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## ABSTRACT

### DEINDUSTRIALIZATION, PLANNING AND CLASS STRUCTURE : A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL POLICY ON SOCIAL STRUCTURE

DAVID S. BYRNE

This thesis examines the relationship between planning programmes in three industrial areas in the North East of England since 1945, and the socio-spatial structure of these places as it has changed over time with a focus on the period since 1975 during which all three areas have undergone a process of major de-industrialization. The study employs secondary data analyses of successive censuses of employment and population to chart the nature of industrial and socio-spatial change, with particular reference to the possible emergence of a spatially segregated and socially residualized 'underclass'. This spatial data is complemented by household level material drawn from the Cleveland Social Survey. The study concludes that there is a spatial segregation between the 'prosperous', defined in terms of housing tenure and location in the labour market, and the 'dispossessed poor' defined in terms of tenure and absence of work relation, but that the benefit dependent 'dispossessed poor' live in close relation to the low waged 'working poor' and more closely resemble a traditional 'industrial reserve army' than a surplus population. The planning history of the areas is reviewed in both its modern and post-modern phases. The study concludes that the socio-spatial structure of the early 1990s is a product of the interaction between global processes of industrial transformation and the local processes of land-use and housing planning in the places studied. Thus, planning programmes are identified as constitutive of social structure as opposed to merely responsive to economic changes.

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DEINDUSTRIALIZATION, PLANNING AND CLASS STRUCTURES :  
A STUDY IN THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL POLICY ON SOCIAL STRUCTURES

DAVID S. BYRNE

SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM  
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY



22 FEB 1994

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## Introduction

This thesis is concerned with the relationships among a series of processes which are of fundamental significance for the changing nature of advanced industrial welfare capitalist societies. The processes are :

(1) The transition in the form of capitalist production described as a movement from organized to disorganized capitalism (Lash and Urry, 1988).

(2) The associated reduction in the proportion of economically active people engaged in 'industrial work', usually described as 'deindustrialization'.

(3) The consequent *apparent* residualization of a proportion of the population as an economically functionless and redundant 'underclass'.

(4) The exclusion of that 'underclass' from participation in those activities which link civil society to the state and form the domain of active citizenship.

(5) The exclusion of that 'underclass' from 'citizen welfare rights' in the form of advantageous aspects of 'collective consumption' mediated through direct and indirect state allocative mechanisms.

The use of terms in this list does not imply an acceptance of the implications of the usual specification of that term in social science. The use of inverted commas around the name of a concept indicates reservation and scepticism. In particular the normal usage of the term 'underclass' will be rejected in the thesis. The so called 'underclass' is not irrelevant to post-modern production and consequent social organization but rather is of fundamental significance for the continued existence of these forms. The creation of a non-citizen 'underclass' has not only been an essential part of the process of restructuring which gets us to the sort of society we have now. The continued maintenance and exclusion of this group is also a precondition of the continuation of that society.

Thus although the title of the thesis includes the word 'polarization',, a central argument is that the greatly increased social divisions of the late 1980s and 90s United Kingdom (as compared with the 1950s and 60s) do not really take the form of polarization but instead constitute a complex linked structure in which the working poor are of great significance. The society is deeply divided but it is not simply polarized.

This thesis has a rather unusual history. It is an 'exploratory piece in that it is organized around empirical investigation and will have a considerable descriptive content. However it is intended as systematic exploration in which findings will illustrate an argument which existed before these specific investigations began. This thesis is part of a continuing

programme of work which began with the author's employment on North Tyneside Community Development Project in the 1970s (or perhaps even with experiences of student community action in the West End of Newcastle in the 1960s) and has continued ever since (see Byrne 1989 a). This study will take further the specific issue of social division and its consequences, both theoretically and in spatial and historical terms. The extension in history is easily explained. Things have moved on since 1988 when I completed the empirical research for Byrne (1989 a). In particular new forms of government intervention in urban life have developed to a stage where a review of their objectives and impact is possible.

The extension in space is also simply justified. The word locale is the key here. The ideas of locale, 'locality' and region will be discussed subsequently but this study does accept the significance of space for social structure and social action. Things happen, and can be made to happen, in places. Space is relevant to economic and social organization. The comparative capacity of capital and labour to make use of space is of enormous significance for developments which affect people's lives. Indeed the opposition of capital and labour over the use of space in production is only part of the story. A good part of this thesis will be concerned with potential opposition between the state and certain fractions of capital on the one hand, and the social and industrial proletariat, together with traditional industrial capital on the other, about the use of space in reproduction. Although I do not want to fetishize space, I do see the notion of place as representing something more than just a basis for

spatially based case studies even if I do not accept all that some geographers would load onto the idea of 'locality', particularly in terms of realist methodology (Gregson, 1987). These issues will be developed in Chapters Two and Four.

This study will be concerned with places which I have not previously investigated in detail *in a systematic and coordinated fashion*. They happen to be places of a very similar kind to those I have so investigated. I am interested in industrial (or previously industrial) towns and make no apology for that. As I shall elaborate in Chapter Two I believe the understanding of changes in such places is crucial for any general understanding of developments and possibilities as we move from the 'modern' to the 'post-modern' precisely because such industrial examples were the purest examples of modern social relations as they used to exist.

The thesis is written as a contribution to the Sociology of Social Policy. That point has to be made for two reasons. The first is that the thesis shares Social Policy's concerns with distributional issues and in particular with the distributional consequences of state activities, usually identified by reference to Titmuss's (1963) essay on "The Social Division of Welfare". An key theme will be that of the implications of the reconstitution of the social structure by industrial 'restructuring' for the form and content of these distributive processes and their consequences the traditional domain of the academic study of Social Policy. However there is more to it than that. Social Policy has always been 'engaged' as a field of study. The work has

been done, not just to contribute to knowledge, but also for the purpose of supporting a strategy of social change ; traditionally the Fabian strategy of equality as identified by Le Grand (1982). This thesis is written with the intention of supporting a strategy which has a similar objective in terms of equality but differs in terms of concept of significant audience. It follows Sayer's proposition that :

"... social science should not be seen as developing a stock of knowledge which is external to us, but should develop a critical self-awareness in people as subjects and indeed assist in their emancipation."  
(1984, 43).

This is self-emancipation. The purpose of a critical social science is not to influence the great and the good, the shapers and movers of Whig history, but to provide an organized account which can be used by those living in the world described as a tool in the task of re-creating that world in accordance with their objectives.

It follows that this study is concerned with social action. It is about what people have done and might do. The issues it addresses are easily anomized and systematized, easily discussed in terms of the general tendencies of underlying abstractions such as the capitalist mode of production. The congruence of realist epistemology with mechanistic versions of marxism has lent considerable respectability to this kind of approach. It does not resolve the problem of the relationship between structure and

action, either in terms of description (passive scientific analysis) or as a basis for action itself. To assert the significance of action is not to dismiss structure, but it is very easy to make the same mistake in reverse. Again this is a point for subsequent development but it has to be introduced here because this is a historical thesis. It deals with what people have done, collectively, and have had done to them collectively, because it is meant to inform what they might do, collectively.

The thesis is organized as follows. It begins with a discussion of the relationship between class and welfare which criticizes the concern of Social Policy with distributional as opposed to constitutive issues. Social Policy has traditionally dealt with the way welfare systems distribute resources around the social structure. Much less attention has been paid to the creative role of the welfare state in relation to that social structure. Welfare systems, in interaction with changes in production systems, play an important part in determining the nature of socially significant structures of inequality in our sort of society. They have played a particularly significant role in relation to the transitions associated with the general use of the prefix 'post' to describe the contemporary social condition - post-industrial, post-urban, post-modern. We should be concerned not just with the distributional consequences of social policies in relation to social structure, but also, and primarily, with the way policies as implemented play a part in creating that structure in the first place.

The thesis cannot examine all relevant aspects of welfare systems. My interest is in the local element in restructuring and hence attention will focus on planning itself, and particularly on processes of urban renewal, on the relationship between housing development and planning processes, and on that element of planning which is concerned with employment creation. Income maintenance provision is clearly of enormous significance for the constitution of social structures of inequality. Formerly (before 1948) income maintenance had a substantial local political element and it was around income maintenance issues that the most significant historical example of a social movement (the National Unemployed Workers' Movement) was organized. However today in the United Kingdom policy determination in income maintenance is wholly national and implementation is by means of a nationally controlled bureaucracy. Personal social service issues are excluded from consideration here because they are 'minority' in focus and/or are distributed in ways which seem separate from broader social structure. With increasing privatization and the move towards a mixed economy of welfare personal social services, and in particular provision for the dependent elderly, are becoming of more significance, but they remain responsive to social structure rather than constitutive of it.

The same is largely true of the Health Care system, although not of aspects of social life which 'determine' health status. Health care does have a spatial dimension, even within a single locale, but that dimension is not part of direct local political process, although the establishment of trusts is integrating

health into the domain of power of the 'new magistracy'. It is also rather difficult to access in a system which is dominated by curative concerns, although current developments towards a more holistic conception of health policy objectives suggest that constitutive issues are about to become part of political agendas. However, currently health care surfaces as constitutive of social structure only indirectly and in ways which can be handled in through a discussion of planning and land use issues.

The missing element in this thesis is education, and in particular any developed discussion of the role played by neighbourhood secondary education in the formation and perpetuation of social divisions. This is enormously important, but the educational system is in such a state of flux (and the Sociology of Education has neglected these sorts of themes for so long, at least in the UK) that it would be far too ambitious to attempt to extend this piece to deal with it. However an effort will be made in the conclusion to point up the direction a programme of research about education might take.

Although the thesis is concerned with the relationship between spatial aspects of welfare state provision and the form of social structure, with relationships as expressed in reproduction, it must also take account of developments in production. I would not wish to challenge the primacy of change in production in relation to the changes affecting the areas and the people with which this thesis is concerned. The social policy developments have been responsive to those changes, but it would be wrong to say that

they have been inevitable responses. There were and are other options with very different consequences, although any serious effort at the achievement of such options would also involve policies for the control and organization of aspects of production. This relationship between production and reproduction is of course expressed in policy areas which straddle and link the two domains. These include many aspects of planning and the links between education and training. Part of the argument of the conclusion of this thesis will be, following Walker (1984), that a programme of proper social planning cannot proceed by 'getting the economy right and then working out what to do with the product'. Solutions have to be couched in terms of societal planning (Ferge, 1979). However societal planning, like all planning, must begin with a proper survey, and that is what is being attempted here.

A general principle in the organization of the thesis is that the empirical work will be local in highly specific places selected precisely because they are almost pure examples of industrial towns. However, the point is to illustrate general developments. The industrial towns have been selected (as opposed to world cities) because they are so representative of the form of relations of industrial, organized capitalism. That is what they were about. That is why they exist. Of course it is convenient for me to work on such places. They are accessible, both culturally and geographically. Nonetheless they *show* what is going on without the confusion introduced by other processes and aspects, and in particular without the complexity introduced by ethnicity.

Subsequently I want to repeat this exercise for places where ethnicity is a crucial dimension, notably for the industrial city of Belfast. Here the focus is on class, welfare and the industrial town alone.

Issues of gender are different. A discussion of them actually provides a way of expressing what is meant by relating the local to the general. The thesis does not focus on gender relations but it will not ignore them. Gender relations intersect with class relations in ways which are of enormous importance for social structure. Changes in the gender dimensions of class matter a good deal for the topics with which this thesis is concerned. They will be investigated as part of the whole account as they are expressed in, particularly, the changing gender-time-sector composition of the occupied work-force and the related employment connections of households. It has to be said, honestly, that this thesis will try not to be gender blind, but it is not a study in class gender relations. Given the nature of the locales studied race/ethnicity will not figure largely in the account, although in other industrial cities attention to this dimension would be absolutely necessary.

A recently re-emergent theme in Social Policy and related areas of Sociology, which is of key significance in relation to the issues dealt with in Chapter One, is that of citizenship (see Roche 1992). Most discussion of this topic has centred on the passive aspect of it, on the receipt of the welfare elements defined as social rights by Marshall (1963). This is very much in

line with the traditional distributive concerns of the field. However, the use of the term 'active citizen', although oddly more usually applied to action in the voluntary sector and hence in civil society and at some remove from the state, whether national or local, does imply a recognition of constitutive possibilities. My interest is more in 'collective citizens' - a term which has some relationship to the idea of 'social movements' but can also cover the political actions of traditional classes and class fractions, both as affected by policies with distributional consequences, and as political shapers of the content of such policies. The concept is important and useful here.

So Chapter One will be about 'Class, Welfare and Social Structure'. The concerns of Chapter Two can best be identified by saying that it will add a dimension which we might call 'and the Industrial City' to the discussion of the relationship of state and welfare. Concerns identified by Saunders (1984) as constituting the domain of 'a non-spatial urban sociology' will be important in Chapter One, particularly the idea of consumption cleavages. Chapter Two will put space back in. This will happen in two ways. The thesis is about specific places, locales, and about how things are happening in those specific places. It is also about policies which have a strong inherent spatial dimension. Planning and housing obviously work in space.

Chapter Two will be largely conceptual. I want to discuss both the methodological questions involved in the ideas of locale/locality and the spatial dimensions of the general social

changes summed up by the word 'post'. Particular attention will be paid to the distinction which exists between 'world cities' (see King, 1989) and 'industrial cities'. This distinction is by no means exact. All world cities are also industrial cities but many industrial cities or towns are not world cities. This thesis is about places which are quite definitely not world cities. The theme is important because it is about how space is involved in domination and control, about how locales can be 'de-capitalized' by decision processes which have virtually no local content. I have said that this thesis is written with a backward referent to earlier work. That backward referent includes a concern with planning, but as with the earlier work I want to carry that theme forward. The thesis will conclude with a section which will introduce some of the problems about planning in a frame of reference which has much in common with the ecological slogan of 'thinking globally, acting locally', but in the traditional planning programme of survey, plan and implement, this piece is a continuation of the survey rather than the development of the plan. The point is that the spatial expression of power relations must be identified as part of the survey and the 'delocalization of decision making' in the sphere of capitalist production is crucial to understanding the places I am concerned with.

This theme has to be handled carefully, even in introduction. In reality the industrial component of world cities is in no way privileged by the spatial congruence of decision making centres, given the *tendency* towards a disorganized market led decision making process. Again immediate qualification is necessary. Harvey

(1989) has rightly criticized the exaggerated character of some discussion of the themes which concern us here. The world *may* have post-fordist characteristics but Ford have just succeeded in integrating their world wide operations in an exactly fordist hierarchical manner. However the focus of this thesis will not be on the delocalization of the planning of capitalist production, although that will be a crucial backdrop. Rather the attention will be on the planning processes of the traditional local state and successor forms (especially Urban Development Corporations) as influenced by a particular conception of the relationship between local decision making and international capitalism. Understanding the understanding of local planners (which term includes elected and non-elected politicians as well as 'professionals') is crucial to understanding the spatial decisions which are shaping up the spatial expression of contemporary inequality.

Chapter Two will be about understanding the place of the locales in the world, at least in terms of the getting together of a set of conceptual tools. A very common mistake of recent urban analyses has been to assume that the set of locales is heterogeneous but that there is a high degree of internal homogeneity within locales. This is absolutely not true now and never has been. A sharp historical illustration is provided by the case of Jarrow which forms part of the Metropolitan District and Journey to Work area of South Tyneside, one of the study locales. In the middle 1930s Jarrow had an unemployment rate in excess of 70%. It was, accurately, characterized as *The Town that was Murdered* (Wilkinson 1939). At the same time there was a

substantial amount of new construction of owner occupied housing going on in Jarrow for that part of the population which was relatively immune from the impact of shipyard closure and was in fact experiencing a real increase in living standards. Chapter Three will be concerned about contemporary expression (and historical origins) of a high degree of internal differentiation *within* the locales studied. Indeed such differentiation is now greater than it has ever been in this sort of place and the form and content of it is likely to be of enormous significance.

In an earlier exploratory piece (Byrne and Parson, 1983) an attempt was made to understand the spatial aspects of the differentiation consequent on deindustrialization. The discussion of planning and housing in the present thesis will take this further. There are two aspects here. The first is a bridge from the concerns of Chapter Two. Planning decisions influence what sort of places the locales studied will be in the medium term future. In community action this theme is often expressed by making the point that decisions taken today will create the nature of places like Sunderland for the year 2000 and beyond. This point is obvious in relation to decisions about land use planning and production but it is also very important in relation to decisions about circulation and reproduction. The contemporary emphasis on the transfer of industrial land to leisure and retail uses, if translated into developments, will have determinative consequences for social structure. However gross structural determination does not happen first, with all spatial allocation decisions at a finer level happening subsequently. The two things go on together and

whilst grosser decisions about the general pattern of base clearly have a determinative effect on finer consequences about the distribution of inequality in space, the finer decisions work back to shape up the grosser process at the same time. *By analogy* Structure Planning and Local Planning decisions interact. This is analogy only. Structural planning decisions are much wider in content than Statutory Structure Plans ever were and local planning decisions include many things besides land use. However there is an internal spatial hierarchy and that matters a great deal because it is how most people experience the aspects of inequality which are the concern of this thesis.

Chapter Three will be about that internal hierarchy, about how inequalities in space are constituted within locales. Again it will be primarily a conceptual chapter dealing with the spatial aspects of the themes about class and welfare which were the subject matter of Chapter One. The best way of defining the area of concern is by reference back to a relatively old, but still rather important, debate about 'housing class' (Rex and Moore, 1967). The idea of housing class was an attempt to understand how a combination of bureaucratic allocative decisions and market relations (which themselves had a bureaucratic allocative component) influenced people's lives. The concept was essentially Weberian and focussed on life chances. It has been stringently criticized and had many defects. However the area of concern is important, not just for housing but in relation to a wider range of allocative decisions which have a spatial component.

If the themes explored were just those of allocation and the consequences for life chances of that allocation, then the discussion would be subject to the same criticism as that levelled at Social Policy in general. It would be merely distributive in focus and would not consider the constitutive element in policies as implemented, here pretty well literally on the ground. In the earlier piece written jointly with Parson (1983) an effort was made to do more than that by addressing the issues of how public sector housing ghettos of the poor played a part in the maintenance of an important component of the industrial reserve army. That kind of structural relation will be addressed here, but the intention is to go farther still. This is in response to the stimulus of Willis's argument (1979) about the role of cultural response by people in setting up their own role within a capitalist social order and associated system of production. Willis documented how people 'did it to themselves' although on my reading of his work I would say his account is rather one of how the reaction to a particular educational experience, the response to the stimulus, led to a particular set of consequences. There are all sorts of criticisms of Willis's work and the present study is very different in form and will not attempt to do that kind of detailed and specific ethnography, but it will have a cultural dimension.

There are two aspects to this. One is that of disabling sub-cultural distinctions which create an 'underclass'. That will be addressed in passing in Chapter One. In Chapter Two I will take up the other. In recent work (1989) I have placed considerable

emphasis on the *industrial culture* of the sort of locales in which the investigations constituting the empirical part of this thesis have been conducted. This approach was influenced by the work of Cooke (1985) on regional cultures and it is true that all my locales are located within a particular regional culture constituted by the people living in them in response to a particular experience of industrial urban life. That is the culture of the North East Coast, although there are variations particularly between the Tyne Wear locales and Cleveland. The latter's experience of ICI and steelmaking and non-experience of coal mining does make for important differences. This is an issue for Chapter Two.

However, despite the considerable *inclusivity* of that North East Coast industrial culture, (simply illustrated by its consequences for voting behaviour where middle class wards which would be safe Tory in the South East are equally safely Labour in this region), there are internal cultural distinctions which matter, not least because of their potential significance for social action. This topic has to be handled carefully because it is very complicated. It is likely that a great deal of the positive potential for social action (no apology for commitment here) comes from the inclusivity of the regional culture. Groups which are very distinctive in many respects remain part of the same moral universe of cultural identity for a variety of reasons which will be discussed in Chapter Three. The distinguishing elements may in fact be highly divisive if the only form of effective action is seen as unitary, but is the only form of

effective action unitary ? Autonomous action by components of the social proletariat is very likely not to be part of unitary political action. It addresses special needs and special situations. It was precisely out of such experience that C.L.R. James and R. Dunayevska (Johnson and Forrest) developed the foundations of the concept in the first place (see Cleaver, 1979).

Aspects of cultural distinction may be disabling. I remain convinced that the 1960s and 70s debate around radical deviance theory dealt largely with aspects of behaviour which far from having any transformational potential were disabling for individuals and the communities from which they came. But that does not rule out distinctive collective action which has its origins in distinctive cultural response. Of course there is a very strong gender component here. Action around issues of social reproduction is frequently the action of women. This itself is differentiated. There have been few more respectable, and effective, working class organizations than the Co-operative Women's Guild. Likewise the response of Glasgow's women in the 1915 rent strikes (see Damer, 1980) was not respectable. These aspects have to be considered. It is not simple. The same people behave 'respectably' and 'not respectably' in different circumstances. The boundary is of the greatest importance and at the same time extra-ordinarily permeable. The link here is between aspects of culture and social order. This is not the central focus of the thesis but again it has to be part of the context in which the central concerns are discussed.

The best way to describe these cultural distinctions is to say that they are contradictory in terms of potential. To say this is emphatically not to endorse any conception of 'disabling subcultures' as an explanation for social inequality. That kind of account is surfacing again in the discussion of the notion of 'underclass' and it merits severe treatment just as much as did the specific version which informed conservative theorizing about poverty in the 1960s. Apparently cultural differences are very largely a function of constraints and represent the only rational response to such constraints, the central and still absolutely valid point of Valentine's (1967) dismissal of the validity of the notion of a distinctive culture of poverty. However all this will be discussed in Chapter Three.

Chapters One to Three form the conceptual framework for the thesis. In the sandwich model they are the first slice of bread under the collective tile of 'Class and the Welfare State in the Industrial City'. The sunflower margarine on that slice is represented by Chapter Four which will deal with the issues involved in researching the themes identified previously. This chapter will contain both a discussion of general methodological position and an account of how the position arrived at has been translated into a research programme. That statement is not meant to imply that a clear methodological position was worked out in advance and a research programme derived from it. Indeed the reverse statement would be more accurate if this thesis is considered, as it should be, as part of a larger programme of work. Like most social researchers I have worked out a way of

working by working, but I do think that that way of working does make methodological sense. This is far more a matter of the way the products of research are related to the development of argument, than of the actual doing of the research. Unless social researchers (most unusually) carry out experiments, their actual way of working is usually one which involves the accumulation of a range of materials using a range of procedures. The actual work done for this thesis consisted of a mixture of documentary and ( a very little) oral historical work, the secondary analysis of data sets and some ethnographic and observational work done over a long period and recorded in various ways. In other words as with all field research an 'umbrella' of techniques was employed (Burgess, 1984). What matters is the kind of analytical understanding which underpins the end account. This will be historical materialist, not realist. Chapter Four will explain why but it will also contain some material on how the research was done, principally in order to construct a systematic record of a way of working.

Chapters Five and Six are the quantitative part of this thesis. They are fundamentally concerned with numerical taxonomies, with classifying 'localities', 'neighbourhoods' and households using quantitative information about those things. The technique used will be cluster analysis and in all classifications an attempt will be made to take account not only of space but also of time. Thus in Chapter Five, which is essentially about classifying localities operationalized as 'non-London' local education authorities, one of the variable sets used in classification will be changes over time, including changes in

industrial structure and population. In Chapter Six the internal structure of the three industrial LEAs chosen as localities, South Tyneside, Sunderland and Cleveland, will be explored in detail using data derived from the 1971, 1981 and 1991 censuses. The differences in socio-spatial ecology at these dates are very important for this thesis.

The Cleveland Social Survey data allows for an extension in level in that it is household based and gets past objections, which are weaker than those who make them think, to much empirical investigation of these issues on the grounds that it involves spatial data and hence ecological fallacies. The last part of Chapter Six will be concerned with these crucial household analyses, again across time by comparing the situation in 1977 with that in 1987.

Chapters Five and Six are, more or less, descriptive. They will say what has happened, although they do have a theoretical contribution to make to debates about the nature of contemporary class structure in deindustrialized Britain. Chapters Seven and Eight are about why that has happened, and what might happen if a stop is not put to it soon. This means that Chapter Seven is about modernization as an indicative planning process and social objective, and about the socio-spatial and class structure effects of the modernization process. Chapter Eight is about the successor to modernization through indicative planning for industrial growth : the post-modernization strategy of catalytic planning for land value return maximization, and about the failures of that

programme and the consequences of those failures. A central theme in these two chapters will be one already identified in this introduction. Social Action matters, so Policy matters, so the Politics of Policy matters (all capitals deliberate). These chapters will be historical but will include contemporary and (in Chapter Eight) alternative prospective history.

The Thesis will conclude with a position statement about the present situation and some preliminary remarks about the kind of social programme which would be necessary to assert universalist citizen rights as a way of overcoming the social division which characterizes that situation. The conclusion is generally pessimistic.

## Chapter 1 - Class, Social Structure and Welfare

### Introduction

This chapter is about the bilateral relationship between class and welfare. That relationship is bilateral because class structure and class action have implications for welfare and the organization and provision of welfare by the Welfare State have implications for class structure. Traditionally academic Social Policy has been concerned almost exclusively with the distributional consequences of welfare provision broadly defined to include not only 'obvious' social services, but also the fiscal and occupational systems of provision (Titmuss 1963). This reflects its relationship with the 'strategy of equality' (Le Grand 1982), the policy objective of promoting some form of equality in the social order. Just what is meant by equality is, open to considerable debate. However that debate has largely been about one side of the nature of the distribution. It has been concerned with some combination of what is distributed and the consequences of that distribution. Much less systematic attention has been paid to the other aspect of any system of distribution, the pre-existing set of categories around which what is being distributed is actually distributed ?

This is a separate (albeit related) point from that made in the Introduction to this thesis where a distinction was made between the distributive and constitutive consequences of social policies as implemented. Of course social policies play a part in

the creation of the complex system of categories which constitutes social structure. The discussion of how some of them do so is the major theme of this thesis. However, before dealing with constitutive matters, it is necessary as it were to freeze the interactive system and look at one side of it. This is particularly the case because social policies are by no means the only, or indeed the most important, determinants of that categorical structure. We are talking here of course about class structure and how it is constituted.

In so far as academic Social Policy has addressed the issues of the structure(s) to which social policies distribute, it has done so in terms of distinguishing among the effects of class, race and gender. This is entirely proper as a start but it is scarcely enough. Indeed actual studies in Social Policy have almost without exception either worked with that crude operational definition of social class provided by the Registrar General's categorization (see Nichols, 1979) or have divided up the actual distribution arithmetically and discussed the proportionate distribution of whatever to those fractions. This thesis is primarily concerned with the interaction between social policies and class. The question immediately arises of 'what is class' ?

The first part of this chapter will be concerned precisely with that question as addressed by contemporary debates in Sociology. Those debates have not ignored the constitutive effects of social policies as generated by Welfare states. Indeed they have paid some attention to a theme which Social Policy has almost

wholly neglected, the impacts of the systems of control and reward allocation created by the employment patterns of welfare state agencies themselves. Nonetheless, there has not been much cross fertilization between Social Policy's distributive concerns and recent Sociological debates about class. The first part of this chapter will be an attempt at such a synthesis. Again it is necessary to say that this thesis is primarily about class and not about race or gender. Race and gender issues will be discussed in relation to class. It would be possible to say that this is a matter of focus, and to a considerable extent it is, but it is also a matter of theoretical position. I believe that class structure is fundamental to the understanding of a capitalist social order and that issues of race and gender must be understood in relation to class structure as determined by capitalist relations of production. This is not to say that race/ethnicity and gender do not have significance. They are very important but they 'derive'. This and related debates will be considered through a discussion of class, state and civil society in the concluding part of this chapter.

### **Three debates about Class**

There are three current debates about class in Sociology which are relevant here. These are :-

(1) The debate about the existence and nature of a 'service class'.

(2) The identification of an 'underclass'.

(3) The assertion of a new system of social division formed around 'consumption cleavages'.

All three debates can be considered as aspects of a wider concern with the changing nature of class structure in a changing social order. The latter two, discussions of the 'underclass' and of 'consumption cleavages' have been to some extent related, but both have proceeded largely in isolation from consideration of the nature and form of a 'service class'. There is a fourth important approach but it has been far less prominent than these three. This is the conception of action-derived divisions within the working class, most easily conceptualized in terms of a distinction between 'central' and 'peripheral' workers (see Friedmann, 1977). In its concern with action this approach has something in common with Parkin's discussion of 'closure' (1979) but Friedman's account locates action in relation to a capitalist mode of production in a way which Parkin's does not. It is essentially a version of the autonomist account which has been clarified, at least for production relations, by Cleaver (1979).

Debate under headings '2' and '3' above has become associated with the revived interest in Marshall's discussion of citizenship. The nature of this concept has been summarized by Roche :

" ... citizenship is a strategically important concept intellectually (original emphasis), not

least in Sociology and Social Theory. It is important in principle because it provides a common field (1) for the sociological study of society to meet the study of social policy and politics and (2) for social theory to meet explicitly normative analysis in political theory and moral philosophy." (1992, p 2)

This thesis is informed by a general analytical position which derives from the autonomist account, albeit that it considers the general nature of that account as incomplete. By this I mean that the autonomist account seems coherent and complete in dealing with relations in production, but that despite the value of the autonomist concept of the social proletariat in clarifying the nature of reproductive relations, so far that account has not succeeded in handling the nature and consequences of class action in the sphere in which reproduction happens and which is constituted by the intersection of the state and civil society. The objective here is in part to contribute to the development of such an autonomist account of reproduction. However the approach towards that account will be indirect. This means that this chapter will not begin with an outline of the autonomist account. Instead the other positions will be reviewed in some detail before the autonomist account is developed, but that review cannot, and should not, be innocent. It is informed by a knowledge of a position which relates the creative action of the working class to the nature of social structure in production, reproduction and the links between them.

These themes will surface again in the epistemological discussion in Chapter Four and it would have been more conventional to begin the main body of the thesis with that Chapter. However I felt that would be artificial. The epistemological position taken here was not adopted in advance of the work, although it did precede the writing of that part of it which is represented by the thesis. The epistemology was taken up in response to the problems and not the other way around.

That means that two themes which relate to the autonomist position need immediate introduction. The first is the Gramscian distinction between a war of position and a war of movement (see Boggs, 1976). The metaphor is derived from the contrast between trench warfare and a blitzkrieg. In the first two roughly equal forces move backwards and forwards over a small terrain, or even engage in a phoney war of looking at each other from massive emplacements. Schumpeter's account of countervailing power is essentially a positional conception, as is the kind of discussion associated with ideas of 'functional conflict' (see Coser 1956). The political conception of corporatism (see Panitch 1980) is a systematization of this approach which extends beyond relations at the point of production into a derivative account of state form and practice. In contrast in a war of movement one side wins ! In an earlier article (Byrne, 1984) I argued that a good deal of recent debate, characterized by the content of Gorz's *Farewell to the Working Class* (1982) was premised on the notion that in the recent past in metropolitan western capitalism, capital has broken through into a war of movement *and won*. This issue has to be

identified here because both the 'underclass' and 'consumption cleavage' positions seem, at least implicitly, to be informed by Gorzian style reports from the fronts of the Class War.

The second autonomist theme is largely a matter of terminology. Already in this thesis the conceptual pair of production/reproduction have been used extensively without elaboration. The point is that the second half of the pair is reproduction and not consumption. The term 'reproduction' is being used in a wider sense than that simply of reproduction of labour power, although that process is of course the central core of reproduction. Here it means all that goes on away from production which is necessary for the continued existence of a capitalist social order. This includes the dimension of legitimation of the form of the order. The advantage of the autonomist account of reproduction is that it extends the terrain of class conflict to include relationships between households, aggregates of households (which may be, but are not necessarily, spatially defined) and the state. In other words it deals with the social relations of the state as welfare state. The importance of this and its implications for the traditional concerns of Social Policy have been stated by Ferge (1979) :

"The relations of distribution are certainly important and the reduction of inequalities inevitably requires their transformation. But it has to be recognized that distribution is not an independent self-determining field of social

reality. Social life exists against the background of social reproduction and distribution is just one phase of the whole process." ( p 21)

The alternative expression 'consumption' does not have this character. As used in Sociology it is largely distributional, although the Weberian provenance of much of the discussion means that there is also a concern with status differentiation. Oddly enough, except in a recent political contribution by Harrington (1989) (and implicitly in regulation theory's notion of a Keynesian system of regulation in a fordist social order) debates about consumption have not been systematically linked to the economic system by reference to the Keynesian conception of the place of aggregate consumption in the achievement of an optimal economic order, and hence as a component of policy designed to produce such an optimum. Contemporary Sociology is post many things, including Keynesianism.

Which provides a link to the ordering of this chapter. It will proceed with a discussion of 'the underclass' because one way of looking at 'the underclass' is to regard them as useless people who are neither an under utilized productive resource nor a potential group of consumers. Thus the idea of 'underclass' is a post-Keynesian conception. Discussions of 'consumption cleavages' turn out in practice to be to a considerable extent discussions of the distinction between 'the underclass' and the rest of the 'former' working class. A review of that approach will follow. The service class are at the other end of the usual range of interest

but it is clear that one of the major defects of the discussion of 'underclass' / 'ordinary people' distinctions is that such discussions have not considered contemporary problems of control over production, (other than in spatial terms dealing with the decapitalization of localities), or reproduction. There are a range of useful historical discussions which are locally grounded and deal with either or both of production and reproduction, and with the link between them through the process of the production of the built environment by an urban bourgeoisie. This concern with capitalists as a class as opposed to the abstraction capital, seems to have lasted longer in the United States than in the United Kingdom where local studies have had very little to say about contemporary capitalists. Addressing the service class is a way into these concerns because discussion of that class must deal with two boundaries, the boundary between it and the working class and the boundary between it and the capitalist class. This latter boundary has been much discussed but little researched, at least in local context.

#### **'Underclass' or Reserve Army of Labour ?**

There is nothing new about the idea of an 'underclass'. MacNicol points out that : "... versions of the general concept of an inter-generational 'underclass' have figured prominently in social debates during the past one hundred years." (1987, p 293). Different terms have been used at different times. The commonest nineteenth century expression was 'residuum' and the idea of a group that has been somehow left behind is an important component

of all versions of the idea. 'Inter-general' transmission, Sir Keith Joseph's notorious cycle of deprivation, has been expressed in both genetic and cultural terms although it is very important to realize that the idea of an underclass can be expressed without reference to either. The term's recent reappearance comes from debates in the United States which are simply a continuation of the debate about 'cultures of poverty' which began in the aftermath of the Moynihan report (1965) and were systematized around ideas of a culture of poverty as expressed by Lewis (1966). The concept has become a central part of the intellectual armoury of the American New Right, notably in the work of Murray (1990).

The United States debate about the underclass has largely been concerned with the position of afro-americans in cities. The arguments of the New Right are remarkable for their lack of originality. They are basically a series of repetitions of the culture of poverty thesis of the 60s without the justification which that account had of being made in a context of more or less full employment and apparent opportunity. The arguments have not gone unchallenged. In particular Wilson (1987, 1989, 1992) and his co-workers have reiterated the criticism Valentine (1967) made of the notion of 'culture of poverty' and have pointed out that different behaviour can be explained by constraints without any need for recourse to cultural accounts:

"... if the concept of underclass is used, it must be a structural concept : it must denote a new socio-spatial patterning of class and racial

domination, recognizable by the unprecedented concentration of the most socially excluded and economically marginal members of the dominated racial and economic group. It should not be used to designate a new breed of individuals moulded freely by a mythical and all powerful culture of poverty." (Wacquant and Wilson, 1989 p 25).

Interestingly they emphasize the spatial aspect of contemporary social division :

"... the urban black poor of today differ both from their counterparts in earlier years and from the white poor in that they are becoming increasingly concentrated in dilapidated territorial enclaves that epitomize acute social and economic marginalization." (Wacquant and Wilson, 1989 p 9).

Wilson summed their position up thus :

"In contrast to discussions of inner-city social dislocation that strongly emphasize the individual attributes of ghetto residents and a so called culture of poverty Wacquant and Wilson draw attention to the structural cleavage separating ghetto residents from other members of society and to the severe constraints and limited opportunities

that shape their daily lives. In highlighting a new socio-spatial patterning of class and racial subjugation in the ghetto Wacquant and Wilson argue that the dramatic rise in inner-city joblessness and economic exclusion is a product of the continuing restructuring of American capitalism." (Wilson, 1989 p 183).

In the actual locations in which the empirical research for this thesis was carried out racial distinction is of minor significance. And yet the spatial segregation of the poor is, as we shall see, very much a reality.

In earlier work Wilson was very careful to make clear that : "The key theoretical concept .... is not culture of poverty but social isolation." (1987 p 61). He sees this isolation as a consequence, not a cause :

"... the communities of the underclass are plagued by massive joblessness, flagrant and open lawlessness and low achieving schools, and, therefore, tend to be avoided by outsiders. Consequently, the residents of these areas, whether women and children of welfare families or aggressive street criminals, have become increasingly socially isolated from mainstream patterns of behaviour." (1987, p58).

Wilson's account has stimulated a good deal of detailed empirical work in the United States, usually taking the form of urban ecological investigations by social geographers. As Rose (1992) has remarked :

" ... a number of operational definitions of underclassness rely strongly on spatial data, especially at the micro scale. Wilson's own treatment of the subject is one in which the role of concentrated poverty and its associated problems are addressed within a micro-environmental context."  
(1992, p491)

In careful and thoughtful reviews of this literature Pearson (1992) and Wilson (1992), agree that its message reinforces Wilson's original points in very specific places but that the idea of 'underclass' cannot appropriately be applied to the US poor in general. Wilson has proposed that the focus should be on 'the ghetto poor'. However the sharpening of focus is not merely one which involves concentration on ethnicity. Rather Wilson uses the spatial literature to demonstrate that the phenomenon with which he is concerned is a function of the interaction of ethnicity and deindustrialization in the frostbelt core of the industrial United States. As Hughes put it in an earlier commentary, Wilson has advanced (and continues to advance in his later work) :

" ... the intriguing proposition .. that the brunt of change in Chicago between 1970 and 1980 was borne disproportionately by certain neighbourhoods and was

made manifest in the increased deprivation in those neighbourhoods relative to the rest of the metropolitan area." (1991, p267)

This very much corresponds with Wilson's own statements of his present position. For him the question is what socio-spatially defined groups have borne the costs of deindustrialization.

I find this formulation of the issues very useful and positive. It represents a way of handling real differences in a way which sets them in structural location and it also points us to the significance of spatial segregation for understanding the contemporary social order. However it only touches on the issue of what 'the underclass' is, although what is said is clearly correct. The underclass has been produced by restructuring. The issue is what has been produced ?

Mellor expresses a common criticism of the idea as it has been applied in the United Kingdom context :

"The concept does little more than recognize that modernization and growth debar categories of the population from recognized paid work, that these are defined as welfare dependent and hence as the poor, that the stigma of poverty isolates them in the quarters of the city defined as 'peripheral' by 'official society' and that the response to the denial of social mobility may in some circumstances be violence. " (1989, p 251).

Gregson and Robinson dismiss the term on much the same lines as merely descriptive (1989). There is some justification for this because as applied to the European context by the main liberal (in the modern sense) proponent, Dahrendorf, of the idea, the term is little more than a kind of descriptive categorization of the poor, without any real discussion of what that group has in common in terms of structural determination and location. Dahrendorf recognizes this deficiency himself and distinguishes between the US situation of rigid separation of experience and the European context in which this is not the case (1989, 9). However he does seem to retain some sort of conception of cultural segregation, certainly in his earlier article (1987). Discussed in these terms the 'underclass' is a residuum which has not just been left behind but has been pushed down by change. It is a kind of collective description for the victims of 'illfare', for the social casualties.

That is the starting point for what I regard as the most important discussion of the term, that developed by Bauman (1987) as part of his general account of post-modernity. Bauman's discussion differs from other more descriptive accounts in two important respects. First it employs the notion of citizenship, and exclusion from citizenship, as a way of distinguishing what is 'under' about the 'underclass'. Second Bauman is careful to say what the underclass must not be if they are to be identified as 'functionless' in a capitalist social order. They are not a 'reserve army'. Bauman begins his analysis with the clearest

endorsement of what I earlier called the 'Gorzian' account of the contemporary relationship between capital and labour :

"The unanticipated effect of left pressure, and of the politics of industrial labour it generated, turned out to be the very opposite of what had been expected. Instead of the emancipation of labour from capital, what happened was the emancipation of capital from labour. Today, capital depends less and less on labour. Instead of engaging the rest of society as producers or servants of the productive process, capital engages society as consumers or servants of consumption." (1987, 21)

From this general understanding Bauman draws a specific account of the position of 'the underclass' :

".... the poor are less and less important to the reproduction of capital in their traditional role as the 'reserve army of labour'. They are no longer the object of concern for the twofold political task of recommodification of labour and limitation of working-class militancy. The previously taken-for-granted principle of social responsibility for the survival - and, indeed, the well being - of that part of society not directly engaged by capital as producers has suddenly come under attack." (Ibid).

The empirically based account which forms the body of this thesis will demonstrate that Bauman is quite wrong about the contemporary role of the poor as a reserve army. Where he is absolutely right is in saying that the poor cannot be both an 'underclass' and a reserve army. There is much else to quarrel with in his statement. The most cursory inspection of the history of welfare provision in the United Kingdom demonstrates that the 'well being' of the welfare dependent has not been taken for granted. Indeed that 'well being' has been the objective of class struggle by the social proletariat and its allies against the contrasting principle of less eligibility, the ideological mechanism for ensuring that the welfare dependent are an 'ever ready' reserve army available to capital as and when required. This account is absolutely contrary to that contained in Mann's recent *The Making of an English Underclass* (1992). That book concludes that :

" Far from excluding themselves, the poor have been excluded by others, most notably for our purposes by organized labour..." (1992, p 141)

This is a bizarre conclusion which represents a kind of miscegenation between Parkin's 1979 account of 'double closure' and Social Policy's use of the idea of a social division of welfare. There is a good deal wrong with Mann's simplistic historical account of class relations and their development in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but that need not detain us in a thesis concerned with the present situation, and will be dealt with elsewhere. Indeed Mann's work is only cited here to illustrate Mellor's point and because it intrudes through its

title. Double closure is an important theme, but it scarcely seems to apply at all to the cities being investigated here. Bauman's virtues are that he understands that an 'underclass', even if a product of capitalist restructuring, is something different from a reserve army which is a necessary mechanism for such restructuring, and recognizes the role of capitalist initiatives in the reformation of class structure.

The best discussion of these issues is provided by O'Connor (1982). He makes it clear that changes in employment relations are not some sort of accidental and unfortunate consequence of capitalist restructuring. The creation of a mass of unemployed and excluded people is a necessary precondition for the achievement of such restructuring and for the continued existence of a new set of social relations within capitalism. To return to the war of movement / war of position dichotomy, the creation of a reserve army is a means of facilitating movement and rolling back labour to a new defensive line with enormous territorial loss. Marx's definition of the 'stagnant reserve army of labour' is immediately relevant :

"The third category of the relative-surplus population, the stagnant, forms a part of the active labour army, but with extremely irregular employment. Hence it furnishes to capital an inexhaustible reservoir of disposable labour-power. Its conditions of life sink below the average normal level of the working class ; this makes it at once

the broad basis of special branches of capitalist exploitation. It is characterized by a maximum of working time, and a minimum of wages. We have learnt to know its chief form under the rubric of "domestic industry".... Its extent grows, as with the extent and energy of accumulation, the creation of a surplus population advances. But it forms at the same time a self-reproducing and self-perpetuating element of the working class, taking a proportionately greater part in the general increase of that class than the other elements." (Marx 1977 p602)

At this stage (in Volume One of *Capital*) Marx was identifying the development of the stagnant reserve army as a general and regular tendency within capitalism. The development of the autonomous account within *Capital* (which is of course not the only account that can be developed from that text!) suggests that the process is to a considerable degree action determined and cyclical. O'Connor says :

"... the crisis-induced recreation of the reserve army of labour is a lever of accumulation to the degree that it is a lever of 'capital restructuring'. This means that layoffs during the early stage of economic crises permit capital to re-establish its domination over the working class which is in turn a social and political pre-

condition for restructuring the means of production and relocating industry. Concentration and centralization of capital, increases in production efficiency, and industrial relocation in turn generate more unemployment. This means that in subsequent short or long-term economic expansions an ever larger reserve army is available to throw into production." (1981 p 315-6).

We will have to return to O'Connor's discussion because it contains some important ideas about the development of the relationship between the reserve army and the rest of the working class. For now let us pursue the logic of the notion of the (re) creation of a reserve army as a mechanism of capitalist restructuring, in terms of its implications for social policy.

Field has documented recent developments in UK social policies, especially in the field of social security, in a recent study *Losing Out* with the subtitle "The Emergence of Britain's Underclass" (1989). A better combination of title and subtitle might have been *Being kicked out*, "The Creation of Britain's Underclass", because the book documents in some detail the components of policy which have played a major role in the production of the present situation and does so under the appropriate title of "Mrs Thatcher's Class Strategy". Field's is an account, like Wilson's, of exclusion but he focuses his concern around the notion of citizenship, as defined by T.H. Marshall (1963). His general conclusion is : "... that the 300-year

evolution of citizenship as an incorporating force in British society has been thrown into reverse." (1989 p2).

Marshall identified three aspects of citizenship : civil, political and social. The first can be summarized as rights at law and to property. The second covers participation in the political process. The third involves rights to economic and social welfare. Bauman also considers exclusion from such citizenship to be part of underclass status. The "outcast poor" are being progressively excluded from full participation in society through :

"... welfare payments becoming instruments of disenfranchisement and the withdrawal of citizenship rights for that rising minority of the consumer society who cannot prove their citizenship in the only way that a consumer market admits. The reality of such a threat has been documented by the legally enforced interference of welfare agencies with the private and family life of their 'clients' : an imposed 'infantilisation' of welfare recipients through denial of their rights to autonomous decision-making and the dense network of surveillance which consumes an ever growing slice of welfare funds. Thus the poor are not just growing poorer. They are being made into a deviant category : a section of the population defined as a separate entity by the withdrawal, or at least suspension, of political and personal rights which were thought to

be the lasting and universal achievement of modernity." (1987 p 21)

All of which is true. However it does not in any way exclude the possibility of the poor being a reserve army. Indeed non-citizens make the best reserve armies. This is the essential purpose of Swiss and West German gastarbeiter status for their front-line reserve armies of immigrant workers. It would be wrong to be too precise about categories here. As already indicated this thesis is concerned with a real situation in which the categories are fuzzy sets located along a continuum. However, there is nothing about exclusion from social or civic participation which is incompatible with continued functionality for a capitalist economic system. The urban 'fourth world' (see Harrison, 1983) can serve as a functional equivalent to the third world and is spatially more convenient, especially for the provision of services.

Thus we have two issues for investigation in relation to the underclass. Both have to do with their exclusion - social and civil about which there is general agreement, and economic about which there is considerable dispute. I will now merely mention that space will be important in relation to both. That is an issue which will be developed in Chapter 3. The issue of economic exclusion has thus far been discussed in relation to arguments about whether or not the poor are a reserve army of labour. Certainly the autonomist account regards them as playing this role. However it includes the poor within a broader category of

'the social proletariat', that is that part of the population which is employed in 'the social factory' and engaged in the reproduction both of labour power and of general social relation. The 'social proletariat' is not a homogeneous group but rather is composed of a set of different elements including women engaged in unpaid housework, (hence the autonomist provenance of the wages for housework campaign) and others whose task/role is to facilitate the reproduction of labour power for capitalism. Clearly the social proletariat is a class in-itself rather than a self-conscious class for itself.

The autonomist position also provides an account of the position of disadvantaged groups of workers employed for wages in production. This account has much in common with Friedman's (1977) discussion of the distinction between central and peripheral workers. This distinction within the employed is of great importance because it is action determined : groups move in and out of central status depending on collective capacities as they can be expressed in changing structural conditions. It provides us with a way of addressing the position of low paid / insecurely employed workers in contemporary society without reliance on essentially structuralist conceptions of dual labour markets. Thus it helps us to recognize the *continuum* of intra-class locations for employed waged workers. However there are those who do not see an continuous relationship but rather identify a new and very sharp set of social distinctions.

## Consumption Cleavages and Social Structure

The idea of consumption cleavages was first proposed by Saunders:

"... a major fault line is opening up in countries like Britain between a majority of people who can service their key consumption requirements through the market and a minority who remain reliant on an increasingly inadequate and alienated form of direct state provision. This division, arising out of the social relations of consumption, is, it is argued, becoming as if not more significant than the more familiar class divisions arising out of the social relations of production, for it is fundamentally influencing not only political alignments, but also material life chances and cultural identities."  
(1986 p 290).

This is a theory of the division between the underclass and the 'middle mass'. In his recent book on owner occupation (1990) Saunders distinguishes between those with access to owner occupation and 'the marginalized minority' who have, not as part of a general argument about the desirability of the attainment of a privatized life based on the ownership of material possessions. Pahl addresses the same theme in a way which relates to our previous discussion of citizenship :

"For a time ordinary people were prepared to go along with solidaristic collectivism as perhaps the only way to get major advances into citizenship. Now, it seems, the citizens of the middle mass are asserting themselves in their private lives." (1986 p 326).

Saunders has made clear the provenance of this sort of approach :

"My starting point here lies in the work of Gorz (1982) and his 'dual society' thesis in which he argues that the characteristic loss of autonomy and fulfilment experienced by most working people in their paid employment today is not a product of capitalist methods of organization and control, but is inherent to the technical imperatives of any advanced division of labour. It follows from that that liberation through labour (i.e. through the socialist reorganization of production) is a chimera ; rather human liberation and self-fulfilment can only come through an extension of personal autonomy outside the formal work process.

This, I believe, is the real significance of consumption location, for if very few of us can ever hope to assert effective control over our lives through our participation in the organized

production sphere, it may nonetheless be the case that certain patterns of consumption do carry with them the potential for personal control and autonomy." (1986 p 159)

There are some quite serious confusions which surround the specification of what is meant by 'consumption cleavage'. Saunders has been very anxious to impose a distinct separation between such cleavages and the production system. In a discussion of Pretceille (1986), who accepted the importance of such consumption located sources for the real contemporary experience of inequality but retained a (fairly minimal) concern with their relationship with class location, Saunders commented that :

"... it is in my view a mistake to go on to assume that class divisions (as opposed to those between employed and unemployed, or single and multiple earner households) are the key factor in structuring access to consumption, or that inequalities generated through consumption are secondary to and derivative of inequalities generated through the social organization of production." (1986 p 159)

There is a very close relationship here with Pahl's distinction between 'work rich' and 'work poor' (1984 p 314) in which participation in the labour market is likewise conflated with possession of assets, although to do Pahl justice he does not suggest that there is some crucial independence of asset ownership

from labour market position. Saunders seems to associate class position and the consequences of the social organization in a way which suggests that he has a unitary conception of the nature of class. How can employment relations be disconnected from the social organization of production ? Saunders does not explain this at all. In his most recent work on owner-occupation (1990) he makes some much exaggerated claims about asset ownership by 'ordinary people' in a way which quite fails to distinguish between marketable and non-marketable assets and seems to be moving almost towards asserting that the degree of asset ownership is so great that a majority can now regard the consumption possibilities of their lives as structured by that ownership rather than work relations. Clearly inequalities which derive from work relations derive from the social organization of production !

The clue to the origin of these confusions is provided by the way Saunders develops his discussion towards a cultural conception and the already quoted assertion that the sphere of consumption is the sphere of autonomy. Saunders' account is characteristically post-modernist and pessimistic. Collective control over production is unattainable. We are forced back to individual control in private life.

I want to develop my argument here by reference back to an earlier piece (Byrne 1989 b). In a review of the very real social divisions in the New Town of Cramlington it was found that location in socially segregated space (in an entirely ethnically homogeneous locale) was determined (in the sense of that word

suggested by Williams 1982) by labour market relation. However the point was that the actual pattern of labour market relations was in turn the product of capitalist determination of the local system of production within a world system of production. Polarization was a consequence of that set of changes. The categories were created by capitalism, whatever the allocative mechanisms which placed households into those categories. In fact the allocative mechanisms has a lot to do with capitalist social relations as well.

Saunders has proposed another basis for consumption cleavages apart from 'work relations' or 'asset accumulation'. He has argued that it is inappropriate :

"... to use essentially nineteenth century theories of stratification (whether Marxist or Weberian) to analyse late twentieth century cleavages and relations - cleavages and relations which are now structured as much by the exercise of state power (as employer and provider) as by the private ownership and control of these societies' productive resources." (1986 p 156)

This means :

"... that determination of household consumption capacity cannot be read off from members' participation in a formal system of production, for

state provision is subject, in part at least, to a political logic which does not reflect the economic logic of the market." (1986 b p 292)

This appears to amount to a version of the relative autonomy of the state thesis which is elaborated to suggest that there is a political logic (derived one must assume from social actions) which operates so as to produce a system of resource allocation with different effects from those generated by labour market participation. So far, fair enough. Indeed LeGrand's 'strategy of equality' might be identified as just such a logic. However to distinguish between the effects of labour market participation and state allocations is not to validate the independence of the state from the logic of the system of production. Indeed it might very well be that in particular historic circumstances the survival of a capitalist system of production would require a more equal redistribution of resources among the proletariat than would be the case if labour market relations alone prevailed. Such a situation is at least deductively feasible.

Such situations are, however, empirically uncommon. The whole burden of investigative Social Policy in the tradition of Titmuss has been to demonstrate the way in which most social policies reinforce existing patterns of inequality. Titmuss's conception of the fiscal welfare state is very important here since the crucial underpinning of the most important system of real asset ownership in the United Kingdom today is the fiscal treatment of loans for the acquisition of owner occupied houses, and of the returns

obtained by their sale. It is this which explains the distinction between the tenure patterns of the United Kingdom and a country like Sweden. Since the general rule of state allocations is To Them that Hath, shall be Given, it seems somewhat strange to argue that the state allocative system has any true independence from production logics.

An interesting characteristic of the consumption cleavage debate is that it has been concerned almost entirely with distinctions between 'the middle mass' and the 'underclass'. Any upwards scan seems almost wholly absent. It does seem somewhat restrictive to confine discussion of social structure and patterns of inequality only to the situation of ordinary people and the very poor. There are other groups in our social order and they are by no means insignificant in numbers and have enormous social significance because a discussion of their position brings us to issues of power. It puts determinant action by capitalists and/or some other set onto the agenda. The and/or is the service class, if it exists and whatever it is.

#### **Above ordinary people**

Therborn (1986 p 32-3) has identified the potential for the 'Brazilianization' of contemporary advanced capitalist societies, especially the United Kingdom, with an emergent three fold division into an underclass, ordinary people and an elite of 'capitalists and top business managers'. This thesis will proceed by working with a three fold scheme for social division along

class lines although it will be somewhat more elaborated than the relatively simple schemata suggested by Therborn. At first thought the development of a notion of 'upward boundary' for ordinary people in a society dominated by wage labour might be considered simple. One direct interpretation of the classic marxist position would be to differentiate between those dependent on wage labour and those who own the means of production, between a classical proletariat and a classical bourgeoisie. However in anything other than extreme abstraction even Marx himself worked with a more elaborate schemata and recent debate has suggested things are much more complex.

To work for the moment at a relatively abstract level, it can be seen that the debate is about ownership, power (as control) and the interaction between them. Thus the debate about a service class is usually considered to have originated with the importation of Renner's idea of a 'service class' into British Sociology by Dahrendorf : "... who tended to assimilate it to his own project of replacing property as the main concern of class theory with a focus on power." (Sarre 1989 p105). While the exact term 'service class' may be due to Renner, the concept has other provenances, notably in Burnham's *Managerial Revolution* (1942) which first introduced into English speaking political debate the notion that in the mid twentieth century, control over the conduct of the economic system could be separated from direct ownership. Titmuss's essay *The Irresponsible Society* (1963) raised the same theme in the specific context of the management of collective assets in the form of pension funds by financial institutions.

'Control' and 'ownership' matter because they have consequences. It is useful to differentiate between immediate and developmental consequences. By the first is meant what happens now as a result of an existing system. The present pattern of resource distribution and consequent consumption are immediate consequences. Developmental consequences are a matter of differential capacity for determining what will happen in the future. The two may be separable conceptually but are usually intrinsically linked in reality. To take an example from the account of consumption cleavage, (which in class terms can be perhaps best interpreted as involving a massive extension of partial petit-bourgeois position), ownership of real equity in a dwelling has immediate consequences for housing conditions and the amount of resources available for other expenditures. It also has creative developmental consequences in terms of capacity for influencing the course of future developments, even if only in terms of what Saunders (1990 p290) calls 'ontological security'. In practice this seems to be planning in the sense that building a bomb shelter is planning. It provides a retreat - human households are reduced to the status of intentional tortoises. Nonetheless it would be facile to deny the reality of the significance of elements of security as part of people's objectives in wanting control over the course of their lives. As C. Wright Mills (1959) told us Sociology is concerned with the intersection of history and biography and household planning is concerned precisely with the consequences of that intersection.

Theories of 'consumption cleavages' are theories of differential capacities derived from ownership. The idea of service class is not well defined but it is about capacities derived from position. Sarre has pointed out that in Renner's original formation the vertical distinction between the private sector and the public sector was of considerable significance, although the term has been taken up far more in terms of a horizontal division determined by power position (1989 p 105). Lash and Urry have identified 'five central points' about this 'service class' (1987 p 162). To paraphrase the 'service class' occupies dominant positions 'which do not principally involve the ownership of capital, land or buildings' ; the tasks of those occupying those positions are managerial in relation to the design and organization of production and of non-household forms of reproduction ; people who occupy these positions are both well rewarded through systems of distribution and often have some sort of 'professional' control over access to the positions ; access is often credential based ; and the size, power and composition of the service class is the resultant of a series of social conflicts. For Lash and Urry the state / non-state distinction is not significant in definition although they are not unaware of the potential importance of such a distinction in a broader sense.

