Durham University

Durham E-Theses

The purpose of stating the faith: an historical and systematic inquiry into the tradition of fundamental articles with special reference to Anglicanism

Stephen Pickard

How to cite:

Pickard, Stephen (1990) The purpose of stating the faith: an historical and systematic inquiry into the tradition of fundamental articles with special reference to Anglicanism. Doctoral thesis, Durham University.

Use policy

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

- a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
- a https://etheses.durham.ac.uk/id/eprint/6220/ is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
- the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.

Academic Support Office, The Palatine Centre, Durham University, Stockton Road, Durham, DH1 3LE
e-mail: e-theses.admin@durham.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
https://etheses.durham.ac.uk

THE PURPOSE OF STATING THE FAITH: AN HISTORICAL AND SYSTEMATIC INQUIRY INTO THE TRADITION OF FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ANGLICANISM

Stephen Pickard

Ph.D. Dissertation

University of Durham

Department of Theology

1990

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without his prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.



24 OCT 1991

ABSTRACT

Stephen Pickard: ***THE PURPOSE OF STATING THE FAITH: AN HISTORICAL AND SYSTEMATIC INQUIRY INTO THE TRADITION OF FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ANGLICANISM***

Stating the faith in the form of fundamental articles has, historically, provided an important strategy by which the identity and continuity of the Church has been expressed. The issue underlying this ecclesiological context of fundamental articles concerns the truth of the one-in-Christ bond in Christianity. However discussion of fundamental articles of the faith has, from the Post-Reformation period, tended to occur as somewhat disconnected from wider concerns to do with the belief, discipleship and mission of the Church. One result is that important issues and motives implicit in the attempt to articulate the fundamental articles of Christianity remain undisclosed and undeveloped.

By means of a multi-level approach - contemporary relevance (Part One), historical development (Part Two), case studies (Part Three) and systematic inquiry (Part Four) - this thesis develops an understanding of fundamental articles which shows how the theme is enmeshed within and contributes to the dynamic of Christian faith in the Church. The resources for this inquiry are drawn from an extensive, but hitherto largely unexamined treatment, of the theme of fundamental articles in Anglicanism.

The Protestant tradition of speaking about fundamental articles of faith is found to offer an important medium through which the reality of being one-in-Christ can be identified, communicated and strengthened. In this way the tradition proves a valuable means for uncovering and examining the purpose(s) of stating the faith.

The problematic role of fundamental articles in Anglican self-understanding reveals itself as an instance of a more general, controversial and unfinished task in theology to state the truth of God's creating and redeeming love.

The thesis thus draws attention to the significance of fundamental articles for expressing the nature and form of ecclesial faith and discipleship. A positive rationale emerges for a more intensive and discerning engagement with the fundamental articles tradition as a strategy by which theology can serve the mission of the Church.

DECLARATION OF COPYRIGHT

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without his prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my thanks to my supervisor, Professor Daniel Hardy for the patient and scholarly way in which he has enabled me to bring this thesis to completion. His wise guidance and strength of theological vision have helped to make this research a joyful pilgrimage of faith.

My gratitude is also due to Bishop Stephen Sykes for the opportunity and encouragement to pursue this project, for his early guidance and continued interest in this work.

I am also indebted to the late Rev'd R.P. (Bob) McDermott for many memorable and enlightening conversations on the history of Anglicanism and many other fascinating subjects. It is my regret that this Durham scholar and friend could not have lived to see the completion of this work.

The community of Durham University and in particular the members of Trevelyan and Van Mildert Colleges have been generous in their support of this research. In particular I am most grateful for a sabbatical term which came at a critical stage in the writing of the thesis.

To the family of St. John's Nevilles Cross, and to family and friends in distant places, I express my heartfelt thanks for their encouragement and prayerful support in this research. In particular I would like to record my gratitude to a member of St. John's, Mr. Colin Tonks, who faithfully persevered in the typing of this thesis, many times! Any errors of course remain my own.

To Miriam, Andrew and Ruth a special thankyou for sharing their father for so long with such a difficult friend.

This thesis would never have materialised had it not been for my wife, Jennifer, whose companionship has been a constant source of peace and strength throughout this Durham research.

For Jennifer: companion on the Way

CONTENTS

PART ONE

1. **THE FUNDAMENTALS OF CHRISTIANITY: Perspectives on a Theme in Contemporary Anglicanism**

The Priority of Truth. 1

Fundamentals and Ecclesial Diversity. 5

Aspects of the Tradition. 11

Recent Anglican Discussions of the Tradition. 25

The Thesis: Some Methodological Considerations. 44

PART TWO

FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES IN ANGLICANISM: The Early History of a Tradition. 51

2. **THE ANTECEDENTS OF A TRADITION**

Articles in Ecclesiality: Early Developments and Anticipations. . . . 54

Multiform Christianity: Conflicts and Strategies. 59

Affirming Unity in Multiformity: The Appeal to Fundamental Articles. . 66

3. **THE FORMATION OF A TRADITION: The English Reformation of the Sixteenth Century**

Identifying Fundamentals: The Ecclesiological Perspective. 69

Common Doctrine: The Way of Agreement. 72

Fundamental Articles in Emergent Anglicanism. 79

4. **THE CONSOLIDATION OF A TRADITION: The Legacy of the Seventeenth Century**

Ecclesial Self-Consciousness and the Appeal to Fundamentals. 91

The Tradition Modified: Ecclesial and Scientific Pressures. 102

PART THREE

THE LATER HISTORY OF THE TRADITION: Selected Case Studies. 112

5. THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE TRADITION: The Significance of John Locke

Introduction. 114

Part I - Reconstructing Knowledge: Epistemological Presuppositions for the Tradition. 118

Experience, Ideas and the Way of Knowledge. 119

Probability and Reliable Human Judgements. 122

The Human Agent as Former of Truth. 125

Part 2 - The Rational Form of Christianity: The Covenant of Faith

Religion in the *Essay*: Criteria for Faith. 127

The Fundamental Articles of the Covenant: *The Reasonableness of Christianity*. 129

The Simplification of Faith: The Locke - Edwards Controversy. . . . 133

Part 3 - Reforming Doctrine: The Significance of Lockean Empiricism

From System to Text: The Locke-Stillingfleet Controversy. 138

Commentary on the Fundamentals: The Paraphrases on St. Paul's Epistles. 146

Part 4 - Fundamental Articles and Ecclesiology: The Letters on Toleration

Conflict and Toleration. 149

The Ecclesial Ideal. 151

The Priority and Simplicity of Trust. 154

The Displacement of Doctrine. 156

Conclusion. 157

6. THE RESTORATION OF THE TRADITION: Daniel Waterland's Defence of Fundamental Articles

Introduction. 160

Part I - Tradition Threatened: The Drift into Undifferentiated Monotheism. 162

Intensity of the Threat to Faith: From Arianism to Atheism. 163

Extent of the Threat to Faith:
The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Sacraments. 172

The Ecclesiological View:
Preserving the Boundaries of the Church. 184

Part 2 - The Fundamentals Restored:
The Nature of the Christian Covenant

The Form of the Fundamental Articles System. 187

System Quality: Further Assessments. 194

Conclusion. 201

7. THE RENEWAL OF THE TRADITION:
The Mystical Theology of William Law

Introduction. 203

Part 1 - From Fundamental Articles to Fundament

Phase One: High Church Traditionalism. 209

Phase Two: The Transposition of Doctrine into Ethics. 213

Phase Three: On the Edges of Interiority. 215

Phase Four: Penetration to the Real. 219

Phase Five: The Divine Superabundance. 229

Part 2 - Fundamentals Renewed: Some
Theological Dimensions of the Mystical Way

The Form of a Tradition: Doctrinal Considerations. 238

The Function of a Tradition: Ecclesial Re-orientations. 245

Unfinished Agenda: The Public Nature of Belief. 248

Conclusion. 250

8. FURTHER ATTEMPTS AT RECONSTITUTION OF THE TRADITION:
Some Post Enlightenment Developments

The Illumination of Reason: Coleridge on Articles of Faith. 252

The 'Affectional Transposition': Simeon on Gospel Truths. 257

Restating Orthodoxy: 'The School of Waterland'. 262

The Ecclesiological Perspective: Newman's Modification. 263

God at the Centre: Maurice on Articles in Ecclesiality. 269

From the Mid-Nineteenth Century: Some Trajectories. 274

PART FOUR

FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES:
The Logic of the Tradition. 281

9. THE PLACEMENT OF THE TRADITION:
The Relevance of the Ecclesial Bond

Presupposition: The Ecclesiality of Christianity. 284

The Locus of the Tradition: The Ecclesial Bond. 287

The Task of the Tradition: Mediation of the Ecclesial Bond. 290

10. THE DIRECTION OF THE TRADITION:
The Problem of Capacity. 294

Loss of Capacity. 295

Identifying Capacity: The Impulse for Articles. 298

Capacity as *Fundament*. 311

11. THE DIRECTION OF THE TRADITION:
The Task of Communications

The Symbolic Process as Structured Response. 314

The Search for Foundations. 316

The Appeal of Simplicity. 324

The Emergence of Hierarchy. 331

The Formation of a System. 338

Excursus: The Genre of Regulative Communication

The 'Articles' Genre. 343

Basic Statements in Theology. 346

12. THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES:
The Significance of Ecclesia's Institutionality 351

Ecclesia as Institution. 352

The Tradition's Task: Truth Guardianship. 356

The Means of Truth Guardianship:
The Tradition as Ecclesial Deed. 364

Ecclesial Endurance: The Dynamics
of Restabilization in the Truth. 372

RETROSPECT. 380

ENDNOTES. 387

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 540

PART ONE

CHAPTER ONE

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF CHRISTIANITY:

Perspectives on a Theme in Contemporary Anglicanism

> *It is the masterpiece of all the divines of Christendom to say what is fundamental in Christianity and what is not* (Herbert Thorndike)[1].

The Priority of Truth

Discussion of the fundamentals of Christianity has occupied an important place within the history of Anglicanism.[2] This is hardly surprising given the fact that fundamentals inquiry can simply indicate an intention to identify what is important and constitutive for any area of concern.[3] More specifically it can be argued, that in Christianity fundamentals inquiry operates as a strategy for *finding, ordering* and *communicating* the truth of ecclesial reality. In this way such a strategy properly belongs to a heuristic process in which truth itself is the object.[4]

This link between inquiry into fundamentals and a concern for truth has, in the history of the Christian tradition, become evident in the continuous attempt to state the faith in the form of articles of belief. However, with the growing recognition of the multiform character of Christianity, particularly from the late Middle Ages, the attempt to state the saving faith of the one Church became increasingly controversial. One response, developed within the emerging Protestantism of the sixteenth century, was to propose agreement upon certain fundamental articles, in order to distinguish them from other beliefs considered to be of lesser importance for faith and unity.

These developments will be briefly explored in Chapter Two. At this preliminary stage a number of simple points are worthy of note. Firstly, inquiry into what is fundamental in Christianity

ideally proceeds from the conviction that the Church already dwells in the truth as it is in Jesus (Eph 4:21b). Secondly, in the effort to express the nature of the truth that bonds the Church, the fundamentals strategy has been further refined by an appeal to certain articles of faith deemed fundamental for the Church's life and mission.

Unsurprisingly, this strategy to state the faith involves a complex of issues concerning the nature of truth itself - its apprehension, communication and social form and function. These quite major issues will surface repeatedly in the course of this inquiry both complexifying and enriching an understanding of the theme of fundamental articles in Christianity and ultimately of the purposes of stating the faith.

Finally, insofar as the task of finding, dwelling-in and communicating truth, belongs to the province of Christianity *per se*, it is to be expected that *fundamentals discussion* should be evident in the history of Anglicanism. The following Chapters will show that this has taken place. What this indicates is that the attempt in Anglicanism to identify the fundamentals of Christianity is simply evidence of a particular Church's engagement with the persistent and, strictly speaking, unavoidable question of truth, that in various ways has occupied and will continue to occupy the energies of churches and theologians throughout the course of Christian history.[5]

An Anglican Tradition?

It has been argued that concern for the fundamentals of Christianity is relevant to life and thought in Christianity wherever it is practised. As such, this concern belongs to the common theological inheritance of Christendom and therefore also to the Anglican communion. However a question arises as to whether fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism displays a *particular* form - at least a conventionally recognised one - which is *characteristic of,*

though not necessarily *unique* to Anglicanism.[6] It is not unusual here for Anglicans to point to a distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals in matters of Church and faith. This distinction is linked to a specifically Anglican method and as such is considered to belong to the 'spirit' of Anglicanism.[7] Though it needs to be stressed that such a differentiation between fundamentals and non-fundamentals in Christianity is a contrast that Anglicanism has shared with other Protestant churches of the Reformation.[8] Furthermore, the distinction has not been foreign to Roman Catholic theology.[9]

What appears to be significant is not the distinction as such but the different ways in which the distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals has been determined and deployed. Thus the stress in Continental Protestantism on doctrinal purity and correct definition, particularly in Lutheranism, gave the theological problem of fundamental belief a high profile.[10] As a result, some quite sophisticated rationales for the fundamentals of the faith were developed by Continental Protestants for the purposes of church teaching, confessional identity and as a means for reconciling separated communions.[11] The distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals in the faith, though theoretically recognised in Roman Catholicism, ceased to be particularly relevant because the ambit of faith tended to be resolved into the formal authority of the Roman Magisterium.[12] A certain Protestant scripturalism likewise rendered the distinction unworkable.[13]

Within Anglicanism discussion of fundamentals has traditionally entailed a distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals. This recurring theme in Anglicanism has been repeatedly offered as a strategy for the handling of conflict and identity in the Church. The distinction has *usually* expressed itself in an appeal to certain *articles of faith* deemed fundamental either for salvation or the existence of a Church.[14] This resolution of the *credenda* of the Church

into certain fundamental articles of the faith in contrast to beliefs deemed non-fundamental, contains within it an oppositional way of handling things, as the continuous controversy generated by the implicit dialectic of the distinction makes clear. This controversy has ranged over matters to do with both church *credenda* (beliefs) and *agenda* (practices and order). This arises because in Anglicanism discussion of fundamentals has included (because it is *church* faith), an appeal to the particularities of church order and practice insofar as they have been deemed constitutive for the being of the Church.[15]

Questions of practice and order have not always been included in fundamentals discussion, or perhaps more to the point, have specifically been classified as matters 'accessory', not necessary for salvation.[16] In the actual history of fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism, questions of faith *and* order have continually converged and complexified fundamentals discussion.[17] The history of this discussion will be sketched out more fully in Part Two of this thesis.

What needs to be recognised at this stage is the fact that fundamentals discussion has exercised a powerful force in the shaping of Anglican self-understanding. Anglicans have invested significant energy in the espousal of what has been variously referred to as the 'doctrine' or 'theory' of fundamentals, the fundamental articles 'apologia' or 'tradition'.[18] Implied here is the development of a quite particular theological tradition to which Anglicans, in common with other Protestant communions, have continued to make direct appeal. Important in the more recent development of this tradition has been the claim that Anglicans have 'no special doctrines' of their own; that they simply share in what is fundamental to the Church universal.[19] Not surprisingly, such a view is highly relevant for an understanding of Anglican ecclesiology, for at the least the claim of 'no special doctrines' suggests a special doctrine of the Church not shared by other communions.[20]

The word 'tradition' is,however, used in its broadest sense at this stage. Later in this Chapter some of the problems of identifying the parameters of this tradition and its status in Anglicanism will be elaborated more fully.

Fundamentals and Ecclesial Diversity

The force of this tradition has continued to be recognised in contemporary Anglicanism and there is, as shortly to be seen, plenty of evidence of the deployment of this tradition as a strategy for the handling of ecclesial identity. More particularly, the argument of this Chapter is that fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism is to be located within the general area concerned with identifying and communicating requirements for the *practice of being one Church.*[21]

The continuing importance of the fundamentals tradition in the above context is evident in the four elements of the Chicago-Lambeth Quadrilateral (Scripture, the creeds, two sacraments and the historic episcopate). This formula, constructed and adopted by the 1888 Lambeth Conference and repeatedly endorsed, though lately with qualifications and amplifications,[22] constitutes, in the mind of one commentator, "a notion of fundamentals and a possible way of construing it".[23] Furthermore, at the 1968 Lambeth Conference, the theme of fundamentals emerged in the Report of one section of the Conference in relation to the comprehensiveness of the Anglican Communion:

> *Comprehensiveness* is an attitude of mind which Anglicans have learned from the thought-provoking controversies of their history ..... Comprehensiveness demands agreement on fundamentals, while tolerating disagreement on matters in which Christians may differ without feeling the necessity of breaking communion.[24]

This statement suggests that the desire and struggle for a genuinely inclusive and pure faith in Anglicanism will mean that fundamentals discussion remains relevant, controversial and urgent. This will necessarily be the case where the oneness of the Church in its diversity is of particular significance for a church's self-

understanding. This is clearly the case in Anglicanism insofar as it does not - according to the above Lambeth statement - understand itself as a monolithic institution but self-consciously admits plurality. A corollary of the recognition of a natural ecclesial plurality is controversy over those fundamental constituents of the Church's life and mission. This tension necessarily remains ongoing and is evident in the continuously controversial and unresolved status of fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism.[25] Implicit in this Anglican self-understanding is a highly positive theological rationale for continuing controversy in a church. It would seem to be the logical corollary of a vision of Christian discipleship which includes living in a godly way within the irreducible diversity of human social existence. From this perspective it can be argued that fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism has provided a critical means by which such an ecclesial vision is kept circulating in the Church.[26]

The linking of fundamentals discussion to the attempt to practice oneness in diversity is relevant for Anglicanism in both its 'inter' and 'intra' church dimensions.

The Intra-Church Context: Some Examples

At the intra-church level issues concerning the nature and limits of that consensus in faith necessary for being a Christian in the Church are clearly evident in the 1938, 1976 and 1981 reports of the Doctrine Commission of the Church of England.[27] A feature linking all these reports is their various attempts to articulate the unity of faith amidst a burgeoning doctrinal pluralism. In this respect it is instructive to consult the 1938 Report's Appended Notes printed at the end of a chapter "On the Sources and Authority of Christian Doctrine" entitled, "On the Application to the Creeds of the Conception of Symbolic Truth" and "On Assent". The discussion here seemed designed to ensure the integrity, or at least the legitimacy, of certain more

'liberal' theological positions. It was equally clear, however, that in this manoeuvre the Anglican fundamentals tradition was being reaffirmed in a quite particular and novel way.[28] This development became even more clearly evident in the 1976 Report's individualistic emphasis.[29] This ensured that the tradition of speaking about fundamentals of the faith could be owned by everyone. A consequence of this was that it was no longer clear how the tradition was a tradition of the *one* Church. This situation was redressed somewhat in the 1981 Report where the fundamentals tradition in Anglicanism was more clearly contextualised by 'the corporate nature of faith'.[30]

The continuing significance of the tradition as an Anglican strategy for dealing with the limits of internal diversity in matters of faith emerged in the 1986 statement by the House of Bishops on *The Nature of Christian Belief*.[31] Here the tradition was seen to be not only an important but also a highly flexible feature of Anglican theological method. This method included a strong moral component: "love for the total inheritance of faith"[32] was stated as the framework for diversity in Christian faith.

The Inter-Church Context: Some Examples

In the ecumenical context there is much evidence of a *recognition* and *deployment* of a fundamentals tradition in Anglicanism. The 1968 Malta Report proposed, as one possible way forward for Anglican-Roman Catholic relations, an investigation of:

> the possible convergences of lines of thought.... between the Anglican distinction of fundamentals from non-fundamentals and the distinction implied by the Vatican Council's references to a 'hierarchy of truths' (Decree on Ecumenism, 11).[33]

The subsequent history of Anglican-Roman Catholic dialogue indicates just how significant a role the aforementioned proposal has played in the exploration of church unity.

At a general level the various Reports have envisaged an important role for doctrinal consensus in the achievement of future church unity.

In this regard it is claimed that 'substantial' agreement on eucharistic faith has been achieved. In this context substantial is meant to indicate that 'differences' and/or 'divergences' in matters of practice, and 'theological judgements relating to them', "may well coexist with a real consensus on the essentials of eucharistic faith...".[34] In a similar vein, on matters to do with ministry and ordination, the Commission has claimed to have achieved a 'consensus' "on essential matters where it considers that doctrine admits no divergence".[35]

In the more recent ARCIC II on *Salvation and the Church* the Commission concludes: "We believe that our two Communions are agreed on the essential aspects of the doctrine of salvation and on the Church's role within it".[36] The rapprochement intended here in respect of the doctrine of justification, whilst not uncontroversial, suggests that both parties envisage some kind of 'fundamental consensus' having been established on the doctrine.[37] It is evidently "not an area where any remaining differences of theological emphasis, either within or between our Communions, can justify our continuing separation".[38] Identifying areas of common belief has, it seems, important ecclesiological significance for both Anglicans and Roman Catholics.

In the highly sensitive area of church authority the Anglican fundamentals apologetic has emerged with clarity and urgency. When fundamental matters of faith are in question the Church can make judgements, but in this respect conciliar authority belongs to only those decrees "which formulate the central truths of salvation".[39] Both Roman Catholics and Anglicans ascribe such authority to "the ecumenical councils of the first centuries".[40] An alleged ambiguity here on the Anglican side is later clarified:

> only those judgements of general councils are guaranteed to 'exclude' what is erroneous or are 'protected from error' which have as their content 'fundamental matters of faith', which formulate the central truths of salvation and which are faithful to Scripture and consistent with Tradition.[41]

Enshrined in this elucidation is the familiar Anglican 'theory of fundamentals' in which the faith is antecedent to the judgement of the Church. The significance of this position emerged quite clearly in the 1976 statement, on the issue of the Marian dogmas, of which "Anglicans doubt the appropriateness, or even the possibility, of defining as essential to the faith of believers".[42]

Later, in 1981, both ecclesial traditions are said to recognise that one consequence of their separation has been for both alike:

> to exaggerate the importance of the Marian dogmas in themselves at the expense of other truths more closely related to the foundation of the Christian faith."[43]

At this point the convergence between the Anglican distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals and the Vatican Council's concept of the 'hierarchy of truths' becomes explicit. However the only way beyond an apparent impasse at this point, at least for Anglicans, seems to lie in the retention of the freedom of the Anglican Church not to subscribe to such Marian dogmas in any future church union.[44] In this way the familiar theory of fundamentals espoused by Anglicans would remain intact.

The particular thrust of the above dialogue - to identify areas of commonality and differences in matters of faith and order - has given the Anglican appeal to fundamentals a seemingly high relevance and usefulness. This does not seem to be the case in Anglican-Orthodox dialogue, where the Orthodox participants have shown themselves resistant to the appeal.[45]

In the context of Anglican dialogue with the Reformed and Lutheran churches the appeal to fundamentals emerges as an important strategy for achieving a higher degree of unity.[46] Thus, drawing upon earlier conversations, the Anglican-Lutheran *Niagara Report* (1987) refers to "the common sharing of fundamental beliefs and practices".[47] Recognition of this 'comprehensive doctrinal agreement'- including the ancient creeds, 'the basic Trinitarian and Christological Dogmas',

Baptism, Eucharist, and Justification - led the Anglican and Lutheran participants to acknowledge "each other as true Churches of Christ, preaching the same gospel, possessing a common apostolic ministry, and celebrating authentic sacraments".[48]

In Anglican dialogue with Reformed Churches the stress has been not so much upon agreement in the faith - in respect of which there does not appear any problem - but rather on exploring the relationship between 'orthodoxy' and 'orthopraxis'.[49] Accordingly, in the 1988 Meissen statement, Anglican, Lutheran and Reformed participants referred to "a common confession of the apostolic faith in word and life" as a necessity for "full, visible unity".[50] In this respect the statement recognised the common bond of faith in Scripture, Creeds and Reformation inheritance. It went on to identify an 'agreement in faith' witnessed in Scripture and early Creeds, particularly emphasising "the basic trinitarian and christological dogmas to which these creeds testify".[51] The Meissen statement concluded with an acknowledgement of "one another's churches as churches belonging to the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church of Jesus Christ and truly participating in the apostolic mission of the whole people of God".[52]

It would be quite wrong to conclude that the appeal to fundamentals in these conversations was uncontroversial. The point here is that the familiar Anglican differentiation of fundamentals and non-fundamentals is in fact a purely *formal* operation which has a variety of possible applications in different contexts. The 'theory of fundamentals' in Anglicanism is relevant not simply to Anglican-Roman Catholic relations, but also to dialogue with other Protestants. In the latter case the shape and content of the fundamentals strategy is differently construed. Questions of Church order and specifically of Episcopacy - its practice and the doctrine of the practice - significantly intrude into the realm of what is perceived to be relevant and essential for future unity.[53]

Anglican discussion with other Protestant Churches has only served to highlight the highly flexible nature of the traditional fundamentals apologetic. Perhaps unsurprisingly such dialogue has raised some quite central issues for Anglicans about the significance of this appeal for the handling of their own identity.[54]

Aspects of the Tradition

So far in this Chapter an Anglican fundamentals tradition has been identified within the larger framework of fundamentals discussion in Christianity. Some examples of the *use* of this tradition in contemporary Anglican thought and practice have been also provided. Further understanding of this important strategy in Anglicanism can be pursued in a preliminary way through a consideration of four aspects of the tradition; its persistence, its documentation, its controversial status, and its unresolved nature.

A Persistent Theme

The fundamentals apologia has been a persistent theme in Anglicanism. At a general level this is not urprising. Iden tifying fundamentals can be a useful strategy for finding and communicating the truth of Christianity. Anglicans continue to recognise and deploy this tradition, and continue to write about it. The tradition has a history, one which is in fact shared but variously interpreted within and outside of the Anglican communion. In Part Two of this thesis a more detailed consideration of the historical significance and development of this tradition in Anglicanism will be presented.

Literature of the Tradition

Identifying the literature of the tradition is a highly problematic exercise. Any attempt at a survey raises some quite critical questions about the nature of the tradition under examination.

Such questions will be considered more fully later in this Chapter. For the moment it is to be noted that the literature on the subject is either potentially vast or rather meagre depending on how one construes the province of fundamentals discussion and accordingly decides what counts as evidence for the discussion in the history of theology. This problem is particularly acute in Anglicanism where there is little evidence of the development of a genuinely critical handling of a mode of argument so important to its own history.[55]

One useful way of identifying the literature of the tradition is to focus on a particular way in which fundamentals discussion has been developed historically. Important here is the tradition of speaking about *fundamental articles* of the faith. This concept has a high profile in fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism.[56] This is not surprising, arising at one level from Anglicanism's particular Protestant heritage. At a deeper level, however, it is important to note that the differentiation in Christianity between matters fundamental and non-fundamental presents itself most clearly at the level of doctrine. Of course to speak of fundamental and non-fundamental *doctrines* does not negate the relevance of Church order and practice for they too have their doctrines.[57]

The aim here is not (nor would it be appropriate or possible) to identify the vast array of literature on fundamental articles, even from the period of its popularization in post-Reformation Christendom. However the tradition of fundamental articles does have a history in Anglicanism. The aim here is simply to identify the literature in which the significance of this tradition is recognised and usefully detailed, insofar as this has relevance for Anglicanism.

In 1970 the French Dominican scholar Yves Congar, in commenting on the well-known importance of the notion of fundamental articles in Anglicanism, noted that the history of the concept had never been written.[58] Congar was unaware at that time of a 1968 work written in

the wake of Vatican II by the German Lutheran, Ulrich Valeske.[59] Valeske had provided a well-documented account of the development of the related concepts of hierarchy of truths and fundamental articles, the latter being discussed as a feature of Protestant dogmatics.[60] Valeske's bibliography provided a most comprehensive documentation of the history of the fundamental articles concept, at least insofar as the discussion belonged to Continental, and in particular, German Protestantism.

Two aspects of Valeske's work are interesting from the perspective of this study. Firstly, the Anglican fundamental articles discussion is usefully set within a much wider attempt in Protestantism to articulate the theological problem of the fundamental article. Secondly, consultation of Valeske's documentation of fundamental articles discussion in Anglicanism gives the rather distorted impression that, apart from the possible relevance of the Lambeth Quadrilateral to fundamental articles discussion, the Anglican history of the fundamental articles concept ended in the early eighteenth century with William Wake and Daniel Waterland.[61] Valeske's work is a useful guide to Continental Protestant discussions of the fundamentals of the faith but quite inadequate in its documentation and appreciation of the Anglican contribution.

In Congar's own ecumenical concerns he has provided helpful material on the fundamental articles concept. In his major work on *Tradition and Traditions* he linked the emergence of the fundamental articles concept to the development of the notion of truths necessary for salvation.[62] In the 1970 essay referred to above, the concept of fundamental articles was discussed in relation to the concept adopted at Vatican II of the hierarchy of truths. In *Diversity and Communion*, written at the end of his life, Congar traced the origins and contexts for the various Protestant discussions of fundamental articles.[63] Congar has made a useful contribution to the study of the Anglican

fundamental articles tradition. His documentation of Anglicanism is more comprehensive than Valeske's, and his highly suggestive remark that "the question of fundamental articles has become an article of ecclesiology in Anglicanism"[64] invites further examination.

It is perhaps not surprising that important discussion on the fundamental articles concept has emerged since Vatican II. Ecumenically-minded Roman Catholic theologians have invested significant energy in examining the notion of a 'hierarchy of truths', and the relevance of the fundamental articles concept has not gone unnoticed.[65] Indeed, the very notion that not all truths are of the same order has encouraged the view among Roman Catholic theologians that doctrinal agreement between the churches might be sought in the interests of achieving a shared Christian vision.[66]

Even in earlier more critical discussions usually dismissive of fundamental articles appearing in Roman Catholic Theological Dictionaries, helpful historical treatments of the subject, which include reference to the Anglican tradition, can still be found.[67] The subject continues to receive brief and more general treatment in Roman Catholic Theological Dictionaries.[68]

The subject has generated its own history within Protestantism. The history of this tradition is usefully documented and discussed in nineteenth and twentieth century dictionary articles.[69] Important contributions to the theme can also be found in more recent Protestant theology.[70] Generally, reference to the Anglican discussion of the subject is minimal.[71] Two things are clear. Firstly, the rather sophisticated development of the tradition by Lutherans.[72] Secondly, the impact on the tradition of the complexities of doctrinal development emergent in the nineteenth century.[73] This challenge did not so much remove fundamental articles concern from the agenda as serve to intensify an already difficult theological problem.[74]

The concept of fundamental articles has, from early in the

Reformation period, been linked with strategies for reconciliation and toleration. Consultation of important works in these areas will provide useful, if scattered, information on the history of the fundamental articles concept.[75] This ecumenical context provides an occasion for continuing Protestant discussion of fundamental articles.[76]

Within Anglicanism literature on the history of the tradition is fairly meagre. Stephen Sykes' recent article on "The Fundamentals of Christianity" is the first significant attempt for over one hundred and fifty years to detail the development of the fundamental articles tradition within Anglicanism.[77] More will be said later in this Chapter on Sykes' history of the Anglican fundamentals tradition. Paul Avis' recent book on *Anglicanism and the Christian Church* includes useful summary information of fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism, particularly as it developed in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.[78]

In 1970 Henry Chadwick delivered a short paper to the Catholic Faculty of Theology at Tubingen on the theological problems of fundamental articles. In this context Chadwick provided a brief account of the early development of the tradition in Anglicanism. The paper was subsequently published in German.[79]

Henry McAdoo's historical studies on Anglicanism include material on the fundamental articles apologia.[80] The literature in which the tradition is both recognised and subjected to even minimal analysis is sparse. A more searching examination of an important part of Anglican apologetic is required.[81] In this respect it is indeed a curiosity that the subject of 'fundamental articles' continues *not* to be treated in what, for most Anglicans at any rate, would be considered a basic reference in theology.[82]

Controversial Status of the Tradition

The tradition does then have a continuing and relevant history

within and outside Anglicanism. Nevertheless, although Anglicans continue to write about it, documentation and analysis of the tradition in Anglicanism is far from adequate. Even the briefest acquaintance with the foregoing literature would be sufficient to indicate the highly controversial status of the fundamentals tradition within and outside the Protestant communions. In Anglicanism at least, with its positive commitment to diversity, fundamentals discussion is not only unavoidably controversial but vitally necessary for the endurance of its own life and mission. However the history of the tradition reveals some sophisticated developments, continued challenges, modifications and, of course, outright dismissals.

Protestant theologians have been critical of the fundamentals apologetic in various ways. The learned Tractarian, William Palmer, (1803-1885) of Worcester College Oxford, dismissed what he termed the *Doctrine of Fundamentals* on the basis of its arbitrariness and the terminological confusion associated with its deployment.[83] John Henry Newman's passage to the Roman communion was, among other things, a signal that the theory of fundamentals, in which he had invested a good deal of energy in his apology for the *via media* of Anglicanism was, in his view, unable to deal with the difficult issues associated with the problem of doctrinal development.[84]

A certain Protestant scripturalism has, from the early seventeenth century, rejected the division between fundamental and non-fundamental articles upon the rationale that the selection of certain doctrines from Scripture to the neglect of others could not but be dangerously arbitrary.[85] This challenge was the logic of an 'inspirationalist school of teaching' which was at odds with a soteriological development of the fundamentals apologetic that may be found in Luther.[86]

In the history of the subject inspirationalism has continually threatened to neutralise all critical deliberation on the problem of the fundamental article.[87] This inspirationalism was capable of being

assimilated within later eighteenth and nineteenth century views on the development of doctrine through the influence of organic theories of doctrinal development which owed their influence to a Romantic school of thought.[88] In this context any attempt to distinguish between beliefs of greater and lesser importance will ultimately fail. The thrust towards doctrinal differentiation will be continually thwarted by an inspirationalist theory of the Word of God that requires obedience to the content of Scripture in its entirety.

However the charge of arbitrariness is inevitably one to which the fundamental articles tradition is vulnerable. It has been developed in the twentieth century in a sharp and sophisticated manner by the Reformed theologian Karl Barth.[89] Barth located the development of the fundamental articles apologetic within the high orthodoxy of seventeenth century Continental Protestantism. As Barth noted;

> its choice of the *fundamentum dogmaticum* was not in fact a bad one . . . . . But it was bad in principle, because it involved a definition, limitation and restriction of the Word of God .... The power of the real Word of God cannot possibly be expected from a Word which is fettered in this way by arbitrary human action, or actually crowded out by a human system of beliefs.[90]

In Barth's view the danger arose when a legitimate 'serviceable heuristic' was raised into a kind of 'classic text' which, in relation to the 'real Word of God', could not but appear arbitrary. For Barth, the whole development degenerated into "the thin formulae by which later Neo-Protestantism thought it could grasp the so-called 'essence of Christianity'".[91]

Barth's forceful critique calls attention to some of the inner dynamics present in fundamentals discussion: articles of faith are not self-generating but are derived from and refer to an encounter with the free Word of God - the *fundamentum substantiale* and *organicum.*[92] As such the fundamental articles tradition lives, as it were, suspended, so that it "can become a matter for vital new decision by the Word of God itself".[93]

This kind of critique has to be taken seriously, notwithstanding its own Romantic presuppositions,[94] and the related question as to whether Barth has correctly identified the fundamental articles tradition with the idea of the essence of Christianity.[95] Furthermore he fails to take account of a tradition which has a history and context other than Continental Protestantism.

Despite his strong critique of the fundamental articles tradition, Barth still wished to speak of 'a certain distinction' in dogmatics "between the essential and the non-essential, the central and the peripheral, the more important and the less important".[96] For Barth it was a matter of the 'proper use' of this distinction. This occurred when the *fundamentum dogmaticum* expressed "the possible and necessary account by the Church of its own particular experience of encounter with the work and activity of God in His Word".[97] When this expression of an encounter with 'God in His Word' became the pretext for "the establishment of specific, irrevocable, fundamental articles" then the way was blocked for the free operation of the Word of God *and* the Church.

Barth's dismissal of the fundamental articles tradition turns, it seems, into a qualified endorsement.[98] For Barth the matter had important ecclesiological consequences: "When we speak of Lutheran, Reformed or Anglican Church, we are not speaking of three different Churches, but of the three present forms of one and the same Church - the Evangelical Church, the one holy, catholic, and apostolic Church".[99] Barth supposed an essential commonality in the 'one Evangelical Church confession', notwithstanding diversity of doctrine. Echoing Calvin, Barth argued that not every difference of doctrine need imply separation or schism. "Unity in the Church is possible even on the assumption that there are differences of doctrine in it".[100] This is the familiar Anglican doctrine of fundamentals, expounded by one deeply and rightly critical of improper uses of the appeal to

fundamental articles.

Some of the fiercest challenges to the tradition of *articuli fundamentales* have come, not surprisingly, from Roman Catholic theologians. They have regularly dismissed it as a Protestant theory subversive of true church unity and unrealisable in practice without an infallible authority to determine content.[101] This was the view of the early twentieth century Roman Catholic theologian Adolf Tanqueray (1854-1932). Tanqueray argued that Protestant preoccupation with identifying fundamental articles of the faith betrayed both a false ecclesiology destructive of the oneness of the visible Church of Christ and, more dangerously, a rationalistic temper destructive of Christianity.[102] This latter feature was evident in a refusal to accept the authority instituted by Jesus Christ (the Roman magisterium) and in the proliferation of Protestant sectarianism. Tanqueray found support for his position in the writings of such Latin Fathers as Tertullian, who argued that all heretics damned themselves by the fact that they made choices between revealed verities.[103]

At the basis of Tanqueray's criticisms is the familiar Roman Catholic argument that all truth revealed by God is worthy of the same faith. The disciple of Christ is to believe the mystery of the Trinity with the same faith as that required for belief in the immaculate conception. The incarnation and the infallible magisterium of the Roman Pontiff likewise require the same faith. This position was clearly enunciated in the papal Encyclical *Mortalium Animos*(1927):

> Furthermore, it is never lawful to employ in connexion with articles of faith the distinction invented by some between 'fundamental' and 'non-fundamental' articles, the former to be accepted by all, the latter being left to the free acceptance of the faithful. The supernatural virtue of faith has as its formal motive the authority of God revealing, and this allows of no such distinction. All true followers of Christ, therefore, will believe the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Mother of God with the same faith as they believe the mystery of the august Trinity, the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff in the sense defined by the Oecumenical Vatican Council with the same faith as they believe the Incarnation of our Lord. That these truths have been solemnly sanctioned and defined by the Church at various times, some of them even quite recently, makes no difference to their certainty,

> nor to our obligation of believing them. Has not God revealed them all?[104]

There appears little room for movement given the different ecclesiological positions implicit here. The Anglican theologian Henry Chadwick has noted,

> The Roman Catholic thinks: we have the church, and that is why we keep the fundamental doctrines. The Protestant thinks: we keep the fundamental doctrines, and that is why we have the church. There is virtually no hope of a union or a compromise between these two attitudes.[105]

In the more open climate of post-Vatican II, the ecumenically-minded Roman Catholic theologian Yves Congar has recognised that modern Catholic theology has increasingly constructed its account of faith on the *quo* (the authority or formal motive for belief) rather than upon the *quod* (the material content of faith).[106] In this development the nature of the content of faith has been obscured. For Congar the fundamental articles relate to the content of faith and in this way he has linked the concept to the Vatican II notion of a 'hierarchy of truths'. In this context the mystery of the Trinity is, argues Congar, more fundamental for the nature of Christianity than the infallibility of the papal magisterium. Congar is clearly in sympathy with the intention behind the distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals. Despite his expressed reservations of an ecclesiological kind the distinction clearly has programmatic force for him, since

> the very idea of diversities compatible with communion, or of the necessary but sufficient minimum of common doctrine to be held in common if unity is to be preserved, is in fact the object of all my research.[107]

Congar's sympathies have been more radically developed by Karl Rahner and Heinrich Fries who have mapped out eight theses for the unity of the future Church.[108] The first thesis calls for agreement on the fundamental truths of Christianity as expressed in the Scriptures and the Nicene and Apostolic creeds. The second thesis outlines requirements for diversity in matters of faith. Other theses deal with ministry, authority and the Petrine office. It is a remarkable piece

of work from Roman Catholic theologians in which a new theological amalgam for future unity has been constructed. The familiar fundamental articles apologetic has not been directly challenged but has been modified by being placed in a wider, more forward-looking ecclesiological context. Accordingly, the fundamental articles concept is shown to offer a potentially useful, though limited strategy, for the reconciliation the churches. Whatever the practical outcome, the proposals of Fries and Rahner have sparked off an important debate, though largely confined to the Continent.[109]

Consideration of the controversial nature of the appeal to fundamental articles of the faith cannot overlook the significance of what the Dutch Reformed theologian G.C.Berkouwer, in speaking of the nature of Christian confession, has referred to as "a tendency to simplicity, to concentration in what is most 'essential'".[110] It is of course a feature recognised by Protestant and Catholic theologians. Karl Rahner's proposals for a 'short-formula' (Kurzformel) of faith testify to his conviction that the important aim is "to express what is essential in brief to today's highly preoccupied men"[111] in an atheistic world. This compression of the faith for confessional and apologetical purposes entails, in Berkouwer's view, a paradox: "the concern in the brevity is precisely to say 'everything' in its qualitative richness".[112] Accordingly, Berkouwer states that "whenever this concentration [of the faith] comes up for discussion, the deepest questions of the Church always come to the fore".[113]

Berkouwer's comment points to the inherently controversial nature of any attempt to state the faith in brief form. Disputation over fundamental articles cannot be interpreted, as Tanqueray suggested, as merely a peculiarity of undisciplined Protestantism. Rather, the controversial status of the tradition belongs to the logic of faith itself. This recognition leads to a consideration of the unresolved nature of the fundamentals tradition.

Unresolved Nature of the Tradition

The fundamentals tradition continues to attract interest and generate controversy across the ecclesiological spectrum. It is neither redundant, nor parochial, nor, if the contestability of the tradition is to be taken account of, is it resolved and secured.

What can at one level appear to be an eminently reasonable and practical appeal to certain fundamentals of the faith in fact turns out to be neither as simple nor unchallengable as it might first seem. There are, as Stephen Sykes notes,

> considerable complexities hidden in the proposal that all Christians do, can or should agree on fundamentals, a proposal which on the surface appears to be self-evident, or at least highly desirable.[114]

Most commentators on the subject share a common conviction concerning the difficulty of the task of fundamentals inquiry. When, in the early seventeenth century, the ecumenically-minded Anglican Bishop John Davenant (1572-1641) turned his mind to the subject he stated that he was "not ignorant on how dangerous a rock he toucheth, who appeareth to define Fundamentall Doctrines or to bound them within certain limits...".[115] The complex and unresolved nature of the task has been clearly evident in history for, as the Anglican systematician Daniel Waterland (1683-1740) noted in 1734, the subject of fundamentals had

> passed through many learned and judicious hands, most of them complaining of the perplexities in it, but all bearing testimony to the great weight and importance of it.[116]

Even the briefest acquaintance with the history of fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism is sufficient to confirm the difficulty inherent in adequately tackling the subject. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, the very fact that exponents of the tradition under examination have provided different solutions both at the same and at different periods in time to the question about the fundamentals of Christianity, does not signal the outright failure of a tradition but indicates the complex phenomenon that Christianity is.

Important here is what Michael Polanyi has termed the 'ineffable domain'[117] - that unspecifiable component in reality that is resistent to definitive thematization, and generative of what has been referred to in theology as the 'essential contestability of Christianity'.[118] From this perspective the attempt to state the faith in the form of fundamental articles will remain controversial and unfinished. Here the question arises of how the determination of fundamentals might be developed to take account of the contingent nature of Christian faith.

Consideration of these matters is important and urgent in Christianity insofar as stating the faith is an attempt to communicate the presence and action of God in contemporary life.[119] The challenge here is to penetrate complex phenomena and achieve ideal communication: a task vital for the Church's life and mission but, as already suggested, an inherently difficult and necessarily ongoing task.

Achieving good communication is exacerbated in the theological enterprise because it continues to be impeded by a lack of "a comprehensive theory of theological statements in present theology".[120] Consequently, the genre of regulative communication in fundamentals discussion remains unresolved. There is little consensus concerning appropriate methods and strategies for theological communication. This is evident in the terminological puzzle which prevails in fundamentals discussion in Christianity. Various terms including *fundamentals*, *fundamental articles*, *fundamental truths of faith*, *essentials of Christianity*, *essence of Christianity*, *fundamentum dogmaticum*, and *truths necessary for salvation*, have emerged as relevant in the history of the discussion. They have been applied to church *credenda* (faith) and/or *agenda* (order), for the purpose of identifying matters *necessary for salvation* or *necessary for the being, well-being* or *perfection of the Church*. In short there are a matrix of possibilities relevant in such discussion and clarification will be achieved only by attention to particular contexts.

Matters here are further complicated by the use of a variety of terms, old and new, which are related in as yet undetermined ways to the foregoing. These include the notion of fundament or foundation, rule of faith, hierarchy of truths, *adiaphora*, Vincentian Canon, and the *consensus quinquesaecularis* or agreement of the first councils.[121] What is clear is that the dynamics of regulative communication remain at best obscure. Some of the more important aspects of this problem, as they affect the theme of fundamental articles, will be attended to in Part Four of this thesis.

Finally, in Anglicanism, issues concerning truth and communication in Christianity continue unresolved, because in this communion fundamentals discussion has, as has already been observed, usually been associated with its own apologia. This apologia, developed by various ecclesial traditions within Anglicanism, has operated in a variety of contexts - polemical, ecumenical, intra-church contexts to do with discipline and authority. These are all *unconducive* to careful attention to the difficulties inherent in fundamentals inquiry. To recognise this is of course to identify *institutionality* as a problem for fundamentals discussion.[122] Highly relevant is the fact that as a particular apologetic strategy gathers strength from successive deployments in the historical process, it becomes increasingly risky to allow the force of challenges to one's own position: the threat of subversion of a well-entrenched position is difficult if not impossible to countenance. The apologia begins to operate as an important theological strategy for the maintenance of a pre-established ecclesiological position. In this way the fundamental articles tradition gathers ideological significance which requires uncovering and critical analysis.[123]

This discussion of the fundamentals of Christianity in Anglicanism has drawn attention to the persistence of the tradition in history, the relatively scant attention given to this history in

Anglicanism, and its continuing highly controversial and unresolved nature. The tradition is clearly of ecclesiological significance but it is neither as self-evidently simple nor as unchallengeable as it may on first inspection appear.

Some Recent Anglican Discussions of the Tradition

There is, as indicated, plenty of evidence for the continued *use* of an appeal to fundamentals in Anglicanism. A preliminary attempt to understand this tradition has revealed certain difficulties inherent in its *operation.* The tradition is clearly important in contemporary Anglicanism. It is a theory which evidently informs an Anglican desire for a principled ecclesial practice. A question arises as to how critically attentive Anglicans have been to a strategy that has been an important determinant of Anglican self-understanding.

Anglicans, however, have not been particularly attentive to the need for theological self-criticism.[124] The fundamentals apologetic is a victim of this indifference, if not antipathy. Moreover, in a self-consciously ecumenical environment the more urgent impulse to identify doctrinal consensus and divergence means that potential difficulties inherent in the fundamentals apologetic are more likely to be ignored.

As has already been suggested, difficulties in Anglican dialogue with other Protestant and Roman churches can be traced to different ways of handling fundamentals in Christianity. Such differences are linked to well established positions with regard to faith and authority in the Church. From another point of view it seems that where the concerns of practical ecclesiology dominate, the tradition does not readily offer itself for interrogation. Consequently, some of the more interesting and important issues concerning the generation and purpose of the fundamental articles tradition simply never surface.

In recent years a few Anglicans have quite self-consciously turned their attention to the fundamentals tradition in Anglicanism. Four

contributions will be considered here; the two former ones warrant only brief comment while the latter two require more extended appraisal.

John Baker

The Anglican commitment to the fundamentals apologia was addressed by the Anglican representative John Austin Baker (then Canon of Westminster) at a conference in 1979 on *Church Unity and the Hierarchy of Truths* organised under the auspices of *Academie Internationale des Sciences Religeuses.*[125] Baker concluded that there was, in Anglican practice, something that may be compared to a doctrine of the 'hierarchy of truths'. However it was not a developed doctrine, not a pyramid with many levels. Rather, it consisted of a simple distinction between those authoritative sources of belief and the basic definitions of its outline, and the multitude of ways in which Christians work out their own individual or corporate faith in each generation within the guidelines drawn by the former category. Baker recognised that discussion over essentials had historically been complicated by problems of the comprehensiveness of the Anglican communion, externally in relation to Roman Catholic and to other Protestant groups, and internally with the development of ecclesial 'party' structures. Other strains on the traditional Anglican position on fundamentals had arisen with the rise of biblical criticism and the challenge of the ecumenical movement.

The theme of the 'hierarchy of truths' gave importance to the discussion though Baker's paper simply restated a well-known Anglican position. In the context of an ecumenical exchange further exploration of fundamentals issues was not pursued.

Henry Chadwick

Earlier, in July 1970, the distinguished Anglican scholar Henry Chadwick, in considering the problem of fundamental articles of the

faith, had traced its history back to the doctrinal conflicts generated by fourth century Arianism.[126] In briefly tracing the development of the problem into the more recent ecumenical context Chadwick paid particular attention to the early seventeenth century Anglican theologian,Richard Field (1561-1616). Chadwick argued that Field could be rightly regarded as one of the founders of the World Council of Churches in that he accepted the divisions of Christendom as a fact and proposed a future reunification upon the basis of an agreement in basic truths.

Chadwick referred to the theoretical and practical difficulties entailed in the appeal to certain basic truths of faith. These included the problem of locating ecclesial existence and endurance in doctrine rather than in the life of the community, the difficulty of deciding upon and imposing certain beliefs, and the danger of a rationalistic and reductive faith as a solution for ecumenical problems. Chadwick was equally desirous of pressing home to his Roman Catholic colleagues the fallacies involved in simply resorting to an appeal to the Roman Magisterium for the determination of essential belief.

Underlying the question of agreement on basic truths Chadwick identified a number of questions concerning the nature of a doctrine and the determination of binding doctrinal definitions. Within this context Chadwick endorsed neither a retreat into Roman infallibility nor a Protestant reductionism but an amalgam in which ecclesially binding doctrines were achieved through a process of careful examination of declarations of faith and tradition, and by means of discussion and deep thought. Chadwick concluded that if Roman Catholics could take a decision on doctrine in this manner then they were as close as possible to the common Protestant position that the declaration of faith is the *norma normans* and the decisions of the Church are *normae normatae*: that decisions of the Church obtain their validity from their loyalty to the faith professed.[127]

Chadwick's analysis of the problem of fundamental articles remains at best partial. His useful treatment of the historical development of the theme is offered in the interests of dialogue with Roman Catholics in relation to their own handling of fundamentals discussion. However the issues that surface are not pressed into systematic form. This ensures the marginalization of questions to do with the status and operation of an important aspect of Anglican apologetic.

Chadwick's more recent comments on the subject indicate a qualified endorsement of the idea of fundamental articles.[128] Drawing upon the theology of the eighteenth century theologian, Daniel Waterland, Chadwick identified fundamental articles as pertaining to that which "the Church must teach to be authentically the Church, to be true to the calling and gospel of God".[129] Whilst recognising that the continuing life of the Church cannot be resolved into a list of doctrines Chadwick clearly wished to commend the notion of fundamental articles to his Roman Catholic colleagues.

> The reality of the matter is that despite all Pius XI's reservations and censures, the notion of fundamental articles is presupposed throughout the long history of Roman approaches to the eastern Orthodox churches, where western theologians have sought to persuade their eastern brothers that behind and beneath the different formulas there is substantial agreement. Pluralism in theology is compatible with unity at the level of faith.[130]

In the context of practical ecumenism the theme of fundamental articles appears to offer an important means of affirming diversity and unity in the Christian faith.

Henry McAdoo

Henry McAdoo, the former Archbishop of Dublin and Anglican co-chairman of the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission, has been aptly described as "a distinguished contemporary exponent of this [fundamentals] tradition."[131]

McAdoo's historical studies of Anglicanism, particularly of theological themes in the seventeenth century,[132] coupled with his own

attempts to articulate Anglican self-understanding in a wider ecumenical context,[133] have left him in no doubt that the distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals " has been part and parcel of the Anglican understanding of the unity of the faith from Hooker through Laud and Taylor to the present ...". [134] Fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism belongs, for McAdoo, to an 'amalgam of stress' which is focussed on the faith once-for-all delivered in Scripture, the faith and practice of the primitive Church (the *hapax*) and the continuity of faith with the early Church.[135] This 'amalgam' repeatedly surfaces in the history of Anglicanism as it reflects on its own identity in relation to other communions.[136] It emerged in the Reformation of the sixteenth century to substantiate the Anglican view that "the Church of England understood itself as the representative of the Church universal on English soil".[137]

McAdoo can also refer to fundamentals terminology as belonging to a 'whole cluster of concepts' relevant to the Anglican amalgam including comprehensiveness, synthesis and symbiosis, fundamentals and non-fundamentals, and a specific theological method.[138] In McAdoo's view fundamentals discussion belongs to the conceptual artillery which Anglicans have historically deployed to commend their arguments for the reformed and catholic character of Anglicanism, on the supposition that it is the representative of the Church universal on English soil.

In the light of developments in biblical criticism and the ecumenical movement of this century McAdoo argues, in *The Unity of Anglicanism*, that there is a need to re-examine the fundamentals apologia, to see "how well or how ill this persistent element in Anglicanism has worn."[139] His analysis is developed along two lines; firstly in response to a critique by Stephen Sykes of the fundamentals tradition[140] and secondly by developing remarks on fundamentals by the ecumenically-minded Archbishop of Canterbury, William Wake (1657-1737). From these two angles McAdoo offers his own proposals concerning the

form and content of the fundamentals apologia in Anglicanism.

A number of relevant issues emerge. Firstly, McAdoo is confident that there is no cause for anxiety as to the Anglican Church's commitment to the traditional fundamentals of the faith. The Preface to the 1975 *Declaration of Assent* "is in the classical line going back to Jewel and is a clear summary of where, for Anglicans, doctrine is to be found".[141] The *hapax* is here preserved. According to McAdoo, Sykes' anxiety is partly the result of his own failure to properly distinguish between public, corporate declarations of faith and the opinions of individual theologians "who modify, question or reject the concept of the *hapax* as enshrined .... in the 1975 Declaration of Assent".[142]

On the difficult problem of doctrinal development McAdoo wants to affirm both the 'historic given-ness of Christianity',[143] 'the richness of the given faith in its totality',[144] and the need for an 'ever-moving response' to this historical given-ness which acknowledges the limitations of language in expressing what has been given. McAdoo identifies with the Venice Statement on *Authority in the Church* in its recognition of the need for restatements and new expressions in the faith, notwithstanding the fact that there are 'certain formulas' of the faith "whose significance transcends the setting in which they were first formulated".[146]

A second issue concerns the ambit of fundamentals discussion. McAdoo argues that this cannot be limited to the region of doctrine *per se*. Those things 'essential to the true being of the Church'[147] include Apostolic faith, Apostolic order (a commonly acknowledged ministry) and Apostolic worship (Baptismal and Eucharistic liturgy). These are the fundamentals "without which the household of faith could have no existence".[148] The supposition here is that a fundamental is "a principle which serves as groundwork for a system, or as the base from which other aspects derive".[149]

Within the context of McAdoo's highly embodied ecclesiology it is crucial that that which is the 'groundwork' or 'base' - that which constitutes the Church's apostolicity - must be 'clearly evident' if the Church is 'to be recognizably the Church'.[150]

McAdoo's handling of the subject of fundamentals is inadequate for a number of related reasons. Firstly, the context for his discussion is not conducive to critical analysis. It seems that the pressing apologetical concerns - of having to provide a rationale for Anglicanism not only to itself but to other communions - so dominate, that important issues in fundamentals discussion remain undetected or are simply skimmed over. Thus in McAdoo's investigations of seventeenth century Anglican theology he notes that "it is the interplay of the idea of continuity with the *finality of fundamentals* which is one of the characteristic aspects of the spirit of Anglicanism" (my italics).[151] Accordingly, McAdoo contends that there was 'no essential difference' in the views of the leading theologians of seventeenth century Anglicanism. Responses varied in so far as each theologian placed different emphasis on one element of an established and shared method which was, notes McAdoo "the outcome and active expression of a *deep-seated conviction* as to what constitutes fundamentals"(my italics).[152] McAdoo's historical view of the subject is important but it is only a first stage in the development of a genuinely theological inquiry into the whence and why of 'what constitutes fundamentals'.

McAdoo's espousal of a particular view of doctrinal development indicates little awareness of the difficulties that attend a theory of the identity and continuity of the Church that is fraught with problems, given the recognised complexities of development in faith and doctrine. In this respect his dismissal of Sykes' concerns is too neat and unconvincing. The point here is that what seems like a self-consciously chosen role as a reaffirmer of a tradition prevents McAdoo

from taking a more genuinely critical stance.

The inadequacy of McAdoo's treatment of fundamentals in Christianity arises not only from preoccupation with apologetic concerns, but also from a methodology which is heavily focussed upon an historical mode of inquiry. It is one thing to present an historical view of the 'Anglican amalgam' in which a 'cluster of concepts', including fundamentals, can be discerned. It is another thing to uncover the inner logic of such concepts and inquire into the suppositions about truth present in particular understandings of fundamentals in the history of the tradition. Without some adequate analysis at this level there is no sufficient basis for judgements as to the relative merits of various ways of construing fundamentals. It is not self-evident that fundamentals are concerned with the 'groundwork for a system'; that they have to be 'clearly evident' for purposes of 'recognizing' a Church. There is a kind of theological empiricism operating here. Theology is reduced to the assembly and strong statement of certain facts gleaned from the Christian tradition in Anglicanism. Such statements carry with them an assumed self-evidence as to their significance for current issues of authority and faith.[153]

A third related inadequacy in McAdoo's handling of fundamentals concerns the issue of the universal and the particular. McAdoo wants to stress the importance of a general principle in Anglicanism: differentiating between fundamentals and non-fundamentals belongs, it seems, to part of a general method that recurs and shapes Anglican identity. For McAdoo this general category distinction can be discerned in particular historical contexts. However this basic orientation in fundamentals discussion makes it extremely difficult to give an adequate and true account of the operation of the fundamentals apologetic in its quite different and specific historical contexts. Particular contexts and exponents of fundamentals - e.g. William Wake -

can only contribute, so it seems, to an understanding of fundamentals issues insofar as they confirm a pre-established view of the operation of the tradition.[154]

In short, McAdoo's handling of fundamentals in Anglicanism betrays a particularly ahistorical method of procedure. For McAdoo it seems that the really interesting features of the tradition are not, in the final analysis, particularly relevant. The diversity within the tradition (regarding both form and content) remains undetected. The possibility that there is not simply one tradition but that Anglican fundamentals discussion is multidimensional, is a possibility that can not be genuinely and adequately investigated where the particular and contingent in the historical process is not taken with the seriousness it demands. The demand for a unitary and all-encompassing methodology overrides attention to the rich and diverse contexts within which the Anglican attempt to state the fundamentals of the Christian faith has occurred.

Stephen Sykes

An important contribution to fundamentals discussion is offered by Stephen Sykes, formerly the Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge. Significant here is the wider ecclesiological context in which the subject has repeatedly emerged. Anglican fundamentals discussion was clearly central in his inquiry into *The Integrity of Anglicanism* (1978). In this context Sykes, like McAdoo, recognised the significance of the historic Anglican appeal to certain fundamentals and raised some critical questions as to the health of this tradition in the light of the impact of modern liberal theology.[155]

Sykes' critique was designed, in part, to raise Anglican consciousness of the fact that changes in the traditional fundamentals apologetic, however subtly they occurred, had important consequences for Anglican ecclesiology. This issue was not only relevant in relation

to theological liberalism but was similarly subtly present in developments in the nineteenth and twentieth century in Anglo-Catholic ecclesiology. The espousal of a particular view of the historic episcopate as being of the *esse* of the Church was, in Sykes' view, a direct challenge to the traditional theory of fundamentals.[156] An important conclusion of this inquiry was the recognition of the importance of worship as that activity "which seeks at once to evoke the fundamentals and induct the worshipper into the heart of the Christian experience".[157] Purity of belief required a worshipping Church.

It was precisely the range of belief implied in Christian worship that lay at the heart of Sykes' call for a fresh theological endeavour in Anglicanism. His essay pointed to the importance of a renewed preoccupation with normative definition in Christianity. This essay generated a good deal of attention and analysis.[158] One commentator linked Sykes' proposals with an earlier work in which Sykes had recognised that,

> For the normative quest it is not a matter of identifying what, if anything, may be common to all who profess the name of Christian. It is the more difficult and adventurous task of trying to state *what* ought to characterize *true* Christianity.[159]

The theme of fundamentals in Christianity was further developed in a work already referred to, *The Identity of Christianity*. Christian identity consisted for Sykes "in the interaction between its [Christianity's] external forms and an inward element...."[160] In this context the Anglican appeal to fundamentals belonged to a vigorous *'externality tradition'* in Christianity where identity and continuity in the faith were 'lodged in certain external features' including doctrines, myths, ethical teachings, rituals and social institutions.[161] In this respect the Anglican appeal to fundamentals belonged to "a particular tradition of interpretation of the identity and continuity of Christianity stemming from the Reformation".[162] Sykes noted that the doctrine of fundamentals had historically operated as a

vital and flexible tool in Anglican apologetic, "against Roman Catholic additions, Presbyterian rigidity and independent wilfulness".[163] Moreover, the doctrine was governed by an appeal to antiquity but was actually quite variable in its content.

Sykes' critique of the externality tradition included an implied critique of the doctrine of fundamentals as he had identified it. In church conflict the externality tradition began with an evident natural advantage over the tradition of inwardness. The reason being that it had already been carefully defined and refined in language, making for easy reference and conflict resolution. Nevertheless, the externality tradition was, argued Sykes, "by itself, clearly and in principle inadequate and impossible".[164] This tradition could easily operate in a law-like way, it was 'profoundly unhistorical', and it disregarded elements of 'interiority' and non-verbal dimensions of Christianity. Furthermore, it was unable to deal with new questions and always required "authoritative contemporary expounders, whose reasons and arguments are bound to involve certain non-traditional features".[165]

These inadequacies were clearly evident in the way the externality tradition in Christianity had characteristically depicted the continuity of the gospel. Thus the fundamental articles belonged to the 'deposit' (*paradosis*) of faith construed as a permanent durable 'specific quantum of hard matter'.[166] One option was to understand this substance as 'exclusively invariable', admitting of absolutely no subtractions or additions. Sykes argued that this 'purely physical model' underpinned the fundamental articles tradition.[167] An alternative option was to regard substance as 'inclusively variable' which allowed for a development in the tradition in the sense of "a mere unveiling of an idea already implicitly present in the original".[168] As Sykes correctly noted, this latter move destroyed the analogy since "the substance of faith is much more complex than the analogy can allow".[169]

Sykes' discussion of the externality tradition was developed in relation to an '*inwardness tradition*' - "the reiterated appeal to that inner spiritual reality of personal lives transformed by God"[170] - and a 'dialectical tradition' which incorporated "an element of each in some kind of interplay".[171] This third tradition could be depicted by the model of 'centre-circumference', the inwardness element corresponding to the notion of centre.[172] Each tradition had its roots in Scripture. In this respect the biblical language of foundation and superstructure (ICor 3:11-15) was appropriate to the externality tradition.[173] On the supposition that it was always possible to build poor superstructures, the idea of a return to the foundation or fundamentals was a useful tool for ecclesial self-criticism. Furthermore, this model did have the merit of drawing attention to the *problem* of building. It entirely failed, in Sykes' view, to specify how the foundation and superstructure were related. Nor did it indicate how the superstructure might be *derived* from or enrich the foundation.

It is difficult to know Sykes' own position in respect of the Anglican fundamentals apologetic as he has depicted it. In his earlier inquiry into the integrity of Anglicanism there was a certain ambivalence. The tradition had proved unable to counteract distorting developments within liberalism and Anglo-Catholicism . Yet the work as a whole was aimed in part at re-routing Anglicanism into the pathway of doctrinal integrity as it was embodied in worship, and articulated in the articles of the faith. This first discussion was inconclusive as to the possible future for the articles tradition, though the ambivalence here was perhaps evidence of an ambivalence towards confessionality in Anglicanism *per se*.[174]

Sykes' analysis of the doctrine of fundamentals in *The Identity of Christianity* is clear and perceptive. However, given the larger set of issues being considered in that work the subject is not treated with the

fullness required. Even in this work Sykes' own position with respect to the tradition remains unclear. His critical remarks are well made; it seems the tradition, as he has depicted it, has no future.

It is arguable that Sykes has, in fact, reconstructed his own version of the tradition. This emerges more clearly in the final chapters of the *The Identity of Christianity* where he discusses the importance of a formal definition of Christianity as satisfying

> the minimum conditions of intelligibility required for the common use of a particular set of terms, Christian, Christianity, and so forth.[175]

Such formal definition is useful in indicating 'the area which believing occupies'.[176] Accordingly, Sykes defines a Christian "as one who gives attention to Jesus, whose achievement is contextualized by God".[177] Such a definition gives maximum scope for contestability concerning *types* of Christology. Furthermore, Christology is placed high on the theological agenda. When such a definition is treated as a sufficient expression of Christian discipleship it immediately becomes reductivist.

In short, formal definition indicates the parameters for Christian discourse and contest. Interestingly, Sykes links this definition and function with the articles of the *fundamentum fidei* of the early Church. Sykes argues that *this* fundamental articles tradition accords with his own depiction. What is important in Sykes' view is that in such summaries into articles

> we are not dealing with a condensation of the whole content of Christian believing, but with a slightly elaborated version of a formal definition of the area which believing occupies.[178]

Thus it seems that from Sykes' perspective a fundamental articles tradition is not only *legitimate* but also *necessary*. Not surprisingly, Sykes' own formal definition receives further elaboration in the form of what might be termed *extended articles*, though Sykes speaks of "elements which together narrate the life and story of Jesus in the context provided by two horizon affirmations".[179] This articulation

is, he notes, 'an insider's depiction'.

From Sykes' point of view the issue is not whether distillation into articles of belief and even in their specialized form as fundamental articles is legitimate. Rather, the question concerns the kind of fundamentals tradition Christianity should generate. This, at least, seems to be the implication of his thought and it is strengthened when he later notes that,

> the attempt *permanently* to locate Christian identity in a *specifiable quantum of propositions* ..... was seen to be a failure in its ability either to account for the fact of conflict or to assign to conflict any positive significance[180] (my italics)

The problem in the procedure of which Sykes is rightly critical is that an unhealable rupture is created between Christianity's internal and external dimensions. The result is that the articles tradition is unable either to recognise or give an adequate account of the essential contestability of Christianity. The implication of Sykes' critique is that a fundamental articles tradition has to operate in such a way as to recognise Christianity's double foci. Such a view immediately destabilizes the solidification of the fundamental articles tradition associated with what Sykes calls the externality tradition. From this point of view the problem in the externality tradition is that the dynamic actually operating in the externalizing process is suppressed in fixed formulas of faith. This suggests the operation of a rigid one-to-one correspondence between that which is mediated and the language of faith. In other words the *logos* realism underpinning the fundamental articles tradition hardens in form, the tradition looses its function as *witness* and begins to operate as a *control* over, rather than an expression of, sacred reality.[181]

Nevertheless, from Sykes' point of view, it seems there are certain 'minimum conditions' for discourse about Christianity which accord with the articles of the *fundamentum fidei* of the early Church.[182] It seems crucial for Sykes that such articles are not so

much *content rich*, but rather indicators of Christianity's formal parameters. His primary concern is rather narrowly based, i.e. to explore how some such articles tradition might assist in the resolution of conflict and contribute to ecclesial identity.

Sykes does not, however, regard Christian identity as something that can be achieved apart from worship, where the external and internal dimensions of Christianity are continually opened up to each other. This suggests that Christian identity is not a state but a process.[183] Yet this process includes a doctrinal aspect: Christian identity cannot be without its minimum or fundamental articles of faith. Furthermore, Sykes wishes to affirm a continuity between his proposal for the *fundamentum fidei* and that of early Christianity. However the strength of that continuity requires to be tested by the capacity of the truth expressed to generate an 'identity of response' to God "which is the proper practical expression of knowledge of his character".[184] To this extent at least the articles tradition remains at best provisional.

Summarising then, for Sykes the traditional fundamental articles apologetic has proved inadequate as a strategy for taking account of Christianity's double foci (external and internal dimensions), insofar as it is unable to give a true account of ecclesial conflict and identity. It seems, however, that the tradition is not to be rejected but reintegrated into theological discourse in a modified form. This reintegration involves at least three moves.

The first involves recognising the interplay between Christianity's external and internal dimensions. The implication here is that the dimension of interiority ought to be relevant to a proper construal of the fundamental articles tradition. It was the recognition of the interiority of faith that had led Barth to reject the latter tradition. Sykes' examination of Barth led him to a more positive though qualified recommendation of the tradition.[185] However, in his

consideration of the tradition of fundamental articles, there is clearly more scope for a fuller account of the generation and the *telos* of this articles tradition in relation to what might be called Christianity's founding reality or *fundament*. How this fundament is understood and communicated belongs to any consideration of the tradition of fundamental articles.[186]

Secondly, reintegration of the tradition is to be achieved by recognising worship as the place where the interplay between external and internal maximally intersect and open up to one another for the purification and renewal of Christian discipleship. This involves an effort by Sykes to overcome a commonly presumed distance between worship and the heavy accent in the Western tradition upon doctrinal purity.[187] Accordingly Sykes wants to speak of communal worship as 'a theatre' in which the various dimensions of Christianity including doctrine, are 'integrally related'.[188] Worship is thus a 'doctrinally loaded activity'.[189] Where true worship was offered "it would embody the truth of the doctrinally formulated relationship between God and humanity".[190] Thus "all Christian doctrinal belief is worshipping belief".[191] Consequently "a doctrine which is not formulated in such a way as to be a vehicle of worship of the creature is open to the most fundamental criticism of all, that it has lost touch with its origins".[192] This leads Sykes to speak of his 'formal definition of Christianity' - i.e. his own construal of the *fundamentum fidei*; the deeds of Jesus set in the context provided by creation beliefs and eschatology - as "the natural substance of the rituals of worship".[193] Sykes' development of belief in relation to worship is important and gives some clues as to how beliefs ought ideally to be held. A certain woodenness and detachment in the fundamentals tradition can thus be overcome; the tradition can be freshly appropriated.

To the extent, however, that the supposition of a distance between worship and doctrine determines the theological agenda, strategies for

response are somewhat limited. For instance, in this context it will be difficult to break free from constricting discussions of the status of doctrine as a criterion for worship.[194] Sykes' effort here is not wholly successful. He wants to talk about true worship embodying the truth of doctrinal formulations, of such formulations ideally operating as a 'vehicle' for worship, and of the articles tradition as 'the natural substance' of the rituals of worship. There is a lingering sense here of doctrinal formulations *driving* worship along.

What is clearly envisaged but not fully explored is the notion at least partially implicit in the above, of the *natural reciprocity* between belief and worship. Such a view does not allow worship to be reduced to the *context* for belief but requires a notion of worship as the activity in which doctrine is *realised* in a particular way. Alternatively, such a view opens up the possibility that doctrine - and hence the tradition of fundamental articles - operates as a form of Christianity's discipleship tradition transferred and concentrated in a particular form. Perhaps the point to be made at this stage is that Sykes' attempt to clarify the relationship between doctrine and worship is important but raises as many issues as it solves. It encourages the view that there may be certainly more involved in the tradition of fundamental articles in the Christian life than Sykes himself has as yet uncovered.

A third way in which Sykes attempts a rehabilitation of the fundamental articles apologetic is by locating it within the province of 'formal definition' of Christianity. An articles tradition begins in, and is developed out of, formal definition. He can talk of "an elaborated version of a formal definition"[195] or propositions that are "fuller than a merely formal definition".[196] Nevertheless such extended articles have the primary focus of depicting 'the area of context'.[197]

A focus on 'formal definition' and *context* leaves wide scope, in Sykes' view, for legitimate theological contest among a variety of

participants. Diversity here is not destructive of any fundamental unity. In this Sykes has achieved the reinstatement of Christianity's doctrinal dimension and more particularly the necessity and legitimacy of "the persistent movement towards a series of statements in which the central content of the Christian faith comes to expression".[198] This thrust towards concentrated and correct definition is able, in Sykes' account, to be pursued with integrity, given his reinterpretation of such a programme.

It is questionable, however, whether Sykes' own proposal concerning 'the ground occupied by Christianity' is wholly free from the charge of arbitrariness.[199] This possibility is given credence by examining more carefully the *content* of Sykes' proposal that "a Christian is defined as one who gives attention to Jesus whose achievement is contextualized by God".[200]

This formal definition is given more extended 'propositional expression' to include the 'life-story of Jesus' set in a context provided by the 'two horizon affirmations' of creation beliefs and eschatology.[201] However this manoeuvre emerges from what Sykes "would suggest that further examination reveals" as to what is entailed in his initial formal definition.[202] The tendency to sterility inherent in overformalization betrays itself by the fact that this 'insider's' depiction lacks any decidedly Trinitarian form and dynamism. This loss of content richness is a serious problem which is only partially offset by a stress on formal definition as pertaining to *context* and the disclaimer that such summaries of faith do *not* involve "a condensation of the whole content of Christian believing".[203] This is by no means an uncontroversial position and there is some evidence of Sykes' own inconsistency in this matter.[204] Sykes' attempt to reclaim some integrity for the articles tradition in Christianity provokes rather than settles the issue of its significance in ecclesial life and encourages a more concerted engagement with this particular tradition

in Christian theology.

It is to be recalled that Sykes' discussion and reconstruction of a fundamental articles apologetic belong to a broader discussion of the identity of Christianity in which the concept of the 'essence of Christianity' was very much the central focus of attention.

In his recent essay on "The Fundamentals of Christianity", Sykes addresses himself quite deliberately and directly to the Anglican fundamentals tradition. Significant here is the fact that Sykes forfeits the opportunity to develop further many of his earlier insights into this tradition, electing instead to trace the history of the tradition in question. Given the briefness of the essay, the schematic and highly selective nature of the treatment of the tradition is inevitable. Furthermore, it is an important essay insofar as it draws the attention of Anglicans (and presumably those of other communions) to an aspect of Anglicanism's Protestant heritage which has remained quite central to its own self-understanding.

In some important respects this essay is the least satisfactory of Sykes' discussions of the fundamentals tradition. The continuing importance of the tradition is recognised, as are its links with Continental Protestantism, its particular appeal in Anglicanism and the various ways in which the tradition has been modified and used in history. What is missing is an uncovering of any inner rationale for the tradition. The essay has the character of an interesting excursion into the history of an important piece of Anglican apologetic, useful but insufficiently focussed as to the wider significance of the tradition. Thus the inconclusiveness of the essay is, if disappointing, not surprising:

> The history of enquiry in the fundamentals of Christianity contains ambiguities, confusions and errors. But it is not for that reason to be set aside.[205]

The essay itself provides no compelling reason why the tradition should not be 'set aside'. Furthermore, it can fairly be asked, is

this essay what a history of fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism should look like? Admittedly it is necessarily selective, but the criteria for selection remain undisclosed. This issue directly concerns how fundamentals discussion ought to be construed, what constitutes fundamentals discussion, and why. It is precisely these kinds of questions, questions that were implicit in Sykes' earlier inquiries, that are clearly relevant to any inquiry into the subject.

This inquiry into some recent Anglican writings on the fundamentals tradition indicates a relative lack of systematic inquiry into the subject. The examination of four fairly recent examples of Anglican fundamentals discussion has served only to illustrate the problematic status of this important tradition. Many of the central issues concerning the truth presuppositions implicit in the operation of this tradition and the determination and function of the tradition in ecclesial life have either been raised but inadequately handled or simply not even recognised.

The Thesis: Some Methodological Considerations

Aim and Scope of Inquiry

The aim of this thesis is to examine the nature, function and significance of the tradition of fundamental articles in Christianity.

The preliminary inquiry in this Chapter into the theme of fundamentals discusssion in Christianity has drawn attention to the fact that fundamentals inquiry provides an interesting and important strategy by which to explore a range of issues to do with *the purposes of stating the faith.* Furthermore, by developing this more general issue through contemporary Anglican handling of fundamentals issues in Christianity attention has also been drawn to the *essential ecclesiality* of the attempt to state the faith in the form of fundamental articles. In this respect inquiry into the tradition of

fundamental articles in Christian theology, developed through a particular Church's treatment of the theme, is simultaneously a way of uncovering and clarifying what is involved in stating the faith in the Church today.

Not surprisingly then, through such an inquiry important matters concerning the nature of Christian faith - its apprehension, communication and social form and function - will repeatedly surface in the course of this thesis. Where appropriate the relevance of such matters will be specified and traced insofar as this contributes to the main aim of the thesis.

Some Presuppositions

The thesis proceeds upon two premises. Firstly that fundamentals discussion is ecclesially significant. The argument of the thesis is designed to justify this premise and in doing so to show more especially how this significance ought to be understood. Secondly, the thesis proceeds on the basis that fundamentals inquiry provides an important means for observing and assessing the strength of the operation of theological realism in contemporary Christianity.[206] It is not the intention of this thesis to launch a comprehensive inquiry into the legitimacy of theological realism in Christian discourse *per se*. This might be an issue more properly pursued in the light of this thesis. However, in this thesis it is intended, through an analysis of the operation of the fundamentals tradition in Anglicanism, to clarify and evaluate a range of possibilities (without being exhaustive) for the operation of theological realism in the fundamentals tradition in Christianity. Accordingly, an important issue in the systematic treatment of the theme in Part Four of this thesis is the extent to which the tradition of fundamental articles admits of a fully realist theological development. Such an inquiry transcends particular ecclesial interests, being relevant to theological discourse generally.

Strategic Considerations: Focus Upon Anglicanism

Anglicanism, as it has developed historically upon English soil, provides the particular focus through which the theme of fundamental articles will be pursued. A special reference to Anglicanism offers a positive and manageable area upon which to treat a major discussion in Christian theology, particularly as it has been developed in post-Reformation Protestantism. As has clearly emerged from this Chapter there has been a long history of association with the theme of fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism. Moreover, the theme apparently remains highly relevant to the attempt in Anglicanism to handle questions of its own identity, and engage in ecumenical endeavours. Furthermore, critical analysis of the theme in Anglicanism, unlike its Protestant partners, remains in its infancy. This preliminary inquiry suggests that clarification of the Anglican treatment of the tradition will make an important contribution, not only to this communion's self-understanding and theological commitments, but also to much wider issues to do with stating the faith in the Church today.

Identifying a *Fundamentals* Tradition

In developing an adequate strategy for the thesis some preliminary clarifications are required in two areas. First is the issue of what the ***fundamentals*** tradition includes. The terminological puzzle relevant here has already been alluded to. Sykes has recognised the problem but has not clarified it, choosing instead to use various terms (fundamentals, fundamentals of Christianity, fundamental articles) interchangeably. This might well be inevitable. Where theological discourse finds itself confronted with an array of similar terms with no settled usage pattern, some confusion is inevitable and a certain type of rigidity would seriously reduce the legitimate range of the discussion. Indeed, the history of fundamentals discussion shows that the tradition has constantly run into difficulties precisely because

rigid distinctions could not be maintained.

One possible strategy is to focus on fundamentals *per se* bearing in mind that the move into articles is a key strand in the discussion. As stated in the aim the preferred alternative is to pursue fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism through attention to a key motif in the tradition i.e. *fundamental articles*. Through an inquiry into this theme, some of the more wide ranging, persistent and difficult issues in fundamentals discussion in Christianity can be examined.

It is important to bear in mind that inquiry into the fundamental articles concept can never be an isolated inquiry. Fundamentals issues do have a doctrinal form, but they also have other ways of presenting themselves, e.g. certain church practices and rituals, customs, ways of being and relating. In short, fundamentals issues concern the variety of ways in which people are held together, in which their One-in-Christness is secured and endures. These matters will be developed further in Part Four of the thesis. However, it is important to note here that to focus on *fundamental articles* can not be construed as a withdrawal from the larger context of fundamentals concern. Rather, a concentration on the *articles* tradition will be found, as already indicated, to be a useful strategy by which to plot a way through the complexities that attend fundamentals inquiry in Christianity.

In concentrating on the fundamental articles concept this thesis will, as already suggested, focus attention on the *operation* of the concept in the changing contexts in which it has been deployed. The different contexts or horizons, representing differing hermeneutical moves within the tradition, each disclose, in their own ways, a variety of presuppositions about the truth. In this substratum of truth suppositions the inner logic of the various construals of the articles tradition will be located. It is precisely in the uncovering and depiction of the dialectic between the *fundament* (as substratum or founding reality) and its doctrinal form in *fundamental articles* that

an adequate understanding of the tradition is made possible and judgements made as to its ideal operation in the Church.

Identifying a *Tradition* of Fundamental Articles

A second issue related to the above concerns the status of fundamental articles as a *tradition*. Earlier the term 'tradition' was applied advisedly to fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism. It is now necessary to make some further clarification of the use of the term *tradition*.

In fact the issue is acute for there are few grounds upon which to decide whether the fundamental articles tradition is a *discernable* tradition and/or whether it is *one* tradition or *many*. This problem is not simply the result of different determinations of the fundamentals of Christianity at the same and different periods in history, though this is not irrelevant.

The problem here is the one already discussed concerning the nature of the framework within which the tradition operates. This framework is *all* that is included in fundamentals discussion, it has both breadth and depth. Belonging to the *tacit* dimension of the tradition, the substratum of presuppositions exercise a decisive impact upon the tradition as it is embodied in a variety of forms. Important points of continuity in the historical flux of the tradition will only be detected as the true breadth and depth of the tradition is recognised, uncovered and clarified.

What has this to do with the problem of speaking of a fundamental articles *tradition* as such? Stephen Sykes' attempt to trace the history of the Anglican discussion of the theme is instructive at this point. For the most part Sykes traced what has been referred to as a 'conventionally recognised form' of the fundamentals tradition in Anglicanism. But because of the way he has construed this tradition, or rather precisely because he has not genuinely taken account of the

larger framework implicit in his inquiry, he has no means by which he can integrate into his treatment of the tradition the variety of quite different construals of the tradition. The range from which his selection of instances of the tradition's operation comes is too narrow. The interesting richness of the tradition remains undetected. Sykes has no method for incorporating into his history the mystical theology of William Law, the evangelical and pietistic thrust of Charles Simeon, or the theology of social order as manifest in F.D.Maurice, to name but a few. But, as this thesis will argue, these Anglican theologians have all contributed to fundamentals discussion; they have all in various ways been involved in the tradition of distillation into articles of belief in its specialized form as *fundamental articles*. Accordingly it is relevant to find a place for such contributions in any account of the operation of the fundamentals tradition. This suggests that identifying the tradition of fundamental articles in Anglicanism can not be achieved without attention to the diverse forms of its expression and operation.

Indeed, the argument of this thesis is that the history of the operation of this tradition indicates a diversity much broader, more interesting and significant than generally recognised. This situation needs to be integrated into an Anglican ecclesiology which has spoken much of the virtue of comprehensiveness but found it difficult to recognise the richness and variety that go to make up free and open life in the Church. Accordingly, to track the history of the fundamental articles tradition provides a useful commentary on Anglican ecclesiological vision. In the uncovering of the inner rationale and ideal form of the operation of the tradition, criteria emerge by which the health and vitality of Christian theology and discipleship may be evaluated and renewed.

Method of Prodedure

Part Two of the thesis will trace the early history of the fundamental articles tradition as it developed in Anglicanism. This phenomenology of the tradition does not intend to be historically exhaustive but purposefully selective with the aim of showing a range of ways in which the tradition has operated in the context of the theological problem of the oneness of the Church. Part Two is thus an attempt to answer, in a preliminary way, the question, what might a history of this tradition in its early phases look like?

From a preliminary placement in relation to the early history of the tradition, Part Three of the thesis engages in a more intensive analysis of the dynamics of the tradition by reference to some selected case studies occurring in a particular phase of the tradition.

Part Four develops, in a systematic way, a range of issues relevant to fundamental articles discussion as they have emerged in Parts One, Two and Three. Part Four is thus concerned to display the inner logic of the tradition and its significance within a more general ecclesiological framework.

What is proposed is the development and use of a multilevel approach to the theme. This method is designed to move through historical reflection, to more detailed case study inquiries, opening up to a fully systematic examination of the logic of the tradition of fundamental articles. The method thus intends to uncover and clarify what is on the theological agenda when the theme of fundamental articles arises in the Church.

PART TWO

FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES IN ANGLICANISM:

The Early History of a Tradition

Introduction: Aim and Method

The aim in Part Two of this thesis is to trace the theme of fundamental articles in terms of its antecedents in the Christian tradition, its formation in sixteenth century reformation England and its consolidation and modifications in seventeenth century Anglicanism. The introductory survey offered in the following Chapters provides a springboard for a more intensive engagement with the tradition in the case studies in Part Three and a more fully systematic inquiry in Part Four. Accordingly, Part Two offers a selective treatment of fundamentals discussion, as it has been evident in the early history of the tradition in Anglicanism.

In Chapter One it was noted that the appeal to fundamental articles in Anglicanism had operated as a strategy for identifying the unity of the Church in its diversity and divisions. The attempt to state the faith in *fundamental* articles indicated a desire to secure common agreement about the one-in-Christ bond. Thus to be concerned with fundamental articles is one way of handling the question: what is the practice by which the Church is one?

For purposes of this historical treatment, at least four important phases can be identified in the history of the discussion of fundamentals in Anglicanism.[1] The *formation* of the tradition in phase one belongs to the attempt in the sixteenth century English Reformation to establish a right focus and balance in the Christian faith. During a second phase in the seventeenth century the tradition is *consolidated* and modified. By the end of the seventeenth century an intensified rationalistic and moralistic temper in theology provides the background for a third *reconstructive* phase. The challenges posed for the

tradition in phase three are taken up with renewed vigour in a fourth *reconstitutive* phase which becomes apparent in the first half of the nineteenth century, though its antecedents can be found in eighteenth century developments. Differentiation between phases three and four draws attention to the quite different contexts in which fundamentals discussion have occurred. Within phase four the survey concentrates on important early attempts to reconstitute the tradition against the background of a set of problems that have only intensified in the course of the twentieth century.

The above framework draws attention to the differing contexts for the operation of fundamental articles and thereby facilitates a hermeneutic of the tradition. What becomes interesting is precisely how, in differing and similar contexts, the tradition functions as a lens through which the continuous attempt in Anglicanism to practise being one Church can be observed and illuminated. It is this concern which informs the methodology in both Parts Two and Three of this thesis. In Part Two the inquiry considers the antecedents of the tradition and its historical development in its *formative* and *consolidating* phases. Part Two thus offers a general survey of the early history of the tradition.

However such an inquiry, though useful, has important limitations. Probably the most serious one is the inability of such an approach to uncover the really interesting and important dynamics of the tradition as it operates in its wider and richer intellectual and ecclesiological environment. Accordingly, phases three and four of the fundamental articles tradition are developed in Part Three of the thesis through a series of case studies. Here major attention is focussed upon three exponents of the tradition - John Locke, Daniel Waterland and William Law. These three belong to what has been referred to as the reconstructive phase of the tradition, which begins roughly in the later decades of the seventeenth century with Locke and extends to the

mid-eighteenth century with Law. These case studies reveal that all three thinkers were responding to some quite new and particular problems which shaped their respective treatments of the tradition in view. A final Chapter in Part Three of the thesis considers important attempts to *reconstitute* the tradition in the early and mid-nineteenth century in England.

In tracing the history of the above theme it is important to recognise two inter-related strands. The first concerns the methods of *determining* fundamental articles. A second concerns the *function* of the tradition. Both strands have ecclesiological significance, the former indirectly, the latter strand quite explicitly. Tracing the operation of the tradition through its differing contexts in terms of these two recurring strands offers a way of retaining control of material and organising the variety of issues relevant to the tradition of fundamental articles in the history of Anglicanism.

Finally, it is important to recognise that the *immediate* background for the operation of the fundamentals tradition is the social, political and intellectual conflicts of Post-Reformation Europe. In this disunited and conflictual context two questions arise: is Christianity one thing? and, what is the truth of that oneness? From this perspective the attempt to state the fundamental articles of the faith in Anglicanism provides an important indicator of how the problem of the unity of Christianity, in and through conditions of high conflict, has been argued about, and practised. By locating the Anglican fundamentals tradition within the above conceptual frame it is possible to draw from a wide range of historical examples of the operation of the tradition but in a highly selective manner.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ANTECEDENTS OF A TRADITION

It seems that the term *articuli fundamentales* was first used in 1593 by Franciscus Junius (1545 - 1602), a French born Reformed minister and later Professor of theology at the University of Leiden.[2] Junius, in one of the first Reformed irenical works, proposed, without elucidation, acceptance of the fundamental articles of the faith as a means for overcoming rivalries between the churches.[3] Irenic motives and the desire to establish ecclesial identities in Post-Reformation Europe fostered the deployment of the idea of fundamental articles among the Reformed Catholic Churches of England and the Continent in the early decades of the seventeenth century.[4] As the appeal to fundamentals became more widely used it was subjected to careful analysis and more sophisticated development.[5] However a tradition of fundamental articles had been developing and crystallizing throughout the course of the Reformation in the sixteenth century.

Articles in Ecclesiality: Early Developments and Anticipations

Exactly why the development of *articles* of faith into their specialized form as *fundamental* articles occurred in the conflicts of the sixteenth century is a question whose answer may appear rather obvious from a position enlightened by nearly four hundred years of acquaintance with the *fact* of this development. However the question does merit the asking, if for no other reason than for the previous fifteen hundred years the Christian tradition is full of evidence of theological disputation *without* the development of a *fundamental articles tradition* as such.[6] This Chapter explores the antecedents of the fundamental articles tradition and uncovers the conditions for its emergence during the Reformation of the sixteenth century.

The Emergent Common Faith

The thrust towards identifying a common Christian faith has witnessed to a long held conviction that Christianity was in fact one thing.[7] This conviction was generated out of the early Church's experience that 'God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself' (2 Cor 5:19). A consequence of this was the affirmation of one Lord, one faith and one baptism (Eph 4:5). This one faith was encapsulated in the early Church's confession of the Lordship of Christ (Acts 2:36, Rom 10:9, 1Cor 12:3). This confession required a fresh appropriation of an inherited Jewish monotheism.[8]

Initially this enriched understanding of the oneness of faith had come to form in various semi-creedal and local statements of faith. These functioned primarily as a *medium fidei* through which the people of God recognised their common faith as expressed in prayer, praise and confession.[9] Multiplicity of confessional forms was not, at this early stage, a threat to the oneness of faith.[10] Nor, if we can take Origen (c.185-c.254) as an example, was the development of a speculative theological strand in Christian faith.[11]

Liturgical, catechetical and particularly apologetical needs caused functional changes in creedal summaries of faith[12], and the development of fixed creedal forms of faith out of the earlier terminological variety.[13] There were aspects of these developments - in recent times often lamented[14] - that indicated a positive theological thrust to remain as inclusive as possible over against heretical reductionism and exclusivism.[15] One result of these developments was that the unity of the faith became focussed in an 'orthodox' or 'patristic consensus'.[16] The internal complexities and tensions of this consensus had, in the succeeding centuries, frequently emerged and provided the occasion for fresh re-examination and synthesis of the centralities of faith in relation to its changing contemporary contexts.[17]

These developments suggest that the question of the fundamentals of the faith is as old as Christianity itself. The earliest semi-creedal formularies, the 'rule of faith' or 'truth', the emergence of universalized creeds, the appeal to 'Apostolic dogmas' and the development of the notion of the *Apostolic Symbol*, all indicate the Church's attempt to recognise that faith by which it was united to the one Lord.[18] In this sense it is possible to speak of a recurring *fundamentum fidei* with roots in the earliest Christian professions.[19] In expressing the unity of the faith, this *fundamentum fidei* provided one solution to the problem of the unity of Christianity and represented an early anticipation of the later appeal to the fundamental articles of the faith.[20]

Late Medieval Developments: The Status of Articles

It is right to speak of an anticipation only, for the tradition being traced here only begins to take shape during and after the 'age of orthodoxy'[21] of the thirteenth century. A number of reasons account for this. Firstly, it was only from the late thirteenth century that the concept 'article of faith' - a term unknown it seems to the early church fathers[22] but identified in the thirteenth century with the various components of the ancient *Apostolic Symbol*[23] - obtained common useage in the discussions over the status of theology as a science.[24]

The concept 'article of faith' was deployed by Scholastic theologians in their attempts to articulate the scientific status of theology in the then prevailing Aristotelian sense of 'science'. Theology was a derived science, proceeding from the articles of faith - analogous to the first principles of science and guaranteed by revelation - to their necessary corollaries by reasoned argument. Theology thus established its conclusions in a scientific manner.

The concept of 'articles of faith' thus came to have an important apologetic value in securing the status of theology. In the theology of

Thomas Aquinas, however, the concept was more fully developed in relation to the content and dynamic of the Christian faith.[25] For Thomas articles of faith had their origin and end in God the *prima verita*. In this sense articles constituted the vision of God in propositional form.[26] Articles belonged to the first category of truths - the *prime credibilia* - in contradistinction to a second category. The criterion for the differentiation was the direct or indirect relation such truths bore towards God himself and eternal salvation.[27] In the first category Thomas distinguished articles concerning the majesty of the Godhead and articles relating to the mystery of the humanity of Christ.[28] In Thomas' theology articles of faith functioned for the Christian as statements witnessing to God the Trinity. They were gathered together out of their diffuse presence in sacred Scripture into that common bond of faith, the *Apostolic Symbol*.[29] Aquinas offered a comprehensive and seminal contribution to the status, placement and purpose of the articles tradition in the Church.[30]

The Rise of Ecclesiological Self-Consciousness

The move from articles of faith to *fundamental* articles, a development which crystallized in the seventeenth century, had its logic not only within that scientific strand in the Christian tradition that focussed on the nature of faith, but also from the strand that can be discerned in the rise of ecclesial consciousness from the fourteenth century. This development was reflected in a growing interest in the doctrine of the Church *per se*.[31] From the fourteenth century discussion of articles of faith occurred in an increasingly conflictual context. From the early fourteenth century through to the early sixteenth century the Western Church evidenced an accelerating crisis of oneness.[32] Contributing to this crisis was a burgeoning doctrinal pluralism.[33] What had held this pluralism together was, as

Jaroslav Pelikan notes, "Augustine's elevation of the catholic unity of the church as the context not only for moral reform but theological difference".[34]

This Catholic unity had been embodied in its most highly centralized institutional form in the promolgation by Boniface VIII in 1302 of his most famous Bull *Unam Sanctum.*[35] In the following two centuries, however, this ideal was ruptured by the Great Schism (1378 - 1427) and the consequent breakdown of Papal credibility, by the failure of attempts to reconcile the Eastern and Western Church,[36] and by various challenges to Papal authority, e.g. the Hussite revolt of the early fifteenth century.[37]

> The stubborn and embarrassing reality of these schisms, especially when combined with the doctrinal pluralism that was increasingly obvious within the 'one true faith' of the Church, made it obligatory for Western ecclesiology to clarify both the nature and the locus of the church's unity with greater precision and subtlety than may have been necessary earlier.[38]

It is not surprising then that ecclesiology became part of doctrinal discussion from the fourteenth century in a self-conscious manner hitherto unknown.[39]

The problem of the unity of the Church had been succinctly put by Anselm of Hauelberg in the early twelfth century. In his discussions on the differences between the East and the West, especially in relation to the filioque, he had inquired, " how the Church of God, while she is one in and of herself, is multiform as far as her sons are concerned, those whom she has formed and continues to form in diverse laws and institutions".[40]

This problem intensified as the multiform character of Christianity, a by no means new phenomenon,[41] began to occupy centre ground in theological controversy. The problem of the unity of the Church now had to be re-negotiated *from* its multiplicity. How the Church was one despite its multiplicity could be variously understood. An environment emerged conducive to competing ecclesiologies.[42] The

various movements of reform in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries reflected this ecclesiological multiformity and involved different attempts to articulate a theological understanding of the unity of Christianity.[43]

Multiform Christianity: Conflicts and Strategies

It is precisely at this point that the developing articles tradition and ecclesiological concerns coalesce. The technical discussion concerning articles of faith; their derivation, function, categorization and enumeration - developments which are clearly discernable in the pre-Reformation period[44]- become contextualised within a highly varied ecclesiological spectrum. This ecclesiological diversity was reflected in the functional diversity of the articles of faith.

In the early fourteenth century the papal critic Marsilius of Padua (c.1275-1342), in his *Defensor pacis* (1324, condemned in 1327), employed the *ecclesia primitiva* as a model for church reform, i.e. the pre-Constantinian apostolic ideal. Marsilius argued that only those beliefs contained in canonical Scriptures or those interpretations of doubtful meanings of Scripture made by a General Council of faithful or catholic Christians, were necessary for salvation.[45] Marsilius had linked a critical reduction in truths necessary for salvation, with a return to a primitive Church ideal.

William of Ockham's Solution

William of Ockham (c.1285-1347), when inquiring into what truths were Catholic, had argued that "The rule of faith is the Sacred Scripture and the doctrine of the universal Church which cannot err".[46] This was a median position between a highly biblicist view later epitomised in the works of John Wycliffe(1330-1384), and a newly emerging and more comprehensive scheme consisting of categories of

catholic truths, including post-apostolic revelations independent of sacred Scripture.[47] Ockham's preferred position concerning the necessary articles was integrated into a highly original and controversial form of a remnant ecclesiology which radicalized the solution of ecclesial oneness:

> The true, infallible church consisted only of those Christians who in fact assented to the truth even if they formed a silent minority in the visible institutional church. In fact, this true church might survive in one Christian alone, if he or she preserved the faith inviolate.[48]

Ockham had shifted the responsibility for determining articles of faith from institutional criteria of any kind to cognitive criteria, i.e. to the understanding.[49] This displacement of authority to the individual was consistent with a developing nominalism which rejected traditional ways of understanding how things were ordered and held together - i.e. by reference to their connections to real universals, the Platonic eternal forms - and tended to locate the truth of things in particularity. One inevitable result of this shift in perspective was a heightening of anxiety over disagreements that could no longer be settled by reference to pre-established universal truths.[50] Henceforth traditional solutions to conflict could not be so neatly invoked.

By contrast to Ockham, Conciliarist and more reactionary ecclesiologies[51] retained a firmer view of the authority of the institutional Church in matters of faith. Here, discussion of articles of faith and the differentiation of categories of 'catholic truths' was not so directly tied to questions of ecclesiology but belonged to those technical matters of 'School' theology.[52] The epistemological insights associated with Aquinas' derivation of the articles of faith were displaced by an overriding concern for the determination of the formal authority structure for faith.[53] Oneness of faith was secured by obedience to ecclesiastical authorities.

The Global Faith of Nicholas of Cusa

In the vision of someone like Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) the problem of articles of faith was placed within a global ecclesiology. Here an attempt was made to embrace the world of faiths within a comprehensive Trinitarian structure.[54] Oneness in faith was derived from God himself. Doctrine *per se* and articles in particular represented approximations towards that one absolute truth, the Triune God. The doctrine of the Trinity was implicit in all faiths to the extent that they sought the one true God. In this way Cusa could develop a notion of fundamental doctrines[55] both specific to Christianity yet inclusive of other faiths. His forward looking proposals represented what might be termed the 'outer-wing' of the articles tradition, expressive of the search for commonality in faith beyond the narrower confines of traditional ecclesiologies.

The multiform character of Christianity was by no means a settled issue in the early sixteenth century. There was neither a settled doctrine of the one Church nor an agreed method of resolving the nature of that faith by which the Church was one.[56] The reassertion of a highly centralized structural unity in the fifteenth century was not so much evidence of stability but rather a sign that, for the moment, the range of ecclesiological options that had been explored, had been contained under a fragile socio-political form of unity.[57]

Finding Truth in Diversity: The Renaissance Heritage

A common presupposition within this ecclesial variety and tension remained: Christianity was one thing, the Church was one, bonded by one faith.[58] The puzzling problem concerning how this unity was to be understood had not only generated a search for the *vera ecclesia* but, in the two centuries prior to the sixteenth, was a problem that had admitted of a variety of solutions all directed in some way or other to reform of the Church. Negatively, reform required a critique of

prevailing abuses. Positively, it included refocussing on what was considered central to Christian life in the Church.

The changed context in which the various reform programmes were pursued had been subtle but decisive. It was reflected in the changing conception of the problem of Church unity. The affirmation of 'one *yet* multiform' had become an affirmation of 'one *in* multiformity'.

Within the context of Renaissance humanism, however, this new orientation - of unity *in* diversity - posed neither a problem nor a threat. Rather, it was something to be welcomed and affirmed; indicative of that richly varied reality in which human beings, as discoverers rather than possessors of truth, were called to creatively contribute to the increase of knowledge.[59] This outlook presupposed the unity of reality not as something merely given but also unfinished, to be discerned in and through variety.

Not all felt able to embrace this more dynamic view of reality and human participation in it. The various tensions within and between 'old' and 'new' ways of learning were evident in the early decades of the sixteenth century in the intensified search for viable solutions to the problem posed by the burgeoning pluralism in Christianity. This situation became evident in the continued pressure for reform.[60] The articles tradition developed in different ways as it was implicated in differing reform strategies. Erasmus and Luther make interesting comparisons in this regard.

Truth through Peace: The Rationale of Erasmian Minimalism

Erasmus' well known advocacy of a dogmatic minimum and stress on practical Christian living exemplified the influential strain of Christian humanism that was so important in the course of the sixteenth century Reformation and seems to be the natural milieu for the emergence of the fundamental articles tradition.[61] What is not so well appreciated is the sophisticated ecclesiological tradition within which

Erasmus' reinterpretation of dogma in relation to piety occurred.[62]

For Erasmus, unity was the presupposition for finding, knowing and living in the truth. Peace preserved the community of discourse by which the Holy Spirit taught the truth.[63] Evangelical peace was synonymous with truth. Without consensus and its social concomitant 'concord', no dogmatic certainty was possible. Consensus then was the principle of intelligibility.[64] It was not a static position but essentially open and dynamic, witnessing to the continuing dialogue of Christ with the flock. This view presupposed a conception of *Logos* not as a single utterance (*verbum*) but as discourse (*sermo*), whose social form was the ecclesial community.[65]

Such a view of consensus cohered with a minimalist approach to the articles *necessary* for salvation. Erasmus referred to those few 'primitives' of the ancient Church's faith. Rightly holding to these essentials generated conviction leading to an interior apprehension of the gospel and a life of godly piety.[66] This was less dogmatic reductionism and more a statement about the way in which the Church could actually renew its performance of being one. Articles of faith belonged to ecclesial practice. Doctrine here operated in a *directional* way. Full definition was irrelevant in this ecclesiology.

Erasmus' ecclesiological pragmatism and focus on piety informed his treatment of the essentials of faith. There are affinities here with the appeal to fundamental articles in early Anglican apologetic, a matter to be considered in the two following Chapters.

Godly Transformation: Luther's Reappropriation of the Articles of faith

Luther makes an interesting contrast to Erasmus. Luther's ecclesiology was highly personalist but less fully social than Erasmus'.[67] In Luther's view the Church's mediational role had failed. The problem was simple. How was access gained to the God of the Church? The important issue was finding salvation as a member of the

Church, or rather, of being one with God's Church. The emphasis was on ecclesial reform *via* personal transformation. The hermeneutical key was justification by faith in Christ through the preaching of the gospel. Implicit in this was an answer to the question of the oneness of the Church. Commonality was created through the preaching of the gospel of Christ. This commonality had its initial focus in a new relationship between God and the individual. The way to a renewed Church was by rediscovery of oneness with Christ.[68]

What happened to the articles tradition in this context? Firstly, Luther's epistemological insight animated the articles of faith. One could live in the central truths of faith *faithfully*. Traditional dogmas were not abandoned but reappropriated into the Christian life.[69] Secondly, this renewal of the doctrinal tradition involved a re-ordering in relation to a soteriological centre.[70]

Luther's insight represented a move away from the later scholastic tendency, already observed, to categorize and enumerate lists of truths. His concern, rather, was with the qualitative wholeness of the gospel,[71] a focus achieved through a Christologically informed centering and ordering of the faith. This entailed judgements as to the relative fundamentality of any doctrine[72] and included an appreciation of things indifferent (adiaphora).[73]

The Priority of Doctrinal Consensus - Melancthon and Calvin

Given Melancthon's understanding of the Church as a 'School' it was not surprising that his reforms included a strong thrust towards doctrinal correctness.[74] Accordingly, with Melancthon, Luther's insights into the dynamic of faith, justification and grace received a more thoroughgoing doctrinalization.[75] The framework was Christian humanism. Melancthon's irenic spirit provided the basis for a solution to multiformity which placed heavy emphasis on doctrinal consensus and a willingness to differ on matters peripheral to faith.[76] This

orientation included an appeal to the consensus of the early Church and the development of the concept of adiaphora,[77] themes which were important both for the English reformation and among those irenic theologians anxious for peace.[78]

Controversies among the young Reformed churches indicated that doctrinal consensus would be harder to achieve than might have been hoped. This was reflected in Melancthon's later ecclesiology where he attempted to define the limits of consensus more sharply by an appeal to the 'fundamentals' of the doctrine of the 'pure Gospel', i.e. that doctrine sufficient for Church unity.[79]

Luther's focus on personal transformation was also shared by Calvin.[80] Indeed, it was the stress on godliness that made the doctrine of justification so central for Calvin.[81] Though in Calvin's different context the social form of this piety was an important issue.[82] Consequently, for Calvin Church reform was to be achieved through personal renewal and by the reconstruction of the Church in society.[83] This included doctrinal correctness.[84] Indeed a later reformer, Bullinger, argued that doctrine was the most important thing.[85] In Calvin's case this thrust was tempered by the influence of a Christian humanism which recognised a distinction between certain essential matters of belief and other doctrines, where differences need not lead to schism.[86]

This distinction became increasingly important for the Reformed churches. Their high doctrine of the Church visible, patterned after the Word of God,[87] provided the impulse for securing visible unity in the faith among the Reformation churches.[88] Precisely because the perfection of unity in the Church was viewed eschatologically, it was important for those churches reformed according to the Word of God to recognise their commonality in a faith that would be perfected in the future.[89] This was developed by Martin Butzer in relation to the theme of love as the manifestation of the reign of Christ in the Church.[90]

Affirming Unity in Multiformity: The Appeal to Fundamental Articles

With the progress of the sixteenth century reform Christianity's multiform character became increasingly evident in confessional variety. In this context the appeal to fundamental articles *emerged* as a strategy for affirming oneness through multiplicity.[91] Here, doctrinal consensus in fundamental articles had moved into the foreground of ecclesiological concerns.

Developments in the counter-reformation make for an interesting contrast. At one level there was a close parallel to the course of the Protestant reformation, for both invested significant energy in achieving doctrinal correctness. This came to its climax at Trent, where the move from doctrinal pluralism to more precise definition was substantially completed.[92] Though here a *de facto* solution to the problem of fundamental articles was secured by reference to the Roman Magisterium as the authority for faith.[93] In this way the desire for unity *in* ecclesial diversity, that had provided the impulse for the development of the appeal to fundamental articles, was subsumed within a structural unity centred on the Papacy. The problem of doctrinal discriminations and articles of faith was restricted to the category of technical discussion, not entirely irrelevant to ecclesiology though never as significant as it would become in Protestantism.[94]

The early impulses for reform in the sixteenth century had included a call for personal transformation, exemplified in Luther's theology and in various ways present in other prominent early reformers. The supposition here was clear - oneness in multiformity would be achieved by an renewal of Christian discipleship. As the early ecclesial ruptures hardened and confessional multiplicity and conflict emerged among the churches of the reform, the prospect of maintaining unity focussed increasingly on achieving consensus in the doctrine of the gospel. The appeal to certain fundamental articles had a certain logic in the attempt to secure a kind of pan-Protestant ecclesiology.

Appeal to fundamental articles was one way of affirming oneness amidst the divisions of developing Protestantism.

It should be clear from the foregoing that the form and function of the tradition whose antecedents have been traced here was, throughout its development, significantly influenced by the larger ecclesiological framework within which it operated. The impact of this ecclesial variety upon the developing articles tradition has been briefly noted in Aquinas, Marsilius, Ockham, Conciliarism, Cusa and in those important early sixteenth century advocates of Reform, Erasmus, Luther, Melancthon and Calvin.

Attention has been drawn to the dialectical relation between ecclesial oneness and multiplicity implicit in the differing solutions provided to the problem of the unity of the Church. A common presupposition persisted however: the Church was constituted as one by virtue of its one Lord, one Gospel and one Baptism.

Against this background the move from articles of faith to *fundamental* articles of faith appears less innovative than it might at first seem. In fact this development offered a way of *continuing* the articles tradition. It did this in two ways. Firstly, in response to the perceived Roman tendency to maximize doctrinal definition, an appeal to *fundamental* articles was one way of maintaining a faith rightly balanced in relation to the dogmatic tradition. Secondly, in response to Protestant confessional multiformity the fundamental articles strategy provided a focus for commonality in the one faith. It therefore offered an important means for securing stability and countering institutional fragmentation.

Both the above responses were linked to a view which understood the Church as constituted by the Word of God. Such a view could, without difficulty, be translated into certain fundamental articles of the faith expressive of Church unity. The corollary of this common Church faith was a recognition that complete uniformity in belief was

not a prerequisite for Church unity. The appeal to fundamental articles had become welded to the doctrine of the Church in Protestantism. Moreover, the variety *within* Protestant ecclesiology, a variety which in many ways reflected the crises of late medieval ecclesiology,[95] gives rise to the expectation of a diversity of forms and functions in the developing fundamental articles tradition. This expectation is strengthened when it is recalled that the operation of articles of faith had hitherto been largely determined by quite specific ecclesiological contexts. The determination and function of the fundamental articles tradition - an offspring and expression of the articles tradition in Christianity - could be expected to evidence the impact of differing ecclesial contexts.

The importance of the subject of fundamental articles in Lutheranism and to a lesser extent in the Reformed churches is well known. This brief inquiry into the antecedents of the tradition indicates, however, that caution is needed in identifying the course of the articles tradition in either of these communions as the measure against which judgements are made concerning the significance of a tradition which has its own particular history in the Anglican communion. The formation and development of the tradition in the early history of Anglicanism is the subject of the following Chapters.

CHAPTER THREE

THE FORMATION OF A TRADITION:

The English Reformation of the Sixteenth Century

Identifying Fundamentals: The Ecclesiological Perspective

The ideal of a fully social ecclesiology provides the larger environment in which the developing fundamental articles tradition can be traced in the English Reformation of the sixteenth century. Such an ecclesial ideal requires some brief explanation. The church historian, William Haugaard, has recently depicted the course of the English Reformation in the following way:

> In Anglicanism's formative century, the two periods, one of fluctuating change and the other of tension-laden stability, provided the successive crucibles from which a recognizably distinctive form of Christianity emerged.[1]

This period was formative for "shaping the outlines of a distinctive way of believing and practising the Christian faith".[2] Haugaard, in common with most commentators, understands this distinctive achievement as a 'political' occurrence,

> provided that 'political' be understood to refer not only to civil matters, but to wider human relations as they reflect the varied aspects of community life, including religious practices, convictions, and church structures.[3]

This interpretation of the sixteenth century English Reformation as 'emphatically a political revolution'[4] is well entrenched and colours discussion of ecclesiological themes in the English Reformation.[5]

The elevation of the political character of the English reform to a position of apparent normative significance betrays, in part at least, the desire to find an all encompassing rationale - a principle of cohesion - for the course of the Reformation in England. The 'political' interpretation emerges as the only genuine option given the commonly echoed sentiment that:

> No single dominating personality, no single coherent theological principle, no single developed theological system, no single

> distinctive vision of community discipline predominated in directing the course of events in England.[6]

The matter is not, however, so clear-cut. Haugaard's careful qualification of the political character of the English Reformation suggests an attempt to break free of modern, highly functionalist understandings of societal life; understandings quite alien to Tudor England.[7] Political, in Haugaard's sense, implies an ideal which is *comprehensively social.* Thus we are not surprised that Haugaard locates the particular achievement of the Reformation in "the evanescent vision of a coherent Christian faith and practice capturing the whole-hearted allegiance of a people in a unitive society".[8]

This points to an important theological intention in the English Reformation; that reform was social in orientation and achievement. Reformation in sixteenth century England was about the doctrine of the Church. Ecclesiology was not developed or derived from more fundamental human transformation individually conceived. Rather, to talk about God's new relation to humankind was to talk about God in human society. The question generated by this intention was simply, how might godly human society be best achieved, given the particular complexities of Tudor England?

Theologically the answer to this question is discerned in the struggle to achieve an ecclesial practice that was rightly proportioned or balanced in relation to what was most essential for godly social life. This context gives a particular force to the arguments of a number of scholars that the English Reformation from Henry VIII, was rooted in a distinction between things necessary for salvation and things indifferent (so-called adiaphora).[9] The roots of this theological strategy in Christian humanism, in particular in Erasmus and Melancthon, were briefly traced in Chapter Two. Their influence in the cross fertilization of ideas concerning this strategy between England and the Continent is not a concern of this study.[10] What is important is that the distinction between essentials and *adiaphora* -

the latter term representing a by no means uncomplicated theological matter[11] - had its particular force in England as a tool for the achievement of healthy social cohesion. This basically ecclesiocentric context was responsible for the particular way in which the thrust back to fundamentals - so much a feature of the sixteenth century Reformation - developed in emerging Anglicanism.

In this context identifying fundamentals of faith belonged to a strategy for church reform aimed at reappraising those social bonds constitutive of ecclesial unity. In the initial stages of the reform this entailed a rejection of Roman jurisdiction. This was not so much a novel development but more an affirmation of the ancient catholicity of *Anglicana Ecclesia*.[12] With the progress of reform there emerged a sharper sense of those features constitutive of common Christian life. This included the gradual recognition of the Bible as the common and central text of the Church, a common language of faith accessible to all (i.e. English from Latin), the development of a common public liturgy, and a search for doctrinal consensus. The achievement of agreement in these areas was an emergent process, neither inevitable nor certain, evidencing periods of rapid progress and regress, cautious moves forward and violent opposition from a variety of quarters.[13]

Throughout the uncertain and vacillating course of this reformation a recurring preoccupation with the problem of being one Church became evident. In this respect it is to be noted that unity did not include for most people allegiance to Papal authority. In terms of church worship it did include an orientation away from privatised liturgical practices towards regular congregational services.[14] For some the greater accessibility of the Scriptures was considered dangerous to social cohesion, for others it was a pre-condition for its achievement.[15] The corollary of this latter view was that an informed and better educated Church was a healthier Church than one which required mere obedience to imposed laws.[16] This view became embodied

in a doctrine and practice of ministry that focussed on teaching rather than its sacrificial function.[17]

It is within the context of an intended - if not always achieved - social reformation of the English Church that the tradition of fundamental articles can be located and traced. The course of this tradition is relevant in two related areas of this Reformation. First, at a primary level it is implicated in the search for common doctrine *in* the one Church. Here, agreement in articles of faith indicated a common understanding of the dynamics of ecclesial formation. The ecclesiology implicit in this development of the tradition became explicit in the later apologetic efforts of John Jewel and Richard Hooker. This second level ecclesiological reflection entailed a shift in the fundamentals tradition from concern for *agreement in doctrine* in the one Church, to self-conscious engagement with *the doctrine of the one Church.* This Chapter first examines the search for commonality in church faith and secondly considers the fundamentals tradition in the ecclesiology developed by Jewel and Hooker.

Common Doctrine: The Way of Agreement

What belief, teaching and confession was required to evidence the unity of the faith? In the English Reformation an answer here involved identifying what was central and what was peripheral in faith. Common doctrine required a faith rightly balanced in this regard.

The achievement in the English reform of a common doctrine can be traced through successive Articles documents:[18] the *Ten Articles* (1536), the *Bishops' Book* (1537), the *Six Articles* (1539), the *King's Book* (1543), the *Forty-two Articles* (1553), Archbishop Parker's Eleven Articles (1561), the *Thirty-nine Articles* (1563, 1571); also in the various Primers (1545, 1551, 1553, 1559, 1560), Books of Homilies (Book I, 1547; Book II, 1563), Catechisms (1553; Nowell's of 1570) and Canon Law Revisions.[19] These documents evidenced a general

attempt to spell out, in turbulent contexts, what was considered central and what was peripheral in belief consonant with the practice of being one Church.

In tracing this attempt three features are particularly relevant. Important here was an emergent methodological principle: Scripture as a critical but not autonomous criterion of things necessary to salvation. This principle was implicit from the early stages of reform when the Scriptures in English were ordered to be placed in all churches,[20] later to be supplemented by the Paraphrases of Erasmus and Homilies.[21] The principle was explicit, though not fully formed, in the ordering of belief and practice in certain Articles documents promulgated in the reign of Henry VIII. Thus, in the Ten Articles (1536) two categories of articles were recognised: those which were "expressly commanded by God and be necessary to our salvation", to be distinguished from rites and ceremonies which were "to be observed and kept accordingly, although they be not expressly commanded of God, nor necessary to salvation".[22] The former constituted 'the chief and principal articles of faith'.[23] However, *within* this category a distinction could be drawn between what was believed to be infallibly true, that "which be comprehended in the whole body and canon of the Bible, and also in the three Creeds or symbols",[24] and those articles of the creeds so necessary to be believed for a person's salvation that refusal to believe them in the form expressed in the creeds severed one from Christ and his Church.[25] This hermeneutical power of the creeds merely echoed a longstanding tradition which could be found in the teaching of Thomas Aquinas.[26] It represented a considerable pruning of the tradition enunciated by William of Ockham, of identifying degrees of catholic truths which included independent post-apostolic revelation.[27]

The Ten Articles were substantially incorporated into the *Bishop's Book* (1537), which in turn received a more traditionalist reworking in the *King's Book* (1543). In these early documents of the reform the

later pre-eminence of the criterion of Scripture was, at most, embryonic. The declared intention to effect reform based on the Scriptures[28] appeared to be consistent with a range of practices and beliefs that were later expressly eschewed as being contrary to the Word of God.[29]

In the subsequent articles of 1553 and 1563 a *form* of Scripture principle clearly emerged. A particular dynamic among the co-ordinates of ecclesial authority - Scripture, the inherited dogmatic tradition, General Councils, and the authority of the Church militant - received formal authority in the Church of England.[30] Important in this structure of authority were the freedoms allowed to national churches in legislating rites and ceremonies, modifying traditions, and exercising authority in controversies of faith.[31] The operation of freedoms in these areas later proved highly contentious and significant for the articles apologetic.[32]

A second feature linked to the English reformers' appeal to Scripture was a Christological intention as the material principle informing the determination of a common faith. The reproportioning of belief and practice in terms of the once-for-all and justifying work of Christ was at best poorly formed initially, and was directed to the pruning of certain aberrant practices and teachings.[33] Later, the reformers' Christocentricism sharpened and received a more thoroughgoing application. It penetrated the Church's mediatorial structure and effected a reordering and purifying of belief and practice concerning sacraments, ministry and the life of the baptised.[34] The application of the critical Christological principle presupposed the continuing foundational significance of Trinitarian dogma. This was reflected in the English Reformers' particular arrangement of the *Thirty-nine Articles of Religion.*[35]

A third feature of the search for consensus was the increasing impact of *doctrinal adiaphorism* in the development of a common faith.

The early Articles documents of the reform gave little encouragement to the view that *doctrines* concerning important beliefs and practices could be deemed *adiaphora* (i.e. things that make no difference). It was of course a different matter with certain rites and practices neither expressly commanded in Scripture nor necessary to salvation.[36] This had been made abundantly clear for one John Frith (c.1503-1533) who applied the term adiaphora to the *doctrine* of the eucharistic presence, and was subsequently burned at the stake for his refusal to believe that transubstantiation was "an undoubted article of the faith, necessary to be believed under pain of damnation".[37]

Frith's doctrinal adiaphorism was significant, not simply because he, along with William Tyndale (1494- 1536), seems to have been among the first of the sixteenth century reformers to apply the term adiaphora to doctrine *per se*,[38] but more particularly because his ascription of the term to the *doctrine* of transubstantiation posed a challenge to the view that a sacrament necessary for salvation could admit of only *one* correct teaching. For Frith, doctrines concerning church practices generally necessary for salvation were of a different order from those doctrines articulated in the articles of the creeds. Frith had implicitly widened the scope of adiaphora to include, not only doctrine *per se* in addition to practices neither forbidden nor commanded, but *within* doctrine a new category of adiaphoristic doctrines, i.e. those that may be '*true yet unnecessary*'. The complication this move caused for the concept of adiaphora[39] was of little concern to Frith who did not wish his *congregation* to be bound by anything other than the creed.[40] This practical ecclesiological view represented a very early attempt to temper the thrust for an excessively definitional and doctrinalized faith.

The text of the *Thirty-nine Articles* evidenced in subtle and important ways the impact of adiaphoristic concerns. Enshrined in this document is a view discerned earlier that the Church had the liberty to

order and enforce its rites, ceremonies and traditions insofar as they were not contrary to Scripture.[41] Equally significant, the text of the *Articles* presupposed that certain matters to do with the *credenda* of the Church ought *not* to be legislated upon. In this respect the shortening of the article on Christ's descent into hell indicated the adiaphoristic nature of doctrinal discussion on a belief which evidently belonged to the Church's Trinitarian foundation.[42] In respect of predestination and election (Article XVII), a rigorous double predestinarian logic was refused; the article remained firmly Christocentric and hence precise in its restraint.[43] Some freedom of opinion was implied in respect of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist,[44] though the articles here were not totally inconclusive - transubstantiation was firmly rejected, so too was any notion of the repetition of Christ's sacrifice in the Eucharist.

One modern commentator on the *Articles* has remarked that the English Reformers' 'moderation' consisted

> in a determined policy of separating the essentials of faith and order from adiaphora ... Anglican moderation is the policy of reserving strong statement and conviction for the few things which really deserve them.[45]

What this author might also have pointed out was that strong statement on a few things was not inconsistent with the English Reformers' subtle deployment of a doctrinal adiaphorism in precisely the central matters of faith and order. The operation of this doctrinal adiaphorism was, not surprisingly, unwelcome among those 'precisions' who desired an articles tradition more unequivocally Calvinist in construction and application,[46] a fact implicit in the controversy over the regulation of subscription to the *Articles of Religion* in 1571.[47] The quest for a common faith in the Reformed Catholic Church in England involved a fresh reconstituting of the most important matters for faith. As outlined above this included certain methodological, Christological and adiaphoristic concerns.

What then constituted that common faith of the Elizabethan Settlement? There is no doubt that the *Articles of Religion* provided a reasonably comprehensive statement of faith. Significantly, the *Articles* did not purport to offer any final and authoritative formulation of fundamental belief. Earlier documents had referred to the articles of the creeds as necessary to be explicitly believed for salvation. This view was now more subtly present in the recognition that the creeds 'may be proved by most certain warrants of holy scripture' (Article VIII). Such proof was a prerequisit for the acceptance of any belief as an article of faith and necessary to salvation (Article VI). The Trinitarian foundation of the *Articles of Religion* (Articles I- V) further endorsed the traditional value of the creeds as containing those necessary articles of faith.

It was equally clear, however, that neither the creeds nor the *Articles of Religion* in their entirety prescribed a terminus to the articles tradition. Scripture now constituted unequivocally the locus for the content of articles of faith. The strength of the *Articles of Religion* lay as much in their *directional* value as in their definitional exactness and comprehensiveness. The inclusion of a controlling heuristic recommendation *within* the *Articles of Religion* witnessed to the unfinished nature of the 'Book of Articles', the source from which the centre of faith could be freshly opened and the way in which the dynamic of an articles tradition could be sustained.

The implicit unfinishedness of the *Articles of Religion* evidenced the essential *ecclesiality* of the English Reformation. This point requires some comment. In this respect it is important to note that the problem of the right 'reading' of faith was, in the English Reform, primarily a social or communal activity. The *Articles of Religion* were not simply to be read *in conjunction* with Prayer Book worship (with its rich and measured articulation of the faith in the creeds, in prayer and praise, liturgy, collects, homilies, Scripture and sacramental

life), but rather the truth of the *Articles* was to be *realised* in communal worship. To 'read' the *Articles* in this way was to transform their law-like status as tests of clerical orthodoxy. Creedal and doctrinal statements might have been "carried into law through their presence in liturgical books",[48] but in this context the law of belief was absorbed within the law of prayer.[49] The 'what' of belief was brought into relation with the 'where' and the 'how' of belief. Articles of belief were to be held to communally.[50] In common worship the individual Christian would be rightly situated within the ordered complexity of faith. The impulse to quantify and finalise important matters of faith was here tempered by the placement of the articles tradition in relation to a life of worship and discipleship.

