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ABSTRACT

A CROSS AND FOUR STRIPES

THE REVIVAL OF NATIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY SCOTLAND AND CATALONIA

The thesis aims to demonstrate that the contemporary nationalist movements in advanced capitalist countries are not an accidental occurrence or a coincidence. It looks for ways to explain this nationalist revival by identifying common causal processes, and concentrates on the cases of Scottish and Catalan nationalism. However, it is not possible to identify a single theory which could explain the recent growth of sub-state nationalism in all advanced industrial countries. Therefore, a framework of analysis is suggested which aims to replace the classical Marxist model of base - superstructure relations with a triangular model of civil society, state and economy, which does not assume deterministic relationships between the three constructs. Rather than seeing political action as determined by economic structures, the framework concentrates on the changing relationships between state, civil society and economy, and examines political action in the light of these processes.

Within this framework, the revival of Scottish and Catalan nationalism is analysed in a historical perspective. It is argued that in each case, the constellation of relationships and processes which characterise advanced capitalist society lead to a politicisation of national identity. How the people become politicised, and what the result of nationalist mobilisation is, depends on specific historical circumstances.

A CROSS AND FOUR STRIPES


**The Revival of Nationalism
in
Contemporary Scotland and Catalonia**

Susanne Barbara Maria Schech

**Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy**

**Department of Geography
University of Durham
1990**

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"The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting".


Milan Kundera: *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*.

"How can anyone hope that the proletariat of all lands, who differ so greatly in temperament, in culture, in economic development, would shoulder the yoke of a uniform political program? Only the demented could imagine such a possibility".

Michael Bakunin: *The International and Karl Marx*.

"Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionising themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from their names, battle cries, and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language."

Karl Marx: *The Eighteenth Brumaire*.



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Thanks to a studentship by the Generalitat de Catalunya, I was able to return to Barcelona for three months in 1988. During that time, Josep Massot i Muntaner from the Institut d'Estudis Catalans was my supervisor, and I appreciate his assistance.

While working on nationalism, I received a lot of support and encouragement from international quarters. I want to thank my postgraduate comrade N.L.A. Karunaratne, who has shared an office and many ideas with me. Suso Ruiz taught me Catalan and introduced me to life in Barcelona. Iain MacLaren, Steve Hurring, Andy Cumbers and Bianca Ebeling read some of my chapters and made helpful comments. I remember the hospitality of Peter Rush and Billy Wolfe in Edinburgh, and the friendliness of the members of the Geography Department at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Above all, I am indebted to those people who have taken their time to be interviewed, and who thus made this study possible.

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To Suso Ruiz i Veintemilla

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PREFACE

1. Nationalism today in Scotland and Catalonia

On November 11, 1988, the Scottish National Party candidate Jim Sillars ran away with a sensational victory in the Glasgow Govan by-election, overturning a 19,500 Labour majority. After more than a decade of stagnation in Scottish nationalism, the Scottish Nationalist Party was once again on the upsurge, breaking into the Labour vote of urban-industrial Scotland. Govan, the home of the Glasgow Rangers football club and a working class seat thought to be safe Labour, had experienced a similar political upheaval in 1973, when Margo MacDonald's by-election victory¹ sent shivers down Labour's spine. In 1988, the nightmare came true again for Labour activists. "Govan result spins Labour into turmoil", declared the front page headline of the Glasgow Herald on the following day. And sure enough, in the aftermath of the by-election, the political atmosphere was charged in Scotland, as Labour's internal and external conflicts over the Scottish situation generated intense debate, and politics became more exciting than even in the 1970's.

The most recent rise of political nationalism in Scotland does not come as a surprise. Ever since the Tory Party came into power in 1979, the party's support in Scotland, waning since the 1950's, has been sinking rapidly². 1987 saw the third consecutive election in which the Tories were returned to Whitehall, with a huge majority in the House of Commons, despite being thrashed in Scotland by Labour. So small is the group of Scottish Tory MPs that the Scottish Affairs Select Committee (which scrutinises the activities of the Scottish Office)

¹Ms. MacDonald received 41.9 per cent of the vote, overturning an eleven thousand Labour majority.

²The first post-war Tory victory in the General Election of 1951 gave the Conservatives 48.6 per cent of the Scottish vote. By 1970, support for the Tories in Scotland was reduced to 38.0 per cent, and when Ms. Thatcher came into office in 1979, it was only 31.4 per cent. In eight years of Tory government, the share of the vote shrank even further to 24.0 per cent, only half the vote of 1951.

had to be abolished because the government party could not find enough members in its ranks. The Scottish opposition MPs staged a walkout in protest, and Labour MP Denis Canavan made the sarcastic proposal that the job could be done by "the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee because the Government was treating Scotland as if it were a colony" (Scotsman, 21.12.1988, 4).

But symbolic walkouts were no longer considered sufficient by many opposition MPs and party activists. Withdrawal from the House of Commons and setting up an extra-parliamentary Scottish Assembly is a strategy seriously considered in some political quarters, and not only that of the SNP. Even before the last general election, the popular political magazine, Radical Scotland, painted a "doomsday scenario" of a numerically powerful, but otherwise helpless Labour Party which had massive support in Scotland with their anti-Tory, pro devolution platform, but was kept in permanent opposition by the English voters. How long were the Scots supposed to vote for Labour and wait for their promises to come true? The Govan by-election result showed that voters were prepared to look for another party: the SNP, which has brought movement into Scottish politics before, and which since 1979 has been undergoing changes which made it more acceptable to Labour supporters. The Glasgow Herald summed it up by calling it the "newly constituted left-led SNP" (Glasgow Herald, 12.11.1988, 1), of which former Labour Party activist Jim Sillars has become a symbol.

Meanwhile, in Catalonia, elections for the autonomous Catalan parliament were held for the third time on May 29, 1988. With 45.7 % of the vote, the centre-right Catalan nationalist party **Convergència i Unió** was again returned with an absolute majority of the parliamentary seats. In an analysis of the election result, the Spanish daily El País suggested in a headline that "The new victory of CiU reinforces the identification between the Generalitat and the government party". It explained that the renewed majority

"is an event of considerable political importance in the present situation in Catalonia (...). In a period of forming and initiating institutional and administrative mechanisms, it gives [the party] a free hand in organising, placing personnel and allocating resources. The limited control of the parliament facilitates this dynamic. Modelling the public apparatus thus

reproduces the conditions which reinforce its political presence (...)."

(El País, 5.6.1988, 23)

Autonomy was shown to be firmly established in Catalonia since the exciting years of the late 1970's. Seemingly irremovable in the centre of Catalan politics is **Convergència** and its small alliance partner **Unió**, which have managed almost to monopolise nationalism ever since its surprising victory over the hitherto hegemonic socialists and communists in 1980. The dominant brand of nationalism, "pujolisme", is named after the charismatic president, Jordi Pujol, who is the unrivalled leader of Catalan politics, even though only 27% of the electorate voted for him in 1988.

So firmly established is **Convergència i Unió** that more than 40% of the electorate did not bother voting, a fact president Jordi Pujol explained with reference to the "great sensation of tranquillity, security, stability" his citizens were experiencing in the late 1980's. Others however deplore the political apathy and complacency reigning over Catalonia, where only money making and sport watching seem to create excitement.

Indeed, the F.C. Barcelona, a symbol of Catalanism under the dictatorship when other symbols and politics were strictly forbidden, is still "more than a club"³. On May 10, 1989, **Barça** won the European Cup in Berne, and 15,000 fans celebrated the victory on the Rambles⁴.

"A few minutes before the end of the match in Berne, the silence which had reigned over the streets in the city centre was broken by an avalanche of fans heading for the **Canaletas** [Rambles]."

(El Periódico, sports supplement, 31.5.1988, 16)

³"Més qu'un club", or "more than a club", was the slogan of **Barça** in the 1970's, when the stadium became regularly transformed into a sea of Catalan flags, and when beating the arch rival **Real Madrid** was like hitting the unloved Franco on his head.

⁴A rambla is a dry river bed which in many towns and cities has been transformed into an avenue. In Barcelona, the Rambles are a stretch of promenades in the heart of the city, leading down to the harbour. Always full of people during the day, its lower part is a traditional place of gathering for celebrating great triumphs or holding demonstrations or street battles (Vázquez Montalbán, 1986, 63).

On the promenade, only team colours and Catalan flags were allowed while a European and a Spanish flag were burned by the fans. The newspapers dedicated special supplements and front pages to the event, and generally, enthusiasm was markedly greater than at the Catalan elections a year before.

Nationalism has an undeniable strength in Catalonia; it underlies the political system and appears in all spheres of Catalan life. Since the Catalan government and the political institutions were established in 1980, diverging opinions about the most appropriate nationalist ideology and action have deepened. Some would like to replace the "suffocating, narrow-minded and folklorist" nationalism of the ruling party with a more "universalist, open, enlightened" type which seemed to dominate Catalan politics under the Franco regime (Diari de Barcelona, 28.4.1987, 2). In the post-Franco generations, support has been growing for radical Catalan cultural and independentist groups, some of which support the use of weapons to achieve "liberation". There is no doubt that since the 1950's, Catalan nationalism has grown steadily despite attempts of successive authoritarian and democratic Spanish governments to repress and control the political movement, and it now dominates Catalan politics.

The nationalist successes in Scotland, and the successive nationalist governments in Catalonia, raise again old questions which have never been satisfactorily analysed and solved since the European nationalist revival began in the 1960's. Despite ups and downs, sub-state nationalism has not disappeared from Western European politics. The rise of the Scottish National Party was widely regarded as an anti government protest vote in the 1960's, with little chance of making a lasting impact in Scottish politics, and the United Kingdom in general. In the 1970's, observers related the nationalist boom to the North Sea oil discoveries which promised to convert Scotland into a Northern version of Kuwait (e.g. Young and Sarsanedas, 1976, 19-23). The persistence of Scottish support for self-government or independence in the 1980's is often ascribed to the nation's disapproval of the Thatcher governments.

The activities of the Catalans against the Francoist dictatorship were so closely connected to their nationalist aspirations, that it is
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difficult to separate the two aspects of the struggle. For many politically aware Catalans, the fight for democracy and for autonomy were two sides of the same coin. But in retrospect - and from the viewpoint of a conservative Catalanist government -, the cultural forces have been elevated to the main motor of the nationalist revival (Benet, interview, 17.4.1988). Either this means that Catalan nationalism involves both political and cultural forces, or that the driving forces within the nationalist movement have changed since the demise of Francoism. Whatever the answer, nationalism has outlasted internal and external changes in both countries.

2. The themes of this thesis

These recent events show that nationalism and nationalist movements in advanced capitalist countries are far from dead. They have been on the upsurge since the 1960's, and despite many attempts to ignore them or deny their political and social importance, they have not disappeared. This thesis looks into the causal relationships and other social processes which help to explain this revival of sub-state nationalism in "nation-states", which not long ago were believed to be unchallengeable monoliths.

Given the great problems nationalism has given to scores of researchers, it would be unrealistic to expect a single coherent theory to explain once and for all the emergence of nationalist movements. The aims of this thesis are far more modest. It departs from a set of relations which have been identified as central to nationalist movements, even if their respective importance may vary considerably in concrete cases. These include the economic and class relations, those between the central state and the national society, and the cultural and territorial relations, in the order of their treatment in the chapters of this thesis. A preceding historical chapter sets these relations into perspective, because it is not possible to make sense of contemporary nationalist movements without knowing where they came from. After all, the aim is not to analyse and dissect nationalism per se, and therefore, the historical background is needed to tie the recent revival into reality. This also enables

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the other chapters to refer back into history whenever appropriate, because although the 1960's mark the beginning of nationalist revival in the chosen case studies, there are underlying processes which were operating in previous decades too.

Given the absence of a coherent theory which could guide the analysis of the case studies, this thesis uses a basic framework which centres on the concepts of state, civil society and economic sphere (see section 3 of the first chapter). Nationalist movements are operating within the sphere of civil society, and they are mainly in conflict with the central state. The economic relations shape to a considerable degree the fundamental structures of capitalist societies, and are therefore also an important factor, although they constitute neither the only nor the most important determinant of political nationalism. As this framework assumes that relationships between the (national) civil society, its economic structure, and the (central) state are dynamic, complex and non-hierarchical, it is useful for an analysis of nationalism which concentrates on processes rather than structures. It helps to assess to what extent contemporary nationalist movements were affected by recent changes in the relationship between these basic constructs of capitalist societies, and leaves sufficient room for contingent processes which vary from case to case.

In order for this rather loose framework of analysis to be more than just a poorly defined backdrop of an empirical study, it has to be used - and tightened up - in dialogue with the material provided by the case studies. As each chapter explores another aspect of the nationalist revival and its political manifestation, it also tries to throw light on the relationships between state, civil society and economic sphere. By linking the case studies closely with the framework of analysis in the structure of this thesis, theory and empirical evidence become more intertwined. The relationship between the perspective of this study and its methodology is discussed in the first appendix.


Finally, a short explanation is required for the choice of Catalonia and Scotland (Fig. 1) as the two case studies used here. They were the stage of two of the strongest nationalist movements in the 1960's and 1970's, and their respective histories reveal some parallels. On the

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other hand, the Catalan and the Scottish nationalist movements seemed sufficiently different to avoid the pitfalls of generalisations drawn from single or very similar cases. Further reasons for adopting a comparative approach and for choosing Catalonia and Scotland are given in section 1.3 of the first chapter and in Appendix 1.

The next chapter introduces Catalan and Scottish nationalism by looking at the differences in the ideologies and definitions their advocates use. It discusses the comparative approach and then goes on to examine the existing literature on old and new nationalisms. In the final section, the framework of analysis which holds the remaining chapters together is presented in more detail.

FIG.1 : CATALONIA AND SCOTLAND IN WESTERN EUROPE



Chapter one:

INTRODUCTION AND LITERARY REVIEW

This chapter introduces nationalism as a political movement which has not only an ideological content, but also a material base. It is suggested in the first section of the chapter that national structures (such as cultural institutions, customs, relations of production, etc.) and nationalism itself are continually reconstructed and changed through social interaction. This accounts for contrasts both between different nationalisms, and between different phases of the same nationalist movement. In part two of the first section, the differences between Catalan and Scottish nationalism are illustrated with reference to the way in which nationalist ideologues and intellectuals defined and described the nationalism, and the tasks of the nationalist movement, of their own country. The section concludes with a brief methodological comment which introduces, and argues for, the comparative approach to nationalist movements adopted in this thesis. Although the Catalan and the Scottish nationalist movements differ in many respects, this should not impede the uncovering of processes which have influenced their re-emergence.

Section two discusses the main currents of recent writing on nationalism, without however pretending to give more than just a selective account of it. In geography, sub-state nationalism has been discovered as a subject matter only in the last few years, and therefore, the existing literature is rather limited. The situation is different in the political and social sciences, where a vast number of studies coexists unhappily with the reiterated complaint that nationalism has so far slipped through all the grids and models of explanation which researchers have tried to force upon it. The most useful analyses of nationalism are informed in one way or another by theories of modernisation and capitalist development. The second part of the section is therefore dedicated to modernisation theories of nationalism, and the third discusses marxist approaches to the issue. One of the main drawbacks of both perspectives is their emphasis on structures, and their neglect of processes and of relationships between structures. Critics have argued that there is a need to re-evaluate the role of agency in political movements in

the light of fundamental changes in advanced capitalist society. Part four thus looks at attempts to define contemporary nationalist movements as "new social movements". In the final part, the focus of the literature research turns on the case studies, as a few comparative studies of Catalan and Scottish nationalism are briefly reviewed.

Based on the insight that there is at present no theoretical model which accounts for the recent nationalist revival in Western European states, section three of this chapter presents a conceptual framework within which the nationalist movements of Catalonia and Scotland can be analysed. It suggests that history and human agency are vital to the understanding of nationalism. Secondly, it adopts the Gramscian distinction between several superstructural levels, and in particular between civil society and state, and conceptualises nationalist movements as political struggles for hegemony and political control over a specific territory. Thirdly, it maintains that since the societies of Catalonia and Scotland are structured by capitalist relations of production, the answers to why, when, how, and by whom the nationalist movements were revived have to take into account the economic sphere and the class structure of these societies.

1. NEO-NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS: WHAT'S NEW?

1.1 Defining nationalism

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a discussion of nationalism per se. Many authors have contributed to the vast literature on nationalism, and the attempts of writers such as Breuilly, Gellner, Hayes, Kedourie and Seton-Watson to come to terms with an elusive concept are well-known (Breuilly, 1982, 18-42; Gellner, 1981; Hayes, 1960, 1-10; Kedourie, 1966, 14-16; Seton-Watson, 1977, 1-13). However, since the terms "nation" and "nationalism" need to be situated in the context of this thesis, some comments about their meaning are appropriate here.

The first point is that nationalism is universal. In the modern world, everyone has, or should have, a nationality. Every citizen with a nationality is a member of a nation, and forms part - in Benedict Anderson's words - of an "imagined political community". They have a sense of belonging to this nation, and feel solidarity with their fellow nationals, although they do not know them personally. Rather than regarding nationalism as an ideology like liberalism, socialism or fascism, it is more fitting to compare it with a religion, or kinship.

The nation is a **political** community because it claims sovereignty over a defined territory. The claim to sovereignty is rooted in the historical origins of the modern nation, "because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm" (B. Anderson, 1983, 15-16). Nationalism is therefore a political movement which asserts its claim to self-government and sovereignty over the national territory.

The second point must now differentiate between different kinds of nationalisms. Raymond Williams pointed out that superficial distinctions are made between **national** feeling and **nationalist** feeling, and also by juxtaposing the national interest with nationalism (R. Williams, 1976, 178-180). The Catalan case shows that a movement in favour of self-government can be generally described as a "national" movement, while in Scotland, the "nationalists" and their supporters are separated off from the rest of the Scots as a minority movement. But more important is the distinction between sub-state and other nationalist movements. Catalonia and Scotland are nations without a state because they form part of one or more established states. Their nationalist movements demand a degree of sovereignty from the state. This demand brings them into conflict with the central states involved, which themselves derive their legitimation from the nation whom they claim to represent. To return to Williams' argument, from the point of view of the British government, the demands of the Scottish nationalists are not in the national interest. For Blaut, the confrontation between sub-state nationalism and central state

involves two nationalisms which are opposed to each other, because the state is fighting to keep both its territory "unified" and its privilege of continuing national oppression (Blaut, 1987, 15).

So far only the national feeling, the sense of solidarity among members of the same nation has been mentioned as a basis for nationalism. This neglects the fact that nations have peculiar features which are historically constituted. They usually are distinguished by language and popular culture, territory and geography, economic structure, civil society, and psychological features¹. These features are not permanent. Whether they fade away or consolidate, and how they are articulated, depends on the vicissitudes of a political struggle which is centred around a specific state model. For example, the Catalan language is central to the consolidation of a Catalan national identity and to the political struggle for autonomy². In the early stages, the linguistic concerns aimed at reconstructing a Catalan high culture were prominent in Catalan nationalism. In Scotland, the specifically Scottish languages are almost forgotten and do not play a major role in the nationalist movement (see Chapter six, section 3.1). Over the centuries, the Scots found it more beneficial to teach their children English, and the literary nationalists of the 1920's had no Scottish popular language to which they could refer.

Because national communities are identified by certain features which set them apart from surrounding territories and peoples,

¹Nationalists point out the distinctive character of their nation. For example, Prat de la Riba (the leader and ideologist of the first Catalanist party, *Lliga Regionalista*) wrote in 1906:

"... we saw that Catalonia had a language, a law, an art of its own; that it had a national spirit, a national character, a national thought: Catalonia was, therefore, a nation."
(Prat de la Riba, 1934, 42)

²Although the Catalan language is the main symbol of Catalan nationalist vindication, it causes complications when used to define the Catalan nation. For it is not only in present-day Catalonia that Catalan is widely spoken and a powerful motor of the nationalist parties, but also in Valencia province, the Balearic Islands, and Catalunya Nord in France, none of which is likely to support a single Catalan state.

Catalans have often referred to the fet nacional, the national reality, rather than the "national question" which appears in so many publications. It is widely considered a fact that Catalonia is a nation, as much as it is a fact that the majority of the people speak Catalan. The same is true for Scotland, because the existence of the Scottish nation has never been questioned.

Although it is true that no single feature is necessary for a sub-state nation to maintain its distinctiveness and to nourish a political movement, there is something such nations have in common, namely the sense of a distinct history which usually involved independence or self-government (C. H. Williams, 1988, 204). In so far as a people is held together by a common past, nationalist movements put much emphasis on historiography. The independent past is projected into the future, which holds a common destiny. After the incorporation into a larger state, national communities are subjected to state legislation and policies and socio-economic and political processes which often reduce the sub-state differences. However, this should not be interpreted as an inevitable process of homogenisation and assimilation. Sub-state nations can also keep their distinctive features, and state policy can contribute to increase the gap between its constituent national communities. For example, one important condition for the formation of a Catalan bourgeoisie in the 18th and 19th century which became the leading force in the first period of nationalism was the access of Catalonia to the colonial markets and the control of the Spanish market. Later on, the efforts of the Franco regime to eradicate national particularity once and for all, and to radically persecute nationalisms which undermined Spanish nationalism, achieved only an even stronger Catalan nationalism.

The presence of a nationalist movement influences the development of those particular structures which characterise the nation. The contemporary manifestations of political nationalism in Catalonia and Scotland show that it is not simply an ideology, but rather that the people - and key actors such as intellectuals in particular - are actively recreating and changing the structure of their nation. The following section demonstrates that national feelings manifest

themselves in different ways in the two case studies, which in turn has a bearing on the type of approach the nationalist movement has been taking.

1.2 Nationalist ideology and national feeling: contrasts between Catalonia and Scotland

Differences between Catalan and Scottish nationalism can be illustrated by looking at the way in which the state of the nation and the task of nationalism are formulated. Throughout the history of Catalan nationalism, the concepts of construcció and nacionalització have occupied a central place in the discourses of the ideologists and politicians. They run through the speeches and writings of nationalists across the whole political spectrum³.

Prat de la Riba, the father of Catalan nationalist thinking, believed in the regeneration of the country - and also of the stagnating Spanish state - with a dynamic, modernising Catalan industrial bourgeoisie (Solé Tura, 1970, 153). The liberal Rovira i Virgili complained about the "national impoverishment" of Catalonia and called for a big popular effort in raising national consciousness (nacionalització). He delivered a prime example of the construction metaphor:

"We realised that the edifice of the Catalan nationality is in ruins like an old, abandoned monument. Since the "renaixença" of last century, some walls have been rebuilt, some arches restored. But everything considered, if we do not press on with this task, it will soon start crumbling again."

³The conservative Torres i Bages, for example, said in the late 19th century that "only the reconstruction of the region can make this most inconvenient domination [of the centralist parliamentary oligarchy] disappear which has existed now for so many years" (Solé Tura, 1970, 88). In a very different context of the immediate post-Franco period, the communist politician Ribó used the term when he claimed that "since that very year 1939, the reconstruction of Catalonia, of Catalan society, was beginning from the base - the workers' movement and the popular movements" (Ribó, 1977a, 28).

In the mid 1960's, Josep Benet observed that Catalan culture was in a phase of transition between survival and recuperation; in the absence of an infrastructure of Catalan culture, destroyed during the first years of the dictatorship of Franco, the Catalan people had to collaborate to create alternative institutions to make the revival possible (Benet, 1980, 155). Elsewhere, Benet stressed that the "construction of autonomy must be the task of all the citizens of this country, without exclusion" and asked for creativity, enthusiasm and self-sacrifice (Benet, 1980, 290).

The discourse of construction is well-established in the party, and the political writings, of the present leader of the Catalan government, Pujol, who coined the phrase "fer país" ("make country") in the 1960's. Pujol stated in 1958 that his generation - i.e. the post-war generation - found itself belonging to a people which was spiritually broken and materially - i.e. socially and economically - exhausted. Though the destruction of the Catalan national spirit was mainly the result of the defeat in 1939, it had already begun in the Second Republic:

"There were individuals and generations in Catalonia which wanted to construct this people, this Catalan community. Valenti Almirall, Prat de la Riba, the bishop Torras, Aguiló, Guimerà⁵, and, in a different context, Salvador Seguí and Campalans⁵, were all men who were involved in the

⁴This article was written in 1916.

⁵The first five are names from the conservative Catalanist scene of the turn of the century. Almirall and Prat are ideologists, the latter became leader of the Lliga Regionalista. Torres i Bages represent the small-town Catalanism, the Catalonia of the comarques; he was also a prominent Catalanist writer and bishop of Vic, the town with the greatest density of clerics in the whole of Spain (Cahner, interview, 11.2.1988). Guimerà is a playwright and Aguiló a poet of the 19th century renaixença, and both are symbols of the national revival. Seguí, on the other hand, was a leading figure on the moderate wing of the anarchist union CNT (Conferación Nacional de Trabajadores), who was assassinated in 1923, at a time when he was negotiating with left wing Catalanist groups. Campalans belongs to the small social-democratic, republican tendency of the early 20th century. He was an ideologue of

(Footnote Continued)

reconstruction of the Catalan people from the roots: the sentiment, the will and the institutions. (...) [But] there came a moment when this line was interrupted. The leaders stopped "making Catalonia" and began to play with the material which were destined to complete [the construction of] the temple."

(Pujol, 1980, 38-39)

Pujol saw the task of the new generation of Catalans⁶ in recovering "some basic virtues" and "creating and living a collective mystic" which is accessible to the whole community. At the same time, the necessary economic and social structures had to be established (Pujol, 1980, 47).

While the terms construcció and nacionalització take different meanings depending on who is addressed as the supposedly most dynamic force in this process - who constructs what and who nationalises whom -, they are undoubtedly important in the national, if not nationalist, discourse of Catalan politics. This is surely a reflection of the efforts of the central state in the 20th century to actively destroy and subsequently inhibit attempts to recreate a

(Footnote Continued)

the USC (**Unió Socialista de Catalunya**) in the 1920's. This homage is equally interesting for the names it does not include, in particular of the period of the Second Republic. These were the leaders which, according to Pujol, caused damage to the Catalan nation because "they played with politics".

⁶With "new generation" are meant those who have not experienced the civil war and the immediate postwar depression. They are those Catalans who leave school or university in the late 1950's and the 1960's, at a time of development and social change, and become involved, in a more or less direct way, in the anti-Francoist struggle. Josep Benet distinguished two basic periods under the Franco regime. The first is a period of repression, during which the Catalan culture and identity was kept alive mostly through small scale initiatives and in the private sphere or in clandestinity. From the 1960's onwards, new generations become the main actors in the cultural and political opposition. Although these had been formed within the Francoist society, they did not abandon Catalan language and culture, but began to recover it.

"in the 1960's, the youth began to rediscover a history, a language; new people emerged, and the young people who were brought up to write in Castilian now began to write in Catalan."

(Benet, interview, 17.4.1988)

The new Catalan publishing houses were a signal of the changes in the cultural-political climate.

national community with infrastructure and representative institutions. However, the fact, that even before the dictatorship periods Prat de la Riba and Virgili spoke of construction, indicates that in the nationalist movement, the active participation of patriots in the achievement of national autonomy was always recognised as important. Not surprisingly, it has been suggested that the greatest resources of Catalan nationalism lie in the institutions of civil society.

"People of such small 'advanced' stateless nations (...) must find their collective identity by falling back on the institutions of their own civil societies, as public and state institutions are alien and often hostile to them."

(Giner, 1980, 10)

In Scotland, no such conception exists. A lack of indigenous cultural activity is recognised, but the remedy is not sought in popular creativity, but rather in an independent state which would support the ailing patient (Maxwell, interview, 9.2.1987). Similarly, confidence in the Scottish bourgeoisie is not great as far as the construction of the country's economy is concerned. The patriotic CV of the ruling class in Scotland is not impressive, if one considers the orchestrated rundown of the Scottish heavy industry and the close connections between the Scottish bourgeoisie and the London governments. But more importantly, this rundown, the plant closures and takeovers have diminished the indigenous industrial employers, and the Scottish economy has become more and more dependent on public investment. Again, it is a Scottish state, or for devolutionists, a Scottish parliament and administration which is expected to take on the main task in the construction of a more developed, more equitable and richer Scottish society.

But Scottish nationalism (as expressed by the Scottish National Party) has never commanded the support of the majority of the Scots. Tom Nairn, one of Scotland's most articulate nationalist marxists, described it as "a strange, narrow, sectarian belief, which has adorned itself with some positive, progressive social-democratic ideas as time went by, but which as a movement and social organisation is still rooted in its origins" (Tageszeitung, 20.4.1989, 11). Neal Ascherson claimed that the fundamental dilemma

in Scottish society was of a psychological nature, the contradiction between self-assertion and self-distrust. National self-distrust, the doubt about the nation's entitlement and capacity to realise its potential through social action, is contrasted with the glorification of historic Scottish rebels and uprisings as moments of euphoric self-assertion. In the 1970's devolution debate, self-distrust scored a victory. According to Ascherson, the debate

"focused on the possibility of self-government, as if national feeling and pride were - in a contradictory manner - private emotions which had no place in the public domain."
(Ascherson, 1988, 86)

Thus, while a private feeling of Scottish identity exists on one level, political nationalism exists on a different level and has been unable to create an ideology which is able to capture the Scottish imagination in the long term. The high tide of Scottish nationalism in the mid-1970's was a moment of self-assertion which did not last. Whether the new tide of 1988/1989 will be seen in a different light, is too early to say.

The Catalan metaphor of the national edifice must be twisted considerably if it is to fit the Scottish case. The Scottish nation exists, and its existence has never been denied or threatened by the Scots or anyone else. Even if a certain lack of Scottish self-confidence is often deplored⁷, Scottish national conscience is usually assumed to be well developed and in no need of particular consciousness raising efforts. In the 1970's, a widely heard pro-devolutionist argument was that Scotland in fact already had all

⁷One example for the delicate nature of the collective Scottish consciousness is the degree to which it is affected by the fortunes of the Scottish international football team, which has often served to represent Scottish identity. In the context of the crucial years of 1978 and 1979, Stephen Maxwell remembered an English journalist saying that "the only time the Scots are happy is in between qualifying for the world cup and crashing out of the world cup in humiliating circumstances" (Maxwell, interview, 9.2.1987). The World Cup of 1978, in which Scotland was the only team from the British Isles, brought a time of euphoria to an end. Scottish newspapers carried letters arguing that the failure of the Scots to manage a football team suggested that they would be even less able to manage Scotland.

the necessary institutions and infrastructure for self-government and only lacked a parliament to be complete. In contrast to Catalonia, the Scottish nation could therefore be imagined as a complete house - with the principal columns representing the Scottish institutions -, functioning and in reasonable working order, but owned by the wrong landlord: the London government.

The ideologies of nationalism are also rather different in the two cases. Catalan nationalism has a markedly essentialist discourse, which was developed by the father of Catalan nationalism, Prat de la Riba, and became hegemonic in the early 20th century⁸. In the second half of the 20th century, historical perspectives modified the essentialist ideology, but no fundamental redefinition of Catalan nationalism took place (Bilbeny, 1988, 217-222).

Whereas in Scottish nationalism, this essentialist aspect is played down. Scottish identity is described as an emotional identity, not dependent on particular institutions, characteristics, etc..

"Scottish nationalism is more an instrumental nationalism rather than an expressive nationalism. People might start off from exactly the same premise and the same socio-political values as their neighbour, and say to themselves, "right, what sort of society ought we to live in". [They] could then go on quite rationally to say, "well, the only way we get that sort of society in Scotland is through the SNP", and would not necessarily express **anything** other than their political and social values in supporting the SNP. They would not be expressing a sense of Scottish identity, or anything else."

(Maxwell, interview, 9.2.1987)

⁸Llobera argued that Catalan nationalism is characterised by the idea of Volksgeist since the beginning of the century and cannot be reduced to empirical manifestations such as language, art, law, etc..

"The work of Prat de la Riba [particularly "La nacionalitat Catalana"] signified not only that the idea of a Catalan nation as a spiritual principle had been intellectually established, but, more importantly, that this idea had become, if one is allowed to paraphrase the Young Marx, a material force which had a grip on the masses."

(Llobera, 1983, 332)

Nationalism is thus seen even from within the nationalist party as a political position which reflects a pragmatic approach, rather than a deep-seated identity fed by a mystical force. One important reason for sympathising with nationalism is the dissatisfaction with the status quo, the feeling that "things are not right"⁹.

Despite such differences in nationalist self-definition and discourse, which to some extent reflect variations in the structure and the political self-confidence of civil society, a comparison of the two cases is possible. Although specific manifestations of nationalist movements must be considered, they do not necessarily impede research approaches which aim to investigate where the line has to be drawn between general processes and specific features, or between necessary and contingent relations.

1.3 Methodological comments: Comparison and generalisation

1.3.i The comparative approach

It was not only in Scotland and Catalonia that nationalism recently came back on the political agenda, but also in several other countries. In developing countries, examples include the Palestinian nationalist movement, the upsurge of nationalism in the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka¹⁰, and - in a rather different context - in the Fijis¹¹

⁹As a point on the side, it appears that for several of the nationalists interviewed here, an important moment in the politicisation of their national identity came when they were living outside the UK. This confronted them with the image of the United Kingdom abroad, which is dominated by England.

¹⁰The Tamil movement for self-government in Sri Lanka is spearheaded by a guerrilla group called the "Tamil Tigers". According to the Guardian, "[t]he Tigers have been, for the past four years, among the most deadly and successful of nationalist guerrilla movements" (Guardian, 19.10.1987, 13).

¹¹The Guardian spoke of a "tidal wave of nationalism in the Fijis" (Guardian, 19.3.1989, 23).

and the Philippines¹². In the "second world", nationalist movements have also become manifest. On the Balkan peninsula, Yugoslavia has experienced an outbreak of latent nationalist conflicts between Serbs and Albanians (Guardian, 27.6.1986), while the new era of glasnost and political reform in the Soviet Union has seen an upsurge of nationalist movements in Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Armenia and other parts of the state (Economist, 2.7.1988, 41). While these examples show that nationalist movements are topical and important in all types of political and economic systems, the rise of sub-state nationalism in advanced capitalist countries is most pertinent in the context of this thesis. There is hardly any European country which is not affected, but the re-emergence of the nationalist challenge has been most surprising to the oldest "nation-states", France, Spain and Britain.

The majority of empirical analyses of nationalist movements consist of single case studies, in monographs as well as edited collections. Hernández and Mercadé, who proposed a model for the investigation of the different nationalist movements in Spain, concluded that, though one set of questions can be used for all, each of them required a specific, exclusive and profound analysis. The view that one's own nation is a unique case which bears little relation to others was often mentioned in interviews and conversations conducted for the purpose of this thesis. The Catalans in particular appeared to consider their nationalism a unique case because the linguistic factor is so strong (Sellarès, interview, 14.4.1988). Looking for differences rather than common traits is a fundamental part of nationalist ideology, and the historicist perspective of many nationalist movements underlines the distinctiveness in the nation's history.

¹²The Philippine movement for democracy which succeeded in removing right-wing dictator Marcos was fuelled by a "growing spirit of nationalism" (Guardian, 29.1.1986, 9).

However, the present wave of nationalism has also sparked off comparative studies in different disciplines¹³. It is recognised that something can be gained by adopting a perspective which does not restrict itself to the specific, but also looks at wider influences and general trends. Hroch's study of nationalist movements in central and eastern Europe (translated from German in 1986) can be regarded as a pioneering investigation, which is relevant although it deals with a different epoch. Hroch pointed out that unique and characteristic features of a nationalist movement can only be conceptualised by comparing it with others. In the context of the Catalan and Scottish cases, it emerges that what fuelled Catalan political nationalism - e.g. the language issue and the territorial organisation - are marginal concerns to nationalists in Scotland. There is no single factor, or combination of factors, which make nationalist revival inevitable. But more importantly, the comparison permits one to identify common causes and influences which helped to trigger off nationalist movements in a variety of states (Hroch, 1968, 26). James Anderson pointed out that nationalisms "are constituted by more than their particular space-time locations and are not reducible to their immediate context". Historically, nationalism has to be set in the context of the rise and development of capitalism and "an integrated world system". Therefore, particular nationalisms share certain features and problems which justify comparisons and generalisations over space and time (J. Anderson, 1988, 19).

1.3.ii Catalonia and Scotland

In the chosen case studies, there are plenty of similarities and differences, as well as temporal incongruities. On the surface, there seem to be some basic common traits, such as the population size, the loss of independence (1707 and 1714 for Scotland and

¹³For examples, see Petrella, 1980, 1-28; Anderson, J, 1985; Rokkan, S. and Urwin, D.W., 1982; Mény, Y, 1986, and Moreno Fernandez, 1986.

Catalonia respectively), the emergence of a self-government movement in the late 19th century and the experience of industrialisation in the 19th century. In both cases, the 1960's was a period of nationalist fermentation, and in the 1970's, the nationalist agitation pressurised the state into action. Unlike the Basque or the Northern Irish Republican nationalism, neither the Catalans nor the Scots regarded the armed struggle as a means of achieving independence.

It must also be noted that neither nationalist movement could be exclusively or primarily associated to any particular social class. The support for self-government came from various sectors of society, and most types of class analyses have not been very successful in explaining why.

However, there are also immediately recognisable differences. Catalanism - whether in the cultural or the political field - has been repressed severely during this century, but the movement seems to have emerged stronger and with more popular support from each phase of repression. One example is the language, which was banned from the public sphere during the Franco regime. In Catalonia, most people speak Catalan, while the official state language is Castilian. The cultural movement, aimed at rehabilitating and "normalising" the indigenous language, was very heterogeneous and enjoyed support among all social classes. Scotland, on the other hand, has not experienced state repression. The language of most Scots is English. Scots, the official language of the Scottish court before the Union of Crowns, has since lost its status as a cultural language, and Gaelic has been receding rapidly and is now spoken by less than 2% of the population. The language issue is of very marginal significance in Scottish nationalism, but at the centre of the Catalanist revival.

Another important difference consists in the rate of success of the nationalist movements in previous phases of revival. In Scotland, nationalism did not enjoy much popular support before the late 1960's, and no tangible concessions have yet been wrought from central government. In Catalonia, however, a measure of

self-administration was conceded in 1914, and in 1933, a parliament and government was granted to the Catalans by the new Republic. This helped to institutionalise political Catalanism and to lend legitimacy to demands for self-government in the 1970's.

The implications of these similarities and differences are noticeable in all the chapters of this thesis. While there are certain developments common to both cases, their impact often depends on specific historical circumstances. Rather than measuring the degree and importance of similarity and difference, this thesis uses them to explore from different perspectives the complicated reasons and mechanisms of nationalist revival.

2. WRITING ABOUT NATIONALISM

2.1 Geography and nationalism: a late beginning

Naturally, the new wave of nationalism has not remained uncommented on by social scientists and political analysts. Writing on nationalism and nationalist movements has always been a daunting subject. Nevertheless, a large body of literature exists, which has accumulated since the last century, and it is not surprising that this preexisting knowledge and thought has influenced the attempts to explain the nationalist movements of the post-war era.

Geography is not very well equipped to deal with territorial disintegration of the European states and political fragmentation along geographical lines which delimit national communities, because the political geographical analysis has been traditionally biased towards the nation-state and supra-state regions or international territorial conflicts (Williams and Kofman, 1989, 7). But since contemporary movements increasingly prefer territorial to primordial definitions of nationalism, and present the central state as the common enemy of all social groups living in the national community (Linz, 1985, 207), more geographers have begun to dedicate their research to the phenomenon in the 1980's.

Two recent edited publications incorporate most of the anglophone geographers who are at present working on nationalism (Johnston *et. al.*, (eds.), 1988; Williams and Kofman (eds.), 1989). Since nationalist movements are distinguished from other social movements by their attachment to a specific territory, it is not surprising that geographers concentrate on the significance of territory for nationalism. James Anderson is a prominent exponent of this emphasis, which he believes to be the "most promising approach to constructing a general theoretical framework" (J. Anderson, 1988, 20). However, the two cases under consideration in this thesis demonstrate that the territorial aspect of nationalism can be more or less important. While in Scotland, the delimitation of the nation follows old-established boundaries, Catalan nationalism includes a growing minority which is in favour of independence for all the Catalan-speaking territories (països catalans). Secondly, ever since its revival in the 1880's, Catalan nationalists and regionalists have displayed a great interest in the geography of the Principat. The identification with a place and the feeling of belonging to a comarca is intimately bound up with Catalan identity.

Some geographers, who criticised approaches which are either cultural or economic determinist, have come up with a socio-spatial thesis in order to explain nationalist and regionalist movements. This enabled Cooke to interpret Welsh regionalism (sic) in terms of territorially specific class relations and the role of ethnicity in restructuring civil society in certain regions and places (Cooke, 1989, 211-218). The influence of new socialist theory is not incidental¹⁴ (Cooke, 1984, 369-374). Harvey pioneered this type of approach, though he was less concerned with regionalism or nationalism than the regional variation of - and the impact of space

¹⁴In an interview with Cooke for Society and Space, Raymond Williams argued that a new theory of socialism must now centrally involve place. Due to the internationalisation of capital, place is probably a stronger bond for the working class than for the capital owning classes. He stressed that apart from class identities, other bonds related to culture and place were also important, and that each becomes stronger when reinforced by others.

and place on - the development of capitalism. With a more fashionable terminology, Soja also analysed the "intercontingent" nature of spatial and social relations, drawing the conclusion that the "inner contradictions of capital are expressed through the restless formation and reformation of geographical landscapes", and that therefore social movements must become consciously spatial movements (Soja, 1985, 177; 182; 188). One example for this would be the Scottish Trades Union Congress claiming to speak for Scotland, and not just for the labour movement in Scotland (Kerevan, 1984, 7). But so far, few attempts have been made to apply these geographically informed approaches of new social theory to nationalist movements.

2.2 Modernisation approaches

In the two cases analysed here - as in most others - nationalism has not appeared "out of the blue"; rather, it grew on several layers of nationalist activity from previous decades. However, in using theories of nationalism which deal with the nationalist movements of the 19th century - when the formation of nations was the political expression of capitalist development - it is assumed that the sub-state nationalist movements of the 1960's and thereafter are operating in similar conditions and following similar aims. MacLaughlin pointed out that in the late 18th and the 19th century, the paradigmatic currents of social philosophy and historiography¹⁵ treated the nation-state as the exclusive alternative to the "idiocy of rural life" and regarded nationalism as natural and primordial. This perspective of nationalism as a necessary stage in history, part of a set of fundamental cultural and economic forces was also shared by Marxism (MacLaughlin, 1987, 1). It still informs autonomist approaches to recent nationalist movements and lives on

¹⁵In the 19th century, this is mainly liberalism. Based on Bertrand Russell, MacLaughlin stated that "the principle that nations, like individuals, had a right to be "free", i.e. not to be ruled by priests, monarchs or foreigners, was, in practice, the most important doctrine of late-nineteenth-century liberalism" (MacLaughlin, 1987, 2-3).

in those which form part of modernisation theory. MacLaughlin suggested that the origin of such widespread "autonomist" theorising lies with Hegel's vision of the state as an "earthly incarnation of Divine Will", and therefore beyond the control of any particular social class (MacLaughlin, 1986a, 309).

The most useful theories of nationalism are informed in one way or other by theories of modernisation and capitalist development. These approaches look at nationalism from outside, as opposed to the inside view of nationalism as a natural, organic "fact". It is claimed that one can understand nationalism only by looking at the material conditions set by "real history", or in other words, through socio-economic analysis (Eley, 1981, 104). This mode of thought includes writers like Hobsbawm (nationalism arose together with the bourgeoisie); Nairn (the real origins of nationalism are located in the machinery of world politics); Lasuén (model of the inverted multi-regional state); Smith (effects of decolonialisation on intellectuals of minority ethnic groups); Gellner (cultural boundaries inhibit social mobility) and Hechter (uneven development reproduces ethnic boundaries). The work of A. D. Smith puts the emphasis on the increase of intellectuals, which is connected with the expansion of bureaucracy and educational institutions (Smith, 1982, 27-29). Deutsch highlights the importance of social communications and the role of the media and other institutions in spreading nationalist ideas (Deutsch, 1966). In a more general framework, Gellner regards nationalism as a consequence of industrialisation processes which on the one hand erode traditional cultures, and on the other hand require the construction of a national culture (Gellner, 1978; 1983). He argued that a shared culture is needed because the social organisation in capitalist states is characterised by high degrees of mobility and division of labour. Due to an objective need for homogeneity, industrial society is therefore necessarily a nationalist society. Where cultural homogeneity is not perfect, conflicts ensue which can be solved either by assimilation or the drawing of new boundaries (Gellner, 1981, 767-769). For the purpose of this study, Gellner's account of nationalism has two main disadvantages. Firstly, as an attempt to explain the emergence of nationalism (in its 19th century guise), it

cannot explain the revival of sub-state nationalism in states with a social organisation which is characteristic for advanced capitalism (high social mobility, pronounced and changing division of labour, strong dominant culture, etc.). This failure results from the fact that it is a structural determinist approach, which leads to the second disadvantage. Everything is seen in terms of the needs of modernisation and industrialisation as if this were a uniform process, with little attention paid to specific historical and spatial settings in which this process takes place, and influences¹ on it by the actions of social groups. This is not surprising, given that Gellner described modern society as a mass of mobile individuals (Gellner, 1981, 757).

Tom Nairn developed Gellner ideas in his own work where he argued that nationalism emerges from territorial conflict which he regarded as an inevitable consequence of uneven capitalist development. This lead him to a determinist conception of the mechanisms behind nationalist politicisation although he intended to avoid it by taking a Gramscian perspective of structural relations in capitalist society. His study of Scottish nationalism presents cultural identity, the UK state, and social and political institutions as constant, static features, and leaves the politicisation of national identity to be explained as a "forced by-product of the grotesquely uneven nature of capitalist development" (Nairn, 1977, 128). Scotland's development in the past 250 years does not permit an easy categorisation into "over-developed" or "under-developed", and Nairn does not take into account the massive decline experienced by the indigenous industry and capitalist class over this century. MacLaughlin is justified in qualifying Nairn's work as "structural determinist", but not in arguing that Nairn did not recognise the hegemonic capacities of the British state¹⁶ (MacLaughlin, 1986b, 315; 317).

¹⁶See the last chapter of the second (1981) edition.

In his support for nationalist movements as a way to break up an archaic state which is standing in the way to socialism, Nairn leans heavily on Lenin's perception of the early 20th century nationalist movements (Nairn, 1977, 86-90). Since much of marxist writing has been influenced by Lenin's and Stalin's polemics on the "national question", the next section is dedicated to a more detailed analysis of the ways in which marxists accounted for the fact that nationalism was often politically more powerful than class struggle.

2.3 Marxist debates on nationalism

Nairn's much quoted statement that "the theory of nationalism represents Marxism's great historical failure" (Nairn, 1977, 329; Gellner, 1978, 103; B. Anderson, 1983, 13; Nimni, 1985, 58) is, in some sense, misleading, as marxists have not really searched for a theoretical understanding of nationalism, or even succeeded in explaining what Marx meant by suggesting that the proletariat of each country must first settle matters with "its own bourgeoisie". Therefore, Anderson argued that "nationalism has proved an uncomfortable anomaly for marxist theory and, precisely for that reason, has been largely eluded, rather than confronted" (B. Anderson, 1983, 13).

At the bottom line of most marxist analyses lies the historical explanation of the creation of nations. This holds that they are formed through the growth of exchange between regions and territories and must be considered bourgeois because it is the merchant capitalists who control this development. Despite other deep seated theoretical and policy related disagreements, Marx, Kautsky, Luxemburg and Lenin all agreed that the nation-state was the state form which best suited the requirements of capitalism. Whether it therefore constituted a step in the historical development which could not be skipped was debated among the leading marxists in the early 20th century.

2.3.i Classical marxist positions

In welding the political form of capitalist relations onto the economic, nationalism became associated with the ideologies of the bourgeoisie. Contrary to the bourgeois ideology of "homogeneous societies" and "eternal, long-standing rights of the people which are above the historic process", most marxists give priority to conflict caused by antagonistic class interests and argue that "democracy" and "civil liberties" are in fact expressions of specific historic conditions and epochs (Hentze, 1975, 106-109). Consequently, nations - a political category which belongs to the epoch of rising capitalism - must eventually depart from the scene with the fall of capitalism, even though in a transition period, socialist nations are likely to emerge from the rubble of the old, bourgeois nations (Stalin, 1954, vol. XI, 353).

Rosa Luxemburg, on the other hand, was a relentless marxist opponent of nationalism¹⁷. She identified the petty bourgeoisie as the principal force in nationalist movements, particularly the intellectuals, who saw their prospects for social mobility blocked by the dominant culture. This judgement led her to campaign against the social democratic participation in the first world war (which constituted a victory of nationalism over internationalism) as well as in her writings on the national question in Poland and other oppressed nations. Luxemburg explained the strong nationalist tendencies among the Polish working class by the intrusion into the proletariat of elements of the petty bourgeoisie, which had a material interest in restoring Polish independence. These groups were prevented by the "russification policy" from occupying desirable posts in administration and public and cultural life, and therefore suffered economic and social decline (Hentze, 1975, 36).

¹⁷Rosa Luxemburg stands out even among her socialist contemporaries in the radical and total manner with which she subordinates the national interest to the class interest" (Hentze, 1975, 117).

Lenin, on the other hand, supported the Social Democrats' position on fundamental democratic rights - such as the right to self-determination - for strategic considerations. According to this, the socialist revolution could just as likely stem from mass mobilisation for self-determination in an oppressed nation as be sparked off by a mass strike. The task of the social democratic parties was to lead the mass movement and to transcend the bounds of bourgeois legality by extending "the struggle for every fundamental democratic demand up to a direct proletarian onslaught on the bourgeoisie" (Lenin, 1964, vol. XXII, 145). The key therefore to Lenin's position is his analysis of the trajectory of revolutionary mass struggles and the central role of class alliances within them. Lenin also warned against isolating the demand for national self-determination as a bourgeois claim, because all democratic demands - not just nationalist claims - could be manipulated by the bourgeoisie (Lenin, 1964, vol. XXII, 153). Democratic demands therefore were not considered by Lenin as inherently bourgeois, whereas other marxists have strictly associated nationalist ideas with the bourgeoisie. He claimed that "the necessity to proclaim and grant liberty to **all** oppressed peoples (i.e., their right to self-determination) will be as urgent in the socialist revolution as it was for the victory of the bourgeois - democratic revolution in, say, Germany in 1848, or Russia in 1905" (Lenin, 1964, vol. XXII, 153). This idea was picked up by Gramsci, for whom a big area of social practices and values existed which did not stem from class allegiance.

However, Lenin's promise to implement full democracy (including the right to self-determination) under socialism is in contrast with his description of the socialist transition period as the dictatorship of the proletariat. Secondly, Lenin stressed that the democratic interests of one country had to be subordinated to the democratic interests of several or all countries, and he left no doubt about the fact that the long term aim of socialism was the removal of national and state boundaries. This could be achieved only by offering the oppressed nations the freedom to secede, while at the same time educating the working classes for international solidarity. These irreconcilable perspectives prompted the

suggestion that Lenin hoped that his strategy of supporting "the slogan of self-determination, rather than acting as a stimulant to nationalism, would prove as an anaesthetic" (Connor, 1985, 34), and provoked Luxemburg to call Lenin's motives for supporting the right to self-determination opportunist (Hentze, 1975, 159). The events after the Russian revolution justified this opinion, and Nairn claimed that what remained of Lenin's dogma on nationalism

"was a double-faced position, the ambiguity of the formulae without their inquiring, restless tension: polemic mumified into priestly chant". (Nairn, 1977, 86)

Lenin's concern for the subject of nationalism was forced upon him through the experience of the division of the Social Democracy in the First World War. Supporting national struggles in certain historic situations was part of his strategy of seeking alliances on the path to socialism, and served therefore a specific function which was always secondary to the main issue of class struggle.

2.3.ii Marxist theory and modern sub-state nationalism

With respect to the recent wave of sub-state nationalisms, the Leninist and the Luxemburg approaches still exert a strong influence on researchers in the marxist tradition. Against idealist and essentialist interpretations, marxists have pointed out that exploitative relationships also exist between dominant and subordinate classes within the sub-state nation which is struggling against a "foreign" state. This contradiction is far more relevant than the shared experiences of history and of exploitation by an external enemy (MacLaughlin, 1986, 317-319). The question is then, in whose interest is the mobilisation of people under a national banner?

The reply of Luxemburg, and many others, was to point to the bourgeoisie, or a sector of it, and to explain how it was using nationalism for its own benefit, while at the same time distracting the workers and peasants from the fundamental struggle. In Catalonia and Scotland of the 1960's, however, the issue is no longer the rise

of the bourgeoisie and its struggle for political control over a particular territory. This was certainly a strong impulse behind the Catalanism of the early decades of the century, and the present domination of Catalan nationalism and politics by the conservative **Convergència i Unió** would support the argument that the bourgeoisie seems to benefit from nationalist movements. Even if they are not the strongest force in the movements themselves, they seem to reap the harvest afterwards. In Scotland, there has never been a sign that the employers were interested in autonomy or independence; rather, much effort and money has been expended in the attempt to stop any change in the present setup (see Chapter four, section 3.3)¹⁸. Calling the nationalists "bourgeois" or "tartan Tories" is more a result of party-political bickering, as opposed to a thorough analysis of the involvement of different social classes in the movement.

There is a danger in confusing the class character of a nationalist movement with the class interests it might end up serving. Many of the present-day sub-state nationalist movements claim to be socialist, or at least social-democratic, and to represent the interests of the workers (whatever the definition of the term). Hedges found that there is a tendency in some movements (in his case, Northern Irish nationalism) to identify with anti-imperialist struggles, which identifies the exploiter with the colonial power (Hedges, 1988, 114-115). This type of marxist interpretation forms the main body of Blaut's writing, who holds that "national struggle is indeed class struggle" (Blaut, 1987, 24). Based on a very selective reading of Marx, Engels and Lenin, the argument goes like this. In class societies, class struggle is the primary source of conflict, and is connected with every other conflict. Class struggle "makes use of all traits and institutions of culture as instruments and arenas of exploitation and resistance", therefore one can

¹⁸ During the referendum campaign, for example, the "no" campaign of the Conservatives had far more resources than those which were favourable to the devolution bill. The CBI in Scotland has spoken out against Scottish autonomy whenever the nationalist movement seemed to be warming up (Macartney, 1981, 21; Ascherson, 1986, 53).

maintain that it is the motor of history (Blaut, 1987, 58). It just appears in various guises. Nationalist movements are struggling for state power, which is what every class wants to achieve. Therefore, nationalist movements can be bourgeois as well as working class. Blaut's view is strongly influenced by his participation in the Puerto Rican nationalist movement, and he does not attempt to apply his insights to other nationalist movements, such as the Scottish and the Catalan.

Touraine has found that even in European capitalist settings (he analysed the Occitan movement in France), the autonomist model of nationalism, which combines social struggle with struggle for national liberation, "is the one which dominates the mind today" (Touraine, 1985, 168). But most movements in advanced capitalist countries do not find themselves in a colonial situation. And more importantly, Touraine has maintained that

"these two orders of struggle - class struggle and national struggle - are of different natures. They may be intermingled, may even join, but they cannot be unified.(...) The stronger external constraints are, the more the two orders of struggle become intermingled, which results particularly in the production of ideologies proclaiming their fundamental unity, even their identity. As soon as these constraints weaken, especially after decolonisation, one finds instead that a separation occurs between nationalism and the workers' or peasants' movement, which generally leads to the triumph of the nationalists over the revolutionaries, and of the military over the unionists."

(Touraine, 1985, 173)

Class struggle and national struggle are thus two distinct "orders of struggle", autonomous from each other, even though under certain conditions both can coincide in their short-term aims. Fundamentally, however, their foci are different; one struggles against social domination, the other against the political domination - not necessarily as **such**, but that exercised by a **particular** state.

At the other end of the marxist spectrum, Debray is diametrically opposed to Blaut and rather closer to Touraine's view. He believes that the nation is "the cultural organisation of the human

collectivity in question", and therefore a "primary invariable" which belongs to human nature (Debray, 1977, 26-28). He stressed the multiplicity and piecemeal nature of history, which is created by the masses "within circumscribed cultural and natural communities" and "as and where they are" (Debray, 1977, 37).

This selective presentation of marxist thought on nationalism gives an idea how different interpretations of nationalism, of the objectives and the main social forces in nationalist movements, have been put forward. One main weakness they all share is that relationships between structures that are recognised as important (such as society and state, culture and state, social class and culture, etc.) are not examined. In the following section, a different approach is presented which tries to avoid class-based explanation and puts great emphasis on human agency. Rather than conceptualising nationalism as a part of class struggle as in the Leninist tradition, some authors take the view that in the late capitalist society, nationalist movements can no longer be ascribed to a particular social class.

2.4 Nationalism: a new social movement?

One of the fundamental problems of modernisation and marxist approaches is their difficulty in connecting structural factors with social and political mobilisation. It has already been noted that there is no combination of underlying conditions which inevitably leads to a nationalist movement. Therefore, it does not suffice to regard such movements solely as the effect of a structural crisis. The actors of these movements are not just puppets, but make decisions and mobilise, put forward ideas and develop objectives.

The second point is to do with changes in the capitalist system, and particularly the new roles of the state. Postindustrial capitalism is linked with new forms of conflict, often shifted to the cultural rather than the economic and political ground (Melucci, 1985, 789-792). There are new forms of subordination which are derived from the expansion of capitalist relations of production and growing

intervention of the state (Laclau and Mouffe, 1984, 160). Based on analyses of Habermas and Touraine, Melucci asserted that

"Capitalist development (...) requires a growing intervention in social relationships, in symbolic systems, in individual identity and needs. Complex societies no longer have an "economic" basis, they are produced by an increasing integration of economic, political and cultural structures."

(Melucci, 1984, 826)

However, Melucci fails to provide evidence for this shift from the social and political to the cultural. Secondly, nationalist movements are not prime examples for the new social movements. He argues that the national question is inextricably linked to class conflict during the phase of industrial capitalism (Melucci, 1988, 246). And he maintains that the ethnic-national movements which have appeared in the more advanced Western societies represented a counter example, because here social and political demands are intertwined (*ibid.*, 260). He thus adopted his model of new social movements, in which "movements are **action systems** operating in a **systematic field** of possibilities and constraints" (Melucci, 1984, 821), to the nationalist movements by combining the "social movement dimension" with structural factors such as economic development, political institutions, historical tradition, etc. (Melucci, 1983, 63).

It therefore appears that the new social movements approach does not provide radically new insights for students of nationalist movements. However, the value of Melucci's and Touraine's work¹⁹ is that they point out the political focus of nationalist movements, which has widened with the increased relevance of the state, with respect to both civil society and economy. Secondly, they appreciate that every movement involves a variety of different groups and agents, and can therefore not be regarded as a monolithic force. Relationships between these agents and groups are very important to the understanding of nationalist movements.

¹⁹See in particular Touraine, 1985.

These ideas are discussed further in the third section, where the framework of analysis is presented. Before summing up the lessons learned from the existing literature, a few studies must be mentioned which compare recent Catalan and Scottish nationalism.

2.5 Comparisons of Catalan and Scottish nationalism

Among the academic studies comparing Scottish and Catalan nationalism, Moreno's doctoral thesis is the most extensive piece. His research objective was "to analyse and evaluate the approaches to political decentralisation in Britain and Spain, more specifically in Scotland and Catalonia, and to postulate future scenarios, according to their political desirability" (Moreno, 1986, 9). After identifying three "necessary and sufficient" preconditions for the emergence of nationalist or regionalist movements (national/regional consciousness, centre - periphery dichotomy, and social mobilisation and political organisation) (*ibid.*, 75), present in both cases, he goes on to outline (party-) political strategies of accommodating nationalist demands for autonomy within the existing state boundaries. Why these preconditions are sufficient, and how they relate to each other is not analysed. The centre-periphery dichotomy is mainly defined in economic terms²⁰ in the cases of Catalonia and Scotland, although Moreno claims that deprivation or grievance are not necessary elements of regionalism and nationalism. According to his model (Moreno, 1986, 63), the only required structural elements are cultural, economic and political spatial differences and a national/regional identity. This makes it difficult to understand why and when social and political mobilisation takes place.

But the objective of Moreno's work is not to explain the emergence of the nationalist movements, but to discuss the constitutional and

²⁰ Moreno distinguishes between relative deprivation in Scotland and comparative grievance in Catalonia, which reinforce national identities and inter-regional inequalities (Moreno, 1986, 63).

political conflicts arising from them, and the ways to solve them. He therefore looked at the (party-) political processes in the 1970's leading up to the referenda, and argued that political divisions between the Labour Party and the "utopian" separatist aims of the Scottish Nationalists were the most important impediments to Scottish devolution; in contrast, Catalan demands for autonomy succeeded because they were moderate and based on consensus policy, to which the central state had to give in (*ibid.*, 139 ff. and 156 ff.). In his last chapter, where Moreno speculates on the future developments in Scotland and Catalonia, he advocates a cross-party assembly under the leadership of the Labour Party as a "preferable" path towards Scottish devolution. In the case of Catalonia, he takes the line of the Catalan Socialists who want a federal solution (*ibid.*, 356). In these political reflections, which define the political rather narrowly in terms of political parties, it is not clear what makes this type of self-government worth striving for, who strives for it and for what reasons. In absence of any mention of social class interests, Moreno's thesis seems to rest on the assumption that regional self-government is a way of saving the democratic and social integrity of the Spanish and British nation-states. But are corporatism, centralism and uniformisation really outdated now, and does regional self-government, as in the Catalan case, really bring a fundamental change in government?

A West-German study of "regionalist movements" goes a step further and asked whether and to what extent postindustrial values could account for the resurgence of regionalism. Kreckel *et al.* define as postindustrial those societies which have satisfied to a large extent material needs (which cause class conflict); instead, new social, cultural and intellectual needs give rise to new forms of political movements that no longer fit into the old categories of class conflict. These new values and needs include the demand for participation, which, the authors believe, has given regionalist movements new force and a postindustrial perspective (Kreckel *et al.*, 1984, 68-79). The researchers compared Catalonia, Occitania and Scotland, and found that the more forceful movements of Scotland and Catalonia were based mainly on industrial capitalist values (*ibid.*, 454) and historical nationalism. They concluded that "the

time has not yet come for a post-industrial (...) regionalism" (*ibid.*, 459). This refutes not only their own hypothesis, but also Melucci's idea that nationalism today is a post-industrial phenomenon (see p. 59 above).

However, the interest of Kreckel *et al.*'s research lies in their consideration of changes of political and social objectives in movements which are based on territorial identity. Although these changes were rather less dramatic than they expected, there has doubtless been a modification of class-based politics in advanced capitalist societies which is also reflected to some extent in nationalist movements. Chapter five looks at these processes in the context of the growth of the state, and argues that nationalist movements to some extent reflect the increasing conflicts between state and civil society which result from this growth.

Finally, Jack Brand's paper (1985) looks at the application of Hechter's explanatory model of internal colonialism to Scottish and Catalan nationalism. Hechter's general model, from which the author himself retracted on several occasions (Hechter, 1975; 1978; Levi and Hechter, 1985, 130-131), hinges on the identification of economic discrimination of peripheral regions with distinctive cultural traits. Although it is widely assumed that a sense of economic discrimination does contribute to political nationalism in Catalonia and Scotland (eg. Moreno, 1986, 8; Kendrick, 1983, 124-125); see Chapter three in this thesis), Brand showed that it is not easy to make a case for discrimination in either situation. Historically, Catalonia and Scotland were "rich, strong economies when modern nationalism was first expressed" (Brand, 1985, 277) - i.e. in the last century - . Subsequently, they have come to occupy different positions in the capitalist economic system (*ibid.*, 292), a fact which demonstrates that objective economic discrimination is neither an inevitable nor a necessary precondition for political nationalism. Brand therefore turned to distinctive popular culture as a mobilising force, but failed to explain the mechanism, the different character and degree of the influence of culture on both nationalist movements.

2.6 Lessons from the literature review

Looking back on a considerable variety of research on contemporary sub-state nationalism, and on nationalism in general, it is clear that there are no satisfactory answers to the questions surrounding the upsurge of nationalist movements. Attempts to formulate a theory which is applicable to a wide range of nationalist movements have failed. However, we owe them many important insights, which will be briefly summarised below.

Analyses based on modernisation theory argue that the development of nationalism in industrial bureaucratic societies is due to specific material conditions and socio-economic structures. In the case of sub-state nationalist movements, the unevenness of capitalist development and the resulting disparities in wealth, opportunities, living standards, cultural values etc. are ultimately held responsible for nationalist demands. This thesis shares the view that nationalist movements are best analysed from a materialist perspective, but does not single out economic and social structures as the most important determinants. It criticises marxist approaches for uncritically accepting much of the instrumentalism and economic determinism of classical marxist theory, which looked at nationalist movements mainly in terms of class interests. Although it is important to look at the social class composition of nationalist movements and to find out which social class is posed to benefit from nationalist demands, it is obvious that in contemporary capitalist societies, sub-state nationalism cannot be simply viewed as a local variation of class struggle.

Also, marxist and modernisation approaches have great difficulties of relating structural factors to the political processes of nationalist mobilisation, and of accounting for the nationalist agents, which cannot easily be defined in class terms. New social movement approaches focus on social processes and relations (rather than structures) and therefore permit a more flexible and dynamic analysis of political action. They point out that other conflicts, such as those between civil society and the state, have become very important in advanced capitalist societies. This point is

particularly useful to the analysis of nationalism, because it can shed light on the role of the state, and on the cultural and social institutions of civil society which occupy a central place in nationalist movements.

What, then, are the requirements for a comparative study of nationalist movements? Firstly, it must avoid narrow, monocausal models of explanation. Secondly, a historical approach should be taken, because today's nationalist movements are to some extent conditioned by their predecessors, ideologically as well as materially. This should not prejudice a thorough evaluation of the changes in Catalan and Scottish societies in the post-war era which relate to more fundamental processes, and underlie the rise of nationalism in its specific configuration. Thirdly, the emphasis should be on relationships, between different social forces, structural factors as well as contingent developments. Johnston et. al. suggest that

"[i]f we wish to achieve a more contextually and historically rooted understanding of nationalism, we shall have to undertake an analysis that incorporates the relationship between the state and civil society (national and regional), the economic, social and cultural transformation these societies have undergone, the different responses of social classes and groups to these changes, and finally, the internal geographical divisions of the territory claimed by nationalist movements. It is only with a rounded understanding of nationalism that we can appreciate that nationalism is not an inevitable strategy, but rather that it emerges as one amongst possible territorial and political responses to a changing world."

(Johnston et. al., 1988, 12)

Sketching out what kinds of social and political theories can be employed to reach such a "rounded understanding", is the topic of the following section.

3. A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

3.1 History, structures and agency

In order to study the causal and contingent processes which help to explain the resurgence of nationalist movements in Catalonia and Scotland in the 1960's and 1970's, a framework of analysis is needed which fulfils several requirements. It must be flexible enough to incorporate the substantial differences encountered between Catalonia and Scotland. For example, Catalan nationalism during the repressive Franco dictatorship was expressed in cultural activities rather than explicitly political organisations. In Scotland, economic grievances and hopes for social and economic progress played a more important role in the rise of the nationalist movement. Although different conditions for nationalism can be identified, these are by no means permanent. Even over a decade the balance of factors can change. The experience of the 1980's shows that Scottish nationalism is affected by a cultural revival in Scotland and by important changes in the British political culture, while the economic factors, which were previously thought to be responsible for nationalism, no longer assume a central role.

Secondly, history must be given a prominent place in the framework. It is important to recognise that past experiences weigh heavily on people's consciousness in general, and sub-state nationalist movements in particular. This is equally true for dominant state nationalism, because the dominant culture has far greater possibilities for putting *its* view of history and *its* version of national identity across (C.H. Williams, 1988, 203). However, Debray noted that

"[a] human being is the sum of many territories and groups, compressed together. The most powerful is generally the deepest seated: of two forms of allegiance, the more recently acquired will be the weaker."

(Debray, 1984, 18)

The desire to belong to a territory and a group has not vanished in the wake of economic unification and internationalisation which

characterise the world in the late 20th century. "It is", claimed Debray, "as if every mechanism for cutting people off from their roots released another one for rediscovering roots, physically or symbolically, as if the vertigo caused by sensory deprivation were everywhere stimulating a panic stricken flight into the past" (Debray, 1984, 18).

Thirdly, political agency is crucial in converting national consciousness into a political movement. This poses questions about the role of political leadership, and of specific institutions in, and the organisation of, the movements in question. In each nationalist movement, individuals, social groups and institutions make political choices according to the conditions under which they are operating and which influence their action. This was also recognised by Johnston et al.:

"The preexisting cultural mosaic supplies the resource upon which nationalist movements are based, but when and where, and for what reasons, such resources will be drawn upon to promote nationalism and its corresponding political organisation are determined by individual and collective action, as well as the relationship between state, society and territory."

(Johnston et al., 1988, 13)

The exact nature of relationships between state, society and territory is different in each capitalist country, and it is important to distinguish general tendencies of change from specific historical differences. Also, the connection between such structural relationships and political events such as nationalist actions is complex and dependent on particular circumstances, if we accept that political action forms part of the fabric of civil society. The success of a sub-state nationalist movement depends on the ability of different political and social groups to form alliances, which in turn depends on their role in civil society and on specific historic conditions. It is therefore important to analyse why, and to see what kinds of alliances are formed in support of the nationalist cause. The answers to these questions shed light on the diverse outcome of the referenda on self-government in 1979: the Catalans' achievement of autonomy and the Scots' failure to achieve devolution.

The following section suggests that the Gramscian concepts of state and civil society can be employed to explore the causal processes affecting the nationalist movements while avoiding structural determinist explanations.

3.2 Superstructures: State and civil society

An approach, which is on the one hand aware of underlying factors and long-term processes structuring the society, culture and identity of a sub-state nation, while on the other it is able to focus on actions of specific groups or agents at certain points in time without trying to explain all actions in terms of the factors and structures, points towards ideas developed by Gramsci, for two reasons. Firstly, because his notion of civil society fills the gap between base and superstructure, without however losing the notion of structural constraints. Second, his treatment of superstructural elements - such as the national-popular culture and its institutions, the organic intellectual, hegemony, and the historical bloc - is significant for the analysis of nationalist movements which draw on culture and private institutions in order to gain political hegemony.

Gramsci was critical of the twofold basis-superstructure theory which, according to Mouffe, gave rise to marxist economism²¹. An example is the Leninist conceptualisation of nationalist movements as being in the interest of the bourgeoisie (see above, section 2.3). Consciousness, which is necessary to all political action, is, however, not acquired simply through belonging to a social class. Rather, subjects gain their consciousness through social practice, which also involves reproductive activities: education, religious practice, forming families, communication leisure, etc.. Other types

²¹Mouffe pointed out that marxists' failure to adequately explain ideology had two main causes, both of which are embraced by the term "economism". Firstly, superstructure was thought of as epiphenomenon of the economic base, and secondly, it was seen as determined by the position of the subjects in the mode of production (Mouffe, 1979, 170).

of group identities therefore emerge, including those based on culture and territory, and they do not have a necessary relationship to an economic class. However, these identities can be seized upon by social classes in order to cement a hegemonic bloc.

By introducing the concept of hegemony²², Gramsci found a way of explaining how a dominant class can rule with the consent of other groups by transcending the limits of the purely economic interests and incorporating other types of interests shared by other social groups (Mouffe, 1979, 180). This "creation of a higher synthesis" (op. cit., p. 184) is the achievement of intellectuals, whose terrain is civil society. The following quote shows how the gap between economic basis and superstructures is closed:

"The relationship between the intellectuals and the world of production is not as direct as it is with the fundamental social groups but is, in varying degrees, "mediated" by the whole fabric of society and by the complex of superstructures, of which the intellectuals are, precisely, the "functionaries". It should be possible both to measure the "organic quality" [organicità] of the various intellectual strata and their degree of connection with a fundamental social group, and to establish a gradation of their functions and of the superstructures from the bottom to the top (from the structural base upwards). What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural "levels": the one that can be called "civil society", that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called "private", and that of "political society" or "the State". These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of "hegemony" which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of "direct domination" or command exercised through the State and "juridical" government."

(Gramsci, 1971, 12)

²²According to R. Williams, "hegemony supposes the existence of something which is truly total, which is not merely secondary or superstructural, like the weak sense of ideology, but which is lived at such depth, which saturates the society to such an extent, and which, as Gramsci put it, even constitutes the limit of common sense for most people under its sway, that it corresponds to the reality of social experience very much more clearly than any notions derived from the formula of base and superstructure".

(R. Williams, 1973, 8)

The distinction of several superstructural levels, simplified in the analytical separation of the State and civil society, is very useful to the study of nationalist struggles. These can now be conceptualised as struggles taking place in civil society and confronting the central state; as struggles for hegemony and political control over a territory in which a distinctive society has formed over time. It is no longer the economic sphere which is seen as the main battle field of the two antagonistic classes, but rather civil society where struggles for political power take place. However, the above quote shows that civil society cannot be considered as one homogenous unit, easily distinguishable from the economic basis on the one side and the State on the other. Rather, it should be envisaged as a series of levels (see for example R. Williams, 1973, 4-5), with grey zones on either side. In Chapter five these "grey zones" will receive more attention.

The threefold division between relations of production, civil society and state have been seized upon by researchers who are trying to get away from economic reductionism and idealist explanations of social practices without losing a broad marxist perspective on capitalist systems. Civil society is interposed between the political (state) and the economic sphere and consists of "heterogeneous relations" between the various social groups; it places various constraints on the state (Urry, 1981, 100-102). Urry agreed with Gramsci that the state attempts to establish hegemony, but these efforts "may well either strengthen existing forms and bases of resistance (...), or generate new bases focused around popular struggles within civil society **against** the state" (*ibid.*, 64). He invoked Laclau's conceptualisation of social classes as having no reality unless as struggles within civil society. These struggles are structured by three basic forms, i) of capital accumulation and relations between capital and labour²³, ii) of

²³ Although Laclau follows Gramsci's approach to superstructures, he goes even further in negating the determination of social struggles in the last instance by the economy, whereas Gramsci considers the fundamental social confrontation to be that between the working class
(Footnote Continued)

political organisation and state apparatuses, and iii) of gender, age, racial, regional and national interpellations within civil society (ibid., 66).

Thus, a variety of social struggles is perceivable, some more and some less directly determined by capitalist relations of production. In those struggles which are less directly determined, such as for example regional and national struggles, the dominant contradiction is not between classes, but between the people and the state. The view that human agents engage in social struggle as subjects, formed as such through social experience in civil society, sheds some light on nationalist movements. Culture - most notably language -, and spatial and temporal location are among the most significant factors influencing the formation of subjects. Social and political struggles can therefore be based not only on class consciousness, but also on cultural, or territorial identities.

But at the same time, it must be recognised that territoriality, culture etc. are also institutionalised in the state apparatus and in civil society. Territoriality in particular has often been ignored in social and political theory, where it is implicitly assumed that states, "national" and "international" economies and civil societies are essentially placeless. In contemporary social theory, however, "a far-reaching and transformative re-theoretisation of the spatiality of social life" has taken place "after nearly a century of conceptual mystification and neglect" (Soja, 1985, 176). Nationalist movements, which demand political control over a specific territory, highlight the importance of territoriality in the structures of state, civil society and economy, and the relationships between them. Chapter seven looks at the territorial angle of these relationships, and shows how territorial identity underpins political alliances and control. It looks at the reasons why territoriality is more important to Catalan

(Footnote Continued)

and the bourgeoisie (Laclau and Mouffe, 1984, 66-84). Urry however used a previous publication of Laclau, where he accepted the priority of the class struggle over the popular-democratic struggle (Laclau, 1979, 108).

than to Scottish nationalism by examining the internal territorial and social divisions.

3.3 Nationalism and culture: the notion of the national-popular

The notion of the national-popular, which in Gramsci's writing is a cultural concept referring to the position of the masses within the culture of the nation (Gramsci, 1971, 421, footnote 65), plays a key role in the construction of hegemony. The term embraces popular culture, common sense, traditions and popular history, and the feelings of common people. Gramsci believed that hegemony was only maintained when the dominant classes overcame their narrow economic interests and adopted national-popular values which would secure them the active consent of other social groups. Since the national-popular is a sedimentation of everyday experience, of lived meanings and values, it has no necessary class contents, and can be claimed by anyone.

This is also an important characteristic of national identity. If B. Anderson noted that there are no great nationalist ideologists as there are great marxists, liberal thinkers etc. (B. Anderson, 1983, 14), then one reason is surely that nationalism draws on national-popular values. In order for nationalism to have popular appeal, it must incorporate national-popular elements and political analysis at the same time. A sub-state nationalist movement has to confront the dominant culture and hegemony with its "own" culture, which is dominant in its territory. It is therefore often the popular cultural elements which are claimed by the nationalists. Folklore, popular language, particular social practices, codes of behaviour, "national" poets and writers etc. are crucial to nationalism. The high profile in nationalist movements of intellectuals in the wider sense accounts for the importance of the cultural content. Gramsci pointed out that without the intimate, organic linkage between the popular masses who "feel" and the understanding and "knowledge" of the intellectuals, no politics or history is possible (Gramsci, 1983, 93-94). This is also true for

nationalist politics, which cannot succeed as a strategy cooked up by a group of bureaucrats or intellectuals.

For example, Scottish nationalism in the 1920's could be described as such a movement which essentially lacked a national-popular basis, and was restricted to very small intellectual circles. Despite a rich tradition of folklore and of famous thinkers and inventors, Scottish nationalism has at present not got a strong cultural component. In Catalan nationalism, on the other hand, the national-popular culture has been important at least since the late-19th century. Its basic manifestation is the Catalan language, spoken by the majority and adopted by a significant part of the people who immigrated over many decades.

Far from being purely ideological concepts, hegemony and the national-popular are social practices and incarnated in material institutions. This makes it possible to analyse how the specific culture which a national movement incorporates is constituted. In Chapter six, a selection of the most relevant institutions and social practices is tackled.

3.4 Relations of production and civil society

In section 3.2 above, the discussion of the Gramscian view on social struggles concentrated on civil society and the state, while the relations of production were ignored. It was shown that contemporary writers in Gramsci's footsteps envisage social struggles which are virtually independent from the economic sphere. Although this might help to get away from economist conceptions of nationalist movements (which tend to define them in terms of class interest), it would be foolish to separate nationalist struggle from social class and the relations of production. After all, the civil societies of Catalonia and Scotland are based on specific relations of productions which are - or have been - characteristic to these societies. The historical perspective is important here, because there are institutions and social relations in all civil societies that have

their roots in economic structures which have been transformed since.

Secondly, conceiving of nationalist struggles as popular struggles is too vague and appears to present them as homogeneous and beneficial to all people. Nationalist movements are often forced to define economic and social policies, where it is impossible to benefit everyone²⁴, and then, the dominant social classes in the nationalist movement decide in whose interest these policies are. Alternatively, in nationalist movements which are based on a broad consensus and an agenda of narrowly defined national autonomy, it is very likely that the newly autonomous unit will be governed by that social class which was hegemonic before. In Catalonia, this is the case since autonomy has been granted.

Thirdly, in many instances, economic grievances which are conceived within the national framework influence the support, outlook and the social composition of the nationalist movements. This is well-established for the Scottish case. Foster and Woolfson argued that struggles against plant closures in Scotland were broadly supported by the national community, and fed into the nationalist movement (Foster and Woolfson, 1986, 389; Woolfson and Foster, 1988, 90-93; see also Sadler, 1985, 190-271). The increasing support for self-government by the Scottish TUC also testifies to this. Economic struggles take on national significance in Scotland because of the post-war tradition of economic planning. The state is made at least partly responsible for the fortunes of the Scottish economy (Salmond, 1986, 226), and economic struggles therefore take on an additional political dimension. In Catalonia, this is also observed, although here the politicisation of economic struggles during the Franco regime were primarily the result of the prohibition to form independent unions.

²⁴The Scottish National Party is a point in case. In the 1970's, it saw an opportunity to make everybody better off through North sea oil revenues, and without any fundamental changes in the social and economic system. The credibility of this project was, however, soon undermined.

These points demonstrate that nationalist movements are constrained by economic structures; however, they are not simply class movements in popular disguise. In Chapter three, the relevance of the economic dimension to the nationalist movements is presented in more detail.

3.5 Outlook

The framework of analysis presented above is not a new theory of nationalism which claims universal applicability. But it conceptualises the basic cornerstones of state, civil society and economy in a way which accepts structural relationships between them without giving a necessary primacy to any of them. Nationalist movements are conceived as political movements within civil society which confront the state.

The next chapters investigate these relationships, the changes which they have undergone, and how they affected the nationalist movements in Catalonia and Spain. Despite the linear order in which they appear, they do not present a one-way chain of arguments; the picture of nationalism they construct is multidimensional.

Chapter two looks back on the past, because nationalist movements justify themselves by referring to history. It assesses the importance of the nationalist movements in the past, relates it to specific social and economic structures which developed in the Catalan and the Scottish civil societies. Chapter three explores the developments in the economic sphere in relation to the nationalist revival in the 1960's and 1970's in order to investigate the economic dimension of sub-state nationalism. In Chapter four, it is argued that the responses of different social classes to economic and social transformations affected their position towards the nationalist movement. At the same time, the ways in which different social classes perceived these economic and social transformations were mediated by their national identity. Chapter five deals with the relations between the state and civil society, which are crucial both to the causes and the form of nationalist movements. It concentrates on the growth of state intervention and the resulting

problems of legitimation which under certain conditions lead to sub-state nationalism. However, the organisation of civil society is an important factor in these processes, and therefore Chapter six takes a closer look at selected cultural institutions of the Catalan and Scottish civil society. In Catalonia, a network of institutions, which were separate from the state apparatus, provided a basis for nationalist organisation, while Scotland's cultural institutions were found to be more integrated into the British state. The cultural component of Scottish nationalism was therefore rather weak in the 1960's and 1970's. Chapter seven contemplates the territoriality of nationalist movements. It points out that civil society, state and economy are not placeless, but rather territorially structured, and argues that this fundamentally affects political processes. But even territoriality does not play the same role in both case studies, because spatial and social relations are interdependent, and therefore articulated in different ways. In Chapter eight, the various dimensions of the analysis of Catalan and Scottish nationalism are drawn together and summarised.

Chapter two:

NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In the preceding chapter, it was argued that contemporary nationalism in Catalonia and Scotland has historical roots. History provides the symbols of nationalism and the terms in which nationalist movements are defined, and to make sense of nationalist movements therefore requires a historical approach. This also helps to explain the formation of civil society and the state, which are at the centre of nationalist conflicts, and accounts for the variations and specific characteristics of the relations between them in the two case studies. Historical approaches above all acknowledge change and variability (Hobsbawm, 1972, 385-386).

However, historical accounts which help to reconstruct the political and economic context of nationalism in Catalonia and Scotland are themselves far from unbiased. The first section argues that nationalist movements construct their own historical framework, which often contradicts the hegemonic historiography of the state. The following seven sections use a variety of historical accounts to trace the development of nationalism in the context of socio-economic and political relations from the late 17th to the mid-20th century. Within this period, Catalonia and Scotland lost their political independence, became integrated in their respective states, and began to question - with different degrees of intensity - this integration.

1. INTRODUCTION: HISTORY OF NATIONALISM AND NATIONALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY

1.1 On the origin of nationalism

An important factor in the Catalan and Scottish history of nationalism is the existence of a history of national independence

to which nationalist movements can refer¹. In the cases of Scotland and Catalonia, this history of independence terminated at the beginning of the 18th century. Scotland became part of the United Kingdom with the Treaty of Union in 1707, and Catalonia lost its independence in 1714 as a result of the war of succession. In both cases, a period of government under a union of crowns preceded the political unification (the crowns of Castille and Aragon were united by marriage in 1479, and Scotland's and England's crown were united under James I in 1603).

Two things must be borne in mind when looking at the historical roots of nationalist movements. The first is that nationalism as a political movement has a relatively short history. The term "national" in the political sense emerged as conceptions of society and political representation changed with the French revolution². When independence was lost in Scotland and Catalonia, there was no organised nationalist movement fighting to regain sovereignty. This is explained by the fact that at the beginning of the 18th century, the popular perception of national independence was not developed, and therefore, nationalism did not exist. The moving forces in those days were strictly limited to a small elite while the masses below

¹Walter Benjamin's "angel of history"; Nairn, 1977, 359; B. Anderson, 1983, 141.