The crucial point about 'service class' members is that they acquire a generous share of real resources without owning the means of production. The basis of this acquisition is not simple. Many definitions seem to conflate two factors. One is true managerial control over processes of production and reproduction. This

involves a real say in determining what will happen : power over developmental consequences. The other is the possession of personal 'human capital' in the form of exceptional skills, usually in practice protected by professional/credential controls over access to occupational roles. The difference is very easily illustrated by recently created occupational divisions at the top of the UK National Health Service. The Unit/District/Regional General Manager is an example of a service class member whose position derives from control. The Consultant Practitioner is an example of one whose position derives from the possession of professionally/credentially defined human capital.

My own view is that if the term 'service class' is to have any real meaning it would be better confined to those who exercise power in managing the future course of development of the capitalist social order. The lines of division are by no means precise. Until very recently UK Health Service Consultants exercised a major managerial role. When does a manager become senior enough to cross the divide into the service class ? In the UK manual workers commonly make a distinction between chargehands who supervise but also work on production (as most UK 'original' University Professors are 'heads of department' but also teach and do research) and supervisors who only manage (as very few UK former Polytechnic Heads of Departments do any teaching or research). UK Health Service Consultants used to be chargehands in a complex professional / gender hierarchy. Now they are workers, at least in salaried practice.

Which raises the question of who are the bourgeoisie ? Bagguley et al (1990 p 107) have operationalized the class structure using a form of amalgamation of Socio-Economic Groups. They identify a Service Class, a Petite Bourgeoisie, intermediate non-manual workers, upper working class and lower working class. I find this schemata odd in a number of respects. For example I find it very odd that poorly paid Junior non-manual and personal service workers are placed in a category without the label working class, whilst Foremen and supervisors (manual) are assigned unequivocally to the working class. There is also the interesting question of where, if anywhere, do we find the grand bourgeoisie ? However my reason for identifying this scheme relates to the location of the category 'Professional Workers - self-employed'. Bagguley et al place this group among the service class. I disagree very much with this and find it useful to do so here because it provides a way of reasserting the significance of the bourgeoisie as part of locally present social formations, even if as the next chapter will demonstrate the delocalization of control over industrial production is of the greatest significance for understanding the contemporary situation of industrial towns.

The argument can be illustrated by consideration of two groups. The first are medical general practitioners. In the UK GPs are not directly employed by the Health Service but are contractors with it and have a self-employed status. As such they belong in Socio-Economic-Group (SEG) 3. How do GPs work ? Clearly a good deal of the reward they receive derives from the human capital they possess and a very well developed professional

monopoly over the provision of important services in relation to an aspect of reproduction. However they do not provide these services alone. They employ others (increasingly so) to carry out necessary associated tasks. Recently an important development in UK Health and Personal Social Service provision has provided many GPs with an opportunity to extend their role as employing capitalists. The run down of long stay geriatric hospitals coupled with a massive demographic increase in the absolute and proportionate numbers of the 'elderly old' has opened up a new business opportunity in the 'private residential care' sector. Many GPs have opened private Old People's Homes employing non-unionized part-time and poorly paid staff to run them. This is very simple petty bourgeois activity.

GPs were introduced as an illustrative example of the petit bourgeois potentiality of service class members. However in the introduction the area of 'health and personal social services' was specifically precluded from the range of empirical consideration in this thesis. The members of the 'complex' I wish to discuss now operate in areas which fall very much within the range of concern of this piece. They are also particularly interesting because they illustrate that a sharp distinction between petty and grand bourgeois may, even now, be inappropriate. Solicitors and Accountants in private practice in the UK are very largely members of SEG 3. Both are involved in 'business'. Let us first consider a very important business in any urban centre, the business of the production and management of the built environment. Solicitors have always had a central 'service' role

in this, but (in the nineteenth century even when nominally employees of city corporations) they have also functioned as investing participants in capitalist development. Accountants have had a similar function. Any historical account of the development of commercial and private residential property always finds accountants and solicitors playing a key role, often through the 'irresponsible' control they have exercised as directors of building societies. Clearly members of these professions form a part of that 'urban bourgeoisie' which has played, and continues to play, such a crucial role in the production and reproduction of the built environment.

Much of building capital remains relatively local, even if not always particularly small scale. What is interesting is the personal survival of local capital, in terms of continuity of family representation of executive power as well as mere ownership, in many large conglomerates into which local smaller capitals have been amalgamated. This is particularly the case for the UK clearing banks as is evidenced by Benwell CDP's (1978) tracing of the fortunes of the descendants of West Newcastle capitalists into the twentieth century.

What is required for further understanding of developments here is research which documents the movements of both personnel and capital. In the empirical part of this study examples will be cited of the continuity of executive control in important parts of manufacturing industry and the dominance of 'personal' capital in construction. However the presence of a Cookson or a Pease in a

very senior executive position in a national or trans-national company, does not necessarily imply that family capital holdings are committed to that company. We need a Sociology of the rich to match our intrusive Sociology of the poor, but the posture of the discipline has always been, in Niclaus's telling phrase, 'Hands palms up, eyes down'. The most accessible part of the relevant processes goes on in relation to the production of the built environment. This involves determinative action and brings us to the necessary question of the relationship between classes and the state apparatus.

### **Class, Control and the Welfare State**

Considerable emphasis has already been placed on the constitutive element of welfare provision, on the way in which the form of the Welfare State and the effects of the processes which derive from it play a crucial part in the formation of class structure. I want to develop that theme in relation to a consideration of the class elements (which term is used because in a broader framework elements act together to constitute social classes) identified in the preceding section. Again the point must be made that the boundaries between adjacent elements are by no means sharp and fixed. Individuals and groups move across it in lifetimes and through history. The elements are : the underclass, the ordinary working class, the service class and the bourgeoisie (including petty and grand).

In considering the relations of these elements with the Welfare State attention has be paid to both directions of a recursive relationship. Welfare State form and processes have a constitutive effect on class structure. Elements in class structure through class action create the form and content of Welfare State and processes. This is both a matter of position, in the sense that the Welfare State creates a series of job opportunities for service class employment, recognized very early by socialist critics such as William Paul (1917, 1974), and of distributive effects. The distributive effects have received much more attention, both in traditional Social Policy and in studies of the political economy of the welfare state.

In examining such effects a distinction should be made between the structural relations of capital and welfare on the one hand, and the relations of active classes and welfare on the other. As Murphy  
has put it:

"Both neo-Weberian and neo-Marxist class analysis will have to rediscover the distinction between structural class situation and conscious collective class action in order to refocus class analysis on the dialectical interaction of the two, and thus redirect class analysis and closure theory away from either one sided structuralism or equally one sided voluntarism." (1986 p 261)

The point can be made evenly more strongly. Murphy is directing attention to the structural elements in class location. We must also consider the structural forces, or even responsibilities, expressed / born by classes. Reference has been made to the general sociological invisibility of the bourgeoisie. This criticism applies to 'active class analyses' which take a historical form. The bourgeoisie usually appears in structural sociological analyses under the form of the abstraction capital. There is of course some justification for considering capital as an abstract force. There is no justification for forgetting that it belongs to people who act to keep what they have and to get more of it.

The best way into any consideration of the distributional effects of welfare is provided by the traditional concern of Social Policy with the questions of who pays, who benefits and what is the balance between contribution and benefit ? Political Economy, as represented for example by the work of O'Connor (1974), has described the relationship of capital and welfare in

terms of a broad distinction between welfare expenditures which support the accumulation rationale of capital and those which are 'social expenses'. The latter may be necessary for 'system maintenance' (in a simple functionalist sense) but they represent a drain on accumulation possibilities, or using the closely related 'New Right' terminology, a 'public burden'.

This account will stand very well for the broad systematic interests and actions of the bourgeois-service class elite as vectors of capital in a capitalist social order. However it is (other than through the very personal interest of the rich in hanging on to and increasing their wealth) somewhat impersonal. Even in the upper reaches of the service class, and for all elements below that position, the impact of personal taxation is of enormous significance. This applies particularly to the distinctions made by Pahl and Saunders between 'ordinary people' and 'the underclass'. The latter are regarded as net recipients of welfare expenditures at the expense of the former who are net contributors. To this extent, to use Parkin's vocabulary (1979) 'ordinary people' and the service class are likely to share an anti-welfare exclusionary ideological position because they see themselves as paying out to support the dependent poor.

Account has to be taken of net benefits. Clearly a major factor producing the very different attitudes to public welfare provision in the United States and the United Kingdom is the existence in the latter society of a National Health Service which is visibly of enormous benefit to 'ordinary people'. The point

about visibility is important. Social Policy has devoted a great deal of attention to the impact of the 'Fiscal Welfare State'. In housing in particular the comparative effects in the UK of the Fiscal and direct Welfare States in the distribution of housing subsidies, using a relatively conservative method of calculating the effects of the former, are such that 'ordinary people' benefit much more than the poor, and the service class benefit much more than ordinary people. It is not that people do not know this, but rather that attitudes to tax subsidies are ambivalent. Certainly they are regarded as separate from welfare.

The effects of the net impact of benefits/tax payments for the non-poor have been reviewed by Gooding and LeGrand (1987). So far as the UK is concerned they conclude :

"Any review of the figures showing the distributional impact of the social services leaves at least one clear impression. Policies involving subsidies whose distribution is dependent upon people's decision to consume the good or use the service concerned favour the better off. Public transport, health care, continuing education and owner-occupied housing, all are subsidized, all are distributed in whole or in part according to people's decisions to use or consume them, and all have a distribution that is pro-rich." (1987 p105)

These issues of benefit and cost have been salient in relation to recent changes in the form of the local state in the UK. These changes have been coincident with major changes in state primary and secondary education, the principle universalistic social service which is both administered by the local state and used by 'ordinary people', although not necessarily by the service class and scarcely at all by the richer bourgeoisie. Urban sociology has paid relatively little attention to education as part of what makes 'locales' or 'localities'. Given the significance of credentials in personal access to class locations this neglect matters.

Another area of benefit and cost which has not been considered very much by traditional Social Policy is the impact of planning decisions. However those workers in a direct Weberian tradition

who were described by Green (1980) as the 'North Eastern School of Political Sociology', especially Dennis (1970, 1972) and Davies (1972) did address these questions. Davies commented :

"Planning becomes a highly repressive form of indirect taxation with those who have least suffering most, and those who have a lot being given more....The planning system relates to the people it is meant to serve in exactly the same way as the educational system relates to the people it is meant to serve : it complements the class structure, giving most to those who already have a lot, and giving least to those who need it most." (1972 p 229)

Dennis raised the question of the role of planners themselves as a professional interest group expressing a set of objectives and interests he summed up as 'evangelical bureaucracy'. This is getting us towards the other aspect of the class-Welfare State relationship, the impact of state positions on the class structure. Before turning to that let me sum up the discussion thus far of distributional effects.

Clearly Welfare State distributions are of great significance to households for those aspects of any Weberian derived conception of class which are concerned with 'life chances'. The distinction between total welfare dependency and non-dependency is crucial to all distinctions made between 'ordinary people' or 'the middle

mass' and the 'underclass'. This sharp distinction has been asserted rather than demonstrated. It has already been suggested that the existence of a substantial body of working poor, a working poor which in the contemporary UK may very well be dependent on 'Speenhamland' cash supplements of low wages and specific welfare related charge remissions like housing benefit, makes this distinction inappropriate. The examination of this boundary is crucial to understanding the character of the poor - if the boundary is permeable then the very poor are not an 'underclass'. Here it must be noted that the role of welfare around this boundary is not merely distributional. The impact of welfare regulations, for example those which make it virtually pointless for the wife of an unemployed man to take non-irregular part time work, are clearly constitutive

However distinctions between the poor and the non-poor are not all that there is to class relations with welfare. Far too little attention has been devoted in recent years to distributions among the non-poor and in particular between the service class and ordinary people. Related to this distributional distinction is the role of Welfare State activity, particularly through the planning system, in supporting capital interests in specific locations. Distributional and systemic effects are very much mixed up in practice and this issue forms part of the subject matter of Chapter 2, being part of the 'urban concern' of this thesis, but it needs to be mentioned here. Likewise education has systemic and distributional effects both among the non-poor and between the non-poor and the poor. Indeed it is worth remembering that the

1960s debate about culture of poverty, from which so much of the contemporary debate about the underclass derives, was conducted in relation to educational systems and educational policy.

Social Policy has paid relatively little attention to effect of the Welfare State as a set of employment locations. For example Goodin and LeGrand (1987 p 151) note that one of the reasons for middle class support for the Welfare State in the UK is the employment possibilities it offers, but their empirical investigations are almost entirely concerned with distributions. The importance of Welfare State employment has been recognized in a general sense of Sociology but there has been relatively little empirical investigation of the situation. William Paul, in the work already cited, written around the time of one of the mass expansions of collective provision in this country, was quite clear about how he saw welfare in a capitalist social order. The expansion of welfare provision, on a Bismarkian precedent, was designed to integrate the working class into the capitalist order and, thereby, to defuse its potential for revolutionary transformation. The 'Fabians' supported such changes because they were an emergent part of the service class who lacked a role in productive industry and could find one in welfare. The analysis seems exact and is an early, and particularly lucid, version of one of the principle Marxist criticisms of welfare capitalism :

"The middle-class activity on behalf of State enterprise or control is due to the fact that the future of competitive capitalism shows little hope

of the intellectual proletarians improving their lot. With the extension of the activities of the State, new avenues of well-paid officials jobs are opened up. The candidates for these official posts have to pass examinations for which they have to be specially prepared. It is indeed a problem for modern middle-class parents to find well-paid situations for their sons and daughters. To them the extension of State ownership shows a way out of the difficulty. Consequently during the past few years there has been an amazing increase in the number of State employees. Small wonder that the middle-class looks upon the State as a glorified institution, as something to save the world." (1917, 1974 p 179)

However, as Harris (1980) has pointed out, Marxist analysis of welfare is inconsistent, or rather has to handle a contradictory situation. Clearly welfare is integrative but it also 'costs' capital in terms of the elimination of accumulation possibilities to the extent that welfare funding is for social expenses. This is a structuralist debate (although Harris's discussion is very clear about the implications of the structure action dichotomy). Usually it is a debate about the relations between the working class and capitalism. However some authors, notably Block (1980) have taken up the question of the relationship between the state and capital with the state seen as another set of interests in the game. This thesis is not about state theory but some of the debate on state theory is relevant because it has implications for the social

location of state workers, although of course state workers are by no means an undifferentiated category.

Offe (1984) has discussed the role of the state in welfare capitalism in terms of its role in crisis management and has remarked that today there is a 'crisis of crisis management' which is a result of the inherent contradiction involved when the state attempts to compensate for market failures without challenging either the existence of market mechanisms or the private ownership of the means of production. There is a good deal of value in considering the present social context as one of continuing crisis, but Offe's approach, like most which owe something to Weber's influence, says rather little about the issue which concerns us, that of the contemporary position of state personnel. This is not the central subject of the present thesis. It is an important and much neglected area which has some considerable implications for any discussion of social differentiation, which is the subject matter of the present thesis. For Weber the issue emerged out of a contrast between the German industrial bourgeoisie and the Junker aristocrats who played such an important role in the Prussian state machine. Any examination of the British state might well pay some attention to the continuing aristocratic presence, particularly in terms of a noblesse de la robe in the judicio-legal machinery. However that is far beyond the locales which are the basis of this study, except of course in terms of the rather important issue of the class composition of appointed boards and of the lay justices bench !

However, the issue here is the position of state employees. The purpose of these initial chapters is to outline issues for investigation rather than to propose a developed account. In relation to the location of state employees, this principle must be adhered to as a matter of necessity. It is not so much a matter of imprecise location as of confusing location. Clearly some state employees, senior civil servants, local government officers and health service managers are service class members if anyone is. By any socio-cultural and distributional criteria other state employees (and the state here is being defined to exclude nationalized industries which produced marketed products, but even that distinction is becoming less precise with the introduction of competitive tendering and customer client relations in all branches of government) are proletarians. Indeed taking account of the extension of the customer client principle and the obligation to make rates of return on capital employed, many formerly ambiguous employees are now proletarian by the criterion of profit generation through exploitative accumulation. These are the hospital cleaners, school cooks and direct works joiners.

The truly ambivalent groups are those who work in areas which do not generate even internal profits, whose salaries are frequently (if male) considerably in excess of the earnings of skilled manual workers, and who directly provide services, even if that service frequently incorporates a considerable element of 'hegemony maintenance'. These groups include teachers, social workers and salaried medical and nursing personnel. They are

supervised. They work directly on, for example, 'the chalkface', they are typically 'credentialized', and they are frequently groups with a recent record of militant trade unionism. Numerically these groups are of considerable significance.

It is these groups which have seen massive expansion in numbers with the growth of the modern Welfare State, and pace Paul's comments on the origins of state workers, many of them are in fact the descendants of skilled industrial households. This is also true of many of the basic level bureaucrats in the national and local governmental service, particularly in welfare related departments such as the Department of Social Security. They are, as we shall see, an important component of the contemporary occupied workforce and their location and action potentials and tendencies are of great importance. It would be wrong to identify them as simply service class. They are characteristically subordinate to, directed by, and antagonistic to, the true service class representatives in the public sector, (although as always boundaries are imprecise and shifting). They matter to the social structure not least, although not only, because a good part of their work is to do with the reproduction of the poor and with the maintenance of public order by incorporation / repression.

Complex ideological factors play a very important part in the self location of these groups. Partly this is functional. Social workers tend to be radical. Police (and the rank and file of the police are clearly members of this group) tend to be conservative. Partly, and interestingly for this study, it is a matter of

regional culture in the terms defined by Cooke (1982, 1985). These factors are products of, as well as producers of, the Welfare State.

### Classes in Action - Collective Citizenship or the return of the Magistracy

The above, extensive, discussion has remained primarily distributional. However, given the criticisms of the orientation of Social Policy made at the beginning of this chapter, things cannot be left there. It is a matter of returning to the issue of 'political citizenship' as collectively expressed. The issue of local political control becomes very important. One of the key themes in relation to planning, the service area which is the focus of this thesis, is the extent to which in the 'post-modernization' era, it has become de-democratized. Indeed that is a theme for many areas of welfare but in planning the replacement of elected local government responsible in some way to a citizen electorate, by what Stewart (1992) has recently referred to as a re-emergent magistracy, is particularly blatant. In other words it cannot be just a matter of who benefits from decisions which have 'constitutive effects' on local social structures. We must also pay attention to who makes those decisions, and how.

The interesting issue here is the class composition of the 'new magistracy'. In important areas, and in particular the membership of the boards of Urban Development Corporations, 'new magisterial' forms have provided a mechanism through which the

traditional urban bourgeoisie can exercise control over development, 'manipulate the city', without being exposed to the democratic process. This is of very great significance and will be returned to in the next chapter.

## Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to review contemporary debates about class. The intention has been both to clarify vocabulary and to identify issues for empirical investigation. Four main questions have emerged. These are :-

Are the poor an a spatially and socially segregated 'underclass' outside the economic order ?

What is the position of state employees in the class structure ?

What is the service class and where are its boundaries ?

What is the position and role of the working poor ?

In Chapter Three these questions of social differentiation will be addressed in relation to space. In other words the issue of intra-urban socio-spatial segregation will be considered. It is the particular intention of this investigation that issues of social structure and its spatial expressions will be related to the form and content of welfare provisions. Thus in addition to locational questions (in terms both of class structure and of

spatial expression of that structure) there are also questions about aspects of welfare in terms of both distributive and constitutive effects. Chapter Four will discuss the research procedures which have been applied in the investigation of all this. It will deal not only with issues of operationalization and investigation, but also with epistemological justification and the conduct of the research programme as a whole. This is a thesis about particular places. It is concerned with the impact on those places, considered not as unities but as differentiated social systems, of a fundamental reorganization of the spatial patterns of capitalist production, although there is more to restructuring than that, whatever the imperialist ambitions of industrial location theorists. Thus the thesis will proceed into Chapter Two and a discussion of restructuring and locality.

## Chapter 2 - Social Division through Space and in Space

### Introduction

The word 'restructuring' has already appeared in this thesis both in specification of the content of this chapter and in relation to the argument about the nature of 'the underclass' advanced by Wilson et al (1989). The elements of the new class structure identified in the previous chapter must be understood as consequences of a set of processes of change in the organization of production and reproduction. This set of changes is restructuring. The set has a number of components. It includes a spatial reordering of production, the central focus of attention of a body of work deriving from refinements of industrial location theory (at least in the UK although there are other sources and the US literature is more widely premised) and addressing issues framed by the concept 'locality'. It also includes changes in the nature of the processes of production itself, including both the direct labour process and 'factory regimes', that is 'the means used to regulate struggles around the relations of domination in any workplace' (Burawoy, 1985). These two in combination are usually seen as the causal elements as investigated in the locality studies summarized in Cooke (1989). The approach is summarized by Hill and Feagin's statement that :

"... answers to questions about a city's political-economic future are to be found as much beyond as within its local boundaries. Cities are spatial

locations in a globally inter-dependent system of production and exchange. That global system is in crisis and transition. So the path that a city follows in the future will depend upon the niche that it comes to occupy in a changing international division of labour." (1987 p 148)

However this is an account of dependency. As Bagguley et al say, in such accounts :

"The focus ... was on the ways in which places became the *victims* (original emphasis) of capital : how they are called into being, transmuted and destroyed in the pursuit of accumulation." (1990, p 2)

That cities, and in particular industrial cities/towns, are dependent on what is happening in capitalism is self-evident. However that is not all that is going on. Cox and Mair point out that :

"While certain generalized technological and social conditions may obtain, there will be particular socio-spatial structures, located around particular sites, necessary to their maintenance. If socio-spatial structures are limited to a particular scale, such as the local, various economic agents acquire interests that are defined at the scale." (1989 p 126-7)

In other words restructuring is about what is happening in capitalism on a world scale, but aspects are about what is happening on a local scale. It is no accident that this reminder comes from US based writers who are well aware of the continuing significance of local capital in the restructuring of the built environment. Indeed the apposite term used for describing the consequence of the interventions of such local capital coalitions of real estate and finance interests is 'the manipulated city'. It is in land use and construction that such interventions occur. Hence, the development of service employment will not be understood without the recognition of the continuing significance of local capital. This is where the state, especially but not exclusively the local state, becomes involved through planning and related processes, although these are also significant in relation to the use made of places by world scale capital. Most available accounts are very much 'capital logic' in form. However, Cooke has asserted that :

"Localities are not simply places or even communities : they are the sum of social energy and agency resulting from the clustering of diverse individuals, groups and social interests in space. They are not passive or residual, but, in varying ways and degrees, centres of collective consciousness. They are bases for interventions in the internal workings of not only individual and collective daily lives but also events on a broader canvas affecting local interests." (1989 p 296)

Cooke has developed this account rather more systematically for 'regions' (1985) than for 'localities' and has done so through a discussion of regional culture. This cultural dimension is important. In a previous study (1989) I identified the cultural complex as crucial in terms of potential for change. The relevance of the local aspect of culture must be evident in any discussion of issues of social division. Warde has observed that useful as the concept of restructuring has been in facilitating understanding of the spatial division of labour :

"... it has been much less successful in analysing persuasively, or in any detail, how industrial restructuring affects local politics or local culture." (1988 p 75)

That reservation may very well derive from engagement only with a particular version of the account of restructuring, that derived from the taking up of structuralist 'marxist' accounts by theorists of industrial location in the late 1970s. It is much less applicable to the US literature and to the work of the Community Development Projects of the mid 1970s, in terms both of inter-project reports such as *The Costs of Industrial Change* (1977) and of interim and final local reports. It also ignores a substantial body of historical literature. However in relation to main stream urban theory it is quite accurate.

Thus there are three aspects of restructuring which will be gone into in this chapter. These are the relationship of places

with the world economy, the impact of local capitalist structures in restructuring, and the cultural and political aspect of local developments. The first is almost always understood in a structuralist fashion with particular places being seen as products of the logic of capital accumulation. The second is understood both in terms of structural determination and a range of 'instrumental' social actions. The last is usually interpreted in action terms. This pattern of interpretation has some foundation but is not by any means absolutely applicable.

Crosscutting the action/structure dichotomy is another of production/reproduction. Again 'world capitalist' factors are usually interpreted in production terms. The local base is often seen in terms of a historical development in which production is de-localized whilst reproduction, including the role of private commodity services in reproduction, remains local. Cultural elements are often associated with productive experience - industrial cultures - but there is a general recognition of the significance of reproduction, especially in relation to aspects of reproduction which relate to women and the domestic/social. Again there is some basis for this tendency although world capitalism includes trans-nationals which are not only employment locales but provide particular reproductive services, and the experience of production and reproduction through wage labour and the Welfare State may very well produce what is in large part, but by no means exclusively, a common proletarian culture.

The chapter will proceed by addressing each of these elements, the relationship of places with the world economy, the impact of local capitalist processes, and the cultural dimension, in turn. It will also include a discussion of how the interaction of these elements generates different sorts of places. This section will be concerned with the distinction between 'world cities' and other cities (see King 1989) and is included because it is useful to have a general inter-locality typology in order to classify the study areas as a group. The study areas are not part of world cities and that has implications for the intra-area impact of restructuring.

The internal impacts, and particularly the form of socio-spatial differentiation, will be the subject matter of the next chapter. This present chapter is concerned with the fist, not the bruise. However, one element which might have been included in the discussion here has been reserved for Chapter Four. That is the discussion of the meaning of the term 'locality' as generally expressed and in relation to realist methodology. This reservation will not be absolute. It will be impossible to proceed with a discussion of the restructuring thesis without saying something about terminology and concept content, but the main part of that discussion will be conducted in the methodological chapter.

## What world capitalism does to places

In their study of Lancaster Bagguley et al (1990 p 2) include an intellectual history of the idea of restructuring as applied to places. They point out that in geography at least it developed as an alternative to positivist correlational location theory and involved an attempt to understand the interaction (although they do not use this word) of 'the qualitative processes and dynamics of changing capitalist *production* (original emphasis) and changing class relations and struggles' on the one hand with the specificity of unique spaces as created by the previous interaction of that place with capitalist and pre-capitalist production and accumulation. This they identify as Massey's (1984) 'geological metaphor', 'describing as it does the ways in which these divisions of labour overlie each other to constitute distinct regions and localities (Warde, 1985)'.

The attraction of this structuralist approach to investigators schooled in, but struggling with, positivism seems apparant. Especially when developed with specific reference to realist epistemology (see Chapter Four) an account of the working out of capital's logic has much in common with the project of identifying underlying causal systems which has been the ,traditional scientific project in anglo-saxon academia. Variation could be introduced both by 'specific sedimentations' and by the use of the notion of 'tendency' in the realist account. An important point to note here and develop in Chapter Four is that there seems to have been a general confusion by writers in this tradition between

variation and action. Things were different in different places and because they were different in different in different places there was a capacity for handling the unique. This was seen as equivalent to resolving the problems of the relations between structure and action, although only occasionally did such studies include historical accounts of action and actors. The general story has been one of capital logic and determination.

Even writers like Bagguley et al who specifically cite class action tend to bring it in as a last item although there is nothing to quarrel with in their reference to :

"... sources of independent struggle and resistance, as the labour that is assembled, collectivised and schooled in class conflict through the agency of capital, organises autonomously around its own interests." (1990 p 3)

In general the tone is one of response. Capital proposes, and disposes, whilst labour responds, usually through resistance. The vocabulary is one in which abstract entities are the disputants (labour versus capital) rather than social classes (bourgeoisie/capitalists versus proletariat/working class). Perhaps for this reason there has been a general neglect of local reproductive struggles as opposed to conflict around production processes. Put another way the debate has been about conflict in relation to exploitation (and it has been very much about exploitation in a classic marxist sense as it relates to

accumulation, and not about domination) rather than about conflict in relation to the terms and conditions of the reproduction of labour. This is one reason why the debate has been about contrasts among places (usually operationally defined as local labour markets expressed as journey to work areas - see Chapter Four) rather than about contrasts within places. Certainly the changing relations and contrast among places are almost entirely to do with production, especially if comparisons are made on a world scale. The converse is by no means so true. There is a significant spatial reordering of production within places, as we shall see (and perhaps one of the reasons why this has so often been missed is because studies have been of small towns rather than great cities). However reproductive reordering in space is intra rather than inter.

The debate would not have acquired anything like so much significance if it had been merely academic, a geographical-urban/regional studies intellectual argument paralleling the battles about cladistics in paleontology. The point was that the restructuring thesis in the United Kingdom and the USA was an idea around at a time when there were ongoing massive changes in those national space economies. Three processes were in operation simultaneously. The first was a massive deindustrialization which involved both a large scale reduction in the absolute and proportional importance of industrial employment and a less massive reduction in industrial output both absolutely for much of the eighties in the UK and relatively (Martin and Rowthorne, 1986). The second was a series of changes in 'factory', or perhaps

it would be better to say 'production', regimes (Braverman 1974, Burawoy 1985). The third was a spatial reordering of production functions with a tendency for separation among control, research and development, and production (Massey 1985)

This last change was related to another process which began much before the changes of the seventies and eighties. This was the delocalization of capital both through the combining of previously autonomous enterprises through amalgamation, take-over and (very important in the study areas) nationalization, and through the development of branch plants. The interventions of the state through regional and local planning policies were of very considerable significance for the latter process. In the United Kingdom much of this reorganization of capital dated from the inter-war period. It involved not only a change in the form and scale of industrial enterprises but a new relation between industrial and finance capital (see Gamble 1990). Capitalist aspects of the production of the built environment remained much more local in character.

The issue of land was remarkably absent from marxist and marxisant discussions. What was discussed was space but it was left to the traditional positivist approach of Fothergill and Gudgeon (1986) to insert a land price dynamic involving changes of use gains and constraints on production in existing plants on existing sites. The first point had certainly been recognized in CDP studies of the 70s (Benwell CDP 1978) but did not form part of the restructuring arguments. This may well be because land prices

and spatial arrangements, although of some significance on the national scale, have a particular impact on intra-locale spatial reorderings and that topic has been neglected by restructuring analysis.

Be that as it may, the reordering of production in space and within the production (or indeed reproduction) unit is of great significance for class structure. Most of the debate in locality studies about this topic has proceeded through a discussion of a move from 'Fordist' (or mass production assembly line techniques) to 'Post-Fordist' or more flexible techniques (see Cooke, 1989). This is a bit simplistic. First much of manufacturing industrial production, other industrial production, construction and large unit service production (eg of domestic services in hospitals) was not 'Fordist' but could be better described as 'manufacturing' where the workers skill was crucial to the organization of the task or 'machinofacture' in which the worker was subordinated to the particular machine but that subordination was not integrated into an overall productive system. Second much of the debate about the 'Fordist' - 'Post Fordist' move dealt only with production organization (and reproductive services are produced) and tended to ignore the external factors of market conditions for products and competing labour. There is little doubt that the theme of increasing flexibility, through some combination of deskilling, stock inventory control, supervisory practices, and inculcation of fear has been important in changing the content of production relations in the United Kingdom.

This has not been just a matter of management. The locality studies literature seems systematically to ignore the impact of restriction on workers' organizational capacities by instrumental legislation since 1979. These things can be done because the UK state (and US 'free labour' state statutes have a similar effect) has made them possible. They have changed the position of workers in work. Likewise the creation of a reserve army of labour 'allows management to manage' and that in the UK has been a consequence of political decisions.

Following Therborn (1985) we can go much farther into the political aspects of deindustrialization and changing work conditions. Job loss in UK manufacturing industry has been in very large part a consequence of exchange rate policies in the early 1980s (see Keegan 1985). These losses resulted from a combination of the dominance of finance capital over manufacturing capital interests in the UK economy and unemployment creation to discipline workers. Add in the inveterate ideological hostility of the present UK government to nationalized industry, as we shall see illustrated in the study areas, and the existence of mass unemployment becomes very much an action consequence, although it is not only this.

None of this is to decry the importance of capital's systematic relations with places but it is an effort to inject a sense of proportion and mechanism into the argument. There are very important general changes which are 'production logic' in origin but even these are expressed in actions. Massey (1985) has

expressed some hostility to debates about the impact on places of planning decisions by trans-national capital's corporate planners. She sees this as distracting attention from the systematic relations of capitalism as expressed through markets. This is clearly an old Althusserian returning to her origins. Markets are part of an anonymous system. Plans involve action and actors. Plans are made. So are management practices, for example the use of 'just in time' at Nissan in one of the study areas (see Garrahan et al 1992). Of course these actions reflect capitalism's conditions and logics. Capitalists too make history, but not in circumstances of their own choosing. Schumpeter's creative destruction thesis, very appropriately cited by Cooke in reference to this debate (1989 p 3), is not just a systemic account. It requires actors, albeit collective actors.

Before leaving the topic of basal restructuring the relationship of changes in employment patterns with gender relations must be examined. Gender is an important component of the basal changes. In a previous work the present author presented 'Time-Gender-Sector' accounts of changes in the occupational profile of a place and this will be done again here for the study areas. Bagguley et al (1990 p26-31) criticize the tenor of discussion of gender issues in relation to restructuring. Their particular criticisms related to the general neglect of service employment in debates about restructuring, a similar neglect of spatial variations in gender relations, and a lack of consideration of the implications of occupational segregation by gender. A special emphasis was placed on the inappropriateness of

regarding women as a reserve army of labour, in contrast to the approach of Massey (1984) asserting that :

".... the concept of women as a reserve army of labour is fundamentally flawed ; indeed arguments about women as a reserve army have now been more or less abandoned.... Women do not 'flow' on to the labour market when there are shortages, precisely because of pre-existing segmentation by gender in both local and national labour markets." (1990 p 30)

It is perfectly appropriate to emphasize the significance of space, services and occupational segregation for an understanding of restructuring. However Bagguley et al's general line of argument (following Urry 1982 and Walby 1985) is one which sees gender relations as a separate but equal system alongside those of production determined class relations. This is rather more a matter of assertion than demonstration. In reality in the study areas, and in others close to them, women, and in particular married women, have played a key role as a reserve army in facilitating restructuring by making possible a massive expansion in particular kinds of service development. Of course the very nature of part-time work in our sort of society has a great deal to do with models of household relations which are predicated on a patriarchal social order and notions about a family wage but part-time work is not an invariable form for married women, even married women with dependent children. We shall shortly observe the enormous significance of full time employment by married women

as a source of socio-spatial differentiation amongst areas and of social differentiation amongst households.

Clearly the forms of service employment, particularly in new retail developments like Gateshead's Metro Centre (see Byrne 1991) are the product of an *interaction* between household relations and capitalist restructuring. The specifically part-time form is possible because of household relations and incomes, which in themselves are in part a product of class struggle in earlier historical periods. This was perhaps not the simple patriarchal domination of women by men leading to the expulsion of women from paid employment and subsequent subordination in the domestic sphere, as portrayed in some accounts. Any examination of, for example gender relations and class politics in the Great Northern Coalfield in the first half of the nineteenth century shows things were rather more complex. In fact women were replaced by ponies, not men, in their main underground mining role of haulage and ponies were more expensive ! None of this is to deny the significance of patriarchal social relations, or even the relative independence of such relations from capitalism's basal relations. There have indeed been contradictions between capitalism and patriarchy. It just doesn't seem as if the recent phase of restructuring has seen many of them. Instead capitalists' and capitalism's requirements have worked in tandem with gender roles. However this remains a contentious area and one which will require careful attention in the review of empirical materials and subsequent discussion.

There remains one further theme for discussion before turning from the world capitalist system and its impact on places, to local capitalist forms and impacts. That is the relationship between transnational capitalism and the state, both national and local, as mediated in particular places through regional and local planning policies. Contemporary relationships between transnational capital and places clearly involve a considerable element of dependency of the latter on the former. This is generally expressed in terms of capital being mobile and labour being fixed, which is of course a simple reversal of the relation in earlier periods of capitalist development. This raises the interesting questions of why is capital now mobile, the answer to which derives in large part from technological innovations and the combined effect of tax treatments of depreciation and grant/incentive regimes, and why is labour so immobile, the answer to which derives from a combination of national immigration policies and labour's historic prosperity in particular places.

The study areas are all located in the North East of England, which area has one of the longest histories of local and regional policy interventions directed at the 'recapitalization' of locales by attraction of new investment. This predates the Special Areas legislation of the mid 1930s but the forms developed at that time persist to the present. McCord (1979) pointed out that the impact of structural unemployment on the inter-war North East involved a descent from the heights of very great relative prosperity, especially for skilled workers and miners, to the depths. The scale of this descent and of existing 'reproductive' capital

offers an explanation for the failure of population in the region to fall, despite considerable out migration, in contrast to the fate of previously redundant regions eg. Cornwall. Be that as it may a sense of dependency on key industries and hence particular vulnerability in times of slump informed subsequent spatial policies. This could be in contradiction with the priorities of existing industry when that was in a relatively prosperous period. Thus there was far less industrial diversification in East Durham and on Teesside where base industries of mining (East Durham) and Steel and Chemicals (Teesside) were thought to be prosperous and to require existing labour reserves (Beynon et al 1990) than on Tyneside or in South Northumberland, although this applied only to male employment. Women were dealt with as a reserve army and served as the basis for diversification.

A full account of policies in terms of incentive regimes is included in Robinson et al (1987) although that investigation perhaps paid too little attention to land strategies and the general planning process of local authorities. Hudson (1989) did pay attention to this, albeit only in relation to County Durham and thereby to coalfield 'non-urban' areas and not to urban social relations. The theme of the state as planner in the servant of capitalist industry has not attracted as much recent attention as it might have. It is very much an aspect of 'organized capitalism' (see Lash and Urry 1987) rather than of the apparently disorganized and chaotic post-modern period. It has been through land use and other plans and through political engagement at a regional level that transnational industry has connected with

civil society in the study areas. This is particularly important in relation to intra-local differentiation, especially when the relationship of locales with the regional socio-spatial system is considered.

Until the early 1980s economic development and related planning policies in the Northern Region were concerned with diversification of the manufacturing base. This project remains crucial, so crucial that new immigrant headless chickens (plants lacking significant R and D content) have been favoured (Nissan) whilst existing core industries with R and D content and record (Sunderland Shipbuilders) have been actively discouraged, at least by national government and its nominees, although indigenous local and regional institutions have acted differently. However the industrial diversification project has now been complimented by a commitment to the development of service employment with massive state subsidy and planning support. These developments which reflect the dependent status of the study areas and the region within which they are embedded, are in turn absolutely dependent on state support, in terms of both finance and initial project management. So far in this thesis it has been possible to identify themes for investigation and development with the minimum of local reference. This is not possible when it comes to the role of state intervention in mediating the relationship between places and transnational capital. That says something about the particular significance of such relationships in the Northern Region, or perhaps more generally in the very old industrial regions of a welfare capitalist society with international connections. In

other words this may be a UK peculiarity but it also applies to Scotland, South Wales and Northern Ireland which were exactly the regions plunged from heights to depths by inter-war structural changes.

In practice the planning processes which support trans-national manufacturing capital and local service and construction capital differ only in relation to grant allocation, and not in relation to land use and land related subsidy. Manufacturing retains access to funding by grants from the Department of Trade and Industry but the 1989 replacement of general regional assistance by a selective system with stringent criteria designed to eliminate deadweighting and substitution, means that even in terms of subsidy land developments operating under the Department of the Environment may receive more state resourcing, particularly if tax breaks are taken into consideration. This is bringing us to the other aspect of capital's relations with places, land development, a process which necessarily meets Cox and Mairs' criterion of being fixed at a local level. Capital may be mobile : land is not !

#### Local Restructuring - Land Development and the Reordering of Space

Land is not mobile but nothing in capitalism is more mobile than money. However, if money is to related to land it has to be done in specific places where the specificity of the place is an important determinant of potential profitability. To quote the US comedy 'Cheers' (a real postmodern icon) there are three things

which matter about any development site : Location, Location and Location. The production of the built environment is intrinsically placed.

There is a marked contrast between the general content of two collections dealing with these issues. In Tabb and Sawers *Marxism and the Metropolis* (1978) there are a range of historically based accounts of the actual experience of urbanization. In particular Mollenkopf in his piece on 'The postwar politics of urban development' develops an account of the nature of urban growth coalitions which prefigures the discussion of Cox and Mair (1989). In contrast in Dear and Scott's *Urbanization and Urban Planning in Capitalist Society* (1981) all this concern with actual social action is denigrated. Rowe and Scott discuss the 'urban land question' and identify 'the manipulated city hypothesis' :

"In this view urban land development is not the outcome of the myriad decisions of atomized individuals, each seeking to secure only his own satisfaction. Rather, urban society is seen as an amalgam of special interests, various social formations, neighbourhood communities, and the like. Members of these interest groups act in concert. Moreover social relations are generally dichotomized into relations between *exploiters* and *exploited*. These relations are underpinned by the degree of *social power* that each group possesses....In the urban context, the main power group is seen as

emerging from a coalition between finance capital (banks, trust companies etc) and the real estate interest (developers, construction companies, landlords etc)." (1981 p 132 original emphases)

This seems pretty true but it did not do for Roweis and Scott who go on :

"To them (theorists of the manipulated city) there is no immanent structural logic (to be revealed by analysis) that will account for urban land problems as a general social phenomenon." (1981 p 133)

Condemning accounts of urban process which might inform some form of political action does seem a bit steep, even for half digested structuralists, so Roweis and Scott proceed to get rid of the political opposition :

"Along with land-holding and land-development activities themselves, landlords have been generally 'assimilated' into the life and intervention of capital at large .... the progressive nineteenth century trend to a deliquescence of a specific landlord *class* has been definitely resolved and this class has now more or less disappeared as a distinctive element of capitalist society." (1981 p 136 and p 151 original emphasis)

This is pretty drastic. A collectivity of people are dissolved or deliquesced (we should be so lucky) into an abstraction. The problem is that these authors see capital and the capitalist class, the bourgeoisie, as undifferentiated. There is a world of difference between accepting that land has now been assimilated to capital and thinking that the result is an undifferentiated social force and consequent undifferentiated social collectivity. The actual history of urban development is in no small part one of alliances against the land fraction, the urban bourgeoisie, between organized workers and industrial capitalists eg. Glasgow 1915. Step forward the joint holders of the Donald Trump Chair in Urban Obfuscation, Drs Rowe and Scott !

The reality of the processes of urban development and the role of the planning system in them are described in standard contemporary planning texts eg. Healey et al (1988). It is important to emphasize that such accounts are no longer merely pluralist. Because they follow the approach adopted by Mollenkopf and others they are informed by an understanding of the privileged but also fragmented character of capital. The value of Cox and Mair's (1989) discussion is that it provides us with a structural account of the origins of that fragmentation. Urban capital, and the urban bourgeoisie, are necessarily local, precisely because the forms of the use made of space (originally of course the interaction of the forms of space with the use made of it) are the determinant of site values (which in the long run have to be understood as capitalized rents).

The importance of consideration of these local development capitals and associated bourgeoisies is that they play a role in the restructuring of places, and especially of larger towns, which is at least in part separate from the impacts of trans-national productive capital. This is essentially local, intra-locale, but it is restructuring none the less and it is intimately associated with planning operations. Bagguley et al suggest that the connection between the inter and intra locale level can be conceptualized by the notion of 'circulation of population':

"The purpose of a notion of 'circulation' (of population).... is to forge a mediating link through which aggregate data on spatial relocation can work to connect the effects of processes or restructuring as 'inputs' to processes of local social change. The second, equivalent, notion is that of the *recomposition* of a population. This applies to significant shifts of experience - and hence, perhaps, of material interests and organizational capacities - for particular local groups. " (1989 p 90 original emphasis)

The problem with this formulation is that it sees the relationship between global restructuring and processes of local social change as one-directional. This privileges the spatial level at which capital and capitalists dominate because of the global level of social organization of the capitalist system. Labour and the working class have no equivalent organization, although the

project of the Communist International was (at least in formal terms) to create one. There is an interesting passage in Harvey's *The Condition of Postmodernism* (1989 ps 235-7) in which he distinguishes between 'place' (by which is meant something very similar to locale as used so far in this thesis) and 'space':

"Working-class movements are, in fact, generally better at organizing in and dominating *place* than they are at commanding *space*. The various revolutions that broke out in Paris in the nineteenth century foundered on the inability to consolidate national power through a spatial strategy that would command the national space." (1989 p 236)

The obvious exception to this general dictum is the October Revolution of 1917 in which the Petrograd proletariat and garrison, in crucial alliance with the all Russian union of railway workers, did break out of a place into the command of national space. At a transformational level in a democratic framework it is clear that the election of Labour and Social-Democratic governments has always represented to some extent the use of command, and not least cultural command, over place as a way of gaining control over institutions on a national level. The local element in the UK Labour Party derives from historic alliances between ILP branches and local Trades Councils. Discussion of the active outward and upward potential of the local inevitably leads towards a discussion of the cultural component.

Before turning to a discussion of the cultural level and of issues of consciousness, it is worthwhile remembering that the local fraction of capital has national and global relevance. Insofar as the capitalist interest must be locally represented this group plays a very important role in the maintenance of the organization of capitalist parties. All historical accounts of the relationship between urban and national politics demonstrate this very clearly. The material interests of the fraction must be represented in political processes at higher levels. Indeed recent developments in UK national environmental and planning policies can, as we shall see, be best understood by reference to instrumentalist support for the alliance between the local urban bourgeoisie and finance capitalists in ways which may well be contradictory to the interests of manufacturing capital and capitalists.

The relationship between finance capital and local urban bourgeois interests and personnel is fascinating and complex. It is by no means necessarily antagonistic. As has already been implicitly suggested, the local urban bourgeoisie are very often the agents of much larger scale finance capital interests in urban development processes. In the US of course finance capital remains to a considerable, albeit diminishing extent, locally organized. The UK clearing banks were organized nationally during the First World War and Building Societies have moved in the same direction. Nonetheless it is interesting to note the role of regional directors in clearing banks and regional interests in building societies. These groups preserve local connections and

local interests. The general absence of attention paid to the sociology of these aspects of economic life is again characteristic of the direction of gaze of the discipline.

### Restructuring, culture and place

The literature on locality has recently paid more attention to the cultural dimension. The concern has been with the way in which place and social meaning interact. To some extent this is a kind of culturalist extension of the geological metaphor. It derives from a recognition of the extent to which 'social being' has determined 'collective consciousness' in terms of the impact of particular located experiences on cultural expression and transmission. Indeed historians who have used a similar, albeit much less formalized, approach, have recognized that cultures can be brought to places and contribute to the development of the cultural matrix in the new location. For example Francis (1980) points out the role of cultural elements derived from Irish immigration in the formation of the consciousness of the South Wales coalfield.

Two issues which arise in relation to 'placed cultures' are scale and inclusivity. Cooke's work, which has been integrated into this general area, has been primarily concerned with the regional which he defined as :



"... a socio-spatial scale at which it is possible to place in focus the specificity of particular class formations ..... regional boundaries are largely coterminous with class practices." (1985 p 213)

Regions are clearly larger than localities, given that the latter are almost invariably defined in terms of labour markets operationalized as journey to work areas. The regional dimension has not received sufficient attention in UK Sociology. In the early 1970s the Rowntree Research Unit at the University of Durham attempted a study of 'regionalism' which equated that concept with a particular form of corporatist partnership among regionally based capital, trade unions and Labour dominated local government. This alliance had particular strength in the North of England but similar arrangements existed in South Wales and Scotland, the 'special areas' of the 1930s. It seems that regionalist corporatism was a product of common involvement in institutions established by the national state in that period. The interesting characteristic of such regionalism is that it has been inclusive and cooperative internally and competitive externally. There is a difference between the Rowntree account and that of Cooke. Cooke deals with regions in which particularly strong working class cultures have achieved hegemonic status, a kind of 'reverse dominance'. Corporatist regionalism is essentially a matter of the political culture of elites. It involves not dominance but collaboration in a shared spatially defined project. In principle Cooke's account is exclusive in terms of class whereas regional corporatism is inclusive in class terms but exclusive spatially.

An alternative approach is through the concept of 'community'. Whereas locality is a concept deriving from Geography's concerns with variations in space, community, in this context, comes from Sociology and Social Anthropology's concerns with local social systems. The term is the usual translation of one half of the opposed pair of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* and emphasizes completeness and indivisibility of social relations. Classic community studies of the 1950s and 60s, notably *Coal is Our Life* (Dennis et al 1969) used the participant observation techniques of ethnography to illuminate local experience and relations in a cultural form. It is worth remarking that *Coal is Our Life* was much more successful in relating work experiences to cultural forms, albeit in the special and extreme case of a mining village, than the recent crop of locality studies. What was being described was a production determined culture. This seems very close to Cooke's concerns and I have previously (Byrne 1989 ps 76-8) used the term 'industrial culture' to describe such cultural forms. They are, to use Urry's (1985) expression, vertical civil societies "... in which social life outside employment is strongly influenced by the institutions and relations of employment itself." (Dickens, 1988 p 102) As Dickens uses the term 'civil society' becomes the cultural experience and social relations of particular people in particular places - 'her civil society' (1988 p 103). Clearly cultural experiences and social relations do happen in civil society but as the term has generally been understood it is a good deal more than the sum of these parts. Urry defined civil society as :

"... that set of social practices outside the state and outside the relations and forces of production in which agents are both constituted as subjects and which presuppose the activities of such subjects - first, in the sphere of circulation directly ; second, in those social relations within which labour power is reproduced economically, biologically and culturally ; and third, in the resultant class and popular democratic forces." (1981 p 31)

Frankel (1987) argues that this leaves us with a considerable problem in defining boundaries but if we accept the 'fuzzy set' status of the concept it is useful as a way of locating the context of culture. Urry's dichotomy between vertical civil societies, as above, and horizontal where 'civil society is organized around issues, struggles and relationships which are relatively separate from those of employment." (Dickens p 103) has value, particularly if it is employed (as it is clearly intended to be) to describe poles of a continuum rather than an absolute dichotomy. Urry has argued that there is a 'horizontalizing' tendency in contemporary society but that is questionable if issues of 'the recapitalization' of localities are central to local political concerns.

Dickens' book, considered as a political project, is largely about how the service class might be integrated into local political concerns and become actors in the politics of locality. His approach is informed by a rather sloppy consideration of just

what the 'middle class' is. The contention that : "Until quite recently the middle classes have not themselves frequently engaged in local politics as councillors." (1989 p 164) is only sustainable if the middle class is equated with the service class and with a particular senior managerial fraction of it at that. It is plainly not true for the local petty bourgeoisie, particularly the specifically urban bourgeoisie, which has been the backbone of urban representation for the post second world war conservative party, and it is not even particularly true for state professionals in labourist regions. However he considers that things are changing because of reduced social mobility by service class members. This produces increased local identification and leads to :

"... the prospect of new and strengthened local and regional political alliances, one involving increasingly shared interests between classes and between genders in the same locality." (1988 ps 216-7)

This is a rather crudely materialist position. It is 'immediate' in that it emphasizes current experience. The state sector of the service class, (and even a good deal of the private sector component of it), in labourist peripheral regions has often been anti-mobility by choice rather than constraint (and the principle constraint of regional differences in house prices is much less severe in 1993 than in the mid 1980s). This is because it has emerged from the cultural matrix of a particular past, a

particularly vertical cultural matrix precisely because particular regions (and this is a matter in the peripheral United Kingdom far more of regions than of localities) were characterized by a very 'organized' form of capitalist social relations (see Lash and Urry 1987). Cooke's recognition of the inter-generational continuity of such relations, even when the material base for them has largely disappeared as in the South Wales coalfield, is in contrast culturalist. To say this is not to disagree with Dickens' strategy which has much in common with the inclusive approach of regional corporatism. The point is that the active cultural element in such a strategy has to be appreciated.

In practice in academic and related work these issues have been considered in terms of psephology. This is not uninteresting but it is rather superficial. It has tended to mask the specifically urban dimension of many changes, the particularities that derive from places being cities within regions. The question emerges of what are cities, what sorts of cities are there, and what is the relation of cities and culture. Here it must be noted that discussions of spatially bounded culture as presented in this chapter are quite different in level of focus from the discussion of separation undertaken by Wilson around the notion of the separation of an underclass. Wilson's concern is with differences within places, with the issues which will be considered in the next chapter. The debate reviewed in this chapter has been about differences among places. That leads naturally to a consideration of typologies of places. However before proceeding with that discussion it is necessary to consider the contrast between

'within space inclusivity', the political project of regional corporatism and Dickens 'local block' approach (which clearly owes much to Gramscian influenced approaches as developed by the Italian Communist Party), and within space exclusion which is the reality of contemporary nationally engendered urban polices in the UK. To a considerable extent the 'within space inclusivity approaches' assume common interests among all occupants of that space. They assert a local identity against trans-national capital logic.

This may be acceptable if the contemporary spatial political strategists recognize the extent to which such approaches in the past were predicated on national and international inclusivity in the form of the 'one nation' implications of the approaches of Keynes and Beveridge in UK domestic politics, and indeed the 'one advanced industrial world' implications of the Bretton Woods agreement. However the discussions do not generally make such connections between the localism of politics and the form of national and international economic politics. This may very well be a consequence of focus. Small towns do not produce such political influence but great cities and regions, particularly in the United States, do have local political frames which have national implications.

## World Cities and Welfare Cities

There a number of available principles for classifying 'cities' but all those currently employed operate on the principle defined by Hill and Feagin (1987). They work in terms of a city's location in a world sytem of production and exchange and in terms of the social consequences which flow from this. This is not a matter of fixed position. Cities are differentiated by the processes of 'restructuring' and these processes operate over time. The location of places within a typology and indeed the very nature of the typology itself are variable. Typologies differ as to the level of focus. Sometimes cities are seen as essentially undifferentiated, as in Gurr and King's fourfold classification based on the crosscutting dichotomous principles of passive / active (in terms of the role of the local state) and stagnant / prosperous. Other classifiers recognize, as do Hill and Feagin, that :

"In the era of regional competition there is no longer one Detroit or two Detroits. There are many Detroits." (1987 p 167)

In other words the relationship of elements in an internally differentiated city with the world system may be very different.

Gurr and King's approach generates a fourfold typology. The elements are

(1) active-stagnant 'old industrial cities' 'A relative handful of old industrial cities are emerging from the transitions of the post-industrial revolution with modernised industries that will continue to produce basic capital and consumer goods.' (1987 p 193).

(2) passive-prosperous 'new industrial cities' which are the new locations of high tech production. Often these were formerly relatively small places without an established industrial history.

(3) active-prosperous 'administrative service' cities, which : " .... whether predominantly public or private, are likely to be more salient to the national state and to have larger public sectors than most industrial cities. Their salience follows from their role as control centres both of state authority and of private economic activity." (1987 p 198)

(4) stagnant-passive 'welfare cities' : "... the old industrial cities (in which) Most of the industries around which they grew in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have been shut down, have cut back production, or have moved elsewhere. Few new enterprises have been attracted in their place and those which remain employ fewer people, mainly in low skill occupations, and generate less wealth and tax

revenues. Nor have these cities acquired substantial new administrative or service functions for either the private or public economies." (1987 p 199)

Gurr and King do recognize that there is some internal differentiation within 'welfare cities' but : "In the aggregate, however, they have proportionally large and inexorably growing numbers of the poor and unemployed and as a consequence relatively large numbers of their people subsist on government transfer payments." (1987 p100)

Hill and Feagin have a similar but different typology of 'production and marketing cities', 'regional cities' and 'world cities'. This is hierarchical organization of ranks of places in a world system in terms of command function. Indeed Feagin and Smith (1987 p 3) speak of world command cities, specialized command cities and divisional command cities. King (A.D.) employs a concept of 'global city' which is essentially identical to the notion of 'world city'. He follows Feagin (1987 p 4) in seeing world cities as '... the cotter pins holding the capitalist world economy together.' King's discussion of London as an internationalized global city is extremely interesting. He follows Feagin and Smith's position that :

"A little researched dimension of the modern global economy is the major multiplier effect that the multi-nationals have on the diffuse urban economies in which they operate." (1987 p 9)

but the essence of his account of the world city is that given by Friedmann and Wolff who define world cities as :

"... the principal urban regions in this (global) network (of production and markets) in which most of the world's active capital comes to be concentrated, regions which play a vital part in the great capitalist undertaking to organize the world for the efficient extraction of surplus .... the world economy is defined by a linked set of markets and production units, organized and controlled by transnational capital ; world cities are the material manifestation of this control, occurring exclusively in core and semi-peripheral regions where they serve as banking and financial centres, administrative headquarters, centers of ideological control and so forth." (1982 p 313)

Clearly world cities have particular characteristics and problems. Most of the literature dealing with them emphasizes their very high degree of polarization, confrontations of an immediate (in the spatial sense) kind between the citadels of the rich and the ghettos of the poor. Marcuse (1989) has challenged this notion of a simple dichotomous polarization in general and with particular reference to the world city of New York. More recently in an extended study of London and New York, Fainstein et al (1992) have argued for a much more complex social structure which recognizes the significance of 'quaternary' (financial and

information command functions) and at the same time also recognizes the enormous significance in such cities of simple tertiary and secondary activity. We will return to this theme in the next chapter. Here the main point is that these typologies deal with the spatial location of control functions. It has to be said that this is not a matter of 'branch plants and headquarters'. To an increasing, if not yet total, degree the location of any manufacturing plant in the same place as the specialized command function of the enterprise gives no special privilege to that particular plant. This literature is dealing with a situation in which the separation of functions has been extended to separation in space. The literature was originally a kind of spatial theorization of the trans-national company (TNC) but has increasingly focussed on the institutional expression of the 'impersonal system forces' of capitalism in the form of markets. Clearly both the ordered control functions of capitalism in the form of the head offices of major TNCs and markets are now increasingly located within 'world cities'. However some cities eg. Detroit, retain sectoral domination centres without major markets.