The particular way in which agreement in doctrine occurred in the English Reformation had important implications for the tradition of fundamental articles. Firstly, doctrine *per se* and articles of faith in particular were not accorded an autonomous ecclesial status but represented an account of a social reformation of the Church in its doctrinal form. Articles were primarily a social form of belief, not subservient to liturgical and discipleship concerns but integrated within these other areas of Christian life.[51]

Secondly, this socialization of doctrine had a significant impact upon the important Reformation concept of pure doctrine. Unlike other Reformed Churches - particularly the Lutherans - the English Church conceived the problem of the purity of doctrine as an ecclesial matter which included, but was not focussed directly upon, issues concerning the personal integrity of belief. This orientation was concerned less with achieving perfectly formed doctrine as the *basis* for communal purity, and more with asking the question, what ought perfectly formed doctrine to look like when considered *as the common doctrine of a community*? Therefore, on the vexed question of correct doctrine, concerns for exactness and precision were not conceived narrowly but

were given a reference to God *as present in community.* The hermeneutical horizon for doctrinal purity was the community in which the truth of faith was to be practised.

One consequence of this perspective was that the thrust towards consensus in the faith was an important feature of the English Reformation. Given the hermeneutical principles enshrined in the *Articles* of the Elizabethan Settlement it was clear that consensus, whilst not achieved apart from the past tradition, was nevertheless open and capable of being reformed in community.[52]

Thirdly, a necessary implication of the above two points was that the Reformed Church of England had not abandoned confessionality *per se* but had secured it, in the wake of much controversy, in its own particular way, and determined it by the special placement of the articles tradition in Anglicanism.[53]

Finally, the Elizabethan Settlement made it clear that the articles tradition was not conceived as something fully determined and static. For both individual and communal discipleship the accent was on right direction to and from the centre of faith. Oneness in multiplicity meant maximum freedom consonant with loyalty to a community consensus. In this fundamentally ecclesial context the ideal of 'singleness' and purity in doctrine "for the avoiding of diversities of opinions and for the establishing of consent touching true religion",[54] had both a logic and urgency.

Fundamental Articles in Emergent Anglican Ecclesiology

John Jewel

When John Jewel (1522-1571) offered his *Apologia Ecclesiae Anglicannae* (1562), the context for articles of faith moved from the *intra*-church to the *inter*-church sphere. This change entailed a shift from preoccupation with being one church *in doctrine* to a more self-conscious engagement with the doctrine of the *one Church.* In

this development the implicit ecclesiological significance of the articles tradition became explicit.

Jewel seated the church "firmly with the continental Lutherans and Reformed in opposition to Roman Catholic and Anabaptist extremes".[55] The anti-Roman polemic had particular poignancy in the light of the then current proceedings of the Council of Trent.[56] A positive theme of 'international protestant solidarity'[57] provided the balance. Jewel's *Apology* was a vigorous assertion of the unity of the Reformed Catholic Church of England with the Universal Church in time and space.

Oneness Through Time

A Church rightly formed in relation to the Word of God was, for Jewel, a Church in continuity with the *primitiva ecclesia*:

> we have searched out the holy bible which we are sure cannot deceive, one sure form of religion, and have returned again unto the primitive church of the ancient fathers and apostles, that is to say, to the first ground and beginning of things, as unto the foundations and head-springs of Christ's church.[58]

This argument offered an important polemical weapon. Based as it was upon the common presupposition enunciated by Tertillian, "Look, whatsoever was first, that is true; and, whatsoever is latter, that is corrupt",[59] it provided a rationale for convicting the Church of Rome of having departed from the purity of the early Fathers, of the Apostles and of Christ. To be 'patterned' after the early Church did not, however, require the wholesale adoption of primitive belief and practice, but rather indicated an intention to eschew Roman novelties and focus upon the foundation of faith:

> we have called home again to the original and first foundation that religion which have been foully foreslowed [neglected] and utterly corrupted.[60]

In Jewel's view the early Church's fidelity to Scripture exemplified how the Church in every age should be similarly focussed on the essentials of the gospel.[61] In this context Jewel argued that the English Church to which he now belonged held to the same substance of

religion as the primitive Church;[62] a substance which, for Jewel, seemed to cohere with the ancient creeds,[63] and was summed up in a brief Trinitarian confession.[64] Jewel's patristic argument, in common with his opponents, included a distinction between things necessary and things indifferent in the early Church.[65] The major question concerned how this distinction was to be applied. Thus Jewel could taunt his opponent Mr Harding: "He fighteth as freely for his pardons and purgatories as he could do for the faith of the Holy Trinity".[66] On the point of Augustine's belief in purgatory Jewel argued that,

> undoubtedly he took it neither for an article of the Christian faith (for therefore it had not been lawful for him to doubt) nor for any tradition of the apostles.[67]

Similarly, the Fathers could not be considered authoritative on the matter of celibacy since they had not considered the doctrine essential but a thing indifferent.[68] Jewel's appeal to the authority of the early Church anticipated what would soon become a common and controversial characteristic of Anglican polemic.

Unity Through Space

The Reformed Catholic Church of England was not only one with the Universal Church in time and history but also in space. Confessional multiplicity and conflict among the Protestant churches required some rationale if this claim was to withstand Roman accusations of heresy and sectarianism, and counter the divisive effects of radical Protestantism.

Against the claim that confessional multiplicity evidenced uncertainty and division in the one faith Jewel argued that this was entirely consonant with the multitude of abuses and errors disseminated in many places with diversity of languages:

> yet notwithstanding in the substance and grounds of the truth [the Protestant churches] have evermore joined together, and never altered.[69]

This was, in Jewel's view, a situation analogous to the ancient Church

where the common faith was not restricted to one form of words. Thus, in respect of Lutheran and Reformed Churches Jewel argued:

> They vary not betwixt themselves upon the principles and foundations of our religion, nor as touching God, nor Christ, nor the Holy Ghost, nor of the means to justification, nor yet everlasting life ... [70]

This oneness in faith among the Reformed (English and Continental) and Lutheran Churches gave Jewel confidence to assert,

> that we agree amongst ourselves touching the whole judgement and chief substance of Christian religion, and with one mouth and with one spirit do worship God and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.[71]

Such a unity was, for Jewel, essentially dynamic and Christocentric: "But the true and christian unity is this, that the whole flock of Christ hear the voice of the only Shepherd, and follow him. The band of unity is simple verity ...". [72]

These claims were all the more remarkable given the fierce conflict generated in the Protestant churches over the presence of Christ in the Eucharist. The difference between Lutherans and Zwinglians on this was, said Jewel, 'neither weighty nor great',[73] at least not 'weighty' in relation to the 'grounds and principles of the christian faith'.[74] As far as Jewel was concerned, "if there be any dissension amongst us, it is not in any article of faith, but only in some particular point of learning".[75]

Dispute over the Eucharist belonged to the category of 'errors in sundry'[76] similar to those errors the ancients 'dissembled and passed over in silence'.[77] It was a necessary but difficult argument to maintain given the fierce disagreements among Protestants over the issue. In any case Jewel considered that agreement would be quickly achieved on the matter.[78]

Jewel's *Apologia* for the Reformed Catholic Church of England focussed on an apostolic succession considered *doctrinally* rather than *ministerially*.[79] The Church was constituted by its oneness in the truth. This truth was present in the Scriptures, faithfully witnessed

to in the 'golden age' of the Church of the first six centuries,[80] and now preserved in the orthodox Churches of the Reform.

In developing this doctrine of the Church Jewel had applied, for apologetic reasons, the particular hermeneutical principles of the *Thirty-nine Articles,* including the notion of doctrinal adiaphorism, to the problem of the unity of the Church. In doing so he had further elaborated the formal definition of the Church enshrined in article nineteen of the *Articles of Religion.*[81] A sufficient, but in no sense purportedly comprehensive statement of the substance of faith, was offered as the basis for the unity of the Elizabethan Church. In this *Apologia* there was an early anticipation of what would become, in seventeenth century Anglican polemic, the appeal to the fundamental articles necessary for the being of the Church. The theological hardening that developed in this later move was not present in Jewel's early deployment of the tradition.

Richard Hooker

In Richard Hooker's ecclesiology the operation of the articles tradition was placed within a careful account of the nature of a *one* and *free* church developed in Book Three of *The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity.*[82]

The Oneness of the Church

Hooker had written: "That Church of Christ, which we properly term his body mystical, can be but one .." (111.1.2). This unity was derived from the oneness of the Triune God;[83] it transcended time and space, yet co-inhered in the visible Church in a particular way:

> The visible Church of Jesus Christ is therefore one, in outward profession of those things, which supernaturally appertain to the very essence of Christianity, and are necessarily required in every particular Christian man (111.1.4).

The God-given unity of the visible Church consisted in the profession

of one Lord, one faith, and one baptism. This one faith accorded with the 'rule of faith' consisting in "Those few articles of Christian Belief" (111.1.5) referred to by such early Church Fathers as Tertulian and Irenaeus. Even though this visible Church was "divided into a number of distinct Societies, every one of which is termed a church within itself" its oneness remained, "as the main body of the sea being one, yet within divers precincts hath divers names"(111.1.14).

Equally important was his careful distinction between the 'sound' and 'corrupted' visible Church:

> For lack of diligent observing the difference, first between the Church of God mystical and visible, then between the visible sound and corrupted, sometimes more, sometimes less, the oversights are neither few nor light that have been committed (111.1.9).

Heretics, unlike infidels, belonged to the visible Church in its corruption; they embraced the principles of Christianity though they erred 'by misconstruction', and as such they remained "a maimed part, yet a part of the visible Church" (111.2.1).[84] Whilst heresy unrepented of excluded one from the mystical Church, errors and faults, even heretical ones to do with outward profession, only separated one from the visible 'sound' Church of Christ.[85]

Hooker's ecclesiology provided the basis for oneness in multiplicity with maximum inclusivity. It presupposd that the unity of the Church was multilevelled and dynamic, something given and something to be achieved. That perfection of oneness derived from God's own being was most fully participated in by the mystical body. The potential for this acheivement was more fully present in the visible sound Church by virtue of its common threefold profession and mutual fellowship. This achievement still, however, remained accessible to that Church visible though corrupted in its common profession. Here was an ecclesiology in which the presence of a God-given unity provided the inner dynamic for movement towards a fuller visible unity. This implied a strong teleological component in Hooker's doctrine of the Church. The perfection of ecclesia required both the providential

ordering of God's Holy Spirit and responsible ongoing human participation in this activity.

This perspective could be developed in a number of directions. From the inter-church angle it was clear to Hooker that the Roman Church, from which the English Church had separated on account of her heretical errors, belonged to the one visible Church of God, albeit the corrupted part. This theme had been carefully examined in Hooker's 1585 sermon "Of Justification, Works, and how the Foundation of Faith is overthrown".[86] In this sermon Hooker had inquired into "the foundation of faith and what it is: secondly, what it is directly to deny it ..." (para. 22). Salvation through Christ was that foundation upon which Christianity stood. The Roman doctrine of works did not, in Hooker's view, 'directly' overturn this foundation. He said,

> Works are in addition to the foundation: be it so, what then? The foundation is not subverted by every kind of addition: simply to add to these *fundamental words* is not to mingle wine with water (para. 29).

The Roman Church received 'the very fundamental words' (para. 33), none refused to subscribe to them. Therefore the Roman Church was part of the visible though corrupt Church. An important pastoral conclusion to this was that the 'fathers of old' could be saved in it.[87]

A doctrine of works, though built upon the foundation, remained necessary though subordinate, "because our sanctification cannot be accomplished without them" (para.32). Rome's fault was not that she required works of those who would be saved but that she "attributeth into works a power of satisfying God for sin; and a virtue to merit both grace here, and in heaven glory" (para. 32). This doctrine of double justice overthrew the foundation 'consequently by addition'. In Hooker's view this was a heresy of the third order, to be distinguished from those heresies which either directly denied any one article of belief, or those like Nestorious, whose opinion implied the denial of every part of his creedal confession. The Roman error was 'removed by

a greater distance from the foundation' and not so easily discerned. Her error was in the superstructure at some remove from the 'foundation'.[88]

The infidel directly denied the foundation of Christianity, the heretic 'by consequent' in varying degrees. For Hooker this foundation of salvation in Christ cohered with the few articles of the Apostles creed.[89] When he referred to this foundation as 'the very fundamental words' (para. 33) he had provided an early Anglican instance of the fundamental articles apologetic.[90]

Hooker's argument raised an interesting question concerning the doctrine of justification by faith. It evidently did not belong to the foundation articles. It more accurately described how the fundamental words were appropriated. Justification by faith, in this context, was the *operational* doctrine of Protestantism; the presupposition of a godly profession of the foundation of faith. Hooker's argument was delicately balanced, and other Protestants were unwilling to allow his carefully nuanced view of heresy and its relation to infidelity. Thus, for the stricter Calvinism of William Perkins (1558-1602), to misconstrue the key doctrine of justification was to subvert the foundation of faith *directly*.[91] Hooker's larger ecclesiological vision could not admit this more exclusivist position.

In Hooker's ecclesiology the Reformed Catholic Church of England remained - by virtue of his appeal to the 'fundamental words'- one with Rome. Because of Rome's errors this oneness was of a lesser quality than the unity Hooker's church had with those visible, sound churches of the Reform. Through a multiplicity of particular church confessions a unity of faith was secured by the 'fundamental words' apologetic.

Fundamentals and Ecclesial Freedom

Hooker's doctrine of the unity of the Church also included a call to responsible freedom. This latter dimension was relevant at the

intra-church level where Hooker

> was already embroiled in controversies with moderate Puritans still part of the comprehensive Church of England, ... about whether one complete form of church polity has been laid out in Scripture, thus forming part of what must be maintained as necessary to salvation.[92]

Hooker's response to this was, in effect, a corollary of his doctrine of the unity of the Church. Visible unity was not required in anything other than the notes of external profession identified above. The Church was thus free as regards,

> general properties belonging unto them as they are public Christian societies. And of such properties common unto all societies Christian, it may not be denied that one of the chiefest is Ecclesiastical Polity (111.1.14).

Hooker described Church Polity as "a form of ordering the public spiritual affairs of the Church of God" (ibid).[93] The freedom implicit concerning polity was articulated negatively: "the necessity of polity and regiment in all Churches may be held without holding any one certain form to be necessary in them all" (111.2.1).[94] This position presupposed a distinction for Hooker between matters of discipline and church government, and matters of faith. The latter constituted those necessaries "of which sort the articles of Christian faith and the sacraments of the Church of Christ are" (111.2.3). The *particulars* of Church government belonged to 'accessories':

> But as for those things that are accessory hereunto, those things that so belong to the way of salvation, as to alter them is no otherwise than to change that way, than a path is changed by altering only the uppermost face thereof; which be it laid with gravel, or set with grass, or paved with stone, remaineth still the same path; in such things because discretion may teach the Church what is convenient, we hold not the Church further tied herein unto Scripture, than that against Scripture nothing be admitted in the Church, lest that path which ought always to be kept even do thereby come to be overgrown with brambles and thorns (ibid).

Underlying the controversial application of the above distinction - one common in principle to all disputants[95] - was Hooker's understanding of the hierarchy of the laws of being and life which encompassed both the positive commands of Scripture and the light of reason. Since all law derived ultimately from God there could be no

contradiction between the positive commands of Scripture and the operation of the natural law of reason. Therefore the Church could have confidence to make judgements concerning the particulars of ecclesial polity in the absence of any positive Scriptural requirements. From Hooker's perspective the Puritan desire to claim a positive-law-status for what were in fact human laws developed from more general Scriptural rules,[96] betrayed a fundamental mistrust of the capacity of human reason to participate in things Divine. In Hooker's ecclesiology the freedom to organise church life was a way whereby human agency participated in the providential ordering of Christ's Church in history.

Hooker's vision of a free one Church was thus maximally inclusive and responsible. The profession of the 'few fundamental words' of the creed represented a practical attempt (a) not to exclude any from the Church visible and (b) to identify those areas wherein any church was *not* free to legislate. This did not, however, signal a dogmatic reductivism but rather presupposed a strong *directional* thrust in the articles tradition. Unity was not achieved *merely* by the profession of the 'fundamental words'. This profession orientated the Church to higher degrees of unity, which included a fuller commonality in doctrine. Furthermore, freedom *within* a church was not simply a matter of polity but also included the freedom to be responsible in those matters necessary to salvation since, "there is doubt how far we are to proceed by collection, before the full and complete measure of things necessary be made up" (1.14.2).[97]

External profession constituted for Hooker both an important barometer of institutional purity and fidelity to its truth concerns, as well as a springboard from which a rich oneness and genuinely responsible faith could be more fully realised. The articles belonged to that enduring dialectic between Scripture and the Church. The goal was the coming to be of the mystical body of Christ. This teleological

component in the articles tradition cohered with Hooker's understanding of law in general - as "a directive rule unto goodness of operation" (1.8.4).[98] This view of law was somewhat at variance with the view that emphasised law as external authority. In respect of this other view Hooker had written:

> They who are thus accostomed to speak apply the name of Law unto that only rule of working which superior authority imposeth; whereas we somewhat more enlarging the sense thereof term any kind of rule or canon, whereby actions are framed, a law (1.111.1).

Doctrines *per se* and articles of faith were not laws imposed by Scripture but rather embodied those rules whereby godly actions were 'framed'. Doctrine could not, on this account, be a terminus in itself but rather an instrument for directing the Church to a higher end.[99] An important consequence was that the perfection of the Church could not be located in an *abundance* of correct *fully defined* doctrine. This would distort the *true* law-like operation of articles of belief.

From Hooker's perspective the perfection of the Church involved the progressive realization in its visible life of the essential unity of the Church given by the presence of God. Oneness had to be achieved responsibly. It could not be short-circuited by a retreat into fixed doctrinal formulas. This latter move only avoided the task of being a united community where the practice of the truth included people agreeing with one another, rather than excluding one another. Thus, in the same way that laws of polity, to be recognised as laws worthy of obedience, were not to be imposed but rather offered and agreed in the whole community,[100] so too articles of faith were articles proposed and agreed in the society of the Church as it had developed through time and space. In Hooker's view this social consensus ought not be distorted through imposition of further articles. Social cohesion was sufficiently secured, doctrinally at least, by the profession of those 'few fundamental words'.

For Hooker the articles tradition was not primarily a logicised doctrinal form of the transformation of human personhood, nor was it conceived as a set of beliefs necessary to be a right believer, but rather it belonged to a finely tuned strategy for achieving a free one Church. In this context the 'fundamental words' apologetic informed and directed a principled ecclesial pragmatism.

Hooker sought a balance in which Christian freedom was given maximum scope for self-expression within an essential oneness. This ecclesiology represented for Hooker the logic of God's active presence in human society. God's Trinitarian form - his oneness in multiplicity - constituted a rich oneness. Accordingly, God's action in the world was

> the exercise of his most glorious and most abundant virtue. Which abundance doth show itself in variety, and for that cause this variety is oftentimes in Scripture exprest by the name of *riches* (1.1.4).

Freedom in oneness represented the social form of this divine activity in the world. This ecclesial ideal expressed itself docrtrinally in Hooker's appeal to the 'fundamental words' of the faith. This was the appropriate profession of faith in a godly society in which endurance in truth and righteousness required responsible human agreement over the terms and forms of its life in God. From this perspective the early Anglican development of the tradition of fundamental articles was directed towards the perfection of God's presence in the society of the Church.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE CONSOLIDATION OF A TRADITION:
The Legacy of the Seventeenth Century

During the course of the seventeenth century a variety of factors contributed to the consolidation and modification of the tradition of fundamental articles in Anglicanism. This Chapter examines firstly, some of the important contributions to the formation and defence of the tradition, and secondly some of the important modifications to the tradition occasioned by religious and scientific developments.[1]

Ecclesial Self-Consciousness and the Appeal to Fundamentals

Recognition of the dividedness of the Church in post-Reformation Europe generated fresh attempts by Anglicans to make sense of the identity of their own and by implication other communions, and provided the context and pretext for the development of the appeal to fundamental articles in Anglicanism.[2] Whilst the tradition remained a point of controversy between Arminian and Calvinist elements in Anglicanism,[3] the crystallization of the tradition was largely the result of disputes with Roman Catholicism. Anglican divines found an appeal to certain enduring fundamentals of the faith an important and useful strategy to convict Rome of introducing novelties in the faith, and of affirming the continuity of the Reformed Catholic Church of England with the Catholic Church in time and space. Thomas Morton (1564-1659), and Lancelot Andrewes (1555-1626) exemplified early seventeenth century Anglican apologetic concerning fundamentals.[4]

Richard Field: the Right-Believing Church

Perhaps the most significant ecclesiology of this early period, developed in relation to the claims of Roman Catholicism, was Richard Field's learned five volume systematic treatise *Of The Church* (1606-

1610).[5] In Book Three Field detailed those things,

> that do so nearly touch the very life and being of the Christian faith and religion, that everyone is bound particularly and expressly to know and believe them upon peril of eternal damnation.[6]

These 'principal heads' of belief were quite detailed in relation to the Trinity, Creation, angelic and human fall, redemption in Christ - including his sacrifice that 'satisfied the wrath of his Father' - repentance and hope, the church sacraments and ministry, and final judgement. Field proposed a comprehensive list of those things that 'do directly concern the matter of eternal salvation' and constitute 'the whole platform of all Christian religion'. It accorded with the rule of faith

> "delivered by Tertullian, Irenaeus, and other of the fathers: and, with addition of conclusions most easily, clearly and unavoidably deduced hence, by Theodoret in his *Epitome Dogmatum*".[7]

Elsewhere Field identified this rule with the Apostolic Creed containing, "the summary comprehension of such principal articles of this divine knowledge, as are the principles whence all other things are concluded and inferred".[8] Though the rule could also include

> all such things as every Christian is bound expressly to believe, by the light and direction whereof he judgeth of other things which are not absolutely necessary so particularly to be known.[9]

In this respect Field referred to "articles of faith, and other verities ever expressly known in the Church as the first principles".[10] These were contained in the Apostles' Creed by way of 'summary comprehension', but they clearly included more than the bare creedal articles.

Field distinguished those principles that made the rule of faith of which a person could not be ignorant and be saved, from other things so clearly deduced "that, whoso advisedly considereth them, cannot but see their consequence from them and dependence of them, a man cannot err and be saved".[11] Included here were the beliefs that Christ had two wills, that there was no salvation outside the Church, that

marriage was pure, that there were no meats to be rejected as unclean by nature. A third category of beliefs concerning 'the place of the father's rest' before the coming of Christ, and the local descending of Christ into 'the hell of the damned', being not so clearly deduced, "a man may be ignorant of, and err in them without danger of damnation, if the error be not joined with pertinacy".[12]

Compared to Hooker, Field's statement of those beliefs necessary for salvation was more extensive and refined, indicative of a concern to establish a 'right-believing' Church.[13] This development signalled an early hardening in the tradition.

Field's discussion of the articles of the faith belonged to his inquiry into who was 'of the church'. Field, like Hooker, sought a more inclusive Church than that suggested by the narrower ecclesial boundaries of Rome and radical Protestantism.[14] Thus, contrary to the Jesuit Bellarmine, Field argued that inward qualities were not required before one was of the Church.[15] Furthermore, schismatics, though they broke unity with their pastors, nevertheless remained of the Church *orthodox* by virtue of their adherence to the rule of faith.[16] Finally, heretics likewise remained of the Church *Christian*, insofar as they continued to make profession "of sundry divine verities, which still they retain in common with right believers"[17] and retained a ministry and sacraments. Like Hooker, Field envisaged different levels of participation in the one Church.[18]

Nevertheless, it was only those 'companies of right believing and Catholic Christians'[19] that merited the status of the true Catholic Church. The notes essential to the being of the true Church were threefold: "First, the entire profession of those supernatural verities, which God hath revealed in Christ his Son".[20] These truths accorded with the rule of faith and were joined to two other notes; "use of the sacraments instituted by Christ, and a union of people in this faith and with these sacraments under lawful pastors".[21]

Field's ecclesiology presupposed the multiple divisions of Christendom.[22] His stress on agreement in basic doctrines of faith indicated a heavy investment in *doctrinal* reconciliation. Upon this basis he argued that the churches of the East were all members of 'the true Catholic Church'. They retained 'a saving profession of all divine verities absolutely necessary to salvation'; their variety in opinion concerned 'things not fundamental'.[23] It was not unimportant to Field that these churches, in all the principal controversies between Rome and the Reformed churches, gave 'testimony of the truth of that we profess'.[24] Furthermore, among those public reformed confessions of faith there was, in Field's view, 'no essential, fundamental or material difference'.[25] This extended even to eucharistic doctrine where Field doubted not of 'the possibility of a general reconciliation'.[26]

The status of the Roman Church posed a special problem for Field. There was no doubt in his mind that the present Roman Church was not a true church but an heretical one.[27] He considered, however, that it still remained "in some sort a part of the visible Church of God".[28] Its errors were 'fundamental'.[29] Rome no longer confessed the 'ancient profession of the primitive Christians'.[30] Yet salvation had been possible in this church for "Formerly, the Church of Rome was the true Church, but had in it an heretical faction: now the Church itself is heretical".[31] Salvation was still possible but more dangerous: the former apostate faction within the Church of Rome now ruled.[32] It was an important but difficult argument to sustain.[33]

Field's ecclesiology was a major attempt to provide a theoretical underpinning for post-Reformation Christendom. The divisions were recognised. How were the multiplicity of churches to understand themselves in order that the unity of the Church could still be affirmed? This was the question Field sought to answer. His argument about fundamental beliefs was a strategy for effecting a doctrinal

reconciliation. But it is hard to see how it might have been translated into any kind of practical unity. It represented a step on the way, encouraging charitable mutual recognition among churches divided.

Given the context Field's concern soon focussed on clarifying and delineating the boundaries between the churches. One result was that the teleological motive in Hooker faded. The nature of Church unity Field wrote of was of a more settled kind. This ecclesial solidification was reflected in the deployment of the concept of the 'true' church (Hooker did not develop this), and in a stronger concern for a right-believing church in determining the status of various communions.

William Laud: Consolidating the Tradition

Discussion over the fundamental doctrines of the faith increasingly intruded into Anglican-Roman Catholic controversy. When William Laud (1573-1645) conducted his famous argument with the Jesuit theologian, John Fisher (1569-1641), Field's four page chapter 'Of those things which everyone is bound expressly to know and believe' had been developed by Laud into a long central chapter of *A Relation of a Conference*[34] entitled 'What are the Fundamentals of the Faith?' The lines of the debate were now clearly drawn, the Jesuit arguing that all points defined by the Church were fundamental. Laud proposed the ancient Apostolic foundation of faith, the *dogmata deposita*[35] contained in the articles of the creed,[36] as '*absolute* fundamental doctrines'(my italics)[37] necessary to the salvation of all. Such '*catholic maxims*' were fundamental in the nature of the case, not determined by the Church but 'published' and 'manifested' by it.[38]

Within this fundamental faith there were, said Laud, *quoedam prima credibilia*, 'certain prime principles of faith', "in the bosom whereof all other articles lay wrapped and folded up".[39] Included here was

that of St John: Every spirit that confesses Jesus Christ come in the flesh is of God (1 John 4.2), and another from Hebrews: He that comes to God, must believe that God is, and that He is a rewarder of them that seek Him. Similarly, the belief of Scripture to be the infallible word of God "is an equal, or rather a preceding, prime principle of faith, with or to the whole body of the Creed".[40] There may of course be many true deductions from the prime principles of faith which become necessary belief for those able to go from principle to conclusion.[41] Elsewhere, Laud spoke of "some few and those immediate deductions from the Creed" not being "formally fundamental" for all, but only for those able "to make or understand them".[42]

Laud's depiction of the necessary faith had formal affinities with Field. Materially it was less comprehensive, Laud focussing on the minimum *community credenda.* Laud's discussion of fundamental articles was foundational for his ecclesiology for "whatsoever is fundamental in the faith is fundamental to the Church, which is 'one by the unity of faith'".[43]

At this point the permanency of church divisions became even more apparent in Laud's unequivocal assertion that Rome, whilst neither 'the true Church' nor 'a right Church', was nevertheless 'a true Church', by virtue of its profession of the fundamental articles of the Creed. The change was subtle, Laud treating *ens* and *verum*, 'being' and 'true', as convertible terms,[44] a move not made by Field or Hooker [45], but which had become common.[46] Laud's vision was that much narrower; either a church was true or it was 'no Church'.[47] Accordingly, Laud had difficulty identifying the extent of current Roman errors. It seemed that he would not grant Rome a 'right' and hence in his eyes, 'orthodox' status.[48] Rome was said to have

> maintained the faith unchanged in the expression of the Articles themselves; but it hath in the exposition both of Creeds and Councils quite changed, and lost the sense and the meaning of some of them.[49]

Rome held the fundamental points literally but erred "grossly, dangerously, nay, damnably in the exposition".[50] Nowhere, however, did Laud refer, as Hooker had, to the foundation being overturned *indirectly*. Significantly, Laud's discussion omitted any reference to the doctrine of justification, a doctrine so crucial to Hooker's judgment upon the status of the Roman communion.[51] All he asserted was that errors in points not fundamental may be damnable.[52]

Laud's deployment of the fundamental articles apologetic was intentionally conciliatory, though it had begun to assume a distinctly 'wooden' form. The distinction between foundation and superstructure, whilst useful in polemic, was rather too simply drawn and, as John Henry Newman was to discover two centuries later, it contained unresolved problems affecting the controversy between Rome and Anglicanism,[53] a fact implicit in the failure of Laud's apologetic to deal with supposed Roman errors.

Laud's argument set the pattern for much future Anglican apologetic. The Church was founded upon the primitive apostolic faith enshrined in the Apostles' Creed, the 'absolute' fundamental doctrines. This became a standard argument of Anglican divines, useful as a way of countering Roman claims to infallibility and securing the unity of the Church. This strategy enabled Anglicans to accord Rome a true church status, though this matter was not uncontroversial.[54] The apologia offered a highly practical and self-evidently plausible solution to the unity and identity of the Church in its divisions.

The fundamental articles apologia appeared, however, dangerously vulnerable to the Roman claim that Protestants differed over the content of the fundamentals and were consequently unable to offer a definitive catalogue of saving beliefs. These criticisms proved a catalyst for uncovering two important features of the Anglican appeal to fundamentals. The Roman criticisms had indicated, in the view of Anglican divines, a failure to understand both the nature of individual

responsibility in the Church and the institutional significance of Christian belief.

William Chillingworth: The Moral Integrity of Belief

The nature of the believer's responsibility in matters of faith was carefully addressed by William Chillingworth (1606-1644) in his controversial writing of 1638, *The Religion of Protestants, a Safe Way to Salvation.*[55] This work was a spirited defence of another Anglican, Christopher Potter (1591-1646), whose controversy in 1633 with the Jesuit Fisher had focussed upon the difficulties Protestants had of agreeing upon a definitive catalogue of fundamentals.[56]

Scripture, for Chillingworth, was 'true absolutely in all things'.[57] However its truths were of two kinds, those necessary to salvation, "of which rank are those only, which constitute and make up the Covenant between God and Man in Christ",[58] and those 'verities' concerning matters of history, prophecy and the like, not intrinsical to the covenant, i.e. not necessary in themselves but by accident. Chillingworth argued that it was unwise and unnecessary to differentiate exactly between belief 'intrinsic' and belief 'accidental' to the covenant. It was unwise because error could easily occur. It was unnecessary because all that was necessary was 'plain' in Scripture. From Chillingworth's point of view it was

> sufficient for any man's Salvation that he believe the Scripture: that he endeavour to believe it in the true sense of it, as far as concerns his duty: And that he conform his life unto it either by obedience or Repentance.[60]

To believe in this way secured one from erring 'fundamentally' and ensured that Protestants, notwithstanding their differences 'cannot differ in fundamentals'; the same heaven could receive them all.[61] This was not a recipe for confusion and perplexity. Protestants were

> sure enough, that all that is necessary any way, is there [in Scripture]; and therefore in believing all that is there, we are sure to believe all that is necessary.[62]

Chillingworth's confidence was derived from his conviction that

the fundamentals that made up the 'essential part of Christianity'[63] were plainly revealed. In a number of places he did not balk at speaking of them.[64] He was not talking here so much about *doctrines* but rather the *kerygma* itself: "Points Fundamental being those only which are revealed by God, and commanded to be *preached* to all, and believed by all"[65](my italics). His concern was for 'all that is simply necessary'.[66] Differences arose when one chose from Scripture propositions and doctrines "which integrate and make up the body of Christian Religion".[67] Since the knowledge of fundamentals was drawn from the Bible therefore,

> whosoever doth truly and firmly believe the Scripture, must of necessity ... either *explicitly*, or at least *implicitly* ... believe all things Fundamental: It being not Fundamental, nor required of Almighty God, to believe the true sense of Scripture in all places, but only that we should endeavour to do so, and be prepared in mind to do so, whensoever it shall be sufficiently propounded to us.[68]

Chillingworth's discussion of fundamentals presupposed a high moral component in all responsible believing, a component endangered by the imposition of extensive requirements for Christian belief. It was 'a question of seeking truth with integrity'.[69] Chillingworth had recovered the *directional* thrust of the articles tradition:

> What matters it for the *direction* of men to Salvation, though they differ in opinion, touching what points are absolutely necessary and what not?[70] (my italics)

This focus on individual responsibility in Christian pilgrimage made sense within the co-ordinates of Scripture and an Anglican liturgy in which, in respect of Scripture, one could 'hear them, read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest them unto everlasting life.'[71]

Edward Stillingfleet: Fundamentals in Ecclesiality

The Roman demand that Protestants provide a full catalogue of fundamentals not only subverted individual moral responsibility before God, it also failed to appreciate the importance of the articles tradition for social cohesion. This matter had not been disregarded by

Chillingworth,[72] though it was the Anglican apologist, Edward Stillingfleet (1635-1699), who was responsible for crystallizing this issue. Stillingfleet discoursed on the subject in *A Rational Account of the Grounds of Protestant Religion* (1664),[73] which was in effect his vindication of Laud's earlier argument against Fisher.

In Chapter Two Stillingfleet considered the grounds upon which anything became necessary to salvation:

> For our better understanding of which, we must consider two things.
> 1. *What things are necessary to the Salvation of Men as such, as considered in their single and private Capacities?*
> 2. *What things are necessary to be owned in order to Salvation, by Christian societies, or as the Bonds and Conditions of Ecclesiastical Communion?*[74]

Stillingfleet went on to remark that,

> The want of understanding this distinction of the necessity of things, hath caused most of the perplexities and Confusion in this Controversy of *Fundamentals.*[75]

Equally important and easily overlooked was Stillingfleet's recognition that fundamentals were properly understood "not as *Principles*, from which Deductions may be drawn of *Theological Truths*; but in regard of that immediate respect which they have to Men's Salvation".[76] Accordingly, concerning individuals, that which was necessary included a formal component of believing whatever God revealed as true, and materially of believing that which made for humankind's eternal welfare and happiness. To this end the gospel contained "a *Covenant of Grace*, or the conditions on which our Salvation depends".[77]

In this respect Stillingfleet spoke of two things 'indispensibly' necessary to salvation: "An hearty Assent to the Doctrine of Christ, and a conscientious walking according to the Precepts of it".[78] The full extent of what was included here "must be gathered by everyone as to himself from Scripture". No final catalogue could be imposed. In respect of the Church catholic, its unity was intended to preserve its being. Stillingfleet argued that the 'Bonds of *Union*' shouldn't "extend

beyond the Foundation of its Being; which is, the owning the things necessary to the Salvation of all".[79]

The communal faith consonant with ecclesial peace went no further than the necessary articles of faith. Negatively, this meant that nothing was necessary that was not inserted in the Ancient Creeds.[80] Positively, Stillingfleet was content to point, as Laud and Chillingworth had done, to the Apostles Creed as "a *summary collection* of the most necessary Points which *God* has revealed".[81] The *Articles of Religion* of national churches clarified abuses in the faith and were propositions for peace, a thing quite different from accounting them necessary articles of faith.

In Stillingfleet's view Rome had failed to distinguish between *articles of faith* necessary for the oneness of the Church catholic and *Articles of Religion*,[82] between articles of faith and *theological verities*.[83] Accordingly, Rome had imposed upon the Church Universal many beliefs beyond the necessary *articles of faith*, the explicit belief of which was required for an individual's salvation.

It was a familiar enough argument. Stillingfleet had provided a sharper analysis than hitherto obtained. In doing so he not only highlighted some of the major conflicts between Anglican and Roman Churches, but had brought into focus the social parameters of the fundamental articles tradition. This concern did not necessarily imply a lack of integrity in the matter of truth, but it did indicate commitment in Anglicanism to the practice of seeking a publicly agreed consensus in faith as a strategy for being one Church.

The Ecumenical Context

The appeal to fundamentals for purposes of social cohesion and peace was important to many irenic Christians of the seventeenth century. Indeed, it has been stated that the distinction between fundamentals and non-essentials was "the root-principal of the

ecumenical minds"[84] of this era. For many, this included an appeal to the undivided Church of the first five centuries. In the case of the German Lutheran, Georg Calixtus (1586-1656), this was linked to the criterion provided by the Vincentian canon.[85] At a practical level this often resolved itself into proposals for reconciliation which included acceptance of the Apostles' Creed as a dogmatic minimum.[86]

Alongside the Scottish ecumenist, John Durie (1596-1680), who also received Anglican orders,[87] the Anglican Bishop John Davenant[88] and Richard Baxter (1615-1691)[89] were among those who found the appeal to fundamentals useful, if finally unfruitful in their irenic efforts.

The Tradition Modified: Ecclesial and Scientific Pressures

A Widening of Scope: The Restoration Settlement

Schemes for 'comprehension' were usually minimally dogmatic though not uncontroversial in their limitations upon religious freedoms.[90] Nevertheless, insofar as fundamental articles were identified as the necessary *communiter credenda*, in contradistinction from matters to do with polity (*communiter agenda*), it was clear that consensus in matters of faith did *not* guarantee ecclesial peace and unity. Polity *per se* was a potentially volatile issue, a fact clearly in evidence from the later sixteenth century.

Being one Church had never been construed in England as *merely* a matter of resolving controversies in faith and finding agreement in doctrine. It had included (as evident in Articles XX and XXXIV of the *Thirty-nine Articles of Religion*) important freedoms and responsibilities for determining commonly agreed church order and worship. Not surprisingly then, questions of church polity, customs and rites remained highly volatile issues in seventeenth century England. Laud's rigour in seeking uniformity in this respect was in marked contrast to the freedoms he espoused in matters of belief.[91]

Polity included the form of ministry. This controversial issue came to a decisive climax at the Restoration when some 1,760 incumbents were ejected from their parishes.[92] In this settlement clear bounds had been set to Anglican comprehensiveness. The amendment in the Ordinal, passed by Parliament in 1662, requiring episcopal ordination for any one to be "accounted or taken to be a lawful Bishop, Priest, or Deacon in the Church of England", and the terms of the *Act of Uniformity,* were instrumental in undermining the hitherto adiaphoristic nature of Episcopacy in the Church of England.[93]

The above action suggested, at least implicitly, that a *particular doctrine* of polity was now integral to the being of the Church. The implied breakdown of the traditional distinction in Anglicanism between *agenda* and *credenda* imported considerable theological confusion into the Anglican fundamental articles apologetic. In effect what Anglicanism had resisted against Rome, i.e. the imposition of further *credenda*, it had now fallen prey to, as it were *de facto.* It was now fundamental to the being of a church to practice a particular doctrine of polity. The scope of the articles tradition had been widened *in principle.* The logic of this development found theological expression in a view later exemplified by Henry Dodwell (1641-1711), who regarded 'Belief in the episcopal function ... a fundamental of fundamentals'.[94] The articles tradition had, it seemed, been subsumed in a doctrine of polity; a doctrine that when practised, had highly significant implications for the relationship of Anglicanism with other Protestant communions. This was particularly dangerous for the operation of the articles tradition, for henceforth a pseudo doctrinal minimalism, proposed in the interests of an inclusivist ecclesiology, could easily mask a doctrinal rigorism (in so far as doctrines of practical polity were concerned), and foster rather sharp and exclusivist ecclesial boundaries. Some of the continuing confusions this development imported into Anglican fundamentals

discussion have, as outlined in Chapter One, surfaced in more recent Anglican dialogue with other Protestant communions.

Identifying Fundamentals: The Claims of Rationality

The appeal to fundamentals was enmeshed in a rich social, intellectual and scientific culture which was experiencing, in the seventeenth century, some profound changes occasioned in part by a fresh scientific awakening and increase in knowledge. Such developments became evident in a renewed concern for epistemological issues and a more general drive towards establishing reliable knowledge in science, law and religious life.[95] One result was an increasing convergence among various strands of inquiry of a scientific, religious and philosophical kind, a convergence based on the recognition of a common fundamental problem, "to work out standards for well-founded, reasonable, highly probable, but noncertain, belief".[96]

Inquiry into kinds of knowledge and certainties, and concomitant concerns for making judgements based on evidences of different qualities, had the momentous effect of initiating a fresh appraisal of authorities for knowledge and action. The authority of reason became of central importance in the determination of scientific and religious belief. This development was neither simple nor immediate. It became apparent, however, that as far as the problem of determining the fundamentals of the Christian faith was concerned, the question of the rationality of the articles of faith would dominate discussion of fundamentals.

Naturalizing Religion: Commonality in the 'Sub-Fundamentals'

At one level the impact of the above concerns became evident in the new attempts to identify those religious principles that functioned more or less as the presuppositions for all faith. This inquiry seemed, at least to some, to offer the prospect of much needed peace in

religion. In 1624 Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1648) had proposed that common to all religions were five innate ideas.[97] He exemplified a strand in the articles tradition which had affinities with Nicholas of Cusa's earlier but more sophisticated development of a global form of faith.[98]

Cherbury's naturalizing of faith presupposed rather static and atomistic conceptions of the articles tradition. This fact emerged in the discussion of the Biblical scholar Joseph Mede (1586-1638). Mede resolved the formal reason of a fundamental into the necessary connection it had with the acts and functions of Christian life. He rejected the idea of developing the notion of fundamentals in relation to one central doctrine since little agreement could be expected.[99] His view was less intricate, but not in principle different, from the proposal to distinguish '*sub-fundamentals*' (the natural principles of religion), '*fundamentals*' in the sense of a foundation for the *Christian* revelation and '*super fundamentals*', which were the immediate consequences of the former. Mede felt caution was needed in deciding upon the content of the 'super fundamentals'. In regard to fundamentals he was careful to distinguish *fundamenta Salutis* or *dogmatum fidei* (those beliefs 'simply' and 'absolutely' necessary for salvation), from the *Fundamenta Theologicarum Veritatum* or *fundamentalia dogmaticum*. The latter indicated those principles from which theological verities were deduced. Mede thought that there may be an overlap in the two latter categories but that they were not identical.

What was interesting in Mede's discussion was that the question of *sub-fundamentals* was not felt worthy of note. It was a matter over which there was presumably a common consensus. The stratified and static form of belief this implied was easily susceptible to the sterile and reductivist attempts of those like Herbert of Cherbury, to lay bare the basic principles of all religion. The content and origin of such 'sub-fundamentals' and their relation to the Christian

revelation, continued to stimulate important intellectual effort in the seventeenth century.[100] This was especially the case among the so called 'rational supernaturalists',[101] of which an Archbishop of Canterbury, John Tillotson (1630-1694), was a later important example.[102]

Affirming Fundamentals: The Authority of Reason

Epistemological issues were equally relevant to that strand of the articles tradition in which the *central* articles pertaining to the Christian revelation were the focus. The desire for a rational grounding of the foundation of faith indicated an attempt to chart a course between dogmatism - exemplified by Roman claims to infallibility and the excesses of sectarian 'enthusiasm' - and scepticism in which certain atheistic tendencies could be discerned. The necessary articles of faith increasingly became identified with 'matters of fact', in contrast to mere opinions. This rationalistic scripturalism presupposed that it was reasonable to believe any matter of fact "provided there was no contrary evidence which led one to doubt".[103] The self evidence of the articles of faith was derived from their plainly being manifest in Scripture,[104] and their warrant by credible testimony.[105] Important in this scheme was a notion of the veracity of God who would not propose for saving belief that which could not be received by reasonable persons.[106]

William Chillingworth provided an important early example of this development. He insisted on the importance of articles being '*sufficiently*' propounded or declared as a preconditon of belief.[107] The point in controversy was Rome's assumed authority to impose articles of faith. Chillingworth's response recognised the importance of the dynamic through which the 'giveness' of revelation was responsibly appropriated. His position presupposed a more finely tuned understanding of human capacities and propensity for error. Diversity

in doctrine was inevitable. Therefore, errors could not be, in and of themselves, 'damnable'.[108] Claims to infallibility by Rome were simple and false solutions to problems of Christian belief. Chillingworth retained an infallibility for Scripture as the rule of faith.[109] He distinguished between absolute and '*conditional*', '*dependent*' or '*limited*' infallibility; *actual* or *sufficient* certainty, and *absolute* infallibility. Such distinctions were important in determining the authority of the Church and the proper basis for human belief.[110] It was Chillingworth's view that the claim that the Church was infallible in the fundamentals of the faith was a way of affirming that there would always be a Church. Rome erred in failing to distinguish this claim from the claim that the Church was an *infallible guide* in fundamentals.[111]

By the time Edward Stillingfleet wrote his vindication of Laud the category of 'moral certainty' had been carefully developed in relation to the articles of the faith.[112] Stillingfleet pointed out that moral certainty, which was relevant beyond the bounds of religion, was

> a sufficient foundation for the most *firm Assent* and therefore if the matter to be believed be the *infallible Truth* of a *Doctrine* upon *suitable evidence*, though we have now but *moral Certainty* of that evidence, the Assent may be firm to such a *Doctrine* as infallible.[113]

Important for an understanding of Stillingfleet's view of the derivation of the articles of faith was his remark, that the nature of certainty was "not so much to be taken from the *matters themselves*, as from the *grounds* inducing the *Assent*".[114]

Moral certainty took away all 'suspicion of doubt', a thing 'plain and evident' to reason. It yielded "sufficient assurance that Christian Religion is infallibly true".[115] Furthermore, moral certainty was all the certainty that religion had ever had. Without it the 'benefit' of Christianity would be inaccessible to those separated by time and space from the 'originating' events.[116]

The Demise of Patristic Authority

The increasing importance accorded to the authority of reason in matters of faith had initiated important modifications in the resolution of the fundamental articles tradition. The importance of the familiar Anglican appeal to a patristic consensus in matters of faith, in particular to the fundamentals, suffered erosion. It is worth noting here that the hitherto strong Patristic orientation in fundamentals discussion in seventeenth century Anglicanism, had succeeded in taming the potentially volatile problem of fundamental articles. By comparison with other Protestant churches, particularly the Lutherans, the Anglican handling of the problem of fundamental articles could not but appear distinctly under-developed, and unsophisticated.[117]

The Anglican appeal to antiquity for the resolution of the fundamentals, an appeal enshrined in Lancelot Andrewes' (1555-1626) now famous definition of the boundaries of Anglicanism,[118] affirmed by Laud and climaxed at the end of the century in the writings of the Anglican divine George Bull (1634-1710),[119] had been subjected to critical examination which had exposed a diversity of testimony in the early Church Fathers.[120] When this development was allied to developing notions of certainty, evidences and 'opinion', the result was an inevitable decline in the reputation of the Church Fathers, especially among those of latitudinarian sympathies.[121]

Thus, although Chillingworth was confident of the early Churches' trustworthiness in the central matters of faith, nevertheless, in principle at least, the authority of reason was determinative. The practices and beliefs of the primitive church were, said Chillingworth, "a good probable way, and therefore [I] am apt to follow it, when I see no reason to the contrary".[122] For Stillingfleet the patristic consensus was useful principally as a negative criterion: what was not included in the ancient creeds could not now be insisted upon.[123]

Fundamental Doctrine: Orientations to Piety

Concomitant with the increasing attention paid to the authority of reason in the determination of the articles of faith, was a shift in the orientation of the tradition from the cognitive to the moral domain. This was true for Chillingworth who had noted that the fundamental doctrines of faith, "have influence upon our lives, *as every essential doctrine of Christianity hath*" (my italics).[124] Though in the context his point was that one was commanded to *believe* them, not *do* them. Nevertheless, the moral component in believing was crucial. The whole thrust of his apology was that rational human beings were morally obliged to scrutinize what was proposed for belief.[125] Doctrinal error did not imply moral shortcoming. What counted was the integrity and intention to find the truth. The implication for ecclesiology was that separation was not so much a doctrinal but moral issue.[126]

Christianity, it seemed, was not primarily a matter of correct believing but of right practice. This perspective received clear exposition in a mid-seventeenth century work of over 120 pages by the Anglican divine Henry Hammond (1605-1660) entitled, *Of Fundamentals, in a Notion Referring to Practice* (1654).[127] In this important work[128] Hammond concentrated, not so much upon the foundation or fundamentals, but upon "what superstructure it is to which this foundation doth refer, or in respect to which peculiarly any article of faith may be denominated fundamental".[129] In Hammond's view

> the way of measuring and defining the necessity of any articles of faith ... is by the 'αὐτάρκεια' or 'sufficiency' of them to enable the teacher or persuade good life, to support those vices which Christ came to banish out of the world, and to radicate those virtues which He came on purpose to implant among men.[130]

From this perspective the ancient creedal articles (Apostolic, Nicene and Athanasian) were directed to the practice of piety.[131] The fundamentals of belief enshrined therein could be resolved into the doctrine of Christ's resurrection,

> there being no more necessary to the superstructuring all piety on that one foundation, but to sink down the belief of that one article from the brain to the heart, *to reduce it effectually to practice.*(my italics)[132]

Here was a concerted attempt to reintegrate the fundamental articles tradition with the practice of being a Christian in the Church. To be one Church required not only right believing but right living.

Implicit in Hammond's development of fundamentals was an intention *not* to forfeit the dynamic of the articles of faith as generators of ecclesial life. What was interesting in Hammond's treatise was the large space he devoted to the description of that necessary superstructure of piety funded by the foundational articles.[133] The traditional distinction between foundation and superstructure had been reinterpreted. The superstructure no longer indicated *secondary doctrines* of faith but instead identified those *practices conducive to a righteous life.* Insofar as this superstructure of piety was directly related to fundamental belief it was axiomatic that a strong moral element had been introduced into the rationale for Christianity's fundamental articles.

This important development in the orientation of the fundamental articles tradition had an impact on ecclesial controversy. Thus Hammond argued that Roman doctrinal errors tended to 'obstruct' or 'intercept' "the cordial superstructuring of Christian life or renovation, where the foundation is duly laid".[134] Similarly, certain Protestant doctrines of predestination evacuated "all the force of these fundamentals, designed by God as motives of great energy to induce good life".[135] Jeremy Taylor (1613-1637) argued similarly, noting that Roman errors destroyed good life rather than faith:

> For false superstructures do not always destroy faith; but many of the doctrines they teach, if they [Rome] were prosecuted to the utmost issue, would destroy good life.[136]

For such theologians the practice of being one Church within a burgeoning multiplicity of conflicting doctrinal interpretation,[137] and proliferation of sectarianism, contributed to a movement away from the

cognitivity of faith into the domain of the ethical.

The positive intention implicit in this handling of the fundamentals tradition was not all gain. An increasing focus on practical Christianity could easily slip into a new form of moralism. In fact the foundation-superstructure motif appeared to encourage the view that Christianity could be reduced to the belief of a few essential articles of faith together with the practice of certain virtues that made for a good life.

The fate of the fundamental articles tradition in seventeenth century Anglicanism was intimately tied up with more general developments in science and theology in which rational inquiry sought facts, evidences and certainties, and scrutinized inherited traditions with more confident zeal. Christian belief was sifted accordingly. What endured would, of necessity, be of high moral value. The quest for certainty and stability in an age of conflict and discovery was reflected in the fate of the fundamental articles tradition in Anglicanism. In its resolution, its orientation and ecclesial deployment[138] the tradition, despite the efforts of some very able exponents, gradually hardened under the impact of late seventeenth century rationalism and moralism. One result was that the tradition became dislocated from wider Christian life. The serious problems this posed for the form and vitality of the tradition were taken up in a variety of ways from the late seventeenth century. Part Three of this thesis undertakes, by means of extended case studies, a more intensive examination of some of the more important strategies developed for handling the fundamental articles in the later history of the tradition.

PART THREE

THE LATER HISTORY OF THE TRADITION:

Some Selected Case Studies

Introduction: Aim and Method

Following the introduction in Part One to the theme of fundamental articles in Anglicanism, Part Two of the thesis selectively traced the pre-history, early formation and seventeenth century developments in this tradition.

In this way the theme has been located in relation to contemporary theology and the history of the Christian tradition. Chapters One to Four have provided an important point of departure for a more intensive engagement with the theme of fundamental articles in Christian theology. This is pursued in Part Three by analysis of the operation of the fundamental articles tradition through extended case studies on John Locke, Daniel Waterland and William Law.

The three studies are drawn from the advent of Enlightenment thought in England in the later decades of the seventeenth century through to the middle of the eighteenth century. The case studies offer quite different responses to the new situation in which theology found itself with the increasing intrusion of Enlightenment rationalism.

By concentrating on some quite specific case studies Part Three overcomes the limitation of Part Two by providing a richer understanding of the dynamics of the fundamentals tradition within particular theological and ecclesial contexts. The three strategies for handling the theme reveal themselves as different hermeneutics of the tradition each informed by quite particular and important pre-suppositions concerning the presence and action of God in Church, society and human thought.

The methodology adopted in Part Three is thus designed to facilitate a fuller uncovering of the theological issues relevant to the theme of fundamental articles. An aim of Part Three of this study is to show how discussion of fundamental articles in Christianity is necessarily connected with the larger dynamic of Christian life in the Church and the world.

Part Three concludes with a Chapter on important developments in the tradition in the nineteenth century and beyond. The historical material of Part Two and the case studies of Part Three provide the resources for a properly systematic treatment of the theme in Part Four.

CHAPTER FIVE

RECONSTRUCTING THE FUNDAMENTALS TRADITION:

The Significance of John Locke

Introduction

In late seventeenth century England John Locke's restatement of the fundamentals of the Christian faith "provided for many the *locus classicus* of the rationalistic reductionism of the eighteenth century".[1] This case study explores Locke's attempted reconstruction of the Christian tradition through an inquiry into his treatment of the fundamental articles of the faith. In doing so it elucidates Locke's seminal importance for the fate of the tradition of fundmental articles in modern Anglican theology and beyond.

Theological concerns occupied both directly and indirectly a high proportion of Locke's published work,[2] and indicated his understanding of the central significance of theology for all life and thought:

> There is, indeed, one science (as they are now distinguished) incomparably above all the rest, where it is not by corruption narrowed into a trade or faction, for mean or ill ends, and secular interests; I mean theology, which, containing the knowledge of God and his creatures, our duty to him and our fellow-creatures, and a view of our present and future state, is the comprehension of all other knowledge directed to its true end; i.e. the honour and veneration of the Creator, and the happiness of mankind. This is the noble study which is every man's duty, and everyone that can be called a rational creature is capable of.[3]

Furthermore, the Lockean scholar, John Yolton, has highlighted the rich theological context in which Locke developed his *Essay concerning Human Understanding* and illuminated its significance for religious thought in the eighteenth century.[4] Yolton's work has been supplemented by more recent studies of Locke's religion and its context, especially in relation to Latitudinarianism, Socinianism and Deism.[5] Such studies indicate an attempt to move beyond earlier uncritical statements concerning Locke's doctrinal minimalism.[6] Political theorists have called attention to the *theological* framework

as the real context of Locke's political thought.[7]

The interlacing themes of faith, reason and knowledge, as they occur in Book Four of Locke's *Essay* have, at least in more recent scholarship, provoked renewed inquiry and remain controversial in their theological implications.[8] However it has also been noted that studies of Locke's religious views have tended to concern themselves with the problems of the existence of God, faith and reason, or revelation and philosophy, and failed "to deal with the genuinely theological side of his [Locke's] thought".[9] In this respect renewed attention has been devoted to Locke's doctrine of justification, and to the themes of law, freedom and sin in his writings.[10]

One result of recent inquiries into Locke's religious views has been a recognition of the centrality of Christian apologetics in Locke's philosophical and theological writings.[11] Yet it is questionable to what extent this new sympathy for Locke's religious thought has uncovered the true significance of his theological programme, and its connection with Locke's wider concerns for science, epistemology and social life.[12] An adequate assessment of the quality of Locke's apology for Christianity remains on the theological agenda and forms part of the backdrop to this present inquiry.

The context for Locke's religious thought was shaped in part by the impact of seventeenth century experimental science, which focussed more on the how than the why of things.[13] Priority was given here to observation, measurement and judgement. This 'experimental' approach accorded high value to the making of reliable human judgements, of weighing evidences, and identifying certain and sure foundations for knowledge. Experimentation and discovery went hand in hand with the quest for certainty, or at least the discovery of its conditions.[14] The focus of this enterprise was man himself as the one who, in exercising reliable human judgements, was inevitably thrust into the position of receiver, processor and former of truth. This context was,

not surprisingly, ripe for the development of the science of epistemology as initiated by Descartes and developed by Locke.[15]

These developments were in large part shaped by a post-Renaissance view which conceived the world analogically as a machine.[16] In this view the world was devoid of intelligence and life. Accordingly, the movements which the world exhibited were imposed from without, and "their regularity.... due to 'laws of nature' likewise imposed from without".[17] Mechanistic understandings of the workings of the world offered, among other things, the prospect of achieving a degree of understanding and control within an environment made increasingly complex through the burgeoning discoveries of experimental science.[18] Emerging within this new attention to experimental knowledge, rational processes and mechanistic analogies was a more fundamental change. A sacramental conception of the universe - which presupposed an intrinsic meaningfulness in the structure and ordering of the world which was derived from God's presence and action - was being supplanted by more thoroughgoing naturalistic views. Important here was the tendency to treat materiality and its operations as simply there, available for human knowing, but without intrinsic meaning or purpose. This desacralizing process undermined hitherto assumed authorities for the ordering and bestowal of meaning.[19]

Locke's response to this new context constituted a major effort to refound science, morality and religion in such a way as to take account positively of these developments whilst attempting to remain faithful to his Christian inheritance. How this programme was developed in the field of religion is traced in this Chapter through Locke's handling of the theme of fundamental articles. Locke's attempt to reconstruct a positive statement of the Christian faith had close affinities with a doctrinal minimalism characteristic of Anglican latitudinarianism.[20] Within this framework, and under the pressure of strong rationalist tendencies, what was fundamental was significantly thinned out. In

Locke, however, a more dangerous dismantling of the tradition occurred. This was the result of the intrusion of an empiricism which was unable to move beyond the dispersed and particular as the location for what was considered interesting, informative and enriching for human life.[21] Accordingly theology, as a richly concentrated, informative communication of truth, was displaced by descriptive discourse that left Christian doctrine in a highly dispersed and unorganised form. In this context what was fundamental in Christianity, where it was located, and how it was to be communicated and contribute to social cohesion, underwent important and long-lasting modifications. These developments were reflected in Locke's handling of the fundamental articles tradition. His attempt to restate the covenant faith reveals itself as a failed effort in theological reconstruction; a development that soon became evident in the rise of Deism and the challenge to a Trinitarian doctrine of God.

To explore these concerns this Chapter is divided into four parts. Part One concentrates on the background for Locke's development of the fundamentals tradition. Of crucial importance here is the mechanism of knowing as the epistemological presupposition for the tradition. This is considered in relation to Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding*. Part Two considers Locke's attempt to state positively the content of the covenant faith in the light of his epistemology. The impact of Locke's empiricism upon the articles tradition is traced in Part Three in his controversy with Edward Stillingfleet and in his late-life's work on the New Testament Epistles. In Part Four consideration is given to Locke's understanding of the dynamics of ecclesial formation, paying particular attention to the themes of toleration and trust.

PART 1 RECONSTRUCTING KNOWLEDGE: Epistemological Presuppositions for the Tradition

What Locke had to say about the Christian faith belonged to a larger framework of thought in which the problem of knowledge - its origin, forms and appropriation - was a major issue. Accordingly, a brief examination of the epistemology of Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding* will provide important clues for an understanding of his handling of the fundamental articles tradition.

The problem of the generation and formation of knowledge was primarily, in Locke's view, a question of how the knowing process worked. To ask about the how of the process was the logic of a mechanistic framework which had regard for 'natural' causation and the field of 'efficient causes and Matter' as means to explain the truth of things.[22] The way the issue of truth and knowledge was expressed indicated "a general transference of interest from metaphysics to physics, from the contemplation of Being to the observation of Becoming".[23] As Locke inferred in the *Essay's* 'Epistle to the Reader', inquiry into the principles of morality and revealed religion could not be usefully prosecuted without a necessary detour, "to examine our own Abilities, and see, what Objects our Understanding were, or were not fitted to deal with".[24] Thus the 'how of things' resolved itself into a question of the human agent as knower. An inquiry began which was aimed at uncovering and analysing the structure and process of human understanding with a view to identifying "the original, Certainty, and Extent of human knowledge; together, with the Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion and Assent ...".[25] The aim was to set down "Measures of the Certainty of our Knowledge".[26]

To know the how of things was of great practical moment, checking the unwarranted overconfidences of human beings[27] and countering a kind of incipient scepticism which would emerge as humankind, in a confused pursuit of truth, finally despaired of knowing anything.[28]

It was a matter of finding the 'horizon' which "sets the Bounds between the enlightened and dark Parts of Things ",[29] with the object of right conduct rather than abundance of opinions.[30] Locke approached the problem of knowledge from the point of view of the physiology of the human understanding.[31] This made it almost inevitable that the truth of things, in order to attain the status of human knowledge, would resemble a product obtained from the processes by which the mind received and interpreted data.

Experience, Ideas and the Way of Knowledge

The mechanism of knowing presupposed a reality, a world external to human beings, which was available to be known - what Locke called that 'vast Ocean of Being'.[32] The truth and goodness of things began not *in the mind* but in nature and history in their particularity.[33] This was absolutely central for Locke. It presupposed a thoroughgoing, if somewhat crude and undifferentiated realism,[34] which formed the basis of his empiricist philosophy. The matter was focussed in Locke's concept of experience as the foundation, in the sense of the 'original', of all knowledge.[35] This inclusive category to denote the source of all knowledge was further specified by Locke to include a double aspect; sensation and reflection. In sensation the senses,

> conversant about particular sensible Objects, do convey into the Mind, several distinct Perceptions of things, according to those various ways, wherein those Objects do affect them ... This great source, of most of the Ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the Understanding, I call SENSATION.[36]

In reflection the mind,

> turns its view inward upon itself, and observes its own Actions about those Ideas it has, takes from thence other Ideas, which are as capable to be the Objects of its Contemplation, as any of those it received from foreign things [37]

Thus, whilst sensation concerned external objects (particular sensible objects), reflection was concerned with the internal operations of the mind. This latter source of ideas "every Man has wholly in himself".[38]

Experience was constituted by reference to an external and internal sensing operation. Experience was where "all our Ideas take their beginnings".[39] It was the 'Fountain' of knowledge "from whence all the Ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring".[40] Experience was the primary location for the richness of reality from which the raw materials of knowledge were gleaned.

In the particularity of experience ideas became present to the mind. It was ideas which constituted the 'materials' of all knowledge. The term 'idea' was used by Locke "to stand for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks...".[41] It was thus an inclusive term to express "whatever is meant by *Phantasm, Notion, Species* or whatever it is, which the Mind can be employed about in thinking ...".[42] Such ideas gained entrance to the understanding through the 'inlet' of experience. Ideas in the understanding were 'coeval with sensation'; sensation being "such an impression or Motion, made in some part of the Body, as produces some Perception in the Understanding .....".[43] However,

> In time, the Mind comes to reflect on its own Operations, about the Ideas got by Sensation, and thereby stores itself with a new set of Ideas, which I call Ideas of Reflection.[44]

There was a strong hint here that ideas of sensation and reflection were generically related. Ideas gleaned through sensation seemed to function as the catalyst for the formation of ideas of reflection.[45] Their origin in experience was critical.

The way of experience was the way of the 'historical plain method'[46] which could provide surer foundations for knowledge and certainty.[47] Knowledge began with attention to what was given in experience.[48] In this attending mode the passive mind simply received the 'simple ideas' offered to it. It could no more refuse to receive what was imprinted, nor 'blot-out' and create new 'impressions', "than a mirror can refuse, alter or obliterate the Images or Ideas, which the Objects set before it, do therein produce".[49]

In Locke's view experience was something which confronted an individual and was passively registered by him or her. It may have been a distorted or overly restricted notion of experience but, as one commentator has noted, it "emerges from the legitimate epistemological interest in the given, the reality which is unfalsified by human influence".[50] Locke's view of the beginning of all knowledge supposed that truth and goodness[51] were not given neat and formed in the mind, as taught in the theory of innate ideas,[52] but were generated in and through experience.

From experience the raw materials of knowledge in its first form (i.e. simple ideas) were acquired. Once received, the stock of simple ideas could be complexified by the power of the mind to gather, relate and abstract.[53] Locke seemed to envisage the possibility of the mind's unlimited potential for active reflection - a sort of infinite mirroring process [54] - in relation to the simple ideas given in sense data. What resulted was a vast store of ideas constructed by the mind in which high level abstractions could be traced back to, and thus identified as, the products of simple ideas. In this way the complex ideas of power, freedom, beauty, infinity, eternity, and even the idea of 'a god' could, by a process of induction, be shown to be derived from simple ideas given in experience.[55]

Experience provided the location for the generation of the mind's simple ideas; the constructive mind was responsible for the increase in complexity of the initial input. However ideas were not knowledge itself, but rather its 'Instruments, or Materials'.[56] Precisely because ideas were the mind's only immediate objects, "our knowledge", said Locke, "is only conversant about them".[57] The movement from ideas to knowledge constituted the final phase of the mechanism of knowing.

Ideas may not have constituted knowledge in Locke's strict sense of the latter term but they did constitute a necessary moment in the

dynamic of knowledge. The mechanism of knowing required, for its completion, the assigning of value to the field of ideas. Here it was a question of the kind of activity involved in knowing that determined the relative status to be accorded to ideas and hence their claim to the status of knowledge. In this respect Locke spoke of three ways of perception - intuitive, demonstrative and sensitive. Each afforded a different degree of knowledge.[58] Intuitive knowledge was irresistible for "like the bright sunshine, [it] forces itself immediately to be perceived".[59] The discursive operations of reason did not intrude. Such knowledge was the basis for "all the Certainty and Evidence of all our Knowledge".[60] Demonstrative knowledge involved both intuition and discursive reasoning, the latter contributing to the lack of 'lustre and full assurance' in this knowledge.[61] Locke's reference to the category of sensitive knowledge underscored his view that what was perceived and processed by the mind did really pertain to the real existence of other things.[62] This was simply for him a fact of experience. The alternative was thoroughgoing scepticism.

Probability and Reliable Human Judgements

The results of Locke's analysis of ideas and ways of knowing were not particularly encouraging.[63] The 'few and narrow Inlets' for knowledge did not seem particularly well equipped to handle the 'vast Ocean of Being'.[64] In the intellectual world knowledge with highest certainty was located in mathematics which attained the idea that other disciplines aspired to without chance of success.[65] In the material world human knowledge extended as far as an intuitive knowledge of one's own existence, a demonstrative knowledge of God's existence and a sensitive knowledge of the external world which faded into the region of probabilities. This was simply a 'fact of life'. "For the state we are at present in, not being that of Vision, we must, in many things, content ourselves with Faith and probability".[66]

The nature of the world, as it appeared to the human agent was, it seemed, of probabilistic status. That there was a vast richness to reality Locke never doubted. The truth of this reality came to its form for the knower in part as real and certain knowledge, but otherwise in the form of probabilities, defined by Locke as

> likeliness to be true, the very notation of the Word signifying such a Proposition, for which there be Arguments or proofs, to make it pass or be received as true.[67]

The region of probabilities was the region of human judgement - that faculty given by God to man "to supply the want of clear and certain knowledge in cases where that cannot be had".[68] The 'grounds' upon which probability judgements were made were twofold; "the conformity of anything with our own Knowledge, Observation, and Experience" and "The Testimony of others".[69] Here, relevant considerations included the number, integrity, and skill of the witnesses, the 'design of the author' (where the testimony came from a book), the consistency of the parts, circumstances of the relation and contrary testimonies. In his treatment of probability Locke was also providing a rationale for his appeal to Scripture revelation grounded upon the credit of the proposer as coming from God.[70]

The mind proceeded rationally as it examined all the grounds of probability. Reason was thus the fuel which propelled the mind through to the judgement.[71] Where reason didn't operate the mind was entirely directionless and arbitrary in its assessments. In human judgement the dynamic of the mechanism of knowing had come to its term.

Locke painted a picture of a world of probabilities in which the human task was to make high quality judgements as close to certainty as possible. This operation involved the finite operations of human reason with its attendant dangers of error.[72] The further the movement away from the particularities of experience (i.e. by reflection), the further the move from the realm of certainty into the region of probability.[73] Probability was the logic of finitude in most

areas. Recognition that this was in fact the human predicament was true wisdom. Accordingly, it was a properly responsible position, sufficient for the chief ends for which mankind existed; worship of God and right performance of one's duties.

However there was a problem in Locke's gospel of probability. Was it reliable? Could human subjects actually make reliable human judgements? If not, then in the practical matters of life mankind was without direction and decision making was entirely arbitrary. Locke seemed to be of the opinion that reliable judgements could be made and the necessities of life could be humbly and confidently embraced because this was the way Locke appeared to envisage human participation in the reality given by God. As God had set some things in 'broad day-light' of which certain knowledge was possible,

> So in the greatest part of our Concernment, he has afforded us only the twilight, as I may so say, of *Probability*, suitable, I presume, to that State of Mediocrity and Probationership, he has been pleased to place us in here; wherein to check our over-confidence....and liableness to Error; the Sense whereof might be a constant Admonition to us, to spend the days of this our Pilgrimage with Industry and Care, in the search, and following of that way, which might lead us to a State of greater Perfection.[74]

In other words, the very fact that the environment for human life was largely one of probability was no reason for scepticism nor mistrust. This was simply the way God meant it to be and He who so ordered it in this way could be trusted to supply human agents with those capacities requisite for living responsibly. The supposition seemed to be that God gave people what they could understand. This view found some support in Locke's argument that God had given the faculty of judgement for humans to live within a probabilistic world.[75]

Human judgements, it seemed, were trusworthy. Locke did not make it entirely clear why this might be so. The above text gives some warrant for the view that Locke's confidence in the process of human judgement was derived from his conviction of the essential trustworthiness of God. Such a trust may have been conditioned by a

belief in God that Locke had tied to the mind's judging operations.[76] Faith itself had likewise been linked to the mind's operations: as a form of trust it represented a judgement of highest quality.[77]

The human subject was not, from this perspective, an autonomous rational agent subject to his or her own arbitrary whims and fancies. Rather the human subject appeared to be directly authenticated by the Divine. Such a view presupposed that human thinking was nothing less than the Divine thinking through human thought. This suggested that a godly human life was one in which reliable judgements were made. Locke seemed to be searching for a way of bringing the form of human judgement into correspondence with the wisdom of God.

The Human Agent as Former of Truth

There was, however, a problem with this kind of correspondence. The movement from knowledge through to judgement involved a successive series of reflections upon the datum of experience.[78] Inevitably, in this process of stimulus-response the focus was increasingly trained on the activity of reflection, and the initial stimulus could not but recede into the background.[79]

In the reflective process human beings received input and transformed it into products. In this way truth in its richness was drawn down into some manageable form.[80] In this process there occurred a progressive disengagement of the knowing subject from what was given for reflection. The result was a highly purified form of the truth, which seemed to require a culling-off of what was considered extraneous to the field of knowledge. Absent in this process was any recognition that human capacities could be formed by what was received. The human agent in Locke's quasi-mechanistic account of knowing was primarily a *former of truth* rather than one *formed by truth*. Highly significant in this respect was the fact that the active power of the human mind, though clearly recognised by Locke, was relegated to an

inferior status.[81] The more the mind intruded into the process of knowing, the further the movement into the region of probabilities and away from certainties.

Locke's physiology of knowing seemed to offer an inadequate account of human participation in knowledge.[82] This was the logic of the mechanistic philosophy which, as observed earlier, sought stability and order and the elimination of the arbitrary and surprising.[83] This required being highly selective as to the origins of knowledge. It also generated a high focus on boundary making between, for example, knowledge and opinion, certainty and probability, the mind passive and active, faith and reason, and natural and supernatural reality. In this schema God became the mechanistic backdrop, the indispensible hypothesis. As Basil Willey noted, "Newton's Machine needed a mechanic".[84] Locke's God was the initiator of the natural process of the world, a somewhat remote, albeit benevolent, imposer and guarantor of the order of things. At another level Locke's schema presupposed a quiet particular form of God's presence in the activity of human reason and judgement. This was why Locke could speak of reason as natural revelation and revelation in its natural form as reason.[85] The implication was that in reason the presence of God was immanentised and naturalised. This view seemed to offer the possibility of reliable human ordering of empirical reality.

Locke's physiology of knowing consisted, it seemed, of a series of filters, the last of which was reason, "the Last Judge and Guide in every Thing".[86] The knowing process suggested a progressive restriction upon what might be justifiably claimed as knowledge. Explanation of things was tacitly identified with justification of knowledge.[87] In Locke's scheme, to determine 'how one knows' was in fact to stipulate where knowledge came from and what could be known. The restrictions Locke placed upon the origin, process and scope of knowledge were mirrored in his treatment of the Christian faith.

PART II THE RATIONAL FORM OF CHRISTIANITY: The Covenant of Faith

Religion in the *Essay*: Criteria for Faith

Locke's argument for the reasonableness of Christianity began, strictly speaking, in Book Four of the *Essay*.[88] To this extent Locke's treatment of faith was already subject to a methodological constraint since for him it was a question of showing that faith was compatible with reason and so could not harm it. As one commentator has remarked "Reason is assumed, and room must be made for faith".[89] This was the logic of the epistemology of the *Essay* and implicit here were further lines of demarcation between faith, reason and knowledge.

In Locke's view faith, unlike reason, did not provide knowledge but rather, as a form of trust, belonged to a category other than that of 'the certainty of knowledge'.[90] The reason was that in terms of Lockean epistemology, faith did not have its origins in the natural faculties of sensation and reflection, i.e. in experience as defined by Locke. Accordingly, faith could not be considered a candidate for knowledge. Faith constituted the mode of access to those matters that could not be derived *by reason from experience*.[91] As one commentator has remarked,

> Locke's solution to the problem of creating a niche for faith in a world increasingly dominated by science was to remove it [faith] from the realm of knowledge altogether.[92]

Did faith then belong to the region of probability? It would seem so since it did involve judgement issuing in 'a firm Assent of the Mind'.[93] Yet if this was the case, then for Locke faith entailed a high quality judgement, an assent of highest probability, the most reliable of all judgements - 'an Assent founded on the highest reason'.[94] Here, assent was not based upon the deductions of reason "but upon the Credit of the Proposer, as coming from GOD ...",[95] whose testimony was worthy of highest trust. Faith then could not issue in knowledge but did represent a high probability judgement, objectively grounded in the

testimony of one who "cannot deceive, nor be deceived, and that is of God himself".[96]

Insofar as faith remained a matter of responsible human judgement, Locke argued that it had to be found reasonable according to the principles of reason. A revelation from God, although it belonged to matters 'above reason', could not be contrary to reason otherwise reason (i.e. revelation in its natural form) would be in opposition to revelation as given directly by God.[97] That which was 'above reason' in its origins had nevertheless to be open to the scrutiny of reason, the 'last judge and guide in every thing'. Faith "can never convince us of any Thing, that contradicts our Knowledge".[98] Thus objectively, faith left no room for 'Doubt or Hesitation'.

> Only we must be sure, that it be a divine Revelation, and that we understand it right ... our Assent can be rationally no higher than the Evidence of its being a Revelation, and that this is the meaning of the Expressions it is delivered in.[99]

The assent of faith, subjectively considered,[100] was determined in relation to proofs, evidences and grounds *extraneous* to the thing believed.[101] Into this category of external signs vouching for divine revelation Locke placed miracles.[102] The Scripture as the 'written Word of GOD *without* us'[103] would seem to come into this category also, though this remained unsubstantiated by Locke. He simply took it as an accepted fact that Scripture was "attested Revelation ... and we may safely receive it for true".[104] Whenever it seemed that the question of the criterion for revealed truths arose Locke simply referred to two marks or rules for judgement;

> the rule of reason with its "principles" (which he [Locke] does not specify) and/or the rule of the word of God, the Scriptures.[105]

Faith, in its subjective mode, was thus 'a firm Assent of the Mind' properly regulated by reason operating in relation to certain criteria external to the object of faith.[106] Reason, in judging of the authenticity of a revelation had, it seemed, to have 'marks' by which it could not be mistaken. This condition was met when such marks were

"extrinsical to the Persuasions themselves".[107]

Locke's handling of faith and reason was designed to counter the enthusiast who knew a revelation was of God "by the light it [revelation] brings with it, which shines bright in their Minds, and they cannot resist".[108] Locke's criteria for faith functioned to eliminate certain supposed claims to revelation.[109] In this clearing operation one was left with genuine matters of faith, i.e. pertaining to things above reason. Such revelation, "where God has been pleased to give it, must carry it [revelation], against the probable Conjectures of Reason."[110] In this way Locke had identified the province of legitimate revelation - i.e. concerning things 'above reason'- with the word of God in Scripture.

Reason operated as the faculty through which a pure form of faith was made possible. Purity was objectively grounded in God and what he revealed. But for human beings to be fully responsible their assents had to be pure, unmixed with notions contrary to their God-given faculties. In this sense reason appeared as the arbiter for assents to claims 'above reason'. What receded into the background in this purification process was the contribution of the grace of God to the forming of human faith. Locke's empiricism meant that faith could not provide *knowledge*, his rationalism controlled those assents in which faith was justified.

The Fundamental Articles of the Covenant: *The Reasonableness of Christianity*

In *The Reasonableness of Christianity* Locke expounded his doctrine of justification.[111] In doing so he spelt out what was included within the covenant of saving faith.[112] Given the formal structure of faith outlined in the *Essay*, it was incumbent upon Locke to depict a 'safe' content for faith. In the interests of epistemological consistency he had to ensure that what was assented to

in faith did not 'spill over' into matters 'contrary to reason'. That which was 'above reason' had to remain reasonable. This was the logic of the epistemology of the *Essay*.[113]

It was not clear, however, from the *Essay* how reason was meant to operate *within* matters of faith. It did seem that the 'Principles of Reason' were intended to scrutinise that other external measure - the word of God in Scripture - when the 'what' of that revelation was being considered.[114] Reason was not only to regulate faith's assent on the basis of evidence, but also to regulate 'what' was assented to; presumably "by some Marks which Reason cannot be mistaken in".[115] It was not surprising therefore that the 'Historical, plain Method' of the *Essay* was transferred into the region of faith. Thus Locke referred to the Scriptures as

> A collection of writings, designed by God, for the instruction of the illiterate bulk of mankind, in the way of salvation; and therefore, generally, and in necessary points, to be understood in the plain direct meaning of the words and phrases: such as they may be supposed to have had in the mouths of the speakers, who used them according to the language of that time and country wherein they lived; without such learned, artificial, and forced senses of them, as are sought out, and put upon them, in most of the systems of divinity, according to the notions that each one has been bred up in.[116]

This method was designed to undercut the accretions to Christianity associated with the development of 'particular creeds and systems'.[117] Safety and purity were to be achieved by a return to the 'facts' as they originally offered themselves, i.e. a return to the 'plain direct meaning' of the Scriptures. The truth of faith for the individual began as Scripture revelation was received in its simplicity; unadorned, unforced and divested of any artificiality. It was a method entirely in accord with the empiricism of the *Essay*. This was the method to uncover what in fact had been revealed, that Jesus was the Messiah. This was the only belief proposed in the New Testament for a justifying and saving faith.[118] As such it constituted 'the fundamental article of his [Christ's] Church',[119] the 'only gospel-article of faith'[120] required to be explicitly believed to make one a Christian and open an

individual to that full freedom given in relation to God.[121]

This belief presupposed what had been required before the revelation of the gospel, i.e. "belief of one invisible, eternal, omnipotent God, maker of heaven and earth, etc.".[122] Yet belief that Jesus was the Messiah was a requirement consequent upon the fall of Adam from original righteousness. In the fall humankind 'lost bliss and immortality'.[123] By the coming of the Messiah the human race was redeemed from its lost state and restored to life eternal.[124] Insofar as Jesus' resurrection was "a mark and undoubted evidence of his being the Messiah" it was "commonly required to be believed as a necessary article, and sometimes solely insisted on" and was "necessary now to be believed by those who would receive him as the Messiah".[125]

To believe this article of faith included repentance and a life of obedience to the laws of the Messianic kingdom. The faith which justified was insufficient for salvation if it remained a bare faith showing no sign of a sincere desire to live a righteous life. The Christian covenant in which redemption was won included the necessity of faith and good works. "It is not enough to believe him to be the Messiah unless we also obey his laws, and take him to be our king to reign over us".[126]

Locke's statement of the covenant faith had been developed in relation to other recent efforts of Continental Protestants.[127] The covenant motif was already important in English theology but what was significant in Locke's presentation was his focus on the *conditional* nature of the Christian covenant.[128] Locke's strong statement of saving belief was developed in relation to a moral imperative that included repentance and godly life. He was drawing upon a well established tradition of covenantal thinking but developing it in a way quite different from Calvinist and Puritan thought.[129]

In Locke's depiction of the content of Christianity, what was revealed was 'safe' because it was intelligible. At a general level

the intelligibility of attested revelation was guaranteed by God. This supposed that God gave to humankind what could be understood. Scripture revelation encouraged this view when it was treated according to the historical plain method, because this method yielded a certain 'matter of factness'. What was revealed could, it seemed, be more or less 'read-off' from the Scripture narrative.[130] Locke summarised the story of redemption thus:

> God, out of the infiniteness of his mercy, has dealt with man, as a compassionate and tender Father. He gave him reason, and with it a law ... But, considering the frailty of man, apt to run into corruption and misery, he promised a Deliverer, whom in his good time he sent; and then declared to all mankind, that whoever would believe him to be the Saviour promised, and take him now raised from the dead, and constituted the Lord and Judge of all men, to be their King and Ruler, should be saved ..".[131]

This was 'a plain intelligible proposition', accessible to all people regardless of capacity. Incarnational doctrine was here naturalised. Jesus Christ was the centre point in a historical process. In the man Jesus what had been anticipated in history had now been realised. The authentication of his Messiahship belonged to that history. It was focussed in the New Testament accounts of the life and preaching of Jesus and the first Apostles.

The Messiahship of Jesus was shown by the miracles he performed.[132] Locke referred to them as 'matters of fact'.[133] The indirect phrases used by Jesus (e.g. the Kingdom of Heaven) signified to the Jews that the times of the Messiah had arrived. The 'plain and direct' words of the Apostles after the resurrection confirmed the above claim.[134] Such words, actions and purity of life bestowed upon Christ and his Apostles 'credit and authority', and evoked trust that Jesus was the Messiah come 'from heaven in the power of God'.[135]

The intelligibility or 'inner consistency'[136] of Christianity also involved a reference beyond the story of salvation in Scripture. Implicit in *The Reasonableness of Christianity* was the idea that the Scripture revelation provided a solution to a more generally recognised need for redemption. The human experience of moral shortcoming and

incapacity to live righteously witnessed, at least tacitly, to the need for a saviour.[137] In this way the intelligibility of redemption in history was strengthened by the wider natural human context.

In Locke's account of Christianity what was fundamental was located in the historical process. It was focussed in the life of a particular man authenticated by God as the Messiah through certain external signs. The plain direct meaning of these facts was presented in the Scripture text. Locke's attention was trained on the particularities of history but he was not so clearly able to identify its translucence to the transcendent. For example, the filial relation of Christ to the Father was primarily developed in terms of the 'evidence' this gave that Christ was the Messiah sent by God.[138] One 'advantage' of Jesus Christ was the promise of assistance in living virtuously though the agency of the Holy Spirit.[139] Under the pressure of Locke's naturalizing of faith the conventional form of Trinitarian and Incarnational doctrine had been considerably flattened out.

The Simplification of Faith: The Locke - Edwards Controversy

Locke's reductionist view of Christianity led him into a lengthy dispute with the Calvinist Anglican, John Edwards (1637-1716).[140] The problem here concerned the extent to which Locke's position represented a legitimate manoeuvre within Christianity and the extent to which it constituted a dissolution of the Christian tradition. Was Locke's reasonable Christianity an orthodox simplification or a simplification of orthodoxy?

From Edwards' perspective Locke's form of Christianity had all the hallmarks of Socinianism and provided the fertile soil for the development of Deism and the spread of Atheism. Edwards discerned these tendencies in Locke's handling of the doctrines of justification and atonement. Particularly important here was Locke's espousal of a moralist view of justification in which faith itself was imputed as

righteousness, and obedience was coupled to faith for justification.[141] Edwards thought Locke must have derived this view from the Anglican, Jeremy Taylor.[142] Insofar as this view undercut the imputation of Christ's righteousness to the believer, Christ's death was removed from any integral connection with salvation. Edwards argued that Locke's reduction of Christianity to belief in the Messiah made Christ's satisfaction unnecessary. Accordingly Locke " gave proof of his being Socinianiz'd by his utter silence about Christ's satisfying for us, and purchasing salvation by virtue of his Death".[143]

Locke's dissolution of what Edward's considered fundamental tenets of Christianity suggested a dangerous simplification of orthodoxy. By way of defence Locke reasserted the main thrust of *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, offered a more thorough treatment of the atonement, and exposed the weaknesses of Edwards' own position. Filtering through his vindications was a concern to establish his position as a legitimate orthodox simplification. The issue came to focus in Locke's discussion of fundamental articles. Locke, following Chillingworth, stated, "I hope it is no derogation to the christian religion, to say, that the fundamentals of it, is easy to be understood by all men".[144]

The assumption here was that what God required as necessary belief God would plainly declare.[145] Locke argued "If fundamentals are to be known, easy to be known, (as, without doubt, they are) then a catalogue may be given of them".[146] But such a catalogue could not be successfully achieved 'upon the usual grounds'.[147] It was important to distinguish clearly between what belief was 'required to make a man a Christian' and what belief was 'required of a Christian'.[148] The former was 'essential' belief, the latter 'integral', signifying "such parts as the thing can be without, but without them will not be so complete and entire as with them".[149] Edwards had failed to make this distinction. Locke's concern was with the former. This accounted for his focus on the early preaching of

Jesus and the apostles in the Gospels and Acts of the Apostles. Here the one article proposed for belief unto salvation was plainly declared. No 'explication' of this article was necessary:

> I think it may be doubted, whether any articles, which need men's explications, can be so clearly and certainly understood, as one which is made so very plain by the scripture itself, as not to need any explication at all. Such is this, that Jesus is the Messiah.[150]

By contrast, Edwards' articles required explication, were capable of competing interpretations and disputation, and some of them 'contain mysteries'.[151] This ran counter to Locke's position for it supposed that "it is necessary for many men to believe what is not intelligible to them ...".[152] Such a position was not possible for Locke.

> For that which can be comprehended by every day labourer, every poor spinster, that is a member of the church, cannot be a mystery. And if what such illiterate people cannot understand be required to be believed, to make them christians, the greatest part of mankind are shut out from being christians.[153]

In Locke's view a faith accessible to all had to possess a certain self-evident quality.

> As men, we have God for our King, and are under the law of reason, as christians, we have Jesus the Messiah for our King, and are under the law revealed by him in the gospel.[154]

This was the fundamental faith in a nutshell. The fundamental article for making people Christians presupposed belief in God, and included certain 'concomitant' articles; those events necessarily associated with Jesus' Messiahship, i.e. resurrection, ascension and coming judgement. To deny these was to deny the fundamental article.[155]

Locke argued that Edwards' doctrine of the 'satisfaction made by Christ', did not belong to the fundamental articles of the Christian religion. The word 'satisfaction' did not appear in the New Testament. It was not an article laid down by Christ and the apostles as being essential to be believed in order to be a Christian, it was not included in the Apostles' Creed and therefore, said Locke, "I could not put it into my Christianity as delivered in the Scripture".[156] Locke did acknowledge that Christ was 'offered up', fulfilling a sacrificial

work of redemption,[157] but this would have fallen short of what Edwards' Calvinism required.

Locke's discussion of fundamentals was developed in relation to a quite specific concern; to determine what explicit belief was necessary to make a person a Christian. Any distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals had no relevance apart from that particular concern. The reason for Locke was clear: all divine revelation given by God was a matter of faith, and necessary to be believed by all Christians to whom it was proposed.[158] Thus he could argue that Christ had taught

> a great many other truths, for the explaining this fundamental article of the law of faith, that Jesus is the Messiah; some whereof have a nearer, and some a more remote connexion with it, and so cannot be denied by any christian, who sees the connexion, or knows they are so taught ....All these truths taught us from God, either by reason or revelation, are of great use, to enlighten our minds, confirm our faith, stir up our affections, etc. And the more we see of them, the more we shall see, admire and magnify the wisdom, goodness, mercy and love of God, in the work of our redemption. This will oblige us to search and study the scripture, wherein it is contained and laid open to us.[159]

In this sense all articles of faith were fundamental. All doctrines delivered by Christ were true; to deny any one of them was to deny Christ's Messiahship and thus forfeit one's salvation.[160] The list of fundamentals expanded as each person's understanding was enlightened. What was required was

> an explicit belief of all those propositions which he, according to the best of his understanding, really apprehends to be contained and meant in the scripture; and implicit belief of all the rest, which he is ready to believe, as soon as it shall please God, upon his use of the means, to enlighten him, and make them clear to his understanding.[161]

From this point of view everyone was orthodox in their own eyes[162] and had their own distinct catalogue of fundamentals; "nobody can fix it for him; no body can collect or prescribe it to another".[163] Two implications followed. Firstly, the attempt by Edwards to enumerate a true and complete catalogue of fundamentals was a purely arbitrary activity, and was doomed to failure.[164] Such systems or creeds, the 'inventions of men', resulted in a 'narrowing' of Christianity and contributed to a fragmented and bloody society.[165]

Secondly, each person had to take personal responsibility for what he or she believed. The alternative was to allow one's faith to be impoverished and imprisoned in ignorance by the 'creed-makers' and systematizers of religion.[166] This could not be countenanced, "for I assure you no-body can rob you of your God, but by your own consent, nor spoil you of any of the articles of your faith".[167]

Locke, following Chillingworth, advocated a diligent search for fundamentals in that place "where God has placed them, in the holy scripture, and take them as he has framed and fashioned them there".[168] In the Scripture the fundamentals were always to be found 'safe and sound'. Thus a rightly formed belief entailed a progress from the foundation into the 'superstructure' of faith, from fundamentals into the things of 'perfection'.[169]

Important in the argument with Edwards was Locke's claim that his position was not a departure from but rather aligned with traditional orthodoxy. He was referring to the Apostolic Creed of the early Church as the sufficient confession for baptism into the Church. Locke described this creed as an 'abridgement' of apostolic faith. Such an abridgement or abstract of anything was

> The whole in little; and if it be of a science or doctrine, the abridgement consists in the essential or necessary parts of it contracted into a narrower compass than where it lies diffused in the ordinary way of delivery, amongst a great number of transitions, explanations, illustrations, proofs, reasonings, corollaries etc.[170]

This abridgement had been a sufficient rule of faith in the primitive church. Furthermore, it had been appealed to by Anglican divines in theological disputes and enshrined in the baptismal practice of the Church of England. Locke did not hesitate to identify this 'rule' with his own short formula.

> How little different the Faith of the ancient church was, from the Faith I have mentioned; may be seen in the words of Tertullion: ***Regula Fidei una omnino et, sola, immobilis.***[171]

Locke's own short formula (i.e. the one gospel-article of faith)

was thus 'the whole in a little': not a simplification of orthodoxy but an orthodox simplification.[172]

Edwards' comprehensively worked out faith, undergirded by an inherited metaphysic, was incompatible with Locke's latitudinarian stance. Edwards considered that this latter position dissolved the foundation and content of belief. Yet Locke had presented a quite different kind of faith; one which was responsible, with apparently strong roots in the Christian tradition. If it was reductionist, it was in a form that appeared to encourage a healthy and inclusive Christianity. It seemed that Locke's depiction of the fundamentals was a legitimate manoeuvre *within* the fundamentals tradition.

At one level the Locke - Edwards controversy continued a long running debate in seventeenth century Anglicanism between conservative Calvinist/Puritan and Arminian/Latitudinarian elements.[173] That Jesus was the Messiah was the plain fact of the gospel; it was supported by evidences and grounded in trustworthy testimony. This was rational Christianity. It was intelligible, it did not involve belief in mysteries, and it did not require explication to uncover meaning. Locke's paring down of the faith had drawn into theological form the epistemology developed in the *Essay*.[174]

Locke's simplification of belief raised a further question about the status of doctrine *per se*. What was greatly simplified was the nature of fundamental articles , where they were located and how they were to be communicated. To attend to Locke's reconstruction of the tradition at this level is to raise more sharply the impact of Lockean empiricism upon his theological endeavour.

PART III REFORMING DOCTRINE: The Significance of Lockean Empiricism

From System to Text: The Locke - Stillingfleet Controversy

Relevant here is Locke's extended debate with the Bishop of Worcester, Edward Stillingfleet.[175] At one level the issue was not

dissimilar to the Edwards - Locke dispute. Stillingfleet considered that Locke's reductionism in the faith would encourage a rising religious scepticism and provide fuel for unitarian and anti-Trinitarian interests, if not atheism. His critique was neither impulsive nor ill-considered, and has given grounds for one writer to describe Stillingfleet as the " most formidable and respected of Locke's opponents during the final years of the seventeenth century..".[176]

Stillingfleet bypassed *The Reasonableness of Christianity* and located the roots of Locke's theological reductionism in the *Essay* itself. From Stillingfleet's point of view, the implications of Locke's discussions in the *Essay* - on substance, nature, person, identity; his construal of the relationship between ideas and things (nominal and real essences), the certainty obtained in these matters and the origin of such certainties - all contributed to the undermining of the fundamental articles of natural and revealed religion. Particularly at stake were the doctrines of the Trinity, Incarnation, the resurrection and immortality of the soul.

Stillingfleet's apology for the central doctrines of Christianity (Trinity and Incarnation), was underscored by particular understandings of the categories of substance, nature, person and identity. Stillingfleet's problem was simple but acute. How could one argue intelligibly for the foundational doctrines of revealed religion if Locke's understanding of the above categories was accepted as legitimate?

As far as Locke was concerned Stillingfleet's objections to the *Essay*'s discussion of the above categories had nothing to do with the credibility of the doctrines of religion. He professed puzzlement as to how his position was inconsistent with or might 'overturn the doctrine of the Trinity' or was 'against mysteries'.[177] Locke distanced himself from Toland's *Christianity not Mysterious*; (1696) the work

which had drawn upon the epistemology of the *Essay* and as a result had sparked off the dispute with Stillingfleet.

The proposals of the *Essay* were, however, highly threatening to the more traditional orthodoxy of Stillingfleet. Locke's notion of 'substance' as a 'substratum', the idea of which was but obscure and confused,[178] was impossible for Stillingfleet to countenance. It completely undermined a traditional rationale for the Trinity which, from Stillingfleet's point of view, required clear and distinct ideas of substance. In fact Locke suggested that the Trinitarian notion of three persons in one was not appropriately explained by an appeal to substance, for

> where there are three persons, there must be three distinct, complete intelligent substances; and so there cannot be three persons in the same individual essence.[179]

Locke consistently refused to pursue the matter himself. In terms of Locke's understanding of person and nature, Stillingfleet's own position was suspect:

> For if a complete intelligible substance be the idea of a person, and the divine and human natures be complete intelligible substances; then the doctrine of the union of two natures and one person is quite sunk, for here must be two persons in this way of your Lordships.[180]

Locke proceeded to charge Stillingfleet with advocating a dangerous rationalism in his employment of reason for the commending of what had been divinely revealed.[181] In Locke's view Stillingfleet was in danger of erecting his own particular interpretations of Scripture into articles of faith.[182]

For his part Locke refused to "own the doctrine of the Trinity, as it hath been received in the christian church".[183] The doctrine had been the subject of such dispute throughout church history that Locke confessed ignorance of how the a doctrine had in fact been received. Stillingfleet's exposition was as fallible as another's. Locke could own the doctrine with an implicit faith but no further.[184] Stillingfleet's was a short way to orthodoxy but Locke "thought it

enough to own it as delivered in the scriptures".[185]

> If your Lordship had showed me anything in my book, that contained or implied any opposition in it to any thing revealed in holy writ concerning the Trinity, or any other doctrine contained in the bible, I should have been thereby obliged to your Lordship for freeing me from that mistake.[186]

In noting that Scripture contained 'infallible truth', Locke remarked "And I wish I could say, there were no mysteries in it: I acknowledge there are to me, and I fear always will be..".[187] It had not been his intention "to write any thing against truth, much less against any of the sacred truths contained in the scriptures". [188]

Locke considered that the New Testament contained all the articles of the Christian faith.[189] Hence the 'resurrection of the dead' was an article of faith but the 'manner of the fact' - resurrection of the same body - was not a necessary article: "the apostle [Paul] directly proposed nothing for or against the same body as necessary to be believed".[190] On the Trinity and Incarnation, Locke pointed to the absence from Scripture of the propositions "there are three persons in one nature, or, there are two natures and one person".[191] The person who argued for Scripture containing such propositions was guilty of making "a new scripture in words and propositions, that the Holy Ghost dictated not".[192]

Locke did not wish to question the truth of the above propositions or deny that they could be 'drawn from scripture', but he did want to assert that such propositions were not in Scripture explicitly. The 'safe' way was to 'keep close'[193] to the words of Scripture. From this position he could affirm belief in the Trinity and Incarnation, i.e. in so far as they were delivered in Scripture.

This was as far as Locke was prepared to go in any discussion of these doctrines. His reticence can be variously explained as an expression of his sympathy with Socinian and Deistic interpretations or as evidence of his pragmatic orientation in matters religious and moral which might have made him reluctant to discuss important theoretical

issues.[194] John Yolton writes:

> [For Locke] the Trinity was simply beside the point of the *Essay*. Whether it was a doctrine Locke accepted (it certainly was not a necessary doctrine for being a Christian for him), we cannot tell, since Locke never goes through the Bible to indicate where the revealed truths are, which ones he does accept as revealed.[195]

Locke's silence over matters traditionally considered of fundamental importance was only partly explained in the above ways. The doctrine of the Trinity could never be a fundamental article for Locke because for him the doctrine, at least in its traditional form was, though perhaps true, nevertheless irrelevant. The Trinity was a doctrine inessential for saving faith not because it might not be true but because it was evidence of *just one's own judgement* as to the truth of things. Such judgements might or might not 'reach back' to the truth of God.

What was peculiarly modern in Locke's handling of the fundamental articles tradition was not so much his minimalist statement of faith, but rather his modification of the *nature* of doctrine itself. When he referred to fundamental *doctrines* or *articles* of faith Locke, it seemed, was primarily focussed on the Scripture text which provided the raw materials in which fundamentals could be discerned.[196] The truth given for faith was present primarily in a dispersed form.

From one point of view Scripture already evidenced the reflection of human minds upon 'original' revelation. However, such 'attested revelation' also offered itself for continued reflection. From this point of view it could be likened to a densely textured repository of ideas awaiting sorting and gathering by the reflective component of the human mind. This in fact was exactly what happened as the Scripture 'facts' were ordered, synthesised and complexified. Strictly speaking this constituted a key stage in the formation of doctrinal statements.

It was from this stage that possible candidates for articles of faith arose. The process came to its term in the human judgement in

which judgements were made as to the relative truth value of ideas. For Locke this involved the minimalist claim that Jesus the Messiah was the sufficient confession to make one a Christian. This was a highly inclusivist statement of faith, designed to undercut the strong oppositions generated among competing systems of Christian doctrine, epitomised for example in the Locke - Edwards debate. It was clear from *The Reasonableness of Christianity* that Locke had precisely this kind of system rivalry in mind.[197]

In the *Essay* Locke had already developed a method to deal with the problem of system rivalry. Thus when he came to the question of the content of faith (i.e. what was revealed), Locke was engaged in a movement backwards through the dynamics of religious knowing to the point of origins. Locke's method of religious purification entailed a return to the simplicities of the source. Systems were not purged but simply rendered irrelevant. In this move the complexities that attended the process of doctrinal formation were ignored. This development signalled a retreat from doctrinalization back to that primordial stage in which high probability judgements were possible, i.e. back to the 'given' of Scripture revelation.

This procedure implied a movement towards reality in its most dispersed and unsynthesised form, in the relatively simple ideas given in revelation. Complexities in ideas at this level could be tolerated only to the extent that they were free from the intrusion of the reflective human mind. For, as already observed in the discussion of the epistemology of the *Essay*, the complexification of ideas, their gathering, ordering and the processes of abstracting and generalising that necessarily accompanied such activity, was the result of the power of the mind.[198] Precisely because these operations involved the progressive intrusion of the human mind into the processing of truth, the possibilities for error were greatly increased.[199] Such constructive activity represented 'the *artificial* Draughts of the

Mind'[200] (my italics). Consequently, the product of such operations had to receive great scrutiny when it came to the matter of assigning relative worth to these idea-complexes. In general, greater intrusion of human activity indicated lower degrees of probability.

Locke, it seemed, conceived of doctrines as high level abstractions, the result of the complexification of ideas produced by the constructive mind. From this perspective it was inevitable that the drive to formulation of statements of faith, and the conflicts this produced, would seem unnecessary and puzzling developments, somewhat removed from the truth of revelation in the Scriptures. Doctrine was clearly for Locke an unsafe territory upon which to trespass. The system rivalry of the seventeenth century had left its heritage in blood. Doctrinal formulation simply represented speculative human judgements. For Locke, the uncertainties that attended human judgements and human proneness to error, rendered the traditional doctrinal form unsafe. Furthermore, it could not *add* to what had been revealed in the propositions of Scripture.

The 'attested revelation' of Scripture, though not original revelation, was as safe as could be achieved since it had been authenticated by God. On the supposition that God would not give what could not be understood, whatever ideas were present at the source would be worthy of assent. In this context articles of faith had the character of the *pure particulars* of faith; pure because they were as free as possible from human constructive activity, and particular because they represented those scripture propositions available as candidates for articles of faith.

On this view the doctrine of the Trinity did not require Stillingfleet's particular philosophical categories. Indeed, the doctrine appeared irrelevant for Christianity in any significant sense. By contrast, Locke's fundamental article - that Jesus was the Messiah - was first and foremost simply a 'plain fact', a given of revelation.

This is what the facts of Scripture meant; all the evidence pointed to this conclusion, and this was consonant with a covenant of faith accessible to all.

From the above perspective the question of the *doctrinal* status of the proposition 'Jesus is the Messiah', became problematic. Was Locke's fundamental of the faith a *doctrine*, at least in the traditional sense of the word? Locke's proposal for saving faith was clearly not intended as an abstraction, the speculative product of a theologian or a tradition. The proposition 'Jesus is the Messiah' was intended to evoke a high quality judgement involving trust in God. From the point of view of doctrine *per se*, the statement, Jesus is the Messiah, functioned more like a 'constitutive image', providing raw material in the process of doctrinal formulation.[201]

The particular way in which Locke effected the displacement of Christian doctrine into the region of human judgement was thus responsible for what was probably the most damaging blow to the articles tradition that was theologically possible: it was rendered irrelevant. Locke's thoroughgoing empiricism, his reticence for synthesis and his wariness concerning the human capacity for error, provided the fertile context in which a rationale for the formulation of richly general statements of faith simply disappeared. Christianity's doctrinal structure could not but represent an unnecessary distortion of the covenant of faith.

The tradition of fundamental articles could only survive as it was severed from systems of belief and relocated in the particularities of texts. This was the logic of a view which was unable to grasp doctrine as a concentrated and highly informative medium for communication. The displacement of doctrine from system into text brought into focus a question that had in fact been implicit throughout Locke's reconstructive effort in religion. What was the legitimate task of theology?

Commentary on the Fundamentals: The Paraphrases on St Paul's Epistles

When Locke wrote *A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul*, with its important *Preface* on scripture interpretation,[202] he drew upon his earlier inquires into the fundamental articles of the faith. Already in *The Reasonableness of Christianity* he had argued against those who selectively highlighted various points from Paul's Epistles and made them "fundamental articles of the christian faith, and necessary to salvation...".[203] Such a procedure failed to recognise that in the epistles the fundamental articles, " Are promiscuously and without distinction mixed with other truths, in discourses that were..... only occasional".[204]

Locke considered that the fundamentals of the faith were present in a 'mixed' form in the Epistles as opposed to a clear and unmistakable form in the Gospels. Any attempt to highlight unnaturally the fundamentals of the faith in the Epistles was resisted by Locke. In fact it was precisely the tendency to treat Scripture 'crumbled into verses' as 'independant aphorisms' useful for constructing necessary articles of faith for church membership, that Locke was at pains to counteract.[205] When Scripture was treated in this way it became the occasion for system rivalry and social conflict. This had its origin in a failure to attend rightly to the revelation of Scripture, and indicated a desire to give Divine sanction to human contrivances. Locke's method of Scripture analysis was designed to undercut the fancies of the system addicts and to obtain access to the one original meaning of the text. Such a method would, said Locke, contribute 'to the peace of the church'.[206]

Locke proposed a thoroughgoing contextualizing of the epistle material. It was a way "'to observe and trace out St. Paul's reasonings".[207] Rigorous attention to the 'train' of the author's thought, in which the words received 'a determined sense from their

companions and adjacents',[208] constituted the 'infallible rule' for uncovering the meaning of Scripture. It was a way that Locke hoped would "furnish us with visible grounds, that we are not mistaken".[209] Important here was the repeated reading of the whole of the epistle. In this way the chief aim of the author could be more easily grasped and from this general sense particular themes could be distinguished. This approach to the text protected it from the distortion that resulted from isolating certain ideas in the text, disengaging them from the text, and using them as foundations for doctrinal systems.

Locke thus objected to the fragmentation of the Epistles. He felt that this process had been aided by the custom of chapter and verse; divisions that obscured rather than exposed the sense of the text. This fragmentation provided the conditions for the growth of system rivalry. For Locke it was simple.

> If the holy scriptures were but laid before the eyes of christians, in its connexion and consistency, it would not then be so easy to snatch out a few words, as if they were separate from the rest, to serve a purpose, to which they do not at all belong...[210]

He proposed a way through the system back to the original sense, the 'tendency and force' of which was clear to the first recipients. This method offered a way of uncovering a sense of the 'strength and force' of the text's inner coherence.[211] The implication was that doctrinal systems, confessions or articles of any church, were at best formed by 'extrapolation' from the text,

> Which, however, pretended to be founded on scripture, are visibly the contrivances of men, fallible both in their opinions and interpretations....[212]

In one sense the *Paraphrases* represented the second stage of Locke's portrayal of the reasonableness of Christianity. In terms of the question of the fundamentals of Christianity, what was interesting was the way in which Locke construed the presence of God in revelation and the ideal form of communicating what had been revealed. Locke's theological rationalism controlled the kind of truth to which he had

access and was able to communicate. His empiricist frame of mind kept him locked in the truth in its highly dispersed form, whether in nature or history. The theological form of this empiricism - implicit in *The Reasonableness of Christianity* and explicit in the *Paraphrases* and argument of the *Preface* - operated on the supposition that generalising theological synthesis obscured and distorted what was really present for faith in revelation. Accordingly, for Locke, ideal communication resolved itself into a kind of 'thick description'.[213] In this activity synthesis was eshewed and attention remained in textual detail. Locke seemed to suppose that the text itself had a beauty, force and power which, when presented, would maximise opportunities for faith *of its own accord.*

It is possible to discern in the foregoing the impact on Locke's religious views of a tradition of nominalism or 'particularism' in philosophy.[214] Here everything exists originally in particularity, and the only universal propositions that can give information about the world are inductive generalizations which can never be more than probable. On the other hand propositions can attain certainty but only because they are concerned merely with abstract ideas.[215] This situation resolves itself into a trade-off between informative, interesting though uncertain statements, and statements which are certain but uninformative.

This feature of nominalist philosophy has important consequences when transferred into the region of theological discourse. Here the only task left for theology, to the extent that it is concerned for the truth of things, is to sacrifice general and rich informativeness for concentration upon description of particulars. This can be discerned in Locke's move from system to text. The vocation of theology implodes into textual commentary. A corollary of this is the displacement and disfigurement of the *doctrinal* tradition in Christianity. Such was the fate of the fundamental articles in Locke's handling of the tradition.

PART IV FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES AND ECCLESIOLOGY: The Letters On Toleration

Locke's reconstruction and displacement of the tradition of fundamental articles belonged to his wider concern for the conditions for the formation and endurance of social life.

Conflict and Toleration

Locke's efforts were part of a widespread attempt in Post-Restoration England to find a basis for healthy communal life. His vision was, as one scholar has said, of "a culture of shared religious good intentions".[216] The articles tradition functioned in just this context. The question implicit here was relatively simple: what can we believe together? In other words, given this kind of social vision what was fair concerning the articles tradition in Christianity? In this sense the articles tradition was heavily implicated in Locke's social strategy for a new kind of society. Important here was a rationale for the containment of conflict.

Locke's enquiries into human capabilities in the *Essay* presupposed that a more enlightened understanding of the capacity of humankind for knowledge would encourage a more generous, tolerant and harmonious social life. Human finitude brought with it certain limitations in possibilities for knowledge. Social conflict arose when probabilities were treated as certainties.[217] Locke's investigations had revealed a far more conservative estimate of human capabilities. The overcoming of conflict would occur in direct proportion to the recognition of this fact.

> if we look a little into the dark side, and take a view of *our Ignorance*: which being infinitely larger than our Knowledge, [it] may serve much to the quieting of Disputes....[218]

This negativity was counterbalanced by what appeared to be a rather naively optimistic view of the possibility of human consensus.

> For I am apt to think, that Men, when they come to examine them, find their simple *Ideas* all generally to agree, though in discourse with one another, they perhaps confound one another with different Names. I imagine, that *Men* who abstract their thoughts, and do well examine the *Ideas* of their own Minds, *cannot much differ in thinking*...[219]

In other words, consensus emerged as a consequence of responsible human action. It was founded on the presupposition that God, who could be trusted, gave to people what could be understood. Indeed it was precisely this fact that created the possibility of human discourse with understanding.[220]

In the face of conflict Locke's strategy in matters religious was to propose a highly inclusive form of faith which offered wide parameters for ecclesial loyalty. The necessary articles of faith were few indeed. Their reasonableness was such that the least of persons could not but understand and the highest intellect could not but acquiesce in.[221] Locke's strategy for conflict resolution focussed thus in the concept of 'toleration'. Toleration was the logic of the epistemology of the *Essay*.[222] His proposals on toleration functioned as an important backdrop to his presentation and defence of the reasonableness of Christianity. The wider ecclesial significance of the concept had earlier been articulated by Locke in his *Letters on Toleration*.[223]

In these letters the presenting issue concerned the limits of civil government's control over ecclesial matters of faith and conduct. This long debated issue was focussed for Locke in the legitimacy or otherwise of a magistrate's use of force in religious matters. Although the letters had a European context they had particular significance for an England in which, since 1688, certain limited relaxations in the civil law concerning ecclesial dissent had taken effect.

Central to Locke's thesis concerning toleration was his sharp distinction between civil and religious societies. Political society was "instituted for no other end, but only to secure every mans possession of the things of this life".[224] Religious matters belonged

to an entirely different region; the salvation of souls. This was not the responsibility of the magistrate but of each individual. To this end the 'business of religion' was for "the regulating of men's lives according to the rules of virtue and piety".[225]

Given this sharp division, the limits of civil control over religious life could be quite easily defined. Religious opinions, which were contrary to human society or morality necessary for social preservation, could not be tolerated. Nor could that religion be countenanced "in which those who enter it, do thereby *ipso facto* deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince".[226] Locke instanced the Mahometan who was required to be obedient to the Ottoman emperor. It was not difficult to see the implications this had for Roman Catholicism in England.[227] Finally atheists, who denied the being of God, could not be tolerated. The atheist, theoretically if not practically, destroyed the basis for human social bonds.

The Ecclesial Ideal

It was in this context of the limits of toleration that Locke offered his definition of Church.

> A Church then I take to be a voluntary society of men, joining themselves together of their own accord, in order to the public worshipping of God, in such a manner as they judge acceptable to him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls.[228]

Locke wanted to stress the forming of a Church as an 'absolutely free and spontaneous' event, the result of responsible human action. This provided him with a basis for a democratic view of ecclesial authority and the rejection of force from any quarter. However, this definition offered a highly atomistic portrayal of ecclesial reality. A voluntary assembly of persons was sufficient for his purposes.[229]

The 'chief mark' of the Church was toleration. "I esteem that toleration to be the chief characteristical mark of the true

church".[230] The Church, as God's divine society, had to manifest a life of mutual tolerance. For Locke, tolerance constituted the true social form of the Church, since tolerance was the way by which human beings lived rationally in a probabilistic world.

More specifically, the ways in which tolerance had to be manifest concerned the outward form and rites of worship and the doctrines and articles of faith.[231] In dealing with the latter Locke identified 'practical articles' - those that 'influence the will and manners' - and speculative opinions (which for these purposes Locke equated with articles of faith or religion), which 'terminate simply in the understanding...'.[232]

Locke's point concerning articles of faith was simply that because they had no relation to the civil rights of subjects, magistrates had no authority to enforce belief. "But if truth makes not her way into the understanding by her own light, she will be weaker for any borrowed force violence can add to her".[233] The terms of communion were, in respect of such articles of faith, broad indeed, consisting "in such things, and such things only, as the Holy Spirit has in the Holy Scriptures declared, in express words, to be necessary to salvation...".[234] For a church to insist on any narrower terms of communion based upon human 'inventions' or 'interpretations' raised questions about that church's true ecclesial status for "No man has or can have authority to shut any one out of the church of Christ, for that for which Christ himself will not shut him out of heaven".[235]

Thus, Jesus' prayer for unity in John's Gospel chapter seventeen, did not imply that "all be of one mind in things not necessary to salvation".[236] What was required was an agreement in those "plain simple truths of the gospel necessary to salvation," and "the maintaining of charity and brotherly kindness with the diversity of opinions in other things".[237]

Toleration in this matter was simply the logic of faith, for a

certain knowledge that any church's articles of faith were necessary for salvation could not be had.[238] Within this context church unity was consistent with many divisions which were more apparent than real for,

> those who hold all things necessary to salvation, and add not thereto any thing in doctrine, discipline or worship, inconsistent with salvation, are of the same religion, though divided into different societies or churches, under different forms.[239]

Diversity it seemed was inevitable. The logic of this was tolerance. The danger came from those who insisted on erecting their particular articles into fundamentals necessary for church communion. For Locke this was heresy which, in the case of Protestantism, occurred when separation was made for opinions not contained in the express words of Scripture.[240] Locke followed the custom of identifying schism as a separation made over matters of worship or discipline, i.e. the *agenda* as compared to the *credenda* of the faith.

Locke astutely noted that salvation was most imperilled by "that religion which comes nearest to it, and most resembles it".[241] He had the Church of England in mind. It was, he said, simply an exclusive 'established sect' and had no greater true-church status than the various dissenting churches.[242] Included here were Presbyterians, Independants, Anabaptists, Arminians, Quakers 'and others'.[243]

Locke's ecclesial boundaries were wide indeed. The toleration he proposed presupposed a proliferation of sects. If this situation was nourished with charity and an 'innocency of life',[244] it was far more in accord with the true form of the Church than obtained under an enforced uniformity. The tolerance he proposed was more than a mere passive acceptance. It had more in common with a positive force of reconciliation and was indicative of Locke's positive engagement with social realities.[245] Locke's discussion of toleration had all the hallmarks of a latter day inquiry into Anglican inclusiveness in a church that had ceased to be genuinely inclusive in spite of its national church status. Locke's minimalist statement for an agreed

upon faith represented his attempt to recover the inclusivist ideal.

The Priority and Simplicity of Trust

Locke's development of the concept of toleration presupposed a heavy investment in communal trusts. Locke had written to a friend in 1659, "Men live upon trust..."[246] Faith, it will be recalled, was for Locke a form of trust. It was a trust placed in God whose character was one of absolute trustworthiness. It was precisely for this reason that Locke's scheme could not sanction atheism. The reason was clear,

> Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God; though but even in thought, dissolves all.[247]

The seed bed from which social tolerance grew was mutual trust among humans, a trust which terminated not in themselves but was directed towards and nourished by a trustworthy God who was absolutely faithful to his promises. The ecclesial bond was formed and sustained by a covenant of trust.

For Locke,Christianity was generated and sustained through trust. Furthermore, it was a concept of trust that was active rather than passive. It was focussed in the life of Jesus, his gospel of peace and holiness of conversation.[248] This was given fuller shape in *The Reasonableness of Christianity* where the way of divine revelation in Jesus was a way of purity in life, and conformity to the prophecies.[249] There was a reserve in Jesus about speaking plainly of his Messiahship, even a reserve in the manifestation of the miraculous.[250] To this extent Jesus' life demonstrated not only a trust in God but more particularly a trust in the 'evidence and energy' of those ordinary qualities of human life through which the power of God could be manifest. It was a life in accord with 'the simplicity of the gospel'.[251]

The first apostles showed a 'simple trust' which refused to pry and speculate.[252] There was a precious simplicity to the gospel for

Locke which could only be embraced by a fundamental trust. Thus he could write in *The Reasonableness of Christianity:*

> This ablation of an heart, fixed with dependence on, and affection to him, is the most acceptable tribute we can pay him, the foundation of true devotion, and life of all religion.[253]

To encourage a recapturing of just this kind of religious life was, explained Locke in his *Vindications*, the motive for *The Reasonableness of Christianity*. He had not been "without some hope of doing some service to decaying piety, and mistaken and slandered Christianity".[254] This motive had been at work in Locke's emphasis on the practice of the practical articles of faith as evidence of faithful discipleship. It was too easy to hide behind a profession of speculative opinions whilst indulging in all kinds of immorality.[255]

Locke's point was that religious life ought not to be construed in a narrowly doctrinal sense, but ideally evidenced in the form of godly human life. Justification came by grace through faith, but not apart from a sanctified life.[256] From Locke's perspective a conditional covenant theology brought into focus the importance of ongoing responsible Christian discipleship, in which people were called to entrust themselves to God and to each other.

This central concept of trust was, not surprisingly, implicated in Locke's presentation and defence of the Christian faith and formed an undercurrent to the missionary enterprise. Locke's point in this respect was simple. Christianity did not require any external force, whether from civil quarters or from accompanying miracles,[257] to make its way in the world. Christianity would, by its own 'light and truth', its own 'beauty force and reasonableness', bring conviction of the truth.[258] To resort to external pressures in order to secure profession of faith indicated a lack of trust in the power of the gospel.[259]

The Displacement of Doctrine

For Locke, religious life operated maximally in the region of trust. To this extent his understanding of Christianity was fundamentally located and manifest in the *interpersonal* mode. However the greater part of this Chapter has focussed on the doctrinal or symbolic dimension of Christianity.[260] It is clear that Locke had made an enormously heavy investment in this dimension of Christianity. This effort indicated that Locke remained convinced that believing *per se* was indispensible for the cohesion of the Church and society.

As previously observed, however, the 'what' of belief remained in a highly dispersed form. To this extent Locke significantly restricted the operation of Christianity in its linguistic symbolic form. Unfortunately one of the results of Locke's handling of the articles tradition was that Christianity, as a symbolic structure, became extremely uninteresting and impoverished.

The impoverishment of the symbolic life of Christianity had a wider ecclesial significance. The concept of trust was at the centre of church life. Trusts given and received generated the dynamic and endurance of the ecclesial community. In this context the articles tradition inherited by Locke operated negatively as a generator of conflict. The articles tradition represented a threat to a society's life in Christ. To focus upon articles of faith diverted and hindered concentration upon the true ingredient for healthy inclusive church life. To the extent that a community placed its confidence in the having of particular doctrines, confessions, and fundamental articles, it was guilty of betraying the trusts which formed its real and enduring existence.

The articles tradition, focussed in the drive to formulate what communities regarded as fundamental, was regarded by Locke as a human activity generative of conflict and oppositions. To this extent it was an unworthy focus for a community's life. Articles of faith were

formed by communities. To the extent that such products of communal believing were merely human deeds, subject to the probabilistic judgements of finite and foolish human beings, such deeds could not be allowed to contribute in any significant way to the ordering of church life. From Locke's perspective the only dynamic that he perceived operating here was a negative one. The articles tradition served only to reinforce prejudices and create ill-formed communities. This process had to be resisted.

It was also the case that Locke's devout Protestant spirit would naturally place a high priority upon Christian discipleship nourished from the symbolic dimension of *logos*. Scripture represented the locus of *logos* communication. However, to the extent that the fundamentals of the faith remained immanent in the Scripture, the range over which the symbolic region could operate was restricted. The symbolic dimension of the word could still contribute to the formation and endurance of ecclesial life. But it could now do so in a way which freed a community from the tyranny of an articles tradition manufactured for the purposes of institutional control. Locke's serious attempt to retain a minimalist *public* statement of saving faith resulted in a displacement of the fundamentals tradition. Furthermore, as the ensuing conflicts with Deism and Atheism revealed, it also indirectly authorised free-running theological discourse unsympathetic towards, and consequently unchecked by, the Trinitarianism of the Christian tradition.

Conclusion

In Locke's view a fragmented social life could not be reconstructed by recourse to strictly enforced rules of belief. In one sense Locke was perfectly correct. Too much strain had, in the past, been placed upon the role of doctrine for peace-making purposes. From Locke's perspective the only way the tradition could be rehabilitated

was by a change of its form.

What was lost in this context was the far richer possibilities that doctrine, in its form of fundamental articles, might offer. Locke's theological programme had forfeited any sense that doctrine *per se*, and fundamental articles in particular, were synthetic constructions which concentrated and directed the bond that Christians had in Christ. The implied loss of any intrinsic truth reference in doctrinal statements was symptomatic of the quite changed world in which it was no longer clear how the empirical world - its materiality and forms of communication - was translucent to the Divine. The failure of Locke's effort to reconstruct a fresh correspondence between Divine and human life was manifest in the marginalisation of belief in Locke's treatment of the Christian covenant. The transcendentals of ecclesial life could not, in Locke's account, break through and be manifest at the linguistic level except in a highly dispersed form. Doctrine as a dense, highly informative communication, offering direction and nourishment in Church life, was foreign to Locke. His frame of mind viewed the development of doctrinal forms as the generators of oppositions and boundaries between people; barriers rather than facilitators of communication and strengtheners of communal bonds.

Locke's lack of trust in this regard was partly the result of his rationalistic and empiricist stance, and partly the result of his view of ecclesial conflict and doctrine. What was thus sacrificed was the richness of Christianity *per se*. The ways in which the fullness of truth could be manifest were restricted. His search for a pure form for Christianity entailed the displacement and deformation of Christianity in its doctrinal form. The fate of the fundamental articles tradition was thus sealed.

This consequence was simply evidence of the more fundamental problem that was located at the very outset of this Chapter in the interpretation of the *Essay*: the problem of truth management in

Locke's programme. Human agents, from beginning to end, were truth formers and processors; they were not, for Locke, truth formed. The theological form of this development was no where more clearly evident than in the puzzle that doctrine, and in particular the doctrine of the Trinity, presented for Locke. Locke's empiricist rationalist frame of mind had no adequate means to affirm the presence of God in a world shorn of its natural sacramentality and seemingly devoid of intrinsic meaning. The Trinitarian life of God in the world which constituted the inner dynamic of the fundamental articles of faith in the Christian tradition had, in Locke's statement of the faith, receded from view.[261]

CHAPTER SIX

THE RESTORATION OF THE TRADITION:

Daniel Waterland's Defence of Fundamental Articles

Introduction

John Locke's reinterpretation of the fundamental articles resulted in significant deformation of the tradition. Moreover, as John Yolton has carefully argued, Lockean thought provided the backdrop for the defence of the Christian faith in the eighteenth century against the rising tide of Deism and Atheism.[1] Among the defenders of orthodoxy there was a strong and able band of theologians who sought a synthesis between the received tradition and the new thought of the day. Samuel Clarke (1675-1729) was perhaps the most prominent and able exponent of this mediating tradition.[2]

There were, however, other important yet more traditionalist approaches to restating the faith. As an example, this Chapter focuses on the Anglican divine, Daniel Waterland (1683-1740). A recent study by Robert Holtby provides a useful introduction to the thought of Waterland in its eighteenth century context.[3] Holtby noted in his Preface that Waterland gained a reputation as 'the leading orthodox champion' of the first half of the eighteenth century. This reputation seemed to be enhanced with the passing years.[4] Gerald Cragg described Waterland as an 'able rather than a distinguished' reaffirmer of Anglicanism.[5] More recently Perry Butler has referred to him as an 'outstanding exponent of Classical orthodoxy' in the battle against eighteenth century Deism.[6]

Waterland's defence of the faith offered another response, quite different from Locke's, to the displacement of a sacramental understanding of the universe in late seventeenth century thought. It was replaced by a mechanistic conception of the universe in which God's relation to the world had undergone serious restriction.

Waterland responsed to this emerging context by a vigorous reassertion of a universe sacramentally understood, where materiality in its variety of forms (including language) mediated God's presence.