²It is worthwhile to quote Lukacs here, whose concise description of the economic and historical conditions of post-1789 nationalism is based on the premise that a fundamental change had taken place in popular conception of "the national":

"It is in the nature of a bourgeois revolution that, if seriously carried through to its conclusion, the national idea becomes the property of the broadest masses. In France it was only as a result of the Revolution and Napoleonic rule that a feeling of nationhood became the experience and property of the peasantry, the lower strata of the petty bourgeoisie and so on. For the first time they experienced France as their own country, as their self-created motherland. But the awakening of national sensibility and with it a feeling and understanding for national history occurs not only in France. The Napoleonic wars everywhere evoked a wave of national feeling, of national resistance to the Napoleonic conquests, an experience of enthusiasm for national independence". (Lukacs, 1962, 22-23).

were passive receivers of modernisation, political change and cultural enlightenment. But as Nairn noted, this was not at all unusual. Not until the French Revolution in 1789 territorial identity connected with mass politics and democracy; before, it was not uncommon for an old nation to be governed by a foreign and distant ruler (Nairn, 1977, 137). A nationalist reaction to the loss of sovereignty in Scotland and Catalonia would have required a different political consciousness, of a type which could only come into existence after 1789. Therefore, the benefits or disadvantages from the loss of independence mainly concerned the ruling class, and manifested themselves in the economic sphere, and not in a political movement. It is only in 19th century³ that powerful nationalist movements emerged in Europe, even then, Scotland and Catalonia were "late developers" compared to other European nations.

These nationalist movements inevitably conveyed a sense and an experience of history to the broad masses. The crucial difference to the ahistorical visions of human progress characteristic of the Enlightenment was that now, man was recognised as the moving force in history. For Lukacs, the connection between nationalism and history in that period was very clear:

"The appeal to national independence and national character is necessarily connected with a reawakening of national history, with memories of the past, of past greatness, of moments of national dishonour, whether this results in a progressive or reactionary ideology."

(Lukacs, 1962, 23)

However, the national past evoked by nationalist movements is often situated in the pre-nationalist era. In the cases of Scotland and Catalonia, the pre-18th history inspired demands for self-government because it served as legitimation of these demands. Anderson called this "subjective antiquity" of nations in the eyes of nationalists who are objectively situated in modernity one of the paradoxes of

³The term "nationalism" did not come into general use until the end of the 19th century, as B. Anderson remarked in a footnote of his book (B. Anderson, 1983, 14).

nationalism (B. Anderson, 1983, 14). This leads to the ideological function of history in nationalism, because historiography legitimises political demands and power structures. In the struggle between central state and sub-state a nationalist movement, the latter has to create its version of history in order to combat the dominant state-centred perspective (C. H. Williams, 1988, 203-204). Controlling a people's history is the first step to maintaining power over the people itself. Advocating an alternative view on national history is one precondition for contesting political control. The following section demonstrates how history is used for legitimisation of nationalism in Catalonia and Scotland.

1.2 Contesting dominant historiography in Scotland and Catalonia

In Scotland, few intellectuals have interpreted history from a nationalist perspective. Turnbull and Beveridge examined some history texts on Scotland⁴ to demonstrate how anglicised the dominant interpretations of Scottish history was. They found that the "stagnant, dark age, barbaric" pre-union past was contrasted with the "enlightened, progressive, modern" post-union developments under English influence. This kind of historiography, they argued, "functions to discourage identification with a past, or, in other words, to effect a rupture between a nation's present and its past" (Turnbull and Beveridge, 1986, 42). This is also reflected in the novels of the 19th and early 20th century, because both historiography and narrative in a novel require a feeling of change, a feeling "that history is not just the account of the events of the past but the process which accounts for the events of the past" (Craig, 1982, 8). Craig found that in the romantic novels of Walter Scott, an idealised vision of the Scottish past is disconnected from the seemingly history-less present; this reproduces the same lack of

⁴ Among others, they included in their study Smout's History of the Scottish People (1970), H. G. Graham's The Social Life of Scotland in the Eighteenth Century (1889) and H. T. Buckle's History of Civilisation in England, vol. III (1861).

continuity which Turnbull and Beveridge saw in Scottish history texts.

In Scottish schools, Scottish history after 1707 practically does not exist; rather, it is categorised as "British history". A Scottish perspective on contemporary history only developed slowly in the wake of rising nationalism in the 1960's, and not in the 19th century as was the case in Catalonia. In Scotland, historiographical publications experienced a noticeable increase as a result of the political successes of the nationalist movement after 1960, and particularly from the 1970's onwards (Harvie, interview, 4.9.1987; Smith, 1989, 11). But in spite of this recent interest in Scottish perspectives on modern history, the bulk of Scottish historiography is biased towards mainstream British approaches.

McDonogh looked at Catalan elementary school history textbooks in the 1890's which reflects the spirit of Catalan regionalism and established national consciousness by referring to a medieval period of wealth created by Catalan merchants and financiers. As in other countries, historiography in the era of Catalan bourgeois hegemony was the preserve of scholars and intellectuals which - to use a Gramscian term - were the organic intellectuals of the bourgeoisie. However, it became the patrimony of the Catalan people as a whole (Llobera, 1983, 340), and Catalan working class perspectives have been added to this body of national(ist) historiography.

Periods of national repression are important in understanding how nationalist perspectives of history are constructed. This is particularly obvious in Catalonia where during the Franco period, teaching and research on the history of Catalonia was prohibited or at least severely restricted. The Catalan historian Izard argues that a people who experience a collective awareness of crisis and insufferable oppression seeks consolation in the past and feels the need to reconstruct its history (Izard, 1983, 74). Thus, the catalanist historiography and the ideologies of the 19th century play an important role in the nationalist revival of the 1960's, since during much of the Francoist period it was difficult to pursue research on Catalan history.

There are many testimonies to the ways in which Catalan history was completely rewritten for the Francoist education system and became integrated into Spanish history. The view that all history was now the collective enterprise of the Spaniards was disseminated in textbooks of political formation (McDonogh, 1986, 35), and the history of autonomy and regionalism was denigrated. Thus, children learned that there existed "bad Spaniard" who denied their fatherland, Spain, and engaged in the "senseless business of demonstrating that their regions were nations in their own right and (constituted) states which were completely independent and different from Spain" (Burgos y Mazo, quoted by Benet, 1979, 323). In the face of such blatant Spanish nationalist indoctrination, historiography became a weapon in the struggle to maintain a Catalan national identity, and served as a means of defining and rebuilding Catalonia as a nation (Elliot, 1960, 13). Catalanist historians such as Coll i Alentorn and Ainaud de Lasarte therefore taught Catalan history in private circles, and from 1960 onwards publicly, to growing audiences (Ainaud de Lasarte, interview, 30.3.1988; Minobis, 1979, 13). The most influential Catalan historians in the 1960's were Soldevila and Vicens i Vives, and the Marxist Pierre Vilar, who had a great impact on the Catalan Left, but there were other intellectuals who wrote about Catalan history⁵.

Relying on a variety of secondary sources which include nationalist perspectives, the following sections of this chapter describe those aspects of the history of Catalan and Scottish society which are important to the understanding of the nationalist movement. The next section begins by looking at the situation of Catalonia and Scotland

⁵Examples are the discussion about Solé-Tura's interpretations of the hegemony of the **Lliga Regionalista** between the author and Benet in the journal Serra d'Or in 1968 (Benet, 1968, 39 and Solé-Tura, 1968, 25); articles discussing the history of the Catalan workers' movement (Piñol, 1965, 13-15; and Balcells, 1971, 13-16); and the political developments during the republican era (Coll i Alentorn, 1971, 11-12; Cruells, 1971, 33; Ardiaca, 1971, 35-36). Serra d'Or played an outstanding role in the mediation of Catalan history, because it was the only journal in Catalan language published under Franco, and strongly sympathetic to Catalan nationalism (see Chapter 6).

in the late 17th century, just before they both lost their independent parliament. In Scotland, the union with England came at a point when the country was divided between the modernising Lowlands and the pre-capitalist Highlands. In the absence of a modern Scottish political identity, the union was established on the basis of economic and strategic interests. In the Catalan case, the loss of independence was the result of a military defeat.

2. INDEPENDENT SCOTLAND AND CATALONIA IN THE 17TH CENTURY

Scottish society was divided in the 17th century between the Lowlands, which were dominated by merchant capital and crafts in the burghs, and the Highlands where feudalist landlord - tenant relations still survived (Foster, 1975, 142-144) (Figs. 2 and 3). Scottish capitalist development in the Lowlands was always under threat from Highland uprisings and raids⁶, and the military and political alliance with the English was necessary to defend the way of life in the Scottish Lowlands and in England against the "barbaric" Highland clans. The pro-union forces came "mainly from the bigger landowners and West coast merchants (whose interests and attitudes closely matched those of their English counterparts)" (Foster, 1975, p.147). As the most developed parts of the pre-union economy in Scotland were the coal and salt industries on the Forth, it therefore seems that the more dynamic impulses towards capitalist development came from the land owning class (Dickson, 1980, 70-71).

At the end of the 17th century, it had become clear that the Scottish bourgeoisie would not accumulate enough capital to engender a significant capitalist development in Scotland, and lacked the military strength to secure for itself a privileged role in international trading (Dickson, 1980, 83). In the end, Scottish capital opted for a deal with England. In exchange for Scottish

⁶See P. H. Brown, 1971, Vol. II, 372; Vol. III, pp. 16-78, pp. 156-188, and pp. 269-325 and Prebble, 1985, 33.

rebellion against the Spanish government to protect the prosperity achieved in the Catalan **Principat**⁸ (P. Vilar, 1987, 420). A second Catalan revolt led to the loss of independence after a long war of succession between 1705 and 1714, in which the Catalans backed the Habsburg monarchy against the Bourbon pretender to the throne. Habsburg had promised to maintain the Catalan political institutions.

Following the conquest of Barcelona, the Spanish king Felipe V imposed a new political and administrative superstructure on Catalonia in 1716 (Nova Planta de Govern) and left a representative of the crown in charge. At the same time, the autonomous political institutions, **Generalitat** and **Consell de Cent**, were abolished (Mercader, 1979, 245).

The next two sections explore the economic, social and cultural developments in the 150 years or so in Catalonia and Scotland after the loss of independence. This period witnessed a slow process of industrialisation in both countries; but in the Catalan case, this formed a society and economy which was increasingly different from the rest of Spain, while Scotland was economically integrated into the British empire, and only one of Britain's industrialising regions.

⁸The revolt was triggered off by the movement of government troops through Catalan territory and by the government's attempt to - unconstitutionally - recruit Catalans for the army. The unrest in the Catalan countryside was carried into the city of Barcelona by the segadors, as the migrant troops of casual land labourers were called. The Catalan national anthem, "Els segadors", was inspired by these rebellions.

3. AFTER LOSING INDEPENDENCE: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN CATALONIA

3.1. Industrialisation and the emergence of a class society

In the 18th century, industrialisation began in Catalonia on the basis of a strong agricultural sector. The population of Catalonia doubled in the space of 70 years, growing from 407,000 inhabitants in 1718 to 814,000 in 1788 (Vilar, 1962, II, 42). The growth took place mainly in the rich agricultural areas of the littoral and the pre-littoral. The largest city was Barcelona, which together with its immediate suburbs⁹ quadrupled its population. Several smaller cities experienced growth, such as Tortosa, Vic, Mataró, Tarragona, Manresa, Reus and Girona, all of which had over 5,000 inhabitants, but they were growing at a lesser rate than the Barcelona area (Mercader, 1979, 318). As in other European regions, the 18th century brought modernisation to the agricultural plains and coastal areas. The expansion of the area under vineyards was made possible by the rabassa morta¹⁰ contract between land owner and producer, which was a uniquely Catalan institution. The security of tenure it involved made long-term investment viable and bound the farmers to the land, and this enabled the countryside to develop in an atmosphere of relatively stable class relations in the course of the

⁹Vilar means here Barcelona with its suburbs St. Andreu de Palomar, St. Marti, St. Gervasi, Sarrià, Orla, Vallvidrera, Vallbona, and Badalona, Espluges, Hospitalet de Llobregat, St. Adrià del Besós, St. Just Desvern and Sta. Coloma de Gramamet which together accounted for 37,488 inhabitants in 1718 and 128,505 in 1787 (Vilar, 1962, II, 119).

¹⁰The rabassa morta had existed in Catalonia since the late Middle Ages. But it became an important institution particularly since the 18th century, when vine production expanded. It was basically a sharecropping contract which was defined in terms of the life of a vineyard, but which could practically last indefinitely. The sharecropper paid the landowner one third of the harvest, but had security of tenure and far-reaching autonomy in the cultivation of the land. As this system stressed the partnership between landlord and peasant, it helped to avoid the proletarianisation of the countryside and the resulting social conflict - at least until the Philoxera crisis in the 1880's (Hansen, 1977, 27; 56-62).

18th and for much of the 19th century (Hansen, 1977, 64). Around the new export oriented product, a range of supporting industries developed such as bottle and pipe manufacturers and distilleries, which enabled the transportation of liquor to European and South American destinations. In 1778, Barcelona was declared a free port and allowed to trade directly with American colonies.

The result of these developments was a growing bourgeoisie involved in manufacturing and trade in the capital, but also in the rural towns. Capital was also reinvested in agricultural production:

"Those who had become rich through trading or manufacturing in the 18th century, who were numerous particularly in the second half of the century, purchased land mainly around the towns and in the valleys and small basins of intensive agriculture. In these areas, investments in the improvement of agricultural production often consisted of commercial or industrial capital."

(Vilar, 1962, vol. II, 576)

However, the Napoleonic wars (1808-14), the loss of the major American colonies and the French occupation (1824-27) caused disruptions in the economic development of Catalonia. But the return of American colonialist as a result of the independence of the colonies brought an influx of capital in Catalan industrial enterprises which favoured particularly the modernisation of the textile industry (Vicens i Vives, 1979, 38). In the mid-19th century, a Catalan bourgeoisie and proletariat had established themselves, and the development gap between Catalonia and the rest of the Spanish territory widened.

This gap soon became a political problem, when the Liberals gained power under Isabel II (1833). The Catalan industrialists realised that their interests were not served by a government which promoted a liberal trading policy and centralisation of the administration. As the economic crisis of the late 1830's worsened with the first effects of the free trade policy, industrialists and workers joined in opposition against the central government in 1840 to press for a protectionist industrial policy. Vilar described the period between 1820 and 1885 as the regionalist-protectionist phase, in which the leaders of Catalan industry tried to conquer and protect the Spanish

market. The second aim was to establish themselves as the political leaders, not of a Catalan state, but of the Spanish nation (Vilar, 1987, 74). For industrialist like Guëll i Ferrer, Nicolau Tous, Sol i Padrís, intellectuals like Vidal Ferrer, Duran i Bas and Bosch Labrús, and administrators and politicians such as Aribau and Víctor Balaguer, it was not difficult to enlist craftsmen, artisans and small traders for the cause of protectionism.

In the countryside, the church and the **Institut Agrícola Catalá de Sant Isidre**¹¹ had as great an influence on politics as the industrialists in the cities. Their interests were not opposed to each other, because

"The absence of heavy industry on the one hand and large estates in the Andalucian style on the other; the dispersion of the textile industry which had reached the highest valleys; and the family links between industrial wealth and land ownership secured a spread and cohesion of the middle bourgeoisie sufficient to compensate for the mediocre aspect of the enterprises on the individual scale. The result of all this is that the agricultural, the folklorist and even the pious bulletins appropriated and diffused the themes of the **Fomento [del Trabajo Nacional]**¹², feeding them into a collective psychology."

(Vilar, 1987, 77)

The press, ranging from small local pamphlets to national (Spanish) papers, tried to convert the protectionist point of view into the common denominator of all classes, or failing this, then at least of all sectors of the Catalan ruling class. Although protectionism applied to the whole Spanish territory, it was not shared by any group of influence in the rest of Spain, and although at different times political channels were opened which enabled the Catalan bourgeoisie to influence Spanish politics, this never amounted to a hegemonic relationship (Vilar, 1987, 84-85). Spanish politics was largely dominated by classes which had established their power base in the pre-industrial era, consisting of large landowners, a

¹¹The **Institut de Sant Isidre** was an organisation of the big landowners.

¹²The **Fomento** was an organisation of mostly Catalan industrialists.

military elite, merchants and banking interests and their organic intellectuals. The relatively well organised¹³ Catalan industrial bourgeoisie therefore looked for support among the Catalan working class, not just to cement their economic power, but also to gain hegemony, as Vilar argued:

"A coherent and organised leading class as we have described it above is not easily satisfied with small immediate gains in the purely material field. It does not only want the State, its means, its continuity, its securities, but it also needs to feel and believe itself to be the incarnation, the "vital force" of the whole society. It likes to surround itself with the entire people and invoke the grand interests of the fatherland."

(Vilar, 1987, 86-87)

Thus, Vilar explained the shift of interest of the Catalan bourgeoisie from the Spanish to the Catalan stage with its failure to become the hegemonic force in Spain. However, it must be stressed that it never gave up the latter aim, and came back to pursue it in the early 20th century, when it had succeeded in dominating Catalan politics.

But was the bourgeois hegemony in Catalonia of the 19th century uncontested? In the countryside, it was challenged several times by Carlist wars¹⁴, but after the defeat in 1874, this challenge was losing strength. In the cities, an urban working class was emerging as a possible threat. Termes estimated the urban working class (including the industrial workers and the salaried workers in commerce, administration, transport, communications, etc.) to account for 11.8 % of the total Catalan population in 1877 and for

¹³Several organisations existed which were dominated by Catalan industrialists, including the *Comisión de Fábricas*, the *Asociación Defensora del Trabajo Nacional* and several *Asociaciones Económicas*. The most effective lobby was the *Instituto Industrial de Cataluña*, founded in 1848, and the *Fomento del Trabajo Nacional* which was founded in 1879 as a result of a concentration process.

¹⁴These wars (1833-36 and 1872-74) involved large parts of rural provinces in the Basque and in the Catalan region, and can be interpreted at least partly as a reaction against centralisation and modernisation (see Butler Clarke, 1906, 100-111 and 374-388).

12.7% in 1887 (with the population growing at a fast rate). Figures for 1900 show that the biggest accumulation of workers in Catalonia (45.7%) lived in the city of Barcelona (Termes, 1987, 238-9). But for most of the 19th century this class lacked appropriate conditions to organise itself. According to Vilar, apart from spontaneous and rather inconsequential violent eruptions in 1835 and 1855, the Catalan workers believed their masters' arguments which pointed to competition from abroad and to the Spanish state as the causes for social discontent (Vilar, 1987, 87-88). However, the common interests did not go very far. For example, the joint opposition of industrialists and workers in 1840 to the free trade policy was followed in 1842 and 1843 by widespread riots and temporary establishment of popular control in some working class areas (compared by some to the Paris Commune in 1871). Military force ended this phase of unrest, and this was not to be the last time that the Catalan bourgeoisie called on the central government for assistance in the struggle against Catalan workers.

The lack of organisation of the working class was mainly due to the executions and phases of repression following the struggles of the 1840's and the 1850's. Throughout the 19th century, the bourgeoisie radically opposed any type of workers' organisation. Whenever the repression was slightly relaxed, numerous workers' associations emerged (Vicens i Vives, 1979, vol. VI, 134-150). But it was not possible to create a strong workers' movement from these dispersed and intermittent associations. The workers became able to contest the bourgeois hegemony only in the 20th century.

3.2 The Catalan Renaixença: cultural nationalism

At the same time as industrialisation was taking off in the 1830's, a cultural revival began as an intellectual bourgeoisie developed alongside the industrial elite. The Catalan language, which had ceased to be the official language in 1714 but was widely spoken in everyday life, was being recovered as a cultural and professional language during the 19th century. This process began with poets such as Rubió i Ors, Maragall and Verdaguer, who wrote in Catalan, and

thus initiated a literary movement which saw its roots in the work of the great poets of the golden age of the Crown of Aragón. However, the cultural revival was not limited to literature. New schools of law, economic theory and journalism developed whose protagonists can be described in the Gramscian sense as the "organic intellectuals" of the bourgeoisie. Vicens i Vives described how these new generations of intellectuals began to influence the upper and middle classes with their ideas of Catalan regionalism¹⁵. The strong influence of the top lawyers of Barcelona on the protectionist movement prompted Vicens i Vives to conclude that the Catalan bourgeoisie "found itself surrounded by eminent personalities who assisted them in all spheres" of life (Vicens i Vives, 1979, vol. VI, 116).

Just as the renaissance poets and playwrights looked back to the medieval period, the historians of the mid-19th century also took a favourable view of Catalan history. The historical writings of historians such as Victor Balaguer and Joan Cortada inspired visions of a greater and more autonomous Catalonia¹⁶.

Probably the most important development of that period with respect to the development of nationalism was the creation of a wide range of private associations and institutions which became characteristic for Catalan civil society. Economic and employers associations (e.g.

¹⁵Joan Mañé i Flaquer, the most influential voice of the Diario de Barcelona in the mid-19th century, is a good example of an "organic intellectual". Vicens i Vives commented that

"Mañé managed to create a school of impartial political journalism which was rooted in the Catalan way of life and the aspirations of the country. The bourgeoisie saw itself represented in this (type of journalism), and gradually swallowed the regionalist and regenerationist theories a la Catalana, which the good Mañé was disseminating every week through this newspaper with the help of a whole panel of collaborators."

Vicens i Vives, 1979, vol. VI, 115)

¹⁶Victor Balaguer published La Corona de Aragón in 1854 and followed this up with Historia de Catalunya y de la Corona de Aragón in 1860, the same year in which Joan Cortada's book on Catalunya y los Catalanes came out. All were written in Castilian.

Amics del País and *Comissió de Fàbriques*) served as think tanks of the industrial bourgeoisie and as pressure groups with the political decision makers, while the opera circles of the *Liceu*, and the *Ateneu Barcelonès* were symbols of bourgeois cultural hegemony. The excursionist associations, the Catalan journals and literary groups¹⁷ were the institutions of the intellectuals and urban professionals.

The cultural associations and institutions of the working class had a much more difficult life in the 19th century, always threatened by government repression as soon as they deviated from a narrowly defined cultural function. As mentioned in the section above, working class political organisations were prohibited, and persecuted when they did surface in periods of lesser repression, and therefore, cultural organisations often took on political functions as well. The *Ateneu Català de la Classe Obrera* is one example for such working class institutions (Vicens i Vives, 1979, vol. VI, 142). Others served as institutions of social mobility, advocating the education of workers into "responsible" members of Catalan society (Solà, 1978, 32-33).

At the end of the 19th century, Catalan society was unique in Spain with a growing manufacturing base and a relatively strong industrial bourgeoisie, which was often in conflict with the other Spanish regional oligarchies over governmental economic policies. Its organic intellectuals were reviving Catalan cultural traditions, and this combination of cultural and economic infrastructure became the material basis of bourgeois Catalan nationalism at the turn of the century.

¹⁷The excursionist associations, *Associació Catalanista d'Excursions Científiques* and *Associació d'Excursions Catalana*, created in 1876 and 1878 in Barcelona, were the first of a long list of similar organisations. Literary circles often developed around Catalan journals such as the *Diari Català*, *La Renaixensa*, and *La Il·lustració Catalana*.

4. AFTER LOSING INDEPENDENCE: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN SCOTLAND

4.1 Economic change and disparities

In order to understand why Scotland did not develop a nationalist movement in the late 19th century, one must look, as in the case of Catalonia, to its political and economic location in the Union. The most significant economic development was the industrial revolution which bound Scotland and England together from the late 18th century onwards. The union provided the opportunity for the Scottish bourgeoisie to be involved in an industrial revolution which was decentralised, spontaneous and self-sustaining. It therefore permitted a higher degree of autonomous development than other submerged nationalities in Europe were able to achieve (Nairn, 1977, 138). This relative freedom applied mainly to the Scottish Lowlands, whose social formation was similar to that of English regions on the verge of industrialisation.

In the 18th century, improved trading conditions under the Treaty of Union helped to increase the penetration of market relations in the countryside and the export orientation of agriculture in the Lowlands (cattle, arable enclosures). Profits made in the Atlantic trade were partly invested in industrial activities like coal and copper mining and after 1770 increasingly into textiles (Dickson, 1980, 90). In the Highlands, expansion of sheep farming led to consolidation of land holdings and widespread evictions. The Scottish lairds were traditionally very powerful because there were few freeholders, and the security of tenure for tenants was very limited.

"Economic dominance was justified by their social position in the community: as heritors they controlled poor relief, parish education and church patronage; they regulated wage rates and could direct labour for road building in their capacity as justices of the peace; and finally, they sat in judgement of their own tenants in the barony courts".

(Dickson, 1980, 95)

The Highlands were traditionally the most populated areas of Scotland. In 1755, just over half of the population lived North of the Tay and only 37% in the central belt (Dickson, 1980, 91).

Just 10 years earlier, a mortal blow had been dealt to the insurrection of an army of the Highland clans, whose invasion of England in 1745 was punished severely by the British troops¹⁸. As Nairn argued, the relationship of the "backward" Highlands and the "advanced" Lowlands was so unequal that the former had no chance of survival and of developing a nationalist movement based on the distinctive Gaelic culture (Nairn, 1977, 148). After 1745, the Lowland culture, increasingly influenced by England, became dominant while the Highland culture went into decline, accelerated by the clearances, emigration waves and anglicisation programmes. This process of decline was far from being a natural one. In the clearances, for example, force was used to evict the impoverished peasants from the estates (McGrath, 1981, 12-13 and 35-37). In McGrath's famous play about the exploitation of the Highlands, the replacement of peasant families with more profitable Cheviot sheep converted the Highlands into a "mighty wilderness" which became the hunting ground for the wealthy English and anglicised Scots elite (McGrath, 1981, 38-44).

But the Highlands also became a source of myths. In the early 19th century, the romantic movement flourished particularly in Scotland, where the memory of Highland culture became infested with a sentimental national consciousness (Figs. 4 and 5). However, this

¹⁸Prebble writes about the English reaction to the 1745 rebellion: "By brutality the Highlands were subdued, the glens emptied, the clans destroyed, and the Hanoverian dynasty made so secure that sixty years or so later the Prince Regent could indulge his romantic fancies by paying for the tomb of Prince Charles."

(Prebble, 1967, 309)

The measures included looting and destruction of Highland settlements, widespread killings and repression through the British army, as well as government legislation. Amongst the latter was the prohibition of kilt and tartan, which was lifted only in 1782.

selective reconstruction of the past was kept very separate from practical and political considerations.

"What mattered in Scotland itself, however, was to render this awareness **politically** null - to make certain that it would not be felt that contemporary Scotland should be the independent continuation of the auld sang".

(Nairn, 1977, 150)

With the defeat of the Highland forces, Lowland capitalism was able to develop and to impose its economic and social relations under conditions of relative peace and protection. In the agricultural areas in the Lowlands, commercial expansion in the 18th century enabled landowners to improve and rationalise agricultural production. This often involved the evictions of tenants, and therefore, the urban population grew in the central belt. It reached almost 1 million (half of Scotland's total population) in 1820 (Dickson, 1980, 137-8). This expanding labour and consumer market encouraged industrial developments, particularly that of cotton, linen and woollen manufacturing (1780-1830)¹⁹. As in Catalonia, the small textile firms which emerged were set up with merchant and small landowner capital.

Big landowners were not involved in industrial developments, only in coal exploitation. But politically, the landed aristocracy in Scotland²⁰ (Figs. 4 and 5) was still powerful. Therefore, the industrial entrepreneurs found their interests better represented through the Union.

¹⁹In 1831, a third of the 95,000 waged persons in Glasgow were working in the textile industry (Dickson, 1980, 185).

²⁰The incorporation of the Scottish Parliament into the Westminster Parliament "involved a drama of Byzantine manoeuvre acted out by the great territorial magnets of Scotland, the Dukes of Argyll, Hamilton, Atholl, and Queensbury, and the leaders of the English parties" (Harvie, 1977, 63).

FIG.4: AN IDYLL OF '45



This pre-Raphaelite painting by Millais (1828-1896), which shows “Scottish Girls charmed by the dash of their English enemy” in 1745, is an example of the reinterpretation of history from an English perspective in the Romantic period.

FIG.5: SCOTLAND FOR HOLIDAY

DEER STALKING IN THE HIGHLANDS

By W. SMITHSON - BROADHEAD

L M S SCOTLAND for HOLIDAYS LNER

ITS QUICKER BY RAIL

Special information from any L.M.S. or L.N.E.R. Station or Agency

This advertisement for British Rail, painted by Broadhead, propagates a new purpose for the Scottish Highlands after they had been cleared from people.

"In Scotland, where the political dominance of the landed interest was very marked, the manufacturers could thus benefit from the client status of the Scottish bourgeoisie after the Union of Parliaments. With legislative powers located at Westminster, Scottish manufacturers sometimes gained from the actions of their more successful brethren - gains which they would have been less likely to obtain from a resurrected Scottish Parliament."

(Dickson, 1980, 147)

While the political representatives were effectively nominated by the landlords, the bourgeoisie started to gain more influence over civil society through the education system, the Church (after the secession of the Free Church in 1843) and local government.

Opposition to the development of capitalism from below was not strong and effective until 1830. The main threat to the social order came from the artisans and waged labour force of the Lowlands. According to Dickson,

"The direction of working class action oscillated between trade unionism, constitutional appeals to the authorities for redress of grievances, political radicalism and insurrectionism in response to the tightening of economic constraints and to political repression."

(*ibid.*, 1980, 176)

Immigration was an important means of escaping economic constraints and political repression²¹.

The second half of the 19th century witnessed the second industrial revolution, the shift from the textile industry to iron and shipbuilding. By the end of the century, Clydeside became the single most important shipbuilding centre in the UK and the Scottish economy was dominated by a closely knit network of family firms. Already in the 1870's, the family dynasties on the Clydeside had

²¹Dickson mentioned as an example a meeting on June 16th 1819 in Glasgow of 35,000-40,000 people who asked the Prince Regent for financial support to enable them to emigrate to the colonies (Dickson, 1980, 176).

consolidated their position as a cosmopolitan elite, proud of their ability to trade and invest on an international scale. Considering the role of the shipbuilding industry in the economic relations within the Empire, it is not surprising to find that Scottish capitalists were vociferous supporters of free trade²². Although overall similarities prevailed between the Scottish and the English economic structure, the former set itself apart from the latter through the extent of its bias towards heavy industry, particularly heavy engineering and shipbuilding.

Scottish identity persisted in the 19th century, but was not connected with political claims. The National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights (1853), a short-lived movement which got support from both Liberals and Conservatives, was mainly concerned with the defence of Scottish institutions and never developed a serious campaign with popular support (Webb, 1978, 37). The campaign of the 1880's for a Scottish secretary limited itself to arguments of greater administrative efficiency through decentralisation and was led by some prominent aristocrats such as the Earl of Rosebery, the Earl of Fife and the Duke of Argyll. That post had been abolished in the aftermath of the 1745 Highland revolts. When it was granted in 1885 by the Liberal government, the effect of this measure was an increase in the assimilation of Scottish and English affairs (Harvie, 1977, 34).

According to Harvie, the weakness of nationalism in Scotland throughout the 19th century was the "inevitable consequence of the entente between emotive nationalism and effective unionism" (Harvie, 1977, 40). Scotland did not harbour economic grievances with respect to England, and her religious and educational institutions remained committed to the Union. Being nationalist in a country which benefited from the Union and imperialism did not make much sense.

²²The Anti-Corn Law League is an example of the free trade stance of the Scottish bourgeoisie which also gained support from the working class. This is in total contrast to the protectionist agitation of the Catalan bourgeoisie around the same time.

benefited from the Union and imperialism did not make much sense. This seemed to have been the prevailing opinion even during the Scottish home rule debate of the late 19th century, which was only a weak reflection of the long-standing home rule demands of neighbouring Ireland.

4.2. The home rule movement in Scotland

The home rule movement in Scotland emerged in the late 19th century under the influence of the far more deeply rooted movement in Ireland. In contrast to the Irish movement, the Scottish Home Rule Association (1886) lacked broad popular support and mainly concentrated on issues of decentralisation and greater autonomy which concerned more those sectors of the middle class which were involved with Scottish institutions. The home rulers followed a strategy of working within the political system through the established political parties. Several private member bills were presented to the House of Commons where support was not strong enough to grant any success.

While the Irish Home Rule Movement became more radical and popular during the first world war (D. Williams, 1966; Hachey, 1977, 130-200), its Scottish offspring retreated into insignificance. Considering the difference in the roles of Scotland and Ireland in the British empire (Cullen and Smout, 1977, 3-18), this is readily understood.

The lack of success of the home rule movement has been explained by analysts with the fact that it did not have the backing of any social class. The industrial bourgeoisie abandoned the Liberal Party when it became too supportive of Home Rule, and found its interests better served in the staunchly unionist Conservative Party. The middle class, which was often the driving force in nationalist movements of the 19th century, also saw their interests connected to the empire. Many of those who emigrated from Scotland were skilled workers from the Lowlands, craftsmen, clerks and weavers; their role in government service, trade missions and capital investment in the

British empire inhibited a fully fledged Scottish nationalist movement (Harvie, 1977, 96). There were links between home rule and Scottish radical politics, particularly during and after the Highland land struggles (of crofters against landlords), which were put down by government troops under the Conservatives in 1886. The political activism of the radical crofters was, however, only a late response to a process of marginalisation, eviction and peasant repression which had been going on for many decades already, and could not be a dominant force in Scottish politics. But it was supported in the 1880's by "middle-class Gaelic revivalists" and trade unions in the Lowlands. This may account for the supportive attitude of the Labour movement under Hardie towards land reform and home rule (Keating and Bleimann, 1979, 46).

When the Liberal Party, which championed the home rule movement, split over Irish home rule in 1886, the Scottish Labour movement, which gradually emerged from the ruins of the Liberal Party, adopted the home rule issue. For the first and second decade of the 20th century, however, the Labour Party concentrated its efforts on trying to conquer a place on the British political stage (Dickson, 1980, 269). But after the First World War, which had brought about the defeat of empires like the Ottoman and the Austrian-Hungarian, the right of small nations to govern themselves gained greater acceptance, and home rule was put back on the Labour Party agenda. The Scottish Home Rule Association involved many Labour MPs during the 1920's, who brought several home rule bills into the House of Commons. Keating and Bleimann see the reason for Labour's commitment in the great post-war confidence in the Scottish economy and the socialist potential of the Scottish population. This confidence dissipated fast, along with the interest in home rule, when the economic depression began to be felt in Scotland. More general developments such as the economic crisis of the inter-war period and the expansion of state bureaucracy brought Scotland and England closer together.

"The First World War effectively closed the option of devolution as a settlement for British political ills.(...) [T]he economic and political impact of total war greatly accelerated the assimilation of Scottish institutions, and



enhanced the power of the British agencies, while the economic upheavals it caused brought an end to the relative prosperity the nation had enjoyed in the British economy."

(Harvie, 1977, 43)

The Labour Party distanced itself from the unsuccessful home rule movement in the course of the 1920's. This eventually led to the foundation of the National Party of Scotland in 1928.

The home rule movement also lacked a cultural component, vital in other national movements and also in the Irish struggle for home rule. Unlike the Catalan 19th century renaissance, which was booming in bourgeois circles, Scottish literature did not provoke a growth in national identity in similar circles here. This led Fry to claim that

"the lack of much culture to be proud of deprived cultural nationalism of political force.(...) The real motor of national feeling was the pride the Scots felt in the rapid development of their country and its contribution to the Union."

(Fry, 1987, 204).

In the 1920's, this changed in so far as a modest cultural revival began in Scotland. However, it did not influence Scottish public opinion, at least not markedly. As in the 19th century, the cause of devolution was the playground for eccentrics.

To summarise therefore, nationalism never became a political force, as it did in Catalonia during this period, because the economic development of the country ensured that the interests of the bourgeoisie (and later also of the working class) were taken care of in the union with England.

5. CATALONIA: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE REGIONALIST PERIOD (1892-1923)

This section deals with the development of Catalan political nationalism at the end of the 19th century and the political hegemony of the nationalist party, the *Lliga Regionalista*.

5.1 The politicisation of Catalan nationalism

According to Vicens i Vives, the "Bases de Manresa" in 1892 constitute a turning point in the catalanist movement, turning towards a more political and more nationalist attitude. In Manresa, the **Unió Regionalista** had its first assembly during which the political programme of autonomy was formulated for the first time. The "Bases de Manresa" therefore heralded the beginning of political nationalism (Vicens i Vives, 1979, vol. VI, 262). The assembly was dominated by a new generation of Catalan intellectuals, who had grown up with the cultural renaissance and learned to take the particular features of Catalan culture as a fact. The **Centre Escolar Catalanista**, founded in 1886, was a centre of political formation for several of the future leaders of the **Unió Regionalista**, which was later reshaped and became the **Lliga Regionalista**. The **Lliga** was formed in 1901 under the leadership of Prat de la Riba, integrating the political and cultural associations in which the nationalists were organised.

Solé-Tura, however, takes a more structuralist view in declaring 1898 the event which marked the transition to nationalism. Before this date,

"the Catalan high bourgeoisie was able to identify itself with the conservative regionalism of people such as Mañé y Flaquer²³, and asked for little more than a good protectionist policy, a modest degree of decentralisation and a well-founded conservatism which would help it to maintain its hegemony in Catalonia and to secure the consensus of the Catalan masses."

(Solé-Tura, 1970, 288)

In 1898, when Spain lost control over its last colonies in the war with the USA, the bourgeoisie lost faith in the central government and turned to the Catalanist movement. In November 1898, the presidents of five of the most influential institutions of the

²³ Director of the Diario de Barcelona, the leading newspaper in the capital.

Catalan bourgeoisie²⁴ presented a proposal to the monarch which included an economic agreement and the suggestion of creating a single province of Catalonia and of adjusting vocational training to the needs of Catalan industry (Llorens, 1979, 382). Most of the presidents were to head the electoral list of the *Lliga Regionalista* three years later.

The loss of the colonies in 1898 was a disaster for Catalan industries, particularly textile manufacturing, which did not recover from the loss of protection and guaranteed external market. Borja de Riquer noted that after 1882, when the Law of Trading Relations with the Antilles was introduced, the Catalan textile exports to the colonies had become an important outlet for the textile industry. In 1896, exports had risen to 22 per cent of total production. In 1898, it had dropped to 13 per cent and was reduced further to reach 7 per cent in 1901, when the *Lliga Regionalista* was founded (Riquer, 1977, 67). This put the textile industry, which was generally small-scale²⁵, dispersed and not very modern, under severe pressure.

The military defeat undermined the legitimacy of the Spanish state. It resulted in a loss of influence in the political and economic scene abroad and in a financial and economic crisis developing at home, and created a political vacuum which in Catalonia benefited the *Lliga Regionalista*. The events of 1898 provoked the economic leaders to withdraw their support of the Spanish parties and become involved in the foundation and the leadership of a Catalan party, the *Lliga Regionalista*. The *Lliga* drew on the intellectuals and

²⁴Involved were Domènech i Montaner from the *Ateneu*, Joan Sallarès from the *Foment del Treball Nacional*, Dr. Robert from the *Societat Econòmica d'Amics del País*, Carles de Camps from the *Institut Agrícola Català de Sant Isidre* and Sebastià Torres from the *Lliga de Defensa Industrial i Comercial*.

²⁵Jutglar maintained that between 1904 and 1906, Catalonia had 3,000 mostly small and dispersed cotton factories which employed around 125,000 workers, out of a total of 250,000 to 300,000 industrial workers (Jutglar, 1982, vol. VII, 87-88).

ideologies which had grown in the seed beds of the cultural and political associations, but the crucial aspect was the fact that many industrialists now threw their weight behind the regionalistes. The continuous rise in national political consciousness over the latter half of the 19th century, which was taking root particularly in the middle classes - though to varying extent - was a precondition of the post-1898 developments in Catalonia. Although the foundation of the Lliga Regionalista was an important step on the road to the distinctive political world of Catalonia in the 1930's, it did not signify a break of the Catalan establishment with the Spanish state. In fact, the history of the Lliga shows that it retained interest in Spanish politics and nourished plans to reform the political system, rather than breaking out of it.

5.2 The hegemony of bourgeois nationalism under the Lliga

Nationalism helped the Catalan bourgeoisie to establish itself as the ruling class. Presenting the Spanish government as the main opponent of the Catalan people, the Lliga soon developed its central political argument and argued that

"the free initiative of the Catalans, on the margin of the centralist State, is the only thing that can solve the problems of Catalonia."

(Riquer, 1977, 237)

This served two purposes, firstly to present class conflict - as surfaced during the course of 1902²⁶ - as a small problem between employers and workers, easily resolved with "bona voluntat per part de tothom"²⁷ if only the central state would let them get on with

²⁶In 1902, a general strike developed in Barcelona which was put down with the help of the military. This was the first of several occasions in which class conflicts were "solved" with violence from the centre without provoking criticism from the camp of the Lliga. In the strikes and riots of 1919, the Lliga took a more active stance by calling upon the government to restore order in the Catalan capital.

²⁷"with the good will of everyone"

it. Secondly, a basic precondition for success of the **Lliga** was to avoid being identified as a simple instrument of the bourgeoisie. The party needed the support of other social groups in order to assume the role as a representative of the Catalans as a nation (Riquer, 1977, 234-5).

Francesc Cambó, who became the political leader of the **Lliga** in the early 20th century (while Prat de la Riba was something like the spiritual leader) and defined its political strategy, maintained these tendencies, but was at the same time careful not to lose contact with the central state or the Spanish monarchs. While the **Lliga** was dominating Catalan politics, it did not make moves in the direction of separatism, but rather tried to gain a foothold in Spanish politics. In this sense, it was a continuation and intensification of the policy of putting pressure on the state which prevailed in the 19th century.

The **Lliga** was always torn between its claims to represent the whole Catalan nation, and the real political and economic interests which dominated the party. After the loss of its liberal wing in 1904 (**El Poble Català**), the **Lliga** became more conservative, although it always tried to widen its popular base. One of the more successful attempts was the electoral alliance **Solidaritat Catalana**, which gained 41 of the 44 Catalan seats in the Cortes in 1907 and helped to establish the **Lliga** as the major political force in Catalonia. The smaller catalanist, Carlist and Republican parties which formed part of the **Solidaritat** soon went their own ways, but the experience served as an example for the power of national feelings in the short term. But over the years it became obvious²⁸ that the social conflicts which were widening the gap between the principal representatives of political nationalism and the organisations of the working class were more significant, dissolving rather quickly the illusions of inter-class solidarity that had remained from the experience of the **Solidaritat Catalana**. It must also be mentioned

²⁸The **Setmana Tràgica** was an early signal in 1909.

that the working class associations and unions did not take part in the **Solidaritat Catalana**, but formed their own alliance, **Solidaridad Obrera**, which constituted an important step towards organised syndicalism. However, since the bulk of the workers was disfranchised and lacked a powerful organisation, consent from that sector of the Catalan population was not seen as relevant or necessary. In the aftermath of the riots of 1909, and based on the **Solidaridad Catalana**, the **CNT**²⁹ (**Confederación Nacional de Trabajo**) was formed in Catalonia. It was to become the most important workers' organisation in the next three decades.

Although support from the working class was not achieved, the **Lliga** did succeed in its appeal to some sectors of the urban middle class. In this context, its control of the provincial government of Barcelona and its resources was relevant, for it was under Prat de la Riba's leadership of Barcelona that the process of modernisation of infrastructure began in Barcelona. It was extended to the other three provinces when the central government finally conceded permission to form joint provincial administrations³⁰. This law was published at the end of 1913, and in April 1914 the **Mancomunitat** of Catalunya was formed, with the support of all political parties. Prat de la Riba was elected president unanimously (Benet, 1964, 13).

While no decentralisation of power over resources from the centre was involved, the **Mancomunitat** made a strong impact in the field of administration and services, renowned for their poor quality in

²⁹The Catalan anarcho-syndicalists were the driving force in the foundation of the **CNT** in 1910. Its roots lay with the **Solidaridad Obrera**, created as a working class response to the bourgeois **Solidaritat Catalana** in 1907, which then became the **Federación Regional**. The **Federación** gave birth to the (Spanish-wide) **CNT** in 1910 (Ucelay da Cal, 1982, 80). In its first congress, 30,000 members were represented; in 1919, the **CNT** had 714,028 members, of which 427,000 were living in Catalonia (Jutglar, 1982, vol. VII, 269-275).

³⁰Already in 1898, the proposal of the five presidents was to merge the four provincial governments into one single administration covering the whole of Catalonia. This aim was also pursued by the **Lliga Regionalista**, as a first step towards Catalan autonomy.

Spain. Despite its weak powers and scarce resources, the **Mancomunitat** became an important political and symbolic power base for the **Lliga**. It is not surprising that the following years are regarded as the years of the **Lliga**'s hegemony; and that Cambó felt encouraged to increase pressure for reform of a Spanish political system that was no longer able to function.

"The **Lliga** was indeed capable of mobilising the communal spirit, and the scope of its campaigns in those years evidently went beyond the limited perspective of a political party. However, this is precisely one of the characteristics of inter-classist movements, which are able to exploit ambiguities to their own advantage. It was after the victory in the general elections of April 1916 that the men of the **Lliga** openly decided to transcend their party political perspectives in order to mobilise a broader spectrum of public opinion."

(Jutglar, 1982, vol. VII, 323)

In other words, the **Lliga** appealed to the nationalist sentiment in order to press for more autonomy. Again, an alliance with other Catalan parties was required. The **Assemblea de Parlamentaris**³¹, which was supposed to achieve this, failed, and in the climate of sharpening social conflict, the **Lliga** decided to leave the course of confrontation and work with the central government instead. In 1918, attempts were undertaken by both the **Lliga**³², the **Mancomunitat**³³ and the Spanish government to make a statute of autonomy for Catalonia, but the plan never advanced beyond the formation of a commission.

³¹This assembly was an attempt in 1917 by the **Lliga Regionalista** to set up a Catalan assembly with the Catalan members of Parliament in order to question the legitimacy of the constitutional setup and to push for greater autonomy.

³²The **Lliga** polled the local government bodies on the issue of autonomy, and found that 98% were in favour of a greater degree of autonomy (Jutglar, 1982, vol. VII, 329).

³³The **Mancomunitat** used the nationalist euphoria at the end of the First World War to announce to the Spanish government that

"At this solemn moment in world history, which vindicates the principle of the collective right of nations to govern themselves freely (...), the Catalans address the Government and the Spanish people to convey their desire to govern Catalan affairs autonomously."

(I. Molas, 1974, 140)

5.3 Class struggle and the end of bourgeois aspirations to autonomy

Under the impact of the post-war depression and due to the increasing strength of the anarcho-syndicalist workers' movement, class struggle became the priority in Catalonia between 1918 and 1923, while the nationalist conflict took the backseat.

It was mentioned above that the majority of the Catalan working class was not represented through any of the political parties in Catalonia. The relatively small republican and social-democratic Catalanist parties (the UFNR, the *Unió Catalanista*, the *Partit Republicà Català*, the *Federació Democràtica Nacionalista* and the *Acció Catalana* (1922), a split-off from the *Lliga*³⁴) - were critical of the *Lliga*, but had no real support among the workers, although they aimed at an alliance between the petty bourgeoisie and the working class (Molas, 1974, 138). Late attempts to bridge the gap between the CNT and the left-wing Catalan parties were doomed to failure in the atmosphere of open class struggle which opened with a big strike wave in 1919. The divisions between the small bourgeoisie and the workers became obvious during these years. From a safe distance, the progressive middle classes in Catalonia identified with the small nations involved in the world war and followed with great interest the peace negotiations which seemed to settle the national questions in Europe. The post-war economic and political crisis shattered their social-democratic illusions very quickly:

"In the atmosphere of radicalisation and hardening of the class struggle in Barcelona, under the impact of the Canadenca strike in February 1919, the interclassist dreams of the petty bourgeoisie dissolved before the direct confrontation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The petty bourgeoisie, the Catalan Left - i.e. the left-wing catalanists and the Catalan republicans - was dreaming about the "new world" of nations, of progress and peace. The

³⁴The two presidents of the Catalan government during the Second Republic, came from such small petty bourgeois parties; Macià from the *Federació Democràtica Nacionalista* and Companys from the *Partit Republicà Català* (I. Molas, 1974, 138).

workers, however, the proletariat organised by the anarcho-syndicalist and revolutionary CNT, were thinking about a different "new world" born in 1917: that of the Soviets."

(Ucelay da Cal, 1978, 57)

Thus, it had become impossible for the Lliga and for the small parties to the Left to reconcile the different social classes with a nationalist project. Unable to cope with a working class which had learned to fight back, the Lliga and the Catalan bourgeoisie called on the central state for military aid, which came in the form of a 7 year dictatorship. It was only under the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930) that inter-class political projects involving the working class began to develop.

Thus, Catalan nationalism was consolidated in the hands of the bourgeoisie after the loss of the last Spanish colonies. Though the Lliga Regionalista appealed to the Catalan people as a whole and for some time managed to maintain hegemony, it failed to obtain the support of the bulk of the working class.

In the following section, the marginal role of Scottish political nationalism in the first half of the 20th century is examined. It argues that the main reason for lack of popular support for nationalism in Scotland was the confidence in the management abilities of the central state.

6. THE SCOTTISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND CENTRALISED ECONOMIC PLANNING IN THE 20TH CENTURY

In the period of depression after the first world war, a Scottish cultural revival began which marked a notable difference to the 19th century, although it occurred on a much smaller scale than the Catalan renaissance of the last century. In the first place, it

affected poetry³⁵ and involved the rediscovery of the minority languages in Scotland. The most renowned poet of the period, the communist and nationalist Hugh MacDiarmid, wrote mostly in Scots. Like the Catalan writers of the renaixença, the Scottish literary movement wanted to connect with the tradition of the 15th and 16th century, i.e. with pre-union literature, but the socio-economic circumstances for such an undertaking were quite different. A great increase in magazines and publications was registered, but there was no galvanising process of intellectuals around particular magazines and associations as there had been in Catalonia. Some young writers created the Scottish National Movement in 1926 (Hanham, 1967, 153), and played a prominent role in the creation of the first nationalist party, the National Party of Scotland (NPS). Hanham saw an obvious connection between nationalism and Scottish culture in the late 1920's.

"The Scottish literary renaissance had stood for the principle that the Scottish nation needed a Scottish literary class to give meaning and depth to its culture and to put Scotland on the map of Europe".

(Hanham, 1967, 162)

However, this was a minority of intellectuals in a very marginal political movement, which soon abandoned ideas of cultural revival and social justice and became a campaigning body for Scottish autonomy. When the NSP joined with the conservative and moderate devolutionist Scottish Party in 1934 to form the Scottish National Party, many intellectuals left the party, among them MacDiarmid. In 1967, he would criticise the SNP for its lack of interest in Scotland's cultural predicament, arguing that he did not believe that a nation could be regenerated by arguments based on statistics or improved business techniques (Grieve, 1969, 228). But the lack of a cultural argument in Scottish political nationalism remained a constant. The SNP of the 1930's, however, had different priorities.

³⁵Some of the most important names in Scottish poetry are Norman MacCaig, George Mackay Brown and Dan Crichton Smith writing in English, Sydney Goodsir Smith, Alexander Scott, Robert Garioch, Albert Mackie, Tom Law and Hugh MacDiarmid in Scots, and Sorley MacLean and George Campbell Hay in Gaelic.

A very marginal political force, its leadership tried to widen the base of support by making home rule the common ground, but it could not increase its popularity³⁶.

Meanwhile, the other parties' interest in devolution had become very low key. Home rule became a fossil in their political programmes which were increasingly geared to centralist planning, particularly in the Labour Party:

"(...) from the 1930s, the old Home Rule concept itself became redundant with the party's move to a philosophy state planning and centralised economic management."

(Keating, 1983, p. 29)

This interest in state intervention in the economy was strengthened considerably under the impression of the inter-war crisis, the deepest capitalist crisis experienced so far. It called not for decentralisation, but for a strong state which could influence the capitalist forces.

In this context, one must consider the peculiar situation of the Scottish economy. For several decades, it had suffered from decline in textile and heavy industries as capital was invested abroad in the empire and competition became stronger from late developers in other parts of Europe. To the structural crisis came the world economic depression. In the first half of the 1930s, when the economic crisis was at its worst, Scotland's unemployment was always above 25 per cent (Foster and Woolfson, 1986, 86-87). In the face of economic and social crisis, the Labour Party supported centralised economic planning, which was in conflict with ideas of decentralisation and self-government. The Conservative Party was also in favour of a greater role for the government in economic affairs. Thus, there existed from the 1930's onwards a consensus

³⁶In 1929, the NPS got 3,000 votes, which it increased in 1931 to 20,000. In 1935, the SNP received 29,000 and maintained the same level in 1945 (30,000), inspite of the by-election victory of Robert McIntyre during the war-time electoral truce between the main parties.

which favoured a strong, powerful government and went completely against the aims that the Scottish nationalists were pursuing.

This consensus also included most of the Scottish population. During the war and the post-war reconstruction, the role of the state in economic planning expanded phenomenally. In the post-war labour government, Thomas Johnston, who had helped in revitalising the Scottish Home Rule movement in 1918, was Secretary for Scotland and

"succeeded in identifying the Labour Party at British level and the 1945 administration in particular, with the aspirations of the Scottish people as a whole for full national development and for control over their economy."

(Foster and Woolfson, 1986, 97)

Thus, Scottish political nationalism, which just began to organise itself at a time of economic disaster, all but disappeared under a wave of British national solidarity during the war, and only maintained a meagre existence on the margins of serious politics. It was unable to get its message through in a period where all hope seemed to lie with a benevolent and strong state. A sector of the SNP, including its chairman, reacted to this by moving back to the home rule approach of the 1920's and building up contacts with other parties in order to prepare the ground for a National Convention. The increasing antagonism between separatists and home rulers in the SNP erupted in 1942, when the home rulers left the party and eventually set up the Scottish Conventional Association. Between 1949 and 1952, the SCA allegedly collected 2.5 million signatures in favour of a Scottish parliament with devolved powers over Scottish affairs (Webb, 1978, 66), but could not convert this general support into a popular political movement. However, there are some signs that the labour movement took notice of these developments and tried to counteract a dangerous politicisation of national feelings. The Scottish Trade Union Congress began to voice demands for a Scottish cabinet, warning of a resurgence of nationalism, and resolved in 1948 that it

"deplores the trend towards Scottish Nationalism which is revealing itself in the Scottish TU movement, and driving us to support uneconomic projects. Congress believes that Scottish culture and traditions will be preserved by their

own strength and virility without the need for exploiting Nationalist sentiments."

(quoted in Tuckett, 1986, 323)

Although the SCA revealed that support for more devolution was widespread and succeeded in raising the nationalistic tone of the 1945 election campaign, it neither provoked a change in policies of the British parties nor a larger share of the vote for the SNP. Scottish nationalism presented no danger to established unionist politics until the 1960's.

In conclusion, the Scottish Nationalist Party was formed at a time when the economic crisis forged a British consensus over the need for a strong, centralised state. Despite the existence of a Scottish national identity which was at times showing its strength, a political nationalist project had only very marginal support during this period. Meanwhile, the Catalan nationalist movement gained support from the broad masses and succeeded to seize political power in Catalonia, as the following section describes.

7. POPULAR NATIONALISM IN CATALONIA (1923-1939)

During the dictatorship of Franco de Rivera, the repression of Catalan nationalism and of the anarcho-syndicalist and the Republican political organisations created the conditions for a popular nationalism that was no longer defined by the bourgeoisie. After seven years of dictatorship, popular nationalism brought about the first Catalan government in 1931, condoned by the new Republican Government in Madrid.

7.1 The reaction to the Rivera dictatorship in Catalonia

The military coup which the Catalan bourgeoisie had supported in 1923 put an end to parliamentary politics. There were two main reasons why the military decided to topple the government. Firstly, they perceived that the Spanish state was no longer able to contain the demands for autonomy in the peripheries. Cambó's assembly of

elected Catalan representatives was one indicator. The struggle between the different regional bourgeoisies for supremacy had become uncontrollable. The second reason was the escalation of class struggle in the aftermath of the first world war.

In both conflicts, Catalonia played a central role. The class conflict was particularly strong in the industrial parts of Catalonia. In order to crush the working class organisations and to suppress strikes and riots, the Catalan bourgeoisie was collaborating with the government, thus demonstrating that class solidarity came before national solidarity. The new dictator, Primo de Rivera, was welcomed by the leaders of the Lliga and the bourgeoisie. But when he began to deal with the two roots of "evil", many middle and upper class Catalan nationalists soon realised that they were also considered part of the "dangerous viruses" in society. Rivera prohibited nationalist and Catalanist organisations³⁷ and national symbols³⁸. Parties, although not prohibited as such, could no longer exercise their political functions. The official use of the Catalan language, which had been promoted under the Mancomunitat, was now forbidden, and the Mancomunitat itself was abolished in 1925. The working class organisations were more vulnerable and suffered greatly under the repression. The CNT was prohibited in 1924 and became clandestine.

The concurrent repression of civil rights, political nationalism and the workers' movement created the conditions for a broad popular opposition to the authoritarian regime, as it did later under Franco. The republican and socialist wing of Catalan nationalism

³⁷This included organisations which were not strictly political, such as the youth organisation *Pomells de Joventut*, Catalan choral societies (*orfeus*), and the CADCI (Centre Autonomista de Dependents del Comerç i de la Indústria) (Jutglar, 1982, vol. VIII, 14).

³⁸The Real Decreto de la Defensa de la Unidad Nacional of September 1923 signalled the beginning of an aggressive type of Spanish nationalism which reached its peak in the 1940's under Franco. It prohibited the public display of national symbols such as the Catalan flag.

gained support. The **Estat Català** (1922) served as a focal organisation for the separatist and nationalist groups and gained strength under the leadership of Francesc Macià, who went into French exile like other political opponents of the regime. After several plans to overthrow the dictatorship through military groups of separatists, communists and anarchists failed, the republicans in Catalonia formed an alliance which became the centre of oppositional activity. The weekly newspaper **L'Opinió**³⁹ became the main voice of the opposition on the left (Jutglar, 1982, vol. VIII, 27), which in the final years of the dictatorship tried to gain political control over the huge, disparate body of the CNT, the key to revolutionary change (Ucelay da Cal, 1982, 104).

Even some sectors of the industrial and the intellectual bourgeoisie which had initially supported the coup turned away from the regime. Vilar described the atmosphere among the intellectuals in 1927 as very Catalanist and anti-Spanish, and observed that close links existed between the industrialists and the intellectuals⁴⁰. By the end of the decade, almost the entire Catalan civil society was alienated from the Spanish regime under General Rivera, and favoured a democratic autonomous government for Catalonia.

7.2 The first Catalan government: hegemony of popular nationalism

In the final years of the dictatorship, several interim governments were established and revolutionary plans were formed by political

³⁹This journal was the creation of a group of young, wealthy professionals who sympathised with the ideas of the **Comité Revolucionari de Catalunya**, led by the republican Companys (who later became the second president of the Generalitat) (Ucelay da Cal, 1982, 99-100).

⁴⁰"Rare were the industrialists and eminent businessmen among those whom I visited who were not poets or folklorists; and few writers or painters were not regular visitors of the **Ateneu** (Vilar, 1980, 532). The **Ateneu Barcelonès** was one of the most important cultural institutions which the bourgeoisie set up in the 19th century, and has been an intellectual and social centre for the educated Barcelonean upper - and later also the middle - classes.

groups to get rid of them. The negotiations in Catalonia between republicans and nationalists made progress in 1930, when an alliance was formed which agreed on a formula of Catalan autonomy. Republicans and nationalists consisted of many small groups many of which had their basis in geographically dispersed cultural institutions and other popular meeting places⁴¹. Macià, the separatist leader who had gained a reputation as a revolutionary hero in the unsuccessful coup attempt in 1926, was the figure around which the different groups assembled⁴². A loose party organisation, the **Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)**, was finally formed in March 1931, just a month before the municipal elections which the monarchic government was forced to concede and which brought its demise. The **ERC** won the elections, Macià returned from exile and declared Catalonia a republic, and Lluís Companys, the new leader of the city council in Barcelona, declared Spain a federal republic.

The situation was brought under control by the new Republican central government which acknowledged the provisional Catalan government (**Generalitat**) under Macià's leadership in exchange for a moderation of Catalan republican and nationalist aspirations. A commission of the **Generalitat** worked out a Catalan constitution (**Estatut d'Autonomia de Nuria**) which received the consent of the majority of the Catalans (80 per cent participation) in the referendum of August 1931. Due to the right-wing and centralist opposition which the proposal of Nuria encountered in the Spanish establishment and in parliament, it was watered down considerably

⁴¹Important Catalan republican nuclei were in Reus (**Andreu i Abelló's Centre Nacionalista Republicà**), Lleida (**La Joventut Republicana** under Humbert Torres), Girona (**Miquel Santaló**) and Sant Feliu de Gúixols (**Josep Irla**), among many others (Ucelay da Cal, 1982, 118).

⁴²He was described by Ucelay da Cal as "a rich land owner who had abandoned comfort and wealth in order to defend the national cause and the oppressed; he was an elegant gentleman, well connected in the Catalan rural and urban society, and friendly with important company lawyers as well as with anarchists and communists, whom he met in exile. He was a revolutionary who embodied reform and self-determination, but who also served as a guarantee of civic peace. These were natural conditions for the role of a charismatic leader." (Ucelay da Cal, 1982, 115)

when it was finally approved by the **Cortes** (the Spanish parliament) in September 1932. The Catalan **Generalitat** however decided to accept the Statute, even though it was far cry from the separatist ideas President Macià had been nurturing during the 1920's.

Considering the long tradition of Spanish centralism and the recent experience of reactionary and anti-autonomist government, neither the opposition to the Catalan desire for autonomy, nor ultimately the compromise, were surprising. However, there were critical voices which particularly resented the lack of legislative powers of the Republican Generalitat, as Jutglar's assessment shows:

"In fact, the Catalan autonomy of 1932 was not real autonomy, but rather a wide ranging process of decentralisation. And despite its wide range, this decentralisation in practice ended up becoming something similar to what the **Mancomunitat** of Catalonia had been during the Restoration (...)".

(Jutglar, 1982, vol. VIII, 89)

Nevertheless, the Catalan nationalist movement achieved in 1932 what its Scottish counterpart could then only dream of: a parliament and a government. Despite their limited resources and powers, they consolidated national political identity and accentuated the distinctiveness of Catalan society. This process, however, was accompanied by conflicts and contradictions which only six years later erupted in the Spanish Civil War.

7.3 The sharpening of socio-economic and political conflicts in the 1930's

Several levels of conflict disrupted Catalan politics in the 1930's. Firstly, there was an ongoing conflict over political priorities between the **Generalitat** and the Spanish government. The political situation in Catalonia was very different from that in the rest of Spain, and the same can be said about the economic problems which dominated the 1930's. While in Catalonia the social conflicts were those of an industrial society, the most important task in many Spanish regions remained agrarian reform. The republicans in Catalonia, and more precisely the **ERC**, had to find support among the

urban working class, the syndicates and the smallholders, and were therefore interested in quite different policies. In addition, the tensions increased between the **Generalitat** and the government in Madrid when the latter became conservative in the 1933 elections, while the **ERC** maintained its power in Catalonia. Within the Catalan context, it should be remembered that the **CNT** regained strength very rapidly in the Republic and became increasingly militant as the economic crisis began to affect Catalan industry⁴³. This sharpened the social climate in the cities, while in the countryside, the demands of the smallholders for a land ownership and tenure reform became louder. Finally, the dominant party, **ERC**, born as a conglomerate of small parties, groups and movements, was a heterogeneous structure with separatist, federalist and conservative catalanist wings (Gatell, 1983, 78), which were difficult to keep together after the party leader, Macià, had died in 1933.

The conflicts erupted in autumn 1934, after the Generalitat had made an agricultural reform law in order to accommodate the demands of the rural tenants⁴⁴. In doing this, the Generalitat took on the land owners which were mainly represented by the **Institut Agrícola Català de Sant Isidre**. The right-wing central government disputed the competence of the Generalitat in the field of social legislation, and thus turned social conflict into constitutional conflict. With the partial support of the Catalan Government, the more radical nationalists took this as an opportunity to revolt and declare Catalonia an autonomous republic. No spontaneous popular support was forthcoming and the central government did not find it difficult to

⁴³Though much less severe than in the more developed industrial states in Europe, unemployment rose in Catalonia from 3.6% in 1931 to 7.4% in 1933, 7.9% in 1935 and 10.7% in 1936 (Jutglar, 1982, vol. VII, 104).

⁴⁴The delicate balance between landlords and tenants in Catalonia had been disturbed since the late 19th century, when a wine disease led to the removal of many vineyards and the long-term tenures connected with them. Loss of markets and overproduction put increasing pressure on the tenants, many of whom became militants in the **Unió de Rabassaires i altres obrers del camp** (Union of wine growers and other land labourers), formed in 1922 (Bacells, 1978, 27).

thwart this badly organised revolt. As a result, the autonomous regime was suspended and the Catalan government imprisoned.

The state of emergency in Catalonia was not lifted until mid-1935. A governor was appointed by the central government. But in the following elections in February 1936, the **Popular Front** won in Spain and Catalonia⁴⁵. This returned the Catalan government under Companys, who were released from prison.

In the few months before the military uprising began on July 18, 1936, Catalonia was described as an "oasis of peace" compared with other parts of Spain which were riddled with violence (Benet, 1978, 12). This vision supports the argument that Catalonia, far from being the cause of the uprising of the right-wing army, was forced into the war because the republican values were so deeply rooted there. The revolt of the military was at the same time a revolt of the Catholic clergy, the Spanish nationalists and the upper classes who felt increasingly threatened by the populist government.

During the civil war, which was triggered off by the "nationalist" military uprising in July 1936, Catalonia was part of the Republican zone and put up a vigorous defence of the Republican government. This is not the place to discuss in detail the international, Spanish and Catalan implications and complications of the war. It should be mentioned, however, that the war was accompanied from the beginning by revolutionary changes in the Republican zone (initiated by the anarchist and socialist syndicates), which were reversed in 1937 by the government's recovery of power on the one hand, and the rise of the communist party under the tutelage of the Soviet Union on the other. The communists played an important role in the fight against revolutionary socialists and syndicalists, which was particularly fierce in Catalonia. Only a few days after the

⁴⁵In Catalonia, the popular front was called **Front d'Esquerres**, and consisted mostly of Catalan parties, such as the **ERC**, the **Unió Socialista de Catalunya (USC)**, the **PCP (Partit Català Proletari)**, the **PCC (Partit Comunista de Catalunya)** and the **Partit Sindicalista**.

beginning of the civil war, the Catalan communists had merged⁴⁶ to form the **Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC)**. Thus, apart from the war between republicans and the "nationalist" under the leadership of General Franco, there was also fighting within the Catalan Republican zone between revolutionary anarchists and communists⁴⁷.

In September 1938, the Francoist troops began to occupy Catalonia, reaching Barcelona in January 1939. The war had disastrous effects on the population and the economy and caused deep divisions in Catalonia. However, the actions of the victorious Francoists later enabled commentators to argue that 1939 brought the defeat of **all** Catalans, whether Republican or "nationalist". According to Benet, even those who as individuals saw their interests - relating to their class position, religious beliefs or ideology - represented by the Francoists, soon found out that as members of the Catalan nation, they were the losers of the war (Benet, 1978, 16). Ucelay da Cal's interpretation demonstrates how Republican and the autonomist experience were welded together in Catalonia, not least in the perception of the Francoists:

"The fall of Catalonia was objectively the end of the Second Republic, and Francoism proved a brutal historic break. (...) The military occupation government which was imposed in 1939 had learned the lessons of the past. It was no longer prepared to act like the dictatorship under Primo de Rivera, which carried out political repression while allowing Catalan culture to flourish. This [had laid the foundations which] made a political revival easy once the dictatorship disappeared. The task which the Nueva España took on in Catalonia entailed precisely the destruction of

⁴⁶The **PSUC** was formed on July 21st, 1936, as a result of the fusion of four parties, the **Partit Comunista Català**, the **Unió Socialista de Catalunya**, the **Federació Catalana del Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)** and the **Partit Català Proletari**.

⁴⁷See Borkenau, 1963; Orwell, 1984; and Chomsky, 1969.

everything connected with populist Catalonia."

(Ucelay da Cal, 1982, 356)

Thus, the experience of repression under the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera united the Catalans to an unprecedented degree. Catalan nationalism became linked with the struggle for democracy and social justice, and when the republicans gained power in 1931, popular pressure for an autonomous government in Catalonia was stronger than ever. After the anti-separatist, Spanish nationalist side had brought down the Republican regime, which had given the Catalans a limited degree of autonomy, repression of Catalan nationalism resumed. But this second dictatorship, too, was faced with an opposition which was strengthened by a sense of national identity.

8. THE CATALANS UNDER THE DICTATORSHIP IN THE 1940'S AND 1950'S

This section looks at the ways in which the Catalans were affected by the repression of the Franco regime in its first two decades, when the country was struggling to get back on its feet. It distinguishes between political, cultural and social repression and shows that resistance was difficult and dispersed. Only in the 1960's did the different struggles begin to emerge in the open and to converge, and nationalism provided the platform for this convergence.

8.1 Political repression

The military victory of the "nationalist" army gave power to a dictatorial regime which stayed for almost four decades. Over this period, the dictatorship underwent some changes, but retained its main characteristics of an extreme personal regime, supported by the landed and the industrial bourgeoisie, the Church, the army and a growing body of civil servants who depended on the state bureaucracy. After several years of severe repression of the parties and organisations of the Republic, the right-wing political groups

which were left over - fascist, reactionary and ultraconservative - were amalgamated into a single government party, the *Movimiento*, in 1946 (S. Vilar, 1985, 40). The government reflected the different components of Franco's support and included generals, Falangists, right-wing monarchists, Carlists and conservative Catholics; in the late 1950's, Catholic technocrats (*Opus Dei*) became an important force in the government due to the change in economic strategy (Giner, 1980, 208).

In the ideological battle with the progressive forces of the Republic, the right-wing political forces had developed the core tenets of Francoism: Catholicism and a widely defined anticommunism, which embraced republicanism, socialism and anarchism as well. The dictatorship interpreted the civil war as a crusade against atheism and communism. The third main ingredient was Spanish nationalism and the defence of national unity, which the regime regarded as its task to achieve through the eradication of - again very widely defined - separatism in Catalonia and the Basque Country. In Ucelay's comment quoted above (p. 44), it becomes clear that the root of the threat to the integrity of the Spanish state was seen to lie in the cultural particularities of the peripheral nations. Therefore, eradication of Catalan nationalism had to involve cultural repression and an aggressive policy of "castilianisation".

"The events confirmed that the "decatalanisation" of Catalonia was one of the fundamental aims of the Francoist regime, and one of the principal causes of the Spanish war. At the same time, severe repression was exercised against anything which stood for democracy".

(Benet, 1979, 96)

This began with the occupation of Lleida in April 1938, when the Generalitat was abolished and all its policies and reforms annulled⁴⁸, including the position of Catalan as the second official language in Catalonia (Benet, 1980, 88). In replacing the Generalitat with military and provincial governors nominated by the dictator, a predominantly non-Catalan political strata was

⁴⁸Decret of April 5th, 1938.

imposed⁴⁹. Although the repression affected all the parties and syndicates of the Republic, it was particularly severe in Catalonia where syndicalism was deeply rooted and the Esquerra Republicana had built up an administrative structure. Many fled to France, easily accessible but shortly afterwards also under fascist occupation, and tens of thousands emigrated to Latin American countries. Others were killed or put into concentration camps under the "cleaning up" campaigns of the new rulers⁵⁰ (newer figures supplied by Solé i Sabaté suggest that the killings affected less people than previously assumed) (Solé i Sabaté, 1985, 264-268).

The Generalitat and most of the prohibited parties set up organisations in exile, while in Catalonia the opposition could only organise clandestinely and under great difficulties. The first nationalist resistance group, the **Front Nacional de Catalunya (FNC)**, was formed in 1940 by exiled members of **Estat Català**, **Nosaltres Sols**, the **ERC** and **Partit Socialista**. The **FNC** was originally a military front but the lack of success of the guerrilla strategy transformed it into a political group in 1945. Another Catalan opposition group, **Solidaritat Catalana**, was set up by the exiled Generalitat in Paris, but included only the **ERC**, **PSUC** and **Acció Catalana** (Molinero, 1981, 63). Political opposition in the 1940's was led by the exiled political leaders, the underlying hope being that the allied forces would liberate Spain, the first victim of fascism. The syndicates and the communist party engaged in sabotage and guerrilla fighting but generally lacked support among a population which was worn out by war and poverty. As a heritage of the war, the antagonism between opposition parties made it

⁴⁹In an examination of the top political personnel of the province of Barcelona, Viver Pi-Sunyer and Climent found that only 13.4% were born in Catalonia (Viver Pi-Sunyer and Climent, 1979, 30)

⁵⁰According to new decrees, anyone who after July 1st 1936 had impeded the **Movimiento Nacional** through action or "grievous passivity" was liable to imprisonment or execution, as were specific groups such as trade unionist, members of masonic lodges, republican or left-wing parties, and supporters of Basque and Catalan nationalism (Gilmour, 1986, 28).

impossible to unite in a Catalan, or, for that matter, Spanish popular front. Some attempts were made, such as the **Alianza Nacional de Fuerzas Politicas de Cataluña** in the short euphoric period of 1945, but soon disintegrated (Molinero and Ysàs, 1981, 81-84).

1948 was a decisive year, as the political opposition groups had to come to terms with the fact that the Franco regime would not fall through allied military action. Some Catalan parties, such as the ERC and the FNC faded away, and no explicitly nationalist organisation was able to maintain a significant presence for many years thereafter (Viladot i Presas, 1987, 57). Instead, the communist party in Catalonia developed and maintained a sufficiently strong underground organisation. The Communists changed their strategy and began to clandestinely develop a hierarchical structure in order to fight the dictatorship from within its own institutions. From the late 1950's onwards, it became the hegemonic force of the opposition in Catalonia. This process will be analysed in more detail in Chapter five.

8.2 Cultural repression

In accordance with the aim of avoiding the errors of Primo de Rivera's anti-separatist policies, the special occupation regime in Barcelona in 1939 prohibited the public use of the Catalan language. Similarly, the public expression of Catalan identity was prohibited. This was pursued down to the smallest detail as the names of streets, corporations, institutions and even the Christian names of people had to be changed. Catalan books disappeared from the shops and public libraries which were purified from documents of marxist, communist and separatist tendency (Benet, 1979, 248) and the printing of Catalan was suspended completely.

In the process of castilianisation, the schools played an important role. As a result of the abolition of the Generalitat, the schools it had administrated fell under the control of the central state. During the Second Republic, Catalan was not compulsory in the schools, but despite this, the use of Catalan as a teaching language

and the ability to read and write the language increased considerably (Benet, 1979, 304). Not surprisingly, many teachers were sacked by the Francoist authorities and replaced by Castilian speakers, hundreds of whom were sent to Catalonia from other parts of Spain.

The Catholic Church Establishment in Catalonia had greeted the dictatorship with euphoria, not least due to the anti-clerical militance of 1936 and 1937. It accepted the castilianisation of the Church and implemented it voluntarily in the parishes (Raguer et al., 1977, 118; Ferrer i Gironès, 1987, 180), although a reaction of the lower clergy against this ban of the Catalan language started soon and developed into an important political issue in the 1960's.

The repression of Catalan language and culture affected above all the Catalan intellectuals, who either had to emigrate or remain in Catalonia where they could not exercise their profession.

"Therefore, commentators have referred to the double-sided exile of the Catalan intellectuals in the post-war period: the exterior - geographical - exile of those who had fled from Catalonia and now had to fulfil their function as intellectuals on the margin of the society which provided a meaningful context to their work; and the inner - personal - exile of those who had stayed and now saw their channels of communication cut off with the people to which they belonged and addressed themselves. They were forced to live in seclusion or shut themselves up in closed, private circles."
(Castellanos, 1977, 28)

As indicated above, the more active intellectuals clandestinely formed groups which would publish and distribute journals and books in Catalan, but did not achieve a public role until much later. Other attempts to loosen the categorical prohibition of public Catalan were undertaken by religious publishers who managed to produce the odd book in the early 1940's with special permission (Massot, 1979a). A significant step was the foundation of the first Catalan publishing house in 1946, a result of several factors including the nomination of a more tolerant governor for the province of Barcelona. Throughout the 1950's, small refuges for Catalan culture were created in semi-legal institutions of civil society most of which were initiated by middle class intellectuals.

The "slow break-through" of the 1960's, when Catalan occupied more public spaces, built on this decentralised and varied basis (see section two in Chapter six).

8.3 Economic situation

The socio-economic sphere, too, was subjected to state repression, which affected the nature of class relations in post-war Catalonia within the context of prevailing class relations. Several facts must be remembered in this context. Firstly, Catalonia was still the most important industrial region in Spain⁵¹; only the Basque country could show similar levels of industrialisation. Secondly, the political party of the Catalan bourgeoisie, the *Lliga Regionalista*, had lost influence in Catalan and Spanish politics since the early 1920's (McDonogh, 1986, 27). At the same time, the Catalan bourgeoisie increasingly made use of the Castilian language and in many cases abandoned Catalan even in domestic communication (McDonogh, 1986, 119). It was therefore not greatly affected by anti-separatist repression during and after the civil war. Thirdly, during the short period of collectivisation and workers' occupations of factories in the first phase of the war, many capitalists fled to the "nationalist" zone or abroad and hoped for a Francoist victory which would allow them to recuperate their businesses. Since the heydays of the *Lliga*, the Catalan bourgeoisie had retracted from nationalism, and this helped the Catalan opposition in the 1970's to present nationalism as a progressive and popular movement.

Although the Catalan upper class supported the military "liberation" - just like in 1923 - and took back their enterprises, they did not regain the strong political influence they had enjoyed in the first

⁵¹In 1930-31, 53.5% of the Catalan active population worked in the secondary sector, and 27.5 % in the primary sector. This was an industrial work force comparable with the British (54%, but with a much larger tertiary work force and only 6% working in the primary sector), but considerably larger than that of the Spanish, which had 34% in the secondary and 48% in the primary sector (Maluquer de Motes, 1987, 170).

two decades. The representation of Catalans in the top levels of the Francoist bureaucracy remained low (unlike the disproportionate Basque share of political posts) (Alba, 1984, 222-226 and 232). Some well publicised conversions to Francoism occurred, but the main tendency among the Catalan bourgeoisie appears to have been the withdrawal from the political scene, while trying to keep some of its associations going (Ribas i Massana, 1978, 25).

The main losers of the civil war were the Catalan middle and the working class. The former was strongly nationalist and formed the bedrock of the Catalan government party, the ERC. The latter bore the brunt of the Francoist repression in the post-war years which brought the destruction of working class organisations and parties, and thus produced an easily exploitable work force with no means to fight back. The 1940's and 1950's are remembered as years of economic hardship for the popular classes in the whole of Spain, but in Catalonia, where the working class had been more developed and better organised, the defeat was felt more strongly.

Thus, it is clear that Catalonia experienced a combination of cultural, social and political repression in the 1940's and 1950's. Much of this also occurred in the other parts of Spain, but there was an additional repression of Catalan nationalism. The Catalans lost their autonomous governmental structures, and many institutions of Catalan civil society were destroyed. Political resistance was unsuccessful, not least because people were tired of fighting and deeply divided through the conflicts that accompanied the civil war. Catalan nationalism went private, and it was only in the 1960's that it re-emerged again in public as an uncoordinated movement for cultural revival.

The following section gives a brief sketch of the nationalist revival in Catalonia and Scotland, which is explored in depth in the following chapters.

9. THE REVIVAL OF POLITICAL NATIONALISM IN CATALONIA AND SCOTLAND


In Catalonia, the cultural movement of the 1960's was almost naturally politicised because Catalan culture was repressed through laws, decrees and bureaucratic procedures. But the first overtly political nationalist organisation was the *Assemblea de Catalunya*, which was clandestinely founded in 1971. It was a popular movement, and after the dictator had died it succeeded in mobilising thousands of Catalans to demonstrate in favour of Catalan autonomy, democracy and amnesty. After the first democratic elections (1977) had been won in Catalonia by those parties which had Catalan autonomy on top of their agenda, the newly elected senators and MPs elaborated a Catalan statute of autonomy which was accepted with some changes by the Spanish parliament. When it was submitted to a referendum in Catalonia in 1979, it was accepted by an overwhelming majority of the electorate.

In Scotland, the first sign of a nationalist upsurge came with the by-election in West Lothian in 1962, where the SNP candidate got a respectable 23 per cent of the vote. It was shrugged off by most political observers as a weird coincidence, but it led to a massive boost of the SNP membership by 40,000 over the next few years (Harvie, 1977, 243). The SNP began to be taken seriously, however, when its candidate Winnie Ewing won the Hamilton by-election in 1967. From then on, the party's fortunes improved in the general elections, too, winning a total of 30 per cent of the Scottish vote and 11 seats in October 1974 (Table 2.1 and Fig. 6). The rising support for the SNP, which was advocating outright independence from the UK, forced the ruling Labour Party to adopt a policy of devolution. This envisaged a Scottish "assembly" - in contrast to Westminster "parliament" - in Edinburgh, which would legislate over those Scottish affairs that had already been delegated to the Scottish Office. The first devolution bill (the Scotland and Wales Act of 1976) having failed due to unionist Labour opponents, the government finally got a revised Scotland Act through parliament in 1978. But it was abandoned after a referendum on the Scotland Bill

FIG.6: SCOTLAND'S POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN OCTOBER 1974

According to Winning Party and Constituency

Orkney & Shetland



Unnamed constituencies: (1) Greenock & Port Glasgow, (2) Motherwell & Wishaw, (3) Paisley, (4) Stirling, Falkirk & Grangemouth (5) Central Ayrshire, (6) Ayr, (7) Kilmarnock, (8) Dunbartonshire Central, (9) Dunbartonshire East, (10) Dunbartonshire West, (11) Central Fife, (12) Dunfermline, (13) Kirkcaldy, (14) Bothwell, (15) East Kilbride, (16) Hamilton, (17) Lanarkshire North, (18) Rutherglen, (19) Renfrewshire East, (20) Renfrewshire West, (21) Clackmannan & East Stirlingshire, (22) West Lothian, (23) Mid Lothian.

Source: The Times Guide to the House of Commons, 1974.

in March 1979 failed to reach the 40 per cent "yes" votes required⁵².

10. CONCLUSION

Although it was not predictable, the upsurge of nationalism in Catalonia and Scotland did not come as a complete surprise. There were important events and processes in the past which laid the foundations for nationalist demands. And in both countries, nationalist movements had emerged before, and were operated with varying degrees of success throughout the 20th century.

Although the main focus of this thesis is the nationalist revival since the 1960s, there are good reasons for looking back on the history of political nationalism, and on the history of Catalonia and Scotland in general. Firstly, nationalist movements themselves use history to legitimise their existence and their demands. The fact that the rise of nationalism is a **revival** indicates that the contemporary movements have their roots in the past, even though their actual growth reflects more recent processes. Secondly, it is important to realise that the civil societies and economies of Catalonia and Scotland have evolved historically. The same is true for the relationships between the national civil society and the central state, which is at the heart of the nationalist conflict. Thirdly, a historical perspective helps to avoid unjustified generalisations, because it draws attention to the variability of social and political action.

There are some parallels in the histories of the Scottish and the Catalan nation. Both lost their political independence in the early 18th century, i.e. in pre-nationalist times. Nationalism did not find support for most of the 19th century, which was the main period

⁵²The 40 per cent clause was squeezed into the Bill by the unionist wing of the Labour Party. It ensured that Devolution was abandoned although a majority of those who voted said "yes" (51.4 per cent).

of nationalist struggle in Europe, but only emerged in the final decades of the century. And in both cases, it did not emerge as a movement for independence, as in most other 19th century cases, but as a regionalist movement aiming for autonomy within the existing state. But the parallels do not reach very far beyond the 1880's.

It is clear that the nationalist movements emerged, gained strength and underwent changes in different circumstances. The relationships between the central state, the national civil society and the economic sphere were rather different. In Catalonia, a widely used language became the basis for a cultural revival which formed the backdrop to bourgeois regionalism, while Scotland took part in the Romantic literary movement without attempting to create a national high culture. Scotland was therefore not adequately equipped for 19th century nationalism, which centred on cultural distinctiveness. For various reasons, the vast majority of the Scots believed for most of the time that, whatever their national feelings, their economic future lay with the United Kingdom. Neither the bourgeoisie, the middle classes or the working class saw an urgent need for autonomy. To a certain extent, this can be explained by the benefits Scotland's privileged role in the British empire gave them. In contrast to Catalonia, where the industrial bourgeoisie saw itself restricted by lack of interest to represent their interests in the governments of Madrid, and therefore forced into a power struggle with the centre, the Scottish industrial leaders did not find themselves alone in the UK, and there was no need to define class interest in nationalist terms.