The cities which are the focus of this research are very much not world cities. They never were locations of markets of anything other than local significance although in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century they did contain the control centres of a very large part of world ship-building capacity. However they are not now even regional centres. They are very much old industrial cities, although they do not fit easily into the distinction made

by Gurr and King between welfare cities and old industrial cities which have some new components of significance because they are both. This is very much a matter of internal differentiation, not just in terms of the residential spatial location of their populations, but in relation to the form and content of their production systems. It is a matter of Nissan versus the shipyards, literally in Sunderland. This raises an interesting theme. The literature on internal differentiation of urban space has almost always been about residential segregation. In Chapter Three we will identify the way in which planning and spatial location of industry have interacted to produce a sharp differentiation of production locations *within* cities.. In large part of course this is a response to spatial constraints on the development of single story buildings and desire for easy access to road networks, the Fothergill and Gudgeon thesis (1988), but whatever its origins it has important social effects.

## Conclusion

The previous chapter concluded with a series of questions for consideration in the analysis of 'findings' which have been generated by the empirical investigations which underpin this thesis. This chapter does not conclude with questions. The account of the processes of restructuring is generally agreed. Capitalist production is changing and it is affecting different places in different ways. So far so good, but not far enough ! One of the purposes of this chapter has been to identify deficiencies of that general account. The two most important are closely related and

both derive from the relative failure of the restructuring account to consider the intra-place impact of restructuring processes. The first deficiency of 'homogeneous restructuring' accounts is a failure to recognize that places, and particularly cities, consist of spatial systems themselves and that components of those spatial systems may be differentially, and indeed contrarily, affected by the impact of global restructuring processes.

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The second deficiency of such 'undifferentiating' accounts relates to a failure to consider the local component of the restructuring process. This deficiency in turn has two aspects. One is that identified by Cox and Mair and derives from the necessarily local character of certain important capitalist processes involving land development. The other is a matter of the relationship between the global and local aspects of capital. In part this is a matter of the mediating character of land development and could be thought of as a necessarily local influence on even capitalist manufacturing production in particular places. However if things were left at that the account would be far too structuralist. We would be dealing with a necessarily local structure derived from land systems and a local influence on global processes which derived from the interaction of that local structure with those global processes. Such an account would have no place for agency. There is more to it than that.

This comment derives in large part from a consideration of the actual content of UK urban policy in the recent past and the

argument will be elaborated in much more detail in Chapter 7. However the point being made is this : policies are about choice of futures. If places are formed by the geological sedimentation of previous phases of capitalist production, so are they formed in the modern world by the sedimentation of policy. To employ the terminology of the organized/disorganized capitalist account, the state in the service of a particular interests can be seen as one of the key disorganizers ! Interestingly other than in avowedly empirical investigations (eg. Hudson 1989), and indeed only in a minority of such empirical studies, the role of state intervention through planning processes and support regimes has been very much neglected in comparison with the very detailed attention paid to the role of capital. These processes have, particularly since 1989, been to a considerable extent a matter of the impact of national policy on particular places, but the impact has been an impact of policy and not of capital alone. Only a very crudely deterministic account would explain Urban Development Corporations simply in terms of the 'requirements of capital' and such an account would have to ignore the conflicts which exist between fractions of capital and of the capitalist class.

It has not only been a matter of the national. In the places in which the research for this thesis has been carried out the impact of a regional policy culture has been very great. The forms of restructuring experienced in these places would not have been possible without the policy framework which made particular strategies and possibilities available to capital and capitalists. This is a matter for historical demonstration and only one aspect

of such processes will be addressed in this thesis. However the argument is related to a central proposition of this thesis - to modify O'Connor's contention it is not just a matter of what will be made to happen, but of what has been made to happen (1982). Subsequently the impact of planning on the spatial reordering of production and reproduction will be investigated. That is a part of the 'policy restructuring' process. Other aspects, and in particular the impact of the restructuring of nationalized industries, have been investigated by other workers, notably Hudson (1989). The accounts given in such studies have generally been entirely adequate as empirical accounts but theoretical discussion of the processes has generally been informed by the crude restructuring thesis. These accounts will be considered as part of the contextual discussion of the locales in Chapters 7 and 8. First we must turn to internal differentiation, theoretically considered.

## Chapter Three - Restructuring and internal urban social division

### Introduction

In the discussion of the 'restructuring' thesis in the previous chapter the approach was criticized because it treats places as internally homogeneous and thereby fails to take account of the differential impact of global processes on the internally stratified urban system. Another criticism was that the restructuring thesis did not recognize the importance of local processes of urban redevelopment. This chapter is will be concerned with the way in which the internal socio-spatial structure of industrial cities is being affected by the interaction of these two levels of process with each other and with state mediated planning.

It will begin with a review of recent re-assertions of the necessity for a concern with urban ecology - statements to the effect that the dismissal of such a concern by Castells (1974) involved throwing out the baby of interest in intra-urban inequality with the positivist-biological epistemology bathwater of the Chicago school. Interestingly such accounts are willing to re-admit social action, but have so far done so only in terms of the behaviour of social groups constructed around ethnicity. Their approach adds a kind of group action to the global structuralism which informs the restructuring account, usually by reference to Giddens' concept of structuration. This is not adequate because it does not deal with urban issues as a ground of class conflict.

That matters because local restructuring of cities through planning and redevelopment processes is of enormous importance for contemporary urban social structure. The new social ecology seems willing to admit action but not the instrumental actions of urban capitalists, the operations of planners and the combination of both in most redevelopment activity.

Of course global restructuring is important for internal social differentiation, although the relationship is by no means only one way. Internal planning led restructuring of industrial cities was very important in making certain kinds of global restructuring by capital possible. This is a matter not only of the internal differentiation of populations in cities but also of the arrangement of production in space. Following a review of 'population' ecology, and a discussion of the spatial element in the underclass debate which is rather closely related to such ecological perspectives, the chapter will continue with a discussion of 'production' ecology, with a consideration of how production (and indeed circulation) are spatially ordered within industrial cities, and of the role of planning and politics in relation to this.

Sharp divisions between residence and economic activity, between the locales of reproduction and production, are not easily made either on the ground or conceptually. The planning process (and that expression is used to cover the general politics of planning which includes within it 'technical' plan production) involves both. Populations have been relocated through 'urban

renewal' in the interests of new retail and production orientation initiatives as well as through 'gentrification'. Indeed the actual replacement of a poorer by a more affluent population in the same space, although not unimportant, may well be less significant for the arrangement of people's lives than road programmes or shopping centre extension. Much 'gentrification' does not involve either one population replacing another or the replacement of working class residences by commercial development or roads but instead takes the form of the redesignation of previously industrial and/or commercial space as residential. This is very important for the lives of the populations previously dependent on the employment base provided in the industrial/commercial space. Decisions (and these processes are mediated through planning decisions) regarding this sort of use designation are clearly local in content and may run counter to the indications and interests of trans-national production logics.

This chapter will proceed by considering recent contributions which have reasserted the validity of 'urban ecology' and comparing the content of these approaches with traditional urban ecology. The relevance of this debate to discussions of the spatial element in the formation of an 'underclass' will be carefully considered. This will be followed by a discussion of the nature of planning as a process and the role of that process in intra-urban restructuring. The general character of the consequences of the interaction of planning, local capitalism and 'global' influences will then be considered in relation to both the ecology of populations in terms of residence/reproduction and

the ecology of production/circulation. The chapter will conclude with an attempt to draw these themes together through the specification of a series of questions for investigation in empirical work.

#### Urban Ecology is respectable again

"A resuscitated social ecology begins with the view that neighbourhoods are neither independent of, nor reduceable to, the urban division of labour. As the local production system changes in response to larger rounds of restructuring ... its effects, through changes in wages, occupational structure, skill levels, and social and spatial mobility - generate new opportunities and constraints to action. The evolution of workplace dynamics necessarily reverberates into local residential formations, including family structures, gender relations, class divisions and everyday consciousness, which in turn affect local patterns of employment." (Warf 1990 p 76)

In a review paper written for North Tyneside CDP in 1974 the present author criticized the concerns of the traditional urban ecology, saying :

"The general tendency in urban analysis has been to concentrate on the attributes of areas rather than to

attempt an incorporation of a spatial dimension into a general account of the hierarchical nature of social structure in advanced capitalist societies. Rather than looking at these aspects of the socio-spatial system, most analysis ignores the substantive socio-historical problems of urban power structures and concentrates instead on the characteristics of areas and interprets these as characteristics of the populations inhabiting these 'social areas'. The absence of a concern with process is reinforced, and might even be said to be determined, by the dominant technique in empirical analysis, which is the use of some sort of factor analysis procedure on multivariate data ... (this) reinforces explanation in terms of the characteristics of spatially-defined populations themselves. The only relational characteristics of these populations to which serious attention is paid are their comparative attributes. Fundamentally, urban analysis is classless and could be described therefore as essentially asociological. The themes of differential urban power and systems of constraints contingent upon power are hardly, if ever, explored in this literature." (1974 p 6)

That statement is worth returning to because it stands as a criticism of both the old social ecology at which it was directed and of the new social ecologies being proposed by Warf (1990), Pratt and Hanson (1988) and Harris (1984). Of course it can be

properly criticized from the point of view of the new social ecology because it too is incomplete. The essence of the new social ecology is summed up in Warf's explicit recognition of the significance of processes at the level of 'political economy' (see Warf 1990 p 75) for the formation of urban social structure. For Warf residential differentiation in a place is a product of the interaction of the changing position of that place as a consequence of global forces and the action decisions of social groups. The recognition of the role of 'global restructuring' is essential. It is interesting to reflect on why concern with this process, a concern which was shortly to become central to most of the work of the CDPs, was not incorporated into our earliest considerations of social differentiation. The explanation almost certainly lies in the outward appearance of our CDP areas in relation to the larger areas of which they were parts. We were dealing with a situation which at that time seemed to correspond to Robson's (in context completely accurate) description of Sunderland :

"The development of local authority housing both in peripheral areas and in central redevelopment areas, together with the general increase in the role of central and local town planning, the spread of affluence and its concomitant eroding of social differentials, or at least the increase in social and geographical mobility that this has brought with it, and the very fact of the great decrease in rates of urban growth : all have led increasingly to

shortcomings in the classical models, and to their limited usefulness in the modern setting." (1969 p 132)

This was rather more than a statement of how the development of outer estates of social housing had modified the socio-spatial ordering of Sunderland to such an extent as to make classical Chicago annular models inappropriate. It was also a recognition of the lessening of social differentiation as a consequence of the combined effects of full employment and social policy - of the programmes of Keynes and Beveridge. The restructuring which has re-ordered industrial towns like Sunderland, one of the locales investigated here, was beginning in the early 1970s but has developed massively since then.

However the 1974 CDP brief does identify a significant element which seems to be lacking from the new ecological studies. It recognizes the importance not just of the actions of social groups in the city in response to global restructuring but also of the urban power structures and interests derived from the processes of urban production and reproduction - the urban bourgeoisie in the manipulated city. Warf's (1990) discussion of developments in Brooklyn is a fascinating and persuasive account of the inter-relationship of waves of new immigrants with the changing production system in this place. It is an account premised on the role of the relations of production, as expressed in changing labour process and sectoral location, in interaction with locational decisions constructed around ethnicity. What is

lacking, not in entirety, but as a developed theme in the piece, is a discussion of the role of specifically urban capitalist processes around urban development and redevelopment, and of the relationship of these to state planning processes. These have been important in Brooklyn, particularly through the impact of road programmes on existing inner city neighbourhoods. These developments are about Brooklyn's relationship with New York suburbs, the residential location of most of its previous inhabitants. They reflect the local scale of urban finance and construction capital. That localism is not a reference to origin. Development capital originating in other places can operate in any locality. However the nature of its operation is framed by the nature of that locality. This is simply a reiteration of Cox and Mair's thesis (1989).

It is interesting that this active capital, the role of urban bourgeoisie and city government in concert in manipulating the internal form of cities, has not yet appeared on the agenda of the new social ecology. It has always been absolutely central to Weberian accounts of urban development eg. Dennis (1970, 1972). Indeed Weberian accounts are best regarded as a special case of generally historical accounts emphasizing the role of collective social actors. Recent urban history (Damer 1988, Mooney 1989, Zukin 1988) is all history of action, albeit action conducted within a historically determined frame, to paraphrase a rather well known expression. Zukin has commented that :

."... what was really valuable was the common search in Harvey, Topalov and the work of their colleague Manuel Castells, for the city as a structured environment that constantly pitted the multifaceted and divided forces of capital (so to speak) against the lower social classes. In short, the city was a spatial and economic, material and symbolic *matrix* (original emphasis) of struggle over capital accumulation. If some researchers emphasized investment by financial institutions or manipulation of the city by real estate developers, while others focused on the chimerical "urban social movements" that grew around issues of collective consumption, they were all nonetheless looking for the whole matrix that made the modern city both dynamic and degraded, both free and socially controlled." (1988 p 206)

One does not have to agree with Zukin's assessment of the amount of attention paid to social action by the early Castells or Harvey at any point between *Social Justice and the City* (1975) and *The Condition of Postmodernity* (1988) to agree with this definition of the appropriate focus of any urban study. In particular her description of the forces of capital as 'multifaceted and divided' is a particularly apt way of characterizing the complex relationship among levels and elements of capital and the bourgeoisie in relation to the restructuring of cities. The appropriate perspective is one in which urban history

is seen as the ground of contest of fractions of capital and fractions of the working class, with all elements attempting to use the state process of urban determination, planning as broadly defined. That sets us up for moving to a discussion of the role of planning in urban segregation, but first three aspects of the new social ecology have to be noticed. These are discussions of the process of gentrification and the respective roles of gender and ethnicity.

The most extensive recent discussion of 'gentrification' is contained in the series of papers in the volume edited by Smith and Williams (1986). The term has a variety of meanings but as used in this book and in related studies it covers the general process by which non-poor people are occupying or re-occupying central areas of cities. Originally the term covered a kind of reversal of the filtration process in which the middle classes recolonized originally middle class housing areas which had moved downmarket through multi-occupation. This process was frequently (at least in the UK) supported by the availability of state aid for the 'improvement' and 'repair' of inner area housing as an alternative to future slum clearance. The classic example of these developments was in Islington in the 1960s and 1970s. When the present author was a student living in rooming house accommodation in Hackney in the late 1960s locals asserted that you could see the spread of the middle classes down from Islington by looking for Renault 4s and Labour Party posters in the window. The returning middle classes were of course members of the 'service class', particularly of its public sector component.

The process quite rapidly extended to include middle class colonization of purpose built private sector working class 'artisan' housing in a number of British, North American and Australian cities and this process continues today, for example in the Batignolle in Paris. Some care has to be taken in looking at this as a process of gentrification per se. All these cities have experienced a massive decline in the importance of highly skilled manual work as a component of their labour base. This is part of the general 'tertiarization' or 'maturing' of advanced capitalism which is one aspect of deindustrialization. To a considerable extent elements in the service class, particularly in its public sector component, occupy the same social rank as that occupied by the labour aristocracy before 1960. Often the service state professionals, parapprofessionals and bureaucrats are children of the skilled manual workers. Frequently the move into late nineteenth and early twentieth century terraced housing by these groups is a reoccupation of the kind of dwellings lived in by their grandparents. In Newcastle this process can be seen clearly in Heaton in contrast to the reversal of filtration which has led to the gentrification of Jesmond.

The third form of gentrification involves the transformation of the function of an area from industrial/commercial use to residential. This may involve changing the internal use of existing structures as in *Loft Living* (Zukin 1988). Alternatively, and more commonly in the UK today, it takes the form of the reclamation of 'derelict' industrial land for residential purposes. This latter process is a major activity of Urban

Development Corporations. Perhaps this last process ought not to be included within the general remit of gentrification. The other forms, including 'loft living', all require some individual pioneers (see the discussion in Smith 1986). The large scale redevelopment of previously industrial land is always a state led activity without individual pioneers. Zukin demonstrates the capacity of markets and planning processes to absorb such pioneering but there is an element of autonomy which is not present in relation to UDC operations.

Clearly gentrification is relevant to any discussion of the new ordering of cities. It is particularly interesting because it may, especially in UK cities with extensive public sector outer estates (and also in Dublin - see Byrne 1984), involve a partial reversal of the traditional relationship between centre and periphery in metropolitan capitalist cities. The inner city may be anything but the location of the poor and deprived. This is likely to be the case in cities whose population is declining. In other words it is part of the general post-industrial, post-modern scenario.

The relationship of ethnicity to socio-spatial stratification is of very great importance. In practice it is of relatively small importance in the three industrial towns which are the locales of study for this research. However in 'multi-ethnic' cities, for example Belfast, ethnicity is a key principle of segregation. Clearly it is a key principle of segregation but it is much harder to argue that ethnicity is primarily constitutive of the structures which

underpin socio-spatial differentiation. In a recent paper I argued that :

"We do not dismiss this factor (race-ethnicity) but consider it to be important for ascription rather than structure formation. In other words structures of inequality derive from the relationship between classes and a mode of production but ethnic factors may be crucial in determining who gets assigned to which position in the structure and in its manifestations in space and housing tenure." (1990 p 3)

Critics of this line have pointed out that in United States cities there is a very high level of segregation for afro-americans regardless of class position. This is also true in contemporary Belfast for catholics and protestants up to the level of higher service class but not including or beyond that, and until 1972 differentiation between catholic and protestant skilled and white collar workers was breaking down on peripheral high quality public sector housing estates. The quotation is true for the North Eastern industrial towns studied, but race-ethnicity can clearly play a role in segregation, although as Wilson's work (1989) demonstrates within the components of an urban system organized on lines of ethnicity, there is a internal class differentiation reflecting relationship with the system of production. Ethnicity has some autonomy in segregation where ethnicity is a central social principle, as in the United State for Blacks and in

Belfast. However the role of ethnicity is nothing like so great in most other industrial or post-industrial cities where the system of segregation is the product of the interaction of structural factors and class action, although ethnicity is by no means trivial even in these places (see Smith, 1989).

The role of gender is different and much more complex. Pratt and Hanson (1988) recognized the complex effect increased female labour force participation has had on the class relations of households, if anything other than a very simple proletarian/bourgeois division is employed. They comment :

"Theories of social reproduction that draw upon outmoded characterisations of urban residential structure simplify and distort the processes through which political consciousness and social identity are defined. Neighbourhoods and families often are not homogeneous in class terms: even individuals (particularly women) may experience a variety of class positions in different facets of their lives. The occupational segregation of women and men, along with the increased participation of women in the paid labor force, effectively break down any occupation-based residential segregation that may have existed in North American cities in the past." (1988 p 33)

It is evidently true that the complex relationships of components of households with class experiences is important. A women may

have an exceptionally exploited (probably absolutely rather than relatively) work experience and be a middle class housewife at home. Clearly the two experiences interact and influence interpretation of each other. However Pratt and Scott are dealing with occupation (and might equally have emphasized time commitment) and not with class as such. Their argument also seems to take insufficient account of the different levels at which classes are constructed. Households are the units of any consumption theory and are not irrelevant to any action theory, albeit that actions are intrinsically individual. Certainly we shall see in these locales as in Northern Tyneside, (see Byrne 1989) that a key differentiating factor among households is the extent of full time female employment. This is very close to Pahl's distinction between work-rich and work-poor households (1984 p 314). Gender is important for understanding socio-spatial segregation, especially because the gender time restructuring of employment is such an important aspect of the general restructuring of work and employment. However, with the important exception of the experiences of female headed households with dependent children, it is not in itself a principle of socio-spatial differentiation.

One further theme must be addressed in a UK based study which is absent from the US literature, and that is the role of housing tenure in relation to socio-spatial patterning. There is a burgeoning literature on this which has already been referenced in the discussion of consumption cleavages in the preceding chapter. It is not necessary to recapitulate that discussion here, but it

is necessary to note that the form of urban development in this country since 1919 has meant that segregation by tenure is to a very considerable extent also segregation in space. Indeed tenurial segregation outside the urban core is the basic mechanism by which urban populations are divided. This theme will be very important in the empirical discussions in this thesis.

Before turning to a discussion of planning processes there is one general point which has been implicit in the discussion so far but must be made explicit. Socio-spatial polarization of populations is part of the process of social reproduction. Warf argues that :

"... the broader question of social reproduction - largely subordinated to the search to understand the mechanisms of production - can be studied through an analytically reconstituted social ecology..." (1990 p 73)

In an earlier piece the present author and Parson suggested that one aspect of recent urban policy in the UK was the creation of 'reserve space' as a way of managing the problems of the reproduction of an ever increasing reserve army of labour (1983) (and the creation of reserve space was crucially dependent on tenurial mechanisms). This was identified as part of a process of 'underdevelopment' in the sense in which that word has been used by autonomist theorists (Cleaver 1977). The general thesis of restructuring is a thesis of the underdevelopment of labour by

capital. However the traditional emphasis has been on the way in which this has been achieved by redefinitions of the labour process in production. The general line of argument emerging from this discussion of socio-spatial ecologies is that socio-spatial differentiation is a process of underdevelopment in reproduction reflecting the logics and commitments of both trans-national productive capital and of local urban capitals. The agencies have very largely been state mediated through planning, to which we now turn.

### 'Underclass' or segregated ghetto poor

In a recent article reflecting on the work stimulated by Wilson's arguments in *The Truly Disadvantaged* Peterson has noted that :

" ... Wilson now states that the cause of the urban underclass is the simultaneous presence of economic marginality and extreme social isolation. Poverty within the inner city is debilitating when it is intensely concentrated, a condition particularly prevalent in large cities. .... It is precisely the living and working conditions in these extremely isolated neighbourhoods that require understanding and analysis." (1992, ps634-5)

In an associated article Wilson makes it clear that he is concerned with the 'ghetto poor' of the deindustrializing cities

of the US frostbelt (1992). This focussing is important. As Rose has pointed out the Wilson thesis relates the micro level of neighbourhood to the macro level of economic forces through asserting that conditions in the one are a result of changes in the other (1991 p491-2). Bagguley and Mann (1992) have used Hughes (1989) to criticize the spatial approach by Wilson. Regrettably, whatever the other strengths of their article, Bagguley and Mann do not seem able to sort out the kind of causal model which Wilson is proposing and consider his approach to amount to a re-assertion of the culture of poverty thesis. Wilson's thesis involves not only causal and dependent variables but intermediate variables. Thus for him the causal process is deindustrialization but he argues that this may create social situations which can take on a cultural form, and hence lead to the reproduction of new social situations. Hence Wilson's concern about the single parent headed family and the absence of successful middle-class black role models. This is tricky territory but it cannot be written out in advance of empirical investigation.

Hughes' raising of the possibility of an 'ecological fallacy' is rather more serious. It is true that geographers tend to respond to any cross-level inference with shrieks of 'ecological fallacy' and a withdrawing of skirts, in ignorance usually of Hammond's important discussion of the use of theory in validating cross-level inference (1972). Hughes argues that :

:"Most of what we know about the inner city is based on census-tract or similar neighbourhood data. These

data provide a picture of the coincidence of characteristics such as race, poverty, and so on in a single neighbourhood. What tends to happen, however, even in the most sophisticated analyses, is a subtle form of the ecological fallacy : the attributes of a shared space are believed to imply shared attributes among individuals occupying that space." (1989 p190)

Where Hughes is going wrong is very clearly illustrated by a key sentence in his argument : " ... it is well within the writ of the social theorist to hypothesize about the emergence of a new kind of individual (my emphasis), the 'ghetto underclass,' and the role that neighbourhood quality plays as an independent effect in that emergence." (1989 p191). Individuals are not classes. Hughes is making the common mistake of seeing class as an individual attribute rather than as a collective formation. From any coherent kind of sociological perspective it makes much more sense to consider collective effects at the neighbourhood level as of significance in class (or any other form of social collectivity) formation, than individual effects. Hughes, and after him Bagguley and Mann (1992), are really rather sloppy here. They think in terms of individual (or rather more properly household, but they don't make this clear) attributes in terms of a separate set of causal and dependent variables. The reality is not that simple. It is one of a complex reflexive relationship. Classification procedures are the appropriate way of handling this. That is the value in classifying spatial entities. That it is the basis of any social ecology.

What this all boils down to is a need in our social ecology to look for spatial concentrations of deprived neighbourhoods. Those who worry that not all those who live in deprived neighbourhoods are deprived, and not all those (or even necessarily a majority) of those who are deprived live in such neighbourhoods, are missing the point. The issue is not simply the spatial segregation of the poor, but the existence of spatial locales where the concentration of deprivation reaches such a level that cultural effects operate at a neighbourhood level. These ghettos are not self-created, the culture of poverty model, but behaviours within them which are cultural matter to those who live there. Classification in search of such locales is part of any new radical social ecology, and is of particular significance in the UK given the enormously greater importance of public sector tenure. In the US of course, it is simply taken for granted that areas of public housing for the non-elderly will be ghettos of the poor.

### Planning and restructuring

Peter Ambrose has recently asked *Whatever happened to Planning?* (1986). The planning to which something has happened can be considered to be two related processes. Obviously it is the system of land use planning introduced into Britain by the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947. However Ambrose's question has, at least implicitly, a wider remit. It is about the whole notion that planning is a process which can do something to make people's lives better. In the era of the new realism of social democracy and old Manchester liberalism of conservatism that idea has been

seen as inappropriate, although we are now far enough into the experience of the disasters across so many aspects of communal life that this new orthodoxy is not so generally accepted as it recently was.

Ambrose locates mass popular pressure for planning firmly in a particular historical experience, at least so far as the UK was concerned. That experience was the contrast between planned reproduction and production in the context of war as experienced by most people and the pre-war experiences of chaotic capitalism as experienced by most people. This general point remains valid. There were moves towards at least a sort of regional indicative planning in the Special Areas legislation of the 1930s. War in Britain may not have been as effectively planned as it has been cracked up to be, although the central theses of Barnett's *Audit of War* (1986) are about post war priorities rather than wartime experience and his evidence does not correspond with the contemporary assessments made by people in terms of political action. It is clear that the 1945-50 Labour government was elected because it was seen as a government of planners. Indeed the procedure retained its political popularity with the electorate in 1951 when Labour lost office with the highest proportion of the popular vote ever received by any UK party.

The nature of the experiences which people wanted not to have again was summed up by Wheatley in the parliamentary debate on the 1930 (Greenwood) Housing Act. He declared that the population of the industrial towns and cities of the UK had lived through a

period in hell. They had experienced the hell of growth and the hell of recession and they wanted something else. It is worth remembering what UK society did get in the years of the Attlee government. It got major initiatives in social policy of a planned kind, especially in principle the NHS even if planning in this system was to proceed for many years by bureaucratic incrementalism. It got a directed economy in which there was major and rapid economic growth. And it got the introduction of a system of essentially local land use planning.

The butskellite Tory administrations of the 1950s and 60s did not dismantle all Labour's planning programmes but they did withdraw from meso-economic intervention by 'making a bonfire of controls'. By the early 1960s planning at an economic level was becoming fashionable again, at least in indicative terms. Wilson's election victory was in large part based on Labour's claim to be the party of new planning. The failure of efforts to introduce a National Plan in the mid 1960s have been extensively documented and discussed (see Walker, 1984). Basically the National Plan was a paper exercise which had ongoing consequences in a limited set of sectors and regions, particularly in the North with the development of the Northern Regional Strategy (for an outline of which see Byrne 1989). At the grand national levels of economic and social planning national planning was quite rapidly reduced to public expenditure planning but the rhetoric of the period did not disappear.

Land use planning at the local level became the agency of modernization. Perhaps the North East of England displayed a particularly developed form of this commitment because of the longer history of such approaches and because of the congruence between a cultural experience of organized capitalism and planning processes (Byrne 1989). This is by no means the same thing as the use made of planning/local government control by the urban bourgeoisie in the UK at earlier periods or of the contemporary US developments around urban renewal. It is really quite important to distinguish between locally originating and locally directed processes on the one hand, and locally originating but globally directed processes on the other. The first largely involved disputes about reproduction and the use of space. They fall within the remit of discussions about the manipulated city. The second really consist of offers made by localities to global processes. These offers may, as has been repeatedly suggested thus far in this thesis, be the basis without which global processes would be unable to proceed, but they originate locally in response to a political perception of the place of particular localities (or in the case of the North to a considerable extent Region) in the global system.

In the locales which will be the object of study for this thesis land use planning has had to accommodate these two separate processes of locally originating locally directed manipulation of space by urban capital concerned with the production of the built environment and locally originating globally directed manipulation of space in relation to the production system. It must be

emphasized that the latter process has gone on in a context in which transnational productive capital has increasingly developed a capacity for giving very clear signals as to its requirements from any locality but the point remains that the local element was not merely responsive. The two processes are of course also by no means as separate in reality as they are conceptually. Nonetheless the distinction is a real one.

The local processes have been largely concerned with reproduction and circulation, at least at the stage beyond the actual production of the built environment itself. The global processes have involved the reordering of land uses in relation to production rationales but have also had a very considerable influence on the spatial location of public sector housing in cities. To this extent they have an important reproductive content. Indeed the spatial reordering of cities which has produced the phenomenon of 'outer estates' can really only be understood in terms of this set and the logic of relating the residential location of labour pools, especially pools of women, to the perceived requirements of transnational productive capital.

This role of land use planning as the agency of modernization and hence as a kind of local corporatist servant of transnational productive capital, has been much reduced in importance in the recent past although it still functions in important ways. It was the dominant mode of the 1960s and early 1970s and the socio-spatial structures of the locales investigated are in essentials the products of it. More recently it has been challenged by a new

'national ideological' rationale originating from central government and involving both the replacement of formal local democracy by appointed boards and a new objective in terms of service led development as opposed to production commitment.

Most recent developments, manifested in the form of the Urban Development Corporations which are operating in all the areas studied, involve a kind of triumph of local urban capitalist process over production orientated planning. Service led solutions are development market solutions concerned with the role of land as the basis for residential and retail uses. Despite a rhetoric of employment generation they are about services to the prosperous elements in a new class structure and the profits which can be made from those services. The actual mechanisms by which this is achieved are exactly those which involve a partnership between local urban capital and finance capital. The developments which stem from this partnership look remarkably like the products of the manipulation of US cities using federal legislation and subsidies in the 1960s. Infrastructural development has become an enabling process for the realization of development possibilities by the private sector.

This was not the case in the era of modernization. Then infrastructural development was informed by the perceived requirements of trans-national production. This was particularly the case with road programmes, most notoriously in the UK in the case of the Belfast Urban Motorway (See Weiner 1974). However throughout this period urban capital continued with its

operations, particularly in the construction of owner-occupied suburbs. In general this proceeded quite separately from the production orientated programmes of modernization although the two processes were integrated in the interesting cases of Washington New Town and Cramlington New Town (see Byrne 1989, 1990). One aspect of modernization was largely carried out by urban and finance capital in partnership. This was the programme of town centre shopping redevelopment in the 1950s and 1960s which was carried out on a basis developed in the 1940s in localities which had been heavily blitzed.

Two of the planning processes which restructured urban centres have now been identified - road development and shopping centre redevelopment. Both involved the destruction of large tracts of inner area working class housing. Sometimes this was done directly under the planning legislation. More often the development of plans was subsequent to the operation of another policy set, that of housing slum clearance. Slum clearance legislation is apparantly quite distinctive from planning legislation. It does deal with areas of poor housing but does so in terms of the quality of the dwellings themselves and the only reference to wider objectives are the provisions which allow for the demolition of fit properties in unfit areas so that clearance can proceed more efficiently. However in practice such procedures have often been used for planning purposes. In the nineteenth century clearances under sanitary legislation was described as a juggernaut which crushed the poor and it seems that most use of the procedures had far more to do with urban restructuring than

with housing purposes. This was also the case in the US under Urban Renewal programmes in the 50s and 60s. In Britain the important inter-war Greenwood Act of 1930 was not the basis of planning led restructuring but developments under the 1957 Housing Act which reintroduced slum clearance on a large scale in the post-war period were very much planning directed and could even be described as planning led.

Details of development in context will be given in the historical reviews of the experiences of the locales of study. This was the era of large scale interventionist urban planning in British industrial cities. It was studied at the time by sociologists working in a Weberian tradition, particularly Dennis (1970, 1972) and Davies (1972). Both emphasized the role of professional planners themselves as evangelistic bureaucrats. In an earlier criticism of this perspective the present author conducted an examination of planning procedures in central North Shields (1974). This can be summarized as follows. Dennis and Davies emphasized the professional ideology of planners which had its origins in urban history and in the pursuit of professional status by planners as a group. Accounts of urban developments were accounts of competition between this technically justified group and existing working class residents. Both Dennis and Davies recognized the negatively distributional effects of planning but regarded this as a byproduct rather than an essential aspect. The ethnographic and historical account of the actions of planners was superb but too little attention was paid to who and what benefitted and why. Dennis and Davies were right to pay attention

to policy actions. The significant omission was a failure to place these policy actions in context : either in the structural context of capital's relationship with urban renewal or in the action context of the competing fractions of capital and the working class.

Of course these grand redevelopment exercises involving the reordering of whole urban areas are things of the past. True, but that does not mean that their consequences are not still with us. This is particularly the case when the socio-spatial order created by them is confronted by a new phase in capital's overall relationship with industrial cities. This is the essence of the position of outer estates, as documented in a series of studies (CES 1984, 1985, Meegan 1989, 1990, Mooney 1989). Very large parts of previously centrally resident working class populations of industrial towns were relocated to the urban periphery in a process which involved a tenure change from private renting to residence in council housing. When they were originally relocated in the 60s and early 70s they were still an employed population either commuting back into old industrial zones or employed in peripheral locations created by the processes of spatial relocation of production which will be described in the next section. The CES report described these places as:

"... areas of council housing located away from city centres and built to house overspill populations in the 1950s and 1960s. Often located near to 1960s' industrial estates, which have been run down, they

have as high or higher levels of unemployment and lower income per head than some inner city areas. With the persisting high level of national unemployment, the estates have sunk to an almost cashless, "subsistence" level local economy isolated by distance and high transport costs from employment and service opportunities in city centres and elsewhere." (1984 p 1)

There are in fact overspill estates of the 1930s and 40s but the CES group were right to see this sort of locale as primarily a product of the slum clearance / planning complex of the 50s and 60s. It is also something of a simplification to say that industrial estates have 'run down'. This has happened in terms of job loss through abandonment of production in particular places but there has also been a change in the forms of production which is of just as much significance. This socio-spatial form is of great significance in the study locales. The CES report identified the proportion of the population resident in such locales for British districts (LAs). In South Tyneside the figure was 29%, in Sunderland 20%, and in Middlesbrough and Hartlepool which are two of the Cleveland districts it was 38% and 28% respectively (1984 p 2).

Of course not all overspill estates are social housing. Indeed the sharpest contrast in the locales investigated for this thesis is not between inner city and outer city but between the outer estates which are the product of grand planning of the 50s and 60s

and the suburban owner occupied locales developed around (and that word is used quite deliberately) the planning system by private speculative builders in the 50s, 60s and 70s - an exact example of local determinant processes in the generation of urban structure and class structure as combined in a socio-spatial system. The combined effect of these processes on the actual physical location of people in industrial towns has been enormous and perhaps insufficiently appreciated. It is these two processes which have played a direct part in locating social groups in particular places. The present condition of those groups is a product of the interaction of that location with changing relations of production and circulation.

#### The urban ecology of production and circulation

This content of this section was prompted by a remark made to the author when being interviewed by local radio. The interview was concerned with the author's opposition to the role of the Urban Development Corporation in Tyne and Wear in general, and in this instance in Sunderland in particular. The interviewer challenged the author's insistence on the continuing significance of the River Wear as the basis of productive industry in Sunderland saying : "But hasn't the centre of industrial gravity shifted from the River to the A19 corridor." The point is a good one based on sharp observation even if the traditional river corridor may well be crucial to any developed future for Sunderland. Here, as in many industrial towns, most of the new industrial development since the 1930s has been on the urban

periphery in relation to road networks and the 'cultural' commitment of planners and politicians to this pattern is very great.

The origins of the new 'radical/realist' geography lie exactly in efforts to develop industrial location theory but the resulting developments are open to the same criticism already expressed about restructuring theory in general. They are rather good at dealing with differences among places but have remarkably little to say about differences within places. Thus in Massey's magisterial review of *Spatial Divisions of Labour* (1984) there is almost no discussion of intra-urban differentiation and in the contributions to the important collection edited by Rowthorn and Martin on *The Geography of Deindustrialization* (1986) only one chapter contains material relevant to this question and even then using it involves a sort of twisting of the author's argument. This is easily stated :

"Modern industry prefers single-storey premises on spacious sites with room for car-parking, circulation of heavy lorries and, where appropriate for outdoor storage and future expansion. This reduces the 'plot-ratios' - the ratio between floorspace and land in new developments to levels well below that in older industrial areas." (Fothergill et al 1986 p 227)

Fothergill et al take this argument, which they root in a micro-economic account of production rationales, as an explanation of

the general tendency of new industrial development to locate away from congested conurbations with difficult transport conditions and high internal land prices. Scott (1982) has conducted a full review of discussions relating to "Locational Patterns and the Dynamics of Industrial Activity in the Modern Metropolis". His account is close to that of Fothergill et al (1986) with the addition of a recognition of the way in which changes in the relations of production (both technical and social) underpin the kind of rationales about site specification which those authors recognize.

A further factor which is not dealt with by the above authors is the extent to which 'decongestion' has been a central principle of both the directive and indicative elements of British land-use planning since the war. However these accounts are just as adequate at explaining why development has occurred on the periphery of existing urban areas as they are at explaining why so much new development has gone to new locales (many of which were part of the 'overspill' destinations used for the decongestion of London). In other words the combination of land prices, access convenience and planning rationales explains the peripheral spatial location of new industrial development in cities. Of particular significance in the 'indicative' planning process has been direct provision of sites on industrial estates and/or major interventions by local authorities in facilitating land acquisition and planning permission in such locations. The case of Nissan in Sunderland is an exact illustration of this and will be discussed subsequently.

This is not a new process. It dates from the 1930s and developments which were addressed to the need to 'modernize' old industrial cities in the face of important structural changes in employment base. Indeed in reviewing literature and development a theme is emerging which will be of some considerable significance for the thesis. This is that the industrial towns which are the focus of attention are examples of a particular combination of productive and reproductive planning with both the autonomous operations of local 'urban capitalists' in association with finance capital around private housing and retail development and the global restructuring processes which have been the focus of attention of studies constructed around the theme of locality.

The reference to retail development is important because the peripheralizing of activity has not just been a matter of the relocation of manufacturing production leaving central areas. To a considerable extent retail service developments have been outside traditional central business districts on peripheral sites accessible to car borne purchasers. This is important both on the ground and even more in terms of proposed developments in all the locales studied here. In addition a good deal of large office employment, particularly in 'paper factory' offices of national government, has been located on the urban periphery. This all begins to look rather like a 'decoring' of the centre of the industrial town with a pattern of segmentation existing both in the remaining centre and in peripheral rings.

## Conclusion

The intention of this conclusion is to specify questions emerging from the discussion of internal social and functional differentiation which ought to be addressed in empirical investigation. Crudely the questions can be reduced to :

(1) What has happened to the arrangement of people and their activities in space in industrial towns ? This question must be answered through spatially ordered description of changes. A subsidiary and related question is : do we have ghettos of the poor who are separated from the rest of us, and in particular separated from work.

(2) Why have these things happened ? This question requires discussion of the way in which global and local processes have interacted in specific places.

(3) How have these things happened ? This question leads to a historical review of recent planning and development history with special reference to the role planning in processes of both industrial and residential change.

The review has generated a kind of preliminary general account of changes and their implications for socio-spatial structure. In particular it has suggested that 'planning for modernization' has

been a very important factor in generating really very large changes with considerable implications for the segregation of populations on a residential basis. This matters considerably because the review of the debates about the nature of the contemporary class structure, which was the core of Chapter 1, showed that a key element in the construction of social division is separation, and especially the social isolation of the poor. It may well be that previously 'integrated' industrial towns in which all components of the population interacted in production and social reproduction, have now been 'disintegrated' with resulting high degrees of social isolation.

Given the relative absence of any significant ethnic component of differentiation in the locales studied, the demonstration of separation and isolation would be important for considerations of the nature of the causal processes underpinning the creation and situation of an 'underclass'. If a population is ethnically homogeneous, and was culturally homogeneous, then changes subsequent to production restructuring can be considered to be consequences of that restructuring. In other words Wilson's argument will be vindicated.

However it is not just a matter of differentiation and its spatial ordering. The empirical study must pay particular attention to the relations between residential segregation and the organization of employment in the locales investigated. Are the outer estate poor simply a displaced and functionless residuum or do they act as a reserve army both in terms of economic discipline

for the employed, and as the basis of special branches of accumulation ? How does their spatial (and tenurial) distinction relate to their roles in production and circulation ? The term circulation is being used here to deal with many of the aspects of service employment but not all service employment is directly related to circulation. Much employment in reproduction, in agencies of the welfare state, is in sectors which are 'decommodified'. What is the relationship of spatial reordering to these aspects of social life ?

## CHAPTER FOUR - DOING A STUDY OF PLACES

### Introduction

It is conventional in any thesis based on empirical study to include a chapter which describes and justifies the investigative procedures used by the researcher. Often this is just an account of the actual conduct of the investigation and of the methods employed. However, investigation is never innocent. It is always underpinned by some conception of what is being investigated and how it might properly be investigated, by positions taken in relation to issues of ontology and epistemology. This is not a thesis in the philosophy of social science and normally it would not be necessary in a piece like this to include any very extended discussion of ontological and epistemological position. Here such a discussion is necessary because this thesis is consciously informed by a qualified scepticism about the currently fashionable dominant 'scientific realism' which informs most of the recent spatially based investigations which have employed the concept of 'locality'. This study is about places. As such it has a good deal in common with recent locality studies. The defining of localities will be very important although the issue of definition is taken farther (or at least taken more systematically) than has usually been the case in, for example, the ESRC funded locality studies reported in Cooke (Ed) 1989, Harloe, Pickvance and Urry (Eds) 1990 and Bagguley et al 1990.

The point is that most discussion has paid a good deal of attention to the theoretical content of the notion of locality but has been rather casual about the the translation of the notion into definition of actual locality boundaries - about the issue of operationalization. However, important as this issue is, it is not the only reason for including a discussion of realism and locality. The issue of definition might be handled without consideration of the issues which arise from the use of a realist framework in studies of this kind. What cannot be addressed without such consideration is the issue of the purpose of social research as part of a critical project, particularly if the critical project is intended as a constitutive criticism. The key word here is planning, because planning as a creative process is very important in considerations of the nature of critical scientific investigation. I will define constitutive criticism as criticism conducted in order to inform planning because planning as a historical process has been crucial to the definition of localities through the establishment of boundaries within which investigation may be conducted. Planning is one of the things which sets edges.

This chapter will begin with a confrontation between critical realism and a position which can best be called political historical materialism. It will continue with a discussion of the concept of locality as that notion is commonly employed within a realist framework and as it will be employed here within a different framework. This will be followed by a review of how the idea of locality might be operationalized in actual investigation.

Finally the chapter will conclude with a description of the actual methods of investigation employed.

### Criticism and emancipation

What is science for ? Here are two different answers to that question advanced by authors who are important exponents of the value of 'realism' in social science.

"Academics generally occupy a place in the social division of labour in which the development of knowledge in propositional forms, in a contemplative relationship to the world, has unusual primacy.

(The alternative) means more than a different way of 'doing social science'. It implies a different view of the social role of this type of knowledge and for 'intellectuals'. It means that social science should not be seen as developing a stock of knowledge about an-object-which is external to us, but--should develop a critical self-awareness in people as subjects and indeed help in their emancipation." (Sayer, 1984 18 and 43)

"There is ... an inescapable commitment to the overall project of modern science to expand and refine our knowledge of the natural and social world. ... For all its elitism, conservatism and political

irresponsibility, modern science, in the broadest sense of systematic study, and a politics informed by that study, is the only way we can hope to understand and retain some influence over the development of our societies." (Outhwaite, 1987 p119)

The statements are similar but also interestingly different. Outhwaite's is, in context, the consistent and logical expression of a conception of the relationship between science and politics which informed marxist derived politics in an unequivocal fashion from the general adoption of Engels *Anti-Duhring* until the publication of Korsch's *Marxism and Philosophy* and Lukacs *History and Class Consciousness* (the original essay of that title). It is the relationship which matters, not the actual content of the scientific position. Engels and his immediate successors, eg. Lenin in *Materialism and Empiro-criticism*, were quite crude materialists with an essentially positivist conception of scientific activity. Realism is an alternative to positivism, but it remains contemplative. In Outhwaite's final account (the above is taken from the concluding passage of his book) scientific understanding precedes social change. We need to understand in order to guide change.

Sayer's approach is not necessarily the same. The task of science need not be to direct, (that conception was the basis of all authoritarian marxism including the whole range from Stalinism to right wing social democracy) but can instead be to act as a guide in self-emancipation. Sayer's definition of task is not a

definition of how that task is to be undertaken. The relationship of science to action is not specified here, however much there is an implicit specification given that this task definition forms part of a book on realist methodology.

The difference in conception is important despite the subsequent identity of Outhwaite and Sayer's solution. Beauregard has given an interesting account of the 'drift' towards locality studies which has the revealing title of :In the Absence of Practice (1988). He remarks :

"Not too long ago, anyone claiming legitimacy as a Leftist, much less a Marxist, could not but view the verification of theory and the relevance of research as linked to their capacity for practical political action. ... The purpose of empirically-advised theory was to change the world, not just understand it."

(1988, p52)

This position would be acceptable to both Sayer and Outhwaite although they might be considered as representing different poles of a continuum in which Outhwaite would be at the end closest to accepting the legitimacy of contemplative work per se. However the issue is not just one of contemplation versus engagement. Two other issues are important. The first which will be just mentioned here is the issue of who possesses critical knowledge and translates it into a programme for action. Traditionally in 'scientistic marxism' that knowledge has been the property of an

elite who thereby have the right to lead. This has been a crucial justification of the party. The position has not gone unchallenged, particularly by the council communists (Lenin's ultra-leftists) and in an important contribution by Jakubowski (1936, 1976), who rejected the Leninist notion that undirected working class consciousness is necessarily confined to merely economistic trade unionism. This theme will be raised again in discussions of popular planning in the conclusion. However here we are concerned more with the nature of knowledge than with who holds it and in particular ontological questions about structure and action.

Dickens et al seized on a (largely formal) endorsement of the realist approach in order to get round another problem, which is the essential problem of social science and of related social action :

"The tension between structure and agency, necessary and contingent recurs in political activity; any political outcome is far from being predetermined or or even appropriate. Similarly, epistemologies also have their political implications. Empiricism reproduces the present world. .... Structuralism ends up in passivity, although sometimes more the passivity of despair rather than acceptance. People must wait for the next structural revolution; for the present they are left with either the pessimism of passive rejection or the release of symbolic

outburst. This world view forgets that people must live now and, even if capitalism is inevitably to break down, there will be considerable room for manoeuvre over how this happens and what will replace it. Indeed, these are probably the more important issues. The realist approach implies the possibilities for more meaningful action between the two extremes." (1985, p 254)

Thus Dickens et al see realism as the answer to the structure action division in both analysis and politics. It becomes a way of allowing independence of action by people which is not 'determined' by the constraints of some pre-existing structure. The meaning of the word 'determine' is very important here. Dickens et al present what seems a reasonable version of the realist definition :

"... *determination* must be distinguished from *determinism*. Events are caused by generative mechanisms (*determination*) but because these are activated by combination with contingent relations, the actual concrete outcome is not pre-determined (*determinism*)." (1985, p 252)

Thus claims are being made for scientific realism to the effect that it has a role to play in informing political action and that the perspective allows for both the existence of structures and the possibility of non-determined social action.

The relationship between generative mechanisms and contingent relations is the key to the new geography's adoption of realism. The position is well summarized by Bagguely et al :

"Realist models of the social world distinguish between relatively enduring social entities which have causal properties and specific contingent events to which the social entities give rise. The relations between causal entities are highly complex, however, in that the *realisation* (original emphasis) of their causal properties is not guaranteed but often depends on partial realisation of the causal properties of other entities, or, indeed, upon the *blocking* (original emphasis) of the realization of the causal properties of the other entities whose effects may be contrary. The way in which empirical phenomena arise, then, reflects the intimate relations between entities, with the mutual realisation, part-realisation or blocking of their causal powers."  
(1990, p3)

Outhwaite said that : "The guiding metaphors (of scientific realism) are those of structures and mechanisms in reality..." (1987, p21-2). The image that Bagguely et al's summary presents is not so much one of mechanism as of ecology. The ecological development of a site is a function of underlying causal entities which relate exactly in the way described. Thus the resulting ecologies shift often from year to year. Sometimes in a garden

border (a very simple ecology) the bluebells develop first and shade out the vetch. In the same border in the next year it may be the other way on. Scientific realism is a powerful epistemology for biology, including epidemiology. But can it cope with action and purpose ?

Gunn (1989) argues not. In a stringent review of realism's political claims he asserts that the position has developed by ignoring the marxist critique of philosophy as an endeavour. The sub-text of his piece is Thesis XI on Feuerbach : "The philosophers have described the world - the point however is to change it." It is interesting to see the history which underpins Outhwaite's endorsement of a version of realism and to see why it has ignored the arguments of Korsch. Outhwaite attempts to synthesize critical theory with realism. Although that is a very simplistic assessment of the the intellectual content of his argument it seems a wholly adequate summary of the political intent. Why is critical theory whoring after the likes of realism ? Because it has lost its god, its agent of transformation. If crude dialectical materialism made a god of the party, critical theory tended to make a god, a creator, out of the working class. This is not the place for an extended review of the history of the movement away from this position. Outhwaite summarizes developments very well in his chapter on 'Realism and Critical Theory'. Nor is the battle for the engagement of critical theory wholly abandoned. Roderick (1986) for example has argued for a basic re-engagement of critical theory with working class politics. Nonetheless the

essential context is expressed by Gorz *Farewell to the Working Class* (1982).

And realism can work with traditional science and its central objective of reflective explanation. Thus Soja :

"The realist philosophy of social science seems almost ready-made to sustain and rationalize the theoretical directions taken by contemporary materialist interpretations of spatiality. For this emerging form of realism revolves around a particular interpretation of the relation between appearances and essences, and echoes Marx's astute comment that 'all science would be superfluous if the outward appearances and essences of things directly coincided. Realist science is a means of conceptual discovery based on the movement at any given level of analysis, from manifest phenomena to knowledge of the structures and mechanisms which generate them ... Empirical analysis is thus given an alternative explanatory methodology ...'" (1985, p121-2)

This is very different from a rejection of structural determinism in any marxist sense. Williams made a very different distinction when he pointed out that there are :

"... quite different possible meanings and interpretations of the word 'determine'. There is, on

the one hand, from its theological inheritance, the notion of an external cause which totally predicts or prefigures, indeed totally controls a subsequent activity. But there is also, from the experience of social practice, a notion of determination as setting limits, exerting pressures." (1980, p 32)

This weaker sense of determine is exactly what Marx meant by his assertion that : "Men (sic) make history but not in circumstances of their own choosing." It also corresponds very well with Gramsci's guideline :

"It has been forgotten that in the case of a very common expression (historical materialism) one should put the accent on the first term - 'historical' - and not on the second, which is of metaphysical origin. The philosophy of praxis is absolute 'historicism', the absolute secularization and earthiness of thought, an absolute humanism of history. It is along this line that one must trace the thread of the new conception of the world." (1971, p 465)

Anderson has identified the creative claim marxist analysis made for the capacity of the working class :

"It is the modern labour movement that has really given birth to this quite new conception of historical change; and it is with the advent of what its founders called scientific socialism that, in effect, for the first time collective projects of social transformation were married to systematic efforts to understand the processes of past and present, to produce a pre-meditated future." (1980, p20)

This is a good description of planning, if it is allowed that planning interventions can be made by agencies other than the collective working class acting for itself. Anderson has confused the ideological expression of the nature of markets with the actual practices of the bourgeoisie, a mistake not made by Marx and Engels. However the point of guided creation remains. As Mao put it to understand the world you change it.

Realism does not discount the possibility of fundamental change, although I find its arguments here thin for reasons which will be developed in the discussion of the notion of locality. However it is necessary to outline the notion of changing social structures before proceeding to that discussion. Outhwaite puts it like this in an explicit paraphrase of Bhaskar (1979) :

"Social structures, unlike natural structures, may be only relatively enduring (so that the tendencies they

ground may not be universal in the sense of space-time invariant)." (1987, p 53)

Sayer makes the same point with an explicitly political referent :

"... radical or revolutionary political changes alter the structures (necessary conditions) by virtue of which the mechanisms exist ..." (1984, p 102)

This is a route for agency but it is not one sensibly taken by the dominant use of realism in urban analysis through use of the idea of locality to which we now turn.

## Are places localities ?

The word locality has been used repeatedly in this thesis but discussion of the content of the term has deliberately postponed to this point. Duncan (1986), Duncan and Savage (1991), and Gregson (1987) have all attempted systematic reviews of different meanings which have been attached to the term in the recent set of locality studies. The intention here is not to repeat such a review but rather to identify a realist conception of locality and propose a historicist alternative. It has to be emphasized that the realist position on locality has been much more asserted than employed, particularly in the recent sets of locality studies deriving from ESRC initiatives. However Bagguley et al do include a clear account of how they handle realist derived conception of locality and this is worth teasing out. In their view : " .... the locality study as a *method* (original emphasis) has arisen from the attempt to address the complexity of spatially intersecting causal processes.. ." (1990, p 8).

They develop their argument thus :

"We derive our sense of the local from a realist perspective, by paying attention to the *spatial ranges* (original emphasis) of the many causal elements that impinge on any chosen area. .... All of these overlies each other and can enter into substantive relations where they overlap, involving sometimes the same and sometimes different

collections of individuals and other subjects. Social reality from this perspective, is made up of the totality of these significant interrelationships over space, and 'restructuring' can be conceived as the spatial and temporal dynamics they embody. Considered globally, the number of these interrelationships is as good as infinite and ... much of the impetus for locality studies may stem from the search for a more manageable object. A 'locality' is simply a ring drawn around one set of these intersections of elements, and is therefore unavoidably *arbitrary* (original emphasis). ... A locality therefore offers the possibility of examining a more rounded set of processes and interrelations of causal entities in different spheres - in the formal economy, civil society and the state. Its size remains unspecified - it too depends on the substantive issues in question..." (1990, ps 10-11)

In this version locality seems to mean a range within which causal mechanisms interact with each other and with complex contingencies. The Lancaster group (Bagguley et al) conclude their book by remarking that :

"In sum, we have isolated a number of key causal mechanisms that are too infrequently considered important in the mediation of the effects of restructuring on daily local life : gender relations,

the nature of services, the character and mobility of fractions of the service class, the nature of local political alliances, as well as the complex contingent managerial strategies of diverse economic enterprises. Place is the intersection of a multitude of processes, the sedimentations of the past, the social practices of the present and projects for the future." (1990, p 219)

This sense of place as range of action seems to be a common conception of locality. If it is a claim that space matters, it is a relatively weak one. It really amounts to very little more than an assertion of the relevance of spatial boundaries to a consideration of history both as process and as a sum of effects, without much in the way of serious consideration of how such boundaries might be defined. This is not a matter of rigidity. Significant boundaries differ for different things. For example the present union recognition - safety dispute offshore in the North Sea oilfields is clearly spatially bounded. However those boundaries are very odd. They include the rigs and the communities, created around shipbuilding, from which offshore workers are drawn and in which rig production is now concentrated. There is a spatial culture of offshore, but is it on the rigs or on Clydeside, Tyneside, Tayside, Teeside and in Aberdeen. The world of the workers is very wide ranging. This was of course a common experience of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Durham miners blacklisted after 1926 went to Canada as silver miners, merchant seamen went everywhere, people moved around the

world of capitalism in skilled work. Offshore has a history and a place, or rather two places because current confrontations are in essence union busting free labour West Texas meets the estuarine British (and Belfast) working class. However the boundaries are only sensibly determined by historical consideration.

This is very different from the rather confused (albeit at least attempted) discussion of the potential causal matrix of variate elements which seems to inform the Lancaster group's sense of the purpose of the notion of locality. This is a kind of spurious scientism. Cochrane has remarked that :

"The distinction between necessary and contingent relations which is so important to realism has been presented as a means of acknowledging the uniqueness of different places, without giving up the idea that their development also reflects general processes."

(1987, p354)

Cochrane calls the result of this endeavour 'micro-structuralism'. This seems a good term. Indeed I think the issue is more substantial than Cochrane has suggested. Duncan's discussion distinguishes between spatial differences which are mere spatial variation (a passive contingency effect) and a another level at which :

"Over and above this contingency effect, causal effects may be locally derived. This is our second level. Furthermore a combination of these may create what can be called a 'locality effect'. The sum of locality derived causes is greater than the parts. In both these cases, our second and third levels of socio-spatial interaction, local variations are active in the sense of causally producing outcomes rather than just contingently affecting them." (1986, p 28)

It is this third level, the level of interaction in the strict statistical sense (values on one variable altering the form of the relationship between another two variables and so on to the infinite order) which involves local micro-structures. Such micro-structures might be sought for through a quantitative project which involved the search for significant levels of interaction in multi-variate data sets. Interestingly realist geography appears to have forsworn any kind of quantitative project. Instead it has proceeded by historical account !