For Waterland, defending the fundamental articles of Christianity involved a retrieval and reassertion of the ancient apostolic faith in the face of challenges deemed to corrupt that 'received' tradition. His defensive strategy was dominated by a drive to recapture the purity of the orthodox system. This approach was developed through extensive polemical writings on Christology and the doctrine of the Trinity. These efforts were crystalised towards the end of his life in an important "Discourse of Fundamentals".[7] This work drew upon earlier discussions of the subject and developed them in terms of a covenantal understanding of Christianity.

Underpinning Waterland's apologetic was a strong realism of the Word in which God's reality as *logos* was given in the form of speech. This *logos* authorized and empowered human words. In the context of a tight mechanistic world view, where God functioned as the imposer and guarantor of order, the communication of the *logos* appeared as law-like normative rules. The Divine word was Divine law to be responded to in a manner befitting the law of God. Fundamentals of covenantal Christianity represented laws for belief, worship and morals. These fundamentals were sanctioned by God, issued in Scripture, confirmed by tradition, conformable with reason, indicies of ecclesial purity and important means for determining terms of communion. Implicit in the above framework was a view of theology as essentially repetition of a pre-established harmony of Divine law.

This was reflected in Waterland's recommendation of highly objectified statements of the faith. The witness of the fundamental articles tradition to *logos* reality was distorted. In this respect consideration of Waterland's handling of the tradition of fundamental articles in Anglicanism provides a means to examine the dynamics of

failure implicit in any *restorative* theological programme which attempts to purify belief by strong re-statement of what the fundamentals of faith are thought to have been.

This study of Waterland is of more than purely historical interest. Where there is uncertainty and conflict concerning the nature and viability of the Christian faith, as in the late twentieth century, the way of orthodoxy implicit in the 'School of Waterland' continues to exert a beguiling appeal both within Anglicanism and across the denominations of the ecclesial spectrum.[8]

This case study proceeds in two parts. Part One considers Waterland's attempt to counter the weakening of Trinitarianism in the early eighteenth century. Waterland's perception of the threat to Christianity and his responsive strategy are important here. This is developed in terms of the intensity, scope and ecclesiological significance of the theological drift into undifferentiated monotheism. Part One provides the basis for a more critical analysis in Part Two of Waterland's attempt to re-state the fundamentals of the faith in terms of covenantal Christianity.

PART 1 TRADITION THREATENED: The Drift into Undifferentiated Monotheism

Waterland's apology for Christianity was developed in relation to a challenge to the fundamental articles of the Christian faith. This threatened corruption of the faith operated as a kind of theological *drift* in which a movement could be discerned from the Trinitarianism of the Christian tradition into the region of generality; a movement from quite determinate construals of the presence and action of God to rather more diffuse and abstracted notions. Waterland's response to the dissolution of belief is examined in terms of the intensity, scope and ecclesial significance of the threat to the fundamental articles of Trinitarian faith.

Intensity of the Threat to Faith: From Arianism to Atheism

The Arian Form

From Waterland's point of view the threat to Christianity was evidenced in a theological drift characterised by a progressive corruption of the articles of the faith. A theological spectrum emerged in which the loss of the fullness and purity of the primitive, catholic and apostolic faith was manifest embryonically in an incipient Arian form. Arianism gave way to Socinianism, itself a prelude to a more thoroughgoing Deism. In Waterland's view, Deism was not far short of either a complete profanation of sacred truth in Atheism or its radical alternative, the embracing of highly superstitious religious forms, of which 'Popery' was but one dangerous example.

This gradual but inevitable loss of the particular form of the Christian tradition represented, for Waterland, one consequence of a highly rationalistic age deeply suspicious of the long held mysteries of the faith. Unease with the idea of mystery nourished a desacralizing process which had a theological form. Waterland captured the 'snowballing' effect of this in a 1731 "Charge to the Clergy":

> We live in a disputing age, and *infidelity* has been long growing upon us. It began with exploding *mysteries* in general, and from thence proceeded to a denial of our Lord's *divinity* in particular. Low notions of the person of Christ are apt to bring in low notions of his *merit* and *satisfaction*, and of the use and value of the Christian *sacraments*, which represent and apply them. And when faith in Christ's blood is once deprecated or frustrated, it is natural to set up *works*, not only as the conditional, but as the *efficacious*, or even *meritorious* cause of salvation. The next step is to exalt morality in opposition to faith, and mere morality in opposition to *instituted* religion; which again prepares the way for looking upon all *revealed* religion as needless or *useless*, which comes to the same thing with denying its truth, because an all-wise God can do nothing in *vain*. [9]

What began as a failure to attend rightly to the person of Christ led to a more general corruption which passed through a number of phases involving a progressive loss of Christianity's Trinitarian form of belief. The undifferentiated monotheism of Deism was, in Waterland's view, simply a form of practical Atheism. Disputation over

the fundamental articles of Christianity would eventually lead to a practical, if not theoretical rejection, of the Christian system.

> Such is the connection or gradation of error, when once men desert the rules of reason and sobriety, to follow their own wanderings; such the obvious and easy descent from disputing the *essentials* of revealed religion, to denying the *whole*.[10]

The matter was of more than merely theoretical concern. In Waterland's view, correct belief was vital for correct religious practice. Good religious practice depended on a prior knowledge of God. Furthermore, "the perfection of that practice depends upon the perfection of such knowledge".[11] This being the case,

> A general and confused notion of God may produce as general and confused rules of demeanour towards him; while a more particular and explicit apprehension of the Deity will of course produce a more particular and explicit service. [12]

The disappearance of a Trinitarian form of belief would become clearly evident in a failure to live a godly human life. Given this lineage of Atheism it was not surprising that Waterland expended such great effort in countering what he regarded as the early forerunners of infidelity. The theological drift had to be met and excised in its Arian form.

The argument with Arianism was focussed upon Christology. The point at issue between Arians and Catholics concerned the consubstantiality and eternity of God the Son with the Father[13]. In attributing a creaturely status to Christ, Arianism could not but fail to affirm the 'received' and Scriptural doctrine of the Trinity. Furthermore, the exponents of Arianism appeared muddled.

> The reason of it is this; they take a kind of middle way between Catholics and Socinians, which admits of so great a latitude, that they know not what to fix ..... the Arians supposing him [Christ] a creature at large, and not knowing the several degrees of perfection on this side *infinite*, are always in uncertainty; not being able to determine how much or how little it may be proper to ascribe to the Son of God: and hence it is that they could never unite together in any one fixed and certain set of principles....."[14]

In the early stage of drift there was thus a kind of passing in and out of orthodoxy. In this oscillation a theological blurring occurred which revealed itself in a wrong view of Scripture and a

misunderstanding of primitive tradition in respect of fundamentals. Thus the testimonies of the ancients were respected, but insofar as such testimonies functioned as 'bare *illustrations*' the Arians, said Waterland, 'sink the value of *antiquity*'.[15]

In Waterland's view Arianism came nearest the truth and thus it presented the greatest danger to the received tradition. The appearance of truth in Arianism lent to this corruption a theological respectability such that it could appear 'open and barefaced'.[16]

Waterland, however, was quite clear. The development of the doctrine of Christ along anti-Trinitarian principles identified Arianism as a form of Polytheism. He described this as 'practical Atheism', since it did, by implication, though perhaps not in intention, ascribe worship to two supreme Gods.[17]

The Socinian Form

Arianism represented the first stage in the dissolution of orthodoxy. Waterland recognised that, especially in regard to someone like Samuel Clarke, the initial divisive explorations over the article of the Trinity were not necessarily inconsistent with 'truth and godliness at heart'.[18] Nevertheless, the initial 'false step' eventually led to a 'deluge of infidelity'. For Waterland it was plain enough: "Arianism is but the dupe to *Deism*, as Deism again is to *Atheism*, or *Popery*".[19]

Socinianism represented a second phase of the drift into Deism and beyond. In one sense it enshrined the last vestiges of Trinitarian belief. The Socinian corruption had its immediate origins in the sixteenth century with one Socinus. The Socinians, dissatisfied with the rationale of the 'catholic' doctrine of the Trinity, and convinced of the unscriptural Arian position, developed a doctrine of Christ as mere man.[20] Thus Socinus understood the Johannine reference to the Word as applying to a '*real*' person, the man Christ Jesus. This had,

in Waterland's view, a semblance of truth, but it failed to affirm the fullness of Christ's divinity. In so distancing God the Father from the man Christ Jesus, the early Socinians were guilty to an even greater degree than the Arians of 'practical Ditheism'.[21]

Waterland noted that modern Socinianism had developed along the lines of the ancient Sabellian heresy where the *Logos* or Word spoken of by St. John was denied "to be any real or substantial thing, distinct from the Person of God the Father".[22] Although this Sabellian construction appeared 'more ingenious and plausible' it proved fatal to the Socinian cause for it signified, from Waterland's perspective, an irretrievable breach in the unity of the Godhead. The logic of this was the rejection of the worship of Christ: "the natural and inevitable consequence of his [Socinus'] scheme, if one would act consistently: and the next consequence to that was *Deism* or *Atheism*".[23] This was, said Waterland, the result of a scheme which operated "upon a *false* principle, that *human imagination* is the measure of *divine truths*".[24]

The Deistic Form

The final phase of the drift into unbelief included both Deism and Atheism and was categorized generally by Waterland as 'infidelity'. Waterland located the roots of modern Deism in the middle of the sixteenth century, though in fact he observed strong parallels between Epicurean philosophy and modern exponents of infidelity, notably Hobbes and Spinoza.[25] Waterland recognised some differentiation in the degrees of infidelity. Thus whilst the Deists did not directly deny the being of a God:

> they did it *consequentially*, or that they did as effectually undermine and destroy all the *influences* of religion, as if they had been professed Atheists...."[26]

Deism thus represented a form of practical Atheism:

> What *Atheism* chiefly aims at, is to sit loose from *present* restraints and *future* reckonings: and those two purposes may be competently served by *Deism*, which is but a more refined kind of *Atheism*.[27]

Between the 'broadest Atheism' and the 'most refined system of Deism' there were various possibilities; Pantheism and 'Hobbism' were 'scandalously bad', 'Fatalism' was little better.[28] The drift into Atheism was nourished by false notions of the character of the Deity, identifying God as either 'universal nature' or a 'kind of Epicurean Deity',

> tied up from interposing at all by *miracles*, and from issuing out any *positive* laws, and from making any rule or order in things *indifferent* here, and from doing *exemplary* justice upon sinners hereafter, for such his vindictive *justice* is profanely miscalled or misconstrued spite, wrath, malice, revenge, tyranny, and the like.[29]

Thus, according to Waterland, the failures in modern Deism to give scope for the 'interposing of miracle', for the issuing of positive laws, and for the provision of a system of reward and punishment were symptomatic of the progressive removal of the presence of God from nature, history and human affairs. Waterland considered that the term 'Christian Deist' merely signified the embracing of a quite particular form of Monotheism identified as Trinitarianism. Those within Christianity who rejected this particular 'traditional' religion, but yet professed to believe in God, could not legitimately claim the epithet *Christian*.[30]

This drift into generalities in belief signalled not only a retreat from revealed religion but also a corruption of natural religion. As Waterland conceived it, revealed religion was the perfection of natural religion.[31] The most perfect systems of natural religion (considered abstractly, apart from revealed religion) were one with revealed religion in certain basic presuppositions. Natural religion found its logical outcome in revealed religion. In this way Deism represented a corruption of genuine natural religion. Deism extolled morality but, devoid of the foundation of faith, this claim was spurious: virtue or morality was simultaneously 'complimented' and 'starved' since it was given 'little or nothing to subsist upon'.[32]

The drift from Trinitarianism into undifferentiated Monotheism gained in intensity from mild Arianism through shades of Socinianism into Deistic forms. This movement entailed a progressive rejection of received revelation and an undermining of the moral order. The outcome was practical Atheism.

Diagnosis of Drift: Infidelity to the Pre-established Consensus

In Waterland's view these developments were the inevitable consequence of forsaking the received faith of the community.[33] This had its first stirrings in division over the article of the Trinity. Such divisions arose out of excessive deference to the reasoning abilities of individuals to the detriment of the received wisdom. This predilection for individual fancy failed to take adequate account of the fact that:

> Truth is of wide extent, and is all over uniform and consistent: and it may require *many eyes* to look out, and search round, that every position advanced may agree with all truths, natural and revealed, and that no heterogeneous mixture be admitted to deform and deface the whole system.[34]

Waterland identified the 'many eyes' with antiquity. In subtle ways the particular authority of the primitive tradition had been forfeited in the early stages of the drift. This trend had intensified resulting in an eventual usurping of traditional faith under the pretext of human reason. Dislocation from the received tradition resulted in a 'freewheeling' human subjectivity which authorized both profanity and superstition. The two had the same root.[35]

The slightest movement from the established mean of orthodoxy would, in Waterland's view, eventually result in a frenzied movement in many opposing and forever changing positions. Thus mild Arianism and developed Deism shared the same characteristic of a refusal of any certain scheme or adherence to one common invariable rule. Adrift from the established faith, the inevitable result was an "*independent, personal various* religion, according as every man may fancy".[36] What

resulted was a new belief system which was highly unfocussed in terms of the received tradition. Waterland astutely noted that Atheists:

> are great *believers* in their way .... It cannot be pretended that they believe *less* than we, since our creeds *reversed* (which usually make theirs) are as long creeds as before; like as traversing the same ground backwards measures the same number of paces.....[37]

It seemed that loss of religious belief was replaced by a complex belief structure derived from nothing more than the profundities of indulgent human fancy. The difference between infidelity and true religion did not concern *quantity* but *quality* of faith.

The logic of this move entailed the refusal of all external authorities. For various social and practical reasons this did not occur in practice.[38] However the emptiness of Deistic generalities opened up two possible alternatives: either the development of various forms of superstition or the complete loss of theistic belief. The progressive surrender of the particularities of Christianity did not destroy belief *per se* but rather increased the possibility of believing anything. Thus, from Waterland's stance, the 'superstition of Popery' was as plausible as Atheism.[39]

The loss of purity of belief was evident in corruption by *defect* but it could also lead to heightened religious superstition, i.e. corruption by *excess*. In this latter category Waterland located 'Antinomian' and 'Solifidian' tendencies. These tendencies essentially concerned aberrations *within* the received tradition. This happened when, for instance, certain 'moderns' reduced the meaning of regeneration to something entirely inward.[40] In the context of church life, the preaching of such a doctrine by the over zealous was dangerous to church structure, and spiritual and moral life. Practical Christianity was thereby distorted.[41]

From Waterland's perspective any movement off the mean would, if persisted in and developed, lead to extremes. From this point of view corruptions by defect and excess both represented the danger of

'enthusiasm' in its differing forms:

> There may be an *irreligious* phrensy, as well as a *religious* one; and the imagination may be as soon heated with a spirit of *profaneness*, as with the fervours of *piety*.[42]

At the root of both movements was what Waterland approvingly quoted from another writer as 'a certain *blind and irrational impetus*'.[43] Thus any movement off the mean represented the operation of an irrational principle, under the guise of 'reason' in respect of Deism, and 'faith' in the case of religious enthusiasm.[44] Both involved the exaltation of the human imagination as an authority in matters human and Divine. In both cases the foundations of true piety were destroyed.[45] In the light of Waterland's depiction of 'true and sound religion' as 'The due mean between the two extremes',[46] it was clear that a retrieval of the fundamentals of the faith would involve a restatement of 'the due mean'.

Countering the Drift: Apology for 'The Golden Mean'

Waterland located the mean of orthodox belief at the midpoint between two opposite extremes. These extremes were corruptions to be refused in favour of a fixed and pre-established mid-position. Waterland conceived of a *simple* mean, neither achieved *beyond* opposites which were absorbed and negated in the process, nor *an original synthesis* out of which contraries arose, nor a mean achieved in the perpetual oscillation between extremes.[47] To be at the mean was to be at the stable and correct position.[48]

Movement off the mean was not a movement of the mean to a different place on the spectrum bounded by the extremes. Rather, any such move represented a change in the actual structure of the mean's configuration. On this account any attempt to develop or state 'the Golden mean' in an 'unconventional' manner would, if not checked, lead to a negation of the mean in favour of an extreme position.[49] Within this context corruption was always deviation from the mean; it involved

a distancing from the received tradition. There was little scope in this conception for communication between competing conceptions of orthodoxy. Waterland perceived only one kind of option available; response by reassertion of the tradition.

The Superiority of the Catholic System

In Waterland's mind orthodoxy had only one form, it presupposed certain principles, and achieved certain goals. Although there were three schemes, Arian, Socinian and Catholic, only the third truly and purely represented the 'middle way' of orthodoxy. The Catholic scheme presupposed one true interpretation of Bible and tradition in essential matters. This interpretation was the 'received' one and included the Catholic language of the early creeds. This Catholic system was qualitatively different from other rival systems.[50] It operated upon Trinitarian principles in Scripture, interpreted according to the consensus of the primitive Church and focussed in the ancient Nicene and Athanasian creeds.[51]

Coupled with these positive principles of orthodoxy went a number of negative principles of an anti-metaphysical kind. Waterland, in the spirit of his age, was suspicious of speculative metaphysics and was critical of the Scholastics. Their wanderings from Scriptural and primitive Christianity into metaphysics had encouraged the development of Arian and Socinian corruptions.[52] Undue deference to metaphysical speculations provided the fertile soil upon which anti-Trinitarian principles could germinate. Waterland conceded that it was in the region of metaphysics that the 'middle way' appeared most vulnerable. He was confident, however, that opponents would not be able to demonstrate that the 'middle way' was *not* possible.[53]

In Waterland's view, the Catholic system offered consistency and completeness. Maintaining this required strict fidelity to the 'middle way'. This was achieved as interpretation of Scripture according to

Trinitarian principles and primitive teaching in matters essential was rigorously adhered to. In this way a path through the intellectual puzzles of Sabellianism and Tritheism could be plotted and heresy avoided. The finished wholeness of the Catholic system had another concomitant feature; whatever aberrations of orthodox belief arose had already been dealt with or could be dealt with in terms of the existing stable orthodox system. [54]

For Waterland, orthodoxy was something that had been hammered out already. Now it was simply a question of re-presenting a previously established formula for faith. The earlier consensus in fundamentals had been secured upon good evidence. This included the testimony of Scripture, the consent and confirmation of the early Church, and the agreement of reason. In this way Waterland deployed the authority of the rationalist appeal to evidences and testimony in his recommendation of established orthodoxy.

Extent of the Threat to Faith: The Doctrine of the Trinity and Sacraments

Not surprisingly the intensity of the drift into undifferentiated monotheism manifested itself over a whole range of Church teachings. The movement towards generalities in religion was thus to be discerned *intensively* and *extensively*. The threat to Christianity was present at the centre of Church teaching in regard to the doctrine of the Trinity. It could also be traced in relation to sacramental theology and was finally to be observed in the disintegration of the entire fabric of the Christian covenant regarding faith, worship and morals. The threat thus penetrated to the core and permeated throughout Christian belief and practice. Fundamental doctrine was imperilled and to this extent *what was fundamental in any doctrine was also at risk*. Waterland was thus obliged to speak about a whole range of matters relevant to the preservation of the Catholic system.

In relation to the core doctrine of the Christian faith, the doctrine of the Trinity, Waterland inquired into its *nature* and *status*. His early works relating to Arianism and his *Vindications of The Divinity of Christ* concerned the nature of the doctrine.[55] His later work, *The Importance of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, focussed on the status of the doctrine.[56]

The Nature of the Doctrine of the Trinity

Controversy over the Trinity involved long and tedious arguments over the correct Scriptural doctrine of the Trinity. Waterland drew the lines of the debate between the Catholic interpretation and other systems which in various ways had their roots in an Arian devaluing of the divinity of Christ. This presupposed the existence of various rival systems embroiled in a conflict. Important in Waterland's defence of the Trinity was the priority he gave to system verification. He pursued this offensively by mapping out a number of theological difficulties that the opposers of the Catholic position were duty bound to address and resolve.[57] Waterland's defence of his position was woven into this essentially offensive strategy.

These concerns were crystallized by Waterland at the end of his *Second Defence Of Some Queries*, wherein he noted that the controversy over the Trinity "may easily be brought to a short issue, and be comprised in two sheets of paper".[58] The 'received' doctrine was verifiable on two counts, one negative and the other positive. Thus, as to the possibility of the doctrine, Waterland concluded: "Upon the whole, since the doctrine can never be proved to be impossible; it must be allowed to be possible".[59] In relation to the 'nature of the thing' the received doctrine could not be demonstrated with any certainty to be contradictory to reason. Positively, Waterland argued that Scripture and antiquity clearly gave evidence of the truth of the received doctrine. The balance of probabilities remained on the side of

the tradition. Strictly speaking this was the 'reasonable' conclusion.

The Catholic interpretation secured the 'mean' of orthodoxy and thereby straddled the orthodox way over against Sabellian and Tritheistic distortions.[60] The logic of this position meant that Church communion could be refused to those who did not embrace the received doctrine. One way to avoid this outcome was to adopt the strategy developed by the Dutch Remonstrant theologian Episcopus (1583-1643) and his disciple Limborch(1633-1712), of distinguishing between the truth of the doctrine and its *importance.*[61] Whilst not wishing to deny that such a distinction in doctrine was legitimate, Waterland perceived that, in the context of the above argument, this distinction was simply another way of blurring the divide between pure and impure belief and thus furthering the cause of Deism.

The Status of the Doctrine of the Trinity

Conflict over the Trinity thus shifted to the question of its status. The question was clear. What makes a revealed truth fundamental ? However, Waterland's approach, of dealing with the *chief objections* to this doctrine's status as a fundamental of the faith, gave little scope for a positive reply to the question. Waterland devoted his energies to a rebuttal of the objections;

> That the received doctrine of the Trinity is not *clear* enough to be admitted for a fundamental. That it is merely *speculative*, or however, not *practical* enough to be important. That it is not sufficiently insisted upon in scripture, as of *necessity* to salvation.[62]

In response to the first objection Waterland argued that, at the 'general level', the Trinitarian mystery was clearly 'conceived' and believed, even by common Christians. However he noted that, "even mysterious doctrines have a *bright* side, as well as a *dark* one; and they are *clear* to look upon, though too deep to be *seen through*".[63] The right Trinitarian faith was 'short and plain':

> Any plain man may easily conceive, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are properly *divine*, are not one the other, and yet are *one*

> God, by an intimate union; and that the Son in particular, being God and man, is *one Christ*.[64]

In Waterland's view, to believe this about God was, it seemed, to hold to the article of the Trinity "in its native simplicity, as laid down in scripture".[65] Indeed Scripture, "in its plain, natural, obvious, unforced meaning, says it, and reason does not gainsay it: upon these two pillars our cause rests".[66] It was only when false metaphysics intruded into Scripture interpretation that the clarity of Scripture as to the doctrine of the Trinity was obscured.

To counter the charge of the doctrine's speculative nature Waterland argued that the doctrine of the Trinity was, "strictly PRACTICAL *and closely interwoven with the Principles of The Christian life*".[67] Finally as to the question of scriptural significance, Waterland suggested that,

> if the truth of a doctrine be fully and plainly taught in *Scripture*, and it appears from the nature and quality of the doctrine itself, that it is *important*, and that much depends upon it, then scripture has by *plain consequence* declared the *necessity* of believing such doctrine, by declaring its truth.[68]

The importance of any doctrine was not to be judged merely from express declarations of it in Scripture but also from the nature and quality of the doctrine itself, its relation to other parts of revealed religion, and the dangers of refusing it. The witness of antiquity, the form of the ancient creeds, the baptism formularies, and the words of Christ himself gave a cumulative force to argument about the importance of a doctrine.[69]

A more positive rationale for the status of the doctrine was touched on by Waterland only in an oblique manner. In this respect he proposed that the status of a doctrine depended upon its significance for the *vitals* of Christianity. Waterland was fairly confident that this relation could, in general, be recognised, though he was equally certain that a complete catalogue of fundamentals could not be given.[70] Fundamental doctrines had the function of preserving the 'Gospel' faith 'whole and entire'.[71] In this way fundamentals would be those truths

connected with 'the whole economy of man's *salvation* by Christ'.[72]

On other occasions Waterland indicated his reasons for the high status he accorded the Trinitarian doctrine in the hierarchy of belief. He pointed to the importance of the doctrine for directing, determining, and energizing all aspects of Christian worship and practice.[73] The doctrine was described as foundational, necessarily involving and securing other important doctrines, e.g. doctrines of the atonement and of grace.[74]

Mistakes in the doctrine of the Trinity affected 'the very form and essence of Christianity' such that the 'very life and soul of it' were lost.[75] This was inevitable given Waterland's view that the doctrine 'runs through every part of Christian theology' giving it 'a new force and spirit'.[76] He suggested that insofar as the doctrine was "interwoven with the very frame and texture of the Christian religion",[77] it provided the rationale for the whole scheme and economy of redemption. The object of this scheme was to bring humankind into 'an acquaintance' with the divine Trinity. As such the doctrine belonged to the 'the very life and spirit' of Christianity.[78]

Trinitarian Formalization

Waterland's suspicion that the 'moderns' had actually lost sight of the object of faith itself fuelled his antagonism to new ways of communicating the faith. The only option he saw available was restatement of the received tradition. Implicit in Waterland's representation of the faith was an isomorphic correspondence between the doctrine of the Trinity and the reality it referred to. To depart from the particular received form was to risk loss of the reality itself.[79] He noted that the technical terms introduced into the history of the Trinitarian controversy were in fact only 'names' and 'terms'.[80] Even if such 'conventions' were dispensed with it would not, in his view, damage the reality of the doctrine itself. It was, after all, there

before the technical language emerged. Nevertheless, one result of Waterland's development of a tight one-to-one correspondence between language and reality was that retrieval and repetition of traditional Trinitarian language was proposed as the only means of satisfying the demand for purity in the faith.

The problem in Waterland's approach became evident in his failure to develop a sustained positive argument for the doctrine of the Trinity. He spoke rather generally of grading belief in relation to the 'vitals' of Christianity. What remained unclarified was the way in which the 'vitals' of Christianity were apprehended, came to form and directed Church life.

At one level this failure was the result of the domination in Waterland's apologetic of defensive manoeuvres. What was lacking was a positive recommendation of Trinitarianism. In this respect Samuel Taylor Coleridge, a later critical admirer of Waterland, discerned his failure "to present the *Idea* itself of the great Doctrine".[81] For Coleridge this failure raised a suspicion that the Trinitarian reality "was never in its cloudless Unity present to him".[82] Coleridge found support for his view in Waterland's tendency to treat the doctrine of the Trinity simply as

> a peculiarity of positive Religion which is to be cleared of all *contradiction* to Reason, and then, thus *negatively* qualified, to be actually received by an act of the mere Will.[83]

Coleridge's perceptive comments suggest that Waterland's vigorous advocacy of the doctrine of the Trinity was in fact subsumed within a dominant monarchial doctrine of God. This problem reappears in the consideration of Waterland's development of the fundamentals of the Christian covenant in Part Two of this Chapter.

Sacramental Theology

The loss of a distinctly Trinitarian form of belief in central matters of faith would inevitably lead, in Waterland's view, to a loss of what was fundamental in other doctrines. There was in his mind an appropriate Trinitarian form of belief which should be evident throughout the theological system. Waterland's extensive writings on sacramental theology reflect this view.[84]

Waterland's desire to talk about sacraments was motivated by his concern to reinstate the sacramental ordinances as fundamental to the operation of the Christian covenant. He discerned a general devaluing of the sacramental ordinances. It could be detected among those divines who, out of a desire to commend a life of moral virtue, espoused an 'instrumentalist' view of sacraments. Thus Samuel Clarke, while recognizing sacraments as being generally necessary to salvation, maintained that they were simply means to an end - the life of virtue and godliness.[85] This instrumentalist view could, in Waterland's opinion, only quicken the demise of sacraments altogether and provide ammunition for less well intentioned religious thinkers to complete the logic of this view and dispense with sacraments altogether.[86] Instrumentalism was not only reductive theology, it also led to the disintegration of the covenant. In its Socinian form it operated to undermine the very thing sought, morality itself.[87]

Waterland's apologetic for the covenant sacraments was undergirded by the supposition that sacramental theology functioned as a barometer of a right holding to the God of the Christian covenant. This meant that the health of the fundamental articles of the faith would be manifest in sacramental theology and that dangers to the tradition would also emerge there.

It was in this context that Waterland became embroiled in controversy over the Eucharist. This occurred initially at a more general level in a critique of Samuel Clarke's instrumentalist

sacramental theology. Later Waterland refuted Bengamine Hoadley's Socinian view of the Eucharist. Later still he responded to the views espoused by Thomas Brett and John Johnson on the nature of sacrifice and sacrament.[88] In these controversies Waterland sought to restore a richer sacramental theology as a counter to the perceived distortions of his opponents.

Instrumentalism Rebutted

Against Clarke's instrumentalism, in which sacraments as 'positive institutions' were subordinated to 'moral duties', Waterland argued for an integrated position in which sacraments, as 'super-added' positive duties, perfected all moral duties. Waterland considered that the distinction between positive and moral duties was purely notional. Sacraments were not merely means to virtue but, as an 'exercise' of one's love of God under the Gospel dispensation - "sometimes the noblest and best exercise of it" [89] - the sacraments possessed (in the worthy participant) virtue in themselves as "part of our moral and Christian holiness, piety, and perfection".[90] As such, moral virtue in Clarke's sense was "but the handmaid leading to the door of salvation, which the *use* of the *sacraments* at length opens, and lets us in".[91] Similarly, sacraments could be understood as 'additional' improvements to virtuous practice by 'augmenting' them and thus, "rendering them saving by the application of Christ's all sufficient expiation to them".[92] Accordingly, the Christian Sacraments (Baptism and Eucharist) were to be regarded "as Divine ordinances, and as the springs of the spiritual life, productive of moral virtues, and perfective of them".[93]

Review of the Eucharist

In an attempt to recover a more balanced view of sacraments Waterland developed a eucharistic theology informed throughout by what might be called 'a qualified realism' appropriate to his central

churchmanship.[94] He argued against an incipient reductionism and an 'objectivist' realism in sacramental theology. Advocates of the former group, to a lesser or greater degree, "exclude God, as it were out of the sacraments..." and "reduce all to a bare human performance".[95] This resulted in a barren and ineffectual symbolism; the sign was retained, the 'thing itself' was lost.[96] This socinian view of the sacraments, typified for Waterland in the doctrine of the Eucharist espoused by Bengamine Hoadley, was countered by Waterland's stronger focus on the derivation of the sacramental character of the Eucharist from the Divine goodness.[97]

The Socinian depreciation of the sacramental character of the Eucharist resulted in an impoverished understanding of sacraments and their function in Christianity. Over against Socinian views which restricted the eucharistic anamnesis to a merely commemorative human act, Waterland fleshed out a far richer notion in which, following the early church apologist Justin Martyn, he referred to the Eucharist as an 'emblem' of the incarnate *logos*.[98] The sacraments generally, and in particular the elements of bread and wine, operated in a representative and 'exhibitive' manner in relation to the thing signified. Drawing upon Hooker, Waterland appealed to a legal analogy;

> A *deed* of *conveyance*, or any like *instrument* under hand and seal, is not a *real* estate, but it *conveys* one; and it is in *effect* the estate itself, as the estate goes along with it; and as the *right, title,* and *property* (which are *real* acquirements) are, as it were, bound up in it, and subsists by it.[99]

The merits of the analogy aside, it was clear that Waterland's 'figurative' expressions were designed to recover a more adequate theology of symbol wherein "some *real thing* is in *just construction* and *certain effect* allowed to be *another thing*".[100]

In this context 'commemoration' became a participation in the benefits of the passion of Christ.[101] 'Feeding' in the Eucharist was of a spiritual kind, in contrast to the Romanist's stress on sacramental feeding.[102] Furthermore, against the Socinians, such spiritual feeding

was not to be understood in a narrow way, i.e. as 'declarative', of receiving Christ's 'doctrine and promises'.[103] Rather, it was generative of a 'mystical union',[104] in which one fed upon the death and passion of Christ.[105] In this 'feeding' benefits were received including 'remission of sins' and 'sanctifying grace'.[106]

Waterland's sacramental realism was, as already indicated, a *qualified* realism. Communion and reception of the spiritual presence of Christ and his benefits presupposed "the worthy use of the sacred symbols".[107] The qualified nature of his eucharistic realism was most apparent in his rebuttals of the more thoroughgoing objectivism of the Roman variety and in a different Protestant form typified by Thomas Brett and John Johnson.[108] In this respect Waterland referred to consecration as conferring a 'relative' holiness on the elements, "on account of their *relation* to what they represent, or point to".[109]

In his consideration of the sacrificial dimension of the Eucharist Waterland argued against the notion of 'material sacrifice' and attempted to recover the language of sacrifice in Protestantism by reference to the Eucharist as a 'spiritual sacrifice'.[110] In this regard Cudworth's earlier espousal of the Eucharist as 'a feast upon a sacrifice' was taken up:

> The Eucharist, considered as a *Sacrament* is indeed representative and exhibitive of the *archetypal sacrifice*; not as *offered* but as *feasted upon* by us, *given* and *applied* by God and Christ to every *worthy* receiver.[111]

Sacraments and Fundamentals Issues

As in the doctrine of God so in sacramental theology Waterland sought pure and correct statements which avoided the dangers of reductionism (sacramental profanation) and superstition. What was at stake was the character and status of sacraments in Christianity. A deeper theological undercurrent here was the problem of Christianity's mediate forms. Deprecation of sacramental theory and practice was

symptomatic of a more generally diminished sense of God's presence in the world. Waterland's qualified sacramental realism, which presupposed a return to a mean position, was an attempt to recover what had been lost in this regard. For Waterland, a right grasp of the fundamentals of the faith would be clearly manifest in the area of sacramental theology and practice. Discourses on the sacraments became for him the arena upon which fundamentals issues were resolved.

In Waterland's view, those suspicious of the plausibility of the 'middle way' of orthodox Trinitarian doctrine would naturally be suspicious of the construction of a sacramental theology which was sufficiently rich in its inclusiveness but exclusive of the extremes.[112] From another point of view the rejection of 'the Golden mean' of orthodoxy was, in Waterland's mind, simply the logic of a Trinitarian reductionism which was moralistic and anti-symbolic in matters religious.

For Waterland the matter was simple: the eucharistic mean was derived from a correct conception of the Trinitarian mean:

> The view is, that the life and soul, as it were, of the Eucharistical *remembrance*, lies in the due consideration of the Divine dignity of the Person whose passion we there remember.[113]

Here, orthodoxy in the doctrine of Christ had to be reflected in the doctrine of eucharistic anamnesis. Furthermore, this matter could not be resolved at a general level for all parties were in agreement that the Eucharist was a remembrance. This foundational principle had to be teased out in the 'superstructure' of meaning.[114] What was fundamental in eucharistic theology could only be achieved through an extensive unravelling of the articles tradition in its sacramental form. The implication was that wholeness in orthodox belief could only be recaptured through attention to particulars.[115]

Slight changes in the core doctrinal areas would have far reaching changes in the dimension of sacramental practice, e.g. preparation for and obligation to attend communion.[116] In Waterland's view, a right

holding to the fundamentals of the faith would be evident in correct sacramental theology and practice.

Waterland's defensive strategy was evident in his tendency to offer smooth renderings of Patristic material (e.g. on eucharistic sacrifice) and in his somewhat restricted focus on the Eucharist in relation to a medieval preoccupation with the passion.[117] This defensive frame of mind was particularly highlighted in his development of sacraments as boundary markers or 'scaffolding' supporting the fundamental articles of the Christian system.

In a Clergy Charge on "The Doctrinal Use of The Christian Sacraments", Waterland examined the use of the sacraments for confirming the Christian faith and its 'prime articles'.[118] At a general level Waterland referred to the sacraments as, "standing monuments of the *truth* of Christianity against Atheists, Deists, Jews, Turks, Pagans and all kinds of infidels".[119] He examined the way in which, down through history, the sacraments had functioned as '*fences* or *barriers*' of the 'most essential articles' of Christianity:

> The doctrine of the *visible* creation by God most high: the doctrine of our *redemption* by Christ, both *God* and *man*: the doctrine of sanctifying *grace* by the *Holy Spirit* of God, a *real* Person, and also *Divine*: the doctrines of *original sin*, and of our Lord's *meritorious* sacrifice, and of a *future resurrection* of the body: these, and as many others as are contained in *these*, have all been eminently preserved and held up by the Christian Sacraments.[120]

Accordingly, such 'sacred deposites' (sacraments) had to be preserved for, said Waterland, " Christianity itself appears to be so entirely wrapped up in them, that, humanly speaking, it must unavoidably stand or fall with them".[121]

Thus, in Waterland's theology, the sacraments functioned in a twofold way. Firstly, as a means for performing the covenant. To this extent they had their own place within the logic of the system. Secondly, they represented the logic of the entire system in a concentrated symbolic form, through which the articles tradition could be preserved, its purity monitored and the threat of drift into

undifferentiated monotheism rebutted.

The Ecclesiological View: Preserving the Boundaries of the Church

The fate of the articles tradition had important consequences for Waterland's treatment of certain ecclesiological matters concerning the stability and firmness of institutional Christianity. In particular, Waterland was concerned with the problem of clearly delineating the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable Church belief.

Blurring of Boundaries: *The Case of Arian Subscription*

Despite the relative lack of any self-conscious reflection on ecclesiology *per se*, it is clear that Waterland's perception of the threat to the Church had to do with the twin problems of *boundary disintegration* and *maintenance*. Disintegration began initially as a 'blurring' within the tradition. Waterland's early discourse on *Arian Subscription*[122] is instructive in this respect. Ostensibly the matter concerned the propriety or otherwise of Samuel Clarke's proposal that clerical assent could be accorded to the 'Public forms' of the Church (including creeds, Articles and liturgy) "whenever he [a cleric] can in any sense at all reconcile them with scripture".[123]

Waterland considered that the introduction of an ambiguity here was a ploy to justify subscription by those of an Arian persuasion. The issue was thus a moral one, "not of the fundamentals of faith, but of the principles of moral honesty".[124] Waterland exposed the fraudulent nature of subscription in this 'new scheme' which disregarded the meaning of the public forms as originally intended by compilers and imposers in the light of the sixth *Article of Religion*.

Waterland stressed that subscription was not "a term of lay-communion but rather of ministerial responsibility",[125] a matter of 'Church Trusts' not 'Church Communion', of 'not-admitting' to ministerial responsibility as opposed to 'ejecting' from ecclesiastial

communion.[126] The subscription issue was, in Waterland's mind, primarily a question of the *inner purity* of Church life. Church teachers should be morally responsible to lead the 'common folk' in the way of orthodoxy 'in the fundamentals of Christianity'.[127]

Subscription in what Waterland regarded as the Arian sense was, he felt, a way of smuggling heretical notions concerning the doctrine of the Trinity into the Church in an improper way. The subscription issue became the focus for dispute over the doctrine of the Trinity. In this context there was simply no room for ambiguity in assent. What was at stake was "the honour of our most holy religion, and the security of Church and State....".[128]

The subscription issue presented itself as one of purity concerning ministerial responsibility, however the more critical issue concerned the maintenance of the Church's institutional structures. This was inevitable given the view that, "The Doctrine of a co-eternal Trinity is really a fundamental Article, and such as our Church declares to be necessary to salvation".[129] This view later led Waterland to conclude in *The Importance of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, that Church communion ought to be refused to those who 'openly rejected' the fundamental doctrines of Christianity.[130]

The subscription issue had presented itself as an issue of inner ecclesial purity. Given Waterland's concern for securing institutional stability by strict clerical adherence to official formularies it was inevitable that the blurring in acceptable belief *within* a church would quickly develop into a more thoroughgoing problem of disintegration of the boundaries between true and false Church belief. The supposition was that boundaries operated as mechanisms for separating and dividing.

The fundamental articles tradition was implicated quite directly in this insofar as the 'public forms' enshrined the fundamentals of the faith. Ambiguity in assent was but the first step in the

disintegration of that faith. The demands of Church purity and unity, insofar as they were shaped by law-like conceptions of a Covenantal God, required subscription to certain fixed formulas of assent. Failure to achieve uniformity here would undermine any attempt to maintain boundaries for the Church.

Boundary Maintenance: The Value of Covenant Sacraments

As 'standing monuments' to the faith, covenant sacraments preservered the 'prime articles' of the Christian system. Thus, in the matter of Baptism, Waterland considered that confusion over Church discipline occurred when the doctrines of justification and regeneration were misunderstood. This was implied in Waterland's discourse on *Regeneration.*[131] He noted how the practice of infant baptism was brought into disrepute by those who urged people already baptised in infancy, to be born anew or to become regenerated.[132] Such teaching, often born of a passionate enthusiasm, could easily lead the people astray into a preoccupation with inward feelings and promptings, which were the forerunner of all kinds of strong delusions.[133]

Good sacramental practice indicated right holding to the fundamentals of the faith. Confusion over entry rites (Baptism) and rites of endurance (Eucharist) in the Church, blurred boundaries and destabilized the institution. Correct sacramental doctrine secured and preserved Church order and clarified the limits of acceptable belief and practice.

Institutional Stability: Fundamentals as Covenant Securities

The significance of the articles tradition as Church boundary markers was nowhere more clearly evident than in Waterland's "Discourse of Fundamentals". In this "Discourse" Waterland sought clarification of the terms of communion in response to the sense of confusion arising from the influence of Deism.[134] In this context the fundamental

articles functioned as symbols of purity and danger. To hold to them in belief and practice was to remain within the covenant. To depart from the received tradition was to move into the region of danger and risk crossing the border into unchurch. Covenant law spelt out expectations for belief, worship and morals in a comprehensive manner. The boundary, for purposes of determining matters of church communion, was sharply defined.

PART II THE FUNDAMENTALS RESTORED: The Nature of the Christian Covenant

This Chapter has focussed on the fundamental articles tradition as it was implicated in Waterland's particular response to threatened ecclesial existence. This threat was observed to be intense, wide ranging, and important ecclesiologically. Waterland's response indicated just how much discussion of fundamentals was developed in terms of oppositions. Increasing vigour in denial of orthodoxy generated stronger reassertion of the 'received' tradition. In this way of handling controversy the form of the fundamental articles tradition was derived from and determined by a theological dialectic which presupposed strong system conflict.

The Form of the Fundamental Articles System

The Presupposition: System Rivalry

By the time Waterland wrote the 'system' concept had been adopted and developed by the European intellectual world. From the second half of the seventeenth century 'system',

> came to be construed as a particular approach to a certain subject - a particular theory or doctrine about it as articulated in an organized complex of concordant hypothesis, a *nexus veritatum*.[135]

The use of the term 'system' in relation to complexes of competing doctrines provided the necessary background for the development of

system rivalry. Though this exposed the term to controversy and left it open to disrepute there is no doubt that the employment of the concept in precisely the above manner was central to Waterland's theological enterprise. His primary concern was with 'the whole system of the Christian religion',[136] though of course the nature of this system worked for the well being 'of the whole rational system'.[137] In confuting the Deist Waterland could refer to Christianity as "the best and only complete system of morality that ever the world was blessed with..."[138]

Waterland wrote within an environment dominated by a multiplicity of systems both within Christianity (e.g. Arian, Socinian, Calvinist, Roman) and without (e.g. Pantheism, Atheism). Each system operated according to its own principles. The situation was one of contest[139] in which there could only be one winner. Different ideas unravelled into opposite systems.[140] System rivalry was the presupposition of theological polemic.

The lengthy Trinitarian controversy was resolved into a contest involving three systems; the Socinian, the Arian and the Catholic or ancient system. Waterland's particular task was to defend the Catholic system as the only one and true system.[141] Notwithstanding its heritage in Scripture and antiquity, it was a scheme superior to others by virtue of its simplicity, consistency and completeness.[142] Other rival systems were spurious, being the fabrications of the human imagination adrift from Scripture, tradition and right reason. In short, the Catholic system, i.e. traditional orthodoxy, was simply the received one. Others were newly created.[143]

System Structure: Covenant fundamentals

The orthodox system had a particular structure and it was precisely in Waterland's attempt to identify the system's structural components - that which gave it its own particular shape and

significance in contrast to other systems - that the appeal to the fundamental articles tradition came into focus.[144] The system structure was expressed in terms of Christianity's fundamental articles. Drawing upon an earlier definition, Waterland defined a fundamental doctrine as

> a doctrine as is in strict sense of the essence of Christianity, without which the whole building and superstructure must fall; the belief of which is necessary to the very being of Christianity ....[145]

Waterland appeared to import considerable confusion into this definition when he elsewhere referred to fundamentals in 'religion or Christianity' as matters "so necessary to its being, or at least to its well-being, that it could not subsist, or maintain itself tolerably without it".[146] This attribution of 'existence' and 'perfection' in the same definition of fundamentals was interpeted a century later by William Palmer as evidence of the problem of ambiguity and contradiction in fundamentals discussion.[147] For Waterland, the central issue was one of identifying 'the essentials of the Christian *fabric* or system'.[148] Elsewhere he had noted that an article's fundamentality could be guaged,

> according as it more or less affects the whole system of the Christian religion, (as there is a difference between the main *beams* and the *rafters* in a building), or as it is more or less connected with the two great commandments, the *love of God*, and the *love of our neighbour*.[149]

Accordingly, in "A Discourse of Fundamentals" Waterland, following in large measure the learned German Lutheran Samuel Pufendorf (1632-94), developed the Christian system in terms of those fundamentals constitutive of the Christian covenant. For Waterland those doctrines and practices "intrinsical or essential to the Christian covenant are fundamental truths, and such as are plainly and directly subversive of it are fundamental errors".[150]

Covenant requirements included: two parties (a divine founder and a respondent capable of being freely covenanted with); the agreement as

evidenced in sacred Scripture; a Divine mediator (Jesus Christ, very God and very man) through whose meritorious sacrifice, atonement and justification were achieved; covenant conditions, including repentance and a holy life; means to covenant fulfillment, including the two sacraments and the assistance of the Holy Spirit (in this context the co-eternal Trinity was deemed a fundamental doctrine); and finally, sanctions to bind the covenant, including the fundamental doctrines of a future state, resurrection, final judgement, heaven and hell.

Insofar as this Christian Covenant was the one true system, it was axiomatic that it included those components necessary for its being *and* its perfection. A distinction here would threaten the completeness and consistency of the system, a consideration ignored by Palmer in his critique of Waterland's view. The designation 'non-fundamentals' or 'extra-fundamentals' referred to those matters to do with faith, worship and morality *extraneous* to the covenant.[151]

The covenant motif was not only important in its own right, it also had high pragmatic value in providing a rather neat scheme within which the conventional doctrines of orthodoxy could be ordered and the message of redemption presented. In this scheme the doctrine of the Trinity was accorded a consequential position in the hierarchy of belief. This was rather odd considering the great energy Waterland had expended in defence of the doctrine. In terms of the logic of the covenant, it was invoked as an implicate of belief in the Holy Spirit who provided the means for covenantal obedience. This may have simply reflected a particular way of ordering articles within a covenantal approach to Christianity. However, the fact that the doctrine of the Trinity had been dislocated from initial statements identifying the need for a covenanting God, betrayed what was earlier referred to as an implicit monarchialism in Waterland's doctrine of God.[152]

Waterland's rule for determining fundamentals had affinities with other ways of resolving the question of fundamental articles. To

resolve an article's fundamentality according to its relation "with the general and comprehensive article of *salvation* by Christ", or in terms of those doctrines necessary to God's love towards humankind and appropriate response to that love, or in terms of the "necessary connection which it has with the acts and functions of *Christian life*", were different ways of securing the same thing.[153]

A complete catalogue of fundamental articles was neither required nor practical in respect of particular individuals.[154] It seemed that the urge to quantify was born of the desire to develop a system structure adequate for distinguishing pure from impure belief systems. In this context what was important was firstly fixing a rule for determining the true form of Christianity and secondly, applying the rule for the stating of the faith.

Certain rules for determining fundamentals were faulty because they could not spawn a genuine and complete Christian system. Waterland, in the second half of the "Discourse", identified ten such faulty rules: the definition of the churches, either primitive or Roman; the appeal to all Scripture truths; Scripture truths expressly taught; or Scripture truths expressly declared necessary; the rule of the Apostles' Creed; the appeal to the first two verses of Hebrews Chapter Six; Locke's rule of belief that Jesus is the Messiah; universality of agreement among Christians; Herbert of Cherbury's rule of universality of agreement of the whole of mankind; and finally the rule that comprised fundamentals into the single article of the good life. All such rules were, in Waterland's view, faulty either by excess or defect. The application of such rules created significant system distortion.

The matter was of more than theoretical importance. It had direct implications for the resolution of the terms of communion. Communion could be legitimately refused to those who did not hold to the fundamental articles of the faith that secured the covenant system. The

fundamental articles tradition was thus directly implicated with the identification of the boundaries between various rival systems. The Christian system, in its particular structure of fundamental doctrines, monitored the limits of inclusiveness in the Church. As such the articles tradition functioned as the theological guardian of the vitals of faith, morals and worship of the Christian covenant. The fundamental articles were the doctrinal symbols of purity and danger.

In the history of fundamentals discussion Waterland's "Discourse" ranks as one of the most able and systematic treatments of the problem by an Anglican theologian.[155] The general question of the truth and purity in faith, a question which had been discussed earlier by Laud, Chillingworth, Stillingfleet and others in relation to the Church of Rome and questions of infallibility, had now been developed by Waterland in response to major challenges to fundamental beliefs hitherto accepted by most parties in controversy.[156] Waterland's reflections were strengthened by his wide learning and intimate acquaintance with the history of the discussion among Continental Protestants as well as those of the Church of England.

The "Discourse" drew together in a concentrated form the important theological work of his career. Indeed, from the perspective of the "Discourse", Waterland's writings on the Trinity and sacraments represented his own efforts to develop in more extended and particular ways arguments for the truth and importance of the orthodox system and its structure. In the light of the "Discourse" it was clear that Waterland's aim had been to demonstrate the superiority of the Christian system and to justify its fundamental articles.

Waterland's Maximalism in Stating the Faith

Waterland's discussion of fundamental articles identified him firmly as a maximiser of the tradition, particularly for example, in relation to the latitudinarian position espoused by John Locke.

Covenant requirements were quite extensive and specific, no doubt to counter point-for-point (so to speak) threats to the system. Significantly too, fundamentals discussion had been focussed entirely upon those things necessary for church communion. Waterland considered that the varying capacities of individuals made it impossible *to fix a rule* for determining necessary belief, let alone *specifying a list* of required beliefs.

He had asserted, however, that "Fundamentals in their *abstract* view are of a fixed determined nature as much as Christianity itself is, and may be ascertained by plain unalterable rules".[157] This signified a heavy investment in clarifying correct belief and practice commensurate with institutional loyalty. Though even here Waterland, following Chillingworth and certain Continental Protestants, argued that it was

> not necessary to exhibit any complete *catalogue* either of fundamental truths or errors: it is sufficient that we have a *certain* rule to conduct by, whenever any question arises about church communion, heresy, schism, or the like.[158]

From an increasing plethora of rules for fundamentals, Waterland had identified what he felt provided 'a certain rule' for resolving fundamentals in the present and future. One implication was that the question of fundamental belief was an open-ended matter. Waterland's handling of the issue also suggested that those 'verities *essential* to the life of Christianity', were variable upwards in a *cumulative* fashion. This implicit maximalist position was, perhaps, the reason why Waterland counselled for caution in deciding whether an article 'be fundamental or otherwise'.

Waterland's scheme of covenant fundamentals had been developed in an effort to expunge the Church of the contamination of faith associated with the drift into undifferentiated monotheism. This purification process was largely prosecuted in terms of negativities. It was a matter of exposing the faults in arguments critical of the tradition and of clearing the ground for the reassertion of what the

faith was thought to have been. What was reasserted was conventional orthodoxy in a comprehensive and quite particular form. The covenant motif provided an important strategy by which this could be achieved. Divine law was positive and non-negotiable. Obedience was the appropriate response. The covenant system, and by implication the fundamental articles tradition, operated as those means for the communication of Waterland's objectified and static conception of Divine reality. This larger framework generated some significant distortions for theological discourse generally and in consequence for Waterland's handling of the tradition of fundamental articles. This Chapter concludes with a brief assessment of the quality of Waterland's system of fundamental belief.

System Quality: Further Assessments

Purity and Contingency

To secure the system against the intrusion of impurities and distortions Waterland's programme involved two key manoeuvres. Firstly, the eighteenth century debate was systematically relocated into another age.[159] The modern enemies were none other than the Arians and Sabellians of the fourth century. By a selective use of the past and an appeal to the uncontroverted fact that the Arians of the fourth century were heretical, it was not difficult to unravel the outcome of the eighteenth century Trinitarian controversies in terms of the victory of the orthodox system. This greatly simplified the resolution of conflict. But it involved smooth renderings of certain patristic evidence, neat solutions for diversity,[160] and disregard for the different historical contexts involved. Indeed the supposition was that the system operated at a *meta-historical level* and as such it could easily be transferred and adapted to any particular historical context.

Secondly, Waterland's apologetic entailed a particular view of how

'systems' operate. Michael Polanyi has argued that stable systems necessarily operate with an inherent circularity. Successive threats to the system are dealt with one at a time. On each occasion a challenge is contextualised by a much wider implicit framework of belief.[161] As each assertion in the system is in turn doubted and consequently confirmed by circularity, the refutation of each consecutive doubt results in strengthening the fundamental convictions in the system. In this way challenges are internalised and resolved within the existing system.

Related to this is a second aspect of stable systems by which the system is able to supply from its reserves successive elaborations of the system which are able to cover all conceivable contingencies. Both circularity and self-expansion are mechanisms that protect an existing system from threats. Both are complemented by the power of a stable system to deny to any rival conception the basis of its attack. These three aspects of a stable system are measures of its completeness but they are also measures of its closedness.

Waterland's manner of argument evidenced the above features. Threats to the system were dealt with one at a time. The early writings on the Trinity and Christology involved long and tedious attention to certain theological queries, with each one being examined, defended and opposing views rebutted. The result was the vindication of the system which in consequence appeared to be stronger for the controversy.[162] The method suited an apologetic designed to negate threats.

In *Christianity Vindicated against Infidelity*, Waterland countered the Deists' retreat to a natural religion shorn of its specifically Christian revelation. He developed an argument refined from the early apologists which proposed,

> that the Gentile world, before Christ came, had, at sundry times, and in divers manners, some beams of Divine light sent them from above, to help the dimness of the light of nature.[163]

In this way the ground was cut from under infidelity which could not prove that 'natural light' was not informed by Divine revelation.[164] In this case the system was able to cope with threat by drawing upon its own reserves to assimilate and thus defeat the counter proposal. The assumption was that communication between systems was impossible. Each system was exclusivist.[165]

Waterland's theological programme presupposed an *enclosed non-contingent system.* This was the price of stability. The transferability of the system to any period of time - its great virtue for Waterland - also meant that the system was unable to respond to contingency. The system was stable but potentially quite redundant.

Options in a Closed System

This system redundancy was evident in Waterland's apologetic as a problem of theological *repetition.* The fundamental articles tradition appeared locked in a system which could only operate by repeating itself. Some of the more particular features of this have already been identified: location of the richness of the faith at a 'mean' position given in its finishedness in a past epoch; the securing of this 'mean' by retrieval of a particular complex of faith language; a tight hierarchical system of belief unable to admit internal change, and a fundamentally defensive theological stance with a high focus on ecclesial boundary maintenance.

To the extent that theological repetition was a product of an enclosed, non-contingent system, it was quite clear that the contingent and surprising novelty of history could not interact with the articles tradition. The force of this potentially damaging criticism was irrelevant given the basic presupposition of the system; that nothing genuinely new and surprising could arise in relation to the fundamentals of the faith. Every conceivable contingency had already been covered, at least potentially.[166] Furthermore, novelty

itself was a witness against the truth.[167] Similarly, what often appeared as new was simply 'an old exploded speculation'.[168] To introduce linguistic innovations was *ipso facto* to reduce the faith.[169] The danger was that new ideas would be smuggled in under cover of old terms.[170]

This perspective greatly enhanced the status of the past which, in Waterland's case, was focussed on the first three centuries of Christian antiquity.[171] The supposition was that those ages closest to the source of revelation were the 'purest and best', the safest and most reliable.[172] Due reverence for the tradition protected one from endorsing arbitrary human opinions.[173] After all, Christianity was an *ancient* 'fact'.[174]

Orthodoxy Reasserted: The Reductivist Trap

The reassertive drive in Waterland's theology generated repetitive discourse. The problem was, however, that Waterland's apology for orthodoxy was hammered out in a particular context that could not fail to alter the nature of his apologetic.

A Lockean rationalism provided the new background for eighteenth century theology. This generated in Waterland's discourse an uneasy alliance between the demands of the new rationalism and the claims of the received tradition. Waterland eschewed metaphysical speculations which only produced conflict.[175] Heretics had their origins here, and used metaphysics to avoid Scripture and 'facts'. [176] The Bible, said Waterland, "is our best metaphysics".[177]

Yet it was more correctly a 'false metaphysics' that Waterland wished to denounce.[178] Furthermore, his theology was indebted to a Lockean rationalism that deferred to 'evidences', weighed probabilities, and criticised opponents for their inability to provide 'demonstrable proofs'. For Waterland faith ideally ought to depend on evidences[179] and 'ultimately was built upon reason'.[180]

Waterland's rationalism was repeatedly slanted in a conservative direction. Reason shone best where the ancient consensus prevailed.[181] Reason, when truly allowed to have its sway, would direct one to the truth as manifest in Scripture and confirmed by antiquity. The result was a rationalism tempered by the force of the tradition or, from another point of view, traditional orthodoxy rationalised.

Waterland's repetition of the tradition was not and could not be a pure and clean repetition. To defend the articles of the faith he was necessarily led into what he regarded as the enemy territory of rationalist theology. The danger was that this new context would simply be 'smuggled in' to Waterland's system and remain for the most part undetected. The tradition was open to distortions from within and, given the nature of the system structure and its presuppositions (completeness, consistency, exclusivism), there was no way by which the system could be purified of alien elements.

The 'received' tradition became, under the impact of the new rationalism, even more tightly secured, rigid and alienated from historical contingency. This was the result of a theology highly focussed on defence, preservation and security. In this context a subtle reversal occurred methodologically, contrary to faith's best instincts. The dynamic between the bond of believers with Christ and the tradition that expressed this bond was short-circuited: a one-way dynamic emerged in which the tradition formed faith but was no longer capable of being *faith-formed.*

To the extent that Waterland's apologetic was funded by a conception of a simple *logos* - i.e. a static finished form - it was axiomatic that successful re-statement of the faith could only be achieved as theology distanced itself from contingency. The latter's contribution had to be minimalised. What resulted was a 'repetitive' mode of discourse which, as earlier suggested, was ultimately derived from a monarchial understanding of Divine reality which was in constant

danger of displacing the truth of God as Trinity.[182]

The particular way in which Waterland attempted to retrieve the fullness of the articles tradition ended up producing a conservative form of theological reductionism. Funding this reduction was a conception of reality in which God's action and presence was restricted to that of a giver of laws and a rewarder of obediential responses. In Waterland's case this stimulus-response framework was mediated through Christianity's covenant structure.

Ideological Motivations

In the light of the foregoing the motivation for Waterland's drive for purity of belief requires further consideration. In a context in which institutional cohesion was threatened by the disintegration of a pre-established orthodox consensus the desire for simple solutions had a powerful and beguiling appeal upon those responsible for the management of the Church. For a Church under threat and somewhat confused in areas quite central to its life the thrust towards simplicities was hard to resist. Against a background threat of an incipient subjectivizing of belief the desire for firm external authority structures was one way of keeping a control and check on institutional loyalty. The crisis in authority had to be dealt with cleanly and simply.

This appeal to simplicity was implicit in some of Waterland's theological manoeuvres already identified: the relocation of the conflict into another period; smooth renderings of historical materials; the subtle blending of Patristic and Scripture traditions; and the vigorous way in which the stability of the theological system was maintained. These manoeuvres were designed to ensure an easy, natural and ready assent to the conventional forms of the faith. In this way conflict could be more easily managed. Church loyalties could be relatively easily determined by reference to certain self-evident

articles held in a particular way, i.e. according to the assumed unambiguous consensus of antiquity.

When the fundamental articles tradition was implicated in the above way in the resolution of conflict, some potentially very unhealthy forms of church life could emerge. To identify the wholeness of the faith with the 'mean' of the received tradition implied a highly inclusive theological position: what was proposed for belief was what had hitherto been universally consented to as constituting the fundamentals of the Catholic faith. When this inclusivist ecclesiology was identified with a particular national church, in which uniformity and institutional loyalty had high focus, conditions emerged for the development of even tighter controls upon beliefs, and more intense oppositional and exclusivist ways of engaging in theological controversy.

The Dissenting churches of Waterland's period were the most obvious victims for, as Waterland remarked, they "have no unlawful terms of communion imposed".[183] There was nothing new in this attitude. It was the logic of a particular view of a national church. It was, however, a view which was unable to make sense of the ecclesial status of other communions on the same soil. John Locke had earlier felt the force of this exclusivist ecclesiology, remarking that the Established Church was nothing more than an 'Established National Sect'.[184]

Waterland was faced not so much by traditional inter-church rivalry, as by the threat of widespread collapse of belief. In response he transferred an exclusivist church mentality into the region of competing belief systems. This did not render the more traditional divisions irrelevant but it did widen the scope for the application of exclusivist principles to newly emerging ecclesial groupings sprouting *within* established communions. This strategy was underpinned by what appeared to be a highly *inclusivist* construal of the fundamental articles tradition. However, a communion bonded by a universal and pure

faith could easily mask both an inflated sectarianism and an inability to respond to a burgeoning multiformity in religious belief. In this context, to state the fundamentals of the faith was to re-state and thus confirm the status quo.

Conclusion

Waterland's theological vision was limited by his conception of the task before him, orthodoxy by reassertion. An adequate statement of the truth of faith required something more than simply *defence* of its fundamental *articles*. A century later Samuel Taylor Coleridge perceptively remarked of both George Bull and Daniel Waterland;

> if the clear free intuition of the Truth had led them to the Article [of the Trinity], and not the Article to *the defence* of it as not proved to be *false*, how different would have been the result! Now we only feel the inconsistency of Arianism not the Truth of the doctrine attached.[185]

In Coleridge's view such a negative defence of the truth of Christianity arose

> Because that great Truth, in which is contained all treasures and all possible knowledge was still *opake* even to Bull and Waterland - because the *Idea* itself - that *Idea idearum*, the one substratum Truth which is the Form, *Measure*, and involvement of all Truths, was never present to them in its entireness, Unity, and transparency.[186]

The opacity of the doctrine arose, in Coleridge's view, because of Waterland's misunderstanding of the idea of the Trinity. For Waterland the Trinity was a conception 'above' comprehension rather than an idea "contra-distinguished from 'conceptions', as not properly above Comprehension, as alien from it".[187]

Waterland's suspicions regarding the crisis of Christianity were sharp, even prophetic. His solution, however, was impotent to counter the rising tide of unbelief. In his restatement of the fundamental articles tradition theology ran into an extremely dangerous dead end. In this respect Waterland exposed his debt to Lockean rationalism which sought clear and distinct ideas developed in terms of the categories 'above', 'according to' or 'contrary to' reason. What was sacrificed

was a wider notion of reason itself as the faculty through which the Trinity was not so much *comprehended* as *apprehended.*[185]

Locke's quasi-mechanistic physiology of the understanding had reduced everything to stimulus and response. From Waterland's perspective the stimulus or input was God's law-like communication of truth. Correspondence to this kind of communication had its theological form in Waterland's objectified *logos* realism. The dangerous rigidity and over-formalization this introduced into the fundamental articles tradition emerged in Waterland's development of Christianity's covenant system.

Waterland's attempt to restore the integrity of orthodox belief only confirmed the impact of a new naturalist metaphysic which had few resources if any for the affirmation of the sacredness of the world by virtue of God's presence and action. Theologically it was not sufficient to indulge in strong statement of the faith on the supposition that all the necessary resources for such an effort could be gleaned from the tradition as such. In a sense this enterprise merely met rationalism on its own terms, the difference being that now the appeal to reason, evidences, and authorities was directed to the vindication of the tradition. More particularly, this approach gave warrant for the view that the God of faith was located *in* the tradition. Implied here was an answer to the problem of knowing where and how to look for God in the world.

Waterland's effort drew out his own strengths as a scholar of the Christian tradition but also made it clear that a *restorative* theological programme could not generate theological renewal. This latter development would require a move through the tradition to the Trinitarian reality that funded it. The renewal of fundamental belief required a move from articles of faith to faith's own fundament. It is in this context that Daniel Waterland gives way to the mysticism of the High Church Anglican William Law.

CHAPTER SEVEN

FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES RENEWED:
The Mystical Theology Of William Law

Introduction

Daniel Waterland's attempt to restate orthodoxy exposed the barren nature of much of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century controversy between deist and divine.[1] This was evident in the manner of disputation over the doctrine of the Trinity. Here argument appeared to proceed on the basis that this doctrine was peculiar or special to Christianity and as such constituted the divide between deism and orthodoxy.[2] Presupposed here was "the sterile confrontation of natural and revealed religion".[3]

The problem was not so much that there might be *other* doctrinal differences between the two groups, but rather that the method of debate presupposed an atomising of the truths of revelation and a consequent dislocation of the articles of faith from other dimensions of Christian life. This development can be discerned in the early seventeenth century Anglican handling of the fundamental articles tradition.[4] By the end of the century such developments became symptomatic of deeper rifts between God and the world and between divine and human life. The inherited symbols of the Christian tradition had become opaque.[5] A universe understood sacramentally, in which it was supposed that nature, history and human life mediated God's presence had, in the course of seventeenth century developments in science and natural philosophy, given way to tight mechanistic conceptions of the universe.[6] Important in this latter development was the attempt to provide very general and simplified explanations of things, and eliminate unpredictability. Here, as shown in the study of Locke, the dimension of the transcendent receded from view. A sharp division in reality between the natural and supernatural was the logic

of such a development.[7]

The tendency to compartmentalise and isolate doctrines pertaining to natural religion, as distinct from supernatural revelation, seriously undermined the inner coherence and dynamic of Christian theology.[8] Waterland had struggled unsuccessfully to restore this. Atomisation of the articles of faith and their disengagement from wider Christian life could be overcome only by a theological renewal won through a fresh reintegration and harmonisation of doctrine in relation to Christian discipleship. This would necessarily have to include those elements of religious experience - "those, namely, which involve an acknowledgement of paradox, even of irrationality at the heart of things, certainly of transcendence or 'otherness'; of God not merely as deified Reason but as *mysterium tremendum*"[9] - which eighteenth century Deism had ignored. From another point of view, what was required was an alternative way of holding and stating belief that would prove adequate to a re-animated and enlarged vision of godly human life.

William Law's Response

The response of the eighteenth century Anglican divine William Law - non-juror, moralist and mystic (1686-1761) - to this situation, was particularly interesting for the way he wove together a renewed stress on the redemptive activity of God immanent in the world, a moral rigour derived from an evangelical call to holiness of life, and a sense of wonder as the human response to God as 'All Love'.

Law's renewed concentration upon God as 'soul-presence', vivifying interior human life and generating human capacity for love and obedience in the moral sphere, constituted a powerful response to the crisis of orthodoxy in early enlightenment thought.[10] In this respect Law's theology exemplified what Jaroslav Pelikan has called 'the affectional transposition of doctrine'.[11] In Law's case this eventually expressed itself in a form of ecclesial mysticism. In this

sense Law's mature theological position represented a radical development of his inherited High Church tradition. In Law's case this represented a move *into* rather than *out of* the tradition. Its radical nature arose from the sheer intensity of the move. Accordingly, Law's theology represents an interesting example of how the strong theological realism traditionally presupposed in the operation of the fundamental articles tradition might be realised.

Waterland's treatment of the articles of faith had been informed by a strong *logos* realism which presupposed an almost isomorphic correspondence between word and object. By contrast, Law's later mystical theology operated with a quite different concept of truth. The objectification of the articles tradition implicit in Waterland's position had been displaced by what might be termed a 'soul-realism'. God was most real as a dynamic interior presence.[12] This development in Law's theological pilgrimage involved a move from one concept of Christianity to another. A vigorous and highly embodied High Church ecclesial tradition gave way to a theological understanding of Christianity in which reality was reversed: God was most intensely and richly present in interiority.

Implicit in this changed understanding of Christianity was a new way of understanding statements of faith in their form as fundamental articles. Articles no longer, as with Waterland, functioned as sacred deposits of truth but operated as a witness to God in interiority. To trace Law's move from fundamental articles to foundational reality or fundament is to uncover the dynamics of belief in the mystical life. More particularly, such an inquiry draws attention to the way in which the tradition of fundmental articles contributes to the formation and endurance of the one-in-Christ bond within the Christian mystical tradition.[13]

Law's Interpreters

The development of this analysis of Law's theology in terms of the theme of fundamental articles also brings into view a way of being Christian in the Church which has remained both alluring and controversial in the history of Christianity. The controversial nature of the mystical way of life is reflected in the sharply divided responses to Law in modern Christian thought. In this respect a modern interpreter of Law, John Hoyles, has noted that Law's

> efforts at theological renewal were eclipsed by the more popular and traditional ideas preached by John Wesley, but are now bearing strange fruit in the age of the "death of God".[14]

Hoyles had in mind Law's affinity with the line of Pascal and Kierkegaard and modern existentialist theology. Law has also been considered a herald of Blake, of nineteenth century romanticism, the Oxford Movement, Thomas Erskine, F.D. Maurice, Schopenhauer, and Freud.[15]

In a recent lucid discussion of Law and 'inward religion' Gordon Rupp, though recognising his abiding importance for contemporary human life, has cautioned against trying to make Law too modern.[16] Such a comment is clearly aimed at those sympathetic to the mystical tradition represented by Law. In this regard one recalls Ralph Inge's analysis and recommendation of Law's theology,[17] Evelyn Underhill's extensive writings on mysticism,[18] and the work of other scholars who have done much to rehabilitate both the stature of Law as a spiritual writer and more generally the Christian mystical tradition.[19]

In Underhill's analysis of mysticism Law belonged to the symbolic, constructive, activistic line, in which strong emphasis was placed on regeneration.[20] As such, Law was said to be "one of the most profound of English writers".[21] Dean Inge, who had an extensive and scholarly knowledge of Christian mysticism and the English spiritual tradition, recommended Law as "one of the glories of Anglican theology",[22] to be read by those wishing to acquaint themselves with "the best that

Anglican theology has produced".[23] The early twentieth century Methodist theologian Newton Flew, in a useful analysis of Law's theology, suggested that "Law is perhaps the greatest of all our English mystics".[24] This opinion was echoed by another fine early twentieth century commentator, Caroline Spurgeon, who identified Law as 'our greatest prose mystic'.[25] More recent sympathetic interpreters of Law have pointed to the reforming and prophetic character of his theology, though their approbation of him has generally been more qualified.[26] There has been an attempt to situate Law more firmly within the Anglican spiritual and liturgical tradition with links, for example, to Lancelot Andrewes and Richard Hooker.[27]

In the twentieth century another strand in the interpretation of William Law has emerged, diametrically opposed to this sympatheic view. In this respect the somewhat whimsical remark of the renowned French Roman Catholic scholar Louis Bouyer, that in Law, Jacob Boehme's bizarre genius turned into "a very British kind of mild dottiness",[28] seems to have stuck.[29] More serious was the view proposed in 1963 by a scholar of Anglican spirituality, Martin Thornton, that with William Law "the true *via media* has collapsed".[30] For Thornton, Law was a transitional figure, retaining certain traits of Caroline spirituality as an earnest moral and spiritual guide, disciplined and dutiful. In other respects Thornton considered him a marker for the post-Caroline disintegration succumbing to "acetical emphases and omissions which overthrew system synthesis, and balance".[31] John Moorman, Anglican Bishop and scholar of Church history and liturgy, was more sympathetic to Law than Thornton, but appeared to view Law's later mystical writings as degenerate by comparison with his earlier ones.[32]

Generally, those sympathetic to Law have remained insufficiently critical or have provided less than rigorous, though insightful, reflections on Law and his history.[33] Those dismissive of Law's efforts show little evidence of genuine engagement with his thought.[34]

A fuller and more critical theological appreciation of Law is required. In this respect Jaroslav Pelikan's suggestive discussion of the 'affectional transposition of doctrine' in eighteenth century Christendom, as a response to the crisis of orthodoxy, offers a useful framework for treating Law's theology. Law's particular way of dealing with this crisis has been fleshed out further by John Hoyles in a perceptive inquiry.[35]

Hoyles' brief study of the aesthetics of spiriruality in Thomas Ken, John Byrom and William Law, reveals that beneath Law's somewhat obscurantist and anachronistic symbolism there runs a powerful, creative and rich theological current, the full significance of which still remains to be uncovered. Hoyles' study is primarily concerned with exploring the implications of these writers for the development of an aesthetic "radically different from those pre-romantic tendencies which were conditioned by the theories of Descartes, Malebranche and Locke".[36] Hoyles' concerns support the pertinent remark of A.M. Allchin, that the Anglican tradition of spirituality "has been much more intensively studied in departments of English Literature than in departments of Theology".[37] Hoyles' literary effort displays keen theological insight and suggests that a properly directed theological study of Law would pay rich dividends.

In this case study Law's effort to renew the Christian tradition is traced in terms of his reconstruction of the fundamental articles tradition. His handling of this tradition illustrates what happens when the fundamentals apologetic is re-developed in terms of its founding reality or fundament. The nature and function of the fundamental articles tradition undergoes substantial modification as a course is charted back to the foundation of faith. In this way the distillation of the faith into fundamental articles is shown to belong to a much wider range of issues concerning both the dynamic of God in the world and personal life, and the emergence and endurance of the

Christian Church.

Part One of this Chapter traces Law's pilgrimage from a fairly hardened and familiar ecclesiological position reminiscent of Laudian theology to a radical ecclesial mysticism. The displacement and subsequent reconstruction of the fundamental articles tradition, and its modified function in the dynamics of ecclesial formation, are plotted in relation to this movement of thought. In Part Two an assessment is made of the value of Law's contribution to the renewal of the fundamental articles tradition and the implications this might have for ecclesiological matters and the character of Christian theology.

PART I FROM FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES TO FUNDAMENT

Phase One: High Church Traditionalism

Law's entry into the arena of theological controversy was occasioned by the controversial Bishop of Bangor, Benjamin Hoadly (1676-1761) who, during the years 1716-1717, had vigorously attacked the Non-jurors and by implication the High Church party of the Church of England.[38] Hoadly was a low churchman and supporter of the ruling Whig party. His provocative remarks concerning the freedom, power and legitimacy of the civil authority went hand in hand with a fervour in denouncing what he considered to be the pretentious claims to authority espoused by the High Church party. Hoadly's latitudinarian stance on matters theological and ecclesial was clear in his disparagement of the importance of church communion, sacramental ordinances and episcopal ordination. Ecclesiastical claims to a supernatural authority and power were a usurpation of that which rightly belonged only to God. Private judgement guided by unbiased reason was a more reliable guide to truth than tradition and dogma.

Sincerity alone was sufficient for Hoadly as the touchstone of faith. God did not favour a person because he belonged to a particular

communion but because he had chosen that communion honestly. The entire question of particular communions was relativized by Hoadly's argument that Christ's Church was to be identified with that kingdom spoken of by Christ to Pilate -"My kingdom is not of this world" (John 18:36).

Hoadly's remarks sparked off an intense controversy. Most churchmen interpreted his work as subversive of institutional Christianity. Law viewed Hoadly as one who had secularised the faith and in a response marked by its clarity, force and wit, Law quickly established himself as an able controversialist and vigorous apologist of High Church Anglicanism.[39] His defence entailed the reassertion of a traditional Caroline method that accorded great weight to Scripture as interpreted by antiquity, with reason occupying a rightful but subservient position in the triad.

For Law, Christ's Church on earth could not but be visible, despite the fact that those who were finally to be saved remained invisible. This was in accordance with article nineteen of the *Articles of Religion* which Hoadly, in Law's view, had denied.

Since Christianity was a 'method of life necessary for salvation', external communion, which was one's profession of Christianity, was a necessity for "we can no other way appear to be Christians....".[40] Law nicely captured the essence of his inherited tradition: "For Christ as truly *comes* to Christians in *Institutions*, as he came to the *Jews* in *Person*; and it is as dangerous to disregard him in the one Appearance, as in the other".[41]

The highly embodied ecclesiology presupposed here was, in Law's mind, entirely dissolved by Hoadly's 'novel' doctrine of sincerity alone as the basis of God's favour.[42] The criterion of sincerity gave no basis for differentiation between the merits of the competing visible and particular communions. Within Law's ecclesiology 'the whole question' turned on a right and safe choice in this regard.[43] To be in a particular communion was *the* way of being in the Church of

Christ; it implied, said Law 'our embracing Christianity....'.[44]

Hoadly's 'Universal Invisible Church', based on the criterion of sincerity alone, was in Law's view 'no church'.[45] Law could envisage an invisible Church but not in contrast to a visible Church. Members of the former were simply those who did not betray their external profession as distinct from members of the 'invisibly bad' Church who did.[46]

The familiar Anglican appeal to fundamentals was here woven into a robust institutional view of the Church. Law recognised an obligation for Christians to be in communion with 'any sound part of the Church on earth'.[47] Law sided with those of the Laudian tradition who included the Church of Rome. Such a view may have invited the charge of 'popery' but this had to be accepted for, said Law, we

> are not for being such *true Protestants*, as to give up the *Apostles Creed*, or lay aside the Sacraments, because they are received by the Church of Rome.[48]

The Laudian tradition in Anglicanism had invested great store by the appeal to the ancient and universally accepted Apostolic Creed as the *locus classicus* of the fundamental articles of the faith.[49] Behind this position lay the view that the breach with Rome was justified, not on the basis of a breach of fundamentals, but as a response to Rome's unlawful *imposition* of certain matters as saving belief but considered by the English Reformers as 'things indifferent'.[50] Law sided with those who defended the Reformation on the basis of its adherence to those doctrines and institutions of Christ and the ancient Apostolic Church.[51] Hoadly, by contrast, had left this 'objective' basis for the truth. His doctrine of sincerity aided by reason appeared to Law arbitrary and subjective. It was, in Law's view, a dangerous and unsafe way to determine the peculiar position of the Church of England in relation to other communions. Hoadly had disparaged the divinity of Christ,[52] and overturned 'universally received doctrine'.[53]

A case in point was confirmation. Hoadly had said it was an

affront to God for a person to expect any grace from any hands but God's own.[54] Law interpreted this as a debasement of a fundamental part of Christ's religion, one of the first principles and 'primary Truths' of the doctrine of Christ, "as much a Foundation-Doctrine, as the Resurrection of the Dead and Eternal Judgement...and received by every age".[55]

Hoadly's disparagement of Episcopacy was a slightly more delicate matter. Law was prepared to assert its necessity according to Scripture. Hoadly had argued that it was only an apostolic practice and was therefore not binding. In response Law argued that permanent and binding apostolic practices could be distinguished from occasional and non-binding practices on the same basis that fundamental articles of faith were distinguished from lesser truths, and 'perpetual' doctrines were differentiated from 'occasional' doctrines.[56] Such distinctions resulted from attention to the nature of doctrines, the tenor of Scripture and the sense of antiquity. Here was a well attested method for achieving an objectivity appropriate to faith, which gained its credibility from attending rightly to antiquity. In other words, the rule for discerning fundamental doctrines (Church *credenda*) was generally applicable to matters concerning *agenda*, in this case, Episcopacy.

In fact, for Law, the practice of Episcopacy distinguished the Church of England from other Protestant communions. This was not a new position but had come into focus in the later part of the seventeenth century in England and had become associated with a High Church version of the doctrine of fundamentals.[57]

The first phase in Law's theology revealed a concept of truth in which reality was manifest in its highest form as it was embodied in the institutions and profession of ecclesia. A vigorous 'externality tradition' predominated: "Christianity itelf is a *Matter of Fact* only conveyed to us by *historical Evidence*".[58] The fundamental articles of

the faith, the testimony of Scripture and tradition all belonged to the fabric of the institution, being measures against which loyalty to the truth could be assessed. Within this environment the process of ecclesial purification operated through vigorous reassertion of established institutional markers - creeds, rites and offices. The arid and static nature of this position became apparent to Law only as he began to search for more satisfying and dynamic ways of living a godly life within Christianity's institutional forms.

Phase Two: The Transposition of Doctrine into Ethics

In Law's *Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life* (1729)[59] he explored the possibilities for dynamic Christianity within an inherited tradition, which included not only the Caroline divines, but also seventeenth century French spiritual writers.[60] His *Serious Call* was an attempt to refocus Christianity in piety, i.e. "a life given, or devoted, to God".[61] Christianity, in its most real form, still concerned externals: "this alone is Christianity, a uniform, open, and visible practice of all these virtues...".[62] He had in mind humility, self denial, renunciation of the world, poverty of spirit and 'heavenly affection'. It was a call designed to undermine the formalism and barrenness of a 'polite age' in which, he noted, "we have so lived away the spirit of devotion...".[63] It was a *serious* call, for it was a challenge to live a life witnessing a return to God.[64]

It was a question for Law of what Christianity should look like anywhere and everywhere at all times. Law's answer was simple, it should appear as a life of regular uniform piety under God.[65] This call was a radical one for an age that made strong professions of Christianity on certain occasions but repeatedly betrayed those professions in its disregard for true devotion in ordinary life. The evangelical tenor was clear: "Either this piety, wisdom and devotion is to go through every way of life, and to extend to the use of

everything or it is to go through no part of life".[66]

This was Christianity at the level of praxis. Doctrine was here transferred into the ethical mode.[67] In an age in which world and Church had become inextricably meshed, renewal would be effected only by a true and radical devotion that penetrated life in its entirety. Accordingly, one held on to and participated in the doctrines of the gospel, and felt and truly believed them as one implemented them in practice.

> If, therefore, a man will so live, as to show that he feels and believes the most fundamental doctrines of Christianity, he must live above the world; this is the temper that must enable him to do the business of life, and yet live wholly unto God....[68]

The implication was that a right holding on to the fundamental articles included an imperative to realize their truth in performance. But what doctrine was it in Law's mind that required realization in practice?

Ethics: the Cruciform Pattern

In the *Serious Call* the doctrine of the cross was central, for in it was focused the character of the true spirit of Christianity; a way of death and crucifixion to the world. This was the spirit of Christ, true Christianity.[69] "The history of the Gospel is chiefly the history of Christ's conquest over the spirit of the world".[70] Only those that lived in that spirit were true Christians. Law perceived that the central doctrines were most properly held as they were manifest in practice. Thus Law suggested that "if the doctrines of Christianity were practised...it would be as easy a thing to know a Christian by his outward course of life, as it is now difficult to find anybody that lives it".[71]

Implicit in this evangelical call to perfection was an attempt by Law to develop a more refined correspondence between the life of piety and the presence and work of the Holy Spirit of God in human life.[72] Far from a reduction of the gospel to moralism, the *Serious Call*

indicated an attempt to recover the centrality of practice in the definition of Christianity.[73] "This, and this alone, is Christianity; an universal holiness in every part of life...".[74] The Reformed doctrine of justification by faith was here immanentised in a life of righteousness.[75] Moreover for Law, this righteousness of life was sharply Christocentric:

> We are to be like him [Christ] in Heart and Mind, to act by the same Rule, to look towards the same End, and to govern our lives by the same Spirit. This is an Imitation of Jesus Christ, which is as necessary to Salvation, as it is necessary to believe in his Name. This is the sole End of all the Counsels, Commands and Doctrines of Christ, to make us like himself.[76]

To be formed in this way was to be an imitation of love itself.

Law's concept of truth was still focussed upon emodiment in outward form. The locus of this embodiment had shifted, however, from institutional forms into the all-encompassing life of piety. The objectivities of faith in their form as fundamental articles had, through the transference of doctrine into ethics, recovered their directional significance for Christian life.

The way of discipleship suggested in the *Serious Call* did implicate Law in a move towards interiority which would later intensify. Devotion did, after all, arise out of a life 'hid in Christ'. It was the inner intentions of the heart, orientated towards a God of infinite love and goodness,[77] that were embodied in the practice of piety.

Phase Three: On the Edges of Interiority

The Doctrine of Resignation

Within the space of two years there appeared, in Law's *Letters to a Lady*,[78] a more definite move to the centre of the life of devotion. Here the spirit of Christianity was said to reside in the 'infant simplicity of resignation to God'.[79] This was the essence of piety and it consisted in an "implicit faith and total resignation of ourselves

to the adorable Providence of God...".[80] This was a 'state of mind' which

> covers all our imperfections, sanctifies all our endeavours, makes us holy without any holiness of our own, makes our weaknesses as serviceable to God as our strength, and renders us acceptable to God at the same time that we do nothing worthy of him.[81]

Law's reader was enjoined to lay hold of this temper in such a way that everything could become "fresh occasions, of committing yourself to God by a faith without bounds, a resignation without reserve".[82] Such true devotion and piety of heart was for Law the way of finding, living-in and feeding from 'Divine Truths'.

This way of piety was the sole guard against the dangers of adventurous human reasoning which, in its weakness, so easily succumbed to the temptation to set up as 'fundamental points' products of groundless imaginings.[83] The way of resignation emerged here as the way through the uncertainties and fallibilities of human reason into the truth. Law was careful to acknowledge the element of struggle in the life of 'resignation'.[84]

The God-directed Life

This way of humility, faith and resignation to God was the means by which the mind was led into the 'truest deepest knowledge of the mysteries of God'. Hence Law's conclusion that "the best knowledge of the mysteries of God gives the greatest height and strength to these virtues".[85] He rightly perceived a natural reciprocity between the object of faith and the life of resignation. The object of faith nourished piety; piety was the means of tapping the vision. It was in this context that Law enjoined his reader to recognise that God was to be 'All in All', not just in the next life but in the present. To find God thus was to be 'full of the honour and glory of God.' Saint Paul - for whom God was so 'All in All' - lived 'so out of himself', without regard for his own vulnerability, that he could have wished his own

destruction if God's glory had been thereby increased.[86] Law understood, with great clarity, that the emergence of a creative and open self was a corollary of the fully conscious act of renunciation, rather than the annihilation of the ego. To live 'out of oneself' was to live in an enriched relation to God.[87] Law had captured a far richer focus here:

> We must consider, that the Infinite Wisdom, Goodness, and Perfection of God, is the fathomless object of our faith and adoration and not of our comprehension ...[88]

Such a God was the object of our love and adoration simply because of what he was, "the sole adorable Lord of all beings", a being of "infinitely infinite Goodness".[89] Law referred to 'God's Extraordinary Goodness' as being always at hand.

For Law then, resignation to a God who was 'All in All' was not a retreat into the self but entailed a dynamic orientation towards a rich and nourishing object of faith. Here was a strengthened focus on the way of being in the truth. It was a way of coming into relation with the God of the Christian tradition rather than, as with Daniel Waterland, retreating into strong restatement of what was thought to be the truth about the God of the tradition.[90]

Terms of Communion

The way of resignation offered a certainty far higher than that achievable by reason and learning.[91] Nevertheless, the question of being in a particular external communion in which was preserved the 'essence of religion' and 'sufficient aids' for essential piety, remained important.[92] The inquiry into the whereabouts of 'a true Christian church' was a rational and important one. When the issue was between the Church of England and Rome, however, the matter was altered. Both these communions already preserved 'the terms of salvation' and all that was of 'the essence of religion'.[93]

Given this state of affairs, to desire to leave the Church of

England for the Roman communion was to abdicate a higher piety for a lesser, an action born of human anxiety and failure to discern the Christian's true calling. It was falling prey to the temptation to seek for "visible deeds, bonds, and securities which cannot satisfy an anxious spirit".[94] Law's method for finding the true Church in these circumstances was by means of a humility and resignation of the heart to God. This entailed acknowledgment in prayer of the divisions of the churches and the helplessness and inability of the individual to decide these matters. It included the recognition of a common bond, at least between the Church of England and Rome, of 'fundamental doctrines and institutions' agreeable to Scripture. Such a prayer ended with the hope that divisions in the Church would not separate the prayer from Christ.[95] Such was the calling of true piety: to love the Church of Rome or Greece with the same strength as one loved the Church of England.[96] In this way one lived amidst the external divisions as 'a true member of the One Holy Church', free from schismatical passions, trusting to be received by God "as truly of the same communion with all his saints, as if I had been a member of every particular church in which any of them lived".[97] When the spirit of resignation to God led to this disposition one was, according to Law, 'in the best of churches'.[98]

The familiar embodied ecclesiology of the Bangorian Letters, though presupposed in the *Letters to a Lady*, was in the process of being displaced by an ecclesiology shaped by the dynamic of the pious life. This dynamic was not yet fully worked out, and to this extent the ecclesiological implications of this turn to piety remained unclear. Law's ecclesiology was in a transitional stage of development.

In this respect Law's newly forming liberal sentiments remained restricted to the narrow band of Anglican-Roman Catholic relations. Here, Law was confident that the institutional markers of Christianity, i.e. the Apostolic Creed and episcopal order, sufficiently guaranteed

the ecclesial status of both communions. Accordingly, he could feel safe to explore that dynamic of piety which animated Christian life. In this way a life directed towards the love and goodness of God emerged as a contender for that "rock to build your peace upon against which the gates of hell could not prevail".[99] In such a life external supports for faith were done away with as one took hold of faith.[100] Implicit in this was an uncompromising Christian discipleship quite at variance with the spirit of the age.

Phase Four: Penetration to the Real

Christianity Nominal and Real

In Law's writings of the late 1730's his espousal of a more radical Christian life was taken up with greater intensity in the light of his reading of Jacob Boehme.[101] Law perceived two kinds of idolatries that afflicted the Church. In addition to the prevailing and direct idolatry of Deism, there was a species of idolatry that had arisen from within Christendom of those

> who, though receiving and professing the Religion of the Gospel, yet worship God not in Spirit and in Truth, but either in the Deadness of an outward form, or in a Pharisaical carnal Trust and Confidence in their own opinions and Doctrines.[102]

Such were the 'nominal', 'historical' or 'literal' Christians. They had only the 'name' of gospel mysteries, the 'image' of the truth. As regards the reality, "the true life of the new birth, they oppose and reject as heartily as the Deist does the outward Form and Letter".[103]

Both kinds of idolatry were destructive of the Christian faith. Both indicated a failure to appreciate the true nature of Christianity. For this reason the central truths of the faith were subverted. The rationalism of Deism had explained away such truths and the idolatry of the Church had impoverished the leading articles of the faith. The lack of depth of nominal Christianity led to a view of Scripture doctrines that allowed "more height and mystery in the expression than

in the thing itself".[104] Thus Hoadly's doctrine of the Eucharist preserved the outward form of the sacrament but by implication entailed a repudiation of the 'whole salvation of the Gospel'.[105] Dr. Trapp's strictures against 'enthusiasm' indicated his ignorance of the true nature of enthusiasm as the vivifying force, providing the capacity for good or ill in all persons.[106] The Deist's denial of the immortality of the soul left no reality in any article of salvation.[107]

In response, Law's efforts were directed to the defence of "the most essential, fundamental and joyful doctrines of the Gospel".[108] Thus in 1737 he argued against Hoadly's sacramental doctrine, focussing upon the latter's restrictive and literalistic understanding of the words of institution. It was a matter which concerned the truth of faith.

> But what Mysteries or Doctrines of Christian Faith are to be acknowledged or confessed by the *Words*, the *Form*, and the *Matter* of it, and what are not, cannot be known from the bare Words of the Institution, but are to be learnt by *that light* which brought the Apostles and the Church after them into a true and full Knowledge of the *fundamental* Articles of the Christian Faith.[109]

Similarly his *Appeal to all that Doubt* (1740) was directed to all those who doubted or disbelieved the truths of the gospel. In the dispute with Dr. Trapp in 1740, Law responded to a common way of holding to the faith which, out of fear of 'enthusiasm', failed to own gospel truths. This happened, for example, when regeneration was reduced to the level of 'figurative expression'.[110] In a similar vein Law's work on *Christian Regeneration* was devoted to securing the importance of the new birth in Christ. This truth lay at the very heart of Christianity and constituted, in Law's mind, "the most solid, substantial edifying and glorious Article of the Christian Faith".[111]

Law's assessment of the situation presupposed a radical engagement in the controversy at the heart of the English Enlightenment between 'inner light' and 'outward Enlightenment'.[112] So much of the controversy between deist and divine had operated at the level of

'outward Enlightenment' and to this extent it was impoverished by the sterility of Lockean philosophy.[113] Some years later Law could summarise a generation of religious controversy thus:

> For I had frequently a Consciousness rising up within me, that the Debate was equally vain on both Sides, doing no more real Good to the one than to the other, not being able to imagine, that a Set of scholastic, logical Opinions about History, Facts, Doctrines, and Institutions of the Church, or a Set of logical Objections against them, were of any Significancy towards making the Soul of Man either an external Angel of Heaven, or an external Devil of Hell.[114]

This was nominal religion. As one interpreter of Law has noted, at this level there was "no difference between the Christian, with or without the Trinity, and the Mahometan".[115] Law's approach was entirely different:

> I would not take the Method generally practised by the modern Defenders of Christianity. I would not attempt to show from *Reason* and *Antiquity*, the Necessity and Reasonableness of a Divine Revelation in general, or of the *Mosaic* and Christian in particular. Nor enlarge upon the Arguments, the Credibility of the Gospel-History, the Reasonableness of its Creeds, Institutions, and Usages, or the Duty of Man to receive Things above, but not contrary to, his Reason. I would avoid all this, because it is wandering from the true Point in Question.[116]

The adoption of this traditional apologetic implied a failure to recognise "this great and decisive Truth, that Christianity is neither more nor less, than the Goodness of the Divine Life, Light and Love, living and working in my Soul...".[117]

On this account infidelity was present wherever the gospel had not been embraced with the heart with a corresponding dying to all that was earthly within and without.[118] Accordingly, infidelity was compatible with "verbal Assents and Consents to everything that is recorded in the New Testament"; it did not matter whether the infidel was a "*Professor* of the Gospel, a Disciple of *Zoraster*, a Follower of *Plato*, a *Jew*, a *Turk*, or an Opposer of the Gospel-History".[119]

Law's defence of the gospel made redundant a whole range of modernist apologetics. The ground of argument was shifted from evidences and reasons to a basic distinction between real and nominal Christianity, between the spirit and the letter. Thus against

Warburton, Law's position was clear. One could either embrace Christianity as a 'sinner' or as a 'scholar'. The former way alone was taught by Christ: "To be a defender of Christianity, is to be a Defender of Christ, but none can defend Him.....than so far as he is his follower".[120] Law desired to be pragmatic, his concern was to recapture and awaken true piety, to establish "real regenerate living members of the mystical body of Christ".[121]

The Significance of Jacob Boehme

For Law the problem was not simply one of the correct statement of important doctrine but concerned appropriating the reality witnessed to in articles of faith. The revitalizing of piety would, he felt, arise only as this reality was brought into focus. This problem manifested itself for Law at the level of doctrine to the extent that the inner logic of the central articles of the faith had, under the force of the twofold idolatries of the age, become obscured, even lost. From Law's point of view, matters of faith and necessary doctrine were quite clear from Scripture. The crisis was for him of a different kind. It was a question of the rationale for such clear and plain 'facts' of the faith. The question was simple, did revelation make sense? From this perspective it was a matter of communicating afresh the reality of Christianity.

It was in this context that Law assimilated and deployed the mystical theology of Jacob Boehme during the 1730's. Boehme provided Law with a framework and strategy which enabled him to pursue his chief concerns.[122] Thus the lengthy discussions in the *Appeal to all that Doubt*, on creation, the origin of the soul, eternal and temporal nature, the angelic fall, the origins of good and evil, and on the theology of fire, all functioned for Law as a kind of clearing operation by means of which the 'true Ground of all the Doctrines of

the Gospel' were exposed, and the objections of Deists, Arians and Socinians "against the first Articles of our Faith dashed to pieces".[123] Law carefully and selectively wove Boehme's thought into his own emerging mystical theology. His expressed aim was to bring "light and clearness into all the Articles of the Christian Faith".[124] The intention was to preserve the mystery in its very unfolding.[125] The fundamentals of faith were thus filtered through what often appeared a bizarre, obscurantist and anachronistic symbolism.[126] However Boehme's system exercised a powerful attraction for Law because in it Law discerned the reality of faith and found a critical stimulus for fresh communication of the truth of Christianity.

Interior Reality

The key feature of the works of the late 1730's was the completion, under the influence of Boehme, of that relocation of reality that had already begun, to some degree, in Law's earlier writings. The basis for Christianity was to be found in interiority. The turn inwards opened up both the wretchedness of humankind and the capacity for new life derived from the *logos* within, the originally given 'in-spoken Word of life'.[127] This presupposed the primacy of an 'experimental' religion that operated beyond concerns for external evidences, authorities and facts, or rather relocated such criteria in inwardness.

Law exhorted his reader to

> know the Place of your Religion, turn inwards, listen to the Voice of Grace, the Instinct of God that speaks and moves within you.... let your Heart pray to God... Your Heart wants nothing but God, and nothing but your Heart can receive him. This is the only Place and Seat of Religion, and of all communications between God and you.[128]

To turn inwards was to leave the outward world. The outward world was the region of the transitory, of burden, strife and deformity. It was the region of fallenness. Mankind's fall was into 'outwardness', a fall into vulnerability.[129] Such a world had "the Nature of an *Hospital*,

where People *only* are, because they are distempered, and where no Happiness is sought for, but that of being *healed*, and made fit to *leave* it".[130]

The Structure of Soul Realism

Reality for Law conformed to a definite hierarchical structure. The highest reality was the life of the Holy Trinity. This divine glory was manifest in the realm of eternal nature - the spiritual world of the Kingdom of Heaven. The chaos that arose through the Angelic fall was checked by the creation of temporal nature, itself 'a gross outbirth'[131] of eternal nature. Into this temporality humankind was originally set in a 'paradisiacal' way, such that one could live in this world yet above it. This quality of earthly life was lost in the fall, and human beings became subject to the disorders and impurities of temporal nature; humankind fell into the 'outwardness' associated with this level of created order.

Law attributed this fall to the operation of what might be termed a *false* imagination or curiosity.[132] He later described this:

> the Eye of his *new unexperienced* Understanding, beginning to cast a wandering Look into that which he *was not, was by an unsuspected Subtlety*, or Serpent, drawn into a *Reasoning* and Conjecturing about a certain *Good* and *Evil*, which were no Part of his own created State.[133]

It was not the power of reason and will as such - this was given by God in freedom - but rather the failure of reason to allow itself to be properly directed, that caused the fall.[134]

The logic of this hierarchy of being was clear. If the fall was occasioned by a movement into outwardness, redemption required a movement back to that higher level of reality discerned inwardly. Thus for Law the outward world was "but a *Glass* or *Representation* of the inward...".[135] The good and evil of the outward world was a manifestation of interior conflicts. Outward reality brought conviction of a lost perfection, protected from the terror that attended this, and

indicated the direction humankind must go if it was to return to its former glory.[136] As a person turned inward and recognised his or her true plight and called for mercy then, said Law, "the *Fall* and the *Redemption* kiss each other".[137] In this action the original divine-human harmony was restored.

Within this schema the soul-world became the focus of Law's concerns. This soul-world was the inner world through which one approached and found God. This was necessarily the case, for it was in the soul that the spark of eternity resided. The fall had not entirely extinguished that original life of God in the soul. A seed of the incarnation was present by virtue of God's 'inspoken' or 'ingrafted Word'.[138] To turn inwards was to recognise this hope of salvation. The outward gospel associated with Christ's incarnation activated the inner gospel prepared in the human soul from eternity.[139] Within this schema the outward gospel necessarily spoke of inward realities. Christ's incarnation took place within. The atonement was repeated within. This was the work of an inward saviour.[140] This new birth was, in effect, a rebirth of the Son of God in the soul and constituted the beginning and end of salvation. This schema contained an implicit doctrine of perfection. Gospel Christianity exceeded original universal Christianity in that it opened up the possibility of, and called humankind to, angelic or glorified goodness.[141]

For Law, the 'whole process of Christ' - his life of struggle and victory over this world, his death and resurrection - had an historical foundation.[142] Christ's process became the believer's pattern.[143] The life of Christ was immanentised in what Law called 'the true inward Christian'.[144] This focus on interiority, immanence and immediacy of communion - "we thus know the Trinity in ourselves"[145] - gave an existential character to the economy of salvation. Heaven and hell were no longer developed in terms of spacial categories but existentially, as ways of being that were present within the soul.[146]

Central here was God's 'All in Allness', focussed in the Scripture passage from Acts 17 - "in him we live and move and have our being". The human being's essential rootedness in such a Being meant that when God communicated with humans, "he can give us nothing but himself, nor any Degree of Salvation, but in such Degree as communicates something more of himself".[147] To receive and dwell in such divine life was to be caught up in the overflow of the goodness of God, focussed in Jesus Christ.[148] To reject this kind of goodness was to reject "all the Goodness that the Divine Nature itself hath for us".[149] Law pressed home in eloquent and forceful prose his argument against the attribution of wrath to the Deity, finding there only an "infinite Fountain of Goodness, infinitely flowing forth in the Riches of his love upon all and every life".[150] The manner of the communication of this love was further specified in Law's depiction of God as an "all-speaking, all-working, all-illuminating Essence....".[151]

Apologetic Impact

The move to interiority undercut the Deistic position which, in Law's view, was grounded upon the false notion that the human relation to God was of an 'outward' kind, necessarily distant and mechanical, analogous to the relation of a Prince to his subjects.[152] The turn inwards gave knowledge of the shallowness of 'nominal' Christianity. What was needed was a light to shine within and bring to birth a divine seeing before one could have any true and full knowledge of the doctrines of the faith. This was the light that arose with saving faith which Law characterised as a hunger, thirst and complete 'given-overness' to the goodness and mercy of God in Christ Jesus. Such a faith signalled a leaving of the chains of this world. In such resignation to God one entered into the reality and truth of the Kingdom.[153] If the deist was ignorant of God and of how to find him, the nominal Christian knew nothing of how to hold on to God and to this

extent such a Christianity betrayed its own poverty.

Doctrinal Reintegration

For Law the turn inwards and resignation to God was the only adequate environment from which faithful theology could be achieved. Thus one spoke of the Trinity from a penitent heart. The alternative was to be lost in idle speculations which failed to see that the simplicity of the Trinity of God was "only revealed as a key, or Direction to the true Depths of that Regeneration, which is to be sought for from the triune Deity."[154] It was a matter of becoming 'inwardly sensible' of the 'great truths' of the faith such that

> when a Man once truly *knows, and feels* these two Truths [Fall and Redemption], he may be said, truly to know, and feel so much of the Power of Christ brought to life in him.[155]

On this account articles of faith were not simply bare facts but means through which the reality of God was realised in human life. This was the burden of Law's argument against Hoadly. In his sacramental doctrine Hoadly, in Law's view, had shown a failure to understand that it was only when the Holy Trinity was made to shine in the heart, that a Christian came into a true and full knowledge of the fundamental articles of the Christian Faith.[156] True enthusiasm was thus 'possessing all that one believes'.[157]

Law had achieved here a rapprochement between the interior form of faith and its linguistic expression. Articles of faith were properly related to their founding reality. In this process articles attained a proper secondary objectivity whereby they operated as a witness to the primary reality of God.

Interiority as Ecclesial Inclusiveness

Law's move to interiority significantly changed his earlier ecclesiology and developed further the liberalization already apparent in the *Letters to a Lady*. The divisions between Catholic and

Protestant now belonged to those who lived in outwardness.[158] The challenge was to achieve the true Catholic spirit. Law identified this as "a *Communion of Saints* in the Love of God and all Goodness",[159] which could not be learnt from the orthodoxy of particular churches. It was attained only through dying to self and all worldly views and entering into a pure love of God. To attain this was to "live in a divided part of the Church, without partaking of its Division".[160]

Such an achievement was based on three truths. Firstly, the primacy of universal love, which gave the whole strength of the heart to God and brought one into the perfection of love, taught that true orthodoxy could be found only in a pure, disinterested love of God. Secondly, the recognition that, in the divisions of Christendom, truth itself was divided and the true Catholic was only the one who had more of truth and less of error than was in any divided part. This truth taught one to live freely *within* the divisions and enabled one to become a real member of the holy Catholic Church. The third truth was the impartiality of God's justice. This was the basis upon which one could recognise and respect the truth wherever it was present and whoever was its advocate. If a person had such a 'Catholic Spirit' it did not matter "where he has his outward Church".[161]

In this Catholic spirit a Protestant and Papist "would not want *half a Sheet* of Paper to hold their Articles of Union, nor be half an Hour before they were of one Religion".[162] Similarly, Law considered that through participation in the truth and light from above, Protestant and Catholic would "be as fully agreed about Gospel Truths, as they are in the Form of a *Square* and a *Circle*".[163]

Here was the vision of a purified Church. It was not a human creation but occurred as Christ was incarnated within. Ecclesiology was interiorized. The soul's communion with the Trinity was the one essential for blessedness of life.[164] Participation with other

Christians in the communion of saints was indirectly achieved through participation in God, the one from whom the true Catholic spirit proceeded and overflowed to others.[165]

What then of the outward Church, its forms, gospel ordinances and sacraments? Law had not abandoned them but they had been displaced: "All *Ways* and *Opinions*, all *Forms* and *Modes* of Divine Worship, stand on the Outside of Religion".[166] They were 'helps' to the Kingdom, to be considered as 'gates' or 'guides' to that 'inward life' where salvation, through the birth of the Son and renewal of Spirit in the soul, was begun and finished.[167] Outward forms functioned 'to keep up, and exercise and strengthen' that faith which arose out of the individual's communion with the Trinity in the 'Temple of the soul'.[168] Such outward forms were intended

> to raise us to such an habitual Faith and Dependence upon the light and holy Spirit of God, that by thus seeking and finding God in the *Institutions* of the Church, one may be habituated to seek him and find him...This is the Enthusiasm in which every good Christian ought to endeavour to live and die.[169]

In this ecclesial enthusiasm corporateness was recognised only indirectly through one's participation in God. The embodied ecclesiology that so characterised the Bangorian letters had been displaced, and with it the familiar appeal to the fundamentals of the faith, at least in so far as they determined the being of the Church and terms of communion. However, in this manoeuvre Law had greatly simplified the dynamics of ecclesial disruption.

Phase Five: The Divine Superabundance

Law's prolonged meditations within and from this new horizon of faith later initiated a fresh and final theological output in which the character of that inner reality was more intensely grasped and further unravelled.

God's Being: Love in Overflow

Law's *Spirit of Love* (1752-1754)[170] was an account of the vision of God he had earlier discovered and had subsequently lived from and meditated upon. Many of the themes of earlier works were again taken up with a more intense focus on the richness of faith's object. Law's spiritual vision was transfixed and nourished by a God who in himself "can be neither more nor less, nor anything else, but an *eternal Will to all Goodness*..".[171] It was, in Law's view, more possible for the sun to give darkness than for God to give anything but goodness. This goodness, which was 'the whole nature of God' was an "infinite Plenitude, or Fullness of Riches....an UNIVERSAL ALL".[172] The created order was that sphere in which the 'hidden Riches' of God might be manifest[173] in order that

> boundless Love might have its Infinity of Height and Depth to dwell and work in. That it may come forth into outward Activity, and manifest its blessed Powers...[174]

The characteristic feature of such a spirit of love as Law found here was captured in the concept of *overflow*. Thus the spirit of love was eternal, unlimited and unbounded, an 'ever overflowing Ocean' of divine attributes, flowing as "streams breaking out of the Abyss of Universal Love", a Trinity of Love for ever and ever giving forth all God's gifts giving "Life to all Nature and Creature".[175] This was the spirit of love which, said Law, had only one desire, 'to propagate itself', seeking nothing 'but its own increase'.[176]

The dynamic of God's Being of love in overflow confronted all wrath, evil, hatred and opposition "only to overcome it with all its Blessings",[177] in such a way that "everything is as Oil to its Flame".[178] Law picked up an Irenaean theme here: this overflow was the means for the recapitulation of all things in God. The Spirit of love would not rest until all outward Nature had been 'rectified' and "brought back again into that *glassy Sea* of Unity and Purity, in which Saint *John* beheld the Throne of God in the Midst of it".[179] This was

the triumph of light and love.

There was a simple centre to this theology of inwardness but it was a simplicity of concentrated richness, not of impoverishment. Law's soaring vision was capable of extensive unfolding. This was the logic of overflow, the reality of which gave new and surprising shape to familiar theological territories into which it intruded.

The Logic of Overflow: Displacement of Wrath

It was in this light that Law considered the attribution of wrath to God. This clearly was, for Law, an impossibility. Love alone was the eternal disposition of the Divine toward the creature. Were wrath supposed to be in God such a wrath, Law argued, would have had to be there eternally, since nothing new could begin in Him: "There must be either all or none, either no Possibility of Wrath, or no Possibility of its having any bounds".[180] When he proceeded to identify wrath as being synonymous with evil, Law had necessarily struck out on a quite different theological path. He located wrath in the creature, in its 'emptiness', 'want', 'impoverishment' and self-imposed 'exile'. It was the result of the individual's loss of the power of the Spirit of love.[182] Wrath arose out of disorder. It was to be likened to a sore in the body that only erupted when the body was not in a right state.[183]

Law, employing much of Boehme's thought, attempted to manoeuvre his way through some of the intellectual difficulties this position produced. His view appeared to contradict many Scripture passages that attributed wrath to the Deity. The thrust of his argument was that the only experience of God available for human beings in their lostness - living according to nature without the life of God - was an experience of God as consuming fire.[184] Yet God, argued Law, had no wrath in himself but continued to be one and the same "infinite Fountain *of Goodness*, infinitely flowing forth *in the Riches of his Love* upon all

and every life".[185]

The apprehension of God as overflowing love compelled Law to view human fallenness not as an occasion for the eruption of wrath in God, but for mercy. Such mercy did not represent something newly begun in God but rather a 'new and occasional' manifestation of that which God was eternally, a will to all goodness.[186] Such Divine mercy was captured for Law in the character of the good physician who, out of love and care for the patient, necessarily administered that which was unpalatable and severe in order to restore health. It was in this context that Law understood the vengeance of God as representing an injunction to hand all things over to the love of God "to be healed by his *Goodness*".[187]

An evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of Law's argument is not at issue here. He had hardly solved the problem of the origin of evil. Moreover, within a framework in which God was conceived as the 'All in All', this problem was clearly of high importance. In dealing with wrath as he had, however, Law had attempted to allow his speech about God to be ordered and directed by God himself. The form and content of thought was derived from and directed towards faith's foundation in the being of God. The doctrine of wrath was reconstituted in relation to Law's new vision of faith's founding reality.

Atonement: From Forensic to Medical Categories

Such a way of ordering speech about God resulted in a fresh and more truthful recognition, in Law's view, of the atoning work of Christ. A long established view had employed forensic categories, interpreting Christ's death as an offering paid to God to satisfy the just demands of his righteousness. Law, in common with the mystical tradition,[188] moved in an entirely opposite direction. Forsaking the fabric of forensic terminology he re-orientated the traditional

Scripture categories for atonement (ransom, sacrifice, price, propitiation) towards the natural sphere of human life. Since this was where wrath and sin arose, this was where the redemptive categories belonged. Thus it was no longer God's righteousness that needed to be satisfied but humankind's original lost righteousness - that which rightly belonged to his 'paradisiacal' natural humanity.

The whole scheme of redemption was now seen to begin in the antecedent love of God who, in mercy, willed the perfection of humankind. This mercy had, in the fullness of time, been incarnated in Christ. He had lived victoriously in the spirit of love through the fallenness of human life. In this 'process' Christ had re-established, as the second and perfect Adam, that righteousness lost in the first Adam. Consequently Christ became the 'Common Father'[189] of all. He satisfied righteousness by fulfilling it. Redemption was neither an alteration of God's state nor a satisfaction of his righteousness, but rather a 'raising' of righteousness in humankind.[190] Christ given for us was "neither more nor less than Christ given into us".[191]

The atonement was an event not 'outside' but 'within' the human being. It operated by Christ's own life within the soul.[192] Medical rather than forensic categories predominated. Christ was the good physician, the 'natural remedy'.[193] Christ eternally 'qualified' to be the redeemer, and 'actualized' this in the process of his incarnation and death.[194] Christ brought perfection to the natural form and he achieved this in a natural way, by overcoming in his natural life all that the first Adam had lost.

Overcoming Dualism: The Naturalness of Redemption

Law believed that such a scheme of redemption was in accord with the requirements of the natural order of things.[195] There was no appeal here to some supernatural redemption being effected from without through some transaction between God and Christ. On this account

Christianity alone qualified as the one, true, 'natural religion'. It was a "religion that had everything in it that the natural state needed".[196] Yet such redemption still belonged to the region of mysteries, for although it happened entirely on the plane of the natural, it happened through the 'interposition' of God and achieved its purpose in a way that fallen humankind could not envisage.[197]

The ground was thus, in Law's view, swept away from under the deist, who was justly critical of an unnatural scheme of redemption which imputed into the character of the Deity a wrath requiring appeasement. Such a view revealed an ignorance of the most fundamental doctrine of the gospel.[198] If held, it could easily become in some a pretext for licentiousness and infidelity, in others, a source of superstition and fear. Perhaps most importantly, such a view, by falsely transferring responsibility away from human beings to God, obscured the calling of the Christian to an absolute resignation to God and renunciation of the world.[199] In this way the demands of truth and piety were falsely ruptured.

For Law "the whole Form and Manner of our Redemption comes wholly from the free, antecedent, infinite Love and Goodness of God towards fallen Man".[200] Law's intention was to allow this reality to inform and shape all human communication. Thus the doctrinal scheme of redemption had to be in praise of the truth of things, such that all was directed to making 'the Providence of God adorable'.[201]

Breaking Double Predestinarianism

As the logic of this stance was further unravelled, it filtered through the web of a doctrinal tradition. The familiar doctrines of election and reprobation underwent significant modification. Election and reprobation were no longer related to particular individuals or divisions of people, but rather referred to everyone as they were constituted according to their earthly and heavenly nature. A person,

according to his or her earthly nature, was reprobate. Election belonged to a person insofar as he or she had the heavenly seed of the Word of God. In this scheme of redemption, that which was elect was brought to full birth, that which was reprobated perished.[202] This was Law's hermeneutical key to the Old Testament passages which spoke of the election of Abel, Isaac and Jacob and the reprobation of Cain, Ishmael and Esau. All that was said of them was

> only as they are figures of the earthly Nature, and heavenly seed in every Man. For nothing is reprobated in *Cain*, but that very same which is reprobated in *Abel*,viz., the *earthly Nature*; nor is anything elected in *Jacob*, but that very same which is elected in *Esau* viz., the heavenly Seed.[203]

This fresh manner of understanding the traditional doctrines of election and reprobation represented the application of the logic of love as overflow. The Spirit of love had an appropriate and quite particular doctrinal form for Law. Overflow at the level of language cast the tradition in a new and arresting light.

The Raising of Humanity

The doctrine was not, however, the Spirit of love itself. Caution was needed lest one "only embrace the Shadow, instead of the substance"[204] of that which one ought to have. Law's concern was that true piety might come to birth and be perfected in the human heart. The fall represented humankind as it failed to live out of the goodness of God. Redemption raised individuals to their true and natural form. This form was the form of the Trinity in the soul. It was present in an impoverished, though genuine way, in humankind. In the birth of the Spirit of love the true and real life of the 'soul' was manifest.[205]

Employing Boehme's symbolism Law spoke of the raising of the form as what happened to 'the man in the cave' as he was released from the bondage of the first three properties of nature by the firelight of the fourth property. This in turn became the occasion for a lifting of a person into the fifth property of nature, a 'new Region of light'.[206]

In this process there was both purification and exaltation, the prelude to the perfection of the Spirit of love, first in fallen humanity, then in 'the whole material system'.[207] The goal for Law was the perfection of love which entailed the raising of the true form of everything to its proper state. Law explained this in terms of a movement through what Boehme had referred to as the seven properties of nature (the seventh being the highest *ternarius Sanctus*). Law adapted Boehme's elaborate and obscure symbols relating to the seven properties of nature in order to reveal the dynamics by which godly human life occurred. The aim was thoroughly pragmatic, to show what was involved in living in the Church, in the Spirit of Love.[208]

Dynamics of the Experimental Way: The Godly Imagination

True Christian discipleship could not be 'rationally apprehended' nor 'historically known' but was only 'experimentally found'.[209] Such a way could be dangerous, open to all kinds of wild excess and arbitrariness. Law considered these matters in *The Spirit of Love* and *The Way to Divine Knowledge* (1752). To find God experimentally was a matter of being rightly bonded to God. In Christian redemption this re-bonding was achieved. A double movement was involved: from one side the heavenly divine life offered itself again to the 'inward' person; from the other side came a hope, faith and desire, a "hungering, and thirsting, stretching after, and calling upon this Divine and Heavenly life".[210] Thus the turn inward was simultaneously a movement of the heart to its centre in God and the emergence of that centre into the foreground of a person's willing, desiring and thinking. In this double turning the divine-human bond was actualized.

Presupposed here was an original reciprocity between the Divine and human life which constituted the basis of interior apprehension of God. The turn inwards was not simply a retreat into subjectivism. Law recognised that there was a kind of turning inward which was nothing

more than a turn of the self to its own will and reason. This left a person prey to the power of their own imagination.[211] True inwardness demanded a different orientation in which the will and desire were directed towards God.

In this process Law did not intend to render human imagination of little consequence. As Law himself had stated, "In *Will, Imagination*, and *Desire*, consists the Life, or fiery Driving of every intelligent Creature".[212] As such, Law considered imagination and desire "the greatest reality we have....the true *Formers* and *Raisers* of all that is real and solid in us."[213] The fall, it will be recalled, was not occasioned by the intrusion of imagination into human life, but more properly by a failure in its direction.[214] Indeed, Law's view of an original 'paradisiacal' reciprocity between God and human life drew creative human capacity, particularly the God-directed imagination, into a vital link with the creative activity of God. A correspondence was presupposed.

> Our own Will, and desirous Imagination, when they work and create in us a *settled Aversion*, or *fixed love* of anything, resemble in some Degree, the Creating Power of God, which makes Things out of itself, or its own working Desire. And our Will, and working Imagination could not have the Power that it has now even after the Fall, but because it is a product, or Spark of that *first* Divine Will or Desire which is omnipotent.[215]

For Law the imagination was at the centre of human creative capacity, giving shape and form to reality. The regeneration of this capacity was therefore critical for godly life. This suggests that a more qualified assessment of Law's supposed disparagement of reason is required.[216]

The move inwards was not simply the pathway to right apprehension of God but also the means to a recovery of the lost or hidden, and true self. It was in fact the recovery of that holy humanity derived from Christ. What emerged in redemption was the beauty of God within as it was manifest in a person's 'heavenly will'.[217] This was not an arbitrary subjectivism but rather the recovery of a rightly formed and

animated subjectivity. Hence for Law,

> nothing is the Way to God, but our heart. God is nowhere else to be found; and the Heart itself cannot find Him, or be helped be any Thing else to find Him, but by its *own Love* of Him, *Faith* in Him, *Dependence* upon Him, *Resignation* to Him, and Expectation of all from Him.[218]

Such, for Law, was the 'simplicity of faith'. The turn inwards in patience, meekness, humility and resignation was a turn to Christ. It was thus simultaneously praise of God and conversion to God.[219] In this simple turning the Spirit of prayer (which Law depicted as the desire of the soul turned to God) became the occasion for the celebration of the 'marriage feast'. Here, humankind entered into the highest state of union with God, referred to by Law as "the *BirthDay* of the Spirit of Love in our Souls...".[220] The Spirit of Prayer and the Spirit of Love coalesced in resignation to God. The form of this meeting was the impress in the soul of the image and likeness of the holy Trinity.

The apprehension of faith entailed both a right engagement of self with God (in *other-directedness*), and knowledge of the right self (the heavenly will). In faith's apprehension therefore there was a double and interrelated knowledge of God and self. What the self discovered was that its life and reality were derived from God. In this discovery the self was not annihilated but released from its own narrowness and rigidity.[221]

Law's achievement was to universalize the possibility of living as a Christian in the Church. The one simple way was not only absolutely necessary, it was also absolutely possible,[222] and possibly irresistible.[223]

Part II FUNDAMENTALS RENEWED: Some Theological Dimensions of the Mystical Way

The Form of a Tradition: Doctrinal Considerations

Law wrote out of the abundance of his heart. As a mystic he had

not abandoned himself to silence but was compelled to communicate his apprehension of God, "an all-speaking, all knowing, all-illuminating Being, out of whom we are born, and in whom we live, and move, and have our being".[224] Human speaking continued the communication of the 'in-spoken' word of God in creation and redemption. Renewal of human language was simply the logic of interior regeneration. Implicit here was a notion of God as a rich transformer of human life and thought. This view was quite different from John Locke's concern for the mechanism of human knowing in the light of God's transformation.[225]

Law recognised that God's presence had implications for the form and content of theological discourse. Because Divine communication was not primarily a communication of information but a giving of God's being,[226] apprehension of this reality remained genuine though incomplete. The vision of God was truly caught but only 'at a glance'.[227] The vision remained rich and consequently unfinished.

As Law began to communicate his fresh understanding of truth the Christian tradition was re-appropriated in an unconventional manner. This has already been observed in Law's treatment of the doctrines of the love of God, wrath, atonement and predestination. Here, the form and ordering of theology took its cue from the spiritual apprehension of God as 'all love'. All statements of faith were filtered through this fundamental vision. The 'affectional transposition of doctrine' in Law was thus derived from a renewed perception of divine reality as expressed in its appropriate doctrinal form.[228]

Presupposed in this was a fresh correspondence between Divine light and human enlightenment, in which the latter was understood as being derived and enlarged in creative response to the former. A correspondence of human life with the life of the Trinity was being sought. Law wrote: "We know the Trinity in ourselves".[229] Here the possibility of a godly and wise human life was grounded in the original constitution of humanity in the image of God. In regeneration

or new birth, that original harmony of Divine and human life was reactivated. "The *Mystery* of Christ's Birth must be the Mystery of *our Birth*; we cannot be his Sons, but by having the *Birth of his Life* derived into us."[230] The perfection of this re-established harmony included the progressive removal of all oppositions between human and divine life. What was critical was the conforming of the human will to God's will.[231] The earlier rigorous moral ethic of Law's *Serious Call* revealed itself as the outworking of an interior transformation. The drive to perfection was thus generated, sustained and fulfilled by the grace of God working within. In this sense Law's *Serious Call* could become a truly joyful call unto 'angelic goodness'.[232]

Doctrine of the Trinity: Revaluations

In this scheme Law had developed an argument for revaluation of the Trinity. He had written:

> We thus know the Trinity in ourselves ... Without this Knowledge, all the Scripture will be used as a *dead letter*, and formed only into a *figurative*, *historical* System of Things, that has no Ground in Nature; and learned Divines can only be learned in the Explication of Phrases, and verbal Distinctions.... but when it is known, that the *triune Nature* of God was brought forth in the *Creation* of Man, that it was lost in his *Fall*, that it is *restored* in his *Redemption*, a never-failing Light arises in all Scripture, from *Genesis* to *Revelation*.[233]

In this view the Trinity could no longer be treated merely as a doctrine *special* or *peculiar* to Christianity. Rather, insofar as the Trinity was present and known within, it became the basis for all knowledge and enlightenment; the doctrine was grounded in nature as such:

> all this on Earth is only a Change or Alteration of *something* that was in Heaven: And Heaven itself is Nothing else but the *first glorious Out-birth*, the *Majestic Manifestation*, the *beatific Visibility* of the One God in trinity. And thus we find out, how this temporal nature is related to God; it is only a *gross Out-birth* of that which is an *Eternal Nature*, or a *blessed Heaven*, and stands only in such a Degree of Distance from it, as *Water* does to *Air*.[234]

Temporal or outward Nature, including human existence - "Every Creature is nothing else but *Nature* put into a *certain Form* of

existence"[235] - was thus a form derived from the Trinity itself. Nature mediated Trinitarian life, and conversely the Trinity was grounded in nature. This led Law to argue that

> nothing can be true in revealed Religion, but what has its *Foundations* in Nature; because a Religion coming from the God of Nature, can have no other End but to reform, and set right the Failings, Transgressions, and Violations of Nature.[236]

This inner relation between temporal existence and the Trinity meant that

> the whole Christian Religion is built upon a *Rock*, and that Rock is *Nature*, and God will appear to be doing every Good to us, that the God of all Nature can possibly do.[237]

In this way the barren confrontation of natural and revealed religion was displaced by the development of a dynamic view of the Trinity in materiality.[238] From such a perspective the doctrine of the Trinity could no longer be treated as a speculative belief but was wholly practical for,

> it is revealed to us, to discover our high Original, and the Greatness of our Fall, to show us the deep and profound Operation of the triune God in the Recovery of the Divine Life in our Souls; that by the Means of this Mystery thus discovered, our Piety may be rightly directed, our *Faith* and *Prayer* have their proper Objects, that the Workings and Aspirings of our own Hearts may co-operate, and correspond with that triune Life in the Deity, which is always desiring to manifest itself in us ...[239]

Thus the manifestation of the Trinity - Father creating, Son regenerating and Holy Spirit sanctifying - was not for the purpose of speculation upon the 'metaphysical Distinctions of the Deity' but to reveal the way by which humankind might be restored in "that first Image of the Holy Trinity in which we were created".[240]

It was in this context that the doctrine of regeneration assumed pivotal significance.[241] It was by means of this doctrine that Law developed a rationale for Christianity. The new-birth pointed backwards into the eternal purposes of the Divine love, it embraced and overcame the fall, and was the catalyst for the final recapitulation of all things in the life of God. In this schema there was no place for a doctrine of the wrath of God. The atonement remained central but in a

new way. The traditional doctrines of election and reprobation were interpreted existentially. The familiar creedal affirmations marking the contours of the incarnation, (virgin birth, death, resurrection, ascension) were given a fresh context. As such they became part of a 'process' encompassed within the horizon of the 'infinite antecedent love of God'.[242] The fundamentals of the faith were thus affirmed, but from a new perspective of faith. The doctrine of the Trinity was revealed as the presupposition of all reality, wholly practical and fully operational in raising the created order to its perfection.[243]

The Simplicity of Faith

"Simplicity was," said Law, "our finest intellectual power".[244] It was in this vein that he wrote in *Christian Regeneration*:

> To know no more, and to seek to know no more of our Salvation, *than* we can know by an *implicit* Faith, and *absolute* Resignation of ourselves to God in Christ Jesus, is the true *saving knowledge* of Christ, and such as keeps us in the highest Degree of Fitness to receive perfect Salvation.[245]

In the *Spirit of Love* resignation was identified as love, faith and dependence. These constituted 'full *Articles* of true Religion', since they carried salvation with them and witnessed a resignation of the self to the *Divine Operation*. In this way such articles were "a true and full Confession of the holy Trinity in Unity", since they implied a looking "wholly to the *Father*, as blessing us with the *Operation* of his *own Word*, and *Spirit*, so they truly confess, and worship the *holy Trinity* of God".[246]

This way of apprehending and dwelling in God required minimal explicit belief. When God the Father was affirmed as Creator, the Son as Regenerator and the Holy Spirit as Sanctifier, "then we are learned enough in this Mystery, and begin to know the Triune God in the same Manner in *Time*, that we shall know him in *Eternity*".[247] Law's focus was clear: ***minimal creedal affirmation, maximum heartfelt adoration.*** This was doctrine in the service of true piety. It offered a freedom

from 'Scholastic Speculations' and a preservation of the doctrine of the Trinity 'in its own Simplicity'.[248]

The simple richness of the faith was clearly shown in the outward form of the sacrament of Baptism, but only insofar as it signified the regeneration of the Trinity inwardly.[249] The critical reduction involved in the Baptismal confession was not an occasion for impoverishment of faith but denoted rather a way of affirming its fullness.

