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Hesiod's *Works and Days*: An Interpretative Commentary

Lilah Grace Canevaro

Hesiod's *Works and Days* was performed in its entirety, but was also relentlessly excerpted, quoted and reapplied. This thesis places the *Works and Days* within these two modes of reading and argues that the text itself, through Hesiod's complex mechanism of rendering elements self-contained and detachable whilst tethering them to their context for the purposes of the poem, sustains both treatments. However, Hesiod gives remarkably little advice on how to negotiate such modes of reading. The seeds of reception are there in the poem's structure and formulation, but a fully worked out schema of usage is not. This thesis argues that this strategy is linked to the high value Hesiod places on self-sufficiency, which is consistently foregrounded in the *Works and Days* as the Iron-Age ideal. Hesiod's emphasis on self-sufficiency creates a productive tension with the didactic thrust of the poem: teaching always involves a relationship of exchange and, at least up to a point, reliance and trust. This thesis argues that the poem's structure and modes of reading reflect the interplay between self-sufficiency and the very point of didactic literature. Hesiod negotiates the potential contradiction between trust and independence by advocating not blind adherence to his teachings but thinking for oneself and working for one's lesson.

The issues are presented in an extensive essay, and then followed through the poem in a line-by-line analysis. This thesis complements the available commentaries on the *Works and Days* (West 1978, Ercolani 2010) by offering a sustained analysis of key aspects of the poem and by using the commentary format self-reflexively to track different ancient reading practices.

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Lilah Grace Canevaro

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Classics and Ancient History

Durham University

2012

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Declaration and Statement of Copyright

This work has been submitted to Durham University in accordance with the regulations for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It is my own work, and none of it has previously been submitted to Durham University or any other university for a degree.

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. All information derived from this thesis must be acknowledged appropriately.

Acknowledgements

This thesis and its author are truly products of Durham University, as the Department of Classics and Ancient History has taken me right from BA to doctorate. The project has been shaped and reshaped through discussions with my supervisor Prof. Barbara Graziosi, who always managed to keep me motivated when there seemed to be too much Work and not enough Days. Prof. Johannes Haubold's impeccable eye for detail has fine-tuned the thesis to within an inch of its life (any remaining inaccuracies being all my own work). To both I am eternally grateful.

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Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to my new husband, Mirko. It would seem that the Durham Department of Classics Couples had its effect – perhaps it's something in the water. But whatever it was that brought us together, may this thesis mark the beginning of an incredible journey. I may have undertaken this project as a Fraser, but I am proud to finish it as a Canevaro.

Abbreviations

Abbreviations of the names of classical authors and works are those used in S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth (2003³) (eds.) *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Oxford.

Lfgre = Snell, B. (1st ed.) (1896–present) *Lexikon des Frühgriechischen Epos*, Göttingen.

Journal names are abbreviated according to the usage of *L'Année Philologique*.

The text used is that of West, M.L. (1978) *Hesiod Works and Days*, Oxford. The sigla referred to are also those of West's edition.

I provide below a list of the commentaries on, and editions of, the *Works and Days* to which I refer by author's surname only. When I refer to them in commentary notes without page numbers, the reference is *s.v.* or *ad loc.*

Ercolani = Ercolani, A. (2010) *Esiado Opere e Giorni: Introduzione, Traduzione e Commento*, Rome

Goettling = Goettling, C. (1843) *Hesiodi Carmina*, London

Mazon = Mazon, P. (1914) *Les Travaux et les Jours*, Paris

Paley = Paley, F.A. (1861) *The Epics of Hesiod*, London

Rzach = Rzach, A. (1958³) *Hesiodi Carmina*, Stuttgart

Sinclair = Sinclair, T.A. (1932) *Hesiod Works and Days*, London

Solmsen = Solmsen, F., Merkelbach, R., West, M.L. (1990³) *Hesiodi Theogonia, Opera et Dies, Scutum, Fragmenta Selecta*, Oxford

Twisten = Twisten, A. (1815) *Commentatio critica de Hesiodi carmine quod inscribitur Opera et Dies*, Kiel

Verdenius = Verdenius, W.J. (1985) *A Commentary on Hesiod Works and Days vv.1-382*,

Leiden

West = West, M.L. (1978) *Hesiod Works and Days*, Oxford

Wilamowitz = Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, U. von (1928) *Hesiodos' Erga*, Berlin

Introduction

This thesis comprises an introductory essay in which I establish the scope and focus of my analysis of Hesiod's *Works and Days* (Part 1), and an interpretative lemmatic commentary in which I follow specific themes throughout the poem (Part 2).

In Part 1a I explore the dual way in which the *Works and Days* was experienced in antiquity. The poem could be useful in two different, even if related ways: as a piece of extended instruction performed in its own right; and as a repository of lines that, when detached from their original context, could be applied to almost any scenario. I give examples of such applications, first of a particular passage to show the range of potential uses, then from various time periods to give an idea of the longevity of the *Works and Days*' perceived usefulness. I start from ancient practices of reading, then, in order to offer a fresh examination of the *Works and Days*. In this respect, my work can be seen as part of a wider shift towards approaching ancient literature through its reception.¹ Recent work on the reception of Hesiod in antiquity includes Irwin's 2005 *Solon and Early Greek Poetry*, Koning's 2010 *Hesiod: the Other Poet* and the 2010 *Plato and Hesiod* edited by Boys-Stones and Haubold. Which elements of Hesiod's poetry were used, by whom and for what purposes are questions that have now begun to be asked, partly under the influence of this new and far-reaching interest in reception, evident in classical scholarship

¹ For overviews of this shift see e.g. Martindale in Martindale/Thomas 2006:1-13, Leonard in Boys-Stones/Graziosi/Vasunia 2009:835-45, and Hardwick/Stray 2011:1-10. Clay 2011:15 'Attention has moved away from the creation and evolution of the poems to questions concerning their reception by an audience and the interaction of the poet and his listeners.'

more generally. What I aim to do in Part 1b is to investigate the role the poems themselves play in establishing their reception – an idea that is briefly explored by Haubold in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010, but which deserves further systematic attention.

In Part 1b, therefore, I take the text as my starting point, outlining the three factors determining its usefulness: selection, structure and formulation of material. I address an issue that has received little attention in the recent Hesiodic studies I have just quoted: how the potential for reuse interplays with a linear reading of the poem. Hesiod carefully balances detachability and applicability on the one hand, and relevance to his overarching didactic purpose on the other, allowing the poem to be treated in both a coherent, linear and a fragmented, excerpting way. The poem shapes, up to a point, its own reception.

In Part 1c I address Hesiod's didactic purpose. I argue that the poem's structure and implied modes of reading reflect the interplay between self-sufficiency, consistently foregrounded in the *Works and Days* as the Iron-Age ideal, and the very tradition of didactic literature. The fullest treatments to date of the theme of self-sufficiency in the *Works and Days* are Millett's 1984 'Hesiod and his world', and Marsilio's 2000 *Farming and Poetry in Hesiod's Works and Days*. The former looks at self-sufficiency in terms of the practical workings of the *oikos*, whilst the latter focuses on the parallel between the ideal of the self-sufficient farmer and Hesiod's ideal of poetic independence. Although I will necessarily touch on both of these aspects of self-sufficiency, particularly as they arise in the commentary, I am primarily concerned with an issue neither Millett nor Marsilio addresses: the

tension between self-sufficiency and didacticism, and Hesiod's negotiation of that tension.

Part 2 takes the form of a commentary on the whole of the *Works and Days*, a commentary that traces the issues presented in Part 1, and gives priority of treatment to them. Briefly put, I offer an interpretative commentary focusing on: the organisation of material; the way in which the *Works and Days* is divided into detachable yet tethered units; how these units might operate within and outside the poem; the Iron-Age condition and the Iron-Age ideal; how self-sufficiency is reconciled with the didactic thrust of the poem. I track the linear reading by tracing dynamic narrative threads, structuring devices and thematic elements which tie the poem together and give it its didactic and moral impetus. Simultaneously, I track the potential for excerpting: I show how the poem falls neatly into detachable units formulated in terms that are generally applicable. In both my strategies of reading I am concerned with the level of conscious crafting and consistent moral direction displayed, and how deliberate shaping interplays with the traditional nature of many of the elements.

Some readers may feel that the commentary form is not the most suited to the project I have just outlined. As de Jong asks, if one is to focus on specific issues, 'why choose the vehicle of a lemmatic commentary at all'?² Why not write a monograph? It seems to me that the structure of the *Works and Days* with its dual mechanism of isolation and tethering is so complex that a line-by-line analysis is the best way to make sense of the detachable units and transitions. An example-based

² De Jong in Gibson/Kraus 2002:62.

study of the kind I offer in Part 1b, to introduce my argument, is not sufficient because one would assume that behind such cherry-picking lie counter-examples; a full line-by-line study, by contrast, is exhaustive in terms of the poem's structural units and so can show how pervasive and consistent the relevant strategies are. A running commentary such as Eisenberger's (1973) on the *Odyssey* would not be preferable to a lemmatic commentary; it would perhaps facilitate the task of following the linear development of the poem, but ultimately it is the very process of lemmatisation which allows me to reflect on the poem's potential for excerpting.

By offering an analysis of the whole of the *Works and Days* in the form of a commentary, I treat the poem in much the same way as I argue it was experienced in antiquity and should be understood today. On the one hand, a commentary is by nature linear: one progresses through the poem from beginning to end, following narrative threads and tracing coherence. Fowler writes of excessive pursuit of this aspect of commentary-writing: 'the New Critical attempt to show how all elements of the text contribute to its overall unity – has been criticised as a modern imposition alien to ancient reading practice';³ however, I explore the unity of the text explicitly *in terms of* ancient reading practices. While tracing threads through the poem, the process of lemmatisation remains essentially selective; as a commentator I have to choose which words or phrases to comment on, which lines to group together, and can give a clear sense of the afterlife of specific passages. Kraus makes the criticism of commentaries that 'the process of choosing and elaborating on textual morsels furthers the decentering of the text that begins with the very existence of commentary, the direction of attention away from a unitary

³ Fowler in Most 1999:433.

‘original’;⁴ however, I argue that in the case of the *Works and Days* we have to get back not only to a *unitary* original but also to a *fragmented* original. Throughout my thesis I argue that the *Works and Days* was structured to be experienced in two ways, and I believe that the best way to argue this is by adopting a format which allows me to track these various modes of reading.

My commentary is selective and guided by the interpretative issues set out in Part 1. I have chosen to produce an interpretative commentary rather than one that seeks to address all aspects of the text, so that I may argue a sustained thesis. The perceived obligation to ‘coverage’ can prove distracting: what I offer here is a sustained thesis about a set of interrelated issues of composition and reception. Kraus notes: ‘Though the genre [of commentary] by its nature attracts *copia*, having an ingrained desire to fill a text’s margins to overflowing, when it does so the commentator may be criticized for drowning the text with information; criticism is especially loud when that information seems without guidance, lacking the paths through it that...reviewers often call for.’⁵ I have tried to steer a clear course, letting Part 1 dictate the focus of the commentary, while at the same time trying to offer a balanced reading. Although commentaries that aim at coverage fall under criticism, those that wilfully pursue only one line of argument can be frustrating too: I try to place my work between extremes, though tilting towards a thematic approach. This aim affects my choices, including the use of comparanda. Gibson describes a commentary which adduces too many parallels in these terms: ‘despite the fact that commentary is supposed to valorize concentration on the primary text, here critical

⁴ Kraus in Gibson/Kraus 2002:14.

⁵ Kraus in Gibson/Kraus 2002:5.

energy is in fact channeled away from the text.’⁶ An inclusive treatment of comparanda may answer more questions from readers, but there is, I hope, also value in a more selective approach.

The kind of commentary I offer is not, of course, without precedent or its own comparanda. I give here just a couple. De Jong proposes a narratological commentary of the *Odyssey* which privileges one (modern) methodology of reading.⁷ She evaluates the approach: ‘If a narratological commentary is by definition more restricted in its scope than a traditional, comprehensive commentary, it is at the same time fuller, in that it is interested in the narrative as a whole, which means the text as a whole, not only those words or passages which in the past have been deemed problematic. Even a relatively uneventful stretch of text may call for attention’.⁸ Similarly, my analysis of detachable units and their transitions persists even in stretches of text with little else of interest on which to comment. Dué and Ebbott’s 2010 book *Iliad 10 and the Poetics of Ambush: a multitext edition with essays and commentary* follows a similar format to mine: in their preface the authors specify that ‘it is designed to be an interpretative commentary’. They intend for their commentary ‘not to replace all others, but to explicate particular aspects of the language’. Similarly, my thesis is intended to complement the available commentaries on the *Works and Days* (West 1978, Ercolani 2010, and Scodel forthcoming) by offering a sustained analysis of key aspects of the poem, in particular the relationship between content and structure, and the seeds of reception within the text. Already in 1999 Fowler described electronic commentaries

⁶ Gibson in Gibson/Kraus 2002:353.

⁷ De Jong in Gibson/Kraus 2002.

⁸ De Jong in Gibson/Kraus 2002:56.

which 'offer the prospect of 'folding' comment so that not everything attached to a passage is shown at once', suggesting that 'readers may be offered pathways through the material'.⁹ This is not unlike what I hope to offer here: one layer of such a 'folding' commentary, a particular pathway through the poem.

I comment on West's 1978 text of the *Works and Days* rather than producing my own. I address textual issues in only two situations: first, where I disagree with West's text, in which cases it is necessary to reassess and re-establish what exactly I am commenting on. In such instances I give West's text in the lemma, to avoid confusion, then argue for an alternative reading. Secondly, even where I do not disagree with West, I comment on instances of particular relevance to my argument: for example variants which seem to have arisen because of a certain passage's active (independent) afterlife, or problems posited because of an inadequate understanding of the two ways of reading the poem, continuous and excerpting.

⁹ Fowler in Most 1999:427.

Part 1

a) Two Reading Traditions: Linear and Excerpting

τὴν μὲν τοι κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι
ῥηιδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει·
τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροισιν ἔθηκαν
ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν
καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὶ δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται,
ῥηιδίῃ δῆπαιτα πέλει, χαλεπὴ περ ἐοῦσα.

Misfortune can be achieved in abundance and
easily, for the way is smooth and she lives very nearby.
But in front of excellence the immortal gods have put
sweat. And the path to her is long and steep
and difficult at first. But when you come to the top,
then it is easy, although difficult.

Works and Days 287-92

Two roads diverged – one to κακότης, one to ἀρετή.¹⁰ This motif captured the imagination of the ancients. Despite the poem's title as it has come to us, it is not the calendar of agricultural works nor the Days which are the most quoted lines of the *Works and Days* in extant ancient Greek literature – nor even the most crowd-pleasing part, the myths – but this simple, applicable, proverbial passage.¹¹

It is quoted some twenty-six times in extant literature dating from 700BC to 300AD, and used to make a vast array of points.¹² It teaches morality: Theognis

¹⁰ For now I leave these terms untranslated – see below for a discussion of Hesiod's use of open-ended, applicable terms.

¹¹ Koning 2010:144n74 with commemogram p.11 shows the distribution of attestations of *Theog.* and *Op.* in antiquity, yielding the results that *Op.* was the more heavily quoted of the two and the most popular elements the proverbs. I am indebted to Koning's collation of the references.

¹² Some of the passages I refer to as quotations or citations here and elsewhere may seem somewhat loose: however, I choose to include them because of the strength of the Hesiod 'stamp' (see p.30-1). Components of *Op.* may have begun as traditional precepts, but after circulating as part of the poem they became Hesiodic wisdom. The strength of the epic poets' authority was such that it is doubtful whether an element of *Op.* could ever again be fully un-Hesiodic. Therefore even vague formulations of *Op.* proverbs are likely to be manipulations of, reactions to or at the very least influenced by Hesiod's poetry, rather than references to traditional wisdom circulating independently. For important work on early citation see esp. Irwin 2005.

treats κακότης and ἀρετή as abstract concepts of ethical import, and Plutarch marks these lines as describing ‘the best and godliest estate to which we can attain’.¹³ Philosophers draw on it: in Xenophon it is cited approvingly by Socrates, along with the consensus of athletic trainers and a verse of Epicharmus, to show that it takes commitment to achieve great things.¹⁴ It is also used for *meta*-comments on philosophy: Plutarch equates philosophical enlightenment with reaching the top after a hard climb, and Philo describes the road to virtue as hard and steep for the man who is ἄφρων.¹⁵ With it Plato and Lucian depict rhetoric as the ‘easy road’ to hasty success.¹⁶ According to Cicero and Galen it can highlight the value of education.¹⁷ Pindar employs it to compare the ‘trodden highway’ of Homer with Hesiod’s ‘deep path of skill’.¹⁸ It is even made into a myth: Heracles at a crossroads is faced with two women representing Ἀρετή and Κακότης, who give him advice on which life-path to follow.¹⁹ Furthermore, the range of uses to which the passage can be put is expanded by strategically omitting specific lines, thus shifting the proverb’s thrust. For example, Simonides omits 287-8 and 292, putting the focus on the difficulty of reaching ἀρετή.²⁰ Plutarch concentrates on 292, shifting the focus onto the reward at the end of the hard road.²¹ Most notably given his other more

¹³ Thgn. 1.1027-8; Plut. *Mor.*24E τῆς ἀρίστης καὶ θειοτάτης ἕξεως ἐν ἡμῖν.

¹⁴ Xen. *Mem.*2.1.20. On philosophy: further Lucian at *Bis Accusatus* 21, *Necyomantia* 4, *Hermot.*2 suggests that the lines were used by the Stoics to illustrate the difficult path of the *proficiens*, although we have no such references in the extant Stoic texts.

¹⁵ Plut. *Mor.*77D, Philo *De Ebrietate* 150. See also ΣEur. *Med.*296.

¹⁶ Pl. *Phdr.*272b, Lucian *Rhetorum Praeceptor* 3 and 7.

¹⁷ Cic. *Fam.*6.18.5; Galen 5.89.

¹⁸ Pind. *Pae.*7b11-20.

¹⁹ Prodicus DK B2 = Xen. *Mem.*2.1.21-34.

²⁰ Simon. fr.579.

²¹ Plut. *Mor.*77D.

faithful uses of the lines elsewhere,²² Plato at *Republic* 364c leaves out 292: now Hesiod is actually *encouraging* κακότης because it is too difficult to achieve ἀρετή.²³

The *Works and Days* was a poem originally experienced in performance.²⁴ It will have been recited by rhapsodes in its entirety: its 828 lines as transmitted to us are an easy performance, in comparison to the monumental Homeric epics. When recited from beginning to end, the poem had to flow: to be sufficiently coherent to be understood and to satisfy the audience. However, this is not the only mode of reading the poem, nor even the only way of performing it. The other is the sort of excerpting and reusing exercise exemplified by the 'Two Roads'.

Scenarios for quotation and reuse could be close to or far from the original context. It seems that the *Works and Days* continued to be used in an agricultural context even in the Middle Ages: Theodore Prodromos, a contemporary of Tzetzes in the twelfth century, pointed out the irony that grammarians, who could read Hesiod, did not need him; while tillers of the soil, who needed Hesiod, could not read him.²⁵ Some illustrators of Byzantine manuscripts of the *Works and Days* even added drawings of agricultural implements of their own time, to 'update' Hesiod's practical teachings so that they could still be used, or in any case seen as relevant to lived experience.²⁶ On the other hand, as early as the sixth and into the fifth century BC the *oikos*-centred teachings of the *Works and Days* were transferred to the *polis*

²² E.g. *Leg.* 718a.

²³ Koning in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010:97 argues that the lines were so well-known that the ancient reader is *meant* to notice the twist.

²⁴ Even if *Op.* was written down at an early stage, Hesiod's society was still primarily oral and so a written version, although perhaps used as an *aide-mémoire* for the rhapsode, would have had little or no circulation among the audience. On the oral nature of Greek society even after the advent of writing see Thomas 1992.

²⁵ Podesta 1947.

²⁶ Bryer 1986.

system.²⁷ Solon fr.4 simultaneously draws on the *Works and Days* and engages with contemporary *polis* politics.²⁸ Thucydides' description of *stasis* in a Greek *polis* is modelled on Hesiod's description of the Iron Race (174-201).²⁹ These examples show that the *Works and Days* was applicable to many different contexts and that its usefulness lasted long after institutional performances of the poem had become obsolete. They also show that it could cross boundaries into entirely different cultural contexts and social structures – and still be relevant.

By the fourth century Hesiod's poetry certainly featured in the school curriculum.³⁰ Again, in this pedagogical context it was seen not as a stagnant entity to be revered and maintained but as a tool:

διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι παῖδας ὄντας ἡμᾶς τὰς τῶν ποιητῶν γνώμας
ἐκμανθάνειν, ἵν' ἄνδρες ὄντες αὐταῖς χρώμεθα.

For it is for this reason, I think, that while we are children we commit to memory the thoughts of the poets, so that when we are men we might make use of them.

Aeschines *Against Ctesiphon* 135³¹

The 'thoughts' of the poets (τὰς τῶν ποιητῶν γνώμας) are presumably excerpts, and the function of excerpting is use (χρώμεθα).

²⁷ See Koning 2010:172-7. Millett 1984:90, on πόλις in *Op.* at 189, 222, 227, 240 and 269, notes that 'Hesiod has dealings with the πόλις only when things go wrong in his own village community (κῶμη, 639).'

²⁸ He draws mainly on the vignette of the Just and the Unjust cities, thus isolating the material most relevant to his own political system. See Irwin 2005.

²⁹ Thuc. 3.82-3. See Koning 2010:172-7.

³⁰ Ford in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010:146-7 argues that it was only *Op.*, not *Theog.*, which was taught in schools. He gives as evidence the observation by Plato's Protagoras that letter-teachers 'set before their students on their benches works of good poets and compel them to learn them by heart, in which there are many admonitions and detailed narratives, panegyrics and eulogies of the good men of the past' (Prt.325e-326a). On the later evidence of use of Hesiod in the school curriculum see Criore 2001:197-8.

³¹ For more on this speech see 240-3n.

The greatest concentration of evidence we have of the uses to which the *Works and Days* was put comes from classical Athens, where poetry was integrated into the discourse of both orators and philosophers.³² The dispute between Aeschines and Demosthenes over *Op.*763-4 can serve as an example of how such excerpts were used – and abused.³³ Aeschines in his speech *Against Timarchus* refers to this passage, flattering his audience by implying that they know poetry and enjoining them to trust his judgement because it is ratified by the poets.

ὁ δ' Ἡσίοδος καὶ διαρρήδην θεὸν αὐτὴν ἀποδείκνυσι, πάνυ σαφῶς
φράζων τοῖς βουλομένοις συνιέναι· λέγει γάρ·
φήμη δ' οὐτις πάνπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἦντινα λαοὶ
πολλοὶ φημίξωσι· θεὸς νύ τίς ἐστι καὶ αὐτή.
καὶ τούτων τῶν ποιημάτων τοὺς μὲν εὐσχημόνως βεβιωκότας εὐρήσετε
ἐπαινέτας ὄντας· πάντες γὰρ οἱ δημοσίᾳ φιλότιμοι παρὰ τῆς ἀγαθῆς
φήμης ἡγοῦνται τὴν δόξαν κομιεῖσθαι· οἷς δ' αἰσχρὸς ἐστὶν ὁ βίος, οὐ
τιμῶσι τὴν θεὸν ταύτην· κατήγορον γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀθάνατον ἔχειν
ἡγοῦνται.

Hesiod even expressly represents her as a goddess, speaking very clearly to those who are willing to understand, for he says: 'Rumour never dies out completely, that which many men rumour. She too is some goddess.' You will find that men whose lives have been decorous are admirers of these poems. For all men who are ambitious for public honour believe that it is from good rumour that fame will come to them. But men whose lives are shameful do not honour this god, for they believe they have her as their immortal accuser.

Aeschines *Against Timarchus* 129

Aeschines bases his argument on a distortion of the original Hesiodic passage; he treats Rumour as something to be worshipped, rather than feared, as Hesiod would

³² For the orators' quotation of the poets see esp. Perlman 1964, Ford in Goldhill/Osborne 1999.

³³ On this exchange see esp. Graziosi in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010. As Ford in Goldhill/Osborne 1999:231 notes: 'Such passages are a valuable reminder that Athenian literary culture was sustained not only by many public performances at state-sponsored festivals, but also by a series of more-or-less informal re-performances of poetry by citizens among each other'.

have it. By excerpting strategically, he manipulates the lines to suit his purpose and trusts that his audience's familiarity with Hesiod is not all that precise.

The misconstrual is noticed by Demosthenes, however, who picks Aeschines up on it:

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἔπη τοῖς δικασταῖς ἔλεγες, οὐδένα μάρτυρ' ἔχων ἐφ' οἷς
ἔκρινες τὸν ἄνθρωπον παρασχέσθαι·
 φήμη δ' οὐ τις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἦντινα λαοὶ
 πολλοὶ φημίξωσι· θεὸς νύ τις ἐστι καὶ αὕτη.
οὐκοῦν, Αἰσχίνη, καὶ σὲ πάντες οὔτοι χρήματ' ἐκ τῆς πρεσβείας φασὶν
εἰληφέναι, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ σοῦ δήπουθεν 'φήμη δ' οὐ τις πάμπαν
ἀπόλλυται, ἦντινα λαοὶ πολλοὶ φημίξωσιν.'

But you even quoted verses to the judges, because you had no witness to bring forward in support of the things for which you were prosecuting the man: 'Rumour never dies out completely, that which many men rumour. She too is some goddess.' And now, Aeschines, all these men say that you made money out of the embassy, so it counts against you too that 'Rumour never dies out completely, that which many men rumour.'

Demosthenes *On the False Embassy* 243

Demosthenes uses the very same Hesiodic lines to criticise Aeschines' behaviour. Aeschines in his own *On the Embassy* 144-5 then retorts with an even fuller excursus on the Hesiodic passage. He adds a further saying which sounds Hesiodic (but is not in our texts of Hesiod) to support his original interpretation: διαβολὴ δ' ἀδελφόν ἐστι συκοφαντία recalls Hesiod's genealogies. Again he seems to gauge his audience's acquaintance with poetry, assuming that they would recognise the Hesiodic tone and themes but not necessarily the lines to the letter.

The law courts thus become a veritable battleground of poetic exegesis, with orators displaying their knowledge of and mastery over epic excerpts whilst simultaneously increasing their circulation. The orators use epic to lend authority to

their arguments,³⁴ whether or not the passages in their original form actually support their position; quotations from the poets even stand in for legal evidence when such evidence is difficult to come by.³⁵ They use epic to establish a rapport with their audience based on a combination of flattery, deception, and testing the boundaries of shared cultural memory.³⁶

Furthermore, Plato reuses the same Hesiodic lines on the very same issues as Aeschines and Demosthenes. This gives us an insight into the dialogue between oratory and philosophy in classical Athens, showing how in tune Plato was with contemporary discourse.³⁷ Simultaneously, it suggests one of the long-term problems with quotation: that of recycling. As Ford notes: 'Quotations suggest that for readers of Plato's time Hesiod's *Works and Days* was usually encountered in pre-selected, often pre-interpreted excerpts.'³⁸ Isocrates has heard the sophists:

διαλέγοντο περί τε τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν καὶ τῆς Ἡσιόδου καὶ τῆς Ὀμήρου ποιήσεως, οὐδὲν μὲν παρ' αὐτῶν λέγοντες, τὰ δ' ἐκείνων ῥαψωδοῦντες καὶ τῶν πρότερον ἄλλοις τισὶν εἰρημένων τὰ χαριέστατα μνημονεύοντες.

they were discussing the poets, especially the poetry of Hesiod and Homer, saying nothing original about them, but merely chanting their verses and repeating from memory the cleverest things which certain others had said about them in the past.

Isocrates *Panathenaicus* 18

The practice of quotation, enacted over and over again, can ultimately stray so far from a linear reading that the whole is all but forgotten in favour of the excerpt.

In modern scholarship we have, I would argue, gone too far in the other direction. By contrast with ancient practices of quotation and re-use, modern

³⁴ Arist. *Rh.*1375b28 recommends that orators cite the poets as authoritative witnesses.

³⁵ Perlman 1964:167-8 on: Aeschin. 1.119-30 (Hesiod), 1.148-50 (Homer); Lycurg. 110.

³⁶ See M. Canevaro in Ceccarelli/Castagnoli (forthcoming).

³⁷ See Graziosi in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010:119 on Pl. *Leg.*838c8-d2.

³⁸ Ford in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010:152.

scholarship has been primarily interested in the unity and internal coherence of the *Works and Days*. This tendency is indicative of scholarly reading practices; reading from the first line to the last, classicists are preoccupied with the order of the lines, with a sense of unity. This is partly the result of modern concerns with authorship: in order to 'defend' Hesiodic authorship of the *Works and Days*, modern scholars often feel obliged to explicate the structure and find complete coherence. The debate over what was and was not 'Hesiodic' in the *Works and Days*, which we can see sparking off already in the Hesiodic scholia, began to rage in the 19th century as the discipline of textual criticism developed and critical editions of the Hesiodic *corpus* were produced. After ground-breaking works such as Wolf's 1795 *Prolegomena ad Homerum*, issues of the epics' authorship became pressing. Goettling, author of one of the earliest critical editions of the *Works and Days*, regarded the poem as a compilation of material produced by different hands.³⁹ His view was quickly contested by Colonel Mure in his *History of Greek Literature*,⁴⁰ who took up the opposing position that the *Works and Days* was composed by a single author, and the subsequent editor Van Lennep often contested Goettling's editorial decisions by arguing for the authenticity of the vulgate text.⁴¹ Paley, in his 1861 edition, adopted a more middle-of-the-road stance, taking great pains to investigate what was 'genuine' and what was not and concluding: 'The pure metal of the true epic age may still exist, though it has suffered alloy in passing through many crucibles in the hands of many different workmen.'

³⁹ Goettling 1843.

⁴⁰ vol ii. p.395.

⁴¹ Van Lennep 1847.

In recent decades this defence of the *Works and Days* has progressed to another level, with scholars pinpointing narrative threads that run through the poem. For example, Beye 1972 picks out inexorability as the poem's focus, whilst Jones 1984 posits ὥραϊος and μέτρον as words that encapsulate the poem's themes. Hamilton 1989 argues that the poem is defined by the two Erides, Nelson 1998 the dispensation of Zeus. Lardinois 1998 traces through the *Works and Days* the theme of the Iron-Age man having to live day-to-day, with the aim of rescuing the Days from brutal editing.⁴² Blümer 2001 takes as his critical principle only what the audience could comprehend during a performance, taking the text as purely linear. Most notable in terms of tracing continuity is the work of Jenny Strauss Clay, who pinpoints a gradual spatial and temporal narrowing of focus. The *Works and Days* moves from myths about the origins and nature of the whole of mankind (42-201), through just and unjust cities (225-47), the annual farming activity of the *oikos* (383-617) and familial concerns like marriage (695-705), to such details as bodily functions (e.g. 727). The seasons of the Calendar (383-617) narrow to Days (765-828) and even to parts of a day (810, 821), and the sweeping historical vision of the Myth of the Races narrows to ominous readings of the future (181-201) and consequences of specific inauspicious actions. She also follows a second narrative thread, the education of Perses: he must be corrected morally (213 ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δ' ἄκουε δίκης μηδ' ὕβριν ὀφελλε) before he can be advised practically (299, 397 ἐργάζεσθαι, Πέρση) and this before he can come to realise some universal truths (765-828 the Days).⁴³

⁴² The entire Days section was omitted by Wilamowitz 1928 and bracketed by Solmsen 1990.

⁴³ Both threads are traced in Clay 2003. She goes further in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009, tracing through *Op.* a double 'ascent-descent' pattern.

These attempts to find continuity are well founded. There are indeed narrative threads tying the poem together, and didactic strategies which hold true from beginning to end. However, are we justified in placing quite so much emphasis on coherence at the expense of all else when ancient audiences could both listen to a recitation of the whole poem at a festival or rhapsodic competition *and* extract, reshuffle, tailor and even radically distort meaning for their own purposes? What kind of balance is to be struck between quotability and unity in our own reading? Modern linear interpretations alone never solve all the problems: as Llewellyn Morgan notes in his review of Nelson 1998, 'the impulse to recuperate Hesiod...is a sound and promising one...[but] Hesiod will undoubtedly remain some way short of flawless in most readers' eyes'. The linear reading only goes so far; for us not only to absolve Hesiod of his flaws but to stop thinking in terms of perceived flaws of unity altogether, we need to draw on a second reading tradition in conjunction with the first. In 1465 the Renaissance humanists Lorenzo Guidetti and Buonaccorso Massari engaged in a battle of scholarly method: whilst the former championed the *utility* of ancient texts, regarding them as pedagogical tools to produce 'well-behaved young men', the latter saw the purpose of scholarship as scientific.⁴⁴ This is the kind of interplay of modes of reading which, I argue, can go some way towards a more nuanced understanding of the *Works and Days*.

⁴⁴ Grafton 1991:26 'Guidetti views his texts as classics, as ideal and unproblematic objects for imitation in the present. Massari views his texts as artefacts, as human and difficult products of an irrecoverable past.'

b) Two Structuring Strategies: Detaching and Tethering

Recent studies of Hesiodic reception in antiquity have begun to change the trajectory of Hesiodic scholarship by paying more attention to the excerpting mode of reading the poems: which elements were used, by whom and for what purposes are questions that are now being asked. However, still underplayed in such studies are the role the text itself plays in its use,⁴⁵ and the way in which use of excerpts from Hesiod's poems operates alongside appreciation of the whole. For example Koning 2010, by taking the reception of Hesiod as his starting point, shows how reception influences the meaning of the text but pays little attention to how or to what extent the text governs its own reception. The idea of the 'catch-word factor' is flagged up,⁴⁶ but Koning does not develop it as a strategy which the text uses to shape its reception, nor as a strategy used by Hesiod to tap the archive of popular wisdom available to him and his audience, shaping it to fit his project. Starting with the text may at times have allowed Koning to produce a more nuanced analysis: for example consideration of how the *Certamen* tradition was, to a certain extent, invited by the *Works and Days* itself may have strengthened his discussion of the tradition,⁴⁷ and consideration of the relative chronology of the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days* as a Hesiodic construct would mean that interpreting the two kinds of Eris in the *Works and Days* as a 'correction' of the *Theogony* need not be dismissed as an 'insensitive reading'.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Haubold in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010 is a notable and welcome exception.

⁴⁶ Koning 2010:144-8.

⁴⁷ Koning 2010:245-66.

⁴⁸ Koning 2010:276-7.

I start from the poem, outlining the processes used by Hesiod to make the *Works and Days* both useful and coherent, facilitating both a linear and a fragmentary reading. I focus not on the reception of the *Works and Days*, but on the seeds of reception embedded in the *Works and Days* itself. I argue that Hesiod makes the *Works and Days* useful first by selecting material of either daily relevance or universal importance; second by structuring this material so that it can be detached from its context; and third by formulating the material in an open way so that, when detached, its potential for applicability increases exponentially. At the same time he maintains control and purpose throughout the *Works and Days* and, to a certain extent, in its reception, by selecting only material relevant to his overarching themes and tethering the self-contained units to their context. Hesiod carefully balances detachability and applicability on the one hand, and relevance to his didactic purpose on the other, allowing the poem to be treated in both a coherent linear and fragmented excerpting way. Where previous scholars have seen in the *Works and Days* a half-digested collection of inherited sayings, I see a text that both originates from and contributes to a tradition of usefulness.

Mine may be seen as a postmodernist approach, particularly inasmuch as I argue that multiple meanings and modes of reading are implicit in the text. However, I do not argue that *all* meanings are latent in the text. Rather, I maintain that the text and the reception it engenders are governed by authorial crafting and by moral intent. First, the level of coherence in the poem – the fact that we can both follow it from beginning to end in a linear way and use excerpts which are nevertheless united through overarching didactic themes – suggests a conscious

crafting of material and a consistent didactic strategy.⁴⁹ I am not convinced that all we find in the *Works and Days* can be attributed to an impersonal oral tradition that developed over centuries: I do not think that models of circumstantial development, such as Lamberton's 'string of beads' or West's idea that Hesiod's themes evolved during the course of a recitation, can adequately account for the level of structural design. Like Clay, I am interested in 'the self-conscious and, yes, rhetorical, exploitation of such verbal devices and persuasive ploys that demonstrate his [Hesiod's] awareness that one must speak differently to different people',⁵⁰ and one cannot think in terms of poetical self-consciousness and self-awareness without positing an authorial 'self' to begin with.

The *Works and Days* may be the product of a tradition – of gnomic maxims, of precepts, of admonitory stories, of wisdom literature – but this does not mean that every element of the poem stems directly from that tradition and that the elements came together as a natural progression of the tradition itself. As Lardinois has persuasively argued, Greek proverbial expressions functioned much like a hexameter line in an epic performance: stemming from a thematic core and made up of traditional formulae, they could be simultaneously both traditional and newly created.⁵¹ The arrangement of the *Works and Days* as we now have it seems the work of one person with a strong authorial voice and moral direction – or at least one didactic strategy maintained so as to appear to be the work of one person. I add this second scenario because, although I argue that all the poem's elements are Hesiodic

⁴⁹ Scholars arguing for an overarching structure to *Op.* include: Hamilton 1989, Clay 2003. On the other side of the debate: West 1978:43, Lamberton 1988:22, Ercolani.

⁵⁰ Clay in Worthington 2007:453.

⁵¹ Lardinois in Watson 2005:93-108.

i.e. 'Hesiod-like', I do not set out to prove that they are all Hesiod's – that is to say, there is the possibility that later poets added to an original core, but nevertheless these additions all fit because of the strong didactic thrust of the poem. Each element, whether traditional or not (and whether original or not), is selected with regard to the poem's overarching themes and tethered either by a contextualising line or by reference to a character or *topos* of the *Works and Days* (see examples below). The self-correction and clarification within the poem make sure, in a linear reading, that the audience take nothing too far but are kept on the right track.⁵² In this thesis, when I use the name Hesiod it is to this consistent driving force behind the text that I refer.⁵³

Whether this authorial force corresponds to the persona of Hesiod as portrayed in the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days* is a question I cannot hope to answer. Any search for the 'real' Hesiod seems futile, and so his persona is best seen in terms of its function within the poem: Beall 2004:6 rightly argues that 'the personalities cited in the poem – the poet himself as participant, his brother, and his father serve literary purposes whether or not they have a basis in actual biography (which if so is unprovable), and that it is such purposes that are relevant in any study of the work qua literature'.⁵⁴ Since we only have the narrator's word to go on, without too much conjecture the discussion is confined to the *Works and Days*' 'reality effect':⁵⁵ we should consider Hesiod, Perses, their father and the kings in

⁵² See e.g. 584n.

⁵³ When on the other hand I use Hesiod to refer to the persona within the poem, it should be clear from the context.

⁵⁴ Following Griffith 1983.

⁵⁵ Term from Barthes 1989:139. On autobiography and reality in Hesiod see further Nagy in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:273.

terms of whether the text invites us to think of them as real or as transparent fiction and, more importantly, what impact this has on our understanding of the poem. The sheer number of biographical readings of the *Works and Days* suggests that the poem's reality effect is strong, with much 20th-century scholarship devoted to reconstructing the trial setting.⁵⁶ Certainly the setting and characters are convincing, whether genuine or not: no suspension of disbelief required. Hesiod as narrator is present throughout the poem, in the autobiographical details and didactic persona.⁵⁷ This strong voice of a single narrator has an impact on the ways in which the poem was experienced. First, it holds together a linear reading with a single hand. Second, it gives the Hesiod 'stamp' to excerpts of the poem as they are used: components of the *Works and Days* may have begun as traditional precepts, but after circulating as part of the poem they become Hesiodic wisdom and as such acquire the authority associated with the poet.⁵⁸

This Hesiodic stamp ensures that the poem's moral direction extends also into uses of excerpts from the poem. Hesiod's teachings are formulated in an open and applicable way so that they can be reused in various circumstances, but because they were once part of Hesiod's project and retain something of his poetic authority even when detached, they are not open to *all* meanings. How we read is never morally indifferent. Hesiod wants everyone to learn something from his poem, but

⁵⁶ E.g. Wade-Gery 1949, Forbes 1950, van Groningen 1957, Gagarin 1974b.

⁵⁷ In contrast to the generally inconspicuous Homeric narrator: the difference was noted already in antiquity, e.g. *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi* 1-17 (Allen), Strabo 13.3.6, Vell. Pat. 1.7.1. Dué/Ebbott 2010 emphasise the need for an approach that would account for narrative peculiarities with recourse to oral-traditional theory rather than critics' presuppositions about a creative genius responsible for the Homeric poems; I argue that the autobiographical elements in *Op.* invite us to take a rather different stance.

⁵⁸ See 106-201n., 111-20n., 202n., 265-6n., 361-7n., 370-2n.

his message is not indeterminate; he wants them to learn to be self-sufficient, hard-working and just, irrespective of status, condition or situation. There are, of course, instances where these teachings were used in a way which undermined their Hesiodic moral context. For example, in Part 1a I have shown how the range of potential meanings of the two roads proverb could be expanded by omitting strategic lines and thus distorting the moral of the passage. But this sort of reception can hardly be attributed to Hesiod; rather, in making his teachings detachable and applicable he ran the risk of making them *too* applicable. The overarching didactic strategy of the poem shaped its reception in that it made it very usable, but one cannot realistically say that it shaped *all* further uses. The coherence and consistent moral direction of the *Works and Days* show that Hesiod had a clear idea of what he wanted his poem to be used for, and that misuses were not in the plan but were something of a side-effect. The fact that Hesiod designed his poem to be detachable, applicable and usable made it the bestseller it became, with the moral direction largely (if not universally) perpetuated in reception by association with the author.

To make his teachings detachable, Hesiod makes them self-contained: grammatically and logically each unit can operate alone. The structure encourages the detaching of material. But what does one do with it when it has been detached? What is it about Hesiod's teachings that makes them not only detachable, but applicable? The answer is twofold: it is both the selection and the formulation of the material which makes it truly useful. First, many of *Works and Days*' precepts address everyday activities and habits (such as 339, on making offerings before

going to bed; 727-32 and 757-9, on urinating) or matters of universal importance (such as 342-52 how to treat one's neighbours), and this choice of useful topics makes the didactic units readily transferable to other contexts. Second, the use of open language allows the excerpts to be applied to multiple scenarios, and the often catchy formulations give certain passages a mnemonic quality. On the other hand, however, for the purposes of the poem, for the coherence of a linear reading, Hesiod tethers these detachable units of open teachings to the context of his own instruction.

To give an idea of how this strategy of detachability, applicability and tethering functions in practice, I give some examples:

- 1) καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων,
καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ.

Potter vies with potter and builder, builder;
beggar envies beggar and singer, singer.

Works and Days 25-6

These lines form a detachable priamel exemplifying the effects of Good Strife. The lines are self-contained and were excerpted as such: for example they are used by Socrates in Plato's *Lysis* (215c-d). Interestingly, Plato changes the sequence, putting the singers in place of the builders. As Boys-Stones shows, the misquotation is deliberate rather than mechanically based on a textual variant.⁵⁹ By leaving the potters at the beginning Plato anchors the quotation, justifying his appropriation of the priamel's poetic authority. He can then go on to play with the verses to fit his purpose. In fact, his immediate purpose is to make the point that nothing is so hostile to like as like: he uses Hesiod's verses on Good Strife to describe hostility

⁵⁹ Boys-Stones in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010:47-8.

(which Hesiod would put in the category of Bad Strife). This potential even for an application diametrically opposed to the original context is inherent to the lines themselves: it has been noted that κότος and φθόνος are not necessarily in the spirit of the Good Eris.⁶⁰ The ostensible polarity does not stand up to scrutiny. The connection with Good Eris is therefore not built into the priamel itself but is established only by its context: 24 ἀγαθὴ δ' Ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσιν. The ambiguity of the three detached lines increases the range of possible interpretations, the preceding line tethers its meaning for Hesiod's purposes. Furthermore, the second line contextualises the first: whilst 25 seems to offer random examples of craftsmen, 26 refers to activities of particular relevance to the *Works and Days* – Perses is repeatedly warned off begging (394-404, 453-4), and Hesiod himself is a singer.

- 2) νῦν δ' αἶνον βασιλεῦς' ἐρέω, φρονέουσιν καὶ αὐτοῖς.
 ὦδ' ἰρηξ προσέειπεν ἀηδόνα ποικιλόδειρον,
 ὕψι μάλ' ἐν νεφέεσσι φέρων, ὀνύχεσσι μεμαρπώς·
 ἢ δ' ἐλεόν, γναμπτοῖσι πεπαρμένη ἀμφ' ὀνύχεσσιν,
 μύρετο· τὴν δ' ὅ γ' ἐπικρατέως πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπεν·
 “δαίμονιη, τί λέληκας; ἔχει νύ σε πολλὸν ἀρείων·
 τῇ δ' εἷς ἡ σ' ἂν ἐγὼ περ ἄγω καὶ ἀοιδὸν ἐοῦσαν·
 δεῖπνον δ' αἶ κ' ἐθέλω ποιήσομαι ἢ ἐμεθήσω.
 ἄφρων δ' ὅς κ' ἐθέλη πρὸς κρείσσονας ἀντιφερίζειν·
 νίκης τε στέρεται πρὸς τ' αἰσχεσιν ἄλγεα πάσχει.”
 ὡς ἔφατ' ὠκυπέτης ἰρηξ, ταυυσίπτερος ὄρνις.

Now I will tell a fable to the kings, and they consider for themselves.
 Thus the hawk addressed the dapple-necked nightingale,
 carrying her high in the clouds, gripping her with his claws.
 And she wept piteously, pierced by the curved claws.
 He said to her commandingly,
 “Wretch, why are you crying out? One much better than you has you now.
 You will go wherever I shall carry you, even if you are a singer;
 I shall make you my dinner if I wish, or I shall let you go.
 Foolish is he who would wish to contend against the stronger;

⁶⁰ West *ad loc.*, Marsilio 2000:53, Pucci 1977:131, Gagarin in Griffith/Mastrorade 1990:174, Thalmann 2004:378.

he is deprived of the victory and suffers pains in addition to his shames.”
So spoke the swift-flying hawk, the long-winged bird.

Works and Days 202-12

The fable is tethered to the poem first by suggestions of links with particular characters, the most obvious being 208 ἀοιδόν:⁶¹ as with the previous example, Hesiod-as-singer provides contextualisation. It is tethered, secondly, by its ensuing explications: the immediate moral at 213 ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δ' ἄκουε Δίκης, μηδ' ὕβριν ὀφελλε, and the delayed 'answer' 276-80 that Justice is different for animals and for men. However, the story is developed in such a way so as to be widely applicable, and indeed the gap between the fable proper and its supposed resolution gives the audience time to formulate their own answers, decoding the fable for themselves, before they are presented with this explanation about animal and human justice.

The fable has been criticised since antiquity as ambiguous and inconsistent. The charge has been that if one tries to map the story onto the predicament of one particular character or situation in the *Works and Days* – whether the 'gift-guzzling' kings, the foolish brother Perses, or Hesiod himself – it does not quite work.⁶² As a consequence, the tendency in scholarship has been to choose one interpretation and criticise everything that does not fit with it – or, failing that, to emend the text in order to *make* it consistently applicable. However, if we understand the fable as part of Hesiod's open and wide-reaching didactic strategy, then it becomes clear that the ambiguities and inconsistencies actually enable multiple identifications and thus allow Hesiod to warn multiple addressees simultaneously. The fable cannot be

⁶¹ See further notes on 203 ἀηδόνα and ποικιλόδειρον. For other possible embedded identifications see 202-12n.

⁶² For an overview of the various positions in scholarship and the problems with them see 202-12n.

expected to map exactly onto one particular situation: if it did so, its applicability would be reduced. Furthermore, potential identifications do not stop at the level of the poem but can be detached and applied by the audience: whether you are a hawk or a nightingale, as it were, you must consider the implications of the story for yourself, decode it, and get advice. To offer just a few general examples: the weak, poor or disempowered man might strive for better things, recognising the nightingale's suffering and envying the hawk's position of strength. The social discontent might be enraged by the injustice done to the weaker nightingale; corrupt leaders might regret abusing their position of strength like the hawk. One man might even find advice on both sides: the hubristic, arrogant or power-hungry man might ally himself with the nightingale, and therefore be checked in his behaviour by the fate of one who tried to rise too high; he might, on the other hand, see in himself a bit of hawk, in which case he could be made aware of his behaviour by seeing it so starkly represented, or he could even extrapolate from the story something along the lines that for every hawk terrorising a nightingale, there is bound to be an eagle.

3) παθὼν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνων

The fool learns by suffering.

Works and Days 218

This is an example of one of the *Works and Days*' shortest detachable units – it does not even make up a full hexameter line. It seems to be a traditional gnomic maxim, with a striking Homeric parallel: ῥεχθὲν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνων, at *Il.*17.32 and 20.198. In both of these Iliadic cases the phrase is preceded by πρὶν τι κακὸν παθεῖν: suffering is flagged up as a warning prior to the proverb. Hesiod puts the Iron-Age

Works and Days stamp on it, however, by changing the order: he ‘starts from the assumption that suffering will take place’.⁶³ The maxim therefore expresses an Iron-Age truth, and as such constitutes a generally applicable trope. However, the use of the term νήπιος tethers it to the poem, making it particularly relevant to Hesiod’s explicit addressees: the kings have been described as νήπιοι at 40 and Perses will be νήπιος at 286, 397 and 633.

- 4) οὔτος μὲν πανάριστος, ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσει,
 φρασσάμενος, τὰ κ’ ἔπειτα καὶ ἐς τέλος ἦσιν ἀμείνω·
 ἐσθλὸς δ’ αὖ καὶ κείνος, ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται·
 ὃς δέ κε μήτ’ αὐτὸς νοέη μήτ’ ἄλλου ἀκούων
 ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὃ δ’ αὖτ’ ἀχρήσιος ἀνήρ.

That man is altogether the best, he who thinks of everything himself,
 considering the things which are then better in the end.
 He too is good, who listens to one who speaks well.
 But he who does not think nor listening to another
 considers in his heart, this man is useless.

Works and Days 293-7

This proverb encapsulates essential didactic ideas found elsewhere in the *Works and Days* such as: thinking for oneself; planning for the long-term; the authority of a good speaker; the need to take advice to heart. Line 294 has been bracketed by some editors and was omitted in some quotations of the lines.⁶⁴ West *ad loc.* comments that the line ‘seemed to add little, indeed it limited the applicability of the gnome’: it is true that the line seems to intrude into a neat ascending tricolon. In light of Hesiod’s tethering strategy elsewhere, I would suggest that we may be dealing with a traditional proverb consisting only of 293 and 295-7, to which Hesiod then added 294 to extend the principle into the long term. The lines, then, both create a link

⁶³ Verdenius 1985 *ad loc.*

⁶⁴ See 294n.

between the precepts on work and justice (ἐς τέλος 294 and 218), and pave the way for the agricultural calendar with its focus on seasonality and the right time.

Within the context of the poem, these lines are first and foremost a didactic tool, giving the audience two ideals to strive for as well as a negative paradigm to be avoided. They are further tethered to the context by the characters in the poem who so clearly match these paradigms: ἀχρήιος is used again at 403 of the man who begs, and at 396 it is explicitly said that Perses was just such a man, so it seems likely that here too we are supposed to supply Perses as the ἀχρήιος ἀνὴρ (at least prior to Hesiod's teachings). Hesiod is both ἐσθλός in that he listens to the advice of the Muses,⁶⁵ and πανάριστος in that he is in didactic control of the poem.

However, that πανάριστος, ἐσθλός and ἀχρήιος are such open and applicable terms means that the lines could also function outside the context of the poem. For example, Aristotle quotes these lines to depict Hesiod as the authority on how to begin an enquiry or treatise.⁶⁶ Zeno takes a few more liberties, reversing the line order and therefore the hierarchy:

φασὶ δὲ καὶ - τοὺς Ἡσιόδου στίχους μεταγράφειν οὕτω
κεῖνος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται,
ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ καὶ κεῖνος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ.

So they say – transcribing the lines of Hesiod thus:

That man is altogether best, who listens to one who speaks well,
He too is good, who thinks of everything himself.

Zeno Stoicorum veterum fragmenta 1.5.10-12⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Noted by Marsilio 2000:4 n38. On Hesiod and the Muses see p.46-7 and 1-10n.

⁶⁶ *Eth. Nic.*1095b8-13.

⁶⁷ Proclus *ad Op.*291 quotes Zeno's quotation, adding: τῇ εὐπειθείᾳ τὰ πρωτεῖα διδούς, τῇ φρονήσει δὲ τὰ δευτερεῖα.

- 5) οἶκον μὲν πρώτιστα γυναῖκά τε βοῦν τ' ἀροτῆρα,
κτητήν, οὐ γαμετήν, ἥτις καὶ βουσὶν ἔποιτο.

Get first of all a house and a woman, an ox and a plough;
a hired woman, not a wedded one, who might follow the oxen.

Works and Days 405-6

The first of these two lines sets out the means of production, whilst the second expands upon one: the woman. With the first line Hesiod supplies a self-contained maxim including the generally applicable term γυναῖκα. This term leaves the line open and transferable: for the young farmer in charge of his own estate this would be a servant woman; for a man of marriageable age, a wife.⁶⁸ The second line then tethers 405 to the context, much like the earlier example 25-6: Hesiod is just beginning his Calendar, and is outlining what a farmer must do to begin his work, so at this point he recommends not a wife but a servant woman. Many scholars take issue with these lines, and get rid of 406.⁶⁹ This is primarily because Aristotle twice quotes 405, both times reading γυναῖκα as 'wife' therefore (it is argued) indicating that he did not know of 406. However, just as likely is that the meaning 'wife' suited Aristotle's purposes and so he excerpted accordingly.

- 6) εὐθημοσύνη γὰρ ἀρίστη
θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποις, κακοθημοσύνη δὲ κακίστη.

Good order is best
for mortal men, but bad order is worst.

Works and Days 471-2

In its context within the poem this maxim acts as a summary of the ploughing instructions given so far, emphasising that the tasks must be done in 'good order' i.e. in the right way at the right time. However, it is comprised almost entirely of

⁶⁸ At 695-7 Hesiod specifies around 30.

⁶⁹ See 405-6n.

applicable terms – εὐθημοσύνη, ἀρίστη, κακοθημοσύνη, κακίστη – which allow the maxim to be applied just as well in other contexts in which order is to be promoted. Hesiod even coined a term, the *hapax* κακοθημοσύνη, to allow for a neat antithesis which renders the parallel lines even more appealing as a detachable unit.

Let us now return to the passage with which we started: 287-92, the two roads (p.16-18). The number of times the passage is attested in extant literature and the range of uses to which it was put testify to its detachability and applicability. We can now see how exactly the text itself actively sustains such a reception. As with the previous example, this proverb is formulated in open terms: 287 κακότης can be used of ‘badness’, whether of moral character (baseness, cowardice), of behaviour (wickedness, vice), or of condition (distress, misery, misfortune); similarly, 289 ἀρετή denotes ‘goodness’ or ‘excellence’ of any kind. There is no indication within the proverb itself as to how we are supposed to construe these generally applicable terms (or, indeed, whether we are to take them as personifications as Most 2006 does, or not, as West). It is only the work-related context which imposes upon the terms meanings such as ‘bad crops’ and ‘good harvest’ or ‘failure’ and ‘prosperity’; when detached from the context their potential increases. Furthermore, this proverb had the added charm of what Koning terms the ‘catch-word factor’.⁷⁰ Not only is ἀρετή an open term which can be applied to multiple contexts, but it also became a point of discourse for the Greeks.⁷¹ ἀρετή

⁷⁰ Koning 2010:144-8.

⁷¹ See e.g. Pl. *Meno*.

sparked particular interest in the passage and went on to influence its use, with the meaning of ἀρετή being often discussed *through* Hesiod's lines.⁷²

I hope that these examples suffice to give an idea of how Hesiod's two structuring strategies function in the *Works and Days*, and how they govern the two ways of reading the poem. On the one hand, nuggets of wisdom are made self-contained and readily detachable, formulated in open language which can be widely applied (κακότης and ἀρετή, ἐυθημοσύνη and κακοθημοσύνη). This detachability encourages excerpting and use. On the other hand, they are tethered to the poem either by the particular relevance of terms they contain to characters or themes of the *Works and Days* (such as the singer in 26 and 208, or the fool at 218), or by contextualising lines which precede or follow the unit (such as Good Eris at 24, or the morals of the fable at 213 and 276-80). This tethering facilitates a linear reading; a continuous performance. To show that these strategies continue throughout the poem, I have chosen examples from various points; to show how Hesiod uses them regardless of narrative form, I have given diverse examples from proverbs, a fable, a priamel and a one-liner – but of course a comprehensive claim can only be made by considering the poem in its entirety, which is what I do in Part 2.

⁷² E.g. Tyrtaeus fr. 12.43-4 West, Simon. fr.579 Page: both are concerned with a more 'manly' kind of ἀρετή than that of farming.

c) Two Ideals: Self-Sufficiency and Didacticism

The *Works and Days* was meant to be used: Hesiod's teachings are left open so that they can be applied to multiple scenarios. It was also meant to be enjoyed in its entirety: the detachable elements are tethered to their context for the purpose of the poem. However, Hesiod-as-teacher gives remarkably little advice on how to negotiate these two modes of reading. He neither guides the audience by the hand through a linear reading (in fact, some of the transitions between units are tenuous at best), nor tells them how exactly to excerpt and reuse. The seeds of reception are there in the poem's structure and formulation, but a fully worked out schema of usage is not. The diverse elements of the *Works and Days* have a meaning for everyone – but you have to look for it. I argue that this reflects both the Iron-Age human condition (the need to work) and the Iron-Age ideal (self-sufficiency).

κρύψαντες γὰρ ἔχουσι θεοὶ βίον ἀνθρώποισιν·
ῥηιδίως γὰρ κεν καὶ ἐπ' ἡματι ἐργάσσαιο
ὥστε σε κεῖς ἐνιαυτὸν ἔχειν καὶ ἀεργὸν ἔοντα·

For having hidden nourishment the gods keep it from men.
For easily you would have worked even in one day
enough that you would have had sufficient for a year though being idle.

Works and Days 42-4

The Iron-Age human condition is characterised by the need to work. In contrast with the pre-Pandora age (and the Golden Age: καρπὸν δ' ἔφερε ζεῖδωρος ἄρουρα | αὐτομάτη πολλόν τε καὶ ἄφθονον· 117-18), in the Iron Age the means of life are hidden. The Iron Race must always work for a living (176-7 οὐδέ ποτ' ἡμαρ | παύσσονται καμάτου καὶ οἰζύος οὐδέ τι νύκτωρ) – much as the audience must work to decode and use Hesiod's teachings. As Hamilton 1989:49 notes on the structure of the *Works and Days*, 'the parts are *too* disorderly'. The detachable

elements are arranged in such a way that even the act of reading (or listening to) the poem constitutes a lesson in Iron-Age living.

The ideal way of managing the Iron-Age condition is through self-sufficiency. The farmer should be resourceful: weaving (538), sewing (544), creating a plough seemingly single-handedly (423-36). He should focus on his own *oikos* as his first priority (405 οἶκον μὲν πρῶτιστα) and distrust the outside world (365 οἴκοι βέλτερον εἶναι, ἐπεὶ βλαβερόν τὸ θύρηφιν). If help must be called for, it should be in the form of a 40-year-old farmhand who will concentrate on his task rather than being distracted by companions (443). Women are regarded with suspicion especially as they pose a threat to production (373-5). The ideal family model is tight-knit; one should choose for a wife a girl who lives nearby (700 ἥτις σέθεν ἐγγύθι ναίει) and there should be only one heir so that the *oikos* will not be diminished by division (376).⁷³ The *communis opinio* among economic historians since the seminal work of M. I. Finley (1973) has been that self-sufficiency characterised the workings of the Greek economy, and that exchanges never grew to a market dimension.⁷⁴ This view has been challenged in recent years: it has been noted that the volume of trade and the differentiation of work in the ancient city points to a much more developed economic system than Finley assumed.⁷⁵ Hints of this in the *Works and Days* can be found in the existence of professionals (25-6),⁷⁶ of trade and profit (631-2): but the poetic thrust is towards self-sufficiency.

⁷³ Although see 379-80n. for an alternative scenario.

⁷⁴ See e.g. Austin/Vidal-Naquet 1977, Garnsey/Hopkins/Whittaker 1983, Millett 1991.

⁷⁵ See e.g. Bresson 2000 (most notably p.109-30), Harris in Cartledge/Cohen/Foxhall 2002:67-99, Horden/Purcell 2000 (in particular p.112-22), and Harris/Woolmer/Lewis (forthcoming).

⁷⁶ E.g. Starr 1977:193 interprets these lines as a sign of 'the development of a more complicated economic structure than the world had ever seen', i.e. economic growth. Millett

The fact that self-sufficiency is consistently foregrounded as the ideal creates a tension with the didactic thrust of the poem, as teaching inevitably involves a relationship of exchange. I argue that Hesiod negotiates this tension through his didactic method which advocates autonomy, thinking for oneself, working for one's lesson and decoding. This tension between depending on a teacher and striving for self-sufficiency is to a certain extent built into the widespread and long-established genre of wisdom literature to which the *Works and Days* belongs, in that all teachers must want their pupils to grow up and take charge of their own affairs. For example, the epilogue to the Egyptian *Instructions of Ptahhotep* includes a lecture on the need to listen to teachings, and the rewards that the listener will reap but the failure set for the 'fool' who refuses to listen.⁷⁷ But Hesiod's unique position lies in his particular Iron-Age preoccupations; he reinterprets the relationship between teaching and learning in light of his own thematic concern with self-sufficiency in the Iron Age.

Hesiod begins to address the problem in his very choice of a brother as primary didactic addressee. With this choice he adapts traditional didactic models to fit what he wants to teach. Hesiod's address to rulers (202 νῦν δ' αἰῶνος βασιλεῦσιν ἐρέω) is common to extant didactic poetry from the ancient Mediterranean and Near East;⁷⁸ such addresses are found in, for example, the

1984:95 is, I think, closer to the truth of the matter (at least as far as Hesiod envisages it): 'Certainly, Hesiod sees it as being in every man's interest to get for himself as much wealth as possible; but he also assumes that the stock of wealth – effectively the quantity of land – is finite and fixed. So what one man gains, another must necessarily lose, and there is no scope for an overall growth in prosperity.' See esp. *Op.* 341.

⁷⁷ See Lichtheim in Loprieno 1996:245

⁷⁸ Greek examples of wisdom literature include the works of Phocylides or Theognis, but examples are found too in the ancient Near East, such as the Sumerian *Instruction of*

Akkadian *Advice to a Prince* or the Egyptian *Instruction for Merikare*. The choice of a brother is (as far as I know) unparalleled in the extant material. There is a definite and purposeful shift in the *Works and Days* away from generational succession towards sibling rivalry: in the Myth of the Races, for example, Hesiod makes clear that the divine succession Ouranos/Kronos/Zeus is in the past; the Golden Race was created in the time of Kronos (111 οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ Κρόνου ἦσαν, ὅτ' οὐρανῷ ἐμβασίλευεν), but we are led to assume that Zeus has come to power some time during the Silver Age (137-8 τοὺς μὲν ἔπειτα Ζεὺς Κρονίδης ἔκρυσσε χολούμενος). His own father is a distant memory, and not exactly a positive one: at 633-40 Hesiod's and Perses' father is used as an example of what not to do. Even the suggestion that one respect one's parents (185-8) comes only *after* concern for the κασίγνητος (184), and the idea of inherited guilt or ancestral fault (282-5) casts a shadow over the generations.⁷⁹ What prevails is the competition engendered by the two sibling Erides.

That Hesiod chooses to diverge from the normal model has often been noted, but the reason for his choice has not yet been adequately explained.⁸⁰ I suggest that Hesiod chooses a brother as his addressee because this better fits what he wants to teach, and how he wants to teach it. The Iron Age is a time of conflict: men are at odds with the earth (176-8), and women are at odds with men (586-7); children will be at odds with parents, guests with hosts and brothers with brothers

Šuruppak, the Akkadian *Counsels of Wisdom*, or the Egyptian *Instruction of Amen-em-Opet* – see further Walcot 1962, 1966, West 1978:3-25, Schmitz in Rollinger/Ulf 2004, Rutherford in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009.

⁷⁹ See Gagné 2010.

⁸⁰ E.g. Nicolai 1964:193-4 and Walcot 1966:105 argue that this deviation is best explained by accepting that Perses was a real person. More insightful is Martin 2004 who argues, I think rightly, that the addressee is not inevitable, but rather achieves a pointed effect.

(182-4). Hesiod needs to teach us how to manage the Iron-Age condition, and so he establishes a didactic framework itself rooted in a conflict – the quarrel with Perses. The best way of managing the Iron-Age condition, according to Hesiod, is through self-sufficiency. To instil this ideal, Hesiod employs a didactic method based on intellectual self-sufficiency. This is best channelled through a sibling: someone of supposedly equal standing (Martin 2004) or at least where the hierarchy is less marked;⁸¹ someone who feels at liberty to question and to protest against injustice. However, to negotiate the apparent contradiction between self-sufficiency and didacticism, Hesiod must also retain didactic authority and moral control. To this end, through a series of mythical paradigms (the two Erides, Prometheus and Epimetheus, Eteocles and Polynices 163n.) he casts himself as the elder, better brother. Just like Hesiod's didactic project, poised precariously as it is between autonomy and dependence, the relationship between brothers strikes a delicate balance between equality and hierarchy.

Hesiod advocates not blind adherence to his teachings, but thinking for oneself. He wants his audience *both* to listen to his advice *and* to work self-sufficiently, so in order to bridge the gap he employs a didactic method which requires his learners to work for their lesson. This is made nowhere more clear than at 293, the championing of the πανάριστος, ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσσει (293). The emphatic formulation makes the point that Hesiod recommends autonomous thought above all else.⁸² So important is this point that he returns to it in the final

⁸¹ Schmitz in Rollinger/Ulf 2004 argues that the choice of didactic model reflects societal norms: Near Eastern texts use a father to son model because their communities are more specifically hierarchical.

⁸² See 293-7n.

lines of the poem: ὃς τάδε πάντα|εἰδὼς ἐργάζεται (826-7). Such intellectual self-sufficiency, I argue, is as much Hesiod's ideal as is practical independence: though the two often run parallel to and depend upon one another (see 455-7n. on ἀνὴρ φρένας ἀφνειός).

In my discussion of 293-7 in Part 1b I discussed the πανάριστος as an example of tethering. This is because Hesiod casts himself in the role, as he thinks for himself in terms of his poetic enterprise. In the *Theogony*, Hesiod established a close relationship with the Muses, beginning with an extended Hymn (*Theog.*1 μουσάων Ἑλικωνιάδων ἀρχώμεθ' αἰεῖδεν) and crediting them with his poetic prowess (*Theog.*22-3: αἶ νύ ποθ' Ἡσίοδον καλήν ἐδίδαξαν ἀοιδήν). This affiliation is appropriate for that particular poetic project as the focus of the *Theogony* is on the gods, and Hesiod needs the Muses to support his claim to privileged knowledge of the divine sphere.⁸³ In the *Works and Days*, however, Hesiod employs this epic convention only to break away from it. Hesiod asks the Muses to sing of Zeus, whose powers he extols; then, in a reversal of audience expectation, he departs from the Muses' song. Although the focus of the proem, Zeus will be replaced by the importance of work and justice as the main theme of the poem proper and as such the Muses are being invited to sing a song tangential to Hesiod's own.⁸⁴ Hesiod himself will sing of ἐτήτυμα, addressed ostensibly in the first instance to Perses; his focus will be on men rather than gods (3 βροτοὶ ἄνδρες). This suggests a narrative and biographical chronology between the two poems: Hesiod's poetic persona develops from the inexperienced shepherd acting under the Muses' tutelage in the

⁸³ See Clay 2003:50-3 (*Theog.*), 72-8 (*Op.*).

⁸⁴ On the Muses' song being tangential to Hesiod's own, see Clay 2003:72-8, Haubold in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010:21.

Theogony (*Theog.*22-3 αἶ νύ ποθ' Ἡσίοδον καλὴν ἐδίδαξαν ἀοιδὴν, ἄρνας ποιμαίνονθ') to the wise farmer-poet less dependent on divine instruction in the *Works and Days*.⁸⁵ But more importantly, this bid for independence, this side-lining of the gods, shows Hesiod putting into practice on a poetological level the self-sufficiency he attempts to impart.

Then, at 11-26, he makes a new addition to his pantheon: the Good Eris which Hamilton 1989:60 defines as having 'only internal effect'. Hesiod takes this inward-facing Strife to the extreme, entering into the spirit of competition specifically with himself: in amending the genealogy of Eris, he is competing with his own *Theogony*, in which there was only Ἔρις στυγερὴ (hateful Strife). Hesiod is the embodiment of the self-sufficient ideal. By contrast, Perses embodies the Bad Eris (14-16n.), begging from others (27-41, 293-319, 394-404) thus undermining Hesiod's self-sufficient ideal.⁸⁶

By setting himself up as a model, Hesiod not only epitomises the self-sufficient πανάριστος, but also initiates a self-sufficient mode of learning. He teaches not by prescription but by example – and it is up to the audience to follow that example. As narrator, Hesiod situates himself explicitly (and discontentedly) within the Iron Age:

μηκέτ' ἔπειτ' ὦφελλον ἐγὼ πέμπτοισι μετεῖναι
 ἀνδράσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ πρόσθε θανεῖν ἢ ἔπειτα γενέσθαι.
 νῦν γὰρ δὴ γένος ἐστὶ σιδήρεον·

Would then that I was no longer among the fifth race of
 men, but either died earlier or was born later.
 For now indeed it is a race of iron.

⁸⁵ Haubold in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010.

⁸⁶ Marsilio 2000:4 'Unlike Hesiod, whose speech urges men to express self-sufficiency through work and justice, Perses uses rhetoric to gain sustenance from others'.

Hesiod thus allies himself with his audience, inspiring confidence. Who better to be emulated by the Iron-Age man than one of us?

The πανάριστος is he who thinks for himself. This emphasis on autonomous thought recurs again and again throughout the *Works and Days*. The exhortation ἄνωγα...φράζεσθαι (I urge you to consider) occurs at 367, 403 and 687: Hesiod teaches, but the audience is meant to think about his teachings before following them. In the mythical section, Prometheus 'Forethought' is the example to follow, whereas his brother Epimetheus 'Afterthought' brings mankind's downfall because he did not *think* (85-6 οὐδ' Ἐπιμηθεύς | ἐφράσαθ'). And again, a brother to brother didactic model makes the contrast all the more pointed.⁸⁷

The Iron-Age condition was initiated when the gods hid livelihood from mortals (42 κρύψαντες γὰρ ἔχουσι θεοὶ βίον ἀνθρώποισιν). The aim of the self-sufficient farmer in the Iron Age should, therefore, be to find this livelihood and to store up enough for a whole year.⁸⁸ And just as the gods hid *bios*, so Hesiod hides his teachings, and his self-sufficient audience must exert some interpretative effort. This didactic strategy is introduced already in the mythical passages: Hesiod tries to initiate the search for meaning at the same time as he narrates the beginning of the search for a sustainable livelihood. At 47-50, the myth of Prometheus and Pandora is summarised, and the summary framed by 47 ἔκρυψε, 50 κρύψε. The synopsis is formulated in an ambiguous way, however, with unspecified objects and confused syntax. Whilst the confusion can be partly attributed to the difficulty of summing

⁸⁷ See further 83-9n.

⁸⁸ A recurring concern: see 30-2n.

up, at some points proleptically, an entire myth in a few lines, it may also be the case that Hesiod is expressing through ambiguous formulations the motif of hiding which is crucial both to the myth (the gods hid *bios*, Prometheus hid fire in a reed and Pandora's threat was hidden behind her deceptively beautiful appearance) and to his own presentation of it.⁸⁹ Further, the links between the Myths of Prometheus and Pandora and the Myth of the Races are not immediately evident, nor is it clear whether the introductory formula 106 ἕτερον λόγον is meant to imply equivalence or difference. The audience has to look beyond surface incompatibilities such as the conflicting chronologies, to the hidden meaning which centres on the human condition.⁹⁰ The Myth of the Races itself begins 106 εἰ δ' ἐθέλεις, ἕτερόν τοι ἐγὼ λόγον ἐκκορυφώσω: a direct appeal to the audience to take charge of their own learning (see similarly 381n., 392 εἴ...ἐθέλησθα).

The fable of the hawk and the nightingale, the structure of which I discussed in Part 1b, does not map directly onto one single situation, so in order to find its meaning the audience must decode it. In fact, the gap between the fable proper and its final resolution at 276-80 gives the audience time to do this. The fable is introduced with the much-debated line νῦν δ' αἶνον βασιλεῦς ἐρέω, φρονέουσιν καὶ αὐτοῖς (202), the latter phrase of which is difficult to construe. If the kings already understand, why does Hesiod need to tell them the fable? It could be a conciliatory gesture (a concession to the kings' superior rank), or an exhortatory one (West: 'You know it's true, admit it'). Most likely, however, the formula underscores 'the difficulty of understanding which is inherent in Hesiod's telling

⁸⁹ See further 47-9n.

⁹⁰ See further 106-201n.

and which challenges the addressees to apply their interpretative skills'.⁹¹ The kings are told to consider the fable for themselves.⁹²

Hesiod hides the answers in ambiguous language such as etymologies, riddles and kennings.⁹³ For example:

νήπιοι, οὐδὲ ἴσασιν ὅσῳ πλέον ἤμισυ παντός,
οὐδ' ὅσον ἐν μαλάχῃ τε καὶ ἀσφοδέλῳ μέγ' ὄνειαρ.

Fools, they do not know how much more the half is than the whole,
nor how much value there is in mallow and asphodel.

Works and Days 40-1

These lines are made up of oxymoronic formulations (ὅσῳ πλέον ἤμισυ παντός), and the meaning is unclear: Hesiod never actually tells us what the great advantage of these plants might be. Calling the kings νήπιοι for not knowing these things is therefore a provocation. Hesiod taunts his audience, challenging them to look for meanings.

The challenge persists through Hesiod's strategy of duality. On the level of language this manifests itself in his use of opposing terms, often juxtaposing positives and negatives from the same root and even coining terms to create balanced antitheses: 3 ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε, 355 δώτη...ἀδώτη, 471-2 εὐθημοσύνη...κακοθημοσύνη, 490 ὀψαρότης πρωιρότη, 529 κεραοὶ καὶ νήκεροι, 715 πολύξεινον...ἄξεινον, 811-13 παναπήμων...πάγκακον.⁹⁴ It is also expressed through the dual/plural nature of concepts: from the two Erides (11-26), through ambiguous *elpis* (96n., 500-1n.) and ambivalent *aidos* (317-19n.) and *zelos* (195-6n.), to *pheme* which is easy to pick up, but hard to bear and difficult to get rid of (760-4).

⁹¹ Mordine 2006:365.

⁹² This meaning of φρονέω occurs in early hexameter also at *Il.*2.36 and 18.4.