There is an alternative position which in a simple way begins with a different ontological position, or rather with a different emphasis on ontological position. It is clear that all the major proponents of realism in social science agree that human society, its relations, and its structures, are human creations and can be re-created in a different form. To this extent they agree with MacIver's very well known dictum :

" ... the social structure is for the most part created. Unlike the physical causal nexus it does not exist apart from the objectives and motives of social beings." (1949, ps 20-1)

However realist geography has not really accepted this position. It has emphasized the impact of global structures on localities and licensed some local contingent or interactive variation (these are not the same thing). What it has not appreciated is that actions which create structures and processes in localities are themselves creative forces, and therefore potentially recreative forces, for global structures. This is not an assertion of the simple additivity of global structures. Of course there is more to global capitalist relations than the simple sum of local social relations. Nonetheless local social relations are creative for global relations. In this thesis the emphasis will be on the creative capacity of local 'capitalist-corporatist' planning as a facilitator of global restructuring and in terms of its effects on local lives. However much of class experience is local, although as the offshore example indicated not all. The point is essentially E.P. Thompson's in his rejection of structuralist conceptions of class, of stopping the machine to see what the structure is. Class is not the frozen instant. It is the process, the sound and the fury (1978). So are social processes in places.

The accounts derived from realism attempt to be dynamic in a mechanistic way. They do seek to handle change, but they can only handle change which is top down but modified. Global processes are

mediated through local micro-structures. That is not my position. Instead I will talk of places and histories. C. Wright Mills (1959) defined the concerns of Sociology as to do with the intersection of history and biography. In dealing with places we are dealing with the intersection of local, (and regional, and national) history with global process. Of course history is tricky to define :

" ... alone among the sciences, *history* (original emphasis) as a term .... designates at once the process and the discipline that seeks to grasp it."

(Anderson, 1980 ps 9-10)

What is going on is a process of change and restructuring at all levels, with the capacity for changes at any level dependent on all others. This works up as well as down. It is not unidirectional. The new radical geography in contrast, with its unidirectional account of relation, albeit its allowance for local mediation, is a disempowering account. As with critical theory and mechanistic political economy it sees the dominated as incapable of initiating change. Even decent reformists like Dickens see change as possible within structures, within a flexible range, rather than re-constitutive. It is not reform versus revolution, but reform directed at transformation versus reform directed at amelioration. This is not an abstract question. As we shall see it is fundamental to practical planning interventions. However before coming to that let us look at how to define places for the purpose of this study.

## Defining places

Bagguley et al, in the passage quoted above, suggested that defining the spatial boundaries of localities was an essentially arbitrary process (1990, p 11) but also reviewed some of the practical criteria by which such localities had been defined. Generally speaking in the recent wave of ESRC funded research projects, localities were : "... towns and hinterlands of roughly local authority district and travel-to-work area ... size." (1990, p11). However travel-to-work areas (TTWAs) and local authority districts are by no means necessarily the same things. Most UK TTWAs contain a multiplicity of LA districts. LA districts are contained within either shire counties, Scottish regions, abolished met counties and the GLC, or Northern Ireland. What are appropriate boundaries and why ?

TTWAs are census of population based operationalizations of local labour markets. They are constructed on the basis of the analysis of data from each decennial census and change quite drastically from census to census. Basically, and subject to some modification, TTWAs are the largest spatial areas which can be put together on a map within which a given proportion of the economically active population both live and work. They are relatively crude efforts at constructing labour markets as represented in space. Economic restructuring changes the boundaries of TTWAs. Thus the Derwentside district of County Durham was part of a separate TTWA whilst Consett steel works remained open. With the closure of the works and loss of locally

available employment Consett became part of the Newcastle TTWA which is very extensive and includes North Tyneside, Gateshead, Derwentside and the southern part of Northumberland. In their study of change in the Newcastle Metropolitan region, Robinson et al added in South Tyneside, Chester-le-Street, Durham and Sunderland which are in separate 1981 based TTWAs. They refer to this conglomerate as a 'function region', a concept which :

" ... has the advantage of defining an area which recognizes the interdependencies of an urban core and the surrounding settlements, providing a framework for examining a 'local economy'. It recognizes, in particular, the interrelationships of the local labour market ..." (1987, p 4)

This area is far larger than the localities investigated in the programme directed by Cooke (1989) who defines the term locality by reference to the exercise of : " ... the civil, social and political rights of citizens ... " (1990, p 12). For Cooke some aspects of government and policy formation and implementation are part of the notion. This emphasis on local government and local politics is repeated in the associated collection edited by Harloe et al (1990) in which Urry asserts that : "... localities in Britain possess important powers of government." (1990, p 188). However in that collection the notion of labour market still remains paramount in operationalizing boundaries. This is because of the emphasis in studies of restructuring on global factors relating to production organization. In his review Dickens draws

on Urry's 1983 classification of 'kinds of local society' by : "... the nature of the dominant employer (sic), the intermediate classes and the working class." (1988, p 23) and this kind of formulation remains central in these recent studies. Local politics and policies are seen as responsive to restructuring factors. Urry in an effort to explain policy variations, differentiates among 'conditions', 'resources' and 'strategies'.

" 'Conditions' refers to the wide variety of circumstances, external to a *given* (original emphasis) locality, within which local policies have to be formulated and implemented. ... 'Resources' refer to the means that are institutionally available to decision-makers within a given locality ... 'Strategies' refer to the various sets of locally implemented policies and procedures... " (1990, ps 191-2)

The interesting thing here is that there is no sense of 'conditions' as something which can be internal to a given locality. Thus we again encounter the external and uni-directional conception of local-global relations.

So localities are definable by labour-market (operationalized as TTWA) and government. Robinson et al (1988) did go a bit further by refencing, at least implicitly, other forms of linkage which might be constitutive of a local economy. Is there anything else ?

There is clearly a problem of level. If localities are local, what are regions ? Cooke has defined 'regional' as :

" ... a socio-spatial scale at which it is possible to place in focus the specificity of particular class formations ... regional boundaries are largely coterminous with class practices." (1985 , p 239)

and goes on to talk of regions as having boundaries defined in terms of : "... the spatial edges ... of social practices." (1985 , p221). This is to introduce an active conception of culture into spatial boundary definition. However regions may also be defined by reference to inter-connections of production. Indeed the nature of past and present inter-connected productive systems, and the interaction among them, is very likely to be the origin of class practices which are cultural boundary demarcators. That is certainly Cooke's position. Ought we to use the cultural dimension at a more local level ?

There is a related issue which derives from the much derided 'community studies' of the 1950s and early 60s which were conducted as part of a social anthropological ethnographic project and generally worked with a conception of local social system. This was almost wholly unmaterialistic, with the important exception of *Coal is Our Life* (Dennis et al, 1969) which in which systems of production, reproduction and social experience were integrated in account and analysis in a way which seems far superior to the rather sketchy recent locality studies. I consider

this to be a function of restriction of method and will return to this theme in the next section of this chapter. Unmaterialistic as the community studies were, they did at least attempt to address popular perceptions and actions. Any spatial boundaries must involve social constructions through social actions. How does this translate into operational definition ?

The best way to begin is by a check list of factors. Any operationalization must take account of economic activity. This has two dimensions. There is general agreement on labour-market, operationalized by TTWA. There is less agreement on integrated production system. Urry has gone so far as to assert that cities are now :

" ... not so much an interlocking economy of producing and consuming enterprises but a *community of subjects* (original emphasis) who produce and consume in order to produce .... There is a substantial shift in the structuring of each urban locality. Previously such localities were integrated within the production and reproduction of capital. However as each urban locality has been reduced to the status of a labour pool so they are now integrated not within the production process of capital but of wage labour, within the sphere of civil society rather than capitalist production *per se*." (1985, p 35)

Urry has a point but it is very much over-stated, particularly when consideration is given to the local aspects of capital in production and circulation. Indeed in the places studied, although it is in retreat, an integrated system of production which created these localities in an earlier phase, is still the most important component of the productive system, and incoming new aspects are often dependent on the human capital trained by the earlier system.

There is general agreement on aspects of government and policy formation. Most of the discussion has been about economic policy formation. Remarkably little attention has been given to planning as a more general process and the boundaries it determines. Attention has been given to other policy areas eg. health, largely in relation to their role as employers in the service sector.

My conception of place is this. Places are spatially bounded locales which have some sort of distinctive history constructed out of the inter-action of local capitalist (and sometimes but not in my examples pre-capitalist) development, developments in global capitalism, and governmental operations, particularly planning. They are local social systems of a scale within which local socio-spatial differentiation is possible. They are not culturally bounded in a general sense (because I agree with Cooke that region is the level of such boundaries) but they are bounded by political and industrial cultures which have interacted in particular ways in these particular places. They do have micro-

structures of place, but these are active, and potentially creative. This study will be placed because the answers to the questions it addresses are those of the relationships among economic restructuring, local socio-spatial change, implemented policies and social consequences, and the best way to investigate this set is by local studies of historically determined places. The remainder of this chapter will be concerned with the actual processes of research, including the choice of places for the study.

### Doing research in places

This thesis has been identified as concerned with social division and its consequences (p 2) and has specified that concern in terms of series of questions. These have come in sets and are :

#### Set One derived from the discussion in Chapter One

Are the poor an underclass outside the economic order

?

What is the position of state employees in the class structure ?

What is the service class and what are its boundaries

?

What is the position and role of the working poor ?

How are crucial decisions, which have constitutive effects on local social structures, taken ?

**Set Two derived from the discussion in Chapter Three**

What has happened to the arrangement of people and their activities in space in industrial towns ?

Why have these things happened ?

How have these things happened ?

The second set are absolutely located because they address the spatial manifestations of class as these are expressed in particular places. These effects are the resultants of global and local capitalist processes of restructuring as it is happening now and has happened in the recent past, policies created in relation to these processes both in response to them and in advance of them, and of various forms of class action. The present situation, or any time fixed situation, is a snapshot in history, in ongoing process. The model is inherently dynamic. History has effects but the effects of history are not fixed now although they may set limits on possibilities. Different uses may be made of history, not just culturally but in terms of actual policies, especially planning policies. This does not fit with the relatively fixed geological strata model of the sedimentation of the past. That can only be ruptured by a sudden change induced by structural stress, an earthquake or revolution. Spatial history in my approach is not

without limits but it would be a mistake to see the limits as immediate structure setting boundaries. Immediate components are better interpreted as sets of possibilities with creative potential.

How then to do research so that some approach can be made to answering these questions ? The first issue is one of choice of places. The choice is informed by two criteria - type and convenience. Type refers to the sort of place. A distinction was made at the end of Chapter Two between 'World Cities' and other large cities in the advanced industrial world. The distinction is not as exact as it may seem but it has value as a rough working approximation. The underpinning agenda of this sort of investigation is 'all the posts' : post-industrialism, post-modernism, post-working classism. Contemporary investigations are of a kind which involve a shift of focus from productive workers at the point of production to other factors in a context in which the determinant centrality of productive work and the class structure derived from it is under major challenge. It therefore makes sense to take pure cases, places which are large industrial towns with a history of being important for making things and not for much else. Sunderland, South Tyneside and Cleveland meet that criterion, (although the last is a set of industrial towns rather than a single town), and they meet the criterion of convenience by being available to me.

I could leave it there with a kind of intuitive and obvious typology serving as the basis for my selection of places but I

want to take it a little further. There is available a very large set of data about places. This spatial data is derived from a series of major surveys, especially the Censuses of Employment and Population. There is also a good deal of other material from other surveys and administrative records. This material is 'secondary data' for me in the sense of being quantitative material not collected by me but available to me for analysis (see Hakim 1982, Dale et al 1988). It allows for exploratory typological analyses. Exploratory Data Analysis (see Tukey 1980, Erikson and Nosanchuk 1979) is an approach to quantitative material which seems tailor made for both realist and historicist studies. It involves the use of data not for the testing of hypotheses, but as a guide to constructing an account of what the picture is. Openshaw (1983) has suggested that the very powerful numerical taxonomic procedures of cluster analysis are properly used in such an exploratory fashion.

I intend to so use cluster analyses, second (in presentation) to explore the internal social arrangements of the places studied and how those arrangements have changed (by using the 7181 SAS change data set and the 81 and 91 census small area statistics) in a way which is now conventional for quantitative ecologies, but first to establish a typology of places. Here I will integrate data from the 1981 Census of Population with data from Censuses of Employment in order to build up a data set for typological analysis at the level of place. The level chosen is that of Local Education Authority Area. This level has been selected for four reasons. First Census of Employment data is

available at this level. Second building this data set will allow me to contextualize educational changes which are an important and neglected part of class formation processes. Third education is the most important function of UK local government in financial terms but it has been neglected by students of the local state. Finally LEAs in the UK are one of five things (at least they were at the time of the 81 Census of Population). They are English or Welsh Shire counties, Scottish Regions, English Metropolitan districts, outer London boroughs or the ILEA. The Scottish pattern is different to the extent that the units of local government are more or less city regions rather than subsets of regions, and interesting though this level is, comparison with the English and Welsh situation does not seem valid. Wales itself has a separate administration and has been excluded on these grounds. London is trickier. Outer boroughs are just residential suburbs without much of a separate history (with the only real exception being Newham). London should be taken as a whole but is so clearly a world city and therefore different that I feel justified in excluding it also, so the locating typology of places will be drawn from non-London English LEAs.

There are boundary problems even here. It is perfectly clear that shire LEAs adjacent to Metropolitan Counties often include what are really suburbs of the Met County districts. This is particularly true of the relationship between Tyne and Wear districts and Durham and Northumberland, although Cleveland is the closest English approximation to a city region authority. Some shire counties are essentially rural areas without much in the way

of industrial town content. Many do not correspond in boundaries with TTWAs. LEAs are rough definitions of anything like places. However they are probably the best 'reproductive' determined boundary set since they are defined by an important reproductive function, education, and are either single level multi-purpose local authority areas or second level shire counties which include discrete sets of county districts.

The status of secondary data based typologies is simply that of explorations of patterns to set places in context. The intra-place typologies have a rather different status. The patterns of social differentiation which they represent are both illustrative of the contemporary nature of classes as arranged in space, and consequences of the interaction of policy and basal change. These ecologies matter because segregation matters. They matter now, but the way in which they came about also matters. They must be given a history.

Before turning to a consideration of historical procedures there is one further secondary data based analysis which must be mentioned. The spatial data derived from the Census of Population is aggregative of households. In other words ED, Ward and District data is constructed by aggregating responses from the households resident in these spatial units. It is not possible to obtain household level data tapes from Censuses (on any local basis) nor will it be until one hundred years after the date of the relevant census. In one of my places, Cleveland, there is an available household level data source to which I have obtained access. This

is the Cleveland Social Survey which has been carried out on an annual basis since the mid 1970s by the Cleveland County Council Research and Intelligence Unit. The survey is a local variant of the General Household Survey and is based on a sample of some 1,400 households. Originally there was an effort to maintain a cohort element but this had to be abandoned so the samples are best regarded as independent repeat investigations. This data base is very useful because it is available for recent years (1987), is a series, and is household level. Thus it has the special value of allowing the construction of typologies of households at different points in time. The household data set includes a spatial location key so the typology of households can be related to ED level socio-spatial differentiation. This will only be possible for Cleveland because only in Cleveland is there such a data set but it is important because it allows for multi-level comparison.

If secondary data analysis is the first technique which will be employed in this study, the second technique is history. The historical materials will include quantitative time series describing economic and social changes, and documentary sources. The documentary sources will be largely the documents of policy formation and implementation and local press comment and news stories. In this study documentary material will predominate and a list of sources consulted is given in a section of the bibliography.

This historical review will be concerned with the general socio-spatial structure of the places. This will include

consideration of changes in industrial structure but it will be concerned with the history of planning and housing development. It is the interaction of these which has created the socio-spatial structure. This will be the subject matter of chapters seven and eight.

I have not here included a long justification of the actual techniques employed. Where technical exposition is necessary it will be provided in relation to the actual investigation to which it relates. Thus I will explain cluster analysis in relation to cluster analyses. The work has been informed by a consideration of methods, not least derived from some ten years experience as a teacher of research methods at under and post-graduate levels. It has also been informed by previous experience. Relevant sources are included in the bibliography. However it does not seem appropriate to reproduce here detailed consideration of the nature of semi-structured interviews or of the general procedures of secondary data analysis. This is a field research study in the sense of using an umbrella of techniques. The justification of technical, as opposed to methodological understanding, must be the account which is finally produced. So now to work !

## Chapter Five

The pattern of Deindustrialization in three industrial areas.

### Introduction

This thesis is about the relationships among deindustrialization, the activities of the welfare state in relation to planning and housing, and socio-spatial division. The purpose of this chapter is to set the context by describing the character and recent history of the three Local Education Authority areas which have been selected as the location for the study. The chapter will begin with an account of a classificatory exercise carried out on all non-London English LEAs and will locate the three study areas in relation to the classifications generated. It will proceed through the presentation of an outline account of each place and of its recent history of industrial and economic change.

It is useful to be able to locate the areas which are being studied in relation to other places. The simplest way to do this is by making typologies based on numerical taxonomy procedures, that is by carrying out cluster analyses. Here we begin with a classification of all non-London English LEAs using the data set described in Appendix 1, which is derived from the Censuses of Employment for 1981 and 1987, from the Census of Population 1981, and from published educational statistics. In the next Chapter we will proceed with this layered set of typologies by creating

classifications using the 1971/1981 change data sets based on census tracts (the smallest geographical unit with consistent boundaries between the 71 and 81 censuses, which may be a single enumeration district or may be an amalgamation of EDs) of the internal arrangements within LEAs and enumeration district data sets from the 1981 and 1991 censuses.

The classificatory procedure used is a cluster analytical approach. This usually involves the combination of Ward's Method of hierarchic fusion with a relocation algorithm starting from a random allocation of cases to ten initial clusters (see Everitt, 1974). The procedure is quite easily understood. Basically the package (CLUSTAN 1B) takes the randomly allocated sets and sorts them out using a given set of criteria (unmasked variables) so that the ten sets are as internally homogeneous and externally heterogeneous as possible. It then fuses the two sets which are most alike and re-sorts. This continues until only one set containing all cases remains. At each level of fusion an 'error message' is given which describes the difference between the first sorted set and that achieved at any level of fusion. When the error message increases in an accelerated fashion (the slope of the error message graph steepens) then the fusion has joined up two very different groups. This indicates significant typology levels.

The procedure is complex in mathematical terms but intuitively simple and as Openshaw (1983) has indicated, is properly regarded as a sophisticated method of exploratory data

analysis. We are not dealing here with proving hypotheses, but rather with seeing what patterns emerge from the data sets, and what those patterns suggest. In our search for patterns we are very much guided by our existing theoretical/historical knowledge of the issues and context. Pattern searching in this mode is the reverse of what C. Wright Mills called 'abstracted empiricism' (1959). This is particularly the case because a major determinant of the typologies generated is the choice of variables in the set which are left 'unmasked' and thereby used to generate the typologies. This choice is explicitly theoretically informed. Thus the first part of this chapter and chapter six are based on theoretically informed (the theory being the content of chapters 1 to 3) secondary data analyses.

#### **A National Typology of non-London LEAs**

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the typologies generated, at the three cluster and two cluster levels respectively, from a cluster analysis of all non-London English LEAs with the variables indicated by an asterisk being left unmasked. Table 5.3 shows the values on the selected variable set for South Tyneside, Sunderland, Cleveland, Northumberland, Newcastle and Cumbria, together with the national values. The variables selected to serve as the basis of the classification were selected as indicators of 'declining labourist industrialism'. To this end they included housing tenure types, proportion of the resident workforce classified as 'skilled manual' in 1981, proportion of pupils leaving school at the earliest possible age, population change

between 1961 and 1981, proportion of employed workforce in industry in 1987, and percentage decline in that proportion between 1981 and 1987.

Cluster 3.1 (first cluster at the three cluster level) contained 26 LEAs as listed in Table 5.4. These were a mix of Shire counties and metropolitan districts including Cleveland, Cumbria and Northumberland in the Northern Region. This cluster was the 'middle grouping'. It had a broadly national profile of tenure patterns, moderately high 1981 census recorded male unemployment, and middling levels of educational performance. Populations had increased by some 10% over the period 1961-81. The LEAs in this cluster were as industrial as cluster 1 in 1981 and remained the most industrialized in 1987. As reflects the mix of Shire and Met. District LEAs population densities were about national average for the data set (which of course is different from the all English level - see Table 5.2).

TABLE 5.1 - LEA INDICES 3 CLUSTERS

	Cl. 1	Cl.2	Cl.3
81 pop.	501,000	350,000	658,000
pop. density	12.4	22.5	4.4
%81 pop.5-15	16.9	16.6	16.4
% born ex UK	3.7	3.6	2.1
% Male Unemp.	11.71	15.8	8.1
% Fem. Unemp.	5.2	6.2	3.8
% Marr. Fems.			
Econ. Act	59.4	56.9	55.8
% Hhds Own.Occ*	60.8	42.7	62.8
% Hhds LA Tens*	28.8	45.9	23.7
% Hhds Oth Tens	10.4	11.3	13.5
% Hhds no car	43.7	52.8	30.7
% Econ Act			
Self Employed	9.6	5.8	11.2
% Ec Act Prof.	3.6	2.6	4.5
% Ec Act Mans.	11.8	8.9	13.4
% Ec Act NMan	29.6	29.5	32.1
% Ec Act SkMan*	22.8	25.1	17.7
% Ec Act Degs or equivalent	11.5	9.8	14.0
% Sch.Leavers No Quals.	10.4	14.1	7.1
% Sch. Leavers 4+ GCSEs	23.0	17.3	26.2
% Sch. Leavers F.Ed.	24.3	19.4	28.8
% Sch. Leavers Min. Age	49.5	52.1	45.0
% Sch. Leavers Higher Ed	21.4	16.5	24.6
Pop.Chan. 71-91*	7.4	-6.0	35.8
% Industrial Emp 81*	41.3	40.0	30.1
MFT 87	50.3	50.1	49.1
MPT 87	3.9	4.0	4.5
FFT 87	24.7	24.5	25.2
FPT87	20.8	20.5	21.2
% Industrial Emp 87*	36.0	31.6	26.0
% Ind. Emp. Loss 81-87*	13.4	27.2	7.7

(\* indicates index used in classification)

TABLE 5.2 - LEA INDICES 2 CLUSTERS

	C1.1	C1.2
81 pop.	581,000	682,000
pop. density	18.2	4.5
%81 pop.5-15	16.9	16.4
% born ex UK	3.8	2.2
% Male Unemp.	14.0	8.3
% Fem. Unemp.	5.7	3.9
% Marr. Fems.		
Econ. Act	58.3	56.3
% Hhds Own.Occ*	51.6	65.2
% Hhds LA Tens*	37.8	23.6
% Hhds Oth Tens*	10.6	13.2
% Hhds no car	48.0	32.8
% Econ Act		
Self Employed	6.8	12.0
% Ec Act Prof.	2.9	4.6
% Ec Act Mans.	10.0	13.7
% Ec Act NMan	29.9	31.4
%Ec Act SkMan*	24.1	18.3
% Ec Act Degs or equivalent	10.7	13.6
% Sch.Leavers		
No Quals.	12.3	7.4
% Sch. Leavers		
4+ GCSEs	20.1	25.9
% Sch. Leavers F.Ed.	21.4	28.6
% Sch. Leavers Hin. Age	50.8	45.7
% Sch. Leavers Higher Ed	18.4	24.7
Pop.Chan. 71-91*	-1.0	23.9
% Industrial		
Emp 81*	40.9	31.7
MFT 87	50.5	49.4
MPT 87	3.9	4.4
FFT 87	24.4	24.3
FPT87	21.0	21.0
% Industrial mp 87*	34.0	27.5
% Ind. Emp.		
Loss 81-87*	20.6	7.9

(\* indicates index used in classification)

Cluster 3.2 contained 18 LEAs. These were all Met. Districts apart from County Durham, and all the Tyne-Wear Met. Districts were in this cluster. Here population densities were very high, as were unemployment rates. The LEAs were marked by a very high proportion of households being council tenants in 1981, a proportion broadly equal to the proportion of owner-occupied households. Car ownership levels and educational performances were both low. In this set populations had declined between 1961 and 1981. Although these LEAs had been as industrial as those in cluster 1.3 in 1981 they had suffered a greater degree of deindustrialization by 1987.

Cluster 3.3 contained 31 LEAs. These were predominantly shire counties with only Sefton, Stockport and Solihull being Met. Districts. These LEAs were 'prosperous England' with high levels of owner occupation and car ownership, high levels of educational attainment and an average of 25% population growth between 1961 and 1981. Unemployment was low. In 1981 and 1987 this set was the least industrial of the three, but deindustrialization was also less than in either of the other two clusters.

At the two cluster level there was a significant resorting. Cluster 3.1 was split between cluster 2.1 and cluster 2.2 with Cleveland and Northumberland going into cluster 2.1 together with other shire LEAs from the Northern regions and all the LEAs from Cluster 3.2. Cluster 2.1 had high population densities, high unemployment, lower levels of owner occupation and car ownership and substantially lower levels of educational achievement.

Populations had fallen since 1961. The areas remained more industrial than those in Cluster 2.2 but had suffered much more industrial job loss. The LEAs in this cluster are clearly part of 'peripheral Britain', whereas those in Cluster 2.2 were the central heartlands. The LEA focus is finer than the regional level which normally underpins descriptions of the North - South divide (see Lewis and Townsend, 1990) but these clusters can be summarized by saying that Cluster 2.1 is what is normally meant by 'the North' in such accounts, and cluster 2.2 is what is normally meant by the South.

No LEA outside the Northern, North Western, Yorks Humberside, East and West Midlands regions was included in the 38 in Cluster 2.1. The 37 in Cluster 2.2 did include Cheshire, Cumbria, Bury, Stockport, Sefton, Lincolnshire, North Yorkshire, Staffordshire, Warwickshire and Solihull which are within those regions. Thus the outposts of the South in the North were a mixture of rural counties and prosperous suburbs, frequently within the one LEA. It should be noted that there is likely to be very considerable differentiation within LEAs included in the prosperous cluster. A simple consideration of the contrasts between Bootle and Southport, both of which are within Sefton, makes this point immediately.

The two cluster classification using these indicators of urban/industrial status shows very clearly what sort of places Sunderland, South Tyneside and Cleveland are, taken in comparison with the national average for all LEAs included in the data set.

This comparison can be taken further by an inspection of Table 5.3. Sunderland and South Tyneside are markedly different from the national picture on everything except degree of industrialism. They are clearly poor deindustrializing towns with high levels of unemployment and low levels of educational attainment. Cleveland is closer to the national mean on everything except unemployment levels. The reason is simple. South Tyneside and Sunderland are highly homogeneous industrial towns where labour market boundaries, as operationalized by 1981 Travel to Work Areas do roughly approximate to LEA boundaries. However they are really segregated districts within a larger conurbation, Tyne Wear, and functional region, Newcastle (Robinson) et al. 1987). Cleveland in contrast is both a conurbation with most of its suburbs (but not all) within its boundaries, and a functional region to the same extent. This suggests that there is likely to be a more unequal internal structure within Cleveland, a suggestion already taken up by Phillimore as one explanation for a marked excess of mortality in the poorest parts of Cleveland as compared with Sunderland (1991).

TABLE 5.3 - LEA INDICES STUDY LEAs

	Cleveland	Sland	S.Tyne	All LEAs
81 pop.	568,000	294,000	160,000	530,000
pop. density	9.7	21.4	25.2	11.3
%81 pop.5-15	17.9	17.3	15.9	16.6
% born ex UK	1.4	0.6	0.6	3.0
% Male Unemp.	18.6	18.1	18.5	11.2
% Fem. Unemp.	6.4	6.6	6.5	4.8
% Marr. Fems.				
Econ. Act	52.6	53.9	53.7	57.3
% Hhds Own.Occ*	56.2	38.0	31.5	57.3
% Hhds LA Tens*	35.7	54.1	56.3	30.8
% Hhds Oth Tens*	8.0	5.6	4.9	9.4
% Hhds no car*	45.8	54.5	59.5	40.5
% Econ Act				
Self Employed	5.0	5.6	4.9	9.4
% Ec Act Prof.	3.4	2.2	2.2	3.7
% Ec Act Mans.	8.7	8.4	8.2	11.8
% Ec Act NMan	30.2	30.8	29.4	30.6
% Ec Act SkMan*	24.9	27.7	28.1	21.2
% Ec Act Degs or equivalent	11.4	9.6	8.7	12.1
% Sch.Leavers				
No Quals.*	11.1	8.5	8.2	9.9
% Sch. Leavers				
4+ GCSEs	27.5	19.3	18.1	23.0
% Sch. Leavers				
F.Ed.	21.3	17.7	15.2	25.0
% Sch. Leavers				
Min. Age	51.3	53.8	54.9	48.3
% Sch. Leavers				
Higher Ed	21.0	19.9	14.9	21.6
% Pop.Chan. 71-91*	8.0	2.1	-13.5	11.7
% Industrial				
Emp 81	37.9	34.0	40.0	36.4
MFT 87	50.3	46.2	47.6	34.0

MPT 87	4.7	3.2	7.2	4.2
FFT 87	22.5	25.8	21.4	24.8
FPT87	29.3	23.7	23.8	20.9
% Industrial				
Emp 87*	29.3	28.0	33.3	30.8
Ind. Emp.				
% Loss 81-87*	30.0	23.5	30.0	14.4

(\* indicates index used in classification)

This clustering exercise was to some extent dynamic, in that variables included as classifiers described changes over a time period. However, the account of change given by those variables was extremely schematic. We will now flesh this out by proceeding to a fuller account of changes in each of the locales, as this has to be understood in relation to changes in the Northern Region of which they are part.

### **Deindustrializing LEAs in a deindustrializing region.**

It is not necessary here to go into much detail about the impact of deindustrialization on the Northern Region. The annual reports from the Northern Association of Councils on *The State of the Region* have documented trends. Academic discussion can be found in Chapman (ed) 1985, Hudson (1989) and Lewis and Townsend (1989). It is, however, necessary, to say something about the policy culture of the Northern Region, about the origins of that culture, and about recent developments in relation to it.

The first thing to realize, about the Northern Region as a whole, and about the three study areas, is that it and they were once extra-ordinarily relatively prosperous on a world-scale, and that that relative prosperity was a function of their industrial character. The high point of that relative prosperity was in the years from 1880 to 1920 when North Eastern industrial wages were among the highest anywhere in the world, but the tradition of very high wages for highly productive industrial workers had been established in coal-mining before 1800. It was these high wages

which acted as the magnet attracting immigrant industrial labour from throughout the UK (including Ireland) and beyond. The high wages reflected the technologically advanced character of industrial production in key areas. Sunderland and South Tyneside were very important ship-building areas in which innovation in production was associated with innovation in operation of the vessels. Mining in their deep under-sea pits was modern. The Teesside towns had modern engineering, shipbuilding and Iron and Steel production.

The inter-war history of the region was varied. Teesside in particular represented a combination of growth and decline, in that traditional heavy industries declined but the opening up of ICI's massive Billingham works introduced a new and advanced sector just as the chemical industry effectively disappeared from the Tyne and Wear. However the general picture was one of industrial collapse and the consequent designation of the North East under the Special Area's legislation was a crucial stage in the development of a regionalist identity and programme. From 1936 onwards industry revived and the 50s were an era of general prosperity, but the closure programme for mines presented a new set of problems in the early 60s which led to the Hailsham plan of 1963 (*Cmnd 2206*).

This initiated a wave of indicative planning led modernization which profoundly affected the whole industrial and social structure. It built on the inter-war analyses of the region's problems which had been identified in terms of a lack of

diversification of industrial base, although in the labour shortage conditions of the 1950s and outside areas of major mining closure even after that, programmes for the diversification of the male employment base were always likely to be challenged or rejected on the grounds of introducing unacceptable competition for scarce male labour. The region's industrial structure can be broadly divided into traditional and diversifying (see Byrne 1989), although this easy classification breaks down somewhat in the case of ICI on Teesside.

Broadly speaking the traditional industries are those which originate from the region's intrinsic development. In consequence they are (or were, and perhaps the past tense is more appropriate today), complete in the sense that they include all aspects of development and production in their Northern location. Thus at some time such sectors have had central management and Research and Development functions in the North East. Mining, heavy engineering and marine manufacturing all have this character, and the engineering sectors have a history of detailed symbiotic integration. Subsequent delocalization of control has reduced this Northern engagement (particularly, as Hudson 1989, shows delocalization consequent on nationalization) but these industries shaped the place. In this context ICI on Teesside is ambivalently traditional. It has many of the aspects of traditional production, including the presence of very real R and D functions, but is not integrated into the core traditional sectors, is not centrally managed from the North (and never has been), and was part of 1930s diversification.

Diversifying industries are basically branch plants introduced through regional policies and associated land development (trading estates). These are headless chickens, typically lacking both central management and R and D functions. Nissan at Washington is a typical, if late, example. These sectors are not integrated into the traditional systems. This division is not exact, but it is useful. It highlights, for example, the real differences between the offshore sector, which is new but dependent on physical and human capital which originated from the traditional sector and includes R and D, and Nissan which has no such connections and has no R and D component. Both these sectors have been severely affected by recent changes, but the branch plant sector has suffered most.

The modernizing era had a particularly dramatic impact on the spatial form of the North. This is best illustrated by reference to the particular places, but it is worth noting the impact of one development which links all three of them. A large part of committed resources under the Hailsham schemes was devoted to infrastructure development, and particularly road-building. The construction of the improved A19 has provide a sub-motorway down the coast, linking South Tyneside, Sunderland and Cleveland. The availability of the road network has had very real consequences for the actual spatial form of these places.

As has already been indicated in Chapter Three, the modernization process had a major impact on the socio-spatial organization of reproduction and of the reproductive

infrastructure, as well as on production and the productive infrastructure. The details of how this worked will be given in chapter six. The rest of this chapter will outline the process of deindustrialization in summary form for the three places studied. To use the contemporary jargon we are turning from the modern to the postmodern, from modernization to postmodernization.

#### Cleveland - Job reducing growth and job destroying decline.

Cleveland County is a product of local government reorganization in 1974 which brought together the industrial towns of Middlesbrough and Stockton (previously combined as Teesside County Borough), the industrial port of Hartlepool, and the Cleveland hinterland as Langbaourgh. Stockton and Hartlepool are old towns which grew massively in the industrial revolution, although West Hartlepool which was the larger of two separate authorities before 1974 was a Victorian new town and Billingham was the inter-war creation of ICI. Middlesbrough was the 'infant Hercules' of the nineteenth century, being a wholly new creation of industrialism. The 1974 reorganization reflected both the spatial congruence of the area through suburban development, and industrial integration particularly under the impact of the Seal Sands development.

In their study of the Wearside economy Stone et al. suggest that :

" ... three main processes have been involved in the loss of employment viz. intensification of production, rationalization and capacity reduction, and introduction of new technology. (For Wearside) The most important source of job losses has been rationalization." (1985 p xi)

All three processes have also been involved in Cleveland but there is a difference. Cleveland has seen a growth in productive capacity which has involved the introduction of larger scale production processes in chemicals and steel which require less labour. This means that new technology has been important as a source of job loss. However the impact is even more complicated. There are fewer jobs in chemicals and steel, and in steel there has also been a substantial change in the organization of employment with a far greater dependence on sub-contracting, so we must add casualization to Stone et al.'s sources of job loss. This is a function of the combination of new technology and market conditions. The actual impact of the wave of 'production construction' took the form of substantial job creation, drawing to a considerable extent on workers previously employed in marine manufacturing. The effect was to transform a previously 'settled' labour force which worked within its own labour market, into one which was connected to an international heavy plant construction labour market.

This was not an absolute transformation. North Eastern workers have always worked on heavy plant construction on an international basis but the proportionate importance of expat and

remote working was greatly increased. There was of course also very substantial job loss at the end of the production phase.

Developments since the mid 60s in Cleveland are described in Foord et al. (1986), Beynon et al. in Cooke (ed) 1989, and Hudson et al. in Harloe et al. (Eds) 1990. As Foord et al. put it :

"The last two decades have seen Teesside (not including Hartlepool in this study, but the argument holds - D.S. Byrne) transformed from an area with the greatest hopes for expansion through massive investment in a thriving and relatively modern industrial base, to one with the highest rate of unemployment (at County level) in Great Britain. ... Teesside has indeed undergone a radical transformation as the previous trend of economic development has been totally reversed." (1986 ps 2-3)

The modernization history of Cleveland began with the *Teesside Survey and Plan* of 1969, which followed on from both the Hailsham era and subsequent national and regional planning initiatives which began with George Brown's short-lived Department of Economic Affairs. At that stage it was envisaged that modernization would generate substantial population growth based on the provision of 120,000 new jobs by 1991 through general industrial growth and the reclamation of 2,000 acres of industrial land at Seal Sands. As usual there was a commitment to diversification of the industrial base. Table 5.4 shows the reality. Between 1971 and 1989 Cleveland lost 25,000 jobs.

TABLE 5.4 - CLEVELAND TIME / GENDER / SECTOR  
 (Thousands - percentages in brackets)

	1971	1981	1989
Male full-time industrial	112 (48)	78 (37)	61 (29)
Male full-time services	38 (17)	42 (18)	46 (22)
Male part-time total	4 (2)	5 (3)	7 (3)
Total Male employed	155 (66)	124 (59)	114 (55)
Female full-time industrial	19 (8)	13 (6)	11 (5)
Female part-time industrial	5 (2)	4 (2)	4 (2)
Female full-time services	34 (15)	34 (16)	35 (17)
Female part-time services	21 (9)	36 (17)	44 (21)
Total Female	78 (34)	87 (41)	93 (45)
Total Employed	234	211	207

TABLE 5.4 - CLEVELAND TIME / GENDER / SECTOR  
 (Thousands - percentages in brackets)

	1971	1981	1991
Male full-time industrial	112 (48)	78 (37)	66 (33)
Male full-time services	38 (17)	42 (18)	34 (17)
Male part-time total	4 (2)	5 (3)	7 (3)
Total Male employed	155 (66)	124 (59)	108 (53)
Female full-time industrial	19 (8)	13 (6)	11 (5)
Female part-time industrial	5 (2)	4 (2)	5 (2)
Female full-time services	34 (15)	34 (16)	32 (16)
Female part-time services	21 (9)	36 (17)	44 (22)
Total Female	78 (34)	87 (41)	94 (47)
Total Employed	234	211	202

Industrial employment (mining, public utilities, manufacturing and construction) halved with the loss of approx. 70,000 jobs. Male employment declined with the loss of more than 40,000 jobs. The growth area has been in part-time female service employment.

In this period, as previously, there was relatively little diversification in Cleveland. Industrial estates were considerably less important than in Tyne and Wear, although rather more important in Hartlepool than in the rest of the county.

It is worth reproducing the comments of the Cleveland County Council Research and Intelligence Unit on the way in which modernization itself contributed to this situation :

"Cleveland has a very productive, highly capital intensive, but narrow manufacturing base. There has been very little employment spin-off in consequence, apart from short-lived construction jobs. Most of the "downstream" industry and service employment is located elsewhere and Cleveland seems to be regarded by outsiders as being suitable primarily for capital intensive industry, which provides few jobs. The problems of Cleveland are not (original emphasis) those of the caricature of a depressed area with low productivity, lack of competitiveness, poor industrial relations and a record of low levels of industrial investment." (1985 quoted in Foord et al., 1986 p 8)

As *The Financial Times* put it in 1981 :

"Cleveland has become a model of the new industrial Britain and it still has unemployment problems as serious as anywhere in the country." (3/6/1981)

Cleveland's total unemployment tripled between 1972 and 1981, and although that figure had fallen back by 1989 the reduction was to a very considerable extent a production of redefinition and the numbers taken out of the count through participation in job creation schemes.

Hudson (1990) has commented of the experience of modernization that :

" ... it became clear that the intended policy effects (employment creation) were no longer being achieved although the unintended and unwanted ones (pollution, congestion etc.) continued." (p 65)

He goes on to observe that :

" ... although the hegemonic modernization project of the 1960s has been blown apart, there is no locally based replacement in prospect." (1990 ps 81-2)

This point is very important and will be a major focus for attention in the subsequent review of planning policy. Hudson, and the other commentators, stopped their review before the effects of the 'postmodernization' agenda could be clearly identified. That is the task of this thesis, but the point made in Chapter Two must be reiterated. Postmodernization is written on the parchment provided by modernization. Cleveland is probably the clearest example of that anywhere in the UK.

## Sunderland - industrial emaciation

The core of Sunderland is provided by the former County Borough of that name which was the largest shipbuilding town in the world. Whilst Monkwearmouth and Bishopwearmouth existed before the mid 18 century, Sunderland is largely a product of industrialization after that date, with its fastest period of growth being in the late nineteenth century. In 1974 Sunderland expanded to take in adjacent areas of County Durham which had previously been coalfield, but which were increasingly suburbanized. Washington, as a designated New Town of the 1960s, was a specific part of the Hailsham programme of modernization in such a former coalfield area.

In 1969 Brian Robson in his classic study of UK urban ecology wrote : "Sunderland is a town which is living on the dwindling fat of its Victorian Expansion." (p 75) Table 5.5 shows how slimming has turned into emaciation. Between 1971 and 1989 Sunderland lost more than half of all its industrial jobs. Female industrial employment was as affected as male. Large female employing branch plants in clothing and tele-communications closed without replacement, whilst the development of Nissan has provided some replacement male industrial employment. Overall employment declined by 15% with the only real growth area again being part-time female employment in services. Unemployment increased by approx. 2.5 times between 72 and 81 and was still double (with the usual caveats about changes in definition etc.) by 1989. Stone et al. stated that :

"All the underlying structural features which disadvantage the region's economy - over-representation of slow growing industries, lack of local control, limited R and D activity, poorly developed business services and a weaker small firms sector - apply to the Wearside economy. But this latter suffers from low incomes and an above average dependence on welfare benefits which adversely affect the demand for local services, overshadowing by the regional capital, and diminishing local advantages relative to the other parts of the region." (1985 ps 2-3)

This is an accurate description of a place which received particular modernizing attention in the post-Hailsham era. The main form of this was through the development of Washington New Town, both as a place to live, which function and its effects will be of considerable significance in subsequent discussion, and as a location for modernizing, diversifying production. Indeed the development of Washington, in contrast to the de-development of central Sunderland, is a very good illustration of the new spatial ecology of production after Fothergill et al., as discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis.

TABLE 5.5 - SUNDERLAND TIME / GENDER / SECTOR

(Thousands - percentages in brackets)

	1971	1981	1989
Male full-time industrial	48 (44)	31 (31)	23 (25)
Male full-time services	18 (16)	20 (20)	20 (22)
Male part-time total	2 (2)	2 (2)	3 (3)
Total Male employed	67 (61)	53 (53)	46 (50)
Female full-time industrial	11 (10)	6 (6)	7 (7)
Female part-time industrial	2 (2)	2 (2)	2 (2)
Female full-time services	17 (16)	20 (20)	17 (19)
Female part-time services	12 (11)	19 (19)	21 (22)
Total Female	43 (39)	47 (47)	46 (50)
Total Employed	110	100	92

TABLE 5.5 - SUNDERLAND TIME / GENDER / SECTOR

(Thousands - percentages in brackets)

	1971	1981	1991
Male full-time	48	31	27
industrial	(44)	(31)	(28)
Male full-time	18	20	17
services	(16)	(20)	(18)
Male part-time total	2	2	3
	(2)	(2)	(3)
Total Male employed	67	53	47
	(61)	(53)	(50)
Female full-time	11	6	8
industrial	(10)	(6)	(8)
Female part-time	2	2	1
industrial	(2)	(2)	(1)
Female full-time	17	20	18
services	(16)	(20)	(19)
Female part-time	12	19	21
services	(11)	(19)	(22)
Total Female	43	47	47
	(39)	(47)	(50)
Total Employed	110	100	95

Stone et al. devote considerable attention to the differences between Washington and the two other zones into which they divide the Wearside Travel to Work Area, which differs from Sunderland as we are dealing with it in including some adjacent areas of Gateshead and County Durham. I have followed their division in Table 5.6 but included only Employment Offices which are located within Sunderland MBC. From Table 5.6 we can see the very large decline in overall employment in central Sunderland between 71 and 89, the smaller but real decline in Houghton, and the increase in Washington. This increase is a consequence of growth in manufacturing employment with the development of Nissan, of out of town shopping services, and of the location of the head office of Child Benefits for the UK

Sunderland's productive economy (which I will take here to include nationally orientated services like head office of Child Benefit) has changed dramatically over the period. Not only has there been a large decline in traditional industries (marine manufacturing, general engineering, glass manufacture, and coal mining) but many 50s, 60s and 70s branch plants have reduced labour requirements or have closed completely. Washington was originally an area of pit villages separate from Sunderland, South Tyneside and Gateshead. It has now become a zone of suburban housing with a mixture of services and industrial production. In Houghton the main change has been the closure of all pits, with some development of small manufacturing. Central Sunderland has simply suffered massive job loss, including retail job loss in response to out of town competition from Washington and Gateshead.

Table 5.6 - Zones in Sunderland 1971-1981

	Employment Structure					
	71		81		91	
	FT	PT	FT	PT	FT	PT
Washington						
Males	7041	84	8565	267	9046	491
Females	2423	791	5536	2817	5320	4288
Total	10329		17185		19154	
Houghton						
Males	9203	282	8310	260	4273	307
Females	2781	1691	2291	3013	2639	1841
Total	13957		12874		9063	
Sunderland						
Males	49212	1307	34302	1541	29667	1948
Females	23355	11445	17910	16816	15926	15865
Total	85319		69939		63612	

It is clear that the modernization strategy has held ground in Washington but only in consequence of truly enormous subsidies to Nissan (see Garrahan 1986, Stewart ed 1990). However taking Sunderland as a whole the assertion by researchers from Newcastle University's Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies that it represents a disaster area in the British space economy, seems wholly accurate (quoted in Stone et al. 1986 p 4).

## South Tyneside - the coalhole of the British Nation

The above description can be completed in terms which are not suitable for an academic thesis. South Tyneside is the smallest metropolitan district in Tyne and Wear and in England. It forms a discrete 1981 Journey to Work area. The District was created in 1974 by the amalgamation of the former county borough of South Shields with the municipal borough of Jarrow, Hebburn Urban District and Boldon Rural District. It comprises the port, shipbuilding-repairing and mining town of South Shields, the shipbuilding and engineering mid Tyne area and the suburban plus mining area of Cleadon and the Boldons. The industrial base of South Tyneside very closely resembles that of Sunderland with the exception that the merchant navy was rather more important and ship building, as opposed to repair, was slightly less important.

Table 5.7 shows the changes in the time-gender-sector composition of the South Tyneside workforce between 1971 and 1989. Industrial employment has more than halved with the loss of more than 20,000 jobs and, as with Sunderland, female industrial employment has been hit as hard as male industrial employment. The components of this change are major job losses in shipbuilding (which has gone) and ship-repair, (although South Tyneside has a good deal of offshore work), heavy engineering (particularly the run down of the massive Reyrolles plant of NEI, now a subsidiary of Rolls Royce),

TABLE 5.7 - SOUTH TYNESIDE TIME / GENDER / SECTOR

(Thousands - percentages in brackets)

	1971	1981	1989
Male full-time	27	19	11
industrial	(46)	(38)	(27)
Male full-time	10	9	8
services	(17)	(18)	(19)
Male part-time total	1	1	1
	(2)	(3)	(3)
Total Male employed	39	29	21
	(65)	(59)	(50)
Female full-time	6	3	3
industrial	(11)	(7)	(7)
Female part-time	1	1	1
industrial	(2)	(1)	(1)
Female full-time	8	7	7
services	(13)	(14)	(16)
Female part-time	6	9	10
services	(11)	(19)	(25)
Total Female	21	20	21
	(36)	(41)	(50)
Total Employed	60	50	41

TABLE 5.7 - SOUTH TYNESIDE TIME / GENDER / SECTOR  
(Thousands - percentages in brackets)

	1971	1981	1991
Male full-time industrial	27 (46)	19 (38)	12 (29)
Male full-time services	10 (17)	9 (18)	7 (17)
Male part-time total	1 (2)	1 (3)	1 (2)
Total Male employed	39 (65)	29 (59)	21 (50)
Female full-time industrial	6 (11)	3 (7)	3 (7)
Female part-time industrial	1 (2)	1 (1)	1 (2)
Female full-time services	8 (13)	7 (14)	7 (17)
Female part-time services	6 (11)	9 (19)	11 (26)
Total Female	21 (36)	20 (41)	21 (50)
Total Employed	60	50	41

mining and clothing. Unusually South Tyneside has seen no real growth in service employment. Decline in full time male and female service employment has offset the growth in part time female service employment. Overall the district has lost one third of its 1971 jobs and this has been associated with a major fall in population. South Tyneside is Sunderland without Washington, and indeed a good proportion of Washington's population originate in South Tyneside.

Given that Washington was the major modernizing element of the Hailsham era for the whole of the South Tyne and Wearside area, there was little direct development in South Tyneside itself, other than a much improved road network. However the district does include substantial trading estate areas dating originally from the 1930s. Jobs lost in this modernizing and diversifying sector include clothing as cited above and the consequences of the closure of the very large Plessey plant which opened in the early 60s and closed some twenty years later.

The only real remaining industrial employment is in Reyrolles (down from more than 12,000 to about 1,000 at most), in off-shore which has very variable labour requirements, and in the large modern Westoe colliery (now under threat of closure). South Tyneside is the most extreme example of urban deindustrialization in England. It does not have a modern zone, like Washington, but as with Sunderland there has been a tendency for new industrial employment, such as it is, to relocate away from the river banks. However, given the relatively small size of the settlements, this

has not produced the kind of radical rezoning which characterizes Sunderland. Neither has South Tyneside seen large scale service development. There is a super-store at Boldon, but otherwise the previously low level of service employment has remained, under the impact of competition from adjacent areas including Washington and Gateshead Metro-Centre. Apart from some overspill head office DSS employment in what was formerly Reyrolle's office block, the district has no national service employment.

'Northern Ireland now resembles a vast workhouse in which most of the inmates are engaged in servicing or controlling each other. Like the typical workhouse it imports a great deal from the outside world whilst providing few exports in return, moreover, as in the case of a workhouse or prison, the gap between imports and exports is financed out of taxes levied on the external population.' (Rowthorn, 1987 p118)

Just substitute South Tyneside for Northern Ireland, and large for vast.

## Conclusion

Cleveland, Sunderland and South Tyneside are not just industrial areas which have undergone recent massive deindustrialization. They are rather the product of the way in which that deindustrialization has interacted with the nature of the places, and in particular with the effects of an explicit

regional and local commitment to modernization which dates back to the 1930s. The very fragility of their industrial structure is in large part a product of previous commitment to diversification of industrial base. It is worth reflecting on this before proceeding to a detailed examination of the socio-spatial form of the three places. It might be argued that without the diversification policies these places would have deindustrialized earlier and with equally disastrous effects.

However, the alternative policy options were not just those of laissez-faire, and diversification through indicative stimuli. What is very evident about regional policy is that it had no real directive or coordinating objective. There has never, since the second world war, been a developed meso-economic strategy for industrial growth, of the kind which has been central to the economic success of strong social market economies like the Federal Republic of Germany, or the state capitalist economies of the Pacific rim. The period since 1971 has been one which has demonstrated the sustained failure of inadequate regional planning. National government's alternative has been through the bizarre 'post-modern' efforts of the Urban Development Corporations which will be described in chapter eight. First we need to look at social consequences as expressed in the developing socio-spatial polarization of the three places.

The relationship between this chapter and the three which follows it should be explained at this point. So far we have seen the relative location of the three places studied within the

socio-spatial system constituted by England excluding Greater London, and have related that place to regional and place specific developments at the level of restructuring as expressed through deindustrialization. In Chapter six we will go on to examine in detail the socio-spatial residential systems which now exist in the three places. The apparent logic is one of global economic changes determining local socio-spatial differentiation.

In the first part of the thesis the idea that the relationship between places and the world capitalist system was so simply structurally determined, in a non-recursive fashion, was explicitly rejected. Instead it was argued that local developments, and in particular the impact of planning policies in the most general sense, played a crucial role in making it possible for certain kinds of development to be imposed on particular places, and hence for certain kinds of social and spatial structures to be created. Social action as expressed through the formation and implementation of policies, and in particular planning policies, was recognized as crucial. This theme has been maintained in this chapter in terms of the discussion of modernization and its concomitants.

Here the account has been at a general regional level. In Chapter seven the theme will be taken up for each of the three places in specific terms. In other words Chapter seven will show how modernizing developments in each place, and in particular the impact of spatial policies of urban re-development, made possible, indeed invited, subsequent restructuring. Thus, to employ an

analogy derived from Hammer Horror, this chapter has dealt with the vampire's embrace, but also with the general invitation the vampire received. Chapter six will describe the bites in three places. Chapter seven will deal with the specific invitations offered to the vampire in the past, through planning procedures organized around modernizing principles.

Chapter eight will (to continue with this increasingly strained analogy) describe the new invitation which is being extended to a different vampire. At least the vampire invited by modernization was industrial capital. The vampire invited by the planning policies of post-modernization is land development capital - an even nastier creature. That chapter will look at the nature of the new invitation and the the form, and effects, of the new bites in the three places . The conclusion will, in part, be about getting the garlic into play.

The emphasis on the active effects of policy is very deliberate, because if policy set things up to happen in the past, different policies might have different consequences in the future. The range and scope of different ways of doing things will have to be thought about carefully. In particular a realist perspective suggests, even if only metaphorically, that there may be periods of transition when actions make a difference, but that these are followed by periods of relatively (but not absolutely) enduring structural relations when the capacity for planned change is much less. We may well be at such a crux point now. This idea

is crucial to the whole logic of this thesis and it is important to set the arrangement of empirical material in relation to it.

Before proceeding to examinations of the detailed internal structure of the three study areas, it is worth looking at the indications given by the 1991 Census results about changes in these locales. This is done in Table 5.8 which looks at the economic activity, or inactivity, of the adult population, and Table 5.9 which examines changes in housing tenure and related factors.

Table 5.8 - Status Adult population 71-91 (percentages)

	Cleveland			S.Tyneside			Sunderland		
	71	81	91	71	81	91	71	81	91
Total (Thous)	408	426	427	133	126	123	216	224	226
Males	48	48	48	47	48	47	48	46	47
Econ Act M	41	38	34	38	37	31	39	39	33
Full Tm M	<i>37</i>	30	23	<i>35</i>	29	22	<i>36</i>	29	22
Self Emp M		2	3		2	2		2	1
Unemp M	3	8	7	4	7	7	3	7	8
Non Ret Econ Inact. M	3	4	7	4	3	7	4	3	7
Retired M	5	6	8	6	7	9	6	6	8
Females	52	51	52	53	52	53	52	54	53
Econ Act F	22	23	24	21	22	24	21	23	24
Full Tm F		11	11		12	11		12	12
Self Emp F	<i>21</i>	1		<i>20</i>	1		<i>20</i>		
Part Tm F		9	10		8	8		8	9
Unemp F	1	2	2	1	2	3		3	3
Non Ret Econ. Inact. F		3	5		2	4		2	4
Housewives F	<i>31</i>	23	14	<i>24</i>	24	14	<i>31</i>	23	14
Ret. F		3	10		3	12		4	10

Note 1 - Figures in italics for 1971 are for full time and self-employed economically active males ; full time, part time and self-employed females ; and retired, housewife and other economically inactive females.

Note 2 - Adults are all persons aged 15 or more in 1971 and 16 or more in 1981 and 1991

Table 5.9 - Tenure, Amenity and Car Ownership 1971-91  
(percentages)

	Cleveland			S.Tyneside			Sunderland		
	71	81	91	71	81	91	71	81	91
Total (Thous)	180	196	212	60	60	64	97	105	113
Own.Occ	50	56	67	25	32	50	33	38	53
O.Occ 3 Amenities	84	97	100	93	95	100	91	98	100
O.Occ No Car	na	26	23	na	32	25	na	32	28
O.Occ 5+ rooms	46	57	65	40	42	43	35	38	38
Pub. Tens	37	39	29	52	58	45	53	57	42
Pub Tens 3 Amenities	91	96	100	100	96	100	98	95	100
Pub Tens No Car	na	70	80	na	67	80	na	67	77
Pub Tens 5+ rooms	22	55	52	17	14	17	12	13	17
Priv Tens	13	6	5	22	8	5	14	6	4
Priv Tens 3 Amenities	42	73	91	39	80	100	43	85	75
Priv Tens No Car	na	55	55	na	60	67	na	73	75
Priv Tens 5+ rooms	17	45	45	7	17	25	7	17	23

The most interesting thing about the economic status of adults in the three locales is the large decline in the economic activity in general over the twenty year period, and in particular of economic activity taking the form of full time work by men. This decline began between 1971 and 1981 but has continued since

that date and is evident in all three areas. The only categories of the economically active which have increased over the period are the unemployed (including in 1991 those on government schemes) and part-time female workers. It should be noted that these increases are in percentage terms, which means that in South Tyneside where the number of adults fell substantially there was an absolute decline in every economically active category. By 1991 just over half of all adults in all three study areas were economically active compared with roughly 70% in 1971. The decline cannot be simply assigned to an increase in the retired proportions, especially among men. Indeed much of the increase in 'retired' in these areas seems to be due to women defining themselves as housewives rather than retired.