The Catalan national movement, pushed into the political realm by the increasing economic and social disparities between Catalonia and the rest of Spain, and led by the bourgeoisie, developed into a powerful political force and was supported by a wide range of private institutions and associations. Once this movement had been granted some of its demands by the central state, it was further legitimised through the autonomous Catalan institutions of government (the **Mancomunitat** and the Republican **Generalitat**). Meanwhile, Scottish nationalism still had to struggle to make its voice heard against a swelling chorus demanding central government

planning. Scottish nationalism thus was a peripheral movement without a material base until the 1960's.

The following chapters examine how, and to what extent, these different histories converged in the 1960's, which saw a nationalist revival in both countries.

Table 2.1 : Results of the referendum on the Catalan Statute of
Autonomy, 1979
(Per cent of vote)

	Yes	No	Blank/Null	Abst.	Electorate (No.)
Barcelona	88.1	8.0	3.9	39.0	1,809,186
Girona	89.0	6.2	4.3	36.4	191,223
Lleida	90.3	5.6	4.1	41.8	139,320
Tarragona	86.9	8.6	4.5	45.4	182,849

Source: Moreno, 1986, 191.

Table 2.2 : The performance of the SNP in the parliamentary elections since 1945

YEAR	VOTES (No.)	VOTES (% of Scottish)	CANDIDATES (No.)	MANDATES (No.)
1945	30,595	1.2	8	0
1950	9,708	0.4	3	0
1951	7,299	0.3	2	0
1955	12,112	0.5	2	0
1959	21,738	0.8	5	0
1964	64,044	2.4	15	0
1966	128,474	5.0	23	0
1970	306,802	11.4	65	1
1974 (Feb.)	633,180	21.9	70	7
1974 (Oct.)	839,617	30.4	71*	11
1979	504,259	17.3	71*	2
1983	331,975	11.7	72*	2
1987	416,873	14.0	71	3

* total number of Scottish constituencies

Source: Craig, 1976, 89; Times Guide to the House of Commons, 1983 and 1987.

Table 2.3: Regional analysis of the Devolution Referendum in 1979
 "Do you want the provisions of the Scotland Act 1978 to be
 put into effect?"

REGION	YES (%)	NO (%)	ELECTORATE No.	TOTAL VOTE No.	TURNOUT (%)
Borders	40.3	59.6	79,746	51,618	67.3
Central	54.7	45.3	195,673	130,599	66.7
Fife	53.7	46.3	243,485	160,942	66.1
Dumfries&Galloway	40.3	59.6	104,085	67,515	64.9
Grampian	48.3	51.6	339,881	196,844	57.9
Highland	51.0	49.0	134,997	88,337	65.4
Lothian	50.1	49.9	561,234	373,970	66.6
Strathclyde	54.0	46.0	1750,299	1106,420	63.2
Tayside	49.5	50.5	290,076	185,089	63.8
Orkney	27.9	71.9	13,789	5,439	54.8
Shetland	27.1	72.8	14,724	5,460	51.0
Western Isles	55.8	44.1	22,127	4,933	50.5
SCOTLAND	51.6	48.3	3747,112	2387,672	63.8

Source: Moreno, 1986, 188.

Chapter three:

**ECONOMIC CHANGE AND
THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC DIMENSION**

1. INTRODUCTION

In the first chapter, I looked at some of the writings of researchers who argue that it is economic factors which trigger off nationalist movements. This view has its roots in the analysis of nationalist movements of the 19th century and the nation-building processes before, which associated nationalism with the interests of the bourgeoisie and with the age of capitalism in general. It may have been useful to some degree to explain the leadership and the strategies of nationalist movements of the 19th century, as Chapter two found when it looked at the reasons for the absence of a strong nationalist movement in Scotland and for its presence in Catalonia. But economist explanations of nationalism in the 20th century have left many gaps in our understanding and exposed the weakness of economist arguments.

This was shown in the review of the literature in Chapter one, which revealed that economist explanations prevail in much marxist and modernisation analysis of contemporary movements. A few examples should suffice to demonstrate their shortcomings in the context of the cases of Catalonia and Scotland. The concept of uneven development underlies the theses of Nairn (1977), Blaut (1987) and Lasuén (1986), albeit in different versions. Nairn related sub-state nationalism to the uneven nature of capitalist development (Nairn, 1977, 128), but could not specify how this works out in the case of Scotland. There, it is difficult to identify relative capitalist under- or overdevelopment with respect to the rest of Britain (Kendrick, 1983a, 153-203). And even if a development gap is found to exist, it does not automatically lead to political nationalism. Blaut's definition of nationalism as "fighting against foreign rule not because foreigners 'dominate' but because they exploit" (Blaut, 1987, 79) reaches back to Leninist theories of anti-imperialist struggles. Chapter two showed that neither Catalonia nor Scotland have been exploited by outside forces; on the contrary, both benefited from forming part of an imperial state, and although this is no longer the case, it cannot be maintained that the roles are reversed now. Lasuén also adopts an economist perspective by relating the phases of Catalan self-government to periods of

depression, during which the economically more dominant Catalonia became aware of its political subordination to Castile (Lasuén, 1986, 135-137). This model, too, does not explain the timing of the rise of nationalist movements, or the existence of territorially based economic interests which according to Lasuén determine nationalist politics.

While there is no doubt that in capitalist societies, such as Catalonia and Scotland, economic processes play an important role in shaping the structure of civil society and the struggles taking place within it, there are no simple causal links between the economic sphere and nationalist struggles. The impact of economic changes at different levels (within Catalonia and Scotland, within Spain and Britain, and at the global level) on nationalist politics is mediated through civil society and state activities. At the same time, the interpretation of economic processes and their relationship to state and civil society are affected by national identity; and this nationalist dimension bears on the actions of (economic) agents.

The main body of the chapter is divided in two parts, which look at the Scottish and the Catalan case respectively. This way of proceeding acknowledges the fact that economic processes in Scotland were distinct from those in Catalonia. In each part, the first section outlines the most important changes in the regional economy, and shows how its autonomy was reduced in the course of the last few decades. The second section looks at the way in which the relationship between the economic sphere and the central state has developed. State intervention in the economy took different forms in Scotland and Catalonia, but in both cases it has made people more aware of the responsibility of governments for their own economic and social well-being or deprivation. In the case of Scotland, central state planning politicised the Scottish economic dimension; and when the limitations of state intervention became increasingly obvious in the 1960's, these too were seen in nationalist terms. The politicisation of economic processes thus combines with a sense of national identity, which together affect class struggles and economic projects of specific social classes. The Labour movement in

Scotland was increasingly under pressure to modify its views on centralised economic planning, and to adopt devolution policies. Section three examines how the prospect of large oil revenues provided the nationalist movement with an alternative to centralised economic planning which convinced many Scottish voters of the economic viability of self-government. The last section on Scotland analyses the response of the central government to the nationalist/economic crisis in Scotland. It argues that the Scottish Development Agency constituted no fundamental change in Labour's approach to economic planning, but it helped the party to re-establish its dominant role in Scottish society.

2. THE SCOTTISH ECONOMY AND THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

2.1 Economic developments in Scotland in the 20th century

Chapter two suggested that Scotland was one of the main pillars of the British manufacturing and trading empire in the 19th century. Kendrick argued that the Scottish economic structure was particularly British because it was closer to the British average than any other region (Kendrick, 1983a, 164). Its very success in the heydays of British steel making, shipbuilding and colonial trade made it vulnerable to the economic recession in the inter-war period, when irreversible changes in the international division of labour spelled the decline of Scotland's traditional manufacturing basis (Kendrick, 1983b, 45). The inter-war period witnessed the emergence of the regional problem in Britain, as the old industrial regions such as Scotland were plunged into a long-term recession and the South of England began to assume a status of economic dominance (Martin, 1989, 22-25).

With the intermittent decline of the traditional industries, the Scottish economy became less autonomous. As in other regions, big business in Scotland was family business up until the Second World War. The concentration and rationalisation measures of the crisis

decades of the inter-war period left a handful of families (Lithgow, Weir, Yarrow, Stephen, Colville) in charge of the heavy industries. The other industries, many of which were dependent on shipbuilding and steel, were overwhelmingly small companies in the hands of small indigenous entrepreneurs. By the mid-1930s, rationalisation and disinvestment had reduced shipbuilding capacity by a third, the coal industry had lost a similar proportion of its work force, and the steel industry had its capacity cut by 20 per cent (Harvie, 1981, 57). The sackings and reductions in wages which accompanied the shrinking of Scotland's industrial basis provoked major strikes and protests. Through the first half of the 1930s, when the economic crisis was at its worst, Scots unemployment was twice as high as unemployment in England, and never below 25 per cent (Foster and Woolfson, 1986, 86-87). The depth of economic crisis was such that both the labour movement and the employers began to advocate economic planning through the state in the 1930's (see section 2.2 below).

The second world war gave the heavy industries another lease of life, but in the 1950's, economic restructuring began to change the industrial landscape of Scotland beyond recognition. And as the decline of the traditional industries accelerated in the 1950's and 1960's, Scotland's big business dynasties lost economic and political power. Employment in the heavy industrial sectors declined steadily throughout the post-war period (see table 3.1; Fig. 7). Between 1958 and 1972, the nationalised coal industry (NCB) reduced its work force by 56,600¹. At the same time, the shipbuilding labour force was cut down from 70,000 to 47,000 (Foster and Woolfson, 1986, 107). Although the waning industrial magnates themselves were largely responsible for this rundown of Scottish industry, they made an unsuccessful and belated effort to expand the heavy industrial branches in Scotland. In a "last bid for autonomy" of Scottish capital, W. Lithgow and R. Colville took charge of the Scottish

¹There were 28,400 coal miners left in 1972 (Murray, 1973, 59).

Council (Development and Research) in 1966². The Scottish Council of those years condemned the slow rundown of older industries and the dependence on inflows of American capital, and repeatedly invoked the image of a Scottish economy weakened by industrial centralisation (Foster and Woolfson, 1986, 115). But the ambitions plans to restructure the shipbuilding and the steel industry in the late 1960's failed to materialise.

Thus, the decades from the first world war to the 1960's witnessed the decline of Scotland's heavy industries, and consequently, of the Scottish big bourgeoisie which had thrived on Union and Empire. In the post-war period, Scotland drifted towards an economic structure which became increasingly dominated by branch plants and the service sector. Transforming industries such as alimentation, electronics and metal manufacturing expanded (Table 3.2; Figs. 8-10).

The new manufacturing industries which came to Scotland required a rather different work force - with different and often less skill - than the traditional heavy industries. The jobs created in these new industries grew at a much slower rate than the losses occurring elsewhere in the economy. For example, the electronics industry had only 20,000 jobs more in the mid-1980's than in 1958 (Hargrave, 1985, 117). Ninety per cent of the electronics jobs were provided by non-Scottish companies³, which shows how little indigenous control was exercised in this sector. Firm pointed out that in the industrial heartland of Scotland, the central Clydeside conurbation, only a third of the employment created between 1958 and 1968 came from local enterprise; the other two thirds were in new incoming establishments from the rest of the UK and overseas respectively (Firm, 1975, 397). It was particularly the larger enterprises and

²The Colvilles controlled what was left of the Scottish steel industry. In line with the traditional industrial linkages, the main product was shipbuilding plate. In 1966, the Labour government nationalised the steel industry.

³This is subdivided into 44 per cent in firms from the rest of the UK, 40 per cent in US firms, and 5 per cent in European firms (Hargrave, 1985, 19).

the fastest growing industrial sectors (instrument, electrical and mechanical engineering, chemical industries) which tended to be controlled externally (op. cit., 405-407).

Many of the new branch plants located in greenfield sites, e.g. in New Towns such as Livingston and Kirkaldy. They were neither able to make up for the job losses in other industries, nor to provide employment for redundant workers, who were categorised as "difficult to employ". A whole new working class was created alongside these new industrial parks, mostly composed of young, unskilled and relatively low paid workers. For example, in Livingston, which forms part of the hi-tech territory (Silicon Glen),

"[e]mployers simply by-pass the last generation with a collective memory, a history, and a notion of them-and-us."

(Guardian, 16.8.1989, 19)

Silicon Glen, which was - and still is - enthusiastically promoted by government agencies, proved unable to solve the chronic unemployment problem of post-war Scotland. But it changed the face of the Scottish economy and created social structures which are no longer characterised by the class consciousness and political loyalties created in the "old" economic order of steel and shipbuilding.

The other major change in Scottish economy concerned the service sector. While manufacturing employment fell by 15 per cent between 1951 and 1981, service sector employment increased by 17 per cent. Scotland had been lagging behind in the shift towards service sector employment, and it was only in the 1960's and 1970's that it caught up with the rest of Britain (Tables 3.3 and 3.4; Figs. 11 and 12). As a result, Scotland's previously rather small middle class experienced expansion, particularly due to public sector employment. This "state-sector middle class" occupied an increasingly influential role in Scottish civil society in the 1960's (Harvie, 1982, 87).

How are these fundamental changes in the economic structure of Scotland related to the nationalist revival of the 1960's? Although
(Chapter three)

there are no direct causal connections, it seems that the economic forces which had stood against Scottish nationalism in the late 19th century became weaker. This applies particularly to the Scottish big bourgeoisie and the privileged status of Scottish economy within Britain and the Empire. In the first half of the 20th century, the Scottish economy was losing autonomy and ground, and control over Scottish manufacturing was moving abroad. The position of Scotland in the world economy declined even more rapidly than that of the UK as a whole. But this does not necessarily lead to nationalism. In order to understand the connection between the changes in the Scottish economy and the nationalist movement, it is necessary to look at the way in which state intervention led to the politicisation of the Scottish economic dimension. The following section therefore looks at the history of economic planning in Scotland and analyses how its purpose of legitimising state control backfired in the form of Scottish nationalism.

2.2 The Scottish dimension in economic planning

The intervention of the central state in the restructuring of the regional economies after the second world war has promoted a view of the Scottish economy as a political unit. This view added another piece to the puzzle of national consciousness, and thereby another factor in the political nationalism of the 1960's and 1970's, which used a great deal of economic arguments to justify Scottish independence. The economic planning policies of the British state did not aim to produce such a politicisation process in the Scottish economic region. On the contrary, both the Labour and the Tory governments approached economic planning from a centralist point of view. It was part of the Keynesian politics with which post-war governments attempted to control the process of capitalist development.

It worked for two decades. Then, in the period from 1965 to 1973, "the inability of Fordism and Keynesianism to contain the inherent contradictions of capitalism became more and more apparent" (Harvey, 1989, 141-142). In Scotland, these contradictions led to growing doubts about the ability of a distant central state to solve Scottish economic problems and gave rise to demands for self-management and self-government. How these demands grew out of the post-war British consensus on economic planning is analysed in three subsections. The first describes the rise of centralised economic planning in Scotland, which provoked the Labour movement to abandon any home rule demands it had developed around the turn of the century. The second analyses its effects on the political discourse of the 1960's and 1970's. The third argues that the loss of confidence in the abilities of the state to plan away Scotland's economic problems led to popular support for nationalism.

2.2.i The beginnings of economic planning

The new consensus began modestly in Scotland. It was the Convention of Royal Burghs which first set up a planning body - the Scottish National Development Council (SNDC) - in 1930 as a Scottish

initiative. Although the first Scottish nationalist party had just been founded (National Party of Scotland: NPS, 1928), it is unlikely that nationalist pressure had a significant impact in the move towards economic planning, because popular support was very limited. The high unemployment rates, and protest actions by the unemployed, as well as pressure from industrialists were probably more important factors. The initiative of the Burghs was soon supported by eminent Scottish industrialists, especially Lithgow who controlled it from 1931 onwards, and the STUC.

In the eyes of the Labour leaders, the structural problems caused by the economic crisis could only be ameliorated with state intervention. Self-government did not make sense in a situation where world wide economic forces were sweeping across the whole of Britain and the other advanced capitalist countries. Therefore,

"from the 1930s, the old Home Rule concept itself became redundant with the party's move to a philosophy of state planning and centralised economic management."
(Keating, 1983, 29)

In 1936, the Scottish Economic Committee was set up as a subcommittee of the SNDC, and, funded by the government through the Scottish Commission for Special Areas, it functioned as an advisory body to the Secretary of State for Scotland, John Colville.

Foster and Woolfson see in these developments a redefinition of political objectives and economic strategies:

"State planning was now presented as a key vehicle for the fulfilment of national development. The character of the planning was statist, corporatist and paternalist, owing at least something to the Presbyterian heritage of previous centuries. At the same time, however, it did raise quite new expectations about the role of Scottish institutions and, within them, of the leaders of Scottish society."
(Foster and Woolfson, 1986, 92)

In the 1930's, these leaders were still the Scottish industrial bourgeoisie. But the first Labour government during the war established the rules of Keynesian economics which had as a centre piece the consensus between big capital, organised Labour and the central State. Regional planning played an important role, and it

was applied to the Scottish economy by the Secretary of State for Scotland, Tom Johnston, who

"succeeded in identifying the Labour Party at British level and the 1945 administration in particular, with the aspirations of the Scottish people as a whole for full national development and for control over their economy."
(Foster and Woolfson, 1986, 97)

The Scottish Trade Union Congress (STUC) even voiced demands for a Scottish cabinet, particularly at times when the Scottish Convention movement grew stronger (see Chapter two, section 6). It wanted to avoid a resurgence of nationalism, latent in its own ranks, and resolved in 1948 that it

"deplores the trend towards Scottish Nationalism which is revealing itself in the Scottish TU movement, and driving us to support uneconomic projects. Congress believes that Scottish culture and traditions will be preserved by their own strength and virility without the need for exploiting Nationalist sentiments."

(quoted in Tuckett, 1986, 323)

After the war the Scottish economy was even more geared to heavy industry than before, and since coal, steel, shipbuilding and heavy engineering were heading for long-term decline, the Scottish Council (Development and Industry) attempted to diversify the economy by encouraging foreign investment. The emphasis on centrally directed economic planning continued through Conservative governments in the 1950s in a weaker form. But towards the end of the decade, MacMillan became more committed to government intervention to solve the economic problems of the peripheries. By now, rising expectations about state intervention in the Scottish economy had come to be reflected in political discourse, and the government had to demonstrate that it was also concerned with the well-being of its Scottish subjects.

2.2.ii Economic planning and nationalist discourse in the 1960's and 1970's

Although self-government did not feature in the political discourse during the 1950's and 1960's - the Labour Party had even formally
(Chapter three)

dropped its Home Rule policy in 1958 -, the Scottish economic dimension became firmly established precisely at that time. The Labour Party in particular often argued that the economic boom had been less beneficial to the Scottish population than to the rest of Britain, and made special reports on the Scottish economy to make their point.

In 1958, around the time when MacMillan claimed that "most of the population never had it so good", the Scottish Council of the Labour Party produced a report entitled 'Let Scotland Prosper'. In this document, Labour stated the need for greater state intervention in the decentralisation of industry. It argued that

"to leave the location of industry to the free forces of the market is an uncivilised conception in this modern age"
(Labour Party, 1958, 4)

The report claimed that particularly in Scotland, such an approach to economic management was based on a broad consensus. It claimed that

"already in the inter-war years the Socialist view had become widely accepted by non-Socialists that the policy of industrial laissez-faire was disastrous for Scotland."
(ibid.)

The parliamentary debates on the Scottish economy around 1960 serve as an example of Labour's use of nationalist rhetoric, which contributed to recreating a Scottish dimension under new circumstances. From this rhetoric the nationalists were able to profit a few years later. In these debates Scottish Labour MPs stressed the fact that Scotland's unemployment and emigration rates (see Tables 3.5 and 3.6), together with its record of deindustrialisation and low growth rates compared poorly with the performance in the rest of the UK. As a result they called for decisive government action. In the debates following the general election in 1959 an additional source of pressure was the defeat of the Tories in Scotland due to Labour gains. It was argued that the Secretary of State for Scotland had his post "only by the grace of Tory English votes", and that the Tories were "not the government party by the will of Scotland". Comparisons were made with other

small, independent nations in Europe, whose economies were in a much healthier state, and Labour MPs speculated in the Commons how things could be, "had we not been part of the United Kingdom" (William Ross and Thomas Fraser MPs, Hansard vol. 626, 1466-1467).

The 1960 Labour Party Conference Report duly acknowledged the role of the Scottish MPs in putting pressure on the government. The following comment shows just how demands for wider ranging regional economic policies were serving an explicitly political purpose.

"The Scottish Labour Group are masters of the art of Parliamentary opposition and use their skills to the full advantage of the people of Scotland."

(Labour Party, 1960, 84)

In the 1960s therefore the Labour Party in Scotland had established its role as "privileged interlocutors for Scotland" on a policy of serving Scottish interests through centrally directed regional planning (Keating, 1983, 29). But proposing a self-government policy could not have been further from their minds. Before the general elections of 1964, William Ross presented Labour's policy for Scotland to the electorate with the following words:

"Labour respects and welcomes Scotland's distinctiveness - our traditions, our own forms of education, law and local government. However, we see no refuge from Scotland's troubles in the littleness of an archaic separatism. No more can we acquiesce in the Conservative tendency, charitably maintained as a useful provider of skilled man-power or as a depopulated playground for the rich. The objective of Labour's Scottish policy - framed by Scots and approved by a Scottish conference - is to harness the resources and energies of Scotland, so that our people can play their full and distinctive part in the regeneration of Britain."

(Scotsman, 5.12.1963, 8)

Despite Labour's nationalist rhetoric north of the border, central planning continued, now under Labour control, in the second half of the 1960's. Despite increased regional aid (Table 3.7; Fig. 13) and high-flying schemes aimed at attracting new industries, unemployment continued to grow. A recession made things worse in the last years of the decade, and discredited not only Keynesianism in general, but also the economic policies of the Labour government in particular. By this time, the rise of the Scottish National Party had already

begun. It was able to turn to its own favour the nationalist discourse of some sectors of the Scottish Labour Party, which was never translated into action. To the amazement of the Labour Party, the Hamilton by-election in 1967 demonstrated that the SNP could threaten Labour on its home ground⁴. The limits to Labour's policy of economic planning were being exposed in the economic as well as in the political sphere. The next subsection examines in more detail how the Labour Party struggled to contain the rise of popular dissatisfaction and of support for the SNP.

2.2.iii The limits to regional economic planning in Scotland

Under the Labour administration (1966-70), Scottish economic problems had not improved notably; unemployment, for example, was still significantly higher than in Britain as a whole (Table 3.5; Fig. 14). It is likely that Scottish voters felt that Labour had not been able to keep its promises. The SNP support was ascribed at least to some extent to the failure of the regional economic policies of the post-war period by analysts such as Firn, who found a "growing disillusionment" in Scotland.

"Despite nearly 40 years of increasingly active government intervention, substantial disparities still remain between the expanding and prosperous areas such as the Midlands and the Southeast, and the older industrial areas of the North of England, Northern Ireland, Wales, and Scotland. (...) It cannot be disputed that the depressed areas of the United Kingdom would have suffered even greater economic and social decline in the absence of regional policies, yet there is a growing realisation that such policies that have been developed and employed have been essentially ad hoc and pragmatic, and certainly not based on a full understanding of the components and processes of regional economic development."

(Firn, 1975, 393)

The decline of Scottish manufacturing continued in the second half of the 1970's (Table 3.8). The vulnerability of an economy with a

⁴The SNP candidate Winnie Ewing won the by-election in Hamilton, which was a traditional Labour seat.

significant branch plant sector became soon clear when several multinationals began to retreat from their Scottish field of action. Closures of established multinationals such as Singer on Clydebank, Rootes/Chrysler/Peugot in Linwood, Monsanto in Dundonald and Cumnock, and Massey-Fergusson in Kilmarnock did not only cause considerable job losses, but they also shook the confidence of Scots in the state which claimed to manage Scottish industrial development. Politically, this was reflected in a rise of support for the SNP.

It was the Labour Party which suffered most from the economic discontent exacerbated by the plant closures. In Cunninghame District, for example, which was "solidly Labour" oriented, the "feeling that something is going wrong" translated itself into a local election victory for the SNP:

"The effect was a secondary effect, because we were afraid that the Scottish people, who were not going to vote Tory, were deserting us and were going to vote for the SNP. But it wasn't for independence; there was just the feeling that there was something wrong."

(Lambie, interview, 7.8.1988)

These fears eventually pushed the Labour Party towards a devolution policy. In the economic planning field, the new Labour government responded to calls for greater Scottish control by setting up the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) in 1975. The STUC in particular played an important role in changing Labour's attitude on the issue of self-government. The trade unions, too, were under pressure, firstly because they were losing members⁵, and secondly because the grass roots demanded more action.

"I was affected politically by the closures. They [the unions] were affected industrially by the closures, and at that time the shop steward movement in Scotland was very strong, and it exerted influence on the officials of the Unions. Therefore the officials had to become more

⁵In the 15 years since the STUC organised the "Assembly on Unemployment", the unions lost 25,000 members. Unemployment rose from 60,000 to 360,000 (Hendry, interview, 25.11.1987).

"revolutionary" in order to keep ahead of the shop stewards."

(Lambie, interview, 7.8.1988)

In the atmosphere of growing nationalism, industrial conflicts, particularly plant closures, took on a more political tone which was often couched in terms of Scottish self-determination. The work-in of the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS) in 1971-72 is one example. The UCS had been reliant on state subsidies, and the Conservative government's decision to no longer support the shipbuilders clearly identified the closure threat with the government. The 6,000 workers employed in the UCS fought against the closure by occupying the shipyards and staging a work-in which they maintained for over a year, until a rescue package was accepted. Jimmy Reid, shop steward and a Communist councillor, pointed out the political significance of the industrial conflict:

"The Upper Clyde is being sacrificed on the altar of sheer political dogma. We refuse to accept that someone sitting in Whitehall is going to kill our industry."

(quoted in Foster and Woolfson, 1986, 176)

The conflict became thus politicised because the influence of the government was clearly visible. Against this remote political centre which was on the side of big industry, a popular alliance developed in Scotland. The struggle won the support of not only the major trade unions, but also other social groups, such as professionals, the petty bourgeoisie and the wider community, which saw itself affected by the closure. The national dimension acted like a glue in this alliance of common interests. The call for Scottish self-government accompanied criticisms of the role of the government. Scotland was seen as particularly vulnerable to policies which favoured monopoly capital, and was thought to occupy a key role in anti-monopoly struggles which then could spread to other regions of Britain (*ibid.*, 222). The struggle of the USC produced a polarisation with the state and (Scottish) big capital on one side, and the Scottish community on the other.

The Scottish TUC, which was fully in tune with the post-war consensus policy of "bureaucratic modernisation through state aid" and which had become involved in countless government initiatives

and quangos (Kerevan, 1984, 8), picked up this mood and tried to control it. Against the background of the ongoing UCS work-in, the STUC organised a "Scottish Assembly on Unemployment". 1,500 representatives of Scottish life assembled, including MPs from all parties, representatives of councils, burghs, cities, industry, commerce, and the churches. They demanded a Scottish development authority, additional grants and incentives for industries, the acceleration of social infrastructure improvements and self-government:

"In a statement punctuated by the cheering and applause of many of the 1,500 people who went to the Usher Hall, [James Jack of the STUC] said: 'The road we are taking may take us finally to a Scottish Parliament (...) I am all for it because (...) there is not the slightest doubt in my head that a Scottish Parliament would be a workers' Parliament'." (Scotsman, 15.2. 1972, 1)

Elsewhere, the Scotsman quoted Raymond Macdonald from the STUC, who rejected the "begging bowl image" as outrageously unfair, and confirmed that

"at any rate, North Sea oil discoveries in Scottish waters, now confirmed as massive and lasting, make possible the direction of huge resources to Scotland by right, if we establish the right, without creating a single economic or industrial problem for the government." (ibid., 9)

With these oil resources, Scotland was no longer as a region which was subsidised by the state and therefore always begging, but could now legitimately demand more resources. Meanwhile, Jim Sillars, Labour MP, warned that the state of crisis in the Scottish nation could not be overestimated, and stressed that "there were the seeds of a very dangerous threat to the unity of the UK, if nothing was done about the intolerable level of Scottish unemployment" (ibid.).

Much of this was political rhetoric which was not followed up by concrete action. Looking at the composition of the assembly this was not surprising. Nevertheless, it demonstrated that the STUC was prepared to reconsider the issue of self-government, and that there was considerable pressure from various sectors of Scottish society to do so. In the following years, the STUC passed this pressure on

to the Scottish Labour Party, and pushed for increasingly stronger devolution bills.

Thus, state intervention in the Scottish economy produced a situation where industrial struggles became politicised in nationalist terms. In the 1980's, other examples of industrial struggles were to follow - such as the campaign against the closures of the Gartcosh and Ravenscraig steel plants⁶ and the Caterpillar occupation⁷ - which went beyond the purely economic and called upon the Scottish public to defend Scottish manufacturing jobs against nationalised or multinational capital. Now as in the early 1970's, calls for Scottish self-government seem to emerge almost naturally from economic struggles. But if the 1960's had proved that centralised economic planning was inadequate to stem the flow of capital and jobs from Scotland, what was the alternative? From 1971 onwards, the Nationalists claimed the alternative was North Sea Oil, and it is to this claim I turn in the following section.

2.3 Oil: fuel for the nationalist movement?

Considering the seemingly inevitable decline of the "old" and the insufficient investment in "new" industries, it is not surprising that the discovery of oil off the Scottish coast played an important role in the public debate on the Scottish economic performance. For a short time it also changed the political climate. Some observers

⁶After a long struggle, Gartcosh was closed down in 1984 while Ravenscraig was saved. Ravenscraig was on the government's hit list because the Scottish market for steel had shrunk with closures in car and other metal industries; 90 per cent of the steel produced at Ravenscraig was now sent to England. The state subsidy for the plant was £ 50 Million per year (Financial Times, 3.12.1982, 21). Sadler explains the reprieve for Ravenscraig with reference to the massive anti-closure campaign which mobilised MP's from all political parties and people from all sectors of society and concludes that this had reinforced Scottish identity and made the closure politically and socially unacceptable (Sadler, 1985, 171).

⁷For further detail see the front page of the Scotsman, 15.1.1987 and the analysis of the occupation by Woolfson and Foster (1988).

went so far as to identify North Sea oil as the main factor in the SNP surge. This argument can be easily refuted, because the SNP membership and electoral support was already growing before oil began to hit the headlines. However, there is no doubt that the issue of oil was employed by the SNP as a shortcut through long-winded debates about the economic viability of an independent Scotland. At the same time, the prospect of oil revenues - which benefited mostly the Conservative governments after 1979 - enabled the Labour Party to promise more public investment for Scotland and the other depressed regions of Great Britain.

It was in 1971 that the first promises of oil wealth were publicised in the Scottish Press. The Glasgow Herald asserted that a "North Sea oil bonanza" was on the way with "'immense' oil benefit for Scotland"⁸. The Scottish National Party took up the issue almost immediately to argue for a "budget boost for Scotland", in whose waters most of the oil was located (Glasgow Herald, 7.3.1972, 19). Three weeks before, the same had been demanded at the "Scottish Assembly on Unemployment" (see above, p. 16). As oil experts promised a bright future for Scotland and the Scottish Council (Development and Industry) put the oil potential at £24,000 Million⁹, the SNP recognised the rare opportunity of putting a clear-cut case for independence which would convince even the more cautious Scots. They decided to fight the 1974 election on the oil issue (Glasgow Herald, 5.9.1973, 3), and came out with a series of memorable slogans such as "It's Scotland's oil!". The opposition was outflanked by this aggressive campaign, which helped to make the SNP the most dynamic political force in Scotland because it had something new to say. A Labour Party politician interpreted the impact in the general context of growing nationalism:

⁸These front page headlines appeared in the Glasgow Herald on October 8th and November 10th of 1971.

⁹Glasgow Herald, 1.10.1973, 3 and 25.9.1973, 3.

"I don't think that these had any effect on the thinking of the Scottish people. I think the main thing that affected it was that we were seeing Scotland running down. Scotland's oil had a second feature because for the first time it was possible to say that Scotland shouldn't be running down. I think it was mainly the systematic running down of Scottish industry and the feeling that Scotland was being hammered by the South, and that our opinions weren't being heard, and that they were just ignoring us."

(Lambie, interview, 7.8.1988)

For the SNP, the campaign was the only way to attack the economic pessimism among the Scottish population which held back the political movement for self-government. The impact was not only one of rational economic argument, but also psychological, according to one SNP politician:

"**After** we achieved our initial breakthrough in the late 1960's, the attack that came against us from everywhere, from Labour, from the Conservatives, was **one basic attack**: "You can't afford it. An independent Scotland **will** be poorer." All the energies were devoted into establishing that case, the government produced Scottish budgets to establish that Scotland will be much poorer were she independent, and so on. (...) Now, it wasn't an easy thing to argue [against] - not because we didn't think there was a very good case, but it was a case that involved some degree of sophisticated economic argument."

(Lindsay, interview, 24.2.1987)

The SNP was also criticising the way in which the state had handled the oil business. Unaware and unprepared for the task of planning the exploitation of the new resource, it was feared by many observers that the multinational energy giants would run the oil industry without any consideration for local and national communities (Taylor, 1975, 270). There had already been negative experiences with multinationals in other spheres of the economy. The SNP proposed far more stringent government control over exploitation, and claimed that the "Conservative Government has been virtually giving away the oil rights away with hardly a squeak of complaint from the Labour Opposition". The accusation was that both major British parties were only interested in the short-term economic and political benefits (Wolfe, 1973, 159), and the fear was that Scotland might lose a unique opportunity to get out of the

downward spiral of economic decline and dependency on foreign capital.

So, North Sea Oil gave the Scots the comforting thought that they had their own resources and were not totally dependent on the umbilical cord through which regional aid and public investment was trickling in from London. At least, Scottish political figures could now claim in view of the oil resources that more public resources were a right of the Scots. But equally if not more important for the SNP were the social and economic effects of the prospected oil revenues in a future independent Scotland. The party created the image of a rapidly expanding economic cake which would meet the interests of the different social classes and form the material basis of a consensus society in which class antagonism was eliminated and replaced by an ethos of social solidarity (Maxwell, interview, 9.2.1987 and Maxwell, 1987, 83).

But the Labour Party, which formed the British government between 1974 and 1979, was able to exploit the sense of being part of Britain which many Scots still felt in order to destroy the Nationalist vision of an independent and wealthy Scotland. Its appeal to Scottish solidarity with the deprived in the rest of Britain had success. While an opinion poll demonstrated that in 1974, a majority of 56-59 per cent believed that the oil belonged to Scotland, a poll in December 1975 showed that opinions were changing. 66 per cent of the poll and even 50 per cent of the SNP voters agreed that "the oil in the North Sea should be used to benefit all of Britain, and not just Scotland alone" (Scotsman, 18.12.1975, 10-11; see also tables 3.9 and 3.10).

In the meantime, the Labour government was making the first steps towards tackling the nationalist/economic crisis in Scotland. Its solution for the nationalist problem was devolution, and the main concession to those who demanded Scottish control over economic matters was the Scottish Development Agency (SDA). The following section assesses the merits of the new economic planning tool which Labour created.

2.4 The Scottish Development Agency: Labour's answer to the Scottish economic and political problem

In 1974, the Scottish Labour Party was forced to accept the need for a devolution policy. But the White Paper on Devolution (1975) and the Devolution Bill itself which was drawn up by the Labour Government in 1976 did not satisfy the needs perceived by many Scots to bring the Scottish economy under closer control. If most Scots viewed devolution functionally in terms of how good a remedy it was for their greatest plagues - unemployment, inflation and bad housing -, then the Bill was almost a complete failure, because it did not give the Scottish Assembly enough powers over these areas (Ascherson, 1976, 735).

Under pressure from Scottish public opinion, rising nationalist feelings and the oil debate whipped up by the SNP, the Labour government decided to create a decentralised regional development planning agency in addition to the existing regional policy structures. The aim was to "foster the regeneration of the Scottish economy" with a government appointed agency which would operate from its Glasgow headquarters with greater effectiveness than the various government departments and agencies had been capable of before. Although the SDA depended on government financing, it was supposed to operate independently and form its own policies. However, given that the board of directors was appointed by the Secretary of State and the agency accountable to him, the room for autonomy was very limited.

When the SDA began its life in 1975, the Times commented that it faced a "daunting task" in trying to reconcile the political and economic needs in Scotland (Times, 10.12.1975, 23). In setting up the agency and thereby channelling additional funds into Scotland, the central government clearly intended to win back voters who had become disenchanted with the remote-controlled economic management practiced by previous governments. Thus, one key function of the SDA was to legitimise the government in Scotland.

"The problem [of the SDA's task] lies (...) in the tension between the political and economic objectives that the agency will be expected to achieve. There are, first of all, the hopes that it will reassure a doubting public that an initiative taken by the United Kingdom Government can further economic prosperity in Scotland."

(Times, 10.12.1975, 23)

The other main function of the SDA was to undermine the economic project of the SNP which was based on Scotland's claims to oil revenues. It was already mentioned that the nationalist movement was criticised for being selfish. The creation of the SDA fuelled this chorus of criticism, as Labour leaders from other depressed regions claimed that the government was favouring the Scots. This undermined the SNP oil campaign, but even more damaging was the economic recession which began to develop fully under the Labour administration. As the Scottish unemployment level hit the 200,000 mark in August 1977 for the first time in 40 years, the oil argument was quickly fading away, even before exploitation and revenues reached noteworthy levels (Tables 3.11 and 3.12; Figs. 15 and 16):

"What began to happen was that in the later 1970's, the rising expectation which had been fuelled by the oil publicity in Scotland began to be undermined by the remorseless rise in unemployment. So, the feeling that Scots had developed in the early 1970's - that perhaps after all Scotland could strike it lucky and really effect an improvement in its living standards and get out of the rot of decline and industrial closures -, that feeling began to be undermined by the rise of unemployment."

(Maxwell, interview, 9.2.1987)

Although the SNP had argued that "this was precisely what would happen if Scotland didn't actually control the oil" (ibid.), people's experience of the recession made the Nationalist propaganda seem appear like a pipe dream.

The general economic situation in the late 1970's made it difficult for the SDA to prove itself¹⁰. The main activities of the SDA have

¹⁰ Between 1977 and 1980 employment in Scottish manufacturing fell by ca. 10 per cent, 3 per cent more than in the UK as a whole (Table 11). Scottish GDP per head (which excludes oil revenues) remained below
(Footnote Continued)

been the construction of factories and the provision of factory sites; investing in industrial companies; fostering small businesses; and promoting Scotland abroad to attract new companies. The renewal of derelict land was particularly prominent in the SDA's list of priorities, because the derelict land was stemming from "a previous industrial age which has left a blight not only on the landscape but also upon people's lives" (SDA Annual Report, 1977, 5). Under Labour, the SDA claimed to adhere to social purposes, particularly in maintaining and providing employment and in improving the environment, but stressed that these might not always coincide with the overriding aims of making the Scottish economy more efficient and productive (SDA Annual Report, 1978, 6-7).

Under Conservative rule after 1979, the agency began to put more emphasis on the attraction of new investment from abroad. The first Thatcher government was hardly under way when the SDA claimed that "to encourage the expansion of the large existing base of overseas corporations in Scotland constitutes one of the main objectives of the Agency" (SDA Annual Report, 1980, 24). The high technology and electronics sector was the first and foremost target. To achieve this, a new body was set up in 1981 which was appropriately named "Locate in Scotland". Industrial investment became an insignificant 7 per cent of the SDA total expenditure in 1987, which demonstrates that the Agency had given up pretences of industrial development (Table 3.13). However, the SDA's budget had always been seen to be insufficient to fulfil the tasks set by the legislators in 1975 (Radical Scotland, April/May 1986, 12), and its activities could not prevent a steeper decline of manufacturing employment in Scotland than in England.

Although the Labour Government set up the SDA in order to quieten the demands for greater Scottish control over economic development, demands which have been voiced with increasing intensity since the

(Footnote Continued)

the UK level throughout the 1970's and declined in the second half of the decade. Emigration picked up again and almost reached 15,000 between mid-1978 and mid-1979 (Regional Trends, 1981, vol. 16, 29).

1960's, it nevertheless was reluctant to give up the central economic planning model. The SDA has always been accountable to the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Westminster Parliament. The Labour Government's plan was that if the promised Scottish Assembly became reality, its economic activities were to be controlled by Westminster and its powers determined by the Secretary of State (The Scotsman, 28.11.1975, 12). Thus, the SDA remained within the old framework of economic planning, and did not really address the more fundamental issue of public control over economic development or the structural economic problems which were underlying the issue in Scotland.

Before going on to look at the links between economic processes and nationalism in Catalonia, it is worth summarising the main arguments for the Scottish case. The economy mattered to the nationalist movement in Scotland. This was due to various developments. Firstly, it was due to the economic restructuring processes as a result of which the Scottish economic region had lost its privileged role in the economic structure of the United Kingdom. Secondly, the involvement of the central state in economic restructuring in the post-war period rendered the economic sphere increasingly political, and since Scotland was considered an economic unit, also national. Thirdly, when the limits of central economic planning became obvious, an alternative solution appeared with the discovery of North Sea oil. These developments provided favourable conditions for the Scottish nationalist movement in the 1970's. The next part of this chapter investigates the Catalan case, where it will be seen that the links between the nationalist revival and economic change are constituted rather differently.

3. THE CATALAN ECONOMY AND THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

In the previous chapter on the history of the Catalan nationalist movement, the connections between economic development and nationalism became clear. A relatively innovative, export oriented agricultural sector dominated by owner occupation and long-term tenancy, together with industrialisation in the 19th century had

turned Catalonia into an industrial-capitalist enclave in a predominantly rural, poverty-stricken state. Catalonia therefore developed an industrial bourgeoisie and working class which formed part of a specifically Catalan civil society. In the early 20th century civil society was dominated by a bourgeois, nationalistic political culture. Both the economic interests of its leaders and their striving for political control in Spain was reflected in the **Lliga Regionalista**. However, it was also shown that other political tendencies existed in the nationalist movement which had increasing support from the middle and lower classes. From these emerged in the late 1920's the popular nationalism of the Second Republic.

In the early phase of Catalan nationalism, the connections between economic, political and cultural control were plainly visible in Catalonia - even if they were not all-embracing. But did such connections persist or re-emerge after the civil war? Such an examination is far from straightforward, because of the prohibitions applying to political parties and other types of organisation during the dictatorship. But by looking at the economic development of Catalan industry, the financial and personal involvement of Catalan entrepreneurs in the cultural movement of the 1960's, and - to a limited extent - from the early political programmes and pamphlets of the Catalan ruling party today, it is possible to get an impression of the extent to which the Catalan bourgeoisie played "the first violin" in the nationalist revival. On the other side, the economic boom and recession from the 1950's to the 1970's brought about changes in the organisation of labour, which also had an impact on the nationalist and other political movements of the period.

In order to explore the links between economic development and the rise of nationalism in Catalonia, I examine first the economic changes in the Francoist period, and second, the level and type of state intervention in the economy. During the Francoist phase, Catalonia maintained a strong position within the Spanish economy, and state intervention was experienced as a hindrance to economic progress rather than as beneficial. The third section is concerned with the way in which some sectors of the Catalan bourgeoisie

developed nationalist strategies to counterbalance the negative effects of state action, while the fourth looks at the touching points of industrial struggles and the nationalist movement.

3.1 Developments in the Catalan economy under Francoism

In the first two decades of Francoism, the economic policy of the dictatorship was heavily influenced by political considerations. The aim was to create an economy which was self-reliant, particularly in important and strategic sectors such as energy, basic industries and food production. Imports and exports were controlled by the state bureaucracy, as was the setting up of new factories or the expansion of existing ones. Under this system of extensive state intervention, corruption and black markets flourished; profits were used for speculative purposes rather than investment, and official growth rates were low (Ribas i Massana, 1978, 102). This latter was due partly to the difficulties of access to imported raw materials and capital goods, and partly to the lack of stimulus to improve productivity, since frozen wages inhibited consumption and competition was low in the highly protected market (Flós, Gasóliba and Serra, 1978, 15). In the 1950's, Spain's relationship to the Western countries improved under the conditions of the cold war, and foreign investors started to discover Spain as a paradise of low wages, a docile labour force and a stable, reactionary government. The Plan de Estabilización in 1959 sealed this process of opening and liberalisation of the economic system.

Throughout the Francoist period, and particularly from the 1950's onwards, the differences between the Catalan and the Spanish economy became progressively smaller (Tables 3.14 and 3.15; Figs. 17 and 18). Spain was transformed within only a couple of decades from an agricultural into a modern industrial society (S. Vilar, 1985, 73). In the boom period of the 1960's, the Spanish GDP grew by between 4.2 and 9.5 per cent every year (Cullell and Farré-Escofet, 1975, 55). Whilst in 1955, 45 per cent of the population was occupied in the primary sector, it was only 32 per cent in 1967 and 20 per cent in 1979. Solé and Miguélez pointed out that economic development

changed the economic balance between Catalonia and the rest of Spain:

"Contrary to what went on in the final years of last century and the first part of this century, when the Catalan productive structure was fundamentally different from the Spanish, one could speak today of fundamental economic integration (...)."

(Solé and Miguélez, 1987, 15)

However, although Catalonia's relative overdevelopment is less pronounced today as it was before the civil war, it is still visible and measurable. Industrial development and the growth of the service sector took place in many parts of Spain, but Catalonia profited more from the boom because she already had a higher level of productivity, income and industrial development (Lluch, 1964, 23). In 1983, for example, disposable family income per person was still 122 per cent of the Spanish average and second highest among all autonomous communities¹¹.

The structure of the Catalan economy underwent some important changes during the boom period. While the Scottish economy was geared to heavy industry, the Catalan economy relied on textile production which was the single most significant industry until far into the 1950's. By 1979, however, the textile sector had shrunk to only 13.4 per cent of the gross added value, and metal processing had gone up from 12.4 per cent to 32.3 per cent in the same period. During the 1960's, the industrial structure became more diversified (Flós, Gasóliba and Serra, 1978, 63-65) (Table 3.16; Figs. 19-21).

However, industrial investment in Catalonia in the last few decades has reduced the degree of autonomy of the Catalan manufacturing sector. Particularly the large enterprises "are increasingly less Catalan and more controlled by big business in Madrid" (Flós et al.,

¹¹Disparities are very pronounced among the autonomous communities. If the Catalan disposable family income was 122 per cent above the Spanish average, it was only 68 per cent in Extremadura, the most depressed community, and 80 per cent in Andalucia, Spain's largest community (Banco de Bilbao, 1986, 50).

1978, 92-3). Secondly, many of the large manufacturing enterprises with headquarters in Barcelona are now controlled by foreign capital. In 1973, 39 per cent of the large Catalan firms involved foreign capital which had in 28 per cent of the cases a controlling interest. Foreign investment was highest in the chemical, metal, food and - to a much lesser extent and concentrated in artificial fibres - textile sectors and originated mainly from other European countries (op. cit., 119-120). According to Solé and Miguélez, this concentration of foreign capital in the main growth sectors, and increasing investment in Catalonia from other parts of Spain, have reduced the level of control of the Catalan bourgeoisie over the manufacturing sector (Solé and Miguélez, 1987, 27).

Although large enterprises, mostly dominated from outside Catalonia, played an important role in the regional economy in the 1960's and 1970's, they were far less prevalent in terms of employment than in the UK¹². Medium sized enterprises accounted for much of the employment and the industrial production, and was predominantly Catalan owned and controlled. Although often subordinated to the large companies, it appears that this "Catalan sector" was linked to the socially and politically dominant groups. The industrial middle bourgeoisie was "socio-politically relevant, but economically subjected to the power of the big foreign capital" (Solé and Miguélez, 1987, 35-6).

Thus, although economic changes in Spain and in the world economy have reduced the relative autonomy of the Catalan economy during the Franco period, it seems that they generally benefited Catalonia. Bearing in mind the conflicts with the state which the Catalan bourgeoisie had in the 19th century, and the fierce anti-separatism of the Franco regime, the next question concerns the affects of

¹²In 1972, 68 per cent of manufacturing employment in the UK was in large enterprises with over 500 employees. Six years later, still only 20 per cent of Catalan manufacturing employees were working in large companies (Solé and Miguélez, 1987, 38).

state intervention on the economy. Did this have any influence on the nationalist movement?

3.2 Economic planning

The new economic doctrine of the Franco regime after its victory in 1939 was influenced by several factors. The most important internal ones were: the "counterrevolution" (reversal of changes in the economic structure that occurred during the 1930's); the fascist theories and ideologies (still significant during the 1940's); and the new mechanisms of state intervention. The situation of the Spanish state during and after the Second World War (isolation and Western trade embargo) was the most relevant external factor. The dictatorship was a reaction to the crisis of capitalism in the late 1920's, and to the revolutionary unrest of the 1930's, therefore the economic and the political were difficult to separate.

In any case, the mixture of the above factors favoured an economic model in which the state played the central role. However, it was not the type of state intervention developing at the same time in other countries, such as Britain. While in Britain, state intervention aimed at keeping the capitalist economy going, Francoist state intervention was guided by other ideological considerations, and to some extent inhibited capitalist accumulation (Ribas i Massana, 1978, 43).

One of the main objectives of state intervention in the 1940's was self-sufficiency both in food and industrial production (Theberge, 1976, 12-14). Foreign trade was restricted and state controlled. This on the one hand protected Spanish industries against outside competition, but on the other disrupted the supply of imported raw material and machinery and led to severe underinvestment. This affected Catalonia, which was relatively industrialised and relied on imported cotton and machinery for her textile industry. Throughout the 1940's, Catalan textile industries could only get around 65 per cent of the cotton they needed (Minguella, 1979, 38).

At the same time, the government had frozen wages (until 1958). The effect was that much of the distribution of raw materials and end products was done on the black market, which allowed the producers to rake in big profits. Despite frozen wages, prices were rising, a situation which created a barrier to economic growth.

New instruments of economic intervention were created such as the **Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI)** in 1941 to further the creation of industries, "especially those which are essential to the defence of the country", and to lead the economy in the direction of autarchy (Ribas i Massana, 1978, 95). In this institution, just as in other organs of economic intervention, the representation of Catalans was minimal. Economic planning and investment carried out by INI did not usually benefit Catalonia, which was regarded as a congested industrial zone in need of decongestion. Many of INI's new industries were located in the Madrid area, and location of state investment seemed to have been guided far more by consideration of personal politics than of national development. State institutions such as INI, and state enterprises provided Franco with excellent opportunities for "rewarding" faithful followers with lucrative posts (Abella, 1985, 134).

The scarce public investment in the Catalan infrastructure was the source of a widespread feeling of neglect. The drain of financial resources from Catalonia to the rest of Spain - more precisely Madrid - was a result of Catalonia's relative wealth, but Catalan economists did not consider this to be the nation's contribution to the deprived regions of Spain. Rather, it was regarded as a subsidy for the enormous bureaucracy of central government, and therefore something which only benefited the political classes.

The bureaucracy established in the period of autarchy was extensive, and in many ways obstructive to capitalist development. Although the jungle of permits, authorisations and controls became lighter with the liberalisation of the economy, the intimate linkages between business and political office were not broken down. Corruption flourished during the economic boom, and central, provincial and local government was often involved in land speculation etc.. The

negative effects on infrastructure, productivity and competitiveness were increasingly noted and criticised by those sectors of the bourgeoisie which were thinking ahead and beyond the boundaries of the Spanish economy. The Catalan bourgeoisie, more distant from the dominant political cadres, had some interest in liberating their economic sphere from the paralysing influence of the state, and to rebuild their own political institutions in Catalonia. It was partly for this reason that some sectors of the bourgeoisie helped to construct the nationalist revival, as the next section explains.

3.3 Catalan business and nationalist projects

3.3.i Money for culture

The Catalan bourgeoisie played a significant role in the Catalanist revival. But this time, it was not so much big bourgeoisie which provided the resources for cultural projects and associations, but rather the petty and medium bourgeoisie which had remained more faithful to the Catalan heritage.

From 1960 onwards, cultural activities such as publishing, music, and teaching contributed a great deal to the slow recovery of the Catalan language and culture. Under the Franco regime, no public resources were available for such activities. Furthermore, censorship, repressive legislation and a drastically and forcedly shrunken market made them politically dangerous and economically unfeasible. Most of these cultural activities therefore had constant financial problems and relied on sponsors from the well-off professional and business sectors.

Whilst no statistics are available to quantify this involvement, many examples demonstrate the intimate involvement of the Catalan bourgeoisie in nationalist activities. First of all, the countless associations and private institutions which played such a significant role in the survival of the Catalan culture and national heritage had to be financed. To some extent, membership fees accounted for this, but sponsorship was also required. In the absence of public resources, everything - Catalan teaching, the numerous literature prizes, prestigious institutions such as the **Institut d'Estudis Catalans** (IEC), etc. - had to be financed privately. The sponsors were naturally found in the ranks of the Catalan business and professional elite, and some of them were directly involved as office holders in these cultural institutions.

One high profile association dedicated to fostering Catalan culture was the **Omnium Cultural**. Founded in 1961, it helped to finance the IEC, the **Obra del Ballet Popular**, the **Agrupació Dramàtica de Barcelona**, etc., and financed cultural prizes such as the **Nit de**

Santa Llúcia, etc. (GEC, 1988). Apart from several hundred members, **Omnium Cultural** had among its presidents well-established entrepreneurs who were committed to supporting Catalan culture, such as Cendrós i Carbonell, owner of the factory **Hangrón Cientifical S.A.**; **Lluís Carulla**, with shares in various food industries; and **Millet i Maristany**, involved in banking and insurance.

In many other cases, the involvement of the Catalan bourgeoisie was as shareholders. A case in point was the Catalan publishing houses, which were at the forefront of the cultural revival in the 1960's, but always in need of cash. The most successful Catalan publisher today, **Edicions 62**, began as a small cultural project in 1962 which was set up by Max Cahner and other intellectuals who had been involved in the journal **Serra d'Or**. The necessary starting capital came from the Cahner family, who had sold their shares in a paint factory. Subsequently, more shareholders were recruited for **Edicions 62**, most of whom had only a small stake in the company (Cahner, interview, 11.2.1988). The same system operated in other Catalan publishing firms. Whatever their ideological stance - many of the Catalan publishing houses were left-wing oriented under the Franco regime, and all were opposed to it - they relied on shareholders. Another example was the publishing house **Laia**:

In those days, the publishing house was formed by a very large number of share holders. There were many people, over a hundred, who held a small number of shares each. They were economically powerful people from the world of industry and finance in Catalonia, which in a way channeled their resistance to the position of the Franco regime with respect to the Catalan culture into the publishing sector. This kind of thing was quite common in Catalonia, and occurred in the cases of **Edicions 62**, **La Magrana**, **Publicacions de Montserrat** as well as **Laia**; journals as well (...), such as "**Oriflama**", "**Presència**", and others formed part of this form of cultural opposition in order to maintain the language. "

(Pagès, interview, 25.4.1988)

The investors in Catalan culture under Franco were mostly from the professional class and from (mainly medium sized) industry. They were people who would not have taken the risk involved in direct political action, but they were prepared to use some of their money as a kind of voluntary tax.

"If we look at them sociologically, they were the same: people from the Catalan bourgeoisie, top professionals who had sufficient income to invest money without expecting any financial returns. Maybe they even did it for their own image."

(Pagès, interview, 16.5.1989)

Capital was not only needed to set up such cultural institutions, but also to keep them going. Making Catalan books was not a profitable business because many people had never learned to read and write Catalan, and the market was very limited. Also, the political restrictions meant that fines and bribes had to be paid to the Spanish authorities to make the publication of this or the other volume possible. Capital for reviving Catalan culture was mostly private; only the **Banca Catalana** was prepared to lend money for such purposes, and only because the bank itself is a product of the movement of "rebuilding the Catalan nation". One of its founders was Jordi Pujol, a "man of the bourgeoisie", and the present leader of the Catalan nationalist party, CiU.

While many members of the Catalan bourgeoisie restricted their nationalist activities to the cultural field, some extended them to the economic sphere. State neglect and mismanagement had produced some limits to economic growth in Catalonia, and therefore, a small sector of the Catalan bourgeoisie argued that a nationalist project was necessary to rebuild the nation's economic structure. The next section looks at the arguments involved.

3.3.ii Rebuilding the nation's economy

"Fer Catalunya" or "construir Catalunya" ("make Catalonia") was the slogan of some sectors of the nationalist movement which aimed at rebuilding the national identity and consciousness by strengthening the economic, social and cultural infrastructure of the country. It was coined by Pujol, who interpreted investment in Catalonia as a patriotic act, and coincided with the economic boom period of the late 1950's and 1960's. Catalan entrepreneurs were generally doing well under the regime and had adapted to the political system. The cultural repression constituted a dilemma for some, but those

entrepreneurs who put their national and cultural rights before their business interests were rare. According to P. Nadal (a Catalan industrialist), the patriotic capitalist tendency was influential only in Catalanist circles and of limited significance (Pere Nadal, interview, 27.1.1988).

The foundation of the **Banca Catalana**, however, was inspired by nationalist considerations. Pujol considered a Catalan bank necessary in order to keep the resources in Catalonia and to create new enterprises. Without a bank of her own,

"Catalonia will always live in danger of losing her best industrial and commercial creations to foreigners. She will always live in danger of being colonised."

(Pujol, 1980, 97)

In short, it was seen as a way to strengthen the control of the Catalan bourgeoisie over the regional economy at a crucial time of economic expansion and rapid structural change. The big textile capitalists had little interest in such a project, because they had culturally and politically adapted to the Franco system¹³. But there was interest in a big autochthonous bank among the younger manager generations and the up and coming manufacturing sectors, such as metal manufacturing, construction, chemicals, as well as the growing service sector (Llarch, 1985, 56). The idea of Catalan self-sufficiency, induced some industrialists to advocate the introduction of heavy industry to provide a secure basis for the transforming industries that dominate in Catalan industry. Such demands were presented as patriotic goals in the spirit of "making country", just like many other entrepreneurial activities. According to Ernest Lluch, this was just a fashionable cover for

¹³The general opinion is that the Catalan big bourgeoisie had betrayed Catalonia. In 1957, the exiled writer Tasis accused the Catalan bourgeoisie of selling out. Rather than attempting to safeguard Catalan economic interests, the great capitalists came to individual arrangements with the new regime. "There has never been a collective action, a unified front, a common programme in defence of Catalan interests - not even of those of the bourgeoisie" (Tasis, 1979, 37).

Catalan capitalists trying to protect their interests against outside competition (Ernest Lluch, 1970, 67; see also Trias i Fargas, 1965, 25-26).

Certainly, these "patriotically inspired" ventures were only a small part of the total economic investment, and were pulled along with the great economic boom that was happening anyway. Nevertheless, they were indicative of a certain current in Catalan nationalism which became stronger in the 1960's. As new industries sprung up and investment was surging, the Catalan bourgeoisie became more assertive. After decades of political and economic determination through the Franco regime, during which the Catalans had lost the political influence gained in the first decades of the century, possibilities arose for a change in the balance of forces. The Banca Catalana exemplifies the nascent organisation of the Catalan bourgeoisie in that period. Not only was the future leader of **Convergència Democràtica** deeply involved with the bank, but it also provided an opportunity to gather other politically and economically ambitious entrepreneurs and professionals around a common goal. In this sense, the credit institute performed the function of a political party at a time when they were still illegal. Even before **Convergència Democràtica** was formed as a party, the interests it represented were already influential in the nationalist movement. As the former General Secretary of the Communist Party pointed out,

"in a certain way, the branches of **Banca Catalana** were important sources of support for Jordi Pujol. He placed friends in strategic positions in the **Catalana** ..."

(Lopez Raimundo, interview, 16.5.1989)

In Pujol's own vision of the reconstruction of the Catalan nation, the bourgeoisie played a fundamental role, particularly those sectors of the petty and middle bourgeoisie which were "reformist, modern and with a social and national conscience" (Marcet, 1987, 286-7). This importance can be traced back to other periods, and is indeed the main building stone of the nation:

"Without the bourgeoisie [...], our modern, dynamic Catalonia would not exist today. I mean that Catalonia which reflects a will to exist and to create, and not just to be passively accepted, almost suffered, like other nations such

as the Provence, Galicia, and until recently Valencia [...]. In our case, the economic strength, - the indigenous economic potency -, has been a decisive influence on Catalan politics and reality."

(Pujol, 1976, 25)

It follows from this argument that economic strength is a precondition for political influence and autonomy. At the same time as reviving the Catalan culture and national consciousness, it was therefore necessary to develop the economic potential of the country. Another consequence of this approach to nationalist affirmation is that the bourgeoisie is not only leading the economic advance of the country, but assumes also social and political leadership. This is precisely what occurred in the 1970's, even though the bourgeoisie - and even Pujol, for that matter - took a backseat in the Catalan nationalist movement during the 1960's and early 1970's.

Having examined the influence of the booming sixties on Catalan nationalism with respect to the bourgeoisie, I now look at the effects economic processes and state intervention had on workers. The next section argues that industrial struggles in the Francoist period became increasingly politicised, and Catalan nationalism was one aspect of this new political sensitivity.

3.4. Industrial strife, political organisation and autonomy

The support of the workers' movement for Catalan self-determination in the 1970's was important for the success of the nationalist movement. Although Catalan nationalism had a popular appeal in the past, working class organisations never wholeheartedly embraced the national issue. During the Second Republic, this uneasy relationship deteriorated rapidly, and the repressions during and after the Civil War -which hit the working class more than others- disrupted the fragile tradition there was of working class support for Catalan self-determination. In the post-war period, the Barcelona region became a magnet for Spanish migrants who were absorbed in the economic expansion. A large part of the immigrants landed in the hard and badly paid manufacturing jobs, and soon formed the hard

core of the working class in Catalonia's industrial belt. This is where the new working class organisations started in the 1960's, when collective bargaining was no longer prohibited (Miguélez, 1985, 599). Given the strong immigrant presence in the working class and its emerging organisations, the question arises to which extent the economic reality in Catalonia favoured the identification of the workers with nationalist demands.

As a highly industrialised region, Barcelona was - together with Madrid and the traditional industrial centres of Guipúzcoa, Viscaya and Asturias - at the forefront of working class mobilisation. This mobilisation had already started in the early 1950's¹⁴ and involved several Catholic workers' organisations (HOAC and JOC) as well as the *Oposición Sindical Obrera*¹⁵, but its main source were the Workers' Commissions (CC.OO.). The CC.OO. became prominent for the first time in the Asturian miners' strikes in 1962 and from then on sprung up in other industrial centres. However, since these organisations emerging on the margin of the official Vertical Syndicate developed in a certain haphazard manner and originated mainly in industrial disputes at enterprise level, they progressed in different ways in the various industrial regions. The conditions for their development were shaped by the working class traditions of the region, the composition of the working class, and the already existing organisational structures and oppositional political nuclei (Miguélez, 1985, 606-608). One of the specific developments in

¹⁴In his history of the Catalan workers' movement under Franco, Ludevid pointed out that in the larger metal and textile manufacturing enterprises, working class activists began to use the Vertical Syndicate to defend workers' real interests already in the 1950's (Ludevid, 1977, 12). This followed a decision by the Communist Party in 1949 to infiltrate the Syndicate with the aim of overthrowing it from within.

¹⁵The OSO were communist influenced, but rather spontaneous and nuclear manifestations of workers' opposition to the Vertical Syndicate. The labour leader and CC.OO. veteran Cipriano García gave examples of Terrassa, in the industrial belt of Barcelona province, where a local group campaigned against the rise of bicycle registration fees and for equal wages (García, interview, 29.3.1988).

Catalonia was the early constitution of a CC.OO. regional structure. In 1964, the **Comisión Central de Barcelona** was formed and a strategy adopted to establish workers' commissions in other Catalan provinces and districts. Two years later, the **Comissió Obrera Nacional de Catalunya (CONC)** was set up. The Catalan Communist party (PSUC) was involved in this attempt to impose a hierarchy and direction on the new movement which deliberately confined it to a Catalan framework of reference. The creation of a national structure was a political decision by labour leaders who wanted to avoid a split between national and class issues which could divide the workers (García, interview, 29.3.1988). In their first congress in 1978¹⁶, the **Comissions Obreres de Catalunya** stressed their national identity and support for the struggle for Catalan autonomy.

The CC.OO. activists were encouraged to take part in nationalist demonstrations on the 11th of September already in the late 1960's, and the CONC decided that it would send representatives to organisations such as the **Taula Rodona** and the **Assemblea de Catalunya**. The Catalan CC.OO leadership's concern for political struggles¹⁷ was not reflected to the same extent in the interests of the rank and file, which centred on concrete improvements at the workplace (Clemente, interview, 21.3.1988). Tensions within the CC.OO. about strategies and priorities affected the Catalan labour movement, and some accused the PSUC of using the CC.OO. to establish

¹⁶ While during the dictatorship CC.OO. constituted the workers' movement, the appearance of other trade unions after Franco's death forced them to define themselves as a trade union. The first congress in May 1978 was held under a slogan which reflected the strong presence of communists in its ranks:

"For a strong class syndicate - leading Catalonia out of the crisis".

(Comissions Obreres de Catalunya, 1978, 1)

¹⁷ The reference to the specific political struggles in Catalonia, such as that of the **Assemblea de Catalunya** and the students' movement of the University of Barcelona, cropped up in the underground press of the CC.OO time and again. Comparisons were drawn between repressive actions of the government against striking workers and protesting students, and messages of solidarity with workers in industrial disputes, such as those of SEAT in 1971 and subsequent years, were printed (Comisiones, 1972, no. 1, 5-11).

its hegemony in Catalonia, and called for a more economist and autonomous strategy (Qué hacer?, 1969, no. 6, 7). While the activities of the labour movement on the factory floor were very limited in the 1960's (Ludevid, 1977, 52), they took on a far greater importance in the 1970's, when industrial disputes in the larger enterprises such as SEAT, Térmica, Pegaso and Olivetti became more frequent and more widespread. These were related to the economic crisis which the country was experiencing after the "fat" years of the previous decade. The creation of the **Assemblea de Catalunya** at a time of widespread strikes in Barcelona (November 1971) was celebrated as the most relevant act of the Catalan opposition against the dictatorship (Nous Horitzons, 1971, no. 23, 1-3).

There is little doubt that the strong presence of the Catalan communist party (PSUC) in both the CC.OO. and the political opposition movement was the main link between the struggles in the factories and the more political struggles which involved a broad spectrum of Catalan society. Throughout the 1960's and 1970's, the PSUC was trying to rally support among workers for the demands for democracy and self-government around which the Catalan opposition was gathering strength. It was rather successful in its attempt to relate national and social oppression and to identify the government as the main source of both. Democracy, freedom and amnesty were seen to be in everybody's interest, and promised to make possible autonomous trade unions as well as self-government.

To conclude, the combination of rapid economic development in the 1960's, state repression and a relatively active working class underground organisation led to industrial struggles which edged closer to the nationalist movement as the state was identified with social and political repression. In this process of politicisation of economic struggles, the working class organisations played an important role.

4. CONCLUSION

This chapter looked at relationships between economic processes and the political manifestation of nationalism. It found that economic development took different paths in Scotland and Catalonia, in spite of general trends such as the increase of foreign investment and control and of state intervention in the economy.

Historically, both countries have a distinctive economic structure. In itself, the existence of these "regional" economies is not remarkable, because the "national" economies of which they are part are constituted by a patchwork of more or less distinctive economic regions. What makes the difference in the cases of Scotland and Catalonia is the peculiar light under which their economies are seen. In this light, which passes through a filter of national consciousness, the Scottish economy, marred by emigration, industrial decline and chronic unemployment, is seen as the deprived adopted brother to its wealthier neighbour to the South. Economic planning as a way of pulling the Scottish economy out of its downhill trajectory gave it an additional political dimension which has featured strongly in political discourse. In Catalonia, it is the other way round: it has a tradition of creating more wealth than most other regions in Spain. In recent decades, the development gap has narrowed, but Catalonia has still more industry and a higher living standard than most of the other Spanish autonomous communities.

While it is not possible to ascribe causal powers to economic structures and "necessities", as some economist approaches do, some processes can be identified which helped to shape and to constrain the nationalist movements. In the case of Scotland, this was the failure of economic planning and the discovery of oil resources. Once the Scottish economy had become a national political issue, major industrial struggles also took on board nationalist perspectives, and in turn became part of the general process of politicisation. However, when the economic situation deteriorated in

the late 1970's, the vision of an independent Scotland and the prospect of political change in general became less attractive.

In Catalonia, the economic boom of the 1960's under conditions of economic liberalisation made both Capital and Labour more confident about gaining more political control. Both identified - from different perspectives - the Franco regime as a hindrance to economic and social well-being, and to political liberalisation. Catalonia being the economically most advanced region in Spain, it felt the contradictions of capitalist growth faster and more intensely, and this provided favourable conditions for the anti-Francoist/nationalist struggle in the 1970's.

Table 3.1: Employment decline in Scottish heavy industry, 1958-78
(in thousands)

HEAVY INDUSTRY	TOTAL	EMPLOYMENT	
	1958	1968	1978
Metal manufacture	58.4	40.6	33.9
Mechanical engineering	104.0	101.0	80.2
Shipbuilding and marine eng.	67.1	37.6	37.6
Vehicles	36.3	38.0	20.6

Sources: Census of Production, 1958; 1968 and 1978.

Table 3.2: Production of Scottish manufacturing by
industry, 1958-78
(Percentage of net output)

	1958	1968	1978
Mining	9.1	4.9	4.9
Water, gas			
electricity	6.5	9.4	7.6
Food, drink			
& tobacco	14.1	18.0	21.6
Textiles	8.3	7.7	6.0
Leather, shoes	2.2	2.3	2.8
Timber, furniture	2.0	2.2	2.6
Paper, printing	6.4	7.0	6.8
Chemicals	6.5	6.7	7.5
Glass, cement	2.6	2.8	2.9
Metal (light ind.)	7.2	13.5	12.3
Metal (heavy ind.)	33.3	23.2	22.4
Other	6.5	2.2	2.6

Sources: Census of Production, 1958, vol. 134, 96-111;
ibid., 1968, vol. 157, 230-249; ibid., 1978,
158-171.

Table 3.3: Employed population in Scotland, 1951-81
(Per cent)

ECONOMIC SECTORS	1951	1966	1981
Agriculture, forestry & fishing	7.4	5.0	3.3
Manufacturing	42.2	38.8	27.4
Construction	6.9	8.6	8.5
Services	43.5	47.6	60.9

Source: Census 1951 (Scotland); Census 1966 (Scotland);
Census 1981 (Scotland).

Table 3.4: Employed population in Great Britain, 1951-81
(Per cent)

ECONOMIC SECTORS	1951	1966	1981
Agriculture, forestry & fishing	5.1	3.2	2.2
Manufacturing	43.1	39.0	30.1
Construction	6.3	7.8	7.0
Services	45.5	50.1	60.6

Source: Census 1951 (England and Wales); Census 1966
(England and Wales); Census 1981 (England and
Wales).

Table 3.5 : Unemployment in Scotland and GB, 1949-79
(Percentage of economically active)

YEAR	SCOTLAND	GREAT BRITAIN
1949	2.7	1.3
1950	2.7	1.4
1951	2.2	1.0
1952	3.1	1.9
1953	2.7	1.4
1954	2.8	1.3
1955	2.4	1.1
1956	2.4	1.2
1957	2.6	1.4
1958	3.8	2.1
1959	4.4	2.2
1960	3.6	1.6
1961	3.1	1.5
1962	3.8	2.0
1963	4.8	2.5
1964	3.6	1.6
1965	3.0	1.4
1966	2.9	1.5
1967	3.9	2.4
1968	3.8	2.4
1969	3.7	2.4
1970	4.2	2.5
1971	5.9	3.4
1972	6.6	3.8
1973	4.7	2.7
1974	4.1	2.6
1975	5.8	4.1
1976	7.0	5.6
1977	8.1	6.0
1978	8.2	6.0
1979	8.0	5.6

Sources: Department of Employment Gazette, Oct. 1949, 351;
Oct. 1950, 345; Oct. 1951, 396; Oct. 1952, 351;
Oct. 1953, 359 (September figures);
Employment and Productivity Gazette, 1969, no. 77,
70-82;
Department of Employment Gazette, May 1974,
450-462; Dec. 1975, 1312-1324; Nov. 1980,
supplement, 18-24.

Table 3.6: Intercensal estimated net migration, 1900 - 1981, for Catalonia and Scotland (Thousands)

	CATALONIA		SCOTLAND ¹	
	Population	Migration	Population	Migration
1900	1,966.4		4,472.1	
		33.6		-254.1
1910	2,084.9		4,760.9	
		224.3		-238.6
1920	2,344.7		4,882.5	
		322.0		-391.9
1930	2,791.3		4,843.0	
		110.1		-220.0
1940	2,891.0		-	
		256.7		-
1950	3,218.6		5,096.4	
		454.2		-282.0
1960	3,888.5		5,179.3	
		742.8		-326.5
1970	5,107.6		5,229.0	
		244.4		-59.3
1975	5,666.4		5,206.2	
		22.6		-82.9
1981	5,958.3		5,180.2	

Sources: Scottish Abstract of Statistics, vol. 15, 1986, 7; Consorti d'Informació i Documentació de Catalunya, Estadística i Societat, 1981, nos. 10-11, 3.

1

The Scottish census are held one year into each decade, i.e. 1901, 1911 etc.. There was no census in 1941.

Table 3.7 : Regional Aid in Scotland, 1960-1982

YEAR	TOTAL (£ Mio)	SHARE OF GB (Per cent)
1960/61	3.3	27.9
1961/62	18.4	56.0
1962/63	14.3	23.9
1963/64	8.0	48.2
1964/65	10.1	33.4
1965/66	27.2	36.4
1966/67	29.5	43.3
1967/68	51.4	32.2
1968/69	88.1	32.8
1969/70	96.3	32.9
1970/71	94.3	31.3
1971/72	84.2	33.4
1972/73	3.0	37.0
1973/74	32.0	29.8
1974/75	61.6	29.0
1975/76	98.5	30.3
1976/77	193.2	29.9
1977/78	113.1	26.4
1978/79	32.7	16.3
1979/80	30.9	20.6
1980/81	48.0	24.5
1981/82	60.0	25.0

Sources: Abstract of Regional Statistics, vols. 5-8;
Regional Statistics, 9-15; Scotsman, 28.3.1975.

Table 3.8: Employees in employment by sector in Scotland
(Thousand)

SECTOR	1974	1976	1978	1980	1983
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	50	49	48	45	43
Mining and quarrying	34	35	39	44	44
Manufacturing ind.	676	608	604	554	431
Construction	170	171	160	159	121
Gas, electr. & water	28	29	28	29	27
Services	1,125	1,179	1,188	1,243	1,216

Source: Scottish Abstract of Statistics, 1984. vol. 13, 57.

Table 3.9 :Opinions on North Sea oil belonging to Scotland
(in per cent)

"The oil in the North Sea belongs to Scotland, and tax revenues from it should be used for the benefit of the Scottish people"							
	May 1974	May 1975	All	December 1975			
				Con.	Labour	SNP	Lib.
Agree	59	56	44	20	36	72	31
Disagree	38	39	51	77	58	25	62
Don't know	3	5	4	3	6	7	3

Source: ORC Poll quoted in Scotsman, 18.12.1975, 10-11

Table 3.10: Opinions on North Sea oil: who is to benefit?
(in per cent)

"The oil in the North Sea should be used to benefit all of Britain, and not just Scotland alone."							
	May 1974	May 1975	All	December 1975			
				Con.	Labour	SNP	Lib.
Agree	60	68	66	79	75	50	84
Disagree	37	27	29	20	21	45	14
Don't know	3	5	5	1	4	5	2

Source: ORC Poll quoted in Scotsman, 18.12.1975, 10-11

Table 3.11 : U.K. Oil Production, 1975-88
(Mio. tonnes)

YEAR	TOTAL PRODUCTION
1975	1.1
1976	11.6
1977	37.3
1978	52.8
1979	77.9
1980	80.5
1981	89.5
1982	103.2
1983	114.9
1984	125.9
1985	122.1
1986	120.7
1987	117.1
1988	114.4

Source: Development of Oil and Gas Resources of the United Kingdom, 1980, 31; 1985, 68; 1989, 112.

Table 3.12 : UK Government Oil and Gas revenues, 1976-89
(in £ Mio)

YEAR	REVENUES
1976-77	80
1977-78	240
1978-79	520
1979-80	2,334
1980-81	3,882
1981-82	6,461
1982-83	7,761
1983-84	8,821
1984-85	12,028
1985-86	11,349
1986-87	4,790
1987-88	4,670
1988-89	3,200

Source: Development of Oil and Gas Resources in the United Kingdom, 1980, 18; 1985, 30; 1989, 84.

Table 3.13 : Expenditure of the Scottish Development Agency
and Government grants provided, 1976-89
(Million £)

Years	Total Expenditure	Investment Operation	Government Grant
1976-77 ²	19.7	2.5	12.0
1977-78	51.0	8.2	43.2
1978-79	67.2	4.6	48.1
1979-80	92.9	5.7	58.4
1980-81	94.8	3.9	76.9
1981-82	104.4	5.8	76.4
1982-83	69.0	3.7	94.0
1983-84	72.6	5.0	83.6
1984-85	91.4	7.2	75.6
1985-86	114.9	5.4	91.4
1986-87	113.8	5.6	87.2
1987-88	125.9	8.0	91.3
1988-89	122.8	9.4	87.6

Source: Kirwan, 1981; Annual Reports (Scottish Development Agency), 1982-89.

²The financial year ends on March 31st.

Table 3.14 : Economically active population in economic sectors, Catalonia, 1955-79
(Percentage of total economically active)

ECONOMIC SECTORS	1955	1967	1979
Agriculture, forestry & fishing	19.4	11.7	7.3
Manufacturing	38.0	41.7	37.5
Construction	6.6	9.2	9.1
Services	35.0	35.7	46.1

Sources: Banco de Bilbao, 1978, 123-132; ibid., 1982, 180.

Table 3.15 : Economically active population in economic sectors, Spain, 1955-79
(Percentage of total economically active)

ECONOMIC SECTORS	1955	1967	1979
Agriculture, forestry & fishing	46.0	32.4	20.4
Manufacturing	21.6	26.1	25.6
Construction	6.5	8.4	8.9
Services	25.8	33.1	45.2

Sources: Banco de Bilbao, 1978, 123-32; ibid., 1982, 180.

Table 3.16 : Production of Catalan manufacturing by
industry, 1955-79
(Percentage of gross value added)

INDUSTRY	1955	1960	1967	1973	1979
Mining	1.7	2.1	1.3	0.8	2.6
Water, gas & electricity	4.8	5.5	4.7	4.6	6.2
Food, drink & tobacco	5.7	7.8	8.2	7.4	9.4
Textiles	42.9	32.3	22.5	17.6	13.4
Leather, shoes	6.8	6.4	9.2	7.0	6.4
Timber, furniture	5.7	5.0	4.2	3.6	3.5
Paper, printing & graphics	3.9	4.1	4.3	6.5	8.2
Chemicals	12.1	12.2	14.4	14.5	13.5
Glass, cement	3.9	3.0	4.4	4.4	3.9
Metal	12.4	21.4	26.5	33.6	32.3

Source: Generalitat de Catalunya (Departament d'Indústria i
Energia), 1987, 27.

Fig. 7: EMPLOYMENT IN HEAVY INDUSTRIES, SCOTLAND
1958-78 (IN THOUSANDS)




Fig. 8: MANUFACTURING IN SCOTLAND, 1958
PERCENTAGE OF NET OUTPUT




Fig. 9: MANUFACTURING IN SCOTLAND, 1968
PERCENTAGE OF NET OUTPUT




Fig. 10: MANUFACTURING IN SCOTLAND, 1978
PERCENTAGE OF NET OUTPUT




Fig. 11: ECONOMIC SECTORS IN SCOTLAND, 1951-81
PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYMENT
Per cent




Fig. 12: ECONOMIC SECTORS IN BRITAIN, 1951-81
PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYMENT
Per cent




Fig. 13: REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AID FOR SCOTLAND
1960-79




**Fig. : UNEMPLOYMENT IN SCOTLAND AND BRITAIN
1949-79**

Per cent of economically active




Fig. 15: U.K. OIL PRODUCTION, 1975-88
(IN MILLION TONNES)
Total production




Fig. 16: GOVERNMENT OIL AND GAS REVENUES, 1976-89
(IN THOUSAND POUNDS)
'000 Pounds




Fig. 17: ECONOMIC SECTORS IN CATALONIA, 1955-79
 PERCENTAGE OF ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION
 Per cent




Fig. 18: ECONOMIC SECTORS IN SPAIN, 1955-79
PERCENTAGE OF ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION
Per cent




Fig. 19: MANUFACTURING IN CATALONIA, 1955
PERCENTAGE OF GROSS VALUE ADDED




Fig. 20: MANUFACTURING IN CATALONIA, 1967
PERCENTAGE OF GROSS VALUE ADDED





Fig. 21: MANUFACTURING IN CATALONIA, 1979
PERCENTAGE OF GROSS VALUE ADDED



Chapter four:

SOCIAL CLASSES AND THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

The preceding chapters on the history and the political economy of nationalist movements often made reference to social classes in order to connect structures and political agency. So far, however, no explanation has been given of the relationship between social class and nationalist movements. This chapter attempts to fill that gap.

Since Catalonia and Scotland are capitalist societies, social and political struggles are fundamentally constrained by the class divisions which are characteristic to capitalism. This is also true for nationalist struggles. But the role of social classes in nationalist movements is not governed by economic interest or any iron rule inherent in the capitalist mode of production, as some classical marxist theorists believed (see chapter one, section 2.3.i). Grounded in this heritage (which shares its economistic outlook with modernisation approaches), class based approaches to nationalism are often based on the idea that nationalism can be distilled to class interest, which in turn is reducible to economic interest. Gramsci tried to shift away from this kind of reductionism, but many Marxists still find it difficult to agree that nationalist struggle is not necessarily determined by class antagonism. As R. Williams explains,

"[w]hat socialism offered was the priority of one kind of bonding - trade unionism, the class bond - this cancelled all other bonds. This, of course, accounts for the hostility to nationalism and the irrelevance of religious movements, as well as the unions' attitude towards the family on the part of some socialists. So there are other bonding mechanisms in reality which are beyond either national consciousness or class consciousness. (...) it seems to me more and more true that where centres of proletarian consciousness developed, their strength really drew from the fact that all the bonds were holding in the same direction."
(quoted in Cooke, 1984, 372)

It is not only **contemporary** sub-state nationalism which requires a rather more flexible approach. Ever since the first appearance of Scottish and Catalan nationalism, the roles of social classes in

these political movements were ambiguous and complex. Chapter two demonstrated that several social classes have been wrapped up in nationalist politics simultaneously or at different times, and that comparable classes in Scotland and Catalonia had disparate attitudes towards the national question. But the revival of nationalism in the 1960's exposed the weaknesses of traditional class based analyses more than has previously been the case. One reason for this is the changes in the class structure, which are to some extent related to the economic changes described in chapter three (i.e. the internationalisation of production processes, deindustrialisation, and the growth of the service sector). The other reason is the mounting evidence that struggles between workers and capitalists are neither the only, nor always the most important conflict in advanced capitalist societies. As a result of increasing state intervention, many struggles now focus on the state. Nationalist movements, too, are more usefully conceived as struggles involving "the people" versus "the State", rather than as class struggles.

In reaction to these changes, there has been an ongoing debate over the last two decades about the (re-)definition of social classes and about their constitution (e.g. Giddens, 1973; Poulantzas, 1975; Urry, 1981; Wright, 1978; Wright, 1985). The most important lesson for this thesis is that social classes should not only be considered in an economic context, but also in their relationship to the state, their position in civil society and their cultural constitution. Seen in this way, classes are no longer monolithic agents which are guided by the same fundamental class interests no matter where and when. How they are constituted depends on several other interpellations or "bonding mechanisms", including national and territorial identity, and on the struggles in which they are involved. The second important aspect of the debate on class is the concern with the constitution and role of the middle classes, which have variously been acknowledged to play a key role in nationalist movements¹.

¹For example, Kiernan writes about the relationship between
(Footnote Continued)

This chapter aims to demonstrate that while contemporary nationalist movements cannot be conceived as class struggle, the "national interest" with which they legitimise themselves cannot be conceived of without reference to the - often antagonistic - interests of different classes (J. Anderson, 1988, 28-30). Drawing on Gramsci's writings, and rather selectively on the more recent class debate, the next section attempts to achieve an understanding of social classes in the context of nationalism. The aim is not to determine social classes statistically, but rather to show that they develop a context of cultural, territorial, and other types of consciousness. There are obvious limits to abstract definitions of social classes and their involvement in nationalist movements. Sections three and four therefore look at the Scottish and Catalan case studies. Based on a threefold class division, they examine in greater detail the relationship between the working class, the middle class and the bourgeoisie in the nationalist movements.

