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The Political Role Of The People's Liberation Army 1949-1973

By Chang Jia-chung

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Politics
University of Durham

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Abstract

The Political Role of the People's Liberation Army 1949-1973

By Chang Jia-chung

For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

**Department of Politics
University of Durham**

1995

This thesis is to study the political role of the People's Liberation Army from the approach of structure and function. The framework of the thesis consists of three major parts, first, the influence of Chinese traditional political culture on, and the formation of, the political role of the PLA; second, the influence of domestic political struggles and external military conflicts on the development of the political role of the PLA; and the third, the analysis of the transition of the PLA's political role from the structure and personnel arrangements of the CCPCC.

Within the above-mentioned three scopes, this thesis make a thorough discussion on the following: (1) The relationship between the structure of the PRC and the formation of the PLA's political role; (2) How has ideology influenced the army's political role; (3) What is Mao's viewpoint and his influence on the development of the army's political role; (4) What is the link between the army and the party, and how has this developed; (6) What accounts for the expansion of the PLA's political functions; (7) What is the influence of political factional struggles on the PLA's political role; (8) Is it political institution or military institution that controls the recruitment of the military elite; (9) What are the disparities between the military elite in handling international conflicts and what are their political considerations; (10) What is the Party's position in the army; (11) How have the Party's important meetings and personnel arrangements influenced the rise and fall of the PLA's political role?

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Introduction

Since World War II, most developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America have faced dramatic political changes. With a mix of low political institutionalisation and expansion of political participation, the army, with its overwhelming superiority, strict organisational system and "barrel of a gun" control, plays a leading role in political development. The influence of the military extends from military to non-military affairs.

The relationship between the military and politics in the PRC is different from that of most developing countries. The PLA is the Party's army. Apart from military affairs, its tasks also include economic, social and political affairs, which means that in addition to the safeguard of national security, the PLA is also responsible for the protection of the Party, of the leader and of Communism. One of the striking features of the PLA is that it has never attempted either to carry out a coup d'état to seize power for themselves, or to oppress, or blackmail the Government with its armed forces.

Since the establishment of PRC's regime, PLA has, to a certain degree, been involved in various political campaigns, which include the movement of Three Red Banners and four major political line struggles, and many other national, economical and social campaigns. Furthermore, the different military backgrounds and their civil war experience formed factions which possess strong trait of mountaintopism, the small group mentality. Mao, therefore, as the supreme authority of the PLA and of the whole nation, took this advantage of the contradiction among the military elite and applied PLA as a means to carry out power-seizure struggles.


In the first step, in the 50's, Mao destroyed Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih to consolidate

central control over the locals, and then, in order to overthrow Liu Shao-ch'i, Mao tactically used Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army to struggle with other field armies. After the Lin Piao incident, however, Mao in turn incited the other field armies to eradicate the Fourth Field Army's power both centrally and the locally.

It is worth noting that the political role of the PLA had gone through great changes between 1949 and 1973. From Peng Te-huai's advocating professional army-building programme after the Korea war to Lin Piao's carrying out political army-building program and a series of personality cults of Mao after the Lushan conference in 1959, and from Lin Piao and Lo Jui-ch'ing's great debate over the military policy of Vietnam War in mid 60's to Mao's once again reinforcing the supreme principal of "Party commands the gun" after the Lin Piao incident in 1971. Then from the Eighth CCP National Congress which emphasised collective leadership and the Ninth CCP National Congress where military men occupied a high ratio of members of CCPCC to the Tenth CCP National Congress which weakened the political role of the PLA in the Central and the local, all these are worthy of thorough study.

It is intended that through the research of this case, this thesis can serve as a most valuable reference to similar issues in the developing countries or contribute to researchers for carrying out the study of PLA's political role from 1973 onwards .

To analyse from the intensity of military intervention in politics, civil-military relations can normally be illustrated by the application of the Mathematical concept of a continuum, shown as follows:



Note: -----> Increase of Military Influence

<-----Decrease of Military Influence

At left end, the complete civilian rule represents the non-existence of military participation in political affairs, at right end, the direct military rule represents all the political power controlled by the military. This thesis is, therefore, intended to interpret that to what degree the political role of the PLA have involved in this diagram.

This thesis is to study the political role of the PLA from the approach of its structure and function. With the characteristic of the dual-role elite of the militarists and of the homogeneity of the Army and Party, the political role of the PLA, in practice, can be defined as the military elite's position of the Party's policies and their role in the participation of inner-Party struggle, such as P'eng Te-huai's criticism on the Policy of the Three Red Banners at the Lushan conference in 1959, and the contradiction between the professional army building program and the policy of "every man a soldier" in the period of People's Communes.

As mentioned in this thesis, PLA did not enter the political arena of their own accord, but at Mao's incitement. As a matter of fact, the PLA has never attempted a coup d'état, which is fully discussed in Chapter IV.

The central theme of this thesis is the development of the PLA's political role. Its intention is to discuss the following: (1) The relationship between the structure of the PRC and the formation of the PLA's political role; (2) How has ideology influenced the army's political role; (3) What is Mao's viewpoint and his influence on the development of the army's political role; (4) What is the link between the army and the party, and how has this developed; (6) What accounts for the expansion of the PLA's political functions; (7) What is the influence of political line struggles on the PLA's political role; (8) Is it political

institution or military institution that controls the recruitment of the military elite; (9) What are the disparities between the military elite in handling international conflicts and what are their political considerations; (10) What is the Party's position in the army; (11) How have the Party's important meetings and personnel arrangements influenced the rise and fall of the PLA's political role?

This thesis can be broken down into a number of parts to cover the above-mentioned issues. The first discusses the influence of Chinese traditional political culture on the political role of the PLA in Chapter I. The second covers the characteristics and function of contemporary China's social and political structure, which includes Mao's ideology of army-building programme, Chou En-lai's instructions in "the September letter of the central committee" in the Red Army era, the relationship between the Army and Party, and the dual role of the Party Elite and Military Elite in Chapter II. All these deeply influenced the political role of the PLA. The third analyses the international environmental influence on the development of the political role of the PLA, and focuses on relevant international events, such as the Korean war, Sino-Soviet split, Chenpao island military clashes and the Vietnam war in Chapter III. The fourth discusses the domestic environment, and emphasises four out of ten major struggles over the party line in the history of the Chinese Communist Party since 1949 according to Mao Tse-tung. This includes the "Kao-Jao anti-Party clique", the "P'eng-Huang anti-Party clique", the "Liu Shao-ch'i event" and the "Lin Piao incident" in Chapter IV. The fifth stresses the important congresses and events that have had a significant impact on the political role of the PLA, which includes the "Eighth CCP National Congress", "Ninth CCP National Congress", "Tenth CCP National Congress", "February Adverse Current", "The Purge of Lo Jui-ch'ing", and the "Wuhan event" in Chapter V and VI .

The time scope of this thesis is set between 1949 and 1973, from the establishment of the

PRC regime to the convention of Tenth CCP National Congress. Apart from some relevant references, such as "Sanwan Reorganisation", "Kutien Conference", "The Party Constitution of the Seventh CCPCC" etc., anything beyond this scope of time is outside the discussion of this thesis. This thesis excludes the discussion of the purely military aspect of the PLA, such as military strategy and tactics, and the analysis of politics irrelevant to this thesis, such as political philosophy, the voting behaviour, electoral institution etc.

The source of materials is mostly original documents including conference records, speeches, and lists of personnel organisations and many others. They were collected from the library of Durham University, Harvard-Yenching Library at Harvard University, Kent Library at Columbia University (New York), and the Library of Institute of International Relations at National Cheng-chi University (Taipei). Since the PRC's official publishings normally carry a propaganda purpose for the authorities, hence, the quotations from *THE SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG* and other official documents in this thesis have been carefully selected, compared and verified from different editions. The transliteration of personal names and place names is given in the Wade-Giles romanization system. They are mostly after consultation with *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism 1921-1965* published by Harvard University in 1971, and *A Comprehensive Glossary of Chinese Communist Terminology* published by National Cheng-chi University in 1978.

Chapter I. The Structure of the P.R.C.

If one takes a macro view, it is clear to see that the Chinese revolution of 1911 was in fact virtually an "incomplete revolution" due to the unsettled problem of land distribution in what was predominantly an agricultural society. Because most of the elite in the government were only interested in their own benefits, this resulted in the characteristics of low cohesion and high penetration in the new organisational structure. Therefore, when the new government came under too much pressure from its external environment¹ and could no longer defend her national interest, the deterioration of the already unstable political, economical and military order was thus further accentuated, the controlling factors of the state system were weakened, and it became unstable.

In fact the 1911 Revolution had not reformed the basic social structure - that is, the peasant class, which constituted the majority of Chinese population. Thus when the new government fell into difficulties, the CCP seized this opportunity to wage another revolution of structural reorganisation by building up a Communist Utopia. This was in accordance with China's structural characteristics.

¹Such as China's unsuccessful attempt of regaining self-govern tariff and abolishing extraterritoriality at both Paris conference in 1919 and Washington conference in 1921, the warlord issues before 1928; the event of Japanese massacre of Shantung province in May 1928; the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 (known as 18 September incident); and The Sino-Japan war between 1937 and 1945. For details see Li Chien-nung, *THE HISTORY OF POLITICS IN CHINA Vol. I* (Taipei: Shang Wu Publishing, 1980); Kuo T'ing-i, *THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPRORY CHINA*, (Taipei: 1976).



I. The Essence of the System

Shang Yang, Prime Minister of the Ch'in Dynasty implemented a "New Law", which crippled the political and military power of feudal nobles, abolished central land monopoly, and set up the system of conscription. Chinese society had a new appearance.² Specific addition were, the free trade in land; conscription shifting from nobles to ordinary civilians; and government offices being no longer hereditary but appointments instead made according to the degree of their military successes. The military became professional.

Confucianism has dominated Chinese political ideology ever since the Han Dynasty (206B.C. -). There is, moreover, the concept of a powerful and stable middle class - that is, family structure, existing between a nation and individuals in the Chinese society. "Filial Piety" is the fundamental basis for holding the members of family together. These moral values based on the family were further extended by Confucianism to form the relationship between upper and lower levels in society. People were taught to pledge their "Loyalty" to the superiors and to the monarch. The concepts of "Loyalty" and "Filial Piety" became public moral values and thus influenced the people from all walks of life. Generally speaking, most Chinese soldiers had the sense of "Loyalty" and "Filial Piety". The belief in "dedicating oneself to the service of monarch and country" is the cardinal trait of their personality.

The morality behind "Loyalty" and "Filial Piety" was effective in the suppression of militarists' interference in politics. In Chinese history, military power was, at all times, either directly or indirectly, under the leadership of the Emperor, even at the time of

²Chang Ch'i-yün, *THE HISTORY OF CHINESE MILITARY*, (Taipei: Central Cultural & Publication Co., 1956), p. 3.

territorial expansion, of external defence or when suppressing a rebellion. The military commanders could only have temporary control over the army. The supreme leadership was in the hands of the Emperor.

In the Chinese feudal society, peasants constituted the majority of the population; in politics, they were the foundation of social stability; in military affairs, they composed the main source of recruits; in economics, they provided a large supply of agricultural production. Nevertheless, this economic structure changed after the "Warring States Periods (403-222 B.C.)", the vicious circle of buying and selling lands, which peasants relied on for a living, had formed the phenomenon of "annexation of land holdings", and thus brought about a new economic model of "landlord economy". The characteristics of "landlord economy" included:

A. In the Political Sphere

Landlords becoming a new social class, with the economic superiority they possessed and the political supremacy arising therefrom. They had even greater power to proceed to a further stage of "annexation of land holdings". The phenomenon of "annexation of land holdings" not only existed within landlord class, but also amongst the upper class, which included bureaucrats and militarists. Even loyal families and their relatives annexed lands using their dominant position in society although to differing degree. This situation was most serious in the final years of each successive dynasty.³

B. In the Military Sphere

The system of "integration of soldiers and peasants" was an important policy in feudal China. One essential prerequisite of this system was that it had to be built up on the basis

³*Chin Kuan-t'ao & Liu Ch'ing-feng, THE RISE AND CRISIS - ON ULTRA-STABILIZED STRUCTURE OF CHINESE FEUDAL SOCIETY, (Taipei: Ku Feng Publishing Co., 1987), pp. 104-107.*

of a stable agricultural society. Consequently, in the early years of each new dynasty, most barren lands or lands that were forfeited by overlords of the former dynasty were distributed to peasants or awarded to those soldiers who had made outstanding moves towards founding the state. It was such land re-distribution policy that prolonged the survival of landowner-peasants and consolidated the military power of the new dynasty. The Central government could therefore in turn enrich army finance by taxing from landowners.

However, when the social economy re-emerged in the guise of "landlord economy", the economic prominence based on the landowner-peasants gradually died out, and the "landlord economy" was very likely to turn into the "feudal lord's economy". It was rather common for feudal lords to keep an army to safeguard their personal lands and property, but they soon expanded their armed forces to such an extent that it was difficult for the Central government to control. As the number of feudal lords grew, the size of army they commanded would also increase and the central government soon had to face the problem of the shortage of armed forces.

A large number of landowner-peasants lost their lands and could not rapidly transfer into tenant-peasants or into other occupations. This meant that if the speed of decreasing number of landowner-peasants was greater than that of the increasing number of those landless peasants shifting to other occupations, a large number of vagabonds would emerge in the society, and if a country was in the throes of war and needed to raise troops, the vagabonds would therefore become the prime manpower of the military. However, when the number of vagabonds in the army increased greatly, the calibre of soldier was obviously lower than before. The military power of that dynasty would thus begin to decline. This situation is most common in the last stage of each successive dynasties.

As the consequence of the Central government implementation of military policy of "integration between soldiers and peasants", it was debatable whether "all soldiers are peasants" or "all peasants are soldiers". The army based on the peasants were likely to be restrained by the characteristics of Chinese social structure and by Confucian ethics. Basically, most soldiers possessed the following traits: being loyal to autocratic authority or central authority, and "Loyalty" as perfect morality; having certain respect and fear towards autocratic authority, fear punishments by superiors; and the army, in name, is the nation's army, but, in reality, is the autocratic authority's army, and therefore they potentially play an important role in politics.

After the CCP assumed power in 1949, many of this traditional characteristics of Chinese social structure continued⁴. Soon however these were changed to a considerable degree by the CCP with its particular method of social reform, and with its systematic programme. If we regard a nation as having a unified political system,⁵ and examine this from the viewpoint of the functions of system structure, two outstanding characteristics can be found in an open system, namely, structure differentiation and functional integration. The core function of a political system is the "authoritative decision of values for a society".⁶

In order to gain peasants' support, the policy of "overthrowing the landlords and re-distributing lands" in the civil war and the policy of "land reform" from 1950 to 1952⁷

⁴The traditional characteristics of Chinese social structure did not have any fundamental changes during the Nationalist period.

⁵See David Easton, *THE POLITICAL SYSTEM*, (New York: Knopf, 1953) & *FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS*, (New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1965), and Gabriel A. Almond & Bingham G. Powell, Jr., *COMPARATIVE POLITICS: A DEVELOPMENT APPROACH* (Boston: Little Brown, 1966).

⁶David Easton, *THE POLITICAL SYSTEM*, op. cit., Chapter IV.

⁷*WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, (Shanghai: People's Press, 1983), pp. 365-366.

implemented by the CCP had changed the phenomena of polarisation of the social economic structure in the countryside since the end of Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1911 A.D.). China entered a new era, the landowner-peasants became the majority of the agricultural population, and the phenomenon of "annexation of land holdings" came to an end. Until the implementation of "People's Communes", the reason peasants and the authorities could maintain smooth relationship was because the land problems had essentially been settled. The people's support of the new government, whether overt or covert, was greater than their demands. Nevertheless, the PRC regime had not cast off "central hegemony" which had been pursued most vigorously by every successive dynasty. Instead it continued to pursue a policy of unified leadership insisting that the "party commands the government" and that the "party commands the army". The central authority applied severe punishments to eradicate the phenomenon of "annexation of land holdings", to re-establish a society based on the landowner-peasants. The peasants, consequently, acquired lands and improved their economy, but on the whole the system did not possess the characteristics of structure differentiation and functional integration, and, therefore, it was not an open system but a closed system.

Basically, a "closed system" can be easily penetrated and the aims of strict control by central authority can be realised through ideology and a leader's charisma that is painstaking moulded by the authority. PRC is an example of this. Since the movement of the People's Communes, Chinese social structure has gone through another important transformation. The leading class of the PRC adopted political means to thoroughly eradicate the agricultural society based on the landowner-peasants that they established themselves. They attempted to carry out the biggest "annexation of land holdings" in modern Chinese history. The principle of "three combinations" -combination of politics with the commune, combination of politics with economy, and combination of labour with military affairs were applied to the People's Communes. This resulted in the People's

Communes being not only the organisation for collective economy in the countryside, but also the organisation for politics and military. It, therefore, became a weapon for central hegemony to control the locality and in turn to suppress anti-governmental organisations. Since the implementation of People's Communes, the authorities carried out all kinds of political campaigns to initiate the development of military and economic construction. In addition, the traditional policy of "everyone's a soldier", on the basis that "soldiers are peasants", was combined with the political and military thoughts of Mao Tse-tung. Such a social structure built on the combination of military and politics has, as the People's Communes fully reflected the preference of "central hegemony".

The PRC restored the collectivisation of land policy by force in spite of the fact that economic conditions for small production based on small landowner-peasants still existed in the Chinese agricultural society. In order to consolidate these huge annexations of land holdings, similar in size to those of the monarchs of past dynasties, the CCP used the army as a tool to maintain its hegemony, to develop the function of system maintenance directly or indirectly and to secure system stability under the supreme leadership of the party.

Moreover, the CCP's revolution was one based on peasant support and led by a small number of intellectuals. In view of the need to organise personnel, at the initial stage of party-building, an intellectual usually had to be in charge of party's work, or to be an commander to direct the peasant uprising. At the stage of army-building, the responsible cadres of the party in the central or the locality, were normally political commissars in the army. For example Liu Shao-ch'i, was elected as a full member of the CCPCC at the "Fifth CCP National Congress" in 1927 and an alternate member of the Politburo of the CCPCC at the "Fourth Plenum of the Six CCPCC" in 1931, but, on the other hand, he was also Party Central Representative of the "Eighth Red-Army Regiment" and "Fifth Red-Army Regiment" and Director of the Political Department of "Third Red-Army Legion" in

1934.⁸ Chou En-lai was another example, he was Director of the Political Department of Whampoa Military Academy and Director of the Political Department of the First Army of National Revolutionary Army in 1924, Secretary of the CCPCC Military Commission and concurrent Secretary of the CCPCC Military Commission at Chekiang area in 1926, and Secretary of the Central bureau of the Soviet Area, Political Commissar of First Workers' and Peasant's Red Army and Vice-chairman of Central Revolutionary Military Commission.⁹ Among leaders of the CCP revolutionary generation, most of them were dual-role elites from political and military backgrounds. Party and military leadership had no significant differentiation and were controlled by the same organisation.¹⁰ After its regime was founded in 1949, the party leaders of the revolutionary generation not only occupied important posts in the party and the army, but also became administrative bureaucrats of various government organisations. Based on such a unique combination of party, military and government, hence, the overlapping between the various roles and functions in the PRC political system can be seen in many cases..

Since the PLA has a strict class stratification, the political participation of the military is, in reality, confined to only those military elites. The military elites of the revolutionary generation normally played the role of party elites at the same time. They were thus involved in the actual participation and decision-making of an authoritative policy. The background of such dual-role elite provided PLA with a regular channel of political participation, which is used to deliver their political view through the party's system. This is one of the reasons why the ultimate principle of the "party commands the army" or of the "party commands the gun", which Mao pursued has never been opposed publicly by the military bureaucrats, including P'eng Te-huai. P'eng, who was then Minister of

⁸WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, *op., cit.*, pp. 533-534.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 611.

¹⁰See Chapter II, Section III.

National Defence, attempted to establish a "professional army-building program". He was forced to express his supports of the "party commands the army" in public by saying that "the entire comrades of the PLA have showed their high initiative and creativity in the climax of the movement of the "Great Leap Forward", and successfully completed the tasks that entrusted by the Party and the people".¹¹ Nevertheless, P'eng was forced to step down from his position of power following his "public criticism" of the failure of the "Great Leap Forward" at the Lushan conference in 1959.¹²

As a direct result of effective political participation by the leading class of the PLA, the praetorian political system¹³ did not appear during Mao's regime. The party organisations and its ideological standpoint have been the ultimate guide of all things in the PRC. It has proved to be a perfect case of the "party commands the army". It should be noted that the scope and depth for militarists' to participate in politics depends entirely on how much the party leader or the supreme authorities have to rely on the army. Consequently, under the leadership of the CCP, the so-called political participation of military does not mean the well institutionalised political participation. This phenomena can also reflect the general course of political participation by non-military social class. As mentioned above, influenced by the power of the supreme authorities, the political participation of the PRC is a kind of passive participation. Consequently, the PRC regime belongs to a state of low political institutionalisation.

There is another structural characteristic of Chinese society, that is, the existence of two influential social classes - the intellectuals and the vagabonds.¹⁴ At the time of social

¹¹"A Speech at the National Days by Marshal Peng Te-huai, Minister of National Defence", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 2 Oct., 1958.

¹²See Chapter IV, Section II.

¹³Refer to Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army", *COMPARATIVE POLITICS*, Vol. I, No. 3, (April, 1969), p. 200.

¹⁴Lei Tsung-hai, *CHINESE CULTURE AND CHINESE SOLDIERS*, (Hong Kong: Lung Men Bookstore,

unrest and corruption of central control, the dispossessed and the vagabonds could be grouped together with little efforts by a slightly-organised group, either peasant or intellectual with a charismatic leader. However "the chief drawback of intellectuals is that they know nothing about the military".¹⁵ In peace time, intellectuals relied on bureaucratic or authoritarian systems to preserve their influence in the centre or the localities. When there were big upheavals, the power which they relied on for existence, shifted to the hands of the vagabonds in lower class, who were skilful at assembling the masses to fight against the existent system by applying superstitious and religious rites to the existing structure. The "Yellow Turbans" in Eastern Han Dynasty (25-220 A.D.), "The Armed Rebellion of Huang Chao" in Tang Dynasty (618-906 A.D.), "The White Lotus Insurrection" in Yüan Dynasty (1234-1368 A.D.), and "Boxer Uprising" in Ch'ing Dynasty are all examples of this. These all comprised a good many vagabonds, a small number of obscurantists and famine victims.¹⁶ The chief drawback of the vagrants was their low education level. They accomplished nothing in peace time, but when turbulence came, the central government, on which the intelligentsia relied, lost its control. They seized the opportunity to take the lead and, if luck was with them, they sometimes achieved great success. "A small number of vagabond leaders succeeded even in founding a state. They normally had a smooth personality and the ability to recognise some individuals abilities and assigned them relevant jobs commensurate with their competence. Such as Kao Tsu of Han Dynasty and Tai Tsu of Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 A.D.) are two well-known figures in Chinese history". "They needed intellectual input in founding the state" "but relied on their efforts even more afterwards in governing the state".¹⁷

1968), p. 137.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 138.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 140.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 142.

Mao had his own viewpoint about the function of the intellectuals¹⁸. He pointed out, "the revolutionary forces cannot be successfully organised and revolutionary work cannot be successfully conducted without the participation of revolutionary intellectuals. However the intellectuals often tend to be subjective and individualistic, impractical in their thinking and irresolute in action until they have thrown themselves heart and soul into mass revolutionary struggles, or made up their minds to serve the interests of the masses and become one with them. Hence although the mass of revolutionary intellectuals in China can play a vanguard role or serve as a link with the masses, not all of them will remain revolutionaries to the end. Some will drop out of the revolutionary ranks at critical moments and become passive, while a few may even become enemies of the revolution. The intellectuals can overcome their shortcomings only in mass struggle over a long period".¹⁹

In the early stage of Chinese Communist Party, intellectuals played an important role. They joined the Communist Party with a lofty idea of establishing a new China and had revolutionary enthusiasm. However, they lacked in-depth systematic study in Marxism and Leninism.²⁰ Such a combination of low political theoretic level and high revolutionary enthusiasm, led intellectuals to make the error of over-simplification in their reasoning and behaviour pattern when solving problems. The leaders of early stage such as Ch'en Tu-hsiu,²¹ Ch'u Ch'iu-pai,²² Ch'en Shao-yü,²³ and Li Li-san²⁴ were typical intellectuals, who

¹⁸The intellectuals refer to persons who receive secondary and higher education. They existed in four classes, namely, national bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, semi-proletariat and proletariat. For Mao's classification of classes, see "Analysis of the classes in Chinese Society (March 1926), *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. I, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), pp. 13-21."

¹⁹"Chinese Revolution and Chinese Communist Party (Dec. 1939)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. II, (1965), op. cit., p.322.

²⁰Feng Chien-huei, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu - At the Early Period of the CCP", *SELECTED WORKS OF THE HISTORY STUDY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, Vol. I, (Changsha: Hunan People's Press, 1983), pp. 71-72.

²¹Ch'en Tu-hsiu, First CCP General Secretary, occupies a position of great significance in China's intellectual modernization as one of the prime movers of the May Fourth Movement. Having helped found the CCP in 1921, he was its chief in the turbulent phase from 1921 to 1927. See Donald W. Klien &

knew nothing about military affairs. On the one hand, Mao Tse-tung perfectly perceived the characteristics of China's structure, he seized the opportunity and applied it thoroughly and flexibly. This was displayed most vividly in his strategy of building up the party and the army. Mao possessed good knowledge of how to control the overall situation and rally forces in turbulent days. This trait of his personality was rare even among the intellectuals. He also possessed the characteristics of vagabonds on the other hand, laying stress on the potential and the class nature of the revolution in the countryside. He applied charismatic skillfully to assemble the vagabonds, and on occasions the intellectuals too, with diversified thoughts for unifying and moulding their political ideology.

Furthermore, the majority of the peasants, who participated in armed rebellions under the command of the CCP were, such as the final years of the last Empire, normally the proletariat and the vagabonds. They joined the PLA, in reality, for the same reason as being the bandits in the past. In essence, "It was the unemployed intellectuals who commanded members of the Party organisations in the metropolitan and the countryside areas".²⁵

When the gap between the expectation of the unemployed intellectuals and their satisfaction towards the society became too wide, they generally tend to engage in

Anne B. Clark, *BIOGRAPHIC DICTIONARY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM 1921-1965*, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 139.

²²Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, early party leader, CCP chief 1927-1928. Beginning his careers a translator of Tolstoy. By August 1927 he had replaced Chen Tu-hsiu as the party chief. See Donald W. Klein & Anne B. Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

²³Ch'en Shao-yü often known as Wang Ming, he was the leader of the Russian returned student faction, which triumphed over the Li Li-san leadership in a major intro-party struggle for power in 1930-1931. See Donald W. Klein & Anne B. Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

²⁴Li Li-san, early labor leader and party leader. Li's policies, known as the "Li Li-san line", dominated the party from mid-1928 until his downfall in late 1930. See Donald W. Klein & Anne B. Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 512.

²⁵Cheng Hsüeh-chia, *FROM CULTURAL REVOLUTION TO THE ELEVENTH CCP NATIONAL CONGRESS*, (Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprise, 1978), p. 14.

carrying out the transformation of system structure and regard it as a holy commitment. At that time, most "young intellectuals who possessed the primitive sense of Marxism-Leninism and showed interest in politics were recruited by the CCP and became a member of the armed forces or a commander".²⁶ Their determination to re-establish the system structure was further reinforced by the deterioration of social environment at that time. Therefore, "the Soviet areas established by the CCP are virtually expanding instead of shrinking".²⁷

The revolutionary foundation of the CCP, in reality, was built with a blend of discontent and aggressiveness amongst intellectuals, the vagabonds and the proletariat in their status as professional revolutionaries with their belief of communism, which they weren't even clear about at that time. Their belief was the foundation of the Bolshevik Party, and portrayed an illusion of prospects to attract a good many of low-educated peasants to participate the revolution by applying communist ideology as a kind of religion. The rise of communist party in China is just another successful version of vagabond movement in the Chinese history. While the party agitated this vagrant movement was the so-called Bolshevik party in Chinese style.²⁸ The army of the CCP was actually a typical peasant army with vagabond characteristics.

Mao possessed the characteristics of both the intellectual and the vagabond. Such a dual personality enabled Mao to establish an unbreakable leader's charisma throughout the party, the army and the whole nation. It should never be disregarded with respect to the development of CCP's regime.

²⁶*Ibid.*

²⁷*Ibid.*

²⁸"On the Sixth congress of the Party", *SELECTED WORKS OF CHOU EN-LAI*, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1981), p. 210.

The anti-foreign movement in the modern history of China was a form of resistance formed by the masses to combat suppression, aggression and unequal treatments from foreign powers²⁹. The anti-foreign movement in late nineteenth century came from the movement of chauvinism and of nationalism, and was gradually expanded from some individual cases locally, such as "anti-missionaries", to a nation-wide mass movement, such as the "Boxer uprising". It was noteworthy, however, that the anti-foreign movement was a spontaneous movement by the intellectuals and the masses to join forces together. They adopted violent means to combat foreign countries regardless of the fine tradition of Confucianism, which advocated humanism and peaceful relationships between the people. Since 1860, the movement of anti-missionaries agitated by the intellectuals had resulted in numerous bloody and destructive events. In other words, it was the long-term foreign oppression and self-respect of a weak nation that forced the intellectuals to abandon Confucianism and apply violent means against imperialism. The anti-foreign sentiment not only formed strong mass forces, which became the major power of anti-imperialist movement, but also impelled the rise of nationalism and of comprehensive moral concepts.

Since the anti-foreign movement could satisfy people's sentiments of nationalism and social morals, it was, therefore, an effective weapon to suppress reactionaries, especially in an undemocratic society. The ruling class tended to exaggerate disputes with hostile countries and created tensions by making use of bureaucratic organs and mass medium to arouse masses' support when they faced certain threats from internal overwhelming forces.

After PRC's regime was founded, the traditional anti-foreign sentiment was further developed into "anti-imperialist" ideology. Mao's early view of imperialism is seen in his

²⁹The anti-foreign mvement was directed against the West from mid 19 century to early 20 century, and against Japan after 1920s,

article of *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party*(1939). Mao saw that the imperialist powers used and continued to use military, political, economic and cultural means of oppression, and that China had become a semi-colony. In this article, Mao said: Through wars and unequal treaties the imperialist powers have controlled all the important trading ports, have acquired extra territoriality, have operated industries, and have monopolised china's banking and finance. The imperialist power have supplied the warlords with large quantities of munitions and host of military advisors to keep them fighting among themselves. Through missionary work and the establishment of hospitals, schools, and the publication of newspapers, the imperialists have conducted a policy of cultural aggression.³⁰

Departing from this basic understanding of imperialism, Mao analysed imperialism from the point of view of class struggle. The imperialist powers, according to Mao, had established a network of comprador and merchant-usurer class in their service, so as to facilitate their exploitation of the mass of the Chinese peasantry and their sections of the people.

Following the Comintern's line, Mao pointed out that "imperialism first allies itself with the ruling strata of the previous social structure, with feudal lords and the trading and money lending bourgeoisie, against the majority of the people".³¹ In the same article, Mao said, "the contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese nation and the contradiction between feudalism and the great masses of the people were the basic contradictions in modern Chinese society".³²

³⁰"*Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party (1939)*", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. II (1965), *op. cit.*, pp. 311-312.

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 312.

³²*Ibid.*, p. 313

According to Mao, these contradictions and their intensification must inevitably result in the incessant growth of revolutionary movement. He said, "The great revolutions in modern and contemporary China have emerged and grown on this basis of their basic contradictions".³³ In Mao's doctrine of revolution, the chief targets of enemies at the first stage of the Chinese revolution were imperialism and feudalism, i.e., the bourgeoisie of the imperialist countries and the landlord class in China.

Mao not only focused on class struggle to form his view of imperialism, but further combined imperialism with Chinese revolution, which subsequently became his fundamental ideology in conducting anti-imperialist movement and in turn to suppress reactionaries after his rise to power.

In 1955, Lo Jui-Ch'ing, minister of public security, delivered a paper entitled *Enhance Vigilance and Combat Numbness*, in which he commented, "As long as there exists classes and class struggle in the world, our enemies will not forget us and thereby relax their sabotage to us at any moments. Countless facts have showed us that whenever our revolutionary undertakings advanced one step forward, it had to suffer serious hostility and sabotage on both the domestic front and abroad. They try every contemptible means to obstruct the socialist construction of our state".³⁴

The CCP employed "anti-imperialism" as an important political means to mobilise the masses and gain their support. The anti-imperialist ideology was drawn into domestic politics ever since 1949. As inner-party power struggle grew stronger. The policy tended to be more "left", and the ideology lay more emphasis on anti-imperialism and anti-foreignism. The continuous political struggle would develop more "left" ideology and

³³*Ibid.*, p. 314.

³⁴Lo Jui-ch'ing, "Enhance Vigilance and Combat Numbness", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 30 June 1955.

stronger anti-foreign sentiments. In the first decade of the PRC, the Peking government's policy of anti-foreignism was reflected in both external and internal movements. Large-scale campaigns such as the "Resist America and Aid Korea" movement clearly were mass activities against U.S. imperialism. The "Resist America and aid Korea" movement was carried on until 1953. Most of the important domestic movements such as the "Three-antis and Five-antis",³⁵ the "Suppression of Counter-revolutionaries",³⁶ and the "Anti-Rightist"³⁷ movements were launched to eradicate people who had relations with foreigners and who had "foreign capitalist ideas", particularly those persons "opposing party policies". In fact, these campaigns were strengthened by anti-foreign sentiment or anti-imperialism". The details of political movements from 1950 to 1959 are shown on the table below:³⁸

Political Movements, 1950-1959

<i>Year</i>	<i>Name of Movements</i>	<i>Main Activities</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
1951	<i>Resist-America and Aid Korea Movement</i>	<i>(1)aroused anti-American feelings; (2) encouraged students to join the army; (3)forced donations for purchase of aeroplanes and artillery.</i>	<i>These movements were carried on until 1953</i>
	<i>First Movement of Suppression of Counter-revolutionary Elements</i>	<i>(1)urged remnant Nationalist military and political personnel to register with the Communist government; (2) accused hidden counter-revolutionaries</i>	

³⁵The three-anti is a movement against corruption, waste, and bureaucratism carried out between Dec. 1951 and June 1952. The five-anti movement developed from the three-anti movement, they were: against "capitalist bribery of government workers, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts and stealing economic information from government sources. See Warren Kuo (ed.) *A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY*, (Taipei: National Cheng-chi University, 1978), p. 428, 671.