Table 5.9 is an interesting pointer towards the next chapter. It shows the dramatic effect on tenure of the Thatcher governments' policies on housing, particularly in South Tyneside and Sunderland where previous absolute majorities of public tenants have been converted into absolute majorities of owner-occupiers through the combination of right to buy legislation and the virtual cessation of council house building. The social effects are nicely illustrated by car ownership figures. In all study areas this has increased for owner occupiers between 1981 and 1991 and has declined for public tenants. This is an interesting pointer to the residualization of the public sector.

## Chapter Six

### The internal structure of three industrial towns

#### Introduction

This chapter takes up the process of classification which was used to generate a national typology of LEAs in Chapter 5. It is based on classifications for the three study areas of the 1971-81 Change Data sets, and on some elaboration of the 1981 situation using 1981 Enumeration District (ED) level 100% and 10% data, and of the 1991 position using 100% ED data. The patterns of inequality which deindustrialization has produced will then be investigated at the level of the household using material derived from the Cleveland Social Survey.

#### Becoming more unequal - the internal structure of the three industrial LEAs

The format of this section will be as follows. The socio-spatial classifications of census tracts for Cleveland, Sunderland, and South Tyneside will be described in turn for the 1971, 1981 and 1991 censuses. The comparisons between the structures at these dates are very important. In 1971 the industrial structures of these industrial towns was largely intact

(see Chapter 5) but by 1981 all had already experienced a very considerable degree of deindustrialization and this continued to 1991. Thus the contrast is between the character of socio-spatial inequalities under industrialism and after de-industrialization. This contrast provides crucial evidence for the debate about the causes of the development of a dispossessed class fragment. If inequalities increase in magnitude in association with de-industrialization then there is a good associative reason for saying that de-industrialization has something to do with the creation of those inequalities. The actual direction of the causal relationship cannot be established by such associative relationships, but it is perfectly appropriate, within anything but a strict and very much outmoded positivist framework, to seek to establish the causal direction by reference to qualitative, and in particular historical, evidence. That account will be given in subsequent chapters. Here the nature of the changes will be documented.

#### **Cleveland - a city-region in change**

In 1971 Cleveland was the great hope for the future of the Northern Region. It was almost totally unaffected by the decline in coalmining (there are no pits in the county but Hartlepool did have a traditional coal traffic), shipbuilding and steel were at worst in slow decline, and the chemical/North Sea offshore sector was seen as the basis of high technology based industrial growth.

Table 6.1 shows the character of the socio-spatial structure of the county (which was of course only created in 1974) in 1971. There were essentially four sorts of area and pen-pictures will be given of each.

First there was a cluster (Cleveland 3/4/71 - the third cluster of the four cluster level for the 1971 classification of Cleveland. This notation will be standard in this chapter), which was basically prosperous and suburban. It had low unemployment rates, high levels of car ownership and large dwellings, and a virtual complete presence of basic household amenities. Dwellings were predominantly owner occupied. This cluster contained 28% of Cleveland's population and households.

The cluster with the highest level of unemployment was 1/4/71. Here car ownership levels were low, there were more small dwellings and 40% of dwellings lacked one or more basic amenity. This cluster had a mixed tenure pattern and included much of the 'inner areas' of the Cleveland districts. It contained 20% of Cleveland's population and 22% of Cleveland's households. Cluster 4/4/71 was similar to 1/4/71 in terms of unemployment and car ownership levels, but had much better housing conditions with vitrtually total possession of basic amenities and a much higher proportion of larger dwellings. This tracts in this cluster were essentially areas of council housing. This cluster contained 23% of Cleveland's population and 20% of households.

Cluster 2/4/71 consisted largely of the areas of cheaper owner-occupied housing, much of which was 'inner-city' terraced housing transferred from private renting to owner-occupation. Unemployment was low but car ownership levels were not high. Dwelling sizes were good but approximately 25% lacked one or more basic amenity. This cluster contained 28% of Cleveland's population and households.

Here the similarities among the clusters are as interesting as the differences. Unemployment levels did vary with the owner-occupied clusters (2/4/71 and 3/4/71) having rates significantly below the other two clusters. However the highest rate was 15% so most households contained employed men. Economic activity rates for men were relatively even (in the range 70-80%). For women the range was greater (60-75%) but the contrast was between the inner areas at around 60% and the more suburban areas at 75% and was not tenure related. Economic activity rates for married women were again in a 10% range between 30 and 40%. The pattern of car ownership is interesting. Only in Cluster 3/4/71 did the majority of households own a car. Indeed the significant difference scanning this table seems to be between the prosperous middle class tracts in 3/4/71 and the other three clusters which seem to have been predominantly working class. Social class data cannot be extracted from the change

Table 6.1 - Cleveland 1971 4 Clusters

	C11	C12	C13	C14
% Pop 0-15	30	25	29	35
% Pop 16-24	14	13	12	15
% Pop Pens.	18	18	10	8
Male UE	15	6	3	12
Female UE	10	6	4	8
% Male EA	80	80	86	87
% Fem. EA	59	62	75	75
% MFem. EA	30	33	39	39
% UK born	96	87	97	98
% Hhds no car	79	61	27	71
% Hhds 1 car	20	35	59	27
% Hhds 2 / 2+ cars	2	4	14	2
% Hhds 3 or less rms	20	7	5	11
% Hhds 5 or more rms	49	73	78	68
% Hhds 1 pers	24	18	10	11
% Hhds 5+ p	9	6	5	16
% Hhds Own Occ	29	58	82	11
% Hhds Pub Tens	50	24	9	87
% Hhds Oth Tens	21	18	8	2
% Hhds all amens	6	74	95	97
% Hhds > 1 ppr	11	5	3	15
% Hhds no child	64	65	53	48
% Pens Hhds	24	22	11	11

data sets so this is a speculation based on asset ownership rather than a firm statement based on occupation. Indeed, we have to be very careful about using the term 'middle class' in relation to the description of this sort of area. It has value in a 'lifestyle' consumption/reproduction sense but it does not in any simple way correspond to a manual/non-manual distinction. Evidence from elsewhere (Byrne 1989,1990) shows that the commonest male occupational category in areas like those in this cluster is social class three manual. We need to consider the character of 'total household' labour market relations (Pahl's 1985 point about work-poor and work-rich households). This will be explored further using 1981 ED level data which allows for an investigation of socio-economic indices, and in particular the rates of full-time and part-time employment for married women.

This pattern of split is in fact largely what was reproduced at the two cluster level (see Table 6.2), although the three cluster level (Table 6.3) shows that there was also a tripartite division of some significance. What is interesting about the three cluster level is the relationship with tenure. In 1971 the middle cluster, containing 43% of Cleveland's population and 42% of households, was simply somewhat better off than the poorest cluster, containing 26% of the population and 27% of households. Both clusters had mixed tenure profiles, a majority of households without cars, a significant proportion of dwellings lacking amenities, and above

Table 6.2 - Cleveland 1971 Change Clusters 3

	C11	C12	C13
% Pop 0-15	29	29	29
% Pop 16-24	14	14	12
% Pop Pens.	17	13	11
Male UE	14	8	3
Female UE	10	7	4
% Male EA	81	83	85
% Fem. EA	60	69	67
% MFem. EA	31	37	38
% UK born	96	97	97
% Hhds no car	78	66	28
% Hhds 1 car	21	31	59
% Hhds 2 / 2+ cars	2	3	14
% Hhds 3 or less rms	19	8	5
% Hhds 5 or more rms	50	74	78
% Hhds 1 p	23	15	10
% Hhds 5+ p	10	10	5
% Hhds Own Occ	28	38	82
% Hhds Pub Tens	53	50	9
% Hhds Oth Tens	19	11	9
% Hhds all amens	66	83	95
% Hhds > 1 ppr	11	9	3
% Hhds no child	62	58	54
% Pens Hhds	23	17	12

Table 6.3 - Cleveland 71 Change Clusters 2

	C11	C12
% Pop 0-15	29	29
% Pop 16-24	14	12
% Pop Pens.	15	12
Male UE	11	4
Female UE	8	4
% Male EA	82	85
% Fem. EA	65	72
% MFem. EA	34	38
% UK born	97	97
% Hhds no car	73	34
% Hhds 1 car	25	54
% Hhds 2 / 2+ cars	2	11
% Hhds 3 or less rms	13	5
% Hhds 5 or more rms	63	78
% Hhds 1 pers	19	11
% Hhds 5+ pers	11	6
% Hhds Own Occ	31	75
% Hhds Pub Tens	54	15
% Hhds Oth Tens	15	9
% Hhds all amens	74	94
% Hhds > 1 ppr	11	4
% Hhds no child	59	55
% Pens Hhds	20	14

national average unemployment rates. In contrast the 'affluent cluster' contained households which were overwhelmingly owner-occupied, car owning and living in dwellings with all three basic amenities. Only for dwelling size did the middle cluster achieve 'top' cluster levels.

The two cluster level was created by the transfer of three quarters of this middle to the bottom cluster. The new lower cluster contained 59% of Cleveland's population and households. It was mixed tenure, with about half of households council tenants. Unemployment rates were double national average, less than 30% of households were car owners and 25% lacked one or more amenity. The more affluent cluster was a repeat of 3/3/71. Thus in 1971 Cleveland's residential socio-spatial structure seemed to be differentiated between the areas which were predominantly occupied by ordinary workers' households and those occupied by a more affluent group, many of whom were likely to be highly paid skilled workers. This was characteristic of industrial towns as they had developed since 1914 with the growth of peripheral suburban development of both owner occupied and council housing areas. The data, does not give occupations, but the distinction between areas which in consumption/reproduction terms consisted of households enjoying a 'middle-class' lifestyle and those which were 'working -class' (in the everyday status useage of those expressions) was apparent. However both sorts of area were characterized by employment.

It was at the four cluster level that a significant typology first emerged in the 1981 Cleveland classification (see Table 6.4). By now things had changed dramatically for Cleveland. Shipbuilding was about to disappear and there had been major job losses in steel and chemicals. This is illustrated by unemployment levels. The male rate for the most prosperous cluster (2/4/81) at 10% was not much less than the rate for the highest four level cluster in 1971. In other respects this cluster resembled 3/4/71. Dwellings were almost all owner occupied and large, and car ownership was high. This cluster contained 40% of Cleveland's population and households.

Cluster 1/4/81 had a 23% male unemployment rate. The tenure was an even mix of owner occupation and council housing with high amenity levels and most dwellings having more than five rooms plus all basic amenities. Cluster 4/4/81 could be distinguished from 1/4/81 largely in terms of dwelling size and amenities. 70% of dwellings had five or more rooms and only 5% lacked one or more basic amenities. Just over half of all households had no car. This cluster contained 35% of Cleveland's population and households.

The new 'sort' of cluster was 3/4/81 where male unemployment levels were over 40%. These tracts were Cleveland's 'outer estates'

Table 6.4 - Cleveland 81 Change Clusters 4

	C11	C12	C13	C14
% Pop 0-15	23	24	30	19
% Pop 16-24	16	14	19	15
% Pop Pens.	16	12	11	25
Male UE	23	10	41	27
Female UE	11	7	23	14
Male EA	78	81	81	70
% Fem. EA	67	74	62	53
% MFem. EA	41	47	31	34
% UK born	98	98	97	95
% Hhds no car	56	22	73	67
% Hhds 1 car	37	56	23	29
% Hhds 2 / 2+ cars	7	22	3	5
% Hhds 3 or less rms	10	5	15	27
% Hhds 5 or more rms	71	79	59	43
% Hhds 1 pers	20	14	19	33
% Hhds 5+ pers	5	3	10	4
% Hhds Own Occ	49	85	16	35
% Hhds Pub Tens	42	6	78	50
% Hhds Oth Tens	9	8	6	14
% Hhds all amens	95	98	95	89
% Hhds > 1 ppr	4	2	11	4
% Hhds no child	64	58	54	73
% Pens Hhds	22	16	15	16

(see CES 1984) of peripheral council housing. There were more small dwellings than in 1 and 3/4/81 but fewer than in 4/4/81. Car ownership was the lowest of any cluster. Amenity levels were 95%. This cluster had a distinctive level of large households (6 or more people) but even here the proportion was only 10%. This cluster contained 14% of Cleveland's population and 12% of households. Cluster 4/4/81 was distinguished by being the only cluster to contain a significant proportion of households without one or more basic amenities (11%). Otherwise it was a mixed tenure cluster that was generally slightly worse on social deprivation indices than 1/4/81. It consisted largely of 'inner areas' and contained 11% of Cleveland's population and 13% of households. It had the highest proportion of small dwellings and single person households.

The 81 three cluster level (see Table 6.5) was achieved by a fusion of 3/4/81 and 4/4/81 with a good deal of relocation. What emerged is a classic tripartite system. Here the poorest cluster 3/3/81 had a male unemployment rate of over a third, low levels of car ownership and less than half of dwellings having five or more rooms. It was a combination of outer estates and inner areas and contained 18% of Cleveland's population and 19% of dwellings.

The middle cluster 1/3/81 had an unemployment rate of over 25% and nearly 60% of households without a car. The tenure pattern was

Table 6.5 - Cleveland 81 Change Clusters 3

	C11	C12	C13
% Pop 0-15	23	24	24
% Pop 16-24	17	14	17
% Pop Pens.	16	13	19
Male UE	25	11	35
Female UE	13	7	19
% Male EA	78	81	74
% Fem. EA	66	74	55
% MFem. EA	40	43	31
% UK born	93	98	95
% Hhds no car	59	24	72
% Hhds 1 car	35	55	25
% Hhds 2 / 2+ cars	6	21	4
% Hhds 3 or less rms	10	5	25
% Hhds 5 or more rms	69	79	45
% Hhds 1 pers	20	14	29
% Hhds 5+ pers	6	3	6
% Hhds Own Occ	43	83	25
% Hhds Pub Tens	48	8	64
% Hhds Oth Tens	8	8	11
% Hhds all amens	95	98	90
% Hhds > 1 ppr	5	2	8
% Hhds no child	63	59	65
% Pens Hhds	2	16	25

mixed and most dwellings had five or more rooms with nearly all having the three basic amenities. This cluster contained 38% of Cleveland's population and households.

The prosperous cluster was 2/3/81 with a male unemployment rate of 11%, over 80% owner-occupation, over 75% car-ownership, large dwellings and almost universal amenity. This cluster contained 43% of Cleveland's population and households.

The two cluster level was achieved by a fusion of 3/3/81 and 1/3/81 with some relocation (see Table 6.6). The prosperous cluster 2/2/81 contained households that were predominantly owner-occupiers (80%), car owners (70%), had five or more rooms (80%), and had a low (for 1981) male unemployment rate of 13%. Cluster 1/2/81 was mixed tenure (34% owner-occupied which is important in relation to the debates about the significance of that tenure - see Saunders 1990, Forrest et al 1990). It had a 30% male unemployment rate and nearly two thirds of households had no car. 2/2/81 contained 49% of Cleveland's population and households so the 1981 split at this level was very nearly half and half.

This is an important contrast between the situation in 1971 and 1981. If we look at the 1981 analyses we find a relatively stable affluent cluster emerging at the four cluster analysis level with 40% of Cleveland's population, persisting at the three cluster

Table 6.6 - Cleveland Change Clusters 81 2

	C11	C12
% Pop 0-15	24	24
% Pop 16-24	17	14
% Pop Pens.	17	13
Male UE	30	13
Female UE	16	7
% Male EA	77	80
% Fem. EA	61	73
% MFem. EA	36	46
% UK born	97	98
% Hhds no car	65	29
% Hhds 1 car	30	53
% Hhds 2 / 2+ cars	5	18
% Hhds 3 or less rms	16	5
% Hhds 5 or more rms	59	79
% Hhds 1 pers	24	15
% Hhds 5+ pers	6	4
% Hhds Own Occ	34	78
% Hhds Pub Tens	56	14
% Hhds Oth Tens	9	7
% Hhds all amens	93	98
% Hhds > 1 ppr	7	2
% Hhds no child	64	60
% Pens Hhds	23	17

level, and expanding to approximately half of total population at the two cluster level. In 1971 the most prosperous cluster at the four cluster level contained 28% of population, stayed very nearly stable at the three cluster level and expanded to 40% of population at the two cluster level. What does this mean in terms of social polarization ?

In essence what happened in Cleveland over the ten years 1971 to 1981 was that quite a lot of households joined the 'middle class' as it could be defined in consumption/reproduction terms in 1971. However the rest were left behind under conditions of life which showed little improvement, apart from the massive reduction in absence of basic amenities, from ten years earlier. Indeed in unemployment terms things deteriorated dramatically. To sum up, a lot of households moved over the divide, but the two groups moved further apart.

If we look at Therborn's (1985) account of the 'Brazilianization' of class structure in advanced industrial capitalist societies, what we see in Cleveland in 1981 is that about half of all households lived in areas occupied by 'ordinary people', that is in the tracts forming the affluent cluster at the two cluster level, and about half were the poor. Of course the affluent cluster would contain representatives of the bourgeoisie and of those senior service class members who are very close to them, but the numbers would not be large enough to be separately

identifiable in a census tract level analysis. There is clearly a specially very deprived group in the areas which look like 'difficult to let' (DOE 1982) council housing and which are outer estates. These are sumps and will also be considered in more detail in the enumeration district based analyses.

It is worth pausing to consider similarities as well as differences. What is important here is the shift in levels of unemployment, which reflect a shift from a situation of something close to full employment (and certainly within the level Beveridge identified as representing full employment for him in 1942) in 1971, to mass unemployment in 1981. Even in the most prosperous cluster, 10% of males were unemployed in 1981. Unemployment was a real and present threat to most people in Cleveland by that time. Living conditions might be very different, but the relationship with the organization of the productive system was coloured, albeit differentially, by that fact.

#### **Sunderland - The first declining coalfield/port/shipbuilding town**

In 1971 Sunderland was probably as prosperous as it had been (in relative terms, its absolute prosperity was far greater) since its late Victorian heyday. The basic industries of shipbuilding and coalmining were relatively healthy and regional policies operating since the 1930s had achieved a significant diversification of industrial base. Of particular importance was

the development of a significant female employing manufacturing sector in clothing and light engineering.

In the 1971 Sunderland analyses the first significant clustering emerged at the five cluster level (see Table 6.7). Cluster 2/5/71 was Sunderland's 1971 prosperous cluster. 80% of households were owner-occupiers, 70% had a car, almost all dwellings had the three basic amenities, 75% contained five or more rooms, and male unemployment was less than 3%. This cluster contained 12% of Sunderland's population and 11% of its households.

In very sharp contrast was cluster 4/5/71 where male unemployment was 24%, car ownership was less than 20% and less than 7% of households were owner-occupiers. This cluster was primarily composed of council housing areas but also included the worse parts of the pre 1914 inner area. 20% of dwellings lacked one or more of the three basic amenities and 60% had less than five rooms. The cluster contained 10% of Sunderland's population and 8% of its households. Most of the inner area pre 1914 was in cluster 1/5/71. Here 40% of dwellings lacked one or more of the basic amenities and 75% had less than five rooms. However male unemployment was much lower than for cluster 4/5/71 at 10%, although 75% of households had no car. Here there was a mixed tenure pattern. The non-council housing areas

Table 6.7 - Sunderland 71 Change Clusters 5

	C11	C12	C13	C14	C15
% Pop 0-15	21	30	31	33	23
% Pop 16-24	14	11	14	14	13
% Pop Pens.	21	9	10	15	18
Male UE	10	3	12	23	7
Female UE	7	4	7	13	5
% Male EA	76	86	85	79	78
% Fem. EA	60	76	74	63	64
% MFem. EA	35	41	38	29	36
% UK born	98	97	99	99	98
% Hhds no car	76	28	74	84	59
% Hhds 1 car	22	62	25	16	36
% Hhds 2 / 2+ cars	2	10	2	1	5
% Hhds 3 or less rms	46	5	30	32	15
% Hhds 5 or more rms	24	74	43	39	53
% Hhds 1 pers	26	8	14	18	19
% Hhds 5+ pers	4	4	10	15	5
% Hhds Own Occ	30	80	2	7	52
% Hhds Pub Tens	43	12	93	72	34
% Hhds Oth Tens	27	8	5	22	14
% Hhds all amens	59	96	96	77	88
% Hhds > 1 ppr	9	4	14	21	6
% Hhds no child	72	49	54	55	66
% Pens Hhds	28	9	14	18	22

in this cluster have formed the basis of Sunderland's subsequent improvement as opposed to demolition programme (see Chapter Seven). This cluster contained 18% of Sunderland's 1971 population and 21% of its households, which reflects the high proportion of single person households.

Two large clusters, 3/5/71 and 5/5/71 were rather similar but differed in one important respect. 5/5/71 was a mixed tenure cluster but households were predominantly owner-occupiers (just over half). Over 90% of households in 3/5/71 were council tenants. Amenity levels were high in 3/5/71 although nearly 20% of households in 5/5/71 lacked one or more basic amenity. However for all other deprivation indices 5/5/71 showed less deprivation than 3/5/71. 3/5/71 contained 31% of Sunderland's population and 28% of households. 5/5/71 also contained 31% of Sunderland's population but had 32% of households.

The next significant fustion for Sunderland was at the three cluster level (see Table 6.8). Here the prosperous cluster was 2/3/71 where male unemployment was 3%, 80% of households were owner-occupiers and 70% had a car, and nearly 75% had five or more rooms. Almost all had the three basic amenities. This cluster contained 14% of Sunderland's population and households.

Table 6.8 - Sunderland 71 Change Clusters 3

	C11	C12	C13
% Pop 0-15	26	28	26
% Pop 16-24	14	11	14
% Pop Pens.	17	12	14
Male UE	14	3	8
Female UE	9	3	5
% Male EA	79	83	81
% Fem. EA	64	71	69
% MFem. EA	34	40	38
% UK born	98	97	98
% Hhds no car	79	31	65
% Hhds 1 car	20	60	31
% Hhds 2 / 2+ cars	1	10	3
% Hhds 3 or less rms	42	6	18
% Hhds 5 or more rms	30	74	49
% Hhds 1 pers	21	11	16
% Hhds 5+ pers	8	4	7
% Hhds Own Occ	14	82	32
% Hhds Pub Tens	76	9	54
% Hhds Oth Tens	19	9	13
% Hhds all amens	76	96	83
% Hhds > 1 ppr	14	3	9
% Hhds no child	63	54	61
% Pens Hhds	22	14	18

The poorest cluster at this level was 1/3/71 with a male unemployment rate of 14%, a predominance of council tenants and only 14% owner-occupiers, nearly 80% of households without a car, 70% with fewer than five rooms and nearly 25% lacking one or more of the basic amenities. This cluster contained 38% of Sunderland's population and 39% of households.

The large intermediate, mixed-tenure cluster was 3/3/71 with a male unemployment rate of 8%, 45% car ownership, just on half of households having five or more rooms and 20% lacking one or more basic amenity. This cluster contained 48% of Sunderland's population and 47% of households.

At the next fusion about one third of the tracts in this middle cluster went into the new prosperous cluster 1/2/71 and two thirds went into the poorer cluster 2/2/71. The prosperous cluster had a male unemployment rate of less than 5% (which was higher than the national average), 67% of its households were owner-occupiers, 55% had a car, 65% had five or more rooms, and 90% had all three basic amenities. 2/2/71 was mixed tenure with a predominance of council tenants (66%), a male unemployment rate of 12%, 20% of households lacking one or more basic amenity, and 60% have fewer than five rooms. 1/2/71 contained 30% of Sunderland's population and households. The remaining 70% were of course in 2/2/71.

The three cluster level probably gives the best picture of the Sunderland situation in 1971, and is quite close in form to the typologies generated using factor analysis and 1961 Census material by Robson (1969 pp 182-3). Again employment connections are similar across the three clusters with economic activity by married women lying within a range of 34-40%. Again car ownership levels and related deprivation index scores for the middle level cluster 3/3/81 are much closer to those for the poorest cluster than for the most affluent. The structure generally resembled that of Cleveland with a 'middle-class' (in reproduction terms) minority, and a working class majority.

By 1981 as Chapter 5 showed Sunderland had already undergone a significant amount of deindustrialization. Shipbuilding had contracted and the 'modernizing' sectors of manufacturing had proved to be very vulnerable to the branch plant syndrome. At the same time, as with all the areas studied here, there had been a significant amount of slum clearance and improvement of older dwellings. There had also been a good deal of housebuilding, particularly by private developers and the New Town Development Corporation in the Washington area.

The first significant level of clustering in 1981 was at the three cluster level (see Table 6.9). Here the prosperous cluster was 3/3/81 with male unemployment rates of 9%, 90% owner-occupation, 70%

Table 6.9 - Sunderland 81 Change Clusters 3

	C11	C12	C13
% Pop 0-15	22	22	23
% Pop 16-24	16	15	13
% Pop Pens.	20	15	13
Male UE	35	20	9
Female UE	20	11	6
% Male EA	74	75	81
% Fem. EA	56	65	72
% MFem. EA	32	41	50
% UK born	99	99	98
% Hhds no car	77	60	29
% Hhds 1 car	21	34	54
% Hhds 2 / 2+ cars	2	5	17
% Hhds 3 or less rms	43	21	9
% Hhds 5 or more rms	34	48	71
% Hhds 1 pers	29	22	16
% Hhds 5+ pers	6	4	3
% Hhds Own Occ	7	35	81
% Hhds Pub Tens	83	55	12
% Hhds Oth Tens	10	10	7
% Hhds all amens	96	95	98
% Hhds > 1 ppr	8	5	2
% Hhds no child	67	66	60
% Pens Hhds	26	25	18

car ownership, and 70% of households having five or more rooms. This cluster contained 33% of Sunderland's 1981 population and 32% of households.

The poorest cluster was 1/3/81 with male unemployment at 35%. Over 80% of households were council tenants, 75% had no car and 70% had fewer than five rooms. This cluster contained 21% of Sunderland's population and 22% of households.

The middle cluster 2/2/81 had a male unemployment rate of 20%. Household tenure was mixed with just over half of households being council tenants. 40% of households had a car and nearly half (48%) had five or more rooms. This cluster contained 46% of Sunderland's population and households.

At the two cluster level over 70% of the middle tracts transferred to the poorer cluster 1/2/81 (see Table 6.10). This had male unemployment rates of nearly 30%, a predominance (80%) of council tenants, only 30% car ownership and 40% of households with fewer than five rooms. It contained just over half of population and households. The other cluster was predominantly owner-occupied (71%), had over 60% car-ownership, and had a male unemployment rate of 11%. 64% of households had more than five rooms.

Table 6.10 - Sunderland 81 Change Clusters 2

	C11	C12
% Pop 0-15	22	23
% Pop 16-24	16	13
% Pop Pens.	19	16
Male UE	27	11
Female UE	15	7
% Male EA	74	79
% Fem. EA	61	70
% MFem. EA	36	47
% UK born	99	99
% Hhds no car	70	38
% Hhds 1 car	26	50
% Hhds 2 / 2+ cars	3	13
% Hhds 3 or less rms	26	10
% Hhds 5 or more rms	41	64
% Hhds 1 pers	26	18
% Hhds 5+ pers	5	3
% Hhds Own Occ	17	71
% Hhds Pub Tens	72	22
% Hhds Oth Tens	10	7
% Hhds all amens	95	96
% Hhds > 1 ppr	6	2
% Hhds no child	66	62
% Pens Hhds	25	21

Again the three cluster level is the most interesting. We can see a relatively affluent third of tracts (and by implication and at this scale households - there is no real problem of ecological fallacy), a large middle group including many council tenants, and a substantial poor population. In 1971 similarities among the clusters were largely in terms of economic activity. This was no longer the case in 1981. In particular the range for economic activity for married women had increased from 34-40% poorest/lowest - most affluent/highest, to 32%-50%, poorest/lowest - most affluent highest. In contrast housing conditions had evened considerably with a virtual elimination of lack of amenity although differences in dwelling size remained important.

The overall change in Sunderland between 1971 and 1981 was much like that in Cleveland. There was an expansion of the 'prosperous' cluster, best understood here in terms of the three cluster analyses and hence representing an expansion from 14 to 33% of households. This expansion is sustained at the two cluster level, but the 'more affluent' cluster in Sunderland at this level is not all that affluent. In any event we see the same sort of polarization organized around dimensions of tenure, which is more marked in Sunderland in a way which reflects the greater importance of council housing in the overall housing stock, and employment. The smaller proportion of 'real affluents' as compared with Cleveland (30 vs. 40%) reflects the greater importance of

inward journeys to work in Sunderland, especially from Durham ! However the picture is the same. More households are affluent, although still exposed to much more unemployment, but the poorer group has not improved its position except in ways which reflect the impact of public sector housing policies.

### South Tyneside - the second declining port/coalfield/shipbuilding town

The position of South Tyneside in 1971 was very similar to that of Sunderland, although there was one interesting difference. In 1971 South Tyneside was not, as it was to become in 1981, a separate journey to work area. It was simply part of the larger Newcastle area, reflecting the significant movement of shipbuilding and other engineering workers around yards and factories along the river. In 1971 the first significant cluster level in South Tyneside was the three cluster level (see Table 6.11). Cluster 1/3/71 was the prosperous cluster with 4% male unemployment, 80% owner-occupation, 65% car ownership and 75% of households with five or more rooms. Virtually all households had the three basic amenities. This cluster contained 18% of the 1971 population and households.

The most deprived 1971 cluster in South Tyneside, Cluster 2/3/71, was interesting. It had a very high level of absence of amenity

Table 6.11 - South Tyneside 1971 Change Clusters 3

	C11	C12	C13
% Pop 0-15	23	24	20
% Pop 16-24	11	14	13
% Pop Pens.	16	21	16
Male UE	4	15	11
Female UE	4	9	11
% Male EA	79	77	82
% Fem. EA	65	59	71
% MFem. EA	38	33	39
% UK born	99	98	98
% Hhds no car	37	81	72
% Hhds 1 car	53	18	26
% Hhds 2 / 2+ cars	11	1	2
% Hhds 3 or less rms	6	41	17
% Hhds 5 or more rms	76	26	55
% Hhds 1 pers	15	27	17
% Hhds 5+ pers	3	5	9
% Hhds Own Occ	79	16	11
% Hhds Pub Tens	9	41	78
% Hhds Oth Tens	11	43	12
% Hhds all amens	98	57	92
% Hhds > 1 ppr	2	12	11
% Hhds no child	62	68	59
% Pens Hhds	18	27	18

(40%) and households with less than five rooms (75%). The largest tenure category was privately rented (43%) although there were almost as many council households. Car ownership was only 20% and male unemployment was 15%. This cluster contained 28% of population and 32% of households.

The middle cluster 3/3/71 was occupied predominantly by council tenants (78%) with a high level of amenity (92%) and just over half of households having five or more rooms (55%). Male unemployment was 11% and car ownership was 28%. This cluster contained 54% of population and 50% of households.

At the two cluster level just over 20% of the middle cluster tracts transferred to the top cluster. This (1/2/71 see Table 6.12) had a male unemployment rate of 6%, 60% owner occupation, 55% car ownership, 75% of households with five or more rooms, and virtually full possession of basic amenities. It contained 28% of population and 27% of households.

Over 70% of population and households were in Cluster 2/2/71 with 13% male unemployment, less than 25% car ownership, a mixed tenure pattern with a majority of council tenants and just 12% of owner-occupiers, 60% of households having less than five rooms, and about 25% lacking one or more basic amenities.

Table 6.12 - South Tyneside 71 Change Clusters 2

	C11	C12
% Pop 0-15	25	26
% Pop 16-24	12	14
% Pop Pens.	15	17
Male UE	6	13
Female UE	4	8
% Male EA	81	80
% Fem. EA	68	66
% MFem. EA	40	36
% UK born	97	98
% Hhds no car	44	78
% Hhds 1 car	47	21
% Hhds 2 / 2+ cars	8	1
% Hhds 3 or less rms	6	28
% Hhds 5 or more rms	76	39
% Hhds 1 pers	14	22
% Hhds 5+ pers	5	7
% Hhds Own Occ	60	12
% Hhds Pub Tens	30	62
% Hhds Oth Tens	9	26
% Hhds all amens	95	76
% Hhds > 1 ppr	4	12
% Hhds no child	60	64
% Pens Hhds	17	23

Again the three cluster level is the most interesting. Again the interesting similarity among the clusters is in levels of economic activity, including economic activity by married women ranging from low/poor 32.5% to higher/affluent 37.9% to middle/highest 38.9%.

By 1981 South Tyneside had undergone the same sort of deindustrialization as Sunderland. However Sunderland had benefited from the development of Washington New Town, at least in population terms, and had maintained population levels as stable. South Tyneside had suffered a major population loss, much of it by movement to Washington.

In 1981 the three cluster level (Table 16.13) was again the first significant level. The affluent cluster was 1/3/81 with male unemployment at 9%, 75% owner-occupation, 70% car ownership, 99% possession of basic amenities, and 78% of households having five or more rooms. This cluster contained 23% of the 1981 population and 22% of households.

The poorest cluster was 2/3/81 with 30% male unemployment, 70% council tenure, less than 25% car ownership and less than 30% of households having five or more rooms, although 90% had the three basic amenities.. This cluster contained 12% of population and 13% of households.

Table 6.13 - South Tyneside 81 Change Clusters 3

	C11	C12	C13
% Pop 0-15	21	21	21
% Pop 16-24	13	15	15
% Pop Pens.	16	23	18
Male UE	9	30	21
Female UE	6	18	11
% Male EA	78	74	77
% Fem. EA	70	53	64
% MFem. EA	48	3	40
% UK born	99	99	99
% Hhds no car	30	79	66
% Hhds 1 car	52	19	30
% Hhds 2 / 2+ cars	17	2	4
% Hhds 3 or less rms	5	42	20
% Hhds 5 or more rms	78	28	52
% Hhds 1 pers	17	35	24
% Hhds 5+ pers	3	3	4
% Hhds Own Occ	76	10	22
% Hhds Pub Tens	18	69	62
% Hhds Oth Tens	6	20	16
% Hhds all amens	99	91	96
% Hhds > 1 ppr	2	7	5
% Hhds no child	64	70	68
% Pens Hhds	21	31	25

The predominant middle cluster 3/3/81 containing 65% of population and households, consisted of a mixture of tenures with over 60% council tenants. 96% of households had the three basic amenities but just over half had fewer than five rooms and nearly two thirds (66%) had no car. Male unemployment was 22%.

At the two cluster level less than 15% of middle level tracts transferred to the more prosperous Cluster 1/2/81 (see Table 6.14). This had a male unemployment rate of 11%, was 66% owner-occupied, 60% car owning, had virtually total amenities, and 75% of households with five or more rooms. It contained 32% of population and 31% of households.

The rest were Cluster 2/2/81 where male unemployment was 24%, 66% of households were council tenants, car ownership was just 30% and 55% of households had fewer than five rooms.

Again the three cluster level was the most interesting. The similarity in 1981 was about possession of amenities. Now married women's economic activity rates ranged from 31% poorest/lowest to 48% most affluent/highest. Again unemployment was a present factor for all clusters, although the socially significant size of the gaps had widened over the decade. It is clear that slum clearance and home improvement support strategies had changed the situation for the better. However even the middle cluster at this level was

Table 6.14 - South Tyneside 81 Change Clusters 2

	C11	C12
% Pop 0-15	21	24
% Pop 16-24	14	15
% Pop Pens.	17	20
Male UE	11	24
Female UE	6	13
% Male EA	78	76
% Fem. EA	60	62
% MFem. EA	45	38
% UK born	99	99
% Hhds no car	38	70
% Hhds 1 car	48	26
% Hhds 2 / 2+ cars	14	3
% Hhds 3 or less rms	7	26
% Hhds 5 or more rms	75	45
% Hhds 1 pers	17	27
% Hhds 5+ pers	3	4
% Hhds Own Occ	66	16
% Hhds Pub Tens	25	67
% Hhds Oth Tens	8	17
% Hhds all amens	98	95
% Hhds > 1 ppr	2	6
% Hhds no child	64	69
% Pens Hhds	22	27

deprived in employment terms and married women's economic activity rate (40%) was now below that of the most affluent cluster (48%). In the poorest cluster this was just 31% so the gap had widened considerably. In South Tyneside, whilst membership of the affluent group increased between 71 and 81 it did so only very marginally at either the three or two cluster level and was still less than a third in 1981 on its most extensive definition. However it was not possible to identify such concentrated locales of high unemployment in South Tyneside, as were present in Cleveland and, to a lesser extent, in Sunderland. Rather there was a high, rather evenly spread, level of deprivation in tracts containing more than two thirds of 1981 population.

There are some interesting differences among these three industrial areas but the basic pattern is the same. In each of the LEA/1981 Journey to Work Areas, deindustrialization between 1971 and 1981 was associated with a polarization of the socio-spatial structure. This was not a simple process. What mattered was the arrangement of three groups on a continuum. In 1971 the poorest group was located both on 'outer estates' and in the remaining slum clearance areas. Then the group's deprivations, as indicated by this data set, were not associated with 'mass unemployment' (although unemployment levels were higher than for other groups) but did include significant housing deprivations. The group was not radically different from the great middle mass, but both were significantly worse off in consumption terms than the prosperous

group of owner-occupying, car-owning households in the most affluent census tracts. What changed between 1971 and 1981 was an expansion of the numbers in the most affluent group at the three cluster level. This was marked in Cleveland and Sunderland where population remained stable, indicating that new owner-occupied 'suburbanization by addition' (see Byrne 1989) was possible and had occurred. In South Tyneside where this did not happen, the increase was small. However the gap between this group and the middle group widened. Essentially the census tracts containing most households fell behind rapidly.

The proportion of population in the poorest group fell between 1971 and 1981. There seem to be two reasons for this. The first was that the massive rise in unemployment between the two dates made high absolute unemployment a middle group experience in 1981 in a way it had not been in 1971. The second was the elimination of the worst inner-area slum housing. The second was clearly progressive. The first was not. It means that in relative terms most households (as represented by census tracts) became more deprived between 1971 and 1981. The poorest cluster got smaller because the middle cluster became more like it.

**Enumeration District Cluster Analyses - a more detailed look at economic activity and class**

The 7181 small area change data set is limited because it does not include material derived from the 10% sample element in the decennial censuses, and therefore does not allow for detailed coverage of economic activity, occupation and social class. It is possible to look at these aspects, although only practicably for the 1981 census, by using the general Small Area Statistics set. This section does that for the three study areas in 1981.

Table 6.15 gives the three cluster analysis that emerged for the ED data in Cleveland in 1981. This is a rough and ready, but reliable, job based on SPSSx quick cluster procedures. The actual pattern of inequalities for the ED level cluster analysis is very similar to that for the Census Tract analysis as displayed in Table 6.3, but the proportion of population in the poorest cluster was much higher (33% vs 18%). This reflects the finer focus of ED level data. Otherwise the pattern for the variables which are common to the Census Tract and ED data sets was much as for the Census Tract analysis. What is interesting is the pattern on the new variables.

The most striking differences were in the pattern of Registrar General's social class of economically active household heads. In all three clusters the proportion of heads who were Skilled Manual

Table 6.15 - Cleveland 81 EDs 3 Clusters

	C11	C12	C13
% Pop 0-15	24	26	25
% Pop Pens	18	11	16
Fert. Rat.	24	25	36
Male UE	18	8	32
Female UE	9	8	12
% Hhds Own. Occ.	58	91	21
% Hhds Pub. Tens.	34	4	73
% Hhds Priv. UFT	5	2	3
% Hhds Priv. FT	2	1	3
% Hhds Ser. T	1	2	1
% Hhds 3 Amens	95	99	93
% Hhds ppr > 1.0	4	2	8
% Hhds no car	49	17	72
% Hhds 2 cars	9	23	3
% Hhds 5 or more rooms	68	80	57
% Mar Fems FT	18	24	11
% Mar Fems PT	23	24	22
% Dwells Flats	4	1	12
% Hhds ct Child Single Parent	15	7	27
% Hds Hhds SC1+2	17	43	7
% Hds Hhds SC3NM	11	13	6
% Hds Hhds SC3M	42	32	43
% Hds Hhds SC4+5	29	15	44

was the highest for any social class and was roughly constant at around 25% of all household heads and varied from 30-40% of economically active heads. However in the affluent cluster the proportion of economically active heads of households who were in Social Classes 1 and 2 was 43% compared with 17% in the middle cluster and 7% in the bottom cluster. In contrast the proportion who were Social Classes 4 and 5 was 15% in the most affluent cluster, 18% in the middle cluster and 44% in the poorest cluster. This pattern confirms an association between the 'consumption/reproduction' differences identified in the Census Tract analyses and employment positions. Interestingly proportions working in manufacturing industry did not differ markedly by cluster, although this was highest in the poorest and lowest in the most affluent cluster with a range of 30-37%. What was also interesting was the proportion of household heads who were economically active ranging from 80% in the most affluent cluster to 62% in the middle cluster and 57% in the poorest cluster.

If we think of household employment connection, then, following Pahl's pointer about 'work-rich' and 'work-poor' households, the labour market position of married women is also very important. There was little difference in the proportion of married women working part-time (range 22-24%), but there were major differences in full-time employment with the most affluent cluster having a rate of 24%, the middle cluster having a rate of 19% and the poorest having a rate of 12%. This does not seem to be

simply a matter of demographic difference. The proportion of the population who were children and the proportion of households containing children was actually highest in the most affluent cluster, although fertility ratios were highest in the poorest cluster. However there was a major difference in the proportion of households containing children which were headed by a single-parent. In the most affluent cluster this was 7%, in the middle 15% and in the poorest 27%. This is of considerable importance in relation to the work-rich, work poor account.

If we look at demographic differences we see an interesting pattern, which is also apparant in the Census Tract analyses. The most affluent and poorest clusters have fewer pensioners, more children and more households containing children. It is the middle cluster which contains most pensioners and pensioner only households. This very much supports a general account which asserts the recent divergence of the socio-spatial structure, precisely because such divergence works to a considerable extent through recent labour market first recruitment, and differentially affects those entering the labour market subsequent to deindustrialization.

The ED 3 Cluster proportions of population were 35% affluent, 32% middle, 33% poorest. At the two cluster level, as illustrated in Table 6.16, the proportions were 44% affluent vs. 56% poorer.

Table 6.16 - Cleveland 1981 EDs 2 Clusters

	C11	C12
% Pop 0-15	24	25
% Pop Pens	17	12
Fert. Rat.	31	25
Male UE	27	9
Female UE	14	6
% Hhds Own. Occ.	34	87
% Hhds Pub. Tens.	58	8
% Hhds Priv. UFT	4	2
% Hhds Priv. FT	2	1
% Hhds Ser. T	1	2
% Hhds 3 Amens	94	99
% Hhds ppr > 1.0	6	2
% Hhds no car	64	21
% Hhds 2 cars	5	21
% Hhds 5 or more rooms	61	79
% Mar Fems FT	15	23
% Mar Fems PT	22	24
% Dwells Flats	8	2
% Hhds ct Child Single Parent	22	8
% Hds Hhds SC1+2	19	37
% Hds Hhds SC3NM	7	13
% Hds Hhds SC3M	39	34
% Hds Hhds SC4+5	36	17

Table 6.16 shows the details with again a close correspondence for similar variables to the 2 Cluster Census Tract analysis. The affluent cluster had 77% of heads of households economically active, of whom 37% were Social Classes 1 and 2 with 17% Social Classes 4 and 5. The poorer cluster had 64% economically active with 19% Social Classes 1 and 2 and 36% Social Classes 4 and 5. Single parenthood rates were 22% vs 8% with a higher fertility rate in the poorer cluster, although demographically they were otherwise not dissimilar.

The analysis for Sunderland 81 EDs at the three cluster level is given in Table 6.17. Census Tract and ED analyses were slightly different in that the proportion of population in the prosperous cluster was nearly constant at 35%, the middle cluster which contains 36% was smaller, whilst the poorest cluster was considerably larger at 31%. The pattern of consumption/reproduction variables was much as for the Census Tract analysis and the pattern for economic activity was much as for Cleveland. In the poorest and middle cluster just 55% of heads of households were economically active compared with 78% in the most affluent cluster. In the most affluent cluster 36% of economically active heads of households were Social Classes 1 and 2 compared with 18% in the middle cluster and 8% in the poorest cluster. The figures for Social Classes 4 and 5 were 12%, 26% and 38%. Again the significant difference in economic activity for married women was in full time work, with 26% working

Table 6.17 - Sunderland 81 Eds 3 Clusters

	C11	C12	C13
% Pop 0-15	27	19	25
% Pop Pens	10	21	15
Fert. Rat.	29	21	33
Male UE	10	15	32
Female UE	6	9	17
% Hhds Own. Occ.	69	40	6
% Hhds Pub. Tens.	27	51	90
% Hhds Priv. UFT	2	5	2
% Hhds Priv. FT	1	2	1
% Hhds Ser. T	1	2	1
% Hhds 3 Amens	99	94	97
% Hhds ppr > 1.0	2	4	8
% Hhds no car	29	60	74
% Hhds 2 cars	15	5	3
% Hhds 5 or more rooms	71	43	46
% Mar Fems FT	26	18	12
% Mar Fems PT	25	25	23
% Dwells Flats	4	6	21
% Hhds ct Child Single Parent	7	12	25
% Hds Hhds SC1+2	36	18	8
% Hds Hhds SC3NM	14	11	7
% Hds Hhds SC3M	38	47	47
% Hds Hhds SC4+5	12	26	38

full time in the most affluent cluster, 18% in the middle cluster and 12% in the poorest cluster. The pattern for single parent headed households (as a percentage of all households containing children) was 7% to 12% to 25%. Again the demographic differences were between the poorest and most affluent on the one hand vs. the middle cluster which had more pensioners, fewer children, fewer child containing households and so on. Again there were not major differences in proportion of economically active adults working in manufacturing with a range of 25-32% The ED level 2 Cluster Analysis (Table 6.18) was again quite close to the Census Tract Analysis with a 42% of population in the prosperous cluster and 48% in the poorest cluster. The pattern of 'consumption/reproduction' differences and economic activity differences corresponded to Cleveland, except to the extent that it reflects the greater significance of social housing in Sunderland.

The analyses for South Tyneside based on the 1981 ED data set were of broadly the same form. At the three Cluster level. Again the affluent cluster is close to that generated at this level from the Census Tract analysis with 25% of population. As with Sunderland ED level analysis leads to an expansion of the poorest Cluster from 23 to 32% of population at the expense of the middle cluster. Table 6.19 gives index details. The pattern is very much as for Cleveland and Sunderland with the same interesting demographic difference

Table 6.18 - Sunderland 81 EDs 2 Clusters

	C11	C12
% Pop 0-15	25	22
% Pop Pens	12	18
Fert. Rat.	28	27
Male UE	10	24
Female UE	7	13
% Hhds Own. Occ.	68	19
% Hhds Pub. Tens.	27	73
% Hhds Priv. UFT	3	3
% Hhds Priv. FT	1	2
% Hhds Ser. T	1	2
% Hhds 3 Amens	98	96
% Hhds ppr > 1.0	2	6
% Hhds no car	33	69
% Hhds 2 cars	14	4
% Hhds 5 or more rooms	67	42
% Mar Fems FT	25	14
% Mar Fems PT	24	23
% Dwells Flats	5	15
% Hhds ct Child Single Parent	8	18
% Hds Hhds SC1+2	35	10
% Hds Hhds SC3NM	15	5
% Hds Hhds SC3M	36	48
% Hds Hhds SC4+5	15	55

Table 6.19 South Tyneside 1981 EDs 3 Clusters

	C11	C12	C13
% Pop 0-15	27	22	17
% Pop Pens	13	16	23
Fert. Rat.	33	21	18
Male UE	26	8	18
Female UE	15	5	9
% Hhds Own. Occ.	11	81	21
% Hhds Pub. Tens.	81	12	68
% Hhds Priv. UFT	7	4	9
% Hhds Priv. FT	1	1	1
% Hhds Ser. T	1	1	1
% Hhds 3 Amens	95	99	96
% Hhds ppr > 1.0	8	2	4
% Hhds no car	71	30	67
% Hhds 2 cars	3	17	4
% Hhds 5 or more rooms	52	77	45
% Har Fems FT	15	25	18
% Har Fems PT	23	23	22
% Dwells Flats	12	1	5
% Hhds ct Child Single Parent	21	7	16
% Hds Hhds SC1+2	8	41	13
% Hds Hhds SC3NH	6	14	11
% Hds Hhds SC3H	49	32	48
% Hds Hhds SC4+5	37	13	29

between poorest and most affluent clusters as opposed to the middle cluster. However there is more of a gradient in economic activity. The lowest proportion of economically active household heads was in the middle cluster at 54%. However the poorest cluster had a higher proportion at 62% compared with a most affluent level of 70%. South Tyneside's most affluent cluster had proportionately fewer manufacturing and skilled manual heads of households in relation to the poorest cluster, as compared with Sunderland and Cleveland, but the difference was marginal and the pattern was broadly the same. This was reproduced at the two cluster level (see Table 6.20) where the most affluent cluster remained completely stable and the other two simply fused, giving a population split of 32 vs. 68%. The pattern on 'consumption/reproduction' variables was virtually identical to that produced at the two cluster level by the Census Tract analysis and the pattern for socio-economic variables was as with Sunderland and Cleveland.

These ED level cluster analyses confirm the significance for 1981 of the three way split, and introduce the important implications of age structure and age cohort. This has been noticed before (see Byrne, 1990), and reflects the considerable significance of age cohorting in new housing stock. The implication of a divergence for the young from a common and more equal origin is very important. The association of this divergence with employment position is crucial.

Table 6.20 South Tyneside 1981 EDs 2 Clusters

	C11	C12
% Pop 0-15	22	21
% Pop Pens	16	19
Fert. Rat.	21	24
Male UE	8	21
Female UE	5	11
% Hhds Own. Occ.	81	18
% Hhds Pub. Tens.	12	72
% Hhds Priv. UFT	4	8
% Hhds Priv. FT	1	1
% Hhds Ser. T	1	1
% Hhds 3 Amens	99	95
% Hhds ppr > 1.0	2	6
% Hhds no car	30	69
% Hhds 2 cars	17	4
% Hhds 5 or more rooms	77	48
% Mar Fems FT	25	17
% Mar Fems PT	23	22
% Dwells Flats	1	8
% Hhds ct Child Single Parent	7	18
% Hds Hhds SC1+2	41	10
% Hds Hhds SC3NM	14	9
% Hds Hhds SC3M	32	57.9
% Hds Hhds SC4+5	13	32.4

## 1991 ED based socio-spatial analyses

Now (March 1993) the 100% data set for enumeration districts as employed in the 1991 Census has just become available. Tables 6.21 to 6.26 show the results of analyses of these sets for the three study areas. It should be noted that the cluster analysis programme used to generate these classifications was CLUSTER under SPSS<sup>+</sup>, rather than CLUSTAN, which is no longer available with the change in Durham's operating system from MTS to UNIX. The same algorithm was employed (Ward's method of hierarchic fusion) but SPSS does not have a relocation procedure. The clusters have however been checked by using QUICKCLUSTER to create clusters at the 3 and 2 cluster level and are reasonably stable.

The remarkable thing about these analyses is the stabilization of the socio-spatial structure of 1981 over the subsequent decade. All three locales are best described in terms of a three fold division into poor, middle and prosperous. In Sunderland the proportion of population in the poorest 1991 clusters has increased somewhat over the 1981 situation from 32% to 37% and in South Tyneside the increase has been from 33% to 48%. In Cleveland the proportion in the poorest cluster at the three cluster level declined from 33% to 21% but this was associated with a much poorer profile for the middle cluster where 1991 male unemployment rates were 27% compared with middle 18% in 1981 and poorest 32%. Indeed perhaps Cleveland's situation is best described by the two

cluster level where 56% of the population were resident in a cluster with a male unemployment rate of 34%. The three cluster level in Cleveland is really a product of the truly extreme conditions in the locales in the poorest cluster where male unemployment was 43% in 1991.

In other respects the 1991 position with regard to tenure and car ownership closely reflected the 1981 patterns. One new variable can now be calculated. This is 'percentage of households containing children in which there is no adult employed'. I regard this as more interesting than single parenthood per se, although the percentage of households containing children headed by a single parent is also given in the table. In the poorest cluster in each locale the rates for households containing children with no working adult were 54% (Cleveland), 47% (Sunderland) and 45% (South Tyneside). This compares with figures of 12%, 10% and 11% in the respective most affluent clusters.

The general message from the 1991 analyses is that the situation created by deindustrialization in the late 1970s and early 1980s has persisted and become entrenched as the basis of social life for at least a decade.

Table 6.21 - Cleveland 1991 ED cluster - 3 clusters

	C11	C12	C13
% of Total Pop.	21	49	27
% Pop 0-4	9	6	7
% Pop 5-15	25	20	22
% 60+	22	18	22
Male Econ Act	64	75	67
EA Male Full Time	50	75	63
EA Male UE+Scheme	43	10	27
Female Econ Act	35	53	42
EA Female Full Time	35	40	42
EA Female Part Time	40	40	42
EA Female UE+Scheme	23	7	15
% Hhds Own. Occ.	20	91	55
% Hhds Pub. Tens.	71	22	53
% Hhds Other Tens	3	5	8
% Hhds no car	71	22	53
% Hhds 2 cars	4	27	10
% Hhds 1-3 rms	23	5	12
% Hhds 6 /6+ rms	49	58	62
% Hhds no child	60	57	49
% Hhds with child no employed person	54	12	34
% Hhds with child Single Parent	28	5	12
% Hhds Pensioner present	25	28	35

Table 6.22 - Cleveland 1991 ED cluster - 2 clusters

	C11	C12
% of Total Pop.	49	51
% Pop 0-4	6	8
% Pop 5-15	20	23
% 60+	18	22
Male Econ Act	75	66
EA Male Full Time	75	57
EA Male UE+Scheme	10	34
Female Econ Act	53	39
EA Female Full Time	40	38
EA Female Part Time	40	41
EA Female UE+Scheme	7	19
% Hhds Own. Occ.	91	39
% Hhds Pub. Tens	22	54
% Hhds Other Tens	5	6
% Hhds no car	22	61
% Hhds 2 cars	27	7
% Hhds 1-3 rms	5	17
% Hhds 6 /6+ rms	58	56
% Hhds no child	57	54
% Hhds with child no employed person	12	43
% Hhds with child Single Parent	5	20
% Hhds Pensioner present	28	35

Table 6.23 - Sunderland 1991 EDs - 3 Clusters

	C11	C12	C13
% of Total Pop.	29	30	41
% Pop 0-4	6	6	8
% Pop 5-15	20	19	22
% 60+	18	21	23
Male Econ Act	76	69	63
EA Male Full Time	76	68	55
EA Male UE+Scheme	10	21	37
Female Econ Act	55	48	38
EA Female Full Time	52	49	42
EA Female Part Time	37	36	37
EA Female UE+Scheme	6	11	21
% Hhds Own. Occ.	93	61	21
% Hhds Pub. Tens.	3	30	77
% Hhds Other Tens	4	10	2
% Hhds no car	23	47	68
% Hhds 2 cars	24	12	5
% Hhds 1-3 rms	5	21	21
% Hhds 6 /6+ rms	58	44	50
% Hhds no child	59	49	58
% Hhds with child no employed person	10	24	47
% Hhds with child Single Parent	5	8	21
% Hhds Pensioner present	28	32	35

Table 6.24 - Sunderland 91 EDs - 2 Clusters

	C11	C12
% of Total Pop.	59	41
% Pop 0-4	6	8
% Pop 5-15	20	22
% 60+	19	23
Male Econ Act	72	63
EA Male Full Time	71	55
EA Male UE+Scheme	13	37
Female Econ Act	51	38
EA Female Full Time	50	42
EA Female Part Time	36	36
EA Female UE+Scheme	9	21
% Hhds Own. Occ.	75	21
% Hhds Pub. Tens.	18	77
% Hhds Other Tens	7	2
% Hhds no car	36	68
% Hhds 2 cars	17	5
% Hhds 1-3 rms	13	21
% Hhds 6 /6+ rms	51	50
% Hhds no child	53	58
% Hhds with child no employed person	18	47
% Hhds with child Single Parent	6	18
% Hhds Pensioner present	29	35

Table 6.25 - South Tyneside 91 ED clusters - 3 Clusters

	C11	C12	C13
% of Total Pop.	28	48	25
% Pop 0-4	6	7	6
% Pop 5-15	20	21	18
% 60+	19	27	23
Male Econ Act	75	63	69
EA Male Full Time	53	43	50
EA Male UE+Scheme	10	33	20
Female Econ Act	54	37	48
EA Female Full Time	53	43	50
EA Female Part Time	35	37	35
EA Female UE+Scheme	7	17	12
% Hhds Own. Occ.	89	24	61
% Hhds Pub. Tens.	6	72	29
% Hhds Other Tens	6	3	10
% Hhds no car	25	70	53
% Hhds 2 cars	23	4	8
% Hhds 1-3 rms	6	20	16
% Hhds 6 /6+ rms	56	51	50
% Hhds no child	55	45	40
% Hhds with child no employed person	11	45	24
% Hhds with child Single Parent	4	15	7
% Hhds Pensioner present	30	40	35

Table 6.25 - South Tyneside 91 ED clusters - 3 Clusters

	C11	C12	C13
% of Total Pop.	28	48	25
% Pop 0-4	6	7	6
% Pop 5-15	20	21	18
% 60+	19	27	23
Male Econ Act	75	63	69
EA Male Full Time	53	43	50
EA Male UE+Scheme	10	33	20
Female Econ Act	54	37	48
EA Female Full Time	53	43	50
EA Female Part Time	35	37	35
EA Female UE+Scheme	7	17	12
% Hhds Own. Occ.	89	24	61
% Hhds Pub. Tens.	6	72	29
% Hhds Other Tens	6	3	10
% Hhds no car	25	70	53
% Hhds 2 cars	23	4	8
% Hhds 1-3 rms	6	20	16
% Hhds 6 /6+ rms	56	51	50
% Hhds no child	55	45	40
% Hhds with child no employed person	11	45	24
% Hhds with child Single Parent	4	15	7
% Hhds Pensioner present	30	40	35

Table 6.26 - South Tyneside 91 ED clusters - 2 Clusters

	C11	C12
% of Total Pop.	48	52
% Pop 0-4	7	6
% Pop 5-15	21	19
% 60+	27	21
Male Econ Act	63	72
EA Male Full Time	60	72
EA Male UE+Scheme	33	14
Female Econ Act	37	51
EA Female Full Time	43	52
EA Female Part Time	37	35
EA Female UE+Scheme	17	9
% Hhds Own. Occ.	24	75
% Hhds Pub. Tens.	72	18
% Hhds Other Tens	3	8
% Hhds no car	70	39
% Hhds 2 cars	4	16
% Hhds 1-3 rms	20	11
% Hhds 6 /6+ rms	51	53
% Hhds no child	45	48
% Hhds with child no employed person	45	18
% Hhds with child Single Parent	15	6
% Hhds Pensioner present	40	33

It is possible to use the 1991 ED data to confirm that the clusters of EDs produced by these classificatory analyses are not randomly distributed across the urban space, but instead form specific social areas. This has been done for the two main urban population centres in Sunderland MBC, i.e. the continuous built up area based on Sunderland itself and Washington New Town. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the actual distribution of EDs by cluster. In the case of Sunderland there is a remarkable congruence between the social areas as displayed in 1991 and in Robson's analyses using 1961 data (see Robson 1969). However, the outer estates, described in Table 6.27 as 'North Sunderland Poor' and 'West Sunderland Poor' were, in the 'Fordist' industrial era analysed by Robson, the location of Sunderland's prosperous working class households. The spatial pattern remains the same, but its social content has been profoundly modified.

