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Rosalind Ralph

THE TSARIST GOVERNMENT, THE ZEMSTVOS

AND PEASANT MIGRATION TO SIBERIA 1861 - 1914

Master of Arts 1992

The thesis examines the development of Tsarist government policy with regard to the colonisation of Siberia and to peasant migration eastwards from the more densely populated provinces of central European Russia. Government policy prior to the Emancipation Act of 1861 is discussed, showing that under Kiselev, the principle of allowing excess population from one area to another was accepted and acted upon. It is argued that far from facilitating the colonisation of Siberia, the Emancipation Act effectively halted its further development by restricting the mobility of the peasantry. Population growth, increasing impoverishment of the peasantry, demands for more land and government ambitions to harness Siberia's resources converged, resulting in growing government interest in encouraging the colonisation of Siberia from the mid-1880s. Peasant migration to Siberia increased rapidly during the 1890s under the auspices of the Siberian Railway Committee then fell back in the early 1900s. The Japanese attack in the Far East in 1904 highlighted the need for swift, large-scale colonisation of Siberia and the upheavals and revolution of 1905 emphasized continuing peasant disaffection. The Stolypin reforms of 1905-1908 addressed both issues simultaneously, freeing the peasant from his ties and paving the way for heavy out-migration from European Russia to Siberia between 1906 and 1913. After the initial peak years, by 1910, numbers of out-migrants were falling due in part, it is suggested, to the growing effectiveness of the Stolypin reforms in resolving peasant grievances in European Russia. The role of the zemstvo movement in relation to peasant out-migration is examined. Zemstvo efforts were largely in the field of welfare and practical assistance and directed principally through two regional organisations, of which the South-Russian Regional Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation, based in Poltava, was by far the more important. Its contribution and effectiveness are assessed.

**THE TSARIST GOVERNMENT, THE ZEMSTVOS
AND PEASANT MIGRATION TO SIBERIA 1861 - 1914**

Volume I of I

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This is to certify that Chapter I of the material offered here has not previously been submitted by me for a degree at this or any other university. Chapters II to VI and the bibliography have been offered for a degree in June 1991 at this university.

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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

Nineteenth century Europe was characterised by expanding industrialisation and the development of improved means of transport and communications. The populations of Europe were encouraged by these advances to become more mobile in search of improved opportunities, whether within their countries of origin or further afield. People moved from the countryside to the towns in search of jobs. Famines caused thousands to leave their homes and countries simply to survive, as in Ireland. Tsarist Russia^{*} did not remain immune from these trends, despite the relative isolation of its mostly rural population. There was some out-migration from European Russia to Western Europe and the Americas, and, during the last decades of the 19th century, within the borders of the Russian Empire itself growing numbers of peasantfarmers, former serfs and state peasants alike, sought improved material conditions of life. Some migrated to the towns to escape relentless overcrowding in the countryside, others travelled far and wide within the Empire in search of seasonal wage-work, on both agricultural and industrial enterprises, to boost their livelihood, still others set off southwards and increasingly eastwards in search of land in less populated areas with a view to permanent settlement. It is with this third group in particular, those who uprooted their families after the Emancipation Act of 1861 in search of new lands to farm in the frontier regions of Siberia and the Tsarist government's management of their demands for resettlement, that this thesis is specifically concerned.

The date 1861 is chosen as the starting point because it was the Emancipation Act which ostensibly freed the peasant from serfdom, thereby increasing his mobility and availability for migration. This is not to suggest that out-migration only began after 1861.

* The writer when referring to colonisation by Russians includes within this grouping all those who originated from the provinces of European Russia as constituted in the 19th and 20th centuries up to 1917, but is well aware that Slavs other than Great Russians, and particularly Little Russians or Ukrainians and Belorussians formed a considerable number among migrants.

There were several initiatives introduced by the Minister of State Domains, Kiselev, during the first half of the 19th century to assist the resettlement of state peasants from over-crowded areas to less populous regions. (1) Indeed, many of the bureaucratic procedures in force after 1861 were merely a continuation of those governing the resettlement of state peasants prior to that date. As such they did little to address the rural problems of the latter half of the 19th century. The migration movement to Siberia as it gathered pace was vast in scope. Between 1896 and 1916 over four million people set off eastwards, the majority in the years 1907 to 1910. Yet this great migration has evoked little attention among Western scholars. Only a handful of works have been published, namely those by Treadgold, (2) Coquin (3) and more recently Yaney (4). Anderson's study (5) has its emphasis on population dynamics rather than legislative provision for resettlement and does not encompass the key years of the Stolypin agrarian reforms. Study of the migration movement has been mainly undertaken by contemporaneous Tsarist writers writing in the latter half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century and Soviet historians. The Tsarist viewpoint however is firmly sited within the framework of European Russia.

Pre-revolutionary writers study only the European Russian angle because there was no representative Siberian viewpoint. Modern Soviet and Western historians have the advantage of a longer period of historical development. But, there is another issue here, namely, that while out-migration has little discernible effect on the areas of origin, immigration has a considerable, long-term and ever-growing impact on the areas of destination. Pre-revolutionary historians were able to observe the migration movement in progress, but once it had subsided the consequences and effects of the movement were to be felt chiefly in Siberia. The October revolution of 1917 meant that it was left to Soviet historians to examine and put forward Siberia's case. Where the pre-revolutionary writer was continuing to debate the causes of peasant migration, its desirability or otherwise, its scope and the efficiency of its execution as a contemporary and evolving process, (6) modern historians are able to tackle the issue of migration in terms of both causes and effects. Irrevocably the emphasis has changed from analysis of the reasons

for peasant migration to consideration of its consequences for Siberia. The perspective shifted away from European Russia to Siberia. This process was already underway by the 1880s with the publication of two articles by Yadrintsev (7) which examined the position of new settlers in Siberia even before the first big waves of migrants arrived from European Russia. Among the most prolific of pre-revolutionary writers on peasant migration was A. A. Kaufman, much of whose work focuses on new settlers particularly in the province of Tomsk. (8) Yamzin undertakes a similar assessment in 1912. (9) Siberia's own centres of learning and research have produced more studies of the impact of peasant migration. The Soviet compilation Istoriya krest'yanstva Sibiri examines peasant resettlement as only one aspect of Siberia's development. (10) Stepynin traces the growth and development of Yeniseisk province as a result of peasant immigration. (11)

For pre-revolutionary writers Siberia was a vast, virgin territory peopled by a small number of nomadic tribes and restrictively used as a place of exile for criminals and political activists. It was described as under-populated and under-exploited, and unrestricted immigration into Siberia was urged. (12) Among the priority aims of the Trans-Siberian Railway Committee were the populating of the empty lands along the railway with ethnic Slavs and the creation of new centres of productivity. (13) A. N. Kulomzin's fact-finding trip to Siberia in 1896 was mainly to seek out new lands for settlement. As is the case with all colonising nations, the advantages and gains to the coloniser, in this instance the Tsarist state, were the sole concern. Siberia was regarded as a colony and its independent development sacrificed to the negative consequences of Russia's historical and social evolution. At the time of the Emancipation, unlike European Russia, Siberia had very few land-owning gentry and negligible numbers of serfs. (14) Old-settler communities, established on the basis of squatters' rights (*pravo zakhvata*) had evolved independently with little bureaucratic interference. It is argued that the increase in land-surveying, the result of the pressure for resettlement, was to the detriment of these old-settlers who often lost land they had regarded as theirs. Furthermore, the self-governing bodies which had been established within the framework of these communities lost their powers to more centralised authorities as the resettlement movement gathered pace. (15) Siberia's history took a different path as a result.

The eastwards migration of the Russian peasantry raises four main issues. Firstly, the causes which provoked the population movement; secondly, the nature and scope of the movement, its ebbs and flows, peaks and troughs; thirdly, the purpose and outcome of Tsarist government legislation associated with peasant resettlement; fourthly, the impact of migration on both European Russia and Siberia.

There is little argument between Tsarist, Soviet, or indeed Western historians as to the fundamental causes of the migration from the European Russian countryside. All regard rural impoverishment caused by what has been termed the 'crisis of agriculture' as the principle motivating factor. Analyses of the elements which led to the crisis are also broadly similar. The restrictions of mobility and on initiative placed upon the peasantry as a result of the Emancipation Act meant that semi-feudal farming practices continued to be the norm. The difficulties in eking out a living led to increasing peasant indebtedness. Added to this was the highest population growth anywhere in Europe during the second half of the 19th century and the increasing incidence of crop failures. The net result was a situation where too little cultivable acreage failed to sustain ever-growing numbers of people. Historians and social commentators of the Tsarist period acknowledged the reality of land-shortage and recorded the peasantry's need for more land or resettlement. Yanson's detailed study published in 1881 shows that many peasants, both former serfs and state peasants alike farmed plots well below the legal minimum area of five desyatinas of land per male. (16) Zaionchkovskii observes that land allocated to peasants within the provisions of the Emancipation Act was often less than that they had occupied prior to the Act. (17) Purchasing or renting of extra land was often out of the question or placed further heavy financial burden on the peasant who was still paying off in redemption dues what he owed on the plot of land received at the time of the Emancipation. Purchasing and renting of extra land was undertaken by the collective of the commune but not in sufficient quantities to keep pace with the growth in population. The attraction of Siberia's vast land resources to the peasants of European Russia is noted by both Tsarist and Soviet historians, but the point is taken further by Anderson, whose findings suggest that had Siberia not been available for settlement many peasants would have remained at their places of origin despite increasingly desperate circumstances. (18) Similar views are offered,

although the case is not proven here, by Stepynin who observes that the migration movement was dependent upon the accessibility of Siberia's land-mass. (19)

Further contributing factors encouraging out-migration were the absence of internal markets for agricultural products which might have stimulated the introduction of more efficient farming practices and ultimately a supply and demand economy and the few options for wage-work to supplement a living, particularly in the very rural provinces of the centre and Ukraine. (20) In effect, there was little opportunity to develop much beyond subsistence-level farming.

The Marxist-Soviet view also contends that the urge to migrate grew where capitalist development was least able to flourish due to the legacy of serfdom. (21) On the other hand, colonisation is seen to have delayed the development of capitalism in the over-crowded provinces of European Russia, but at the same time to have encouraged its growth in the frontier areas. (22)

There is similarly little argument between Tsarist, Soviet or Western historians as to the scope of Russian migration eastwards into Siberia. Most work in this field is predicated on official Tsarist statistics. Prior to 1885, most figures are either approximations and considered unreliable or are entirely absent. However, some zemstvos undertook their own research and were able to offer insights into the development of the migration movement from their individual provinces. (23) More authoritative pre-revolutionary statistics are those of the numbers of migrants which passed through the migrant check-points of Chelyabinsk and Syzran from 1896 until 1914. These continue to provide the most reliable indicators of the flows of out-migrants and returnees together with their licensed or unlicensed status. Similar details are provided for all scouts. Even these however do not provide the definitive numbers of out-migrants to Siberia, as those who journeyed via other routes were not as closely monitored. Much work has also been done to interpret the findings of the 1897 census to shed light on internal migration throughout the Russian Empire. Tikhonov

produces significant details on the flow of migrants both within European Russia and from Russia into Siberia based on the numbers of individuals who were not native to their places of residence at the time of the census. (24)

More contentious is the role of the Tsarist government in the resettlement process. The special committee called in 1881 to discuss resettlement and the problems of rural Russia sparked off the debate. The crucial issue was the extent to which out-migration should be subject to government control both at the point of departure and in the settlement areas. Opinion was divided. Yanson, while commenting favourably on the government's provisions to ensure an organised resettlement movement, also highlights the legal restrictions which obstructed the peasantry in its pursuit of improved opportunities. (25) Other contemporaneous commentators advocated the lifting of all restriction on peasant migration to Siberia and propounded the view that government involvement should only take the form of financial assistance in support of migrants, reasoning that the peasantry, left to its own devices, would settle and exploit the land to their and the state's advantage. (26) By no means all intellectual opinion supported out-migration from European Russia. Some argued instead that a more effective, long-term solution to the problem of rural over-crowding would be to increase peasant land-holdings in Russia. (27) An important factor in the debate is what has come to be known as the vested interests of the land-owning classes. Their opposition to wholesale out-migration from European Russia was seen to rest on a number of issues. Firstly, they would lose revenue received from the peasants in the form of redemption payments, secondly, that the existing pool of labour would disappear, thirdly, there would be fewer opportunities to rent out land. (28)

Much pre-revolutionary historical work on resettlement is seen as too supportive of the government and too glowing in its assessment of achievements. This is perhaps inevitable in volumes such as Aziatskaya Rossiya, itself a publication of the Chief Directorate of Land Management and Agriculture; however, they do give an important overview of Siberia's history and development from earliest times, together with much geographical and anthropological detail. (29)

The attitude of Soviet historians towards Tsarist government action on resettlement is ambivalent. Stepynin sees two distinct periods characterising the government's attitude post-Emancipation towards peasant resettlement: the first from 1861 to 1905 when the government was clearly opposed to resettlement, the second from 1906 to 1917 when the government did all in its power to encourage resettlement. (30) In Krest'yanstvo Sibiri three varying government responses are identified. The first, prevalent during the period between 1861 and the early 1880s was one of prevention, the second which held precedence from the 1880s until after the turn of the century was to allow some resettlement and finally the third, after 1904 was positively to encourage resettlement as a means of resolving the agrarian crisis in Russia. (31) This shows a slight relaxing in the Soviet hardline view of Tsarist government activity and an acknowledgement that legislation during the 1890s, while still restrictive, went some way to easing procedures for the prospective migrant. However, the Soviet historian is unable to endorse Tsarist government legislative action during any of these periods. On the one hand restricting migration is seen to have been detrimental to those peasants from European Russia seeking resettlement, and on the other, encouraging massive resettlement in Siberia is considered to have left many poorer peasants in a state of penury as their hopes were raised and then dashed by the inefficiency of resettlement procedures, (32) and to have placed great strains on Siberia's own development. The element of force and coercion used to implement the government's policy of mapping out settler plots is highlighted. (33)

The independent role played by some zemstvos in support of resettlement is given prominence by Zenchenko, (34) himself a member of the Poltava Zemstvo, but is more often than not ignored by Soviet historians and sometimes dismissed by Tsarist historians, Veselovskii for example, (35) although the contribution made by statisticians of individual zemstvos in noting numbers of out-migrants from respective provinces is generally acknowledged. Zenchenko stresses the distribution of information on settlement areas and the guidance offered to migrants at the point of settlement as being significant contributions, but this last has received the Soviet charge of propaganda in support of resettlement. (36) Sidel'nikov notes the cooperation between the land settlement commissions and the zemstvos in the distribution of funds for migrants. (37)

~~notes the cooperation between the land settlement commissions and the zemstvos in the distribution of funds for migrants. (37)~~

The fourth issue raised by migration of the peasantry to Siberia is the impact the movement had on the supplying provinces of Russia and the receiving territory of Siberia. The effect on rural Russia of peasant out-migration was minimal in comparison with that on Siberia of a massive influx of population. The European Russian perspective viewed resettlement not in isolation, but as a component part in addressing the problems of land shortage and rural destitution before the turn of the 20th century and even prior to the 1861 Emancipation Act in the days of Kiselev's initiatives on resettlement. After 1905 a positive resettlement policy emerged but still remained as only one aspect of the overall package of land and agricultural reforms undertaken by Stolypin. For Siberia, Russian peasant immigration was one of, if not the most important single development in its modern evolutionary history. The movement irrevocably determined the nature of Siberia today, its settled areas, its demographic mix, the level of its industrial and agricultural development, the exploitation of its natural resources. It is generally acknowledged that Siberia rapidly became agriculturally very productive. It is also generally accepted among Tsarist and Western historians that the peasant who settled successfully in Siberia enjoyed a higher standard of living than had been his lot in European Russia. (38) Sklyarov however, vigorously questions the conclusion that on the whole migrants benefited materially from resettlement and re-examines the methodology employed, maintaining instead that the new settlers' apparent prosperity depended largely on their level of affluence prior to leaving European Russia and that therefore resettlement did not necessarily assist the poor peasant. (39) Further examination of the peasant's economic level of well-being in Siberia is however beyond the scope of this thesis which will study resettlement and the migration movement from the perspective of European Russia. While the one-sided nature of this approach is acknowledged it is the attitude and legislation of government and zemstvo response, dictated by the exigencies of the agrarian crisis within European Russia which forms the basis of this thesis.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

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- (3) Francois-Xavier Coquin, La Sibérie: peuplement et immigration paysanne au XIX siecle. (Paris, 1969)
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- (5) Barbara A. Anderson, Internal migration during modernization in late 19th century Russia. (Princeton: 1980)
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N. Aref'ev, "Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie v Sibir' v 1896 godu", Severnii Vestnik, 1897, VI, pp.124-134.
N. M. Yadrintsev, "Nashi vyseleniya i kolonizatsiya", Vestnik Evropy, 1880, VI
N. Emel'yanov, "Organizatsiya pereseleniya", Russkii Vestnik 1899, X, pp.817-823.
- (7) N. M. Yadrintsev, "Polozhenie pereselentsev v Sibiri", Vestnik Evropy, 1881, VIII, and "Desyatiletie pereselencheskogo dela", Vestnik Evropy. 1891, VIII
- (8) A. A. Kaufman, Khozyaistvennoe polozhenie pereselentsev vodvorennykh na kazennykh zemlyakh Tomskoi gubernii po dannym issledovaniya 1894 g. St. Petersburg, 1895 and 1896. Tomskie pereselentsy no podvornomu issledovaniyu 1894 g. Sbornik pravoved. i obshch. znanii, 1897, VII.
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- (11) V. A. Stepynin, Kolonizatsiya Yeniseiskoi gubernii v epokhu kapitalizma. (Krasnoyarsk, 1962)

- (12) Yadrintsev, Nashi vyseleniya i kolonizatsiya, p. 483.
- (13) N. Aref'ev, "Uregulirovanie pereseleniya", Severnii Vestnik, 1987, VIII, p. 41.
- (14) Goryushkin, Krest'yanstvo Sibiri, p. 16.
- (15) A. T. Topchii, Krest'yanskie reformy v Sibiri 1861-1899 gg. (Tomsk, 1979.) p. 140.
- (16) Yu. E. Yanson, Opyt statisticheskogo issledovaniya o krest'yanskikh nadelakh i platezhakh. (St. Petersburg 1881)
- (17) P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Provedenie v zhizn' krest'yanskoj reformy 1861 g. (Moscow 1958)
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- (19) Stepynin, Kolonizatsiya Yeniseiskoi gubernii, p. 66.
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- (22) Stepynin, Kolonizatsiya Yeniseiskoi gubernii, p. 5.
- (23) Pereselenie iz Poltavskoi gubernii s 1861 po 1900, Part I: 1861-1893; Part II: 1894-1900. (Poltava, 1900-1905)
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- (26) Yadrintsev, Nashi vyseleniya i kolonizatsiya, pp. 480-483.
- (27) Emel'yanov, Organizatsiya pereseleniya, pp. 817-818.
- (28) B. B. Veselovskii, Istoriya zemstva za sorok let. Vol. II. (Oriental Research Partners. 1973) p. 85.
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- (31) Goryushkin, Krest'yanstvo Sibiri, p. 111.
- (32) L.F. Sklyarov, Pereselenie i zemleustroistvo v Sibiri v gody Stolypinskoi agrarnoi reformy. (Izd. Leningradskogo universiteta 1962) pp. 459-462.
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- (35) Veselovskii, Istoriya zemstva, Vol. III, p. 119
- (36) Sklyarov, Pereselenie i zemleustroistvo, pp. 125.
- (37) S. M. Sidel'nikov, Agrarnyi vopros i reforma Stolypina (Izd. Moskovskogo universiteta, 1973) pp. 206-207.
- (38) Sklyarov, Pereselenie i zemleustroistvo, p. 387.
- (39) Sklyarov, Pereselenie i zemleustroistvo, p. 382-383.

CHAPTER II

PEASANT MIGRATION AND RESETTLEMENT PRIOR TO THE EMANCIPATION ACT OF 19TH FEBRUARY 1861

The spontaneous movement eastwards by the peasantry of European Russia during the 19th and the early 20th centuries marks a watershed in the history of the colonisation of Siberia. Before examining the migration movement of the European Russian peasantry after the Emancipation Act of 1861, it is intended in this chapter to outline briefly the extent to which Siberia was colonised in the preceding centuries and to examine what, if any, specifically peasant migration, or resettlement, had taken place and government policy towards it.

The first farming communities in Siberia were set up in 1590 when the Russian state launched attempts to establish permanent, civilian centres of population by transferring peasants to cultivate the land and provide food for the conquering, military garrisons. Initially volunteers were sought, but if insufficient numbers came forward, suitable quotas from given areas were press-ganged into giving their services. These early colonisers were settled on land near the garrisons and issued with seed. Once their crops were established they were required to hand over up to one-fifth of their produce to the local authorities. (1)

*(The Russian word 'pereselenie' has been translated variously in this thesis as migration, resettlement or relocation. The term migration has been used when referring to the spontaneous, popular phenomenon of movement of peoples. Resettlement and relocation have been used to emphasize the movement of peoples assisted by outside agencies subject to specific administrative procedures).

By the 1640s Russian explorers and military expeditions had reached the Pacific at the Sea of Okhotsk. A settlement was established at Okhotsk in 1647. In order to consolidate territorial gains the pattern of settlement outlined above continued: territory was conquered, a garrison built and farming communities established. By the 17th century, a system was already in operation to encourage persons to move to Siberia with the promise of sustenance en route and the provision of certain financial aid and material supplies on arrival at their destinations. In return for these benefits, such persons were expected to assist in the erection of government buildings and in general to set up a basic infrastructure, providing roads and transport and busying themselves with agricultural and forestry work. (2)

By the end of the 17th century, 25,000 Russian households were established in Siberia, nearly half peasant families situated primarily in Western Siberia. (3) An indication of the intended permanency of early settlement in Western Siberia is given in the fact that the towns of Tyumen and Tobolsk were not only founded in 1586 and 1587 respectively, but were also awarded the status of towns in those same years. (4)

It was during the 17th century that steps were taken to bring to an end the peregrinations of the peasantry who, it seemed, were continually on the move in search of more fruitful lands. In order to stabilise this fluctuating workforce, millions of peasants were settled on plots of land, for which they were required to pay a rent either in money or in produce to the owner, either the state or a landlord. (5) G.T. Robinson writes of the resulting gradual decline towards serfdom, as peasant indebtedness increased over the centuries, binding peasant families ever more closely in subservience to the landlord. (6)

Up until this time the peasantry had moved around at will and some had crossed the Urals into Siberia without let or hindrance by the state. The

peasant's new settled status however, restricted this freedom of movement and made such action contrary to law. An Imperial decree of 24th June 1683, addressed to the military governor of Siberia, made it apparent that Siberia was not open to free settlement, by stipulating that any Russian crossing into Siberia should be forcibly detained. (7) The Imperial state was to be the sole arbiter for determining the colonisation of Siberia.

Nevertheless, Siberia was seen as a haven for the fugitives who fled across the Urals despite all prohibitions. They were often Old Believers, who faced persecution, frequently in the form of the death penalty, in the Russian homeland, or peasants who had absconded from their plots of land, dissatisfied with their lot. Many originated from northern and north-eastern Russia where the schismatic movement had enjoyed particular support. The relative proximity of these areas to Siberia and the availability of river routes enabled the fugitive to flee and the absconder to disappear more easily. (8)

In 1719 two decrees concerning Siberia were issued, the first on 29 May acknowledged the territory's developing importance and the necessity for imperial control by dividing Siberia into three regions or provinces, the second of 4 December allowed for the despatch of peasants to Siberia with their prior agreement. A clause no doubt open to interpretation. (10) The government was powerless to stem the movement of these fugitives and a decree was passed on 11th June 1763 legitimising the position of those who had fled to Siberia and whose travel permits had expired. (9) This acceptance of the *fait accompli* was to be repeated several times in the following century as the lesser of two evils when coping with illegal settlers, the alternative being forcible repatriation. It was also recognised that it was to the state's advantage to encourage successful civilian settlement in order to retain its territorial acquisitions. Also contained within the decree was approval for the recruitment of merchants for settlement in Siberia.