The Dynamics of Communication: The Form of Articles

In Law's expression of the faith a natural fluidity was apparent. At any one moment the faith could be captured with an economy of expression, yet such language remained full of meaning. The 'in-breathed' *logos* acted as a stimulant and releaser of speech. This revealed itself in Law's later writings in a form of communication that revelled in rich, extended, free-flowing discourse, unselfconsciously mirroring the creativity of God's own overflowing Spirit.[250] A poetic quality emerged in his prose. It was, said Law, 'the style of love'.[251]

In this context doctrine operated within a linguistic flux which oscillated between highly compressed statements of faith and the abundance of free-flowing speech. Here simplicity and plenitude in communication co-inhered: the latent richness of short statements of faith - God is love, 'Love is the Christ of God' - manifested itself in the wide ranging theological discourse spawned by such aphoristic forms.[252]

Doctrine: Modified Objectivities

Law's focus upon the primary reality of faith had made its impact upon his style of communication. It also was responsible for breaking conventional forms of doctrine which presupposed a strong one-to-one

correspondence between language and divine reality. What emerged was a modified objectivity in which statements of faith witnessed to and hence mediated the Divine-human interrelation.

Matters of faith and necessary doctrines were still plain scriptural 'facts', but their objectivity was of a secondary order. Their proper function was as witness to the primary unifying divine reality. Thus the Scriptures belonged to those "Helps to an Holiness which they cannot give..."[253] though they are "a true, outward, verbal Direction to the one only true Light, and Salvation of Man".[254] The written Word witnessed to Jesus who "is alone *that Word* of God.."[255] As such they were analogous to the 'office' and 'power' of John the Baptist's witness to the one true Light.[256] In this renewed symbolic operation of language statements of faith moved beyond mere description to fulfill a transforming ethical function. Law's mystical theology evoked not only knowledge that the world was constituted in such a way but also a knowledge of how to live in the light of the new reality of faith.[257] What was mediated was not just information but an enticement to godly life.

The relation between doctrine and its fundament was analogous to the body-spirit relation. Body and Spirit were 'essentially distinct' "yet all that was in the Body, was from the *Nature, Will* and *Working* of its Spirit".[258] The higher reality was the Spirit which manifested itself through the body as derived reality. The language of faith was in this same way a mediate form. It belonged to the 'shadow'. It was not the 'substance' but, precisely because it operated symbolically, "it carries us further than itself".[259] Accordingly, Law could distinguish between the *doctrine* of the Spirit of love and *the thing itself.* It was a distinction aimed at ensuring a correct focus for piety.

It was possible, however, to rejoice in doctrine. It participated in the 'delight' that truth brought, but only "as it calls forth the

Birth, and Growth, and Exercise" of the Spirit of Love.[260] Law's goal was reality in its fullness and beauty. Statements of the truth of faith had significance only as there was "a power of the supernatural light opening its endless Wonders in them".[261]

The Function of a Tradition: Ecclesiological Re-orientations

The relocation of reality in interiority resulted in a radical doctrine of the Church. The ecclesial bond was located *within* the believer. The bond was dynamic but remained elusive in terms of social existence. In Law's final work, *An Address to the Clergy* (1761), he wrote: "Christ in us, or we in his Church, is the same Thing".[262] In reply to the question about where to go to be in the true salvation-Church, Law answered that a person "need go nowhere".[263] This, he stated, was 'the *Mystic* Religion'.

In *A Serious Call* Law had enjoined his readers to live "in the world as in a holy temple of God".[264] In his later works 'world' and 'temple' had been relocated entirely in interiority where the heavenly Church dwelt. Similarly, schism in the Church was a matter of inner dispositions. The warning against living with 'schismatical passions' which he issued in *Letters to a Lady* in 1731 had intensified to the point that all divisions had their primary location in the heart.

Spirit and Ethic of Love

Yet for Law the outward practice of Christianity which had figured so prominently in his *Serious Call* remained. It became the mark of true social Christianity. Thus, in a letter written in 1756, he explored the nature of Church communion. The true Church could only be discerned by a 'turn inwards'. But Church communion was both internal and external, corresponding to 'inward truth' and 'outward sign' respectively. The Church as inward truth "is regeneration, or the life, Spirit and Power of Christ, quickened and brought to life, in

the soul".[265] Regeneration was the means by which the 'inward Church' or Kingdom of God was established within. The Church as 'outward sign' was the outward visible form or manner of life proper to inner regeneration. The Church was known and existed outwardly where the outward 'behaviour' of Christ was evident in the practice of religion.

Christ's life provided the perfect form of life for the Church to imitate. True membership of the one Church required nothing more or less than "Conformity to and Union with the inward Spirit and outward Form of Christ's Life and Behaviour in this World".[266] To live this life was to be in the 'highest perfection of Church unity', being inwardly united to Christ through the Spirit and outwardly exercising the life of Christ. "For what is Christianity, but that which Christ was while on Earth?".[267]

Law identified three social evils that ran counter to the life of the Church; the love of acquiring riches, the taking of Oaths and the recourse to war.[268] Implicit in this ethical mysticism was a critique of all earlier attempts at reformation which, in Law's view, had remained within the province of worldly wisdom and failed to generate a true outward spirit of Love.[269]

Displacement of Confessionality

To confessionalise the Church bond risked, in Law's view, displacement of that primary interior bond between the believer and Christ. Attempts to secure outward forms of Church bonding were a sign that the inner reality had been lost. Efforts to preserve Church unity through 'learning' and 'words' could not compensate for the new birth which constituted the real and original life of the Church.[270] Law turned his attention to the more common view of the Church as an external society torn by divisions and quarrelling over doctrines. He pointed out that this was not the true form of the Church but a merely human externality. It had to be endured with patiently. A person was

responsible simply to ensure that he or she was inwardly a true worshipper.[271] Law recognised wide limits of tolerance on external matters. Defects, mutilations and variations in baptismal *practice* and eucharistic doctrine were of no consequence. What was *intended* inwardly was not subject to human power, being entirely "transacted between God and myself".[272] All that was required was to love the 'inward Truth' intended.

Assemblies of worship were not joined because of their purity but because of what was 'meant' and 'intended', for in spite of their 'fallenness' Law said, "I reverence them, *as the venerable Remains* of all that, which once was and will I hope be again the Glory of Church Assemblies viz the Ministration of the Spirit, and not of the dead letter".[273]

Law saw two signs of hope for a renewed Church. Firstly, the increase in outward argument and division would reach a crisis in which the emptiness of all such strife would cause a re-orientation of the Church towards the inward truth of the Spirit. The second sign was already in evidence in those with whom Law identified; those who had already begun the search for mystical and spiritual instruction, who had discerned the inner voice, had 'turned inwards' and were even now being led from

> *outward Shadows into the substantial ever enduring truth* the everlasting Union of the Soul with God, as its only Good, through the Spirit and Nature of Christ truly formed and fully revealed in it...[274]

Religious opinions, doctrines, creeds and confessions often existed in a religious vacuum. In Law's view it was a constant danger to be lured into an attachment to an Augsburg Confession, a Council of Trent, Synod of Dort or Thirty-nine Articles. Confessionalism obscured a real knowledge of God.

> For had a man a hundred Articles, if they were anything else but a hundred Calls to a Christ come in the Spirit, to a God within him, as the only possible light, and Teacher of his Mind, it would be a hundred times better for him to be without them.[275]

From another point of view, Law was simply reiterating a point he had long held, that the fullness of truth was co-present in any particular article of faith.[276] Attachment to 'Notions' about God indicated that a person was blind to the knowledge of God within.[277] When the Church bond was confessionalised the believer was deflected away from the life *in* Christ. What was primary was the immediacy of God to human life. Articles of faith mediated this primary bond.

Unfinished Agenda: The Public Nature of Belief

In Law's mystical theology a highly disembodied ecclesiological position emerged. Participation within the body of Christ upon earth was indirectly achieved through communion with God.

The Church was one by its unity of faith. However this faith was held implicitly. Articles of faith were an 'outbirth' of an antecedent inner communion. The Church was one by virtue of the inner bond. Traditional ecclesial boundaries were shattered. The Church had a beginning in the Spirit but was difficult to discern in time and space.

A problem remains as to why Law considered it necessary to turn inwards to find real Christianity. The mystic way represented the way of purifying the Church. This involved the disruption of all social and intellectual boundaries. In this sense ecclesial mysticism was a reforming and evangelical way. Law saw himself confronted with an insipid Church life which he considered generally apostate, professing Christianity but lacking the reality.[278] He was acutely conscious of the growing vigour of the critique of religion developed by eighteenth century rationalism. Law sought the reality of faith beyond established institutions and rational religion. This 'beyond' was not distant but immanent within the heart.

The mystic way was, however, a response to threatened existence. The inner bond provided a certainty and security that was only dimly reflected in any confessionalised form it might take. Law's method of

locating the divine life was thus a response to the environment of his time. It provided a way of stating anew the fundamentals of Trinitarian belief.

The move into interiority was also costly. Law's handling of Christian faith was not simply a response to the beauty of the form of God but also to failed institutional Church life. The move to interiority offered a protected space where faith could be freed from the contamination of rationalism. In this context to state the fundamentals of the faith was to state the form of the interior life. What resulted was an unintentional de-socializing of belief. This was a concomitant feature of a weakened sense of Christianity's institutional form.[279] It was no longer clear how, in Law's reconstitution of the fundamental articles tradition, Christian belief remained public and open to scrutiny.

This problem was present in the very strategy by which Law sought to renew Christian life in the Church. His mystical theology was developed in relation to the individual. Law had argued that the human person was "a Microcosm of all this great outward World; that is of everything in it, its Stars and Elements ...".[280] This supposed that all life was 'in a hidden Birth' in the individual. Accordingly, knowledge of the truth of human nature was also knowledge of the truth of *everything*. The individual was 'the *little World*'.[281] The renewal of this little world initiated the perfection of all existence.[282]

Law's focus for the renewal of Christianity was *personal interiority*. This restriction made it difficult to give an adequate or direct account of the presence and action of God the Trinity in creation more generally, and particularly in more mundane human life and vocation. Law's strategy for renewal had displaced decadent institutional life. In overcoming the dualism implicit in the dichotomy between revealed and natural religion, and hence restoring sacredness

to the natural order, Law's mystical theology generated a dualism between the individual and the community.[283]

With this restriction of the treatment of the articles of faith to personal interiority, Law significantly underplayed the social function of the fundamental articles tradition. Here the social function of belief had been transferred into particular ethical forms, through which new social bonding could arise that cut across traditional ecclesial boundaries. Positively, the attempt by Law to formulate a full Trinitarian faith constituted a responsive praise of God that witnessed to transformed human existence. The irony was that Law's Trinitarianism was only very indirectly able to generate renewed *communal* existence. Institutional renewal was implicitly perceived as an occurrence *derived from* personal regeneration.

Law's strong Trinitarianism was insufficiently communal. What was offered was a truncated version of the true mystical form of the Church. A correspondence was established between human life and God which was unable to provide a positive account of God in society. Law's statement of the faith was determined by personal piety. The fundamental articles tradition could mediate only indirectly the communal life of the Trinity in the world and institutional life.

Conclusion

Law's quest for a purified 'Gospel Christianity' had been developed within the framework of the Christian mystical tradition. Here the focus was upon "an awakened Divine Life set up amongst Men",[284] that appealed to what alone was "capable of being touched with these Offers of a new Life", i.e. the human heart and conscience. This inner reawakening presupposed an opening of the human heart to the Spirit of love. A new covenant bond was formed. Law wrote: "as Gospel Christians, we belong to the new Covenant of the Holy Spirit ...".[285] Such a Christianity was its own proof, "it can be proved from nothing

but itself; it wants neither Miracles, nor outward Witness; but, like the Sun, is only its own Discoverer".[286] Law had attempted a radical refounding of Christianity. He had charted a course back to that fundament from which all reality flowed.

In this process the tradition of fundamental articles had been reconstituted in terms of Christianity's founding reality. The only proper and legitimate affirmation of the doctrines of the Gospel was one that emanated from life renewed in the Spirit of God. What Law had offered was a fresh way of responding to God the Trinity. It was a way of believing that found its nourishment from God. In this context faith could not be reduced to notional assent to certain doctrines, adherence to the 'History of the Facts, Doctrines and Institutions of the Gospel', or appeals to Canons, Councils, Antiquity and ancient usages, for

> Faith is not a Notion, but a real, strong essential Hunger, an attracting, or magnetic Desire of Christ, which as it proceeds from a Seed of the Divine Nature in us, so it attracts and unites with its Like, it lays hold on Christ, puts on the Divine Nature, and in a living and real Manner, grows powerful over all Sins, and effectually works out our Salvation.[287]

To state the fundamentals of such a faith was to witness to a correspondence of God's Being with human being, of Spirit and soul, of Wisdom and the wise:

> For the Truth of Christianity is the Spirit of God living and working in it; and where this Spirit is not the Life of it, there the outward Form is but like the outward Carcase of a departed Soul.[288]

In tracing the outworking of this truth in Law's theological pilgrimage and Christian discipleship, this study has uncovered the dynamics of an important and controversial strategy for renewal in the tradition of fundamental articles in modern theology.

CHAPTER EIGHT

FURTHER ATTEMPTS AT RECONSTITUTION OF THE TRADITION:

Some Post-Enlightenment Developments

Whereas John Locke's philosophy had retained a strong, if crude realism,[1] the more thoroughgoing Kantian 'turn to the subject' presupposed a radical disjunction between phenomena and 'the-thing-in-itself'.[2] Within the Kantian framework doctrine operated as a regulative ideal; a principle of systematization and unity, rather than for the extension of knowledge to objects beyond normal experience.[3] This presupposed the substitution of a *dogmatic* anthropomorphism with a *symbolic* anthropomorphism; a strategy designed, it seems, for *excluding* the presence of God from the world and human believing.[4]

Within this context any viable affirmation of the articles of Christian faith would require a reassessment of the capacity of human beings for apprehension of God. In fact, the 'Romantic Enlightenment'[5] of late eighteenth century Europe had devoted fresh attention to this matter, through a renewed emphasis upon *experiential* Christianity. This development was typified by Friedrich Schleiermacher[6] (1768-1834) on the Continent, and in England by Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834).[7]

The Illumination of Reason: Coleridge on Articles of Faith

Through an appeal to the creative activity of the imaginative faculty and its counterpart 'Reason' - the organ of the 'supersensuous' - Coleridge sought to locate a capacity in human life for transcendence beyond a narrow Lockean sensationalism, which had limited human understanding to the reception and organization of sense experience.[8] Thus, as a complement to reason as understanding, Coleridge spoke of a 'Higher Reason', by which he intended to describe human beings in their capacity for the apprehension of supersensuous reality. In this sense Reason was 'the irradiative power representative of the infinite'.[9]

The possibility for human communion with God was grounded in the *logos* of God which was present to man as such in 'Reason'.[10] In the proper use of reason and will human beings were raised to correspondence with the Being of God the Trinity.[11]

The focus for Coleridge was the imagination "that combines and manifests the whole mind and expresses the truth and reason of ideas in a symbolic language grasped by the understanding".[12] In the imagination human capacity for God and God's animating presence for the individual coalesced, expanding faith and renewing the divine image in human life. The imagination thus represented a locus for the communication of the *logos* of God.[13] Implicit in Coleridge's development of 'Reason' and imagination was an intention to affirm a dynamic correspondence between human and Divine thinking and willing. Upon this basis articles of faith were reinstated with ontological, as opposed to merely regulative, significance.[14] Doctrine genuinely mediated, without exhausting, the truth to which it was directed, and in this way it was properly symbolic.[15]

Coleridge emphasised the personal and practical nature of Christianity.[16] The truth that was apprehended was the truth of life as it was to be lived in relation to God. Articles of faith, on this account, both expressed and directed individuals to the truth of human existence. In response to two questions that might arise in relation to the tenets 'peculiar to Christianity', how can I comprehend this? and, how is this to be proved?, Coleridge could reply: "To the first question I should answer: Christianity is not a Theory, or a Speculation; but a *life*; - not a *Philosophy* of Life, but a Life and a living Process. To the second: TRY IT".[17] In this way the truth of Christianity was confirmed, not simply by reference to the intellect or external authority but in practice. The apprehension of truth involved a reciprocity between revelation and human experience.[18]

Articles of faith were to be understood from a practical, moral view. The doctrine of original sin concerned a '*mysterious* Fact' of existence, and it had to be understood "in the sense in which it alone is binding on ... faith".[19] The doctrine of election had to be understood in its relation to the human being.[20] The issue here was to learn how to *hold* doctrines. The rational and safe way was to adhere to them practically and morally.[21] Coleridge's practical view had to do with 'facts' not 'systems':

> The Gospel is not a system of Theology, nor a *syntagma* of theoretical propositions .... But it is a history, a series of facts and events ..... most important doctrinal Truths; but still *Facts* and Declaration of *Facts*.[22]

In this practical view belief involved a threefold dynamic; will, understanding and love.[23] Human subjectivity could not be reduced to certain rational and logical operations. To do this rendered one impotent to apprehend those articles most peculiar to Christianity.[24]

In this manner Coleridge was able to affirm Christian Trinitarian belief. Indeed, his *Aids to Reflection* (1825) had been offered in part as a defence of the 'peculiar' doctrines of Christianity.[25] Such "Mysteries *are* Reason, Reason in its highest form of Self-affirmation".[26]

The fact that these mysteries might be "not *quite* simple and what any plain body can understand at the first hearing",[27] could not be a reason for rejecting them as 'fundamental articles'.[28] The mysteries of faith could not be "cut and squared for the comprehension of the understanding".[29] Such '*Minimifidianism*' drew "religion down to the believer's intellect, instead of raising his intellect up to religion".[30]

Within Coleridge's fundamental conception of the unity of truth,[31] an ordered hierarchy of belief emerged. At a general level he could refer to 'the great fundamental truths' - the existence and attributes of God, and the life after death - as the 'First Truths'[32] or 'articles', upon which the 'superstructure' of the gospel revelation

was raised.[33] Such articles were the 'ground-work of Christianity, and 'essentials' in the faith,

> but not its characteristic and peculiar Doctrines: except indeed as they are confirmed, enlivened, realized and brought home to the *whole being* of man, head, heart and spirit, by the truths and influences of the Gospel.[34]

Elsewhere he spoke of the articles essential before Christ.[35] He included the doctrine of original sin as the ground of Christianity upon which the 'edifice' was raised:[36] "the great Constituent Article of the Faith in Christ, as the Remedy of the Disease - The Doctrine of Redemption".[37] Doctrines preliminary to Redemption, such as original sin, secured an 'intelligibility of relation'[38] for the structure of belief. It was only in the doctrine of redemption that such 'preceeding' articles were 'realized'.[39] The 'entire Scheme of *necessary* Faith' came under the 'two heads' of original sin ('Sin Originate') and 'the doctrine of Redemption', in relation to which there were 'minor tenets of general belief' to be believed 'in a spirit worthy of these'.[40]

When Coleridge wanted to draw attention to those important beliefs directly connected with the gospel revelation he spoke of 'the peculiar and distinguishing fundamentals of Christianity', the 'especial constituents of Christianity'.[41] Doctrines peculiar to Christianity included: belief that the 'Means of Salvation' had been secured; 'the great Redemptive Act' of the incarnation of the Son of God in the person of Jesus Christ, his life, death and resurrection; belief in the possibility of appropriating this redemption by repentance and faith (including 'the aids' that render an effective faith and repentance themselves possible); belief in eternal life for the 'heirs of salvation'; belief in the 'awakening of the spirit' in believers and 'communion of the spirit' with the Holy Spirit; belief in the 'gifts' and 'graces' of the Spirit manifest in a life of righteous works ('the appointed signs and evidences of our Faith'). Coleridge concluded:

"All these, together with the doctrine of the Fathers [of Judaism] re-proclaimed in the everlasting Gospel, we receive...".[42] He considered his list of articles of faith to be the common profession of Protestantism.[43] It was clear, however, that he also envisaged the possibility of developing a genuinely ecumenical confession of

> "the whole Scheme of the Christian Faith, including *all* the Articles of Belief common to the Greek and Latin, the Roman and the Protestant Churches, with the threefold proof, that it is *ideally, morally* and *historically* true".[44]

Within Coleridge's scheme of faith a certain fluidity emerged. Mixed in with the familiar and fairly rigid concept of fundamentals - its references to foundations, groundwork, superstructures, edifices - was a more dynamic view of doctrine, in which interconnections and relations were recognised.[45] The doctrine of original sin gave

> to all the other mysteries of religion, a common basis, a connection of dependency, an intelligibility of relation, and total harmony, that supersede extrinsic proof.[46]

Doctrinal interrelatedness was such that the doctrine of the Trinity and Incarnation ought to receive top priority.[47] Elsewhere he referred to the doctrine of redemption as constituting that article *stantis vel cadentis Ecclesiae.*[48] The soteriological motif[49] was embraced within a richer pattern of doctrine that intended to express the truth of human life in relation to God the Trinity.[50]

Yet this organic and 'practical' view of doctrine could generate highly compressed statements of faith. Thus Coleridge offered his own short formula or rule for the determination of fundamental articles:

> In the strictest sense of essential, this alone is the essential in Christianity, that the same spirit should be growing in us which was in the fullness of all perfection in Christ Jesus. Whatever else is named essential is such because, and only as far as, it is instrumental to this, or evidently implied herein.[51]

Here, Coleridge's practical view emerged as a recommendation of the tradition of 'inward religion'.[52] The result was mysticism, a matter that Coleridge addressed in his conclusion to *Aids to Reflection.* In concluding thus Coleridge acknowledged his debt to William Law.[53]

Coleridge revitalised the fundamental articles of faith from within, through a reintegration of the historical facts of Christianity with human experience.[54] This achievement was facilitated by a retrieval of the rich subjectivity of faith, which included emotional, intellectual and volitional elements. In this way he recovered the human capacity for reality in its fullness as given by God.[55]

Articles of faith operated as symbols of the confluence of two currents of human life. Revelation in Scripture and the common Reformation faith provided the objective current. Another related to the realities of human existence, the subjective current. The truth required by the latter was assured by the former. This resonance was expressed in the language of the mysteries of faith. To state these mysteries demonstrated a godly use of reason and will and thereby witnessed to a human capacity for transcendence.[56] Perhaps equally important was Coleridge's recognition that articles of faith remained unfinished until confirmed in performance.

Coleridge's inquiries into the nature of experiential Christianity had placed the fundamental articles of the faith within the dynamic of the Christian life. In this context the emphasis of the tradition was firmly related to its *directional* function in the Church. It was in ongoing Christian discipleship that the 'common-place truth' of the articles tradition could be restored to its 'uncommon lustre'.[57]

The 'Affectional Transposition': Charles Simeon on Gospel Truths

From a somewhat different angle the directional thrust in Coleridge's handling of the fundamental articles was recovered by one of the leaders of the late eighteenth century evangelical revival in England, Charles Simeon (1759-1836).[58] For Simeon, the famed preacher at Holy Trinity Cambridge for over half a century and inheritor of a rich evangelical tradition that included both Calvinist and Arminian strands, the focus of ecclesal life was conformity to the truth of the

Gospel through conversion and sanctification. As the truth was communicated through the preaching of the gospel, godly human life was generated and sustained.

The gospel message of redemption by Christ was revealed in the Scriptures. In this respect it was incumbent upon Christians to discriminate wisely between matters of greater and lesser importance for salvation. Drawing upon St Paul's reference to foundations and superstructures, Simeon distinguished between those first principles of Christianity, to do with the great doctrines of salvation by grace through faith in Christ, and 'the deeper things of God'.[59] It was not so much a distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental doctrines but rather between the fundamental doctrines of the *kerygma*, and things of further perfection, such as the doctrine of predestination.[60]

The aim of such discrimination was not to disregard certain scripture truths that appeared to contradict others or did not fit with a particular system, but in order that all truth might be rightly proportioned. Simeon had in mind the tendency of the 'ultra evangelicals' to ignore all but the 'leading doctrines' of the scripture revelation.[61] One had to rest content with the scripture system, remembering that the truth lay not in just one, nor in a confused mixture of two apparently contradictory truths, "but in the proper and seasonable application of them both".[62]

For Simeon this meant that the truth was not in the middle nor in one extreme, but in both. The golden mean of Aristotle was to be discarded for St Paul's 'strange notions' which entailed

> "oscillating (not vacillating) from pole to pole. Sometimes I am a high Calvinist, at other times a low Arminian, so that if extremes will please you, I am your man; only remember, it is not one extreme that we are to go to, but both extremes".[63]

At the heart here was Simeon's lively sense of paradox in Christianity which undermined all theological systems that threatened to displace the scripture system which was,

> of a broader and more comprehensive character than some very exact and dogmatical theologians are inclined to allow: and that as the wheels in a complicated machine may move in opposite directions and yet subserve one common end, so may truths apparently opposite be perfectly reconcilable with each other and equally subserve the purposes of God in the accomplishment of man's salvation.[64]

This perspective gave Simeon a considerable freedom in expository preaching from the whole of Scripture, a fact demonstrated in his twenty-one volumes of sermon 'outlines' drawn from throughout Scripture, and designed, as he argued in the Preface, as a supplement to the Book of Homilies of the Church of England. As an evangelical preacher the central message of the gospel was never lost sight of. Redemption in Christ was the centre. The doctrinal web which secured this constituted the fundamentals of the gospel which were plainly written in Scripture.[65]

What was fundamental could be articulated in a highly compressed form. Thus, in stating that Christ was 'the annointed Saviour of the world' and 'the King and Governor of all whom he saves' Simeon argued:

> This is the truth; this is the sum and substance of the Gospel: there is nothing connected with justification, sanctification, or the complete and everlasting salvation of mankind, which is not comprehended in this.[66]

On the other hand, the essentials of evangelical religion could be stated in and developed from a variety of doctrines.[67] The doctrine of the Trinity was a 'fundamental article' and its denial and all doctrines dependent upon it - atonement, imputed righteousness, divine influences - could all be traced back to the fact that fallen humankind did not feel the need of the Divine Saviour.[68]

Simeon pointed to a way of holding the fundamental truths of faith that went beyond 'mere assent' and overcame a bare formalism:

> By the term, "believing", we are not to understand a mere assent given to any particular doctrine .... The faith intended in the text [Mk.16.15-16] is far more than acknowledgement of the truth of the Gospel; it is an approbation of it as excellent ... Assent is an act of the understanding only: but true faith is a consent of the will also, with the full concurrence of our warmest affections: it is called in one place a "believing with the heart; and in another, a "believing with all the heart". In few words, faith is a new and living principle, whereby we are enabled to

> rely upon the Lord Jesus Christ for all the ends and purposes for which he came into the world.[69]

Simeon saw here the centre of true religion: the renovation of heart and life, the result of simple reliance upon Christ in faith. In believing the gospel doctrines one was enjoined to feel them 'with the full concurrence of our warmest affections'.

This was a way of believing that enabled the evangelical Simeon to offer a wider vision for unity among Christians. He noted that, though there were differences in matters of inferior moment,

> yet in fundamental points such as our fall in Adam, our recovery by Christ, our renovation by the Spirit, the evil of sin, the beauty of holiness, the security of believers, and many other points connected with the spiritual life, there is no difference...[70]

Significantly, he added:

> or if they differ a little in modes of expression when disputing for opinions, they agree perfectly when they come upon their knees before God; which shows that their differences are rather imaginary than real.

Whilst it is likely that Simeon's closing comment is more hopeful than real, nevertheless his sentiments were clear: unity of faith was 'learned by the heart rather than the head'.[71]

The key to this richer understanding of the dynamic of evangelical doctrine in the Church was the central role of the Holy Spirit in Simeon's theology.[72] Gospel truths could simply 'abide in the mind' as any speculative subject might, though when they were 'applied to the soul' by the Spirit of God, "they produce a feeling corresponding with the truths themselves".[73] Thus, in a sermon on "The Spirit of Vital Christianity", Simeon spoke of the 'real character' of Christianity as being something 'infused into the soul' and 'exhibited in life', forming a person of 'energy'.[74]

Gospel truth was thus inseparable from Gospel piety. The bond was secured through the 'influence', as Simeon called it, of the Spirit. For Simeon the *testimonium internum Spiritus Sancti* was the corollary of justification by faith, and as a result it was the primary

confirmation to the Christian of the truth of Christianity, prophecy and miracles notwithstanding.[75]

For Simeon, a faith rightly formed in its subjective mode in the believer was one that corresponded with the fundamental truths of the gospel. Priority was thus placed upon a godly practice of faith. Statements of belief required an 'affectional transposition', that was evident in heart-felt obedience to God. Even the deeper truths of faith (e.g. predestination) were legitimate only when they functioned to 'compose the mind' and 'to keep us steadfast in a time of need'.

Simeon did not balk at extending the logic of this position to his understanding of the doctrine and liturgy of the Church. The *Articles of Religion* repudiated only those who 'denied some fundamental truth of Christianity'. Both Calvinist and Arminian met in the *Articles of Religion*. As for the Liturgy, "it comes nearer to inspiration than any book that ever was composed",[76] and expressed "exactly what a broken hearted penitent before God would desire to express". Specifically, the General Confession was "as beautiful, as just, as scriptural a summary of experimental religion as ever was penned..".[77] Its words corresponded to the appropriate 'feelings' or 'necessities' of a penitent. Repeating the confession was one thing, feeling it quite another. Charges against the Liturgy of overformulation and coldness were repudiated by Simeon: "All that is wanting is an heart suited to the liturgy, and cast as it were into that mould".[78] The Liturgy required a rightly formed inward disposition and was "intended and is calculated to produce tender seriousness, a meek devotion and a humble joy i.e. equally remote from the unmeaning coldness of a formalist; the self importance of a systematic dogmatist".[79]

The liturgy provided the ideal place in which the truths of the gospel could be realised. In the liturgy even the deepest truths could be contemplated for illumination and believers could experience the sanctifying efficacy of such truths upon their hearts.[80] Institutional

religion had an inner form without which it was impoverished. Conversely, the piety of faith could be safely located in the public formularies. This enabled Simeon to remain faithful both to the preaching of the Gospel and to the Established Church. Against Dissenters and enthusiasts Simeon maintained that continuity in the Gospel was not inconsistent with loyalty to the national church. All that was required was a heart cast into the gospel mould, which he was confident could be discerned in the Church of England.

For Simeon, Christianity took the form of an enlivened religious subjectivity shaped in relation to certain specific theological loci. The appropriation of evangelical truth involved an internalizing of doctrine. This occured through the action of the Holy Spirit, and an outer-directed movement in which the articles of salvation were transferred into godly human life. The context for this dynamic was the individual in the Church.

Simeon's handling of fundamental articles countered the tendency of the tradition to become turned towards delineation of Church boundaries. This tendency was apparent when certain evangelical doctrines obtained a law-like status identifying commitments to Arminian or Calvinist systems. In Simeon's evangelicalism this was displaced by a more dynamic approach. Here the tradition operated with a directional quality, forming piety and enlivening Christian life and Church institutions. Simeon's practical focus on scripturally informed, experiential Christianity recovered the potential of his inherited evangelicalism. This development entailed important concerns for a strong apostolic ecclesiology. This was evident in the modern missionary thrust of the Anglican church, which owed a great deal to Simeon's Cambridge ministry in the early nineteenth century.

Restating Orthodoxy: 'The School of Waterland'

Simeon's and Coleridge's handling of the fundamental articles

tradition had not eclipsed a more conventional treatment of that tradition associated with the 'School of Waterland'[81] and the rational theology of William Paley (1743-1805).[82] Nineteenth century exponents of fundamentals discussion in the Waterland line largely ignored the issues addressed by Coleridge. An example of this was evident in William Van Mildert's (1765-1836) *Bampton Lectures* of 1814.[83]

Van Mildert noted that the question of what was fundamental remained an 'open inquiry'. The answer was to be sought in a more careful explanation of the Apostles' aphorism: other foundation can no one lay, than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ (1Cor 3:11).[84] Van Mildert followed Waterland's earlier exposition of the fundamentals of the Christian covenant, but with the express addition of a reference to Christian Priesthood. By virtue of its necessity for sacramental validation and effect the Priesthood was said to be "interwoven into the very substance of Christianity, and inseparable from its general design".[85] It was no doubt a puzzle for Van Mildert why Waterland had omitted this ordinance. Its omission appeared to injure "if not the system of Christianity itself, yet the mode which infinite Wisdom has ordained of carrying it into effect".[86]

Van Mildert's development of Waterland's schema indicated a further shift from the *quad* to the *quo* in matters of faith (i.e. from the material constituents to the formal conditions).[87] This development was implicit in William Palmer's later dismissal of the fundamentals tradition in his scholarly *Treatise on the Church of Christ* (1838). It appeared to provide a viable option to defend the fundamental articles of Christianity in an environment increasingly rationalistic and hostile to faith.[88]

The Ecclesiological Perspective: Newman's Modification

The fundamental incompatibility of the Coleridge 'minority tradition' and the objectivist stance represented by the 'Waterland

School', emerged in John Henry Newman's (1801-1890) handling of the fundamental articles tradition. Newman's deployment of the theory of fundamentals in his controversy with a French Abbé,[89] his subsequent development and modification of the theory in his *Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church* (1837),[90] and his eventual rejection of this tradition as a strategy for depicting the identity and continuity of Christianity[91] has, in the wake of Vatican II, received careful attention from both Protestant and Roman Catholic theologians.[92] Insofar as these inquiries have not been directly concerned with the fundamental articles tradition Newman's handling of the tradition still awaits fuller analysis. In this respect a number of issues merit consideration.

For Newman the fundamentals apologia provided a crucial theoretical underpinning for a highly embodied and static ecclesiology. This was evident in the way Newman deployed the tradition - "one of the most static versions of guaranteed external continuity"[93] - as a strategy in controversy with Rome:

> Both parties consider 'the faith' to be *necessary to salvation*; but we say the faith is prior to the Church; they, the Church is prior to the faith.[94]

In this view the fundamentals of the faith were contained in Scripture. In important doctrines, such as the Trinity, the fundamentals were often 'hidden under the text of scripture'.[95] However the fundamentals of the faith had been explicitly and clearly witnessed to in the undivided Church of antiquity. Church unity was, in Newman's view, a precondition for securing those fundamentals in which the Catholic Church was 'indefectible'.[96] Newman followed Laud's and Stillingfleet's view that the Apostolic creed, the *Regula Fidei* of the ancient church, was a sufficient catalogue of fundamentals for church communion.[97]

This retrospective unity in fundamentals with the Church of old was, for Newman and the tradition which he espoused, the only ground

for present and prospective unity.[98] This was Newman's theory of fundamentals.[99] What was peculiarly Anglican about it was not the continued preoccupation with the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental articles - the theological problem of fundamental articles was still relevant to Continental Protestantism[100] - but rather its construal in a particularly static form. This was at variance with such earlier exponents of the tradition as Hooker and Chillingworth.[101]

Nonetheless, Newman identified his theory of fundamentals with the 'received notion in the English school', and he stated 'its peculiarity' in graphic and highly significant language:

> [The doctrine of Fundamentals] supposes the Truth to be entirely *objective* and *detached*, not lying hid in the *bosom* of the Church as if one with her, clinging to her and (as it were) lost in her embrace, but as being sole and unapproachable as on the Cross or at the Resurrection, with the Church close by, but in the background.[102] (my italics)

In Newman's passage from the Anglican to the Roman Church the analogy of fundamentals with the cross and resurrection was displaced by a view of doctrine nestled 'in the bosom' of the Church. This move remained a puzzle to William Palmer, whose handling of the theory of fundamentals had led Newman to surmise that Palmer's ecclesiology was "the first real nearing to Romanism which has in *principle* been made".[103]

Newman's controversial move to the Roman Church was intertwined with an equally controversial development of the theory of fundamentals. His change of allegiance was facilitated by his participation in, and development of, the Coleridge 'minority' tradition.[104] Important to this tradition was the view that "the church manifests the presence of Christ sacramentally to the world".[105] According to this view language operated sacramentally, communicating the truth in rich symbolic form.[106]

For Newman this conception of truth meant that revelation was a mystery, "a doctrine *lying hid* in language".[107] It was a view highly

disruptive of the cruder realism of Newman's fundamentals apologetic. This was expressed initially in Newman's uncertainty over the precise constituents of his proposed 'Episcopal' and 'Prophetic' traditions.[105] Later it emerged in his more finely developed unitary conception of Christian doctrine - as developed in the 1843 sermon on '*The Theory of Developments in Religious Doctrine*'.[109] Finally, the challenge his sacramental theory of language posed to his inherited theory of fundamentals was crystalised in his *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (1845). Here, Newman spoke of the Catholic doctrines as 'members of one family', making up but 'one integral religion'. He argued: "You must accept the whole or reject the whole".[110]

In tracing the development of Christian doctrine Newman was tracing the history of the corporate consciousness of the Church as it had expressed itself through time in response to its apprehension of the oneness of God who was Trinity.[111] This presupposed that doctrine did have a history, a characteristic that Newman's inherited theory of fundamentals could not, without danger, assimilate.

If Christian doctrine did have a history, some organic concept of truth was necessary if doctrinal developments, as in the Roman Church, were not to be deemed illegitimate. By the time Newman had developed these ideas his change of ecclesial allegiance was all but secured; his *Essay* was simply 'an hypothesis to account for a difficulty', i.e. "the apparent variation and growth in Christian doctrine and worship".[112] The *Via Media* was an impossible idea and had been discarded. The uncovering of the dynamic of doctrine, language and idea, rendered the polemical thrust of the fundamentals apologetic impotent.

At this stage a third issue arises. To what extent had Newman overturned the fundamental articles tradition?[113] Certainly at one level he had rejected its hitherto strategic role in Church conflict.[114] However the formal structure of the theory remained,[115] and perhaps more importantly, Newman's ordering of truth within its

fundamentally organic structure revealed a continued preoccupation with identifying hierarchical patterns.[116] Thus the doctrine of the incarnation, albeit for '*convenience* of arrangements' (my italics), was referred to as the 'central doctrine'.[117] In fact this doctrine provided the rationale for a variety of Roman developments and, as Stephen Sykes has noted, this singling out of the 'idea' of the incarnation has a parallel in the operation of Schleiermacher's concept of the 'essence of Christianity', as a principle of coherence.[118]

The irony of the *Essay* was that, in an attempt to justify the truth of Roman developments, Newman was involved in ordering a 'family' of doctrine in relation to one central doctrine. All doctrine proposed by an infallibly developing authority might be worthy of belief,[119] and in this sense fundamental. Nonetheless, judgments could be made as to the *relative* importance of *fundamental* doctrines.[120]

In Newman what might be referred to as a *core tradition* endured within his organic concept of doctrine. Christianity remained 'based' on a creed.[121] Furthermore, in the notes accompanying the 1877 edition of the *Via Media*, Newman stated that the "Creed contains the primary, rudimental articles, those which St. Paul calls the '*elementa exordii sermonum Dei*'".[122] Such core belief, in this context, represented the ***first*** **essentials** in the order of explicit belief. Nevertheless, as **demonstrated** in his concern over the determination of Papal **infallibility**, Newman considered himself a minimiser not a maximiser.[123]

There was, it seems, an element of ambiguity in Newman's handling of the fundamentals tradition. This recalls the issue with which Coleridge himself attempted to grapple; the contribution of human subjectivity in belief. In Newman this problem was perceived pre-eminently as a problem of the Church's explication of its corporate consciousness through history.[124] However Newman had a strong suspicion of the power of the 'illative' imagination. Its true and

false operations required some guarantee other than an assumption of self-authentication inherent in the symbolising process itself. Rather, for Newman,

> the guarantee is in fact given .... by the special subject-matter: an infallibly guided Church. To interpet rightly is not a gift of the illative imagination working by itself ...[125]

For Newman it was an issue of the proper placement of faith. The truth was only safely and fully held in the 'bosom' of the Church. Thus Stephen Prickett comments that for Newman, "the truth of Catholic belief ... is safeguarded by its own inner life as a whole".[126] In this respect it seems that the articles tradition required an ecclesial environment least unlike the primitive one,[127] a requirement satisfied for Newman by that church in which the development of truth was maximally secured by reference to an institutionalised infallible authority.

Newman's finely tuned theological instinct concerning the ideal placement of faith in the Church both protected and *endangered* faith. That this was in fact the case emerged in the rather mechanical form of organic growth presupposed in the development of Christian doctrine.[128] The implication of such a view of the development of doctrine was that the creative human potential to give new expression to truth, in response to new circumstances, was refused, or at least subjugated to an external authority to which individual responsibility was displaced. The strong dialectic of the fundamental articles tradition - whereby the tradition not only formed the Christian in the truth but was itself 're-made' in the process[129] - was abated in the transfer of responsibility to the legitimating authorities of the Roman hierarchy. Such a move encouraged the suspicion that the dynamic of faith in history required some fixed and certain control *beyond contingency*.[130] In this respect at least, Newman's handling of the fundamental articles tradition, in both its Anglican and Roman guise, was of a piece with the majority of his Anglican critics; a fact succinctly put by William

Archer Butler who argued that, "Christianity was born full-grown ... *nothing could take His [God's] Dispensation by surprise*" [131] (my italics). Newman would not have disagreed with the sentiment, whilst departing radically from the conclusions Butler had drawn.

God at the Centre: Maurice on Articles in Ecclesiality

Generally speaking Newman's Anglican critics responded by the restatement of a tradition which he had already discarded.[132] Their various efforts illustrated both the impotence and the possibilities offered by a fairly rigid conception of the fundamental articles tradition.[133]

A noteable exception to the general Anglican response came from Frederick Denison Maurice (1805-1872).[134] His critique of Newman's *Essay* was all the more interesting because it indicated a further option for the reworking of fundamental articles of faith by one who shared with Newman the inheritance of the Coleridge 'common tradition'. For Maurice, this 'common tradition' operated according to the principle of 'development' and 'dialectic'.[135] In other words, the history of the divine-human inter-relation not only showed development towards organic wholeness, but also radical disruptive intrusions creative of a tension in human existence.

In Maurice's view this dialectic, i.e. the principle of 'disconfirmation',[136] was missing from Newman's more mechanical understanding of the development of Chistian doctrine. Newman's 'homogenous evolution' of doctrine was not able to take account of the ever emerging, rich and surprising variety of human life. The contingent could not genuinely contribute to the developmental process.[137] According to Maurice, Newman's particular form of organic development of doctrine had forfeited the very life of Christianity. The tensions and strivings for oneness could not be satisfied by assent to propositions or to Papal authority but only in that living and

personal centre of life - God the Trinity.[138] As Maurice had once written in a letter: "Men are crying after a Personal Centre".[139]

For Maurice the centre of reality was unequivocally personal, the very antithesis of mechanism. The latter generated 'systems' which excluded variety, spontenaity and openness to change. The former generated 'method', a 'principle of progression' by which one moved from the known to the unknown.[140] Maurice's personal and methodological focus seemed to be aimed at uncovering the very pre-conditions for those experiences denied in the notion of system.

Whereas for Newman truth had a developing *doctrinal* form, for Maurice Trinitarian personalism was ideally manifest in *social* form. The Church was a symbol of the godly social reality intended for the created order.[141] Implied here was a dynamic principle for renewal of structure and belief, an outflow from a self-giving centre. It was a rationale for mission and underpinned Maurice's commitment to renewal of the social order.[142]

This view had significant implications for the fundamental articles tradition. Insofar as the truth of faith operated maximally in the regions of personal integrity and social order, it was clear that the doctrinal tradition *per se* had suffered displacement. More particularly, the power of propositional systems of belief to mould Church identity and nourish division was subverted. The dogmatic principle, the recognition of the importance of opinions in religion, was displaced.[143]

Associated with this approach was a renewed concentration on the catholic creeds of the early Church.[144] These creeds had an objectivity - the Apostolic creed was 'the absolute creed', not a symbol of 'our own choosing'.[145] They confounded all systems, pre-eminently because the creed had to do with a 'NAME' - the Trinitarian name of God.[146] The objective and personal dimensions of revelation were symbolized in the creed. Here,

> The 'belief' is really lost in Him who is believed. The Faith goes out of the I into the object. It does not try to realise itself apart from the one or the other.[147]

Insofar as the creeds operated 'beneath all notions, opinions and precious beliefs',[148] they remained maximally accessible for all, regardless of intellect, social class or church party. As the universal symbol of humanity constituted in Christ, the ancient creedal faith represented a true social unifier.[149]

Maurice distinguished between the universal creeds and confessional articles. The former were 'professions of personal faith in God', the latter, such as the *Thirty-nine Articles* of the Church of England, were 'merely intellectual propositions'. However the latter protected the English national church from private opinion, prevented it 'from sinking into a particular theological system' and thus witnessed to truths 'bigger than a system', i.e. the Trinitarian confession.[150] Maurice had found a way of affirming the fundamental articles of apostolic belief long extolled in Anglicanism. He had achieved this through a fresh recentering of the tradition such that:

> The doctrine that God has claimed us all in Christ as His son's, which seems to me the *articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae*, where I use article not in its vulgar sense as importing that which is formal and dogmatic, but that which is necessary to the vitality and coherency of the body of Christ.[151]

Fundamental articles were *fundamental* by virtue of their immediacy to Christianity's personal centre. As such they could never be *merely* articles, but rather rich symbolic forms through which Divine life was mediated. In Maurice's opinion the course of Christian history, including Lutheranism and Calvinism, showed corruption through the development of systems of doctrine in which propositions had been substituted for living realities.[152] To 'dig' beneath such developments generated a new ordering of doctrine. Some doctrines, such as the belief of everlasting punishment, had to be jettisoned.[153] This matter was of no little cost to Maurice's professional life, precipitating as it did his dismissal from King's College, London.

Maurice's reworking of the fundamental articles tradition aimed at overcoming a rigid conventionalism in belief and restoring the inward life of faith. The tradition was repersonalized.[154] This was apparent in Maurice's understanding of the presence of God in social relations and institutional life. It was also evident in his focus upon the early creeds. In respect of the dogmas of faith theological reductionism was not so much a *quantitative* matter as a *qualitative* loss of the fullness of the truth symbolised in the brief ancient creeds. Such a loss was discerned in the displacement of the 'NAME' witnessed to in the creeds by an over-emphasis upon the *propositions* of belief.

Ultimately, for Maurice, the Scriptures provided that abundant resource for godly human life.[155] What was richly dispersed in Scripture was concentrated in the ancient creedal forms. It was precisely at this point that Maurice significantly undermined the fundamental articles tradition. One was enjoined to 'dig' into the language of faith enshrined in the early creeds.[156] From the centre of faith one continually moved further into the centre. This methodological prescription offered little incentive for the systematic development of Christian belief and discipleship. The implication was that this latter constructive theological task was of secondary significance for being a Christian in the Church.

Underlying Maurice's reticence for systematic statement of the faith, and his recommendation of the digging motif, was his fear of the conflict and division doctrinal dispute had generated. The only safe form of the articles tradition was the one that had been 'received'. In this respect the Scriptures and the ancient creeds were sufficient. Among other things, this stance revealed Maurice's own view that Christianity operated most interestingly and importantly not in doctrine but in social order. Hence, in *The Kingdom of Christ* Maurice could write of the English Reformation:

> Here the idea of the Church as a Spiritual Polity ruled over by Christ, and consisting of all baptized persons, did, owing to

> various providential circumstances, supersede the notion of a Church, as a sect, maintaining certain options; or to speak more correctly, the dogmatical side of Christianity was here felt to be its accessory and subordinate side, and the ordinances, which were the manifestation of it as the law of our social and practical life, were considered its principle side.[157]

It has been said of Maurice's Anglicanism that it was focussed on what was practically effective rather than what was theoretically true.[158] To the extent that this was true the Church was denied an important means by which its common practices and institutional forms could be critically evaluated and nourished. Specifically, it was no longer clear how theology could recall the Church to the truth of its life as bestowed by God.[159] This problem in Maurice's position was reflected in his handling of the fundamental articles tradition. In his attempt to overcome the dangers of doctrinal conflict Maurice had placed a theoretical restriction on the range of the fundamental articles tradition. The presupposition was that the received tradition was a sufficient doctrinal monitor for current Church practices. The implication was that the tradition had been completed, that henceforth the theological task was simply to bring current practice into correspondence with the truth symbolised in the 'old' creeds.

At this point Maurice's programme succumbed to the rather naive and dangerous view that the interconnections between the 'received' doctrinal tradition, its dispersal in the Scriptures, and contemporary Church life could, with a little 'digging', be exposed, and practice reformed accordingly. The *process* of making these linkages was urgent and difficult. It was also precisely the way in which the fundamental articles were reconstituted as truth-bearing tradition for the divine society.[160] The 'digging' motif and the emphasis upon the personal centre of faith indicated positive *directional* thrusts. However the potential dynamic implicit here was not fully realised. The tradition remained bounded by the provinciality of the ancient creeds. Maurice had argued for a God-centred ecclesiality but had forfeited an important means by which the truth at the centre could be communicated.

From the Mid-Nineteenth Century: Some Trajectories

It was axiomatic for Coleridge, Simeon, Newman and Maurice that believing *per se* constituted a true means of social cohesion. It was precisely their affirmation of this possibility that was reflected in their varied handling of the fundamental articles tradition. For Coleridge it was primarily a matter of uncovering the conditions for affirming the historic faith. For Simeon the tradition had a practical thrust with a focus on renewed religious subjectivity shaped in relation to evangelical doctrine. This was developed further by Newman in terms of the *range* of doctrinal truth believable in the church. It was precisely Maurice's restriction of the articles tradition that indicated his conviction that what was believed witnessed, not simply to personal opinions, but rather to the presence of the kingdom of God in society. In consequence, what was proposed for belief was offered upon the basis that such belief genuinely mediated the truth of God's relation to the world and that such belief could thus function as a true social unifier.

These convictions had to be reaffirmed in a post-Enlightenment environment increasingly complex and unsympathetic to Christian faith. Answers to some of the important issues raised for Christian faith and practice, such as those of human subjectivity, the nature of God's presence in the world, the dynamic of truth in history and the possibilities for godly social life, have been implicit in the way in which the fundamental articles tradition has been handled, with varying degrees of success, in the variety of exponents of the tradition explored in this Chapter.

The possibility that belief, and in this case Christian faith, could continue to operate as a genuine social unifier has remained relevant in the recent modern period. The prospect of finding common social meaning has also proved increasingly controversial. Post-Enlightenment developments have threatened an inner deconstruction of

the basic articles of Christian belief.[161] This field is massive and only a few brief comments can be made here in order to indicate the general trajectory of issues relevant to the operation of the fundamental articles tradition in modern Anglicanism.

Problems of Believing

When historical biblical criticism challenged the scriptual basis of fundamentals, Charles Gore and the *Lux Mundi* school attempted to assimilate criticism and to continue to defend the truth of all the articles of the creed.[162] However Gore's defence of the creedal doctrines, in particular the virgin birth and bodily resurrection of Christ, did not prevail over a more thoroughgoing 'symbolic' approach which appeared to offer a more flexible response to the problem of criticism than Gore's relatively objectivist stance.[163] This symbolic view became enshrined in the 1938 *Report of the Doctrine Commision of the Church of England.*[164]

One feature of the symbolic view of doctrine had important consequences for the articles tradition. This concerned the distinction made between the primary experiential base and its doctrinal formulations.[165] For William Sanday (1843-1920), this distinction took the form of *continuity of thought* and *relativity of expression.*[166] This move was designed to counter the 'unalterable deposit' theory of the articles tradition. Sanday was a New Testament scholar. His opponent, Norman Williams (1883-1943), was an able philosophical theologian who argued cogently for a more refined traditionalist stance.[167] Common to both theologians was an acknowledgement of a division in the creeds between 'metaphysical' and 'historical' truth. Controversy centered on the latter. Sanday wanted to treat this material more loosely and hence open to reinterpretation, whilst Williams proposed a more objectivist stance.[168]

Earlier, Henry Major in *The Gospel of Freedom* (1912), had advocated something similar to Sanday. Major suggested that in treating historical dogmas it was important to distinguish between the essential and non-essential parts in the dogma. The essential part in the dogma of the resurrection was

> that Christ's personality survived death and that He, in some mysterious way, convinced His Apostles of that fact ... The way in which Christ survived death and the means by which He communicated the fact of His survival to His Apostles is not of the essence of the dogma ..[169]

It was more cut and dried with the virgin birth. This historical dogma was not essential for the doctrine of the incarnation. The rationalist undercurrent was clear; failure to make the correct distinctions in matters of faith might have the effect of "weakening the hold of the dogma as a whole on the minds of some of the more logical and thoughtful of our congregation".[170]

Dean Inge saw clearly that what was at stake was a form of symbolic reductionism in the creedal articles, a development in which articles functioned as legal formularies for Church membership; a degradation of symbol into 'bare fact'.[171] The dangers of such a 'fixed point' theory of doctrine were also recognised among evangelical scholars.[172]

Symbolic reductionism, as Inge well knew, was no simple affair. The fate of the fundamental articles in the modern era seems tied up with how effectively theology can respond to the steady depreciation of the symbol richness of Christian belief.[173] However, to state the case in this way is to move beyond the problems posed by biblical and historical criticism. It is a different matter altogether to reconstitute Christian belief from within a framework in which the fundamental articles of faith have, it seems, been reduced to a collection of important ideas without any clear reference to Divine reality.[174] In such an account articles of faith become self-referencing and God can easily become the sum total of human values and opinions. This Feuerbachian scenario, a development of a Kantian

idealism,[175] was precisely what Newman, Maurice and Coleridge had, in their own ways, wrestled with over a century before. The fate of the fundamental articles tradition seems tied up with the way Christian theology can deal with this basic challenge to the tradition of theological realism.[176]

Bonding through Believing: Some Ecclesial Issues

Being one in the truth presupposes a *common* agreement on the truth that bonds. Increasing social fragmentation, however, has ensured that the fundamental articles tradition, as a strategy for expressing and securing ecclesial oneness, has remained highly controversial in Anglicanism.

Perhaps the most familiar context with which the tradition has been associated from the late nineteenth century has been directly ecclesiological. This is not surprising. The missionary thrust of the nineteenth century and the rapid expansion of Anglicanism into a world-wide communion has generated a concomitant development of an Anglican ecclesiology unencumbered by the peculiarities of its national church status in England.[177] Within this larger and fecund context the multiform character of the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church has emerged with fresh clarity and given birth to twentieth century ecumenism.[178] Thus, ironically, the missionary movement of the last century has generated new reflection on the scandal of ecclesial separateness. Being one Church has a new urgency as a gospel imperative: "That the world may believe that thou hast sent me" (John 17:21b).

Within this context the long established Anglican appeal to certain enduring fundamentals of Christianity has been a persistent theme in Anglican ecumenism since the nineteenth century.[179] In Chapter One of this thesis some more recent examples of the fundamentals appeal in inter-church dialogue have been noted, including

the Chicago-Lambeth Quadrilateral. These efforts have a long Anglican heritage to draw upon, including the example of William Wake, for whom the fundamental articles apologia proved an important strategy for communication across divided communions.[180]

This heritage was not lost on Charles Gore (1853-1932) who, during the Malines conferences in the 1920's proposed, as a basis for 'corporate reconciliation' of Orthodox, Anglican and Roman Communions, "acceptance of those articles of faith which fall under the Vincentian Canon ...."[181] For Gore this meant the fundamental doctrines:

> Those which have always been held and believed in the Church in substance. There has been no development in the doctrine but only in the terminology.[182]

Gore cited Newman's later views as support! For his own part Gore included in his list

> not only the doctrine of the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation, but the doctrine of the Atonement and of the inspiration of Scripture, of the visible Catholic church, of the sacraments as real instruments of specific divine gifts, of the resurrection of the body, of the intermediate state, of the day of judgment, of heaven and hell.[183]

Later, when Gore addressed the 1927 World Conference on Faith and Order at Lausanne on the subject of 'The Church's Common Confession of Faith', his list of fundamental doctrines went no further than the Apostolic and Nicene creeds.[184] This strategy was followed by another Anglican, Arthur Headlam (1862-1947), for whom the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental articles was at the basis of his proposals for Church reunion.[185]

Another tradition within Anglican ecclesiology has continued in critical relation to this highly embodied form. This ecclesial mysticism, a feature of the later William Law, re-emerged in the early decades of the twentieth century in, among others, the writings of William Ralph Inge (1860-1954). Inge was, not surprisingly, critical of Gore's proposals for unity based on the creeds. It implied that Gore's 'party', "cannot take any step that would divide them from the whole Church and the whole Church no longer exists, it has long ago

been shivered into fragments".[186]

For Inge the problems of Church disunity could not be overcome by invoking an appeal to some retrospective unity in certain articles of faith.[187] Seeking agreements in external confessions of belief, though perhaps worthy, was impractical.[188] In any case Inge was concerned with transcending traditional divisions and narrow institutionalism. In quoting Ignatius of Antioch 'Wherever Christ Jesus is, there is the Catholic Church', Inge wanted to stress that followers of the mystical tradition "are members of an undivided Church; for Christendom has never been divided in the chambers where good men pray and meditate".[189] This was not a recipe for isolationism, but belonged to Inge's view that the mysticial tradition was rooted in the essential features of Christianity and its values.[190] Furthermore, it offered a way to live in the Church in its disunity, and was open to the creative capacity of the emerging scientific culture.[191]

As observed in the case study on William Law, the tradition represented by Inge is not without its problems. It is, however, a legitimate form of the fundamental articles tradition in Anglicanism. Furthermore, it remains an important witness to the potential for renewal of the articles tradition as the horizon is extended beyond conventional ecclesial and intellectual boundaries.

Implicit in this present treatment of the tradition of fundamental articles has been the assumption that the truth of God is accessible, that it remains one in multiplicity, and that it ought to be able to operate as a bond of a society that is highly differentiated and increasingly complex.[192] When such assumptions become subject to dispute, as they have in the twentieth century, one interesting and important consequence is a widening gulf between the deployment of the fundamental articles tradition as a practical strategy for inter-ecclesial communication and bonding, and the attempt to reconstitute the tradition in relation to the major issues with which Christian

belief and discipleship have to wrestle. It seems that increasing institutional fragmentation has placed greater pressure to locate true social unifiers. Simple solutions to difficult problems too quickly commend themselves. In this context the articles tradition appears a ready candidate. As the history of the tradition clearly shows, this is as dangerous a procedure as it is a fruitful one to embark upon.

The inquiry in Parts One, Two and Three, and in particular the case studies of Part Three, have attempted to show how the tradition of fundamental articles does in fact connect with a wide range of issues concerning belief and discipleship, and cannot, for this reason, be understood simply as a theme of practical ecumenism. This is not to underrate its importance in this latter field. Indeed, the inquiry has revealed that disputation between churches over fundamental articles has repeatedly erupted because of the impact of differing conceptions of Christianity and the life it entails.

Within the wider context of issues of Christian belief and discipleship, and social, intellectual and scientific life, it is clear that Yves Congar's claim, that the question of fundamental articles has become an article of Anglican ecclesiology, is somewhat short-sighted. The tradition is one which is genuinely shared. At a general level the tradition is an attempt to express the bond believers have in Christ in the world. Why and how this operation of the tradition is significant for Church and theology remains on the theological agenda of all churches, and therefore of the Anglican Church. Further clarification of the issues involved here requires a systematic development of the tradition of fundamental articles which draws upon the historical resources presented in Parts Two and Three of this study. This task is taken up in the final section of this thesis.

PART IV

FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES: The Logic of the Tradition

Introduction

Following a preliminary placement of the theme of fundamental articles within Anglicanism and Christianity more generally, in Part One of this thesis, Part Two moved to the level of historical inquiry. The operation of the fundamentals tradition was traced through a number of phases in Anglican theology. The multiform and conflictive nature of Christianity provided the horizon against which this examination of the tradition was carried out. The tradition of fundamental articles was found to be an important and controversial strategy by which the identity and unity of the Church had been affirmed.

The presupposition common to the many exponents of the tradition was that Christianity remained one thing in its multiple forms over time, and that this unity provided the basis and impulse for the practice of being one-in-Christ. It was precisely the viability of this presupposition, however, that raised such difficult problems for the determination and function of fundamental articles in the history of the tradition. Indeed, controversy over the unity of Christianity accounted for the variety of ways in which the tradition underwent modification for the purpose of articulating the one-in-Christ bond in the Church. These issues were explored in greater detail and brought into sharper focus through analysis of the theme of fundamental articles in the case studies in Part Three of the thesis. In particular, Part Three drew attention to the operation of the tradition within the wider framework of the dynamics of faith in the Church and society.

Part Four of this study offers a more thoroughgoing systematic treatment of important issues that have emerged or are implicit in the examination of the tradition so far. For example, the study of

fundamental articles has revealed a dialectical relation between 'directional' and 'boundary' concerns in the operation of the tradition. Renewal of the tradition usually involved a recapturing of this dialectic and overcoming the strong drive to skew the tradition in the direction of ecclesial boundary-making concerns. Clearly, both directional and boundary concepts will be significant for the tradition's institutional operation. These and related issues require closer attention, a move facilitated by a shift from an historical and case study approach to fuller systematic inquiry.

The aim of this part of the thesis will be to explore what is important immediately and ultimately in fundamentals concern, to place the theme of fundamental articles within this larger framework, to identify interconnections, uncover presuppositions and point to areas of difficulty. What is being sought is not full explication of relevant issues but the development of a framework that enriches an understanding of the tradition in view. In this respect Part Four attempts to move beyond an understanding of the fundamental articles tradition that unnecessarily restricts its significance to a band of problem solving strategies more usually associated with the concerns of practical ecumenism. The aim, rather, is to clarify what is necessarily on the theological agenda in inquiry into the theme of fundamental articles in the Church.

Part Four of the thesis comprises four Chapters in which the logic of the fundamental articles tradition is successively uncovered. In Chapter Nine the essential ecclesiality of the tradition and its relevance to the one-in-Christ bond is examined as an issue of the *placement* of the tradition. This discussion gives rise to two strands of inquiry. First, the theme is developed as a problem of the *directional* nature of the tradition. Here, issues concerning the *impulse* for the tradition (Chapter Ten), and *communications* (Chapter Eleven), are examined. A second major strand emerging from Chapter Nine

is treated in Chapter Twelve as the the problem of the social dynamics of the tradition. Here, the operation of the tradition is considered as a feature of ecclesia's institutionality as such.

An important consequence of this approach is that the Anglican handling of the theme is placed within a more general ecclesiological framework. The methodology of Part Four leads to the development of some important perspectives on the tradition of fundamental articles in relation to ecclesiology and the nature and function of theology in the Church.

CHAPTER NINE

THE PLACEMENT OF THE TRADITION:

The Relevance of the Ecclesial Bond

The question here is relatively simple: why and how is the concept of fundamental articles significant ecclesiologically? The course of this inquiry indicates that there are many *practical* reasons why people in the Church invoke an appeal to the fundamental articles of the faith. Yet this makes even more important an inquiry into the *rationale* that informs the practice of stating the faith in fundamental articles. From another point of view the question concerns the truth of Yves Congar's claim, that the question of fundamental articles has become an article of ecclesiology in Anglicanism.[1]

Presupposition: The Ecclesiality of Christianity

The logic of the *ecclesial nature* of the fundamental articles of Christianity is first of all a question concerning the relationship between ecclesia and the nature of Christianity *per se*.[2] Within this admittedly complex issue at least three possibilities emerge. At one extreme a radical *disjunction* obtains, Church and Christianity remain in parallel, essentially unintegrated. This problem was perceived in the early nineteenth century by Friedrick Schleiermacher who, in depicting the antithesis between Protestantism and Catholicism, argued that

> the former makes the individual's relation to the Church dependent on his relation to Christ, while the latter contrariwise makes the individual's relation to Christ dependent on his relation to the Church.[3]

In the context in which these remarks were uttered it is clear that, so far as Schleiermacher was concerned, both Protestant and Catholic conceptions contained disjunctive elements. Protestantism, whilst holding fast to the reference to Christ, might forfeit 'the Christian principle' by dissolving the communion; Roman Catholicism, whilst

holding fast to this communion, was in danger of becoming un-Christian 'by neglecting the reference to Christ'.[4] Only the 'spirit of Christianity' which prevailed in the Church prevented these occurrences. The attempt to overcome this disjunctive conception assumes one of its most radical forms in an ecclesial mysticism, typified in this study by William Law. In this case both Christ and the Church coalesced in the heart of the believer. The danger here was an even more radical disjunction between spirit and matter.[5]

A second option is to conceive the relationship between Church and Christianity *generically*. According to this view Church is derived from a more general conception of Christianity. Generic categories open up a range of options. Thus the highly embodied and institutional conception of the Church as the 'extension of the incarnation' which carries on the work of Christ,[6] and a 'call type' ecclesiology, in which the Church comes into existence as people respond to the call of Christ in the Gospel,[7] both draw upon generic categories to depict the relationship between Church and Christianity.

A third way of understanding the relation between the Church and Christianity might be depicted as a relation of *co-inherence*. Whereas the former conception (generic) easily fostered a simple cause-effect, quasi-mechanistic dynamic between Christianity and Church,[8] the co-inherence conception overcomes the vestigial disjunctions present to varying degrees in the use of generic categories. Generic categories are not irrelevant but ultimately inadequate to this third way in which Church is conceived as *the social form of Christianity*. This notion is encapsulated in Karl Rahner's statement that 'a Christian *has* to be an ecclesial Christian'(my italics).[9]

In this third conception of the relation between ecclesia and the nature of Christianity, a problem arises which is present but obscured in the two former conceptualizations of the relation. Precisely because of the high focus on sociality *per se*, the problem of excessively

individualistic and privatised notions of Christianity - what has been described as the contemporary 'peril' of ecclesia[10] - is inescapable. The American Lutheran theologian, Edward Farley, writes:

> Individualism, the contemporary form of the Church's repression of its ecclesial dimension, is so close to us, so very much a part of us that it is almost beyond thematization.[11]

The force of individualism can be discerned across a range of theological traditions and becomes evident in "the omission of ecclesia in the formulation of the situation of faith and the pursuit of theological themes".[12] Farley argues that the phenomenon of individualism is a general one. A high focus on the institutionality of Christianity can simply mask the fact that "Face-to-face relation is displaced by the anonymity of the large and economically successful (non) congregation".[13]

Against this background the attempt to provide a rationale for Church as the social form of Christianity remains urgent and difficult. There have been important contributions to the discussion, of which Schleiermacher's was an early and significant example. In the twentieth century Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945) developed a view of the Church as 'Christ existing as the community'.[14] The social form of Christianity was not a secondary matter but arose in (was given with) relationship with God:

> Communion with God exists only through Christ, but Christ is present only in His church, hence there is communion with God only in the church. This fact destroys every individualistic conception of the Church.[15]

In this view *relational* categories have been important.[16]

Such endeavours indicate an attempt to identify those elements which justify true society. This has generated a conception pivotal to the entire enterprise: being with God is fundamentally *interpersonal.* With this category individualism appears to be overcome. An important task remains to show how the region of the interpersonal might cohere with or inter-relate with *all* that might be included in the sociality of being with God. The region of the

interpersonal may be too narrowly restricted to the extent that it is tied to a sociality developed *out of redemption* as such.[17]

Recently, an attempt has been made to *expand* the region of the interpersonal by locating the sociality relevant to Christianity in the structure of creation as such.[18] In this case redemption is not something fundamentally alien but is properly a 'reconstitution' of all that which is already present in creation.[19] In this reconstitution the elements of 'created sociality' are changed 'from within what they are'.[20] Such a conception is ultimately to be 'traced to the logos of God operative in creation'.[21] Some of the insights associated with this view will be found relevant to the discussion in this Chapter on the nature of the ecclesial bond.

It has been argued that a relation of co-inherence portrays most adequately the truth of the connection between ecclesia and the nature of Christianity: ecclesia *is* Christianity in its social form. Furthermore, attention has been drawn to the difficulty of identifying a fully social form of Christianity and to a possible way of achieving this by reference to 'created sociality'. The discussion suggests that the question of Christianity's social form is neither a secondary feature of Christianity, nor is it a settled matter in theology.[22] Consideration of the ecclesiality of Christianity and the elements of its true sociality, raises the question of the nature of the *ecclesial bond*, as the locus for the operation of the fundamental articles tradition.

The Locus of the Tradition: The Ecclesial Bond

Consideration of the ecclesial nature of Christianity presupposed that Christianity's social form must necessily be included in any account of the fundamentals of Christianity. To the extent that this is *not* the case, the relationship between ecclesia and the nature of Christianity betrays individualist and hence sub-social

presuppositions. This results in a consequent failure to recognise ecclesia as *the* saving entity and include it in the formulation of the situation of faith and the pursuit of theological themes.[23] This argu ment suggests the operation of a reflexive relation. *What is fundamental to Christianity has an ecclesial form: ecclesia is what is stated in the fundamentals of Christianity.* Thus the fundamentals of the ecclesial bond - those elements constitutive of the social form of Christianity - *are* the fundamentals of Christianity, ecclesially considered. This reflexivity is implicit in Richard Hooker's statement:

> The visible Church of Jesus Christ is therefore one, in outward profession of those things[one Lord, one Faith, one Baptism of initiation], which supernaturally appertain to the very essence of Christianity...[24]

Here the ecclesial bond is the locus for what is fundamental to Christianity: what is of the 'very essence of Christianity' has an ecclesial form.

To ask about the nature of the ecclesial bond is to inquire into those ways in which human beings are held together. Such an inquiry is difficult to pursue, for Church life is rich and diverse. This points to the fact that the Church is a highly complex social reality that resists simple thematization. At a general level, the ecclesial bond may be depicted as a *one-in-Christ* bond ('you are all one in Christ Jesus', Gal 3:28; cf. Col 3:11, John 17:11 & 22, Eph 2:14). A distinctly theological task is to determine how the one-in-Christ bond operates. Important here are questions concerning its basis, formation, endurance, expression and purpose. This suggests that the ecclesial bond is not a simple fact but complex and multidimensional, mirroring the vast range of ways by which human social bonds are formed and sustained.

It is possible to identify different levels within the ecclesial bond. At a primary level (ontological) the one-in-Christ bond is

constituted by God's own sociality. This can be depicted in a highly generalized form as the forming and enlarging of social life by the presence of God in creation and redemption.[25] The supposition here is that sociality has a transcendental basis; that the one-in-Christ bond is a way 'through which being displays itself'.[26] The proposal here is that God the Trinity is the primary unifier, the life giver of all that has, is or shall be.

The question of how this primary unity is *mediated*, draws attention to the need to identify 'intermediate' categories for God's presence in the world. Daniel Hardy has identified at least five; *place* (or territoriality), *polity* (social organization; including institutionality, laws, customs, political leadership); *economics* (mediums of exchange, production and distribution); *interpersonal relationships* (natural and 'spiritual' or friendship); *communication* (language, symbol and culture).[27] These categories are by no means exhaustive.[28] By and through these categories social formation is made possible and social bonding can be realized.

But the *ecclesial* bond is a one-in-Christ bond; *it is quite particular.* How is it developed from the foregoing? Strictly speaking the *ecclesial* bond is not so much a different kind of category but depicts a way of being bonded *within* the above categories. Such intermediate categories constitute the fundamental perspectives through which the ecclesial bond is expressed and operates. The particularity of the ecclesial bond is that this bond expresses what being one-in-Christ entails within the basic forms of human and created sociality. The presupposition here is that in Christ, God effected a reconstitution of the basic forms of social life. This reconstitution "is what forms from created sociality a truly redeemed sociality".[29]

The issues raised in this Chapter are complex and only a brief sketch has been offered as to how an understanding of the nature and dynamic of the ecclesial bond might be developed. The argument of the

Chapter is now developed in relation to the concept of fundamental articles.

The Task of the Tradition: Mediation of the Ecclesial Bond

In terms of the intermediate categories previously identified it is clear that the doctrinal domain of Christianity (the domain of the fundamental articles concept) belongs to the general area of communications and specifically the region of the symbolic.

From the above perspective doctrines - understood in their more general sense as pertaining to what is believed, taught and confessed in and by the Church [30] - have to do with the *symbolically mediated forms of the ecclesial bond.* Insofar as doctrine represents this bond in language, doctrine concerns the *symbolic verbalizations* of the ecclesial bond. Doctrine is thus a linguistic strategy for expressing the truth of ecclesia. In this respect David Tracy refers to the "genre 'doctrine'.....as a crucial 'corrective' genre to refine, formulate, clarify, and explicate certain central beliefs of the Christian community..".[31] Furthermore, the region of the symbolic itself, and hence Christian doctrine, constitutes a primary intermediate category by which the ecclesial bond is mediated and communication thereby facilitated. Moreover, doctrine's symbolizing function gives it the capacity to render in language the truth of *all* the constituents of the ecclesial bond. Yet in performing this function the genre 'doctrine' evidences a quite particular category constitutive of that bond.

This leads to a definition of *fundamental* doctrines as *those theological statements in which the truth of the one-in-Christ bond receives determinate and concentrated form.* In terms of Bernard Lonergan's identification of various types of doctrines, fundamental doctrines might be most naturally associated with what Lonergan calls 'Church doctrines'. Though, from another point of view, Lonergan's discussion would seem more relevant to an understanding of the process

by which fundamental belief comes to form at different stages in the differentiation of human consciousness.[32] An important conclusion of the above argument is that the articles tradition belongs to those intermediate forms through which the presence of God as primary social unifier is manifest.

The mediational function of doctrine in its specialised form as fundamental articles has been already identified. This can be further clarified by considering the 'subjective' dimension of the symbolic element of the ecclesial bond. One effect of *stating* the truth of God as primary unifier in the one-in-Christ bond is to draw into consciousness what is already present and implicit for faith.[33] In the process of symbolic verbalization the truth of Christianity is elucidated and made clear to consciousness. Symbolic objectification thus includes a subjectivity appropriate to faith seeking understanding. This suggests that in stating the doctrines of faith something is being added. This is true in the qualified sense that what is happening is enlargement of understanding of what is already present. What is thus added is not a secondary 'overlay' upon some primary reality.[34] The danger here is of reducing the region of the symbolic to that of mere human artifact, merely cultural conventions for human communication.[35] Doctrine's mediational function includes a necessary subjective mode in which understanding and communication occur. The supposition here is that in the forming of doctrine in the Church the one-in-Christ bond is actually enlarged and strengthened. Expressed in another way, the argument supposes that through the doctrinal form the primary reality of God is genuinely mediated.

In terms of the argument of this Chapter stating the faith in fundamental articles is a deed of the Church; a strategy through which the constituents of the one-in-Christ bond are expressed in concentrated symbolic form. Accordingly, the appeal to fundamental articles provides a way of articulating an understanding of the Church

in relation to God and the world. What the truth might be in this regard, is stated in the fundamental articles. On this account doctrine represents an instance of God's action in the world, a determinate form of *logos* communication. Insofar that this communication brings to consciousness and enlarges understanding of the truth of God already present, the tradition of fundamental articles operates as a strategy to shape and strengthen the Church's bond in Christ. The kind of argument developed above provides what would seem to be the necessary minimum conditions for an adequate account of believing as a true social unifier.[36]

In this Chapter a way of stating Christianity's fundamental articles has been proposed which does not treat as secondary the ecclesial nature of the tradition. This position finds some support in the persistent treatment in Anglicanism of the fundamental articles of Christianity in relation to the highly controversial issue of the terms of communion.[37] Furthermore, as observed in Chapter Three, identifying 'agreed communal belief' was an important constraint in the development of the concept of the purity of doctrine in the English Reformation.[35]

It might quite properly be argued that the fundamental articles tradition does not merely concern ecclesiology *per se*. Implicit in such a view is a loci method which tends to treat a range of themes in theology as separate units. Some of the issues this method raises for fundamental articles will be examined in the 'excursus' at the end of Chapter Eleven. At this stage, however, it is important to note that if the above objection is granted the priority of the social form of the truth of Christianity is displaced. The implication is that there are other important matters besides ecclesiology, and that some ranking is necessary here.[39] This is not directly in question. However, an inevitable consequence of putting the issue in the above manner is that the ecclesiality of Christianity, in spite of vigorous attempts to rehabilitate it, is ultimately sacrificed to other more

central concerns.[40]

The above issue needs to be 'put' in a different way. The question is more properly, how are the fundamental articles of Christianity to be stated from the perspective of the social form of truth? On this account the ecclesial nature of Christianity is more than mere *context*.[41] This is already implicit in the discussion of primary and secondary unifiers in the ecclesial bond.

Minimally, what is implied here is a different way of appropriating theology's conventional themes and important doctrines. The suggestion is that the doctrines of God, salvation, the human person, church and creation, are capable of being treated in a manner which displays their ecclesial form. What this might involve remains as yet largely undetermined. It is explored a little further at the end of Chapter Eleven.[42] What is being proposed here is a method that gives scope for a fresh reordering of fundamental doctrine. Conventional ways of stating what is important and assigning relative fundamentality are no longer normative for the articles tradition. The reference point is God in ecclesiality. The form of the fundamental articles tradition is derived from and interrelated to the nature and dynamic of the one-in-Christ bond and all that this might include.

This development of the ecclesiological significance of the tradition moves beyond the rather narrow confines of denominational pragmatics, a position implicit in Yves Congar's claim that the question of fundamental articles has become an article of ecclesiology in Anglicanism. The theme of fundamental articles can not be restricted to the ecclesiological concerns of one particular communion, but has relevance to all efforts to find and state the truth of God in ecclesiality. The preliminary placement of the fundamental articles tradition in Christianity proposed in this Chapter is developed in a number of directions in the three Chapters that follow.

CHAPTER TEN

THE DIRECTION OF THE TRADITION:

The Problem of Capacity

Chapter Nine offered a brief account of the *placement* of fundamental articles in Christianity. As a result a number of important issues emerged concerning the operation of the tradition as an intermediate form for the mediation of the ecclesial bond. Some of these issues concerning the nature of Christianity, strategies for communication and the significance of Christianity's institutional forms, were identified in a preliminary way in Chapter One of the thesis.[1]

These issues will be developed as the problem of the direction of the tradition's movement (Chapters Ten and Eleven) and the social dynamics of the tradition (Chapter Twelve). Directional concerns are pursued in this Chapter in terms of the question, what capacitates articles of faith? In this regard the contemporary problem of the loss or diminution of capacity provides the basis for an exploration of some possible ways of construing fundamental articles. This leads to consideration of the concept of *fundament* as the capacitator (or impulse) of the tradition. The concept of *fundament* is developed further in Chapter Eleven. Here the problem of directions is not considered in terms of *impulse* but as a process of *communication.* This view considers some important features of the tradition of fundamental articles as a communications system in which a structured response of faith is sought. A recurring sub-theme throughout both Chapters is the impact of the dialectic between doctrine and fundament upon the effort to state the faith in the form of fundamental articles. Chapter Eleven concludes with an important excursus on the problem of identifying the genre of regulative communication. The fundamental articles tradition is, in this way, located within a family

of strategies designed to communicate the faith.

An exhaustive consideration of these issues is neither necessary nor possible here. The aim will be to identify relevant issues, point to their interconnections and clarify the framework for the operation of the tradition of fundamental articles examined in Parts One, Two and Three.

Loss of Capacity

Motivations for identifying the fundamentals of Christianity vary. In Chapter One it was proposed that ideally such an activity arises from and is informed by a concern for the truth present and witnessed to in the Church.[2] It was suggested that inquiry into the fundamentals of Christianity was pursued in the Church because it believed the truth of its life was accessible. Yet precisely because of the nature of the truth present, the Church found communication difficult to achieve. To cope with this difficulty strategies were developed in the Church to express the truth of its life in Christ. Furthermore, the Church considered this endeavour worthwhile insofar as it was fuelled by the conviction that the truth as given in Jesus Christ (Eph 4:21b) was the basis of its life and hope (1 Cor 3: 11).

It is precisely the supposition that concern for fundamentals indicates an orientation towards truth that has become problematic for theology in the 'post' or 'late modern' period of the twentieth century.[3] Whilst truth finding should ideally motivate inquiry into what is fundamental in the Church, it has become unclear what the ecclesial bond witnesses to and is capacitated by. In other words, the assumption that the constituents of the ecclesial bond operate as intermediate forms of the presence of *God*, has become problematic. Specifically, a question arises as to whether the fundamental articles of Christianity 'reach back' to, and in consequence mediate, the

primary reality of God present and witnessed to in the one-in-Christ bond. The question of truth in contemporary theology and hence the question of the truth of the fundamental articles tradition have become problems of ecclesia's 'reality reference'.[4]

Specifically, the problem that now faces theology in the Church has been portrayed by Edward Farley as "the loss or diminution of reality in contemporary Christendom".[5] For various reasons it has become unclear in the Church whether and how its language, stories, symbols, rituals and doctrines refer to and thus mediate the reality of God. Uncertainty about this has provided the fertile ground for a debasement of ecclesia's forms to the extent that such forms are perceived as evidence of merely human interactions. One result is that it ceases to be entirely clear that those intermediate forms of ecclesial life - including the symbolic region in which doctrine is to be located - are orientated towards, and capacitated by, ecclesia's transcendental basis presupposed in its being one-in-Christ. Confusion here signals a retreat from the richer and primary bonding generated by God's presence in society: *social bonding is understood as a human work but not so clearly as a godly one.*

A hitherto shared conviction that faith "witnesses to distinctive transcendent, human and historical realities",[6] has come under suspicion in recent years. Does faith apprehend any distinguishing realities? Could it be that there are no realities at all revealed in the language (including the testimony, the story telling, the liturgical expressions) of the historical faith; that faith involves no cognizing, no apprehensions at all? These suspicions have been fuelled by challenges of a Feuerbachian kind[7], and the relativing of the historical dimension of faith's references through historical criticism. These suspicions are not confined to academic thought but take their cue, argues Farley, from the sense of loss or diminution of reality reference apparent in Western Christendom.[8]

As a consequence of this suspicion, the traditional disputes over theological method (criteriology) have been replaced by the prior problem of whether or not faith apprehends any distinctive realities at all; the problem beneath the problem of theological method. It is a question of the subject matter to which theology attends. Theology does have subject matter of a phenomenal kind which has empirical dimensions extending out of the past into the present cultus. However, the presence of distinctive cultic, linguistic and literary phenomena are at best 'vehicles' for the realities faith apprehends. Farley argues that "If theology accedes to the total translation of its subject matter into these phenomena, it ceases to be theology".[9]

Even a cursory review of the origins, developments, persons, and events of Christianity reveals, according to Farley,

> a prevailing consensus that faith is directed to realities which are unreducible to the images, experiences or behaviours of this historical religion.....which transcends its own determinacy, representations and theology.[10]

Significant here is the reality loss or diminution spoken of by Farley. It results in a rapid implosion of faith's realities into the empirically describable content of faith (cultic behaviour, language games, self-understanding, historical essence). Theology is left with a 'vehicular' subject matter as its defining content. Believing in God turns into believing in believing in God! This is precisely the thoroughgoing subjectivizing alternative that Farley and others would want to resist, for it ultimately raises doubts about the subject matter of theology and faith.[11]

When the nature of the reality that ecclesial existence witnesses to becomes problematical, it is clear that this state of affairs will be reflected in the kind of status accorded to theology and by implication fundamental Christian beliefs. In this context doctrines are susceptible of being treated as simply collections of ideas conventionally considered to be important even if somewhat puzzling.[12] These kinds of issues surfaced in the treatment of the fundamental

articles tradition in Chapter Eight. This led to the brief discussion of the problem of believing as a source of social cohesion in modern Christianity.[13]

The 'antidoctrinalism'[14] and 'antisymbolic'[15] mood of contemporary Christianity belongs to a much larger environment. Important in this wider framework is the loss of confidence in the possibility of finding common meaning and communal norms. This has arisen, in part at least, due to a deconstructivist and fragmented cultural and intellectual climate in which, among other things, the possibility of finding reality through language has been surrendered.[16] This condition fuels the suspicion that Christian doctrine can no longer function as a witness to divine reality. This problem in Christian speech reveals itself as a *particular* instance of a more general loss of the sense of the presence of God.

Identifying Capacity: The Impulse for Articles

Uncertainty over the presence of God in the world and human society poses immense problems for the tradition of theological realism.[17] Indeed, it raises quite sharply the question of whether a fully realist theological stance remains a possibility. The attempt to grapple with this issue can be observed in the development of some quite sophisticated responses for the handling of doctrine. These responses have important implications for the nature and function of the tradition of fundamental articles. A spectrum of options for the handling of articles of faith is found to be relevant within the tradition of theological realism.

Conventional Objectivism

One extremity evidences a *conventional objectivism.* This is characterised by a reassertion of a 'classical' propositional view of doctrine. It is underpinned by the assumption of a one-to-one

correspondence between word and object. George Lindbeck notes that the tendency of this view is to "take a particular formulation of a doctrine (e.g. a particular description of the resurrection) as a truth claim with objective or ontological import..".[18]

The projection of the classical view into the critical pluralism of late modernity easily falls prey to a naive realism.[19] As ontological pure 'givens', articles of faith are sacralized. The result is that they are no longer able to function as witnesses to faith's central realities. Attention is transferred from what is primary to its mediate form. Divine reality is pressed into linguistic formulas that are unalterable and irreversible. This tendency was already observed in Chapter Eight of this thesis in the exchange between the two Anglican scholars, Norman Williams and William Sandy, in the second decade of this century.[20] In conventional objectivism, articles of faith operate as linguistic *controls* upon sacred reality. The manoeuvre easily becomes skewed in the direction of theological boundary maintenance in the interests of institutional security.

By investing too much weight in particular language forms this procedure reveals a misguided response to the problems of ecclesia's reality reference in contemporary culture. An important consequence of this view of the articles tradition is its inability to account for the complexities of doctrinal development. This fact was clearly shown in the general Anglican response to Newman's theory of development of doctrine.[21] More significantly, the over-formalization of the tradition forfeits the *intimedness* and contingency of faith for an illusion of security. What is thus eliminated is the possibility of 'surprise'.[22] An important presupposition here is that the purity of statements of faith are maximally achieved by extrapolation from historical contingency.

Historically, an objectivist handling of the fundamental articles tradition in Anglicanism seems to have been associated with a drive to

eliminate the contribution of contingency and human subjectivity. Locke had recognised the dangers of fallible human ideas being imposed upon communities of faith. This had led to his highly reductivist proposals for the articles of faith, and brought into question the whole enterprise of systematic theology.[23] Similarly, underlying Waterland's vigorous reassertion of the tradition in a tight and hardened form, was a desire to overcome the dangers of what he perceived as undisciplined rationality.[24] For nineteenth century exponents of the tradition, such as Newman and Maurice, the issue of human subjectivity was critical.[25] William Palmer's critique of the fundamentals apologia was quite clearly associated with his fear of the contaminating effects of rationalism.[26] This fear gives added significance to the heavy investment by Anglicans in their appeal to a pre-established and secure patristic consensus in fundamentals.[27]

The Domain of Subjectivity

As a counterpoise to conventional objectivism the other extremity of the theological spectrum locates the impulse for the articles tradition within the realm of human religious subjectivity. When correctly understood this tradition more properly belongs firmly *within* the spectrum. It has been developed with some subtlety and sophistication from the time of Schleiermacher, and has been identified by George Lindbeck as representing an experiential-expressivist theory of doctrine.[28]

Important in considering the fate of the articles tradition is the disjunction implied in this view between human experience as the bearer of divine reality and doctrine as human reflection; a secondary activity somewhat distanced from the realm of divine-human encounter.[29] This notion opens up certain options within a realist framework which will be discussed below. However, an important point is that this *particular* 'interpretive' theory of doctrine[30] can lead to a radical

distortion of doctrine's mediational and witnessing function. Insofar as the central doctrines of the theological tradition (e.g. Christology, Trinity) are considered to represent the impositions of fallible human interpretations of the life of Jesus, the articles of faith merely mediate human distortion.[31] It remains unclear *how* such reflections genuinely *reflect* the truth of God's presence.

Articles and Autonomous Subjectivity

The domain of subjectivity can be developed from an overtly 'anti-realist' or 'instrumentalist' framework. Here

> religious language provides a useful, even uniquely useful, system of symbols which is action-guiding for the believer but [is] not to be taken as making reference to a cosmos-transcending being in the traditional sense.[32]

In this situation articles of faith become identified as products of human activity derived from nothing more, it seems, than the profundities of human expectations. This development is exemplified in the writings of the Anglican Don Cupitt, for whom human beings are the creators of the many realities that are.[33] Within this context religious language offers symbolizations of the development of human consciousness and personhood[34]. God as such becomes a "unifying symbol that eloquently personifies and represents to us everything that spirituality requires of us".[35] Thus for Cupitt, Christianity is redeveloped as 'autonomous spiritual practice' with strong ethical implications.[36]

Articles of faith no longer refer to an 'objective personal God'.[37] Cupitt suggests that "The old language is still used, but the modern believer should use it expressively rather than descriptively".[38] There occurs here a radical implosion of the articles of faith into personal ideals.[39] A corollary of this sacralizing of the autonomy of human experience is a respiritualizing of the articles of faith. However their sacredness belongs to a fundamentally

individualist ethic.[40]

Both conventional objectivism and *radicalized* human subjectivity represent attempts to respond to the problem of God and human freedom in contemporary life. In terms of the articles tradition this leads, in the former case, to objectification of articles as an overcompensating response to unrestricted subjectivism.[41] In the latter case, articles of faith are emptied of any reference beyond one's personal ideals. This latter development signals an attempt to find release from what is perceived as a 'spiritually oppressive' God 'out there' blocking human 'attainment of full self-consciousness'.[42]

In both cases the articles tradition suffers damaging displacement. At one extreme articles of faith are so objectified that they are no longer able to witness to Divine reality. This is as distorting and dangerous as the displacement of the tradition into the region of human ideals.

Moves within the theological spectrum are varied and sophisticated. Lindbeck's typology,[43] though useful and provocative, seems unable to take adequate account of the subtlety and range of ways of handling doctrine *within* the categories he has identified.[44] The reference to a 'theological spectrum' provides at least a formal way of recognising the typological problem in relation to doctrine. It needs much more careful development than can be offered here. Its configuration will probably be quite complex. This Chapter has been concerned with the question, what capacitates the fundamental articles tradition? Two extreme positions, 'conventional objectivism' and 'autonomous subjectivity', have been plotted. Within the spectrum there is a certain fluidity and overlap.

A Qualified Realism

In various ways the drive to state the faith belongs to a wider concern for theology's mediating function in relation to God, human

beings and the world. To the extent that this task is construed primarily as a problem of *corresponding to revelation*, the articles are implicated in the development of modified propositional views of doctrine. Naive realism is here eschewed in favour of more sophisticated theories of correspondence in which a 'real' relation is posited between what is really there and its linguistic forms. On this account articles of faith are generated out of what is *given* for faith to apprehend.

Thus, for Karl Barth correspondence is derived from the action of God as Trinity. The articles tradition is a 'graced' response informed by an encounter with the work and activity of God in his Word. Accordingly the fundamental articles tradition ideally operates in dynamic relation with God's prevenient activity.[45] This basic position has been developed by the Scottish theologian T.F. Torrance, who speaks of existence-statements, "which refer to an objective reality above and beyond them, and which are true in terms of that reference",[46] and coherence statements, "which have their truth in their inter-relations or with reference to a system of ideas ..".[47] Theological statements are, for Torrance, of the first sort,

> they refer to the Being and Existence of God as the given reality .... they are derived from God, and have their truth from Him and not in themselves .... they arise *a posteriori* out of an actual encounter with objective reality, while the nature of that reality determines the kind and mode of empirical reference they involve.[48]

This strong realism nevertheless avoids the trap of conventional objectivism. Theological statements 'have their truth *from* Him and *not in themselves*'(my italics).

For Hans Urs Von Balthasar, corresponding to revelation involves aesthetic considerations. The mystery of Christianity has an inner form to be discerned by the light of faith as it attends to what is given.[49] Christ constitutes the 'fundamental form'.[50] The *visio Christi* - 'the material heart and centre of his theology'[51] - is manifested in the 'transparency' of ecclesia's mediate forms which

receive their form from the form of Christ.[52] Thus " a person does not stake his life for one article of faith, but for Jesus Christ and his indivisible truth, which shines forth from each individual article".[53]

These three theologians express, in their own ways, a common answer to the question of what capacitates the fundamental articles of faith. Such articles receive their nature from God. However, the correspondence implied here can never be isomorphic for it is a correspondence with God who is being in plenitude.[54]

In this study of the fundamental articles tradition in Anglicanism this general line of approach has been found in Hooker[55] drawing upon Aquinas,[56] and later in the mystical theology of William Law. Important differences remain, not least being Law's radical interiorization of faith. At a deeper level, Law's understanding of doctrine was developed in relation to the dynamic of God as 'soul presence'. What was foundational, the life of the Trinity within, was witnessed to in the fundamental articles of the faith. Articles of faith represented a linguistic overflow of God's presence.[57] The correspondence was genuine but could be never isomorphic for doctrine operated as a *response* to the *plenitude* of God's own being. Insofar as articles of faith are capacitated from this source and directed towards this object they remain necessarily unfinished. The purity of the tradition is an essentially eschatological concept.[58] Accordingly, the articles tradition, within these options, is fundamentally a tradition open to criticism and revision.[59]

Articles: The Experiential Ground

Problems in the above view concern the contribution of contingency and human experience to the ongoing task of theology. This area remains contested.[60] It is, after all, human beings whose apprehension of the divine life receives expression in faith's formulations. Inquiry into articles of faith will, in some way, have to take account of human

experience as the field from within which the impulse to speak of God arises. However to put the issue in this way is to move towards the other end of the spectrum of theological realism. In contemporary theology this has been linked with the Kantian 'turn to the subject' and given classic expression in Protestantism in Friedrich Schleiermacher's analysis of religious subjectivity. However, this fundamentally *experiential* tradition in Christianity, in which personal religious experience has an important epistemological significance, has a long and rich history.[61] This larger tradition links Calvin's *pietas* (inward reverence and love) and Schleiermacher's *pistis*.[62] In both cases religious experience operated as a control on a doctrinal tradition's overreaching itself beyond the limits of experience into speculative theology. For Schleiermacher such a move was not so much sinful (as it was for Calvin) as simply unable to generate dogmatics which began *in* piety.[63]

Articles: Piety Confessionalized

Schleiermacher's point of departure, or rather radicalization of the articles tradition, was to be located in his programmatic refusal of the hitherto generally recognised cognitive element in revelation. Revelation was not 'originally and essentially *doctrine*'[64] but piety - "a modification of feeling or immediate self-consciousness".[65] In Christianity piety was informed by the 'original impression'[66] of Christ the redeemer. The displacement of the cognitive element in religion undermined a Protestant doctrinal formalism. This move did not entail a rejection of the notion of fundamental articles but rather their displacement.[67] Confessions remained important and necessary, though now priority was given to the spirit rather than the letter.[68] What resulted was a modified appeal to fundamental articles of faith:

> since in the confessional documents, at least of the second stage, Reformed modes of presentation are directed against Lutheran, and vice versa, it must be admitted at the outset that only that part of the confessional documents in which they all agree can be

really essential to Protestantism ..[69]

Schleiermacher did not elaborate further though the argument would not have been unfamiliar to early Anglican exponents of the fundamental articles tradition for whom a general Protestant consensus in faith was more important than fully defined belief.[70]

Schleiermacher regarded Christian doctrine as "nothing but the expressions given to the Christian self-consciousness and its connexions".[71] This was not meant to give licence for arbitrary speculation: "For there is an inner experience to which they [Christian dogmas] may all be traced: they rest upon a *given*".[72] The 'given' in this case not being equated with a specific quantifiable corpus of revelation but rather an inner relation to the redeemer.[73] Hence, dogmatics had "simply the fundamental inner fact of christian piety which it postulates".[74] Doctrines had "their ultimate ground so exclusively in the emotions of the religious self-consciousness that where these do not exist the doctrines cannot arise".[75] Doctrine thus bore "witness to the determinations of the religious self-consciousness as inward certainty".[76] Here, the articles tradition was reworked as an account of the Christian religious affections set forth in speech.[77]

Schleiermacher's handling of the problem of the 'whence' of doctrine was sophisticated and programmatic for a great deal of subsequent liberal Protestant theology.[78] For Schleiermacher, doctrine was 'derived' from only one 'source' - the self-proclamation of Christ.[79] Its region of 'interest' was but one - the religious self-consciousness.[80] Dogmatic propositions arose out of "logically ordered reflection upon the immediate utterances of the religious self-consciousness".[81] What was given for consciousness as such was the redeeming work of Christ inwardly appropriated. Doctrine was properly Christian only as it expressed this inner relation. The catalyst for the forming of doctrine was the 'impression' of the Redeemer. Doctrine represented a stage in the development of the self-awareness of

Christian piety.[82] The purpose of the continuing conceptualization of faith within a community was to filter out impure statements of Christian piety, i.e. those that were not directed to being in relation to the Redeemer.[83]

It was clearly then not the case for Schleiermacher that articles of faith were simply arbitarily spun out of the human imagination. What was revealed, however, was at most *indirectly* referenced in doctrine.[84] Correspondence seemed to be as strong or weak as the consciousness of redemption as such. Reference operated within the limitations of the religious self-consciousness. An indirect disclosure of God was possible in the self's experience of self. This has led one commentator to identify here a form of 'relational knowing' rather than 'objective knowledge'.[85]

Perhaps an underlying difficulty with this approach was the failure of Schleiermacher to provide an adequate account of doctrine as *response* to God. By rejecting the region of the cognitive as a constituent of revelation it was difficult to see how doctrine could contribute to the enlargement of faith's apprehension of the Redeemer. What was lacking was a rationale for the truth of doctrine as *piety forming.* Doctrine was rather *piety formed.* It witnessed to *piety* and in its most highly refined conceptual forms doctrine 'guided the expressions of piety'.[86] Doctrine was primarily a response to piety and only indirectly a response to God.[87]

Articles: The 'Affectional Transposition'

Schleiermacher's approach did represent an important strategy for purifying the fundamental articles tradition from within, and represented, at a most general level, an example of what Jaroslav Pelikan calls the 'affectional transposition' of doctrine.[88] This move had been important for those within Anglicanism attempting to break the rigidities of overformalised belief. In the early history of the

fundamentals tradition in Anglicanism this transposition of doctrine into the experiential and performative regions of Christian life can be detected in Chillingworth. He orientated the fundamental articles of faith towards a life of Christian integrity, realised in seeking and practising the truth.[89] This ethical thrust became more pronounced in the writings of the later Caroline Divines such as Hammond and Taylor.[90] It was Taylor who said "A holy life will make our belief holy".[91]

Charles Simeon continued, in his own evangelical way, to exemplify this 'affectional transposition of doctrine'.[92] With William Law and Samuel Coleridge it was probably less an 'affectional transposition' and more "a new way of taking the believing self into the theological program".[93] This orientation has appealed to many Anglicans from the late nineteenth century who, in their anxiety to affirm the viability and security of agreed communal belief, have located the fundamentals of Christianity in the region of common religious experience.[94]

Within this general experiential domain important differences have obtained. They were exemplified in the nineteenth century in the two quite different strands represented by Schleiermacher and Coleridge. Thus in Coleridge, for whom a human being's total capacity for God included the cognitive faculty, articles of faith were not a secondary feature of being in relation to God, but were constitutive as such. A right affirmation of the Trinitarian articles of faith was nourishing and faith enlarging.[95]

Articles as 'Response'

Schleiermacher has been presented as an early modern example of how the articles tradition has been handled within the experiential-expressivist mould. In the twentieth century the experiential tradition has generated and been enriched by important developments that have taken place in hermeneutics and understandings of human experience.[96]

Such developments point to the fact that whatever is stated in the articles tradition must somehow be a response to the diversity of human engagements with the world and God. Doctrine cannot be without experience as its 'companion'.[97]

From the perspective of this inquiry into the impulse for the articles tradition a major issue relates to the 'quality of response' possible for a human subject who merely 'interprets' and 'reflects' upon experience. Response, in this case, easily assumes a passive quality which may not do justice to the creative ways in which human beings live in society in relation to God.[98] This suggests that the notion of articles as *response* ought not be reduced to the effort of 'the solitary self-communicating self' but be understood as a form of communication emerging out of a fundamentally social activity in relation to God.[99] In this latter view statements of faith would operate as witnesses to the truth of those common practices by which human beings were related to each other and God.[100] This view was implicit in the discussion in Chapter Nine of the relationship between the fundamental articles tradition and the ecclesial bond.

Articles: From Experience to Rule

Difficulties with the notion of a theological spectrum begin to emerge with the attempt to incorporate what has been more recently espoused in theological circles by George Lindbeck as the rule theory of doctrine.[101] Lindbeck has developed this in relation to an understanding of religion as analogous to a 'cultural-linguistic system'. This view abandons the notion that the source of religion is in 'prior experience'. Instead, it stresses "the degree to which human experience is shaped, moulded, and in a sense constituted by cultural and linguistic forms".[102] Thus, to become religious "involves becoming skilled in the language, the symbol system of a given religion".[103] The supposition is that different religious systems "produce fundamentally

divergent depth experiences of what it is to be human".[104] The story and language of a religion is "the medium in which one moves, a set of skills that one employs in living one's life".[105] In this context doctrine functions as the abiding grammar which informs and shapes a community's faith and life.[106]

Within this functionalist or rule theory of doctrine, inquiry into the 'whence' of the community *credenda* ceases to be relevant.[107] The inner rationale for those regulative rules which apparently constitute the source of unity throughout cultural and theological changes[108] remains unclear.

Another way to approach the issues raised here is to ask, what quality of response is implied in the rule theory of doctrine? The transposition of articles of faith into 'meta-linguistic rules' certainly modifies the nature of articles. Whilst articles might express the dynamics of communal life and purpose it is no longer clear whether their reference reaches back to the truth of *God*.[109] By carving out a protected space for statements of faith rule theory *confirms* the loss or dimunition of reality reference in ecclesial life. Articles of faith loose their publicness.[110]

Nicholas Lash endorses Lindbeck's regulative theory in his own depiction of doctrine as 'protocol'.[111] Lash suggests that we 'require' some such summary or regulative grammar as a means of protection and purification of communal thought and life against pressures from within and without which

> incline us to opt for 'irrelation': to treat persons as things, and to bind the mystery of God into the It-world .... We *require* some 'set of protocols against idolatry', against the manifold forms of the illusion that the nature of God lies within our grasp.[112]

In Lash's view creedal declaration has an 'identity-sustaining function', and rules of discourse ideally function as 'the regulative pattern of the pedagogy of contemplative practice'.[113]

When rule theory is developed in terms of its intrinsic necessity,

it is unclear how or why rules might arise except as response to the ever-present dangers of idolatry. This is legitimate and necessary but it is an essentially negatively informed rationale.[114] Furthermore, a question arises as to why certain rules and not another. If certain rules have in fact fulfilled this function of ecclesial purity over time the urgency of the question is not thereby abated but merely intensified.

Ultimately the question is whether rule theory is able to take cognizance of the strong realism it tacitly presumes but from which, publicly at least, it appears to retreat.[115] Lindbeck's discussion of religious utterances obtaining a 'performative' ontological correspondence might end up leaving theology stranded in the region of *semi-realism*.[116] Ultimately, the truth of performance has to be judged not simply in relation to certain rules. If ecclesial practice is to express the transformative presence of God, then the rules informing such practice are more than *mere* rules, they concern people in society being in relation to God, and thus concern transcendentals (those necessary notes of being) mediated in and through the one-in-Christ bond.

In this Chapter various options have been identified for the handling of doctrine in relation to the impulse or capacitator of articles of faith in Christianity. In particular, the lack of consensus as regards the impulse for the tradition has uncovered what is problematic to theological discourse *per se*, and by implication, to the development of fundamental articles of faith. This problem concerns the notion of ecclesia's *fundament* or founding reality.[117]

Capacity as *Fundament*

In Chapter Nine the concept of 'fundament' was found relevant to the discussion of the primary and secondary (intermediate) unifiers of the ecclesial bond. The notion of fundament is a layered concept. In

its primary form it concerns God's own being. In its secondary form the concept of fundament concerns the forms of mediation of the one-in-Christ bond.

The variety of ways of understanding the impulse for the articles tradition contained implicit assumptions about the quality and dynamic of what was 'given' in ecclesia's fundament. The 'conventional objectivist' approach to articles of faith presupposed a concept of fundament as a static and finished form.

In approaches to the articles tradition orientated to human subjectivity, it was unclear how the concept of fundament was developed in relation to the presence of God. A somewhat restricted notion of fundament emerged. This was not inevitable for, as already noted, the development of articles of faith in relation to experiential and practical concerns offered a way of recapturing the dynamic of God in human life. Schleiermacher certainly intended this, though in his case the dynamic of Christianity's fundament could easily become controlled by consciousness as such. For someone like Don Cupitt the notion of fundament appears co-terminous with the self-authenticating individual.

In more recent rule theory articles of faith are treated as the continuing grammar of faith that informs ecclesia's ongoing life. It is no longer clear how that life is energised in relation to the presence of God. It seems clear that some kind of interactive presence is presupposed. But it remains unclear what notion of fundament is relevant. Indeed the issue appears to be deliberately avoided.[118]

For Barth, Torrance and Von Balthasar the concept of fundament was related to the plenitude of God's own being. There are possibilities here, it would seem, for articles of faith to reflect a fuller and more dynamic *logos* realism.

Perhaps not surprisingly, inquiry into the concept of fundament opens up a complex of problems for modern theology, amongst which the doctrine of God looms large. Here the questions are relatively simple:

what is the being of God? and, how is this being manifest? How these difficult and controversial questions are answered in modern theology will be reflected in the future development of the form and content of the tradition of fundamental articles in Christianity.

It has been suggested that the question of what capacitates the fundamental articles tradition is at heart a question of ecclesia's fundament. This was an important undercurrent to the case studies on Locke, Waterland and Law. Their handling of the fundamental articles theme was observed to be reflexively related to the nature and quality of that fundament implicit in their discourse.[119]

In the case of Locke the presence of God as the guarantor of reliable human judgements was foundational. Waterland's focus was a *logos* of God in the Tradition requiring obediential responses. For Law, the soul-presence of God the Trinity constituted the fundament of Christian reality. The impact of these quite different conceptions of how the foundation of reality was construed accounted for their varied handling of the fundamental articles tradition.

By transferring the articles tradition into the region of merely human judgements, Locke's reconstructive effort was highly reductive with respect to the form and content of fundamental articles. Waterland's overformalised *logos* realism was reflected in his codification of the fundamentals of the faith into the form of law-like statements. Law's dynamic interiorization of faith generated a rich, free-flowing articles tradition, somewhat removed from the public domain.

The dialectic between articles of faith and their fundament will be developed further in Chapter Eleven as a problem of theology's communicative task. This signals a move from the problem of the impulse for articles to a consideration of their significance in the communication of the faith.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE DIRECTION OF THE TRADITION:

The Task of Communications

An important purpose of the tradition of fundamental articles in Anglicanism is to achieve good and efficient communication in the Church. The attempt to state what is maximally important for faith is therefore an attempt to transmit information. Information is understood here as knowledge of what matters.[1] This Chapter is concerned to identify those features of the transmission process relevant to the fundamentals tradition and by implication to theological discourse more generally.

The Chapter begins by identifying the symbolic task of theology as one of structured response to its own fundament. It goes on to discuss the search for foundations, the appeal of simplicity, the emergence of hierarchy and the formation of a system, treating these as important features of the communication structure of theology. The relevance of this structure for the fundamental articles tradition is identified at key points by reference to the earlier historical analysis. The Chapter ends with an excursus on the genre of regulative communication in which fundamental articles are located within a variety of forms of theological communication.

The Symbolic Process as Structured Response

In Chapter Ten the directional thrust of the articles tradition was pursued as a question the origin and impulse for articles of faith. This inquiry brought into focus the key concept of fundament as the locus of the presuppositions about truth operating in the articles tradition. The dialectic between fundament and fundamental articles is developed in this Chapter as a problem of the dynamics of ecclesial communication.

In recent years there have been quite sophisticated developments by social theorists in the field of communications theory.[2] The theological implications have yet to be fully uncovered, though it is clear that a theology of communications could make significant contributions to ecclesiological theory and practice.[3] From this perspective the Church has been referred to as a 'community of critical communication' and as 'the sacrament of non-dominative communication'.[4]

This Chapter's interest in communications is rather narrowly focussed on the communicative structure of theology.[5] The concern is with theology as a *structured response* of faith within which the tradition of fundamental articles can be placed. Specifically, the intention of the Chapter is to present some of the key moments in the development of this tradition in relation to that fundament or founding reality which capacitates the ecclesial bond and generates a structured response of faith. The focus is thus on important operations in the transmission of what is implicit in the one-in-Christ bond into explicit and determinate form, as instanced in the tradition of fundamental articles.

At a general level this argument attempts, through analysis of the fundamental articles tradition, to understand statements of faith in terms of a concept of communication as "the transmission of energy in a form".[6] Communication is not, on this account, a secondary matter but rather provides a medium through which faith is expanded and the true strength of the one-in-Christ bond is actualised in the Church.

When communication is understood as a secondary, merely pragmatic task, this indicates a highly reductive understanding of theology as response. In this respect the identification of theology as a 'second order' operation, as 'reflection' or 'interpretation' upon what has been given, fuels the suspicion that the symbolic task is of secondary significance for ecclesial existence.[7] Ultimately, such a view betrays a lack of confidence in the possibility of identifying a positive

rationale for theology in the Church.[8]

The point here is that theology is not merely the *product* of reflection. This view mistakenly imputes a relation between theology and its fundament which presupposes not proximity but 'distance'.[9] More correctly, theological discourse operates within a relation of proximity to what is given and is directed towards its appropriation *at the level of language.* The supposition here is that there is a fundamental form of relation between God and human beings which is not readily expressible. Doctrine 'grasps' this form, not at some 'remove', but from *within* this relation. That such grasping is inadequate or rather incomplete, is not simply a result of distortion caused by human refraction. Rather, incompleteness arises precisely because theology can only ever mediate with the same quality as those other intermediate categories for God's presence (i.e. besides the linguistic region of the symbolic) identified in Chapter Nine. Accordingly, theological discourse offers genuine and unfinished communication.[10]

This argument suggests that the difficulty of achieving good communication in the Church occurs for two very positive and related reasons. Firstly, the complexity and richness of what is given for communication, i.e. that fundament of ecclesial existence. Secondly, the way in which the symbolic dimension actually operates; of directness *in* indirectness.[11] Both contribute to the difficulties of the symbolic task and generate various strategies to order and facilitate communication. In what follows attention is paid to three such strategies relevant to the dynamics of communication and operative in the formation of the tradition of fundamental articles.

The Search for Foundations

The search for foundations has, historically at least, provided one important strategy *initiating* faith's attempt to deepen understanding of life in relation to God. The search for

foundations for life and knowledge has not been a peculiarly theological enterprise. The desire to identify certain secure foundations from which to develop a derivative superstructure of knowledge has been a general feature of Western philosophical and scientific endeavour. Its roots can be located in Classical culture operating on a Euclidean model of knowledge.[12] In the emerging experimental sciences of the seventeenth century the search for secure and certain foundations for knowledge intensified. This development contributed to the heavy preoccupation in the modern sciences with epistemological issues.[13]

With the breakdown of Classical presuppositions concerning knowledge and its appropriation, the foundationalist strategy has been subjected to severe criticism[14], and undergone sophisticated development.[15] This debate has largely taken place in the sciences and particularly in the Philosophy of Science. The significance of the 'foundationalist' strategy in theology has only recently been identified.[16]

The fundamental articles tradition has a rather obvious relevance to the issue of foundationalism. The notion of *fundamental* articles suggests that it is possible to identify a core of doctrinal truth expressible in certain secure propositions. In relation to such fundamental beliefs further truths represent a doctrinal superstructure evidencing varying degrees of closeness to the foundational truths. The structure of knowledge presupposed here is similar to an inverted pyramid.

In this context the search for foundational truths - faith's axiomatic doctrinal substructure - offers the possibility of fixity, permanence and definiteness. Such features have been found useful in depicting the synchronic and diachronic unity of Christianity.[17] The foundationalist strategy is thus one kind of initial response to complexity. It represents a way of affirming oneness in multiplicity by

identifying the domain of common and uncontroverted belief.

As observed in Chapter Four, this strategy became an important feature of Anglican theological method in the seventeenth century.[18] The strength and quality of the superstructure of belief was judged by its degree of interwovenness with the 'primitives' or foundational articles, from which all subsequent belief proposed for acceptance was derived.[19] This methodology was associated with a more widespread drive for objectivity and security in matters of faith.[20] This had an obvious appeal for Anglican apologists seeking to commend the authority of their communion, determined as it was by a commonly agreed and unalterable foundation of faith. The strategy thus provided a counter to a Roman and Protestant tendency to maximise required belief.[21]

Not surprisingly, the concern to locate secure and common foundations for faith, when invoked in a context of post-Enlightenment relativism, is vulnerable to the same kinds of criticisms directed towards foundationalism *per se*. Included here is criticism of the assumption that self-evident axioms are simply there, available to be 'read off' and/or intuited in some way; the difficulty of recognising the contribution made to knowledge by the superstructure spawned; problems of assimilation of what is new, surprising or potentially threatening to the stability of knowledge; and difficulties of depicting the interrelation between the foundation and superstructure of knowledge.

In theology many of the main difficulties with foundationalism surface in the tendency of this strategy to overstabilize the dynamic of faith's response to God. What is perceived as foundational is fixed in quasi-sacralized forms which secure the foundation. As observed in Chapter Ten, this can result in a kind of 'conventional objectivism'.[22] These criticisms suggest that the foundationalist strategy in theology is both unsatisfactory and theologically distorted. The attempts by some 'post-liberal' theologians to pursue non-foundationalist

strategies may not, however, have overcome foundationalism but simply disguised a 'weak foundationalism' while avoiding the really pressing issue of the *kind* of foundation relevant to theological discourse.[23]

Reinterpreting Foundations

To retain a notion of foundations and explore strategies for identifying what is foundational a reconsideration of the concept of fundament in ecclesia is required. The matter has been carefully examined by the American theologian Ray Hart who suggests "The question of revelation as fundament is at bottom the question of the radicalization of the foundation of faith".[24] Accordingly, Hart argues that

> Revelation as fundament refers first and foremost to that constitutive process whereby the what or substantive bearing of revelation is built up as the intentionality of human being in historical time. This constitutive process comprises an inseparably triadic movement; fundament refers to the already founded, to founding afresh, and to the yet to be founded. Revelation as fundament therefore founds human being on and in the co-inherence of the modes of historical time.[25]

In this immensely important programmatic statement Hart highlights the *dynamic* of what is given as fundament. It is 'a triadic constitutive process' in which past, present and future are included. The *given* cannot be restricted to the 'already founded':

> Theology is thereby deprived of an all but congenital proclivity, viz., to be pathologically preoccupied with an archeology of its own primitive foundation.[26]

Foreclosure of the dynamic of fundament is illegitimate for,

> no phase can gain exclusive ascendancy without arresting the movement as such. In classical theological terms, this movement [triadic] is the intention of interlacing the doctrines of creation, redemption, and eschatology.[27]

This conceptualization of fundament is necessarily enmeshed in the historical and contingent. It is primarily 'interaction-event',[28] directed to "the expansion of our manhood toward wholeness of being".[29] For Hart, however, the 'very *is-ness*' of what is given as fundament, precisely because it is *not* an ontological 'fixity', "depends upon

(among other factors) our participation in them, upon our simultaneously active and passive existence as their inheritor".[30] The human imagination is thus implicated in a constitutive manner in the triadic process relevant to fundament.[31]

Hart's proposals offer one alternative way to construe ecclesia's fundament. One thing is clear: as soon as the ontological fixity of the 'object' is broken the search for foundations is considerably complicated. No longer can foundations be 'read off' from past texts; their security can no longer reside in a fixity and permanence that corresponds to the fixity of what is revealed for faith. Indeed, Hart's construal of foundations forbids the restriction of the language of faith's primary realities to pre-established formulas. If the search for foundations is to be directed to what is given, such a search will have to take cognizance of fundament as 'interaction-event' involving ongoing human responses to God.[32] In this sense fundament remains unfinished, though such a fundament is not for this reason any less foundational.

These remarks indicate that the foundationalist strategy presents a rather too static account of the kind of foundation relevant to faith. The search for foundations may be legitimate but the foundationalist strategy is ill equipped to discern the kind of foundations present in ecclesia. A more adequate hermeneutic of foundations is required; one that recognizes the 'intimedness' and contingent nature of that fundament constitutive of the one-in-Christ bond. Bernard Lonergan is thus right in arguing that foundations can no longer be construed in a 'simple manner', 'as a set of premisses, of logically first proportions'. He suggests that foundations have to be understood in a 'complex manner' pointing to 'what is first in any ordered set'.[33]

Precisely what this complexity might entail remains a controversial subject in theology. In this Chapter attention has been

drawn to the importance and difficulty of developing a true and full account of foundations for faith and theology. One implication of what has been said is that theology as response is response from *within* a relation to God. Here, fundament is what is present in this interrelation.

The nature of this interrelation is difficult to specify. The reason is that in the Christian tradition the mediation of *this* relation is the mediation of *plenitude*, concentrated in Christ (Colossians 1:19, 2:9 -τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος ; John 10:10b -περισσός), and experienced by humankind as God's *superabundance* of grace, faith and love (1 Timothy 1:14 -ὑπερεπλεόνασεν). It is this plenitude of being which has funded, among other things (e.g. the notion of God as mystery), a recurring Trinitarian conceptuality in the history of Christian theology. This kind of plenitude is richness in perfection; the maximal concentration of 'God's expanding perfection'.[34] What is thus present in fundament as contingent interaction-event eludes all attempts to fully thematize. The foundationalist drive to achieve certainty and security can only succeed at the expense of impoverishing truth itself. For theology to remain self-critical such reductivism requires uncovering *en route* to a fuller statement of God's presence in the world.

Fundamental Articles: Recovering the Dynamic

The fundamental articles tradition is easily attuned to the foundationalist strategy. It happens in at least two major ways. When the tradition is sacralized through over-formalization in fixed linguistic forms, the fundamental articles operate autonomously, no longer in relation to their own fundament. This persistent strand in Anglicanism has been identified in the historical treatment in Parts Two and Three of this thesis.[35] Something similar happens when the fundamental articles are relativised. In this case articles mediate

the flow in history of autonomous human consciousness.[36] These forms of objectivism and relativism[37] both represent a distortion of the one-in-Christ bond, insofar as they either try to fix it in particular formulas or transpose it altogether into the region of consciousness. In both cases doctrine ceases to function as a genuine intermediate form through which the one-in-Christ bond is communicated. Its symbolic status is distorted either through excessive rigidity (as in doctrinal objectivism), or undisciplined looseness (as in religious utterances that have retreated into human self-referencing). Both occurrences misconstrue the nature of foundations. In the former, foundations assume a static form. In the latter they are dispensed with altogether.

The above analysis suggests that what is stated as fundamental can only be so stated from within the continuing mesh of fundament in its historical contingency. From this perspective the drive to objectivity in the faith , an important and powerful current within the fundamental articles tradition, can be understood as a rejection of the dynamics of human understanding and *imaginative* capacity. These latter elements could not but represent a potentially dangerous destabilizing factor for the tradition. This problem was apparent in William Archer Butler's assertion, in response to Newman's *Essay on Development*, that nothing could take God's dispensation by surprise.[38] Ultimately, to interpret the search for security as a search for a simple and immovable foundation[39] betrays a fear of complexity, a fact poignantly exposed by Karl Barth.[40]

The search for foundations has been an important strategy informing the development of theology as structured response to its own fundament. The dynamic relation between fundament and its expression in language complexify the search for foundations. Manoeuvres which negate this dynamic distort the true nature of the Church's bond in Christ. It seems that the quality of the

fundamental articles tradition will be judged according to the intensity of its engagement with its own fundament.[41] What is stated in the tradition ought ideally to evidence a genuine, and precisely because of this, unfinished rendering of the foundations of Christian life in the Church.[42]

This inquiry into the search for foundations in Christianity clarifies an important regenerative force within the tradition of fundamental articles in Anglicanism. A recovery of the directional thrust of the articles tradition has been linked historically to a renewed integration of the fundamental articles in relation to the presence of God in ecclesiality. In the case studies in Part Three this renewal came to the fore most vividly in the later theology of William Law. For Law, the presence of the Trinitarian God who was 'All Love' generated interior renewal, animated the doctrines of redemption and broke the conventional form of the articles tradition. The dynamic of faith rediscovered by Law was identified in the concept of 'outflow' or 'overflow'.[43] Coleridge's understanding of the Trinitarian ground of all reality indicated his debt to this same tradition.[44] Maurice's repersonalization of the creedal articles of faith expressed a similar concern to overcome formalism in belief.[45] Simeon, from another angle, broke through the conventions of evangelicalism to a richer notion of the transformative presence of God.[46]

In one sense the above examples indicated what kinds of manoeuvres for the renewal of the fundamentals tradition were possible within particular contexts and an inherited foundationalist framework. The above examples testified to the fact that foundations that are rooted in God are foundations with the capacity to continually disrupt what is stable and conventional in favour of fresh and surprising orderings of reality. This dynamic, exemplified in, but not restricted to the case of William Law's mystical theology, represented the logic of God's outward flow of love incarnate in Christ and continued in the

Spirit. Law's new understanding of the foundation of faith significantly modified his understanding and communication of the 'received' view of fundamentals as regards content, order and style.[47]

The Appeal of Simplicity

The rich diversity of Christianity makes communications difficult and calls attention to the need to find economical and energy conserving means of communicating in the Church. Searching for foundations is one way of dealing with this. Implicit in this strategy is a concept of simplicity. Simplicity is one of the parameters traditionally invoked, whether consciously or not, as a criterion in the structuring of knowledge.[48] One philosopher of science has perceptively noted that the desire for theories in science, "in large measure reduces to a desire for simplicity".[49] The importance and elusiveness of the concept has received increasing attention by philosophers of science. Elliott Sober has remarked that

> diversity of our intuitions about simplicity is matched only by the tenacity with which these intuitions refuse to yield to formal characterization. Our intuitions seem unanimous in favour of sparse ontologies, smooth curves, homogeneous universes, invariant equations, and impoverished assumptions.[50]

The same author notes that recent theorizing about simplicity is a 'chaos of opinion'. Another philosopher, Mario Bunge, has referred to the 'myth' of simplicity. He argues that the concept, though useful at some stages in the structuring of knowledge, fails as a reliable criterion of truth and that the rule of simplicity boils down to 'minimize superfluities'.[51] In reaching this conclusion, however, Bunge gives considerable attention to the problem of the 'complexity of simplicity'.[52]

Simplicity: Motives and Types

A concept of simplicity is implicit in any form of critical reduction in theology. An exmple of this is the important discussion

in Protestantism of the 'essence of Christianity'.[53] Furthermore, this study of fundamental articles in Anglicanism suggests that this tradition is informed, tacitly at least, by some quite different notions of simplicity. It is possible to include here simplicities of a *pragmatic* kind. For example, catechesis requires simple and relatively uncomplicated presentations of the faith. In Anglicanism there has been a long history of the use of catechism for instruction 'for children'.[54] The catechizing offers

> a way of bringing together the Church's double responsibility of teaching as clearly as possible basic tenets of Christian faith and life, and of doing so in a way which will awaken personal response in those who are taught.[55]

For such an important work the wisdom of simplicity was paramount. The Anglican divine, Lancelot Andrewes (1555-1626), in his Preface to *A Pattern of Catechistical Doctrine* stated:

> The duty of the catechist, or him that doth catechise, is to make his doctrine easy to enter, by giving it an edge and perspicuity of method.[56]

The demands of institutional loyalty and apologetic and polemical motives would also seem to require finely honed and relatively simple statements of faith.[57] In considering the needs of worship and piety simplicities in the faith might also be important. This seemed to be the view of Hooker and Locke.[58]

Epistemological simplicities have also been relevant to the fundamental articles tradition. For example, in the seventeenth century debate over infallibility, it was important for Chillingworth and Stillingfleet to be able to appeal to those foundational articles of Christianity of which one could have greatest certainty.[59] The ontological significance of simplicity has been reflected in a long running discussion in Christian theology, from the Patristic period through to medieval scholasticism, concerning the unity of God.[60] These examples draw attention to the possibility of a range of types of simplicity.