The Washington pattern is interesting. Washington was built as a series of 'village' neighbourhoods separated by roads and elaborate shrubbery planting etc. The social areas pretty well exactly follow the tenurial boundaries of these neighbourhoods. Thus areas are contiguous on the map but widely separate in actual social distance, as is the case in some instances in the Sunderland periphery. It is actually very hard to get from one neighbourhood to another in Washington other than by road transport.

Table 6.27 - Sunderland Social Areas

	A	B	C	D	E
Total Pop.	22672	18974	26276	15641	2663
No of Hhds	9952	7999	10720	6559	1453
% Pop 0-15	31	24	30	26	28
% 60+	22	26	22	21	20
Male Econ Act	63	68	64	70	58
EA Male Full Time	56	74	52	70	33
EA Male UE+Scheme	42	12	44	19	60
Female Econ Act	37	46	38	48	28
EA Fem Full Time	41	48	40	49	32
EA Fem Part Time	36	41	37	36	30
EA Fem UE+Scheme	22	7	21	11	35
% Hhds Own. Occ.	21	87	22	78	5
% Hhds Pub. Tens.	76	9	77	9	90
Hhds Other Tens	2	5	1	13	7
% Hhds no car	71	35	69	40	89
% Hhds 2 cars	4	16	5	15	2
% Hhds 1-3 rms	22	6	22	15	45
% Hhds 6 /6+ rms	48	58	51	49	22
% Hhds with child	47	39	47	43	26
% Hhds with child no employed person	51	14	49	18	68
% Hhds with child Single Parent	24	3	21	7	34
% Hhds Pensioner present	35	40	38	31	40

Table 6.27 (continued) - Zones in Washington in 1991


	Poor	Prosperous
Total Population	16528	13819
Number of Hhds	6298	5027
% Pop 0-15	36	32
% Pop 60+	15	10
% Males Econ Act	71	82
% EA Males FT	66	79
% EA Males UE	25	6
% Females Econ Act	45	63
% EA Females FT	46	56
% EA Females PT	37	33
% EA Females UE	15	5
% Hhds Own Occ	23	90
% Hhds Pub Tens	75	8
% Hhds Oth Tens	1	2
Hhds no car	56	14
% Hhds 2 or more cars	7	37
% Hhds 1-3 rms	17	4
% Hhds 6/6+ rms	55	52
% Hhds contain child	53	60
% Hhds with child no employed person	37	8
% Hhds with child single parent	21	4
% Hhds contain pensioner	25	16

The poorest identifiable area in Sunderland MBC remains the traditional inner city of the East End, but this small area now consists almost entirely of public sector slum clearance replacement housing dating from the 1930s and 1960s. It is in any event only 10% the size of the larger deprived social housing areas, and these contain ED clusters which are fully as deprived. Sunderland's East End is actually more separate than it used to be from the more prosperous central areas. It is another example of the extent to which road developments and estate layouts since the 1930s have actually transformed the patterns of movement in urban space, so that segregation has become much easier. The pattern of segregation in Washington is less severe but even here in the poorer EDs which contain about 40% of the New Town area's population, nearly 40% of children live in a household with no employed person present.

The patterns revealed by these maps and by Table 6.27 certainly support an account of ghettoization, but not simply of the unemployed. They support an account of socio-tenurial, and hence socio-spatial, polarization with those whose lives are 'riskier' segregated in space from the more secure. The implications of this are profound, particularly given the potential spatial basis of important social goods, especially schools.


Figure 6.1 Social Areas in Sunderland

Poor ■  
Pros. ■



# Figure 6.2 Social Areas in Washington

Poor  
Pros.



**Cleveland's Households - Changes in Structure through ten years of deindustrialization.**

Since 1974 the Research and Intelligence Unit of Cleveland County Council has carried out an annual Household Survey. Descriptions of the general character of this survey are given in Mobbs and Vamplew (1974) and Mobbs (1987) but a brief outline is appropriate here. The survey resembles the nationally conducted General Household Survey but is based on information given by only one household member about themselves and other household members, in contrast with GHS where all adults are interviewed. The range of information about household members other than the informant is restricted, but full information is collected about the household head where the head is not the actual respondent. In all cases in addition to a range of base household information on household composition, tenure, housing conditions etc. the economic activity of all adult members is recorded as is their 'time' status in terms of numbers of hours worked per week.

The survey sample averages somewhat more than 1,000 households and is collected on a basis stratified by geographical area. This means that it provides a good representative account of developments in Cleveland as a whole. Using data from this survey for the years 1977 and 1987 it is possible to chart changes in the relations of Cleveland's households with the employment system. In so doing it seemed most appropriate to concentrate on the changing

relationships between households' connections with the labour market on the one hand, and household attributes including age, tenure, composition, and social class of household head on the other.

The Cleveland Household Survey data makes examination of changes in economic relations by tenure very straightforward. Table 6.28 shows economic status of heads of households by sex, and tenure in 1977 and 1987. What is immediately apparent is the massive decline in employment for male heads of public tenant households. In 1977 roughly half of male heads were full time employed. By 1987 less than 15% were so employed. This is not just a matter of an ageing population in public sector housing. Table 6.29 shows that the decline holds even when pensioner heads are excluded. Table 6.30 shows that this change holds for all household members. In 1977 40% of public tenanted households contained no full time worker. By 1987 this figure had risen to 79%. The tables show that whilst owner occupying households did become less likely to be based around employment between 1977 and 1987, the decline was far less marked and the differences between the two tenures increased dramatically. It should be noted that all these differences are massively statistically significant, as might be expected given their size

Table 6.28 - Tenure, Gender and Economic Activity

Heads of Households Cleveland 1977 and 1987  
(column percentages)

	1977			1987		
	O.Occ	Pub.T	Oth.	O.Occ	Pub.T	Oth
<b>Males</b>						
Full Tm	75	45	45	59	13	28
Part Tm	1	-	2	1	1	6
Unem.	2	7	2	9	17	8
Sick	1	4	1	3	9	4
Ret.	8	15	18	14	19	14
Oth.	-	-	2	1	2	-
<b>Females</b>						
Full Tm	3	2	5	5	2	6
Part Tm	2	3	1	2	4	4
Unem.	-	-	-	1	2	-
Sick	-	-	-	1	1	-
Ret.	2	3	6	4	7	8
Oth.	5	17	18	7	23	16
<b>Totals</b>	<b>953</b>	<b>603</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>1046</b>	<b>590</b>	<b>51</b>

Table 6.29 - Tenure, Gender and Economic Activity

Non Retired Heads of Households Cleveland 1977 and 1987  
(column percentages)

	1977			1987		
	O.Occ	Pub.T	Oth.	O.Occ	Pub.T	Oth
<b>Males</b>						
Full Tm	84	54	63	71	17	32
Part Tm	1	1	1	1	11	2
Unem.	3	12	1	7	23	8
Sick	2	7	1	4	12	4
Oth.	-	-	3	-	2	6
<b>Females</b>						
Full Tm	3	3	8	6	2	10
Part Tm	2	5	1	2	6	8
Unem.	-	3	-	-	3	-
Sick	2	1	-	1	1	-
Oth.	5	21	22	8	32	32
Totals	851	489	65	863	434	50

Table 6.30 - Overall full time workers  
by household tenure (row percents)

	0	1	2	3 / 3+	Total
1977					
Own Occ	19	53	24	5	953
Pub Ten	40	37	17	6	603
Other	46	37	16	1	94
1987					
Own Occ	31	45	20	4	1050
Pub Ten	79	16	4	-	598
Other	61	29	6	4	51

and the very large sample size. Significance levels generally exceed 0.001 and can be taken as given.

Given the emphasis in Murray's polemic on inter-generational transmission of underclass status, it seemed worth while looking at changes for households containing children. This has been done in Table 6.31 In 1977 91% of owner-occupied and 70% of public tenanted households containing children were headed by a male in full time work. By 1987 the comparable figures were 81% and 22%. The massive decline in the public sector was only in smaller part a function of an increase in female headed households. Between 77 and 87 the percentage of such households increased from 13% to 31%. The percentage of households headed by unemployed men increased from 10% to 33%. In Table 6.31 (part 2) this is taken further by crosstabulating by age of household head. In 1977 21%

of heads of public sector child containing households who were aged 30 or less were not full time employed. By 1987 the comparable figure was 84%. Murray places considerable emphasis on the notion of the dysfunctional female headed single parent family. Table 6.30 demonstrates that there has indeed been an increase in female headed single parent households but this has to be set in perspective. There has been an even greater increase in the number and proportion of child-containing households headed by non-employed men. This category (unemployed and sick) has increased from 16% to 39% of all public sector households containing children and is now the largest category in that tenure.

Table 6.31 - Tenure, Gender and Economic Activity

Heads of Households - Families with Children  
Cleveland 1977 and 1987 (column percentages)

	1977		1987	
	O.Occ	Pub.T	O.Occ	Pub.T
<b>Males</b>				
Full time	91	70	81	22
Part time	-	-	-	1
Unemployed	2	10	8	33
Sick	-	6	1	6
Oth.	-	1	1	3
Total Male	93	87	91	65
<b>Females</b>				
Full Tm	2	1	3	-
Part Tm	2	2	2	6
Unem.	-	1	-	3
Sick	-	-	-	-
Oth.	3	9	3	22
Total Female	7	13	8	31
Totals	463	248	388	178

Table 6.31 (continued) - Tenure and age  
 Heads of Hhds containing children - Cleveland 1977 and 1987  
 (column percentages)

	1977		1987	
	O.Occ	Pub.T	O.Occ	Pub.T
Lt 30				
Full Tm	94	79	79	16
Part Tm	-	-	5	14
Unem.	4	15	11	27
Sick	-	-	-	-
Ret.	-	-	-	-
Oth.	2	4	5	43
Total	89	59	64	65
30-44				
Full Tm	92	74	86	33
Part Tm	2	5	1	7
Unem.	2	11	9	44
Sick	-	4	1	6
Ret.	-	-	-	-
Oth.	2	10	3	11
Total	276	111	268	83
45+				
Full Tm	94	64	84	22
Part Tm	-	4	3	13
Unem.	2	11	3	33
Sick	-	12	5	25
Ret.	-	1	2	1
Oth.	1	9	5	7
Total	97	75	55	24

Table 6.32 - Tenure by Social Class Hd Hhd  
by Economic Activity Hd Hhd

	1977 O.Occ and Pub Ten (Doub Col percents)							
	1+2		3NM		3M		4+5	
	OO	PT	OO	PT	OO	PT	OO	PT
Full Tm	69	4	56	2	43	21	29	24
Part Tm	3	-	2	2	-	-	2	4
Unemployed.	1	-	-	-	2	3	1	5
Sick	-	-	3	1	-	2	1	3
Ret.	11	3	6	5	7	7	2	10
Other	3	1	2	3	3	5	2	10
Total.	277	23	122	69	368	254	175	255

	1987 O.Occ and Pub Ten (Doub Col percents)							
	1+2		3NM		3M		4+5	
	OO	PT	OO	PT	OO	PT	OO	PT
Full Tm	63	2	37	5	41	6	24	7
Part Tm	2	-	6	4	-	2	2	3
Unem.	1	-	1	-	6	5	4	16
Sick	1	-	1	-	4	4	4	6
Ret.	15	4	7	7	4	6	7	11
Oth.	4	4	7	7	4	6	3	10
Total	344	38	134	47	413	210	187	229

It seemed worthwhile to extend the analysis of changing economic-tenurial relations to take account of social class. This is done in Table 6.32 The most notable thing which emerges from this comparison is the change in the relative position of skilled manual worker heads of public tenant and owner occupied households. In 1977 the rate of full time work by council skilled manual heads was half that for owner-occupied heads. By 1987 it was just on 15%. It does seem as if the intervening ten years saw a crucial division established within the skilled manual working class, Teesside's modal occupationally defined social grouping.

This household level data confirms the general picture of increasing social polarization given by the census based analyses. In Table 6.33 an attempt has been made to look at socio-spatial implications, using the standard zones which are the lowest level into which the Cleveland Social Survey data can be sensibly disaggregated. The tenure and social class descriptions of household heads show that most of these zones are fairly mixed. By 1987 in all

Table 6.33 -  
 Heads of Households Cleveland 1977 and 1987  
 by zone and economic activity (row percentages for year)

	FT		PT		SW		OTH		Total	
	77	87	77	87	77	87	77	87	77	87
IHP	61	40	6	3	4	18	29	39	139	139
OHP	76	37	4	4	5	9	15	43	126	149
B+SW	67	43	4	5	3	11	26	38	118	131
SC	61	47	4	4	4	13	31	40	242	261
T+SS	71	56	3	1	2	8	24	36	136	142
Mbr IC	59	42	7	5	7	13	27	35	93	94
Mbr S	69	59	5	2	2	5	24	35	161	184
E Mbr	47	11	4	9	9	20	40	48	155	132
E+SB	68	42	1	4	4	17	27	38	153	136
R+M	69	46	1	3	3	9	27	44	148	187
E Cl	65	63	2	3	4	7	29	27	141	130

Table 6.33 (continued)  
 Standard Zones by Hhd Tenure (row percents)

	O.Occ		P. Ten		Oth.Ten		Tot	
	77	87	77	87	77	87	77	87
IHP	63	73	26	35	11	2	139	139
OHP	42	54	56	44	2	2	126	153
B+SW	62	63	31	33	7	3	118	131
SC	56	62	38	34	6	3	242	263
T+SS	64	76	31	20	5	4	136	143
Mbr IC	62	63	18	30	20	8	93	94
Mbr S	87	76	9	20	4	3	161	141
E Mbr	17	28	77	72	6	1	155	132
E+SB	52	46	46	53	2	1	253	139
R+M	62	70	36	25	2	4	148	187
E.Cl	65	70	25	28	10	2	141	133

Table 6.33 (continued)  
 Standard Zones by no of workers in Hhd (row percents)

		0	1	2	3 or more	Total				
	77	87	77	87	77	87	77	87	77	87
IHP	30	56	45	29	21	12	4	3	139	139
OHP	19	57	50	26	24	12	8	4	126	153
B+SW	24	50	48	33	24	15	4	3	118	131
SC	31	47	44	35	11	14	6	4	242	263
T+SS	23	37	46	42	25	17	6	4	136	143
Mbr IC	32	53	39	39	26	8	3	1	93	94
Mbr S	28	37	45	42	22	18	6	4	161	184
E Mbr	29	72	38	19	15	8	8	1	155	132
E+SB	24	53	53	33	16	11	5	4	153	139
R+M	29	49	33	19	17	4	2	4	148	187
E Cl	32	32	43	45	22	20	3	3	141	133

Table 6.34 -  
 Heads of Households Cleveland 1977 and 1987  
 by zone and work relation (row percentages for year)

	77				87			
	Wkp	Av	Wkr	Tot	Wkp	Av	Wkr	Tot
IHP	30	35	36	139	56	18	26	139
OHP	19	32	50	126	57	14	27	153
B+SW	24	37	39	118	50	25	25	131
SC	31	32	37	282	47	24	29	263
T+SS	23	30	47	136	37	28	35	143
Mbr IC	32	29	39	93	53	25	22	94
Mbr S	28	32	41	161	37	23	40	184
E Mbr	39	27	35	155	72	11	17	132
E+SB	24	39	37	153	53	16	32	139
R+M	29	33	38	148	49	23	29	187
E Cl	32	26	43	141	32	30	38	133

except East Middlesbrough, Owner Occupation was the predominant tenure form. However East Middlesbrough is much more homogeneous. It was clearly the poorest and least economically associated zone in 1977 but about half of household heads were full time workers in that year. By 1987 the comparable proportion was about 20%. Indeed only in three of 11 zones were a majority of household heads full time workers in 1987 and in only two was this a substantial majority. In 1977 every zone except East Middlesbrough had had a majority of household heads who were full time workers. Table 6.33 shows that this pattern was repeated when the numbers of full time workers in households were examined for both years. In 1977 a large majority of all households in all zones contained one or more full time workers. By 1987 households containing no full time workers were the largest category in all but five of the eleven zones and in East Middlesbrough this category contained more than 70% of all households.

The Cleveland Social Survey data is household based and therefore allows us to examine relationships which are relevant to Pahl's previously cited (1985) contention of an emerging distinction between work-rich and work-poor households. This is done in Tables 6.31 to 6.36. Cleveland households were classified into seven types of work relation viz. no workers, part-time workers only, one full-time worker only, one full time plus one part-time, two full-time workers, more than two full-time workers, two full-time workers plus one or more part-time workers.

Households with no workers are obviously 'work-poor'. Conversely households with more than one full-time worker (including those with one full and one part-time worker) can be counted work rich. By this criterion the percentage of work poor households increased from 28% to 49% between 1977 and 1987, whereas the proportion of work rich households declined from 40% to 30%. However these shifts were by no means evenly distributed.

Table 6.35 shows that if we examine the relationship between work relation and tenure, the pattern of the residualization of public sector tenure continues. In 1977 19% of owner occupied and 40% of public tenanted households were work poor. The 1987 figures were 31% and 80%. Conversely in 1977 45% of owner occupied and 32% of public tenanted households were work rich. In 1987 the comparable figures were 42% (no real change) and 9%. Table 6.36 examines the relationship of work relation of household and the registrar general's social class of household head. Here the remarkable shift is for households with a head in RG SC 4 and 5. In 1977 these were as work rich as other households with a proportion work rich of 40%. Only Social Class 1+2 households maintained this figure in 1987. For households headed by an semi or unskilled worker the proportion of work rich declined to 22%. All groups increased their 'no work' proportion.

Table 6.35 - Work Relation by Tenure of Hhd (row percents)

	77				87			
	Wkp	Av	Wkr	Tot	Wkp	Av	Wkr	Tot
O.Ccc	19	36	45	954	31	28	42	1050
Pub Ten	40	26	34	603	80	11	9	598
Oth	39	28	25	95	60	24	16	51
Total	28	32	40	1652	49	22	30	1698

Table 6.36 - Work Relation by Reg. Gen. Social Class of Hhd Hd (row percents)

	77				87			
	Wkp	Av	Wkr	Tot	Wkp	Av	Wkr	Tot
SC1+2	19	40	41	318	30	31	39	345
SC3 Non Man	22	39	39	178	53	23	25	183
SC3 Man	29	30	41	653	45	21	34	637
SC 4+5	33	27	40	464	61	17	22	455
Total	21	32	40	1613	49	22	30	1621

Table 6.37 - Work Relation by Sex Hhd Hd (row percents)

	77				87			
	Wkp	Av	Wkr	Tot	Wkp	Av	Wkr	Tot
Male	19	35	46	1350	38	24	38	1263
Female	71	19	10	302	80	15	5	435
Total	28	32	40	1652	49	22	30	1698

Table 6.38 - Work Relation by age Hd Hhd (row percents)

	77				87			
	Wkp	Av	Wkr	Tot	Wkp	Av	Wkr	Tot
>30	9	52	39	231	42	30	28	234
30-44	10	40	51	463	23	31	46	471
45-60	10	30	61	466	32	25	43	455
60+	72	18	10	490	89	7	4	538

Table 6.39 - Work Relation Hd of Hhd by presence of child in Hhd  
(row percentages)

	77				87			
	Wkp	Av	Wkr	Tot	Wkp	Av	Wkr	Tot
Child	11	41	48	733	33	45	45	580
No Child	42	25	33	918	57	18	25	501

Table 6.40 - Work Relation Social Class 3 Manual Hds of Hhds  
by Tenure (row percents)

	77				87			
	Wkp	Av	Wkr	Tot	Wkp	Av	Wkr	Tot
O. Occ	20	33	45	368	30	24	46	414
Pub Ten	38	29	36	254	76	14	11	210
Total (inc Oth Tens)	187	197	268	653	287	136	214	638

Table 6.38 crosstabulates work relation by age of head of household. Here the most interesting aspect is the apparant effect of age cohorting, the extent to which generational groups seem able to carry through middle life the work relations established at their point of entry into the labour market. Thus whilst all age groups are more work poor in 1987 than in 1977 this is particularly marked for the youngest and oldest groups, whilst the two middle age groups are much less affected. It seems that non-recruitment and early retirement shift the burden of work loss to the youngest and oldest groups. This pattern is repeated in Table 6.39 which examines the connection between household work relation and whether or not the household contains children. What is notable is that between 1977 and 1987 the proportion of households containing children which had a poor work relation increased from 11% to 33%.

Table 6.41 examines the pattern of work relationship of households by standard zone. In 1977 only in East Middlesbrough was the largest category of households those with no work connection and then only marginally. In 1987 this category was largest in 9 zones, equal largest in a ninth, and second largest in the remaining zone (prosperous East Cleveland). In East Middlesbrough by 1987 nearly 75% of all households had no work connection.

Table 6.41 -  
Households Cleveland 1977 and 1987  
by zone and work relation (row percentages for year)

	77				87			
	Wkp	Av	Wkr	Tot	Wkp	Av	Wkr	Tot
IHP	30	35	36	139	56	18	26	139
OHP	19	32	50	126	57	14	27	153
B+SW	24	37	39	118	50	25	25	131
SC	31	32	37	282	47	24	29	263
T+SS	23	30	47	136	37	28	35	143
Mbr IC	32	29	39	93	53	25	22	94
Mbr S	28	32	41	161	37	23	40	184
E Mbr	39	27	35	155	72	11	17	132
E+SB	24	39	37	153	53	16	32	139
R+M	29	33	38	148	49	23	29	187
E Cl	32	26	43	141	32	30	38	133

It seemed worth examining Cleveland's modal households, those headed by a skilled manual worker, in somewhat more detail. In Table 6.36 this is done by examining the tenure relations of this group for the two years. In 1977 20% of owner occupied skilled manual headed households had no worker and 45% were work rich. The comparable figures for public tenants were 38% and 36%. The position of the owner occupied group changed relatively little over ten years. In 1987 30% had no workers and 46% again were work rich. For the public tenants the change was dramatic. By 1987 76% of these households had no poor work connections and only 11% were work rich.

This household level data generally supports the findings of the ED analysis, given that the more prosperous groups retained their size over the period although their absolute level of prosperity seemed to deteriorate slightly. At the same time the position of the less prosperous groups and areas deteriorated markedly. The simplest measure of this is the overall number of work rich owner occupied households as compared with the number of work poor none owner occupied households. In 1977 the Cleveland Survey sample had 429 of its households in the first category (26%) and 278 in the second (17%). In 1987 there were 441 work rich owner occupied households (26%) and 509 work poor non owner occupied households (30%).

Although the data generated by the Cleveland Household Survey is primarily attribute data, it is possible to use Cluster Analysis based taxonomic procedures on it by treating the code value on each attribute as a binary attribute i.e. either present (1) or absent (0). Thus, for example, age of head of household becomes seven binary attributes in which the head of household is either under 20 or not, between 21 and 25 or not, between 25 and 30 or not, and so on. Clearly only one of the binary attributes can have a positive value.

A series of cluster analyses using simple clustering procedures (either RELOC with a simple algorithm in CLUSTAN or QUICK CLUSTER default procedures in SPSSx) were carried out using such binary attribute data generated from the 77 and 87 Cleveland Social Survey data sets. Again Cluster Analysis was being used as an exploratory technique, and choice of method or algorithm made little difference to cluster forms at the levels which are significant for this discussion.

First an analysis was carried out using CLUSTAN RELOC for those households which contained children. The results are given in Table 6.42. They are really quite striking. What they show is that in 1977 Cleveland Households containing children were divided by tenure, and at a level which fell within the skilled manual working class. The division was, to use conventional status labels, between prosperous

Table 6.42 - 2 Cluster Level for Households containing children

(percentage occurrence of attribute)

	77		87	
Nos in Cluster	106	617	145	391
	C11	C12	C11	C12
Hd Hhd <20	1	1	1	-
Hd Hhd 21-25	1	7	15	5
Hd Hhd 26-30	16	20	23	17
Hd Hhd 31-40	41	36	44	49
Hd Hhd 41-50	27	28	13	24
Hd Hhd 51-60	12	8	4	5
Hd Hhd 60+	2	1	1	1
Own Occ	12	72	13	93
Pub Ten	86	25	83	6
Oth Ten	2	3	4	1
HoH Male	75	95	70	95
HoH Female	25	5	30	5
HoH SC 1+2	1	26	7	29
HoH SC 3 NonM	1	10	9	10
HoH SC 3 Man	69	37	19	45
HoH SC 4+5	30	27	65	15
Hhd Wk Poor	53	2	83	8
Hhd Wk Med	3	48	9	38
Hhd Wk Rich	44	50	8	56

Table 6.42 - 2 Cluster Level for Households containing children  
 (percentage occurrence of attribute) - (continued)

	77		87	
	C11	C12	C11	C12
Hd Fem SP	19	4	26	1
Hd Male SP	4	-	-	1
2 Adults	66	91	63	89
Mult No SP	5	2	7	2
Mult with SP	7	4	4	4
Own Car	55	69	15	85
HoH FT wkr	33	95	14	89
HoH PT wkr	5	2	14	1
HoH UE	32	1	45	7
HoH Sick	11	1	7	1
HoH Ret	1	2	-	1 -
HoH Other	18	-	20	1

Table 6.43 - 2 Cluster Level for All Households  
(percentage occurrence of attribute)

Nos in Cluster	77		87	
	594	1018	677	938
	C11	C12	C11	C12
Hd Hhd <20	-	-	-	-
Hd Hhd 21-25	1	7	6	5
Hd Hhd 26-30	5	14	7	11
Hd Hhd 31-40	11	23	12	25
Hd Hhd 41-50	14	22	8	22
Hd Hhd 51-60	16	21	14	21
Hd Hhd 60+	53	12	53	17
Own Occ	18	82	21	95
Pub Ten	75	13	79	4
Oth Ten	7	5	4	1
HoH Male	67	92	58	91
HoH Female	33	8	42	9
HoH SC 1+2	3	29	11	29
HoH SC 3 NonM	7	13	10	12
HoH SC 3 Man	55	32	30	47
HoH SC 4+5	35	25	49	13
Hhd Wk Poor	62	7	83	20
Hhd Wk Med	12	44	10	31
Hhd Wk Rich	26	49	7	49
Cont Children	31	53	23	40

Table 6.43 - 2 Cluster Level for All Households  
 (percentage occurrence of attribute) - (continued)

	77		87	
	C11	C12	C11	C12
Hd Fem SP	4	2	6	2
Hd Male SP	1	-	-	-
2 Adults	87	92	89	94
Mult No SP	2	1	2	1
Mult with SP	6	5	4	3
Own Car	20	77	14	87
HoH FT wkr	27	89	13	72
HoH PT wkr	5	2	5	3
HoH UE	9	1	16	7
HoH Sick	6	1	9	3
HoH Ret	29	6	30	14
HoH Other	23	-	27	1

lower-middle and skilled working class households owning their own homes, and less prosperous working class households which were public sector tenants. Households in the second category were either work poor or work rich, but not in the middle (which reflects the strategy of low income households in an employed society and the benefits regime in the UK - either nobody worked or more than one worked) less likely to own a car and more likely to be headed by a woman.

By 1987 the situation had changed. The first category remained intact. The second was characterized by its work poverty. 71% of households in it contained no working adults. 26% of these households were headed by a female single parent. The division was now not among workers but between workers and workless.

This pattern also applied to the Clusters generated by SPSSx QUICK CLUSTER for all households. Table 6.43 shows the position. In 77 the distinction was between households which were less likely to have work and those which were more likely. A substantial (29%) of households in the first category were retired. There were substantial tenure differences. In 87 the absence of work remained the demarcating aspect of the second category. In 1987 there were significant tenurial differences. The deprived cluster was predominantly public tenanted households with a significant minority of owner-occupiers. The more affluent cluster (see car ownership figures) was overwhelmingly owner-

occupied. Registrar General's Social Class patterns also differed 79% of the households in the 87 less affluent cluster were headed by a manual worker, compared with 60% in the more affluent cluster. The comparable figures for SC4+5 heads were 49% and 13%. By 1987 the relative proportions of affluent and deprived had shifted from those in 1977. In 1977 36% of all households were in the 'deprived' cluster. By 1987 43% were in a more deprived cluster. For households containing children the shifts were from 15% to 28% - a very near doubling - and again the deprived cluster was 'more deprived', both relatively and absolutely..

One final area can be investigated using the Cleveland Household Survey data. This is the change in the make up of households in terms of the social class and industrial location of their heads. Table 6.44 shows this for non-retired households in Cleveland at the two dates. From this table we can see that although there has been a tertiarization of the composition of the group of employed heads, the actual numbers in private and public sector services did not shift over the period, but rather remained static and much the same as a proportion of all non-retired heads. The dramatic shift was the massive decline in industrially employed heads from social classes 3,4 and 5 manual. However, the pattern does show some service class development. The proportion of heads of households in employment who were in social classes 1 and 2 increased as a proportion of all employed heads in all three sectors viz. industrial, private service and public service. This

supports the general account of a shift towards new employment systems emphasizing at one extreme flexibility and qualification, although social class 1 and 2 members are not necessarily to be considered as part of the service class.

Table 6.44 - Sectoral location of non-retired household heads

Services	Industrial		Private Services		Public	
	77	87	77	87	77	87
SC 1+2	9	6	2	5	7	7
SC 3 NH	4	2	3	3	6	2
SC3 Man	25	17	4	5	2	2
SC4+5	15	8	2	2	2	2
-----						
PT Total	4	5				
UE Total	3	13				
Other Total	10	16				
Total Nos	1358	1252				

## Conclusion

The census derived material organized in this chapter is addressed to two of the questions set earlier in this thesis and has implications for three of the others. It is directly relevant for the question : 'Are the poor a socially and spatially segregated underclass outside the economic order ?' and has implications for all the other three questions set in Chapter One about class structure. It is also directly relevant for the first question set in Chapter Three 'What has happened to the arrangement of people and their activities in space in industrial towns ?'. Of course it is limited by the nature of the data sets. Both the Change Census Tract and Enumeration District sets are aggregations of households. They do not permit a household level analysis. However that is not necessarily a problem, and may indeed in an important way be an advantage.

That advantage derives from the linking of the question about the underclass with the question about spatial ordering. In Wilson's formulation he related 'dispossession' with spatial separation. To be among the dispossessed was not simply to be irrelevant to accumulation. Indeed that is not Wilson's formulation, but Bauman's. Rather Wilson emphasized the segregation of the poorest from the rest of society in spatial terms, and hence, through spatially mediated accesses, from the ordinary life of ordinary people.

So we have two related but separate questions which are concerned with the nature of the position of the poorest people in our sort of society. First, what is their connection with the economy ? Second, are they spatially segregated and hence isolated from the ordinary majority ? The census data we have is spatial, and can only be used to answer those questions in spatial terms. It does not address the position of individual households, but of aggregates of households who live in close proximity. It is about spatial collectivities.

Working at this level of spatial collectivity, we can see that the poorest areas are not disconnected from employment. True, unemployment in the poorest identifiable clusters in 1981 was above 35% for men. Women's rates were also high, but even more significant was the low level of full time economic activity by married women in 1981. However 35% unemployment for men meant 65% male employment and part-time work was as prevalent for married women in the poorest areas in 1981 as anywhere else. The characteristic of these areas was that they contained people who, on the evidence we have available about social class, were likely to be the working poor who lived in close proximity with people who were unemployed. It is perfectly possible that transition from one status to another was common. What we have here is far better described in terms of a reserve army than in terms which emphasize economic irrelevancy.

The analyses of the 1991 data confirm the continued existence of this pattern, although unemployment rates for both men and women were substantially higher and were approaching 40%. Even more indicative was the fact that in these poorest clusters roughly half of all households containing children had no working adult. The situation seems to be becoming stabilized in a new form.

The degree of spatial segregation is also high. There is clearly a tenure segregation in that households resident in the poorest clusters at the three cluster level in all three LEAs are very likely to be public sector tenants and less likely to be owner-occupiers. Conversely the prosperous are very likely to be owner-occupiers. Patterns vary. Cleveland has 20% owner-occupiers in the poorest ED three level cluster. Sunderland's equivalent is nearly 90% public tenant. However inspection of ED maps shows that a lot of Cleveland's poor owner-occupiers are inner city residents. In the suburbs there is segregation.

We need to think carefully about the character of the changes over the twenty years for which we can access them. What emerges from the analyses of the change data set has already been described but the ED data does take things further in an important way. What we have seen in these three industrial towns is an expansion in the proportion of people who live in prosperous areas (and hence by a no means heroic cross-level inference, in the

proportion of people who are prosperous). At the same time the position of the rest of the population has deteriorated in one crucial respect. They no longer live under conditions of full employment.

The consequence of this is simple. The relative position of the non-prosperous, what Wilkinson (1990) has identified as the crucial determinant of life chances in the most direct and straightforward way, has got a good deal worse. This would have happened in terms of relative deprivation (See Runciman 1967) even if there had been no significant absolute decline in the condition of those left behind as more made it over into 'middle-class' consumption prosperity. That is how relative deprivation works. However there has been a major and important absolute decline.

The question of the relationship between the poorest and middle groups is very important. The evidence suggesting that a major source of the difference is generational (i.e. the contrasts between the situation in 1971 and 1981) is crucial, because it implies that we are carrying forward through people's life histories a division which began with deindustrialization at the time they were going into the labour market. Only household panel studies carried forward through time can provide a full answer to this question. However the 1991 findings which show a degree of demographic homogeneity amongst socio-spatial clusters, do suggest that the structure is becoming stable and permanent. The findings

of the Cleveland Social Survey do allow us both to focus at the unit which is the essential basis of social reproduction, the household, in a way which is not possible for the Censuses which cannot (within a one hundred year time limit) be disaggregated below the level of Enumeration District in a way which preserves the local spatial referent.

The Social Survey data confirms that the divisions identified at an ED level for 1981 and 1991 also existed at a household level in 1987. Indeed the whole general tenor of this material is to confirm the ED level analyses, not only by extension in time, but by showing that relationships and trends which exist at the aggregate level of ED do in fact hold at the household level. The social survey data confirms the tendency to socio-tenurial polarization, confirms the generational character of differences, and points up the very great extent to which the costs of deindustrialization in Cleveland have been born by the poorer social groups. It also confirms the questioning of Pahl's and similar accounts of absolute polarization. To be work rich is not necessarily to be in receipt of high incomes. The presence of worker containing households in poorer areas and especially in council tenure, shows that those households are constrained by income from access to better residential and tenurial positions. Put simply they are low paid workers. We cannot confirm this from income data, because that is not collected by Cleveland Social Survey, but car ownership figures do support the contention that

there is group of working poor which overlaps in residence with the benefit dependent poor.

The household level cluster analyses are very important here. The deprived clusters for both 87 household sets (containing children and all households) have very high proportions of households with no workers, but they also include a large proportion of households which do contain workers (a slight majority for the all household cluster). This very much supports the interpretation placed on the geographical data to the effect that the working poor and the workless poor overlap. This is confirmed by the zone analyses using the household data sets. With case information at the household level we can see that Cleveland zones (which are large geographical areas) do show social differentiation. In particular East Middlesbrough (which is an area of great interest because of its specific planning history - see chapter seven) is clearly a deprived area containing non-working and poor working households. Essentially the household data sets triangulate the ED and Census tract material.

The only other longitudinal based analysis of this kind which I have been able to identify is that of Dale and Bamford (1989). The Cleveland data in part supports and in part differs from the points they make about polarization among UK households as a whole. In particular the Cleveland trend towards polarization is much more marked and unequivocal than for the national picture.

which suggests the vital significance of studies of the impact of deindustrialization at the level at which it really occurs, that of the functional employment/industrial complex of the regional city. However Dale and Bamford do make an important point which is worth noting here. In essence they ask :is the position of the young poor a permanent one in the sense that as suggested in this chapter they will carry their disadvantages through a working life, or does it represent the emergence of a new household work/prosperity cycle in which young adults take much longer to enter central work, but do achieve this position in middle life, only to lose it again in later life. As Dale and Bamford say, that is a question for longitudinal analyses based on panel studies, although some of the Cleveland annual surveys do offer the possibility of retrospective examination of work relations of households over the period of deindustrialization as it has happened. Although Dale and Bamford do not use this form of account explicitly, they are asking in realist terms if we are going through a transition from one relatively permanent structural form to another, in which life cycle has a good deal more saliency.

In my view the answer to that question is not determined. In other words, to quote O'Connor (1982) it is not a matter of what will happen but of what will be made to happen. That to a considerable extent in the industrial towns with which this thesis is concerned will be a matter for planning, and will reflect the

impact of planning processes which are underway as this thesis is being written. That will be the focus of the next but one chapter. However we can, at this stage, identify a potential situation of differentiation. It does not seem to be one which supports the notion of a permanently benefit dependent underclass as separated from the rest of the population. Rather it is one which identifies a population of households which are residentially segregated but which are characterized by a mix of benefit dependency and 'poor work' and are likely to shift between these at different stages in the household life cycle and in response to changing economic conditions. The image is of a kind of super-exploited (at least in absolute terms) population housed within our society, which has something of the character of colonial proletariat. The idea of a 'fourth world' (see Harrison, 1983) seems to describe this rather well.

## Chapter Seven - The Modernisation of three industrial towns

### Introduction

The idea of modernization has already been introduced into this thesis with specific reference both to Cook's (1987) conceptualization of the process, and to the impact of the general processes of government intervention as mediated through regional policy and related activities. I have suggested that for the UK as a whole it was the structural problems of the early 1960s which triggered the emergence of modernization as a process, but that the style and content of modernization policies owed much to the earlier era of the 1930s and the impact of 'Special Areas' policies in specific places. In the North East the Hailsham initiative of 1963 was clearly modelled on the Special Areas policies, and like them prioritized industrial diversification.

Considerable attention has been paid to the general form of these policies, as they reacted with the investment decisions of private capital and influenced investment decisions in the key production elements in the nationalized industries of coal, steel and shipbuilding (See Hudson 1989, Townsend 1985, Beynon et al 1991). The emphasis has been on the reorganization of the system of production, and that is of the greatest importance. This thesis has little to add to this account, apart from some consideration of the intra-urban relocation of production as outlined in Chapter Three. The emphasis here is on the other aspect of modernization,

on the recasting of the organization of urban socio-spatial and tenurial patterns through a massive physical programme of urban reconstruction, 'renewal' and consequent suburbanization. Some serious attention was paid to this in the early 1970s (see J.G. Davies 1973, Dennis 1969, 1971) but it has been relatively neglected since then in comparison with the intensive study of production and the labour process. In other words the investigative emphasis has been on production rather than reproduction (with the partial exception of Saddler, 1990 for Teesside). Here it is the other way around.

Of course the separation of production and reproduction is abstract and artificial. In reality the reconstruction of the processes was often closely related. For example the impact of urban road programmes, usually justified by claims of the necessity to facilitate industrial development, on residential patterns, has been immense. Likewise the possibility of the massive expansion of suburban owner-occupation depended on the structure of real household incomes which emerged at least in part from the recasting of production and employment dependent on it. However the separation has heuristic value and avoids repetition in relation to the production centred account.

It is, however, necessary to identify a key thematic which links both processes. From the end of the War until the middle 1960s there was an unequivocal link between all strategies of modernization and the political objective of full employment - the

essence of left Keynesianism. This does not mean that the effect of policies was always to facilitate the achievement of full employment. In very important instances it was quite the opposite, as with support from regional policy funding for the development of capital intensive and employment destroying investment in chemicals and steel, although even this programme was a late development. However at a formal level the objective of full employment was maintained. This was both an essential of assuring labour movement cooperation in a basically corporatist enterprise, and a quite genuine commitment on the part of public servants and private capitalists (of the regional sort) who were followers of Macmillan's version of one nation Toryism. The labour movement never explicitly abandoned its commitment to full employment. It just drifted into a kind of supine acceptance of its impossibility. The 'policy community' was more precise. In the First Interim Report of the Northern Regional Strategy Team (1976) the objective of the strategy was identified as : ' a healthy and stable economy capable of providing work for all who seek it, a range of employment opportunities and incomes comparable to those found elsewhere in Britain.' By 1977 and the Second Interim Report definitions had changed :

"In the context of the UK, a strong regional economy may be defined as one that over the longer term, is not continually dependent of special resource transfer from the rest of the country in order (i) to sustain a level of prosperity no less than the national average and (ii) to generate new job

opportunities such the the rate of unemployment and balance of migration are acceptable from a national point of view." (1977 : Vol I, p 4 ,para 2.4)

At the time this position was clearly identified by the Durham Regional Research Unit as involving the abandonment of a commitment to full employment (1977, p 17). A useful distinction was made in the early 70s by Carney and Townsend, in their commentary on the Teeside Structure Plan (1976), between the 'politics of modernization' and the 'politics of social reform', although the distinction is perhaps too simplistic and should be extended to take account of 'the politics of urban manipulation'. By the politics of modernisation Carney and Townsend meant support for the recasting of production to facilitate the requirements of trans-national capital. By the politics of social reform they meant the traditional North Eastern labourist objectives of full employment, high wages and decent social conditions (1976, Chapter 10). As they remarked :

"The politics of social reform have placed great emphasis on reducing social inequality and eradicating poverty. The politics of modernisation have relatively little orientation towards social inequality ; it is not identified as having great importance. Where such policies are dominant we expect to find poverty and social inequality being ignored." (1976 b p 14)

Carney and Townsend included the role both of more nationally orientated property capital and local housebuilding capital in achieving their respective objectives in relation to Structure Plan content, as part of the politics of modernization (1976 b Chapter 10). This is an interesting point. It seems to me on reflection that they were certainly part of a necessary local coalition of interests, as was the 'road lobby', but that there was no general structural requirement for their inclusion, in contrast to the road lobby. In other words central area and suburban developers were 'local' because of the 'local' (in the sense defined by Cox and Mair, 1987) scale of their operation. Their operations were not structurally necessary for a recasting of production, as the development of a new road network was necessary for such recasting. In another place and at another time, the production restructuring could have proceeded without the political support of these fractions (and I am very much reminded here of Lefbvre's distinction between primary and secondary circuits of capital, and the role of property development in relation to the latter). However at this time and in this place, the participation of the urban developers was necessary. My reference above to 'the politics of manipulation' is a reference to their role.

The situation in Teesside, at least in relation to the development of planning policy, if not of its social consequences, is relatively well documented. The situation in Sunderland is less well documented (apart from Robson's very useful descriptions of

1967) because Dennis was more concerned with the neighbourhood scale. The situation in South Tyneside is not documented. This chapter will proceed by an examination of the nature and form of urban transformation in the three areas between the end of the war and 1980. The start date has been selected because key decisions were taken in the 1940s in relation to obligations under the 1944 and 1949 Planning acts. The end date is set by the Local Government (Planning and Land) Act 1980 which can be considered to be the legislative embodiment of 'post-modernization' principles in planning and urban reconstruction. I include the content of Structure Plans as developed in the late 1970s and updated in the early 1980s as part of the modern phase of planning. In other words the modern and post-modern phases overlap during the period when Structure Plans were still extant. It is only with the development of Unitary Development Plans and City Challenge proposals in the early 1990s that we can see an unequivocal post-modern, post-modernization phase in planning.

The distinction between the period between 1945 and the late 1950s on the one hand, and developments subsequently, and particularly around the Hailsham initiative of 1963 on the other is of great importance. The earlier phase was very much dominated by the 'politics of social reform', whereas the later was much more modernization led. There can be no exact divide between these phases but one guideline relates to the nature of housing policy. Between 1945 and the late 1950s this was dominated by public sector supply to relieve housing shortages and overcrowding and

proceeded through 'suburbanization by addition' in good quality traditionally built estates. Subsequently it was divided with a massive re-emergence of the private sector 'suburbanizing by addition' with the public sector concentrating on slum clearance, although in the study areas much of that continued to be on peripheral estates and in traditional housing forms. However the slum clearance developments did provide a crucial opportunity for urban renewal, much of which had been planned in the immediate post-war period of reconstruction but which was not implemented until much later. Of particular significance here was Hailsham's explicitly Keynesian intervention of the early 1960s when he funded all the 'back of the drawer' schemes of local authorities in order to sustain employment levels.

#### **The Modernisation of South Tyneside and Wearside**

I will deal with these two areas together because a crucial process for both was the construction of Washington New Town which lies between them, although much of the modernization occurred on the peripheries of both as the existing river bank settlements expanded towards each other and took in the intervening part of the Durham Coalfield including Washington. The simplest way to convey the extent of the change is by giving figures for housing construction and slum clearance over the period and that is done for all the study areas in Table 7.1. The enormous scale of the combined impact of slum clearance and housing development is clear. Between 1951 and 1991 the combined populations of South

Table 7.1 - Housing Construction and Clearance in the Study Areas

	Sunderland	Washin.*	South Tyne	Cleve.
Clearance 55-75	11,833		12,728	24,480
as % of 51 Total dwellings	16.5		23.7	21.1
76-91 clearance	938		3,475	10,124
% of this post 83	3.8		10.4	5.9
as % of 51 total dwellings	1.3		6.4	8.7
New Building 45-75 Tot	55,625		31,753	105,018
% Social	77.0		80.4	58.6
% Private	23.0		19.6	41.4
Net Gain 45-75	30,972		12,807	70,414
New Building 76-91	8,831	8,793	8,925	34,046
% Social	39.7	59.3	53.4	40.0
% Private	60.3	41.7	46.6	60.0
Net Gain 76-91	7,893	8,793	5,450	23,922
Private Imp Grants 51-91	19,904		10,510	44,917
Population 1951	276,672		174,608	473,352
Population 1991	287,718		152,236	544,440
Dwellings 1951	71,775		53,705	116,019
Dwellings 1991	117,737		65,851	221,719

\* covering the period 75-88 when Washington was not included in Sunderland figures

Tyneside and Sunderland (including Washington New Town) actually declined from 451,280 to 439,414. This combined population had peaked in 1961 at 473,261. In contrast the number of dwellings increased between 1951 and 1991 from 125,480 to 183,588. Thus a 7% decline in population was associated with a 46% increase in the number of dwellings. This was of course not a matter of simple new building. Over the forty five year period from 1946 to 1991 28,974 dwellings were demolished and 113,954 were built. Some 20,000 were built in the immediate six post-war years and 90,000 after 1951. The balance of the total appears to have come from conversions.

If we look at the phasing of these changes there is a distinction between the combined effects of the post-war and modernization period on the one hand, and the era of post-modernization on the other. It is not a precise distinction because important changes began under the Heath government of 1970 - 74 but broadly speaking the social reform / modernization era was one of slum clearance and public sector house building, whilst in the post-modernization era slum clearance was faded out and new provision is much more likely to be in the private sector. In Sunderland and South Tyneside 78% of new housebuilding between 45 and 76 was in the public sector. Subsequently that proportion fell to 50% over the period 76-91. Moreover, there have been big shifts in volume of construction. Between 45 and 75 completions of new dwellings in the Sunderland - South Shields axis averaged 4,162 per year. Since 1976 average completions has fallen to 2,413 and this average is lifted by higher completion rates in the late

70s as the modernization programmes ran down, and by the impact of Washington New Town which was a modernization initiative. Most of the public sector development was front-loaded in this way, and recent construction has been very much private sector dominated, although there has not been much of it. In other words there was more private sector construction in the 60s and early 70s than there was in the 80s, although the early phase co-existed with a continuing public housing programme.

The actual form taken by these developments was that of massive peripheral suburbanization of housing, both public and private, and the relocation of much industrial employment from the traditional river corridors to 'trading estate' style developments also located peripherally. An important effect has been to transform the pattern of urban living from congested, public transport based, high density city life to spread out, car based, low density suburban life. The archetype of this development has been Washington New Town.

The relocation of population has been very considerable. In 1951 the settlement pattern of the South Tyneside / Sunderland area consisted of estuarine towns (Sunderland itself, South Shields, Jarrow, Hebburn) and associated pit villages with a handful of surviving pre-industrial rural villages without a pit. The great mass of the population lived in pre 1914 housing concentrated within half a mile of the industrial rivers, although inter-war suburbanization had already doubled the size of the

built up area. By 1979 this built up area had increased by nine times over its 1911 level (TW Structure Plan, 1979). The first phase of overspill council estates - Marsden, Hedworth, Whiteleas, Red House, Thorney Close, Pennywell etc., was followed both by the development of Washington and by a revival of owner-occupied overspill development - Seaburn Dean, Temple Park, East Boldon. More recently there has been massive overspill owner-occupied development extending into the former coalfield, especially at Houghton-le-Spring. Given that this development is associated with an extensive road network, the area has taken on a post-urban decentred, 'edge-city' form.

This has to be seen as the explicit intention of the combined social reform and modernization policies of this period. In the 1950s the Medical Officer of Health of nearby Gateshead had welcomed the opportunity slum clearance gave for urban renewal :

" ... it is by the clearance of these dwellings, now obsolete, decrepit and sometimes even ruinous, that the wide spaces are to be found to make possible the potentially valuable commercial and business development as well as the modern road improvements."

(Gateshead Post, 29th November 1963)

Indeed this was a relatively late statement. An examination of the documents prepared in connection with the immediate post-war town planning schemes in South Shields and Sunderland shows the same

concern was present then. It is worth emphasizing this early period because it shows rather clearly how very real social reform concerns of the reconstruction period could later be incorporated into the modernization programme.

In South Shields the key figure was the Borough Engineer, the formidable John Reid. In a series of moderate, sensible reports prepared in typescript and duplicated (I read these on the same day as I read the current *City Challenge* bid for Sunderland - the contrast was remarkable), he outlined a major programme of redevelopment driven by two concerns. The first was the need to provide housing to relieve acute housing need in what was one of the worst housed towns in England. The second was a desperate concern for a diversification of the industrial base, so that the post world war I experience of collapse of over-stimulated war orientated heavy industries, would not produce the long term structural unemployment of the 1920s and 30s. This was a very real fear at the time, although the actual decline did not begin until the 1960s.

Reid's plan was for peripheral development of nearly 600 acres of land at Simonside and Whiteleas for housing (today's Whiteleas, Brockley Whins, Simonside and Biddick Hall estates) with a massive expansion of the council housing in the Marsden area, coupled with an expansion of industrial estates in order to provide a diversified industrial base (see *Draft Town Planning Scheme - Written Statement* 1950 which summarized a series of earlier

reports). By 1953 Reid had prepared a development plan for the central area of South Shields covering 43.2 acres which was associated with adjacent slum clearance schemes covering 200 acres. The land released was to be used for central area renewal (in South Shields a modest scheme amounting to the restoration of bomb damage), central area industrial sites and a modern road network. The assumption was that industry should expand by the provision of modern facilities on the periphery of the existing industrial belt and roads should be provided to service it, whilst housing was separated in the new suburbs.

Reid pointed out (as his equivalent did at the same time in Tynemouth - see Byrne 1980) that land use constraints meant that the authority : " ... must accept multi-storied flats as inevitable.", but a combination of political pressure for houses and ground conditions in an area which is almost totally underlain by coal workings, means that there are few flatted blocks, and no high rise, in South Shields. The reader of these reports must be struck by the impact of the war-time experience. Reid placed considerable emphasis on the need for agricultural land in order to minimize reliance on imports - very understandable in a town which had not only was still undergoing food rationing, but had had the highest casualties of any in Britain during the war, as a consequence of the losses of merchant seamen. However, as Reid pointed out, the development costs of greenfield sites were £100-200 per acre compared with £1,000 for central sites, but, and this

theme was constantly repeated, Reid pointed out that South Shields did not have enough development land within its boundaries.

The reconstruction plans for Jarrow and Hebburn were prepared by Durham County Council on broadly the same lines, with even more emphasis on slum clearance (*County Durham Development Plan - Written Statement CDA 1 - Jarrow 1955*). Emphasis was placed on industrial diversification using English Industrial Estate's Bede Trading Estate located between South Shields and Jarrow, understandable in the town with the highest 1930s unemployment rate in the UK, and on the clearance of the central area where 75% of dwellings required replacement.

Sunderland's proposals were very similar, with the additional problem of dealing with a good deal more bomb damage. Sunderland had had 1,200 dwellings destroyed by enemy action and 34,749 damaged, which was many more than South Shields, whereas Jarrow and Hebburn had never been bombed. In 1951 the *Development Plan - Written Analysis* estimated that by 1971 the County Borough area would have a population of 185,000 of whom there was space within the borough boundary for just 170,000. It was these population (over) estimates (see Dennis 1970) which shaped developments and supported the building of Washington New Town. Sunderland planned for 25,000 people to live in overspill areas within the borough boundaries, and began a massive construction programme at Hylton Red House, Castletown, Farrington and Grindon. This was later

extended to include Silksworth, with the 70s Doxford Park development being the final phase of this extension.

The present author was actually an eye-witness of these processes. My primary school was located in the middle of the redevelopment areas in South Shields (one of the flats in which we then lived was subsequently demolished, although most have been retained as part of improvement schemes), and I walked to Grammar School from Sunderland bus station through a major redevelopment zone in that town. The documentary evidence and my own lived experience fully supports the commitments to slum clearance and industrial diversification. People did live in appalling conditions (Tyneside and Wearside had more overcrowding than any other areas in England and Wales and approached Clydeside levels) and the fear of the return of the 30s was real. On the whole, with important exceptions towards the end of the programme as Dennis documented for Millfield in Sunderland (1970,1972) the planning programmes of this era were popular and effective.

However, they were not participatory, other than to the extent (much more real then than now, because of effective trade union links) that the Labour Party itself was a democratic organization. There was little dispute, and the technicians were unable to impose flats, but there was minimal consultation with the mass of the population. Housing development and job diversification were consensual objectives in the social reform period, but the absence of participation was a crucial weakness

subsequently. This is illustrated by the events post 1963 when social reform had given way to modernization, which are well exemplified by the history of Washington New Town.

The Washington Development Corporation was created in 1963 as part of the Hailsham programme of modernization of the North East Coalfield. The intention was to combine the replacement of employment in a declining coal industry with urban decongestion by the development of a New Town on a coalfield site which would draw much of its population from the Tyne and Wear conurbations. The location was very much determined by the existing plans for the development of the A1(M) and A19 (Tyne Tunnel) roads, and the site was located between these (Holley, 1983). The Development Corporation was an statist, dirigist quango (Holley's book was entitled *Washington - Quicker by Quango*) whose Chief Executive was a former colonial civil servant. Over the 20 year life of the Development Corporation 16,280 dwellings were built (9,123 by the Development Corporation to rent, 373 by WDC for sale, 1,316 by Sunderland and its predecessor local authorities to rent, 149 by Housing Associations, and 5,297 by private developers for sale). Over the same period 454,670 sq. metres of factory space was provided, 61,066 sq. metres of shopping provision and 72,390 sq. metres of office space. Employment peaked at 21,594 total in 1979. The core of this employment was in branch manufacturing plants attracted by regional development incentives but there has been a pattern of closure and job loss very similar to that in Cramlington (see Byrne 1989). Significant closures include Timex

(1,000 job losses), Howard Rotavator (500), RCA (300), TI Tubes (300), Rotaprint (150), etc.

However, Washington is the location of the largest recent job gain in the North East in the form of the development of Nissan and the plants associated with it. The full story of Nissan is given in Garrahan and Stewart (1992) but it should be regarded as part of the modernization era, with a new, post-modernization, twist. In form Nissan is a classic modernization era car making branch plant, just as Hailewood and Linwood were in the 1960s. The element which requires discussion in relation to the post-modernization era is Nissan's control over development land around its own main site, which will be dealt with in the next chapter. In other respects - state subsidy, the form of negotiations surrounding its arrival, the low skill content of work, and the lack of integration with the traditional industrial culture, Nissan differs very little from predecessor branch plants.