⁹³ Etymologies: 3n. Zeus, 81-2n. Pandora. Kennings: 524 ἀνόστεος, 529 ὕληκοῖται, 560 εὐφρόναι, 571 φερέοικος, 605 ἡμερόκοιτος ἀνήρ, 742 πεντόζοιο, 778 ἰδρις.

⁹⁴ For other coinages see 230 ἰθυδίκησι, 411 ἐτωσιοεργός, 413 ἀμβολιεργός, 451 ἀβούτεω.

Whereas in the *Theogony* ambiguities of language (there largely consisting of etymologies) were used to make the point that there exists a correctness of language reflecting the state of the divine sphere,⁹⁵ in the *Works and Days* the use of ambiguous etymologies (for example that of Pandora, 80-2) and multiple concepts reflects the need for autonomous thought. They emphasise the need to work, not just in the fields but at the site of meaning. The Iron Age must be worked through self-sufficiently, and Hesiod would not be teaching this lesson if he gave his audience all the answers on a silver platter. He hides them in riddles and divides them between polarities, forcing his audience to go searching.

In its first appearance in the *Works and Days*, *bios* is both quantified and qualified in temporal terms: 31-2 βίος...ἐπιητανός... ὥραϊος.⁹⁶ The farmer must not just be self-sufficient now, but must plan to be so in the long term. As Purves in Rosen 2004:148 puts it, Hesiod's 'impulse toward grasping the ever-fleeting immediacy of the 'right time' is countered by a more general thread that runs through the poem, and that is the need to constantly live not in the present, but rather just one step ahead of it.' Similarly, Hesiod's audience must not only follow his teachings now, but must use them later. In fact the two kinds of self-sufficiency, agricultural and intellectual, are linked through the two uses of the verb ἐγκατατίθεμαι at 27 and 627. At 627 (ἐγκάτθεο οἴκῳ), the verb is used in a practical sense, of storing up equipment in the house. At 27, however, τεῶν ἐνικάτθεο θυμῷ is an exhortation that the audience 'store up' Hesiod's teachings

⁹⁵ See Gambarara 1984:130-2, Arrighetti 1987:23-36, Vergados 2012.

⁹⁶ See further 30-2n.

i.e. consider and remember them (equivalent to σὺ δ' ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῆσιν 107, similarly 274).⁹⁷

Formulations involving memory are also particularly telling in terms of the long range of Hesiod's thought. At 422 ὑλοτομεῖν μεμνημένος, 623 ἐργάζεσθαι μεμνημένος and 711 τείνυσθαι μεμνημένος an infinitive followed by μεμνημένος gives either the meaning 'being mindful to do x' or 'do x, being mindful'.⁹⁸ Similarly at 616 and 641 μεμνημένος εἶναι is used with a genitive of the task to be remembered. At 298 μεμνημένος αἰέν makes explicit the long-term impetus of the verb. At 728 (αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ κε δύη, μεμνημένος, ἔς τ' ἀνιόντα) the verb is framed by the sun's rising and setting, implying the frequency with which one should be mindful. Such exhortations form part of Hesiod's negotiation of didacticism and self-sufficiency, as he asks his audience to be taught, but to retain the independence to take those teachings away and apply them at another time. Furthermore, in terms of Hesiod's poetic enterprise, it marks his own self-sufficiency; it emphasises his divergence in the *Works and Days* from the Muses as daughters of Memory, making the point that teaching, and teaching about timely Iron-Age tasks no less, is Hesiod's own kind of memory.

Extending self-sufficiency into the long term inevitably involves planning for multiple eventualities. Hesiod advises that the farmer have two ploughs (432-4); he suggests what to do with both a 7-foot and an 8-foot axle (424-5); he plans for an alternative scenario in which the late plougher might rival the early plougher (485); at 707-14 with repeated εἰ δέ he introduces multiple scenarios about how to treat

⁹⁷ This parallel is noted by Pucci 1977:110 and Marsilio 2000:23.

⁹⁸ The latter being the more likely, given the number of imperatival infinitives elsewhere in *Op*.

others. In didactic terms, Hesiod encourages his audience to be self-sufficient in their planning by taking himself out of the equation. He does this by establishing caveats formulated in terms of the gods, for example:

εἰ τέλος αὐτὸς ὀπισθεν Ὀλύμπιος ἐσθλὸν ὀπάζοι

If the Olympian should then give a good outcome

Works and Days 474

Or:

ἄλλοτε δ' ἄλλοιός Ζηνὸς νόος αἰγιόχοιο,
ἀργαλέος δ' ἄνδρεσσι καταθνητοῖσι νοῆσαι.

The mind of aegis-bearing Zeus is of a different sort at different times,
and it is difficult for mortal men to know.

Works and Days 483-4

The Iron Age is delineated by a firm separation between gods and men. Whereas the previous Race, the Heroes, were ἡμίθεοι (160), on the cusp of divinity though removed from it, we are but mortals (201 θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποισι). However, even in an Iron-Age context, the gods do have a function, and it is generally related to the unknown. Hesiod gives the gods the final word, thereby exonerating himself from having to predict everything to the letter.⁹⁹ One must follow Hesiod's immediate advice *and* plan ahead – and even then, there may be unforeseeable factors. This final point is where self-sufficiency really takes centre stage.

By stepping back, Hesiod allows his audience to recognise the potential for uncertainty and to plan accordingly. However, so as not to put his didactic authority at risk, he balances such admissions of powerlessness with claims to special knowledge. In his introduction to the Myth of the Races, for example, Hesiod encourages his audience to take control of their own learning (106 εἰ δ'

⁹⁹ For other examples of the gods used for exculpation see: 483-4, 638, 645, 667.

ἐθέλεις) and to extend it into the long term (107 σὺ δ' ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῆσιν), whilst at the same time explicitly establishing his poetic and didactic authority: 106-7 ἐγὼ λόγον ἐκκορυφώσω, | εὖ καὶ ἐπισταμένως (see further note).

This special knowledge too is often expressed in terms of the divine. For example, though at 483-4 he concedes that the mind of Zeus is difficult for men to know, in the next lines Hesiod goes on to give some very precise information: it may be difficult to predict everything, but he comes pretty close. He goes even further at 661-2:¹⁰⁰

ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥς ἐρέω Ζηνὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο:
Μοῦσαι γάρ μ' ἐδίδαξαν ἀθέσφατον ὕμνον αἰεῖειν.

But I shall tell the mind of aegis-bearing Zeus,
for the Muses taught me to sing a boundless song.

He knows well enough the mind of Zeus that he can, with the Muses' help, 'tell' it.¹⁰¹ Similarly:

αἶδε μὲν ἡμέραι εἰσὶν ἐπιχθονίοις μέγ' ὄνειαρ·
αἱ δ' ἄλλαι μετὰ δουποῖ, ἀκήριοι, οὐ τι φέρουσιν,
ἄλλος δ' ἀλλοίην αἰνεῖ, παῦροι δέ τ' ἴσασιν·

These days are a great blessing for mortals.
But there are others which are uncertain, unlucky, unprofitable.
Each man praises a different sort of day, but few know.

Works and Days 822-4

The unknown is emphasised by anaphora, ambiguous language and a parallel with *Theog.* 871-5.¹⁰² Such emphasis creates a marked contrast with the final phrase παῦροι δέ τ' ἴσασιν, which has parallels at 814 παῦροι δ' αὖτε ἴσασιν and 818 παῦροι δέ τ' ἀληθέα κικλήσκουσιν and which highlights Hesiod's special

¹⁰⁰ The two passages are linked by the same epithet sequence (used only in these two instances in *Op.*): Ζηνὸς νόος αἰγιόχοιο.

¹⁰¹ For this kind of *recusatio* which ultimately emphasises Hesiod's privileged knowledge see further 456-7n.

¹⁰² See further 822-8n.

knowledge. Few are versed in these matters but Hesiod is – and he will tell us about them. Hesiod may be a man of the Iron Age, allying himself with his Iron-Age audience and stepping back so that they might find their feet, but to maintain his didactic authority he cannot help reminding them that he is one step ahead.

One of the most striking examples of Hesiod's knowledge is his description of woodcutting (414-47). It is full of types of wood, kinds of tools, parts of the plough – all with precise measurements. In an (at least partly) oral setting, such a detailed section seems to be designed to impress. Whether or not one could go away from a performance of the *Works and Days* able to make a wagon or a plough, one would have the lingering impression of a knowledgeable poet or rhapsode able to recall not just myths and precepts but also minute technical details of how things fit together. It is this impression which makes the passage so effective in didactic terms. When the subject matter is not naturally so compelling (the plough is no Promethean myth), the way in which it is described must be; Hesiod holds his audience's attention by amazing them with detail, making them mindful (422 μνηστικός) by displaying his own memory, and encouraging them to learn by showing them how much he knows (427 πόλλ' ἐπικαμπύλα καλά). He sets an example of knowledge which both encourages his audience to follow it of their own accord and establishes his didactic authority. Furthermore, immediately after the lengthy description of the woodcutting we have these lines:

νήπιος, οὐδὲ τὸ οἶδ': ἑκατὸν δέ τε δούρατ' ἀμάξης.
τῶν πρόσθεν μελέτην ἔχέμεν οἰκία θέσθαι.

Fool, he does not know: one hundred are the timbers of a wagon.
Take care to have them in the house in advance.

Works and Days 456-7

Only the fool thinks he can put together a wagon. In the preceding section Hesiod himself seems to think he could do just such a thing: so, is Hesiod a fool? We presume not. Rather, with this assertion he reflects on his earlier rhetorical and didactic showpiece, making the point that the fool is the man who takes on the task of woodcutting lightly, who doesn't listen to Hesiod's advice and doesn't make the right preparations at the right time. Hesiod himself *knows* that many are the curved planks (427 πόλλ' ἐπικαμπύλα κᾶλα) and one hundred are the timbers of a wagon (456 ἑκατὸν δέ τε δούρατ' ἀμάξης): he has just told us them all, at length and with great precision. Furthermore, the formulation νήπιος, οὐδὲ τὸ οἶδα implies superiority: as in the other use of the phrase at 40-1, Hesiod sets himself above the fool rather than on his level.

This added extra which Hesiod tends to display reflects another issue closely linked with self-sufficiency: reciprocity. Millett 1984:100 makes the important observation that 'the two concepts of co-ordination and self-sufficiency are complementary'; reciprocity does not undermine self-sufficiency because it does not involve *reliance* on others but is concerned with establishing good relations with neighbouring *oikoi* in order that your own *oikos* is not put at risk.¹⁰³ Good relations are to be of such a kind 'that you are the equal or superior of your neighbour, and do not end up in a position of dependence'.¹⁰⁴ This delicate balance is brought out most clearly at 349-51:

¹⁰³ See 707-14n. for the idea of negative reciprocity, a more direct defensive technique which comes into play at a later stage of Hesiod's darkening of vision. For the reciprocity of words see 721n.

¹⁰⁴ Millett 1984:101.

εὖ μὲν μετρεῖσθαι παρὰ γείτονος, εὖ δ' ἀποδοῦναι,
αὐτῷ τῷ μέτρῳ, καὶ λώιον, αἶ κε δύνῃαι,
ὥς ἂν χρηίζων καὶ ἐς ὕστερον ἄρκιον εὕρης.

Measure out well from your neighbour, but give back well too,
in the same measure, or even more, if you are able,
so that being in need later you might find something to rely on.¹⁰⁵

Hesiod puts this idea of reciprocity into practice on a didactic level by establishing good relations with his audience. He encourages intellectual equality by asking his audience to think for themselves, to assess his teachings, but his claims to especial knowledge hint at superiority. He establishes a healthy reciprocal relationship – yet makes sure he comes out with the upper hand: ‘give back...even more, if you are able’.

Hesiod’s dual didactic strategy in the *Works and Days* – to impart knowledge but to have the audience receive it self-sufficiently – takes us back full circle to the two modes of reading which the *Works and Days* engenders. On the one hand, experiencing the poem in continuous performance is akin to the didactic model in which teacher teaches, student listens and learns. On the other, excerpting and reusing puts into practice the self-sufficient ideals Hesiod endeavours to instil: teacher encourages student to discover and decode information independently, and apply it in new contexts. According to Plato, the sophist Protagoras considered Hesiod to be a predecessor.¹⁰⁶ Indeed, his teachings, his carefully tailored persona and his sophisticated world view mark Hesiod as a proto-sophist. However, one

¹⁰⁵ For interpretative possibilities see 351n.

¹⁰⁶ Pl. *Prt.*316d3-9, with Haubold in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010. On Hesiod and the sophists see also Koning 2010:111-15.

might also say that the *way* in which he teaches, by offering wisdom but making his audience work for it, in fact marks him as a proto-Socratic. Further, if one were to impose modern pedagogical theory on the *Works and Days*, the linear aspect of Hesiod's teachings would conform to the objectivist model of learning (the lecture), whereas by concealing meaning, by leaving elements open to interpretation, by making his audience actively participate in their learning, Hesiod at the same time assumes the role of prototypical constructivist.¹⁰⁷

Some of the ways in which Hesiod negotiates the interplay between didacticism and self-sufficiency themselves forge a link with the two modes of reading. For example, in the formulations involving memory such as 422 ὕλοτομεῖν μεμνημένος, 623 ἐργάζεσθαι μεμνημένος and 711 τείνυσθαι μεμνημένος, the verb μιμνήσκω simultaneously advocates excerpting ('remember and reuse') and evokes the poem's performative aspect as memory is the realm of the rhapsode.¹⁰⁸ Further, Hesiod's interest in how things are put together is not limited to wagons: at the level of language, Hesiod picks apart words by juxtaposing compounds with their uncompounded elements (see 189n. for examples) or by coining terms to create antitheses (p.50-1), and it is an awareness of sense units, of poetic elements, of nuggets of wisdom – how they fit together and how they can be separated – which lies behind the two ways of reading the *Works and Days*.

Finally, Hesiod himself reflects on his own didactic practice:

δαίμονι δ' οἷος ἔησθα, τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι ἄμεινον,
εἴ κεν ἅπ' ἀλλοτρίων κτεάνων ἀεσίφρονα θυμόν

¹⁰⁷ For recent examples of teaching handbooks that use this terminology see Butcher/Davies/Highton 2006 and Fry/Ketteridge/Marshall 2007.

¹⁰⁸ This is particularly relevant in the use of such a formulation at 422 as this passage constitutes a real feat of memory: see above p.52 and 414-47n.

εἰς ἔργον τρέψας μελετᾶς βίου, ὥς σε κελεύω.

Whatever sort of man you are by way of fortune, to work is better,
if turning your foolish heart from other people's possessions to work
you take care of your livelihood, as I urge.

Works and Days 314-16

These lines encapsulate all of the issues raised so far: the two ways of reading the *Works and Days*; the applicable yet tethered nature of Hesiod's teachings; the tension between didacticism and self-sufficiency. With the phrase 314 δαίμονι δ' οἷος ἔησθα (see 122n. for the etymology of δαίμων) Hesiod emphasises the applicability of his teachings: work is crucial, *whoever* you are. At the same time, however, Hesiod maps his advice onto Perses, his current explicit addressee: at 315 the theme of quarrelling over others' possessions unavoidably recalls his brother, who is so intent on disputes κτήμασ' ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις (34). Just as the older farmhand who pays attention to his work (443 ὅς κ' ἔργου μελετῶν) is the more employable, so turning attention to one's own work (316 μελετᾶς) is key to the self-sufficient lifestyle which Hesiod advocates. Yet Hesiod as teacher cannot resist offering his guidance: ὥς σε κελεύω.

Ian Rutherford in Depew/Obbink 2000 noticed a double structure in the *Catalogue of Women*: a genealogical superstructure on the one hand (a larger, linear narrative), and a series of *ehoiai* on the other (examples; ready-made excerpts). Whilst he considered the conflict between these two organising principles unsustainable and posited that one (the latter) must no longer be exerting a force on the text and audience, Elizabeth Irwin in Hunter 2005 argued that the force of the *ehoiai* too could be retained: in the context of the symposium. I argue that to understand the *Works and Days* we must similarly understand the dual way in

which the poem was experienced in antiquity: my position bears a close resemblance to Irwin's argument that the *Catalogue* could be experienced either in its entirety *or* through excerpts suited to a symposiastic setting. I hope that my study, as Irwin's, shows that to gain a more nuanced understanding of archaic epic we must consider multiple performance contexts and avenues of reception, and how they were engendered and facilitated by the very construction of the poems themselves.

Should I dare to cast my net of comparisons even further, Lisa Kallet in Rengakos/Tsagalis 2006 spotted a champion of intellectual self-sufficiency in Thucydides. She argued that Thucydides' statement on the utility of history (1.22.4) shows that his work is didactic, but that the lessons are not self-evident. Thucydides makes his readers work, complicating matters in order to show the reader how to engage in critical inquiry. My study shows, I hope, that the relationship Thucydides constructs between teacher and student is not without precedent: Hesiod too was set on making life difficult.

Part 2

An Interpretative Commentary on Hesiod's *Works and Days*

1-10 : Proem

This has been viewed since antiquity as a separable unit: Pausanias 9.31.4-5 claimed that the Boeotians 'remove the proem to the Muses, saying that it begins with the lines about the Strifes'. The most likely explanation for this is that the Boeotian version represents a stage in performance (also transmitted in writing: Paus. is shown a lead tablet engraved with this version) where the poem was prefaced by a context-specific prelude, and so the proem as we know it was elided. That such preludes existed is testified by the *Hom. Hymns*, which seem to have been used as prefaces to epic recitations, hymning the god relevant to the performance context. For different stages of a poem's development reflected in a proem cf. the extant variants on the *Iliad* proem: 1) Μούσας αἰείδω καὶ Ἀπόλλωνα κλυτότοξον (see Kirk 1985-94 vol.1:52 – text owned by Apellicon, according to Nicanor and Crates as cited by the *Anecdota Romana*), 2) ἔσπετε νῦν μοι, μοῦσαι, Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι, ὅπως δὴ μῆνις τε χόλος θ' ἔλε Πηλεΐωνα Ἰητοῦς τ' ἀγλαὸν υἱόν· ὁ γὰρ βασιλῆι χολωθείς...

The proem as we have it is indeed separable; it is a neat introduction which is grammatically and metrically self-contained. However, it is simultaneously programmatic (*pace* Wheeler 2002:48). The division of labour between the Muses, Zeus and Hesiod as outlined here structures the rest of the poem: the Muses, having been not entirely dismissed, return to lend support when Hesiod is not confident about seafaring; Zeus is kept on-side so that he can be involved with the myths,

with Justice and with the kings; and Hesiod takes on the rest of the programme. Concepts and characters introduced here are expanded later in *Op.*: the crooked judgements which Zeus straightens at 7 ἰθύνει σκολίων are made by gift-swallowing men at 221; δίκη, first mentioned at 7, is a key theme, particularly at 213-85; Perses is introduced at 10. The proem could be and indeed was detached, but it is also tethered to the poem by theme and by character: multiple modes of reading are established from the outset. This in itself is not particularly compelling evidence for Hesiod's structuring strategy as unique and striking (cf. *Il.*, *Od.* and *Theog.*). The survival of programmatic proems is probably due to the fact that the versions we have are a 'fixing by writing' (Ford 1992:1), the end product of a shift from an oral to a literate culture, and thus bound to have closer links with the main body of the poems than any earlier versions would have had. However, in the other epics this potential for different kinds of reading does not persist as it does in *Op.*

1 Μοῦσαι: Hesiod begins with the Muses, conforming to their demand at *Theog.*34: σφᾶς δ' αὐτὰς πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστατον αἰὲν αἰδεῖν. As daughters of Memory the Muses have a special relevance to poems rooted in the oral tradition. Beginning with the Muses became an epic convention: *Il.*1 μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά; *Od.*1 ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα; *Cat.* 2 Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες; according to the *Certamen*, the *Thebaid* began Ἄργος ἄειδε, θεά, πολυδίψιον, and the *Epigoni* Νῦν αὖθ' ὀπλοτέρων ἀνδρῶν ἀρχώμεθα, Μοῦσαι. In *Il.* invocations to the Muses are also interspersed at points of high tension or before an enumeration or catalogue (*Il.*1.1, 1.8, 2.484-93, 2.761-2, 11.218-20, 14.508-10, 16.112-13). See esp. Ford 1992. For the complex relationship between Hesiod and the Muses see p.46-7.

Πιερίην: the Muses' birthplace at *Theog.*53. Cf. Μουσάων Ἑλικωνιάδων *Theog.*1, *Op.*658, and Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες *Theog.*25, 52, 966, 967, 1022. Marks the contrast between the proems of *Op.* and *Theog.*; where *Theog.* begins with multiple hymns to the Muses, here we have an invocation of the Muses so condensed that the narrative of their birth (a conventional component of a hymn, see *Hom. Hymns*) has been elided to just this one epithet. Tzetzes (also Wilamowitz) took it with 2 δεῦτε, 'come here from Pieria'.

κλείουσαι: as Hesiod will break away from cosmogonic narrative, so he will also break away from the genre of heroic epic (618-94n.). The phrase ἀοιδῆσι κλείουσαι evokes both songs of the gods and songs of heroes: cf. the epic definition κλέα ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε. κλείουσαι is etymologically connected with κλέος – see *Lfgre s.v.*, and their juxtaposition in *Hom. Hymn* 32.18-20.

2 δεῦτε: a formula of cletic hymns, which ask the god to 'come hither' (Calame 1996:174, Rousseau 1996:103-4). Hesiod is trying to establish a compromise as he recognises the Muses' birthplace (1 Πιερίην), but wants them to come to Boeotia to help him undertake his task. Similarly, in *Theog.* Hesiod reconciles two traditions; he invokes the Muses of Helikon (1) but at 68 moves them to Olympos (ἴσαν πρὸς Ὀλυμπον).

Hesiod's use of hexameter differs from that of Homer in that his lines are not so predominantly end-stopped: line 1 contained no finite verb, only a participle, so we must wait until 2 for the main action. Contrast *Il.*1 and *Od.*1: although elaborated upon in the subsequent lines, they make complete sense in isolation. In this way *Il.* and *Od.* seem put together at the level of the line, whereas *Op.* is put together at the

level of a sense unit or didactic unit which is rendered independent from its surroundings but has internal coherence.

Δί' ἐννέπετε: cf. *Od.*1 ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε: there the focus is the man, here Hesiod's focus is ostensibly on Zeus. However, Zeus in this proem is only celebrated in regards to his relationship with mortals (Quaglia 1973:17): omitted are the conventional hymnic features such as narratives of the god's birth and his divine deeds. These features are instead in *Theog.* – this is one of many elements which suggest that the two poems should be read together, as complementary (e.g. Clay 2003). On the role of the divine in general and Zeus in particular in *Op.* see further Beall 2004b, Allan 2006.

It seems to have been common practice to hymn Zeus at the beginning of a poetic performance, whether or not the context was a festival of Zeus (Wheeler 2002:47): cf. Pind. *Nem.*2.1-3 ὄθενπερ καὶ Ὀμηρίδαι ἱράπτων ἐπέων τὰ πόλλ' ἀοιδοὶ ἰᾶρχονται Διὸς ἐκ προοιμίου. Also: *Il.*5 Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή; Aratus *Phaen.*1 Ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα; in the proem of the *Cypria* (*ΣIl.*(Erbse)1.5) Zeus determines to lighten the earth of her burden of men. However, Zeus is particularly relevant to Hesiod's enterprise as the god of kings, the father of Justice, the 'fondatore dell'ordine cosmico' (Ercolani), and a chthonic god connected with agriculture (465 Διὶ χθονίῳ).

σφέτερον πατέρ': at *Theog.*53-4 the Muses are daughters of Zeus and Memory. *ΣOp.*(Pertusi)2a notes that Hesiod has disregarded proper use of pronouns here, and is using the third person instead of second person ὑμέτερον. The use of

σφέτερον could be a distancing technique; Zeus is quite usually described as ‘father’, but he is ‘their’ father rather than ‘our’ father here (or ‘father of gods and men’ – cf. 59n.). Hesiod groups together Zeus and the Muses as part of the divine family, whilst simultaneously distancing himself from them and marking his own independence (p.47-8).

3 ὄν τε διὰ: meaning ‘through whom’, or ‘by whose agency’, is a paretyymology of Zeus’ name and echoes Δί’ at 2. It emphasises Zeus’ role as mediator, punishing mortals for their crooked judgements. On Hesiod as etymologiser see Koning in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010; for play on the name of Zeus see Regali in the same volume; for other examples 81-2n., 256n., *Theog.*252 Κυμοδόκη...κύματ’, *Theog.*346-7 Κουράων...κουρίζουσι. In *Op.* etymologies are used to disguise meaning, for which the audience must then search: the only etymology explicitly presented as one is that of Pandora’s name, which is ambiguous and problematic (81-2n.).

βροτοὶ ἄνδρες: this noun-epithet phrase draws attention to the mortal condition with which *Op.* is primarily concerned. Further, the use of ἄνδρες rather than ἄνθρωποι suggests that Hesiod intends his poem for a male audience: this is supported both by the absence of advice suited to women, and the suspicion with which Hesiod treats the opposite sex (59-105n.).

ὁμῶς: introducing a series of binary oppositions (ἄφατοί/φατοί, ῥητοί/ἄρρητοί etc.). These dualities are programmatic, expressing at the level of language Hesiod’s interest in doubling or splitting throughout *Op.* (his *Begriffsspaltung*): two Strifes (11-26); two sides to *aidos* (317-19); two mortal brothers Hesiod and Perses (10, 27-41);

two mythical brothers Prometheus and Epimetheus (42-58); two rival birds the hawk and the nightingale (202-12). For the didactic function of this see p.50-1.

ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε: the idea of being spoken of (or not, as the case may be) is connected with κλέος: see 2n. for the Muses as responsible for praising i.e. conferring κλέος or making someone φάτος. Here, however, this appears as a role of Zeus, a displacement of functions which shows the Muses from the outset being subordinated to Zeus. Although to be spoken about in terms of one's κλέος is a positive thing, φήμη 'rumour' will later be cast in a negative light (760-4n.): Hesiod is also referring to people who are talked about for the wrong reasons (including his own brother).

ἄφατος seems to be a term coined by Hesiod, as in early literature it appears only here. One of Hesiod's forms of wordplay is the juxtaposition of positives and negatives from the same root. However, Hesiod often has to invent one of the terms to create his antithesis (p.50-1).

4 Διὸς μέγαλοιο ἔκητι: cf. *Il.*1.5 Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή – the plan or will of Zeus tends to have repercussions for mortals. See also *Op.*105 οὕτως οὐ τί πη ἔστι Διὸς νόον ἐξαλέασθαι, *Theog.*613 ὥς οὐκ ἔστι Διὸς κλέψαι νόον οὐδὲ παρελθεῖν.

5-7 ῥέα...ῥέα...| ῥεῖα...| ῥεῖα: the anaphora marks this out as a unit on the power of Zeus who does everything with ease whilst mortals in the Iron Age have to toil. The adverb links these three lines, an elaborate description which can stand alone but which needs line 8 to provide its subject. Elsewhere in *Op.* anaphora is primarily used in passages concerned with the harsh realities of life in the Iron Age: 182-4

οὐδέ, the prophesied breakdown of Iron-Age society; 190-1 the qualities which will no longer be prized in the decline of the Iron Age; 230-1 οὐδέ, the Iron-Age evils which will be avoided by just citizens; 317-19 αἰδώς in a passage on the importance of work; 453-4 ῥηίδιον poverty and begging; 578-80 ἡώς, summer and the importance of timely work; 715-17 μηδέ, keeping good relations with others.

Line 7 stands out as having more of a moral slant and, where 5 and 6 offer simply a direct opposition between two groups, 7 provides a development of ideas. To emphasise this, each line is formulated differently: in 5 the two phrases are linked by ῥέα...ῥέα; in 6 the construction is parallel; in 7 chiasmic. Metre is varied for effect. However all the different formulations are based on oppositions and antitheses. 6 ἄδηλον, like 3 ἄφατοι, is unattested elsewhere in early Greek: Hesiod is creating vocabulary so that he can play with positives and negatives from the same root (in the case of ἄφατοι) and assonance (ἀρίζηλον...ἄδηλον). The opposition between straight and crooked (7 ἰθύνει σκολιόν) continues throughout *Op.*: e.g. at 194 crooked words mark the breakdown of society, at 221 Justice is dragged along by men with crooked δίκη (9n.).

8 Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης: Zeus is named in ring composition with 2, framing the description of his powers and tethering the description to its context. With ὅς ὑπέρτατα δώματα ναίει, the description is emphatically lofty: see further 17-20n.

9 κλυθι: κλυθι is etymologically linked with κλέος, ‘acoustic renown’ (Svenbro 1993:164) – see 1n. κλείουσαι. The hendiadys κλυθι ἰδὼν ἄϊων τε (noted at Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)9d καὶ τοῦτο διττῶς νοεῖται) emphasises the importance of hearing. Again the proem evokes tales of gods and heroes, only to break away from them.

κλῦθι in the closing lines of the proem takes the place of the usual imperative χαῖρε (*Hom. Hymn* 1.20, 3.546, 4.579, 5.292. κλῦθι does appear at *Hom. Hymn* 8.9, and in the *Orphic Hymns*). Rather than announcing his intention to praise the god, Hesiod turns to Perses and true things. Just as he encourages Perses *et al.* to listen and to consider for themselves, so he wants Zeus to listen and judge, taking an analytical role rather than just rejoicing. He establishes his didactic method from the outset, initiating it boldly on an Olympian level.

δίκη δ' ἴθυνε θέμιστας: up until this point, Zeus has been depicted in terms of his terrible power. This line clarifies his motives: he can change radically the fortunes of men, but does so with justice. This establishes the crucial role of justice throughout *Op.* (see esp. 213-85n.), and provides an ultimate role model for men: not only must men work, but they must work *justly* (Quaglia 1973:24 notes Zeus' exemplifying role, but goes too far in making a distinction between two types of justice: human and 'true', i.e. that of Zeus).

The relationship between Zeus and justice is a complex one. In 9 Zeus should make laws straight, with justice, while Hesiod deals with Perses. However cf. 35-6 διακρινώμεθα νεῖκος | ἰθείησι δίκης, αἳ τ' ἐκ Διός εἰσιν ἄρισται; when Hesiod begins to address fully his brother's predicament, he considers rectitude and justice to be dispensed by Zeus but filtered through mortal agents. Cf. 213 ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δ' ἄκουε Δίκης (repeated at 275) – at this point justice is becoming personified, and is now neither a tool of Zeus nor his dispensation to be processed by mortals, but an independent power. This personification becomes complete from 220 (a passage which echoes the proem by repetition of e.g. ἰθείας and θέμιστας), but Justice's

connection with Zeus is reiterated at 239 where he is said to allot justice, and at 256 Justice is the child of Zeus, sitting next to him.

Cf. *Theog.*81-90 (the gifts of the Muses to men) esp. 84-6 οἱ δέ τε λαοὶ | πάντες ἐς αὐτὸν ὁρῶσι διακρίνοντα θέμιστας | ἰθείησι δίκησιν; those whom the Muses favour are able to carry out the role described at 9.

θέμιστας: this does not refer to Hesiod's and Perses' case in particular (27-41n.) but to human law-giving in general. Responsible for these laws are the kings (Hesiod's addressees at 202, 248, 263) who, though criticised for their crooked judgements, are under Zeus' jurisdiction. Themis is personified in *Theog.*135 and is a daughter of Ouranos and Gaia: this makes her Zeus' aunt, a familial tie which is reflected in the connection between Zeus and laws. For the link between law-giving and the poets, see Koning 2010:72-81.

10 τύνη· ἐγώ: the enjambment results in a juxtaposition of Zeus and Hesiod which is an adaptation of the conventional hymnic farewell formula; at *Hom. Hymn* 2.496, 3.547, 4.580, 6.21, 10.6, 19.49, 28.18, 30.19 the singer ends with αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ σεῖο καὶ ἄλλης μνήσομ' αἰοιδῆς, promising to sing another song also. For τύνη in this metrical position with the same syllabic emphasis, see *Theog.*36 τύνη, Μουσάων ἀρχώμεθα. Although the juxtaposition here is clearly emphatic, exactly what it emphasises is debated (Quaglia 1973:27-31, Ercolani). It seems to me that the thrust of the emphasis is programmatic, setting out the complex division of labour we will find in the poem (1-10n.). Hesiod will tell of Iron-Age rather than Olympian matters, so he distances himself from Zeus; however, in order to establish his didactic credentials he claims to know Zeus' mind (p.54-5), and he uses Zeus to

exonerate him from having to predict everything to the letter (p.53). The juxtaposition, therefore, signifies simultaneously independence and collaboration.

Πέσση: Hesiod's brother: his initial explicit addressee, first addressed directly at 27. See further p.43-5. He also addresses the kings (202), and his didactic message is intended for a wider (implied) audience. We do not yet find out the relationship between Perses and Hesiod (not until 633, in fact) nor the quarrel context (27-41n.): a name must suffice for now. Perhaps this assumes the audience's familiarity with the back-story, and could suggest that *Op.* was a poem designed for (or shaped by) reperformance.

Although we are never explicitly told who is the elder and who the younger brother, there is a presumption that Perses is the younger sibling in need of educating: see e.g. Hesiod's condescending tone at 286; at 86 the analogy with cunning Prometheus and foolish brother Epimetheus suggests there will be dire consequences if Perses does not listen to Hesiod. Hesiod is allied with the Good Eris, 'a living representative of the good spirit of competition' (Walcot 1966:85), while Perses champions Bad Eris (14-16n.) – surely it is no coincidence that the Good Eris is the elder sister (17n.). In the wider tradition of wisdom poetry the Akkadian *Counsels of Wisdom* (54) features the precept *amur aha rabâ*, 'obey the elder brother'. Indeed, the wider tradition usually has this same logical premise of the elder instructing the younger, though it primarily presents a 'father to son' didactic model (inc. most of the Egyptian examples – *Instruction of Amenemhet*, *Instruction of a Man to his Son*, *Instruction of Sehetipibre*, *Instruction of Amen-em-Opet*, *Instructions of 'Onchsheshonqy*, *Instruction of Ptahhotep* – as well as the Sumerian *Instruction of*

Suruppak and *The Father and his Misguided Son*, and the Akkadian *Counsels of Wisdom*). Nicolai 1964:193-4 and Walcot 1966:105 argue that this generic deviation is best explained by accepting that Perses was a real person; West 1978 and Schmidt 1986 believe that the level of individualisation in *Op.* confirms the autobiographical details as factual (for other supporters of the autobiographical reading see Fränkel 1962, Stein 1990; for a different view e.g. Griffith 1983, Stoddard 2004). However, these kinds of assumptions are methodologically unsound, as they attribute to reality what supposedly cannot be easily explained in literary terms.

We soon learn that Perses has taken more than his fair share of their inheritance (37-8); he has ingratiated himself with corrupt kings by bribery (38-9); is both a spectator of disputes (29) and an active litigant (34); and, worst of all in Hesiod's estimation, he is an idler with no secure βίος (31). Perses is a dynamic character, evolving in the course of the poem as he listens to his brother's advice. Wilamowitz sees a shift from a Hesiod trying to convince an idle Perses to work (293-319), to a Hesiod in the Calendar offering practical advice when Perses has accepted the need for work (383ff.); Clay 2003:34 traces the 'education of Perses' (p.24); Marsilio 1992:8 notes that Perses' appearances are united by increasingly severe stages of his dependence on others, until at 405 he begins to be a 'would-be farmer whose goal is self-sufficiency' – he eventually begins to aspire to Hesiod's Iron-Age ideal. Whilst some scholars argue that Hesiod's portrayal of Perses is inconsistent as 'his failings are different in different contexts' (West 1978:36), if we consider Perses' potential as a didactic tool it makes more sense to interpret these supposed inconsistencies as stages in his education: 'We would have, then, not different failings, but sequential

stages of the same failing' (Jones 1984:317). That Perses is accused of having many different faults serves to make him the perfect didactic addressee: Hesiod uses his brother's injustice as an excuse to launch into a diatribe on Justice; he marks Perses as a fool so that there is a need for him to be taught; he takes his addressee's idleness as a basis for teachings on the benefits of hard work.

ἐτήτυμα μυθησαίμην: cf. *Hom. Hymn* 2.44 ἐτήτυμα μυθήσασθαι. This phrase is ambiguous. On the one hand, if we take μυθέομαι to be a 'marked term' with connotations of storytelling (Clay 2003:32, also Yamagata in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010:85 μῦθος as fiction, λόγος grounded in reason) then it stands in contrast to the claim to ἐτήτυμα. If, however, Hesiod is using μῦθος to refer to authoritative speech (as in *Hom.* – Martin 1989) it could instead lend support to the truth claims; indeed it often appears in expressions for 'telling the truth'. In *Theog.* this second assumption seems to hold true, with μῦθος being used by the Muses at 24 and Kronos at 169. In *Op.*, however, the situation is more complex; here, μῦθος is often authoritative, but not always straight and true – at 194 crooked words are used by wicked people; at 206 the hawk speaks imperiously to the nightingale; at 263 the kings need to straighten their words (though there δίκας is attested as a variant for μύθους). In *Hom. Hymn* 2 the ambiguity is utilised as Demeter wants 'authoritative speech' but is only being told tales.

It acts as a programmatic statement, defining *Op.* from the outset as a poem concerned with veracity and precision. It could explain the autobiographical passages interspersed in the poem, as doses of realism in keeping with this programme. Forbes 1950 suggests that Hesiod's claim to the truth (the whole truth,

and nothing but the truth) is appropriate for a litigant appealing to Zeus. It can be connected with the invocation to the Muses, as in *Theog.* the Muses are associated with truth: 28 ἴδμεν δ'εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι. The Muses are ambiguous figures in this respect, however, as they can also 'speak lies that sound like the truth' (*Theog.* 27 ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα – see esp. Pucci 2007). We are led to draw a comparison between the veracity of Muse-inspired poetry and that of Hesiod's own poetry after he has broken away from their influence. This also raises the issue of different kinds of knowledge; Hesiod can be trusted with Iron-Age matters, but for cosmogonic narrative he needs higher authentication. See Clay 2003:78: in *Theog.* 'Hesiod could indeed transmit the words of the Muses, but he could not guarantee the truth of those words, because of his inevitable mortal incapacity to distinguish *aletheia* from *pseudos*', so *Op.* is more reliable because the poet can vouch for his own truth. Hesiod allies himself with his Iron-Age audience by telling them their kind of truth, and simultaneously establishes didactic authority by asserting his capacity to do so (*pace* Stoddard 2004:191).

11-26 The two Erides.

A pointed addition to *Theog.* 225-32, which only contemplated a single Strife: Ἐρις στρυγερή. Much of Hesiodic scholarship has striven to prove the relative compositional chronology of *Theog.* and *Op.* (e.g. Walcot 1966, Most in Arrighetti/Montanari 1993, Rousseau 1996), with *Theog.* emerging as the first enterprise partly because of this passage. However, given that the poems operate so

well together in creating a coherent world overview (from the dawn of time, *Theog.* 115 ἐξ ἀρχῆς, 116 πρῶτιστα, to the present day, *Op.* 176 νῦν γὰρ δὴ γένος ἐστὶ σιδήρεον), and that the links, overlaps and divergences between them are so artfully manipulated, more useful is a synchronic view of the poems' composition (Clay 2003:6). Whether or not *Theog.* was actually composed before *Op.*, the point is that Hesiod composed them to be read together. However, the passage would have made sense even without prior knowledge of *Theog.*, if (as the negative depiction of Eris in heroic epic would suggest) Hesiod is adding not only to his own poem, but also to a standard assumption: at this point we need not go so far as to say that 'The poet seems to take it for granted that *The Theogony* was well known to his readers or listeners' (Kumaniecki 1963:70).

Hesiod exemplifies Good Strife by competing with himself as author of *Theog.* and by ostensibly correcting the depiction of a single Eris in heroic epic (e.g. *Il.* 4.440-5 Eris sister of Ares, 5.518, 5.740, 11.2-12, 11.73-4, 18.535, 20.48; see further Mazon 42, Stoddard 2004:17, Koning 2010:276-7, and esp. Thalmann 2004:376 who points out that whilst this is a correction of the *explicit* uses of *eris*, it may also tap into the multiple potentialities *implicit* elsewhere). His statement does not contradict his previous claims, but adds information relevant to this poem: Strife in *Theog.* is always bad because it spells intergenerational conflict and upheaval (e.g. *Theog.* 637, 705, 710), and in Hom. is often synonymous with war (e.g. *Il.* 3.7 κακὴν ἔριδα, 20.55 ἔριδα βαρβαρίαν), whereas Good Strife suits Hesiod's focus in *Op.* on mankind, who can fight (Bad Eris) but can also compete (Good Eris). The programmatic claim to tell 'true things' (10n. ἐτήτυμα) is borne out in this surprising revelation (Verdenius

14, Thalmann 2004:365n15), matched by surprising vocabulary: neither ἐπιωμητή nor ἄνδιχα (13) are used elsewhere in Hesiod, and 18 ὑψίζυγος (see note) is never found in *Theog.*

The two Strifes are used as a structural tool, highlighting the difference in character between Hesiod and Perses (13n.) and containing a programmatic element: themes from 11-26 are worked out later in the poem (Hamilton 1989:58 specifies ‘in the second part’ i.e. from 286): πλούσιον 313, ἀρώμεναι 429, φυτεύειν 812, οἶκον 365, γείτων 345-9, πτωχός 395, ἀοιδός 208. See further Quaglia 1973:33-48, Gagarin in Griffith/Mastrorade 1990:173-83.

11-13 The first three lines give a summary of the situation: there are two kinds of Eris rather than one, and they are very different. The revelation and its deviation from *Theog.* are consistently emphasised. First, Hesiod starts with a negative (11 οὐκ), heightening tension before the revelation. Next, the use of ἄρα fits Denniston’s (1954:35-7) category of ‘expressing the surprise attendant upon disillusionment’; Most in Arrighetti/Montanari 1993:78 argues that what such uses ‘have in common is a difference, in understanding and in time, between two phases: an earlier one of incomplete or false knowledge (that marked by ἄρα and the past-tense verb) and a later one, chastened by experience and less inadequate in cognition’, thus marking that Hesiod is not contradicting but refining his *Theog.* description of Eris, in light of his experience in Iron-Age matters. This shift in perception over time is suggested by the shift from imperfect (11 ἔην) to present (12 εἰσὶ). The revelation itself is then emphasised by the enjambment 11-12, topicalising 12 εἰσὶ δὺω, and the increase in number of Erides is exaggerated by the use of γένος

at 11: perhaps driven by the genealogical armature of *Theog.*, Hesiod speaks of ‘a race of Strifes’ when in *Theog.* he introduced only one Eris, and is about to extend that number only to two, not an entire family.

These lines introduce the idea of multiple paths between which we must choose independently. There are two (opposite) Erides: the difference between them is emphasised by 13 διὰ δ’ ἄνδιχα θυμὸν ἔχουσιν, a type of phrase generally used of disagreement over a particular matter (as at *Il.*20.32 δίχα θυμὸν ἔχοντες or *Hom. Hymn* 4.315 ἀμφὶς θυμὸν ἔχοντες) but here used to refer to an innate difference in character or disposition – cf. Hesiod and Perses themselves (further Walcot 1966:85). The two Erides are described in terms of praise (12 ἐπαινῆσαι; of competition again in its other appearance in Hes. at *Theog.*664) and blame (13 ἐπιμωμητή), in other words how people react to them (noted by Quaglia 1973:37 and Nagler 1992:88-9): we can choose between following Good or Bad Eris, a choice which involves independent judgement, encapsulated in these evaluative terms. 12 νοήσας is the first expression in *Op.* of the importance of the capacity to understand (as Arrighetti 1998:404 points out), a capacity pivotal for Hesiod’s didactic method as he urges his audience to think for themselves. That the Erides are formulated in terms of how people react to them also suggests the importance of reputation: see 159, 244, 284, 313, 477-8, 482, 701, 715-16, 721, 760-4.

14-16 The Bad Eris. 14 gives an initial description, but needs 15 to specify the subject: σχετλίη (most often of deeds in Hes. – σχέτλια ἔργα 124, 238, 254 – and the Iron Race are σχέτλιοι at 187). Bad Eris is embodied by Perses, as both help

quarrels: 14 δῆριν ὀφέλλει (Bad Eris), 33 δῆριν ὀφέλλοις (Perses; ὀφέλλω again in an instruction to Perses at 213).

That mortals honour Bad Eris is said to be due to the compulsion (15 ἀνάγκης) arising from the gods' plans. ἀνάγκη is a strong force, and in later literature is personified: at Eur. *Alc.*962-80 even Zeus must look to the goddess Ἀνάγκη for help; at Hdt. 8.111 Themistokles refers to her and Πειθῶ (see 73) as the two 'great gods'. This agency of the gods is somewhat incongruous in *Op.*, as even in the mythical passages the onus tends to be on mortal culpability: 89 the gods create Pandora, but it is Epimetheus who accepts her; 139 the Silver Race are destroyed because of their *hybris*; 152 the Bronze Race destroy themselves; 180-1 Zeus will destroy the Iron Race when their behaviour becomes unacceptable. This is a reflection of the fact that Bad Eris featured in heroic epic and in *Theog.*, where the gods played a greater role, whereas Good Eris is exclusively Iron-Age.

17-20 Good Eris. We are told that her mother is Νύξ ἐρεβεννή, an epithet formula also used at *Theog.*213 in the same metrical position. Night generally gives birth to negative concepts: *Theog.*211 Κῆρα – *Op.*92; *Theog.*212 καὶ Θάνατον, τέκε δ' Ὕπνον – *Op.*116 θνητῶν δ' ὥσθ' ὕπνω δεδμημένοι; *Theog.*214 Μῶμον – *Op.*756; *Theog.*214 Ὀϊζύν – *Op.*113, 177; *Theog.*217 Μοίρα – *Op.*745, 765; *Theog.*223 Νέμεσιν – *Op.*200; *Theog.*225 Γῆρας – *Op.*114, 331, 705. Following the relevant branch of the genealogy, appearances of children of Ἔρις: Πόνος (91, 113, 470), Λιμός (230, 243, 299, 302, 363, 404, 647), Ἄλγος (133, 200, 211, 741, 799), Νεῖκος (29, 30, 33, 35), Ἄτη (216, 231, 352, 413), Ὀρκος (194, 219, 804). For more on Hesiod's personification of abstracts see

Stafford 2000 (Πειθώ and Νέμεσις), Cairns 1993 (Αἰδώς) and Burkert in Stafford/Herrin 2005 (Near Eastern parallels).

She is the elder sibling: 17 προτέρην. Ercolani argues against the majority of commentators: that this does not suggest superiority, and that comparative examples such as *Il*.2.707 ὁ δ' ἄμα πρότερος καὶ ἀρείων are not conclusive because of their use of a qualifying adj. However, even if προτέρην does not indicate superiority by itself, it is equated with 19 ἀμείνω and therefore qualified. Although a later addition to Hesiod's poetic pantheon, Good Strife is firmly established and embedded in the earth (19 ῥίζησι; for more on the role of earth in *Op.* see 121n.). This 'rooting' has been interpreted in many ways, e.g. Good Strife is as old as the world (Mazon); she is a fundamental principle of human life (Verdenius, Arrighetti 1998:404). By internalising competition and by being herself embedded in the roots of the earth, she introduces the theme of being 'within' which continues through 41, the benefit in mallow and asphodel, to 42, the hidden sustenance of the Prometheus narrative (Beye 1972:31). Indeed, Nagler 1988 goes so far as to contend that *eris*, as opposed to *alke*, refers specifically to conflict *within* a community (though Thalmann 2004:371 is right in pointing out that this is not the whole picture: *eris* is both intracommunal and intercommunal). Her position in the earth marks her as a chthonic goddess (like Demeter) appropriate for a poem concerned with working the land: Good Strife was elided in heroic epic and in *Theog.* but is crucial for the Iron Age in which hard work and self-sufficiency predominate. Good Strife's closeness to the earth stands in contrast with Zeus Κρονίδης ὑψίζυγος αἰθέρι ναίων (18, and *Il*.4.166), a series of epithets which not only evokes Zeus' supreme

authority but points out that he is as far from the earth as possible; ὑψίζυγος is of unclear meaning but probably means 'high-seated' (see also Verdenius and Tandy/Neale 1996:52 for its potential as a seafaring metaphor), and is never used in *Theog.* because it suggests Zeus has established his supreme authority, a stability which is not certain until after the *Theog.* narrative.

There may, however, be an element of threat to 19 ῥίζησι. The word appears at *Theog.* 728 and 812 of Tartarus, so we would expect ῥίζα to be used here of Bad Strife, the more likely to be associated with the underworld, but Hesiod includes it in his positive description. This reversal of expectation reinforces *Op.*'s departure from *Theog.* and suggests the fine line between Good and Bad Strife, so closely related that words with negative associations filter through to the positive concept. On a structural level, the interweaving of the positive and negative leaves the lines open to interpretation: we need the context to clarify which Eris is being described (cf. 25 κοτέει and 26 φθονέει, verbs which are not clearly positive).

Good Eris encourages hard work, the first priority in Iron-Age living. At 20 she rouses even the idle to work. The same idea is refined at 573, where the farmer himself rouses his workers; by that point in Hesiod's teachings, it is hoped that the audience has learned the value of work and can undertake it self-sufficiently, without the urging of Eris.

21-4 The consequences of Good Strife. They are spelled out in 'three loosely connected statements' (Beye 1972:27), although the sense is cumulative, and end with the subject spelled out: 24 ἀγαθὴ δ' Ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσιν. Good Eris engenders

competition. It makes you look at the work of others (21 εἰς ἕτερον γὰρ τίς τε ἰδών) so that you might be more productive yourself: cf. 477-8 if you follow Hesiod's farming programme, you will not have to look to another – on the contrary, at 482 the man who reaps little will not be admired by others. It makes you envy others: 23 ζηλοῖ is expanded upon at 312, where the same verb is used to define the envious neighbour as the idle man and the envied neighbour as the hard worker. LSJ I 1a suggests 'in bad sense, *to be jealous of, envy*' – but inspiring envy is the work of the Good rather than Bad Eris, and although the process may not be entirely positive the result is here intended to be so (contrast its destructive results at 195-6). It makes you hurry (22 σπεύδει, 24 σπεύδοντ') to complete seasonal tasks (22 ἀρώμεναι ἥδ' ἐφυτεύειν: for the particulars see the Calendar 383-617) at the right time: for Hesiod's concern with the right time see further 30-2n.

Good Eris encourages internalised competition: with oneself, like Hesiod competing within his own poetic project, or within a trade, like Hesiod breaking away from other poetry. This is emphasised by the polyptoton γείτονα γείτων (23) – cf. 25-6, 51-3, 182-3, 189, 353, 380, 382, 644; *Theog.* 380, 742 (*Il.* 13.130-1, 16.111, *Od.* 1.313, 7.120-1, 9.47, 10.82, 17.217) – a phrase which may have been proverbial as Ercolani notes that polyptoton and δέ τε (cf. 218, 284, 456) are characteristic of proverbs. As Edwards 2004:92 notes, Hesiod 'explicitly establishes the neighbourhood, the village, as the arena for this sentiment of admiring envy'. General advice can be extrapolated from Hesiod's teachings, but in the context of the poem they are designed first and foremost for the *oikos*.

The unit contains an apparent anacolouthon, perhaps indicating that the text is corrupt, or that in putting together traditional elements Hesiod did not quite iron everything out. Many attempts have been made to smooth the syntax: χατίζει for 21 χατίζων (hyparchetype Ω and a variant reading in Stob., adopted by e.g. Mazon, Rzach), contributing the elusive main verb; ἴδεν for 21 ἰδών (Waeschke's conjecture, adopted by Solmsen); deleting 22 ὅς (Wilamowitz), the most attractive option as later insertion of ὅς is not difficult to imagine, and σπεύδει would be rendered the main verb as at e.g. Solon fr.13.43, a poem heavily influenced by the Hesiodic model.

25-6 A priamel elaborating on internalised competition (p.32-3). This could be a traditional proverb (*pace* Verdenius who argues that 'the metre does not suit a proverb'): κοτέει and φθονέει are the only instances in Hesiod of such an ending left uncontracted, except for verbs with monosyllabic roots; as Ercolani notes, the verb choices may be explained in terms of a wish for alliteration (25 κ-, 26 πτ/φθ-), making a catchy maxim; the uses of polyptoton and chiasmus (κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ...τέκτονι τέκτων) are strikingly mnemonic.

κότος and φθόνος exist between members of the same profession. All of these professions are played out in the course of the poem: Hesiod the singer, Perses the beggar; the *pithos*, the plough, the wagon and the house produced by the potter and the carpenter (Hamilton 1989:59). This agonistic attitude led to the tradition of a poetry contest between Homer and Hesiod, see 654-9 and *Certamen* 149 φθονῶν – Hesiod becomes jealous of Homer, is encouraged by Good Eris, and his competitive approach results in success, just as he predicted here in *Op.* Stoddard (2004:17,

following Rousseau 1996) takes this reference to singer competing with singer as metapoetic: ‘the question with which Hesiod is dealing in this section is actually one of poetic genres’. This would be the first of many anti-Homeric meta-narratives within *Op.*: see also 582-4n., 646-62n., 651-3n., 663-78n., and (more tenuously) 37-9n., 40-1n. Solon takes up and criticises these lines at fr.13:43-62, elaborating upon different professions and their various fates.

κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ: Arist. *Pol.* reverses the order (κεραμεῖ κεραμεύς) to make a parallelism, as in 26. The sequence of rivalries was also disputed in antiquity – Plato puts the singers in place of the builders, Priscus has the τέκτων in 26. A poem *Κεραμεῖς* was attributed to Hesiod in antiquity (Poll. *Lex.*10.85), perhaps because of this line.

26 πτωχός: the beggar brings into focus the issue of βίος, livelihood, which is so central to *Op.* (30-2n.). For begging cf. 394-404, 453-4. For ‘the use of poverty, hunger and material need as metaphorical representations of poetic drive or inspiration’, see Rosen 1990:106-7.

27-41 The Quarrel: νεῖκος (29, 30, 33 the disputes of others; 35 Perses’ own dispute with Hesiod). Such focus on a νεῖκος could be another example of Hesiod marking his divergence from heroic epic: cf. 1n. κλείουσai, 9n. κλῦθι, 620n., 651-3n., 663-78n. Quarrels pervade much of the epic tradition, for example that between Achilles and Agamemnon, that depicted on the Shield of Achilles *Il.*18.497-508, or that between Odysseus and Achilles told of in *Od.*8.75-82, but the dispute between Hesiod and

Perses is of a markedly different type: they are arguing not over spoils of war, but over the distribution of their inheritance. They are concerned with land and with *bios*: essentially Iron-Age concerns (though for a hint of this in the Age of Heroes see 163n.). For the didactic value of the quarrel see p.43-5.

These lines contain the highest concentration of ‘facts’ relating to the situation between Hesiod and his brother Perses (see 10n. and p.29-30, 43-5). However, the quarrel is not fully explained, and is difficult to reconstruct. For (methodologically unsound) attempts to piece together details of the quarrel by combining lines from different sections of the poem see e.g. Mazon, Marsilio 2000:2. For attempts to parallel the quarrel in *Op.* with heroic epic see Rousseau 1996:54, Stoddard 2004:17. For ‘reconstructions’ of the trial process see Latimer 1930, Forbes 1950. All that is clear about such a trial is that the brothers have a choice between deciding for themselves, and getting the kings to adjudicate (cf. *Il.*23.570-85).

27-9 Address to Perses (also 213, 274, 289, 299, 397, 611, 641). This marks a shift from general maxim to specific address. There is also a shift from approbation of the Good Eris with which Hesiod ended, back to a warning against 28 Ἐρις κακόχαρτος. This is necessary because of Perses’ Bad-Eris tendencies (14-16n.). Bad Eris distracts Perses from work (28 ἀπ’ ἔργου). However, it is not idleness *per se* which is featured as the problem here (though it is at 303, 311, 495, 501, 574), but watching and listening to disputes. This is an issue, first, because quarrelling and work are mutually exclusive activities (given the time and attention both require – see 30, and Jones 1984:308): competition between members of the same profession, on the other hand, helps rather than hinders work. Secondly, it is a problem because

watching (ὀπιπεύοντ') and listening (ἐπακουὸν ἔόντα) are passive activities entirely dependent upon others. This does not fit with Hesiod's programme of self-sufficiency: although he advocates learning from others (295 ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ καὶ κεῖνος, ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται), dependency is discouraged.

With the exhortation 27 τεῶ ἐνικάτθεο θυμῶ (~Hom. σὺ δ' ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῆσιν – at *Op.* 107, similarly 274) Hesiod gives Perses *et al.* instructions, which they must 'store up' in their hearts i.e. consider and use. Hesiod uses the same formula with which he advises self-sufficiency of the *oikos* (627 ἐγκάτθεο οἴκῳ), thus linking intellectual and practical self-sufficiency (Pucci 1977:110, Marsilio 2000:23). The image of Perses watching quarrels will be recalled by that of the young farmhand looking around at his companions (444 παπταίνων μεθ' ὁμήλικας): 'Perses is thereby associated with the idle excitement of youth' (Marsilio 2000:52) and the threat to productivity it poses. That the *agora* threatens productivity is not solely a Greek motif: cf. Akkadian *Counsels of Wisdom* 31-6, *Instructions of Šuruppak* 22-31.

The adjective κακόχαρτος is used only here and at 196 of Ζῆλος, making a connection between two personified concepts concerned with competition; yet this link is unexpected, as at 23 envy was a mark of *Good* Eris. See 195-6n. on ambivalent *zelos*, and 25-6n. on *eris*.

30-2 ὥρη...ὥραϊος: watching disputes and making stores are marked out as mutually exclusive. ὥρη meaning 'concern' creates a word-play with 32 ὥραϊος, framing this as a memorable unit: the modified word-play ὥρη/ὥρη is already established in *Theog.* 901-3. ὥρη 'time'/'season' (read by e.g. Troxler 1964:11-12, Jensen 1966) would indeed make this word-play more evident, but is the *lectio*

facilior. Accentuation and breathings are late features of the written text but are likely to have been transmitted through performance, where pronunciation could be playfully manipulated.

These lines introduce some of *Op.*'s key themes. 31 βίος, livelihood i.e. the production needed to sustain life, is of central importance in *Op.*: also at 42, 232, 316, 501, 577, 601, 634, 689 (similarly βίोटος at 167, 301, 307, 400, 476, 499). It is usually either qualified (501, 577 ἄρκιος, 634 ἐσθλοῦ) or quantified (601, 689 πάντα, 232 πολύν) – here it is both: timely, ripe *bios* (ώραῖος) sufficient for a year (ἐπηετανός). ἐπηετανός is etymologised as either from ἐπ' αἰεί or ἐπ' ἔτος. The literal meaning 'enough for a year' is not always appropriate (e.g. at 517, *pace* West), but here it works in accordance with Hesiod's focus on the annual cycle of *bios* (Jones 1984:310). ώραῖος introduces the idea of the right time: livelihood must be timely (31-2, 307), as must ploughing (617), sailing (630, 642, 665) and marriage (695). On the right time see 294n., 368-9n., 543n., 642n., and esp. 383-617n. 31 ἔνδον continues the theme of things kept 'within' (cf. 17-20n.), which is important in terms of storing up *bios* and Hesiod's teachings, in terms of keeping to oneself (i.e. self-sufficiency), and in connection with the motif of hiding, which is prominent in the Prometheus and Pandora myths and which is indicative of Hesiod's cryptic didactic method.

32 further specifies the kind of *bios* with which Hesiod is concerned (Jones 1984:310): his main focus is agriculture (ἀκτῆν) and, though earth bears crops, unlike at 43-5 (the world without Prometheus) and 117 (the Golden Age) men have to work for them. Crops are described as Δημήτερος ἀκτῆ, words which appear in Hesiod only together, becoming an inextricable noun-epithet pair: 466, 597, 805 (and

Il.13.322, 21.76). This gives us an indication of the role of the divine in *Op.*: Hesiod's focus is on chthonic gods, as the most relevant to agriculture, and in the Iron-Age context they are not on the whole vivid characters with their own narratives but something more like forces of nature.

33 δῆριν ὀφέλλοις: this makes the connection between Perses and Bad Eris (14-16n.). Steitz 1869 and Schoemann 1869 conjecture (although Solmsen claims it is attested in *C ante correcturam*) ὀφέλλοι, impersonal use, so that 34 σοὶ δ' expresses a contrast between agents. West is inclined to agree; Verdenius objects on the grounds that at 402 there is no contrast between σύ and other persons (again, *contra* West). Emendation is, in any case, unnecessary both grammatically and for the sense. If σοὶ δ' is to be read as emphatic (which in itself is not strictly necessary), it should rather be expressing a temporal contrast between the prior situation and the envisaged one (33-6).

34-5 There is a shift from Perses as observer to Perses as active litigant. The threat to self-sufficiency posed by quarrels is now even more evident, as not only is Perses neglecting his own productivity whilst wasting his time watching others but he is now actively trying to take others' possessions (κτήμασ' ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις). Indeed, Perses' dependence on others links his appearances at 27-41, 293-319, 394-404 (315 ἀλλοτρίων, 395 ἀλλοτρίους).

35-6 Hesiod attempts a reconciliation. 35 αὖθι expresses his eagerness for resolution, having potentially both temporal ('at once') and locative ('right here') force here (Marsilio 2000:46, Tandy/Neale 1996:54, West). Hesiod takes matters into his own hands: διακρινώμεθα. Not only does he seek to be self-sufficient in

agriculture and in poetry, and advocate self-sufficient learning, but he also wants self-sufficient justice. Justice and judgements come from Zeus (36 ἐκ Διός), who gives authority to kings (*Theog.*84-6). This chain functioned in *Theog.*, where kings dispensed straight judgements; in *Op.*, however, the kings are corrupt (219, 250, 264) and so, for straight judgements (36 ἰθείησι δίκης: cf. *Theog.*85-6, *Op.*225-6, *Hom. Hymn* 2.152) Hesiod and Perses must bypass them (e.g. Clay in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:75). Further, marking out straight judgements as the ‘best’ (ἄριστα) is in itself a self-authorising move: Hesiod claims didactic authority, presenting himself as arbiter (cf. 279-80n., 293-7n.).

37-9 The terms of the quarrel. We finally get the back-story (37 ἤδη): the brothers divided up their father’s estate (37 κληῖρον), but Perses took more than his fair share (37 ἄλλα τε πολλά is an ambiguous phrase, see Pucci 1977:52, Gagarin 1992:72-3 – presumably additional portions of land, or possessions. Marsilio 2000:49, following Rosen, suggests that we are to think of the father’s *poetic* legacy, making this a quarrel over poetry). 38 ἐφόρεις is an imperfect which it seems to me can logically be neither iterative (as Fränkel 1960:89n2) nor conative (as van Groningen 1957:4, Gagarin 1974b, Arrighetti 1998:406): see 34 οὐκέτι δεύτερον ἔσται – Perses has done this only once before, and with apparent success. If the sense were ingressive, however, then it would emphasise Perses’ intentions – he *began* to take away many additional things, but has now come back for more.

38-9 βασιλῆας| δωροφάγους: addressed directly at 202, 248, 263; described as δωροφάγους also at 221, 264. Hesiod is not specific about their identity or position in society, only about their role as arbitrators: *Op.*’s advice is intended to be widely

applicable rather than appropriate to only one area or system. West suggests they could be comparable to the Phaeacian elders in *Od.* (called βασιλῆες at 6.54, 7.49, 8.41, 390), or the two Spartan kings in later writers such as Tyrtaeus, or rulers of the district. The title is even used of Ouranos (*Theog.*486), Kronos (*Theog.*476) and Zeus (*Theog.*886, *Op.*688). For further discussion see Tandy/Neale 1996:16-21.

The kings (to choose an appellation) of *Op.* are corrupt and greedy, taking more than is their due. It has been argued that δωροφάγους could simply be a reference to the usual fee paid to the mediator by participants in arbitration (Gagarin 1974b): see a similar sort of gift exchange at *Il.*18.508. However, even if payment was usual in such circumstances, the term here is loaded and markedly derogatory: Hesiod does not want the case between himself and his brother to fill the kings' bellies, especially when the judgement may end up being crooked. For δῶρον as 'bribe' see the γραφή δώρων (prosecution for bribery) procedure in Athenian law: Harp. *s.v.* (Keaney), Aeschin. 3.232; MacDowell 1978:172-4. 38 κυδαίνων indeed implies that Perses has been bribing the kings, or at the very least flattering them (cf. *Il.*23.793) to secure their support. For the formulation βασιλῆας δωροφάγους cf. *Il.*1.231 δημοβόρος βασιλεύς; for the idea of 'eating' gifts cf. *Il.*2.237 γέρα πεσσέμεν (πέσσω literally means 'digest', though by extension 'brood over').

This negative image of kings in *Op.* stands in contrast with the positive description in *Theog.* (81-92). Tandy 1997:194-227 explains this as a response to real economic and social changes in the poet's world: but even without positing a real world backdrop, it is appropriate to Hesiod's didactic setting as it taps into very Iron-Age

concerns about injustice. On a didactic level, Hesiod's authoritative persona allows him to address even kings as inferior when it suits his purpose.

40-1 Both proverbs champion frugal but honest living over unjust gain (Marsilio 2000:50 sees a rather Callimachean metanarrative of modest Hesiodic poetry prioritised over heroic epic); 40 suggests the zero-sum nature of the Iron-Age world; 41 praises the foods which need little cultivation i.e. ease the Iron-Age farmer's burden of labour. That the message is not immediately evident, however, is indicative of Hesiod's interest in hiding his meaning so that his audience have to work for it, much as they have to work for *bios* (p.50). That Hesiod *presents* the proverbs as transparent establishes his authoritative didactic persona and superior knowledge (p.54-6). By addressing the kings as νήπιοι Hesiod adopts a tone of superiority: he knows more than these fools he is teaching (and even taunting).

Plut. *Mor.*36a-b equates 40 and 266 with the doctrines of Plato in *Grg.* (473a and 474c) and *Resp.* (354a, 334d), giving the meaning 'to do wrong is worse than to be wronged' – on this sort of enforced alignment of the poets and the philosophers see Koning 2010:96-101.

42-58 Prometheus.

The myth functions as an *aition*, explaining the roots of the Iron-Age human condition with which *Op.* is concerned. Read in a linear way the story of Pandora then adds to the picture of Iron-Age hardship, making the point that no transgression against Zeus goes unpunished. However, the two parts of the myth

could also be separated out and still achieve the same cosmic result: the myth of Prometheus begins with the gods hiding *bios*, and Pandora's actions release (amongst other evils) toil i.e. the need to search for *bios*.

The same story is narrated also at *Theog.*534-69. There the quarrel between Zeus and Prometheus is described at greater length, true to the poem's focus on the relationship between the gods (as opposed to a focus on humans in *Op.*). Because *Op.*'s account is the shorter, it has been used since antiquity as evidence for *Theog.*'s diachronic precedence: Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)48a δῆλον δὲ ὡς προεκδέδοται ἡ Θεογονία; also Beall 1991, Arrighetti 1998:384.

For the wider myth of Prometheus see e.g. Vandvik 1943 and Griffith 1983 on [Aesch.] *PV*; also Vernant 1980, Dougherty 2006. For Near Eastern parallels see Penglase 1994:166-92. For Hesiod's version as an amalgamation of disparate elements from the wider mythology see West; for its unity Vernant 1980, Clay 2003:101. Most relevant to this passage is the tradition in which Prometheus himself is credited with creating man from clay – e.g. Hes. fr.268, Ar. *Av.*686, Paus. 10.4.4, Hor. *Carm.*1.16.13-16. For Hesiod's engagement with this tradition see Walcot 1966:63 (Hesiod knew of Prometheus only as a benefactor, not as a creator); Carter Philips 1973:292 (Hesiod knew of the tradition but it didn't fit in his compressed narrative).

42 The emphasis on the hidden provides a transition (explanatory γὰρ) from the previous line in which nourishment was hidden in meagre foods (Beye 1972:31),

and Hesiod's message hidden in a riddle. See Naiden 2003 for a parallel with *The Epic of Gilgamesh*.

The sequence of verbs (κρύψαντες γὰρ ἔχουσι) denotes a two-stage process of ongoing restriction – the gods hide *bios* and keep it. Cf. *Il*.1.356, 507 ἐλὼν γὰρ ἔχει γέρας αὐτὸς ἀπούρας, *Thgn*. 1.1061-2 οἱ μὲν γὰρ κακότητα κατακρύψαντες ἔχουσιν | πλούτῳ, τοὶ δ' ἀρετὴν οὐλομένην πενίῃ. The responsibility here is given to θεοί; at 47 Ζεὺς ἔκρυψε it switches to Zeus in particular (though see 47-9n. for various interpretative possibilities). That Prometheus' relationship with mankind is antithetical to that which the gods in general have with men is emphasised by the datives 42 ἀνθρώποισιν and 51 ἀνθρώποισι: at 42 the gods keep *bios* hidden *from* men, in 51 Prometheus steals fire *for* men.

Euseb. *Praep. evang.*14.4.15, quoting Arcesilaus, quotes this single line from *Op.* but reads νόον instead of βίον (see also 62n.). This misses both a key *Op.* theme and the Iron-Age aetiological function of the Prometheus narrative, and is likely to reflect the Platonic thrust of Eusebius' argument (the gods hide νόον: men cannot know ideal forms). This example of reception shows that the line, with its sequence of verbs and opposition between θεοί and ἀνθρώποισιν, is memorable and usable, but that it is *bios* which gives it its Hesiodic intent and that only by replacing *bios* can the range of potential meanings be extended further.

43-6 The world as it would have been had Prometheus not deceived Zeus. The idyllic state is formulated very much from a farmer's point of view: agriculture still features, but the point is that it is easy (43 ῥηιδίως: in the Iron Age this is a privilege

of Zeus alone, cf. 5-7). Similarly, sustenance must be taken from the earth in the Golden Age (117-19) but it requires no work, and the Heroic Race on the Isles of the Blessed do not flourish in a way separate from agriculture but rather get three crops a year (170-3).

The second stipulation of the idyllic condition is that seafaring should be kept to a minimum and accomplished quickly (45 αἶψα: see Hesiod's dislike of seafaring at 618-94). The reuse of the formulation at 629 highlights the discrepancy between this ideal and the Iron-Age reality: at 629 hanging up the rudder marks merely a hiatus in the cycle of labour. The repetition of the motif also shows Hesiod using an image from the practical experience of his audience to describe more vividly a (hypothetical) mythical age. Seafaring is essentially problematic in that it conflicts with Hesiod's ideal of self-sufficiency: it involves leaving the *oikos* and engaging in trade. He envisages a world in which there is no need for trade because the earth produces sufficient *bios*.

That this is a hypothetical situation is indicated by the syntax: 43 κεν (=ἄν) plus aorist optative expresses present or future potential, rarely a past (in which case it still expresses an unrealised possibility: *Il*.5.311, 19.90 exclamation about Delusion). These lines therefore do not describe a remembered 'pre-Prometheus' world (*pace* Fontenrose 1974:1, Clay in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:76), for which cf. 90-2n. The hypothetical scenario is emphasised by contrasting phrases (43-4 ἐπ' ἧματι...ἐνιαυτόν; ἐργάσσαιο...ἀεργὸν ἔόντα) and by repeated emphatic καί (καὶ ἐπ' ἧματι...κεῖς ἐνιαυτόν...καὶ ἀεργόν): Ercolani *ad* 43 cites *Il*.10.48, 19.229 etc. where καί underlines the difference between the hypothetical and reality.

43 ἐπ' ἡματι ἐργάσσαιο: Hesiod juxtaposes the two concepts which later gave their title to the poem. Lardinois 1998:326 links this line with the Days (765-828n.), in that both express the idea that mortals must work from day to day.

47-9 The mythical background, summarising the narrative given in full in *Theog.* There is dispute over how these lines should be interpreted. First, as the object of 47 ἔκρυψε is unspecified, Zeus could be hiding either *bios* or fire. If *bios*, there is a shift in agency from 42 to 47, specifying Zeus as the main divine protagonist in initiating the Iron-Age human condition. If fire, there is a ring composition with 50 κρύψε δὲ πῦρ. Second, Prometheus' deceit (48 ἐξαπάτησε) could refer either to the sacrifice trick, in which case it would summarise the element of the story narrated at *Theog.*535-7 but omitted in *Op.*, or to the stealing of fire, in which case Zeus must be hiding *bios* in 47, and 50 κρύψε δὲ πῦρ moves backwards chronologically (note that 48 μιν ἐξαπάτησε = *Theog.*565 of the theft of fire). The confusion here can be partially attributed to the difficulty of summing up an entire myth in a few lines. However, it may also be the case that Hesiod is expressing through ambiguous formulations the motif of hiding which is all-important here (47 ἔκρυψε, 50 κρύψε). See further p.48-9.

48 Προμηθεύς: although direct derivation is unlikely on linguistic grounds, the name was associated in antiquity with μήδεα and μῆτις: *Etym. Magn.* Προμηθεύς· κατὰ μεταβολήν, προμηδεύς, ὁ προορῶν τὰ μήδεα, τὰ βουλευόμενα. See Hesiod's repeated use of connected vocabulary e.g. *Op.*48, *Theog.*546 ἀγκυλομήτης; 51 μητιόεντος; 54 (= *Theog.*559), *Theog.*545, 550, 561 μήδεα; and brother Ἐπιμηθεύς.

ἀγκυλομήτης: variant ἀγκυλόμητις (Moschopulus, Marc. gr. 464, C^{rec}), also at *Theog.*546. Hesiod himself already etymologised ἀγκυλομήτης as ἀγκύλος + μῆτις, see *Theog.*545-7 where 547 is an etymologising gloss on 546. The later reading (genitive ἀγκυλομήτεω at *Il.*2.205, 2.319 proves that ἀγκυλομήτης is an early form) brings out the Hesiodic etymology more clearly, on the model of πολύμητις, and iotacism makes this a very easy change. ποικιλομήτης is the reading recognised by Proclus – although there are parallels (*Theog.*511 ποικίλος, 521 ποικιλόβουλος), the more direct parallel is Προμηθεὺς ἀγκυλομήτης 48 and *Theog.*546. Elsewhere in Hes. and Hom. the adjective is used only of Kronos. Kronos and the father of Prometheus are Titans (see *Theog.*134 Iapetos, and 50n.), and are the only Titans named as such in Hom. (*Il.*8.479). They are also the only individual threats to Zeus later in *Theog.*; Kronos was defeated by Zeus, as Prometheus will be (Pucci in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:60).

49 ἀνθρώποισιν: individual transgressions have consequences for everyone. See also 56, 240, 261, 269n., *Theog.*552, *Il.*1.410, *Od.*2.66-7. Whilst Hesiod does not advise dependence on others, he does advise maintaining good relations: for reciprocity as an aspect of self-sufficiency see p.56-7.

50-2 Zeus hides fire, Prometheus steals it back. Prometheus' deceit too involves hiding, as did his apportioning of meat: he hides fire in a reed (52 ἐν κοίλῳ νάρθηκι = *Theog.*567: according to Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)52, Plin. *HN*13.126, the stalk of the fennel can be used to contain fire), and he escapes Zeus' notice (52 λαθὼν Δία τερπικέραυνον). Prometheus is son of Iapetos (50 ἐὺς πάις Ἰαπετοῖο = *Theog.*565), a

Titan: he is of divine descent, but sides with mortals in his deceits (51 ἀνθρώποισι *for men*).