Motives for invoking simplicity seem to fall into three categories; the legitimate, ambiguous and illegitimate.[61] The desire to disclose the primary units of discourse as an aid in analysis and clarification is legitimate. So too is the wish to increase systematicity of discourse, systematicity being an important feature of the structuring of knowledge *per se*. More ambiguous in nature is the desire to understand, which is often satisfied by an impoverishment of the subject and sacrifice of deeper truths. The region of the illegitimate is more controversial, though it would certainly seem to include a type of infallibilism whose motto is 'safety first', 'security at any price'.

Simplicity: Concentrated Complexity

It would seem that the simplicity concept has important functions in theological discourse understood as a structured response to the complexity of faith. Primarily, the appeal to simplicity performs a *concentrating* function in relation to faith, though an ordering function is reflexively operating in this. Highly concentrated conceptual discourse presupposes selection and ordering in complexity. Yet such concentration also provides a heuristic for fresh ordering of material.[62]

Simplicity, as concentration of complexity, is particularly important in the institutional context of ecclesia where basic instruction in the faith is valued. Furthermore, simplicity in the communication of the faith makes more plausible the claim that the Church is indeed one by virtue of its common profession.[63] Affirming oneness in multiplicity requires, at the level of doctrine, the wisdom of being simple in complexity. Adherence to a relatively concise and precise confession of faith becomes a measure of institutional loyalty. Considerations pertaining to institutional cohesion indicate that concentration of complexity has high pragmatic value for the

maintenance of the ecclesial bond, the success of the catechetical task and apologetic concerns. These matters that will be found relevant in the discussion in Chapter Twelve on institutionality.

The concept of simplicity as concentrated complexity becomes problematic when theological concerns are *disregarded* and/or wrongly identified. The point here is that a utilitarian deployment of the simplicity concept involves the concomitant danger of suppressing meaning and introducing semantic ambiguity if not confusion. Linguistic concentrations have a latent complexity. This points to the fact that simplicities as such belong to a *process* directed towards the expansion of knowledge and understanding of faith.[64] What has been referred to in the philosophy of science as the 'forced poverty of beginning'[65] of every theory, can be understood in theology as the problem of the latent complexity of the *discrimen.* The *discrimen* represents "imaginative construals of the mode of the presence of God".[66] From this perspective the purpose of extended statement of the faith can be understood as the unravelling of the *discrimen.* In the course of this process concepts of simplicity may be invoked; to unravel complexities which obscure progress, to regain control of material and tighten coherence.[67]

Simplicity is not an end in itself, but rather a *recurring moment* in theology's structured response. As such it operates as a parameter of understanding, useful at certain stages in the ordering and penetration of the complexity of faith. When simplicity is extolled as a virtue in itself it becomes merely a pseudonym for 'simplistic'. Simplicity as conceptual economy is thus a sign of *transitoriness.* The philosopher of science, Mario Bunge, interprets this transitoriness as falsity being superseded by a lesser falsity. In doing so he not only reverses the scholastic dictum, *simplex sigillum veri* ('simplicity is the seal of truth') into *simplex sigillum falsi*, he also raises the critical question of simplicity in relation to truth.[68]

The Simplicity of God

For the tradition of theological realism the issue here concerns the ontological significance of simplicity. The problem resides in the fact that increasing penetration of reality discloses increasingly higher degrees of complexity.[69] It would seem that theology must divest itself of the concept of simplicity except as a purely pragmatic strategy. The supposition here is that simplicity cannot be predicated of the being of God. The appeal of simplicity ultimately raises for Christian theology a question of the truth of God's own being.

The concept of God as pure simplicity has been a dominant feature of the doctrine of God from early in the Christian tradition. Karl Barth has disapprovingly noted that the "simplicity of the being of God has always been held to be the only true description of that being".[70] In Barth's view the resolution of the nature of God into this one overriding concept became firmly established through the influence of nominalist philosophy. The result was that theological talk of God meant essentially, "only the simplicity of God and not the richness, at best the simplicity of riches, but at bottom only the simplicity".[71]

Barth attempted a rehabilitation of the concept by interrelating simplicity and plenitude in his discussion of the perfections of God. He referred to simplicity and plenitude as the characteristic relations of the Lord of Glory.[72] There was a co-inherence of concepts[73]; simplicity included the plenitude of God's perfections.

> Consideration of the divine attributes can but move in circles around the one but infinitely rich being of God whose *simplicity is abundance itself and whose abundance is simplicity itself.*[74](my italics)

Consequently, for Barth, God's simplicity was not 'poverty': "On the contrary, God is one in the fullness of his deity and constant in its living vigour".[75] In this way the doctrine of the Trinity, as plenitude in simplicity, *was* the Christian doctrine of God.[76] In the light of Barth's statement that "Everything else is only relatively

simple ... He [God] is absolutely simple ... the only being who is really one"[77], it is possible to formulate a concept of God as *a being of maximal economy*, whose simplicity is concentration of plenitude. Communication of this kind of simplicity will clearly be a matter of great complexity which will require, at the level of language and thought, strategic simplifications of the kind already referred to *en route* to fuller communication.

The Simplicity of Doctrine

This brief discussion of simplicity is highly relevant to the truth of the tradition under review for it raises the question, what have we when we have *fundamental* articles? The argument above suggests that the genre 'doctrine' has that quality of being a *maximally economic and informative* communication of truth.[78] It follows that *fundamental* articles are a specialized form in which the general character of doctrine receives its most focussed and determinate form as a *maximal concentration of the truth of the ecclesial bond*: an instance of doctrine being *raised* to its ideal form and operation.

Such a perspective enriches, without negating, the pragmatic thrust of the tradition where demands of intelligibility, ease of learning, retention and institutional cohesion dominate. Specifically, it draws attention to the danger of 'simplistic' reductive moves which distort communication.

This discussion suggests that the criterion of simplicity is a necessary though risky parameter to employ in theological communication. Doctrinal concentrations which are maximally economic in their informativeness are also subject to ossification when the truth stated in such concentrations is obscured. This can occur when simplicities of a pragmatic kind *dominate* or intrude into all areas of communication in the Church.[79] This problem can be discerned in repetitive theological discourse. Such communication has few resources

to generate fresh speech in response to the reality of faith in its newly emerging contexts.[80] The latent complexity of what is maximally informative calls *for* and calls *forth* a symbolic process that remains essentially incomplete.

From this perspective, the fundamental articles tradition is a strategy *en route* to the achievement of more comprehensive communication of the truth of ecclesia's one-in-Christness. The tradition of fundamental articles in Anglicanism is clearly indebted to the drive for theological compression. At this level the tradition has important affinities with the popular notion of the 'essence of Christianity'. This conceptual affinity is rooted in the concept of simplicity. The discussion of simplicity in this Chapter indicates that simplicity can operate in a reductionist way. This suggests that great care is required to avoid the reductivist strand in the 'essence of Christianity' concept in theology.[81] Richard Hooker's compression of faith, as evident in his appeal to the 'essence of Christianity' and the 'fundamental words' apologetic, showed that theological compression was not necessarily reductionist, but belonged to a teleological framework directed towards the perfection of the mystical body of Christ.[82]

John Locke

The appeal of simplicity was most fully explored in the case study on John Locke in Chapter Five. At one level Locke's compression of the faith was a practical manoeuvre to take account of the different capacities of people, to find a firm basis for communal belief and overcome the destabilizing effect of theological controversy.[83]

It is equally clear that simplicity had an epistemological significance for Locke. The fundamentals of faith in which highest probability obtained were few indeed and generally sufficient for salvation. Simplicities of faith were those beliefs least contaminated

by human reason, and thus closest to the facts of revelation in Scripture.[84] In the text of Scripture, in which communication was maximally achieved, God had given what was 'clear plain and easy to understand'.[85] Here, simplicity operated as a *control* on communication. It disallowed any fuller opening of the divine-human relation. Simplicity was no longer a strategy in a process leading to *enlargement* of faith but an end in itself. Locke's concept of simplicity was determined by a particularly restrictive notion of what was deemed to be intelligible. Ultimately, the richness of God's own simplicity was impoverished. This became apparent in Locke's silence over that mystery that was anything but 'plain, clear and easy to understand', i.e. the Trinity. By contrast, for William Law, God's Triune simplicity generated expanding and free-flowing communication.[86]

This discussion indicates that the appeal to simplicity is far from simple. The quality of the articles tradition will be impaired to the extent that its implicit appeal to simplicity is merely deployed for practical purposes, e.g. the delineation of the boundaries of faith and constructing checks on belief and institutional loyalty. The quality of the tradition will be raised as compressed statements of faith lead to expansion of the latent fullness of faith.

The Emergence of Hierarchy

An important feature present in the ordering of complexity through a discriminating use of simplicities is what may be called the emergence of hierarchy. The reflexive relation that obtains between simplicity as concentration of complexities and the ordering function in theological communication has already been noted. Careful ordering, if it is to be epistemologically significant, will involve both a notion of simplicity and hierarchical structuring in a reflexive relation.[87] The appeal to simplicity and the emergence of hierarchy can be perhaps best understood as two complementary responses to

complexity. As a constituent of the 'architecture' of complexity hierarchy emerges as a means of reconciling the drive for simplicity with the recognition of the objectively complex structure of reality.

Both substantive and pragmatic considerations are relevant here. The emergence of hierarchical structures can, at one level, be understood as a practical strategy by means of which sorting and ranking of the complexities of faith can be achieved for the purposes of understanding and communication. This preoccupation with identifying priorities for the purpose of communicating the more central matters of faith is an important feature of the tradition of fundamental articles. As indicated earlier this represents an important practical effort to disclose the intelligibility of the faith for teaching and apologetic purposes.

To the extent that hierarchy emerges as a response to complexity *per se*, evidencing an attempt to assign relative values to complex phenomena, more substantive issues are involved. Indeed, such a development of hierarchy presupposes different levels *within* reality and the possibility of differentiation as such.[88]

From this perspective hierarchy in theology mediates, at the level of language, the richly differentiated form of God's presence in the world and human society. Hierarchy operates ideally as a strategy opposed to impoverishing reductions. The formation of hierarchy is designed to overcome abstraction and enable intelligent attentiveness and efficient penetration of the particular and complex. The purpose here is to identify and respond to the differentials in value and meaning present in reality. This suggests that the emergence of hierarchy in theological discourse evidences the power of selection and differentiation, and the wisdom to avoid what is trivial for an understanding of life.[89]

Hierarchy is thus what happens as theological discourse attempts to be formed from and give form to its own fundament.[90] This

perspective was important for the early development of the fundamental articles in relation to the notion of the foundation of faith.[91]

Dimensions of Hierarchy

The concept of hierarchy in theology might be more adequately developed from an understanding of the concept of hierarchy in the philosophy of science and General Systems Theory.[92] Defining a complex system as "one made up of a large number of parts that intersect in a non-simple way",[93] Herbert Simon noted that system complexity may be either disorganized or organized. He argued that complex systems organized hierarchically evolved more quickly than disorganized ones. Hierarchical systems were applicable in a variety of areas including social, biological, physical, and symbolic. In each case the hierarchical system was one composed of interrelated subsystems of hierarchic structure, the foundation being constituted by the most elementary subsystem. More specifically, the structure of the hierarchy could be identified according to the criterion of *intensity of interaction* between and among subsystems. Simon described the notion of a *'flat'* hierarchy, where the ratio of the number of levels to the span (number of subsystems into which it was partitioned) was small. The same author referred to the concept of system redundancy. An *un-redundant* system was one "where no aspect of the complex structure can be inferred from any other".[94] Redundancy, when recognised, could be eliminated through simplification.

Mario Bunge identified the central feature of hierarchy as the idea of dominance in which a 'one-way bossing' relation occurred.[95] In his view very few 'hierarchies' were genuine ones since they lacked this feature. Bunge preferred to speak of 'levels'. He differentiated nine levels relevant to the sciences. His analysis offers a method of identifying different kinds of hierarchical structures. He identified 'rank' hierarchies analogous to a 'staircase pyramid' in which

dependence was in one direction only. This was different from a *layer* analogous to geological stratification where the strata are arranged according to an order of emergence in time or logic. When such emergent layers were also rooted in lower levels retaining all the qualities of the latter, then the concept of *rooted layer*, after the manner of a telescopic system, was appropriate. A final level identified by Bunge referred to grades of being itself in which a movement from reality to experience to knowledge was envisaged.

Hierarchy in the Articles Tradition

The fundamental articles tradition, as it has conventionally operated in Anglicanism, accords most closely with Bunge's *rank* hierarchy, analogous to a staircase pyramid. The direction of movement is from foundational axioms to a dependent derivative superstructure. A system of 'one-way bossing' operates. Its virtue is security and fixity, though the *intensity of interaction* is minimal. Indeed, it is unclear how interaction takes place at all. This problem was evident in the difficulty exponents of the tradition had in developing notions of relative fundamentality, nearness to the foundation, additions to the foundation and degree of error in relation to the foundation. In the early seventeenth century these issues emerged, for example, in William Laud's controversy with the Jesuit John Fisher.[96] In the nineteenth century the Anglican responses to Newman's *Essay on Development* encountered similar difficulties.[97]

To the extent that the derivative superstructure of faith was incapable of contributing new theological insights not already included in the base of the hierarchy, the rationale for ongoing theological development was effectively neutralized. This meant that beyond the base the hierarchy was strictly speaking unnecessary, i.e. non-fundamental for faith. There were important theological reasons for this position. They had to do with an awareness of the dangers of over

doctrinalization in the faith, and an attempt by Anglicans to remain ecclesially inclusive. Such concerns exercised a limiting factor upon the emergence of more finely developed theological hierarchies.[98] However this approach could degenerate into 'redundant' discourse in which certain basic statements (albeit highly rich in content) were perpetuated by repetition without roots in the historical and contingent. This tendency was observed in Daniel Waterland's development of the tradition.[99]

Hierarchy and Maurice's Vision of Theology

Unsurprisingly, repetetive discourse could easily spawn a 'flat hierarchy' in which the endurance of simple bases masked a disorganized theological complexity. John Locke is a rather obvious example here.[100] F.D. Maurice's handling of the tradition is also relevant.[101] Maurice remained tightly centered on the 'old absolute creeds'. It was not that he eschewed any notion of hierarchy. On the contrary, he was willing to depart from more traditional views on eternal punishment.[102] Furthermore, his attitude to the *Articles of Religion* indicated a structuring of belief where the Articles witnessed to truths 'bigger than a system'.[103] Here, the superstructure of belief operated as a protective coating for the creedal profession.

For Maurice, the hierarchicalization of belief was informed by a 'digging' motif. Beginning from the centre of faith all energy was then directed to the further penetration of that centre. Yet the opening up of the primitives of faith was a risky business and ultimately, for Maurice, it was always on the brink of collapse back into repetition of the Trinitarian name. A more thoroughgoing systematic statement of the richness of the foundation, and the teasing out of a more comprehensive hierarchical structure of belief was continually thwarted. As argued earlier, Maurice transferred this kind of development into the region of personal and godly ecclesial order.[104]

From the point of view of theology as communication by means of a structured response of faith to its own fundament, Maurice's effort could not but appear *antithetical* to the entire enterprise. For Maurice, it seemed that ideal theological communication required a *critical destructuring* response. At best what could result from this orientation was an embryonic system characterised by 'flat hierarchies' and a great deal of latent and unorganized theological richness.[105]

Grading Belief: Fundamental Articles or Hierarchy of Truths

Grading of belief has always been important in the Anglican fundamentals tradition. In the case of Newman this remained so even as a Roman Catholic.[106] When, at Vatican II, the concept of 'hierarchy of truths' was introduced,[107] the implied structuring of faith seemed to provide a possible rapprochement with Protestantism. To invoke this concept, however, was immediately to open up a controversy with which Protestants have had four centuries of familiarity.

The relation between 'hierarchy of truths' and the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental beliefs remains unclear.[108] The latter has certainly been associated in Protestantism with a critical and controversial reductionist thrust in Christian belief. Both concepts presuppose the formation of hierarchy in the faith. Furthermore, recent arguments of ecumenically-minded Roman Catholic theologians suggest that the fundamental articles tradition is not to be identified simply as an *enumerative* theological method.[109]

Perhaps the difference between the concepts 'hierarchy of truths', and fundamental articles lies more in the *direction* of approach to a common issue. The former concept might indicate, from the Roman Catholic perspective, how a critical movement towards a fresh doctrinal harmony in faith may be *recovered.* In this respect, to invoke the notion of 'hierarchy of truths' would signal a shift from concern for the *quo* (the formal authority), to differentiation *within* the the *quod*

(the content) of faith.[110] For Protestants, the latter conceptuality (fundamental articles) might indicate an attempt to identify the core doctrinal matrix from which all faithful communication *emanates*.

From this perspective both conceptualities imply an emergent hierarchical structuring of faith informed by the truth of faith present and indwelt. Both appear vulnerable to the danger of mere enumeration of truths and boundary making concerns.[111] Both have the potential to raise the quality of theological communication. This could happen when the hierarchical structures generated genuinely open up the rootedness of ecclesial life in the presence and action of God in the world. This recalls the earlier comment, that hierarchy is what happens as theological discourse attempts to be formed from and give form to its own fundament.

Perhaps, in the final analysis, it is not a question of either 'fundamental articles' or 'hierarchy of truths' but rather a question of the quality of the vision which predominates in quite specific ecclesiological contexts. Where this vision moves beyond traditional boundaries, evidencing a disciplined openness to God's presence in all things, then the use of either concept can improve communication and provide direction in the Church.

Theological Hierarchy: Emergent and Unfinished

In terms of the discussion so far it is possible to specify three important features of theological hierarchy. Firstly, insofar as the hierarchical structure of theology is a way of expressing the nature of theology's fundament *per se*, the articles hierarchy is clearly a *derived* hierarchy. Secondly, precisely because of its derived status, the development of hierarchical structure will necessarily include an *inner flexibility*. Such a flexibility recognises that the ordering of faith *is* always being formed afresh in the meshing of Divine and contingent reality. Finally, this argument suggests that hierarchial

forms of belief have an ongoing emergent quality in correspondence with the dynamic of Christian life in the world. Dietrich Ritschl has remarked in connection with this, that there can be "no final hierarchy, no unchanging 'mobile' can be discovered".[112] The point is, there will probably be a great range of (perhaps infinite) possible hierarchical forms through which faith can be stated.[113]

Theological hierarchy is thus a derived, emergent, and therefore unfinished structure of faith. These remarks raise as many questions as they answer. The task here is simply to identify some of the important issues in the concept of hierarchy and its relevance to the operation of the fundamental articles tradition. In this respect certain dangers have been identified; problems of direction, i.e. 'one-way bossing'; 'flat' hierarchies and redundant communication. The significance of fundament for the consideration of hierarchy has also been raised. Attention has also been drawn to the derived, emergent and unfinished nature of hierarchically structured communication.

Grading of belief has been an important means by which Anglicanism has attempted to achieve an ecclesiality which is both inclusive and pure. Such grading implies an awareness of the dangers for ecclesia's institutionality of a maximalist tendency in faith that easily obscures what is important. This was linked in early Anglicanism with a notion of purity in doctrine which sought a balanced harmony in faith commensurate with the ideal of social, political and ecclesial unity.[114] Simple grading of belief has thus been an important strategy for solving the problems of divided ecclesial bodies.[115] This brief analysis suggests, however, that the tradition can be beneficial at a practical level only as it is developed afresh and deployed with wisdom for the directing and deepening of Church life in relation to God's presence.

The Formation of a System

The search for foundations, the appeal to simplicity and the

emergence of hierarchy are component features of the fundamental articles tradition as a communications system. The mediation of the potentially limitless range of ecclesial faith generates the formation of a communication system. Ideally developed, such a system expresses the true form of the one-in-Christ bond.

The relevance of systems analysis to religion has been recognised within Anglicanism, however the matter awaits further specification and clarification in relation to the symbolic region of doctrine.[116] The history of the fundamental articles tradition evidences an ambivalence towards theological system as such: on the one hand antipathy (e.g. John Locke and F.D. Maurice), on the other hand, strong recommendation of quite particular systems of faith (e.g. Daniel Waterland).[117]

The tradition of fundamental Articles in Anglicanism might in fact be understood as a recurring strategy to break the power of system domination. This domination could be discerned in an excessive formalizing and ordering of the faith. The Anglican fundamentals apology, particularly with its heavy patristic orientation was, as earlier argued, one way of countering this problem.[118]

The appeal to fundamental articles could, however, just as easily provide a theoretical underpinning for quite particular and exclusivist ecclesial systems. In Chapter Four it was argued that this happened at the time of the Restoration.[119] Later it was exemplified in Waterland's handling of the subject, though it was present to varying degrees in most of the major exponents of the tradition from the time of Hooker. This suggests that the tradition represents a vital component sub-system in a larger ecclesial system. The fundamental articles tradition is thus a communications system whose placement within a larger ecclesial system, perhaps skewed by certain ideological presuppositions, gives vital clues to the operational significance of the sub-system.

Open and Closed Systems

The critical issue is thus not whether the tradition evidences system features as such.[120] Rather, it is focussed on the kind of communications system implicit in the operation of the tradition. At this level the question concerns the openness or closedness of a system. A closed system may be defined as,

> a subsystem which, in reality or by definition, is not in an essential relation of feedback to an environment. Any feedback relationships between variables are strictly internal to the system, or better still, this feedback ... has nothing to do with the matching or fitting of the system to the environment, or of the environment to the system.[121]

The feedback referred to here may be called 'pseudo-feedback'. Such a system is unable to use and incorporate new information. It is 'information tight' or 'closed'. In this respect, Thomas Torrance has depicted a closed system as one evidencing a rigid axiomatic structure which "copes only with what can be logically derived from what we already know and cannot cope with what is utterly new".[122]

By contrast, open systems are in relation to their 'environment', without which they cannot survive and upon which they depend for their own development. Such systems are capable of using and incorporating new information which controls and directs the system's energy.[123] Open information systems,

> are essentially those which are capable of constructing, or are required to construct, within certain constraints, their own relation to an environment, once they have decided it is 'other' than themselves.[124]

This constructive task is developed from the recognition of

> an irreducible indeterminacy or openness in our conception and description of reality, corresponding to the indeterminate nature of its objectivity which, while accessible to our rational inquiry, reaches far beyond what we can overtake in our comprehension and formalization.[125]

This combination of objectivity and indeterminacy calls for *controlled openness* [126] characterised by a

> *flexible axiomatic* method directed by a heuristic vision, in which there takes place a constant adaptation of the structure of our knowing to the structure of what we seek to know.[127]

This has affinities with what Michael Polanyi has called the 'fiduciary framework' of knowledge. Important here is the revisability of the framework in terms of its fundamental beliefs which fund the discovery and integration of new truth but which nevertheless remain resistant to complete formalization.[128]

The Fundamental Articles System: Locke, Waterland and Law

The case studies in Part Three indicated the different ways in which the fundamental articles tradition operated within a system framework. Locke's reductivist proposals were fuelled by an antipathy to prevailing tight dogmatic systems of theology. He sought something freer and more inclusive but his strategy resulted in a dismantling of the articles tradition. For Locke, systems of theology were fallible human constructions, quite inadequate for securing communal bonds.

The only safe system for Locke was a 'simple' one. Here the question of a system's openness or closedness was developed in terms of its relative complexity. Increasing complexification of structure implied, for Locke, lower probabilities of truth. When transferred into theology this meant that the Christian faith was, in the interests of purity of belief, condemned to remain in a highly dispersed and disorganized system.[129] This was the result of the application in theology of his own closed epistemological system.

Daniel Waterland's response to this kind of manoeuvre entailed a vigorous reassertion of received orthodoxy concerning fundamental articles. A highly bounded, closed information system resulted.[130] The lines between orthodoxy and heresy were sharply drawn. Waterland's system operated at a meta-historical level; it was not environment specific.[131] It was singularly unable to incorporate new information. The system was self-regulating and relied on 'pseudo-feedback'. This functioned to maintain a pre-determined goal, i.e. the securing of the 'received' tradition. In this context the 'environment' could only

appear as a threat and a potential source of contamination.

William Law's interiorization of the articles of faith disengaged the tradition from tight rationalistic theological systems. A strong dynamic interrelation between Divine and human life was restored. This presupposed a full opening of the system to its environment, conceived as the presence of God in interiority. This new ecclesial environment found expression in Law's mystical theology. A theological system emerged capacitated by the plenitude of God's own being.[132]

Law's promising start was hampered by the very means by which it had begun. The focus upon interiority ignored the larger social and corporate environment within which a believer lived and was nourished.[133] This was reflected in the inability of Law's mystical theology to give an adequate account of human relationality with other persons in the society of the Church. Relational life was only indirectly given through participation in God's own life. An interesting and renewing development of the fundamentals system emerged somewhat closed from public scrutiny.

To the extent that the fundamental articles tradition evidences system repetition, failure to cope with new contingencies, suppression of complexity, and resistance to reformation or public scrutiny, it operates as a closed or 'congealed system'.[134] Such systems remain inadequately related to their environment. The tradition operates as an open system to the extent that it evidences a capacity for revision and reordering in the community of faith, elimination of repetition, and the ability to respond to new and surprising contingencies. Such a 'stable open system' does not imply loss of objectivity or rejection of its inherited form, but it does mean that the tradition is subject to reconstitution in terms of its own fundament.[135]

This inquiry into the fundamental articles tradition as a problem of communications has identified important features operative in the formation of a system of communication - the search for

foundations, the appeal of simplicity, and the emergence of hierarchy. Furthermore, the Chapter has uncovered something of the dialectic operating between fundament and fundamental articles. In the communication of that which capacitates the articles tradition, a *structured* response of faith emerges. The inquiry into the directional movement of the fundamental articles tradition - its impulse (Chapter Ten) and communicative structure (Chapter Eleven) - has drawn attention to the important dynamic of the tradition in the life of faith in the Church and theology. The one-in-Christ bond mediated through the tradition provides the impulse and guidance for the reconstitution of fundamental articles of faith in the community of the Church.

Reference to the community of faith as the locus of the tradition adds a further dimension to the dynamic relevant to its operation. The social dynamics of fundamental articles, a matter that surfaced in the discussion of the ecclesial bond in Chapter Nine, clearly requires consideration. This matter will be pursued in Chapter Twelve as the question of the institutional significance of ecclesia and its relation to fundamental articles of faith.

Excursus: *The Genre of Regulative Communication*

Relevant, though somewhat tangential to the discussion of fundamental articles as an issue of communications, is the problem of identifying fundamental articles within the genre of regulative communication. This matter was briefly alluded to in Chapter One where attention was drawn to the lack of "a comprehensive theory of theological statements in present theology".[136] The matter is complex, and unsurprisingly remains unresolved. In terms of this study what is required is an answer to the question: what kind of communication do fundamental articles represent?

The 'Articles' Genre

At one level the problem is identifying fundamental *articles*

within the range of possible forms of linguistic communication. This variety includes aphorism, metaphor, parable, narrative, creed, articles and extended discourse. At one end of this spectrum of possibilities aphoristic discourse can be located. Coleridge's *Aids to Reflection* belongs to this category.[137] Aphorisms are nugget-like, highly compressed linguistic forms. Somewhat less compressed in form is parabolic discourse which narrates.[138] As addressing speech, parable is 'discovering language', opening up new life possibilities for those addressed.[139] In the field of modern theology Kierkegaard's deployment of parabolic discourse is indicative of its force and poignancy.[140]

The narrrative form of discourse admits of extension beyond parabolic story: "The thought of God can be thought only as the telling of a story....If thinking wants to think God, then it must endeavour to tell stories".[141] Narrative can provide the raw material for more discursive theological programmes, a fact exemplified pre-eminantly this century in the writings of Karl Barth.[142] However this development signals a movement towards the other end of the linguistic spectrum characterised by highly developed systematic manoeuvres and extensive unravelling of theology's subject matter. Inclusiveness here is achieved *extensively* rather than by *compression.* Paul Tillich's systematic theology is an example of this kind of discourse.[143]

Within this continuum the genre of articles represents a highly compressed linguistic form. As such, articles offer maximally economic communication of information. Such high conceptual generalisation operates as both *summary* of narrative and as a *catalyst* for extended discourse.

The existence of a variety of Confessional documents and short formulas of faith indicates that the application of the articles nomenclature is somewhat fluid. Articles of faith may be predicated of the Apostles' Creed. In this case such articles express the faith in

its 'concentrated centre' and in this way they can be said to state 'the fundamental truths of Christian faith'.[144] The *Thirty-nine Articles of Religion* in Anglicanism can be understood as a series of extended propositions on the faith. Other sixteenth century confessions are somewhat longer Articles documents but not as extensive as, for example, the seventeenth century *Westminster Confession.*[145]

The Barmen Declaration of 1934 is an important modern example of articles construction.[146] Karl Rahner's proposals for short formulas of faith also belong to this discussion of the articles genre.[147] So too is the World Council of Churches statement of the basis of its faith.[148] The 1982 Lima statement on Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry, though of a more discursive nature, is nonetheless, in method of presentation, not unlike earlier Articles documents.[149]

It is tempting to identify the articles motif with the *Loci* method in theology. This view has some etymological justification: 'article' being derived from *artus*, and from *arcto.* Here 'article' signifies members of the body closely joined together, as the joints of the fingers closely cohere. The concept includes the idea of a whole as it is constituted by its various parts. Accordingly, the concept *collectively* may signify a whole head of doctrine and *distributively* it may apply to any assertion or enunciation which constitutes a part of Christian doctrine. Thus articles of faith may be applicable both to doctrine as it is divided into heads or theological *loci,* and the theses under separate heads of doctrine.[150]

To identify the articles tradition with the *loci* method may simply be continuing a tradition of theological communication that is no longer helpful. The *loci* method presupposes a pre-given unity which is then displayed through compartmentalizing of the faith according to various articles or heads of doctrine. An interconnection is presumed, however the accent is on the autonomy of isolated and well rehearsed themes. The *loci* method has a tendency towards a closed theological

system. In this respect Dietrich Rischl has noted that the method "makes it possible to slip from one sub-theme to another and thus ultimately excludes the possibility of carrying through a theological discourse".[151]

An alternative conceptual framework for the articles tradition might be possible. It might be the case that there are an infinite number of perspectives from which and through which a comprehensive view of Christianity could be displayed.[152] Here, if there is a *loci* method, it operates *intensively*. Accordingly, articles represent concentration points *en route* to the fuller uncovering of Christianity from the particular perspective chosen, e.g. ecclesiology, cosmology. Thus the short programmatic statements (theses) that lace Barth's *Church Dogmatics,* operate as concentration points for extended discussions. In this sense, they represent the successive opening of articles of faith according to the logic of Barth's particular Trinitarian perspective. This construal of the articles tradition implies that there may be myriad ways of communicating what is fundamental in Christianity. Furthermore, what is said to be fundamental will be communicated differently as it is expressed from differing perspectives.

In this alternative view articles continue to operate as concentrated conceptual generalizations. It is equally clear, however, that in this framework the articles tradition is capable of immense variety in communication. The goal here is *comprehensively integrated conceptualization.* The supposition is that there is no one fixed form for the presentation of Christianity in its rational form.

Basic Statements in Theology

Consideration of the articles genre raises the question of what the designation *fundamental* articles might mean. At one level the term might apply to that particular perspective through which Christianity

was being treated. What might be important here is to identify those perspectives that were relevant and important to be interrogated theologically, given a particular historical context. For example, the Reformers of the sixteenth century found, in the doctine of justification by faith, a means of critically reappropriating the Christian tradition. Today this might be achieved, for example, through the doctrine of the Church.

Fundamental articles have been traditionally identified with those foundational beliefs either for salvation and/or the being of a Church. The latter usually meant beliefs necessary for Church communion, or it might mean, as for Waterland, beliefs constitutive of the Christian system of faith. Other beliefs could be designated non-fundamental, non-essential, adiaphora, or elements making for the perfection of belief.

Recently, however, Dietrich Ritschl has proposed an alternative to the usual method of distinguishing between central and peripheral, important and unimportant:

> Better than a generalizing distinction and a division, starting from a fictitious static overall system, into central and peripheral themes or doctrinal principles, is one that can be noted from various parts of the church as they actually are, between what is 'of lasting importance' and what is 'of momentary urgency'.[153]

Ritschl highlights the interrelatedness of these two categories:

> we recognise what is urgent only from insight into what is of lasting importance - though we owe the occasion for this insight each time to confrontation with what is of momentary urgency.[154]

It seems that, from Ritschl's viewpoint, the two categories can in fact converge "at the focal point of the hierarchy of all that is of momentary urgency".[155] This creative proposal simply begs the question of how to decide what was worthy of the designation 'lasting importance'. Ritschl alludes to the doctrine of the Trinity, though later ecclesiological concerns related to the doctrine of election assume a central significance. The matter is clearly ripe for

exploration. In terms of the discussion in Chapter Nine, matters of lasting importance have already been specified formally as those which express most economically ecclesia's one-in-Christ bond.[156] What might be included here would be stated in the fundamental articles of faith.

Fundamental articles evidence an attempt to give linguistic form to what is of lasting importance in the ecclesial bond. As already observed, however, this is an ongoing task given the dynamic and ultimately unformalisable character of ecclesia's fundament. A question arises here concerning the deployment in modern theology of conceptual apparatus, other than fundamental articles, that are designed to uncover and communicate ecclesial reality.

The Scottish Reformed theologian, Thomas Torrance, has devoted special effort to elucidate for science and theology the significance of 'ultimate beliefs'.[157] Torrance argues that such beliefs have a normative character and a 'directive' function and as such affect the 'entire scope and shape' of human inquiry.[158] Such beliefs usually go unnoticed, buried deep in the framework of knowing. Attempts to formulate them remain essentially unfinished.[159]

According to the German Lutheran systematician, Dietrich Ritschl, a major task for genuinely ecumenical theology is the tracking down of the 'regulative statements' of Christianity; those mechanisms which ensure that thought and language can be examined and guided.[160] For Ritschl, it seems that regulative statements operate at different levels. He refers to them as 'implicit axioms'. He has in mind their internal ordering function for Christian thinking and acting. As such, regulative statements are more akin to ideals or principles embedded in ecclesial life ('behind everyday language'), and necessarily resistent to direct focus and thematization.

Regulative statements can also be formulated in language. Accordingly, doctrine can be understood as 'complexes of regulative statements'.[161] Furthermore, Ritschl identifies what he considers the

most central statement in all theology, "that Israel has been elected by Y H W H and that the church of Jews and Gentiles has been elected in Jesus Christ",[162] as permitting and providing "a basis for *fundamental* regulative statements in theology"(my italics) .[163] Ritschl seeks a binding ecumenical theology: "at least of a fundamental theology of minimal statements capable of achieving consensus to the maximum extent".[164]

The Canadian Jesuit scholar Bernard Lonergan has developed a notion of 'foundations' in theology in which what is first "is the immanent and operative set of norms that guides each forward step in the process".[165] The discriminations that occur in foundations between truth and error (the dialectic) operate as a principle of selection in the more determinate context of doctrines. Such discriminations are "not doctrines but the horizon within which the meaning of doctrines can be apprehended".[166]

Doctrines are derived from and depend upon such foundational discriminations, the latter functioning as criteria in doctrinal formulation for deciding between alternatives. Doctrine "is a set of meanings and values"[167] that informs an individual and a community's living, knowing and doing. In Lonergan's view, what is formulated in 'Church doctrine' derives its intelligibility from,[168] and bodies forth in language, those 'immanent and operative set of norms' that guide each forward step of ecclesia's 'ongoing developing reality'. Doctrines belong to that 'descent' from the unity of a grounding horizon which is not properly a deduction but rather "a succession of transpositions to ever more determinate contexts".[169] In this view 'Church doctrine' represents that more determinate context for ecclesia's immanent guiding norms.

The American Lutheran theologian Ronald Thiemann deals with the same issues as Torrance, Ritschl and Lonergan in his deployment of what he terms 'background convictions'.[170] Such convictions are

indispensible background beliefs within the logic of Christian faith. The burden of Thiemann's argument is to offer a 'holistic justification'[171] for what he regards as that belief central and constitutive for Christian identity, i.e. belief in God's prevenience. The conviction of the truth of this belief ought to frame that thinking and living which claims allegience to the Christian tradition.[172]

Thiemann proposes a 'meta rule' for the control of the development of doctrine and virtue: "Let all Christian interpretation proceed in a manner which recognises the absolute primacy of God's promising grace".[173] The rationale for this belief is found in its necessity for the coherence of those uncontroverted beliefs and practices of the Christian community. It can be argued that Thiemann has failed to provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of the whence of background convictions.[174] It is equally clear, however, that they are intended to operate in a way that corresponds to Ritschl's regulative statements.

This discussion of basic statements in theology points to the fact that the notion of fundamental articles belongs to a family of concepts employed to deal with the dynamic inherent in the forming and reforming of that Christian doctrine constitutive of the ecclesial bond. Thus the search for 'regulative statements' (Ritschl), the uncovering of 'ultimate beliefs' (Torrance), the grounding of 'Church doctrine' (Lonergan), and the establishment of 'background convictions' (Thiemann), signify operations through which the 'unnoticed', 'implicit', 'immanent', and 'background' dimensions of faith, receive linguistic conceptual form. It is thus accurate to speak of fundamental articles and its cognates. This suggests that when fundamental articles are *not* being spoken about other conceptual apparatus may be performing similar kinds of communicative operations for the purpose of mediating the one-in-Christ bond.

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES: The Significance of Ecclesia as Institution

A second major strand relevant to the theme of fundamental articles concerns the significance of Christianity's social form for the operation of the articles tradition. In Chapter Nine ecclesia was identified as the social form of Christianity. As such the ecclesial bond represented the locus of the fundamentals tradition. To state the fundamentals of Christianity was to state the truth of being one-in-Christ. The task of the articles tradition was to mediate this bond.[1] What has yet to be determined more precisely are the ways in which the very *ecclesiality* of faith contributes to the form and function of the tradition of fundamental articles. Reflexively this implies consideration of the ways in which the articles tradition contributes to Christianity's ideal social form. Stating the fundamentals of the faith is conditioned by the fact that this activity occurs *in* the Church. From another point of view the Church's own life and mission is conditioned by its attempt to express the truth of its life in the tradition of fundamental articles. It is this interrelationship between faith and Church that is explored in this Chapter as a question of the social dynamics of fundamental articles.

This matter is considered initially in terms of the significance of institutionality for ecclesial existence. This provides the basis for the development of the fundamental articles tradition as a strategy for *truth guardianship* in institutionality. This strategy highlights the importance of the tradition as an *ecclesial deed.* The Chapter concludes with a consideration of the contribution of the tradition to the problem of the identity and continuity of the Church.

Ecclesia as Institution

Hitherto the concept of ecclesia has been employed somewhat loosely to refer to Christianity in its social form. In further specifying this form a range of general categories have been identified, i.e. place, polity, economics, interpersonal relationships, and communications. In Chapter Nine these categories were proposed as constitutive of social life as created and redeemed by God. It is this sociality which takes form in and through that concrete, historical and particular form called the ecclesial community. Accordingly, Karl Barth has stated: "If the ecclesia exists visibly, this means that it exists in a form."[2] Barth identified the ecclesial community as "the earthly-historical form of His [Jesus Christ] existence".[3] Ecclesial existence has a more concrete empirical form as it exists as *institution.*[4] In this respect 'Church' can be defined as "a comprehensive term for the social and institutional carrier of Christianity".[5] While Church as *institutional form*, and *ecclesial community* co-inhere, the penetration is never complete. Ecclesia's institutionality is a form through which ecclesial existence is both manifest yet unperfected.

Church, as institutional form of Christianity, is significant insofar as it is the locus of redeemed sociality, i.e. as it genuinely mediates ecclesial existence.[6] As ecclesia is Christianity in its social form, so institutionality renders ecclesia as a *determinate, empirical, social form.*

Institutionality: A Form of Organized Complexity

Within the field of sociology and religion the subject of institutionality has been developed with some degree of sophistication, though problems to do with definition, and institutional dynamic and function, remain controversial and unresolved.[7] An enduring conviction is, however, that institutionality appears to be a feature of man's life as such: "He may modify the existing institutions, but he cannot

escape from the confines of his own institutionality".[8] Exactly why this should be the case remains unclear though the sociologist Niklas Luhmann has argued that

> The formation of any society depends first of all on a transformation of undefined complexity and contingency into defined or at least definable - in other words, on a definition of the world or at least a guarantee of its definability.[9]

An important consequence of this 'guarantee of definability' is that it offers "a possibility of increasing complexity and contingency and so making tolerable a higher degree of uncertainty and security".[10] On this account institutionality is the way human society co-ordinates and integrates itself, and thus copes with its own developing complexity.[11]

On this account, institutionality appears necessary if not inevitable, offering a safe and secure environment where the expanding complexities of existence can be ordered, personal needs met, disappointments endured, and human capacity for achievement fostered.[12] This suggests a theory of law in institutions which draws attention to the way in which institutional rules function as guarantors of personal and communal safety by removal or containment of excessive risk and danger.[13] It is a rationale that is echoed in Edward Farley's comment that the primary function of institutionalization is "to integrate and thereby order potentially threatening activities and interpersonal relations into the larger society".[14] Farley notes that in this process the institutionalized activity "gains perpetuation over time, usually bridging several generations".[15]

The Ecclesial Context

These remarks have an obvious relevance for the community of ecclesia as 'a specific form of corporate existence'.[16] The implementation and endurance of its purposes have to be achieved in conditions of high social complexity. In particular, Luhmann's positive

functional approach helps to explain both the drive towards and the indispensable status of institutionality as an appropriate social form of ecclesial existence.[17]

This positive appraisal of ecclesia's institutionality provides a corrective to less adequate and more distorted views within Protestant theology which have tended to regard the emergence of Christianity's institutional forms as evidence of a regression from a previously ideal form of life. The familiar enough routinization of a previously spontaneous spirit-led communal life is perceived to effect a regrettable loss of an ideal 'pneumatic anarchism', a process leading to the suppression or even extinction of the Spirit.[18] Such a view presented a romanticised Protestant ideal which has endured with greater or lesser intensity.[19]

Among other things, Protestant antipathy towards ecclesia's institutionality evidenced a reaction to excessive claims made by Roman Catholicism for the institution of the Church.[20] In the latter's incipient tendency towards institutional 'sacralization'[21], means were transformed into ends and thus absolutized.[22] This distorting development was present in a variety of ecclesial traditions. It entailed "the exchange of ecclesia for a closed and provincial religious community".[23]

The problem of institutionality for theology can no longer be developed properly from the perspective of ecclesiological allegiance. Rather, a theology of institutions requires development in terms of the contemporary form of the Church's repression of its ecclesial dimension - individualism.[24] The 'spirit of anti-institutionalism'[25] of modern society generates both a lack of confidence in and even disdain for institutional life, and ironically, an increasing drive to institutional sacralization. This latter development is evidenced in an ecclesial exclusivism in which "individual piety and religious experiences replace collective memory" and "provincial space and

concern for fellowship replaces the space perpetually drawing in the stranger".[26] In an increasingly fragmented culture, the alienated individual's drive for security overreaches itself. This occurs most obviously by rejection of all authority structures. It can also occur by a retreat into social structures. In this latter case private personal security is fostered in direct proportion to the capacity of the institution to enforce uniformity and suppress individual differences. Institutional tyranny masks the insecurities of alienated individualism.[27]

Ecclesia as Ideal Institutionality

Against this background it would seem that any adequate theological view of institutionality would have to take account of both its indispensibility and its relativity. This task is crystalized in the qestion of what kind of institution ecclesia is. Luhmann's functionalist approach draws attention to the need for meaning and security, and the dynamic of complexity as important motivations for institutionalization. This overcomes much of the negativity associated with institutionality.

Ecclesia, as *institutional mediation of complexity*, informs the earlier discussion of the ecclesial bond and its constituents. That which is complexively present in ecclesia's one-in-Christ bond - those various intermediate forms of God's presence that are constitutive of ecclesia - receive form, order and determinacy in institutionality. On this account institutionality is significant for ecclesia as that concrete form in which the inner complexity of godly human life - i.e. life as it is given reference to God - is *organised, integrated* and thus *stabilized*. On this account ecclesia's institutionality emerges as the *economy* of godly life in concrete historical form.

Theologically, the above conception includes but moves beyond the merely pragmatic level, where the concern is restricted to organising

things *for other purposes.* The pragmatic view is inadequate theologically because it is the *one-in-Christ* bond that receives determinate and concrete form in institutionality. God's own rich sociality is that which ideally informs ecclesia's institutional form, opening up new possibilities for human life *from within* institutional life. In this way institutionality functions for ecclesia as the place where apprehensions of what it means to be one-in-Christ can arise and a new and richer kind of social life can form and expand. This higher form of life embraces but is not reduced to the level of individualism. It requires, but does not remain at the level of institutionality, moving ideally within this form to the level of mediation of a higher form of human community in which is manifest the creating and redeeming work of God in Christ. Institutionality is not, on this account, simply the *context* for faith. Rather it is the concrete historical *form* in which the full scope of godly human life can express itself and expand under the direction of its own inner life in Christ.[28]

In Chapter Nine the task of the tradition of fundamental articles was identified as one of mediation of the ecclesial bond. The present discussion indicates that this bond has a necessary *institutional* form. The articles tradition is unavoidably a feature of ecclesia's institutionality as such. Moreover, the foregoing perspective gives rise to a reflexive relation. In institutionality, the truth of the one-in-Christ bond receives determinate form: institutionality is that *particular form* in which the ecclesial community *embodies* and *maintains* its concern for truth. This leads to a consideration of the fundamental articles tradition as a means through which an institution exercises *truth guardianship.*

The Tradition's Task: Truth Guardianship

Ecclesia's institutionality evidences a high degree of differentiation and development indicative of the diverse ways in which

the community of faith attempts to organise, express and guard its truth concerns. A component in this differentiation is the *symbolic* or *communicative* region through which the institution expresses the truth of its life in language. These forms may be specific (e.g. liturgy, story, creed, confession) as well as more general theological discourse. Insofar as the fundamental articles tradition belongs to he symbolic region of ecclesia it is part of that complex institutional structure of truth guardianship. This truth guardianship function is implicit in Niklas Luhmann's depiction of the emergence of the religious dogmatic system.

> The religious system must be differentiated not only on the obvious level of visibly sacral, ritual action, but also on the level of interpretations of meaning. In other words, it must have developed a special view of the world as a whole and be capable of communicating it. A dogmatic system may then arise to control and co-ordinate these interpretations which sanctifies particular concepts, key interpretations and combinations of ideas, and at the same time, by generalizing them, gives them sufficient flexibility to deal with events in the world, its own texts and religious experiences.[29]

Luhmann's analysis suggests that truth guardianship involves control and co-ordination of meaning. This occurs through theological generalizing that is comprehensively theoretical rather than abstract.[30] This includes, according to Luhmann, an inbuilt flexibility of response to contingency. Such a view coheres with the earlier discussion in Chapter Eleven of the fundamentals tradition in relation to the concepts of fundament, foundations, simplicity, hierarchy and system. The difference is that now, however, the institutional dimension of this discussion provides the hermeneutical perspective.

Dynamics of Truth Guardianship

Institutional truth guardianship through the dogmatic system involves complex interconnections at the symbolic level. The discussion in Chapter Eleven, in particular as it concerned hierarchy in theology, focussed on the importance of differentiating the relative truth value

of doctrines. In this Chapter, where the context is institutionality, attention shifts to the way in which doctrine functions to guard the truth concerns of the Church. Specifically, it may be useful to identify different functional operations within a community's doctrinal structure. Relevant here is the notion of 'governing doctrines'.

Rules for Fundamentals: 'Governing Doctrines'

In this respect the philosopher of religion William Christian, in his investigation of doctrines of religious communities,[31] has drawn attention to the rather complex system by which a community's *primary* doctrines are developed and maintained. Christian's inquiry focusses on a community's 'governing doctrines', those principles and rules which communities build into their bodies of doctrines:

> As a community enters upon its teaching activities, and especially as it reflects on its body of doctrines, it comes to hold and teach doctrines of another sort also. Along with its doctrines about the setting of human life and the conduct of life in that setting, a community works out principles and rules to govern the formation and development of its body of doctrines. These norms are doctrines about its doctrines; they are the communities' governing doctrines.[32]

Primary and governing doctrines are contrasted thus:

> We would say that the primary doctrines of a community, taken together, are what the community has to say to the world. And we could say, by way of contrast, that a community's norms for its doctrines, taken together, are what the community has to say to itself about its doctrines.[33]

Christian's analysis leads him to investigate types of governing doctrines that yield rules for authenticity, derivation, ordering, consistency, and rules for judgements of 'alien claims'. He draws an analogy with the legal system which develops 'rules of recognition' by which a society identifies its primary rules. Such rules determine primary rules of obligation though such rules of recognition "incline a decision one way, though not conclusively, and they survive intact when they do not prevail".[34]

Governing Doctrines in Anglicanism

Christian's analysis uncovers part of the operational machinery which monitors and informs the development of the dogmatic system. Specifically, it highlights the interconnectedness of a variety of principles and terminology associated with the fundamental articles tradition as it has operated in Anglicanism. Important here are the concepts *rule of faith, Vincentian canon* and *consensus quinquesaecularis* (agreement of the first councils). These are examples of governing doctrines informing Anglican construals of the fundamental articles tradition. These concepts instance governing doctrines which guide the selection process by which proposals for what is considered fundamental can be made. What is significant about the governing doctrines identified above is their essentially conservative orientation; governing doctrines not so much for the advancement of the tradition but its preservation.[35]

Such governing doctrines belong to a larger complex of doctrines in Anglicanism concerning rules for the achievement of consensus in what Christian terms 'primary belief'. Evidence of this larger complex of governing doctrines can be discerned in the *Thirty-nine Articles of Religion*. In Article VI, 'Of the Sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures for salvation', a number of governing doctrines are present. Thus there is a governing doctrine for deriving doctrines.[36] Article VI states that authentic sources for the community's primary doctrines are to be gleaned from the stated list of canonical books and not from the books of the Apocrypha as listed which, "the church doth read for example of life and instruction of manners; but yet doth it not apply them to establish any doctrine". Another governing doctrine in Article VI concerns limits on the *scope* of primary doctrines. In this respect the article recognises that its primary doctrines are designed for a life unto salvation. The implication is that there may be other truths and

right courses of action which a community is not bound to teach.[37]

Implicit in much Anglican controversy over fundamental articles has been a continuing dispute over the identification and application of governing doctrines. In Chapter Three, in discussing the development of a notion of common doctrine climaxed in the sixteenth century in the *Articles of Religion*, the inclusion of 'a controlling heuristic recommendation *within* the *Articles of Religion*' was noted. This referred to a 'particular dynamic among the co-ordinates of ecclesial authority' - Scripture, the inherited dogmatic tradition, General Councils, and the authority of the Church militant.[38] In terms of the present discussion, this achievement represented a clarification of governing doctrines in Anglicanism.

As the history of fundamentals discussion indicates, this early settlement did not foreclose the question of the content of the faith.[39] Furthermore, it soon became apparent that there existed a certain flexibility within the web of governing doctrines. For Chillingworth and the latitudinarian strand, the authority of General Councils and the inherited dogmatic tradition were not as determinative for developing fundamental belief as reason applied to the reading and hearing of Scripture.[40] By contrast, the Tractarian focus upon tradition as the filter for fundamentals, for example in Newman and Palmer,[41] showed how governing doctrines could be skewed towards the past, thereby avoiding the pitfalls of rationalism and supportive of a drive for the autonomy of Church and State.

Waterland, in his "Discourse of Fundamentals", identified at least fourteen rules for the determination of fundamental articles, ten faulty, four correct.[42] According to the nineteenth century Anglican theologian, James Mozley, rules could be either 'intrinsic' (i.e. informal criteria) or 'external'.[43] Most of the rules identified by Waterland were of the latter kind, though the plethora of rules had led this eminent divine to comment that there were "almost as many

different rules for determining fundamentals as there are different sects or parties...".[44] Mozley recognised that "No rule has been laid down for determining Fundamentals that will bear a strictly logical test of adequacy".[45] In Mozley's opinion, the Roman rule only tested ecclesiastical obedience. The Protestant Scripture principle governed what was *not* to be considered fundamental. The rule of St. Vincent (*quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*) rested on no logical basis since "no valid reason can be given why some things not necessary to be believed may not yet in matter of fact have been universally believed in the first ages of the church".[46]

The question of governing doctrines in Anglicanism has remained controversial belonging, as it does, to the larger issue of Anglican methodology.[47] At one level this concern presupposes that consensus in *rules* leads to agreement in the determination of the faith.[48] Furthermore, such methodological concerns draw attention to the importance of achieving right direction in ecclesial matters of faith and order. However the exercise may also provide a rather useful strategy to cope with burgeoning pluriformity in doctrinal matters, i.e. a way of legitimizing diversity in actual belief and/or of avoiding discussion of the content of theology.[49] At this level *excessive* preoccupation with governing doctrines may actually deflect a community from more rigorous theological discourse and self-criticism.[50]

Fundamentals: Foundational, Operational and Practical Aspects

Perhaps part of the above problem might be uncertainty about the relationship between governing doctrines and what Christian calls a community's primary doctrines. Christian is not particularly helpful here. Primary doctrines for Christian are 'what the community has to say to the world'. These doctrines are not his concern. Neither are 'practical' doctrines, such as the duty of love toward God and

neighbour.[51]

The analysis of the fundamental articles tradition in Anglicanism suggests, however, a more refined differentiation in doctrine. Governing doctrines function in relation to doctrine in its *foundational, operational* and *practical* aspects.[52] The history of the tradition would seem to give some warrant for the above differentiation.

In respect of *operational* doctrines, it was noted in Chapter Three how, for Hooker, the doctrine of justification by faith, whilst it did not belong to the 'few fundamental words', nevertheless was the criterion by which a Church's right holding to the 'foundation' of faith could be determined. In Hooker's view the Roman doctrine of 'double justice' overthrew the foundation 'indirectly'.[53]

In Chapter Two it was suggested that Luther's focus on the justification of the sinner before God was the means whereby the dogmatic tradition was reappropriated. In this sense the doctrine of justification functioned operationally as the reactivator of traditional dogma. This view seems to be endorsed in recent Anglican-Lutheran dialogue where it is stated:

> One important and newly recognised way to understand the Lutheran reformation confession of 'justification by faith' is that it is not so much a new or additional doctrine, but rather it is an instruction to pastors about how they are to preach and teach the Christ of the ancient classic doctrines so that Christ is therefore received by faith, not by some inappropriate response (e.g.'works').[54]

In William Law, the doctrine of regeneration was the means for his reaffirmation of Trinitarian and Christological dogma, albeit with certain important modifications.[55]

Doctrine, in its *practical* view, has been equally important in the history of fundamental articles discussion in Anglicanism. For Chillingworth, what was believed had "influence upon our lives, as every essential doctrine of Christianity hath".[56] In Hammond's exposition of fundamentals a strong orientation was observed towards

the superstructure of piety spawned by the foundational doctrines.[57] Here, holding to the fundamentals of the faith was a practical matter pertaining to righteousness of life. Hammond's intention had been to recover that fuller dimension of the moral life which represented the actualisation of fundamental belief. The doctrine of justification was displaced in this particular re-orientation to sacramental life and the practice of piety.[58]

Implicit in the development of the concept of the 'conditional covenant' in later seventeenth century Anglicanism, was the idea that Christian discipleship could not be reduced to mere assent to certain beliefs, but included a strong moral component.[59] This practical view of doctrine was important for John Locke.[60] For Charles Simeon the godly practice of faith in the light of the Gospel was paramount.[61]

There is a certain artificiality in the above schema. The differentiation of function is not so much according to *type* of doctrine but rather *depiction of important* doctrine from particular perspectives.[62] Operational doctrine might be understood as *initiating* the process of opening what is foundational in Christianity. Doctrine in its operational mode admits of great variety. In this respect Jaroslav Pelikan has suggested that the doctrine of the Church has become "the bearer of the *whole* of the Christian message for the twentieth century, as well as the *recapitulation of the entire doctrinal tradition* from the preceding centuries" (my italics).[63]

In this section it as been suggested that an institution's maintenance of its concern for truth occurs at the level of doctrine, through a fourfold structure. Specifically, guardianship of truth in its specialised form as fundamental articles is a guardianship that attends to what is foundational for faith. This focus is informed by and presupposes certain governing doctrines that require uncovering and clarification in the interests of rightly directed and self-critical theological discourse. Furthermore, proper orientation to foundations

involves a hermeneutical renewal of the Christian faith effected by the emergence of variable and critical *operational* doctrines. This functional structure of doctrine has its issue at the level of practical doctrine as it is transferred into a community's discipleship in righteousness and truth.

Insofar as truth guardianship is a purpose and task of ecclesia's institutional life, it is axiomatic that the results of engagement in this task constitute a work done in and by the Church. As a result, it is the case that truth guardianship generates certain *ecclesial deeds.* The having of fundamental articles is evidence of one such deed. Consequently, there arises the question of the institutional significance of this particular deed.

The Tradition as Ecclesial Deed

Institutionality, it seems, is a creative process for which human beings are responsible. Institutions are not merely there to be encountered.[64] Accordingly, discussion of truth guardianship requires deepening to take account of the dynamics of institutionality. Indeed, William Christian recognises that the relationship between a community's governing and primary doctrines "reminds us that a community has an active and important part to play in the formation and development of its body of doctrines".[65] From this perspective the development of a structure of truth guardianship, as instanced in the fundamental articles tradition, belongs to a dynamic process, the outcome of which are *ecclesial deeds.*

Ecclesial Deeds: From Implicit to Explicit Form

The having of fundamental articles is evidence of the work of the Church expressing the one-in-Christ bond in determinate form. There is an important dynamic here which corresponds to the earlier discussion of the tradition as a problem of communications. At one level the

ecclesial bond is constituted by that range of ways in which human beings are held together as freshly understood by reference to God. This has been previously identified in terms of those intermediate forms through which the activity of God is mediated. The *form* of this godward reference is complex and resistant to thematization.

The ecclesial bond may operate by an inner form appropriate to faith, e.g. the kingdom of God is in the midst of you, Luke 17:21. Here, the accent is upon God's transformation of human existence by virtue of his presence in the inner life of the individual or, what is more likely, by virtue of his presence confronting the human social world with the claims of the Kingdom of God.[66] A focus on faith's inner form may result in Christianity being presented as a kind of transubjective consciousness. In this case people are bonded by a transformed intentionality towards God and others which, in the case of Edward Farley, focuses on the new status of the stranger in ecclesial life.[67] A strong ethical form of the ecclesial bond is presented in Bonhoeffer's *Sanctorum Communio*. Here, people are held together by what they do and how they do it.[68]

In institutions, however, the ways in which the ecclesial bond operates undergoes modification. The one-in-Christ bond receives more determinate institutional forms. Indeed, institutionality may be referred to as that form of ecclesial community in which social bonding by reference to God is *fixed in forms designed to secure what is common to all*. In this context the fundamental articles tradition represents an *externalization* and *confessionalization* of the one-in-Christ bond.

In this development, what is fundamental to the bond assumes the form of an ecclesial deed. This involves a transposition in which that which was *formative* of community now appears as the *product* of a community. Guardianship of truth is thus achieved institutionally through a process in which the implicit and undefined richness of being in relation to God in the world is rendered in a determinate form.

In the discussion of the directional dynamic of the fundamental articles tradition, the emergence of fundamental articles was discussed as a problem of communication. Recognition of the institutional nature of the tradition locates the issue of communication within the wider framework of the truth guardianship function of the Church. Specifically, an institutional requirement for truth guardianship entails manoeuvres in which the complexities of faith are rendered in determinate forms for the achievement of institutional stability. The externalization of the ecclesial bond implied here is not necessarily a retrograde step. Positively, it may be considered an *energy saving* strategy enabling a strengthening of the ecclesial bond through more efficient and higher quality communication of information (knowledge that matters) in an institution.[69]

Furthermore, it seems that insofar as *memory* is essential to the ecclesial community there will be a thrust within the institution towards 'visible' forms in which the community's remembering of Jesus Christ can endure as corporate public expression.[70] The fundamental articles tradition belongs to this matrix of remembering and evidences an earnest on behalf of the institution to take its communal memory seriously. As such, the tradition operates as a focus for the Church's identity. In this way the tradition, in its confessional and creedal forms, can exercise an integrative function, offering signs of mutual recognition within a community.[71] A corollary of this is that the tradition can also function as a barometer of institutional loyalty.

The tradition thus operates in two directions, offering a focus for institutional unity and a marker for the delineation of boundaries. As institutional unifier it can function as an authorized sign of institutional purity and loyalty. As boundary marker it indicates the borders between safety and danger in institutional commitments.[72]

Bonding Through Believing

Implicit in the functioning of fundamental articles as outlined above is a notion of simplicity. As noted in Chapter Eleven, the appeal of simplicity has an important pragmatic value for communicating unambiguously the centre and boundary of communally normative belief. An obvious case here is the need for catechesis in the Christian community.[73] The presupposition here is that believing *per se* is an important source of institutional cohesion. This is by no means self evident, nor can it be taken for granted. Indeed, it is precisely this assumption which has come under suspicion in modern Christianity. Its roots have been discerned in the Lockean distinction between knowledge and faith:

> How well-grounded and great soever the assurance of faith may be wherewith it is received: but faith it is still and not knowledge; persuasion and not certainty. This is the highest the nature of things will permit us to go in matters of revealed religion, which are therefore called matters of faith; a persuasion of our own minds, short of knowledge, is the result that determines us in such truths.[74]

Michael Polanyi's comment on this passage is apposite:

> Belief is here no longer a higher power that reveals to us knowledge lying beyond the range of observation and reason, but a mere personal acceptance which falls short of empirical and rational demonstrability.[75]

Polanyi goes on to observe:

> Belief was so thoroughly discredited that, apart from specially privileged opportunities, such as may be still granted to the holding and profession of religious beliefs, modern man lost his capacity to accept any explicit statement as his own belief. *All belief was reduced to the status of subjectivity*: to that of an imperfection by which knowledge fell short of universality (my italics).[76]

The discussion in Chapters Eight and Ten of this study on the fate of the fundamental articles tradition in the modern period indicates that religious believing has lost any privileged position it may ever have held. In this context believing is reduced to a purely self referencing affair. What one believes is understood as the result of one's personal choices.[77] Such a way of handling Christian belief can

simply mask an attempt to displace and marginalise a claim about how Christian doctrine has traditionally worked.[78]

The reduction of believing to an issue of personal choice is highlighted when people argue about matters of belief as though God were not present, that what was believed was merely a matter of personal choice, albeit one arrived at through critical effort.[79] God himself is not present in such believing but is rather the *product* of a certain kind of believing. Under these conditions it would seem that believing *per se* as a source of social unity has been abandoned.[80] Where believing has become a matter of convenience, it is no longer relevant for ecclesia's institutional cohesion, i.e. for the *practice* of being one.

In the above context, the fundamental beliefs professed in ecclesia no longer function as primary unifiers of the institution, i.e. as mediating the truth of God's presence and action, but have become *merely* human unifiers, i.e. simply what people think. Confidence in believing as such, as a source of institutional cohesion, can hardly be sustained from this highly impoverished position. In Chapter Eight, precisely this kind of development has been noted in the more recent history of the operation of the fundamental articles in Anglicanism.[81] Ultimately, this is not simply a problem of Christian belief and its primary articles but concerns the status of any and every potential intermediate form for the truth of God.[82]

The possibility of institutional cohesion through commonality of belief has been one of the driving forces behind the operation of the fundamental articles tradition from its emergence in the reformation period of the sixteenth century. It was a motivation undergirded by the affirmation of the oneness of Christianity. As the history of the tradition indicates, this conviction became problematic in the post-Reformation divisions of the Church. The drive of particular communions to remain genuinely inclusive in belief, has evidenced

itself in the way the tradition has been flexibly developed in a *wider* view (e.g. Hooker and Locke) compared to a *narrower* construction typified by Waterland. The desire for a global form of faith that included the particularities of various denominational allegiences has persisted in Anglicanism despite the fact that consensus in belief has remained elusive.[83]

Consensus in Fundamentals

Minimally, the persistence of such a motivating ideal indicates a refusal to abandon believing as a source of social cohesion. It is evidently a deed worth pursuing. This supposes that it remains possible to identify communal belief that has authority as 'normative doctrine'.[84] Communal bonding through believing minimally entails commitment to the achieving of consensus. Exactly how such consensus ought to be construed is controversial. More traditional approaches have held consensus to be necessary and worth pursuing. More recent approaches treat consensus "only as another empirical variable and as such see it to be of a limited necessity".[85]

Even *within* the former approach important differences obtained. Thus, as observed in Chapter Two, consensus did not entail for Erasmus comprehensive agreement.[86] Rather, the concept was construed minimally, orientated to the past (the few primitives of the faith) and open for further future determination. Implied here was a recognition of a differential between *actual* and *ideal* consensus. The drive for a more comprehensively defined and imposed communal faith as, for example, in Roman Catholicism at the Council of Trent and among certain Continental Protestants at the Synod of Dort, bespoke a tendency to *maximize* agreement in the faith.[87]

In the complexities of modern society Luhmann has pointed out that "there cannot even be a fully adequate experience of the concrete richness of meaning let alone a full consensus".[88] Luhmann's view

suggests that discussion over consensus in terms of *maxima* or *minima* of acceptable belief has to be balanced by an approach which focuses on *anticipations* of consensus.[89] In this situation it would be presumed, without initial explicit agreement, that a minimum of 'belief expectations' finds general agreement. Such a view would see the function of the institution depending less on the 'creation', than on the 'economy' of consensus.[90] In this context any 'given' consensus would only be realised in an emergent way, and this process would be facilitated by economical distribution and communication of an actual minimal expanding agreement.

Fundamentals: Unfinished Consensus

In Anglicanism the consensus ideal has endured. Indeed, it seems that the Anglican handling of the fundamental articles tradition implies commitment to a qualified or dialectical concept of consensus.[91] Here, what seems to be important is that a healthy institutional approach to consensus requires a recognition of the disjunction between actual and ideal consensus. In this sense consensus in fundamental belief is an eschatological concept, a view implicit in the discussion of the resolution of communal norms for faith in the sixteenth century English reformation.[92]

This view of consensus could be discerned in the doctrinal adiaphorism in the *Thirty-nine Articles of Religion.*[93] It was implicit in the strong directional thrust of the Thirty-nine Articles. Full definition was observed to be incompatible with the essential ecclesiality of the Christian faith. This feature was highlighted in Hooker's handling of the tradition.[94] It appeared in the theology of Edward Stillingfleet, John Locke and F.D. Maurice.[95]

In Chapter Eight it was noted that the above notion of consensus has been severely challenged by developments which appeared to render any talk of achieving an actual communal consensus in belief highly

problematic. What is abundantly clear from the deployment of the consensus concept in Anglicanism from the time of Hooker, is the essential unfinishedness of the quest for 'normative belief', a view implicit in the *Thirty-nine Articles of Religion.*

The attempt to state the articles of faith remains, in Anglicanism, a deed *in process.* This has not always been so obviously the case. To the extent that a minimalist doctrinal consensus was identified with a fixed consensus from the past (e.g. as in Maurice), the dynamic of the articles tradition was suppressed. The commitment to a dialectical view of consensus was effectively undermined. In Maurice's concern for a practical ecclesiology he had wisely cautioned against over definition and systematizing of the faith. This caution could also lead to an unjustified closure of the question of consensus, and by implication of the scope of the fundamental articles.[96]

The Boundary-Direction Dialectic

Throughout this inquiry the premature closure of the forming of belief was evidenced when the articles tradition was skewed towards boundary-making concerns in the Church. This invariably represented a hardening of the tradition and loss of dynamic, a feature that began in the early seventeenth century with Richard Field, in his concern to define 'right believers'.[97] It intensified in William Laud and was firmly entrenched by the time Daniel Waterland entered into fundamentals discussion.[98] In Chapter Eight the re-emergence of this 'boundary delineation' strand was observed in the nineteenth century in William Van Mildert, John Henry Newman, William Palmer, F.D. Maurice and later in Charles Gore.

Renewal of the tradition was invariably accompanied by a recapturing of the directional thrust, of which Richard Hooker was the classic early exponent. In Chapter Four this was discerned in Chillingworth's concern for the integrity of the believer. It was

implicit in Hammond's practical view of fundamentals. It re-emerged with new clarity in the case study on William Law. Law provides a classic example of a strategy by which a theologian moves from a heavy investment in ecclesial boundary concerns to an enriched understanding of dynamic Christian reality. Coleridge and Simeon, from their own perspectives, stood in this tradition, as did Maurice, to the extent that renewal was transferred out of doctrine into other concerns.

Implicit in the directional view of the fundamental articles tradition is a recognition of its unfinishedness. This suggests a directional-boundary dialectic. To the extent that this dialectic is allowed to operate, the articles tradition retains a dynamic in which the ideal of 'normative doctrine' is pursued as an ecclesial imperative. It remains a deed awaiting completion. Presupposed here is a genuine, even if provisional, consensus in faith.

Reference to a 'genuine provisional consensus' raises questions of vital concern for the endurance of the institutional form of Christianity. Specifically, it raises two questions. How may ecclesial endurance in time and space be understood on the supposition of a consensus in matters of fundamental belief which remains unfinished? A second question necessarily follows. How does the fundamental articles tradition contribute to the continuity of ecclesial identity?

Ecclesial Endurance: The Dynamics of Restabilization in the Truth

It has been argued that the fundamental articles tradition is a strategy developed by the institution of the Church for the exercise of responsible truth guardianship. This perspective has been deepened by an appreciation of the dynamic involved in the formation of the tradition as an ecclesial deed expressive of the inner form of the ecclesial bond. Such a deed contributes to institutional cohesion, self-understanding, economy of communication and ongoing discipleship in the truth.

The Logic of Reconstitution of Fundamentals

Recognition that this dynamic has a history which belongs to the contingent history of ecclesia as such, further complexifies the operation of the fundamental articles tradition. The problem can be stated in the following way. Fidelity of the institution to its truth guardianship responsibility necessitates a continued reconstitution of the fundamental articles tradition. In terms of the discussion in Chapters Ten and Eleven, this reconstitution can be understood as ongoing response for the achievement of communication. From the perspective of institutionality, reconstitution of the tradition *is a necessary moment in the institution's effort to restabilize itself.* Insofar as the history of institutionality can be understood as an attempt by human beings to cope with ever expanding complexity in life and thought, of transforming the indefinable into definable form, the drive for institutional stability remains an ongoing and unfinished task. Ecclesial endurance is achieved in successful institutional restabilization.

Those deeds through which ecclesia's institutionality achieves stability remain ongoing and essentially unfinished. If the institution is to endure as an organiser of expanding complexity for the purpose of nourishing godly human life, its deeds will necessarily have to be reconstituted in order to assimilate the new and changing environment of institutionality. Indeed, the perspective offered here suggests that institutionality *is* that environment in an organized form.

Earlier the fundamental articles tradition was noted as a component in ecclesia's institutionalized 'remembering of Jesus Christ'. Insofar as this remembering is historically contingent, that 'vehicle of social duration' through which the institution guards the truth of its memory will have to be capable of reconstitution. The fundamental articles tradition as ecclesial deed, can not be however,

simply repeated. To merely repeat the deed entails both a rejection of its contingent status, a concomitant sacralizing of a past particular statement of faith, and thus an expression of the institution's *infidelity* to its guardianship of the truth.

A major problem arises as to how reconstitution of faith actually operates. This leads into the highly controversial and unresolved area of doctrinal development. With increasing recognition in theology of the *fact* of doctrinal development, a simple theory of reconstitution by repetition of a fixed unalterable deposit, received certain modifications. From the time of Newman's *Essay on the Development of Doctrine*, these modifications have continued to endure in various sophisticated forms.[99] The matter is admittedly complex. The concern here is not with doctrinal development *per se*. Rather, the question is how the fundamental articles tradition contributes to the ecclesial institution's impetus towards restabilization, and the achievement of its truth guardianship function. In other words the concern is to identify how ecclesia's memory is secured institutionally.

The Doctrinalization Process

The process by which the articles of faith are implicated in ecclesia's impetus towards restabilization is illuminated in Edward Farley's analysis of doctrinalization. This is defined as "the community's reflective discernment of the linkage between its symbols and world structures".[100] Farley points out that doctrinalization

> is not simply conceptualization, that is, translation into conceptual form; rather it is discernment of and expression of the connection between symbolic content and world structure.[101]

Doctrinalization is a *linking* activity that presupposes a distinction between the 'subterranean' language of story and image, synonymous for Farley with symbol,[102] and the cosmologized language "which dominates the everyday world of the cultus".[103] Story "is the linguistic unit most proper to ecclesia".[104] However, in that

ecclesia's story is the witness to "a redemptive alteration of human existence made possible by a redeemer and certain events in space and time", ecclesia's story cannot be reduced to "a quasi-existential vehicle of expressing segments of one's own autobiography". The story abounds in images, i.e. "the mode in which content is present prior to its translation into definitions".[105]

Specifically, Farley refers to 'constitutive'[106] images through which the community orientation to redemptive existence is focussed. Such images are not 'reflectively produced' but simply guide the everyday activities of the community. As such they express situations rather than describe entities. They are 'fact' like in content expressing entities in "a certain relation, situation or with certain features".[107] Images "represent the mode of presentation of content rather than the object", such that one believes *through* images not *in* them. Finally, images are interrelated insofar as their 'receptacle' is the paradigm story, the unity of which such images reflect. This story unity has its own depth as a story in which insight into the world and redemption is present. This gives a rich unity to ecclesia's constitutive imagery.

Farley notes that story and its images "occur in conjunction with more complex linguistic entities"[108] - apologetic and theological accretions, customs, taboos, cultic expressions, creeds, doctrines - all of which constitute the "more visible everyday world linguistic strata". The rationale for the development of language beyond story and imagery is located by Farley in the problem of contemporaneity:

> The problem of contemporaneity occurs because of the inevitable lag between insights, experiences, customs, and institutions which arise and function at one time and the perpetual changes of world-views, cultures and languages.[109]

Farley argues that the received tradition "whose basal form is story and image"[110] would be a "mere puzzle, an atavistic residue which had lost all reference to reality" if the 'lag' was absolute. The 'lag' is

overcome as the tradition "finds retranslation into the world-view, language, and day-to-day activities of the present".

At the heart of the rationale for retranslation is the fact that essential to *ecclesial* existence is the "rejection of every provincial and restricted condition of God's presence".[111] There is thus an inner theological rationale for ecclesial retranslation, an inbuilt drive for its story and image to achieve contemporaneity.

In translation the tradition is integrated into the dominant 'world picture', a cosmologizing of the story and its images occurs, and is further integrated into institutional structures for the purposes of achieving ecclesial endurance in time and space. Myth is what results from the cosmologizing translation. Myth is not the most original layer of religious imagery but "the product of an attempt to translate such into the inclusive and objective world-view of a given age".[112] Doctrine is what happens when, in response to the requirements of truth and knowledge, the 'image-myth amalgam' receives conceptualization. This then functions as a criteria for institutional loyalty.[113]

Farley observes that such translations are always occurring, sometimes rapidly, more often slowly and subtly. Though rather crucially he notes that the requirements of contemporaneity generate two processes which work against each other:

> Story and image are always in search of a myth, a way of being cosmologized into the objective consensus of an age and its world-picture. As this consensus breaks down, the pressure from story and image is toward demythologization.[114]

A consequence is that doctrinalization is ambiguous: "it can both defend or criticize anachronostic myth".[115]

It is clear in Farley's account that story and image have a certain priority. It is equally clear, however, that without doctrinalization there is no linkage between story and image, and contemporaneity. Thus it might be said that the relativity of doctrinalization is precisely its freedom to mediate God's ongoing

creative and redemptive activity in contingency.

The doctrinalization process is further developed by Farley in *Ecclesial Reflection.* Important here is the dipolar structure of ecclesial process which includes both a transformative (adaptive and innovative) pole and "that through which the transforming occurs, the traditional, the remembered".[116] The retention of the past in the ecclesial community includes past doctrinalizations which have the character of an institution's 'linguistic sedimentations'.[117] Such sedimentations are evidence of ecclesia's ongoing creative attempts to identify the truth of contemporaneity.[118] Doctrinalization is thus ideally the outcome of living interpretation.[119] Fidelity to this is fundamentally a reconstitutive activity.[120] This fails when the 'tradition pole' is isolated from the 'transformation pole'. This failure evidences itself in the ecclesial community's focus on *maintenance* and *preservation* of the tradition which has become an object of faith.[121] Freedom for reconstitution (i.e. ongoing doctrinalization) is present as the tradition

> functions more as the lens through which contemporaneity is experienced, in which realities and dimensions hitherto not grasped come into view.[122]

Thus ideally, tradition endures "as something through which the ever-changing situations of the world are experienced".[123]

For tradition to operate in the above way, successive hermeneutical disengagements of doctrines and symbols are required.[124] Doctrinalization is thus a process of making, breaking and remaking. Tradition, in this view, is not merely a 'generation-bridging vehicle' which impinges as 'burden' or 'idol'. Rather, by virtue of the 'intrinsic reality reference' of living interpretation (i.e. the possibility of sedimented disclosures transcending the merely occasional or situational truth) tradition can genuinely function in the ongoing doctrinalization process.[125]

In Farley's analysis of doctrinalization the complex process of theological judgement is uncovered. His analsis clarifies the way in which the fundamental articles tradition is reconstituted. This reconstituting of faith is the way in which the tradition contributes to the restabilization of ecclesia's institutional form. Reconstitution involves a fresh appropriation of contemporary world view(s), sedimented tradition and ongoing redemptive experience. In this process of doctrinalization the fundamentals of ecclesial existence come to form in new statements of faith. Because these are deeds of ecclesia they belong to the structure of its institutional life and contribute to its emerging form.

Continuity in Fundamentals: The Institutional Perspective

The argument outlined above suggests that doctrinalization is a synthetic activity in which God's redemptive activity in contemporaneity is disclosed through linguistic forms. In the theological judgements implied here an ordering of faith occurs. This receives concrete determinate form as it is institutionalized. The fundamental articles tradition is an example of this activity in the Church. As a feature of ecclesia's institutionality as such, the tradition operates as an agent of restabilization, albeit of a provisional kind. In this way the tradition provides testimony that the ongoing task of transforming the undefined into defined has continued to take place.

The foregoing helps to clarify the contribution of the fundamental articles tradition to the problem of identity and continuity in Christianity. It is only as the tradition undergoes doctrinalization that the tradition evidences a *linkage of fidelity* to its own earlier deeds. The tradition is properly a deed-in-process. Its co-ordinates are multidimensional. Continuity and identity cannot be construed *simply*. Such reductionism is evidenced when the fundamental articles

tradition is used to *secure* continuity with what is thought to have been a past ecclesial identity. Reductionism is also apparent when the tradition is radically relativised through disregard of Christianity's 'sedimented tradition'. Both are false manoeuvres expressive of human desire to be simple and to escape complexity.[126]

When the tradition is distorted through objectification or relativization it is indicative of a *falsely stabilized* institution, either through neglect of contemporaneity or rejection of its own history. In the former stability is overreached,[127] in the latter it is underachieved.

Continuity and identity are correlative to successful ongoing institutional restabilization.[128] The fundamental articles tradition does not secure a guarantee of continuity with the past but rather embodies ecclesia's emergent continuity with past and present in relation to the presence and activity of God.

As a means for the practice of being one church bonded in Christ through time and space, the tradition can evidence no more than the genuine *unfinishedness* and unfinished *genuineness*, that attends any intermediate form for the presence of God in created and redeemed life. In the attempt to state the faith of the Church, the tradition of fundamental articles ideally offers an 'echo of the Godhead'[129] in a determinate form. A strategy thus emerges by which the ecclesia of Christ 'realises' the truth of its life and keeps this truth circulating in the community, and on the Church's theological agenda.

RETROSPECT

This thesis has examined the tradition of fundamental articles in Christianity. The Anglican treatment of this theme has provided the focus for an inquiry that has examined a range of issues concerning the purposes of stating the faith in Christianity.

By the development and use of a multilevel approach in the thesis, more general theological issues related to stating the faith have been uncovered within the discussion of a quite particular theme in a specific ecclesial tradition. In this way the particular studies of fundamental articles have been situated within a wider and richer theological horizon. As a result the thesis has provided a hermeneutic of the Anglican treatment of the tradition of fundamental articles. An equally important corollary of this has been that the inquiry into fundamental articles has clarified what might be involved in the effort to state the faith.

Historically, the thesis has shown that in Anglicanism there is a long and continuing engagement with the attempt to state the faith in the form of fundamental articles. At this level it is right to speak of a *tradition* of fundamental articles.

What has proved particularly interesting is the variety of ways in which this tradition has developed and operated in different and similar contexts. In this respect the thesis has uncovered important aspects of the history, dynamic and rationale of the fundamental articles tradition as a strategy for affirming the unity and identity of Christianity. One result has been a clearer understanding of the particular contribution of the tradition to the formation and endurance of ecclesial life. One consequence is that this study has developed and clarified the Anglican treatment of the fundamental articles tradition in Christianity beyond what has hitherto been the case.

The inquiry into the Anglican handling of fundamental articles has, however, provided its own contribution to an understanding of the

purposes of stating the faith. The early history of reformation Anglicanism highlighted the way in which Christian belief was secured in a genuine and unfinished form that required ongoing responsible human participation. Implicit here was an ecclesiology which assumed authority in the Church to proclaim the gospel faith, not so much for the purposes of determining a set of correct beliefs or placing a check on over- or under-definition in belief, as for directing an ecclesial communion in its practice of being one-in-Christ. As observed in Parts One, Two and Three of this thesis, this particular operation of the tradition in Anglicanism has remained an important feature of what, on any account, has been a most varied and conflictual tradition in theology. Fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism represents a continuing and by no means settled way of unravelling a host of critical issues in theology and of maintaining such issues in circulation in the Church.

More widely, however, this thesis has interpreted the tradition of fundamental articles in relation to the dynamics relevant to ecclesial faith and practice in Christianity. It has emerged that what is agreed upon, believed together and proclaimed as a community of faith, has functioned less as a set of correct beliefs requiring assent and more as a medium through which the truth of the Church's common practices - worship, discipleship, organisation, witness - could be ***realised.***

In this respect the case studies in Part Three of the thesis revealed a variety of different ways of determining and deploying the fundamental articles tradition for stating and securing the truth of common practice as informed by and directed to God. The thesis has, in this way, drawn attention to the need for a fuller inquiry and specification of the interrelationship between worship, belief and discipleship in Christianity. The thesis could be profitably developed in this direction.

In Part Three the study was developed in relation to a range of issues relevant to ecclesiology and the doctrine of God. What emerged in this discussion of a varietv of attempts to state the faith was the fact that the theme of fundamental articles represented an important medium for engagement with, and expression of, a Christian Trinitarian theology. Fundamental articles discussion represented a continuing dialogue within Trinitarianism, albeit construed in different ways. The case studies afforded a means by which this recurring Trinitarian conception of Christianity, its forms and presuppositions, was able to be drawn more sharply into focus, particularly in relation to ecclesiological themes.

Here, for example, issues to do with the terms of ecclesial communion were developed out of the differing understandings of the presence and action of God. The dynamics operating here were reflected in the quite different ways in which the fundamental articles tradition functioned in relation to the issue of terms of communion. Consequently, the case studies of Part Three illustrated how the variety of attempts to state fundamental articles in Christianity evidenced differing understandings of God in ecclesiality.

In Part Four important issues implicit in fundamentals discussion in Parts One, Two and Three received fuller systematic development. In this respect, the Anglican focus was opened up into a more general treatment of the inner logic of the attempt to state the faith as it came to form in the fundamentals tradition.

Part Four represented a more sustained effort to uncover the fully ecclesial dimensions of stating the faith. A reflexive relation was posited. What was fundamental to Christianity had an ecclesial form: ecclesia was what was expressed in the fundamentals of Christianity.

Stating ecclesial fundamentals raised issues concerning the impulse and formation of the articles tradition. An argument was

developed to show how doctrine generally and in its specialised form as fundamental articles mediated, by drawing into determinate form, the truth of the one-in-Christ bond. Stating the faith was observed to be a fully ecclesial effort which was considerably complexified in modernity against the background of an increasingly anti-realist stance in matters theological.

In Part Four treatment of fundamental articles embraced but moved beyond practical concerns for the furthering of Church unity. The discussion opened up into an inquiry into the task, problems and function of communicating the faith in contemporary Christianity. Attention was thus directed to the dynamics of the inner structure of theology as evidenced in the formation of the fundamental articles tradition. Relevant here was the search for foundations, the appeal of simplicity, the emergence of hierarchy, all of which contributed to the formation of a system of communication.

These features of the tradition were shown to have a particularly important function in relation to Christianity's institutional existence. It was argued that institutionality was a form through which the complexity of God's relation to created and social life was organised. The fundamentals tradition evidenced one strategy for the ordering of the truth of God in ecclesiality. In this way the attempt to state the faith contributed to the ideal functioning of ecclesia's institutionality.

Presupposed in fundamentals discussion was a desire to offer normative statements of faith. Essential to this enterprise was the development of criteria for judgement as to the quality of the statements made. This criteriological concern was implicit throughout the thesis and emerged repeatedly in the discussion of the dialectic inherent in the fundamental articles tradition between boundary and directional concerns in stating the faith.

The demands of institutionality encouraged delineation of boundaries for acceptable belief. Excessive concern for definition in the interests of fixing boundaries for acceptable belief and securing institutional stability, betrayed an incipient formalism in faith and easily ignored the directional thrust of saving Christian belief. Where discussion of fundamental articles was reduced to the level of boundary concerns, it was evidence of a misunderstanding of ecclesia's institutionality as such.

Where directional concerns came more clearly into focus the articles tradition in Christianity functioned as a form through which the plenitude of God's own being as present and active in creation and godly human life could be expressed. As such, the articles tradition could contribute to the enlargement of faith and the realization of the strength of ecclesia's one-in-Christ bond.

Recovery of directional concerns in theology and Christian discipleship has been identified and traced in the treatment of fundamental articles in Christianity. In this way the tradition has operated as a monitor of the relative health of ecclesial vision.

Strong directional concerns were found not to obliterate boundary making activities, however they significantly modified how boundaries ought to be conceived and operate. Boundaries could no longer operate as barriers to communication, i.e. as strategies for exclusion, oppositions or even bases for communication with other different communions. Rather, boundaries were ideally to be viewed as facilitators of communication; the necessary preconditions for further enlargement of understanding, harmony and perfection of ecclesial life.

For such a way of construing boundaries fundamental articles were not beliefs set over against other beliefs of lesser importance, or even particular articles opposed to other beliefs considered by other communions as fundamental. Rather, such statements of faith mediated, by drawing into concentrated conceptual form, the truth of the one-in-

Christ bond. Accordingly, the quality of theological engagement with the fundamental articles tradition will be judged by the intensity with which the dialectic between directional and boundary concerns is allowed maximal operation.

Implicit in the direction-boundary dialectic was the supposition that the truth of ecclesial reality, as expressed in the tradition of fundamental articles, had the quality of an unfinished *genuineness* and a genuine *unfinishedness*. This arose because the direction-boundary dialectic mirrored the dynamic between fundamental articles and fundament or ecclesia's founding reality. This latter dialectic provided the impulse for fresh attempts to state the truth of faith. In doing so it evidenced an inbuilt drive in theology for the reconstituting of the boundaries of faith.

This was found to be particularly important for Christianity's institutional forms. Here, the capacity of institutional life to successfully organize expanding complexity required an ongoing restabilization in the truth. Recognition of the genuine though unfinished status of the fundamental articles tradition kept open the possibility of a continuing fidelity of the Church's institutional life to its own truth.

The above considerations point to the contingent status of faith and its expressions. How contingency ought to be dealt with theologically remains on the agenda of any future Christian theology. A variety of strategies are possible. Locke, Waterland and Law represented three. None proved successful, but all showed how important an issue contingency was. These three exponents of the fundamental articles tradition operated in the context of Enlightenment rationalism and all three wrestled with the problem of retrieving a fully sacramental understanding of the universe. This problem remains on the theological agenda of the Church. In this respect, Locke's approach, of attending to the particularity of the natural world and

human society as that environ in which the presence and action of God is to be discerned, still beckons theology and constitutes a worthy and urgent task for the tradition of fundamental articles.

A rationale thus emerges for a more intensive and discerning engagement with the fundamental articles tradition in Christianity. This requires a discussion which includes but moves beyond immediate issues of ecclesial pragmatics and attempts to open up, articulate and keep circulating in the Church issues concerning the truth of God's presence in the world. From this perspective, stating the faith reveals itself as a *means* and a *form* through which God's creating and redeeming love is witnessed to. In this continuing witness theology contributes to the ongoing mission of the Church.

CHAPTER ONE: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF CHRISTIANITY: Perspectives On a Theme in Contemporary Anglicanism

1. From Herbert Thorndike (1598-1672), *Principles of Christian Truth*, Bk.I chap.22, sec.2.; cited in J.B. Mozley, *A Review of the Baptismal Controversy* (1865) [London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1895], 1.

2. See e.g. the art. by Stephen Sykes, "The Fundamentals of Christianity" in S.W. Sykes and J. Booty eds., *The Study of Anglicanism* (London & Philadelphia: SPCK & Fortress Press, 1988), 231 - 245. Hereafter Sykes, Fundamentals.

3. At a general level the use of fundamentals language has no necessary technical connotation. It is a useful means of communicating certain intentions which might be equally well conveyed by other terms, e.g. essentials or essence. Thus reference to 'fundamentals' may simply be a useful publishing device to arouse interest and indicate a work of general accessibility. Where the word appears in works of theology it indicates an introduction to what is considered most important; for example, G.S. Spinks, *The Fundamentals of Religious Belief* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1961); A.C. Baird, *Christian Fundamentals: A Modern Apology for the Apostles Creed* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1926); or C.A. Briggs, *The Fundamental Christian Faith: The Origin, History and Interpretion of the Apostles' and Nicene Creed* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1913). Even at this level fundamentals concern will usually involve some kind of simplification process. This in turn requires an ordering of priorities in which epistemological issues may be relevant. Stephen Sykes' discussion of the use of 'essence' language is relevant here; see Stephen Sykes, *The Identity of Christianity: Theologians and the Essence of Christianity from Schleiermacher to Barth* (London: SPCK, 1984), 220-230. As the dynamics of fundamentals discussion are uncovered, some complex operations become apparent. The matter is significantly complicated by the nature of the subject under inquiry.

4. In fundamentals concern an intention to identify the *truth* of the subject in question is being expressed. Moreover, a strategy is also implied as to how that truth might be found. In this way fundamentals inquiry is properly part of a heuristic process. Fundamentals concern presupposes both commitment to the reality in question and the presence of some clues, derived from that reality, that anticipate and propel the movement towards it. The dynamics of the heuristic process, and the framework of commitment which it operates in, have received careful and insightful analysis by Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983). See his index for references to 'heuristic'. In something as richly complex as Christianity it is clear that fundamentals inquiry will belong to a sophisticated and ongoing heuristic process. The aim here is deeper understanding of the truth already indwelt and affirmed in Christian faith.

5. See the brief but useful discussion of truth in theology in Edward Farley, *Ecclesial Reflection: An Anatomy of Theological Method* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), chap. 13. Farley argues

that "If faith has to do with realities, and if its language is reality bearing, this suggests that truth intention is immanent in faith itself ..... Faith experiences in its own peculiar mode the way things are. And this is the primary ground for the truth question being unavoidable in theology and why every dimension of theological reflection occurs under the propulsion of the question of truth", 302. Farley also argues that "the concern for truth in the ecclesial community cannot be described as simply early Christianity's flirtation with and marriage to Hellenism, philosophy and gnosis", 301. Rather, "Concern for truth, born in faith itself, is a feature of theology as such ...", 301. Cf. Coleridge's remark: "He who begins by loving Christianity better than Truth, will proceed by loving his own Sect or Church better than Christianity, and end in loving himself better than all", see *Aids to Reflection,* moral and religious aphorism XXV.

6. As Stephen Sykes points out: "A specific characteristic does not need to be a unique characteristic. What is specific to Anglicanism does not have to be a unique characteristic". See Stephen Sykes, *The Integrity of Anglicanism* (London & Oxford: Mowbrays, 1978), 67. Hereafter Sykes, *Integrity.*

7. See e.g. the essay by Paul Elmer More, "The Spirit of Anglicanism" in P.E. More and F.L. Cross eds., *Anglicanism: the Thought and Practice of the Church of England, illustrated from the religious literature of the seventeenth century* (London: SPCK, 1935), esp. sec. IV of More's essay. See also Henry McAdoo, *The Spirit of Anglicanism: A Survey of Anglican Theological Method in the seventeenth Century* (London: A & C Black, 1965). The author notes that in seventeenth century Anglicanism the distinction between necessary things and things of a lighter consequence more remote from the foundation became "so much a part of theological method ... that it is almost taken for granted", 228. Elsewhere he states that "it is the interplay of the idea of continuity with the finality of fundamentals which is one of the characteristic aspects of the spirit of Anglicanism", 377. The diversity of the period was contained within a shared method which was itself "the outcome and expression of a deep seated conviction as to what constitutes fundamentals", 349. In linking fundamentals concern to what McAdoo considers a specificly Anglican methodology he has ensured that fundamentals discussion remains highly controversial in Anglicanism. See Sykes, *Integrity*, chaps. 1 and 5. See also the first four articles in M.D. Bryant ed., *The Future of Anglican Theology,* Toronto Studies in Theology XVII (New York & Toronto: Edwin Mellen Press,1984).

The significance of the distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals for the Reformation in England has been recognized by the historian Geoffrey Elton, *Reform and Reformation: England 1509-1558* (London: Edward Arnold, 1977), esp. chap. 7 on the discussion of the ideas of Thomas Starkey. See also Stephen Sykes' essay, " Anglicanism and Protestantism" in S.W. Sykes ed., *England and Germany: Studies in Theological Diplomacy* (Frankfurt am Main und Bern: Peter D. Lang, 1982), where the author points to the above distinction as a leading characteristic of the Anglican Reformation understood "as a continuously self-modifying process", 117. Cf. the discussion by Tom Wright, "Doctrine Declared" in *Believing in the Church: The Corporate Nature of Faith*, A Report by the Doctrine Commission of the Church of England (London: SPCK, 1981), 108-141.

8. See Sykes, Fundamentals, 232ff. This matter will be treated more fully later in this chapter.

9. See the examples cited by Yves Congar in *Diversity and Communion,* trans. J. Bowden (1982, French; ET, London: SCM, 1984). Congar states that "one could make a list of evidence establishing that from the seventeenth century to our day Catholics have recognized the validity of the expression 'fundamental articles'", 118. Congar's subsequent list includes ten important Roman theologians who "have recognized that there is a place for the category of 'fundamental articles'", 119.

10. See e.g. Otto Weber, *Foundations of Dogmatics,* 2 vols., trans. D.L. Guder (Grand Rapids, Michigan: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1981-83), vol.I: 112-127, and esp. vol.II: 544ff.

11. The importance of the theological problem of fundamental articles for Continental Protestantism will be more fully discussed later. For the moment refer to the discussion in Congar, *Diversity and Communion,* 107-118; Robert D. Preus, *The Theology of Post-Reformation Lutheranism* (London: Concordia, 1970), 143-154. For more detailed information consult Ulrich Valeske, *Hierachia Veritatum: Theologiegeschichtlich Hintergrunde und mögliche Konsequenzen eines Hinweises im 'O'kumenism us dekret des II. Vatikanischen Konzils zum zwischenkirchlichen Gespräch* (Munich: Claudius Verlag, 1968), chap.3, "Das Problem dei Fundamentalartikel in der Theologiegeschichte der nichtromischen kirchen".

12. Congar, *Diversity and Communion,* 119; but particularly Congar's *Tradition and Traditions* (London: Burns & Oates, 1966), "Excursus B, Scripture and the 'Truths Necessary for Salvation'", 508-519; see also idem, "On the 'Hierarchia Veritatum'" in D. Neiman and M. Schatkin eds., *The Heritage of the Early Church: Essays in Honour of G. Florovsky* (Orientalia Christiana Analecta, no. 195; Rome, 1973).

13. Refer to discussion below on the controversial status of the tradition pp.15-21.

14. The move into articles *per se* is familiar enough, but the legitimacy and significance of focussing on either truths necessary for salvation or articles constitutive for the existence of the Church has not always been appreciated. In the mid seventeenth century Edward Stillingfleet (1635-1699) in *A Rational Account of the Grounds of Protestant Religion* (1664), distinguished between those things necessary to the salvation of persons as such in their individual capacities, and those things "necessary to be owned for salvation, by Christian societies, or as the bonds and conditions of ecclesiastical communion". Stillingfleet went on to claim that "The want of understanding this distinction of the necessity of things has caused most of the perplexities and confusions in this controversy of fundamentals". The apologetic motive is important here. In Stillingfleet's mind the Roman Church had obscured this distinction and thereby fell into the fatal error of attempting to prescribe the limits of faith necessary for an individual's salvation. See Stillingfleet's *Works,* 6 vols. (London,1709-10), vol.IV: 48. The importance of Stillingfleet's distinction was not lost on John Henry Newman in his *Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church Viewed Relatively to Romanism and Popular Protestantism* (London: 1837), esp. lecture IX "On The Essentials of the Gospel". Newman reissued this work as a Roman Catholic with a new preface and notes, *The Via Media of the Church of England* (London: Basil

Montague Pickering, 1877), vol.I.

15. For a recent example of this see Henry R. McAdoo, *The Unity of Anglicanism: Catholic and Reformed* (Wilton, Connecticut: Morehouse-Barlow Co., Inc, 1983), lecture II. On the relationship between faith and church order see the important work by Arthur Michael Ramsey, *The Gospel and the Catholic Church* (London, New York, & Toronto: Longmans, Green & Co., 1936). Drawing upon new insights from biblical theology, Ramsey argued that the central reality of the Gospel - redemption won by Christ through the cross and resurrection - was generically related to the doctrine of the Church: "Of this redemption the Church is the utterance and its order is an expression", 229. Faith and order were not separate. The latter was the institutionally structured form of the former; the gospel objectified in social form, 57. It was an important attempt to develop a rationale for Episcopal government as 'of the *esse* of the universal Church', that necessary ministerial structural form of redemptive faith. Within this context the traditional distinction in Anglicanism between faith and order was considerably complicated in respect of fundamentals discussion.

16. The distinction between the *credenda* and *agenda*, the latter belonging to the mutable laws of church government, was certainly an important feature of Richard Hooker's ecclesiology. This emerged in Book Three, *Of The Laws Of Ecclesiactical Polity* (1594) where Hooker developed the distinction between things necessary and things accessory according to the image of a path which, despite the possibility of its uppermost face being constituted of gravel, grass or stone, or in fact of being overgrown with brambles and thorns, nevertheless remained a path (bk.III, chap.3, para.3). Hooker's point was that matters of polity and/or Roman additions to the faith, belonged to the 'accessories'. The necessaries included the articles of Christian faith and the sacraments of the Church of Christ. For a useful discussion of Hooker in relation to the more vexed issue of episcopacy see the art. by Richard A. Norris, "Episcopacy" in Sykes and Booty eds., *The Study of Anglicanism*, 296-309.

17. For example, cf. above en.15 and chap.4 (pp.102f) of this thesis. Sykes, *Integrity* (83-86), shows how a particular doctrine of episcopacy can subtly overthrow a more traditional Anglican fundamentals apologetic. For further background see also S.W. Sykes and S.W. Gilley, "'No Bishop, No Church!' The Tractarian impact on Anglicanism" in G. Rowell ed., *Tradition Renewed: The Oxford Movement Conference Papers* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1986), chap.8. The problem of the status of questions of church *order* in the fundamentals apologetic had its roots much earlier in the tradition and is evident in the *Act of Uniformity* (1662), one result of which was to elevate subtly the practice of episcopacy from the region of adiaphora (things different) to a form integral to the Catholic church. On this see Sykes, "Anglicanism and Protestantism", 120ff. Sykes' remarks find confirmation in the writings of the lay theologian Henry Dodwell (1641-1711) who, in defending non-juror Bishops in 1692, wrote "If there be degrees of fundamentals, I should think the fundamentals concerning the Church as a society to be of the greatest consequence, and therefore fundamental in the highest degree ..... So that in order to keeping these other fundamentals, the Church as a society is supposed antecedently as a condition that alone can qualify her for having such a trust committed to her...". The cornerstone of the Church as a society was, for Dodwell, the bishop. To be a non-

episcopal Christian was to be an enemy of Catholicity, of episcopacy and the rule of tradition deriving from Christ. The above quotation [from *Dodwell's Vindication of the Deprived Bishops* (1692), 31], is cited and discussed by George H. Tavard, *The Quest for Catholicity: A Study in Anglicanism* (London: Burns & Oates, 1963), 90-93. The whole matter of church order in relation to fundamentals discussion remains highly controversial, if not confused.

18. From the early nineteenth century at least, Anglicans appear to have quite self-consciously spoken of 'the doctrine of fundamentals'. Certainly Newman the Anglican did, regarding it as central to the theory of the *via media*. See e.g. his 1938 essay, "Palmer's View of Faith And Unity" in *Essays Critical and Historical*, 2 vols. 5th ed. (London: Pickering & Co, 1881), vol.I: 204, and 209ff. There is no doubt that for Newman the doctrine of fundamentals was the theoretical foundation of the *via media* of Anglicanism. William Palmer (of Worcester College, Oxford) took a different view and rejected "The Doctrine of Fundamentals". See, *A Treatise on the Church of Christ*, 2 vols. (London: J G & F Rivington, 1838), vol.I, chap.5, appendix. Newman considered that Palmer had thereby disowned the *via media* 'as Anglicans generally understand it'. In this respect see the notes added by Newman as a Roman Catholic at the end of his essay on Palmer. Earlier writings on the subject *discourse* on the problem of fundamentals, without talking about a 'doctrine' or 'theory'. However the apologetic motive remains important. See e.g. the Anglican theologian Daniel Waterland's (1683-1740) "A Discourse of Fundamentals" in *The Works of the Rev. Daniel Waterland*, 6 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1843), vol.V: 73-104.

In more recent times the Anglican fundamentals apologia has been variously referred to as 'the theory of fundamentals', 'the fundamental articles tradition', and "the 'fundamental articles' apologia". See Stephen Sykes, "Authority in The Church of England" in P. Eaton ed., *The Trial of Faith* (Sussex: Churchman Pub., 1988), chap.2; idem, Fundamentals, 242; idem, *Identity*, 106, 257; also his art. " Anglicanism and the Anglican Doctrine of the Church" in J. Robert Wright ed., *Quadrilateral At One Hundred: Essays on the Centenary of the Chicago-Lambeth Quadrilateral* 1886/88 - 1986/88 (Oxford: Mowbrays, 1988), 160.

19. See e.g. J.R. Wright, "Anglicanism, *Ecclesia Anglicana*, and Anglican: An Essay on Terminology" in Sykes and Booty eds., *The Study of Anglicanism*, 424-29. Wright identifies John Macquarrie, Henry McAdoo and the late Stephen Neill as contemporary exponents of the 'no special doctrines' claim, which Wright also finds enshrined in the Report to the Lambeth Conference of 1930 on "The Anglican Communion". Cf. the discussion on Hensley Henson on 'no special doctrines' by T. Wright, "Doctrine Declared", 109f, 125. Sykes, "Anglicanism and the Anglican Doctrine of the Church", cites as another example of the 'no special doctrines' claim, J.W.C. Wand, 157ff.

The 'no special doctrine' claim was implicit in the theology of one of the most important exponents of Anglican ecclesiology in the early twentieth century, A.C. Headlam. Headlam proposed church reunion upon, among other things, adherence to the 'fundamental beliefs' enshrined in the Apostles and Nicene creeds. In this respect Headlam wrote "We want to be Christians and if the Church is Christian it is sufficient". The corollary of this Anglican approach to fundamentals is that what is special to Christendom is special to Anglicanism and no more. See A.C. Headlam, *Christian Unity* (London: SCM, 1930), chap.2; and p.51 for

quotation. Cf., *The Doctrine of the Church and Christian Reunion*, the Bampton Lectures 1920 (London: John Murray, 1920), esp.122, 206, 228-240, 280-283.

20. See esp. Sykes', "Anglicanism and the Anglican Doctrine of the Church", where the author seeks to expose the fallaciousness of the thesis that Anglicans have no special doctrines of their own; in other words that Anglicans simply share in what is fundamental to the Church universal. Sykes argues that "The NSD [non special doctrines] claim and the Anglican attempt to identify fundamentals belong to the same world of discourse", 159. In fact the argument about fundamentals or NSD is shown to be a form of apologetic highly characteristic of Anglicanism and moreover one that has exerted a powerful influence upon Anglican self-understanding in relation to the Universal Church. Sykes shows how the NSD claim implies a quite special doctrine of the Church not shared by other communions. Fundamentals discussion thus remains highly significant in Anglican ecclesiology.

21. That the oneness of the Church is the proper framework for fundamentals discussion will become clear as this thesis surveys the history of the discussion in Anglicanism (Part Two), examines the theme through case studies (Part Three) and inquires into the logic of this discussion (Part Four). It is clear from Sykes' discussion in *Identity* on "The Unity of Christianity", chap.10, that fundamentals discussion in Anglicanism has been inextricably enmeshed in the problem of affirming the oneness of Christianity.

22. *Bonds of Affection*, Proceedings of the Anglican Consultative Council - 6 (London: Anglican Consultative Council, 1984), 70-75. Cf. discussion of the Quadrilateral in *The Truth Shall Make You Free, The Lambeth Conference* 1988 (London: Anglican Consultative Council, 1988), 136-140.

23. Sykes, Fundamentals, 232.

24. *The Lambeth Conference* 1968 (London: Anglican Consultative Council, 1968), 140. Commenting on this notion of comprehensiveness Sykes, Fundamentals, notes that "Reports to the Conference carry only the authority of those by whom it was approved, in this case some one-third of the assembled bishops," 243.

25. See below 15-25.

26. The logic of this position is developed in chap.12 of this thesis as a problem of institutional restabilization in the truth.

27. See (a) *Doctrine in the Church of England*, The Report of the Commission on Christian Doctrine Appointed by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York in 1922 (pub., 1938; rep. with new intro. by G.W.H. Lampe; London: SPCK, 1982).

(b) *Christian Believing: The Nature of the Christian Faith and its Expression in Holy Scripture and Creeds*, A Report by The Doctrine Commission of the Church of England (London: SPCK, 1976).

(c) *Believing in the Church: The Corporate Nature of Faith*, A Report by the Doctrine Commission of the Church of England (London: SPCK, 1981).

28. The introduction of a particular and highly idiosyncratic understanding of symbolic truth - that "Statements affirming particular facts may be found to have value as pictorial expressions of spiritual truths, even though the supposed facts themselves did not actually happen" - was a dangerous manoeuvre. It also demonstrated how amenable the fundamentals tradition was to changing content, and furthermore how important it was felt that this tradition, with its Anglican focus on the Creeds, be assented to in a form as inclusive as possible. Cf. the Commission's brief to investigate "how far it is possible to remove or diminish existing differences", 19. The American theologian, Paul Tillich, has pointed to the dangers involved in such a view of symbols noting that "some theological movements, such as Protestant Hegelianism and Catholic modernism, have interpreted religious language symbolically in order to dissolve its realistic meaning and to weaken its seriousness, its power, and its spiritual impact". See Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, combined vol. (Digswell Place, Welwyn: James Nisbet & Co. Ltd, 1968), vol. I: 267.

29. Thus in this report there were forty-two pages on an agreed statement and one hundred and fourteen pages of signed appendices or individual essays!

30. See esp. the essay in the Report by Anthony Thiselton, "Knowledge, Myth and Corporate Memory". The author's discussion of "instruments for the transmission and institutionalization of its corporate knowledge" (53), is clearly relevant to the tradition under discussion which has, in the course of Anglican history at least, been an important agent in the interpretation of the identity and continuity of Christianity in its institutional form. For further see chap.12 of this thesis.

31. *The Nature of Christian Belief:* A Statement and Exposition by the House of Bishops of the General Synod of the Church of England (London: Church House Pub., 1986).

32. Ibid., para.14.

33. The present reference can be found in the *Malta Report* as reprinted in *ARCIC The Final Report* (London: SPCK & CTS, 1982), 110. Cf. Congar, *Diversity and Communion*, for full text relevant to 'hierarchy' of truths, 126.

34. This comment was made in the Elucidation (1979) of The Statement (1971) on *Eucharistic Doctrine*, in *ARCIC The Final Report*, 24.

35. See The Statement (1973) on *Ministry and Ordination* in *The Final Report*, 38; and cf. Elucidation (1979) in *The Final Report*, 44.

36. *Salvation and the Church* (1987): An Agreed Statement by the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission ARCIC II, with commentary and study guide by M. Cecily Boulding OP and Timothy Bradshaw (London: Church House Pub. & CTS, 1989). This reference, para.32 of statement.

37. Harding Meyer, "Fundamental Difference - Fundamental Consensus", *Midstream* XXV (1986): 247-259, links the notion of 'fundamental consensus' with the Anglican-Roman Catholic references to 'substantial agreement', 248.

38. *Salvation and the Church*, para.32.

39. See The Statement (1976) on *Authority in the Church* in *The Final Report*, 62.

40. Ibid., 63.

41. See Elucidation (1981) on *Authority in the Church* in *The Final Report*, 71.

42. *The Final Report*, 65.

43. See The Statement (1981) on *Authority in the Church* in *The Final Report*, 96.

44. Ibid. Interestingly this is precisely what seems to be envisaged by the Roman Catholic theologians Heinrich Fries and Karl Rahner in *Unity of the Churches: An Actual Possibility* [1983 German pub.; trans. R.C. & E.W. Gritsch (Philadelphia & New York: Fortress Press & Paulist, 1985)]. See esp. the second of their eight theses for the future one church and the commentary on it, 25-41.

The American Lutheran theologian George Lindbeck comments that Rahner and Fries' proposals are an eloquent exposition of an ecclesial model for unity - 'a communion of communions' - which underlies the Anglican-Roman Catholic dialogue. See his essay, "The Church" in Geoffrey Wainwright ed., *Keeping The Faith: Essays to Mark the Centenary of Lux Mundi* (London: SPCK, 1989), 201.

45. In *Anglican-Orthodox Dialogue* The Moscow Agreed Statement 1976 (London: SPCK, 1977), sec 4, "The Authority of the Councils", para.14, it is noted that "Anglican members, while accepting the dogmatic decrees of the fifth, sixth, and seventh Councils, have long been accustomed to lay more emphasis on the first four, and believe that the concept of 'an order or "hierarchy" of truths' can usefully be applied to the decisions of the Councils. The Orthodox members find this concept to be in conflict with the unity of the faith as a whole, though they recognise gradations of importance in matters of practice". This position is reiterated in *Anglican-Orthodox Dialogue* The Dublin Agreed Statement 1984 (London: SPCK, 1985), para. 105.

The Anglican attempt to accord a differential authority to certain Church Councils of the early church is related to an Anglican conception of the fundamentals of the faith. Orthodox members resist Anglican handling of the authority of councils precisely because they are out of sympathy with the contrast between fundamentals and non-fundamentals in matters of faith. The Anglican appeal to a 'hierarchy' within conciliar decisions was rightly discerned by Orthodox members as being in conflict with their view of the unity of the faith. The Orthodox reaction is understandable given their vigorous rejection of the fundamental articles tradition of Protestantism. Consult Congar, *Diversity and Communion*, 120.

46. Particularly relevant here are the following: *Anglican-Lutheran Dialogue*, The Report of the Anglican-Lutheran European Regional Commission, Helsinki, 1982 (London: SPCK, 1983); *Anglican-Lutheran Relations*, Report of the Anglican-Lutheran Joint Working Group, Cold Ash, 1983 (London & Geneva: Anglican Consultative Council & Lutheran World Federation, 1983); *The Niagara Report*, Report of the Anglican-Lutheran Consultation on Episcope 1987 (London & Geneva: Anglican Consultative Council & Lutheran World Federation,

1988); *God's Reign And Our Unity*, The Report of the Anglican-Reformed International Commission 1981-1984 (London & Edinburgh: SPCK & The Saint Andrew Press, 1984); and *On The Way To Visible Unity*, Meissen, 1988 (London: Church House Pub., 1988).

47. *The Niagara Report*, para.72 and generally para.60-72.

48. Ibid., 71; cf. Helsinki, 1982 report, para.62-63.

49. *God's Reign and Our Unity*, esp. para. 39-46.

50. Meissen, 1988, para.8.

51. Ibid., para.15(ii).

52. Ibid., para.17A(i).

53. Thus in Anglican-Lutheran dialogue it seems that 'full Communion', as opposed to 'closer fellowship' and 'mutual recognition' of ministries, can emerge only as Anglicans modify their doctrine of the historic episcopate, given the unwillingness of Lutherans to accept that their own ministry remains defective until the time when it enters into an existing line of episcopal succession. See *Anglican-Lutheran Dialogue*, Helsinki, 1982, para. 43 and Appendix two, para.79-87. In the Preface to *The Niagara Report*, there is a recognition that the issue of *episcope* is "the chief remaining obstacle to full communion between Anglicans and Lutherans". The report recognises that the 'office of *episcope*' - the ministry of pastoral leadership, co-operation and oversight, para.7 - operates in both communions (para.55, 56, 59 & 75). Furthermore, a subtle change is introduced into one Anglican view of episcopacy when it is stated that, in the light of study of the New Testament, it is "unthinkable for us to isolate ordination at the hands of someone in linear succession to the apostles as the sole criterion of faithfulness to the apostolic commission .... the burden of proof has passed to those who would argue otherwise" (para.20; cf. para.54 and esp. para.94). One result is that "the ordained ministry is no longer an issue which need divide our two Churches" (para.59; cf. 71). With the Lutherans it seems the issue is now one of mapping out the important practical details to implement full communion (para.81-116). Significantly Anglicans are said to be "free to do this both by grace and power of the Holy Spirit and because such action [canonical revision for reordering their relationships with Lutherans] does not mean surrender of the gift of the historic episcopate"(para.94).

In Anglican-Reformed dialogue it is stated that both comunions 'define themselves in different ways'; in relation to confessions (Reformed) and Liturgy (Anglican) (para.7). This difference "is expressive of a deep divergence in the ways in which the two churches understand themselves". More specifically, as regards ministry and ordination to ministry, the two communions are divided because "of different views about the role of the continuity of ordination in signifying and safeguarding unity" (para.87). In this respect Anglicans are said to preserve "this continuity *or* succession through episcopal ordination; in the Reformed tradition it is preserved through ministerial ordination" (my italics; para.89). Overcoming separation requires, it seems, unambiguous acknowledgement of the reality of God's gift of ministry to the churches and "that the continuity of succession in ordination with the undivided Church is - so far as lies in our power - visibly restored and maintained" (para.90). The report makes certain practical suggestions to assist this process,

(para.112-119). The implication of this dialogue is that Anglican and reformed 'patterns of oversight' can be reconciled (para.9).

In Anglican, Lutheran and Reformed discussions at Meissen (1988) it was acknowledged "that personal and collegial oversight (*episkope*) is embodied and exercised in our churches in a variety of forms, episcopal and non-episcopal, as a visible sign of the Church's unity and continuity in apostolic life, mission and ministry" [para.17A(iv)]. The sticking point for 'full, visible unity' still turns on a particular form of *episkope* - 'episcopal succession' - being made "a necessary condition for 'full, visible unity'" (para.16). However, nowhere in the Meissen statement does there appear any further elaboration of what 'episcopal succession' or 'historic episcopate' might include.

These conversations make it abundantly clear that for Anglicans a *particular form* of *episcopy* and the doctrine(s) of its practice significantly intrude into all efforts towards unity with other Protestant churches of the Reformation. Implicit in the Anglican handling of fundamentals issues is the view that faith and order cannot be neatly separated but have to be addressed together. The question is whether Anglicans fully appreciate the logic of their own position. For example, from this Anglican perspective, a reticence to move to full communion because of a perceived lack in another church's ministry ought to raise questions for Anglicans about the fullness of the gospel present in that communion. This would not only be unwelcome but probably theologically unsound. However if this matter was faced Anglicans would have to confront some of the contradictions present in their own handling of what is deemed to be essential to being a Christian in the Church.

54. See above en.19, 20, 54. Cf. Sykes, *Integrity*, chap.6 "Anglicans and the Theology of the Church", esp. 83ff.

55. This is not to deny what is obvious; that there is a long history of attempts to expound an Anglican theology. These attempts have too often been vitiated by a lack of self criticism in respect of its apologetic strategies, to which the appeal to fundamentals is quite central. For further discussion of this general problem in Anglicanism consult: Sykes, *Integrity*; Bryant ed., *The Future of Anglican Theology*, esp. the pertinent comments by W. Taylor Stevenson on method and dialectic in his contribution, "Is There a Characteristic Anglican Theology?",15-26.

56. See e.g. Sykes, Fundamentals; Waterland, "A Discourse of Fundamentals".

57. See e.g. above en.17 and en.53. and relevant discussion in the text above.

58. Congar, "On the 'Hierarchia Veritatum'", 414.

59. Valeske, *Hierarchia Veritatum*.

60. Ibid., chap.3.

61. Thus in a sixty-four page chapter on the fundamental article problem in Protestantism, Valeska devoted four pages to summary information on selected Anglican theologians: Thomas Cranmer, Richard Hooker, Joseph Hall, John Davenant, William Laud, John Dury, Richard Baxter, John Locke, Daniel Waterland, and William

Wake (137-141; cf. 157 on Lambeth Quadrilateral).

62. Congar, *Tradition and Traditions*, 508-519.

63. Congar, *Diversity and Communion*, identifies a context in Church and dogmatics, an Erasmian context, Lutheran orthodoxy, and Anglicanism (109-118).

64. Ibid., 116.

65. See Congar, ibid., 212, for a useful bibliography on the idea of the 'hierarchy of truths'. Congar cites an early article on the subject by George Tavard, "'Hierarchia Veritatum': A preliminary investigation", *Theological Studies* XXXII (1971): 278-289. Tavard recognised that the concept of *hierarchia veritatum* had "analogous conceptions in Anglican and perhaps in Protestant thought", 289. He was referring to the Anglican distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals, 282.

66. See A. Dulles, "Paths to Doctrinal Agreement: Ten Theses", *Theological Studies* XLVII (1986): 32-47.

67. See esp. G.H. Joyce, art. "Fundamental Articles" in *Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York: 1913), Vol. IV: 319-321. Joyce's article is important for two reasons. Firstly, it is one of the few Dictionary articles (the only Roman Catholic one) of any substantial length (approx 2,500 words) devoted to the subject of fundamental articles *in English.* Secondly, it contains some interesting information on the Anglican tradition, including a reference to the otherwise forgotten and important work (for its detailed documentation of scholastic sources in respect of fundamental articles) by the Laudian divine, Christopher Potter. Potter's debate with Edward Knott, S.J., was later continued by William Chillingworth (1602-44) in his celebrated work *The Religion of Protestants* (1637), in which discussion over the fundamentals of Christianity figured prominently (see pp.98f, 106f of this thesis). See also the reasonably comprehensive and still useful treatment provided by A. Tanqueray, art. "Articles fondamentaux (système des)" in *Dictionaire de Théologie Catholique* 3 vols. (Paris, 1923), vol.I: 2025-35.

68. See: M.E. Williams, art. "Fundamental Articles", *New Catholic Encyclopedia* (Washington: McGraw Hill, 1967), vol.VI: 222; art. "Fundamental Articles" in Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler eds., *Concise Theological Dictionary*, 2nd. ed., (London: Burns & Oates, 1983), 183; Karl Rahner, art. 'Dogma' in Karl Rahner ed., *Encyclopedia of Theology: A Concise Sacramentum Mundi* (London: Burns & Oates, 1975), esp. Part I(c) 'Division of Dogmas'; also a slightly older but useful article (in the light of the more recent interest in 'hierarchy of truths') is Yves Congar, art., "Articles Fondamentaux", *Catholicisme* (Paris, 1948), vol.I: 882f.

69. A quite detailed and useful late nineteenth century discussion of the development of the problem of fundamental articles, with particular emphasis on the Continental Lutheran context, can be found in A. Schmidt, art. "Fundamentalartikel", *Kirchenlexikon* (Freiburg, 1886), Vol.IV: 2120-2137. Consult also: D. Schaff, art. "Fundamental Doctrines of Christianity" in *The New Schaff Hertzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge* (New York, 1909), vol.IV: 410-13; art. "Fundamentals" in J. McClintock and J. Strong eds., *Encyclopedia of Biblical Theological and Ecclesiastical Literature*, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1883),

vol.III: 693-94. For more recent treatments consult: F.W. Kantzenbach, art. "Fundamental Articles" in J. Bodensieck ed., *The Encyclopedia of the Lutheran Church* (Minneapolis & Minnesota: Augsburg Pub., 1965), vol.II: 893-895; art. "Fundamental Doctrines" in E.L. Lueker ed., *Lutheran Encyclopedia*, rev. ed., (London & St Louis: Concordia, 1975), 319-320; W. Joest, art. "Fundamentalartikel" in *Theologische Realenzyklopädie* (Berlin and New York, 1983), vol.XI: 727-32.

70. A good recent introduction to the fundamental articles discussion in Lutheranism can be found in Preus, *The Theology of Post-Reformation Lutheranism*, esp. 142-154 and index, for references to 'articles of faith' and 'fundamental articles'. From the Reformed side see the helpful analysis by G.C. Berkouwer, *The Church* trans. J.E. Davison (1970-72 Dutch; Grand Rapids, Michigan: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1976), chap.11 "Apostolic Confession". See also Heinrich Schmidt, *Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church* (1889), 3rd, ed. rev. and trans. C.A. Hay and H.E. Jacobs (Mineapolis, Minniesota; Augsburg Pub. House, 1961 rep.), chap.5 "Concerning the Articles of Faith and the Symbol of the Church", 92-102. A more recent and stimulating discussion of fundamental articles in the ecumenical context can be found in F.W. Kantzenbach, "Das Theologische Problem der Fundamentalartikel", *Lutherische Monatshefte* I, December 1962, 542-47. The author proposed a movement beyond mere confessional texts towards a renewed testimony to the gospel story in its wholeness. In this context fundamental articles were no longer simply construed as an assemblage of well-defined dogmatical statements, but rather they had a focussing and directional function leading the Church, not to understanding 'more', but to a more deeper understanding of its basic commitments. Kantzenbach's article is the original and slightly longer version of the article he contributed to *The Encyclopedia of the Lutheran Church.* For an extensive bibliography of German discussion of fundamental articles consult Valeske, *Hierarchia Veritatum.*

71. Even the English articles by Schaff and, McClintock and Strong, which make some reference to the Anglican situation, have at best only a limited usefulness.

72. From the early seventeenth century, beginning with the careful work of the Lutheran theologian Nicholas Hunnius (1585-1643), the fundamental articles apologetic was developed to a high degree of precision and elaborateness in seventeenth century Lutheran scholasticism. See esp. Preus, *The Theology of Post-Reformation Lutheranism;* Kantzenbach, "Problem der Fundamentalartikel"; Schmidt, "Fundamentalartikel"; and Sykes, Fundamentals, 236. This development in Lutheranism is not surprising given the importance historically attached to doctrinal purity. See above en.10.

73. This issue is discussed in the articles by Schmidt and Kantzenbach.

74. Kantzenbach, "Fundamental Doctrines", refers to the efforts of Lutheran theologians to intergrate an 'organic' understanding of doctrine into traditional discussion of fundamental articles. F. Philippi developed a distinction between 'undeveloped original' fundamental articles and 'developed secondary' fundamental articles. This led to the conclusion that all were fundamental, differing only in form or rank. Kantzenbach concluded: "The end of the whole discussion was resignation: the quest for a real distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals, between the

confession of faith and its theological elaboration, was given up", 894.