³⁶A movement from 1950 to 1952 to eliminate alien elements from the party government and other organization. See Warren Kuo (ed.) *op. cit.*, p. 12.

³⁷An anti-Rightist movement initiated in the late 1950s. See Warren Kuo (ed.) *op. cit.*, p. 140.

³⁸Liao Kuang-sheng, *ANTIFOREIGNISM AND MODERNIZATION IN CHINA 1860-1980*, (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press 1984), pp. 122-123.

1952	<i>Three-antis and Five-antis Movements</i>	<i>(1) submit a detailed report on one's own background; and review one's own thought; (2) urged businessmen to pay evaded taxes; (3) urged popular support to battle-fronts.</i>	<i>Targets of these movements were industrialists, businessmen and cadres</i>
1955	<i>Second Movement of Suppression of Counter-revolutionary Elements</i>	<i>(1) review of thought; (2) ideological struggles; (3) strict classification of class affiliations</i>	<i>The most bitter ideological struggle</i>
1956	<i>Suppression of Counter-revolutionaries; and Rectification Movement</i>	<i>(1) propaganda; (2) accusations of counter-revolutionaries</i>	<i>Movements suspended due to anti-Communist revolutions in East Europe</i>
1957	<i>Rectification Movement; (Blooming and Contending Movement); Anti-rightists Movement</i>	<i>(1) self-criticism among students and teachers with Party membership; (2) participation of non-party-member students and teachers in the rectification Movement; (3) retaliation against non-party-member student and teachers by those with party membership</i>	<i>Three Movements closely related to one another</i>
1959	<i>Movement against Rightist Tendencies</i>	<i>Study of documents issued by Eighth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party</i>	<i>Movements carried out on a local basis in response to the CCPCC</i>

In his power struggle against Liu Shao-ch'i, Chairman of the PRC, Mao applied anti-foreign sentiment to his attack. Mao linked Liu with "Soviet Revisionism" and accused him of being "China's Khrushchev". Mao pointed out that P'eng Te-huai, Minister of National Defence, "dared to criticise the failure of the 'Great Leap Forward' at the Lushan conference in 1959... Such anti-party activity was, in fact, conducted under the support and the shelter of bourgeois headquarters led by the Chinese Khrushchev".³⁹ Mao manipulated the media, and aroused the masses with anti-foreign sentiment to reinforce his control and consolidate his power.

In his speech *On the Issue of Anti-China* in 1960, Mao proclaimed that "their anti-China movement is only to evoke the unification of our party and the entire people and to set up

³⁹"From the Failure of Peng Te-huai to the Bankruptcy of Chinese Khrushchev", RED FLAG, No. 13, 1967. p. 23.

our lofty ambitions".⁴⁰ In other words, in China, under Mao's regime, external provocation could be used as a tool to reinforce internal unification. Since "xenophobia" carried strong characteristics of nationalism, which could evoke the masses' emotion and spread quickly, a ruler thereby increased his political supremacy every time a large-scale anti-foreign movement was conducted. And the ruler's supreme position had always been the best weapon to eliminate the dissidents. For instance, during the period of the Cultural Revolution, Mao's clique began to mobilise the masses to seize power from "capitalist roaders in the party" by early 1967. The mass media manipulated by Mao increased its attack on Liu Shao-ch'i without naming him specifically, there was also a simultaneous sharp increase in the criticism against Soviet Revisionism. In Peking newspaper for example, the articles attacking Soviet Union increased from 6.82 percent between July and December 1966, to 18.75 percent between January and June 1967.⁴¹ Moreover, according to statistical data, there were 58 articles in January and 91 in February published by *People's Daily* to criticise the counter-revolutionary activities carried by Soviet Revisionists. "Soviet Revisionists" became common choice of words that used to struggle reactionaries. In addition, the articles about "Soviet revisionists' restoration of capitalism" were constantly carried in newspapers between 1967 and 1968.⁴²

In the struggle between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i during the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, Mao's apply of "anti-foreigners" policy contained two hidden functions. First, Mao's followers claimed to be patriots, constantly attacked foreign enemies, and accused that Liu Shao-ch'i had betrayed China's revolution in his attempt to collude "Soviet imperialists" and "Soviet revisionists". Mao deliberately called an "internal enemy" as a "hidden traitor" and turned "his enemy" into a "public enemy" through nation-

⁴⁰Liao Kuang-sheng, *ANTIFOREIGNISM AND CHINESE POLITICS*, (Taipei: 1987), p. 266.

⁴¹Daniel Tretiak, "Is China Preparing to Turn Out?", *ASIAN SURVEY*, March 1971, p.224.

⁴²Liao Kuang-sheng, *ANTIFOREIGNISM AND CHINESE POLITICS*, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

wide mass media. Mao applied simple logic, that was, since the "internal enemy" had colluded with a "foreign enemy", a large-scale anti-foreign movement would therefore be conducive to the criticism against Liu. Secondly, Mao could consolidate his supreme leadership through the anti-foreign movement. The masses transformed their patriotism into forces to support Mao and his domestic and foreign policies. Chinese people had suffered too much humiliation from foreign powers since 1840, which forced them to unite under the leadership of a powerful man. On the other hand, since the government must prepare itself to fight in the event of war, it was important to unite internal forces and establish a unified leadership. Mao, as chairman of the CCP, without doubt became the supreme commander. Consequently, the evocation of anti-foreign sentiment not only could increase Mao's commanding position, but also minimise the resistance in carrying out inner struggles and gain masses' support.

Without doubt the leading class of the CCP had its purposes for using the mass media to provoke external disputes at a time when a full-scale internal power-seizure struggle was most vehement. When the media fiercely attacked Soviet Union in early 1967, it was also the time when Mao contended with Liu for power the most. Mao attempted to arouse the masses' indignation towards "revisionists" through the attack of "Soviet Revisionism", Liu was thus accused of being "China's Khrushchev" at that time. But after Liu was purged at the Twelfth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC in October 1968, the criticism against the Soviet Union in the mass media also dropped dramatically. It is usually too complicated a motive for an undemocratic nation to apply nationalism as a means of political mobilisation. But, one thing can be for sure, to the leading class of the CCP, anti-foreignism, undoubtedly, was the best policy to eradicate the dissidents.

II. Political Socialisation and Political Culture

A. Political Socialisation

After their rise to power in 1949, the CCP faced three cardinal issues if they wished to exercise their absolute leadership. These were: state integration, legalising the communist regime and constructing socialism.

To solve the above issues, the CCP authority started to proceed to structural reorganisation. Their purpose was to establish a new political culture so that the members in the system could accept the supreme aim of the construction of a "socialist society" based on Mao's ideology. This was because "the struggle of the proletariat and the revolutionary people to change the world comprises the fulfilment of the following tasks: to change the objective world and, at the same time, their own subjective ability and change - to change their cognitive ability and change the relations between the subjective and the objective world".⁴³

The ideal society portrayed by communism is based on the model of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs". It is not merely a kind of economic system, but also proposed a hypothesis of excellent personality traits, that is to say, all men will do their duty without any consideration of rewards. In addition, it also proposed that if all men possessed the high moral virtue of self-restraint, they would obtain commodities according to their needs, not their desires.

Although Mao was respectfully addressed as representing "the general truth of Marxism-

⁴³"On Practice", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. I (1975)*, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

Leninism of our era"⁴⁴ and "the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era",⁴⁵ he did not put the Utopian society of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs", the pinnacle of communism, into practice. Mao recognised the importance of the proletariat to change their own subjective world of their own, and attempted to bring the communist society with Chinese characteristics to a new stage of evolution through the changing people. Chinese communists proclaimed that "comrade Mao Tse-tung has inherited, defended and developed Marxism-Leninism with genius, creatively and comprehensively and has brought it to a higher and completely new stage".⁴⁶ In order to create and to bring Marxism-Leninism to a higher and completely new stage, it was primarily necessary to change the fundamental values and mores of traditional Chinese society.

Family was the most important medium for the political socialisation⁴⁷ in traditional Chinese society. However, in order to carry out thoroughly the people's ideological reform, the CCP intentionally reduced the function of family to the lowest degree, and authorised the organs controlled by the party, such as mass media, schools and peer groups, to shoulder the responsibility of political socialisation.

The movement of "People's Communes" in 1950's can be regarded as a formal challenge to the traditional family by the authorities. The implementation of "People's Communes" had profound significance in many aspects of society. In military affairs, it was to carry out the policy of "everyone is a soldier"; in the area of the economy, it was to support the industrialisation of the "Great Leap Forward" through the collectivisation and assembly of

⁴⁴"Comrade Chiao Yu-lu is good model of studying and applying Maoist thought in a creative way", *RED FLAG*, No. 4, 1966. p. 9.

⁴⁵*QUOTATIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG*, (Peking: East is Red Press, 1967). p.ii.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*

⁴⁷"Political Socialization - the process of a person's learning or being guidance for acquiring political orientation and behavior pattern", see Kenneth P. Langton, *POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION* (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1969), p.5.

the labour forces; in politics, it was to create a lower level unit of control for the purpose of enforcing a high degree of centralisation.

The establishment of the "People's Communes" destroyed the traditional structure of family as a fundamental constituent of the society. Traditional parental authority was replaced by the authority of the people's commune, or, in practice, by the authority of party's organisation or the supreme leadership of the party. The social system based on the patriarch collapsed, and the authority of parents in the family decreased. Every individual became a member of the society instead of a member of family, and the functions of the family, which included economical and political socialisation, were also replaced with that of a nation or of the people's commune so as to decrease people's dependence on the family and transferred to Mao and the Party their responsibility towards the family. Such phenomena as the collapse of the family system finds confirmation at the time when many children made a clear break with, and even struggled against or criticised, their parents during the Cultural Revolution.

Educational institutions are among the most important organisations for a nation to conduct its "political socialisation". They can be used to mould members of that nation to form their political orientation and political behaviour.⁴⁸ According to one study, through the personality cult of Mao Tse-tung, the leading class of the CCP have moulded the political attitudes of members of the PRC. Mao was cast in the dual role of "loving father" and "monarch" in the PRC⁴⁹ Such a moulding of political attitudes aimed at transferring to Mao and to the legitimacy of the PRC regime people's traditional devotion towards the family and parents.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*

⁴⁹Charles R. Ridley, Paul H. B. Godwin, and Dennis J. Doolin, *THE MAKING OF A MODEL CITIZEN IN COMMUNIST CHINA* (Carlifornia: Stanford University, The Hoover Institution Press, 1971), p. 135.

In addition to the support of the legitimacy of PRC leadership, the system further encouraged the masses to attack anyone or anything that was harmful to the Communist regime by adopting more vigorous means. It hoped that through this kind of attack, it would in turn strengthen the foundation of the legitimacy of its regime. For instance, traditional Chinese society, the Kuomintang, landlords and the rich were all classified into "rightists", "class enemies" and "counter-revolutionaries", and being attacked or being criticised all depended on the personal will of a supreme leader, which meant that whoever ran counter to Mao's wish or whoever Mao subjectively believed would threaten his position was the target of attack or criticism.

In the PRC, Mao's thought and words had become a kind of "morality". As the result of the combination of "morality" with "political authority", Mao was in the vanguard of historical development and thus became the "great leader, the great teacher, great marshal, and great helmsmen"⁵⁰ guiding the development of political line and the whole nation towards a communist society. Whoever opposed the party or opposed Mao was against the law of historical development, immorality, disloyalty and was the enemy to be annihilated.

In its behaviour pattern, P.R.C. constantly emphasised a behaviour model in which the party's interests were seen as greater than individual's interests. Each person should attribute his success to the party's leadership. As a pioneering communist, one should make his utmost contribution to the party and to the communist society.

Consequently, a series of campaigns were launched among the army by Lin Piao, then the

⁵⁰Yen Chia-ch'i & Kao Kao, *THE TEN-YEAR HISTORY OF THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION* (Taipei: Institute of Current China Studies, 1988), p. 53.

Minister of National Defence. The campaign of "three-eight working style" in May 1960 referred to three phases and eight characters. The three phrases: "a firm, correct political orientation, a simple and arduous working style and flexible strategy and tactics"; and the eight characters were t'uan-chieh (unity), ching-chang (alertness), yen-su (sternness) and huo-p'o (liveliness)".⁵¹ The movement of "four-good company" in December 1961 was an honour to be bestowed on companies which were "good in political and ideological work, in the 'three-eight' working style, in military training and in arranging their everyday life".⁵² At the same time, the movement of "five good fighter" was also launched which set up a criteria of five points for a good fighter. They were (1) have a correct political thought; (2) be masters of military technique; (3) conform to the three-eight work style, (4) accomplish tasks successfully, (5) have good physical training.⁵³ And a series of political campaigns to "learn from Lei Feng"⁵⁴ in 1963 were specially initiated with the aim of turning every soldier into "chairman Mao's good fighters". The Army should do it, and so should the whole society for Mao wanted "people of the whole country to learn from the liberation army".⁵⁵

As for the "role recognition", the view that "teaching by verbal instruction is not as good as personal example" was emphasised in Chinese traditional culture. The PRC applied

⁵¹"Report at the Representation conference of Cultural and Educational Activities in the PLA", *PEOPLE DAILY*, 24 May, 1960 or see *THE EXPLANATION OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY*, (Taipei: China Publishing Company, 1971), p. 67, or see Warren Kuo (ed.) *A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY*, op. cit., p. 453.

⁵²*THE EXPLANATION OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY*, op. cit., p. 195; "PLA's Work for 1966", *PEKING REVIEW*, No. 49, 1965, pp. 3-4; *A COLLECTION OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS ON LIN PIAO AFFAIR*, (Taipei: Institute of Mainland China Affair, 1972), p. 31; Warren Kuo (ed.) *A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY*, op. cit., p. 524.

⁵³"The PLA Made Excellent Achievement in the Five-Good Campaign", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 31 July 1959; Warren Kuo (ed.) *A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY*, op. cit., p. 673; *A COLLECTION OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS ON LIN PIAO AFFAIR*, op. cit., p. 31.

⁵⁴*THE EXPLANATION OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY*, op. cit., p. 389; *WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY* (Shanghai: People's Press, 1983), pp. 414-415.

⁵⁵"The Whole Nation Should Learn From the Liberation Army", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 1 Feb. 1964.

exemplary figures extensively as a tool for carrying out political socialisation. There are two typical examples of "role recognition". First, the above-mentioned "movement to learn from Lei Feng". To learn from Lei Feng means to learn from his diligence in reading "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung", to learn to become a activist under the guidance of Maoist thought, and to learn to be clear about what to love and what to hate in class position.⁵⁶ Second, the "movement to learn from the Liberation Army".⁵⁷ To learn from the Liberation Army means to learn from them how to "raise high the great red banner of Maoist thought", and how to "read Mao's writings thoroughly, and listen to what Mao said, and do everything according to Mao's wishes, to become chairman Mao's good fighter".⁵⁸

The creation of exemplary figures out of common people like Lei Feng was aimed at providing an easier way for people to follow so that they could devote themselves to the party to the same extent as the exemplary figure had achieved, and henceforth developed a sense of participation and devotion towards the society.

There was another important characteristics in the course of PRC's political socialisation, that was, it paid a great deal of attention to the influence of peer groups. "hsiao tsu" (a small team) is not only the most fundamental but also the best unit among the peer groups. Its functions for political socialisation, whether in the society or in the army, can be summarised as follows: 1. The "hsiao tsu" leader can personally supervise and control the propagation and conduction of a party's policy. 2. In view of the ways of learning and discussion in a "hsiao tsu", which enables members of the "hsiao tsu" to form a strong desire and consciousness of political participation. 3. Because a "hsiao tsu" is formed of

⁵⁶WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, *op. cit.*, p.415.

⁵⁷"The Whole Nation Should Learn From the Liberation Army", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 1 Feb., 1964.

⁵⁸Yen Chia-ch'i & Kao Kao, *op. cit.*, p.171; "Cadres at all levels should follow Maoist Thought and become the model of the soldiers", *RED FLAG*, No. 8. 1966, p. 1.

members with the same or similar tasks, they are more liable to exert "social" pressure, and are beneficial to the unity of concepts, henceforth will bring about the consistency of political behaviour.⁵⁹

Moreover, mass media of various kinds have played an important role in the process of political socialisation. Its function is for the strengthening and the change of a person's political orientation and behaviour pattern. The mass media of the PRC, according to its functions, can be classified into the following four categories:⁶⁰ namely, mobilisation, providing information, power struggle and ideological reinforcement. Mao held the idea that "Before the elimination of the classes, every piece of news, whether press service or newspaper, has its own class character, what bourgeois claimed about free press is nothing but a lie."⁶¹

Mao stressed that news undertakings must unconditionally comply with proletarian interests, party's newspapers and periodicals are the weapons for power struggle, and the tools for propagating, organising, and instructing masses, hence the leader of the party "should control the press in his own hands as a weapon for organising and educating masses, and a weapon for reflecting as well as directing politics, military and economics".⁶²

Mao made a clear definition about the task and the function of newspapers as a major tool of mass media in *A Talk to the Editorial Staff of the Shansi-Suiyuan Daily* on 2 April

⁵⁹James Jownsend, "Political Participation" in Yung Wei (ed.), *COMMUNIST CHINA*, (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1972), p. 263.

⁶⁰Godwin C. Chu, "The Current Structure and Functions of China's Mass Media" in Godwin C. Chu and Francis L. K. Hsu (ed.), *MOVING A MOUNTAIN: CULTURAL CHANGE IN CHINA* (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1979), p. 58.

⁶¹"The theory and practice of Mao Tse-tung's journalism constitute a part of the thought of Mao Tse-tung", *THE YEAR BOOK OF CHINA NEWS* 1984, p. 88.

⁶²*Ibid.*

1948. He commented, "The role and power of the newspapers consists in its ability to bring the Party programme, the Party line, the Party's general and specific policies, its tasks and methods of work, before the masses in the quickest and most extensive way".⁶³ In Mao's opinion, since the mass media is a powerful weapon, all newspapers and periodicals, broadcasting stations and press services should, therefore, follow the leadership of the party unconditionally, and persist in the Party's principle of proletarian character.

The major mass media of "two newspapers and one periodical" - the *People's Daily*, the *Liberation Army's Daily* and the *Red Flag* - had loyally transmitted Mao's instructions according to his wish. In all political campaigns, the "two newspapers and one periodical" applied Mao Tse-tung's thought as a criterion for criticism or support.

In order to transmit political instructions to every corner of the country, and based on the concern that there was a tremendous amount of illiteracy in the countryside, the PRC had to set up broadcasting systems in all villages and small towns as a means of transmission and apply "hsiao tsu meetings" to convey the instructions verbally. According statistical data, it can be seen that between 1965 and 1976, the number of broadcasting loudspeakers increased from 8,725,455 in 1965 to 113,246,412 in 1976. In the meantime, the number of television stations increased from 12 to 32, and the number of television broadcasting stations increased from only 3 to 194.⁶⁴

The use of "big-character posters", one of the smaller forms of communication, became the primary source of news during the period of the Cultural Revolution, and its political

⁶³"A talk to the editorial staff of the *Shansi-suiyuan Daily*", (April 2, 1948), *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. IV (1969), op. cit., p. 241.

⁶⁴"The Rise and Development of Chinese Journalist Academic Circles", *THE YEARBOOK OF CHINA NEWS* 1984, p. 54.

significance reached a climax at the time when Mao personally wrote his first poster entitled "Bombard the Headquarters - my first big-character poster"⁶⁵ and made public on 5 August 1967 to the Eleventh Plenary of the Eighth CCPCC. Due to the function of comprehensive public participation it provided, big-character posters became most widely-used medium by the authority to arouse masses' enthusiasm for revolution. In fact, when the masses were fed up with dogmatic official propaganda, the big character posters in turn became the more reliable sources of news, and immensely increased its function for political socialisation because of the direct masses' participation.

B. Political Culture

Chinese political culture is a mix of parochial political culture and subject political culture. Within such a mix, the people hold negative and conservative attitudes about politics, they have no expectation of the input of the political system, but instead unilaterally accept the restrictions from the output of political system. In other words, their support for the decision maker or for the authority itself is greater than that of their demands. Under such circumstances, people have a very low desire to participate in politics, it is the elite who control and operate the politics. Consequently, under the leadership of Mao, the people who were really involved in every political campaign, faction or power struggle were those party and military elites. The masses were merely considered as a tool of political struggle after being indoctrinated.

As mentioned in the first section, the termination of the phenomenon of annexation of land holdings at the initial stage of the PRC's regime had changed the structure of Chinese agriculture society to a social model based on small landowner-peasants, which satisfied

⁶⁵"Bombard the Headquarters - my first big-character poster", (Aug. 5, 1966), *RED FLAG*, No. 13, 1967, p. 3.

the peasant life long dream to possess a piece of land. Although the PRC adopted violent means in the course of the movement of land reform, it is indisputable that the majority of poor peasants benefited from that movement. Consequently, it can be assured that before the "Three Red Banners" movement - Great Leap forward, the General Line for socialist construction and the People's communes, the PRC's regime had gained the majority of its support from members of grass-root units.⁶⁶ Such support stabilised the uncertain factors which a new government often confronts at the initial stage of its regime.

However, between the movement of "People's Communes" and the movement of "Great Leap Forward" which was promoted on the basis of "People's Communes", in less than 10 years, Mao initiated by force an economic cycle to transform the society based on the small landowner-peasants into that of annexation of land holdings. In Chinese history, such an economic cycle normally depicted the rise and fall of a dynasty. Mao re-seized the land from the hands of small landowner-peasants, and implemented "People's Communes" as the basis of social structure. Although the policy of "People's communes" had its political significance, as mentioned before, it was applied as a weapon for the central hegemony to control the locality or in turn to suppress anti-governmental organisation. However, once the masses became a political tool, the phenomenon of universal politicisation was very likely to emerge. Moreover, since the movement of "Three Red Banners", the PRC launched a series of power struggles in the name of "political line", which gave people no means to predict the approach of governmental policies.

After the Cultural Revolution, the social order was in particular destroyed because of the power struggles among the leading class. The people were brought into the political arena, and consequently, the sign of structural instability in the PRC began to appear. The

⁶⁶*This is a conclusion of interviews with domestic and oversea Chinese.*

gravity of this phenomenon reached its climax at the time when Lin Biao, - "Mao's close comrade-in-arms", and who was listed as "the successor to Mao", and who would always "raise high the great red flag of Maoist thought" - was accused of "turning traitor and defecting to the enemy" and was classified as "the representative of imperialism, revisionism and anti-party, the general backing of landlords, the rich, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements and rightists, the most fierce and dangerous enemy concealed in the party", "the bourgeois careerist as well as conspirator" and "the counter-revolutionary group whose words never strayed from Mao's saying, and the shouts of 'long live chairman Mao' never ceased, to our faces only spoke good words, but behind our backs spread poison".⁶⁷ At this point, the political values of the masses began to appear in the state of divergence and chaos.

Because the political value formed by the movement of political socialisation at the initial stage of the PRC regime conflicted with their subsequent experiences of life, the people of the PRC began to doubt the trustworthiness and authoritativeness of the state system. The incident of the "Gang of Four" after Mao's death was a reflection of such doubts which demonstrated that people had changed their concepts of loyalty towards the leading class.

Moreover, It should be noted that through the use of propaganda, the PRC had hoped to create among the masses a consciousness of enthusiasm and initiative, and the spirit to fight for a better tomorrow of communism in the process of the transformation of political socialisation. However, according to one survey, of all members of society, 60 percent held a negative attitude towards the question whether a person's efforts can be duly rewarded? 70 percent believed that "one needs to follow the right person in order to be

⁶⁷"The Tenth CCP National Congress", *RED FLAG*, No. 9, 1973, pp. 6-9.

successful",⁶⁸ which also meant the "kuan hsi" (the relationship) with upper leaders is very important. This reveals that the people of the PRC still belonged to the society of "external control" value inclination. There is an obvious gap between the outcome of the survey and the communist spirit which stress the importance of enthusiasm and initiative. From this we can understand the reason for the occurrence of factional conflicts or power struggles. This is largely because once a person is classified as a member of a certain interest group, he can not but fight desperately and follow the group leader to the finish until the final victory comes. One can observe that there were hardly any factional defectors in successive line conflicts, apart from Ch'en Po-ta who deserted Mao's faction to join the faction of Lin Piao. This will be addressed in a later chapter. During the period of the Cultural Revolution, the Fourth Field Army led by Lin Piao oppressed other field armies. After Lin Piao stepped down from the political arena, Mao made concerted efforts to eliminate the influence of Fourth Field Army in both politics and military affairs, which was the reflection of such phenomenon.

Another striking feature of the PRC's political culture is the recognition of the central authority, but the lack of mutual trust among the people or among political competitors. As a consequence of such distrust, there is no rules of games in the PRC, the only efficient approach to seize political gains is to follow and depend upon a factional leader.

It is a general practice in Communist ideology to treat class comrade with love and co-operation, and class enemy with hate and struggle. Under such a extreme political culture, political rivalries became a zero-sum game and can not be compromised, and struggles became the only means for factions to survive. Moreover, in a nation putting politics in command of everything, making a mistake in one's political stand means the end of his

⁶⁸Lucian Pye, *THE DYNAMICS OF CHINESE POLITICS* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 282.

political career. Consequently, for the reason of self-protection, the PRC elite never easily show their political stand unless they are forced to do so, and if they do, the wish of the supreme authority is the only thing they considered. This explains why no one, except P'eng Te-huai, dare to oppose Mao openly and ask him to be responsible for the failure of "Three Red Banners" movement even though it had caused great damage to the PRC, and why all participants including Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai sided with Mao and attacked P'eng at the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC in August 1959.⁶⁹

One can roughly see the inevitability of the combination of politics with morality and the appearance of nation-wide universal politicisation from the essence of political culture of the PRC and from the course of political socialisation. The movement of "the people of the whole country should learn from the liberation army" in 1964 was significant with regard to the formation of universal politicisation. The comments in that editorial of *People's Daily* gave the best annotation to the substance of political culture and political socialisation under the PRC regime, it said "The basic reason why the liberation army can become an extraordinary proletarian and extraordinary fighting army is because they raise high the great red flag of Maoist thought".⁷⁰ The leading class of the PRC attempted to carry out the movement of political socialisation to its largest extent through the army, and to achieve the supreme and final goal of consolidating leadership through role-recognition.

⁶⁹For details refer to Chapter IV, Section II.

⁷⁰"The whole nation should learn from the liberation army", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 1 Feb., 1964.

III. The Unique Function of Ideology in the PRC's Regime

As mentioned before, the state under the control of Chinese Communist Party belongs to a closed system. In the closed system, the ideology and the leader's personal charisma are the cardinal foundations for the leading class of the system to carry out absolute control and establish authoritative leadership within that system.

Ideology has a special function in the society of the PRC. The final arbiter, determine who possesses so-called orthodox ideology, will dominate the final result of a power struggle and in turn will influence the trend of its political development afterwards. Because of the distinguished class divergence between the dominator and the dominated; the unique characteristic of insurmountable class barriers in the Chinese social structure; and also the long-term ideological indoctrination of the whole nation with Maoist thought; Mao established a supreme or immortal (God-like) status in the PRC. Since Mao was the final arbiter of orthodox ideology, this put him in an invincible position in every faction or power struggle.

The ideology has multi-functions: - firstly, it provides people with a conceptual framework and a rational approach, which serves as the fundamental pattern for the recognition of an objective world. Secondly, it is the guiding principle for a person or a group movement. Thirdly, it forms the criterion for the evaluation of the people's as well as a nation's conduct.

Generally speaking, ideology has two important functions in the PRC system, namely legitimacy and political mobilisation.

A. The function of legitimacy

No regime can rely on violence for its government in the long run, it has to win people's support, which include manifest and latent support. Under such circumstances, the ideology shoulders an important function of legitimacy - it entitles the leading class to govern and turns their political control into an everlasting and more effective authoritarian leadership, this makes people concede to the legitimacy and reasonableness of its domination and willing to follow and obey the orders of their own accord.

After the Chinese Communists gained power in 1949, they failed to use democratic elections as a means to win people's support. Under the leadership of these "self-perpetuating" revolutionary militarists, there was a need to develop a common consciousness conforming to the demands of Communist China so their leadership was recognised as the only legitimate one. And only ideology could fulfil this function.

B. The function of political mobilisation

With revolutionary characteristics, an ideology will normally promise the prospects of an ideal society and a better life for tomorrow. The ultimate goal of such an ideal state is to reach the mythical Utopian society. It may not satisfy the material needs of the great majority, but, in reality, it will certainly meet their psychological needs. Under such circumstances, the ideology is the conversion of ideas into social levers, it can inspire the masses to strive for the myth of a Utopian society.

In the PRC, the retarded economy had nullified the attempt to mobilise the masses in production through material motivation, consequently, the spiritual stimulus was used to achieve the mobilisation. This can be seen in some propaganda and many of Mao's speeches. For example, in one of his speech, *You Are Models for the Whole Nation*, at the early stage of the PRC's regime, Mao indicated, "You are an activists propelling the people's cause forward to triumph in all spheres of endeavour, a firm pillar of support to

the people's government.... China must build a powerful national defence force and a powerful economy - two tasks of major importance, fulfilment of these tasks depends on you comrades forging close ties of unity and making concerted efforts together with all the commanders and fighters of the PLA and all the workers, peasants and other sections of the people".⁷¹ Another example is that Mao encouraged the PLA who entered the Korea war with the following passage: "You must fully anticipate various possible and inevitable difficulties and be prepared to overcome them with great enthusiasm, courage, care and stamina".⁷² Moreover, the government defined the "mass heroes" as: "They are men and women who have the spirit of overcoming difficulties and of devotion to socialist construction with no thought of self,... they do not think of individual reward or comfort.... The 'mass heroes' have created 'miracles' by their day-to-day behaviour".⁷³ From which we can learn the importance of spiritual stimulus being used to mobilise the mass.

According to Marxist doctrine, the function of ideology is only a part of superstructure, and "with the change of economic foundation, the superstructure of great vitality will change accordingly sooner or latter".⁷⁴ Consequently, the economy is a decisive factor in the final analysis. However, according to Mao's annotation of the function of ideology, ideology in the PRC's regime was more than a part of superstructure. It had influenced Chinese social operations. Mao asserted, "We recognise that in the general development of history, the material determines the mental and social being determines social consciousness, we also - and indeed - recognise the reaction of mental on material things,

⁷¹"You are Models for the Whole Nation (25 Sept. 1950)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. V, (1977), *op. cit.*, pp. 41-42.

⁷²"Order to the Chinese People's Volunteers (8 Oct., 1950)", *ibid.*, p. 43.

⁷³"Conference of Mass Heroes", *CHINA RECONSTRUCTS*, Vol. VIII, Dec. 1959, p. 1.

⁷⁴"Preface on the Criticism of Political Economics", *A COMPREHENSIVE WORKS OF MARX-ENGELS*, Vol. XIII, (Peking: People's Press, 1960), p. 9.

social consciousness on social being and of the superstructure on the economic base".⁷⁵ From Mao's point of view, one can understand the ideology not only existed in the superstructure but also had its function in infrastructure, which was the "spiritual reaction", this accounted for Mao's unbeatable position in the CCP when his thought became the orthodox ideology. Generally speaking, Maoist thought, in essence, differs from the analytic and theoretical ideology of Marxists.⁷⁶

In his paper *On New Democracy*, Mao stressed "To advocate 'wholesale westernization' is wrong, China has suffered a great deal from the mechanical absorption of foreign materials. Similarly, in applying Marxism to China, Chinese communists must fully and properly integrate the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, or in other words, the universal truth of Marxism must be combined with specific national characteristics and acquire a definite national form if it is to be useful, and in no circumstance can it be applied subjectively as a mere formula, Marxists who make a fetish of formulas are simply playing the fool with Marxism and the Chinese revolution, and there is no room for them in the ranks of the Chinese revolution".⁷⁷ Once Marxism had acquired a Chinese form, Maoist thought would become the only representation of the "Marxism in Chinese-style", or even override Marxism and become the supreme guiding principle of the PRC's political campaigns.

The Seventh CCP National Congress formally embodied Mao Tse-tung thought in the 'General Program' of the Party Constitution. Mao became the ideological monopolizer in China, and Maoist thought became the guiding principle for the party's policies and the

⁷⁵"On Contradiction (Aug. 1937)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. I (1975)*, op. cit., p.336.

⁷⁶Refer to Frang Schurmann, *IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA*, (California: University of Berkeley Press, 1968), p. 22.

⁷⁷"On New Democracy (Jan. 1940)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. I (1965)*, op. cit., pp. 380-381.

basis for the army's line. Mao's leadership reached to its climax at the Seventh CCP National Congress and was unsurpassed by any other party and army elites in the PRC.

After the establishment of PRC's regime, in view of the fact that the socialist construction, or even communist world, must be realised under the extremely adverse economic conditions, the leadership had to continue its efforts in promoting the cult of Mao Tse-tung and of Maoist thought. Basically, the leading elite had attempted to transfer to the organisation people's obedience towards Mao. However, until the death of Mao Tse-tung in 1976, this attempt had never been realised. Mao's personal authority surpassed organisational authority, and Mao controlled the party machines and state organs throughout his life.

The failure of the "Great Leap Forward" movement in 1958 seriously damaged Mao's supreme position in the Party. However, Mao's charisma hadn't faded out because of this. On the contrary, through Lin Piao's continued propaganda of Mao's sacredness throughout the army, the development of the cult of Mao Tse-tung was thus transformed into some sort of religious movement. As Maoist thought became a religion of this life, Mao was fully supported by the people of the whole nation. This explained why Mao could still rely on his ideological authority to initiate the Cultural Revolution to struggle against Liu Shao-ch'i, who was then the Chairman of the PRC and had a strong Party background, after he had lost his official organisational authority (i.e. Mao was replaced by Liu Shao-ch'i as chairman of the PRC in 1959).

The result of the above-mentioned two functions, legitimacy and political mobilisation, fulfilled by the ideology in the PRC regime can be attributed to the following two impacts, namely, the impacts of political culture and the impacts of organisational characteristics in China.