51 Διὸς παρὰ μητιόεντος: cf. 273, 769, *Theog.*286, 457: in these cases the epithet is used appropriately. Here, however, it is a shocking oxymoron (*Lfgre*): Zeus ‘wise in counsel’ is (it would seem) deceived by the lesser god Prometheus. Further, Zeus’ power is emphasised by the next in the sequence of epithets: τερπικέραυνον, meaning ‘delighting in thunder’, used often in Hom. but only here in Hes. There is debate over whether or not omniscient Zeus (*Theog.*545, 551) could actually have been deceived (Vandvik 1943:11, Stoddard 2004:102). Nevertheless, the moral of the story is that Zeus is never deceived for long – he retaliates (hiding fire, creating woman) and, ultimately, 105 οὕτως οὐ τί πη ἔστι Διὸς νόον ἐξαλέασθαι.

53-8 Zeus’ threat. The speech begins in much the same way as did that at *Theog.*558-9: 53-4 repeats *Theog.*558-9 almost verbatim, with the exception of μέγ’ ὀχθήσας changing in *Op.* to χολωσάμενος, probably to follow 47 χολωσάμενος. In 54-5 Zeus begins by recognising Prometheus’ cunning, though it did not deceive him for long: 54 πάντων πέρι μήδεα εἰδώς. πάντων πέρι denotes the extent of his cunning, meaning either ‘in all things’ or ‘above all others’ (cf. 819). μήδεα εἰδώς is used in Hes. only in the Prometheus passages, of both Prometheus (*Op.*54, *Theog.*559) and Zeus (*Theog.*545, 550, 561) and thus sets them up as duelling equals (an implication lost in the variant of ms. ω₃ κέρδεα). He acknowledges the two modes of Prometheus’ deceit, both actions (55 πῦρ κλέψας) and words: 55 ἡπεροπεύσας means here ‘to deceive with words’ (*Lfgre*), appropriately used in early hexameter only in direct speech (with the exception of *Hom. Hymn* 4.577).

In 56 the extent of the threat is emphasised. The contrast between σοί τ' αὐτῷ and ἀνδράσιν ἐσσομένοισιν marks Prometheus as the one responsible for the downfall of mankind (see 49n.), and not only mankind now but all mankind in the future. In 57-8 the threat is introduced, its nature described though its identity (Pandora) not yet specified. The punishment will be given ἀντὶ πυρός (=Theog.570), implying some kind of equivalence: indeed at 705 women singe men. Zeus warns δώσω κακόν: although the punishment is not identified, part of Pandora's compound name is used to give the audience a hint (see 81-2). Cf. Theog.222 δώωσι κακὴν (ὄπιν) is used of the Erinyes. That men will take pleasure in the evil, 58 τέρπωνται, is ironic (cf. 358n.): it evokes Pandora's very nature as the καλὸν κακόν (Theog.585) who seems pleasing, but brings evil. The verb is used in Theog. (37, 51) exclusively of the Muses pleasing Zeus – cf. 59n.

59-105 Pandora.

This account is characterised by its expansive detail. The elaboration operates on two levels: between Theog. and Op., and between 60-8 and 70-80 (for the latter see 70-80n.). This emphasis on Pandora in Op. (and, conversely, on Prometheus in Theog.) is driven by the respective focus of the two poems. Prometheus is of greater importance to Theog. because the focus is on gods and the perspective is that of the gods. Prometheus is himself the son of a Titan (Theog.134); his divine punishment is described at Theog.521-5 and again at Theog.615-16; this particular myth is included to mark the beginning of the separation between gods and men (Theog.535 καὶ γὰρ ὅτ' ἐκρίνοντο θεοὶ θνητοὶ τ' ἄνθρωποι). In Op., however, the two stories are

included primarily to explain why mankind must work (47-8), so Pandora is crucial because of her responsibility for the human condition in the Iron Age. She epitomises the 'male dilemma' (Brown 1997:26): sexual desire vs. economic stability; family continuity vs. problems of property and inheritance (Clay 2003:120); the intractable human institution of marriage. Women consume resources (373-5) and increase the need for livelihood. Thus the Pandora myth in *Op.* should be understood as an elaboration of *Theog.*, emphasising Woman's impact on mankind and her responsibility for the Iron-Age human condition. For Hesiod's women defining the human condition see further: the stealing woman (373-5n.), the working woman (405-6n.), the tender-skinned maiden (519-23n.), the wife (702-3n.).

The two Hesiodic versions of the myth are interlinked: there are adapted lines, e.g. the Woman's creation in *Theog.* is announced with 570-1 αὐτίκα δ' ἅντι πυρὸς τεῦξεν κακὸν ἀνθρώποισι· | γαίης γὰρ σύμπλασσε περικλυτὸς Ἀμφιγυήεις, and at the corresponding point of *Op.* we have a shorter version of these lines 70 αὐτίκα δ' ἐκ γαίης πλάσσε κλυτὸς Ἀμφιγυήεις; there are even identical lines: *Op.* 71-2 = *Theog.* 572-3. We cannot help but consider the two versions *in tandem*.

That the *Op.* version of the Pandora myth arises from a refocusing of that in *Theog.* can be indicated first by a comparison between the relative proportions of the two versions: *Theog.* gives Prometheus 34 lines, but the Woman/Wife only 29; *Op.* instead leaves Pandora 46 lines, but Prometheus just 17. Second, it can be indicated by the distribution of allusions in the two versions. Each version alludes to episodes given in full in the other (Vernant 1980, Most in Arrighetti/Montanari 1993:89-90): Prometheus' sacrifice trick is narrated fully at *Theog.* 536-7 but is only alluded to at

*Op.*47-8; Epimetheus' acceptance of Pandora is described in full at *Op.*85-9, but in *Theog.* is reduced to the minimal comment *πρῶτος γάρ ῥα Διὸς πλαστήν ὑπέδεκτο γυναῖκα | παρθένον* (*Theog.*513-14). In *Op.* genealogies of characters already featured in *Theog.* are omitted: *Op.*84 does not make explicit that Epimetheus is Prometheus' brother, but their genealogy as sons of Iapetos and Clymene is given at *Theog.*507-14. One explanation for these allusions is that Hesiod was drawing from a pre-existing Promethean myth (Heitsch 1963, Mondi 1986:26). Certainly, not all the elliptical lines in one poem are explained in the other, and without a common ancestor the first composition would be lacking without the second to explain its allusions. This common model, then, would provide the background knowledge needed by an audience to fill the gaps; it would also explain the many shared lines. However, whether or not this was the case (whether Hesiod was selecting details from a pre-existing myth or from his own imagination, and whether or not these choices would have confused an original audience of his first poem), what is clear is that the *organisation* of the allusions is such that the Prometheus story is consistently abbreviated in *Op.* and the Pandora myth is abbreviated in *Theog.*

Not only is the *Op.* version of the Pandora myth longer, but it is more elaborate: the emphasis on Pandora in *Op.* in comparison with *Theog.* is enacted not just through longer description, but through the details of that description. In *Theog.* the Woman/Wife is left nameless, because not *all* the gods have contributed to her creation so she does not yet deserve the name; in *Op.* she is given the name Pandora. As Wickkiser 2010 argues, the *Theog.* Woman is more statue than human, whereas *Op.* Pandora is more animated. In *Theog.* she poses a threat only in so much

as she creates women who in turn threaten men's livelihood and drain their resources; in *Op.* Pandora poses this threat herself. In this way, the Woman in *Theog.* in comparison with Pandora in *Op.* is almost tangential to Zeus' punishment: its catalyst. This sidelining is reinforced by the focus on the Woman's headdress in *Theog.*, which contrasts with the focus on Pandora herself in *Op.* The Woman has both a garland of flowers and a golden diadem, the combination of which 'with its doubling of the natural and the artificial, of nature and culture, would seem the perfect emblem of the Woman/Wife herself and the marital institution she embodies' (Clay 2003:120). Key here is the diadem (on which Brown 1997:29, Marquardt 1982:287), made by Hephaistos: for Hephaistos and ekphrastic items cf. the Shield of Heracles at Hes. [Sc.]139-320, the Shield of Achilles *Il.*18.468-608 (note the similarities with *Op.*212-85) and Hephaistos' attendants at *Il.*18.419-20 (on which see 60-3n.), and further Francis 2009. With its depiction of terrible monsters of land and sea (582 κνώδαλ' ὅσ' ἤπειρος δεινὰ τρέφει ἡδὲ θάλασσα) it is above all the diadem, not the Woman herself as in *Op.*, which is indicative of her threat. Editors have struggled to come to terms with the excess of adornment (e.g. Solmsen brackets 578-84): however, the adornment here (a καλὸν κακόν in its own right) both entices Epimetheus and encapsulates the Woman's threat, thus fulfilling the same role as does Pandora herself in *Op.*, and so must be elaborated accordingly. The impression that the Woman is tangential in *Theog.* is furthered by the use of a simile at 594-9 (on which Sussman 1978), an essentially indirect narrative form, in which women, who consume men's resources, are compared with drones devouring the fruits of worker bees' labour. On the Pandora passage see further Fraser 2011.

59 ἐγέλασσε: like 28 Ἔρις κακόχαρτος, Zeus is laughing at others' misfortunes. At *Theog.*40 it is used of the Muses pleasing Olympus (58n.).

Origen reads ἐτέλεσε (not attested in mss.) when at *C. Cels.*4.38 he quotes 53-67, 69, 73-82, 90-8. Other divergences from West's text are: 62 ἀθανάτοις δὲ θεοῖς (also attested in some mss.); 64 διδασκόμεν (although this is against the metre: the form probably goes back to διδασκόμεναι, also in some mss. – see 63-4n.) for διδασκῆσαι; 74 τήνδε for τήν γε (also attested in some mss.). To put this in context: Origen thinks the Bible should be read allegorically so it is not open to mockery. On the contrary, Celsus refuses to read the Bible allegorically but does so with Hesiod; Origen is incensed by Celsus' inconsistency and his prizing Hesiod above the Bible. He therefore tries to show both how ridiculous it is to take stories at face value, and how Hesiod is inferior to the Bible, by making fun of the Prometheus/Pandora story.

πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε: formulaic in Hom. and *Theog.* but only here in *Op.*: see *Theog.*542, 643, 838, *Il.*1.544, 4.68 etc. It takes on particular importance here as the scene of Pandora's creation shows Zeus indeed to be 'father' (in a sense) of gods, men *and* women.

60-8 Zeus orders the gods to create Pandora. In *Theog.* Hephaistos and Athene alone create Pandora, here Aphrodite and Hermes are added – more spheres of influence are needed to accommodate the expanded details of Pandora's attributes (see further 70-80n., Rowe 1983:129). 60 ἐκέλευσε and 68 ἦνωγε (with variation for emphasis) convey the established Olympian hierarchy under Zeus, reinforced by 69

ἐπίθοντο and 70 αὐτίκα: not only do the gods obey Zeus' commands, but they snap to it.

This motif of the ruling god calling on expert gods for creative help is common also to Near Eastern creation myths: in *Atrahasis*, Ea asks the mother goddess Mami to create humans out of clay, upon which the gods all spit; in *Enuma Eliš* Marduk commands Ea to create mankind.

60-3 Ἡφαίστων: a creative task is naturally entrusted to the blacksmith god, see also the very similar description of Hephaistos' attendants at *Il.*18.419-20: νόος *Op.*67, *Il.*18.419; αὐδὴ *Op.*61, *Il.*18.419; σθένος *Op.*62, *Il.*18.420; ἔργα *Op.*64, *Il.*18.420. He is to create her from earth and water (61 γαῖαν ὕδρι φύρειν – see 121n.): for the reverse see *Il.*7.99 ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς μὲν πάντες ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα γένοισθε. In *Theog.*, Pandora is the only being created rather than generated. In *Op.*, man is created by the gods (106-201), but the difference lies in their development – men are re-created through the Ages, but women are created once and remain static and unchanging (at 373-5 they are still as deceitful as Pandora: see e.g. Zeitlin 1996:57). Hephaistos is to give her σθένος (62): in early Greek epic this sums up bodily strength (one can be filled with σθένος, one is inactive without it, it complements strength in limbs e.g. *Od.*8.136), a meaning which explains the transition to 'vital force' here and *Il.*18.420. Clem. Al. *Strom.*5.14.100.3 has νόον – cf. 42n. Eusebius replaced βίον with νόον: as Clem. Al. was a theologian developing a form of Christian Platonism, the reason for the change is likely to stem from philosophical concerns. Hephaistos is to make her resemble the goddesses (62 ἀθανάτης δὲ θεῆς εἰς ὧπα ἔϊσκειν): cf. Helen *Il.*3.158 αἰνῶς ἀθανάτησι θεῆς εἰς ὧπα ἔοικεν – there the negative effect of woman is

made explicit. He is to give her the lovely form of a maiden: here παρθενικῆς (63) is used of an artificial creation with inherent threat, whereas at 519 it is the form as found in nature – innocent, vulnerable (see also 71n.). ἐπήρατον (63) is used elsewhere in Hes. only at *Theog.*67, of the Muses: although whilst the Muses have lovely voice (ὄσσα), Pandora's beauty is only skin deep (εἶδος). See Pucci in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:62 for a comparison between Pandora's deceptive appearance and the Muses who lie (*Theog.*27-8).

63-4 Ἀθήνην: Athene is to teach crafts (ἔργα): cf. *Od.*20.72, *Hom. Hymn* 5.14 (παρθενικάς). All uses of διδάσκω in Hes. are connected with females (mortal women/goddesses): *Theog.*22, *Op.*662 the Muses teach Hesiod to sing (see also *Od.*8.481, 8.488); here Athene teaches Pandora to weave; 699 Hesiod advises teaching one's wife. In the hierarchy of instruction, goddesses have the power to teach but mortal women must be taught. Contrast Athene teaching female crafts (ἔργα) with Hesiod teaching labour (also ἔργα) – that these are specifically female works is not made clear until 64 ὑφαίνειν. In early hexameter, weaving is an essentially female activity (for gender roles see *Il.*6.490-3, *Od.*1.356-9; for weaving as an 'inside' activity confining women to the domestic sphere see *Il.*3.125, 22.440; for weaving symbolising domestic stability see Pantelia 1993; cf. weaving as empowering at *Il.*3.125-8; for women weaving in *Op.* see 779n.). Pandora will define the female sphere.

65-6 Ἀφροδίτην: she is introduced with the formula χρυσῇν Ἀφροδίτην, delayed to the end of the line for both metrical and stylistic reasons, similarly 68 Ἑρμείην. For more on Aphrodite and her epithets see van Eck 1978, Faulkner 2008. Aphrodite

is to give Pandora πόθον (66) – it is ‘the longing felt by a man because of her, not longing felt by her; but it is treated as an attribute of hers’ (West). Pandora initiates a new kind of longing, never before experienced by men, and this novelty is reflected in the vocabulary: πόθον, γυιοβόρους and μελεδώνας are used nowhere else in Hes. Indeed γυιοβόρους (γυῖον + βιβρώσκω ‘gnawing the limbs’) is not attested at all in epic and hardly anywhere else: the closest parallels are compounds such as θυμοβόρος (e.g. *Il.*7.210, 16.476) and δημοβόρος (*hapax* at *Il.*1.231). Its variant γυιοκόρους (γυῖον + κείρω *Etym. Magn.*, ‘limb devouring’) is even more obscure, being a *hapax legomenon*: as the *lectio difficilior* it is rightly printed by e.g. Rzach, Mazon, Sinclair, Verdenius. This reading is further supported by its more physical meaning and by the ancient discussions – see Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)66b, and Σ*Il.*(Erbse)21.204c where κείροντες is ἀπλήστως ἐσθίοντες· ὅθεν ὁ κόρος. West and *Lfgre*, following *Etym. Magn.* 576.23 (μελεδώνας is etymologised as from αἱ τὰ μέλη ἔδουσαι φροντίδες), suggest an etymologising pun on μελεδώνας (μέλεα ‘limbs’, ἔδμεναι ‘to eat’ – this therefore becomes a gloss): quite possible given Hesiod’s fondness for wordplay.

67-8 Ἐρμείην: Hermes takes care of Pandora’s internal qualities: her mind and her nature (Quaglia 1973:61, Verdenius, and Arrighetti 1998:412 note that whereas here Hesiod’s attention is on Pandora’s inner characteristics, in *Theog.* he focused solely on her physical attributes). He is to give her κύνεόν τε νόον: for more on wicked female attractiveness see 373-5; for the dog as a model of shamelessness see e.g. *Il.*3.180, 6.344 (Helen); see also Semon. fr.7.12-20 the woman-as-dog (denoting

curiosity); further Wolkow 2007. He is to give her ἐπίκλοπον ἦθος (cf. Thgn. 965): a devious nature is a direct retaliation against Prometheus' deceit (see *Theog.* 535-57).

Hesiod explores the diversity of Hermes' spheres of influence: 68 (and 77) διάκτορον ἀργεῖφόντην suggest his association with theft and trickery, see *Hom. Hymn* 4 (διάκτορον 'messenger' from διάγω; ἀργεῖφόντην either 'slayer of Argos' as Chantraine 1953-8 and *Lfgre* – for the story see *Ov. Met.* 1.601-746 – or, more likely because of the difficulty in getting from Ἀργο- to Ἀργει-, 'dog-slayer'); at 80 he singles out his capacity as θεῶν κήρυξ; and at 85 his role as messenger god. He is cast in as many roles as possible in this passage, to give the expansive impression of multiple gods from one: and his particular nature as god of boundaries (*hermai*, puberty, sleeping/waking, life/death) suits him for the purpose.

69 Zeus has spoken and the gods obey. However, in 70-80 it becomes evident that though the gods create and adorn Pandora, they do not do so in quite the way they were told. Following instruction is a key didactic concept: note the repeated use of πείθω through the poem (295 one should obey he who speaks well; 359 he who obeys shamelessness will suffer; 375 he who believes a woman, believes a cheater; 671 obey the winds in the sailing season). However, throughout *Op.* Hesiod advocates not blind adherence to his teachings but some degree of interpretative effort and creative input on the part of his audience. Here this is exemplified on a divine level: Zeus commands, the gods follow those commands but in their own way, contributing something of their own characters and expertise. In contrast with Prometheus, something of a loose cannon amongst the gods, here we have a positive example of Zeus harnessing divine talent.

70-80 Compare 60-8. We would expect the details of the commands to be repeated in their execution (as closely as the shift from indirect command to direct action will allow), however they are altered and added to. These discrepancies (as well as other factors such as uneven attestation in ancient sources: 70-2 omitted by Origen) have led many scholars to criticise or expunge the lines e.g. 70-82 deleted by Twisten, and Lendle (Lendle 1957:22-6 gives collected views of critics on 70-80); 69-82 by Kirchhoff 1889, Lisco 1903 and Wilamowitz. Other scholars have proposed complicated hypotheses regarding the transmission of the lines, e.g. Lehrs 1837 attributes them to a different recension of the *Theog.* version. In recent decades editors have become more inclined to preserve the text, though with little explanation of its structure – West, for example, dismisses the differences with the comment ‘nothing is more natural than that Hesiod himself, on coming to describe the gods at work, should slip back into that [his *Theogony*] version’.

The differences are all explicable in terms of elaboration (see 59-105n. and Fraser 2011), and reinforce the idea of Pandora as unique and dangerous. Firstly, the additions: in *Theog.* two gods make Pandora (*Theog.*571-3), in *Op.*60-8 four gods are entrusted with her creation (60n.), at 70-80 six (sets of) gods undertake the task – a balanced increase emphasising her elevated importance. Furthermore, the number is upped once again in line 81 when *all* the gods give her a gift: this apparent discrepancy (between the six gods named as contributors and 81 πάντες) functions as the ultimate elaboration. Secondly, the alterations: narratologically, the divergences between Zeus’ commands and their execution by the gods emphasise that, although they obey Zeus and act Κρονίδεω διὰ βουλάς (71, see 60n.), the gods

also add their own flair; they all creatively contribute to 'Pandora' (whose name is also added here – see 81n.). For *variatio* used for specific effect see e.g. 71n. The replacing of Aphrodite by the Charites, Peitho and the Horai can be explained in terms of elaboration, emphatic variation and the use of type scenes: see 73-5n.

For the theme of expansion see Solmsen 1949:78n12 and Rowe 1983:129. For other interpretations e.g. Walcot 1961a:16-19 (attributes the difference to Hesiod's 'break with the rigidity of the oral tradition' i.e. that *Op.* was affected by writing); Brown 1997:30 ('This technique enables him to draw attention to the contrasts between the malicious intention behind the gift...and the attractive façade behind which divine cunning succeeds in hiding it'); Rowe 1983:129-30 (Hesiod is describing the same things from different perspectives).

70-1 Ἀμφιγυῆεις: epithet of Hephaistos, also in Hom., meaning 'lame' (crooked on both sides) or 'handy' (limbed on both sides: Tandy/Neale 1996:62). The use of an epithet to replace the name of a god here adds to the impression of expansion (59-105n.) – Hephaistos is not given this epithet elsewhere in *Op.*, so it is as though yet another god is being introduced into the creative process. Whereas at 63 Hephaistos was to make παρθενικῆς καλὸν εἶδος ἐπήρατον, at 71 he makes παρθένω αἰδοίη ἴκελον: she is *like* a maiden, an ambiguous formulation which suggests deceit (cf. 256n.). Hephaistos' work may therefore be overlapping with that of Hermes.

72 Ἀθήνη: Athene adorns Pandora. The verb κόσμησε is used also at 306: Pandora's legacy has taken effect and we are in the Iron Age where work must be put in order. Aly in Heitsch 1966:335 and Quaglia 1973:63 suggest that here Athene

anticipates the outcome of her teaching (64); Verdenius accepts it as ‘only natural’ that crafts will come to Pandora later.

73-5 At 65 Aphrodite is given instructions, here her instructions are carried out by the Charites, Peitho and the Horai. Editors have tried to resolve this apparent problem, e.g. Goettling would replace 76 Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη with δῖ' Ἀφροδίτη; scholars from Farnell 1896.2:665 onwards claim that Peitho *is* Aphrodite. The latter supposition is not as radical as it might seem, given that Peitho and Aphrodite are consistently associated in poetry, Peitho often appears as a cult title of Aphrodite (*LIMC s.v.*), and there is a clear association here between beauty and persuasion. However, given Peitho’s separate identity at *Theog.*349 as a child of Thetis and the lack of other examples in epic of Peitho representing Aphrodite, it is more feasible to explain this divergence in terms of both type scenes and elaboration.

This is a ‘dressing-up’ *topos*: see esp. *Hom. Hymn* 5.61-5, 6.5-13, *Cypria* fr.4, 5 (all of Aphrodite), *Il.*14.170-221 (Hera); see further Brown 1997:30-7. That this is a typical scene may account for Aphrodite’s disappearance – the Charites and Horai are her attendants, so it would usually be Aphrodite herself they were dressing, here replaced by Pandora. Note in particular the use at *Hom. Hymn* 5.88-9 and 6.11 of the golden necklaces we see here at 74: they are worn by Aphrodite herself, in *Hom. Hymn* 5 to enchant Anchises (5.91 Ἀγχίσην δ' ἔρος εἶλεν), in *Hom. Hymn* 6 with the result that all the gods want to make her their wife (6.16-17 καὶ ἡρώσαντο ἕκαστος|εἶναι κουριδίην ἄλοχον καὶ οἴκαδ' ἄγεσθαι) – this use of the type scene draws attention to the divinely powerful and, most importantly, deceptive nature of the adornment (in fact, the same type scene is used in *Theog.*, there also with the

Woman's presentation to the gods as at *Hom. Hymn* 6.14-18). This *topos* is rarely without significance: Hera dresses to seduce and distract Zeus and so redirect the course of the Trojan war; Aphrodite (the most frequent subject of this *topos*, in a Hesiodic context her very birth connotes threat and even violence – see *Theog.*188-92 her birth from Ouranos' genitals after his castration by Kronos) in *Cypria* fr.4 prepares for the Judgement of Paris which will spark off the war in the first place; Pandora will inaugurate the human condition.

The scene also functions in terms of elaboration. First, why use one goddess when you can use three? Employing all of Aphrodite's entourage increases the number of gods involved in Pandora's creation, adding more spheres of influence and emphasising her importance. Second, Aphrodite, because of her association with appearances/love/sex, is key to Pandora's creation so her presence need not be repeated. Third, the choice of retinue is particularly relevant. By extension of the dressing and adornment *topos*, the group (all together or in part) often appears in a marriage context (see Plut. *Quaest. Rom.*2.264b; Pirenne-Delforge 1994:421, Parker 2005:440n87): grace is the quality of a bride, persuasion her allure, the seasons the right time for a woman to marry. This is appropriate here because of Pandora's bride-like presentation to Epimetheus. Peitho is important because of the seductive power of persuasion. She is consistently associated with Aphrodite in particular (see e.g. Sappho 90.7f.); for Peitho paired with the Charites see Pind. fr.123.14; for her as one of them see Hermesianax fr.11P (quoted by Paus. 9.35.5); for her appearance with them (and with Hermes) in cult on Paros, Thasos and Lesbos see Stafford 2000:111-45. The Horai are pertinent to the Iron-Age purpose of this myth:

they are connected with things that are ὠραῖος ‘ripe’, and are concerned with the works of mortals (*Theog.*903 αἶ τ' ἔργ' ὠρεύουσι καταθνητοῖσι βροτοῖσι). They are attendants of Aphrodite also at *Cypria* fr.4 and *Hom. Hymn* 5.61-5, and dance with her (and the Charites) at *Hom. Hymn* 3.194-6. The Charites are the epitome of grace, love and beauty (*Theog.*910-11, *Il.*17.51): though at 65 Aphrodite is instructed to χάριν ἀμφιχέαι, here she goes further and has the command fulfilled by the very personifications of this χάρις (see Rowe 1983:130: we should not concentrate ‘exclusively on the anthropomorphic aspect of Hesiod’s divine figures, when this is only part of his conception. χάρις and πειθώ are simultaneously things that Pandora possesses, and the entities that give those things to her’).

76 Ἀθήνη: with 72 frames Pandora’s adornment by the Charites, Peitho and the Horai. It acts as a ‘summing-up line’ (West; Verdenius ‘she added the finishing touch’) like *Il.*14.187 or *Hom. Hymn* 6.14, and marks a return from personified abstracts to Olympians. *Pace* e.g. Paley, Sinclair, Solmsen who athetise 76, or Goettling who would replace Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη with δῖ Ἀφροδίτη to resolve the ‘problem’ of 73-5 (see note).

77-82 Hermes completes his assigned tasks.

79 φωνήν: there is a discrepancy between 61 where Hephaistos is told to give Pandora αὐδὴν, and 79 where Hermes gives her φωνήν. Two main explanations have been proposed for this: first, that Hephaistos does not do as he is told so Hermes has to step in; second, that αὐδὴν and φωνήν are different things, the former ‘vocal apparatus’ and the latter ‘articulate speech’ (West’s definitions, but the explanation is propagated also by *ΣOp.*(Pertusi)61d, 77-8, 77ab, 79-80, Mazon, Sinclair,

Verdenius). The first explanation is problematic as it creates an inconsistency with 69-71 where we are told that Hephaistos did as he was ordered (this inconsistency led Rzach to athetise 79). The second is more likely as it offers an explanation for the divergence between command and execution, without positing disobedience. However, two points should be added: firstly, this differentiation between the two words is not a given, as they seem to be synonymous at *Theog.*39-40 (φωνῇ ὀμρεῦσαι, τῶν δ' ἀκάματος ῥέει αὐδὴ | ἐκ στομάτων ἡδεῖα), and so we must look closely at their context. Secondly, at *Theog.*31 Hesiod is given αὐδὴ by the Muses: we must assume he already had some sort of 'vocal apparatus', so the definition given above does not suffice. In the *Theog.* context we are supposed to understand some kind of special, poetic voice (a quality which must be built into the word αὐδὴ itself rather than just the qualifying adjective *θέσπις*, since 'divine vocal apparatus' or 'divine human voice' still does not convey the necessary meaning). Perhaps the word is used as a marked term also here, highlighting Hephaistos' ability to give life to his creations: see *Il.*18.419-20 Hephaistos' attendants, also given αὐδὴ.

If αὐδὴ marks Hephaistos' particular contribution, it follows that φωνή distinguishes not just 'articulate speech' but Hermes' kind of articulate speech: for Hermes as god of speech and named as such see e.g. Pl. *Cra.*407e-408a ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἔοικε περὶ λόγον τι εἶναι ὁ Ἑρμῆς, 'Well then, this name "Hermes" seems to me to have to do with speech' (Text and translation Fowler 1977); Diod. Sic. 1.16.1-2 ὑπὸ γὰρ τούτου πρῶτον μὲν τὴν τε κοινὴν διάλεκτον δαρθρωθῆναι 'It was by Hermes, for instance, according to them [sc. the Greeks] that the common

language of mankind was first further articulated' (Text and translation Oldfather 1933). Verdenius comments 'It is only natural that Hermes as herald of the gods makes her speech sounding': indeed he appears as θεῶν κήρυξ at 80 because he is to announce Pandora's newly-given name. However, Hermes' φωνή could also refer to lies and wily words, which are in fact specified at 78. In this way, the use of vocabulary here emphasises the creative contribution made by the gods: they put into Pandora their own specialities.

80-2 Pandora is given a name which is immediately glossed. The name inverts the customary epithet of 'all-giving' Gaia (Ar. *Av.*971, Zeitlin 1996:60, Clay in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:77; Pandora is also known as the name of a chthonic Earth-goddess, see West, and Farnell 1896.1:290) and expresses Pandora's deceptive character: 'ambiguous as she is promising all, but in reality all-consuming' (Clay 2003:123). On etymologies see 3n. Lehrs 1837 considers these lines to be a later addition and suggests 80 ὀνόμηνε δὲ τήνδε γυναῖκα originally meant 'he named her woman' – see also 94n.

The most debated ambiguity here (already at Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)81) is whether δῶρον ἐδώρησαν should be translated 'gave her a gift' (preferred by Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)82 as at 84 it is Zeus alone who sends her to Epimetheus) or 'gave her *as* a gift' (ironic). If we understand the divergences between Zeus' commands and the gods' execution of them as expressing creative contribution, this could hint at the former interpretation: however, Clay 2003:120 follows similar logic but arrives at the opposite conclusion. This ambiguity fits with Hesiod's didactic use of riddling

language and duality (p.50-1), and with Pandora's own ambivalent nature as the καλὸν κακόν.

83-9 Epimetheus receives Pandora. See *Theog.*511 for his role as Prometheus' brother (their relationship is not explained here, see 59-105n. on allusions). Epimetheus is used as a didactic character: an admonitory negative example. If Prometheus is 'foresight' (he predicts the disaster, albeit in vague terms: 88 τι κακόν), Epimetheus is 'hindsight'. 85-6 οὐδ' Ἐπιμηθεύς|ἐφράσαθ': he does not consider the advice he is given, as Hesiod's audience are told to do repeatedly, and the consequences are dire. 89 ὁ δεξάμενος ὅτε δὴ κακὸν εἶχ' ἐνόησεν: he is the fool who learns through suffering (218 παθὼν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνων). At 86 he does not listen to his brother: this is an analogy which maps neatly onto the brothers Hesiod and Perses (e.g. Walcot 1966:62). That Hesiod associates himself with Prometheus is reinforced by 88 γένηται, subj. instead of opt. suggesting that Hesiod chose to write this advice from Prometheus' perspective. Nor does Epimetheus think for himself and project into the long-term; in terms of Hesiod's ideal models therefore, Epimetheus is neither the πανάριστος (293) nor the ἐσθλός (295).

83 δόλον αἰπὺν ἀμήχανον ἐξετέλεσσεν: despite the gods' contributions, Zeus (presumably the subject here) takes the credit for Pandora's creation (although cf. variant plural ἐξετέλεσσαν): similarly in *Enuma Eliš*, though it is Ea who creates mankind it is Marduk, the ruling god, who takes the credit. ἀμήχανον also of Pandora at *Theog.*589, but elsewhere in Hesiod only of monsters who threaten the Olympian hierarchy (*Theog.*295, 310, 836); this and the two negative adjectives emphasise the threat Pandora poses to the world's stability. αἰπὺν means literally

‘steep’ (e.g. *Il.*2.538, *Od.*3.485), but is also applied in epic to e.g. ὄλεθρος (e.g. *Il.*6.57, *Od.*1.11), πόνος (*Il.*11.601, 16.651), φόνος (*Il.*17.365, *Od.*4.843), χόλος (*Il.*15.223) and here δόλος (also *Theog.*589, *Hom. Hymn* 4.66) – meaning ‘insurmountable’ or ‘unapproachable’. This trick parallels that by Prometheus (see Walcot 1966:60), but with a severity of consequence which corresponds to the respective power of the agents. On the wordplay 82 δῶρον/83 δόλον, hinting at Pandora’s deceptive nature, see Mazur 2004.

90-2 Here we see the second of 3 (often conflated) idyllic world visions: 43-9 world without Prometheus, 90-2 world before Pandora, 106-26 Golden Race. The problem is: how do we reconcile them? First, scenario 1 (see 43-6n.) can be set aside as it expresses the hypothetical situation had Prometheus *not* deceived Zeus (which, in Hesiod’s mythological history, he did). Scenarios 2 and 3, however, are intentionally drawn together by direct parallels to link the Prometheus/Pandora myth with the Myth of the Races 106-201 (see 106n. for further links between the first myth and the ‘other account’, ἕτερον λόγον): ζώεσκον 90 and 112; pleonasm νόσφιν ἄτερ 91 and 113; 91 χαλεποῖο πόνοιο and 113 πόνου καὶ οἰζύος; Pandora brings cares (95 κήδεα), the Golden Race lives free from cares (ἀκηδέα); she causes diseases to wander 103 αὐτόματοι, like the earth produces crops αὐτομάτη in the Golden Age; those diseases wander (φοιτῶσι) just like the Golden Race after their peaceful deaths (φοιτῶντες ἐπ’ αἶαν 125).

Pandora causes a similar problem of conflation in *Theog.*: a double aetiology of evil (the other being the line of Chaos). Sedley in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010:257 proposes: ‘what was there [in *Theog.*] being accounted for was no more than the

word's *potentiality* to contain evils of these many kinds. The actual advent of the evils required in addition a specific genetic cause, the creation of woman': indeed her presence makes evil more tangible for mortals.

[93 =*Od.*19.360. Absent from many mss. (PrΩDTzφ₅ψ₆ψ₇), in the margins of others (Nφ*ψ*), in the text of others (Eφ₆φ₇ψ₉MoTr), deleted by e.g. Mazon, West. West suggests it is an anticipation of 113-14: the context is indeed comparable as at *Od.*19.359 old age is marked by feet and hands, but this does not explain why the interpolation comes *here*.

Lehrs 1837:229 (followed by e.g. Paley, Mazon, Sinclair, Verdenius) explains the interpolated line as stemming from the variant γῆρας for κῆρας (92), first found in ms. Vat. gr. 1384 from 1466. However, since this ms. is unlikely to represent an independent tradition (although there is of course the possibility that it may have picked up a stray older variant) and comes three centuries after ms. E (our earliest e.g. of the interpolated line), this is unlikely.]

94-9 Pandora opens the jar. The *pithos* is absent from the shorter *Theog.* version. In antiquity, it was thought to be linked to Zeus' two *pithoi* at *Il.*24.527-8 – see Σ*Il.*(Erbse)24.527-8a and bT, Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)94a, Plut. *Mor.*105D. In the wider myth (see Proclus) Prometheus had received the jar from the satyrs and left it with Epimetheus, telling him not to receive Pandora. From the 16th century the jar became a box, because of a conflation of Hesiod's Pandora and Apuleius' Psyche by Erasmus in *Adages* 1.31 – see further Panofsky/Panofsky 1956, Kenaan 2008:12-13.

The *pithos* has been thought to act as Pandora's double – seductive but deceptive, promising *bios* but in reality destroying it (see Clay in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:77, and 373-5n.). The choice of a *pithos* is particularly relevant to Hesiod's concern for self-sufficiency as the everyday use of such an object was for food storage: see 475n.

95 ἀνθρώποισι δ' ἐμήσατο κήδεα λυγρὰ =49, linking Prometheus' culpability with Pandora's agency.

96 Ἑλπίς: usually translated as 'hope' but more accurately meaning 'expectation' (Beall 1989) or 'anticipation' (Most 2006) because of its ambiguous usage: it is vain at 498 (the idle man has nothing but empty *elpis*) and 500 (*elpis* is not good when it accompanies a man in want); it is temporarily vain in *Hom. Hymn* 2.37; it is justified in *Od.* (16.101, 19.84); it is left equivocal at *Pl. Leg.* 644c δόξα μελόντων.

The main interpretative possibilities are:

1) the jar held evils. This is the majority view of commentators, and is attested at least as early as Philodemus of Gadara (1st century B.C., *On Piety* 130.1-8). This view supports two interpretations:

1a) the evils were released, but Elpis was preserved for men (Mazon, West, Arrighetti 1998:413-16, Nelson 1998, Sánchez Ortiz de Landeluce 1998, Lauriola 2000, Warman 2004, Fasciano 2005). According to this view, Elpis is good: it can help mankind understand their own human condition as it distinguishes men from omniscient gods who have no need for expectation, and men from beasts which are unaware of their own mortality (Vernant 1980). It also defines the Iron Age in which

we live, where good things are mixed with evils (179 ἔμπτῃς καὶ τοῖσι μεμείξεται ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν): we are past the Golden Age, where everything was good so we did not expect evil (106-26), but we have not yet reached the apocalyptic time Hesiod describes at 180-201, in which everything will be evil so we will not expect good. In support of Elpis being kept *for* men, the fact that it appears elsewhere in *Op.* (498, 500) shows that it is indeed accessible to men.

1b) the evils were released, but Elpis was imprisoned away from men (Sinclair, Verdenius, Byrne 1998, Blümer 2001.2:179-200, Neils in Barringer/Hurwit 2005). In support of Elpis being kept *away from* men is the logical progression that if evils are present for men because they *leave* the jar, Elpis being *in* the jar must mean it is kept away from men. For her imprisonment to be positive, she herself would have to be negative: this would be compatible with the tradition on which Homer draws at *Il.*24.527-8 (for ancient discussion see *ΣIl.*(Erbse)24.527-8a and bT, *ΣOp.*(Pertusi)94a, *Plut. Mor.*105D), in which Zeus has two clearly differentiated jars, one of evils and one of goods (*pace* Zarecki 2007:24 who takes this passage and draws the opposite conclusion: he notes ‘Zeus often mixes the good with the bad’, but Zeus does this from two separate jars, not inside one jar). Also at 100 we have the formulation ἄλλα δὲ μυρία λυγρά – for there to be ‘other’ evils there must be an initial one which, in the context, should be Elpis (for other interpretations see Hays 1918:89-90, West, Zarecki 2007:22).

2) the jar held goods. The main proponents of this view are Musäus 2004 and Beall 1989. Again, this opens up two possibilities:

2a) the jar contained good spirits or *daimones*, which before Pandora were present as protectors against evil but which were driven away by her (Beall 1989, Zarecki; Babrius 58 a *pithos* of useful entities, which when freed left for Mount Olympus, leaving only Elpis; Thgn. 1135-8 only Elpis stayed on earth after certain noble deities went to Olympus).

2b) the jar contained material provisions, which Pandora scattered and thus initiated the need for work (Musäus 2004, Holzhausen 2004, Krajczynski/Rösler 2006). This would fit with the uses of a jar elsewhere in *Op.* (see 368-9n. and 475n.) and with the usual (i.e. the audience's) conception of what a jar should be used for.

The narrative supports all of these interpretative possibilities to a certain extent, though all have their logical inconsistencies. That Elpis remains in the jar is ambiguous. In fact, this whole myth hinges on ambiguity, uncertainty and deceit: Pandora is the *καλὸν κακόν* (*Theog.*585) with a beautiful appearance, a lovely voice, but a terrible nature (see Vernant 1980 for a comparison between Elpis and Pandora, and Zarecki 2007 and Marquardt 1982:290-1 for connections between Eris and Pandora). Elpis herself is of uncertain quality: she is the expectation of *either* good *or* ill; in her later appearance at 500 she is described in the very same way as is *aidos* at 317, certainly presented as ambivalent (317-19n.). Therefore her status too – whether she is essentially good or essentially evil, whether she is preserved for men or imprisoned away from them – is kept ambiguous.

For other attempts at presenting the various interpretative possibilities see esp. *LfggrE s.v.*, Verdenius *ad loc.*, Musäus 2004:13-30.

ἐν ἀρρήκτοισι δόμοισιν: Walcot 1966:61 suggests the jar was probably made of bronze. If it were indeed metal, this would fit with the idea of imprisonment. Use of δόμος suggests personification of Elpis – see also 100n. Seleucus instead conjectures μυχοῖσιν, perhaps to create (with 97 θύραζε) an analogy with 523 the tender-skinned maiden who never ventures outside (she is essentially sheltered, μυχή).

97 ἔνδον...οὐδὲ θύραζε: for emphasis the same idea is expressed twice, in a positive and negative form. Similarly 228-9, 354, 471-2, 491, 515, 637-8.

98 ἐπέμβαλε: some mss. have instead ἐπέβαλε, others have ἐπέλ(λ)αβε. This is either a slip (common confusion of βαλ-/λαβ-) or due to speculation about the *pithos* and this passage as a whole: with ἐπέμβαλε the sense is Pandora ‘put on’ the lid of the jar, whereas the variant ἐπέλ(λ)αβε could be an attempt to remove a supposed contradiction between the initiative of Pandora and the initiative of Zeus: perhaps the lid of the jar ‘stopped’ *elpis*. This perceived contradiction has been addressed since antiquity: e.g. Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)98e tries to take the verb intransitively; Plut. omits 99 (bracketed by e.g. Wilamowitz, Solmsen). However, it makes more sense simply to see Zeus as acting through Pandora’s agency, thus the contradiction becomes instead co-operation.

99 Often considered to be an interpolation (suspected by e.g. Wilamowitz, Solmsen) as it is an act of mercy on the part of Zeus (this if we are to believe either that Elpis is good and is preserved, or that she is bad and imprisoned). This could be seen as inconsistent behaviour when Zeus has just been so set on vengeance, however cf. *Il.*24.529 Zeus mixing for men good and evils from two jars, and the other interpretative possibilities of Elpis. Also, throughout the Prometheus/Pandora

narrative Hesiod wants to stress the unavoidable will of Zeus, so such reiteration, even awkwardly positioned as here, is not unlikely.

100-4 The post-Pandora world. The evils are personified: 100 ἀλλάληται, 103 αὐτόμαται, 103 φοιτῶσι (cf. 255 Zeus' guards wander the earth). That they are all-encompassing is emphasised by the parallelism in 101, marked by anaphora of πλείη.

104 σιγή: although the evils were unleashed by Pandora, they are contrasted with her in terms of articulation – at 79 she is given a voice (φωνήν), here Zeus deprives the evils of theirs. Unlike the released evils, Pandora is given the added ability to deceive with words. See also Solon fr.4.15 on Justice – whilst she cries and complains in *Op.* (259-60) she is silent in Solon.

105 ἐξάλεασθαι: also at *Op.* 736a, 758 and 802. A key theme of *Op.* is inexorability – the seasons must revolve, the Days must progress, work must be done. With this verb, the will of Zeus cannot be resisted, rules must be followed, and certain days must be avoided. That the will of Zeus is unavoidable is one of the main morals of the whole Prometheus/Pandora story, as at *Theog.* 613.

106-201 The Myth of the Races

Hesiod sets out his purpose to give 'another account', ἕτερον λόγον (poetological introduction 106-8), then relates the Myth of the Races beginning with the ideal Gold (109-26n.) through childish Silver (127-42n.), brutal Bronze (143-55n.) and warlike Heroes (156-73n.), to apocalyptic Iron (174-201n.).

The phrase ἕτερον λόγον is ambiguous, as it could imply either equivalence with (LSJ *s.v.* I – in poetry without article) or difference from (LSJ *s.v.* II, III) what came before – in this case the Myth of Prometheus and Pandora. In either scenario it is a transitional formula from one story to the next, connecting the two in some way (whether as a parallel or an antithesis). Martin 2004:9-10 reads an even stronger connection between the two, arguing that in epic usage ἕτερος can have the full etymological meaning ‘the other of two’, whether or not the demonstrative is present (cf. *Il.* 4.502, 5.258). On the surface the two stories are very different, sometimes even conflicting, with incompatible chronologies (see Fontenrose 1974:2). However, if we look more closely there are in fact links which centre around the human condition: both myths describe a fall from a better state (90-2, 106-206 – as to whether the former state was a paradise, see 109-26n.); both warn of the human potential for disaster (Brown 1998:387-8); both are concerned with work (42-8, 177) and justice (54-8, 134-7, 185-201), Prometheus/Pandora arguably more concerned with the former and the Races with the latter; the second myth ‘supplements’ the first (Verdenius), with divine punishment caused not only by the individual (56) but by whole races. These continuities are further emphasised by parallel language, e.g. see 90-2n. for links between the pre-Pandora world and the Golden Age.

That the audience must look for a deeper meaning – below the surface incompatibilities to the hidden links – is suggested by 106 εἰ δ’ ἐθέλεις: Hesiod does not just launch into his next story but encourages audience involvement (see Haubold in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010:26). Indeed the importance of hidden meaning provides yet another link with the previous myth, in which the gods hid

bios, Prometheus hid fire in a reed and Pandora's threat was hidden behind her deceptively beautiful appearance.

To tell this next story Hesiod must take these fundamental equivalences and work them into a 'traditional' framework of the Myth of the Races. However, he does not use just one tradition: he tries to reconcile *Op.* with his own *Theog.* chronology (111n.); he incorporates the heroic tradition (156-73n.); he looks back to the previous Age in terms of materials used (150-1n.); he slots in aspects of other traditions e.g. men as descended from trees (see 145n.). Furthermore, he combines a diachronic approach (the sequence of Races) with synchronic considerations: he is concerned with the Races' various fates after death (Gold 122-3 δαίμονες ἐπιχθόνιοι – for their role in policing Justice in the Iron Age see 254-5n.; Silver 141 ὑποχθόνιοι μάκαρες θνητοί; Heroes 171 ἐν μακάρων νήσοισι) because they act as an *aition*, telling us where the Races are *now* (see Rohde 1910:91-110, Goldschmidt 1950, Walcot 1961a; Arrighetti 1998:398 links the Races after death with Hesiod's additions to his *Theog.* pantheon: the second Eris and Pheme).

It seems likely that Hesiod combined Greek ingredients with Near Eastern traditions – for parallels (although none before Hesiod's time) see: from the last two books of the Avesta the dream of Zoroaster, in which the prophet sees a tree with metal branches (gold, silver, steel, iron alloy) representing the future ages (see Müller 1879-1910.5:37); from the Book of Daniel 2.31ff. the dream of Nebuchadnezzar, in which he sees a statue with metal parts (gold head, silver breast and arms, brass belly and thighs, iron legs, iron and clay feet) representing future world kingdoms; in the Indian *Mahābhārata* the story of four, successively

declining, world ages named after the throws of the die (Four, Three, Two, One); in the Egyptian *Prophecy of Nefertiti* (AEL 1.139-45) and the *Admonitions of Ipuwar* (AEL 1.149-62) the idea that the present age is bad and the future may be worse. For more on Hesiod's Near Eastern sources see Walcot 1966, Fontenrose 1974:2-3, Koenen 1994, West 1997:312-19, Rutherford in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009, Ercolani *ad* 121-6. For Hesiodic innovation see Most 1997, Tsagalis in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:145.

Hesiod takes these disparate elements and puts them together in a linear scheme. Inevitably, there are problems of internal coherence: the Heroes interrupt the metallic scheme (156-73n.); the Bronze and Iron Races use their respective metals whereas the Gold and Silver do not (150-1n.); in the Prometheus/Pandora Myth mankind is created just once whereas here there is a series of creations. However, we should not put too much emphasis on the discontinuities – Hesiod does not mean to be a historian, after all (Rowe 1983:134), and more importantly he does not spoon-feed those he is teaching – rather we should understand that this construction invites deconstruction, and forces the audience to work even harder to decipher Hesiod's message.

The composite nature of the myth has led to it being interpreted in various ways, even leading to alternative versions e.g. in Diodorus (see 111-20n.). For a recent summary of interpretative approaches see Tsagalis in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:145-6. One of the most influential is the structuralist approach: e.g. Vernant 1980, 1988; Walcot 1961a; Querbach 1985:1-12; Most 1997:104-27. This had an impact on interpretation (Vernant notes that the Myth is defined by alternation between

hybris – silver, bronze – and *dike* – gold, heroes), on levels of classification (Vernant: the myth is to be viewed on three levels – human history, contemporary society, supernatural classes. Most: classification on two levels – tripartite and four-part), and even on the number of Races (Vernant divides the Races into six rather than five, splitting the Iron Age into two – similarly Martin 1943:70-1; Walcot 1961a and Querbach 1985 exclude the Iron Race so are left with four; Most 1997 counts the Heroic and Iron Races as one). Other approaches include a psychological reading (each Race corresponds to a distinct age in human life, seen in ascending order from childhood to old age – Smith 1980:145-63), a poetological reading (Tsagalis in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:144-7), or even a satirical reading (Nisbet 2004:155-6).

For discussion of the meaning of the metallic scheme see Griffiths 1956, Most 1997, Clay 2003:81-95; Brown 1998:395 ‘gold can be used as found (the earth bears fruit spontaneously), and never loses its lustre (the first race do not grow old), silver ore must always first undergo processes of separation and refinement (the long childhood), and the finished metal soon tarnishes (the second race die soon after reaching maturity). Bronze and iron require even more skill and effort to make, corrode much more radically than silver, and represent respectively the toils of war and of back-breaking agricultural labour’.

This myth was reused in later literature. Plato’s use of it in the *Republic* in particular can give us an idea of the strength of the Hesiodic ‘stamp’ on traditional material here (see further p.30-1, and 111-20n.). At *Resp.*3.414b-415c the metallic scheme of Races forms part of Socrates’ infamous ‘noble lie’ for Callipolis, in a version quite

unlike that of *Op.*: the metal Races do not come into existence in diachronic sequence, but are contemporaneous and divide the citizens into classes. That Plato has Hesiod in mind, however, is made explicit later at 8.547a1 when in the decline of Callipolis rulers will fail to test τὰ Ἡσιόδου τε καὶ τὰ παρ' ὑμῖν γένη. As Van Noorden in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010:182 argues, 'Socrates' account of constitutional decline appropriates for the *Republic* the urgency of choosing justice that underlies Hesiod's address to Perses and the Kings'. Plato may not follow Hesiod to the letter (not even close, in fact), but he still trusts that the moral direction of Hesiodic excerpts will ring true. See further Haubold and Van Noorden in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010.

106-8 An introduction to the myth. Hesiod encourages his audience to take control of their own learning (106 εἰ δ' ἐθέλεις – this is more than just a rhetorical device, *pace* Verdenius, Sinclair) and to extend it into the long-term (107 σὺ δ' ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῆσιν).

He also asserts his poetic and didactic authority (106-7 ἐκκορυφώσω,|εὖ καὶ ἐπισταμένως – see further p.49). Although it is common to announce a story (e.g. 202 ἐρέω), the verb ἐκκορυφώσω is *hapax legomenon* in early epic and is of uncertain meaning. For debate in antiquity see Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)106-8 τὸ ἐκκορυφῶσαι δηλοῖ τὸ ἀποκαλύψαι καὶ εἰς τὴν ἄκρην γνῶσιν ἡμᾶς ἀναπέμψαι τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως. Δηλοῖ τὸ ἐπαγόμενον. Modern attempts at definition include: 'to summarise' (*Lfgre*, West, Wakker 1990; Nisbet 2004:155 reads this as satirical irony, as Hesiod's claim 'I'll be brief' is followed by a narrative almost 100 lines long), 'to perfect/bring to its peak' (Haubold in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010:27, Wilamowitz

1928:53-4, Most in Arrighetti/Montanari 1993:91), ‘to tell from beginning to end’ (Verdenius, Tsagalis in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:144). In any case, it constitutes a self-reflection by Hesiod on his own poetic practice and, given how rare and striking a word it is, a challenge to the reader.

107 εὖ καὶ ἐπισταμένως is used of craftsmanship or work at *Il.*10.265, *Od.*20.161, 23.197. Verdenius and Wakker 1990:90 also compare the skill of the bard at *Od.*11.368 ἐπισταμένως: speaking well, like a bard, is enough to guarantee the truth of Odysseus’ tale. Cf. Homer’s reticence about his own poetic skill at *Il.*2.484-93. Note also, however, *Hom. Hymn* 4.390 where the phrase is used of a lie. At *Theog.*87 putting a stop to quarrels ἐπισταμένως is an attribute of a good king: here Hesiod is arguably more kingly than his addressees, βασιλῆας δωροφάγους (38).

Line 108 purports to introduce the subject matter of the myth. However, its meaning and relevance are obscure. ὁμόθεν usually means ‘from the same origins’ e.g. *Hom. Hymn* 5.135 (relatives), *Od.*5.477 (two trees growing from the same point). Though this meaning is not impossible here, given that in *Theog.* both men and gods come ultimately from Gaia and Ouranos (see also Zeus’ epithet πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε; Pind. *Nem.*6.1 ἐν ἀνδρῶν ἐν θεῶν γένος), it is difficult and even led some editors to reject the line (e.g. Lehrs 1837, Schoemann 1869, Mazon). As the focus here is on creation rather than generation (Clay 2003:86), a more likely meaning would be ‘on the same terms’ (West) i.e. the Golden Race lived 112 ὥστε θεοί. On this problem see further Arrighetti 1998:417. Men and gods are brought together by the phrase θεοὶ θνητοὶ τ’ ἄνθρωποι, formulaic in *Theog.* (302, 535, 588) but only

here in *Op.*: in the Iron Age gods and mortals are separated – only in myth can they be linked in this way.

109-26 The Golden Race (109 χρύσειον).

The Golden Race is the ideal, both in life and in death. In life they are free from cares (112), without old age (114), having abundant food (117-18); in death they become guardian spirits (122-3). However, as Arrighetti 1998:418 points out, this account ‘non ha i caratteri del vagheggiamento di un paradiso perduto’ because the Golden Race are not known for their rationality and morality. See 90-2n. for similarities with the pre-Pandora world and 213-85n. for correspondences to the Just City. For an overview of the Golden Age in classical Greek and Latin literature see Martin 1943:62-71 and Gatz 1967.

Paradoxically, Hesiod’s Golden Race is characterised by simplicity rather than riches (*pace* Vernant who takes ‘Golden’ as proof of their ‘totally royal character’) – this led to discussions of meaning e.g. at Pl. *Cra.*398a Socrates says Hesiod meant οὐκ ἐκ χρυσοῦ πεφυκὸς ἀλλ’ ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ καλόν. Indeed from 144-5, 176 we know that the metals are intended as symbolic (although see Griffiths 1956 for an archaeological interpretation) – Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)¹¹² offers the explanation that the first race are golden in that they are untainted like untarnished gold. In epic, gold often characterises the gods and distinguishes them from mortals (*Op.*65 χρυσέην Ἀφροδίτην), so it is appropriate for a race ‘like the gods’ (112 ὥστε θεοί). Although a better age is mentioned elsewhere in *Op.* (43-6, 90-2), it is only here that gold is mentioned: Hesiod is now systematically looking back from his age of Iron.

The ideal Race is elsewhere conceptualised as the Age of Kronos/Saturn (see e.g. Arist. [*Ath.Pol.*]16.7, Pl. *Plt.*268e-74d, *Leg.*712e-14b). Baldry 1952 considers the Golden Age to be a Hesiodic invention on this model, however Brown 1998 rightly considers the Near Eastern influences on Hesiod's version. What is clear is that Hesiod is combining different traditions (see 106-201n.): at 111 situating the Golden Age *in* the Age of Kronos (for a similar approach see 111-20n. Diod. Sic.). For comparison with Scheria land of Phaeacians in *Od.* and the Hyperboreans in Pind. *Pyth.*10, see Brown 1998:398-404.

γένος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων: formula also used to introduce the Bronze Race (143), and to foresee the demise of the Iron Race (180). From its formulaic context (epithet with ἀνθρωποι and βροτοῖσιν) μερόπων clearly means something like 'mortal' – see *Lfgre* for possible etymologies.

110 ποιήσαν Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες: despite the fact that this is the second of *Op.*'s creation myths, this is the first occurrence of the verb ποιέω in the poem. It is used throughout the Myth of the Races, here introducing the Golden Race, at 128 Silver, 144 Bronze and 158 Heroes. It does not, however, occur in Pandora's creation, either in *Op.* or in *Theog.* (with the exception of *Theog.*579, but this is of Hephaistos making Pandora's circlet, rather than Pandora herself). Such marked usage might, then, distinguish between two different types of creative process: indeed whereas in the Pandora myth the material realities of creation are evident, in the Myth of the Races few details are given. Further, the Races are 'hidden' rather than destroyed (unlike in Near Eastern narratives such as *Atrahasis*, where the corollary to creation is material destruction), so perhaps the force of ποιέω here is

something more like 'introduce'. Part of the point of formulaic ποιέω seems to be precisely that it allows Hesiod to gloss over the details and present the Race of Heroes, for example, as structurally equivalent to the others, despite its descent from the gods (see further 156-73n.): he eases the amalgamation of traditions by using what looks like a (genuine or coined, we cannot know) traditional formula.

The divine purpose behind the Races' creation is not made explicit in this myth. Why do the gods create mankind in the first place? And if the Golden Race are so perfect, why must they be replaced (see Clay in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:79 they were *too* close to the gods, or 111n. on Kronos, or 113n. on labour)? Hesiod may set himself up as a didactic authority with superior knowledge (106-8n.), but he also allies himself with the Iron-Age man and so unlike the Muse-inspired singer of *Theog.* cannot profess to have too detailed a knowledge of divine matters.

111-20 Quoted by Diod. Sic. 5.66.6 though with many divergences from mss. and other quotations e.g. 113 contaminated by 91-2; 115 ἐόντες for ἀπάντων; 116 ἄλλα τε πολλά for ἐσθλὰ δὲ πάντα; 118 ἐπὶ γαίῃ for ἐθέλημοι; 119 εὐφρονες for ἥσυχοι; added line at 120 (athetised by most editors). As there is no corroborating evidence for Diodorus' readings (*pace* West who proffers the hypothesis that Diod. Sic. might be using a lesser-known variant transmitted by the Alexandrian historians of Crete), it is likely that the alterations are his own, either because he misremembered the passage or because he needed to change the passage to make a particular point. The general context of the quotation is in a section entitled 'On Crete and the myths which are recounted about it, down to comparatively recent

times', and the immediate context is a section on Kronos. To produce an overview of Kronos' mythology, Diod. Sic. must reconcile two different myths of the ideal Age – the Golden Race, and the Age of Kronos (see 109-26n.). His approach is to treat Hesiod's Golden Race as simply an alternative description of the Age of Kronos. He explains that when Kronos became king, he raised up all his mortal subjects from a primitive to a civilised life characterised by justice. In his quotation from Hesiod, then, he must omit not only the subsequent Races, but also 109-10 (difficult mention of 'Golden', 'first', and 'made by the gods'). The forced amalgamation also explains the addition of 120: Rosenmeyer in Heitsch 1966 notes an inconsistency in that sheep should not come in until the fourth Race (see 163), however Diod. Sic. does not intend to include the fourth Race so this inconsistency will not arise, and he needs to include the flocks here as another example of the 'civilised life' he wants to describe. Finally, in omitting 109-10 Diod. Sic. has omitted the gods altogether, so it seems logical that he should add their blessings here.

Diodorus' use of Hesiod's Myth of the Races raises some interesting points about the effects of Hesiod's appropriation of traditional material. *Op.*106-201 seems to be an amalgamation of various traditions (see note). Presumably, then, there were other versions in existence with other arrangements and even other agendas on which to draw. However, such was the authority of Hesiodic authorship that Diodorus felt his purpose would be best achieved by attributing the passage to Hesiod, despite having to rework it quite drastically (5.66.6 *περὶ δὲ τούτων καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν Ἡσίοδον ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν ἐν τοῖσδε τοῖς ἔπεσιν*).

111 ἐπὶ Κρόνου: see 109-26n. for ‘the age of Kronos’ as an alternative formulation of the ideal Race. Hesiod is attempting to reconcile his myth both with pre-existing tradition and with the divine chronology of *Theog.*: cf. 143, 158 (Zeus creates Bronze/Heroes), 180 (he will destroy the Iron Race). At 122, Zeus makes the Golden Race δαίμονες, so we must assume that Zeus has come to power some time during the Golden Age (*pace* West on 122 ‘A feature of the world as it is now is naturally ascribed to Zeus’ will, not to Kronos’). This could be a reason why the Golden Race have to be replaced (for the problem cf. 110n.): they were made by Kronos, and so have to go with him when he is succeeded. The relative chronology can be no better than approximate, given the omission of mankind’s development in *Theog.*, so it should not be taken too far (*pace* West who would in light of 111 identify 110 ἄθάνατοι as the Titans). See further 173a-e n.

112 ὥστε θεοί: see 109-26n. for association between gold and divinity. The Golden Race are *almost* gods (113-14 οὐδέ τι δειλόν|γῆρας ἐπῆν, 115n. θαλίῃσι) but not quite, because they are mortal (116 θνήσκον).

ἀκηδέα θυμὸν ἔχοντες: at 170 of the Race of Heroes, at *Theog.* 61 of the Muses. At *Theog.* 489 Zeus himself is also ἀκηδής (and the gods are ἀκηδέες at *Il.* 24.526). One cannot be truly free from cares unless close to divinity. Contrast 49, 95 κήδεα λυγρά.

113 πόνου: read by Herodian, West and Solmsen, supported by parallels at *Il.* 13.2, 14.480, *Od.* 8.529, [*Sc.*]351. However, the reading πόνων of the mss. (accepted by Paley, Wilamowitz, Mazon, Sinclair, Rzach, Verdenius) should be retained as the change from pl. to sing. is much more likely to occur as a corruption than the

opposite, in the context – πόνου can be understood as an assimilation to οἰζύος, and is paralleled by 91 πόνοιο. Cf. the variation from sing. to pl. in *Od.* 4.851 καί με κέλει παύσασθαι οἰζύος ἥδ' ὀδυνάων | πολλέων, αἶ μ' ἐρέθουσι κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν: however, in the *Od.* passage the pl. is stressed: it comes afterwards, and is expanded in the next line.

As at 91 the idyllic age is characterised by a lack of toil. It is very much a farmer's idea of paradise. This links the two myths, forms a contrast with the Iron-Age condition, provides an aetiology for labour (it is a symptom of mankind's decline) and even goes some way towards explaining why the Golden Race cannot last (see 110n.): the Races must have justice (see 106-201n. for structuralist readings: *dike* held by Golden and Heroic Races) but, in accordance with Hesiod's priorities throughout *Op.*, they must also work.

In-keeping with their semi-divine status (112n.), the Golden Race are defined by semi-divine abstracts: at *Theog.* 226 πόνος is personified as a daughter of Eris: similarly 113 οἰζύος is a child of Night at *Theog.* 213, as is 114 γῆρας at *Theog.* 225. 116 θνητῶν δ' ὥσθ' ὕπνω δεδμημένοι: *Theog.* 212 Death and Sleep are so closely associated (also at *Od.* 13.80, 18.201-2) because they are siblings, children of Night.

οἰζύος: cf. Iron Race 176-7 οὐδέ ποτ' ἤμαρ | παύσονται καμάτου καὶ οἰζύος.

113-14 οὐδέ τι δειλὸν | γῆρας ἐπῆν: cf. the Silver Race who have a prolonged childhood (130-3), and the future of the Iron Race which will be characterised by instant old age, with children born grey-haired (181). On age in the Myth of the Races see further Falkner 1989:42-60.

114 πόδας καὶ χεῖρας: for the effects of old age on hands and feet see also *Od.*11.497, 19.359 (see 93n. *Od.*19.360 added there, perhaps because of this line). The effects of toil could also be referred to here: the Golden Race do not age, but they also do not work. For feet and hands in distinctly Iron-Age contexts (labour, poverty, the seasons, injustice, gain) see 497, 524, 541 (feet), 192, 321, 468, 480, 497, 797 (hands).

115 θαλίησι: feasting epitomises the good life – in *Theog.* the Muses (one is Θάλεια) and Graces (one is Θαλίη) delight in feasting, in *Op.* it is an activity of the Golden Race and the people of the Just City. It emphasises the almost divine nature of the Golden Race as the gods are described as feasting constantly: *Il.*1.601-4, *Theog.*802, *Op.*736, 742 (further Graziosi/Haubold 2005).

118-19 ἐθελημοί| ἥσυχαι: ἐθελημοί occurs only here in early epic. The point is that the Golden Race are happy with their lot and willing to accept it, unlike the Silver Race who commit *hybris* (see Mazon, Verdenius) – for the contrast see *Ap. Rhod. Argon.*2.655-7 οὐδέ οἱ ὕβρις|ἦνδανεν, ἀλλ' ἐθελημὸς ἐφ' ὕδασι πατρὸς ἐοῖο|μητέρι συνναίεσκεν. Similarly ἥσυχία is often used as the opposite of *hybris* (Solon fr.4.8-10, Pind. *Pyth.*11.55), and a synonym of σωφροσύνη (Pl. *Chrm.*159b).

[120 Appears only in Diod. Sic., see 111-20n. It is too poorly attested to be retained.]

121 τοῦτο γένος κατὰ γαῖα κάλυψεν: also at 140 (Silver) and 156 (Bronze), cf. *Heroes* 170-3 (allowed a continued existence on the isles of the blessed). Their ultimate fate is the same, but there are differences: Gold become guardians of mortals (123), though we are not told why they died; Silver are hidden by Zeus

because of *hybris* (138) but become 141 ὑποχθόνιοι μάκαρες θνητοί; Bronze destroy themselves and go nameless to Hades (152-4).

In *Op.* the earth characterises the Iron Age as it is important for farming (32, 232) and is used in locative formulae to mark out the mortal world (101, 487, 505, 508, 548, 551). Even in this agricultural vein, however, Earth is sometimes personified, her divinity restored: see e.g. 563 Γῆ πάντων μήτηρ. Furthermore, at times she steps outside of agriculture and reassumes her cosmic significance (familiar from *Theog.*: see her role in the succession myth at e.g. 159-84): at 19 she is home to Eris; at 61, 70 in her elemental role she contributes to Pandora's creation (with water at 61 but alone at 70); here she is involved in ending the Races.

Plato reads μοῖρα for γαῖα at *Cra.*397e either because it fits his purpose (the Golden Race are wise, but are fated to die), or because he wanted to resolve an apparent inconsistency (the Golden Race do not go below the earth but remain on it). Slatkin in Daston/Vidal 2004:28 notes that the abstraction 'nature' (*phusis*) is never found in Hes. or Hom., but instead is often represented as earth. Plato's use of μοῖρα could be linked to this nexus of ideas; a later philosopher wanting to render earth as an abstraction.

122-3 Plato quotes these lines at *Cra.*397-8a and *Resp.*468e-469a; they are alluded to, without citation, also at *Resp.*620d, *Leg.*713c-e, *Symp.*202d-203a, *Plut. Mor.*415b. The quotations differ from the mss. of *Op.*: *Cra.*398a reads οἱ μὲν δαίμονες ἄγνοὶ ὑποχθόνιοι καλέονται| ἐσθλοὶ ἀλεξίκακοι φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων, *Resp.*469a οἱ μὲν δαίμονες ἄγνοὶ ἐπιχθόνιοι τελέθουσιν| ἐσθλοὶ ἀλεξίκακοι φύλακες μερόπων ἀνθρώπων. Some editors (e.g. Wilamowitz) print one of Plato's

versions, or a mix of the two, rather than the reading of the mss., however in both cases Plato changes *Op.* to suit his purpose: for example, in *Cratylus* Socrates is concerned with decoding the wisdom supposedly embedded in the word δαίμων – it is therefore the *name* δαίμων which is central to his argument and so the verb καλέονται is of particular relevance (El Murr in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010:281-2). We should follow the mss.

As Plato's Race-system in the *Republic* is based on the contemporaneous existence of all the metal Races (see 106-201n.), the fate of the Golden Race is for him not a past, lost, ideal state but something to which the just citizens of Callipolis might actually aspire.

122 δαίμονες: variously etymologised as deriving from: δάω 'learn' (Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)122a δαίμονας καλεῖ παρὰ τὸ δαῖναι ἥτοι γινῶναι τὰ πάντα ἢ μερίζειν τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις); δαήμονες 'wise' (Pl. *Cra.*398b); δαίω 'distribute' (Lfgre). If we accept the latter explanation, the δαίμονες are 'those who give out shares', they are 123 ἐσθλοί in terms of the shares they give to men, and so at 126 πλουτοδότης fulfil their literal function. In Hom. they are often synonymous with θεοί (e.g. *Il.*1.222, 3.420), or denote divine power (e.g. *Il.*17.98): on the conflation of gods and *daimones* in Hom. see e.g. Plut. *Mor.*415a-b Ὅμηρος μὲν ἔτι φαίνεται κοινῶς ἀμφοτέροις χρώμενος τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἔστιν ὅτε δαίμονας προσαγορεύων. Here, however, their function and origin deny them such a status: Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)122a notes a hierarchy – first gods, second δαίμονες, third heroes, fourth men. On a general level, the term *daimon* seems to be used for

‘an occult power, a force that drives man forward when no agent can be named’ (Burkert 1985:180).

This passage gave rise to Hesiod’s later reputation as an expert on demonology: see the *Purifications* of Empedocles (esp. DK B 115), Plato (*Crat.*397e-398c, *Resp.*468e, 620d, *Leg.*713c-e), Plutarch (*Mor.*415b-416b, 417b, 431b, 431e, 361b, 593d); with Koning 2010:165-72. That Hesiod differentiates between gods and *daimones* sets him apart from Homer and ahead in terms of authority on this matter.

123 ἐπιχθόνιοι: here there is a primary contrast between earthbound mortals and gods Ὀλύμπια δώματ’ ἔχοντες (e.g. 110, 128), and a secondary contrast with the Silver Race 141 ὑποχθόνιοι.

[124-5 =254-5 Omitted here by papyri Π₄₀ and Π₃₈ (*ut videtur*) and by Proclus, Plutarch, Macrobius. Bracketed by e.g. Wilamowitz, Sinclair, Rzach, Mazon, West, Solmsen; kept in the main text by e.g. Paley, Verdenius, Arrighetti. Although the lines are included in the medieval *paradosis* and some scholia, and they do make good sense in the context, the degree of repetition is uncharacteristic of *Op.* and it is likely that the lines were interpolated here as an explanatory gloss on 123 φύλακες, a gloss transposed from the later passage in which the φύλακες appear for a second time. See further 253-5n.]

126 πλουτοδοταὶ καὶ τοῦτο γέρας βασιλῆιον ἔσχον: cf. 39 δωροφάγους (same metrical position as πλουτοδοταὶ: emphatic at beginning of line): giving wealth is a kingly gift of honour, but by the Iron Age the kings have abused their power to

such an extent that they give wealth neither directly nor indirectly, but snatch it for themselves.

127-42 The Silver Race.

The Silver Race are characterised by their childish nature. They begin life with 100 years of childhood (130) and, even after they reach ἡβης μέτρον (132) they neglect their duties and fight amongst themselves like badly behaved children.

127 πολὺ χειρότερον: the Silver Race are inferior to the ideal Golden Race. The phrase is emphatic, but formulaic (cf. *Il.*15.641, 20.434, 23.572, 577, *Od.*11.621, 21.325): Hesiod further emphasises the hierarchy by prefacing this comparative with another, δεύτερον (this could have both temporal and qualitative force). This begins the transition from Gold to Iron, the ‘fall from grace’ which this myth (and that of Prometheus and Pandora, see 106-201n.) describes. However, because of its composite nature the story is not a tidy one of steady decline: the Heroes are far superior to both Silver and Bronze (see 156-73n.).

μετόπισθεν: here of the progression of the Ages, cf. its use at 284-5 of the progression of generations within the Iron Age. At *Theog.*210, just like the hubristic Silver Race, the Titans will be punished afterwards (ἔπειτα τίσιν μετόπισθεν ἔσεσθαι).

128 ἀργύρεον ποίησαν: cf. 144 χάλκεον ποίησ’.

129 οὔτε φυὴν ἐναλίγκιον οὔτε νόημα=[Sc.]88. For the complementary pairing of appearance and mind see e.g. *Il.*1.115, *Od.*8.168 (φυὴν and φρένας), *Il.*3.208 (φυὴν and μήδεα). Contrast Pandora whose thievish nature (78 ἐπίκλοπον ἦθος) does *not* correspond to her outward beauty.

130 ἑκατὸν μὲν παῖς ἔτεα: cf. Genesis 6.3 – after the Flood, God will limit man’s lifespan from 969 (that of the first race) to 120 years. Hesiod’s Silver Race have a long youthful lifespan; however, for 100 years they are stuck in childhood rather than reaching ἦβη, so this is more a curse than a blessing – see further 131n. on νήπιος.

παρὰ μητέρι κεδνῇ: formulaic for the home, see e.g. *Od.*10.8 οἱ δ’ αἰεὶ παρὰ πατρὶ φίλω καὶ μητέρι κεδνῇ. This is a rare mention of a woman in the Myth of the Races, here specifically in her role as mother: see also 520 the tender-skinned maiden stays at home beside her mother. As Helen in the Heroic Race (165) is there less as a member of the Race and more as a catalyst of events, so the women in the Silver Age are not part of the sequence but make a point about the nature of this Race (so the logical difficulty of having children reared for 100 years by mothers with a short adult lifespan is irrelevant).

These children are useless (see Falkner 1989:53), so they are placed next to the other ineffectual element (59-105n.): woman. Notably there is no father in this vignette. The Silver Race are a matriarchal society with no male role models: a situation intended to explain why, when they finally do grow up, they do not grow out of childish sibling rivalry (Proclus, Sinclair, *pace* Ercolani). The matriarchal model is depicted as disastrous, which takes on particular relevance when considered with

the Pandora Myth: see also the threat of woman in *Theog.* e.g. 169 Kronos addresses to his μητέρα κεδνήν his desire to join in her plot against Ouranos.

131 μέγα νήπιος: in this context of extended childhood it can be taken in its literal, etymological, meaning: ‘without speech’ (*Lfgre*), i.e. childlike, as noted at Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)131b. This is unusual and striking, *pace* West, who argues that ‘the line is filled out with formulae’.

132 ὅτ’ ἄρ’ ἠβήσαι τε καὶ ἠβης μέτρον ἵκοιτο: pleonastic construction, emphasising the Silver Race’s progression from childhood (though in terms of behaviour they don’t get very far) and the idea of the right time for which cf. ἠβάω at 698 of a potential wife, ἠβης μέτρον at 438 of oxen.

133 ἄλγε’ ἔχοντες: also at *Theog.*621 the binding of the Titans: in both instances a mythical race must be sent underground as punishment for overstepping the mark.