2. RECONSIDERING CLASSES IN NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS

In this section, I argue that nationalism is not necessarily connected with the interests of a particular social class and cannot therefore be defined in class terms. But social classes, which are based on a specific economic structure and constituted in civil society, require a national identity in order to claim a hegemonic role in that society.

(Footnote Continued)

nationalism and social classes:

"Support was nearly always forthcoming from the loose bundle of lower-middle-class groupings - teachers, small traders, artisans and many more - which have been lumped together as the 'petty bourgeoisie'."

Because these are "unattached, unanchored individuals or clusters" (i.e. without class consciousness), they welcome nationalism more than any other class (Kiernan, 1976, 115-116). From a different perspective, Montcalm has argued that contemporary nationalism is a class movement based on the emergence of a new middle class (Montcalm, 1983, 342-351).

While nationalist movements are not class struggles as such, they often assume the characteristics of class struggle; this is because social classes (or sectors of social classes) participate and take sides in nationalist struggles in order to identify with national-popular traits of civil society. In the construction of hegemony and of national identity, intellectuals (in the Gramscian sense) play an important role. They also form the leadership in many nationalist movements, and therefore deserve particular attention in this analysis. It is suggested here that intellectuals are not classifiable in fundamental classes, but usually occupy what Wright calls "contradictory class positions" (Wright, 1978).

In recent decades, such contradictory class positions have increased in number and size, and the class structure of advanced capitalist societies has become increasingly complicated to define. Although sections three and four use the basic distinction of working class, middle class and bourgeoisie, it is clear that a great deal of differentiation has taken place within these classes, which is reflected in contradictory positions with respect to the national question.

2.1 Classes, nationalism and hegemony

Chapter one claimed that nationalism had no necessary class character. However, all social classes of a national community have a national identity, which can be mobilised into political nationalism. The problem with many Marxist approaches is that they fail to acknowledge the simple fact that even though capitalism is a global phenomenon, concrete class interests are usually manifested in national terms. The classes themselves are constituted in civil societies which have national traits. Gramsci's observation that middle classes varied from country to country and from one period to another (Gramsci, 1971, 216 footnote 6) is correct, but this also applied to the working class and the bourgeoisie. When some sections of the Labour movement in Scotland criticised Scottish nationalists as bourgeois and anti-socialist because they were only thinking in terms of Scotland's interests, they often ignored the fact that

throughout the 20th century the Labour movement had identified itself with the British national interest. This British national interest was more or less different from the national interest advocated by British capital, but seen from the perspective of an outsider, it could have easily been identified as nationalist and anti-socialist (if socialism is taken to mean the fundamental interest of the **universal** proletariat).

Gramsci argues that a class can gain and maintain its dominant position only by becoming a national-popular force, i.e. by embracing the particular cultural and national traditions and values which are the sedimentation of everyday experience in the national territory (see chapter one, section 3.3). This view, however, implies a rejection of economist theories of political action, which according to Cohen still inhabit much Marxist class theory². Cohen argues that Marx' reduction of civil society to production relations is the underlying cause of economist reductionism (Cohen, 1982, 109). Middle classes did not fit into this scheme of fundamental class contradictions. The petty bourgeoisie, a strong social group in Marx' times, had to be defined as a transitional class between capital and labour. According to Marx, its position between the fundamental classes led it to believe that it stood above class antagonism and claimed the real divisions to lie between the "people" and their oppressors; many of its representatives became protagonists of nationalism and democracy³ (Cohen, 1982, 117). But

²Cohen argued that Poulantzas failed in this field by hanging on to the concepts of "old" and "new petty bourgeoisie which lead to a steadily diminishing working class. Wright tried to overcome the problem by inventing complicated and ambiguous "contradictory locations between classes". Neither of the two transcended the rigid definitions of class in terms of "fundamental class interest" (Cohen, 1982, 12).

³In the Communist manifesto, Marx put it like this:
"But the democrat, because he represents the petty bourgeoisie, that is, a transition class, in which the interests of the two classes are simultaneously mutually blunted, imagines himself elevated above class antagonism, generally. The democrats concede that a privileged class confronts them, but they, along with all the rest of the
(Footnote Continued)

Cohen argues that it was not only the petty bourgeoisie which failed to express its objective class interests directly through political action. To make sense of the political actions of the fundamental classes and bridge the gap between economic interest and political action, Marx was forced to move to the domain of social imagery (symbols, historic traditions, belief systems, principles, cultural values, etc.) (Cohen, 123-126). This social imagery, which coincides with the concept of the national-popular, serves to unify civil society and is a necessary ingredient in the mobilisation of the masses for any political purpose, and through any political class.

Because social classes have national-popular components, they are present in nationalist struggles. Since these struggles involve two conflicting national and territorial identities, the social classes of the sub-state nation can be either part of the nationalist movement, or on the side of the state; often the classes are divided internally, but there is no neutral position. Whether a social class (or a part of it) is supportive of a nationalist movement shapes several other relationships; for example, the degree to which it has been integrated into the state structure (see chapter five), and the role it plays in the reproduction of national culture and the structures of civil society. These are contingent factors and depend on specific historic circumstances. What remains to be done before I go on to discuss the Catalan and Scottish circumstances in greater detail is a brief outline of the class structure I am adopting here.

2.2 Class structure in advanced capitalist societies

(Footnote Continued)

nation, form the **people**. What they represent is the **people's rights**; what interests them is the **people's interests**. Accordingly, when a struggle is impending, they do not need to examine the interests and positions of the different classes. They do not need to weigh their own resources too critically. They have merely to give the signal and the **people**, with all its inexhaustible resources, will fall upon the oppressors."

(quoted in Cohen, 1982, 117)

Many of the problems with the class structure of advanced capitalist countries, which Marxists have debated in the last decades, concern the middle classes. The persistence and actual growth of those social groups which lie between the manual working class and the bourgeois owners of the means of production (i.e. the fundamental classes that are defined by capitalist relations of production), and the emergence of new ones have led to new efforts in modifying or replacing the Marxist dual class theory. Recent examples of such efforts in the British context include Giddens, who argued that there was a third fundamental criteria (the possession of qualifications and skills) which is the basis for the middle class (Giddens, 1973, 107-10). Abercrombie and Urry also came up with a threefold classification of contemporary capitalist society in which the new class emerged in the service sector and is determined by market and work situations (Abercrombie and Urry, 1983, 119-24). Thus, there is an important re-evaluation of those sectors which were often referred to as the "petty bourgeoisie".

The petty bourgeoisie, or middle class, includes those social groups which have been growing in size throughout this century: professionals, technicians, bureaucrats and other non-manual public sector employees, clerical employees, as well as shopkeepers, the self-employed and the clergy. According to Hroch, these are exactly the social groups which were the most active in the nationalist movements of the 19th century (Hroch, 1985, 161). What these social groups have in common is the fact that they live from their intellectual labour and are therefore intellectuals in the Gramscian sense. As Gramsci argued, the function of intellectuals in civil society is to create and disseminate ideologies, to establish consensus and hegemony around the national-popular values and structures. Therefore, intellectuals operate both in civil society and in the state apparatus (Gramsci, 1971, 12 and 60-61). When consensus breaks down and a conflict develops between a sub-state national community and a central state, the imbeddedness of intellectuals in the institutions and structures of civil society almost predestines them to become key actors in the nationalist movement, as the example of catalanism in the late 19th century and in the 1920's demonstrated. But some middle class sectors may opt to

defend state hegemony, if they are firmly integrated into the state apparatus. The Scottish case shows that the assimilation of Scottish and English national institutions led to the integration of Scottish intellectuals into the British system; they became an "extensive, civil-based, autonomous corps de chiens de garde" of the state (Nairn, 1977, 39; see also Mackintosh, 1982, 95-99). In general, however, middle classes are more responsive to national-popular struggles, such as nationalist movements, due to the fact that they occupy a position in relation to the means of production which does not entail direct antagonism with another social class (Urry, 1981, 67).

In contrast, the working class does occupy an antagonistic position in the economic sphere, and unless its class enemy is dissociated with the national community, this antagonism is bound to become part of the nationalist movement. However, the way in which the class struggle component is expressed through nationalism depends on the internal divisions - not only of economic interests, but also in terms of religion, culture, language, and place - within the working class. In advanced capitalist societies, the working class has become more difficult to define. Deindustrialisation, nationalisation of key industries, the growth of a service working class, etc. have led to a fragmentation of the old proletariat. Also, it has been argued that the "ability of advanced capitalism to meet the vital needs of the population undermines the formerly explosive contradiction between the old working class and capitalism" (Cohen, 1982, 6-7). Chapter three showed that in Britain, the Labour movement itself contributed to undermine this contradiction. However, there are signs that the destructive effects on communities of deindustrialisation and increasing mobility of capital have brought about a territorialisation of working class political action (Cooke, 1984, 373), which is in some cases articulated in nationalist terms. After all, control over space is an important element in the power relations between the fundamental classes (Harvey, 1989, 234), and nationalist movements are concerned with control over a specific territory.

The bourgeoisie, too, has undergone changes in contemporary capitalism. Chapter three demonstrated that before the first world war, the bourgeoisie was rooted in particular economic regions, and was more easily identifiable as those who own and control the means of production in that region. Now, as capital has become internationally mobile, so has the bourgeoisie. Those involved in controlling and managing the operation of production are no longer necessarily the owners of the factory, but are likely to be employees themselves (Giddens, 1973, 161-162). Thus, the dividing line between middle class and bourgeoisie has softened and been replaced by contradictory class positions. The concentration of capital in fewer hands has divided the bourgeoisie into those mostly smaller employers who are still largely bound to a specific place, and multinational corporations which control an increasingly larger part of the economy, but are able to shift around the globe in search of higher profits. To what extent capitalist class interests coincide with nationalist demands, depends at least in part on the question of whether indigenous capital is still significant, both in the sphere of production and in civil society. The other important criteria is its relationship with the central state. Although it is difficult to imagine a regional bourgeoisie in control of a nationalist movement, there is no doubt that it will influence the nationalist struggle, because in order to maintain hegemony, it needs to incorporate into its discourse the national-popular elements of that national society.

If the aim is to abandon economistic concepts of classes and of political action, it is counterproductive to make abstract comments on the relationship between classes and nationalist movements. How class and national identities intersect, and how class struggles interact with nationalist struggles, cannot be determined theoretically, but has to be examined in each case separately. The next two sections look at Scotland and Catalonia respectively. They aim to show that class matters to nationalist movements, but that nationalism cannot be reduced to class interests, even if we assume - with a dose of economic reductionism for the sake of simplicity - that the political class based organisations actually represent the interests of the class to which they correspond.

3. SOCIAL CLASSES AND NATIONALISM IN SCOTLAND

This section deals with the Scottish case, beginning with the relationship between the working class (and the Labour movement) and the nationalist movement. Chapter three already discussed the unionist tradition of the Scottish working class and showed how its organisations were strongly involved in corporate economic planning. Nevertheless, there has always been a home rule strand within the Scottish labour movement, and at least a formally separate trade union organisation, around which working class nationalism could crystallise. And as the economic developments in the 1960's and 1970's exposed the limitations of economic planning in Scotland, support for nationalist alternatives increased. However, the move towards a devolutionist position was not a uniform process; there are internal class divisions within the working class which influenced the attitude of different working class sectors towards self-government. The fact that both the Labour Party and the Scottish Nationalist Party (particularly after 1979) wooed the working class with nationalist proposals testifies to its important role in civil society.

3.1 The workers' movement and nationalism in Scotland

3.1.i A working class nation?

There are conflicting ideas about the strength, the level of consciousness and the distinctiveness of the working class in Scottish society which demonstrate that social class cannot be determined statistically. Although statisticians and sociologists insist that in contemporary Britain, the working class is shifting ground and rapidly becoming a minority in society, it seems that in Scotland the reality is different. In political struggles and in civil society as a whole, the working class is still well established. Part of the national-popular self-definition of the Scottish community is the notion that Scotland still is a working

class nation which adheres to radical egalitarianism. Scottish nationalists and home rulers have appealed to what some called the "egalitarian myth" (McCrone, Bechhofer and Kendrick, 1982, 127). Egalitarianism in the 18th century referred to the opportunities of social mobility which community oriented institutions like the parish schools offered to some. The radical tradition stems from 15th century anti-feudal peasant movements in Scotland, and it re-emerged in various guises, such as in the Highland land struggles in the late 19th century. But it was also applied to the developed industrial society of this century. The idea that, in comparison to England, Scotland's working class was stronger and more class conscious, and endowed with "an aggressive spirit of independence and egalitarianism" was re-enforced in periods of relative strength of the Scottish labour movement (e.g. the Red Clydeside), and through arguments of a stronger working class component in Scottish society. The most recent example is the relative strength of the Labour Party in Scotland since the 1950's, compared with its weakness in many parts of England, which is manifested in a greater social or socialist consciousness and political awareness across Scotland.

Chapter three showed that there is only scant statistical evidence to back up the claim that the Scottish working class is bigger. Kendrick used census data on occupational structure and sectional employment to defuse it, arguing that Scotland was a miniature version of Britain in terms of her manufacturing and industrial employment structure⁴ (Kendrick, 1983, 175). However, he conceded that during the first half of this century, some differences developed which were redressed only in the 1960's when electrical engineering and electronics moved into Scotland, service sector

⁴In his analysis of the data, Kendrick compared Scotland either with the whole of Britain (including Scotland) or with other UK regions. This approach intended to be objective in the sense of avoiding to regard Scotland as a distinctive economic (and political) unit, but it had the effect of diminishing any material differences there were. Besides, Scots are unlikely to compare their own social and economic performance with other depressed regions, but rather with the booming South East, which is the political and economic centre of Britain.

employment expanded, and England "caught up with Scotland's unemployment levels. Harvie found evidence - though far from iron clad - that the middle class declined between 1934 and 1949 in Scotland while the working class grew in proportion, which

"shows a more proletarian country, and one likely to show strong evidence of class consciousness."

(Harvie, 1981, 85)

Notions of a radical Scotland which, if it were independent, might set the pace for progressive social transformation in the rest of the British state, remained alive in the 1960's and 1970's particularly among left-wing intellectuals. Labour MP Lambie publicly stated his conviction that he wanted a socialist republic in Scotland. But Nairn argued that Scotland's egalitarianism did not derive from Jacobinism or Bolshevism, but rather from Scottish protestantism. He said that "[i]t stands for the democracy of souls before the All Mighty, rather than an explosive, popular effort to do anything" (Nairn, 1968, 11). Although Scottish radicalness may not have manifested itself in revolutionary action, it is a part of the Scottish identity which can be mobilised for a political project. It combines with the experience over the past decades of the failure of Labour's reformist unionism and the detachment of indigenous big capital from the Scottish economy, which formed the basis for working class support for Scottish self-government in the 1970's (Foster, 1989, 50-53).

In the past, the unionist position of the Scottish Labour movement for most of its history was in line with class interests, argues Foster, in order to combat attempts by Scottish capital to isolate Scottish workers from those in England, and to drive wedges into the fabric of the Scottish working class (Foster, 1989, 48-49). For the Scottish working class is not ethnically and culturally uniform, as is explained below with reference to religious divisions.

3.1.ii Religious divisions within the working class

The reluctance of the Labour movement in Scotland to promote self-government was connected to fears that it would entail serious divisions within the working class along religious lines. While the majority of working class Scots were part of the Church of Scotland, the industrial centres in the West and along the East coast attracted many Catholic immigrants from Ireland, which usually made up the lowest ranks of the working class⁵. In the 1920's, the Catholic Scots became a strong pillar of support for the Labour Party. In the depressed inter-war years, the relationship between Protestants and Catholic in Scotland was characterised by deep seated prejudices and sometimes even violent conflict. After more than a century of Irish immigration, the post-war era saw increasing integration of the two communities⁶. The Labour Party was an important institution in this process, and still relies on the Catholic vote for many of their seats in the West of Scotland (Gallagher, 1987, 352).

While under SNP leadership, the nationalist movement had little support among the Scottish Catholics, partly because the Church of Scotland and the education system, which grew under its wings, are two of the main symbols of Scottish nationhood. Billy Wolfe recounted that in the 1970's, sermons were preached against him in Catholic churches in West Lothian during election campaigns, especially when Labour started to feel threatened (Wolfe, interview, 25.2.1987). Also, the experience of the catholic community in Northern Ireland made the Catholics in Scotland hostile to the home

⁵Catholics in Scotland not only were mostly working class up until recent decades, but also occupied relatively lower ranks within that class. Gallagher pointed out that several reasons accounted for this situation, not least discrimination barriers set up by the Protestant majority and the lack of an upwardly mobile reference group (Gallagher, 1987, 348).

⁶"After 1945, large numbers of Catholics in Scotland gravitated towards the public sector, and the service sector of the economy generally, once it was clear that racial or religious criteria were not part of the entry qualifications as in many of the skilled trades. The income gap between the catholic minority and the rest of the society began to close as the outline of a middle-class took shape in the 1960's." (Gallagher, 1987, 351 (commas mine)).

rule ideas put forward by Scottish nationalists, and the eruption of inter-community conflict in Northern Ireland in 1968 rekindled fears of a Protestant backlash in nearby West of Scotland, where the Protestant orange movement was indeed reviving for a brief period (Gallagher, 1987, 292-293).

However, some sectors of the Protestant working class were strongly unionist, and even less inclined to self-government, as David Lambie, the current Labour MP for Cunninghame South, explained:

"That was always the problem in Scotland. We had a very strong orange tradition, who are Unionists (The Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party). You only need to go up to Ibrox Park and go to a big football match there, and see the number of union jacks that are flying, and then tell me that the Scottish Protestant population are wanting to break up the Union. Because there is a different tradition. We also have a very strong Catholic tradition, especially in the West of Scotland. The reason why the Labour party has been able to stand against serious inroads by the SNP is because our solid core of votes is the working class Catholic. The working class Catholic, [when] looking at devolution as well as independence, they look across to Ulster (...): [D]oes an independent Scotland mean that the Protestant, the Unionists, the orangemen are going to take control of Scotland the way they have done in Ireland? That trend never comes up in public, but that is an underlying trend. And that is why we didn't get the support for the referendum for devolution that we should have got."

(Lambie, interview, 7.8.1988)

Thus, the attitude of the Scottish working class towards nationalism has been affected by other bonding mechanisms, which are not determined by either class or national identities. However, religious ties are weakening, and material inequalities between Catholics and Protestants have been decreasing rapidly over the past decades. As a result, nationalist and devolutionist politics have become acceptable to large sectors of the working class. The outcome

⁷The two Glasgow first division football clubs, Celtic and Rangers, thrive on a traditional rival relationship which is rooted in their respective Catholic and Protestant communities. As the Catholic community in Glasgow central is mostly of Irish origin, the Irish Tricolour is a symbol of Celtic. The mostly Protestant following of Rangers use the Union Jack.

of the devolution referendum demonstrated not only that some Catholic sectors were still opposed to devolution, but also that support in the industrial working class Strathclyde region was higher than in most others (see Table 2.3 in Chapter two).

Also, there was little doubt that the SNP succeeded in attracting some of the working class electorate in the late 1960's and early 1970's. From a Labour unionist perspective, this was a sign of class disintegration and declining class consciousness. The next sub-section therefore looks at the way in which social and spatial mobility contributed in shifting working class identity towards Scottish nationalism.

3.1.iii Social and spatial mobility

Sociological research related the new working class sectors, which emerged with new industries, and the new working and middle classes to the growth of the nationalist movement in Scotland, using arguments of weakening class consciousness and a more functional and individualist approach of these social groups. Kendrick claimed that the people who voted for the SNP in the 1970's were those who had "done well", either within the working class or by moving out of the working class (Kendrick, 1983, 282). Dickson made a similar connection by relating the politicisation of national identity with economic and social restructuring, as a consequence of which the old inner city working class communities were dispersed (Dickson, 1980, 311). As chapter three mentioned, the new industrial centres had often very little connection with trade union or other traditional working class structures.

To Labour MP Mackintosh, the 1967 by-election victory of Winifred Ewing in Hamilton against the Labour candidate favourite, a middle-aged miner backed by the NUM, served as an example of how socio-economic changes in Scottish communities affected their political outlook:

"Hamilton was once a miner's seat but now there are only 2,000 miners in the constituency. The result was to confirm Labour's Scottish image as an elderly party of special interests stemming from the old and declining heavy industry". (Mackintosh, 1982, 138)

In the 1970's, a general drift to the SNP was noticeable among working class voters who were hard hit by the process of deindustrialisation. As a general feeling was spreading that "something was going wrong", Labour Party officials in Scotland became frightened:

"We were the establishment here, and suddenly realised, "my God, the Scots folk is going to desert us!".
(Lambie, interview, 7.8.1988)

Of course, social and spatial mobility as a source of weakening working class cohesion was not new in the 1970's. One must also remember that several other, already mentioned, factors contributed to the growing national politicisation in the Scottish population as a whole, **including** the working class. But it is important to realise that all these tendencies put increasing pressure on the Labour movement to adopt devolution, whether for strategic political reasons, or in response to an undeniable shift of attitude among the Scottish working class. Once Scottish Labour had decided to adopt a devolutionist stance, the SNP advance into the Labour vote became more difficult.

3.1.iv Nationalism in Labour politics

At first, the Scottish Labour Party was a reluctant campaigner for self-government. Between the two general elections in 1974, its executive refused to support devolution and then was coerced by the National Executive in London into supporting it. This was a fine example of Labour's centralism, and a necessary move if Labour wanted to win the election. There were clear signs that devolution was what the Scottish people wanted to see.

"They weren't supporting independence, but they were willing to support devolution, under the influence of the SNP which was activating opinion in Scotland. When the [Scottish]

Labour Party took this decision against devolution, actively **against** it, then that sent shock waves through the whole Labour and Trade Union movement."

(Lambie, interview, 7.8.1988)

Labour's decision to take on board devolution for Scotland was then due both to pressure from the rank and file of the labour movement, and to electoral pressure exerted by the SNP (Canavan, interview, 17.9.1988). There was always a sector within the Labour establishment which was radically opposed to it. Some argued that the SNP's nationalist project was betraying working class solidarity with slogans asking what people would rather be, poor Britons or rich Scots. A rising star in the Scottish Labour Party, Gordon Brown, said that the true sources of oppression, namely "uneven and uncontrolled development of capitalism and the failure of successive governments to challenge and transform it", were shared by the whole of British working class. Scotland's problems required "planned control of our economy and a transformation of democracy at all levels" (Brown, 1975, 8). This, of course, was not a new idea.

The Scottish Trades Union Council (STUC) claimed commitment to a "meaningful" devolution, i.e. the "establishment of a Scottish Assembly having the power and ability to influence the economic, political and social decision-making process in Scotland" (STUC Annual Report, 1977, 334). It was in favour of a regional fund financed with oil revenues which would assist depressed areas in the United Kingdom, but the Labour Party refused to give in to this demand (Labour Party Campaign Handbook Scotland, 1979). Creating a Scottish Assembly with "economic teeth" might have satisfied the STUC, but the Labour Party leadership feared a worsening English backlash. The result was a Labour devolution bill in 1978 which did not meet the widespread demands for more local control over economic decision-making, but succeeded in buying off nationalism from the SNP (Keating, 1983, 30).

Since the failure of the Devolution Bill in the 1979 referendum, the Scottish Labour Party has maintained and strengthened its devolution policy with every lost general election. This suggests that Labour in Scotland no longer seems to believe that self-government in Scotland would be a blow to the working class. To the contrary, the

neo-nationalist section of the Labour Party believe that "Scotland is ripe for socialism but held back by England" (Keating, 1983, 30), which adds another aspect to the national-popular element of radicalism (see section 3.1.i). Not only is nationalism increasingly working class, but more working class people than members of the middle classes or the bourgeoisie profess to be Scottish, rather than British (Table 4.1).

This 1980's combination of socialist and nationalist strands finds its expression in the pages of Radical Scotland. While criticising the British Labour leadership for their "pollster-led retreat from Socialist principle" and deploring that no radical attack was being planned on "the distribution of income, wealth and concentrated economic power", the journal demanded that Labour should

"permit the development of policies tailored to the state of progressive thinking in Scotland and the Scottish electoral situation, instead of the whole country being forced to pander the interests of the South-East of England homeowner on £15,000 a year."

(Radical Scotland, 1985b, 9)

In the 1980's, a strong aspect of the increasingly solid working class support for Scottish self-government was anti-Thatcherism⁸. Grass roots pressure forced the Labour Party to join the multi-party Scottish Constitutional Convention, and Donald Dewar had to admit in his speech at the first meeting of the Convention in March 1989:

"Throughout my political life there has been a need to recognise and harness the feeling of Scottish identity which has grown and strengthened over the years."

(Dewar, 1989)

The STUC, too, acknowledged that unlike in the previous decade, in the 1980's, the "bulk of the Labour movement in Scotland is now

⁸ SNP politician Isobel Lindsay saw the basis of a political consensus developing around Scottish nationalism as a result of the Thatcher governments. Apart from Tories and their business allies, "almost everyone else [is] in that end of the spectrum which goes from support for a fairly strong Scottish legislature to full independence" (Lindsay, 1987, 14).

(...) enthusiastic about the establishment of a Scottish Assembly" (Radical Scotland, 1984, 14).

Since the mid-1970's, the attitude of the Scottish labour movement towards self-government has changed considerably. Its representatives no longer speak of working class unity being destroyed through nationalism and devolution; to the contrary, the Scottish Left argues that a self-governing, socialist Scotland could set an example for the working class in the rest of Britain. As the image of radicalism and egalitarianism became once more interwoven with national identity, the nationalist movement broke out from the SNP to embrace large parts of the Labourist working class. As the next part will show, the SNP tried to adapt to this by moving to the left.

3.1.v The working class in Nationalist projects

By the 1970's, the SNP had established a social-democratic identity which implied the rejection of class based politics and claimed to represent the Scottish people as a whole⁹. However, in Westminster Parliament its emphasis on popular consensus gave rise to inconsistencies in political decision making which contributed to the erosion of its working class support in the later years of the decades. Now that Labour offered devolution, the SNP had no longer the monopoly on popular nationalism. When the working class came out strongly in favour of Scottish autonomy in the 1979 referendum (Nairn, 1979, 313), and the SNP vote slumped to 17 per cent in the following general elections, the left-wing of the party saw a need to link the nationalist project to socialism. In their view, the referendum had shown that nationalism was in the interest of the working class, rather than any other social class. If the SNP wanted

⁹In the words of party chairman, Billy Wolfe,
"[t]he National Party stands for the nation; all sections,
all people in it; welded in a common purpose; devoted,
dedicated to the social and economic improvement of all".
(Wolfe, 1973, 55)

to maintain its leadership of the nationalist movement, it had to focus on working class interests.

This policy was represented most forcefully by the "79 Group" which formed within the SNP in 1979. The group's principles were: full independence, a republic state, and a "socialist redistribution of power, wealth and income" (Maxwell, 1985, 11). In order to gain credibility in the eyes of key agents of the trade union and labour movement, the "79 Group" backed up its socialist rhetoric with civil disobedience and anti-closure campaigns (the Scottish Resistance Campaign). Although it brought some young activists into the party (Doig, interview, 27.10.1987), it failed to bring the SNP significant working class support in the elections. In 1982, the Group was banned by the SNP leadership because it was believed responsible for the increasing left-right polarisation in the party¹⁰.

Thus, this attempt to relate working class interests to nationalist politics did not succeed, partly because it was based on an economist notion of class, and partly because working class nationalism was already being absorbed by the Scottish Labour Party. It was easier for Labour to grasp the thistle with a barge pole from a position of hegemony, than for the SNP to win over sceptical working class people with red carnations. In any case, the SNP had already been classified as a political force of the middle class or petty bourgeoisie. The next section examines the middle class basis of Scottish nationalism, and argues that a class interest in nationalism is difficult to identify.

¹⁰When the "79 Group" was dissolved by the 1982 SNP conference and seven members expelled, some activists, like Margo MacDonald, left politics. A few (Kevin Dunion, Chris Cunningham and Digi Robertson) joined the political magazine Radical Scotland, which is Scotland's only left-wing nationalist magazine today. Radical Scotland is not a SNP journal, but sees itself as a link between nationalism and the Labour movement, according to its editor, Allan Lawson (interview, 29.10.1987). Other ex-members, such as Jim Sillars, Kenny MacAskill, Alex Salmond and Chris MacLean now occupy important leadership positions in the SNP.

3.2 The middle classes and nationalism

Section two already mentioned that the middle classes are seen by many marxist writers to be the principal basis for struggles which mobilise the "people" or the "nation" against the "oppressors". Marx believed that this was because they stand between the two fundamental class interests, which suggests that the class interests of the middle classes do not entail direct class struggle. Gramsci pointed out that the function of intellectuals - which form the bulk of the middle class as defined above - as creators and reproducers of social imagery and national-popular traditions, institutions, etc. gives them a key role in social and political struggles over hegemony and control; a role which is not economically determined, nor necessarily in the interest of a specific class. In nationalist movements, which are centred more than most other struggles around national-popular elements, the participation of middle class activists is therefore to be expected. But does this mean that nationalist movements pursue their class interests? If not, what does it mean if nationalist movements are based mainly on middle class support?

In order to explore this question, I will look at the Scottish National Party's support, because it was the main force of Scottish nationalism up until the late 1970's. Though its core support is middle class, there are many middle class sectors which do not flock to the SNP. Instead of defending their interests in Scotland, many middle class Scots have opted to emigrate, and many of those who stay are involved in Scottish civil society institutions which have increasingly come under the control of the central state.

3.2.i The Scottish National Party: a middle class party?

The SNP is widely regarded as a middle class party. For example, Foster and Woolfson described the activists in the national movement's foremost exponent, the SNP, as typical components of the middle classes: small business people, professionals, white collar workers, who had become the victims of the monopoly rule in the

1960's (Foster and Woolfson, 1986, 89). Traditionally, small towns and rural society provide a fertile ground for the SNP and even in the 1970's, the SNP vote was strongest in the rural constituencies on the Western periphery and in the North East¹¹, where Labour was never successful, but where an anti-landlord and therefore anti-Tory sentiment was present (Kellas, 1975, 130). This can be regarded as the skeleton of the SNP support, which became visible again when its vote collapsed in 1979.

New in the 1970's was the support of the white collar workers and the so-called "new" workers. Kreckel and collaborators pointed out that the surge of the SNP in the mid-1970's was due to these social class sectors. Drucker and Brown explained their emergence and political position by the economic development of the 1960's and 1970's which had broken the backbone of the Labour movement and given rise to a middle class. While the entrenched Tory and Labour voters resisted the SNP in the 1970's elections, those who had benefited from economic progress and felt cheated by its limits, supported the SNP (Drucker and Brown, 1980, 48-50).

The activists in the SNP had the same values and attitudes as Scottish society as a whole (Maxwell, interview). It is part of the claim of a nationalist movement to represent the whole nation. At the peak of its support, the SNP supporters were evenly distributed over the different social classes (Kreckel *et al.*, 1984, 135). This was demonstrated by Brand with opinion polls carried out in 1975 (Table 4.2) (Brand, 1978, 146-147). Brand argued that the traditional British system of class politics had been broken up by the SNP, and that people increasingly considered economic and social problems within a national framework rather than a class based point of view. It turned out to be not quite so, because the deflated SNP of 1979 came to rely to a large extent on their traditional middle

¹¹In the February elections of 1974, the SNP won majorities in Aberdeenshire East, Argyll, Banffshire, and Moray and Nairn. In October of the same year, Angus South, Dunbartonshire East, Galloway, and Perth and East Perthshire were added.

class voters. But the fact is that from 1960s onwards, politics could no longer be seen only in terms of class - and Labour vs. Tory - antagonism.

Class interest was seen by the SNP's policies as secondary to the people's interest (see p. 187). According to SNP policies, thrashed out in the mid-1970's under the impact of North Sea oil discoveries, independent Scotland would be classless and painlessly radical (Maxwell, 1982, 7). However, its social-democratic policies calling for a mixed economy under a strong independent Scottish state, land reform and decentralisation were not fundamentally different from those that the Labour Party was pursuing. In the 1970's and today, the SNP and the Labour Party have been wooing for the support of the "popular classes", i.e. the working and middle classes (Lindsay, interview, 24.2.1987¹²; Lambie, interview, 7.8.1988¹³).

The traditional middle class, whose class interest the nationalist movement supposedly represented, showed in the devolution debate that it did not care much for devolution or independence. Mackintosh found that a majority of teachers, lawyers, university staff, etc. opposed the aims of the nationalist movement (Mackintosh, 1982, 130-133), and Nairn commented after the referendum:

"After decades of pious blethering about 'More say in our own affairs', much of the Scottish middle class sidled furtively into the booths and placed its cross firmly on the 'No' square."

(Nairn, 1979, 313)

12 "I think [the SNP] has developed a position in which it accepts that there is a substantial body of interest in common between the Scottish working class and the Scottish middle class, but that there is little in common in many cases between the Scottish working and middle class and the Scottish upper class." (Lindsay, interview, 24.2.1987)

13 "We are sure of a proportion of the middle class voting for us, so that we can beat the Tories in the Tory areas if the working class vote comes out."

(Lambie, interview, 7.8.1988)

This demonstrates the difficulties in ascribing middle class interests to the nationalist movement. The support for the SNP in rural areas and medium sized towns is not simply explained by a specific class interest, but rather by a complex mixture of local culture and place specific politics, particularly where the economic classes are less segregated and the British parties less entrenched. Just like nationalist support in Scotland in general, the phenomenon of the SNP is not reducible to middle class interests. The next section explores other factors which affect the role of the middle class in Scottish nationalism in general.

3.2.ii Emigration, the state and middle class nationalism

In the 18th and 19th century, the middle class - then to a large extent constrained to professionals and clerics - was embedded within the capitalist class (MacLaren, 1989, 138-139). This means that despite the preservation of Scottish institutions which were the domain of the middle classes, there was no vested interest in independence or home rule among the middle classes. Another factor was the fact that the empire provided middle (and working) class Scots with the possibility to climb up the social ladder through emigration. Nairn has explained the absence of nationalism in 19th century Scotland with reference to the imperialist outlook and interests of the Scottish intellectuals. The same argument would hold for much of the 20th century. Between 1951 and 1971, an average of 30,000 people left Scotland every year, and almost 50% of these migrants went overseas (Table 4.3). The migrant population had a higher socio-economic profile and was better educated than the Scottish average (H. R. Jones, 1979, 8). Thus, instead of leading the nationalist movement to change the causes for their dissatisfaction, many of the more dynamic middle class people left Scotland. In his discussion of the "diverging paths of the emigrant and the nationalist", Smith argues that it is the underprivileged, those excluded from the privileges of the advanced urban classes and "but lightly touched by this culture" who are most prone to emigration (Smith, 1983, 119 and 139). In contrast, the intellectuals (for which he uses Gellner's description as the "class

which is alienated from its own society by the very fact of its education") is the driving force in the nationalist movements (Smith, 1983, 133-134). But this is not the case in Scotland, where emigration also affected the highly educated sectors of society.

However, emigration also served as an eye-opener to some who worked abroad temporarily and returned later. Several nationalists related their own politicisation to a stay in England where they realised that "British" is often equated with "English", while Scottishness is excluded from both. Others saw the legacy of the British empire in African states and felt less pride in being British and more in being Scottish. Returning Scots then became involved in the rising nationalist wave with a stronger consciousness of their national identity.

The British state affected the attitude of Scottish middle class sectors in other ways. Through increasing state intervention in civil society, the institutions which were the pillars of Scottish identity and at the same time the mainstays of Scottish professionals (i.e. education, legal system, local government and administration) became more and more anglicised (eg. Carty, 1983; Turner, 1984). Other sectors of the Scottish middle classes, which are connected with the public sector, owed their very existence and their considerable growth to the expansion of the state, and were therefore ambiguous in their attitude to political nationalism. This is discussed in more detail in the next chapter, which concentrates on the relationship between state and civil society. But it is already clear that the relationship of Scottish intellectuals to the nationalist movement is not explained with reference to a class interest, which Marxists have been struggling to define in the first place.

To complete the analysis of relationships between social classes and nationalism in the Scottish case, the next sub-section looks at the Scottish bourgeoisie. While various sectors of the Scottish working and middle classes were involved in the nationalist movement since its revival in the 1960's, the indigenous bourgeoisie remained largely uninterested. Why has the bourgeoisie failed to take an

interest in nationalism, or even in the strand of nationalism represented by the - in Nairn's view - bourgeois SNP (Nairn, 1979, 313)?

3.3. The bourgeoisie and nationalism

In the second chapter, it was argued that the union was closely linked to the process of industrialisation and benefited the upper classes. Also, the new British identity which the Scots gained in 1707 was inherently imperialist. Access to the English - now British - imperial markets gave Scottish capitalists and large landowners economic power and enabled them to promote the internal reproduction of capital in Scotland. It was not by accident that shipbuilding - crucial to overseas trade - became one of the pivotal Scottish industries. Chapter three showed that the 20th century witnessed the decline of large-scale indigenous industry, the influx of multinationals and the merger for Scottish with British capital. This externalisation of capital and economic control strengthened the national consciousness of the working and middle classes, who became increasingly aware of the erosion of Scotland's industrial base. The class conflict between labour and capital has come to coincide with the national conflict between Scots and the British state, as capital is increasingly conceived as English controlled (see Fig. 22) Events such as the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders' work-in mobilised Scottish people in "national class alliances" against British capital and the state (Foster and Woolfson, 1986; Foster, 1989).

As Scottish capital increasingly lost autonomy in the economic sphere, and in importance in Scottish civil society during the 1960's and 1970's, the Conservative Party began to lose popular support. The Tories, which represented unionism not only for the Scottish bourgeoisie, but also for many working and middle class people, still commanded in 1955 a sizeable vote which put them at the same level as the Labour Party. Their seven Glasgow seats in 1955 were all lost by the mid-1980's. From 30 Scottish seats under the MacMillan government, only 10 were left in 1987, without great

Fig. : THE PROBLEM IS NOT SO MUCH THE ENGLISH...



Source: *Radical Scotland*, April/May 1984, 9.

hope of increasing the share in the near future. The Tories were extremely reluctant to support devolution in the 1970s' although the SNP also munched its way into the Conservative vote.

The incompatibility of Scottish nationalism with bourgeois interests was reiterated many times in the 1970's and 1980's¹⁴. Under Thatcher's leadership, the Tories turned decidedly against devolution, while independence had always been an anathema to the party. George Younger explained the Tories' case against independence in September 1977 by claiming that it would lead to a lack of investment and to unemployment¹⁵. The same argument was applied to devolution. Tory opposition to nationalism and devolution mirrored the response of the Scottish industrialists. They were strongly represented in the "Scotland says no" (SSN) campaign which emerged in 1978 to fight the Scotland Bill in the referendum campaign (Macartney, 1981, 21). The SSN included Labour and Conservative MPs, but - more significantly - also leading business figures such as the former Scottish CBI Chairman Douglas Hardie, Viscount Weir (Chairman of the Weir Group and of the Great Northern Investment Trust), Lord Polwarth (Director of the Bank of Scotland and various other banking and insurance companies), Sir Toothill (Company director of Ferranti), and Harold Whitson (Director of the Scottish Mutual Insurance Group and former director of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce). The last four were all members of the Scottish Council (Development and Industry), supposedly the spearhead of Scottish industrialists' efforts to address the maladies of the Scottish economy and to affirm Scottish control over its economic development. The opposition of Scottish capital against devolution was reflected in the press, which came out with

¹⁴Little has changed since. Through the mouth of old industrialist Lord Weir, the Tory Party started the 1990's with an attack on Scottish home rule (Guardian, 16.1.1990, 6).

¹⁵He asked: "Who would want to set up business in a tiny country with only five million people when there are numerous sites available in England with a home market ten times as large and much nearer to the mainland of Europe?" (quoted in Ascherson, 1986, 52).

headlines such as "Weir warns: Home rule would cost us business" (Glasgow Herald, 17.11.1977, 3)¹⁶.

The fear of home rule and independence was not explicable only in terms of economic interests. The SNP did not aim to alienate Scottish industry with socialist policies and "the old class warfare", but it did want to curtail the influence of non-Scottish business and spoke of "legislation which ensures more participation and a much fairer distribution of wealth" (Wolfe, 1973, 133). In its policy documents, the SNP stressed the needs and interests of the Scottish people, which had to be satisfied by Scottish industry rather than any sectional interests¹⁷. Presumably, Scottish capitalists feared increased state intervention from a powerful, oil endowed Scottish government with social-democratic ideals of workers, employers and the state all collaborating for the benefit of the nation (SNP policy document Manpower and Industrial Relations). SNP plans for restricting landownership to family size

¹⁶Other headlines in the Glasgow Herald to the same effect were "Leading companies might consider a move south" (6.4.1977, 7); "Cautious Scots bosses switch HQs to England" (6.5.1977, 4); "Independence frowned on by businessmen" (20.8.1977, 11) and "CBI gets tough on devolution", (9.12.1977).

¹⁷The document anticipated that Scotland would be less dependent on foreign investment, as the independent government would assist small indigenous enterprises in various ways. It envisaged "employee participation in policy making" in all enterprises where a majority of employees are in favour of such a scheme. More generally, the SNP "believes that the primary function of industry is to produce the goods and services which the nation requires, and to do so in an manner which benefits the Scottish people as a whole and not, as presently happens, in a manner which benefits the unbalanced and often conflicting sectional interests."

Some kind of mixed economy was envisaged, with the party having "no objection in principle to either public or private enterprise", but with a greatly increased role for co-operatives (which remained undefined) (SNP Policy document Industry).

holdings and for nationalisation of large estates¹⁸, did not do very much to appease the large landowners among Scotland's upper class.

Though it appears that the Scottish bourgeoisie saw nationalist demands as contravening its own class interests, these cannot be reduced to economic interests alone. Ascherson pointed out that the economic arguments of the anti-devolutionist lobbies were contradictory, because the Tories and the industrialists were claiming that Scotland would become poorer, and Labour opponents were saying that devolution would give Scotland an unfair economic advantage over the English regions (Ascherson, 1986, 53). Independent Scotland under an SNP leadership would hardly have got rid of capitalism, and neither would a weak devolved Scottish Assembly under Labour domination. The missing links in the relationship between Scottish capital and the nationalist movement are found in their respective positions with regards to the British state (see chapter five).

To conclude, the role of the different classes in Scotland in the nationalist movement is ambiguous, with the exception of the bourgeoisie, which has rejected Scottish nationalism out of hand. The working class and the middle class were divided over the issue in the 1970's, although the nationalist movement as a whole counted with growing popular support. In the 1980's, nationalist demands are embraced by the popular majority, and the leadership of the movement has shifted to the left. Any political party or social class which claims hegemony in Scotland today has to make the demand for self-government its own. Economic interests alone fail to explain the relationship between classes and the nationalist movement, which have been variously interpreted in contradictory terms.

¹⁸The SNP had strong policies on land ownership, which go back to the nationalism of the crofters at the end of last century (see chapter two). It is party policy that "the land of Scotland belongs inalienably of the people of Scotland" and that estates not used to the benefit of the nation or the local community should be nationalised (SNP policy document Land Ownership and Use).

In the next section, I examine the same relationships for the Catalan case.

4. SOCIAL CLASS AND NATIONALISM IN CATALONIA

In Catalonia, social classes have historically played different roles in the nationalist movement than in Scotland. Indeed, the role of social classes in contemporary nationalism cannot be understood separately from the historic developments in civil society before the civil war. Since the end of the 19th century, various strands of nationalism have dominated Catalan politics and gained popular support. Although the bourgeoisie has shaped nationalist ideology more than other classes, the sometimes important role of the middle classes and the working class are not to be ignored in the analysis of contemporary Catalan nationalism. They have become more prominent since the 1920's, when the Catalan bourgeoisie lost touch with the rest of civil society. Then, the collision between the Catalan bourgeoisie and the working class organisations destroyed the illusions of the former to maintain its hegemony with the help of a national-popular ideology. It was left to the middle classes to try and establish a **popular** nationalist movement in the 1930's by incorporating the working class and elements of social and political reform. But under the exceptional historical circumstances of the 1930's, this was only partially successful. One of the problems of the Catalan republican government was precisely the fact that the bulk of the working class was detached from political nationalism (Pujol, 1980, 115). The repression which followed the occupation of Catalonia (chapter two, section 10) was directed both against the aspirations of the working class and the nationalist movement in Catalonia. Therefore, the linkages between classes and nationalism were modified again under Francoist rule.

The nationalist revival in the 1960's was characterised by cross-class support for Catalan autonomy. All social classes participated in the nationalist movement, which became the battle ground for the fight over hegemony after Franco's death (1975). This

does not mean that classes were not divided on the issue of nationalism. However, neither these divisions nor the support for nationalism can be explained with reference to economic class interests. As in the case of Scotland, I will analyse the social classes separately, starting with the working class. The next sub-section argues that the main problem in the relationship between the working class and nationalism is the high level of immigration to Catalonia. Divided along cultural and ethnic lines, the working class was also split on the national issue, not least because nationalism was also cherished by some sectors of the Catalan bourgeoisie. It was the identification of Spanish nationalism with the Franco regime which enabled the working class leadership to justify working class support for Catalan autonomy.

4.1 Immigration, nationalism and working class strategies

4.1.1 Immigration during the Franco period

If immigration was perceived by middle and upper class nationalists in the first few decades of the century as a possible threat to the unity of the Catalan community, this fear was even greater in the post-war period. Due to poor economic performance in southern and central Spanish areas as compared to Catalonia (chapter three), immigration to Catalonia picked up soon again in the 1940's. Already in the 1950's it surpassed the high levels of the 1920's, and the strong performance of the Catalan economy attracted even more workers once Franco decided to open up the country to outside investors. The peak of immigration was reached in the 1960's, when 720,000 came to work in Catalonia (Termes, 1983, 292-293) (see chapter three, Table 3.6). By 1970, almost 38 % of the population was born outside Catalonia, most of them living in and around Barcelona (the industrial comarques of Barcelonès, Vallès Occidental, El Maresme and Baix Llobregat) (Miguélez and Solé, 1987,

101). Thus, the industrial and general economic development after the civil war re-enforced the old patterns of uneven development¹⁹.

Although a part of the immigration from other parts of Spain boosted the public sector middle class (functionaries and state officials as well as police and military personnel) in Catalonia, the bulk of the immigrants of the 1950's and 1960's joined the manual working class, particularly its lower ranks (Miguélez and Solé, 1987, 111). By the time of the Catalan cultural revival (1960's), there existed thus a substantial non-Catalan working class sector on the very bottom of the social hierarchy. As one Catalan politician explained, the immigrants of the 1940's and 1950's were mostly agricultural workers who became unskilled workers in Catalan factories (Ferrer, interview, 22.3.1988). The immigrant community was not only socially isolated from the other sectors of Catalan society, but due to the anti-Catalan cultural policies of the Franco regime they were also denied the opportunities to learn the language and the ways of life of their Catalan equals. As Candel explained,

"The immigrant of today finds himself among a vast majority of non-Catalans. There is only a small contingent of natives in those areas where he would end up living in most cases. A long period would pass before he would come into contact with the Catalan sector, and this contact could well turn out to be sporadic through all his life."

(Candel, 1974, 85)

Particularly those immigrants who lived in the urban industrial zones of Barcelona province had little opportunity to learn Catalan; in the comarca of Baix Llobregat, only 17 per cent of the non-Catalan immigrants could speak Catalan in 1975, and less than 40 per cent understood the language (Table 4.4). There were suspicions that the Castilian speaking working class immigrants were not on an equal footing with the Catalan workers. The latter found it easier

¹⁹ See chapter three for social and economic divisions in Spain. But also within Catalonia, previous tendencies of uneven development established themselves more firmly in the period of economic growth of the 1950's and 1960's. At the same time as the population explosion occurred in the industrial comarques, the interior areas of Catalonia experienced depopulation and economic decline.

to move on to better jobs and were less marginalised in social and cultural terms, even though the Castilian culture dominated the official structures. Catalan intellectuals perceived that these structures could lead to a polarisation of Castilian workers and the rest of Catalan civil society and the discrepancies in Catalan proficiency between upper and lower social status positions in the mid-1970's justified this fear (Table 4.5). In the phase of nationalist revival, which was led by Catalan intellectuals, the integration of Castilian immigrants was regarded as one of the main tasks, if a popular nationalist movement was to succeed.

4.1.ii Catalanists and the immigrant problem

Among Catalan intellectuals, the danger of extinction of Catalan language and culture was perceived as imminent, because their public reproduction had been prohibited by Franco. Catalonia was "castilianised", and the Catalan identity had retreated to the private sphere. Therefore, the official integration of immigrants into Catalan society and culture was not possible. The fact that many immigrants arrived at the bottom of the social hierarchy could also lead to a situation in which class barriers and cultural barriers were superimposed and re-enforcing each other, provoking a politicisation of the national question in terms of social class. It is not surprising that among the Catalan middle class, creating the conditions for social mobility (social improvement of the individual rather than of the working class as a whole) of the immigrant workers was regarded to be a primary concern. More conservative nationalists believed that the root of the problem lay in the regions of origin. Pujol was arguing as early as the 1950's that Andalusia and Extremadura required economic investment so that Catalonia would not need to absorb poorly educated immigrants (Ainaud de Lasarte, interview, 30.3.1988). In the tradition of pre-war nationalism, some nationalists made immigration into the single most important problem for Catalan society. Jordi Pujol, who is now president of the **Generalitat**, argued in 1964 that

"our main problem, as far as the country is concerned, is not the language or the social question, nor economic progress or any political problem; our main problem is the immigration, and as a consequence, the integration."

(Pujol, 1964, 33)

In other words, immigration stood for all these problematic aspects; political, social and cultural cleavages. But the main impact of the immigrant issue on Catalan nationalism was the introduction of a significant dose of social concern. Catalan citizenship was now being more widely defined to include the immigrant population, and "all those who live and work in Catalonia" were considered as Catalans. This national "egalitarianism" required values which had to be applicable to everyone. It is in this context that one can interpret the interest and concern about the miserable, dangerous and cramped living conditions to which the "other Catalans"²⁰ - as the Castilian immigrants were called - were submitted in the sprawling fringes of the industrial cities²¹. Cultural demands (to allow teaching in Catalan at school, etc.) were linked to demands for social change in order to abolish barriers to social integration. Thus, the ultimate responsibility for class conflicts, social tensions and marginalisation in the society was put on the doorstep of the central state (see chapter five) and linked to the anti-francoist struggle. When nationalists like Pujol argued that only political power and autonomy for Catalonia could solve the cultural and the social problems (Pujol, 1976, 29; 40-1)²², it was a

²⁰The term "els altres Catalans" was the title of a widely read and discussed book by Francesc Candel (Candel, 1964). It depicted the experiences of immigrants in Catalonia from an insider's perspective and tried to portray the immigrants as keen to integrate with the Catalan population.

²¹In several articles of Serra d'Or, the housing crisis was analysed and the social structures and economic system were pointed out as not being geared to the elementary needs of the people, and particularly the immigrants. There were also strong attacks against the government's inability to produce the necessary social and physical infrastructure (e.g. Matabosch, 1962, 21-22; Lluch and Estrada, 1962, 26-28; Anonymous, 1962, 14-15).

²²Pujol argued for social mobility of the marginalised working class sectors in order to integrate them into the Catalan society. At
(Footnote Continued)

message to the immigrant population, pointing to the central state as the "real" culprit. After autonomy was achieved and Pujol became president of the **Generalitat**, the argument was turned on its head.

But there was another motive for integrating the immigrant working class. In the 1950's, the first signs of social unrest and working class organisation appeared in the factories, in the working class suburbs of Barcelona and in the neighbouring industrial towns, as chapter three showed (section 3.4). The workers' protests, which were expressed from within the Vertical Syndicate and increasingly through the Workers' Commissions (**CC.OO.**), concentrated mainly on social and economic issues, and were therefore directed against the (mostly Catalan) employers. The development of a predominantly Castilian-speaking working class movement which confronted Catalan entrepreneurs, would have had a damaging effect on the unity of Catalan society - which was after all the claim underlying autonomist and nationalist aspirations. On the other hand, the working class leadership became increasingly aware that it would be impossible for the workers' movement to gain hegemony without embracing the national-popular aspects of Catalan identity. The next sub-section looks at the position of the working class leadership on Catalan nationalism.

4.1.iii Working class organisations and the national problem

For the socialist and Marxist opposition forces, the danger of a permanent division of cultural communities and of the working class was a daunting prospect which had to be avoided. For the Catalan communist party (**PSUC**), from the 1950's onwards the most important clandestine party, it was therefore necessary to incorporate the demand for political autonomy into the struggle for democracy and socialism. Soon after the Franco regime was installed, the Communist

(Footnote Continued)

the same time, he asked the working class to accept the leading role of other, more progressive social groups, such as the Catalan middle class and bourgeoisie (Pujol, 1980, 140).

leader Comorera claimed that the Catalans - and in particular the Catalan working class - had the "sacred duty" of fighting against the fascist State of Franco, in order to lead Catalonia to even greater national self-determination than in 1931 (Comorera, 1977, 139). This view was based on the three stages theory, according to which nationalism started off as a bourgeois ideology, which then became democratized and popular under the petty bourgeoisie and was now the property of the working class.

In order to form a popular front against the dictatorship which had to include not only workers but also writers, academics, professionals, employees etc., the national issue and the socio-economic issues had to be linked together. It was clear that the Communist Party could not restrict itself to the interests of the working class alone, but had to speak for the people as a whole. The people in Catalonia were still mostly Catalan, so embracing nationalism was at least for some Communists a tactical question to do with finding allies (Ribó, 1986, 27).

The agreement of all political opposition forces to regard autonomy as a central demand was an indicator as to their political strategy in what was to be the conversion of a clandestine opposition into an open popular opposition. It is not surprising that a selection of Catalan politicians and intellectuals, interviewed by Mercadé in the aftermath of the dictatorship, coincided in considering national consciousness either interclassist or popular (Mercadé, 1982, 160-162)²³. While the political regime was regarded as the principal enemy, the conditions were favourable to an interpretation of the national movement as being in the interests of all popular classes. The Catalan high bourgeoisie could be excluded on the grounds of their economic function as well as their dissociation from Catalan language and hence identity.

²³ Mercadé found that generally, the attitudes of different social classes towards the Catalan question was not a topic of debate and theoretical analysis in Catalonia (Mercadé, 1982; 160).

In the last ten years of Francoism, when the anti-francoist opposition groups in Catalonia began to collaborate, the identification of the national issue with any particular class was not pursued. While it is impossible to assign a particular class interest to the national movement, it does not mean that there were no class interests involved. However, the fact that all relevant opposition forces adopted the demand for autonomy must signify that it was considered an issue which was indeed able to transcend class divisions.

The alliance, which the PSUC and other Catalan socialist forces were seeking between some progressive sectors of the Catalan middle classes and the working class, convinced some working class leaders of the need to adopt a favourable attitude towards Catalan autonomy²⁴. As chapter three maintained, this was the main objective in creating the Catalan organisation of the CC.OO. (Comisión Obrera Nacional de Catalunya (CONC)), which was not unanimously supported by all the worker's representatives²⁵. As the co-founder of the CONC, Cipriano García, explained, the Catalan Communists realised that if they did not want to leave the national question to the bourgeoisie, they had to take the initiative themselves (García,

²⁴If the CC.OO. were never a Communist syndicate during the francoist period (when it was the only powerful workers' movement), the PSUC has always had a strong influence on it, not least because it was the only active political party. After being legalised in 1977, the PSUC said that it had supported the CC.OO. throughout, and that the syndicate came closer than any other workers' movement to the PSUC's ideal of a democratic, national, unitarian mass movement (PSUC, 1977b, 4-5).

²⁵Cipriano García, one of the founder members of the CONC in 1966, claimed that the debates which preceded the constitution of the CONC, and which took place in a Jesuit institute in Barcelona, lasted for 48 hours. The trade unionists with catholic backgrounds (eg. in HOAC) resisted the adoption of a policy on Catalan autonomy on the grounds that such a policy would amount to a betrayal of the international working class. Given the catalanist tendencies of the Catalan Church, this was interpreted by some as an attempt to prevent the CC.OO. to take on the national issue, and therefore to isolate the working class in Catalonia (García, interview, 29.3.1988).

interview, 29.3.1988)²⁶. The decision of trade union leaders to take on board the struggle for national self-determination won the **PSUC** and the **CC.OO** support from large sections of the Catalan intellectuals and middle classes (García, interview, 29.3.1988), which was not so easy to get in other parts of Spain.

García claimed that by linking the social and the national struggle against the cultural and the social repression which the state exercised, the nationalist movement was prevented from being dominated by the bourgeoisie or "incompetent and sterile separatists" (García, 1976, 33). An important consideration was also the realities of uneven development which had given Catalonia a pivotal role in the struggle for structural (social and economic) change. It was therefore necessary to grant a certain autonomy to the regional and national working class organisations, so that the workers of every nation/region could attack the specific problems which arose from their position in the capitalist system (García, 1980, 10).

Although the Communist Party seemed to have assumed the leadership of political nationalism during the last years of the Franco regime, it did not manage to convert this into a hegemonic position in the transition period to democracy. In the first elections, the **PSUC** had only 20 per cent of the Catalan vote, and in subsequent autonomous elections, more and more workers rallied to Pujol's increasingly right-wing party, **Convergència**, which came to dominate Catalan nationalism in the 1980's. The former General Secretary of the **PSUC**, Lopez Raimundo, said that this was because

²⁶ So competitive was the **PSUC** in this respect that it immediately reacted to the publication of the Catalan language journal Serra d'Or, which was the initiative of catalanist middle class intellectuals with close links to the Catalan Church (chapter seven). In 1958, the Communist Catalan language journal Nous Horitzons was started, but its production in Marseille and its clandestine nature never allowed it to become as significant and widely read as Serra d'Or.

"Convergència sabia mejor cómo presentar el tema nacional. Tal vez por las tradiciones, o tal vez porque daban más confianza."²⁷

(Lopez Raimundo, interview, 16.5.1989)

According to Marin and Tresseres, the reason for the Communists' failure to establish themselves as the nationalist party was its functional attitude towards nationalism.

"Jugan la carta del catalanisme formal, perque en definitiva es una manera de conquerir la hegemonia. En la societat catalana no es pot conquerir la hegemonia jugant una part anti-catalanista."²⁸

(Marin and Tresseres, interview, 15.2.1988)

After Franco's death, the Catalan Left came to be seen as not really nationalist, but only using nationalism as a strategy to win the support of the middle classes and as a step towards a democratic state. It got caught up in the dilemma of class versus nationalism. Marin and Tresseres claimed that the PSUC did not use the opportunity to rewrite the history of Catalan nationalism by appreciating the radical popular elements of Catalan history, e.g. the anarchist tradition or the revolution of 1937 (*ibid.*).

To conclude, the participation of the working class was very important in the nationalist movement, not only in the eyes of intellectuals who feared for the future of Catalan language and culture, but also for working class organisations themselves and for their unity. An active role by the working class organisations and their members in the nationalist struggles (or at least their consent) was a necessary, but not a sufficient precondition to gain hegemony in Catalan civil society. The nationalist struggle was not primarily seen in class terms by the working class and its organisations, but rather in terms of the people struggling against

²⁷"Convergència was most skillful at presenting the national issue. Maybe because of the traditions, or maybe because they instilled more confidence."

²⁸"They play the nationalist card, because it definitively is a way of winning hegemony. It is not possible to win hegemony in Catalan society by taking an anti-Catalanist position."

a repressive state. This brought the working class organisations closer to the Catalan middle class intellectuals, who were the key protagonists in the nationalist revival. It is to the role of the middle class in the nationalist movement that I will now turn.

4.2. Middle classes and the nationalist movement

The Catalan middle classes had a strong involvement with Catalan nationalism which goes back to the cultural revival in the 19th century. In the 1960's, the cultural revival was the first sign of political nationalism, and it was led by those who were most aware of cultural repression, namely the intellectuals. Mostly from the Catalan middle class, they were able to reproduce a sense of Catalan identity in a whole range of civil society institutions which were separate from the state. The fact that middle class nationalists and workers saw the same enemy in the Franco regime, radicalised some sectors of the middle class, and created favourable circumstances for a nationalist opposition movement. The following sections look at the role of various sectors of the Catalan middle class in the construction of the nationalist and anti-Francoist movement, which spanned across the different social classes.

4.2.i The Catalan middle class and cultural nationalism

The middle classes, which had been the stronghold of the republican parties and developed the populist version of Catalan nationalism during the Second Republic, were also the principal force in the cultural movement during the dictatorship. As members of **Esquerra Republicana** or office holders in the Catalan administration, many suffered political and cultural repression after the occupation or were driven into exile. For the Catalan intellectuals who stayed in the country, the repression and the intention to impose the new fascist ideologies on civil society lead to a complete break with the republican culture, and in many cases pushed them into clandestine existence or into the private sphere (see chapter two, section 8.2). It was in those circles which were linked to Christian

parties (e.g. **Unió Democràtica de Catalunya**) or to the church, and which were economically secure in the hunger years of the 1940's, that the nuclei of the cultural movement²⁹ emerged which served as a fragile link to the republican Generalitat, and generally the catalanist tradition (Marin and Tresseres, interview, 15.2.1988).

The Catalan middle classes held a concern for Catalan culture and the historic claim to autonomy alive throughout the dictatorship. The **Front Universitari de Catalunya (FUC)**, for example, which in its first national congress in 1944 in the monastery of Montserrat demonstrated both its links to Christian democracy and the special function of Montserrat in relation to nationalist politics, consisted of students from the University of Barcelona who demanded the recognition of Catalan nationhood³⁰. The **FUC** did not survive the post-war crisis in the opposition, but can serve as an example for the type of nationalism which, invested with a sense of social justice, was based on the idea of national unity which transcended differences between social classes. Josep Benet said in his inaugural speech as the president of the **FUC**:

²⁹In 1941, some young, mostly upper middle class Catalans formed a group which later adopted the name of the conservative bishop and devoted catalanist, Torres i Bages. They organised meetings with historians, geographers and other intellectuals of the Republican era, Catalan language classes etc., and had a democratic, Christian and catalanist outlook. Some present figures of the nationalist CDC, such as Pujol, and Lasarte were part of this group (Samper i Triedu, 1987, 123-125). Another example for this type of cultural activity, which was limited to small groups in the Catalan middle classes, is the **Acadèmia de Llengua Catalana**, formed in 1953, which engaged in a variety of symbolic acts (putting up stone plates commemorating historic events and figures of the Catalanist past), published a children's journal in Catalan (**Caball Fort**) and organised public campaigns in favour of Catalan masses and Catalan bishops in the 1960's (*ibid.*, 1987, 61-62; Sayrach, interview, 23.2.1988).

³⁰At the time, there was still widespread hope in oppositional circles that the francoist nightmare would end with the victory of the allied forces over the fascist regimes. The popular front was a tool which several oppositional groups, including the **Front Nacionalista de Catalunya** as the main nationalist political organisation, considered appropriate in the early years of the dictatorship.

"Remember that despite autonomy, we did not manage to leave behind us the party politics copied from Madrid. All Catalans had to belong to the left or the right. They did not understand that, as Catalans of the new Catalonia, they had to transcend the politics of left and right."

(Benet, 1978, 104)

Catalan culture, the return to the moral principles which formed the basis of Catalan civilisation, was thought to be able to build a harmonic relationship between the classes. Without class struggle, the workers would turn their attention to the problems of their country. The roots in the ideologies of bourgeois catalanism are obvious, and so are the similarities with the SNP line in Scotland. But what is also significant is the attempt to achieve "national reconciliation" by appealing to a deeper sense of national unity.

The significance of these small-scale, practically private initiatives, often under the protection of the Church, lies in their effect on the political formation of the participants, and their integration in an oppositional culture. Some members of the FUC of the mid-1940's, such as Josep Benet, Lluís Casassas, Alexandre Cirici and Joan Ainaud de Lasarte, were all involved in subsequent cultural and political organisations, and were important activists in the Catalan revival of the 1960's (see chapter six).

4.2.ii The social background of the intelligentsia

The world of the educated Catalan middle class, from which many of the politicians and catalanists later emerged, was rather small until the growth of the social groups of the middle classes in the boom period of the 1960's. When considering the political developments in the student population in Barcelona, whose radicalisation contributed to the nationalist and the anti-francoist movement according to the historians (who also emerged from this milieu), it is important to remember the social background and small size of the young intelligentsia during the first two decades of the dictatorship. In the late 1950's, university education was the privilege of the affluent middle classes and the upper classes, and less than 0.2 % of the population had access to it (Petit i

Fontserè, 1962, 24) - though this expanded fast in the 1960's and 1970's.

Secondary schooling was practically reserved for these social groups, because it was almost exclusively in the hands of the church and private institutions (Ernest Lluch i Martin, 1962, 25-27) and served therefore as a very effective preserver of the existing class divisions. Catalan middle class families regarded education as one important means to social success, and were prepared to make sacrifices for their children's future prospects and prosperity. Private and religious schools were also more likely to have at least some autonomy in their teaching, and to be more sympathetic to Catalan language and history than the few existing state schools³¹. The role of the clergy thus must be seen in context with the position of Catalan intellectuals and middle classes towards the Catalan question. Its relevance was of course greatest at the cultural level, which is examined in chapter six, but it also played a significant political role as a part of the traditional middle class intelligentsia.

4.2.iii The clergy and Catalan nationalism

The Catalan Church looked back on a tradition of Catalanist sympathies, which could long be characterised by the conservative vision of Catalan regional distinctiveness in bishop Torras i Bages' essay on La Tradició Catalana, published in 1892. Particularly the

³¹Raguer et al. suggested that the religious schools were keen to comply with the regulations imposed on them by the Franco regime, and generally were very efficient instruments in the castilianisation of the Catalan population (Raguer et al., 1977, 120). But Cahner argued that the Church was an important institution in the survival of the Catalan language in many parts of rural Catalonia (Cahner, interview, 11.2.1988). In Barcelona city, Jesuits and other religious orders were running schools which were known to be sympathetic to Catalan culture, and the participation of priests and Jesuit and Capuchine monks in the political events of the 1960's support the view that private religious schools were more sympathetic to Catalan issues than state schools, where no such liberties were possible.

monasteries of the Capuchines, Benedictines and the Jesuits, which had a tradition of teaching and science, were conscious of their Catalan identity (Raquer et al., 1977, 65). After the civil war, which many francoists described as a crusade against atheism, the pre-republican extent of economic power and social influence of the Church was restored by Franco. The Church and organisations related to it such as the Unió Democràtica de Catalunya provided the only spaces - often literally - in which Catalan cultural activities could take place and Catalanist sympathies be expressed during much of the Franco period. While the Church hierarchy was replaced by non-Catalans, the lower clergy remained largely Catalan, and a schism developed within the Catalan Church between the two strata. On the one hand, the Church was occupying an important role in legitimising the dictatorship as part of its hegemonic apparatus, but on the other hand, the close contact of its lower clergy - as priests or teachers - with the people exposed the repression of Catalan language and culture as a problem which was very close to the bone. As the Church became a key institution in the survival and the revival of Catalan culture³², the Montserrat monastery was made into a symbol of Catalanism.

The Catalan church not only had a strong influence on civil society through the provision of education to middle and upper class offspring, but also through youth organisations which developed under its protective umbrella and constituted an alternative to the fascist youth organisation of the state. The scouts movement, largely lead by young priests, was particularly popular among the urban middle class and bourgeoisie with catalanist sympathies, who wanted to give their children a civic formation in the catalanist and Christian spirit.

"The lack of state schools, the restrictions imposed on private schools where defiant attitudes emerged only very slowly, and the impossibility of participating in

³²Initiatives began in the 1940's with the groups such as Grup Torras i Bages, Comissió Abat Oliba, and was continued in the 1950's with the Catalan journals Qüestions de la Vida Cristiana and Serra d'Or.

internationalist ideals via the official institutions of the regime, all contributed to the fact that in 1974 (...), more than 10,000 were affiliated to the scouts movement. The progressive bourgeoisie, skilled workers (menestralia) and some small sectors of immigrants who were already integrated joined the institution looking for catalanism, discipline without authority, outdoor activities (...)." (Vanguardia, supplement, 3.5.1987, 78)

Many of the political activists and future political leaders³³ emerged from the scouts movement and the social and cultural milieu which supported it. Catalan nationalism of the 1970's and 1980's was strongly invested with this type of church related, "culturalist", middle class based institutions and associations which preserved Catalan traditions during the dictatorship. But it must also be mentioned that the Church had an impact on Catalan Communism and on the working class movement. The lower clergy in working class parishes and the workers' catholic associations³⁴ provided an organisational framework from which many militants of the communist workers' movement and communist and socialist parties emerged. As sections of the lower clergy became more politicised and took part in the anti-francoist movement, churches, convents and monasteries served as meeting places for clandestine reunions of the CC.OO and the **Assemblea de Catalunya**.

³³Narcís Serra, Pascual Maragall, Raimon Obiols and Lluís Armet now occupy posts in the social-democratic party **PSC-PSOE**. Josep-Maria Cullerell, Joan Ainaud de Lasarte, Raimon Galí, Josep Miró i Ardevol are connected with the **CDC** or **UDC**, and Rafael Ribó is the current leader of the **PSUC** (Vanguardia, supplement, 3.5.1987, 66).

³⁴The **PSUC** acknowledged the role of active Christians in its ranks in declaration in 1976 where it said:

"In many working class parishes, the priests and the Christian communities have expressed their solidarity with the popular working class movement in many different ways, and many of these Christians became active in political and syndical organisations in their community (...). Apostolic workers' movements such as the **HOAC**, **JOC**, **ACO**, **VOJ JARC** (...) and other movements which were orientated more towards the middle classes (...) have been catalysts of democratisation and social transformation."

(**PSUC**, 1979, 13)

In Barcelona, the university was also a place of political activity and nationalist mobilisation. The next sub-section will examine the significance of intellectuals and professionals as key activists in the nationalist movement and as bridges between the socialist and the nationalist wing of the Catalan opposition in the 1960's and 1970's.

4.2.iv Intellectuals and professionals in the Catalan opposition

Catalan intellectuals had not only an important impact on the cultural movement in the 1960's (see chapter six), but also played a key role in creating the anti-Francoist consensus which developed in the late 1960's and early 1970's.

The students' protests in the 1950's were one of the first signs of political discontent³⁵. By the mid-1960's, they had grown into a strong democratic movement against the Francoist students'

³⁵The radicalism of the students, who were mostly from Catalan middle and upper class backgrounds, is rather ironically described in Juan Marse's novel which is set in the days of student unrest in the second half of the 1950's in Barcelona:

"The prestige which Luis Trias de Giralt enjoyed in those days was fabulous. Imprisoned already twice, he was always surrounded by the aura of melancholic torment (sometimes he was even seen absorbed in expressive silences and holding intimate conversations with himself). In the University he was taken to be an important figure - a strange praise which, if it meant anything, was precisely that. A year ago, Teresa Serrat had felt drawn to collaborate with him on a myriad of cultural and extra-cultural activities, as if she had sensed or guessed the adoration to which this prestige would soon become subject: Luis Trias de Giralt was said to be "politically connected". A talented student of economics, grandson of Mediterranean pirates and son of a very capable businessman who made millions by importing textiles in the early 1950's, he was tall, good-looking, but with flaccid, dishonest and fundamentally political features, a reddish complexion, curly hair without strength, sparkling but unsteady eyes; he (...) gave the impression of a somewhat perplex, gentle seminarist on vacations ...".

(Marse, 1971, 106)

(Footnote Continued)

organisation, and the regime as a whole. There were connections between the students movement, progressive academics, professionals and clergy, which indicated that the middle classes became increasingly active against the Franco regime. One example for the type of activities pursued by students and intellectuals is the campaign of **Taula Rodona** (1966) (a loose organisation of intellectuals from opposition parties and social associations in support of the democratic students' movement) against the torturing of political prisoners which was signed in 1968 by scores of university teachers, members of the clergy, writers, lawyers, artists, publishers and other professionals (S. Vilar, 1984, 403). Middle class intellectuals, who had become radicalised against the Franco regime, swelled the ranks of the **PSUC** (Table 4.6), which was in the 1960's and the early 1970's the only effective opposition organisation.

"En aquel moment cal tenir en compte qu'el group més influent era el Comunista. El **PSUC** a Catalunya era el que tenia el predomini sobre els intel.lectuals, sobre el mon de professions liberals. Aquest mon sentia tret pel **PSUC**, curiosament. Per la seva actitud antifranquista radical, això val recordar-ho, però també per una gran capacitat d'infiltració que havia tingut. El fet de ser clandestí permetia infiltrar-se a tots els llocs. I aleshores el **PSUC** estava infiltrat desde les parròquies catòliques fins al mon de professionals i de artistes, a tot arreu. Això potser va fer creure en el **PSUC** que tenia més incidència popular de lo que tenia."³⁶

(Ainaud de Lasarte, interview, 30.3.1988)

(Footnote Continued)

Two year later, he had left the University and started to work in his father's factory, now "in harmony, if not with the country, then at least with himself", depoliticised and forgotten without regrets.

³⁶"One has to bear in mind that at that time, the most influential group were the Communists. The **PSUC** was dominant among the intellectuals and the liberal professions in Catalonia. For some reason, these circles were in sympathy with the **PSUC**. Maybe for its radical anti-francoist attitude, which is worth remembering, but also because the **PSUC** had a great ability to infiltrate. Its clandestine existence allowed it to infiltrate everywhere. And at that time, the **PSUC** had infiltrated everything, from the Catholic parishes to the circles of professionals and artists. This probably created the impression that the **PSUC** had more popular support than was actually the case."

The strategy of the Communists to form popular alliances and to concentrate on the conflict of people versus oppressive state did much to attract the middle class clientele. But the main reason was the fact that this conflict involved two nationalities and two distinctive cultures. Pagès suggested that therefore,

"50% de los militantes del PSUC en estos días procedieron de la universidad y de las capas profesionales, y no de la clase obrera. Ellos no habían nacido en los barrios obreros ni habían tenido una educación proletaria. Esa gente tenía ciertos objetivos culturales, y en las circunstancias específicas del franquismo, ellos se vieron radicalizados de alguna manera. Yo supongo que se puede especular que el error del partido comunista³⁷ fue ahí. Parecía tener una fuerza que luego no existía."

(Pagès, interview, 16.5.1989)

That it was the national question, and implicitly the call for democracy, which activated many intellectuals and professionals, is made obvious in the first reunion of the intellectuals, professionals and artists for the whole of Spain in 1977. In the inaugural speech, it was stressed that

"[t]he history of the resistance of [the peoples of Spain] to losing their national identity is one of the most important phenomena in the last 40 years"

(Benet, 1978, 61)

- during which Franco tried hard to achieve the opposite. The **Catalan Assemblea Permanent d'Intel·lectuals, Professionals i Artistes** was the outcome of the campaign against the trials of six ETA militants in Burgos in 1970, which prompted 300 Catalan intellectuals to organise a sit-in in Montserrat as a sign of protest.

³⁷"50 % of the activists of the PSUC in those days were from the university and from the professional sector, not from the working class. They had not been born in working class districts, nor had undergone a proletarian formation. These people had certain cultural aims, and in a specific situation such as the Franco regime, they had become radicalised in a certain way. I suppose that one could speculate that the error of the the Communist Party lied here. It seemed to have a strength which later turned out not to exist."

When we try to explain the political activity of professionals and technicians during the dictatorship in general, and their nationalist tendencies in particular, Miguélez and Solé's account of their growth and changing position in the relations of production proves useful. Particularly since the change of economic strategy in 1957, the economic development in the industrial regions of Spain produced rapid changes in technology and organisation of work processes, which required many new technical and professional skills and generally pulled these occupations increasingly into salaried employment. Although their influence on decision making processes and their social and economic power was greater than that of the working class, these processes brought the "new middle classes" closer to it (Miguélez and Solé, 1987, 137). The militance of some Catalan middle class sectors can be explained by their contradictory class position as the spearheads of modernisation and reorganisation of capitalism, which was not matched by social and political power in the political and civil society. The shared lack of political and decision making power was an important factor in the popular opposition movement.

"[T]his brings them to adopt anti-francoist positions, to identify with the project of modernising Catalonia which had been truncated by the civil war, and to look for an alliance to pursue this project with the working class, because they were aware of the weakness of the modernisation project of the democratic sector of the Catalan bourgeoisie."

(Miguélez and Solé, 1987, 144)

The roots of intellectuals in their culture and their role in the reproduction of this culture entail a central role in the opposition movement, which assumes a strong nationalist character. The younger and more politicised sectors of the intellectuals and professionals adopted in the 1960's and 1970's a political attitude which linked nationalist demands with social concern³⁸ (see the articles on

³⁸"The technical and scientific development, which despite adverse conditions is also manifest to a certain extent in our country, has inflated the middle strata - technicians, functionaries and professionals - and at the same time caused a higher level of proletarianisation. These two interdependent tendencies have led these

(Footnote Continued)

unequal opportunities in the education system, cultural and class segregation in the housing market, etc. in "Serra d'Or" in the early 1960's). But as Miguélez and Solé observed, this was not an attitude shared by the majority of the middle classes, and in the course of the 1970's, more intellectuals and professionals moved back into the traditional vein of catalanism and abandoned projects of structural change. The typical party for the "new middle classes" became the *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya*, which is discussed below in connection with the Catalan bourgeoisie.

The nationalist and anti-Francoist movement also included some sectors of the bourgeoisie, which chapter three (section 3.3) argued were significant in the cultural revival in the 1960's. Although the bourgeoisie showed little political activism under the Franco regime, it rose rapidly to importance in the second half of the 1970's.

4.3 The bourgeoisie and nationalism

Since the political project of the *Lliga* had been overtaken by the historic developments of the 1920's and 1930's, the Catalan bourgeoisie seemed to have opted out of Catalan nationalism. The Catalan big bourgeoisie welcomed Franco, because this was a way of getting back what had been expropriated and occupied by workers during the Civil War. But it was not prominent in the Franco regime; indeed, it had very little political influence. But as Jutglar pointed out, this did not mean that the Catalan bourgeoisie was a victim of the regime.

"What happened was simply that Madrid was now in charge of politics - with the help of an increasingly sinuous and omnipresent state apparatus -, and the bourgeoisie per se had the function of reproducing the economic system, i.e. to

(Footnote Continued)

social groups to fight together with the working class". (García, 1976, 32).

amass fortunes. However, the rules for getting rich were laid down by Madrid."

(Jutglar, 1982, 247)

The old industrial families (as described in Donogh, 1986) were regarded as "castilianised" and therefore no longer part of the Catalan nation. By excluding the "castilianised" and the big industrialist from the national consensus, the small and medium bourgeoisie became acceptable to many progressive middle class and even working class activists. After Franco's death, the CDC (founded in 1974 by Pujol) came to be Catalonia's self-defined nationalist party which was closest to bourgeois interests. It said in a pamphlet in 1977 that "CDC does not believe in the political leadership of the big bourgeoisie of our country which has demonstrated too often that its interests were above the interests of Catalonia" (CDC, 1977, 1). But there were also the "good" Catalan entrepreneurs who claimed to be operating in the interest of the nation. In any case, the changes in the economic system brought forward new types of industrialists and managers who were no longer identifiable with the closely knit Catalan industrial families.

The patriotically inspired "fer pais" movement (Chapter three, section 3.3), which certain affluent nationalist capitalists and also intellectuals were advocating in the 1960's, was pulled on to a more explicitly political plane in the mid-1970's, when the power of the Francoist elites was crumbling away. The middle and upper classes with catalanist traditions, who had helped to "rebuild" Catalan civil society and economic structures, now needed a new nationalist political organisation separate from the communists and socialists, in which they would be the dominant force. With the Franco regime on its last leg, "making politics" was a project which followed almost naturally from "making the country". It was logical that, at a time when the political future was insecure, the bourgeoisie protected its political and economic interests.

4.3.ii Convergence of Catalans - the CDC as the heir to nationalist tradition

Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC) organised those sectors which had kept a low profile until then. But it also attracted many people who were politically active in left-wing parties while only those were operating, and who were driven into political activity by their nationalist consciousness. Now that the end of the dictatorship was in sight, it became important to separate nationalist concerns for culture and language from aims to restructure the economic and social basis of society. From the beginning, the party was very concerned to keep at a distance from the left-wing, and particularly the communist party, which were dominating the political movement. In the **Assemblea de Catalunya**, the Catalan conservative democrats did not play a significant role because it smacked of Communist dominance. Instead, they went for changing the political regime from within:

"At the same time as the "Assemblea" was formed, the "pujolistes" and the social democrats lead by Josep Pallach (PSC-R) and Herriert Barrera (ERC) campaigned for a series of candidates who were standing for the francoist elections to the Cortes in Barcelona, Lleida and Tarragona."

(Colomer, 1981, 20)

In the founding conference of the CDC, which not surprisingly took place in Montserrat, Pujol described the electorate he was aiming at. His aim was to try and integrate the bourgeoisie and the middle classes, whom he considered the dominant classes in Catalan society, but also to incorporate a part of the working class:

"This programme, I believe, fulfils the expectations of a great Catalan sector, more precisely the most central sector of Catalonia. A sector which is catalanist and democratical, not communist and socialist. It is a sector with a constructive attitude and the mentality of "fer país". It embraces a large part of the bourgeoisie with a national consciousness and of the so-called popular strata - middle classes, liberal professions, employees, management, developed sectors of the working class ["sectores obreros evolucionados"] -, part of the catholic community - but neither "Christians for Socialism" nor the "brotherhood of Padre Claret"-, of the comarcal society - which has a certain interclassist unity -, of the cooperatives, of the sectors - which have a certain weight in Catalonia - with

But already two years before, the conservative tendencies of the CDC were apparent. The *Manifest per la Ruptura*⁴⁰ (June 1976) of the *Assemblea de Catalunya* did not find support among the leaders of the CDC (Sellarès, 1981, 47), who had no interest in radical changes in society. Rather than integrating themselves into a movement which was largely dominated by the Communist Party, the CDC and the other centrist Catalanist parties concentrated on the *Consell de Forces Polítiques* where only political parties were represented, and negotiated separately with the regime, adopting an attitude which Colomer described as "traditional" of the Catalan bourgeoisie: renouncing any plans to structural changes of society and negotiating particular advantages for the Catalans (Colomer, 1981, 23). This political strategy gave them a powerful position in the late 1970's. The CDC pooled those social groups who wanted to maintain in principle the economic strategy of the francoist state and the capitalist relations of production.

A survey of the delegates to the 5th Congress of the CDC (1978) demonstrated that most of them - 94 % - had not been politically active before they joined the party (this at a time when Franco's death was imminent), but that on the other hand, many were members of cultural, sport, or neighbourhood associations (Marcet, 1987, 223; 228). The socio-economic characteristics of the voters of CDC in 1978 show that more than 50 % of the economically active were in two occupational categories, entrepreneurs and middle and lower management (Marcet, 1987, 240; Table 4.7).

Thus, the Catalan middle and upper classes who had benefited from the economic boom and expanded over the 1960's and 1970's, were the central forces in the nationalist party which emerged in the mid-1970's, and succeeded in establishing its version of nationalism in Catalan society in the 1980's. Those reached the top who were

⁴⁰This manifesto expressed the aim of the *Assemblea* to not just reform and democratise the Franco state, but to break with it and to establish a new society from scratch. It was in line with Communist and CC.OO. policies, which were however abandoned in 1977 in favour of the reformist approach of the Euro-Communists.

from those sectors which had money, time, and economic power and were therefore predestined to play a role in society, and who followed Pujol's call to move on from romantic and intellectual day dreaming and begin with real politics by actively forming the future of the country (Pujol, 1967, 23). The fact that many of the CDC activists had been active in the cultural movement legitimised the CDC as the core of the nationalist movement. Even though in the first elections, the CDC (which formed part of the **Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya**) was no more autonomist and nationalist than most of the other parties and less so than the PSUC (Tables 4.8a and 4.8b), it managed to capture the nationalist intellectuals and therefore the hegemony in Catalunya.

This account of the role of social classes in the nationalist movement in Catalonia demonstrates that to a greater or lesser extent, the support for Catalan autonomy came from all three classes. It is difficult to determine how well the various underground parties and political bodies reflected the political and social aspirations of the social classes. However, it appears that a potent national-popular opposition alliance emerged at the end of the 1960's which included sectors of the organised working class, the middle class intellectuals, and the nationalist elements of the small and middle bourgeoisie. This alliance was held together by Catalan nationalism and anti-Francoism. The fact that the vast majority of the Catalan parties in the first elections opposed centralism showed that support for Catalan autonomy was hegemonic. Once these short term aims had been achieved, the alliance fell apart in the late 1970's, as the struggle for hegemony in Catalonia revealed antagonistic political projects. The CDC emerged as the winner in this struggle, because its bourgeois and middle class leadership succeeded in capitalising on their leading role in the history of Catalan nationalism and the cultural revival of the 1960's.