Other settlers during the 17th century included prisoners-of-war, the results of Russian expansion westwards at the expense of Poland and Lithuania, exiled political and religious dissidents, administrative personnel, fur-hunters, traders and peasant farmers and artisans. (11) The situation changed little during the 18th century. Coquin refers to several organised attempts to populate certain areas during the reign of Catherine the Great (1762 - 1796): in 1763 several groups of Old Believers were exiled to the Altai region; in 1783, several hundred volunteers were despatched to settle the route from Yakutsk to Okhotsk; in 1795 settlers were sent to the area around the upper Irtysh river, but the total number of colonisers resulting from these measures amounted to no more than three to four thousand. (12) Nevertheless centres of population were springing up: Tomsk was founded in 1604, Yakutsk in 1632 and Irkutsk in 1651. (13) The famous 'trakt' was already in existence in the time of the Empress Elisabeth (1741 - 1761), meandering from Russia proper as far as Irkutsk and beyond. (14)

By 1797, the number of Russian settlers in Siberia was in the region of 575,800 persons (15) and already greatly exceeded the total indigenous population whose number was put at only 363,362. (16)

Two years later an ambitious project was initiated by the decrees of 17th October 1799. It marked a first attempt by the Russian state at substantial colonisation of Siberia, in this case of the Transbaikal region near the border with China. The decree ordered the transfer within one year of some 10,000 volunteer male peasants, made up of retired soldiers, miscreants sentenced to exile and serfs released by their masters specifically to become colonists, to the area bordered by Lake Baikal, the upper Angara, Nerchinsk and Kyakhta. Each adult male transferred under the scheme was to receive thirty desyatinas of the most fertile, cultivable land available in the area. (17)

The voluntary nature of the scheme is stressed in Aziatskaya Rossiya and all the advantages and support which were to have been provided, including

houses, are highlighted, but no assessment of the successor failure level is given beyond a brief statement that the difficulties to be overcome on the journey alone were in the extreme. (18) Coquin concludes that the problems involved in organising the transfer of 10,000 families to Far Eastern Siberia and supervising their settlement proved well-nigh insurmountable. He emphasizes the non-feasibility of the project from the beginning, not only in terms of the lack of preparation to receive the new colonisers, but also in the absence of the necessary administrative back-up to ensure that all were able to complete the journey. By 1806, although some had been installed in the designated area, a majority had set up temporary homes along the journey route. (19)

As the wealth of Siberian natural resources came to be recognised, so the desire to exploit these created the need for a permanent labour force. While some exiles worked out their sentences of hard labour in Siberia, their numbers were not sufficient to meet the perceived requirements. In order to increase the number of labourers the decree of 17 October 1760 had allowed for the despatch to the factories of Nerchinsk of criminals of both sexes who had been sentenced to exile. Further legislation enacted on 13th December 1760, granted land-owners the right to volunteer their unwanted serfs for resettlement in Siberia by the administrative authorities. (20) Alan Wood details the workings of this law and subsequent related decrees which specified the age limit and fitness level of serfs which would be accepted under this scheme. He argues that while the government viewed the measures primarily as a means of increasing settlement and the workforce in Siberia, the reality of the transfer of these serfs was as harsh and punitive as that of other exiles. (21)

Coquin notes that following the enactment of the 1799 law several villages in the Caucasus petitioned for the right to be transferred to Siberia. (22) Fearing possible depopulation and consequent vulnerability of their newly acquired territories of New Russia, the authorities introduced punitive measures on 17 June 1812 to restrict movement out of the area. The law forbade peasants to

move from one province to another. It also revived the provisions of a law requiring peasants remaining in a village to pay a tax on those who left to settle elsewhere. On the other hand the law also held out a carrot to peasants and Cossacks settling in New Russia in the form of a special allowance. (23) Clearly, peasant mobility was to be held strictly within the state's control and resettlement directed to where lay the state's priority for colonisation.

The problem of rural overcrowding within the central provinces of European Russia was highlighted as early as 1810 by the Governor of Tambov, who alerted the government to the problems faced by the provinces of Ryazan, Tambov and Orel. Where earlier in the provinces there had been land in plenty, many villages now had no more than two or three desyatinas of land per male soul. (24) This led inevitably to increasing impoverishment and indebtedness of state peasants caused by the inability to produce enough yield on the amount of land available to them.

Little was done to address these ills until 1822 when proposals put forward by the then Governor General of Siberia, Speransky, were made law. Speransky recognising that the population of Siberia needed to be increased if he was to fulfil his task of consolidating the territory, wished to encourage peasant settlement in Siberia and proposed that Siberia be opened to settlement by state peasants. The law of 10 April 1822 provided for such resettlement for those with less than five desyatinas of land and further stipulated that permits to settle be authorised on demand, not only to those wishing to move from European Russia to Siberia, but also from one province to another within Siberia. There were, however, several conditions to be fulfilled prior to being granted a permit, namely the despatch of a scout to reconnoitre suitable land for settlement, the acquiring of a certificate of permission to leave the commune of origin and a certificate of acceptance from the commune at the point of destination. Furthermore, all debts had to be paid off in full. (25) As in 1812, the fear that New Russia would be left insufficiently populated as state peasants rushed to take advantage of the

relaxation in laws governing their mobility led the state to except the New Russia provinces of Kherson, Tauride and Ekaterinoslav from application of the 1822 Act by a new decree of 26 January 1823. (26)

The issue of shortage of land received increasing attention. A commission set up in 1826 estimated that up to 900,000 state peasants had less than the legal norm of eight desyatinas per male soul. (27) The act of 1822 entitled the state peasant with less than five desyatinas of land to apply for resettlement in a less populous area. The earlier ban on resettlement in Siberia had been removed. (28) Yet, few availed themselves of the opportunity to resettle in Siberia. Between 1826 and 1834, legal migrants arriving in Omsk oblast numbered only 4,487. (29) The number of fugitives, or illegal migrants, was not much greater. In 1826, 1,102 adult males were found to be illegally settled in Tomsk province, but only half of these were primary immigrants, originating from European Russia; the remainder had moved from the neighbouring Siberian province of Tobolsk. (30)

By 1837 the government was sufficiently concerned about the problem of rural over-crowding to create two new bodies specifically to address the question of peasant resettlement. The first was the Sibirskoe Mezhevanie, or Siberian Survey, introduced by law of 7 March 1838 and tasked with locating and surveying lands suitable for settlement. (31) The second was the Ministry of State Domains, founded on 26 December 1837. The establishment of the new ministry was one of a series of proposals put forward by Count Kiselev as a part of a reorganisation of the rural administration. The new Ministry was to be responsible for overseeing and promoting the well-being of rural areas and agriculture, by means of resettlement where necessary in cases of land shortage. (32) As such, its responsibilities included the administration of all peasants occupying state land, but not of the serfs who were seen as the concern of their individual owners.

Under the direction of the Minister, Count Kiselev, the Ministry, in its first years, conducted extensive research into the size of peasant land-holdings throughout forty-three provinces. It found that only in seven provinces was the legal norm of eight desyatinas of land available per male soul. Thirty provinces did not have enough land to provide even the minimum specified land-holding of five desyatinas per male soul. Thirteen provinces could only provide between one and three desyatinas per male soul. (33) As a result of its findings, the Ministry became increasingly concerned with organising a strategy and ultimately, procedures for encouraging a redistribution of excess population.

With the principle of mobility of state peasants established, since 10 April 1822, the way lay clear to reducing overcrowding in those areas most seriously affected by means of the transfer of surplus population to regions where land was in plentiful supply. Thus declared the law of 8 April 1843 on resettlement. (34) The government was clear in its own mind of the objectives, but what of the method of their achievement? In order to encourage a sometimes still reluctant peasantry, the 1843 law introduced incentives for peasants to move out of crowded areas. In settlement areas hereditary family plots would be created. A determined procedure for resettlement was agreed: that migrants would depart in groups accompanied by a guide and were required to be supplied with provisions for the journey. Migrants would be eligible for certain benefits namely bread for consumption, seed, 100 trees per family for construction of abode and a grant of twenty roubles per family, thirty-five roubles in non-wooded areas. Each family would additionally be given one pair of oxen, agricultural implements and crop seeds. Migrants would also enjoy exemption from taxes for up to six years and would not be eligible for conscription or the billeting of soldiers for an initial three years. (35) Migrants should hail from the most densely populated provinces and should be channelled towards areas which the government considered to be in need of settlement. Migration, better termed in this instance resettlement, at this stage, clearly very much was government initiated and directed.

Between 1838 and 1845, some 61,464 peasants were officially transferred to other areas under the auspices of the Ministry of State Domains, the majority of whom settled in Ekaterinoslav, the Caucasus, Orenburg and Saratov. (36) As yet Siberia remained too remote for the peasant who had the option of resettling somewhere less distant. Nevertheless, the government continued to encourage peasant migrants to Siberia. The law of 14 March 1839 reiterated that state peasants would be allowed to settle in Siberia and made Siberia the only destination open to those wishing to relocate from areas with sufficient land to grant each peasant the legal norm. (37) Disastrous harvests in the years 1841 to 1845 and the resulting famine conditions encouraged many peasants to petition for transfer to other areas. The Ministry of State Domains seized the opportunity and applicants were directed towards Siberia. Coquin notes a memorandum from Kiselev to his subordinates instructing them to direct migrants towards Kurgan in Tobolsk province and to liaise with the governor to see how many migrants might be accommodated and even to suggest to applicants who had expressed a wish to settle somewhere other than Siberia that they should head for Kurgan instead. (38) In all, some 100,000 migrants made their way to Siberia during the years 1845 and 1855. (39) The law of 17 June 1847 stressing the desirability of increasing the Russian peasant population in Siberia in ratio to the indigenous peoples and exiles advised the continuing support for Siberia's economy and specifically its agriculture. Between 1852 and 1862, the Ministry of State Domains resettled some 14,000 men and women from the north and north-eastern provinces of European Russia who had been invited to volunteer for relocation in Yenisei and Irkutsk. (40)

Hand in hand with its policy of resettling peasants from overcrowded areas the Ministry was releasing more state land for occupation by state peasants and sometimes reducing the size of larger plots of land in an attempt to increase the size of the smallest allotments. By 1857, benefits available for peasants applying for resettlement, in addition to those outlined above, included the provision of a fresh water supply and mills for the processing of crops. (41)

The procedure for embarking on government-sponsored resettlement, however, was lengthy in the extreme. The would-be migrant had first to submit three documents to the okrug authorities: a request to migrate, a no-objection certificate to his departure from his commune and an endorsement from the volost authorities that there was no legal impediment to his relocation. These documents would then be passed to the local office of State Domain which would in turn forward them to the Ministry of State Domains. Here it was, more often than not, the minister himself who approved the applications, on the basis of several criteria, but chiefly that the applicant was presently domiciled in an area of land shortage and that conditions in the intended area of destination, such as climate, were not too different from those in the province of origin. Once registered for resettlement the peasant might still change his mind and remain on his home plot, but once embarked on the journey to his settler plot, he was committed and forfeited all rights to return to his place of origin. (42)

Once permission to relocate had been received, the would-be migrant was entitled to despatch a scout to examine the allocated settler plot and to choose an alternative plot if the first was not suitable. Measures were relaxed for those moving to Siberia in that they might despatch a scout before permission to resettle had been received, requiring only a letter of release from the commune and confirmation from Siberia that they had chosen a location in which to settle. (43) Further aid to migrants included the provision of food and medical assistance on their journey and the issuing of itineraries detailing the routes and distances to settlement areas, even determining the mileage to be covered each day. Provincial authorities were to be informed of the exact date of the migrant's scheduled arrival in their respective provinces. Any loss of numbers before leaving each province had to be accounted for, discouraging defectors en route. (44) These were advantageous provisions by any standards, but their efficacy was reduced by bureaucratic delay. Applications to relocate were taking longer and longer to process, frustrating the desires and needs of the peasantry. Many left

without waiting for official sanction, creating the confusion and chaos the Ministry had hoped to avoid, as they settled on unprepared land without benefit of government assistance. (45)

Siberia was still far from being the preferred destination of migrants despite government incentives. Of some 170,000 requests to be relocated received by the Ministry by 1844, little more than one thousand were applications to resettle in Siberia.

Movement of peoples is rarely easily controlled and despite the government's efforts to direct and channel migrants, there were those peasants who chose to ignore all restraints and relocate without benefit of government assistance. Their reasons for doing so were varied, but for those arriving from the overcrowded central provinces of European Russia bureaucratic delay or rejection of their application were often the chief cause. There was, too, much movement of the peasantry within Siberia. Often peasants who had undertaken resettlement under the auspices of the Ministry of State Domains, quickly farmed their lands to exhaustion or found that their lands were unproductive, and felt fully entitled to move on at will. This became such a problem, hampering the work of the surveyors, among others, that a law was introduced in January 1846 once again prohibiting the movement without authorisation of the peasantry within Siberia. Peasants from provinces bordering on Siberia, from Orenburg particularly, also settled illegally in Siberia, feeling they had been squeezed out by the influx of settlers from the central provinces. (46)

By the tenth revision of 1858, the total population of Siberia, excluding central Asia, had reached almost three million, of which over two and a quarter million people were either Russians or foreigners and the remainder native Siberians. The 1797 census had revealed a figure of some 575,756 non-indigenous residents in Siberia. (47) The population growth during the intervening sixty years was attributable to a number of factors, among them

the rate of natural increase, the continuing policy of exiling political dissidents and criminals, and to fugitive peasants attracted by the wealth of unoccupied land and the opportunities for work in the gold-mining districts of the Altai in Tomsk province. There was only a negligible number of government-sponsored peasant settlers. It is estimated that of some 350,000 peasants of both sexes resettled between the later 1830's and the mid 1860's under the aegis of the Ministry of State Domains, little more than one third, or 115,000, were moved to Siberia, mainly to the western provinces of Tobolsk and Tomsk. (48)

By 1851 some 300,000 persons were registered in Siberia as peasants. (49) By 1858, of registered peasants only a handful, 3,701 were serfs (50) and with perhaps fewer than 100,000 state peasants settled in Siberia under Kiselev's policy of resettlement by 1858, the great majority of peasant settlers in Siberia prior to the Emancipation were old-settlers, (starozhily) and descendants of past fugitives. A few freed proprietary serfs may have made their way to Siberia following the law of 1844 which freed a landlord from paying poll-tax or other duties on an ex-serf and may occasionally have given some small encouragement to voluntarily release a serf. (51)

Recognition within governing circles of the problems of rural overcrowding in European Russia was matched by acceptance of the desirability, indeed necessity, of population redistribution. The resettlement work of the Ministry of State Domains was primarily targeted towards channelling settlers to New Russia, but the procedures for resettlement, laid down by the Ministry, established the principle of government-aided resettlement and, as such, became the basis for the development of resettlement activity in Siberia later in the century. Already some migrants were being directed towards Siberia and government legislation appeared to be making conscious efforts to encourage out-migration to Siberia from the more densely populated areas. Thus far, only the interests of the state peasant were being considered. For these peasants, resettlement might have proceeded smoothly, growing in scope and developing more efficient practices had it not been for the intervention of the Emancipation Act of 1861. The Act, which bound the

former serf to his plot of land, later similarly restricted the state peasant, imposing new restraints on the mobility he had previously enjoyed. Rather than continuing Kiselev's policy of encouraging population redistribution through resettlement, the Emancipation Act effectively put an end to it, although the problems which had prompted Kiselev's reforms remained.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

- (1) Coquin, La Sibérie, pp. 11-12.
- (2) Glinka, Aziatskaya Rossiya, Vol. I p. 442.
- (3) Coquin, La Siberie, pp. 11-12.
- (4) Glinka, Aziatskaya Rossiya, Vol. I, p. 345.
- (5) Glinka, Aziatskaya Rossiya, Vol. I, pp. 442-443.
- (6) Geroid T. Robinson, Rural Russia under the old regime (New York: Macmillan, Revised edition, 1949), pp.19-20.
- (7) Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii (hereafter PSZRI) Vol. I -1851 N^o 1030. See also: Glinka, Aziatskaya Rossiya, Vol. I, p. 444.
- (8) Glinka, Aziatskaya Rossiya, Vol. I, p. 444.
- (9) PSZRI, Vol. I -1851, N^o 3378 and N^o 3419.
- (10) PSZRI, Vol. I -1851, N^o 11860.
- (11) Basil Dmytryshyn, "Russian expansion to the Pacific, 1580-1700 : a historiographical review". Siberica : a journal of north Pacific studies (1) no. 1 Summer 1990, p. 8.
- (12) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 20.
- (13) Glinka, Aziatskaya Rossiya, Vol. I, p. 346.
- (14) Harman Tupper, To the great ocean: Siberia and the Trans-siberian railway (London: Secker and Warburg, 1965).
- (15) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 16 From Kolonizatsiya Sibiri v svyazi s obshchim pereselencheskim voprosom St. Petersburg 1900, p. 43.
- (16) Treadgold, Siberian migration, From Arved Shultz, Siberien : eine Landeskunde; Breslau, 1925, p.167.
- (17) PSZRI, Vol. I -1851, N^o 19157. See also : Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 25 From Ts. G. I. A. L. Fonds 13, series 1, 7, pp. 1-4.
- (18) Glinka, Aziatskaya Rossiya, Vol. I, p. 447.

- (19) Coquin, La Sibérie, pp. 25-35.
- (20) PSZRI, Vol. I -1851, N° 11123 and N° 11166.
- (21) Alan Wood, "Siberian exile in the eighteen century."
Siberica : a journal of north Pacific studies (1) no. 1 Summer 1990, p. 55.
- (22) Coquin, La Sibérie, pp. 38-39, From Ts. G. I. A. L. 1285, I, 51 pp. 49-50
- (23) Polnoe sobranie zakonov, Vol. I -1851, p. 1002, N° 25150.
- (24) Coquin, "Faim et migrations paysannes en Russie au XIX siecle".
Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine. Vol. II, 1964, p.129.
- (25) PSZRI, Vol. I -1851, N° 28997. See also: Druzhinin,
Gosudarstvennye krest'yane. Part I Predposylki i sushnosti reformy p.94 and Coquin, La Siberie, p. 72 From Ts. G. I. A. L. 1264, I, 483 pp. 24-25.
- (26) PSZRI, Vol. I -1851, N° 29283.
- (27) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 117 From Ts. G. I. A. L. 1152, I, 151 p. 4.
- (28) Druzhinin, Gosudarstvennye krest'yane, Part I, p. 94.
- (29) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 96 From Ts. G. I. A. L. 379, I, 1552 pp. 172-176.
- (30) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 89 From Ts. G. I. A. L. 379, I, 1038 pp. 19-79
- (31) Vtoroe Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii (VPSZRI) t. XIII N° 11031.
- (32) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 125 From Ts. G. I. A. L. 383, 3, 2377/ I p.156.
- (33) Druzhinin, Gosudarstvennye krest'yane, Part I, p. 319
- (34) Glinka, Aziatskaya Rossiya, Vol. I, p. 448
- (35) VPSZRI, t.XVIII, N° 16718 ; t.XXX, N° 29811 ;
Druzhinin, Gosudarstvennye krest'yane, Part II, pp. 19-20 From Fond Kantselyariya ministra gosudarstvennykh imushchestv 1843g. d. 520, II.240-249 See also : Yu. E. Yanson, Ocherk pravitelstvennikh mer po pereseleniyu krest'yan posle izdaniya polozheniya 19

fevralya 1861 goda. (St. Petersburg. 1881) p. 36.

- (36) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 135 From Zhurnal Ministra gosudarstvennikh imushchestv 1854g II p. 8 & p. 16.
- (37) VPSZRI, t.XIV N^o 12116
Yanson, Ocherk pravitelstvennikh mer, p. 40.
- (38) Coquin, La Sibérie, p.138 From Ts. G. I. A. L. 383, -, 6275 pp. 1-2.
- (39) Coquin, Faim et migrations paysannes, pp. 134-135.
- (40) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 154 From Ts. G. I. A. L. 383, -, 10647, p. 17 and pp. 34-42 and pp. 72-83.
- (41) Yanson, Ocherk pravitelstvennikh mer, p. 36
- (42) Yanson, Ocherk pravitelstvennikh mer, pp. 37-38
- (43) Yanson, Ocherk pravitelstvennikh mer, pp. 38-40
- (44) Coquin, La Sibérie, pp. 168-169 From Ts. G. I. A. L. 398, -, 2769, pp. 6-15 and Ts. G. I. A. L. 383, 3, 2377 |,I, p.154
- (45) Yanson, Ocherk pravitelstvennikh mer, p. 37
- (46) Coquin, La Sibérie, pp. 195-205
- (47) Treadgold, Siberian migration, p. 32 From Arved Schultz, Sibirien: eine Landeskunde; Breslau, 1923, p.167.
- (48) Glinka, Aziatskaya Rossiya, Vol. I, p. 448.
- (49) Krest'yanstvo Sibiri, p. 19.
- (50) Krest'yanstvo Sibiri, p. 16.
- (51) S.L. Hoch & W.R. Augustine, "Decline of the serf population", Slavic Review 38 (3), p.417.

CHAPTER III

GOVERNMENT POLICY ON PEASANT MIGRATION AND RESETTLEMENT 1861-1914

There is agreement that the Emancipation Act of 19 February 1861 did little to benefit the cause of peasant resettlement. In the view of D.W. Treadgold, the Act "removed the legal bar to migration along with personal servitude", but did not reduce the practical difficulties which faced the peasant who wished to leave both his land and commune. (1) F.M. Watters saw the Act as confirming the primacy of the group, in this case the village commune, or 'obshchestvo', over the individual. Where the peasant had been tied to the landlord he was now tied to the commune. (2) Aziatskaya Rossiya, under the editorship of G.V. Glinka, considered that the Act, while declaring otherwise, continued to deny the former serfs the right to freedom of movement. (3) Skylarov agrees, stating that the act withheld from the peasant any right to seek freedom of movement. (4) In effect, the Act ignored the question of resettlement. The conditions for release from the commune were such that to fulfil them was almost impossible. (5) As Yanson concludes, it is intended here to examine those provisions which might have affected the freedom of movement of the individual peasant and therefore his availability for legal migration.

The Emancipation Act was concerned with abolishing the system of serfdom. Its objectives, therefore, were to free the proprietary serf from his lord. The landlord would no longer own the serf. In general terms the Act provided for an allotment of agricultural land for each former proprietary male serf and a house and garden plot assigned in heredity. The former serfs were to be organised into village communes, 'obshchestvo' and administered by a village assembly, 'sel'skii skhod'. The Act continued to recognise the two traditional forms of land-tenure, the repartitional and the hereditary.

The former serf was required to accept his allotted plot of land and to purchase, or redeem it financially over a period of time from his former lord. He did not have the right to refuse his land allotment. The redemption dues were calculated separately for each locality. In Chernigov they ranged from 1 rouble 40 kopecks to 2 roubles 50 kopecks per desyatina, in Poltava from 2 roubles to 2 roubles 50 kopecks per desyatina and in Kharkov from 1 rouble 80 kopecks to 2 roubles 80 kopecks per desyatina. (6) Often redemption dues were charged upon land valuations, above the market value, (in order to adequately compensate the landowner for his loss). The high redemption charges, and the lack of financial resources among the peasantry invariably dictated that redemption was undertaken with financial assistance from the government. In the case of communes with repartitional tenure of land, once this aid had been accepted, all households in the commune became communally responsible for the redemption payments. Henceforth a householder might renounce or transfer his allotment only with the consent of the village assembly. Should the emancipated serf wish to withdraw from the commune altogether, he was required to pay off half the debt still owed upon his allotment and surrender the land to the commune but, there was no compulsion on the part of the commune to guarantee the balance of the debt, a condition that also had to be met. If however a householder, acting as an individual, redeemed his house and garden plot, he was permitted to renounce the remainder of his allotted land, provided that the land which he retained was no less than one third of the maximum plot allocation. Such a course of action, however, would leave the emancipated serf with little possibility of making a living other than through wagework as a farm labourer, which offered little security or he might sell up and move out to either another district or to the town.

In the communes with hereditary household tenure, provided he acted before the establishment of the redemption process, the individual householder could leave the commune if he surrendered all claim to his allotment. Further, if the commune's households decided to redeem their plots and the redemption process was already underway, the individual householder might only transfer his allotment to another member of the commune who was willing to assume his redemption payments. If however, the householders decided to act together in the matter of redemption payments, the commune was required to convert the allotments into repartitional communal holdings

with the application of the appropriate provisions. Furthermore, if a commune redeeming its land collectively agreed to the departure of more than one-third of its members without receiving any replacement members, no additional member would be allowed to leave without meeting his redemption payments in full. The Emancipated serfs, therefore, were tied to the commune until the completion of these redemption payments on their plot of land, or for a maximum period of forty-nine years.

Additional restrictions on the movement of heads of households included the requirement to ensure that neither he nor any member of his family had any debt, that his redemption payments were paid until the following 1st January, that any incapacitated family members who were to remain in the commune were provided for and finally, that he was in receipt of a letter of acceptance from the commune in which he proposed to settle. The plot of land which he proposed to occupy had to be of a size not less than that stipulated for the area and situated not more than 15 versts from his new commune. Certain other conditions had to be met by any member of the commune before he might legally depart, whether temporarily or permanently, including the requirement to be in possession of a passport. For the first two years, or until the village communes had been established, these were still issued by the landlord. Subsequently, elected representatives of the peasants assumed the responsibility and the corresponding right to deny passport applications for whatever reason. A non-head of a household also needed the consent of his father before he might leave the commune permanently.

As may be seen, far from offering incentives to peasants to move, the Act positively discouraged any thoughts of leaving the commune legally. Those who might have been inclined to leave were precisely those peasants with the least opportunity to do so legally, that is the less successful members of the commune. House-servants and peasants attached to factories or mines were given the opportunity to move from their home district inasmuch as they were permitted to join a commune of their choice, but these too were tied to a plot of land while making redemption payments. (7)

As the shortfalls of the bill became more apparent, provisions had to be relaxed for other categories who were then able to relocate, such as those hired labourers to whom the landlord did not agree to grant a plot of land, provided they found themselves in this position as of 1st January 1865. Later, a decree of 1868 allowed smallholders of the western provinces to move to free state lands. (8)

In effect there was little immediate change in the circumstances of the former serfs. It was a different matter for the state peasants. As outlined in the previous chapter, the state peasants had been administered by the Ministry of State Domains where the principle of resettlement in cases of land-shortage had been accepted and acted upon as early as the 1830s and 1840s. The law of 18 January 1866 transferred the administration of these peasants to the Ministry of the Interior. They were assimilated with the former serfs and subject to the same regulations introduced by the Emancipation Statute. (9) Not only had they lost the possibility of relocating, but they now found themselves tied to the land for an indefinite period. (10)

Together with the abandonment of the resettlement policy of Kiselev and the Ministry of State Domains, the hitherto substantial assistance, both en route and at their destination, which had been offered to those state peasants who wished to move was halted by the law of 15 December 1866. (11) Nevertheless, throughout the 1860s the government continued to seek volunteers for its policy of strategic settlement within Siberia. Barely a month after the promulgation of the Emancipation Act, volunteers were being sought to settle the Amur district. Other attempts were made to recruit settlers in 1865 for the mining district of the Altai in Western Siberia. In 1866 the South-Ussuri region was opened to settlement and in 1868 for Semireche. Only state peasants were eligible to apply. They were obliged to register with old-settler communes where they were allocated up to fifteen desyatinas of land, for annual cost of 6 roubles, but after 1866 were not entitled to any loans or benefits. (12)

These two objectives of colonising Siberia and continuing to reduce the pressure of over-crowding in the countryside of European Russia might have

continued to develop together, but the new restrictive measures imposed on former serfs and state peasants alike by the Emancipation, demonstrated a lack of awareness of the situation in rural areas. The result was an incoherent policy and general unpreparedness for the peasantry's push out of European Russia towards the end of the century.