134 ὕβριν: according to this myth it is during the Silver Age that *hybris* appears in the world: and as Arrighetti 1998:420 rightly notes, ‘non lo [i.e. il mondo] lascerà più ma solo muterà gli strumenti coi quali esercitarsi’. See also 146 downfall of the Bronze Race; 191 *hybris* as a symptom of the Iron Age’s apocalyptic future; 213, 214, 217 Hesiod warns Perses against it; 238 it characterises the Unjust City (further parallel 134 and 241 ἀτάσθαλον). It acts as the polar opposite of *dike*: the two are directly contrasted at 213, 217.

On definitions of *hybris* see esp. the debate between MacDowell (definition: ‘having energy or power and misusing it self-indulgently’ 1976:21) and Fisher (definition, following Arist. *Rh.*: intending ‘gratuitously to inflict dishonour and shame upon

others' 1979:32), later supplemented by Cairns 1996. Most relevant to this passage with its focus on childishness, MacDowell 1976:15 notes that *hybris* is particularly associated with youth (see e.g. Pl. *Leg.*808d). Here the exact meaning is unclear (it does not refer to disobedience to the gods, for which see 135-6): from 135 ἀλλήλων perhaps we are to assume violence, as in the Bronze Age 146.

ἀτάσθαλον: often with *hybris*: *Il.*11.695, *Od.*3.207, 16.86, 17.588, 20.370, 24.282, 24.352, *Theog.*996. In this combination *Lfgre* defines it as an urge without the inhibition of thought or reason – note its proximity to ἀφραδίας. Given its phonetic similarity with 131 ἀτάλλων, and its associations with naïve foolishness, it is likely that Hesiod uses the pair as etymological wordplay emphasising the childish nature of the Silver Race

οὐκ ἐδύναντο: cf. 136 ἤθελον, they *choose* not to worship the gods, but they are *unable* (presumably because of their god-given nature – for a parallel with animal nature see 278n.) to refrain from *hybris* against each other. Furthermore 135 ἀπέχειν is used elsewhere in *Op.* only of the winds (645): an inexorable force, like the nature of the Silver Race. This could exonerate the Silver Race to a certain extent (*pace* Macdowell 1976:21 '*hybris* is always voluntary'), and could go some way towards explaining why after all their bad behaviour they are still allowed to become blessed and honoured (138n.). They were unable always to behave self-sufficiently and to make independent choices, so they are not punished too harshly.

135-6 This acts as another link both with *Theog.* chronology and with the Prometheus/Pandora narrative: it indicates the point when gods and men separate and sacrifice is established (136 βωμοῖς, *Theog.*557 βωμῶν).

137 θέμις: at *Theog.*135 she is personified as a daughter of Gaia and Ouranos, at *Theog.*901-6 she is the second wife of Zeus, producing children including Dike (see 134n. on *hybris* as the opposite of *dike*).

138 Ζεὺς Κρονίδης: see 111n. – Kronos was ruling during the Golden Age but now Zeus has come to power: the transition is marked by use of the patronymic. ‘The gods’ (at e.g. 110, 128) are replaced by Zeus because of his particular association with justice (see 9n., 35-6n.): with Silver begins the Races’ moral decline.

ἔκρυψε χολούμενος: cf. 47 – Zeus’ anger and its manifestation in the motif of hiding links the Myth of the Races with the myths of Prometheus and Pandora. West in his commentary offers the translation ‘removed from the scene’, however the literal meaning ‘hid’ is more likely given the parallel with the earlier myth, and given that the Silver Race are covered by the earth (140) and become ὑποχθόνιοι (141).

τιμάς: also at 142, 347. The Silver Race are destroyed because they do not give honour (τιμάς) to the blessed gods (μακάρεσσι θεοῖς), yet paradoxically Zeus still allows them to become μάκαρες θνητοί (141), with their own τιμή (142). For a possible explanation see 134n.

140 =156. See 121n.

141 ὑποχθόνιοι μάκαρες θνητοί: this combination is extraordinary, reinforcing the idea of Hesiod’s myth as a constructed amalgamation (106-201n.). μάκαρες θνητοί is an oxymoron (used only here in early epic) as μάκαρες is usually with θεοί (139), or synonymous with them (136): see esp. the dichotomy at *Il.*1.339 πρὸς

τε θεῶν μακάρων πρὸς τε θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων. An interesting exception is a simile at *Il.*11.67-9 in which the owners of the fields are blessed men, a message relevant to Hesiod's enterprise. For more on this pair see Schoele 1960. Perhaps Hesiod coined the phrase in order that he might establish a hierarchy: 123 the Golden Race become δαίμονες *on* the earth, but the Silver Race are not so exemplary and are left as blessed mortals *under* the earth; the Golden Race lived 112 ὥστε θεοί and become 122 δαίμονες when they die, but the highest title the inferior (127) Silver Race can get is μάκαρες θνητοί. The juxtaposition ὑποχθόνιοι μάκαρες is again strange, with ὑποχθόνιοι used only here in early epic. Peppmüller 1896 conjectures θνητοῖς (no mss. support, reading accepted by e.g. Rzach, Mazon) for θνητοί (unanimous in mss. and retained by e.g. Wilamowitz, Sinclair, West), so the sense becomes 'they are called blessed underworld dwellers *by mortals*': the combination is now not so strange. However, if the status of the Silver Race is inferior to that of the Golden Race, they must be lesser than δαίμονες and so θνητοί must be kept. Furthermore, West notes that the construction with θνητοῖς would be syntactically without parallel in epic.

142 δεύτεροι: with 127 δεύτερον frames the section. This could be a general reference to the 'second Race' (with pl. here rather than sing. because it follows 141 θνητοί, not γένος). More likely, however, is the meaning 'inferior' (Verdenius) or 'in second place' (Most), corresponding to 127 χειρότερον: see 141n. and 142 ἀλλ' ἔμπης.

143-55 The Bronze Race

In this section are numerous words/phrases/lines not used elsewhere in *Op.* but which feature in *Theog.*: 145 μελιᾶν (*Theog.*187, 563); 147 ἥσθιον (*Theog.*524, 773); ἀδάμαντος (*Theog.*161, 188, 239); 148 ἄπλαστοι (*Theog.*151); 149 = *Theog.*152, 673; 148 βίη καὶ χεῖρες (*Theog.*649); 153 κρουερού (*Theog.*657). The Bronze Race are characterised by their strength and violence, so Hesiod likens them more to the gods of his *Theog.* (at their particularly brutish moments e.g. 147 the castration of Ouranos, 148-9 the Hundred-Handers and the Titanomachy) than to other races of humans. As violence played such a crucial role in the *Theog.* succession myth, so here violence will end this Race and give way to its successors.

143 Ζεὺς δὲ πατήρ: cf. 111n. ἐπὶ Κρόνου. This is the first race made by Zeus alone rather than by the Olympians in general – see also Heroes 158. This formula is particularly relevant here as Zeus appears in his capacity as creator (see also 59n.).

144 οὐκ ἀργυρέω οὐδὲν ὁμοῖον: this formulation already suggests a decline which is made explicit in the next line, 145 δεινόν τε καὶ ὄβριμον: for epic usage of ὁμοῖος to mark qualitative comparison cf. *Il.*2.553-4, 4.410, 5.441-2, 9.305-6, 10.216, 12.270-1, 14.521, 16.53, 23.632. The Silver and Bronze Races combine to represent an aition of human vice (Fontenrose 1974:8, Brown 1998:389): both commit *hybris* (134, 146), the Silver through neglect of the gods, overstepping boundaries, and foolishness; the Bronze through violence (*pace* Verdenius' claim that they add warlike acts to the *hybris* already existing in the Silver Race: the Races are all separate, so their *hybris* is not cumulative).

145 ἐκ μελιᾶν: at *Theog.*187 the Μελῖαι are a group of nymphs (West notes that the use of the Aeolic/Doric gen. here, which makes the fem. clear, shows that Hesiod is

thinking of these nymphs); at *Theog.*563 Zeus withholds from men the fire stored up in ash trees (μελίησι). The wood is a source of strength, associated with gods and with latent power: see also its use in Homer μέλινον ἔγχος (Nagy 1979:156-60, 172-3 even suggests that Achilles himself is meant here). It emphasises the natural violence of the Bronze Race (Ercolani). Further, Hesiod is trying to incorporate yet more traditions into his composite myth (106-201n.): *Theog.*187 the Meliai are born with the Gigantes, with whom the lineage of men is connected at *Theog.*50 (see also common vocabulary e.g. τεύχεα in Hes. only of the Gigantes, *Theog.*186, and the Bronze Race, *Op.*150); there is evidence of a tradition that has men descended from trees (see e.g. *ΣIl.*(Erbse)22.126, *Od.*19.162-3).

146 ἔργ’: here used of war, the works of Ares: the register is that of heroic epic. At 64 Athene teaches Pandora women’s works, 521 the tender-skinned maiden is innocent of the works of Aphrodite. It is used more commonly in *Op.* of human labour.

146-7 οὐδέ τι σῖτον ἤσθιον: grain is the product of agriculture, therefore a sign of civilised society: for ‘grain-eating’ as an epithet of mortals see *Od.*8.222, 9.89, 10.101 (σῖτον ἔδοντες), 9.191 (σιτοφάγοι), similarly 82 ἀλφηστῆσιν. Like Homer’s heroes the Bronze Race presumably eat meat, however the lack of σῖτον renders them inferior to the Heroes (for the diet of Hesiod’s Heroes see 157n., for the Bronze as inferior to them see 158n.) as σῖτος is necessary for good fighters (*Il.*9.706, 19.160-70) and is abstained from only in times of great grief (*Il.*19.303-8, 24.128-30 Achilles fasts when he loses Patroclus). In *Theog.* ἤσθιον is used only of violent creatures: at *Theog.*524 of the eagle who eats Prometheus’ liver, at 773 of Cerberus. Arrighetti

1998:420 sees a conflict between this line and 151 χαλκῷ δ' εἰργάζοντο, as it seems to him that 'working with bronze' must refer to agriculture: however, it could just as well refer to other crafts – see 151n.

147 ἀδάμαντος ἔχον κρατερόφρονα θυμόν: ἀδάμαντος at *Theog.*161, 188 of the sickle used to castrate Ouranos. Verdenius notes: 'Hes. is inspired by the Homeric phrase ἧ γὰρ σοί γε σιδήρεος ἐν φρεσὶ θυμός (*Il.*22.357, *Od.*23.172), but he avoids the word 'iron' because he is describing a bronze race.'

148-9 ~*Theog.*151-2 the Hundred-Handers. In particular 149=*Theog.*152 (and 673). The difference is that *Theog.*151 κεφαλαὶ δὲ ἐκάστω πεντήκοντα has been replaced with μεγάλη δὲ βίη καὶ χεῖρες ἄαπτοι, a phrase used at *Theog.*649 again of the Hundred-Handers (for whom of course this description is particularly relevant). This alteration is logical: giving the Bronze Race fifty heads would take them too far away from being human, so the emphasis is transferred to the χεῖρες ἄαπτοι which, after all, will prove the death of them (152). The alteration does render 149 ἐπὶ στιβαροῖσι μέλεσσιν difficult, however the phrase should not be athetised (as it is by e.g. Wilamowitz) because it is unanimously attested in mss., the process of analogy which explains its use here is understandable, and it can be made sense of even in this context if we take μέλεα to mean 'body' rather than limbs.

148 ἄπλαστοι...ἄαπτοι: ἄπλαστοι has been variously explained as equivalent to ἀπέλαστοι or ἄπλητοι (see *Theog.*151-3 ἄπλαστοι...ἄπλητος) 'unapproachable' (*Lfgre*, Verdenius, Arrighetti 1998:420, Most 2006), and as the negated form of πλαστός 'shaped' by a craftsman i.e. 'unshaped', 'shapeless' (West). ἄαπτοι, used only with χεῖρες in early epic, is also of uncertain etymology – the most plausible

suggestion (*Lfgre*) is that it comes from ἄπτομαι and so would mean ‘untouchable’. The emphatic positioning of the two adj., framing the line, suggests a correspondence: if we accept the first explanation of ἄπλαστοι and the above suggestion for ἄαπτοι, at least in so far as the words are understood by Hesiod, then they form a neat pleonasm.

150-1 χάλκεα μὲν τεύχεα, χάλκεοι δέ τε οἵκοι, | χαλκῷ δ’ εἰργάζοντο: on anaphora see 5-7n. Unlike the Gold and Silver Races, the Bronze Race actually use the metal with which they are associated – 151 μέλας δ’ οὐκ ἔσκε σίδηρος suggests that the same will go for the Iron Race. This shows a further amalgamation of traditions (see 106-201n., and Smith 1980:150 for the inevitable inconsistencies caused by this construction): Hesiod is also looking back to the previous Ages in terms of materials used. Since the ‘Three-Age System’ (Stone, Bronze, Iron) was not formally coined until the early 19th century, it would be going too far to attribute to Hesiod systematic historical knowledge here; however, awareness of a previous Age in which bronze rather than iron was used (the archaeological Bronze Age ended not more than a few hundred years before Hesiod’s time: see esp. Snodgrass in *Wertime/Muhly* 1980) was transmitted in story and song – see the prominence of the metal in Hom. For τεύχεα in Hes. see *Theog.*186 and 145n. For bronze οἵκοι in epic see e.g. *Od.*7.86 (Alcinous), *Il.*18.371 (Hephaistos), *Il.*1.426, 14.173, 21.438, 21.505 (Zeus).

Although ἐργάζομαι is used elsewhere in *Op.* primarily of agriculture (e.g. 43, 299, 309, 312, 314, 382, 397, 438, 623), here in light of 146-7 this cannot be the case: it must refer rather to hunting, building etc. The flexibility of the verb allows for such

context-dependent interpretations: see its varied uses at e.g. *Il.*18.469 the work of a blacksmith (the shield of Achilles); *Od.*3.435 the work of a goldsmith; *Od.*22.422 the work of a slave girl, in particular carding wool; *Theog.*440 the work of those at sea.

151 μέλας δ'οὐκ ἔσκε σίδηρος: marks a contrast with χαλκῶ at the beginning of the line, and paves the way for the Iron Age. At *Theog.*864 iron is introduced as ὁ περ κρατερώτατός ἐστιν – we might expect this brutish race to work with such a strong metal, however iron is more difficult to work than bronze so it needs a more advanced Race, and bronze is the usual metal for weaponry which is the primary concern of this warlike Race. Iron is reserved for the current 'doomed' Age (155 μέλας used of death, as often in Hom.; σιδήρεον used at *Op.*176 of the Iron Age and *Theog.*764 of Death) both for effect and for 'historical' accuracy (150-1n.).

152-5 A pleonastic sequence of four expressions for death. The Bronze Race do not have an afterlife or honours after death, as did the Gold and Silver Races, so Hesiod replaces this element with an elaboration emphasising the finality of their demise.

152 χεῖρεσσιν ὑπὸ σφετέρῃσι δαμέντες: the gods are not involved in this Race's destruction – they destroy each other. The appearance of Hades (153) does not contradict this: he is mentioned only in his capacity as lord of the underworld, and does not play an active role.

153-4 βῆσαν ἐς εὐρώεντα δόμον κρυεροῦ Αἰδαοἰνώνυμοι: cf. 123, 141 – the Bronze Race have no afterlife or honours after death. κρυεροῦ occurs at *Theog.*657 of the work of Ares: the works of war which in fact have destroyed the Bronze Race.

154 καὶ ἐκπάγλους περ ἔόντας: death takes them *even though* they are frightful.

The concessive (καί and περ) implies that their death is unexpected, and by extension that strength and immortality are connected.

155 λαμπρὸν δ' ἔλιπον φάος ἡελίοιο: formula for death, also at *Il.*18.11, *Od.*11.93

(although there of Odysseus' descent to the Underworld, not his death), *Hom. Hymn*

5.272. λαμπρόν is so positioned as to form an antithesis with μέλας.

156-73 The Race of Heroes.

The Race of Heroes does not fit easily in Hesiod's scheme. It intrudes into the metallic sequence, and marks not a decline but a superior Age: the Race of Heroes is more just and better (158 δικαιότερον καὶ ἄρχειον) than the Bronze Race; the Race is described as 159 θεῖον γένος and 160 ἡμίθεοι, in contrast to the Silver Race who do not even observe rites (135-7); the Heroes do not all meet the same fate, indicating individual glory (166-73); some are given an afterlife even greater than the Golden Race (173n.).

This incongruity is symptomatic of the myth's constructed nature (see 106-201n.). Hesiod is producing a composite myth, in which he must include the Greek heroic tradition (see e.g. Fontenrose 1974:9; Brown 1998:396 suggests the heroes were 'too worthy, and too familiar to the audience as individuals, to be lumped together as an impersonal metallic grouping'). He is looking both systematically from the Golden to the Iron Race, and back from his own Race to the previous one (or to a previous generation within his Race – see 160n. προτέρη γενεή). This Race marks the

divergence between *Theog.* and *Op.*: in *Theog.* the gods in unions with mortals still produce heroes (*Theog.* 970 Demeter with hero Iasion produces the demigod Ploutos, 1009 Aphrodite bears to Anchises the hero Aeneas); in Hes. *Cat.* and *Hom. Hymn* these unions continue; the Homeric epics are concerned with the world of the heroes and their relationship with the gods; by the time described in *Op.*, the actions of Prometheus have caused a schism between gods and mortals, unions have ceased, the heroes are confined to a myth about the past.

The interpretational difficulties caused by this incongruity are further compounded by the textual problems. We have the extra or alternative lines 173a-e (see note), which attempt (in the vein of 111 ἐπὶ Κρόνου) to reconcile the *Op.* myth with *Theog.* chronology.

156 See 121n.

157 χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ: usually in Hes. this suggests extent: *Theog.* 531 the wide spread of Heracles' fame; 252 the reach of Zeus' spies; 510 the wind fells trees all over the earth; here the whole of the third Race is replaced by the fourth. However, the adj. may also have a more pointed use here: it could imply that Hesiod's Heroes eat grain, in which case it would mark a progression from the Bronze Race 146-7 οὐδέ τι σῖτον ἥσθιον.

158 Ζεὺς Κρονίδης ποίησε: see 111n.

δικαιότερον καὶ ἄρειον: cf. 127 χειρότερον (Gold to Silver), 144 οὐδὲν ὁμοῖον (Silver to Bronze). This looks ahead to Hesiod's teachings on Justice: 279 δίκην, ἥ πολλὸν ἀρίστη| γίνεται – justice is the best thing, so being more just makes a Race

better. Like the Bronze Race the Heroes fight: however, they engage in proper πόλεμος rather than unbridled skirmishes (161); they have justification for entering into battle (163 Oedipus' flocks, 165 Helen) rather than fighting simply because it is their nature; and they do it all justly.

159 ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων: a common formula in epic (at *Il.*5.746-7, 8.390-1, 9.524-5, 13.346, *Od.*1.101, 4.268, 11.629, 14.97, 24.25, 24.88, [Sc.]19). The combination is particularly relevant here, however: to disguise how contrived their place is in the myth of human races, Hesiod reinforces the fact that, although they are heroes, they are also men.

καλέονται: the Heroes' reputation precedes them: thanks, in part, to their prominence in epic. For the importance of reputation see 11-13n.

159-60 θεῖον...ἡμίθεοι: pleonasm emphasising the Heroes' status: like the Golden Race (112 ὥστε θεοί) they are godlike. As West argues, these words properly refer to divine descent, however in this case we have not generation but creation: there is a conflation between the heroic tradition in which heroes were sons of gods, and Hesiod's myth in which the heroes are early men, created by Zeus. See further 167-73n.

160 προτέρη γενεή: Most 1997 argues that γενεή is used to distinguish between sub-groups within a γένος, and so this phrase would mean not previous *race*, but previous *generation* (within that race). This, however, conflicts with the numbering of the Race τέταρτον.

ἀπείρονα γαῖαν: cf. 168 *πείρασι γαίης*: the earth is not literally 'boundless', since the Heroes can be settled at the ends of it, but 'vast'.

161-5 The wars of the Race of Heroes are reduced to the two cycles most important to the epic tradition: the Theban and the Trojan. This compression is understandable in terms of the composite nature of the myth, as Hesiod is trying to insert into his metallic scheme a summary of the entire heroic tradition. He puts the Theban war first: mention of it at e.g. *Il.*4.372-410, 23.671-80 shows that it was considered to have been the earlier. The compression resembles that at 651-3, where it may have a poetological rather than a primarily narrative function.

162 *τοὺς μὲν ὑφ' ἑπταπύλῳ Θήβῃ, Καδμηίδι γαίῃ*: 'some...others' also at 166-7 (although see 166n. for textual problem): the heroes fight various wars, and come to various ends. They are the first Race to be treated as individuals because of their capacity for personal glory. Unlike the Silver Race who are depicted as powerless in the face of their own nature (134n.), in the Heroic Race we catch a first glimpse of the independent thought which Hesiod prizes so highly. *ἑπτάπυλος* always in epic of Thebes: *Il.*4.406, *Od.*11.263, [*Sc.*]49. The Thebans are often called *Καδμεῖοι* in epic: *Il.*4.385, 5.804, 23.680.

163 *μαρναμένους μῆλων ἔνεκ' Οἰδιπόδαο*: this is probably a reference to the quarrel between brothers Eteocles and Polynices over their inheritance (*Thebaid* fr.2-3 Bernabé), rather than to the war between the Thebans and the Minyans as Verdenius suggests. It marks a shift from the generational conflict of the succession

myth, to the sibling rivalry which will come to characterise Iron-Age conflict: another quarrel between brothers will provide Hesiod's Iron-Age didactic setting.

164-5 The Trojan War. See also 651-3. Here Helen (Ἑλένης...ἠυκόμοιο) is named explicitly as the reason for the Greek expedition to Troy. At 653 she is not named but, presumably because of her presence, Troy has become associated with beautiful women (Τροίην καλλιγύναικα). Hesiod focuses on the voyage, perhaps because of his anxiety about seafaring (e.g. 649).

166 Omitted in two papyri (Π₃₈, Π₄₀), omission followed by Proclus, line bracketed by Solmsen (see 1982:22-4 for argumentation – an interpolated explanatory gloss, disregarded in the scholia), with the result that all the Heroes go to the Isles of the Blessed. However, the idea of differentiation has been introduced by 162-4 τοὺς μὲν...τοὺς δέ (there are two different battles to be fought), and this Race is characterised by wars (πόλεμος) in which Heroes achieve individual glory, so it makes more sense that only those who have proved themselves the most heroic of Heroes will end up on the Isles. Similarly in Hom. most heroes go to Hades, but at *Od.*4.561-9 Menelaos and Rhadamanthus will go to Elysium (πείρατα γαίης *Od.*4.563, *Op.*168). It is thus more likely that the line was omitted in some versions to resolve an apparent contradiction.

ἀμφεκάλυψε: in Hes. only here and at 555: here of the inexorability of death, at 555 of the enveloping clouds – powerful forces of nature. This kind of language is standard in heroic epic: e.g. *Il.*5.68 θάνατος δέ μιν ἀμφεκάλυψε, 12.116 μιν μοῖρα

δυσώνυμος ἀμφεκάλυψεν. It is death itself that covers the Heroic Race, not the earth as at 121, 140, 156.

167 ὀπάσσας: here Zeus grants an eternal dwelling-place to the Heroes, at 474 with the same verb he grants a good harvest to men: in work-oriented *Op.*, man's greatest wish should be productivity.

167-73 The reward given to the Heroic Race has similarities with the Golden Age and with the afterlives of both the Gold and Silver Races e.g. 112, 170 ἀκηδέα θυμόν; 171 ἐν μακάρων νήσοισι, 141 μάκαρες θνητοί. However, their reward goes further: the ὄλβιοι ἥρωες (172) are not just blessed but they get to live forever on the Isles of the Blessed; 117-18 in the Golden Age, the earth bears fruit of its own accord (καρπὸν δ' ἔφερε ζείδωρος ἄρουρα|αὐτομάτη πολλόν τε καὶ ἄφθονον), for the Heroic Race the fruit comes three times a year (173 τρις ἔτεος: for 'three' denoting abundance see 252n.). Furthermore, West notes that 'μάκαρες unqualified in the poetic language almost always means 'the gods'' (see 136), so there is a suggestion here that the Heroes, being ἡμίθεοι, actually end up *with* the gods (for the gods' visits to Oceanos see e.g. *Il.* 1.423, 14.201, 23.205).

168 κατένασσε πατήρ ἐν πείρασι γαίης: see *Theog.* 617-33 Ouranos banishes the Hundred-Handers: including 620 κατένασσε, 622 ἐν πείρασι γαίης. There it is a punishment, with the creatures forced to live in torment and suffering; here the 'ends of the earth' are a place where Heroes live eternally care-free (see further Bergren 1975). There seem to have been other characterisations of the Isles of the Blessed in circulation: at Hes. *Cat.* fr.204.96-119 (58-81) Zeus plans to destroy many

men and the heroes, separating men from gods and consigning the heroes to the Isles of the Blessed.

[169 See 173a, formerly numbered 169 because of its position in some mss.]

172 θάλλοντα: this connects the Race of Heroes with the Just City, as θάλλω is used again at 227 (the Just City will flourish) and 236 (the Just community always flourishes with good things). Although such metaphors of 'blooming' are commonly used to describe success and prosperity, they are particularly appropriate in a poem so concerned with agriculture in which even the ideal state is repeatedly described in terms of farming (see 43-6n.).

[173a-e Fragments preserved in two papyri, omitted in a third. 173a is preserved in a scholion and is in some mss., but at different points in each. 173b-e are not attested in the medieval *paradosis*. The lack of consistency in their attestation suggests that these lines are not authentic. Their subject matter is also difficult: although mention of Kronos could be another attempt to reconcile the *Op.* myth with *Theog.* (see 111n.), it would be a rather clumsy one. Having the Isles of the Blessed ruled by Kronos creates more of a discrepancy with *Theog.* than an accord with it (see *Theog.* 729-34 Kronos can never escape from Tartarus), and negates the chronological progression in *Op.* from the Golden Race (111 in the time of Kronos) to the Race of Heroes (158 created by Zeus). It is, however, clear why the lines were inserted: to connect the Race of Heroes with the Golden Race through Kronos (thus praising the Heroes even further), and to provide an introduction to the Iron Race, which is otherwise noticeably lacking.

West offers the plausible explanation that they are ‘alternative’ lines, with a-c able to stand in for 172-3 (see esp. τοῖσιν in the same position in 172 and a): indeed 173a would make much better sense after 171 than after 173. The presence of both in Π₃₈ is not necessarily evidence against this hypothesis but could be an example of ‘alternative versions copied in succession’ (West) as at *Theog.*590-1. For a discussion of these lines and their transmission see most recently Livrea in Bastianini/Casanova 2008:43-53, Ercolani *Addenda ad loc.*]

174-201 The Iron Race.

The Iron Age is divided into two sections (Vernant goes so far as to count two Races): present (176 νῦν, Hesiod’s own Age: 174 ἐγώ) and potential future (his apocalyptic vision). Hesiod is worried for the state of his Race so issues a warning to his contemporaries, outlining what will happen if they continue on their current path: the picture is that the Iron Race already struggle, but beyond hardship (177-8) lies destruction (180). That destruction begins with a reversal of the natural order (181), continues with breakdowns of societal norms (182-8) and the prizing of bad qualities over good (190-6), and ends with the departure from earth of Aidos and Nemesis (197-201). See 213-85n. for links between the Iron Race and Hesiod’s teachings on Justice.

This Race stands out from the others because its creation is neither described nor attributed to a particular god (although 180 makes it explicit that we are in the time of Zeus), and we are not told of its fate after death. Some scholars (Walcot 1961a, Querbach 1985) have explained this by claiming that the Iron Race was a later

addition to a pre-existing myth of four Ages; however, the Iron Race *must* be portrayed differently because it is our own Race. It sets the poem at a specific historical and mythological juncture, and leaves open the question of how things will turn out. One implication of this is that the future depends in part on the power of Hesiod's teachings, and the willingness of his audience to put them into practice.

174-5 A personal interjection from Hesiod. He situates himself in the Iron Race (174 ὧφελλον ἐγώ) and expresses his own opinion of it: he wishes to live any time but now. 175 ἔπειτα γενέσθαι is not to be interpreted as indicating a cyclic view of the Ages i.e. a Golden Age will come around again after the demise of the Iron Race (as is assumed by e.g. Goettling), or as suggesting a better sixth Race (as proposed by e.g. Martin 1943:68, Quaglia 1973): there is no concrete indication of future improvement elsewhere in the myth, and in fact a cyclic view would undermine Hesiod's warnings of the Iron Race's final destruction (see further Clay 2003:81-5, Clay in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:78, Calame 2006:88-91). Within the confines of the myth, the Iron Age is the final one. The interjection is, rather, a 'rhetorical sigh' (Verdenius). It is an exclamation of dismay at the current state of the world, and of trepidation about the dire future Hesiod predicts. However, it is not quite an exclamation of despair (*pace* Frisch 1949:86), as the fact that Hesiod offers so much advice (in this context see esp. 213 σὺ δ' ἄκουε Δίκης, μηδ' ὕβριν ὀφελλε) suggests that he is not a complete pessimist but believes in his own didactic authority: follow Hesiod's advice and the future *can* change. Further, the double vignette of the Just and the Unjust city indicates that even the Iron Race has

a choice. Hesiod uses the myth to warn us of what will happen *if* we give in to idleness and *hybris* (see further Koenen 1994:1-34, and p.52-3).

176-9 The current (bad) state of affairs. 176 νῦν γὰρ δὴ γένος ἐστὶ σιδήρεον explicitly marks out the present Iron Age. The categorisation applies also to materials used, as in the Bronze Age – see 150-1n. See also 151n. for the link Hesiod makes between iron and death. On the formula νῦν δὴ see 270n. At 177-9 Hesiod describes the troubles the Iron Race have, the hardships the gods give them, which will never cease (176 οὐδέ ποτ' ἤμαρ...177 οὐδέ τι νύκτωρ). Papyrus Π₈ has at 177 the present παύονται (accepted by Wilamowitz) in place of the future παύσονται: this is symptomatic of the complexity of a present state which is set to continue into the future. But for now at least good will be mixed in with that evil (179).

178 τειρόμενοι: φθειρόμενοι is the reading of the medieval *paradosis* (followed by e.g. Paley, Wilamowitz, Mazon, Rzach, Sinclair, Verdenius, Ercolani) and should be retained. Π₈ is the only papyrus with this line, and the beginning of the word is not visible so it is open to editorial conjecture. West (followed by Solmsen) supplies τειρόμενοι, 'oppressed', because there is little space before]ειρομενοι in Π₈, and because of analogy with *Or.Sib.*1.70-1 (to which he could also have added *Il.*17.745 τείρω with καμάτος). The ms. of Clement reads γινόμενοι, Eusebius στεινόμενοι (burdened, as Gaia at *Theog.*160). Verdenius explains Clement's and Eusebius' readings as avoiding any suggestion of complete destruction, difficult in the context since one cannot really be destroyed over a long period of time (176-7). To keep φθειρόμενοι we must therefore take it to mean something like 'ruined' or 'corrupted'.

179-81 Condemned by Lehrs 1837, bracketed by Rzach, West claims they interrupt the train of thought. However, the grey-haired babies continue the theme of aging: the Golden Race do not age (113-14), the Silver Race age late (130-3). The lines have a purpose, and are relevant at this point: 179 follows on from 178 θεοὶ δώσουσι as goods and evils are often conceptualised as gifts of the gods (92-9 Pandora opens the jar of evils according to Zeus' plans; see also *Il.*24.527-8) and it sounds a note of optimism (the softening of the blow, if men follow Hesiod's advice) before 180 introduces the worst case scenario which continues from 182.

180-1 From 180 on, things will get worse (*sc.* if we continue on the same course) and society will degenerate entirely. The future destructive role of Zeus (180 Ζεὺς δ' ὀλέσει) contrasts with his creative role in the past (109, 143), and resembles *Hom. Hymn* 2.310 καὶ νύ κε πάμπαν ὄλεσσε γένος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων. The downfall of the Iron Race is marked by reversals of the natural and social order, of which this is the first: children born grey at the temples (on age in the Ages see 113-14n.). As Arrighetti 1998:422 notes, the only other characters in Hes. with grey hair from birth are the Graeae (*Theog.*270-2). The choice of adj. 181 πολιοκρόταφοι is appropriate to this Race as the first part of the compound, πολιός 'grey', is used in formulae describing iron at e.g. *Il.*9.366, 23.261, *Od.*21.3, 21.81, 24.168. See 185 γηράσκοντας, 188 γηράντεσσι: old age is central to the Iron Race (*pace* West 'The repetition of 'aging parents' is clumsy'), in contrast to the never-aging Golden Race (181 τελέθωσιν also at 121 of the Golden Race) and the childish Silver.

182-4 Anaphora of οὐδέ (see 5-7n.) forming a sequence of dire prophecies which contravene the fundamental bonds of society: parents and children, guest-friends,

comrades, siblings. This breakdown of society is typical of Near Eastern prophecies e.g. *Prophecy of Nefer-rohu* (ANET 445), and the strikingly mnemonic quality of the lines (esp. 183 ξείνος ξεινοδόκῳ...ἑταῖρος ἑταίρῳ) hints at traditional wisdom. However, the reference to siblings has particular relevance to *Op.*'s didactic setting: a quarrel between brothers, such as that initiated by Perses, will be symptomatic of the Iron Age's downfall. On ἑταῖρος ἑταίρῳ see further 707-14, esp. 707 on comrades and brothers (184 κασίγνητος); on the guest/host relationship as a fundamental societal bond involving mutual respect see further 225, 327, Finley 1954, Kakridis 1963.

182 ὁμοίος: used in Hom. as an epithet of uncertain etymology and meaning, primarily of πόλεμος (*Il.*9.440, 13.358, 13.635, 15.670, 18.242, 21.294, *Od.*18.264, 24.543) but also of γῆρας (*Il.*4.315), νεῖκος (*Il.*4.444), θάνατος (*Od.*3.236). If we supply it also in 183, with guests and comrades, it cannot mean 'resemble' (i.e. genetically), but must mean 'like-minded', or 'well-disposed': cf. 235n.

185-8 Dishonouring parents. The unit is framed by 185 γηράσκοντας...τοκῆας, 188 γηράντεσσι τοκεῦσιν. On 186 χαλεποῖς βάζοντες ἔπεσιν cf. 332 χαλεποῖσι καταπτόμενος ἐπέεσσιν, also of children disputing with their parents: the parallel, with the children as the subject, confirms the reading βάζοντες (adopted by Wilamowitz, Mazon, Rzach, Sinclair, West, Solmsen, Verdenius) as opposed to the dual βάζοντε (attested in mss., adopted by Paley) which would refer to the parents. βάζοντες occurs in Hesiod only here and at 788. The point of similarity is the base nature of the words spoken – here children of the Iron Race speak in harsh words; at 788 it is the day for sarcastic and lying boys to be born. Similarly, βάζω in Homer

is used of lying (*Od.*14.127, 157), babbling like a child (*Od.*4.32), speaking idly (*Od.*18.322, 392) and speaking 'like a bad wind' (*Il.*4.355, *Od.*4.837, 11.464).

The Iron Race are described as 187 σκέτλιοι: associated with the Bad Eris at 15. They do not heed the will of the gods (θεῶν ὄπιν): also at 251 where divine spies investigate this kind of behaviour, and see the Silver Race for an example of punishment meted out to those who neglect the gods.

189 Omitted by Mazon (put in app. crit.); bracketed by Wilamowitz (although he withdraws his rejection in 1928:389), Rzach, Sinclair, Solmsen; Verdenius suggests that it be moved after 181. Often suspected because χειροδίκαι overlaps with 192 δίκη δ' ἐν χειροσί, and because conflict between cities is not mentioned elsewhere in the passage. However, Hesiod often uses a compound and its uncompounded elements in quick succession as an element of wordplay (for other kinds of wordplay in *Op.* see p.50-1): 230 ἰθυδίκησι and 225-6 δίκας...ἰθείας; 248 καταφράζεσθε and 250 φράζονται; 411 ἐτωσιοεργός and 402, 440 ἐτώσια; 413 ἀμβολιεργός and 409-10 ἔργον...ἀναβάλλεσθαι, 412 ἀναβαλλόμενος; 490 ὀψαρότης and 485 ὄψ' ἀρόσεις; 536 ἔσσασθαι and 539 περιέσσασθαι. Furthermore, considering the close links between the description of the Iron Race and Hesiod's teachings on Justice through the vignettes of the Good and Bad City (213-85n.), it is not surprising that conflict between cities should be mentioned here.

190-4 The good will suffer and the bad prosper. The unit is framed by oaths: 190 εὐόρκου, 194 ὄρκον (see further 219n.). In 190-1 anaphora of οὐδέ is used again for emphasis (cf. 182-4n., further 5-7n.), this time to mark all those previously prized qualities which will no longer be respected: honesty, justice, goodness. The doer of

evil and the hubristic man will be honoured: on *hybris* see 134n., here 191 ὕβριν qualifies 192 ἀνέρα – though we would expect ὕβριστήν, ὕβριν is even more dramatic – ‘Hubris incarnate’ (West). At 194 crooked words (μύθοισι σκολιοῖς) are symptomatic of the Iron Race in general, though of bad kings in particular at 262. As the Iron Race deteriorates, men will not only speak crooked words, but will swear to them (ἐπὶ δ’ ὄρκον ὀμεῖται).

192 αἰδώς: this is the first appearance of this important concept in *Op.* (although see 71n. αἰδοίη). The most comprehensive study of *aidos* is that of Cairns 1993 (see also McKay 1963, and Cairns 2011:30-8): he identifies it as ‘a prospective, inhibitory emotion focusing on one’s idea of oneself, especially as that idea is affected by or comes into contact with others’ (432). For the link between *aidos* and *dike* here see Cairns 1993:152. At *Theog.*92 *aidos* is a mark of a good king; at *Op.*200 it becomes a fully personified concept; at 317-19 its complex implications within society are worked out. Similarly 193 βλάβει: used of a good king at *Theog.*89 (when the people do harm, a good king sets it right); at *Op.*258 it is a bad man who harms Justice, at 283 the bearer of false witness causes harm (194 ὀμεῖται also at 282). This connection between *aidos* and kings is crucial in the context: the lines become a warning directed straight to the corrupt kings Hesiod is addressing, as in the Iron Race kings will no longer be good because *aidos* will leave the earth (200).

193 ἐσσεῖται: this is West’s conjecture (1964:162), to resolve a ‘problem’ here: he claims that δίκη cannot be the subject of οὐκ ἔσται and still give the necessary sense ‘justice will be in their hands’. Moreover, the absence of αἰδώς here conflicts with *Aidos* leaving the earth at 200. However, the conjecture is unnecessary and the

unanimously attested οὐκ ἔσται should be retained, giving the sense: justice [sc. will be] in their hands, and there will be no *aidos*. This does not conflict with 200, *Aidos* leaving men, but simply pre-empts it. Wilamowitz (although he changes his reading in 1928:389), Mazon, Rzach, Sinclair and Solmsen all punctuate after ἐν χερσί. The rationale is that the two statements are different in nature, the first requiring copulative use of ἔσται and the second existential. However, Paley and Verdenius do not punctuate here, thus supplying ἔσται from 193: Verdenius has shown (with reference e.g. to its use with adverbs: *Il.*7.424, *Hdt.* 4.134.2: further Chantraine 1958-9.2:9) that copulative and existential εἶναι were not sharply distinguished in classical and pre-classical Greek literature.

195-6 ζῆλος: West does not capitalise, but given the number and strength of adjectives it would seem that Envy is built up into a personified concept here (at *Theog.*384 *Zelos* is a child of *Styx* and *Pallas*). 196 στυγερώπης, only here in epic and meaning ‘with a hateful face’, is particularly expressive. Here Envy is linked with the Bad *Eris*, as both are described as κακόχαρτος (28, 196) – cf. 23 Good *Eris* is accompanied by envy. Nowhere is it specified that there are *two* Envies, but *zelos* is depicted as an ambivalent concept with two distinct aspects (like *aidos*, see 317-19n.).

197-201 *Aidos* and *Nemesis* will leave the earth. They go to join the gods (199 φῦλον ἵτον, also of *Aphrodite* at *Theog.*202 when she joins the ranks of the immortals), leaving men behind: this marks the downfall of the Iron Race as men no longer have a moral framework to defend themselves against evil (201 κακοῦ ἀλκή).

Aidos and Nemesis are often coupled in Hom. e.g. *Il.* 11.649, 13.121-2, *Od.* 2.64-5; on the pair see Redfield 1975:115-18 ('*Aidōs* shrinks away and draws back; *nemesis* is an invasive passion...*Aidōs* and *nemesis* are a reflexive pair'), West *ad loc.* ('Both are forces that inhibit wickedness, one working from inside, the other, public disapproval, from without'). Cairns 1993:51-4 sums up *nemesis* as an 'expression of popular disapproval' (51, similarly Redfield 1975:115 'the moral disapproval of others') and 'anger in which the subject feels himself justified' (see further Redfield 1975:117, Scott 1980:26). See Stafford 2000:75-110 for etymology: from νέμω 'to distribute, apportion' i.e. first distribution (the lot with which you are born – association with fate, see *Theog.* 217-19 Fates, 223 Nemesis), or 'distribution of what is due' i.e. 'righteous anger' or 'indignation' (links with justice – *nomos* law).

Nemesis appeared as a child of Night in *Theog.* (223) – her nature is ambivalent like that of Aidos (317-19), Pheme (761-4), Eris (11-26) or Zelos (195-6n.). At *Theog.* 223 she was a bane to mortal men (πῆμα θνητοῖσι βροτοῖσι), but here her *leaving* mortals causes the trouble. At Smyrna in Asia Minor a pair of Nemeseis was worshipped: on Aidos and Nemesis in cult see respectively Farnell 1909.5:444-7 and Stafford 2000:75-110.

In the final part of the Myth of the Races we have a last link back to the Myths of Prometheus and Pandora (see further Zarecki 2007:21). Aidos and Nemesis conceal their 'beautiful skin' (198 χροά καλόν): thus far in *Op.* χρώς has been used only of Pandora, at 74, 76. She is also described as beautiful (63 καλόν) and the object of respect (71 αἰδοίη), and just as Pandora releases evils onto men (95 κήδεα λυγρά,

100 μυρία λυγρά), so by quitting earth Aidos and Nemesis leave men in an even worse state (200 ἄλγεα λυγρά).

202-12 The hawk and the nightingale.

The fable connects with the previous story (106 ἔτερον λόγον – similarly 202 νῦν δ' αἶνον), as it picks up on the idea of corrupt *dike* and the prevalence of *hybris* in the Iron Race (192 δίκη ἐν χερσὶ): Verdenius notes, 'The heroes were 'better' because they were more just (158), the present rulers are 'better' (207) because they are stronger (210)' – so far has the human race declined.

This passage has been criticised for its inconsistencies and ambiguities, even resulting in emendation such as 202 athetised by Goettling, and 210-11 by Aristarchus, Goettling, Rzach. However, the key point here is that Hesiod's fable must warn *all* his addressees through one story, and ambiguities enable multiple interpretations and identifications. As a result, the fable cannot be expected to map exactly onto a particular situation: if it did so, its meaning would not be so readily transferable. See further p.33-5.

Problems of interpretation include: 1. The fable seems to begin *in medias res*, without an introductory section. 2. The protagonist (hawk) pronounces his own moral (210-11) without ridicule or disaster: contrast Aesop's fable 567 (Perry 1952) hawk and nightingale – the hawk is caught by a fowler. 3. It is only later that Hesiod advises σὺ δ' ἄκουε Δίκης, μηδ' ὕβριν ὀφείλλε (213), and even later (276-8) that he explains that moral law is different for animals and for men. 4. Hesiod begins with one set of

addressees (202 βασιλεῦσ') but in his conclusion redirects the moral to Perses (213).

5. The fable does not clearly match up with what follows: 213-21 Hesiod tells Perses that *dike* overcomes *hybris* – not the ostensible outcome of the fable at all (see Hubbard 1995:161).

In light of these problems, and short of emending, various interpretations have been proposed: the prevailing interpretation (already at Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)202a, 207-12) is that the hawk represents the kings and the nightingale Hesiod (see esp. 208 αἰδόν): for articulations of this view see Wilamowitz, Nicolai 1964:52-3, Pucci 1977:61-81, Østerud 1976:22, West, Verdenius, Mordine 2006. Alternatively, Jensen 1966:20 and Rodgers 1971:291 see the hawk as representing Zeus and the nightingale the corrupt kings: this ignores the importance of 208 αἰδόν, but matches up much more naturally with 213-21 (*dike* overcomes *hybris*). Hubbard 1995 keeps the hawk as the kings but posits as the nightingale Perses, who has ingratiated himself with the kings who will now reassert their superiority: interpreting 210 ἀντιφερίζειν as 'to consider oneself on the same level with'. In this interpretation Perses is effectively warned against *hybris*, but the kings are not reprimanded for their corruption, and again the issue of 208 αἰδόν remains (Hubbard's suggestion of singing as a family trait is hardly satisfactory here).

Steiner 2007 gives a poetological interpretation, arguing that the two birds with their different bearings and voices embody two different poetic personae: the nightingale Hesiodic poetry, the hawk Homeric martial poetry. Lonsdale 1989 and Collins 2002 see the fable as an omen, tapping into the oracular language of ornithomancy (see 448-92n. γεράνου φωνήν, with parallel language 204 ὕψι μάλ')

ἐν νεφέεσσιν, 449 ὑπόθεν ἐκ νεφέων). Lonsdale 1989:404 allegorises the hawk as *hybris* and the nightingale as *dike*. Beye 1972:35 allegorises the hawk as the natural world (inexorable, arbitrary and amoral) and the nightingale as mankind. Daly 1961:45-51, Heath 1985:249 and Arrighetti 1998:425 explain the fable as a negative paradigm of animal behaviour which does not relate directly to the human world (on the basis of 276-8).

As the wealth of debate would suggest, none of these interpretations adequately resolves all the difficulties. Most illuminating on this quandary is Nelson 1997 who notes that 'Hesiod's fable is not a static set piece, but a dynamic element of the poem' (237). She combines the prevailing kings/Hesiod interpretation with the Zeus/kings explanation (see 204-5n., 209n.), arguing that Hesiod moves from one meaning to the other within the fable. However, although she recognises the possibility of multiple readings, this linear analysis is still too rigid, given that 'a fable achieves its force in part by leaving its audience to provide its parallel for itself' (Nelson 1997:239). Hesiod is explicitly addressing the kings (202) and Perses (213), and implicitly teaching the Iron Race as a whole, so he creates a fable which can be applied by all, each to their current situation.

202 αἶνον: this can refer to any story with an implied message, including proverbs or riddles – for the full semantic range see Nagy in Calame 1989, Mordine 2006. Here it is primarily a fable (*pace* Wilamowitz who claims it is 'just a simile', and Lonsdale 1989 and Collins 2002 who explore its potential as an omen): a story with a moral message told through animal characters, which we have to interpret (see further Hesiod's concluding advice at 828 ὄρνιθας κρίνων).

In antiquity, Hesiod's fable was often considered to begin or at least define the genre: in the Dinner of the Seven Sages (Plut. *Mor.*158B) Aesop is said to have been a pupil of Hesiod on the basis of his use of fable; Quint. 5.11.19, writing about Aesop's fables, attributes the first fable to Hesiod – '*Illae quoque fabellae quae, etiam si originem non ab Aesopo acceperunt (nam videtur earum primus auctor Hesiodus)...*'; in the *Suda*'s definition of αἶνος is included 'this is also what Hesiod appears to have written' (2.173). However, it is likely that such stories were circulating during and indeed before Hesiod's time: telling some home truths through animal characters is something we might logically expect from an archaic society whose βίος depended partly on animals; fables were found not only elsewhere in early Greek literature (e.g. Archil. fr.174-81 West, the fox and the eagle) but in other cultures too (for Sumerian examples see Walcot 1966:90, Alster 1997; for Akkadian fables Lambert 1960); Aesop's fables seem to represent a fully established genre. In this way, we can assume that Hesiod's unorthodox use of the fable here (for its multiple interpretative possibilities see 202-12n.) is due not to a weak grasp of a new genre, but to sophisticated manipulation of an already extant method of storytelling. That later authors attributed the origins of the genre to him is both a reflection of the ancient search for *protoi heuretai* (cf. Hdt. 2.53 Homer and Hesiod as founders of Greek theology), and a mark of the strength of Hesiodic attribution (see p.30-1). Hesiod's careful negotiation of the human and the animal worlds confirms that he is working with a well-established genre: in the Iron Age society has declined to such an extent that we are assimilated to animals, but at 276-80 we are given a glimpse of hope – we are *not* animals and so have the possibility of redemption (if we follow

Hesiod's advice). For more on this negotiation see 278n.; for Hesiod's manipulation of established narrative forms see 278n. and 304-6.

βασιλεῦς: the kings are the ostensible addressees of the fable (see 38-9n.), however at 213 it is Perses who is explicitly given the moral. The two addressees mentioned stand in for the multiple interpretations and applications of the fable.

ἐρέω, φρονέουσι καὶ αὐτοῖς: ἐρέω is also used at 286, 661, all marking out new themes. Both φρονέουσι (read by Paley, Wilamowitz, Mazon, Rzach, Sinclair, Solmsen, West) and νοέουσι (read by Verdenius,) are well-attested – the former in papyri and mss. (the reading of the medieval paradosis), the latter in papyri and testimonia. Verdenius argues for νοέουσι on the grounds that φρονέω does not (before Sophocles) mean 'know' or 'understand'. However, in epic at least the two words were not so clearly differentiated: see their juxtaposition at e.g. *Il.*23.305 φρονέων νοέοντι, *Od.*16.136 φρονέω τά γε δὴ νοέοντι κελεύεις (these lines could also explain how the variant arose). Also, φρονέω appears in *Il.*2.36 and 18.4 with the meaning 'consider': even more appropriate here given the need to decode the fable for oneself. See further p.49-50.

203 ἰρηξ: also at 212 – the fable is marked out as a separate story in ring composition. For the hawk as a motif in folk literature see Thompson 1958:367.

προσέειπεν: elsewhere in Hes. again of power struggles: at *Theog.*542, 546 Zeus and Prometheus address each other as they vie for power; at *Theog.*749 Night and Day address each other as equally powerful deities who must never work together.

ἀηδόνα: the hawk's prey in Hom. is usually the dove (*Il.*21.493, 22.140, *Od.*15.527).

Here the change creates a connection with 208 αἰδόν: the nightingale is the song bird *par excellence*, emphasised by the assonance ἀηδόνα...αἰδόν (see 208n.).

ποικιλόδειρον: compound adj. meaning 'dappled-necked' – ornithologically inappropriate. Some commentators take this as a conflation resulting from the adaptation of a traditional story, and try to deduce what the original bird might have been: West thinks thrush, Verdenius swallow. However, more likely is that the adj. is used to create a further connection with the singer i.e. meaning 'with a variegated voice' (Steiner 2007:180 – cf. *Od.*19.521 πολυηχέα φωνήν, of the nightingale). ποικίλος is often associated with craft and song – see e.g. Odysseus as ποικιλομήτης (further Martin 2004; cf. Mordine 2006:369 connection with Prometheus ποικιλόβουλος *Theog.*521).

204-5 ὀνύχεσσι...ὀνύχεσσιν: the repetition emphasises the hawk's power: see further 206n. ἐπικρατέως, and 209n.

204 ὕψι: used again of birds at 449 (again with νέφος) – there of the crane announcing the ploughing season: see 202-12n., 448-92n. on the bird motif in *Op.* and its oracular potential. See also its use in the archery contest *Il.*23.874 – also in that passage is ἐπικρατέως (23.864, of Teukros).

206 ἐπικρατέως: this in particular supports the connection with Zeus: forms of κράτος/κάρτος (with the exception of the adj. forms, more generally used of Zeus' adversaries) are used in Hesiod almost exclusively of the power of Zeus (*Theog.*49, 73, 385, 403, 647, 662, 710 – see Mordine 2006:369n21): indeed Κράτος personified

sits beside Zeus (*Theog.*388). However, it is also a generic indication of power which could just as readily be applied to the kings, and in Hesiod's cosmic scheme kings are under the special jurisdiction of Zeus so attributes are naturally transferred from one to the other.

πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπεν: formulaic speech opening, used often in Hom. In Hes. again at *Theog.*24 of the first words spoken to Hesiod by the authoritative Muses, when they 'taught him fine song': see 208 ἀοιδόν. See further Martin in Panourgiá/Marcus 2008:51 – a *muthos* is an authoritative utterance which falls into one of three categories: displays of memory, directives, and insults (the hawk's speech has characteristics of both directive and insult, and of course the rhapsode's recitation of it constitutes a display of memory).

207-11 The hawk pronounces his own moral: he has power over the nightingale (she must go wherever he leads, he can eat her or let her go on a whim), and only a fool would try to challenge the stronger. The hawk's speech has much in common with a Homeric battle speech, delivered by a warrior with an opponent at his mercy: see e.g. *Il.*16.830-54 Hector to Patroclus, 22.331-6 Achilles to Hector (both include νήπιε 16.833, 22.333; claim to superiority 16.834, 22.333; warning of dreadful fate 16.836, 22.335-6). See further Puelma 1972:89, 93; Steiner 2007 draws on these similarities in linking the hawk with Homeric martial epic. Such a moral is also used in advice: *Il.*7.109-14 Agamemnon warns Menelaus not to fight with a man who is better than him (Hector).

207 δαίμονιη: literally 'possessed by a δαίμων' (see 122n. for etymology of δαίμων), although in its usage it is difficult to define. In Hom. it appears only in the

voc. as here: Brunius-Nilsson 1955 claims that the voc. evokes intimacy, though more likely here is that it expresses criticism. Burkert 1985:180-1 suggests that ‘it is more reproach than praise, and therefore certainly does not mean divine; it is used when the speaker does not understand what the addressee is doing and why he is doing it.’

λέληκας: Puelma 1972:93n33 and Verdenius take this as sarcastic because it is used of more fearsome birds (see *Il.*22.141 of a κίρκος, a hawk or a falcon), and link it with 210 ἀντιφερίζειν; West uses the same evidence but concludes that the use of traditional material has caused a conflation. Martin 2004 makes the more insightful observation that the fact that the nightingale laments (206 μύρετο) but the hawk asks her why she is shrieking, indicates that one of the hawk’s problems is his inability to listen and to understand (sc. ‘Perses, *you* should listen’ – see 213 ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δ’ ἄκουε).

208 αἰδόν: see 202-12n.: this is the line which links the nightingale with Hesiod. The use of the concessive here suggests that singers are in a special class and should be treated well. In a few mss. αἰδόν becomes ἀηδόν(‘), presumably because of the verbal similarity – see 203n.

209-11 209 and 210 are parallel in their second feet (αἶ κ’ ἐθέλω...ὅς κ’ ἐθέλη), 210 and 211 linked by repetition of πρὸς in their third feet, and all three lines are linked by the same metrical pattern (see McKay 1962:249). Aristarchus athetised 210-11, being worried that an animal usually without speech should be in a position to give the moral of the story (ὥς ἀλόγῳ γνωμολογεῖν οὐκ ἂν προσῆκον). However, this

is not without parallel, and the metrical points show that the three lines form a strong unit.

209 αἴ κ' ἐθέλω: the conditional expresses the hawk's godlike power 'to perform diametrically opposite actions as he pleases' (Mordine 2006:369) – see 268 αἴ κ' ἐθέλῃσ' used of Zeus, and 3-8 Zeus can accomplish opposites. See also the parallelism with (in the same metrical position) 210 ὅς κ' ἐθέλῃ, which emphasises the difference in power between the hawk and the nightingale.

210 κρείσσονας: see 202-12n. on different interpretations for different audiences: this plural can encompass both the kings and Zeus (and anyone else to whom it might apply).

ἀντιφροίζειν: self-comparison with one's betters (as at *Il.*21.357, 411, 488, *Theog.*609-10, *Pind. Pyth.*9.50-1; see further Hubbard 1995:165). Here the hawk turns the tables by criticising the nightingale, apparently for hubristic behaviour. Hubbard 1995:165 uses this to argue that the nightingale represents Perses, as it was he who tried to ingratiate himself with the kings and set himself on their level, over other men. With the hawk as the kings, this reversal would signify both a reflection on the downfall of society which has resulted in 'gift-swallowing' kings pronouncing verdicts on their victims without *dike*, and an acknowledgement that it is not only the kings who commit *hybris*, but also the average Iron-Age man (whom the nightingale represents). With the hawk as Zeus, it has the added force that the kings *will* get their comeuppance, if they go so far as to think themselves equal to the gods.

211 πάσχει: the hawk claims that a fool, ἄφρων, will suffer (he qualifies: ‘if he struggles against one who is stronger’); Hesiod picks this up at 218 παθὼν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνων – the fool learns through suffering.

πρὸς τ’ αἰσχεσιν ἄλγεα: the transmitted text should be retained, over Merkelbach’s conjecture πρὸς τ’ ἄλγεσιν αἰσχεα. As Verdenius notes, πρὸς τ’ αἰσχεσιν has a mock-heroic sound (see further 207-11n.), thus ‘the hawk attaches more importance to the shame of defeat than to the pains’: for shame as a key theme in *Op.* cf. 192n. αἰδώς.

212 τανυσίπτερος ὄρνις: also at *Theog.*525, of the eagle assigned to peck out Prometheus’ liver. Mordine 2006:369 posits similarities between the nightingale and Prometheus (just as the nightingale could be made the hawk’s dinner or released (209), Prometheus ‘serves as the eagle’s dinner and is later released by Heracles’).

213-85 Justice.

This section, although comprised of personified concepts and vignettes, is not introduced as a ‘story’ or a ‘fable’ – after the mythological section (42-212: Prometheus, Pandora, the Races, the Hawk and the Nightingale) with its focus on storytelling, we now get some direct teachings. Hesiod tells exactly what benefits come from justice, and what happens to those who live unjustly. These teachings focus on *people* and, more specifically, people *now*. The personal impetus is emphasised by the organisation of the section into direct apostrophes – 213-47 apostrophe to Perses, 248-73 apostrophe to the kings, 274-85 second apostrophe to

Perses. I follow this division below as it brings out most clearly the structural parallelisms between parts of the section as whole (see Claus 1977:75 for a helpful diagram, divided in this way): however, these divisions are based only on the explicit addressees, and Hesiod's teachings are actually for multiple audiences simultaneously (see esp. 202-12n.). The focus on people *now* is essential in that it highlights the pitfalls of Iron-Age life and shows Hesiod trying to correct the Race within which he explicitly situates himself (see 176 and 270 νῦν). However, he does not stop there: Hesiod extends his temporal concerns to the future. He has a long-range vision, considering what lies at the end of the road (218 ἐς τέλος, cf. 294), showing concern for subsequent generations (271n.), and even injecting a dose of optimism (273n. ἔολπα). For Hesiod's concern with the long term see further 284-5, 333 ἐς δὲ τελευτήν, 394 μέταζε, 503 οὐκ αἰεὶ θέρος ἐσσεῖται.

This passage acts as a culmination of all the tales told so far, encapsulating the message which has pervaded the entire mythological section: work, and do it justly. The Just City has many verbal parallels with the Golden Race, and as such is advertised as the attainable Iron-Age version of the mythical ideal state (θαλίῃσι 115, 231; καρπὸν δ' ἔφερε ζείδωρος ἄρουρα 117, 237; ἔργ' ἐνέμοντο 119, 231). The Just City is also linked with the Race of Heroes who made it to the Isles of the Blessed: another ideal state (θάλλω 227, 236, 172). However, most evident throughout the Justice section are the verbal parallels with the Iron Race: whether one's city is just or unjust, we are now in the Iron Age where we walk a fine line between prosperity and cataclysm – see further 242n. (ξεῖνος 183, 225; θεῶν ὄπιν 187, 251; εὐόρκου 190, 285; βλάβει 193, 258, 283; σκολιοῖς ἐνέπων 194, 262; ὄρκον

194, 219; ὁμειῖται 194, 282; 270-2~174-5 or 190-2). Parallels can also be drawn with the other myths: in the Unjust City the idea of one bad man causing trouble for a whole city (240) is reminiscent of Prometheus, whose actions resulted in a fall from glory for all mankind (49n.); 218 παθὼν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω could be a comment on Epimetheus' ignorance at 89; the fable of the hawk and the nightingale is evoked with the similarities 220~208, 268~209.

The section constitutes a double encomium: to Dike (there are no fewer than 27 words with the root δικ- in 213-85, and 256-62 constitute a miniature hymn to Dike) and to Zeus (he is mentioned, by name or patronymic, at 229, 239, 242, 245, 247, 253, 256, 259, 267, 273, 276, 281) – on the relationship between the two see 9n., 213n. The meaning of *dike* in archaic Greek has been much-debated. It is usually etymologised as deriving from **deik-* (the root of δείκνυμι), but the meanings as they developed are difficult to categorise. Gagarin (1973, 1974a – later 1992) argued that in Hesiod *dike* always refers to a settlement or legal process, and was not a moral concept (as argued earlier by Latte 1946:65, Pearson 1962:46, Havelock 1969:51) at least until 480BC. His views were soon disputed, by Claus 1977 and Dickie 1978, on the basis of counter-examples and expanding the overly narrow contexts used by Gagarin. It is now widely accepted (exceptions include Tandy/Neale 1996) that, although *dike* can refer to legal processes, it can also have moral overtones, in which instances it should properly be translated as 'justice'. This ambiguity was accepted already in antiquity: Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)279a ποτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς σωματοειδοῦς θεᾶς, ποτὲ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαίου, ποτὲ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς κρίσεως, ποτὲ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς τιμωρίας ('sometimes the personified goddess, sometimes justice, sometimes judgement, and sometimes

punishment’ – transl. Clay in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:75). Perhaps most relevant to this particular passage is Nagy in Irani/Silver 1995:64: ‘When an earthly king renders *dikê*, it is a “judgement” in the short term, but when Zeus as absolute sovereign renders *dikê*, it is...“justice” in the long term’: here we have an interplay between kings and Zeus, both of whom affect or effect *dike* but in very different ways, combining legality and morality.

This passage, particularly the diptych of the Just and Unjust Cities, has been well-used in later literature: most notably in Pl. *Resp.* (on Plato’s use of Hesiod cf. 106-201n.), and in Solon fr.4 (17/27~*Op.*240-1, 14/32~*Op.*220-1, 36~*Op.*248-73, 34-7~*Op.*5-8). For more on Solon’s engagement with Hesiod see Irwin 2005.

213-47 Apostrophe to Perses: 213-24 Justice personified; 225-36 Just City; 237-47 Unjust City.

The apostrophe 213 ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δ’ marks a shift in explicit addressee from 202 βασιλεῦς. However, as the fable had implicit applications for both, δέ does not necessarily have adversative force here (as Verdenius notes). After an apostrophe it can often be read as a weak form of δή. For the next apostrophe to Perses see 274-5n. From the outset Hesiod establishes his preferred didactic dynamic, instructing Perses to listen to Justice (σὺ δ’ ἄκουε Δίκης) rather than to Hesiod himself as teacher: he tries to fade into the background and encourages his audience to find their own way.

213-24 A series of images (the road, Oath running alongside man) and personifications (Hybris, Dike, Ate, Oath).

213 Δίκη: *dike* has appeared earlier in *Op.* (9, 36, 39, 124, 192), however this is the first passage in which she becomes personified. Cf. PHEME 763-4 who becomes, by the end of the description of her, θεός νύ τις. West capitalises 'according to the degree of personification suggested by the phrase' (although see 217n.). Dike is a divinity: at *Theog.*902 she is a child of Themis, at *Op.*256 Διὸς ἐκγεγαυῖα. For Dike in cult see Farnell 1909.5:444-7. She is described first as inevitably triumphant over *hybris* (217-18), then as victim to 'gift-swallowing' men, dragged weeping. Finally, at 256-62 she sits beside Zeus. She is good by nature, seen in contrast to *hybris* (for the two as polar opposites see 134n.) and as something to cultivate, however she can be disfigured by men who do not dispense her straight (224), resulting in crooked verdicts (250 σκολιῇσι δίκηνσιν), and she can bring evil to men (223n.). This dual effect of Dike (positive or negative, depending on one's behaviour; cf. *zelos* 195-6n.) is yet another example of the duality inherent in Hesiod's personified concepts (noted by e.g. Arrighetti 1998:426). To the more obvious reasons for her personification (vividness, pathos, eventual threat), Martin 2004:17 adds that it appeals to Perses' instincts: surely he cannot resist helping a maiden in such distress.

214 δειλῶ...ἔσθλός: δειλῶ βροτῶ is used at 686 in its simple formulaic sense as in Hom. (mortals as opposed to gods), but here it takes on a more pointed meaning when contrasted with ἔσθλός: 'inferior/superior in social standing' (West; similarly Zanker 1986:27).

215-16 βαρύθει δέ θ' ὑπ' αὐτῆς | ἐγκύρσας Ἄτησιν: the precise meaning of this is debated. West takes the first phrase before the second: 'The man weighed down with unrighteousness is at their mercy' (i.e. that of Ate). Most 2006 and Roisman 1983 emphasise the aor. participle in the second phrase: Most translates one 'encounters calamities and then is weighed down under her' (i.e. Hybris). Verdenius argues that the two elements could be contemporaneous: he translates 'he is weighed down by her (i.e. Hybris) when he meets with disaster'. This debate is particularly relevant for deducing the actual meaning of Ate here. Cairns 2012 notes in Hom. two roles of *ate*: as a cause (delusion) and as a result (calamity). If we follow the sequence suggested by Most and Roisman, and assume some kind of consequential progression, then the most accurate translation would be 'delusion' (*pace* Most 2006) as it is the Ate which *causes* the Hybris. If, however, we follow West's interpretation, Ate is the *result* of Hybris and so is more like 'calamity'.

West personifies Ate at 216, 231 and 413, but not at 352. He argues that here 'the idea seems to be of ruffians encountered on the road': this is very likely, given that the passage is full of concrete images (216-17n.) and vivid description (*pace* Verdenius: 'the literal meaning is no more present than in 'to meet with)'). See also 413n. Ἄτησι παλαίει. At *Theog.*230 Ate is a child of Strife (cf. *Il.*19.91, 9.508 for another tradition: Ate as daughter of Zeus): although there Ate appears in the singular, elsewhere in *Op.* we have seen single deities pluralised (11 Ἐρίδων) so the plural here does not rule out personification. βαρύθει is particularly vivid, depicting hybris as a physical burden (see also PHEME at 763-4). Elsewhere in epic only at *Il.*16.519, there also preceded by δύναται.

216-17 ὁδὸς δ' ἑτέρηφι παρελθεῖν | κρείσσων ἐς τὰ δίκαια: another difficult phrase to construe. Verdenius gives a neat summary of the likely conflation of ideas here (he rightly dismisses the ms. variant μετελθεῖν, adopted by Paley, as the *lectio facilior*) '(a) κρεῖσσόν ἐστι παρελθεῖν ἐς τὰ δίκαια, (b) ἑτέρηφι παρέλθοις ἂν ἐς τὰ δίκαια, (c) αὕτη ἡ ὁδὸς κρείσσων ἐστίν'. According to this image, Hybris is on one road, but it is possible (and better) to get round her by taking the other road, that to Justice: mankind has a choice. Hesiod presents the two options, though prizing one over the other, and therefore encourages his audience to make the (right) choice themselves. The image continues with 218 ἐξελοῦσα, and at 219 there is a variation on the theme, with Oath running beside crooked judgements. For another, more elaborate, road image see 287-92n.

217 δίκη δ' ὑπὲρ ὕβριος ἴσχει: see 213n. on *dike* – here West does not capitalise. More likely, however, is that the personification continues (e.g. Most 2006 capitalises), and Hesiod envisages here an actual confrontation.

218 ἐς τέλος ἐξελοῦσα: this constitutes a typical moral lesson: in the end, good will triumph over evil. If we take τέλος as literally the end of the road, this also continues the image. On Hesiod's long-term vision see further 213-85n.; for similar phrases see 293-7n., 333-5.

παθὼν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνων: gnomic maxim (including gnomic aor.). West rightly notes that 'gnomic tags often occupy the second half of the hexameter'. Cf. *Il.* 17.32, 20.198. Although generally applicable, this maxim is particularly relevant to the kings (40 νήπιοι) and to Perses (νήπιος 286, 397, 633), and sums up Epimetheus'

mistake at 89 – see 213-85n. for this passage as a distillation of the preceding myths, and further p.35-6.

219 αὐτίκα γὰρ τρέχει...ἄμα: this marks a change of pace, leading to the vivid personification of Dike (dragged, weeping), and continues the road imagery. Similarly *Il*.9.505-7 running Ate.

Ὅρκος: at *Theog*.231 and *Op*.804 he is a child of Strife (just like Ate – see 216n.). At *Op*.194 in the decline of the Iron Race men will pronounce crooked judgements and swear an oath on them. Here Oath runs along beside crooked judgements; at 282-5 the man who swears a false oath suffers whereas the man who keeps his oath prospers; at 804 Oath is a bane for those who break their oaths. Hesiod uses ὄρκος in two senses: the oath sworn by litigants, and the curse that will befall them should they lie under oath (commit perjury). This reflects the multiple elements of which oaths are comprised: Sommerstein in Sommerstein/Fletcher 2007:2 distinguishes 1) a declaration, 2) a specification of higher powers invoked as witnesses, and 3) a ‘curse which the swearer(s) call down upon themselves if their assertion is false or if their promise is violated’. Hesiod adds weight to the threat of the conditional curse by personifying the latter, creating an actual persecutor of perjurers.

On the use of oaths in archaic Greek law see Thür in Foxhall/Lewis 1996:57-72 and Gagarin 1992:76; for an in-depth analysis of ὄρκος in many different contexts see Sommerstein/Fletcher 2007.

220 τῆς δὲ Δίκης ῥόθος ἐλκομένης: ῥόθος is most likely ‘the murmur of protest that spreads among the people’ (West, also Goettling, Wilamowitz, Verdenius,

Ercolani) rather than the cries of Dike (e.g. Mazon), as it always refers to a confused noise of tumult (Sinclair: 'properly the noise of waves') rather than that of a single agent. Plutarch (according to Proclus: Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)220-1) instead took it as a Boeotian word meaning a rough mountain track. ἐλκομένης is used here of the abuse of Justice, elsewhere in *Op.* it is more prosaic: 469 oxen dragging a plough; 631, 672 dragging a ship to the sea. Similarly 222 ἔπεται – there of Justice, cf. 406 a woman to follow the oxen, 441 a man to follow the plough. In Hom. it is most often used of drawing a sword from its scabbard or dragging a ship, also of the dragging of one's opponent in battle: most importantly here, however, it is sometimes used in connection with rape e.g. *Il.*6.465, 22.62, *Od.*11.580: the abuse of Dike is phrased in terms of sexual violence. The Greeks did not have a word which translates directly as 'rape', but used a variety of terms (perhaps dependent on the circumstances of the sexual violence) inc. βιάζειν, ὑβρίζειν – see Harris 2006:293-332.

The raping of Dike sets up a contrast between a violated maiden (at 256 she is a παρθένος) and a properly fertile, child-bearing city: the Just City is visited by Εἰρήνη κουροτρόφος, and its women bear children like their parents (235). Furthermore, at 244 a result of violating Dike is a barren city. This link between women and Justice is striking: despite Hesiod's mistrust of women (see 59-105n.), he chooses to conceptualise abuse of Justice as the rape of a maiden, and female fertility is an integral part of his ideal state. Women are a necessary evil, acceptable (and indeed to be protected) when they fulfil a contributory role.

ἧ κ' ἄνδρες ἄγωσιν: similar in tone to 208, just as 268~209 – see 213-85n. for recapping the preceding stories. Dike resembles the nightingale in that both are victims of violence.

221 δωροφάγοι, σκολιῆς δὲ δίκης: also at 264, see further 38-9n.

222 ἔπεται: Dike is a constant presence – this functions as a comfort to the just, and a warning to the unjust.

πόλιν καὶ ἦθεα λαῶν: reference to the city prefaces the coming vignettes, and the idea of a whole city being punished. This phrase is not the object of κλαίουσα (as Mazon, Sinclair, Verdenius, Ercolani) but is after ἔπεται (West, Most 2006): Justice has been dragged and distorted and will be driven out, thus she wants to punish injustice, not lament it. ἦθεα is taken by e.g. Paley, Mazon, Sinclair and West to mean 'dwelling-places'; by Arrighetti in hendiadys with πόλιν; by Verdenius as 'habit' – 260 νόον seems to refer back to ἦθεα. On the *polis* in Hes. as primarily a social unit see Luce 1978:14.

223-4 Cf. *Il.*16.384-93: a simile tells of the wrath of Zeus when men pass crooked judgments in the assembly and drive out justice (386-7 οἱ βίη εἰν ἄγορῇ σκολιάς κρίνωσι θέμιστας,| ἐκ δὲ δίκην ἐλάσωσι θεῶν ὅπιν οὐκ ἀλέγοντες). On the similarities see Walcot 1963:17-20 (both poets drawing on traditional material), *pace* Verdenius ('the similarities are so specific that a direct influence seems to be more probable').

223 The line is considered problematic (it is bracketed by Mazon and Sinclair) because it is strange that a departing divinity should bring evil, and it should be

Zeus who brings the evil rather than Dike herself. However, Dike brings evil in the sense that she reports injustice to Zeus and so becomes the catalyst for the wrongdoers' punishment (259-62). The line incorporates elements of 103 and 125 – although this has often led to criticism (for mixed imagery), see 213-85n.

ἡέρα ἔσσαμένη: here of Dike, at 255 (and 125 – but see note) of Zeus' mortal-watchers. Both fulfil a similar role: policing the deeds of men. In Hom. mist is used by gods to whisk heroes off the battlefield (e.g. *Il.*3.381, 11.752), and to cloud mortals' vision and knowledge (e.g. *Il.*5.864, 17.644-7): it is the second function which is crucial in *Op.*, marking the division between gods and men which is so central to the Iron-Age condition.

224 οἷ: the unjust, as opposed to 225 οἱ δέ the just – for other contrasts see 224 οὐκ ἰθεῖαν 226 ἰθείας, 224 ἐξελάσουσι 226 μή τι παρεκβαίνουσι. An initial distinction is made between men who drive out Justice (224) and those who give straight judgements (225), which acts as a precursor to the contrast proper: the two vignettes 225 οἱ δέ, 238 οἷς δ'.

οὐχ ἰθεῖαν ἔνειμαν: although Dike is straight by definition, she *can* be bent out of shape by crooked judgements. In the previous verses Dike was a divinity superior to men, but here she is subordinated to the men who administer her: as Ercolani notes, this exemplifies the fine line which separates personifications from abstract concepts.

225-37 The Just City. It is characterised by the absence of war, famine, Ate and seafaring, and by the ideals of peace, *bios*, livestock, offspring and farming.