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5. CONCLUSION

This chapter argued that the nationalist movements in Catalonia and Scotland can not be regarded as a political expression of any fundamental class interest. If it was possible to associate nationalist movements of the 19th century with the material interests of the bourgeoisie - without being able to explain them exclusively on this basis (Hroch, 1985, 7) -, this was no longer possible in the second half of the 20th century. In the recent phase of popular nationalism, the question of fundamental class interest became even more thorny as the class boundaries were increasingly difficult to define. The middle classes appeared as the key force in the nationalist movements, especially in Catalonia where the cultural bonds were reinforcing the national identity. In both countries, the nationalist movement involved sectors of the popular classes, and to a lesser extent, of the bourgeoisie, which were held together - for a limited time span - by the intellectuals. In the case of Catalonia, the intellectuals were tied to the state to a lesser extent than was the case in Scotland, and were therefore more influential in the national movement evolving in civil society.

Gramscian concepts provide the possibility of moving away from simplistic models of the relationship between class interests and political nationalism, to look at social groups within the context of civil society. The concept of "intellectuals" is difficult to define in terms of fundamental classes, but catches the contradictory role of middle class sectors which form the core of the nationalist movements in Catalonia and Scotland. Any social class which strives for national hegemony has to embrace key elements of popular nationalism, therefore the nationalist movements involve conflicting class sectors, and fragment when their demands for autonomy have been met.

I tried to demonstrate that the attitude of different social class sectors to the national question depended on many circumstances which were not reducible to their position in the economic relations of capitalist society. One of the main influences which emerged in

this chapter is the role of the different social classes in the state apparatus, and the form and nature of the state in general. In the next chapter, the focus is therefore turned on the state, which is the main opponent of nationalist movements. In both cases, tensions between the state and civil society are a fundamental source of unity among the social classes within civil society. The strength of nationalist movements therefore is explained to a large extent with reference to the changes in form and function of the state and to its tightening grip on civil society.

APPENDIX: Tables

Table: 4.1 : Opinion poll on national identity and social class in Scotland, 1986
(per cent)

NATIONALITY	AB	C L A S S		DE
		C1	C2	
Scottish not British	23	35	40	47
More Scottish than British	31	32	31	27
Equally Scottish and British	26	21	17	17
More British than Scottish	9	4	5	1
British not Scottish	9	7	5	5
Don't know	2	2	3	2
Total number	145	203	280	338

Source: System Three Scotland, 1986.

Table 4.2 : Political Party Vote and Social Class
(per cent)

	A & B		C1		C2		D & E	
Conservative	56*	47+	40*	40+	23*	20+	22*	20+
Labour	14	20	23	21	39	32	48	36
Liberal	10	11	6	7	6	4	6	3
SNP	20	22	30	32	32	43	23	40
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

*) Survey carried out for the "Scotsman" by the Opinion Research Centre during June 1975 (Brand, 1978, 146).

+) Survey carried out by the Opinion Research Centre during December 1975 (Brand, 1978, 147).

Table 4.3: Intercensal changes in migration, Scotland, 1921 - 1981
(in thousands)

Census year	Population	Estimated net migration		
		Total	Remainder of United Kingdom	Overseas
1921	4,882.5			
		-391.9	-330.0	-60.0
1931	4,843.0			
		-220.0	-210.0	-10.0
1951*	5,096.4			
		-282.0	-140.0	-142.0
1961	5,179.3			
		-326.5	-169.0	-157.5
1971	5,229.0			
		-144.2	-52.1	-92.1
1981	5,130.7			

*) Note the twenty year gap

Source: Scottish Abstract of Statistics, 15, 1986, 7.

Table 4.4 : Non-catalan Spanish immigrants and familiarity of Catalan language in the province of Barcelona, 1975

COMARCA	Immigrants (per cent of total pop.)	Understand	Speak	Family ¹
		(per cent of immigrant pop.)		
Osona	16.0	82.2	34.3	15.1
Berguedà	18.4	78.3	32.2	12.2
Alt Penedès	21.3	63.0	26.1	11.3
Bages	25.2	76.5	32.1	11.8
Anoia	28.6	67.1	24.9	11.3
Maresme	32.7	63.4	27.1	10.0
Garraf	34.1	59.0	21.4	8.3
Vallès Oriental	37.2	59.4	22.2	6.4
Vallès Occidental	39.1	54.4	18.3	6.0
Baix Llobregat	46.2	45.0	13.0	4.3
Barcelonès (excl. Barcelona)	47.2	45.2	12.7	4.1
TOTAL (excl. B.)	39.9	52.1	17.1	6.0

Source: Reixach, 1985, p. 71.

1

This denotes those who primarily use Catalan in their family.

Table 4.5 : Familiarity with the Catalan language according to social status in Barcelona province, 1975
(per cent of total sample)

SOCIAL STATUS	Understand	Speak	Family	Write
Professionals and technicians	91.8	74.2	59.5	41.4
Managers (private & public enterprises)	97.1	88.6	80.0	45.0
Administrative personnel	91.4	73.3	55.2	30.5
Salespersons etc.	88.3	72.5	57.4	24.4
Service sector employees	71.7	44.7	30.9	9.2
Farmers, fishermen etc.	91.2	84.6	81.4	20.0
Workers (skilled and unskilled)	71.8	44.4	30.5	9.4
Armed forces	54.4	16.6	9.1	2.6
Inactive	59.7	44.4	38.1	8.6
Undefined	69.1	46.3	37.3	10.7
TOTAL	68.3	48.0	38.2	11.5

Source: Reixach, 1985, p. 121.

Table 4.6 : Social composition of the delegates to the IV Congress of the PSUC
(per cent)

Occupational groups	PSUC delegates
Cultural forces	17.8
Students	3.2
Professional and administrative employees	21.7
Self-employed workers	3.4
Agricultural workers	1.6
Industrial workers	30.1
Service sector employees	3.2
Entrepreneurs	1.1
Other	17.1
TOTAL NUMBER	1140

Source: PSUC, 1977a, 377.

Table 4.7 : Social composition of the voters of Convergència i Unió in March 1979

(per cent)

Occupational groups	CiU vote
Liberal professions	2.7
Self-employed	9.6
Entrepreneurs	28.3
Managers	7.6
Middle management and admin.	26.9
Skilled workers	15.9
Unskilled workers	9.0
Total	100.0

Source: Marcet, 1987, 240.

Table 4.8a : Attitudes of voters in the first elections (15.6.1977) on self-government (per cent)

Voted party	Centralism	Autonomy	Federalism	Independence	TOTAL
Extreme Left	-	51	34	8	92
Catalan Left	2	23	55	21	101
PSUC	8	52	29	11	100
PSC-PSOE	13	49	28	8	98
PDC	19	45	33	4	101
UDC-CC	31	37	32	-	100
UCD	26	49	20	3	98
AP	69	13	17	-	99
Others	11	26	44	19	100
Didn't vote	21	32	22	23	98
No answer	25	45	7	22	99
Under voting age	19	36	26	18	99

Source: Linz (ed.), 1981, 546 (DATA opinion poll, 1978).

Table 4.8b : Attitudes on Selfgovernment according to party vote in the first elections (15.6.1977) (per cent)

Voted party	Centralism	Autonomy	Federalism	Independence	TOTAL VOTE
Extreme Left	-	2	3	1	2
Catalan Left	-	1	4	4	2
PSUC	6	17	17	15	15
PSC-PSOE	16	27	26	17	24
PDC	6	6	7	2	6
UDC-CC	2	1	1	-	1
UCD	27	23	16	6	20
AP	12	1	2	-	3
Others	1	1	2	3	2
Didn't vote	14	10	11	28	13
No answer	8	7	2	13	6
Under voting age	6	5	6	10	6
TOTAL	98	101	97	99	100

Source: Linz (ed.), 1981, 547 DATA Opinion poll 1978).

Chapter five:

THE STATE AND NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, it was argued that although nationalist movements involve class interests and class struggles, they cannot be defined purely in those terms. What is more important to the genesis and dynamics of nationalist movements is the relationship between the central state and "the people", whereby "the people" are not an amorphous mass, but rather structured in classes, cultural groups, neighbourhoods, families etc.; in short, the relationship between state and civil society.

Nationalist movements are a challenge to the state which tries to correspond to the ideal of the nation state and claims to act in the interest of its entire population. With their base in civil society, nationalist movements are antagonistic to the state which is seen as separate from the civil society of the nation. Disputing the legitimacy of the state as the centre of political power, nationalists demand changes in the constitution which they see as allowing a shift of power to the nation, and in the case of separatist movements, the establishment of an independent state. To what extent the claim of political power for the nation implies democratisation and "power to the people" is another question.

There have been developments in the relationship between state and civil society in the last decades which doubly justify such an approach. Two aspects of change influenced the revival of nationalism in the post-1945 era and gave rise to the specific nationalist movements which are examined here. The first concerns changes in the form of the state. Here, differences between the Spanish and the British state emerge. The Spanish state had problems of legitimisation because it was authoritarian. The legitimacy of the British state constitution has been fading in the eyes of the Scots only since the 1980's due to the widening gap in political attitudes between Scotland and England. This aspect of the relationship between state and civil society is discussed in section two. The second aspect arises from the changes in the relationship between state and civil society which correspond to general trends in advanced capitalist states. These changes involve an increase in (chapter five)

state intervention and a related increasing need for sources of legitimation. As the state touches more and more aspects of civil society, and people experience the arm of the state with great frequency, popular control over, and participation in, state structures are seen as increasingly necessary. How such developments affect the Catalan and Scottish nationalist movements is the concern of the third section. It also discusses the legitimation arising from the challenge of the nationalist movements. The Catalan movement was linked to the broader anti-Francoist movement, which existed in other parts of Spain as well but had its own organisation and peculiar characteristics in Catalonia. In both Scotland and Catalonia, arguments concerning inefficient government, inability to solve social problems and the remoteness of government from the people fed into the nationalist debate, but they were not seen from the same angle and had a varying impact.

The strategies of the nationalist movements and the ability of the state to respond to their demands are the topic of the fourth section. In this context, the degree of autonomy of civil society, the nature of the demands of the nationalist movements, and the general conditions outlined in the three previous sections together determined the outcome of 1979, when the referendum in Scotland was lost and that in Catalonia won.

2. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

2.1. Forms of state, forms of nationalist movements

It is argued here that the constitution of a state and its forms of legitimation condition the way in which the nationalist movement is organised, what its demands are and who participates in it. The differences between the Catalan and the Scottish nationalist movement which we have already encountered in previous chapters are to some extent explicable with reference to the different nature of the states involved.

When the nationalist revival occurred, Spain was under the rule of General Franco, who had led the military coup against the Republican government and won the three year war in 1939. Francoist Spain is variably qualified as a "fascist dictatorship" (Molinero and Ysàs, 1981, 22), a "reactionary despotic state" (Giner and Sevilla, 1980, 201) and a "modernising authoritarian regime" (Bernecker, 1984, 396; Hansen, 1977, 4), a variety of terms which reflects both the authors' political outlooks and the - limited - changes which the regime underwent in the course of almost four decades, without ever undergoing ideological ruptures (Miguel, 1985, 91).

The Francoist state was forced upon Catalonia, which counted among the losers of the war, and was not able to claim majority support and legitimation as a result. Coercion rather than consent characterised the relationship between the Spanish state and Catalan society. Particularly in the first decade, the repression of people and institutions associated with the Republic and the autonomous government was carried out relentlessly, and the control over the Catalan civil society was geared to the extinction of Catalan national identity. From the first actions of the Franco regime, Catalan autonomy and democracy were connected through the repression of both, and this link manifested itself in opposition movements of the 1970's.

Giner's and Sevilla's analysis of the Francoist "despotic state" focuses on four characteristics. The first concerns the class character of the state, which functioned as a guardian of uninhibited capital accumulation and capitalist development in the interest of the ruling classes. From this perspective, the working class had lost the civil war "as a class". In the first years of the dictatorship, working class organisations were systematically destroyed. Deprived of organisations, the workers were now individuals, "isolated in the extremely difficult struggle of solving everyday problems" (Molinero and Ysàs, 1981, 20).

Secondly, the state excluded ideologies of all the subordinate classes, be they communist, liberal, separatist or democratic. This repressive attitude also affected the middle classes which had (chapter five)

supported the democratic republican state, and according to Benet, the persecution of "separatism" amounted to a repression of the Catalan nation as a whole, regardless of class belonging (Benet, 1978, 16). The remaining two features concern the ways in which the state controls civil society. Giner and Sevilla argue that while institutions and movements which were not sanctioned by the state suffered tight surveillance and repression, the majority of individuals which were not organised were left alone:

"Cautious non-interference with vast areas of social life thus becomes the hallmark of modern despotic regimes, coupled with a keen protection and encouragement of recognised "apolitical" institutions such as the "orthodox" national church and other associations devoted to the control of the means of emotional production, especially of those geared towards popular distraction and the sponsorship of patriotic notoriety in sport."

(Giner and Sevilla, 1980, 205)

These gaps in state control over civil society became wider after the economic liberalisation in 1959, and were increasingly used for the formation of oppositional movements, including the nationalist movement. As far as the state is concerned, it achieved the passive obedience rather than active participation of the subordinate classes. Therefore, it was difficult for popular movements such as the workers' movement or the Catalan nationalist movement to mobilise people who had over the decades become rather apolitical.

Britain, on the other hand, has been a democratic parliamentary state with corporatist features since the second world war, and as such has found acceptance by the vast majority of the people. The British state never had an explicit policy of reducing Scottish distinctiveness, although Chapter three showed that regional policies aimed at reducing at least the economic and social differences between the British regions, including Scotland. A good case can be made for the argument that Scotland grew into a nation only after the loss of independence, because it was after 1707 that the juxtaposition of Gaelic and Lowland culture, and differences in the level of development within Scotland were deconstructed under the British state legislation.

Nairn has drawn attention to the "presence" of the British state, which is based on the revolution of 1688, and which has not experienced any further radical changes. Instead, the state has been able to gradually adapt to changes in the economy and society and to broaden its social basis through a policy of containment and concession. Thus evolved a political system which "both Dukes and dustmen could like, or at least find tolerable" (Nairn, 1981, 51). The strength of the state lies in the relatively unchallenged acceptance of Westminster as the soul of the UK commanding hegemony over civil society in England and Scotland (Nairn, 1981, 375). It is therefore not surprising that the nationalist challenge to the state in the 1970's took the parliamentary road. The SNP's strategy consisted in standing for elections and hoping that the very institutions of the state would bring about independence¹. Foreign observers and journalists expressed surprise about this approach of the SNP Nationalists:

"Almost without exception they thought that the Scottish National Party was at once the nicest and the most totally ineffectual nationalist party they ever had come across. In the sense that they were very nice, but they actually suffered from the delusion that if they won a majority in Scotland, British government would immediately say: "Oh, well, if the Scots want independence, they can have it." And this vastly intrigued other people, particularly people in your own country [West-Germany] brought up in a rather more realistic tradition of politics."

(Jim Ross, interview, 9.8.1988)

Given these differences in the forms of state in Spain and the UK, it is only logical that the relationships between civil society and the state, and between the nationalist movement and the central government, also show great differences. Not only does this mean that the possibility of containment was greater in Scotland and the likelihood of open struggle and radical change greater in Catalonia. It also had an impact on the ways in which the national identity was

¹The idea of a neutral state which does whatever the majority of the people want was also the basic assumption underlying the Labour Party's social-democratic policies of the post-war era. Only here it was assumed that the state could be "captured and turned to socialist purposes" (Hudson, 1990, forthcoming).

politicised, and on the structure and strategy of the nationalist movement. In Scotland, political nationalism was largely institutionalised in parties - above all in the SNP -. In the case of Catalonia, where parties were prohibited until 1976, it surfaced in a broader and more popular movement which relied on spontaneous action and mass demonstrations.

2.2. Consensus, repression, alienation

Tensions in the relationship between state and civil society can give force to nationalist movements, if the hegemony of the state seems to break along existing national boundaries. Collective experiences of alienation, discrimination or repression contribute to this.

In the case of Catalonia, prohibiting the public use of the native language, which had official status during the Republic, was just such an example of collective repression, felt by all members of the nation - whether politically active or not - who were used to communicating in Catalan. The Spanish state attempted to replace the Catalan national identity with Spanish nationalism, and did not try to win sympathies or consent by connecting with the national-popular ideologies² in Catalan society. Even when publishing in Catalan was expanding again in the 1960's, censorship was still applied rigorously to the issue of Catalan nationalism; a reference to the Catalan speaking territory or references to the institutions of Catalan autonomy and to political Catalanism generally could jeopardise the publication of an article or a book (Massot i Muntaner, interview, 29.1.1988).

²National-popular in this context has two meanings. In the first, it is a cultural concept which is applied to culture rooted in the national tradition and popular experience of a specific society. The second meaning, here more relevant, concerns interests and feelings which different social agents, groups, and classes share; the national-popular evokes the possibility of alliances. Both aspects are connected because the cultural is the ground on which a political alliance can be constructed (Forgacs, 1984, 94-95).

The national-popular elements of Catalan identity were repressed, silenced and excluded from the realm of politics, along with the vast majority of the population. Catalans were also excluded from governing. The positions of power in the Franco regime were occupied mostly by non-Catalans, the elites of the regime being overwhelmingly recruited from central and southern Spain³. This practice was in keeping with the pre-republican system of recruiting governmental elites and meant that the Franco regime represented the interests of the traditional upper and middle classes, and only those sectors of the new industrial bourgeoisie which had become part of the establishment in Madrid (Hansen, 1977, 9). Not only did this exclude the Catalan bourgeoisie from participating in government under Franco, but it also brought non-Catalan functionaries to Catalonia who occupied many of the higher echelons of state apparatus there (Jones, 1976, 249; Alba, 1984, 232). From the perspective of the Catalan people, therefore, the Franco regime was a state which imposed its will by force on a politically impotent people (Hansen, 1977, 11), and its representatives in Catalonia who implemented the numerous "organic laws" the regime produced were not from their culture⁴.

In Scotland, the increasing appeal of the SNP to the voters in the 1960's and 1970's expressed dissatisfaction with the government and the two main parties which have monopolised politics in the UK since the first world war. Though the share of voters which favoured independence was a minority and the British political and

³In the higher echelons of the Franco bureaucracy, Catalans were underrepresented, as were people from other peripheral regions (Alba, 1984, 232).

⁴Interviewees maintained that Catalans did not occupy public functions or worked as teachers in the state school sector (Cahner, interview, 11.2.1988), and that "there is no policeman who speaks Catalan" (Ferrer, interview, 22.3.1988). Though these statements do not stand up to rigorous investigation - since not all employees of the public sector were immigrants -, they do reflect a tendency for Catalans not to seek work in the state sector; more importantly, they show the degree to which the state sector was "castilianised" and considered alien by many Catalans.

constitutional framework was still accepted, it was clear to some that alienation from the central government was widespread in Scotland. In his analysis of the Hamilton bye-election in 1967, Mackintosh pointed out that one of the winning arguments of the SNP was based on the "theory that Scotland is governed from London by Englishmen who either do not understand the problems or who do not care" (Mackintosh, 1982, 139). Government was considered as too remote, too complex and difficult to influence. "Capturing the state" turned out to be impossible for Labour. Therefore, shifting power to the periphery through devolution was an alternative with which the Labour government in the late 1970's seemed to satisfy the demands of many Scots.

While the SNP had challenged the assumption that Britain was a nation state, it was left to the Labour Party to put forward an alternative organisation of the state without substantially altering the political framework. Unlike the Spanish state, its British counterpart was able to respond to the nationalist challenge, and to the demonstration of popular alienation, with a strategy which was designed to reassert its hegemony over Scottish society⁵. The precondition was the fact that belief in democracy was not profoundly shaken⁶, and the Scots did not experience any policy of national repression which could have led to an open conflict of the people with the state. As Lambie said, there was just a feeling that "something was going wrong" (Lambie, 7.8.1988). Thus, the nationalist movements threw up rather different constitutional questions. This was, however, not only a consequence of the form of

⁵By adopting a devolution policy, the Labour Party wanted to regain lost ground in Scotland in 1978. Ascherson wrote that the party was "committing almost all their energies ahead to the winning and planning of a Scottish Assembly and its programme" (Scotsman, 7.11.1978, 11). Similarly, the Labour controlled Scottish Office was busy working out a provisional structure for the future Scottish Assembly before it had even been passed by Parliament (Ross, interview, 9.8.1988).

⁶Billy Wolfe (Chairman of the SNP, 1968-78) suggested that in the 1970's the SNP nurtured an unjustified belief in British democracy, thinking that if the Scots really wanted independence, the English would let them go (Wolfe, interview, 25.2.1987).

the state and the impact it had on the people, but also a result of historical processes.

2.3. Constitutional questions

The Catalan nationalist and the democratic opposition movement were not faced with problems of finding a formula which would capture the Catalan desire for autonomy. Since Franco had abolished the **Generalitat** and the **Estatut d'Autonomia**⁷, it was only logical that the restoration of the statutes of 1932 would serve as a focus of nationalist and democratic demands. One of the main reasons for the inclusion of the principle of autonomy in the constitution was the fact that the Catalan opposition forces had agreed on the re-establishment of the Generalitat, which had "disappeared" with the arrival of the Francoist troops (Benet, interview, 17.4.1988). The recognition of the national rights of the Catalans was a major unifying factor in the clandestine opposition from 1969 onwards. The **Assemblea de Catalunya** (1971-77) defined this aim as one of the four basic demands with which the opposition campaigned for popular support⁸. In its "rupture manifesto" of June 1976, the **Assemblea** argued that the precondition for the restoration of the political and national liberty of Catalonia was a global strategy of democratic rupture for the whole of Spain (Colomer, 1981, 22). In the end, however, democracy was a process of transition, brought about by negotiations between the Francoist government and the leaders of the opposition parties, although some degree of mass mobilisation helped to put pressure on the government. The autonomy for Catalonia arrived in a similar way, as section four below will show.

⁷In the Ley de 5 de Abril de 1938 de Derogación del Estatuto de Cataluña, Franco stated that the statute had legally ceased to exist on the first day of the military coup (17.7.1936) (Lluch and Nel.lo, 1984, vol. II, 1115).

⁸The other three demands were: amnesty, democratic liberties and a constitutional parliament.

Although the constitutional aspect of Catalan autonomy seemed relatively straightforward, there were also radical nationalist organisations which were aiming at independence. The most important, **PSAN** (**Partit Socialista d'Alliberament Nacional**), demanded a socialist state of the Catalan countries⁹, but regarded the defeat of the Francoist regime and the establishment of democratic - both political and national - liberties as their immediate goal (Colomer et al., 1976, vol. 2, 115). Therefore, the party participated in Catalan multi-party political organisations such as the **Assemblea de Catalunya** and the **Consell de Forces Polítiques**¹⁰, subscribing to their minimalist demands. Thus, the Catalan nationalist movement's main demand was the restoration of the Catalan government of 1932.

In the case of Scotland, the nationalist movement - while dominated by the SNP - related its perspective on constitutional changes to the pre-1714 status, when Scotland was an independent state. In 1963, the SNP drew up a policy statement which confirmed the party's struggle for independence within the framework of the British constitution. In the opinion of the SNP, the occupation of the majority of parliamentary seats in Scotland would legitimise their demand for independence. Aware of the conservatism of the Scots and the general tendency to equate democracy with Parliament at Westminster, the former chairman of SNP Billy Wolfe said:

"When the people of Scotland give power to the Scottish National Party they must be confident of at least two things - the ability of the Scottish National Party leadership, particularly its Parliamentary candidates, to form a provisional Government capable of being responsible to the people of Scotland in an effective way and, secondly, the people must have confidence in the Party's integrity in relation to its attitude to democracy. In other words, we must continue to give a guarantee, as the party has always guaranteed, that when the people of Scotland vote for

⁹The **PSAN** defined the future Catalan state in terms of cultural boundaries, and therefore included the Catalan speaking part of France, València, the Balearic Islands and Catalonia.

¹⁰The Council of the Political Forces was formed in 1976 and included two representatives of each of the Catalan democratic opposition parties.

independence by voting for the SNP, they know that a thoroughly democratic constitution will be submitted to the people and that a General Election will be held immediately thereafter."

(Wolfe, 1973, 42)

The radical constitutional change at which the SNP aimed had to come through the institutions of the British state, because the constitutional legitimacy of the existing political setup was not questioned in principle, but only in its geographical limits. The SNP wanted a state based on the same principles, but it should be Scotland's own.

Another side of this constitutionalist approach to nationalism is reflected in the SNP's refusal to be associated with other nationalist movements which include military groups, for fear they could be seen as condoning violent means in the struggle for independence (Ascherson, 1986, 9). The SNP's reluctance to step outside a narrowly defined constitutional strategy was highlighted during the internal debate about the Scottish resistance campaign of the '79 Group¹¹ (see Chapter four, section 3.1.iv). Sillars, then a member of the '79 Group, maintained that

"[i]n responding to Scotland's claim of self-determination, Westminster's parliament will always cheat and change the rules, and not hesitate to treat the principles of democracy with contempt. (...) The old, cosy, quiet, parliamentary ways simply have Westminster in charge, delighted to stand democracy on its head by imposing on Scotland a government we did not elect."

(Sillars, 1981, 2)

"Non-violent direct action up to the point of planned mass scale civil disobedience" was an answer which did not find majority

¹¹The traditionalists in the party were opposed to civil disobedience, and the party chairman, Gordon Wilson, stated that his personal principles did not allow him to support any such campaign. Wilson is a lawyer by profession.

support in the SNP for very long¹². However, it was a first sign of more active and direct challenging of state structures.

The alternative to the SNP stance - independence through Westminster - can be subsumed under the concept of devolution advocated by the Labour Party. The devolution bills of 1976 and 1978 foresaw the setting up of a Scottish Assembly while leaving the sovereignty of Westminster Parliament - and its possibilities to override the decisions of the Assembly - untouched. Jim Ross, undersecretary of state for devolution in the Scottish Office between 1975 and 1979, maintained that the Labour leadership and Parliament were not enthusiastic about the idea of changing the state structures.

"Whatever they said in public, their private attitudes were that this was something that they just had to do, and it was highly regrettable, and their objective was that it should be as little difference as possible to the established government in Great Britain. And the whole attitude was that 'British democracy is wonderful, chaps, but we are going to make it ever so slightly more wonderful by having a Scottish Assembly.'"

(Ross, interview, 9.8.1988)

But nevertheless, even though the bills tried to instill confidence that devolution would not lead to constitutional changes, they represented a constitutional change significant enough to encounter vigorous opposition from unionists, who tended to overemphasise the radicalness of the reform¹³. The Queen, too, joined the unionist scaremongers when she expressed her worry about the continued existence of the Union in 1977 (Ascherson, 1986, 11). What

¹²A motion at the Annual Conference in 1981, declaring that "Conference recognises that a real Scottish resistance and defence of jobs demands direct action up to and including political strikes and civil disobedience on a mass scale" was accepted. But only one year later, the '79 Group, the driving force behind the concept, was banned, after bad results in the Regional Elections (Salmond, 1982, 2).

¹³Tam Dalyell's "West Lothian Question" is one example of the kind of constitutional problems thrown up in the 1970's. It concerned the representation of Scots at Westminster after devolution. Dalyell argued that the Scottish MPs at Westminster should be reduced numerically, and their participation in those legislative matters be restricted which did not concern Scotland.

devolution meant and involved was much more open to debate than either the independence option of the SNP or the Catalan statute of autonomy, because there was no previous experience on which the government and the British people could have based their opinions (apart from the Stormont, which had already demonstrated its inability to solve the situation in Northern Ireland). At the end of five years of struggling over the contents and the possible consequences of devolution, the unionist side of the devolution debate registered a victory. Impressed by the range of conflicting arguments against devolution, so many Scots voted against the Devolution Bill, or did not vote at all, that the positive outcome of the 1979 referendum was almost totally ignored¹⁴.

However, the way in which Westminster Parliament and the government had gone about granting Scotland even the limited amount of self-government contained in the devolution bills, helped to undermine confidence in the representative institutions of the British state. At least those who were in favour of Scottish self-government became increasingly doubtful as time wore on that the British parliament would allow Scotland to set up her own representative assembly.

These doubts about the democratic nature of the British constitution have been voiced with increasing frequency since the election in 1983. It was the second general election running that the Scottish voters saw a Tory government being formed despite a clear majority of Labour seats in Scotland. No definitive conclusions can be drawn as yet about the significance of this challenge to the legitimacy of the representativeness of the British government and the democratic nature of the constitutional system as a whole. It seems that these criticisms have strengthened the case for self-government in Scotland. Influential commentators such as Neal Ascherson have called for drastic constitutional changes in order to move power to the people. Looking back at the history of the British state,

¹⁴See Chapter two table 2.3 for the regional breakdown of the referendum results.

Ascherson argues that the English Revolution simply transferred absolutism from the king to Parliament. Without a doctrine of popular sovereignty or a written constitution to which the subject could appeal,


"[t]here is no way in which Parliament can share its absolute power, except by lending it as a loan revocable at any moment - a lesson we in Scotland learned during the devolution debates."

(Ascherson, 1988, 148-149)

A "war against the State is waiting to be fought by a mass 'freedom party' of the Left" to achieve immediate constitutional change which would transfer power to the people (Ascherson, 1988, 156). Demands for self-government for Scotland is seen by many leftist intellectuals as a case in point, part and parcel of the recovery of individual and collective liberties, which have been undermined in a decade of authoritarian Conservative rule. In the political magazine Radical Scotland, Thatcher was even compared to Franco (Fig. 23).

The Scottish National Party has been trying to convert the fading legitimacy of the British government in Scotland into a crisis of the state. The SNP's election campaign in 1987 pivoted around the "doomsday scenario" (New Statesman, 20.3.1987, 15), in which the Scottish electorate would be faced with yet another Tory government despite an overwhelming anti-Tory vote. As this scenario became reality, the deficiencies of British political society was laid open once again. In 1988, the manifesto "Claim of Right for Scotland" suggested that the political opinions of people in Scotland no longer found adequate room for expression in the British state. The first sentence of the document stated that "[p]arliamentary government under the present British constitution had failed Scotland and more than Parliamentary action was needed to redeem the failure" (Constitutional Steering Committee, 1988). The manifesto for a constitutional convention represents an attempt to establish

Fig.23FRANCO-PHILE THATCHER



Source: *Radical Scotland*, Dec./Jan. 1988, 28.

an alternative forum in which Scottish civil society would be able find political expression. In this way, the Constitutional Convention can be compared with the **Assemblea de Catalunya**, because both pursued constitutional reform to achieve national autonomy, and both claimed to be representative of the Scottish people. Like the **Assemblea**, the Constitutional Convention (set up in 1989) involves all political parties who are in favour of Scottish self-government, and has representatives of many institutions of Scottish civil society (eg. local government, Churches, trade unions, etc.).

In conclusion, section two argued that the nationalist movements in Catalonia and Scotland were shaped by the form of the state and its relationship to civil society. In the case of Catalonia, the central state had imposed its power by force, and against the manifested will of the majority of Catalans. State and Catalan civil society were separated by a cultural and political cleavage, because the state repressed Catalan culture and governed Catalonia mostly through Castilians. The Catalan nationalist movement presented a challenge to the Francoist state by the simple fact that it disturbed the reign of political apathy on which the regime was relying. The demand for self-determination undermined several principles which epitomised Francoism, and presented a constitutional challenge. In the case of Scotland, the nationalist movement accepted the legitimacy of the British state institutions. The trust in British democracy was so great that the SNP decided to go the parliamentary road to achieve independence. At the devolutionist end of the nationalist movement, the Labour Party believed that some nationalist demands could be granted within the existing constitutional framework. Only in the 1980's has the nationalist movement in Scotland adopted a more critical attitude towards the British constitution and expressed doubts about the likelihood of the Scottish people to obtain self-government. In this sense, the situation of the Scottish nationalist movement today resembles that of the Catalan movement in the 1970's more than ever before.

In the next section, I examine how changes in the relationship between state and civil society gave rise to more and more conflicts between people and state. As the state interferes more frequently in more aspects of civil society and in the lives of its citizens, it politicises those aspects of social life. One consequence of this process of politicisation are demands by people to take control of their own affairs, and of the activities of the state. In the cases of Scotland and Catalonia, such demands were expressed in nationalist terms.

3. STATE ENCROACHMENT ON CIVIL SOCIETY

Of course, state and civil society do not represent clearly distinguishable, autonomous entities, and what separates them must therefore necessarily be overemphasised for the sake of better understanding. It is mostly in the context of studies of "new social movements" that changes in the state - civil society relationship have been discussed. To what extent nationalist movements can be considered under this category is a question which is open to debate (Melucci, 1988; Touraine, 1985; see Chapter one, section 2.4). Melucci developed this approach to nationalist movements, regarding the recent revival of ethnic-national movements as a combination of social and political movements.

"These movements synthesise the heritage of concern with the national question and the new identity problems posed by the development of complex societies."

(Melucci, 1988, 246)

However, if the new social movements are anti-statist and want to restore the independence of spheres of civil society from the intrusion of state bureaucracy, as Offe suggested (Offe, 1985, 820), nationalist movements cannot be easily included in this category since they are struggling to establish a new state or level of state administration which is closer, more representative and controllable. Indeed, in both case studies, it appears that the nationalist movements were based on rather conventional ideas about the role of the state in a future autonomous society. But on the other hand, there are also indicators that the expansion of state (chapter five)

bureaucracy fuelled demands for autonomy. In assessing the impact of the changes in the relationship between state and civil society on the Catalan and Scottish political discourse, it is suggested below that nationalist movements can benefit from legitimisation crises which derive from the expansion of the state. This expansion occurred both in the sphere of civil society, and in the economic sphere of production, as the following two subsections show.

3.1. Shifts of power between state and civil society

The reorganisation of capitalist societies after the Second World War involved growing state intervention in processes of reproduction and distribution which form part of civil society. This intervention, and the bureaucratisation of many aspects of everyday life which it entailed, have become a source of inequality and conflict, and thus of what Laclau and Mouffe call "new forms of subordination" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 160). The expansion of state bureaucracy shifted the boundaries between public and private and rendered new domains of civil society political. Keane maintains that the growth of state power in the developed capitalist world over the past 50 years fostered the dissolution of the old dualism of state and civil society which was characteristic of the liberal capitalist state¹⁵. State sanctioned policies draw closer and closer to lives of ordinary citizens, and political decision making moves beyond their immediate control (Keane, 1984, 23).

Increasing intervention can give rise to movements which aim for autonomy (fighting manipulation, control dependence and bureaucratisation) in areas of social life affected by state intervention. To some extent, nationalist movements can also be interpreted in this way because they have some concerns in common

¹⁵ In liberal capitalism civil society is defined as a sphere of social relations emancipated from coercive, personal power. The state's function is mainly reduced to securing the unhindered market relations and sphere of reproduction by laws.

which are not "described adequately in the traditional language of class struggle alone" (Rosanvallon, 1988, 215). However, we must bear two things in mind which distinguish nationalist movements from other social movements. Firstly, more than in other social movements, autonomy refers to a specific territory. Secondly, nationalist movements do not aim at autonomy from political intervention in general, but rather from a specific state, and in this sense seek to redefine the boundary between state and civil society.

In looking at the effects of state intervention on the nationalist movements, it is necessary to deal with the two case studies separately. In Britain, state intervention was part and parcel of the Keynesian approach, while in Spain, intervention was used mostly as a tool to keep the population under control.

3.1.i Shifts of power between the state and Catalan civil society

The Franco regime interfered with civil society in an authoritarian manner, abolishing or restricting civil rights, policing the public sphere, censoring books, controlling society through organs such as the sindicato vertical, the Movimiento and the Fascist youth organisation (Frente de Juventudes). It also placed people who were sympathetic to the regime at the top of important institutions such as the Church, the universities, etc.. These acts of intervention resulted in a shift of power to the state. But when the Franco regime decided to integrate the Spanish economy into the international economic system, it was no longer possible to keep people ignorant about the different state - civil society relationships in neighbouring countries. Since Catalonia had a border with France and received a large part of the European tourists to Spain, it had better opportunities than others to notice the differences. From the late 1950's onwards, criticisms, concerning the corrupt bureaucracy and the general lack of interest of the state authorities in the needs of the people, became louder. The uncontrolled growth during the economic boom exposed these attitudes of government institutions and local authorities, which

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prevented town planners and architects from implementing planning regulations. Looking at attempts to plan the development of the city of Barcelona, Naylor observed that existing development plans were never put into practice because the authorities lacked the necessary financial means and will, and above all, a democratic legitimation (Naylor, 1984, 77).

A growing dissatisfaction with a state, who only seemed to intervene for its own good but not for the good of the people, became manifest particularly in the **Associacions de Veïns (AA.VV., i.e. Neighbourhood Associations)** which acted as local pressure groups in the 1970's. In Catalonia, the **AA.VV.** became increasingly politicised and involved in the political struggle for national autonomy and democracy. Directed particularly at the local government level, the **AA.VV.** addressed urban planning and environmental problems, but also voiced concrete political demands¹⁶, campaigning for democratic government structures. By 1976, there were over 100 such **AA.VV.** in the city of Barcelona alone, but the movement had also spread to other towns. The campaigns "**Salvem Catalunya**" ("Save Catalonia") and

¹⁶It should be noted that the **AA.VV.** were a late attempt of the Franco Regime to establish formal links to the people, while at the same time controlling social activities by channelling them into institutions which were approved by the authorities. The Catalan communist party, **PSUC**, was strongly involved in these associations, as one activist remembered:

"The **AA.VV.** were in practice organised by the Communist Party. They represented a very important structure for its clandestine social activities. Because the **AA.VV.** were used to develop political activities, to politicise, and practically all the [Communist] activists were involved in them."

(Ortega, interview, 23.2.1988)

The **AA.VV.** were strong in the residential zones of the middle classes. Professionals who advised **AA.VV.** were often members of the **PSUC**, or at least linked in some ways to the party:

"Since the 1950's there existed terrible planning problems in the industrial belt [of Barcelona], where whole towns were built without proper services, without green areas, etc.. The movements, which aimed at pressurising the government and local authorities to get things sorted out, needed technical and professional groups, and the **PSUC** was the only organisation which provided those people."

(Marin and Tresseres, interview, 15.2.1988)

"**Salvem Barcelona**" ("Save Barcelona") took up issues such as the contamination of the Llobregat river by industry in Prat (Codina, 1976, 27); the "irrational" building developments on the Costa Brava (Marc, 1977, 31); land speculation in Sant Cugat (Luzán, 1977, 33) and in Balaguer (Ballaster, 1977, 30); the deficit of primary schools in Santa Coloma de Gramenet (Madueño, 1976, 29); and against the planned "urbanist monster" housing estate of Sant Joan Despí (Arreu, 1976, No. 6, 30-31). Naylon argued that the **AA.VV.** became a power factor after the death of Franco (1975) and put pressure on government authorities and private interest groups to improve the living conditions of the population (Naylon, 1984, 90). It should be remembered that this movement drew considerable membership and support from the ranks of intellectuals, professionals and industrialists, who acted as advisors and provided facts, figures and alternative solutions. Mismanagement and chaotic growth affected not only the living conditions of the immigrant workers (though these suffered most), but also those of the middle and upper classes. The **AA.VV.** movement therefore united the different classes of civil society against the state, and often also against big business.

While the complaints were mainly directed against local authorities or the state departments responsible for the objectionable policies, the culprits were also seen as the capitalists who benefited from the laws, or from the tendency of the authorities to ignore existing legal regulations. In a situation of great demand for urban land and weak planning authorities, land speculation was rampant and did not go unnoticed (Naylon, 1984, 82). Demands for popular participation in politics were linked in Catalonia with demands for autonomy from a thoroughly corrupt political system. It was therefore argued that a new political framework was called for,

"a framework in which autonomy provides the possibility for a balanced development strategy [and] for the rational investment of public resources into areas of priority (...)."
(Marc, 1977, 31)

Due to the politicisation of the **AA.VV.** through the **PSUC**, the **AA.VV.** constituted a substantial part of the membership in the first years

of the **Assemblea de Catalunya**¹⁷. Later, when the **Assemblea** began to decentralise, neighbourhood associations formed either part of the **Assemblees Democràtiques**, or were involved at local level in the movement for democratic local government (**Ayuntaments Democràtics**). The connection between movements which arose from new demands on the state as a provider of services on the one hand, and the nationalist movement's principal organ in the 1970's, the **Assemblea de Catalunya** on the other, is thus established.

The other area of state intervention which affected the nationalist movement is in the area of Catalan culture. Here, the state was actively intervening in a disruptive and repressive way. As Ribó (the present leader of the **PSUC**) argued in 1977, Franco's efforts to eliminate Catalan language, or to at least confine it to the functions of a dialect in the private sphere, constituted an assault on Catalan values and ideals in the wider sense (Ribó, 1977, 28). From the moment the Francoist troops began to occupy Catalan territory, governmental orders were issued which aimed at removing the language from the public sphere, including Catalan names in civil registers, church services and all written communication (Ferrer, 1987, 180-182). Self-evidently, public functionaries could only use the Castilian language, and could lose their post if they used Catalan (Ferrer, 1987, 186-88).

In the 1960's, these policies were gradually undermined by the cultural revival (see Chapter six), but it was not until the transition period that the repressive laws were changed. Despite campaigns for the return of Catalan language teaching in schools (1966-68)¹⁸, the state made no positive steps to satisfy these demands.

¹⁷In 1972, **AA.VV.** accounted for almost 36% of the 45 member organisations. By May 1977, their weight was diminished to 10%, but in the meantime, the number of associated organisations had grown to 195 (Marcet et al., 1981, 29).

¹⁸See Garcia Grau, J.: "Una enquesta sobre l'ensenyament. Hom vol català a les escoles", **Serra d'Or**, June 1966, 22-24).

(Footnote Continued)

"In fact, it was the Catalan society which started to adopt courageous attitudes and introduced the Catalan language into the education system, particularly in private schools."
(Ferrer, 1987, 203)

The nationalist movement was of course concerned with the re-establishment of Catalan civil culture. This meant that the central state had to be pushed out of the realm of Catalan civil society, and an autonomous Catalan government created which would protect Catalan culture. The **Assemblea de Catalunya** organised a campaign demanding official status for the Catalan language (1973), and the **Congrès de Cultura Catalana**¹⁹ declared that the Catalan language should be fully rehabilitated, arguing that

"[t]he full recuperation of the Catalan language is today a demand which enjoys increasingly strong support by wide sectors of our society, including large numbers of men and women who have migrated from other areas and are now living and working in the Catalan Countries."

(Congrès de Cultura Catalana, 1978, vol. IV, 73)

The connection between lack of democracy and cultural repression is also observable in the censorship practices of the regime. While publishing in Catalan was not explicitly prohibited, it was subjected to censorship and surveillance like Castilian language publications, and restricted in additional ways²⁰. Most of the

(Footnote Continued)

The campaign was supported by practically all the Catalan institutions, from the **Ateneu Barcelonès** to the Barcelona football teams, and exerted great pressure on the schools and the government. In 1970, a law of primary education acknowledged the presence of other native languages in the school curriculum, which opened some limited possibilities for introducing Catalan into the curriculum (Benet, interview, 17.4.1988).

¹⁹The **Congrès de Cultura Catalana** was a movement consisting of 1,500 institutions, enterprises, unions, etc. and 15,000 individual members. It was founded in January 1975 for all Catalan speaking territories and organised public meetings and conferences in order to promote Catalan culture. Its main task consisted the investigation of the state of Catalan culture after four decades of repression, and to outline the path towards normalisation (**Congrès de Cultura Catalana**, 1978, 11-12).

²⁰"Fast" publications such as newspapers and journals did not exist in Catalan, with the exception of **Serra d'Or** which was published by the monastery of Montserrat. Catalan issues which could be interpreted as
(Footnote Continued)

publishers were forced to operate in the grey area of semi-legality, faced with an unpredictable administrative system which treated everything which was not explicitly allowed as potentially forbidden (see Massot i Muntaner, interview, 29.1.1988; Ainaud de Lasarte, interview, 30.3. 1988).

Government intervention in the cultural sphere in Catalonia, therefore, was crucial in encouraging anti-Francoist and pro-Catalanist activities. The regime was actively undermining the basis for its legitimation, which rests precisely in the socio-cultural system (Habermas, 1976, 68-77). On the other hand, it was the failure of the state to intervene on behalf of the well-being of its citizens which brought some sections of the Catalan population to criticise the authorities and demand a different political framework that was democratic and autonomous.

3.1.ii Shifts of power between state and Scottish civil society

In Scotland, as in Britain as a whole, the main changes in the relationship between state and civil society were due to the introduction of the welfare state. This is demonstrated by a recent publication on the state in Britain which begins like this:

"No one in Britain today lives beyond the reach of the state. In its numerous different guises it intervenes in all of our lives."

(Hillyard and Percy-Smith, 1988, 1)

That this can throw up demands about changes in the political structure is illustrated by the findings of the Kilbrandon Commission. It was set up in the wake of the nationalist revival to examine the case for constitutional reform. The Kilbrandon Report saw the expansion of the state as an important reason for devolution tendencies in Britain, and pointed out that 80-90 per cent of the

(Footnote Continued)

remotely political, and particularly those concerning Catalan nationalism, were barred from publication.

questions dealt with in the House of Commons in the 1970's would not have been considered government concern in 1900.

"The cumulative effect of government expansion on people's lives and activities has been considerable. The individual a hundred years ago hardly needed to know that the central government existed. His birth, marriage and death would be registered, and he might be conscious of the safeguards for his security provided by the forces of law and order and of imperial defence; but, except for the very limited provisions of the poor law and factory legislation, his welfare and progress were matters for which he alone bore the responsibility. By the turn of the century the position was not much changed. Today, however, the individual citizen submits himself to the guidance of the state at all times. His schooling is enforced; his physical well-being can be looked after in a comprehensive health service; he may be helped by government agencies to find and train for a job; he is obliged while in employment to insure against sickness, accident and unemployment; his house may be let to him by a public authority or he may be assisted in its purchase or improvement; he can avail himself of a wide range of government welfare allowances and services; and he draws a state pension on his retirement. In these and many other ways unknown to his counterpart of a century ago, he is brought into close and regular contact with the government and its agencies."

(Kilbrandon, 1973, 76)

The expansion of the Scottish Office in Edinburgh testifies to the expansion of state intervention over the past decades. The effects of these shifts of inner state boundaries on the nationalist movement are varied and contradictory.

Although the Scottish institutions are often described as the pillars of the Scottish nation, it is clear that their distinctiveness and separateness from the British state have been progressively reduced as the state took on more competences. According to Brian Turner, the rise of Scottish nationalism is explained with reference to the erosion of the distinctiveness of Scottish civil society in the context of economic decline (Turner, 1984, 175). However, firstly, this erosion was already under way in

the 19th century²¹, and secondly, as Turner claims, this explanation is flawed because with the exception of the Kirk, the institutions of Scottish civil society are elitist, not popular:

"What we have witnessed is not the decline of popular institutions and culture, but the erosion of bourgeois institutions in a situation where the "patrician bargain" has been under considerable threat. (...) The sanctity of Scots law, higher education, administrative institutions and Royal Burghs are not exactly promising sites of mass attachment and popular enthusiasm."

(ibid., 175-176)

The undeniable fact that Scottish institutions generally were not strongly involved in the nationalist movement is, however, not simply reducible to their bourgeois roots which are particularly noticeable in the legal system. Firstly, it must be born in mind that the state took on responsibilities and intervened in the administration of these institutions. Their independence vis à vis the state has therefore become reduced. The huge expansion of employment which is directly dependent on the state (eg. in local government and the education system²²) testifies to this. Chapter four already mentioned the close ties between the Scottish public sector middle class and the state.

In the 1970's debates about the devolution bills (Scotland and Wales Bill, 1977; Scotland Bill 1978), the Scottish universities did not want to be devolved (W. B. Johnston et al., 1977, 48). They were largely assimilated to the English model (Maxwell, interview, 9.2.1987). Neither were the teachers very keen on devolution, and the Church of Scotland played a reactive, rather than a leading,

²¹For example, in 1845, Westminster Parliament changed the framework of Scottish Poor Law which was previously under the control of the Church of Scotland. The schools were also secularised in 1872 and brought under the control of the state, and in 1929, the local government system was also reorganised by law.

²²"Scotland has its own educational system. But the important decisions (school leaving age, comprehensive structure etc.) are taken elsewhere and pressures for assimilation with the larger English system is a pervasive force" (Scotsman, 8.2.1979).

role in the nationalist movement (W. B. Johnston, et al., 1977, 4). As far as Scottish local government is concerned, the president of COSLA (Convention of Scottish Local Authorities) in 1978 advocated a positive vote in the devolution referendum, but many of the newly constituted local authorities were hostile to the idea of a Scottish Assembly which might assume local government competences (Scotsman, 22.10.1978, 10²³). The phantasm of overload - i.e. the tendency of the Government "to provide, to fix, to pay for, to settle everything" (Scotsman, 15.8.1977) -, the perceived remoteness of the government from the people, and the lack of democratic control²⁴ of the ever expanding Scottish Office are contradictory criticisms. But they are all interlinked and the result of the intervention of the State into new spheres of civil society.

But who was in favour of devolution? The professionals and middle classes who owed their posts to the state? While awaiting the Government's devolution proposals after the 1974 elections, Ascherson found evidence that the professions - many of which in the Scottish institutions - were in favour of autonomy. He interpreted this as a sign that the middle-class and professionals were divorcing their desire to control the bureaucratic apparatus from the control of the means of production (Scotsman, 14.7.1975). Whereas in Scotland, more and more institutions became advocates of

²³ Councillor James Anderson, convener of Central Regional Council, predicted chaos and higher local taxation of regions were abolished under a Scottish Assembly territorial reorganisation (Scotsman, 20.2.1979).

²⁴ Pointing out that the Scottish Office should not be singled out as being particularly remote from the citizens, Labour MP Dalyell defended the prevailing structure of administration:

"Are we saying that 150 Assemblymen in Edinburgh would be able to do the job of the Dental Estimates Board, the Historic Buildings Council and the Highlands and Islands Development Board? These are all jobs better done by the experts who sit on these bodies."

(Scotsman, 22.10.1978, 10)

Faced with considering the possibility of letting democratically elected representatives make the decisions, Dalyell chose the cult of professionalisation. This is typical of the centralised planning approach of the Labour Party.

autonomy, the Scottish pillars of nationhood (local government, legal system, education system) were becoming increasingly integrated into the state apparatus, and - at least under the Labour Government (1974-79) - divided over the devolution issue.

Whatever the effects of government intervention on the nationalist movement, it is clear that the movement was not advocating curbing back the state along the lines of the Conservative governments in the 1980's.

While the Tory Government claims to release more and more institutions into the "free" market, the Scottish people are increasingly opposed to "devolution of power" of this type. The nationalist movement in Scotland then and now is not about devolving power to those who can afford it, but rather about making the state more accountable to the people.

3.2. State intervention in the economy

The involvement of the state in the economic system was already discussed in Chapter three. It was made clear that a distinction must be made between the authoritarian intervention of the Spanish state in the economy on the one hand, and the (non-wartime) economic strategies of the British state on the other. In the first two decades or so after the civil war, the Spanish state exercised strong control over the economy to achieve autarchy, and was the driving force in modernising the economy along the lines of developed capitalist countries from the late 1950's onwards. The British welfare state of the postwar period can be defined by the goal of crisis management, involving not only the regulation of the processes of socialisation and reproduction mentioned in the previous section, but also economic policies aimed at minimising the self-paralysing tendencies of privately controlled exchange processes (Keane, 1984, 13). In the Scottish context, increased involvement of the British state in the relations of production and the economic sphere - e.g. through nationalisation of heavy industries (coal 1949; steel 1967), investment aids, tax relief, and various other types of economic planning strategies - produced new

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demands on the state. The solution of each economic contradiction through the state eventually raises new ones, and drives the state further along the road of control. Thus, the post-war era witnessed more active state intervention in the economy precisely at a time of increasing interdependence between capitalist economies (Warren, 1971, 86-88). In a previous chapter, I already explained how increasing state intervention politicised the Scottish economic dimension, and argued that it was because of the prominent role of the state in the Scottish economy that the economy mattered to the nationalist movement (Chapter three, section 3.2).

Based on the analyses in chapters three and four, this section maintains that the nationalist movements did not challenge the concept of state intervention in the economy, but rather pointed out that the central state was not able to make policies which suited the specific economic problems in the national territory; in short, the state was not where the economy was.

3.2.i Links between economic interventionism and Scottish nationalism

Chapter three pointed out that the rise of the SNP began when the credibility of state economic planning was no longer pervasive among the Scottish electorate. The reason was that the promises it involved could not be kept. Mackintosh's reflections on the failures of economic planning showed that some intellectuals' belief in the power of the state and the politicians to influence the economy had started to dissolve. He argued that since the Government had no influence on important forces in the economic sphere, it was unable to find long-term solutions. Its dependency on popular support made this even less likely, because long-term solutions were bound to go against the interests of some social groups. He advocated therefore the limitation of state intervention, saying that

"[i]t would be far better, in my view, if Government more often announced that they would do nothing about certain problems."

(Scotsman, 15.8.1977)

This, of course, is what happened under Conservative rule in the 1980's. In the 1970's, however, there were many signs that people did not question the ability of the state to intervene in the economy in principle. This was demonstrated both by the alternative solution put forward by the SNP, and the reaction of the Labour Party, both of which did not involve a reduction of state involvement. The public debate on devolution and independence focused on the argument of remoteness, suggesting that it was not so much the principle of interventionism, but its quality and the effectiveness which fuelled the demands for autonomy. After the publication of the White Paper on devolution in 1975, James Gilvray (Director of Research at the Fraser of Allander Institute) supported the "shrivelling blast of criticism" (Scotsman, 28.11.1975) in the Scottish press:

"[H]owever meritorious the Government's proposal for the devolution of non-economic functions, these will tend to be ignored if the proposed economic functions do not go some way towards satisfying what John Mackintosh has described as the 'maximalist' solution. To put it in cruder political terms, the White Paper proposals will fail to stem the advance of the Nationalists unless the Government can convince the electorate that the Assembly will exercise significant economic powers."

(Scotsman, 10.12.1975)

The Labour government reacted to Scottish dissatisfaction with the results of state economic planning by offering even more intervention. The Scottish Development Agency (SDA) was Labour's acknowledgment of the fact that Scotland's economic problems needed special attention. But Chapter three already pointed out that the SDA was not geared up to solving the problems in the way expected, or to increase Scottish control over the economic sphere.

The SNP, too, envisaged an increase in state intervention after independence. The SNP's policy paper on post-independence economic strategy envisaged an even greater role of the state in the economic sphere than previously. Not only did it have to repair the damage caused by "economic mismanagement and neglect by successive London governments", but also to lay "a firm foundation for economic prosperity" based on radical industrial restructuring, improved

economic productivity, income policies, etc. (SNP Economic Policies Document, 1975).

In the Report of the Constitutional Steering Committee, state involvement in Scotland's economy is considered inevitable. It maintains that the problem of relative decline of the North had not improved considerably and lastingly, and asks: "Does this mean that the wrong regional policies have been chosen, or that the right policies have been irresolutely applied, or that regional policies can never do more than suppress symptoms of the disease?" It concludes that "past regional policies have proved inadequate because they have been inadequately conceived and executed" and that "for Scotland within the framework of the United Kingdom, strong regional economic policies are essential". When Scotland did well economically under the Union (between 1770 and 1870), the Report argues, it was at a time of far less intrusion from foreign capital and London governments. Although the history of government intervention is judged less than positively, the Report does not present an alternative. But it goes against the economic principles of the present neo-conservative central government (Habermas, 1985, 153-156) by advocating a Scottish Assembly which would be able to devise policies which are suited to Scotland's needs (Constitutional Steering Committee, 1988, 8-9).

The upshot of government intervention in the economic sphere in Scotland is that it effectively helped to unify the nationalist movement. This is because economic conflicts and problems involve at least to some extent the state, and therefore assume the air of a conflict between people and the state. They are no longer only class conflicts. As the discussion of industrial struggles in Chapter three (section 2.2.iii) showed, this can lead to a reinterpretation of industrial struggles as conflicts between national civil society and the state, which receive widespread popular support and help to fuel the nationalist struggle.

In Catalonia, the links between state, economy and nationalism were constructed in a different way, because the Francoist state was not a welfare state. Catalan nationalism can be seen at least in part as (chapter five)

a reaction of civil society to the failure of the central state to cope with the social contradictions whose roots lie in the capitalist mode of production. As in the case of Scotland, the nationalist movement (or the political parties which formed part of it) did not envisage less state intervention, but rather the contrary.

3.2.ii Economic interventionism and nationalism in Catalonia

Chapter three (section 3.2) maintained that state involvement in the economy was stronger during the dictatorship than ever before. Two main influences on the Catalan economy were mentioned: firstly, the effect of state intervention on Catalan industry through the **Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI)**, and secondly, the repression of the working class through the **Sindicato Vertical**.

However, despite an inflated state bureaucracy, the pattern of growth during the economic boom period was not in any way guided by government policy (Flós et al., 1978, 187). Waldmann suggested that Catalonia's economic growth after 1955 was not supported by the state, but rather happened despite it. The central state was seen as a parasite, draining capital away from Catalonia²⁵, subsidising the development in other regions - or rather, the private enterprises of those sectors of the ruling class which were well connected in government circles - and leaving Catalonia with a substandard infrastructure (Waldmann, 1984, 183-184). The call for control over Catalan resources and the ideology of self-help have been strong, particularly in the ranks of conservative nationalists ever since the 1960's, and are still part of nationalist rhetoric today. They

²⁵Trias Fargas calculated a Catalan annual deficit of 32 - 41 million pesetas between 1968 and 1971. Only 50 % of the money taken from Catalonia was reinvested in Catalonia (Cañellas et al., 1975, 152). (Trias Fargas is a leading politician of **Convergència**. His family background portrays an upper middle class nationalist tradition. His grandfather was a founding member of the **Lliga Regionalista**, and his father was an activist of **Acció Catalana** during the Second Republic (Cañellas et al., 1975, 139).

are an expression of the old resentments against a state which does not represent Catalan interests, but takes advantage of Catalonia's advanced state of development in the interest of a political class which was mostly based in other Spanish regions.

But there was also a reaction against the state from the working class. It was argued above that the Workers' Commissions, which constituted the main strand of the workers' movement, and the workers' struggles became increasingly politicised in the 1970's (Chapter three, section 3.4). One main reason was the fact that the **Sindicato Vertical**, into which the workers and employers were compulsorily integrated, was under state control, and any other, independent, workers' organisation was illegal. State control over the working class did, of course, not only apply to Catalonia, but to the whole of Spain. However, since Catalonia was one of the most industrialised regions, its effect was felt particularly strongly in Catalonia.

However, from the mid-1950's onwards, the **Sindicato Vertical** began to move under the grip of the dictatorship. For the first time in 1955, the **SV** promised to fight for better working conditions and wage increases, in an attempt to increase its credibility among its compulsory membership. In 1958, collective bargaining was introduced. Nevertheless, the performance of the **Sindicato Vertical** remained severely constrained by its role in the political and economic system. Because workers' organisations outside the **SV** were impossible to establish, the oppositional movements slowly developed within the **SV**.

"It was a well-known fact that the only way to make an impact on the workers' movement was through the **Sindicato Vertical**. They had it under firm control, the Francoists. It was a very dangerous area, and therefore they operated with great caution and [made sure] they kept it tightly controlled. At that time, the only possibility to promote the workers' consciousness lay within the syndicate. The main task was to create consciousness (...), and this was to a certain extent possible within the [structures of] the **Sindicato Vertical**."

(Ortega, interview, 23.2.1988)

Labour conflicts in the increasingly tense political climate of the late 60's and the 70's were no longer only directed against the employers, but happened in defiance of the **Sindicato Vertical** and the state administration. Therefore, there was an inbuilt political component in industrial struggles during the dictatorship²⁶. Discontent with state institutions was directed by the Communist Party towards pro-democracy and pro-autonomy demands. Thus, the repressive policies of the Franco regime in the field of industrial relations made the workers' movement more inclined to feel solidarity with the nationalist cause, which was directed against a common enemy, the Francoist state.

As industrial conflicts were sharpening in the 1970's and the workers' organisations were sliding out of the control of the state, the Catalan employers also became aware that the Francoist state no longer served their own interests. A different, more caring state was now needed. It was even acknowledged in the more progressive quarters of the bourgeoisie that the workers needed organisations, structure and leadership in order to be fully integrated into Catalan modern society (Pujol, 1980, 80). And lastly, cooperation with the labour movement was necessary to cope with the economic recession which began to affect Catalonia in the early 1970's. In the aftermath of Franco's death before the first democratic elections, the political party manifestoes of the centre and the right in Catalonia which represented mostly the bourgeoisie and the upper middle class advocated egalitarian distribution of wealth and

²⁶The SEAT strikes in the first years of the 1970's are an example for the increasingly political confrontation between the state and the employers on the one hand, and the workers on the other. Miguélez argued that

"the interferences in the negotiations, the presence of the public sector in the firm, and the political repressions of the more militant workers gave the industrial disputes the aspect of confrontation with the regime itself. The continuing conflicts converted wage demands into political demands."

(Miguélez, 1978, 193)

a welfare state²⁷ (Colomer et al., vol. I, 69; 115; 171-173). All the parties from the right to the left which participated in the nationalist movement in Catalonia demanded state intervention in the economy, and their proposals orientated themselves more or less along Keynesian principles.

The evidence presented in this section supports a now familiar argument that "the institutional differentiation between socio-cultural and economic processes on the one hand, and political processes on the other, which was characteristic of the West in the nineteenth century, has largely ceased to operate in our own" (Pocci, 1978, 121). The result is legitimisation problems for the state. What is more, the nationalist movements were able to exploit these problems of legitimisation.

3.3 Legitimation problems of the state

In Scotland, the post-war state sought legitimacy "through acts of rule that assist the economic system in producing an ever increasing flow of goods and services for the consumer", thus lending private concerns public significance (Pocci, 1978, 134). The inadequacy of the state to steer and improve the Scottish economy therefore diminished its credibility. The rising level of demand, which is proportional to the growing need for legitimisation, is not satisfied with rewards (Habermas, 1975, 73²⁸).

²⁷ Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, which came to be the party of the Catalan bourgeoisie, said:

"The economy must be organised for the benefit of the people with the help of planning and state subsidies to those economic sectors and establishments which condition the nation's economic and social life in an important way."

(Colomer, et al., 171)

The party manifesto suggested nationalisation and worker's participation as possible ways of gaining public control.

²⁸ "Because the economic crisis has been intercepted and transformed into a systematic overloading of the public budget, it has put off the mantle of a natural fate of society. If governmental crisis management
(Footnote Continued)

Since the British welfare state intruded in the cultural system as well as in the economic sphere, the boundaries between the political and the cultural spheres shifted in such a way that cultural activities previously taken for granted have fallen into the area of administrative planning. This had the effect that new areas of life became politicised and led to new demands.

Jim Sillars' description of his canvassing experiences in Govan in 1973²⁹ can serve as an example for the effect these developments have on the legitimization of the state:

"Women electors calmly discussed with me the problem of the rats which ran around the closes and backyards and their fear that one would attack the children. (...) Another took me outside to show how, with a huge pool of undrained water covering the whole backyard, she and her neighbours had to walk across a bridge of old bricks. A man pointed to the rubble of broken glass, old cans, and other rubbish in the streets and to a burned-out car lying at the corner."

(Sillars, 1986, 42)

Disenchantment with the government, or the political system as a whole, comes as a result of the rising demands on the state, and the difficulties of fulfilling them. But while the welfare state has ceased to be a viable solution to the socio-economic problems of late capitalist societies, the frontiers of the state can not be rolled back (Keane, 1984, 27). The Scottish nationalist movement advocated a solution to this fundamental contradiction which consisted in redrawing the boundaries between civil society and state by moving the latter closer to the former. It argues that political mobilisation, and more public and democratic control over one's own state structures can solve the problems of legitimization.

(Footnote Continued)

fails, it lags behind programmatic demands **that it has placed on itself**. The penalty for this failure is withdrawal of legitimization. Thus, the scope for action contracts precisely at those moments in which it needs to be drastically expanded". (Habermas, 1975, 69)

²⁹ Jim Sillars was then an MP for the Labour Party. At the time, the Conservative Party was in government, but Govan was traditionally staunchly Labour, and the local government was under Labour control.

An Opinion Research Centre Poll in December 1975 suggested that 43% of the poll wanted to have far-reaching autonomy or independence for Scotland, while an additional 27% wanted to keep the present political system provided that more decision making was transferred to Scotland (Scotsman, 16.12.1975; Table 5.1). But the up and down of opinion polls and the tendency to associate nationalism only with the SNP make it difficult to assess the real popular support for autonomy in Scotland. In comparison with Catalonia, and considering the democratic liberties in Scotland, it remains remarkable how little public support was shown spontaneously. This was partly due to the fact that people were able to express their national identity through the ballot box. But there was also a general impression that the Scots did not find the arguments of the nationalists convincing enough.

The Franco regime was also confronted with rising demands concerning the quality of life and the effects of the economic crisis which started to be felt in 1973 (Triunfo, 8.2.1975 and 15.3.1975). Organisations of professionals in Catalonia joined the opposition in defence of a more democratic society where professionals' interests can be safeguarded (Triunfo, 29.3.1975), and employers began to find the Francoist state a hindrance to their activities. Among middle and upper class Catalans, there was resentment about the central state's neglect of public services and infrastructure, and about the political class with business interests which benefited from the corrupt system, and which traditionally excluded most of the Catalan bourgeoisie (P. Nadal, interview, 27.1.1988³⁰). In various social

³⁰"Someone who denounced a case, a problem which went against the interests of Catalonia, of a locality, or of Barcelona, would be faced with a stone wall. In my family, for example, I was involved in a case where we defended our town against some barbaric activities which were going on: the sale of a green zone by the municipal authority. But a green zone cannot be sold. Very well. We denounced (...) all these barbaric activities via the official complaints procedures. Denounced them to the authorities, and this was in 1973. And in 1973, we found that the civil governors, the housing department, the whole administrative system was one monolithic block. And everything was due to "orders from Madrid". (...) Therefore the growth of Catalonia and of

(Footnote Continued)

groups, therefore, the inability of the state to create the kinds of services and conditions appropriate for a developed industrial society was recognised, and seen as a good reason for opposing the regime openly by joining the Catalan nationalist opposition. Since the culprit for mismanagement of public resources was identified as the central government and its territorial state apparatus, self-government was regarded as a possibility for setting up a political structure which was untainted by the atrocities of the dictatorship. The **Assemblea de Catalunya** became the spearhead of the struggle for political change and Catalan autonomy.

In the last years of Franco, the **Assemblea** was subjected to state repression, but this only served to mobilise more people. When 113 participants of the **Assemblea's** tenth clandestine meeting were arrested and kept in the prison of Barcelona for several weeks in 1973, it was publicised through the grapevine. The fact that many of the arrested were known political activists and members of the middle class facilitated widespread concern among the more influential groups of Catalan society. Thus, repressive reactions of the Franco regime to the nationalist opposition in this period served to undermine the legitimacy of the state even further. The alienation of the Catalan middle class from the regime played an important role in this context (see Chapter four, section 4.2). Ortega argued that

"aquí en Catalunya era más fácil estar en la clandestinidad que fuera de Catalunya. Porque siempre había un cierto

(Footnote Continued)

Barcelona from the point of view of urban planning, and the whole development of the Costa Brava, was a disaster. (...) They destroyed the ecology, the urban landscape, the beauty of the coastline, the beauty of the towns. This of course happened with the consent of the civil governors, housing officials, etc. because if so many things go wrong, it was due to some gentlemen who were corrupt, either because they were part of the system or because they were afraid of a sector which was powerful, wealthy and influential. It was a system of corruption, of corruption through and through. (...) Furthermore, there was a total lack of control from a fiscal point of view. There was no taxation, and everyone did what they wanted. But this was a bill which had to be footed one day, because if things are badly made in the first place, they soon start rotting."

sector de la sociedad que apoyaba de alguna manera. No sé querían comprometer, esto no, pero tampoco te denunciaban."³¹

(Ortega, interview, 23.2.1988)

Asked whether he meant the bourgeoisie, he became more concrete:

"Yo diría más bien de la pequeña burguesía. Eran con este sentimiento nacionalista, sobre todo frente al franquismo, y aunque a ellos se les iba bien, económicamente les iba bien, no estaban de acuerdo con el franquismo, no todos, o un sector de esa burguesía, y tenía esa ventaja que no te denunciaban. Si sabían que había un piso que era sospechoso, en donde se hacían actividades clandestinas, no iban a denunciarlo a la policía; algunos sí, pero normalmente no. Simplemente callaban y lo ignoraban, y te dejaban hacer. Eso era la actitud."³²

(ibid.)

Although throughout Franco's dictatorship mass manifestations were of limited size and generally rare, it was in Catalonia where such events were more likely to occur than in other regions of Spain (apart from the Basque Country). If political demonstrations were rare, mobilisations around cultural issues were not uncommon in Catalonia. They included large concerts of the Catalan protest singers of the Nova Cançó³³, campaigns in favour of Catalan at school, and the Congrès de Cultura Catalana, launched clandestinely

³¹"Here in Catalonia, it was easier in the underground than elsewhere. Because there was always a certain sector of society which gave its support. They did not want to stick their neck out, but at least they did not denounce you."

³²"I would rather say the bourgeoisie. They had this nationalist sentiment, particularly vis-à-vis Francoism, and although they were doing well - economically, that is -, they did not agree with Francoism, at least a sector of the bourgeoisie didn't, and this had the advantage that did not denounce you. When they realised that there was a suspicious flat, where clandestine activities were going on, they would not inform the police. Some would, but not normally. They just kept quiet and ignored it, and they let you carry on. This was the predominant attitude."

³³The Nova Cançó is a Catalan folk song movement which emerged in the early 1960's and became a sort of symbol of Catalan cultural revival. Singing in Catalan was a political act in itself, but singers like Raimon, Maria del Mar Bonet and Lluís Llach also made political protest songs which became popular at political rallies and manifestations in the 1970's (Pradas i Camps, 1968, 31-33).

in 1975 and involving many thousands of members and institutions. After Franco's death, large-scale demonstrations took place over the demands of the **Assemblea de Catalunya**.

"When the dictatorship disappeared and the timid liberalisation policies began, a broad popular, democratic and autonomist movement emerged from clandestinity; this surprised those who were ignorant of the intensive political and syndical unitary front which had developed in the Principat [Catalonia] despite the repression, particularly since the appearance of the **Assemblea de Catalunya**. The large popular demonstrations on the first two Sundays in February 1976 [testified to this]."

(Benet, 1980, 285)

Benet mentioned the unauthorised demonstrations in February for "freedom, amnesty and autonomy" in which tens of thousands took part. The demonstration on the National Day of 1977 was even larger. More than a million people took to the streets of Barcelona with Catalan flags and party banners, led by the elected members of the two chambers. It was the biggest demonstration for autonomy ever seen in Catalonia, and the front page of the Diario de Barcelona read: "United Catalonia demands the Statute" (Diario de Barcelona, 13.9.1977). These mass demonstrations by Catalans put the central government under pressure to change. In contrast to Scotland, the Catalan nationalist movement had a relatively clear source of legitimation for its demands which was based on Catalan culture and the institutions of Catalan civil society (see Chapter six). This was one reason for the greater intensity of the nationalist struggle in Catalonia. In contrast, Scottish nationalism lacked a simple solution to the problems arising from the existing relationship between state and civil society, and the weakness of Scottish culture made it difficult to present it as a source of socio-cultural legitimation for nationalism.

Given the differences between the two nationalist movements in terms of the state they were facing and the legitimation problems they were addressing, it comes as little surprise that the strategies of both sides in the nationalist struggle also varied in Catalonia and Scotland. The next section looks at the way in which the struggles developed, and argues that the popular front approach of the Catalan

movement was more successful than the parliamentary approach of the Scottish nationalists.

4. STRATEGIES OF THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND STATE RESPONSES

4.1 Catalonia: unitary strategy and power vacuum

Many different parties and institutions of civil society joined to form a united front against Francoism and in favour of autonomy. Since the beginning of the 1970's political nationalism was represented by the **Assemblea de Catalunya**, which held the claim of representing the Catalan people, although considerations of formal representation were obsolete then. It embraced a wide enough range of political parties, organisations and popular movements, particularly on the left of the political spectrum, and apart from basic principles of democracy and autonomy for Catalonia, no specific ideas about the political future after Franco were elaborated. The **Estatut d'Autonomia** of 1932 served as an alternative to the Francoist state, and the presidents of the Republican Generalitat, Macià, Companys and the exiled Tarradellas were called upon as the symbols of the movement (Benet, 1978, 100). Since there was no way to express one's political opinions through the ballot box, popular manifestations and extra parliamentary activities and institutions were the common carrier of the message of the **Assemblea de Catalunya**.

Unitarianism prevailed in the nationalist movement until the first general elections, although the first differences between the different sectors of the movement had already become visible. For example, the nationalist party of the centre, **Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya**, favoured negotiations in high places to organised pressure through mass movements, and therefore initiated the creation of the **Consell de Forces Polítiques de Catalunya** (Catalan Council of Political Forces) in December 1975. This shifted the emphasis from popular struggle and participation to negotiation

through (often self-appointed) representatives which were mostly middle class intellectuals.

However, publicly the unitary struggle was still on. In 1977, the recently (January 1976) formed **Partit Socialista de Catalunya**³⁴ (**PSC**) suggested that the Catalan nationalist opposition should go into the first democratic elections on a unitary platform. It argued that "whatever the political and ideological objectives or class interests of individuals or groups, it is an absolute priority to establish the institutional framework [**Generalitat** and **Estatut** of 1932] and the political power required to fulfil the national will in order to enable the people to decide freely" (Sobrequés, 1988, 20). This quote shows just to what extent the Catalan Socialists had tuned to the nationalist discourse, and come to regard autonomy as a more urgent issue than social reform or rupture³⁵. This unitary platform for the first elections (June 1977) was the **Entesa dels Catalans**. Although the centrist **Convergència** and the government party **UCD** did not join the **Entesa**³⁶, it nevertheless gained 12 out of 16 senator seats³⁷. In the elections to the Spanish parliament (**Cortes**), which took place on the same day, the parties of the Left

³⁴I.e. the Catalan socialist party which was later to merge with the Catalan wing of the Spanish socialist party to form the **PSC-PSOE** of today.

³⁵Isidre Molas, a leading figure in the **PSC**, explained that the strategy of the socialists then coincided in practice with that of the Communists. They wanted to form a progressive alliance with the **PSUC** and **Convergència** in opposition to the **UCD** which was in government in Madrid (Molas, interview, 21.3.1988).

³⁶**Convergència** did not want to be in a pact with the Communists, because this would mean that the right-wing Catalans would refuse it their support. Unitarian Catalan politics located **Convergència** on the centre-left of the political spectrum (Molas, interview, 21.3.1988). With increasing dissociation of the party from the Catalan left during the second half of the 1970's, it succeeded in increasing its share with the aid of the conservative vote.

³⁷The other Catalan parties, who did not want to make an alliance with the communists, formed another electoral alliance, **Democràtica i Catalunya** and got two senators, and the **UCD** one. In the Senate, all Catalan representatives, except for the **UCD** senator, formed a group and threw their weight behind the demand for autonomy.

won a resounding victory in Catalonia; meanwhile in the rest of Spain, the post-Francoist **Unión del Centro Democrático (UCD)** got the majority of the vote and became the government party (Table 5.2).

After the 1977 elections, the elected representatives devoted their efforts to negotiating with the central government about the re-establishment of the Generalitat under Tarradellas. But by limiting itself to this aspect of political change, the Catalan nationalist movement handed over the initiative to the central government under the conservative **UCD**. It was the Spanish president Suárez and the president of the Generalitat in exile, Tarradellas, who became the main protagonists in the provisional re-establishment of the Generalitat. Tarradellas was not only a symbol for the continuity of the Generalitat, as some Catalan parties claimed, but he was permitted by the leaders of the nationalist movement to become the only political figure who could lay claim to legitimacy in Catalan politics. In the summer of 1977, Tarradellas was brought back from exile by the Suárez government.

While many interviewees and commentators from the whole political spectrum argued that the unitary and moderate approach of the Catalan opposition was responsible for the central government's decision to cave in and provisionally restore the **Generalitat** under Tarradellas, Jutglar provided a more critical opinion. He noted that after the general elections of 1977, public participation in the nationalist struggle declined, both in demonstrations and in elections. He saw the reason for this in the increasing division between the Catalan "political class" and the people. The politicians were so obsessed with unitarity and negotiated solutions that the more radical contents of the Left's political programme "fell under the table". The activities behind the scenes which surrounded the establishment of the provisional **Generalitat**, and the subsequently emerging party political struggles for hegemony, were not reported to the public. Instead, all the parties involved maintained the myth of national unity. Many negotiations with the **UCD** government, the elaboration of the Spanish constitution and of the Catalan statute of autonomy were all conducted in absolute secrecy, without grass roots debates and participatory mechanisms.

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This lack of democratic mechanisms in the political reform process heralded the beginning of popular disenchantment with the new democracy (Jutglar, 1982, 300-302).

Without asking their supporters, Catalan political parties from right to left abandoned their claims to change through political rupture. Rather than pressing for the abolition of all Francoist institutions and laws, because "democracy must base itself on institutions created by the people and on laws made by a democratic parliament elected by the people" (Colomer *et al.*, vol. II, 1976, 135), they settled for a negotiated transition to constitutional democracy. Even the Communist party leadership decided in 1977 to join in the negotiations for a reform of the state (Clemente, interview, 21.3.1988).

Thus, the "people" became the audience and the political activists in leading party posts the actors on the political stage with the curtains drawn. The *Unión del Centro Democrático* was able to present themselves as the "men who made democracy and autonomy possible"³⁸. In the eyes of a member of the provisional Catalan government in the late 1970's, it was a quiet, well-behaved revolution (Pi-Sunyer, interview, 8.4.1988). But critics like Josep Benet claim that the strong position of the Catalan opposition in the period of transition could have been used to achieve a greater degree of autonomy and more financial concessions from the central state. precisely during the transition period (Benet, interview, 17.4.1988). Although the new Statute of Autonomy received overwhelming support from the electorate in the 1979 referendum (Moreno Fernandez, 1986, 191; see Chapter two, Table 2.1), the autonomous structures of government it created did not provide the conditions for people to become actively involved in governing

³⁸This slogan epitomised the change in the political climate. The same men had only a couple of years before been referred to as Francoists. Now, they were post-Francoist reformers, instrumental in the transition to democracy.

themselves. Instead, the Catalan **Generalitat** and its organs became a new bureaucracy in the 1980's.

4.2. Scotland: parliamentary cul-de-sac to devolution

Meanwhile, the demands for autonomy and independence were primarily channelled into electoral support, first for the SNP, and from 1977 onwards increasingly for the Labour Party. From the beginning it was obvious that the Scottish public regarded the Parliament at Westminster as the proper place for pursuing self-government and/or finding a way to save the legitimacy of the state. As events showed, the state proved amazingly capable of dealing with this challenge without delivering autonomy, at least in the short term.

The Labour Party managed to control the nationalist tide by make concessions, as the U-turn of the Scottish Labour Party under the influence of the British party leadership demonstrated in 1974 (Sillars, 1986, 45). Secondly, the state engaged in delaying tactics. The Scotsman, which was rather sympathetic to the nationalist movement, argued in a leader in 1975:

"For at least eight years - since the Hamilton by-election in 1967 - devolution has been a lively issue, one very hard for professional politicians to neglect. Yet that is a feat which English Ministers and MPs are quite capable of achieving."

(Scotsman, 29.10.1975)

Time-wasting, calls for a "great debate" and a referendum on the devolution issue, lack of urgency and commitment on behalf of the government, and demands for "the same for England" were accusations the pro-devolutionist Labour back bencher John Mackintosh made, and he asked angrily:

"With 80 per cent of the electorate wanting either independence (20 per cent) or more devolution (60 per cent), with 30 per cent having voted SNP last year, with a majority of the Scottish Labour Party at all levels in favour of devolution and the Conservatives limping along behind, what more can be done to demonstrate to the London-based establishment that this demand exists and will not evaporate?"

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(Scotsman, 24.11.1975)

However, the Scottish people did not take the issue into their own hands and feet, as there was no mass demonstration or popular campaign worth entering the historical records. The first devolution bill was so weak and incoherent that it did not have popular or party political support and fell through in 1977. The second bill, launched in autumn 1977, only got through the Commons with considerable concessions to the group of anti-devolutionist Labour rebels, and intensive pressure on them³⁹.

The SNP, on the other hand, no longer seemed to be on the crest of the nationalist wave (Scotsman, 26.10.1977). Its presence in the House of Commons damaged its popularity in Scotland (Wolfe, interview, 25.2.1987).

The referendum result, and the way it was treated in Scotland and in government circles reflected the deep divisions among the political parties and the lack of imagination of the nationalist movement as regards to ways of mobilising the Scottish people. The lessons from the 1970's for today's nationalists in Scotland are that the movement needs a body representing all sections of Scottish civil society which could express the strong feelings in favour of self-government. Since the establishment of the Constitutional Convention in 1989, such a body exists, but it is too early to judge on its performance. The Constitutional Convention is an implicit acknowledgement that the assembly is unlikely to come through the parliamentary way (Jim Ross, interview, 9.8.1988). But for extra-parliamentary action, Radical Scotland argued, "there'll have to be some serious public campaigning to raise support (...). This will require a type of campaigning which a) attracts the broadest possible support, and b) enables public feeling to be expressed

³⁹In a front page article headed "Callaghan ultimatum to Labour's rebel MPs - Devolution or General Election", the Scotsman reported that the prime minister had "clearly embarked on a high-power campaign to put tremendous, if not unbearable pressure on potential rebels" (Scotsman, 13.10.1977), at a time when opinion polls put the Scottish labour vote second to the SNP.

spontaneously, rather than channelled (controlled?) through existing formal structures" (Radical Scotland, 29, Oct./Nov. 1987, 9).

If the actual political trends indicate a departure of the Scottish national movement from the parliamentary road - tried and failed in the 1970's - and the antagonism between Scottish society and the British state has grown to the extent suggested above, then it would be possible to see a coalition movement in favour of self-government similar to that observed in Catalonia in the 1970's. Whether it will have the same limitations is another question.

5. CONCLUSION

The influence of the changes in, and the expansion of, the state over the past decades on the nationalist movements in Scotland and Catalonia was the topic of this chapter. It has been argued that the differences between the Spanish dictatorial regime under Franco and the British democratic state were vast, and the motives and aims of the national movements were to a large extent shaped by the nature of the state they were confronting. Not only the contents, but also the form of the movements were strongly influenced by the prevailing political regime.

In the Catalan case, a unitary opposition movement organised the political struggle for autonomy, and this demand was inextricably linked to the struggle for democracy. In Scotland, the SNP was the main vehicle for expressing discontent with the central state and the desire for more autonomy for Scotland, putting pressure on other political parties to "do something about" the growing nationalist tide. While demands for autonomy constituted a direct threat to the basis of the Spanish state and implied a break with the structure of the Franco regime, devolution was a concept which could be accommodated in the existing political structures in Britain without too great a shift of power away from the centre.

However, the development of capitalism in Spain slowly changed the parameters which defined the edifice of the state. More demands were

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made on the state, and its failure to intervene to redress the inequalities and the hardship caused by the economic boom and the subsequent crisis in the 1960's and 1970's mobilised even those sectors of Catalan society to political action against the state which economically benefited under the dictatorship. Failure to act on behalf of the well-being of citizens was in contradiction with the ways in which the state interfered in the socio-cultural sphere, repressing the Catalan language and culture, and in the political sphere, repressing political opposition and anti-capitalist class organisation. An autonomous government in Catalonia was therefore regarded as a way of getting rid of an inefficient, corrupt and repressive state regarded as alien to the Catalans, and a symbol for a democratic alternative which would solve the country's problems.

In Scotland, the crisis of legitimation of the state was of a different kind, brought about by the failure of the welfare state to solve all those problems which it had promised to solve in the 1940's and 1950's. Demands for closer control over the activities of the state and more popular participation in decision making processes concerning the tasks of the state were important arguments in the devolution debate, whereby the nature and degree of popular participation and self-government were not redefined in radical terms.