1. The impacts of political culture

Political culture refers to the orientation and the behaviour pattern that members of the political system hold about politics. Since the majority of Chinese society consists of peasants, and China, based on an agricultural society, belongs to a closed system, the people therefore uncritically accept any inputs from the leading class. This is the mix of parochial political culture and subject political culture asserted by Almond and Verba.⁷⁸ They argued, within such a mix, the majority are indifferent to who the decision-makers are, and to the output of a policy. This remains so as long as the decision-makers, or the leading class, could fulfil and protect their interests and security. They do not mind whether the process of a decision-making is legitimate and conforms to social justice.

Moreover, modern China moved towards a nation of authoritarianism. It had to restore people's self-esteem and satisfy their traditional sentiment of being the "centre" of the world. On the other hand, it had to provide a foundation of social reconstruction which differs from that of feudal society. Since Chinese political philosophy is deeply influenced by its traditional culture, the people feel insecure if there they lack a national leader or "Godfather" to guide them and an ideology to comply to and to maintain the social order. Such a mentality of the people is beneficial to the establishment of orthodoxy.

Since the founding of their state, the CCP had been making full use of the characteristics of political culture, continuously dominating the social values with brief and forceful slogans and symbols, and establishing the system of political belief.⁷⁹ In other words, through the use of political jargon, political leaders had legitimised their authoritative leadership. Take the PLA for example. The PLA had been indoctrinated with official

⁷⁸Gabriel A. Almond & Sidney Verba, *THE CIVIC CULTURE: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND DEMOCRACY IN FIVE NATIONS*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), pp. 16-18.

⁷⁹Lucian Pye & Sidney Verba (ed.), *POLITICAL CULTURAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT*, (New Jersey: Princeton Uni. Press, 1965), p. 545.

ideology for such a long period that it had transformed into an internalised ideology. They recognised the closeness of the PRC system and had a strong degree of adherence towards the system. Consequently, the official ideology not only spread among the PLA at all levels, but also became a unified ideology to be complied with, and moreover, such obedience was regarded as an essential property of a soldier or member of the armed forces.

2. The impacts of organisational characteristics in China

A system's existence highly depends on the degree of satisfaction that members of the system have towards the output of policies; the degree of their recognition of the system itself; and the degree of their fear for retribution from the system.

Through the mobilisation of broad masses of peasants and vagabonds in the infrastructure, the CCP gained power and founded the state on the basis of rebellions in the armed forces. However, the broad masses needed a political belief to preserve their enthusiasm and support to a new regime.

The reason why the majority of the intellectuals supported the CCP at the early stage of the Chinese revolution was because they recognised the CCP's promise to reconstruct the social structure to bring about a better future, not because they accepted the communist ideology. In other words, the intellectuals had no profound allegiance to communist regime itself. What they strove for was a prosperous and strong China. Consequently, after their rise to power, the CCP realised the fact that communism was not applicable to the construction of a modern democratic country and that Chinese Communist couldn't continue to attract the people with the promise of better prospects and better economic conditions to preserve the stability of the CCP regime. Under such circumstances, they had to propagate the official ideology throughout the country in order to gain continuous

support from the masses and the intellectuals. Their aim was to change China's traditional political culture and people's mentality so as to sustain the CCP regime.

The characteristics of the PRC system structure can be summarised in the following nine points, all of which have profound impacts on the formation and the function of the political role of the PLA. (1) Political system is a system of centralised hegemony based on agricultural society. (2) The System structure, basically, belongs to a form of restoration of the "Asiatic mode of production". (3) An ideology based on Mao Tse-tung thought has ultimate arbitration and supreme authority. It is the standard of social morality and social value. (4) The process of political socialisation is strictly controlled by the authority. (5) Xenophobia is used as a tool in the struggle against the opposed. (6) The PLA is mainly comprised of intellectuals and vagabonds. It carries a strong characteristic of peasant movement. (7) After the implementation of the policy of the "People's Communes", the system structure began to bear the essence of "militarisation". (8) Party and military leadership had no significant differentiation, the elite normally possesses both political and military backgrounds. The principle of "party commands the army" is a common recognition by the party and military elites. (9) Influenced by the traditional culture, the army pledges their loyalty to the authority and regards "loyalty" as the perfect morality.

Chapter II. The Formation of the PLA's Political Role

I. The Origins

In feudal China, one of the main functions of centralism was to conduct large-scale irrigation works for maintaining agricultural production. The control of water resources by the government meant the control of peasant production and their loyalty towards the government. The government dominating the water supply as a means of rewarding or punishing the society that serves as the ruling model of autocratic monarchy in politics. In addition, chronic insecurity forced the ruler to be a military leader, while the villages provided the necessary source of armed forces. Since villages are an isolated and decentralised organisation in the framework of agricultural society, with a strong attachment towards family system but politically aloof, the ruler controlled the channel for vertical movement between upper and lower classes in society. Under such a closed system, peasant needs, are based on economic but not on political considerations. Landless peasants once organised would bring about the phenomena of system instability.

Prior to the Chinese Communist Party gained power in 1949, Mao Tse-tung realised the importance of the agricultural society in the framework of Chinese society - it provided an inexhaustible source of armed force which could be developed as the "revolutionary base". In the "report" based on his visit to Hunan in January 1927, Mao made the significant observation that peasants in China have revolutionary importance; therefore the peasants and armed forces should be the pillar of revolutionary power. Mao perceived that "the revolution in the countryside is for the peasant class to overthrow the landlord class", and therefore "overthrowing the armed forces of the landlords and establishing those of the

peasants".¹ Mao rapidly succeeded as a result of applying peasant forces, which in itself raised peasant consciousness and hence increased its importance in his mind, "most dynastic change came about as a result of such peasant uprisings... poor peasants, the biggest motive force of the Chinese revolution",² "It is the peasants who are the source of the Chinese army, the soldier are peasants in military uniform".³ He believed that only through a political movement to inspire the peasant forces and to control "the peasants in military uniform" could the communists overcome objectively social as well as economic conditions, and propel history forward.

Because of the simplicity of the armed forces' tasks, the peasant army could still elaborate their specified functions in the period of insurrection. However once the character of the armed forces of the peasants had changed and became a regular army, the ideological structure of the military peasants must also be changed if they wish to maintain their functions, and the purely "insurrectionist viewpoint" must be removed so as to create a revolutionary consciousness of "fighting for whom? and for what?".

Therefore the P.R.C. placed the army under the leadership of the Party and attempted to carry out the multiple functions for the achievement of the revolutionary target through the Party's control and the communist ideological transformation. The PRC's army is like the army of those successive dynasties since the Ch'in (221 B.C. - 207 B.C.), taking peasants as the major source. But, if one compares them with those of each successive dynasty in Chinese history, the cardinal difference was that the army of Mao's Dynasty was implemented with the thorough teachings of political ideology and was bestowed with a

¹"Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan (Mar. 1927)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), p. 28, 41.

²"Chinese Revolutions and Chinese Communist Party (Dec. 1939), *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. II (1965), op. cit., pp. 306-307, 324.

³"On Coalition Government (24 Apr. 1945)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. III (1967), op. cit., p. 250.

high degree of political responsibility. Its view was "war is politics and war itself is a political action", "war cannot for a single moment be separated from politics",⁴ "politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed" and "war is the continuation of politics by other means, when politics develops to a certain stage beyond which it cannot proceed by the usual means, war breaks out to sweep obstacles from the way",⁵ hence when analysing the use of warfare, Mao always emphasised that the military should serve politics, and that military issues should be dealt with the Party's position in mind and also from the viewpoint of political interests. He opposed a purely military viewpoint and recognised that in all military works "politics takes the lead", and that the army should follow the "absolute leadership" of the Party and hence act according to Party's political line.

The function of PLA in politics was determined at the "Sanwan Reorganisation" in September 1927⁶ and "Kutien conference",⁷ on 29 December 1929. Mao commanded the survivors of the autumn harvest uprising elements to preside over the meeting of the Party committees of the fronts at Sanwan village, Yunghsin county in Kiangsi Province, to deal with the reorganisation of the army. At the meeting, Mao proposed the principle that the party branch should be organised on a company basis, each squad having its party group and each company having its party branch, furthermore, each battalion and regiment

⁴"On Protracted War (May 1938)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. II (1965), op. cit., p. 152.*

⁵*Ibid.* p. 153.

⁶*Survivors of the Worker-peasant Revolutionary Army led by Mao at Sanwan, Kiangsi in September 1927. In the wake of the abortive "autumn harvest uprisings" in eastern Hunan, Mao Tse-tung led his troops in retreat, moving eastward to Lohsiao Mountain. On their way to Ching Kang Mountain, they were ambushed and a great many men deserted Mao. Then the remainder arrived at Sanwan in Yunghsin county, Chiangsi in September 1927, only a few hundred men of the 1st Division of the Worker-peasant Revolutionary Army were left. Then, Mao persuaded his reliable cadres to reorganise into a regiment of about 400 men and dismissed the pessimists with severance pay.*

See COMMENTS ON HISTORICAL FACTS IN THE PERIOD OF THE SECOND REVOLUTIONARY WAR IN CHINA, (Peking: San Lien Bookstore, 1956), p. 56.

⁷"On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (Dec. 1929)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. I (1967), op. cit., pp. 105-116.*

should set up a party committee, and the army at all levels above company should set up party representatives, appointing party representatives as the secretary of the party branch or as the secretary of the party committee, while the supreme leading body in the army was the Party committees of the fronts led by Mao Tse-tung.⁸

The "Sanwan reorganisation" was the founding stone of the PRC's implementation of a party committee system in the army. Although it also touched upon the institutions of political works of the PLA and the so-called democratic system inside the army, in reality the quality of the constituent members of the PLA was poor, and thus the political programme could not be executed effectively. Nevertheless, the Sanwan reorganisation determined the Party's position on the army and initiated the establishment of the system of "party commands army".

In April 1928, after their defeat, the routed forces of the "Nanchang uprising"⁹, commanded by Chu Te and Ch'en I, met the survivors of the "autumn harvest uprising" peasants, led by Mao, at the Chingkang Mountains to carry out the army's reorganisation. The two groups were reorganised into "The fourth army of Chinese workers and the peasants Red Army", Chu Te was the army commander, while Mao was party representative and concurrently held the post of secretary of party committees of the fronts,¹⁰ which were the supreme leading bodies of party, politics and army in the area of Chingkang mountains. The party organisation of the Fourth Red Army was divided into four levels -company branch, battalion committee, regiment committee, and military

⁸WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, (Shanghai: People's Press, 1983), pp. 142-143; Lo Jung-huan, "Autumn Harvest Uprising and the Early Stage of Red Army", A SINGLE SPARK CAN START A PRAIRIE FIRE, (Peking: Soldier's Press, 1980), p. 130.

⁹Warren Kuo, ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol. I (Taipei: National Cheng-chi University 1968), pp. 371-373, 425-437.

¹⁰Warren Kuo, ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

commission, in which the military commission was the supreme leading body subordinated to the party committees of the fronts.

The Central Committee of the CCP at that time was in fact in favour of the establishment of the party committee system in the PLA as adopted by Mao Tse-tung. This viewpoint was revealed by Chou En-lai, the secretary of the military commission of CCP, in his directive letter to Ho Lung, commander of the Second Red-Army Regiment, and to the Front Committees in western Hunan-Hupei Soviet base.¹¹ Chou directed " So long as you feel it facilitates work, it is all right for you to form a party branch under the Front Committee to take charge of party organisations in the army as a whole. Among the troops under Chu Te and Mao Tse-tung the party takes the company as a unit. There is a party branch in each company, with party under it and regimental and battalion committees above. With a party organisation in every company, there is party guidance in times of both peace and combat. People who have come from the Chu and Mao area say that they feel the form of organisation is good".¹²

Furthermore, in his paper *The struggle in the Ching kang Mountains*, Mao indicated "as to class origin, the Red Army consists part of workers and peasants and part of lumpen-proletarians. Of course, it is inadvisable to have too many of the latter. But, they are able to fight, and as fighting is going on every day with mounting casualties, it is already no easy matter to get replacements even from among them. In these circumstances the only solution is to intensify political training".¹³ Mao believed that only through political

¹¹The armed troop in the base of Western Hunan-Hupei was "The Second Red Army", Ho Lung was then the Chief in Command, and Kuan Hsiang-yin was the political commissar. See Warren Kuo, *ANALYTIC HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 12.

¹²"Some Questions Concerning the Development of the Western Hunan-Hupei Soviet Area (17 Mar. 1929)", *SELECTED WORKS OF THE CHOU EN-LAI* Vol. I (Peking: Foreign Languages Press 1981), p. 28.

¹³"The Struggle in the Ching kang Mountains (25 Nov. 1928)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. I (1975), op. cit., p. 65.

education could the Red Army soldiers have class consciousness. Furthermore, only after the concepts of land distribution and the establishment of political power, and the consciousness of armed labours and peasants had rooted in their minds could they fight for themselves and for the workers as well as peasant class.

Based on his experience in the period of armed uprising, Mao commented, "experience has proved that the system of the party representative must not be abolished. The party representative is particularly important at company level, since party branches are organised on a company basis, it is he who has to see that the soldiers' committee carries out political training, to guide the work of the mass movements, and to serve concurrently as the secretary of the party branch".¹⁴ The policy for carrying out political training in the army and for the role of the party representative in the military as well as political training adopted by Mao was a consequence of the low quality of the constituent members of PLA, while such policy pushed the PLA to the dead end of a high degree of politicisation.

In December 1929, the PLA convened "The Ninth Representative Conference of the Fourth Red Army" at Kutien in Fukien province (historically known as the Kutien meeting). At the meeting, in the light of ideological confusion in the Red Army at that time, Mao delivered his speech *On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party*¹⁵, which was later passed as a resolution by the Army Conference, based on "the spirit of September letter of the central committee". His speech dealt with the question of erroneous conceptions, which included "purely military viewpoint", "ultra-democracy", "the disregard of organisational discipline", "absolute equalitarianism", "subjectivism", "individualism", "the ideology of roving rebel bands", and "the remnants of putschism".

¹⁴"*The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountain (8 Nov. 1928)*", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. I (1975), *op. cit.*, pp. 81-82.

¹⁵"*On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (Dec. 1929)*", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. I (1975), *op. cit.*, pp. 105-152.

This Kutien resolution provided a substantial historical basis for the political participation of PLA and the establishment of the principle of "party commands gun".

The "Directive from the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Front Committee of the Fourth Army of the Red Army", also known as "the September letter of the central committee", gave a series of clear instructions, which included the basic tasks and prospects of the Red Army; the area in which the Red Army should operate and its strategy; the Red Army and the masses; the organisation and training of Red Army; party works in the Red Army; and the question of the Red Army's current operation. It laid down the basic tasks of the Red Army mainly as follows: (1) to mobilise the masses in struggle, accomplish the agrarian revolution and establish Soviet regimes; (2) arm the peasants and expand the Red Army; (3) to extend political influence throughout the country.¹⁶ Furthermore, it pointed out the importance of applying political education to correct the PLA's mistaken ideas and to the development of political tasks. Above all, the most important one was to oppose the "purely military viewpoint".¹⁷ As for the tasks of the political commissars, it indicated that the "political commissar's responsibility is to supervise administrative work in the army, consolidate political leadership, countersign orders, and so on".¹⁸

The Kutien resolution is important not only because it is the first extended treatment of the question of political control and education by Mao or any other Chinese communist leaders, but because it sets the pattern for the approach to this question throughout the army's subsequent history. Political work was, and still is, regarded as a totality which

¹⁶"Directive From the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Front Committee of the Fourth Army of the Red Army (28 Sep. 1929)", *SELECTED WORKS OF CHOU EN-LAI Vol. I* (1981), *op. cit.*, p.45.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 56.

¹⁸*Ibid.* p. 51.

embraces all aspects of the army's everyday life, of its cultural, educational, and spare-time activities. It also dictates the way in which relations between the army and the civilian population, and within the army itself between officers and men, are handled.

Based on the above-mentioned "September letter", Mao pointed out the mistaken ideas of the PLA and the methods for their corrections. The mistaken ideas on the purely military viewpoint are as follows: (1) These comrades regard military affairs and politics as opposed to each other and refuse to recognise that military affairs are only one means of accomplishing political tasks;¹⁹ (2) They do not understand that the Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution. The Red Army besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength, should shoulder such important tasks as doing propaganda among the masses, organising the masses, arming them, helping them to establish revolutionary political power and setting up party organisations; (3) Organisationally, these comrades subordinate the departments of the Red Army, doing political work to those doing military works. This idea would involve the danger of estrangement from the masses control of the government by the army and departure from proletarian leadership; (4) In propaganda work they overlook the importance of propaganda teams; (5) Selfish departmentalism - they think only of the fourth army and do not realise that it is an important task of the army to arm the local masses; (6) Extreme addiction to the idea of conserving strength and avoiding action. This is a remnant of opportunism; (7) Some comrades, disregarding the subjective and objective conditions, suffer from the malady of revolutionary impetuosity. This is a remnant of putschism.²⁰

¹⁹Mao regarded military affairs as only one means of accomplishing political tasks, this viewpoint is different from what Carl von Clausewitz asserted that war is the continuation of politics. To Mao, politics carried a strong struggle nature, it worked in concert with the principle of "party commands the gun". For Clausewitz's military theory, see Charles Reynolds, *THE POLITICS OF WAR*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), pp. 59-83.

²⁰"On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (Dec. 1929), *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. I (1975), op. cit., pp. 105-107.

Mao considered the source of the purely military viewpoints which included: (1) A low political level, from this flows the failure to recognise the role of political leadership in the army; (2) The mentality of mercenaries. Many prisoners captured in past battles have joined the Red Army, and such elements bring with them a markedly mercenary outlook, thereby providing a basis in the lower ranks for the purely military viewpoint; (3) From the two proceeding causes there arises a third, over confidence in military strength and absence of confidence in the strength of the masses of the people; (4) The party's failure actively to attend to and discuss military work is also a reason for the emergence of the purely military viewpoint among a number of comrades.²¹

In the resolution, it pointed out the methods for correction as follows: (1) Raise the political level in the party by means of education, destroy the theoretical roots of the purely military viewpoint, at the same time, eliminate the remnants of opportunism and putschism and break down the selfish departmentalism; (2) Intensify the political training of officers and soldiers. At the same time, as far as possible let the local governments select workers and peasants experienced in struggle to join the Red Army, thus organisationally weakening or even eradicating the purely military viewpoint; (3) Arouse the local party organisations to criticise the party organisations in the Red Army and the organs of mass political power to criticise the Red Army itself in order to influence the party organisations and the officers and soldiers of the Red Army; (4) The party must actively attend to and discuss military work; (5) Draw up Red Army rules and regulations which already define its tasks, the relationship between its military and its political apparatus.²²

²¹*Ibid.*

²²"On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (Dec. 1929)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. I (1975), *op. cit.*, pp. 107-108.

Furthermore, the "resolution" also criticised the ideology of roving rebel bands among the Red Army²³. It indicated "the political ideology of roving rebel bands has emerged in the Red Army because the proportion of vagabond elements is large and because there are great masses of vagabonds in China, especially in the southern provinces",²⁴ this ideology manifested itself as follows: "some people want to increase our political influence only by means of roving guerrilla actions, but are unwilling to increase it by undertaking the arduous task of building up base area and establishing the peoples' political power",²⁵ "in expanding the Red Army, some people follow the line of hiring men and buying horses and recruiting deserters and accepting mutineers, rather than the line of expanding the local Red Guards and the local troops and thus developing the main forces of the Red Army".²⁶ To eliminate the above-mentioned ideology of roving rebel bands, the resolution laid down that the party should "intensify education, criticise incorrect ideas, and eradicate ideology of roving rebel bands", "intensify education to counter the vagabond outlook", and "draw active workers and peasants experienced in struggle into the ranks of the Red Army so as to change its composition".²⁷

The resolution clearly established that "military affairs are only one means of accomplishing political tasks, it is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution". Such regulation negated the possibility for PLA only to become a

²³The reasons that Mao opposed roving rebel bands are as follows: For a brief period after their defeat in 1927, a "left putschist" tendency arose in the CCP. Regarding the Chinese revolution as a "permanent revolution", and the revolutionary situation in China as a "permanent upsurge", the putschist comrades refused to organise and orderly retreat and, adopting the methods of commandism and relying only on a small number of party members and a small section of the masses, erroneously attempted to stage a series of local uprisings throughout the country, which had no prospect of success. Such putschist activities were widespread at the end of 1927. See "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (Dec. 1929)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. I (1975), op. cit., p. 115.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 114.

²⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶*Ibid.*

²⁷*Ibid.*

professionalised army. The PLA was destined to merge with politics as a means of accomplishing political tasks.

It was due to the tendency for putschism, opportunism and selfish departmentalism caused by the vagabond outlook at the basic level, and the purely military viewpoint which needed to be corrected, that Chinese Communist Party began to apply political and ideological education to the PLA and to intensify the leadership of party in the army. The "Sanwan reorganisation" determined the party's position on the army, while "the September letter" and "Kutien resolution" enlarged the PLA's function in non-military aspects and determined its political role. In the future, the development of the party and the political tasks of the PLA might be different, but, its basic line would not overstep the above-mentioned patterns.

In addition to military tasks, the PLA concurrently shouldered political tasks. Apart from its principle that was determined at the "Sanwan reorganisation" and the "Kutien conference", and its direction being dominated by Mao's thought of army building, it was also a product of habit and design. From the point of view of "habit", the chief cadres of PLA were those who had participated revolution and constructed army in the early period of CCP, after the state was founded, they had gained both military and party power, since there was no distinction between the two; it was only natural that the military should have strong political functions. To look at "design" on the other hand, the army by participating in political tasks implied two major objectives - to mobilise masses and conserve the power of authoritative establishment.

It is noticeable that before "the September letter" and the "Kutien conference", the PLA had held the "Sixth CCP National Congress" in Moscow in July 1928 under the direct instruction of the Communist International. Bukharin was sent to participate and to direct

its development. All the resolutions at the congress were passed by "The Sixth Communist International Congress" which subsequently became CCP's guiding principles for Soviet movements in the following ten years. The final resolution "The military of Chinese Communist Party" at the Sixth Communist International Congress laid down that "all military works should be put together under the CCP central military department, each region should set up a military commission and work under the general instructions of the local communist party, while in the area of military tactics, it should be directed under the central military department".²⁸ To avoid factional conflicts in the CCP, the Third International (Comintern) arranged for Hsiang Chung-fa, from a working class background, to be the general secretary of CCPCC, and for Chou En-lai to act as the Director of Military Department after the inauguration of The Sixth CCP National Congress. Since Hsiang Chung-fa was only a pawn to balance factional conflicts in the party, the real military power of CCP was in reality held in the hands of Chou En-lai.²⁹

In January 1938, Chou En-lai made a report entitled *Political work in the Anti-Japanese Armed Forces*, in which he indicated that "the most important factor in reforming the armed forces is the establishment of a system for carrying out revolutionary political work.... The Soviet Red Army was able to unite the workers and peasants in the midst of ravages and privation and beat back the attacks of the White Guards and foreign aggressors; the Chinese Red Army was able, during the past ten years, to unite the people of the Soviet areas in waging ruthless battles... these were all 'miracles'. Therefore, we can affirm that political work based on dedication to the revolutionary cause is the life and soul of every revolutionary armed force".³⁰

²⁸Warren Kuo, *ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, Vol. V, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

²⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

³⁰"*Political Work in the Anti-Japanese Armed Forces (10 Jan. 1938)*", *SELECTED WORKS OF CHOU EN-LAI*, Vol. I (1981), *op. cit.*, p. 112.

As for the political works in the army, Chou directed, "we must carry out revolutionary political education among all officers and men in every units... political education in the army must be on a par with military training and must be conducted regularly. With regard to the political organisations in the army, Chou commented: There must be an independent organisational system for doing political work at each level in the armed forces, from the highest General Political Department right down to the company political instructor... The military officers at the various levels must do everything possible to facilitate political work at their respective levels and should refrain from either interfering with or obstructing it.... The officers of the political organs at each level have the right to impeach, before a political organ at a higher level, any military officer at the corresponding or lower levels who harms the revolutionary cause or violates the revolutionary political programme or revolutionary discipline".³¹

Until the convening of the Tsunyi conference, an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CCPCC,³² held from 6 to 8 January 1935, Chou En-lai had been, in reality, in charge of military affairs, and one of the chief leaders in the Party. The directive to Mao was issued in his status as Director of the Military Department and the member of the Political Bureau of the CCPCC. It was certain at that time that Chou's power over the

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 118.

³²An enlarged meeting of the CCPCC politburo held at Tsunyi, Kweichow, Jan. 6-8, 1935. The meeting is significant in that it enabled Mao for the first time to gain leadership of the CCPCC military commission. It also marked a major change in the strategy for the "Long March". Attending the meeting were some 20 CCP leaders, including members and alternate members of the politburo Ch'in Pang-hsien, Chang Wen-t'ien, Chou En-lai, Ch'en Yün, Chu Te, Ho K'e-ch'üan; members of the central committee Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, Lo Mai, P'eng Te-huai; alternate members and specially designated persons Li Fu-ch'un, Yang Shang-k'un, Wang Shou-tao, Liu Po-ch'eng, Lin Piao, Nieh Jung-chen and Teng Fa, and a military advisor from the Communist International, Li Te (also known as Otto Braun). The Tsunyi Resolutions for the first time systematically explained Mao's military strategy. In addition, they furnish scholars with reasons and evidence of the decline of the so called international function - the downfall of Po Ku (Chin Pan-hsien) and the departure of Chou En-lai and Wang Chia-hsiang from military duties. See Warren Kuo, *ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, Vol. III, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-27; *WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-190; "Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference", *THE CHINA QUARTERLY*, No. 40, Oct.- Dec. 1969, pp. 1-17.

army was greater than that of Mao Tse-tung.

Nevertheless, the Tsunyi conference reorganised the CCPCC and the CCPCC Military Commission, and dismissed Chou En-lai from his post of chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission and appointed Mao Tse-tung to take over.³³ The fall of Chou was mainly due to the failure of the fifth counter-campaign of encirclement and suppression. The fifth campaign was conducted by the Nationalist Government against the Red area in Kiangsi in October 1933, Chiang Kai-shek, chairman of the National Military Council, employed the strategy of "thirty percent military and seventy percent political actions", which proved to be successful. In October 1934, the CCP made a big strategic mistake in retreating, resulting in the loss of two thirds of its strength and the dissatisfaction of the leaders of the fifth counter-campaign by the party and military cadres. At the Tsunyi conference, P'eng Te-huai, commander of the Third Red-Army Regiment, was the first to criticise the strategy of escaping which cause the Red Army to suffer a disastrous defeat. Mao also condemned the fifth counter-campaign for making the strategic mistake of purely acting in defence, which led to the total collapse of the Central Soviet area and forcing the CCP to adopt the strategy of retreat. Chou committed the strategic mistakes in the fifth counter-campaign and during the long distance retreat. Liu Po-ch'eng agreed with Mao's opinion and passed the "Resolution on the Enlarged Meeting of the Politburo of the CCPCC - Examine the Mistake of Military Line by Po Ku (also known as Ch'in Pang-hsien), Chou En-lai, Li Te (Also Known As Otto Braun) and relieve Ch'in Pang-hsien of his position as Secretary-general of the CCPCC, Chou En-lai of his position as Chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission, Li Te, military advisor from Germany, no longer took charge of military affairs.³⁴

³³Warren Kuo, *ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, Vol. III, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

³⁴Warren Kuo, *ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, Vol. III, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-33, and Vol. IV, pp. 433-508.

The Tsunyi conference enabled Mao for the first time to gain the leadership of the CCPCC Military Commission, but since Mao was not a military expert and lacked a communist international background, he had to rely heavily on Wang Ming's support, Wang Ming was the head of communist international and had intimate relations with the Soviet Union. During the Long March, Mao assigned the party and political work in the army, and the party's work in the local area enroute to northern Shensi to the leaders of the communist international.³⁵ The members of the Politburo and of the Standing Committee remained unchanged except that Mao Tse-tung was a newly elected member. In order to maintain the party's unity, Ch'in Pang-hsien and Chou En-lai remained members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo although they were dismissed from their posts. Chou En-lai remained in charge of military affairs in his capacity of vice-chairman of the CCPCC Military Committee. To Mao, this was the only way to secure the military and political power that he had gained.

The Tsunyi conference enabled Mao to become the Chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission, but he was not yet Secretary-general of the CCPCC, his power was not boundless. However, Mao possessed the dual character of intellectual and vagabond, he had the intellectual brain to map out the seizure of power step by step, and a vagabond's nerve to adopt vigorous measures for accomplishing it. Lin Piao once described Mao with the following passage: "Looking back at the history of the past few decades, is there anyone whom he had supported initially who has not finally been handed a political death sentence... Is there a single political force which has been able to work with him from beginning to end?... He is paranoid and a sadist, his philosophy of liquidating people is

³⁵At that time, the Communist International appointed Ch'in Pang-hsien as director of the General Political Department, under the department had Organisation Division with Lo Mai as the chief, and Propaganda Division with Ho K'e-ch'uan as the chief. See Warren Kuo, *ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, Vol. IV, *op. cit.*, p. 458

either don't do it, or do it thoroughly. Every time he liquidates someone, he will put them to death before he desists; once he hurts you, he will hurt you all the way; and he puts the blame for all bad things on others. Frankly speaking, all of those who have been forced from the scene in his merry-go-round style have in fact been made scapegoats for his own crime,... Today they use this group to attack that group; tomorrow they use that group to attack this group. today one small handful, tomorrow another... They not only incite cadres to struggle against cadres, and the masses to struggle against the masses, but they also incite the armed forces to struggle against the armed forces, and party members against party members".³⁶

The process of Mao's seizure of power was tortuous and slow, Mao deeply perceived that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" was the fundamental creed for accomplishing the seizure of power by armed revolution. In his paper *Problems of War and Strategy*, Mao clearly expressed: "The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and for all countries... 'In China the armed revolution is fighting the armed counterrevolution. That is one of the specific feature and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution'. This thesis of comrade Stalin's is perfectly correct".³⁷ As for the tasks of communists, Mao commented: "Communists do not fight for personal military power, but they must fight for military power for the party, for military power for the people... where there is naiveté on the question of military power, nothing whatsoever can be achieved... Every communist must grasp the truth, 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun', 'our principle is

³⁶James T. Myers (ed.), "The CCP Central Committee Document", CHUNG-FA (1972), No. 4, CHINESE POLITICS - DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS, (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), p. 152.

³⁷"Problems of War and Strategy (6 Nov. 1938)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. II (1965), op. cit., p. 219, 221.

that the party commands the gun, and gun must never be allowed to command the party".³⁸

Mao believed to control the army he must first control the chief component of the army, the peasants. In Mao's opinion, peasants had revolutionary importance, and constituted the real motive force of historical development in Chinese society³⁹. Therefore as the successor to Marxism, Mao inherited but partly departed from Marxist principle of class struggle, Mao chose peasants to be liberated first instead of the workers. This was because Mao intend to use peasants to compose the majority of the army and to use them as a tool for his revolution.

The "September Letter" had clear instructions on the establishment of political ideology in the PLA, and on the function of party in the army. It was drafted by Ch'en I, secretary of the Front Committee of the Fourth Army of the Red Army, for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the basis of several talks with Chou En-lai and a Central Committee meeting, it was read and approved by Chou En-lai.⁴⁰ Since Mao's Kutien resolution was based on that "spirit of September letter", he therefore was substantially influenced by Chou En-lai in his ideology of army building. Consequently, Mao could develop the spirit of the Kutien resolution organically in the course of PLA's changing political environment, which in turn increased his importance in directing the development of the PLA's political role and consolidated his leading position.

³⁸*Ibid.*, p. 224.

³⁹See "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society (Mar. 1926)" and "Investigation of Peasant Movement in Hunan (March 1927)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. I (1975), *op. cit.*, p. 17; pp. 23-59.

⁴⁰"Directive From the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Front Committee of the fourth Army of the Red Army (28 Sep. 1929)", *SELECTED WORKS OF CHOU EN-LAI*, Vol. I (1981), *op. cit.*, p. 41.

II. The Formation of Mao's ideology for Building Up the Army and of the PLA's Political Role

The martial quality of *water margins* had particular appeal to Mao Tse-tung during his formative years. These fascinating stories relate the martial exploits of outlaw heroes who dedicated themselves to aiding the peasants of medieval China in the perennial struggle against oppressive landlords and repressive governments. Another of Mao's early favourites was *The Romances of the Three Kingdom*. From this absorbing account of Ts'ao Ts'ao's (A.D. 155 -220)⁴¹ campaigns against the generals of the kingdoms of Wu and Shu, Mao painlessly assimilated a sound fundamental education in the arts of generalship and strategy and science of tactics.

The Resolution On Some Historical Issues Since the Founding of People's Republic of China, passed by the CCPCC at "Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh CCPCC" On 27 July 1981 had vividly recalled the ideology of the early stage of the building up of the PLA. It stated "Because bourgeois democracy does not exist in our country, and also because the reactionary ruling class carries out autocratic and horror acts of exercising control with the aid of armed forces, revolution can only proceed in the form of long-term armed struggle. The Chinese armed struggle is a revolutionary war led by the proletariat and based on the peasants. Since peasants are the most reliable allied force of the proletariat, it is necessary for the proletariat to apply advanced thinking, strict organisation, and discipline to arouse the masses' consciousness, and to build up bases in the countryside so as to further revolutionary war and to strengthen revolutionary force in the long run."⁴²

⁴¹Ts'ao Ts'ao (A.D. 155-220), founder of the short-lived Wei Dynasty. His name and martial achievements, perpetuated for centuries in the classical drama, he was a master of mobile war.

⁴²"On Some Historical Issues Since the Founding of People's Republic of China", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 1st July 1981.