Cf. *Od.*19.108-14 Odysseus tells Penelope her glory is like that of a blameless king (βασιλῆος ἀμύμονος), whose rule causes the earth to provide crops, the trees fruit, the animals young, the sea fish – and his people prosper (for more on the parallel see Neitzel 1975:69-71). That a good king brings a good harvest and that a bad king can bring disaster were already common *topoi* in the ancient Near East: see Walcott 1966:72-3. However, *Op.* is rather different to both Hom. and the Near Eastern examples, in that the responsibility of the kings is shared by the citizens (Arrighetti 1998:426). 225 οἱ δέ and 238 οἷς δ' refer to the kings (e.g. they give judgements at 225), but also cover 'men' in general – at 231 they care for labour, at 237 they choose agriculture over seafaring, and, most importantly, at 240 it is any κακὸς ἀνὴρ who can cause the city's downfall. This is typical of Hesiod's inclusive approach: not just the kings, but *every man* must act with justice.

225-6 δίκας...ιθείας: the separation of noun and adj., with the resultant topicalising of the qualifying ιθείας, forcefully introduces this first vignette. Justice has been in the preceding lines and will be after this section abused or ignored, resulting in crooked judgements (219, 221, 224, 250, 262, 264): in the Just City, however, judgements are straight.

225 ξείνοισι καὶ ἐνδήμοισι: the same distinction is made also at e.g. Thgn. 793-4. The rights of the former were less than those of the latter, but an offence against a ξείνος would still constitute an injustice.

226 παρεκβαίνουσι: this continues the road metaphor – ‘Based on the image of leaving the right road and walking beside it’ (Verdenius), see *Il.*10.349, *Od.*4.348.

δικαίου: the slight change in vocabulary suggests that this is not quite equivalent to *δίκης* (*pace* Verdenius): Cairns 1993:153 distinguishes between the two in that *dikaion* is the principle of fairness which makes a *dike* straight. Π₅₂ has δικαίων, however παρεκβαίνουσι is best followed here by a single, general principle.

227 τοῖσι: in the same position also at 232. Paley notes: ‘It has been thought, with some probability, that v.232-7 are a kind of duplicate, or different recension, in place of v.227-31.’ They are indeed introduced in the same way; however there is no overlap of ideas, but rather the first part deals with the ‘big picture’ (peace, war, famine, *ate*), the second shifts from the general to the specific by zooming in on Hesiod’s particular concerns in *Op.*: farming, livestock, the *oikos* and seafaring.

τέθηλε πόλις, λαοὶ δ’ ἀνθέουσιν: agricultural metaphor, revived at 236 θάλλουσιν. The chiasmic arrangement brings together the city and the people, which live in harmony with one another: further emphasised by ἐν αὐτῇ.

228-9 Εἰρήνη...οὐδέ...πόλεμον: for the same idea expressed twice, in a positive and negative form, see 97n. At *Theog.*902 Εἰρήνη is a child of Themis and sibling of Justice (note the use there of τέθηλε). οὐδέ is repeated three times (228, 230, 231 – cf. 5-7n.), creating a tricolon of the evils avoided by the just: war, famine and *ate*. Further, at 236 it closes this first vignette in ring composition and adds seafaring to the list of evils.

229 τεκμαίρεται εὐρύοπα Ζεύς: also at 239 – the Just and Unjust Cities are introduced with the same formula. εὐρύοπα Ζεύς also at 281 in the conclusion to the section on Justice. εὐρύοπα was etymologised in antiquity variously as from ὄπ-, ὄψομαι (far-seeing) or from ὄπ- ‘voice’ (far-sounding).

230 ἰθυδίκησι: cf. 225-6 δίκας...ἰθείας: a compound and its uncompounded elements are placed in close proximity, see 189n. This compound is found only here in early literature: Hesiod coins a term in order to create wordplay (p.50-1).

Λιμός: at *Theog.*227 a child of Strife (as 216 Ἄτη, 219 Ὀρκος). To Hesiod in *Op.*, hunger (mentioned also at 243, 302, 363, 404, 647) is the result of injustice, poor farming, bad timing, idleness and lack of long-term vision. It is not explicitly connected with variables about which he cannot advise, such as rainfall (see Tandy/Neale 1996:33).

231 Ἄτη: see 215-16n.

Θαλίης: on the importance of feasting see 115n. – the Just City is like the Golden Race, which is in turn like the gods. Sittl 1889 personifies (spirits of abundance): indeed, at *Theog.*909 Θαλίη is a daughter of Zeus by Eurynome, and as 216 suggests Hesiod seems to have no scruples about multiplying personified concepts (*pace* Verdenius’ refutation ‘Hes. knows only one Θαλίη’); however, in the context it seems more likely that we are dealing with non-personified feasting.

μεμηλότα ἔργα νέμονται: this acts as a further exhortation to Perses (addressed at 213) to work – just men do not only work, but they *care* about it.

233-4 Cited at Pl. *Resp.*2.363b, along with *Od.*19.109, as enumerating the blessings given to just men of good repute. By invoking Hes. together with Hom., Plato thinks to strengthen his argument: see p.20-2 on the authority of the poets, and on Hes. in conjunction with Hom. see further Koning 2010:25-125.

233 ἄκρη...μέσση: ἄκρη begins the sentence and μέσση is placed in the middle: the form fits the meaning.

μελίσσας: West suggests this could be a rationalisation of earlier Golden-Age myths of honey and milk streams. This is possible given the parallels Hesiod draws between the Just City and the Golden Race (see 213-85n.); however, more simply and perhaps more importantly in the Iron-Age context, the bees exemplify the bounty of nature when people behave justly. Cf. their use in similes at 303-7 and *Theog.*594: drones, representing idlers in *Op.* and women in *Theog.*, ruin the work of the hives.

235 τίκτουσιν δὲ γυναῖκες ἑοικότα τέκνα γονεῦσιν: in the Just City women are fertile, contrast 244 the women are barren: see further 220n. on women and justice. The mention of children expands the scope of the passage: justice (or injustice) has an impact on a whole city, and over multiple generations.

Cf. 182n.: in the Iron Age, children will cease to resemble (there, probably 'in mind') their parents; in the ideal Just City, women produce offspring just like their parents. Here the resemblance could be in both mind (family harmony: parents and children are like-minded so do not quarrel) and body (parents and children *look* alike: legitimacy is confirmed and the family line undisrupted). Although Hesiod is

concerned with the family line (see e.g. his advice on heirs at 376), the resemblance here is important less in terms of ‘continuità genealogica di un’etica nobiliare’ (Arrighetti 1998:426) and more as a safeguard against degeneration (further Renahan 1980:349, Koenen 1994:9). In the Iron Age, such ‘noble’ concerns as preservation of a pure family are less immediate than the threat of societal decline.

236-7 ~116-19 Golden Race.

236 οὐδ’ ἐπὶ νηῶν: this addition to the list of evils avoided by the just is dear to Hesiod’s heart: at 633-40 we learn of his father’s voyages, and Hesiod’s own opinion on the risks involved in seafaring. Agriculture is preferable, in terms of risk and self-sufficiency: the Just City is ideal in that the people can work the land easily so do not have to resort to sailing.

238-47 The Unjust City.

Though the vignettes are not directly parallel, there are many correspondences and contrasts between them: 231 μεμηλότα, 238 μέμηλε; 229 and 239 τεκμαίρεται εὐρύοπα Ζεύς; 230 οὐδ’...λιμός, 243 λιμόν; 235 τίκτουσιν δὲ γυναῖκες, 244 οὐδὲ γυναῖκες τίκτουσιν. The contrast is marked from the outset: 238 οἷς δ’.

238 μέμηλε: cf. 231 μεμηλότα: there the Just City cared for their (agricultural) works, here the Unjust City care for *hybris* and wicked deeds (~146).

239 δίκην: on the different meanings of *dike* see 213-85n. Here it must be a bane, as it is allotted by Zeus to the unjust: however, more explicit translations such as

‘atonement’ (West) or ‘punishment’ (Evelyn-White) are unnecessary. When Zeus or (good) kings render justice, the result is an alignment of the legal/moral order, and so for the good the effects are favourable, for the bad unfavourable: whilst there are two different outcomes, the process is the same, so we should interpret *dike* here as something like the ‘result of righteousness’ (Verdenius).

240-7 An abridged version of these lines (omitting 244-5, see note) is given in Aeschin. *In Ctes.*3.135. The κακὸς ἀνὴρ (240) is kept anonymous within the poem: he is whoever the audience believe him to be. This applicability allowed Aeschines to excerpt according to his own agenda, and to cast Demosthenes in the role. He goes so far as to say (3.136): ἐὰν περιελόντες τοῦ ποιητοῦ τὸ μέτρον τὰς γνώμας ἐξετάζητε, οἶμαι ὑμῖν δόξειν οὐ ποιήματα Ἡσιόδου εἶναι, ἀλλὰ χρησμὸν εἰς τὴν Δημοσθένους πολιτείαν (‘if you strip away the metre of the poet and examine his thoughts, I think that this will seem to you to be not the poetry of Hesiod, but an oracle about Demosthenes’ administration’). And in his speech *On the Embassy* 2.158 Aeschines uses 240-1 to implore the people to cast out the bad man (again, Demosthenes). For the orators’ use of Hes. see further p.20-2.

240 ξύμπασα πόλις κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀπηύρα: one bad man causes trouble for the whole (emphasised by the prefix) city – cf. 49n. κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς also at 271: there, society has declined to such an extent that the bad man is deemed just.

241 ὅστις ἀλιτράινει: the relative pronoun refers to κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς, introducing a description of what it actually means to be a ‘bad man’ (transgressing and contriving wickedness). That it is an indefinite pronoun shows this to be a general principle. Here the offending type of man is introduced; at 321-2 his troublesome

acts are listed, and the link emphasised by repetition of this verb at 330. Furthermore, 244 μινύθουσι δὲ οἴκοι is repeated at 325.

242 οὐρανόθεν μέγ' ἐπήγαγε πῆμα Κρονίων: Verdenius rather prosaically suggests: 'Hes. may be thinking of torrential rain causing floods which destroy the crops'. However, there may be more going on here. The use of οὐρανόθεν and Κρονίων in the same line, followed by 245 Ζηνὸς...Ὀλυμπίου, suggests Zeus' lineage, and in fact acts as an encapsulation of the *Theog.* succession myth (Ouranos displaced by Kronos succeeded by Zeus who is now king of Olympus). Further evidence for this comes at 245 φραδμοσύνησιν, which is used elsewhere in Hes. only at *Theog.* 626, 884, 891, in connection with the plans of Gaia, catalyst of each stage of the succession. The effect of this allusion is twofold: first, it strengthens Hesiod's warning (by evoking the episode in which Zeus' ultimate power is most evident); second, it threatens not just deterioration but cataclysm – at every stage of the succession was cosmic revolution (and Gaia), and it is this kind of melt-down of which Hesiod warns both in the Iron Race passage and here in the Unjust City.

243 λιμὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ λοιμόν: paired also at e.g. Hdt. 7.171.2, Thuc. 1.23.3. West notes that 'malnutrition reduces resistance to disease'; however, the formula is so neat that stylistic concerns are likely to have prompted their association even more than realism.

ἀποφθινύθουσι δὲ λαοί: also at *Il.* 5.643, of Sarpedon's people as a result of his cowardice. Cf. 240n.: one man's actions have consequences for an entire people.

244-5 Rejected by Plut. and Proclus, omitted by Aeschin., bracketed by Wilamowitz and Solmsen, treated as being ‘of dubious authenticity’ by Paley. However, the lines are attested in all the papyri of the passage, and there seems no sufficient reason to reject them: in fact, they balance 235; 244 includes a neat chiasmus with the second phrase parallel to that in the previous line; the repetition of Zeus’ involvement fits with the emphatic line 239.

244 μινύθουσι: Zeus’ ability to weaken men and their houses was already introduced at 6 ῥεῖα δ’ ἀρίζηλον μινύθει. The verb is used at 6, 244, 325, 409 – both 6 and 325 begin with ῥεῖα, emphasising Zeus’ power. The threat could be to the households themselves (e.g. line of succession), to their social standing (see 11-13n.) or to their livelihood.

245 ἄλλοτε: picks up 240 πολλάκι. The injustice and subsequent punishment were not a one-off; time and again men behave contrary to *dike*.

246 στρατὸν εὐρύν: cf. 228-9: in the Just City there was no war, but Peace was on the earth. In the Unjust City, not only is there war rather than peace, but there is *unsuccessful* war: there is not even the glory of victory to soften the blow, because Zeus destroys the army.

247 νέας ἐν πόντῳ: see 236 – both vignettes end with a warning against seafaring.

248-73 Apostrophe to the kings.

This apostrophe is characterised by escalation. Hesiod's warning to the kings becomes increasingly urgent: first he tells them to consider this justice, but makes general statements about the bad man (240 κακοῦ ἀνδρός) and gives a vignette of Dike complaining to Zeus (256-60); then he makes it explicit that it is the kings who are unjust (260-2), and tells them directly to straighten their words (263-4). The policing of justice escalates too: first Zeus' watchers monitor judgements and wicked deeds (244); then Dike herself reports injustices so that Zeus might take vengeance (260); finally, in case we were thinking of hiding from the watchers or Dike, Zeus himself sees and knows all (267).

248-51 Warning: be just, for you are being watched. The apostrophe (248) resembles that to the kings at 202: ὦ βασιλῆς corresponds to βασιλεῦς, καταφράζεσθε recalls φρονέουσι (see p.49-50), καὶ αὐτοί is in the same emphatic metrical position as καὶ αὐτοῖς. Again the kings are urged to consider Hesiod's teachings for themselves. Mordine 2006:371 notes this parallel, and argues that it colours the next line: 'What is most noteworthy is that ὦδ' ἰρηξ has been 'replaced' in the later passage by τήνδε δίκην. The hawk is textually erased and supplanted by justice: δίκη, a system regulating power relations, is substituted for the ἰρηξ, a manifestation of ὕβρις and arbitrary power'. The phrase ὦ βασιλῆς is revealing as ὦ is not used when an inferior addresses his superior (Chantraine 1953-8.2:37): Hesiod does not subordinate himself to the kings. Furthermore, Hesiod uses an imperative here (καταφράζεσθε) and in the reiterated apostrophe at 263, just as when he addresses Perses at 213 and 274: not only does this create parallelisms between the apostrophes, but it puts the kings on the same level as Perses, and sets

Hesiod above both parties. 248 καὶ αὐτοί emphasises the shift from one addressee to the other: just as Perses has had to consider justice, now it is the kings' turn (*pace* West: 'that is, as well as the divine watchers...and Zeus', and Verdenius '*scil.* for the gods are already observing it and will punish it' – these interpretations are proleptic, as the watchers have not yet been mentioned).

249 τήνδε δίκην: the specification reflects both the different meanings of *dike*, cf. 239n., and the potential for distortion of it, cf. 224n., 269n. The force of the deictic seems not limited to referring back to the previous vignettes, nor forward to the watchers (as suggested by e.g. Sinclair), but rather evokes the entire picture of justice which Hesiod has conjured before us: cf. e.g. *Il.*3.166-7 Helen's view from the walls (with Bakker 1999).

250 φράζονται: cf. 248 καταφράζεσθε – for compounds and their uncompounded elements in quick succession see 189n. Here Hesiod uses this emphatic device in relation to his ideal of intellectual self-sufficiency.

251 θεῶν ὅπιν οὐκ ἀλέγοντες: although Hesiod professes to speak of worldly matters, still there is no greater threat than the punishment of the gods. Also at *Il.*16.388, of men who pervert justice.

252-5 The watchers of men.

252 τρίς γὰρ μυρία: emphatic: 'three times countless' (similarly *Theog.*365 τρίς χίλιαι – Π5 actually gives χίλιοι here) – μυρία as 10,000 is not clearly attested before 5th century BC. Three is often used in early epic to denote abundance (*Od.*4.86,

*Op.*173) and good fortune (formula τρεῖς μάκαρες *Od.*5.306, 6.154; *Il.*8.488 τριλλιστος).

254-5 =124-5 (see note). This degree of repetition is uncharacteristic of *Op.* and the lines are likely to have been interpolated from here into the earlier passage as an explanatory gloss on 123 φύλακες. In light of the present passage we can add that a secondary reason for the interpolation may be the other linguistic parallels between the Golden Race and Justice.

However, even if we athetise 124-5 we still have some repetition in the second half of lines 123 and 253: twice Hesiod mentions Zeus' watchers. This raises the question: are they the same φύλακες in both cases? The repetition and the many linguistic connections between the Golden Race and Justice would suggest so. This is a new use of the parallel between the two passages: whereas the similarities usually amount to some positive trait (see 213-85n. the Just City is a 'Golden Age' within the Iron Age), here the Golden Race would be allied with justice in terms of *threat*. In this way, the passage incorporates both Hesiod's diachronic and his synchronic approach (see 106-201n.): in the Iron Race we should strive to be like the Golden Race *were* – and our behaviour will be policed by the Golden Race as they are *now*. This makes the present passage rather different from e.g. *Od.*17.485-7 (often quoted as a parallel: 17.487 was even interpolated after *Op.*255 by Oenomaus and Sextus), as here the watchers are not gods (θεοί) but should be understood as early men who are now δαίμονες: 'ἀθάνατοι' in terms of their afterlife.

255 ἤερα ἐσσάμενοι: see 223n.

256-62 Hymn to Dike. The unit includes typical hymnic features such as parentage (256 Διὸς ἐκγεγαυῖα), sphere of influence (260 γηρύετ' ἀνθρώπων ἄδικον νόον), and the other gods' reactions (257 κυδρὴ τ' αἰδοίη).

256 παρθένος: the implications of this term have been widely debated. It is interpreted by some as a purely social concept (Calame 1977:65), referring to the time just before a woman is married; by others as denoting sexual virginity; by still others as both (Sissa 1987). Verdenius argues that here the meaning is social, as the point is that she does not have a husband to help her so must go to her father. However, it could also assume an ironic sexual sense: at 220 she was violated by men, and this contradiction pathetically evokes the earlier passage. The only other παρθένος in *Op.* is Pandora, another female bringing punishment to men – see 70-1n. there it is also an ambiguous formulation.

Διὸς ἐκγεγαυῖα: at *Theog.*901 Dike is daughter of Zeus and Themis. This formulation offers a paretyymology for the name Dike (assonance Διὸς ἐκ- ~Δίκη) – cf. 3n. The same formula is used of the Muses at *Theog.*76: similarly 257 θεοῖς οἱ Ὀλυμπον ἔχουσιν is used at *Theog.*101 of the Muses singing of the gods, and 260 γηρύετ' at *Theog.*28 of the Muses telling lies when they wish.

259 The motif of a god complaining to Zeus is also found at e.g. *Il.*1.500-16 Thetis asking for Zeus' help on Achilles' behalf, *Il.*5.868-87 Ares complaining to Zeus about Diomedes, and most similar to the present passage *Il.*9.508-12 the Litai asking Zeus to punish men who reject them. Here, as in the Homeric examples, the appeal is personal and heartfelt: although Dike does not mention to Zeus her violation at the hands of men, the earlier episode and 256 παρθένος suggest that we are meant to

(because Dike does) have this background in mind. Zeus is referred to as father (Διὶ πατρὶ): a pointed use of the epithet here, as not only is he actually her father (256 Διὸς ἐκγεγαυῖα), but he is here acting in a fatherly capacity.

260 ἄδικον νόον: νόος is specified as the seat of injustice. Similarly 261 λυγρὰ νοέοντες: the verb expresses intention, but rather than intending things which will harm them, the unjust rather intend things which will have the unwarranted result of causing harm. On νόος in Hes., with the occurrences of the word usefully categorised, see further Sullivan 1990.

260-1 ἀποτείση | δῆμος ἀτασθαλίας βασιλέων: in accordance with the principle formulated at 240, where the unjust ‘bad man’ brings the wrath of the gods down upon the people: here, the perpetrators are the kings. Their behaviour is elaborated upon in 261-2, and they are warned explicitly at 263-4.

262 ἄλλῃ: in another (i.e. the wrong) direction – also in Hom.: *Od.* 4.347-8, 14.124-5, 19.555-6 – Verdenius: ‘in all these cases ἄλλος refers to untruth, and this also applies to the unjust judges’.

παρκλίνωσι: this line is difficult to construe. The verb could be either transitive (‘they bend judgements in another direction, speaking judgements crookedly’) or intransitive (‘they lean in another direction, speaking judgements crookedly’). The former would make δίκας a double object both of παρκλίνωσι and ἐνέποντες, and render the phrase σκολιῶς ἐνέποντες somewhat redundant – perhaps then it is better to read it intransitively, as at e.g. *Il.* 23.424 (Ercolani: this reading is supported by the metre, as the main caesura suggests a break after παρκλίνωσι).

263-4 Hesiod addressees the kings again, more strongly this time (see 248-73n. on escalation). The address at 248 implored the kings to consider justice; now they must straighten their words and avoid crooked justice. This time, the implication that they have done wrong is clear: their words *need* straightening, and once again they are δωροφάγοι (cf. 39).

265-6 These proverbial-sounding lines specify that retribution will fall on the perpetrators of injustice i.e. the kings. The structure of the lines is varied: Hesiod switches from parallelism in 265 to chiasmus in 266, as at e.g. 4-5 and the reverse at 25-6. On the balanced proverbial language cf. e.g. 346-7, 375.

Callim. fr.2.5 (Pfeiffer) regards these lines as so central to Hesiod's message that he lists them, in addition to the birth of Chaos, as one of the things the Muses taught him (τεύχω]ν ὥς ἑτέρω τις ἔϋ [κακὸν ἥματι τεύχει – see Hunter in Bastianini/Casanova 2008:153-64): even if they were traditional proverbs, they certainly gained the Hesiodic 'stamp' (p.30-1). Plut. *Mor.* 553f-554a compares Hesiod's idea that a criminal damages his own 'soul' and so is punished immediately by his crime, with Plato's (less strict) view that punishment follows later. For another Platonising interpretation of these lines see Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)265-6.

267-73 Deleted by Plut. (according to Proclus, Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)270-3) 'because they are unworthy of Hesiod's opinion about justice and injustice' (ὥς ἀναξίους τῆς Ἡσιόδου περὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων κρίσεως). However, in these lines Hesiod emphasises the inescapable power of Zeus (as at e.g. 105), characterises a city by its justice (as at 225-47), gives a personal interjection (as at 174-5) and finally a glimmer of hope (see 174-5n. on Hesiod's not-quite-complete pessimism): all very Hesiodic

features. It seems that with this excision Plut. was trying to 'Platonise' Hesiod – cf. 265-6n. and for further discussion see Hunter in Bastianini/Casanova 2008:161.

267-9 Zeus is depicted as omniscient and omnipotent, emphasised by the parallel phrasing at 267 with repetition of πάντα, and his acting according to whim (268 αἶκ' ἐθέλησ': just like the hawk at 209). The idea of divine omnipotence is common to many cultures: for a full-scale analysis see Pettazzoni 1955. Although Zeus is depicted in this way elsewhere in Hes. (e.g. 105 οὕτως οὐ τίς πη ἔστι Διὸς νόον ἐξαλέασθαι), his power is only here described in terms of his eye (Διὸς ὀφθαλμός). This formulation has sparked debate, particularly in its use of the singular: e.g. Verdenius thinks that 'eye' is simply equivalent to 'look', *concretum pro abstracto*; Walcot 1966 and West draw on comparative examples (West from the Indo-European tradition, Walcot from the ancient Near East) and conclude that the singular is a remnant of a tradition in which Zeus was associated with the sun. Indeed, this association resonates clearly in early Greek epic: the formula at *Il.*3.277, *Od.*11.109, 12.323 Ἡελίος θ', ὃς πάντ' ἐφορᾷς καὶ πάντ' ἐπακούεις has much in common with 267; 268 ἐπιδέρεται is used here of Zeus but at *Theog.*760 and *Od.*11.16 of the Sun.

269 οἶν δὲ καὶ τήνδε δίκην: although *dike* is fundamentally good, it can be distorted and dispensed crookedly (see e.g. 224 – it is even used of punishment at 239), so here Zeus has to police not only whether a city has justice, but what *kind* of justice it has. On qualifying *dike* see also 249n. τήνδε δίκην.

πόλις ἐντὸς ἔργει: Zeus considers the city as a whole – all will be punished for one man's transgressions (49n.).

270-3 Hesiod tells of a paradoxical time when society has declined to such an extent that it is bad for a man to be just since the more unjust will receive greater justice (cf. the downfall of the Iron Race at 190-2). This personal interjection is (like Hesiod's last exclamation at 174-5 – see further 270n.) phrased as a wish. The paradoxical formulation continues in 273: 270-1 (esp. 270 νῦν δῆ) give the impression that this is the situation *now*, but at 273 Zeus will not let it come to this – it turns out we are not yet at that point. On Δία μητιόεντα see 51n.

270 νῦν δῆ: see this formula's use at 176: in both cases it is used to mark a personal interjection from the poet (here it precedes the interjection, at 176 it follows it) in the form of a wish. In both cases Hesiod simultaneously situates himself within and wishes to distance himself from the declining Iron Race. The phrase is a common transitional formula (as at e.g. 202), but in 176 and here it has a more pointed use. At 176 it marks a true temporal statement: νῦν γὰρ δὴ γένος ἐστὶ σιδήρεον. However, it is then followed by a series of verbs in the future tense: now is the Iron Race, but the decline Hesiod describes is in the future, and (at least for now) we still have good things mixed in with our evils (179). At 270 Hesiod seems to give his opinion on 'current' justice: he does not want to be part of this world where injustice is rewarded. However, as with the decline of the Iron Race, the situation has not yet come to this, and at 273 Hesiod hopes that Zeus will not let it (again, he offsets his apocalyptic warning with a dose of optimism).

271 ἐμὸς υἱός: scholiasts were concerned with identifying this son (see ΣOp.(Pertusi)271a, b), even offering the suggestion that Hesiod was the father of Stesichorus. However, even if Hesiod did have a son whom he wanted to protect

from injustice, this interjection should be interpreted more generally: Hesiod is representing the everyman. He is disappointed in his Age, and expresses the inevitable sentiment 'I don't wish to tell my son to be just if no-one else is'. He extends his worries into the long-term: for Hesiod's concern with future generations cf. 235n., 284-5n., 376-80n.

273 ἔολπαι: see 96n. ἔλπω should be translated as 'expect' or 'anticipate' rather than 'hope': indeed, at 475 Hesiod expects that, if the farmer follows his instructions, Zeus will give a good harvest and the well-prepared will rejoice in their livelihood. Similarly, here Hesiod anticipates that, if the Iron-Age man follows his warnings, Zeus will maintain order.

274-85 Apostrophe to Perses

Hesiod returns to Perses partly by association: as Verdenius notes 'Perses is one of those ἄδικοι who always try to get μείζω δίκην (272)', and it is natural that thought of 'my son' (271) might lead on to other familial concerns. However, the parallelisms between the apostrophes and the clear structure of the Justice passage as a whole indicate that there is more than just mental association involved. In particular, there is a 'chiastic parallelism of animal fable/apostrophe (202-13) and apostrophe/animal lack of δίκη (275-80)' (Claus 1977:76); the apostrophe at 274-5 picks up on that at 213 (and indeed reaches even further back, to 27); the discussion of oaths picks up on 219 τρέχει Ὀρκος ἅμα σκολιῇσι δίκησιν.

274-5 Cf. 27 and 213: this apostrophe to Perses combines elements from the earlier two. In all three cases Perses is addressed with ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δέ. 274 ταῦτα μετὰ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῆσιν lays down the same challenge to consider for oneself and remember Hesiod's teachings as 27 ταῦτα τεῶ ἐνικάτθεο θυμῶ; and 275 Δίκης ἐπάκουε, βίης δ' ἐπιλήθεο parallels 213 ἄκουε Δίκης, μηδ' ὕβριν ὄφελλε. Hesiod brings in all his didactic ammunition, urging Perses both to consider the advice of Hesiod-as-teacher (and remember it in the long-term) and to listen directly to Dike. One of the most striking changes is the replacement of Hybris with *bie*: for Hybris having connotations of violence see its role in the Silver Race at 134 and the Bronze Race at 146.

275 *πάμπαν*: used four times in *Op.*, each time emphasising Iron-Age struggles: here Perses must forget force altogether; at 302 hunger altogether befalls idlers; at 335 Hesiod advises altogether avoiding wicked deeds; at 763 he warns that gossip is altogether difficult to dismiss.

276-80 See 202-12n. and 202n. αἶνον. Given the substantial gap between the fable and these lines, this cannot be the *primary* moral of the fable: in the first case we are not meant to read the fable as a negative paradigm of human behaviour (*pace* Daly 1961:45-51, Heath 1985:249, Arrighetti 1998:425) but as an advisory tale to be mapped onto one's own life. However, we cannot avoid reading it at least as a secondary moral: although society has declined so far that we are at the point of animalism, we are *not* animals – this is our glimpse of hope. The delay is characteristic of Hesiod's didactic method: since this is ostensibly an answer to the riddle of the fable, Hesiod gives his audience time to formulate their own response

before he presents them with this one. The two animal passages are linked by two apostrophes to Perses: 213 and 274.

276 νόμον διέταξε: the meaning of *nomos* here seems to be something like ‘natural order’: if it is to apply to animals it can hardly be a ‘law’ or ‘ordinance’. διέταξε here and at *Theog.*74, both of Zeus: here he sets out the natural order for mankind; in *Theog.* he sets out the gods’ spheres of influence. For wordplay see 388n.

278 ἔσθειν ἀλλήλους: West comments (with examples): ‘fish were especially notorious for this’. Perhaps so, but we can take more from the phrase than this. At first glance, it looks like Hesiod chose this element of animalism as the furthest away from human behaviour: however, there is a (early) human parallel – noted by Gagné 2010:7. At 134-5 we are told of the Silver Race: ὕβριν γὰρ ἀτάσθαλον οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἀλλήλων ἀπέχειν. It is in their nature to turn on each other because *hybris*, polar opposite of *dike*, is among them. Similarly, here it is in the nature of animals to turn on each other because *Dike* is not among them (οὐ Δίκη ἐστὶ μετ’ αὐτοῖς). The effect of this parallel is the same as the secondary effect of the fable (276-80n.): humans (both in the decline of the Iron Age as we have seen, and in their early stages of development) have much in common with animals, but are *not* animals – there is still hope.

279-80 ἡ πολλὸν ἀρίστη | γίνεται: being just is the best thing that men can aspire to. In the context ἀρίστη should be translated as ‘most advantageous’ or ‘most profitable’, given that the following lines (280-5) are concerned with the rewards given to the just and the penalties exacted from the unjust. Marking something out as ‘the best’ is a self-authorising move (293-7n., Griffith in Griffith/Mastrorade

1990): Hesiod presents himself as arbiter, in didactic terms as well as in the context of his quarrel with Perses (35-6n.).

280-5 Hesiod adds another element to his exploration of *dike*: one must know justice (281 γινώσκων) *and* speak about it (280 ἀγορευσαι) – as Hesiod knows and speaks. This constitutes another link back to Hesiod’s first apostrophe to Perses at 27 (see also 274-5n.) where he advises Perses (31) to be neither a watcher of disputes nor a listener of public business (ἀγορῆς): public *fora* should not be used as a distraction from work, but should only be frequented when one knows justice. In these lines we see a shift from more general maxims (274-5 Perses listen to Hesiod and Dike, 276-80 animals do not have justice but men do) to warnings suited specifically to litigants (Perses) and lawgivers (kings). Vocabulary such as 280 ἀγορευσαι, 282 μαρτυρίῃσιν, 282 ἐπίορκον ὁμόσσης, 285 εὐόρκου situates us in a context of litigation, where perjury harms the perjurer, his descendants, and Dike. On the notion of ancestral fault in these lines see Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)283-5 and Gagné 2010.

ἀγορευσαι: of begging at 402, and Hesiod advising Perses at 688. A closer parallel to its use here, however, is *Theog.*86 where a good king speaks with justice and argues decisively: although in an apostrophe to Perses, this advice could also resonate with the kings (see 213-85n. on explicit/implicit addressees).

282 ἐκὼν ἐπίορκον ὁμόσσης: also at *Theog.*232 in the description of Oath. The discussion of oaths here forms a ring with the first apostrophe to Perses, as at 219 Oath runs along beside crooked judgements (see note).

283 ψεύσεται: also at 709 (general instructions on how to behave) and *Theog.*783.

At *Theog.*782-806 we find out what happens to gods who commit perjury (against the water of Styx, their greatest oath: also at *Il.*2.755, 14.271, 15.37-8, *Od.*5.185-6, *Hom. Hymn* 2.259, 3.85-6) – they lie breathless for a whole year, then for another nine years are cut off from the rest of the gods. *Op.*283-4 complete the picture, specifying the corresponding mortal punishment – the perjurer’s family is left weakened.

Δίκην βλάψας νήκεστον ἀάσθη: here Dike is harmed by perjury, at 258 by being scorned. Here Hesiod gives a concrete example of his proverb at 265 οἱ τ’ αὐτῶ κακὰ τεύχει ἀνὴρ ἄλλω κακὰ τεύχων.

284 Hesiod warns not only of immediate punishment, but also of retribution exacted from subsequent generations (as at 244 μινύθουσι δὲ οἴκοι): the race of the perjurer is left more obscure (i.e. lower in social standing – on the importance of reputation see 11-13n.). The extent of the penalty is emphasised by the repetition of γενεῇ μετόπισθε(ν) in the same metrical position in the following line (Π₁₀ has κατόπισθε(ν), a variant also at *Od.*11.6, 12.148 and *Theog.*210; however, even this is repeated). 285 may seem superfluous since the prosperity given to the man who speaks with justice is covered at 281, however the line brings out more clearly the continuing impact of justice/injustice and, as West notes, ‘Truth’s reward is restated in a form more strictly antithetical to 284’. Gagné 2010:13 notes a narrowing in focus, from the threat of punishment of a race (106-201) to that of a city (213-73) to, here, that of a family: he also notes that the groups are not mutually exclusive, but form a ‘cosmic solidarity in crime’.

ἀμαυροτέρῃ: ‘more obscure’. For this language used elsewhere in warnings see 325 the gods weaken (μαυροῦσι) the shameless man, 693 do not overload your wagon lest the cargo be diminished (μαυρωθείη).

286-382 Precepts on the importance of work.

After a long section on the importance of justice (213-85), Hesiod ostensibly switches to the other side of his didactic project: work. However, the division is not quite as clear-cut as it might seem: although justice is the primary focus of 213-85 and work that of 286-382, the two are interlinked (333-4n. social injustices in the ‘work’ section). Hesiod does not present justice and work as mutually exclusive: rather, his poem constitutes a protreptic to both *in tandem*.

286 Apostrophe to Perses. Hesiod asserts his didactic authority by setting up a dichotomy between himself who thinks well, ἐσθλὰ νοέων (293-7n.), and μέγα νήπιε Πέρση. ἐσθλός has broad applicability (287-92n.), but here the verb νοέω and the contrast with Perses contextualise it in terms of didacticism.

287-92 There are two roads: the first is easy and leads to κακότης; the second, more difficult, to ἀρετή. This parallels 216-17 the two roads to *hybris* and *dike*: Hesiod begins his discourse on work in the same way as he began that on justice. The lines were heavily quoted in antiquity: see p.16-18, 39-40. Such an active reception can be attributed to the open, applicable terms: see κακότης of ritual impurity at 740, and ἀρετή at 313.

288 ῥηιδίως: cf. 5-7 anaphora of ῥέα. The language is indicative of the Iron-Age human condition: Zeus can change our fortunes without effort but all we mortals can do easily is grab misery.

λείη: West (also Paley, Mazon, Wilamowitz, Rzach, Sinclair, Solmsen) adopts this reading, which is attested only in the indirect tradition (testimonia) and a supralinear variant in one ms., on the grounds that it avoids tautology with μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει and creates an antithesis with ὄρθιος and τρηχύς (290-1). However, as Verdenius notes, this argument 'is tantamount to saying that λείη is a *lectio facilior*'. The reading ὀλίγη (adopted by Verdenius and Arrighetti 1998) is attested in Π₃₈, the medieval *paradosis*, Proclus and other testimonia, and should be retained. Furthermore, as Arrighetti 1998 notes, ὀλίγη is the perfect antithesis to 290 μακρός.

ἐγγύθι ναίει: here the phrase is used metaphorically, with κακότης likened to a neighbour: elsewhere in *Op.* it is used literally, at 343 of an actual neighbour and at 700 of a woman living nearby (see 698-701n.). The point is that κακότης is deceptive: she *seems* an attractive choice because she is convenient and fits with the ideal of self-sufficiency (don't stray too far from the *oikos*).

289 ἰδρῶτα...προπάροιθεν: a vivid description. To make his point more emphatically, Hesiod chooses a graphic image of sweat over a general reference to toil. προπάροιθεν occurs only twice in Hesiod – here and at *Theog.*769, both of obstructions of a kind appropriate to their respective poem. Here sweat is in the way of virtue, at *Theog.*769 Cerberus stands guard in front of Hades and Persephone.

290-1 290 μακρός is the antithesis of 288 μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει and 288 ὀλίγη (for this reading see 288n. λείη). 290 ὄρθιος and 291 τρηχύς do not have direct opposites in the preceding lines (unless we read λείη at 288: in fact, creating such an antithesis is one of the reasons West gives for his reading). This is because the description of the hard road is more extensive and elaborate than that of the easy one: as it must be in order to draw the audience's attention to it so that they are set on the right path.

290 ὄρθιος: Verdenius cites as examples of 'steep' equated with 'laborious' *Il.* 13.317, 11.601, 16.651. However, these are all examples of αἰπύς rather than ὄρθιος: if we are to go down this route, the best comparative example would be 83 (see note) in which αἰπύς is used of Pandora, one of the instigators of the hard road.

291-2 As at 270-3 (see note), Hesiod describes an apparently paradoxical situation: the road is easy, although difficult. Verdenius and West get round the problem by construing 292 χαλεπή περ εἶοῦσα as 'hard though it was before', however the meaning 'hard though it may still be' (Sinclair, Mazon, Most 2006) is possible: it is difficult to achieve ἀρετή, and once achieved it is difficult to maintain, but given its positive effects it is easy to bear. The contrast between the spondaic line 291 and the dactyls in 292 emphasises the point (Paley, Verdenius, Nicolai 1964:67).

εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται: although it is not clear grammatically whether the subject here is the traveller or the road, in the context the former seems the more natural (West, Verdenius; *pace* Ercolani). However, 292 with ῥηιδίη and χαλεπή reverts to the feminine: this could be because of ἀρετή, but more likely because Hesiod continues the image of the road.

293-7 Defining the *πανάρριστος*: he who thinks for himself and considers what will be better in the end. *ἔσθλός* is he who is persuaded by someone who speaks well; *ἄχρησις* is he who neither thinks for himself nor listens to others. Hesiod describes in proverbial form two ideals, but sets up a hierarchy between the two: the prefixed superlative *πανάρριστος* is doubly emphatic (for the prefix cf. 811 *παναπήμων*), picked up by *πάντα* and reinforced by the reflexive *αὐτός*. The simple adjective *ἔσθλός* is less emphatic, and the *variatio* *οὗτος...κεῖνος* foregrounds the *πανάρριστος* and sets further back the *ἔσθλός*.

This proverb encapsulates essential didactic ideas which we find elsewhere in *Op.* such as: thinking for oneself (294 *φρασσάμενος* evokes hortatory formulations such as *ἄνωγα φράζεσθαι* at 367, 403-4, 687-8; see also 85-6 Epimetheus accepts mankind's downfall because he did not consider, *ἐφράσαθ'*, his brother's words); planning for the long-term (294 *ἐς τέλος* recalls 218 *dike* triumphs over *hybris* *ἐς τέλος ἐξελθοῦσα*); the authority of a good speaker (295 *εὖ εἰπόντι* picks up on 106-7 *ἐκκορυφώσω, | εὖ καὶ ἐπισταμένως*); the need to take advice to heart (297 *ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται* finds parallels at 27, 107, 274).

In Hom. we often find the formula *ὄχ' ἄριστος*: e.g. at *Il.*2.761 of 'the best' of the men and horses who went with the sons of Atreus; at *Il.*23.357 of Diomedes 'the best' of all; at *Od.*13.297 of Odysseus 'the best' of mortals. Perhaps, then, the *πανάρριστος* is Hesiod's version of the heroic *ὄχ' ἄριστος*: he who thinks for himself is the Hesiodic hero. Further, for the authority one establishes by marking something out as 'the best', cf. 279-80n.

293 πάντα νοήσει: cf. 267 πάντα νοήσας used of Zeus: the πανάριστος even claims god-like omniscience (Clay 2003:43 Hesiod adopts the ‘thundering voice of a god’).

294 Bracketed by Paley and Wilamowitz, omitted in some quotations of the lines (Arist. *Eth. Nic.*1095b8-13, Aristid. 2.97, Clem. *Paed.*3.42, Stob. 3.4.25). It is true that the line seems to intrude into a neat ascending tricolon, so it may be for mnemonic reasons (reducing the proverb to easy-to-remember basics) that the line is omitted in some attestations. However, with this line the structure is arguably even neater: the πανάριστος is described in two lines, the ἐσθλός in one, the ἀχρήιος ἀνὴρ again in two – a structure more appropriate than steady ascent, given that Hesiod wants to contrast primarily the ideal πανάριστος with the negative paradigm ἀχρήιος. Extending the superiority of the πανάριστος into the long-term future is necessary in the context (a protreptic to work, focusing on timeliness and planning), particularly where Perses is concerned (Verdenius: ‘Perses has always confined his attention to the advantage of the present moment and has neglected the consequences’). This creates a link between the precepts on work and those on justice (ἐς τέλος 294 and 218), and paves the way for the agricultural Calendar with its focus on the seasons and the right time. Further, φρασσάμενος emphasises the importance of self-sufficient thought so important to Hesiod’s didactic method.

298-319 The Benefits of Work.

As with the double vignette of the Just and Unjust City, here Hesiod lays out two potential futures dependent on present behaviour: what will happen to the idle man

(302 Λιμὸς γάρ τοι πάμπαν ἀεργῶ σύμφορος ἀνδρί), and the rewards which will follow toil. These benefits are: 299-302 Famine will hate and Demeter love you; 306-9 you will have timely provisions (ὠραῖος βίος), sheep and wealth, and the gods will love you; 312-13 you will be envied, you will have ἀρετή and glory. Hesiod is concerned with the long-term effects of present action: he does not just give stark didactic precepts, but considers the consequences of following his advice (introduced by e.g. 299 ὄφρα, 307 ὥς).

Despite digressions (303-6 simile of the idler and the drone, 317-19 αἰδώς), maxims (311 the disgrace, ὄνειδος, attached to idleness), and even a reflection on the detachability of his own advice (314-16), Hesiod uses the theme of work to give unity to the section: there are no fewer than 14 words in it with root ἐργ-.

298-301 Apostrophe to Perses, echoing 286. ἀλλὰ σύ (298) cannot mark a change in addressee, as there has been none: Verdenius plausibly suggests that it rather ‘marks the transition from preliminary reflections to a call to action’: see Denniston 1954:14.

Perses is addressed as δῖον γένος (299). This occurs elsewhere in epic at *Il.*9.538 (Artemis’ line – descendants of Zeus) and *Hom. Hymn* 1.2 (Dionysus, a child of Zeus): in both cases the formula could mean ‘descendant of Zeus’. However, here this cannot be the case. The ambiguity of the formula stems from the uncertain etymology and meaning of δῖος itself – it could be connected with heaven, i.e. ‘heavenly, shining, divine’, or with Zeus, i.e. belonging to/descended from Zeus (*Lfgre*). Indeed, it appears again in *Op.* at 479 as an epithet of χθών. As Perses is not technically a descendant of Zeus, we must consider what this formula is doing here

(it is not sufficient to attribute it to the oral tradition – a formula used for metrical convenience: *pace* Millett 1984:87). Most likely is that it is an address intended to flatter, elevating Perses as a way of encouraging him to listen: a didactic strategy. This elevation could derive from a direct connection with Zeus, or from analogy with the heroes (Walcot 1970:112, Clay 1993:29). Another possibility is that the formula is ironic here (Marsilio 2000:24), in which case it fulfils its didactic purpose by making the point that Hesiod is closer than other Iron-Age mortals to Zeus, in contrast to Perses.

In antiquity, the didactic purpose of the address was largely ignored, and a more prosaic interpretation offered: ‘son of Dios’, a supposed revelation of Perses’ lineage which gave rise to traditions, traceable from the 5th century BC, about a Dios as father of Hesiod – see e.g. Pherec. 3 F 167, Hellanicus 4 F 5. Some scholars translate ‘descendant of Zeus’, taking this to signify royalty: Wilamowitz (followed by West) suggests that Hesiod’s and Perses’ father had represented himself, when he immigrated to Boeotia, as of royal descent; Bravo 1977:10-13 that he was an aristocrat from Cyme who had fallen on hard times. Verdenius, however, notes that ‘Hes. never assumes the air of a nobleman’, and Renehan 1980:351 makes the point that Perses may come from an excellent family, but not a royal one.

298 ἡμετέροισι μνηστέον αἰὲν ἐφετμή: the plural (‘our’ for ‘my’) is an example of the rhetorical *pluralis societatis* (Verdenius, Arrighetti 1998:429, Ercolani) used by superiors ostensibly to set themselves on the same level as their inferiors, in order to urge them on in some way (here: to work). The apostrophe picks up on the preceding proverb (293-7): Perses should ‘remember’ (i.e. take to heart 297),

‘always’ (see 294 ἐς τέλος), ‘our advice’ (see 295 εὖ εἰπόντι). On the didactic function of the verb μιμνήσκω see 422n. and p.52, 58.

299 Λιμός: see 230n. and 302n.

300 ἐχθαίρη: this threat is put in an emphatic position: at the beginning of the line, in enjambment (subject and object in preceding line), juxtaposed with its opposite φιλέη, with Λιμός and Δημήτηρ put at the ends of their respective lines, creating a chiasmus.

ἐυστέφανος: epithet used of Demeter four times in *Hom. Hymn 2* (similarly 301 αἰδοίη at *Hom. Hymn 2.374*). It is not, however, tied to her: it is used in *Theog.* variously of Cytherea (Aphrodite), Alimede (one of the Nereids) and even the city of Thebes. Verdenius suggests: ‘The crown does not seem to have a special function, but belongs to a beautiful woman’, *contra* Boedeker 1974:27-8 it ‘may refer to the garlands often worn in the sacred dances performed for fertility goddesses’. The ancient variant ἐυπλόκαμος is attested at *Od.5.125* of Demeter.

301 πιμπλήσι καλήν: also at 411; similarly 307 (with πλήθωσι instead of πιμπλήσι). Here and at 307 Hesiod advises Perses to fill his granary; at 411 he gives the negative example of idlers and procrastinators who do not fill theirs. See further 374 the granary must be protected from women; 503 granaries must be prepared in summer to withstand winter.

302 A maxim picking up on 299 Λιμός.

303-7 The idle man. He is described (303-4), compared with drones (304-6), then linked with Perses (306) who is given advice (307). 303 ἄεργος is consistent with Perses' character (Marsilio 2000:12). However, the description is formulated in the third person, and thus is at first kept generally applicable. At 306 the use of the second person singular (σοί) then tethers the description to *Op.* and its characters, marking another reiteration of the apostrophe to Perses (with 307 repeating the reason for working given at 299-301). The advice is formulated in terms of μέτρον (307 μέτρια κοσμεῖν), an essential concept in *Op.*: cf. 349 μετρεῖσθαι, 350 αὐτῷ τῷ μέτρῳ, 397 ἐπιμετρήσω, 559-60n., 600 μέτρῳ δ' εὖ κομίσασθαι. See further 307 ὠραίου βίотου – this section comprises advice on work, and so employs the essential vocabulary of agriculture (measure, maturity, livelihood). Verdenius on the importance of μέτρια notes 'The word does not denote the right quantity (Pal.), the right time (Maz.), or the right place (We.), but all these together'.

The simile compares idle men with drones. Just as drones are an encumbrance to the hive, consuming all that is produced (κάματος here is 'product of labour') by the bees, idle men are a blight on society. West argues that the simile is not particularly apposite here, as 'the idler of *Op.* does not feast on others' labours, he starves': however, the simile is in fact doubly apposite as drones survive initially by draining others' resources (as 395-6 Perses has already come begging at his brother's door), but when they have fulfilled their role they are often left to starve. At *Theog.*594-9 a longer version of this simile is applied to women: a resonance relevant here as women too are a burden in the Iron Age. See Sussman 1978 on gender roles in the two similes.

Marsilio 2000:12 links this simile with ideas of education and inspiration: as the Muses save Hesiod from being a ‘mere belly’ (*Theog.*26 γαστέρες οἶον) by giving him poetic inspiration, so Hesiod will save Perses from ‘eating others’ labour’ by telling him ἐτήτυμα (10). One could note further *Theog.*599 ἀλλότριον κάματον σφετέρην ἐς γαστέρ’ ἀμῶνται (‘they gather into their bellies others’ labour’ – a perverted harvest): this further links the education of Hesiod with that of Perses, expressing the same idea as the simile in *Op.* but including the γαστήρ of *Theog.*26.

The drones are described as κοθούροι (304): this is a *hapax legomenon* of unknown meaning. However, given that drones are notable not only for their idleness but also for their lack of sting, and –ουρος could be connected with οὐρά ‘tail’ or ‘rear end’, the most likely interpretation is ‘stingless’ (*Lfgre*). Other explanations were suggested in the scholia: e.g. Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)304-6 suggests ‘sting-hiding’ (κεύθερος), ‘without a tail’ (κόλος, κολοβός), and ‘full of impudence’ (τοῦ κόρου πλήθουσι). Didymus (Chalc. fr. p.300 Schmidt) suggests ‘angry-tailed’ (κοτούροις, ὅτι κότον ἔχουσιν ἐν οὐρᾷ): indeed 304 ὀργήν, meaning generally ‘natural propensity’ or ‘temperament’, is often used of a specifically *angry* temperament (the mss. variants ὀρμήν and ἀλκήν may have arisen as explanatory glosses on ὀργήν).

308-13 A string of one- to two-line precepts on the benefits of work: 308 wealth, formulated in terms of pastoral farming; 309 divine approval; 311 work is no disgrace (a neat proverbial-sounding line, with parallel phrases and repetition of the key concept ὄνειδος; cf. 354-6, and further afield e.g. *Il.*22.495); 312-13 you will be envied as you amass wealth (cf. 21-4, 195-6n.). In turn, wealth has its own benefits: ἀρετή (cf. 287-92n.) and κῦδος (a Homeric concept, appears 69 times in *Il.*,

in Hes. only here in *Op.* and in *Theog.* at 433, 439 as something bestowed only by Hecate). This seems to be a cluster of traditional precepts, all making (different aspects of) the same point and moving from one to the other through association. However, their arrangement is striking. There are no parallel formulations, there is no anaphora (cf. 5-7n.). On the contrary, the precepts are strikingly different: see for example the degree of *variatio* in ways of expressing the main theme – 308 ἐξ ἔργων, 309 ἐργαζόμενος, 311 ἔργον, 312 εἰ δέ κεν ἐργάζῃ. Similarly, the rationales given for work vary: they are put in terms of wealth (308, 312-13), in terms of divine approval (309), in terms of what other people think (311, 312), in antithesis to the idler (311, 312). Or the different levels of generalising or specifying (on reading *Op.* from the general to the specific see esp. 765-828n.): 308 plural ἄνδρες, 309 singular (generalising?) ἐργαζόμενος (the variant plural is less well attested and may be an attempt at correction), 311 and 313 abstract concepts (ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος and πλούτῳ δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ), 312 second person σε (Perses?). It is as if Hesiod chose these precepts in order to make his point from every conceivable angle.

The precepts work together to make one (very strong) point. In particular, 309 and 311 balance each other as the former gives the reaction of the gods to work, the latter that of men (ὄνειδος usually functions among peers, i.e. being 'disgraced' in front of or 'rebuked' by one's fellow men – on the importance of reputation see 11-13n.). However, the loose links between them render the precepts readily detachable. For example 313 is referred to at Plut. *Mor.*24e where, to clarify the point and (as Koning 2010:89 suggests) to take the sting out of 'Hesiod's potentially elitist

remark', he defines ἀρετή as 'repute, or influence, or good fortune or the like' (ἀντὶ δόξης ἢ δυνάμεως ἢ εὐτυχίας ἢ τινος ὁμοίου). In fact, the potential for misuse of 311 (see also 287-92n.) is explored in Polycrates' *Accusation of Socrates* and Xen. *Mem.*1.2.56-7 (for discussion see Koning 2010:90, Graziosi in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010:120-5, also Ford in the same volume 148). As it stands in *Op.*, οὐδέν should be taken with ὄνειδος ('work is no disgrace'), however Socrates seems to have taken οὐδέν with ἔργον ('no work is a disgrace'), thereby encouraging *any* work, however immoral. In response, Xenophon defends Socrates (again quoting 311), claiming that in Socrates' definition ἔργον referred only to 'morally good work': see similarly Critias' use of Hesiod's line to mark the difference between 'working' and 'doing' at Pl. *Chrm.*163b1-d7.

[310 This line is absent from all of the papyri which have this section, from ms. D and from the testimonia. Although the line is appropriate in the context as 'gods and men' parallels 303, and it expands the elliptical syntax of 309, it is too poorly attested to be retained. Wilamowitz, Mazon and Sinclair delete, Goettling, Rzach, Solmsen and West bracket, Verdenius classes it as 'Certainly spurious'; Paley leaves it in his text without brackets, and Arrighetti 1998:429-30 defends the line.]

314-16 After the string of precepts, usable by many people in various situations, follows an explicit reflection on the applicability of Hesiod's advice. 314 δαίμονι δ' οἷος ἔησθα must mean something like 'Whatever sort of man you are by way of fortune'. See 122n. for the etymology of δαίμων – probably from δαίω 'distribute', and so by extension the δαίμων can be someone who gives out shares (as the δαίμονες of the Golden Race are πλουτοδόται at 126) or the shares which one has

been allotted i.e. fortune. With this phrase Hesiod explicitly emphasises the applicability of his maxims: work is crucial, *whoever* you are. See further p.59.

317-19 A three-line unit on αἰδώς, marked by anaphora (5-7n.). These lines follow from 311 ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος: as Verdenius notes, 'After having expressed his advice Hes. expects his brother to repeat his objection that manual labour does not befit a well-born man', and so he anticipates it by reflecting on the nature of αἰδώς (not synonymous with ὄνειδος, but in the same category of social and emotional sanctions – see 192n. for Cairns' definition of αἰδώς).

317 αἰδώς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθή is a surprising opening statement, which Hesiod then has to qualify: at 318 αἰδώς is *sometimes* bad, but sometimes good. At 319 he reconfigures 318 in terms of wealth, making the proverbial expression fit the context. That 317 and 318 are proverbial is supported by the remarkable Homeric parallels: 317 with *Od.*17.347 αἰδώς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθή κεχρημένῳ ἀνδρὶ παρεῖναι, and 318 with *Il.*24.44-5 οὐδέ οἱ αἰδώς ἰγίνεται, ἥ τ' ἄνδρας μέγα σίνεται ἢ δ' ὀνίνησι. Because of this, editors have suspected interpolations: Plutarch athetised 317-18 (bracketed by Paley), Aristarchus athetised *Il.*24.45, Mazon deletes both *Op.*318 and *Il.*24.45. However, more fruitful would be to recognise a shared *topos* or proverb (noted by e.g. Sinclair 1925b:147, Cairns 1993:149n7), put to different uses in the poems (see Arrighetti 1998:431 for a comparison between 317 and *Od.*17.347). These similarities may even have had an impact on the textual tradition: see below.

Because of this unexpected opening gambit and the resultant ambiguity of αἰδώς, the passage has been a cause of much controversy. However, if we understand αἰδώς to be an inhibitory emotion (Cairns 1993) then this ambiguity makes some

sense: being inhibited is good in that it keeps one from excess or misdemeanour, but bad when it ‘inhibits the conduct required to fulfil some desired and legitimate end’ (Cairns 1993:149). Similarly *elpis*, described in much the same way at 500-1 (see note), can be the expectation of either good *or* bad.

This ambiguity of αἰδώς has sparked a related debate: is there one αἰδώς, or two? It is compared with two-fold Eris by e.g. Verdenius, and certainly it has both positive and negative elements. However, Hesiod never explicitly delineates a good αἰδώς and a bad: 317 αἰδώς δ’ οὐκ ἀγαθή can easily be interpreted as situationally-dependent rather than personifying. It seems therefore to fall into the category of ambivalent concepts whose meanings change depending on the context (see e.g. *elpis*, *zelos*), rather than specifically *dual* concepts (the distinction is made here also by e.g. West, Cairns 1993:149 and Arrighetti 1998:431; it is elided by e.g. Claus 1977:82, Verdenius).

Most of the controversy about this passage centres on 319: more specifically the nature of θάρσος. Wilamowitz, Hoekstra 1950:99-106 and West take it as negative (the brazenness that goes with wealth), but it is taken as positive by e.g. McKay 1963, Verdenius (‘intrepidity: Perses has to take courage and forget his scruples’) and Arrighetti 1998:430 (the security of the rich). Most insightful on this ambiguity is McKay 1963 followed by Cairns 1993:149: θάρσος must be positive in the context (and αἰδώς therefore negative – the αἰδώς δ’ οὐκ ἀγαθή of 317) as Hesiod is promoting ὄλβος and encouraging Perses to show the θάρσος needed to overcome αἰδώς (as an inhibitory emotion); however, θάρσος is often negative (e.g. *Od.*17.449, 18.331, *Il.*21.395), and perhaps we should surmise that there was an original proverb

in which it was negative, and which Hesiod manipulated to suit his purposes. We may even reconstruct a proverb ‘by which the poor consoled themselves with the contrast between their superiors’ arrogance and their own respect for others and proper conduct’ (Cairns 1993:149). Hesiod shows awareness of this negative potential when he warns of ἀναιδείη at 324, which could be interpreted as the ‘shamelessness’ of too much θάρσος.

317 κομίζειν: West reads κομίζειν (the reading of the papyri), but Paley, Wilamowitz, Mazon, Verdenius and others read κομίζει (the reading of the medieval tradition, and the more likely). With inf. the sense is ‘*Aidos* is not good at attending a needy man’ (οὐκ ἀγαθή predicative); with indic. ‘*Aidos*, not good, attends a needy man’ (οὐκ ἀγαθή attributive). Both meanings are possible: see also 317-19n. on ambiguity. Whilst corruption from inf. to indic. is difficult to account for, a shift from indic. to inf. could be explained by assimilation with παρεῖναι in *Od.*17.347 (*pace* West, who takes the parallel as confirming rather than refuting the reading). κομίζει is therefore the *lectio difficilior* and should be read here. The same problem arises at 500 where ἐλπίς, another ambiguous concept (see 96n.), is described in exactly the same way as αἰδώς is here.

319 πρὸς: meaning ‘is a feature of’ (West, Arrighetti). αἰδώς and θάρσος are therefore symptoms of poverty and wealth respectively. In support of this are e.g. *Il.*4.112, 5.408, 425, *Od.*5.329 and 433-4. Verdenius suggests instead ‘leads to’, but this would be a very unusual meaning for πρὸς: πρὸς οἱ at *Il.*20.418, 21.507 and *Od.*24.347 could go some way towards supporting his interpretation, but even in

these cases the meaning 'to' is guaranteed by verbs of motion which are not easily elided.

320-80 Prosperity – how to deal with the benefits of work.

The description of αἰδώς (317-19) forms a transition between 298-316 the benefits of work, and 320-80 which addresses the consequences of these benefits: 319 θάρσος to ὄλβος, 320 how best to get ὄλβος (in a nutshell), 321-34 elaboration on this advice. The precise nature of the connection with the preceding lines depends on the nature of 317 θάρσος (see note). If θάρσος is a good thing (the most likely interpretation in the context), the connection is: although security comes with wealth, do not steal to get it (McKay 1963:22). If a bad thing, the connection would be: don't let over-boldness lead you to theft (Verdenius).

320 A balanced, detachable precept. It is elliptical, and so 321 expands upon it. For later parallels see e.g. Solon fr.13.9-10, Thgn. 197-202, Pind. *Nem.*8.17. χρήματα are best god-given rather than snatched; similarly at 402 one should not beg for possessions; at 605 Hesiod advises vigilance against those who might take your possessions; at 686 he emphasises the importance of possessions by equating them with ψυχή. Although a generally applicable precept, it has direct relevance to Perses who snatched (38 ἀρπάζων, 320 ἀρπακτά) more than his fair share.

θεόσδοτα: this could be interpreted literally, with a god giving out wealth just as Zeus gives from jars of good and evil at *Il.*24, or it could just indicate 'fortune', as does δαίμονι at 314.

321-6 An elaboration of 320. That one should not take wealth *χερσὶ βίη* (321) is conclusive advice against the ‘might is right’ position which was held by the hawk (202-12), and which will prevail in the downfall of the Iron Race (189). That one should not plunder (*ληίσσεται* seems charged here) wealth *ἀπὸ γλώσσης* (322) refers on one level to verbal deception generally (for Hesiod on oath see 219n., for the dangers of ‘wheedling words’ 374); however, it is also of particular relevance to Perses and his misspent time at the *agora* (29 – although he is a listener, he may quickly become a speaker, and in the meantime Hesiod targets those to whom Perses is listening).

323 κέρδος: despite Hesiod’s concern in *Op.* with work and production, profit is portrayed throughout in a negative light: here κέρδος (probably ‘desire for profit’) can deceive one’s mind; at 352 *κακὰ κέρδεα* lead to disaster; the other three mentions of κέρδος (632, twice in 644), although being ostensibly positive, are nevertheless connected with the discredited venture of seafaring.

Marsilio 2000:8n47 and Tandy/Neale 1996:37, 84 define κέρδος as ‘gain achieved for oneself as opposed to gain achieved for one’s community’, i.e. selfishness. However, there is little emphasis on the wider community in *Op.*: more important is the self-sufficient operation of one’s *oikos*. More likely, therefore, κέρδος is *excess* gain. Productivity is good in that it supports the producer and his *oikos*; however, if productivity exceeds one’s needs thus becoming profit it might lead one to reach beyond one’s *oikos* (i.e. engage in trade). That Hesiod sees κέρδος as a threat to *bios* is implied by 323 *ἐξαπατήσει*, a verb used elsewhere in *Op.* only of Prometheus (48) and women (373): both responsible for the Iron-Age human condition.

324 **Ἀναιδείη**: here it embodies an immodest desire for gain; at 359 the heart of the shameless man is frozen when he takes from another. On its meaning see 197-201n. and 317-19n. on αἰδώς, the positive root which this concept negates.

325-6 The punishment which will follow improper accumulation of wealth: see similarly 394-404. This punishment affects not only the perpetrator but also his *oikos*: cf. 284-5n. Easily the gods diminish the *oikos* of the profit-grabbing, shameless man: cf. 6 Zeus easily diminishes the conspicuous (ἀρίζηλον). The benefits snatched will not last in the long run (326 παῦρον χρόνον).

327-32 A series of reversals of social norms, just like those prophesied in the downfall of the Iron Race (182-8): in both cases the violated relationships include those between the generations, among brothers, and guest friendship. This is marked as a unit by the repetition of ὅς (327, 328, 330, 331); at 333 τῷ marks the shift from violations to their punishment. 327 ἴσον denotes some sort of equivalence: either with what has gone before, i.e. the violations in the next lines are as bad as the aforementioned (West) or they will receive the same punishment (Verdenius), or with what is to come (cf. Solon fr.24.1), i.e. the violations in 327-32 are all as bad as each other.

330 One violation of social norms is to offend against orphan children. The protection of widows and orphans, in particular by kings and judges, was a moral obligation both in ancient Greece and the Near East (see Fensham 1962 and Patterson 1973): cf. e.g. *Suda* 4.369 (Solon makes this a requirement), Exodus 22.21-3, Deuteronomy 14.28-9. As such, it was a common *topos* of wisdom literature, for

example in the Egyptian *Complaints of a Peasant* the peasant addresses the chief steward as ‘the father of the orphan, the husband of the widow’.

331 ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῶ: formulaic, also at *Il.*22.60, 24.487, *Od.*15.348 (without ἐπὶ at *Od.*15.246, 23.212, *Hom. Hymn* 5.106). In most cases it is used to evoke pathos: e.g. *Il.*24.487 in Priam’s appeal to Achilles; *Od.*15.348 of the father Odysseus left behind; *Od.*23.212 in Penelope’s reunion with Odysseus. Here therefore it emphasises the offense by evoking pity for the victim.

333-4 Zeus’ reaction to the social injustices (ἔργων ἀδίκων). The reaction may not be instant, but will come in the end (ἐς δὲ τελευτήν): Zeus operates on a long-term basis, just like Hesiod (see 213-85n., and in this passage 325-6n.).

335 Explicit warning against the immoral behaviour described at 327-32. σύ could refer specifically to Perses (see apostrophe 286), or it could be generalising, i.e. addressing each audience member directly (see also 308-13n.).

336-41 After the social norms (327-32), Hesiod turns to religious norms. This is more a matter of organisation of material than of conceptual dichotomy, however. In Hesiod’s world the two aspects, social and religious, were not so clearly distinguished (Verdenius: ‘Hes. does not draw a sharp distinction between morality and religion’; Lardinois 1998:333 on the Days: ‘Different cosmological domains, such as agriculture, the gods, human society, and justice, which we tend to regard as separate and distinct, are here brought in direct contact with one another’). For example, the gods are not absent from the social prohibitions: 333-4 Zeus punishes social transgressions. The shift is therefore merely one of thematic focus: whilst 327-

32 addressed violated relationships (generational, fraternal, guest-friendship), 335-41 cover sacrifice (336-7), libations (338 σπονδῆσι) and burnt offerings (338 θύεσσι): how, when and why to perform them. The explanatory element is typical of this section, and of the agricultural Calendar (see e.g. 427-36n.), in which Hesiod does not just give stark didactic precepts but offers either apotreptic or protreptic qualification (contrast 765-828n.): he wants his audience to consider his teachings for themselves, so provides them with all the necessary information, including his own rationale.

The language used here is formulaic, as are the actions described: 336 ἔρδειν ἰέο' at *Il.*11.707, *Od.*23.277, *Theog.*417; 337 ἀγνῶς καὶ καθαῶς at *Hom. Hymn* 3.121; 337 μηρία καίειν at *Il.*1.40, 8.240, 11.773, 15.373, 22.170, 24.34, *Od.*3.9, 273, 4.764, 9.553, 17.241, 19.366, 397, 22.336; 340 κραδίην καὶ θυμόν at *Il.*2.171, 8.147, 9.635, 10.220, 244, 319, 15.208, 16.52, 266, *Od.*1.353, 4.548, 15.395, 18.61, 274, *Hom. Hymn* 2.65, 436 (on the relationship between κραδίη and θυμός see Schmitt 1990 and review by Cairns 1992; also Cadwell 1990). Indeed, formulae are a typical feature of ritual language: so much so that the ritual resonance of the formula is often of more importance than its meaning – cf. Graziosi/Haubold 2010 *ad Il.*6.93-4 ἦνις ἠκέστας: 'More important than the precise meaning of the words is the sense of arcane propriety they convey'.

336 At *Xen. Mem.*1.3.3-4 Socrates is defended from charges of non-conformity with civic religion by the claim that he admired this verse (see Ford in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010:149). Further, the way in which Socrates uses the line highlights its applicability. In the phrase ἔρδειν ἰέο' the verb is versatile: with the

basic meaning 'to act', at 136 it has the meaning 'to sacrifice' even without an object. At Xen. *Mem.*1.3.3-4 Socrates utilises the open nature of the verb by extending the meaning of the line to both sacrifice and 'acting' in general. ἔρδειν is the first infinitive used as an imperative in the poem; from here on the construction is found frequently.

339 ὅτ' εὐνάζη καὶ ὅτ' ἄν φάος ἱερὸν ἔλθῃ: Hesiod's precepts are linked to everyday activities and habits, or to matters of universal importance (see 342-52n.), which enhances their applicability. For another example of making offerings before going to bed see *Od.*3.333-4 ὄφρα Ποσειδάωνι καὶ ἄλλοις ἀθανάτοισι ἰσπεύσαντες κοίτοιο μεδώμεθα· τοῖο γὰρ ὥρη.

341 This balanced line seems proverbial. If it is traditional, nevertheless it is very relevant to *Op.* – κλῆρον evokes the quarrel between Hesiod and Perses (see 37). When appropriating traditional material, Hesiod selects maxims pertinent to his poem's themes and characters: p.40.

342-52 How to treat one's neighbours. This follows on naturally from the previous lines because of the connection between sacrifice and feasting: see e.g. Xen. *Mem.*2.3.11 ὁπότε θύοι, καλεῖν σε ἐπὶ δεῖπνον. These lines, particularly 348, became the definitive piece of advice on how to establish friendly relationships with neighbours: see e.g. Plut. *Mor.*34b. The subject matter is of universal importance (see e.g. neighbours featuring in Pericles' funeral oration Thuc. 2.37, or the Christian 'love thy neighbour'), and it is this choice of useful precepts, combined with their formulation, which renders Hesiod's teachings so readily transferable to other contexts. In terms of phrasing, this passage is particularly quotable because it is full

of balanced, detachable lines: 342, 345 (chiasmus), 346 (another chiasmus), 347, 348, 349. Further, the advice is formulated in open terms: for example 342 τὸν φιλέοντ'...τὸν δ'ἐχθρόν. The antithesis between treatment of friends and of enemies is a common one: indeed at Plut. *Mor.*530d this line needs defending against criticism that it is rather obvious advice. Verdenius argues that 'Hes. is thinking in terms of business rather than of social feelings': certainly 341 is concerned with business matters, but this line is left open to interpretation.

The importance of neighbours is of particular relevance to Hesiod's pursuit of self-sufficiency. He advocates relying on others as little as possible, but also maintaining good relationships with those nearby so that they will not pose a threat to the productivity of the *oikos* (see p.56-7). He is concerned with 'whoever lives near you' (343 ὅστις σέθεν ἐγγύθι ναίει): this phrase appears again at 700, there of the ideal choice of wife – see also the balanced lines 346 and 702-3. Hesiod accepts that sometimes one may need to ask for help, and it is a neighbour who will respond: whether 345 refers to the speed at which a neighbour can respond to a call for help (West) or to the small distance they have to cover (Mazon, Verdenius), the point is that a neighbour is useful in times of trouble.

344 ἐγχώριον: this is the reading of the mss. and is adopted by Mazon, Rzach, West. The variant ἐγκώμιον, attested in one papyrus, a scholion and testimonia, is adopted by Paley, Wilamowitz, Solmsen, Verdenius, Arrighetti. West considers ἐγκώμιον to be 'unsuitable', however Verdenius rightly argues against ἐγχώριον as the *lectio facillior*, and Renehan 1980:352 rightly points out that ἐγκώμιον alludes to events in the κώμη for which the help of neighbours could naturally be solicited.

πηοί: this refers to in-laws, kinsmen by marriage: see *Od.*8.581-3 ἤ τις τοι καὶ πηὸς ἀπέφθιτο Ἰλιόθι πρὸ | ἐσθλὸς ἑὼν, γαμβρὸς ἢ πενθερός, οἳ τε μάλιστα | κήδιστοι τελέθουσι μεθ' αἵμά τε καὶ γένος αὐτῶν; They are appropriate here because they are more likely than blood relations to be living further away.

347 ἔμμορέ τοι τιμῆς: formulaic: *Il.*1.278, 9.616, 15.189, *Od.*5.335, 11.338, *Theog.*414, 426, *Hom. Hymn* 5.37. In its Homeric usages the formula refers to honour: this meaning is also appropriate in *Op.* as, although Hesiod is not dealing with the martial or heroic sphere, he is often concerned with what people think – see 760-4 *pheme*. West, however, argues that here τιμή means ‘good value’: this is unparalleled (Verdenius) and therefore less likely, but it shows that the precept lends itself to situationally-dependent interpretations and hence to reuse in other contexts. Key to its reuse are the generally applicable terms ἐσθλοῦ at 347 and κακός at 348.

349-51 Reciprocity. To maintain good relations with one’s neighbours, self-sufficiency and reciprocity must go hand-in-hand. One should be not just fair, but generous (350 καὶ λώιον), to ensure one’s neighbours’ goodwill. See further p.56-7.

349 μετρεῖσθαι: one of many expressions of Hesiod’s concern with the right measure: see also 350 αὐτῷ τῷ μέτρῳ (and further 303-7n.). Slatkin in Daston/Vidal 2004:30 makes the point that with many of these phrases ‘For Hesiod, the discourse of measure mediates between the “is” and the “ought”’ (description, explanation and narrative to exhortation and prescription).

351 ἄρκιον: of μισθός at 370, and βίος at 501 and 577. Here it could describe a neighbour (it was read this way by Proclus and Tzetzes), or the form could be neuter meaning ‘something to rely on’ (West, Verdenius; *Lfgre* s.v. takes it with μέτρον). The formulation is open, allowing for various applications.

352 A free-standing maxim. On the negative view of profit in *Op.* (κακὰ κέρδεα) see 323n. On *ate* see 216n. West argues that here *ate* refers to ‘losses, the opposite of κέρδεα’, however this would imply that κέρδεα left unqualified is positive, which in *Op.* is not the case.

353-60 Hesiod moves from how to treat neighbours to how to treat people in general. As at 349-51 the advice is based on reciprocity, a corollary to self-sufficiency.

353 The line appears also at Archilochus fr.23.14, with the addition τὸν δ’ ἐχθρὸν ἐχθαίρειν. It has been noted that Archilochus thus subsumes Hesiod’s positive advice here under the vengeful attitude of ‘help your friends, harm your enemies’: however, it should also be noted that this is not so far from Hesiod’s thought, as he said just that at 342. We should also bear in mind that it is not clear whether Archilochus is really quoting Hesiod here, or whether they were both drawing on a common model: but in any case, Hesiod is again treating matters of universal importance which were of interest to other poets, and is either appropriating traditional material and tethering it to his context or himself creating a reusable precept.

τῷ προσιόντι προσεῖναι: an ambiguous formulation: it has been interpreted variously as ‘go visit those who visit you’ (Most 2006), ‘give your company to him that seeks it’ (West), or ‘render assistance to he who applies to you for help’ (Verdenius). In any case, Hesiod is advising fairness and reciprocity.

354-8 An extended precept on giving, with the theme emphasised by multiple words from the same root. Some are coined *ad hoc*, such as 355 δώτη, ἀδώτη (see p.50-1). The mnemonic value of such a repetitive formulation makes it a traditional feature of wisdom literature (cf. *Instructions of Ptahhotep* p.64 Erman – of hearing), but the particular relevance of the precept to the context and the presence of what seem to be *ad hoc* coinages suggest that Hesiod formulated the lines anew, following a traditional pattern.

356 Ἄρπαξ: West capitalises because he reads it as an agent noun and notes that θανάτοιο δότειρα suggests a personified power. However, the use of δότειρα is motivated primarily not by a desire to personify but by wordplay with Δώς (again, not necessarily a personification), and the overall focus remains on human agency (357 ὃς μὲν γάρ κεν ἄνῃρ). On snatching see 320: there Hesiod advised against it, here he intensifies the warning with the rather extreme phrase θανάτοιο δότειρα.