75. See esp. J. Lecler S.J., *Toleration and the Reformation*, 2 vols. (London & New York: Longmans & Assoc. Press, 1960); R. Rouse and S. Neill, eds., *A History of the Ecumenical Movement 1517 - 1948*, 3rd. ed. (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1986). Esp. essays by M. Schmidt, "Ecumenical Activity on the Continent of Europe in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries", and N. Sykes, "Ecumenical Movements in Great Britain in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries".

76. See e.g. Oscar Cullmann, *Unity Through Diversity: Its Foundation, and a Contribution to the Discussion concerning the Possibilities of its Actualization*, trans. M. Eugene Boring (1986 German; ET, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), esp. 22-28; Michael Kinnamon, *Truth and Community: Diversity and its Limits in the Ecumenical Movement* (Geneva: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1988), esp. 19-33 and 53-57.

77. Daniel Waterland's, "Discourse of Fundamentals", was delivered in 1734. William Palmer's much shorter, though perceptive, critique of the 'Doctrine of Fundamentals', appeared in 1838. See above en.18. Significantly, Sykes' bibliography makes no reference to the theological problem of fundamental articles in contempory Anglicanism.

78. See P. Avis, *Anglicanism and the Christian Church* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1989). In Avis' numerous short case studies of various Anglican theologians he includes reference to the theme of fundamentals.

79. H. Chadwick, "Einigkert in den fundamentalen Glaubensartiken", *Theologische Quartalschrift* CL (1970): 396-403.

80. H.R. McAdoo: *The Spirit of Anglicanism; The Unity of Anglicanism.* See also his essay, "Anglican-Roman Catholic Relations, 1717-1980. A 'Detection of Themes'" in D. Loades et al. eds., *Rome and the Anglicans: Historical and Doctrinal Aspects of Anglican-Roman Catholic Relations* (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1982), 143-281. More recently "The Influence of the Seventeenth Century on Contemporary Anglican Understanding of the Purpose and Functioning of Authority in the Church" in G.R. Evans ed., *Christian Authority: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), chap.13.

81. The tradition, perhaps because it is so much a feature of Anglicanism, is more usually simply noted with some description but with negligible analysis. In part this has arisen because of the impact of an historical method of theological inquiry in Anglicanism. For further see Stephen Sykes "Theology through History" in D. Ford ed., *The Modern Theologians: An introduction to Christian theology in the twentieth century*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), vol.II: 3-29. Sykes discusses the contributions of the historians Norman Sykes and Herbert Butterfield to the doctrine of the Church in Anglicanism. McAdoo's work is a good example of how the historical descriptive mode can fail to yield adequate theological insight in respect of the fundamentals apologia. For further examples of how the tradition is treated in a rather indirect way consult: Stanley L. Greenslade, "The Authority of the Tradition of the Early Church in Early Anglican Thought", *Oecumenica*, 1971/72, 9-33; Gareth V.

Bennett, "Patristic Tradition in Anglican Thought, 1660-1900", *Oecumenica*, 1971/72, 63-87.

82. See Gerald O'Collins, "Articles of Faith" in A. Richardson and J. Bowden eds. *A New Dictionary of Christian Theology* (London: SCM, 1983), where, for the first time, there appears a short article in which passing reference is made to fundamental 'articles of faith'. The article was written by a Roman Catholic theologian. The editors betray a distinct lack of appreciation and awareness of an Anglican and Protestant dimension to this subject.

83. Thus Palmer, in his appendix "On The Doctrine of Fundamentals" in vol.I of his *Treatise on the Church of Christ*, wrote: "This term is capable of so many meanings as applied to Christian doctrine, and it actually is, has been, and must continue to be, used in so great a diversity of senses, that it is morally impossible to avoid perplexity while it is employed in controversy. As an ambiguous term, as conveying no one definite notion, it seems unqualified to be of any practical utility in questions of controversy", 103.

84. See Newman's *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* (1864), for his own personal account of his journey from Anglicanism to Roman Catholicism, and especially part VI "History of my Religious Opinions - 1841-1845", for an account of his rejection of the fundamentals tradition of the *Via Media*.

85. This kind of criticism is implicit in the controversy between Richard Hooker and the Puritans. In the early decades of the seventeenth century it becomes quite explicit. Thus, in reaction to the Laudian sympathiser Richard Montagu - who had argued in his *Appello Caesareum: A Just Appeal From Two Unjust Informers* (625) that Rome, whilst not a 'sound' church, was still a true church, because it retained the fundamentals - the Anglican Puritan A. Wotton in *A Dangerous Plot Discovered* (1626), rejected Montagu's fundamentals/non-fundamentals distinction as arbitrary and contrary to the requirement to believe all of divine revelation.

86. Refer Kantzenbach, "Problem der Fundamentalartikel", 542.

87. Ibid., 542-545.

88. Ibid., 544; and cf. Schmidt, "Fundamentalartikel", 2132f.

89. Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, G. Bromiley and T. Torrance, eds. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1978 impression), vol. I/pt.2, 863-66.

90. Ibid., 865f.

91. Ibid., 866. Barth may have been mistaken here. Cf. Sykes, *Identity*, 194 and 316n.77.

92. Ibid., 865.

93. Ibid.

94. In examining Barth's critique of the fundamental articles tradition Stephen Sykes, in his essay, "Barth on the Centre of Theology" in S.W. Sykes ed., *Karl Barth - Studies of his Theological Methods* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) goes on to argue that Barth's "'principle of the centre' consists in an essentially Romantic aversion to abstract clarity", 51. From

Barth's point of view the fundamental articles tradition contradicts such an idea of the centre.

95. See Sykes, *Identity*, 214, 316.

96. *Church Dogmatics*, I/2, 864.

97. *Church Dogmatics*, I/2, 864.

98. William A. Christian, SR., *Doctrines of Religious Communities: A Philosphical Study* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1987) makes the point that Barth's critique, whilst it certainly involves a 'warning' about usurping the free Word of God, nevertheless still sanctions a legitimate ordering and ranking of doctrines (39ff).

99. *Church Dogmatics*, I/2, 831.

100. Ibid., 832. For Calvin see *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (1562) [The Library of Christian Classics XXI; J.T. McNeill ed. (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1965)] Bk.iv. chap.1 para.12, and discussion in chap.2 (p.64f) of this thesis.

101. See e.g. Tanqueray, "Articles fondamentaux (système des)", 2029.

102. Ibid., 2035.

103. Ibid., 2033.

104. *Mortalium Animos.* Encyclical letter on fostering True Religious Unity of our Most Holy Lord Pius XI (6.1.1927). Translation is from G.K.A. Bell, *Documents on Christian Unity: Second Series* (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), 60. Cf. Congar, *Diversity and Communion*, 118f.

105. As cited in Congar, *Diversity and Communion*, 120. Cf. Chadwick, "Einigkeit in den fundamentalen Glaubensartikeln", 401.

106. Congar, *Diversity and Communion*, 119; and cf. esp. Congar, "Hierarchia Veritatum", 416.

107. Congar, *Diversity and Communion*, 118.

108. *Unity of the Churches.*

109. See e.g. Cullman, *Unity through Diversity*, 67-71.

110. Berkouwer, *The Church*, 281.

111. K.Rahner, "The Need for a 'Short Formula' of Christian Faith" in *Theological Investigations*, trans. G. Harrison (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972), Vol.IX: 117.

112. Berkouwer, *The Church*, 289.

113. Ibid.

114. Sykes, Fundamentals, 232.

115. John Davenant, *Exhortation to Brotherly Communion betwixt the Protestant Churches* (London, 1640), preface.

116. *Works*, vol.V: 75.

117. Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge*, 87ff.

118. Sykes, *Identity*, chap. 10.

119. See e.g. a brief but useful introduction to the significance of communications theory for ecclesiology can be found in G. Baum and A. Greely eds., *Communication in the Church* in *Concilium* CXI (1978), esp. part 4. This work draws upon the thought of the critical social philosophy of Jürgen Habermas. See further chap.11 of this thesis.

120. E. Schlink, *The Coming Christ and the Coming Church* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1968), 66.

121. The nature of the interconnections among these varying terms, and the true significance of these conceptual relations, are two areas where a great deal of clarification is required. In Congar's otherwise useful book, *Diversity and Communion*, these issues are not tackled.

122. This issue is the subject of chap.12 of this thesis.

123. In this respect see the pertinent comments by William R. Crockett "The Hermeneutics of Doctrine" in Bryant ed., *The Future of Anglican Theology*, where the author notes that "The task of ideological analysis is to attempt to expose ways in which doctrine has and does function ideologically in order to make it clear that doctrine not only functions at the level of the reflective understanding but also has a social role, whether as a form of ideological justification for the existing set of social relationships or as the basis for transforming and liberative praxis", 65. Crockett goes on to ask : "How far, for example, have the political ideologies of empire, moderation, and compromise, the ideologies of the English class system and the older universities, and the ideologies of the English intellectual tradition with its empirical bias shaped the Anglican doctrinal ethos? An ideological analysis of Anglican doctrine would help to answer that question", 65.

124. Sykes, *Integrity*, esp intro. and chap.I. See above ens. 55 and 123.

125. This conference, held at Regensburg and entitled "Hierarchie des Verites et Unite de L'Eglise - Ce qui est Central et Peripherique dans la Foi", was attended by Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Lutheran, Reformed and Anglican theologians. As far as I can determine the proceedings of this conference do not seem to have been published. A participant at the conference, Dr. George Dragas of Durham University, drew my attention to the conference and kindly supplied me with a copy of the paper presented by John Baker.

126. Chadwick, "Einigkeit in den fundamentalen Glaubensartikeln".

127. Ibid., 403.

128. "Unity and Pluralism" in M. Gourgeres and G.D. Mailhiot eds., *L'Altérité; Vivre ensemble Différents*; a paper given at Actes du Colloque pluridisciplinaire tenu à l'occasion du 75e anniversaire du College dominican de philosophie et de théologie (Ottawa, 1984), *Recherches Nouvelle Série* - 7, 1986, esp. 359f.

129. Ibid., 359.

130. Ibid., 360.

131. See Sykes, Fundamentals, 232.

132. Esp., *The Spirit of Anglicanism*; "Anglican-Roman Catholic Relations 1717-1980" and most recently "The Influence of the Seventeenth Century in contemporary Anglican Understanding".

133. See esp., *The Unity of Anglicanism*.

134. Ibid., 31. Cf. his essay "The Influence of the Seventeenth Century in contemporary Anglican Understanding", 269.

135. Ibid., 37.

136. Ibid., 38.

137. Ibid., 16.

138. Ibid., 18.

139. Ibid., 39.

140. Sykes, *Integrity*.

141. *The Unity of Anglicanism*, 48.

142. Ibid., 52.

143. Ibid., 57.

144. Ibid., 60.

145. See "Authority in the Church" (Venice 1976) in *ARCIC The Final Report*.

146. Ibid., 59 (para.15 of statement); cf. *The Unity of Anglicanism*, 62.

147. *The Unity of Anglicanism*, 65.

148. Ibid.

149. Ibid., 70.

150. Ibid.

151. *The Spirit of Anglicanism*, 377.

152. Ibid., 349.

153. The problem with McAdoo's approach is that it fails to move beyond historical interpretation and as a result consistently avoids the difficulties inherent in his 'deposit' theory of revelation. His solution to the problems of faith and authority in the Church today is too neat. He espouses a method to preserve the deposit - "the fundamental objective content and quality of the 'truth of the Gospel'"; see "The Influence of the Seventeenth Century in Contemporary Anglican Understanding", 253. From this fairly static

presupposition McAdoo is able to skate over the history of the fundamentals tradition identifying its form and content in relation to a pre-determined pattern of authority and faith.

154. McAdoo's handling of Archbishop William Wake's early eighteenth century discussion of fundamentals seems to be a case in point. Thus, in *The Unity of Anglicanism*, which is devoted in large measure to a discussion of Wake's reunion efforts, McAdoo attempts to draw out of Wake's somewhat enigmatic remarks a doctrine of fundamentals that McAdoo thinks appropriate and necessary for contemporary Anglican ecclesiology (see 39f, 64-70). It seems that a question mark remains in McAdoo's own mind as to the correctness of his interpretation (66). The problem Wake wrestled with, of rightly differentiating between essentials and non-essentials for salvation, is greatly simplified by McAdoo. For further comments on Wake see chap.8 en.180 of this thesis.

155. *Integrity*, 11-14, 20-25 and chap.2.

156. Sykes, *Integrity*, 128.

157. Ibid., 129.

158. See e.g. the essays in Bryant ed., *The Future of Anglican Theology*.

159. From Sykes, *Christian Theology Today*, rev. ed. (London & Oxford: Mowbray, 1983), 54; cited by Donald Wiebe in his essay "'Comprehensiveness', *The Integrity of Anglican Theology*" in Bryant ed., *The Future of Anglican Theology*, 51.

160. Sykes, *Identity*, 283.

161. Ibid., 232.

162. Ibid., 104.

163. Ibid., 106.

164. Ibid.

165. Ibid.

166. Ibid., 233.

167. Ibid., 234.

168. Ibid.

169. Ibid.

170. Ibid., 231.

171. Ibid., 233.

172. Ibid., 237.

173. Ibid., 236.

174. This matter is usefully opened up in Weibe's essay above, en.159.

175. Ibid., 256.

176. Ibid., 257.

177. Ibid., 255.

178. Ibid., 143.

179. Ibid., 258.

180. Ibid., 282.

181. This problem is explored in the case study on Daniel Waterland (chap.6) and later in chap.10 in this thesis.

182. Sykes, *Identity*, 282.

183. Ibid., 285.

184. Ibid., 246.

185. Ibid., 193-196.

186. These issues re-emerge in the case studies in Part Three and receive more direct treatment in chaps.10 and 11 (Part Four) of this thesis.

187. Sykes, *Identity*, 277.

188. Ibid., 267.

189. Ibid., 276.

190. Ibid.

191. Ibid., 278.

192. Ibid., 279.

193. Ibid., 281.

194. Ibid., 276.

195. Ibid., 257.

196. Ibid., 258.

197. Ibid.

198. Ibid., 257.

199. Ibid., 258ff.

200. Ibid., 255.

201. Ibid., 258.

202. Ibid., 257.

203. Ibid.

204. At the root here is a problem of simplicity, a matter which still awaits more adequate determination in Christian theology. For a

fuller discussion of simplicity see chap.11 of this thesis. For criticism of Sykes on this issue and its relevance to Sykes' use of the notion of a 'summary' or 'condensation' of the faith see chap.11 en.82.

205. Sykes, Fundamentals, 243.

206. For a useful discussion of realism in theology see Janet Martin Soskice, "Theological Realism" in W.J. Abraham and S.W. Haltzer eds., *The Rationality of Religious Belief: Essays in Honour of Basil Mitchell* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).

FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES IN ANGLICANISM:
The Early History of a Tradition

INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO, AND CHAPTER TWO: ANTECEDENTS OF THE TRADITION

1. For a different attempt to provide a five-fold framework for the interpretation of Anglicanism see Stephen Sykes, "Anglicanism and Protestantism". More recently see Avis, *Anglicanism and the Christian Church*, for an interpretation of Anglicanism in terms of three paradigms, Erastian , Apostolic and Baptismal.

2. Consult Weber, *Foundations of Dogmatics*, I: 114 n.31; Congar, *Tradition and Traditions*, 517.

3. For further information on Junius consult C. De Jonge, "Franciscus Junius (1545-1602) and the English separatists at Amsterdam" in D. Baker ed., *Reform and Reformation: England and the Continent c1500-c1750* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), 165-173; Lecler, *Toleration and the Reformation*, II: 256, 269-271; Rouse and Neill eds., *A History of the Ecumenical Movement 1517-1948*, I: 66f, 86f.

4. In this sense the fundamental articles tradition belongs to developments within seventeenth century Protestant orthodoxy. See e.g. Preus, *The Theology of Post-Reformation Lutheranism;* Henry R. McAdoo, *The Spirit of Anglicanism*; Yves Congar, *Diversity in Communion*, 208 n.35, wherein Congar cites a list of seventeenth century Anglicans for whom the fundamentals apologetic was important; Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, I/2, 865ff.

5. A seminal contribution to fundamental articles analysis was made in 1626 by the German Lutheran Nicholas Hunnias. See Preus, *The Theology of Post-Reformation Lutheranism*, 143ff.

6. See the masterly analysis of the course of Christian theology by Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine*, 5 vols. (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1971-88). Pelikan discusses early Trinitarian and Christological disputes as a process in "The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition" (vol.I). Reconsideration and re-examination of the Augustinian synthesis generated a fresh reintegration of the tradition (vol.III). The breakdown of this medieval consensus and the doctrinal pluralism of the later middle ages provides the context for the "Reformation of Church and Dogma" (vol.IV). The subsequent breakdown of orthodoxy and search for a new consensus in the Christian Tradition since 1700 is detailed in "Christian Doctrine and Modern Culture (since 1700)", vol.V.

   In Pelikan's analysis the development of doctrine includes a dialectical relation between the central Christian realities and the varying historical contexts in which these realities find expression in thought and practice. The problems associated with the fundamental articles concept belong to his discussion of seventeenth century confessional dogmatics (vol.IV, chaps. 6 and 7). Before this period, disputation about the articles of the Christian faith did not give rise to the concept of 'fundamental articles' but certainly anticipated it. Hereafter Pelikan, *CT* [followed by vol. and page no. (sometimes chap.no.)].

7. Pelikan, *CT.*, III, chap. 5; IV, chap.1. Consult also: T.F. Torrance, *The Trinitarian Faith* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1989), chap.7, "The Oneness of the Church"; Sykes, *Identity*, chap.10, "The Unity of Christianity".

8. See J.D.G. Dunn, "Was Christianity a Monotheistic Faith from the Beginning", *Scottish Journal of Theology* XXXV (1982): 303-336.

9. Refer J.N.D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, 3rd. ed. (London: Longmans Green & Co, 1972), chap.1. Consult also E. Schillebeeckx ed., *Tension Between Church and Faith, Concilium* I, no.6 (1970), esp. 131-153. This volume contains very useful material on the origin, function and development of creeds in the early Church.

10. Refer Schillebeeckx ed., *Concilium*, ibid., 136.

11. It was precisely from the standpoint of the oneness of the faith that Origen developed a speculative theological strand and distinguished between doctrines which were necessary to be known and believed - the Trinitarian articles of the creed - and those doctrines that were not necessary for salvation - the time and mode of the creation of angels, whether the sun, moon and stars were animate or not. Upon the basis of this distinction, Eusebius of Caesarea claimed that Origen had preserved 'the rule of the church' (See Pelikan, *CT*, III: 19). For Origen at least doctrinal discriminations could be made without impinging on central Christian beliefs. Furthermore, in a later period Origen could still be appealed to as a witness to orthodoxy; the point being that the content of the one faith had become so stabilized that even the heretic Origen could be studied and quoted "without becoming a threat to the integrity of the catholic tradition" (Pelikan, ibid.). The late seventeenth century Anglican George Bull (1634-1710), appealed to Origen's above distinctions as an early anticipation of the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental articles of the faith. See Bull's, A *Defence of the Nicene Creed* (1685 Latin), Library of Anglo Catholic Theology (Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1852), Bk.II, Chap.9, 281ff.

12. This point is developed in Schillebeeckx ed., *Tension Between Church and Faith, Concilium* I, no.6. (1970): 33-42, 131-153.

13. See Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, chap.3. In a fourth century context the earlier creeds were universalized, doctrinalized and politicised (Kelly, 205; Pelikan, *CT*, I: 332ff; Schillebeeckx ed., *Concilium* I, no.6, 131-153). The *Symbolum fidei* began to function as an indice of ecclesial and political loyalty. In this context multiple creedal forms were a potentially dangerous threat to social and political harmony. The thrust towards uniformity and codification came to its term in the West in the Athanasian Creed, "A convenient and authoritative compendium of the catholic consensus in the West ..... Here the trinitarian argumentation of Augustine was given creedal form" (Pelikan, *CT*, I: 351).

14. Thus for Harnack the loss of creedal diversity and the pressing of faith into all embracing dogmatic formularies was associated in part with a hellenization of the Christian Gospel: "Dogma in its conception and development is a work of the Greek spirit on the soil of the Gospel". *History of Dogma* (1894-99), trans. N. Buchanan from 3rd. German ed., 7 vols. (London: Williams & Norgate, 3rd. imp.,1905), vol.I: 17. Harnack distinguished between dogma and gospel, the former representing a third element 'thrust' between practical faith and the historical and critical account of

Christianity. Thus the philosophical means used in early times for making the gospel intelligible had become "fused with the contents of the Gospel and raised to dogma", 18. Did this signify that the history of dogma was a pathological process within the history of the gospel? Harnack said no. "Christianity without dogma, that is, without a clear expression of its contents, is inconceivable", 22.

Underlying Harnack's views was a more fundamental concern to reanimate the Christian tradition, a concern which entailed breaking the domination of the tradition by a particular dogmatic form. However the terms in which this programme was prosecuted inevitably led to the view that the hellenization of the gospel was an intrusive force necessary to be repelled for the sake of the purity of the gospel. This at least was how the effort was absorbed into theology. For an early Anglican interpretation along these lines see Percy Gardner, *Exploratio Evangelica: A Survey of the Foundations of Christianity* (1899), 2nd. ed. (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1907), esp. chaps.27 and 28.

15. See Pelikan, *CT*, I: 108, 127, 134. Pelikan also makes the point that within the shared beliefs of the orthodox there were 'divergent emphases' arising from the different conclusions drawn from a 'core' set of presuppositions in relation to the Trinity and the person of Christ (I: 228ff).

16. See Pelikan, *CT*, I, chap.7. This patristic consensus - the legacy of the early church - was nicely captured by St. Basil the Great (c.330-379) who referred to orthodoxy as 'homodoxy', when speaking of "the communion of those who hold one and the same faith". See F.X. Lawlor, art. "Church II (Theology of)" in *New Catholic Encyclopedia* (Washington: McGraw Hill, 1967), vol. III: 689.

17. Pelikan, *CT*, III esp. chaps.5 and 6; IV, esp. chaps.1 and 2.

18. See: Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, chaps.1 to 3; Pelikan, *CT*, I: 120, for reference to 'apostolic dogmas', and III chap. 1. Tertullian (c.160-225) regarded the 'rule of faith' as an indispensible mark of the one Church. This obtained even in his later ecclesiology when he still wanted to argue that the 'spirituals' and 'psychics' were really one Church on the basis of their common possession of the same rule of faith. See further Robert F. Evans, *One and Holy: The Church in Latin Patristic Thought* (London : SPCK., 1972), chap.1.

19. See Pelikan, *CT*, I: 117, who, in commenting on the early terminological fluidity of creedal texts, notes that "two elements remain constant through the citations, and one or both of them may safely be said to have formed the outline of most creeds: Father, Son and Holy Spirit; the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ". Cf. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, 94ff.

20. Sykes, in *Identity*, 257ff, links the *fundamentum fidei* of the early church with the fundamental articles tradition in his discussion of a formal definition of Christianity. See also discussion of Sykes in chap.I, pp.33-44 of this thesis.

21. See Pelikan, *CT*, III: 268-307; and cf. IV: 9.

22. See P.F. Chirico, art. "Article of Faith" in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, I: 922; C. Ruch, art. "Article De Foi" in *Dictionaire de Théologie Catholique* (Paris, 1923), vol.I: 2024-25.

23. See Valeske, *Hierarchia Veritatum*, 70, who suggests that the ancient Church Symbol implies the apostolicum and sacred Scripture in the widest sense.

24. For the general context refer to Y. Congar, *A History of Theology*, trans. H. Guthrie (New York: Doubleday, 1968), chap.4, "The Golden Age of Scholasticism". On the specific question of 'articles of faith' see W. Pannenberg, *Theology and the Philosophy of Science*, trans. F. McDonagh (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976), 228ff.

25. The most comprehensive treatment by St. Thomas of articles of faith can be found in *Summa Theologiae*: Ia. I,a.1-8 (Vol.I); and 2a. 2ae.I,a. 1-10 and 2,a. 1-10 (Vol.XXXI). The text consulted is the Latin text and English trans., Introductions, Notes, Appendices and Glossaries. Various eds., (London: Blackfriars & Eyre & Spottiswood, 1964-74), vols.I and XXXI. For further discussion see Per Erik Persson, *Sacre Doctrina: Reason and Revelation in Aquinas*, trans. R. Mackenzie (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970), 41-90; and Valeska, *Herarchia Veritatum*, 71-82.

26. Aquinas, in an endeavour to counter a scepticism about the scientific status of theology, had attempted "to give a more exact account of the scientific status of theology by calling it a derived science and thus claiming for it the right to be called a science in the full sense of the word" (Pannenberg, *Theology and the Philosophy of Science*, 229f). With this in mind he had distinguished two kinds of sciences; one that proceeded from premises recognised in the innate light of knowledge, e.g. arithmetic, another proceeding from premises recognised in the light of a higher science, e.g. optics from geometry principles. Christian theology qualified as a science in terms of the latter sense, "for it flows from founts recognised in the light of a higher science, namely God's very own which He shares with the blessed" (Ia. I, a.2). In this context articles of faith were theology's first principles revealed by God. However it was precisely here that the issue of the *placement* of articles became crucial for Aquinas. Since Christian theology had the character of "an imprint on us of God's own knowledge, which is the single and simple vision of everything" (Ia. I, a.3ad2), it is clear that for Thomas articles of faith operated as the *medium* rather than the *terminus* of faith. Articles of faith "although the proximate principle or origin of theological discourse, are not the first principium or fount, but well up from the deeper and more mysterious cleaving to God himself in faith, which itself is a sharing in God's own knowledge given to the blessed in Christ" (para.34 Appendix 6 of vol.I of Blackfriars ed. Cf. Ia.I,a.2; 2a. 2ae. I,a.5). God himself was the *prima veritas* - the first truth. Faith was properly the power to adhere to the first truth (2a. 2ae. I,a.1). The assent of faith terminated in the articles of faith "only so far as they have some reference to God" (2a. 2ae. I,a.1). Thus the articles of faith in the creed were the *term* of the believer's act but "such an act does not have a proposition as its term but a reality" (2a. 2ae. I,a.2ad2). Articles of faith had their origin and telos in God. Faith, in the form of articles, constituted a form of the vision of God (2a. 2ae. I,a.2ad3).

27. See 2a.2ae. I,a. 6ad1: "Among its [Faith's] objects there are those that faith regards for their own sake; there are others that faith regards not for themselves but only for their relationship to other objects ...". Thomas regularly employed a distinction between truths direct and indirect, primary and secondary, original and deduced. See: Valeska, *Hierarchia Veritatum* 70-82;

Congar, *Diversity and Communion*, 131f; idem "On the 'Hierarchia Veritatum'", 411f. The first category of truths - the *prime credibilia* - were analogous with the first principles of science. Consequently "all the articles of faith are implicit in certain primary ones, namely that God exists and that he has providence over man's salvation. For the truth that God is includes everything that we believe to exist eternally in God and that will comprise our beatitude. Faith in God's providence comprises all those things that God arranges in history for man's salvation and that make up our way towards beatitude. As to the remaining articles; some are implicit in others, e.g. faith in the Redemption implies Christ's incarnation and Passion and all related matters" (2a.2ae.I,a.7). Indirect credibilia - the second category of truths - included historical references in Scripture, i.e. points of belief proposed "not for their own value but as making known the first kind of truths" (2a.2ae.I,a.6ad1). There was, said Thomas, "no reason to match articles of faith to such details". Indirect credibilia also included those expressions related to actual articles of faith, i.e. antecedents and consequents such as the reliability of Scripture (See 2a.2ae.11,a.2; and cf. para.15 Appendix 9, vol.I Blackfriars ed.).

28. 2a.2ae.I,a.8; and cf.2a.2ae.I,a.6. It would appear that some flexibility on the number of articles relating to the majesty of the Godhead and the mystery of Christ's humanity was possible. It depended on the ways in which theologians might arrange them. Also a number of truths of faith could be included within one article.

29. 2a.2ae.I.a.9. Persson, *Sacra Doctrina*, notes that for Thomas "What is given in the creed is a summary of what scripture means when it is correctly interpreted. Since the articles of faith, articuli fidei, and the canonical scriptures are identical in content when they are seen in this way, anything that may be said of the one can also apply to the other - hence Thomas can state that the articles of the creed, which constitute the principia of theology, have been given *immediate a Deo per revelationem* (directly from God through revelation)", 59. Cf. Ia.I.a.5 ad2.

30. Recent Roman Catholic proposals concerning the idea of a hierarchy of truths makes Aquinas' discussion of the nature and ordering of the truths of faith particularly important.

31. J.R. Lerch, art. "Ecclesiology" in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol.V: 34, notes that "The reality of the Church was first lived for many centuries before it became a direct object of systematic theological investigation, and so ecclesiology as a particular branch of theology appeared somewhat late in the history of the Church". Lerch, in common with other commentators, argues that this development occurred as a corollary of the various ecclesial crises of the fourteenth century. Pelikan, *CT*, III: 269, notes that "the twelfth century summarized the full scope of the medieval doctrine of the church more effectively than the thirteenth did; on the other hand, it was only in the fourteenth century that the doctrine began to develop". Pelikan notes that the first treatise on the Church by James of Viterbo appeared in 1301-1302, to be followed almost immediately by Giles of Rome and John of Paris. For further information on the development of the doctrine of the Church consult: Congar, art. "Ecclesiology" in *The Encyclopedia of Religion* (Mircea Eliade ed-in-chief; New York: Macmillan & Free Press, 1977), III: 480-489, including bibliography; Lawlor, "Church II", *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, III:

684-693; and especially the well documented and comprehensive treatment provided by Brian Gogan, *The Common Corps of Christendom: Ecclesiological Themes in the Writings of Sir Thomas More*, Studies in the History of Christian Thought XXV (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982), chap.1 "The Course of Medieval Ecclesiology".

32. For a general discussion refer to Pelikan, *CT*, IV, chap.2. More particularly see Frantisek Graus, "The Crisis of the Middle Ages and the Hussites" trans. J.J. Heaney in Steven E. Ozment ed., *The Reformation in Medieval Perspective* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 76-103. Graus sets the breakdown of church unity within a larger social crisis of symbols of security. See further Heiko Oberman, *The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1986), chaps.1 and 2.

33. See Pelikan, *CT*, IV, chap.1, "Doctrinal Pluralism in the Later Middle Ages". Cf. Oberman, *The Dawn of the Reformation*, where, in chap.1, the author develops his thesis of 'the pregnant plurality of fourteenth-century thought', 1.

34. Pelikan, *CT*, IV: 68.

35. Ibid., 69ff.

36. The final breach between Greek and Latin Christendom is usually assigned to the year 1054. In fact attempts at reconciliation were made by the Councils of Lyons (1274), and Florence (1438-1439). These attempts were ultimately unsuccessful. See further Pelikan, *CT*, II: 270-280; II: 76-79.

37. See Graus, "The Crisis of the Middle Ages and the Hussites"; Pelikan, *CT*, IV: 76ff.

38. Pelikan, *CT*, IV: 79.

39. Ibid., vol.IV: 71.

40. Pelikan, *CT*, III: 230.

41. This feature of early Christianity has already been referred to. Diversity in Christianity was not a patristic development but was present from the beginnings of the Christian Church. See J.D.G. Dunn, *Unity and Diversity in the New Testament: An Inquiry into the Character of Earliest Christianity* (London: SCM, 1977). The reasons for this feature of Christianity have been explored by Sykes, *Identity*, in terms of the dialectic between the traditions of 'inwardness' and 'externality'.

42. The range and sophistication of ecclesiological responses to the ecclesial crises leading up to the sixteenth century has been ably examined by the Lutheran theologian Scott H. Hendrix, "In Quest of the *Vera Ecclesia*: The Crises of Late Medieval Ecclesiology", *Viator: Medieval and Renaissance Studies* VII(1976): 347-378.

43. Ecclesial oneness is the theological presupposition of the search for the true church. Hendrix's failure to take account of this inter-relationship results in a not wholly satisfactory approach to Luther's ecclesiological concerns, a matter to be taken up later in this section.

44. The tendency from the fourteenth century to list truths of faith is discussed by George Tavard, *Holy Writ or Holy Church: The Crisis of the Protestant Reformation* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978) chaps.3 and 4; Congar, *Tradition and Traditions,* 95ff, 511ff; Gogan, *The Common Corps of Christendom*, chap.1 esp. 35f.

45. See Hendrix, *Vera Ecclesia*, 358f; Tavard, *Holy Writ*, 29f.

46. Cited in Tavard, *Holy Writ*, 30ff.

47. For Wycliffe see Tavard, ibid., 37,40f; Congar, *Tradition and Traditions*, 512. For the categorising of truths see Tavard, *Holy Writ, 30-37; Congar, Tradition and Traditions*, 511f.

48. Hendrix, *Vera Ecclesia*, 361.

49. Ibid., 362-364. Cf. the discussion of Ockham's ecclesiology in Brian Tierney, *Origins of Papal Infallibility 1150-1350,* Studies in the History of Christian Thought VI (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972), 206-210; J. Morrall, "Ockham and Ecclesiology", *Medieval Studies Presented to Aubrey Gwynn S.J.*, J.A. Watt et al. eds. (Dublin: Colm OLochlainn,1961), 481-491.

50. Ockham's displacement of the authority of the institution in matters of faith, and his relocation of criteria for articles in the understanding, represented an important strategy by which the anxieties generated by nominalist thought could be alleviated. It was now the individual who had to take responsibility for assent to articles proposed for belief. One result was that faith could easily be privatised. It also meant that anxiety over disagreements in faith could no longer be solved by attempts to enforce uniformity or invoke some pre-given unity in truth. Another consequence of such developments was a gradual pruning of the range of communal belief deemed necessary for salvation. Both these implications of Ockham's handling of the faith can be traced in John Locke's reconstruction of the fundamental articles tradition. For reference to the influence of nominalism or 'particularism' in Locke see chap.5, p.117 and 148 of this thesis.

51. Hendrix, *Vera Ecclesia*, 365-370, discusses the variety of conciliarist ecclesiologies. In doing so he pays particular attention to what he calls Jean Gerson's (1363-1429) 'semen-ecclesiology'. Consult also the discussion on this issue in Tavard, *Holy Writ*, chaps.3 and 4; Gogan, *The Common Corps of Christendom*, chap.1.

52. Whilst this feature of the articles tradition is clearly implicit in the discussions of the 'truths of faith' in Tavard, Gogan, Hendrix and Congar, it can only be fully recognised as the ecclesiological contexts are brought more sharply into view. Hendrix achieves most success here. However the problem of the placement of the articles tradition within differing ecclesiological contexts is hinted at by Congar in *Tradition and Traditions.* He notes that Ockham, in enumerating his five categories of 'Catholic Truths', "was no longer speaking in terms of necessity for salvation, but merely in terms of an obligation to give, or freedom to withhold, one's assent, *quibus non licet Christianis aliter dissentire*", 512. It is not surprising then that Congar notes that "The notion of fundamental articles plays only a secondary and limited role in a rather technical sphere in

Catholic theology", 518.

53. See Congar, "On the 'Hierarchia Veritatum'", 413ff.

54. Thus Pelikan, *CT*, IV: 312-313, refers to Nicholas of Cusas' 'trinitarian universalism' and notes that in Cusa's 'Reconciliation between the World Religions' [*De pace fidei*] "his doctrine of catholic concordance found its counterpart in a quest for the concord of religions". For further comment on Cusa see Pelikan, ibid., IV: 64-68, 98-103, 312-313; Lecler, *Toleration and the Reformation*, I: 107-110.

55. See Lecler, *Toleration and the Reformation*, 110.

56. See e.g. Gogan, *The Common Corps of Christendom*, 60-63.

57. See Pelikan, *CT*, IV: 72-85.

58. Ibid., 59-68.

59. See chapters 16 and 18 on metaphysics and theories of knowledge in C.B. Schmitt general ed., *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), esp. 584, 596, 672-680. Cf.also Pelikan, *CT*, IV: 79.

60. Thus Hendrix in *Vera Ecclesia*, makes the point that the ecclesiology of the Hussite movement could be absorbed within the Roman Church, whilst Luther's could not (374-376).

61. See e.g. R.H. Bainton, "Erasmus and the Wesen des Christentums" in G. Muller and W. Zeller eds., *Glaube Geist Geschichte: Festschrift für Ernst Benz* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967), 200-206; Lecler, *Toleration and the Reformation*, I: 114-133.

62. This issue is illuminated in an insightful article by J.K. McConica "Erasmus and the Grammar of Consent" in J. Coppens ed., *Scrinium Erasmianum*, 2 vols.(Leiden: E.J. Brill,1969), II: 77-99. See also Gogan, *The Common Corps of Christendom*, 365-370 for discussion of Erasmus on 'consensus'.

63. McConica, "Erasmus and the Grammar of Consent", 96.

64. Ibid., 88f.

65. Ibid., 89f.

66. Ibid., 97f.

67. This matter is controversial and it is not a debate that can be developed here, though it is worth noting that Hendrix, in *Vera Ecclesia*, is anxious to avoid the charge that Luther was guilty of a subjectivist and individualist faith. Hendrix argues that "ecclesiological concerns were at the centre of his theological development", 376f. This view is derived from Luther's consistent stress on "the dependence of the church on the word of Scripture and the definition of the church by that word". The importance of the Church as *creatura verbi divini* for Luther (and Calvin) has been recently argued by Christoph Schwöbel, "The Creature of the Word: Recovering the Ecclesiology of the Reformers" in C.E. Gunton and D.W. Hardy eds. *On Being the Church: Essays on the Christian Community* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1989), 110-155. Schwöbel's thesis is that Luther's theology should be interpreted from the

fundamentally asymmetrical relationship of *opus Dei* and *opus hominum*. The Church is constituted by God's action not by human action. Here it seems that the field of human agency is one of response construed primarily in personalist terms. "The identity of the content of the revelation of God in Christ which is authenticated by the spirit for many people in many different historical situations and cultural contexts constitutes the unity of the Church", 127. The human community of witness is made possible by God's action which "creates the certainty which makes faith possible ... This certainty has to be understood as *personal* certainty, because it is created by the authentification of the Gospel of Christ for the individual believer", 131. Schwöbel goes on to argue that in the forgiveness of sins God reconstitutes the relationship between God and man not only in respect of 'human personhood' 'but also' in respect of 'our created sociality as redeemed sociality'. However Schwöbel's neat attempt to argue for a more fully social ecclesiology in Luther does not pay sufficient attention to the dynamic entailed in the movement from reconstitution of human personhood *to* ecclesial community.

68. This reconstitution of the oneness of man and God in Christ had consequences for the social form of the Church; a fact that became increasingly obvious with the course of the reform. Cf. Schwöbel, "The Creature of the Word", 116-121.

69. Thus Pelikan, *CT*, IV: 156ff, rejects Harnack's contention that with Luther "the old dogmatic Christianity was abolished", arguing instead for Luther's fundamental 'reappropriation' of the dogmatic Christianity of Nicea and Chalcedon. The theological form of this reappropriation was the doctrine of justification by faith.

70. Ibid., IV: 155-167. Cf. also Valeske, *Hierarchia Veritatum*, 108; and the discussion by Sykes on Luther and the centre of theology, *Identity*, 225, 320f. Notwithstanding the disagreement among Luther commentators on this issue, Sykes notes that "when Luther wants a critical criterion for other doctrines, especially in ecclesiology, he deploys justification by faith" (321 n.31). Note also Pelikan, *CT*, IV: 176, who refers to the Augsburg Confession, in which the doctrine of the ministry 'follows' the doctrine of justification.

71. See e.g. F.W. Kantzenbach, "Problem der Fundamentalartikel", 546, who argues that Luther was not interested in an organically jointed system but in the qualitative organic wholeness of the Gospel - "der qualitativ - organischen Ganzheit des Evangelicems". Cf. B J. Verkamp, *The Indifferent Mean: Adiaphorism in the English Reformation to 1554* (Athens, Ohio, Detroit, Michigan: Ohio & Wayne State University Presses, 1977), 96 and 109 n.18.

72. Verkamp, *The Indifferent Mean*, 96, 110 n.20 & n.25.

73. Ibid., 96, 110 n.23.

74. Melancthon had an understanding of Church as a 'School', in which the latter image "stood for a doctrinal continuity that is real, historical and observable, like the visible aspect of the Church, yet visible not by institutions but by the process of teaching the Word". See P. Fraenkel, *Testimonia Patrum: The Function of the Patristic Argument in the Theology of Philip Melancthon* (Geneva, 1961), 133f and chap.3 generally. Importantly Fraenkel points out that for Melancthon this development offered one option to renew the Church given the failure of the ecclesiastical institution.

75. See Weber, *Foundations of Dogmatics* II: 544ff; F. Hildebrandt, *Melancthon: Alien or Ally?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1946), 27-33. Congar, *Diversity and Communion*, argues that Melancthon "betrayed Luther's insight by making faith a doctrine: *Fundamentum intelligit (Paulus) articulos fidei, hoc est summam doctrinae christianae et doctrinam de beneficus Christi*, 'Paul understands by foundation the articles of faith, that is the sum of Christian doctrine and the doctrine of the benefits of Christ'", 114.

76. See e.g. John T. McNeill, *Unitive Protestantism* (London: Epworth Press, 1964), chap.4; Hildebrandt, *Melancthon: Alien or Ally?*, 27-33, 78-98.

77. On 'adiaphorism' in Melancthon see Hildebrandt, *Melancthon: Alien or Ally?*, 78-98. On Melancthon's appeal to the early church see P. Fraenkel, *Testimonia Patrum.*

78. Thus the Catholic humanist George Cassander proposed a notion of 'fundamental points' in his plan for the peace of Christendom in 1561. His interest was not so much to conciliate all the differences between Protestants and Catholics but to focus on the essentials which he identified with the Apostolic Creed. "The whole Christ", he wrote, "is both Body and Head. One is only severed from the Head by a doctrine which is false and contrary to Scripture concerning Christ, our Head. One is separated from the body, that is, the Church, only by the loss of charity, and in no way by some diversity in rites and opinions" (Lecler, *Toleration and the Reformation*, I: 273). Thus for Cassander, "Every Church which is based on the true and Apostolic doctrine as contained in the brief Symbol of Faith, and which is not separated from the communion with other Churches by a wicked schism, I regard as the true Church, a member of the true Church and of the Catholic Church of Christ. And I say this not only of the Western Churches but also of the Eastern ones" (Lecler, ibid.). Cassander's formulation was an anticipation of what later became a popular theory of the fundamental articles, particularly among the ecumenically-minded of the seventeenth century. For further information on Cassander and his contemporaries see Lecler, I: 261-276.

79. In 1554 Melancthon referred to the three marks of the true Church: "1. Agreement in the doctrine of the pure gospel, that is , in fundamentals, 11. proper use of the sacraments, 111. obedience owed, next to the gospel itself, to the ministry". See Paul D.L. Avis, *The Church in the Theology of the Reformers* (London: Marshall Morgan & Scott, 1981), 27. The new mark of the Church here was discipline however the definition of the pure gospel has also been further specified by reference to 'fundamentals'.

80. See e.g. Brian Gerrish, *The Old Protestantism and the New: Essays on the Reformation Heritage* (Chicago, Edinburgh: University of Chicago Press, T & T Clark, 1982), chap.12.

81. Ibid., and cf. Calvin's statement: "the schools of the Sorbonne, the parents of all heresies, have deprived us of justification by faith, which lies at the root of all godliness", *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (1562 ed.) Bk.III, chap.15, para.7.

82. Schwöbel, "The Creature of the Word", 138, notes the new problem confronting Calvin, i.e. of consolidating the Reformed community in relation to the radical wing of the Reformation. Cf.

Weber, *Foundations of Dogmatics*, II: 544ff, where the author discusses the Lutheran stress on 'pure doctrine' over against the Reformed emphasis on the 'pure Church', the differences being derived from different construals of the relationship between the Church visible and invisible.

83. See e.g. Avis, *The Church in the Theology of the Reformers*, 29-35, 40-43; T. F. Torrance, *Kingdom and Church: A Study in the Theology of the Reformation* (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1956), chap.4, wherein the author notes that, "In contrast to Luther Calvin laid greater emphasis upon the *ecclesia externa sive visibilis*. The Kingdom of Christ consists not only in the Gospel, not only in the hidden community of believers, but in the historical communication of the Gospel, and the building up of the Church on earth by human agency (*humanitus*)", 148.

84. Torrance, *Kingdom and Church*, 154.

85. Pelikan, *CT*, IV: 4.

86. Calvin's most developed formulation appears in the *Christian Institutes* (1562), bk.IV, chap.1, para.12. Congar, *Diversity and Communion* (110), notes that this text is a straight quotation from the text of chap. 4 of the 1536 edition of the *Institutes*. Cf. also *Institutes*, bk.I, chap.13, para.21; bk.III, chap.5, para. 9. See also Verkamp, *The Indifferent Mean*, 96.

87. Torrance, *Kingdom and Church*, 63.

88. Ibid., 164. Cf. W. Nijenhuis, *Ecclesia Reformata: Studies on the Reformation* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972), on the concept of tolerance in Calvin, esp. in relation to the need for unity (chap. 6).

89. Torrance, *Kingdom and Church*, 90-164 esp. 148f. See also McNeill, *Unitive Protestantism*, esp. chap.5.

90. Torrance, *Kingdom and Church*, 73-89; McNeill, *Unitive Protestantism*, chap.4.

91. It is right to speak of this tradition as an 'emergent' strategy to secure unity for, as W. Nijenhuis, *Ecclesia Reformata*, observes, "In the beginning of the Reformation the multiplicity of confessions did not necessarily indicate any confessionalistic narrow-mindedness but on the contrary may be taken as a sign of a certain ecumenical openness", 113. Cf. Weber, *Foundations of Dogmatics*, I: 114.

92. See e.g. Pelikan, *CT*, IV: 274-289.

93. See e.g. Congar, "On the *Hierarchia Veritatum*", 415ff.

94. Ibid.; also Congar, *Tradition and Traditions*, 518f.

95. One of the central themes of Hendrix's *Vera Ecclesia* is the ecclesiological variety of late medieval theology, a variety which intensified rather than diminished during the sixteenth century reformation.

CHAPTER THREE: FORMATION OF THE TRADITION

1. William P. Haugaard, "From the Reformation to the Eighteenth Century" in Sykes & Booty eds., *The Study of Anglicanism*, 6.

2. Ibid., 9 C.f. the comments of Oliver O'Donovan: "The Tudor Church has exercised the most profoundly formative role in determining what Anglicanism is ever since, in all its varieties, has been and now is. Each century has left its stamp on us; but the sixteenth century has determined the shape of the whole". See *On the Thirty-Nine Articles: A Conversation with Tudor Christianity* (Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1986), 12.

3. Haugaard, "Reformation to the Eighteenth Century", 10.

4. This judgement of Owen Chadwick [*The Reformation.* The Pelican History of the Church, vol.3 (Penguin Books, 1964, 1978), 97.] is cited and endorsed by Schwöbel,"The Creature of the Word", 112.

5. Schwöbel, ibid, claims that the precedence of legal over religious reformation "established a pattern in which ecclesiological issues were primarily treated as questions about polity and church-order and only then as questions about the nature and mission of the Church", 112. This contributed to a concentration "more on the problem of authority in the Church than on the primary question of the authority on which the Church is founded", 113. The author cites in support an article by Robert S. Paul, "'A Way to Wyn Them': Ecclesiology and Religion in the English Reformation" in B. A. Gerrish and R. Benedetto eds., *Reformation Perennis: Essays on Calvin and the Reformation. In Honor of Ford Lewis Battles*, Pittsburgh Theological Monograph Series XXXII (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: The Pickwick Press, 1981), 103. Schwöbel's endorsement of the 'political' character of the English Reformation, and his subsequent comments on authority, are too simplistic and do not cohere with the ecclesiological tradition associated with Richard Hooker as examined in this chapter.

6. Haugaard, "Reformation to the Eighteenth Century", 10.

7. See e.g. O'Donovan, *On the Thirty-Nine Articles*, 99ff.

8. Haugaard, "Reformation to the Eighteenth Century", 18.

9. See e.g. Sykes "Anglicanism and Protestantism", 118; O'Donovan, *On the Thirty-Nine Articles*, 14; A.G. Dickens, *The English Reformation*, rev. ed. (London, Glasgow: Collins, 1967), chap. 14; G. Elton, *Reform and Reformation* , esp. chap.7 on Thomas Starkey.

10. See Carl S. Meyer, "Melancthon's Influence on English Thought in the Sixteenth Century", *Miscellanes Historiae Ecclesiasticae* (1967), vol.II: 163-185; James Kelsey McConica, *English Humanists and Reformation Politics Under Henry VIII and Edward VI* (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1965), esp. chap.2.

11. See the careful analysis of the concept of adiaphora in the early stages of the English Reformation by Verkamp, *The Indifferent Mean.*

12. Haugaard, "Reformation to the Eighteenth Century", 6f.

13. Christopher Haigh, "The Recent Historiography of the English Reformation", *The Historical Journal* XXV/4 (1982): 995-1007.

14. Dickens, *The English Reformation*, 262.

15. Ibid., 186ff, 264.

16. Ibid., 336.

17. See John B. Webster, " Ministry and Priesthood" in Sykes & Booty eds., *The Study of Anglicanism.*

18. Consult: C. Hardwick, *A History of the Articles of Religion* (Cambridge: Deighton, Bell & Co., 1859); William P. Haugaard, *Elizabeth and the English Reformation: The Struggle for a Stable Settlement of Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), chaps.1 and 6; Articles by Peter Toon, "The Articles and Homilies", and James Hartin, "Catechisms", in Sykes & Booty eds. *The Study of Anglicanism*; Charles Lloyd ed., *Formularies of Faith 1536-1543* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1825).

19. For the various attempts at Canon Law revision see Haugaard, *Elizabeth and the English Reformation*, 17-18, 56-57, 70, 169-170, 255-6, 278, 282 n.1.

20. See Dickens, *The English Reformation*, 183-196.

21. Ibid., 281.

22. Lloyd, *Formularies*, xvi.

23. Ibid., xvii.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., xviii.

26. See discussion of Aquinas on articles and the creed in chap.2 of this thesis and esp. ens.26-29.

27. See discussion on this issue in chap.2 of this thesis and esp. references in ens.44.

28. Thus the *Bishops Book* (1536) spoke of a "diligent search and persuing of holy scripture", 123; the *Kings Book* (1543) referred to the "opening of God's truth, with setting forth and publishing of the scriptures" (215) and of seeking to find "the true doctrine of God .... which is the true sense of the text", 219. Page references are to Lloyd, *Formularies.*

29. The most obvious example of this is the doctrine of transubstantiation, though questions to do with clerical marriage, purgatory and communion in both kinds also later received much sharper clarification in relation to scripture teaching.

30. See Articles VI, VIII, XX and XXI of the *Thirty-nine Articles.*

31. This was encapsulated in Article XX of the Thirty-nine Articles, 'Of the authoritie of the Church'.

32. The controversial nature of Article XX and its application in reform became abundantly clear in Richard Hooker's argument with the more hard-line Anglicans over the issue of polity. This will be discussed later in this section.

33. Thus the early Articles documents offer an as yet unsharpened doctrine of justification ('by contrition and faith joined with clarity'), and a continued, though qualified, endorsement of certain practices and beliefs to do with images, saints, and purgatory. The qualification is of a christological kind but remains unfinished. See relevant articles in Lloyd, *Formularies*.

34. See Articles XI to XVIII, XXII, XXV to XXXI of the *Thirty-nine Articles*. Perhaps the key articles here were articles XXXI, 'Of the one oblation of Christe finished upon the Crosse'; XVIII 'Of obtaynyng eternall saluation, only by the name of Christe'; and XV 'Of Christe alone without sinne'. See further O'Donovan, *The Thirty Nine Articles*, chaps.6 and 10, for an exposition of the christological thrust of these articles, and its implications for a range of belief and practices.

35. The reality of the Trinity was firmly stated at the beginning of the *Thirty-nine Articles*; controversial material was generally subordinated to the later articles. As O'Donovan, ibid., notes "For the Anglican Reformers, who were deeply concerned with epistemological questions, reality, nevertheless was, in the last resort, more important even than knowledge itself", 18.

36. See Lloyd, *Formularies*, xxviiiff, 210-211, 375-377; Verkamp, *The Indifferent Mean*, 50-54, 60 n.100.

37. See "The Articles Wherefore John Frith Died" in N.T. Wright ed. and intro., *The Works of John Frith*, The Courtenay Library of Reformation Classics VII (Sutton Courtenay Press, 1978), 454.

38. Verkamp, *The Indifferent Mean*, 97, and more generally chap.5.

39. Verkamp, ibid., claimed that Frith's introduction of the creed as a material principle 'makes for considerable confusion' (110 n.34). But the author misses the specific ecclesiological issue at 'stake' for Firth. For the being of the church certain doctrines may be 'true yet unnecessary'.

40. "Articles Wherefore John Frith Died", *Works*, 455.

41. Article XX of the *Thirty-nine Articles*. C.f. Verkamp, *The Indifferent Mean*, 50-54, 60 n.100, and chap.5.

42. Article III of the *Thirty-nine Articles*. Cf. O'Donovan, *The Thirty Nine Articles*, 32; and esp. E. Tyrrell Green, *The Thirty-nine Articles and The Age of the Reformation* (London: Wells Gardner, Darton & Co., 1896), 36-38.

43. Cf., O'Donovan, *The Thirty-Nine Articles*, 82-87.

44. Thus whilst Article XXVIII 'Of the Lordes Supper' firmly asserts the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, the manner of this presence is more generally referred to: "The body of Christe is geven, taken, and eaten in the supper only after an heavenly and spirituall maner". Cf. O'Donovan, ibid., 125, who notes that these words would have been congenial to Calvin's disciples as well as to Catholic Anglicans.

45. O'Donovan, ibid., 14.

46. See Haugaard, *Elizabeth and the English Reformation*, chap.6; Hardwick, *History of the Articles Religion*, 152ff, 226ff.

47. Haugaard, ibid., 286-287. Cf. Hardwick, ibid.

48. W.J. Hankey, art. "Canon Law" in Sykes & Booty eds. *The Study of Anglicanism*, 202.

49. This feature of Anglicanism is discussed by W. Taylor Stevenson art. "Lex Orandi - Lex Credendi" in Sykes & Booty eds., *The Study of Anglicanism.*

50. This is finely illustrated in Article XVII 'Of Predestination and election', where there is an implied warning that the doctrine of predestination should be used with care if not restraint. The consequences of undue preoccupation with this teaching were socially harmful. Cf. Green, *The Thirty-nine Articles and the Age of Reformation*, 118; E.J. Bicknell, *A Theological Introduction to the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., new imp. 1944), 288f.

51. A point usually overlooked by those who point out that in the English Reformation, Prayer Book construction occurred before the question of articles was resolved, the implication being that in Anglicanism the *lex orandi* takes priority over the *lex credendi*. See e.g. Haugaard, *Elizabeth and the English Reformation*, 100, 233ff. What is characteristic of Anglicanism is not the subserviance of doctrine to liturgy but rather the particular *placement* of doctrine in liturgy, and the particular way in which liturgy and doctrine are intergrated.

52. Implied here is a recognition of the eschatological and dialectical nature of truth and purity. Cf. Paul Avis, "'The True Church' in Reformation Theology", *Scottish Journal of Theology* XXX (1977): 319-345.

53. Anglican ambivalence, indeed confusion, on the subject of its confessional status has been recently exposed by Sykes "Anglicanism and the Anglican Doctrine of the Church". This problem continues in contributions to Sykes & Booty eds. *The Study of Anglicanism*. See e.g. 13f, 174ff, 220f.

54. As it appears in the introductory announcement of the *Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion*. See J.I. Packer and R.T. Beckwith, *The Thirty-Nine Articles: Their Place and Use Today* (Oxford: Latimer House, 1984), 5. C.f. the well known petition of the *Book of Common Prayer* (1662) for "truth, unity and concord" and that Christians would "agree in the truth of thy holy Word, and live in unity and godly love". See here P.E. Thomas art. "Doctrine of the Church" in Sykes & Booty eds., *The Study of Anglicanism*, 221.

55. Haugaard, "Reformation to the Eighteenth Century", 13.

56. Haugaard, *Elizabeth and the English Reformation*, 245.

57. Patrick Collinson, "Calvinism with an Anglican Face: The Stranger Churches in Early Elizabethan London and their Superintendent" in Baker ed., *Reform and Reformation: England and the Continent c1500-c1750* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979) 72.

58. John Jewel, *Apologia Ecclesiae Anglicanae. An Apology of the Church of England* and *Defence of the Apology* in J. Ayre ed., *The Works of John Jewel*, (The Parker Society; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1848), vol.III: 106.

59. Ibid., 100.

60. Ibid.

61. John E. Booty, *John Jewel as Apologist of the Church of England* (London: SPCK, 1963), 133.

62. W.M. Southgate, *John Jewel and the Problem of Doctrinal Authority* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), 176 and 183ff.

63. See Jewel, *An Apology*, 58; and *Defence of the Apology*, 252, where the basic creedal structure is appealed to by Jewel.

64. Jewel, *Defence of Apology*, 257.

65. Booty, *John Jewel as Apologist*, 133.

66. Jewel, *Defence of Apology*, 120 (preface).

67. Ibid., 566.

68. Ibid., 385, 387. Cf. Southgate, *John Jewel and Doctrinal Authority*, 184ff.

69. Jewel, *Defence of Apology*, 255.

70. Jewel, *An Apology*, 69f.

71. Ibid., 106.

72. Jewel, *Defence of Apology*, 623.

73. Jewel, *An Apology*, 70.

74. Jewel, *Defence of Apology*, 623.

75. Ibid.

76. Jewel, *Apology*, 68.

77. Jewel, *Defence of Apology*, 623.

78. Ibid., 624. Cf. *Apology*, 70.

79. Jewel, *Defence of Apology*, 348. C.f. Southgate, *John Jewel and Doctrinal Authority*, 196-201.

80. See Greenslade, "The Authority of the Tradition of the Early Church in Early Anglican Thought", *Occumenia* (1971/72):5.

81. *Of the Church*: "The visible Church of Christ is a congregation of faithful men, in which the pure Word of God is preached, and the Sacraments be duly ministered according to Christ's ordinance in all those things that of necessity are requisite to the same".

82. Richard Hooker, *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* (Books I to IV, 1593). All quotations are from the Everyman ed. (London & New York: J.M. Dent & E.P. Dutton, 1954), and quotations in the text are in the form: bk., chap., para., i.e. I.4.2.

83. See I.2.2.

84. III.1.8. and IV.4.2 where Hooker refers to Rome as heretical.

85. III.2.1.

86. This sermon appears in vol.1 of the Everyman ed. of Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*. All references are to paragraph numbers in the sermon.

87. Para. 35 and para. 36.

88. Para. 32.

89. Para. 23 and para. 61.

90. Cf. Sykes, "Anglicanism and the Anglican Doctrine of the Church", 160f, who finds in Hooker's use of the concept of the 'essence of Christianity' (III.1.4) an early instance of the fundamental articles tradition. Hooker's earlier sermon on justification is even more suggestive.

91. Thus the Anglican Divine, William Perkins (1558-1602) wrote, in *A Reformed Catholike* (1598), of Roman errors having 'razed the foundation'. Whether this was directly or by necessary consequence was not particularly relevant for Perkins. It was enough that the foundation had been destroyed; fundamental errors had subverted the fundamental points of religion. Rome was neither a true nor sound member of the catholic Church. Perkins did not appear interested in Hooker's particular argument about the visibility of a Church. For further details consult: *The Works of William Perkins* in I. Breward ed. and intro. The Courtenay Library of Reformation Classics (Appleford, Abingdon, & Berkshire, England: The Sutton Courtenay Press, 1970), vol.III, 263-275, 519-547; also H. F. Woodhouse, *The Doctrine of the Church in Anglican Theology 1547-1603* (London: SPCK, 1954), chap.10.

92. Sykes, Fundamentals, 236.

93. Cf. III.10.20.

94. Cf. III.10.14.

95. See Hooker's remarks on his opponents use of the distinction between necessaries and accessories: III.3.2; III.3.4; III.10.19.

96. III.7.4.

97. Cf. Tavard, *The Quest for Catholicity*, where the author argues that Hooker "restores to Anglican theology a dimension which has largely been lost: he reopens Anglican thought to a conception of doctrine as a developing awareness of Scripture in the Church's experience", 40. This is a puzzling comment in so far as the 'awareness' spoken of by Tavard belongs to the hermeneutical principles of the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion. See e.g. Articles VI and XX.

98. Cf. I.3.4; I.3.5; III.10.1.

99. Cf. III.10.1; III.10.2; III.10.3; III.7.4.

100. See esp. I.1.3, "Behold therefore we offer the laws whereby we live unto the general trial and judgment of the whole world..". Cf. I.8.3 and the Preface to *Ecclesiastical Polity*, chap.5, para.2 and 6, where the issues of publicness and consent are key elements in the establishment of socially binding laws.

CHAPTER FOUR: CONSOLIDATION OF THE TRADITION

1. See e.g. Barbara J. Shapiro, *Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England: A Study of the Relationships between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law and Literature* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983), esp. chap.1.

2. In this respect Tavard, *The Quest for Catholicity*, notes that "With the outwardly secure position of Anglicanism at the end of the Elizabethan age, controversies on particular points of doctrine had largely subsided. The theologians were no longer engaged in defining the Eucharist and other items of the Christian faith. Rather, they were anxious to formulate the relationship of their Church as a whole to the Church of past ages, to the present reformed Churches of the Continent, and to the continuing Church of Rome", 46.

3. The Calvinism of the Anglican scholar William Perkins generated a hard line approach to the issue of fundamentals. See e.g. his A *Reformed Catholicke* (1598). One implication was that Perkins opposed those Anglicans like Hooker who espoused a more qualified rejection of the Roman Church. Perkins' scripturalism did not allow for genuine differentiation between fundamental and non-fundamental articles of faith (cf. chap.3 en.91). The clash between the Perkins and Hooker traditions repeatedly broke surface. See e.g. the controversy between the Laudian sympathizer Richard Montagu and the Anglican Puritan A. Wotton in 1625-26 (chap.1, en.85).

4. Thomas Morton in *A Catholike appeal for Protestants* [London: 1609], argued that "the belief of some articles are so absolutely necessary for the constitution of a true Church, as a reasonable soul is for the essential being of a man" (Bk.IV: 443). He included here knowledge of the unity of the Godhead, the Trinity of persons, a true and faithful apprehension of Christ as divine and human, the power of his death and resurrection, remission of sins and everlasting life. To hold to these was to hold to Christ the head of the Church. Protestants, Morton said, "do fundamentally profess the faith of Christ" (Bk.IV: 451) and enjoy the fellowship of 'inward' unity notwithstanding their separation by Rome (Bk.IV: 453f). In an important passage he observed that controversies between the churches were due to a "failure to distinguish doctrines fundamental the denial of which excludes from salvation and disannulleth the name of a Church as such .... from errors which are not absolutely fundamental but may consist with a possibility of grace ..." (Bk.V: 575). Although Rome erred in some 'weighty points' of a heretical kind she remained a true yet unsound church (Bk.V: 442f. cf. Bk.V: 675f). Morton's theory

of fundamentals derived support from that of the irenic Catholic theologian Georg Cassander (1513-1566) [ref. chap.2 en.78]. See e.g. Morton's *Catholic appeal*, Bk.IV: 453.

Lancelot Andrewes (1555-1626) argued against the claim of Bellarmine the Jesuit that the question of catholicity depended on the acceptance of certain specific doctrines (papal supremacy, transubstantiation, invocation of saints). Such doctrines could not, in Andrewes' view, constitute a test of catholicity since they were only recent developments. The Church of England held the 'the principal dogmas' (*dogmata principalia*), the primitive faith in its main principles. This was a public faith, not speculative Jesuitical doctrine. The Church of England had maintained continuity with the faith of the ancient church; see McAdoo, *The Spirit of Anglicanism*, 332ff.

5. *Of the Church*, Five Books (Bks.I-IV, 1606; Bk.V, 1610). The following references and quotations are from the 3rd ed. (Oxford, 1635) of this treatise as reprinted in 4 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1847-52). Where appropriate both references have been given.

6. *Of the Church*, Bk.III chap.4 (vol.IV: 158).

7. Ibid., IV: 161.

8. Bk.IV, chap.14 (II: 442). Cf. Bk.IV, chap.10 (II: 464); Append. Bk.V (IV: 450, 461).

9. Bk.IV, chap.14 (II: 442).

10. Ibid.

11. Bk.III, chap.4 (I: 161).

12. Ibid. Cf. Bk.IV, chap.10 (II: 467), where Field adopted the scholastic distinction between *de pietate* and *de necessitate fidei*, his point being that the perpetual virginity of Mary belonged to the former category.

13. Field had a high concern for 'right-believers' and the truth of doctrine. See e.g. Bk.I chap.7, chap.14; Bk.II, chap.2. More generally most of Book III, its append., parts of Book IV and the append. to Book V, are devoted to a defence of orthodox doctrines, the orthodoxy of the Eastern Churches, doctrinal harmony between Protestants, and Roman doctrinal errors.

14. On Rome: Bk.I, chaps.11 and 14; Bk.III, chap.2. On Radical Protestantism: Bk.I, chap.18.

15. Bk.I, chap.11 (I: 38).

16. Bk.I, chap.13 (I: 42).

17. Bk.I, chap.14 (I: 43).

18. For Field the Church of the living God derived its being and perfection, its beginning and end, from the grace and call of God. In respect of the Church of the redeemed of God, Field identified five categories: The name *Church* distinguished this society from infidels, *Christian* Church from Jews, *orthodox* Church to distinguish right believing Christians from heretics, *Catholic* Church in which the faith was held in unity in contradistinction

from schismatics, the *invisible* or *mystical* Church to distinguish the elect from all the rest. There were thus different levels of participation (See Bk.I,chap.7). One could be *in* the Church by virtue of 'external profession' and 'affection' and thus in a conditional sense *of* the Church, but only the elect, known only to God, were 'principally, fully and absolutely' *of* the Church (See Bk.I, chaps.8 to 10).

19. Bk.II, chap.2 (I: 65).

20. Ibid.

21. Field held the scholastic doctrine which recognised, in respect of the relationship between presbyters and Bishops, an equality of order but a difference obtaining in the power of jurisdiction. He noted "that the best learned amongst the schoolmen are of opinion, that bishops are no greater than presbyters in the power of consecration or order, but only in the exercise of it, and in the power of jurisdiction.." (Bk.V, chap.27).

22. See e.g. Bk.III, chap.2.

23. Bk.III, chap.1 (I: 151, and cf. 105ff on *filioque*). Cf. Bk.III, chap.5; Append. Bk.V (IV, 288ff).

24. Bk.III, chap.1 (I: 152).

25. Bk.III, chap.12 (I: 188).

26. Append. Bk.V (IV: 420; and cf. 498-511 for further doctrinal reconciliation among Protestants).

27. Bk.III, chap.47.

28. Append. Bk.V (IV: 527).

29. Ibid., IV: 519. Cf. Bk.III, chaps. 7 to 9.

30. Bk.III, chap.21 (I: 238).

31. Bk.III, chap.47 (I: 359).

32. Bk.III, chap.9.

33. See Bk.III, chaps.6 to 9, and Field's argument in his append. to Bk.III and his final defence of the thesis in Append. to Bk.V (IV: 522-527).

34. *A Relation of the Conference between William Laud and Mr Fisher the Jesuit*, new ed. with intro. and notes by C.H. Simpkinson (London & New York: Macmillan & Co., 1901). The original conference took place in 1622, a first edition was published by Laud in 1624, and in 1639 Laud brought out a book which, though based on the earlier work, was a lengthy restatement of the whole question.

35. *A Relation of a Conference*, 46.

36. Ibid., 35, 49f.

37. Ibid., 158.

38. Ibid., 36f, 45.

39. Ibid., 50, cf. 423.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., 34, 422.

42. Ibid., 390, cf. 293.

43. Ibid., 44.

44. Ibid., 146.

45. See ibid. where Laud, in drawing upon Hooker for support for his claim that Rome was a true Church, appears to have 'read back' into Hooker what was frankly not there.

46. See e.g. the list of divines that Morton, in his *Catholike appeal* (Bk.IV: 443f), states as counting Rome a 'true' Church. Joseph Hall (1574-1656) argued similarly in the late 1620s in *The Old Religion* in *The Works of Joseph Hall*, 12 vols. (Oxford 1837-39, vol.IX: 310-395). Hall expressly dissented from Hooker's view on this matter, 311f. In response to criticisms of Hall by those who did not believe it was correct to account Rome a true Church, Hall submitted the matter to his friend Bishop John Davenant who responded in 1628 with a carefully worded letter expressing an opinion in support of Hall. The letter is reproduced in full by Gilbert Burnet in his *Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England* (1699). See J.R. Page's rev. ed. (London: Adam Scott, 1847), 242f.

47. *A Relation of a Conference*, 29.

48. Ibid., 146.

49. Ibid., 374.

50. Ibid.

51. The absence from Laud's argument of the doctrine of justification has been noted by C.F. Allison, *The Rise of Moralism: The Proclamation of the Gospel from Hooker to Baxter* (London: SPCK, 1966), 60f.

52. *A Relation of a Conference*, 50.

53. See chap.8 of this thesis for discussion of Newman.

54. See en.46.

55. *The Religion of Protestants A Safe Way to Salvation* (1638). Present references are to the London ed. of 1664.

56. See C. Potter (1591-1646), *Want of Charity justly charged on all such Romanists as dare affirm that Protestancy destroyeth Salvation* (1633). This important discussion illustrated how Anglicans at that time understood the idea of fundamentals in relation to the scholastic tradition of the *articuli* as discussed by Aquinas.

57. *Religion of Protestants*, 133.

58. Ibid., 21.

59. Ibid., 120.

60. Ibid., 21; cf. 120f, 199.

61. Ibid., 21, cf. 195f.

62. Ibid., 120.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., 140-142, 147.

65. Ibid., 122.

66. Ibid., 142.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid., 118.

70. Ibid., 142.

71. From the Collect for Second Sunday in Advent, *Book of Common Prayer* (1662).

72. The matter had been addressed in chap.4 of *The Religion of Protestants*, in connection with discussion about the Apostles Creed.

73. The following references are to page numbers of *A Rational Account of the Grounds of Protestant Religion (1664), Works*, vol.IV.

74. Ibid., 48.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid., 51.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid., 52.

80. Ibid., 55.

81. Ibid., 97.

82. Ibid., 53.

83. Ibid., 73.

84. See Norman Sykes "Ecumenical Movements in Great Britain in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries" in Rouse and Neill, *A History of the Ecumenical Movement*, 134.

85. On Calixtus consult references in Preus, *The Theology of Post -Reformation Lutheranism.*

86. See Congar, *Diversity and Communion*, chap.11.

87. See Rouse and Neill, *A History of the Ecumenical Movement*, 97ff and 134ff for Durie's ecumenical work.

88. See Davenant's, *Exhortation to Brotherly Communion betwixt the Protestant Churches* (London, 1640), where the author refers to 'fundamental doctrines' (16), 'Fundatories of Religion' (63), 'Capitall or Radicall articles' (16), 'the first believables' (14), all in distinction to other 'things for perfection' (63). Davenant proposed a union of Protestants based on the Apostles Creed, the Decalogue, Sacraments and the Lord's Prayer (71).

89. For Baxter refer to the essay by Norman Sykes in Rouse and Neill, *A History of the Ecumenical Movement*, esp. 140-147. For details of Baxter's scheme for comprehension in 1653 consult art. "Fundamentals" in McClintock and Strong eds., *Encyclopedia of Biblical Theological and Ecclesiastical Literature*, vol.III: 693-94.

90. Ibid.

91. See Laud's 'Epistle Dedicatory' to *A Relation of a Conference* where he wrote "that no one thing hath made conscientious men more wavering in their own minds, or more apt and easy to be drawn aside from the sincerity of religion professed in the Church of England, than the want of uniform and decent order in too many churches of the kingdom ..... It is true, the inward worship of the heart is the great service of God, and no service acceptable without it; but the external worship of God in His Church is the great witness to the world, that our heart stands right in that service of God ... Now, no external action in the world can be uniform without some ceremonies ..... [being] the hedge that fence the substance of religion from all the indignities which profaneness and sacrilege too commonly put upon it" (xxix).

92. This figure is given by Norman Sykes in his essay in Rouse and Neill, *A History of the Ecumenical Movement*, 142.

93. For further discussion of this point refer Sykes "Anglicanism and Protestantism", 120f. Cf. Norman Sykes, *Old Priest and New Presbyter* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), 115-118, who argues that "the outstanding innovation of the Anglican restoration settlement was the unvarying requirement of episcopal ordination for ministry in whatever capacity in the church", 118. See also G.F. Nuttall and O. Chadwick eds., *From Uniformity to Unity 1662-1962* (London: SPCK, 1962), esp. 72-88, 135-146.

94. See Tavard, *The Quest For Catholicity*, 90.

95. See Shapiro, *Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England*, chap.1.

96. Ibid., 5.

97. Ibid., 89. Cf. art. on "Herbert of Cherbury" in F.L. Cross and E.A. Livingstone eds., *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, sec. rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974).

98. See discussion of Nicholas of Cusa in chap.2 p.61 of this thesis.

99. See Mede's 'Letters to Mr Hartlib' (1637) in J. Worthington ed. *The Works of Joseph Mede*, in five books (London, 1677), bk.IV: 868-876.

100. Shapiro, *Probability and Certainty*, chap.3.

101. See James C. Livingston, *Modern Christian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Vatican II* (London & New York: Macmillan Pub., 1971), chap.2.

102. Ibid., 15f; and Shapiro, *Probability and Certainty*, 102ff.

103. Shapiro, *Probability and Certainty*, 103.

104. See e.g. William Chillingworth, *The Religion of Protestants*, 124, 144.

105. Ibid., 127, 176. Cf. Shapiro, *Probability and Certainty*, 96, 98f and 101-104, where the author refers to Tillotson, Stillingfleet, and particularly Isaac Barrow (1630-1677).

106. This position would later become central for John Locke's (1632-1704) discussion of faith and reason in Book IV of his *Essay concerning Human Understanding* (1690). See chap.5 of this thesis.

107. *Religion of Protestants*, 120, 130, 142 and his preface.

108. Ibid., 121.

109. Ibid., 125.

110. Ibid., 125-134.

111. Ibid., 134.

112. See Shapiro, *Probability and Certainty*, 94-104.

113. *A Rational Account*, 199.

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid., 200.

116. Ibid.

117. See chap.1 of this thesis p.14 and en.72.

118. Andrewes wrote: "One canon reduced to writing by God himself, two testaments, three creeds, four general councils, five centuries, and the series of fathers in that period - the centuries that is, before Constantine, and two after, determine the boundary of our faith" (McAdoo, *The Spirit of Anglicanism*, 320).

119. In Laud's *A Relation of a Conference*, he wrote, "for to believe the Scripture and the Creeds, to believe these in the sense of the ancient primitive Church, to receive the four great General Councils, so much magnified by antiquity, to believe all points of

doctrine, generally received as fundamental in the Church of Christ, is a faith in which to live and die cannot but give salvation", 379. See also Bull's *Defence of the Nicene Faith* (1685) [The Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology; Oxford, 1855]. The implication of both these works was that the faith of the primitive church in the fundamentals was sufficient and secure.

120. This had been detailed by the French Reformed patristic scholar Jean Daille (1594-1670), *On the Use of the Fathers* (French, 1632; English, 1651); refer *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church.*

121. See Shapiro, *Probability and Certainty*, 109.

122. *Religion of Protestants*, 136. Cf. his comments on the creed which, according to the ancient Fathers contained a sufficient summary of the fundamentals - 'a matter *very probable* but not *absolutely certain*'. Though Chillingworth still wished to recognise the authority of the Fathers (177), he looked forward to *future* consensus in the faith and he thus hesitated to offer a final catalogue of fundamentals for fear that this might prejudice this possibility. A past consensus could not be determinative for him. See Robert R. Orr, *Reason and Authority: The Thought of William Chillingworth* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), chap.5 esp. 138f.

123. *A Rational Account*, 55.

124. *Religion of Protestants*, 140.

125. Cf. Orr, *Reason and Authority*, 169.

126. Ibid., 130, where Orr notes that schism was so serious a matter to Chillingworth that doctrinal disagreement could not justify it. For Chillingworth "intellectual freedom rather than liberty of action" was uppermost. One had a moral duty to maintain a single cohesive society, a precondition for both intellectual and moral freedoms.

127. See *The Miscellaneous Theological Works* of Henry Hammond (Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology, 3 vols. in 4, 1847-1850) vol.II: 65-189.

128. In a modern work by John W. Packer, *The Transformation of Anglicanism 1643-1660 with special reference to Henry Hammond* (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1969), the author simply notes the publication of the work (38), but nowhere discusses its contents or significance.

129. *Of Fundamentals*, 70f.

130. Ibid., 74.

131. Ibid., 98-116.

132. Ibid., 90.

133. The discussion relevant to the superstructure of piety indirectly concerned the first ten chapters and was directly addressed as the subject of the last nine chapters. In all, 72 of the 120 page publication concerned the issue of the

superstructure of piety.

134. *Of Fundamentals*, 123.

135. Ibid., 146.

136. See *A Discourse of the Liberty of Prophesying* in R. Heber ed. *The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, D.D.*, 15 vols. (London, 1822), vol.VIII: 218.

137. See e.g. ibid., vol.VII: 496ff.

138. See e.g. Gilbert Burnet's, *Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles* (1699), where the subject of fundamentals was treated in the course of his exposition of article XIX, 'Of the Church'. See esp. pp.241-247. Interestingly the subject of fundamentals was raised in Burnet's exposition of article VI, 'On the Sufficiency of Holy Scriptures for Salvation', but again the discussion resolves itself into the ecclesial question of the basis of the broken communion between the Roman Church and Protestants, 99ff.

THE LATER HISTORY OF THE TRADITION
Selected Case Studies

CHAPTER FIVE: LOCKE'S RECONSTRUCTION OF THE TRADITION

1. See Sykes, *Identity*, 194.

2. Unless otherwise indicated references to Locke in this chapter are in respect of *The Works of John Locke*, 10 vols., (London: Churchill & Manship, tenth ed., 1801). Cited as *Works*, followed by volume and page, e.g. *Works* V:6.

   (a) Locke advocated religious freedom. See his three *Letters concerning Toleration* (*Works* VI); and also J.T. Moore, "Locke on Assent and Toleration", *Journal of Religion* LVIII (Jan. 1978): 330-336.

   (b) The subject that provoked *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* (1690) concerned, according to his friend James Tyrrell, 'the Principles of morality and revealed Religion' (see Nidditch ed. of the Essay, xix). Peter H. Nidditch's ed. of Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) is hereafter cited in the text as *Essay*, and in endnotes in the form: bk. chap. para., i.e. IV.1.1. Recent commentators have argued that the *Essay* had, as one of its aims, an inquiry into epistemology that would secure the foundation of religion. See John W. Yolton, *John Locke and the Way of Ideas* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), 117; J.C. Biddle, "Locke's Critique of Innate Principles and Toland's Deism", *Journal of the History of Ideas* XXXVII (July-Sept. 1976): 411-417.

   (c) Locke's treatise on *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (1695) expounded his theological views in relation to the doctrine of justification. Towards the end of that work Locke commented that "justification" was "the subject of this present treatise"; see *Works* VII: 158. The publication of this work was followed by two vindications: *A Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity ... From Mr. Edwards' Reflections* (London, 1695); *A Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity* (London, 1697). See *Works* VII.

   (d) Locke published a lengthy debate with the Bishop of Worcester, Edward Stillingfleet, over the theological sigificance of the *Essay*. Locke wrote two letters to Stillingfleet and gave replies to Stillingfleet's rejoinders to his letters. See *A letter to the Right Rev. Edward Lord Bishop of Worcester, concerning some Passages relating to Mr. Locke's Essay of Human Understanding, in a late Discourse of his Lordship's in Vindication of the Trinity* (London, 1696); *Mr. Locke's Reply to the Bishop of Worcester's Answer to his Letter ...* (London, 1697); *An Answer to Remarks upon an Essay concerning Human Understanding* (London,1697); *Mr. Locke's Reply to the Right Reverend The Lord Bishop of Worcester's Answer to his Second Letter* (London, 1698). See *Works* IV.

   (e) Locke's latter days were spent in biblical studies. See *A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul to the Galatians, Corinthians, Romans, Ephesians, To which is Prefix'd, An Essay For*

the Understanding of St. Paul's Epistles by Consulting St. Paul Himself (London, 1705-1707). See *Works*, VIII. Also see *A Discourse of Miracles* (1702), *Works* IX: 256-265.

3. From Locke's *Of the Conduct of the Understanding*, *Works* IV: 166 and cited in John Dunn, *The Political Thought of John Locke* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 259.

4. Yolton, *Locke and the Way of Ideas*, esp. chap.5.

5. Especially helpful here is the survey of relevant literature presented by Dewey D. Wallace, Jr., "Socinianism, Justification by Faith, and the sources of John Locke's The Reasonableness of Christianity", *Journal of the History of Ideas* XLV (Jan-Mar. 1984): 49-66. The same author concludes that "He [Locke] was a major and influential, if not very original, formulator of the Latitudinarian and later 'rational Christian' interpretation of Christian revelation", 66. See also Biddle, "Locke's Critique of Innate Principles", 411-422; Samuel C. Pearson, Jr.,"The Religion of John Locke and the character of His Thought", *Journal of Religion* LVIII (July 1978): 244-262; Merwyn S. Johnson, *Locke on Freedom: An incisive study of the thought of John Locke* (Austin, Texas: Best Printing Co., 1977).

6. Thus Basil Willey states "Locke's main object in writing this treatise *[The Reasonableness of Christianity]* seems to have been to show how few and how simple the credal demands made upon us by Christianity, and how consonant with 'natural revelation' were its moral injunctions". *The Seventeenth-Century: Background Studies in the thought of the age in relation to poetry and religion* (London: ARC Paperbacks, 1986 ed.), 255. Cf. Emile Brehier, *The Seventeenth Century* (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1966), who notes that in *The Reasonableness of Christianity* Locke, "reduced all of the essential dogmas of Christianity to that which can be demonstrated by reason", 274.

7. *See Dunn, Political Thought of John Locke*, 11-26, 245-261. Dunn lays down the basis of his reinterpretation of Locke in the following form: "one of the central expository points made throughout this book is the intimate dependence of an extremely high proportion of Locke's arguments for their very intelligibility, let alone plausibility, on a series of theological commitments" (*preface* XI).

8. See David C. Snyder, "Faith and Reason in Locke's *Essay*", *Journal of the History of Ideas* XLVII (April-June, 1986): 197-213, for a survey of recent discussions on these matters. Snyder notes that where comments have not been perfunctory, interpretations of Locke on faith and reason 'differ wildly'. Thus Ashcraft maintains that Locke's views on faith and reason, whilst not adequate, remain coherent [R. Ashcraft, "Faith and Knowledge in Locke's Philosophy" in John Yolton ed. *John Locke: Problems and Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 194-223]. This view is challenged by Paul Helm who contends that Locke's views are confused and contradictory ["Locke on Faith and Knowledge", *Philosophical Quarterly* (1973) XXIII: 52-66]. Snyder argues for Locke's modification of an Aquinas 'complementarist' view of the relation between faith and reason where faith "adds to reason but the two operate in different spheres", 199. For Aquinas faith was assumed but room had to be made for reason. Locke reversed this in response to the process of secularization. Snyder concludes that Locke "was not quite the consistently Christian thinker that he

wished to be", 213. More recently S.N. Williams in "John Locke on the Status of Faith", *Scottish Journal of Theology* XL (1987): 591-606, has offered a qualified defence of Locke against the charge of subjectivism in belief. Williams points to Locke's intention "to seek for religious belief a status that permits it to apprehend cognitively what reason cannot apprehend and to do so on unimpeachably rational grounds offered in terms of epistemological principles and their application", 605.

9. See Johnson, *Locke on Freedom*, 12.

10. See esp. Johnson, ibid ., chap.7 "Full Freedom - The Relation to God"; W. Spellman, *John Locke and the Problem of Depravity* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Wallace "Socinianism, and Locke on Christianity". Johnson and Wallace differ markedly in their assessment of Locke's doctrine of justification, the former pointing to Locke's debt to the Reformed tradition for his understanding of justification, the latter regarding Locke's doctrines of justification and atonement as radical departures from Reformation Protestantism. See Johnson, 150-153, and Wallace, 56f.

11. See Wallace, "Socianism and Locke on Christinaity," 50; Pearson, "The Religion of John Locke", esp.244, 248, 256. Biddle, "Locke's Critique of Innate Principles and Toland's Deism", argues that Locke "sought in the *Essay* to establish traditional revelation as the primary guide in that proper science and business of mankind, morality and religion", 417. Ashcraft, "Faith and Knowledge in Locke's Philosophy", shows a similar sympathy for Locke arguing that the apologetic task, begun in the *Essay*, was completed in *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (see 194, 198, 202, 218-19). Johnson, *Locke on Freedom*, goes so far as to claim that Locke's Christological doctrine anticipates nineteenth and twentieth century developments respecting the humanity of Christ and thereby does not 'eliminate' but give a new foundation to the doctrine of the Trinity, 150f. Locke is thus identified as a forerunner of Karl Barth (165 en.21)!

12. The chief fault of modern contextual studies of Locke is that they fail to move beyond the level of historical inquiry in their assessments of Locke's theological views. Perhaps the one recent exception is Johnson, though he seems more interested in linking Locke to earlier Reformed theology. As a result there are a number of useful studies outlining *how* Locke's views were apologetical but we have few clues upon which to decide whether his programme was successful or unsuccessful and why.

13. Thus e.g. Willey, *The Seventeenth-Century Background*, in chap.1 "The Rejection of Scholasticism" writes: "Interest was now directed to the *how*, the manner of causation, not its *why*, its final cause", 11f. For other useful background material consult; G.R. Cragg, *From Puritanism to the Age of Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), chap.6; W. von Leyden, *Seventeenth-Century Metaphysics* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1968), esp. chap.2.

14. See esp. Henry G. von Leeuwen, *The Problem of Certainty in English Thought, 1630-1690* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), chap.5.

15. Richard Rorty in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), chap.3, traces the 'epistemological turn' taken by Descartes in the seventeenth century, and its important

development in Locke's theory of knowledge.

16. See e.g. Anders Wedberg, *A History of Philosophy: The Modern Age to Romantlcism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), part one, "The Mechanistic World View in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries". Cf. R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945), 3-9 and 93-112 more generally.

17. Collingwood, ibid., 5.

18. Cf. Francis Oakley, "Christian Theology and the Newtonian Science: The Rise of the Concept of the Laws of Nature", *Church History* XXX (1961): 433-457, who argues that the revival by late thirteenth century nominalist theologians of the semitic idea of an omnipotent Creator-God as an explanation for a new simplified view of nature provided the theological resources for the seventeenth century mechanistic physics (see 449f).

19. For example, the doctrine of innate ideas functioned as a hitherto assumed internal ordering mechanism which offered the possibility of finding meaning in the world. The doctrine assumed that the meaning and truth of things was implicit in whatever was discovered and it was able to be ordered in relation to certain enduring principles. The doctrine in short supposed the operation of a set of meta-principles in terms of which all contingency could be understood. See en.52.

20. See Wallace, "Socinianism and Locke on Christianity".

21. This 'particularism' was fundamental for Locke. Thus he began his discussion of general terms in the *Essay*, III.3.1, with the statement "All Things, that exist, being Particulars ...". He returned to the theme in III.3.11. This particularism linked Locke to a nominalist tradition in philosophy which, as will be argued in section three of this chapter, was a crucial determinative factor in Locke's handling of the fundamental articles tradition. See further J.R. Milton, "John Locke and the Nominalist Tradition" in R. Brandt ed., *John Locke Symposium Wolfenbuttel 1979* (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1981), 128-145.

22. Willey, *The Seventeenth-Century Background*, 10-14.

23. Ibid., 13.

24. See Nidditch ed., 7.

25. I.1.2.

26. Ibid.

27. Truth in its fullest extent was likened by Locke to a "vast Ocean of Being" (I.1.7). It was precisely this richness and depth which posed a danger to humankind who, without due regard for their own capacities, ventured beyond "a quiet and secure Possession of Truths, that most concern'd us ..." into those depths which were "beyond their capacities",(ibid). The *Essay* was designed, in part at least, as a check to the overconfidences of man.

28. "If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things: we shall do much - what as wisely as he, who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no Wings to

fly" (I.1.5). The sceptical spirit left one without hope, the overconfident zealot lived with much false hope. There was little difference insofar as both positions provided fertile ground for the generation of high social conflict without the hope of peaceful resolution.

29. I.1.7.

30. "Our Business here, is not to know all things, but those which concern our Conduct. If we can find out those Measures, whereby a rational Creature put in that State, which Man is in, in this World, may, and ought to govern his Opinions, and Actions depending thereon, we need not be troubled, that some other things escape our Knowledge" (I.1.6).

31. See Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, who cites Kant's remark concerning "the physiology of the human understanding of the celebrated Mr. Locke", 138.

32. I.1.7.

33. See above en.21.

34. See e.g. II.1.24, where Locke referred to ideas of reflection as "the Impressions that are made on our Senses by outward Objects, that are extrinsical to the mind". In the receiving of impressions of 'outward Objects' the understanding is passive, "the mind is forced to receive the Impressions; and cannot avoid the perception of those Ideas that are annexed to them" (II.1.25; cf. II.9.1).

35. II.1.2. The concept of experience was invoked by Locke as an answer to the question of the whence of the minds 'materials of Reason and Knowledge'.

36. II.1.3.

37. II.6.1.

38. II.1.4.

39. II.1.4.

40. II.1.2.

41. I.1.8.

42. Ibid.

43. II.1.23.

44. II.1.24.

45. Cf., II.9.1, where Locke referred to perception as being "the first faculty of the Mind, exercised about our *Ideas*; so it is the first and simplest *Idea* we have from Reflection ...".

46. See I.1.2.

47. I.4.23.

48. For Locke it was a question of being responsible for what knowledge one had. Given the origin of such knowledge this responsibility could only be properly exercised as one attended to the concrete and particular. This was to recognise what Locke could describe as "the first Capacity of Humane Intellect" wherein it was "fitted to receive the Impressions made on it" (II.1.24). This was 'the first step' one made towards the discovery of anything. To be thus responsible was akin to what Locke elsewhere referred to as "the principle exercise of Freedom" where one was enjoined to "stand still, open the eyes, look about...." (II.21.67).

49. II.1.25.

50. See Lorenz Kruger, "The Concept of Experience in John Locke" in R. Brandt ed., *John Locke Symposium Wolfenbuttel 1979*, (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1981), 75 and 74-89 generally.

51. Thus the goodness of a thing had its beginning in the pleasure and pain that accompanied experience. "It has therefore pleased our Wise Creator, to annex to several Objects, and to the *Ideas* which we receive from them, as also to several of our thoughts, a concomitant pleasure..."(II.7.3). Pleasure and pain were present in sensation as a means to the directing of human beings along one course and not another. Direction towards the good began at this level. The fact that pleasure and pain had been so 'blended together' "in all the things that environ and affect us" (II.7.5), intensified the human drive towards the highest and purest good.

52. The theory of innateness was for Locke, and a number of others before him, fatally flawed as a way of knowledge for science, morality and society. Locke carefully brought together in a sustained and focussed way the earlier attacks on the doctrine of innate ideas. His own vehement rejection of the doctrine was directly related to his empiricist position. Locke considered that the doctrine of innateness undermined any attempt to take contingency seriously. The theory of innateness supposed the mind to be 'imprinted' with certain foundational ideas from which could be derived human knowledge and moral order. Such "native beams of light"(I.2.27) provided "infallible certainties"(I.3.13) from which could be deduced equally certain conclusions.

    The theory not only made it easy to bypass the particular, it systematically thwarted efforts to reach the particularities of experience. Any such attempt was unnecessary because the foundational ideas were already delivered neat and formed prior to observation and experience. Innateness provided a way of coming to and managing experience but experience itself could not contribute to the generation of the ideas of the mind. In this way the doctrine of innate ideas demonstrated a basically negative disposition towards the whole notion of discovery as the expansion of human knowledge through careful attention to the structure of the created order. The enterprise of science was thus impoverished.

    In the sphere of conduct and morality the theory was largely vacuous since the rules or principles it proposed offered little guidance at the level of human action (I.3.18). At the level of society the doctrine provided, at least tacitly, a justification for the confident affirmations of many contrary opinions among people which, remarked Locke, "great numbers are ready at any time to seal with their blood" (I.3.27).

    See Yolton, *Locke and the Way of Ideas*, chap.2, for a survey of the doctrine of innate knowledge prior to 1688. Locke was

aware of the modified version of the doctrine (as opposed to the naive form). This 'dispositional' theory claimed, said Yolton, "not that men were born with completed ideas and principles of morality but only that knowledge was implicit in the soul and merely required experience to elicit awareness of it," 39f. Locke apparently did not wish to dispute this, "he only wished to point out that in this form the theory claimed so little that it no longer merited the name 'innate'," 53.

53. Locke discussed and classified the varieties of complex ideas in II.12-23. In II.12.1, Locke observed the transition from the 'passive' mind in receipt of simple ideas from sensation and reflection, to "The Acts of the Mind wherein it exerts its Power over its simple *Ideas* ..". Furthermore "In this faculty of repeating and joining together its *Ideas*, the Mind has great power in varying and multiplying the Objects of its Thoughts, infinitely beyond what Sensation or Reflection furnished it with .." (II.12.2).

54. The image of the mind as a mirror was important for Locke. See II.1.25 & IV.2.6. The possibility of the mind's infinite mirroring and refraction of ideas is the supposition of Locke's recognition of the infinite number and endless variety of complex ideas that 'entertain the Thoughts of Men' (II.12.3). For further see Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, chap.3.

55. Thus the idea one had of 'the incomprehensible supreme Being' was 'made up' of simple ideas from reflection such that: "having from what we experiment in our selves, got the Ideas of Exisitence and Duration; of Knowledge and Power; of Pleasure and Happiness; and of several other qualities and Powers .... when we would frame an Idea the most suitable we can to the supreme Being, we enlarge every one of these with our Idea of Infinity; and so putting them together, make our complex Idea of God" (II.23.33). This was the way in which said Locke "we frame the best Idea of him our Minds are capable of" (II.23.34). This complex idea of God was the only kind of idea human beings could frame, notwithstanding the simplicity to be attributed to God's own essence of which nothing could be known (II.23.35).

56. II.23.19.

57. IV.1.1.

58. IV.2.

59. IV.2.1.

60. Ibid.

61. IV.2.2.2-6, esp. para.6, on the increasing dimness of knowledge obtained through discursive reasoning involving successive reflection.

62. For this knowledge humans possessed evidence: "For I ask anyone, Whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different Perception, when he looks on the Sun by day, and thinks on it by night ..." (IV.2-14). To be so 'invincibly conscious' was not a matter of faith or opinion. Locke's realism could not countenance such a sceptical alternative.

63. See IV.3.22-31. Locke's realism had widened the field over which knowledge could be won to include the category of real existence as well as relations between ideas. This same realism was also responsible for his rather sceptical view of the extent of possible knowledge. "When we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the World, and the Reasons we have to think, that what lies within our Ken, is but a small part of the immense Universe, we shall then discover an huge Abyss of Ignorance" (IV.3.24). For further discussion see R.I. Aaron, *John Locke* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 231-237.

64. The phrase appears in IV.3.23. Within Locke's schema the progressive restriction on the extent of knowledge could be attributed firstly, to the absence of any ideas at all, and secondly to the lack of clear and adequate ideas and finally to the inability of the human mind to make the proper connections between its ideas.

65. Mathematical ideas, being of a relational kind, were necessarily real and adequate to the object intended (the ideas were their own archetypes). Within this field the possibilities for knowledge, through intuitive and demonstrative operations, appeared limitless (IV.3.18). Here demonstration depended 'not upon the sense'. It had the character of pure deduction with an apparent absence of inductive element. There was a certain irony here; the richness and purity of mathematical knowledge obtained for Locke precisely because this discipline operated at a distance from the world of external fact to which it was only tenuously related. Cf; IV.3.19; IV.4.13; IV.11.6, and discussion by Aaron, *John Locke*, 233.

66. IV.3.6. For Locke, sensitive knowledge related to existence only in its particularity (IV.11.13). Furthermore it only extended "as far as the present testimony of our Senses ... and no farther" (IV.11.9). Beyond this the nature of sensitive knowledge as knowledge was a little unclear. In Book II he had distinguished within the material world between primary and secondary qualities of substances; the latter representing "Powers to produce various sensations in us by their Primary Qualities" (II.8.10). Primary qualities were 'resemblances' of objects, however ideas produced by secondary qualities, had no resemblance to the objects at all. "There is nothing like our Ideas, existing in the Bodies themselves. They are in the Bodies, we denominate from them, only a power to produce those Sensations in us ..." (II.18.15). Whatever insights human beings had into the structure of things could be obtained only through attention to the way objects appeared to people by virtue of the operation of those powers produced by an object's secondary qualities (IV.3.10).

    In terms of raw knowledge, as it was considered in Book IV in relation to sensitive knowledge, the above conclusion was meagre indeed. Through observation one could point to certain operational laws 'that we know not' and of which only an 'experimental Knowledge' was discoverable. Locke was not optimistic. "From all which 'tis easy to perceive, what a darkness we are involved in, how little 'tis of Being, and the things that are, that we are capable to know" (IV.3.29). The pathway to knowledge via particular experience was necessarily indirect and required trained observation, meticulous examination and restrained conclusions. This was basically Locke's recipe for the method of natural philosophy.

67. IV.15.3. Probability had to do with 'appearance' of truth "being to supply the defect of our Knowledge and to guide us where that fails ..." (IV.15.4).

68. IV.14.3.

69. IV.15.4.

70. See IV.18.2.

71. See e.g. IV.17.2. For the mechanism of judgement see, IV.15.2; IV.16.5 & 9-12; IV.17.3.

72. See e.g. IV.17.9-13.

73. This is already implicit in Locke's discussion of demonstrative knowledge. See IV.2.6.

74. IV.14.2.

75. IV.14.3.

76. See IV.10., on the proof of God's existence. Cf. IV.3.21., wherein Locke refers to "a demonstrative Knowledge of the *Existence* of a God". In II.23.33 and 34, Locke described how the 'idea' of God was derived from the mind's simple ideas and by the senses from exterior things. Locke thus assured himself that the mind, when judging rightly, came to a demonstrative knowledge of God. Minimally some form of correspondence was presupposed here.

77. See below p.127f.

78. On the mind's mirroring operations, see above en.54 and below en.82.

79. Thus e.g. Locke explained that the certainty of demonstrative knowledge was less than intuitive "like a Face reflected by several Mirrors one to another, where as long as it retains the similitude and agreement with the Object, it produces a Knowledge; but 'tis still in every successive reflection with a lessening of that perfect Clearness and Distinctness, which is in the first, till at last, after many removes, it has a great mixture of Dimness, and is not at first Sight so knowable, especially to weak Eyes", (IV.2.6). This process would be intensified with the move into the region of probabilities.

80. See e.g. IV.17.2 where reason functions "to draw into view the truth sought for".

81. Cf. Willey, *Seventeenth-Century Background*, 262.

82. In this respect see the interesting discussion of the power of the mind in Locke in relation to the imagination in James Engells, *The Creative Imagination: Enlightenment to Romanticism* (London & Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), 17-21.

83. For an account of Locke's 'mechanistic critical realism' see Wedburg, *A History of Philosophy*, 101-129.

84. Willey, *Seventeenth-Century Background*, 251.

85. IV.19.4.

86. IV.19.14.

87. See Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 139-148.

88. IV.18-19.

89. See Snyder, "Faith and Reason in Locke's *Essay*", 213.

90. See e.g. IV.11.12, where it is clear that for Locke the evidence of faith cannot lead to 'certain knowledge'. Cf. Snyder, ibid, 204f, who cites in further support Locke's *Third Letter Concerning Toleration* in *Works*, VI: 143.

91. IV.18.6.

92. Snyder, "Faith and Reason in Locke's *Essay*", 213.

93. IV.17.24. Cf. Snyder, ibid, 204f. The issue was taken up in an interesting way with Edward Stillingfleet in Locke's second reply to the Bishop, *An Answer to Remarks upon an Essay concerning Human Understanding* (*Works* IV: 273f). Stillingfleet had argued that, to the extent that faith was not 'certain', the credibility of the fundamental articles of the faith was endangered. Locke explicitly identified his remarks in the *Essay*, IV.17.16, on the probability of some propositions being such as to warrant assent as knowledge does demonstration, with the assurance of faith. There was for Locke no doubt that faith could not be knowledge; it belonged to the region of probabilities. However this did not undermine the articles tradition for their certainty had its origin in God not man: "For the veracity of God is as capable of making me know a proposition to be true, as any other way of proof can be; and attain certainty", 281. This is a remarkable statement from Locke. Its rationale is to be explained by what is referred to below as the subjective and objective dimension of faith for Locke.

94. IV.16.14.

95. IV.18.2.

96. Ibid.

97. IV.18.5.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid.

100. The reference to faith in its objective and subjective modes corresponds to what Snyder in " Faith and Reason in Locke's *Essay*" refers to as the difference for Locke between the source of the validity of propositions of faith (which give, from this perspective, certain knowledge or full assurance) and the epistemic status of such propositions which appertain only to belief, 206.

101. IV.15.3 and IV.19.13.

102. IV.16.13.

103. IV.19.16.

104. IV.19.5. Cf. John Yolton, *Locke: An Introduction* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), who discusses the problematic status of Scripture as "an outward sign, of a mark of revelation". 90f.

105. Yolton, ibid.

106. IV.17.24; cf. IV.18.8-10. R.F. Thiemann, *Revelation and Theology: The Gospel As Narrated Promise* (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985) states: "Locke consistently understands faith as reason's assent to propositions revealed by God", 23.

107. IV.19.14.

108. IV.19.11.

109. See IV.18.3 & 5, where criteria are provided for the elimination of supposed claims to revelation.

110. IV.18.8.

111. See *The Reasonableness of Christianity, Works* VII: 158; cf. 186f. Hereafter *R of C*, followed by page number.

112. Locke's treatment of justification was developed in terms of the covenantal relationship of God with man, prefigured in the Abramic covenant and re-established as a covenant of grace in the coming of Jesus Christ. See e.g. *R of C*, 16 and 103ff.

113. Thus Aaron, *John Locke*, states: "The whole aim of the Reasonableness of Christianity, as its title suggests, is to show that there is nothing in that religion contrary to reason," 349. Yolton, *Locke and the Way of Ideas*, overlooks this when he states: "But the appeal of Locke in that work [*Reasonableness*] was made not from the epistemological principles set forth in his Essay, but from the standpoint of common sense and simplicity", 118. One of Yolton's main purposes throughout his book is to distance Locke's *Essay* from undue responsibility being placed upon it for some of the distortions it received by certain Deistic theologians. However in doing so he completely omits to show how the *Essay* made its impress upon Locke's own depiction of *The Reasonableness of Christianity*. For further see T. Kato, "The Reasonableness in the Historical Light of the Essay" in *The Locke Newsletter* XII (1981): 45-59. Cf. Williams, "Locke on Faith", 604f.

114. The *Essay* suggests that the task of reason was to understand revelation correctly (IV.16.14), to judge "of signification of the Words, wherein it [revelation] is delivered" (IV.18.8).

115. IV.19.14.

116. *R of C*, 5.

117. For example see, *R of C*, preface, 5, 101, 132.

118. *R of C*, 101.

119. Ibid., 56.

120. Ibid., 102.

121. See Johnson, *Locke on Freedom*, 148.

122. *R of C*, 16f.

123. Ibid., 5.

124. Ibid., 9.

125. Ibid., 20.

126. Ibid., 120.

127. Spellman, *Locke on Depravity*, shows how Locke developed his *Reasonableness of Christianity* from his associations with the Dutch Remonstrant, Philippus van Limborch and the translator and merchant William Popple. See 125-136.

128. "These two, faith and repentence, i.e. believing Jesus to be the Messiah, and a good life, are the indispensible conditions of the new covenant, to be performed by all those who would obtain eternal life", *R of C*, 104.

129. Cf. Wallace, "Socianism and Locke on Christianity", who notes: "The prominence of covenantal thinking in Puritan and Calvinist thought has long been a common place, but their view of the covenant always included the explanation that it was God's grace which enabled his elect to fulfill the terms of the covenant.... The emergence and prominence of a truly conditional covenant theology among later seventeenth-century Anglicans, however, has been given less attention than it deserves", 47.

130. For Locke that which was most reliable and close to reality accorded with that which was given. The 'facts' were the given. Interpretation of the 'facts' was a second order exercise carried out by fallible human beings. The facts were intelligible in and of themselves insofar as they were identified with the literal or historical sense. Here fact and meaning implode. See further on this Hans W. Frei, *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1974), 75-123.

131. *R of C*, 157.

132. Ibid., 32f.

133. Ibid., 146.

134. Ibid., 33f. Later on Locke took some pains to indicate the reason for Jesus' reserve concerning the messianic claim. The true marks of Messiahship - purity of life , miracles, his conformity to all the preconditions concerning him - clearly showed his status. The absence of any direct declarations by Jesus to the above enabled him to live out this Messianic life in a full and complete way until the time of his death. To have proclaimed publically his Messiahship would have meant running the risk of being confused with false Jewish notions of Messiahship which would have prematurely cut short his mission at the hands of Roman authorities. His Messiahship, to remain pure, had to be clear to the Jews but in such a way as to protect him from the Roman authorities. See *R of C*, 81f.

135. Ibid., 145ff. Cf. reference to the authority of the credit of the proposer in *Essay*, IV.18.2.

136. Johnson, *Locke on Freedom*, argues that "the 'reasonableness' Locke points to in the doctrine of justification as in the title [*R of C*] clearly does not mean rational as *opposed* to believable. Locke intends to convey more the 'sensibleness' or inner consistency of Christianity" (162 en.10). Yet Johnson fails to point out that for Locke the doctrine was sensible and therefore believable because it accorded with Locke's understanding of what could be accepted as rational.

137. Ibid., 1-6 & 132-151. Cf. Frei, *Eclipse of Biblical Narrative*, who argues that although Locke takes the story of salvation literally he "still argues the case for the need of redemption on a more general basis", 125.

138. See e.g. *R of C*, 47, 92.

139 Ibid., 151.

140. See Wallace, "Socinianism, and Locke on Christianity", for a brief but useful account of Edward's criticisms of Locke. Wallace also refers to criticisms of Locke by Thomas Burnet and John Milner. For a recent detailed appraisal of the Locke-Edwards dispute in terms of their shared doctrine of man and sin see Spellman, *Locke and Depravity*, chap.5 esp.143. Locke replied to Edwards twice: *A Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity, etc. from Mr. Edwards Reflections* (London, 1695), *A Second Vindication of The Reasonableness of Christianity* (London, 1697), see *Works*, VII. Citations of Locke's two vindications will be in the form of *Works*, vol., page.

141. See Wallace, ibid., 56, 62. Cf. Locke's *Second Vindication*: "For the faith for which God justifieth, is not an empty speculation, but a faith joined with repentence, and working by love" (*Works* VII: 235).

142. Ibid., 57.

143. Wallace, 64, citing Edwards, *Socinianism Unmasked*, 4, 13-15, 94-101.

144. *Works* VII: 176.

145. Ibid., 229.

146. Ibid., 219.

147. Ibid., 231, 352.

148. Ibid., 219, 247.

149. Ibid., 247.

150. Ibid., 178; cf. 244.

151. Ibid., 178, 217, 244.

152. Ibid., 237f.

153. Ibid., 239.

154. Ibid., 229.

155. Ibid., 341f; cf. 320-23, 339-45.

156. Ibid., 267.

157. Ibid., 267f.

158. Ibid., 275, 321.

159. Ibid., 228.

160. Ibid., 234.

161. Ibid., 272.

162. Ibid., 377.

163. Ibid., 233.

164. Ibid., 215, 226, 230f.

165. Ibid., 295f; cf. 358.

166. Ibid., 289, 294, 297.

167. Ibid., 305.

168. Ibid.

169. Ibid., 254f. The manner in which Locke distinguished between things of great weight and beliefs of lesser moment, i.e. in the form of fundamentals and things of perfection, was not unfamiliar in the fundamentals tradition. Indeed ninety years earlier Francis Bacon had employed the distinction. When Daniel Waterland considered the matter of fundamentals he referred to Bacon's form of the distinction as 'not accurate'. Waterland accordingly developed his own scheme. See his "Discourse of Fundamentals" in *Works*, vol.V.

170. Ibid., 276.

171. Ibid.

172. This suggests that Locke was working with some notion of the essence of Christianity. This may well be the case but it does raise the problem of Locke's theory of universals. Aaron, *John Locke*, has identified three different strands to Locke's theory of universals. Universals could be (a) particulars in their representative capacity, (b) that in which consists the common qualities of the whole, or (c) an essence in which all else was included (see 195-207). All three strands are relevant to Locke's discussion of fundamental articles. Thus the appearance of Jesus the Messiah was a turning point in the history of salvation. This event was the focus and pivot by which Locke ordered and made sense of the economy of salvation. It was in this sense a particular event which 'stood for' other particular events [sense (a)]. However, included within this affirmation was of course the supposition of belief in One God (Hebrews 6: 1-2). It also included what Locke later referred to as the concomitant articles of resurrection and ascension. In this case the one fundamental

functioned as a concentrated form of a larger whole. This might be either construed in a reductive manner [sense (b)] or as something more like a formula for the essence of Christianity [sense(c)]. In *The Reasonableness of Christianity* the proposition 'Jesus is the Messiah' seemed to include all three senses. However it was only in his argument with Edwards that the article 'Jesus the Messiah' operated clearly as a compression of faith, i.e. as its essence in which all else was included. Apologetic motives necessitated this, i.e. the desire to ensure that the simplification remained orthodox and inclusive in faith.

173. See Wallace, "Socinianism and Locke on Christianity", 57-66.

174. The impact of Locke's epistemology upon his presentation of the Christian faith is controversial. For instance Biddle, "Locke's Critique of Innate Principles", states that for Locke the "reasonableness of Christianity lay not so much in its conformity to reason as in its simplicity, intelligibility and effectiveness", 422. But cf. Locke in *The Reasonableness of Christianity:* "The most elevated understandings cannot but submit to the authority of this doctrine [that Jesus Christ was sent by God to be king and saviour] as divine; which coming from the mouths of a company of illiterate men, hath not only the attestation of miracles, *but reason to confirm it,* since they delivered no precepts, but such, as though reason of itself had not clearly made out, yet it could not but assent to when thus discovered, and think itself indebted for the discovery" (147; my italics). For further discussion see above ens. 113 and 136.

175. Locke's side of the controversy appears in *Works* IV (refer en.2 above). For two brief but useful discussions of the controversy consult Yolton, *John Locke: An Introduction,* 92-103; Spellman, *Locke and Depravity,* 171-183.

176. Spellman, ibid., 171.

177. See Locke's *Works* IV: 110, 95.

178. Ibid., 230.

179. Ibid., 338.

180. Ibid.

181. Ibid., 154, 338, 477.

182. Ibid., 305, 311.

183. Ibid., 197.

184. Ibid., 198.

185. Ibid., 197.

186. Ibid., 96.

187. Ibid.

188. Ibid., 114.

189. Ibid., 303.

190. Ibid., 324.

191. Ibid., 343.

192. Ibid., 348.

193. Ibid., 275, 334.

194. See Yolton, *Locke and the Way of Ideas*, 10, 140.

195. Yolton, *John Locke: An Introduction*, 96.

196. How Locke construed this discerning is unclear. Ian Ramsey in *John Locke: The Reasonableness of Christianity* with *A Discourse of Miracles* and part of *A Third Letter Concerning Toleration* (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1958), discusses the issue of 'idea particulars' and revealed propositions in Locke. Upon one reading of Locke revealed propositions have no epistemological link with ideas, but just happen to be given ad hoc along with other occurrences of a special sort such as extraordinary wonders. Alternatively revealed propositions are given with certain idea particulars when such propositions are linked with idea particulars in an intuitive situation. This latter view would mean that in thinking of the Messiah as a descriptive label which fitted Jesus, Locke was appealing to some kind of disclosure situation which intuitively linked ideas and revealed propositions (see 11-17).

197. See Nicholas Rescher, *Cognitive Systematization* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), chap.1, for an account of the development of system rivalry in the second half of the seventeenth century. Rescher refers to Condillac, who developed 'a judicious critique of systems' in which, "the good systems are the scientific systems, based on 'experience', typified by Newtonian physics, the bad systems are the philosophical ones, based on speculative hypotheses, typified by the ideas of the presocratics", 7. Locke's critique was thus directed to the latter kind of systems, though his rejection of the system concept appeared quite thoroughgoing.

198. See above p.121 and discussion in ens. 53, 54 and 55.

199. See above p.123 and discussion in ens.72, 79.

200. II.24.3.

201. Edward Farley in *Ecclesial Man: A Social Phenomenology of Faith and Reality* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), identifies the characteristic of 'constitutive images' of the ecclesial community thus: "Their content is more like a fact (a conjunction of noun and verb) than a substantive", 118. That Jesus 'died for our sins' or is a 'suffering Messiah' are, says Farley, images, but 'two natures in one person' is not.

202. See *Works* VIII; also see en.2 for full biblographical details.

203. *R of C*, 152.

204. Ibid., 154.

205. *Paraphrases*, *Works* VIII: 8f (preface).

206. Ibid., 26.

207. Ibid., 16.

208. Ibid., 10.

209. Ibid., 18.

210. Ibid., 8.

211. Ibid., 7.

212. Ibid., 20.

213. A useful recent discussion and deployment of this concept can be found in George A. Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Post Liberal Age* (London: SPCK, 1984). Lindbeck asserts: "Thick description, it should be noted, is not to be confused with Baconian empiricism, with sticking to current facts. It is rather the full range of the interpretive medium which needs to be exhibited, and because this range in the case of religion is potentially all-encompassing, description has a creative aspect", 115. The core of the problem here is not that 'thick description' is crudely empiricist in the sense of attending to 'current facts'. Rather 'thick description' presupposes that reality is present in a highly dispersed and varied way and 'description' of phenomena is the most profitable way of dealing with reality. The presupposition is thoroughly empiricist. To synthesise is to distort. Lindbeck's discussion is highly pertinent to Locke's theological programme.

214. See Milton, "Locke and the Nominalist Tradition", and discussion above p.117 and en.21.

215. Ibid., 138f; cf. *Essay*, IV.6.16. and IV.12.10.

216. See John Dunn, *Locke* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 20.

217. Locke attributed much of the confusion here to the doctrine of innate ideas, though he saw conflict being inherent in the learning process. See II.32.18.

218. IV.3.22.

219. IV.13.27.

220. Ibid.

221. *R of C*, 147.

222. "Since therefore it is unavoidable to the greatest part of Men, if not all, to have several *Opinions*, without certain and indubitable proofs of their Truths; and it carries too great an imputation of ignorance, lightness, or folly, for Men to quit and renounce their former Tenets, presently upon the offer of an Argument, which they cannot immediately answer, and show the sufficiency of: It would, methinks, become to all Men to maintain *Peace*, and the common Offices of Humanity, *and Friendship, in the diversity of Opinions*" (IV.16.4).

223. Refer *Works* VI: *A Letter concerning Toleration*, trans. William Popple from the Latin original (London, 1689). *A Second Letter concerning Toleration* (London, 1690). *A Third Letter concerning*

Toleration (London, 1692). Citation will be *Works*, vol., page.

224. *Works* VI: 43.

225. Ibid., 6.

226. Ibid., 46.

227. Locke rejected the true church status of Rome. See *Works* VI: 55, 422. Papists could be saved if they as individuals did not reject truth necessary for salvation, 229. He did not include the Roman Church in those sects to be tolerated in England, 52.

228. Ibid., 13.

229. Cf. Dunn, *The Political Thought of John Locke*, 249f.

230. *Works* VI: 5.

231. Ibid., 29.

232. Ibid., 39.

233. Ibid., 40.

234. Ibid., 15.

235. Ibid., 239.

236. Ibid., 237.

237. Ibid.

238. Ibid., 145.

239. Ibid., 328.

240. Ibid., 56.

241. Ibid., 230.

242. Ibid., 239, 287, 410.

243. Ibid., 52.

244. Ibid., 7.

245. Thus Johnson, *Locke on Freedom*, notes that Locke's thought is not only empirical, "It is profoundly concrete, realistic, and dynamic. These qualities come through above all in Locke's concept of freedom ...", 175. Cf. the comments by Dunn, *The Political Thought of Locke*, who notes that Locke, in his later religious efforts, "was keeping a kind of faith with the majority of his fellow men with which the more benign Hobbes had scarcely troubled himself, labouring to preserve for all men that ease to be won from labour which could alone confer rationality upon their lives", 260. This pragmatic realism was undergirded by Locke's Christian theism.

246. *The Correspondence of John Locke*, 8 vols., E.S.De Beer ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), I:123. Dunn, *Locke*, chap.2, explains Locke's political thought from the perspective of trust

(the bond of human society).

247. *Works* VI: 47.

248. Ibid.,9.

249. *R of C*, 82.

250. Ibid., 85f. There is an interesting undercurrent to Locke's discussion of Jesus' reluctance to say explicitly he was the Messiah. For had he done so, the only way to have preserved him till his 'hour', would have been by constant miraculous interventions by God. In Locke's view, such intrusions would have detracted from the feel of the story's authenticity. Locke's point was that the miracles themselves would have eventually lost their force, however there is at least a hint that the 'naturalness' of Jesus life and mission was also at stake.

251. Ibid., 158. For Locke, God's wisdom was a thing 'clear, plain and easy to understand'(134, 147 ; cf. *Works* VI: 76); the simplicity of the gospel showed itself in the simplicity of the Messiah's life.

252. Ibid., 83.

253. Ibid., 129.

254. *Works* VII: 166.

255. *Works* VI: 241f.

256. Thus in *R of C*, 121 Locke refers to the wedding parable of Matthew 22, in which he noted that those who came (i.e. believed in Jesus) but wore no garment (repentence and virtuous life) were not received. Only those who accepted the invitation (i.e. believed in the Messiah) and wore the wedding garment (i.e. obeyed his laws), received salvation. Richard Hooker in *The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, Bk.III chap.1 para.7, had made the same point in stating that "the want of these virtues [moral righteousness and honesty] excludeth from salvation".

257. *Works* VI: 444.

258. Ibid., 63, 436, 443.

259. Ibid., 63.

260. See chap.9 of this thesis where fundamental articles are discussed in terms of the symbolic dimension of ecclesial life.

261. The doctrine remains buried 'in the text' and passed over in silence. See e.g. *Paraphrases* where St. Paul's Trinitarian form of blessing (2 Corinthians 13:14) is neither noted nor paraphrased; it is simply left there in the text, 243.

CHAPTER SIX: WATERLAND'S DEFENCE OF THE TRADITION

1. Yolton, *Locke and the Way of Ideas*, esp. final chap.

2. For Clarke see J.P. Fergusen, *An Eighteenth Century Heretic Dr.Samuel Clarke* (Kineton, England: Roundwood Press, 1976). See also references to Clarke in Yolton, ibid; Gerald R. Cragg, *Reason and Authority in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964); Gordon Rupp, *Religion in England 1688-1791* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 251-256.

3. Robert T. Holtby, *Daniel Waterland: A Study in Eighteenth* Century Orthodoxy (Carlisle: Charles Thurnam & Sons, 1966).

4. Waterland was held in high esteem by the Bishop of Durham, William Van Mildert (1765-1836) who was chiefly responsible for collecting and editing Waterland's works in 10 vols. in 1823. See esp. Van Mildert's 'Review' of Waterland's life and writings in vol.I. For purposes of citation, references will give short title of the work, followed by vol. and page no. in which it appears in *The Works*, 6 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1843), e.g. *Christianity Vindicated Against Infidelity*, V: 3.

5. Cragg, *Reason and Authority*, 36.

6. Perry Butler, "From the Early Eighteenth Century to the Present Day" in Sykes and Booty eds., *The Study of Anglicanism*, 32.

7. See "A Discourse of Fundamentals" in V: 77-104. Waterland's "Discourse" is discussed in Part Two of this chapter.

8. For an informative attempt to locate the 'School of Waterland' in its Oxford Movement context see the unpublished Oxford Ph.D (1982) by Peter Nockles, *Continuity and Changes in Anglican High Churchmanship in Britain 1792-1850*, esp. chap.2 "The Rule of Faith". See chap.8 of this thesis where the 'Waterland School' is traced in William Van Mildert's theology, in Newman's High Church Anglican critics and in the twentieth century in modified form as a strand in the theology of Charles Gore, Arthur Headlam, Henry McAdoo and Henry Chadwick (see chap.1 for Chadwick and McAdoo). In this lineage what is central is a relatively objectified account of fundamental articles which ultimately generates a reassertive mode of theological discourse. For further see Sykes, *Identity*, on the externality tradition in Christianity, and chap.10 of this thesis on the significance of 'conventional objectivism'.

9. See *Christianity Vindicated Against Infidelity*, V: 3f.

10. Ibid., 4.

11. *The Importance of the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity*, III: 416.

12. Ibid.

13. *Eight Sermons on the Divinity of Christ*, II: xi (preface).

14. Ibid., 36 (sermon).

15. *Importance of Trinity*, III: 662.

16. *A Sermon preached before The Sons of the Clergy*, VIII: 425.

17. *Importance of Trinity*, III: 424.

18. *Remarks upon Dr.Clarke's Exposition of the Church Catechism*, IV: 49f.

19. Ibid., 50.

20. *Eight Sermons*, II: 8, 47.

21. Ibid., 20.

22. Ibid., 31.

23. *Importance of Trinity*, III: 477.

24. Ibid., 674.

25. *Christianity Vindicated*, V: 35; cf. 46.

26. Ibid., 35.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., 67.

29. Ibid., 66.

30. Ibid., 61.

31. Ibid., 81f.

32. Ibid., 46.

33. *A Review of the Doctrine of the Eucharist: As Laid Down In Scripture and Antiquity*, IV: 464.

34. Ibid.

35. *Christianity Vindicated*, V: 57.

36. Ibid., 68.

37. Ibid., 42.

38. Ibid., 48f.

39. Ibid., 44.

40. *Regeneration Stated and Explained According to Scripture and Antiquity In a Discourse on Titus III. 4,5,6*; IV: 427.

41. Ibid., 458 ; cf. *Doctrine of Justification*, V: 37f.

42. *Christianity Vindicated*, V: 52.

43. Ibid.

44. See ibid., 50-56, for discussion on the various forms of 'enthusiasm'.

45. Cf. *The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy of the Christian Sacraments*, IV: 100.

46. *Christianity Vindicated*, V: 48.

47. For a brief but useful discussion of the concept of 'the mean' see J.G. Davies, *The Theology of William Blake* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1948), 138f; David Newsome, *Two Classes of Men: Platonism and English Romantic Thought* (London: John Murray, 1974), esp. references to '*coincidentia oppositorum*'.

48. This essentially static conception was devoid of any notion of the mean as a genuine, though provisional achievement of a dynamic harmony within a complex communication structure. Rather, the mean was a fixed pre-established position.

49. *Importance of Trinity*, III: 474.

50. *Eight Sermons*, II: 5.

51. *Importance of Trinity*, III: 424.

52. See below p.197 and ens. 175-77

53. See below p.173 and en.59.

54. Thus e.g. in regard to Clarke's *Argument à priori*, III: 380, that which appears to be new in relation to long held truths usually turns out, upon Waterland's analysis, to be an 'old exploded speculation'.

55. See *Works* I, II and III.

56. Although the work on the Trinity appears in *Works* III, it was in fact written much later, in 1734, and represented Waterland's more mature and systematic presentation of the doctrine of the Trinity.

57. *Vindication of Christ's Divinity*, I: 556; cf. *A Second Vindication*, II: 760.

58. See *A Second Vindication,* II: 763.

59. Ibid.

60. The denial of any such middle way was absolutely central to Waterland's opponents such as Clarke and Whitby. See e.g. *An Answer to Dr. Whitby's Reply*, II: 201.

61. *Importance of Trinity*, III: 397f.

62. Ibid., 404.

63. Ibid., 407.

64. Ibid., 409.

65. Ibid., 411.

66. Ibid., 412.

67. Ibid., 416.

68. Ibid., 445.

69. Ibid., 455.

70. Ibid., 400.

71. Ibid.

72. *Remarks upon Dr. Clarke's Exposition*, IV: 18.

73. *Importance of the Trinity*, III: 416ff.

74. Ibid., 427, 431.

75. Ibid., 433.

76. Ibid., 434.

77. Ibid., 433.

78. Ibid., 456.

79. Cf. *Vindication of Christ's Divinity*, (Query xvi), I: 411 where Waterland, in complaining of Dr. Clarke's substitution of 'honour' for the words 'worship' and 'adoration' of Christ argued: "Let us keep to the *Terms* we began with; lest by the changing of Words we make a change of *Ideas*, and alter the very state of question". This confusion of word, idea and Ideas Samuel Coleridge attributed to Locke. See Robert F. Brinkley, *Coleridge on the Seventeenth Century* (Duke University Press, 1955), 384.

80. *Importance of Trinity*, III: 408ff.