It is clear that there was a much more participatory commitment surrounding the Tyne and Wear Structure Plan (1979) as that was prepared in the 1970s. This reflected both the content of national legislation after the Skeffington report (1969) and a genuine local understanding of the impact of directed plans on local communities.. However, the Structure Plan was explicitly derived from the Northern Regional Strategy Team's overview of the region as a whole (1976, 1977, 1979) and consequently reflected a rather uneasy combination of 'modernization' and 'social reform'

objectives. Thus in *The Report of Survey* it was asserted that :  
The Structure Plan is a land-use plan, not an instrument of social  
planning." (Tyne and Wear County Council, 1979 p15 para 2.1) whilst  
the earlier *Choosing the Strategy* had begun with the statement :

"The Strategy has two principle aims : to help  
increase the number and range of jobs in the County,  
and to help direct the greatest benefits to the most  
deprived sections of the community." (Tyne and Wear  
County Council, 1978 p I)

In practical terms the plan emphasized the retention of industrial  
land, and indeed the reservation of key strategic sites for  
potential large incoming plants. Special note was taken of the  
unique character of sites with deep water frontage (Policy ED 4  
*Tyne and Wear Structure Plan 1979*). Vacant sites were specified  
for port related uses. Of particular subsequent significance in  
Sunderland was the statement of the Structure Plan derived *A Plan  
for the Riverside 1977* where in *Draft Policies and Proposals* it  
was stated that :

"In recognition of the importance of riverside  
industry to Sunderland all suitable sites along the  
waterfront will be allocated for this purpose.  
(Policy I)

On the housing, office development and shopping fronts the Structure Plan sought to contain urban growth. It recognized that the massive increase in housing units coupled with what it saw as at best a slowly growing population, could lead to an oversupply of accommodation in the conurbation. There was a particular emphasis on the development of housing in inner city locations and control of overspill greenfield development.

These objectives reflected the very extensive character of private and public 'suburbanization by addition' (see Byrne 1989 p 51). The Centre for Environmental Studies identified 29% of the population of South Tyneside and 20% of the population of Sunderland as living on public sector outer estates in 1981 (Table 1, p2, 1984) . The whole of Washington New Town was an example of 'suburbanization by addition' and its suburban character was asserted by the Structure Planners who rejected the New Town Development Corporation's efforts to have it identified as a separate and distinctive settlement.

In practice the formally presented and extensively documented Structure Plan has had little impact. Indeed the next chapter will be in large part devoted to outlining how developments in the post-modernization era reflect departures from its detailed content and overall objectives. However it is worth noting that to a considerable extent the Structure Plan did represent an attempt to redress some of the excesses of the earlier phase of modernization by emphasizing the need to retain central services

On the housing, office development and shopping fronts the Structure Plan sought to contain urban growth. It recognized that the massive increase in housing units coupled with what it saw as at best a slowly growing population, could lead to an oversupply of accommodation in the conurbation. There was a particular emphasis on the development of housing in inner city locations and control of overspill greenfield development.

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and seeking to pre-empt out of town commercial (as opposed to industrial) developments based on the modernization generated road network.

By the mid 70s the urban conditions of Tyneside and Wearside had been transformed. Slum clearance and improvement policies had largely eliminated issues of housing amenity. Massive construction, coupled with high out migration, had eliminated overcrowding. The road networks and associated suburban development had 'de-urbanized' what had previously been two of the most urban areas in England. This was the situation when deindustrialization hit.

**Cleveland - from planned social reform through modernization.**

The immediate post-war planning of Cleveland was achieved through plans for Middlesbrough, Hartlepool and Stockton and by the planning processes of Durham and North Yorkshire County Councils. The emphasis here will be on the plans prepared for the urban areas, because Billingham UDC was to all intents and purposes planned by ICI and post-war development continued the inter-war pattern. The two more interesting plans were those prepared for the Hartlepools (both the municipal borough of Hartlepool and the county borough of West Hartlepool), and for Middlesbrough by the Max Lock group.

*The Middlesbrough Survey and Plan* (1946) is a fascinating document. It derived from a decision taken by the Borough council in 1943 and combined physical and social planning. Indeed much of the theme for the plan was set by Ruth Glass in her sociological contributions. Unlike the South Tyneside and Sunderland plans there was nothing like so much emphasis on industrial diversification, although this was not ignored. Instead the key theme was urban renewal. This reflects the very low level of inter-war clearance in Middlesbrough compared with Tyneside and Wearside, although it should be remembered that Middlesbrough was a new town of the second half of the nineteenth century and hence lacked the pre-industrial and early 19th century slums of the other conurbation. Only 775 dwellings had been demolished in the inter-war years, whereas 4,190 council houses had been built. Although these were used for relief of overcrowding, it is noticeable that, in contrast with Tyneside, 1930s housing areas are not regarded as dump housing in Middlesbrough, and remain among the more respectable estates.

The key social element in the Lock plan was for the construction of 19,700 new dwellings in Middlesbrough over a thirty year period to 1975 and the demolition of 22,000 over the same period. The remainder of new housing would be provided by overspill development, although this was not planned at this stage. The main new development was to be at East Middlesbrough where the existing Bramble Farm and Whitehouse Farm developments were to be added to through the expansion of North Ormesby and

through new developments at Park Avenue, Pallister Park and Thorntree. An adjacent industrial estate was developed in order to provide some diversification of employment, especially for women. Park Avenue was intended as a middle class owner occupied area to retain some middle class in Middlesbrough. The Lock team's plan for Hartlepool (1948) was on very similar lines with a similar scheme at Ouston Manor. Stockton's plans were locally prepared but as Vamplew (1992), shows took a very similar form. The Lock team's surveys and plans were not the official local authority plans under the 1947 act but they were the basis of them. The result was a massive expansion of housing development in these areas in the late 40s and 50s, and the broad framework laid out at this time guided public sector housing development into the 1970s.

It should be noted that the Max Lock plan was informed by extensive public consultation. There was a pioneering social survey and more than 22,000 people attended an exhibition of the scheme prior to its formal adoption. This was a pioneering example of planning informed by public views.

Teesside (by which was meant Stockton, Middlesbrough, Billingham, and Redcar) was the location of a major innovation in local government in the key modernization period of the early 1960s with the establishment of the new Teesside County Borough in 1968, although *Teesplan* (1968) was begun by a central and local government consortium prior to this change. The actual relationships among *Teesplan*, and the subsequent structure plans

of Teesside County Borough (1972) and Cleveland County Council (1977) are complex in administrative detail (see Hudson et al, 1990), but straightforward enough in essentials. Although there was some early commitment to industrial diversification in the aftermath of Hailsham, which led to the development by English Industrial Estates of the Teesside Industrial Estate (1964), the overwhelming emphasis on the production side was on the facilitation of capital intensive developments in Chemicals and Steel. In *Crisis in Cleveland - From Dream to Nightmare* (1985) Cleveland County Planning Department were to describe this period as that of the capital intensive revolution. These events and processes have been fully documented as noted above. Much less attention has been paid to social developments.

In a revealing comment, which is sustained by an examination of the subsequent pattern of housing development, Carney and Townsend remarked that :

"Interests involved in private housing site development in Teesside are identified. These interests constitute a powerful 'lobby' seeking to influence the direction of housing progress and policy. The interests of the lobby are to ensure that Council Direct Labour Organizations are not built up and that council building is done at times and in such ways as to suit private builders' requirements.

Moreover these interest effectively control much of the housing land in Cleveland." (1976, p5, para 8)

The position is complicated in the 70s by the existence of four separate structure plans for Cleveland County covering Teesside (the area of the short-lived County Borough), Hartlepool, East Cleveland, and West Cleveland. Within the core urban areas (Stockton, Middlesbrough and Hartlepool Districts) there was adequate housing land, and the pattern of residential development does not seem to have been contentious. By the time the Structure Plan's were brought together in 1990 (Cleveland County Council), there was an emphasis on new development at Coulby Newham which at that time was intended to be 60% public and 40% private, but this was really wishful thinking. As Table 7.1 shows most of Cleveland's housing development in recent years has been in the private sector. There has been continuous development in West Middlesbrough, Yarm, Eaglescliff, in suburban Hartlepool and into East Cleveland. Sunderland and South Tyneside have had a similar types of development since the late 50s. The effects of tenurial divisions in space will be returned to in the consideration of the 'post-modern' phase.

The actual production process for these developments did change slightly over time. In the late 50s and 60s development involved a revival of the 1930s pattern and frequently took the form of addition to 1930s private developments, as East Middlesbrough had involved development by addition to 1930s public

sector schemes. The major builders were, with the exception of Wimpey, regional in origin. Some (Bell's see Banim 1985, Leech's see Byrne, forthcoming) continued their inter-war role. Others (Yuill's) grew in the immediate post-war period, often through public housebuilding contracts, from small jobbing builders to builder developers. It is clear that land development profits were important to them (the major advantage of building on speculation for sale as opposed to, to tender on a public contract) but the rent element in land development was not massive. It should be stressed that builders cannot be seen in isolation in this system. They were intimately linked through cross-director networking and established business practices with building societies and realty professionals (surveyors, estate agents, solicitors and accountants) in a pattern which dated back to the system established for urban development for private renting in the second half of the nineteenth century (see Boddy, 1980; North Tyneside CDP 1975).

The significance of these 'Elm Lodge' estates (see *Whatever happened to the likely lads* - the TV sitcom of the late 70s) is enormous. They were a market product, much more so than in the inter-war years when extensive state subsidy, guarantee and facilitation was required to sustain the owner-occupied sector in this region (see Byrne, 1980), although state facilitation through planning processes and co-operation remained important. They were very much the product of general full employment and prosperity. It is noticeable that ICI's company town of Billingham has much

housing of this sort, both from the 1930s and from the 1950s, and contains areas which look very like a prosperous North London suburb. It would be impossible to place too much emphasis on the 'peaceful co-existence' of this sector with its immediate good quality council housing precursors. As Vamplew (1992) has shown there was considerable movement from the latter into the former, and the evidence of social (especially familial) connections etc is great. The North East is not marked by any Cuttleslow walls.

Crucial to all of this was the relative cheapness of the construction. Table 7.2 shows house prices and earnings over the period 1971-1990. In 1969 the average price of a new dwelling (almost always then a semi-detached house) in the Northern Region (the study areas contain 30% of the Region's population) was 2.9 times the average income of a purchaser and 3.4 times the average annual earnings of a full time male manual worker. In 1992 they were 4.0 to purchaser's income and 5.1 to average full time male manual earnings. New house prices increased in relation to purchasers incomes during the 80s and in relation to male manual earnings. In the 60s and 70s standard new dwellings were accessible to better paid manual workers purchasing as new buyers. By 1990 they were much less likely to be so accessible as they cost half as much again in relation to wages.

This was not a matter of comparative quality. In fact the dwellings built in the 60s and early 70s were substantially better

Table 7.2 - House Prices and Earnings in the North East

	Price NDW	Price Av Dw	Borr Inc (% Av Dw)	Av Man Inc (% Av Dw)
1969	£4,200	£3,714	43	36
1974	na	£8,444	41	29
1979	na	£15,443	38	32
1984	£28,800	£22,600	43	25
1989	£58,300	£47,300*	30	25
1992	£70,300	£50,100*	35	28

\*(excluding council houses purchased by sitting tenant)

than the average new dwelling of the late 80s when far more flats and starter homes were built. Semi-detached houses sold new for £4,800 in South Shields and Sunderland in the late 60s now sell for £70,000. Of course inheritance does complicate the relationship between earnings and access to new stock, but that factor only applies to households which have grandparents and/or parents who were owner-occupiers themselves.

### Conclusion

It has been quite difficult to sort out the periodization of developments in planning in the study areas, but I have been helped enormously by reading Mike Davis' *City of Quartz* (1990). I was particularly struck by his discussion of the 'Keynesian' tract developers of the 50s and 60s in that city. The combination of cheap land and access to credit created the idealized suburb. What interested me was the idea that this process was best understood by a Keynesian referent. In other words it was to be understood not in terms of production processes - for example as Fordist (not in terms of the actual production of dwellings but in relation to the dominant mode in manufacturing) - but in terms of public policy style and objectives. If Los Angeles was characterized by right wing Keynesianism (and as Parson, 1983 has documented it was because the public sector rented alternative was systematically destroyed) then the North Eastern industrial towns I have studied were examples of left-wing Keynesianism in action. All this was dependent on growth and on the absence of a sense of

competitive threat, but through from the 40s to the 60s social reform objectives were pursued TO GREAT EFFECT. The achievements in housing terms were enormous and on Tyne and Wear side the immediate effects of industrial diversification contributed to an unprecedented level of prosperity, unprecedented because it provided relatively well paid employment for women in association with traditional high wages for men.

What is interesting is the way in which the genuinely consensual objectives of the 40s and 50s (based on immediate post-war plans) were so easily subordinated to the pressures of modernization. Cleveland (and Teesside in particular) is the most striking example because the capital intensive mode adopted, although it generated a good deal of very highly paid short-term construction employment, ultimately was job destroying. For all the weaknesses associated with branch plant development on Tyneside and Wear side, the reality is that without the branch plants (or, of course, without an alternative planned meso-economic strategy) loss of employment in coal mining would have created massive unemployment fifteen years earlier than it actually happened.

It seems to me that one plausible explanation for the ease with which this transition occurs is to be found if we shift back from the global to the local perspective, although that local perspective has to be set in the context of national housing policy. In the 50s and 60s there was actually a political

competition, mediated both nationally and locally, between left Keynesianism with its public housing orientation, and right Keynesianism which allowed realtors a key role in the process. In the urban North local political apparatuses froze the realtors out until the early 1960s. It was the necessity for modernization in the sphere of production which opened up local political systems **again** after World War II to the interests of locally based capital (some of it dependent on capital extracted from the production sector as compensation for nationalized assets) because those locally based capitals were in alliance with national capital and national politics (see Byrne 1989b for an account of this in relation to Cramlington New Town).

However, it must not be forgotten that the shift in housing policy after 1960 was a shift within a generally Keynesian frame from left to right, and did not thereby involve a wholesale abandonment of inclusive, citizenship orientated commitment. In the left Keynesian phase the emphasis was on general public sector provision for all. In the right Keynesian phase the public sector remained as a major provider for those who could not obtain housing through market mechanisms (although the retreat from universalism allowed experiments with unpopular forms of 'mass housing' - see Dunleavy 1984). The market mechanisms closely resembled those of the 1930s, and motives for purchase seem to have been very similar. In other words owner-occupation was seen as the only route for 'the disappearing waiting lists' towards decent modern accommodation. Speculative gains were not a motive,

at least not a motive identified in the advertising material of the era. A crucial point here is that over the period from 1960 to 1980 standard new owner-occupied housing in the urban North East (the three bedroomed semi or link villa) was probably cheaper in relation to median household incomes than it had ever been before, or has been since pending a really massive reduction in house prices which is has not yet happened here.

The major difference between the council estates of the 40s and 50s on the one hand and the owner-occupied estates of the 60s and 70s on the other was generational, rather than in terms of employment. Of course the owner-occupied areas were rather more white collar, but, as the cluster analyses in Chapter Five showed, the modal registrar general's social class of household heads in both these sorts of area was Social Class III manual. Until the 70s both were locales of prosperous working class life with the 1930s (in Tyne and Wear), 1960s/70s slum clearance replacement social housing, and remaining inner-area private rented stock all being occupied by a poorer population.

The production of the new owner-occupied suburbs of the industrial North East was very similar to that of their equivalents in Los Angeles. A development industry which combined effective control of local building societies with realty (estate agency) and construction interests, put together packages of land, finance and building.

The other factor which must be emphatically noted here is the effect of the modernization period on the spatial location of employment opportunities in manufacturing. Whereas the post-war theme in Tyne and Wear had been for the location of new industrial development on cleared housing land in traditional (and generally estuarine central) industrial areas serviced by new radial roads, the modernization approach was for new manufacturing to be located on new orbital roads on the urban periphery. In the post-modernization period this approach has, as we shall see, been extended to include office and retail development, which modernization policies continued to maintain as central area functions. Teesside was less affected by this approach, because of the emphasis on the capital intensification of core heavy industries, but there were equivalent developments. This was not a wholly new departure. Team Valley, the proto-typical industrial estate, had been developed peripherally in the 1930s, although the reliance then was on rail rather than road transport servicing.

One aspect of these developments which, to some extent, justifies the use of the Fordist / post-Fordist dichotomy (although industrial / post-industrial would be a better expression), is the attitude of the state to land use and land prices. In the modernization era land uses were dominated by manufacturing, both in terms of the retention of existing industrial land and through the expansion of peripheral 'industrial estate' development. There was a policy of detailed

local use separation, but manufacturing uses dominated, not competitively, but by always being prioritized in plan development. This was not a market matter. The only real land market for development in the modernization era was in peripheral green-field housing land, and even this was highly artificial, given the engagement of the local state with the development process. In the next chapter we shall see that land 'values' have become much more important, although these are not by any means true market values, but rather entirely notional designations by public bodies. However the change in land use prioritizing is very significant and the absolute dominance of manufacturing (and deep mined coal extraction) must be noted for the earlier periods.

Finally, it must be recognized that the modernization period in particular (after 1963) was one of enormous real developments. Things happened under the stimulus of Keynesian programmes of regional development and public sector growth. The key-note was real change, coupled with a maintenance of post-war employment levels. The result was the rather even society which is described by the socio-spatial analyses based on 1971 Census data and 1977 Cleveland Social Survey Data as laid out in Chapter Six. It is true that in 1971 much of the traditional inner-city 'slum' problem associated with poor standards of housing amenity did remain in the study areas, although the actual housing was usually late nineteenth century purpose built working class housing rather than downwardly filtered multi-occupied tenements. Its inhabitants often resisted designation of their areas as slums (see Dennis

1970, 1972) and much of the stock remains today having had amenity added through improvement policies. Thus 1971 is a good date to have for a quantitative representation of the even society.

The source of the changes which are so clearly apparent in the analyses based on 1981, 1987 and 1991 data was not housing or planning policy as such. Recent shifts in a post-modernization direction had scarcely had time to make any real impact. It was rather the massive de-industrialization and associated job loss. The argument of the next chapter will be that post-modernization planning and housing policies have operated to reinforce rather than counter consequent social inequalities as expressed in space. However the source of those inequalities was the deindustrialization of the late 70s and early 80s. To say this is not to discount the significance of the planning / housing policies described in this chapter. At the risk of repetition it must again be said that the form of inequalities was shaped by the urban system created by those policies. The Global painted on the Local, but what was painted was a function of the interaction of brush and canvas. At the simplest level this was a reflection of Lever's point about the greater Glasgow area - inequalities are sharper because the population is spread out over a much greater space and hence more segregated (1991). However, there is more to it than this.

The only way I can see to conceptualize this is to use the economist's notion of opportunity cost as an analogy - to think of

the costs of the failure to do things differently. The effect of modernization planning with its failure to develop systems of control over investment created a production system which was particularly vulnerable to deindustrialization. This was an important part of the canvas. The brush combined the specifically national element of pro-finance and anti-manufacturing macro-economic policies, and the global factors in production processes and the spatial division of labour. What I would want to emphasize is the extent to which the subordination of the places was a product of political failure - the failure to develop political systems which could do anything else. Here mention must be made of the failure to reform processes of government. That is not the theme of this thesis, but it is apparant (see Byrne forthcoming) that the re-organization of English local government in 1974 was undertaken in such a way that co-ordinated land use planning which reflected the productive and reproductive requirements of modernization could not be carried out as part of a directly democratic process. The units - conurbation and shire counties - were simply on the wrong scale. Even in Cleveland, where the shire county came closest to the city regions proposed by Derek Senior in his minority report to Redcliffe-Maude (1969), the absence of a provincial level of economic co-ordination, despite the existence of the Northern Regional Strategy Team, meant that control over production developments was minimal. Indeed Cleveland's job destroying capital intensive investment, funded through regional policy, made things particularly bad.

All this is to indulge in hindsight, but such indulgence is necessary in a piece written in a social policy mode. After all we are examining a situation whose reality was reflectively summarized for Middlesbrough in 1985:

"The pioneering 1946 Max Lock Plan set out a very ambitious thirty year programme which involved the relocation of 50,000 people and heroically aimed at 'pulling together' the town, which was at that time regarded as socially fragmented. Ironically, the thirty year building programme of East Middlesbrough's eleven neighbourhood estates put even more physical and social distance between East Middlesbrough's working class population and the rest of the town." (CES, 1985 p 1)

This is the template on which the post-modernization experience is being written. Areas which were core respectable working class in the 1960s have changed, not because of any intrinsic change in the places themselves, but because of the combined impact of globally mediated de-industrialization and the local development of the competing housing tenure of new mass owner-occupation. By the end of the modernization era as the 1981 Census materials show there was a high degree of socio-spatial differentiation in these places. Let us now look at current planning forms, objectives and processes in terms of their intended and actual impact on the system modernization had created.

## Chapter eight : planning after postmodernization

### Introduction

The title of this chapter was carefully considered. It might have been called 'post-modern planning and its consequences' but that would have been misleading for two reasons. First, it would have suggested that there is a much more coherent conception of what the purposes of planning 'after modernization' are than evidence suggests actually exists. There is a strong 'post-modern' strand underlying recent developments, which can be identified with the commitment to 'catalytic planning' as a process. However, catalytic planning lacks the consensual basis of 'modernization', and is not even really understood by many of the collective actors involved around it, and in particular by supporting local authorities. Second, it now seems likely that the consequences for social structure of recent planning decisions and developments, (and it is those consequences which are the concern of this thesis), are likely to be very different from those intended. These planning processes have failed to meet almost all of their objectives and they have done so very rapidly indeed. In contrast the complex combination of planning for modernization and social justice, which was the subject of the previous chapter, achieved most of its objectives into the medium term, and is even sustaining some of them into the long term.

This is not to say that recent planning initiatives will not have consequences for social structure. They have the potential to have very great consequences, but the consequences will not be those which were formally asserted, and ,in these places, may not even be the sort of consequences which might be derived from an examination of the apparent 'post-fordist' logic of capitalist development as a whole.

Durand has recently (1992) proposed a modification of the regulation theory school's account which is particularly relevant to the period under review here - that since 1980. Her arguments are most easily summarized by a series of quotations :

"In 'Fordist' growth expanded reproduction takes place in such a way that all the elements of income and of demand grow proportionally so that enlarged reproduction implies no structural deformation in the division of income and its allocation. In 'Post-Fordist' growth things happen differently. To put it simply, incomes rise but wages are blocked - hence the same for the consumption of wage earners.(p83)

If we want to clarify the current forms of capital reproduction we must focus on its tendency to divided into two large sectors : the first is the modern industrial and computer service sector characterized essentially by high gains in productivity and the

creation of rather small numbers of jobs. The second sector is that of services, with low productivity, more sheltered by its nature from international competition. This is the privileged place for the creation of jobs. (ps83-4)

This brief examination of this theoretical model of growth leads to two predictions : the creation of jobs in the service sector must be accompanied by lower wages and the allocation of income must be modified in favour of non-wage demand.(p85)" (all 1992)

Durand illustrates her analysis by reference to 'the Great American Job Machine'. Between 1980 and 1986 ten million jobs were created in the USA whilst in the four major European countries (which have roughly the same total population as the US) two million were lost. The US jobs created were in low waged service employment. The product of this sector is differentially purchased from 'non-wage' incomes which have increased dramatically in real terms whilst US wage incomes have remained stagnant. It is worth noting that this account provides a 'political economy' based explanation for the developments with regard to income distribution in the UK described by Piachaud in a series of articles and summarized in his piece in *The Guardian* of 30th September 1992 (p21). Piachaud's material also provides a useful corrective to Durand's emphasis on non-wage incomes as a source

for consumption of services, because he shows that higher wages incomes did rise in real terms. However this is actually compatible with Durand's general account of developments in production in privileged high technology sectors. It fits developments on Teesside like a glove !

The point of this discussion is that the principles underlying the planning innovations described in this chapter could certainly be regarded as expressing the logic derived from Durand's sort of account. The intention was to set up a land-use system which would sustain exactly the kind of low waged service sector in combination with high tech production which she describes. To some extent this has happened, but recent developments have thrown the whole process into confusion. It is certainly possible to see the consequences for social structure of the development of catalytic exclusivity in planning, but that strategy seems to have run into a brick wall. It is important to say this here, before the empirical account, precisely because that account could only too easily be interpreted as supporting the rather formal and rationalistic regulation theory account of developments from fordist to post-fordist social relations. It is not just a matter of the real world always being messier than theory. The contemporary situation is one in which the system of 'service consumption' seems to be failing, and failing badly. This has the most profound consequences, but the character of those consequences will be difficult to determine. Nonetheless a tentative prognosis will be attempted at the end of this chapter.

The plans and processes which will be described here reflect all of the global, national and local levels. The global level is that described by Durand. The most up to date account of the national (with some useful local referent) is provided by Lewis (1992). As he remarks :

" ... one of the most striking phenomena in this area is the sheer complexity engendered by the range of initiatives and actors involved in the field. This produces a number of problems. The first is simply to identify who is doing what at any given moment. An anatomy of the major actors is called for, but is often very difficult to draw. An attendant problem is the likelihood that strategic planning will suffer with a myriad of different schemes in operation. Finally, we are faced with a serious question of constitutional accountability for what is happening in our cities. An increasingly opaque central government machine is exhorting industrial and financial capital, the community and volunteer movement, to a greater or lesser extent local government, and a clutch of quangos to act in the local interest. With local government not necessarily playing the central role it becomes exceedingly difficult to identify responsibility for action taken and not taken." (1992 ps 1-2)

Lewis places a very proper emphasis on process, on the change in the nature of decision making in a post-corporatist direction. The nature of post-corporatism is very complicated. Certainly in the places studied for this thesis, the organized labour movement in both its industrial and local government form is represented in the decision making process, at least in a formal sense. However the resulting decisions seem to have minimal relation to the interests of the working classes as broadly defined. Of course the organized labour movement as at present constituted has no real relationship with the disorganized working class, with the benefit dependent poor and those in non-unionized employment. What is surprising is the extent to which the planning decisions to be described in this chapter are antagonistic not only to the disorganized (by promoting their further disorganization) but to core sections of the organized working class in industrial employment. This contrast vividly with the previous 'fordist' (or, as I prefer it, Keynesian - see Byrne, 1992) modernization era, when organized working class interests in production and reproduction were certainly asserted very vigourously in corporatist processes.

Process is important, but it is not the main focus of this thesis. Here we are concerned with the rationale for and content of decisions. The decisions are those associated with post 1980 planning in the three places in general, and with three elements in particular. The three elements are :

(1) The operations of the Tyne and Wear Development Corporation (TWDC) and the Teesside Development Corporation (TDC) - the two Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) operating in Tyne and Wear, and Cleveland.

(2) The nature of City Challenge bids made in the places studied.

(3) The content of the Unitary Development Plans (UDPs) being prepared as a replacement for Structure Plans in the two metropolitan districts of Sunderland and South Tyneside.

Other post-modernization planning elements will be mentioned in relation to these, not least because what is happening is as Lewis indicated, the sum of the effects of a complex web of agencies and policies. However the three elements identified above will be the primary foci of attention. The UDCs are about land. City Challenge is about people. The UDPs are supposed to be about both, although land use is the medium through which they operate. The UDCs are unequivocally post-modernization in rationale, form and objective. City Challenge is quite complex. Some bids are very much a development of modernization objectives, including the sensible, straightforward and successful bid by Middlesbrough District. Sunderland's successful bid is bizarrely post-modern. Others have elements of both. The UDPs are interesting because they reveal the

extent to which elected local government has departed from modernization strategies.

There will be one evident absence from this chapter, and it is worth remarking that it is an evident absence in the post-modernization period in a way in which its far more serious precursors are not evidently absent from the discussion of the modernization era, despite a complete lack of mention of them. I am referring to the operations of the Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) in relation to training, in contrast to the training roles of Industrial Training Boards (ITBs) in the modernization period. ITBs were national whereas TECs are local, so they did not appear in local planning, although training was always recognized as a key element in regional development strategies and was of concern to REPCs. TECs do, particularly in relation to schemes directed at the urban poor's supposed skill and work experience deficits. They surface in relation to the topics investigated in this chapter, particularly in relation to City Challenge. Where they surface they will be noticed. Otherwise they will be omitted from consideration as outside the theme of land use and consequent socio-spatial structure despite the scale of their budgets, their complex relationship with the educational system, and the offensiveness of their attitudes to the poor.

## Catalytic Planning and its consequences - the role of the UDCs

There are a number of general accounts of the legislative background and operations of UDCs (Stoker, 1989 ; Centre for Local Economic Strategies, 1990, 1992). The report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Employment (1988) is particularly valuable because of the unequivocal evidence from the Permanent Secretary at the Department of the Environment (DOE) to the effect that the purpose of UDCs was to achieve regeneration of urban land, and that resident and adjacent populations were irrelevant to this objective. Of course this statement has been qualified. Local UDC publicity claims the contrary and UDCs were identified in *Action for Cities* (1989) as part of a wider urban programme with more general social objectives, but it does seem fair to characterize them as concerned with the re-establishment of the possibility for accumulation through inner urban land rather than anything else (see Byrne, 1992).

UDCs have an odd relationship with markets. On the one hand, despite their origins in Heseltine's programme, they have always been informed by, and have employed, a market rhetoric, (Indeed this is not so surprising. Only in the UK could Heseltine be portrayed as a corporatist interventionist). Thus they are part of an anti-planning programme, part of a commitment to the principle that resource allocation decisions should be taken by market mechanisms (see Ambrose, 1985). On the other, they have very large resources at their command in the form both of public money and of

public land which they use to subsidize operations which private sector developers would not otherwise engage in. This contradiction is the basis of their general financial failure. UDCs were supposed to use 'brown-field' sites (inner city land restored to a useable state for development by land reclamation) as sources of revenue. They were engaged with a market through land sales. It seems likely that apart from a period in London Docklands, no brown field site in a UDC area has ever had any value at all. When the sums are done the cost of non-land subsidies (i.e. excluding the costs of the land reclamation process) will exceed the prices actually paid by 'private sector' developers. If infra-structure development costs are added in, then the devalorization of the values of these sites is such that even in Docklands all will have had negative value.

It has to be said that those involved in UDCs did recognize this contradiction. They were supposed to be replacing planning with market decision making, but there was no market. The approach employed was to argue that the resources dedicated to development were employed in re-creating a market by setting up conditions under which sites would acquire real value and market led development would proceed under its own steam without any requirement for public subsidy. Planning had two roles in this scenario. One was generally recognized (e.g. by Hall, 1988) - planning was seen as a servant to the private sector in the city of enterprise. Planners used layout skills, powers of eminent domain, coordination etc. to facilitate the private development

process. The other has not been so well recognized in academic writing (at least in urban studies as opposed to the technical literature of planning), but is clearly expressed in the publications of urban development corporations themselves.

This is the conception of planning and public development as 'catalytic'. I first encountered this term in the brief of evidence prepared by TWDC for the public enquiry into its compulsory purchase of a number of properties on the East Quayside site in Newcastle (TWDC, 1989 a). There it was defined thus by TWDC's expert planning witness, P.W. Jones, a director of Debenham, Tewson and Chinnocks, project advisors :

"There is, in my opinions, a distinction to be drawn between 'regeneration' and 'redevelopment'. Redevelopment of a site will succeed in bringing land and buildings into whatever use the market determines as the most appropriate for that site at that time. Regeneration on the other hand, aims to create new markets by increasing confidence and attracting inward investment. A regeneration project is needed to rekindle economic and cultural vitality of the site itself and also creates similar betterment to its immediate environs. When combined with other such schemes, it will also be a catalyst for sustained improvement and growth in the whole city and indeed the region." (1989, p 12 para 3.1.4)

In other words the task of the UDCs was to use public resources get the market going, as TWDC put it (Jones, 1989 p16 para 3.2.2.4) to act as "A Catalyst for Regeneration" - the catalytic image implies that the potential existed. It was only necessary to inject some energy into the system to initiate a self-sustaining reaction which would proceed without further intervention. This is not particularly good physical chemistry but it was clearly the sense in which the term was being employed. The use of the term 'flagship' by UDCs to describe particular developments is significant here. The 'flagships' are the physical representation of the catalytic process - the late twentieth century equivalent of Gray Street around the development of which the mid-nineteenth century urban renewal of Newcastle was hinged. The concept is quite well founded in the history of urban development and renewal but has only proceeded without any subsidy in urban centres and, very briefly, (Welfare Island where Olympia and York did succeed) on non-central sites in world cities. This was the process which was to be applied to 'derelict' sites (the reasons for the inverted commas will become apparent) in clapped out North Eastern industrial towns.

Of all economic activities it is the production of the built environment which is most informed by fashion and trend. The imagery of science fiction is employed by both social scientific analysts and developers. If the developers did not read post-modern texts themselves, their architects certainly did, and the objective of recent private sector development has reflected the

content of the 'posts' - post-modern in style, post-fordist in consumption (although absolutely not in production - the labour process remains manufacturing), post-industrial. The scenario revolved around a revealing word, which recurs again and again in the promotional literature - ~~exclusive~~. This very much reflects the 'post' concern with differentiation in products, in consumption, in lifestyle, in space. Eversley (1990) writing from the perspective of someone with a lifetime's experience of both planning analysis and practice within the Keynesian, universalist mode, has bitterly denounced the confrontation between the 'citadels of the rich' and 'ghettoes of the poor' which post-Keynesian planning has sought to achieve.

This was the imagery of catalytic development on the industrial rivers of the North East - exclusive residential and service facilities which would be related to post-industrial office space supported by a new service sector - possibly in financial services and to a new, flexible, B1 (a planning use order category which permits the combination of production and services) business park environment for high tech production and producer services. It was an idealized version of London Docklands writ elsewhere. The central role of land values in pushing this approach has to be recognized. It did not matter that the real land values of brown-field sites employed for these purposes was negative. The notional land values attached to non-industrial uses always outweighed any value which would be generated by industrial use. Industrial values were always low. The only land which has

had historic value in industrial towns is peripheral housing land and central business district land. The objective of the two North Eastern UDCs, and particularly of TWDC which has done little else, was to achieve this kind of development in the former industrial core of their respective conurbations.

The more I think about this, the more I start to see the operations of TWDC as a kind of slum clearance exercise directed at traditional industry. This is precisely what the Chief Executive said in his evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Employment :

" ... industry within the river corridors is characterized by heavy marine-based manufacturing. Due to world market conditions causing decline in these sectors, there are also a growing number of derelict factories, warehouses, shipyards, slipways and dry docks along both rivers with river or rail access primarily, many of which are unlikely ever again to be used for their present purpose." (1988, p309)

Subsequently in *A Vision for the Future* (1990) TWDC asserted not only that the marine manufacturing sites were derelict and redundant, but that the industrial culture characterizing traditional production was itself a barrier to new development :

"The economy of the North East has, until recently, depended on three industries : heavy engineering, coal mining and shipbuilding ... For too long the need for a more diversified regional economy was not seen as important or necessary .... Indeed the senior management of these three industries was so small relative to the numbers employed that the opportunities for aspiring talent were severely limited, so for the most part they left the region. The opportunities for local entrepreneurial activity, given the dominance of engineering, shipbuilding and coal in the market, were limited. With the decline of these three sectors, the banks of the Tyne and Wear, essential to the functioning of those industries, lapsed into dereliction." (1990, p 4)

As we shall see the actions of TWDC certainly sustain the logic of these perspectives.. TDC has worked in the same way but without such dramatic effect because it has so much space to play with that it has not had to challenge existing industrial uses. It should also be noted that TWDC has been confronting medium sized private and formerly nationalized capital (the exception being William Press Ltd which is part of AMEC, but AMEC's property interests are involved in the development of the East Quayside), whereas on the Tees private capital is represented by the key world players in the chemical industry.

There are two processes going on with the catalytic, ~~exclusive~~, development of inner urban industrial land. One is that of enforced relative deprivation - the theme raised by Eversley in his discussion (1990). This involves a confrontation between developers and the poor, contained for the moment in terms of 'formal' community politics (not the contradiction in terms it appears) by a strategy of crumbs from the table. This is the effect on the 'disorganized'. The other is the effect on the bases for organization in the working class - on traditional locales of organized capitalist production. This effect applies both to potential - to sites not presently in productive use but reserved under previous planning regimes for the recapitalization of localities on an organized basis, and (and it is difficult to believe this, but it is true), to actually existing production facilities.

Let us turn to the actual activities of the two UDCs, beginning with Teesside. Coulson (1989) gives a coherent account of the *Strategy and Impact of the Teesside Development Corporation*. Here it is simply necessary to summarize and update this. It is interesting to note that his study was commissioned by Cleveland County Council and three of the districts, but not Hartlepool, which is indicative of the political context in which it was prepared. TDC with a territory of 11,280 acres has the largest area of any UDC. Its public funding, as with all the second wave of UDCs, was intended to amount to £150-200 million over ten years, but there have been additions to this to

facilitate development on the high profile Teesdale site in Stockton. Coulson, in common with other commentators, places some emphasis on the role of personalities in the style of UDC operations. As we shall see my view is that there is little difference in practice, as opposed to public relations, between TWDC and TDC, and what difference does exist is to the benefit of TDC, but the former is often identified as community orientated whereas the latter's :

" ... Chairman has a property background and has interpreted his role as getting physical development, bricks and mortar, on the ground as quickly as possible. Its Chief Executive was previously Chief Executive of Corby District Council, has little faith in traditional town planning or structure plans, gives little weight to consultation and involvement of local people, and believes that in most traditional local authority economic development activity "the fundamental requirements of economic rejuvenation, namely political certainty and decisive decision making to match the requirements of the incoming industry, are irrevocably lost". The TDC ethos is in that sense the most radical of any of the UDCs, and not dissimilar to that of London Docklands Development Corporation in its early days." (Coulson, 1989 p 10)

Nonetheless in his evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Employment, TDC's Chairman asserted that his primary commitment was to job creation. In practice, (by their deeds ye shall know them), TDC has been much more industrially orientated than TWDC, and has not pursued a policy of denigrating and disadvantaging traditional local industrial activities and land uses.

It has however promoted the post-industrial future. Its major schemes are :

(1) Teesside Park - 187 acres of retail development on the site of the former Stockton racecourse. Part of this site was originally identified in the Cleveland Structure Plan as reserved for industrial development. Stockton and Middlesbrough District Councils and Cleveland County Council unsuccessfully sought a judicial review challenging this redesignation. This site is now back in the ownership of TDC following developer failure. The promised leisure facility element has not materialized. In form it is a rather mundane car based retail park.

(2) Teesdale - 250 acres south of Stockton town centre. This site was originally identified for housing development but has actually been developed as a mixture of office space (Dunedin house with two

principle tenants - one of which is TDC itself), educational facility (Joint University College on Teesside JUCOT), residential establishments (a facility for sufferers from Alzheimer's disease), and (as of 1992) 100 dwellings. This project is closely associated with the Tees Barrage which will render the river above it non-tidal and promote leisure uses.

(3) Hartlepool Marina. This is located in the South Harbour at Hartlepool and is intended to provide berthing facilities for up to 1,000 small craft and 1,500 dwellings units built on 165 acres of land. This harbour was described in the 1950s as built for twice the existing trade carried in ships half the current size, so its redesignation for non-industrial uses was not contentious. As of early 1992 the lead developer, Lovell Partnerships, had completed 34 dwellings with a further 83 under construction as social housing by Three Rivers Housing Association. This site is often referred to as 'Hartlepool Renaissance'.

Other major projects sponsored, although not always initiated, by TDC include attempts to locate the Ministry of Defence Quality Assurance Unit on Preston Farm in Stockton. The MOD move appears to have fallen through as part of the peace dividend. This large

site, originally occupied in part by the industrial concern Whessoe, is now developing as a motor trading complex. The Britannia Enterprise Zone in Middlesbrough is a mixed industrial / warehousing site of a fairly traditional kind. Tees Offshore base is a conversion of the Smiths Dock shipyard into a servicing facility for the offshore industry. This has created 450 industrial jobs, which is more than can be said of any TWDC development. The Middlehaven site North East of Middlesbrough town centre does not seem to have any current development prospects.

The membership of TDC is interesting. It includes the leaders of Hartlepool and Middlesbrough councils, the leader of Stockton's quite large Tory group (the town has a Tory MP for one of its seats), the former Labour MP Lord Dorman, a representative of ICI, Lady Eccles of Moulton - a peripatetic Tory peeress who sits on the boards of many quangos, two property developers, a former Middlesbrough Tory MP (from the dim past) and a former industrial chief executive. There is no county council representative and there has been continued hostility between TDC and Cleveland County in relation to departures from the Structure Plan etc.

In the Autumn of 1992, five years into TDC's life, the effects it has had on Cleveland's social structure are not great. It was always much less 'post-industrial' in assertion than TWDC. It has not attacked major traditional industrial sites and uses. Stockton Racecourse was intended to attract immigrant investment to a more or less greenfield site. It was not a traditional

industrial location. Although there was clearly an agenda of post-industrial, exclusive servicing, it has not come off. Hartlepool Coal Dock was never the best of prospects for any renaissance of that kind. We will encounter TDC again in a discussion of City Challenge bids in Cleveland, but even there it is not a transformer, except perhaps in relation to the political culture in Hartlepool. In the rest of Cleveland scepticism prevails.

When we turn to TWDC the picture is rather different. TWDC covers 5,870 acres along the estuarine Tyne and Wear with territory in all the Metropolitan Districts except Gateshead. This means that it is the local planning authority for almost all the traditional port and shipbuilding/repair sites in the county. Many of these sites were in public ownership when TWDC was designated. On Tyneside key sites belong(ed) to the Port of Tyne Authority. In Sunderland other key sites were held by the municipal Port and, more significantly, by the nationalized Sunderland Shipbuilders. TWDC has taken many of these sites into its direct ownership by agreed purchase (the flagship 'Royal Quays' site at North Shields, vesting (sites in the ownership of Sunderland MBC), and compulsory purchase (sites in Sunderland). I have written extensively about TWDC's operations elsewhere (Byrne, 1993) but a summary is appropriate here. TWDC's current members are its chair, Nicholson of Vaux's beerage, a regional director of Barclay's bank and a senior partner from Price Waterhouse, the leader of Sunderland and deputy leader of Newcastle councils, the Tory minority leader from North Tyneside and former (lost election) Tory leader of

Newcastle, a representative of NEI and another from the offshore industry, the chair of Tyneside TEC, Newcastle University's professor of planning, and the former regional chair of the TGWU.

The context of TWDC's sites is important. Both the Tyne and the Wear have declined as ports in the post-war period. In part this reflects the massive decline in coal shipments from the North East. In part it is a consequence of the 1960s decision in national port planning (an offshoot of Labour's National Plan) to concentrate port development on Teesside which is now the UK's third biggest port by tonnage handled. The decline in coal exports, and in the import of pit-wood (pitprops), meant that there were large derelict areas of port land around both rivers.

The shipbuilding / ship-repair situation is more complex. There has been a massive decline in merchant shipbuilding, although this is of course a highly cyclical business with a long time period to its cycles. Ship repair has declined much less. Warship building, now concentrated at Swan Hunters in Wallsend, is very much a function of MOD policies. Today, 13th May 1993, Swan Hunters has just gone into receivership in consequence of a failure to win an MOD order for a helicopter platform ship. However, there has been a very considerable development of employment in offshore construction. The Tyne has become the European centre for top-side engineering - the fitting of accommodation and production modules to oil rig jackets. This is

high value added work and now employs more men than all the other maritime manufacturing activities combined.

That last statement has only been true since the closure of Sunderland Shipbuilders - based on the two most modern shipbuilding facilities in Europe - in 1989. TWDC played a part in the closure and its insistence on the application of non-industrial land 'values' (there was no non-industrial market interest) to a key site, was a serious problem for those seeking to sustain a marine manufacturing facility in Sunderland (see Byrne, forthcoming b).

TWDC's flagships include a number of post-industrial and / or post-fordist style developments. Armstrong Business Park and the Science Park at Manors are clearly facilitators of flexible production and associated producer services. Developments on the Newcastle Quayside, especially on East Quayside, are about the substituting of service for industrial uses, including the removal from East Quayside of part of the European headquarters (but not production) operations of Proctor and Gamble. 'Royal Quays', for an account of which see Byrne (forthcoming, b) is exactly a deindustrializing development by changing the status of a key riverfronting deep water industrial site to housing, leisure and retail uses. It is perhaps indicative of the truly clapped out nature of South Tyneside that as yet the effects of TWDC's operations in the Borough are minimal, although TWDC has had as we shall see considerable influence on the Unitary Development Plan.

However there are no TWDC schemes of any significance here which are in progress in South Tyneside.

Sunderland is a very different matter. Here TWDC has done several actively post-industrializing things which are of key significance. One has not involved a redesignation of use. The modern Southwick Shipyard, a covered yard, has been demolished, and the site is being prepared for an industrial park. This is not a use change and required no planning intervention. The other crucial development is at 'St Peter's Riverside', the name given by TWDC to a linked series of sites below the bridges on the North bank of the Wear. It is worth noting that TWDC links these sites in publicity and in strategic planning documents, but has taken considerable care to handle all planning procedures on an individual site basis. The sites are in order going seawards : Manor Quay - a former fitting out berth which is particularly significant for continuing marine manufacturing on the Wear ; North Sands - a former shipyard site ; and North Dock, the Northern part of Sunderland harbour. TWDC's general and specific intentions were made clear in a 1991 document : *Piloting Progress* :

"Their (heavy industries) need for riverside frontages to give access to deep water created a physical barrier between the rivers and their communities. The natural focus of the Tyne and the Wear has been obscured by the backyard of industry. Our aim is to restore that focus." (1991, p 3)

In Sunderland this led to the following specific approach :

"Sunderland has always earned its reputation from the sea. As shipbuilding has declined and industry has moved up river towards the Nissan site and Washington New Town, our plan is to retain Sunderland's manufacturing tradition with the creation of advanced production centres up river from the town centre and to open up the mouth of the Wear as a place to live and enjoy." (1991, p7)

This was of course a complete reversal of the modernization era view. To quote the relevant section of Chapter Seven :

"Special note was taken (in the Structure Plan) of the unique character of sites with deep water frontage (Policy ED 4 *Tyne and Wear Structure Plan 1979*). Vacant sites were specified for port related uses. Of particular subsequent significance in Sunderland was the statement of the Structure Plan derived *A Plan for the Riverside 1977* where in *Draft Policies and Proposals* it was stated that :

'In recognition of the importance of riverside industry to Sunderland all suitable sites along the waterfront will be allocated for this purpose. (Policy I).' "

The post-industrial St Peter's riverside will, if it is ever completed, consist of a mixture of residential, leisure and recreational developments at North Dock, housing at North Sands, and the proposed new campus of the University of Sunderland, originally described as a 'Business School', at Manor Quay. The housing comprises 500 units of which some will be social housing provided by housing associations. The schemes were handled on piece-meal basis through planning procedures, although they have always formed part of a single strategy. This means that a kind of salami tactic was adopted with TWDC departing from the Structure Plan a slice at a time, and justifying subsequent departures (particularly Manor Quay) by reference to previous decisions.

Both of Sunderland town's MPs opposed these developments, arguing that whatever the merits of a new campus for the University of Sunderland, there was no need to build it on the last Wearside site available to marine manufacturing for down-river fitting out work. Their objection was supported by Pallion Engineering, the mixed worker-management buy-out of the Pallion Yard of Sunderland Shipbuilders who were anxious to retain this crucial site as the basis of a revival of general marine manufacturing in Sunderland. Particular emphasis was placed on offshore work, although there was a hidden agenda related to the possibility of the revival of merchant shipbuilding with the removal of the EEC ban on this activity imposed (in formal terms) because the site of the demolished Southwark yard and adjacent areas had been given Enterprise Zone status. Perhaps the most revealing of the planning

documents associated with these developments was the statement submitted by the University of Sunderland in which it was revealed that more than three quarters of the senior staff of the University did not live in the Wearside area. Subsequently it has transpired that, in marked contrast to the fairly recent past, only 9% of the University's students originate in Sunderland and only 30% in the Northern Region.

The actual procedures adopted by TWDC here are highly questionable. A crucial strategic decision was taken without any of the participatory or inquiry processes which had been necessary for the Structure Plan. This was pointed out to the DOE as the basis of the demand that Manor Quay development be called in and subject to a public inquiry, but this demand was rejected. Sunderland MBC accepted these developments, although the relevant constituency Labour Party, Sunderland North, is absolutely opposed to them.

The references to advanced manufacturing up river in the branch plant area, and including Nissan, is interesting. Nissan is of course a headless chicken without much R and D capacity, and is primitive indeed in contrast with Sunderland Shipbuilders. What is interesting about Nissan is the use of land around the plant. Nissan acquired much more than the acreage it requires for its own operations, however far extended. As Stewart and Garrahan have commented :

"Another condition for the Nissan investment was that the company would secure sufficient land for its development purposes : as a result the company now owns 733 acres of the Borough (now City) of Sunderland. This gives Nissan effective industrial development control both over the physical environment and over its favoured trading partners, since Nissan does not need all of this 733 acres for itself but is engaged in onward sales to supplier companies. The local council retains the nominal status of planning authority, but since it is Nissan which decides on onward sales, the company's control over the physical environment is heightened and so, by implication is Nissan's superordinate relationship over its component suppliers." (1992 p 24)

Here we have a very clear example of the use of land use planning as the mechanism by which production is spatially peripheralized and a specific production system, 'just in time', is supported by land allocation and planning policies. Garrahan and Stewart review the way in which control over land and the 'just in time' system are integrated in Nissan's approach to Sunderland (1992 ps 40-6). They comment particularly on the way in which the whole development, land sale and planning permission procedure was concealed from public view and democratic scrutiny.

To sum up the situation I will quote from P. Healey, bizarrely enough a present member of the TWDC board :

"The net result in the conurbation was a considerable flow of subsidy to particular kinds of activity, in a situation where local authority and regional assistance was being reduced. Public subsidy had thus switched from providing support the *demand* for land and property in various ways to encouraging property *supply* (original emphases). Much of the subsidy was spatially targeted, to inner city areas, but also to zones away from established centres for office and service activity. These locations thus looked set to alter established spatial patterns in the conurbation. The subsidy was accompanied by agencies urged to be helpful to the private sector, and encouraged to engage in energetic promotional activity. ... Urban policy was thus directed at transforming the spatial structure and institutional relations of the conurbation to reflect post-industrial conceptions of urban structure and lifestyle." (1992 p 8)

Or that was the intention. The reality has been very different. In a way the content of City Challenge reflects that difference.

## City Challenge - Social Rescue or Fingers in the Dykes ?

"Under city challenge I will invite Local Authorities to draw up programmes of action to tackle their key neighbourhoods. I will expect the authorities, in the preparation of these programmes, to draw upon the wealth of talent and enterprise which exist in their cities ; local people and the voluntary sector, the business and academic communities, the training and enterprise councils, and government and other statutory agencies. I will expect them to attract private finance and involve the private sector throughout in managing the programme." (Hesletine, Sec. of State for the Environment, HC 5th series, Vol 191 549-50w)

Thus was City Challenge introduced through the unusual mechanism of a written answer to a parliamentary question, and there is still very little published about it. In particular there has been no White Paper or parliamentary debate. This is possible because in administrative terms City Challenge is simply a modification of the way in which Urban Programme resources are distributed, and has been funded by top-slicing Urban Programme as a whole. Urban Programme began with the 1977 Labour initiative (see Lewis, 1992 ; Lawless, 1989 for accounts of its development) and has been important in terms of specific programme elements.

However, it has not involved a major recasting of planning objectives, despite a general shift from social to economic priorities, which indeed City Challenge in some sense reverses. City Challenge is different because bids represent coordinated approaches to urban problems and are interestingly indicative of style and objectives.

In part this is a function of resources. Budgets in the Cleveland districts run at £20 million over five years. In the Tyne Wear metropolitan districts, budgets were projected at £37.5 million over the same period. These sums describe public funding from central government and require matching local authority funding according to complex and variable formulae which reflect the formulae applied to the schemes which have been top-sliced to produce City Challenge, and the exact mixture of components in a given bid and its component schemes. Each scheme had a gearing ratio of public to private ranging from 1:1.75 in Middlesbrough to 1:4.5 in Sunderland, although these gearing ratios are often little more than wishful thinking. In the study areas Hartlepool, Middlesbrough, Stockton and Sunderland have submitted successful bids, and South Tyneside and Langbaugh have submitted failed bids. The content of these will be examined with particular emphasis on Middlesbrough's re-modernization approach to East Middlesbrough and Sunderland's very different post-modernization (and in the view of this writer post-rational) approach to North Sunderland.

City Challenge bids are not formal land use plans, but they are plans in a wider sense and they do indicate both the concerns of local government and its 'partners' about social problems associated with de-industrialization, and their general strategic orientation towards those problems. City Challenge bids do depart from the UDC's land led approach. If UDCs are about redundant land, and primarily redundant industrial land, then City Challenge bids are about a mixture of redundant people and the areas in which they live (primarily outer estates), and the run down commercial centres of industrial towns. This is an odd and probably incompatible combination, particularly when, as is the case in Hartlepool, the whole programme is literally the surrounding support of a collapsing UDC flagship, the 'Hartlepool Renaissance'. However City Challenge does have people in view, even if the TEC led approach to them is highly questionable. In other words it is probably right to think of City Challenge as some sort of recognition of the social problems that stem from redundant and disorganized populations.

#### **Middlesbrough - A Commonsensical Rescue Bid**

Middlesbrough's City Challenge bid is essentially an effort at reviving the fortunes of the locale created by the Max Lock Plan, East Middlesbrough. The bid is a rather clever working around of the general 'selling line' of the City Challenge format to meet real social needs. The Cleveland authorities, and particularly Middlesbrough and the county council, have

consistently, both recognized the social problems engendered by deindustrialization, and been realistic about their implications. For example in *Crisis in Cleveland - From Dream to Nightmare* it was pointed out :

"The social and economic problems generated by the scale of unemployment are enormous. It speaks volumes for the maturity, good sense and desire to attract new employment opportunities displayed by the unemployed community in Cleveland, that the area has not erupted into the violence displayed in other parts of the country. No one in Cleveland wants riots - but equally we must beware that feelings of total hopelessness do not set in." (1985 par 3.14)

The bid began with the assertion that :

"Within five years, City Challenge will establish the roots of a self-supporting, enterprising and caring community with high morale and pride." (Executive Summary)

In the developed version this is translated into a series of objectives related to :

(1) - the reduction of the negative social indicators of fear of crime and unemployment to the average level for the town.

(2) - the improvement of environmental quality and the achievement of better health standards.

(3) - an impact from skill training (very modestly specified through work placements matching skills to opportunities.

(4) - enhancement of image

(5) - tenurial mix, replacing social renting as absolutely dominant.

(6) - community spirit and sense of optimism.

In other words the formal objectives are about rescuing East Middlesbrough (and that part of central Middlesbrough around North Ormsby Road) from the consequences of deindustrialization. This area has an area of 792 ha. and contains 40,300 people. It also contains the run-down East Middlesbrough Industrial Estate. The actual financial programme is divided into main and reserve. Table 8.1 shows the actual pattern of funding commitment. The largest single element in the programme is that under the Strategic Objective 3 intended to :

" ... improve the standard, variety and management of housing to create 'A Good Place to Live'.

- a major housing tenure change through building for sale, shared ownership and new Housing Association rented dwellings.
  
- declaration of Housing Renewal Areas in North Ormsby and Breckon Hill.
  
- major improvements to security and layout on two key estates.
  
- devolved management in Cargo Fleet, Brambles Farm and in multistorey flat blocks." (1992 p 11)

This is a mixture of the questionable and sensible. The housing action areas in run-down older housing areas are sensible, as is the proposed investment in layout and security. The value of devolved management is questionable. The notion that there is much scope for building for sale, even of 210 low cost dwellings, in East Middlesbrough is also questionable, given the probable lack of demand for the product.

The other strategic objectives involve commitment to provision of much needed community resources and a mixture of training commitments, business advice and what looks very like an industrial improvement area. The commitment of resources to existing firms on the East Middlesbrough Industrial Estate and in the Lawson and Saltwells industrial areas does offer some prospect

of the maintenance of an employment base currently providing some 5,000 jobs in 135 firms. The formal targets of 575 jobs created through the direct programme with a prospect of 1675 from the reserve, and 215 firms from the direct programme with 170 from the reserve, look extremely optimistic, if the gain is supposed to be gross.

In reality the Middlesbrough City Action Programme is pretty much what a sensible local authority would be spending (if it was allowed to do so) on essentially palliative measures, with a bit of dressing up in terms of schemes and vocabulary to sell it to the regime currently occupying the Department of the Environment. It is unlikely to do much to make East Middlesbrough better, but it is a serious effort to prevent things from getting any worse.

The Management Board of the Action Plan will include seven elected representatives from Middlesbrough and Cleveland County (total), two private sector reps, two community reps and reps from the Cleveland Action Team, the DOE, Middlesbrough Task Force, Teesside TEC, TDC, the Chief Executive of Middlesbrough Council and the City Challenge Manager. It will be chaired by the Leader of the City Council. The impression is of a local authority show with the others invited along.