358 τέρεται: a giver rejoices in his gift. In light of Hesiod’s interest in self-sufficiency and his concern for reciprocity primarily in terms of the long-term rewards it has for one’s own *oikos*, this pleasure is unlikely to be simply the satisfaction of altruism. Rather, as Verdenius points out, ‘he feels himself superior as a benefactor’. Indeed, the other instance in *Op.* of men taking pleasure in a gift is

58 Pandora – a markedly ironic use of the verb, which may have implications for the present passage.

359 ἀναιδείηφι: the snatcher is prompted by shamelessness. ἀναΐδεια denotes a lack of αἰδώς, an inhibitory emotion (see 192n. and 317-19n.): such misdemeanours occur when a man lowers his inhibitions.

360 ἐπάχνωσεν φίλον ἦτορ: West and Verdenius argue that this must refer to the victim, the man robbed: however, more likely it refers to the effect that snatching has on the snatcher (Sinclair, Mazon, Quaglia 1973); cf. 358 the giver rejoices in his gift.

361-7 From reciprocity to self-sufficiency. Whereas the preceding lines advise maintaining good relations with others, these lines focus more closely on the *oikos* itself. The transition is made in 361-2, a precept following on from 360 σμικρόν (361 σμικρόν ἐπὶ σμικρῷ). It is a saying which refers in the first instance to building up domestic stores (West): 361 καταθεῖο is used of stores at 601, and this meaning is picked up by 364 τό γ' εἰν οἴκῳ κατακείμενον. However, in the context lines 361-2 must refer to giving and snatching: they are thus given a situationally-dependent meaning in the poem. When detached, they could be used for other purposes: similar English phrases such as 'every little helps' or 'take care of the pennies and the pounds will take care of themselves' can be used in many contexts. At Pl. *Cra.*428a lines 361-2 are even used on multiple levels: to defend gradual comprehension of a large and important subject; to invite Cratylus not to be shy; and as a comment on the conversation, a discussion of the smallest elements of language (see further Koning in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010:108).

Hesiod advises building up stores 364 εἰν οἴκῳ κατακείμενον, and champions the inside over the outside at 365. He emphasises his points about practical self-sufficiency through a didactic formula which itself advocates intellectual self-sufficiency on the part of his audience: 367 ἄ σε φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα (also at 403-4, 687-8). The use of 365 at *Hom. Hymn* 4.36 emphasises both the applicability of the line and the strength of the Hesiodic ‘stamp’ (p.30-1): it occurs in Hermes’ address to the tortoise, a use that is markedly different from the present context but which relies for its comic value on the continuing link with Hesiod and *Op*.

368-9 Another precept advising self-sufficiency through storing up provisions. Some critics are concerned primarily with what was *in* the jar, the *communis opinio* being wine: already at Σ*Op*.(Pertusi)369a ὁ γὰρ μεταξὺ οἴνου ἰσχυρότερος ἅμα καὶ ἐπίμονος. However, this precept is less about e.g. how best to use wine, and more about when to be cautious and frugal. For the importance of *bios* and production see 30-2n. For the importance of the right time (here: when to be frugal, when to let down one’s guard) see 30-2n. Other scholia considered the relevance of this precept to ritual (Σ*Op*.(Pertusi)368-9 makes a connection with a festival called the *Pithoigia*), or read it allegorically (Σ*Op*.(Pertusi)368b suggests it may refer to one’s time of life: enjoy yourself in childhood and old age, but work in between them). Mention of the πίθος evokes the myth of Pandora (59-105: 94, 97, 98), and thus paves the way for the theme of women and their wheedling words at 373-5. On the recurring motif of the storage jar see further 475n.

370-2 These lines are attested at this point in the text in some mss., and in the commentaries of Tzetzes and Moschopulus; before 369 in one ms., in the margins of

others and reduced to line 370 alone, after 382, in still others; they are omitted altogether in two papyri which have this passage. The lines were known to Proclus, although as a quotation, not a lemma; they were also known to Plut., although it is uncertain where he read them in the text because the fragment in which he discusses them is displaced. Because of these uncertainties, they are bracketed by Wilamowitz, Solmsen and West; they are accepted by e.g. Verdenius because of the strong mss. attestation. As far as sense is concerned, they are neither necessary nor a problem (*pace* West): as they form a detachable unit, the passage works with (see below) or without them. Textual problems such as this are a direct result of Hesiod's didactic method: in a poem so readily split up and reused in multiple contexts, it can be difficult to isolate later interpolations, particularly when the oscillating textual tradition itself does not provide us with clear answers. A further effect of Hesiod's didactic method is the multiple attribution of these lines: Plut. *Vit. Thes.*3.3 and Arist. fr.598 attribute them to Pittheus. Pittheus seems to have taught and written on the art of speaking (Paus. 2.31.3), and to have been renowned for his wisdom, eloquence and piety (Eur. *Med.*684-6; ΣEur. *Hipp.*11; cf. Callim. fr.237): it was for this reason that pieces of Hesiodic wisdom, as well as sayings such as μηδὲν ἄγαν ('nothing in excess'; ΣEur. *Hipp.*264), were attributed to him. This could be their true origin, in which case they presumably crept into texts of *Op.* because of their detachable nature and because of the attractiveness of the Hesiodic stamp (p.30-1); on the other hand, if they were originally Hesiodic then their secondary attribution is nevertheless testament to their detachability.

The lines do fit the context: even if they were a later insertion, it is not a clumsy one. Hesiod moves from what you spend on yourself to what you spend on others: the φίλος ἀνὴρ, the brother, the wife. In all three cases he emphasises due measure, but the tone becomes increasingly anxious: the friend should be paid ‘sufficiently’ (ἄρκιος), i.e. in the middle ground between 368 κορέσασθαι and 369 φείδεσθαι, the implication being that there is a commitment to be honoured. With brothers, due measure becomes more a matter of limiting demands than of honouring commitments (a case in point being Perses himself: one could even extrapolate from 371, as Verdenius does, that the conflict between Hesiod and Perses came about because the brothers made an agreement without witnesses). The issue of πίστις (372) then leads on to women as the ultimate challenge (and ἀνδρί...ἄνδρας leads neatly on to 373 γυνή). On 370 ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ cf. 342, 353; on 370 ἄρκιος cf. 351.

373-5 In matters of property and *bios*, one should trust neither a brother (371) nor a wife (373-5). Hesiod’s attitude towards others is informed by his anxiety about work and productivity. Women are particularly to be mistrusted because they consume resources, posing a risk to *bios* and self-sufficiency (see further 59-105n., and Marquardt 1982). The main threats of the woman described are her appearance and her words. Both can be linked back to Pandora (Wolkow 2007:257), whose beautiful appearance stood in contrast to her deceitful nature, and to whom Hermes gave ‘deceiving words’ (78 αἰμυλίου...λόγους) just as this woman speaks αἰμύλα. Female beauty is celebrated in e.g. Hes. *Cat.* which adopts the perspective of the gods, but is treated with suspicion in *Op.* because the perspective is that of men bent on survival (cf. Osborne in Hunter 2005).

373 γυνή: there has been much debate over the identity of this woman. As Verdenius notes, ‘the context strongly suggests that she is the farmer’s wife herself’. However, it should be added that the general term leaves the lines open to individual application: one can apply this to any woman (within reason: 374 καλιήν keeps the lines in a farming context). Similarly 375 γυναικί.

πυγοστόλος: a compound adj. appearing only here, it is made up of πυγή (arse – West rightly describes it as an ‘earthy word’, a kind usually avoided in epic language) and στέλλω (dress up, adorn, arrange) – see *Lfgre* s.v. Given its components, it must refer to a way of drawing attention to the rear: this could be by dressing in a particular manner, on which see West, Verdenius, Marquardt 1982:289, *ΣOp.*(Pertusi)373-4; or by walking in a certain way, see *ΣOp.*(Pertusi)373b ἡ κινουῖσα τὴν πυγὴν ἐν τῇ πορείᾳ ἢ ἀποστίλβουσα τὸ σῶμα. Other interpretations include Martinazzoli 1960 sticking out one’s arse; Verdenius’ neologism ‘dressed in buttocks’; or Wilamowitz and later Vox 1980 who link it with a bird. Indeed, this *hapax* has succeeded in inspiring all manner of detailed discussion about what exactly women do to attract attention to their rear. The word has proved a distraction – just like the woman it describes. It characterises the exchange between the man and the woman: she is busy with something else, something detrimental to him, turning her back whilst he looks on. This is not an equal, direct, face-to-face encounter.

374 διφῶσα: elsewhere in early epic only at *Il.*16.747, of fishing. *Lfgre* gives ‘search (by probing into something); with acc. of thing sought (1) and of thing searched (2)’. Logically this *Op.* instance must fit in category (2), see e.g. West, *Lfgre*. Renehan

1980:353 puts it in category (1), i.e ‘seek after that which one does not possess’, but this would depend on the unnecessary leap of taking ‘granary’ as an instance of the container for the contained.

375 φιλήτησιν: thus Wilamowitz, West, Solmsen, Arrighetti 1998; φηλήτησιν is read by Paley, Mazon, Rzach, Verdenius: there is little to choose between them, as both are attested in mss. and papyri and mean ‘thieves’, ‘cheaters’. The singular γυναικί is followed by plural φιλήτησιν: both refer to a collective, ‘women who are cheats’ (Verdenius: ‘a collective singular is often followed by a plural’).

376-80 The importance of having only one child: the inheritance will not be split, so the estate’s fortune will grow (377 ἀέξεται: cf. 6). This is a general piece of advice, continuing the movement from brother to wife to children, all of whom combine to put pressure on the *oikos*. It also works on the autobiographical level: things would have been easier for Hesiod had Perses not been around to demand (more than) his share of their father’s estate (see Verdenius, and Walcot 1970:48). As Goldhill in Mitsis/Tsagalis 2010:124 notes: ‘The tension between the danger of having one son and the danger of having several sons is integral to the political dynamics of the Greek *oikos*’. Indeed the Homeric poems are more concerned with the counter-side to this worry, as in the Homeric world to be *mounogenes* is a bad thing: e.g. *Il*.9.482, 10.317, 14.492, *Od*.16.19 – and see esp. *Od*.16.117-20, with Goldhill 124.

378 θάνοις: read by West and Verdenius; θάνοι by Rzach, Wilamowitz, Solmsen – both are attested in the mss. θάνοι, the third person, gives the easier sense than θάνοις second person, but it is for this reason that it is often rejected as the *lectio faciliior*. The wish can be interpreted either as ‘it is good to die old with a grandchild

(see below on ἕτερον παῖδ') securing the estate's future', or 'you will make it to old age if you have a child to look after you'.

ἕτερον παῖδ': the identity of this child has been the subject of much debate, the obvious problem being that Hesiod advises having only one son then mentions another. One approach is to interpret ἕτερον παῖδ' as either the first and only son (Moschopoulos explains ἕτερον as ἄλλον ἀντὶ σοῦ; Verdenius 'another, namely your son'), or the only child of the second generation, a grandson (West). However, given the alternative scenario presented at 379-80 with its emphasis on safety in numbers, it is likely that this line really does refer to 'another child'. The thrust could be something like: 'Have one son only. *If* you have a second son as joint-heir [as Hesiod's father did], then may you die old [in order to be able to oversee the fair division of the estate when the two children come of age]' (see Renehan 1980:353 and Arrighetti 1998). Further, Hesiod may be making a distinction between what is sufficient during one's adult life and one's old age: one should not spare the *pithos* when it is almost empty, as it were (cf. 368-9).

379-80 Hesiod presents an alternative scenario in which more than one child per generation can be adequately provided for: on planning for multiple eventualities see also e.g. 485. Line 380, with its repetition πλείων μὲν πλεόνων (echoing 379 πλεόνεσσι), introduces the idea of safety in numbers which offers a viable alternative to the only child of 376-80. Both possibilities have their advantages in terms of productivity: the only child will preserve the wealth of the *oikos*, the larger family might even add to it. This constitutes a reflection by Hesiod on his choice of primary addressee: on the one hand, without a brother in tow Hesiod would have

fitted more neatly into his own ideal, contained, self-sufficient model; on the other hand, this would have given him little didactic licence – no-one to rail against, no-one to use as a negative foil.

381 εἰ πλούτου θυμὸς ἐέλδεται: cf. 618, 646-7. Hesiod encourages his audience to engage with his teachings: he establishes a rhetoric whereby his advice appears dependent on his audience's desire to listen to it. See further 106.

382 ἔρδειν...ἔργον...ἔργῳ ἐργάζεσθαι: an apt and emphatic prelude to the agricultural Calendar. For the juxtaposition of noun and verb from the same root cf. 763-4 φήμη...φημίξουσιν.

383-617 The Farming Calendar.

This section is clearly marked out from the preceding lines by the first seasonal indicators: the Pleiades. In some mss. the Calendar was even signified by a rubricated letter or the title βίβλος δεύτερος. 384 ἄρχεσθ' marks out a new start: cf. 384n. This shows that the Calendar or parts of it could be taken in isolation, as well as in conjunction with what precedes – for example, lines 383-92 were quoted by Hesiod in the *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi*, characterising him as the poet of peace (see further 383-92n.).

In the Calendar, time is measured both by the stars and by natural signs such as the behaviour of birds and insects (in contrast to the Days measured with a lunar Calendar: see 765-828n., with the exception of 801). The basic seasonal structure is: 383-447 preparations, 448-92 autumn, 493-563 winter, 564-70 spring, 571-608

summer, 609-17 back to autumn. However, this chronological progression is at times interrupted: by a glimpse back or forwards, which 'creates a sense of breathless urgency during the busy periods of the year and emphasizes the farmer's dependence on the imperatives of time' (Clay in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:85), and by changes in pace such as the lengthy descriptive passages in summer and winter when extreme weather forces inactivity. Further, beginning and ending the Calendar in autumn is unexpected – see 414-47n.

With the possible exception of wood-cutting, Hesiod does not give much detailed practical advice about how to run a farm (Nelson 1996 with bibliography: 52 'Hesiod's section on farming is two hundred and three lines long. Nearly half of it, ninety-five lines, describes not a task, but the conditions of the season, the conditions the farmer works under, or how the farmer feels'). He does not present a handbook for farmers, unlike the *Geoponica* or *Xen. Oec.* He does, on the other hand, present us with a coherent and vivid picture of the seasonally revolving life on a farm and the importance of hard work at the right time. The Calendar is therefore partly didactic, partly descriptive. Although it is marked out as a new section and can be used in isolation, it continues with the didactic themes addressed so far in *Op.*, such as timeliness (30-2n.) and hard work (286-382n.). In this section, Hesiod takes these overarching themes and lets them play out at the level of the seasons and the farm. On this transition see esp. Clay 2003, who notes a gradual spatial and temporal narrowing of focus as the poem progresses: from the world to the polis to the *oikos* to the body; from considerations of mythical pasts and apocalyptic futures to the seasons and then months and days.

For more on the Calendar see esp. West's chart (253), Tandy/Neale 1996:38 chart, Isager/Skydsgaard 1992 chart, Marsilio 2000, Nelson 1998, Riedinger 1992. For more on the stars as seasonal markers see Lorimer 1951. For poetological readings (farmer~poet) see Marsilio 2000, Nelson 1997, Beall 2004, Tsagalis in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:148-50.

383-447 Preparations.

383-413 These lines set the scene (seasons marked by the stars 383-7) the scope (νόμος applies to inhabitants of plains/shore/glens 388-91) and the ground rules (timeliness 392, 410-3) of the Calendar. Hesiod summarises the key farming tasks (384 juxtaposition ἀμῆτου, ἀρότοιο) and outlines the preparations which must be made before the first seasonal task at 414: get a house, a woman, and an ox (405-6).

383-92 Chosen by Hesiod in the *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi* (176-89) as 'the very best piece' of his work. 383-4 are also quoted in a similar context in Dio Chrys. *Second Oration on Kingship* 9. These lines characterised him as the 'poet of peace' in contrast to Homer as the poet of war and for that reason, although he was not quite so popular with the crowd, won him the prize. The ease with which the lines could be detached from *Op.* is symptomatic of the poem's overall construction. Furthermore, this particular use emphasises the potential for selection in detachability: a vast proportion of the Hesiodic corpus deals with war and violence, and yet through selective quotation of this passage Hesiod was characterised as a poet of peace. See e.g. Graziosi in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010:125-30.

383 The section opens with a striking three-word line. See similarly *Il.*2.706 αὐτοκασίγνητος μεγαθύμου Πρωτεσιλάου, *Il.*11.427 αὐτοκασίγνητον εὐηγενέος Σώκοιο, *Il.*15.678 κολλητὸν βλήτροισι δυωκαεικοσίπηχυ, *Od.*10.137 αὐτοκασιγνήτη ὀλοόφρονος Αἰήταο, *Hom. Hymn* 2.31 πατροκασίγνητος πολυσημάντωρ πολυδέγμων. Most of these cases follow the formula '[brother/sister in nom.] of [epithet in gen.][name in gen.]' (*Il.*15.678 is an exception and *Hom. Hymn* 2.31 a variant). While it does not follow this pattern, the Hesiodic line does retain the name (Πληιάδων) and the familial relationship (if we take Ἀτλαγενέων as a patronymic).

Πληιάδων Ἀτλαγενέων: the Pleiades are a cluster of stars used in *Op.* as a seasonal marker: their rising ἐπιτελλομένων announces the harvest (383, 572), their setting δυσομενῶν the season for ploughing (384, 615). At 619 they show the time for seafaring. They are often identified with the seven daughters of Atlas (see e.g. [Hes.] fr.169, Simon. 555), hence the patronymic: however, it is unclear why these sisters should be collectively transferred to the stars. Ancient attempts at explaining the name Pleiades have suggested connections with: their number (*ΣOp.*(Pertusi)383a Πληιάδες ὥς ἀπὸ τοῦ πλήθους κληθεῖσαι); doves (*ΣOp.*(Pertusi)383c ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰς πελείας μεταμορφωθῆναι); the revolving of the year (*ΣOp.*(Pertusi)383c ἀπὸ τοῦ πολεῖν ἐκ περιόδου καὶ συμπληροῦν τὸν ἐνιαυτόν); and seed (Pind. fr.74 knew the stars as Πληιμόνα, which West suggests points to a link with πλειών 'seed').

384 ἄρχεσθ': Tsagalis in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:148 sees here a poetological reference, providing a link with the *Theog.* proem and *Hom. Hymns:*

‘The poetological function of ἄρχομαι is guaranteed by its traditional referentiality, i.e. its metonymic use in epic poetry.’ This is convincing. With this verb, then, Hesiod marks out a new start: no wonder the βίβλος δεύτερος started here, and the passage could represent *Op.* in the *Certamen*.

385 νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας: cf. 562. The phrase seems strange in the context, as we would not expect to see stars during the day. This incongruity can be explained by its formulaic nature: see *Il.*5.490 etc., *Od.*2.345 etc., *Theog.*722, 724, *Hom. Hymn* 4.482 (and see further 386n.). In the context, the formula is relevant to Hesiod’s gradual narrowing of focus in *Op.* (see 383-617n.); even within the seasonal section he begins to look ahead to the passage of days.

386 περιπλομένου ἐνιαυτοῦ: verse-ending formula also at *Il.*23.833, *Od.*1.16, *Hom. Hymn* 2.266, all in the plural. Hesiod adapts the expression to his concern with the structure of the farming year. The use of two formulas in as many lines shows Hesiod appropriating traditional ways of marking out time.

387 χαρασσομένοιο σιδήρου: in the first place this is a synecdoche, with iron representing the sickle. However, in this poem iron inevitably brings to mind the Age in which work is paramount (cf. 420 σιδήρῳ).

388 οὗτός τοι πεδίων πέλεται νόμος: it is unclear whether οὗτος νόμος refers forward to working the land naked (West), or back (Paley). Cf. 276 τόνδε γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόμον (which referred forwards). In any case, after the *nomos* of justice at 276 Hesiod is now laying down a new law, to signal that we are entering a new part of the poem (see 383-617n.).

This νόμος is often treated in poetological readings of the Calendar (see 383-617n.). As Marsilio 2000:8 points out (see also Nagy 1990:87-91), νόμος means ‘custom’ or ‘law’ but it can also mean ‘tune’ (used by e.g. Alcm., Pind., Thgn.), and could thus be read as a reference to a song within a song, a dual meaning linking agriculture and poetry: similarly *Theog.* 66-7 of the song of the Muses πάντων τε νόμους καὶ ἦθεα κεδνὰ | ἀθανάτων κλείουσιν. A further issue with νόμος is the potential wordplay with νομός, lit. ‘food’ or ‘pastureland’ then extended metaphorically to ‘range’ (e.g. of words). At 276-8 this play on words is evident, as νόμος (there: natural law) is used, but of eating. Here we have νόμος, then at 403 νομός: they are drawn together by Tsagalis in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:149, and Marsilio 2000 who sees the wordplay here as constructing an opposition between the speech of the poet (388, νόμος as ‘tune’), and that of the beggar (403) – she then connects this opposition with the juxtaposition beggar/singer at 25-6.

390 πίωνα: in *Theog.* (477, 538, 971) this epithet is used exclusively of δῆμος. In *Op.* however, Hesiod’s farming concerns are paramount and so here the adjective is applied to χῶρος, the land itself, and at 585 it is the αἶγες, goats, who are ‘rich’.

391-6 A strongly didactic unit: instruction (391-2 three imperatival infinitives); audience involvement (392 εἰ...ἐθέλησθα); explication of a key theme (392 ὥρια, 394 ὥρι’); positive consequence of following advice (393 ὥς); negative consequence of not following advice (394 μὴ; expanded upon at 399-403). The instructions are left simple for now, to be expanded as each arises in the Calendar e.g. σπεύρειν at 463, ἀμάειν at 480, 775, 778.

391-2 These lines are marked out as a sub-unit by anaphora of γυμνόν. If we take γυμνόν to indicate some kind of scanty clothing, this emphasises one of the key didactic themes of the Calendar, the right time (see 30-2n.): one can only work the land γυμνός if one does so in the right season (see Lorimer 1951:99, Arrighetti 1998:434). Another possibility is that the adjective emphasises hard work: Beall 2004:7n20 suggests that it implies something equivalent to our expression ‘roll up your sleeves’.

393 ἔργα...Δημήτερος: Δημήτερος is a *genitivus auctoris*: work comes from Demeter, the patron of this part of *Op*. The phrase is metonymic, standing in for agricultural labour (or the products of it). Cf. 63-4 the ἔργα of Athene: there, however, we are in the mythical section and so there is no need for metonymy and Athene can be said to teach the works herself.

394-404 An ‘autobiographical’ section: general comments on the negative consequences of not adhering to the right time are made personal at 396 ὥς καὶ νῦν ἐπ’ ἔμ’ ἦλθες. Here Perses shifts from litigant (35-41) to beggar. Hesiod’s refusal at 396-7 ἐγὼ δέ τοι οὐκ ἐπιδώσω | οὐδ’ ἐπιμετρέησω fulfils his warning at 34-5 σοὶ δ’ οὐκέτι δεύτερον ἔσται | ὧδ’ ἔρδειν (noted by Marsilio 2000:6), and this is further emphasised by 401 δις μὲν γὰρ καὶ τρις τάχα τεύξεαι. Hesiod tells Perses that he has had enough of his demands, and suggests that no-one who goes begging at other people’s doors will be successful for long (for Hesiod’s concern with the long term: 213-85n.). This is then reiterated at 408-9, where Hesiod envisages the entire process of begging and refusal (see note).

395 ἀνύσσης: also at 635, there of seafaring – both begging and sailing are portrayed by Hesiod as activities undertaken against his advice and in vain.

396-7 ἐπιδώσω...ἐπιμετρέσω: prefix ἐπι- here meaning 'in addition', i.e. 'I will not give or measure out any more' (see also 446 ἐπισπορίην). This implies that Perses has come begging to Hesiod before, at which time Hesiod gave him something; but if he is to do it again his brother will not be so amenable. In the case of the second verb, Ercolani suggests that the prefix is used primarily to create parallelism and assonance with the first: however, the meaning 'in addition' is likely also in the second case.

397 νήπιε Πέρση: the last address to Perses until 611 – he is conspicuous by his absence for a long tract of the poem. However, this does not necessarily mean that the principal addressee is neglected, nor that Hesiod has finished teaching his brother. This particular apostrophe comes within the Calendar, at its outset in fact, and implies Perses' involvement in this section. Although he is not mentioned by name, Perses continues to act as an implicit addressee: indeed, the whole Calendar could be read as an expansion of this admonition, with Hesiod varying his didactic technique to reinforce his points. As Petropoulos 1994:72 explains, the advice at 397 'frames the next half of the *Works and Days* and locks the poet and the now reformed Perses into the permanent relationship of a *parainesis* ('exhortation') that resembles a farmer's almanac'.

398 ἔργα, τὰ τ' ἀνθρώποισι θεοὶ διετεκμήραντο: for the connection between gods and work see 42. On διετεκμήραντο cf. 229 and 339: as Zeus marks out war

and *dike* to the Unjust and Just City respectively, here the gods mark out work for men. This verb shows the pervasiveness in the Calendar of Hesiod's concern with the right time: work is not just 'given', but is 'marked out', just as seasonal tasks are marked out by the stars.

399 σὺν παίδεσσι γυναικί: this adds pathos, creating a tragic scenario in which a beggar must also provide for dependents. We cannot extrapolate from it that Perses had a wife and children: even the scholia did not do so, in contrast to those at 271 ἐμὸς υἱός. They note only: δεινῶν δεινότερον τὸ μετὰ γυναικὸς καὶ τέκνων χρήζειν (ΣΟρ.(Pertusi)399a).

400 κατὰ γείτονας: on the importance of neighbours see esp. 342-52.

402 ἐτώσια: again at 440. Hesiod is concerned with productivity: here he warns against ineffectual words, and at 440 work which comes to nothing.

ἀγορεύσεις: suggests a connection with Perses' rhetorical abilities (noted by Marsilio 2000:5 and Hamilton 1989:70). It forms a link with Perses' first incarnation as a listener at the lawcourts (29 ἀγορῆς) – see 394-404n. Other links are with: 280 a man should know justice and proclaim it (ἀγορεύσαι); 688 Hesiod's own rhetorical skill (ἀγορεύω).

403-4 σ' ἄνωγα | φράζεσθαι: see 361-7n.

403 ἀχρεῖος δ' ἔσται ἐπέων νομός: on wordplay νόμος/νομός see 388n. ἐπέων νομός again at *Il.*20.249, similarly νομὸς ᾠδῆς at *Hom. Hymn* 3.20. On ἀχρεῖος cf.

297 ἀχρήσιος: the third kind of man, who doesn't speak well (see 402 ἀγορεύσεις) or take advice (see 403-4 σ' ἄνωγα | φράζεσθαι).

404 χρεῶν τε λύσιν λιμοῦ τ' ἀλεωρήν: cf. 647 χρέα τε προφυγεῖν καὶ λιμόν.

This explicit mention of 'loosing from debts' may have influenced Solon's choice of Hesiod as a poetic model: see Solon fr.36.10-1 τοῦ δ' ἀναγκαίη ὑπὸ | χρεῶν φυγόντα, Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*]6.1 (of Solon) καὶ νόμους ἔθηκε καὶ χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς ἐποίησε. It is unclear, however, whether this is a general reference to potential threat, or the pointed language of an actual crisis: see Tandy/Neale 1996:15 and 39-42 for debts in Hesiod's Greece. χρεῶν creates a wordplay with 403 ἀχρεῖος, reinforcing the impetus to 'think' (φράζεσθαι).

405-13 To avoid debts and famine, one must acquire the basics: a house, a woman, an ox. Cf. *Od.*14.64 οἶκόν τε κληῖρόν τε πολυμνήστην τε γυναῖκα. One must arrange everything well, and do everything at the right time without unproductive work or procrastination.

405-6 With the first line Hesiod supplies a basic maxim (whether traditional, as West suggests, or not), with the second he tethers it to the context: see p.38. Many scholars take issue with these lines, and get rid of 406: deleted by Goettling, Wilamowitz, bracketed by Paley, Rzach, Solmsen. The atheteses are based on Aristotle's quotations of only 405 at [*Oec.*]1343a21 and *Pol.*1252b11-12, and on internal grounds – see 406n., and Beall 2001:155-6.

406 ἦτις καὶ βουσὶν ἔποιτο: two main problems have been noted with this phrase. First, that the plural βουσὶν is inconsistent with singular βοῦν at 405.

However, Hesiod's usual formulation of the word is either dual or plural so it is 405 βούων which is the anomaly, and this can be explained in terms of the generalising and detachable nature of the line, 'a house, a woman, an ox': the singular fits the trend of the line, and is more open than, say, a dual.

Second, that the woman is 'following' the oxen. This description is used at 441 of the ploughman – but it has been noted (by e.g. West) that ploughing, needing strength and stamina, is not a woman's job. This could be explained by taking ἔποιτο here not as a reference to ploughing, but meaning something like 'look after', and so the woman is acting as a cowherd: a perfectly suitable job for a woman. West argues that 'Hesiod shows no interest elsewhere in the pastoral side of farming. If the author of this line does, and if he uses βουσὶν ἔπεσθαι in a different sense from that in which Hesiod uses it in 441, the suspicion that he is not Hesiod is strengthened'. However, this observation could just as well support Hesiodic authorship. Indeed, Hesiod is not interested in the pastoral side, and so it is natural that he would conflate the two uses of βουσὶν ἔπεσθαι. He wants to incorporate this character (or, perhaps more likely, he wants to use the detachable line 405, then needs to contextualise it, then needs to qualify the contextualisation), so he transfers the woman from a pastoral to an arable role, through the use of this phrase.

408-9 σὺ μὲν...ὁ δ'...σὺ δὲ...| ἡ δ' ὥρη...δέ τοι ἔργον: with these multiple subject changes, Hesiod summarises what would happen should one ignore his advice on preparation and timeliness. He again advises, in accordance with his self-sufficient ideals, against asking others for help. μὴ σὺ μὲν αἰτῆς ἄλλον at 408 works on a

general level, but could also be read as another reference to the situation with Perses, reiterating the pointed advice given at 394-404 (see note).

410-13 The dangers of procrastination. These lines follow on from 409 ὥρη (and 392 ὥρια, 394 ὥρι'), treating the key issue of the right time. However, in these lines Hesiod does not just give a schedule and warn against neglecting it, but he identifies the kinds of men who will suffer from time-wasting. At 410 he advises against ἀναβάλλεσθαι, procrastinating: at 411 he criticises the ἐτωσιοεργὸς ἀνὴρ, at 412 the ἀναβαλλόμενος, at 413 the ἀμβολιεργὸς ἀνὴρ. These terms are not entirely synonymous: all describe procrastination, but each distinguishes a slightly different kind of procrastinator, thus casting a wider net of advisees (see Beall 2001:157, *pace* e.g. West who argues for hendiadys). Some (ἐτωσιοεργός, ἀμβολιεργός) are even coinages which Hesiod creates in order to make these subtle distinctions and cover the full range of men to be warned: cf. p.50-1. From their etymologies, the ἐτωσιοεργὸς ἀνὴρ is the man who does useless work (cf. 402 ἐτώσια 'in vain'), the ἀναβαλλόμενος is the one who 'throws things over' to another time. The ἀμβολιεργὸς ἀνὴρ could be the man who works sporadically: Beall 2001 notes that ἀναβολή can refer to an intermittent process (e.g. a boiling liquid making bubbles: Arist. [*Pr.*]936b). This final distinction is more tenuous than the others, as ἀμβολιεργός comes from the same root as ἀναβαλλόμενος: however, the fact that Hesiod uses two different forms does point towards some differentiation of meaning, or at least gives the impression of covering multiple possibilities.

413 Ἀτῆσι παλαίει: wrestling with Ate. Cf. 216 ἐγκύρσας Ἀτῆσιν giving the idea of encountering ‘ruffians’ on the road – it seems that Ate lends itself to the use of vivid metaphor, particularly when used in the plural.

414-47 The woodcutting season.

After setting the scene and outlining the key preparations and basic farming tasks (383-413), Hesiod moves on to more specific preparations. They are described in greater detail and are situated seasonally: 422 τῆμος ἄρ’ ὕλοτομεῖν μεμνημένος, ὥριον ἔργον. The woodcutting season is marked twice: first by natural indicators (414 ἦμος δὴ – the weather and its effects), second by the movement of the stars (417 δὴ γὰρ τότε – Sirius). τῆμος 420 and 422 then marks and reiterates the task to be done. Arrighetti 1998:435 notes that Hesiod covers quite a spectrum of seasonal markers: ‘meteorologiche (vv. 414-416), antropologiche (v.v. 416-417), astronomiche (vv. 417-419), zoologiche (vv. 420-421), botaniche (v. 421).’

Hesiod gives advice on making tools (423-5), a wagon (426) and a plough (427-36), with which come oxen (436-40) and workers (441-7). Much scholarly attention has been given to Hesiod’s measurements (see 423-5n.), types of wood (427-36n.) and construction advice, in order to assess whether or not the woodcutting is feasible: for reconstructions see esp. West, Richardson/Piggott 1982, Isager/Skydsgaard 1992:46-9, Tandy/Neale 1996:99-103 (and Leclerc 1994 on the further construction details at 469).

For the purposes of this commentary, the most interesting point is the incongruity of this section with the rest of *Op*. It is the only part of the Calendar with hands-on advice (whether accurate or not), which is given at length: Nelson 1996:46 notes ‘Thirty-three lines, ranging from making a mortar and pestle to the size of the plowman’s lunch, describe preparations for the fall plowing and sowing (414-47). Six describe the sowing itself (465-71).’ It has already been established (383-617n.) that the Calendar does not have a primarily *practical* didactic purpose: it teaches about hard work at the right time and describes the ‘drama of Hesiod’s farm’ (Nelson 1996). So what is the woodcutting section doing here? To a certain extent it elaborates on previous didactic themes: the preparations involve hard work, they must be begun at a certain time and completed before the seasonal farming proper. However, these themes do not fully account for the level of detail given here if, as is the *communis opinio* among scholars, one could not really construct a wagon just from these instructions. More likely is that Hesiod uses such a description as a rhetorical and didactic showpiece, setting an example of knowledge which both encourages his audience to follow it of their own accord and establishes his didactic authority: see further p.55-6.

The choice of subject matter may be *exempli gratia*, suggesting that Hesiod could, if he wanted, treat us to this level of detail on any topic. However, it may also be tied to an early hexameter framework, acting as something of a set piece: see for example the extended description of the wagon at *Il*.24.266-82. Macleod 1982 *ad Il*.24.266-74 sees Homer’s wagon as a pacing and texturing device (‘a relief after the pain and rage of Priam’s speeches’) – cf. 493-563n. For a poetic rather than didactic

interpretation of the woodcutting see Beall 2004: in particular the potential for ploughing as a metaphor for poetic creation.

414 ἦμος: at 414, 486, 582 and 679 to mark the timely work which must be completed in particular seasons. Also: τῆμος at 420, 422, 488, 559, 585 and 670. Radin 1988 shows that ἦμος in Hom. and Hes. refers only to occasions which repeat in cycles: in the Hesiodic Calendar it marks the circularity of the year.

415 μετοπωρινόν: there is debate over what period this refers to: autumn in general (*Lfgre* 'herbstlich', LSJ 'autumnal') or, more likely given the meaning of ὀπώρα (late summer), the beginning of autumn in particular (Mazon, Ercolani, Lorimer 1951:89 'the meaning must be limited to the first autumn rains'). For further discussion see Hofinger 1981:87.

What is unexpected here is that Hesiod begins his Calendar in autumn. Hesiod himself specifies elsewhere that the farmer's year begins in the spring (475-7, 561-3), and Nelson 1996:46 rightly points out that λήγει ('leaves off' 414, 421) describes 'what has just ended, the heat of the summer and the sprouting of the trees, rather than what is now beginning'. This is because Hesiod foregrounds the human rather than the natural year, so he puts first the time of preparation (woodcutting) and the autumn ploughing. It also situates the poem firmly in the Iron Age where nothing comes to us of its own accord: the idea of two beginnings chasing one another emphasises the circularity of the seasons, the revolving years where each depends on the results of the last (see further 561-3n.). Whereas starting in spring or summer may have felt too much like the Golden Age (cf. 117-19), starting in autumn forces

us to relive some of the sense of loss which comes with the transition to the Iron Age, as summer turns to autumn and we must set to work (cf. 503 οὐκ αἰεὶ θέρος ἐσσεῖται). 421 φύλλα δ' ἔραζε χέει seems particularly suggestive of the human condition, in light of e.g. *Cat.* fr.155.124-5 (Most), trees shedding their leaves at the end of the Age of Heroes, or *Il.* 6.146 οἷη περ φύλλων γενεὴ τοίῃ δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν.

416 Ζηνός: Zeus is frequently associated with rain in *Op.*: see 488 Ζεὺς ὕοι, 626 Διὸς ὄμβρος, 676-7 Διὸς ὄμβρῳ|πολλῷ ὀπωρινῷ. Elsewhere he has further connections with the sky and weather: see e.g. *Theog.* 690 ἀστράπτων, *Il.* 8.133 βροντήσας, *Il.* 15.187-93 Zeus is allotted as his domain the sky, and, most relevant here, *Il.* 16.385-6 Zeus sends the autumn rains. In fact, the name Zeus means 'Sky Father': Burkert 1985:125 notes that 'Zeus is the only name of a Greek god which is entirely transparent etymologically, and which indeed has long been paraded as a model case in Indo-European philology'. The phrase 'Zeus rains' is likely to be a traditional one: Burkert 1985:126 gives the example that 'in Imperial times children were still singing, 'Rain, rain, O dear Zeus, on the fields of the Athenians', and 550-3 makes it clear that Hesiod is aware of the real cause of rain.

417-18 τρέπεται βρότεος χρώς|πολλὸν ἐλαφρότερος: for other seasonal effects on the skin see 497, 575, 588.

417 Σείριος: here and at 587, 609 used as a seasonal marker. Its being in the sky for much of the day marked the hot season, and so was associated with heat and fevers – see 587, *Il.* 22.30-1 λαμπρότατος μὲν ὃ γ' ἐστί, κακὸν δέ τε σῆμα τέτυκται,|καί τε φέρει πολλὸν πυρετὸν δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσιν. This association was misinterpreted

by some ancient critics, however, who thought that the poets were referring to the sun: see Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)417a Σείριος ὁ ἥλιος ἢ ὁ ἀστήρ. This scholion also offers multiple suggestions for the etymology of Sirius: from εἶρω ‘I say’, with added sigma – he who announces the time of summer; from σεσηρῆναι ‘to gnash the teeth’, hence the name ‘the Dog Star’; from σειροῦν ‘to scorch’; from σειριάειν ‘to sparkle’. *Lfgre*, on the other hand, gives the etymology <*t(r)i-Hstr-io- ‘zum Dreigestirn gehörig’.

418 ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς: this refers primarily to the place of the star in the sky, but considering the associations of the star with the hot season it is difficult to avoid reading also a suggestion of the head as particularly affected by the heat (see 587).

κηριτρεφῶν ἀνθρώπων: the phrase seems formulaic, but is attested nowhere else in early epic: cf. the formula διοτρεφεῖς βασιλῆες *Il.*1.176 etc., *Od.*3.480 etc., *Theog.*82, 992, *Hom. Hymn* 7.11. κηριτρεφῶν must mean something like ‘raised for cares’.

420 ἀδηκτοτάτη: cf. 435 ἀκιώτατοι. Both refer to wood that is least worm-eaten: ἀδηκτοτάτη comes from δάκνω ‘bite’, whereas ἀκιώτατοι is from κίς ‘worm’. In the Iron Age, natural growth inevitably becomes corrupting.

σιδήρῳ: see 387n., and for the Iron-Age impetus of the passage 415n.

421 ὕλη: here wood as a material: elsewhere in Hes. (*Theog.*694, *Op.*508, 511) wooded areas.

422 ὕλοτομεῖν μεμνημένος: inf. followed by μεμνημένος – also 623 ἐργάζεσθαι μεμνημένος, 711 τείνυσθαι μεμνημένος. This could be read as ‘being mindful *to cut wood*’; however, it is more likely that μεμνημένος should be read as absolute, and ὕλοτομεῖν as yet another imperatival infinitive (thus West, Ercolani): ‘cut wood, being mindful’. Such exhortations to be mindful are characteristic of Hesiod’s long-ranging didactic method: one must not only follow his advice on the instant, but also remember it later. Furthermore, μεμνημένος here may create a link between performer and audience: the audience is advised to remember, whilst the rhapsode displays his memory skills through this passage’s striking level of detail (see 414-47n.). See further p.52, 58.

ὥριον ἔργον: reiteration of the right time (see 30-2n., 383-617n.). This theme is of such central importance to the latter part of *Op.* that Hesiod constructs with ὥριον his own kind of epic formula: it is found in this metrical position (the penultimate foot – a very typical position for traditional epithets in epic) also at 492 ὥριος ὄμβρος, 543 ὥριον ἔλθη, 697 ὥριος οὔτος.

423-6 Tools: a mortar (423 ὄλμον) and pestle (423 ὑπερον) for crushing corn, a mallet (425 σφῦραν) for breaking clods of earth, the wagon (426 ἀμάξη) for transporting, complete with axle (426 ἄξονα) and felloes (426 ἄψιν). All their measurements are given: West notes that ‘they are arranged in order of length’, but also, in the case of e.g. 423 τριπόδην, that ‘we do not know the exact length of Hesiod’s foot’. What is clear is that the measurements give a sense of precision and expert knowledge: whether they are accurate or not is irrelevant, in terms of rhetorical and didactic effect.

424 ἄρμενον: cf. 407 χρήματα δ' εἰν οἴκῳ πάντ' ἄρμενα. As having everything 'fitting' in the *oikos* was part of Hesiod's advice for general preparations (383-413), so having every piece of wood 'fitting' features in his more specific advice here.

425 εἰ δέ κεν ὀκταπόδην: if you make a mistake in your measurements, or perhaps if you have some wood spare: even in this very precise section, Hesiod's broad didactic scope caters for more than one eventuality. See also 432-4n.

427-36 The Plough. The necessary parts and their woods are: a plough-tree of holm-oak (427-9 γύην...πρίνινον, 436 πρίνου δὲ γύης), a yoke-pole of laurel or elm (431 ἱστοβοῆϊ, 435 δάφνης ἥ πετέλης...ἱστοβοῆες), a plough-stock of oak (430 ἐν ἐλύματι, 436 δρυὸς ἔλυμα) – and see 467 for the plough-tail (ἐχέτης). For the construction see diagrams in West (266), Isager/Skydsgaard 1992:47 and Tandy/Neale 1996:103.

Hesiod gives reasons for his choices of wood: 435 the yoke-pole should be of laurel or elm because these woods are ἀκιώτατοι (see 420n.); 429 the plough-tree should be of holm-oak ὅς γάρ βουσὶν ἀροῦν ὀχυρώτατός ἐστιν. This fits with his explicatory didactic approach: as noted at 335-41n., Hesiod does not (until the Days) just give stark didactic precepts, but justifies them. His knowledge of the types of wood adds another level to his precision, giving the audience confidence in his didactic credentials and encouraging them to use all the information he gives them. His practical information does not necessarily derive from personal experience (*pace* Ercolani *ad* 435-6), but it does depict him as a repository of knowledge.

427 *πόλλ' ἐπικαμπύλα κᾶλα*: this emphasises the difficulty of knowing all the parts of a plough: similarly 456 *ἐκατὸν δέ τε δούρατ' ἀμάξης*. It emphasises the importance of timeliness and hard work rather than infallibility or even craftsmanship, whilst simultaneously highlighting the performer's rhetorical skill in remembering so many details.

428 *ἐς οἶκον*: the timbers, when you find them, must be brought home. Hesiod's concern for the *oikos* – its prosperity and its insular organisation – is characteristic of his self-sufficient ideals in *Op*. See further 432 *κατὰ οἶκον*.

διζήμενος: here of searching for the right kind of wood, at 603 of searching for an employable woman. Both occupy a similar place in Hesiod's thoughts: they are the means of production.

430 *Ἀθηναίης δμῶς*: the 'servant of Athene' refers to a craftsman: whether the farmer himself, or a professional like the *τέκτων* at 25 (Tandy/Neale 1996:96 'an indication of specialist labour', Ercolani 'Pur in regime di autosufficienza, il ricorso ad alcune figure specializzate era necessario'). The meaning stems from one of Athene's spheres of influence, as goddess of crafts: she has already appeared at 63-4 in such a role, but there connected with specifically female crafts. Cf. 393n. *ἔργα Δημήτερος*. Here *δμῶς* is metaphorical, expressing the craftsman's allegiance to his patron goddess – elsewhere (see 459n.) it indicates a worker's allegiance to the *oikos*. Nussbaum 1960:219 suggests that 'metaphors of this kind are the smoke which reveal the fire of social consciousness'; the use of servitude in a metaphor

may indicate reflection on servile status – although it may just as well be on the model of the formulaic *therapontes Areos*, with no implications of social servitude.

432-4 Have two ploughs. This piece of advice shows Hesiod planning for eventualities, like at 425n. εἰ δέ κεν ὀκταπόδην. He gives reasons for his advice (434 εἴ χ' ἕτερον ἄξαις, ἕτερόν κ' ἐπὶ βουσί βάλοις), on which see 427-36n. He puts the focus not on the farmer's infallibility or craftsmanship but on getting the work done, as at 427 πόλλ' ἐπικαμπύλα κᾶλα: he specifies the two ploughs as 433 αὐτόγυον καὶ πηκτόν (one of one piece, one of several pieces), the former a cheap and simple model to back up the complicated and expensive πηκτόν type. He keeps the focus on key themes: hard work (432 πονησάμενος) and self-sufficiency (432 κατὰ οἶκον). Whilst πηκτόν ἄροτρον is formulaic (*Il.*10.353, 13.703, *Od.*13.32), αὐτόγυος appears only here in epic: Hesiod here acts as a hyper-realist, correcting or improving on epic by planning for all eventualities.

436-47 After describing how to construct a plough, Hesiod completes the picture by giving details on the animals to pull it (436-40) and the workers in charge (441-7).

436-40 Oxen. First, Hesiod suggests a pair of nine-year-old oxen (βόε δ' ἐνναετήρῳ | ἄρσενε κεκτηῖσθαι: on the dual cf. 406n.). The optimum age of nine years is then explained in the following lines. As with the choice of wood (see 427-36n.), Hesiod gives reasons for his specification: 437 τῶν γὰρ σθένος οὐκ ἀλαπαδνόν, 438 τὼ ἐργάζεσθαι ἀρίστω, 439-40 they will not quarrel and break the plough. For what will happen if one ignores this advice, see 451 ἀνδρὸς ἀβούτεω.

West (followed by Ercolani) argues that ‘Hesiod cannot really mean to set such a narrow limit on the ox’s serviceability as it seems. It was just that the epic language only offered ready-made means for expressing animals’ ages in precise terms; five and nine are ‘formulaic’ ages’. It is certainly true that nine was a formulaic age, and that it is not in fact the optimum working age of an ox: however, this section is characterised by at least apparent precision, and with this specification Hesiod acts as a hyper-realist (cf. 432-4n.). In fact, the oxen’s age is of key importance to Hesiod’s didactic themes in the Calendar: throughout, he advises hard work and timeliness – here we have both encapsulated in 438 ἥβης μέτρον ἔχοντε (the right time – for the formula cf. 132) τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι ἀρίστῳ (hard work). Cf. *Od.*18.371-4, esp. ἀριστοί, ἥλικες.

Hesiod’s specifications here function not only at the level of livestock, but also as general advice on how to behave. At 439-40 the oxen should not quarrel (439 ἐρίσαντε), just as he and Perses should cease their quarrelling, and his wider audience should avoid the Bad Eris. Cf. *Il.*13.704 ἴσον θυμὸν ἔχοντε: the theme is traditional, but Hesiod uses it for his own specific purposes. 440 ἔργον ἐτώσιον provides a link with 402 ἐτώσια and 411 ἐτωσιοεργὸς ἀνὴρ: if you do not follow Hesiod’s advice on oxen, their work will be in vain, just as begging and procrastinating are ultimately useless.

Solmsen brackets 437-8 τῶν γὰρ σθένος οὐκ ἀλαπαδνόν, ἥβης μέτρον ἔχοντε, Wilamowitz deletes and Paley brackets 438, on the grounds that these lines were ‘probably added by some one who thought the age of nine years was too advanced to be useful’ (Paley). However, as noted by e.g. Ercolani, there are insufficient

textual reasons to expunge these lines, and as shown above they are entirely relevant to Hesiod's didactic interests in the Calendar: it is not unusual for Hesiod to give pieces of advice which encapsulate and reiterate his didactic themes (see e.g. 432-4n.). Cf. *Od.*18.373: what is in the *Odyssey* a vague reference to youth becomes in Hesiod a wisdom trope (ἥβης μέτρον).

441-7 The ploughman is described in much the same way as are the oxen: Hesiod specifies the best age (441 τεσσαρακονταετής – a traditional figure used here with at least the *illusion* of precision, see 436-40n.) and the reasons for it (443-5), and suggests links with his didactic concerns. As the oxen must not quarrel in the furrow, so the right ploughman ploughs a straight furrow (443 ἰθεῖάν κ' αὐλακ' ἐλαύνει). The use of ἰθεῖάν here can also be linked to good behaviour and justice (a persistent theme in *Op.* from 7 ἰθύνει on). A good ploughman should keep to himself, not being distracted by looking around at his peers (ὁμήλικας 444, 447): cf. Perses and his distractions at 29-35. A farmer running an essentially self-sufficient *oikos* may out of necessity employ a ploughman, but that ploughman must uphold those same ideals of self-sufficiency. Cf. *Od.*18.366-75 (with Murnaghan in Rosen/Sluiter 2006), including *eris* (366), seasonality (367 ὥρη ἐν εἰαρινῇ), the importance of work (366, 369) and ploughing a straight furrow (375): as with the description of the oxen (see 436-40n.), Hesiod draws on a traditional motif which can also be related directly to his didactic context.

442 ἄρτον δειπνήσας: Beall 2004:16 makes the insightful point that 'given the subject, when 442 begins as ἀρ- the first audience expects ἀρότρω, "(follow) with the plow."' Thus ἄρτον provides a twist, adding a new element. This line might be

aimed against *Od.*18.370-2, where the oxen are fed (ἀμφὼ κεκορηότε ποίης) but the ploughmen go without food all day long (νήστιες ἄχρῃ μάλα κνέφαος), or more generally against the misplaced bravado of martial epic: as at 432-4 (see note), Hesiod is playing the hyper-realist. In the *Odyssey* passage, the ‘ability to withstand hunger is what sets Odysseus apart from several sets of social equals in the poem: his companions, who fatally eat what they should not, and the suitors, who are eating up the wealth of Odysseus’ house’ (Murnaghan in Rosen/Sluiter 2006:96): Hesiod in turn sets himself apart from the epic hero by pointing out practicalities.

τετράτυφον ὀκτάβλωμον: this phrase has been explained variously as: a quarter of an eight-scored loaf (West); a four-piece eight-part loaf (Most 2006); an eight-part loaf kneaded four times (alternative Most 2006, Hofinger 1967); a four-piece loaf eaten in eight bites (*ΣOp.*(Pertusi)442a); a loaf divided in four one way and in two another to create eight pieces (Paley); a quarter-loaf divided into eight pieces to be eaten in eight pauses through the day (Ercolani). On the various interpretations see further Ercolani; on τετράτυφον in particular see Hofinger 1981:89-93. Clearly it is a complex phrase, advertising insider knowledge and encouraging the audience to think, and with its use of fractions resembles the riddle language at 40 ὅσῳ πλέον ἥμισυ παντός: again Hesiod is championing frugal living.

445 τοῦ δ’ οὐ τι νεώτερος ἄλλος ἀμείνων: another ambiguous phrase, it could refer to a second worker (‘another man, not at all younger than this one’ – read this way by e.g. West, Most 2006), needed to scatter the seeds because the ploughman’s hands are occupied. It could, on the other hand, refer to the same man, emphasising the importance of his age (‘no man younger than this one’ – e.g. Ercolani).

448-92 The Ploughing Season.

This is the first farming activity proper (woodcutting, though seasonal, was still preparatory). It is situated seasonally by bird signs: γεράνου φωνήν (448), σῆμα φέρεει (450); cf. e.g. *Il.*3.2-6, Aratus 1025, Thgn. 1197-1202 (reworks *Op.*448-51, describing the experience of the man whose heart is struck by the cry of the crane). For bird signs elsewhere in *Op.* see 486 ἦμος κόκκυξ κοκκύζει, 568 Πανδιονὶς ὦρτο χελιδών, 679 κορώνη, 747 κρώξει λακέρυζα κορώνη. In the first place, the birds are seasonal agricultural markers, just like the stars and other natural phenomena. However, they are described through oracular language such as φράζεσθαι (448 – cf. e.g. Hdt. 8.20.2) and σῆμα (450). Watching out for the annual migrations of birds does not really qualify as ornithomancy (although a work entitled the *Ornithomanteia* supposedly followed *Op.*828 – see note, and 801 οἰωνοὺς κρίνας): Hesiod is giving advice about farming through the elevated language of omen-reading. Contrast the reading of bird-omens in Hom.: there are no seasons in the main narrative, the birds' flights are erratic rather than migrational, bird calls are not used for interpretation, and a seer is needed. On birds and bird omens in Hes. see esp. Collins 2002 (p.30 on this passage), Steiner 2007.

451-7 These lines form an admonitory digression, before the 'practical' instruction begins at 458 with a reiteration of the season. The digression is made up of detachable units, each connected to the one preceding by some thematic link: mention of the ἀνδρὸς ἀβούτεω (451) leads to a unit on begging in vain for oxen (453-4), which includes mention of the ἄμαξαν (453) and so in turn leads to a unit

on the difficulty of making a wagon (455-7). These units also recall topics addressed previously in *Op.*: 453-4 recalls begging as a consequence of being ill-prepared at 394-404 and 408-9; 456-7 returns to the woodcutting of 414-47.

451 ἀνδρὸς ἀβούτεω: the *hapax* ἀβούτεω reiterates in what looks like an *ad hoc* epithet (see p.50-1 for coinages) the importance of preparations detailed in the preceding lines: at 405 ‘have an ox’ is one of the first things a farmer must remember; at 436-40 the farmer is told in more detail what oxen to have. 452 ἔλικας βόας is formulaic (here and at 795 in *Op.*, 11 times in Hom. and twice in *Hom. Hymns*): formulaic language suggests itself when it comes to describing things as they should be, especially after the jarring ἀβούτεω.

452 ἔνδον ἐόντας: cf. 476 βίότου αἰρεόμενον ἔνδον ἐόντος. For the benefits of inside over outside see 365 οἶκοι βέλτερον εἶναι, ἐπεὶ βλαβερόν τὸ θύρηφιν. This promotion of ‘indoors’ (Most 2006, I think rightly, translates thus also at 476, although there the phrase could also mean ‘inside the storage jars’) emphasises Hesiod’s concern for self-sufficiency of the *oikos* – indeed, Ercolani notes that oxen kept ‘inside’ indicates oxen owned i.e. part of one’s own livelihood.

453-4 Parallel lines marked by anaphora ῥηίδιον...ῥηίδιον (cf. 5-7n.). It is easy to beg, but it is also easy to refuse a beggar (with ἔπος added, forming a *figura etymologica*, to emphasise, as West notes, the implied contrast between the request for the oxen and cart and the obtaining of them). On the transition see 451-7n.; it reiterates that one of the worst things about poverty is the threat to self-sufficiency.

455-7 Only the fool (νήπιος) thinks he can put together a wagon. See 453 “βόε δὸς καὶ ἄμαξαν”: as lines 453-4 consider the oxen, so 455-7 turn to the wagon. This claim seems to stand in contrast to the woodcutting section (which includes 426 ἀμάξη): there, Hesiod purports to know all the measurements and woods for making tools and building equipment. With this assertion he reflects on his earlier rhetorical and didactic showpiece (414-47n.). The fool is the man who doesn’t listen to Hesiod’s advice: see further p.55-6. 455 ἀνὴρ φρένας ἀφνειός is an ironic formulation, i.e. the man who is wealthy only in his mind (Most 2006): Hesiod may advocate thinking for oneself, but it seems that this is not always enough – at least in the context of the *oikos*, intellectual self-sufficiency must go hand-in-hand with practical self-sufficiency.

456 Quoted by Socrates in Pl. *Tht.*207a as an example of what Koning in Boys-Stones/Haubold 2010:107 terms ‘atomistic’ thinking – acquiring knowledge through enumeration of all the elements of the thing to be known. It was seen as a very intellectualising approach, even if Plato’s final verdict was that knowledge of timbers will *not* lead to knowing a wagon.

457 μελέτην ἐχέμεν οἰκῆια θέσθαι: cf. 428 bring the timbers into the house (ἐς οἶκον), and 432 have two ploughs as you work around the house (πονησάμενος κατὰ οἶκον). Beall 2001:158 argues that this means ‘take care to make these your own’ as at e.g. Hdt. 1.45, but the link with οἶκος should not be elided: having the right equipment *in the house* is key to Hesiod’s self-sufficient ideals.

458 πρῶτιστ’ ἄροτος θνητοῖσι φανήη: you will know the right time through the σῆμα described at 448-9. After the digression 451-7, we return to the seasonal task:

ploughing (and sowing – Ercolani suggests that ἄροτος indicates both together, and certainly a worker covers the seeds at 469-71). πρῶτιστ' ἄροτος is repeated at 467, emphasising the intricacies and timeliness of the ploughing process; it is one of many beginnings in the Calendar, cf. 415n.

459 ὁμῶς δμῶές τε καὶ αὐτός: from Meyer 1910 on, the scholarly *communis opinio* has been that slavery was not significant in Homer. Harris (forthcoming) shows convincingly, however, that this is not the case: the Homeric δμῶες have all the characteristics of slaves under both legal and social definitions of slavery, and are very common. Although Harris takes most of his evidence from Hom., nothing in Hes. is inconsistent with this picture and so the conclusion can hold here too. In this line, however, the hierarchy is rather blurred, with the phrase suggesting co-operation between the farmer and his δμῶες: indeed, as Nussbaum 1960:217 notes, there is no word in *Op.* which could be rendered 'master'. This shows Hesiod's preoccupation with Iron-Age struggles: the farmer may have workers to call upon (470, 502, 573, 597, 608, 766), and craftsmen for particular tasks (430n. Ἀθηναίης δμῶς), but he must also work hard himself if he is to get everything done at the right time.

460-1 A note of urgency. To be successful, one must be committed, ploughing in all weathers (460 αὖτην καὶ διερεὴν ἀρόων), and prompt, ploughing as soon as possible (461 πρῶτ' ἄλλὰ σπεύδων – this could refer to the season or to the day: either way, it encourages punctuality and dedication). One must do this so that the fields bear ample crops (461 ἵνα τοι πλήθωσιν ἄρουραι). For the formulation cf. 307 ὥς κέ τοι ὠραίου βιότου πλήθωσι καλλιᾷ (similarly 301, 411 πῦμπλησι καλήν): a full field

leads to a full granary. See σπεύδω also at 22, 24, 576, 673, and Solon's sceptical response at fr.13.43-76.: given Hesiod's concern for both hard work and timeliness, the verb in *Op.* can carry the sense of both 'strive' and 'hurry'.

462-4 The repetition νεωμένη...νειὸν...νειός marks these lines as a unit on a single theme: the importance of leaving fallow land.

462 ἔαρι πολεῖν: although spring is given its own (brief) section at 564-70, here and at 477 and 492 mention of it creeps into autumn. Similarly, at 462 summer appears outside its own section (571-608). *Op.* is highly structured, but Hesiod uses these cross-references to show that the seasons are all connected, with each season's work being dependent on the results of the last.

464 Αἰδωνέος κηλήτειρα: this is West's 1964 conjecture, which he then prints in his text: 'beguiler of Hades'. The transmitted text is παίδων εὐκηλήτειρα: 'soother of children'. West conjectures because he thinks that the transmitted line is 'devoid of sense and incredible as Greek'. He makes *this* conjecture because it provides a transition to the prayer to chthonic gods in the next line, and because fallow land would appease Hades by not requiring the release of Persephone (the corn maiden). The conjecture has been widely rejected: for defences of the transmitted text see Richardson 1979:170, Renehan 1980:354, Marquardt 1984, Ercolani. Some explanations of παίδων εὐκηλήτειρα include: a ritual in which a child lay down in a fallow field (first Lehrs 1837:197; Ercolani leans towards a ritual interpretation too), or a personifying phrase comparable to γῆ κουροτρόφος (Renehan 1980:354).

465 Διὸ χθονίῳ Δημήτερι θ' ἄγνῃ: the first seasonal task (emphasised by 467 ἀρχόμενος τὰ πρῶτ') is a good point at which to pray to the chthonic gods, who are connected with agriculture. Isager/Skydsgaard 1992:163 make the neat distinction that Zeus is invoked for rain, Demeter for grain. For Demeter and agriculture in *Op.* see 32 Δημήτερος ἀκτὴν, 300 εὐστέφανος Δημήτηρ, 393 ἔργα Δημήτερος, 466, 597, 805 Δημήτερος ἱερὸν ἀκτὴν. Although the name Zeus Chthonios can sometimes refer to Hades (e.g. *Il.*9.457 – see also *Theog.*767 θεοῦ χθονίου =Hades), here given the all-pervasive role of Zeus in *Op.* it is more likely to indicate another sphere of Zeus' influence (*pace* Tandy/Neale 1996:100). For Zeus in the Calendar see 475 αὐτὸς Ὀλύμπιος. For Zeus Chthonios in cult see *LSCG* 96.25 (Mykonos, with Ge Chthonia), Paus. 2.2.8 (Corinth) and 5.14.8 (Olympia).

466 Δημήτερος ἱερὸν ἀκτὴν: formula also at 597, 806.

469-71 A worker with a mattock must cover up the seeds. This *topos* of hiding recalls 42: the gods hide food for humans and humans make life difficult for animals, according to the natural hierarchy. For the mattock (μακέλην) see Amouretti 1976 fig.2. At 469, the transmitted text is τυτθός: 'the worker, a child'. This is retained by most editors, and by critics on this passage e.g. Nussbaum 1960, as the textual evidence is overwhelming and the picture of a child being found a job to do on the farm does not seem implausible. *Od.*15.381 also provides support for the mss. reading. West, however, along with Paley, follows Schaefer's conjecture and prints ὁ δὲ **τυτθὸν** ὅπισθεν 'the worker a little way behind', on the grounds that the transmitted text is 'absurd' as the task is too strenuous for a child, and that

there are other examples of the proposed formulation: cf. *Il*.5.443 τυτθὸν ὀπίσσω, *Od*.9.539-40 μετόπισθε...τυτθόν.

471-2 A maxim comprised of applicable terms: εὐθημοσύνη (good order), ἀρίστη, κακοθημοσύνη (disorder), κακίστη – cf. 287-92n., and p.38-9.

474 Zeus himself (αὐτός) is given the final say on agricultural matters. Paley suggests that here Zeus appears in his connection with rain (see 416n.). Certainly, after the preparations are complete it is ultimately the elements which decide whether or not a harvest will be successful. However, this line has more than practical significance, as it encapsulates many of Hesiod's didactic strategies. With this single caveat Hesiod exculpates himself from having to predict everything to the letter (p.53), he expresses his concern for the long run (εἰ τέλος...ὀπάζοι), and he plans for multiple eventualities (cf. 425n., 432-4n.). One must follow Hesiod's immediate advice, one must also follow his advice on planning ahead, and, even then, there may be unforeseeable factors.

475 ἐκ δ' ἄγγέων ἐλάσειας ἀράχνια: this suggests putting your storage jars to use again. For spider-webs as a sign of disuse in epic cf. *Od*.16.34-5 Ὀδυσσεὺς δέ που εὐνή|χήτει ἐνευναίων κάκ' ἀράχνια κεῖται ἔχουσα.

In this context the ἄγγος stores grain, again at 600 ἐν ἄγγεσιν; at 613 εἰς ἄγγε' wine. Cf. the πίθος at 94, 97, 98, 368, 815, 819. Storage jars are such a frequent motif in *Op*. primarily because of Hesiod's concern with planning for the long term and multiple eventualities: they are the farmer's line of defence. They are firmly linked with agriculture as they appear in *Op*. only in the Calendar, the Days, and the

Pandora passage which is itself an *aition* for farming (N.B. the jar does not appear in the *Theog.* version of the myth, whose focus is not work but the division of gods and men). The vital role played by the jar in the Pandora passage leads to the other jars in *Op.* often having a resonance with this myth: at 368-9 the *πίθος* prefaced the vignette of the stealing woman a few lines later; here the line concludes with *καί σε ἔολπα* (*Elpis* is the one thing left in Pandora's jar at 96). Taking the wider epic tradition into account, these recurring mentions of jars also evoke Zeus who at *Il.*24.527 gives to men from a jar of evil and a jar of good: this connection is particularly relevant to *Op.* as Zeus is present throughout, not least in his agricultural roles (rain 416n., chthonic god 465n., guarantor of the harvest 474n.). As Purves in Rosen 2004:152-4 shows, the motif of the jar in *Op.* has a strong temporal aspect: by opening the jar 'Pandora creates a new space in time, what Hesiod elsewhere calls the 'iron age' of men'; she keeps Hope inside, itself expectation of the future; and the coping mechanism of Iron-Age man is based on storing up for the future and planning for the long term.

476 *ἔνδον ἔόντος*: see 452n.

477 *πολιὸν ἔαρ*: see 462n. *πολιός* is used elsewhere in epic only of the sea, iron, wolves and old people, with the meaning 'grey' (as in the compound *πολιοκρόταφοι* at 181). Its use in *Op.* of spring (also at 492) is unparalleled in epic, but its later uses of *αἰθήρ* and *ἡήρ* suggest that it could refer to the quality of the air or the light, i.e. bright, clear.

477-8 It is better for someone to ask you for help than for you to ask them. This precept combines self-sufficient ideals (don't beg, cf. 394-404n; don't get distracted by looking around at others) with the importance of reputation (you must be well-prepared, and known to be so – see 11-13n.).

479-82 Hesiod warns of what will happen if one ignores his advice on timeliness and ploughs at the wrong time (479 ἡελίοιο τροπῆς – here the winter solstice: on the phrase see Dicks 1966). He warns of a meagre crop, reiterating the point in no fewer than seven different ways. You will reap ἥμενος: the only other use of this verb in *Op.* is at 501, of the man who idles on couches – sitting is discredited both as a cause and result of failure. The verb often has negative connotations elsewhere in early hexameter: in *Il.* it is at times indicative of threat (e.g. 1.330 Achilles, 1.498 Zeus, 4.21 Athene and Hera, 10.100 enemies) or sorrow (e.g. 2.137, 6.336), at others used disparagingly (e.g. 1.134, 2.200, 2.255, 7.100, 13.253). You will carry home your produce in a basket (ἐν φορμῶ) rather than a cart (*ΣOp.*(Pertusi)479-82 οὐκ ἐφ' ἀμάξης), for which see 426, 456-7. The vivid picture culminates in 482 παῦροι δέ σε θήσονται: for the importance of reputation see 11-13n.

483-4 These self-contained lines could easily be detached from their context, with the generalising formula ἄλλοτε δ' ἄλλοιός allowing them to be used in multiple scenarios as a maxim on unpredictability. In context, they provide a transition between Hesiod's dire warnings against ploughing at the wrong time (479-82, with plenty of emphasis), and his offering of another possible time to plough (485-90). To resolve the apparent inconsistency, he gives Zeus the final word (as at 474 – see further p.53). The mind of Zeus is difficult to know, and this difficulty releases

Hesiod from the necessity to foresee every circumstance. However, in the next lines Hesiod goes on to describe in very precise detail the alternative scenario: it may be difficult to predict everything, but he comes pretty close.

485-90 The scenario in which a late plougher (ὀψαρότης) might rival an early one (πρωιηρότη). After his series of warnings (479-82), Hesiod offers a remedy (485 φάρμακον): although the optatives (485 εἴη, 490 ἰσοφαρίζοι) make clear that it is not infallible. The uncertainty may again be due to Zeus, as this scenario too is dependent on him, this time specifically in his association with rain (488 Ζεὺς ὕοι τρίτω ἥματι μηδ' ἀπολήγοι). For another 'alternative' scenario see 678-94n.

485 ὄψ' ἀρόσεις: cf. 490 ὀψαρότης (a *hapax* – with πρωιηρότη coined to create an antithesis: see p.50-1).

486 ἦμος κόκκυξ κοκκύζει: the second ploughing is marked by a bird call, just as the first was indicated by the cry of the crane (448 γεράνου φωνήν). And as the bird in the leaves (486 πετάλοισι) marks the second ploughing, so the leaves (680 πέταλ') of the fig-tree will mark the second sailing. The cuckoo pleases mortals (487 τέρπει δὲ βροτούς) not because it is melodious, but because it announces spring (see ΣΟρ.(Pertusi)486a). The formulation ἦμος...τῆμος echoes that which marks the woodcutting season: see 414-47n.

489 The rain must fill but not overflow the hoof-print (or come up to but not go above the hoof) of an ox. This is a far more folkloric form of measurement than the precise figures used in the woodcutting section. See similarly 696-7 measuring age (ἀπολείπων...ἐπιθείς). The formulation may be indicative of traditional lines which

Hesiod has appropriated. Whether or not this is the case, it is possible that Hesiod phrased these measurements in this way for the very reason of contrasting with and thus emphasising his woodcutting showpiece, in terms of both tone (scientific vs. folkloric) and method (one would hardly measure the rainfall with a carpenter's tools). Further, in the context of ploughing the ox is appropriately used as the measure of all things (cf. 303-7n.).

490 ἰσοφαρίζοι: that one plougher might rival another suggests Good Eris within a profession: cf. 25-6n. The verb also recalls ἀντιφερίζω at 210 (see note): however, there the connotations were of *hybris* rather than *eris* because of the clear discrepancy between hawk and nightingale.

491 ἐν θυμῷ δ' εὖ πάντα φυλάσσεο: 491-2 conclude this seasonal activity with an exhortation to take Hesiod's advice to heart. For final exhortations to 'take care' (φυλάσσεσθαι) see also 561, 694.

493-563 Winter.

The section on winter has been considered by many to be inconsistent with the latter part of *Op.* Most 19th century editors (Twisten, Lehrs 1837, Goettling, Schoemann 1869, Fick 1887, Paley) rejected the passage; Evelyn-White 1916b argued that only lines 493-503 are genuine. This is mainly because of the highly descriptive nature of the passage, seen to be inappropriate in a Calendar meant to give practical advice, and the disproportionate number of lines given to it (for contrasting features with other seasons see Hamilton 1989:70-1). However, as more recent scholarship

such as Nelson 1996/1998 has shown (see 383-617n.), the primary focus of the Calendar is *not* practical instruction, but a coherent picture of the seasonally revolving life on a farm and the importance in all things of hard work at the right time. The length and pacing of the various parts of the Calendar reflect the seasons' activity. As Nelson 1996:50 notes, 'The length of the section reflects not how long the month of January is, but how long it seems to be. There is no task' (see 495n.). Hesiod moulds the form to fit the content, describing a season lacking in activity through leisurely narrative. Moreover, winter of all seasons deserves description in *Op.* as it is emblematic of the Iron Age: it is harsh and unforgiving, and as such enforces Hesiodic virtues.

493-503 Introduction – prepare for winter.

This introduction, just like 451-7 (see note), is made up mainly of detachable units: 496-7 poverty (a unit so detachable that it is absent from some mss.); 498-9 the idle man; 500-1 ἐλπίζ; 502-3 summer preparations. They operate together, however, in creating a picture of the dangers of winter and the measures that must be taken to defend oneself against them.

493 χαλκεῖον θῶκον: most editors (following the mss.) print χάλκειον: from χαλκός 'copper', 'bronze', (more generally) 'metal'. West prints χαλκεῖον: from χαλκεύς 'smith' (Ercolani follows West in his commentary, although he prints Solmsen's text). Whichever accentuation we choose the meaning is ultimately the same: 'pass by the smithy', a place of gathering just like the λέσχη (in fact, the two seem to form a hendiadys). With West's text the meaning is direct, with χάλκειον it is metonymic: the 'bronze seat' stands for the smithy. More tenuous interpretations

include that by Beall 2001:158 who suggests that ‘in Hesiod's time the phrase *chalkeios thokos*, "bronze session(?)," must have been a colloquialism for some institution involving gossip or the like (cf. our "coffee klatch"). If the session was held at the smith's shop, then that is connoted, not denoted’. For the λέσχη and the place of the χαλκεύς paired, and in their connection with gathering and conversation, cf. *Od.*18.328-9 οὐδ' ἐθέλεις εὔδειν χαλκήϊον ἐς δόμον ἐλθών, ἢ ἐπου ἐς λέσχην, ἀλλ' ἐνθάδε πόλλ' ἀγορεύεις. For the parallel seat of summer see 574-7n.

ἐπαλέα λέσχην: the λέσχη denotes here a place of gathering, described as ‘warm’ (*ἐπαλέα* is a *hapax legomenon*) – an enticing distraction which must be resisted in winter. Ercolani notes that many of its derivatives have something to do with speaking/chatting (*πρόλεσχος*, *λεσχὴν*, *λεσχηνεύομαι*), which supports its social function (see further Tandy/Neale 1996:104-6, Buxton 1994:41-2). It is linked with idleness and insufficient *bios* at 501. It has particular relevance to Perses, as gathering places (and idling in them) seem to be his downfall – cf. 27-41.

494 ὥρη χειμερῖη: the season itself is delayed to the second line of the seasonal section – contrast 414, 448, 458, 504, 564, 571, 582, 609, 614, 619, 663, 679 (the other exception being 598). This gives priority to the warning against distractions in 493, and draws attention to the contrast between the warm gathering place and this, the winter cold.

495 ἰσχάνει...ὀφέλλου: the antithetical verbs pointedly frame the line (noted by Marsilio 2000:32n124). The word order emphasises that there is a way to combat the cold: being ἄοκνος.

ἐνθά κ' ἄοκνος ἀνὴρ: it is the ἄοκνος ἀνὴρ who will help his *oikos* in winter: the harshest season (cf. 493-563n.). He stands in contrast to the ἀεργὸς ἀνὴρ of 498. However, *what* exactly the resolute man does and the idle man does not do, is not really specified here: all we are told is where one should go. This reflects Hesiod's concern for conveying a convincing image of a season, rather than just outlining its key agricultural features. The key thing about winter, according to Hesiod, is the weather; thus he describes it in great detail (504-63), and gives strategies for coping with it. Cf. *Od.*10.84 ἐνθά κ' ἄυπνος ἀνὴρ, with variant reading ἄοκνος: there the productivity of such a man is spelled out – he could earn two wages, one tending cattle and the other pasturing sheep.

496-7 Although these lines are absent from many sources which have this section (including one papyrus, some mss. and Tzetzes' commentary), they seem to have been known to Plutarch and Proclus and are printed here by most modern editors (e.g. Wilamowitz, Mazon, Rzach, Solmsen, West). The lines form a detachable unit on the threat of winter, constituted by Ἀμηχανίη and Πενία (personified in West's text, *contra* most other editors); the two are paired again at Thgn. 384, Hdt. 8.111.2. Πενία in particular is an important concept in *Op.*: here Hesiod warns of it, at 638 his father fled from it, at 717 he advises against taunting those afflicted by it. Here its effects are depicted vividly and (it seems) proverbially, with the neat hyperbaton λεπτῇ δὲ παχὺν πόδα χειρὶ πιέζης (497). Arrighetti 1998:436 notes the traditional appearance of the phrase, but argues that Hesiod is reusing material in a new way: Homer has χειρὶ παχεΐη as a metrical unit about the warrior's hand (e.g. *Il.*5.309), but here 'Esiodo risemantizza l'aggettivo e lo riferisce non più alla mano, ma al

pie, in un contesto realistico'. For other examples of Hesiod's hyper-realism cf. 432-4n., 442n.