As far as the response of the state was concerned, it was noted that the democratic British state had more options available to defuse and weaken the nationalist ground swell. Taking time and exhausting all possible paths of parliamentary democracy (and bureaucracy) to delay any decision were just two examples. The Spanish state - in the grip of an authoritarian leadership and with an entrenched, corrupt bureaucracy - was less flexible, especially when it became obvious that the nationalist movement in Catalonia had a lot of popular support. Nevertheless, the post-Francoist Suárez government succeeded to some extent in taking the radical edge off the movement by exploiting the lack of democratic structures within it.

With respect to the development in the Scottish nationalist movement after the referendum, the most significant aspect is probably the (chapter five)

continuous erosion of legitimation of the - widely regarded as authoritarian and undemocratic - Tory government in Scotland. The call for self-government has become louder and more widespread since the 1983 elections (Table 5.3). Over the recent years the nationalist movement in Scotland has adopted some of the strategies used by the Catalan national movement and resorted increasingly to extra parliamentary forms of popular mobilisation. The very recent establishment of a unitary opposition organisation, which is claiming to represent Scottish civil society and to voice its demand for self-government, is another step in the slow process of erosion of the government's legitimation in Scotland.

TABLES OF CHAPTER FIVE

Table 5.1: Preferred alternatives for running Scotland as a whole
(per cent)

OPINION	July/August 1970	May 1974	December 1975
Leave things as they are at present	6	14	11
Keep things much the same as they are now, but make sure that the needs of Scotland are better understood	19	20	16
Keep the present system but allow more decisions to be made in Scotland	26	24	27
Have a new system of governing Scotland so that as many decisions as possible are mad in the area	24	23	19
Let Scotland take over complete responsibility for running things in Scotland	23	18	24
Don't know	1	1	3

Source: Opinion Research Centre Poll, in Scotsman, 16.12.1975.

Table 5.2: Results of the Spanish parliamentary elections, 1977
(Per cent in Catalan provinces and Spain)

SPAN. PARTIES CAT. PARTIES	UCD	AP Conviv	PSOE PSC	PCE PSUC	Pacte	EC	UDC	Other
PROVINCES								
Barcelona	15.1	3.1	30.5	19.4	15.2	4.7	5.3	6.7
Girona	18.0	3.2	24.2	10.0	26.8	2.5	5.5	5.1
Lleida	18.6	4.2	11.3	9.3	18.6	5.8	7.3	-
Tarragona	27.1	5.9	22.8	16.4	14.3	-	5.8	5.9
SPAIN	48.0	4.8	33.1*	5.4	2.8	*	-	5.9

* The results of the Catalan parties PSC and EC are included in the figure of the Pacte Democràtic.

Source: Diario de Barcelona, 17.6.1977.

Table 5.3: "Discussion is once more going on regarding the setting up of a political Assembly for Scotland. Do you think the need for a Scottish Assembly is greater or less than it was five years ago [1979]?" (in per cent)

Replies	Total	SNP	Labour	Alliance	Tory
Greater	54	76	64	53	29
Less	14	3	9	21	31
About the same	15	10	10	18	22
Don't know	17	11	17	8	18

Source: System Three Opinion Poll September 20-25, 1984, in Radical Scotland, 12, December/January 1985, 6-8.

Chapter six:

**THE POLITICS OF CULTURE:
CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS AND INTELLECTUALS
IN THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS**

1. INTRODUCTION

One of the arguments used in the previous chapter was that culture plays an important role in the legitimisation of a state. If a state denies and undermines the cultural structures and traditions of its subjects, it can lead to the erosion of its legitimacy. This was the case with the Franco regime in Catalonia, where the prohibition of Catalan as a public language politicised everyday activities which under "normal" circumstances would not have been regarded as political. The nationalist revival began as a cultural movement which aimed at liberating the public realm of Catalan civil society from the influence of the state. Since the Francoist repression of Catalan culture affected the lives of the majority of Catalans, the political opposition against the regime was able to count at least on the passive support of all social classes. Chapter four has explained the active participation of several sectors of the middle class and the bourgeoisie in the Catalan unitary opposition by reference to the strong Catalan cultural identity which characterised them. The availability of a distinctive culture, which could serve as a socio-cultural basis of legitimation, kept the nationalist movement together (until the first elections) despite the variety of political projects that were floating around within its ranks.

In Scotland, such a strong and distinctive culture did not exist. Whatever cultural differences there existed between Scottish and English civil society, they were not considered as a basis of legitimation by the Scottish nationalist movement. Therefore, the above mentioned factor which helped to mobilise and unify the Catalan movement was only a peripheral concern in Scotland. This surely accounts to some degree for the internal divisions within the Scottish nationalist movement, its confused sense of direction, and the lack of powerful popular manifestations for self-government. In Scotland, it was left mostly to the elected politicians to sort it all out.

This chapter looks in more detail at the role which culture played in the process of nationalist politicisation and the struggle for

legitimation, and to the key agents in nationalist movements, the intellectuals. The term "culture" does not only describe the intellectual and imaginative products of a particular society, but more generally the meanings and values which guide social practice, and which are expressed in institutions and ordinary behaviour (R. Williams, 1961, 41-42). In this definition, culture and hegemony can be taken to mean virtually the same thing. Raymond Williams regarded hegemony as "a culture which has also to be seen as the lived dominance and subordination of particular classes", but which constitutes a sense of reality for the people because it expresses the meanings and values that are reproduced in everyday life (R. Williams, 1976, 110).

This view owes much to Gramsci, who recognised culture as a central aspect of hegemony. He conceived of intellectuals as those people in a given society who exercise the functions of hegemony. Intellectuals create and disseminate ideologies, sustain, modify and alter the modes of thinking and behaviour of the masses. In order for popular support or consent to be durable, the intellectuals must be part of a national-popular culture, or, in Gramsci's words, the intellectuals must come from the people, and know and sense their people's needs, aspirations and feelings¹. Gramsci argued that without this link between popular feeling and intellectual knowledge, there is no history and no politics. Any action of historical dimension can only be carried out by "collective man", i.e. it presupposes the creation of cultural-social unity, for which a large number of agents with different interests are prepared to form an alliance on the basis of a shared world view (Gramsci, 1983, 257). The historical and sentimental bonds between intellectuals and people can also be described as the national identity of the

¹This would explain the importance of Romanticism in the 19th century wave of nationalism. According to Gramsci, Romanticism assumes a special relationship between intellectuals and the people (Gramsci, 1985, 205). In Catalonia, it was under the influence of Romanticist literature that the cultural basis of Catalan nationalism was laid. The political movement then built on this "national reality", a term with which Catalans describe the social practices and organisation which distinguish Catalonia from the rest of Spain.

intellectuals (Gramsci, 1971, 20). Their activities tie them into a determined culture and civilisation, which makes them more likely to develop or preserve a national consciousness. The language is probably the main tie, because people write, learn, preach and generally conceive of their environment in a determined language. Many academic studies of nationalism therefore consider intellectuals as the key social group in nationalist movements (Anderson, B., 1983; Hroch, 1985; Nairn, 1977; A. D. Smith, 1982). Nationalist movements are political movements in which the function of culture as a unifying social bond is particularly obvious. This is heightened in those cases where language differences exist, or where, as in the Catalan case, a national language is repressed.

National culture is reproduced in institutions of civil society, i.e. in those organisations which are situated between the individual and the state, such as schools, clubs, the media, the church, etc.. This is also true for those cultures which are not official, although, in such cases, the institutions are more remote from the state, and tend to be of a private nature. In fact, precisely the lack of acceptance of cultural values and traditions by the state promoted in Catalonia the creation of an extensive network of institutions in which these traditions were cultivated. Thus, in cultural institutions provide interesting information which helps to assess the role of intellectuals in the nationalist movement, and to find out what kind of culture is presented as national and by whom. For the purpose of this thesis, it is sufficient to pick out a few institutions of which it is argued that they had an important function in the nationalist movement.


The strong presence of a national language makes a big difference to nationalist movements, because it is the main element of a culture and a key manifestation of nationality. Although Catalan was not the official language in Catalonia for much of modern history (except during the Second Republic when it was co-official with Castilian), it remained the language of the people throughout (Termes, 1986, 15), and therefore also the medium of communication for many intellectuals. Catalan is spoken not only by a majority of the inhabitants of Catalonia, but also in the surrounding areas, such as

(Chapter six)

the province of Valencia and in the Balearic Islands (Fig. 24). Under the repressive conditions of the Franco regime, the Catalan language became a unifying link between the different social groups which came to participate in the nationalist movement. Scotland, on the other hand, demonstrates that language and culture in the narrow sense are not necessarily the main nucleus of a nationalist movement. Most Scots use the language of the British state, and therefore share the English and British cultural heritage. Gaelic, the dominant language in Scotland up until the 16th century, has all but disappeared. Most Scottish intellectuals regard English as their language, and only a few of them are focusing on Scotland's indigenous languages.

This chapter will demonstrate that culture plays a very different role in the Catalan and the Scottish nationalist revival. In Catalonia, we are faced with a strong and distinctive culture which has been a very conscious part of civil society since the end of the 19th century. The repression which Catalans suffered under Franco due to their cultural distinctiveness has failed to eradicate Catalan culture. Instead, it became politicised, and in the 1960's, Catalan language and cultural institutions came to epitomise the national struggle against the Franco regime. Thus, here the cultural movement was leading the political movement for self-government and became intertwined with it. As an example of the links between the cultural and the political revival of Catalan nationalism, I look at publishing houses, which were particularly significant institutions in the 1960's. Many intellectuals who were involved with the revival of Catalan publishing also played important roles in the leadership of the nationalist movement and of the opposition parties. Since the publishing houses exerted their influence mostly on middle class people, it is also necessary to consider more popular and working class institutions in order to examine the links between culture and politics in the working class. For this reason I conclude the section on Catalonia by analysing the role of the Football Club Barcelona (F. C. Barcelona) in the nationalist politicisation process.

Fig.24:CATALAN LANGUAGE AREA



Source: Atlas de Catalunya, 3rd edition, 1981

LEGEND

Oriental Catalan

-  *Rossellones*
-  *Transition zone*
-  *Central Catalan*
-  *Balearic*

Occidental Catalan

-  *Northeast Catalan*
-  *Transition zone*
-  *Valencian*

Boundaries

-  *Dialect boundary*
-  *Orient-Occident boundary*
-  *Language boundary*
-  *State boundary*

In the Scottish case, many observers have argued that the political movement has led the cultural revival, rather than vice versa. Scottish culture since the Union is regarded as deformed and degraded by indigenous intellectuals, and modern nationalists have been trying to separate the cultural from the political. As McCrone claims, they prefer a nationalism without the encumbrance of heavy cultural baggage (McCrone, 1989, 172). Section three examines what this baggage consists of, and which parts of it have been accepted, or rejected, by the nationalist movement. The critical attitude of Scottish intellectuals towards the Scottish cultural heritage has often been matched with similar scepticism about political nationalism. Difficulties in acknowledging, and identifying with, Scottish popular culture has weakened the nationalist movement and restricted the role of the intelligentsia within it. Only recently has the slow revival of Scottish indigenous culture over this century become openly discussed and appreciated.

2. SYMBOLS OF CATALAN IDENTITY: THE CATALAN LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

In order to grasp the central role of Catalan culture in the nationalist revival, we have to step back and adopt a historical perspective. Chapter two pointed out that the establishment of the Franco regime cut short a process of cultural reconstruction which had involved several generations of Catalans. By the end of the 1930's, the Catalan culture was firmly rooted in civil society, and therefore, the Francoist repression which followed had the effect of cementing it even more. This was not an inevitable process, but rather depended, to a large extent, on the attitude of the Catalan intellectuals, as the next subsections argue.

2.1 The repression and politicisation of Catalan language and culture under Franco

The repression of Catalanism after the Spanish civil war (1936-39) demonstrated that Catalan autonomy had a deeply hostile reception

among many Spaniards, and triggered off fears of a breakup of the state. In his analysis of the press and political literature, Benet concluded that

"One of the main reasons, and one of the fundamental aims of this war was the intent to annihilate the national personality of Catalonia, her language and culture, and the abolition of the moderate autonomous government which the Second Spanish Republic had granted the Catalans."

(Benet, 1979, 89)

The Franco regime did everything to remove the symbols and products of Catalan culture from the public sphere: changing Catalan place names to Castilian², confiscating statues of prominent Catalans from public places (Benet, 1979, 349-350), refusing to accept Catalan personal names in birth certificates, prohibiting Catalan folklore dances, destroying Catalan books in public libraries and prohibiting their production and sale, placing loyal Francoists at the top of cultural and educational institutes, and prohibiting the use of Catalan in public. Thousands of intellectuals were forced to leave the country, and it was no longer possible to use Catalan as a language of culture and science as it was banned from schools (Benet, 1980, 146-147). Thus, after the cultural boom of the 1930's, suddenly there was no more sign of Catalan culture left in the early 1940's. For most of the subsequent years of the Franco regime, many types of cultural activity were clandestine in Catalonia. The comprehensive campaign of repression of a language which was widely used as an official language affected many Catalans. The shared fate of having the "wrong" culture became a source of solidarity irrespective of social class (Benet, 1978, 16), the language itself a symbol of Catalan identity, and, most important of all, Catalan culture was elevated into a quasi political issue.

The Catalan language thus passed into the private sphere, became the spoken language of the Catalan family which was passed on to the

²To mention just a few examples, a boulevard named after the Catalan architect Gaudí was given the name of the 1920's dictator General Primo de Rivera, the road "Autonomia" was changed into "Unidad", etc. (Benet, 1979, 252-253).

next generation, but no longer learned properly. After the period of the most stringent repression was over, the anti-Catalan regulations were relaxed to some extent, and the authorities more prepared to turn a blind eye on purely cultural activities. Max Cahner, who was a prominent figure in the Catalan cultural revival from the late 1950's onwards, commented on the developments after 1945:

"The model according to which the regime was now operating was to say, "alright, it is an impossible thing, an utopia, to suppress Catalan; it is a language which is used by the people, and it cannot be extinguished. What we **can** do is to transform it from a national language into a **regional** language and culture". [...] So, it was alright for some priests to write poems, for some gentlemen to write rural novels, to engage in folklore activities ...; in short, all this was now permitted, and the aim was to transform Catalan into a regional language, like those in France. [...] They decided to reduce the Catalan language to a language of intimacy, familiarity, rural environment, memories, etc.. But for science, economy, for earning a living, for the academic world, and above all for politics, meetings and mass events only Castilian was to be used."

(Cahner, interview, 11.2.1988)

Censorship was one of the most important instruments in this endeavour of rendering the Catalan language irrelevant. The following subsection focuses on the way in which censorship affected Catalan culture in the publishing sector.

2.2 Censorship practices

Publishing was submitted to censorship throughout the Franco period, and in Catalan as well as Castilian, although over the decades its application underwent changes. These developments have not been studied sufficiently to draw definitive conclusions³, but some general comments can be made about them.

³It is only now that censorship material of the first two decades of the Franco regime can be consulted and analysed, and there are still restrictions of access to some of that material (Massot, interview, 28.2.1988).

The period is roughly divided into three phases, with the last fading into the transition period. The 1940's and 1950's are defined as an era of heavy restrictions, particularly the first 5 to 6 years of the 1940's until the new political balance of power after the end of World War II produced the first changes in the Franco regime. In the case of Catalonia, the production of Catalan books was almost reduced to zero because the regime decided that it was no longer a language of culture. At the beginning of the 1960's, in the wake of the new economic policy of the regime, a degree of liberalisation of the censorship took place without fundamentally changing the premises on which it was built. After Franco's death, many restrictions fell away, although selected items were still being withdrawn until the Suarez government abolished censorship completely⁴.

The ideological, political and moral censorship was applied to Castilian and Catalan publishing alike, and in the first phase in particular, this manifested itself in the scarcity of political, philosophical and social science writing. The national theme, first widely defined as anything published in Catalan and then more narrowly defined as the Catalan national question, was an additional taboo for the Catalan language areas. Even when more books were allowed to be published, themes such as Catalan history, nationalism, and Catalanist politics remained severely censored or prohibited until the transition period. Expressions such as països catalans (Catalan countries) were forbidden, as was any discussion of Catalan autonomy.

The censorship practices were not usually founded on clear-cut laws, but were the result of a complicated mixture of decrees and orders, personal attitudes of ministers and general directors in charge at different times. The frequent changes in the political micro climate also influenced them. This created a situation in which everything

⁴Although the Spanish constitution of 1978 denies legitimation to these censorship laws, they are still existing. According to Massot, they have never been abolished (Massot, interview, 29.1.1988).

that was not allowed was in principle forbidden, with most activities taking place in a grey zone of semi-legality established through practice.

The Church played a privileged role in this system, because their publications were exempted from civil censorship until the 1966 law (an ecclesiastic censorship existed within the Church). This explains the important role of the Church in the Catalan cultural revival⁵, because it was one of the few places which were relatively free of state intervention. The autonomy of the church was guaranteed by the **Concordate** (an agreement between the Vatican and the Franco regime) in 1953 which restored the judicial privileges of the Church (abolished with the First Republic) and reaffirmed the independence of the Church as a "perfect society" (Hermet, 1986, vol. 2, 239).

In the wake of the new Press and Printing Law of 1966, some new practices were introduced into the censorship system in order to rationalise it⁶. But for most of the Catalan publishing houses which had sprung up in the 1960's, very little changed (Edicions 62, 1987, 38-39). The Ministry of Tourism and Information or the provincial governors were still able to interfere in their activities, withdrawing their books, enforcing changes or closing them down altogether.

An important distinction was made by the regime between books on the one hand, and journals and newspapers on the other. The censors of periodic publications were different people, usually of a higher

⁵Massot notes that in the first years after the civil war, the only Catalan publications were religious books published by confessional institutions under the authority of the Church (Massot, 1979a, 92).

⁶Officially, this law abolished censorship altogether, changing the name of "previous censorship" to "voluntary consultation". But in practice, it only rationalised the censorship methods. Massot said:

"In practice it was a system of control. The theory however was magnificent, because in theory, the censorship did no longer exist."

(Massot, interview, 29.1.1988)

educational standard and with a political background (Cahner, interview, 11.2.1988), and scrutinised more thoroughly the political contents. The different purpose, style, distribution and readership of the periodical publications gave them a greater political significance. Catalan newspapers and journals were generally forbidden, and could only be published clandestinely or under the protection of the Church. Only the Catalan Communist Party was strong enough to support a clandestine Catalan language magazine over a long period (Nous Horitzons), and Serra d'Or is the only example of a major Catalan journal which appeared under the name of a religious institution.

Thus, due to state intervention, the reproduction of Catalan culture was severely curtailed. Even when the Franco regime had accepted that it would be impossible to eradicate the language, it still pursued policies which aimed at restricting the social and public functions of Catalan language and culture. Since the reasons for this were political, the struggle of Catalans to prevent the degradation of their culture also assumed a political dimension. The next part is concerned with the role of civil society institutions and intellectuals in the cultural revival. Although it is commonly accepted that the takeoff of the Catalan cultural movement was around 1960, it is clear that the fight against state repression had already begun with Franco's victory in 1939.

2.3 Cultural revival: The role of intellectuals and institutions

The cultural revival was possible because the majority of Catalans continued using their Catalan mother tongue in private, and because a semi-clandestine infrastructure based on private initiatives and the Church emerged where previously a Catalan public infrastructure existed. This included cultural associations such as the Omnium Cultural, which organised Catalan language and history courses and

teacher training⁷; private schools which taught Catalan after hours, and churches where mass was held in Catalan. The Church based Scout movement also had Catalanist tendencies, and therefore became an important "alternative" education system which allowed Catalan middle class families in Barcelona to avoid the Francoist youth organisation (*Frente de Juventudes*) (Chapter four, section 4.2.iii). Other institutions, such as the excursionist societies and the local (comarcal) history associations had existed before the Civil War and were reactivated after the anti-separatist purges of the early 1940's.

The Catholic church played a significant role in the revival. It was mentioned in the fourth chapter (section 4.2.iii) that it was sympathetic to the conservative, small town roots of the Catalan nationalist movement in the 19th century. The Lliga Regionalista was close to the Catholic Church, and the foundation of the UDC in the Second Republic as a moderate Christian-democratic party continued this close relationship in a more democratic form⁸. The monastery of Montserrat displayed a particularly strong affinity with Catalan culture, as Massot suggested in his book on the history of Montserrat which is subtitled A Hundred Years in the Service of Catalan Culture (Massot, 1979b). The Catalan government in the Second Republic did not share the anti-clerical mood of some sectors of the republican, socialist and anarchist movements, but could not prevent the bitter conflicts which drove many clerics into the Francoist zone of the Republic or into exile. In Franco's Spain, the Catholic Church was one of the main pillars of support for the regime, a fact which did not leave the Church in Catalonia unaffected. Nevertheless, the history of Catalanist sympathies in

⁷For a social background of *Omnium Cultural*, see chapter three, section 3.3.ii.

⁸It has been argued that a specifically Catalan Catholicism developed under the influence of the industrial revolution which fused with the regionalist movement in the early 20th century. Catalan Catholicism in the early decades of this century was described by analysts as "expansive, tolerant and optimistic", which was seen as a consequence of the nationalist revival" (Carrasco Calvo, 1985, 439).

the Catalan Church proved sufficiently strong for the lower clergy to become instrumental in the cultural revival. There were compelling reasons for the Church to help restore the Catalan language, because otherwise it would have become too distant from the people and unable to carry out its hegemonic function.

In the "dark period" of the 1940's and 1950's, the cultural opposition needed the Church as a protective umbrella. Small groups like Grup Torres i Bages, Congregaciones Marianes, Acadèmia de la Llengua Catalana, and Comissió Abat Oliba⁹ were part of this small, middle class Catalanist movement which was closely linked to the Catalan Church and held together through personal connections. It is an inward looking movement, closely knit and provincial, with a limited political horizon. In this early stage of the retrieval of Catalan culture, publishing Church leaflets in Catalan was regarded as an important step in the struggle for Catalan culture, as was the dancing of the sardana¹⁰ in front of churches (evidence from interviews; Manent, 1971, 36; Hermet, 1986, vol. II, 270-271). Little was left of the Catalan cultural boom of the pre-war period. Francoism functioned like a filter, leaving only the most folklorist elements of Catalan culture: the Scouts, excursionism, the sardana, Montserrat (Marin and Tresseres, interview, 15.2.1988). As we will see in section three, a similar process of folklorisation occurred in Scotland, only over a much longer period, and therefore with more damaging results.

In the 1950's, the monastery of Montserrat became increasingly interested in the predicament of the Catalan language. This concern was nonpolitical in the first place, but under the conditions of the Franco regime, Montserrat was - often unknowingly - protecting not

⁹The Comissió Abat Oliba prepared a religious festival at Montserrat in 1946-47, which was to involve the whole Catalan nation. Josep Benet, who later became one of the best known representatives of the **Assemblea de Catalunya**, was involved in the organisation. According to Massot i Muntaner, this festival initiated the re-catalanisation of the monastery (Massot, 1979a, 176; see also Manent, 1971, 35-38).

¹⁰The sardana is a Catalan national dance.

only Catalan culture, but also the Catalan political opposition (Massot, 1979, 170). The monastery took the responsibility and sponsorship for the Catalan language journal Serra d' Or, which remained the single most important platform of Catalan intellectuals until the 1970's. Since the Church did not have to submit to state censorship, it was predestined to be a main source of Catalan language publications, and indeed of any written material which fell outside the ideological framework of the Franco regime (Cahner, interview, 11.2.1988).

The Second Vatican Council (1959) radicalised the lower levels of the church hierarchy, most of whom were from a Catalan background¹¹. Amongst other things, this gave a massive boost to those who had been fighting for the right to preach in the language of the people, which in many parishes was Catalan. A few years later, the abbot of Montserrat, Escarré, wrote an article to the French paper Le Monde, complaining that he had been prevented from holding a religious ceremony in Catalan for the radio, and stating that the regime impeded the development of Catalan culture. He went into exile soon after. However, the event was a sign of a marked deterioration in the relationship between the Franco regime and the Catalan Church, in which the main problem was the status of Catalan culture.

Montserrat also played a role in rekindling christian-democratic political organisations during the later stages of the Franco regime. The decimated ranks of the UDC (Unió Democràtica de Catalunya) always maintained close contact to the Monastery, and some groups such as the Grup Torres i Bages and the CC (which stood for Christ and Catalonia), have also been close to this, in the 1950's and 1960's relatively progressive and Catalanist, sector of the Church (Fabre i Huertas, 1981, 54). Politically, these groups did not play a significant role under Franco, but their members were

¹¹ Many parish priests were of Catalan origin, although in the episcopacies of Lleida and Tortosa, this was less so. On the other hand, most bishops were Castilian, although in the 1960's, popular campaigns put pressure on the Vatican to appoint Catalan bishops (Hermet, 1986, vol. II, 357-388).

active in the, far safer, cultural ground (Marin and Tresseres, interview, 15.2.1988). Only in the mid-1970's did these groups become the seedlings for the new nationalist party of the centre-right, the CDC.

The 1960's opened a new chapter in the history of Catalan cultural revival. The cultural activities multiplied and expanded in scale. They involved mainly younger intellectuals which had grown up under Franco, but had learned Catalan at home and, in many cases, been educated in the above mentioned independent Catalan institutions. This most significant phase of cultural Catalanism was linked to the economic liberalisation and growing prosperity of the country (see Chapter three, section 3).

When in the mid 1960's the Catalan linguist Badia i Margarit investigated the state of the Catalan language in Barcelona after 25 years of repression and marginalisation, he found that the language was still very much alive. It was more widely used among the older generations, but also enjoying a lot of support among the younger ones who had been educated under the Franco system. Immigrants who had no opportunity to learn Catalan in schools demanded that they should be taught the language, as this would help to integrate them into Catalan society (Porcel, 1970, 20-21). Thus, in the atmosphere of economic boom, those who were occupying the lowest ranks of Catalan society regarded the Catalan language as important for social mobility (see Chapter four, Table 4.5). Between 1966 and 1968, campaigns for Catalan at schools attracted widespread support, even from the highly popular Barcelona football clubs (Benet, interview, 17.4.1988).

In one of numerous private conferences of Catalan intellectuals and businessmen in 1966¹², Benet claimed that Catalan culture was in a

¹²The "Primeres Jornades d'Estudi" were concerned with the state of Catalan culture and held clandestinely in the house of Fèlix Millet in
(Footnote Continued)

state of transition after having survived the most severe and persistent persecution in Catalan history. According to Benet, this survival was the sole achievement of the Catalan people, and in particular the intellectuals - writers, teachers, university lecturers - who despite economic and social pressure had remained faithful to their language. But equally important was the support of "some men from our business world" who

"had the lucidity and the courage to fulfil quietly their duty in the hour of need by applying their financial resources and enthusiasm to the task of keeping the language and the culture of the country alive. These men knew to remain faithful to a tradition of¹³ sponsoring which had already made possible our Renaixença" (...)."
(Benet, 1980, 146)

In chapter three, this phenomenon of cultural sponsorship has already been mentioned in a different context (Chapter three, section 3.2.iii). In order to describe in more detail the connections between the cultural movement, political nationalism, and the nationally conscious sectors of the middle and upper classes, I have chosen the Catalan publishing sector as an example. There are several reasons for this choice. Firstly, the publishing houses were a particularly dynamic sector of the cultural revival. Secondly, they represented a political project, namely to re-establish the Catalan language as a normal vehicle of communication. Thirdly, the books published in Catalan in the 1960's and early 1970's constituted a break with the intellectual and cultural isolation which had characterised the Catalan culture in the previous decades. Fourthly, the publishing houses were a nucleus of convergence for intellectuals of different ideologies who found a common denominator in their anti-Francoist and Catalanist stance. In

(Footnote Continued)

January of 1966. The participants came from the Catalan cultural and business world, such as the writers Salvador Espriu, Albert Manent, and Joan Triadú; the academics Jordi Carbonell, Emili Giralt, and Joaquim Molas; the publishers Castellet and Verdura; and Catalanist businessmen Jordi Pujol, Lluís Carulla and Fèlix Millet.

¹³The Renaixença was the Catalan cultural revival in the second half of the 19th century (see Chapter two, section 3.2).

this sense, they were quasi-political institutions for the emerging anti-Francoist opposition which later found its expression in organisations such as the **Assemblea de Catalunya** (1971-77). Finally, the publishing activities provide a good example for the relations between politicised intellectuals and the Catalan business community.

2.4 The Catalan cultural revival in publishing

2.4.i The situation before 1960

Apart from clandestine publishing activities such as **Edicions de Mitja Nit**, Antologia or Occident, and the publications of religious books through the Church, there was only one important Catalan publishing house in Barcelona, **Selecta-Aedos**. Cruzet, its owner, set it up in the early forties with capital he had accumulated with his Barcelona bookshop. Cruzet had spent the time of the civil war outside Catalonia, and was therefore not a political suspect in the eyes of the regime. He got a publishing permit for a novel by Verdaguer in 1941¹⁴ after lengthy negotiations and using personal connections in the Madrid government circles. Political connections and other, financially based, ways of lubricating the rusty doors of the Ministry of Information and Tourism which was in charge of censorship were frequently used by other publishers in later years.

In 1946, Cruzet succeeded in getting a publishing licence which legalised his enterprise. In fact, the time of the founding coincided with a slight change of policy in the perception of the Catalan problem by the regime, which dispatched a new civil

¹⁴The novel of Verdaguer, and several others in the early 1940's, had to be published in the antique Catalan which preceded the normalised grammar of Pompeu Fabra. With this rule, the authorities tried to impose an archaic image on the language which suited their political aims.

governor¹⁵ to Barcelona province. His task was to gain the sympathies of the indigenous intellectuals, and to exercise moderation in his approach to cultural issues in order to prevent the Catalan language from becoming a weapon for Catalanist and other left-wing opponents of the regime (Massot i Muntaner, 1979a).

While other classical and religious texts had already been published in Catalan elsewhere, *Selecta* was the first publishing house which had a determined project (Massot i Muntaner, 1979a, p. 94). It consisted in making the writings of well-known Catalan authors available to 'the people, i.e. to prevent Catalan literature from being collectively forgotten. Cruzet therefore planned to publish the collected works of Verdaguer, Maragall, Costa i Llobera, Rusiñol, Sagarra, López-Pico etc., all of whom were writers of the 19th century Renaixença and the turn of the century. Later, contemporary writers were added to the programme, but overall it was severely limited in several respects. For example, the publication of translated books was made impossible by the censorship practices. Nonfiction was limited to relatively noncontroversial topics such as the traditional music, landscape and travel descriptions, as well as religion. The first cultural-political volume appeared in 1955¹⁶.

Given the narrow definition of culture underlying this publishing house, the readership reached by the publisher was limited in size and in terms of social class. Judging from the editorial catalogue, the books would appeal to sectors of the cultured bourgeoisie. Therefore, the censorship was less rigorous, because this kind of publishing activity was not undermining the general government policy of castilianisation of Catalonia. The editions were usually below 3,000¹⁷, and the number of books published up to 1960 was only

¹⁵Bartolomé Barba Hernández

¹⁶Ferrater Mora's Les Formes de la Vida Catalana, which was first published in Chile in 1944.

¹⁷A poll conducted in 1961 among several publishers of Catalan books revealed that the best-sellers reached 6,000 or 7,000 copies, but
(Footnote Continued)

around 300. Nevertheless, between 1952 and 1962, **Selecta** was the most important publisher in Catalonia. When "Biblioteca Selecta", its most successful series, celebrated the publication of the 300th volume in 1962, Josep Pla, one of **Selecta's** most prolific writers, reminded the assembled intelligentsia that the publishing house was created in the most repressive years of the Franco regime, "at a time when our literature was becoming a mere historical record" (Pla, 1964, 39). Thus **Selecta** can be described as a first step in the cultural reconstruction, whose main achievement was to get the Franco regime used to the existence of Catalan written language. In the 1960's, the new publishing houses were politically and culturally more ambitious, and interested to reach a much broader public.

2.4.ii The publishing sector after 1960

a) Serra d'Or

The first significant change in the Catalan cultural realm was the appearance of the journal Serra d'Or in 1959. Under the Franco regime, newspapers and journals were regarded as being politically dangerous, and subjected to far more stringent censorship than books. The presence of Catalan newspapers or journals would have militated against the essence of government policy on Catalan culture, as it would have upgraded the status of the language. Therefore, no newspaper in Catalan was ever allowed to appear, and restrictions on periodicals were so severe that many were forced into the volatile existence of underground press. The main reason why Serra d'Or was able to operate was the protection it had from Montserrat Abbey.

(Footnote Continued)

that each single edition did not exceed the limit of 3,000 (Serra d'Or, 1961).

Its origins lie with two small newsletters related to the monastery¹⁸, which were merged and restructured by Ramon Bastardes and Max Cahner. The former had connections with Montserrat through the Scouts, and Cahner became involved because he realised that the Church provided the best cover for Catalan culture: "We took over Germinabit only in order to make politics, of course" (Cahner, interview, 11.2.1988).

Since the journal was the first of **general interest** to appear officially in Catalan in the post-war period, it needed a wider perspective than the other journals published by the church. The editorial and a section of the journal was dedicated to religious themes and mostly written by the monks of Montserrat. The rest of the magazine was organised by Cahner and Bastardes, who created a team of leading Catalan intellectuals to take charge of the different sections of the journal¹⁹. Serra d'Or was a project aimed at undermining the policy of the regime to relegate the Catalan language to the provincial, private, folklorist realm. Therefore, it was important to reach a high level of quality, and to cover the whole spectrum of newsworthy material (Cahner, interview, 11.2.1988).

Social and political criticism of the regime was not voiced openly in the journal, and particularly in the early 1960's, the political

¹⁸These were the newsletter of the employees of Montserrat Abbey, Serra d'Or, and the bulletin of the society of former choir boys of Montserrat (Unió Escolània de Montserrat) which was called Geminabit and founded by Josep Benet in the mid-1950's.

¹⁹In the early 1960's, Alexandre Cirici was arts editor, Oriol Bohigas editor for architecture, design and town planning, and the writer J.V. Foix was responsible for the literature section. E. Artells was the specialist on Catalan linguistics, Duran i Sempere for history and archaeology, and Jordi Carbonell for theatre. Serra d'Or had extensive reports about activities in the smaller towns and comarques of Catalonia as well as the Catalan communities in French and Latin American exile, which in the first period were compiled by Jordi Pujol. It also had reports on politics under a section called El món concret (the real world) which were edited by Max Cahner, Ernest Lluch and Josep Benet, and columns dealing with the economy (Ernest Lluch) and geographical issues (Enric Lluch).

articles more often than not dealt with foreign countries which were less sensitive than home news. However, the concern of the progressive Catalan middle class with the underfinanced social infrastructure of the country and, more specifically, its inability to cope with the wave of immigration is reflected in Serra d'Or (October and November issues of 1962; see Chapter four, section 4.1.ii). Towards the end of the decade, the articles became more explicitly political, e.g. expressing support for the emerging **Comisiones Obreras** in the syndical elections of 1967. With respect to the Catalan political situation, the articles soon expanded from literature and language issues to cover aspects of Catalan history such as the **Solidaritat Catalana** in Valencia (Cucó, 1963), the 50th anniversary of the Catalan Mancomunitat (Benet, 1964), and the regionalist period of the early 20th century (Benet, 1968; Solé-Tura, 1968). The journal also participated in the campaigns pressing for Catalan bishops, Catalan language teaching at schools, etc.. While anyone who was in support of Catalan autonomy and culture could contribute to the journal, whatever his or her political stance, the censorship regulations had to be taken into account. The ultimate responsibility rested with Montserrat which officially published Serra d'Or, although in practice the journal was produced and printed independently of the monastery. Therefore, the editors of Serra d'Or avoided militancy and party political allegiance in its articles. Bastardes explained that

"in agreement with the authors, we undertook to avoid anything that could cause conflicts - always a rather subjective judgement - and Montserrat received the offprints of all the material planned for publication and made comments on them"

(Bastardes, 1984, 26)

Since many of the names which were connected with the journal in the 1960's still dominate Catalan cultural and political life after Franco, it is possible to evaluate the significance of Serra d'Or in drawing together intellectuals who were unwilling to accept the political and cultural strait jacket which the Franco regime was imposing on them. The people involved in the organisation constituted a relatively small group, which considered itself as a

cultural vanguard. Cahner affirmed that it was always the same people who were active in the cultural movement. In his own case,

"I think that my task was primarily that of an agitator, of organising things with a political aim in mind."

(Cahner, interview, 11.2.1988)

The strategy was to foster cultural politics at a time when political awareness was still very weak. Active political opposition involved only a small minority which was operating clandestinely and under high risks. Even symbolic protest was repressed, as the incident in the **Palau de la Música** demonstrated in 1960. A group of Catalanists, amongst them Jordi Pujol, distributed leaflets to protest against the treatment of the Catalans under the regime and sang the Catalan national anthem. As one of the "ring leaders" of the campaign, Pujol received a prison sentence of 7 years, which earned him a reputation of a pillar of Catalan resistance.

Cultural politics did not run such risks. It tried to exploit the holes in the legislation and the grey areas of semi-legality which expanded in the measure in which the government needed to improve its image with its economic and political partners abroad. It used the personal connections within the small intellectual world of Barcelona which had been pushed out of the Spanish mainstream and which was held together through an ever increasing number of private associations. As Cahner explained,

"We profited from things that were permitted. In the 1940's, until the end of the second world war, the anti-Catalan repression was total, up to the point where a visitor's card written in Catalan was a punishable offence; although there was no law to this end, things really worked like that. In that period [the 1950's], on the other hand, the ways of operating of the government had become more subtle, hidden, flexible, so as not to cause international scandals."

(Cahner, interview, 11.2.1988)

Many of those who were involved in Serra d'Or were also the key figures of another publishing enterprise which came to be the most powerful Catalan publishing house of the post-Franco period: **Edicions 62**.

b) Edicions 62

As a natural expansion of Serra d'Or and encouraged by Jordi Pujol and Josep Benet, Cahner and Bastardes founded a publishing house in 1962. They aimed at overcoming the restrictions facing **Selecta-Aedos**, which had confined Catalan culture to a small group of middle class and upper class readers. What would restore Catalan to its former function of a modern, popular, all purpose language was the policy of publishing everything, including translated novels and nonfiction material.

"This was a proof of normalisation. What we were looking for was to destroy the image of Catalan as a regional language, and to establish it as the language of a national community. This was the achievement of **Edicions 62**."

(Cahner, interview, 11.2.1988)

The literary editor, Castellet, described the political-cultural project of **Edicions 62** thus. Firstly, the aim was to give the Catalan language a public presence. Secondly, contemporary history and politics books were published in order to make the public more politically informed, and serve as a basis for a democratic future of Catalonia. Thirdly, the study of cultural, social, etc. aspects of the present situation of Catalonia were promoted by the publisher. Catalan intellectuals were encouraged to contribute to this patriotic task by writing appropriate volumes. Fourthly and fifthly, new aspects of popular culture were made available to Catalan readers, and the gaps in Catalan culture began to be filled (**Edicions 62**, 1987, 35-36). Thus, the first American modern thrillers reached Spain through Catalan language editions, Gramsci and Sartre were published, Böll and Duras translated for the first time.

At the beginning, this involved bribing government functionaries. Then, as censorship restrictions became more relaxed, **Edicions 62** managed to buy the copyrights for many foreign writers who were not published in Spain, and established itself as a progressive publisher. The collection "Llibres a l'Abast" (which translates somewhat awkwardly as "books within easy reach") demonstrates that **Edicions 62** tried to make up for 25 years of intellectual isolation by publishing a couple of books on every major current of contemporary thought, from feminism over Third World development to

Marxist philosophy, existentialism and sociology. Many of these books caused censorship problems, and were regarded by established Castilian publishers as too political. In the course of the 1960's, Catalan publishers gained an advantage over their Castilian colleagues with respect to the censoring authorities. In a situation of rapid social change and political fermentation, Catalan language publications were regarded less dangerous because it served a very much smaller readership (Pagès, interview, 25.4.1988). This became a problem for the Catalan publishers, because since only few people had properly learned to read and write, the market had become too small for the massive expansion of publishing to which **Edicions 62** contributed its fair share. 300 new titles in 1962 grew to a tide of 1,000 only a few years later (Fig. 25), and caused an overproduction crisis in the late 1960's as a result of which Cahner had to declare bankruptcy and **Edicions 62** had to find new share holders. These were not difficult to find in a Catalan upper middle class which had money to spend and which cared for its native culture.

The political significance of what elsewhere would simply be regarded as cultural activities is undeniable in the case of Catalonia in the 1960's and early 1970's. In this period,

"every book which **Edicions 62** published was a patriotic act. And to the extent it was the Left in disguise, it was a patriotic and **revolutionary** act."

(Marin and Tresseres, interview, 15.2.1988)


Writing, publishing and even buying was a political act if it involved a Catalan book. Those who were connected to the Catalan intelligentsia bought books because they were in Catalan.

"We bought everything, psychology, philosophy, anything which seemed to go against the Francoist establishment..."

(Pagès, interview, 25.4.1988)

People thought that this was a necessary investment, particularly in the case of books which were dealing with Catalonia. That doctoral theses on Philip XV of Catalonia and on the War of Secession of 1714 were published and sold out was unthinkable in any other country.

Fig. 25 : ANNUAL PRODUCTION OF BOOKS IN CATALAN,
1936-85



Source: Edicions 62, 1987, 113.

According to Pagès,

"the most extraordinary case is the Catalunya en l'Espanya Moderna by Pierre Vilar²⁰, a doctoral thesis which for someone who is not a specialist on history is totally incomprehensible except for the introductions. But it sold thousands and thousands of copies. You can go to someone's home who in this period were between 20 and 35 years old, and apart from Picasso's *Guernica* (as a sign of their ideological stance) they may have very few books but these would include Catalunya en l'Espanya Moderna, which was another symbol of their identity.(...) It would not surprise me if the book had sold 60,000 copies or more."

(Pagès, interview, 25.4.1988)

Thus, by the mid-1960's, the cultural revival was well under way. Two of the most significant publishing initiatives - **Edicions 62** and **Serra d'Or** - were the achievement of a rather limited group of Catalan intellectuals. The network of civil society institutions which involved mostly middle class intellectuals was the basis for the flourishing of these initiatives. However, there were other Catalan publishing houses which had closer contact with working class institutions. **Estela-Laia** is one such example.

c) Editorial Estela-Laia

Editorial Estela - Laia is a publishing house which was founded in 1959 in the wake of the Second Vatican Council by progressive catholic circles. It exemplifies the strong influence of liberation theology on the political climate in Spain in general and on the Catalan nationalist movement in particular. Its editorial line, which concentrated heavily on Christian literature, changed when Alfons Comín and Josep Verdura became directors of **Estela**. Comín was a Catholic-Marxist ideologically close to the **Frente de Liberación Nacional** (the "Felipes", National Liberation Front), while Verdura was a worker who was involved in the workers' movement and close to

²⁰ Catalunya en la Espanya Moderna by Vilar is a three volume history of Catalonia up until the 19th century, first published in Catalan by **Edicions 62** in 1964.

the Catalan Communist Party. He was asked to join the publishing house in order to make it more working class oriented.

This change in ideology provoked the Minister of Information and Tourism, Fraga Ibarne, to close down the publishing house in 1971, but due to pressure from representatives of the Catalan cultural, political and financial world this decision was reversed soon later. This pressure was exerted on Madrid directly, and came from influential people who were linked to the publishing house (Pagès, interview, 25.4.1988). When it was reopened, it had to change its name to **Laia** in order to save the face of the minister.

Estela - Laia never subscribed to radical cultural Catalanism, and always had the policy of publishing in Castilian as well as in Catalan. The publishers perceived Catalonia as a bilingual society, and recognised that the Castilian culture had also been suffering under the Franco regime. Its close connections with the Left, particularly the CC.OO and the PSUC, and the intention to publish for the Castilian speaking working class as well meant that at least 50 per cent of the books of **Estela-Laia** were in Castilian. Whether they reached their target readership - the Catalan working class - is doubtful. A collection of books was produced on trade unionism, but even those were mostly read by university students who wanted to distance themselves from their class origins and from other intellectuals. The working class itself was not interested in theoretical elaborations of syndicalism; "it was a militant working class, but not a cultured working class" (Pagès, interview, 15.5.1989). Nevertheless, this policy is indicative of the attitude of many Catalan intellectuals in opposition to the Franco regime, in so far as it tried to prevent a wedge being driven between the militant Castilian speaking working class and the Catalan intellectuals.

As a final example, I look at the Catalan encyclopaedia, which came to epitomise the determination of the Catalan intelligentsia to defend their culture from fading into history. The **Gran Enciclopèdia Catalana** is interesting not only because it was started under the adverse condition of the Franco regime, but also because it involved

scores of Catalan intellectuals, many of whom became the political elite of the post-Franco era.

d) Gran Enciclopèdia Catalana

It could be argued that the **Gran Enciclopèdia Catalana** (GEC) is the culmination of the determined effort of the Catalan intellectuals to re-establish Catalan as their national language. It became a symbol of cultural revival, and owning it is still a kind of Catalan identity card, at least for the middle classes.

Like Serra d'Or and **Edicions 62**, the GEC was initiated by the same group of people, mainly Max Cahner, Enric Lluç and Jordi Carbonell. Work began in 1967 in the offices of **Edicions 62**, but creating an encyclopaedia from scratch soon exceeded the resources of the publishing house. It was therefore bought up in 1969 by **Banca Catalana**, which was mentioned above (Chapter three) in the context of the nationalistic campaign to reconstruct the Catalan economy. The encyclopaedia was regarded by the editors as a collective cultural project which aimed at creating a reference work for the nation and in a language which had suffered under decades of repression. In the introduction to the first volume, the editors drew attention to the gaps in Catalan culture which they argued were inflicted by "deficiencies of our society", and praised the GEC as

"the effort of a whole generation of Catalan intellectuals to produce a reference work which reflects the present cultural, social, and economic situation of the Catalan Countries [**Països Catalans**]".

(GEC, 1969, introduction)

The list of editors and collaborators is indeed several hundred names long and includes many of those intellectuals who were involved in other cultural activities. As cultural and political activism was closely connected in the 1960's and 1970's, it is not surprising to find several political activists among the editors of the GEC who stepped into leading positions once their respective parties were legalised. A few examples are given below:

Herribert Barrera, a Doctor of Philosophy in physics, and one of the leading politicians of the ERC (*Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*), edited the section on science and technology.

Max Cahner, the founder of the GEC, was appointed Minister of Culture to the first autonomous government (1980).

Manuel Sacristán, who later became professor for philosophy at the University of Barcelona, and a prominent activist in the PSUC (*Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya*), was the head of the philosophy section.

J.M. Obiols, who is now the chairman of the PSC (*Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya*), edited the geology section.

Joan Colomines i Puig, who is a prominent member of UDC (*Unió Democràtica de Catalunya*), headed the medicine section.

Josep Benet i Morell, a lawyer and historian, headed the section on contemporary history of Catalonia. He was one of the principal figures in the *Assamblea de Catalunya* (1971-77), and became the most voted for senator during the transition period. In the 1980 elections, Benet stood as a candidate for the Catalan presidency for the Communist Party.

Though this already indicates that the cultural revival was effectively also a political revival, the explicitly political function of the Catalan publishing sector still remains to be discussed.

2.5 Intellectuals and politics

It is by no means the case that all those involved in cultural activities during the 1960's were also active in the political opposition. Many intellectuals were drawn into a political position simply, because under the circumstances, Catalan culture was a political issue. But others were involved in the cultural revival

because this was a part of their struggle against the Franco regime and for Catalan autonomy or independence. A large number of the second category were organised in, or at least collaborating with, the Catalan Communist Party, which was the best organised underground party and had a strong presence in the University of Barcelona as well as the workers' movement (Chapter four, section 4.2.iv). Since many Catalan intellectuals were connected to the major publishing activities, and at the same time associated in one way or another with the PSUC or other left-wing parties, it comes as little surprise that often the same people were involved in both cultural politics and the organised political opposition.

A particular generation of intellectuals became active in the 1960's, and then moved into politics in the 1970's. Those who took risks while involved in the cultural movement gained a Catalanist reputation, which lifted them into political office later on. Pagès, who worked for **Edicions 62** in the 1960s and is with the publishing house **Laia** today, pointed out another connection between the cultural and the political struggle. He claimed that the Catalan publishing houses were a kind of niche, where politically active intellectuals were able to earn their living.

"People who are now in the Catalan Parliament have at one stage been working here as editors. People who now have posts in the administration of culture [of the Catalan Government] worked as proof readers, editors or translators [in the publishing houses]. In addition, one of the ways for publishers to contribute to the political resistance was to publish work to many of these people (...) who had just come out from prison and couldn't find work elsewhere. Far from being an obstacle, this was treated as a recommendation here. A mutual friend would ring up and say, "Look, such-and-such, whom you don't know, has just come out of Burgos prison; if you can do anything for him ...", Well, if you could, you did."

(Pagès, interview, 25.4.1988)

The publishing houses regarded it as their duty to provide work for political activists. Josep Verdura had been in prison for trade union activities before he came to **Laia**. Jordi Solé-Tura (now professor of law at the University of Barcelona, and prominent political activist for the Socialist Party (PSC), was a communist activist in the 1960's. He did many translations for "Edicions 62"

between 1965 and 1969, particularly of social and political science and philosophy writings. He translated the marxist classics in the "Llibres a l'Abast" series. Verdura is another example. He was involved in trade union activities, and was collaborating with Marxist parties when he came to work for Estela in the late 1960's.

Not least because of these personal and work based connections, the publishing houses became sites of political meetings, which also involved people who were not directly connected with the house. "Edicions 62" was

"a common meeting place for people from all groups or parties which were in the anti-Francoist opposition. It was like a permanent tertúlia, where manifestoes were hammered out and passed around for people to sign. Putting out more or less subversive protest leaflets was an established custom here, and then friends - authors and others - would be called in to sign them. It also happened frequently that a more or less clandestine figure would pass by in order to collect or leave (probably quite innocent) messages. The anti-Francoist movement was full of such things, which were more illusion than reality."

(Castellet, 1987, 46)

Although the publishing houses were probably on the periphery of underground political activities, it is certainly the case that they had a political role, which was accepted by those involved. Meetings in preparation of the **Assamblea de Catalunya** were remembered by Cahner, as were meetings of leading activists of the **PCE (Partit Comunista de España)** and the **PSUC** (Cahner, interview, 11.2.1988).

What is striking about the cultural movement in the 1960's, which involved political nationalism, and gradually evolved into a political movement, is the fact that it was so closely knit. The hard core of the culturally and politically active intellectuals was centred in Barcelona, and was connected through family, friendship, and through institutions of civil society (Scout movement, publishing houses, university, cultural institutions). Even in the nationalist movement under Franco, there were only a few hundred activists (Sellarès, interview 14.4.1988). Although the cultural movement was touching many more Catalans, it is still difficult to explain how hundreds of thousands of Catalans became sufficiently

aware culturally and politically to join the protest marches after Franco's death. It is important therefore to see that there were other institutions of popular culture which reached not only the Catalan middle class, but also sectors of the working class. The next subsection concerns such popular institutions, which became symbols of Catalan identity often despite their apparently unpolitical nature.

2.6 Popular institutions and Catalan identity

If the principal agents in the cultural revival were intellectuals, it could be questioned to what extent Catalan nationalism had popular support. Catalan books were read in those days only by people who had the necessary resources to teach themselves the language; this restricted the people involved in cultural activities to the middle and upper classes. In order to show how a mass consensus could be achieved in favour of Catalan autonomy, it is necessary to take a look at another Catalan institution which operated at a different cultural level and more openly in the public sphere. It is often claimed that the **F. C. Barcelona** (which is commonly abbreviated to an affectionate **Barça**), played precisely this role. It was a symbol of catalanism with which people could easily identify, and it provided the opportunity for large numbers of people from different social and cultural backgrounds to assemble. Waving a Catalan flag in the football stadium became a popular way of showing one's national identity in the 1970's. Even today, Catalan flags and those of the club are the only ones used by the fans. Any others, and particularly the Spanish flag, are considered inappropriate (see Preface, p. 26).

2.6.i Barça - something more than a football club²¹

The slogan of the club in the 1970's said that **Barça** was not only about football; it was also about politics. Neither was it only the club of Barcelona city, because there existed another club, **Español**, in the city, but its name alone would have made it impossible to occupy such a central place in the Catalans' hearts as **Barça**. But more significantly, **Barça** occupied the role of a national institution; it was about Catalonia, the nation, not just Barcelona. In 1988, there were 445 fan clubs in existence, the majority of them in Barcelona and the industrial belt, but many also in the provinces of Girona, Tarragona and Lléida. With 110,000 club members, **Barça** was the largest of the Catalan associations last year, and the presidency of the club was regarded as the second most prestigious post in Catalonia, after the presidency of the **Generalitat** (Sabartès, interview, 4.3.1988).

It is difficult to pin down exactly why **Barça** means so much to so many Catalans. But already before the civil war, the club played a political role, because it was used by the nationalist bourgeoisie - both the **Regionalistes** and the republican nationalist petty bourgeoisie - to mobilise the masses behind the Catalan flag (Goward, 1981, 23). During the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-30), the blue and red club colours were paraded in the streets as proxies of the forbidden Catalan red and yellow stripes. In 1925, the government closed down the club for half a year because of anti-Spanish protests during the celebrations of its 25th anniversary (Artells, 1972, 177). This event increased greatly the popularity of the club at a time when football started to become a sport of the popular classes in Catalonia (La Vanguardia, 1988, supplement, 99). Under Franco, the club also became a symbol of Catalan identity and a forum for expressing popular discontent with the ruling class.

²¹"El Barça es quelcom més que un club de futbol" was the election slogan of **Barça's** president Montal.

It was not that the club directors created this symbol. In 1939, **Barça** became castilianised, just like all the other institutions, and the Catalan flag was removed from its code of arms. The president was selected by the government, and in subsequent years appointed in undemocratic ways by prestigious club members who were mostly sympathetic to the Franco regime. Most members of the directorates were in some ways connected with the Catalan textile bourgeoisie²² (Sabartés, 1982a, 35), and officially, the club was apolitical. However, the directors were mostly Catalans, and had a depoliticised national identity. In festivities of the club such as the inauguration of a new stadium which attracted huge numbers of people, the Catalan culture would be brought into the stadium in the form of Catalan choral societies (orfeus), sardanes, and open air masses in Montserrat.

But it was mainly the popular masses who invested their national identity into the club. Vice-president Casaus confirmed this:

"The truth is that since Catalanist manifestations were prohibited in public, Catalans took advantage of mass events to display their Catalan identity. It is therefore logical that they would take advantage of a football game with tens of thousands of spectators in order to express their national feelings, which in the political sphere they were not able to show."

(Casaus, interview, 20.1.1988)

Jordi Pujol reflected on the "supreme symbol of Catalanism" a year before he stood for presidency of the Catalan **Generalitat** that even back in the dark year of 1951, the Catalan people associated **Barça** with Catalan autonomy and democracy. Rather sentimentally, he claimed that those masses who lined the streets waiting for the arrival of the victorious team were in fact the same - in essence - as those who were waiting for the arrival of the first Catalan

²²Agusti Montal was president of **Barça** between 1969 and 1978, when the club grew to be a symbol of Catalan political aspirations. As general manager of **Montalfita SA** and vice president of the **Caja de Jubilaciones y Subsidios de la Industria Textil**, he also was a representative of the Catalan textile bourgeoisie (Sabartés, 1982b, 105).

president in 1931 (Pujol, 1979, 15). It is probable that in the eyes of many people, Catalonia - which had officially ceased to exist but was still **felt** - came to be represented by **Barça**. The club symbolised the struggle of a nation against a repressive state. The enemy were the arch rival **Real Madrid** and the Federation of Spanish Football, whose president was of course appointed by Franco. They were easily identified with the government²³. In the last years of the Franco regime, Catalan flags began to appear in the stadium, and the spectators were singing the **Barça** hymn and the Catalan anthem, both of which were radical acts under the political circumstances. The membership grew from 52,000 in 1970 to 70,000 in 1974, and having a membership card was almost regarded as being part of the Catalan opposition movement.

For immigrants, the club was one of rather few ways to actively take on Catalan nationality. Since it was difficult to learn Catalan and to become integrated, many immigrants who wanted this felt that

"the best way to become a native Catalan is (...) to register their new baby as a member of **Barça** as soon as it is born."

(Diario de Barcelona, 8.5.1977, 4)

Although details of the membership are a closely guarded secret of the club, which wants to be seen as a happy family and a true mirror of Catalan society, it is confirmed that a third of the membership is of Castilian origin. The popular appeal of the club is also manifest in the fact that many women are members and watch the games. Family membership is a common feature. The club has members from all social classes, with the middle and working class constituting most of the membership. But the club is able to mobilise far more people than just its members. When it won the European cup in 1979, half a million are alleged to have gathered in

²³ A key event in the politicisation of **Barça** was a game against **Real Madrid** in 1970 which had to be cancelled after a biased decision by the referee. **Barça** fans invaded the field when police began to brutally beat up the protestors, and the whole event erupted into an anti-government manifestation (Sabartés, interview, 4.3.1988).

the city centre to celebrate the victory, many equipped with Catalan flags. In mass demonstrations in favour of Catalan autonomy, on the other hand, many people were wielding the red and blue colours of **Barça**. Because of its popular appeal, the Catalan Left supported the club, as it appeared to represent the democratic will of the people. For example, the elections for the directorate of the club attracted as much attention in the media as government elections today. The election campaigns were an opportunity for the disenfranchised to express their preferences, even though not even **Barça** elections were democratic. Nevertheless, in the political desert of Catalonia under Franco, they were closely monitored by the media and treated like political campaigns. (Sabartés, 1982a, 41-42).

Cultural institutions during the Franco period, more willingly - as in the case of the publishing houses - or less - as in the case of **F.C. Barcelona** - became vehicles of political mobilisation and symbols of Catalan national identity. Culture and politics were difficult to disentangle at the height of popular politicisation in the mid-seventies, when a unified Catalan movement called for autonomy and democracy. After the legalisation of political parties, people were able to express political preferences directly, but those cultural entities which were most infested with Catalanist sentiment did not lose their symbolic status. And because this status lends them cross class popular support, it becomes important for the Catalan parties to embrace these institutions in order to establish their hegemony.

This method of gathering political support was far easier than trying to convince people with political arguments and action. When in the last years of the 1970's the abstention from elections was rising and popular participation in politics rapidly declining, the new democratic parties in Catalonia made efforts to increase their popularity with the help of the then successful football club. Jutglar observed that even before Catalonia was granted autonomy officially, the pro-autonomy demonstrations on the National Day (September 11) halved every year. While in 1978, only half a million demonstrated on that day, twice as many came out to greet the **Barça** team after its victory in the European Cup in May 1979. Politicians

of all parties exploited the occasion, gathered on the **Plaça Sant Jaume** where the Catalan Government has its seat, and made long speeches to claim that "the victory of **Barça** is a victory for Catalonia". Jutglar was appalled by the fact that

"football, which had been denounced so often by the opposition as a brutalising opium of popular consciousness, was now manipulated by the new politicians in a similar way as before".

(Jutglar, 1982, vol. VIII, 337)

Even today, popular cultural institutions of civil society, such as the **F.C. Barcelona**, command a more stable position in Catalonia than democratic parties. In Gramsci's words they represent the trenches which political parties have to conquer in the battle over hegemony. They are used to create links with the - often depoliticised - people, but also for the purpose of manipulating them.

So far, this chapter has examined the cultural basis of legitimation for Catalan nationalism in civil society. From a vast range and number of institutions developing in Catalonia during the Franco period, I chose two types which exemplified different aspects of the links between public culture and politics. These links were shaped by the relationship between civil society and the state, and by the ways in which Catalan society was structured in social and cultural terms. The publishing houses threw light on the involvement of intellectuals in the nationalist conflict, and the **F.C. Barcelona** served as an example of a popular institution which became a public symbol of shared national identity.

The next section examines the cultural basis of Scottish nationalism. In the first place, I am concerned with the question whether such a basis exists at all. In various parts of this thesis, it has been made clear that the cultural aspect of Scottish identity is given little emphasis in the nationalist movement. The Scottish nation is defined historically, and with reference to civil society institutions, which have subsequently become part of the British state apparatus (e.g. local government, the education system, and the legal system). Unlike Catalonia, where a distinctive language served to distinguish Catalan culture from that of the Spanish state

and to unite the Catalan population, Scotland's culture merges into English (and British) culture. As a result, the links between culture and nationalism, and the role of intellectuals in the nationalist movements, have been more ambiguous, and as a whole less important than in the Catalan case.

3. SCOTTISH CULTURE - A REGIONAL CULTURE?

Scottish culture was not the strong wind blowing behind the sails of the nationalist movement of the 1960's and 1970's. Some kind of revival took place, such as a growing interest in the mass media for "things Scottish", and a slight increase in publishing in order to feed the political debate of the period. But apart from dedicated intellectuals committed to their cultural heritage, popular knowledge of Scottish culture was scant, and few people had a political perspective on the issue. In fact, few were proud of what is commonly regarded as Scottish culture: 19th century sentimental novels, glorified Highland wars which all too often ended in defeats, and tourist oriented folk music and tartans. More serious intellectuals and most of the Scottish bourgeoisie dissociated themselves from this "sub-national culture" which always seemed to accept its parochial, ridiculous image:

"The remarkable assemblage of heterogeneous elements, neurotic double-binds, falsely honoured shades, and brainless vulgarity which make up "national culture" here have naturally troubled intellectuals."

(Nairn, 1977, 168)

According to Nairn, the Tartan monster epitomised the vulgarity and depravity of a national culture without mouth. The long tradition of middle class emigration, which meant that modern Scottish society "is notoriously marked by the lack of a large, confident and politically influential middle class" (Ascherson, 1988, 66), is surely one reason for this lack of mouth. Successful writers, journalists and artists often move to London, where they and their work are no longer associated with Scotland; those who stay are at best "local heroes". The word "parochial" haunts Scottish politics,

literature, education and arts (Craig, 1982, 3). This fragile cultural basis, which lacks prestige even among many Scots, is to a large degree responsible for the vulnerability of nationalist resistance and support (Craig, 1983b, 24-25). McCrone has argued that the negative representation of Scottish culture has influenced the Scottish intelligentsia in such a way that "their contributions to the development of neo-nationalism in Scotland have been negative and critical" (McCrone, 1989, 161). He proposes that Scottish nationalists should stop worrying about the lack of a distinctive national culture, and just get on with politics (*ibid.*, 172-173).

If cultural difference is the main nucleus of national identity and the national culture is a problem for Scots, it is not surprising that Scottish identity is not taken for granted, particularly by intellectuals. It becomes the subject of films and books, where Scottishness is often portrayed through images of defeat and powerlessness: the destruction of Highland culture, the displaced peasantry, the deprivation in Glasgow's working class areas. Craig argued that these foci of identity are one-sided. They constitute one end of a dialectic which derives its power from outside Scotland (Craig, 1983a, 8-11). In this sense, what is commonly regarded as Scottish culture today is a regional culture, "essentially folklorist and picturesque", as Gramsci described regional cultures in Italy²⁴. Thus, the weakness of Scottish culture cannot be isolated, but must be seen as part of Scotland's peripheral situation next to a dominant English culture. Due to its image, Scottish culture is separated from the political and becomes a matter of private experience (Maxwell, 1980, 4). It requires a shift of consciousness to recognise that the status of Scottish culture is to some extent the product of the lack of political autonomy. Many Scots do not know about their culture because it has been completely

²⁴"The 'regional' people were seen from outside through the glasses of paternalism, with the disenchanted cosmopolitan spirit of tourists in search of strong and original raw sensations. The deeply rooted 'apolitical' nature of Italian writers, coated with verbose national rhetoric, has been really harmful to them" (Gramsci, 1985, 202).


absent from the education system (Radical Scotland, Feb./March 1987, No. 25, 34). The situation of the Scottish languages is a case in point, which will be examined in the section below.

3.1 Scottish languages: Gaelic and Scots

In contrast to Catalonia, languages play only a very peripheral role in Scottish nationalism. Throughout the past five centuries, the Scottish languages have been declining, replaced and marginalised by the "Queen's English", which was the language of modernisation. Language revivals have taken place, but on a much less significant scale, because English had become the language of the person in the street. The reasons for the decline of the indigenous Scottish languages cannot be discussed here in detail, but a few comments should illuminate the constraints of language based nationalist claims. Firstly, there are several languages spoken in Scotland, and none of them is a serious rival to English as a means of mass communication today. Secondly, the status of these languages has traditionally been low, at least since the Union with England. Many Gaelic and Scots speakers have regarded it to be in their own interest to adopt English. Thirdly, the state neglected Scots and Gaelic over a long period, and therefore contributed to their decline. Only recently have some efforts begun to teach them at schools and to use them in official media. It should be noted that neither of these specific languages are required as linguistic markers, as the Scottish accent is usually sufficient to distinguish English speaking Scots from other English speakers.

Turning to the first point, there is not one language deemed to be specifically Scottish, but **several**, among which Gaelic and Scots are the most prominent. The dominant theory is that never throughout history has Scotland had one single unitary - and unifying - language covering her whole area. But the distribution of Gaelic place names suggests that Gaelic came close to being a national language in the (pre-nationalist) 15th century. With the disappearance of Gaelic (Fig. 26) and Scots from their last bastions

Fig. 26 : DISTRIBUTION OF GAELIC SPEAKERS IN SCOTLAND, 1971



Source: Stephens, 1976, 54.

in the Western Isles and the North East respectively, the English language has almost achieved complete dominance (Henderson, 1988, 263). Since the Union of Crowns (1603), Gaelic has retreated further and further into the Highlands, while Scots became increasingly seen as a Lowland dialect of English. However, there is evidence that in southern parts of Scotland, such as Ayrshire and Galloway, Gaelic was still spoken as late as the last century. The much emphasised dichotomy between the Highlands and the Lowlands was not as clear-cut as some historians led one to believe (Iain MacLaren, personal communication; Withers, 1982). However, socio-economic and cultural pressures from both inside and outside Scotland spelled the seemingly unstoppable decline of Gaelic²⁵ (see Chapter two, section 4.1). In the Scottish Lowlands, a version of English began to be adopted as the language of the middle and upper classes as early as the 14th century. Though a derivation of English, it developed in distinctive ways which in the eyes of some commentators qualifies it for the status of a language, rather than just a dialect²⁶ (Price, 1984, 187; Weekend Guardian, 1.-2.4.1989, 8). Up until the Union of Crowns (1603), Scots was the official national language, but not the language of the people (Agutter, 1988, 13-14). The "Golden Age" of Scots verse in the 15th and 16th century gave the Scots language a place at the table of European high culture. With the Union, it gradually lost prestige and became the "street dialect", as which it is perceived today. That it has, however, not lost all claim to the status of language is testified to by the growing body of dictionaries²⁷, grammars and etymologies. As well as being spoken in rural as well as urban environments, Scots is also still a literary

²⁵Even a century ago, only 6.9 per cent of the Scottish population were bilingual or mono-lingual in Gaelic (Price, 1984, 59).

²⁶Billy Kay, a prominent defender of the Scots language, compared the situation of Scots in Britain to that of other minority languages. He argued that for example Galician is regarded as a "degraded gutter version" of standard Castilian, while at the same time it is the official language in Portugal (Weekend Guardian, 1.-2.4.1989, 8).

²⁷Among these are the Scottish National Dictionary, the Dictionary of the Older Scottish Tongue, and the Concise Scottish Dictionary.

language, which was boosted by the small-scale revivals in the 18th century (Robert Burns) and the 1920's (Hugh MacDiarmid).

Against the dominant English, neither of these two languages were able to maintain a position which would enable them to serve as a cultural basis for national consciousness. The political Union with England was partly responsible for this, because it meant that English became the official language. The 1872 Education Acts, for example, made primary school education compulsory without considering the Scottish minority languages. Although the Scottish education system is regarded as a national institution, with a history of its own and an almost exclusively Scottish staff, it has willingly anglicised the curriculum²⁸. But it is also important to note that the Scottish people themselves promoted the switch to the language of power and social mobility. Particularly the middle and upper classes "have been falling over themselves to loose their Scots and acquire the more prestigious English" (Weekend Guardian, 1.-2.4.1989, 8). Similarly, many Gaelic speakers tended to depreciate their mother tongue which was confined to such a restricted role that it became an impediment to educational and social advancement.

The difference to the Catalan case is that Scots and Gaelic were not the languages of modernisation and industrialisation. They thus became relegated to the private sphere and to traditional rural environments. Billy Wolfe, the former chairman of the SNP, claimed that he was one of few nationalists who were not only committed to economic independence, but also to the cultural heritage of Scotland. Now retired from politics and active in the Scottish Poetry Society, he recalled his experience of the Scots language:

"I was bilingual from the time I started running out in the street. [...] my parents didn't speak Scots, although my

²⁸The degree to which Scottish schools are dominated by English culture is criticised in a recent report of the **Scottish Resources in Schools Project**, which encouraged schools to "insert the Scottish" angle into all subjects (Radical Scotland, Aug./Sept. 1985, 15-16).

father did when I was older. He had a large vocabulary, but it was looked down upon, as is the case with lots and lots of languages in a colonial situation. So, I had a language in the school playground and in the streets, and a different vocabulary when I was at home or in the class room. And most Scots are like that even today [...]."

(Wolfe, interview, 25.2.1987)

While in Catalonia, it was the aim of the Franco regime to reduce the Catalan language to just such a peripheral status through repression, the decline of the indigenous Scottish languages occurred over many centuries. History shows that forceful state repression and economic power played a role²⁹, and that Westminster legislation was a very important factor in the process of degradation and decline. Particularly in the last 150 years, the education system in Scotland has almost completely ignored the Scottish languages and indigenous literature, as English literature and culture was taken to epitomise the ideal model for civilised development not only for Britain, but also for the whole Empire (Craig, 1987, 2). But cultural nationalists cannot blame only foreign powers for the situation of the languages, and for the deficiencies of Scottish culture in general; they also have to make their own compatriots responsible for it. As Chapter four implied, most Scottish intellectuals have subscribed to the hegemony of English culture, rather than reconstructing the indigenous cultural structures, as happened in Catalonia. Given these pressures on distinctive Scottish culture, it comes as a surprise not only that Scots and Gaelic still exist, but that they are the languages in which a great deal of Scottish literature has been created in the 20th century.

²⁹In McGrath's play The Cheviot, the Stag and the Black, Black Oil, the decline of the Gaelic speaking population was explained thus:

"Because English is the language of the ruling class. Because English is the language of the people who own the highlands and control the highlands and invest in the highlands -".

"Because English is the language of the Development Board, the Hydro Board, the Tourist Board, the Forestry Commission, the County Council and, I suppose, the Chicago Bridge Construction Company."

(McGrath, 1981, 52)

In the last decades, interest has been growing in conserving Gaelic and reconsidering the status of the Scots language. TV and radio run programmes in Gaelic, research into popular culture has been intensifying, and publishing houses are now more prepared to take on Scots and Gaelic publications (evidence from interviews). While the languages now have a greater public presence than before, they remain minority languages, and the Scottish intellectuals using them creatively hardly ever receive much attention. This contrasts starkly with the Catalan publishing revival in the 1960's, where anyone who was remotely able to compose a book was begged by editors to publish something (Cahner, interview). As long as it was in Catalan, it did not even have to be readable. So, even today Scottish identity is far more linked to the Scottish accent than either Gaelic or Scots, and even the Scottish accent is often kept in defiance of pressures to speak proper English³⁰.

The next section discusses the relationship between Scottish culture and nationalist politics. Although culture has never been as strong a symbol of national identity as in most other nationalist movements, there are identifiable links between the political and the cultural revival, which suggests that we are not dealing with a straightforward absence of cultural nationalism.

3.2 The role of Scottish culture in nationalist politics

In the past few decades, Scottish culture has achieved a better image, and there is now a greater awareness of it in Scotland than before. There are diverging opinions whether this cultural revival is a side effect of political nationalism, or whether both went hand in hand. What is certain is that the cultural and the political have been much less closely related than in Catalonia. Rather than being a fundamental building stone of political nationalism, Scottish

³⁰ A couple of years ago, a Scottish pop duo composed a song about the Scottish accent which reflects these pressures. The text of Throw your 'R' away is reproduced in Table 4.1.

culture can be regarded as forming part of the furniture with which nationalists intend to make the reconstructed nation homely. This does not mean that there have not been many Scots dedicated to the idea of a national culture. Hamish Henderson, the heart and soul of the School of Scottish Studies (founded in Edinburgh in 1951 and expanding ever since until 1979), maintained that for him,

"the whole national question has been saturated with the necessity of defending the Scottish cultural position".

(Henderson, interview, 9.8.1988)

Although nationalist politicians formulated demands aimed at fostering and increasing public awareness for Scottish culture, this was regarded more as a token gesture which was not expected to rally the masses. Ascherson found in 1977, at the peak of interest in Scottish self-government, that none of the Scots questioned in a radio interview (about the cultural and intellectual accompaniment to the political revival)

"seemed to see a cultural revival, most were sceptical about the political revival, nobody wished to speculate about the future or even, really, to discuss the present. The only "creative" name mentioned upon middle-earth was Billy Connolly."

(Ascherson, 1986, 5)

Despite new magazines, publishers and some developments in Scottish theatre, there was really no flowering of Scottish culture which corresponded to the political movement. But this was not because the soil was too thin for such a flowering.

"It is partly the anti-intellectual bias of the SNP (...). It is mostly that the connection between political and cultural movements can't be established."

(ibid.)

Cultural nationalists did not enjoy a high profile in the political movement as in Catalonia. Intellectuals involved in the revival of Scottish culture, such as Hamish Henderson, were involved in the political movement, but not prominently. Billy Wolfe thought that this division between culture and politics was a general characteristic in Scotland:

"Most people in Scotland, including 99 per cent of all the active politicians, aren't in the slightest interested in culture, and would not even accept that culture has anything to do with politics. As far as they are concerned, it's only economics, and social issues related to wealth and the distribution of wealth".

(Wolfe, interview, 25.2.1987)

SNP politician Stephen Maxwell argued that the Scottish nationalist movement is, unlike most other European nationalisms, without a linguistic basis. Although the SNP would appeal to people's sense of pride in being Scottish and support Gaelic speaking and the teaching of Scots literature and Scottish history in schools, the party does not give prominence to specific cultural causes.

"In Scotland, if someone wants to make a cultural case for nationalism, they're likely to do it post-facto; in other words, they are likely to say, "when we have independence then we can start developing institutions which will support a more vigorous Scottish culture. [...] I'm not saying that a linguistic revival in both Gaelic and Scots may not be an important element in a revived culture, but they can never lead even the cultural case, let alone the political".

(Maxwell, interview, 27.2.1987)

Some commentators regarded the marginal role of culture in Scottish nationalism during the 1970's as a weakness of the political movement. The nationalist movement showed some awareness of the way in which Scottish culture had been suppressed by the metropolitan culture, but did not propose any real challenge to the dominant cultural modes. What it offered was

"a bit more Scottish history, a look at MacDiarmid and McLellan, greater tolerance of Scots and Gaelic ...".

(Turnbull and Beveridge, 1980, 2)

This limitedness in the cultural aspirations of the nationalist movement, the authors argued, to some extent justified criticisms of Scottish nationalism as parochial and chauvinistic.

However, if the lack of faith in Scottish culture in the SNP can be explained with reference to middle class traditions of accepting English cultural hegemony, one might expect of the Labour Party to take a more positive approach. Since the Labour Party both embraces a large part of the Scottish intelligentsia and of the working

class, and due to its strong position in Scottish local government, it has played a dominant role in Scottish popular culture. But the Labour Party's unionist tradition weighs heavily. In the 1960's and 1970's, when nationalist politicisation posed a threat to the party's dominant role in Scottish society, those who tried to promote Scottish culture were often ridiculed by the party. The impression was created that "to support your indigenous culture was to be narrow-minded, bigoted and even possibly racist in some way" (Iain MacLaren, personal communication). Thus, Scottish indigenous culture did not have a home in the "party of the people" either, despite the fact that "distinctively Scottish culture has more affinity with the working classes than English culture, is more imbued with a continuing sense of a living 'folk' culture" (Craig, 1987, 3). When Labour came to support devolution, it was due mostly to political and socio-economic, and not for cultural, reasons.

Thus, neither sector of the nationalist movement in the 1970's presented a cultural case for nationalism, or consciously attempted to retrieve and to foster those cultural practices which existed outside the major institutions of Scottish civil society. It seemed impossible to bring the cultural together with the political - at least until the political case of nationalism failed to win in 1979.

If the cultural basis of Scottish identity is generally elusive and changeable, there are some aspects of popular culture which for a long time have been seen as symbols of national identity. As in Catalonia, football has occupied a privileged position among these symbols. But the link to nationalism is clearer in Scotland, which has her own national team. The yearly annual between England and Scotland developed into important demonstrations of nationalist sentiments. As Moorhouse notes,

"most Scots can understand the weight of neglect and disdain by England that might drive football fans to seek and enjoy symbolic victories against the old enemy."

(Moorhouse, 1989, 226)

When Scotland goes to play in a World cup, it is as if it were the national team of an independent country. And it seems that Scottish football reflects the political situation in Scotland. In 1977,

Scotland won against England in Wembley, at a time when the nationalist movement was at its height; one year later, the disastrous performance of the Scottish team in the World Cup coincided with the downturn of the SNP. Some Scots argue that the disappointment and humiliation of Scotland in the World Cup actually caused a loss of national confidence, and thus influenced the outcome of the devolution referendum.

Hamden Park, the national home ground, is "the nearest thing Scotland has to a National Assembly". At the Scottish cup final in 1988, Scots used it to express their disagreement with the British Prime Minister who attended as a guest, and brandished red cards at her (McCarra, 1989, 29). Thus, as in the case of Catalonia, Scottish football has served as a substitute for independent political institutions. But since most Scots have accepted (until recently) the British state as representative and legitimate, football has not been politicised to such a degree.

In section 3.3, I look beyond the referendum and argue that the Scottish cultural revival in the recent decades has come to support political nationalism in the 1980's.

3.3 A recent cultural revival

The Scottish cultural revival in the 20th century began in the 1920's, when it was connected with nationalism. Although it continued after the second world war, the cultural movement was still only a poor and distant cousin of political nationalism in the 1970's. But in the 1980's, there were signs that this might change. Since the late 70's, the overriding importance of oil and independence and the hold of the SNP over the nationalist discourse were broken. Some have argued that it is political frustration which triggered off the boom of Scottish theatre, painting, pop music and literature. A remarkable characteristic of the cultural revival in Scotland is its tendency to seek its roots and its audience in the working class. This highlights the gap between "working class,

Labour voting Scotland" and "class unconscious, Thatcher voting England", and is laced with nationalist overtones.

Theatre is a case in point. While the 7:84 company under John McGrath was a lone voice in the 1970's, many small companies and playwrights have joined it in the 1980's. Actors who, training in Scottish drama colleges in the early 1970, "were not encouraged to be **Scottish** actors", and had no contemporary Scottish dramas to perform, now find themselves riding on a wave of Scottish productions (Radical Scotland, April/May 1988, 30). The poet and playwright Liz Lochhead had big successes with plays translated into Scots, as well as with her own plays which integrate "archaic Scots and present-day Glaswegian" and deal with politically and socially relevant issues. For her,

"the most exciting thing [...] about being a playwright in Scotland at the moment is the very real hunger in Scottish audiences for plays that speak to them about their own culture and/or history."

(Radical Scotland, April/May 1988, 30)

This sounds rather more like Catalonia in the 1960's. Similar to the developments in Scottish theatre, there has been a notable increase in Scottish pop bands. The "Proclaimers" and "Hue and Cry", two of Scotland's more popular bands, have made songs on the political situation of Scotland in Britain, and shared the platform with SNP candidate Jim Sillars in the Govan by-election campaign (Scotland on Sunday, 19.3.1989, 33). The folk music movement, in Catalonia a powerful vehicle of national consciousness, has been relatively strong in Scotland since the early 1950's³¹. But here, the nationalist end of the folk music spectrum was part of the "parodic, sentimental kailyardery" (Wright, 1987, 36-7) whose skin deep,

³¹The recent folk song revival started with the People's Festival in 1951 which was organised by the socialist Labour Festival Committee. From the beginning it had a strong political component, and not only because folk songs deal with the lives of ordinary people. Gramsci suggested that folk culture developed a separate way of perceiving the world which is opposed to official and dominant culture. This element of protest and dissent can be found in the more political folk songs.

apolitical nationalism has been present in Scottish culture ever since Walter Scott.

The contemporary cultural boom in Scotland cannot be separated from its political context. It has already been mentioned in the context of working class plays that they reflect an increasing awareness of Scotland's working class cultural traditions, much of which has been reproduced through local tradition bearers, rather than in institutions. To some extent, the cultural revival of the 1980's reflects a change in attitude of middle class intellectuals. This has led to a greater public appreciation of Scottish cultural traditions which had been less noted before.

One reason for the home grown cultural revival and its popular appeal is surely that following the disappointing result of the SNP's political nationalism and Labour's devolutionism in 1979, Scots turned to their cultural roots. These roots are linked to the nationalist movement, which is no longer commanded by one party as in the 1970's, but has a wider base in Scottish society. The years of Thatcherite economics and neo-conservative cultural values have antagonised a vast majority of working and middle class Scots, and the lack of political weapons against what many regard as a vicious attack against Scottish civil culture has brought about the politicisation of culture. The Conservatives criticised the Scots for their values which set them apart from the English mainstream. Nicholas Ridley said in an interview with the Scotsman:

"The Scots have fastened on their separate identity as a nation to try and establish that somehow all this does not apply to them (...). I don't think they can go on having a different political philosophy and at the same time expect to benefit economically like the rest of us."³²

(quoted in Harvie, 1988, 12)

³²He continued:

"You cannot have it both ways; you cannot both be the underdog - the dependent nation asking always for more largesse - and at the same time get the prosperity which a different attitude has produced in the rest of the English mainland".

But it seems that Scots are not prepared to adhere to English cultural and political values as before. There are signs that Scottish values diverge considerably from what are widely regarded as the values of Thatcher's Britain. The British Social Attitudes report of 1987 showed that in Scotland, a greater proportion tended to explain poverty in terms of social injustice than in the other British regions (British Social Attitudes, 1987). More Scots than other British citizens - 67 per cent - believed in 1984 that the low level of social benefits causing hardship (British Social Attitudes, 1984). In 1986, this percentage increased to 70 per cent in Scotland, and declined to 29 per cent in Southern England (Lindsay, 1987, 14). Elsewhere, research on social values of Scots revealed that Conservative economic policies and cuts in public spending were widely regarded as inappropriate to the Scottish reality (Dickson, 1989, 63). Given this reluctance to share neo-conservative values, which underpin the Tories' "greedy grasping selfish rat race policies" (as one Scottish interviewee labelled them), it is not surprising that Scottish dissent finds expression in the cultural arena, if the political channels to Westminster appear blocked.

4. CONCLUSION

The uneven treatment of the two case studies demonstrates that the cultural component of nationalist movements can be of varying importance. In Catalonia, the language and culture are deeply rooted in society, and therefore played a significant role in the national revival in the 1960's. In Scotland, on the other hand, culture is a marginal factor in the mobilisation of the people behind nationalist demands. That Scottish culture is widely regarded as inferior to the dominant English culture is partly a result of the absence of an autonomous Scottish government. But it is also due to the disinterest of the Scottish bourgeoisie and intelligentsia in their own culture. The experience of many decades of cultural decline, which was partly due to repressive policies in the cultural sphere and partly to economic and social pressures from within the Scottish

community, means that Scottish culture was far less distinctive as a whole than Catalan culture after twenty or thirty years of Francoism.

The attitude of Catalan intellectuals has been more supportive of the indigenous culture. Last century, the Catalan bourgeoisie and its organic intellectuals have put a lot of effort into constructing and appropriating the cultural heritage of Catalonia, and in particular the language, which had been the mother tongue of most Catalans all along. Before the civil war, Catalans had their own government, and Catalan was an official language, together with Castilian. The Franco regime was not able to wipe out a culture with such strong roots, and its attempts to do so strengthened the Catalans' determination to maintain their language and culture even more.