Since the setting up of the party, the CCP had attempted to agitate industrial workers, vagabonds and poor peasants, those who were full of peasant consciousness and strong factional concepts but lacked education, to provoke rebellions in the cities and to seize political power, however they did not succeed. In his *Report on An Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan* (Mar. 1927), Mao asserted the importance of the peasantry and of peasant issues and perceived that the vast areas of the countryside had inexhaustible armed forces that could be used as a revolutionary base. In order to seize power, it was necessary to "overthrow the armed forces of the landlords and establish those of the peasants".⁴³

Furthermore, in his paper *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist*, Mao once more emphasised that "The scale of peasant uprisings and peasant wars in Chinese history has no parallel anywhere else. The class struggles of the peasants, the peasants uprisings and peasant wars constituted the real motive force of historical development in Chinese feudal society. For each of the major peasant uprisings and wars dealt a blow to the feudal regime of the time and hence more or less furthered the growth of the social productive forces".⁴⁴

With regard to the tasks of the Chinese revolution, Mao pointed out the following: "The peasantry constitutes approximately eighty percent of China's total population... The poor peasants in China, together with the farm labourers, form about thirty percent of the rural population. They the broad peasant masses with no land or insufficient land, the semi-proletariat of the countryside, are the biggest motive force of the Chinese revolution, the natural and most reliable ally of the proletariat and the main contingent of China's

⁴³"Report on An Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan (March 1927)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. I (1975), *op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁴⁴"Chinese Revolution and Chinese Communist Party (Dec. 1939)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. II (1965), *op. cit.*, p. 308.

revolutionary forces. Only under the leadership of the proletariat can the poor and middle peasants achieve their liberation, and only by forming a firm alliance with the poor and middle peasants can the proletariat lead the revolution to victory".⁴⁵

The characteristics of the Chinese social structure included: Firstly, a feudal and semi-colonial country with a retarded economy. Secondly, a society where production is derived from the small peasants. Thirdly, peasants possess a revolutionary character in Chinese history. Fourthly, it possesses the historical experience of "the whole nation in arms", whether "soldiers are peasants" or "peasants are soldiers". Finally, an agricultural society that can provide a boundless resource of armed forces. Based on the above-mentioned characteristics, Mao planned a unique line of army building which was fit for revolution. In view of "The people, and people only, being the motive force of world history",⁴⁶ Mao summed up his experience of the struggles during the period in Chingkang Mountains and thus developed his military idea of integrating peasants with land revolution and armed struggle.

The peasant was the major force of Mao's revolutionary undertakings, Mao believed "it is the peasants who are the source of the Chinese army, the soldiers are peasants in military uniform".⁴⁷ Mao's "peasant doctrine" was in fact the psychological reflection of his belief that only through man-made changing of the ways of the production relationship and through political mobilisation to increase recognition of Maoist thought can the gigantic structure of the national system be changed, wholly and immediately, and the nation's future developing trend be fully controlled.⁴⁸ Mao highlighted the ideology of "class

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, p. 324.

⁴⁶"On Coalition Government (24 Apr. 1945)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. III (1967)*, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

⁴⁷*Ibid.* p. 300.

⁴⁸"On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (Dec. 1929)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. I (1975)*, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-114.

struggle" ostensibly to express detestation and absolute negation of capitalism but really it was to consolidate his supreme position in the nation and to establish a permanent Maoist Dynasty. Based on his concept of "peasant doctrine", Mao's attempt to seek loyalty from all members in China through peasant consciousness presented the viewpoint of "immortal revolution". Mao applied the morality of "loyalty" from Confucianism of traditional Chinese society to carry out constant revolution in politics,

Mao developed the "people's war"⁴⁹ from the concept of "peasant", and "wars are all-powerful" from the concept of "armed struggles". "In China the armed revolution is fighting the armed counter-revolution. That is one of the specific features and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution",⁵⁰ "Armed struggle in China is, in essence, peasant war, and the Party's relations with the peasantry and its close relations with the peasant war are one and the same thing",⁵¹ and "In China the seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution",⁵² since the issue has to be settled by war, one must affirm the significance of the barrel of a gun. Based on this theory of "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun", Mao further developed the principle of army building, that is, "the party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party",⁵³ which also applied to the

⁴⁹A war fought by mobilising and arming all the people. Mao Tse-tung first advocated people's war in his report "On Coalition government" on 24 April 1945. Describing the advantage of a people's war, Mao said: "This army is powerful because it has the people's self-defence corps and militia - the vast armed organisations of the masses - fighting in co-ordination with it.

In Sep. 1965, Lin Piao honoured this concept as the basis of the CCP's victory in China by saying: "To rely on the peasants, build rural base areas and use the countryside to encircle and finally capture the cities - such was the way to victory in the Chinese Revolution".

See "On Coalition Government (24 Apr. 1945)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. III (1967), op. cit., pp. 263-267; Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War", *RED FLAG*, No. 10, 1965, pp. 11-20.

⁵⁰"Introducing the Communist (4th Oct. 1939)", *SELECTED WORK OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. II (1965), op. cit., p. 287.

⁵¹*Ibid.*

⁵²"Problems of War and Strategy (6th Nov. 1938)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. II (1965), op. cit., p. 219.

⁵³*Ibid.*

relationship between the party and peasants, only the party can command peasants, the peasants are not allowed to command the party. The relationship between army and party in spirit was subordinate and defined as such at the very beginning of building the army.

In view of the special features of the members of the PLA and the principle of the "party commands the gun", Mao defined the characteristics of the PLA and its tasks, together with his criticism on a "purely military viewpoint", at the Kutien conference in 1929 when he presented his general conclusion. With regard to its character, he commented "the Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political task of the revolution";⁵⁴ with regard to its tasks Mao concluded that the "Red Army should certainly not confine itself to fighting, besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength, it should shoulder such important tasks as spreading propaganda among the masses, organising the masses, arming them, helping them to establish revolutionary political power and setting up party organisations".⁵⁵

Mao insisted that the PLA must possess the following four characteristics. First, it must be under the absolute leadership of the Chinese communist party; Second, it must at the same time be a fighting force, a political work force, and a production corps; Third, the Army must consist of local forces as well as of regular forces, moreover, it must energetically build and develop the militia, thus practising the system of combining the three military formations, i.e., the regular forces, the local forces, and the militia; Fourth, the army must first and foremost build on a political basis, politics is the commander, political work is the lifeline of the PLA⁵⁶

⁵⁴"On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (Dec. 1929)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. I (1975), p. 106.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*

⁵⁶Lin Piao, "Long Live to Victory of People's War (Sep. 1965)", *RED FLAG*, No. 10, 1965, pp. 11-20; *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 30 Sep. 1965; Michael Y. M. Kau (ed.), *LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, (New York: International Arts and Science Press, Inc., 1975), pp. 265-316.

Furthermore, in view of the proposition that the "peasant force is the major force of Chinese revolution", Mao organised the army in a way which was based on the peasants, and further developed the concept of "militia" from the concept of "people's war". Under the leadership of Mao, the basic line of the militia was closely related to politics, such as a militarised organisation; politics taking the lead; thoroughly carrying out the class line; and persisting with the principle of combining labour with military.⁵⁷

The policy of "the whole nation in arms" implemented by Mao was one of the important responses to his principle of army building. Mao advanced the viewpoint of "overthrowing the armed forces of the landlords and establishing those of the peasants" in his *Report on Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan* at the very beginning of the revolution. Mao regarded militia as the important component of army building as the militia itself was a major integration of the masses. It not only could serve as the backup force for regular troops but was also a nationwide political campaign, in addition, since the majority of militia came from peasant society, it commanded the broad masses and possessed a class nature. Therefore, in certain functions, the militia became the major force in balancing regular troops to prevent them from departing from the political functions. The Militia became an important asset for Mao in conducting class and power struggles.

Moreover, the policy of "the whole nation in arms" had practised the military concept of "integration of military and peasantry" in the traditional Chinese defence strategy. Mao believed, "the richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people",⁵⁸ "the

⁵⁷Fu Ch'iu-t'ao, "Set up Militia Division", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 30 Oct. 1958.

⁵⁸"On Protracted War (May 1938)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. II (1965), *op. cit.*, p. 186.

real bastion of iron is the masses, they sincerely and wholeheartedly support revolution".⁵⁹ Through the militarisation of "People's Communes", the aggression of actions, and the collectivisation of life, Mao reinforced armed troops and created a society with a character of militarisation.

If a state possess the character of militarisation and highly appraises the value of armed forces, it is likely that the policy is generated with a certain degree of violent inclination. The militarists will spontaneously try to play the role of leading actors in the course of decision making when they occupy notably high political status; whereas, in a society of non-militarisation, militarists are only considered as specialist in their area, and their function is mainly to maintain state security.

Mao's view concerning military power was quite straightforward. He indicated that "every communist must grasp the truth, 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun', our principle is that the party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party, yet, having the gun, we can create party organisations, as witness the powerful party organisations which the Eight Route Army has created in northern China, we can also create cadres, create schools, create culture, create mass movements, everything in Yen-an has been created by having guns. All things grow out of the barrel of a gun".⁶⁰ In order to guard against the appearance of the "gun commands the party", Mao deliberately controlled the army through the direct involvement of a power system and personnel arrangement in politics, the military as well as the party. He further intensified his control over the army to the extent of absolute loyalty to himself alone by developing a personality cult in all political campaigns. It was because of this that Mao held a special

⁵⁹Fu Ch'iu-t'ao, "The Whole Nation in Arms", *RED FLAG*, No. 10, 1958, p. 21.

⁶⁰"Problems of War and Strategy (6th Nov. 1938)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. II (1965), *op. cit.*, pp. 224-225.

viewpoint about the political role of militarists, he in reality did not care for the importance of the political role of militarists, or whether they were strong or weak, what he insisted on was the effective control of the army, and to ensure his supreme position in the army. The political campaigns of the PLA, he argued, at all times should follow his absolute leadership and should proceed under the general principle of consolidating Maoist ideology. Any political movements in the army should stick to the principle of "safeguard chairman Mao's military line" and "support the Central Committee led by chairman Mao". Thus, the PLA under Mao's leadership became his private-owned troops. The political standing of the army needed to be identical to Mao's, and any militarist showing a slight difference in his political standing or anyone whom Mao subjectively believed did not or possibly would not follow his absolute leadership was criticised, the incidents of Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih, P'eng Te-huai, Lo Jui-ch'ing, and Lin Piao were examples of this⁶¹.

In the state of primitive political institutionalisation, it is necessary for the political leader to mould his personal charisma so that his thinking can become the orthodox ideology in the system structure. Ideology is a variable that determines political behaviour and an important link in the chains of political phenomena. It is used by the authority to transform compulsory means into legitimate and acceptable ones, and is also the source of "legitimacy" so called by the leadership of ruling class. Alternatively, through the process of political socialisation, the internalised ideology becomes the political personality of system's members and thus forms a common recognition towards the nation or regime. It is the foundation for integrating a political system. Since ideology is the legitimate basis for exercising political power and the foundation for integrating a political system, the extent of power controlled by the authorities is closely related to the degree of their

⁶¹For details refer to Chapter III, Section I and Chapter IV.

overall monopoly of ideology and to the special position of authoritative annotator.

In the PRC, whether based on the strategic consideration or practical situation, the ideological myth of Mao was gradually brought up through the Yen-an rectification campaigns⁶², the Seventh CCP National Congress⁶³, and the "God-making" movement promoted by Lin Biao with his utmost efforts. In February 1942, the rectification campaigns which lasted for three and half years were brought about under the instigation of Mao, one of its main purposes was to establish a good growing environment for advancing Maoist thought of "Marxism-Leninism with Chinese characteristics" through the attacks on "communist international faction" in the party headed by Wang Ming. Another important purpose was to place Mao's speech and writings as the central idea so as to internalise Maoist thought of "practically integrating the theory of Marxism-Leninism with Chinese revolution" into the conscious of the members of the party and military through the means of criticism, review and group learning.

It is obvious that the Yen-an rectification campaign in fact carried strong intentions of conducting ideological reform. Mao attempted to create his style of Marxism-Leninism through the approach of "Marxism-Leninism with Chinese characteristics". Due to the failure of "rectify the party's style of work", one of the activities in the rectification

⁶²Feb. 1942 when Mao delivered a speech, "Rectify the Party's Style of Work" at the newly reorganised party school of the CCPCC. Several days later, Mao again talked on "Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing" before a meeting of cadres in Yen-an. Afterwards, the rectification campaign spread to party units in all areas, in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border area in particular, and lasted for three and a half years. The rectification work at that time involved seven areas: the party, politics, the military, the masses, party-people relations, finance, and education. the real target of this campaign, obviously, was the Wang Ming group, Mao's last obstacle on his way to leadership of the Party.

See Wang Ming, "It Is Not A Cultural Revolution But A Counterrevolutionary Political Coup", RADIO MOSCOW MANDARIN BROADCAST, 31 March 1969, (Taipei: Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Defence, 1969), pp. 2-5; "Rectify the Party's Style of Work (1st Feb. 1942)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. III (1967), op. cit., pp. 35-51; Warren Kuo, ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol. IV, op. cit., pp. 369-415.

⁶³The congress was held in Yen-an from 23 April to 11 June 1945 presided over by Mao, it was attended by 547 delegates and 303 party members.

campaign, the party school of the CCPCC was forced to reorganise. "In the light of such circumstance, the party school of the CCPCC is reorganised according to the instruction of Central Communist Party. Comrade Mao Tse-tung takes the concurrent post of Principal, Comrade Lin Piao and P'eng Chen are the Vice-principals, with regard to the leadership of rectification campaigns and the leadership of ideological works, they are directly in the charge of comrade P'eng Chen"; "The rectification movement in the Yen-an party school of CCPCC is the heart as well as the epitome of the whole party's rectification movement".⁶⁴ Mao chose the party school as the focus of rectification which was based on the consideration that "Nearly a thousand cadres, coming from all parts of the country to be transferred to Yen-an, and representatives, selecting from everywhere to participate 'Seventh CCP National Congress', are all grouped to receive training in the party school".⁶⁵ In order to establish the leading position of Maoist thought and thus become the values standard in the party, Mao had to eliminate ideological dissenters in the name of rectification.

Liu Shao-ch'i delivered a speech *Reports on the Revision of the Party Constitution* at the Seventh CCP National Congress held in Yen-an between 23 April and 11 June 1945, in which Liu indicated "the general provisions of the Party Constitution clearly state that the Chinese communist party guides its entire work by the teachings which unite the theories of Marxism-Leninism with the actual practice of the Chinese revolution - Mao Tse-tung theory - and fights against any dogmatist or empiricist deviations"; "Maoist thought is Communism and Marxism with Chinese characteristics, his thought, from the 'viewpoint of universe' to the 'work style', is all for the development of Marxism in a Chinese way, it is

⁶⁴Chang Ting-ch'eng, "The Rectification in Yen-an Party School of CCPCC", *A SINGLE SPARK CAN START A PRAIRIE FIRE*, Vol. VI, (Peking: People's Press, 1962), p. 6.

⁶⁵Warren Kuo, *ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, Vol. IV, *op. cit.*, p. 381.

the complete revolutionary theory for the Chinese people."⁶⁶ The Party Constitution passed by Seventh CCP National Congress laid down "it is the obligation of every Communist to learn Marxism-Leninism and lay the foundation of Maoist thought".⁶⁷

Mao eventually achieved his purpose and became the only annotator and monopolizer of the ideology of Chinese Communist Party.

At the "Lushan conference" in 1959, Mao suffered serious inner-party attacks for the first time as the result of the destruction caused by the "Great Leap Forward" movement.⁶⁸ Mao delimited the struggle at the Lushan conference to the kind of class struggle and to the stepping down of P'eng Te-huai from the political arena,⁶⁹ but in fact his sacred position was violated and the crisis of an inner-party split began to emerge. With the help of Lin Piao, Mao had to rebuild his personal myth which had been seriously damaged by this struggle.

The "Extraordinary meeting of enlarged session of the CCPCC Military Commission", convened by Lin Piao in Peking between 14 September and 20 October 1960, passed the "Resolution of the Strengthening of Political and Ideological Work among the Armed Forces". The resolution, which called for a radical overhaul both of the content and of the

⁶⁶"Reports on the Revision of the Party Constitution", *THE SELECTED WORKS OF LIU SHAO-CH'I*, (Tokyo: Chinese Cultural Service Publications, 1976), p. 151.

⁶⁷"Reports on the Division of the Party Constitution", *Ibid.*

⁶⁸A drive to increase industrial and agricultural production in the late 1950s. The Great Leap Forward policy was conceived by Mao in the winter of 1957 and put into execution after endorsement by the National People's congress (NPC) in Feb. 1958. The idea of the Great Leap Forward was seized upon by Mao as a means to increase the pace of internal economic development and was prompted in large part by the suspension of Soviet economic aid. Anti-conservatism, anti-waste, and self-reliant economic development were the major themes of the campaign. The Great Leap Forward ended in 1960 and is generally conceded to be a failure.

See "Ninth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 21 Jan. 1961; *COLLECTED LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA*, Vol. VII, (Peking: Law Publishing House, 1958), p. 4.

⁶⁹For details refer to Chapter IV, Section II.

machinery of political education in the PLA. It drew attention to the continuing importance of Mao Tse-tung's Kutien speech of December 1929 as the "basis for political work" and stated that "Mao Tse-tung's thought was the basis for our army in the past, present and future". The detailed measures which were laid down in the resolution amount to a reaffirmation of the all-inclusive nature of political work as formulated by Mao at Kutien. It advanced that "Maoist thought, in the past, present, or future, is the guiding light for our army building", it also stressed the importance of "holding high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung thought"⁷⁰ so as to heighten the revolutionary consciousness of the PLA, to formally privatise the PLA and to make the establishment of "Mao's army" a task of the highest importance.

Since the enlarged session of the CCPCC Military Commission, political work conferences had been held by the General Political Department of the PLA, which had assessed the progress of the movement and called for greater efforts.⁷¹ A series of slogans and campaigns had been popularised, of which the most important were the "Five-Good" campaign for the rank-and-file soldier, the parallel "Four-Good" campaign for army companies, the "Three-Eight" working style, the "Seven measures in improving leadership over companies", the "Twelve basic experiences in company building", and the "company management and education" campaign.⁷²

Mao had largely increased his authority in the army by developing a personality cult in the PLA - the slogans such as "hold high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought",

⁷⁰"Extraordinary Meeting of And Enlarged Session of the CCPCC Military Commission - The Resolution of The Strengthening of Political and Ideological Work among the Armed Forces (20th Oct. 1960)", *WORKS CIRCULAR*, Vol. IV, (Peking: General Political Department, 1961), p. 219.

⁷¹PLA Political Work conferences had been held in Mar. 1961; 18 Oct. -11 Nov. 1961; Feb. 1963; Jan. 1964 and Jan. 1966.

⁷²For the text of theses and other formulae, see "Terms of PLA Political Work", *LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY*, 22 January 1964, or see Warren Kuo, (ed.), *A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY*, op., cit., p. 466, 524, 674

"Further apply Maoist thought to arm the brains of commanders and fighters, and insist on 'Maoist thought takes the lead' in all tasks", and "study Chairman Mao's writing, follow his teachings and act according to his instructions, be chairman Mao's good fighters".⁷³ - all initiated by Lin Piao, the Minister of National Defence. Because Mao was the founding member of the army and party, he was considered as the father of this big family. This combination of parental consciousness with Mao's myth was further enhanced through social movements of various kinds. In addition, due to the strict structure and class nature in the army, along with its unique discipline and culture, Maoist thought became the supreme morality in the army, soldiers were taught to pledge their loyalty to Mao alone and to apply Maoist thought as the standard for evaluating between the right and wrong of everything.

Mao's thoughts for army building and for the pattern of the political role of the PLA were closely related to his personal experience. His well-known dictum "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" can be understood in the light of the experience of the party's struggle and armed seizure of power in his early period of the CCP. This is further confirmed when Mao anxiously seized the real commanding power of the Red Army instead of being the Secretary-general of the party at Tsunyi conference in Jan. 1935, which was held to reorganise Central Committee of the CCP and the CCPCC Military Commission. Such was the best explanation for his introspection of the political failure in the past and the thorough understanding of the true meaning of power. Mao realised the nearest road to obtain the party's power is through the grasping of military power.

Mao in reality faithfully practised Ludwig Feuerbach's (1804-1872) concept of "religious

⁷³Lo Jui-ch'ing, "Learn from Lei Feng - To Chinese Youth", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 5th March 1963, or see "Proletariat Must Control the Barrel of A Gun -Commemorate the Fortieth Anniversary of PLA", *RED FLAG*, 1967, No. 12, p. 46.

alienation"⁷⁴ during his domination of China. By the hand of Lin Piao and the PLA, Maoist thought and the *Quotation of Mao Tse-tung* became almost the bible of the Maoist religion of this life in China, his image was cast in the mould of an omnipresent, mighty God, and became the sword of Maoist domination and Maoist religion, whether in the army or in politics. After Mao was cast in the mould of God, he used this power and position as God to transform his criticism towards the old society, class, line and the viewpoint of purely military, into criticism towards his close comrade-in-arms and his successor. P'eng Te-huai, who was praised as "the big general who commands the army sweeping away the enemy and performs deeds of valour in battle"⁷⁵ in the period of "Long March", was at the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC (Lushan conference) in 1959, denounced: "P'eng Te-huai and his anti-party activities reflect the kind of class struggle in which the Chinese bourgeoisie opposes the proletarian socialist revolution and attempt to mould the party, the army, and the world in its own bourgeois image... the remnants of the Kao Kang clique⁷⁶ and other right opportunist elements of every variety headed by P'eng Te-huai could wait no longer, seized on what they considered an opportune moment to stir up trouble, and came out in opposition to the leadership of the central committee and Mao Tse-tung. Representing the interests of the bourgeoisie and the upper strata of the party bourgeoisie, they seek to sabotage the dictatorship of the proletariat and undermine the socialist revolution by splitting and demoralising the vanguard of the

⁷⁴The so called alienation is an resisting force which was brought about by the subject in its process of development but then conversely transformed into a alien force to oppose subject.

Ludwin Feuerbach indicated that according to the Bible, the God created mankind according to his own image, but in converse, it is mankind who created God according to their own images. Therefore he considered only through stopping the worship of God can one overcome the "religious alienation".

See Wang Jo-shui, "Talk about some issues of alienation", SHIN HUA MONTHLY REPORTS, Oct. 1980, p. 15., or see Karl Marx, THE MANUSCRIPTS OF ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY, (Peking: People's Press, 1963), p. 52.

⁷⁵Huang K'e-ch'eng, "An Upright Person with Loyal Heart Will Last Stand through the Ages", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 3rd Jan. 1979, P'eng Te-huai was then the commander of the Red Army Branch in Shensi and Kansu area, and Mao was concurrent political commissar.

⁷⁶For details refer to Chapter V, Section I.

proletariat and organising opportunist factions".⁷⁷

Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao, who had been successively appointed by Mao as successors and close comrades-in-arms, both came to a miserable end. At the Twelfth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC in October 1968, Liu was accused of being "the top capitalist-roader in power in the party, a renegade, traitor, scab, and a lackey of imperialism, modern revisionism, and the Kuomintang reactionaries with a long list of crimes hiding in the party".⁷⁸ Therefore, "The plenary session calls on all comrades in the party and the people of the whole country to carry on deep-going revolutionary mass criticism and repudiation and eradicate the counterrevolutionary revisionist ideas of Liu Shao-ch'i and the handful of other top party persons in authority taking the capitalist road".⁷⁹ As for Lin Piao, he was, at the Tenth CCP National Congress, classified as "the bourgeois careerist, conspirator, and double-dealer, engaged in machinations within our party not just for one decade but for several decades. At important junctures of the revolution, he invariably committed right opportunist errors and invariably played double -faced tricks, putting up a false front to deceive the party and the people... Lin Piao and his like, who were capitalist-roaders in power working only for the interests of the minority and whose ambition grew with the rise of their position, overestimating their own strength and underestimating the strength of the people, could no longer remain under cover and therefore sprang out for a trial of strength with the proletariat".⁸⁰

⁷⁷"Central Committee Resolution on P'eng Te-huai", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. II, (Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc. 1980), p. 755; *NEWS CHINA NEWS AGENCY*, 15 Aug. 1967

⁷⁸"Report by the CCP Central Committee's Special Panel on the Case of Liu Shao-ch'i (18 Oct. 1968)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1976 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 2191.

⁷⁹"Communiqué of the Twelfth Plenum (31 Oct. 1968)", op. *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1976 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 2195; *NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY*, 1 Nov. 1968

⁸⁰Chou En-lai, "Report to the Tenth Party Congress (24 Aug. 1973)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1976 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. V, op. cit., pp. 2463-2465

Although the above figures (P'eng, Liu, and Lin etc.) represented the antagonistic forces towards Mao, initiated by Mao through his playing politics in the process of pursuing or consolidating power they also conversely transformed into a force of "alienation" to oppose Mao. In reality, neither of them (P'eng, Liu, or Lin etc.) had denied the fundamental principle of "party commands the gun" or "gun commands the party", or dissented towards the authoritative leadership of Mao in essence. All of them were the members of first revolutionary generation like comrade Mao, and recognised Mao's parental position in the Chinese communist family, nevertheless they were eliminated for transmitting their discontent of certain of Mao's policies, or attempting to acquire more power. This made Mao suspicious of their loyalty and he thus adopted vigorous measures to deal with it.

The political role of the PLA was regarded as a tool, or more precisely, a tool under the command of Mao, and nobody else. Mao constantly stressed the absolute leadership of "party commands the gun", but, in fact, it was the absolute leadership of "Mao commands the gun", what Mao called "the party" really means the small group based on himself, not the structure of communist organisation. With regard to the PLA, since the countryside and social infrastructure constituted the majority of its composition, only if it didn't run counter to Mao's ideology and his authority of leadership, it could continue to enjoy its special position in society and the class arising therefrom. Although Mao constantly advocated the importance of the proletarian revolution, the PLA would never apply "class suicide" to return to the vagabond proletarian class on its own accords, under such circumstances, a unique bureaucratic system had thus formed, the PLA had to follow Maoist thought and thus became his personal political weapon. Since Mao controlled the distribution of class interest in the army, it became necessary for PLA to give their absolute support if they wished to secure its vested interests.

The political tradition of the PLA formed under such a structure; worshipping an idol, not a institution. Mao at all times controlled the military power of the PRC and directed the development of the PLA, thus during the period of Mao's rule, the political role of the PLA did not rise and fall sharply but gradually developed as part of a steady process. Although in the Cultural Revolution, some areas were occupied by local army commanders and there was occurrence of the "gun commands the party", if one looks from the viewpoint of the overall situation, the PLA had never escaped Mao's domination, Mao could still implement the re-establishment of party organisation at the time when the initiative of the PLA was raised to the extent of threatening the ecology of the party system, and effectively suppressed the already largely expanded political power in the army. From this, one can draw the impression that Mao still held certain rules and restrictions towards the pattern of the political role of the PLA. Mao was convinced that he could use the army as his political weapon in the power struggle.

III. The Relationship Between the Party and the Army

A. The Subordination of Military Power

There was no department in the party actually directing military affairs during the early stages when the CCP was building up its army. However in May 1924, the Military Affairs Department was formally set up in the Canton Regional Committee and Chou En-lai was appointed the concurrent post of the Director. Subsequently in 1925, the CCPCC established the Military Affairs Department and appointed Chang Kuo-t'ao⁸¹ as the Director. In 1926 the Ministry Affairs Department of the Canton Regional Committee moved to Wuhan and was incorporated into the Ministry Affairs Department of the CCP, Chou En-lai replaced Chang Kuo-t'ao as the Director, whose job at that time was to organise the armed forces of the workers and peasants and to direct uprisings. In August 1927, the PRC built up its armed forces and established the "party committee of the fronts", "party representatives" and party organisations at various levels, the embryonic "party commands the army" began to emerge.⁸² In May 1928, the CCPCC further drew up a "program of military affairs" and it laid down that it should "organise a leading body for

⁸¹Chang Kuo-t'ao also known as (Chang T'e-li) attended the founding congress of the CCP in 1921, and was among the most important early party leaders. Chang was the chief party leader in the Oytüwan Soviet area after 1932. From 1935 to 1937 Chang and Mao Tse-tung were engaged in a series of bitter disputes that centred in party on questions of the strategy and destination of the Long March. The two rivals took their forces on different routes, Chang moving westward toward Tibet while Mao moved north to Sensi. Unfortunately, for Chang, his units were disastrously defeated in Kansu, and by the time he reached Yen-an he was in no position to challenge the Mao leadership. After leaving Yen-an, Chang found refuge in Hankow, then the capital of the Nationalist Government, and later moved on to Chungking when the Nationalists made it their capital. From 1939 to 1945, while the Sino-Japanese war continued, Chang took some part in Government and KMT affairs. In 1945 he was elected to the KMT Central Executive Committee, and in the next year he became director of the Kiangsi regional office of the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Association. When the Chinese communists were completing their conquest of the mainland China in 1949, Chang moved to Hong Kong. See Donald W. Klein & Anne B. Clark (ed.), *BIOGRAPHIC DICTIONARY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM, 1921-1965*, Vol. 1, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 38-43.

⁸²Warren Kuo, *ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 293-296.

Soviet military affairs" which became the Soviet Military Commission.⁸³ During that period, the leading body of the CCP military affairs at the central level was the military affairs department, while at the local level, it was the Soviet Military Commission. Nevertheless, the real power was held by the "party committee of the fronts".

In order to reinforce their leadership in military affairs in Soviet areas, the CCP decided to establish a bureau and sub-bureau of the CCP Central Committee in every Soviet area. In November 1931, "the bureau of Central Committee in the Soviet area" was set up in the Kiangsi Soviet area, and the "CCPCC Military Commission" was concurrently established, Hsiang Ying being appointed the chairman. After the "first All-China Soviet Congress" in November, the "CCPCC Revolutionary Military Commission" was set up under the "CCPCC Soviet Executive Committee", and Chu Te was appointed the chairman, while the "Military-Civilian Department" was under the "CCPCC People's Council", Chu Te was also the concurrent director.⁸⁴ During that period, the three leading bodies of military affairs were the - "CCPCC Military Commission", "CCPCC Revolutionary Military Commission", and "Military-Civilian Department".

In January 1934, Chou En-lai replaced Hsiang Ying as chairman of the CCPCC Military Committee at the Fifth Plenum of the Sixth CCPCC. While in January 1935 after an enlarged meeting of the CCPCC Political Bureau convened at Tsunyi in Kweichow, a new Central Committee leadership was established, Chou En-lai was relieved of his post as chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission, and was succeeded by Mao. Mao was elected a member of the Political Bureau and of its standing committee.

⁸³Fan Chih-yüan, *"The Issues of Chinese Military Leadership", THE SELECTED WORKS OF SEVENTH SINO-AMERICAN MAINLAND CHINA ISSUES*, (Taipei: National Cheng-chi University), pp. 1-2.

⁸⁴*Ibid.* Chu Te was then the Chief-in -Commander of the Red Army.

Between 1949 and 1976, the structure of the military leadership of the PRC and the relationship of the party and army, in law and in substance, can be summarised by the following three stages.

1. The Common Program Period (1949 - 1954)⁸⁵

The Common Program article 20 laid down "The People's Republic of China shall build up a unified army, that is, the People's Liberation Army,.... which shall be under the command of the People's Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central People's Government".⁸⁶

During the Common Program period, Mao not only held the post of chairman of "Central People's Government" and the concurrent chairman of the People's Revolutionary Military Commission, but also was the chairman of CCPCC and the CCPCC Military Commission. Mao possessed both nominal military power bestowed by law and the substantial one for he was the party leader.

2. The 1954 Constitution of the People's Republic of China

⁸⁵The title is "Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference". The most important document of the "three great charters" (Common Program, Organic Law of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and the Organic Law of the Central People's Government) adopted by the 1st Plenary Session of the CPPCC (Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference) on Sep. 29, 1949. This program, in effect, was the "Constitution" of the regime before the 1954 Constitution was adopted, and hence was the "basic law" for people on the China in the period 1949-54. See PEOPLE'S YEARBOOK, (Hong Kong: Ta Kung Bookstore, 1950), Part D, p. 13.

⁸⁶ Revolutionary Military Commission was set up in 1949, Mao Tse-tung was its chairman and Chu Te, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, P'eng Te-huai, Ch'eng Ch'ien were vice-chairmen. Committee members numbered twenty-two including: Ho Lung, Liu Po-ch'eng, Ch'en I, Lin Piao, Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, Yeh Chien-ying, Nieh Jung-chen, Kao Kang, Su Yü, Chang Yün-i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Li Hsien-nien, Jao Shu-shih, Teng Tzu-hui, Hsi Chung-hsün, Lo Jui-ch'ing, Sa Chen-ping, Chang Chih-chung, Fu Tso-i, Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai, Lung Yün, and Liu Fei. When the People's revolutionary Military Commission was abolished on Aug. 1954, its chairman was still Mao Tse-tung.

See STUDIES OF THE ORGANISATION AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMUNIST ARMY, (Taipei: The Study Group on Chinese Communist Ministry Affairs, 1956), pp. 3-6; "Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (29 Sep. 1949)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, op. cit., pp. 52-53; Donald W. Klein & Anne B. Clark, BIOGRAPHIC DICTIONARY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM 1921-1965, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 1064.

The 1954 Constitution removed the People's Revolutionary Military Commission, and set up the "Council of National Defence" under the "State Chairman" and "Ministry of National Defence" under the "State Council". The Constitution article 27 laid down: "The National People's Congress exercises the following function and power... to decide on the choice of the premier of the State Council upon recommendation by the chairman of the People's Republic of China, and of the component members of the State Council upon recommendation by the premier... to decide on the choice of the vice-chairman and members of the council of National Defence upon recommendation by the chairman of the People's Republic of China"; article 42: "The chairman of the People's Republic of China commands the armed force of the country, and is chairman of the Council of National Defence".⁸⁷

During that period (between 1954 and 1959), Mao was the Chairman of the PRC, and concurrent Chairman of the CCPCC and the CCPCC Military Commission. Mao possessed both a nominal military power bestowed by law and a substantial one being the party leader. Between April 1959 and December 1966, Liu succeeded Mao and became the Chairman of the PRC, Mao retreated to the second line in government organisation, but since he still occupied the post of the chairman of the CCPCC and the chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission in party's organ, in practice, he held substantial military power without a legitimate basis.

3. The 1975 Constitution

The 1975 Constitution abolished the post of Chairman of the PRC, and laid down that "The Chinese People's Liberation Army and the people's militia are the workers' and

⁸⁷*The Constitution of the People's Republic of China (20 Sep. 1954)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1976 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. 1, pp. 101-102; NEW CHINA NEW AGENCY, 20 Sep. 1954.*

peasants' own armed forces led by the communist party of China... The Chairman of the CCPCC commands the armed forces of the whole nation"⁸⁸ in its Article 15, Chapter 1.

This article legally recognised the principle of the "party commands the army". The PLA, militia and all the military forces were under the direct leadership of Chinese Communist Party. Mao was appointed the Chairman of the CCPCC and the Chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission, he controlled the supreme military power both in law and in substance.