498-9 In winter, trouble will befall the idle man who waits in hope (κενεήν ἐπὶ ἐλπίδα μίμνων) and in want (χρηίζων βιότοιο). These lines form a neat detachable unit which is emphasised by the striking separation of πολλά...κακά (we should take them as agreeing, as does e.g. Sinclair; *pace* e.g. Ercolani who interprets πολλά as an adverb denoting frequency). Here ἐλπίς is empty (498 κενεήν); a concept kept open and ambivalent in the Pandora passage (see 96n.) acquires negative connotations in a new context. It is expanded on with another two-line unit: see 500-1n. LSJ and the scholia understand 499 κακά προσελέξατο θυμῷ as a metaphor meaning that the idle man 'takes evil counsel with himself' or 'meditates evil'. It is an internalising formulation, and as such acts as the negative counterpart to exhortative didactic phrases such as 27 τεῷ ἐνικάτθεο θυμῷ or 107 σὺ δ' ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῆσιν (similarly 274). See further 504-63n.

500-1 A unit on ἐλπίς. It is linked with the preceding unit as it is an expansion on 498 ἐλπίδα, and 501 τῷ μὴ βίος ἄρκιος εἶη reiterates 499 χρηίζων βιότοιο. The first line of the pair is almost identical to 317, with ἐλπίς replacing αἰδώς as the subject. ἐλπίς, like αἰδώς, is an ambivalent concept whose meaning changes depending on context (see 96n., 317-19n.), but as it is negative at 498 so 500 continues in that vein, and 501 expands on the predicament of the destitute man (κεχρημένον ἄνδρα). The same textual problem arises here as in 317: κομίζειν (read by West) and κομίζει are both attested. On 501 ἥμενον ἐν λésχη cf. 479-82n. ἥμενος linked with failure, and 493n. ἐπαλέα λésχην as a distraction.

502-3 Prefacing the winter section proper is a glimpse back to summer. This emphasises the fact that the seasons are interconnected, with each season's work being dependent on the success of the last (see further 383-617n., 415n. and 462n.). As Nelson 1996:50 observes, this particular chronological interruption 'reflects the farmer's worries as, unable to do any more about the crops, he watches the winter come in, and wonders about the adequacy of his provisions'. The lines highlight some of Hesiod's main concerns in the Calendar: planning for the long run, hard work and timeliness. They also have striking cross-cultural parallels, whether because they tap into common agricultural concerns or because Hesiod is appropriating traditional material: cf. *Instruction of 'Onchscheshonqy* 9.16 'Do not say "It is summer"; there is the winter (to come). He who does not gather wood in summer will not be warm in winter'. On καλιάς cf. 301n.

504-63 The winter cold.

After the introduction to winter made up of a series of didactic units (493-503n.), these lines form one continuous descriptive passage. As Nelson 1998:55 neatly summarises: 'The description stands out as exceptional among Hesiod's vignettes. It occupies nearly a fourth of the farming section, ranges over the whole extent of the farmer's world, and gives us nothing to do'. This summary highlights three main elements of the passage: description, range, and lack of instruction. First, the passage sets the scene through visual description (note the impressive number of noun-adjective pairings: 504 κάκ' ἤματα, βουδόρα πάντα, 507 Θρήκης ἵπποτρόφου εὐρέι πόντῳ, 509 πολλὰς δὲ δρυὺς ὑψικόμους ἐλάτας τε παχείας, 510 χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ, 511 νήριτος ὕλη); through aural description (508 μέμυκε δὲ

γαῖα καὶ ὕλη although see note, and 511 καὶ πᾶσα βοᾷ τότε νήριτος ὕλη); and through vignettes (the old man 518, the tender skinned maiden 519-23, the ‘Boneless One’ 524-5). Marsilio 2000:40 notes that the use of riddles and lofty expressions in this passage provides a pointed contrast with the introductory section (493-503) in which the idle man wastes his time with gossip (493n. ἐπαλέα λέσχην) and complaints to himself (499 κακὰ προσελέξατο θυμῷ).

Second, it can range ‘over the whole extent of the farmer's world’ because Boreas does. The North wind is used as a structural device as it affects the land (505-11), animals (512-18, 524-6) and people (518-23, 527-8), and animals and people alike have to protect themselves against it (529-35 animals, 536-46 people). As Ercolani *ad* 512-23 notes, ‘Uomini e animali, non più separati e opposti come a 276-280, sono accomunati da un’identica condizione di patimento del freddo’. That man and beast are in it together is emphasised by thematic shifts from animals to people and back again; the simile at 533-5 which likens the beasts of the forest to a man with a stick; the common vocabulary used to describe them (539n.); the explicit link between the two at 558; the balancing of their rations at 559-60. Third, all this description has displaced practical instruction: see 493-563n. and 495n. ἐνθά κ’ ἄοκνος ἀνήρ.

504 Ληναιῶνα: this is the only named month in *Op.*, and there are but a few examples elsewhere in early Greek literature (Anac. 362 Ποσιδηίων). Lenaion equates to the end of January and beginning of February. The main issue here is that Lenaion is not a Boeotian month name, but an Ionian one (the termination -ών is Attic-Ionic). This led Evelyn-White 1916b to conclude that the passage was the work of an Ionian interpolator. However, scholars such as Thomson 1943:58 have

shown that the reasons for expunging the line are insufficient, and West notes that ‘there is in any case so much that is Ionian in his [Hesiod’s] work that we have no real reason to doubt *Ληναιῶνα*’. Many explanations have been proposed: Cassio in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:193 suggests that Hesiod had an Ionic audience in mind; Tandy/Neale 1996:106 suggest Hesiod was attempting to reach a large audience; Arrighetti 1998:436 sees ‘un atto di omaggio alla lingua epica’; Martin 1992:28 suggests that ‘There is no need to take Hesiodic poetry as the product of Boeotia, or concerned with a Boeotian audience, at all’. The choice could also be explained in terms of the range of this passage (504-63n.): emphasising that the winter wind is common to *all* men (and lands, and animals) – see further 528 Πανελλήνεσι. This is supported by the fact that Hesiod did not dispense with the Boeotian name entirely, but preserved it in the description of the days as βουδόρα (ox-flaying, i.e. cold and windy enough to take the hide off an ox): the local name for the month was (probably) Βουκάτιος (the ox-killer). So in 504 Hesiod combines two traditions (for this all-inclusive tendency see 106-201n.), the Ionian and the Boeotian, extending both his target audience and the range of his description.

505 τοὔτον ἀλεύασθαι: for ways to avoid the cold wind see 536-46.

506 Βορέας: Boreas is the North wind which predominates in winter – also at 518, 547, 553. It is the coldest of the winds, the greatest cause of hardship, and so in *Op.* with its focus on Iron-Age living is naturally given the most extensive description. In fact, it governs this entire passage (508 ἐμπνεύσας, 514, 516, 517, 519, 552 (δι)άησι). By contrast, the mild West wind (Ζέφυρος) appears only once (594 summer). In Hes. *Cat.* fr.155 Most (=fr.204 Merkelbach/West) 124-43 (86-105) Boreas

blows not in winter but in spring: this is a portent of doom (Most in Bastianini/Casanova 2008:58-61).

507 Θρήκης ίπποτρόφου: Boreas is associated with Thrace here and at 553; see also *Il.*9.4-5, 23.229-30. Thrace is associated with the best horses at *Il.*10.434-7 (the horses of Rhesos the Thracian king) and 10.550-9: however, *ίπποτρόφου* here is a *hapax* – the closest Homeric adj. is *ίππόβοτος*. For Hesiodic coinages see p.50-1.

508 μέμυκε: grammatically this could be from *μυκάομαι* ‘roar’, or *μύω* ‘is closed up’. Both possibilities were noted already in the scholia (*ΣOp.*(Pertusi)508a); however, given the parallels between this line and 511 (508 begins *έμπνεύσας*, 511 *έμπίπτων*; both end with *ύλη*), it seems likely that 508 *μέμυκε* should parallel 511 *βοᾷ* and so mean ‘roar’.

512-18 The effect of Boreas on animals: 512 *θῆρες δὲ φρίσσουσ’* (cf. 540 *φρίσσωσιν*). The shift in focus is marked out by a change in style: West notes that ‘The last five lines might have stood in some epic simile, but now Hesiod moves on to more individual ground’ – however, he does continue to employ stylistic devices such as anaphora (515-16 *καί τε διά...καί τε δι’*).

515 ὄϊνῳ βοός: cf. 541 *πέδιλα βοός* and 544 *νεύρω βοός* – here the ox is blasted by Boreas, later it becomes man’s defence against the same cold.

516-17 With West’s punctuation (a comma at the end of 516), the sense is that sheep are uniquely protected from the wind; West cites as supporting evidence *Arist. Hist. an.*610b33. However, as Beall 2001:159 notes, this assertion, whether true or not, does not fit with the hyperbolic nature of the passage: ‘The point is to create the

impression that nothing in nature can stop the wind's force'. To solve this problem, all we have to do is get rid of the comma; this gives a translation 'nor are there any flocks whereby the force of the Borean wind does not blow through them (merely) on account of their abundant fleece' (translation Beall).

518 ἴς ἀνέμου Βορέω: the formulation combines one traditional pattern (ἴς ἀνέμοιο) with another (ἴς with the name of the protagonist, e.g. ἴς Τηλεμάχοιο at *Od.* 2.409, 16.476, 18.60, 405, 21.101, 22.354). Boreas, the wind, thus becomes the double protagonist of the passage.

τροχαλὸν δὲ γέροντα τίθησιν: from animals Hesiod turns to people, more specifically vulnerable people: the old man, and 519-23 the tender-skinned maiden. The juxtaposition of the two creates an antithesis which makes the point, made by Hesiod elsewhere e.g. 365, that outside is dangerous compared with the self-contained *oikos*.

The description of the old man as τροχαλός has been the object of much debate. The two main interpretations, both linked with the suggestion of a wheel, are: 'running' (Wilamowitz 1928:104, Marsilio 2000:35n130, Nicolai 1964:112n269, West, Ercolani), in the sense of bowling along like a wheel or hoop; and 'bent' (Mazon, Tandy/Neale 1996:108). Both explanations were proposed already in the scholia: Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)518a ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τοῦ τροχοῦ· ἐπικαμπῇ ἢ ὁξὺν ἐν τῷ δρόμῳ.

519-23 The tender-skinned maiden. It has often been noted that the tone of this vignette is surprisingly gentle, given the suspicion with which women are treated elsewhere in *Op.*: cf. 59-105n. But within the rhythm of the passage the maiden

allows for a moment of serenity in a tale of struggle. She is a vehicle of contrast, both with the preceding old man and the following ἀνόστεος. In order to illustrate the precious seclusion of the inner oikos (520 δόμων ἔντοσθε, 523 μυχίη, 523 ἔνδοθι οἴκου), Hesiod chooses a woman whose youth, vulnerability (522 τέρενα χροά) and innocence (521 οὐ πω ἔργ' εἰδυῖα πολυχρύσου Ἀφροδίτης) mean that she does not yet constitute that threat to production from which stems Hesiod's negative attitude towards women elsewhere in *Op*. Although all women are a drain on resources to a certain extent, only adult women can really cause the 'male dilemma' (Brown 1997:26 'the conflicting desires for sexual gratification and domestic stability'). It is relevant, therefore, that Hesiod describes the maiden in detail but mentions her mother only in passing (520 φίλη παρὰ μητέρι μίμνει).

However, whilst the tone is gentle and leisurely, even here Hesiod does not change his attitude completely; in a poem so focused on the importance of hard work, a scene of such utter idleness as this surely cannot be without pointed negative connotation (for a hyperbole of this sort of female idleness see Semonides 7.25-6; for another veiled suggestion of the dichotomy 'hard-working man/idle woman' see 538n.). The maiden is 'unprofitable' (Marquardt 1982:288). She stays by her dear mother (520 φίλη παρὰ μητέρι μίμνει), just like the childish Silver Race who would ultimately be destroyed (130 παρὰ μητέρι κεδνῇ – indeed this formulation is attested as an unmetrical variant at 520). Moreover, ἔντοσθε μίμνει (520) recalls *Theog.*598 ἔντοσθε μένοντες, used of the idle drone bees in the simile describing women. Even the maiden's claims to innocence are not as straightforward as they first appear: she is said to be ignorant of the works of Aphrodite, yet she is actually

linked with the goddess. The description of her bathing and anointing herself (522-3) is a type scene, which often had as the central figure Aphrodite herself: see *Hom. Hymn* 5.61 = *Od.* 8.364 ἔνθα δέ μιν Χάριτες λοῦσαν καὶ χρῖσαν ἐλαίῳ. Indeed there are some notable similarities between this passage and *Hom. Hymn* 5: 519 παρθενικῆς ἀπαλόχροος ~ *Hom. Hymn* 5.14 παρθενικᾶς ἀπαλόχροας; 521 οὐ πω ἔργ’ εἰδυῖα πολυχρύσου Ἀφροδίτης ~ *Hom. Hymn* 5.9 οὐ γάρ οἱ εὔαδεν ἔργα πολυχρύσου Ἀφροδίτης. As Pandora stands in for Aphrodite in a dressing-up type scene (see Aphrodite’s disappearance 73-5n.), so here the maiden stands in for the goddess in this bathing *topos*. This link with Aphrodite, and with Pandora by proxy, points to an uncomfortable awareness on Hesiod’s part, even here, of the future potential for sexual allure and the Iron-Age problems it brings.

524-5 The Boneless One (ἀνόστεος). The prevailing interpretation of this kenning, already in antiquity, is that it refers to the octopus: this takes the *hapax* τένδω as related to τένθω ‘gnaw at’, as the octopus was thought to eat its own tentacles in times of extreme hunger (cf. *Arist. Hist. an.* 590b18). More likely, however, is the interpretation proposed by Troxler 1964:23 and followed by e.g. Edwards 1971:112-13, Hofinger 1981:131-40, Arrighetti 1998:437, Beall 2001:159: the ἀνόστεος is a snail. τένδω would then mean ‘retract’ – the snail retracts its foot into its house in winter. This makes more sense in that the snail is naturally associated with his house and so provides a more appropriate analogy with the maiden in hers; the snail fits better with the idea of a ‘pasture’ (526 νομόν – for plays on this word in *Op.* see 388n.) than does a sea creature; the snail would presumably have been more familiar to the farmer than would an octopus; a snail here creates a balance with 571 φερέουκος

(for parallels between the cold and warm seasons see Riedinger 1992:123-7). Other more tenuous interpretations include: cuttlefish (Paley); generally ‘mollusc’ (Quaglia 1973:171n28); a dog with no bone (Mierow 1929:76-8); even the penis (Watkins 1978, Campanile 1986). The very range of identifications shows that the lines function well as a riddle (see Edwards 1971:112, West 290; and further Bagordo 2009).

The basic connection between the boneless one and the tender-skinned maiden is the season: both are described in ἤματι χειμερίῳ (524). In terms of descriptive language, there is also a marked contrast between the two: both are inside, but whilst this means safety for the maiden there is no comfort for the boneless one ἐν τ’ ἀπύρῳ οἴκῳ (525). This seemingly straightforward contrast takes on ironic undertones if we consider Hesiod’s veiled criticisms of the maiden: the description of the ἀνόστεος suggests lack (Marsilio 2000:37 ἀπύρῳ οἴκῳ indicates insufficient supply of *bios*), consequences which Hesiod might well foresee for the idle woman and the menfolk whose resources she consumes.

527 Πανελλήνεσσι: elsewhere in epic only at *Il*.2.530 Πανέλληνας καὶ Ἀχαιούς, where it seems to denote a sub-set of Greeks: the Panhellenes as opposed to the Achaeans. Here, however, it must logically mean ‘all Greeks under the sun’: the earliest attestation of the word in this sense (noted by e.g. Nagy 1990:37, Fowler 1998:10, Arrighetti 1998:437). Nagy in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:274-5 goes on to note that this archaic use of the compound noun explains the later use of the non-compound ‘Hellenes’ to mean ‘Greeks’ – earlier, it had denoted Thessalian Greeks. The idea of panhellenism is important for our understanding of Hesiod’s society and poetics. As Nagy 1990:37 notes, Hesiod’s poems ‘synthesize the diverse

local traditions of each major city-state into a unified pan-Hellenic model that suits most city-states but corresponds exactly to none’.

529 καὶ τότε δῆ: marks another thematic shift, this time back to animals (see 504-63n.). 533 τότε δῆ both reiterates the theme and marks the link between animals and men (for the simile see note), then 536 καὶ τότε marks the final shift to people (and, as West notes, introduces the instruction after all this description). τότε often serves this purpose also in Hom.: e.g. at *Il.*6.176 καὶ τότε μιν (echoing 175 ἀλλ’ ὅτε δῆ) marks a crucial turning point in the story (see Graziosi/Haubold 2010 *ad loc.*).

κερραὶ καὶ νήκεροι ὕληκοῖται: νήκερος does not occur elsewhere: Hesiod coins a term in order to create an antithesis (p.50-1). ὕληκοίτης is also unattested elsewhere: Hesiod invents a kind of kenning, standing for wild animals – cf. 560 εὐφρόναι for ‘nights’. The phrase seems all-encompassing, indicating all the animals in the forest (also Ercolani): specifications such as those of Edwards 1971:113 (male/female deer) and West (adult/young) are unnecessary.

532 οἳ: the relative pronoun is transmitted unanimously by the mss. and should be retained, as it is by e.g. West. We might follow Most 2006 in translating ‘caring in their spirit only for searching for shelter and finding sturdy hiding-places’; alternatively we might look back to 42 where ἔχουσι was used to express half of a two-stage process, so the line tells how the animals must search for shelter before they come to have it.

533 τρίποδι βροτῶ ἴσοι: βροτῶ is the reading of the mss., printed by West and supported by e.g. Beall 2001:160-1, in which the animals are compared with man.

Some editors emend to βροτοί (Solmsen), ‘mortals are like the three-footed one’, on the basis that quadrupeds are not usually compared with humans. However, West rightly defends the mss. reading with comparative evidence from Greece and India, and as noted at 504-63n. men and animals are linked throughout this passage. The comparison with an old man also looks back to the vignette at 518; animals are as vulnerable to the cold as the old man bowling along.

The simile takes the form of a riddle: for Hesiod’s use of riddle language see e.g. 40-1n., 524-5n. The riddle is the same as that given to Oedipus by the Sphinx. It may have been common enough to bear no Oedipodean resonance for Hesiod (West: ‘There is no reason to suppose that the Sphinx’s riddle is pre-Hesiodic’). However, (as Paley notes) the Sphinx is referred to at *Theog.*326, and Oedipus at *Op.*163, so there may in fact be a connection.

536 καὶ τότε: back to people.

ἔσασσθαι: cf. 539 περιέσσασθαι: Hesiod follows up the simple form with the complex – see 189n. As Renehan 1980:355 notes, the complex form is probably meant to strengthen the sense.

ἔρυμα χρῶς: whilst the tender-skinned maiden (519-23) spends her time washing and anointing her skin, and Pandora adorns hers, the harsh Iron-Age reality is that what is most needed is a defence. The image is militant (clothes are armour against the cold): more so if we consider the use of this phrase at *Il.*4.137 (of armour). Similarly, 541 βοὸς ἴφι κταμένοιο appears elsewhere in epic only at *Il.*3.375, of a

helmet's chinstrap; 542, 544 *πίλος* (shoes padded with and hat made of felt) is used elsewhere only for the inside of a helmet at *Il.*10.265.

ὥς σε κελεύω: on this didactic phrase see 316.

537 *χλαῖναν...χιτῶνα*: both 537 and 538 are chiasmic, which gives the lines a mnemonic feel. They may or may not be traditional proverbs; either way, Hesiod makes it more likely that we will excerpt and reuse his advice by making it catchy.

538 *μηρύσασθαι*: as with the other iussive infinitives in this passage, this is directed to Hesiod's wider audience: which we assume (because of the type of advice given and the attitudes adopted) to be predominantly male. However, this line advises weaving: a traditionally female activity (see Pandora 63-4n.). This apparent incongruity emphasises Hesiod's superior knowledge and self-sufficient ideals: he gives detailed instructions even for an activity in which men are not necessarily supposed to be well-versed, and advises the farmer to keep track of everything the *oikos* must produce.

539 *τρίχες*: cf. 516 *τανύτριχα*, 517 *τρίχες*: that animals and men suffer equally from the winter cold is reflected in the common vocabulary used to describe them.

541-6 Hesiod specifies three defences against the cold, marked out by parts of the body: feet (541), back (544), head (545). He reasons out everything: e.g. 546 wear a hat so that your ears don't get wet (*ἴν' οὖατα μὴ καταδεύῃ*).

541-2 Cf. *Od.*14.23-4: the swineherd Eumaeus is fitting just such shoes onto his feet. They seem to be the mark of the countryside, the farm, the worker. For the effects of labour on the feet see 114n.

541 βοὸς ἱφι κταμένοιο: the benefit of a slaughtered ox over one dead from age or illness, that is the quality of the hide, was explained already in *ΣOp.*(Pertusi)541-2. Similarly, it was noted at *ΣOp.*(Pertusi)543-5 that the hides of recently-born kids (543 πρωτογόνων δ' ἐρίφων) should be used because they are stronger. On this phrase at *Il.*3.375 see 536n. For the ox being put to other uses by the farmer see 544, and in particular the earlier section on ploughing (448-92).

543 πρωτογόνων δ' ἐρίφων: on the quality of the hide see 541n. The use of πρωτογόνων here has been explained by Ercolani: it is a formula which in its usual sacrificial context is analogous to 'first-fruits'; here the formula is retained but the meaning needed is not 'first-born' but 'recently-born' i.e. young. The importance of the right time (ὥριον) applies even to such choices as this, cf. 30-2n.

547-53 Here Hesiod reverts to the descriptive mode which predominates in the winter section, before some concluding prescriptive lines (554-63).

549 μακάρων: this has caused much confusion as it usually refers to divinities, but here must refer to men (with ellipse of ἀνδρῶν). The usage is not unprecedented, however: it is used of mortals also at *Il.*11.68, *Od.*1.217-18, 5.306, and appears unqualified also at 171.

πυροφόροις: all mss. but one have nom. πυροφόρος, agreeing with ἀήρ. From the scholia on this has been linked either with πῦρ 'fire', giving the meaning 'bringer of

sun/fever' (*ΣOp.*(Pertusi)549a), or with πυρός 'wheat-bearing' (*ΣOp.*(Pertusi)548-54). Because of the linguistic difficulties of positing πῦρ as an etymology (the first syllable would have to be short: here it is long), and the logical difficulty of 'wheat-bearing mist', many editors (inc. Wilamowitz, Solmsen, West) print dat. πυροφόροις (Hermann's conjecture, later found as a variant reading in ψ₁₀), agreeing with ἔργοις ('wheat-bearing works'). Indeed the adj. is found elsewhere mainly of land, and does give a better sense. However, there are some who still defend the nom. (with ἀήρ): Sinclair, and Beall 2001:161-2 note that Hesiod at times transfers properties from effect to cause (Beall cites as examples 66, 580-1, 701).

550-3 Adding yet another level of didactic authority, Hesiod shows his meteorological knowledge (Hom. is often thought to do the same at *Il.*1.359): that mist in the air is made up of water from the earth, and that it is this water which then comes down as rain.

553 Θρηκίου Βορέω: see 507n.

554 οἰκόνδε νέεσθαι: an epic formula (cf. e.g. *Il.*2.354, *Od.*1.17), used here in an unexpected way: Hesiod is interested not in a hero's return from war, but in a farmer's return from the fields (or at 673 from trade on the sea).

557 ὑπαλεύασθαι μείς: cf. 504-5 μήνα...ἀλεύασθαι. Hesiod ends the section on winter as he began it, with a warning about the harshness of the month. The repetition has been interpreted by some (e.g. Paley) as indication that much of the material in between is spurious; however, the repetition creates a ring composition which frames the season and makes it into a neat detachable unit. It suggests the

relationship between poetry and life in the Iron Age: the season which poses the greatest threat to the Iron-Age man is that which must be described in the greatest detail (cf. 493-563n.). What the farmer must avoid, Hesiod spins out.

558 χειμέριος: the definition of the season is left for the second of these two concluding lines; cf. 494 (ῶρη χειμερίη delayed). The structural parallel shows another glimpse back to the beginning of the season (this time further, to the first introduction of winter at 493).

χαλεπὸς προβάτοις, χαλεπὸς δ' ἀνθρώποις: the winter cold affects animals and humans alike (cf. 504-63n.): here the two are brought together through anaphora and parallelism.

559-60 Animals and men are linked through the relative apportioning of rations. They may suffer equally from the cold, but they must be fed in different measure: in winter, men need more food than do their livestock to combat the cold, and the animals' feed should be increased towards summer in line with the work they do (which is, presumably, the meaning of 562 ἰσοῦσθαι νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας). Although the basic meaning of the lines is clear enough, the formulation is riddle-like: cf. 40 (inc. πλέον, ἥμισυ), 442n. τετράτρυφον ὀκτάβλωμον. For Hesiod's concern with the right measure cf. 303-7n.

560 μακροὶ γὰρ ἐπίτροθοι εὐφρόναι εἰσίν: εὐφρόναι here means 'nights', and is later used with that meaning in both poetry (e.g. Pind. *Nem.*7.3) and prose (e.g. Heraclitus 26, 57, Hdt. 7.12, 56). ἐπίτροθοι is used as a noun referring to the gods with the sense of 'helper' at *Il.*4.390, 23.770; here (and later), however, its use has

been extended to a metaphorical adjective. The phrase is proverb-like in structure, with rather obscure, almost riddling, language; yet tethering is strong here as the phrase includes γάῳ, and does not fill a whole line.

561-3 Plutarch (according to Proclus Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)561-3) expunged these lines, supposedly on the grounds that they suggest one must keep an eye on the nights/days all year. Wilamowitz considered them a rhapsodic interpolation to conclude the performance with the spring equinox. There are, however, no textual grounds on which to reject the lines, and they function quite appropriately as a close of one season before the description of the next. The slightly awkward transition from 560 can be attributed to that line's proverbial formulation (560n.). On the apparent conflict between 561 τετελεσμένον εἰς ἐνιαυτόν (the year ends with winter) and the Calendar beginning in autumn, see 415n.: the natural year as different from the human year, the different beginnings chasing each other as the seasons revolve (562 αὖτις emphasises this seasonal circularity).

563 Γῆ πάντων μήτηρ: here Earth is personified: for her various roles in *Op.* see 121n. The line signals the miracle of spring: after the Iron-Age depths of winter in which everything is a struggle (504-63n.), it turns out that nature *can* work for us after all.

564-70 Spring.

The season is distinguished by three types of marker – solar (564 μετὰ τροπὰς ἡελίου), stellar (565-6 ἀστήρ| Ἀρκτοῦρος) and animal (568 χελιδών) – each

introduced by temporal formulae (εὖτ' ἂν...δὴ ῥα τότε...τὸν δὲ μετ'). The season is named at 569 ἔαρος νέον ἱσταμένοιο (referred to at 678, 682: the spring sailing). The prominence of seasonal markers stands in contrast to the abbreviated instructions in this season: the farmer is told only 570 οἶνας περιταμνέμεν. The situation is not the same as in winter, however, despite the similar lack of instruction; there the narrative pace was leisurely, emphasising the fact that there is little to do though much to describe. Here the compression of the season into seven lines is anything but leisurely. The repeated marking of the season and the little room given to it suggest a particular importance here of the right time: whatever is to be done (though Hesiod doesn't have much time to tell it) must be done quickly and promptly as the year starts up: see 570n. (and 572n.). This impression of spring as fleeting contributes to the overall image of the circularity of seasons, with beginnings of the year at each others' heels (see 415n., 561-3n.).

564 μετὰ τροπὰς ἡελίοιο: formula also at 663. Here it refers to the winter solstice (for Hesiod's purposes at least, though inaccuracies in his astronomical data are often pointed out). As ἡελίοιο ends this line, so ἀστήρ concludes the following one, bringing together the celestial markers of the season.

566 Ἀρκτοῦρος: the name means 'the watcher of the Bear': Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)566a ἔχει δὲ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ διώκοντος 'ἄρκτον' ἀναστραφεῖσαν, διὸ καὶ Ἀρκτοῦρος λέγεται. It is the brightest star of its constellation Boötes (also known as Ἀρκτοφύλαξ – Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)566a), that used by Odysseus for navigation at *Od.*5.275. Here Hesiod refers to its acronychal rising (rising at twilight), from which detail many scholars have tried to reconstruct Hesiod's position/time/accuracy. It is

used again as a seasonal marker at 610, similarly 598 Ὠρίωνος also at 609 (and 615, 619): these parallels support the reading of Beall 2005 (following Riedinger 1992:137-8) which shows the ring-compositional structure of the latter third of the Calendar (from 564), with the 'exterior circle' comprised of 564-70 and 609-14 (both about viticulture).

568 ὀρθρογὴ Πανδιονὶς ὦρτο χελιδών: for the swallow used as a seasonal marker see *Od.*19.519, and the examples of the χελιδόνισμα (swallow song) given in Petropoulos 1994:5-9: they include *Ath.* 8.360B, and modern examples from northern Greece and the southern Aegean. That marking the season is the swallow's key function in Hesiod's Calendar, performed similarly by other birds at e.g. 448, 486, does not sufficiently inform Beall 2005:237 where he argues that the swallow is 'a synecdoche for the swallows of Greek mythology, and that that generic swallow is an entity that *augurs deception*'. Beall does however put to rest Blomberg's (1992) argument that χελιδών here is not a bird but a star (Beall 2001:162-3).

569 ἐς φάος: Hesiod may use the migrations of birds as key seasonal markers, but he does not show much understanding of actual migratory patterns: here it seems he thought that the swallow hid itself away in winter (for this view see also *Arist. Hist. an.*600a10ff.).

ἔαρος νέον ἱσταμένοιο: spring coming anew emphasises both the impression of seasonal circularity which we get throughout the Calendar (similarly e.g. 562 αὖτις), and the natural renewal which is characteristic of the season (see winter's concluding line 563 Γῇ πάντων μήτηρ καρπὸν σύμμικτον ἐνείκη). The phrase is used also at *Od.*19.519, of the nightingale.

570 τὴν φθάμενος οἶνας περιταμνέμεν: it is important to anticipate the swallow, as it was important in winter (554) to anticipate Boreas. Here Hesiod effectively elides spring altogether: the swallow comes at the beginning of spring (569 ἔαρος νέον ἱσταμένοιο), but in the only advice we are given for the season we must preempt her – and the next thing we know, it is summer. For other advice on viticulture in *Op.* see 572, 609-14.

571-608 Summer.

Summer is depicted as a mixed season: periods of hard labour under strict time constraints (571-81 the harvest, 597-608 threshing and management), and a moment of leisure (582-96 the festival scene). Each part of the season is both distinct from and linked to the others, facilitating both an isolated and a linear reading. To make the distinctions, each period is introduced with its own seasonal markers, and the divide between labour and idleness is reinforced throughout (e.g. 589 πετράϊ τε σκιῇ and 593 ἐν σκιῇ ἐζόμενον contrast with 574 φεύγειν δὲ σκιερὸς θώκους). However, there are links; for example the formulation of ‘labour’ as ‘fleeing idleness’ at 574 makes sure that we keep both antithetical ideas in mind, and the harvesting and threshing sections are linked by parallel motifs e.g. 573 δμῶας ἐγείρειν/ 597-8 δμῶσι...δινέμεν; 577 βίος/ 601 βίον; 574 ἐπ’ ἡῶ κοιτόν/ 605 ἡμερόκοιτος ἀνήρ; 581 βουσί/ 607 βουσί καὶ ἡμιόνουσιν.

As Nelson 1998:49 notes, within this structure ‘More lines describe a summer picnic than are given to the harvest, to the vintage, or to the threshing’. Hesiod fits the form to the content, slowing the narrative pace to reflect the season of enforced

inactivity, just as he did under such circumstances in winter. Winter and summer are thus parallel in pace, whilst at the same time being in many ways opposites, and Hesiod explores this relationship through the many links he makes between the two seasons: see 574-7n., 581n., 582-96n., 592n., 594n.

The arrangement work/leisure/work gives the season a ring compositional structure (see further Petropoulos 1994:38). This ring composition does not result naturally from the farming Calendar, however, but rather is something contrived by Hesiod: as the seasonal markers show, the threshing in fact happens before the time of rest (597-608n.). By separating the harvest and the threshing, Hesiod 'reinforces our sense of leisure' in the intervening scene (Nelson 1998:56), whilst also leaving the threat of further work to hang over the leisure time (see above: keeping labour/idleness intertwined). Furthermore, this neat structure with its framing gives the summer season the potential to stand alone as a self-contained section. Hesiod also uses this structural device on a smaller scale, isolating as detachable smaller units within the larger one: the threshing section is framed by 597 *δμωσί*, 608 *δμῶας*. In this way, he constructs a description of summer which operates on many levels: within the Calendar (in particular as winter's opposite); as a self-contained season; as a set of smaller detachable prescriptive/descriptive units.

571-81 The harvest. It is distinguished by animal (571 *φερέουκος*) and stellar (572 *Πληιάδας*) markers, and by 575 *ὅτε τ' ἥλιος χρῶα κάρφει*: a vivid description of the season which also operates as a solar marker. As West notes, between the spring section and harvest time 'We jump nearly three months' – this emphasises the impression of spring as fleeting, with which we were left by the preceding lines.

The harvest itself is crucial to the farmer's survival, filling the granaries for the coming year: it must be carried out successfully to secure *bios* (577 ἵνα τοι βίος ἄρκιος εἴη). Similarly, the threshing ensures that 601 πάντα βίον κατάθῃαι ἐπάρμενον ἔνδοθι οἴκου.

571 ἀλλ' ὅπῳτ' ἄν: temporal formula to mark out the season. For its use as an incipit in oracles see Ercolani.

φερέοικος: a kenning. Here it must mean 'snail', although it is used elsewhere of other creatures (see Ercolani). Given the other parallels between summer and winter (see 571-608n.), that this kenning represents a snail gives support to the same interpretation of the debated ἀνόστεος at 524. The snail is fleeing the Pleiades (572 Πληιάδας φεύγων): a comical image, which contrasts with the verb's use just two lines later (574 φεύγειν δὲ σκιερούς θώκους) in an important precept directed at the farmer. Beall 2005:238, following the examples from modern Greek farming gathered by Petropoulos 1994, suggests that this 'rustic wit' is apposite here given the tendency for farm-hands to sing and tell jokes while they harvest.

572 τότε δὴ σκάφος οὐκέτι οἰνέων: cf. 570n.: the time for viticulture has already passed. West sees σκάφος as a general reference to viticulture, noting that 'Digging went with pruning, and Hesiod tacitly subsumes each with the other': on this elision of tasks see further 597-608n.

573 δμῶας: cf. 459n.

ἐγείρειν: cf. 20n.

574-7 The structure of the lines recalls that of 493-7: two distractions to avoid (including θῶκον/θώκους – in winter the warm smithy, in summer shady places); the season in which to avoid them (ῶρη χειμερῖη/ ῶρη ἐν ἀμῆτου); further seasonal specifications marked by temporal adverbs (όπότε...ἐνθά/ ὅτε...τημουῖτος); a result clause giving a protreptic towards *bios* (μή...Πενίη/ ἵνα τοι βίος ἄρκιος εἴη). With these parallels Hesiod links the summer season with winter: two opposite ends of the scale, at the same time linked by periods of enforced idleness.

574 ἐπ' ἡῶ κοῖτον: although a period of idleness will come (582-96), there is little rest in harvest time. Cf. 578-80 unit on ἡώς.

575 ῶρη ἐν ἀμῆτου: as a sub-season (summer is comprised of harvest, leisure, and threshing), this period is marked not by a seasonal name but by a key task.

576 τημουῖτος σπεύδειν: for σπεύδειν and Hesiod's concern with hard work and timeliness see 460-1n.

578-81 A detachable unit on 'dawn'. ἡώς is one of three sections of the day: Proclus at Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)578-81 cites *Il.*21.111 ἔσσεται ἢ ἡώς ἢ δειλή ἢ μέσον ἡμαρ – see further 821. The lines function on a practical, a religious, and a rhetorical level. Farmers 'had to take advantage of the crucial three or so hours after day-break, when the stalks were still moist and so more pliable and the heat still bearable' (Petropoulos 1994:40), and the lines address some of *Op.*'s key didactic issues such as timeliness, hard work (ἐργοιο...ἐργου) and measure (ἐργοιο τρίτην ἀπομείρεται). Poetic devices make these lines memorable, including two levels of anaphora (ἡώς and προφέρει), and the parallel construction at 579 προφέρει μὲν

όδοῦ, προφέρει δὲ καὶ ἔργου. 'The genitive defines the field within which the πρὸ has its reference' (West).

The lines resemble 'a ritual paeon to a deity, or at least a celebration of a hero' (Beall 2005:239); for this reason Beall plausibly suggests that ἠώς is personified (and should be capitalised), and indeed it is the grammatical subject throughout these lines. We are given another patron deity: as Demeter governs the agricultural Calendar as a whole and Boreas is the patron for winter, so Dawn oversees the harvest.

580 ἐπέβησε: cf. its use at 659, of the Muses setting Hesiod on the path of song.

581 ἀνθρώπους...βουσί: animals and men are linked just as at 558-9, creating another parallel between summer and winter (and between Dawn and Boreas, 578-81n.). For further such links in summer see 585-6n., 607-8n.

582-96 The festival. Its initial markers are flowers (582 σκόλυμός τ' ἀνθεῖ, the golden thistle) and insects (582 τέτιξ, the cicada), which are then compounded by further seasonal descriptors introduced by 585 τῆμος (behaviour of men and animals) and 587 ἐπεῖ (Sirius the dog-star). Petropoulos 1994:1 argues that the lines probably originated as 'a local sub-literary or even popular song that found its way into a literary composition of 'panhellenic' scope'. He explains the close similarities over such an extended time period as a result of the ritually and seasonally controlled content of the songs; the tradition changes little because of the 'long stability in the seasonal rituals which they accompany' (16). If this is correct, it constitutes an example of Hesiod appropriating traditional material (in this case an

extended passage) relevant to his poetic enterprise, and preserving it through his panhellenic composition (giving it the stamp of Hesiodic authority). For a similar passage, which may have drawn on the wider tradition or on *Op.* directly, see Alc. fr.347 (LP): a drinking song.

582-4 The cicada. Here the cicada is the herald of summer, a role it also has in Hes. [Sc.]393-5 ἦμος δὲ χλοερῶ κυανόπτερος ἡχέτα τέττιξ | ὄζω ἐφεζόμενος θέρος ἀνθρώποισιν αἰεῖδεν | ἄρχεται... (When the dark-winged sonorous cicada, sitting on a green branch, begins to sing of summer to human beings...), and in many proverbs (for examples see Petropoulos 1994:47) where the cicada heralds the arrival of summer as the swallow heralds spring (see 568n.). The cicada also signifies the ripening of grapes and so anticipates the vintage (Petropoulos 1994:48).

There are two main traditions surrounding the cicada, both of which are pertinent to *Op.* In the first the cicada is a divine singer with links to the poet. Here the sound of the cicada is described as ‘song’ which projects well (583 λιγυρὴν...ἀοιδήν), cf. *Il.*3.151-2, where the Trojan elders are likened to cicadas with a ‘silver’ voice (ὄπα λειριόεσσιν; the cicadas there too sit in a tree, δενδρέω ἐφεζόμενοι). The connection with the poet (see also 208n. ἀοιδόν) is realised by Hesiod in his description of his own song at 659 (λιγυρῆς...ἀοιδῆς): this traditional description of the cicada is tethered to *Op.* by reference to a character in the poem. As the cicada heralds the ‘festival’ or leisure season, there may be a suggestion here that summer with its enforced inactivity is the time for song and poetry (Rosen 1990:107). We might also read into 584 πυκνόν an indication of the *type* of poetry to be composed: not epic, but ‘dense’ poetry (for another such possible metapoetic allusion see 650-3

with Rosen 1990:109). For more on the connection between the cicada and the poet see Marsilio 2000:27, Tsagalis in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:150.

In the second tradition, the cicada is a symbol of idleness. Petropoulos 1994:54-6 gives examples of fables (such as Aesop Fable 373 Perry) and demotic songs depicting the ant and the cicada. In the most common version of the story, the cicada does not take part in the harvest as he is too busy singing, and is criticised by the hard-working ant. The cicada ends up reduced to begging. This is sometimes expressed in terms of a curse: the cicada is cursed to sing in summer and starve in winter. This tradition is particularly relevant to *Op.*, rendering the lines both a threat to Perses and an admonitory lesson to any other potential idler. Note also that the formula λιγυρήν...ἀοιδήν does not always have positive connotations; at *Od.*12.44, 183 it is used of the song of the Sirens which lures men to their doom.

The cicada, then, is an ambivalent figure. He could both represent the poet and be a foil for him. Perhaps Hesiod is combining the two traditions, as does Plato at *Phdr.*259b-c (see Petropoulos 1994): in fact, an amalgamation of traditions would be a typically Hesiodic strategy to encourage his audience to search for meaning (cf. 106-201n.). The middle ground would lie in the cicada's sphere of activity: he is a singer (tradition one), but emphatically not a worker (tradition two). He therefore encapsulates the period of midsummer, in which work must halt and rest and feasting take its place – all of which suggests that midsummer is the 'right time' for singing.

584 θέρεος καματώδεος ὥρη: the season is finally named – and immediately qualified as toilsome. The qualification corrects or clarifies 503, which suggested

that summer is apart from the working Calendar: Hesiod adds a distinctly non-Golden-Age description in order to avoid misunderstanding. The phrase is repeated at 664, see note.

585-6 This season is described in terms of extremes, with a string of superlatives (πιόταταί...ἄριστος...μαχλόταται...ἀφαιρότατοι). The conditions of both animals and men are described: for similar juxtapositions see 504-63n., 581n. On the οἶνος ἄριστος see further 589n., and on viticulture 570n., 572n.

586 The parallel structure of the line weighs the two sexes against each other. The comparison shows conflicting rather than parallel behaviour, however: as Clay in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:86 notes, 'nature affects male and female in opposite ways, so that the sexes are eternally out of synch'. This imbalance between the sexes underlies much of Hesiod's attitude towards women in *Op.*, and has been explored, albeit in more oblique ways, already in the myth of Pandora (59-105), the description of the stealing woman (373-5), and the vignette of the tender-skinned maiden (519-23). Throughout *Op.* the imbalance is expressed either through the dichotomy labour/idleness (as at 519-23) or through sexual allusion (373-5, 59-105), exploring the two sides of the 'male dilemma' (Brown 1997:26). Here μαχλόταται and ἀφαιρότατοι are sexual in meaning and so fit with the latter (on ἀφαιρότατοι Renehan 1980:356 suggests wordplay with Sirius 'drying' head and knees; cf. Arist. *[Pr.]*4.25.879a26-8 Διὰ τί ἐν τῷ θερῷ οἱ μὲν ἄνδρες ἥττον δύνανται ἀφροδισιάζειν, αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες μᾶλλον, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς λέγει ἐπὶ τῷ σκολύμῳ...; (Why are men less capable of sexual relations in summer, whereas women are more so,

just as the poet also says of the time when the golden thistle flowers...?), Arist. *Hist. an.*542a 32, Alc. fr.347a (LP), Plin. *HN*22.86.

587 Σείκιος: see 417n.

588-96 Midsummer follows the structure established elsewhere in the Calendar: from seasonal markers and description (582-7), to prescription (588-96). Beall 2005:243 notes that the transition between the two is marked by ‘violent’ enjambment (588-9). However, the instructions Hesiod gives here are nothing like those in the wood-cutting, the ploughing, the harvest or the threshing seasons, for example: they are, rather, a guide to leisure. He advises shade, wine, cake (see 590n.), milk and meat (on the benefits of the βοὸς ὑλοφάγοιο see Beall 2001:163). As in winter, in midsummer there is no work to be done: but rather than opting for further extended description to characterise the season (cf. 504-63), Hesiod continues to use didactic language (see further 592-6n.). Precision pervades these lines, leading to the ostentatious obscurity of the expert: Hesiod employs specialist terms such as 589 Βίβλινος οἶνος (the epithet could refer to place of origin, see West and Ercolani, or type of grape as Troxler 1964 suggests) and 590 μᾶζά τ’ ἀμολγαίη (given various interpretations at Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)588-90), and engages in specifics such as 592 πρωτογόνων τ’ ἐρίφων.

589 Βίβλινος οἶνος: wine, already mentioned at 585, is recommended: here by type, and at 592-6 by mixture. Its production is seasonal: its quality acts as a seasonal marker at 585, and at 674 it is even used to represent a season (winter, the autumn rains, or new wine).

592 πρωτογόνων τ' ἐρίφων: summer is the time to eat their meat; in winter one should use their hides for clothing (543). The same formula is used, in the same position in the line, emphasising the link between these opposite seasons and the need for timeliness in each.

592-6 This extension of 585 οἶνος ἄριστος and 589 Βίβλινος οἶνος (wine, type of wine, mixture of wine) both reinforces the idea of Hesiod as a knowledgeable and precise teacher (see e.g. 414-47n., 588-96n.) and, by prescribing what to *do*, suggests that even in this season of inactivity the farmer should be alert to the right time and correct procedure in all things. The lines form a detachable unit as they have a ring compositional structure, with the reiteration of the theme οἶνον...οἶνου framing a list of specifications.

594 Ζεφύρου: the warm West wind: a stark contrast to Boreas described at length in winter (406n.). Zephyr can bring good crops (*Od.*7.119-22) but can also be devastating (*Il.*2.147-9).

597-608 The threshing, and farm management. The section is introduced with a stellar marker: 598 εὖτ' ἂν πρῶτα φανῇ σθένος Ὠρίωνος. The heliacal rising of Orion (see West) occurs about a month before the rising of Sirius (587), so here Hesiod jumps back to before the leisure time: on the effects of this structure see 571-608n. West notes that Hesiod does not describe all the tasks to be attended to at this time; for example with 599 εὐαεῖ he subsumes the winnowing into the threshing (as digging and pruning were amalgamated at 572). Hesiod hurries through the summer's tasks, a narrative pace which reflects the urgency of the work and the importance of it being completed on time. Yet he maintains his precise didactic

persona, giving technical advice (599 ἐντροχάλω ἐν ἄλωῃ) and remaining authoritative (603 κέλομαι, and see 597n.).

597 δμωσί: Hesiod establishes a didactic hierarchy: he instructs the farmer (δινέμεν – iussive infinitive) who must in turn instruct his workers (ἐποτρύνειν – infinitive in indirect command). δμωσί is put first both in its line and in the threshing section to create a contrast with and thereby emphasise the farmer's leisure described in the preceding passage (West, Nelson 1998:56). The workers will have their turn for rest, however: 608 δμῶας ἀναψῦξαι φίλα γούνατα.

599 ἐντροχάλω ἐν ἄλωῃ: again at 807, where Hesiod specifies the process even further. Contrast the Homeric formula ἐὺκτιμένη ἐν ἄλωῃ at *Il.*20.496, 21.77, *Od.*24.226; and compare other examples of Hesiodic hyper-realism at 432-4n., 436-40n., 442n, 496-7n.

600 μέτρῳ δ' εὖ κομίσασθαι: on Hesiod's concern with the right measure see 303-7n. Here μέτρῳ is probably being used in a more concrete sense: the scoop used to measure.

ἐν ἄγγεσιν: on the importance of storage vessels in *Op.* see 475n.

601 ἐπάρομενον: West rightly suggests that here it probably has the sense of 'locked', rather than 'fitting': Hesiod advises protecting one's livelihood, keeping it in the house (ἐνδοθι οἴκου: the safest place at 365, 452, 476, 520). It is also used at 627, of the ship's tackle: the farmer must protect not only his livelihood but also his means of procuring it.

602-5 Wilamowitz, followed by Beall 2005, would transpose these lines to after 608 to rectify ‘the order of the thoughts’ (Beall 2005:240). Most editors however keep the lines where they are, as there is no textual support for their transposition and they make sufficient sense here. This is an instance in which detachability creates debate: these lines form a detachable unit, and though the unit is relevant to its context the fact that it comes within a prescriptive rather than a narrative section means that it is not necessarily relevant at only one point in the text.

602-3 Hesiod’s advice on farm management begins with workers. The most problematic phrase here is 602 θῆτά τ’ ἄουκον ποιῆσθαι. The θής is a hired hand: see *Il.*21.444-5 θητεύσαμεν εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν ἰμισθῶ ἔπι ῥητῶ, and a distinction between types of workers at *Od.*4.644 θῆτές τε δμῶές τε. The sense of the phrase could be either ‘set about engaging a man with no household of his own’ (Paley, West), or ‘turn your hired man out of your house’ (Most 2006, Nussbaum 1960:215n5). The latter explanation puts the focus on the seasonality of labour so fits with Hesiod’s concern for the right time and the revolving seasons. However, the former has more to recommend it: it does not elide the nuance of the middle voice; it fits with Hesiod’s concern for self-sufficiency and productivity as the worker must have no dependants to distract him from his work (cf. 441-7n., and the problem of dependants made explicit at 603 χαλεπή δ’ ὑπόπορτις ἔριθος); it echoes in sense the structural parallelism with ἄτεκνον ἔριθον δίζησθαι (another worker without dependants) which creates such a neat chiasmus.

604-5 Next on the list is a guard dog, κύνα καρχαρόδοντα (see further 797). Both the adj. and the animal are, in Hes., innately threatening; the adj. is used elsewhere

in Hes. only of the sickle used to castrate Kronos (*Theog.*175, 180), and the only other Hesiodic dog is Cerberus (*Theog.*309, 311, 769). In Hom., sharp-toothed dogs appear at *Il.*10.360 and 13.198: both similes for heroic warfare. The formulation ἡμερόκοιτος ἀνὴρ acts as a kenning for the thief against whom the dog must guard, and as Beall 2005:241 notes it creates ‘a clever play on epic phrases consisting of a compound epithet with nominative case ἀνὴρ such as the more positive figure of the ἀρματοπηγὸς ἀνὴρ “chariot-building man” (*Il.*4.485)’. The formulation is particularly relevant to *Op.* as the thief is characterised in terms of idleness: discredited by Hesiod throughout *Op.*

606-7 Finally there must be fodder for the livestock. The specification συρφετόν, the chaff from the threshing, emphasises the importance of planning and efficiency to the running of a farm: nothing should be wasted. 607 βουσι καὶ ἡμιόνοισιν is a formulaic combination, repeated in the same position at 816. Although mules have not appeared elsewhere in the Calendar, they do not seem out of place as they are mentioned at 46, 791, 796, 816.

607-8 After the threshing and the preparations it is time for workers and animals alike (for the juxtaposition of the two cf. 504-63n., 581n., 585-6n.) to rest. Because Hesiod broke with chronology in this season, the time of rest referred to here is the same already described at length in 582-96.

609-17 Autumn (again).

Hesiod has one task left to teach: the grape harvest in September (609-14). He then rounds off the farming Calendar with a return to the ploughing season in October/November (614-17) which he already depicted in full at 448-92. Because of this repetition, Paley for example suggests that 614-17 were a later addition; however, coming full circle fits perfectly with Hesiod's treatment of the revolving seasons and the circularity of the year (see e.g. 415n., 561-3n.).

The two periods are marked by the stars: 609-10 Ὠρίων καὶ Σείριος...Ἄρκτουρον; 615 Πληιάδες θ' Ὑάδες τε τό τε σθένος Ὠρίωνος. The accumulation of astral markers suggests fullness: the completion of the yearly cycle and Hesiod's account of it (615 the stars set, δύνωσιν; contrast 383 the Pleiades rise, ἐπιτελλομενάων). Arcturus is fitting to introduce viticulture here, as it gave the sign for pruning vines at 566 (570 οἶνας περιταμνέμεν) and is associated with the vintage again at e.g. Pl. *Leg.* 844e. In the case of Sirius, Ercolani shows how the link between this star and grapes is reflected in later myth: the dog of Orestheus gave birth not to a puppy but to a stick, from which grew the first vines (Paus. 10.38.1); this dog is identified with the constellation of the dog, of which Sirius is the brightest star.

609-14 The grape harvest. The passage leads Proclus *ΣOp.*(Pertusi)612-14 to describe the process more fully; see also *Od.* 7.122-6. Here, however, many details are elided: as West notes 'The treading is subsumed in the drawing off from the vat'. Once again (similarly 564-70 spring) Hesiod gives us the information we need to conjure up a picture of the season and to recognise him as a precise didactic authority (note the temporal specifications δέκα...δέκα...πέντε...ἑκτα, which

express Hesiod's concern with the right time), without letting lengthy prescription delay the inexorable progression of the seasons.

610 ὦ Πέρση: the first direct address to Perses since 397, at the very outset of the Calendar (see note). This address (dismissed by West as only 'a colourless vocative') balances the preceding one and indicates that the Calendar is drawing to a close.

613 εἰς ἄγγε': see 475n.

614 δῶρα Διωνύσου πολυγηθέος: the god is introduced with this formula (Διόνυσον πολυγηθέα, in the accusative) in his birth narrative at *Theog.*941; here, in keeping with the Iron-Age focus of the poem, he is confined to the earthly gifts he gives to men. The connection between Dionysus and wine seems to be attested from very early on: a Linear B tablet from Pylos (c. 1250 BC) on which he is referred to by name has on the reverse a list of women from a town which is named after wine (*wo-no-wa-ti-si*). He is depicted as the god of wine on black-figure vases from the 6th century BC.

617 πλειὼν δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς ἄρμενος εἶη: the Calendar ends with a phrase which is problematic because the meaning of πλειὼν is unclear: rather an anticlimax for the modern reader. It was interpreted as 'year' by Hellenistic and later poets, and indeed was glossed as ἐνιαυτός by Proclus *ΣOp.*(Pertusi)614-17, and *ΣOp.*(Pertusi)617a. Because of this Hellenistic connection Goettling suspected the line to be a later interpolation. Mazon and West, however, following Hesychius' lexicographical entry πλειόνει· σπείρει have interpreted πλειὼν as 'seed' (etymology <*πλη-ών, that which fills up or multiplies), while Troxler 1964 and

Livrea 1966:473 have taken it to mean 'abundance'. Beall 2001:164 returned to the ancient interpretation 'year', smoothing the sense by taking κατά as distributive: 'may a full year be fittingly allocated over (works) of the earth', or 'Even better: the year deals with matters according to the earth, as opposed to the sea treated next'. Certainly the antithesis earth/sea seems a pointed one (with wordplay πλειών – πλέω/πλόος), and contriving it may be what rendered the line rather awkward.

As Hyman/Thibodeau 1999 point out, Virgil at G.1.224 shows an awareness of the potential for ambiguity here by rendering πλειών as *anni spem*: 'he acknowledges the Alexandrian tradition that πλειών means 'year' while at the same time allowing for the intuitive sense of πλειών 'seed'. Facing the problems presented by the hapax πλειών, Virgil interprets Hesiod instead of merely translating him. "The hope of the year" forms an elegant metonym for 'seed'. The collocation means more than the sum of its parts.'

618-94 Seafaring.

Hesiod moves from the farming Calendar to an excursus on seafaring (often known as the Nautilia, from ναυτιλίη at 618, 642, 649). It addresses many of the same themes as the Calendar: the right time (630 ώραῖον μίμνειν πλόον, 642 ώραίων πάντων, 665 ώραῖος...πλόος, 694 καιρὸς δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος); measure (648, 694 μέτρα); hard work. Hesiod maintains his authoritative didactic persona: he once more addresses Perses as μέγα νήπιε Πέρση (633), and 'autobiographical' sections are framed by passages using the didactic structure he established in the Calendar (619-21n., 663-78n.). However, he himself admits that he knows little about

seafaring (649 οὐτέ τι ναυτιλίας σεσοφισμένος): this creates a paradox of the teacher ignorant of what he is teaching. Hesiod's ability to teach about seafaring, then, comes from two sources: the Muses (658-62n.), and his didactic prowess in analogous matters (namely agriculture: see 692-3n.). Hesiod's admission of ignorance frames this section as a test-case for his didactic method: he will set an example for his audience, overcoming his ignorance by thinking for himself (the πανάριστος, using his knowledge of analogous matters) and by taking advice (the ἐσθλός, listening to the Muses).

The relationship between seafaring and farming has been the topic of much debate. West, for example, argues that 'For Hesiod this is not an alternative way of life to farming (as in Solon fr.13.43-8) but an optional supplement to it'; the farmer must take to the sea to sell his excess produce elsewhere when there is insufficient local demand (cf. also Clay 1993:31). Ercolani, on the other hand, maintains that it is a specialist activity separate from farming. Ercolani is right that seafaring is *presented* as incompatible with farming: buying a ship and tackle (627 ὄπλα – for a list see ΣOp.(Pertusi)627-9) would have been too big an investment for Hesiod's self-sufficient farmer; seafaring presupposes a port, which would necessarily be part of a *polis*, something which contradicts the picture we have so far of life in a κώμη; the sailing periods are specified as spring and summer, which are times of essential farming activity that could not be abandoned (although see 664n.). However, why would Hesiod, who advocates the pursuit of *bios* through agriculture, spend so much of his poem on an unrelated activity? It seems that whilst agriculture is the fundamental activity of production, Hesiod is aware that seafaring is a possibility

for a farmer, and so in the spirit of didactic thoroughness he must consider it. But it is not a possibility which should be undertaken lightly – it is risky, expensive, a distraction, a last resort: 647 *χρέα τε προφυγεῖν καὶ λιμὸν ἀτεροπέα*. To make this point, Hesiod utilises the incompatibilities with farming to discredit seafaring as a risky enterprise. Other discrediting techniques include: presenting it as irrational (618n.) and foolish (646 *ἐπ' ἐμπορίην τρέψας ἀεσίφρονα θυμόν*), emphasising the danger (621n., 625n., 634n., 665-6n.), continuing to focus on agriculture (623, 692-3), explicitly and emphatically stating his disapproval (682-3n.).

The structure of the section has also been disputed. First, West would move 646 and following to the beginning of the section. If we keep the text as it is, however, there is still disagreement about how it fits together. 618-45 and 646-94 are usually considered two distinctive sections which approach the same theme with some parallel content, but from different angles. For example both give 'autobiographical' information, but the first gives less practical advice than does the second. This observation has produced two different camps. One, led by Solmsen (1982b:30-1), sees the two sections as two alternative versions, with the second intended to replace the first. The other, including Kumaniecki 1963 and Arrighetti 1998, argues more plausibly that the first section gives the reason for Hesiod's diffidence towards the sea whilst the second exemplifies the poet's professional pride; that the two parts are complementary, not alternative. In a divergence from all this, Rosen 1990 divides the passage into three: 618-45 sailing, 646-62 sphragis, 663-94 sailing.

These divisions centre on the 'autobiographical' information (on autobiography in *Op.* see p.29-30), and indeed this is the most striking feature of the passage. In the

first part Hesiod tells of his father's chequered career; in the second his own voyage and poetic contest. The two contrast with each other as the first is a tale of misfortune, the second of success. The primary function of these autobiographical details, therefore, is to set up contrasting positive and negative models. As Griffith 1983:62 argues, the father functions as a negative paradigm for Perses, in contrast to the wise man who concentrates on agriculture: see further 618-45n. Hesiod himself is the positive paradigm, successful in poetry and knowledgeable in agriculture. He has made his own way in life, breaking away from his father's example just as he breaks away from epic and from the Muses. For a summary of contrasts between Hesiod and his father see Thalmann 1984:23-4.

618-45 When *no longer* to sail (622 μηκέτι), and the story of Hesiod's father. Hesiod depicts seafaring as the mirror image of farming. First, the theme of timeliness is addressed by beginning with when *not* to sail. Second, at 624-9 the ship is first described through its dismantling: contrast the attention given to how to put together farming equipment (414-47n.).

That Hesiod's father is used as a negative exemplar constitutes quite a shift from traditional didactic models: in contrast to the usual hierarchy in which the father teaches the son (e.g. Akkadian *Counsels of Wisdom*, Sumerian *Instruction of Šuruppak*, Egyptian *Instruction of Ptahhotep*), Hesiod sets himself up as superior to (or at least more successful than) his father.

618 εἰ δέ: 'The apodosis consists of the whole section' (West). The entire excursus on seafaring is phrased as a possibility to be discarded.

ἔμερος αἶρεϊ: elsewhere in epic this phrase is used exclusively of good things: love, food, wine (usually preceded by γλυκύς). Here, however, it is a desire for something bad (δυσπεμφέλου). This oxymoron introduces Hesiod's diffidence towards seafaring. It 'suggests an irrational, seductive, and deceptive desire' (Clay 1993:31): hardly a valid reason to embark on such a risky venture (as Hesiod portrays it: e.g. 645 εἴ κ' ἄνεμοί γε κακὰς ἀπέχουσιν ἀήτας, 667-8). In *Theog.* ἔμερος is personified, and is associated with the Muses at *Theog.*64 and with Aphrodite at 201: Rosen 1990:103 notes that these associations give Desire an aesthetic aspect, which he sees as supporting a poetological reading of the *Op.* passage.

δυσπεμφέλου: connected with the sea at *Theog.*440 and *Il.*16.748: at 722, however, it is used of behaviour at a feast.

619-21 Seafaring is introduced with seasonal markers (619-20 stellar, 621 weather), just as were individual sections of the farming Calendar. In a twist, however, we are first told when *no longer* to sail. The reversal of expectation is made even more striking by the incorporation of the sea into the seasonal marker: 620 the Pleiades πίπτωσιν ἐς ἡεροφοιδέα πόντον. This structure allows Hesiod to reinforce his focus on agriculture (623 γῆν ἐργάζεσθαι μεμνημένος) and to discredit seafaring.

620 ἡεροφοιδέα πόντον: although this is its only appearance in *Op.*, the noun-epithet pair is common in epic: twice in *Theog.* (252, 873) and 11 times in Hom. Other phrases for the sea and for the ship are similarly epic: 622 (and 817) οἶνοπι

πόντω 18 times in Hom.; 628 νηὸς...ποντοπόροιο 19 times in Hom.; 631 (and 671) νῆα θοὴν 59 times elsewhere in early hexameter; 636 νηὶ μελαίνῃ 59 times in Hom.; 648 πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης 10 times in Hom. Other epic language includes 624 ἐπ' ἠπείρου ἐρύσαι (at *Il.*1.485, *Od.*16.325, 359, *Hom. Hymn* 3.489), 631 νῆα θοὴν ἄλαδ' ἐλκέμεν (*Od.*2.389), 667 Ποσειδάων ἐνοσίχθων (24 times in Hom.). There are even some formulae which *seem* epic but are not attested in Hom. such as 660 νηῶν...πολυγόμφων: Hesiod may be constructing his own formulae along epic lines, or utilising non-Homeric traditional material. Hesiod's use of epic language here is the result of his professed ignorance of a topic on which epic has a lot to say (although his didactic persona will not allow him to yield to complete ignorance: see 626n. on technical language). With language so markedly different from that of the agricultural Calendar, Hesiod delineates the sea as a separate sphere. On a poetological level this language shows that, although at e.g. 651-3 (see note) Hesiod distances himself from heroic epic, this is a choice on his part about when and how to engage with the genre: he is certainly not ignorant of it, and can in fact make use of it when it serves his purposes. This fits with Martin's point (2004:20) that 'we need not read Hesiod's "autobiography" here as part of a humble concession that his poetry is second to the ambitious scope of epic'.

621 παντοίων ανέμων θυίουσιν ἀῆται: a vivid image, emphasising the dangers of seafaring. ἀῆται is repeated at 645 and 675 to discredit the venture. παντοίων ανέμων is an epic formula, used in the *Iliad* in similes (*Il.*2.397, 17.56) and in the *Odyssey* usually to mark the power of a god *Od.*5.293 (Poseidon), 5.305 (Zeus).

622 νῆας: here plural, elsewhere in the passage singular. Solmsen therefore conjectures νῆα here, but West defends the transmitted νῆας by analogy with 689 ἐν νηυσίν, and Ercolani notes that νῆα would create an unusual hiatus. The fluctuation between singular and plural is probably due simply to the influence of epic language here.

622-3 πόντω,|γῆν: the enjambment creates an antithesis between the two ‘incompatible’ livelihoods: Hesiod champions the latter.

623 γῆν ἐργάζεσθαι μεμνημένος: on the construction see 422n. and p.52. Even in the seafaring section, clearly delineated at 618 ναυτιλίας, Hesiod gives an agricultural reminder (ὥς σε κελεύω i.e. ‘as I spent the last 200+ lines telling you’). This line supports the above view of seafaring as a farming ‘extra’, albeit only as a last resort (*pace* Ercolani).

625 ἀνέμων μένος ὕγρὸν ἀέντων: also at *Theog.*869 of the winds blowing from Tartarus which destroy sailors: the link emphasises the dangers of seafaring. In Hom. the formula is used of things through which the wind does *not* blow (*Od.*5.478, 19.440 ἀνέμων διάη μένος ὕγρὸν ἀέντων): this does not lessen the threat of the winds, however, but is rather a way to emphasise the strength of those things against danger.

626 χεῖμαρον ἐξερύσας: translate ‘take out the bilge plug’. This seems to be very technical language for someone with little acquaintance with ships; similarly 628 στολίσας refers to furling the sails and is not found elsewhere in epic. Hesiod is

intent on maintaining his knowledgeable persona and didactic authority. For other technical language used to display Hesiod's didactic ability cf. 414-47n.

Διὸς ὄμβρος: for the connection between Zeus and rain see 416n.

627 ἐγκάτθεο οἴκῳ: on the verb see 27n. On the importance of the inside for self-sufficiency see 365n., 452n. The line continues the idea of dismantling which marks out seafaring as the mirror image of farming (618-45n.).

629 ~45: see note.

630 ὥραιον μίμνειν πλόον: the importance of the right time: Hesiod's seasonal concerns continue from the Calendar. Unusually, the iussive infinitive here prescribes a *lack* of action, as the right time is not defined until 663 (Arrighetti 1998:439 notes this as a reason why the two parts are not alternatives but are both needed): sailing is portrayed as the mirror image of farming (618-45n.).

631 νῆα θοὴν ἄλαδ' ἐλκέμεν: the counterpart to 624 νῆα δ' ἐπ' ἠπείρου ἐρύσαι, this too is Homeric: cf. *Od.*2.389.

631-2 φόρτον...κέρδος: both are recurrent concerns: φόρτος 644, 672, φορτίον 643, 693, φορτίζω 690 (only here in epic); on κέρδος see 323n., and Perysinakis 1986. Profit here is portrayed as the upside to a generally discredited venture. It is important inasmuch as it is brought *home* (632 οἴκαδε): it must contribute to the household.

633-40 The first of two autobiographical seafaring episodes: the travels of Hesiod's and Perses' father. 633, with its two possessives surrounding the subject (ἐμός τε

πατήρ καὶ σός) and the second of the two elaborated by an apostrophe (μέγα νήπιε Πέρση), finally makes explicit the relationship between the poet and his primary named addressee.

634 πλωίζεσκ’: the iterative infix gives the impression of difficulty, of desperation: their father ‘kept on sailing’. However, despite his efforts he suffers just as the idle man (634 βίου κεχρημένος ἐσθλοῦ ~498-9 πολλὰ δ’ ἀεργὸς ἀνὴρ, κενεὴν ἐπὶ ἐλπίδα μίμνων, | χρηίζων βιότοιο): the parallel marks seafaring as a risky venture.

635 Κύμην Αἰολίδα προλιπών: Hesiod’s father was from Aeolian Cyme. The specification Αἰολίδα was probably included to distinguish this Cyme from the Italian town Cumae (this would give us a *terminus post quem* for the poem, as that Cumae was founded c.730BC) or from Cyme in Euboea mentioned by Steph. Byz. s.v. Κύμη. See similarly Hdt. 7.194.1 Κύμης τῆς Αἰολίδος, Thuc. 3.31.1. The specification also emphasises Hesiod’s panhellenic persona (527n.): he is Boeotian, his roots are Aeolian, much of his language is Ionian (504n.). According to the so-called *Herodotean Life*, Homer too was from Cyme: when he returned there impoverished, he was denied help and so cursed the Cymeans and left. This line then would point to their shared origins, with similarities between Homer’s self-exile and Hesiod’s father’s emigration, and set the scene for the metapoetic comment at 651-3 (Clay 2003:181-2).

637-8 οὐκ ἄφενος... | ἀλλὰ κακὴν πενίην: the same idea is expressed in negative and positive forms: cf. 97n. The use of three nouns in 637, all near synonymns (ἄφενος, πλοῦτος, ὄλβος), is striking: the effect is that they draw all attention to the ‘evil poverty’ with which the next line begins. The Iron-Age value of the

synonymous concepts has already been addressed by Hesiod: *πλοῦτος* and *ὄλβος* were both part of the nexus of ideas in the precepts on the importance of work (286-382: *πλοῦτος* 313, 377, 381; *ὄλβος* 319, 321, 326, 379), and hurrying towards *ἄφενος* was explicitly something initiated by the Good Eris (24).

638 *Ζεὺς ἄνδρεσσι δίδωσιν*: as at e.g. 474, Hesiod uses the agency of Zeus as exculpation: here to exonerate his father of responsibility for his fallen state. See further p.53.

639 *νάσσατο δ' ἄγχ' Ἑλικῶνος*: Helicon has connections with Hesiod's poetic journey: it is the home of the Muses (*Theog.*2, 7) and the place where they teach shepherd Hesiod the art of song (*Theog.*23). These connections emphasise the similarities and differences between his father's and Hesiod's own journey: 'Hesiod's own short sea voyage culminated in poetic victory while his father's habitual sailing resulted in failure' (Marsilio 2000:37). Marsilio 2000:38 (also Hubbard 1995:161-71, Cook 1989:170-1) even goes so far as to extrapolate from these details that the father's 'obvious misery at Ascra "near Helicon"' would suggest that the Muses denied him'.

640 *Ἀσκη*: evidence used to locate Ascra includes Paus. 9.29.1,2 and Strabo 9.2.25. For the topography of the area see Wallace 1974; for a reassessment of the poem's historical context see Edwards 2004. Ascra is not mentioned in Homer's Catalogue of Ships (which has quite a full list of Boeotian places): Zenodotus tried to emend 'Arne rich in vines' (*Il.*2.507) to 'Ascra rich in vines', but Strabo argued that this couldn't possibly be Ascra, given how bad Hesiod makes it out to be: an example of the ancients' attempts to harmonise the two poets (see Koning 2010:96-101, 122). In

fact, Hesiod's negative depiction of it contradicts ancient testimony: it is generally agreed to have been rather a pleasant place. The description here, then, must have a poetic purpose. It emphasises the importance of agriculture: farming, even in an awful place like Ascra, is preferable to the uncertainty of seafaring (Griffith 1983:61-2, Ercolani; cf. 618-94n.). Hesiod's father is used as focaliser: he is unsuccessful and disillusioned, and projects it onto the place to which his poverty has exiled him (Marsilio 2000:38, Hamilton 1989:68, Rosen 1990:105).

641-2 An apostrophe to Perses, which follows naturally from the preceding lines: Hesiod has told the story as a warning to Perses not to follow their father's example. Here Hesiod no longer opposes *erga* and *nautilia* (cf. 618-45n.), but merges the two: and it is the crucial idea of timeliness (642 ὥραίων πάντων; cf. 30-2n.) which can bring them together. Timeliness provides an excuse for engaging in seafaring, and seafaring in turn becomes a didactic test case (see further 673n.). On the phrase ἔργων μεμνημένος εἶναι cf. 422n. and p.52.

643 αἰνεῖν: in *Op.* this always refers to misplaced praise: here a big ship is better for transporting cargo, although you praise a small one; at 683 Hesiod does not praise spring as a season for sailing, although many men mistakenly do so; at 824 everyone praises a different day, but few understand them.

644 The repetitions μείζων...μειῖζον and ἐπὶ κέρδει κέρδος make this line mnemonic, emphasising the need to remember Hesiod's teachings, extract and reuse them (623, 642 μεμνημένος). On the formulation ἐπὶ κέρδει κέρδος cf. 382 ἔργον ἐπ' ἔργῳ ἐργάζεσθαι.

645 εἴ: introduces a final caveat – Hesiod can’t predict everything, particularly for such a risky venture as seafaring. Cf. 638 Zeus, and 667-8.

646-62 Hesiod’s *sphragis*. As noted at 618-94n., Hesiod’s success here contrasts with his father’s difficult life and so sets up positive and negative models for Perses *et al.* Furthermore, the passage acts as a self-reflexive poetological comment. Through *recusatio* (648-50), a ‘heroic’ narrative (651-3) and an ‘autobiographical’ narrative (654-62), Hesiod makes a metapoetic comparison between his own poetry and heroic epic. For poetological readings of the passage see Nagy in Luce 1982:66, Rosen 1990, Marsilio 2000, Martin 2004:19-21, Tsagalis in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:15.

The narrative section is marked out as a detachable unit, a self-contained story, by the ring composition 650-1 οὐ γάρ πώ ποτε νηί γ’ ἐπέπλων εὐρέα πόντον,¹ εἰ μὴ... 660 τόσσόν τοι νηῶν γε πεπείρημαι.

648-50 Hesiod’s *recusatio*. He claims to be ignorant of seafaring, but gives instructions on it nevertheless: his authority comes therefore not from specific experience (650 οὐ γάρ πώ ποτε νηί γ’ ἐπέπλων) but from the Muses (see 658-62n. – and 692-3n. on analogous experience). At 648 Hesiod offers to teach (δείξω can imply prescription: cf. 502 δείκνυε δὲ δμώεσσι) the μέτρα πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης. Ercolani interprets μέτρα as routes, distances feasible depending on the conditions of the sea: this meaning is suited to the context of when (not) to sail, with analogues at *Od.* 3.179, 4.389 and 10.539, but should perhaps be extended to include

measures of any skill more generally: for the μέτρα of a sphere of activity being known to whoever is an expert in that activity, see e.g. Solon fr.13.52 (of a poet) ἱμερτῆς σοφίης μέτρον ἐπιστάμενος, and further Griffith in Griffith/Mastrorade 1990:188-90. However, in the following lines Hesiod professes (rather emphatically) *not* to have such expertise: 649 οὐτέ τι ναυτιλίας σεσοφισμένος, 650 οὐ γάρ πώ ποτε... This inconsistency is further emphasised by the ‘exception’ to this ignorance (651 εἰ μή): a short voyage (651 ἐς Εὐβοίαν ἐξ Αὐλίδος) which hardly makes him an expert. As Rosen 1990:102 notes, ‘this very absurdity suggests that we are to understand his claim as metaphorical’: that, as Rosen suggests, Hesiod ‘is not skilled in the type of poetry that deals with such affairs’ as seafaring, or, without the self-deprecating undertone, that Hesiod’s poetry is *distinct* from that which deals with such things.