Perhaps in acknowledgment of some of the contradictions present within its existing policy, the government in 1869, called a special Commission of the Ministries of the Interior, State Domains and Finance to examine the existing legal framework for resettlement and to make recommendations in the light of the increasing demand for the right to relocate. The Commission found that the new restrictions imposed on the former state peasants were incompatible with the government's recognition of the necessity to populate certain areas, and did little to serve the interests of either the treasury or the peasantry. It argued that, rather than restricting the movement of former serfs, the government should have extended the right to settle on free state lands, previously enjoyed by the state peasants, to the former serfs. The Commission recognised that there were peasants who had settled on land illegally and recommended that these should be allowed to remain in situ, but, in order to limit future such occurrences it proposed the opening of provincial offices dealing with the peasants' affairs which would be better able to monitor whether or not all legal conditions had been met by a prospective migrant. These offices would also pass on information received from the Ministry of State Domains on the location of free lands for settlement and direct migrants accordingly. The commission further recommended that the subsidies to migrants which had been abolished in 1866 should be restored and that additional assistance, including agricultural advice, should be offered to new arrivals to encourage successful settlement. (13) While these recommendations appear reasonable enough they were never ratified by government.

Yanson argues strongly that the government's indecisiveness was a major weakness in its policy-making. He illustrates his assertion by reference to two circulars issued in 1868. The circular of 13th April 1868 stressed the importance for legal migration of obtaining the necessary permits. Firstly, the peasant needed proof that he had registered with and been accepted into an

old-settler commune at the point of destination. This had to be shown to the authorities at his place of origin together with a release letter from his ' volost '. Both permits were subsequently submitted to the local office of the Ministry of State Domains at the intended settlement area on arrival. To the peasant, Yanson suggests, the law signified government sanction of resettlement. The second circular of 4th May 1868 denied the peasant the right to sell-up before he had received permission to leave the commune. (14) This was a government attempt to limit the numbers of peasants who might be tempted to leave and settle elsewhere illegally with no provision, the reasoning being that they would not simply abandon their homes and possessions and set off with nothing. Not only was the requirement often unforceable, but it may also have had the opposite effect, in that obtaining permits often required money, usually realised by selling homes and personal effects. If the peasant lacked the wherewithal to obtain the necessary permits, he had no alternative but to leave illegally if he was determined to leave at all. Furthermore, rather than spend money on permits, he would have more means for the journey and settlement elsewhere.

The government viewed the checks on peasant enthusiasm to leave as necessary. Land ready for settlement was not sufficient and local authorities were not prepared for the welfare difficulties to which an influx of hungry, often destitute, peasants would give rise. Yet, peasants were neglecting to sow their land, were selling up and leaving, often with no provisions for the journey, ostensibly in anticipation of receiving permission to relocate. Others simply left regardless. Many of them were so-called ' darstvenniki ', * (cf. pp 45 & 78) those who had opted to forfeit their plot of land rather than accept forty-nine years of redemption payments. (15) If indeed government intention was to limit numbers of illegal and destitute peasants with its second circular of 4th May 1868, then it miscalculated the determination or desperation of the peasant migrants.

Illegal or unlicensed migrants were to form a considerable proportion, frequently a majority throughout the period of resettlement, up to 1916.

* See also pp. 45 and 78

The powerlessness of the government to control illegal settlement is illustrated by its acceptance of the *fait accompli*. The government recognised that there was little benefit to be gained by repatriating illegal settlers, rather the contrary, such action would give rise to greater administrative difficulties and hardship. Accordingly, the laws of 9th April 1869 and 6th February 1871 regularised the position of some categories of illegal migrants in Orenburg and Ufa provinces. Some migrants, volunteers, who had left their villages with the intention of reaching the Amur district and who had agreed to undertake the journey at their own expense, were often destitute by the time they reached Orenburg and unable, either physically or financially, to continue their journey. They remained illegally in Orenburg. The government now agreed to allow them to settle in Orenburg, granting them plots of treasury land here in lieu of those awaiting them in Siberia. Similarly, others who had travelled to Orenburg on passports rather than with permits to relocate and had remained, while still retaining their plot of land in their home provinces, were now obliged to surrender these and re-register at their new place of domicile. The laws applied to between 10,000 and 15,000 peasants. (16)

The law of 9th April 1869 also relaxed slightly the measures imposed on the peasant who wished to leave his commune by waiving the stipulation that he needed to pay off half his redemption dues before departure provided that, by leaving, the peasant did not contribute to an increase above the upper plot limit of plot size for the remaining peasants. (17) In other words, the easing of this particular restriction did not apply in areas where land was in sufficient supply.

In 1873 the Ministry of the Interior called a further special Commission to examine the problems of resettlement in Orenburg province and ease the burden of the illegal settlers. The Commission concluded that treasury lands should be made available for settlement by those in the province who had remained without land after April 1869, whether they had left their communes with permission to relocate or without. It also recommended that migrants should be assisted in acquiring the ownership of land they were renting on condition that they contributed part of the purchase price. The Commission further advised that resettling peasants in Siberia should be discontinued in

view of the large numbers of migrants who failed to complete their journey and remained in Orenburg. (18) Government attempts to colonise strategic areas of Siberia continued to meet with little success, attributable chiefly to a lack of government assistance in terms of transport and financial subsidy and to the peasant's own inclination to first colonise the more easily accessible areas.

The Commission targeted its new proposals for regularising the position of illegal settlers towards those who formed the bulk of illegal settlement, that is those without land. The primary consideration was the need to restrict the growth of a floating and therefore potentially unstable population. The 1873 Commission's recommendations finally came to fruition in the law of 28th January 1876 which made settlement on free treasury lands in Orenburg and Ufa provinces a legal entitlement for landless peasants and those who had received the minimum size plot of one-quarter of a desyatina, the so-called 'darstvenniki', (cf pp. 43 and 78). They were not permitted to refuse their allotted plots. Peasants who had left their communes legally were also entitled to settle on free treasury lands. (19) Permits to migrate would be granted subject to fulfilment of the following conditions: that the would-be migrant had no outstanding debts, that his taxes, including his redemption dues, were fully paid up until 1st January of the following year, that he was not liable for military service and that he was in possession of an acceptance certificate from his proposed new commune. (20)

Again in 1881 as part of the temporary regulations, proposed but never published, of 10th July 1881 the position of yet more illegal settlers was regularised. (21) Widespread illegal settlement was now occurring further east in Siberia itself in the Altai region of Tomsk province, where the number of non-registered settlers was estimated at 3,000 to 4,000 males in 1876. By 1882, this number had risen to 18,000 and to more than 30,000 only eighteen months later. (22)

* See also pp. 43 and 78

The whole question of resettlement was being debated in the Russian press of the 1870s. It was argued that all restrictions on the free movement of the peasantry should be lifted, that containment was the root cause of the overcrowding which existed in the rural areas where, instead of peasants having the freedom to settle areas in proportion to the local labour requirements, they continued to be tied to a plot of land of insufficient size, which could only become smaller as it was further sub-divided, were saddled with an enormous debt in the form of redemption payments and were generally prevented from taking any initiative which might enable them to fulfil their potential as small agriculturalists. (23) The government was accused of not understanding the historical imperative of the migration movement, of refusing to acknowledge the natural laws which dictate that fertile unpopulated land should be settled and rendered productive and, further, that it misconstrued the desire of the peasant to improve his economic situation by settling in less congested areas, as a tendency to rootlessness and therefore as a character weakness of the peasantry. (24) In 1881 several proposals were put to a special Commission under the temporary legislations of 10th July 1881, *Vremennye pravila o pereselenii krest'yan na svobodnye kazennye zemli*. These included recommendations that the criteria for eligibility to migrate should be widened, applications to relocate from anyone in straitened circumstances should now be considered and any debt arrears should be transferred to the new place of domicile rather than requiring to be paid off in full before departure. They also proposed that migrants should receive between eight and fifteen desyatinas of land. However, the proposals were never ratified and were subsequently abandoned. (25) One positive result was the establishment in Batraki of the first migrant office assessing the number of out-migrants from the Russian provinces and providing information on free land plots. (26)

The government felt itself under considerable pressure to act on the question of migration, but considered that it had little room for manoeuvre. It feared that to lift restrictions on the free movement of the peasantry would plunge the country into chaos with, possibly, irreparable damage to an already inefficient economy. Furthermore, the lifting of restrictions would have entailed the repeal of the Emancipation Act with far-reaching implications for the whole structure of rural society, including the peasant's relationship to the land and to the landlord. This was not something the government was

prepared to contemplate. Not only might the vested interests of the landowners, presently safeguarded by the provision of the Act, have been jeopardised as they lost their workforce, but a massive undirected dispersal of population might have resulted. The unpreparedness of individual migrants, who often had little idea where they were headed, how long their journeys would take, or how they would take, or how they would set up a homestead and feed themselves in the meantime, was matched by the unpreparedness of the government, which had insufficient administrative systems in place to respond to the consequences of a mass movement of people. The resulting chaos might have amounted to a massive human catastrophe. Maintaining restrictions was the only option.

In the mid-1880s the direction of the migration turned increasingly eastwards, following declarations by the territories of New Russia, Tauride, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, the Caucasus, especially the area around Stavropol and Samara that they had no more state land available for occupation. In 1890 the government officially suspended all granting of land to migrants in Samara province. In the following years the ban was extended to Saratov, Orenburg, and Ufa. (27) The closing down of New Russia as a destination for migrants meant that the government could now promote Siberia as an attractive alternative. New measures of 17th May 1884 marked a significant development in this direction. The measures declared that more land was to be made available in Siberia and divided into migrant plots and that additional migration offices to assist migrants were to be opened on the principal migration routes to Siberia, especially in Tobolsk and Tomsk. (28) As a consequence, in January 1885, a special team of surveyors was created, based in Western Siberia, (*Zapadno-Sibirskii pereselencheskii otryad*), (29) similar to the *Sibirskoe Mezhevanie* of Kiselev's day, and further migration offices were opened in Orenburg, Ufa, Ekaterinburg, Tyumen, Tomsk and Barnaul. One of their primary functions was to monitor the flow of migrants, but they also issued itineraries, agricultural advice, medical assistance, farming implements and information on vacant lands. (30) This last was particularly important. Of those peasants relocated in Ufa province during the 1870s little more than one-third were actually settled on land which belonged to them or the commune. The situation was worse in Orenburg where the number fell to less than 10%. (31) This insecurity created a large and potentially itinerant group who were likely to move, or be moved on, exacerbating the situation for initial migrants and officialdom alike.

Between 1885 and 1892 the West Siberian survey team mapped out 146 resettlement regions, an area of some 430,000 desyatinas, mainly in Tomsk province. On the basis of 15 desyatinas per adult male, this should have been enough to accommodate some 28,500 adult male migrants, although Krest'yanstvo Sibiri v epokhu kapitalizma puts the figure at 48,000 male migrants. In reality, 25,680 were able to settle, the remaining land being unsuitable. (32) Over the seven year period land was prepared for an average of little more than 4,000 adult male migrants a year. The average number of arrivals per year during the period is put at 32,519, but this figure includes both sexes. (33) Even allowing for the inclusion in this figure of children and taking an average of five dependants per adult male, land to accommodate nearly 5,500 adult male migrants annually would have been needed. Land surveyed and prepared fell short of what was now required. The survey teams were not keeping pace with the out-flow of migrants.

Particularly significant amongst the 17th May 1884 measures was the provision at clause 7 for a new section within the Ministry of the Interior, dealing specifically with resettlement. (34) It is unclear to what extent this new department was to be responsible for formulating resettlement policy. Its activities did however include the issuing of permits to migrate. The 'land section', as it was known, later evolved into the Resettlement Administration when this organisation was formed in 1896 with Krivoshein as its deputy-director. Krivoshein had previously served in the 'land section'. (35)

While acknowledging the growing impetus to migrate and recognising the necessity to prepare, the government was still reluctant to allocate the necessary resources. Government expenditure on resettlement in the late 1880s was low and to become lower. The Plehve Commission of 1885 envisaged an annual budget of 200,000 roubles for the purposes of resettlement. Although this sum was in addition to the annual budgetary allowances for the migrant offices and surveying teams, at an estimated cost of something less than 300 roubles for successful resettlement of a family, it was only enough to resettle between 2,000 and 3,000 families a year. Total government expenditure on resettlement amounted to something considerably less than half a million roubles per year. Following the measures of July 1889, (dealt with in greater detail below), the 200,000

roubles migrant assistance was reduced to 120,000 roubles annually. (36) Greater emphasis was to be placed on the financial resources of the prospective migrant in assessing his suitability for resettlement. Coquin notes a decree of 1st June 1882 which made available 'considerable resources' for the settlement of the Russian Far East by sea via Suez and Singapore. (37) This was a continuation of the government's strategic settlement programme. As such it may have been viewed as a separate issue from the spontaneous overland migration and presumably would have been separately financed.

To what extent the 13th July 1889 law on resettlement was a product of the new 'land section' is arguable. Certainly there was some consultation between interested parties prior to the final draft of the law. The special commission of 1881 analysed the options for the organisation of resettlement. Proposals ranged from granting universal freedom to migrants with government assistance to those most in need to only permitting those peasants with less than 1/3 of the legal average plot-size to resettle. (38) There was also consultation between government and provincial governors on the need or otherwise for resettlement. (39) The law itself marked an attempt to clearly define the parameters for legal migration. In Krest'yanstvo Sibiri it is considered that the law brought resettlement under strict government control. (40) Sklyarov maintains that the law preserved the spirit of serfdom in the field of resettlement and goes on to argue that, indeed much pre-Stolypin legislation on resettlement was enacted from the standpoint that serfdom was still in existence. (41) Yaney also concludes that the law stifled any peasant initiative requiring him only to obtain the necessary papers. (42) Under the new law, permits to relocate had to be obtained from both the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of State Domains. Applications to migrate were to be submitted to the provincial governor, who would forward the application to the Ministry of the Interior together with details of the peasant resources and recommendations from the local official in charge of peasant affairs, also known as the land captain. The Ministry of State Domains would choose a suitable settlement plot for the migrant on the basis of soil fertility and agricultural conditions. Land would be issued on the basis of the actual number of male souls. To those resettling in European Russia, land would be issued for rent on a temporary basis for an initial period of between six and twelve years, after which settlers would be awarded

permanent tenure. In Tomsk, Tobolsk and the steppe regions of Semireche, Semipalatinsk and Akmolinsk, land would be issued immediately in permanent tenure. The decision on whether to farm the land communally or individually was to be left to the new settlers. The establishment of new settler villages was permitted provided they comprised no less than forty males. New villages were either to join existing Volosts or set up new ones. The land vacated by the out-going migrant was to revert to the commune together with responsibility for maintaining redemption payments. (43) Legal migration would entitle the peasant to two years exemption from tax and military service, for those settling in European Russia, plus another two years at half-rate tax. Exemption from tax and military service would be extended to three years if the peasant was settling in Tomsk, Tobolsk or steppe lands. What the law failed to advertise, and Coquin highlights, were the benefits which might be issued, in cases of need, to the migrant by the authorities. These included assistance in the form of free building materials, the provision of grain and agricultural implements. (44) The procedures for legal migration remained ponderous, and were clearly unable to cope with the volume of migrants which flowed eastwards following the harvest failures and resulting famine of 1891. Meanwhile the chaos caused by growing numbers of applications to migrate and thousands of illegal and ill-prepared migrants moving in the same direction was compounded by the shortage of migrant plots available for settlement in Siberia. (46) The situation was such that a Ministry of the Interior circular of 6th March 1892 halted the issue of permits to migrate altogether. (47)

It was little wonder therefore that the 1890s saw a significant rise in the percentage of unlicensed migrants, the so-called 'samovol'nye'. The peasants became less and less willing to run the gauntlet of bureaucratic procedures when their very lives were at stake. They cut their losses and headed eastwards with or without authorisation. According to Yamzin, the rise in the number of 'samovol'nye' began in 1896 when 38.7% of the total number of migrants left their home provinces without permits. (48) Yaney, more credibly, points to a sharp increase in illegal migration between 1891 and 1894 with the number of illegals passing through Chelyabinsk in 1894 reaching 78% (49). Figures for this period are not available here, but similar high percentage levels of illegal migrants are evident in 1904 and 1905 when the government also halted the issue of permits and again in 1908 (see Table

1). While the total number of migrants was significantly reduced in these later instances, inevitably the percentage of unlicensed migrants rose dramatically. Government policy was able to stem the flow of out-migrants but not stop it altogether.

Simultaneously with the new laws on resettlement, a new functionary was introduced into rural areas. The ' zemskii nachal'nik ', or land captain, was instituted by the statutes of 12th July and 29th December 1889. (50) These Land Captains were local, government appointed officials who would submit their own recommendations in support of a peasant's application to migrate. They are widely viewed in a less than positive light as another level of government control in the countryside. The fact that these land captains were recruited exclusively from the local hereditary nobility, had to own an estate within the province and have some level of education may have raised peasant suspicions which were in no way allayed by the land captain's power to impose fines of up to six roubles or a maximum of three days imprisonment. Yet, they may also have been used in a more favourable capacity as conduits between the Ministry of the Interior and the countryside, disseminating and executing at a local level government policy with regard to rural issues. Similarly, they were in a position to make recommendations and representations to the Ministry from a local standpoint. Yaney proposes that the land captains played an important role in the government's attempts to control the migration movement. It was they, he suggests, who quickly identified to the land section of the Ministry of the Interior the need for financial assistance for migrants. Yaney further speculates that failure to elicit appropriate funds for this purpose may have led land captains to encourage illegal migration thus contributing to the rise in numbers of ' samovol 'nye ' between 1891 and 1894. (51) Linking the ' zemskii nachal'niki ' with the new measures on resettlement may be supported by their introduction on consecutive days.

The founding of the Siberian Railway Committee by the two decrees of 10th December 1892 and 15th January 1893 (52) confirms the thrust eastwards towards consolidation of Siberia. The Committee became the government's instrument for the realisation of this ambition. Development of the railway and the subsequent utilisation of Siberia's resources formed a key element in

Sergei Witte's push for industrial and economic expansion. In 1892 Witte moved from his post as the Minister of Communications to become the Minister of Finance. The natural home for the Siberian Railway Committee would have been within the Ministry of Communications, but it was placed with the Ministry of Finance, directly under Witte and therefore had powerful support in its endeavours, although nominally, the law of 15th January 1893 had placed the management of the Committee in the hands of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The Committee's primary task was to oversee the development of the railway, but from the beginning its area of activity was much wider, encompassing responsibility for the management and organisation of the whole resettlement process in Siberia. (53) Its objective was to spread Russian influence by the introduction of ethnic Russians throughout areas traversed by the railway, stimulating the growth of new centres of Russian population and promoting new economic opportunities while neutralising any unsympathetic attitudes on the part of the indigenous people. (54) This ambition for an ethnically integrated Siberia dominated by Russians is further illustrated by a clause in section II of the law of 15th April 1896 which stressed the desirability of integrating as far as possible the indigenous population within communities of Russian settlers. (55)

It was the Siberian Railway Committee which doubled the numbers of surveyors, (56) opened up new lands for settlement, earmarking some three and a half million desyatinas of suitable free land between 1893 and 1897, which prepared migrant plots trying to ensure that each had the requisite arable land, wood, drinking water, which planned the infrastructure, building churches and schools, roads, postal offices, which ensured water supplies were available, which organised the transport of migrants to their chosen destinations, providing food and medical assistance at points along the route. The Committee also issued loans of nearly two million roubles to migrants in 1896, studied the impact of Russian settlers on nomadic indigenous populations and undertook expeditions to establish the amount and location of land suitable for settlement in Siberia. (57)

The Siberian Railway Committee was also closely concerned with initiating legislation on the migration question. The worrying and overwhelming number of illegal migrants after 1891 led to the setting up in 1895 of a special

Commission, under the auspices of the Committee, to investigate the failure of the existing laws to deal adequately with the many applications to migrate. The Commission concluded that the high incidence of illegal migration was due to such short-comings as the long delay between the application to migrate and the final issuing of the permit and the few benefits to be gained by migrating legally. (58) The law of 15th April 1896 went some way towards addressing these short-comings by simplifying procedures for legal migration and offering publicised benefits to legal migrants. (59) Permits to migrate would now be needed only from the Minister of the Interior who might delegate this responsibility to the official in charge of peasant affairs at provincial level, in other words, the land captain. Once in receipt of a resettlement permit, the migrant would be entitled to rail transport at special reduced rates as far as possible to his chosen settlement area. There was a further easing of government control : where hitherto the Ministry of State Domains had allocated land plots, now the peasant, subject to agreement by the land captain, might send a scout to reconnoitre a suitable plot within the settlement area and register a claim which would remain valid for a period of two years. These scouts would also be entitled to a return journey by rail at a reduced rate. The law also adopted a more pragmatic approach to illegal migration. The illegal migrant, while continuing to be ineligible for any benefits such as exemption from tax and military service, would be permitted to settle on Treasury lands and be legally registered provided that he was not wanted by the law and that provision was made for family members remaining in his old place of residence. Any debts or tax arrears accrued at the migrant's old place of residence would no longer fall to his commune for payment but would be transferred to his new domicile to be paid off within ten years. A further circular of 20th January 1897 made the despatch of a scout obligatory. (60) Responsibility for the dissemination of information regarding the true conditions to be encountered during resettlement was to rest with the Ministry of the Interior. (61)

Meanwhile the Ministry of the Interior through the land section was urging the land captains to give every assistance to those wishing to migrate legally. Provincial authorities were advised to deal more quickly with applications to migrate. (62) Over the next few months, in 1896, a mass of legislation was introduced, proposed by the Siberian Railway Committee, to regularise the position of illegal settlers in the Altai and settle them on proper plots. The law

of 27th April 1896 (63) was directed towards legalising the position of illegal migrants in the Altai. Migrants who had joined communes of industrial workers without the necessary permits should now be legally registered and allotted a plot of land of up to fifteen desyatinas, subject to availability. Migrants who expressed desire to settle in specific areas should be permitted to do so with appropriate registration and on plots of up to fifteen desyatinas. Such settlers would be exempt from poll tax for three years from the date of their registration and liable to only half-tax for the following three years. Similarly, settlers who did not fall in the above categories should register in the volosts or towns in which they were living whereupon they would benefit from tax exemption. The provisions were subject to verification of the identity of the settlers and conditional upon their not being wanted by the law. May 23, 1896 saw the introduction of a law relating to plot-size of land allocations to peasants and indigenous people on Treasury lands in Tobolsk, Tomsk, Yenisei and Irkutsk. (64) A maximum plot-size of fifteen desyatinas was also established in these regions. Communes and villages might petition for an increase in the amount of land occupied if this was less than fifteen desyatinas per plot. On the other hand, if an area above fifteen desyatinas per male soul was occupied by a village or commune, the excess might only be retained with the provision that additional settlers would be accepted so that occupation was reduced to fifteen desyatinas. A further law, designed to help restrict illegal migration within Siberia was introduced on 12th April 1897. Any settler who moved after he had been issued with a plot of land in Siberia would not be entitled to settle legally on another plot and his allocated plot would be considered free for occupation by other migrants after a period of three years. (65)

It was soon realised, however, that while the government was encouraging the process of obtaining authorisation to become shorter and less bureaucratic, the amount of land ready to receive migrants was quickly disappearing. As before, surveying and the preparation of new lands could not keep pace with demand. The law of 15th April 1896 even gave the Siberian Railway Committee the right to demand free labour from village residents to assist its survey teams in Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk and Semirechensk. (66) In 1897 land reserves were sufficient to accommodate some 129,000 individuals. (67) Although the number of out-migrants in 1897 was relatively low, (67,653), numbers for both 1896, (177,168) and 1898

(146,002) exceeded that for which land was available (Table I refers). Attempts were again made to reduce the numbers of migrants. Confidential government circulars were sent to local officials and the land captains urging them to make known the shortage of available land and to discourage applications to migrate. (68) Restrictions on the issuing of permits to resettle were reintroduced by the newly operational Resettlement Administration (Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie). The Resettlement Administration was established on 2nd December 1896 as a department of the Ministry of the Interior with its own budget of 51,900 roubles per annum. It succeeded the old land section of the Ministry and retained the land section's employees. The function of the new department was to direct the issuing of permits to settle, to organise the movement of migrants, to look after new settlers, to disburse all credits for settlement and to work out new legislation and administrative measures for the future development of resettlement. (69)

Acknowledging the chaotic state of the migration movement, the limited number of plots available and other contributing causes to unsuccessful settlement, the new Resettlement Administration declared that it would be necessary to become more selective in issuing permits to migrate. Aref'ev refers to Kulomzin's trip to Siberia in 1896 and his finding that where, hitherto, migrant plots had included land which had seen earlier cultivation, migrants now were having to clear virgin land before they could think about planting crops. This required much greater physical strength and expense on the part of the migrant. Kulomzin recommended that only those families with enough strong, able-bodied members and sufficient funds to see them through the initial difficult period should be allowed to migrate. Further circulars were issued forbidding the despatch of scouts until the would-be migrant family had received its permit to migrate. Resettlement would not be permitted unless the migrant's home commune would benefit from a lowering of its numbers and provided the family was neither too small, nor too poor to resettle successfully. All attempts at illegal migration were to be nipped in the bud. (70)

Together, the Siberian Railway Committee and the Resettlement Administration made considerable improvements to the conditions which had obtained earlier. The introduction of scouting assisted in reducing the

number of persons wandering aimlessly in Siberia; the mopping-up operation of allocating migrant plots to those illegally settled in the Altai helped to clarify the position with regard to vacant land; the limit placed on the amount of land held firstly by new settlers and subsequently by old-settlers, 'starozhily', to a fifteen desyatina maximum, plus three of forest, made more land available for migrant plots. In Krest'yanstvo Sibiri, this is seen as a negative development, subject to frequent abuse in that land was often appropriated from old-settlers where their occupation was less than fifteen desyatinas per adult male, and therefore detrimental to the interests of the peasants. (71) The irrigation projects, the communications links of roads, telegraph stations, the social and cultural amenities such as churches, schools, medical centres, all assisted in the establishment of more settled communities, while the loans, cheap rail-fares and wayside medical and food provisions enabled migrants to reach their destinations more easily. (72) During these twelve years between 1893 and 1905, expenditure on all aspects of resettlement reached some thirty million roubles. This included 8,467,175 roubles on land allotment, or 705,594 roubles annually. (73) The 1896 legislation on resettlement signalled the government's commitment, albeit reluctant, to the principle of resettlement and its recognition that government should assist both materially and legislatively towards its successful completion. No longer was the emphasis to be upon restriction and containment. Instead the settlement process was to be restructured and organised on a more ordered and realistic footing, and peasant initiative acknowledged and to some extent supported. With the extension of the Siberian Railway into Siberia, the wishes and needs of the peasantry for more land and the interests of the Russian state in colonising and expanding into vacant, untapped territory were once again able to complement each other as they had in Kiselev's day.