The real commandship of the PLA, legally speaking, was in the hands of the Chairman of Revolutionary Military Commission and the Chairman of the Central People's Government as laid down in the "Common Programme", or in the hands of the Chairman of the PRC as laid down in the 1954 Constitution. But in communist China, substantive power does not inhere to the bureaucracies established by their constitution, it resides in the Military Commission, the organ of the Central Committee and its Politburo which deals with military policy. The Military Commission, routinely chaired by the first deputy-chairman of Military Commission, generates policy directives affecting the armed forces on all but the most sensitive and important matters, which are handled by the politburo of its standing committee.

Until April 1959, Mao was Chairman of the Central Committee and the Military Commission and Chairman of the PRC. Since he possessed the great power of the party and of the military both in reality and in name, he was an example of the principle of the "party commands the gun" or the "gun commands the party". After Liu Shao-ch'i replaced

⁸⁸"The Constitution of the People's Republic of China", RED FLAG, No. II, 1975, pp. 8-9; "The Constitution of the People's Republic of China (17 Jan. 1975)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. V, op. cit., p. 2504; NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 19 Jan. 1975.

him as the chairman of PRC in April 1959, the power of the State Chairman and the function of "Council of National Defence" remained unchanged in the Constitution, but because the political system of the "Party commands politics" had been formed, the tradition of party's position being superior to that of the nation was established, Liu was merely the nominal commander of the armed forces, the real military leadership was in the hands of the Chairman of the CCP and the chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission.

The General Provision of the Party Regulation, Both in the "Ninth PRC National Congress" in April 1969 and in the "Tenth CCP National Congress" in August 1973, laid down "the theoretical basis guiding Chinese thinking is Maoist thought as well as Marxism-Leninism".⁸⁹ The 1975 Constitution clearly defined the leadership of military subordination as being controlled by the Party Chairman. The power of Mao Tse-tung, whether on a legal basis, in ideological leadership, or in substantial operation, was unsurpassed by no one else in China. Like all founding emperors of every successive dynasty, Mao implemented centralism to control military power.

B. The Interaction between the Party and Army

In the structure of the PRC's party and army, the political role of the militarists is subordinate to the party, while in the relationship between the party and army, the PLA possessed three important characteristics - namely, the homogeneity of the army and party; the dual-role elite of the militarists; and the principle of "party commands the gun" under the system of party committee.

1. The Homogeneity of the Army and Party

⁸⁹"The Regulation of the CCP", RED FLAG, No. 5, 1969, p. 34. and No. 9, 1973, p. 24.

In the communist regime, "Party" is the highest form of the proletariat class and the leading force of proletarian revolution, proletarian dictatorship and socialistic construction. The fundamental principle of the communist party is that all Communists should follow the leadership of the party through the party's organisations. The military was used as a tool of the proletarian dictatorship and as an integral part of the party, following the leadership of the party. Under such a unique political structure, the party and army became homogeneous. The character of the homogeneity of the party and army forced the military to participate in the party's political affairs outside their own professional activities. The demands for a political role for the military in that system was not caused by the pressure from them, but in fact by the central organs of the party. It became the rights and obligation of those of the Armed Forces, who possessed party membership, to support and participate in the party's political affairs.

Under such circumstances, it should not be regarded as a challenge to the authority of the party or to the legality of the system if the military criticised certain policies or changed a policy's orientation in their capacity as party members. Therefore "Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih's anti-party clique"⁹⁰ and "P'eng Te-huai and Huang K'e-ch'eng's anti-party clique"⁹¹ could only be treated as opposition by taking a different line or policy, but could never be regarded as opposition to the political system structure.

⁹⁰PEOPLE'S HANDBOOK, 1956, pp. 78-79; Mao Tse-tung, "Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (15th Nov. 1957)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. V (1977), pp. 340-341; *WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, op. cit., pp. 377-378. Please refer to Chapter IV, Section 1 for details of the incident.

⁹¹"Resolution of the 8th Plenum of the 8th CCPCC concerning the Anti-party Clique Headed By Peng Te-huai", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 16th Aug. 1967; *WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, op. cit., pp. 404-405; Jürgen Domes, *P'ENG TE-HUAI - THE MAN AND THE IMAGE*, (London: C. Hurst & company Ltd., 1985), pp. 77-95. Please refer to Chapter IV, section 2, for details of the incident.

What Kao Kang wanted was only to take the post as Secretary-general or Vice-chairman of the party, or the Premier of the State Council; as for P'eng Te-huai, his intention was to query or express dissatisfaction at the policies of the "Great Leap Forward" movement,⁹² but they (Kao, Jao, P'eng and Huang) were all eliminated by Mao Tse-tung. From this it is obvious that Mao interpreted their behaviour from the view of power. Kao, Jao, P'eng and Huang all had military backgrounds, since it is the barrel of a gun that lies behind the military, if the military dominated or intervened in the party's leadership, Mao would consider it as the forewarning of the "gun commands the party" and thus adopt vigorous measures. Additionally, the suppression of the militarists could exactly demonstrate his ability of controlling military power.

In the structure of the homogeneity of party and army, any conflicts between the military elite, the party and the government elite is a kind of inner-party conflict or factional conflict beyond professional rivalry. The members of factions may cover a wide range from all bodies of the party, government and army, thus if one observes the relationship between the party and army from the view of power, the "party commands the gun" means that the gun itself is the incarnation of the party, and therefore the consistency between the army and party, whether in structure of power, in policy design, or in ideology, is very high. Under such a system structure, only Mao possessed the power of final arbitration, the rest - the leading core of the party, the authoritative establishment, or the successor to Mao, - in reality were merely the governing authorities led by Mao. The absolute party leadership of the army, which the PRC constantly stressed, was in fact the absolute

⁹²In the Lushan resolution in Aug. 1959, Mao castigated P'eng for denying the victory of the general line and the achievement of the Great Leap Forward, and for opposing the high speed development of the national economy, the movement to promote high yields on the agricultural front, the mass movement to make iron and steel, the people's commune movement, the mass movements in economic construction, and party leadership in socialist construction.

See "Resolution of the 8th Plenum of the 8th CCPCC Concerning the Anti-party clique Headed by P'eng Te-huai", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 16th Aug. 1967.

leadership of Mao over the army. Mao controlled and guided the army , while the army pledged loyalty to the governing authorities.

2. The Dual-Role Elite of the Militarists

It should be noted that the relationship between the party and the military, had been very much influenced by the increasing specialisation of leadership roles and the functional differentiation of organisational structure in each network. In the early period of the communist movement in China, party and military leadership were not clearly differentiated particularly since the organisation was more or less functionally diffuse rather than functionally specific. In the Kiangsi Soviet period (1930-1934) and the Yenan Period the military and the party were controlled by the same organisation. During the Sino-Japanese war period (1937-1945), the areas controlled by the CCP also had much overlap of personnel in the military, party, and government organisations.

From the point of view of power, the power relationship between the party and the army had experienced several changes since 1949. Before 1954 the military tended to dominate party officials, whereas after 1954 the party official assumed increasing control over military affairs. The party committee at any military level was responsible to the organisations one level above it, and the chain led directly to the Military Commission.⁹³ The party committee of a given military unit consisted of the military commander, the political commissar, and one or more principal staff members who were also party members. The formal link between the military and the party networks was in the political department, which extended from the PLA headquarters down to the political office of the regiment. At the lowest level, the party committee and the political department tend, to

⁹³John Gittings, *THE ROLE OF CHINESE ARMY*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 106-118.

merge, especially at the company level.

From the point of view of personnel, for the first four years after the establishment of the PRC party leadership and military leadership, on the central level and on the regional level, could not be clearly distinguished particularly on the regional level, party and military cadres shared in the regional administration as well as in the regional party. At the beginning of 1953, there were, among the 345 members of the leading organs in the six "Great Administrative Regions", 104 military men, a share of 30.1 percent. If one only counts the CCP members in these organs, the share of the PLA was 36.4 percent.⁹⁴

This situation changed in 1954, when the Great Administrative Regions were abolished and the first constitution was promulgated by early 1956, under the leadership of P'eng Te-huai, PLA turned more and more toward professionalisation. Moreover, since the late 1950s, the party leadership in the PLA, strongly influenced by Liu Shao-ch'i, had succeeded in establishing and strengthening its own position within the PLA by way of the political commissar network. The PLA had become an organisational network unlike the party network.

Although most of the political commissars of the troop units had a military background, 77.3 percent of the commissars of the territorial organisation, the military area commands, and the military district commands in 1965 had gained their experience in the party organisation. At the same time, only 28, or 10.5 percent, of the 267 provincial party committees secretaries were military men.⁹⁵ These figures indicate that in the mid-1960s, the party organisation definitely dominated civilian-military relation within the CCP.

⁹⁴Jürgen Domes, *THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE PRC - A TIME OF TRANSITION*, (London: Westview Press, 1985), p. 118.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 119.

But soon, a drastic change occurred, when the civilian party and state administrative organisation collapsed during the high tide of the Cultural Revolution, the PLA remained the only relatively intact major institutional subsystem. Under the slogan "Three-Support, Two-Military" (support workers, the peasants, and the left and for management and training by the military) movement. the PLA, between January and August 1967, took over the leadership of the administration, economy, and political work of almost all the provinces of the PRC.

With Lin Piao's fall from the power and death on 12 September 1971, the balance started to change again. Although most of the military leaders kept their positions in the provinces until the thorough-going transfer of commanders-in-chief of military area commands in December 1973, the majority of new appointments to regional and central government and party position were made from the ranks of the civilian party organisation. This development has accelerated since 1977 with the exception of the Politburo. The change of the membership of the Central Committee and leading organs of the State Administrative organs are illustrated by the data presented in the table below.⁹⁶

PLA Representation on Leading Organs of the CCP and the PRC (1965-1983)

<i>Organ</i>	<i>1965</i>	<i>1971</i>	<i>1975</i>	<i>1978</i>	<i>1983</i>
<i>NPC Standing Committee</i>	17.4	*	14.4	17.3	10.4
<i>State council</i>	25.4	*	33.3	16.3	5.7
<i>PPR Secretariats</i>	10.4	62.0	35.2	22.9	6.2
<i>PPC first secretariats</i>	10.7	72.4	48.3	17.2	13.8
<i>CC (full members)</i>	34.0	50.0	37.5	32.4	25.2
<i>Politburo (total)</i>	25.0	56.0	34.6	40.0	40.7
<i>Politburo (full members)</i>	33.3	57.1	36.4	42.8	41.7

Note: NPC - National People's congress
PPC - Provincial Party Committee
CC - Central Committee

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 120.

* - *Non-existent or practically non-existent*

If one observes Party and army from the level of organisation, the appearance of the dual-role elite in the structure of the organisation can clearly be seen, that is, the military elite and party elite are homogeneous. The political campaigns in the army were largely influenced by the chief elite in the army system, they therefore could be regarded as political campaigns in the state system.

The phenomena of the dual-role elite in the PRC can be proved as in the cases of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih of the "Kao and Jao anti-party clique"; P'eng Te-huai and Huang K'e-ch'eng of the "P'eng and Huang anti-party clique"; Liu Shao-ch'i; and Lin Piao, - the chief figures of the four line struggles since PRC was founded, which was generally recognised by Mao in public.⁹⁷

Kao Kang had been Political Commissar of the 26th army of the Red Army, Chairman of the Northwest Political Bureau of the CCP and Vice-commander and Political Commissar of the People's Liberation Army in the Northeast Region; Jao Shu-shih had been Political Commissar of both the New Fourth Army and of the Shantung Military Region, member of the People's Revolutionary Military Commission and Chief of the Organisation Department of the CCPCC; P'eng Te-huai had been acting secretary of the North Bureau of the CCP, First Secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP, Vice-chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission, Vice-premier of State Council, and Minister of National Defence; Liu Shao-ch'i had been Party representative of both the Eighth Red-Army Regiment and Fifth Red-Army Regiment, and Director of the Political Department of the

⁹⁷CCPCC DOCUMENT CHUNG-FA (1972) NO. 12, "Mao Tse-tung's Talks to Responsible comrades in Nanking and Shanghai Area During His Inspection of the Troops", *YEARBOOK ON CHINESE COMMUNISM* (Taipei: Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Defence, 1973), Part 7, pp. 5-6; Michael Y. M. Kau (ed.), *THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, (New York: International Arts and Sciences Press Inc., 1975), pp. 55-66. Please refer to Chapter IV for details of major power struggles in the history of the CCP.

Third Red-Army Regiment, Chairman of the PRC and concurrent Chairman of the National Defence Council, and Vice-chairman of the CCPCC; Lin Piao had been Commander of the Fourth Field Army, Vice-chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission, Vice-premier of the State Council, and Minister of National Defence.⁹⁸ Moreover, apart from above-mentioned P'eng Te-huai and Lin Piao, the rest of the "ten marshals" possessed the background of both the army and the party. Chu Te had been member of the Central Committee, Vice-chairman of the Central Committee, member of the Politburo, Vice-chairman of the Politburo, member of the Standing Committee and the Politburo and member of the CCPCC Military Commission; Ch'en I had been member of the Central Committee, member of the Politburo, Vice-chairman of the National Defence Council, Vice-premier of the State Council, Mayor of the Shanghai Municipality, Minister of the Foreigner Affairs and member of the CCPCC Military Commission; Ho Lung had been member of the Central Committee, member of the Politburo, member of the State Council, vice-premier of the State Council, vice-chairman of the National Defence Council, member of the CCPCC Military Commission; Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien had been member of the Central Committee, vice-chairman of the National Defence Council and member of the CCPCC Military Commission; Liu Po-ch'eng had been member of the Central Committee, member of the Politburo, member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, vice-chairman of the National Defence Council, member of the CCPCC Military Commission; Lo Jung-huan had been member of the National Defence Council, vice-chairman of the National Defence Council, member of the Central Committee, member of the Politburo, member of the Military Commission and director of the General Political Department of the PLA; Nieh Jung-chen had been member of the Central Committee, Vice-premier of the State Council, vice-chairman of the National Defence Council, Chairman of the Scientific and Technological Commission, member of

⁹⁸WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, *op. cit.*, p. 588, 598, 627, 633, 652.

CCPCC Military Commission, Yeh Chien-Ying had been member of the Central Committee, Vice-chairman of the National Defence Council, member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Director and Political Commissar of the Academy of Military Science member of CCPCC Military Commission.⁹⁹

From the backgrounds of the above-mentioned figures, one can roughly understand an overall situation of overlapping duties or the dual role of the military elite and party elite. Under the monopolised leadership of the Party, the degree of integration between the cardinal cadres of the party and military at high-level political system was rather high. Such integration had special significance from a political viewpoint, it ensured the control of the army by the party; while from the viewpoint of the organisation, it bestowed the military with legitimacy to play the political role under the system of the PRC. Such a dual role character made the PLA more like a political organisation than a purely professional army. Hence when there were power conflicts in the leading class of the party, they were handled as military line conflict and considered as conflicts between the bourgeois military line and the proletarian military line. On the whole such conflicts can only be considered as inner-party struggles or the struggles of the inner-party leading class. Such was the case for the incident of "P'eng and Huang anti-party clique" and the "Lin Piao incident". Though Lin Piao was classified as having "counter-party elements", he did not oppose the CCP system structure nor intend to change it. As did P'eng Te-huai, P'eng merely wanted to query or express his dissatisfaction with the party's policies in his capacity as party member. Since in the structure of the dual-role elite and the homogeneity of the party and army, the political conflicts of the military elite was an inner-party one, the final arbitration of these conflicts naturally fell into the hands of the party's leader - Mao Tse-tung.

⁹⁹Samuel B. Griffith, II, *"The Chinese People's Liberation Army"*, (New York: McGraw-Hill book Company, 1967), pp. 303-317.

In addition, the PLA possessed the character of a "peasant army", if the party wished to maintain overall control of the army with a "strong peasant consciousness",¹⁰⁰ it was necessary to proceed with politicisation of the army, such as establishing party organisations in the army so that army could be incorporated into the party organisation or its personnel system. Under such a prerequisite, apart from the overlapping dual-role of military elite and party elite, one distinct character about PLA organisation was that it followed the leadership of a military commander in the structure of an army organisation, while in reality, it followed the leadership of the party. The army had a high commitment to act as subordinate to the party and the party centre, indeed, they pledged their loyalty to the party leader.

Since the party carried out a long-term intensive ideological education among the army, militarists developed a high degree of political consciousness. This ensured that the army would not depart from politics or weaken its recognition of its relationship to the party. Besides, the reinforcement of political consciousness among the army could also prevent the appearance of the political culture of the unorthodox Maoist ideology or threaten the leadership of the party. Under such circumstances, any attacks against or struggles with the authoritative establishment made by the military elite could not represent the intention of the whole army, but only personal interests.

3. The Principle of Party Commanding the Army under the System of Party Committees

On 9 July 1928, the CCP held the Sixth CCP National Congress in Moscow. At the congress it passed the final resolution of "the military tasks of the Chinese Communist

¹⁰⁰"The Directive Letter of the Central committee to the fourth Red Army of the Party Committee of the Fronts (28 Sep. 1929)", *SELECTED WORKS OF CHOU EN-LAI, Vol. I (1981), op. cit., p. 37.*

Party", which confined the orientation of military tasks being "the militarisation of the party members" and laid down that "each region should set up a military commission and act under the general instructions of the local communist party".¹⁰¹

With regard to the composition and source of the Red Army mentioned in the "September letter of the Central Committee", it commented that "The source of recruits for the Red Army is the vast impoverished peasantry. It is true that the impoverished peasants display a very pronounced non-proletarian ideology. But the only way to combat peasant ideology is to build up proletarian ideology and made it predominate. There is no point in cherishing the illusion that the peasant ideology in the Red Army can be changed by taking in a large number of workers right now".¹⁰² In order to build up proletarian ideology and make it predominate, and since the party is theoretically the supreme form of the proletariat and the leading forces of proletarian revolution, proletarian dictatorship and socialistic construction, before the destruction of a nation, the party is at all times the supreme headquarters of the proletariat and should carry out political leadership - that is, the leadership of line and fundamental principle and political supervision, - among various proletarian organisations in order to ensure that the great proletarian army will act according to the unified direction and target.¹⁰³ It was therefore important that the PLA should follow the party leadership to intensify its proletarian ideology and act according to the line and fundamental principle of the party.

For the accomplishment of the party's goal, it was necessary to "apply political education among the soldiers of the Red Army so as to inspire their spontaneous learning, but never

¹⁰¹Warren Kuo, *ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol. II. op. cit., p. 37; WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, op. cit., p. 152.*

¹⁰²"Directive of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Front Committee of the Fourth Army of the Red Army (28 Sep. 1929)", *SELECTED WORKS OF CHOU EN-LAI, Vol. I (1981), op. cit., p. 50.*

¹⁰³Yeh Shang-chih, *ON PARTY'S CONSTRUCTION AFTER 1949, (Anhui: People's Press, 1983), p. 20.*

violating the principle of centralised command because democracy can only exist under the Party centralised control".¹⁰⁴ Under "democratic centralism", the party thereby had the double meaning of unification of ideology and organisation. It was because the party possessed the character of "class", "revolution" and "authoritative ideology", and moreover that PLA possessed the inherited "non-proletarian ideology", thus the only means for authoritative establishment to change the nature of the army was to carry out the principle of "party commands army".

In order to correct the "purely military viewpoint", the Kutien conference defined the characteristics of the Red Army, "it is an armed body for carrying out the political task of the revolution".¹⁰⁵ Since the Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political task, it should therefore obey the command from the party or from some political organisations. In 1932, during the Soviet period in Kiangsi province, the CCP once abolished the system of party committees in the army to strengthen the political commissar system, as in the general rule of "provisional regulations governing political tasks in the Chinese labourers, peasants and Red Army", it laid down that the "political commissar is not only the representative of the Soviet regime in the Red Army, but also the representative of the Chinese Communist Party in the Red Army, he possess the double impact of representing the regime and the party, and carries out the party's political line in the Red Army".¹⁰⁶ Based on the above regulation, "whenever there is a dispute between the political commissar and the army commander, the political commissar has the right to terminate the army commander's military power".¹⁰⁷ Its purpose was to "consolidate the

¹⁰⁴"The Directive Letter of the Central Committee to the Fourth Red Army of the Party Committee of the Fronts (28 Sep. 1929)", *SELECTED WORKS OF CHOU EN-LAI*, Vol. I (1981), *op. cit.*, p. 39.

¹⁰⁵"On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (Dec. 1929)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. I (1975), *op. cit.*, p. 105.

¹⁰⁶"Provisional Regulations Governing Political Works in the Chinese Labours, Peasants and Red Army", *THE COLLECTIONS OF RED ARMY REACTIONARY DOCUMENTS*, Vol. VI (Military), (Taipei: Ministry of Defence), p. 1893.

¹⁰⁷"Provisional Regulations Governing Political Works in the Chinese Labours, Peasants and Red Army",

leadership of proletarian pioneers - Chinese Communist Party - in the Red Army, and enable the Red Army to become forceful armed forces of the workers and peasant revolution".¹⁰⁸

Between the 7th and 12th February 1934, Wang Chia-hsiang, the director of General Political Department of the Red Army, convened the "First Political Works Conference of the Red Army" at Jueichin in Kiangsi province. Apart from Chu Te (chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission) and Chou En-lai (vice-chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission) delivering speeches at the conference, Wang also reported on "the current situation and tasks of political works". The conference concentrated upon strengthening the leadership of the party over the army, and also raised some important principles for the political works in the army, for example, political works are the lifeline of army; political works are the source of the army's fighting capacity and thus should never be neglected; political works must ensure the absolute execution of a fighting order; political works must ensure the development of military quality in the army; and political cadres must also study military affair and learn how to conduct operation.¹⁰⁹ All these subsequently became the fundamental paradigm for the political works of the Red Army.

In July 1937, the Sino-Japanese war broke out in China, and the CCP, on the 25 August of the same year, held an "Enlarged Meeting for the Political Bureau", also known as Loch'üan meeting, at Loch'üan in northern Shensi province.¹¹⁰ The meeting concentrated

THE COLLECTIONS OF RED ARMY REACTIONARY DOCUMENTS, Vol. VI (Military), *op. cit.*, p. 1894.

¹⁰⁸Warren Kuo, "Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party", Vol. II, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

¹⁰⁹"The Political Works of PLA", THE STUDIES OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, (Taipei: National Cheng-chi University, 1986), p. 78.

¹¹⁰The meeting approved the "Principles Concerning Area Works in the War of resistance" secretly issued by the CCP Organisation Department on Aug. 12, and the "Te-point National Salvation Program" by the CCP Propaganda Department on Aug. 15. At the conference such matters as reorganisation of the Red Armies into 8th Route Army and the latter's future tactical programs, assessment of the situation of the War of Resistance against Japan. And the CCP's talks were discussed and the "Decisions on the

on disputes over whether the Red Army should be reorganised according to the establishment and the institution of the Kuomintang army after it was incorporated into Kuomintang army. It subsequently approved that Red Army should, in form, be reorganised according to the system of the Kuomintang's army, the system of political commissar of the Red Army should be abolished, and the original political commissar should be reappointed as the vice-commander or the director of political department in the new reorganised army, but continue to carry out his original duties as the political commissar so as to maintain party's supervision of military commanders.¹¹¹

In the course of the Yen-an rectification movement, on 1 September 1942, the CCPCC political bureau passed the resolution "on unifying the leadership of the party in anti-Japanese bases and modifying the relationship among all bodies", which placed special stress on the fact that the "party is the proletarian pioneering team and the highest form of proletarian body. It should take the lead among other bodies such as the army, the government and the masses' group".¹¹²

In order to fulfil the monopolised leadership of the party, the resolution laid down "all resolutions or instructions from central representative bodies (bureau or sub-bureau of the CCP Central Committee), regional party committee and prefectural party committee should be executed unconditionally", "our main forces are the armed troops led by the party and are the powerful foundations for building bases and supporting struggles", "any

Current Situation and the Party's Talks" was approved. As decided by the conference, Li Fu-ch'un replaced Ch'in Pang-hsien as head of the Organisation Department, and Yang shang-k'un replaced Liu shao-ch'i as secretary of the CCPCC North China Bureau.

See Mao Tse-tung, "For the Mobilisations of All the Nation's forces for victory in the War of Resistance (23 Aug. 1937)", SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. II (1965), op. cit., pp. 23-28; Warren Kuo, ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol. III, op. cit., pp. 215-246.

¹¹¹Warren Kuo, ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol. III, op. cit., pp. 215-246.

¹¹²Warren Kuo, ANALYTICAL HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 107.

communists in the regime who disobeys the party's resolutions or runs counter to party's regulations must be corrected", "the leadership of the party depends on the strict execution of the principle that lower levels should obey their superior and the whole party should obey the central".¹¹³

According to Jen Pi-shih, the member of the political bureau of the CCPCC and the secretary of the central secretary bureau, the CCP placed its stress on monopolised leadership of the party at that time because "among the armies, there was little respect for the party, they even consider themselves superior than the party", and "treat the party's army as their own force".¹¹⁴ The Red Army at that time did not show too much obedience to the party, and therefore the CCP tried every possible ways to determine their position in the party, for example, the Seventh CCP National Congress in April 1945 decided that the party organisations of the army should emphasise the "Kutien resolution". And on the 27 February 1947 the CCPCC issued the directive to "restore party committee system at various levels of the army", demanding all troops to organise party committee system at various levels of the army so as to avoid any drawbacks resulted from the purely leading cadre's system in the army.¹¹⁵

Henceforth, through a series of resolutions - "Draft Regulations of Party Committee of Chinese People's Liberation Army" issued by General Political Department on the 28 July 1947; "The Resolution on Amplifying Party Committee System" passed by CCPCC on 20 September 1948; "On the September Meeting - Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China",¹¹⁶ the inner-party circular issued by CCP on 10 October

¹¹³*Ibid.* pp. 401-402.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.* p. 403; Jen Pi-shih, "Opinions about Some Issues (7 Jan. 1943)", *THE REFERENCE MATERIALS OF THE RECTIFICATION MOVEMENT*, Vol. VI, pp. 71-108.

¹¹⁵Kuo Chan-po, "The Transformation of Party Commanding System in PLA", *THE STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY HISTORY*, Jan. 1983, pp. 119-120.

¹¹⁶This inner-party circular was drafted by Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee of the Communist

1948, it restored the party committee system at various levels of the army and the soldiers committee system in the companies,¹¹⁷ which had been implemented between 1927 and 1932 but subsequently removed; and the *Report on Methods of Work of Party Committees* delivered by Mao at the Second Plenum of Seventh CCPCC in March 1949, which he directed, "A party committee should keep a firm grasp on its central task, the party committee must not merely grasp, but must 'grasp firmly' its main tasks".¹¹⁸ The party committee system in the PLA had been gradually re-established, and the principle of "party commands gun" had been deeply rooted into the structure of the whole military organisation.

After the PRC regime was founded, in order to strengthen the absolute leadership of the party under the principle of "party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party", to ensure the effective implementation of policies and decrees, and to avoid the tendency of a purely military viewpoint and individualism among military cadres, the "party committee system" of the army was further developed into "The System of Individual Responsibility by Leaders under the Collective Leadership of the Party Committee".

In September 1956, P'eng The-huai, the Minister of National Defence, made a brief explanation about "The System of Individual Responsibility by Leaders under the Collective Leadership of the Party Committee" in his "Report on Military Affairs" to the Eighth CCPCC National Congress. The main points are summarised as follows:¹¹⁹

Party. The meeting was held in Hsipaipo village, Pingshan county, Hopei province.

See "On the September Meeting - Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (10 Oct. 1948)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. IV (1969), *op. cit.*, p. 270.

¹¹⁷"On the September Meeting - Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (10 Oct. 1948)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. VI (1969), *op. cit.*, p. 271.

¹¹⁸"Methods of Work of Party Committees (13 March 1949)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. IV (1969), *op. cit.*, p. 379.

¹¹⁹"Speech at the 8th CCP National Congress by P'eng Te-hui", *A COLLECTION OF CCP MILITARY*

1. In the Armed Forces, the Communist party committees at all levels are established in compliance with the system of democratic centralism to provide collective leadership of the party over the work of the troops according to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. all important matters in the Armed Forces should be discussed at the party committee meetings, except in emergency circumstances under which the troop leaders may decide according to their authority... the party committee meeting should adopt correct decisions for the military and political leaders of the troops the carry out.

2. In the Armed Forces, the military commanders and the political commissioners are both leaders of the troops, sharing responsibilities and dividing the work of leadership over the troops. On the orders and directives from higher level organs and the decisions of the party committees of the corresponding levels, the military commanders would be responsible for implementing those concerning military affairs, with the political commissioners carrying out those concerning political work.

With the regard to the function of this system, P'eng made the following explanation: "Implementation of the collective leadership of party committee is necessary in the Armed Forces because it can better assure the party leadership over the Armed Forces, insure compliance to the party policies and state ordinances, and avoid the tendencies toward purely military viewpoints and individualism."¹²⁰

The party committee and political commission of the army were two equally important

DOCUMENTS, (Hong Kong: Yü Lien Publication, 1965), p. 49; P'eng Te-huai, "Report on Military affairs (19th September 1956)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, op. cit., p. 439.

¹²⁰P'eng Te-huai, "Report on Military Affairs (19th September 1956)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 439.*

bodies for carrying out the principle of "party leads the army". Moreover, the "Regulations Governing Political Work in the Chinese People's Liberation Army"¹²¹ laid down the following rules for the works of political commissar of the PLA.

1. Political Works

The political commissar has independent rights to issue an order in the aspect of political work.

2. Party Works

The political commissar is responsible for party committee work and holds the concurrent post as the secretary of the party committee.

3. Military Works

The issuing of orders, and all personnel arrangements made by the military commander will only become effective upon the signature of political commissar of the corresponding level. Political commissars have the right to query every work concerning military affairs. If by any chance political commissars encounter the death of a military commander on the battlefield, he is empowered to take over and command the army.

One can learn from the above duties of the political commissar, the dialectical relations of both unity and opposites lies between the political commission system and the military commander system. The works of political commissars contained two parts - military and political. In addition, political commissars were a link between the party and the army,

¹²¹REGULATIONS GOVERNING POLITICAL WORK IN THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY, (Taipei: General Political Warfare Department, Ministry of Defence, 1965), p. 16; "The Directive of the Central Committee to the Fourth Red Army of the Party Committee of the Fronts (28 Sep. 1929)", *SELECTED WORKS OF CHOU EN-LAI*, Vol. I (1981), *op. cit.*, p. 38; "The CCPCC Issues Regulations Governing Political Work in the Chinese People's Liberation Army", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 29 APRIL 1963; *PEKING REVIEW*, No. 21, 1963, p. 3.

responsible for the political line and ideological works which enabled them to gain more obvious and stronger ideological standing. Moreover, they were also in charge of political tasks and thereby persisted in the viewpoint of "politics takes lead". It is therefore the political commissars who were liable to evaluate the changing political environment with ideological standing, and who formed the conservative force in the army.

The Party Committee was the major leading body in the army, and consisted of army commanders, political commissars, directors of political departments and others. From the viewpoint of the functions and purposes of the establishment of party committee, political commissions, it is obvious that CCP had indeed built up the power blueprint of the "party commands the army".

IV. The Relationship Between The Army And the Government

As of June 1945, the Chinese Communist Army consisted of three major groupings: Firstly, the Northeast Democratic Union Army under the command of Lin Piao with Hsiao Ching-kuang as deputy commander in chief, Liu Ya-lou as chief of staff, P'eng Chen as commissar; secondly, the Eighteenth Army Group (The 8th Route Army) under the command of Chu Te with P'eng Te-huai as deputy commander in chief, T'eng Tai-yüan as chief of staff; and finally, the New Fourth Army under the command of Ch'en I with Chang I-yün as deputy commander in chief, Ch'en Shih-ch'u as chief of staff, Liu Shao-ch'i as commissar.¹²²

In July 1947, all armed forces under the leadership of the CCP were unified as the PLA. Their units underwent reorganisation into five field armies: (1) The North-eastern Field Army under the command of P'eng Te-huai with Hsi Chung-hsün as Political Commissar, which operated in Shansi, Shensi and Ninghsia. In February 1949, it was renamed the First Field Army. (2) The Central Field Army under the command of Liu Po-ch'eng with Teng Hsiao-p'ing as Political Commissar, which operated in Honan, Hupei and Anhui. In February 1949, it was renamed the Second Field Army. (3) The East China Field Army under the command of Ch'en I with Jao Shu-shih as Political Commissar, which operated in Shantung, Kiangsu, and parts of Anhui. In February 1949, it was renamed the Third Field Army. (4) The Northeast Field Army under the command of Lin Piao with Lo Jung-huan as Political Commissar, which operated in Manchuria. In February 1949, it was renamed the Fourth Field Army. (5) The North China Field Army under the command of Nieh Jung-chen with Li Ching-ch'üan as Political Commissar most of the time, which

¹²²"Government of the Republic of China", *OUTLINE OF BATTLE DURING THE CIVIL WAR*, (Taipei: Military History Bureau, Ministry of National Defence), Vol. I, II, and Samuel B. Griffith, II, *THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY*, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

operated in Hopei, Inner Mongolia, and parts of Shansi. In February 1949, it was the only one of the five large PLA units to keep its name.¹²³

By early 1950 all of the Chinese mainland had been conquered by the PLA.¹²⁴ The PRC was divided, until the early part of 1954, into Six Great Administrative Regions: (1) The Northeast, garrisoned by units of the Fourth Field Army but under a civilian government. With Kao Kang as Commander and Political Commissar. (2) North China, under the direct control of the Central Government and garrisoned by the North China Field Army. With: Nieh Jung-chen as Commander and Po I-po as Political Commissar. (3) East China, under the control of the Third Field Army. With Ch'en I as Commander and Jao Shu-shih as Political Commissar. (4) Central-south China, under the control of the Fourth Field Army. With Lin Piao as Commander and Lo Jung-huan as Political Commissar. (5) Southwest China, under the control of the Second Field Army. With Ho Lung as Commander and Teng Hsiao-p'ing as Political Commissar. (6) Northwest China, under the control of the First Field Army. With P'eng Te-huai as Commander and Hsi Chung-hsün as Political Commissar.¹²⁵

Military control began at the local level as soon as a town or county had been liberated. The first action of the officer in command of the newly-arrived PLA units would be to set up an Military Control Committee (MCC) as the supreme administrative organ of the state. The chairman of the MCC, who usually held the concurrent post of Mayor, was invariably the senior ranking military officer in the locality, as in the cases of Yeh Chien-ying (Peking), Huang Ching (Tientsin), Liu Po-ch'eng (Nanking), and Ch'en I (Shanghai).