651-3 According to heroic tradition, the Achaeans gathered at Aulis before proceeding to Troy (*Il.*2.303-4). At 652 they are said to have been μείναντες χειμῶνα (cf. 630 ὥραϊον μίμνειν πλόον): in the *Cypria* and Aesch. *Ag.* they are delayed by bad weather (and must, in some versions, appease the gods by sacrificing Iphigenia) so Goettling and Mazon interpret ‘waiting for the good grace of the storm’; however the Greek more naturally means ‘waiting out the winter’ and so perhaps refers to another version of the story. For a similar compression of the heroic tradition cf. 161-5n. (on the parallel between the passages Hamilton 1989:69).

West comments: ‘it shows how strong was the interest in heroic poetry, that Hesiod cannot mention Aulis without thinking of the Atreidai and their expedition’. However, there is more to the Homeric echo than mere thought progression:

Hesiod's use of traditional material here is pointed and sophisticated – he does not reuse but reworks. At 650 he used a Homeric phrase ἐπέπλων εὐρέα πόντον (cf. *Il.* 6.291) in a pointedly ironic sense. At 653 he reverses the traditional epithets of Greece and Troy – Greece becomes ἱερῆς and Troy καλλιγύναικα – this both acts as a polemical correction of Homeric diction (Graziosi 2002:170; Edwards 1971:80 sees Hesiod's sense of humour here), just like Hesiod corrects his own *Theog.* at 11-12, and reflects Helen's move from one to the other (Arrighetti 1998:441). Therefore Aulis rather 'serves as the springboard for a daring poetological leap' (Tsagalis in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:151). Hesiod compares his own poetry with that of Homer: he has made a 'small voyage', but is unpractised in heroic epic. As Rosen 1990:112 admits, this interpretation 'presupposes a degree of literary self-consciousness and gamesmanship that we normally reserve for Hellenistic poets'. However, it does not seem implausible, given Hesiod's sophisticated use of wordplay and riddling language in *Op.*, and his interest in poetic inspiration, authority and truth as well as poetic self-sufficiency.

654-7 Hesiod travelled to Chalcis for the funeral games of Amphidamas. According to Plut. *Mor.* 153f-154a, this Amphidamas fell in the Lelantine War (in Plut. *Mor.* 153f he is ἀνὴρ πολεμικός; here δαΐφρωνος and μεγαλήτορος could attest to his prestige in war), an identification which would provide a *terminus post quem* for the poem of somewhere between the end of the 8th and middle of the 7th century BC – if the Lelantine War actually happened: Fehling 1979:199-210 has argued that it is fictional, Tausend 1987:499-514 mythical; on the problem see further Naddaf 2002:346-7, Hall 2007:4-7.

Funeral games are a common epic motif, the most notable example being those for Patroclus in *Il.*23 (including the ‘other’ Amphidamas), and tripods a usual prize. Here the games are organised by Amphidamas’ sons (cf. e.g. *Il.*23.631), on which Marsilio 2000:44 comments: ‘Unlike the brothers Hesiod and Perses, who are opponents in a dispute over the distribution of their dead father’s estate, the sons of Amphidamas harmoniously joined together to offer prizes at their father’s funeral’. This idea of positive and negative examples can be traced even in Hesiod’s participation in the games: ‘Unlike Perses, who conspired with kings to gain an unfair advantage over his opponent, Hesiod was willing to compete in a fair contest’ (Marsilio 2000:45).

Hesiod wins a prize for song (657 ὕμνῳ νικήσαντα), though we are not told which song: perhaps it was his *Theog.* (West 1966 *ad Theog.*44-6, Janko 1982:94, Marsilio 2000:44). It is this detail which provided the background for the later tradition in which Homer was cast as Hesiod’s rival in this competition: cf. *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi* (extant version probably from 2nd c. AD, with origins in Alcidas’ 4th c. BC *Mouseion*). According to this tradition (*Certamen* 13, Procl. *vita Hom.*55), inscribed on the tripod won by Hesiod was an epigram: Ἡσίοδος Μούσαις Ἐλικωνίσι τόνδ’ ἀνέθηκεν | ὕμνῳ νικήσας ἐν Χαλκίδι θεῖον Ὅμηρον. The second line of this epigram was transposed into the scholia, and is presented by Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)657a as a variant (ἄλλοι γράφουσιν· ὕμνῳ νικήσαντ’ ἐν Χαλκίδι θεῖον Ὅμηρον). Such effects of the later tradition on the text of *Op.* itself are epitomised by Plutarch’s omission of 650-62 (according to Proclus): he regarded this whole section as an interpolation, presumably in light of the later tradition in which the contest between

Homer and Hesiod became so embedded that an indication of it here was interpreted not as its origin but as an anachronism.

658-62 Hesiod and the Muses: see p.46-7. The Muses perform two functions here: first, they are part of Hesiod's autobiographical narrative. They are key to the immediate narrative – that of the funeral games – as they taught Hesiod the skill with which he won the contest: 659 λιγυρῆς ἐπέβησαν ἀοιδῆς (cf. 582-4n.). They also have wider connections with Hesiod's autobiography, with roots in *Theog.*: Hesiod makes his dedication to them in the place where they taught him to sing (659), an allusion to the specification at *Theog.*²³ Ἑλικῶνος ὑπο ζαθέοιο, a link strengthened by the formula Μούσης Ἑλικωνιάδεσσ' used at both 658 and *Theog.*1. Second, they support Hesiod on a topic of which he is ignorant: seafaring. They have been absent for a long tract of the poem, and indeed in the proem were asked to sing a song *parallel* to Hesiod's own, but here Hesiod reiterates their role not only to reminisce but also to reinvolve their inspiration. 662 μ' ἐδίδαξαν ἀθέσφατον ὕμνον αἰεῖν: Hesiod may not have first-hand experience of sailing, but he is nevertheless qualified to speak of it because the Muses have taught him a 'boundless' song. Homer too invokes the Muses when in doubt: cf. *Il.*2.484-92. To show how 'boundless' this song really is, Hesiod claims at 661 ἐρέω Ζηνὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο: he knows not only the ways of the sea as they appear to men, but also the divine power behind them, privileged knowledge which can come only from the Muses. Even Hesiod cannot be self-sufficient all the time, but must sometimes depend completely on his teachers.

663-78 The first sailing season. After the autobiographical narratives, Hesiod returns to prescription and the didactic structure he established in the Calendar and at the beginning of the seafaring section (619-21): the season for sailing (665 ὥραϊος...πλόος; cf. 630) is marked by a solar indicator (663 τροπὰς ἡελίοιο), with a seasonal description introduced by the usual τῆμος (670).

Epic allusions are not confined to the autobiographical narratives, however, but continue here, now in a particularly Odyssean vein. At 665-6 the dangers to be avoided by sailing at the right time are specified as destroying one's ship and one's men: Odysseus' own fate. 667 Ποσειδάων ἐνοσίχθων reinforces this Odyssean connection: a key character in *Od.*, Poseidon appears only here in *Op.*, and is a striking interloper in a context which in its other occurrences in *Op.* (474, 483-4) featured only Zeus (see 664n., 667n.). The epithet used to describe him is the closest to a 'sea' epithet he has in Hom., and in fact is used at *Od.* 5.282 when Poseidon decides to wreck Odysseus' ship off the land of the Phaeacians. 670 εὐκρινέες τ' αὔραι καὶ πόντος ἀπήμεων reshuffles the elements of the Odyssean formula for navigational winds οὖρος ἀπήμεων (*Od.* 5.268, 7.266, 12.167). These allusions (not necessarily to *Od.* itself, but rather to a common *nostos* tradition) give Hesiod's teachings extra admonitory force: if you listen to Hesiod, you will not suffer disaster on the sea as e.g. Odysseus did (*Od.* 1.4 πολλὰ δ' ὃ γ' ἐν πόντῳ πάθεν ἄλγεα). However the implications are rather more complex than in the *sphragis*, because of the essential relevance to Hesiod's own enterprise of the *nostos* tradition. Whilst in the *sphragis* the hints were to martial epic (heroes off to war), something which Hesiod can happily disown, here he simultaneously discredits the venture of

seafaring, i.e. epic, and supports the fundamental idea of the *nostos* tradition – the desire to return home (673 πάλιν οἰκόνδε νέεσθαι).

664 ἐς τέλος; cf. 669 ἐν τοῖς γὰρ τέλος ἐστίν. Elsewhere in *Op.* e.g. 218 and 294 (see notes), concern for τέλος has been linked with Hesiod's long-term vision and has even had moral implications. At 474 it was linked with Zeus and his final say on agricultural matters. Here it seems to have a primarily seasonal meaning, but may retain some suggestion of the importance of planning for the long term: Hesiod is, after all, concerned with the seafarer's safe return home (673 πάλιν οἰκόνδε νέεσθαι). At 669 it is used as at 474, of the gods' final word: the sentiment seems to be proverbial (although on Poseidon's role see 663-78n. and 667n.), as does the balanced formulation of 669, so perhaps the more prosaic use of τέλος at 664 brought to mind a relevant maxim.

θέρεος, καματώδεος ὥρης; also at 584, of the cicada's midsummer song. The repetition may be intended to reinforce the conflict between the two activities agriculture and seafaring (618-94n.); however, it may give the farmer a non-detrimental window of opportunity for seafaring by fitting it into the summer 'gap'.

665-6 Importance of sailing at the right time (ὥραϊος; cf. 30-2n.): see 618-94n. for the dangers of seafaring used to discredit the venture.

667 εἰ δὲ μή; introduces a caveat which exculpates Hesiod from full responsibility (p.53). He has discredited seafaring (618-94n.), has specified when not to sail (619-21n.) and when to do it (663-78n.), and has even asked the Muses to teach him about

it (658-62n.); there is little more he can do, the venture is still risky but is ultimately 'in the hands of the gods'.

669 ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε: here Zeus and Poseidon are in charge of good and evil; at *Theog.*901 it is because he swallowed Metis that Zeus understands such things; at *Theog.*219 and 906 the Fates measure out good and evil for mortals. In *Od.* the formulation is used of both Zeus (4.237) and the Muse (8.63). The line seems proverbial, and indeed 667-9 form a neat unit on the deciding power of the gods.

670 τῆμος: good sailing conditions, introduced by a formula familiar from the agricultural Calendar: Hesiod may not favour seafaring, but he is fair in his treatment of it.

672 ἐλκέμεν ἐς πόντον: we have reached the time for sailing: cf. 631 τότε νῆα θοὴν ἄλαδ' ἐλκέμεν.

φόρτον: see 631-2n. Here Hesiod advises putting on board the entire cargo (φόρτόν...πάντα): contrast his advice at 689-90.

673 σπεύδειν δ' ὅτι τάχιστα: timeliness is as relevant to seafaring as to agriculture: in fact at 641-2, more so. It is this idea of timeliness which provides the rationale for mentioning seafaring at all. On the verb see 460-1n.

674-7 In line with his general reluctance to teach sailing, Hesiod delineates even more times *not* to sail (cf. 619-21), neatly summarising different seasons e.g. 674 οἶνόν τε νέον encapsulates the September grape harvest described at 609-14. 675-7 focus on the risk posed to sailors by the winds. Although it is the South wind that is

described here (675 Νότοιο), it resembles winter Boreas of which Hesiod warned at such great length (cf. 506n.): 507-8 εὐρέι πόντῳ | ἐμπνεύσας ὥρινε; 676 ὅς τ' ὥρινε θάλασσαν.

678-94 The alternative sailing season: spring. West calls it 'a second-best time', although ἄλλος does not suggest a hierarchy: for the farmer turning his hand to seafaring, the summer season is certainly preferable to spring as he can take advantage of the time of enforced agricultural inactivity – see 664n., and Hesiod's explicit displeasure at 682-3n. Cf. 485-60 the alternative ploughing: in both cases the seasonal markers involve birds, trees, and the formulation ἦμος...τὸ πρῶτον (and see 680n.).

The spring sailing is marked by natural indicators, framed by references to the season in ring composition: 678 ἄλλος δ' εἰαρινὸς πέλεται πλόος...682 εἰαρινὸς δ' οὗτος πέλεται πλόος. This ring composition draws attention to what is a strange set of indicators. There are some parallels for the formulation: Nilsson 1920:49 cites from the Pennsylvanian Indian 'when the leaf of the white oak is as large as a mouse's ear, it is time to plant the maize', Hays 1918 gives 'plant corn when the oak leaves are the size of a squirrel's ear'. The connection between the crow and the fig tree seems to be a traditional one, as at Ar. *Pax* 628 there is a type of fig called the κορώνεως (sc. συκῇ). The indicators are even introduced in a formulaic way – 679 ἦμος, 681 τότε (although it is worth noting that this is the only case in *Op.* of this combination: usually ἦμος...τῆμος) – and draw on the usual elements (birds: see 448n., and on the crow again 747). However, the formulation is on the whole obscure and riddling. Rosen 1990:110-11 interprets the lines as another *ainos* (cf. 202-

12n.): the crow represents a bad poet (as at Pind. *Ol.*2.86 with Σ, and *Nem.*3.82), 680 ἐποίησεν refers to making poetry, and 680 ἵχνος is the poetry of the crow-poet. He backs up this interpretation with parallels between the cicada passage (for its poetological meaning see 582-4n.) and the *later* crow passage (747). He admits, however, that despite isolating these ‘meanings’, the impetus of the *ainos* is still elusive. It may, after all, be simply a piece of rural wisdom entrenched in tradition: cf. Hesiod’s use of riddling language at 40-1.

680 φανήη: this is Rzach’s correction of the transmitted φανείη, made on the basis of 458: similar phrasing provides another parallel between the two sailing and two ploughing seasons.

682-3 Hesiod gives his opinion on the spring sailing: emphasised by 682 ἔγωγε (at the end of its line, creating enjambment) and 683 ἐμῷ θυμῷ. His negative opinion is in keeping with his attempts throughout the sailing passage to discredit the venture (see 618-94n.), and is emphasised even more explicitly here because, for a farmer, the spring sailing is even more disruptive than that in summer (678-88n.). Whilst West sees most of 683 as ‘padding’, Rosen 1990:111 notes that κεχαρισμένος suggests aesthetic judgement, and this he interprets as marking the spring ‘sailing’ as a poetic venture.

684 ἀρπακτός: cf. 320 χρήματα δ’ οὐχ ἀρπακτά – snatching is discouraged for both property and sailing. For the connection between the two see further 686-7n.

686-7 An ostensibly formulaic pair of lines: 686 seems proverbial, and indeed was cited as such by Stob. 4.31a23; 686 δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσιν is a formula found also at 214;

the sentiment of 687, that to die at sea is terrible because there can be no funeral, is expressed also at *Od.* 1.161-2, 5.306-12. However, all of these formulae are here used pointedly, to express Hesiod's negative views on seafaring. For example, Ercolani suggests that the use of δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσιν here is pointed as obsession with riches is most characteristic of δειλοί men: those who are low on the social scale.

Most notably, 686 χρήματα γὰρ ψυχὴ πέλεται creates a dichotomy between χρήματα and ψυχὴ which pre-empts the parallelism 687/691: the repeated structure δεινόν...κύμασιν refers in the first instance to loss of life and in the second to loss of cargo. Hesiod uses a combination of maxims here to make two striking points: first, men who take to the sea do so because they have replaced a concern for life with a concern for possessions; and second, seafaring poses a threat to both.

687-8 σ' ἄνωγα ἰφράζεσθαι...ὥς ἀγορεύω: these emphatically didactic lines introduce some more general considerations on seafaring, not necessarily specific to spring sailing. Hesiod urges his audience to listen to his warnings about seafaring: also 694. The phrasing resonates throughout *Op.*: for σ' ἄνωγα φράζεσθαι cf. 403-4; μετὰ φρεσὶν cf. 274; ὥς ἀγορεύω see similarly ὥς σε κελεύω 316, 536.

689-90 Contrast 672: there we were told to put all our cargo onboard, here one must *not* put all one's livelihood on a ship (μηδ' ἐν νηυσὶν ἅπαντα βίον).

692-3 The introduction of the wagon here has caused much debate. Its apparent incongruity led some editors to doubt the text: e.g. Lehrs 1837:211. However, given Hesiod's championing of farming over seafaring, it is not so surprising that he would use a comparative agricultural example to make his point: for farming

creeping into the sailing section elsewhere cf. 623n. His choice of comparative material is particularly interesting in that it recalls the plough of 427-36, Hesiod's rhetorical showpiece (414-47n.). Although Hesiod is not well-versed in seafaring from personal experience, he is qualified to give advice not only because of the Muses (658-62n.) but also because he is the didactic authority in analogous matters.

694 An emphatically didactic conclusion to the digression on seafaring. As 687-8 consolidated characteristic didactic formulae, this line reiterates two of *Op.*'s main didactic themes which apply equally well to farming, seafaring and the general maxims to come (thus giving them a uniting rationale): measure, and the right time.

695-764 Everyday social (695-723) and religious (724-59) norms. The passage is made up of a series of loosely connected prescriptions, employing strings of iussive infinitives to address issues as varied as marriage and urination. The nuggets of advice come one after the other through association of thought or 'logical drift' (Scodel 2012).

This gnomic passage and that at 320-80 frame the Calendar (and the section on seafaring). A comparison between the two framing passages highlights the poem's 'progressive darkening of vision' (Clay 2003:47): see e.g. 707-14n. Furthermore the two sets of maxims, the second more pessimistic than the first, seem distinctly Iron-Age as they parallel the two phases of the Iron Race (see 174-201n.): the bad present and the worse future. Both gnomic passages refer to the Iron Age passage, and the darker tone of the second gnomic passage makes it analogous with the latter

‘apocalyptic’ part of the Age. At 705 a bad wife brings her husband to early old age (ὠμῶ γήραϊ): at 181 premature ageing is the first sign that Zeus will destroy the Iron Race. At 707-14 (as at 327-32) Hesiod considers social norms and their reversal: at 182-4 these conflicts (in particular those of the ἐταῖρος and the κασίγνητος, as here) signify the downfall of the Race. 712 δίκην recalls a main theme of the first part of *Op.*, a striking echo as it is a theme of which we have seen little since 283 (the only other instance being 334 ἔργων ἀδίκων in the first gnomic passage). The anaphora of μηδέ at 715-17 recalls that of οὐδέ at 182-4 and 190-1.

695-705 These lines stand out as a coherent unit, before the more meandering strings of maxims which follow. The theme of marriage is reiterated throughout: 697 γάμος, 698 γαμοῖτο, 700 γαμεῖν, 701 γήμης. The connection with the previous lines is the theme of the right time: 694 καιρός leads on to 695 ὥραϊος. Hesiod will pick up on the theme of marriage again in the Days section: 784, 800.

695-7 A self-contained sub-unit on the age at which a man should marry. The three lines are marked out as a unit by the ring composition 695 ὥραϊος...697 ὥριος οὔτος: on the latter formulation cf. 682 οὔτος πέλεται πλόος, also the concluding component of a ring-compositional structure (678-94n.). The lines seem proverbial, with mnemonic features such as anaphora (μήτε...μήτ') and repetition (μάλα πόλλ'...μάλα πολλά), and the provision concerning age following the structure of the very folkloric rain measurement at 489 (see note). The age specified (c.30) seems traditional too: cf. e.g. Solon fr.27.9 (marry in the 5th hebdomad), Pl. *Leg.* 721b-d (30-35), 772d (25-35), 785b (30-35). However, Hesiod fits the traditional material to his own didactic purposes: 695 οἶκον ἄγεσθαι is a formula for marriage, found at

*Il.*3.72, 3.93, *Od.*6.159, *Hom. Hymn* 6.17, but it takes on greater significance in the context of *Op.* with its particular concern for the *oikos* and self-sufficiency (see further 700 on neighbours).

698-701 The ideal wife. She should be in her fifth year after puberty: a rather less precise formulation than for the male, although puberty is fixed at 14 by e.g. *Arist. Hist. an.*581a12ff. She should be παρθενική (699): on the uncertainty as to whether this is a social or a physical concept see 256n.; on the sexual connotations of ‘teaching’ one’s bride (699) cf. 519-23 the tender-skinned maiden (παρθενικῆς ἀπαλόχροος) ignorant of the works of Aphrodite. She should live nearby (700-1): a woman of the village is, as West puts it, ‘more or less a known quantity’, so less likely to end up a cause of humiliation (701 μὴ γείτοσι χάσματα γήμης) – for Hesiod’s concern with reputation see 11-13n.; on neighbours cf. 342-52 (esp. 343~700). Furthermore a bride living nearby fits with Hesiod’s self-sufficient ideals: as a farmer would hope to have all the means of production within the *oikos*, so too he should not have to go far for a wife. However, as with the tender-skinned maiden (519-23n.), even the woman living nearby is not entirely without threat: also nearby, at 288, is κακότης.

These characteristics of the ideal wife, arranged in an ascending tricolon, are surely traditional and widespread: on the last point cf. e.g. *Instructions of ‘Onchsheshonqy* 15.15 ‘Do not let your son marry a woman from another village lest he be taken from you’; Italian proverb ‘moglie e buoi dei paesi tuoi’. It is interesting, however, how strikingly Hesiodic they are too: a good wife is determined by the right time, by proximity to the *oikos*, and by the potential for being taught (699 διδάξεις). Again

Hesiod uses traditional material, but only where it fits the didactic themes of his poem. What one must teach one's bride is not specified: *Op.* is targeted at a male audience and so, although he points out the need for women to be taught, Hesiod does not go into detail here.

702-5 The first two lines form a balanced pair. For the sentiment cf. 343, on 702 λήϊζετ' cf. 322n. 704-5 then expand on the idea of the bad wife. This is an example of Hesiod appropriating traditional lines (702-3) and tethering them to his own purposes: 704-5 sway the balance in a negative direction, reflecting Hesiod's suspicion of women throughout *Op.* Indeed, the latter lines seem more Hesiodic than traditional: for example 704 δειπνολόχης is a *hapax*. It could mean either 'a dinner-ambusher' i.e. gluttonous, or more likely 'an ambusher-at-dinner' i.e. a distraction as at 373-5 (the latter at Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)699-705, Paley, Nicolai 1979:720, Beall 2001:164-5). The paradoxical metaphor 705 εὔει ἄτερ δαλοῖο recalls earlier associations between women and fire/heat: the sequence of events linking Prometheus/fire/Pandora (57 ἀντὶ πυρός), and the midsummer 'clash of the sexes' 586. The threat of women bringing men to early old age 705 ὦμῳ γήραϊ is found also at *Od.*15.357 (a parallel which created a variant reading in *Op.*). However, in the context of *Op.* it takes on a greater significance. In the apocalyptic passage of the Myth of the Races, Zeus will destroy the Iron Race εὖτ' ἂν γεινόμενοι πολιορκόταφοι τελέθωσιν (181): the echo of this premature aging here suggests that a bad wife is so bad that she will even play a role in the downfall of the Race. See further 695-764n.

706 Because of its disconnection with what precedes and what follows, and its composition of formulaic elements (ὅπιν ἀθανάτων ~187, 251 θεῶν ὅπιν; εὔ...πεφυλαγμένος cf. 491, 765; πεφυλαγμένος εἶναι ~616, 641 μεμνημένος εἶναι), the line was doubted by Lehrs 1837, moved to after 723 by Steitz 1869, and rejected by Wilamowitz (*ad* 760-4). West defends the line through an intricate hypothesis regarding Hesiod's thought processes. It suffices to say, however, that this is where the 'logical drift' really begins: from now on, each theme blends into the one following with no clear divisions or explicit rationale. This line sounds like a catch-all, a generic warning which can apply to any and all of the maxims to come.

707-14 How to treat others. Clay 2003:47 notes that whilst at 370-1 neither a friend nor a brother is to be trusted, at 707 we are instructed not to treat a friend as equal to a brother: 'Blood has become thicker'. Another difference Clay notes between the two sets of maxims, the darkening of vision, also comes to the fore here: the principle of reciprocity governed the first set, but this passage is 'characterized by a kind of negative reciprocity and avoidance', the first evident in 711 δις τόσα τείνυσθαι and the second in 708 μή μιν πρότερος κακὸν ἔρξεις. Both reciprocity and negative reciprocity are aspects of self-sufficiency: the first is concerned with establishing good relations with one's neighbours to protect one's own *oikos*, the second is a more direct defensive measure.

Ercolani makes the interesting point that the 'casuistic' formulation of these lines (i.e. the use of case-based reasoning) seems to develop a basic kind of law code. The formulation referred to is no doubt the repeated εἰ δέ (708, 709, 711) with which Hesiod introduces multiple scenarios: on planning for eventualities cf. 425n., 432-

4n., 474n. That the lines prescribe some kind of behavioural code is suggested by the focus on deeds and action: although at 710 Hesiod balances ἔπος and ἔργον, this is a formulaic pairing (cf. e.g. *Il.*1.395, 504, 5.879, *Od.*3.99, 4.163, 329, 690, 15.375, *Hom. Hymn* 2.199, 3.541) and it is in fact the ἔργον which is emphasised through repeated use of the verbs ποιέω (707, 708, 714) and ἔρδω (708, 710). Furthermore, the return of δίκη after a prolonged absence (see further 695-764n.) is indicative both of this behavioural code (cf. 213-85n.), and of laws (cf. 9 δίκη δ'ἔθυνε θέμιστας).

As Ercolani notes, such precepts might constitute a kind of 'canon' in an oral culture. By formulating these lines in such a way, Hesiod makes his advice applicable outside his own family unit (as West notes, 'We are no longer conscious of Perses as the recipient of this advice'). Whilst the structure indicates a coherent procedure on the one hand, on the other hand the use of enjambment at 712-13 and 713-14 contributes to the meandering feel of this whole section, characterised as it is by loose connections.

Theognis too deals with this theme (on the archaic poets cf. 695-705n.), sometimes agreeing sometimes disagreeing with Hes.: Thgn. 97-9 conveys the opposite sentiment to *Op.*707 (as does *Od.*8.546-7); Thgn. 1.1089-90 so closely resembles *Op.*710-11 that it may be a direct reference.

714 σὲ δὲ μή τι νόος κατελεγχέτω εἶδος: your appearance should match your mind. A discrepancy between the two is criticised also at *Od.*8.176-7 and 17.454, and in the context of *Op.* the most evident example of this discord is Pandora, she who

has the beautiful and lovely form of a maiden (63 παρθενικῆς καλὸν εἶδος ἐπήρατον) but the mind of a dog (67 κύνεόν τε νόον).

715-23 Guests and feasts. The transition between these and the previous lines seems to be simply 713 φίλον ἄλλοτε ἄλλον, 715 πολύξεινον. This section is comprised of a string of one- or two-line maxims detachable in their own right. It can be recognised as a larger unit, however, by the continuity of theme, by linking phrases (πλείστη δὲ χάρις 720 and 723), and by the ring composition 715 πολύξεινον...722 πολυξείνου which draws it together. On 722 West comments ‘the adjective was in Hesiod’s mind from 715’; however, as elsewhere in *Op.* the ring composition is more likely to indicate conscious structuring of material. All of these maxims function both as traditional expressions of general concerns (see the comparative material) and as advice pertinent to Hesiod’s didactic themes in *Op.*: 715-16 and 721 reputation, 717-18 poverty and the role of the gods, 719-20 measure.

715-16 How many friends one should have. The sentiment may have been a traditional one (the issue is a concern also at e.g. Plut. *Mor.*93b-97b, Arist. *Eth. Nic.*1170b20-3 – the latter with reference to *Op.*715; cf. also κακῶν ἔταρον at *Il.*24.63), but the way in which this maxim is formulated is distinctly Hesiodic: anaphora (cf. 5-7n.); antitheses between positives and negatives from the same root (cf. 3n.); pointed use of generally applicable terms (716 κακῶν...ἐσθλῶν cf. 287-92); coinages (716 νεικεστῆρα is a *hapax*, and ἄξεινος is not attested elsewhere in early epic). Both lines are governed by the verb καλέεσθαι, which here denotes a concern for one’s reputation: see 11-13n. For avoidance of quarrels (do not be a wrangler, 716 νεικεστῆρα) cf. 27-41.

717-18 Do not reproach the poor. The theme recurs at Thgn. 155-8 and 1062, with some of the same phrasing: πενίην θυμοφθόρον ἀνδρί 717, Thgn. 155; 717 οὐλομένη πενίη, Thgn. 155-6 πενίην...οὐλομένην. For a comparative example from another culture see e.g. *Counsels of Wisdom* 57ff. 'Do not insult the downtrodden...It is not pleasing to Šamaš, who will repay him with evil'. For Hesiod this maxim may have been linked with that at 695-705 on marriage as 717 οὐλομένη πενίη recurs at *Theog.*593, of women who support men in prosperity but not in poverty. The final phrase 718 μακάρων δόσιν αἰὲν ἔόντων is composed of formulaic elements (cf. e.g. *Theog.*33 μακάρων γένος αἰὲν ἔόντων), but in the context of *Op.* it acts as another of Hesiod's 'escape clauses': he has taught us all he can about how to avoid poverty, but the gods have the final say (cf. 474, 483-4, 667 – and on poverty 638 κακὴν πενίην, τὴν Ζεὺς ἀνδρεσσι δίδωσιν).

719-20 Guard your tongue. Another traditional theme: cf. e.g. *Counsels of Wisdom* 26-7 'Let your mouth be controlled and your speech guarded: therein is a man's wealth – let your lips be very precious'. Proper speech is specified in terms of μέτρον (720), a recurring preoccupation in *Op.*

721 Avoid gossip. The reciprocity of words is another traditional theme: cf. e.g. *Counsels of Wisdom* 133 'what you say in a moment will follow you afterwards', *Il.*20.250 ὅπποῖόν κ' εἶπησθα ἔπος, τοῖόν κ' ἐπακούσῃς. The formulation (εἰ δέ introducing a potential, undesirable, scenario) is used often in *Op.*: 425, 434, 474. This theme reiterates the concern for reputation highlighted by the maxim 715-16, and will be revisited at 760-4: as the final point of the *Works*, in fact. See further 11-13n. That words are reciprocal evokes the larger theme of reciprocity (see p.56-7),

itself an element of self-sufficiency: Hesiod portrays gossip as a vicious cycle of words, which one should avoid by keeping one's thoughts to oneself.

722-3 These lines conclude the social maxim section by reusing components from the preceding maxims: 722 πολυξείνου creates ring composition with 715, and 723 πλείστη δὲ χάρις reiterates a phrase from 720. The lines finish with a chiasmus (723 πλείστη δὲ χάρις δαπάνη τ' ὀλιγίστη) which rounds off the section stylistically whilst giving a nod to frugality. As θησαυρός was used metaphorically at 719 for the tongue, so at 722 'stormy' (δυσπεμφέλου) behaviour is a seafaring metaphor.

724-59 After a series of social maxims, here religious precepts predominate. The transition parallels that between 327-32 (social norms) and 335-41 (religious norms): though cf. 335-41n. on the divide as purely thematic rather than conceptual. Many of these precepts are intended to prohibit pollution, protecting the sun, the hearth, roads, rivers and springs: on pollution see further Parker 1983:293. Although this section involves gods, they are important only inasmuch as they have an impact on everyday Iron-Age life (cf. e.g. 771n.), and Hesiod makes this point by referring here not to Olympians but to more primal, elemental divinities (sun, hearth, rivers).

The section was rejected first by Twisten, along with the subsequent lines; Wilamowitz (*ad* 760-4) was the first to reject these lines but retain those following. He influenced e.g. Solmsen 1963:317-19 and Nicolai 1964:140-2. The main reason for their suspicions is that the superstitious tone, insufficient reasoning and lack of structure are 'out of character'. However, these reasons are themselves insufficient

grounds for athetesis. The so-called superstitions are cultural norms which may sound strange to us but are hardly inappropriate for an archaic Greek poet; the reasoning is certainly looser than in some other parts of *Op.* but bears a striking resemblance to lines that are above suspicion such as 424, 433, 570; the structure too may be looser than elsewhere but it fits the pattern established already in 706 (and which is set to continue in the *Days*). The passage as a whole displays Hesiod's expertise in more obscure matters (rituals, religious lore): the obscurity of the structure may, then, be part of the intended effect.

724-6 Do not pour a libation with unwashed hands. The pouring of libations was already mentioned at 338, and washing one's hands as an important ritual consideration will be advised again at 740, in the same terms: *χερσὶν ἀνίπτοισιν* 725, 740. For Homeric examples of washing one's hands before pouring a libation cf. *Il.* 16.230, 24.303-4, and esp. 6.266 *χερσὶ δ' ἀνίπτοισιν Διὶ λείβειν αἶθοπα οἶνον*: another arrangement of the same formulaic elements we have here in *Op.*

The result of such a transgression would be that the gods do not listen, 725 οὐ κλύουσιν. The form κλύουσιν (secondary pres. from aor. ἔκλυον) occurs only here in archaic poetry, and 725 ἀποπτύουσι is not found as a graphic metaphor for 'reject' again before Aeschylus. The use of a strange verb formation is hardly un-Hesiodic, and he has used metaphorical language in maxims at 705, 718, 722.

727-32 Where/when (not) to urinate. See further 757-9. At 727 the theme is first introduced by the verb ὀμείχειν, an archaic word found only here in early Greek epic and replaced by οὐρεῖν which Hesiod also uses (729, 736, 758). The theme is marked as a religiously orientated one by the rationale 729 μακάρων τοι νύκτες

ἔασιν and by the θεῖος ἀνὴρ at 731. However, Hesiod tempers the stark precepts with exhortations to be mindful and wise: 728 μεμνημένος (cf. e.g. 711), 731 θεῖος ἀνὴρ, πεπνυμένα εἰδώς (cf. 293 πανάριστος, ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσει).

The order and authenticity of the lines has been a matter of some debate: Wilamowitz regarded 728 and 730 as later interpolations; Solmsen transposes 729 to after 720; the summary of the lines provided by Proclus (*ΣOp.*(Pertusi)727-32) does not quite coincide with our text, suggesting he may have been using another version. Discrepancies between texts can be explained in terms of the high levels of detachability here. Not only is the section self-contained, but as it does not present a cumulative argument and each line makes its own point, the lines could be detached individually: and put back together in more than one order. This disjointed structure may be the result of an appropriation of traditional material (cf. e.g. *Laws of Manu* 4.45-50), or of the lack of explanatory force in the precepts of this part of *Op.* (see 724-59n.).

727-8 When (not) to urinate is prescribed in terms of the sun. That ‘pollution’ should be hidden from the sun is related to the sun’s divinity; indeed, Beall 2001:165 suggests that ἡελίου be ‘sensed as personal’ and capitalised. Furthermore, on the formulation ἄντ’ ἡελίου, Beall notes a parallel with hostile actions ἄντ’ Αἴαντος (*Il.*15.415) and ἄντ’ Ἀχιλλῆος (*Il.*20.89, 365): not only is the sun personified, but it is presented as under attack. As the days are to be protected, so are the nights (730 μακάρων τοι νύκτες ἔασιν): Hesiod leaves little room for manoeuvre. On 728 μεμνημένος see 422n. and p.52.

729 Where not to urinate. The anaphora μήτ'...μήτ'... (cf. 715-17), the repetition with polyptoton ὀδῶ/ ὀδοῦ, and the opposing prepositions ἐν/ ἐκτός all make this line mnemonic.

731-2 Where to urinate. On 731 ἐζόμενος in particular see the comparative examples given by West *ad loc.*

733-6 Where/when (not) to have sexual intercourse. As with urinating, the problem is one of pollution – in most cultures, sexual relations are hedged by taboo, and in the context of Greek religion this means that they impair ritual purity: they constitute *miasma*. Another such taint is that of death: this explains the warning against sexual relations after returning from a funeral (735 δυσφήμοιο τάφου; with this meaning also at *Il.*23.29, *Od.*3.309). As the taint of death would make one ritually impure, so too would it be inauspicious for conception: cf. 750-2n. Auspicious, on the other hand, would be returning from a meal of the immortals (736 ἀθανάτων ἀπὸ δαιτός; cf. 742): this implies a meal with a sacrifice i.e. meat, after which the gods would be propitious.

The section is comprised of two pairs of lines (733-4, 735-6), each introduced with a negative prohibition (μηδ') followed by a positive statement introduced by ἀλλ'. In both pairs Hesiod formulates his advice in terms of the *oikos* (733 ἐνδοθι οἴκου, 735 ἀπονοστήσαντα): reproduction is essential for the perpetuation of the family line and so the maintaining of the *oikos* with which Hesiod is so concerned throughout *Op.* This concern with the family home is most evident in the first prohibition, that against baring oneself to the hearth (734 ἰστίη): for the Greeks, the hearth was the heart of the home – see e.g. *Od.*14.159. As with the sun at 727, one might capitalise

ἰστίῃ here, as modesty before the hearth is partly necessary because of Hestia's divinity: according to *Theog.*⁴⁵⁴ she is daughter of Rhea and Kronos. Most relevant to these prohibitions, at *Hom. Hymn* 5.21-32 she is a virgin goddess.

734 ἐμπελαδόν: a *hapax* which must in the context mean 'near', possibly coined by Hesiod (on the basis of 732 πελάσας) for the purpose of ritual hyper-precision (cf. 724-59n.).

757-9 Where not to urinate: cf. 727-32n. Here Hesiod completes the picture by adding 759 μηδ' ἐναποψύχειν: West cites as a comparison *Laws of Manu* 4.56 'Let him not throw urine or faeces into the water'. The predominating concern is again pollution: this time of rivers (757 προχοῆς ποταμῶν) and springs (758 κρηνάων).

These lines were transposed to after 736 by West. In the medieval *paradosis* the second of the lines (758) appears both after 757 and after 736: it is printed in both places by e.g. Solmsen. It is essential as a link between 757 and 759, in which position it also has ancient attestation, but West argues that it also constitutes an essential link between urination (727-32) and rivers (737-41), and so he moves all three lines to this earlier point in the text. He argues that the original displacement occurred because of a mechanical error prompted by the similarities between 737 and 757 (both have μηδέ ποτ' and ποταμῶν). This transposition is very tempting. In support of it, one might add that 757-8 follow the same pattern as 733-4 and 735-6: negative prohibition (μηδ') followed by a positive statement – 758 μάλα δ' ἐξαλέασθαι ~734 ἀλλ' ἀλέασθαι. Also, in this case the burnt offerings at 755-6 (see note) would conclude the set of religious precepts, thus creating a ring with the libations at 724-6. However, as e.g. Beall 2001:166 argues, West's reasons are

insufficient for such a radical transposition. The most prudent solution would be to retain the line in both positions, without shifting 757 and 759: having 758 repeated after 736 (736a) could be acceptable alone, and its omission in some versions would be due to suspicion of repeated lines. Stylistically, Beall notes, West's transposition would 'create a fourfold epanaphora with *mēde* since it also begins 737, but the normal epic form is threefold'.

737-41 Crossing a river. These lines too are governed by the idea of pollution: to cross a river one must be ritually (738 εὔξη) and physically (739 χεῖρας νιψάμενος – cf. 724-6n.) clean. The sanctity of the river is emphasised by the elaborate use of noun-epithet pairings, many of which are epic formulae, to describe the waters: 737 αἰενάων ποταμῶν, 737 καλλίχροον ὕδωρ (cf. *Il.*2.752, 12.33, *Hom. Hymn* 3.241, 380), 738 καλὰ ῥέεθρα (cf. e.g. *Il.*21.238, *Od.*11.240), 739 πολυηράτῳ ὕδατι λευκῷ (ὕδατι λευκῷ cf. *Il.*23.282, *Od.*5.70). For rivers as divinities see *Theog.*337-45.

740-1 These lines act as a warning: 740 specifies the transgression, 741 the punishment. 740-1 repeat the same idea as 737-9 but, as Ercolani notes, the first pair takes the form of a prohibition, the second is a gnomic maxim. In the zeugma 740 κακότητ' ἰδὲ χεῖρας ἄνιπτος the two accusatives express the two potential kinds of impurity. On the various uses of κακότης cf. 287-92 – here it must denote ritual impurity. The context gives meaning to a broadly applicable term. 741 τῷ δὲ θεοὶ νεμεσῶσι repeats a phrased used at 303 of idleness: for Hesiod, the ultimate sin.

742-5 Behaviour at a feast – cf. 715-23 (and 736).

742-3 Don't cut your nails at a feast. Although rather more obscure than washing one's hands or praying, presumably this is again connected with ritual purity: the lines are interpreted thus by Plut. *Mor.*352e. Even more obscure than the topic of the prohibition is its formulation: metaphors (742 πεντόζοιο, 743 αὖον ἀπὸ χλωροῦ) and a kenning give it a riddling feel. πεντόζοιο, lit. 'the five-branched', is a kenning for the hand: West 2007:82 traces its Indo-European roots – 'In the Rigveda (10.137.7 =AV 4.13.7) *dásāsākha*- 'ten-branched' is employed as an epithet of the hands, and in the *Rāmāyana* (6.47.54) *pañcāsākha*- 'five-branched'".

744-5 Don't put the ladle on top of the mixing bowl while people are drinking (πινόντων). Although the punishment for this is clear (745 ὅλοῖ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ μοῖρα τέτυκται – cf. 765 κατὰ μοῖραν), the rationale is less so. Proclus (*ΣOp.*(Pertusi)744-5), following similar Pythagorean precepts, reads the lines allegorically: not putting the ladle on the mixing bowl represents not putting the individual before the common good. Similarly *ΣOp.*(Pertusi)744a don't put the worse before the better. It has otherwise been interpreted as the host must not hint to guests that the feast is over (Beltrami 1897), or linked with superstitions about laying things one across another (Sinclair, Sikes 1893:391).

746-7 Building a house. Although there seems to be little connection between this prohibition and that which precedes it, the crow (747 κορώνη) recalls earlier passages in *Op.*: on bird omens see esp. 448n. As at 679, the crow appears here in what seems to be a folkloric context: its cawing presumably portends evil, such as the bad weather it announces in classical literature (e.g. Aratus 949, 1022), or the death in the house it signifies in modern Greek superstition (Lawson 1910:310).

The crow sits (ἐφεζομένη) on the roof as the cicada sits (ἐφεζόμενος) in the tree at 583, but whereas the cicada's song carried (λιγυρήν), the crow is screeching (λακέρυζα; the verb λάσκω from which this derives was used of the nightingale at 207). Rosen 1990:110 offers a poetological reading of this contrast (cf. Steiner's 2007 interpretation of the fable: hawk=Homer, nightingale=Hesiod): the song of the cicada is Hesiodic poetry, that of the crow the other poets', with the verb ποιῶν marking poetic activity (as at 680 ἐποίησεν) and the 'unfinished' state of the house ἀνεπίξεστον (West rightly explains the variant ἀνεπίρρεκτον as an anticipation of 748) reflecting a kind of poetry of which Hesiod disapproves. This, then, would be another instance of Hesiod marking his poetic self-sufficiency.

748-9 Don't use unconsecrated pots. This is another prohibition involving pollution and purification. It illustrates Hesiod's meticulous attention to detail: he has already addressed washing for purification (724-6, 740) and purity at a feast (715-23, 742-5), now he specifies that even the vessels (748 χυτροπόδων – some kind of pot with feet) used for such activities as washing and eating (749 ἔσθειν μηδὲ λόεσθαι) must themselves be ritually pure. This time it is a ποινή rather than a μοῖρα (745) or ἄλγεα (741) that is in store: this recurs at 755, again in relation to λόεσθαι.

750-2 Don't sit a child on a tomb. To be avoided here are ἀκινήτοισι (750), 'things which can/must not be moved' presumably (given the context) for religious reasons: most likely altars or tombs (ΣOp.(Pertusi)750-2 ἐπὶ τάφων, 750a ἐπὶ ἀκινήτῳ τάφῳ ἢ βωμῷ). This prohibition concerns the taint of death warned against at 735 (733-6n.). In this earlier case the rationale was that a funeral was inauspicious for conception; if we assume the same nexus of ideas is at work here, the oxymoronic

warning 751 ἀνέγ' ἀνήνορα ποιεῖ would refer to sexual impotence or infertility (rather than e.g. cowardice). The vulnerable ages of the child, 751 δυωδεκαταῖον and 752 δυωδεκάμηνον, are left unexplained: cf. Graziosi/Haubold 2010 *ad Il.6.134* 'the language of cult is at once precise and impenetrable', and *ad Il.6.93-4* 'the number twelve typically expresses a sense of completeness' – Hesiod uses formulaic obscurities to give the impression of ritual knowledge and precision.

Ercolani notes that 752 breaks the pattern of couplets followed throughout 742-51. This leads him to pinpoint this verse as a join between portions of original text. However, the following lines 753-6 do not fit this pattern either – in fact, the divisions between precepts will blur as enjambment predominates – and so we might rather see a conscious shift in structure as this section on religious prohibitions draws to a close.

753-5 Don't wash in a woman's bathwater. On washing cf. 724-6, 740, 749 (also with ποινή) – though 753 φαιδρύνεσθαι appears only here in epic. The gender divide (753-4 γυναικείῳ...ἀνέρο) suggests that the rationale is the same as at 751 ἀνέγ' ἀνήνορα ποιεῖ. The consequences of a transgression here are specified as lasting 754 ἐπὶ χρόνον: the 'impurity' has a time-limit, as at e.g. Leviticus 11.24.

755-6 How to behave at a sacrifice. Whether 756 θεός refers to the particular god being propitiated (West) or, as a singular with collective force, to gods in general (Robertson 1969), the 'god' is left nameless and so the precept can be applied to any relevant situation. Whilst 724-6 addressed libations, this precept is concerned with burnt offerings (755 ἱεροῖσιν ἐπ' αἰθομένοισι) – for the two paired cf. 338 σπονδῇσι θύεσσι τε. The link between the libation and the burnt offering is strengthened by

Robertson's observation (1969:168) that in the two Homeric parallels for 755 (ἐπ' αἰθομένους ἱεροῖσι at *Il.*11.775, *Od.*12.362), the phrase occurs at the same stage of the sacrifice: 'the moment when a libation of wine (or water as a substitute) is poured over the hearth or altar so as to damp the blaze that has consumed the gods' portion of meat.' On the structural implications of the pairing see 757-9n.

The meaning of 756 μωμεύειν αἰδηλα has been debated. Robertson 1969 refers to the Homeric phrase πῦρ αἰδηλον ('consuming fire' e.g. *Il.*2.455, 9.436), and persuasively argues for 'do not carp at what is consumed'. μωμεύειν is certainly a negative act for Hesiod: at *Theog.*214 Μῶμος is a child of Night, as is Νέμεσις (*Theog.*223) recalled by the verb νεμεσσᾶ at 756. For Night's troublesome children appearing throughout *Op.* cf. 17-20n.

For 757-9 see after 736.

760-4 Rumour. Hesiod rounds off this part of the poem (before the final Days section) with a warning about φήμη, rumour or reputation (reiterated at 760, 761, 763). It is something with which Hesiod has been concerned throughout *Op.* (cf. 11-13n.), and which can be applied to all of the precepts which have led to this point: if you should ignore any of these prohibitions, your transgression will be spoken about. Although φήμη becomes a goddess, it is essentially a concept for mortals (759 βροτῶν) as it is men who will talk about each other. φήμη, therefore, constitutes a counterpart to the religious precepts 724-59: after warning of divine punishments, Hesiod considers the mortal side of the coin. 760 ὧδ' ἔρδειν,

therefore, should be interpreted here as referring to what has come before rather than what comes after: it encapsulates all the preceding precepts and introduces another rationale for them.

As Bakker 2002:140-2 notes, φήμη is the anti-*kleos*: whilst *kleos* is to be heard about in positive terms, φήμη is to be talked about negatively (760 δειλήν – variant δεινήν, preferred by e.g. Clay 2003:148n48 because φήμη ends up as a goddess to be feared). The link between the two is strengthened by 763 φήμη δ' οὐ τις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται: this recalls the Homeric formula κλέος οὐ ποτ' ὀλεῖται (*Il.*2.325, 7.91, *Od.*24.196), or even κλέος ἄφθιτον. That Hesiod is more concerned with φήμη than with *kleos* marks his poem as firmly set in the Iron Age: he is composing in and about a post-heroic world. As Clay 2003:148 notes, φήμη takes us back to and makes us reassess the earlier line 3 ὃν τε διὰ βροτοὶ ἄνδρες ὁμῶς ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε. There Zeus made men spoken of or not, here φήμη is generated not by the gods but by πολλοὶ λαοί: after the Calendar and countless precepts about daily life, we are now firmly entrenched in the Iron Age with its focus on mankind. In the earlier passage it was left ambiguous which was the positive, ἄφατοί or φατοί - now it is clear that to be φατοί is not something to wish for. The contrast with the heroic age could not be starker.

In this passage we see a gradual build-up of the concept. In 760 φήμη comes at the end of the line and is something to avoid. It is then brought to the fore in 761-3, and described in much the same way as other key concepts such as *hybris* (761 φήμη γάρ τε κακὴ πέλεται ~214 ὕβρις γάρ τε κακὴ δειλῶ βροτῶ; 761-2 κούφη μὲν ἀεῖραι ἰρέϊα μάλ' ~215 ῥηιδίως φερέμεν δύναται), *aidos* (761~317 αἰδῶς δ' οὐχ

ἀγαθή) and *elpis* (761~500 ἐλπίς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθή). Finally, in 764 the abstract concept φήμη is elevated to the level of a deity (cf. θεός νύ used at 759 of a god to whom sacrifices are made). These lines, therefore, give us a glimpse into the process of the deification of abstracts which underpins *Theog.* and (to a lesser extent) *Op.* They also recall the earlier passage 11-26, in which Hesiod adds to his *Theog.* pantheon with the second Eris. To call this ring composition does not necessarily imply a rejection of the Days: just as 11-26 did not begin the poem, neither does 760-4 conclude it.

Hesiod's 'creation' of a goddess clearly had its influence. Not only were these lines quoted, but φήμη was treated as a goddess. We can see an example of both of these tributes in Aeschines and scholia: 763-4 were quoted in *In Tim.* 129-30 and *On the False Embassy* 114-15; ΣAeschin. 1.128 (also Paus. 1.17.1) tells us that PHEME was given an altar in 467 B.C. because news of the victory at Eurymedon reached Athens so quickly. On the supernatural speed of φήμη see also Hdt. 9.100. However, the spirit of the lines was not always upheld in the passage's reception: in the rhetorical battle between Aeschin. and Dem. (*On the False Embassy* 243-4), rumour becomes a positive: something to be trusted rather than avoided (p.20-2).

765-828 The Days (765 ἡμέτα).

No ancient critic is known to have questioned the authenticity of the Days. Although there are relatively few references in antiquity to passages after 764, the citations begin already in the 6th century BC with Heraclitus (DK B106, Plut. *Vit. Cam.* 19.1=fr.59). However, since the 19th century many editors and critics have suspected this section of being inauthentic: a later interpolation, or a separate poem

which at some point coalesced with *Op.* The first to express this suspicion was Twisten 1815:60-2; Wilamowitz went so far as to delete the whole section; these suspicions were taken up by e.g. Fränkel 1962:124, 143-4, Solmsen 1963, Samuel 1966, Marg 1970:383-6; Solmsen brackets the section. Such suspicions are based not on historical or textual evidence, but on perceived problems of inconsistency and tone such as: the prevalence of superstitious advice which contrasts with earlier rational teachings in *Op.*; the use of the lunar calendar in contrast to earlier solar and stellar markers; the general disorder of the section and its monotonous and compressed style; material discrepancies with the Hesiodic farm.

There have, on the other hand, been scholars who accept the section as authentic, such as Mazon, Sinclair, Walcot 1961a:14, Pellizer 1975:169-82. West addressed and rightly countered each and every one of the objections to the Days. However, even many of these scholars who accept the lines have done so with reservations: what is the section doing here and how well is it integrated within the rest of the poem? Hamilton 1989:78-84 and Kelly 2007:388 have offered useful structural analyses of the poem, incorporating the Days. Lardinois in a persuasive article of 1998 showed that the Days should be accepted not just because their authenticity cannot be conclusively *disproved*, but because they cohere with themes found elsewhere in *Op.* He traces an overarching concern from earlier parts of *Op.* to the Days: that men in the Iron Age must live day-to-day (see Fränkel 1946 on 'ephemeral' humans). An analysis of the uses of ἥμαρ and ἡμέρη in earlier parts of *Op.* yields compelling results: they are always concerned with Iron-Age toil and suffering, whether in the myths about the origin of the human condition (43, 102, 176) or throughout the

agricultural Calendar. The passages in which they are lacking are also revealing: as Lardinois 1998:329 summarises, 'Days throughout the poem are associated with work and work with days; when there is no work, as in the summer or in the Golden Age, there is no need to count the days either'.

Furthermore, Clay 2003 and in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009 shows that this theme of Iron-Age men living day-to-day has a dynamic aspect: it develops and intensifies over the course of the poem. Structurally, therefore, the Days represent the end-point of the gradual temporal and spatial narrowing of focus which one can follow throughout *Op.* (Clay 2003; see 694-764n., 810, 821) and 'a climactic demonstration of a theme that has increasingly resonated in the latter third of the poem: the decrease in human certainty and a corresponding increase in the precariousness of human existence' (Clay in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:89).

The way in which time is measured in the Days is one of the perceived problems with the passage: the measurement is lunar, whereas the rest of *Op.* is governed by stellar and solar markers (with the exception of 504 *Ληναίων*). As West and Lardinois 1998 (amongst others) have shown, however, it was not unusual for two such systems to coexist, and in fact two different measurement strategies might be adopted for different purposes (in this case, agricultural Calendar vs. good/bad days). A further problem is that the measurement itself is complex. Essentially, Hesiod uses in tandem three forms of lunar measurement: months of 30 days; two halves of a month (the waxing and the waning); three sets of nine days per month. On time measurement in the Days see further West Excursus II. West has shown that most Greek cities used in their calendars at least two different ways of counting

the days, and he suggests that Hesiod then added to this some particular ‘local’ features. As Lardinois 1998:324 suggests, this multiculturalism of the Days shows Hesiod ‘trying to establish a Panhellenic point of view, which transcends any one local tradition’ (we have had hints of this at 527 and 635, see notes, and see esp. Nagy in Sutton 1989). It is likely that much of this Panhellenic calendar derives from traditional material, however it is clear that Hesiod integrated this material fully into his poem (Lardinois 1998:319-20). Indeed the Days can be, and often are, read from the general to the particular (i.e. the biographical): see 765-9n., 780-801n. This dual reading reflects Hesiod’s strategy of tethering units to his poem by evoking *Op.* themes or characters.

With regards to conscious crafting of material, even within this minefield of measurements we can find some patterns: for example, as West notes, most of the ‘good days’ are concentrated in the early part of the month, presumably because the waxing moon was associated with growth, development and therefore prosperity. It is particularly interesting to note that, despite the meticulous procedural detail into which Hesiod goes in this section, approximately one third of days are unaccounted for or of unknown quality: as Clay in Montanari/Rengakos/Tsagalis 2009:89 puts it, ‘Hesiod’s calculations thus precisely quantify the uncertainty of all human endeavours’ – see further 822-8n.

765-9 The Days begin with an introductory unit marked out by ring composition: 765 ἡματα δ’ ἐκ Διόθεν...769 αἶδε γὰρ ἡμέραι εἰσὶ Διὸς πάρα μητιόεντος. This unit summarises many of the poem’s key themes: men in the Iron Age living day-

to-day (765 ἡματα, 769 ἡμέραι), the power of Zeus (765 Διόθεν, 769 Διός – on Διὸς μητιόεντος see 51n.), the importance of timeliness (765 πεφυλαγμένος εὔ cf. 491, 706), the structure of the farm (766 δμώεσσι cf. 502), work (767 ἔργα), measure (767 ἄρμαλὴν δατέασθαι cf. 560), *dike* and judgement (768 κρίνοντες cf. 221). Through such connections with earlier passages, these introductory lines firmly tether the Days to a Hesiodic context.

This unit functions on both a specific and a general level. On the one hand, Lardinois 1998:330 persuasively argues that 768 refers to a trial process: in classical Athens the Areopagus came together and homicide trials were held on the last three days of the month (Wallace 1985:122, 257n104-5), cf. 766 τριηκάδα μηνός; on the shield of Achilles (*Il.*18.497-508) the λαοί are depicted as coming together in the agora to witness a trial, cf. 768 λαοὶ κρίνοντες (this phrase also constitutes a link with the preceding unit on *pheme*: cf. 764 λαοί). This would suggest an autobiographical element here (a stronger suggestion, perhaps, than that read by Walcot 1961a:14 who wonders ‘whether we may infer that Hesiod’s birthday fell on the twentieth (792-3) and that of Perses on the sixth (788-9)’): Hesiod may be alluding to his quarrel with Perses and the behaviour of the corrupt kings (27-41n.). This is strengthened by 768 ἀληθείην: at 10 Hesiod promises to tell ἐτήτυμα to Perses, which is the only other explicit reference to truth in *Op*. In this way, in the Days we come full circle: back to the setting of the poem. On the other hand, Nagy in Sutton 1989:274 sees this line as marking a process of panhellenisation: on the 30th, when local traditions are at their greatest variance (in crisis and need to be sorted out – κρίνοντες), ‘the norm is conveyed here by the notion of *alētheia*’.

770 ἱερὸν ἡμαρ: also at 819, of the middle 4th. Even without explicit mention of a god, how propitious a day might be is governed by how ‘holy’ it is: for religion as an underlying factor in everyday Iron-Age life, cf. precepts at 335-42 and 724-59.

771 Απόλλωνα χρυσάορα γείνατο Λητώ: the narrative of Apollo’s birth is given also at *Theog.*918, *Il.*21.495, *Od.*6.100, 11.318 and esp. *Hom. Hymn* 3, and he is called χρυσάορος/χρυσάωρ also at *Il.*5.509, 15.256, *Hom. Hymn* 3.123, 395. For Leto’s background (daughter of Phoebe and Coeus) see *Theog.*406. This is Apollo’s only appearance in *Op.*, despite his connection with poetry: in the Iron Age, his role is reduced to that of marking a special day. Hesiod’s specification here reflects actual religious practice: festivals of Apollo such as the Thargelia, Pyanopsia and Delphinia at Athens, the Carneia at Cyrene, and the Stepterion at Delphi, were usually on the 7th of the month; according to *Hdt.* 6.57.2, the Spartans offered sacrifices to Apollo on the 1st and 7th. In the *Days*, regard for the divine is more closely linked with everyday life than with mythology.

772-3 μηνός!...ἀεξομένοιο: the formulation marks out the lunar reckoning used in the *Days*, as in the context μηνός must mean not simply month but ‘moon’. Similarly 780 μηνὸς δ’ ἵσταμένου τε, and 798 φθίνοντός θ’ ἵσταμένου (*sc.* μηνός).

773 βροτήσια ἔργα πένεσθαι: despite 770 ἱερὸν ἡμαρ and 771 Απόλλωνα, we are firmly in the Iron Age, a fact which this phrase makes abundantly clear. Hesiod employs two items of vocabulary not used elsewhere in *Op.* (and βροτήσια only here in early epic): he reiterates one of the main themes of his poem, the importance of work, but even at this late stage manages to do so with a degree of *variatio*.

775 οἷς πείκειν ἡδ' εὐφρονα καρπὸν ἀμᾶσθαι: here Hesiod combines pastoral and arable farming, in contrast to the Calendar in which crops predominate. The theme recalls earlier harvest passages: cf. 475, 571-81, 607-14. For the verb cf. 778 σωρὸν ἀμᾶται: although 775 ἀμᾶσθαι must, because of the short initial vowel, come from ἀμάομαι 'collect' rather than ἀμάω 'reap', Hesiod may not have sharply distinguished between the two, or may have used one to cue the other. This is the only attestation of πείκειν in epic used to mean 'shear': at *Il.*14.176 it is used rather of combing hair, at *Od.*18.316 of carding wool.

777 νῆ νήματ': for noun/verb from the same root cf. 382, 763-4, and 779 – in both theme and form, therefore, the spider spinning its web looks ahead to 779, the woman weaving.

ἀερσιπότητος ἀράχνης: the adj. 'high soaring' is an unusual compound as it is made up of two verbal elements. It occurs in epic only here and at [*Sc.*]316 (of swans).

778 ἰδοῖς: elsewhere used either as an attribute in conjunction with ἀνὴρ (*Od.* 6.233), or predicatively with inf./genitive (*Od.* 7.108). This absolute use as a noun is unparalleled and prompts us to wonder who or what this 'expert' is. 779 τῆι corresponds to 777 τῆι, and what comes between should add another marker of time, as τε in 778 (ὅτε τ') also suggests: animal behaviour is typically used for that purpose (cf. 524). From the scholia, Tzetzes and Moschopulus, to most modern scholarship (exceptions include Beall 2001:166-7), ἰδοῖς has been interpreted as a kenning for the ant. The ant was proverbial for wisdom, cf. e.g. Hor. *Sat.*1.1.33-8, Verg. *G.*1.186 – and, as Bader 1989:181-2 notes, the association of the spider and the

ant is an Indo-European motif. The ant is also connected with weather (predicting rain) at Theophr. *De signis* 22, Aratus 956.

The use of two animal markers in such quick succession is striking. As the spider looks ahead to the woman weaving, perhaps the ant stands in for the man making stores: the juxtaposition would then mark a division of labour between the sexes.

779 Unlike most other appearances of a woman in *Op.*, this line does not seem to be heavily charged (cf. 59-105n.). This is because here she is doing a woman's ἔργον, weaving: not only is she firmly located in the domestic sphere, but she is fulfilling a contributory role rather than posing a threat to productivity. She fits into Hesiod's scheme of the ideally self-sufficient *oikos* – although even weaving can have negative connotations in *Op.*, cf. 63-4 (πολυδαίδαλον ἱστὸν ὑφαίνειν), and 777 the 'high-soaring' spider which could have connotations of being difficult to control. The woman's work is described through the *figura etymologica* ἱστὸν στήσαιτο, picked up by ἱσταμένου in 780.

780-801 After an introductory two lines on sowing and planting (780-1; on sowing cf. 465-71), Hesiod makes a transition, which is both chronological and (metaphorically) associative, to child bearing. In the remainder of these lines the chronological sequence breaks down, and Hesiod intertwines two themes: procreation, and animal husbandry. The combination suggests that procreation in *Op.* is seen primarily in terms of productivity of the *oikos*, analogous to planting or rearing animals.

Good for childbearing are the middle 6th (783), the first 6th (788), the 10th (794), and the 20th (792-3). On the latter, described in a two-line unit, will be born a 'knowing man' (ἴστωρ φῶς): in Hom. the term denotes specifically 'he who knows the laws/customs' i.e. a judge (*Il.*18.501, 23.486), but here it can be interpreted more generally as 'he who knows'. For Hesiod on the wise man cf. 293-7n.: just as we might assume that there Hesiod aligns himself with the πανάριστος, so here Walcott 1961a:14 makes the intriguing suggestion that Hesiod's own birthday may have fallen on the 20th. This is an example of the Days being read from the general to the particular (765-828n.). Walcott continues by suggesting that Perses' birthday fell on the 6th, on the basis of 788-9: however, the tone of those lines is rather more ambiguous. The formulation 789 ψεύδεά θ' αἰμυλίου τε λόγους is repeated from 78 where, used as it is of Pandora, it is certainly negative. However, here it is used of a boy born on a day that is good for childbearing so it seems we are to assume it is a positive asset, or at least acceptable behaviour. The discrepancy between the two uses of the phrase, therefore, seems rather to indicate both Hesiod's androcentrism, and an imbalance between the sexes (for which see esp. 586n.).

In keeping with Hesiod's gender bias, four different days are specified as good for a boy to be born, whereas only the middle 4th is specified for a girl (794-5 – though see further 811-13n.). It is on the girl's day (795 τῇ) that sheep, oxen, dogs and mules may be tamed (797 πρηνῆν ἐπὶ χεῖρα τιθείς): the connection suggests that the woman Hesiod prescribes for the ideal *oikos* must herself be tamed. When (not) to marry picks up the advice at 695-705, and completes the picture of the woman's use in the *oikos*: 784 don't marry on the middle 6th, 800 marry on the 4th. The addition of

bird omens at 801 (οἰωνοὺς κρίνας) suggests that ‘marriage is so risky...that the right day alone is no sufficient guarantee’ (West). Solmsen 1963:302 uses this addition to throw doubt on Hesiodic authorship of the Days, arguing that ‘it should certainly be noted that he nowhere else shows an interest in bird *omina*’: however, it seems reasonable that bird omens should be used by Hesiod as a natural progression from the bird markers used throughout *Op.*: see 448n., further 828n.

The other focus of the passage is animals. Many of the descriptions are formulaic: 796 καὶ κύνα καρχαρόδοντα repeats 604; 795 καὶ εἰλίποδας ἔλικας βοῦς also at *Il.*9.466, 23.166, *Od.*1.92, 9.46; οὐρεῖας ταλαεργούς at 791 and 796 is a rearrangement of traditional elements as in Hom. οὐρεύς is synonymous with ἡμίονος but the epithet ταλαεργός is used only with the latter. One of the criticisms targeted against the authenticity of the Days is that it presents material discrepancies with the Hesiodic farm, i.e. boars (790 κάπρον) and horses (816 ἵπποις) appear only in the Days, and sheep (795) appear only infrequently elsewhere (at 516, and as a measure of wealth at 308 πολύμηλοι). However, Hesiod’s focus in the earlier agricultural part of the poem was on arable rather than pastoral farming, the mark of civilised human society (146-7n.), so his references to livestock were not systematic.

The gods are not mentioned here. However, we can trace some tacit associations. The qualities ascribed to the 6th (786-9) all belong to Hermes’ sphere of influence (shepherding, mockery, lies); at 782 the middle 7th is good for planting, and according to Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F189 this day was sacred to Athene, patron of the olive; at 800 the 4th is good for marriage, and *ΣOp.*(Pertusi)800b tells us that the 4th

was sacred to Aphrodite. That the connections go unacknowledged by Hesiod may indicate that they are a later construct which might even have been rooted in *Op.* itself, or that Hesiod didn't want to spell them out but rather left them to be decoded by the audience.

Lines 792-6 were (according to Proclus) omitted by Plut. As West rightly notes, the omission was probably due simply to homoeoteleuton: *ταλαεργούς* at 791 and 796.

802-4 Hesiod warns against the fifths, and relates a birth narrative to explain why. He recommends avoiding the fifths in general, rather than merely avoiding marriage on the fifths, beginning the line with a number to indicate a new theme (cf. 772, 774, 782, 798). This is the only date in the plural, and could refer to the 5th of every month or the 5th of each decad.

On the 5th, Horkos (Oath) was born: attended by the Erinyes (Furies), a child of Eris (Strife). For the Furies see *Theog.*185: born from Gaia and the drops of blood spilled when Kronos castrates his father. For Oath see 219n. (and *Theog.*231); here *ἐπιόρκοις* picks up on *Ὀρκον*. For Eris see 11-26n. (and *Theog.*226-32): here, however, only one Eris is mentioned – Beall 2004b:178 suggests that 'the poet goes back to primordial forces'.

805-9 The organisation becomes once again chronological. Hesiod groups together activities suited to the middle 7th: threshing and woodcutting. These recall earlier passages in *Op.* (Solmsen 1963:296 uses the difference in tone as evidence against the authenticity of the Days): threshing 597-9 *Δημήτερος ἱερὸν ἀκτὴν* (805, 597, 466) and *ἐντροχάλω ἐν ἄλωϊ* (806, 599); woodcutting 414-57 *ταμεῖν* (807, 423, 426),

ύλοτομεῖν (422, 807 ύλοτόμον), πήξασθαι (455, 809 πήγνυσθαι). Here the wood is for 807 θαλαμῖα δοῦρα (only here in early literature) and 808 νήια: neither was the focus at 414-47 (farming equipment), but the first provides a link with the themes of marriage and procreation which persist throughout the Days, and the second draws in another of Hesiod's topics from earlier in *Op.*: seafaring, cf. 618-94. Seafaring once again grabs Hesiod's attention: he breaks the chronological arrangement to add another comment on seafaring at 809 (and will add another at 817-18). 809 is reminiscent both of 455 (πήξασθαι) and 643: the size of the ship.

810 ἐπὶ δειέλα λώιον ἥμαρ: Hesiod distinguishes even between parts of a day: this is the final step in the temporal narrowing of focus one can trace throughout a linear reading of *Op.* See further 821.

811-13 The first 9th is emphatically propitious: it is described as 811 παναπήμων, then Hesiod coins a correspondingly emphatic negative term at 813 οὐ ποτε πάγκακον. The question is: what makes this day so good? Already at 782-3 Hesiod made a transition, both chronological and associative, from planting to childbearing: here again he slides between the two ideas, which are very close in his mind. Combined, then, the two examples in 812 (φυτευέμεν ἥδὲ γενέσθαι) emphasise procreation: and procreation is emphasised here rather than at e.g. 783-801 (a longer excursus on childbearing) because on this day it is good for both a boy *and* a girl to be born. This is what makes the day so striking. The emphatic enjambment 812-13 (γενέσθαι | ἀνέρι τ' ἥδὲ γυναικί) makes the point. On this day, one of Hesiod's persistent worries, the imbalance between the sexes in the Iron Age, is resolved.

814-18 A unit on the third 9th (τρισεινάς). On this day one should start on a cask (815 ἄρξασθαί τε πίθου: cf. 819 οἷγε πίθον, on the significance of the jar see 475n.), yoke animals, and take the ship to the sea (on seafaring in the Days cf. 808-9). The activities are described through epic formulae: 816 βουσὶ καὶ ἡμιόνοισι 607, *Il.*7.333; ἵπποισι ὠκυπόδεσσιν *Il.*23.504; 817~*Il.*7.88 (and the individual components frequent elsewhere).

The unit is marked out by ring composition παῦροι δ' αὖτε ἴσασι...παῦροι δέ τ' ἀληθέα κυκλήσκουσιν. These phrases, as well as 820 παῦροι and 824 παῦροι δέ τ' ἴσασι, are implicit comments on Hesiod's own superior knowledge: few know these things, but Hesiod does – and will tell us. For this didactic strategy elsewhere in *Op.* cf. 40-1, 456-7n. 818 παῦροι δέ τ' ἀληθέα κυκλήσκουσιν is particularly striking: ἀληθέα evokes the 'truth' of words, with which Hesiod is most famously concerned at *Theog.*27-8 (and cf. 768), and κυκλήσκουσιν too suggests ambiguity, used elsewhere at *Theog.*197 of the variety of names given to Aphrodite. Hesiod thus seems to suggest some kind of allusive game (noted too by Ercolani), or to offer some comment on the ambiguity of language: it is this kind of formulation which gave rise to his reception as the Hesiod of the 'correctness of names', by e.g. Prodicus and Plato – see further Koning 2010:224-33.

819 ἰερόν ἦμαρ: cf. 770n.

821 Another instance of the narrowing of focus towards the end of the Days: cf. 810n. On ἡοῦς cf. 578-81n.

822-8 A conclusion to the Days. It is introduced by 822 αἶδε μὲν ἡμέραι, in which αἶδε is now retrospective: it recalls ἡματα δ' ἐκ Διόθεν...αἶδε γὰρ ἡμέραι with which the Days began, framing the whole section in ring composition. 822 ἐπιχθονίοις μέγ' ὄνειαρ is a rather generalising summary of the section, which ignores the days marked as unpropitious for various activities (Solmsen 1963:297-8 sees this 'inconsistency' as evidence that these lines were a later interpolation). The focus on the positive in this line, however, allows a shift to the negative in the next, and the contrast (however contrived) serves to underline one of Hesiod's recurrent themes throughout *Op.*: the unpredictability of life in the Iron Age.

Hesiod expresses the uncertainty of Iron-Age life through ambiguous language: 823 μετάδουποι is a strange compound of unknown meaning, perhaps from μετά + δοῦπος 'of changeable thunder' i.e. of uncertain omen (West), or *μεταδουπέω 'fall in the middle', modelled on ἐνδουπέω (Troxler 1964:139); 823 ἀκήριοι is here used to mean 'doomless' though elsewhere in early epic it has the meaning 'lifeless/spiritless' (*Il.*) or 'unharmed' (*Od.*). Further, many have noted the similarities between 822-4 and *Theog.*871-5 (e.g. 822 ἐπιχθονίοις μέγ' ὄνειαρ, *Theog.*871 θνητοῖς μέγ' ὄνειαρ; 823 and *Theog.*872 αἱ δ' ἄλλαι; 825 and *Theog.*875 ἄλλοτε): the *Theog.* passage depicts the analogous idea of the unpredictability of the winds. See further p.54-5.

The anaphora 825 ἄλλοτε...ἄλλοτε, echoing 824 ἄλλος δ' ἄλλοιην, introduces an antithesis between μητρυνή and μήτηρ (for the 'evil stepmother' see Isae. 12.5, fairytales such as Cinderella, and Thompson 1957.5:300, 1958.6:748). More important, however, is the implication the anaphora has for Hesiod's concern with

timeliness: the Iron Age is so uncertain and changeable, that the idea of the right time, which has been crucial throughout *Op.* (30-2n.), is now pushed to its limits.

The role of the gods (827 ἀναίτιος ἀθανάτοισιν) and bird omens (828 ὄρνιθας κρίνων) in the final lines can also be explained in terms of the uncertainty of the Iron Age. Hesiod has been interested in the gods in *Op.* (at least after the mythical section) inasmuch as they have an impact on life in the Iron Age. One of the ways in which he formulates this is to attribute to the gods anything over which he cannot have full control, thus exculpating himself from responsibility for the unpredictability of life in the Iron Age: e.g. 474, 483-4, 638, 667, 718. According to Σ*Op.*(Pertusi)828a (with hints also at Hes. fr.312 and 355 Merkelbach/West), a work entitled the *Ornithomanteia* followed line 828 but Apollonius of Rhodes athetised it. We shall probably never know the truth of this: whether it was Hesiodic, whether it really existed, whether Apollonius athetised it and, if so, why. Many theories have been proposed: e.g. that the *Great Works* which we find attributed to Hesiod in some sources (Ath. 8.66 p. 364b [Most T66] ἐκ τῶν εἰς Ἡσίοδον ἀναφερομένων μεγάλων Ἡοίων καὶ μεγάλων Ἔργων) consisted of *Op.* along with the *Ornithomanteia* and the *Precepts of Chiron* (Markscheffel 1840:89, 188-9), or that 826-8 form an optional 'transitional' passage similar to e.g. the shorter *Hom. Hymns*. However, what is clear from the text as we have it is that first, in its current form it is coherent and consistent, and second, the final line invites elaboration. Whether this elaboration was undertaken, and whether by Hesiod or not, we do not know; what is important in terms of the construction of *Op.* as a whole is that its open formulations invite application (here: 828 applied to a whole field of ornithomancy),

and that its division into detachable units makes omissions possible without damage to the whole.

Once again (cf. 814-18n.) Hesiod marks his superior knowledge: 824 παῦροι δέ τ' ἴσασιν. He then champions the man who thinks, and works (826-7 ὅς τάδε πάντα|εἰδὼς ἐργάζεται). Whilst some commentators e.g. West have argued that ἐργάζεται need only refer to the activities mentioned in the Days, it seems more likely that it summarises *Op.* in its entirety as this final characterisation epitomises both the πανάριστος, ὅς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσει (293 either Hesiod himself, or his 'ideal'), and the hard worker whom Hesiod has tried throughout *Op.* to shape.

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