The Siberian Railway Committee and the Resettlement Administration worked together as separate bodies until a reorganisation of government departments in 1905 when the two were merged to form a single body, the new Resettlement Administration. Initially located within the Ministry of the Interior, the new Resettlement Administration was transferred on 6th May 1905 to the newly-combined Ministry of Agriculture and State Domains which was in turn renamed the Chief Directorate for Land Management and Agriculture (Glavnoe upravlenie zemleustroistva i zemledeliya). Within the

same law was provision for the foundation of a Committee for Land Affairs to deal with general policy direction of all land and resettlement questions and to examine the activities of the landowner's Land Bank and the Peasant Land Bank. (74) The new Resettlement Administration became responsible for all aspects of resettlement including land surveying, preparation of migrant plots, plot allocation and overseeing the improvements of farming practices amongst settlers. (75)

This rationalisation preceded the drastic overhaul which was being prepared for Russian agriculture with the Stolypin reforms and marked the importance with which resettlement was now viewed within the context of Russian agriculture and agricultural reform. The possibility should not be dismissed that the creation of the new department was in preparation for coping with the very great increase in numbers of out-migrants which the government foresaw as a result of its prospective agricultural reforms. Prior to this government reorganisation, responsibility for managing peasant resettlement had been distributed amongst the Ministries of the Interior, Finance and Agriculture and State Domains. The first Resettlement Administration, set up in 1896, had been created from the land department operating within the Ministry of the Interior. The Trans-Siberian Railway Committee lay with the Ministry of Finance, under the personal supervision of the Minister, Sergei Witte, while the Ministry of Agriculture and State Domains had dealt with Land-surveying. (76)

The emergence of the new Resettlement Administration led to a more co-ordinated approach. Siberia was divided into twelve areas for the purposes of resettlement. A manager was appointed in each area to oversee the preparation of land and settlement of migrants. Each of the twelve areas was in turn divided into sub-regions, each again with its own resettlement official who, additionally, supervised the provision for and development of education, health, communications, subsidies and general economic well-being of the new settlers. (77)

This fairly dramatic change of attitude on the government's part towards peasant resettlement was prompted by various factors. The poor harvests of 1899, 1900 and 1901 caused widespread misery, even famine conditions in some parts of European Russia. Riots erupted amongst the peasantry in 1902. These were particularly serious in the provinces of Poltava and Kharkov, where a total of eighty estates were sacked by peasants in search of food, fifty six in Poltava province and twenty-four in Kharkov. (78) Shortage of land was a continuing grievance. In 1902, the special conference on the needs of agriculture recommended the formation of local committees at gubernia and uezd level to assess the requirements of agriculture. Many called for increased loans to the peasantry by the Peasant Land Bank and significantly, for the resettlement of peasants short of land on Cabinet lands. The zemstvo agrarian programme of 1905 demanded that resettlement should be established on a wide basis. (79) These recommendations, demands, observations, disturbances coalesced in the government's collective mind and produced rapid and dramatic changes in peasant law in the form of Stolypin's land-reforms which redefined the peasant's status and his potential.

Numbers of migrants fell by nearly half between 1900 and 1901 and dropped by more than half again in 1904 and 1905 as a consequence of the Russo-Japanese war. What migration there was in 1904 and 1905 was almost entirely without authorization and reflects the government's reluctance to issue any permits to resettle during this period. (Table I shows the high percentage values for unlicensed migrants in 1904 and 1905). Migrant transport was severely curtailed with the need for trains to convey troops and armaments to the Far-East.

With depressed numbers of out-migrants during 1904 and 1905, pressure in the more over-crowded central provinces was again building up and the continuing peasant unrest, particularly towards the end of 1905, encouraged the government to take swift action to eliminate one long-standing peasant grievance. On 3rd November 1905 the government committed itself to reducing redemption payments by half in 1906 and abandoning them altogether by 1907. (80) In 1906 further measures were introduced to address rural over-crowding. The issue was to be tackled on two fronts :

firstly, by extending peasant land-holdings within the provinces of European Russia. Henceforth, the Peasant Land Bank would be allowed to lend the total purchase price for land at a reduced rate of 4.5% interest. Secondly, families from severely over-crowded areas would be resettled in less populated regions. To this end the Committee for Land Settlement Affairs was established within the Chief Directorate of Land Management and Agriculture, on 4th March 1906, with land-settlement commissions at both provincial and uezd levels answerable to it. The provincial and uezd land settlement commissions each included six elected representatives forming roughly half the membership, three from the zemstvo assemblies and three from the peasant volost assemblies. The role of the commissions was to assist the Peasant Bank in purchasing suitable land and advising where sales of land were most needed to increase peasant land-holdings and generally facilitate the purchase of land by the peasant. (81) The uezd land-settlement commissions, particularly, also enabled the government to further decentralise resettlement procedure. Henceforth all petitions for resettlement were to be directed to them. It was left to the uezd land-settlement commissions to decide who should receive priority to migrate, based on a number of criteria : firstly, that there was no other way of increasing a peasant's land-holdings; secondly, that family resources were sufficient for the journey and initial period of settlement; thirdly, that agriculture was the chief means of livelihood. Parties of scouts in receipt of government loans were to be organised by the uezd land-settlement commissions and the land captains. It was further recommended that the uezd land-settlement commissions be given the authority to issue scouting and travel permits and reduced rate train passes. (82) They became responsible for organising legal resettlement at a local level.

Towards the end of 1906 two more important pieces of legalisation were introduced. On 5th October 1906 the peasant's mobility rights were extended to equal those of other citizens. No longer would the peasant be required to obtain a certificate of discharge from the commune or be automatically expelled from his commune of origin if he joined another. Furthermore the peasant would be able to choose his place of permanent residence. This was of particular relevance to peasants contemplating the move east-wards into Siberia and must have contributed in some measure to the surge in numbers of out-migrants from European Russia from 1907. Other provisions

within the bill included the abolition of the land captain's powers to impose fines without due procedure of law. (83) The following month on 9th November 1906 Stolypin's law confirmed the individual peasant's right to ownership of private property. The peasant might now demand the consolidation of his land plot and if this was not practicable he would be entitled to monetary compensation from the commune. (84) The reforms constituted a major offensive on the agricultural front. They sought not only to re-structure a system of land-holding which had been in operation for hundreds of years, but also to redefine the status of the peasant. He was to become a landowner rather than a tenant, an individual farmer with his own decisions to make rather than a member of the commune dependent upon and answerable to the collective. It was hoped that the peasant, acting on his own initiative and for his own advantage, would introduce improved farming practices.

The reforms also benefitted the would-be migrant, providing him with a saleable asset. In the event of a sale, usually to the Peasant Land Bank, the proceeds would accrue to him, furnishing him with much needed funds to finance both the journey to Siberia and the initial settling-in period, thus making successful settlement a more likely outcome. The government's interest was served by the resulting growth in the amount of land available to those peasants who remained. The alacrity with which prospective out-migrants took advantage of their right to sell their plots is well demonstrated by Tyukavkin who found that while, between 1893 and 1903 only 38.9% of out-migrants sold their plots before departure, between 1904 and 1910 70% of out-migrants sold their plots. (85)

The reforms produced an explosion of out-migrants in 1906 and particularly in 1907 and 1908. 1907 was the golden year for out-migrants with record numbers leaving European Russia with full government encouragement, evidenced by the low levels of unlicensed out-migrants and scouts, (see Table I) despite an enormous rise in actual numbers.

The government's volte-face with regard to resettlement, from restriction to encouragement and its full acceptance of resettlement as a necessary tool, amongst an array of other measures, to improve the agrarian situation is also illustrated by the considerably more than doubling of government expenditure on peasant resettlement between 1906 and 1907. Japan's aggression in the Far East had also highlighted the need for the very rapid colonisation of Siberia. There was also considerable pressure for the quick resolution of the problems of land-shortage. Vociferous demands had been made in the First Duma for not only state, cabinet and church lands to be made available for settlement by the peasantry, but that privately owned land should be forcibly expropriated and handed over to the peasantry. The government resisted firmly, pointing out that there were also private landowners among the peasantry, and strongly defended the principle of inalienability and inviolability of property. The disagreement led to the dissolution of the first Duma on 9th July 1906 only 72 days after its opening. However, the message was clear; the peasantry would not wait forever to seize the land they needed. (86) In 1906 expenditure on resettlement amounted to a total of 5,317,269 roubles of which more than half was allocated to the preparation of migrant plots (see Table II). 1,580,945 roubles was set aside for subsidies, working out at almost exactly 66 roubles per migrant family for the 23,693 families which set off for Siberia in 1906. This accorded with the average subsidy per family allowed for by the government. (87) More than three-quarters of a million roubles was to be spent on the provision of medical and food aid. The remainder, less than 200,000 roubles, supported the Resettlement Administration. Expenditure in 1907 rose to a total of 13,528,933 roubles with the greatest increase in funds being allocated for the migrant subsidies, up from one and a half million to 7,037,189 roubles. On the same basis of 66 roubles per family, this was a considerable overestimate and allowed for the resettlement of over 106,000 families. In fact only 63,753 families (421,335 individuals) moved to Siberia in 1907, but by now the government was clearly anxious that as much land as possible be added to the land pool in European Russia by out-migration. Spending on the preparation of migrant plots increased by a further 2 million roubles and the amount allocated for food and medical provision doubled. Administrative expenses were reduced to 106,048 roubles.

The Chief Director of Land Management and Agriculture Vasil'chikov in a letter of 6th October 1906 envisaged a resettlement budget of 19,200,000 roubles for 1907, out of a budget demand for agriculture as a whole of 41,730,000 roubles. This included the provision of infrastructure such as roads and irrigation systems which did not apparently form part of the calculations of government expenditure as detailed above. It also allowed for the preparation of a further 200,000 migrant plots and a total migrant subsidy allocation of eight and three-quarter million roubles together with spending increases for the improvement of medical facilities. (88) Disregarding exaggerated ministerial claims, the very considerable increase in expenditure on resettlement to which the treasury agreed, testifies to the urgency with which the reform of agriculture was viewed and the significant role which resettlement was now expected to play.

Resettlement did not proceed smoothly. In 1907 particularly, the volume of migrants threatened to completely overwhelm the authorities. The Minister of Ways and Communication, defending his unenviable position of providing rail transport for the swelling numbers, declared the need for at least another two thousand special carriages. By the spring of 1907, he added, up to 40 migrant trains a day needed to be despatched eastwards to Zlatoust on a line where rolling-stock was available for only twelve trains a day, excluding a few passenger trains. The clogging of the line meant that goods trains had virtually ceased to run. Proposals put forward by the railway authorities in attempts to restrict the numbers were rejected by the government as an impediment to freedom to migrate. (89)

Problems were not only evident on the railway. Encouraging out-migration from the European Russian provinces necessitated the rapid provision of a sufficient quantity of settler plots to accommodate the outflow and avoid the build-up of a backlog. The ukaz of 19th September 1906 released some one and a half million desyatinas of Cabinet lands in the Altai region to the Chief Directorate of Land Management and Agriculture, specifically for the settlement of migrants. (90) Yet, at the settlement areas, migrant plots continued to be in short supply with, declared the Chief Director of Land Management and Agriculture, only 153,000 available as at the beginning of 1907, of which up to 40,000 were either unsuitable or as yet inaccessible.

(91) The government, despite its growing anxiety to quickly redistribute the population, had once again to introduce certain restrictions in response to representations from governors in Siberia that sufficient plots were not available. As from mid-August 1907, scouting permits would only be issued to those seeking to find plots in the provinces of Tobolsk and Tomsk. Permits would no longer be granted to those wishing to settle in the Far East. Only those scouting parties organised by either land settlement commissions or the zemstvo would be deemed to be official. However, Central government was unwilling to go as far as halting all benefits to scouts to reduce the number of departures as recommended by the Chief Directorate. (92) The attempts to limit the numbers of scouts heading eastwards is reflected in the figures at Table I where the percentage of unlicensed scouts for 1908 and 1909 rise dramatically despite a considerable drop in actual numbers (see Table I).

1908 saw the largest number of migrants since the movement began. It was to be the peak year for out-migration with official figures showing that 649,866 migrants passed through Chelyabinsk and Syzran (see Table I). Yet, in January 1909, the government felt sufficiently sanguine about its ability to cope to plan the resumption of free scouting as from spring of that year in the Far East, in the Primorye, Amur and Transbaikal regions. In the other areas scouting was to be regulated to the amount of land available. (93)

New initiatives for dealing with illegal migrants were proposed. These included reducing the number of illegal migrants settling on crown lands by only permitting the allocation of plots to illegals if these plots were in the gift of the Chief Directorate of Land Management and Agriculture. Families of illegal migrants arriving after 1st January 1909 would only be settled on migrant plots once legal migrants had been accommodated. A government circular of 30th December 1909 attempted to give some relief to the poorer migrants by declaring that some would be eligible for free travel, but only on application to the provincial governor and, through him, to the Chief Directorate of Land Management and Agriculture. Those who might apply were veterans of the war with Japan, families travelling to the Far East and

those whose resettlement was connected with the consolidation of land-plots in European Russia. Otherwise the government maintained its position on subsidies and declared that these would only be issued in the form of loans. (94)

Expenditure on resettlement increased rapidly in 1908 and 1909, (see Table II) topping 23 million roubles in the latter year, a far cry from the five and half million roubles just three years earlier in 1906. Thereafter, steady increases were recorded until 1915 when expenditure fell, but only by a small margin relative to the drop in migrant numbers. Upper limits on the size of subsidies to migrants were laid down by the ukaz of 5th July 1912 which placed a ceiling of 400 roubles per household for those settling in the more far-flung regions of the Far East, Zabaikal, Primorskaya and Amurskaya, oblast and Sakhalin Island, and 250 roubles for those in other parts of Asiatic Russia. New settlers in old settler villages would be entitled to no more than half the laid down norms. (96) Sklyarov maintains that the migrant was rarely successful in receiving the full subsidy and there were often delays in issuing the subsidy entitlement by the local authorities. (99) Nevertheless, they were appropriately targetted, and the government could do little more by legislation.

The years up to and including 1914 and the out-break of war in Europe, saw the expansion of resettlement areas, with new territories being opened up in the steppe regions of Turkestan and less hospitable environments of the Far East, in Zabaikal and Nerchinsk. Many of these areas were crown lands newly released for settlement. Government attempts to organise scouting were finally abandoned altogether, but efforts were planned to increase the provision of information. (97) 1914 saw the last great wave of migrants to Siberia (see Table I). In 1915, as the effects of the war began to take their toll, numbers fell to 23,000 from 225,000 in 1914. By 1916, only a trickle of some 9,500 migrants made the journey to Siberia.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

- (1) Treadgold, The great Siberian migration, p. 67
- (2) Francis M. Watters, "The peasant and the village commune" in Vucinich (ed.), Vol.I The peasant in nineteenth century Russia (Stanford University Press 1968) pp. 133-157.
- (3) Glinka, Aziatskaya Rossiya, Vol.I pp. 450-541.
- (4) Sklyarov, Pereselenie i zemleustroistvo, p. 52.
- (5) Yanson, Ocherk pravitel'stvennikh mer, p. 41.
- (6) Zaionchkovskii, Provedenie v zhizn' krest'yanskoi reformy p. 157 From Art. 177 of Emancipation Statute.
- (7) Robinson, Rural Russia, pp. 64-93. Robinson gives a clear and lucid account of the provisions of the Emancipation Act, See also R. Portal, le Statut des paysans libérés du servage 1861-1961 Recueil d'articles p. 169-204.
- (8) Yanson, Ocherk pravitel'stvennikh mer, p. 47.
- (9) VPSZRI, t. XLI, N° 42889.
- (10) Yanson, Ocherk pravitel'stvennikh mer, p. 44.
- (11) VPSZRI, t. XLI, N° 43987.
- (12) Goryushkin, Krest'yanstvo Sibiri, p. 32. See also Sklyarov, Pereselenie i zemleustroistvo, p.56.
- (13) Yanson, Ocherk pravitel'stvennikh mer, pp. 55-60.
- (14) Yanson, Ocherk pravitel'stvennikh mer, pp. 66-71.
- (15) Coquin, Faim et migrations paysannes, p. 139.
- (16) Yanson, Ocherk pravitel'stvennikh mer, pp. 82-88.
- (17) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 305 from Ts. G. I. A. L. 1291, 53, 73, p. 1-2.
- (18) Yanson, Ocherk pravitel'stvennikh mer, pp. 89-90.
- (19) Yanson, Ocherk pravitel'stvennikh mer, pp. 91-92
- (20) Voroponov, Vopros o krest'yanskikh pereseleniyakh, p. 201.

- (21) Skylarov, Pereselenie i zemleustroistvo, p. 60. See also : Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 351.
- (22) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 303 from Chudnovskii, "Perselencheskoe delo na Altai", Russkaya Mysl', 1890, III.
- (23) Voroponov, Vopros o krest'yanskikh pereseleniyakh, p. 182.
- (24) Yanson, Ocherk pravitel'stvennikh mer, p. 51.
- (25) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 351. See also : Glinka, Aziatskaya Rossiya, p. 454.
- (26) Skylarov, Pereselenie i zemleustroistvo, p. 60.
- (27) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 311, From Pereseleniya iz Poltavskoi gubernii s 1861 po 1900, Vol. I, 1861-1893, p. 38 and pp. 39-42, and A.A Charushin, "Perselencheskoe delo v Rossii", Russkii Vestnik, 1905 VII- VIII.
- (28) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 381 From Ts. G. I. A. L. 1273, 1, 354, p. 33-34 Coquin lends much weight to the import of these measures. They are not however noted in Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii.
- (29) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 475.
- (30) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 457 From Ts. G. I. A. L. 391, I, II, p. 549-551, p.142-172 and p. 549-570.
- (31) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 267 from K.K. Kochurovskii, "Krest'yanskoe khozyaistvo i pereselenie. Itogi razmerov i rezul'tatov pereselencheskogo dvizheniya za istekshee tridtsati letie", Russkaya Mysl', 1894 II p. 31-32.
- (32) Goryushkin, Krest'yanstvo Sibiri, p. 35 From Ts. G. I. A. L. 1273, 1, 276, p. 33 ob; 391,1,289, p.238.
- (33) Yamzin, Pereselencheskoe divizhenie, p. 23.
- (34) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 381 From Ts. G. I. A. L. 1273, 1, 354, p. 33.
- (35) George Yaney, The urge to mobilize: agrarian reform in Russia 1861-1930 (University of Illinois Press: 1982) pp. 225-226. From K. A. Krivoshein, A. V. Krivoshein, Paris, 1973, pp. 11-14.
- (36) Coquin, La Sibérie, pp. 387-388, From Ts. G. I. A. L. 391,1, 16, p. 279.

- (37) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 379
- (38) Yamzin, Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie, p. 24.
- (39) Skylarov, Pereselenie i zemleustroistvo, p. 61.
- (40) Goryushkin, Krest'yanstvo Sibiri, p. 32.
- (41) Skylarov, Pereselenie i zemleustroistvo, p. 63-64
- (42) Yaney, Urge to mobilize, p.126.
- (43) Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii, PSZRI, 3rd series, Vol. 9, N° 6198. See also : Yaney, Urge to mobilize, p. 126 and Coquin, La Siberie, pp. 385-386.
- (44) Coquin, La Sibérie p. 387 from Ts. G. I. A. L. 1149, 12, 130, I. 155.
- (45) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 386.
- (46) Coquin, La Sibérie p. 472, from Ocherk rabot po zagotovleniyu pereselencheskikh uchastkov: 1893-1899. St. Petersburg, 1900, p. 14, which notes that between 1885 and 1893 plots were prepared to accommodate only 14,743 male souls.
- (47) Yamzin, Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie, p. 24.
- (48) Yamzin, Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie, p. 45.
- (49) Yaney, Urge to mobilize, p. 130.
- (50) PSZRI, 3rd series, N° 6195, 6196 of 12th July 1889 and 6482 and 6483 of 29th December 1889.
- (51) Yaney, Urge to mobilize, p. 129.
- (52) PSZRI, 3rd series, Vol. 12, N° 9140 and Vol. 13, N° 9248.
- (53) Yamzin, Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie p. 25.
- (54) Aref'ev, Uregulirovanie pereseleniya, p. 41.
- (55) PSZRI 3rd series, Vol 16, N° 12777, p. 290.
- (56) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 474.
- (57) Both Glinka, Aziatskaya Rossiya, Vol. I, p. 462 and Aref'ev, "Uregulirovanie pereseleniya", p. 42, contain positive accounts of the Committee's achievements.

- (58) Aref'ev, Uregulirovanie pereseleniya, p. 42.
- (59) PSZRI 3rd series, Vol. 16, N^o 12777.
- (60) Coquin, La Sibérie, pp. 488-489 from Pravitel'stvennyi Vestnik 1863-1917, 1897 N^o 16, Sbornik yzakonenii i rasporyazhenii o pereselenii, St Petersburg, 1901, p. 69.
- (61) Aref'ev, Uregulirovanie pereseleniya, p. 44.
- (62) Yaney, Urge to mobilize, p. 129.
- (63) PSZRI 3rd series, Vol. 16, N^o 12837.
- (64) PSZRI 3rd series, Vol. 16, N^o 12998.
- (65) PSZRI 3rd series, Vol. 17, N^o 13963. See also : Aref'ev, Uregulirovanie pereseleniya, p. 45.
- (66) PSZRI 3rd series Vol. 16, N^o 12771.
- (67) Aref'ev, Uregulirovanie pereseleniya, p. 50.
- (68) Yaney, Urge to mobilize, p. 131.
- (69) PSZRI 3rd series, Vol. 16, N^o 13464. See also : Glinka, Aziatskaya Rossiya, Vol.I, p.461.
- (70) Aref'ev, Uregulirovanie pereseleniya, p. 54.
- (71) Goryushkin, Krest'yanstvo Sibiri, p. 185.
- (72) Glinka, Aziatskaya Rossiya, Vol.I, p. 462, see also : Aref'ev, Uregulirovanie pereseleniya, pp. 42-46.
- (73) Glinka, Aziatskaya Rossiya, Vol.I, p. 462, see also : Yamzin, Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie, p. 27.
- (74) PSZRI 3rd series, Vol. 25, N^o 26172.
- (75) Glinka, Aziatskaya Rossiya, Vol.I, p. 464.
- (76) Yaney, Urge to mobilize, p. 225-226, See also : Glinka, Aziatskaya Rossiya, Vol.I, pp. 462-464.
- (77) Zenchenko, Pereselenie i zemstvo, p. 8.

- (78) I.P. Belokonskii, "Zemskoe dvizhenie do obrazovaniya partii narodnoi svobody". Byloe - Zhurnal posvyashchennyi istorii osvoboditel'nago dvizheniya (4)no. 16 1907, p. 241.
See also : S. Bensidoun, L'Agitation paysanne en Russie de 1881 a 1902. Paris, 1975, p. 426 from L. I. Yemelyakh, "Krest'yanskoe dvizhenie v Poltavskoi i Kharkovskoi guberniakh v 1902". Istoricheskie Zapiski, Moscow 1951, t. 38, p. 154-175.
- (79) Veselovskii, Istoriya zemstva, pp. 77-89.
- (80) PSZRI 3rd series, Vol. 25 N^o 26871.
- (81) PSZRI 3rd series, Vol. 26 N^o 27478. See also : Yaney, Urge to mobilize, pp. 257-259.
- (82) S. M. Sidel'nikov, Agrarnii vopros i reforma Stolypina (Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta 1973)p. 206, from Ts. G. I. A. SSIR, fond 1291, opis 120, 1908g. delo 25, l. 70-71.
- (83) PSZRI, 3rd series, Vol. 26 pp. 891-893.
- (84) PSZRI, 3rd series, Vol. 26 pp. 970-973 N^o 28528.
- (85) Goryushkin, Krest'yanstvo Sibiri, p. 233, from V.G. Tyukavkin, Sotsial'no - ekonomicheskie predposylki pereseleniya krest'yan v Sibiri v nachale XX V. Uch. zap. Irkutskogo pedagogicheskogo instituta 1961, vyp. XVI, s. 23.
- (86) Gosudarstvennaya Duma, Stenograficheskie otchety, 1906 god, Sessia 1, Vol. 1 (St. Petersburg) pp. 239-241 and pp. 321-323.
- (87) Sidel'nikov, Agrarnyi vopros, p. 187. Text of communication dated 19th October 1906 to Stolypin from Minister of Finance. Ts. G. I. A. SSSR. fond. 1276, opis 2, 1906g., delo 409, list 45-46.
- (88) Sidel'nikov, Agrarnyi vopros, p. 184. Text of communication dated 6th October 1906 from Vasil'chikov to Stolypin. Ts. G. I. A. SSSR. fond. 1276, opis 2, 1906g. delo 409, list 10.
- (89) Sidel'nikov, Agrarnyi vopros, pp. 191-192. Text of letter from Minister of Communications to Stolypin. Ts. G. I. A. SSSR. fond. 1276, opis 3; 1907g. delo 484, list 4-6.
- (90) Sidel'nikov, Agrarnyi vopros, p. 94. Ukaz of 19th September 1906 on transfer of Cabinet land in the Altai. PSZRI, 3rd series, Vol. 26, N^o 28357.