¹²³Jürgen Domes, *THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE PRC - A TIME OF TRANSITION*, op. cit., p. 107.

¹²⁴Hainan island was last conquered by the PLA in early May 1950.

¹²⁵Jürgen Domes, *THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE PRC - A TIME OF TRANSITION*, op. cit., p. 108; Donald W. Klein & Anne b. Clark, *BIOGRAPHIC DICTIONARY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM 1921-1965*, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 1128-1129.



The MCC was appointed directly from Peking by the People's Revolutionary Military Council (PRMC), and in turn made appointment to the local "People's Government", which was usually set up shortly afterwards. This pattern of merged military and government functions persisted until early 1954.

Between 1949 and 1954, there was virtually no distinction between "political" and "military" communist cadres, which helped to prevent military domination of the civil administration, since cadres transferred from the army to local government also transferred their allegiances without difficulty.

Furthermore, Six Great Administrative Regions, each modelled exactly on the structure of the Central Government and intended to act as middlemen between Peking and the provinces, municipalities, and counties. for military purpose, PRC was also divided into the same six military regions, so that in each area a military region controlled the same territory as an administrative region. The details are illustrated in the table below:¹²⁶

PLA And Regional Government 1950 - 1954
Central People's Government Council

Field Armies	Great Military Region	Great Admin. Region
1st com.: P'eng Te-huai pol. com.: Hsi Chung-hsün	Northwest Com: P'eng Te-huai Pol. Com: Hsi Chung-hsün	Northwest Chairman: P'eng Te-huai vice-chair.: Hsi Chung-hsün & others
2nd com.: Liu Po-ch'eng Pol. com.: Teng Hsiao-p'ing	Southwest com.: Ho Lung Pol. com.: Teng Hsiao-p'ing	Southwest chairman: Liu Po-ch'eng vice-chair.: Teng Hsiao-p'ing and others

¹²⁶John Gittings, *THE ROLE OF CHINESE ARMY*, op. cit., p. 307; Samuel B. Griffith, II, *THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY*, op. cit., p. 342.

<i>3rd com.: Ch'en I Pol. com.: Jao Shu-shih</i>	<i>East China com.: Ch'en I Pol. com.: Jao Shu-shih</i>	<i>East China chairman: Jao Shu-shih vice-chair.: Ch'en I and others</i>
<i>4th com.: Lin Piao Pol. com.: Lo Jung-huan</i>	<i>Central-south com.: Yeh Chien-ying Pol. com.: Lo Jung-huan</i>	<i>Central-south chairman: Lin Piao vice-chair.: Yeh Chien-Ying and others</i>
<i>North China or (5th) com.: Nieh Jung-chen Pol. com.: Po I-po</i>	<i>North China com.: Nieh Jung-chen Pol. com.: Po I-po</i>	<i>North China administered by Central Government offices</i>
<i>North-east China garrisoned by units of 4th Field Army</i>	<i>North-east China com.: Kao Kang Pol. com.: Kao Kang</i>	<i>North-east People's Government chairman: Kao Kang</i>

From the table listed above, one can realise that the senior officials of the Great Administrative Region, the Great Military Region and the Field Army were headed by the same person. Moreover, the centralised control of the PLA from Peking was provided by the PRMC and its General Headquarters. The PRMC was the highest authority, in military affairs, equal in status to the State Administrative Council (SAC) and responsible only to the Central People's Government Council. PRMC included all the leading military commanders, as well as Mao (chairman), Chu Te, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai and P'eng Te-huai (vice-chairman), however, it also including two former Nationalist generals, Ch'eng Ch'ien and Fu Ts'o-i, and four so called representatives of democratic parties: Chang Chih-chung, Ts'ai T'ing-K'ai, Lung Yün, and Liu Fei. It seems likely therefore that major policy decisions were taken by the Military Commission operating as a party caucus within the PRMC, while the apparatus of the "United Front" approach to military control was maintained, just as it was in other areas of government.

At the Second Plenum of the Seventh CCPCC, held in March 1949, the party made preparation to convene the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) which became the forerunner to the National People's Congress (NPC). The plans for the convening of the NPC was discussed in the Fourth Plenum of the Seventh CCPCC in

February 1954. In September 1954 the first NPC was convened.¹²⁷

Three branches were structurally subsumed under the NPC, the People's Courts and Procuracy, the National Defence Council(NDC), and the State Council. The NDC, the so-called military branch of the Government, replaced its forerunner, the PRMC. The member of the NDC were elected by the representative of the NPC.¹²⁸

With the convening of the NPC, the establishment of the State Council and the expansion of the PLA General Headquarters, there were five major departments: General Staff Department, General Political Department, General Logistics Department, General Cadres Department and General Training Department. But by 1959-60 the Cadres and Training Departments were abolished following the dismissed of P'eng Te-huai. Ordnance, and Finance were also abolished, and their function was taken over by the Logistics Department.¹²⁹


In June 1954, both the six Great Military Regions and the corresponding Great Administrative Regions were abolished, to be replaced respectively by thirteen military regions under PLA Headquarters control and by provincial governments responsible directly to the People's Government.

¹²⁷"Constitution of the People's Republic of China (20 Sep. 1954)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-106.

¹²⁸See 1954 Constitution, Article 27, *Ibid.*, pp. 101-102.

¹²⁹Paul Wang, *CHINA'S HIGH LEADERSHIP IN THE SOCIALIST TRANSITION* (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 20.

The Military Organisational Structure as shown in the table listed below:¹³⁰



¹³⁰John Gittings, *THE ROLE OF CHINESE ARMY*, op. cit., p. 281, 308; William W. Whitson, *THE CHINESE HIGH COMMAND - A HISTORY OF COMMUNIST MILITARY POLITICS 1927-1971*, (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd. 1973), pp. 506-507.

Note: ----- *Command Structure by the Government*

Real Command Structure

FA: *Field Army*

In 1954, the chairman of the National Defence Council was Mao Tse-tung, with fifteen vice-chairman, Chu Te, P'eng Te-huai, Lin Piao, Liu Po-ch'eng, Ho Lung, Ch'en I, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Lo Jung-huan, Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, Yeh Chien-ying, Nieh Jung-chen, Chang Chih-chung, Fu Ts'o-i, Ch'eng Ch'ien, Lung Yün. Committee members including Li Ming-yang numbered 81.¹³¹ With the exception of Fu Ts'o-i and Ch'eng Ch'ien, who were former nationalist generals with only symbolic and not substantial significance, the vice-chairmen consisted of members of "ten marshals", vice-chairmen of the CCPCC Military Commission and responsible leaders in other military organs.

In April of 1959, Liu Shao-ch'i was elected chairman and P'eng Te-huai, Lin Piao, Liu Po-ch'eng, Ho Lung, Ch'en I, Lo Jung-huan, Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, Yeh Chien-ying, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Ch'eng Ch'ien, Chang Chih-chung, Fu Ts'o-i and Wei Li-huang were made vice-chairmen. Committee members including Su Yü numbered 100.¹³² Of all the vice-chairmen, 8 of the "ten marshals" were re-elected with the exception of Chu Te and Nieh Jung-chen, Both Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and Wei Li-huang, former Nationalist General, were new vice-chairmen, the rest were members of the CCPCC Military Commission.

In December 1963, Liu Shao-ch'i was re-elected chairman and Lin Piao, Liu Po-ch'eng, Ho Lung, Ch'en I, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, Nieh Jung-chen, Yeh Chien-ying, Lo Jui-ch'ing, Ch'eng Ch'ien, Chang Chih-chung, Fu Ts'o-i, Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai were made

¹³¹Warren Kuo, (ed.), *A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY*, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

¹³²*Ibid.*

vice-chairmen. Committee members including Wang P'ing numbered 107.¹³³ The membership of the National Defence Council reflected the actual power structure in the party at that time. Lin Piao replaced P'eng Te-huai to rank the number one among the vice-chairman, which balanced the power of Liu Shao-ch'i. Like the election in April 1959, Ch'eng Ch'ien, Chang Chih-chung and Fu Ts'o-I were made vice-chairmen only in name without substantive powers.

In October 1968, the Twelfth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC, the communiqué stated the resolution to expel Liu Shao-ch'i from the party once and for all, and to dismiss him from all posts both inside and outside the party.¹³⁴ Since then, the National Defence Council stopped functioning, and its organisation and administration were not mentioned in the Constitution adopted on 17 January 1975, by the fourth NPC.¹³⁵

In some cases, evidence concerning leadership conflicts, and mobility could be detected through an inspection of changes in the membership and ranks within the NDC, especially in its chairmen. For instance, P'eng Te-huai ranked number two among the vice-chairman of the NDC, only next to Chu Te, in the first term when he was still Minister of National Defence. But when P'eng was purged at the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC (Lushan conference) in 1959, he was dismissed from his post as vice-chairman of the NDC, and his name was absent in the list of vice-chairmen of the NDC thereafter.

In the case of Lin Piao, his ranking rose from number three in the first term to number two

¹³³*Ibid.*

¹³⁴"Report by the CPC Central Committee's Special Panel on the Case of Liu Shao-ch'i (18 Oct. 1968)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. IV, *op. cit.*, pp. 2191-2193

¹³⁵"The New Constitution of the People's Republic of China (17 Jan. 1975)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. V, *op. cit.*, pp. 2502-2506; *NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY*, 19 Jan. 1975.

in the second, and then to number one in the third term among the vice-chairmen.

The NDC controlled no real military power, but the change of the membership within the NDC, including the ranking and whether in or out of the list, reflected a change in the distribution of power. With the exception of few former nationalist generals, who had only symbolic roles, all members in the NDC had overlapping background in the Military and the Party.

Traditionally, in the PRC's power structure, the military power is controlled by the CCPCC Military Commission and by the Standing Committee of the Politburo. The CCPCC Military Commission is the pinnacle of the PLA pyramid; not only does it set military policy and strategy, it is also involved in budgeting, training, military technology, command of forces, militia work, approving promotions of officers at division level and above, and political indoctrination. Virtually all directives to the PLA as a whole come from the CCPCC Military Commission as opposed to the Ministry of National Defence or some lower echelon. Subordinate organisations such as the General Staff and General Political Departments are responsible to the CCPCC Military Commission.¹³⁶

Beneath the chairman are a small number of vice-chairmen. The Minister of National Defence is normally the First vice-chairman who runs the day-to-day affairs of the CCPCC Military Commission and takes charge of routine meetings when the chairman is not in attendance. Until the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC in August 1959, this post was taken by P'eng Te-huai. He was succeeded by Lin Piao in August 1959.¹³⁷

¹³⁶*POLITICS-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS IN COMMUNIST CHINA*, (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1963), pp. 5-6.

¹³⁷Hsiao ching-kuang, Hsiao K'e, Huang K'e-ch'eng, Li Ta, Liao Han-sheng, T'an Cheng, Wang Shu-sheng was appointed vice-ministers of the National Defence in Nov. 1954.

Ch'en Keng, Hsiao ching-kuang, Hsü Kuang-ta, Hsü Shih-yu, Liao Han-sheng, Liu Ya-low, Lo Jui-ch'ing, Su Yü, T'an Cheng, Wang Shu-sheng was made vice-ministers of the National Defence in Sep. 1959

Lin had carried out most of his responsibilities through the CCPCC Military Commission. Despite the apparent power of the post as vice-chairman of the CCPCC Commission, the defence minister has been in a political decline following Lin Piao's disappearance in 1971. Yeh Chien-ying was made Defence Minister in January 1975.

The minister and vice-ministers of the National Defence comprise the core of the standing committee of the CCPCC. The chief of the General Staff Department of the PLA is another important member, who normally serves concurrently as the secretary of the CCPCC Military Commission.¹³⁸ Before 1976, with the exception of Su Yü and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, all of the six former chiefs of the General Staff Department were purged including Huang K'e-ch'eng, Lo Jui-ch'ing, Yang Ch'eng-wu and Huang Yung-sheng.¹³⁹

Due to its power, the membership of the standing committee of the CCPCC is highly political and fluid. The CCPCC Military Commission effectively centralise control over the PLA. Military region commanders and service arms and branches are all closely supervised by and must report to this body.

The Ministry of National Defence had three major staff units, namely, General Staff Department, of the General Political Department and General Logistics Department. The functions of these departments are as follows:

The General Staff Department takes charge of operations, intelligence, military training, military administration, equipment, supplying arms for the people, martial law and

¹³⁸Warren Kuo, (ed.), *A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY*, op. cit., p. 625.

¹³⁹For details refer to Chapter IV and V.

communication.¹⁴⁰ This department is expected to be able to assume the work of co-ordination between the army and the government. It has divisions for operations, intelligence, military training, military affairs, equipment, mobilisation, transportation, signal communication, military schools, surveying, meteorology and political affairs and general bureau for military law.¹⁴¹

The General Staff Department is the chief executive of the CCPCC Military Commission. Military orders, as opposed to political directive, are issued through it, it is the second step in the command chain. The Chief of General Staff must exercise restraint when issuing orders under his own authority lest the CCPCC Military Commission perceive it as usurping its authority. Anyway, the CCPCC would certainly retain final decision-making powers over all military planning.

The General Political Department has division for organisation, propaganda, culture, cadre administration, security, liaison, youth work, mass work, and army posts. The General Political Department is headed by a director and several deputy directors. The director usually serves concurrently as deputy secretary of the CCPCC Military Commission.¹⁴² The functions of the General Political Department fall into three broad categories; ideology, discipline, and moral. Ideologically, the General Political Department must ensure party leadership over the armed forces and see to it that the party line and regulations are implemented; it is responsible for the ideological condition and political indoctrination of the PLA.

¹⁴⁰Warren Kuo, (ed.), *A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY*, op. cit., p. 625.

¹⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 625; *THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY ORGANS*, (Taipei: The Study Group on Chinese Communist Personnel Sources, 1962), p. 144.

¹⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 624, and *ibid.*, pp. 144-145.

With regard to discipline, the General Political Department has broad responsibilities for PLA internal security. It is specifically charged with keeping track of the political and ideological quality of high ranking cadres. In order to carry out its many tasks, the General Political Department has at its disposal a pyramid of party committee, political departments, and commissars within the PLA, a network reaching to every geographic corner of China . Before 1976, the post of the department director had been held successively by Lo Jung-huan, T'an Cheng (purged in 1962), Hsiao Hua (purged in 1967), Li Te-sheng, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Wei Kuo-ch'ing.

The General Logistics Department has divisions for political work, finance, munitions, medical service, engineering, transportation, installation, materials, tractors, fuel, horses, and veterinary medicine.¹⁴³ It is also responsible for supplying armies to foreign allies and insurgent groups through its International Equipment Division. The General Logistics Department also produced some famous figure in the inner power struggle of the PRC, such as Hung Hsüeh-chih who was director of this department and was purged before the Cultural Revolution. Afterward, another director, Ch'iu Hui-tso, was liquidated in September 1972 on charges of having collaborated with Lin Piao.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 146.

¹⁴⁴For details of Lin P'iao's incident refer to Chapter IV, Section IV.

Chapter III. The Relationship Between The Development of Military Line and Politics of PRC

There were no objections as to the principle of "party commands the gun" among the leading class of the PRC in the development of the military line, and it was commonly agreed prior to the Korea war that the role of the army was based on the principle of "Sanwan reorganisation" and "Kutien resolution". Mao had always argued that the army's political role should be expanded, and that the Red Army should be an armed body for carrying out political tasks. A new voice rose from the PLA after experience gained from the Korean war, however, which recognised an urgent need for the professionalisation and modernisation of the military, and thus held different viewpoints about the role of PLA. This voice was headed by P'eng Te-huai, then the commander of "Chinese People's volunteers" for the "struggle to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea" and the Minister of National Defence.

I. The impact of Korean War on the Development of the Political Role of the PLA

In the afternoon of October 1950, the CCPCC held a meeting at Yi-nein Hall in Peking and reached an agreement to dispatch troops to aid Korea against the U.N. with P'eng Te-huai as its commander. They was in favour of Lin Piao to be the commander in the first place, but Lin turned them down for the reason of his poor health. On 4 October, P'eng arrived in Peking, and attended the Political Bureau conference the following day, in which he was appointed the commander of the "Chinese People's volunteers for the resistance against U.S. aggression and aid Korea" and a concurrent political commissar by the CCPCC. Mao also instructed the "Chinese People's volunteers" to take North East Administrative Region as their general rear-area base with Kao Kang the commander and a concurrent political commissar of Northeast Military Region as its responsible leader.¹

On 19 October 1950 PRC dispatched troops on a large scale to intervene in the Korean war.² The strategy of "taking mobile warfare as the major force, combining it partly with positional warfare and guerrilla warfare in the enemy controlled area" was applied.³ But since "Korea is a long and narrow peninsula with many mountains and forestry but narrow topography and is boarded on the sea in three sides", it "largely restricted the mobility of our troops".⁴ Under such circumstances, the PLA could not employ the same mobile warfare to annihilate U.S. forces as they had done against Kuomintang troops in the civil war, and thus the strategy was changed to protracted war and active defence, and the form

¹THE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF P'ENG TE-HUAL, (Peking: Contemporary China Press, 1993), pp. 400-404; THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF NIEH JUNG-CHEN, Vol. II, (Peking: The PLA Press, 1984), p. 736.

²The first group of armies to enter the North Korea was the 13th legion, including 38th, 39th 40th and 42nd corps; and the 1st, 2nd and 8th artillery divisions. See Ibid., p. 403.

³"The Conclusion of Korea War, (27 Dec. 1958)", SELECTED WORKS OF PRC MILITARY WRITINGS, (Taipei: Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Defence, 1968). p. 245; see THE BIBLOGRAPHY OF P'ENG TE-HUAL, op. cit., p. 406.

⁴Ibid., p. 244; ibid., p. 406.

of the warfare was changed from mobile warfare to positional warfare.⁵

The PLA suffered a terrible mauling. The casualties were calculated as being between 700,000 and 900,000, medical services were inadequate, food in short supply, and even clothing was unsuitable for the Korean winter. Almost 90 percent of Chinese troops were reported to have suffered from frostbite in the harsh winter campaigns. Weapons included those left by the Kuomintang when they retreated to Taiwan and were a motley assemblage of American, Japanese, Russian, German, and other materials - all four types often being used in the same regiment. Only in 1951, as the Soviet Union made MIG fighters available, did the Chinese get any parity in the air. And they never had any effective naval forces to counteract the formidable sea power of the United States.⁶

In view of the above-mentioned situation, the PRC had to adjust its policy during Korea war. The original intention of expelling U.N. forces out of Korea peninsula was replaced with the hope of reaching an effective political settlement. It was obvious that the strategy of protracted war and decisive campaigns was no longer applicable to the Korean war. In addition, the PLA had a difficult time in fighting powerful and well-equipped hostile forces, and the narrow Korea peninsula provided no bases in the countryside which made it even more difficult for the PLA to conduct a long-term revolutionary war. The senior commanders of the PLA for the first time realised that the lack of naval and air forces was a serious obstacle for accomplishing their military target. Under such circumstances, the war carried out by the PLA outside the Chinese territory was a positional warfare which exacted a high sacrifice, the operational guidance which the PLA accumulated from experience during the Civil war was no longer applicable to the Korean battlefield. After

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 246; *ibid.*, pp. 406-407.

⁶Jonathan D. Spence, *THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA*, (London: Century Hutchinson Ltd., 1990), p. 557.

the Korean war, a summary of the war experience was concluded as follows: The experience of the Korean war is very precious. It has certainly effected our army-building program, and is beneficial for us to study and learn the Soviet army-building experience. It can also serve as a valuable reference in future warfare.⁷

The experience of the Korean war undoubtedly had a profound effect on the army-building program of the PLA. With aid from Soviet Union, "to learn from Soviet Union" became the current trend. In his special article to celebrate "August 1 Army-Building Day", Li Yu, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, appealed to the PLA "to speedily build up modernised armed forces, to study aggressively the advanced experience of Soviet forces, to acquire the art of modern wars, and to modernise our army-building in accordance with the Soviet armed forces".⁸

Furthermore, on 1 October, 1954, following his September appointment as vice-Chairman of the National Defence Council, Vice-premier of the State Council, and Minister of National Defence from the original post as Commander of "Korean War", P'eng Te-huai ordered all members of the PLA to study aggressively all the advanced experience of the Soviet forces, to acquire the art of modern wars, to obey orders, observe discipline, and struggle to assure victory in each military operation. This marked the beginning of a concentrated effort thoroughly to professionalise and regularise the armed forces in accordance with the Soviet military ethic and style. The Soviet rank, pay, and career educational systems and its military doctrine became standards for PLA emulation.

During the Korean war, the advent of ultra-professionalism in the PLA seriously

⁷"The Conclusion of Korea War (27 Dec. 1958)", *SELECTED WORKS OF PRC MILITARY WRITINGS*, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

⁸*TA KUANG DAILY*, 1 Aug. 1954

undermined the credibility of the commissar, especially at the unit level. His traditional right to countersign all orders was frequently ignored, especially at the company level where battle pressures were most acute. By 1954, with the formal reorganisation of the PLA along Russian lines the commissar found his role seriously restricted.

Since the political control didn't reduce the amount of casualties in positional warfare, the decreasing importance of commissars among the PLA during the Korean war could be anticipated. Having learned the lessons from Korea, P'eng Te-huai embarked on a program of professionalisation and regularisation, thus the army-building program emphasised by the 1929 "Kutien resolution" confronted a great challenge. The army-building program of regularisation and professionalisation in accordance with the Soviet forces had met with little resistance inside the communist party before the Sino-Soviet split. In fact, many regulations were formulated without opposition.

On 7 Feb. 1955, the Fifth Session of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress approved the "Draft Conscription Law".⁹ This law was drawn up in accordance with the provisions of Article 10 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China which states: "It is the sacred duty of every citizen of the People's Republic of China to defend the Motherland. It is the honourable duty of citizens to perform military service".¹⁰ The importance of conscription as a means of contributing to national security was obvious. Defence Minister P'eng Te-huai's report on the Draft Conscription Law was delivered to the National People's Congress on 16 July 1955.

The Conscription Law laid down the following concerning the army-building program of

⁹"Draft Conscription Law, (Feb. 1955)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1976 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I. *op. cit.*, p.306-310.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 306-307; "Constitution of the People's Republic of China, (20, Sep. 1954)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

regularisation: Chapter I: General Provision. Article 2: All male citizens of the People's Republic of China reaching the full age of 18, regardless of nationality, race, occupation, social status, religious belief, or educational background, have the duty of performing military service as required by this law.¹¹ Article 4: The armed strength of the People's Republic of China shall be composed of the various components and units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.¹² Article 5: Military service shall be divided into active and reserve service. Those performing active service shall be called active military personnel and those performing reserve service, reserve military personnel.¹³ Article 6: Active military personnel and reserve military personnel shall be divide into officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates.¹⁴ Article 12: The state council and the state administrative organs of provinces, autonomous districts, and municipalities under the direct jurisdiction of the Central People's Government, autonomous chou (prefecture), hsien (county), autonomous hsien, and municipalities shall organise military draft committees to guide conscription work. The organisation and functions of such military draft committees shall be stipulated by the state council.¹⁵ And article 13: Provinces, autonomous districts, and municipalities under the direct jurisdiction of the Central Government, autonomous chou, hsien, autonomous hsien, and municipalities shall establish military draft bureaux to administer the work of drafting conscripts. The Peoples' committee in chou under the jurisdiction of municipalities, hsiang, and chen (town) shall administer the work of drafting conscription in conformity with the stipulations of the military draft bureaux of municipalities under the direct jurisdiction of the Central People's Government, hsien, autonomous hsien, and municipalities.¹⁶

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 307.

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶*Ibid.*

Furthermore, Chapter 4. Article 33 to 37 regulated the rank of officers in active and reserve service, especially Article 34 which laid down the stipulations on the maximum age for officers in active and reserve service.¹⁷

Other chapters included "Rights and Duties of the Active Officers and Reserve Service Officers", "Wartime Conscription", "Military Training for Students of Senior Middle Schools and Higher Schools". In essence, the Soviet model was its blueprint in conscription.

Accompanied by the "Draft Conscription Law", the document *Explanation of the Draft Conscription Law*¹⁸ was issued, in which it clearly proclaimed that "The Draft Conscription Law of the People's Republic of China is formulated on the basis of the actual condition in the country as well as Soviet advanced experience. The Conscription Law we have drawn up used the advanced experiences of the Soviet Union as a basic guide".¹⁹

The Korean experience had changed the PLA markedly, by July, 1953, a total of thirty-five corps had been used to strengthen and equip the twenty-five corps that fought in

¹⁷A (1). Second Lieutenant of the ground force, air force, and public security force, active service (AC), age 30; first class reserve service (FCRS) age 40; second class reserve service (SCRS), age 45; (2). First lieutenant: AC, 30; FCRS, 40; SCRS, 45; (3). Captain: AC, 35; FCRS, 45; SCRS, 50; (4). Senior captain: AC, 35; FCRS, 45; SCRS, 50; (5). Major: AC, 40; FCRS, 50; SCRS, 55; (6). Lieutenant colonel: AC, 45; FCRS, 55; SCRS, 60; (7). Colonel: AC, 50; FCRS, 55; SCRS, 60; (8). Senior colonel: AC, 50; FCRS, 55; SCRS, 60; (9). Major general: AC, 55; FCRS, 60; SCRS, 65; (10). Lieutenant general and above shall be decided according to the actual condition.

B.(1). Officers of the naval force and seaborne public security vessels; ensign; AC, 35; FCRS, 40; SCRS, 45; (2). Lieutenant junior grade: AC, 35; FCRS, 40; SCRS, 45; (3). Lieutenant: AC, 40; FCRS, 45; SCRS, 50; (4). Lieutenant commander: AC, 45; FCRS, 50; SCRS, 55; (5). Commander: AC, 50; FCRS, 55; SCRS, 60; (6). Captain: AC, 55; FCRS, 55; SCRS, 60; (7). Senior captain: AC, 55; FCRS, 55; SCRS, 60; (8). Rear admiral: AC, 55; FCRS, 60; SCRS, 65; (9). Vice admiral: AC, 60; FCRS, 60; SCRS, 65.

Ibid., pp. 308-309.

¹⁸"Explanation of the Draft Conscription Law, (Feb. 1955)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 310-315.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 312.

Korea. The remaining fifteen regular corps (in contrast with the many deactivated corps) had also rotated many of their officers into Korea or had sent them to the New Advanced Military Institute in Nanking, where Liu Po-ch'eng, the commander of Second Field Army, was teaching the lessons learned in Korea, lessons that bore little relationship to Mao Tse-tung's thoughts on people's war.

P'eng's idea of army-building was that the PLA should not only build up modernised armed forces, but at same time must speedily establish a regularised military system. This idea was stated clearly in his report on the "Draft Conscription Law" delivered to the Nation People's Congress on 16 July 1955, in which he stressed once more: "We must speedily build up powerful modernised armed forces. We must have not only a mighty army but also a mighty navy. To have powerful armed forces does not mean relying on the numerical strength of an over-sized peacetime standing army; for this is not only disadvantageous to the productive pursuits of the people and to national construction but it also of limited military significance. Powerful armed forces primarily depend on a combination of strong active units and strong reserves. This makes it necessary for our country to go over speedily to a system of military service which conforms to the requirements a modern national defence, a system of periodic call-up and demobilisation, in other words, a system of compulsory military service".²⁰

On 19 September 1956, P'eng delivered a report on military affairs to the Eighth CCP National Congress,²¹ in which he made the following explanation concerning the disarmament and military budget: "During the past 7 years, a great deal of work concerning national defence construction has been carried out. According to the

²⁰P'eng Te-huai, "Report on the Draft Conscription Law, (16, July, 1955)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 316.

²¹P'eng Te-huai, "Report on Military Affairs, (19 Sep. 1956)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 434-442.

requirements of actual circumstances, nearly 5 million men of our army have been shifted to civilian production and construction, including 31 full divisions and 8 regiments, demobilised cadres, and army men who shifted to civilian work after discharge. At present, the number of officers and men in the Liberation Army, including new recruits is 2.7 million less than the highest number at the time of liberation. Military expenditures had been reduced to 19.98 percent of the total state expenditure for 1956 as against 48 percent in 1951".²²

As for the development of the PLA, P'eng pointed out: "The Chinese People's Liberation Army, which used to be entirely an infantry force, has now become armed forces with various branches, including air, naval, anti-aircraft, public security forces, artillery and armoured forces, engineering, railway engineering, signal, and anti-chemical warfare corps".²³

When he spoke of the army-building program of modernisation and regularisation, P'eng indicated: "Artillery and armoured forces have been greatly strengthened and the technique and equipment of other branches immensely improved. The air defence force has been built up with modernised equipment. There has been some development in the

²²*The Military Expenditure of People's Republic of China 1950-60 (according to official statistics)*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Million Yuan</i>	<i>Percent of Budgetary Expenditure</i>
1950	2827	41.53
1951	5061	48.00
1952	4371	26.04
1953	6176	28.00
1954	5814	23.60
1955	6500	24.30
1956	6117	19.91
1957	5523	18.85
1958	5000	15.12
1959	5800	11.12
1960	5826	8.30

Ibid. p. 438; Jonathan D. Spence, *THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA*, *op. cit.*, p. 558; John Gittings, *THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE ARMY*, *op. cit.*, p.309.

²³*Ibid.*

build-up of our navy.... Following the rapid development of our rational economic construction, the standard for the modernisation of our armed forces will be further raised. Simultaneously with the improvement of military technique and equipment, our armed forces have launched a regular training program to raise the levels of its command capacity, technical drills, political consciousness, and its science and culture.... Up to the present, various academies and schools have been set up by the PLA, and a large number of officers with past combat experience have been receiving further training and elevating their knowledge of the principles of modern warfare and technology".²⁴

In addition, as to the concept of "regular military system", P'eng explained as follows: The "regular military build-up" consists of a unified command , a unified organisation, a unified system, unified training, and unified discipline.²⁵

P'eng stressed the importance to learn from Soviet advanced experience in this report, as he said: "It was a correct proposal to learn all the advanced experiences of the Soviet army when the modernisation of our army first began... the Soviet Army is the most advanced modernised revolutionary army, its military science is superb, its military tactics are of the first rate, and it possesses rich experience. It is the shortcut towards the speedy modernisation of our army".²⁶

Apart from P'eng Te-huai, Chu Te also advocated the importance of learning from advanced Soviet experience as early as the Army Day in 1953, when he pointed out that "a unified regular training program had begun throughout the PLA. This program covered the fields of weapon training and manoeuvres, of organisation and planning, and of

²⁴*Ibid.*

²⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 441

military discipline".²⁷

One of the Marshals Yeh Chien-ying told the sixth Military colleges conference in May 1956, "We must also learn from the fraternal countries, and study their useful experience. Apart from this, we must also study the military doctrine of the capitalist countries. This must be studies both from the point of view of learning their doctrine and techniques".²⁸

People's Daily also pointed out, new techniques in training were called for in the age of modernisation. The army had acquired "rich and valuable experience during the revolutionary war, but this experience did not suffice to meet modern requirements. Military training should be intensified, and the PLA should redouble its efforts to strengthen its highly centralised and united organisational disciplinary qualities".²⁹

The accomplishment of military tasks was an essential prerequisite of army-building programme of regularisation and professionalisation. Military training therefore must increase considerably, while other political and non-military tasks must decrease in proportion. Based on this condition, not only the role of political commissars and members of party committee must be restricted, but their power and responsibility must also be reduced, and thus the principle of "party commands the army" and the fundamental essence of the "army is the fighting group as well as working team", which were determined by the "Sanwan reorganisation" and "Kutien conference", would also be questioned. The army-building program of regularisation and professionalisation was in essence in confrontation with the principle of Mao's "party commands the gun" and "politics takes the lead".

²⁷John Gittings, *THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE ARMY*, op. cit., p. 146.

²⁸*LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY*, 5, May, 1956.

²⁹"On the Tasks of the PLA", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 24, July, 1954; John Gittings, *THE ROLE OF CHINESE ARMY*, op. cit., p. 147.

However, P'eng's army-building program was not fully supported by most elites in the PLA, one of his subordinates, T'an Cheng, Deputy-director of the General Political Department, criticised the mistakes of the advanced experience of Soviet armed forces shortly after P'eng delivered his report on military affairs at the Eighth CCP National Congress in September 1956. T'an indicated, "In the course of regularised army building, all cadres should of course obey the regulations governing their duties and disciplines, the regulations itself however must be formulated based on the historical characteristics and current situation of our army, and must adopt the organisational forms of various kinds which is accustomed by our army. Under no circumstances should we mechanically apply foreign experience".³⁰ T'an Cheng's comments represented the PLA's disapproval of P'eng's army-building program of regularisation, they remained to consider the "party commands the gun" as the supreme guiding principle of the army-building program. The so-called "historical characteristics" mentioned by T'an Cheng had explicitly expressed the fact that the traditional line of "politics takes the lead" which the PLA had always highlighted could never be changed. This viewpoint was carried out by T'an as he pointed out, "The process of modernisation, it was explained, would itself suffer if divorced from the army's revolutionary traditions", "Revolution is the army's basis and essence; modernisation is its special tendency, and is dependent upon revolutionisation. Not only can we not weaken the latter for the sake of the former, but we should not place them on the same level or regard them as coextensive. If we overlook revolutionisation, and concentrate excessively on modernisation, not only will we not raise our army's fighting strength, but on the contrary we shall enfeeble our army's revolutionary characteristics, and even make it become a 'fake tiger'".³¹

³⁰"Questions of Political Work at the New Stage of Army Building", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 24, Sep. 1956.

³¹"Oppose One-sided Emphasis on Modernisation", *LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY*, 17, Aug. 1958.