81. Brinkley, *Coleridge on the Seventeenth Century*, 381.

82. Ibid.,380.

83. Ibid.

84. See *Nature of Christian Sacraments*, *Regeneration*, *Review of Eucharist* (*Works* IV); "Doctrinal Use of Sacraments", "The Christian Sacrifice", "Sacramental Part of Eucharist", "Distinctions of Sacrifice" (*Works* V), and articles on Baptism in *Works* VI.

85. See *Nature of the Christian Sacraments* and *Supplement* in IV: 52-148.

86. Ibid., 99.

87. *Review of Eucharist*, IV: 764.

88. See Holtby, *Daniel Waterland*, chap. 7.

89. *Remarks upon Dr. Clarke's Exposition*, IV: 46.

90. Ibid., 79.

91. Ibid., 41-46, 79, 90.

92. Ibid., 90.

93. Ibid., 101.

94. See Holtby, *Daniel Waterland*, 187f, 206.

95. *Review of the Eucharist, Works* IV:469

96. Ibid., 506.

97. The fact that the Eucharist operated sacramentally by virtue of the 'divine dispensation' enabled Waterland to argue in his *Review* firstly, that grace was genuinely communicated; and secondly, that this communication occurred not merely 'in' but 'by' the sacrament, 623. This was simply the logic of the covenantal nature of sacraments "wherein God bears a share as well as man", 724. Participation or communion on man's side was matched by "a *communication* on the other side", 709. For Waterland the Eucharist was a federal rite in which a covenant renewal was achieved. Insofar as the Eucharist was a medium for the operation of Divine grace, it was properly a sacrament; insofar as it involved responsible participation in the covenant, the Eucharist was sacrificial (750, 754).

98. Ibid., 504. Cf. "Doctrinal Use of Sacraments", V: 114 note u. for a refinement of 'emblem' concept.

99. Ibid., 572.

100. Ibid., 575; cf. 649.

101. Ibid., 518; cf. 709.

102. Ibid., 565.

103. Ibid., 617.

104. Ibid., 609.

105. Ibid., 568.

106. Ibid., 721.

107. Ibid., 535. Waterland's debt to Hooker and Cranmer was clear. See Holtby, *Daniel Waterland*, chap.7.

108. Ibid.

109. *Review of Eucharist*, IV: 535.

110. Ibid., 725.

111. Ibid., 750.

112. Ibid., 609.

113. Ibid., 505.

114. Ibid., 500.

115. Ibid., 501, 610, 622.

116. Ibid., 764-802.

117. Holtby, *Daniel Waterland*, chap.7 esp. 184f.,191f.

118. *Works* V: 107.

119. Ibid., 108.

120. Ibid., 118.

121. Ibid., 119.

122. *The Case of Arian Subscription Considered* and *Supplement*, II: 259-363.

123. Ibid., 265.

124. Ibid., 264.

125. Ibid., 330.

126. Ibid., 356.

127. Ibid.

128. Ibid., 307.

129. Ibid., 331.

130. III: 456-473.

131. IV: 425-458; also refer above en.40.

132. Ibid., 445.

133. Ibid., 457.

134. "A Discourse of Fundamentals", V: 77-104.

135. Rescher, *Cognitive Systematization*, 7.

136. *Remarks on Dr. Clarke's Exposition*, IV: 18.

137. See "Christ's Sacrifice of Himself Explained" (Sermon 31), V: 741, for present reference.

138. *Christianity Vindicated*, V: 38f.

139. *Vindication of Christ's Divinity*, I: 556.

140. "Distinctions of Sacrifice", V:295 note q., Waterland, in discoursing on the true idea of *sacrament* and *sacrifice*, discerned substantial changes to the whole system of theology in certain terminological modifications. He noted that "where a road first *divides*, two travellers may almost shake hands: but if one goes on here, and another there, as far as the *diverging* roads will lead them, they may at length be found at a very wide distance from each other: so it is here. An *equivocal* word, perhaps, or phrase, in which both parties agree, first strikes out *two* very different *ideas*, having their different *train* or *connection*, do at length carry the two parties off, wide and far from each other, into very opposite systems".

141. *Eight Sermons*, II: 30f.

142. Ibid., 79f; cf. *Christianity Vindicated*, V: 56 note 2.

143. Ibid., 59.

144. See "A Discourse of Fundamentals", V: 77-104.

145. Ibid., 79.

146. Ibid., 74.

147. See Palmer, *A Treatise on the Church of Christ*, vol.I: 103f.

148. "Discourse of Fundamentals", V: 77.

149. *Remarks on Dr. Clarke's Exposition*, IV: 18.

150. "Discourse of Fundamentals", V: 79.

151. It is for this reason that the earlier differentiation between 'points fundamental' and points of further perfection (adopted by Francis Bacon; 1561-1626) had been rejected by Waterland as inaccurate. See ibid.,73.

152. See above p.177 and below p.198.

153. Ibid., 87.

154. Ibid., 85.

155. In the "Discourse" Waterland drew upon earlier English and Continental theologians who had addressed themselves to the problem. In the nineteenth century William Palmer relied heavily upon Waterland's "Discourse" in the development of his own critique of the fundamentals apologetic. For more recent Anglican appreciation of Waterland's contribution see Sykes, "Fundamentals", 239f; Chadwick, "Unity and Pluralism", 359f. The importance of the "Discourse" is recognised by Roman Catholic theologians. See e.g. Joyce, "Fundamental Articles", 319ff; Tanqueray, "Articles fondamentaux (système des)", 2027.

156. Cf. discussion in chap.4 of this thesis.

157. "Discourse of Fundamentals", V:77. Cf. Stillingfleet's discussion of this in chap.4 p.99f of this thesis.

158. Ibid., 84.

159. See e.g. *Eight Sermons*, II: 78, 194; *Scripture Vindicated*, IV: 284; *Christianity Vindicated*, V: 67.

160. See e.g. Waterland's rationale for the existence of various sects in *Importance of Trinity*, III: 656.

161. This part of the analysis makes use of some of the insights on the operations of stable systems of belief discussed by Michael Polanyi in *Personal Knowledge*, 288-94.

162. See esp. Waterland's three *Vindications of Christ's Divinity* in *Works* I, II and III. The same method of rebuttal, by attention to minutiae, emerged in Waterland's reply to Tindal's, *Christianity as Old as Creation* (1730). Waterland's principal reply was *Scripture Vindicated* begun in 1730 and consisting of three parts, with a preface on principles of interpretation being added in 1732. See *Works* IV: 149-370. Here supposed scripture difficulties

were refuted one by one and more often discounted as 'trite' objections already determined in the Christian tradition, e.g. 179. The method suited an apologetic designed to negate threats.

163. V: 22.

164. Ibid., 32.

165. *Vindication of Christ's Divinity*, I: 460, 482; *Importance of Trinity*, III: 605.

166. *Eight Sermons*, II: 30.

167. *Review of Eucharist*, IV: 465.

168. *Argument à priori*, III: 380.

169. "The Sacramental part of the Eucharist explained", V: 204. Restraint was to be observed in the introduction of 'novel and affected phrases' for, argued Waterland, "generally speaking, *ancient doctrine* is best kept up by adhering strictly to *ancient language*; and *new phrases* at any time, taken up without necessity, have been observed to lead the way to a *new faith*".

170. *Eight Sermons*, II: 188; *A Second Vindication*, II: 755; *Importance of Trinity*, III: 439.

171. See esp. chap. 7 of Waterland's *Review of the Eucharist*, "Showing the Use and Value of Ecclesiastical Antiquity with Respect to Controversies of Faith", III: 601-66. For reference to the first three centuries see *Eight Sermons*, II: 133; *Importance of Trinity*, III: 639; *Remarks on Dr. Clarke's Exposition*, V: 189.

172. *Remarks on Dr. Clark's Exposition*, IV: 10. Cf. *Vindication of Christ's Divinity*, I: 531.

173. *Importance of Trinity*, III: 625; *Regeneration*, IV: 463.

174. *A Second Vindication*, II: 433. Cf. *Christianity Vindicated*, VIII: 48,51.

175. *Importance of Trinity*, III: 418.

176. Ibid., 437,675; *A Second Vindication*, II: 755.

177. *Remarks on Dr. Clarke's Exposition*, IV: 36.

178. *Argument à priori*, III: 383.

179. *Importance of Trinity*, III: 435.

180. "The Care Required in choosing our Religious Principles", V: 659.

181. *Review of Eucharist*, IV: 462.

182. When a monarchial conception of God is operating, e.g. where everything is explained by reference to the sovereignty of God, the inevitable result is a modeless Trinity and a correspondingly thinned-out human life developed in terms of a single category, e.g. obedience. The logic of monarchialism is repetition, the only thing left for God to do is repeat himself. Waterland's *logos* realism was *simple* in the above manner. Fidelity to the

tradition could only be maintained by repetition.

183. See sermon on "the Nature of Peaceableness", V: 431; cf. Holtby, *Daniel Waterland*, 207.

184. The comment appears in Locke's *Third Letter Concerning Toleration* (London, 1692), in the 1801 ed. of *Works* IV: 239, 287, 410.

185. Brinkley, *Coleridge on the Seventeenth Century*, 383.

186. Ibid., 382.

187. Ibid., 386.

188. Ibid., 385.

CHAPTER SEVEN: LAW'S RENEWAL OF THE TRADITION

1. John Hoyles has remarked: "Orthodox or heterodox, they [deist and divine] were fighting each other in the same boat". See *The Edges of Augustanism: the Aesthetics of Spirituality in Thomas Ken, John Byrom and William Law*, International Archives of the History of Ideas LIII (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), 90. Hoyles has in mind here the rationalism which figured so prominently in arguments from all quarters. See e.g. the discussion in chap.6 pp.197f, on the influence of Lockean thought in Waterland's theology.

2. This appeared to be the logic of Daniel Waterland's treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity. It was certainly the opinion of Samuel Coleridge, a later admirer of Waterland, see chap.6 pp.177.

3. Hoyles, *Edges of Augustanism*, 115.

4. See chap.4 of this thesis. Relevant here is Richard Field's attempt to enumerate those truths of faith necessary for salvation and required for 'right-believing' (chap.4 p.91-95). Laud's heavy investment in the foundation-superstructure analogy encouraged this atomizing view of statements of faith (chap.4 p.95-97). Henry Hammond's attempt to re-orientate the fundamentals of belief towards piety presupposed the problem of truths of faith isolated from Christian life (chap.4 p.108-110).

5. See e.g. J. Robert Barth, S.J., *The Symbolic Imagination: Coleridge and the Romantic Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 130ff.

6. See the intro. to chap.5 of this thesis in which the context for Locke's handling of faith is briefly discussed in relation to rationalism and mechanism.

7. It seems, from the two previous case studies, that the rationalist frame of mind automatically generates oppositional ways of understanding, e.g. faith/reason, natural/supernatural. The urge to purify, order and simplify is here rather too neatly satisfied by a process of excluding what cannot be readily assimilated into the categories indicated by 'reason' and 'natural'.

8. An early seventeenth century example of this development was Herbert of Cherbury's attempt to identify those beliefs common to humankind prior to an appeal to the Christian revelation. Something similar was operating in Joseph Mead's discussion of 'sub-fundamentals', 'fundamentals' and 'super-fundamentals' of religion. See chap.4 p.104f of this thesis.

9. Basil Willey, *The Eighteenth Century Background: Studies on the Idea of Nature in the Thought of the Period* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1974), 84.

10. See the recent discussion by Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition*, vol.V, *Christian Doctrine and Modern Culture*, chap.1

11. Ibid., 119-130. Pelikan notes that this 'affectional transposition' involved 'every article of faith' (128) and aimed "to recover the centrality of 'practice' in the definition of Christianity" (129). The development was not new but belonged to a longstanding attempt within the Christian tradition "to draw a correlation between the objectivity of God and the subjectivity of the self" (130). Pelikan thus concludes: "As the attention of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the experiential foundation and 'experimental' implication of Christian doctrines had shown, every doctrine in the corpus of theology was susceptible of such 'affectional transposition' and existential re-appropriation" (287). Thus the dogmas of the Trinity and the two natures of Christ "could therefore be epitomized in the exclamation that Christ was 'king of my heart'" (127). [Pelikan is citing Aleksandr Sturza, *Enchiridion of the Orthodox Christian* (St Petersburg, 1828), 303]. Pelikan discusses William Law within this general context of a theology of the heart and in particular the concern for evangelical perfection, see esp. 146-162.

12. See chap.1 of this thesis pp.34-6 for a brief discussion of the relation between the externality and inwardness tradition in Christianity and its relevance for the theme of fundamental articles. For further see Sykes, *Identity*, chap.2.

13. See chap.9 of this thesis for further discussion of the nature of the ecclesial bond.

14. Hoyle, *Edges of Augustanism*, 4.

15. Thus Hoyle, ibid., views Law as pointing forward to the spirit of Blake (147) and as an anticipator of the discoveries of Freud, esp. concerning the psycho-analytical concept of repression (129). Henri Talon, *William Law: A Study in Literary Craftsmanship* (London: Rockliff, 1948), links Law to Blake, the Romantics and the Oxford Movement (97ff). Coleridge, in the conclusion to *Aids to Reflection*, acknowledged his debt to Law and Boehme. Oliver Elton, *A Survey of English Literature 1730-1780* (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1928), vol.II: 208, finds echoes of Law in Blake and Schopenhauer as regards Law's focus upon the will. Caroline Spurgeon, "William Law and the Mystics", *The Cambridge History of English Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920), vol.IX: 328, noted that Law's influence filtered into the nineteenth century, that Thomas Erskine, who was influential for F.D. Maurice, was indebted to Law.

16. Rupp, *Religion in England*, 241f and more generally 218-242.

17. See e.g. W.R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, The Bampton Lectures, 1899 (London: Methuen & Co.Ltd., 4th ed. 1918), 278-286; idem, *Studies of English Mystics* (London: John Murray, 1907), 124-172.

18. See esp. *Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness* (London: Methuen, rep. 1960).

19. See the modern introduction to Law by A. Keith Walker, *William Law: His Life and Thought* (London: SPCK, 1973). There is also a very useful introduction to Law's thought by John Booty and Austin Warren in the reprint of Law's *Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life* and *The Spirit of Love* in *The Classics of Western Spirituality*, Paul G. Stanwood ed. (London: SPCK, 1978). See also A.W. Hopkinson, *About William Law* (London: SPCK, 1948); also the classic nineteenth century study by J.H. Overton, *William Law: Nonjuror and Mystic* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1881); and more recently Stephen Hobhouse, *William Law and Eighteenth-Century Quakerism* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1927) and idem, *Selected Mystical Writings of William Law* (London: C.W. Daniel Co. Ltd., 1938); as well as the earlier studies by Spurgeon (see en.15) and Talon's 1948 study (see en.15). These studies have done much to recover the importance of Law and the mystical tradition.

20. *Mysticism*, 469.

21. Ibid., 472.

22. *Mysticism in Religion* (London: Rider & Co., 1969 edn.), 174.

23. *Studies of English Mystics*, 172.

24. R. Newton Flew, *The Idea of Perfection in Christian Theology* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), 304.

25. Spurgeon, *William Law and the Mystics*, 308.

26. John Booty, in his preface to William Law in *The Classics of Western Spirituality*, refers to Law's prophetic and reforming zeal. Austin Warren's introduction in the same volume is sympathetic but not entirely uncritical (p.19). See, Walker, *William Law*, chap.24 for a more guarded recommendation of Law.

27. See e.g. A.M. Allchin, "Anglican Spirituality", and Henry Chadwick, " Tradition, Fathers and Councils" in Sykes and Booty eds., *The Study of Anglicanism*, 104 and 315ff; Booty, preface to Law in *The Classics of Western Spirituality*; Talon, *William Law*, 97.

28. Louis Bouyer, *A History of Christian Spirituality*, vol.III *Orthodox Spirituality and Protestant and Anglican Spirituality* (London & Tunbridge Wells: Burns & Oates, 1968), 186.

29. See e.g. the endorsement of Bouyer's comment by W.J. Grisbrooke in his brief art. " The Nonjurors and William Law" in C. James, G Wainwright and E. Yarnold eds., *The Study of Spirituality* (London: SPCK, 1986), 452-454.

30. Martin Thornton art. "Later Protestant Spirituality", ibid, 437.

31. Martin Thornton, *English Spirituality: An outline of Ascetical Theology according to the English Pastoral Tradition* (London: SPCK, 1963), 282.

32. John R.H. Moorman, *The Anglican Spiritual Tradition* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1983), 134.

33. Paul Stanwood, in his biographical note to the volume on William Law in *The Classics of Western Spirituality*, suggests that Walker's recent study of Law, though "excellent and comprehensive for the facts of Law's life" is "inadequate in interpretation", 37. In a similar vein Rupp, *Religion in England*, refers to Walker's 'not very perceptive' study of Law, 242. However, Rupp's up-to-date and sharp introduction to Law is more in the historical reflective mode and does not really attempt a more rigorous systematic treatment. One of the best twentieth century critical appreciations of Law's theological effort was offered by R. Newton Flew in *The Idea of Perfection.*

34. This is the only reasonable conclusion to make from the brief remarks on Law made by Bouyer, Thornton, Grisbrooke, and Moorman. Alec Vidler, in his foreword to Walker's study, displays his own impatience with Law's writings.

35. See en.1.

36. Ibid., 147.

37. Allchin, "Anglican Spirituality", 318. In this respect we note another brief and illuminating study of Law by P. Grant, *The Literature of Mysticism in the Western Tradition* (London: Macmillan Press, 1983), 86-93. Grant treats Law as "a mystical author concerned to show through imagination the self's creative intuition" and as one whose writing "shows us with particular clarity the challenge posed for ego by faith", 86.

38. Law's *Three Letters to the Bishop of Bangor*, appear in *The Works of the Reverend William Law, M.A.* 9 vols. (London, 1762), vol.I. The 1892 reprint of these *Works* (privately rep. for G. Moreton), is the text used in this chapter. For purposes of citation, references will give full title of work (thereafter short title), followed by vol. and page number; e.g. *The Spirit of Love*, VIII: 3. A brief account of the nature of Hoadly's attack upon the Church can be found in the introduction to *William Law's Defence of Church Principles*, J.O. Nash and C. Gore, eds. (London: Griffith Farran & Co., 1893). Also useful is Walker, *William Law*, chap.2.

39. See, Walker ibid., 21-29.

40. *Bangorian Letters*, I: 168.

41. Ibid., 158.

42. Ibid., 38.

43. Ibid., 103, 139.

44. Ibid., 180.

45. Ibid., 90.

46. Ibid., 111.

47. Ibid., 169.

48. Ibid., 70.

49. See chap.4 of this thesis pp.95 and passim.

50. *Bangorian Letters*, I: 124, 195.

51. Ibid., 199.

52. Ibid., 62.

53. Ibid., 110.

54. Ibid., 28.

55. Ibid., 30.

56. Ibid., 77f.

57. See chap.4 of this thesis p.103.

58. *Bangorian Letters*, I: 79.

59. Full title, *A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life: adapted to the State and Condition of all orders of Christians.* The text used in this chapter is that appearing in The Ancient and Modern Library of Theological Literature (London: Griffith, Farran, Brown & Co., no date), vol.X.

60. See Walker, *William Law*, 66f.

61. *A Serious Call*, 13.

62. Ibid., 18.

63. Ibid., 277.

64. Ibid., 284.

65. Ibid., 47.

66. Ibid., 52.

67. Jaroslav Pelikan discusses Law's contribution to the eighteenth century effort to recover the centrality of practice in the definition of Christianity. See *The Christian Tradition*, V: 129, 152ff.

68. *A Serious Call*, 41.

69. Ibid., 188.

70. Ibid., 182.

71. Ibid., 20.

72. Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition*, V: 162, notes that the rescue of evangelical perfection from perfectionism required a "recognition that the divine principle of immanence, also the principle for the immanence of subjective experience, was the Holy Spirit". Pelikan thus observes that "the correlation of what 'experience teaches us' with what 'the Holy Spirit says' was a necessary counterpart of the new preoccupation with the soul of the individual and with

the morality of evangelical perfection".

73. Ibid., 129, 152. Grisbrooke, "The Nonjurors and William Law", completely misses this point when, in commenting upon *A Serious Call*, he states that "there is not much that is *specifically Christian* about the 'devout and holy life'", (my italics; 454).

74. *A Serious Call*, 99.

75. Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition*, V: 152.

76. See *A Practical Treatise upon Christian Perfection* (1726), III: 216; cf. *A Serious Call*, 227. Next to the Scriptures Law regarded Thomas à Kempis', *The Imitation of Christ*, as the best devotional book. See *Letters to a Lady inclined to enter into the Communion of the Church of Rome*, IX: 249.

77. *A Serious Call*, 145, 228.

78. *Letters to a Lady*, IX: 213-264.

79. Ibid., 236. Later in the same letter Law indicated that he regarded the theme of 'resignation to God' as the most important feature of his earlier *Serious Call*.

80. Ibid., 249.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid., 246.

83. Ibid., 237.

84. Ibid., 250.

85. Ibid., 238.

86. Ibid., 256.

87. See the important discussion by P. Grant, *Mysticism in the Western Tradition*, on Law's handling of the challenge posed for the ego by Christian faith, 86-93.

88. *Letters to a Lady*, IX: 234.

89. Ibid., 238.

90. See chap.6 of this thesis.

91. *Letters to a Lady*, IX: 245.

92. Ibid., 251.

93. Ibid., 223.

94. Ibid., 251.

95. Ibid., 252.

96. Ibid., 232.

97. Ibid., 231.

98. Ibid., 246.

99. Ibid., 264.

100. Ibid., 248.

101. Law wrote five works in the late 1730s: *A Demonstration of the Gross and Fundamental Errors of a late Book, called, A plain Account of the Nature and End of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper* (1737); *The Grounds and Reasons of Christian Regeneration, or, the New-Birth, Offered to the Consideration of Christians and Deists* (1739); *An Earnest and Serious Answer to Dr. Trapp's Discourse of the Folly, Sin, and Danger of being Righteous overmuch* (1740); *An Appeal to all that Doubt, or Disbelieve the Truths of the gospel, whether They be Deists, Arians, Socinians, or Nominal Christians. In which the true Grounds and reasons of the whole Christian Faith and Life are plainly and fully demonstrated* (1740); *Some Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp's late Reply* (1740). For Law's engagement with Jacob Boehme consult: Walker, *William Law*, chap.10; Rupp, *Religion in England*, 232-240. Rupp (234) points to Law's digression in his attack upon Hoadly's eucharistic doctrine [*Demonstration of Fundamental Errors* (1737)], as the first real indication of Law's new preoccupation with Boehme and the mystical tradition. In *Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp* (1740), Law expressly acknowledged his debt to Boehme and the whole mystical tradition, V: 204f.

102. *Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp*, VI: 206.

103. Ibid.; cf. *Christian Regeneration*, V: 167f.

104. Ibid., 160.

105. *Demonstration of Fundamental Errors*, V: 131.

106. In *Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp*, Law articulated a doctrine of enthusiasm as "the common Condition of human life in all its States, our prevailing Fire of Life", V:199. Atheists were 'dark Enthusiasts' but 'enthusiasm' was also operating where "a *worldly Spirit*, the *Schools, Criticism*, and *Controversy* have so dried, and deadened every Thing [in Scripture] into an outward Letter and figurative Expression", 205. It was clear from Law's argument that he felt Dr. Trapp belonged to this latter category of enthusiasm.

107. *An Appeal to all that Doubt*, VI: 92.

108. *Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp*, VI: 203.

109. *Demonstration of Fundamental Errors*, V: 11. Law's point was that a 'bare' literalistic understanding of the words of institution rendered unintelligible the 'chief articles' of salvation.

110. *Answer to Dr. Trapp's Discourse*, VI: 19; cf. *Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp*, VI: 200.

111. Ibid., 19.

112. See Hoyle, *The Edges of Augustanism*, chap.7.

113. Hoyle, ibid., states that "Byrom and Law belong to the few outside the French Enlightenment who felt the full force of Locke's

philosophy", 87.

114. See, *The Way to Divine Knowledge: Being several Dialogues between Humanus, Academicus, Rusticus and Theophilus* (1752), VII: 153.

115. Hoyle, *The Edges of Augustanism*, 101.

116. *The Way to Divine Knowledge*, VII: 150.

117. Ibid., 153.

118. Ibid., 151.

119. Ibid., 152.

120. *A Short but Sufficient Confutation of the Reverend Dr. Warburton's Projected Defence (As he calls it) of Christianity, in his Divine Legation of Moses* (1757), VIII: 212.

121. *Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp*, VI: 204.

122. The relationship between the thought of Law and Boehme has been discussed by most commentators on Law. Talon, *William Law*, points out that Law had an "intense need both of mystical knowledge and intellectual certainty, and was in quest of a 'system' which could answer at once the desires of his heart and the demands of his mind", 59. Boehme satisfied this need; however Talon notes Law's selective use of Boehme, 61ff. There is a suggestion implicit in Rupp's recent useful discussion of the subject, that the theme of 'energy' was a vital link between Law and Boehme. See *Religion in England*, 234. Hoyle, *The Edges of Augustanism*, notes that "the structure of Law's thought depended on his interpretation of Jacob Boehme. From the German mystic Law felt he could derive a scientifically based ideology", 83. Importantly Hoyle points to Law's philosophy as being "primarily derived from Boehme, as an instrument to sharpen his critique of latitudinarianism", though he goes on to note that this philosophy "became in Law's hands a vision of life as well as a method of reasoning", 115.

Austin, in his introduction to Law in *The Classics of Western Spirituality* sums up thus: "The general sense of commentaries on their [Law and Boehme] relationship would have it that Law selects from Boehme, omits the too esoteric, and gives a simplified version of the system; and I think this by and large true", 26. However Austin makes the pertinent observation that "the doctrine of Boehme, chiefly, when stripped of its alchemy and theosophy, is good Evangelical Protestant mysticism", 26. Austin concludes that in his judgement "Law professed and felt an indebtedness and a reverence for Boehme which was partly adventitious, and he attributed to Boehme much which he had already read in the earlier mystics but was earlier not ready to accept - his 'pride of the intellect', his logic powers, and his sheer English common sense had first to give way", 26. Law, for his part, though more than ready to acknowledge his debt to Boehme, was his 'own carver', unwilling to write upon a subject until he 'could call it my own'. See *Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp*, VI: 204; and *Demonstration of Fundamental Errors*, V: 100.

123. *Christian Regeneration*, V: 136.

124. This was how Law, in his later work, *The Spirit of Love*, expressed his intention in the *Appeal to all that Doubt*. See VIII: 77.

125. *Christian Regeneration*, V: 155

126. Law's adoption of Boehme's early seventeenth century alchemic symbolism made it almost inevitable that his work would be misunderstood. See Underhill, *Mysticism*, for a discussion of Boehme's alchemic conceptuality (140-148, 263, 469-472). Underhill refers to the triumph in the eighteenth century of the activist stream in mysticism as the Quietist movement faded. This in part accounts for the renewed interest in Boehme, whose difficult and obscure mystical vocabulary had by then also become antiquated. See also Rupp, *Religion in England*, 239f. Hoyle, *The Edges of Augustanism*, notes Law's anachronistic philosophy, and observes that his "militant and systematic thought has many advanced features which belie its surface obscurantism", 3. In this respect Hoyle later argues that the perpetuation by Law of a pre-Enlightenment structure for supporting the existence of an inward ground or imagination - i.e. by interpreting as metaphysical realties the microscopic correspondences of the previous century - gave rise to a dynamic theory of the 'little world of man' which prefigured Blake's later development of the concept of energy. See 144f.

127. *Appeal to all that Doubt*, VI: 90. Law thus concluded "Therefore, O Man! look well to thyself, and see what Birth thou art bringing forth, what Nature is growing up in Thee ...", 106. Consideration of the working of one's will exposed the evil within and led to the cry for mercy and regeneration in Christ. In an important sense Law's focus on interiority marked him out as a theologian of the *consciousness* as such. Thus Flew, *The Idea of Perfection*, states that Law "owes his influence primarily to his appeal to the conscience of mankind", 293. Hoyle, *The Edges of Augustanism*, observes: "The substitution of 'inward light' for 'the spacious firmament', is of the essence of Byrom and Law's critique of the religious consciousness of the English Enlightenment", 101. Cf. *Christian Regeneration*, V: 152: "Repentance is but a kind of Table-Talk, till we see so much of the Deformity of our inward Nature"; *Demonstration of Fundamental Errors*, V: 103.

128. *Demonstration of Fundamental Errors*, V: 94.

129. *Christian Regeneration*, V: 144.

130. Ibid., 143.

131. *Appeal to all that Doubt*, VI: 67, 117.

132. See Spurgeon, "William Law and the Mystics", 319; Flew, *The Idea of Perfection*, 306. Cf. *Christian Regeneration*, V: 144.

133. *The Way to Divine Knowledge*, VII: 171.

134. See e.g. *Appeal to all that Doubt*, where Law refers to thinking, willing and desire as qualities which in and of themselves are good. The problem arises when such qualities become separated and disunited: "And thus that some *Strength* and *Quality*, which in Creatures making a right use of their *own Will*, or *Self-motion*, becomes their *Goodness* and *Perfection*, doth in Creatures making a wrong Use of their Will, become their evil and mischievous Nature", VI: 68. It is thus a matter of the right use and direction of human capacities for reason, imagination and will.

135. *Christian Regeneration*, V: 172.

136. Ibid., 140ff.

137. *The Way to Divine Knowledge*, VII: 180.

138. See e.g. *Christian Regeneration*, V: 165; *Appeal to all that Doubt*, VI: 90, 103.

139. *Demonstration of Fundamental Errors*, V:76; *Christian Regeneration*, V: 145. Cf. *The Way to Divine Knowledge*, VII: 181f.

140. *Christian Regeneration*, V:156; cf. *Demonstration of Fundamental Errors*, V: 74f.

141. See e.g. *The Way to Divine Knowledge*, VII: 181; cf. Flew, *The Idea of Perfection*, 307.

142. Law developed the notion of the 'process' of Christ in relation to the economy of salvation. See *Appeal to all that Doubt*, VI: 144f, 149; *The Way to Divine Knowledge*, VII: 200; *The Spirit of Love*, VIII: 82-90, 145, 251. The historicity of the events involved in this process - birth, life, death, resurrection, ascension - was simply assumed. Law was concerned to look beyond such facts to their significance for human participation in the life of God. For further see Underhill, *Mysticism*, 118ff. Cf. Rupp, *Religion in England*, who argues that Law's attention to the 'Christ process' indicated a failure to attend to the true humanity of Christ, 237.
    Rupp's point is fair, but Law's originality ought not to be lost sight of. The presupposition of the 'Christ process' was, for Law, Christ's taking upon himself 'the Life of fallen Nature'. Furthermore, the overcoming of his sufferings and entitlement to be the saviour "could only consist in his acting in, and with a Spirit suitable to the first created State of perfect Man; that is, He must in his Spirit be as much above all *Good* and *Evil* of this fallen World, as the first Man was", VIII: 88. What then seems to mark the 'process' is Christ's "living wholly and solely to God". Presupposed here is the operation of the Holy Spirit. What law seems to have been pushing towards was a spirit-centred anthropology, though the context is the necessity of the sufferings of Christ *in* fallen humanity. The Holy Spirit is the raiser of humanity, of which Christ was the prototype.

143. This was implicit in Law's emphasis on Christian discipleship as an imitation of Christ's life. See above pp.215 and en.76. Cf. *Appeal to all that Doubt*, VI: 144f. Later in *Of Justification by Faith and Works. A Dialogue between a Methodist and a Churchman* (1760), the concepts of imitation and 'process' were nicely linked: "Nothing brings Death upon the old Man, but that one self-denying Process of Christ; Nothing gives life to the new Man, but the one Spirit of Christ born in it. This is the Gospel-Language from the Beginning to the End", IX: 251.

144. *Christian Regeneration*, V: 163.

145. *Demonstration of Fundamental Errors*, V: 82.

146. "Now as this *Hell, Serpent, Worm*, and *Death*, are all *within us*, rising up in the Forms and Essences of our fallen Soul; so our Redeemer, or Regenerator, whatever it be, must be also equally *within us*, and spring up from as great a Depth in *our Nature*". *Christian Regeneration*, V: 154, and generally 152-156.

147. *Demonstration of Fundamental Errors*, V: 87.

148. *Appeal to all that Doubt*, VI: 105.

149. *Christian Regeneration*, V: 142.

150. *Appeal to all that Doubt*, VI: 128.

151. Ibid., 47.

152. Ibid., 140.

153. *Christian Regeneration*, V: 152.

154. *Appeal to all that Doubt*, VI: 83.

155. *Christian Regeneration*, V: 161f.

156. *Demonstration of Fundamental Errors*, V: 11.

157. *Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp*, VI: 200.

158. Ibid., 169.

159. Ibid., 184.

160. Ibid.

161. Ibid., 186.

162. Ibid., 183.

163. Ibid., 169.

164. *Appeal to all that Doubt*, VI: 83.

165. Ibid.; cf. *Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp*, VI: 200.

166. Ibid., 23.

167. Ibid.

168. *Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp*, VI: 201.

169. Ibid.

170. *The Spirit of Love*, VIII: 1-133.

171. Ibid., 1-2.

172. Ibid., 61.

173. Ibid., 35.

174. Ibid., 10.

175. Ibid., 35.

176. Ibid., 4.

177. Ibid., 5.

178. Ibid., 4.

179. Ibid., 9.

180. Ibid., 37.

181. Ibid., 42.

182. Ibid., 42f, 55.

183. Ibid., 39.

184. Ibid., 55.

185. Ibid.

186. Ibid., 36.

187. Ibid., 66.

188. See Warren's introduction to William Law in *The Classics of Western Spirituality*, 30.

189. *The Spirit of Love*, VIII: 89f; cf. *Appeal to all that Doubt*, VI: 148.

190. Ibid., 76, 78.

191. Ibid., 74.

192. Ibid., 74f.

193. Ibid., 80, 84.

194. Ibid., 96.

195. Ibid., 83.

196. Ibid., 91.

197. Ibid., 92.

198. *Appeal to all that Doubt*, VI: 149.

199. *The Spirit of Love*, VIII: 81.

200. Ibid., 85.

201. Ibid., 83.

202. Ibid., 101.

203. Ibid., 103.

204. Ibid., 100.

205. Ibid., 10.

206. Ibid., 27 and more generally 22-31, for Law's discussion of the seven properties of nature in relation to the action of the Spirit of Love. "The *Spirit of Love* is a Spirit of *Nature* and *Life* ..", 23. For further see Walker, *William Law*, 102f, 190f, 195.

207. Ibid., 21.

208. Thus Law's purpose in employing the Boehmean notion of the properties of nature was to uncover the dynamics by which godly human life was generated from within ungodliness, i.e. from *within* rather than *outside* of human nature. See *The Spirit of Love*, VIII: 24, on the property of 'fire'. In more modern terms Law is concerned with the dynamics of existential transformation. To point to the confusions and logical difficulties of the structure of the properties is surely to miss the point. See Walker, *William Law*, 239.

209. *The Way to Divine Knowledge*, VII: 262.

210. Ibid., 190.

211. Thus in *The Spirit of Love*, Law argued that Deism was false, a "*fanatic* Product of pure Imagination.....because it quite disregards the *Nature* of Things, stands wholly upon a *supernatural* Ground" going above and contrary to the 'Powers of Nature', VIII: 93; cf. *Appeal to all that Doubt*: "If thou turnest in towards thyself, to live to thyself, to be happy in the Workings of an *own Will*, ...[thou] canst only have such a Life, Spirit and Blessing from God, as a *Thistle* has from the *Sun*", VI: 62.

    Furthermore, Law refused to make too strict a division between reason and imagination stating that the latter "signifies no distinct faculty from our reason, but only reason acting upon our *own ideas*". *The Case of Reason or Natural Religion, Fairly and Fully Stated. In Answer to a Book, entitled, Christianity as old as the Creation*, II: 133.

212. *Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp*, VI: 197.

213. *Appeal to all that Doubt*, VI: 134.

214. See above p.224.

215. *Appeal to all that Doubt*, VI: 72.

216. See the important discussion of Law's development of imagination and reason in Hoyle, *The Edges of Augustanism*, chap.12. Talon, *William Law*, notes Law's disparagement of reason but suggests that Coleridge's 'Reason' and Law's 'sensibility of the soul' or 'light of his heart', differ more in verbal expression than the reality they stand for, 26ff. See *Demonstration of Fundamental Errors*, V: 115-118. Law was clearly moving towards the rehabilitation of a fuller notion of reason which derived its visionary capacity from God himself.

217. *The Way to Divine Knowledge*, VII: 218.

218. *The Spirit of Love*, VIII: 128.

219. Ibid., 125ff.

220. Ibid., 131.

221. This is how Grant, *Mysticism in the Western Tradition* (93), interprets the self and ego in Law and Boethius.

222. *The Spirit of Love*, VIII: 132.

223. Thus in *Christian Regeneration*, Law writes : "I will grant you all *that* you can suppose, of the Goodness of God, and that no Creature will be finally lost, but what *Infinite Love* cannot save", V: 158.

224. *Animadversions upon Dr. Trapp*, VI: 197.

225. In chap.5 of this thesis, it was argued that Locke's way of knowledge presupposed that human beings gave form to truth without themselves being truth formed; see e.g. 119, 158f.

226. A favourite passage of Law was Acts 17.28: "In him we live and move and have our Being". God's 'all-in-allness' meant for Law "that he can give us nothing but himself, nor any Degree of Salvation, but in such Degree as he communicates something more of himself". See *Demonstration of Fundamental Errors*, V: 87.

227. See esp. *The Way to Divine Knowledge*, where Law, speaking through the mouth of John the simple shepherd, indicated that no scholar was needed to unravel the vision of the heavenly worship around the Throne of God in Revelation 4:2f. The vision did not belong to the category of riddle but rather of richness. In the vision the whole matter was apprehended "as if a Glance of the Majesty of Heaven had just passed by me". The whole thing was given and apprehended but only caught in 'a glance'. Genuine communication was assumed but the 'glance' required and invited further unfolding. See VII: 188.

228. Cf. Zinzendorf's effort in 1747 to transpose the Augsburg Confession into a 'creed of the heart' in *Twenty-One Discourses on the Augsburg Confession*. "The twenty-one discourses did not correspond to the 'summary of doctrines' in the first twenty-one articles of the confession, but recast both the sequence and the content of those articles". See Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition*, V: 125. Pelikan notes that the *Discourses* did not open with the doctrine of God as Trinity as the Augsburg Confession had "but with an examination of the 'vast difference' between doctrine and faith, between 'being a believer' and merely 'acknowledging a truth'".

229. *Appeal to all that Doubt*, VI: 82.

230. Ibid., 25.

231. Ibid., 62; cf. *The Way to Divine Knowledge*, VII: 218.

232. Thus John Booty observes of Law: "His plan of devotional exercises in *A Serious Call* may seem impossible given the conditions of our modern lives. But then, true devotion may seem impossible. *The Spirit of Love* concerns the motivation which makes the impossible more nearly possible". See *William Law, The Classics of Western Spirituality*, 5. Austin Warren, in the same volume, almost reverses this, observing that for Law "The higher stages [mysticism] presuppose the lower [asceticism]", 32.

Law recognized that 'the Masters of Morality and human Discipline' might 'tame and reform the outward Man' but it was only when the Spirit of God - 'the One Good and One Life' - had its birth in man "that the free genuine Works of Goodness flow forth with the Freedom of the Divine Life, wherewith the Spirit of God has made us free". In this condition one could do the "Works of Heaven with a cheerful and willing Mind". Such 'angelic Goodness' was thus done in freedom and joy. See *The Way to Divine Knowledge*, VII: 158.

233. *Appeal to all that Doubt*, VI: 82.

234. Ibid., 67.

235. Ibid., 61.

236. Ibid., 102.

237. Ibid., 82.

238. See the discussion by Hoyle, *The Edges of Augustanism*, chap.10

239. *Appeal to all that Doubt*, VI: 82.

240. Ibid., 83.

241. Ibid., 89: "Now, the one great Doctrine of the Christian Religion and which includes all the rest, is this, that *Adam*, by his Sin, *died* to the Kingdom of Heaven, or that the *Divine Life* extinguished in him; That he cannot be *redeemed*, or restored to this first *Divine Life*, but by having it kindled or regenerated in him by the Son and the Holy Spirit of God".

242. See e.g. *The Spirit of love*, VIII: 72f. In refuting the notion of wrath in God, Law states that "the Incarnation and Sufferings of Christ come from, and are given to us by the infinite *antecedent* Love of God for us, and are the gracious Effects of his own Love and Goodness towards us". Thus Law wants to talk about the mercy and benefits of Christ as "the *free antecedent* Gift of God Himself to us".

243. Law equates 'Perfection of Life' with the life of 'angelic Goodness' - a possibility for mankind by virtue of the new birth of Christ within and the arising of 'the heavenly angelic Nature'. See *The Way to Divine Knowledge*, VII: 154ff, 166.

244. *Appeal to all that Doubt*, VI: 57.

245. *Christian Regeneration*, V: 177.

246. *The Spirit of Love*, VIII: 129.

247. *Appeal to all that Doubt*, VI: 73.

248. Ibid., 82.

249. Ibid., 83.

250. Law was clearly operating within a tradition of Protestant aesthetics in which the writer understood himself or herself as an imitator of God's own creativity. The poet's model was the Bible which, by its very nature as God's word, stimulated rather than restricted the divine poet's highest flights. In this context *logos* realism authorized an abundance of free flowing expression. Law's prose represents a transposition of this understanding of poetry into prose. See Barbara K. Lewalski, *Protestant Poetics and the Seventeenth-Century Religious Lyric* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), esp. chap. 8 on John Donne.

This feature of Law's later mystical theology has been examined by Talon, *William Law*, 85-96. Cf. Rupp's more critical

comment, "It has sometimes been said that Law's prose improved in his later writings. There seems more evidence that it was spoiled by being Teutonized ..", *Religion in England*, 240.

251. "Study not therefore how to find fault with me, or to dislike the Words, or Manner of my *Style*, for it is the Style of Love and Zeal for your Salvation ...". *Demonstration of Fundamental Errors*, V: 84

252. *The Spirit of Love*, VIII: 108. Cf. Letter VI. "In Answer to a Question", IX: 161. In commenting upon Christ's words "If any Man will be my Disciple, let him deny himself, take up his Cross daily, and follow me", Law said that "to read this one single Line of Christ, is to be led into the open, full Truth of the whole Nature, both of the Fall and Redemption".

253. *The Spirit of Love*, VIII: 45.

254. Ibid., 105.

255. Ibid.

256. Ibid., 105f.

257. For Law, theology was the communication of the beauty of God's presence in the world and pre-eminently in humankind. It was correlated to the call of the Gospel to repentance and holiness of life in imitation of Christ. Stating the truth was completed in its performance in a virtuous habit of life. Yet such performance included the stating of the truth apprehended. Doctrine was directed to performance and belonged to a moment in that process. The purifying of the theological tradition thus contributed to the renewal of Christian discipleship. In more modern terms Law's mystical theology was nothing less than the theory of holy practice. For a useful recent discussion of descriptive and transformative functions of language in mystical awareness see Frederick J. Streng, "Language and Mystical Awareness" in Steven T. Kutz, ed., *Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis* (London: Sheldon Press, 1978), 150-157. Streng notes that "mystical language functions to recondition the expectations about the subjective factors in one's experience", 154.

258. Ibid., 41.

259. Ibid., 106.

260. Ibid., 108.

261. Ibid., 113.

262. *Address to the Clergy*, IX: 94.

263. Ibid., 100.

264. *A Serious Call*, 47.

265. Letter I to Mr. J. L, IX: 41.

266. Ibid., 110.

267. *Address to the Clergy*, IX: 41.

268. Ibid., 78f.

269. Ibid., 93.

270. Ibid., 48.

271. Ibid., 114ff.

272. Ibid., 117.

273. Ibid., 118.

274. Ibid.

275. Letter VI. "In Answer to a Question", IX: 160.

276. See e.g. *Appeal to all that Doubt*, VI: 147: "And to ascribe our Deliverance from Sin, or the Remission of our Sins more to the Life and *Actions*, than to the *Death* of Christ, or to his Death more than to his *Resurrection* and *Ascension*, is directly contrary to the plain Letter and Tenor of the Scripture, which speaks of *all these* Things as *jointly* qualifying our Lord to be the *all-sufficient* Redeemer of Mankind; and when speaking separately of any of them, ascribes the *same* Power, Efficacy, and redeeming Virtue to one as to the other".
Cf. "Every Part therefore of our Saviour's Character, or Process, has its full and *equal* Share in all that, which is said of him, as our *Peace* with God, our *Righteousness*, our *Justification*, our *Ransom*, our *Atonement*, our *Satisfaction*, our *Life* and new *Birth*; for all these different Expressions have no difference in Doctrine, but whether separately, or jointly taken, signify nothing else, but this one Thing, that he was the true and full *Destroyer* of all *the Works of the Devil* in Man, and the true Raiser of *a Divine Life, in all that died in Adam* .... Thus it was, and to this End, that 'God was in Christ Jesus' in his whole Process" (Letter IV. "In Answer to a Scruple", IX: 139). The co-inherence of all doctrine was the logic of Law's view that the 'sole End' of all doctrines was the imitation of Christ whose being co-inhered in God's (e.g. "Love is the Christ of God"). See, *Christian Perfection*, III: 216; The *Spirit of Prayer*, VIII: 108.

277. Letter VI. "In Answer to a Question", IX: 160f.

278. *Address to the Clergy*, IX: 72.

279. See chap.12 of this thesis on institutionality and belief.

280. *The Way to Divine Knowledge*, VII: 202.

281. *Appeal to all that Doubt*, VI: 66.

282. *The Spirit of Love*, VIII: 21. "Light and Love ... was made Flesh to redeem the fallen Humanity first, and after that the whole material System".

283. See Flew, *The Idea of Perfection*: "But the fact remains that nowhere is the thought of the *communio sanctorum* dwelt upon and drawn out as though it were congenial to the writer's [Law] mind", 304. Cf. Rupp, *Religion in England*, who refers to the absence in Law of what Wesley called 'social holiness', 237. The relationship between inner life and social vision continues to be

discussed by writers on mysticism. See e.g. Rufus Jones, *The Testimony of the Soul* (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1936), chap.3 "The Inner Life and the Social Order"; cf. R. Inge, *Outspoken Essays (First Series)* [London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1924], chap.9 "Mysticism and Institutionalism".

284. *The Way to Divine Knowledge*, VII: 182.

285. Ibid.

286. Ibid., 183.

287. *Christian Regeneration*, VI: 168.

288. *The Way to Divine Knowledge*, VII: 183.

CHAPTER EIGHT: SOME POST-ENLIGHTENMENT DEVELOPMENTS

1. Thus Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding* (1690) can be understood as an inquiry into the capacity of human beings for making reliable judgements in relation to that objective reality which presents itself to an essentially passive human receptor. See e.g. *Essay* Bk.II, chap.1, para.24 and 25; c.f. Bk.II, chap.9, para.1.

2. Kant's thoroughgoing 'turn to the subject' entailed not merely a modification of Locke's crude realism, but a radical disjunction between reality, and reality as assimilated by human beings. Human apprehension of reality was already shaped by the constructive activity of the human subject. Reality was both encountered and produced by human reason. Thus Kant argued that whilst reason must approach nature in order to be taught by it, "It must not, however, do so in the character of a pupil who listens to everything that the teacher chooses to say, but as an appointed judge who compels the witnesses to answer questions which he himself formulated". From Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N.K. Smith (London: Macmillan, 1933). In Kantian terms there can be no pure mediation of objective reality, reality is necessarily subjective; 'the thing-in-itself' is inaccessible as such. Cf. Thomas F. Torrance, *Theological Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 88f.

3. See Livingstone, *Modern Christian Thought*, 68, and more generally 63-76. According to Kant, belief in God is a rational postulate - a necessary transcendental condition of morality - based on the requirements of practical reason. Such belief operates as a regulative ideal for morality. Accordingly, the doctrines of Church faith are, properly understood, particular constructions designed to further the claims of the moral law, and have neither their source nor reference in anything beyond the human understanding. Cf. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, on "The Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason", 532-549.

4. For Kant symbolic anthropomorphism is legitimate because it concerns language only and not the object itself. Such language consists of statements about relations in which a concept of God remains *for us*, while God himself remains unknown. "The *symbolic* anthropomorphism, which Kant asserts as his position in his

analogous talk about God, has the very function of keeping God out of the world with the help of language". See Eberhard Jüngel, *God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the Theology of the Crucified One in the Dispute between Theism and Atheism*, trans., D.L. Guder (Grand Rapids, Michigan: W.B. Eerdmans Pub.,1983), 279, and his fuller discussion 261-281. Accordingly Jüngel states: "In the last resort Kant is a deist", 58.

5. See Livingston, *Modern Christian Thought*, chap.4.

6. Schleiermacher developed his analysis of religion in his programmatic work, *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers* (1799), trans. by John Oman (New York: Harper & Row Pub., 1958).

7. The following discussion of Coleridge on the articles tradition focuses on his later work, *Aids to Reflection in the formation of a manly character on the several grounds of prudence, morality and religion, illustrated by select passages from our elder divines, especially from Archbishop Leighton* (1825) as published in Bohn's Standard Library ed. of Coleridge's works as, *Aids to Reflection* and *The Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit*, to which are added His *Essay on Faith* and the *Book of Common Prayer* etc. (London & New York: George Bell & Sons, 1893). References will give title (*AR* - i.e. *Aids to Reflection*), and page number in above ed.

8. See *Essay on Faith*, ibid, 345, where 'Reason' is referred to as 'supersensual' and 'super-sensuous'; and cf. *AR*, 115, where Coleridge speaks of Reason as the 'Organ of *Wisdom*'. In this faculty human beings are capacitated for communion with God: "Whenever by self-subjection to this universal light, the will of the individual, the *particular* will, has become a will of reason, the man is regenerate: and reason is then the *spirit* of the regenerated man, whereby the person is capable of a quickening inter-communion with the Divine Spirit", (*AR*, 143). Reason in this respect had to be carefully identified in relation to understanding. See *AR*, 143-156: "On the Difference in Kind of Reason and the Understanding"; and cf. *Essay on Faith*, 341-349.

9. *Essay on Faith*, 346.

10. Ibid., 346ff.

11. For Coleridge what man was - "his proper *being* his truest *self, the man in* the man" - was nothing less than the inbreathed life of God (*AR*, 4). Thus, from Coleridge's point of view, human reason and will, when properly used, "were seen to correspond to the divine reason and will which were themselves trinitarian in form". See Daniel W. Hardy, "Created and Redeemed Sociality" in Gunton and Hardy eds., *On Being the Church.*

12. Engell, *The Creative Imagination*, 365.

13. Ibid., 362-366, for an account of how Coleridge attempted to reconcile his dynamic philosophy with traditional Christianity. Engell draws out the important parallel between the *logos* as 'communicative intellect in Man and Deity', as symbolised in the Scriptures and Christ, with the operation of the creative imagination. This of course is not surprising given Coleridge's attempt to interconnect *logos* as 'Reason' with the reasoning and willing activity in man. Cf. Coleridge's *Essay on Faith.*

14. Thus Coleridge notes that Reason "is a direct aspect of Truth, an inward beholding" (*AR*, 148), "the source of living and actual Truths" (*AR*, 115). Faith is not something different from, but the continuation of, reason beyond its own horizon. See J. Robert Barth, S.J., *Coleridge and Christian Doctrine* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), 50. From this position Coleridge understood the peculiar doctrines of the Christian faith "Reason in its highest form of Self-affirmation" (*AR*, xviii). However so to state the case was to move beyond the regulative ideas of reason in Kant. "Coleridge wished to assign ontological reality and validity to these (and later to other) ideas". See James D. Boulger, *Coleridge as Religious Thinker* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), 75ff. It was the 'Higher Reason' (i.e. 'than merely speculative reason'), that gave validity to Kant's merely regulative ideas, and could provide what Coleridge called 'a *Safety-lamp* for religious inquirers' (*AR*, 114), i.e. a way of affirming conventional orthodoxy, albeit from a practical point of view. See further Livingston, *Modern Christian Thought*, 87-96.

15. Thus in the *Biographia Literaria* Coleridge stated: "an IDEA, in the *highest* sense of that word, cannot be conveyed but by a *symbol*"; cited by Barth, *Coleridge and Christian Doctrine*, 21. This symbolising activity was the work of imagination, "that reconciling and mediatory power, which incorporating the Reason in Images of the Sense, and organizing (as it were) the flux of the Senses by the permanence and self-circling energies of the Reason, gives birth to a system of symbols, harmonious in themselves, and consubstantial with the truths, of which they are the conductors". [From *Stateman's Manual* (29) as cited in Engell, *The Creative Imagination*, 338]. The point here is that "Reason must be transformed into a symbolic, sensual language before it can inform other faculties or communicate truth" (Engell, ibid). Imagination gives reason a language and the ability to appear in concrete forms, yet since man's deepest apprehension of God and the spiritual life has no adequate expression then even the most vivid symbol "is only an approximation to that absolute *Union*, which the soul..... yearns after". (From the *Friend* quoted in Engell, ibid, 363). Thus symbolic expressions cannot but express "The *same* subject but with a *difference*" (*AR*, 136). Accordingly doctrine, and especially those peculiar doctrines of Christianity, genuinely mediate though never exhaust the truth symbolised. For further see chap.11 en.11 of this thesis.

16. Revealed truths could be safely believed insofar as one focussed on their practical and personal significance. See *AR*, 108, 114, 120; cf., Livingston, commenting on Coleridge in *Modern Christian Thought*: "Dogmas accepted by intellect or authority alone, and not evidenced by being lived in practice, are the very opposite of spiritual truths, for such truths are inextricably related to the moral Will", 91.

17. *AR*, 134.

18. *AR*, 120: "Revelation must have assured it [i.e. the truth realized], my Conscience required it - or in some way or other I must have an *interest* in this belief". Coleridge proceeds to discuss the doctrine of the Trinity in this light.

19. *AR*, 195. Here Coleridge focuses on the doctrine's existential and moral significance, avoiding needless controversy on original sin as a *consequence* of Adam's fall; see generally, 188-195.

20. *AR*, 108, 113.

21. *AR*, 113.

22. *AR*, 136.

23. *AR*, 231, where Coleridge cites from Jeremy Taylor's, *The Worthy Communicant*. Cf. Boulger, *Coleridge as Religious Thinker*, who refers to Coleridge's quest for the constitutive principles of human beings in the emotional, 'volitional' and intellectual domains, 92.

24. *AR*, 269.

25. Thus in the Preface to *AR*, Coleridge gives, as one of his reasons for writing, "To exhibit a full and consistent Scheme of the Christian dispensation, and more largely of all the *peculiar* doctrines of the Christian Faith ...", xviii.

26. *AR*, xviii.

27. *AR*, 210.

28. Coleridge here refers explicitly to 'the fundamental articles or essentials of Christian faith' (*AR*, 210); cf. the reference to 'fundamental truths' in *AR*, 158.

29. *AR*, 199.

30. *AR*, 142.

31. For Coleridge, the being and operation of the universe presupposed an antecedent unity - "a Universal Power, as the cause and pre-condition of the harmony of all particular Wholes" which, in relation to the existence of intelligent and self-conscious Beings - 'the great community of *Persons*' - meant a "One universal Presence, a One present to all and in all" (*AR*, 40f). Though for Coleridge God's oneness was Triune (*AR*, 116ff). From this derives Coleridge's conception of the oneness of truth, which leads him to assert the impossibility of contradiction between truth learned from special revelation and truth learned from one's own reflections. The source of all truth is God, thus there can be no religion which is not revealed (*AR*, 120). Thus when it comes to the peculiar doctrines of Christianity, they belong in scripture 'as organized parts of a great organic whole' (*AR*, 108). See further Barth, *Coleridge and Christian Doctrine*, 44ff; and Engell, *The Creative Imagination*, 362-366.

32. *AR*, 157.

33. *AR*, 158.

34. *AR*, 130.

35. *AR*, 130.

36. *AR*, 194f; cf. 206.

37. *AR*, 195.

38. *AR*, 198.

39. *AR*, 130.

40. *AR*, 170.

41. *AR*, 241; cf. 140, 168, 232.

42. *AR*, 130.

43. See *AR*, xvi, where Coleridge, in speaking of the Christian faith, included in parenthesis in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd eds.: "in which I include every article of belief and doctrine professed by the first Reformers in common". Cf., 102f, 130f; and cf. *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit* in same vol., where Coleridge outlines "the creed, or system of *credenda*, common to all the Fathers of the Reformation - overlooking, as non-essential, the differences between the several Reformed Churches", 292.

44. *AR*, 103.

45. This organic view belongs to Coleridge's understanding of the unity of all things in God (see above en.31), and the significance of linguistic symbolization in the communication of truth (see above en.15). Accordingly, Coleridge writes in the preface to *AR*, "For if words are not THINGS, they are LIVING POWERS, by which the things of most importance to mankind are actuated, combined and humanized", xix. Stephen Prickett comments about this verse that Coleridge is clearly thinking in terms of organic growth. Plato's ideas are dynamised. See *Romanticism and Religion: The Tradition of Coleridge and Wordsworth in the Victorian Church* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 30. Insofar as the Christian faith is for Coleridge 'the perfection of human intelligence' (*AR*, preface xvi.), it is clear that doctrine will be fundamentally organic discourse upon a single but highly differentiated subject. Thus Coleridge states: "I affirm that the article of the Trinity is Religion *is* Reason ... and that there neither is nor can be *any* Reasons, any Religion, but what is or *is an expansion of the Truth of the Trinity*" [last sequence my italics; cited in Engell, *The Creative Imagination*, 364].

46. *AR*, 198.

47. *AR*, 168; and cf. AR, 116ff and above en. 45.

48. *AR*, 210, 223.

49. *AR*, 209.

50. *AR*, 125.

51. *AR*, 247.

52. So Coleridge could state: "My inward Creed, as a Christian, remains without subtraction or addition as it stands in the Aids to Reflection .... My outward Creed is the Apostles as expanded in the Nicene" (cited in Barth, *Coleridge and Christian Doctrine*, 101). Cf. "The sublime and obtruse doctrines of Christian belief belong to the Church; but the faith of the individual, centered in his heart, is or may be collateral to them. Faith is subjective. I throw myself in adoration before God, acknowledge myself his creature - simple, weak, lost; and pray for help and pardon

through Jesus Christ; but when I rise from my knees, I discuss the doctrine of the Trinity as I would a problem in geometry; in the same temper of mind, I mean, not by the same process of reasoning, of course" (From Coleridge's Table Talk on 'Faith and Belief'; cited in Boulger, *Coleridge as Religious Thinker*, 199).

53. *AR*, 258ff.

54. Thus Bougler, *Coleridge as Religious Thinker*, refers to Coleridge's development of an "existential, empirical relationship between subjective consciousness and the historical facts of Christianity", 85. From a different angle Prickett, *Romanticism and Religion*, identifies Coleridge as one who looked at religion 'from within' and in this way uncovered the inner rationale of Christianity as a conjunction of facts and experience, 266.

55. Cf. *AR*, 269, where Coleridge criticises Descartes' mechanistic conceptions which produced "Nothingness and Phantom from the Plentitude of Reality".

56. Cf. Hardy, "Created and Redeemed Sociality", 23f. Cf. Prickett's criticism of the ascription to Coleridge of a 'constructivist' account of Christian truth. See *Romanticism and Religion*, 27.

57. *AR*, 1.

58. Simeon's major work was his *Horae Homileticae: or, Discourses now digested into one continued series, and forming a commentary upon every book of the Old and New Testament*, 21 vols. (London: Holdsworth & Ball, 1832). Refer also to A. Pollard and M. Hennell eds., *Charles Simeon 1759-1836: Essays Written in Commemoration of his Bi-Centenary by Members of the Evangelical Fellowship for Theological Literature*, (London: SPCK, 1959).

59. See *Horae Homileticae*, I: xx (preface); and cf. XIV: Sermon on "The Importance of the Leading Doctrines of the Gospel".

60. Ibid., XV: 312-321, on "Predestination Considered", where Simeon notes that though the doctrine is important, nevertheless for those who cannot yet receive it, he exhorts them to pursue those matters 'of primary and fundamental importance', 317; cf. XIX: 260f. Simeon also argued that the doctrine of assurance was not to be made an article necessary to salvation (XXI: 426).

61. Ibid., I: xxv (preface).

62. Ibid., I: xv (preface).

63. The quotation is from William Caries, ed., *Memories of the Life of the Rev. Charles Simeon* (Hatchard, 1848), 600; cited in *Evangelical Preaching: An Anthology of Sermons*, ed. with intro. by John Stott (Portland, Oregon: Multnomah Press, 1986), 35.

64. *Horae Homileticae*, I: xxiii (preface).

65. Ibid., e.g. sermons on "The Gospel Message", XII: 196-211 and XXI: 409-427; "Christ Crucified", XVI: 32-48; "The Churchman's Confession", XVI: 406-421.

66. Ibid., XIV: 163. Cf. XIX: 521: "the truth is that the way of salvation.... is very plain and simple: it is all comprehended in

these few words 'Faith working by love'".

67. See e.g. ibid., XIV: 64f, where union with Christ is said to be "the most sublime and most important doctrine of our holy religion..... the very cornerstone of religion". Cf. XVI: 32-48, sermon on the doctrine of Christ crucified; and XI: 221-225, "The Single Eye", where Simeon notes: "While Christianity *in general*, is allowed to be both good and necessary, there is scarcely any regard paid to its *particular*, and most distinguishing tenets. Its fundamental doctrines, such as original sin, justification by faith, regeneration by the Holy Spirit, are discarded as erroneous; and its most essential precepts of holiness and self-denial are ridiculed as preciseness and enthusiasm", 223.

68. Ibid., XVII: 82; and cf. XIV: 378-383.

69. Ibid., XII: 198.

70. Ibid., XIV: 136; and cf. XVII: 338f; XX: 478.

71. Ibid., XIV: 136.

72. See his four sermons on the Holy Spirit delivered before the University of Cambridge in ibid., XV: 209-264; and cf. his comment in relation to these sermons in I: xxvii (preface). The doctrine of the Holy Spirit was central. See Pollard and Hennell, *Charles Simeon*, 69.

73. Ibid., XVI: 92.

74. Ibid., XIX: 1.

75. Ibid., XX: 537f. Cf. Pollard and Hennell, *Charles Simeon*, 55.

76. Ibid., XIV: 437.

77. Ibid., XVI: 419.

78. Ibid., II: 274.

79. Ibid., II: 268. Simeon was eager to soften the application of the damnatory clauses of the Athanasian Creed which he considered an exception to the liturgy's moderation and candour. "The damnatory clauses should be understood only in reference to the doctrine affirmed, and not be extended to the parts which are adduced only in confirmation of it", 272. Thus if one believed that the doctrine of the Trinity was a 'fundamental article of the Christian faith', one could, said Simeon, 'without any breach of clarity' apply to that doctrine the damnatory clause.

80. Ibid.

81. The development of the 'School of Waterland' in the late eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century has been traced by Nockles, *Continuity and Change in Anglican High Churchmanship in Britain, 1792-1850.* Esp. see chap.2 "The Rule of Faith", for the significance of the principle of 'fundamentals' for the School of Waterland, and the way in which Nockles understands this principle to have been abandoned by the Tractarians.

82. Coleridge was critical of Paley's latitudinarianism and preoccupation with external evidences for Christianity. See AR, 232, 271ff.

83. See William Van Mildert, An *Inquiry into the General Principles of Scripture-Interpretation*, Bampton Lectures for 1814, 3rd. ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1831), esp. Sermon 5.

84. Ibid., 119.

85. Ibid., 117-127; and cf. his notes on pp.305-315 for Van Mildert's useful list of sources. For reference to Christian Priesthood see 125f.

86. Van Mildert, *Bampton Lectures*, 126.

87. Cf. Discussion in chap.1 p.20 of this thesis of the observation of the Roman Catholic Yves Congar that Catholic theology has, in recent times, focussed more on the formal authority for faith rather than its content. The declaration of Papal Infallibility in 1870 exemplified this development. Avis, *Anglicanism and the Christian Church*, notes that Palmer "departs from the mainstream of Anglican ecclesiology in not availing himself of the concept of fundamentals as the basis of unity", 178. Caution is required here. Palmer, in his appendix "On the Doctrine of Fundamentals", rejected the use of the term 'fundamentals' as leading to ambiguity. He did not doubt that a distinction was to be made between matters of faith and other doctrines, however he was critical of attempts "by human reasoning to weigh the *importance* of truths certainly revealed by Christ, relatively to each other ...[for] it is a necessary preliminary to any examination of the relative *importance* of doctrines, because Christian doctrines are so conatenated, that without a perfect view of all, it would be impossible even to attempt their comparison", 130. Thus behind the apparent rejection of the theory of fundamentals lay Palmer's fear of rationalism. It led him to reject unity in the faith as a visible mark of the Church of Christ, on the premise that it was too difficult an exercise to determine whether in fact any church actually maintained a unity in the orthodox faith (*Treatise on the Church of Christ*, vol.I, chap.5, sec.4). This of course led Palmer to reject that English tradition which had recognised the ecclesial status of the Nestorian and Monophysite churches by virtue of their adherence to the orthodox faith. They were "no part of the church of Christ, for .... the assumption that they hold what are called fundamental doctrines, and are therefore free from heresy, is founded on an uncertain and arbitrary distinction" (vol.I: 422).

However the matter was not quite so simple. Palmer could refer to the "most vital truths of Christianity" including the doctrines of the "Trinity, the real divinity of Jesus Christ, Original Sin, etc" (vol.II: 34). Later he spoke of those 'not many' doctrines which "constitute the very heart of the christian religion" (vol.II: 125). Here he referred to those doctrines "extending little beyond the Nicene faith, the right doctrine of the trinity, incarnation, and grace" (ibid.). Palmer eschewed the use of the 'term' fundamentals but had not forfeited a notion of what was fundamental. His criteria here were the sanction of Scripture and the consent of the Universal Church. This provided a bulwark against the threat of rationalism and it was carried through into his ecclesiology where a heavy investment was placed upon what Avis has referred to as the 'apostolic paradigm'. The fundamentals apologia was, to this extent, rejected. Such was

the authority of the Universal Church for Palmer that he could argue that "when all lawful conditions are observed, individuals are not justified in opposing their own opinion to the decree of the universal church" (vol.II: 125). Palmer did not envisage future universal decrees adding new articles of faith, though there was an element of truth in Newman's claim that Palmer's ecclesiological principle implied that the faith was capable of development. See "Palmer's View of Faith and Unity" in *Essays Historical and Critical*, vol.I: 212. The threat of rationalism led Palmer to reject the deployment of the fundamentals concept. However in doing so Palmer had developed a way of handling fundamentals discussion which had affinities with another strand in the high church tradition which could be identified with, among others, Herbert Thorndike (see Avis, *Anglicanism*, 147-150).

88. See above en.87. In chap.4 p.103 of this thesis it was shown how Henry Dodwell the elder (1641-1711) had developed a doctrine of the Bishop in the Church as the great fundamental for the securing of all other fundamentals. In such an ecclesiology the episcopal symbol operates as the bulwark against a rationalist reductionism in the faith.

89. See Louis Allen, *John Henry Newman and the Abbé Jager* (London & New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).

90. See esp. lectures 9 and 10 "On The Essentials of the Gospel".

91. Consult Newman's *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* (1864), esp. parts 5 and 6. From 1839 Newman saw the 'hitch' in the Anglican argument: "I could not prove that the Anglican communion was an integral part of the One Church, on the ground of its being Apostolic or Catholic, without reasoning in favour of what are commonly called the Roman corruptions; and I could not defend our separation from Rome without using arguments prejudicial to those great doctrines concerning our Lord, which are the very foundation of the Christian religion. The *Via Media* was an impossible idea ...", 148. The radical reworking of the doctrine of fundamentals that this view implied, became apparent in his 1843 sermon on "The Theory of Developments in Religious Doctrine" [in *Newman's University Sermons*, with intro. essays by D.M.MacKinnon and J.D.Holmes (London: SPCK, 1970), sermon 15.], and later in his *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (1845).

92. See e.g: Sykes, *Identity*, chap.5; Nicholas Lash, *Newman on Development: The Search for an Explanation in History* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1975); and more recently Stephen Thomas, *Newman on Heresy: The Anglican Writings* (Unpublished Ph.D thesis, Durham, 1988). In particular, Thomas' study of Newman contains important discussion on Newman's handling of orthodoxy and the fundamental articles tradition.

93. Sykes, *Identity*, 120.

94. "Dr Wiseman's Lectures on The Catholic Church", *The British Critic, Quarterly Theological Review, and Ecclesiastical Record*, XX (1836): 373-403. Here, 383.

95. See Tract 85 on "Scripture and Creed", in *Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects* (London, 1873), 125, 127f. Newman was familiar with Edward Hawkins' comment: "In general too the more fundamental the doctrine, (unless it were a point particularly controverted at the time) the more likely would it be

rather to be implied, than directly taught, in the writings of the apostles addressed to societies of Christians, instructed without doubt by previous oral communication in the more elementary articles of belief". See *A Dissertation Upon the Use and Importance of Unauthoritative Tradition, as an Introduction to the Christian Doctrines; Including the substance of a Sermon, Preached before the University of Oxford, May 31, 1818, Upon 2 Thess. II. 15.* (Oxford, 1819), 64.

96. See *The Via Media*, vol.I, Lecture 8, "The Indefectibility of the Church", esp. 199-207. Newman was unwilling to specify exactly when unity was lost: "The principle is clear, the fact obscure", 207. He seemed content to align himself with those who placed the onset of schism around the fourth or fifth centuries, 205-209. Cf. Allen, *Newman and the Abbé Jager*, 33.

97. *Via Media*, vol.I, Lecture 9 "On the Essentials of the Gospel" 217ff. The Nicene and Apostles Creed are said to be 'identical', the 'homoousion' being "merely an explanation of a great article of faith held from the first",227f. Cf. Allen, *Newman and the Abbé Jager*, 40, 44, 91f, 98. It seems that the authority of Nicea has a parallel for Newman in the Articles of Religion. However the issue is far from clear. Thomas, in *Newman on Heresy* (268), suggests that for Newman the 'homoousion' has the status of a 'true but not necessary' article of belief. This recalls John Frith's treatment of the doctrine of transubstantiation, the ecclesiological significance he gave to the issue, and the difficulty this imported into the notion of adiaphora. See chap.3 p.75 of this thesis. The category of 'true yet not necessary' is a category that emerges when ecclesiological issues dominate. In this context Thomas' suggestion makes sense of Newman's handling of the 'homoousion'. It would accordingly be a true expression of the Apostolic creed but not necessary for purposes of church communion. If the Nicene and Apostolic creeds were 'identical', Newman had in fact given himself a puzzle.

98. Cf. John Jebb, *Peculiar Character of the Church of England as distinguished both from other branches of the Reformation, and from the modern Church of Rome* (London: Rivingtons, 1939), 18.

99. Newman argued that his general line was taken from Stillingfleet upon Laud. He wished to avoid being identified with Chillingworth's avowedly Protestant formulation. To have taken Waterland's line might, he felt, have risked 'slipping between two stools', i.e. between Stillingfleet's and Waterland's basis for the theory. See Allen, *Newman and the Abbé Jager*, 154-162. Newman's comment upon Waterland in relation to Stillingfleet is revealing for there is no doubt that the former's careful analysis of the problem of fundamentals, if genuinely attended to by Newman, would have significantly modified the rigid line he had developed on fundamentals in the *Via Media*, at least insofar as Waterland was not so concerned, as Stillingfleet was, with the problem of infallibility. For further see chap.6 p.192 of this thesis.

100. Sykes in "Fundamentals", is correct to observe that the theory of fundamentals espoused by Newman and his later Anglican critics "preserved a style of theological argument which had ceased to be current in the European context", 241. However it would have been equally correct to point out that the theological problem of the fundamental article continued to evoke important discussion among Continental theologians who were anxious to integrate an older

style orthodoxy with newer insights on development and the history of doctrine. It was a matter both of theoretical and practical importance in relation to Church union schemes. The point is that Schleiermacher's undermining of his inherited fundamental articles tradition jostled with other more traditionalist ways of handling the tradition in the new context. Even Schleiermacher allowed room for an appeal to certain fundamental articles common to sixteenth century Protestantism. See below p.305f; and cf. chap.1 p.14 of this thesis. Valeske, *Hierarchia Veritatum*, points out that the matter was also relevant to Roman Catholics such as Matthias Scheeben, 93-102. Cf. Congar, *Diversity and Communion*, 119.

101. The analysis of Hooker (chap.3 pp.83-90) and Chillingworth (chap.4 p.98f) on this subject earlier in this thesis revealed a more dynamic handling of the tradition. This is important to note in view of the tendency to treat the tradition as *one thing without differentiation.* This is a fault in Thomas' fine study of Newman. Newman's theory is quickly identified with *the* classical theory of fundamentals, as if this was truly representative of the Anglican stance. Cf. Stanley L. Greenslade who, in comparing Hooker and Andrewes on fundamentals, tradition and authority, notes that while Andrewes 'followed Hooker' in finding place for the exercise of reason and judgement in discerning what is essential and what may be left as a matter of opinion, *"he looked backwards rather than forwards"* (my italics). See "The Authority of the Tradition of the Early Church in Early Anglican Thought", 25.

102. "Palmer's View of Faith and Unity" in *Essays Historical and Critical*, vol.I: 209f.

103. *The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman*, I. Kerr and T. Gornall S.J. eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), vol.VI: 352; and cf. Newman's important critique of Palmer's doctrine of the fundamentals in "Palmer's View of Faith and Unity", ibid., 179-221.

104. Prickett in *Romanticism and Religion*, refers to a Coleridge 'minority tradition', to which both Maurice and Newman were indebted; e.g. 3f, 190f. Earlier John Coulson in *Newman and the Common Tradition: A Study in the Language of Church and Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), developed the notion of a 'common tradition' linking the aforementioned.

105. Coulson, *Newman and the Common Tradition*, preface.

106 Ibid., chaps.1 and 2; and cf. above en.15. Newman's 1843 sermon "On the Theory of Developments in Religious Doctrine", exemplifies this conception.

107. See "On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into Revealed Religion" in *Essays Critical and Historical*, vol.I: 41. Cf. *Via Media*, I: 257; and Allen, *Newman and The Abbé Jager*, 89.

108. *Via Media*, I: 249-260.

109. See the discussion in Sykes, *Identity*, 109-112.

110. See *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (1845),chap.3, sec.3 [J.M. Cameron, ed. (Pelican Books, 1974), 198f].

111. For Newman this was a process of explication of that impression of the one truth that was held inwardly. To track the course of doctrinal development was to track the process by which the Church realised the truth of its own life: "Realizing is the very life of true developments; it is peculiar to the Church, and the justification of her definitions" (Sermon on Development, 337). Cf. Sykes, *Identity*, 112.

112. Sykes, *Identity*, 112.

113. This matter has been briefly discussed by Sykes, *Identity*, who, in agreeing with Lash states that "the argument about fundamentals is not overthrown by the argument of the Sermon" (302 n.36). Sykes points out that the chief change is Newman's modification of the 'crude realism' in which the traditional fundamentals apologia was often expressed. However Lash, *Newman on Development* (195 n.28), cites the view of Stern [*Bible et Tradition chez Newman: aux Origines de la Theorie du Development* (Paris, 1967)] that the theory of the fundamentals was overturned in Newman's 1843 Sermon on Development. Observing the stress on the unity of the object of faith, Stern had noted: "ainsi se trouvre renversé le système des 'articles fondamentaux', bâti sur i'hypothèse d'une Révélation composée d'un certain nombre de vérités distinctes les unes des autres", 185. Lash, in noting this conclusion, commented that he had found no evidence that the system of the 'fundamentals' was built upon Stern's hypothesis.

114. The disintegration of the *ecclesiological* significance of the argument over fundamentals is precisely what occurs when the crude faith-church conception which had been such a controversial feature of the theory, was rendered no longer tenable.

115. See Lash, *Newman on Development*, 131ff. Commenting on Newman's 1847 work to Perrone, Lash notes that "whereas previously the distinction between Episcopal and Prophetical Tradition was material as well as formal (the 'essential' doctrines being ascribed to the former, and the non-essential to the latter), now the distinction is simply formed, and the whole of revealed truth is presumed to be held in each form of tradition", 132.

116. *Essay on Development*, Cameron, 1845 ed., chap.III sec.3 (198f); cf. 1878 ed. chap.II, sec.3, subsec.2.

117. See *Essay on Development*, 1978 ed. (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1900), chap.I, sec.1, subsec.3; chap.I, sec.2, subsec.10; chap.7, sec.1, subsec.3. Cf. Sykes, *Identity*, 115.

118. Sykes, *Identity*, 118-122, 212.

119. "You must accept the whole or reject the whole; reduction does but enfeeble, and amputation mutilate". Cameron ed. (1845), 199 (chap.3, sec.3).

120. At the heart of the fundamentals apologia was a concern for doctrinal discrimination. The problem was discriminating in doctrine 'the greater from the less, the true from the false' [See Cameron, 1845 ed.,167, (chap.2 sec.2)]. These two kinds of distinctions are not the same. The fundamentals apologia concerned 'the greater from the less' in the interests of ecclesiological polemics. Newman, having resolved his ecclesiological loyalty, was concerned in the *Essay* with vindicating Roman developments, i.e. he was concerned with discriminating the true from the false.

What Newman required was a justified integrated hierarchy in belief. In the process of achieving this he was led to identify what he regarded as 'primary' or 'central' belief, [1978 ed.,199 (chap.3, sec.1)]. Such beliefs were *first* in the hierarchy. He also noted that developments in such doctrines (Trinity, Incarnation) "are mere portions of the original impression, and modes of representing it" (1978 ed., chap.1, sec.2, subsec.9). Is there not here a basis for regarding such belief as more central to faith by virtue of its relation to the original impression given by God? Might it not be that for Newman, developments *from* and developments *of* the central doctrines, whilst both worthy of belief, were not of the same order? It is certainly the kind of argument that the Anglican theory of fundamentals would have been amenable to, though in the context of the *Essay* it is not pursued. Cf. Lash, *Newman on Development*, 130f.

121. See *Essay on Development*, Cameron, 1845 ed., 176 (chap.2, sec.2); cf. 1878 ed., 89 (chap.2, sec.2, subsec.13).

122. *Via Media*, I: 223; and see also 232f and comments by Lash, *Newman on Development*, 196 n.35. Cf. *Essay*, 1878 ed., 68 (chap.2, sec.1, subsec.12).

123. Cf. *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, 227, wherein Newman speaks of the truths of the moral law, natural religion and the articles of the apostolical *depositum* as the 'boundary and foundation' for papal definitions. See esp. A *Letter addressed to his Grace the Duke of Norfolk on the occasion of Mr. Gladstone's recent Expostulation* (London: W. Pickering & Co., 1875), part 9, "The Vatican Definition", where Newman, on a number of occasions, speaks of the virtue of a 'wise and gentle minimism' in matters of faith.

124. For Newman "The development of Christian doctrine is indeed the story of the mental and spiritual growth of mankind ..." (Prickett, *Romanticism and Religion*, 172; cf.173).

125. Ibid., 195; cf. 173. See also *Apologia*, 226 on infallibility: "Its object is, and its effect also, not to enfeeble the freedom or vigour of human thought in religious speculation, but to *resist* and *control its extravagance" (my italics).*

126. Prickett, Romanticism and Religion, 196.

127. In a sense Newman's attempted reintegration of the articles tradition into the inner life of the Church reflects a return to his earlier ideal in which the mysteries of faith were most adequately safeguarded as they remained hidden in the bosom of the Church. Externalization of the faith into creeds and articles implied a distancing from the 'bosom of the church'. Thus in *The Arians of the Fourth Century* (1833), 5th. ed., (London: W. Pickering & Co., 1883) Newman argued that freedom from symbols and articles constituted 'the highest state of Christian communion', 36. The problem with the fundamentals apologia for Newman was its overreaching of the objective pole in faith. His return to the Roman Church meant for him a regaining of the tension between the faith in its objectivity and hiddenness. Cf. Thomas, *Newman on Heresy*, who notes that in the *Essay* orthodoxy and church are organically identified, 324.

128. Cf. Prickett, *Romanticism and Religion*: "Newman's idea of Christianity seems to grow according to an 'organic' principle so inflexible as to exclude the spontaneity we associate with human

growth", 165.

129. Thus Prickett, ibid, notes that for Coleridge, organic development was balanced by the principle of dialectic: "Not merely does tradition make the writer, but also, the writer, by being new, *re-makes* the tradition. What we mean by 'tradition' is this constant interaction of history and the individual who creates, even as he is created by it".

130. Ibid., 171, esp. Julius Hare's critique of Newman. Newman appears to envisage a kind of 'homogenous evolution' in doctrine. Thus Prickett notes: "He [Newman] makes it clear that he is writing about *individuation* of species - the process by which an organism strives to become ever more fully itself - not the evolution of species", 162. What of course is crucial in the former model is the capacity to exclude the modifying effects of historical contingency. See further Thomas, *Newman on Heresy*, 329ff, where it is shown how the problem of fixity and non-contingency re-emerges in Newman's thought.

131. See William Archer Butler, *Letters on the Development of Christian Doctrine, in Reply to Mr Newman's Essay*, T. Woodward, ed. (Dublin, 1850), 391.

132. See e.g. David Nicholls "Newman's Anglican Critics", *Anglican Theological Review* XLVII (1965): 377-395. Also Nockles, *Continuity and Change in Anglican High Churchmanship*, chap.2 esp. 163.

133. James Mozley's critique of Newman was important and enduring, being taken up in the twentieth century by Charles Gore in *The Holy Spirit and the Church* (London: John Murray, 1924), chap.7. Mozley argued that Newman had neglected the possibility of corruption by exaggeration, a danger whenever the two classes of doctrines, primitive Nicene and later Roman, were identified as a whole development. All great corruptions required time for the process was continuous, subtle and gradual. See "Newman on Development", *Christian Remembrancer* XIII (1847): 117-265, esp. 136-142, 260.

134. Frederick Denison Maurice, *The Epistle to the Hebrews, Being the Substance of Three Lectures with a Preface Containing a Review of Mr Newman's Theory of Development* (London: J.W. Parker, 1846).

135. See Prickett, *Romanticism and Religion*, chap.6, for discussion of these themes.

136. Ibid., 165ff, 173.

137. Thus when Newman wrote on the power of assimilation as a test of true development, a one-way osmotic process of corruption-avoidance is envisaged. Here facts and opinions "are gradually attracted to a new influence and subjected to a new sovereign. They are modified, laid fresh, thrust aside, as the case may be. A new element of order and composition has come among them; and its life is proved by this capacity of expansion, without disarrangement or dissolution" [Cameron, 1845 ed., 131 (chap.I, sec.3, subsec.5)]. Maurice, in his *Hebrews preface (xix)*, commented: "So far from the fact of such incorporation implying corruption, development implies incorporation".

138. Maurice, *Hebrews preface*, xliif, lxff.

139. *The Life of Frederick Denison Maurice Chiefly Told in His Own Letters*, Frederick Maurice ed., 2 vols. 2nd. ed. (London: Macmillan & Co.), I: 348.

140. Prickett, *Romanticism and Religion*, 126.

141. Thus Torben Christensen has observed that for Maurice, "The Church is simply mankind when it has surrendered its lies and falsehoods and attained a true knowledge of reality". See *The Divine Order: A Study in F.D. Maurice's Theology* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973), 254. In Maurice's view there were two possible forms of a universal society, 'this world' and 'the church', the latter element witnessing to humankind's common humanity in relation to God. For the recognition of the universality of this church element as constitutive of the human race it 'must be a *distinct* body'. The universality of God's relation to mankind is thus actualised through a particular societal ordering. See *The Kingdom of Christ*, 2nd. ed. 1842 rep. (London: James Clarke & Co, 1959), I: 260f.

142. Cf. e.g. Prickett, *Romanticism and Religion*: "The indwelling Spirit of Christ shapes and uses the corrupt form, but is not shaped by it. Everywhere man is subject to the divine dialectic: he cannot be content with a spiritual society that is not spiritual. Maurice's later Christian Socialism springs directly from this conviction", 142.

143. *Hebrews preface* (lxxxviii-xcix). Cf. *Life*, II: 517, 572, where Maurice refers to Pusey, Newman and the Tractarians as having missed the centre of faith and ground of Catholic unity. See also, *Kingdom of Christ*, I: 254ff.

144. *Kingdom of Christ*, II, chap.4, sec.2.

145. *Life*, I: 339.

146. Ibid., II: 494f; *Kingdom of Christ*, II: 4.

147. *Hebrews preface*, lxxxiif.

148. *Life*, II: 354.

149. See e.g. *Kingdom of Christ*, II: 3-7. Any hopes for a renewed and united Church required for Maurice an abandonment of all things save the 'old faith', the 'common faith of mankind'. He joined the Church of England precisely because it was not primarily bonded by opinion or certain doctrines. See *Life*, II: 317, 325, 375, 386, 391, 571, 573.

150. *Subscription no Bondage - or the Practical advantages afforded by the Thirty-Nine Articles as Guides in all Branches of Academical Education ....* by Rusticus (Oxford: J.H. Parker, 1835) 82-87. For reference to 'sinking' into a system see, *Kingdom of Christ*, II: 309. Cf. *Life*, I: 398; II: 154, 214, 392, 399, 604.

151. *Life*, II: 357.

152. *Kingdom of Christ*, I: 108-127, on 'Protestant Systems'; cf. *Life*, I: 261; II: 317, 575, 615.

153. See *Theological Essays*, 4th. ed. (London: Macmillan & Co., 1881), 377-408. Maurice perceived that in the acceptance of this doctrine as a fundamental article "the whole Gospel of God is set aside", 405. Maurice was "obliged to believe in an abyss of love which is deeper than the abyss of death", 406. Cf. *Life*, II: 169.

154. "To exhibit that truth [the Trinitarian name] not in notions but in a person has been and is the object of my life" (*Life*, II: 231).

155. "I look upon the language of scripture as the simplest, truest, most reasonable language of all that has ever been uttered ....." (*Hebrews preface*, xxxviii). Cf. Prickett, *Romanticism and Religion*, 167.

156. *Life*, II: 136f, 351.

157. Cited by Sykes, *Integrity*, 18 [from *The Kingdom of Christ* (1838 ed.), II: 338]. Cf. 1842 ed., II: 301, where Maurice refers to the English Reformers view of the Church as a 'Kingdom' focussed on a 'Person' rather than 'a system of dogmas'.

158. See the discussion of this feature of Maurice's theology in Sykes, *Integrity*, 16-20.

159. Cf. Daniel W. Hardy, "Theology through Philosophy" in D. Ford ed., *The Modern Theologians*, II: 30-71, for a discussion of the significance of principled common practice in the vision of English theology.

160. The importance of the concept of 'linkaging' for the successful operation of the fundamental articles tradition is developed in chap.12 of this thesis.

161. Refer to the discussion in chap.10 of this thesis on the problem of determining the impulse for the articles tradition in modern theology.

162. See *Lux Mundi: A Series of Studies in the Religion of the Incarnation* (1889), Charles Gore, ed. (London: John Murray, 1902), 190. Gore's essay in *Lux Mundi* entitled "The Holy Spirit and Inspiration", identified one of the most controversial issues of the day. For a lucid discussion of Gore's views on criticism and faith see "New Testament Criticism and Faith", *The Pilot* V (1901) 124-126, 153-154, 180-182, 209-211; cf. *The Basis of Angican Fellowship in Faith and Organization: An open letter to the Clergy of the Diocese of Oxford* (London: Mowbray & Co., Ltd., 1914).

163. For an account of the conflict in Anglicanism over the bible and creeds in the early decades of the twentieth century see Thomas A. Langford, *In Search of Foundations: English Theology 1900-1920* (Nashville, New York: Abingdon Press, 1969), chap.5.

164. See chap.1 of this thesis p.6 and en.28.

165. This received systematic exposition in Gardner's *Exploratio Evangelica* (1899). Gardner argued that in crtiticism of the creed one had to distinguish between the idea or general principle which "gives birth to the doctrine, and the expression which the doctrine finds in the intellectual sphere", 365. The idea is grounded in history and experience. The main principles of the

faith had a universal subjectivity. Permanence and continuity could be located in certain principles that cohered with common human experience. What was variable was the intellectual expression. Thus he could assert: "In so far as doctrine is the immediate expression in terms of intellect of the ultimate realities of religious experience, it remains true for all men and all time", 322. The doctrinal expression was the 'husk' to preserve the 'root principles of Christianity', 299.

166. See *Form and Content in the Christian Tradition* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1916), 2.

167. See e.g. ibid: "The' metaphysical' doctrines are inherently and absolutely unalterable ('permanent and unchangeable') in respect of their *content*; in respect of their *form*, they are *conditionally* unalterable, i.e. they cannot be altered unless and until some instrument, more perfectly adapted for describing the mutual relations of Reals, than was the old logic, is discovered", 148. This concession was purely theoretical, for in Williams' mind any alterations required the consent of the Universal Church! But cf. his further comment: "I dare say that in regard to these doctrines ['metaphysical' dogmas] there must always be a small margin of variation in the individual apprehension and assimilation of them", 150.

168. Ibid., 149ff.

169. *The Gospel of Freedom* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1912), 77.

170. Ibid., 78.

171. See Inge's essay, "The Person of Christ" in *Contentio Veritatis: Essays in Constructive Theology*, by six Tutors (London: John Murray, 1902), 87.

172. See T. Guy ed., *Liberal Evangelism: An Interpretation by Members of the Church of England* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1923), 36.

173. See e.g. Paul Tillich's comment that protestant Hegelianism and Catholic modernism "have interpreted religious language symbolically in order to dissolve its realistic meaning and to weaken its seriousness, its power, and its spiritual impact". *Systematic Theology*, combined vol., I: 266.

174. See chap.10 p.301f of this thesis for a discussion of the significance of Don Cupitt's idealism for articles of faith.

175. See discussion in text and en.1 & 2, at beginning of this chapter.

176. Refer to discussion in chap.10 of this thesis.

177. See Phillip Thomas, *The Lambeth Conferences and the Development of Anglican Ecclesiology, 1867-1978* (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Durham, 1982).

178. Thus Thomas, ibid., writes: "The ecumenical movement, long germinating in the seed-bed of co-operation on the mission fields of the nineteenth century, came to life at the 1910 International Missionary Conference in Edinburgh", 112.

179. See e.g. Henry R.T. Brandreth, *The Oecumenical Ideals of the Oxford Movement* (London: SPCK, 1947). Especially important in

this respect was Pusey's *Eirenicon* (1865) in which an appeal was made for reunion on the basis of the common dogmas shared by Rome and the Church of England. See Brandreth, chap.4. For F.D. Maurice the 'old creeds' constituted that necessary and sufficient dogmatic base for Christian unity. See Vidler, *The Theology of F. D. Maurice* (London: SCM, 1945), chap.8, "United Confession of the Name".

180. William Wake (1657-1737), Archbishop of Canterbury from 1716, deployed the fundamental articles apologetic as a strategy for reunion efforts with the Gallican Church, and as a lever in facilitating reconciliation between Continental Lutheran and Reformed churches. His effort is well documented and continues to invite discussion. The major work on Wake is Norman Sykes *William Wake: Archbishop of Canterbury 1657-1737*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957). See esp. "The Care of all the Churches: The Gallican Correspondence", I, chap.4; "The Care of all the Churches: The Union of Protestants", II, chap.6; and " False Doctrine, Heresy and Schism", II, chap.8. Consult also: Rupp, *Religion in England*, 76-85 for perceptive comments; Sykes, "Fundamentals", 238f; McAdoo, *The Unity of Anglicanism*, lecture II.

The fundamentals apologetic proved itself, as it had done in the seventeenth century, a useful strategy to *initiate* ecclesial dialogue but insufficient to secure genuine union. The problem was inherent in the distinction, for once having made this, Wake recognised that, "It is indeed a work of greater difficulty, not to say danger, to distinguish the essential articles of doctrine from the rest, in such wise that nothing in them is either superfluous or lacking; that nothing essential to salvation is omitted, nor anything non-essential included in the number of essentials ...(Sykes, *William Wake*, II: 262).

This matter had been important to the 'reasonable orthodoxy' of the famous 'Swiss triumvirate' with whom Wake was in close correspondence. See Rouse and Neill, *A History of the Ecumenical Movement*, I: 105-109. One of their number, Jean Alphonse Turrettini (1671-1737), had written in 1719 an important treatise on the issue of fundamentals with a dedicatory epistle to Wake. (Sykes, *William Wake*, II: 72f). What is significant but perhaps less well known is that Turrentini's fifty-six page preface was translated into English in 1720 under the title *Discourse on Fundamental Articles in Religion.* [Rep. with intro. Jared Sparks ed., *A Collection of Essays and Tracts in Theology*, 6 vols. (Boston, Mass.: 1823-1826), I: 3-91].

The efforts of Wake, Turrettini and colleagues to clarify the difficult borderline between things necessary and things indifferent was directed to the urgent practical issue of the reunion of the churches. Wake's deployment of a seemingly innocent theological strategy ultimately proved unsuccessful, a result to which political and ecclesiastical factors no doubt contributed (Sykes, *William Wake*, I: 298-302; II: 85f). However the tradition has shown itself to be anything but innocent, a fact which gives good grounds to reflect upon the pragmatics of using a strategy that in reality has proved highly volatile. Wake deployed the strategy as an 'olive branch' for the reconciliation of particular churches abroad but at home he seemed to view it more as a weapon to maintain the status quo against Dissenting churches and to suppress views that unsettled the received orthodoxy (Ibid., II: 167-187, 262ff; cf. Rupp's comments, *Religion in England*, 84f).

181. See Addendum VII, Gore's paper "On Unity with Diversity", in W. Frere, *Recollections of Malines* (London: Century Press, 1935), 119.

182. Ibid., 115.

183. Ibid. Gore considered that this list corresponded with Vincent of Lerins' formula. Cf. *The Holy Spirit and the Church*, 213 n.3, for another list by Gore of fundamentals, including the doctrines of the Deity of Christ, the Incarnation and the Holy Trinity and 'perhaps' the doctrines of the sacraments in general and the ministry and the resurrection.

184. H.N. Bate ed., *Faith and Order*, Proceedings of the World Conference, Lausanne, August 3-21, 1927 (London: SCM, 1927), 161-165.

185. This is the judgement of Stephen Neill in *The Church and Christian Union*, The Bampton Lectures 1964 (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), 383-387.

186. *Outspoken Essays: First Series* (London: Longmans, Green, 1919), 124.

187. *The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought*, The Hulsean Lectures 1925-1926 (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1926), 39f.

188. Ibid.

189. Ibid., 104f.

190. Ibid., 4.

191. Ibid., 33, 81. Cf. Langford, *In Search of Foundations*, 119ff.

192. See the discussion on consensus in chap.12 pp.369-371 of this thesis.

FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES:
The Logic of the Tradition

CHAPTER NINE: THE PLACEMENT OF THE TRADITION

1. Congar, *Diversity and Communion*, 116.

2. The significance of ecclesiology for inquiry into the nature and truth of Christianity is highlighted by Dietrich Ritschl, *The Logic of Theology: A brief Account of the Relationship Between Basic Concepts in Theology* (London: SCM, 1986). He writes: "Not to begin there [in ecclesiology] but in another field of regulative statements [for theology] would lead to an artificial disregard of the field in which theological seekers find themselves from the start. There, in the church, is the cognitive starting point for all theology", 126. Cf. Karl Rahner, *Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity* (London: Darton Longman & Todd, 1978), part 7 esp. 342-346.

3. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1928), 103.

4. Ibid., 106.

5. In Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, 2 vols. (London & New York: George Allen & Unwin, Macmillan; 1931), ecclesial mysticism was developed as a third type of Protestant ecclesiology alongside the institutional and sect types. The sociological character of so-called 'spiritual religion' overcame the Church-Christianity disjunction through radical internalisation. But this manoeuvre made it difficult to develop strong institutional social bonds. See vol.II: 745-746, 797-800.

6. The idea of the Church as 'the extension of the incarnation' has been important in the development of Anglican ecclesiology. It was developed in the early nineteenth century by the Roman theologian John Adam Mö hler: "Thus, the visible Church,....is the Son of God himself, everlastingly manifesting himself among men in a human form, perpetually renovated, and eternally young - the permanent incarnation of the same, as in Holy Writ, even the faithful, are called 'the Body of Christ'" [*Symbolism: or Exposition of the Doctrinal Differences between Catholics and protestants, as evidenced by their Symbolical Writings*, trans. J.B. Robertson, 2 vols. (London: Charles Dolman, 1843), I:6]. This idea of the Church as the permanent incarnation of Christ influenced the Tractarian Anglican Richard Wilberforce, who developed a triadic ecclesiology centred on the incarnation and flanked on either side by expositions of the doctrine of baptism and the eucharist. Wilberforce still wanted to talk about the sacraments as the 'extension of the incarnation' but from the perspective of the Church as the continuation of the life of Christ, the 'Pattern Man' for humanity. Not surprisingly Wilberforce developed a highly institutionalized and objectivist ecclesiology in response to a perceived rationalising of the faith. See *The Doctrine of the Incarnation of Jesus Christ, in its relation to mankind and the church* (Philadelphia: Hooker & Co., 1849), esp. chaps.1, 11, 13.

For an important discussion of Wilberforce's linking ecclesiology to Christology and the influence of Mö hler see Peter Sedgwick, *The Character of Christ: The Correlation of Moral Philosophy and Christology in Anglican Theology 1830-1870* (unpublished Ph.D, Durham, 1982), 167-210. The theme of the Church as the extension of the incarnation was taken up by Walter Locke in his essay, "The Church" in Charles Gore ed., *Lux Mundi*: "It [the Church] is a visible body, because it has in some sense to represent the Incarnate Lord", 275. Gore spoke of the incarnation as the presupposition for the Church, the latter's role being to "perpetuate the presence, and represent the will and mind, of Christ". See *The Church and the Ministry* (1886), rev. ed. (London: SPCK, 1936), 5; and chap.I generally.

7. See e.g. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Sanctorum Communio* (London: Collins, 1963). "Thus from the utmost isolation concrete community arises; for in the preaching of the love of God we hear of the communion which God has entered into with each and every man who in his utter loneliness knows that he is separated from God and his fellow-man, and who believes this message", 109. For Bonhoeffer ecclesia is the result of the right hearing of the call (cf. 108). Emphasis on the right hearing of the call means that the *sanctorum communio* "is continually falling, coming into existence once more" (147); a movement of repentance and faith in response to the Word of God.

8. For example, this rather static approach found expression in an Anglican view of ministry typified in Charles Gore's defence of Apostolic succession in *The Church and the Ministry*. The whole scheme became a rather mechanical affair. God's action, present in Christ, was carried on in the Church, through the appointed agents dispensing grace to the body. Some years later Michael Ramsey in *The Gospel and the Catholic Church*, attempted to overcome the rather static view implied in the notion of the Church as the extension of the incarnation. He developed a more dynamic ecclesiology in relation to the passion and resurrection of Christ. See esp. chap.I of his work p.5f.

9. Rahner, *Foundations of the Christian Faith*, 345. One of the merits of Bonhoeffer's pioneering effort bringing sociological analysis to bear upon the consideration of the doctrine of the Church, was precisely the manner in which his inherited 'call type' ecclesiology was integrated into a fuller view of Christianity's essential sociality, a matter referred to further on in this chapter.

10. See Edward Farley, *Ecclesial Man*, 182.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., 182f.

13. Ibid., 185.

14. Bonhoeffer, *Sanctorum Communio*, 160.

15. Ibid., 116. Cf. Bonhoeffer's statement: "Social community is in essence given with community with God. The latter is not without social community, nor is social community without community with God" [Cited in D. Hardy, "Created and Redeemed Sociality", 38; from E. Feil, *The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 8]. Commenting on this statement, Hardy

notes: "Bonhoeffer derives sociality directly from relationship to God; human sociality arises in (is given with) relationship with God - as a necessary part of it, not as a post facto addition to it".

16. In this respect Karl Barth speaks not of an *analogia entis* but of *analogia relationis*: "God is in relationship, and so too is the man created by Him. This is his divine likeness". *Church Dogmatics* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1960), III/2, 324. Human relationality is derived from the relationality which belongs to God's own being. Thus the relationship of Jesus to the disciples in John's Gospel Chap.17 "is not original, but an exact copy of the relationship in which he stands to the Father and the Father to Him" (III/2, 220). Human community is thus grounded in the community of God's own being, the former is intended to mirror the latter which is present in the former in hope (III/2, 324). Thus, to the extent that human life is created in correspondence with God's own being, the human being is not solitary but a being-in-relation. Cf. Farley, *Ecclesial Man*, who wants to speak of ecclesia in terms of a 'determinate intersubjectivity', in which intersubjectivity stands for the 'pre-given, socially structured consciousness' (95) presupposed in all acts of reciprocity and interpersonal relations. This focus, claims Farley "obviously eschews individualistic formulations of the situation of faith which interpret redemption wholly in psychological and existential terms", 175.

17. The theological difficulties that arise from an overemphasis on the generation of sociality from redemption, to the virtual exclusion of sociality given in creation, has been recently addressed by Hardy, "Created and Redeemed Sociality". Created sociality includes the region of the interpersonal within a larger web of interconnectedness embracing the multifaceted dimensions relevant to human beings. Perhaps the problem is that when the region of the interpersonal is developed specifically and fundamentally out of redemption, the relevance of the interpersonal is rather too quickly confined to a particular act (Christ) in a particular place (the church). The sociality relevant to creation as such is bypassed.

    This criticism might be more applicable to Farley than Barth. For Farley redemptive existence is pivotal. However in *Ecclesial Reflection* Farley comments without committing himself: "It may even be argued that human beings are intersubjective before they are subjective, that their very individuality has intersubjectivity as its ontological matrix", 350. Barth's development of the *analogia relationis* in terms of man's createdness provides a basis for a more 'general sociality', though some kind of further development would appear necessary if this promising start was to avoid the problem of the ultimate elimination of the significance of a created sociality present in the human condition as such. This can happen when the social transcendental is displaced in theology by the specific gift of God in Christ whose locus is the apostolicity of the Church. One result of this kind of specificity is that the world as such can only be treated as the arena upon which the work of the Church takes place.

18. Hardy, "Created and Redeemed Sociality", 21-47.

19. Ibid. The concept of reconstitution is the presupposition of the essay and emerges in discussion of the raising of the social transcendent to its true form (42), and in discussion of how human

social activity is involved in reconstituting (45) and transforming (46) itself. However in another essay, "Rationality, the Sciences and Theology" in G. Wainwright ed., *Keeping the Faith,* Hardy refers to Jesus as the "one in whom wisdom reconstituted the ways in which things and people in the world are 'placed' in space and time (through their being, life and death), their sociality, economy, polity, interpersonhood and communication", 296.

20. Hardy, "Rationality, the Sciences and Theology", 296.

21. Hardy, "Created and Redeemed Sociality", 42.

22. Farley, *Ecclesial Man*, refers to the attempt in one strand of contemporary Protestant theology, typified by H. Richard Niebuhr and Paul Lehmann, to rehabilitate ecclesiology by appealing to ecclesia as 'context' for theology and ethics. The fact that ecclesiality "tends to drop out of sight in the contextualist ethics which they inspired" (183), is not simply a failure of integration, as Farley seems to imply, but more particularly, it indicates the inadequacy of the concept of ecclesia as 'context'.

    The problem is not confined to Protestant theology. Karl Rahner, *Foundations of Christian Faith*, has maintained that ecclesiology does not represent the central truth of Christianity, "not the core of the ultimate truth of Christianity", 324. In the 'hierarchy of truths', the central realities for a Christian have to do with Jesus Christ crucified and risen, faith, love and trust. There are, it seems, truths of Christianity more fundamental than those that relate to the ecclesial nature of Christianity. However it is unclear how this position, developed in part to avoid any suggestion of a militant ecclesiology, coheres with Rahner's portrayal of Christianity as "the personal self-communication of the mystery of God" (347), a self-communication which can be successful for man whose essence is 'being orientated to God'. The human being is thus characterised as 'a being of interpersonal communication' (322, cf. 347), such that 'wherever there are human beings there is Church', 342. Thus it would seem that Christianity must be understood ecclesially if it is to be understood at all.

    Is there not an incipient individualism in Rahner's ecclesiology, overlain with more fully social categories? The problem is exposed in Rahner's rather telling comment: "The Church belongs to Christianity, *at least when Christianity really becomes conscious of itself* and when it intends to maintain the continuity of a real history of salvation and has to prolong this continuity", 347 (my italics). The apologetic motive here betrays Rahner's fundamentally individualistic starting point. At the least, the problem of Christianity's ecclesiality remains somewhat ambiguous. Cf., from a different angle, Fergus Kerr's critical remarks on Rahner's individualism and the difficulty of reconciling this with his ecclesiology. See *Theology After Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 10-14.

23. Farley, *Ecclesial Man*, 183ff.

24. *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity,* III.1.4.

25. Hardy, "Created and Redeemed Sociality", 42.

26. Ibid., 25; cf., 9.

27. Ibid., 44-47.

28. Thus the categories belong to the 'ordinary' materiality of the world. This includes the materiality of being bodily, living and dying in a place with others, as well as the mediums of exchange. See Hardy, "Rationality, the Sciences and Theology", 296f. Hardy's categories are general, others may be possible. The matter remains undetermined.

29. Hardy, "Created and Redeemed Sociality", 47.

30. This follows the general definition adopted by the American Lutheran theologian Jaroslav Pelikan: "What the church of Jesus Christ believes, teaches and confesses on the basis of the work of God: this is Christian doctrine"; *The Christian Tradition,* I:1. Cf. "Doctrine is what is believed, taught and confessed" (ibid., I:3), and his helpful discussion of the dynamic operating between the three elements in doctrine (1-7).

31. See David Tracy, *The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism* (London: SCM, 1981), 294 en.57.

32. Bernard Lonergan in *Method in Theology* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972), defines 'Church doctrines' as "the content of the Church's witness to Christ; they express the set of meanings and values that inform individual and collective Christian living" (311; cf. 327). He differentiates them, for example, from 'primary sources', 'methodological doctrine' and 'theological doctrines', the last named belonging to an academic discipline, "concerned to know and understand the Christian tradition and to further its development" (311). As Lonergan points out, however, 'theological doctrines' feed off Church doctrines, the latter being developed in this process (312f; 319-26). This dynamic entails a fuller systematic effort which "is concerned with promoting an understanding of the realities affirmed in ...doctrines" (335f; cf. 349). Accordingly Lonergan argues that all form of doctrine "aims at a clear and distinct affirmation of religious realities; its principal concern is the truth of such an affirmation; its concern to understand is limited to the clarity and distinctness of its affirmations. On the other hand, systematics aims at an understanding of the religious realities affirmed by doctrines" (349).

    The above suggests that sharp distinctions are difficult to sustain. Common to all doctrinal forms is the fact that they are taught (295) and are constitutive both of the individual Christian - "inasmuch as the doctrine is a set of meanings and values that inform his living, his knowing and his doing" (298) - and the Christian community, "for community exists inasmuch as there is a commonly accepted set of meanings and values shared by people in contact with one another" (298; cf. 319). From this perspective the permanent truth "is the meaning of the dogma [fundamental doctrine?] in the context in which it was defined"(325).

    The proposal regarding fundamental doctrines is more fluid than Lonergan's analysis of doctrine; one result being that the concept of fundamental doctrines is applicable to doctrine in its various forms and stages of development. However, to the extent that fundamental doctrines express the fullness of truth in a concentrated form, the domain of 'Church doctrines' would seem to be the closest parallel.

33. See Lonergan's discussion of the impact of successive differentiations of consciousness on the forms of theological discourse, ibid., Chap.12 esp. 302-305. The process of drawing

into explicit form, e.g. in 'Church doctrine' invites further exploration and understanding, the achievement of which requires further differentiations developed in systematics. In general the more intense and sustained is the opening of consciousness of faith, the greater the potential for understanding and the greater the possibility of good communications.

34. This would seem to be the implication of David Tracy's discussion of the "genre of 'doctrine'". Tracy states: "Doctrine *is* an abstraction from the concreteness of symbolic, metaphoric, poetic language..... Doctrines, as abstract, are relatively less adequate as expression than the originating metaphorical or symbolic language". *The Analogical Imagination*, 293 en.57. For further see Chapter 10 p.315f of this thesis.

35. Paul Tillich's systematic theology is particularly aimed at overcoming the problem of 'dead' symbols that have been reduced to merely cultural conventions and have lost their luminosity to divine reality. See chap.1 en.28, for remarks by Tillich on symbolic reductionism in modern theology.

36. The problem of believing as a source of social cohesion was briefly discussed towards the end of chap.8 of this thesis. It is addressed quite directly in chap.10.

37. See e.g. discussion in chap.3 on Jewel and Hooker; Chap.4 on Field, Laud and Stillingfleet; chap. 5 pp.149-154 on Locke; chap.6 pp.184-187, 191ff on Waterland; chap.7 pp.210f, 227f, 245-248, on Law; chap.8 esp. 263-269, on Newman.

38. See p.78f of this thesis.

39. This issue is faced by Dietrich Ritschl in *The Logic of Theology*. He refers to a hierarchy which is more akin to a balanced 'mobile' in which ecclesiology, anthropology, Christology and Trinitarian concerns coinhere, 119-123. Ritschl's starting point for theological discourse is ecclesiology (see en.2).

40. See for example the comments on Rahner's theology, en.22.

41. Ibid.

42. See chap.11 'Excursus:The Genre of Regulative Communication'.

CHAPTER TEN: THE PROBLEM OF CAPACITY

1. See pp.22-25.

2. See p.1f.

3. The relevance of the concepts 'post modernism' and 'late modernity' to theology in the late twentieth century is briefly discussed by David Ford, "Epilogue: Postmodernism and Postscript" in D. Ford ed., *The Modern Theologians*, II: 291-297.

4. The discussion of this problem draws from the analysis by Farley, *Ecclesial Man*, chap.1. Cf. idem, *Ecclesial Reflection*: "the

problem of truth is at one time the problem of how reality comes forth, occurs, is manifest .... When we shift the scene to theology, [this] first sense of truth turns out to be the problem of reality" (304f; and 301-308 more generally).

5. Farley, *Ecclesial Man*, 12.

6. Ibid., 12.

7. Thus e.g. Daniel W. Hardy and David Ford in *Jubilate: Theology in Praise* (London: Darton Longman & Todd, 1984), have identified the category of 'suspicion' in its common-sense and more sophisticated forms (Freud, Marx and Nietzsche) as one of the major threats to the praise of God in contemporary life. Suspicion of God as the object of human worship represents the logic of Feuerbach's reduction of the notion of God to that of merely human projection (11-13).

8. Farley, *Ecclesial Man*, 9-13.

9. Ibid., 15.

10. Ibid., 15.

11. This matter is taken up by Farley in *Ecclesial Reflection*, where the ambiguity relating to the subject matter of theology is said to be reducible to two major programmatic alternatives, "a thoroughgoing subjectivizing of theology's references and a linguistic therapeutic which would uncover the correlation between these references and their modes of availability", 181.

12. The significance of this view can be gauged by the various strategies developed to treat Christian doctrine. For example, when doctrines are treated as strategic and practical necessities within particular 'meaning systems' it is clear that such a manoeuvre is an attempt to *recover* the true significance of religious language from the notion of it being simply a collection of important conventions. This problem is treated more fully later in this chapter.

13. See pp.274-280.

14. Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine*, refers to a "contemporary antidoctrinalism", 77.

15. Langdon Gilkey in *Naming the Whirlwind: The Renewal of God Language* (Indianapolis, New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1969), refers to the 'antisymbolic' nature of modern consciousness; a product of a modern apprehension of the relativity of all things together with a correlative restriction of intelligible language to the immediately given, 51f.

16. Ford, *The Modern Theologians,* identifies "the impossibility of getting beyond language 'to reality'", as a feature of post-modernity (II:292). In fact, to put the problem in such a way is a peculiarly post-modern view. Cf. Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, for a brief but pertinent discussion of the task of finding common meaning (353-358). "As common meaning constitutes community, so divergent meaning divides it" (357). Common meaning calls for a 'common field of experience' and, "when that is lacking, people get out of touch" (356). For Lonergan it seems that the common field of experience is constituted by intellectual, moral and

religious conversion. Doctrines are the linguistic form of such conversion and can be thus constitutive of community (298).

17. In a recent useful discussion of the function of metaphor in religious language Soskice, "Theological Realism", refers to theological realists as "those who, while aware of the inability of any theological formulation to catch the divine realities, none the less accept that there *are* divine realities that theologians, however ham-fistedly, are trying to catch", 108. Against the background of the sense of loss or diminution of reality reference in contemporary Christendom the realist position is no longer a self-evident starting point in theology.

18. Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine*, 80.

19. See Bernard Lonergan, *Doctrinal Pluralism* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1971), who discusses the significance for doctrine of the shift from a classical to a contemporary culture. The important feature of classical propositional views of doctrine would seem to reside not only in the fact of ascribing doctrinal formulations an objective or ontological import *per se*, but also in the ascription of *particular* formulations as irreplaceable categories in which a one-to-one correspondence with reality is *secured*. This, as Lonergan points out, is no longer viable in a pluralistic culture. Failure to recognise this new context generates a naive realism which is easily transferred into the region of doctrine. Presumably a modified one-to-one correspondence might be argued for; a fact implicit in Lindbeck's recognition of the importance of recent contributions of the classical propositional type. It seems that Lindbeck, in distancing himself from classical propositionalism, is in fact desirous of disassociating his own position from cognitivist approaches to religion generally; see e.g. *The Nature of Doctrine*, 24.

    When *particular* formulations of faith are simply re-presented from the past as the locus of doctrine's divine-human correspondence, then such formulations have begun to function as doctrinal conventions; objective facts to be assented to and undergirded by a naive realism. This is perhaps what Farley has in mind in speaking of the distorting effects upon the Christian faith associated with 'a correspondence theory of truth' (*Ecclesial Reflection*, 181).

20. William s' traditionalist approach included an appeal to the Homoousian as an instance of an unalterable and irreversible form that would "most perfectly preserve the essential *content* till the end of time" (Sandy and Williams, *Form and Content in the Christian Tradition*, 32). Such forms had a universal significance; "they *are* the best terms which are ever likely to be hit upon by human beings", 33. William s' position was a prime example of Lonergan's depiction of a classical propositionalism being projected into a modern context. Such a view could easily degenerate into what has been termed conventional objectivism.

21. See chap.8, pp.269 of this thesis. Some of the manoeuvres possible within this view of doctrine to deal with the problem of doctrinal development have been inquired into as options relevant to Christianity's externality tradition. See Sykes, *Identity*, chap.9. Lindbeck, in *The Nature of Doctrine*, argues that the more sophisticated cognitivist theories of doctrine that include an experiential-expressivist dimension - as espoused by Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan - also fail to provide intelligible accounts

of doctrinal development (16-17). In this vein Lindbeck notes the tendency among both Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians to modify the classical propositional approach by distinguishing between a doctrine's ontological affirmations and the diverse conceptualities or formulations in which such affirmations can be expressed (80, 89 n.15, 90 n.19).

22. Hence the remark of William Archer Butler (in *Letters on the Development of Christian Doctrine*), in response to Newman's *Essay on Development*, that "Christianity was born full-grown...nothing could take His [God's] Dispensation by surprise", 391.

23. See e.g. chap.5 pp.156f.

24. See e.g. chap.6 pp.168-172.

25. See e.g. chap.8. pp.267-269, 272-274.

26. See chap.8 en.88.

27. In this respect it is indeed an irony of the fundamentals tradition that George Bull in his *Defence of the Nicene Faith* employed the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental doctrines to *exonerate* Origen's orthodoxy and thus strengthen Bull's argument for a 'patristic consensus' in the orthodox faith. Here the fundamentals apologia was turned on its head so to speak. The content of faith was no longer determined according to an assumed patristic consensus but rather an assumed orthodoxy was employed to secure traditional criteriology! There was of course an inevitable circularity in the argument but it was heavily slanted, nonetheless, towards the past. Cf. chap.2 en.11 and chap.4 en.119.

28. Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine*, chap.1. The experiential-expressive dimension of religion "interprets doctrines as non-informative and non-discursive symbols of inner feelings, attitudes, or existential orientations. This approach highlights the resemblances of religions to aesthetic enterprises and is particularly congenial to the liberal theologies influenced by the Continental developments that began with Schleiermacher", 16.

29. Ibid., where Lindbeck notes that according to the experiential-expressivist view doctrine is "not crucial for religious agreement or disagreement, because these are constituted by harmony or conflict in underlying feelings, attitudes, existential orientations, or practices, rather than by what happens on the level of symbolic (including doctrinal) objectifications", 17. Thus doctrines can alter without change of meaning and conversely religiously significant meanings can vary while doctrines remain the same. Clearly the implication here is that doctrine is of second order significance. This disjunction between doctrine and experience is widespread, a feature of what Lindbeck terms the 'psychosocial context'. It is common in theology. For further discussion see chap.11 pp.314-316 and esp. en.7.

30. To the extent that theology is made to rest upon human experience and reason, as in Lindbeck's notion of experiential-expressivism, a distorted understanding of doctrine as interpretation emerges. Cf. Hardy, "Theology through Philosophy", where he speaks of 'a new kind of realism' in which human beings engage in 'interpreting things in relation to God', 38; an activity which displaces a realism in which the activity of human

judgement was intended to recall things to their true quality as given by God. Doctrine as 'interpretation' becomes a highly restricted activity within the 'new realism' spoken of by Hardy. Within this new schema there is a strong dichotomy between the Christ-event and subsequent interpretations of its meaning which can not be part of the event itself, 58.

31. See Hardy, ibid., 54-59, for a discussion of John Hick in this regard. The same might be said of Maurice Wiles and to a lesser extent Bernard Lonergan. See further Hardy, "Rationality, the Sciences and Theology", 295, 308 n.36.

32. Soskice, "Theological Realism", 108.

33. Don Cupitt, *Life Lines* (London: SCM, 1986); 101.

34. Ibid., 3, 12.

35. Cupitt, *Taking leave of God* (London: SCM, 1986), 9.

36. These features of Cupitt's thought have been highlighted in an overview and critique of Cupitt's thought by Hardy, "Theology through Philosophy" in Ford ed., *The Modern Theologians*, vol.II: 59-65.

37. *Taking Leave of God*, 93.

38. Ibid.

39. Cupitt in *Lifelines* catalogues an array of different emergent forms of Christianity including mythical, 'doctrinal', 'obedientary', 'designer', and 'metaphysical' realism. Each successive transformation to a new level of spiritual understanding approximates to a new stage in the human life-cycle and implies a new understanding of the nature of religious truth. Cupitt understands the development of Christianity as a move from objectification of God 'out there' to a radical internalization (13-16). Articles, on this account, operate as symbolic language for personal human concerns and are, as such, expressive of autonomous human freedom.

40. Hardy in "Theology through Philosophy" notes that for Cupitt, "God is present through the willing of the good", 64. Doctrines on this account represent the sum of human moral aspirations.

41. Cupitt refers to this as 'doctrinal realism' which can develop into 'obedientary realism', "a protestant, moralized and internalized version of doctrinal realism" (*Life Lines*, 69).

42. Cupitt, *Taking Leave of God*, 8.

43. Lindbeck, in *The Nature of Doctrine*, chap.1, refers to three familiar theological theories of religion and doctrine; cognitive-propositional, symbolic or experiential-expressivist, and a regulative or rule theory.

44. Lindbeck himself seems to acknowledge this, by identifying both propositional and *modified* propositional theories (79f), and by recognizing the significance of two-dimensional theories of doctrine espoused by Rahner and Lonergan which combine both cognitive and experiential elements, 16f. For purposes of his analysis these variations are subsumed under the above basic

threefold typology. Critics of Lindbeck have likewise pointed to the difficulty of fitting the variety of ways of handling doctrine into the neat categories suggested by Lindbeck. See e.g. David Tracy's criticism, that Lindbeck has failed to take account of the major and varied developments that have taken place *within* Lindbeck's 'experiential-expressivist' category. Tracy rejects this category as inappropriate for the liberal tradition in which he (Tracy) stands. See David Tracy, "Lindbeck's New Program for Theology: A Reflection", *The Thomist* XLIX/3 (July 1985): 460-472, esp. 460-466.

45. When this dynamic relation between Word of God and the articles tradition is refused or blocked the tradition itself is no longer able to operate as a response to the Word of God in its freshness and vitality. This was the basis for Barth's critique of the fundamental articles tradition of Protestant orthodoxy (*Church Dogmatics*, I/ 2, 863-866).

46. Torrance, *Theological Science*, 173.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid., 174.

49. Hans Urs Von Balthasar, in *The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics*, vol.I 'Seeing the Form' (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1982), speaks of faith as "the light of God becoming luminous in man, for, in his triune intimacy, God is known only by God", I: 156.

50. Ibid., 576. Cf. 153, where, at "the very centre of Christian revelation - the Word of God became flesh ..... we have before us a genuine, 'legible' form, and not merely a sign or an assemblage of signs".

51. Remark made by Donald Mackinnon in his intro. (p.4) to the English ed. of Von Balthasar's *Engagement with God*, trans. J. Halliburton (London: SPCK, 1975).

52. Von Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord*: "the word of scripture and the form of the sacraments, both administered by the Church, are not only light from the light of Christ, but form from the form of Christ" (I: 252).

53. Ibid., 242. Cf. Von Balthasar's statement that the dogma that Jesus Christ is the only Son of the Father "expresses the fundamental form of Christian faith" (I: 591). The formulation of this dogma in Chalcedon represents "a point of departure, a methodological and heuristic principle for a Christology that must be developed from it" (I: 77). The unfinished nature of this task ultimately derives from the fact that God "does not primarily communicate 'truths' about himself, but rather bestows *himself* as absolute truth and love" (I: 166).

54. Thus Barth regards simplicity and plenitude as the characteristic relations of the Lord of Glory (*Church Dogmatics*, II/I, 327). For further discussion of Barth refer to chap.11 of this thesis in relation to 'The appeal of simplicity'. For Von Balthasar God's gift of himself to the world in Jesus Christ is the locus of God's plenitude such that "the image of this reality remains for all historical time open to ever deeper comprehension and penetration" (*Glory of the Lord*, I: 552). But this plenitude

is simplicity itself: "for eyes that have been illumined by faith, the image in its totality is simple and visible at a glance ('You have the anointing of the Spirit and you know everything', I Jn. 2.20), and the superabundant fullness is not a threat but rather the description of this simplicity" (ibid.). It is the fullness of the fundamental form of God's being as mediated in the Scriptual image that gives rise to "the endless range of interpretability stemming from it.." (ibid.). Torrance refers to the Truth of God as it is in Jesus as being "so full and rich and inexhaustible that the more we know of it the more we realize the ineffable and infinite fullness of its reality which defies complete disclosure within the limits of our experience". See *Theological Science*, 149. Thus Truth as mystery 'expresses the objective depth of rationality', 150.

55. Chap.3 p.83-90 and esp. 90.

56. Chap.2 p.56f and en.26 & 27.

57. Chap.7 pp.238-245.

58. 'Pure doctrine' is thus not a possession but a regulative ideal, its attainment eludes us. See e.g. Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, II/I, 800ff. Again, it is the eschatological nature of doctrine that Barth saw as being forfeited in the fundamental articles tradition insofar as the locus of the tradition's purity was located in a past formulation. Similarly for Von Balthasar, dogmatic purity was not achieved by reduction to a few 'fundamental thoughts' but was demonstrated in the ongoing development of a multiplicity of forms which sought to make the primal form visible (*The Glory of the Lord*, I: 552ff). From a somewhat different angle see the discussion in chap.3 pp.76-78 of this thesis on the concept of'pure doctrine'.

59. Thus e.g. Barth in *Church Dogmatics*, writes: "In dogmatics, therefore, traditional notions as to what is fundamental or not, central or peripheral, more or less important, have to be suspended, so that they can become a matter for vital new decision by the Word of God itself" (I/2, 865). Cf. Torrance, *Theological Science*: "Real theological thinking is thus alive and on the move under the control of the Truth that makes it free from imprisonment in timeless logical connections" (174; and cf. 145, 196).

60. See e.g. Thiemann, *Revelation and Theology*, for a critique of Torrance in this and other respects (chap.2). Cf. Paul Avis, *The Methods of Modern Theology: The Dream of Reason* (Basingstoke, England: Marshall Pickering, 1986), on Barth (49ff) and Torrance (210f). See also Hardy on Torrance in "Theology Through Philosophy" in *The Modern Theologians* I, esp. 85-89.

61. Thus e.g. Jaroslav Pelikan, in *The Christian Tradition*, III: 303-307, points to the significance of personal religious experience as an epistemological principle in theology for a number of thirteenth century writers but especially Bonaventure in *The Journey of the Mind to God.* This experiential tradition overlaps with what Sykes in *Identity*, chap.3 calls " The Tradition of Inwardness", with its roots in the Old Testament. Sykes refers to Christianity's 'internal or experiential aspect', 37.

62. See Brian Gerrish, *The Old Protestantism and the New*, 197-205.

63. Ibid., 203.

64. Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, 50.

65. Ibid., 5. Claude Welch, *Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, 2 vols. (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1972), substitutes 'determination' for 'modification' (I:65) to emphasise, it seems, that piety for Schleiermacher, "is never apart from its determination by the 'infinite' or the 'whole' (*Speeches*) or the 'whence' (*Christian Faith*)" (I:67). Cf. *The Christian Faith*, 16.