- (91) Sidel'nikov, Agrarnyi vopros, p. 194. Text of letter from Chief Director of Land Management and Resettlement to Council of Ministers dated 5th July 1907, from Ts. G. I. A. SSSR, fond 1276, opis 3, delo 510, list 2-6.
- (92) Sidel'nikov, Agrarnyi vopros, p. 197, from Ts. G. I. A. SSSR, fond 1276, opis 3, delo 510, list 2-6.
- (93) Sidel'nikov, Agrarnyi vopros, p. 205, from Ts. G. I. A. SSSR, fond 1291, opis 120, 1908g., delo 25, l. 70-71.
- (94) Sidel'nikov, Agrarnyi vopros, p. 207-208, from Ts. G. I. A. SSSR, fond 1276, opis 3, delo 510, list 70-71.
- (95) PSZRI 3rd series, Vol. 32, N^o 37714.
- (96) Skylarov, Pereselenie i zemleustroistvo , p. 105.
- (97) Sidel'nikov, Agrarnyi vopros p. 214-216
Extract from Resettlement Administration's account of requirements for resettlement and government measures to define them from : Pereselenie i zemleustreistvo za Uralom v 1913 g.
Petrograd 1914, p. I - V.

CHAPTER IV

PEASANT MIGRATION AND RESETTLEMENT

1861-1914

What prompted peasants, despite all the difficulties, to uproot their families, abandon their lands, their homes and set off on an arduous journey of many months' duration to a destination of which they had only the haziest impression? Undoubtedly rumours ran rife of more fruitful land, land so plentiful and so fertile that crops could not help but grow and livestock prosper and multiply. To a peasant now saddled with often little more than two desyatinas of land from which he had not only to feed his family but also raise the wherewithal to pay off redemption dues, taxes and other debts incurred, the belief that there existed fertile virgin land in plenty just waiting to be settled and cultivated must have proved irresistible. The idea of migration was in the air. There was population movement westwards from Europe to America and across the American continent. Building up now was the pressure for movement to the south and east from European Russia.

Fundamentally the peasant's desire to leave European Russia is attributable to the lack of opportunity which his situation provided to make an adequate living. This in turn was caused by insufficient land to produce a reasonable agricultural yield, the relatively high level of redemption dues and taxes, the very rapid growth of population experienced by European Russia in the second half of the 19th century and lack of innovative farming practices.

Perceived shortage of land was an acknowledged problem as early as 1826, and continued to be particularly acutely felt in the more densely populated fertile black-earth regions of European Russia. Following the Emancipation and the compulsory allocation of land plots to the emancipated serfs, the amount of land under peasant occupation was reduced. Zaionchkovskii quoting B.G. Litvak's figures shows that throughout thirteen uyezds in Moscow province, peasant landholdings were reduced as a result of the 1861 Statute by amounts varying from 5.1% to as much as 23.2%. (1) Similarly in the

province of Vladimir, land occupied by peasants was reduced by 15.75% overall. (2) Furthermore, calculations of average plot-size in certain provinces, based on the numbers of peasants at the time of the 1858 census and the amount of land released to them following the Emancipation, show that plots were often markedly smaller than the minimum legal norm of five desyatinas per soul. This was true for provinces in non-black earth provinces and black-earth provinces alike. It was also true that former serfs were allocated considerably smaller land plots than those occupied by state peasants. The position then of a peasant in a province such as Poltava, which had a high ratio of former serfs to state peasants, was particularly invidious. Here, average plot-size per revision soul was 3.9 desyatinas for state peasants and 1.9 for the former proprietary serf. (3)

The high land-values dictated by high soil fertility encouraged greater pressure from landowners to limit the amount of land allocated to emancipated serfs. The obverse argument should also have held true in that the greater the potential yield of the soil the smaller the area required by the peasant. However, the province also suffered from a greater density of population relative to the rest of Russia. The small plots and the reduced opportunity to rent or buy additional acreage made for a bleak prospect, particularly for the emancipated serf. There is agreement that a simple increase in the amount of land was not of itself the answer to the problem of the Russian countryside. Comparison between the amount of land held by the Russian peasant and that farmed by his west European counterpart show that the latter obtained greater productivity on smaller acreage. Russia, however, had a unique problem in its sheer size, the remoteness of many of its districts and the consequent under-development and lack of markets for produce, a situation almost encouraging subsistence level farming. Lower than usual crop yields therefore had an immediate and direct impact on the peasant. Repartitional tenure provided little incentive to alter existing farming practices. Viewed from the peasant's perspective therefore, more land was the only solution. While Poltava is an extreme example, having the worst ratio of land to peasant, and the highest number of former proprietary serfs, (4) it is significant in that it was in provinces with similar problems to those of Poltava and in Poltava itself that the desire for resettlement was most strongly demonstrated by the peasantry.

There was an additional factor which made the outlook bleaker still, especially for the emancipated serf, namely the switch from 'barshchina', or payment in labour for use of land by working on the landowner's land, to 'obrok', that of paying redemption dues in money or in kind. As Pavlovsky explains, this was a quantum leap for the emancipated serf living in areas where agriculture was the chief form of livelihood who was more used to the system of 'barshchina' and who had few other opportunities for wage-work. (5)

The incidence of bad harvests, often leading to famine, was another powerful incentive to the peasant to seek improved conditions elsewhere. Yamzin notes the interesting parallel between the price of bread and the incidence of out-migration between 1861 and 1891 with numbers of out-migrants rising as bread prices rose. Similarly Yamzin shows that the high number of out-migrants between 1885 and 1894 corresponded to the years of poor harvest and consequently high bread prices, while numbers declined in years of better harvests and lower bread prices. (6)

Another powerful incentive to move away from the central provinces was the rapid growth in population which only exacerbated existing problems. In the second half of the 19th century, European Russia experienced one of the largest population growths in Europe. In 1858 all the provinces comprised a total of 59,330,792 inhabitants. At the time of the 1897 census the population had risen to 94,215,416 persons. This represents an increase of 59% in forty years despite such adverse factors as several years of widespread famine and a high child mortality rate (an average of 423 deaths per 1,000 live births was recorded during the period 1867-1881) for infants aged five and under. (7) Other factors working against such a growth in population were out-migration (8) and a negligible rate of immigration.

Such a surge in the growth of the population resulted in ever less land being available for the individual peasant farmer. Although more land was falling under peasant control either through purchase or renting, it was in insufficient quantity to keep up with the pace of population growth. In 1881 the Ministry

of the Interior estimated that over half a million peasants had plots of an area less than the legal minimum norm in the central provinces. (9) An example of the over-population and consequent difficulties occurring in the villages of the more fertile regions of European Russia is the case of a village in Shchigrovskii uezd in Kursk province. After Poltava, Kursk province suffered most from small allotments. After the Emancipation, the average plot-size for former state peasants was 4.2 desyatinas, but for former proprietary serfs only 2.3 desyatinas. (10) Here, in 1886 a population of 250 male souls was cultivating land which had been allotted at the time of the Emancipation to 95 revision souls. As a result, many were driven either to hiring themselves out as labour to big farms in the neighbourhood or to renting additional land. The rents for land charged in this instance were as high as twenty-four roubles per desyatina. Any delay in payment was liable to a fine of an additional 2 roubles and 60 kopecks. Similar punitive charges were made if redemption payments were overdue. Such circumstances encouraged whole villages to apply to move out of the area. (11)

Rumours also played their part in stimulating the aspirations of the peasantry and the growth in demand for more land. Those who hired themselves out as seasonal labourers in the southern provinces and in Siberia returned with news of vast tracts of unpopulated, fertile land. Their numbers were considerable. In the year 1877-1878 450,000 annual passports, seasonal passes or authorisations of absence were issued in Vyatka province alone. (12) Sometimes the rumours were fuelled by government agencies as was the case when a memorandum, circulated by the Ministry of the Interior, referred to the tens of thousands of desyatinas of free land to be found in Kherson and Bessarabia stating that these lands might be occupied by any who wished to do so. (13)

The extent to which the problems of rural areas affect the propensity of the peasant to migrate and the direction of migration has been examined by Barbara Anderson. In her study of the causes of migration in the late 19th century Russia, Anderson finds that migrants from areas where traditional agriculture is the predominant occupation and the level of education is low would tend to settle in what is termed an agricultural frontier destination. They have no wish to change their life-style, but simply seek increased space

in which to pursue it. Over time, population pressure increasingly becomes the motivating factor. On the other hand Anderson finds that population pressure has no noticeable effect on migration from the countryside of persons in a similar category to urban areas and puts forward the possibility that the migrants who headed south and eastwards were unlikely to have moved anywhere, despite increased population density, had this option not been open to them. (14)

Pavlovsky suggests that population pressure was not the only factor at work and contends that an area which offers few or no alternative earning opportunities outside agriculture tends to supply a larger percentage of out-migrants. He cites the example of Moscow which, in relative terms had efficient communications and a growing industrial base. Rural conditions were similar to other provinces with small land plots. The soil was not highly fertile yet the peasant did not feel driven to abandon his home in search of more land. In support of his thesis, Pavlovsky compares the 1.6% of all out-migrants who hailed from the Moscow region with the 11.8% from the Western provinces, the 8.4% from Central Agricultural Region, the 10.5% from New Russia. (15)

The two views are not necessarily irreconcilable. Anderson's study highlights the existence of a 'hierarchy of destinations' for the migrant, with the migrant more modern in his outlook and with greater access to education and information, being attracted to the cities. The migrant less modern in his outlook, with a lower literacy level is more likely to be attracted to a destination similar to his place of origin. (16) The dearth of relatively large industrialised centres comparable to Moscow in late 19th century Russia gave few opportunities for the peasant in Poltava or Chernigov to widen his horizons or to seek supplementary means of livelihood. For him the only option was to seek more land, where vacant, cultivable land existed.

The Emancipation Act did not stimulate a sudden increase in the numbers of peasant migrants, although the Ministry of State Domains received many requests from landless peasants, the 'darstvenniki' * (cf. pp. 43 and 45),

* See also pp. 43 and 45

to be relocated on free Cabinet Lands. (17) There was, however, a steady rise in the number of out-migrants, although estimates of the numbers of peasant migrants prior to 1885 are variable and unreliable due to the absence of migrant registration. (18) However, an approximation of numbers of out-migrants between 1860 and 1885 is put at 300,000 persons, including both sexes (19), an average of 12,000 per year. Coquin estimates at 30,000 a year the number of migrants to all destinations during the 1870s, with perhaps half the number heading for Siberia. (20) The number of illegal settlers in Siberia between 1861 and 1868 remained negligible with an average of little more than one thousand a year. (21)

Between 1885 and 1895 a total of some 161,671 out-migrants were counted, an average of 14,697 per year. (22) Yamzin's figure for the number of out-migrants from 1885 to 1895 inclusive is considerably higher at 469,270, an annual average of 42,660 with 1895 as the year when numbers of out-migrants rose rapidly. (23) The primary migrant destinations at this time were the southern and eastern provinces of European Russia, especially the Caucasus and the Don basin. The law of 13th April 1868, outlining conditions for settlement in Samara and Orenburg, (24) coupled with the 1869 special governmental committee on resettlement, which recommended that 100,000 desyatinas of land should be released annually for resettlement in the provinces of Samara, Astrakhan, Orenburg and Kherson, indicates a growing easterly orientation. (25) (See Map I) The amount of land thus released was slightly less than was required to accommodate annually 12,000 male settlers with an average each of eight desyatinas of land, and only enough to provide 6,000-7,000 male souls with an average of fifteen desyatinas of land. Clearly there was little margin to cater for any increase in the numbers of migrants.

In 1865, Cabinet Lands of the Altai region of Tomsk province in Western Siberia were first opened up to settlement. In an attempt to recruit labour for the nearby mines, fifteen desyatinas of land and unrestricted use of the forests for a yearly rent of six roubles were being offered to any state peasant who would volunteer to settle there. (26) Between 1861 and 1862, 30,904 revision souls settled in Tomsk province (27), primarily in the Altai. (28) Semirech'e received 7,000 settlers as a result of government recruitment of

volunteers in the ten years following the Emancipation. (29) Other settlement areas were in the provinces of Tobolsk and Yenisei where several hundred families had settled by the later 1870s, and to a lesser extent Akmolinsk and Turgai. (30)

The Circular of 13 April 1868 (see page 43) which set out requirements for legal resettlement also confirmed the fact that the free land existed in these areas. In many cases this was enough to fuel the peasant's desire to move. The bad harvest of 1867 also played its part. The year 1868-1869 saw between 20,000 and 30,000 male souls on the move, primarily from the provinces of Tula, Penza, Kazan, Voronezh and Ekaterinoslav. (32)

Yamzin uses figures of out-migration taken from research conducted by Poltava zemstvo to demonstrate the predominance of areas other than Siberia, but primarily the Caucasus and New Russia, as migrant destinations. Between 1861 and 1867 50% of out-migrants from Poltava province headed for the Caucasus and 35% to New Russia. During the period 1877 and 1886 between 50% and 60% of the province's out-migrants made their way to the Caucasus, while less than five percent headed east towards Siberia. The remainder settled in New Russia and a few on the western bank of the Volga. By 1892-1893 however, Asiatic Russia accounted for more than 70% of Poltava province's out-migrants, New Russia for just over 3% and the Caucasus for little more than 15%. Between 1896 and 1900 Siberia was the destination of 87% of all out-migrants from Poltava province. (33)

What caused this very sharp increase in the percentage of migrants to Siberia? The more easily accessible lands which had been available were simply filling up. By the mid-1880s Stavropol declared itself unable to accommodate any more settlers on state land. Other areas of the Caucasus followed suit as did the provinces of Tauride, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson and Samara. In 1890 the government officially suspended all granting of land to migrants in Samara province. (34) In 1892 the ban was extended to the south-eastern provinces of Saratov, Orenburg and Ufa. (35) As discussed in Chapter III, the government was also becoming reconciled to the idea of

pressing for more peasant colonisation of Siberia and had begun pursuing policies to this end.

With previous migrant destinations now closed there was little option for the peasant but to venture further eastwards into Siberia and the steppe lands of Asiatic Russia. The land surveying and marking out of settlers' plots in Siberia, begun in 1885, took place mainly in Tomsk province which, between 1885 and 1893 accommodated 75% of all out-migrants from European Russia. (36) Yet progress was slow, by 1892 only six thousand plots had been prepared, to accommodate an average number of arrivals per year of 32,519 persons including both sexes. (37)

Government resettlement procedures were out-paced by the demand for more land. Between 1889 and 1892 17,289 permits were issued to peasant families, but 28,911 families actually migrated out of their home provinces. In 1892 the issue of permits to resettle was suspended altogether due to a shortage of settler plots. (38)

The opening of the Trans-Siberian Railway project in 1893 provided a faster means of reaching a specific destination at reasonable cost to the migrant, but also helped to stimulate the growth in numbers of out-migrants. The peasant who would not have contemplated making the arduous and lengthy journey by river and overland would have been encouraged by the offer of a relatively short rail journey at reduced rates. Despite the advantage of a shorter journey time, conditions for rail travellers were also grim. Arefev describes how, in 1896, migrants were transported, with their baggage, from Chelyabinsk for up to seven days in very crowded goods-wagons with no heating, lighting or sanitary facilities. The migrant points which had been set up to provide shelter, food and medical attention to migrants en route were far from adequate. In early 1896, Chelyabinsk, the most important of these, could only muster one barrack-block and eight large tents in accommodation facilities, or sufficient to shelter 550 persons. Chelyabinsk canteen was able to provide 800 meals each day for a small charge of two kopecks. The hospital had only eight beds. Yet, in 1896 117,168 migrants, excluding scouts, passed through Chelyabinsk and Syzran. Things improved through

1896 with the availability of more rolling stock and the building of additional accommodation blocks and hospitals. Migrants travelling the longer route by river to Tyumen suffered much less from lack of shelter, food or medical assistance. (39)

The census of 1897 provided the first statistical data which accurately gauged the shifts in population within the Russian Empire. Tikhonov's analysis of the census results presents some interesting findings on the scope and direction of migration by 1897. Tikhonov shows that the majority of out-migrants up to 1897 not only numerically, but also in percentage terms (12.9%), hailed from the six provinces of the central agricultural region: Voronezh, Kursk, Orel, Ryazan, Tambov and Tula. These six together with the three provinces of the Ukraine or Little Russia Poltava, Chernigov and Kharkov accounted for the bulk of out-migrants, over twice as many as the nine provinces of the industrial non-agricultural region, Vladimir, Kaluga, Kostroma, Nizhegorod, Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, Tver, Yaroslavl, the next most popular region of origin for out-migrants. (40) From 89 provinces of the Russian Empire it is the provinces of the central agricultural region and the Ukraine headed by Kursk, Poltava, Voronezh, Ryazan and Tambov which provided the greatest out-flow of migrants. The recipients of this out-flow were primarily the capital areas, the Kuban in the northern Caucasus, Tomsk in western Siberia, the provinces of New Russia. (41) The areas of settlement, however, of migrants from the central agricultural region are markedly different from those of migrants from the Ukraine. Migrant out-flow from the former headed, in descending order of popularity, towards New Russia, the capital areas, Western Siberia and the Northern Caucasus. There was also significant movement from one to another of the six provinces comprising the region. Out-flow from the Ukraine however headed towards the Northern Caucasus, New Russia and Western Siberia. Very few made for the capital areas and there was much less movement from one Ukrainian province to another. (42)

Between 1896 and 1911 a total of 3,288,999 out-migrants and 776,024 scouts left the provinces of European Russia for Asiatic Russia and Siberia through Chelyabinsk and Syzran (see Table I). (43) The peak years for out-migration were 1907, 1908 and 1909 following the Stolypin reforms, and the

government's ever increasing encouragement of migration. The years of low out-migration were 1897, 1904 and 1905 which saw the Russo-Japanese war and the revolution sparked by peasant and urban worker unrest, although the years 1901 to 1905 saw a marked decline generally. The migrants set off from all parts of European Russia, with the black-earth provinces continuing to provide the majority of migrants after 1897 but the percentage values of out-migrants from these provinces declined as numbers from other provinces rose. Yamzin's figures show that for the whole period 1885 to 1909 the black-earth provinces provided 50.8% of the total number of out-migrants (see Map I). The percentage of out-migrants from the north-eastern provinces was at its highest of 20.4% between 1885 and 1889. It fell considerably thereafter and during the whole period provided only 4.5% of the total number of migrants. A steady flow migrants left the south-eastern provinces during the period, especially through the 1890s, accounting for 9.2% of the total. The southern steppe regions and western provinces saw negligible numbers of out-migrants during the first five years 1885-1889, but percentage numbers rose to 14.1% and 22.3% respectively between 1900 and 1905, peaking at a time when migrant numbers generally were markedly reduced. (44)

The main settlement areas in Siberia were located in Western Siberia. It is calculated that between 1861 and 1897 40% of Siberia's increase in population was attributable to the arrival of new settlers. In some regions however, the numbers of settlers were a particularly significant factor in population growth. This was especially so in Tomsk province, where new settlers accounted for 67% of the increase in population between 1861 and 1897. (45) Even in the four southerly regions of Yenisei province, between 1881 and 1890, 37.2% of the annual growth rate was attributable to new settlers. (46) The extent of Russia's colonisation is illustrated by the findings in Aziatskaya Rossiya that by 1911 the indigenous population of Siberia comprised only 12.7% of the total, while Russians accounted for 84.6%. (47) Between 1896 and 1913 more than half of all settlers in Siberia settled in Tomsk province. By 1914, more than three quarters of the total population of Siberia lived in Western Siberia. (48) There was spreading settlement southwards into the steppe regions of Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk and Turgai. A few migrants made their way further east but the length and arduousness

of the journey doubtless deterred many. Between 1906 and 1914 only 10.3% of settlers continued beyond Lake Baikal. (49)

Over the years there were changes in the sort of peasants who made their way to Siberia. Prior to the 1890s, out-migrants were primarily state peasants. Traditionally they had enjoyed a greater degree of personal mobility and freedom than the proprietary serf, to seek wage-work in other areas. As a group they were arguably more used to leaving their homes and venturing into little-known territories. Resettlement legislation in the first half of the 19th century directed solely at state peasants, had made them aware of opportunities in distant regions, as did shared experiences of seasonal work. New settlers in Yeniseisk province between 1865 and 1890 comprised 64.7% former state peasants and only 8.6% former proprietary serfs, (50) Former state peasants were similarly dominant in Tomsk province in 1894 where they made up 51.2% of all new settlers and 67.4% in the Altai region alone. (51) By the 1890s more former serfs were encouraged to attempt resettlement. The famine years of 1890-91, rural overcrowding, the start of the Trans-Siberian rail project, new legislation in 1896 which reduced the bureaucratic procedure, facilitated departure from the commune and acknowledged the significance of resettlement, prompted greater numbers of former serfs to seek land away from their over-crowded home provinces. Table III shows the number of out-migrants to Siberia, excluding scouts for 1896 was 177,168. This is an enormous figure relative to the average annual number of out-migrants from 1885-1895 discussed at page 80, the highest estimate being Yamzin's at 42,660 out-migrants per year.

It is hardly surprising, in view of the many difficulties faced by the migrant peasants both en route and at the place of settlement, that some were unable to establish themselves successfully. Upon arrival at their planned destination, settlers were often confronted with a lack of precise information as to the location of their plot of land. Surveying work had not always been completed. Prospective settlers were sent from pillar to post in search of their plot. Plots were not always adequately supplied with water or wood and were frequently unsuitable for settlement. By this time, thoroughly demoralised and sometimes destitute, having expended all their resources on

the outward journey, some migrants were left with little option but to make their way home again. (52) Yamzin found that the most frequently cited reason given by returnees between 1896 and 1910 for their failure to settle in Siberia was the lack of financial resources and able-bodied working hands or family members, together with the few opportunities for wage-work. Other causes were crop failure, and unsuitability of a plot due to poor soil, incompatible climate and lack of wood or water. The absence of sufficient financial and manpower resources assumed greater importance after the turn of the century. Earlier, plot unsuitability was the most frequently given reason for settlers to return. (53) This was not simply a matter of turning back, but required a further permit, issued upon presentation of an acceptance certificate from the commune of origin and proof that all outstanding debts had been paid. For those who had arrived in Siberia without the necessary permits, the illegal or unlicensed migrants, the situation was similarly dismal. Without permits they were not entitled to a settler plot and were often obliged to attach themselves to old-settler villages for payment, in many cases, of a substantial fee. (54) The only other possibility, were they to remain in Siberia, was to hire themselves out as labourers.

Many found the problems insuperable and turned back towards European Russia and their home provinces. These were the returnees. Dubrovskii unequivocally states that the numbers of returnees demonstrated the failure of Tsarist resettlement policies and the inability of the authorities to satisfactorily accommodate migrants in the settlement areas. (55) Examination of different sets of figures inevitably produces different results, despite the common base. In this case figures are based on the numbers of migrants passing through Chelyabinsk and Syzran. In Krest'yanstvo Sibiri, percentage numbers of returnees are based on the total number of migrants travelling in family groups together with the numbers of single migrants. The percentage number of returnees each year is calculated on the basis of the total number of returnees, in family groups and individuals returning within any one year as a percentage of the total number of out-migrants in that same year. The results, also utilised by Dubrovskii, of this method, present some astonishingly high rates of returnees, indicating a return rate, for example, of 36.3% in 1910, 61.3% in 1911 and 28.5% in 1912. (56) While these figures may be useful in demonstrating an overall annual percentage value in the number of returnees (9% for period 1906-1909 and 30.4% for

period 1910-1914), they are not able to indicate trends. At Table III are given the annual percentage figures of out-migrants who returned within the same year for the years 1896 to 1911, based on the numbers of out-migrants excluding scouts and individuals. The years from 1906 to 1911, with the exception of 1910, show generally lower percentage rates of returnees returning within the same year than hitherto, despite the very much greater actual numbers of out-migrants. For these years, the return rate did not exceed 5% of the total number of out-migrants. These more favourable figures reflect both the government's investment in peasant resettlement through subsidies to migrant families and preparation of settler plots as shown at Table III, and possibly an improvement in the organisation of settlement procedure through the newly restructured Resettlement Administration. The downward trend in the number of returnees is evident. Ironically, the year of the lowest percentage rate of same year returnees, 1908, is also the year of the highest out-migration.

However, Table III also shows a down side. The overall number of returnees rose sharply after 1906 which is predictable in view of the growing numbers of out-migrants. Inevitably, 1907, which saw the biggest leap in numbers of out-migrants, also had the highest percentage of returnees returning within the same year, although Sklyarov claims that a rumour circulating in 1907 that the government would make available ten million desyatinas of land for sale to peasants through the Peasant Land Bank, (cf. p. 96) prompted many in difficulties to return. (57) After 1907 the percentage rate of returnees returning within the same year was falling, but actual numbers of returnees were increasing. This indicates a rising number of longer term settlers returning to European Russia. Two factors which may have influenced this development were the poorer quality of land plots which were being issued. often virgin land requiring much work in clearance and preparation before sowing could begin, and secondly, the developments in land reform which were beginning to take effect, making the rural situation in European Russia more attractive than it had been. The highest numbers of returnees were recorded in 1910 and 1911. Numbers dropped substantially thereafter for the next three years until 1914 despite increasing out-migration, (see Table III) but the number of same year returnees dips sharply for those two years. Inversely, the number of returning longer-term settlers rises. It might be suggested that many of these were the poorer peasants who, finding

themselves suddenly free from the commune, had rushed eastwards in overwhelming numbers in 1907, 1908 and 1909 only to find the problems of settlement too great.