Basically, it was the professionalism accompanied by the regularisation which could threaten party's leadership in the army that worried PLA's political commissars the most, and yet their concern was aggravated when the Eighth CCP National Congress passed the resolution to enumerate Marxism-Leninism instead of Mao Tse-tung's thought as the "guiding principle" for the Party in the General Program of the new Party Constitution. And thus the General Program of the former Party Constitution adopted by the Seventh CCP National Congress stating "Mao Tse-tung thought - the theory which integrates Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution - as the guide in all its works"³² was changed into "The Communist Party of China takes Marxism-Leninism as its guide to action. Only Marxism-Leninism correctly sets forth the laws of development of society and correctly charts the path leading to the achievement of socialism and communism" in the new Party Constitution.³³ P'eng Te-huai failed to satisfy political commissars' demand for securing the principle of "party commands the army", although he did try to relieve their concern by making the following comments on the relationships between military commanders and the political commissioners when he delivered his report on military affairs at the Eighth CCP National congress. "In our armed forces", he said, "the military commanders and the political commissioners are both leaders of the troops, sharing responsibilities and dividing the work of leadership over the troops. On the orders and directives from higher level organs and the decisions of the party committees of the corresponding levels, the military commanders would be responsible for implementing those concerning military affairs, with the political commissioners carrying out those concerning political works"³⁴

³²"On the Party", *THE SELECTED WORKS OF LIU SHAO-CH'I*, Vol. I, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1984), p. 315; "The Constitution of the Communist Party of China (26 Sep. 1956)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1979, A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 406.

³³"Constitution of the Communist Party of China (26, Sep. 1956)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 406; *NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY*, 26 September 1956.

³⁴P'eng Te-huai, "Report on Military Affairs (19, Sep. 1956)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 439.

Prior to the convening of the Eighth CCP National Congress, Mao had disapproved of P'eng's army-building program. He clearly criticised P'eng's viewpoint to learn from Soviet military experience in his article *On the Ten Great Relationships*³⁵ in April 1956, in which he commented that "We must analyse and learn critically.... We must not create a bias for copying any and everything foreign, for mechanically transplanting it". After the Twentieth CPSU Party Congress of the same year, the editorial department of the *People's Daily* published an article *On the Historical Experience of Proletarian Dictatorship*, strongly attacking dogmatism. In June of the same year, the CCPCC further issued a *Circular on studying five documents including "Improve Our Study"*, indicating the importance to "overcome subjectivism in our daily works, which refers to dogmatism and experimentalism".³⁶

Presided by P'eng Te-huai, the convening of the enlarged meeting of the CCPCC Military Commission between 27 May and 22 July 1956 was aimed at resolving three major issues in the army so as to support P'eng's army-building program, namely, the army-building policy including party leadership, inner army relationship and the relationship between the people and the army; army-building approach including the modernisation and regularisation of the army-building program; and strategic approach including the preparation of a war and the organisation and construction in all armed services.³⁷ On 9 June, however, the theme of the meeting changed and the situation began to turn "left" when Huang K'e-ch'eng passed on Mao's directions to the participants. Huang said, "Chairman Mao showed his great concern over this meeting. Nobody leaves until we have made certain progress.... The Party secretary in all divisions must attend the meeting if we

³⁵"On the Ten Great Relationship (April 1956)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I, *op. cit.*, pp. 325-331.

³⁶*THE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF P'ENG TE-HUAI*, *op. cit.*, p. 545.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 551.

wish to extend the scope of the meeting. Chairman Mao also indicated one important point, that is, dogmatists ignore the truth that the existence of a society decides people's mentality, and people's mentality can in turn affect the existence of a society. They do not realise the fact that a big nation has its own Constitution , whereas a small nation also has its own Constitution. The rules and regulations of the Soviet Army can only grow in Soviet soil. They deny the existence of the Chinese society and the fact that China's has its own special character".³⁸

At the "Conference of Party's Leading Cadres on National Military System", presided over by P'eng between 7 December 1953 and 26 January 1954, P'eng had made a compromise on the political commissar's position in the army. He was forced to give up the system of unified leadership under a military commander in the army, and adopted the system of leading cadre's responsibility under the leadership of the army and party.³⁹ This compromise, however, did not make Mao loose his attack on P'eng in the subsequent "Conference on Opposition to Dogmatism".

The removal of Mao Tse-tung's thought in the Party Constitution of Eighth CCP National Congress was the prerequisite for turning the PLA into a professional and regular national army. While this move was enough to deepen Mao's disapproval of P'eng Te-huai, the leading figure of army-building program of professionalisation and regularisation. P'eng's attempt to reconstruct the army into a modernised armed force had offended Mao. After the Eighth CCP National Congress, Mao began to reconstruct the army to ensure "red" above "expert", and the long-standing tradition of "party command the gun", and to further secure his supreme leadership.

³⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 509-513.

³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 552.

Shortly after the Eighth CCP National Congress, Lo Jung-huan was dismissed from his post as Director of the General Political Department at the end of 1956 because of his failure to proceed with political works in the army, giving a free hand for PLA to move towards the road of "expert but not red". In November 1957, Liu Po-ch'eng who supported P'eng Te-huai's army-building program of regularisation was also discharged from the post of Director of the Department of Training Supervision and the President of the Military Academy.

To correct the deviation of "only expert but not red", the PLA set off a movement to "send cadres from higher to lower organs" between the end of 1957 and beginning of 1958, there was a program for regular cadres "to merge with the soldiers in practical work, eat, sleep and operate together so as to learn their skills".⁴⁰ Between 27 May and 22 July 1958, the CCPCC Military Commission held an enlarged meeting in Peking, in which Mao seriously condemned P'eng's army-building program,⁴¹ he believed the army-building program promoted by P'eng would not only belittle the importance of party in the army, but would also change the principle of "party commands the gun". In fact, what Mao could not tolerate was the fact that the army-building program of regularisation would weaken his control over the armed forces. Mao had been attempting to take overall control of the army since he became Chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission in January 1935 at the "Tsunyi conference", he initiated the well-known dictum "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun", believing that only through firm control of the armed forces could he maintain his supreme power. Once the professional militarists fostered by P'eng Te-huai's army-building program of regularisation were in power, they would become the major threat to Mao's leadership among the army and the

⁴⁰Ho Lung, "Fight for the Continuous Progress of Military Works", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 29, Sep. 1959.

⁴¹*WHOSE WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, (Shanghai: People's Press, 1983), p. 398.

party. Mao therefore began his power-seizure struggle after the Eighth CCP National Congress, and Lin Piao was the person whom he appointed to launch this series of attacks.

Before the Eighth CCP National Congress, Lin Piao ranked the last among the 13 members of the Political Bureau of the CCPCC. The order was: Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Lin Tzu-han, Chang Wen-t'ien, Ch'en Yün, Dung Pi-wu, P'eng Cheng, K'ang Sheng, P'eng Te-huai, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and Lin Piao.⁴² After the Eighth CCP National Congress, the Political Bureau was reorganised, and Lin Piao promoted to the seventh place among the total 17 members, only after Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Ch'en Yün, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, but before P'eng Te-huai who ranked 14th of all.⁴³ At that time P'eng Te-huai was the First Vice-chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission and Minister of National Defence, while Lin Piao was merely Vice-chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission. Mao's intention to promote Lin and repress P'eng was quite obvious. At the Fifth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC in May 1958, Lin Piao was elected the Vice-chairman of Central Committee and a member of standing committee of Political Bureau,⁴⁴ his political position in the party had surpassed that of P'eng's.

After Lin Piao was promoted to the Vice-chairman of the Central Committee, he delivered a speech to the senior cadres of the army, in which he attacked P'eng by saying, but without mentioned his name, "ignoring politics is backwardness, anyone who is politically backward will lose his direction, cannot see through the main stream and the essence, and thus will put himself in an improper position"; "someone said only foreign things are real things, this is wrong... comrade Mao Tse-tung's military writings are military science and

⁴²THE SUM-UP STUDY OF EIGHTH CCP NATIONAL CONGRESS, (Taipei: Bureau of Investigation, Ministry of Judicial Administration, 1956), p. 136.

⁴³WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, *op. cit.*, p. 689.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 398

are the creative development of Marxism-Leninism in the military aspect", "our army is for the service of politics, we take politics to be the guide of the military, and the guide of routine tasks. Politics is the most basic foundation. A political backward will also lag behind in any other aspects".⁴⁵

Lin Piao's speech undoubtedly revealed an important political signal - that was, the increasing conflicts between "red" and "expert". A year later, the struggle to purge P'eng Te-huai at the "Lushan conference" between July and August 1959 formally broke out.

On 17 August 1958, after the CCPCC adopted the "Resolution on the Establishment of People's Communes in the Rural Areas"⁴⁶ when the Enlarged Meeting of the Politburo of the CCPCC convened at Peitaiho, Mao began to take each people's commune as a unit and to organise the masses in a form of militia for carrying out the policy of "the whole nation in arms", and to expand the armed forces through militarisation of organisation, aggression of action, and collectivisation of life. It was an arduous, massive, and political task for the PRC to implement the policy of "the whole nation in arms". Mao aimed at proceeding with ideological reform through nation-wide political mobilisation and consolidating the "supreme" position of Maoist thought.

"The basic line of the militia is the leadership of the Party Committees and is 'politics takes the lead'. They must think in accordance with Maoist thought".⁴⁷ From the political viewpoint, the movement of "the whole nation in arms" was, to a certain extent, the reflection of Mao's disapproval of P'eng Te-huai's taking the Soviet line and his army-

⁴⁵Li T'ien-min, *THE PROFILE OF LIN PIAO*, (Hong Kong: Ming Daily Press, 1978), p. 90

⁴⁶"Central Committee Decision on People's Communes, (29 August 1958)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 678-684; or see *NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY*, 9 September 1958.

⁴⁷Fu Ch'iu-t'ao, "Expand Militia Division", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 30, Oct. 1958

building program of regularisation. Mao attempted to suppress P'eng Te-huai with a Maoist army.

In view of nation-wide disasters caused by the "Three Red Banners" movement,⁴⁸ P'eng spoke to the Northwest group meeting consecutively from 3 to 4 and 6 to 10 July in the enlarged meeting of politburo of the CCPCC between 3 and 23 July (also known as Lushan conference), criticising the policy of the Great Leap Forward, the focal points in his speech are summarised as follows: Firstly, the fault of bureaucracy - it is very easy to make the mistake of bureaucracy because the application of the party's prestige will certainly gain the trust of the masses, but it will also produce more administrative orders.... It is every one's responsibility, including comrade Mao Tse-tung, to criticise the fault of bureaucracy. Secondly, the fault of boasting and exaggeration - the over-estimating of the output of agricultural production at the commune in chairman Mao's home town created a false appearance. And finally, the fault of left adventurism - politics and economics each have their own rules, and thus economic development cannot be replaced by ideological education.⁴⁹

P'eng Te-huai did not speak about military affairs in his capacity as Minister of National Defence, rather he placed emphasis on the criticism of economical production. The emphasis of "bureaucracy" and "politics and economics each have their own rules" in his speech at the Lushan conference was in fact showing his dissatisfaction of Mao's oppression of regularised army building. P'eng's "politics and economics are two different

⁴⁸*Three Red Banners - the Great Leap Forward, the General Line for Socialist Construction and the People's Communes. For details refer to "The Eighth CCPCC Convened 1st 9th Plenary Session", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 21 Jan. 1961.*

⁴⁹*THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF P'ENG TE-HUAI, (Peking: People's Press, 1981), pp. 281-287; Wang Yuan, PRC'S STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE, (Taipei: Department of East Asia Studies, National Cheng-chi University, 1982), pp. 158-162; Ting Wang, "Issues of P'eng Te-huai Event", COLLECTIONS OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION OF THE P.R.C., Vol. III, (Hong Kong: Ming Daily Press, 1969), pp. 1-3.*

things" had a further implication - that was, "politics and military are different". The original aim of the Lushan conference was to target the "anti-leftists", but the situation was reversed and P'eng was classified as the "anti-party group" and of being a "representative of rightist opportunism attacking the party". When Mao threatened that "If we deserve to perish then I'll go away, go to the countryside to lead the peasants and overthrow the government, if you (the Liberation Army) don't follow me, I'll go and find a Red Army, I think the Liberation Army will follow me".⁵⁰

At the conference, Mao accused P'eng of "recruiting men and buying horses" and being "overweeningly ambitious", and further the "Resolution of the Eighth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Concerning the Anti-party Clique Headed by P'eng Te-huai", passed on 16 Aug., especially pointed out the following: "P'eng Te-huai has long been making vicious attacks and spreading slanders inside the party and the armed forces against comrade Mao Tse-tung, the leader of the party, and against other leading comrades of the Central Committee and its military commission. He took the Lushan meeting as his opportune moment. Because of his position in the Central Committee and in the People's Liberation Army, and also because of his tactics of feigning candour and frugality, P'eng Te-huai's activities could and did mislead a number of people, they are fraught with danger for the future of the party and the People's Liberation Army".⁵¹

Mao's intention to purge P'eng was very obvious, it was a problem of the primacy of the political role. P'eng assertedly negated "politics in command" and declared training and

⁵⁰"Mao Tse-tung's speech at the Eighth Plenary Session of the CCP's Eighth Central Committee", *ISSUES AND STUDIES*, Vol. VI, No. 7, (April 1970), pp. 80-86

⁵¹"Central Committee Resolution on P'eng Te-huai (16 August 1959)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 755; *NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY*, 15 August 1967.

military science the key to army building. He was further accused of discarding PLA traditions and instead slavishly copying "Soviet revisionist" methods. P'eng allegedly even sought to replace the collective leadership of party committees with one man leadership and also to abolish political commissars. Moreover, he reportedly claimed modern warfare made "Mao Tse-tung's military thinking...out of date and no longer applicable". He assertedly opposed Mao's 1958 program of greatly expanding the militia under the slogan "everyone a soldier".⁵² An editorial of the *Liberation Army's Daily* clearly pointed out the reason for P'eng's fall from power, it stated "the chief members of the anti-party group that were exposed by the Party in the Lushan conference, making use of their seized posts from the army, attempted to abolish the absolute leadership of the party in the army and the political works, abolish the army's participation in socialist construction and the tasks for the masses, abolish local forces and militia, and fundamentally negating Mao's people's army and the ideology of the people's war".⁵³

After P'eng fell from power, Lin Piao replaced him as Minister of National Defence and was promoted to the post as the First Vice-chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission, and handled its day-to-day works. Shortly after his rise to power, Lin made the following comments directed against P'eng's modernised army building: In the stage of building up modernised armed forces when our armed forces are constantly improving their technical equipment, and attaching greater importance than before to learning and improving their skills... Some cadres are of the opinion that modern warfare is different from that of the past. When our troops fought with very backward arms and equipment, they depended primarily upon men, relying on the bravery and wisdom of men to win battles. Modern warfare involves technology, iron and steel, and machinery. In the face of these things, the

⁵²NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 30, July and 19, Aug. 1967; Frederick C. Twiwes, *POLITICS AND PURGES IN CHINA*, (Kent: Dawson & Son Ltd., 1979), p. 425.

⁵³LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY, 1, June 1966.

function of man should retreat to a position secondary in importance. They hold in esteem only machines and also attempt to change revolutionary soldiers into mechanical men devoid of their revolutionary spirit of initiative. We are different from these. In our opinion, while equipment and technology are important, nevertheless, the factor of man is even more important. Technology itself is to be mastered by man. Man and things should be united, with man the leading factor.⁵⁴

Lin's emphasis of the importance of man in modern war in fact reflected Mao Tse-tung's military thinking. As early as December 1929, the resolution drawn up by Mao for the Ninth Party Assembly of the Fourth Army of the Red Army *On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party*, indicated that a purely military viewpoint is one of the mistaken ideas.⁵⁵ The article *Long Live the Victory of the People's War* subsequently delivered by Lin Piao in September 1962 pointed out, "The essence of comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of army building is that in building a people's army prominence must be given to politics, that is, the army must first and foremost be built on a political basis. Politics is the commander, politics is the soul of everything. Political work is the lifeline of our army. True, a people's army must pay attention to the constant improvement of its weapons and equipment and its military technique; but in its fighting it does not rely purely on weapons, and technique, it relies mainly on politics".⁵⁶

After Lin Piao became the Minister of National Defence and took charge of the CCPCC

⁵⁴*Ta Kung Daily*, 30, Sep. 1959; Lin Piao, "March Ahead under the Red Flag of the Party's General Line and Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking", *RED FLAG*, No. 19, Oct. 1959, pp. 16-25; "Lin Piao on the Maoist Line in Military Affairs (29 Sep. 1959)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 781; *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 29, Sep. 1959.

⁵⁵"On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (Dec., 1929)", *THE SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. I (1975), op. cit., p. 105.

⁵⁶"Peking's Defence Minister States the Maoist Line on Vietnam (3 Sep. 1965)", (also known as Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War"), *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 1229.

Military Commission, he began to enhance the political role of the army in accordance with Maoist lines, and rectify basic party organisation of the army so as to strengthen party's control over the army. The Enlarged Meeting of the CCPCC Military Commission which was held in Peking from 14 September to 20 October 1960, took up Lin Piao's proposal to strengthen political and ideological works as its central topic of discussion, with the concern and guidance given to it by the central authorities of the party and Mao. The meeting then passed the "Resolution on Strengthening the Political and Ideological Works in the Army", which stated clearly: Mao Tse-tung's thought, whether in the past, at present, or in the future, serves always as the guide for the building up our army and consequently also for the conduct of political and ideological work there.... In the important period of building a new, modernised revolutionary army, and having criticised and corrected the bourgeois military line advocated by P'eng Te-huai and Huang K'e-ch'eng, we made another new development in the political work of our army.⁵⁷ In addition, the first article of the resolution was "hold high the red flag of Mao Tse-tung's thought, and to know it thoroughly" for the reason that "Mao Tse-tung is the guiding force of the Chinese people's revolution and of socialist construction, a powerful ideological weapon against imperialism, revisionism, and dogmatism. Mao Tse-tung's thought not only provides a steadfast political direction for our army, but also the only correct line for the building of our army. Hence to raise high the red flag of Mao Tse-tung's thought, to fill the minds of all commanding officers with Mao's thought, to insist on its supremacy in all departments of work in the most fundamental task of political and ideological in our army".⁵⁸

⁵⁷"Reindoctrinating the People's Liberation Army (October 1960), *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 882; J. Chester Cheng, (ed.), *THE POLITICS OF THE CHINESE RED ARMY: A TRANSLATION OF THE BULLETIN OF ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY* (Stanford University: Hoover Institution Press, 1966), p. 480

⁵⁸"The Reindoctrinating the People's Liberation Army (October 1960)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 884.

The fall of P'eng Te-huai and the rise of Lin Piao formally marked the end of the PLA's army-building program of professionalisation and regularisation, the PLA once again returned to the same old road determined by the Kutien resolution. The PLA's new tasks was once again aimed at building up a political army at the time when the last group of "Chinese people's volunteers" retreated from North Korea on 16 October 1958, and when General Yang Young, who succeeded Peng as the commander of "Chinese people's volunteers", reported to the Standing Committee of National People's Congress and the Enlarged Joint Conference of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and the Standing Committee of National Committee Conference on 30 October, stating that "the great victory of the struggle to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea is in fact the victory of the Party's and Chairman Mao's brilliant decision-making, it also means the victory of chairman Mao's thought".⁵⁹ Mao was marching to the climax of his career.

⁵⁹Yang Yüng, *"The Work Report on Eight Year's Experience of Chinese People's Volunteers to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea"*, *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 31, Oct. 1958.

II. The Impact of Sino-Soviet Conflicts on the Development of the Political Role of the PLA

Before the establishment of the PRC's regime, Mao's policy of "leaning to the side of Soviet Union" was determined in his paper *On People's Democratic Dictatorship* in July 1949, which clearly stated, "We are firmly convinced that in order to win victory and consolidate it we must lean to one side. In the light of the experience, all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road".⁶⁰ "It was through the Russians that the Chinese found Marxism.... The salvoes of the October Revolution brought us Marxism-Leninism. October Revolution helped progressives in China to adopt the proletarian world outlook as the instrument for studying a nation's destiny and considering anew their own problems. Follow the path of Russians - that was my conclusion".⁶¹

Mao visited the Soviet Union from 16 December 1949 to 17 February 1950 and signed the following - "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China"; "Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China on the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur and Dairen"; and "Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China on Granting Credits to the People's Republic of China".⁶² By its terms:

⁶⁰"On the People's Democratic Dictatorship (30 June 1949) - In Commemoration of the Twenty-eighth Anniversary of the Communist Party of China", *THE SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. IV (1969), op. cit., p. 415.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, p. 413

⁶²"Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Between the Soviet and the People's Republic of China (14 Feb. 1950)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 123-126; Michael B. Yahuda, *CHINA'S ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS*, (London: Croom Helm, 1978), pp. 51-52; Ho Kan-chih, *THE HISTORY OF MODERN CHINA'S REVOLUTION*, (Shanghai: People's Press, 1985), p. 341

(1) The Soviet Union was to maintain its special privileges in Manchuria with regard to the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur and Dairen until a peace treaty was signed with Japan or until 1952, whichever came sooner; (2) The Soviet Union would advance to China a credit of 300 million American dollars, taking 35 American dollars to one ounce of fine gold, over five years as from 1 January 1950; (3) The independence of Mongolia was recognised; (4) Certain property acquired by the Soviet Union from the Japanese in Manchuria would be returned to China without charge, as would some property in Peking.

On 17 February 1950, Mao delivered a farewell speech in Moscow, and said, "It is obvious to see that the unity between the two nations bound by the treaties is solid and unbreakable. Such unity not only will ensure the prosperity of our two major powers, but also will influence the future of mankind, and the peace and justice of the world".⁶³

Khrushchev visited Peking between September and October 1954 for the PRC's Fifth Anniversary Celebrations, and made two declarations and four Sino-Soviet communiqués. The two declarations were "Joint Declaration of the Government of China and the Government of the USSR" and "Sino-Soviet Joint Declaration on Relations with Japan", and the four Sino-Soviet communiqués included "On the Withdrawal of Soviet Armed forces from Port Arthur", "On Transfer of Soviet Shares in Joint Stock Companies to China", "On Scientific and Technical Co-operation Agreement", and "On Construction of Lanchow-Urumchi-Alma Ata Railway"; and one "Sino-Soviet-Mongolian Joint Communiqué on Construction of Chiling-Ulan Bator Railway".⁶⁴ They stipulated that: (1) The Soviet Union agrees to increase economic aid to the PRC; (2) The Soviet Union agrees to the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from port Arthur, and would return it to

⁶³*Ho Kan-chih, op. cit., p. 341*

⁶⁴"*Communiqués and Joint Declaration by China and the Soviet Union (12 October 1954)*", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1979, A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, I, op. cit., pp. 139-142, or see NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 12 October 1954.*

the PRC without charge; (3) The two sides will provide each other with technical data, exchange related information and send specialists to give technical assistance and acquaint each other with their achievements in the fields of science and technology.

During the 20th conference of party representatives convened by CPSU in Moscow in February 1956, Khrushchev openly criticised Stalin, his predecessor, accused him of brutally murdering Red Army generals, alleged that over 70 percent of the party representatives elected by the political commissars at the 17th conference of party representatives was secretly executed by him, and castigated Stalin for developing a personality cult in his later years which had seriously jeopardised the development of Soviet socialism.⁶⁵

Meanwhile, Khrushchev asserted that a war is avoidable, "peaceful coexistence" and "peaceful competition" were possible in countries of different social systems, and that "peaceful transition" from a capitalist to a socialist society was workable through parliamentary struggles. This meant that the idea to "regard violent and civil war as the only means leading to the socialist re-construction" in the course of transition from a capitalist to a socialist society was wrong, while political power could be obtained through the parliamentary elections, and socialist construction could then proceed. Khrushchev's sum-up report delivered at the 20th conference of party representatives had seriously struck at Mao's personal leadership and Maoist revolutionary viewpoints.

In response to this report, an enlarged conference of the CCPCC Political Bureau was convened in April, and passed the resolution on some questions concerning the struggle of

⁶⁵Nikita Khrushchev, *"The Sum-up Report on the 20th Conference of Party Representatives of the CPSU"*, *THE COLLECTIONS OF THE ORIGINAL DATA OF SINO-SOVIET CONFLICTS*, (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1964), pp. 1-56.

Stalin. The *People's Daily* published an article *On the Historical Experience of the Proletariat*⁶⁶ in the name of the editorial department, stating that Khrushchev's struggle against Stalin could not be fully approved, and that Stalin's achievements were greater than his faults. Subsequently in December of the same year, Stalin's merits and achievements were restated in the paper *On the Historical Experience of Proletarian Dictatorship Once Again*.⁶⁷

Nevertheless, the criticism of Stalin at the 20th conference of party representatives convened by the CPSU had brought about a chain reaction in the PRC. In spite of a series of criticism against the struggle of Stalin by the official media, the Eighth CCP National Congress adopted a resolution to remove Mao Tse-tung's thought as the guiding principle for the Party from the Party Constitution of the Seventh CCP National Congress under the initiation of Liu Shao-ch'i. This laid a remote course for the subsequent inner-party power struggle. It also influenced the development of the political role of the PLA. From then on, The struggle against Khrushchev was aimed at Liu Shao-ch'i for Liu was called the agent of Soviet revisionism. Similarly, P'eng Te-huai's army-building program to learn from the Soviet army came to an end with the deteriorating of Sino-Soviet relationship.

Furthermore, the Peitaiho conference, an enlarged meeting of the CCPCC politburo held at Peitaiho between 17 and 30 August 1958, passed the resolution to establish "People's Communes". To ensure this policy would be consistent with communist theory, the CCPCC asserted that the "people's communes is the best organisational form to expedite socialism and to transit to communism. The implementation of People's Communes is aimed at expediting socialist construction in the first place, followed by seeking a practical

⁶⁶"On the Historical Experience of Proletariat", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 5, April, 1956.

⁶⁷"On the Historical Experience of Proletariat Once Again", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 29 Dec. 1956.

route to transfer to the communism via the people's commune".⁶⁸ The CCPCC regarded the people's commune as an organisation that would avoid any winding roads to transfer to a communist society. In other words, it implied that Mao had successfully resolved the issue of communist construction in backward countries, and that it had a profound significance on the development of the entire international communist movement. This argument was tantamount to the discarding of Soviet experience in socialist construction and proved a challenge to the Soviet leadership.

A series of counter-measures was taken by the CPSU to cope with the ideological challenge of CCPCC. In response to the implementation of People's Communes, the CPSU issued the programme of "Seven Year Plan" in November 1958, which according to Khrushchev, the realisation of "seven year plan" meant the completion of fundamental tasks of communist construction of Soviet Union.⁶⁹ Such behaviour was clearly a manifestation of disapproval by using the arguments of CPSU's communist society against that of CCPCC's people's commune. Furthermore, the CPSU leadership condemned the impropriety of people's commune, for it had made the mistakes of a "small bourgeois fever" and run counter to scientific laws, attempting to construct socialist society in haste.⁷⁰ Khrushchev had clearly expressed this viewpoint by saying when H. H. Humphrey, U.S. senator visiting Moscow on 1 December 1958, that "the people's commune is not only out of date, but also reactionary".⁷¹

Moreover, In a report at the 21st representative conference convened by CPSU in Moscow on 27 January 1959, Khrushchev promoted the slogan "transition to

⁶⁸"The Resolution on Some Issues about the Establishment of People's Commune in the Rural Area", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 10 Sep. 1958.

⁶⁹Nikita Khrushchev, "Report on the 21st conference of party representatives of CPSU", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 1 Feb., 1959.

⁷⁰*PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 1 Feb., 1959 and 27 April 1964.

⁷¹*LIFE*, 12 Jan. 1959, pp. 80-91.

communism", which he indicated "no society can leap from capitalism to communism without passing through the stage of social development. The realisation of communism can only be advanced gradually according to productive conditions, not by leaping".⁷² Khrushchev implied that the construction of communist society by implementing the "Great Leap Forward" was against the pattern of historical development".

In response to the criticism of the CPSU, the CCP struck back by quoting the theory of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. They argued that the people's commune was a "new-born phenomenon", it manifested itself as "the struggle between old and new, between decline and progress - and it is the foundation of our development".⁷³ The *People's Daily* also reaffirmed the by saying "the Great Leap Forward is the transition from socialism to communism and is the manifestation of the theory of continuous revolution and the stage of revolutionary development".⁷⁴

As Soviet Union did not agree with the PRC's "Three Red Banners" movement, at the 21st representative conference in January 1959, Khrushchev gave strong condemnation on Mao's people's commune policy for its lack of material foundation, and on the retarded economy and backward industry and agriculture brought about by the "Great Leap Forward" movements. On 6 September of the same year, Soviet Union unilaterally tore up "the agreement of new technology in national defence" concluded with PRC in October 1957.⁷⁵ The Peking government was aware of the seriousness of this matter, and therefore strongly opposed the coming U.S.- Soviet talks in Camp David openly. The

⁷²Nikita Khrushchev, "Report on the 21st conference of party representatives of CPSU", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 1 Feb. 1959.

⁷³"How should Marxists Treat the Newborn Object", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 29 Feb. 1960.

⁷⁴"On Continuous Revolution and On the Stage of Revolutionary Development", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 27 July, 1959.

⁷⁵"The Origin and Development of the Difference between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves", *THE POLEMIC ON THE GENERAL LINE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT*, *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 6 Sep., 1963.

second day after his return from Camp David, Khrushchev immediately flew to Peking to explain the purpose of his visit to the States, and clearly advised the Peking leadership that they "should not misuse armed force to test the stability of capitalist system",⁷⁶ he also reaffirmed the Soviet position, and indicated that the policy of peaceful coexistence was a means of struggle in a peaceful way, such a struggle was political or economic, but not military.

Mao could not tolerate compromise between the Soviet Union and capitalism. He began to launch ideological attacks from April 1960 in the name of commemorating the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth and published a series of article in *Red Flag* and the *People's Daily* to denounce the Soviet Union, which included *On Imperialism as the Source of Contemporary War and the Road to Peace that Chinese People Strive for*, *Long Live Leninism*, *Advance along the Footpath of the Great Lenin*, *Unite under the Revolutionary Banner of Lenin* and *The Theory of Peace and War*.⁷⁷

In addition to the use of Lenin's writings to attack Khrushchev's policy in a planned way, the CCPCC issued a succession of 9 comprehensive statements⁷⁸ to criticise the CPSU's open letter in the name of the editorial department of *People's Daily* and *Red Flag*

⁷⁶"How Does the Differences Begin?", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 27 Feb., 1963.

⁷⁷"On Imperialism Is the Source of Contemporary War, And the Road to Peace that Chinese People Strive for", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 1 April, 1960; "Long Live The Leninism", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 16 April, 1960; "Advance along the Footpath of Greatest Lenin", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 22 April, 1960; "Unite under the Revolutionary Banner of Lenin", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 23 April, 1960.

⁷⁸The 9 comprehensive statements include: *The origin and development of the differences between the leadership of the CPSU and ourselves* (3 Sep. 1963); *On the question of Stalin* (13 Sep. 1963); *Is Yugoslavia a socialist country?* (26 Sep. 1963); *Apologists of neo-colonialism* (22 Oct. 1963); *Two different lines on the question of war and peace* (19 Nov. 1963); *Peaceful coexistence - two diametrically opposed policies* (12 Dec. 1963); *The leaders of the CPSU are the greatest splitters of our times* (4 Feb. 1964); *The proletarian revolution and Khrushchev's revisionism* (31 Mar. 1964); and *On Khrushchev's phoney communism and its historical lessons for the world* (14 Jul. 1964). For details refer to *THE POLEMIC ON THE GENERAL LINE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT*, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 55-467; or see *Peking Review* No. 37, 1963, pp. 6-20; No. 38, 1963, pp. 8-15; No. 39, 1963, pp. 14-27; No. 43, 1963, pp. 6-15; No. 47, 1963, pp. 6-16; No. 51, 1963, pp. 6-13; No. 6, 1964, pp.5-21; No. 14, 1964, pp. 5-21; No. 29, 1964, pp. 7-27,

between 6 September 1963 and July 1964.

In PRC's viewpoints that "Khrushchev and his followers have clearly betrayed international proletariat and world revolutionary people, degenerated themselves to the extent of colluding with imperialists and all reactionaries to work together against people's revolutionary struggles of each nation",⁷⁹ and that it was Khrushchev, who took one-sided criticism on the labour party of Albania at the 22nd representative conference, and CPSU headed by Khrushchev to stir up an "unfriendly and insulting" open polemic in the first place; and further intensified the polemics in the movement of communist internationalism by issuing "The Open Letter of CPSU to All Party Organisations and All Communists of Soviet Union" on 14 July 1963, to attack Chinese Communist Party unilaterally. The leadership of CPSU should take all the responsibilities.⁸⁰

The ideological disputes between Peking and Moscow was not only over the general line of international communist movement, but, under the mask, it was used by Mao as a means of power struggle. The struggle of Stalin by the CPSU alluded to the fact that Mao's position in the party would face a challenge. Mao's opposition to Khrushchev was in fact to protect himself, and to recognise Stalin's achievements was to consolidate his position in the party. Moreover, Khrushchev disapproved of the movement of People's Communes and regarded it as the "small bourgeois fever", however, he didn't realise that Mao's People's Communes was not really aimed at quickly transmitting to communism. It was only one of Mao's army-building programs to turn "everyone a soldier". This program was an important means for carrying out Mao's "people's war", and in Mao's view, the "people's war" carried strong political flavour, the general picture of this can be

⁷⁹*"Comment on the Selected Works of Khrushchev, Vol. V", RED FLAG, No. 4, 1965, pp. 14-15.*

⁸⁰*"Comment on the conference convened by the Leadership of CPSU Started from 1 March", RED FLAG, No. 4, 1965, pp. 27-28.*

clearly seen in Mao's early writings.

In the course of the deteriorating relationship between China and Soviet Union, the Chinese inner-party struggle was already in full progress. At Lushan conference in 1959, P'eng Te-huai, Minister of National Defence, wrote a "letter of opinion" to Mao, stating his disapproval of the Great Leap Forward. Mao thereby arranged the removal of P'eng and his replacement by Lin Piao as the Minister of National Defence.

In the 60s, when the breach between China and Soviet Union became complete, the PRC fell into a strategic predicament, facing a possible pincer attack from the United States and the Soviet Union as two potential enemies. This was the biggest threat to the PRC's national security which Lin had to encounter after he becoming the Minister of National Defence. On one hand, Lin had to pacify the army's morale and eradicate P'eng's influence in the army, terminate the army-building policy of learning from the Soviet Union and avoid any Soviet influence, and brought the army back to the traditional line of Maoist "political army building"; on the other hand, Lin had to find a way to deal with the military threat from the United States and the Soviet Union, two superpowers, for the safeguard of it's national security. Within these circumstances, the relationship between the military line and politics was in practice a kind of compromise.