## North Sunderland - a New City away with the Fairies

The same cannot be said of Sunderland's successful 1992 City Challenge bid. This covers an area in North Sunderland with a population of 37,000 (22,000 of whom live in the 'North Sunderland Poor' zone described in Chapter Six) and, like East Middlesbrough, consisting primarily of outer council estates. The bid starts with the truly bizarre claim that :

"The construction of our economy has helped us to buck national trends. We can beat the recession. We confidently expect 12,000 new jobs to be created here over the next five years of which 9,000 will be within a few minutes drive of the homes of many North Sunderland Residents." (1992, p 1)

The major developments on the jobs front in Sunderland since this piece of nonsense have included the announcement of the mothballing of Monkwearmouth Colliery with the direct loss of 1,500 jobs (although the pit now has been given two years more of life) and the indirect loss of many more, and the closure of a North Sunderland clothing plant with the loss of 300 jobs. This will help greatly in the achievement of the main target of the bid, the reduction of unemployment by 30% by 1998. Other targets are crime reduction, the trebling of FE and Training participation rates (the closure of Monkwearmouth Pit may help here !), the preparation of a 'unique system of contract based Charters' as the

basis of 'exemplary public service' (1992, p1), the improvement of 8,000 homes and the development of better transport links. There is nothing wrong with the crime reduction targets (although they will be hard to achieve), and the housing improvement and transport strategies are sensible palliatives. The idea of 'Charters' reflects current fashion.

The questionable factors are in the land development part of the bid. Here the transfer of 600 acres of land to new uses, half of which will be 'active leisure', is identified as a target, although it might more sensibly be seen as a method. The bid includes details of a number of development projects which are outside the direct North Sunderland area but are considered to be supportive of the general intention. The transformed uses will include a new Concord Centre (£60 million) including a stadium development to replace Roker Park but to be called Roker Park, although it will be located next to Nissan near the magical attractions of the A19. This will house a football club currently on its way down into the second (third) division. Other proposals are for a 'Glass City' and 'Enterprise Garden' (£5 million) and for a new Bridges Shopping Centre (£40 million), in a town whose existing main shopping area, Fawcett Street, is crumbling under the impact of competition from the Metro Centre, and has recently seen the closure of Binns, the town's traditional quality department store. The housing proposals include the modernization of 2,760 council dwellings, the building of 510 low cost starter homes, and the transfer of 617 LA properties to the private sector

or housing associations for conversion for sale. The bid assures us that there are :

" ... waiting lists for former council properties, including many young professionals." (1992, p9)

The financial details of the bid are interesting. It works on a 'direct' leverage ratio of 1 : 1.03 (which involves committed public sector funds including TWDC) and an ultimate ratio of 1 : 4.68 ! As with all these bids overall budgets are specified in terms of expectations. The great bulk of expenditure 'anticipated' is on housing and the environment, but the two headings of 'Promotion of Training' and 'Education and Personal Advancement' take up almost as much of the base budget of £37.5 million. What is interesting is the attention paid in the bid to : " ... a number of large developments which, while scheduled to take place with or without City Challenge. are very important to the future of North Sunderland." (1992, p5). It is these which are 'planning' orientated. They include Sunderland Enterprise Park (Hylton Riverside Enterprise Zone) with an investment from TWDC of £10 million and a projected private investment of £60 million, Heron International Bridges Shopping Development at £40 million, an extension of the Metro (very sensible) at £75 million, £6 million for an (again sensible) Guided Transport Expressway, and £24 million invested in the new St Peter's Campus of the University of Sunderland (see above), in addition to 'Glass City' and the 'Concord Centre'.

The bid warns that the enterprise will require 'dramatic changes in culture, not least within the council' (1992, p 24) and assures us that City Challenge 'will indeed have liberated North Sunderland' (1992, p 27). An examination of the structure of the organization which will run the scheme shows that one thing from which North Sunderland will be liberated will be democratic government. The twenty member management board of 'Community North' (which will have fully delegated powers - there will be no LA shadowing committee) will include two city councillors, the city's chief executive, three members of the Riverside North Business Group, one from the Chamber of Commerce, three from educational institutions, two from the Police, two from public agencies (TEC, TWDC, Health Authority), and six community representatives appointed from the local Community Councils. The Executive (not officer) Board of six, which will clearly have very considerable policy control, will consist of the City Chief Executive, two business reps, two community reps and one from 'the public agencies'. There will be no elected councillor. Middlesbrough City Councillors are managing City Challenge to their own ends. Their Chief Executive will be on the board to clerk for them. Sunderland have given much of their city, including by implication planning matters, away.

There are interesting differences between Sunderland's successful bid of 1992 and its unsolicited bid of 1991. The former was much closer in style to Middlesbrough's and emphasized relative social deprivation as the issue, whilst retaining some

elected member input into a management system, which nonetheless involved the private sector in terms of named individuals. The original bid looked like a corporatist partnership between the local authority and the private sector. The successful bid has given much more to quangoes. Sunderland obviously learned to be more subservient.

#### Hartlepool and Stockton - enhancing the work of the UDC

Both the successful bids to City Challenge by Hartlepool and Stockton district councils amount to programmes for the revitalization of their very run down town centres and adjacent areas, which are to a considerable extent an extension of UDC themes back into commercial and residential areas from the formerly industrial areas which are under UDC control. Indeed in Stockton there is even a proposal to extend UDC territory to include a significant part of the existing town centre. However Hartlepool's bid is the more obviously subservient, which reflects Hartlepool district council's general attitude to TDC.

This bid is constructed around 'three inextricably linked aims' (1992 p 3) viz. :

"(1) To create a sustainable economic base for Hartlepool .... seizing the unique opportunity presented by the Hartlepool Renaissance Project.

(2) To transform the image of Hartlepool.

(3) To improve the quality of life of Hartlepool residents." (1992, p3)

The area covered comprises 280 ha., has a resident population of 11,235 and includes 4,600 dwellings, 250 firms and 8,600 jobs. The bid comments on the low skill level of residents and repeats a constant theme of central government related initiatives in the North East by lamenting the lack of enterprise skills in consequence of the traditional reliance on large employers. The City Challenge funding of £37.5 million is expected to work on a leverage ratio of 1 : 1.94 producing £136 million total investment (this is their arithmetic, not mine).

The actual components of the programme include the revitalization of Oakesway Industrial Estate (another IIA), a new industrial park at Greeland Road, and revitalization of run-down inner city and council housing areas. The largest direct single component is housing but the industrial objective is identified as attracting the largest private sector investment. In this emphasis is placed on the city centre and on, after five years, having 'fused together the Marina and the rest of the town' (1992, p16). The bid includes service development in health and leisure, but what is most interesting is the way the whole project is wrapped around 'Hartlepool Renaissance'.

As with all the City Challenge bids, Stockton's depended to a considerable extent on the support of a pre-existing private/public sector partnership, in this case the Stockton Central Area Development Agency. The bid was actually introduced by the private sector Chairman of this body rather than by the Council Leader. The bid begins with a specification of objectives, including a link with TDC's Teesdale development, and proceeds to an account of social deprivation in the area. Here the leverage ratio is identified as 1 : 3.2 and the main emphasis is on City Centre revitalization (30% of funded programme and 25% of total programme). The other largest components are for housing and environment, with the usual inclusion of a commitment to diversifying housing tenure, and training. The diversification of housing tenure will be achieved by sale of LA stock on the notorious Blue Hall estate both to the private sector for conversion for sale, and to housing associations for conversion for rent. There is also a proposal to develop new industrial sites and a linked proposal for the regeneration of the Eastern Industrial Estates.

This project will be managed by a main board of fourteen and an Executive Committee of six. The membership of the main board will include four elected councillors, one rep of TDC, 3 community reps, 1 rep for Stockton Voluntary Services organizations, 1 rep from Stockton Chamber of Commerce, 2 industrial reps, 1 rep from Teesside TEC, the City Challenge Manager, and two co-opted reps, one of whom will be from higher education. The City Challenge

Manager will also be a member. This makes sixteen ! The 'independent Chairman' will be drawn from local industry, with the Borough Council Leader acting as Vice-Chairman (1992 p49). Stockton have kept a heavy LA representation on the Executive Board with two elected members from six, in addition to two community reps, one Chamber of Commerce rep, the overall Chairman and the City Challenge Manager (makes seven by my arithmetic - does City Challenge damage your maths ?).

Overall the Stockton bid is largely sensible. It primarily consists of projects which any local authority would want to do anyway, and is more or less under LA control. It is certainly much less of an 'add on' to the TDC schemes than is the case with Hartlepool.

#### **The unsuccessful bids - South Tyneside and Langbaugh**

The word of mouth is that South Tyneside's bid for City Challenge was unsuccessful because the local authority, drawing among other things on material prepared some years ago for them by the present author, and corresponding to the Census based description of the district's socio-spatial system in Chapter Five, argued that that their district was characterized by high, even levels of deprivation, rather than specific concentrations. Thus they included 'too much' territory and were not spatially specific to an extent which suited the DOE.

South Tyneside's bid was riverside orientated and covered areas running in parallel with the UDC territory along the industrial riverside, apart from an overspill extension intended to cope with the long-standing problem of Monkton Coke Works. The bid built on an existing 'partnership' strategy which originated in the 1984 establishment of South Tyneside's Economic Development Strategy Committee :

" ... bringing together representatives of the City Action Team and Government Departments, the private sector, the Borough Council and other organisations involved in economic development in South Tyneside, under an independent Chairman." (1992, p3)

Other supporters of the bid included TWDC, South Tyneside's own Enterprise Agency, TEDCo., and Tyneside TEC. The area proposed covered 1,400 ha. with a resident population of 33,000 people and an existing employment base of 20,000 jobs (over half the borough's total). The actual formula of the bid closely resembled those already examined. The broad intention was :

(1) - to support economic development through a mix of business advice and support services (including one interesting scheme for the support of home workers), the provision of sites and premises, and infrastructural investment, with additional commitments to retail and commercial development and

tourism. Outputs here were defined in terms of 1,980 new jobs (clearly intended to be net), 1.2 million new sq ft of commercial and industrial floorspace and 2,230 construction jobs.

(2) - the usual range of training initiatives with a mixture of local employment structure relevant and general 'priority' group training for the long-term unemployed etc. - output : lots more training.

(3) - a set of land reclamation schemes and town centre improvement schemes.

(4) - community strategies including the building of 565 new private dwellings and 160 social housing units, the refurbishment of 390 local authority dwellings, support for local community projects, and crime prevention.

South Tyneside did not propose to establish a legally separate agency to run City Challenge, but instead intended to maintain its existing Economic and Community advisory bodies and to have a City Challenge Board, including four elected Councillors, four reps of the finance and business sector, four community reps, and reps from TWDC, Task Force, TEC and City Challenge (the last two as alternatives). The bid was integrated into an existing local authority - quango network.

Langbaurgh's bid for Redcar was not very different. Again it built on an LA established quango, the 'Redcar Regeneration Initiative' and supported the bid by citation of social deprivation indices. The target projects were organized around developing the economy (2,743 new jobs, 643 construction jobs, retail, office and industrial development, business advice etc.) ; leisure and tourism (all sorts including 160 new jobs and 348 construction jobs) ; education and training ; the environment ; crime and safety ; health ; housing (902 new private homes and 110 new Housing Association units, a tenure transfer to a housing association, and 600 revites) ; transport (infrastructure) ; and community development. The bid was larded with the language of 'flagships' and 'partnerships' and came complete with a 'shadow board' including named local industrialists and builders, five elected councillors, and Lord Zetland representing the racecourse. In all it was intended ultimately to include 8 private sector reps, 5 councillors, 4 community reps, 1 Health authority rep, 1 police rep, 1 Tourist Board rep, 1 DOE rep and the Chief Executive of Langbaurgh Council. There was no TDC rep, and the word of mouth has it that this was Langbaurgh's mistake.

### **City Challenge ?**

In the economic context of March 1993 most City Challenge bids seem laughable. Certainly the grandiose job creation objectives are ridiculous, especially since they are completely separated from any coherent industrial strategy. However they are

interesting. Only Middlesbrough has a bid which looks like something put together by a local authority with some self-respect. All the others, to a greater (Sunderland) or lesser (Stockton) degree have surrendered something, (in Sunderland's case just about everything), to a spurious culture of 'enterprise and image'. The significance of City Challenge is that it extends the concept of catalytic planning from industrial land to areas which contain redundant industrial populations. The bids, other than Middlesbrough's decent piece of social reformism, are about stimulus without direction, or even very much in the way of indication. They lack anything so coherent as a clear conception of catalytic planning but that is the way they intend things to work - sprats to catch mackerels.

Of course all the bids contain large components of genuinely palliative measures directed at improving the housing, health, environmental and community conditions of the populations in the areas, and most include some very sensible land reclamation and infrastructural transport development. The training strategies are largely offensive in their clear implication that personal deficits are an important explanation for structural unemployment in the contemporary urban North East, and they lack any integration into a coherent workforce development policy, but they are peripheral to the interests of this thesis.

What is interesting is probably the principle rather than the practice (which may be minimal) of City Challenge. These schemes

are neither democratic nor participatory. Rather they represent a kind of deformed corporatism with organized labour written out, and a dependent community written in. This will cause immense difficulties, given the really very serious issues of accountability and credibility which surround the operation of community organizations in areas inhabited by dispossessed populations, but that is a subject for another thesis. I will now turn to Unitary Development Plans.

### **Unitary Development Planning - Dependent Planning**

The two metropolitan districts of Sunderland and South Tyneside are currently engaged in the production of their Unitary Development Plans (UDPs). These replace the combination of Structure and Local Plans which were produced under the former arrangements in the metropolitan county of Tyne and Wear. Both have currently reached the stage of having a draft plan out to consultation. The nature of UDPs is succinctly described in the South Tyneside document :

"This document, the first Unitary Development Plan for South Tyneside, provides guidance on land use and future development in the Borough, up to the end of the year 2001. 'Unitary', in this case, means a single Plan prepared for the whole of South Tyneside. The essential role of the Plan is to determine how

much development the Borough can accommodate." (1992, para 1.1.1 p1)

"The South Tyneside UDP has been prepared under the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended by the Planning and Compensation Act 1991. Under these arrangements a metropolitan district council, like South Tyneside, must prepare a plan which combines strategic issues previously covered in the Tyne and Wear County Structure Plan with detailed, site specific proposals previously considered in local plans." (1992, para 2.1.1 p7)

However in an authority which includes territory under the control of a UDC matters are not so simple. As Lewis has pointed out :

"The DOE has decided that local authorities should not draw up unitary development plans for UDC areas, but rather that unitary development plans should adopt the strategies of the UDCs. Moreover, local authorities are required to take into account in their UDPs the impact of UDCs outside the UDC's area. In effect then UDCs become the plan-making authorities for their areas - and have a right to influence planning matters well outside their areas." (1992, p53)

This point was recognized in the South Tyneside UDP : "It should be noted that in this Plan, reference to 'the Local Planning Authority' should be taken to mean the Borough Council or the UDC as appropriate. (1992 para 1.6.2 p3 original emphasis).

Thus the two UDPs under consideration here describe the local authorities preferred options, but with much of the strategic decision making having already been made for them.

In South Tyneside the process began with the 1990 production of *South Tyneside Beyond 2000 : A Strategy for the Future* which laid out the broad picture in relation to the DOE's *Regional Planning Guidance : Strategic Guidance for Tyne and Wear* (RPG1, 1989). South Tyneside's own Town Development Committee had previously (1987) agreed a series of objectives which any new plan should seek to achieve. These were organized under the traditional and recognizable headings of : Jobs, Housing, Environment, Transport, Shopping and Resources. RPG1's frame was around : Urban Regeneration, Retailing, Transportation and Environment. RPG1 was in fact itself a rather traditional 'modern' account of planning objectives, and it was quite easy for South Tyneside to organize their priorities under its headings, with Urban Regeneration taken to incorporate 'Jobs', although as has been indicated above, urban regeneration has no necessary relationship with employment development. Housing was also taken as falling under the urban regeneration heading.

The 1990 document is a straightforward run through of issues. By the time of the production of the Draft UDP in June 1992, things had changed, albeit that the changes were rather more in style than in substance - but, in the postmodern era style may be substance. The concern with employment does remain central, but the nature of solutions are now identified in terms coloured by the vocabulary of the 'enterprise culture'.

"The nature of the key problems remaining can be summarised as :

the borough's image, both within and outside the Northern Region.

the scale of restructuring required to remodel its economic base.

the shortage of private sector entrepreneurial skill and initiatives to achieve that restructuring.

the consequential depopulation, caused by lack of employment opportunity and limited range of housing choice.

In practice the plan is cautious and sensible. It recognizes the real decline of South Tyneside since the 1970s and

comments, guardedly, on the role of the UDC, remarking for example that :

"The scale and loss of former industrial land to other uses has been such as to warrant careful consideration of the extent to which prospects might be frustrated by similar losses in future. Thus the UDP must address the extent to which the Local Planning Authority (UDC - see above) would wish to see land zoned for industry retained in the longer term for that purpose, despite pressures for redevelopment for other uses, possibly in the absence of any prevailing or potential economic development interest in the future. This is of particular importance where the sites concerned have special characteristics, such as access to a deep water quay or dock." ( 1992 para 3.4.12 p 13)

In most respects the plan is a modest document. Perhaps it is optimistic in relation to population growth, but not to any ludicrous extent, which has not always been the case with UDPs - see Sunderland below, although the notion that 5.000 new dwellings will be built over the years 1988-2001 does seem very optimistic on present construction figures. It is essentially a responsive land development plan, and rather accurately reflects the very low level of development activity in any sector at the time of its publication. In summary it can be seen as sensible palliation.

This plan will change little. The only thing of real interest in it is the site specific element relating to UDC territory. These are contained in the chapter on Economic Development.

This includes a strategic statement which moves in a post-industrial direction :

"The Plan should take into account the shift in employment trends away from traditional heavy industry to commercial and service development. Policies relating to new economic development areas, town centres, mobility and public transport will need to reflect this trend." (1992, par 8.3.4 pa 91)

However it should be noted that policy ED3 attempts to control non-industrial development within traditional industrial areas and asserts that no new residential development will be permitted. This jars somewhat with the specific policy ED4/2 which releases land at Harton Low Staithes from industrial use and proposes its redevelopment for a mix of residential, office, leisure and car parking uses. Likewise 'the Local Planning Authority' will release Market Dock and the former Brigham and Cowan Yard at South Shields for a mix of residential development and open space (ED4/3). For these two sites 'the Local Planning Authority' is TWDC and both are excluded from the list of 'traditional industrial areas' in the relevant appendix, although both are traditional industrial areas and are so designated in existing plans. Market Dock is

actually still in active use ! The other TWDC release is the land presently occupied by the fabrication sheds at Hebburn Shipyard (the largest merchant shipbuilding facility still in existence in the UK), again for a mixture including residential uses (ED4/12). Again this site is not listed as 'traditional industrial'.

Essentially South Tyneside UDP is a mixture of local authority modesty and TWDC insistence on its deindustrializing strategy. It should be noted that the plan will involve little in the way of major spatial reorganization of the borough. Most of the housing development will be on infill or relatively small sites. There is no programme of massive post-modern reconstruction and reordering. Even on the optimistic population estimates employed, the population will simply not be there for such development.

Sunderland's very recently published (December 1992) UDP is rather a boring document. The key decisions had already been taken by the UDC or as part of the City Challenge scheme, and the UDP simply confirms these. Perhaps the most interesting part of the document is the set of assumptions and assertions with which it begins. It talks of :

" ... the upturn in the industrial future of Sunderland, reflected in the grant of City status and the attraction of major Japanese investment.

... the UDC and Enterprize Zone initiatives which enhance the City's potential for new development.

... the trend towards local authority / private sector partnership to secure the implementation of major projects, together with structural changes in the roles and responsibilities of publicly elected authorities.

... a society looking for additional outlets for its leisure time and increasing prosperity." (para. 1.3 p.1)

The actual proposals are for a strategy of general peripheral development including small scale suburbanization by addition and the preparation of a large strategic site for a single immigrant plant. TWDC's schemes are taken as givens, which the authority was obliged to do. The most interesting sections of the document relate to the proposed plans of the University of Sunderland which seems to be developing the kind of growth schemes which had such a negative impact on inner urban areas in American cities in the 1960s. It is worth noting that the plans do seem to reflect the interest and background of the currently dominant faction in Sunderland's controlling Labour group. This is drawn primarily from the former coalfield areas incorporated into Sunderland at 1974 re-organization. It is interesting to note that at a public meeting held to review the future of Sunderland, the Deputy Leader

of the Council, perfectly accurately, pointed out that residents of Washington and of the Houghton/Hetton area, did not particularly associate themselves with Sunderland centre for services but used facilities on Tyneside and in Durham City. It was a clear statement of the reality of 'Edge City'.

The former Sunderland Poly is a transformed institution, not least in terms of the origins of its student body. Its Vice-Chancellor stated, at the public meeting referred to above, that only 9% of its student body came from Sunderland and 30% from the Northern Region. This is a radical transformation from the situation in the 70s when the institution recruited primarily from the North Region on a Scots pattern. As of 90-91 it had 7,700 students of whom 6,200 were full time. It is projected to grow (although in the light of recent government backtracking on student numbers, this is an optimistic position) to 18,500 by 2000-1 of whom 6,000 will be part-time. The more than doubling of numbers has considerable implications. Already the development of student accommodation is a major issue in central Sunderland.

The UDP also reveals the ad-hoc 'lets fill this hole up with anything but a shipyard' nature of the decision to build a second campus at St. Peter's Riverside, commenting that :

"When the Sunderland Town Centre Plan was approved in 1989, it was hoped to consolidate most of the Teaching facilities on or near the Chester Rd campus." (para 6.25)

The development of the St. Peter's campus will be phased, and it is clear that its successful completion will depend on both the funding of the massively increased student numbers, and on the sale of existing poly sites, particularly the existing Art School site which is located in a desirable residential area. In other words the campus is a speculative venture which depends on a government policy which is already being slowed down, and may be reversed, and on a falling property market. The intention is to relocate existing activity and to expand employment (although not in proportion given the marginal cost method of student numbers funding) through growth.

The Sunderland UDP plan is a very clear example of trend planning. It is, as all UDPs seem to be, light on contextual survey. In line with current fashion it is upbeat. The effect of the combination of these two factors is that it seems to ignore the very serious social consequences of structural decline and has no apparent sense of direction in dealing with them.

## Conclusion

The conclusion to this chapter will be brief, and is essentially a reiteration of the pessimistic assertions in the introduction to it. The clear consequence of post-modernization planning, if achieved, would have increased social division. The projects have failed or are failing. The property led approach of the UDCs has produced a clean wasteland, but a wasteland nevertheless. City Challenge is at best palliative. The UDPs have no sense of direction and reflect the increasing powerlessness of local government, both in formal terms, and probably much more importantly in terms of any cultural commitment. Some elected local governments, and Sunderland's is the prime example, seem to be behaving more like a collaborationist nominated legislative council in a crown colony, rather than as democratically elected representative bodies. The universalist commitment of the post-war period has gone and nothing real has come in its place. Where now ?

It is difficult to disagree with Gaffikin and Warf's recent comment :

"In a 'post-Keynesian world problems are redefined : unemployment is no longer perceived (and explained) as a failure, but as an inevitable outcome of the progress of productivity. But beyond this level of macro-economic rationale, post-Keynesiansism also

infers that the age of public planning itself has become redundant in the face of a more diverse and unpredictable world, to which only de-regulated markets have the flexibility to respond." (1993 p 68)

This is not the public face of interventions in the areas described in this thesis, but it is the reality of them. Perhaps the rather blase dismissal of the significance of these post-modern developments at the beginning of this chapter was wrong. It is true that the wonderful vision of 'consumption' which they peddled is looking increasingly shabby and unrealistic, although it what has been implicit in this discussion should be made explicit. The model of development proposed, in particular by the UDCs, has been one of affluent consumption serviced by a low-wage flexible workforce. To some extent that has been achieved, although actually in different spatial locales from these clapped out industrial cores. Here spatial peripheralization of consumption is important. However, the way in which the operations of the UDCs have consumed political energy and administrative capacity is important. They have been part of a re-acculturation exercise - a kind of socio-political bootcamp in which the political and administrative systems and personnel have been remoulded - in particular the post-Keynesian pessimism summarized by Gaffikin and Warf has been drummed into heads - there is no alternative. Is there ?

## Conclusion - The fragmenting city in a fragmenting society

This thesis has attempted to produce a synthesis between two areas of contemporary social consideration and investigation. It has been concerned with changing class structure, and in particular with the 'sloughing off' of a stratum below the working class, as that class was constituted in the Fordist era, and it has been concerned with changes in urban form and urban policy. Two sets of questions were identified as a way of summarizing the approach of these two areas of sociological and policy concern. The first related to class structure and welfare and were :

- (1) Are the poor an underclass outside the economic order ?
- (2) What is the position of state employees in the class structure ?
- (3) What is the service class and where are its boundaries ?
- (4) What is the position of the working poor ?

The second set were essentially about the changing nature of the socio-spatial structures of industrial conurbations, and about the planning processes which mediated these changes :

- (a) What has happened to the arrangement of people and their activities in space in industrial towns ?
- (b) Why have these things happened ?
- (c) How have these things happened ?

This thesis has been able to say a good deal about questions (1) and (4) above, and about the relationship of the socio-spatial

structure within which answers to those questions are embedded, to the planning processes of the past and present, as represented by the concerns of questions (a) to (c) above. This conclusion will be organized in three parts. First, it will look at what the analyses of census and Cleveland social survey data tell us about the form of class relations at the bottom end, at questions (1) and (4) above. Most of the necessary conclusions have already been drawn at the end of Chapter Six, but the essentials will be re-iterated here. Second, the conclusion will sum up the nature of the planning processes, the concern of questions (a) to (c). Again much of this has already been done at the ends of Chapters Seven and Eight. The point of this (brief) re-iteration is explicitly to relate the nature of planning processes and socio-spatial structures. This theme has been a constant in the thesis, but here it will be dealt with in final summary. This will be a position statement.

Finally the conclusion will make some preliminary suggestions about the way in which the situation we find ourselves in might be changed. It will pick up, yet again, the theme of structural social planning and argue that the present crisis has developed to such a point, that such an approach is probably the only alternative to a grossly divided, unpleasant and unstable social order.

**'The dog is barking'.**

The Chief Probation Officer for Cleveland has recently commented that the 1991 riots in the North East, and the associated wave of crime (especially car crime) should be understood as the long awaited response of the white poor to the structural conditions under which they are living - the riots which didn't happen in 1981 when disturbances, although by no means simply racial, always had an origin in ethnic minority resentment of policing practices. There is much to commend this point of view, but it should be developed. The fact is that by

1991 the degree of separation between the lives of the poor and the lives of the non-poor in the North East was beginning to approximate the extent of an ethnic divide. By this I mean that the quality of life was so different and absence of social contacts so great, that there was as big a social distance between well educated and well paid police officers and their social milieu on the one hand and many of the young poor and their social milieu on the other, as exists in ethnically divided societies.

However, the situation is not simply one of polarization. Although (and I regard this as key social indicator in relation to the 'underclass' debate) nearly half of all children in enumerated households (and the character of non-enumerated households can be guesstimated to be poorer) in the poorest areas identified were living in households containing no employed adult, this means that half were not. The structural and spatial arrangements expressing hierarchy are much more complex than mere polarization. In a recent examination of two world cities, Fainstein et al (1992) have endorsed earlier critiques of the 'dual city' metaphor, agreeing with Mollenkopf and Castells contention that : "... the complexity of New York's social structure (and any other urban social structure) cannot be reduced to a dichotomy between the two extremes of the scale of income distribution." (1991, p401). Fainstein et al support Runciman's (1990) schema of seven classes viz:

(1) an upper class defined by property ownership, control (senior managers), or skill marketability (senior lawyers, accountants). (In practice these three dimensions intersect - DSB).

(2) The new service class of managers and professionals just below the above plus the larger petit bourgeoisie.

(3) The lower service class - this looks rather like Registrar General's Social Class II plus the surviving smaller petit-bourgeoisie.

(4) White collar employees who nevertheless have some promotion prospects and 'the functional proximity to authority' (Runciman, 1990, p386). (The 'staff' in everyday language).

(5) The skilled working class, which according to Runciman is potentially vulnerable.

(6) The semi and unskilled working class which is actually vulnerable.

(7) The benefit dependent underclass.

Perhaps Fainstein et al. make rather more of this rather simple minded schemata than it deserves. In many respects it is just an elaboration of the Registrar General's system, and it ignores the significance of private/public sector and industrial/non-industrial divides. Many industrial managers are very vulnerable under conditions of de-industrialization. However it has heuristic value.

Fainstein et al.'s argument is that groups (1) and (2) above have a determinative influence over urban development, separate from democratic process. If we take account of the industrial / non-industrial divide, that fits what has happened in the study areas, but that is a theme for later. They also conclude, following a version of Wilson's definition of the 'ghetto poor' which includes both permanently unemployed and low paid, that this group is expanding rapidly. In the world city context they see it as fragmented internally (1992 p293) on ethnic and other grounds.

What is clear from the present study is that the benefit dependent (and no cross-sectional data base, even if sequentially ordered can say whether or not they are permanently benefit dependent) in ethnically homogeneous conurbations in the North East of England are spatially segregated from the affluent, especially but not exclusively through the concentration of the poor in public sector housing, and that their city spaces contain both the benefit dependent and the low paid.

The issue of tenure is important here. In 1991 in none of the areas was public housing present at any meaningful level in the most affluent ED cluster at the three cluster level. Indeed it was always the smaller of the two major tenures in the middle clusters. However, even at the three cluster level there were at least 20% of households in the poorest cluster which were owner occupied, and the proportion in the poorer cluster at the two cluster level was higher in Cleveland where there is an English normal tenure pattern. This very much supports the arguments of Forrest et al (1990) that, whilst public sector housing in the UK is becoming a residualized tenure of the poor, owner-occupation is a segmented tenure which contains all levels of the social system. As they say :

"One perspective ... is to see home ownership in terms of a continuum that at one end is indistinct from renting. The owner has a continuing mortgage commitment and limited choice and autonomy in sectors of the market that do not keep pace with the general rate of accumulation of housing. Low-paid or insecure employment leave the owners with important periods of dependency on state benefits and external support. At the other end of the continuum, home ownership involves independence, autonomy and high rates of accumulation, which provides opportunities in other spheres and the attributes of positional goods. ... Households at different points in this continuum are

all affected by constantly changing patterns of investment and disinvestment in home ownership and by the instability that marks patterns of investment and rates of house price inflation. However, the impact of these variations is not uniform. Rather it reflects the resources and circumstances of the households involved. Employment and job situation are critical factors in this." (1990 p198-9)

In a period of falling house values and economic crisis, Forrest et al may have been rather sanguine about the upper end of the continuum. Many entrepreneurs have become homeless as lenders have called in loans to failing businesses guaranteed against the owners' house. However, the notion of a continuum is entirely supported by the findings of this study. Indeed the general argument about a ghetto poor is very much supported. In all three study areas by 1991 there were identifiable clusters of Enumeration Districts which contained over 40% of the area's population, had male unemployment rates in excess of 30% and in which over 40% of households with dependent children had no employed adult present. These were spatially separated from the affluent. This is ghettoization. The question is why ?

**The tragic failure of modernization and the farcical irrelevance of post-modernization.**

In her recent interesting review of 'post-modern' planning in Newcastle, Wilkinson remarked that :

"The T.Dan Smith era was concerned primarily with civic pride and a utopian version of the city as an urban machine fit for living in. It was essentially a modernist vision with a strong social welfare component, managed by the public sector on Keynesian functional principles." (1992 p178)

She contrasts this with :

" ... the post-modern city ... characterized by a shift away from comprehensive redevelopment projects, characteristic of the 1960s and 1970s, towards the planning of urban fragments, evidenced in the mosaic effect created by the development of the new urban villages, flag-ship schemes, self-contained waterfront developments and cultural quarters. These islands of renewal also act as highly visible symbols of urban regeneration and, as such, they are regarded by public and private-sector agencies as vital ingredients in the place-marketing process." (1992, p177).

That fits entirely with the account of post-modern planning objectives and achievements in the study areas, as given here. It is worth noting that the inevitable consequence of such a 'fragmented' approach will be to exacerbate socio-spatial division. However, these programmes scarcely exist in South Tyneside and are proving dismal failures in Sunderland and Teesside (and even, now, in the potentially much more fruitful locale of Newcastle). They will make things worse, but they did not make things the way they are. What did ?

The answer given in this thesis is unequivocal. It has been the interaction of Keynesian planning from above and de-industrialization which has created the present combination of social and spatial segregation evidenced in the study areas. It should be noted that this ultimate failure is not only a failure of the T. Dan Smith era of the 60s in which techno-solutions were imposed from above in the form of mass housing developments and overweening programmes of slum clearance. It is even a failure of the immediate post-war programmes which were much more popular, both in formation and in content. Essentially the whole programme hinged around full employment. Without it, with the new fragmented

employment structure which characterizes these industrial places, we get the socio-spatial structure described here.

Full scale fragmentary land value led processes of the kind attempted by the UDCs will make things worse, if they ever happen, and in some places manipulation by a public sector elite (as in Sunderland) may well bring to fruition at least part (if never all) of a scheme, they will cause very long-lasting damage (damage lasting as long as that use on that site). However, these were not the causes - they are merely aggravating factors. The wound is being soaked with acid. It is certainly the case that the Thatcherite programme of non-intervention, antagonism to strategic planning of any kind, and macro-economic support for finance as against industrial capital, could not have been better designed (and designed is the proper term - these things were done, deliberately - there were agents) to maximize the negative impact of structural forces. Things have been made as bad as they could be, and the de-industrialization of the early 1980s is to a very considerable degree the direct result of specific government policies at the macro level. It is the subsequent meso 'non' (in the Orwellian sense) interventions which I am describing as 'merely' aggravating the wounds.

Much of City Challenge (and in some places eg. Middlesbrough, virtually all of it) is at least an attempt to apply a dressing, although in Sunderland even the dressing has been dipped in acid. However, such measures are merely palliative and offer no real prospect of any solutions. The current tendency is for divisions to widen. The role of education will be crucial here, not in creating divisions but by providing a mechanism through which they will be reinforced. Overall there is simply a profound failure of public policy in general, and of Labour local government in particular. Not only are there no solutions being proposed. The whole style is in many ways one of denying the reality of the problem. So where do we go from here, if not to Tasmania, which is now a privilege available only to the well connected instead of a

locale for dumping a surplus population. At least in the early nineteenth century a society with no use for people thought up somewhere to put them, even if it exterminated another part of the human race in so doing. Can anything be done ?

It is interesting to compare developments in these English (and the use of that word, rather than British is deliberate) conurbations with the situation in the United States. There is an argument, well summarized in Bond (1991) to the effect that :

"Among the most powerful and damaging forces buffeting the inner city of the 1980s and 1990s is the new found capacity of financial markets and leading financial institutions to impose upon policy makers severe constraints, not particularly related to the logic of capitalist development but rather tied to the vicissitudes of global financial speculation." (1991, p141)

Bond describes the credit imperative driven logic of this process, and its consequences in urban development and social re-organization in a wholly convincing way. He also describes the processes by which a coalition of community action has been created, which if it has shown no capacity for changing the direction of such developments, has at least been successful in demanding community gains as a part of the development scenario. However, there are immense differences. First, there is a localism to the financial institutions, reinforced by the state level of power in the USA, which is wholly lacking in an English region (but not in Scotland or Northern Ireland, hence the qualification above). Second, there is the position of the afro-american middle class. This group seems to have been the prime beneficiary of Baltimore actions, largely because it has been the prime mover. In the locales studied there is no equivalent excluded group.

There is a presence of 'classes 1 and 2' as detailed in the summary of Runciman's (1990) account of contemporary UK class structure as employed by Harloe and Fainstein (1992). These groups have congrued in a sort of elite growth coalition, functioning in the way described by Logan and Molotoch :

"We believe that the question of who governs or rules has to be asked in conjunction with the equally central question 'For what' ? .... For those who count, the city is a growth machine." (1987 p59)

"Although they may differ on which particular strategy will best succeed, elites use their growth consensus to eliminate any alternative vision of the purpose of local government or the meaning of community. The issues that reach public agendas (and are therefore available for pluralists' investigations) do so precisely because they are problems on which elites have, in effect, agreed to disagree." (1987, p51)

It is much harder to unpick direct material interests in the UK than in the USA, although by no means impossible. This thesis has noted the presence of representatives of development capital in crucial decision making roles in the non-elected bodies which have taken important decisions in the post-modernization era, and has pointed out the equally important significance of the shift from left to right Keynesianism in public policy, which resulted in the post 1950s construction of the mass owner occupied peripheral estates. The city is being manipulated, although in an increasingly desperate fashion, in a way which began with the abandonment of planning mechanisms in order to maximize development profitability, and is ending with frantic searches for fixes to system disintegration.

Bond's optimistic note about likely developments revolves around the genesis of local 'rainbow coalitions' as described above, but it seems evident from his account that the only real success of such approaches has been in inserting some 'minority' representation into the elites (blacks on boards) and in extracting some planning gain. In the sense of the word as discussed in chapter one, such coalitions have had no determinative influence. Bond documents the weakness of this kind of coalition in achieving any real labour and trade union movement objectives in relation to the new fragmented employment structure. It is clear that the intention of post-modern planning in the study areas was to move in the Baltimore direction. The most recent example of this is the very recent planning application in Sunderland for a 'New Roker Park' sports stadium and massive retail etc. development on green belt land in Washington. This is being justified as a job creating 'flagship' in the now classic way. Interestingly the proposal is being opposed by Nissan on the grounds that it may cause access difficulties for the 'just in time' plant, but it seems that large amounts of European 'regional development' funding may be obtained in order to improve the road network and facilitate the whole project. However, such a proposal notwithstanding, the current record of postmodern planning strategies is one of failure, and indeed this is happening in places like Baltimore as well as the North East. As David Harvey observed from his Baltimore base :

"Heightened inter-urban competition produces socially wasteful investments that contribute to rather than ameliorate the over-accumulation problem that lay behind the transition to flexible accumulation in the first place .... Put simply, how many successful convention centres, sports stadia, disney worlds, and harbour palaces can there be ? .... Over-investment in everything from shopping-malls to cultural facilities makes the values embedded in urban space highly vulnerable to devaluation. Down-town revivals

built upon burgeoning employment in financial and real-estate services where people daily process loans and real-estate deals for other people employed in financial services, depends upon a huge expansion of personal, corporate and governmental debt. If that turns sour ..... " (1987, p265)

He summed his argument up thus :

"Flexible accumulation (*note that word - DSB*), in short, is associated with a highly fragile pattern of urban investment as well as increasing social and spatial polarization of urban class antagonisms." (ibid, p 278)

It is worth returning to the 'workhouse economy' metaphor employed by Rowthorne (1988) to describe Northern Ireland and cited with specific reference to South Tyneside in Chapter Five. The term can now be generalized to describe these industrial conurbations as a whole. Much of the employed population - the public sector service class - obtains its living from containing and / or servicing the dispossessed. This service class is itself somewhat vulnerable, both to the imposition of market pressures on it through the development of internal markets, compulsory competitive tendering and 'skill mix' (deskilling and job-substitution which applies as much to the police as to health-visitors), but it is relatively secure and prosperous. To a considerable extent this group, recruited through educational mobility from the traditional working class, is the principle beneficiary of traditional labourist social democracy. It has been given the job of zoo keeper - keep em in and keep em quiet.

The recent literature on 'post-fordist' local government in the UK (summarized in Goodwin et al, 1993) has begun to take these themes into consideration. It is important to introduce a

theory of agency into the abstract accounts of regulation theory and their point that :

"Despite the fact that the state is clearly identified as a key component of any mode of regulation, the actual processes through which economic and social forces are translated into state activity are rarely examined." (1993, p 67)

is well made. This thesis has in large part been an attempt to conduct such an examination. It would certainly, on the basis of a good deal more of empirical account than underpins the cited article, support the argument that post 1945 planning was to a considerable degree in the service of Fordism, although Goodwin et al get the implications of this for gender relations absolutely wrong ! However, as the thesis has attempted to show, that is not all it was. In addition to the overweening, but not necessarily overwhelming, logic of developments in the mode of production at the global level, there were the extremely important effects of local action - of the manipulators of the city whose right Keynesian developments (after Davis's account of Los Angeles) supported the logic of consumption, and the organized (both industrially, and in this country, politically) working class with its objective of social justice.

The tensions generated by the competing, but also in the Fordist era often complementary, interests of these groups underpin the account given here up to the present crisis. This account supports the implicit (and elsewhere in his text) explicit assertion of Harvey's that the system is in crisis and may be failing. There has been no smooth and easy transition to any sort of post-industrial future. Rather in the places described much of the former central working class (or more properly its descendants) have been peripheralized and residualized, without any coherent and successful resolution of the issue of what capitalism wants of these former industrial places. It seems as if

they have no future, not just in terms of a future implied by the logic of post-fordist capitalism, but, even in terms of the capacity of any significant collective actor to imagine a future for them. That is the real crisis of modernism in these most modern of places. What, if anything, can be done ? Who, if any (collective) body is going to do it ?

It is necessary to be a little cautious. There has been a message about the purpose of the dispossessed working class which has been quite clearly transmitted by the Thatcher era's public policy programme with regard to urban development, social security policy and trade union regulation. These people are to be the basis of 'flexible accumulation'. They are an 'underdeveloped' (in Cleaver's sense of that term - 1979) industrial reserve army functioning as Marx put it, both as a disciplining mechanism and as the basis of special branches of accumulation with very high rates of exploitation - both in services and in manufacturing production. The programme of the New Right was not about rendering these people surplus - it was about making them malleable. The point is that this programme - an action programme undertaken by actors (see Therborn 1986) may have gone too far, even for its own purposes. I am here proposing an account in which the dominant political class in the UK in the 1980s undertook a deliberate programme of public policy which, far from countering the structural tendency to crisis in the capitalist system of production - the whole point of Keynesian regulation mechanisms - actually reinforced its logic and pushed developments towards a social crisis. So the caution is not in the description of the situation. It is just as bad as ever I have contended it is. Rather it is necessary to clarify the background.

## Is a structural social planning possible ?

"Why the emphasis on local communities ? Have people not understood that they need an international working class movement to oppose the multinational corporations, a strong democratic parliament, reinforced by participatory democracy, to control the centralised state, and a multiple, interactive communication system to use the new technologies of the media to express (not to suppress) the cultural diversity of society ? Why, instead of choosing the right ones, do people insist on aiming at the local targets ? For the simple reason, that, according to available information, people appear to have no other choice." (M. Castells, 1983, p239)

This thesis so far presents a dismal record of failure and deterioration. In fact it is a far more dismal record than any that could be written for the United States or most other advanced industrial countries, because it is a dismal record from a region in which apparently democratic socialist / labourist objectives have been absolutely hegemonic. There has been more planning, even if that planning was (with the very important exception of wartime production planning) marked by an absence of popular participation, than in most places. Of course some commentators regard the collapse of this kind of project as quite uncontentious and probably rather a good thing in the end (notably Gorz, 1982, and, even although they are rather more in touch with reality than Gorz, Keane and Owens, 1986). However, these paens to the 'post-employment' society are rather less noticeable in the early 1990s, now that we are actually getting some first hand acquaintanceship with it. There have been serious discussion of the implications of our new sort of society, only in relation to one area of social policy - in the debate about 'Guaranteed Basic Income' in relation to reforms of social security. That is a very interesting idea, but it would require a redefinition of social solidarity on a

major scale, and in any event might be dismissed as involving an acceptance of the inevitability of the present basal situation.

I must admit to a considerable degree of pessimism. In an earlier work (Byrne, 1989) I argued that a significant recasting of political and constitutional arrangements was a necessary precondition of positive change, and I remain convinced of that (Byrne, forthcoming c). However, the exclusion from citizenship of so many people is so profound that it is very difficult to chart a way for them to come back. I am referring particularly here to 'active citizenship', that is to the capacity of people to have some determinative influence on political developments through the democratic process. The poor have not been disenfranchised *de jure* in the locales studied, but they have been disenfranchised *de facto*. The areas of life controlled in any meaningful sense by elected local government have been massively eroded by the extension of the power of the new appointed magistracy and by financial constraints imposed by central government. Over the same period the influence of the poor on national politics has been minimal. In these places one political party has been able to take them for granted, and the other has been able to ignore them. The effect has been the erosion of their status as citizens in terms of all the meanings which can be attached to that word.

It is true that City Challenge has some participatory element, but only in relation to the actual implementation and management of palliative schemes. There was no participatory, and very little representative democratic, element in the design of any City Challenge scheme examined here, apart from that of Middlesbrough where elected representatives did have a lot of say. Communities were not asked about the needs they identified, or about their preferred methods of producing solutions to these needs. The schemes were drawn up by 'experts'.

It is instructive to make an explicit comparison between the planning procedures of the immediate post-war period, and those of

today. In the 1940s planners functioned in a directive way, although subject to detailed representative democratic oversight, but around a clearly perceived and articulated set of social goals - in the study areas the post-war maintenance of full employment and the reconstruction of an extremely deficient reproductive system, especially through the construction of new housing. There simply are no similar agreed goals today. *Faith in the City* attempted to articulate some by a marriage of social Christianity and conventional universalism, but was dismissed as 'marxist' by Tory Ministers, and, if not ignored, was largely ineffective in shaping urban policy. It has to be said that the dilemma this poses reflects the particularity of the social goals of redress for the urban poor today.

The key word in this thesis is differentiation. Social groups have been separated, in conditions of life, in space, and in social objectives. It is true that there is a necessary connection between the dispossessed's role as a reserve army of labour and the conditions of the employed working class, but as the recent TIMEX dispute illustrates this is a connection within the poor - within the 'fourth world'. It is true that there is a fragility and vulnerability about the economic location of the prosperous, but this might have as much potential for exclusionary strategies (certainly apparent in the exercise of 'parent power' in school control and often exercised, literally, through exclusion) as for universalism. Can there be a connecting set of interests which serve as the basis of an alternative programme ?

The dreadful irony of the North East is that universalism is the formal political position people express when they vote. The problem is that the votes don't translate into any sort of social action. We are faced with a new and much more extreme set of 'Dilemmas of Social Reform' (Marris and Rein, 1967). Marris's and Rein's were dilemmas of agency. Those dilemmas remain, and have been too much neglected in recent essentially structuralist discussion, but we are faced with a serious issue of the dilemma

of possibility - can any possible actions make a significant difference ?

The one answer that can be made is to say that alternatives have not been tried. Land use planning as a basis for structural social planning, has now effectively abandoned real participatory processes in relation to the formation of agendas, and, in the UDC and adjacent territories, has thrown out much in the way of real democratic control. The important 'window of opportunity' that currently exists, does so because this non-democratic, manipulative, post-modern planning agenda has so plainly failed by any criterion of judgement. It has failed to meet any of its claims for job creation ; it has failed to reconstruct these urban spaces in a post-modern form ; it has failed to provide the profit accumulation which was the structural basis for its existence. It too is in crisis.

The word which springs to mind in considering ways forward is 'reconstruction'. If the era through which we are passing is one of 'restructuring' : one in which capitalism is showing all its potential for destruction, then we need to consider the actual mechanisms through which that destruction can be made creative (in Schumpeterian terms), because they do not seem to be self-generating. The idea of reconstruction is important here. It first emerged in British politics in the form of the Ministry for Reconstruction during the First World War, underpinned the approach of the New Deal in the United States, and was the implicit theme of post 1944 (the year of the 'White Paper Chase') politics in the UK. It is important to remember that this country has not previously had a politics of peace-time reconstruction. Unlike the United States where the New Deal served as a model for the Johnson administration's Great Society programmes of the 1960s, both our major national reconstruction programmes have been in the aftermath of world war. The only real exception is the Hailsham initiated programme of post-coal reconstruction, addressed

to a specific regional problem of structural unemployment, in precisely the region which contains the locales studied here.

It is almost certainly the case that the achievement of a programme of reconstruction will require significant administrative and constitutional reform as a necessary preliminary. The record of post-modern planning documented in this thesis demonstrates that existing local government structures lack all of the necessary characteristics for achieving change. They are too restricted in spatial terms. They lack significant powers. Most importantly, with the erosion of the trade union cultural base which underpinned traditional labourist politics, they have no coherent 'alternative culture' as a basis for a different politics. Those of us who thought that community organization could provide a parallel set of reproductive structures to compliment, support, and sometimes challenge the production based structures of working class action (see North Tyneside CDP, 1977) have instead seen community work employed primarily as an incorporating process through which discontent is channelled, diffused and defused. The mechanisms are rather different from those described by Piven and Cloward (1979) but the end result is much the same. Community work is, generally, in and for the state.

The greatest problem of all, and perhaps the most important contribution that this thesis can make is to identify this problem clearly, is that the recasting of the social structure created by the effect of deindustrialization on the matrix created by Keynesian planning, has effectively excluded much of the population from the political process. The debate and arguments about political reorganization which takes the form of concern with voting systems and subsidiarity, is a debate within the political class. The residual organized working class is involved through the trade union movement, but the disorganized working class (and here we have now arrived at my term for the so called 'underclass') are not part of the process. They are not a component of the political class. In Scotland with the emergence

of Scottish Militant as an actual political force, there is a connection with organized politics. In the North East of England, Britain, and possibly the world's most labourist region, there is none.

The only possible solution here is a programme of re-organization. This is a matter of the politics both of production and reproduction. The formal trade union movement has failed almost entirely in any serious development of organization among the working poor. It is perfectly true that it is faced with the most hostile legal environment for such a programme since the repeal of the Combination Laws, but it hasn't tried particularly hard. However, this thesis is about the reproductive rather than the productive sphere and it will now turn to a possible politics of reproduction around planning forward from here.

It seems to me that the techniques of 'community development' are crucial to this re-organization, but that the actual practices of much of contemporary community development are designed to make sure that it doesn't happen. Let alone the cynical, but at least relatively open approach, to community development of organizations like UDCs, where it is a mechanism through which possible opposition is bought off with crumbs from the table, it seems clear that much of local authority and voluntary organization community development activity, although organized around slogans of 'empowerment' is actually disempowering in practice and intention (see Byrne, 1986). This reflects the complex degree to which local authority community workers form part of a public sector service class whose interests are not always by any means identical with those of the disorganized working class. This is particularly reflected in the professionalization through credentialism of community work itself, and by the way in which community work is related to management structures in local government. There is a distinct whiff of evangelical bureaucracy in this system.

Participation in planning was an important focus of community development. At least the Unitary Development Plans, if not the other elements in contemporary planning, retain a requirement for a participatory input, although this has generally been rather formalistic. It is remarkable that this has not served as the basis of any developed community work, and particularly not community work by adult education agencies. In one of the locales studied there is, perhaps, a particular reason for this. TWDC has funded the organisers of the two major public meetings held which have had the function of reviewing the future of Sunderland. The first was organized as *Sunderland 2000* under the auspices of a group co-ordinated by the Workers' Education Association, although the local democratic element in the WEA was not involved. It should be noted that this democratic element in the form of a District Committee is Tyneside rather than Wearside based, but its absence is worth remarking on. This meeting was at least one in which all shades of opinion were represented on the platform (including the present author) and was reasonably well attended. However it did not form part of any coherent strategy for taking things farther. The more recent meeting organized by *A19 Video* as part of its major project which is wholly funded by TWDC, was an example of farce following tragedy. It was very poorly publicized, took place on a dreadful winter's night, was poorly attended, had a platform vetted by TWDC's Chief Executive, and got nowhere. Indeed very few of the attenders seemed to be from Sunderland. The platform's membership did say some revealing things about objectives and intentions, but that was all.

It is clear that representative democratic systems taken alone displayed significant flaws in the Keynesian-Fordist era, flaws which were particularly apparent in the planning process itself. The New Right's substitute is the flexible market. The Left has not worked out an alternative system in which participatory mechanisms are taken seriously. They are proposed, as in this thesis, but not developed.

## A New system of Government ?

Before concluding the conclusion it is necessary to return to the issue of the organization of local government. These remarks are prompted in part by the announcement in mid May 1993 that the preferred solution of the local government boundary commissioners for the future of Cleveland County is that it be broken up into four constituent districts with unitary authority status. The rationale for this is that it will put local government 'closer to the people'. The reality is that it will create four minnows with no clear line of democratic accountability for confronting the issues facing the Cleveland conurbation. The effect will be to further conceal the nature of the planning process through the enhancement of the role of TDC and the 'rendering invisible' of co-ordinating decisions among the districts.

What then should be done ? So far as structure goes there is a great deal to be said for the idea of city-region as proposed by Senior in his minority report to the Redcliffe-Maude Commission on Local Government in 1969. It is true that Senior's provincial (standard planning region) level should be directly elected, as he himself was later to agree, but the unitary authority should be one which can handle planning decisions about land use, or rather at least has the scale to handle such decisions. The qualification is very important. Certainly a free-standing Hartlepool will be absolutely incapable of doing anything very much about the appalling problems caused by the dispossession of much of its population, but would even a Cleveland County (which does approximate a city region) have much scope, even if in possession of the sort of powers possessed by local government in 1945 ?

That is the point Castells is making in the passage quoted above. It is not just an issue of local government. It is an issue of the capacity of any level of government in contending with the forces of capitalism. Although Castells is a born-again left-Weberian, he shares the sense of structuralist pessimism which

informs so much of the understanding of social science in relation to these issues. This thesis has tried to appreciate the significance of structure. De-industrialization was a necessary cause of the social differentiation it describes, but right Keynesianism's victory in housing policy in the 60s was equally necessary for the production of this socio-spatial system. It is a matter of complex causality. Structure could not work without agency - agency determined (the reverse of the usual direction in accounts) the impact of structure. Can there be agency again? Can anybody or any group or any level of government do anything?

The only answer I feel able to give at this stage is that the system of governance (to use Harold Wilson's expression) we have, could not be worse. We must have something which allows representative and participatory democracy to function at a level which has some real power. Constitutional reform is an essential, but it cannot function alone. We have to re-politicize through agency. Leninism is dead, and good riddance to it, but we need to revive some way of organizing people (and this thesis retains a sense of the significance of the proletariat as the collective actor) towards a resolution of the difficulties which face them.

I will conclude this conclusion by suggesting that the appropriate strategy which might be applied in the contexts which this thesis has described, and sought to explain, would be a mass programme of community development, on the lines of the late 60s Community Development Projects, but funded on general lines and not as an experiment. There is a lot to be said for action-research, locally situated, locally related, time limited, and quite separate from professional and local authority managerial structures.

It will not be easy. A minor, but significant, theme in this thesis has been the way in which public sector workers, and especially professionally qualified public sector workers, have become separated from the dispossessed and disorganized working

class, both culturally and spatially. It was not too hard for the first generation graduate children of skilled manual workers to work in working class communities which were somewhat poorer than, but recognizably of the same kind as, those from which they came. The contemporary situation is very different. Things, groups and places have moved apart. Have we reached a point where quantity has become transformed into quality ? I hope not.

The alternative to participatory integration is already before us. It is an interpretation of the problems in terms of policing, of the management of the discontents of the disorganized poor by strategies of containment. This is not a remark which is meant to be particularly critical of the police. Indeed many police officers are, in my experience both as teacher of them, and local councillor, rather well aware of the issues and dissatisfied with the notion that they are to be used to exclude non-citizens. However, that is the way things are going now.

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
## Appendix One - List of Abbreviations

Av Dw	Average Dwelling
Av Man Inc	Average Male Manual Income
BC	Borough Council
Borr Inc	Borrower's Income
CBC	County Borough Council
Cl	Cluster
CLSS	Cleveland Social Survey
Degs	Degrees
Dwells	Dwellings
Ec Act	Economically Active
Econ Act	Economically Active
Fem	Female
FFT	Female Full Time
FPT	Female Part Time
FT	Full time
DE	Dept of the Environment
DOE	Dept of Employment
Hd	Head - as in 'Head of Household'
Hhd	Household
Ind	Industrial
LA Ten	Local Authority Tenant
Man	Managerial
MBC	Metropolitan Borough Council
Marr Fems	Married Females
Min Age	Minimum School Leaving Age

MFem	Married Females
MFT	Male Full Time
MPT	Male Part Time
N Dw	New Dwelling
N.Man	Routine Non-Manual
Own Occ	Owner Occupier
Oth Ten	Other Tenants
Pop	Population
Pop Chan	Population Change
Prof	Professional
Reg. Gen.	Registrar General
SC	Registrar General's Social Class
Ser	Services
Ser.T.	Service Tenancy
SK Man	Skilled Manual
TDC	Teesside Development Corporation
TWDC	Tyne and Wear Development Corporation
Tot	Total
UDC	Urban Development Corporation
UE	Unemployment
3 Amens	Possesses 3 basic amenities of fixed bath, hotwater supply and inside WC

## Appendix Two - Sources of Tables

- 5.1 - 5.3      *Statistics of Education 86-7*  
Tables C191, 24 (26). HMSO ; *Regional Trends*  
24 1988 HMSO ; NOMIS unemployment tables ;  
NOMIS Census of Employment ; *Census of*  
*Population County Leaflets 1981.*
- 5.4 - 5.7      NOMIS Census of Employment.
- 5.8 - 5.9      *Census of Population County Leaflets*  
1971,1981,1991.
- 6.1 - 6.14     *Saspac81 SAS 71/81 Change Data Set*
- 6.15 - 6.20     *Saspac81 SAS 81 ED Data Set*
- 6.21 - 6.27b    *Saspac91 SAS 91 ED Data Set*
- 6.29 - 6.44     *Cleveland Social Survey 77 and 87 Data Sets*
- 7.1             *Northern Regional Strategy Team - Technical*  
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- 7.2             *Regional Trends HMSO*




- County Boundaries
- Main Urban Areas
- ==== Motorways
- ==== Other Major Roads
- ==== Main Railways
- † Airports
- \* New Towns
- National Park Boundaries




1400 feet (427 metres)  
600 feet (183 metres)

TDC Area : Teesside



# TWDC Area : Tyneside



- 470 -

# TWDC Area : Wearside