The fall in the number of out-migrants between 1910 and 1911 (see Table I) may also be linked to improving rural conditions in European Russia. With the advent of the Stolypin reforms, despite the fact that resettlement came to be regarded as a necessary element in the collection of measures designed to alleviate peasant grievances, the onus remained on the peasant to initiate the resettlement process. If the impetus to migrate came from the peasant, the fact that actual numbers of out-migrants fell back after 1909, despite population growth, simpler procedures and annual increases in expenditure on resettlement suggests that certain factors were at work which may have reduced the level of grievance felt by the peasant. The following may have had varying degrees of influence : firstly, that more land was passing into peasant hands thanks to the activities of the Peasant Land Bank, secondly, that the effects of the Stolypin reforms which allowed the peasant to consolidate his plot of land and become an individual peasant farmer were beginning to be felt and thirdly, that growing industrial development provided markets for peasant produce, thus stimulating the peasant's desire to harvest greater yields, encouraging more innovative farming practices. Peasant grievances were being addressed. The conditions of his tenure of land had changed offering him greater security and potential for improving his economic position. Although numbers of out-migrants were rising again in the years 1912 to 1914, the rise was more gradual. The number of returnees continued to fall (see Table III). Resettlement was beginning to proceed more smoothly and at a moderate pace after the frenetic activity of the Stolypin reforms.

The extent to which resettlement helped ease the problems of land-hunger in European Russia cannot be gauged reliably in view of the many other factors which came into play to alleviate peasant disaffection and thus the peasant's inclination to migrate. Between 1896 and 1911 a total of 4,108,410 migrants and scouts made their way to Siberia, the majority in the three years 1907, 1908 and 1909, a yearly average of 263,000 over the sixteen year period. Between 1897 and 1913 the population of Russia grew by 40.1 million

people, an average of 2.4 million per year. (58) These figures suggest that resettlement on its own would have had little impact on the problems in rural areas, despite Yamzin's argument that out-migration considerably reduced the rate of natural increase in some areas of European Russia. (59)

Whether the peasant benefitted from his settlement in Siberia is challenged by some. Sklyarov for example, stresses that new settlers did not experience an improvement in living standards across the board and that assessments should not be reached on the basis of comparisons between the peasant's economic situation or the amount of land under his control at the place of origin and his place of settlement. Rather, he compares the economic level of peasants within Siberia showing that the well-off peasants, those cultivating over 9 desyatinas, controlled 46% of the cultivable land yet only made up 16.7% of the population. Middle peasants, those cultivating between 3 and 9 desyatinas, comprised 42% of the population and farmed 41.8% of cultivable land. The remaining 42.3%, poor peasants, had only 12.2% of cultivable land. (60) Yet Sklyarov acknowledges the findings of a survey conducted in 1913 of the 18,488 households, which showed that the majority of households 8,715, (47%), were cultivating between 3 and 9, desyatinas. Those farming over 9 desyatinas were 3,455 households, (18.6%). 6,318 households, (34%), were farming up to three desyatinas. The survey also showed that the number of migrants in Siberia with no land under cultivation dropped over time and that the longer term settlers were farming increased acreage. (61) Settlement and land cultivation took time but, economic well-being was growing in proportion with the increasing duration of established settlement. In Krest'yanstvo Sibiri, it is maintained that Siberian peasants were better equipped with agricultural machinery than their European Russian counterparts, although much of it was in the hands of kulaks, the well-to-do peasant. Agricultural yields per desyatina in Siberia rose rapidly. During the period 1911-1915 Siberia was producing an average annual yield of 286.2 million poods, an increase of 66% above yields in the first years of the century. European Russia could only manage an increase of 11%. (62) Other indicators, for example, the number of livestock per household were also higher in Siberia than in European Russia. Nevertheless there were many who were not able to settle in Siberia, who did not have enough financial resources, family members to work the fields, equipment. Yamzin paints a dismal picture particularly of the plight of illegal

migrants in Siberia. According to figures of the 1909 census in Tomsk province alone there remained 454,192 persons without a fixed abode. (63) For those who were able to establish themselves, who had the necessary resources and entrepreneurial spirit, resettlement was undoubtedly of benefit. For Siberia, resettlement brought rapid Russian colonisation. It was above all a rural colonisation, one which Soviet writers suggest delayed the development of capitalism in European Russia by providing land for peasants who might otherwise have been forced into urban waged work in European Russia. For the government, resettlement helped to defuse mounting rural unrest. To this end it was vigorously encouraged from 1906 onwards.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

- (1) Zaionchkovskii Provedenie v zhizn' krest'yanskoi reformy, p. 184 from B. G. Litvak - Ustavnye gramoty Moskovskoi gubernii, kak istochnik po istorii realizatsii "Polozhenii", 19 Fevralya 1861, p.204 .
- (2) Zaionchkovskii Provedenie v zhizn' krest'yanskoi reformy, p. 190-191 from V. G. Zimina, Krest'yanskaya reforma 1861 g. vo Vladimirskoi gubernii, p. 340.
- (3) Yanson, Yu. E., Opyt statisticheskogo issledovaniya o krest'yanskikh nadelakh i platezhakh, St. Petersburg, Revised edition 1881, p. 16, 48.
- (4) Yanson, Ocherk pravitel'stvennikh mer, p. 6-7
Yanson's figures show that in 1876 in Poltava there were 71,499 male souls who were former state peasants and 355,077 males souls who were former proprietary serfs.
- (5) George P. Pavlovsky, Agricultural Russia on the eve of the revolution (New York: Howard Fertig, 1968)p. 78.
- (6) Yamzin, Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie, p. 97 from Pereselenie iz Poltavskii gubernii V.II. str. 86. Yamzin, p. 99 from V.N. Grigoriev, Dannyya dlya vyvoda siedne - geometricheskikh tzen rzhi po Rossii and V.I. Pokrovskii, Yestestvennoye dvizhenie naseleniya v sopostavlenii s urozhaem i tsenami khleba. See also : Coquin, Faim et migrations paysannes, p. 133-134, from Ts.G.I.A.L., 391, dos. 4329 pp. 22-24.
- (7) Bensidoun, Agitation Paysanne, p.66 from A.G. Rashin, Naselenie Rossii za 100 let (1881-1913), Moscow 1956, p. 195-196. Tikhonov's readings of the 1897 census give a total population of 93,442,864 , see Tikhonov, Pereselenie v Rossii p. 180.
- (8) Tikhonov, Pereselenie v Rossii p.180-181. Tikhonov's figures show a considerable outflow of population from the central agricultural region and the Ukraine up to 1897.
- (9) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 393, from Ts. G. I. A. L. 391, 1, 4, p. 48.
- (10) Yanson, Opyt statisticheskogo issledovaniya, p. 48.
- (11) M. Osvyannikov, Iz Shchigrovskogo uezda Kurskoi gubernii. Novoe Slovo VIII. 1896, p. 132.
- (12) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 279, from N.N. Romanov, Pereseleniya krest'yan Vyatskoi gubernii, Vyatka 1880, p. 189.

- (13) F. Voroponov, Vopros o Krest'yanskikh pereseleniakh. Vestnik Evropy I. 1876, p. 195.
- (14) Anderson, Internal Migration during Modernisation.
- (15) Pavlovsky, Agricultural Russia, p. 183
The sources of Pavlovsky's figures are not given.
- (16) Anderson, Internal Migration during Modernisation .
- (17) Yanson, Ocherk pravitel'stvennikh mer, p. 61.
- (18) Yamzin, Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie, p. 9.
- (19) Yamzin, Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie, p. 1. See also : Zemel'naya Reforma p.390 from Ezhegodnik Rossii 1907g. St. Petersburg, 1908. Kratkii ocherk kolonizatsii Sibiri, 11 otdel, stv. XXV, published by Resettlement Administration in Dubrovskii, Stolypinskaya zemel' naya reforma.
- (20) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 349
- (21) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 276, from Report of 16th August 1868 in Ts. G. I.A.L. fond 1291, 58, 209/I p.11.
- (22) Dubrovskii, Stolypinskaya Zemel'naya Reforma. Table 139, p. 390 from Pereselenie v Sibir s 1885 po 1895 g. Published by Resettlement Administration, St. Petersburg 1906.
- (23) Yamzin, Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie, p.12.
- (24) Yanson, Ocherk pravitel'stvennikh mer, p. 66.
- (25) Yanson, Ocherk pravitel'stvennikh mer, p. 58.
- (26) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 271, from PSZRI, 2nd ser. Vol. XL N^o 42353.
- (27) Yamzin, Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie, p. 11.
- (28) Glinka, Aziatskaya Rossiya, Vol. 1 p. 455.
- (29) Yadrintsev, Nashi vyseleniya i kolonizatsiya, p. 477.
- (30) Yadrintsev, Nashi vyseleniya i kolonizatsiya, pp. 479-480.
- (31) Yanson, Ocherk pravitel'stvennikh mer, pp. 66-68.
- (32) Yanson, Ocherk pravitel'stvennikh mer, pp. 74-76.

- (33) Yamzin, Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie, pp. 10-11.
- (34) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 311 from Ts. G. I. A. L. 391, 1, 69, p. 53.
- (35) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 311, from A. A. Charusin, "Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie v Rossii ", Russkii Vestnik, VIII p. 576.
- (36) Goryushkin, Krest'yanstvo Sibiri, p. 33, from Kolonizatsiya Sibiri v svyazi s obshchim pereselencheskim voprosom, St. Petersburg, 1900 p.196.
- (37) Yamzin, Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie, p. 23.
- (38) Yamzin, Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie, pp. 22-24.
- (39) Aref'ev, N. "Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie v Sibir v 1896 godu". Severnii Vestnik VI. 1897, pp. 125-130.
- (40) Tikhonov, Pereselenie v Rossii, pp.180-181.
- (41) Tikhonov, Pereselenie v Rossii, p.176.
- (42) Tikhonov, Pereselenie v Rossii, pp.182-183.
- (43) Dubrovskii notes that migrants through Tyumen were not included in the total statistics of out-migrants published by the government. See Dubrovskii, S. M. Stolypinskaya zemel'naya reforma p. 398.
- (44) Yamzin, Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie, pp. 14-15.
Yamzin does not define the geographical regions by the same provinces as Tikhonov. Here, the black-earth provinces comprise the northern black-earth provinces of Kursk, Tambov, Penza, Orel, Chernigov, Tula, Ryazan and the central black-earth provinces of Poltava, Kharkov and Voronezh.
- (45) Goryushkin, Krest'yanstvo Sibiri, p. 39 from Pervaya vseobshchaya perepis' naseleniya Rossiiskoi imperii 1897. T. 79 Tomskaya guberniya. St Petersburg 1904 s. 4.
- (46) Goryushkin, Krest'yanstvo Sibiri, p.39. from Materialy po issledovaniyu zemlepol'zovaniya i khozyaistvennogo byta sel'skogo naseleniya Irkutskoi i Yeniseiskoi gubernii. T.IV, vyp.2. Irkutsk 1893 s. 81,129.
- (47) Glinka, Aziatskaya Rossiya, Vol. I p. 86-87.
- (48) Goryushkin, Krest'yanstvo Sibiri, p. 184.

- (49) Pavlovsky, Agricultural Russia, p. 178.
- (50) Stepynin, Kolonizatsiya Yeniseiskoi gubernii, p.69, from Materialy po issledovaniyu zemlepol'zovaniya i khozyaistvennogo byta sel'skogo naseleniya Irkutskoi i Yeniseiskoi gubernii T.IV, vyp.2. Irkutsk 1893 s. 81,129.
- (51) Stepynin, Kolonizatsiya Yeniseiskoi gubernii, p. 69, from Kaufman A. A., Pereselenie i Kolonizatsiya, St. Petersburg. 1905 s. 183.
- (52) Aref'ev, Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie v 1896 godu pp. 130-132.
- (53) Yamzin, Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie, pp.148, 198.
- (54) Sklyarov shows the ever rising charges to new settlers for acceptance into old settler communities. During the 1870s these were often as much as 15, even 25 roubles. By the late 1880s between 35 and 50 roubles were demanded, rising to sometimes as much as 70 roubles in the 1890s and beginning of the 20th century. After 1905 prices in Tomsk province were anything from 40-60 roubles to 100-200 roubles. Sklyarov, Pereselenie i zemleustroistvo v Sibirii, p.436-437. Yamzin's findings suggest that the expense of buying into an old settler community did not contribute greatly to an increase in the numbers of returnees. Yamzin, Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie, p.128.
- (55) Dubrovskii, Stolypinskaya zemel'naya reforma, p.401.
- (56) Goryushkin, Krest'yanstvo Sibiri, p. 231. See also Dubrovskii, Stolypinskaya zemel'naya reforma p. 392.
- (57) Sklyarov, Pereselenie i zemleustroistvo, p. 460.
- (58) R.I. Sifman, Dinamika chislyanosti naseleniya Rossii za 1897-1914 in Vishnevskii, ed., Brachnost', Rozhdaemost', Smertnost' v Rossii u SSSR. Sbornik statei (Moscow : Statistika, 1977) p. 81.
- (59) Yamzin, Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie, p.105, from Pereselenie krest'yan Kharkovskoi gubernii, Vyp.I. str. 330 and Vyp.II. str. 51.
- (60) Sklyarov, Pereselenie i zemleustroistvo, p. 388-389.
- (61) Sklyarov, Pereselenie i zemleustroistvo, p. 387.
- (62) Goryushkin, Krest'yanstvo Sibiri, p. 240, from Sbornik statistiko-economiceskikh svedenii po sel'skomu khozyaistvu Rossii i inostrannikh gosudarstv. God desyatiy. Petrograd 1917, pp.48-55.

- (63) Yamzin, Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie, p.140, from Voprosy kolonizatsii, N^o 9, 1911, Stat'ya zaveduyushchago pereselencheskikh statistik v Tomskoi gubernii.

CHAPTER V

THE ROLE OF THE ZEMSTVO IN MIGRATION AND RESETTLEMENT

It is intended in this chapter to examine the role of the ' Zemstvo ' in relation to the migration movement, whether this was one of rendering assistance or hindering the migration of the peasants out of European Russia either by implementing the policies of central government or by initiatives taken at a local level.

The Statute on Zemstvo Institutions was promulgated on 1st January 1864.

(1) It provided for the establishment of Zemstvo Samoupravlenie, or local self-government institutions in thirty-three provinces (guberniia) of European Russia, and in each district (uezd) within those provinces. These institutions of self-government were to consist of an assembly and an executive board in each province and district. Deputies to the district assemblies were chosen by three electoral groups based on property qualification, while members of the provincial assemblies were elected by the district assemblies from among their own number. The governor retained overall responsibility for the conduct of local affairs within each province. (2)

The social composition of the new zemstvo favoured the gentry and urban population rather than the peasantry, although representation from each of the three social classes, the private landowners, the townspeople and the peasantry was guaranteed. Each class had its own electoral curia from which to choose deputies to the zemstvo assemblies. The casting of direct votes for deputies to the assemblies was only granted to those with specified amounts of property or other wealth. These constituted the first electoral group. Group two comprised members of the urban population excluded from group one through insufficient property or wealth, who elected representatives to vote on their behalf for deputies to the zemstvo assemblies. Group three were the ' volost' elders who voted for deputies to the zemstvo assemblies having themselves been elected by commune elders and representatives of each ten peasant householders, who had in turn been chosen by heads of peasant households. (3)

The Zemstvo Statute laid down specific areas which were henceforth to be the responsibility of the new institutions. These included the fields of public health and education, veterinary facilities, public works, which encompassed the maintenance of hospitals and prisons and the construction of local roads and administrative buildings, fire prevention and administration of fire insurance, encouraging local trade and industry and holding local elections. (4) In short, the overall brief of the zemstvo was to manage affairs relating to the local economic well-being and the needs of every province and every district. (5) The problems of agriculture, land-shortage and increasingly the migration movement should have fitted very naturally into this wide schedule, but zemstvos were often reluctant to recognise the mounting hardships of rural life and their fundamental causes. Veselovskii, author of the definitive work on the zemstvo movement, Istoriya zemstva za sorok let, could find only one district zemstvo, that of Novouzenskoye in Samara province, which admitted to the existence of land-shortage in the 1860s. By the mid-1870s Veselovskii lists only the provincial zemstvos of Tver, Yaroslavl, Moscow, Kostroma, Tauride and Kherson as having taken any steps to extend peasant land-holdings, despite the findings of zemstvo-commissioned investigations which showed that the peasants' economic status had deteriorated as a result of land-shortage. He attributes this to the gentry-weighted social composition of the zemstva assemblies which failed to consider problems from the point of view of the peasantry. (6)

By the mid-1870s, the problems of illiteracy, lack of resources and general backwardness of the Russian peasantry as contributive to the agrarian debility in rural areas were generally acknowledged. Most allowed that land shortage was also a factor. The solution was seen to lie in increasing the amount of land held by the peasantry. There were two options : either to increase the purchasing power of the peasantry by extending credit specifically for the purpose of buying land, or to encourage the vacating of over-crowded areas through migration. At this stage central government opted to increase peasant land-holdings within European Russia by extending credit rather than promoting widespread migration. The Peasant Land Bank was founded by statute on 18 May 1882 and opened 7th April 1883 as a state institution within the Ministry of Finance. Its brief was to facilitate the purchase of land by peasants of whatever means, if the owner wished to sell. The Bank's branches would be managed by appointees from

the Ministry of Finance with the help of three assistants, one appointed by the local provincial governor and two others chosen by the Provincial Zemstvo Assembly. The Bank's duties included helping the purchaser and the seller to complete their transaction and make available loans for this purpose not exceeding 125 roubles per male soul or 500 roubles per household. (7) Some provincial zemstvos, notably Tver and to some extent Poltava, had already introduced limited credit facilities for land purchase although the schemes were not always exclusively designated for the peasantry. Others, while considering the arguments, failed to act positively in providing credit for peasant land purchases, although by 1879, twenty-four zemstvos voted in favour of a more active role for zemstvos in this field. (8)

There were isolated cases in the 1870s of the initiatives proposed by individual zemstvos to encourage out-migration from particular provinces, but none achieved a marked change in policy towards migrants. As early as 1870 and later in 1873, the Chernigov provincial zemstvo reaffirmed that the best way to improve the economic situation of the province would be to encourage out-migration. (9) However, it was not until 1876 that the zemstvo adopted a motion petitioning central government to reschedule redemption payments to facilitate the departure of peasants from the province. (10) In 1876, the Orel district zemstvo in Vyatka province agreed a motion to petition the provincial assembly for finance for the issue of grants to those who wished to move to other areas. The grants were to have been awarded to inhabitants of those 'volosti' where climatic and soil conditions made it impossible to farm successfully or feed a family. The proposal was accepted by the provincial assembly which declared its readiness to assign more than 1,000 roubles to assist in resettlement. (11) In 1875, the Voronezh provincial zemstvo urged the creation of a bureau specifically to encourage peasants to migrate out of the province. (12) A further proposal in 1880 within Voronezh zemstvo recommended the establishment of a resettlement department to operate in conjunction with each provincial zemstvo, which would provide statistical information for ready reference on areas of vacant land, land prices, itineraries and expenses of journey. (13)

Prior to 1880-1881 the zemstvos, for the most part, either opposed the notion of resettlement or remained indifferent to it. In addition to the examples given

above, a few district zemstvos were prepared to see some merit in the idea, but only on a very qualified basis. One supported resettlement, but only from those areas of extreme land-shortage. Another proposed that only a specified percentage of the population should be permitted to migrate. Another, while agreeing with the principle of migration, declared that it would only lead to useful results when the population had reached a higher degree of development and agricultural know-how. Still others, among them the provincial zemstva of Novgorod, Ekaterinsolav and Ufa, viewed resettlement from the opposite perspective and were anxious to attract settlers. (14)

In 1880 and 1881 the press was conducting heated debates on the question of migration and resettlement and was subsequently barred from dealing with the subject. Resettlement was also brought to the forefront of zemstvo attention as a result of a government initiative to seek out relevant zemstvo opinion and ideas. In 1881 zemstvo representatives were invited to attend the special commission to consider the question of peasant resettlement set up by the Ministry of the Interior. The commission concluded that steps needed to be taken to assess the number of out-migrants from the Russian provinces. To this end, on 10th July 1881, as part of the *Vremennye pravila o pereselenii krest'yan na svobodnye kazennye zemli*, the first migrant office was established by the Ministry of the Interior in Syzran district, Simbirsk province to monitor the flow of migrants. However, the findings, as Yadrintsev explains, remained largely unpublished. (15) No further practical measures were taken as a result of the commission.

Following the debate within the zemstvo assemblies, the provincial zemstvos of Vladimir, Voronezh, Pskov, Tula, Chernigov, Tauride and Tambov now declared themselves to be in favour of organised resettlement. Tambov provincial zemstvo in particular advocated unrestricted resettlement, one member even proposing the allocation of funds to ease the process of migration for its peasants. (16) Several district zemstvos also declared their approval.

An examination of the process of consideration within the Poltava zemstvo assemblies illustrates the lack of urgency with which most zemstvos viewed

the question of resettlement. It is necessary to bear in mind that Poltava was one of the provinces most seriously affected by population density and that it later came to be regarded as a pioneer of zemstvo involvement in migration. In response to the government initiative, the zemstvo board (uprava) began to examine the question of migration as it affected the province and prepared a report which it put before the provincial zemstvo assembly in 1881. The report considered that to encourage migration from Poltava province would not be in the best interests of the province. (17) Zenchenko does not elaborate further, but Veselovskii indicates that this negative attitude rested on the premise that a population surplus to the requirements of agriculture would stimulate industrial development (18), by providing a large reserve of cheap labour.

The provincial zemstvo board's report added, however, that this did not exclude the possibility that in extreme circumstances, when out-migration was considered necessary, measures might be swiftly organised in order to avoid the needless waste of the population's strength and resources. The zemstvo assembly proposed that further consideration of the migration question should be delayed until the following year and asked the board (uprava) to continue its study. In 1882 the matter was passed to the district (uezd) assemblies for their consideration. The conclusions of the district assemblies together with the revised report were then submitted to the provincial assembly in 1883 for further consideration, but none was given either that year or the following year. In short, the question of migration was not a priority. The report contained two proposals : one was that responsibility for dealing with the problems of migrants and migrant workers should be given to agencies established for that purpose at provincial and district level ; the second, that a meeting should be convened at regional (oblastnoi) level to consider measures to regulate migration and the out-flow of migrant workers. However, another ten years was to pass before the subject of migration and resettlement was again brought before the Poltava provincial zemstvo assembly. (19)

The zemstvo assemblies of Poltava province were not alone in dragging their feet on the matter of resettlement. Between 1882 and 1891, most either ignored or rejected outright the notion that resettlement was fast becoming a

necessity, seeing the duty of the zemstvo to be that of ascertaining the causes of migration and eliminating them, rather than of encouraging the movement. (20) Few zemstvo assemblies, it seemed, were willing to recognise the importance of land-shortage as a spur to migration and few saw the possible economic benefits, despite the fact that one of their declared objectives was to raise economic conditions. Not until the 1890s did resettlement again become a subject for deliberation in the zemstvo assemblies.

Prior to this development, however, there took place on 12 June 1890, a reform of the zemstvo. Henceforth, the zemstvo institutions would be brought within the framework of the state bureaucracy. Zemstvo chairmen and executive members were now to become fully-fledged civil servants, but more importantly the reform changed the electoral groups. These were now to be defined by estate (soslovie) rather than by property. The three new groups were : noble, non-noble but excluding the peasantry and peasant members of communities. As Dorothy Atkinson notes, all independent peasant landowners and all private peasant landholding associations were now left with no representation in the zemstvo assemblies. Peasants had been increasing their representation in the landowners' electoral group, by 1885 accounting for one-tenth of electors. At the same time there had been a small decline in the number of zemstvo deputies elected by the peasant communes. (21)

The composition of the Poltava provincial zemstvo assembly between 1890 and 1893 reflects the near total absence of peasant deputies. Of the sixty-two members of the provincial assembly, fifty-nine were gentry. Thirty-one members of the sixty-two had received higher education, twenty-eight had received secondary education and three elementary education only. Only two members owned less than 200 desyatinas of land. (22) Such a line-up was unlikely to fully appreciate the problems caused by rural over-crowding. However, bad harvests culminating in the widespread famine of 1891 prompted some response and in 1892, a revisory commission of the new Poltava provincial zemstvo assembly proposed that the zemstvo petition

central government to grant those short of land in the province the right to move and settle on free Cabinet lands and receive assistance to do so. Despite agreement on such a course of action, it was felt that further study was needed before a petition of this nature could be submitted. To this end the Poltava provincial office of statistics was given the task of compiling material on the migration movement out of Poltava province. (23) This measure, directed towards studying the question of migration, to passive observation, made little practical contribution towards influencing the movement or assisting the migrants. Nevertheless it constituted a radical change of attitude. It was the first comprehensive, long-term assessment by a zemstvo, or any other body, of the impact of out-migration on a province. Similar studies were conducted in the provinces of Voronezh, Vyatka, Chernigov and Kharkov. *

The famine of 1891 stimulated debate on peasant migration within other zemstvos and more provincial zemstvos were now prepared to support the idea, among them : Voronezh, Kursk, Perm, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tula and Chernigov. Old habits die hard, however, and although approval was given in principle to the idea of resettlement, it was also stipulated that landowners' interests should not be compromised. The general view was that although migration could not be halted completely, attempts should be made to limit numbers to those who could not find work locally or, whose presence, if they remained, would reduce the average plot-size to below the norm. (24)

Loans to facilitate the purchase of migrants' land by those remaining were introduced in 1894 by Poltava uezd zemstvo which allocated 3,000 roubles for this purpose. This was intended to work to both the migrant's benefit, who would be able to realise his assets more speedily, obtaining the funds necessary for his journey, and to the advantage of those remaining in that they could extend their land-holdings by ownership on favourable terms, 6% interest over ten years.