The cultural revival in Catalonia in the 1960's formed the basis for the political Catalanism, which gradually came out in public in the 1970's. The organisers of the revival were mostly intellectuals from the middle and upper classes, because they could afford it. As Pagès explains,

"Es óvio que la burguesía catalana jugó un papel excepcional, la burguesía mediana, la alta burguesía, la pequeña burguesía, porque estamos hablando de un sentimiento Catalan común. (...) La creación de escuelas privadas en donde se podía enseñar el catalán clandestinamente o semi-legalmente, quién podía hacer eso? - Claro que tenía que ser la pequeña burguesía y la burguesía mediana que era capaz de mandar a sus hijos a una escuela privada. (...). Era óvio que la burguesía catalana puse la base para una infraestructura escolar Catalana. La clase obrera que no era catalán y que no tenía los recursos no lo podía hacer."³³

³³"It is obvious that the Catalan bourgeoisie - the middle bourgeoisie, the big and the petty bourgeoisie - played an outstanding role, because we are talking about a shared Catalan sentiment. (...) The creation of private schools, in which it was possible to teach Catalan clandestinely or semi-legally, who was able to do that? - Of course, it would be the petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie which were able to afford their children a private school. (...) It is obvious that the Catalan bourgeoisie laid the foundations for a Catalan school
(Footnote Continued)

(Pagès, interview, 15.5.1988)

The same is true for the other cultural institutions which were the nuclei for the cultural revival.

At the same time, cultural activities were closely linked to political dissent. Many of those intellectuals who were on the forefront of the cultural revival also became involved in the Catalan opposition movement, which was held together by moderate nationalist demands, and/or were active in clandestine left-wing parties, particularly the PSUC. Thus, a cultural and political elite was formed which was able to command popular support on the basis of a common Catalan identity. On the other hand, the image of parochialism which infests Scottish culture has inhibited a full-grown revival. The comparison with Catalonia highlights the importance of a bourgeoisie and a middle class with a commitment to the national culture. In Scotland, the indigenous bourgeoisie has always been looking towards England for its culture, and now its ranks have been decimated by economic decline. If public and institutional support for Scottish writers was not forthcoming in the 1970's, private sponsors were also thin on the ground. It was demonstrated above that in Catalonia, private capital was the main source of finance for cultural projects. In Scotland, those who could afford it were not willing to pay for their culture, because it seemed provincial to them. There are far less "cultural heroes" in Scotland than in Catalonia after three decades of nationalist revival. But this is also due to the fact that those Scots who were cultural activists were given less credit for their efforts, not least because there is no autonomous Scottish government which could reward them with political and other significant posts. Only in recent years has the Scottish public been made aware of a cultural revival. This flight into culture has been related to the decline of legitimacy of established politics in Scotland.

Table 6.1 : Lyrics of "Throw the 'R' away".

I've been so sad
since you said my accent was bad.
He has worn a frown
this Caledonian clown.

I'm just gonna have to learn to hesitate
to make sure my words don't assassinate your ears.
But I would't know a single word to say
if I flattened all the vowels and I throw the 'R' away.

You say if I want to get ahead
the language I use should be left for dead.
It doesn't please your ears
that's a pity, that's a pity.

And though you're (...)
it seems you're still full of John Bull.
You just refuse to hear.

Oh what can I do
to be understood by you.
Perhaps with some money
I could talk like a bee dripping honey.

Chapter seven:

TERRITORY AND NATIONALISM

1. INTRODUCTION

Culture, political power and class come together in the issue of territoriality, which is not only central to nationalist movements, but also a fundamental human need (Johnston *et al.* (eds.), 1986, 482). Territoriality is an important part of national identity, which is always attached by a distinctive group to a specific geographic space. But more importantly, territoriality, as "the attempt by an individual or groups to influence, affect or control objects, people and relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area" (Sack, 1983, 56), permits one to analyse the conflicts which arise from nationalist movements in a more detailed, focused manner. In the previous chapters it was shown that conflicts are not just limited to the struggle for power over a territory between nationalists and the central state. They also arise within the sub-state nation between different social groups. Territoriality is also important here. On the one hand, it is used ideologically in order to unify the different social classes in the "national interest" and to create territorially based class alliances, as James Anderson argued (J. Anderson, 1988, 32). On the other hand, the dominant social class can disguise and legitimise social control by associating it with a place in which that control is exercised - in this case, the national territory.

Although territoriality is recognised to generally play a significant role in nationalist movements because it represents one of their key claims, it must also be acknowledged that its relevance to the nationalist discourse in Catalonia is far more pronounced than in Scotland. The politicisation of territoriality in Catalonia is to some extent a consequence of autonomy, which was granted in 1979. Thus, the debate surrounding the territorial reorganisation of Catalonia in 1987, and the question of a unification of the Catalan speaking territories, which has been thrown up repeatedly by various separatist groups, can both be regarded as belonging to a new phase in the politicisation of territorial and national identity. But to the extent that both issues, and particularly the first, have played a role in the nationalist movement throughout its history, they

illuminate some aspects of the movement which have received only limited attention in the previous chapters. In particular, they help to explain that alliances between different class sectors in the nationalist movement have a territorial basis, and that local identity can be mobilised in support of nationalism.

If in Catalonia local territorial identities appear to be a constituent part of nationalism, the case of Scotland shows that this does not necessarily have to be so. Although the geography of Scotland is as different from that of the rest of Britain as Catalonia's from the rest of Spain, this distinctiveness has not been politicised to nearly the same extent. In Scotland, territoriality has not been a contentious issue. The local government reorganisation in 1975, at the height of the nationalist upsurge, was treated as separate from any debate about devolution and self-government. Nationalism is not, as in the case of Catalonia, linked to a specific territorial organisation, and the nationalist movement does not have any particular demands in that respect.

In the following chapter, the issue of territoriality is assessed for both nationalist movements. In the case of Catalonia, it is argued that territoriality is connected with cultural and geographical distinctiveness, and has been employed for political purposes. In Scotland, internal territorial organisation was depoliticised and defined in terms of managerial efficiency and governability.

2. TERRITORIALITY AND THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN CATALONIA

The territorial issue has been important for Catalan nationalism in two areas. The first concerns the definition of the Catalan territory, and although this is a minority issue in Catalonia, it has received more attention in the 1980's. However, the question, whether the present boundaries of the Catalan autonomous community - which correspond to the Catalan **Principat** or dukedom - should be

accepted, or all Catalan speaking territories (Països Catalans) be united, has been around much longer. Even during the Franco period in the 1960's and 1970's, political organisations such as the **PSAN** (**Partit Socialista d'Alliberament Nacionalista**) existed which claimed to fight for the liberation of all the Catalan countries, rather than just Catalonia. Thus, there has been a small sector within Catalan nationalism advocating pan-Catalanism on the basis of a shared language and culture. In most cases, it is linked to independentist demands.

The second issue is within the main stream of Catalan nationalism, and concerns the internal territorial organisation of Catalonia. Since the early beginning of the Catalanist revival of last century, the territorial division has been a symbol of Catalan demands for self-government. It was argued by those early Catalan patriots that the comarca was the fundamental natural and/or historical unit of Catalonia, while the official territorial division in provinces had been imposed on the country in the interest of the Spanish state. During the Second Republic, the **Generalitat** adopted a territorial division which was based on the comarca, and under Franco, this was, of course, abolished along with Catalan autonomy. The Catalan opposition took the comarcal division on board, and it became a symbol for the Catalan struggle for autonomy and democracy. While it is probable that the repression under Franco increased the significance of the comarcal division, there is still the question of how and why the local sense of belonging to a comarca has been incorporated into the nationalist doctrine in the first place. Did certain social groups have a vested interest in the comarcal organisation, and did it reflect the territorial distribution of power and influence? In post-Franco Catalonia, the debate on the territorial organisation reflects political conflict crosscutting geographical divisions, and demonstrates what a central role territory can play in struggles over political hegemony.

2.1 The question of the Països Catalans

The Països Catalans (PP.CC.) are defined according to cultural and historical rather than political and economic criteria. Historically, the boundaries of the Catalan Countries are traced back to the Kingdom of Aragon and Catalonia. Culturally, they delineate the Catalan speaking areas (see Chapter six, Fig. 24). Politically and economically, however, the development in the different parts of the Kingdom of Aragon and Catalonia, was diverging. The northernmost part of the Catalan speaking area was lost to France in 1659. Aragon was an agrarian and feudal country, while Valencia and the Balearic Isles had a feudal countryside and mercantile cities. Only the **Principat**, or what is now referred to as Catalonia, underwent an industrialisation process; Valencia's tentative efforts in this direction in the mid-19th century were frustrated, and it specialised on Mediterranean agricultural produce for export. Thus, the industrial bourgeoisie, which became the main political force in the nationalist movement, was concentrated in the **Principat**, and had economic and political interest which were rather different from that of the other regions (Fontana, 1977, 5-7). Despite the common language - which is spoken by far less people in Valencia and in Aragon than in Catalonia and the Balears -, each País Catalan looks back on a distinctive social and economic development.

There was no national consciousness which united the Països Catalans in the early 20th century, when the nationalist movement in Catalonia was struggling for autonomy, and it is limited to a small minority even today (Ribó, 1977, 120). The political landscape in Catalonia was different from that in the other Catalan countries. The **Lliga Regionalista**, the **Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya**, and later the **PSUC** the **CiU** and other Catalan political organisations which evolved under the Franco period and thereafter, were only operating in the **Principat**. As late as the 1960's, a Valencian nationalist commented on his home country as "a land without politics" (Fuster, 1968, 23).

Claims of pan-Catalan unity nevertheless go back to the beginning of this century, but have traditionally been restricted to the cultural sphere. The definition of the Països Catalans reflected this, as it

explicitly ignored any (potentially divisive) factors other than the cultural heritage which unites the Catalan-speaking areas. Thus,

"the Països Catalans are the Catalan-speaking areas; areas which are poetically related to each other through language and form a higher, spiritual unit, beyond economic, social or political conjunctures..."

(Carod-Rovira, 1987, 50)

But it was only in the 1960's that concrete political claims were attached to this common cultural heritage. This was due to the fact that the Catalan language was oppressed not only in Catalonia, but also in the other Catalan speaking areas, which produced a certain degree of solidarity. It also mobilised the national consciousness among people on the Balearic Islands and in Valencia. By the time Franco died, Valencia was caught up in nationalist mobilisation as well. In 1975, Valencians witnessed the first declaration, by people from a wide political spectrum in favour of Valencian autonomy (but separately from the **Catalan** nationalist claims), and participated in demonstrations and popular manifestoes in support of Catalan to become the official language followed (Guía, 1977, 30-31).

Some years before in Catalonia, a left-wing nationalist party was formed (in 1969), which called itself "socialist national liberation party" (**Partit Socialista d'Alliberament Nacional dels PP.CC.**), and demanded the independence and unification of the Catalan countries. Despite its pan-Catalan definition of the national territory and its independentist stance, the **PSAN** collaborated with the other Catalan opposition parties and accepted the four demands of the **Assemblea de Catalunya**. These referred to the re-establishment of the Catalan **Generalitat** of the Second Republic and did not talk of independence or the **Països Catalans**. In 1974, there was a split within the **PSAN** over the attitude towards armed struggle. Various other coalitions and splits took place in the second half of the 1970's and in the 1980's, and overall, the radical nationalist camp remained very small, and divided between those who supported **ETA** strategies and those who rejected them. It was not until 1980 that an armed group, **Terra Lluire**, was formed, but so far without achieving nearly as much popular support as **ETA** has in the Basque Country. In the mid-1970's, the predominantly Barcelona based **PSAN** incorporated

increasing numbers of Valencian and Balearic activists and became prominently involved in the popular democratic campaigns (Colomer J. et al., 1976, 108). Electoral results in the autonomous elections, however, were poor.

Most of the Catalan parties, including the nationalist **CiU**, have shown no signs of adopting nationalism and of extending their operations beyond the boundaries of the Catalan **Generalitat** (Crexell, 1988, 31). As for the Balears and the Valencians, they now have their own autonomous communities and their own parties, and many nationalists there resent the "imperialist" attitudes of independentists from Catalonia. But in the political landscape of Catalonia in the 1980's, the minority groups of radical nationalists have started to attract mainly young people with no direct experience of the consensus politics of the 1970's. Groups like the **Crida**¹ and the **Moviment de Defensa de la Terra** have given the issues of territorial integration and independence a wider audience, pan-Catalan political journals such as **El Temps** and **Debat Nacionalista** provide a forum for discussion in intellectual circles. Pan-Catalan independence seems to attract mainly middle class youths² and intellectuals. However, both **Crida** and **MDT** have adopted socialist ideas, and oppose for example multinational capital with

¹The **Crida a la Solidaritat en nom de la Llengua, la Cultura i la Nació Catalanes** was formed by several institutions in order to mobilise a wide spectrum of Catalan society behind a campaign which was primarily linguistic and cultural. It wanted a more radical and faster catalanisation of the society.

²Sellarès explained:

"Where do these sectors of nationalist youths come from? I think they are basically the children of the middle class, people from the comarques. Not so much from the big bourgeoisie, although a certain conversion to Catalanism has been taking place among the bourgeoisie, which has sided with Pujol (...). But the middle class is very important in Catalonia; the botiguers, those who belong to the petty bourgeoisie. And we are talking about their children. (...) I would say that today the children of the pujolistes and the **Esquerra Republicana** are with the **Moviment de Defensa de la Terra**."

(Sellarès, interview, 14.4.1988)

great vigour. Their social and political strategies for the Països Catalans today are still ideologically incoherent, and command little popular interest. Nevertheless, it is likely that they will become more prominent in future.

2.2 Catalan nationalism and the internal division of Catalonia

If pan-Catalan nationalism is remote from the main strand of Catalan nationalism, the question of the internal organisation of the Catalan territory has played an important role since the early beginning of political Catalanism. Central to this question is the comarcal division. In order to put the recent comarcal debate into context, it is necessary to go back to the last century, which is when the territorial division of Catalonia became part of the nationalist discourse. The following subsections discuss how and why the comarcal division was invented, what role it played in early Catalan nationalism, and how it was used to establish conservative nationalist hegemony in the 1980's.

2.2.i Inventing the comarcal division of Catalonia: the political and historical context

The idea of the comarca is not a construct of the 19th century. Already in the early 17th century geography books talked about comarques as the basic territorial unit of Catalonia. The comarca was, however, not defined in terms of precise geographic boundaries; it rather represented a local area constituted through shared everyday experience. It captured a feeling of belonging to an area which was loosely held together by a set of economic and social relations.

"La comarca era un sentit de pertinença; era aquesta idea cultural més que física, **cultural**. La gent que es sentia, doncs, solidària perquè tenia els mateixos problemes - a vegades com a conseqüència per a la unitat de les condicions físiques, per que es trobaven en el mateix àplec, perquè es trobaven en el mateix mercat, en fi, la gent, sense saber bé perquè, d' aquest tros de terra deien "el Vallès", o

"l'Empordà"³, però mai s'havien preocupat on comencaven i on acabaven."

(Casassas, interview, 27.4.1988)

These small counties appeared on maps in the early 18th century, but without boundaries. When the Liberal Party took power in Spain after the death of the absolutist king Ferdinand 7th (1833), they immediately began to reorganise and rationalise the administrative system by casting over the old, hazardous division a grid of provinces, for which they took their inspiration from the French departmental division. This new territorial division was to enable the government in Madrid to modernise the country and to impose its policies through loyal civil governors (gobernadores civiles), who were appointed to preside over the administration in the provincias.

At the same time, the new regime was aware that the provinces were too large to maintain control over a country as poorly equipped with infrastructure as Spain. Therefore, it divided the provinces into smaller units, the partits judicials, in such a way that the civil guard (guardia civil) could reach every point in the area within twelve hours. The centre of a partit judicial was usually a market town in which a bureaucratic structure developed as a magistrate, a registrar, a solicitor, a tax collector and a guardia civil post were allocated to it. The four provinces of Catalonia were divided into 35 partits judicials, which closely resembled the comarcal division developed some decades later (Casassas, interview, 28.4.1988).

In creating the partits judicials, a strata of bureaucrats and professionals were established in positions of influence which closely connected them to the class of local landowners and

³"The comarca was a sense of belonging. It was a **cultural**, rather than physical, concept of people who felt solidarity with one another because they shared the same problems - sometimes as a consequence of the unity of physical features, or because they found themselves in the same **aplec**, because they belonged to a specific market place In short, without really knowing why, the people called this piece of land "**Vallès**", or that "**Empordà**", but they never worried about where it began and where it ended."

industrialists. These social groups were based in the rural towns, many of which were important agricultural markets or had some textile industry. As mentioned in Chapter two (section 3.1), the early industrialisation during the 18th century (until the steam engine became widely used) centred not so much on the coast, but inland on the rivers of the Llobregat, Cardener, Ter, Freser, Anoia, Fluvià, and in the cities of Manresa, Vilanova, Sabadell, Terrassa, Reus, Salt de Girona, Matarò and Calella. Thus, the new classes of industrialists, workers and professionals connected with industrialisation were also present in the small towns. The largest industrial centre, however, was Barcelona, which in the course of the 19th century developed rapidly to become the first industrial centre and Spain's largest city.

In the same period a wide range of associations and institutions were formed, with which the economic and intellectual bourgeoisie expressed their hegemony over Catalan civil society and established the defence of their material and ideological interests. The "excursionist movement" was part of this process, which was also affected by the Catalan cultural revival and the Romanticist interest in rural life and landscape. In 1876 and 1878, the **Associació Catalanista d'Excursions Científiques** and the **Associació d'Excursions Catalana** were founded by sections of the young generation of the thriving bourgeoisie. These societies were not simply mountaineering clubs, but comprised a whole range of activities involving the study of Catalan landscapes, archaeology, fauna and flora, etc.. They aimed at expanding the knowledge of Catalonia at a time when no such studies took place in formal education. This movement became part of the Catalan cultural and national revival⁴, and much of the comarcal debate took place in its associations. The approach to Catalan geography taken by the

⁴The first Catalanist congress, which took place in 1880, included among its 850 participants 87 members of the **Associació d'Excursionistes Catalana** and the **Associació Catalana d'Excursions Científiques**. The other participants were involved in cultural associations and journals such as the Diari Català, La Renaixensa and La Il·lustració Catalana (see Chapter two, section 3.2).

intellectuals of "excursionism" resembled that of Vidal de la Blache's regional geography, which stressed the uniqueness of small communities as the result of the interaction of cultural and physical phenomena (Holt-Jensen, 1988, 34).

In the 1880's and 1890's, when the nationalist ideologies were being thrashed out, the scientific discussion about the comarcal division in the excursionist associations was in full swing. Three types of comarcal studies were debated in the Catalanist circles, all of which were the product of the generation of the second half of the 19th century. Pella i Forges (1852 -1919) maintained that the comarques were defined by the physical relief (which gave them eternal validity), while Flos i Calçat (1859 - 1929) perceived them as products of ethnic and cultural history. Font i Sagué (1874 - 1910) integrated these views and ended up with the following - rather Vidalian - definition of the comarca, which became the basis of the nationalist vision of the Catalan comarques:

"The comarca is a territory which is determined by certain topographical accidents and where characteristic differences in language, production, uses, customs, etc. are perceived."

(quoted by Martí-Henneberg, 1986, 34)

The attachment to the local area and Catalan patriotism was one main reason for joining excursionist institutions. Though he belonged to a later generation of excursionist, the well-known geographer Josep Iglèsies provides an example of how one became interested in the Catalan comarques and identify with them. His involvement demonstrates the close connections between excursionisme, comarcal studies and Catalan geography:

"My attachment to geography derives from being an excursionist. As a youth, I was not simply a trailblazer, walking around blindly without taking notice of the things around me. I always asked myself many questions and developed a great interest and love for Catalonia, though not in abstract terms, but with a desire to touch her and get to know her down to the last detail, if that were possible. When I was young, I belonged to the excursionist section of the **Centre de Lectures de Reus**, where we brought about a revival in its cultural activities and orientations with the help of weekly conferences, well-known speakers

from Barcelona and the districts, group outings and camps, exhibitions, courses, etc.."

(Iglèsies, quoted in Nogué i Font, 1986, 107)

The increasing incidences of class struggle and working class radicalisation, which could be witnessed during the Federalist Revolution of 1868 and the First Republic (1868-74), had a notable influence on the excursionist movement. It led to a critical attitude towards the metropolis, where the working class was most numerous and best organised, and which was recognised as the centre of the revolutionary ideas. The alternative picture which was now being propagated centred on the (mountainous) interior of Catalonia as the symbol of social peace.

"...the poets and the bourgeoisie thought that too many ideas were floating around in the city, and destructive ones, too. The balance was disturbed; and the literature reflected the new state of mind, according to which the city was the centre of perversion, while the mountains signified social peace. In this context, the Catalan excursionist movement, and later political nationalism, represented the attempt of the bourgeoisie to group the different social spheres around a common ideal. From this stems the popular character which the movement was always claiming (...)."

(Martí-Henneberg, 1986, 28)

This was the situation in which the idea of the comarca became attractive to some sectors of the bourgeoisie. It represented the ideal of social peace at a time when class conflict became more frequent in the urban industrial centres, especially Barcelona. Rooted in popular tradition and everyday experience, it was a national-popular element of Catalan identity, ideally suited to unite the more conservative sectors of society.

There was, however, another reason for the revitalisation of the comarca as a territorial division. The expansion of urbanised capital posed a threat to the local bourgeoisie in the smaller rural towns, as Casassas explained:

"Es creà capital financer català que va tenir en aquest moment molta importància. I lo primer que va fer el capital financer es invertir els diners a la compra de terres i al control de les banques locals. I això els espanta. I aleshores, és curiós, és en aquests moments, els 1850, 1860, que apareix la idea de que, primer, front a les províncies

de Madrid, que implanten una política de tipus lliberal, segon, front al poder econòmic i polític de Barcelona. S'han de crear uns centres polítics de poder local que serveixen de contrapès. I aleshores (...) la idea apareix en aquests moments de que les províncies són l'òrgan del centralisme de Madrid, que realment interessa és el reflotament de unes unitats petites que consagrin el poder de les classes rurals amb un territori per poder salvaguardar els seus interessos - cosa que no diuen mai, sino de salvaguardar la seva personalitat. De salvaguardar les característiques especials de cada una d' aquestes comarques. I a Catalunya, lo que és normal, natural, tradicional, etc., són les comarques. I la comarca s'ha de convertir en una futura Catalunya en l'òrgan de govern de Catalunya, perquè és el respecte a la individualitat de cada tros de territori."⁵

(Casassas, interview, 28.4.1988)

But, as Riquer pointed out, this did not signify that the rural bourgeoisie was in the least opposed to the capitalist modes of production and property ownership. It militated against the "urban values" and liberal ideas which were associated with the domination of the countryside through the industrial city and which threatened the position of the rural bourgeoisie in the rich comarques (Riquer, 1987, 82-83). Thus, the reasons for wanting to promote the comarques as the proper division of Catalonia to some extent reflected the political and economic interests of the bourgeoisie, both in the city of Barcelona and the comarcatal towns. Although the rural and the urban bourgeoisies were on one level engaged in a struggle for

⁵"Catalan financial capital was formed which at the time was of great importance. And the first thing finance capital did was to invest money in land property and in the control of local banks. This frightened them. And this is the time, in the 1850's and 1860's, when the idea appeared that one should stand up firstly to the provinces of Madrid from where the liberal policies were coming, and secondly to the economic and political power of Barcelona [which is also a provincial capital]; that political centres of local power had to be created which could serve as a counterweight. At this point, (...), the idea appeared that the provinces were the instrument of centralism of Madrid, and that a resurrection of small units was necessary, in order to preserve the power of the rural classes within their territories, and to enable them to safeguard their interests. They would never say this explicitly, but rather express it in terms of "safeguarding the personality of the territory"; safeguarding the peculiar characteristics of each one of these comarques. And in Catalonia, the comarques stand for normality, naturalness, tradition, etc.. Thus, the comarca must become the government organ in a future Catalonia, because it is the respect for the individuality of every piece of territory."

supremacy, both agreed on the need to keep the working class out of the political arena, and thus shared a deeply conservative attitude (Riquer, 1987, 80-81; see Chapter two, section 5.2). The fact that it drew on already existing senses of belonging among the population is also important, because it explains why the comarcal idea appealed to the people, and not only to those who had a vested interest in social peace and territorially fixed property.

The question now arises how and why the comarques became part of the Catalanist movement in the final decades of the 19th century. It is important to remember in this context that there was a big overlap between the political and the cultural aspect of the movement, and that associations like the excursionists were deeply involved in cultural Catalanism. But this does not automatically explain why a political movement which had as its centre Barcelona adopted an idea which would strengthen the rural towns and their respective economic and social leaders.

2.2.ii Catalanising the comarques: the Catalanist movement at the turn the century

The comarcal division played a significant role in the major competing ideological treatises of bourgeois Catalanism at the end of the 19th century. Reference to two writers of the time, Almirall and Torras i Bages, will be sufficient to demonstrate this. The first promoted a Catalan regionalism based on a powerful bourgeoisie and a modern, industrial capitalist society which should aim at as much autonomy from the rest of Spain as possible (Solé-Tura, 1970, 109). The second represented the rural conservative strand in Catalan nationalism and promoted the comarcal division as a means of preserving the old social order against the threat of revolution.

Almirall perceived Catalonia as an organic, objectively existing unit, the particularity of which is denied by the centralist Spanish state. Solé-Tura argues that

"[i]n denouncing bureaucratic centralism, he also rejects the progressive contents of Jacobinism and takes position against party politics, propagating instead the organic integration of all classes and strata of every distinctive nucleus."

(Solé-Tura, 1970, 111)

This anti-centralist position led him to defend the comarques as the proper territorial organisation of Catalonia. But how did this fit the vision of a industrial society at a time when Barcelona was already set to become the dominant city in Catalonia? The answer probably lies with the real geographic and political divisions within Catalonia, which made it difficult for any nationalist movement to embrace the whole population, or even all sectors of the dominant class. Almirall's answer to this was his particularist thesis which consecrated not only the distinctions **between** different nations and peoples, but also the personality of every group or variety **within** them. In Almirall's view, the solution to the conflict between the hegemonic classes of Catalonia and Spain consisted in autonomy for Catalonia, while the conflicts between different social groups **within** Catalonia can be reconciled only by perceiving Catalonia as an organic whole, the individuality of whose constituent parts is respected.

In the writings of Torras i Bages, one of the most influential ideologues of political Catalanism and bishop of Vic, the class interests connected with the nationalists' interest in the comarca become more obvious. In his essay on the church and regionalism⁶, Torras i Bages looked at the developments in neighbouring France, and argued that the disappearance of regionalism there had been a causal factor of the French Revolution - which in his view caused "miserable social dissolution":

"The strongest argument against centralism is the modern revolution, which had been impossible under the antique,

⁶Torras i Bages, J. (1985): L'Església i el Regionalisme i altres textos (1887-1899). The title essay was written in response to two publications by Almirall, Lo Catalanisme in 1886 and L'Espanne telle qu'elle est in 1887, which most bourgeois Catalanists and the Church found too left-wing.

regionalist social system, just as a serious disease is impossible in a body where the humours are balanced and appropriately distributed over all its constituent parts (...) Thus, the Revolution came as a consequence of the annihilation of the antique society which was organised in regions, and therefore, due to this sinful legacy with which it was conceived, and which forms part of its nature, it is anti-regionalist⁷ of necessity."

(Torras i Bages, 1985, 35)

This vision, which looks back to a glorified medieval past, perceives the political parties, the state and big capital as the forces which destroy the infrastructure of the comarques. These are characterised by communal property, agricultural banks, communal schools and other institutions. In other words, the essence of the comarques, as seen by Torras i Bages, is being destroyed:

"The foundation of the regional life is the love (...) for one's own land, (...), that affection for the comarca, its mountains, rivers, villages, churches, for the customs by which it is governed, for the institutions which live in it, the monuments which adorn it (...).

(Torras i Bages, 1985, 39)

As Solé-Tura points out, Torras i Bages regarded the rural Catalonia as the only "authentic" one, and largely ignored the industrial and urban sector. Whenever he did refer to it, he adopted a moralistic tone. In his view, the society in the modern cities had lost its spiritual bonds and was held together only by materialist and egoist interests. While in the large city immoral lifestyles, despotism and anarchy prospered, the rural/regional life was dominated by the love of the home and the fatherland, which was the necessary condition for a morally sane society (Solé-Tura, 1970, 82).

The two ideologists presented above reflect the considerable tensions which existed within Catalonia between the countryside and the industrial city, between comarcal towns and Barcelona city, and between the new urban proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The crisis of the Spanish state of 1898, which affected both the rural and the urban bourgeoisie in Catalonia, brought about a convergence between

⁷Torras i Bages refers to Catalonia as a "region".

the two groups. The rural bourgeoisie had always been critical of government influence and keen to preserve their local power bases, and had therefore a strong regionalist lobby. Now, the urban industrial bourgeoisie had also come round to the regionalist position (Riquer, 1987, 84). The comarcal division became a symbol for the ideological compromise between the two sectors of the Catalan bourgeoisie. It was useful in reconciling the different nationalist and regionalist visions to one single nationalist doctrine that was acceptable to the traditional rural and the urban industrial middle and upper classes. As mentioned above (Chapter two, section 5.1) Prat de la Riba formed in 1891 the **Unió Catalanista**, which in its first assembly one year later in Manresa approved the **Bases per la Constitució Regional Catalana**. The Bases accepted the comarcal division as the proper territorial division of Catalonia, and from then on, the comarcal structure became an integral part of the nationalist doctrine, and a symbol of resentment against the existing centralist structure of the Spanish state.

2.2.iii Making the comarca functional: the territorial theme in the first Generalitat

The first opportunity of converting the nationalist ideal of internal territorial organisation into reality arose with the establishment of the autonomous government of the Generalitat in 1931. Soon after it was established by the Republican Government, the Generalitat appointed a commission, the **Ponència d'Estudi de la Divisió Territorial de Catalunya**, to elaborate a territorial division based on the comarques which could be used to decentralise the administration of the Generalitat. Pau Vila, a geographer who at the time presided over the **Centre Excursionista de Catalunya**, became the vice-president of the **Ponència**, which consisted of highly respected professionals and intellectuals. Pau Vila had previously worked on a comarcal division based on Font i Sagué's map, but the commission decided to elaborate a division from scratch.

"At the time it was made known that the planned survey would start from scratch, and that no previous report, not even one signed by individual members of the committee, would influence the decisions in any way."

(Iglèsies, quoted in Nogué i Font, 1986, 111)

When the **Ponència** began its research, it soon transpired that the definition and delineation of the comarques was based on popular perceptions of belonging. They approached the over 1,000 local authorities and asked them to which comarca they belonged. As a result, 118 comarques emerged. Other criteria used were economic (market), which yielded 87 comarques. Since the commission believed that such large numbers of administrative units were not functional, they returned to the partits judicials and the old comarcal maps, modified them slightly in the light of their findings, and drew up a map of 38 comarques, which was accepted by the government (Casassas, interview, 28.4.1988) (Fig. 27). As soon as the map was published in 1933, complaints began pouring in of people and institutions which did not accept the new division. But the suspension of the Generalitat between 1934 and 1936 and other, more urgent, priorities during the Civil War prevented the implementation of the new territorial organisation in any case. However, the revolutionary parties and the syndicates used these comarques for administering some aspects of the war economy⁸, and in 1937, the Generalitat legalised this practice (Lluch and Nel.lo, 1984, 25; Solé-Sabaris, 1984, 111).

However strong or weak the popular acceptance of the comarcal division at the time and the failure to fully implement it, the official acceptance by the Generalitat had undoubtedly converted it into an integral part of Catalan political autonomy. This became clear in the 1970s when the political parties felt that they could not avoid the inclusion of the comarcal division in their catalogue of demands, even if they had wanted.

⁸The **Concell d'Economia** (Catalan Department of Economy) was the driving force behind this use of the comarcal structure as the territorial organisation of the new collectivised structures of the Catalan economy.

2.2.iv The use of the comarca as a cultural and political symbol during the Franco period

Under Franco, the the comarcal structure was abolished together with the Generalitat. Although the comarques lost their official role, they remained an integral part of the suppressed Catalan political culture, and were used in some political institutions of the Catalan opposition, such as the **Assamblea de Catalunya** and the **Commissions Obreres**, as well as by cultural institutions such as the **Omnium Cultural** and the **Congrès de Cultura Catalana**. The excursionist tradition and the informal study of Catalan **comarques** was also resumed.

Soon after the end of the war, the excursionist associations increased their activities again, assuming the role of an alternative popular university which was trying to fill the gaps created by an education system strongly opposed to Catalan studies. Within the same movement, comarcal study institutions were formed to bring together local researchers and people interested in their cultural and physical environment. From 1950 onwards inter-comarcal conferences took place in different towns in Catalonia⁹, often coinciding with the opening of a privately funded comarcal study centre, library, or museum, and consisting of papers on different aspects of the particular comarca which was hosting the conference. Iglèsies, who had been Secretary of the **Ponència** of 1932-33, and a cultural adviser to the Republican **Generalitat**, was the figure in organising these conferences.

Some of the larger and more established comarcal study centres became important foci for Catalanists and researchers working on Catalan themes at a time when these were absent from the curricula of the schools and universities. In the 1960's and 1970's cultural

⁹Between 1950 and 1982, 27 comarcal assemblies took place. The first was in Matorell, and was one of the first public events held in Catalan. The second, in Santes Creus, had to take place behind closed doors for fear of intervention of the authorities (Gran Enciclopèdia Catalana, Supplement, 1983, 82; Nogué i Font, 1986, 109).

revival, many Catalan comarcal journals, such the Revista del Centre de Lectura de Reus, Aplec de Treball of the Centre d'Estudis de la Conca de Barberà and the Miscel.lania Penedescena, originated in comarcal study centres. They usually published articles on local history, architecture, earth sciences, arts and folklore, and botany, similar to the 19th century **Associació Catalana d'Excursions Científiques**.

Guillamet has argued that large parts of the comarcal press assumed a political role in the 1960s and the 1970s in the struggle against the dictatorship and for the democratic and national reconstruction of Catalonia. He maintained that publishing at the comarcal level and for a comarcal or local readership was deeply rooted in Catalonia from the 19th century, and that attempts to establish a provincial press like in the rest of Spain failed to eradicate this tradition (Guillamet, 1983, 24-26). As in many other examples of anti-Francoist activities, the comarcal press is not political in the narrow sense. However, under the conditions of the Franco regime, the decision of groups of people to maintain or revive their cultural practices was interpreted as political.

The Catalan language journal Serra d'Or (see Chapter six, section 2.4.ii) also adopted the comarcal division as a frame of reference for its news section "Informació Cultural"¹⁰. In the first year of the journal, Jordi Pujol was its coordinator and in charge of liaisons with the comarques (Bastardes, 1984, 27). The news included reports from excursionist centres, folklore groups, sardana associations, poetry readings and local conferences, church activities and choir performances, etc., and testified to the revival of Catalan culture in the comarques.

As in previous periods, the comarcal division was used by Catalan nationalists to unify the Catalan territory, although some criticised the "unrealistic egalitarianism" in the comarcal movement

¹⁰This section was later called "L'actualitat catalana", "Vida catalana" and "Terres catalanes".

which tended to ignore the huge differences in the economic and social variations between the comarques (Table 7.1). The problem of caciquisme, i.e. the control of a locality by a locally powerful, politically well-connected, wealthy individual or social group, was closely linked to these variations. It was also claimed that the institutions which promote comarcal studies are often linked to these local oligarchies (Carreras et al., 1971, 24). This criticism shows that the class interests in the comarcal division played a role in the 1960's as well as at the turn of the century. It anticipated the accusations from the Catalan Left which were directed against the dominant conservative-nationalist interpretation of the comarcal organisation under the **Generalitat** in the 1980's.

Although some oppositional political forces used the comarcal division for their internal organisation, it seems that under Franco, the division had far more ideological and symbolic significance than practical relevance. Most of the nationalist and anti-Francoist activities took place in and around Barcelona anyway, and political awareness was rather low in most other areas. It was only with the re-establishment of the Catalan Generalitat after the demise of the Franco regime that the political debate about the internal organisation of Catalonia was revived. This was the moment when the comarca turned from being part of a discourse established in defiance of the dictatorship into an issue of political control, decentralisation and local administration, by which all the settlements and inhabitants could feel affected¹¹. The doubts about the legitimacy of the comarcal division of 1933 and its relevance to Catalonia in the 1980's now came to the surface:

¹¹The lively public debate on the issue of territorial organisation testified to this interest. Between only January of 1984 and September of 1985, Lluçh and Nel.lo listed 36 debating events and conferences, most of which involved local authorities, comarcal study centres, educational institutions, geographic societies, and politicians. The public interest was greatest in the areas most affected by population concentration or depopulation, and in those areas where the comarcal division was contested (Lluçh and Nel.lo, 1985, 29, 32-35).

"Tothom tenia assumit que dintre de la reivindicació catalanista republicana calia també fer referència a les comarques d'en Pau Vila com a contraposició a la província, i per això doncs hi havia estudis comarcals i col·leccions de geografia comarcals i altres coses d'aquest tipus, i per tant les comarques històriques es feien funcionar en el món acadèmic com unitats d'anàlisi. Però a la hora de donar'ls hi una personalitat política, ningú s'ho acabava de creure, i ningú acabava de tenir ganes de fer-ho realment."¹²

(Nadal, interview, 20.4.1988)

The **Estatut d'Autonomia** of 1979 committed the Catalan government to introduce a comarcal division, but at the same time guaranteed the already existent levels of local government autonomy. Since it did not specify which kind of comarcal division was to be created, and made no mention of the comarcal map of 1933, it revived the debate about the definition of the comarcal division. After years of demanding Catalan autonomy and the reinstitution of the comarcal division in the same breath, the political parties now had doubts whether the comarques of 1933 were at all useful for modern government requirements. Subirà¹³, from the **CDC (Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya)**, maintained that the validity of the division of 1933 was arguable:

"We thought that the 1936 division had been mystified, because it never had functioned. It was a thing which had only positive connotations and no defects, since it never had been put into practice."

(Subirà, interview, 28.3.1988)

¹²"Everybody assumed that within the framework of the republican Catalanist demands, they also had to demand that the comarques of Pau Vila replaced the provinces. Therefore, comarcal studies were pursued, and geographical collections on the comarques and other studies of this type were produced. In this way the historical comarques were used in the academic world as units of analysis. However, when it came to giving them a political function, it turned out that no one believed in this, and nobody really felt like doing it."

¹³Antoni Subirà represented the ruling nationalist party in the second commission on the territorial reorganisation, which was set up by the Catalan Parliament in 1984.

Only in 1987 did the government coalition reluctantly present a bill to the Catalan Parliament which dealt with the issue and finally brought a long-winded debate to an end which gave rise to bitter confrontations between the different political forces. In the following section, some of the main issues in the debate are discussed.

2.2.v. Institutionalising the comarca: the political conflict over the territorial division in the autonomous Catalonia

The political significance of the territorial debate in the 1980's must be seen in the context of demographic, economic and social changes that had taken place in Catalonia since the 1930's, and which had strong spatial impacts. Enric Lluç sketchd out these major changes that developed during the 1960's and 1970's:

"The concentration of productive activities, the transport system and population, in what we would describe today as the metropolitan area of Barcelona, is a very important phenomenon. After the rise of Tarragona and its surrounding areas in the 1960's, another area has emerged in the comarques of the Camp region which bears no relation with the same area in 1931. Along the coast of Region II of the Generalitat, between Blanes and Portbou, there has been an extraordinary transformation, provoked by the phenomenon of European tourism, which has produced a territorial structure which did not exist before: the Costa Brava. (...) There have also been very significant changes in the Alt Pirineu: The snow, the milk and the summer tourism are probably now the main income sources. And everywhere in Catalonia there is the other, negative, side: the rural exodus, the de-industrialisation of the comarques of the interior."

(quoted in Borja, 1984, 625)

Changes in the spatial organisation of production, the higher degree of spatial integration through improved transport, and the grossly uneven distribution of people (Fig. 28) thus threw doubts on the old comarcal division, which may or may not have suited the Catalonia of the 1930's.

But even more important was the question what purposes a new comarcal organisation should serve, and whom it should serve. It was mentioned in Chapter five (section 3.1.i) that there has been a more general development at the level of the state which influenced the comarcal debate. The functions of the state as a provider of social and physical infrastructure, and the bureaucratisation of the public and private spheres which came along with these functions, increased significantly over the last decades. The process of democratisation of the political system had given rise to new public demands on the state. The issue of the Catalan territorial organisation therefore received a new political dimension in addition to that of being part

of a set of nationalist demands. The territorial debate of the 1980's brought a new set of political questions to the surface which were connected to different conceptions of decentralisation, participation and greater transparency of local politics. Should it be geared to administration within the present territorial structures, or should it rather serve as an instrument of redressing the uneven geographical distribution of economic and demographic development? Should the comarques make central government more efficient, or local government more autonomous and accessible to the people it represents? Should the new territorial division replace the municipal units (many of which are too small¹⁴), the provinces, both, or neither? Apart from representing yet another layer of local government, the provinces were in the eyes of many nationalists a symbol of central government control. In 1980, the Catalan Parliament was prevented from transferring the competences of the four provincial governments to the **Generalitat**, because the Constitutional Court decided it was unconstitutional. This frustrated attempt at solving the problem of territorial organisation made the **Generalitat** wary of the whole issue. The **Generalitat** also seemed reluctant to decentralise power so soon after it had gained it. It argued that in a period of national reconstruction, "the government had to keep the reins of power in its own hands and control the situation" (Casassas, interview, 28.4.1988).

On the other hand, the debate over degrees and types of internal decentralisation and devolution of power was governed by party political considerations of territorial control. The Socialists were in charge of the metropolitan area of Greater Barcelona and the capitals of the other three provinces, while the nationalist coalition **CiU** was stronger in the less populated rural areas and the smaller comarcals towns, where it managed to establish a voting

¹⁴The total number of local government units (municipis) was 935. More than 70 per cent of these had less than 2,000 inhabitants, and a large percentage of the Catalan population was concentrated in relatively few local authorities (Bernis i Calatayud, 1987, 10).

majority between 1980 and 1984 (Table 7.2 and 7.3; Fig. 29). Creating an administrative tier, which would give more power and influence to the rural territories and take administrative functions away from the provincias, could therefore create a power base for the government coalition. Thus, the question about the comarcal organisation was no longer only a problem of the lack of precision of local people's perceptions of place and sense of belonging, but became a political question about the purpose of comarcalisation and about models of autonomous government. Ultimately, it was about how to establish political hegemony.

Since the politicians were reluctant to address themselves to the issue in parliament, they took their time over it. During the first **Generalitat** under a minority government of the nationalist CiU coalition, the Catalan Parliament set up a commission to prepare legislation on territorial organisation. The commission limited itself to collecting opinions from institutions of civil society, but never used them constructively:

"Aleshores aquesta gent - poc a poc sense correr massa - van començar a fer un treball que serà interessant de llegir un dia o altre però que ningú ha vist mai, de recullir opinions de gent. Van convidar persones que s'havien preocupat per la divisió territorial, organitzacions patronals, els sindicats, les universitats, la societat catalana de geografia, alguns autors que havien escrit llibres, per exemple jo hi vaig anar per la societat de geografia, jo hi vaig anar per l'universitat, i jo hi vaig anar com autor d'un llibre de la organització territorial de Catalunya. (...) Ja es veia, i ja es veia que a més a més no tenien cap interès de correr, de que s'acabaria la legislatura i que no haurien acabat el seu informe. Perque no tenien cap ganes de fer un informe. Perquè, al nivell personal, ¿que et confesaven? Doncs, que sí que l'opinió general gairebé de tothom és de que s'havien de restablir les comarques del 1936, però, més, menys, més grans, més petites, s'havia de canviar la idea de que no havia de servir de base, però no hi havia un acord exactament quins havien de ser i sobretot lo que no hi havia era un acord sobre el contingut qu' havien de tenir les comarques."¹⁵

¹⁵"Now, these people began - without great hurry - to document people's opinions. One day it would be interesting to read this
(Footnote Continued)

(Casassas, interview, 27.4.1988)

Thus, there was a general consensus that the comarques had to be re-established because they were part of the demands for autonomy and formed part of the Catalan spirit. No Catalan political party wanted to dissociate itself from these nationalist tenets. Everything else however was undecided.

From the academic debate during the 1970's and the early 1980's, two basic models of territorial organisation emerged. One defended the comarcal division of 1933 with the 38 comarques. The other was based on an investigation by Casassas and Clusa in the late 1970's (Casassas and Clusa, 1981). They came up with a division of the territory in five regions - dominated by the present provincial capitals, and Manresa - which would serve for the decentralisation of the administration of the **Generalitat**. Next to these cities, the other Catalan towns which the division of 1933 designated as comarcal capitals play a much lesser role. As far as the local government structure was concerned, Casassas and Clusa found that only a few territories were functioning according to the comarcal model. Much more frequent were smaller areas, consisting of a group of villages and small towns without a dominant urban centre which they called municipalies. These municipalies functioned as an "extended town" of everyday interaction and mutual dependence. According to Casassas, the new territorial division should respond to contemporary needs. It should be based on the principles of local

(Footnote Continued)

material, but no one has ever set eyes on it. They invited people who had occupied themselves with the territorial division, employers' organisations, trade unions, universities, the **Societat Catalana de Geografia**, authors who had written books on the issue. I was summoned three times (...). But one could see already that they had no interest in acting fast, and that Parliament would finish without them having finished their report. Because in fact, they did not feel like making a report. What did they confessed to you under four eyes? Well, that the general opinion of nearly everyone was that the comarques of 1936 had to be re-established, but that they should be made more, or less, or larger, or smaller... The idea that the division of 1936 should not serve as a basis had to be abandoned, but there was no agreement about exactly how the comarques should look like, and above all, what was missing was an agreement about the content they should be given."

democracy and participation, simplicity, and administrative and economic efficiency, rather than being modelled on the necessities of the autonomous government:

"¿Es una entitat jerarquitzada, capital, súbdits, senyor que mana, senyors que obeixen? Això seria una definició que ens en aniria bé per posar-hi el representant de la Generalitat, perquè és el que mana, i els altres que obeeixen. O bé per la gent que viu al territori, no els que están a un despatx a Barcelona, sino els que viuen al territori, la comarca es un conjunt de municipis interrelacionats amb relacions diàries."¹⁶

(Casassas, interview, 28.4.1988)

Casassas' and Clusa's ideas were taken up by the Communist Party (PSUC) and used in the election programme for the autonomous elections in 1984 (PSUC, 1984, 59) and in the parliamentary debates in March 1987. The PSUC wanted to abolish the four provinces and to let the local government administrations decide to which comarca they wanted to belong, expecting to arrive at 80 to 90 with this "method from below".

As the first Ponència failed to reach a solution, a second parliamentary commission was set up after the 1984 elections in which CiU won the majority of the seats. This gave them the power to enforce their own territorial model on the commission. Catalonia was now carved up into Socialist and CiU territories, with the former dominating the Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona (CMB) and the Provincial Governments (diputacions), and the latter winning most of the rural areas and small towns. The legislation which reached the Parliament in March 1987 was put forward by CiU and affected the CMB, the local governments, the provinces and the comarques. They

- i) abolished the CMB,

¹⁶"What is a comarca? Is it a hierarchical unit, with a capital and subordinates, one who gives orders and the rest who obeys? This would be an appropriate definition if we wanted to locate there representatives of the **Generalitat**, because they would give the orders and the others would have to obey. For those people who live there - not those who are in an office somewhere in Barcelona, but those who live on the territory - the comarca is a group of municipal authorities which are linked to each other through everyday interaction."

- ii) adopted the central legislation framework for local government to the Catalan case,
- iii) created a framework for future laws which would enable the Generalitat to assume the competences of the diputacions, and
- iv) established the comarcal division of 1933.

The electoral system and the boundaries adopted for the comarques made it possible for **CiU** to control all but four comarcal councils, because of the concentration of the urban industrial population in only a few comarques.

The political debate about the territorial organisation in the 1980's also demonstrated that the consensus between the Catalan parties on the issue of self-government had broken down. Although the Catalan president, Pujol, ostensibly wanted the territorial organisation of the country to be reached by consensus (Lluch and Nel.lo, 1985, 27), neither the result nor the way in which it was achieved suggest that this was the case. In reality, it was a struggle for hegemony in Catalonia between different parties which had formed part of the nationalist movement. Matias Vives, the speaker for the **PSUC** in the territorial debate, argued that **CiU** never really tried to establish a consensus because it would have had to compromise considerably. **CiU** attempted to isolate its main opponent, the Socialists (**PSC-PSOE**), by creating a "national alliance" with the "Catalan" parties, **Esquerra Republicana** and the **PSUC**, against the "centralist Spanish" **PSC-PSOE** and **AP**. This failed, but the Socialists did not collaborate with the other opposition parties by accepting an alternative solution to the comarcal division proposed by the **CiU** (Vives, interview, 11.4.1988). The Socialist party was concerned with keeping hold of its power base in the **CMB**, and to prevent the shift of functions and resources from the existing local authorities to the **comarques**. Joaquim Nadal, the Socialist president of the federation of Catalan local authorities (**Federació de Municipis Catalana**) said that his view,

" - which is not exactly that of the socialist party - is that by polarising the whole attention on the **Llei de la Corporació Metropolitana**, the problems posed by the other

laws were diluted. I think that the debate about the **CMB** dominated all the other debates, and therefore caused damage above all to the comarcal and the municipal laws."

(Nadal, interview, 20.4.1988)

The comarques which the **Generalitat** established in 1987¹⁷ have few resources and powers. Squeezed between the provincial administration and the virtually unchanged local authorities, they have to rely on functions which the local authorities are not capable of carrying out, and on tasks transferred to them by the **Generalitat**. It is difficult to see how they could develop into anything other than a bureaucratic tier through which the governing **CiU** can stabilise and extend its control.

Despite the extensive nature of the debate on, and behind, the political stage, it seems that the wrong questions were addressed. Casassas suggested that fundamental problems, such as the decentralisation of government and the uneven distribution of development and resources, were neglected, and the whole issue was turned into a party political struggle:

"Es curiós, perquè totes quatre lleis, discutides una a una, van omplir mesos i mesos de discussions. I la discussió va ser com a una cortina de fum; jo crec que va ser una manera d'entretenir el país davant de altres problemes més importants que hi havia - i que hi ha -, i una mostra de la rivalitat que hi ha entre els dos partits majoritaris que no s'arriben a entendre mai. Però, va servir per fer desaparèixer lo que fa referència a la organització territorial el veritable problema que és: ¿Quina es la naturalesa de les comarques? ¿Què representa la comarca a Catalunya? ¿Què és, amb tota la seva evolució històrica desde que va apareixer el concepte de la comarca política fins a la comarca política actual? ¿Perquè ha seguit una determinada trajectòria? ¿A qui l'interessa la comarca? ¿Per a què volen la comarca? Aquest debat no es va tenir. Amb molta abilitat el govern va convertir el debat, i potser amb

¹⁷After the laws had gone through the Catalan parliament, three additional comarques were conceded by the Commission which was dealing with popular objections to the comarcal boundaries. These are Plà de l'Estany, which lies to the west of Gironès; Plà d'Urgell south of Urgell; and Alta Ribagorça in the northwestern corner of Catalonia on the border with the autonomous community of Aragon. Other complaints by local governments and proposals for new comarques were rejected (Casassas, interview, 18.4.1988).

una curtedat de vista de la posició, en una discussió de què interessa els consells que governaran les comarques, com s'anomenaran els consellers ...¿entens?, en qüestions de tipus tècnic. El diàleg va ser un diàleg de sords, un diàleg molt llarg, però la clau fonamental de què és la comarca, per què serveix la comarca, a qui ha de servir la comarca, (...) no es va discutir, i vam continuar dient que les comarques del 32-36 eren unes comarques magnífiques i que la única qüestió era qui governaria les comarques i com es repartiria el poder."¹⁸

(Casassas, interview, 28.4.1988)

2.2.vi. Territorial organisation and political control

The territorial organisation was picked out as a component of the nationalist discourse which has transformed over time and adapted by different political and social forces, but nevertheless continued to be part of the Catalan history. Comparable to the Catalan language, the sense of belonging to a comarca - whatever its exact boundaries - is deeply rooted in a large part of the population, and has been glorified by another part which lives in metropolitan areas where other territorial identities are stronger. Since the comarcal identity is not class specific, it can serve as a cohesive agent, and be politicised in a variety of ways. Thus, the comarques have a

¹⁸"The four laws, discussed one by one, took months and months of discussion. And the discussion had the effect of a curtain of smoke. I think that it was a way of entertaining the country, while other, more important problems, which existed then and which still exist today, were pushed into the background. It was a demonstration of the rivalry between two major parties which will never reach an understanding. But it also succeeded in keeping out from the agenda of territorial organisation some real problems, such as these: What is the nature of the comarques? What represents the comarca in Catalonia? How has the meaning of the political comarca changed since it first made its appearance? Why has it followed a specific process of development? Who is interested in the comarca? Why do they want the comarca? This debate has not taken place. The government converted the debate with great skill, and maybe with a short-sighted view, into a discussion about the councils which govern the comarca, about how these councillors are to be elected, in short, about technical questions. The dialogue became a dialogue of the deaf, and a **very long** dialogue, but the key questions, what the comarca is and whom it should serve, was not discussed. So they kept repeating that the comarques of 1933-36 were magnificent comarques and that the only problem was who should govern them and how the powers should be distributed."

conservative connotation stemming from the 19th century, and a progressive, or even radical, history which is linked to the republican Generalitat, and which was carried into the anti-Francoist opposition after the civil war.

During the dictatorship, the territorial debate re-emerged with the cultural revival, and its identification with Catalanism of different versions, but specifically of the Second Republic, heightened its political significance and converted it into a major issue after autonomy was achieved. The participants of the debate were always intellectuals (in the widest sense) and politicians, but the topic was much less specialised and technocratic than in other countries, and more people took an interest in it (Tables 7.4 and 7.5).

With the arrival of Catalan autonomy, the "comarcal consensus" began to break, but no political party was willing to distance itself from this Catalanist symbol. The law of 1987 which re-established the 38 comarques was described by Vives as a "great piece of archaeology" because it dug out the old comarcal boundaries. Since the comarcal identity was also existing among the popular classes, it could not be identified with any specific political ideology (Vives, 1987, 51). However, the functions, which the comarcal division were given in 1987, did correspond to the interest of the ruling Catalan party, which took it as an opportunity to fortify its influence and its bureaucratic structure in large parts of the territory, and to establish a competing level of government in others, where it had less support. At the same time, it was able to claim that it gave the Catalan people back the right to govern themselves in their own territory, and thus legitimise its Catalanist image.

3. TERRITORIALITY AND THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN SCOTLAND

While territory and its organisation have an important place in Catalan nationalism, these issues were less politicised in the case of Scotland. The reasons are partly historical, because, unlike the

Catalans, the Scottish nationalist movement did not have an alternative government model to which they could easily refer. But geographical divisions, which are interwoven with economic, social and cultural discrepancies, are also present in Scotland, as is the need for the nationalist movement to reconcile different social groups and territorially based interests. The previous chapters have exposed some of these geographical disparities. The next three subsections demonstrate that the external boundaries of the Scottish nation have been successfully questioned by unionists, and the internal division of Scotland's territory remained confined to questions of administrative efficiency.

3.1 The Shetland pawns: Scottish territory and North Sea oil interests

The Scottish territory is a well-defined economic unit, which has long been used in government statistics and censuses. In the Scottish Office, Scotland has also a separate administrative body. Even before the nationalist movement became politically relevant in the 1960's, the territorial boundaries of Scotland were well established and widely recognised. Far less accepted was the argument that the people within these boundaries had a legitimate claim to political autonomy. However, when the Scottish National Party started to voice these claims with increasing volume, at least one thing seemed clearly defined, and that was the territory to which these claims referred.

Things changed when North Sea oil was pushed to the forefront of the political agenda in Scotland, and the SNP claimed that it was Scottish oil. Those areas, where vested interests were most concentrated, became subject to territorial conflicts. The Nationalists argued that most of the North Sea oil and gas fields belonged to Scotland, if the Continental Shelf Jurisdiction Order of

1968¹⁹ or the Continental Shelf Treaty were applied. Given the prospects of self-sufficiency in oil and of huge tax revenues, the SNP oil campaign was a direct economic threat to the British state.

This was the perception of those sectors of the Labour and Conservative parties which opposed devolution with the argument that it would only lead to separatism. To counter this threat, they undermined the territorial integrity of Scotland by playing the Shetland card. The same methods of delineating the maritime boundaries were used to ascertain that more than half of the supposedly Scottish resources would in fact belong to the Shetland Islands (Glasgow Herald, 4.4.1977). Media attention thus switched to the Shetland Islands, lying to the northeast of Scotland, which were claimed to not really belong to the Scottish nation, because their cultural heritage was distinctively Norse, rather than Celtic or Anglo-Saxon as the Scottish mainland. The Shetlanders, it was argued, may not want to be part of an independent Scotland, but prefer a favourable deal with Westminster, if it gave them more autonomy. The reason was that the Shetland Islands did not need a strong Scottish Assembly to help their economy to its feet, because they were experiencing an unprecedented economic boom based on the oil industry. The Shetland council had just been established as a single tier local authority under the Local Government (Scotland) Act in 1973, and been given special planning powers to deal with oil developments. Fear arose that these powers would be diminished by a future Scottish Assembly, and oil wealth would be "gobbled up" by the areas of deprivation in the central belt (Lawson, 1989, 13). Therefore, they did not share Scotland's interest in devolution (Times, 16.11.1977). It was asserted that an independent Scotland under SNP control would almost certainly refuse to respect the Shetlanders' "autonomy", because it would be economically too dependent on the oil revenues to do so:

¹⁹This order was drawn up by the British government in order to separate the reference of accidents, crimes, etc. to either the Scottish or the English legal system.

"The islanders' only hope is that England, in the transitional period, would uphold their right to independence and to be governed, with whatever status, from Westminster. (...) Scotland, with its appetite for oil resources and adequate resources of its own, would, in extremes, simply annexe it. A community of 20,000 people without patronage alliances could not resist a country of five million people."

(Glasgow Herald, 4.4.1977)

That the Shetlanders' right to independence was equalled in the above article to the right to be governed from Westminster suggested that its author could see no reason why Westminster would want to give the Shetlanders real independence. They were only pawns in the political conflict between Nationalists and the British government. The real reason was to undermine the SNP's arguments for an independence which was made attractive through the prospect of oil wealth. In this endeavour, the unionist parties used the ambiguous issues of territorial identity²⁰. Although it is true that the Shetlanders have preserved their own identity and expressed greater concern about their specific problems and their own well-being, this was not the real reason for focusing the devolution debate on Shetland. Rather, the issue was blown up to a crucial problem in the devolution debate by opponents of devolution for political reasons, and used in order to weaken the nationalist case.

The Scottish Conservative MP Galbraith illuminated the new interest for the Shetlanders by asking during a debate of the Scotland and Wales Bill (which he admitted he "hated"):

"But if they were going to start to split up Britain, why stop at Scotland? Why not take the integral parts of which Scotland was composed, and start with that?"

(Times, 20.1.1977, 9)

²⁰ Another such issue was the loyalty many Scots felt for Britain, and in particular class based solidarity. Since several territorial identities can exist next to each other, it is not surprising that Scots with a dual identity felt that claiming the oil for Scotland alone was unfair in the face of the severe economic problems which depressed regions in England were facing (see Chapter three, Tables 3.9 and 3.10). The Labour Party in particular seized upon this conflict of loyalties in Scotland, and used it against the SNP.

Labour "rebel" MP Abse asked for a separate referendum on the Devolution Bill for the Shetland Islands, the outcome of which was expected to be negative. Hinting at the real reason for his concern for the Shetlanders, he claimed that an SNP controlled Scottish Assembly would

"totally snarl up the retrieval of UK oil and subvert the whole strategy upon which our present economic plans rest."
(Times, 5.11.1977, 1-2; emphasis mine)

Another Labour MP for Scotland, Buchan, said that the SNP had adopted an imperialist position in the case of Orkney and Shetland that was "even cruder than British imperialism at its most crude", although the SNP had promised to guarantee the existing rights of the Shetlanders²¹ (Times, 20.1.1977, 9).

As far as the powers of the Scottish Assembly over Shetland was concerned, most of the matters devolved in the Scotland and Wales Bill were already under the administration of the Scottish Office. The issue of control over the oil was also theoretical, since the British government did not intend to devolve any powers over oil developments or revenues to Scotland, or, for that matter, the Shetland Islands, either in the Scotland and Wales Bill or in the subsequent Scotland Bill:

"Of course, the Government in no way concedes a scrap of control over North Sea oil to the proposed assembly."
(Times, 5.11.1977, 1-2)

Nevertheless, the SNP was caught out by the unionist arguments, which seemed to apply to Shetland in principle the same logic as the Nationalists in their claim that it was "Scotland's oil", even though there was never a question of Westminster allowing Shetland to become the independent owner of the vast oil fields. Shetland in

²¹In order to pacify concerns on the Orkney and Shetland Islands about the social and environmental disruption, which would be caused by oil-related on-shore developments, Parliament passed the Orkney and Zetland County Council Acts in 1974. These acts gave the island local authorities considerable powers to control oil developments and to generate considerable oil-related income (Lawson, 1989, 12).

the end agreed to accept a compromise in form of a special representative in the Scottish Assembly, not least because refusing to be devolved with Scotland would have created practical problems of governing the islands. An amendment ("Grimond Amendment" named after the islands' Liberal MP) was included in the Scotland Bill which guaranteed - yet another - Constitutional Commission to investigate the relationship of Orkney and Shetland to the Scottish Assembly. According to the SNP politician Maxwell, it would not have been in the Shetlanders' interest to stay with Westminster, because the oil exploitation policy of the SNP in an independent Scotland would have served their long term interests better. The whole issue, however, exposed some weaknesses of the Nationalists' oil based strategy in the 1970's. Moreover, it revealed the importance of territorial integrity to the nationalist movement. In the case of Scotland, the identification with the national territory was obviously not equally strong in all areas, and particularly weak in Shetland. In the devolution referendum in 1979, 72 per cent of the Orkney and 73 per cent of the Shetland vote went against the Act (see Chapter two, Table 2.3).

The following two subsections deal in greater detail with internal divisions within Scotland. Firstly, I analyse the implications of the territorial reorganisation of Scotland for the nationalist movement; and secondly, I consider the spatial manifestation of social and political cleavages, in the context of nationalist politicisation.

3.2 Internal territorial organisation

The most radical reorganisation of local government in Scotland fell precisely into the period of nationalist revival. At first sight, it is surprising that it was investigated and carried out completely separately from the investigation into constitutional changes, which was set up in 1969 in response to the rise of the nationalist movement. Both, the popular disinterest in local government and the rise of the nationalist movement, had a common source in the "insistence that government could and should do much more, and an

almost contemptuous dismissal of the present system" (Mackintosh, 1968, 142). The Scottish National Party was attacking the bureaucratic local government machinery of Labour councils in the West of Scotland, some of which had been in power for decades. In Glasgow, where the Labour Party was dominant over a long period, the local election turnout was only 28 per cent in some seats in the early 1960's. In the 1968 elections, people's dissatisfaction with the Labour establishment was reflected in a big swing to the SNP. The surprised Times reported that Labour had "lost control of Glasgow, their last really big municipal bastion, where they had been in power for more than 30 years" (Times, 8.5.1968, 1).

In the following pages I argue that in establishing two separate commissions, the government managed to depoliticise the issues of decentralisation, devolution of power and territorial identity. After the local government reorganisation had been finally carried out, devolution became for many, and particularly for the new local bureaucracy with a vested interest in the existing structures, "yet another" tier of local government.

The third section deals with the importance of territorial identities for nationalism and the "interweaving of place and politics" which affect it. Although the local government reorganisation was initiated by the central government, and removed a long established structure, there was no significant popular mobilisation against the changes, or for a distinctively Scottish structure. The internal geographical division in Scotland is strongly reflected in local territorial identities. However, while they are manifest in political voting patterns, they have not been an integral part of the national identity as in Catalonia. During the 1960's and 1970's, the nationalist movement never had its centre in the Scottish heartland - the Glasgow conurbation or the Edinburgh administrative centre - nor in the rural, culturally distinctive Highlands, where many national symbols and myths are rooted. It has not been able to embrace the geographical divisions from its stronghold in the towns in between, which have shaped the image of the SNP.

3.2.i The Wheatley Commission and its recommendations

In 1966, the Wheatley Commission was set up by the Labour Government to review the structure of local government in Scotland, which had been left untouched since 1929 (Fig. 30). It consisted of many small government units, some of which, e.g. many small burghs, originated in medieval Scotland (Sewel, 1987, 5-6), and a few very large ones in the industrial belt²², and it was divided strictly between the rural (county) and the urban (burgh) Scotland.

The Commission went ahead with the meticulous and time consuming approach common to such bodies, and published 26 volumes of written evidence over following few years which collected the opinions of every institution of civil society and every local government body in Scotland that wished to comment on the matter. What was limited about this all-embracing enquiry was its frame of reference. The Commission was told by the government that it should not deal with constitutional matters of devolution of power to Scotland, which were being investigated by the Kilbrandon Commission from February 1969 onwards (Wheatley Report, 1969, 5). This was in line with the policy of British governments to break up "the question of institutional reform, almost as if to ensure that the broader issues will not be discussed", as argued Mackintosh (1968, 39). For the Wheatley Commission not to consider devolution to Scotland was "a great mistake", as the rise of the Scottish National Party had shown that "there is far more interest in nationwide decisions and therefore single-unit government, than in a series of internal regions". In the case of Scotland, a single unit "is far more democratically viable" (Mackintosh, 1968, 40-41).

The principal consideration of the Wheatley Commission was not creating units which would make more local democracy more vigorous,

²²There were the four powerful counties of cities of Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh and Glasgow, 21 large burghs, 176 small burghs with under 20,000 inhabitants, 33 counties and 196 districts. Their functions depended to a large extent on their size, irrespective of their status (Royal Commission on Local Government in Scotland, 1969, Report, 26).

but rather creating units which would be functional in terms of strategic economic planning. On the basis of the then fashionable city-hinterland model, Scotland was subdivided into city-centred regions, with the largest (Strathclyde) including half the population of Scotland. The fact, that many submissions suggested a regional division of Scotland, reflected the awareness of Scots about the regionalisation of the territory (Burghardt, 1982, 131-133). A second tier was created below that of regional government: the districts. The small burghs, seen as the place where Scottishness is most intense (Ascherson, 1988, 14), disappeared, and the large burghs lost many of their functions (McIver, interview, 30.10.1987). For the islands, all-purpose island councils were established by the government, after a successful campaign of the island councils against the Wheatley proposals to lump them together with the enormous Highland region, and to thus remove most local government functions from them.

Historical considerations played a relatively insignificant role in the Wheatley Commission, as the abolition of the burghs demonstrated. Although the Wheatley Report often mentioned the term "community", in the actual recommendations it "gave little weight to [the] call for the maintenance of community", which was heavily stressed in most submissions (Burghardt, 1982, 139). Community had for Wheatley the meaning of "a grouping of the population on a geographical basis - large or small - which has social and economic coherence" (Wheatley Report, 1969, 139). But in the end, the "community" only found expression in the Community Councils, which have no functions. In the attempt to find out from the people themselves what they considered as their "home area", the Commission did not get any "help in building up the picture of communities which exist for wider purposes" (Wheatley Report, 1969, 140-141). However, numerous complaints were lodged about the way in which small units were swallowed up by larger neighbours, and about how local political culture was ignored. Wheatley's decision to place most functions with the six regions he had designated, meant that the public and the local authorities concentrated their campaign on trying to maintain their regional structure, particularly in the Borders and Fife, rather than fighting over the status of individual

burghs. The Borders and Fife were later established as regions by the Conservative Government, which enacted the local reorganisation.

The submission of the SNP to the Wheatley Commission argued for greater local autonomy and smaller units, and stressed that people's identity with distinctive local communities should form the basis for local democracy:

"The root of local democracy in Scotland lies in the individual's personal identification with his local community, and reorganisation of local government must in no way seek to create large units of administrative convenience by arbitrarily destroying the feelings of local pride and community awareness that are so valuable in protecting the individual from the social and cultural sterility of an increasing conformist society."

(Royal Commission ..., Written Evidence, vol. II, 9)

This advocacy for small units was criticised by Labour Party sympathisers as "petty bourgeois", and as not in the interest of the working class people (Young, 1975, 71 and footnote 10 on 83), whose real needs required centralised planning. And generally, such arguments carried the day, as most of the recommendations of the Wheatley Commission were taken up by the - then Conservative - government. A Local Government Bill was passed in 1973, which converted the old structure into a two tier system with regional and district councils (Fig. 31).

3.2.ii The effect of local government reorganisation on the devolution debate

The reorganisation, though supposedly completely independent from any discussions about constitutional changes which were being led by the Kilbrandon Commission, had important repercussions for the devolution debate in the 1970's. As the first White Paper on Devolution was being drafted by the Labour Government, political pressure was building up for local government changes. It was widely argued by all the major political parties that the Scottish Assembly would have the powers and the duty to reorganise the local government structure. The SNP, which had campaigned for local

government reorganisation to be delayed until the setting up of a Scottish Assembly, criticised the 1973 Act as "a mistake" and proposed a system of single-tier authorities by phasing out the regions (SNP Policy Document on Local Government, 1977). The party listed local government reform among their legislative priorities in a future Scottish Assembly, in order to prevent "rigor mortis" setting in (Scotsman, 19.11.1975). The Tories' committee on devolution also recommended a one-tier system, but the Labour Party was "officially sitting on the fence", arguing that the newly established councils needed time to prove themselves (Scotsman, 14.10.1975).

Indeed, for the Labour Party which had committed itself under electoral pressure to go through with devolution, the local government reform became a great hindrance. The Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA), which was dominated by the large Labour councils, was officially pro-devolution, but in practice less than enthusiastic. At the COSLA annual conference in 1977, "much scorn was poured on the idea of changing the whole system only two years after the large changes" (Times, 1.4.1977, 2), and "most delegates (...) appeared unenthusiastic about many aspects of devolution" (Times, 2.4.1977, 3). Most of the powers which were to be devolved to the Scottish Assembly - housing, planning, transport, environment etc. - were also functions of local government, and therefore a large body of opinion in COSLA, including its then president George Sharp, feared interference and opposed a Scottish Assembly (Scotsman, 2.4.1977). The Government sent the Minister of State to the conference to dampen fears about the effects of a powerful assembly, reaffirming its rejection of economic powers for a Scottish Assembly. In 1979, the situation had not changed. COSLA stated 210 reasons **against** devolution, but said that it was **not** against it. Party political considerations also played a role here, since many of the central belt councils were dominated by Labour and the Scottish Assembly would possibly be dominated by the SNP.

Anti-devolutionists in the Labour Party seized upon this, and did exactly what the Royal Commission under Wheatley was told not to do,

namely to link the issues of devolution of power and local democracy. The Assembly, it was argued, was just another level of government which made the bureaucratic structure of the state even more complicated and oppressive; it therefore contravened the interests of those who wanted to bring people closer to the leavers of power. Labour MP Dalyell said in his pamphlet, entitled Why not all Scots support proposals for an Edinburgh Assembly:

"We Scots can hardly have Brussels, Westminster, the Royal High School²³, the Region, the District, the Community Council on top of us. If we have an assembly, the Regions would have to disappear. (...) The first option, whatever else it is, is centralising decision-making in Edinburgh, not the devolution of power."

(Dalyell, 1976, 3-4)

The widespread discontent with the whole machinery of government, which despite its large volume had failed to satisfy the demands of the Scottish people (see Chapter five, section 3.3), was fuelled by such arguments. Presenting the Scottish Assembly as a further layer of government, with limited powers and resources, dampened expectations and enthusiasm about the whole issue of devolution. As Mackintosh argued, "the tragedy of the recent reform of local government is that it has induced a mood of total scepticism about institutional changes (Mackintosh, 1982, 125). Conflicts between districts and regions over functions, rising rates and larger more remote units gave Scottish local government a worse press than anywhere else in Britain (Times, 1.4.1977, 2). "Scotland says no" campaign used "overgovernment" as an argument against devolution (Bochel et. al., 1981, 172). Thus, the local government reorganisation influenced the devolution debate in a negative sense, giving opponents an ideological weapon, and establishing an influential body in local government, which had a vested interest in fighting the creation of a strong Scottish Assembly. After the local government elections in 1977, the newly elected representatives were

²³The Royal High School is the building where the Scottish Assembly was to be housed.

unsympathetic to another local government reorganisation through a Scottish Assembly²⁴ (McIver, interview, 30.10.1987)

But the reorganisation, and the Wheatley Commission which prepared it, did not have great repercussions for the nationalist resurgence in general. This is surprising, because the Act levelled out differences in local government, and virtually abolished the division between burghs and counties, which were characteristic for Scotland, by creating city-regions. Many burghs had a long history and represented the small town level between the city and the countryside. This level "shows the nation at its most authentic and least diluted", according to Ascherson (1988, 15). At a time when the awareness of being Scottish was becoming increasingly politicised, such interference with old-established local units could have become politically sensitive. Why then did the reorganisation of these and other Scottish places not produce a stronger political response from the affected population? Why did the reorganisation not mobilise people's identity with their local territory into a source of support for the nationalist movement?

It appears that the issue of local government and local identity on the one hand, and devolution and Scottish nationalism on the other, were not as closely linked as in Catalonia, where the comarcal division has been regarded as part and parcel of Catalan autonomy. In Scotland, a specifically Scottish territorial organisation has never been formulated as a political demand. Reorganisation was initiated by the central state. In the Wheatley Commission and the Local Government Act of 1973, which eventually emerged from it, the

²⁴After several years of the Conservative Government curbing local government grants and taking powers away from local government, Scottish local governments have become more interested in the prospects of Scottish autonomy. COSLA set up a subcommittee to investigate a single-tier structure under a future Assembly, which indicates that "the whole question of local government has changed from being a divisive factor on the Assembly question to being a strongly supportive one" (Stewart, 1987, 11). Stewart observed that while previously, some of the strongest opposition to a Scottish Assembly came from local government, "Regions and Districts are now amongst the strongest supporters of the Campaign For A Scottish Assembly" (*ibid.*).

reorganisation of Scottish local government was guided first and foremost by considerations of efficiency in planning and service provision. Local politics and feelings of belonging did not play such an important role. The process of reorganisation followed a well-established, long-winded procedure, which involved a great number of institutions. But it was not aimed at involving the people themselves; rather, it responded to problems of governability, and was initiated by the state.

It could be argued that people's interest in local government and territorial organisation had not been great. Their alienation from the local government apparatus was reflected in low polls and a general low prestige of local government representatives. Increasingly, power was removed from local public control and handed over to appointed boards and "quangos" (Mackintosh, 1982, 28-29). Another reason is that the Scots accepted local government as part of the British state apparatus, and therefore the government could legitimately reorganise its structure. It must be borne in mind that, unlike in Catalonia where local bourgeoisies developed an interest in a decentralised territorial structure which would protect them from the centripetal power of Barcelona, such local base of power were not strongly developed in Scotland outside the big cities. The Scottish bourgeoisie and the middle classes were traditionally much less rooted in their places, and far more prepared to move away from their home territories. Scotland's geographical diversity was therefore not integrated into the nationalist ideology, but rather formed part of a complex pattern of political disparities, which has posed difficulties for the nationalist movement.

3.3. Geographical divisions and political and social cleavages

Support for the SNP in the 1960's and 1970's (see Fig. 32) was unevenly distributed in Scotland and did not simply follow geographical divisions or patterns of social and economic cleavages. The same can be said about the distribution of support for

devolution, which in the 1979 did not correspond to the distribution of the SNP vote (Fig. 33). The "interweaving of place and politics" is particularly complex in those parts of Scotland which neither belong to the Highlands - traditionally Liberal - nor the - Labour controlled - Strathclyde region" (Agnew, 1987, 131).

Some of the SNP election successes happened in areas with a mixture of rural and industrial population, which were undergoing social and economic changes. These were particularly strongly felt in new towns such as Cumbernauld and Kirkcaldy, whose inhabitants lacked local roots and traditional class allegiances. The party had much less support in the big Scottish cities, where Tories and Labour had already carved out their territories. But there were exceptions, such as Glasgow Govan and Dundee. Very rural areas also proved difficult for the party, because political attitudes were more entrenched and communication networks scarce, and because the population was scattered over a wide area and difficult to access. In the mixed areas and the towns, it was possible to build up local support, but where people relied on the "national" media, the SNP as an outsider party had difficulty (MacCartney, interview, 10.2.1987).

Frequent changes in the constituency boundaries make it difficult to compare the strength and weakness of the SNP in different places in the last few decades. The voting pattern suggests that the SNP has been particularly successful in industrialised but partly agricultural Lowland constituencies such as Dunbarton²⁵, Clackmannan and Stirlingshire²⁶, West Lothian²⁷ and Lanarkshire²⁸ (Table 7.7).

²⁵In Dunbartonshire East, the SNP had over 20 per cent of the vote in the 1974 and 1979 elections.

²⁶Clackmannan and East Stirling came under SNP control in 1974, when more than 40 per cent voted for George Reid. But this was not so surprising, because the SNP vote had been over 19 per cent since 1966. As in most other areas, the Tories suffered losses, but Labour also lost 20 points to the SNP. In 1979, a Labour candidate was returned, but the SNP still maintained a respectable share of the vote. The three seats in Stirling and Clackmannanshire had between 16 and 26 per cent SNP vote in the 1966 election, and belongs therefore to the Nationalist "heartland".

(Footnote Continued)

It was to these areas outside the Strathclyde region that the new industries of the 1960's and 1970's went, transforming the existing social structure in the communities and weakening old party loyalties.

In the cities of Aberdeen, Edinburgh and Glasgow, the support was much more volatile (Table 7.7). Edinburgh was most resistant to the SNP tide, while the Tory vote in Glasgow turned out to be more vulnerable to the SNP attack. In Glasgow, the SNP polled 26 per cent in October 1974, and narrowly missed victory in Glasgow Govan, which SNP's Margo MacDonald had won in 1973. The party showed that it could threaten the Labour Party in Glasgow as early as 1968, when Labour lost control over the city council and the SNP gained 13 seats. The Times took this as a confirmation of

"their ability to win support in the solid industrial areas where they used to find the most stubborn resistance to their appeal."

(Times, 9.5.1968, 1)

But in retrospect, it can be said that the Nationalists found it difficult to establish a solid base of support in the Strathclyde region. In many seats, the Labour Party held their vote in the 1974

(Footnote Continued)

²⁷Westlothian was one of the main battlegrounds between Labour and the SNP, and more specifically between Labour MP Dalyell and his SNP rival Billy Wolfe. Wolfe won 23.3 per cent in a by-election in 1962 and managed to undermine the Tory further and to make some inroads into the Labour vote in the mid-1960's. In 1964, he received 30.5 and in 1966, 35.3 per cent. In October 1974, Labour almost lost the seat, and with the exception of the 1983 election (18.4 per cent), the SNP has polled over 20 per cent here even after the 1979 referendum.

²⁸The most striking SNP success was in Hamilton in 1967, a traditionally safe working class seat in industrial Lanarkshire which has become more of a commuter town since the 1960's. Both the old county and the Glasgow borough constituencies have been traditionally Labour territory, but even in 1966, the SNP had around 10 per cent of the vote in those Glasgow constituencies which it contested. West Stirlingshire (now Falkirk West) has voted 21 per cent SNP in 1970. In October 1974, the Nationalist vote peaked at 38.2 per cent and came very close to a victory over Labour, but it declined to 18 per cent in 1979.

elections, and particularly the Catholic working class remained solid Labour²⁹. Since the mid-1970's, the tide has gone against the SNP, while the Labour Party rank and file in the West of Scotland has moved to a more militant position in favour of Scottish autonomy or independence.

Despite its oil campaign, the SNP made a weak impact in Aberdeen, which was at the centre of oil based developments. But in Dundee, the Nationalists did well in the 1973 by-election and maintained a strong presence ever since. Apart from Dundee, the SNP success in the cities in the October election of 1974 proved to be a quirk. It was difficult to build up a solid support, and easy to lose voters again.

"in a big city area, where people don't read local newspapers very much because they tend to read national papers, they don't get news of the local campaigns and the local parties; so, it is much more difficult.... If you find that the tide is coming in, it comes in all over Glasgow, all over Edinburgh, at roughly the same percentage; and if it is going down, you get bad results everywhere People there react to the national media, not the local."

(MacCartney, interview 10.2.1987)

In 1979, the "SNP crag has vanished, leaving only a mound" as "Labour and Conservative cut the SNP vote in half, at the national level, and shared the spoils almost equally between them" (Scotsman, 5.5.1979, 7).

In the more rural areas, the SNP found a more faithful support more readily. The Highland counties in the North, the mixed agricultural and industrial counties in the East, and the border constituencies in the South were mostly in the hands of the Liberals or the Tories. The SNP seats of 1974-79 (Angus South, Banffshire, Moray and Nairn,

²⁹The Catholic population is particularly strong in the Strathclyde region, estimated at 25 per cent or 624,000 in 1977 (Agnew, 1987, 124). Traditionally Labour voters, the Catholic working class population has tended to be critical of Home Rule and devolution proposals. In the February elections of 1974, almost 80 per cent of Scottish Catholics remained loyal to Labour at a time when the SNP encroached on the Labour vote (Agnew, 1987, 126).

Aberdeenshire, Galloway, Argyll and Bute, Dunbartonshire, Perth and East Perthshire) were all won from the Conservatives with the help of the opposition Labour and Liberal vote³⁰. In some areas such as Perthshire, the SNP already had gained a foothold in previous elections (16 - 21 per cent in 1966). In Angus South, the SNP consistently polled over 23 per cent since 1970 against the dominant Tories, and won the seat in 1974. Indeed, most of the eleven SNP seats in 1974-79 were in these semi-rural counties. Two seats were in the Highlands and the Western Isles, three each in the Tayside and the Grampian region, and one each in Strathclyde, Dumfries and Galloway and the Central region. The Highlands had traditionally weak attachments to the two major British parties, and here as in the islands, local issues have a higher priority than Scottish or British politics (Agnew, 1987, 131).

The nationalist vote for the SNP did not simply reflect structures of class and economic interest structures, although it is true that in many areas the SNP was a refuge for disenchanted Tory voters. The SNP did well in some of the most deprived areas outside the Glasgow region, which were rural and sympathetic to the SNP, such as Argyll and Bute, Perth and the Western Isles, or industrial, such as West Lothian³¹. In the high income areas of Midlothian, the SNP was doing not so well, and the Conservatives held their vote in Edinburgh better than anywhere else. Thus, "even for a party which bases its appeal around **Scottish** themes and interests rather than British or class ones, place and locality continues to set limits to partisanship" (Agnew, 1987, 167). The great variety of places, where the SNP did find support, caused problems for the party when it came to concrete policy matters. It was accused by political opponents of promoting socialist policies in working class areas and other policies in professional and middle class constituencies which were

³⁰In Moray and Nairn, the Labour vote of 22.8 per cent was reduced to only 1 per cent between 1970 and 1974.

³¹Argyll and Bute had a per capita income of only 71 per cent of the Scottish average in 1967/8, Perth had 82 per cent, and West Lothian 73 per cent (Agnew, 1987, 121).

often contradictory. Not surprisingly, the contradictions were also present in the ranks of the party, where in the 1970's a gap developed between the social-democratic and the conservative-fundamentalist sectors, which could roughly be associated with the Central-Western and the Northeastern constituencies.

So even in the 1970's, different types of nationalism were attached to the SNP vote which varied strongly across the Scottish territory. This pattern has become even more complicated in the 1980's as more radical nationalist positions developed among Labour Party supporters particularly in Western Central Scotland³². It is now widely acknowledged that voting for Labour can be as much a manifestation of Scottish nationalism as voting for the SNP. So far, no single party has succeeded in reconciling these fragmented expressions of nationalist sentiment and to integrate them. Although it was shown in the previous section that the local territorial identities were rather separate from the issue of nationalism, it is obvious that political nationalism is geographically fragmented and based on a variety of local interests. It could be argued that this situation favours a cross party approach to the national question, since no hegemonic force has been able to impose its nationalist vision on the whole of Scotland.

³²One of the more recent expression of nationalist pressure within the Labour Party was the setting up of a **Scottish Labour Action** group at the Scottish Labour Conference in 1988, which is lead by party activists from Western and Eastern Central constituencies such as Midlothian and North Paisley. Scottish Labour Action argued that the Tory Party had no mandate in Scotland, and that therefore its government could legitimately be "made difficult" with civil disobedience. The principal aim was seen in bringing about the "early establishment of alternative democratic forms of government in Scotland" (Radical Scotland, April/May 1988, 32, 9).

4. CONCLUSION

Territory is an indispensable factor in nationalist movements, which distinguish themselves from other political movements by their demand for autonomy over a specific piece of land. In Catalonia and Scotland, the outer boundaries of the area to which these claims refer are well-defined. Within Catalan nationalism, there exists a small radical minority, which defines the national boundaries in cultural and historical terms and demands independence and unity for all Catalan speaking areas. This current, however, has kept a low profile in the consensus oriented 1960's and the 1970's, and only began to become more prominent in recent years. In the case of Scotland, the lack of national consciousness among the small island communities in the northeast has been used in the 1970's by opponents of the nationalist movement, but this was for strategic reasons, rather than being based on fundamental conflicts over the Scottish boundaries. The problem has now all but disappeared.