66. *The Christian Faith*, 125; cf. 'image' (56), 'influence' (49).

67. Thus in his earlier *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultural Despisers* (1799), trans. J. Oman (New York: Harper & Row, 1958) Schleiermacher criticised those who identified the peculiar element in religion with "a definite quantity of religious matter", 218. For those who determined their religion in this way "there is a standing quarrel about essentials and non-essentials. They do not know what to separate as free and accidental..", 220. This issue re-emerged in *The Christian Faith*, though by relating dogmatics to "the fundamental inner act of Christian piety" (121), Schleiermacher had displaced rather than rejected the fundamental articles tradition in Protestantism.

68. See *The Christian Faith*, 112-118.

69. Ibid., 114.

70. See e.g. chap.3 on Jewel and Hooker.

71. *The Christian Faith*, 66.

72. Ibid., 67.

73. Ibid., 56; cf. above en. 67.

74. Ibid., 121.

75. Ibid., 78.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid., 76.

78. See e.g. Welch, *Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, chap.3 for a useful discussion of Schleiermacher and the direction in which his thought was subsequently taken; and also Sykes, *Identity*, chap.4, who argues for the 'lasting significance' of Schleiermacher's '*methodological* contribution to theology' in essence of Christianity definition.

79. *The Christian Faith*, 92.

80. Ibid., 119; and cf. 78.

81. Ibid., 81.

82. Ibid., 77.

83. Ibid., 81, 83, 85, 98.

84. Welch, *Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, notes that for Schleiermacher theological statements "are descriptions of the self in its awareness of dependence, and therefore indirectly, or at a second level, proper references to God as present in that relationship. They reflect the self's viewing of God, the actual disclosure of God in the self's experience of itself, but now in the form of dogmatic statements", I: 79.

85. Ibid., 78.

86. *The Christian Faith*, 81. See further Brian Gerrish, "Friedrick Schleiermacher" in Ninian Smart et al. eds., *Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West*, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), vol.I esp. 145-149.

87. From another point of view it is not at all clear how Schleiermacher's conception of doctrine moved beyond a concern simply for the pragmatics of human communication. See Schleiermacher's discussion on the impulse for 'the collection of dogmatic propositions', *The Christian Faith*, 85-88. In the movement from preaching to teaching the didactic form of expression functions to bring 'the idea in its clarity home to the consciousness', and/or isolates 'more definitely the immediate religious self-consciousness'. The greater the precision and independence achieved here, the more accessible becomes the preached message - i.e. there is a freeing from the conflict and ambiguity of metaphor. As a result doctrine becomes "the most important means to promote the living circulation of the religious consciousness", 87. Dogmatic theology is thus the science which systematizes the doctrine in circulation at any one time (88), and thus helps to clear up and prevent 'misconceptions' in communication (120). This is important but it seems that Schleiermacher has no means to conceive of doctrine as a *required* human response to God's redeeming presence in Christ. Doctrine springs from piety and only indirectly can it be a response to God.

88. Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition*, vol V. chap.3.

89. See Chap.4 p.108f.

90. For Hammond see chap.4 p.109f.

91. See *The Liberty of Prophesying* in *Works*, VII: 442.

92. See chap.8 pp.257-262.

93. Welch, *Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, I: 60. Thus for Law it was a question of learning to 'possess' everything that one believed (Chap.7 p.227); for Coleridge of refounding human participation in the Divine.

94. For example, in Gardner's *Exploratio Evangelica*, the doctrines of faith are founded upon human experience of the Divine and are slanted in the direction of practical Christianity. However the notion of faith's cognitive component operating as an enrichment and enlargement of faith is ignored. Gardner is primarily concerned in a critique of the doctrinal overlay upon 'the root principles of Christianity'. See chaps.4-6, 25, 27-28. Cf. chap. 8 en.165 of this thesis.

95. By finding a place for an enriched understanding of cognition in faith - faith was reason's continuation beyond its own horizon - Coleridge moved in a quite different direction to Schleiermacher. See J.R. Barth, *Coleridge and Christian Doctrine*, 45-50. Cf. chap.8, 252-257 of this thesis.

96. Developments in the field of hermeneutics provides the basis for David Tracy's critique of Lindbeck's appeal to an experimential-expressivist category in religion and doctrine. See above en.44. On the issue of human experience David Kelsey identifies six new strategies for handling the modern turn to the subject; see "Human Being" in P.C. Hodgson and R.H. King eds., *Christian Theology: An Introduction to its Traditions and Tasks* (London: SCM, 1988), esp. 156-67. See also the essay by James J. Buckley, "Revisionists and Liberals" in Ford ed., *The Modern Theologians*, II: 89-102; cf. Nicholas Lash, *Easter in Ordinary: Reflections on Human Experience and the Knowledge of God* (London: SCM, 1988).

97. The notion of experience as doctrine's 'companion' was used by Gerson (1363-1429). See Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition*, IV: 65.

98. This is an issue raised by James J. Buckley in his assessment of modern theological revisionists and liberals who, he suggests, have placed great store on human beings as free subjects but may have failed to show how "the subject's self-constituting does justice to the material bases of human life - or aptly describes our identity before God not only as passive subjects but also agents". See "Revisionists and Liberals" in D. Ford ed. *The Modern Theologians*, II: 97.

99. The phrase is Kerr's in *Theology After Wittgenstein*, 72. Kerr has some important remarks on God in relation to sociality: "what constitutes us as human beings is the regular and patterned reactions that we have to one another", 65; "Nothing is more foundational to the whole human enterprise than the community that we create in our natural reactions to one another as they have been cultivated and elaborated in a very contingent historical tradition", 76. These echoes of Wittgenstein suggest a social matrix in which the common practices of human community are recalled and conformed to a form of godly humanity.

100. Cf. here Hardy, "Theology through Philosophy", 30-40.

101. Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine*, esp. 17-19 and chap.4.

102. Ibid., 34.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid., 41.

105. Ibid., 35.

106. Ibid., but esp. 79-84. "The novelty of rule theory, ... is that it does not locate the abiding and doctrinally significant aspect of religion in propositionally formulated truths, much less in inner experiences, but in the story it tells and in the grammar that informs the way the story is told and used", 80. Lindbeck wants to locate continuity in the endurance of rules or general regulative principles which are applied in different contexts. Thus the permanence and unity of doctrine is secured despite changing and diverse formulations.

107. See Lindbeck's "Excursus on Religion and Truth" in *The Nature of Doctrine*, where he attempts to show how and to what extent doctrine's referential significance is to be achieved within an 'intrasystematic' performative understanding of religious language: "a religious utterance, one might say, acquires the propositional truth of ontological correspondence only insofar as it is a performance, an act or deed, which helps create that correspondence", 65. A regulative theory of doctrine as espoused by Lindbeck is designed not so much to answer the question of the 'whence' of doctrine but rather highlight its function. How the two might be related is not adequately addressed by Lindbeck.

108. Cf. Lee C. Barrett, "Theology as Grammar: Regulative Principles or Paradigms and Practices" in *Modern Theology* IV/2 (Jan. 1988): 153-172, for a critique of Lindbeck's 'misleading' distinction between doctrine as 'formal syntactical rules' and their 'instantiation in practice', 161. Barrett argues that "the identity of Christianity should not be attributed to the continuity of formal doctrinal principles apart from the continuity of particular first-order truth claims, behaviour practices, and experiences", 161. Lindbeck, he argues, has unnecessarily placed "the entire burden of continuity upon abstract formal rules", 161.

109. Thus Lindbeck distinguishes between the 'intrasystematic' and 'ontological' truth of statements, the former only being relevant to the rule theory of doctrine he espouses. On this account doctrines of faith are intrasystematically true when they cohere with the 'total relevant context', which for Lindbeck is the *particular* religious system in view. But such truth "in no sense assures their ontological truth or meaningfulness", 65. Rule theory is simply silent as regards the truth of correspondence to reality. In fact Lindbeck argues that the Nicene Creed "in its role as a communal doctrine does not make first-order truth claims", 19.

110. Hence the significance of David Tracy's claim that Lindbeck's cultural linguistic theory of religion and doctrine is "confessionalism with occasional 'ad hoc' apologetic skirmishes". See Tracy, "Lindbeck's New Program for Theology: A Reflection", 469f.

111. See Nicholas Lash, *Easter in Ordinary*, 257-266.

112. Ibid., 261.

113. Ibid., 266.

114. Cf. Hardy, "Rationality, the Sciences and Theology", where the author argues that Lonergan "fails to recognise that it [doctrine] is required by response to Jesus as agent of wisdom", 309 n.36. Thus "Interpretation is exactly what Jesus' followers should do, and rational interpretation, in the form of statements of teaching and practice, is a perpetuation of the agency of Jesus in the impartation of wisdom", 295. The inner rationale for the generation of doctrine is essentially positive, a form of praise itself. See Hardy and Ford, *Jubilate*, where the communication of truth in language is a form of Christian praise; see e.g. 158.

115. The problem reveals itself in the restriction of truth questions in theology to the 'intrasystematic' level of language, whilst supposing that the Church's communal life and believing refers to

a *metasystematic* reality. Thiemann's development of the notion of 'background convictions' - in his case the prevenient grace of God - is an example of how Lindbeck's rule theory is in fact supported by a strong theological realism which can be affirmed only by a most indirect route. See further on Theimann chap.11 en.23 and 'Excursus: The Genre of Regulative Communication'.

116. "a religious utterance, one might say, acquires the propositional truth of ontological correspondence only in so far as it is a performance, an act or deed, which helps create that correspondence" (Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine*, 65). Lindbeck's functionalist approach does not pursue the nature of its own foundations and might be said to produce a 'half-way house' to full realism or alternately a 'semi-realism'.

117. For an insightful discussion of the notion of revelation as fundament see Ray L. Hart, *Unfinished Man and the Imagination: Toward an Ontology and a Rhetoric of Revelation* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1968), 83-97. Hart's use of the concept of fundament is taken up in this thesis in Chapter Eleven.

118. Thus e.g. Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine*, suggests that classical theists, adopting a performative view of religious utterances, proceed "*as if* God were good in relation to us ....", 67. Here a notion of fundament is proposed, but it operates more like a Kantian regulative rule, a working hypothesis for action.

119. For a brief summary of how Locke, Waterland and Law developed these issues see the conclusions of the case studies in chapters 5, 6, and 7.

CHAPTER ELEVEN: THE TASK OF COMMUNICATIONS

1. The notion of 'information' intended here ought not to be equated with a storehouse of available facts and opinions or hard assemblage of data fragmented and without intrinsic meaning. The attempt to state the faith implies a power of selecting knowledge that matters, such knowledge being itself 'an aspect of wisdom'. See Mary Midgley, *Wisdom Information and Wonder: What is Knowledge for?* (London & New York: Routledge, 1989), 45, for above discussion and more generally (9-11, 43-45, 63-65, 179, 253) for references to 'information'.

2. An example is the critical theory of communication developed by the social philosopher Jürgen Habermas. For an introduction see M. Pusey, *Jürgen Habermas* (London & Chichester: Tavistock Pub., & Ellis Horwood Ltd., 1987), chap.3 "Communication and Social Action".

3. This matter has received a helpful treatment in Baum and Greeley eds., *Communication in the Church, Concilium* III (1978), esp. the two essays in part 4, "Communication without Domination", which draws upon Habermas' work, and "Communication in the Church: Aspects of a Theological Theme".

4. Ibid., 92, 98ff.

5. Communications embraces other forms besides linguistic, e.g. ritual, bodily actions, organizational structure, cultural symbols.

6. See Hardy and Ford, *Jubilate*: "In the most fundamental sense, communication consists in the transmission of energy in form; and this is what occurs in all communicative activity, for example in speech, music and symbolic behaviour", 157.

7. This matter arose in chap.10 in relation to the human subject as 'interpreter' of what is given. The human being as 'reflector' upon what is given was found to be determinative for John Locke's handling of the fundamental articles tradition. The notion is implicit in much contemporary theology. It is presupposed in David Tracy's discussion of the genre of 'doctrine'. For Tracy, in *The Analogical Imagination*, doctrine 'reflects' and 'interprets' important aspects of 'the originating religious symbolic and metaphysical language'. Accordingly "doctrine *is* an abstraction from the concreteness of symbolic, metaphoric, poetic language" and, whilst doctrinal clarification can enrich community self-understanding nevertheless "doctrines, as abstract, are relatively less adequate as expression than the originating metaphorical or symbolic language" (293 n.57). Leonardo Boff in *Trinity and Society*, trans. P. Burns (London: Burns & Oates, 1988), makes a rather simple distinction between *reality* and *doctrine*: "The reality of the Holy Trinity is independent of doctrines", 25.

This issue requires some care. At one level the notion of theology as 'interpretation' or 'reflection' provides a strategy to break the domination in theology of 'conventional objectivism'. From this point of view rigid correspondence theories of truth are undermined and possibilities for inter-ecclesial communication are enhanced. This would seem to be at the basis of George Lindbeck's 'rule theory' in which doctrines are said to be second-order rather than first-order propositions, i.e. "they make intrasystematic rather than ontological truth claims" (*The Nature of Doctrine*, 80). In this sense doctrine affirms "nothing about extra-linguistic or extra-human reality", 80. Doctrine, according to Lindbeck, may function symbolically or as a first-order proposition but to this extent the doctrine "cannot or need not be construed as a norm of communal belief or practice; it is not being used as a church doctrine". Lindbeck's concern is fundamentally directed to the needs of practical ecclesiology. In ecumenical dialogue he seeks a theory of doctrine that facilitates "doctrinal reconciliation without capitulation", 18.

For Paul Avis, in *Ecumenical Theology and the Elusiveness of Doctrine* (London: SPCK,1986) theology, as interpretation, provides a way of recovering a personalist view of doctrine and overcoming an impersonal objectivism. Again, this theory provides a basis for churches recognising a shared, albeit tacit faith, that only imperfectly comes to form in doctrine. For John Hick, an interpretive theory of doctrine belongs to a universalized view of religion in which the Christian faith is one equal participant. For discussion of Hick see Hardy, "Theology through Philosophy", 54-59. For Maurice Wiles, the 'interpretive' view of doctrine gives licence for considerable academic freedom. See "The Role of a Critical Theology in the Church Today" in *Explorations in Theology* No.4 (London: SCM, 1979), 1-13.

However the implications of this approach go deeper. It is one thing to reject a *simplistic* model of correspondence. It is quite another to develop an adequate understanding of God, who is inexpressible, yet can be thought, but "only within the context of the most rigorous discipline of silence" [from Donald McKinnon,

Themes in Theology: The Three-Fold Cord (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1987), 19]. McKinnon has discussed this matter with lucidity and sophistication. See further "The Problem of the 'System of Projection' appropriate to Christian Theological Statements" in *Explorations in Theology* No.5 (London: SCM, 1979), 70-89. In tackling this difficult issue it is not sufficient to develop interpretive theories of doctrine which highlight the refracted and imperfect medium within which theology operates, and yet *fail* to show how the truth of God is properly present through the language of faith. It is a lack in theological discourse in this latter regard that betrays a more fundamental suspicion of the importance of the symbolic task of theology and leads to its displacement in ecclesial life as being merely of secondary importance.

8. The problem here is reflected in the tendency to treat the development of doctrine in patristic theology as *corrective* strategies responding to false and dangerous modes of thought. Thus interpretation is occasioned by perceived heretical developments. See e.g. G.W.H.Lampe, "Christian Theology in the Patristic Period" in Herbert Cunliff-Jones, ed. *A History of Christian Doctrine* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1978), esp. 28,98. The tendency in the modern period to identify such interpretations as the intrusion of alien (Greek/hellenistic) philosophical categories, a development typified in Adolf von Harnack's famous *History of Dogma*, is indicative of a failure to locate a positive rationale for theological discourse *from within* the nature of its subject matter (on Harnack see chap.2 en.14). Attempts to move beyond this negative assessment can not be said to be entirely successful. Thus Bernard Lonergan sees doctrine not as an alien intrusion but as a product of 'differentiated consciousness' *(Method in Theology*, 295-334). However the rationale for the dogmatic impulse is not exhausted by reference to certain historical contingencies (e.g. conflict and heresy), nor by the practical needs of an institution for security and direction, nor is it adequately accounted for as a product of human consciousness as such. In all these cases the rationale for theological discourse fails to illuminate the communication ideal, i.e. the transmission of energy in a form. The energy here is the energy of Jesus as agent of God's wisdom and these accounts of doctrine fail to see that this form of energy generates a reciprocal response: interpretation is thus a requirement of right response. See further chap.10 en.114. In terms of the argument in chap.9 inadequate views of doctrine fail to accord the language of faith its true status as an intermediate form expressive of the ecclesial bond.

9. If theology is properly to be a form in which energy is transmitted, then the prime concept cannot be 'distance' but 'participation'. Interpretation cannot be achieved apart from participation in that which is transmitted. Fundamentally, theological discourse, as mediation of energy, shows *what overcoming of distance might look like linguistically considered.* It is thus a form through which the paradox of distance and proximity in the relationship of God to the world can be manifest. In a sense theology is 'second order' in the same way that all human life and creation is derived from and referred to God. The presupposition here is that language is a rich medium of God's relation to creation. This rules out both a conventional objectivist approach to doctrine and views which trade on the relativity of all theological effort.

10. This statement recalls the discussion in chap.10 of the relation between God's being as plenitude and the eschatological nature of doctrinal purity. See pp.304 and ens. 54 and 58.

11. This arises insofar as language, as a form of symbolic mediation, has both manifest and latent meaning; a characteristic that leads Paul Ricoeur to state that "a symbol, in the most general sense functions as a surplus of signification". This surplus of meaning "is the residue of the literal interpretation. Yet for the one who participates in the Symbolic signification there are really not two significations, one literal and the other symbolic, but rather a single movement, which transfers him from one level to the other and which assimilates him to the second signification by means of, or through, the literal one.

    Symbolic signification, therefore, is so constituted that we can only attain the secondary signification by way of the primary signification, where this primary signification is the sole means of access to the surplus of meaning. The primary signification gives the secondary signification, in effect, as the meaning of a meaning". Quotations are from *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning* (Fort Worth, Texas: The Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 55.

    The double-meaning structure of symbolic language uncovers the dynamic of directness in indirectness. That which the symbol mediates is present directly *only in indirectness.* The symbol is in fact an indirect form of referring to something else which can not be communicated directly. This symbol opacity arises because linguistic discourse mediates a non-linguistic order which is inexhaustible in its depth, and resistent to complete thematization. Thus, as a region of mediacy, language can only indirectly refer to what is directly given. Theological discourse, insofar as it refers to the presence and activity of God in the world, focusses most sharply the unavoidability, indeed necessity, of directness through indirectness. This *is* the way in which theological discourse recognizes the nature of its own fundament.

12. For useful if brief introductions to the subject of Foundationalism see: Rescher, *Cognitive Systematization*, chap.3; idem " Foundationalism, Coherentism, and the Idea of Cognitive Systematization", *The Journal of Philosophy* LXXI (1974): 695-708; Midgley, *Wisdom Information and Wonder,* chap.13, "What Foundations Are"; Anthony Quinton, "The Foundations of Knowledge" in B. Williams and A. Montefiore eds., *British Analytical Philosophy* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971), 55-86.

13. See Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, intro. and chap.3.

14. An important early critique was made in 1935 by Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, 2nd.ed., (New York & London: Hutchinson & Co., 1960). In attempting to distance himself from the empiricist tradition which attempted to build a science by first collecting the basic or 'protocol sentences', Popper argued that such axioms were not entirely the product of immediate experience but arose in the application of theory. Basic statements were accepted in the course of testing theories proposed to explain experience. They arose in process and were subject to refutation. The persistence of 'basic statements' was indicative of rigorous testing that had not yet refuted them. Such statements were thus revisable but persisted by consensus, for the time being. This position led Popper to conclude: "Science does

not rest upon rock-bottom. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or 'given' base; and when we cease our attempts to drive our piles into a deeper layer, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that they are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being", 111. More recently see Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, esp. 155-164.

15. For an examination of the variety obtaining within foundationalism in modern science see Laurence Bonjour, *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge* (Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard University Press, 1985), 26-30.

16. For a critique of the foundationalist strategy in theology see Thiemann, *Revelation and Theology*. Thiemann argues that by associating revelation with a foundationalist epistemology - i.e. the conviction "that knowledge is grounded in a set of non-inferential, self-evident beliefs" (158 n.20), revelation mistakenly becomes the starting point from which the superstructure of Christian beliefs can be derived. In this respect Thiemann examines the foundationalist strategy as it appears in germinal form in John Locke and is developed in Friedrich Schleiermacher and Thomas Torrance. He finds all three united by their "same incoherent notion of intuition" (33), and to this extent their causal explanation theory of revelation collapses, 44. In Thiemann's view the problem with the foundationalist programme is that it attempts to justify revelation causally by reference to origins rather than according to content and argument. For Thiemann the "doctrine of revelation is not an epistemological theory but an account which justifies a set of Christian convictions concerning God's identity and reality", 7. Torrance's position may be a good deal more sophisticated than Thiemann grants (see Hardy, "Thomas Torrance" in D. Ford ed., *The Modern Theologians*, I: 76-82, on the nature of scientific intuition and the logic of discovery). However, the merits of Thiemann's critique aside, his discussion of theological foundationalism is important, particularly considering the continuing strong hold of foundationalist epistemology and ontology in Christianity. See Hardy "Rationality, the Sciences and Theology", 278f. For further see the recent work by D.Z. Phillips, *Faith after Foundationalism* (London & New York: Routledge, 1988), Part One.

17. Thus e.g. John Jewel's *Apologia Ecclesiae Anglicannae* (1562) found the argument of a common secure foundation of faith an important means of affirming both the continuity of the English Reformation Church with the early Church (diachronic unity) and the unity of the then separated and diverse Protestant Churches of Christendom (synchronic unity). See chap.3 of this thesis. The appeal to such foundational truths became an important plank in Anglican ecclesiology (Sykes, *Identity*, 240).

18. Thus Richard Field deployed the notion of fundamental beliefs to develop a notion of the unity of a Christendom by then sharply divided (chap.4 pp.91-95).

19. See Laud's discussion of fundamental articles in chap.4 pp.95-97 of this thesis.

20. See chap.4 pp.104-110 of this thesis; cf. Shapiro, *Probability and Certainty*, chap.3.

21. Thus Rome, in the view of Anglicans like Laud, was guilty of having imposed non-fundamental belief. More Puritan elements in English Protestantism in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, tended to reject the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental beliefs on the basis that it was wrong to make such differentiations within the Word of God. For further details see chap.4 en.3.

22. See pp.298-300.

23. In this respect it might be argued that Thiemann, in *Revelation and Theology*, has really produced an inverted form of foundationalism, since the entire structure of his theological programme is designed to justify the key 'background conviction' of the prevenient grace of God. The problem Thiemann sees with this background conviction is that it is no longer, as it was in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, uncontroversial and universally accepted, 76. Therefore to *begin* with this belief requires a justificatory argument which inevitably flounders on some notion of intuition. Thus what Thiemann proposes is to begin in the forecourt of uncontroverted belief and show how such belief requires just such a background conviction, 76ff. He begins in the superstructure of belief and presses towards the belief essential for the Christian tradition. Prevenience is thus "retrospectively implied by a cluster of Christian convictions" (80), such that if these convictions are 'true' then "*the belief upon which they rest*" (81; my italics) is true. If this is not inverted foundationalism at the least it is a 'non-foundational' strategy designed to justify and hence secure what is foundational. What has altered is the *direction* of the argument. This may be important but it is difficult to see how Thiemann can avoid the pressing epistemological issues inherent in his programme. Revealingly Thiemann recognizes that the question of how the reader makes the transition from unbelief to belief cannot be explained within theology's descriptive competence, 150. William C. Placher, "Revisionist and Post liberal Theologies", *The Thomist* XLIX/3 (July 1985): 392-416, briefly discusses the merits of the foundationalist charge made by Thiemann and others in respect of the 'revisionist' theologies of Tracy and Lonergan, 411f. A case could be made that Thiemann's non-foundationalism is more correctly what Bonjour, *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*, calls 'weak' foundationalism, "a kind of hybrid between moderate foundationalism and the coherence theories", 28ff.

24. Hart, *Unfinished Man and the Imagination*, 84.

25. Ibid., 85.

26. Ibid., 87.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., 250.

29. Ibid., 182.

30. Ibid., 195.

31. Thus Hart writes "There is 'light' in events and 'light' in the mind .... [the] mind is possessed of a light whose rays chip a larger aperture in events: sometimes, as in poetry and scripture, to be met with a light more intense than itself. Such a light, in search of enlightenment, is active imagination", 90. Cf. Hardy and Ford *Jubilate*, 108-114, on the imagination and theology.

32. For Hart 'imaginative' engagement is primary. But this may be unnecessarily restrictive. There are a range of other ways in which human beings participate with God in the world, e.g. bodily interactions, practical tasks, aesthetic concerns, as well as more explicitly rational and transrational (e.g. subject to subject, being with) forms.

33. Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 269ff. "If the ordered set consists in propositions, then the first will be the logically first propositions. If the ordered set consists in an ongoing, developing reality, then the first is the immanent and operative set of norms that guides each forward step in the process".

34. Hardy and Ford, *Jubilate*, 63 and more generally 161-167.

35. The case study on Waterland (chap.6) represented this way of handling fundamental articles. See also chap.8 on William Van Mildert, Newman's critics, Charles Gore and Norman Williams.

36. See our discussion of Don Cupitt and his 'instrumentalist' view in relation to articles of faith in chap.10.

37. See Richard Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 8-16 for a discussion of the terms objectivism, relativism and subjectivism. In this study the use of these words accords more with what Bernstein identifies as the more conventional view.

38. See chap.8, p.268f of this thesis.

39. This was very much the programme of Descartes. See Midgley, *Wisdom Information and Wonder*, 134ff.

40. See *Church Dogmatics* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1957), II./1, 449f: "It is very understandable that, complex as he is and suffering from his own complexity as he does, man would like to be different, i.e. simple". In Barth's view this desire for deliverance from complexity generated man's idolatries with the result that the true simplicity of God was impoverished. The drive for objectivity became a false human manoeuvre to escape from complexity to simplicity.

41. This was precisely the point at issue in Karl Barth's critique of the fundamental articles tradition in Protestantism. See *Church Dogmatics*, I/2, 863-866.

42. This dynamic by which our fundamental beliefs are continually reconsidered in relation to their own foundation has been succinctly described by Michael Polanyi in *Personal Knowledge*. In commenting upon St Augustine's method of exposition of fundamental beliefs in his *Confessions*, Polanyi states that "the process of examining any topic is both an exploration of the topic, and an exegesis of our fundamental beliefs in the light of which we approach it; a dialectical combination of exploration and exegesis. Our fundamental beliefs are continuously reconsidered

in the course of such a process, but only within the scope of their own basic premises", 267.

This kind of provisionality in fundamental belief has been developed in theology by Thomas Torrance, who suggests that basic beliefs are continually tested and clarified in the light of reality as it is understood. Creedal statements are thus revisable in the light of God. Because fundamental belief is locked into a range that reaches beyond what we know, such beliefs are not yet completed, not fully justified, but as such our fundamental beliefs provide the heuristic impulse for further discovery. Increasing insight is thus facilitated in this process of conceptual refinement and enrichment. Our hold upon reality is accordingly strengthened in the process. See Thomas Torrance, "The Framework of Belief" in T.F. Torrance ed., *Belief in Science and in Christian Life: The Relevance of Michael Polanyi's Thought for Christian Faith and Life*, (Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1980), chap.1.

43. See chap.7 pp.229f.

44. Coleridge recognised his debt to Law and developed an understanding of human life grounded in the reality of the plenitude of God the Trinity. See e.g. his statement on the Trinity, chap.8 en.45.

45. See chap.8 pp.269-273.

46. See chap.8 pp.257-262.

47. See chap.7. pp.238-245.

48. Rescher, *Cognitive Systematization*, 8-13. Cf. S.F. Barker, "On Simplicity in Empirical Hypotheses", *Philosophy of Science* XXVIII/2 (1961): 162-171.

49. Elliott Sober, *Simplicity* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 168.

50. Ibid., preface.

51. Mario Bunge, "The Weight of Simplicity in the Construction and Assaying of Scientific Theories", in *Philosophy of Science*, XXVIII/2 (1961): 120-149. This reference p.149.

52. Mario Bunge, *The Myth of Simplicity: Problems of Scientific Philosophy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963).

53. See Sykes, *Identity*, 219-230.

54. See Hartin, "Catechisms", 154-163.

55. Ibid., 155.

56. A 1630 ed. of the work exists. Reprinted as *A Pattern of Catechistical Doctrine, and other Minor Works* (Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology; Oxford: J.H. Parker, 1846). This reference p.6.

57. See e.g. Hooker's reference to those 'few fundamental words' constitutive of the faith of the Church (chap.3 p.85). Hooker had in mind the Apostles Creed. He was followed by many other apologists including Chillingworth and Stillingfleet (see chap.4 pp.99-101, and en.72).

58. One motive behind Hooker's sermon on justification was to defend the interests of a piety which agonized over the fate of those who had died whilst the Church had existed under Roman bondage. Hooker's argument suggested that one's forebears could indeed be saved in the Roman Church for it held to the foundation of faith and at least had not overthrown it directly. This fact could be established by virtue of its adherence to the few essentials of the faith. This argument would have been much less apparent and more difficult to commend had the fundamentals not been *notationally* simple and easily identifiable. To the extent that they were, such simplicities calmed the soul. See chap.3 p.85. For Locke, see chap.5 p.134ff, 154f. Refer chap.12 en.47 for a brief discussion of the link between simplicity and worship.

59. See chap.4 p.106f.

60. For patristic discussion on the unity of God see C. Stead, *Divine Substance* (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1977), 103-9, and 180-9.

61. See Bunge, *The Myth of Simplicity*, chaps.4 and 5 for discussion of types of simplicities and chap.6 (pp.86-88) for consideration of motives.

62. The reflexive relationship between simplicity and ordering is not fully recognised by Sykes in *Identity*, who writes: "A good simplifier will be someone who has thought carefully about priorities. On the other hand, not everyone who thinks carefully about priorities will necessarily be engaged in simplification", 223. He cites Schleiermacher as an example. Sykes' failure to identify the dynamic between simplicity and ordering in theological discourse arises because of an inadequate construal of simplicity as *abbreviation*. In fact simplicity operates more like the principle of cohesion Schleiermacher sought in essence of Christianity definition (cf. Sykes, ibid., 212). Simplicity cannot be reduced to 'simplification' or 'abbreviation'; rather it is a necessary *moment* in the organization of complex material, and *good* ordering of priorities will *always* include the operation of the simplicity concept. See further on Sykes below en.82.

63. This has been an important component of Anglican apologetic and was initiated in John Jewel's famous *Apology* for the Church of England (chap.3 pp.79-83).

64. Thus "every simplification in the basis is paid for by a complication in the body of consequences" (Bunge, *The Myth of Simplicity*, 64). Bunge argues that one has to distinguish the 'manifest' from the 'latent' complexity of a theory's postulates. For Bunge "Simplicity is not so much a property of reality as a property of our approach to reality", 93; and further 80-84, 88-93.

65. Bunge, "The Weight of Simplicity", 148.

66. David Kelsey, *The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology* (London: SCM, 1975), 163.

67. See Bunge, "The Weight of Simplicity", 148; and cf. idem, *The Myth of Simplicity*, 88-90.

68. Bunge, *The Myth of Simplicity*, 96-98, 111ff; and cf. idem, "The Weight of Simplicity", 148f. Bunge argues that insofar as the goal of science is truth, progress towards this goal involves

science in increasing complexities. Truth is related not to simplicity but complexity. The policy of simplicity is thus unwelcome in the attempt to penetrate the depth structure of reality.

69. Ibid. Thus in speaking of the positive content of wisdom to which knowledge is to be assimilated in order to be knowledge, Daniel Hardy states that such wisdom "seems to be so mysteriously deep as to require it to be seen as a complexity in which various aspects or levels are present. This depth leads to the supposition of an inner complexity which is incapable of being known without comparable complexities in the structure of knowledge ..... and in the relation between knowledge and other aspects of the well-being of humankind, such as goodness and beauty". See "Rationality, the Sciences and Theology", 282f.

70. *Church Dogmatics*, II/1, 327.

71. Ibid., II/1: 329; cf. II/1: 333.

72. Ibid., II/1, 327.

73. Ibid., II/1, 333.

74. Ibid., II/1, 406.

75. Ibid., II/1, 592.

76. Cf. ibid., II/1, 326f; cf. II/1, 445f.

77. Ibid., II/1, 447.

78. Cf. Sober, *Simplicity*, who argues that simplicity is a question of relative informativeness, 19. That which requires the minimum extra information (10), i.e. that which is maximally informative, is the most simple. Simplicity is informativeness in its most concentrated form. Accordingly the desire for theories "in large measure reduces to a desire for simplicity", 168. This view of simplicity as economic communication has a parallel in Christian theology in the idea of the economy of God in salvation. See Symeon Lash, art., " Economy" in Richardson and Bowden eds. *A New Dictionary of Christian Theology*, 171f.

79. The catechetical task is the obvious context for simplicities of a pragmatic kind. In the interests of ecclesiological apologetics, deeper and more important issues can remain repressed. In this respect see the criticisms of Henry McAdoo and Henry Chadwick in chap.1 pp.26-33 of this thesis.

80. In the case of Waterland (chap.6) an over-riding divine monarchialism was reflected in a re-assertive mode of theological discourse unresponsive to contingency. The whole question of simplicity might be considerably enriched by developing it in relation to worship. Here simplicities are important for focussing and directing the worshipper, e.g. creedal affirmation, liturgical responses. However such concentrations are interwoven with more extended communication, e.g. sermon, prayer, song. Simplicities in worship are not necessarily to be associated with stale repetitive formalas, but rather operate in a fuller dynamic of communal and individual praise. The activity of worship would seem to require a strong element of repetitive communication involving simplicities of language. But such

repetition provides opportunities for maximal openness, quite at variance with an appeal to simplicity designed to thwart and close off communication. To recognise worship as an activity in which simplicities are relevant qualifies a too negative appraisal of repetitive theological communication (see Sykes, *Identity*, 325 n.28).

81. What is sought for in the fundamental articles tradition is truth preserving simplifications. Insofar as 'essence of Christianity' discussion is a theological form of the operation of the concept of simplicity, it is clear that essence definition is fundamentally a stage in a process. One does not arrive at an 'essence of Christianity'. Thus discussion of simplicity in relation to the Trinity indicates that any attempt to develop an understanding of the essence of Christianity which is not simultaneously an affirmation of the abundance of the being of God in the world will end in impoverishment. Behind the essentialist mistake is a false or undeveloped notion of simplicity, a problem that lurks in Stephen Sykes' discussion of simplicity in relation to the 'essence of Christianity' definition (See above en.62 and below en.82.).

82. Reduction in scale ought not to be identified with 'reductionism'. Sykes himself states that Hooker's essence of Christianity was "an abbreviation of the *whole Christian tradition*" (my italics; *Identity*, 228). But cf. "In such summaries [articles of *fundamentum fidei* of early Church] we are not dealing with a condensation of the whole context of Christian believing, but with a slightly elaborated version of a formal definition of the area which believing occupies", 257. It seems that Sykes is in danger of sliding between two quite different conceptions of simplicity here. His comment on Hooker suggests a *qualitative* compression of faith. This was certainly the thrust of Hooker's own apologetic. Sykes' second comment is much more in the *quantifying* strand of the fundamental articles tradition. Both strands can be found in John Locke. Thus he spoke of the article 'Jesus is the Messiah' as an 'abridgement' - 'the whole in a little'. Locke was not quite consistent here (see chap.5 en.172). Newman's discussion of the meaning of the Baptismal faith indicated that compression of faith did not imply reductionism *per se* (see *Via Media*, I: 249-60).

83. See e.g. discussion of fundamentals and ecclesiology in chap.5 pp.149-157.

84. Thus Locke suggested that one ought to stay with the text of Scripture where the fundamentals could be found 'safe and sound' (chap.5 p.137).

85. *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, Works VII: 147.

86. See chap.7 p.243.

87. The epistemological significance of the reflexive relation between simplicity and hierarchy is illustrated in Luther for whom, Stephen Sykes argues, prioritizing and epistemology were 'decisively linked'. See *Identity*, 224f, 298 n.26. Cf. the discussion of Luther in chap.2 p.63f of this thesis.

88. Michael Polanyi in *Personal Knowledge*, Part 4 "Knowing and Being", recaptures the significance of a hierarchically conceived cosmology in his attempt to expose a real interrelation between

knowing and being. For an attempt to spell out the implication of this cosmologically conceived transcendence for Christology see Colin Gunton, "The Truth of Christology" in T.F. Torrance ed., *Belief in Science and in Christian Life*, 91-107, esp. 101-107.

89. Cf. Midgley, *Wisdom Information and Wonder*, 45.

90. Dietrich Ritschl in *The Logic of Theology*, has recognised the significance and difficulty of hierarchical ordering in the quest for truth (See 119-123). He is self-consciously drawing upon the insights of Michael Polanyi. Ritschl's attempt to uncover the 'fundamental regulative statements' of theology presupposes the ordering of truth in some kind of structured form.

91. Thus for Hooker, Laud and others, the quality of truths was to be decided by reference to their closeness or distance from the foundation of faith. A notion of 'relative fundamentality' was implied. See esp. chap.3 p.85ff and chap.4 p.96f of this thesis.

92. For discussion of the concept of hierarchy in the sciences see L.L. Whyte et al., *Hierarchical Structures* (New York: American Elsevier Pub. Co. Inc., 1969). See esp. the introductory essay by L. Whyte for a brief but useful historical survey of the concept of hierarchy.

93. Herbert A. Simon, "The Architecture of Complexity", *General Systems*, Yearbook of the Society for General Systems Research, L. von Bertalanffy and A. Rapoport, eds. (Ann Arbor Michigan: Soc. for Gen. Sys. Res., 1965), X: 63-76. Quotation is from p.63.

94. Ibid., 73.

95. See Mario Bunge "The Metaphysics, Epistemology and Methodology of Levels in Hierarchical Structures" in L.L. Whyte et al. *Hierarchical Structures*, 17-29: "Strictly speaking, a hierarchy or hierarchical structure is a set equipped with a relation of domination or its converse, subordination", 17. On this strict interpretation Bunge argues that hierarchies are a human invention for "in nature reciprocal action, rather than unidirectional action, seems to be the rule", 19. Bunge differentiates 'domination' in which 'bossing' is in one direction only, from concepts to do with 'generation', 'production' or which may be construed as 'giving rise to'. He concludes that "one-sided domination seems to be an artifact", 19. For this reason Bunge prefers to speak of *levels*. Cf. p.52 for the reference to Bunge's 'one-way bossing relation' in true hierarchy. Cf. *The Myth of Simplicity*, for discussion of 'levels' (37-48).

96. See chap.4 p.95-98.

97. See chap.8 p.269 and en.132 and 133.

98. See e.g. chap.3 p.76-79, and 88f on Hooker; chap.4 pp.98-101 on Chillingworth, Stillingfleet; chap.5 pp.156-159 on Locke; and chap.8 pp.269-273 on Maurice. Important for these theologians was a desire to achieve a principled ecclesial practice as well as a rejection of the tendency to over define the faith. Accordingly the fundamental articles were never developed with the kind of sophistication apparent in the seventeenth century Lutheran orthodoxy of e.g. Nicholas Hunnias.

99. Chap.6 pp.196-199.

100. This partly explains why Locke argued that belief necessary to *become* a Christian was quite different from that belief necessary to *remain* a Christian. Belief in the latter case would extend as far as peoples' capacity and presumably may even require them to believe mysteries! See e.g. chap.5 136f, 141.

101. See chap.8 pp.269-273.

102. Ibid., p.271.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid., p.270.

105. Cf. the criticisms of Maurice around this point by Sykes, *Integrity*, 16-20.

106. See chap.8 p.266f and en. 113, 115, 120.

107. For the full text see Congar, *Diversity and Communion*, 126.

108. See chap.1 pp.20, 24 and Congar, ibid, 126-134.

109. See e.g. Fries and Rahner, *The Unity of the Churches*, where the authors present the *Apostolicum*, and the 'confession' of Nicea (325) and Constantinople (381) as "the totality of the fundamental truths of the Christian faith", 17. This is a familiar Anglican apologetic. Fries and Rahner employ a compression theory such that these creeds "contain a whole theology in shorthand", 18. Cf. Locke in his argument with John Edwards. Upon this basis future 'interpretation and development' can be 'included' in the fundamental truths. This sanctions, for these two Roman theologians, the appeal to the 'principle' of the hierarchy of truths. This is a principle "not of selection but of correct interpretation" (20) in relation to the foundation of the Christian faith. Clearly for Fries and Rahner the hierarchy of truths is not envisaged as merely *enumerative* in intent. However these theologians, in their search for reconciliation between the churches, have adopted a familiar Anglican approach to fundamental articles, including notions of the compression of faith and quality of truth in relation to the foundation, and linked it with the Vatican II concept of 'hierarchy of truths'. So too has A. Dulles, "Paths to Doctrinal Agreement: Ten Theses". Thus Stephen Sykes is not right to suggest that the fundamental articles concept is enumerative and quantitative, in distinction from the 'qualitative' concern expressed in the hierarchy of truths concept. See *Identity*, 226f. This history of the tradition indicates that 'fundamental articles' can be construed both *qualitatively* and *quantitatively* (e.g. see above en.82).

110. See chap.1 p.20 of this thesis.

111. Fries and Rahner, *The Unity of the Churches*, have not escaped this danger: "The Confession of Nicaea and Constantinople is therefore a *clamp* which still holds the meanwhile-separated churches together. At the same time, it exhorts to ecclesiological communion, for which it is the historically established presupposition and condition", 17 (my italics).

112. *The Logic of Theology*, 122.

113. See the discussion in the final section of this chap. 'Excursus', on the genre of regulative communication, in which an alternative to the *loci* method in theology is presented. In this alternative an argument is developed to justify a range of hierarchical structures for the articles tradition.

114. Chap.3 pp.76-79. Cf. chap.4 pp.99-101 on Stillingfleet regarding institutional belief.

115. See e.g. chap.3 pp.79-83 on Jewel and chap.4 pp.101f on schemes for reunion and comprehension, and more recently Gore and Headlam (chap.8 pp.277-280).

116. See e.g. John Bowker, "Religions as Systems", in *Believing in the Church*, Report of the Doctrine Commission of Church of England, chap.6.

117. The problem of system in theology and belief was explored most fully in this thesis in relation to Daniel Waterland. See esp. pp.187-201.

118. See chap.4 p.107f.

119. pp.102f.

120. See e.g. Rescher, *Cognitive Systematization*, who states: "A system is a collection of interrelated entities, the relationships among which are such that information about them affords a basis for inferring conclusions regarding the structure, *modus operandi*, or temporal history of the system as a whole", 14.

121. Anthony Wilden, *System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1972), 357, and more generally 356-361.

122. Thomas F. Torrance, *Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge: Explorations in the Interrelations of Scientific and Theological Enterprise* (Belfast: Christian Journals Limited, 1984), 146.

123. Wilden, *System and Structure*, usefully illuminates the relationship between the concepts of 'information' and 'energy' in an open system: "the essential characteristic of an open system is its organization. Organization is controlled by information and fuelled by energy", 358. It seems that without information generation a system tends to decomposition or disorder. Information focusses the flow of energy and maintains or increases organization.

124. Ibid., 359.

125. Torrance, *Transformation and Convergence*, 135f; and cf. 140.

126. Ibid., 136.

127. Ibid., 145.

128. See above 42.

129. See e.g. esp. chap.5 pp.138-148.

130. See chap.6 pp.196-199.

131. Ibid., 194-196.

132. See e.g. chap.7 pp.238-245.

133. Ibid., 248-250.

134. The phrase is Ritschl's, *The Logic of Theology*: "What we are concerned with is the prophetic objection to a fixed, congealed system in which each of the *loci* has its firm place and in which God and human beings have become the prisoners of a theological system", 94.

135. Cf., Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge*, who discusses this feature of what he terms an 'open stable system'. "It is a fundamental property of open systems,..... that they stabilize any improbable event which serves to elicit them", 384. Though as Polanyi notes in relation to a stable flame, "The fluctuation which leads to the establishment of an open system does not vanish after the event ....The atomic configuration which ignited a flame keeps renewing itself within the flame", 384. In other words the dynamic is not dissipated but remains active within the system.

136. See chap.1 p.23.

137. *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* 3rd. ed. (London: Guild Pub., 1983), refers to aphorisms as 'terse general reflections'. Coleridge in *Aids to Reflection*, introductory aphorism xxvii, states: "Exclusive of the abstract sciences, the largest and worthiest portion of our knowledge consists of *aphorisms*: and the greatest and best of men is but an *aphorism*". His *Aids to Reflection* consists of a series of aphorisms which accords with his desire expressed in introductory aphorism II, to reflect on *commonplace* maxims.

138. *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* refers to the *narrative* quality of parabolic discourse. Cf. Jungel, *God as the Mystery of the World*: "a parable narrates while a metaphor coalesces the narrative in a single word", 289.

139. Jungel, ibid., 291.

140. See e.g. *Parables of Kierkegaard*, ed. with an intro. by Thomas Cohen (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978).

141. Jungel, *God as the Mystery of the World*, 303.

142. See e.g. David F. Ford, "Barth's Interpretation of the Bible" in S.W. Sykes ed., *Karl Barth: Studies of his Theological Methods*, 55-87, esp. 63 where Ford refers to Barth's doctrine of God as a 'metaphysics of the Gospel story'. Cf. Ritschl, *The Logic of Theology* (19-25), on narrative and its relation to theology.

143. Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, 3 vols. See Tillich's highly pertinent remark: "The statement that Jesus is the Christ contains in some way the *whole theological system*, as the telling of a parable of Jesus contains all artistic potentialities of Christianity" (my italics; III: 215). Tillich's systematics represents an expansion of this highly concentrated statement.

144. See Fries and Rahner, *The Unity of the Churches*, 15ff.

145. Consult John H. Leith ed., *Creeds of the Churches*, rev. ed. (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1973), 192-230.

146. Ibid., 517-522.

147. See Rahner, *Foundations of Christian Faith*, 448-459.

148. See Leith, *Creeds of the Churches*, 583.

149. *Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry*, Faith and Order Paper No.111 (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1982). What is novel is the accompanying commentary.

150. Consult H. Schmidt, *Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church*, 92f. Cf. Charles Gore, *The Solidarity of the Faith*, Modern Oxford Tracts (London: Longmans Green & Co, 1914): "When we speak of an 'article' of the Christian faith we use a word which means originally a small limb or joint, a component part of a living whole; and in its transferred sense, as meaning an element in a connected statement of principle, it still retained the idea of interconnection and logical coherence between one article and all the rest", 9. Gore's point was that one was not at liberty to select from among the articles. The 'essential' articles of the Catholic faith cohere "so that the admission of one suggests the admission of all, and the refusal of one the refusal of all", 9.

151. Ritschl, *The Logic of Theology*, 113.

152. There is perhaps nothing peculiarly novel in this proposal though it has a certain logic that has been quite ingeniously depicted by Daniel Hardy: "If one cuts a hole in the inner tube of a bicycle tyre where the valve is and begins to pull the rest of the tube through the hole, what happens? The issue with modern understanding - though hardly fully appreciated yet - is that one can repeat the exercise at an infinite number of points on the tube, drawing the tube through *after* it has been drawn through at an infinite number of other points. That is a fascinating prospect, not only a testimony to the amazing creativity of human understanding but an indication of the possibility of an endlessly multiplying complexity in knowledge". See "Rationality, the Sciences and Theology", 305. Hardy wants to speak of the 'indefinite plenitude' of knowledge. The significance of the above for the structure of theological discourse is yet to be unravelled though it seems clear that such a conception entails a dynamic, integrated series of discourses, representing different 'holes on the tyre' through which fuller and fuller knowledge is generated.

153. *The Logic of Theology*, 90.

154. Ibid.

155. Ibid., 91.

156. See p.290ff.

157. "Ultimate Beliefs and the Scientific Revolution" in T.F. Torrance ed., *Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge*, chap.5.

158. Ibid., 199.

159. Ibid., 199f.

160. See *The Logic of Theology*, index for references to regulative statements, but esp. introductory preface.

161. Ibid., 79.

162. Ibid., 126.

163. Ibid., 124.

164. Ibid., 110.

165. Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 270.

166. Ibid., 131.

167. Ibid., 298.

168. Cf. ibid., 319.

169. Ibid., 142.

170. See Thiemann, *Revelation and Theology*, 11ff.

171. Ibid., 71ff.

172. Ibid., 3.

173. Ibid., 149.

174. See above en.23.

CHAPTER TWELVE: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INSTITUTIONALITY

1. See esp. chap.9 p.290ff.

2. Barth, *Church Dogmatics* IV/2, 676.

3. Ibid., IV/2, 696.

4. "The term *ecclesial institutionality* suggests something more specific, more concrete, than the ideal-historical term *ecclesial existence*. It describes some empirical-historical manifestation of ecclesial existence in a determinate community, a visible society" (Farley, *Ecclesial Reflection*, 262).

5. Ibid., 205; and cf. idem, *Ecclesial Man*, 107.

6. Thus Karl Barth, in depicting that 'definite form' of ecclesia which corresponds to righteousness and truth, states that this form "is nothing more nor less than the whole human being and action of the Christian community as a *provisional representation* of the sanctification of man as it has taken place in Jesus Christ", (my italics; *Church Dogmatics*, IV/2, 677). The quality of this provisional representation is the criterion of the true significance of Church considered as an institution.

7. For a recent interesting discussion of institutionality see Mary Douglas, *How Institutions Think* (New York: Syracuse University

Press, 1986).

8. Hans Dombois, "The Church as Koinonia and Institution" in N. Ehrenstrom and W.G. Muelder eds. *Institutionalism and Church Unity* (London: SCM, 1963), 108.

9. Niklas Luhmann, "Institutionalized Religion in the Perspective of Functional Sociology" in Baum and Greely, eds., *The Church as Institution, Concilium* XCI (1974): 47.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., 55.

12. Luhmann has developed these matters to a high degree of sophistication in *A Sociological Theory of Law*, trans. from 1972 German ed. by E. King and M. Albrow (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985). See esp. chap.2, subsec.3, on 'Handling of disappointments'. Luhmann notes that "Expectational structures which selectively decrease complexity and contingency are a life necessity" (40), but they simultaneously raise the problem of disappointment. "It is for this reason that the social system has to supervise and channel the process of disappointments of expectation - and this not only to enforce effectively the right expectations (such as legal norms), but in order to create the possibility of counter-factual, disappointment-prepared and normative expectation in the first place. The expectant person must be prepared and equipped in case he arrives at a discrepant reality. He would otherwise not have the courage to expect normatively, and therefore with determination. The channelling and cooling out of disappointments is part of the stabilization of structures", 41.

    This suggests that institutionalization provides a social mechanism for endurance in failure. Stabilizing explanation of disappointment "is dependent on societal sources for cognitive plausibility and, at the same time, is equally dependent on the particular accepted horizon of beliefs - whether it be magic, religion or science", 44.

13. Thus Luhmann, ibid., states: "Law is in no way primarily a coercive order, but rather a facilitation of expectation. The facilitation depends on the availability of congruently generalized channels of expectation, i.e. a high degree of harmless indifference to other possibilities, which lowers the risk of counter-factual expectation significantly" (78 and more generally 73-83).

14. Farley, *Ecclesial Man*, 98.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., 175: "Whatever else it is , ecclesia is a specific form of corporate existence ..... In some sense of the word ecclesia means a specific community".

17. Thus Farley, *Ecclesial Man*, notes: "An impetus toward institutionalization exists in any group which wishes any kind of permanence and effectiveness. Because a given group would scarcely retain any continuity apart from repeatable and visible repetitions, it tends to originate customs, rules, organizational structures, rites, and symbols which express and maintain the purpose or purposes of a group", 175. This point is ignored by

Avery Dulles, S.J., in *Models of the Church* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1976), chap.2. Dulles discusses the idea of the Church as an institution, but does so from a critical Roman Catholic perspective. "By institutionalism we mean a system in which the institutional element is treated as primary", 32. From Dulles' point of view institutionalism is a 'deformation of the true nature of the Church', but institutionality is 'fitting and proper', for what seems to be good practical reasons. But he fails to push the discussion into genuine analysis of the rationale for institutionality.

18. Gotthold Hasenhüttl, "Church and Institution" in Baum and Greely eds., *The Church as Institution, Concilium* XCI: 14, referring to the thesis of the Protestant theologian Rudolph Sohm (1841-1917).

19. Cf. Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, IV/2, 679, for critique of Sohm and Emil Brunner (1889-1966).

20. Hasenhüttl, "Church and Institution", refers to the limited and weaker forms by which Protestantism affirmed ecclesia's institutionality. "There are tendencies which limit themselves to particular elements (preaching, two sacraments), or even only allow the institution conditional existence. The institution belongs (dialectically) to the Church as response to certain needs. As a whole, however, Protestants do not deny that the Church is an institution", 13.

21. Barth, in *Church Dogmatics*, IV/2, 670, refers to the "slipping of the community into the sacralization in which it not only cuts itself off from its own origin and goal and loses its secret by trying to reveal it in itself, but also separates itself ... from poor, sinful, erring humanity ..... Sacralization means the transmutation of the Lordship of Jesus Christ into the vanity of a Christianity which vaunts itself in His name but in reality is enamoured only of itself and its traditions, confessions and institutions". As such, sacralization 'means the end of the community'. For Barth this was not limited to Roman Catholicism.

22. See e.g. Thomas O'Dea, "Pathology and Renewal of Religious Institutions" in Baum and Greely eds., *The Church as Institution, Concilium*, XCI: 125.

23. Farley, *Ecclesial Man*, 185.

24. Ibid., 182-185., and cf. Hodgson and King, eds., *Christian Theology*, 223f, 238ff.

25. Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, "The Church as a Religious Institution" in Baum and Greely eds., *The Church as Institution*, 81, uses this phrase, of which he finds Karl Rahner's theology culpable.

26. Farley, *Ecclesial Man*, 185.

27. In this respect Stanley Hauerwas' comment on John Rawls' theory of justice is telling: "he [Rawls] represents the ultimate liberal irony: individualism, in an effort to secure societal cooperation and justice, must deny individual differences". See *A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic* (Notre Dame & London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 83. Cf. in the same work Hauerwas' remark that "one of the great ironies of our society is that by attempting to make freedom an end in itself we have become an excessively legalistic society," 75. In a

somewhat more popular vein, but with penetration and wisdom is M. Scott Peck, *The Different Drum: Community-Making and Peace* (London, Melbourne, Auckland, Johannesburg: Rider Books, 1987). Particularly relevant is Peck's discussion of stages of community making in chap.5. The author observes a tendency for social groups to oscillate between *pseudo-community* (in which individual differences are denied) and a condition of *chaos* in which individual differences erupt and conflict is generated. One way out of chaos, notes Peck, is through *organization*, though this can easily degenerate into a masked pseudo-community.

28. In this argument ecclesia's institutionality is taken with the utmost seriousness. It is the logic of the argument begun in Chapter Nine concerning the ecclesial bond as the bond in which those constituents of human social life are given a reference to God. The view of institutionality proposed here is thus derived from an understanding of God in creation concentrated in Christ (Colossians I:16 - "all things were created through him and for him", R.S.V.). Cf. Hebrews 9:11 - "Christ appeared as a high priest of the good things that have come", RSV ('already in being', N.E.B.). This rendering is supported by B.M. Metzger, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament* (London & New York: United Bible Societies, 1975), 668. The supposition is that God in Christ is in relation to creation as it is already constituted. The natural and ideal reference of human and created life is to him. Thus our life is 'hid with Christ in God' (Colossians 3:3). In ecclesia's institutionality this godward reference is actualised in concrete form. Thus the wisdom of Jesus Christ is not 'independent' of, nor understood as 'occasionally addressing' the above constituents of social life but Christ is "one whose being and behaviour is the presence of wisdom in those mediums. Nor is his reality to be seen 'shining through' these mediums, epiphany-like. He is to be seen as the coincidence of wisdom with them, and not accidently so" (Hardy, "Rationality, the Sciences and Theology", 296).

29. Luhmann, "Institutionalized Religion and Functional Sociology", 54.

30. Cf. Sykes, *Identity*: "systematic theology is a form of professional generalizing, a kind of 'general practice' theology", 13; "it is in relation to the doctrinal tradition that internal conflict becomes most explicit and manageable", 30. Conflict is a concommitant feature of the richness, diversity and complexity of reality. Organising, and thus giving sense to things belongs, in the nature of the case, to the task of 'theological generalizing'. For further refer to the discussion on simplicity in Chapter Eleven. It is surely misleading of David Tracy, *The Analogical Imagination*, to state that doctrine is an 'abstraction from' more 'concrete' forms of communication (293 n.57). The attempt in theology to state the theory of the practice of Christianity is distorted and falsified when the theory is identified as an abstraction, with the implied suggestion that the endeavour is somewhat removed from where things really happen.

31. William A. Christian, SR., *Doctrines of Religious Communities.*

32. Ibid.,2. Primary doctrines for Christian are doctrines explicitly held and proposed for belief, in contrast to governing doctrines that operate more at the tacit level as parameters for doctrinal formation. This is not to say that governing doctrines cannot be explicitly formed and known.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.,33, citing Robert S. Summers, ed., *Essays in Legal Philosophy* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1968),49.

35. The strength of such governing doctrines has shaped the Anglican fundamental articles tradition in its conventionally recognised form. The classic expression of their force is found in Newman's *Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church* (1837), esp. lectures 2, 8, 9, 10. The apologetic motif was central "for unless we can appeal to the past, how can we condemn the present?" See Newman on "Palmer's View of Faith and Unity" in *Essays Critical and Historical*, I: 212. Cf. Congar's criticism of such criteria in *Diversity and Communion:* "But one cannot stop the life of the church in the truth at a past moment of its history," 124. Cf. discussion on H. McAdoo in chap.1 for a modern exponent of the 'preservative' tradition in Anglican theology.

36. See Christian, *Doctrine of Religious Communities*, 179 and for further examples derived from Anglican formularies see 87ff, 176ff.

37. Ibid., 179.

38. p.77.

39. Chap.3 p.77 and 79.

40. See e.g. chap.4 p.106ff and chap.5 on John Locke.

41. For Newman the Anglican and Palmer, the appeal to tradition in fundamental belief went hand in hand with their heavy investment in an episcopally ordered church. Both provided a bulwark against rationalism. See Sykes and Gilley, "'No Bishop, No Church!' The Tractarian Impact On Anglicanism".

42. See chap.6 p.190ff.

43. Mozley, *A Review of the Baptismal Controversy*, 2ff.

44. "Discourse of Fundamentals", Works,V: 76.

45. *A Review of the Baptismal Controversy*, 1.

46. Ibid., 2.

47. Cf. Sykes, *Integrity*, chap.5; Bryant ed., *The Future of Anglican Theology*; Avis, *Ecumenical Theology*; and more recently H. McAdoo, "The Influence of the Seventeenth century on Contemporary Anglican Understanding of the purpose and functioning of Authority in the Church". All these writings can be understood in terms of the search for and clarification of the operation of governing doctrines in Anglicanism. For example, discussion of Anglican methodology in terms of a 'synthesis' of disparate elements, or 'symbiosis' ("the permanent union between organisms each of which depends for its existence on the other" [McAdoo, *The Unity of Anglicanism*, 73]), or of 'polarity', i.e. truths in tension (Avis, *Ecumenical Theology*, 122ff.), propose guidelines for determining the way a community is to hold and express its truth concerns. Sykes, *Identity*, draws attention to the priority of worship as that "theatre in which doctrine, ethics, myth, social embodiment,

ritual and inward experience are integrally related", 267. The implicit governing doctrine here concerns both the 'what' and the 'how' of belief, i.e. authentic belief must admit of being actualised in Christian worship.

48. Cf. The discussion in chap.1 of McAdoo's handling of fundamentals. By extolling the 'Classical' method McAdoo assumes he has also identified the content of fundamental belief. However, in his repeated attempts to propound the 'Classical' view of the 'hapax' - the faith once delivered - McAdoo presents a highly simplified way of treating Christian doctrine and its development. When rules are viewed primarily in their preservative function there is always the tacit assumption that following the rule will lead to a form of faith already assumed to be the case. This can only lead to anxiety and preoccupation with getting the method correct, i.e. identifying the correct 'rule' to follow.

49. This might be a problem in Stephen Sykes' discussion of 'formal definition' of Christianity, which describes not so much *content* but *context* of Christian believing. See chap.1.41f.

50. Perhaps the real issue here lies in the tacit assumption that questions of theological method, - i.e. matters to do with governing doctrines - can be discussed without reference to matters of theological content. In fact questions of method and content co-inhere; attention to one implies and provokes concern for the other. However, when questions of methodology are discussed as though the issue of content had already been settled, then methodological inquiry simply operates in the service of maintaining the *status quo*. The interrelatedness between method and content is undermined, and continued preoccupation with methodology thwarts more constructive and self-critical theological discourse. See further, Sykes, *Integrity,* chap.5 and esp. e.g. his comments on Richard Hanson's view of comprehensiveness (69f), in which Sykes discerns a failure to integrate method and content in theology.

51. Christian, *Doctrines of Religious Communities,*

52. This classification has a certain artificiality, however it does represent an attempt to open up more fully the dynamics of how an institution's doctrinal structure operates to maintain the institution's truth concerns. See Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine,* for a reference to 'operational' doctrines which later become 'official',75.

53. See chap.3 p.85f.

54. From the statement of the Anglican-Lutheran International Continuation Committee, Wimbleton, 1986 report; Appendix III, sec14(d) of *The Niagara Report.*

55. See chap.7 p.240ff.

56. See chap.4 p.109.

57. See chap.4 p.109f.

58. See Allison, *The Rise of Moralism*, 96-106.

59. The uncharted territory of the emergence of 'conditional' covenant theology in Anglicanism from the mid-seventeenth century was

briefly touched on in the discussion of Locke's doctrine of justification. See chap.5 p.131f and en.127, 128, 129.

60. Ibid.

61. Chap.8, p.261f.

62. Classification according to type is implicit in Christian's analysis and Lindbeck's reference to operational doctrines that later become official. In Lindbeck this development is referred to as a shift from implicit to explicit belief. Cf. also Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 295-299. In this study the question of *type* of doctrine is important in considering the way in which communication is achieved through doctrine.

63. Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition*, V: 282.

64. "Analyzing its institutions; man discovered that he has always been creating them.... And now these institutions impose claims and obligations upon man, even though he seems to be their creator and master. Obligation and existence seem to be synchronized in institutions....". Wolf-Dieter Marsch "The Concept of Institution in the Light of Sociology and Theology" in N. Ehrenstrom and W. Muelder eds., *Institutionalism and Church Unity* (London: SCM, 1963), 39.

65. *Doctrines of Religious Communities*, 2.

66. See on Luke 17: 21, I. Howard Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke* (Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1978), 655f.

67. Farley, *Ecclesial Man*, 169-174.

68. Thus for Bonhoeffer, a person's hearing of God's call is at the same time a hearing of the call of the other person. The social acts in which people recognise and respond to the needs of others are constitutive of the community of love. See *Sanctorum Communio*, esp. 126-136.

69. In this respect Mary Douglas refers to "the saving of energy from institutional coding and inertia". The point being that frequent use 'makes some words hardy' and partially resistent to constant change. Thus she notes: "Thanks to the weight of institutional inertia, shifting images are held steady enough for communication to be possible" (*How Institutions Think*, 63). Thus the encoding of complexity in institutions through rendering the undefined into more determinate forms, provides the possibility for more economical communication of information in an institution.

70. Farley, *Ecclesial Man*, 176ff; and cf. *Ecclesial Reflection*, 88-92, and chap.12.

71. Cf. Ronald Modras, "Creedal Statements: Functions and Limitations", in H.Kung and J. Moltmann eds., *An Ecumenical Confession of Faith*, *Concilium* CXVIII (1979): 36-44.

72. Thus the tradition indicates the boundary contours of safe beliefs and tacitly indicates in what direction 'danger-beliefs' might lie in regard to matters of social cohesion and control. See further on institutional boundary making and its significance (including 'danger-beliefs'), Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger: an Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (London: Routledge & Kegan

Paul,1966), intro. and chap.7. See also John Bowker, "Religions as Systems" in *Believing in the Church,* for a recent attempt to describe the operation of the concept of boundary in system development.

73. See chap.11 p.325.

74. John Locke, *A Third Letter on Toleration,* cited in Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge,* 266.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid. Cf. for a more qualified assessment of Locke's contribution to this state of affairs, S.N. Williams, "John Locke on the Status of Faith" (see chap.5 en.8).

77. The reduction of belief to the status of personal choice was recognised by Newman as the corollary of the rejection of the dogmatic principle. The result of such a false view was: "That truth and falsehood in religion are but matter of opinion: that the Governor of the world does not intend that we should gain the truth; that there is no truth; that we are not more acceptable to God by believing this than by believing that; that no one is answerable for his opinions; that they are a matter of necessity or accident; that it is enough if we sincerely hold what we profess; that our merit lies in seeking, not in possessing; that it is a duty to follow what seems to us true, without a fear lest it should not be true; that it may be a gain to succeed, and can be no harm to fail; that we may take up and lay down opinions at pleasure; that belief belongs to the merely intellect, not to the heart; that we may safely trust ourselves in matters of Faith, and need no other guide, - this is the principle of philosophies and heresies, which is very weakness". See *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (1845), Cameron ed., 357.

78. This strategy is exemplified in the writings of Don Cupitt. In the interests of personal freedom from traditionalist oppressive views of a God 'out-there', Cupitt ends up denying the legitimacy of those views different from his own. He begins with a highly *inclusivist* approach and maintains it by 'squeezing out' a whole range of options that he considers distorted. (See esp. *Life Lines*). In such radical liberal individualism any notion of a *community* of faith evaporates. See chap.10 p.301f.

79. For example, Hans Kung, *On Being a Christian* (Collins Fount Paperbacks, 1978) states that "*whether* he [Jesus Christ] is in fact to be the model for me is a *wholly* (my italics) personal question. It will depend on my wholly personal decision", 515. In the context Kung means 'wholly' in the sense of free from any constraints whatsoever. It is an idealised view and supports Kung's unsympathetic handling of the doctrine of the Trinity (472-478). In the issue of 'wholly personal decisions' this doctrine can be, it seems, disregarded.

80. The significance which is attached to believing as a source of social unity might, for example, be indicated by the *tone* of a controversy: "The tone of a controversy is a direct indication of the hearts of the controversialists. How controversialists argue has a close bearing upon what is intended in Jesus' achievement" (Sykes, *Identity,* 260). In this case the 'tone' might indicate whether what was affirmed or denied in controversy was actually

considered to determine social bonds. However, it is also the case that the *placement* of belief *per se* is suggestive of its secondary significance for institutional cohesion. Believing in large measure concerns one's personal convictions, choices made, but, it seems, unrelated to the enduring life of a community: "For the life of faith is shaped not by a set of clear-cut beliefs, but by a whole rich tradition of imagery, of worship, and of patterns of life and conduct. It is these that provide the assurance, the deepening and the direction that man needs". See Maurice Wiles' essay in *Christian Believing*, Doctrine Commission of the Church of England, 131; and cf. Wiles, *Explorations in Theology* No.4. (London: SCM, 1979), 12.

81. See pp.275-280.

82. See chap.9 of this thesis, 'Loss of Capacity'. The problem is nicely encapsulated by Maurice Wiles in *Explorations in Theology:* "But the only ultimate security is in God himself. Other things - buildings, institutions, formularies - *may help to mediate* the reality of God's eternal changelessness to us. But none of them, however good, must be allowed the absoluteness that belongs to God alone. That is idolatry", 12 (my italics). What is neatly sidesteped in such arguments is precisely how mediation works and 'how good' it is, issues not pursued by Wiles.

83. This is exemplified in the structure of the report of the Doctrine Commission of the Church of England, *Christian Believing*, in which individual essays accounted for almost 100 of the 156 pages of the report.

84. The possibility of identifying 'normative doctrine' is grounded for Lonergan in the constitution of human community in shared or 'common meaning.' Such common meaning requires a common field of experience, complementary ways of understanding, common judgements, values, goals and policies. The genesis of common meaning is "an ongoing process of communication, of people coming to share the same cognitive, constitutive and effective meanings". In this way Lonergan suggests common meaning 'constitutes' community and divergent meaning divides it. See *Method in Theology*, 356ff.

However exactly how such 'common meaning' assumes normative form is controversial. The 'Excursus' on the genre of regulative communication in chap.11 highlighted the dynamic involved between common meaning and normative forms, e.g. Ritschl's analysis of 'regulative statements.' In a 'post' - or 'late modern' context the search for normative belief appears highly problematic given the difficulty of identifying a substratum of 'common meaning'. For one way of dealing with this see Edward Schillebeckx, *The Understanding of Faith* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1974), 55-70. The author develops a notion of the 'proportional norm' for orthodoxy, i.e. "models of structurisation of faith, of which the scripture supplies the first and therefore the normative ones", 62. This theoretical norm requires the criterion of Christian orthopraxis. This "is not a consequence of a previously given, communal unity of faith, but the manner in which such a communal unity and conviction is realized", 68. Normative belief is achieved in right practice. This does not lessen the importance of the question of the theoretical norm, but it does bring into focus the issue of how consensus in faith ought to be construed. Farley's proposals in *Ecclesial Reflection* represent one strategy for normative statements in theology following the collapse of the traditional 'house of authority'.

85. Luhmann, *The Sociology of Law,* 51 and his discussion generally 51-55, 73f.

86. P.62f.

87. See Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition,* V: 235-242 (Dort), 274-290 (Trent).

88. Luhmann, *The Sociology of Law,* 51.

89. Luhmann's pragmatic realism leads him to state that institutions "do not depend on actual agreement between determinate expressions of opinion, but on their successful overestimation. Their continuity is guaranteed, as long as more or less everyone presumes that everyone agrees; possibly even when nearly everyone presumes that nearly everyone presumes that nearly everyone agrees" (ibid., 55). This suggests that with increasing social complexity, institutional stability requires the successful "concealment of the actual chances of consensus"(55), or more positively the strengthening of *anticipations* of consensus. The fact that actual consensus is rare means for Luhmann that institutional homogeneity is largely fictional and thus highly sensitive to the communication of facts.

90. For Luhmann the consensus ideal cannot be simply directed to increasing factual consensus: "With the institutionalization of behavioural expectations it is only a matter of the better use of a minimal degree of concurrent and equivalent experience, distributing it equally to the socially important bearers of meaning and forces making consensus expectable and available on demand. But more than anything else it is a matter of covering the existing preparedness for consensus, so that the 'general societal consensus' needs only to be matched in certain respects and moments by the actual experience of some people" (ibid., 51). Luhmann concludes that "the function of institutions depends, therefore, less on the creation than on the economy of consensus". The saving is achieved mainly by anticipated consensus in the expectation of expectations, acting as a presumption and not normally even requiring a concrete test".

91. Cf. e.g. Avis, *Anglicanism and the Christian Church,* 306, where the author is critical of 'undialectical notions of consensus' he discerns in recent ecumenical dialogue. He proposes a dialectical concept of consensus which he finds implicit in the idea of fundamental articles in Anglicanism.

92. See chap.3 p.79.

93. Ibid., p.75f.

94. Ibid., p.89.

95. For example see chap.4 pp.99ff, chap.5 pp.151ff on toleration, and chap.8 pp.269ff, for Stillingfleet, Locke and Maurice.

96. See e.g. chap.8 p.273f; cf. chap.11 p.335f on Maurice and the notion of hierarchy in theology.

97. See chap.4 pp.91-95.

98. In chap.4 p.97 Laud's 'wooden' handling of the fundamental articles was referred to. In chap.6 Waterland's treatment of the tradition was dominated by the notion of Covenant and law.

99. See chap.8 on Newman and his Anglican critics. Cf. discussion in chap.10 pp.298-300 and 302-304. on 'classical' and 'modified' propositional theories of doctrine.

100. *Ecclesial Reflection.*, 318.

101. Ibid.

102. *Ecclesial Man.*, 119.

103. Ibid., 125 and generally 119-126.

104. Ibid., 117.

105. Ibid., 118.

106. Ibid.; cf. *Ecclesial Reflection;* 'primary symbol' (321), 'fundamental imagery' (325).

107. *Ecclesial Man.*, 118.

108. Ibid., 120.

109. Ibid., 121.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid., 121f.

113. Ibid.; cf. *Ecclesial Reflection,* 293f, on the truth intention in doctrine.

114. *Ecclesial Man.*, 122.

115. Ibid.

116. *Ecclesial Reflection,* 246.

117. Ibid., 251, 295.

118. Ibid., 293ff.

119. Ibid., 291f; cf. 329.

120. In *Ecclesial Man* Farley talks about 'translation' (124). In *Ecclesial Reflection* this is further clarified as 'linkage' creation, 318. Reconstitution is thus achieved in this 'linkaging' process, i.e. doctrinalization.

121. *Ecclesial Reflection,* 247.

122. Ibid., 292.

123. Ibid., 247.

124. Ibid., 329f.

125. Ibid., 296-298.

126. See chap.11 en.40.

127. For Farley in *Ecclesial Reflection*, this manoeuvre belongs to what he terms the 'house of authority' in which the authoritative carriers of redemptive existence have become identified as its locus. See esp. chaps.4 and 5.

128. Ibid., 248: "The self-identity of ecclesial existence is not so much a cluster of ideas as a genre of historical being, and it has obtained expression in a sedimented linguistic deposit.... The continuity of ecclesial existence is that self-identity as it transforms various provincial spaces and thereafter obtains *solidification* of the new, transformed space".

129. The phrase is Colin Gunton's in his essay "The Church on Earth: The Roots of Community" in Gunton and Hardy eds., *On Being the Church*, 79.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

AARON, R.I. *John Locke.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.

ALLCHIN, A.M. "Anglican Spirituality" in Sykes and Booty eds. *The Study of Anglicanism*; below.

ALLEN, L. *John Henry Newman and Abbé Jager.* London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.

ALLISON, C.F. *The Rise of Moralism: The Proclamation of the Gospel from Hooker to Baxter.* London: SPCK, 1966.

ANDREWES, L. *A Pattern of Catechistical Doctrine, and other Minor Works.* Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology. Oxford: J.H. Parker, 1846.

ANGLICAN-LUTHERAN DIALOGUE. The Report of the Anglican-Lutheran European Regional Commission, Helsinki, 1982. London: SPCK, 1983.

_____ *Anglican-Lutheran Relations.* Report of the Anglican-Lutheran Joint Working Group, Cold Ash, 1983. London and Geneva: Anglican Consultative Council and Lutheran World Federation, 1983.

_____ *The Niagara Report.* Report of the Anglican-Lutheran Consultation on Episcope, 1987. London and Geneva: Anglican Consultative Council and Lutheran World Federation, 1988.

ANGLICAN-LUTHERAN-REFORMED. *On the Way to Visible Unity.* Meissen, 1988. London: Church House Pub., 1988.

ANGLICAN-ORTHODOX DIALOGUE. *The Moscow Agreed Statement* (1976). London: SPCK, 1977.

_____ *The Dublin Agreed Statement* (1984). London: SPCK, 1985.

ANGLICAN-REFORMED DIALOGUE. *God's Reign and Our Unity.* The Report of the Anglican-Reformed International Commission 1981-84. London and Edinburgh: SPCK and The Saint Andrew Press, 1984.

ANGLICAN-ROMAN CATHOLIC INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION. *The Final Report.* London: Catholic Truth Society and SPCK, 1981.

_____ *Salvation and the Church* (1987). ARCIC II with commentary and study guide by M. Cecily Boulding and T. Bradshaw. London: Church House Pub., and C.T.S., 1989.

AQUINAS. *Summa Theologia.* Ia, I,a.1-8, (Vol.I); 2a.2ae. I,a.1-10 and 2,a.1-10 (Vol. XXXI). Various eds. London: Blackfriars and Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1964-74.

ASHCRAFT, R. "Faith and Knowledge in Locke's Philosophy" in J. Yolton ed. *John Locke: Problems and Perspectives.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.

AVIS, P. "The 'True Church', in Reformation Theology", *Scottish Journal of Theology* XXX (1977): 319-345.

AVIS, P. Ecumenical Theology and the Elusiveness of Doctrine. London: SPCK, 1986.

AVIS, P. *The Methods of Modern Theology: The Dream of Reason.* Basingstoke, England: Marshall Pickering, 1986.

_____ *Anglicanism and the Christian Church.* Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1989.

_____ *The Church in the Theology of the Reformers.* London: Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 1981.

BAINTON, R. "Erasmus and the Wesen des Christentums" in G. Muller and W. Zellor, eds. *Glaube Geist Geschichte. Festschrift für Ernst Benz.* Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967.

BAIRD, A.C. *Christian Fundamentals: A Modern Apology for the Apostles' Creed.* Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1926.

BAKER, J. Unpublished paper on the Anglican position with respect to the hierarchy of truths. Conference at Regensburg on Church Unity and the Hierarchy of truths, 1979. For Academie Internationale des Sciences Religeuses.

BARKER, S.F. "On Simplicity in Empirical Hypotheses", *Philosophy of Science* XXVIII/2 (1962): 162-171.

BARRETT, L.C. "Theology as Grammar: Regulative Principles or Paradigms and Practices", *Modern Theology* IV/2 (Jan. 1988): 153-172.

BARTH, J.R. *Coleridge and Christian Doctrine.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969.

_____ *The Symbolic Imagination: Coleridge and the Romantic Tradition.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.

BARTH, K. *Church Dogmatics.* G. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance eds., Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1956-78. I/2, 853-885; II/1, 351-677; III/2, 320-34; IV/2, 614-726.

BATE, H.N. ed. *Faith and Order*: Proceedings of the World Conference, Lusanne, August 3-21, 1927. London: SCM, 1927.

BAUM, G. and A. GREELY eds. *The Church as Institution. Concilium* XCI (1974).

_____ *Communication in the Church. Concilium* CXI (1978).

BENNETT, G.V. "Patristic Tradition in Anglican Thought, 1660-1900", *Oecumenica* 1971/72, 63-87.

BERKOUWER, G.C. *The Church.* Dutch 1970-72, trans. J.E. Davison. Grand Rapids, Michigan: W.B. Eerdmans Pub., Co., 1976.

BERNSTEIN, R. *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983.

BICKNELL, E.J. *A Theological Introduction to the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England.* London: Longmans, Green and Co., new imp. 1944.

BIDDLE, J.C. "Locke's Critique of Innate Principles and Toland's Deism", *Journal of the History of Ideas* XXXVII (July-Sept 1976): 411-17.

BONDS OF AFFECTION. Proceedings of the Anglican Consultative Council - 6. London: Anglican Consultative Council, 1984.

BONHOEFFER, D. *Sanctorum Communio: A Dogmatic Inquiry into the Sociology of the Church.* London: Collins, 1963.

BONJOUR, L. *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.* Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1985.

BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER (1662).

BOOTY, J. *John Jewel as Apologist of the Church of England.* London: SPCK, 1963.

BOFF, L. *Trinity and Society.* Trans. P. Burns. London: Burns and Oates, 1988.

BOULGER, J.D. *Coleridge as Religious Thinker.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.

BOWKER, J. "Religions as Systems" in *Believing in the Church.* Report of the Doctrine Commission of the Church of England, 1981; below.

BOUYER, L. *A History of Christian Spriritualityy* Vol.III *Orthodox Spirituality and Protestant and Anglican Spirituality.* London and Tunbridge Wells: Burns and Oates, 1968.

BRANDRETH, H.R.T. *The Oecumenical Ideals of the Oxford Movement.* London: SPCK, 1947.

BREHIER, E. *The Seventeenth Century.* Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1966.

BRIGGS, C.A. *The Fundamental Christian Faith: The Origin, History and Interpretation of the Apostles' and Nicene Creed.* Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1913.

BRINKLEY, R.F. *Coleridge on the Seventeenth Century.* Duke University Press, 1955.

BRYANT, M.D. ed. *The Future of Anglican Theology.* Toronto Studies in Theology XVII. New York and Toronto: Edwin Mellen Press, 1984.

BUCKLEY, J.J. "Revisionists and Liberals" in D. Ford ed., *The Modern Theologians.* Vol.II; below.

BULL, G.A. *Defence of the Nicene Faith* (1685). Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology. Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1852.

BUNGE, M. "The Weight of Simplicity in the Construction and Assaying of Scientific Theories", *Philosophy of Science* XXVIII/2 (1961): 120-149.

_____ The Myth of Simplicity: Problems of Scientific Philosophy. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963.

_____ "The Metaphysics, Epistemology and Methodology of Levels in Hierarchical Structures" in L.L. Whyte et al. *Hierarchical Structures*; below.

BURNETT, G. *Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England* (1699). Rev. ed. J.R. Page. London: Adam Scott, 1847.

BUTLER, P. "From the Early Eighteenth Century to the Present Day" in Sykes and Booty eds. *The Study of Anglicanism*; below.

BUTLER, W.A. *Letters on the Development of Christian Doctrine, in Reply to Mr Newman's Essay.* T. Woodward. ed. Dublin, 1850.

CALVIN, J. *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (1562). The Library of Christian Classics XX and XXI. J.T. McNeill ed. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960.

CHADWICK, H. "Einigkert in den fundamentalen Glaubensartiken", Theologische Quartalschrift CL (1970): 396-402.

_____ "Unity and Pluralism" in M. Gourges and G.D. Mailhiot eds. *L'Altérité; Vivre ensemble différénts.* Actues de colloque (Ottawa 4-6 Oct.1984). *Recherches Nouvelle Série* - 7, 1986.

_____ "Tradition, Fathers and Councils" in Sykes and Booty eds. *The Study of Anglicanism*; below.

CHILLINGWORTH, W. *The Religion of Protestants A Safe Way to Salvation* (1638). London, 1664.

CHIRICO, P.F. "Article of Faith", *New Catholic Encyclopedia.* Vol.I:922. Washington: McGraw Hill, 1967.

CHRISTENSEN, T. *The Divine Order: A Study in F.D. Maurice's Theology.* Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973.

CHRISTIAN Sr., W.A. *Doctrines of Religious Communities: A Philosophical Study.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987.

COLERIDGE, S.T. *Aids to Reflection* and *The Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit* to which are added his *Essay on Faith* and the *Book of Common Prayer.* Bohn's Standard Library. London: George Bell and Sons, 1893.

COLLINGWOOD, R.G. *The Idea of Nature.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945.

COLLINSON, P. "Calvinism with an Anglican Face: The Stranger Churches in Early Elizabethan London and their Superintendent", in D. Baker ed., *Reform and Reformation: England and the Continent c1500-c1750.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979.

CONGAR, Y. "Excursus B, Scripture and the 'Truths Necessary for Salvation'" in *Tradition and Traditions.* London: Burns and Oates, 1966.

_____ "Articles Fondamentaux", *Catholicisme.* Vol.I: 882f. Paris, 1948.

_____ *A History of Theology.* Trans. H. Guthrie. New York: Doubleday, 1968.

_____ "On the 'Hierarchia Veritatum'" in D. Neiman and M. Schatkin. eds. *The Heritage of the Early Church: Essays in Honour of G. Florovsky.* Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 195. Rome, 1973.

CONGAR, Y. "Ecclesiology", *The Encyclopedia of Religion.* Vol.III: 480-89. Mircea Eliade ed-in-chief. New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1977.

_____ *Communion and Diversity.* French 1982; trans. J. Bowden. London: SCM, 1984.

COULSON, J. *Newman and the Common Tradition: A Study in the Language of Church and Society.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.

CRAGG, G.R. *The Church in the Age of Reason 1648-1789.* The Pelican History of the Church IV. Hodder and Stoughton, 1960.

_____ *Reason and Authority in the Eighteenth Century.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964.

_____ *From Puritanism to the Age of Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950).

CROCKETT, W. "The Hermeneutics of Doctrine" in Bryant ed. *The Future of Anglican Theology*; above.

CULLMANN, D. *Unity Through Diversity: Its Foundation, and a contribution to the Discussion concerning the possibilities of its Actualization.* trans. M. Eugene Boring. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988.

CUPITT, D. *Life Lines.* London: SCM, 1986.

_____ *Taking Leave of God.* London: SCM, 1986.

DAVENANT, J. *Exhortation to Brotherly Communion betwixt the Protestant Churches.* London, 1640.

DAVIES, J.G. *The Theology of William Blake.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948.

DICKENS, A.G. *The English Reformation.* Rev. ed. London and Glasgow: Collins, 1967.

DICTIONARY *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary.* 3rd ed. London: Guild Pub., 1983.

DOCTRINE COMMISSION OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND. *Doctrine in the Church of England (1938 Report).* Rep. and intro. by G.W.H. Lampe. London: SPCK, 1982.

_____ *Christian Believing: The Nature of the Christian Faith and its Expression in Holy Scripture and Creeds.* London: SPCK, 1976.

_____ *Believing in the Church: The Corporate Nature of Faith.* London: SPCK, 1981.

DOMBOIS, H. "The Church as Koinonia and Institution" in N. Ehrenstrom and W.G. Muelder eds. *Institutionalism and Church Unity.* London: SCM, 1963.

DOUGLAS, M. *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of concepts of Pollution and Taboo.* London: Routledge and Keegan Pub., 1966.

_____ *How Institutions Think.* New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986.

DULLES, A. *Models of the Church.* Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1976.

_____ "Paths to Doctrinal Agreement: Ten Theses", *Theological Studies* XLVII (1986): 32-47.

DUNN. J.D.G. *Unity and Diversity in the New Testament: An Inquiry into the Character of Earliest Christianity.* London: SCM, 1977.

_____ "Was Christianity a Monotheistic Faith from the Beginning", *Scottish Journal of Theology* XXXV (1982): 303-36.

DUNN, J. *The Political Thought of John Locke.* Cambridge: Cambridge Universtity Press, 1969.
—— LOCKE. Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1984.

ELTON, G. *Reform and Reformation: England 1509-1558.* London: Edward Arnold, 1977.

ELTON, O. *A Survey of English Literature 1730-1780.* London: Edward Arnold and Co., 1928.

ENGELLS, J. *The Creative Imagination: Enlightenment to Romanticism.* London and Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981.

EVANS, R.J. *One and Holy: The Church in Latin Patristic Thought.* London: SPCK, 1972.

FARLEY, E. *Ecclesial Man: A Social Phenomenology of Faith and Reality.* Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975.

_____ *Ecclesial Reflection: An Anatomy of Theological Method.* Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982.

FERGUSON, J.P. *An Eighteenth Century Heretic Dr. Samuel Clarke.* Kineton, England: Roundwood Press, 1976.

FIELD, R. *Of the Church.* Five books. (1606-1610). 3rd ed.(1635) rep. in 4 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1847-52.

FLEW, R.N. *The Idea of Perfection in Christian Theology.* London: Oxford University Press, 1934.

FORD, D. ed. *The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian theology in the twentieth century.* 2 vols. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989.

_____ "Barth's Interpretation of the Bible" in S.W. Sykes ed. *Karl Barth: Studies of his Theological Methods*; below.

FRAENKEL, P. *Testimonia Patrum: The Function of the Patristic Agreement in the Theology of Philip Melancthon.* Geneva, 1961.

FREI, H.W. *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974.

FRIES, H. and RAHNER, K. *Unity of the Churches: An Actual Possibility.* Trans. R.C.L. and E.W. Gritsch. New York and Philadelphia: Paulist and Fortress Presses, 1985.

FRITH, J. "The Articles Wherefore John Frith Died" in N.T. Wright ed. and intro. *The Works of John Frith.* The Courtenay Library of Reformation Classics. Vol. VII. Sutton Courtenay Press, 1978.

GARDNER, P. *Exploratio Evangelica: A Survey of the Foundations of Christianity* (1899). 2nd. ed. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1907.

GERRISH, B. *The Old Protestantism and the New: Essays on the Reformation Heritage.* Chicago and Edinburgh: University of Chicago Press and T and T Clark, 1982.

_____ "Friedrick Schleiermacher" in N. Smart et al. eds. *Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West.* Vol.I of 3 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

GILKEY, L. *Naming the Whirlwind: The Renewal of God Language.* Indianopolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1969.

GOGAN, B. *The Common Corps of Christendom: Ecclesiological Themes in the Writings of Sir Thomas More.* Studies in the History of Christian Thought XXV. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1982.

GORE, C. "New Testament Criticism and Faith", *The Pilot* V (1901): 124-126, 153-154, 180-182, 209-211.

_____ ed. *Lux Mundi: A Series of Studies in the Religion of the Incarnation* (1889). London: John Murray, 1902.

_____ *The Basis of Anglican Fellowship in Faith and Organisation.* An Open letter to the Clergy of the Diocese of Oxford. London: Mowbray and Co. Ltd., 1914.

_____ *The Solidarity of the Faith.* Modern Oxford Tracts. London: Longmans Green and Co., 1914.

_____ *The Holy Spirit and the Church.* London: John Murray, 1924.

_____ "On Unity with Diversity", Addendum VII in W. Frere. *Recollections of Malines.* London: Century Press, 1935.

_____ *The Church and the Ministry* (1886). Rev. ed. London: SPCK, 1936.

GRANT, P. *The Literature of Mysticism in the Western Tradition.* London: Macmillan Press, 1983.

GRAUS, F. "The Crisis of the Middle Ages and the Hussites" in S.E. Ozment ed. *The Reformation in Medieval Perspective.* Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971.

GREEN, E.T. *The Thirty-Nine Articles and the Age of the Reformation.* London: Wells Gardner, Darton and Co., 1896.

GREENSLADE, S.L. "The Authority of the Tradition of the Early Church in Early Anglican Thought", *Oecumenica* (1971/72), 9-33.

GRISBROOKE, W.J. "The Nonjurors and William Law" in C. James, G. Wainwright and E. Yarnold eds. *The Study of Spirituality.* London: SPCK, 1986.

GUNTON, C. *Enlightenment and Alienation: An Essay towards a Trinitarian Theology.* Grand Rapids, Michigan: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1985.

_____ "The Truth of Christology" in T.F. Torrance ed. *Belief in Science and Christian Life*; below.

_____ "The Church on Earth: The Roots of Community" in Gunton and Hardy eds. *On Being the Church*; below.

GUNTON, C. and D.W. HARDY eds. *On Being the Church: Essays on the Christian Community.* Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1989.

HAIGH, C. "The Recent Historiography of the English Reformation", *The Historical Journal* XXV/4 (1982): 995-1007.

HALL, J. *The Old Religion* in P. Hall ed. *The Works of Joseph Hall.* Vol. IX of 12 vols. Oxford: D. A. Talboys, 1837.

HAMMOND, H. *Of Fundamentals, in a Notion Referring to Practice* (1654) in *The Miscellaneous Theological Works of Henry Hammond.* Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology. Vol. II of 4 vols. 1847-1850.

HANKEY, W.J. "Canon Law" in Sykes and Booty eds. *The Study of Anglicanism*; below.

HARDWICK, C. *A History of the Articles of Religion.* Cambridge: Deighton, Bell and Co., 1859.

HARDY, D.W. "Created and Redeemed Sociality" in Gunton and Hardy eds. *On Being the Church*; above.

_____ "Rationality, the Sciences and Theology" in G. Wainwright ed. *Keeping the Faith*; below.

_____ "Theology through Philosophy" in D. Ford ed. *The Modern Theologians.* Vol. II; above.

_____ "Thomas Torrance" in D. Ford ed. *The Modern Theologians*, Vol.I; above.

HARDY, D.W. and D. FORD. *Jubilate: Theology in Praise.* London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1984.

HART, R. L. *Unfinished Man and the Imagination: Toward an Ontology and a Rhetoric of Revelation.* New York: Herder and Herder, 1968.

HARTIN, J. "Catechisms" in Sykes and Booty eds. *The Study of Anglicanism*; below.

HASENHÜTTL, G. "Church and Institution" in Baum and Greely eds. *The Church as Institution*; above.

HAUGAARD, W.P. *Elizabeth and the English Reformation: The Struggle for a Stable Settlement of Religion.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.

_____ "From the Reformation to the Eighteenth Century" in Sykes and Booty eds. *The Study of Anglicanism*; below.

HAUERWAS, S. *A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Social Christian Ethic.* Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame, 1981.

HAWKINS, E. *A Dissertation Upon the Use and Importance of Unauthorative Tradition, as an Introduction to the Christian Doctrines: Including the substance of a Sermon, preached before the University of Oxford, May 31, 1818. Upon 2 Thess. 2:15.* Oxford, 1819.

HEADLAM, A.C. *Christian Unity.* London: SCM, 1930.

_____ *The Doctrine of the Church and Christian Reunion.* The Bampton Lectures 1920. London: John Murray, 1920.

HELM, P. "Locke on Faith and Knowledge", *Philosophical Quarterly* XXIII (1973): 52-66.

HENDRIX, S.H. "In Quest of the *Vera Ecclesia*: The Crises of Late Medieval Ecclesiology", *Viator: Medieval and Renaissance Studies* VII (1976): 347-378.

HILDEBRANDT, F. *Melancthon: Alien or Ally?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949.

HOBHOUSE, S. *Selected Mystical Writings of William Law.* London: C.W. Daniel Co. Ltd., 1938.

_____ *William Law and Eighteenth-Century Quakerism.* London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1927.

HOLTBY, R.T. *Daniel Waterland: A Study in Eighteenth Century Orthodoxy.* Carlisle: Charles Thurnam and Sons, 1966.

HOOKER, R. *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* (Books I to IV; 1593). Everyman ed. Vol. I of 2 vols. London and New York: J.M. Dent and E.P. Dutton, 1954.

_____ Sermon entitled "Learned Discourse of Justification, Works, and how the Foundation of Faith is Overthrown" in Everyman ed. *Ecclesiastical Polity.* Vol.I: 14-75.

HOPKINSON, A.W. *About William Law.* London: SPCK, 1948.

HOYLES, J. *The Edges of Augustanism: The Aesthetics of Spirituality in Thomas Ken, John Byrom and William Law.* International Archives of the History of Ideas LIII. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972.

INGE, W.R. "The Person of Christ" in *Contentio Veritatis: Essays in Constructive Theology.* By Six Tutors. London: John Murray, 1902.

_____ *Studies of English Mystics.* London: John Murray, 1906.

_____ *The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought.* The Hulsean Lectures 1925-26. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1926.

_____ *Christian Mysticism.* The Bampton Lectures 1899. 4th ed. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1918.

_____ *Mysticism in Religion.* London: Rider and Co., 1969.

INGE, W.R. *Outspoken Essays. First Series.* London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1924.

JEBB, J. *Peculiar Character of the Church of England as distinguished both from other branches of the Reformation, and from the modern Church of Rome.* London: Rivingtons, 1939.

JEWEL, J. *Apologia Ecclesiae Anglicanae. An Apology of the Church of England. The Defence of the Apology, Parts* I - III. The Works of John Jewel. Vol. III. J. Ayre ed. The Parker Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1848.

JOEST, W. "Fundamentalartikel", *Theologische Realenzyklopädie.* Vol. XI:727-32. Berlin and New York, 1983.

JOHNSON, M.S. *Locke on Freedom: An Incisive Study of the Thought of John Locke.* Austin, Texas: Best Printing Co., 1977.

JONES, R. *The Testimony of the Soul.* New York: Macmillan and Co., 1936.

JONGE C. De "Franciscus Junius (1545-1602) and the English separatists at Amsterdam" in D. Baker ed. *Reform and Reformation: England and the Continent c1500-c1750.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979.

JOYCE, G.H. "Fundamental Articles", *Catholic Encyclopedia.* Vol.IV: 319-321. New York, 1913.

JUNGEL, E. *God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the Theology of the Crucified One in the Dispute between Theism and Atheism* Trans. D.L. Guder. Grand Rapids, Michigan: W.B. Eerdmans Pub., 1983.

KANT, I. *Critique of Pure Reason.* Trans. N.K. Smith. London: Macmillan, 1933.

KANTZENBACH, F.W. "Das Theologische Problem der Fundermentalartikel", *Lutherische Monatshefte* I (1962): 542-547.

_____ "Fundamental Articles", *The Encyclopedia of the Lutheran Church.* Vol. II: 893-95. J. Bodensieck ed. Minneapolis and Minnesota: Augsburg Pubs., 1965.

KATO, T. "*The Reasonableness* in the Historical Light of the *Essay*", *The Locke Newsletter* XII (1981): 45-49.

KAUFMANN, F. "The Church as a Religious Institution" in Baum and Greely, eds. *The Church as Institution*; above.

KELLY, J.N.D. *Early Christian Creeds.* 3rd ed. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1972.

KELSEY, D. *The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology.* London: SCM, 1975.

_____ "Human Being" in P.C. Hodgson and R.H. King eds. *Christian Theology: An Introduction to its traditions and Tasks.* London: SCM, 1988.

KERR, F. *Theology After Wittgenstein.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.

KIERKEGAARD, S. *The Parables of Kierkegaard.* T. Cohen ed. and intro. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978.

KINNAMON, M. *Truth and Community: Diversity and its Limits in the Ecumenical Movement.* Geneva and Grand Rapids, Michigan: World Council of Churches and W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1988.

KUNG, H. *On Being a Christian.* Collins Fount Paperbacks, 1979.

KRUGER, L. "The Concept of Experience in John Locke" in R. Brandt ed. *John Locke Symposium Wolfenbuttel 1979.* Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1981.

LAMBETH CONFERENCE. *The Truth Shall Make You Free. The Lambeth Conference* 1988. London: Anglican Consultative Council, 1988.

_____ *The Lambeth Conference* 1968. London: Anglican Consultative Council, 1968.

LAMPE, G.W.H. "Christian Theology in the Patristic Period" in H. Cunliffe-Jones ed. *A History of Christian Doctrine.* Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1978.

LANGFORD, T.A. *In Search of Foundations: English Theology 1900-1920.* Nashville, New York: Abingdon Press, 1969.

LASH, N. *Newman on Development. The Search for an Explanation in History.* London: Sheed and Ward, 1975.

_____ *Easter in Ordinary: Reflections on Human Experience and the Knowledge of God.* London: SCM, 1988.

LASH, S. "Economy" in A. Richardson and J. Bowden eds. *A New Dictionary of Christian Theology.* London: SCM, 1983.

LAUD, W. *A Relation of a Conference between William Laud and Mr Fisher the Jesuit.* New ed. with intro. and notes. C.H. Simpkinson. London and New York: Macmillan and Co., 1901.

LAW, W. *The Works of the Reverend William Law, M.A.* 9 Vols. London, 1762. Rep. privately for G. Moreton, 1893.

_____ *A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life: adapted to the State and Condition of all orders of Christians.* Ancient and Modern Library of Theological Literature X. London: Griffith Farran, Brown and Co. No date.

_____ *A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life and the Spirit of Love* in P. Standwood ed. with Preface by J. Booty and Intro. by A. Warren. *The Classics of Western Spirituality.* London: SPCK, 1978.

LAWLOR, F.X. "Church II (Theology of)", *New Catholic Encyclopedia.* Vol. III: 684-93. Washington: McGraw Hill, 1967.

LECLER, J. *Toleration and the Reformation.* 2 vols. London and New York: Longmans and Assoc. Press, 1960.

LEITH, J.H. *Creeds of the Churches.* Rev. ed. Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1973.

LERCH, J.R. "Ecclesiology", *New Catholic Encyclopedia.* Vol.IV: 34-35. Washington: McGraw Hill, 1967.

LEWALSKI, B.K. *Protestant Poetics and the Seventeenth Century Religious Lyric.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979.

LIMA DOCUMENT. *Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry:* Faith and Order Paper No.III. Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1982.

LINDBECK, G. "The Church" in G. Wainwright ed. *Keeping the Faith*; below.

_____ *The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Post Liberal Age.* London: SPCK, 1984.

LIVINGSTON, J.C. *Modern Christian Thought: From the Englightenment to Vatican II.* London and New York: Macmillan Pub., 1971.

LLOYD, C. ed. *Formularies of Faith 1536-1543.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1825.

LOCKE, J. *The Works of John Locke.* 10 Vols. 10th ed. London: Churchill and Manship, 1801.

_____ *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.* P.H. Nidditch ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

_____ *The Correspondence of John Locke.* E.S. De Beer ed. Vol. I of 8 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976.

LONERGAN, B. *Doctrinal Pluralism.* Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1971.

_____ *Method in Theology.* London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972.

LUEKER, E.L. ed. "Fundamental Doctrines" in *Lutheran Encyclopedia.* Rev. ed. London and St. Louis: Concordia, 1975.

LUHMANN, N. *A Sociological Theory of Law.* Trans. E. King and M. Albrow. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985.

_____ "Institutionalised Religion in the Perspective of Functional Sociology" in Baum and Greely eds. *The Church as Institution*; above.

McADOO, H. *The Spirit of Anglicanism: A Survey of Anglican Theological Method in the Seventeenth Century.* London: A and C Black. 1965.

_____ *The Unity of Anglicanism: Catholic and Reformed.* Wilton, Conneticut: Morehouse-Barlow Co.Inc., 1983.

_____ "Anglican/Roman Catholic Relations, 1717-1980. A 'Detection of Themes'" in D. Loades et al. eds. *Rome and the Anglicans: Historical and Doctrinal Aspects of Anglican-Roman Catholic Relations.* Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1982.

_____ "The Influence of the Seventeenth Century on Contemporary Anglican Understanding of the Purpose and Functioning of Authority in the Church" in G.R. Evans ed. *Christian Authority: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.

McCLINTOCK, J. and J. STRONG, "Fundamentals", *Encyclopedia of Biblical and Ecclesiastical Literature.* Vol.III: 693-94. New York: Harper and Brothers Pub., 1883.

McCONICA, J.K. *English Humanists and Reformation Politics Under Henry VIII and Edward VI.* Chap. 2. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965.

_____ "Erasmus and the Grammar of Consent" in J Coppens ed. *Scrinium Erasmianum.* Vol. I of 2 vols. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1969.

MACKINNON, D. Introduction to H.U. Von Balthasar, *Engagement with God.* Trans. J. Halliburton. London: SPCK, 1975.

_____ *Explorations in Theology.* No.5 London: SCM, 1979.

_____ *Themes in Theology: The Threefold Cord.* Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1987.

McNEILL, J.T. *Unitive Protestantism.* London: Epworth Press, 1964.

MARSCH, W. "The Concept of Institution in the Light of Sociology and Theology" in N. Ehrenstrom and W. Muelder eds. *Institutionalism and Church Unity.* London: SCM, 1963.

MARSHALL, I.H. *The Gospel of Luke.* Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1978.

MAJOR, H.D.A. *The Gospel of Freedom.* London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1912.

MAURICE, F. ed. *The Life of Frederick Denison Maurice Chiefly Told in His Own Letters.* 2 vols. 2nd. ed. London: Macmillan and Co., 1884.

MAURICE, F.D. *Subscription no Bondage - or the Practical advantages afforded by the Thirty-Nine Articles as Guides in all Branches of Academical Education...* by Rusticus. Oxford: J.H. Parker, 1835.

_____ *The Epistle to the Hebrews, Being the Substance of Three Lectures with a Preface Containing a Review of Mr Newman's Theory of Development.* London: J.W. Parker, 1846.

_____ *The Kingdom of Christ.* 1842 2nd. ed. 2 vols. London: James Clarke and Co., 1959.

MEDE, J. "Letters to Mr Hartlib" (1637) in J. Worthington ed. *The Works of Joseph Mede* in five books. Book IV. London, 1677.

METZGER, B.M. *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament.* London and New York: United Bible Societies, 1975.

MEYER, C.S. "Melancthon's Influence on English Thought in the Sixteenth Century", *Miscellanes Historiae Ecclesiasticae* II (1967): 163-185.

MEYER, H. "Fundamental Difference - Fundamental Consensus", *Midstream* XXV (1986): 247-259.

MIDGLEY, M. *Wisdom Information and Wonder: What is Knowledge For?* London and New York: Routledge, 1989.

MILTON, J.R. "John Locke and the Nominalist Tradition", in R. Brandt ed. *John Locke Symposium Wolfenbuttel 1979.* Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1981.

MODRAS, R. "Creedal Statements: Functions and Limitations" in H. Kung and J. Moltmann eds. *An Ecumenical Confession of Faith. Concilium* CXVIII (1979).

MÖHLER, J.A. *Symbolism: or Exposition of the Doctrinal Differences between Catholics and Protestants, as evidenced by their Symbolical Writings.* Trans. J.B. Robertson. Vol. I of 2 vols. London: Charles Dolman, 1843.

MOORE, J.T. "Locke on Assent and Toleration", *Journal of Religion* LVIII (Jan. 1978): 330-36.

MOORMAN, J.R.H. *The Anglican Spiritual Tradition.* London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1983.

MORE, P.E. "The Spirit of Anglicanism" in P.E. More and F.L. Cross eds. *Anglicanism: The Thought and Practice of the Church of England, illustrated from the Religious literature of the Seventeenth Century.* London: SPCK, 1935.

MORRALL, J. "Ockham and Ecclesiology" in J.A. Watt et al. eds. *Medieval Studies Presented to Aubrey Gwynn S.J.* Dublin: Colm Olochlainn, 1961.

MORTALIUM ANIMOS. *Encyclical Letter on Fostering True Religious Unity of our Most Holy Lord Pius XI* (6th Jan. 1927). In G.K.A. Bell, *Documents on Christian Unity.* Second series. London: Oxford University Press, 1930.

MORTON, T. *A Catholic Appeal for Protestants.* London, 1609.

MOUNTAGU, R. *Appello Caesarem: A Just Appeal from Two Unjust Informers* (1625).

MOZLEY, J. *A Review of the Baptismal Controversy (1865).* New ed. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1895.

_____ "Newman on Development", *Christian Remembrancer XIII* (1847): 117-265.

NASH, J.D. and GORE, C. *William Law's Defence of Church Principles.* London: Griffith Farran and Co., 1893.

NATURE OF CHRISTIAN BELIEF (THE). A Statement and Exposition by the House of Bishops of the General Synod of the Church of England. London: Church House Pub., 1986.

NEILL, S. *The Church and Christian Union.* The Bampton Lectures 1964. London: Oxford University Press, 1968.

NEWMAN, J.H. *The Arians of the Fourth Century* (1833). 5th ed. London: Pickering and Co., 1883.

_____ "Dr Wiseman's Lectures on The Catholic Church", *The British Critic, Quarterly Theological Review and Ecclesiastical Record* XX (1836): 373-403.

_____ "Tract 85 on 'Scripture and Creed'" in *Discussions and Agreements on Various Subjects.* London, 1873.

NEWMAN, J.H. *A Letter addressed to His Grace the Duke of Norfolk on the occasion of Mr Gladstone's recent Expostulation.* London: W. Pickering and Co., 1875.

_____ *Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church viewed relatively to Romanism and Popular Protestantism.* 3rd.ed. re-issued with Preface and Notes, *The Via Media of the Anglican Church.* Vol. I of 2 vols. London: Basil Montague Pickering, 1877.

_____ *Essays Historical and Critical.* Vol. I of 2 vols. 5th.ed. London: Pickering and Co., 1881.

_____ *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine.* 1878 ed. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1900.

_____ *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* (1864). Everyman ed. London: J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd., rep. 1949.

_____ Sermon on "The Theory of Developments in Religious Doctrine" in *Newman's University Sermons.* Intro. essays by D.M. Mackinnon and J.D. Holmes. London: SPCK, 1970.

_____ *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (1845). J.M. Cameron ed. Pelican Books, 1974.

_____ *The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman.* I. Kerr and T. Gornall, S.J. eds. Vol. VI. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1984.

NEWSOME, D. *Two Classes of Men: Platonism and English Romantic Thought.* London: John Murray, 1974.

NICHOLLS, D. "Newman's Anglican Critics", *Anglican Theological Review,* XLVII (1965): 377-395.

NIJENHUIS, W. *Ecclesia Reformata: Studies on the Reformation.* Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972.

NOCKLES, P. *Continuity and Changes in Anglican High Churchmanship in Britain 1792-1850.* Vol. I of 2 vols. Unpublished Ph.D. Oxford 1982.

NORRIS, R.A. "Episcopacy" in Sykes and Booty eds. *The Study of Anglicanism*; below.

NUTTALL, G.F. and O. CHADWICK. eds. *From Uniformity to Unity 1662-1962.* London: SPCK, 1962.

OAKLEY, F. "Christian Theology and the Newtonian Science: The Rise of the Concept of the Laws of Nature", *Church History* XXX (1961): 433-57.

OBERMAN, H. *The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought.* Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1986.

O'COLLINS, G. "Articles of Faith" in A. Richardson and J. Bowden eds. *A New Dictionary of Christian Theology.* London: SCM, 1983.

O'DEA, T. "Pathology and Renewal of Religious Institutions" in Baum and Greely eds. *The Church as Institution*; above.

O'DONOVAN, O. *On the Thirty-Nine Articles: A Conversation with Tudor Christianity.* Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1986.

ORR, R.R. *Reason and Authority: The Thought of William Chillingworth.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967.

OXFORD DICTIONARY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH (THE). F.L. Cross and E.A. Livingston eds. Sec. rev. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974.

PACKER, J.I. and R.T. BECKWITH. *The Thirty-Nine Articles: Their Place and Use Today.* Oxford: Latimer House, 1984.

PACKER, J.W. *The Transformation of Anglicanism 1643-1660: with special reference to Henry Hammond.* Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1969.

PALMER, W. *A Treatise on the Church of Christ.* 2 vols. London: J.G. and F. Rivington, 1838.

PANNENBERG, W. *Theology and the Philosophy of Science.* Trans. F. McDonagh. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976.

PAUL, R.S. "'A Way to Wyn them': Ecclesiology and Religion in the English Reformation" in B.A. Gerrish and R. Bernedette eds. *Reformation Perennis: Essays on Calvin and the Reformation. In Honour of Ford Lewis Battles.* Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: The Pickwick Press, 1981.

PEARSON, Jr., S.C. "The Religion of John Locke and the Character of His Thought", *Journal of Religion* LVIII (July 1978): 244-262.

PECK, M.S. *The Different Drum: Community- Making and Peace.* London, Melbourne, Auckland, Johannesburg: Rider Books, 1987.

PELIKAN, J. *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine.* 5 Vols. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1971-88.

PERKINS, W. A *Reformed Catholike* (1598) in I. Breward ed. *The Works of William Perkins.* The Courtenay Library of Reformation Classics III. Berkshire, England: Sutton Courtenay Press, 1970.

PERSSON, P.E. *Sacre Doctrina: Reason and Revelation in Aquinas.* Trans. R. Mackenzie. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. *Faith After Foundationalism.* London and New York: Routledge, 1988.

PLACHER, W.C. "Revisionists and Post Liberal Theologies", *The Thomist* XLIX (July 1985): 392-416.

POLANYI, M. *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983.

POLLARD, A. and M. HENNELL. eds. *Charles Simon: Essays Written in Commemoration of his Bi-Centenary by Members of the Evangelical Fellowship for Theological Literature.* London: SPCK, 1959.

POPPER, K. *The Logic of Scientific Discovery.* 2nd. ed. New York and London: Hutchinson and Co., 1960.

POTTER, C. *Want of Charity justly charged on all such Romanists as dare affirm that Protestancy destroyeth Salvation.* London, 1633.

PREUS, R.D. *The Theology of Post-Reformation Lutheranism: A Study of Theological Prologemena.* St. Louis: Concordia Pub. House, 1970.

PRICKET, S. *Romanticism and Religion: The Tradition of Coleridge and Wordsworth in the Victorian Church.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

PUSEY, M. *Jürgen Habermas.* London and Chichester: Tavistock Pub., and Ellis Horwood Ltd., 1987.

QUINTON, A. "The Foundations of Knowledge" in B. Williams and A. Montefiore eds. *British Analytical Philosophy.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966.

RAHNER, K. "The Need For a 'Short Formula' of Christian Faith" in *Theological Investigations* IX. Trans. G. Harrison. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972.

_____ *Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity.* Trans. W.V. Dych. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1978.

RAHNER, K. and H. VORGRIMLER. eds. "Fundamental Articles", *Concise Theological Dictionary.* 2nd. ed. London: Burns and Oates, 1983.

_____ ed. "Dogma", *Encyclopedia of Theology: A Concise Sacramentum Mundi.* London: Burns and Oates, 1975.

RAMSEY, A.M. *The Gospel and the Catholic Church.* London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1936.

RAMSEY, I. ed. *John Locke: The Reasonableness of Christianity* with *A Discourse of Miracles* and part of *A Third Letter Concerning Toleration.* London: Adam and Charles Black, 1958.

RESCHER, N. "Foundationalism, Coherentism and the Idea of Cognitive Systematization", *The Journal of Philosophy* LXXI (1974): 695-708.

_____ *Cognitive Systematization.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979.

RICOEUR, P. *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning.* Fort Worth, Texas: The Texas Christian University Press, 1976.

RITSCHL, D. *The Logic of Theology: A Brief account of the relationship between basic concepts in theology.* Trans. J. Bowden. London: SCM, 1986.

ROGERS, T.G. ed. *Liberal Evangelicalism: An Interpretation by Members of the Church of England.* London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1923.

RORTY, R. *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980.

ROUSE, R. and NEILL S. *A History of the Ecumenical Movement 1517-1948.* 3rd ed. Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1986.

RUCH, C. "Article De Foi", *Dictionaire de Théologie Catholique.* Vol.I: 2024-25. Paris, 1923.

RUPP, G. *Religion in England 1688-1791.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.

SANDY, W. and N. WILLIAMS, *Form and Content in the Christian Tradition.* London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1916.

SCHAFF, D. "Fundamental Doctrines of Christianity", *The New Schaff Hertzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge.* Vol. IV: 410-13. New York, 1909.

SCHILLEBEECKX, E. ed. *Tension Between Church and Faith. Concilium* I no.6 (1970).

_____ The Understanding of Faith. London: Sheed and Ward, 1974.

SCHLEIERMACHER, F. *The Christian Faith.* Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1928.

_____ *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers* (1799). Trans. J. Oman. New York: Harper and Row Pub., 1958.

SCHLINK, E. *The Coming Christ and the Coming Church.* Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1968.

SCHMIDT, A. "Fundamentalartikel", *Kirchenlexikon.* Vol. IV: 2120-37. Freiburg, 1886.

SCHMIDT, H. *The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church* (1889). 3rd. ed. rev. and trans. C.A. Hay and H.E. Jacobs. Minneapolis, Minnesota: Augsburg Pubs. House, 1961.

SCHMITT, C.B. general ed. *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy.* Cambridge, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne and Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

SCHWÖBEL, C. "The Creature of the Word: Recovering the Ecclesiology of the Reformers" in Gunton and Hardy eds. *On Being the Church*; above.

SEDGWICK, P. *The Character of Christ: The Correlation of Moral Philosophy and Christology in Anglican Theology 1830-1870.* Unpublished Ph.D. Durham University, 1982.

SHAPIRO, B.J. *Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth Century England: A Study of the Relationship between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law and Literature.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983.

SIMEON, C. *Horae Homiletical: or Discourses now digested into one continued series, and forming a commentary upon every book of the Old and New Testament.* 21 vols. London: Holdsworth and Bell, 1832.

_____ *Evangelical Preaching. An anthology of sermons by Charles Simeon.* Intro. by J. Stott. Portland, Oregon: Multnomah Press, 1986.

SIMON, H.A. "The Architecture of Complexity", *General Systems*, L. von Bertalanffy and A. Rapoport eds. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Soc. for Gen. Sys. Res., 1965. Vol.X: 63-76.

SNYDER, D.C. "Faith and Reason in Locke's Essay", *Journal of the History of Ideas* XLVII (April-June 1986): 197-213.

SOBER, E. *Simplicity.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

SOSKICE, J.M. "Theological Realism" in W.J. Abraham and S.W. Haltzer eds. *The Rationality of Religious Belief: Essays in Honour of Basil Mitchell.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.

SOUTHGATE, W.M. *John Jewel and the Problem of Doctrinal Authority.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962.

SPELLMAN, W. *John Locke and the Problem of Depravity.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.

SPINKS, G.S. *The Fundamentals of Religious Belief.* London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1961.

SPURGEON, C. "William Law and the Mystics" in *The Cambridge History of English Literature.* Vol. IX. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920.

STEAD, C. *Divine Substance.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977.

STEVENSON, W.T. "Is There a Characteristic Anglican Theology" in Bryant ed. *The Future of Anglican Theology*; above.

_____ "Lex Orandi - Lex Crendendi" in Sykes and Booty eds. *The Study of Anglicanism*; below.

STILLINGFLEET, E. *A Rational Account of the Grounds of Protestant Religion* (1664) in *The Works.* Vol. IV of 6 vols. London, 1709-10.

STRENG, F.J. "Language and Mystical Awareness" in S.T. Kutz ed. *Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis.* London: Sheldon Press, 1978.

SYKES, N. *Old Priest and New Presbyter.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956.

_____ *William Wake: Archbishop of Canterbury* 1657-1737. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957.

SYKES, S.W. *The Integrity of Anglicanism.* London and Oxford: Mowbrays, 1978.

_____ "Barth on the Centre of Theology" in S.W. Sykes ed. *Karl Barth - Studies of his Theological Methods.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.

_____ ed. *Karl Barth - Studies of his Theological Methods*; above.

_____ "Theology through History" in D. Ford ed. *The Modern Theologians*; above.

_____ "Anglicanism and Protestantism" in S.W. Sykes ed. *England and Germany: Studies in Theological Diplomacy.* Frankfurt am Main und Bern: Peter D. Lang, 1982.

_____ *The Identity of Christianity: Theologians and the Essence of Christianity from Schleiermacher to Barth.* London: SPCK, 1984.

_____ "Anglicanism and the Anglican Doctrine of the Church" in J.R. Wright ed. *Quadrilateral at One Hundred: Essays on the Centenary of the Chicago - Lambeth Quadrilateral 1886/88-1986/88.* Oxford: Mowbrays, 1988.

SYKES, S.W. "Authority in the Church of England" in P. Eaton ed. *The Trial of Faith.* Sussex: Churchman Pub., 1988.

SYKES, S.W. and J. BOOTY, eds. *The Study of Anglicanism.* London and Philadelphia: SPCK and Fortress Press, 1984.

SYKES, S.W. and S.W. GILLEY, "'No Bishop, No Church!' The Tractarian Impact on Anglicanism" in G. Rowell ed. *Tradition Renewed: The Oxford Movement Conference Papers.* London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1986.

TALON, H. *William Law: A Study in Literary Craftsmanship.* London: Rockliffe, 1948.

TANQUERAY, A. "Articles fondamentaux (système des)", *Dictionaire de Théologie Catholique* 3 vols. Vol I: 2025-35. Paris, 1923.

TAVARD, G. "'Hierarchia Veritatum': A Preliminary Investigation", *Theological Studies* XXXII (1971): 278-89.

_____ *Holy Writ or Holy Church: The Crisis of the Protestant Reformation.* Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978.

_____ *The Quest for Catholicity: A Study in Anglicanism.* London: Burns and Oates, 1963.

TAYLOR, J. *A Discourse of the Liberty of Prophesying* in R. Heber ed. *The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor.* Vol. VIII of 15 vols. London, 1822.

THIEMANN, R.F. *Revelation and Theology: The Gospel as Narrated Promise.* London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985.

THOMAS, P. *The Lambeth Conferences and the Development of Anglican Ecclesiology, 1867-1978.* Unpublished Ph.D, University of Durham, 1982.

_____ "Doctrine of the Church" in Sykes and Booty eds. *The Study of Anglicanism*; above.

THOMAS, S. *Newman on Heresy: The Anglican Writings.* Unpublished Ph.D. University of Durham, 1988.

THORNTON, M. "Later Protestant Spirituality" in C. James, G. Wainwright and E. Yarnold eds. *The Study of Spirituality.* London: SPCK, 1986.

THISELTON, A. "Knowledge, Myth and Corporate Memory" in *Believing in the Church.* Report of the Doctrine Commission of the Church of England, 1981; above.

TIERNEY, B. *Origins of Papal Infallibility 1150-1350.* Studies in the History of Christian Thought VI. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972.

TILLICH, P. *Systematic Theology.* combined vol. Digswell Place, Welwyn: James Nisbet and Co. Ltd., 1968.

TOON. P. "The Articles and Homilies" in Sykes and Booty eds. *The Study of Anglicanism*; above.

TORRANCE, T.F. *Kingdom and Church: A Study in the Theology of the Reformation.* Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1956.

_____ *Theological Science.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969.

_____ "The Framework of Belief" in T.F. Torrance ed. *Belief in Science and Christian Life: The Relevance of Michael Polanyi's Thought for Christian Faith and Life.* Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1980.

_____ *Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge: Explorations in the Interrelations of Scientific and Theological Enterprise.* Belfast: Christian Journals Ltd., 1984.

_____ *The Trinitarian Faith.* Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1989.

TRACY, D. *The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism.* London: SCM, 1981.

_____ "Linbeck's New Programme for Theology: A Reflection", *The Thomist* XLIX/3 (July 1985): 460-472.

TROELTSCH, E. *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches.* Vol. II of 2 vols. London and New York: George Allen and Unwin, Macmillan, 1931.

TURRETTINI, J.A. *Discourse on Fundamentals* in J. Sparks ed. *A Collection of Essays and Tracts in Theology.* Vol. I of 6 vols. Boston, Mass., 1823-1826.

UNDERHILL, E. *Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness.* London: Methuen, rep. 1960.

VALESKE, U. *Hierarchia Veritatum: Theologiegeschichtlich Hintergrunde und mögliche Konsequenzen eines Hinweises im 'O'Kumenism us dekret des II. Vatikanischen Konzils zum zwischenkirchlichen Gesprä ch.* Munich: Claudius Verlag, 1968.

VAN MILDERT, W. *An Inquiry into the General Principles of Scripture - Interpretation.* The Bampton Lectures 1814. 3rd.ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1831.

VERKAMP, B.J. *The Indifferent Mean: Adiaphorism in the English Reformation to 1554.* Athens, Ohio, Detroit, Mich., Ohio and Wayne State University Presses, 1977.

VIDLER, A. *The Theology of F.D. Maurice.* London: SCM, 1945.

VON BALTHASAR, H.U. *The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics.* Vol.I. *Seeing the Form.* Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1982.

VON HARNACK, A. *History of Dogma* (1894-99). Vol. I of 7 vols. Trans. N. Buchanan from 3rd. German ed. London: Williams and Norgate, 3rd. imp., 1905.

VON LEEUWEN, G.H. *The Problem of Certainty in English Thought, 1630-1690.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.

VON LEYDON, W. *Seventeenth Century Metaphysics.* London: Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd., 1968.

WAINWRIGHT, G. ed. *Keeping the Faith: Essays to Mark the Centenary of Lux Mundi.* London: SPCK, 1989.

WALKER, A.K. *William Law: His Life and Thought.* London: SPCK, 1973.

WALLACE Jr., D.D. "Socinianism, Justification by faith, and the sources of John Locke's The Reasonableness of Christianity", *Journal of the History of Ideas* XLV (Jan-March 1984): 49-66.

WATERLAND, D. *The Works of the Rev. Daniel Waterland.* 6 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1843.

WEBER, O. *Foundations of Dogmatics.* 2 vols. trans. D.L. Guder. Grand Rapids, Michigan: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1981-83.

WEBSTER, J.B. "Ministry and Priesthood" in Sykes and Booty eds. *The Study of Anglicanism*; above.

WEDBERG, A. *A History of Philosophy: The Modern Age to Romanticism.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982.

WELCH, C. *Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century.* Vol. I of 2 vols. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972.

WIEBE, D. "Comprehensiveness: The Integrity of Anglican Theology" in Bryant ed. *The Future of Anglican Theology*; above.

WHYTE, L.L. et al. *Hierarchical Structures.* New York: American Elsevier Pub., 1969.

WILBERFORCE, R.I. *The Doctrine of the Incarnation of Jesus Christ, in its relation to mankind and to the Church.* Philadelphia: H. Hooker and Co., 1849.

WILDEN, A. *System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange.* London: Tavistock Pub., 1972.

WILES, M. *Explorations in Theology* No.4. London: SCM, 1979.

WILLEY, B. *The Seventeenth-Century Background: Studies in the thought of the age in relation to poetry and religion.* London: ARK Paperbacks, 1986.

_____ *The Eighteenth Century Background: Studies on the Idea of Nature in the Thought of the Period.* London: Chatto and Windus, 1974.

WILLIAMS, M.E. "Fundamental Articles", *New Catholic Encyclopedia.* Vol. VI: 222. Washington: McGraw Hill, 1967.

WILLIAMS, S.N. "John Locke on the Status of Faith", *Scottish Journal of Theology* XL(1987): 591-606.

WOODHOUSE, H.F. *The Doctrine of the Church in Anglican Theology 1547-1603.* London: SPCK, 1954.

WOTTON, A. *A Dangerous Plot Discovered* (1626).

WRIGHT, J.R. "Anglicanism, *Ecclesia Anglicana*, and Anglican: An Essay on Terminology" in Sykes and Booty eds. *The Study of Anglicanism*; above.

WRIGHT. T. "Doctrine Declared" in *Believing in the Church.* Report of the Doctrine Commission of the Church of England, 1981; above.

YOLTON, J. *Locke: An Introduction.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985.

_____ *John Locke and the Way of Ideas.* London: Oxford University Press, 1956.