* ' Pereselenie iz Poltavskoi gubernii 1861-1893 ' and ' 1894-1901 ' was published in 1900 and 1905 respectively. I. Lisanevich compiled a short study of peasant out-migration from Voronezh province between 1870 and 1882. N.N. Romanov's 'Pereseleniya krest'yan Vyatskoi gubernii ' was published in 1880.

The loan allocation was raised to 5,000 roubles in 1894 and nearly 6,000 in 1897, but the numbers assisted in this way were insignificant : only 42 loans were issued in 1897. (25)

The district and provincial zemstvos of Orel province vigorously debated the subject of resettlement in 1899. Nine out of twelve of the province's district zemstvos were in favour of unrestricted migration. (26) More and more district and provincial zemstvos recognised that migration was a ready-made, popular solution to one aspect of the agrarian problem blighting European Russia. It was not a solution accepted readily, but rather represented a recognition that the movement was unstoppable anyway and a hope that unrestricted migration might help stave off the disaster of widespread peasant unrest in the countryside. The provinces of Kharkov and Poltava, particularly experienced serious peasant disturbances in 1902.

Matters were taken further in 1903 when a zemstvo programme for agrarian reform put before the commission investigating the impoverishment of the centre, included the demand that resettlement and population redistribution be properly established on a wide basis. The upheavals of 1905, however, sparked a resurgence of negative attitudes towards resettlement. Most zemstvos reverted to ignoring the issue although some continued to consider the movement and their response to it. Among the latter were the provincial zemstva of Perm, Samara, Smolensk, Poltava, Ekaterinoslav, Kharkov and Chernigov, together with some district zemstva. (27)

Zemstvo involvement in resettlement was also evident in areas other than debate. A link, however tenuous, was established with the practical aspects of resettlement when zemstvo statistician Shcherbin, working with the Resettlement Administration, led an expeditionary group in 1895 to research Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk and Turgai oblasts. (28) The first zemstvo-sponsored expedition was undertaken by Poltava zemstvo which, in 1906, despatched their agronomist Sokolovskii, in the company of a party of scouts, to Turgai. The object was to assess the suitability of the steppe regions of Turgai for settlement by migrants from Poltava province and to study the mechanics of resettling migrants. (29) Later in 1906, Sosnitskii uезд in

Chernigov province similarly despatched a zemstvo member, N.L. Radchenko, to accompany a party of scouts to the Ural region. (30) Further trips were undertaken in the following years, notably that by A.A. Svechin, a member of Chernigov provincial zemstvo, in 1910. Svechin made detailed studies of areas in Turgai and Akmolinsk and assessed conditions for migrants, particularly for those from his home province. An account of Svechin's trip to Siberia, Otchet o komandirovke v Sibir A. A. Svechina by A. Orlov, 1911, reaches several conclusions on ways in which conditions of resettlement might be improved. The establishment of permanent offices (agentura) in settlement areas is recommended to assist migrants and the building of road and rail links is seen as a priority. Insofar as was possible, migrants should make the final decision on their choice of plot as this would reconcile them to any shortcomings. Surveying needed to be improved and agricultural advisers on hand to assist the new settlers, improving their farming methods and where possible, reducing the introduction of the inefficient practices prevalent in European Russia. The working members of a family should be allowed to leave ahead of dependants and thereby be given the opportunity to establish themselves more successfully. Credit facilities should be available from locally-based agencies. Mobile medical teams should be formed. (31)

The zemstvos were also active in providing food aid for destitute and starving migrants. In May 1907, approval was obtained from the Resettlement Administration for the provision of food aid to migrants through the All-Zemstvo Organisation. (32) The Organisation had been established originally to assist the sick and wounded during the Russo-Japanese War. It later continued its work on a much larger scale during the First World War. (33). Meanwhile, it was able to direct its services towards alleviating the hardships of the migrants. The effects of the poor harvest of 1906 had been particularly severe, with the result that the peasants left their homes already short of food, their situation becoming progressively worse as they made their way to the settlement areas.

The very large numbers of out-migrants following the introduction of the Stolypin reforms in 1906, elicited further consideration of resettlement amongst some individual zemstvos. Ekaterinoslav provincial zemstvo,

Kharkov provincial zemstvo and one individual district zemstvo from Kursk province and one from Voronezh province turned to Poltava for information and advice on migration and resettlement. By 1907 Poltava provincial zemstvo had already deployed seven resettlement agents in Siberia, whose duties were wholly concerned with the resettlement of migrants at their place of destination. It also allocated approximately 14,000 roubles per annum to resettlement. (34)

It is clear however, that there was no sudden surge of concern throughout the 34 provincial zemstvos and the 358 district zemstvos in existence at the time and that the numbers who were anxious to take some sort of positive action to promote improved conditions of mass resettlement were very small indeed. Calls had been made in the press for increased zemstvo participation in the resettlement movement. A.A. Belevskii, in an article published in 1904, went so far as to suggest that were zemstvo institutions to be set up in Siberia the future management of resettlement and colonisation might safely be left to them. In addition to looking after migrants, the zemstvos might also assume the tasks of exploration and designation of land suitable for settlement, to all intents and purposes making the Resettlement Administration redundant. It was argued that the zemstvos, liaising and co-ordinating their activities, would be far more effective in reducing the prevailing haphazard nature of resettlement and consequent high numbers of settlers who failed to establish themselves in their new environment. The rationale behind this desire to see increased zemstvo involvement was that no other institution or agency possessed greater knowledge of conditions at a local level, or was better placed to allocate resources effectively. (35)

Representatives from several zemstvos met together for three days, 3rd-6th October 1907, in Kharkov, at what became known as the first Regional Resettlement Conference (Pervyi oblastnoi pereselencheskii s'ezd). The meeting was chaired by the president of the Kharkov provincial zemstvo board, Prince A.D. Golitsyn. Other participants included the chairman of Poltava and Ekaterinoslav provincial zemstvos, representatives from the provincial zemstvos of Chernigov, Kherson, Orel, Poltava and Kharkov, the chairmen of three district zemstvos, members of several land settlement commissions, several agronomists, a forester, a researcher at an agricultural

school, a local director of the Peasant Bank and two of Poltava provincial zemstvo's resettlement agents. It is tempting thus far to dismiss the meeting as a purely localised affair, but weight is given to its significance by the presence of three officials from the Resettlement Administration, one of whom was G.V. Glinka (editor of Aziatskaya Rossiya which was to be for some time the definitive work on the development and colonisation of Siberia) and two members of the All-Zemstvo Organisation, including its President, Prince G.E. Lvov. (36)

The meeting agreed that the zemstvos had a valuable contribution to make to the work of resettlement. In the first instance they might usefully assume responsibility for all aspects of dealing with migrants prior to their departure. This might include issuing permits, organising groups of scouts to be accompanied by zemstvo agents, facilitating the sale and purchase of migrants' plots, possibly even petitioning central government to grant the zemstvos the right to purchase the plots of those who were leaving in order to assist the speedy realisation of assets and be in a position to sell the acquired plots to those most in need who remained. (37) These were rather ambitious proposals and unlikely to have any hope of realisation particularly as responsibility for the issuing of permits to migrate, the organising of rail transport and scouting parties and, more importantly, land purchase, already lay within the government-established land-settlement commissions set up the previous year in March 1906 (see Chapter 2). The suggestion that these tasks should lie within the scope of zemstvos activity, was clearly an attempt by the zemstvo to assume greater powers for themselves by demonstrating that the land-settlement commissions were largely unnecessary. It was unlikely, however, that government would have handed over responsibility for such a key aspect of its agricultural reform and colonisation policy, to organisations which it had long mistrusted and over whose activities it might have had inadequate control.

A second important role for the zemstvos was seen to lie in liaising and co-ordinating their activities with those of the Resettlement Administration in settling migrants at their destination. Migrant plots designated by the Resettlement Administration should be open to preliminary inspection and conditional acceptance, for a set period, by zemstvo officials. At the same

time, the zemstvo officials would be required to make detailed plans and descriptions of those plots to distribute amongst those wishing to migrate.

The meeting further agreed that increased subsidies from the central government would be needed to provide food and medical aid and for loans, sufficient to build a first house, improved rail-links, more river-routes and roads, irrigation systems, educational and cultural amenities, experimental agricultural stations. (37)

Finally the meeting accepted proposals for the formation of a regional zemstvo resettlement organisation and outlined its structure. The organisation would be run by a congress comprising two representatives chosen from amongst the members of the provincial zemstvo assemblies of each participating province. The congress would meet three times a year in February, June and October, before the start, at the height and at the end of the migration season. It would formulate the organisation's resettlement policy. The executive function of the organisation would lie with a special bureau attached to the Poltava provincial zemstvo board and subordinate to its control. In addition, an office would be set up within each province to operate simultaneously and in conjunction with the central organisation. To fund the organisation, each participating zemstvo would contribute annually an amount proportional to the number of out-migrants from its province during the period 1885-1906 inclusive. (38)

The new organisation would deploy agents in the settlement areas to act as intermediaries between migrants and officials of the Resettlement Administration and to generally concern themselves with all aspects of distribution and settling of migrants. A resettlement campaign plan would be drawn up by the regional organisation and provincial zemstvo boards. There would be more liaison between the provincial and district zemstvos on matters of resettlement. The district zemstvos should become responsible for offering practical assistance in arranging the peasant's departure, completing legal formalities for permission to resettle, organising rail transport. The All-Zemstvo Organisation should continue its work of providing assistance to

migrants en route, but where this was not possible, the regional organisation would assume responsibilities. (39)

The proposed Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation also saw for itself a useful role in disseminating throughout its member provinces information on the resettlement areas in Siberia collated by the Resettlement Administration. One of the major defects of the system of resettling migrants as perceived by the zemstvos was the paucity of information available to the migrant. It was now proposed that zemstvo representatives based in the settlement area would obtain information from the Resettlement Administration on the progress of settlement, conditions in and geographical details of specific areas, the amount and location of land designated for settlement. The information would be passed to the new organisation's central bureau for onward distribution to member provinces. (40) Sklyarov estimates that in 1907 more than six-and-a-half million copies of various brochures and leaflets were distributed amongst the peasantry, including 130,000 reference booklets and 400,000 pamphlets detailing conditions of settlement. He is scathing on the subject of those information booklets, asserting that they were little more than propaganda and contained glowing, but often, misleading information, which encouraged many to depart eastwards without the necessary permits and therefore government assistance. On the other hand he also acknowledged that the good and bad aspects of particular localities were included in those information sheets provided by the zemstvos. (41)

In effect, the work of an organisation which may have been envisaged, initially and optimistically, as a potentially influential, regional organisation, assuming ever greater responsibility for all aspects of peasant resettlement at the expense of the centrally based Resettlement Administration, found its aspirations curtailed and its activity limited to looking after the welfare of migrants, providing food and medical aid, geographical information and ensuring that any difficulties associated with leaving their place of origin and settling in at their destination were more speedily overcome.

At a meeting held on 8th-11th June 1908 in Poltava, a charter for the proposed Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation was finally presented and accepted and the South-Russian Regional Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation (Yuzhno-russkaya oblastnaya zemskaya pereselencheskaya organizatsiya) came into being. The first chairman was F.A. Lizogub, chairman of the Poltava provincial zemstvo. The founding members of the new organisation were the provinces of Ekaterinoslav, Kiev, Poltava, Kharkov and Cheringov. (42) Kiev did not have a zemstvo institution until 1911. Instead, it was one of the nine Western provinces in which, in 1903, were established non-elected bodies similar to the zemstvo, whose officials were appointed by the Ministry of the Interior. (43) Kiev's participation at this early stage in the organisation's existence, may suggest a role as counter-balance to the more ambitious zemstvo plans, but also indicates that central government was not wholly averse to the idea of the zemstvo collaboration in the practical and welfare side of resettlement. Map III shows the provinces associated with the organisation covered an extensive area within agriculturally rich zones.

A glance at the staffing levels of the new organisation gives an idea of the scale of possible activities open to it. The executive arm, which carried out the decisions of the congress consisted of a director, a secretary, a copyist, a filing clerk and nine settlement agents, two mobile agents to accompany migrants en route and seven to be based within the settlement areas in Siberia. All of these were transferred from Poltava provincial zemstvo. (44) In other words, the executive arm of the organisation was to be those officials already deployed in the settlement areas by Poltava provincial zemstvo acting alone with the addition of a manager, the first being an agronomist M.A. Nikolskii, and office staff, but now the office had greatly increased responsibilities. There is heavy reliance on Zenchenko's account in this and subsequent paragraphs dealing with areas of zemstvo involvement in resettlement, and organisational structure for, despite the occasional lapse of accuracy with regard to geographical detail noted by his reviewer (see *Voprosy kolonizatsiya* No. 12 1913 pp. 434-436) and his obvious pro-Poltava zemstvo standpoint, he does indicate clearly those areas in which the zemstvo organisation felt it had a role to play.

Primarily, the organisation's brief was to oversee all the activities affording physical assistance to the migrants, to liaise closely with officials of the Resettlement Administration in Siberia, tasks undertaken by the locally-based resettlement agents, while that part of the office located in Poltava was to act as a link between the provincial zemstvos of member provinces and Siberia. (45) The scale of the responsibilities also increased with figures for 1908 showing a total of 230,976 migrants and scouts, legal and illegal originating from the five member provinces and heading for Siberia. In 1907, Poltava resettlement officials had only had to deal with 30,725 migrants and scouts, legal and illegal. (46)

The agents' tasks were subsequently defined in a charter approved in April 1912. Those agents deployed in settlement areas were, firstly, to familiarise themselves with their respective areas, studying the geographical and economic conditions. This included determining the capacity for colonisation of a given area and its suitability for agricultural produce, assessing communications links, in short everything which might shed greater light on the appropriateness of the area for settlement by out-migrants from member provinces. Secondly, the agents were to assist scouts in choosing plots of land and in registering claims. This involved meeting arriving scouts at a designated point, verifying their documents, stressing the obligations of the scout vis-a-vis those on whose behalf he had made the journey, acquainting him, with the aid of plans, photographs, diagrams with the characteristics of the area, describing the migrant plots available for settlement explaining their advantages and disadvantages and finally giving the scout the opportunity to personally inspect the plots. If, after examination of the plot the scout wished to stake his claim in his own name, the agent would assist in registering the scout's name as soon as possible. If, on the other hand, the scout wished to stake a conditional claim on behalf of others, the agent would advise him of the procedure. The agents were further required to advise the length of time it might take a migrant to establish himself, to indicate the size of government loans and how to apply for such a loan, the best time of year to set out to the new lands, the journey conditions and provisions for transport and baggage. Thirdly, the agents were to study the conditions of life of the new settlers, where necessary rendering assistance to encourage their continued occupation of the lands. Agents based within the home provinces were to keep prospective scouts and migrants fully informed of appropriate settlement



areas, to monitor the operation of the migrant trains, to mediate between migrants and officialdom and lastly to do their own studies of the settlement areas. (47) The tasks which the zemstvo organisation may have hoped to take over from the land-settlement commissions are given no mention here, confirming that these responsibilities remained firmly with the representatives of the central government.

In addition to their duties towards the migrants, agents within the settlement areas were also required to survey at least fifty migrant plots a year, or between 25,000 and 50,000 desyatinas of land. Some managed to conduct surveys on up to 200 plots. The information thus gathered was returned to the central office in Poltava where it was collated and distributed in a series of leaflets and manuals. By the beginning of 1910, a manual for Scouts and Migrants and surveys of Akmolinsk, Yenisei, Irkutsk, Semipalatinsk, Semireche settlement areas, complete with maps, and lists of migrant plots including descriptive notes and plans, had been published. The organisation also published a monthly periodical ' Izvestiya '. (48)

By mid-1912, the organisation had expanded to a total of 57 employees, of whom 17 were based at the central office in Poltava, 24 in groups of two in each settlement area and 9 as mobile agents. (49) The organisation itself had also undergone some change by 1912. In 1909 Ekaterinoslav provincial zemstvo discontinued its association, but Kherson and Voronezh joined, as did Volhynia in 1910 and Saratov in 1913. There were fears that Kiev and Chernigov might also withdraw, indicating that not all ran as smoothly as Zenchenko would have his readers believe, but such a development was averted. (50) Changes were also made to the structure of the organisation. In 1909 it was decided that a plenary sub-committee should be established, subordinate to the main decision-making congress which would be able to deal with matters falling outside the routine category, but which did not require the sanction of the congress. The sub-committee was to consist of a single representative from each zemstvo and the director of the executive Bureau. (51)

This was the position of the South-Russia Regional Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation by 1912 when it was invited to submit a paper detailing its own achievements with regard to resettlement and zemstvo involvement in general to a zemstvo jubilee held in Moscow to celebrate the founding of the zemstvo institutions. (52) Zenchenko, while including an outline of the aspects of the organisation's work to be covered in the address, gives no account of the final evaluation of the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation's contribution.

In 1909 a second regional zemstvo resettlement organisation was founded, headed by Orel provincial zemstvo. Other member provinces were Smolensk, Tula, Tambov, Ryazan, Kursk and Kaluga. (53) It was less well-documented and may therefore be assumed to have been less effective in its activities than the Poltava based South-Russian Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation.

How valuable to the resettlement process were the activities of the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation ? The reviewer of Zenchenko's book, writing in 1913, describes the work as timely and the zemstvo experiment in resettlement matters as instructive and exemplary to other zemstvos. (54) Veselovskii considers the zemstvo contribution within the overall resettlement programme to be of little significance, (55) while Glinka praises the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation's activities, as does Pavlovsky. Its role is often ignored by Soviet historians. (56)

The South-Russian Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation was not finally established until June 1908, midway through the year of highest out-migration from European Russia to Siberia. The number of out-migrants from the founding member provinces of Kiev, Chernigov, Poltava, Kharkov and Ekaterinoslav for 1908 was 201,528. To this number must be added 29,448 scouts. Looking after the welfare of this large number of people were no more than nine resettlement agents, two accompanying migrants on the journey and seven based within the settlement areas of Siberia. It is almost impossible at this juncture to suggest that the work of the Organisation made any beneficial impact at all.

The tasks which the organisation set itself may be placed within the two categories of social welfare and practical assistance in negotiating the administrative formalities of resettlement. Success in the former is not easily quantifiable on the basis of figures available here. The provision of food and medical aid en route and improved conditions of transport may have had a considerable impact on the well-being of the individual migrant, but would not necessarily have contributed to the rate of successful settlement. The value of the Organisation's contribution may be better assessed in terms of its activities in relation to the practical aspects of resettlement, the paperwork, facilitating licensed departures with all due subsidies and entitlements, which may translate into proportionally fewer instances of migrants leaving without the necessary permits, or unlicensed, and an improving rate of successful settlement compared with the figures for the rest of European Russia.

Three sets of figures have been compared for Russia as a whole and for the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation : firstly, the percentage rates of unlicensed out-migrants; secondly, the percentage of out-migrants who returned within the same year; thirdly, the number of same year returnees as a percentage of the total number of returnees per year. The figures are based on the number of out-migrants, scouts and returnees from the member provinces of Volhynia, Voronezh, Kiev, Poltava, Kharkov, Kherson and Chernigov. Although Volhynia zemstvo did not join the Organisation until 1910, the numbers from this province were so few that little difference would have been made to the final figure in the earlier years.

Pavlovsky agrees with Grigorovsky's contention that the success of the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation is demonstrated by the consistently lower percentage figures of unlicensed out-migrants achieved by the Organisation compared with the rest of Russia. (57) Table I shows that for the three full years for which figures are available here, 1909, 1910, 1911 and during which the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation was active, the Organisation did indeed achieve a lower percentage rate of unlicensed out-migrants as compared with the rest of Russia, and for the first two years 1909 and 1910 had a lower percentage rate of unlicensed scouts. However, figures for earlier years, 1906, 1907, 1908 show this to have been the case also in those same provinces taken together before the founding of the

Organisation. Table III shows that percentage rates for out-migrants who returned within the same year do not differ greatly, although 1911 shows a higher than expected level of same year returnees for the Organisation. The percentage of returnees who were returning within the same year is lower for Russia as a whole. This may be interpreted as either a positive or negative trend (see Chapter III) but is not significant in terms of the beneficial contribution made by the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation.

One further indicator might have been a divergence in the percentage of unlicensed returnees with perhaps a higher rate of unlicensed returnees returning to provinces associated with the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation showing that more licensed migrants were settling successfully. Table IV shows falling percentage rates of unlicensed returnees for all provinces of the Organisation, and inversely, rising percentages of licensed migrants returning. The figures are therefore inconclusive and of limited value in assessing the work of the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation.

More interesting, however, are the figures at Table V which show the percentage of unlicensed out-migrants from six of the individual provinces within the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation. The figures suggest that the lower than national average percentages of unlicensed out-migrants for the Organisation as a whole are due to the activities of three provinces : Kiev, Poltava and Chernigov. Poltava and Chernigov show consistently lower rates of unlicensed out-migrants than the national average throughout the period 1896 to 1911, as does Kiev from 1906. Figures for Kharkov are remarkably similar to the national average, while those for Voronezh are significantly higher. Percentage figures for unlicensed scouts are more variable, (see Table III), but between 1906 and 1911 the rates for Chernigov province are considerably lower than the national average and must contribute significantly to the overall better showing of the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation as a whole compared to the rest of Russia in this respect. The number of out-migrants from individual provinces is only significant in demonstrating that those provinces with the highest number of out-migrants throughout the period 1896-1911, in this instance, Poltava and Chernigov, were also those who took active and early steps to promote resettlement. (See Table V or VII).

The findings lead to the conclusion that in terms of successful settlement, on the basis of the figures available, there seems to have been little advantage to being an out-migrant from the provinces of the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation. There is however, some basis for suggesting that out-migrants from specific provinces, Poltava, Chernigov and Kiev in particular, may have received more encouragement to leave, but this did not hinge on the organisational frame-work of the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation. Rather it depended on the continuing activities of these individual provincial zemstvo, especially Poltava and Chernigov, in support of the principle of resettlement. This conclusion does not detract from the Organisation's contribution to the provision of information.

The activities of the South-Russia Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation were, however, attracting the interest of other zemstvos, as evidenced by the invitation to address the gathering in Moscow in 1912. It is possible that in time the Organisation may have had a significant impact on the progress of successful resettlement. It is also probable that the Organisation would not have remained satisfied with a purely welfare function. In 1910 it declared its intention to establish the Organisation on a legal basis. It also joined in the call for the introduction of zemstvo institutions in Siberia, sharing Belevskii's vision of the zemstvo superseding all other bodies in matters of local government. (58) These matters were never definitively resolved and by 1915, after a steady annual rise in the number of out-migrants between 1912 and 1914, the outbreak of war and the massive decline in the number of out-migrants made the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation's activities largely irrelevant.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

- (1) PSZRI, 2nd series, vol. 39 N^o 40457.
- (2) Kermit E., Mckenzie ' Zemstvo organisation and role within the administrative structure ' in Emmons, Vucinich, ed., Zemstvo in Russia. Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 31.
- (3) C. Timberlake and J. Malloy, Introduction to Veselovskii's Istoriya zemstva za sorok let (Republished by Oriental Research Partners 1973) p. viii .
- (4) Timberlake and Malloy, Introduction to Veselovskii's Istoriya zemstva, p. iv from PSZRI, 1864 Pt. I, p. 2 .
- (5) Belokonskii, Zemskoye dvizhenie, p. 233.
- (6) Veselovskii, Istoriya zemstva V II, p. 59-60.
- (7) PSZRI, 3rd ser. Vol. 2 pp. 218-221 N^o 894.
- (8) Veselovskii, Istoriya zemstva V II, pp. 61-66.
- (9) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 319 From Pereselenie v Sibir' iz Chernigovskii gubernii v 1906-1908. Chernigov 1910. p. vii .
- (10) Veselovskii, Istoriya zemstva V II, p. 85.
- (11) Yadrintsev, Nashi vyseleniya i kolonizatsiya. p. 450-483 (p. 460).
- (12) Coquin, La Sibérie p. 319 from N. G. Serpovskii Pereseleniya v Rossii v drevnee i novoe vremya i ikh znachenie v khozaistve strany - Yaroslavl 1885, p. 166.
- (13) Coquin, La Sibérie, p. 318 from P. D. : K pereselencheskomu voprosu, Kiev 1881, p. 45.
- (14) Veselovskii, Istoriya zemstva V II, pp. 84-85.
- (15) N. M. Yadrintsev, "Desyatiletie pereselencheskogo dela". Vestnik Evropy viii. 1891, pp. 791-793.
- (16) Veselovskii, Istoriya zemstva V II, pp. 84-86 and 69.
- (17) Zenchenko, Pereselenie i zemstvo, p. 15.
- (18) Veselovskii, Istoriya zemstva V II, pp. 85-86.