Far more significant for both nationalist movements were the social conflicts, the uneven economic development and the cultural differences, which existed **within** the national boundaries, and which overlapped each other in a complex pattern of geographical diversity. In order to mobilise the population, the nationalist leadership had to find ways of convincing them that what united them was more important and more deeply rooted than the structural and geographical divisions. In Catalonia, the comarcal division was a useful symbol for Catalan unity (particularly after it had become popular during the first **Generalitat** and been abolished by the Franco regime). Although it institutionalised the geographical divisions, it also claimed that it was precisely these divisions which distinguished Catalonia from the rest of Spain. Once the comarcal division was accepted as part of the national-popular heritage, it became a powerful instrument of territorial control for whichever political force aimed at gaining hegemony in Catalonia. This message emerged from the territorial debate, which was pushed into the foreground in the 1980's. At the same time, the debate

showed that arguments in favour of decentralisation and local democracy tended to fall under the table, particularly if a nationalist party, such as the CiU, took a centralist stance within its "own" territory. In the 1980's, the political parties in Catalonia were more worried about consolidating the power of the Generalitat, rather than about strengthening decentralised democratic structures in Catalan civil society.

In Scotland, the internal geographical divisions were even more pronounced than in Catalonia, but the nationalist movement had not elaborated a model of internal organisation, which could bridge these divisions and gain the support of at least the most prominent social groups. One reason for this is that historically, the urban and rural bourgeoisies and the Scottish intellectual classes had not found it necessary to elaborate a political project just for Scotland. Nationalism had never been the hegemonic political force in Scotland, but rather occupied only a very marginal role until the 1970's. When the internal territorial organisation was discussed in the late 1960's, it was not related to nationalism, and the discussion was conducted in a comparatively apolitical manner. Once the new local governments were set up in the middle of the 1970's, they helped to conserve the existing centralist structures of government. In the course of the 1970's it became obvious that the territorial basis of support for the nationalist movement, which was then identified with the SNP, was constrained, and that no nationalist model existed which could forge the different local types of national and territorial identity together.

Table 7.1 : Population distribution in the Catalan comarques in 1981

COMARQUES	POPULATION in 1981	ECONOMICALLY % Primary	ACTIVE POPULATION IN 1975 % Secondary	% Tertiary
<u>REGION I</u>	<u>4,104,898</u>			
Baix Llobregat	516,360	2.6	68.3	29.1
Barcelonès	2,511,592	0.5	44.5	55.0
Maresme	253,527	7.8	59.9	32.3
Vallès Occidental	608,477	1.5	68.7	29.8
Vallès Oriental	214,942	6.2	67.8	26.0
<u>REGION II</u>	<u>427,268</u>			
Alt Empordà	80,790	20.4	34.7	44.9
Baix Empordà	81,990	15.0	47.6	37.4
Garrotxa	45,245	13.9	61.5	24.6
Gironès	136,637	8.0	45.0	47.0
Selva	82,606	11.6	58.0	30.4
<u>REGION III</u>	<u>345,899</u>			
Alt Camp	33,027	24.4	48.6	27.0
Alt Penedès	63,530	15.0	56.2	28.8
Baix Penedès	29,023	14.8	54.4	30.8
Garraf	70,448	6.1	61.7	36.2
Tarragonès	149,871	6.9	47.1	46.0
<u>REGION IV</u>	<u>171,744</u>			
Baix Camp	118,091	16.9	40.7	42.4
Conca de Barberà	18,140	31.5	43.6	24.9
Priorat	10,529	53.0	27.1	19.9
Ribera	29,984	29.0	44.9	26.1
<u>REGION V</u>	<u>129,257</u>			
Baix Ebre	65,961	33.8	32.7	33.5
Montsià	49,564	39.6	32.7	33.5
Terra Alta	13,732	60.9	23.7	15.4
<u>REGION VI</u>	<u>156,661</u>			
Cerdanya	12,041	26.7	32.0	41.3
Osona	111,518	11.3	60.8	27.9
Ripollès	33,102	10.6	64.2	25.2
<u>REGION VII</u>	<u>281,399</u>			
Anoia	78,348	7.8	68.2	24.0
Bages	150,657	5.4	65.6	29.0
Berguedà	41,630	11.4	65.9	22.7
Solsonès	10,764	40.7	30.6	28.7
<u>REGION VIII</u>	<u>289,927</u>			
Garrigues	22,810	56.2	23.6	20.2
Noguera	45,350	42.7	30.7	26.6
Segarra	17,359	38.1	34.0	27.9
Segrià	169,066	25.5	32.0	42.5
Urgell	35,342	36.2	32.6	31.2
<u>REGION IX</u>	<u>49,361</u>			
Alt Urgell	19,335	29.7	33.9	36.4
Pallars Jussà	18,768	34.6	32.9	32.5
Pallars Sobirà	5,450	52.9	21.1	26.0
Vall d'Aran	5,808	21.8	30.1	48.1
<u>CATALONIA</u>	<u>5,956,414</u>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>51.0</u>	<u>42.7</u>

Sources: Estadística i Societat, March/April 1981, 8-9; ibid., Dec. 1982, 21, 2.

Table 7.2 : Election for the Catalan Parliament in 1980
(per cent of vote)

COMARQUES	UCD	PSA	CiU	ERC	PSC	PSUC	Others	Abst.
REGION I.....								
Baix Llobregat	5.8	4.4	19.0	5.1	25.6	31.8	8.3	35.8
Barcelonès	9.0	3.0	24.8	9.2	23.6	19.9	10.5	41.5
Maresme	8.2	3.5	36.3	8.6	20.2	14.9	8.3	31.3
Vallès Occ.	5.6	2.7	27.2	5.8	22.4	27.5	8.8	34.2
Vallès Orient.	7.6	3.9	34.3	6.2	22.5	17.5	8.0	32.9
REGION II.....								
Alt Empordà	18.7	1.5	32.4	12.1	22.9	5.7	6.7	34.8
Baix Empordà	14.3	1.5	32.4	14.0	19.1	12.4	6.3	31.5
Garrotxa	15.6	0.5	41.8	10.9	15.8	6.3	9.1	30.0
Gironès	12.9	1.4	37.7	9.4	20.3	10.6	7.7	31.3
Selva	13.3	1.5	42.4	8.3	18.1	10.0	6.4	32.4
REGION III....								
Alt Camp	12.9	1.5	33.7	14.4	18.1	11.9	7.3	29.5
Alt Penedès	9.6	1.7	34.4	8.8	26.9	8.8	9.8	30.3
Baix Penedès	10.7	2.2	24.9	6.8	31.9	8.5	15.0	34.1
Garraf	8.2	2.2	20.9	10.0	29.6	11.2	17.9	32.4
Tarragonès	15.6	1.1	22.8	10.3	20.2	18.0	12.0	41.3
REGION IV.....								
Baix Camp	15.2	2.5	26.0	15.1	20.4	13.4	7.4	42.3
C. d. Barberà	18.3	0.8	34.0	8.2	14.2	16.9	7.6	37.1
Priorat	26.6	0.4	19.3	12.4	16.9	16.1	8.3	31.5
Ribera d'Ebre	21.7	2.6	19.4	13.1	16.5	16.8	9.9	40.3
REGION V.....								
Baix Ebre	28.4	0.5	17.1	5.8	18.8	13.5	15.9	47.2
Montsià	34.0	0.4	13.8	4.9	27.7	17.2	2.0	46.0
Terra Alta	38.1	0.3	17.6	6.6	13.2	12.2	12.0	32.3
REGION VI.....								
Cerdanya	25.3	1.1	39.5	7.4	16.5	4.7	5.5	39.2
Osona	8.8	1.2	44.4	12.6	11.9	9.0	12.1	28.7
Ripollès	15.0	0.9	38.6	10.0	18.8	8.9	7.8	28.4
REGION VII.....								
Anoia	7.5	2.0	37.7	7.8	26.3	10.6	8.1	31.4
Bages	8.1	1.4	37.6	7.3	21.1	14.7	9.8	29.5
Berguedà	11.0	1.1	41.2	10.9	12.8	11.2	11.8	32.3
Solsonès	31.4	0.7	47.4	6.8	7.1	2.6	4.0	40.0
REGION VIII..								
Garrigues	21.0	0.2	24.5	15.0	20.1	11.8	7.4	35.9
Noguera	23.9	0.4	26.7	14.4	15.9	12.5	6.2	40.1
Segarra	25.2	0.4	38.6	13.8	7.2	7.2	7.6	40.7
Segrià	22.4	0.8	22.2	11.7	23.3	13.4	6.2	41.5
Urgell	23.3	0.4	36.3	14.3	15.8	5.0	6.9	36.0
REGION IX.....								
Alt Urgell	23.8	0.7	36.0	7.1	19.0	8.4	5.0	44.7
Pallars Jussà	25.6	0.8	34.8	9.6	16.8	6.5	5.9	43.6
Pallars Sobirà	22.4	0.1	29.2	20.4	18.2	4.3	5.4	44.4
Vall d'Aran	26.8	0.6	29.6	3.2	26.5	6.9	6.4	42.9
CATALONIA	10.6	2.6	27.6	8.9	22.3	18.7	9.3	37.9

Source: Equip de Sociologia Electoral(UAB), 1982.

Table 7.3 : Election for the Catalan Parliament in 1984
(per cent of vote)

COMARQUES	AP	CiU	ERC	PSC	PSUC	Others	Abst.
REGION I.....							
Baix Llobregat	6.0	30.0	2.7	43.0	9.5	7.9	38.8
Barcelonès	9.2	43.2	4.0	31.9	6.0	4.6	37.7
Maresme	6.1	52.1	5.0	27.6	4.0	4.4	31.9
Vallès Occ.	5.6	38.7	3.4	36.6	7.7	7.3	37.0
Vallès Orient	3.7	49.0	3.5	32.0	5.0	4.0	33.3
REGION II.....							
Alt Empordà	6.3	56.8	6.2	24.4	1.7	3.5	33.9
Baix Empordà	5.5	56.1	7.0	23.3	3.8	3.4	30.2
Garrotxa	4.3	66.6	7.2	15.9	2.0	2.5	28.6
Gironès	6.3	55.9	6.0	22.7	4.0	3.8	29.6
Selva	5.2	61.0	5.6	20.1	3.4	3.8	32.0
REGION III.....							
Alt Camp	5.1	59.1	5.4	22.2	3.3	3.9	24.9
Alt Penedès	5.0	56.5	5.8	25.7	2.8	3.2	27.6
Baix Penedès	6.1	50.4	3.7	32.0	3.2	3.6	31.4
Garraf	7.1	43.1	5.3	32.7	5.8	5.2	36.4
Tarragonès	10.4	40.7	3.7	32.8	5.9	5.3	35.8
REGION IV.....							
Baix Camp	8.0	49.8	5.7	26.1	4.3	4.8	41.6
C. d. Barberà	7.3	61.3	5.9	15.5	5.9	2.5	29.4
Priorat	8.8	49.1	6.8	23.5	5.9	4.3	26.6
Ribera d'Ebre	10.5	44.1	10.7	22.1	7.5	4.0	36.7
REGION V.....							
Baix Ebre	15.0	48.4	2.7	23.1	5.9	3.1	40.9
Montsià	12.4	45.9	2.5	25.8	6.4	5.1	37.2
Terra Alta	21.7	53.7	5.5	11.4	4.5	1.9	30.0
REGION VI.....							
Cerdanya	6.2	71.9	3.8	13.6	1.7	2.0	29.5
Osona	4.7	67.8	5.8	13.4	2.0	3.3	27.3
Ripollès	3.3	68.1	5.3	16.9	2.7	2.7	25.3
REGION VII.....							
Anoia	4.9	56.1	4.7	27.3	2.5	3.4	29.7
Bages	4.2	61.0	4.6	21.8	4.2	3.7	27.1
Berguedà	4.9	64.6	7.0	16.6	2.6	3.4	29.4
Solsonès	7.8	75.7	3.8	8.9	0.4	2.4	29.7
REGION VIII....							
Garrigues	8.2	54.0	7.8	21.7	2.9	4.6	30.3
Noguera	8.0	63.6	6.4	14.3	3.0	3.6	31.3
Segarra	8.5	71.2	4.4	9.5	0.8	4.7	31.9
Segrià	10.7	48.1	5.3	26.0	3.8	4.9	39.0
Urgell	6.6	65.8	7.1	15.2	1.2	3.2	29.9
REGION IX.....							
Alt Urgell	7.4	69.6	4.1	13.6	2.4	2.3	36.0
Pallars Jussà	5.3	63.1	5.4	19.2	2.0	4.2	39.6
Pallars Sobirà	4.9	66.3	10.4	13.6	1.4	2.4	34.9
Vall d'Aran	6.7	47.9	0.7	17.4	0.9	22.5	30.6
CATALONIA	7.7	46.6	4.4	30.0	5.6	4.9	35.7

Source: Equip de Sociologia Electoral (UAB), 1986.

Table 7.4 "Frente a las cuatro provincias actuales. la nueva legislación divide a Cataluña en 38 comarcas. ¿Cree usted que estas comarcas deberían substituir a la larga a las cuatro provincias?"¹
(per cent)

Areas	No	Yes	Don't know/ No reply
Barcelona City	45	43	12
Metropolitan area of Barcelona	44	43	13
Rest of Catalonia	52	31	17
Catalonia (total)	46	39	15

Source: Opinion poll in El País, 27.3.1987, 25

¹"The new legislation divides Catalonia in 38 comarques, as opposed to the four existing provinces. Do you think that these comarques should replace the four provinces in the long term?"

Table 7.5 "A qué cree usted que responde más la nueva ordenación territorial de Cataluña que se hace en este proyecto de ley?"²
(per cent)

REASONS	Barcelona City	Metropolitan area of B.	Rest of Catalonia	Catalonia (total)
Al deseo de mejorar y racionalizar la situación administrativa y territorial de Cataluña	41	45	39	43
A los intereses partidistas de Convergència i Unió	41	41	29	37
Don't know/no reply	18	14	32	20

Source: Opinion poll in El País, 27.3.1987, 25.

²"In your opinion, which of the following is the more important reason for the new territorial organisation which has been drawn up in the new bill?". The reasons given below translate as follows: i) "To the wish to improve and rationalise the administrative and territorial structure of Catalonia", and ii) "To the party political interests of Convergència i Unió".

Table 7.6: Analysis of voting in Scottish cities, October 1974 to 1987
(Per cent of the vote)

CITY	YEAR	CON	LAB	LIB/ALL	SNP
Aberdeen	1970	34.6	51.9	6.1	6.7
	O1974	24.2	42.3	8.9	24.6
	1979	29.6	48.6	11.2	10.6
	1983	23.9	44.3	25.4	7.1
	1987	24.4	46.4	19.3	10.0
Dundee	1970	40.2	50.0	-	8.8
	O1974	17.6	36.9	3.7	41.3
	1979	22.0	41.6	2.3	33.7
	1983	18.6	38.2	12.4	30.4
	1987	15.4	47.9	8.7	27.7
Edinburgh	O1974	32.2	33.3	10.7	23.7
	1979	38.2	39.0	12.3	10.1
	1983	34.7	30.8	28.6	5.4
	1987	32.3	37.5	22.8	7.0
Glasgow	O1974	20.2	49.0	4.2	26.2
	1979	25.8	58.0	4.0	11.4
	1983	18.8	51.9	21.2	7.6
	1987	12.6	61.8	14.9	10.2


Source: The Times Guide to the House of Commons, 1970, 1974, 1979, 1983 and 1987.

Table 7.7: Regional distribution of high levels of support for the SNP
(over 20% of vote per constituency)

REGIONS	ELECTION DATE						
	1964	1966	1970	Feb.1974	Oct.1974	1979	1983
Strathclyde	-	-	1	11	29	0	0
Central	-	2	1	3	3	1	0
Lothian	1	1	1	3	9	0	0
Fife	-	-	-	1	4	0	0
Tayside	1	-	2	5	5	4	4
Borders	-	-	0	0	0	0	0
Grampian (incl. Orkney & Shetland	-	-	2	4	6	3	2
Dumfries and Galloway	-	-	1	1	1	1	1

Source: Agnew, 1987, 132-133.

Fig. 28 : COMARCAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CATALAN POPULATION, 1986



Source: Consorci d'Informació i Documentació de Catalunya, 1987, nos. 61-64.

**Fig. 29: DISTRIBUTION OF CiU VOTES IN
THE CATALAN ELECTIONS, 1980**





Fig.30 SCOTLAND
BY COUNTY, 1973 & 1974



A map of the Shetland Islands, showing the main island of Lewis and Harris and the smaller islands to the east. The word "SHETLAND" is written in capital letters above the map. A dashed line indicates the boundary between the Shetland Islands and the rest of Scotland.




FIG.32:SNP VOTE IN OCTOBER ELECTIONS, 1974

PERCENTAGES IN CONSTITUENCIES





FIG.33:REGIONAL ANALYSIS OF DEVOLUTION REFERENDUM IN SCOTLAND, 1979

PER CENT OF YES VOTES



Chapter eight:

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

1. SUMMARISING THE ARGUMENTS

The thesis aimed to demonstrate that today's nationalist movements in Catalonia and Scotland, which were illustrated in the preface, are not an accidental occurrence or a coincidence. It looked for ways to explain this nationalist revival (which also affected other states in Europe and elsewhere) by identifying common causal processes. However, it was not possible to identify a single theory which would be able to explain the recent growth of sub-state nationalism in all advanced industrial countries. In the first chapter, therefore, a framework was suggested for the analysis of Catalan and Scottish nationalism, based on Gramscian concepts and complemented with other fragments from contemporary social theory. Its principal purpose was to replace the classical Marxist model of base - superstructure relations in capitalist societies with a triangular model of civil society, state and economy, which does not assume deterministic relationships between the three constructs. Rather than seeing political action as determined by economic structures, the framework concentrates on the changing relationships between state, civil society and economy, and examines political action in the light of these processes. It is also important to recognise the territoriality of state, civil society and economy, which adds another dimension to these relationships. This becomes explicit in nationalist movements, which represent the political struggle of a (sub-state) national civil society within a defined territory against the dominance of a central state.

In the remainder of this section, I will briefly summarise the main arguments of the previous chapters. Section two concludes this thesis with a critical look back on its approach, reflecting on its achievements and shortcomings; and with a look forward towards future research, which might help to improve our understanding of contemporary nationalist movements.

1.1 History and national identity

It is important to realise that contemporary nationalist movements are - more than other social and political movements - rooted in history. This does not mean that they are just a new edition of old conflicts over political control and hegemony. But in order to legitimise their struggle against an established nation state (which is itself fortified through history), nationalist movements "conjure up the spirits of the past to their service", in Marx' words. Thus, the history of independence and of nationalist struggle is employed by nationalist activists in order to legitimise their demand for self-government today. Martyrs and heroes of the struggle for national liberation are retrieved to demonstrate that the struggle is rightful, and that the nation is a reality which cannot be denied or repressed indefinitely. History gives nationalist movements their raison d'être.

At the same time, Chapter two argued, nationalist movements are not the expression of an ahistoric essence, but rather political constructs which emerge under specific structural and historical conditions. Previous stirrings of nationalism in Catalonia and Scotland in the 18th and 19th century were related to specific conditions. However, historic explanations of the appearance and disappearance of nationalism throw up a fundamental problem, because the evaluation of history depends on the perspective of the interpreter. Historical analysis often has to rely on historiography, which always has been a vital instrument of legitimation not only for nationalist movements and their demands, but also for "nation states" which oppose them.

This apparent contradiction is particularly obvious in Catalan nationalism. Throughout this century, Catalan intellectuals have been aware of the need to rebuild the nation (i.e. the infrastructures of its civil society) and to reanimate national consciousness, firstly because Spanish state and civil institutions were seen as not appropriate for Catalans' interests and their ways of life, and secondly because Catalan institutions had been destroyed or repressed more than once. At the same time, the Catalan government's preparation for the celebration of "A Thousand Years of Catalonia" (millenari) in 1992 is an act of recreating history in

order to argue, as Ainaud de Lasarte does, that "we existed throughout history" (Ainaud de Lasarte, interview, 30.3.1988). The reinterpretation of history from a nationalist perspective is a much more popular and rewarding activity in Catalonia than in Scotland. This is partly due to the fact that it was supported by the Catalan authorities during the short spells of autonomy in the past. But it is also because Catalans perceived their national community as materially more advanced, politically more progressive, and culturally more creative than the Spanish centre, and therefore its recent history was worth investigating.

In Scotland, the weakness of Scottish national identity and its cultural and political peripheralisation during the Union did not become as blatantly obvious as in Catalonia. There was no widespread awareness among Scottish intellectuals of the need to construct a modern political identity, not least because numerous elements of national identity - however hollow - were preserved (Nairn, interview, 30.10.1988). It was obvious enough that Scotland was Scotland, and not England. But at another, less obvious and more structural level, identification with the Scottish nation was not very strong, and this fragility of Scottish national identity was laid open by the failures of the nationalist movement in the 1970's. The intellectuals and middle classes, which elsewhere are instrumental in the important processes of creating the cultural and civic infrastructures and retrieving historical and cultural traditions, played a negative role here. They tended to accept and promote a "British" culture which does not recognise its English domination, identified with the economic fortunes which British empire provided, and were little supportive of Scottish popular culture. Scottish history after 1707 was defined as British, and the Scottish history before 1707 belonged to a Scotland which is now hardly recognisable. Indeed, many intellectuals maintain that the "making of Scotland" as we know it today occurred under the Union (Brewer, 1989, 27).

Although the partiality of much historiography must be recognised, there is no way around an historical approach to nationalism. Why and when nationalist movements re-emerge, how they change, and why

they are strong or weak depends on the formation and restructuring of civil society, economy and the state through history. But it also depends on the presence or absence of nationalist movements in the past. As soon became obvious, the Catalan nationalists in the 1970's were able to feed on the successes of their predecessors, while the Scottish nationalist movement had little nationalist history to build on. Chapter two therefore looked at the history of nationalist politics in the context of political and economic developments from the 18th to the mid-20th century. It showed that the economic and political circumstances in Catalonia at the end of the 19th century made the development of a nationalist movement more likely than those in Scotland. At that time, Catalan language and culture in general was experiencing a revival in the upper classes, and was now not only the language of the people, but also the language of industrial society and economic progress, and of bourgeois politics. The main reason for this was the isolated position of the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie and of the Catalan working class in a predominantly rural Spain, which led the Catalan ruling class to consolidate its power base in Catalonia.

A similar thing could not have happened in Scotland. Not only was there no linguistic basis for nationalism, after the repression and the fragmentation of the Gaelic-speaking Highland population. From the beginning of the industrialisation processes, English was the language of modern Scotland, of the Scottish bourgeoisie and its organic intellectuals, and through education and state legislation also of the popular classes. A linguistic and cultural case for nationalism was put forward by a handful of Scottish poets and writers who were involved in the creation of the nationalist party in 1928, but this soon became a marginal factor even within the marginal nationalist movement. Up until the 1950's, economic interests stood squarely against Scottish nationalism, because the Scottish bourgeoisie was committed to the British and imperial markets, and consequently to Conservative unionism. The Labour movement lost its Scottish perspective as it became integrated into the corporate state of economic planning and social reformism in the early decades of this century. By setting its hopes on capturing the State, the Labour Party had no more room for self-government

demands. However, a few decades later, the demise of the British empire, the decline of the Scottish bourgeoisie, and a growing dissatisfaction with central state planning among the popular classes permitted the unprecedented rise of Scottish nationalism in the 1960's.

1.2 Economic structures, class interests, and nationalism

Based on this historical materialist account of the emergence of nationalism in the two study areas, chapters three to seven explored various aspects of the relationships between economy, civil society and the state in order to throw light on its recent revival. It was pointed out in the introduction that these relationships were neither thought to be fixed, nor of the same nature in both cases, and that the ways in which they influenced nationalist politics could differ greatly.

Chapter three dealt with the relationships between the Catalan and Scottish economy on the one hand, and state and civil society on the other. Marxist and modernisation theorists have often tried to explain the emergence of nationalist movements in terms of structural economic factors, but they failed to account for the recent nationalist revival. However, this does not necessarily mean that contemporary nationalist movements are not conditioned by economic relations, but only that no **specific** economic relations are conditional for their emergence.

The economic developments which affected the formation of the nationalist movements were rather different in Catalonia and Scotland. In the case of Scotland, this was the juxtaposition of industrial decline and the discovery of oil resources. Industrial decline and structural economic and social problems in Scotland did not improve with central economic planning as promised and expected, and this gave rise to calls for more appropriate state action (Labour), and for a more appropriate state (SNP). The oil findings provided the SNP with an important economic argument for independence, and certainly contributed to the rise of the party in

elections and opinion polls, but they did not constitute the main cause for the nationalist revival. The Scottish Development Agency was an attempt by the central state to diffuse the economic grievances, but it was not sufficient. It did not address the demands for democratically accountable control over the Scottish economy, and the devolution bill for Scotland, which was finally and reluctantly sanctioned by Parliament, did not offer that either.

In Catalonia, economic factors in the nationalist movement in the 1960's are more mediated than in Scotland. The historic development gap between Catalonia and the rest of Spain narrowed in the Franco period, and Catalan nationalism in the 1960's appeared as a predominantly cultural, and not even political, movement. However, there were some economic processes which were favourable to Catalan nationalism and the anti-Francoist opposition, the intertwined political currents which cannot easily be separated. Economic liberalisation and the growth boom precipitated demand for greater political liberalisation, especially in Catalonia, which benefited disproportionately from the economic miracle of the 1960's. The juxtaposition of chaotic and uneven economic growth and continued state repression created contradictions which politicised increasingly larger sections of the middle and working class, and to a lesser extent the middle bourgeoisie. The strong position of the Catalan economy in Spain encouraged these social groups to take the Catalan nation as a framework of reference for social and political change.

In both cases, the strong involvement of the state in the economy contributed to the politicisation of economic and class relations. In Scotland, the failure of the Keynesian state to restructure the economy and prevent hardship revealed itself in the 1960's. The Scottish economic dimension, which had been re-enforced through economic planning aimed at the depressed Scottish region, now served as a framework of reference for expressions of disagreement with the activities of the "State in London". Due to its economic involvement, the state was becoming directly affected by industrial conflicts, which in Scotland sometimes took the form of struggles between the people on one side, and the state and capital on the

other. In Catalonia, the Francoist state was also directly involved in class and economic relations, because it controlled the employers' and workers' syndicates and had shares in some large factories, such as SEAT. In the 1970's, industrial struggles often took on a political dimension, which was channelled by labour leaders into support for Catalan autonomy.

To a greater or lesser extent, changes in the economic sphere set the scene for a nationalist revival in Catalonia and Scotland. But they were not the main cause of nationalist politicisation. It is therefore doubtful that the instrumental role some analysts ascribed to social classes in nationalist movements can be taken for granted. Marxists have argued that nationalist movements are in fact class struggles, whereby nationalist politics are seen as being merely the expression - or at least the representation - of class interests, which in turn are determined by the economic structure. Although this view was rejected as economic deterministic and as unable to explain the presence of several social classes in the nationalist movements, the importance of social classes in structuring civil societies and politics was not denied. Chapter four examined how the the class structures of advanced capitalist society were reflected in the nationalist movements.

This thesis argued with Urry that social classes had to be defined not as categories of economic agents, but rather as categories which are constituted within civil society (Urry, 1981, 66). But civil society is not only the sphere in which social classes are constructed, but also where territorial and national identities are constituted (Urry, 1981, 72). Where people are living, which language they grow up with, etc., are social experiences which can cut across class boundaries. In the context of nationalist movements, social classes must therefore be considered not only according to their position in the economy, but also in their relationship to the state, their role in civil society and their cultural constitution.

Looking at the case studies, chapter four found that firstly, the attitude of specific social classes to nationalism have changed over

time; secondly, it was not the same in Scotland and in Catalonia; and thirdly, the class structure of Catalan and Scottish society had undergone changes in the last decades which had repercussions in nationalist politics. Historically, the Scottish bourgeoisie was politically and economically integrated into the British empire and did not support self-government. The early Scottish labour movement, on the other hand, and some groups of liberal intellectuals perceived home rule as a progressive demand, although it was not at the top of the political agenda. In Catalonia, it was the other way round; the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals were the main protagonists of the nationalist movement at the beginning of the century, while the Catalan working class organisations were indifferent or even hostile to nationalism. This was to a large extent because the working class was largely excluded from politics, and nationalism was employed by the Catalan bourgeoisie to promote its own class interests.

In the 1960's and 1970's, it was the growing ranks of the middle classes which revived the issue of self-government. A large proportion of the middle classes consist of intellectuals (in the Gramscian sense), who are the main social force in the relations between civil society and the state. Their function as builders of consensus and hegemony involves the articulation of the national-popular, which is shared by the whole society. This function can cause nationalist politicisation if a discrepancy appears between the national-popular values and institutions of a national community and the state. One must also take into account that in contemporary capitalist societies, increasing numbers of intellectuals are working in public institutions that are dependent on the state. They are not in direct class conflict, and therefore more likely to be involved in struggles whose main line of conflict confronts civil society and the state, as is the case with nationalist movements.

In Catalonia, the middle class intellectuals were alienated from the Francoist state, which repressed Catalan language and culture and destroyed many institutions of Catalan civil society. In addition to the general political repression in Spain under Franco, their

political and public function was therefore severely constrained through the imposition of Castilian culture. As the most directly affected group, Catalan intellectuals led the nationalist revival in the 1960's and forged it to anti-Francoism. The working class, too, was affected by the cultural repression, but it was culturally divided due to massive Castilian immigration. Their antagonistic relationship to the state, however, led some important sectors of the working class to support nationalist demands. They considered embracing Catalan nationalism as important in the struggle for hegemony over Catalan civil society. The involvement of the bourgeoisie in the nationalist movement increased in the 1970's, when it saw the chance of making a strong impact on the transition to a democratic and autonomous Catalonia. The Catalan bourgeoisie had little political influence on the Franco regime despite its economic strength. During the 1960's and before, its more nationalist sector helped the cultural revival by giving financial support. The Catalan big bourgeoisie, however, opted for the regime and castilianisation. This enabled the Catalan nationalist movement to present itself as socially progressive, with the Catalan "people" on one side and the capitalists and the state on the other.

The Scottish case revealed a different constellation, although here, too, it was not possible to reduce nationalism to any particular class interests. In the 1960's, it was in the first place the middle classes which supported the nationalist movement. They were critical of Scotland's "provincial second-class status", which seemed to be perpetuated, rather than eliminated, by central state intervention. The growing nationalist politicisation around economic and political issues was channelled into the SNP. The historically grown class related support for the Conservative and the Labour Party left the SNP with a broadening middle ground, which included privileged sectors of the working class and the small bourgeoisie, as well rural communities which were traditionally less strongly divided along class lines. The increasing support for nationalism shook the Labour movement out of its unionist mould in the mid-1970's and forced it to adopt devolution. This change of mind paved the way for a broadening nationalist movement, which is no longer confined to the SNP. The Scottish bourgeoisie was and has remained largely

hostile to self-government demands, partly because it was already participating in the Scottish agencies of the central government, and partly because it feared that in an autonomous Scotland, their power could be drastically reduced.

1.3 Civil society and the state

From Chapter four it emerged that the class constitution of the nationalist movements was not so much determined by economic interests as by the relationship between the national civil society - and its constituent social classes -, and the central state. It depends on the form of the state and its relationship to the civil society how strong and how unified the nationalist movements are, whether they are successful and how the state fights back to maintain power over the disputed territory.

The Catalan and the Scottish movements both aimed at transforming this relationship, but they adopted different strategies. This was largely explained with the institutional form of the state they were challenging. Chapter five argued that there were obvious differences between the British and the Spanish case. Spain was ruled by a dictatorial regime, which maintained a very hostile attitude to nationalist movements within its realm. The Catalan territory was occupied at the end of the civil war, and with the loss of democracy (as elsewhere in Spain), the Catalans also saw their autonomous government abolished by a simple decree. Not surprisingly, most of the Catalan opposition considered autonomy and democracy as connected demands. From their point of view, overthrowing the Franco regime was the precondition for democracy, social justice and Catalan autonomy.

The government's repressive policies against not just political, but also cultural manifestations of Catalan national identity gave rise to the broad cultural-nationalist movement in Catalonia in the 1960's. The reason for this was that by denying the right of a distinctive Catalan language and culture to exist and to find free expression, the Franco regime progressively undermined its

legitimation among the Catalan population. The reactionary, impoverished and distorted brand of Spanish nationalism, which the Franco regime forced down the throat of its citizens, was not able to provide an adequate replacement¹, particularly since the whole country was subjected to political repression and censorship. The interventionist policies of the State aimed at repressing Catalan language and culture and political opposition were in strange contrast to the laissez-faire approach of the government in other spheres which affected people's lives. Social problems as a result of uncontrolled capitalist economic growth throughout the 1960's were exacerbated by widespread corruption, which reached into the top levels of the state bureaucracy. This added to the pressure on the state in the 1970's. However, the central government succeeded after Franco's death in preventing radical changes in the state apparatus, and in ensuring that the nationalist challenge did not threaten the unity of the Spanish state.

Looking at Scotland as part of the British state, chapter five argued that the nationalist movement - and particularly the SNP's demand for independence - called into question the legitimation of the state. The reasons included the failure of the state to deliver the promises of equality and welfare, and to solve the structural economic and social problems in Scotland with central planning. Thus, the attempt of the state to establish hegemony through planning and increasing intervention generated new bases of resistance, which were articulated in the nationalist movement. The state was perceived as remote and difficult to control, and the Scottish Office was a constant reminder to the Scots that they had

¹The Catalan nationalist leader Jordi Pujol said that the Franco regime had taken away the Catalans' political identity and culture without offering anything in return. He wrote in 1958:

"We cannot resign ourselves to the annihilation of our people. Castille, which won the war and destroyed our half built temple, has not provided another one which could be of use to us. In the last five hundred years, the only useful structures which have been created here were ours - insufficient as they may be."

(Pujol, 1980, 47)

their own bureaucracy, but it was only a long arm which was moved from London. Independence meant for the SNP simply chopping that arm off, and devolution meant for the Labour Party some Scottish control over the finger movements while leaving the arm intact.

While the Catalan nationalist and anti-Francoist movement was operating in semi-legality or openly in defiance of the state, the Scottish nationalist movement was part of the democratic political system, and in that respect, it did not threaten the basic constitutional structures. Both independentists and devolutionists tried to achieve their aim of greater autonomy through Westminster parliament. Within that system, the political forces which wanted to maintain the integrity of the British state had a greater range of options in dealing with the nationalist movement. These options included "stealing the nationalists' clothes", delaying legislation and evoking the dual national identity of Scots. This is how the Labour Party succeeded in maintaining its hegemony in Scotland, which looked so fragile in the mid-1970's.

1.4 National Culture: source of legitimation for nationalism?

From the argument summarised above, it can be deduced that the socio-cultural sphere represents a significant source of legitimation, which under certain circumstances can be mobilised by nationalist movements against the state. Chapter six showed that this was the case in Catalonia, where the cultural revival in the 1960's paved the way for political nationalism in the 1970's. Language being a fundamental source of identity, it is not surprising that the widely spoken Catalan language became a symbol of Catalan nationalism during the period of cultural repression under Franco. Due to state intervention in the Catalan cultural sphere, which aimed at eradicating and later at demoting Catalan culture from a national to a regional culture, activities such as publishing or holding mass in Catalan, forming Catalan cultural associations, etc. were not only politicised, but often even regarded by the state as political acts of defiance. Thus, the

cultural sphere formed the basis of legitimation for the Catalan nationalist and anti-Francoist movement.

The close relationship between Catalan culture and politics was reflected in the composition of Catalan political activists. It was noted that a particular generation of intellectuals, which had grown up under the Franco regime, became active in the cultural revival and/or the political opposition movement after 1960. Among the civil society institutions which were central to the nationalist movement, chapter six concentrated on Catalan publishing houses, because they involved many politically active intellectuals which in the 1970's became part of the new political establishment of democratic and autonomous Catalonia.

Although the Catalan cultural revival became significant only in the 1960's, it must be stressed that small scale - and often underground - cultural activities in the first two decades of Francoism played an important role. Those writers and historians, who had experienced the republican era under the *Generalitat* and who had stayed in Catalonia, constituted a vital link to the Catalan (and the Catalanist) heritage. The claim that "once more it has been a handful of banned writers, tired old poets and sacked philosophers who have stubbornly kept alive the memory of another kind of culture and society, another way of being citizens ..." (*Guardian*, 30.11.1989) could be applied to Catalonia.

In Scotland, there was no recent persecution of indigenous culture, and therefore no banned writers or sacked philosophers. Those poets and writers who tried in the 1920's (and thereafter) to revive a distinctive Scottish language and culture remained at the margin of Scottish nationalism. This is partly due to the dwindling numbers of Gaelic speakers, and to the fact that the Scots language was perceived after the Union of Crowns as a degraded dialect of English that was only used by the lower classes and in informal situations. But more important was perhaps that Scottish culture had a low prestige among the Scottish population, which has been reiterated and reinforced by many Scottish intellectuals. Being part of the British empire also involved speaking its language and becoming

anglicised, which was what generations after generations of Scottish intellectuals helped to carry out.

Again, history explains to some extent the predicament of Scottish culture and its relative unimportance in the nationalist movement. But one must also consider that Catalan nationalists view their most recent history from the vantage point of - at least partial - success, from which isolated individuals and small groups of young and dynamic intellectuals appear as the heroes of the cultural revival. In Scotland, such people also exist; Scottish culture has experienced a steady revival, which was encouraged by the growth of political nationalism. But the Scottish nationalist movement did not achieve a change in state-society relationships, and the status of Scottish culture therefore remained largely unchanged. In the 1980's, however, there are signs indicating that culture is becoming a more important component of Scottish identity, as political nationalism is still licking its wounds from the battle for devolution in the 1970's.

1.5 Territoriality and nationalism

The territorial definition of nationalist movements distinguishes them from other political movements, and therefore territoriality is central to an understanding of nationalism. The sense of belonging to a place, a region and a country is a fundamental interpellation which constitutes subjectivity, and there are several layers of territorial identity. Chapter seven argued that a shared territorial identity is an important cohesive factor in nationalist movements.

Both Catalonia and Scotland have well-defined boundaries which constitute the geographical limits in which the nationalist movement was operating. In Scotland, the national boundaries are historically and culturally defined and socially reproduced, while in Catalonia, the boundaries are socially and economically defined. If cultural criteria are used to define the Catalan nation, then adjacent territories have to be included. Within Catalan nationalism, there is therefore a minority which adheres to pan-Catalan nationalism,

but in the period examined in this thesis, this minority was relatively insignificant politically. The oil propaganda of the Scottish nationalists in the 1970's gave the unionist forces the opportunity to undermine the credibility of the nationalist movement by pointing out the cultural distinctiveness of the Orkney and Shetland Islands. The unionists saw in the SNP's policy of counting these small islands to Scotland but granting them autonomy within an independent Scotland an imperialist attitude. What the Shetland problem demonstrated was in the first place the weakness of the nationalist strategy and political discourse. The second lesson was the fact that identification with the national territory turned out to be less self-evident than assumed, not least because there are other territorial identities coexisting and conflicting with the national identity. In particular, conflicts are likely to arise when vested interests are involved.

Harvey's argument that inter-regional conflicts also have a material basis because some capital is fixed to the territory (Harvey, 1982, 419-420) goes a long way towards explaining why the Shetland problem was played up so strongly in the mid-1970's. It also helps to explain how and for what reasons territorially based class alliances emerge on a national level, as demonstrated in Scotland², and more clearly defined in Catalonia³. These different layers of territorial identities based on social interaction do not necessarily conflict with each other, as the comarcal theme in Catalan nationalism shows. Here, the internal division of Catalonia, which historically gave rise to conflicts between different fractions of Catalan capital, was incorporated by 19th century nationalists into the national territorial identity. Comarcalism since then became an integral part

²Such Scottish class alliances became apparent in specific conflicts such as the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders work-in and as a less well-defined political trend in the early 1970's in response to the unemployment problem, and in the 1980's in opposition to the Thatcher governments.

³In Catalonia, the class alliance strategy on a national platform was an explicit strategy of the Catalan anti-Francoist opposition in the 1970's.

of Catalan nationalism, and has been used by the ruling conservative party in Catalonia to legitimise its power. In Scotland, internal differences are no less significant, but they have not become integrated into nationalism in a similar way. This became obvious during the reorganisation of local government in 1973, which was dealt with separately from the nationalist problem. Rather than enhancing nationalism - as in Catalonia -, local identity and distinctiveness **within** Scotland set limits to nationalist support.

2. CRITICAL REFLECTIONS

The second part of this chapter is reserved for critical reflections on the approach I have taken in this thesis. While the thesis itself shows that the approach is both useful in coping with contemporary nationalism in a comparative perspective, and fertile in throwing up relevant questions and providing a framework within which to deal with them, some problems arose from it which should be mentioned. Finally, some areas are pointed out which deserve further research, and which would help to refine the framework used here.

2.1 Problems with the approach

The aim of this thesis was not to solve the problems of social science in finding an adequate theory for the revival of nationalism in advanced capitalist states. Rather, it was to recognise the complicated nature of this phenomenon, and to argue that a whole series of processes have affected in a more or less direct manner the politicisation of national identity. Nationalist movements, as we found them in Catalonia and Scotland in the 1970's, must be understood in the context of changing relationships between the central state, the national civil society, and the economic sphere. These relationships have fundamental features in common in societies which are based on capitalist modes of production. More specifically, I argued that in the period has which witnessed the recent revival of nationalism, perceivable changes were occurring

that were highlighting the increasingly active role of the state in all spheres of life. As a result, boundaries between the socio-cultural, the economic, and the political (i.e. between civil society, economic sphere, and the state) have become less and less clearly defined. This leads firstly to the politicisation of national identities, which are constructed in civil society and involve its national-popular elements; and secondly to a tendency of interpreting social problems and conflicts in terms of a confrontation between the state and the people. Of course, these processes do not only occur in areas where a strong national identity exists; but it is in those areas where these processes can lead to a revival of nationalism.

While in theory the connectedness of these relationships between civil society, economy and the state stands to reason, it is far more difficult to pin down how in practice changes in the relationships can affect and condition nationalist movements. Various problems have cropped up in this thesis which help to explain these difficulties.

Firstly, in analysing the ways in which state intervention rendered economic and socio-cultural relations political, it became clear that the type of state and the reasons for intervening were different in Catalonia and Scotland. These differences became clear at the level of civil society, because the Francoist state intervened mainly in order to control and repress its population, while in the case of Scotland, it was the intervention of a welfare state. Despite these differences, the result - loss of legitimation and politicisation of national identity - was similar, although the degree varied to which the nationalist movement was able to exploit it. However, these differences between the two cases also impinge on the question to what extent common causal processes are identifiable. In the case of Scotland, the cause of the legitimation problem was historically specific, because the state never had such powers to intervene before. But authoritarian states which exercise their powers to repress civil society have existed at all times, and therefore, the Francoist repression of Catalan culture appeared more as a problem of authoritarianism. Nationalism in Catalonia was

intimately linked with anti-Francoism; but its continued existence in the post-Franco era demonstrates that it was not just a reaction to the cultural and political policies of the Franco regime.

Second, and rather more fundamental, is the problem of defining the boundaries between state, civil society and economy. Part of the argument advanced in this thesis is that nationalist movements aim to redefine these boundaries, which undergo shifts as the triangular relationships change. In the case of Scotland, it proved difficult to decide whether for example the education system was part of the state apparatus or of the Scottish civil society. Even more ambiguous is the position of political parties. While these posed no problems in Catalonia, as they were illegal and therefore separate from the state, it was difficult to decide in Scotland. After all, the Labour Party was in power when it tried to embrace Scottish nationalism by tying it down to devolution. In other contexts, Labour (and other parties) were considered as a force in civil society. Thus, it seems that the terminology used here is too coarse to cope with processes and structures we are able to distinguish "on the ground". How to relate theoretical concepts with specific pieces of evidence becomes a problem, if what we are dealing with are very basic concepts.

The third major constraint of the approach taken in this thesis is closely related to its strength. By looking at general processes and relationships, the amount of information which is directly or indirectly relevant is difficult to limit. However, if the available time, space and resources are limited, it becomes almost inevitable to concentrate on specific case studies within each set of fundamental relationships. For example, the analysis of the cultural revival in Catalonia centred on the rise of the Catalan publishing sector. This is only one - albeit important - aspect of the revival, and other activities which involved different groups of people remained unexamined. The choice of detailed studies reflected the important role that this thesis ascribed to the intellectuals as the key agents in nationalist movements, as the vast majority of the interviewees belonged to this social sector. In this thesis, I tried to resist the temptation to force the two nationalist movements into

a uniform mould, and to allow for the considerable variations between them. Together with the need to concentrate on specific details in order to do justice to the complex processes that were related to the rise of nationalism, differences were given a greater emphasis than similarities. However, it is my view that the approach is justified, because it managed to avoid both mono-causal explanatory models, and particularistic analysis which treats nationalist movements as incomparable, and thus ignores fundamental causal processes.

2.2 Future research

This thesis was mostly concerned with the nationalist revival in the 1960's and 1970's, but it was informed by later developments and made use of this information. The referenda on autonomy (in Catalonia) and devolution (in Scotland) in 1979 did not lay the nationalist movements to rest. In various parts of this thesis developments in the 1980's were hinted at, suggesting that nationalism is still present in Catalonia and Scotland, although the former has now an autonomous government and the latter has not. Due to the different outcomes of the referenda, the year of 1979 was seen as a watershed; in the case of Catalonia, relationships between civil society, economy, and state underwent some fundamental changes thereafter. The most obvious one was the creation of a Catalan government and bureaucratic apparatus. After repeated victories of **Convergència i Unió**, the alliance is so thoroughly intertwined with political power in Catalonia that Catalans begin to find it natural. Pujolisme appears now as the hegemonic version of Catalan nationalism, and despite popular alliances in the 1970's, this conservative version of nationalism ended up in dominating Catalan politics.

In the 1980's, support for Catalan independence has grown mainly among the young, which have little or no memory of the hard times under Franco. For them, the present arrangements are not satisfactory, and they want to see far greater autonomy (Sellarès, interview, 14.4.1988). Movements such as the **Moviment de Defensa de**

la Terra (Movement of the Defense of the Country) and **Crida** (a radical cultural nationalist movement founded in 1980) regard Catalonia as a nation suppressed by the Spanish state, and call for liberation. Their support is still relatively small, but they catch many of those who are not politically apathetic. In Catalonia, therefore, a radicalisation of nationalism has taken place which could have repercussions in the 1990's.

It would be interesting to study these developments in the light of changing relationships between state, economy, and civil society. When a nationalist movement succeeds in having its demands met by the state, it - or a part of it - assumes control over the new political structures, and becomes part of the state apparatus. As the nationalist popular alliance broke up towards the end of the 1970's, different strands of nationalism became obvious; some legitimise the ruling party and class, and others are used to question that legitimacy.

Developments in Scotland point in a different direction, and in some ways resemble more the Catalan situation in the early 1970's. In Scotland, the referendum debacle left the nationalist claims unsolved. An embarrassed silence descended on Scotland, the SNP drowned in bitter internal struggles, and everything seemed to point to the fact that the Scots had given up. But according to Nairn, "that defeat and what followed has done more to reshape underlying Scottish attitudes than the SNP's heady victories" (Nairn, 1989, 7). Nationalism today is different from that in the 1970's, and this difference has its roots in the changing relationship between Scottish civil society and the British state, as Chapter five already suggested. If anti-Francoism was one of the main building stones of the nationalist movement in the 1970's in Catalonia, anti-Thatcherism fuelled Scottish nationalism in the 1980's. As the largest opposition party, the Labour Party has benefited the most from the rejection of Thatcher's policies. The experience of the 1980's seems to have Scots more aware of their own cultural values. Thus, to playwright John McGrath, the rejection of Thatcherism is "only one manifestation of a deeper difference: the survival in

Scotland of hope for the future, of the belief that it is worth struggling for a better society" (McGrath, 1989, 2). Widespread popular resistance against the poll tax, which was introduced in Scotland in April 1989 by the Conservative government, justifies this opinion. The sharpening confrontation between people and the state has strengthened the more progressive side of Scottish nationalism, and tied social struggles more firmly to the national struggle.

While the nationalist movement in Catalonia was aiming for democracy and autonomy, the alternative to the status quo in Scotland is less straightforward to define. After all, Britain is a democracy. This throws up a more fundamental question about the conceptualisation of nationalist movements as striving for a more democratically accountable state and for more popular participation in political decision making. These goals are hardly achieved by establishing autonomous or independent governments without strengthening the democratic structures of civil society. Again, this is a question of changing the boundaries between civil society and the state.

These are just some ideas about studying the more recent developments in the two case studies. There are, of course, a number of other nationalist movements which are little understood, in particular those in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, which have come only recently to our attention. The nationalist movements in the Baltic states and various other parts of the region have their own history, and their revival in recent years surely surprises local people less than Western commentators and analysts. The framework of analysis used for this thesis assumes that the relations between state, civil society and economy are shaped by the capitalist relations of production. It would be interesting to analyse the rise of nationalism in socialist countries, and to see how these relationships differ from those in Scotland or Catalonia. The differences might turn out to be less fundamental than assumed. This thesis was critical of theories of nationalism, because they often advanced inappropriate economic explanations. It now seems that Marxism's failures in this field are no longer only of a

theoretical nature, but also rapidly turning into a fundamental cause for the defeat of practical socialism as epitomised by the Soviet Union. To quote from Raymond Williams:

"Many socialists are influenced by universalist propositions of an ideal kind, such as the international proletariat overcoming its national divisions. (...) There can then be a rapid intellectual supersession of all the complex actualities of settled but then dislocated and relocated communities, to the point where some vanguard has a clear set of 'social' positions only to find that the majority of its nominally connected people have declined to follow it. When this turns, as sometimes, to abusing them, there is a certain finality of defeat."

(R. Williams, 1983, 196)

This thesis argued against adopting a universalist and economist approach to contemporary nationalist movements. It suggested that while people make their own history not in conditions of their own choosing, their action can change these conditions. The relationships between state, economy and civil society are fixed, but constantly changing. In order to change them, people may form nationalist movements, and the outcome and the direction of these movements are not predetermined. It became clear from the study of the Catalan and the Scottish case that nationalist movements reflect the desire of people to have more control over their own lives, and to reaffirm their sense of belonging to a community. Building a society which is centred around people's needs and aspirations is a creative process, which must involve the people themselves and start from their "lived and worked and placeable social identities" (R. Williams, 1983, 197). The nationalist movements in Scotland and Catalonia have showed up some of the problems which contemporary political and social relationships between state and people pose to the realisation of such a society. They may not have succeeded in challenging these existing relationships enough - all that is certain is that people will continue to do so.

APPENDICES

APPENIDIX ONE

COMMENTS ON METHOD AND METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

1. Theory and evidence

In Chapter one I described the aim of the thesis being to find out why and how nationalist movements became prominent in Catalonia and Scotland during the 1960's and 1970's. A historical approach was taken which traced nationalism back to its beginning, and which required a certain amount of historical reconstruction of the social, economic and political events and processes of the last few decades in the study areas. Particularly in the Catalan case, a scarcity of information material on the politics of the opposition - to which the nationalist movement belonged - under Franco made it difficult to document these processes. Interviews were particularly important here, because they could throw up new, hitherto unknown issues, or bring in new perspectives. Rather than conceiving of interview material purely as empirical evidence which is held against a theory or a hypothesis, it was integrated into the argument, and used to interpret.

In this thesis, theory and empirical evidence are not divided by rigid boundaries. This is partly due to the nature of the questions asked, and partly to the subject matter of the thesis. Although it is possible and necessary to look at nationalist movements from a theoretical perspective which stresses the interdependent relationships between economy, civil society and state, and which upholds their territoriality, there is no theory of nationalist movements which can be tested with empirical data. I found no model which could explain convincingly why Catalonia and Scotland came to produce nationalist movements at this moment in time, and it is not the aim of this thesis to come up with such a general theory. Thus, the research agenda and the subject matter favoured what Sayer and Morgan would describe as an intensive research design (Sayer and Morgan, 1985, 150), which allows for distinction between "necessary" and "contingent" causal relations. However, their case

example of the electrical engineering sector in South Wales was able to assume rather more straightforward "necessary causal relations" than was possible for the political movements I was studying. In politics and political movements, people are even less predictable than in capitalist production, and their actions seldomly conform to preconceived models and theories. It is a world in which "people can contradict themselves as well as others, giving (...) different versions of the truth" (D. M. Smith, 1988, 258). Therefore, the division between theory and evidence are more blurred here.

2. Comparative approach

2.1 Does it make sense to compare nationalist movements?

Although I have already commented on the reasons for choosing the two case studies in Chapter one (section 1.3), it is appropriate to discuss here the problems in comparing the chosen movements. Firstly, nationalist ideologies stress the unique characteristics to the national territory and its population. The sense of being different from the outside world is to a large extent inherent in sub-state nationalism because of the need to delineate the nation from the surrounding "nation-state". For many nationalist activists I spoke to, it was difficult to see any similarities to other nationalist movements, and few saw the point of comparing Scottish and Catalan nationalism with each other.

Though some argued that it was impossible for an outsider to grasp the essence (sic) of their nationalism, it must also be recognised that it is difficult for affected people to step back and analyse their own nationalist movement and abstract from it. (This applies also to researchers who come from the dominant state culture, such as Stephen Kendrick, who looked at Scottish nationalism, and Luis Moreno, who compared "decentralisation" in Catalonia and Scotland). Interviewees in both study areas reacted positively to the fact that I was a German outsider, which in their view made me more impartial. However, some Scottish contacts were surprised to hear that I was

attached to an English university, because they argued - with some justification - that the scarcity of Scottish information material in England would hamper my research.

2.2 Practical problems of doing comparative research

One of the difficulties of comparing nationalist movements in two states is the travelling it requires. Living outside Scotland made frequent trips north necessary during 1987, and some in 1988. The frequency was limited by the fact that my travel expenses were never fully covered, and without the help of friends in Scotland it would have been impossible to make as many visits as I ended up doing.

As far as Catalonia was concerned, it was more convenient to stay for several months at a time, which I did in spring 1987, and for the first four months in 1988. This second prolonged stay was financed by a studentship of the Catalan government, and I am grateful to Enric Lluch for drawing my attention to it. The experience of living in Barcelona and immersing myself in the Catalan daily (and sometimes night-) life was as important as the literature research and interviews I conducted there, because it opened my eyes to many aspects of the Catalan civil society which would otherwise remained hidden or incomprehensible.

Ideally, I would have liked to have spent a similar period of time in Edinburgh or Glasgow, but I was unable to find a grant to study Scottish affairs. The present political and constitutional setup in Scotland explains this lack of interest in - and consequently resources for - such research. In contrast, the Catalan government and other public institutions have a vested interest in supporting Catalan studies, because they help to legitimise Catalan institutions. Although a longer spell in Scotland would have been beneficial, it was not as vital as in the Catalan case, because a lot of the research could be done from Durham.

2.3 Methodological problems of comparing Catalonia and Scotland

In the course of researching the nationalist movements, several methodological issues emerged which required some thought.

As I gathered more information about the case studies, I became more aware of the differences between them. At times, the differences seemed to overshadow the similarities, and this posed questions for the organisation of the thesis, and more fundamentally for the purpose of the comparison. If the Catalan and the Scottish nationalist movements were so different, then comparing them would be a futile exercise from which little could be learned.

The question of similarity and difference depends on the focus one adopts. A narrow focus which concentrates on details usually emphasises differences, while a wider and more general view often recognises the similarities. This thesis started from the premise that a phenomenon as strong and widespread as the nationalist revival in various advanced capitalist states was likely to be based on a similar set of processes. It identified a number of themes which seemed central to contemporary nationalist movements, such as historiography, economic development, national culture and territoriality, and suggested a conceptual framework within which these themes could be explored. However, since it deals with processes rather than fixed structures, and with causal relations, the comparison becomes rather complex. The composition, outlook, development and success of the nationalist movements which I chose to study depended on specific historic circumstances in each case, and therefore did not lend themselves to generalisation.

That this thesis found many differences between Catalonia and Scotland is partly the outcome of its structure. It assumed fundamental processes and structures which apply to both areas, and finds after more detailed investigation that the combinations and inner contradictions of these processes are different in each case. It is therefore not surprising that the nationalist movements vary considerably in structure, motivation and direction.

Despite the limitations of the comparison, it proved very useful in several ways. Firstly, it avoids the extremes of excessive

concentration on unique characteristics and unfounded generalisation, both of which are quite often the the outcome of single case studies. Comparing two cases always forced me to step back from the particularities of each of them, and to weigh up carefully any general statements on nationalist movements I encountered or generated. Secondly, the comparison soon ruled out any testing of theories, because there was no theory which accounted for both cases. It therefore enabled me to think about a different framework of studying nationalist movements, and I found the triangle of economy, state and civil society a useful (even if not very elaborate) framework. Finally, one of the main inspirations of this thesis was to find an explanation for the contemporary upsurge in sub-state nationalism in advanced capitalist countries. It was necessary to use more than one case in order to tease out any common underlying tendencies. In the last few years, nationalist movements have also emerged with considerable force in advanced socialist countries, and it would be interesting to see whether they share any causal processes with those in the capitalist West. However, the events in Eastern Europe and the USSR came too late to make an impact on this thesis.

3. Collecting information

3.1 Language requirements

Since language and culture often play an important role in nationalist movements, it is essential that researchers should be able to communicate in the national language. The language factor already entered into my thesis when I was trying to decide which nationalist movements to compare. Since I was fluent in Castilian and English, Spain and Britain offered themselves as plurinational states. In Scotland, English is the dominant language of the people and of the nationalist movement. Given the low percentage of Gaelic speakers in Scotland and the status of Scots, it was unnecessary to speak either of them for the purposes of this thesis. However, the language issue was more complicated in Spain. The choice fell on Catalonia as the study area in Spain at least partly because the

language issue was more complicated in Spain. The choice fell on Catalonia as the study area in Spain at least partly because the Catalan language is relatively easy to learn for a person with a knowledge of Castilian and French, and because there was an opportunity to take a language course in the Spanish Department at the University of Durham.

Without an understanding of Catalan, research in Catalonia would have been impossible, since most of the relevant literature is written in Catalan. Oral communication does not require Catalan because most people are bilingual in Castilian, but there are many who have difficulties in expressing themselves in Castilian. Far more important is however the fact that speaking Catalan is part of people's national identity, of which they are very conscious. Particularly the generations of Catalans who have experienced cultural repression under Franco (but also the young generations brought up in the Catalan schools of the present autonomous regime) regard speaking Catalan as a basic right and a symbol of their identity. In some situations, it would have been paradoxical to conduct interviews on Catalan nationalism in Castilian, because this would have undermined from the beginning the legitimacy of nationalist demands and the basis for a good rapport with the interviewee. But it also must be recognised that many Catalans were brought up and educated in Castilians, and therefore feel more comfortable in that language.

Since I had more difficulties with Catalan than with Castilian, it took some time to gather sufficient courage for interviewing in Catalan. This was one of the main reasons for conducting most of my interviews during my second visit to Barcelona. Many people being bilingual, it was usually the first contact with the informant or interviewee which decided which language would be used. From background information, I tried to decide which language would be most likely to suit the interviewee best, and in which case the choice of language would be strategically important. For example, I usually approached in Catalan those who were strongly involved in the cultural side of nationalism, while I spoke in Castilian with trade unionists and working class activists. Although this seems to

reflect language and class structures to a certain extent, with many working class Catalans having a Castilian family background, it was mostly a matter of my own convenience. In general, my interviewees were very tolerant of my linguistic limitations and appreciated my efforts. The result is a mixture of Catalan and Castilian, as appendix 2 of the interviews shows, and does not necessarily represent the preferences of the individual or the socio-linguistic structures.

In the thesis text, oral quotes were rendered in the original language with an English translation given as a footnote at the bottom of the page where appropriate, so that the languages should not be an obstacle to English readers. Quotes from Catalan, Castilian, German and Italian printed sources were translated only, as this is not a linguistic piece of work, and therefore the precise wording is not important to the meaning of the passages. Any mistakes in translating either oral or written quotes are my responsibility.

3.2 The localisation and kinds of secondary sources

Secondary sources of information regarding nationalism in Catalonia and Scotland are very important to this thesis, because it is concerned with the reconstruction of a political debate. One essential task consisted in making available Catalan and Castilian sources of information, since little was written in English on the subject of Catalan nationalism. Material, particularly since it involved travels to the study areas.

In the case of Catalonia, most of that material was only available in the study area, and even then sometimes difficult to get hold of. Unlike Scotland, which has a large National Library in Edinburgh where much relevant information is held, Catalan written sources of information previous to 1975 are scattered in different public and private libraries and archives as a result of the censorship and cultural and political repression under Franco. Firstly, there is a scarcity of material covering the Franco period (and also the 1920's

during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera), because Catalan nationalism was prohibited and research on Catalan issues to a large extent a taboo. Secondly, the material which is available was often produced under difficult circumstances, often illegal, and is difficult to find and to evaluate. The process of collecting and retrieving documents of contemporary Catalan history is progressing slowly, and is hampered by the lack of resources (Benet, interview, 1988). However, there are a number of important libraries, of which the **Biblioteca de Catalunya** turned out the most useful for this research. I also had access to the library of the **Ateneu de Barcelona**, which held many brand-new books related to my subject which I could not afford to purchase, and used the library of the **Institut Catòlic d'Estudis Socials** and the faculty libraries of the **Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona**. In the public library and archive of the City of Barcelona, **Casa de l'Ardiaca**, I found some illegal journals and pamphlets of the 1960's and 1970's which gave me a taste of the social and political struggles and debates that were taking place then.

These were the most important places of secondary material in Barcelona, and very interesting and pleasurable working environments, too. Furthermore, the **Generalitat** was establishing in 1988 a centre of autonomy studies (**Centre d'Estudis Autònòmics**), which collected many journals, legal documents and monographs on the subject of political decentralisation and was mostly concerned with the developments after autonomy. A national archive was being set up by the **Generalitat** but still not usable in 1988, and various other documentation centres existed or were under way (such as the nationalist **Fundació Centre de Documentació Política**). This multiplicity of libraries made the search for information both fascinating and tiring, and helped me to quickly find my way around the city.

Back in England, it became difficult and time-consuming to trace Catalan and Castilian material, although the interlibrary loan service and the library of the University of Cambridge were useful on numerous occasions. From this point of view, the Scottish case was easier to research, because the secondary material was easier to

come to know about and to get hold of. There is however less of it, because the cultural revival was not so prominent (see Chapter six) as in the Catalan case, and because of the political disenchantment which followed the failure of the referendum in 1979. As a result, only a limited number of books were produced on the subject, and relatively little research has been done on the nationalist movement in Scotland itself.

Since for different reasons I found published material in certain areas to be thin on the ground, I needed to look at newspapers and political magazines in order to reconstruct the history of the nationalist revival and the political events which manifested this revival. I had the fortune of being given access to Dr. Adams' voluminous collection of newspaper cuttings which cover the peak period of Scottish nationalism between 1975 and 1979. Due to a lack of time and resources, I could make only very limited use of it, but much of the press information used in this thesis stems from the press cuttings of Dr. Adams, who lectures Geography at the University of Edinburgh. Since Scotland has a distinctive newspaper culture, which has been successful at defending the Scottish realm from the "national media" emanating from London, it is necessary to look at the regional Scottish newspapers¹ such as the Glasgow Herald and the Scotsman information on Scottish events. Kendrick pointed out that the Scottish press in the 1970's was playing up nationalism and emphasising the Scottish dimension (Kendrick, 1983, 130 and personal communication), but this was not surprising, since it was an issue of public interest and one of the few times when there was actually something happening on the Scottish political scene.

¹The Glasgow Herald is mostly read in and around Glasgow, and reaches about 122,000 readers, according to a survey in 1986. The Scotsman is mainly an Edinburgh paper, but is also that Scottish daily which is most likely to be found on newsstands in England. It sells around 96,000 copies. In eastern Scotland, the readership is divided up into the Dundee Courier (125,000) and the Press and Journal (108,000) around Aberdeen. In comparison, the London based quality newspapers reach only between 9,000 (Independent) and 24,000 (Daily Telegraph) readers (Cargill, 1987, 139), and they do not carry a great deal of Scottish news.

Scottish political scene. Nationalist bias in the newspaper reports was not a big issue in my own view. For information on the nationalist movement in the 1980's, Radical Scotland was an essential source.

In Catalonia, press coverage was not so useful because it was restricted by censorship. Only in the mid-1970's, the newspapers became more independent, and Catalan political magazines such as Arreu were available. Although two Catalan dailies have been founded since the death of Franco², most Catalan readers rely on Castilian newspapers such as El País and La Vanguardia, which cover Catalan affairs extensively. nevertheless, the Catalan press is not as separate from the Spanish media than in Scotland.

3.3 Published statistics

Particularly for the third chapter, which looks at the economic background of political nationalism, I used some published data to back up and simplify the description of economic changes in the context of which the nationalist revival was set. Since Scotland is treated separately from the rest of the UK in most governmental statistics, it is easy to pick out and to compare with the British or UK average. But in the case of Catalonia, I found few useful governmental statistics. I used the annual reports on the national (Spanish) income of the Banco de Bilbao, which is thought to be the most accurate and comprehensive source, and some more recent Catalan statistics. Until the reestablishment of Catalan autonomy, statistics did not discriminate at the Catalan level, but were only broken down into provinces and smaller units.

²Avui was founded in 1976 as a Catalan newspaper embracing the nationalist cause, but its readership declined as the paper was getting closer and closer to the political line of Convergència. In 1987, the Socialist Party (PSC-PSOE) facilitated the reappearance of the discontinued Diario de Barcelona, this time in Catalan (Diari de Barcelona), but this, too, has only a small readership compared with the Castilian dailies.

For background information on voting preferences, on people's attitudes towards self-government and on their self-professed national identity, I took published opinion polls. Because the outcome of such polls depend heavily on the way in which the questions are asked and on the general political atmosphere, it is difficult to draw hard and fast conclusions from them or to make international comparisons. This emerged from Moreno's thesis, which was not able to back up as intended with opinion polls the claim that Catalans and Scots had a double national identity (Moreno, 1986, 66-67). Thus, the opinion polls are used as only one of many sources of information which convey the story of contemporary nationalism.

3.4 Interviews

The main primary source of information were interviews with key agents, who could be expected to provide insider information and to make connections between different events and processes which they had witnessed. This was particularly important in the Catalan case, due to the fact that the nationalist revival was for political reasons scarcely documented. For example, there were still no sources available about the campaigns in the mid- to late-1960's for Catalan teaching. Here as in many other instances, the researcher has to rely on assertions of other researchers and to take the risk of giving credence to unsubstantiated statements. Interviews are useful in trying to fill these gaps of information.

With such a wide and complex topic, interviewees have to be chosen according to their specific experience and knowledge of particular aspects of the nationalist movement. Most interviewees were academics, political activists and/or politicians, and can therefore be described as intellectuals in the Gramscian sense. It must be borne in mind that they are not meant to be representative of the whole population; rather, their personal involvement in political and cultural activities, and in some cases their role in political decision making are meant to throw light on processes and events which are important to the understanding of the nationalist

movements. Many of them were involved in one way or another in the nationalist movement, even though they espouse a great variety of political attitudes and backgrounds. Because I was concerned with relating the political movements to underlying structures and relevant decision makers, it was necessary to approach individuals who were involved in the decision making, and/or who had reflected on and analysed these dynamic relationships. Appendix 2, which contains the list of all interviewees, serves to give not only an overview of the interviewing activities, but also an indication of the interviewees backgrounds, because these were decisive in my selecting them. Of course, there are many more who could or should have been interviewed, but time and financial resources limited my activities. The interviewees themselves were not difficult to contact, and with very few exceptions also able to grant my request.

Since my interviewees were selected according to their contexts, they were interviewed interactively. I came with a list of questions which was more or less different for each of them, because each informant was supposed to contribute a piece to the puzzle. Depending on the time available for the interview and the type of person, it was possible to find out new and sometimes even puzzling information, which could change the direction of the conversation. From the outset already, every interview was different, though in some cases I asked similar sorts of questions.

Most of the interviews taped with a portable recorder, except in those cases where the environment was not conducive, the recorder failed or the interviewee did not want to be quoted.

Finally, I should point out that with one exception, all interviewees were men. The main reason for this is that very few women had the positions and backgrounds which I required for the purposes outlined above. This of course reflects the scarcity of women in decision making positions, academia and politics, which in turn is a result of the blatantly uneven distribution of power between the sexes. Though this may be gradually changing, it is certainly true that in the 1960's and 1970's, very few women were actively involved in those spheres of public life which I was

concerned with in Catalonia and also in Spain. The effects of my experience of cross-gender interviewing are impossible to define precisely. However, my subjective impression is that in some cases, the male expert and/or decision maker I was interviewing tried to dominate and control the interview by answering in long speeches. Though this behaviour is partly due to everyday practice among politicians and academics, it has been suggested that males interviewed by female researchers are more prone to it (McKee and O'Brien, 1983, 150). In interactive interviews, the danger of manipulation by the interviewee is greater, because they are often less formal and less structured.

APPENDIX TWO

INTERVIEWEES AND INFORMANTS

NAME	INTERVIEW DETAILS	BACKGROUND
<u>Adams, I.</u>	Edinburgh 15.1.1987 (English)	Lecturer in Geography, Edinburgh University; Member of the SNP.
<u>Ainaud de Lasarte, J. M.</u>	Barcelona 30.3.1988 (Catalan)	Historian; city councillor of Barcelona (Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya); friend and advisor of Jordi Pujol.
<u>Alay, A.</u>	Barcelona 12.2.1988 (Catalan)	Leading politician of the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya; member of the Catalan Parliament.
<u>Arribes, R.</u>	Terrassa 22.3.1988 4.3.1988 (Catalan)	Geographer.
<u>Benet i Morell, J.</u>	Barcelona 1.6.1987 (Castilian) 17.4.1988 (Catalan)	Historian and lawyer; author; leading figure in Assemblea de Catalunya, senator for Entesa de Catalunya (1977-82); PSUC candidate for presidency in the 1980 Catalan elections; director of the Institut de Història Contemporànea of the Generalitat (1988).
<u>Cahner, M.</u>	Barcelona 11.2.1988 (Catalan)	Editor; Minister of Culture of the Generalitat (1980-83).
<u>Canavan, D.</u>	Edinburgh 17.9.1988 (English)	Labour Party MP for West Stirlingshire since October 1974; former teacher.
<u>Casassas i Simó, Ll.</u>	Barcelona 27.4.1988 (Catalan)	Professor Emeritus in Geography at the Universitat de Barcelona; President of the Societat de Geografia.
<u>Casaus, N.</u>	Barcelona 20.1.1988 (Castilian)	Vice-President of the F. C. Barcelona.

<u>Clemente Conte</u> , A.	Barcelona 21.3.1988 (Castilian)	General Secretary of the Unió dels Sindicats de Comissions Obreres de Barcelona (since 1978); executive member of Partit dels Comunistes de Catalunya (1981-1989).
<u>Craig</u> , C.	Edinburgh 11.2.1987 (English)	Lecturer of English at Edinburgh University; editorial board of <u>Cencrastus</u> .
<u>Doig</u> , A.	Edinburgh 27.10.1987 (English)	Member of SNP and of the '79 Group (1979-82); Parliamentary candidate for the SNP (1987).
<u>Ferrer i Gironès</u> , F.	Girona 22.3.1988 (Catalan)	Member of Pujol's CC group; founder member of CDC (until 1978); Senator (1977-).
<u>García Sánchez</u> , C.	Barcelona 29.3.1988 (Castilian)	Co-founder of the Comission Obrera Nacional de Catalunya ; PSUC Member of the Cortes Constitucionales (1977-79), of Cortes (1979-82), and of the Catalan Parlament (1984-88).
<u>Gasòliba i Böhm</u> , C.	Barcelona 27.4.1988 (Catalan)	Economist; CDC Member of the European Parliament (1985-).
<u>Halliday</u> , J.	Dundee 6.3.1987 (English)	Chairperson of the SNP (1955-60); Chairperson of <u>Scots Independent</u> newspaper; lecturer in history, Dundee College of Education.
<u>Harvie</u> , C.	London 4.9.1987 (English)	Professor of British Studies at Universität Tübingen .
<u>Henderson</u> , H.	Edinburgh 9.8.1988 (English)	Lecturer at the School of Scottish Studies of Edinburgh University; poet and writer.
<u>Hendry</u> , J.	Glasgow 18.11.1987 (English)	Trade Union official at the Scottish Trade Union Congress; participant in the Constitutional Steering Committee.
<u>Lambie</u> , D. .	Irvine 7.8.1988 (English)	Labour MP for Cunninghame South (since 1983) and Central Ayrshire (1970-83); former teacher.

<u>Lawson, A.</u>	Edinburgh 18. 9.1987 (English)	Editor of <u>Radical Scotland</u> .
<u>Leslie, G.</u>	Glasgow 24.2.1987 (English)	Veterinarian; parliamentary candidate for SNP since 1966.
<u>Lindsay, I.</u>	Edinburgh 24.2.1987 (English)	Lecturer of Sociology at the University of Strathclyde; vice-president of the SNP.
<u>Lluch i Martin, Enric</u>	Barcelona 12.4.1987 (Catalan)	Lecturer of Geography at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona .
<u>Lopez Raimundo, G</u>	Barcelona 16.5.1989 (Castilian)	General Secretary of the PSUC (1956-1977).
<u>Macartney, A.</u>	Edinburgh 10.2.1987 (English)	Lecturer of Politics at the Open University; leading politician of the SNP.
<u>MacLaren, I.</u>	Durham various dates (English)	Research Assistant; University of Durham.
<u>Manent, A.</u>	Barcelona 28.3.1988 (Catalan)	Literary critic; Department of Culture of the Generalitat .
<u>Marin, E.</u>	Barcelona 15.2.1988 1.3.1988 (Catalan)	Lecturer of Journalism at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona ; activist in nationalist movement Crida .
<u>Massot i Muntaner, J.</u>	Barcelona 21.1.1988 29.2.1988 (Catalan)	Editor of Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat .
<u>Maxwell, S.</u>	Edinburgh 9.2.1987 (English)	SNP activist and member of the 79 Group; policy researcher with the Scottish Council of Voluntary Organisations.
<u>Molas, I.</u>	Barcelona 21.3.1988 (Catalan)	Leading politician of the PSC ; Vice-president of the Catalan Parlament (1984-88); Writer and lecturer of law at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona .

<u>Nadal, J.</u>	Girona 20.4.1988 (Catalan)	Mayor of Girona; MP of the Catalan Parlament for the PSC ; president of the (socialist) local government federation in Catalonia, FMC .
<u>Nadal, P.</u>	Rubi 27.1.1988 (Catalan)	Manager of multinational chemical plant; CDC supporter.
<u>Nairn, T.</u>	Edinburgh 30.10.1987 (English)	Writer of the New Left.
<u>Ortega, J. M.</u>	Barcelona 23.2.1988 (Castilian)	Master of students' residence Col.legi Major of the Universitat de Barcelona . PSUC activist.
<u>Pagès, F.</u>	Barcelona 25.4.1988 16.5.1989 (Catalan)	Catalan publications editor for Iaia .
<u>Paterson, G.</u>	Glasgow 28.10.1987 (English)	Small businessman; executive vice-chairman for local government of the SNP .
<u>Pi-Sunyer, P.</u>	Barcelona 8.4.1988 (Catalan)	Minister of Education and Culture in the provisional Catalan government under Tarradellas (1977-1980).
<u>Prat, J.</u>	Barcelona 17.3.1988 (Catalan)	Departament de Política Territorial of the Generalitat leader of the High Mountain Action Group.
<u>Ross, J.</u>	Edinburgh 9.8.1988 (English)	Undersecretary of state for local government of the Scottish Office (1975-79); Secretary of the Constitutional Steering Committee.
<u>Sellarès, M.</u>	Barcelona 14.4.1988 (Catalan)	CDC co-founder and activist of the Assemblea de Catalunya ; director of the nationalist Fundació Centre de Documentació Política and editor of <u>Debat Nacionalista</u> , the Catalan political magazine (1988-).

<u>Sillars</u> , J.	Edinburgh 28.2.1987 (English)	Former Labour (1970-75) and Scottish Labour MP (1975-79); vice-president of the SNP and SNP MP for Govan (1988-).
<u>Sayrach</u> , M.	Barcelona 23.2.1988 (Catalan)	Sub-editor of Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat ; member of Acadèmia de Llengua Catalana (1953-1966).
<u>Subirà</u> , A.	Barcelona 8.4.1988 (Catalan)	Member of Catalan Parlament for CDC (1980-); member of the parliamentary commission for the territorial organisation of Catalonia (1984-87); economist.
<u>Ventura</u> , J.	Barcelona 18.4.1988 (Catalan)	Leading member of the Entesa dels Nacionalistes d'Esquerra .
<u>Vila</u> , M.-A.	Barcelona 10.2.1988 (Catalan)	Geographer and lawyer; member of Catalan Parlament for ERC (1980-88).
<u>Vives</u> , M.	Tarragona 11.4.1988 (Castilian)	Member of Catalan Parlament for PSUC (1980-1988); member of parliamentary commission for the territorial organisation of Catalonia (1984-1987); lawyer.
<u>Wilson</u> , G.	Dundee 6.3.1987 (English)	Chairperson of the SNP since 1978; MP for Dundee East (?) since 1972?; lawyer.
<u>Wolfe</u> , B.	Edinburgh 25.2.1987 (English)	Chairperson of the SNP (1968-78); president of the SNP until 1982; accountant.

APPENDIX THREE

APPENDIX OF CATALAN AND SPANISH POLITICAL PARTIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS

Moderate centrist and conservative catalanist parties

- Acció Catalana** Split off from Lliga in 1922, involving the younger and more radical nationalist sectors.
- CDC** Centre-right Catalan nationalist party
Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, with together with the small **UDC** has been dominating Catalan politics since the autonomous elections in 1980.
- CiU** Coalition between **CDC** and **UDC** since 1979 (?).
- Lliga Regionalista** Founded in 1901 by Prat de la Riba; catalanist party of the bourgeoisie in the first two decades of this century.
- Pacte Democràtic** centre-left Catalanist coalition for the first general election of 1977 including **Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya**, **Esquerra Democràtica**,
PSC
- **Reagrupament** and **Front Nacional de Catalunya**.
- UDC** Christian-democratic catalanist **Unió Democràtica de Catalunya**, which after the first election formed a permanent alliance with **Convergència (CiU)**.

Spanish right-wing parties

- AP** francoist party, of which **Convivència Catalana** is the Catalan subsidiary.
- UCD** **Unión del Centro Democrático**, the post-francoist party which drew together the younger elements of the Franco administration and dominated the transition. period 1977-1979; its Catalan subsidiary was **CC, Centristes de Catalunya**.

Spanish and Catalan Social-democratic parties

Entesa dels Catalans The coalition of Catalan social-democratic and communist parties for the elections to the Senate in 1977. **PSC** Catalan social-democratic **Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya**.

EC **Esquerrres de Catalunya**. Catalanist and leftist coalition for the first general election of 1977 with **Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya**, **Estat Català**, **Partit del Treball**, **Associació Catalana de la Dona** and **Confederació de Sindicats Unitaris**.

ERC **Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya**, the party which was dominant in Catalonia during the Second Republic. Participated in the government of the **Generalitat** in 1980 and moved slowly down the independentist road since 1987.

PSOE Spanish social-democratic **Partido Socialista Obrero Español**, which has formed Spanish governments since 1982.

PSC-PSOE Catalan sector of the **PSOE** which was formed by uniting **PSC** and the Catalan fraction of the **PSOE**, **FSC**.

Communist parties

BOC	Bloc Obrer i Camperol, Catalan Marxist party founded in 1929.
PCE	Partido Comunista de España.
POUM	Partit Obrer Unificat Marxista, Catalan Trotskyist party founded in 1930.
PSUC	Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya, the Catalan communist party federated with the PCE
POC	Partido Comunista de Catalunya. Catalan wing of the Partido Comunista de los Pueblos, PCP, which broke away from the PSUC and the PCE respectively in 1981.

Catalan separatist parties

BEAN	Bloc d'Esquerra d'Alliberament Nacional de Catalunya, the Catalan nationalist party committed to independence and the unification of the Catalan countries.
Estat Català	Separatist party-movement, founded by Macià in 1925.
PSAN	Partit Socialista d'Alliberament Nacional
MDT	Moviment de la Defensa de la Terra

Trade Unions

CADCI	Centre Autonomista de Dependents del Comerç i de la Indústria was an organisation of white collar

employees in the service and manufacturing sector.

CNT **Confederación Nacional del Trabajo**, the anarcho-syndicalist umbrella organisation of workers' unions. Founded in Barcelona in 1909.

CC.OO. **Comisiones Obreras**. Workers' commissions which emerged from 1958 onwards. Established as a union in 1976.

Unió de Rabassaires i de Altres Treballadors del Camp was the union for peasants and land labourers, formed in 1922.

Civil society organisations

Ateneu Barcelonès Founded in 1872 (fusion of the **Ateneu Català** (1860) and the **Casino Mercantil Barcelonès** (1864)) as a cultural centre of the Catalan bourgeoisie and professionals and intellectuals.

Cámara de Comercio de Barcelona was founded in 1886 as an organisation of Catalan industrial and business groups.

Fomento del Trabajo Nacional was founded in 1889 (fusion of the **Instituto Industrial de Cataluña** (1847), the **Fomento Producción Nacional** (1869) and the **Fomento de Producción Española** (1876)). As its precursors, it represented the economic interests of the bourgeoisie.

Institut Agrícola Català de Sant Isidre was founded in 1851 to represent the interests of the Catalan landowners and the landed aristocracy.

Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País was founded in 1822 to represent the interests of the Catalan bourgeoisie.

Political Pacts

Assemblea de Catalunya was founded in 1971 as an umbrella organisation of oppositional groups in Catalonia.

Assemblea de Parlamentaris was formed in 1977. It included all Catalan representatives that had been elected to the Spanish parliament and the senate in the 1977 elections.

Concell de Forces Polítiques de Catalunya was founded in 1976 as an organisation of Catalan opposition parties.

Coordinadora de Forces Polítiques de Catalunya was the precursor of the Assemblea, formed in 1969.

APPENDIX FOUR

GLOSSARY OF CASTILIAN AND CATALAN TERMS

botiguer (Cat.)	shopkeeper
comarca, comarques (pl.) (Cat.)	Catalan local government area
construcció (Cat.)	construction, shaping (of the nation)
diputació (Cat.)	provincial government
Estatut d'Autonomia (Cat.)	Catalan statute of autonomy
" " de Nùria (Cat.)	proposal for the Catalan statute of autonomy in 1931, which was drawn up in Nùria
" " de Sau (Cat.)	proposal for the Catalan statute of autonomy in 1978, which was drawn up in Sau.
fer país (Cat.)	creating the infrastructure of the nation
fet nacional (Cat.)	national reality (as opposed to "national question")
gobernador civil (Cast.)	civil governor of a Spanish province
menestralia (Cat.)	craftsmen, artisans
municipi (Cat.)	lowest level of local government

nacionalització (Cat.)	integrate into the national structures of civil society; infest with nationalism
normalització (linguística) (Cat.)	restore (language) to its "normal", national state
orfeu (Cat.)	Catalan choral society
països catalans (Cat.)	those areas of Spain and France which belong to the Catalan cultural region, i.e. Catalonia, Valencia, the Balearic Islands, Rosselló or the French part of Northern Catalonia, and the Eastern fringe of Aragon.
partits judicials (Cat.)	Spanish local government units (19th century)
petits pays (Fr.)	distinctive cultural and geographical region
ponència (Cat.)	parliamentary commission
provincia (Cat.)	province; Spanish local government unit
pujolisme (Cat.)	specific brand of Catalan nationalism associated with President Jordi Pujol.
rabassa morta (Cat.)	long-term sharecropping contract based on the life of a vineyard, with 1/3 of the harvest going to the proprietor and the rest to the sharecropper.
rabassaire (Cat.)	sharecropper
rambla, rambles (pl.) (Cat.)	promenade in the city centre

regionalistes (Cat.)	activists of the Lliga Regionalista
renaixença (Cat.)	Catalan cultural renaissance in the second half of the 19th century
tertúlia (Cat.)	group of people assembled to discuss and eat in a relaxed environment
vegueria (Cat.)	Catalan region
Volksgeist (Ger.)	national spirit

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