- (19) Zenchenko, Pereselenie i zemstvo, p. 15.
- (20) Veselovskii, Istoriya zemstva V II, p. 87.
- (21) Dorothy Atkinson, 'Zemstvo and the peasantry' in Emmons, Vucinich, ed., Zemstvo in Russia. p. 88.
- (22) N. M. Pirumova, Zemskoe liberal'noe dvizhenie : sotsial'nie korni i evolutsiya do nachala XX veka (Izdatel'stvo Nauka : 1977)pp. 78-79, from Ts. G. I. A. SSSR fond 1287, opis, 27, delo 2576 (Lichnyi sostav Poltavskogo gubernskogo i uezdnogo zemskikh sobranii).
- (23) Zenchenko, Pereselenie i zemstvo, p. 15.
- (24) Veselovskii, Istoriya zemstva V II, p. 87.
- (25) Veselovskii, Istoriya zemstva V II, pp. 87-88.
- (26) Veselovskii, Istoriya zemstva V II, p. 88.
- (27) Veselovskii, Istoriya zemstva V II, pp. 81-84.
- (28) Voprosi kolonizatsii, Sbornik statei, Uspenskii A. V., Chirkin G. F. ed., N^o 9, 1911 p.403. Statisticheskie raboty Pereselencheskogo Upravleniya v 1911g.
- (29) Voprosy kolonizatsii, N^o 9, 1911 p. 406 See also : Zenchenko, Pereselenie i zemstvo, pp. 16-17.
- (30) Voprosy kolonizatsii, N^o 2, p. 406. Chernigovskoe gubernskoe zemskoe sobranie po pereselencheskomu delu.
- (31) Voprosy kolonizatsii, N^o 8, pp. 272-275 A. Orlov, ' Otchet o komandirovke v Sibir A. A. Svechina '.
- (32) Voprosy kolonizatsii, N^o2, . Doklad' zemskim sobraniyam predsedatelya Obshchezemskoi Organizatsii Knyazya Lvova ob uchastii Obshchezemskoi organizatsii v pereselencheskom dele.
- (33) Mckenzie, Zemstvo organisation and role, p. 48
William Gleason gives an account of the Union's activities during World War I, also in Emmon, Vucinich ed. Zemstvo in Russia, pp. 365-382.
- (34) Zenchenko, Pereselenie i zemstvo, pp. 18-19.
- (35) A. A. Belevskii, "K pereselencheskomu voprosu". Russkoe Bogatstvo , 1904.

- (36) Voprosy kolonizatsii, N° 2, ' Pervyi oblastnoi pereselencheskii s'ezd v gorode Kharkove ' pp. 399-404.
- (37) Voprosy kolonizatsii, N° 2, ' Pervyi oblastnoi pereselencheskii s'ezd v gorode Kharkove ' pp. 401-404.
- (38) Voprosy kolonizatsii, N° 2, ' Pervyi oblastnoi pereselencheskii s'ezd v gorode Kharkove ' p. 404. See also : Zenchenko, Pereselenie i zemstvo, p. 25.
- (39) Voprosy kolonizatsii, N° 2, ' Pervyi oblastnoi pereselencheskii s'ezd v gorode Kharkove ' p. 404.
- (40) Zenchenko, Pereselenie i zemstvo, pp. 23-24.
- (41) Skylarov, Pereselenie i zemleuetroistvo, p. 125, 127-128, 135.
- (42) Zenchenko, Pereselenie i zemstvo, pp. 36-37.
- (43) PSZRI, 3rd series, Vol. 31, N° 34903.
- (44) Zenchenko, Pereselenie i zemstvo, p. 38.
- (45) Zenchenko, Pereselenie i zemstvo, pp. 74-76.
- (46) Tablitsy dvizheniya pereselentsev v pryamom i obratnom napravlenii po dannym Chelyabinskoi i Syzranskoi registratsii, in Zenchenko, Pereselenie i zemstvo, pp. 64-66.
- (47) Zenchenko, Pereselenie i zemstvo, pp. 79-83.
- (48) Zenchenko, Pereselenie i zemstvo, pp. 40-43.
- (49) Zenchenko, Pereselenie i zemstvo, pp. 38-39.
- (50) Veselovskii, Istoriya zemstva, V IV, p. 119.
- (51) Zenchenko, Pereselenie i zemstvo, p. 38.
- (52) Zenchenko, Pereselenie i zemstvo, pp. 87-88.
- (53) Veselovskii, Istoriya zemstva, p. 119.
- (54) Voprosy kolonizatsii, Review of Pereselenie i zemstvo, p. 434.
- (55) Veselovskii, Istoriya zemstva, V IV p. 119.
- (56) Glinka, Aziatskaya Rossiya, p. 466.

- (57) Pavlovsky, Agricultural Russia, p.177, from A. Grigorovsky, The progress of emigration in 1912-13, in Agronomicheskii Zhurnal , N° 9-10, 1913, p. 118
- (58) Veselovskii, Istoriya zemstva, p. 119.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Peasant migration eastwards had a significant impact on the development of Siberia and the Tsarist agrarian policies within European Russia. As a result of this initially spontaneous movement of peoples certain areas of Siberia were, latterly, swiftly and productively colonised, becoming an inalienable part of firstly the Russian Empire and subsequently the Soviet Union. By stimulating government action, migration speeded up the exploration and scientific survey of vast tracts of Siberia. Furthermore, migration by the peasantry forced the Imperial government to reassess its attitude towards agriculture and the role of the peasant within the framework of the State, ultimately bringing about a radical overhaul in the organisation of agriculture and creating the climate for a restructuring of peasant society.

Attempts by the Imperial government in the early nineteenth century to introduce colonisers into Siberia were singularly unsuccessful. Numbers of volunteers recruited were too few and the government half-hearted, unclear in its own mind what policies it wanted to pursue. Population density, although evident, had not yet reached the proportions it was later to assume and nearly half the peasant population, as proprietary serfs, were ineligible to volunteer for resettlement. Despite the desire to colonise Siberia and the efforts of the Ministry of State Domains, the number of peasants relocated in Siberia was not encouraging. Nevertheless, Kiselev's policies had established the principle of resettlement.

The lot of the former serfs was little improved as a result of the Emancipation. While freeing him from ownership by the landlord, it tied him to the land and to the commune during the period of redemption payment. State peasants later became similarly disadvantaged with what little freedom of movement they had enjoyed earlier being likewise curtailed. A certain amount of movement did however take place as the struggle to make ends meet forced many peasants to make their way to other areas in search of wage-work. The tales these brought home, while often fuelling rumours, also brought knowledge of other areas. Over time, these distant regions became more

familiar and less daunting to a prospective migrant. As difficulties associated with bad harvests and the population increase arose, numbers of out-migrants grew.

Likewise the Act brought little benefit to agriculture. The regular occurrence of bad harvests and resulting famines continued, culminating in the very severe famine of 1891. The inability, unwillingness or simply the sheer enormity of the task to introduce beneficial long-term reform into the countryside, meant that, of necessity the government viewed the problems of rural Russia from the same perspective as the peasant and also concluded that the answer lay in increasing the amount of land held by the peasantry. In effect, providing more land was the easiest, most practical and immediately visible means of addressing the problems of rural deprivation. The disaster of the 1891 famine and the burgeoning rural population prompted greater activity towards this objective, in European Russia, through the Peasant Land Bank and in Siberia through the activities of the Trans-Siberian Railway Committee.

Government intention was always to remain in control of Siberia's colonisation. The opening of the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1893, with its declared aspirations of populating Siberia with Russians was an expression of this intent. Not only did it provide the instrument whereby, ultimately, four million migrants made their way to Siberia, but it also encouraged the quickening pace of scientific exploration. Much data was collected on climate, flora and fauna and soil conditions. Surveying, communications and community infrastructures were developed and extended, work later continued by the Resettlement Administration. In European Russia the emphasis of government policy remained on controlling the out-flow of migrants. The apparent contradiction between on the one hand the impetus within the peasant population to occupy the uncrowded lands to the east and the ambition of the government to bring Siberia under Imperial Russian control while at the same time maintaining restraints on the movement of the peasantry, is attributable to several factors. Firstly, there was pressure from the landlords within European Russia not to risk the possibility of destabilising the countryside by allowing unrestrained movement of the rural workforce out of Russia. Secondly, the government wished to dictate the areas of settlement and direct land allocation, subject to the completion of

survey work, in order to give maximum benefit to the State in terms of Slav dominance of the land, productive exploitation of natural resources and successful settlement. Thirdly, and following on from the last point, there was a lack of preparation within Siberia to receive thousands of migrants. It was difficult to shed the paternalistic approach and allow each to make his own way, although some interest was expressed in the American experience of westward expansion by 'homesteaders'. However, the State, again, was anxious to avoid creating a large, unstable and itinerant peasant population. Fourthly, the negativity with which the peasant was regarded coloured the attitude of legislators. There was always doubt as to the peasant's reliability. His perceived lack of commitment and tendency to wander required continuing checks on his freedom of movement. Despite these misgivings and following the hardships endured by the rural population in the early 1890s, government attitude was changing rapidly. The body of legislation concerning migrants enacted in 1896 eased the bureaucratic restraints on peasant mobility and introduced widely publicised benefits, including rail-travel, to migrants who used the proper channels and sought legal authorisation to leave their places of origin. Peasant resettlement was henceforth to be supported to a degree. It was not a great leap from this position to that of 1905 which saw the introduction of the first of Stolypin's reforms and heralded the beginning of almost feverish encouragement of out-migrants from European Russia.

The causes to the great surge eastwards which began in 1906 can be found in the widespread and often violent unrest in the countryside of European Russia and Japanese aggression in the Far East. Attempts to restore order internally were taken on two fronts, by force and by hastening the pace of rural change through the introduction of Stolypin's land reforms. As a result of these, the peasant was freer than he had ever been to move out of his village if he so wished. The Russo-Japanese War highlighted the vulnerability of Siberia to predatory designs by its neighbours, demonstrating the necessity for rapid colonisation. Permits to resettle were issued more readily than ever before and government expenditure on resettlement rose dramatically. 1907 showed the lowest percentage number of unlicensed out-migrants making their way to Siberia despite an enormous rise in actual numbers. Scouts were particularly encouraged.

Migration, as distinct from the government's policy of resettlement, pre-Emancipation and up until the mid-1880s was southwards towards the territories of New Russia and eastwards as far as Samara and Orenburg. When here too the pool of land ran short, settlers spread further east into Siberia. Here, the areas most affected by peasant settlement were the provinces of Tomsk and Yeniseisk in Western Siberia, although Tobolsk and Transbaikal also received significant numbers of settlers. Increasingly though the peasant was being attracted to the steppe regions of Semipalatinsk, Turgai and particularly Akmolinsk rather than to the Far East.

There is little evidence up to the year 1911 to suggest that the role the South-Russian Regional Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation envisaged for itself and attempted to play significantly affected the resettlement process in areas which might be deemed to be important, or that it contributed noticeably to successful resettlement, although two individual zemstvos within the Organisation were more effective than others. Over time the less successful zemstvos may have benefited from their association with these.

The success or failure of the government's resettlement policy is usually assessed by Soviet historians on the basis of the number of returnees from Siberia. These were many despite bureaucratic attempts to restrict their numbers. In all for the period 1896 to 1911 returnees comprised 13.7% of the number of out-migrants, with numbers especially heavy in 1909, 1910 and 1911. Many found their land plots unsuitable for cultivation and had few, if any, resources with which to join old settler communes or rent land. By the second decade of this century, amongst the returnees were rising numbers of longer term settlers returning to European Russia unable to eke out a living in Siberia and possibly attracted by rumours of increasing amounts of land to be released to the peasantry and by the impact of the Stolypin landholding consolidation reforms. Many may have been discouraged from remaining in Siberia by the surge in numbers of new settlers from 1907 or they may have been among those who sought resettlement, encouraged by Stolypin's lifting of restrictions on peasant mobility, and whose numbers were far in excess of those the resettlement authorities in Siberia could reasonably manage to settle.

However, figures from research conducted in 1911 showed that those migrants who did settle successfully were slowly increasing in prosperity. Numbers of livestock per household were rising in ratio to the length of time the household had been settled. Also encouraging were the figures which showed that, over time, not only was acreage under cultivation per household rising, but the average amount of land occupied by a single household was also growing. The peasant settler over the years was not only increasing his plot size, but also his productivity. These were the successes of resettlement although they perhaps owe as much to peasant initiative as they do to the government's resettlement policy.

What might have happened to Siberia's further development had world war, revolution and accession of the Bolsheviks not intervened can only be speculation, but, since the rate of exodus from European Russia declined after 1910 and greater numbers of long-term settlers were returning and the onus on whether to migrate or not continued to remain with the peasant, it seems likely that Siberia's colonisation and consequent development would have proceeded at a slower pace than that instituted by Lenin and his push for industrialisation. During the Tsarist period it was the peasant who dictated the pace at which Siberia was colonised and to some extent the areas which were surveyed and made ready for settlement. Similarly, the activities and development of the Zemstvo Resettlement Organisation were cut short. Under different circumstances, the second regional organisation may have established itself and with two organisations catering to the welfare and practical aspects of resettlement, the conditions out-migrants had to endure, may have been greatly improved. However, war in 1914, reduction in the number of out-migrants to a trickle by 1916 and finally revolution in 1917 brought peasant migration and Tsarist resettlement policy to an abrupt end.

TABLE I

OUT-MIGRANTS AND SCOUTS FOR ALL PROVINCES 1896 - 1916

Year	ALL PROVINCES		S.-R.R.Z.R.O		Out - migrants	Out - migrants	Scouts	% unlicensed	% unlicensed	Scouts	% unlicensed
	Out - migrants	% unlicensed	unlicensed	% unlicensed							
1896	177,168	38.3	11,910	93.1	94,051	25.0	4,447	92.4			
1897	67,653	38.9	17,780	31.0	28,036	30.4	4,447	42.5			
1898	146,002	39.7	54,403	39.3	25,633	29.2	9,055	32.7			
1899	166,121	45.5	53,073	50.4	41,610	31.6	13,284	43.3			
1900	161,476	29.9	53,017	31.3	66,283	28.9	20,011	34.6			
1901	83,326	33.1	31,161	52.4	33,168	33.1	9,843	49.8			
1902	77,272	34.3	29,009	38.7	28,256	36.2	8,362	39.4			
1903	88,072	32.8	31,211	29.1	27,369	36.9	7,794	35.2			
1904	37,063	91.7	6,731	88.4	18,551	94.5	2,798	94.5			
1905	37,168	89.9	5,269	92.4	20,323	90.8	2,603	87.0			
1906	135,274	56.2	77,584	11.0	48,314	45.7	18,808	10.6			
1907	421,335	22.6	149,640	2.7	168,048	16.9	44,291	2.1			
1908	649,866	53.4	94,035	61.2	242,154	50.4	34,320	40.6			
1909	593,806	52.2	88,143	67.4	217,002	47.2	28,801	58.4			
1910	285,878	35.1	36,787	44.6	126,998	30.9	16,341	43.8			
1911	161,519	39.2	36,271	19.1	60,254	32.6	11,151	21.3			
	<u>3,288,999</u>		<u>776,024</u>								

Numbers of out-migrants and scouts are taken from official statistics of out-migrants passing through Chelyabinsk and Syzran.

1912	176,528*	49.6*	52,558*
1913	219,976*	41.1*	92,553*
1914	224,987*	36.1*	94,535*
1915	22,995*		
1916	9,433*		

* Sidel'nikov, Agrarnyi Vopros, p. 218. Compiled from Itogi pereselencheskogo dvizheniya za vremya s 1910 po 1914 g. N. Turchaninov i A. Domrachev Petrograd 1916, 2-45; Pereselenie i zemleustroistvo za Uralom Petrograd, 1915, 1-2; Statisticheskii ezhegodnik Rossii 1916 g., vyp. 1, izd. Tsentral'nogo statisticheskogo komiteta Ministerstva Vnutrennikh Del Petrograd, 1918, 92 - 100.

EXPENDITURE IN ROUBLES ON RESETTLEMENT 1900-1915

Year	Plot preparation resettlement of migrants	Administration	Loans and subsidies	Medical and food assistance	Total
1906	2,826,179	184,674	1,580,945	725,471	5,317,269
1907	4,839,069	106,048	7,037,189	1,546,627	13,528,933
1908	6,500,671	139,946	10,484,636	1,757,245	18,882,498
1909	8,940,835	151,900	11,597,301	2,388,727	23,078,763
1910	10,113,641	144,050	11,762,514	3,248,958	25,269,163
1911	11,561,341	148,550	11,506,953	3,974,559	27,191,403
1912	13,677,985	176,550	9,830,816	4,634,037	28,319,388
1913	12,697,867	194,049	10,354,842	4,953,759	28,200,517
1914	12,591,079	223,093	11,388,244	5,367,370	29,569,786
1915	12,689,796	204,676	9,677,829	2,821,702	25,394,003
Total	96,438,463	1,673,536	95,221,269	31,418,455	224,751,723

extrapolated by Sidel'nikov, V. p. 230, from Otchety gosudarstvennogo kontroliya po ispolneniya gosudarstvennoi vospisi dokhodov i raskhodov i finansovykh smet.

St. Petersburg 1907, 440-445;
1908, 474-477;
1909, 504-509;
1910, 512-517;
1911, 560-569;
1912, 588-599;
1913, 590-605;
Petrograd 1914, 618-633;
1915, 628-641.

Pereselenie i zemleustroistvo za Uralom v 1915 g. Petrograd, 1916.

TABLE IV

PERCENTAGE OF ALL ANNUAL UNLICENSED RETURNEES 1896 - 1911

YEAR	ALL PROVINCES	S.-R.Z.R.O.
1896	45.1	33.3
1897	67.4	61.0
1898	41.2	46.2
1899	67.8	64.7
1900	61.6	50.8
1901	53.2	43.5
1902	53.3	50.3
1903	45.0	56.0
1904	75.2	87.5
1905	87.5	93.9
1906	77.8	78.3
1907	43.0	39.5
1908	65.3	69.7
1909	69.6	69.6
1910	64.4	61.1
1911	56.8	57.3

TABLE V

OUT-MIGRANTS (EXCLUDING SCOUTS) FOR SIX PROVINCES OF S.-R.-Z.R.O.

Year	Poltava		Kharkov		Chernigov		Kherson		Voronezh		Kiev		RUSSIA		S.-R.-Z. R.O.	
	% unlic	% unlic	% unlic	% unlic	% unlic	% unlic	% unlic	% unlic	% unlic	% unlic	% unlic	% unlic				
1896	38,649	5.6	8,471	12.1	35,536	38.2	3,750	45.9	5,266	55.9	1,953	88.1	38.3	25.0		
1897	6,762	7.1	2,704	22.4	9,897	23.2	3,246	71.2	3,560	42.9	1,047	52.5	38.9	30.4		
1898	4,403	26.0	3,510	34.4	5,979	22.6	1,329	34.6	7,084	49.3	3,538	19.9	39.7	29.2		
1899	10,785	24.3	6,888	38.8	6,276	27.6	2,617	52.9	10,161	37.3	3,457	13.6	45.5	31.6		
1900	26,604	23.9	11,009	35.3	11,058	19.4	4,071	72.3	8,001	30.9	3,576	28.4	29.9	28.9		
1901	11,405	29.1	3,062	30.3	8,590	17.5	3,078	71.9	1,961	38.6	3,170	48.3	33.1	33.1		
1902	9,774	22.5	3,261	48.4	5,914	24.5	2,381	73.8	2,623	62.3	3,485	36.6	34.3	36.2		
1903	8,037	17.7	4,916	38.8	4,345	21.0	3,076	69.4	3,586	65.4	2,446	46.3	32.8	36.9		
1904	3,574	90.4	3,030	97.4	1,825	76.2	6,000	98.3	1,533	98.5	2,479	98.6	91.7	94.5		
1905	6,553	92.4	1,689	99.6	3,221	69.6	3,594	91.9	1,610	99.5	3,164	97.1	89.9	90.8		
1906	9,421	38.2	7,219	55.7	9,378	35.6	5,343	48.3	8,635	49.6	7,728	54.7	56.2	45.7		
1907	30,025	18.8	20,014	14.4	45,783	11.1	3,566	20.6	25,907	43.0	34,119	76.2	22.6	16.9		
1908	53,064	51.6	32,608	53.5	47,243	45.0	14,745	55.5	39,163	71.8	44,386	38.5	53.4	50.4		
1909	53,359	32.9	29,454	51.3	28,894	34.5	23,279	54.0	39,110	78.4	33,540	37.0	52.2	47.2		
1910	32,026	24.1	24,033	35.8	14,739	16.6	19,980	55.9	10,084	49.0	18,163	20.6	35.1	30.9		
1911	14,291	25.4	10,733	39.4	7,389	22.8	11,612	45.4	4,244	56.3	7,553	25.0	39.2	32.6		
1912													49.6			
1913													41.1			
1914													36.1			

TABLE VI

SCOUTS FOR SIX PROVINCES OF S.-R.R.Z.R.O.

Year	Poltava		Kharkov		Chernigov		Kherson		Voronezh		Kiev		ALL RUSSIA		S-R.Z. R.O.	
	% unlic	% unlic	% unlic	% unlic	% unlic	% unlic	% unlic	% unlic	% unlic	% unlic	% unlic	% unlic				
1896	900	78.8	511	92.3	2,040	96.7	202	93.5	580	95.0	189	93.1	-	92.4		
1897	640	62.6	468	52.2	1,803	26.7	310	55.4	578	38.7	487	31.0	47.6	42.5		
1898	1,156	68.6	962	87.1	2,626	11.0	286	82.1	3,067	13.6	598	39.3	49.4	32.7		
1899	3,921	64.4	1,817	80.9	2,530	14.2	441	59.1	3,073	15.1	905	50.4	66.9	43.3		
1900	6,726	37.6	2,299	64.8	5,163	7.5	762	69.4	2,615	17.5	1,744	31.3	82.1	34.6		
1901	2,755	57.2	1,150	39.4	2,106	22.1	1,007	66.0	894	26.2	1,481	52.4	91.0	49.8		
1902	3,328	35.0	1,045	31.8	1,530	35.7	376	82.1	1,169	22.2	750	38.7	87.0	39.4		
1903	1,706	33.4	1,136	41.8	1,738	17.8	1,182	47.0	1,255	25.8	611	29.1	75.1	35.2		
1904	814	93.6	349	96.8	357	91.8	517	95.7	323	89.4	420	86.4	99.0	94.5		
1905	971	68.3	237	-	235	-4.3	320	91.8	392	99.7	421	92.4	99.5	87.0		
1906	2,340	12.5	2,363	12.2	4,929	1.2	987	23.8	4,162	13.6	3,649	11.0	10.3	10.6		
1907	8,059	3.6	4,824	2.5	11,236	32.2	840	5.9	9,130	2.1	7,899	2.7	1.59	2.1		
1908	7,870	46.5	4,743	47.5	7,537	38.6	1,904	61.0	5,026	78.4	5,595	61.2	51.5	40.6		
1909	5,628	52.4	3,889	65.8	4,555	23.8	2,480	89.8	5,272	80.4	5,008	67.4	53.0	58.4		
1910	3,914	36.3	2,428	61.6	2,208	12.5	2,637	68.6	1,521	56.2	2,579	44.6	34.0	43.8		
1911	3,422	17.1	1,929	22.6	1,659		1,309	37.8	1,137	29.2	1,168	19.1	23.4	21.3		

TABLE VII


OUT-MIGRANTS (EXCLUDING SCOUTS) AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FOR ALL PROVINCES

Year	All Provinces	Poltava	% of total	Kharkov	% of total	Chernigov	% of total	Kherson	% of total	Voronezh	% of total	Kiev	% of total
1896	177,168	38,649	21.8	8,471	4.78	35,536	20.0	3,750	2.1	5,266	2.97	1,953	1.1
1897	67,653	6,726	9.9	2,704	3.99	9,897	14.6	3,246	4.79	3,560	5.2	1,047	1.5
1898	146,002	4,403	3.0	3,510	2.4	5,979	4.09	1,329	0.9	7,084	4.8	3,538	2.4
1899	166,121	10,785	6.49	6,888	4.1	6,276	3.7	2,617	1.5	10,161	6.1	3,457	2.0
1900	161,476	26,604	16.4	11,009	6.8	11,058	6.8	4,071	2.5	8,001	4.9	3,576	2.2
1901	83,326	11,405	13.6	3,062	3.6	8,590	10.3	3,078	3.69	1,961	2.3	3,170	3.8
1902	77,272	9,774	12.6	3,261	4.2	5,914	7.6	2,381	3.08	2,623	3.3	3,485	4.5
1903	88,072	8,037	9.1	4,916	5.5	4,345	4.9	3,076	3.49	3,586	4.0	2,446	2.7
1904	37,063	3,574	9.6	3,030	8.1	1,825	4.9	6,000	16.1	1,553	4.19	2,479	6.6
1905	37,168	6,553	17.6	1,689	4.5	3,221	8.6	3,594	9.6	1,610	4.3	3,164	8.5
1906	135,274	9,421	6.9	7,219	5.3	9,378	6.9	5,343	3.9	8,636	6.3	7,728	5.7
1907	421,335	30,025	7.1	20,014	4.7	45,783	10.8	3,566	0.8	25,907	6.1	34,119	8.0
1908	649,866	53,064	8.1	32,608	5.0	47,243	7.2	14,745	2.2	39,163	6.0	44,386	6.8
1909	593,806	53,359	8.9	29,454	4.9	28,894	4.8	23,279	3.9	39,110	6.5	33,540	5.6
1910	285,878	32,026	11.2	24,033	8.4	14,739	5.1	19,980	6.9	10,084	3.5	18,163	6.3
1911	161,519	14,691	9.0	10,733	6.6	7,389	4.5	11,612	7.1	4,244	2.6	7,553	4.6

MAP I

Areas of peasant settlement

- pre - 1861 
- 1861 - 1885 
- 1885 - 1892 
- 1890s and 1900s 
- 1910 - 1914 




The map is not intended to indicate density of settlement.

The Administrative map of Russian Empire from Hans Rogger. Russia in the age of Modernisation and Revolution 1881 - 1917. 1973 pp. 314-315.

MAP II

Origin of out-migrants 1885 - 1909



Map of provinces of European Russia in 1900 from Martin Gilbert, Imperial Russian History Atlas. Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1978 p. 74.

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