In politics, immediately after Lin Piao assumed power, he delivered the paper *March Ahead under the Red Flag of the Party General Line and Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking*⁸¹, in which he stressed the following:

⁸¹"Lin Piao on the Maoist Line in Military Affairs (29 September 1959)", (also known as Lin Piao, "March Ahead under the Red Flag of the Party's General Line and Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking), THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 777-784; PEOPLE'S DAILY, 29 September 1959.

Firstly, "In the new historical era, political work and ideological work in the armed forces are extremely important and under no circumstances should this work be neglected. 'Political work is the vital line of our armed forces' is a truth which has been proven by our armed forces through practice in revolution in the past several scores of years... In the course of modernising our armed forces, the most important side, not to forget politics and to emphasise the importance of political work. Our armed forces are military organisations serving politics and socialism. We must use politics to command and guide military affairs as well as other daily routine tasks, politics is the fundamental factor; we cannot talk about other work if we fail to carry out political and ideological work properly".⁸²

Secondly, "We mentioned above that the PLA is an instrument of political struggle, revolutionary military personnel should not divorce themselves from politics but pay attention to and study politics. Mass movements and practice in socialist struggle are rich in politics. We must constantly maintain our connections with the masses and absorb the valuable experiences from revolutionary mass movements... Experience has repeatedly shown that participation by the armed forces in the mass campaign has always been the most vital, most intensive, and richest political lesson for the officers and men of the armed forces".⁸³

Thirdly, "The absolute leadership of the party over the troops and the strong party character of the broad masses of cadres in our armed forces constitute the greatest assurance of victory for the undertakings of national defence in the socialist construction of our country. In his article on *The Question of War and Struggle*, comrade Mao Tse-tung said: 'From the viewpoint of Marxist theory concerning the state the armed forces

⁸²*Ibid.*, p. 779; *RED FLAG*, No. 19, 1959, p. 19.

⁸³*Ibid.*, p. 781.

constitute an essential part of the political power of a state. Whoever intends to seize the political power of a nation and to maintain it should have powerful armed forces⁸⁴... In the same article, he also said: 'Members of the communist party will not fight for their own personal power over the troops (they must never fight for that and never follow the example of Chang Kuo-t'ao). However, they should fight for the power of the party over the troops, and the power of the people over the troops... Our principle is to have the party directing the guns, and never allow the guns to direct the party'⁸⁵

And Finally, "Party character is not an abstract thing. To the communist party members and the cadres who are working in the armed forces, a resolute party character should express itself in the form of determination to defend the unity of the party at any time and under any circumstances, and in wholeheartedness in carrying out the struggle for the program and line of the party".⁸⁶

Moreover, Lin attacked P'eng, although not by name, for his army-building line, and "promptly criticised and firmly corrected these mistaken viewpoints, continuously developed the long-standing glorious tradition of our army, capable of carrying out three tasks at the same time namely, fighting, holding mass campaigns campaign and participating in production".⁸⁷ Lin ordered PLA to support mass movements in all aspects in accordance with the needs of socialist reform and socialist construction in different period of time.

⁸⁴"*Problems of War and Strategy* (6 Nov. 1938)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. II* (1965), *op. cit.*, p. 219.

⁸⁵"*March Ahead under the Red Flag of the Party's General Line and Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking*), *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, op. cit.*, p. 783; *ibid.*, p. 224.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, p. 783.

⁸⁷*Ta Kung Daily*, 30 Sep. 1959.

Lin redeveloped the tradition of "politics" which had long been neglected by the PLA in the era of P'eng Te-huai, strengthening the supremacy of Mao Tse-tung thought throughout the PLA within the system of the "party commands the gun", and demanding every member of the PLA to "study Chairman Mao's writing, follow his teachings and act according to his instructions, be chairman Mao's good fighters",⁸⁸ "no matter what kind of 'authority' there may be, whoever opposes Mao Tse-tung's thought should be punished by the party members and the people of the whole nation".⁸⁹ The enlarged meeting of the CCPCC Military Commission was convened by Lin Piao from 14 to 20 September 1960, and passed the resolution "On Strengthening the Political and Ideological Works among the Army". It made the following points concerning the contents of ideological education in every day life: (1) Party line and policies as well as the directives of the central authorities of the party and chairman Mao; (2) The international and domestic situation and the task of the struggle; (3) Different tasks of various army units, such as the various military arms, various branches of service, the border and coastal defence forces, the people's armed forces, scientific research units, hospitals, military bases, warehouses, etc.; (4). Different ideological problems of different types of persons, such as veteran soldiers, new soldiers, the wounded, young intellectuals, those who have been punished, etc.; (5) The glorious tradition of PLA. Such as the purpose of building PLA, the system of leadership, the political system, the three-eight working style, the three main rules of discipline and the eight points for attention, the history of the PLA and its heroic events; (6) Festivals celebrating the revolution; (7) Commendation of good persons and good deeds, and criticism for bad tendencies, bad persons and bad deeds; (8) The various kinds of practical ideological problems.⁹⁰

⁸⁸"The Cadres at All Levels Should Take the Lead to Put Mao's Tse-tung's Thinking in Command of Everything", *RED FLAG*, No. 8, 1966, p. 3.

⁸⁹"Mao Tse-tung's Thought is the Telescope and Microscope of Our Revolutionary Undertakings", *LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY*, 7 June, 1966

⁹⁰"Reindoctrinating the People's Liberation Army (Oct. 1960)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 889

The resolution laid down the following on the method of conducting living ideological teaching: (1) Combine political movements with regular education, simultaneously giving attention to the movements and to education; (2) The political organs at the divisional level and above should from time to time write some lectures and slogans to be recited at the time of roll call according to the state of conditions and the nature of duties in their respective units; or they can call preparatory meetings to arrange programs for practical ideological education; (3). Strengthen PLA viewpoints about the masses and labour, promote class awareness, advance the level of theoretical and policy understanding, broaden thought, and enrich intelligence through such activities as participating in mass movements; (4) Extensively and flexibly make use of such means as blooming, contending, debating, arguing, and big-character newspapers for posting on bulletin boards; (5) The form of political education must be varied. Adopting such forms as inviting leaders to give lectures; recalling incidents of the past as compared with the present; calling slogans at the time of reveille and retreat; issuing wall bulletins and big character newspapers; (6) All literacy and art work as well as cultural activity in army units, such as the plays of the cultural work troupe, amateur literary activities, motion pictures, broadcasting, arts, and library work, should serve the purpose of enhancing the proletariat and exterminating the bourgeoisie in combination with the state of ideological conditions and the nature of duties in the army units.⁹¹

Furthermore, the resolution not only stressed that "The basic aim of our political education is to raise high the red flag of Mao Tse-tung's thought...in the course of teaching, we must elevate all practical problems arising from the revolutionary struggle to the level of Marxism-Leninism and explain them accordingly",⁹² but also demanded the

⁹¹*Ibid.*

⁹²*Ibid.*, pp. 889-890

party committees "to strengthen the leadership of political work in the army unit" which included the following: (1) "The party committee must spend most of its energy in taking hold of problems involving policies and principles. It should frequently check the work of various departments and units in terms of party policies and principle. It must resolutely struggle with all those thoughts and kinds of behaviour which are in violation of the party line and policies". (2). "Party committees at various levels must put political and ideological work in the place of primary importance, frequently analyse and study the ideological tendency of the army units, hold special discussions in regard to political and ideological work, and check and direct the party's construction of ideology and organisation". (3) "It must carry through thoroughly the system of dual leadership of the military system and the local party committee over the army units under the unified leadership of the central authorities of the party". (4) "In order to strengthen the collective leadership within the leadership organs at various levels, it shall establish party committees in the headquarters and political departments at the army (provincial military district) level and above".⁹³

Lin Piao regarded this resolution as the one following and manifesting the spirit of the Kutien conference, it marked a new milestone in the progress of the PLA. Lin ordered the party committees and political organs at various levels to carry out promptly and thoroughly the resolutions of the Enlarged Meeting of the CCPCC Military Commission down to the primary level. All headquarters, military arms, branches of service, military regions and districts, and academics and schools should make a careful examination every six months of the results as shown in the attempt to carry out this resolution and report the result of the examination to the CCPCC Military Commission and General Political Department. The CCPCC Military Commission will check every year the results gained in

⁹³*Ibid.*, pp. 895-896

carrying out this resolution.⁹⁴

Since this Enlarged Meeting of the CCPCC Military Committee, political conferences have been held by the General Political Department of the PLA approximately once a year.⁹⁵ A series of slogans and campaigns have been popularised, of which the most important are the "five-good" campaign for the rank-and-file soldier, the parallel "four-good" campaign for army companies, the "three-eight" working style, the "seven measures in improving leadership over companies", the "twelve basic experiences in company building", and the "company management and education" campaign.⁹⁶

Behind these slogans and campaigns, political education was through efforts to secure the loyalty of the individual rank-and-file soldier, and in particular the younger element in the PLA. Young soldiers were encouraged to join their local branch of the young communist league (YCL), or the soldiers club, and to compete in the five-good movement, which calls for good performance in political thinking, military training, style of work, fulfilment of tasks, and physical education. this movement extolled all the simple virtues and basic principles by which the personal behaviour of the individual soldier should be governed if he was to be truly "revolutionary". He should study Mao's writings, adroitly use and protect his weapons and equipment, obey orders promptly and agilely, acquire good habits of cleanliness and hygiene, etc.⁹⁷ In accordance with the precept of Lin Piao that "one who knows nothing about exploitation knows nothing about revolution",⁹⁸ young soldiers

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 897

⁹⁵PLA political work conferences had been held in March 1961, 18 Oct. -11 Nov., 1961, February 1963, January 1964 and January 1966. See John Gittings, *THE ROLE OF CHINESE ARMY*, op. cit., p. 246.

⁹⁶For the test of these and other formulae, see "Terms of PLA Political Work", *LIBERATION ARMY DAILY*, 22 Jan. 1964.

⁹⁷John Gittings, *THE ROLE OF CHINESE ARMY*, op., cit., p. 249.

⁹⁸Quoted in "Comrade Hsiao Hua Dwells on Important Work of Company - Building at PLA Political Work Conference", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 15 November 1961; John Gittings, *THE ROLE OF CHINESE ARMY*, op. cit., p. 249.

were invited to re-create in their imaginations the bitter days of pre-liberation - a process known as the "recollection of past revolutionary songs, interviewed veterans, visited exhibitions of revolutionary relics, and read the memoirs of wartime heroes.

The successful completion of rooting Maoist ideological works in the army encouraged Lin Piao to proceed to another even greater movement of God creation. On New Year's Day, 1964, he firstly called upon the people of the whole nation to learn from the experience of political works of the People's Liberation Army in the editorial of *People's Daily*.⁹⁹ It constituted approval of commissar efforts to rectify the PLA and warned society of a new era that would bring the PLA into renewed contact with every aspect of economic, intellectual, and ultimately even political life in communist China. Within the military, the role of the commander was also in transition, his authority was eroded during this period as commissar responsibility increased at all levels.

Subsequently, on 1 February, an article *The Whole Country Must Learn from the People's Liberation Army* was published in the editorial of *People's Daily*.¹⁰⁰ It demanded that party and government leadership organs at all levels, all industrial and mining units, all business organisations, people's organisations, should strengthen their political-ideological works, and like the PLA, ensure that political-ideological work is truly and thoroughly implemented by the basic levels and should carry out ideological work in a painstaking and delicate manner, so as to lay a solid and secure foundation. The editorial also regarded that the reasons for the whole country placing political work in the first position in the same manner in which the PLA correctly handles the relationship between various tasks

⁹⁹PEOPLE'S DAILY, 1 Jan. 1964

¹⁰⁰"The Whole Country Must Learn from the People's Liberation Army", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 1 Feb. 1964; LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY, 1 Feb. 1964; and see "An Exhortation to Learn from the People's Liberation Army (1 February 1964)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 1010-1014

and political works was because politics is the supreme commander and the social, political work is not only the lifeline of the PLA, but also the lifeline of all revolutionary work and a basic guarantee for all other work. And, most importantly, the editorial once again stressed that the PLA could become an army of an extremely high proletarian and combat character, was mainly due to the fact that it has always raised high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought and put his ideas in command in carrying out all its tasks.

Lin Piao carried out political and ideological works in a planned way, he firstly cast the PLA into the model for learning from Maoist ideological works, and further called upon the people of the whole nation to learn from the Liberation Army through the movement *The Whole Country Must Learn from the People's Liberation Army*, studying how to carry out the liberation of political ideology. The PLA became Lin Piao's major tool consolidating Mao's thought and once more played an important example of a political role in the idol worship of Mao.

While the military, in view of the facts that a large amount of soldiers retired from the army after the Korean war, which had seriously jeopardised army's fighting capability, and that the PLA did not win the Taiwan Strait war and recover Taiwan, Penghu, and Quemoy, Matsu islands as it had planned, Lin Piao had to confess that "the situation has changed after the end of the movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, our soldiers have not gone through the test of a battle in recent years even for those who had war experience in the past", and therefore "politics is of the first and major importance in terms of the relationship between military and politics, while the military is of the first importance and should make more efforts than political training in terms of training".¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹WORK CIRCULAR, Vol. I, p. 9

After the Sino-Soviet split, several subsequent developments had additional adverse implications for the earlier emphasis on military technology. Commissars received increasing authority to supervise the economic drive and there was a revival of interest in an expanded militia and in the implementation of the "four-first" movement: the priority of man over weapons, of political work over other work, of ideology over administrative routine, and of living ideas over book ideas.¹⁰² As the economic crisis deepened, however, the concept of the role of the military shifted perceptibly from a former emphasis on orthodox combat to a concern for internal stability and mass mobilisation.

In the early stage when Lin Piao took the post as the Minister of National Defence, he promoted a series of army rectification movements. These movements, however, was by no means aimed at the entire negation of military objectives that P'eng set up in his days, because Lin had to handle the opposition force and firmly control the army. On the one hand, Lin Piao reduced total man hours devoted to non-professional activities such as land reclamation, and established a new training cycle for all regular units. On the other hand he encouraged commissars to devote more time to political indoctrination. There wasn't a great deal of difference between Lin and P'eng in the goal of seeking the limited modernisation of PLA.

In fact, the fundamental character of the PLA in the sixties was that it simultaneously proceeded with the development of weapon modernisation and they paid attention to the expansion of the political role of the army in the country. Above all, the value of nuclear weapons as a means of war deserved more attention and had political and military significance. In politics, the achievement of nuclear weapons had realised an historical

¹⁰²Warren Kuo (ed.), *A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY F CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY*, op. cit., p. 539.

pride in being suzerain state especially in the diplomatic arena, the PRC became the "hegemony" which the third world had to rely on. While in the military, Mao gradually developed the most important structure of the PLA's defensive strategy by integrating people's war with nuclear deterrence, and satisfying professional army officers' needs for modern military technology.

Professional army officers, many of whom experienced overwhelming U.S. firepower during the Korea war, stressed the importance of nuclear weapons and modern military technology. Their arguments could be concluded as follows:¹⁰³

1. Military professionals believe that it is China, and not the Soviet Union that is a "paper tiger" doubting the ability of the PLA to respond effectively to an attack by superior Soviet force.
2. They realise that, in the event of war with Moscow, China can do very little against the Soviet Union's deadly nuclear strike force combined with a quick and massive armoured and conventional attack.
3. They believe that the Maoist military doctrine of guerrilla warfare is not now the "magic" formula for defeating Moscow. They believe that to speak strong but empty language when the country is in reality not strong would invite immediate danger and extinction.¹⁰⁴ They accuse Mao of underestimating Soviet military strength with easy pride, optimism, and arrogance and also of treating military affairs in their nuclear age as something to toy with.

¹⁰³Tai Sung-an, *THE SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL DISPUTE*, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1973), pp. 144-147.

¹⁰⁴NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 30 Aug. 1967; PEKING REVIEW, 3 Jan. 1968, p. 42

4. They believe that the PLA is too weak to allow Mao to talk lightly of war with Moscow, unless and until Peking develops a sophisticated and credible nuclear capability. If such an effective military posture is acquired they believe that Peking should defuse the current tense boundary conflict with Soviets, enter into protracted diplomatic negotiation, or even seek a compromise with Moscow on outstanding boundary and other issues.¹⁰⁵

5. They resent or even oppose excessive political interference in their command by the party and its political commissars. They argue that modern warfare is too scientific technical and complex for political commissars to comprehend, and that the principle of having politics in command of military affairs is incompatible with the important requirement of functional, technical, and organisational efficiency in modern warfare. They favour a single chain of command and control rather than the present dual political and military command structure in the PLA.¹⁰⁶

6. They dislike the intensive political indoctrination program for the armed forces. They assert that their splendid revolutionary past and their membership in the party should exempt them from all ideological reforms and indoctrination and that they should be left alone to improve their own military proficiency.¹⁰⁷

7. They oppose the Maoist idea of "a multipurpose army", i.e., the employment of troops for non-military purpose, such as farming, operating factories, constructing roads and dikes, digging canals, and doing political propaganda work. They contend that such employment depresses army morale, dissipates troops' energy, and interferes with the

¹⁰⁵NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 18 Dec. 1967; PEKING REVIEW, 3 Jan. 1968, p. 41.

¹⁰⁶LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY, 1 Aug. 1965.

¹⁰⁷PEOPLE'S DAILY, 7 Feb. 1967.

military training program. They resent having the talents and energies of their man diverted to non-military tasks at a time when they are charged with the responsibility of preparing for a possible conflict with the Soviet Union, which has superior military hardware.

8. They disagree strongly with Mao on the idea as well as the utility of the militia.¹⁰⁸ They argue that the militia is professionally deficient in military training and technology, economically wasteful, and military useless in times of war.

9. They strongly dislike Mao's policy, in effect since May, 1965, of abolishing all military ranks and badges in the PLA. They feared that this policy affects the authority and prestige of the officers, weakens army discipline, and impedes the work of the military command, thereby leading eventually to a sharp decline in professional standards as well as combat effectiveness of the armed forces.¹⁰⁹

10. They request up to date armed forces equipped with ultramodern military weapons as a deterrent to Soviet attack on their country, they place the highest priority on the development of a strong nuclear capability, even at the expense of economic development.¹¹⁰

While Mao held different viewpoints with military professionals on the possibility of Soviet attack. Mao feared that the Soviet Union would or might attack the China as a result of escalation of the boundary conflict. For such an eventuality, the Maoist military doctrine presupposes the feasibility of a protracted guerrilla-type "defence in depth" of the

¹⁰⁸NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 16 Sep. 1967; PEKING REVIEW, 24 Nov. 1967, p. 14.

¹⁰⁹LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY, 1 Aug. 1965.

¹¹⁰Tai Sung-an, THE SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, op. cit., p. 144.

vast territory of China, the outcome of which would be decided by close-range hand-to-hand combat, day and night, with two hundred metres between soldiers, using primitive conventional weapons such as bayonets, grenades, knives, and axes.¹¹¹

Mao insists that the Soviet Union would not be able to defeat China solely by a massive nuclear attack, because of China's large territory and population and its complicated terrain. For final victory, therefore, Soviet ground forces would still have to invade and occupy the Chinese mainland, and Soviet invasion would only plunge the enemy into "the escape-proof net of a great, just people's war against aggression".¹¹²

In the eventuality of a Soviet nuclear attack on the China, Mao expected about 300 million Chinese to be killed, leaving about 500 million survivors, who would "dare to lure the enemy deep into a battle of annihilation". The surviving highly mobilised Chinese masses - regular forces, a massive militia, and local forces - would attack the Soviet invaders in caves, bunkers, mountains, forests, ditches, tunnels, and houses - that is to say, practically from all sides.¹¹³ They would combine mobilised, large, and set piece conventional battles with well-coordinated, widespread, intensive and independent guerrilla warfare, and the invading Soviet enemy forces would be "bogged down in endless battle" and "drowned in a hostile human sea". Their readiness to fight with primitive conventional weapons at the close range of two hundred meters would nullify the Soviet advantage in military technology and weapons systems. In such an event, the Maoist Chinese assert, the "people's war" magic taught by Mao Tse-tung during the previous war against Japanese invasion would certainly be able to exhaust and, finally, defeat the Soviet Union.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY, 25 Nov. 1965, and 23 Aug. 1966.

¹¹²PEOPLE'S DAILY, and LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY, 1 Oct. 1969.

¹¹³PEOPLE'S DAILY, 7 Sep. 1967; PEKING REVIEW, 5 Feb. 1965, p. 20

¹¹⁴PEOPLE'S DAILY, 14 May 1965; LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY, 17 Sep. 1966; PEKING REVIEW, 14 May 1965, pp. 15-22.

Generally speaking, Mao had his own appraisal of nuclear weapons and modernised army building, he commented: The atomic bomb is a paper tiger which the reactionaries use to scare people. it looks terrible, but in fact it isn't... the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapon.¹¹⁵ Mao had always criticised the so-called purely military viewpoints on the grounds that "war is the highest form of struggle for resolving contradictions, when they have developed to a certain stage, between classes, nations, states, or political groups",¹¹⁶ "war is the continuation of politics, in this sense, war is politics and war itself is a political action, since ancient times there has never been a war that did not have a political character".¹¹⁷ "It is, however, not a smooth road for the weak to defeat the strong and a reborn force to triumph over decayed force" and thus one must "fight, fail, fight again, fail again, fight again... till victory, that is the logic of the people".¹¹⁸ Mao further indicated that "weapons decide everything", "which constitutes a mechanical approach to the question of war and a subjective and one-sided view. Our view is opposed to this; we see not only weapons but also people. Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not material, that are decisive".¹¹⁹

To speak in terms of people's war and class struggles, the advancement of nuclear weapons had not and could not change the pattern of social development of mankind, and

¹¹⁵"Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong (Aug. 1946)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. IV (1969), *op. cit.*, p. 100.

¹¹⁶"Strategy in China's Revolutionary War (Dec. 1969)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. I (1975), *op. cit.*, p. 184.

¹¹⁷"On Protracted War (May 1938)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. II (1965), *op. cit.*, p. 152.

¹¹⁸"Cast Away Illusions, Prepare for Struggle (14 Aug. 1949)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. IV (1969), *op. cit.*, p. 428; "It Is People, Not Material, That Are Decisive Factor in War", *RED FLAG*, No. 8, 1965, p. 32.

¹¹⁹"On Protracted War (May 1938)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. II (1965), *op. cit.*, p. 143.

that of class struggle; it hadn't or couldn't change the fact that capitalist system is doomed to be replaced by socialism; it hadn't and couldn't change the army's political position and its influence in non-military tasks.

The possession of nuclear weapons, in Mao's view, couldn't possibly minimise imperialist and reactionary aggression and exploitation, nor could it change the nature of their oppression of the broad masses of labours, and thus Mao actively carried out the policy of "all people are soldiers" in the course of the implement of "People's Communes".

The policy of "all people are soldiers" was an important reflection of his strategic viewpoint that military and politics are a unit in Maoist people's war. Mao was a typical intellectual of Chinese agricultural society, he learned the Chinese classical novel and historical warfare of each dynasty very well, and perceived the fact that policy of "all people are soldiers", making no distinguish between soldiers and peasants, was usually the omen for social unrest on the eve of dynastic changes. Nevertheless, Mao advocated the movement of "all people are soldiers" in the fifties, at the time when China did not possess the requisites for revolution. His secret inward wish was to balance the inner-system power operations including the suppression of a potentially professional army, involving no political affairs, which was being brought about by P'eng Te-huai's regularised army building program, while outwardly, Mao's intention was to show his disapproval of the Soviet Union, and create his own way. In addition, the PRC faced a possible nuclear threat after breaking with Soviet Union. In such an inferior position, Mao had to emphasise the importance of "people" in the event of modern war. Mao copied Lenin's idea from his paper "the army and revolution" in 1905, attempted to turn every soldier into a citizen and every sound citizen into a soldier. The paper pointed out, "when there exists the oppressed and the deprived in the world, it is the whole nation in arms, not the liberation

of weapons, that we should strive for".¹²⁰ Mao fulfilled the conscious of "the whole nation in arms", and was ready to fight a perfect people's war when the Soviet Union invaded China.

Generally speaking, "people's war" and "nuclear deterrence" were contradictory to each other and were two extremely different strategic ideas. When Mao advocated the theory that the "atomic bomb is a paper tiger", but conversely, started developing the atomic bomb, the following accounted for a great change in Mao's military doctrine:

In the early 1950s, the PRC adopted the policy of "lean to the side of the Soviet Union" in its foreign affairs, hoping to safeguard its national security under the protection of the Soviet nuclear umbrella by means of people's war. Since the PRC considered that people's war was based on the full co-ordination of people and weapons, and on the foundation that people should be valued more than weapons, the slogan the "atomic bomb is a paper tiger" was repeatedly propagated to belittle the value of nuclear weapons, and the principle "the factor of people is of the first importance" was constantly emphasised to increase the importance of people in the nuclear war. The Chinese leadership at that time held the view that any large-scale nuclear attacks could not destroy China thoroughly because of China's unique agricultural society structure. For final victory, the hostile country would still have to dispatch traditional ground forces to invade and occupy the Chinese mainland. The people's war was thereafter developed to counter such a situation. They also believed when co-ordinated the protracted war of "lure the enemy in deep" with the policy of all people are soldiers, and the favourable conditions of vast territory and broad masses of people, any hostile country that dared to invade China would follow the same disastrous road of Japanese aggression, and would be "drowned in a hostile human

¹²⁰Fu Ch'iu-t'ao, "The Whole Nation in Arms", *RED FLAG*, No. 10, 1958, pp. 22-23.

sea".

In order to stabilise the situation in Pacific area and to suppress the PRC's ambitious military attempt when the Taiwan Strait crisis emerged between 1954 and 1955, President Eisenhower of the United States indicated in a press conference on 16 March 1955, that "the United States does not exclude the possibility of using atomic weapons to attack military targets along the Chinese coast".¹²¹ Subsequently when the PRC bombarded Quemoy offshore island on 23 August 1955, United States reaffirmed its stand to safeguard the peace over the Taiwan Strait, and the issue about the use of nuclear weapons was once again mentioned at the White House conference on 25 and 29 of March.¹²² On 2 September, John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, and the members of Joint Chiefs of Staff held a conference to discuss possible emergency measures if the PRC should dispatch troops to attack Taiwan offshore islands, Dulles indicating after the conference that there was no need for the U.S. to use nuclear weapons at this moment, but that they would not afraid to use it when it was necessary.¹²³

Dulles met with Eisenhower on Rhode island to discuss this matter on 4 September. Dulles expressed his view about handling the crisis in one paper. He commented that the U.S. would lose its influence in the Far East if Taiwanese off-shore islands should fall into the hands of the PRC, and that nuclear weapons would be applied unless the U.S. could effectively obstruct the PRC's attempt by issuing a statement before PRC launching its attack or by proceeding with a bombardment immediately after the PRC's attack.¹²⁴

¹²¹Lin Cheng-i, *U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS TAIWAN DURING THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS OF 1958*, (Taipei: Shang-wu Publication, 1985), p. 24.

¹²²*Ibid.*, p. 81.

¹²³Morton H. Halperin, *THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS OF 1958*, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation Research Memorandum, 1966), p. 24.

¹²⁴Dwight D. Eisenhower, *THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS: WAGING PEACE 1956-1961*, (New York: Double Day, 1965), pp. 691-693.

Dulles issued a statement after the meeting, in which he proclaimed that the U.S. had an obligation to defend Taiwan from armed attacks, and indicated that the Taiwan resolution, passed by the Congress, had authorised President the power to use force for safeguarding the off-shore islands of Quemoy, Matsu etc.¹²⁵

To counter with the threat of U.S. nuclear weapons, Mao criticised the U.S. in a meeting of the State Council on 8 September 1958, said "Taiwan - the territory of China, Lebanon and other U.S. military bases abroad is the rope hanging around the American imperialist neck, it isn't anyone else but the U.S. itself has produced this rope and placed it around its own neck".¹²⁶ He also said, "United States has monopolised the capitalist bloc, she is bound to be hanged by the people of the whole world if she continued to insist on carrying out its aggression and war policies".¹²⁷

As the result of the inability to gain Soviet agreement, either in offering national security or in providing any anti-nuclear deterrence against U.S., the PRC applied no any counterattack other than an emotional rebuke, yet, Khrushchev's attitude towards the Taiwan Strait crisis further strengthened the PRC's determination to develop its own nuclear weapons.

The PRC had concluded the following two points from Korea war and the crisis of Taiwan Strait. Firstly, no matter how many militia and conventional forces the PRC possessed, it was always nuclear deterrence that produced the greatest influence at the time of crisis. Secondly, Although the Soviet Union, the big brother of the communist camp, was a nuclear superpower, it would never risk the danger of nuclear war to directly attack the

¹²⁵DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 39 (22 Sep. 1958), pp. 445-446.

¹²⁶"On Current Situation - Chairman Mao's Speech at the Supreme Meeting of State Affairs", *HSIN HUA Semi-monthly*, Vol. XVIII, (Peking: People's Publication, 1958), p. 14; *RED FLAG*, No. 8, 1958, p. 3.

¹²⁷*Ibid.*

U.S. for the precaution of the PRC's national security. Based on the above-mentioned facts, the PRC had to develop and produce its own nuclear weapons if she wished to play a leading role in international politics.

The deteriorating relations between Soviet Union and PRC due to Soviet inability to offer any support to the PRC during the Taiwan Strait crisis, and because of Khrushchev's disapproval of Mao's radical economic and political measures, were worsened by the controversy over the orthodoxy of communist ideology. This brought about unilateral termination of the "agreement on new technology for national defence" by Soviet Union in June 1959. One can reasonably believe, the lesson from the Taiwan Strait crisis had helped the PRC to expedite the development and production of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, prior to the creation of a reliable nuclear deterrence, the only means for self-defence was the use of the primitive ecology of mankind, applying "people's war" to counter the threat of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. To the PRC, the most effective means to stress the value of "people's" war is through the mould of leader's charisma so as to become the idol for the people to follow fanatically and guide the people with his own will.

Accompanied by the conflicts between the PRC and the Soviet Union and the PRC's determination to produce its own nuclear weapons, were a series of important political movements launched by Mao. These included the "Rectification campaign" in April 1957, a movement aimed at oppressing intellectuals to give up all non-proletarian conscious and anti-Maoist thought by carrying out "ideological construction" among communists through education and study,¹²⁸ and instruction "On Preparing Organisational Force to Counterattack Rightists" was issued by CCPCC in June 1957 to carry out a nation-wide

¹²⁸THE EXPLANATION OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY (Taipei, China Publishing Company, 1971), p. 425.

anti-rightist struggle, and the movement of "Three Red Banners" approached its climax in 1958, and at an enlarged meeting of the CCPCC Military Commission the same year, Mao criticised P'eng Te-huai for his army-building line, voiced his indignation of the policies of regularisation and modernisation, and opposed the departing of the PLA from the masses and politics.¹²⁹ This series of political campaigns, however, did not impede the progress of nuclear development.

It was noteworthy that soon after the "Agreement on New Technology for National Defence" was unilaterally torn up by Soviet Union in June 1959, the CCPCC held the "Lushan conference" between July and August, and reached the decision to criticise P'eng Te-huai and dismiss him from the post of Minister of National Defence. Although the purge of P'eng was due to P'eng's fierce attack on the movement of the "Three Red Banners", and yet, his pro-Soviet policy and the Mao's disapproval of his "purely military viewpoint" were other faults that could not be overlooked.

In fact, Mao had believed, as early as 1936, that China's revolutionary war had specific laws of its own. He commented, "Some people hold wrong view, which we refuted long ago. They say that it is enough merely to study the experience of revolutionary war in Russia, or, to put it more concretely, that it is enough merely to follow the laws by which the civil war in the Soviet Union was directed and the military manuals published by Soviet military organisations. They do not see that these laws and manuals embody the specific characteristics of the civil war and the Red Army in the Soviet Union, and that if we copy and apply them without allowing any change, we shall also be "cutting the feet to fit the shoes" and be defeated".¹³⁰

¹²⁹WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, *op. cit.*, p. 398.

¹³⁰"Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War (Dec. 1936), *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. I (1975), op. cit.*, p. 180.

In addition, on 15 November 1956, Mao spoke at the Second Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC. When commenting on Sino-Soviet relations, Mao pointed out: Some comrades simply don't pay attention to dialectics and are not analytical. They say all things Soviet are good and they transplant them mechanically, and it still persists among a considerable number of comrades. They take a one-sided view of things and think everything Soviet is good and transplant it indiscriminately, bringing in quite a few things which should not have been transplanted. Among our cadres of higher and middle rank there are a few who maintain illicit relations with foreign countries, this kind of business must stop.¹³¹

Although Mao didn't mention the name in this speech, he attacked P'eng violently for his transplanting of the Soviet army-building line, considered this act as proof of his maintaining illicit relations with foreign countries, and it was a true moral degeneration. Such an accusation signalled the re-appearance of Chinese traditional anti-foreign sentiment. As a consequence, the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations had, in fact, laid down a remote cause for the removal of P'eng Te-huai at the forthcoming Lushan conference in 1959. From the viewpoint of military policy, the movement to purge P'eng was, to a certain extent, a big revision of the PLA's pro-Soviet line. While from the political viewpoint, the fall of P'eng represented the return of the PLA to the main trend - that was "putting red in command of expert" or "red" above "expert".

Generally speaking, from the time when Lin Piao became Minister of National Defence at the Lushan conference to the PLA's overall intervention in power struggle of the Cultural Revolution, apart from employing army to carry out a series of political campaigns, Lin Piao's policy within that period was to expedite the work of weaponry modernisation for

¹³¹"Speech at Second Session of Eighth Central Committee (15 Nov. 1956)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. V (1977), op. cit., pp. 339-340.*

maintaining favourable conditions to win a "people's war", and for developing nuclear weapons at full-speed so as to gain a reliable capability of nuclear deterrence. His aims were:

Firstly, to consolidate his own political position through the moulding of Mao's supreme leadership in the army under the system of "party commands the gun" and the glorious tradition of "politics takes the lead". To start with, Lin first made the PLA the model for the movement to learn from Maoist thought in a planned way, following the movement "The Whole Country Must Learn from People's Liberation Army", appealing to the masses' to learn to study Maoist thought from the People's Liberation Army, and finally propagandist Mao's charisma to a climax through the constant use of mass media. In order to strengthen people's attachment to Mao, Lin used every opportunity to prove the myth of Mao's omnipotent power and his sacred mission bestowed by God. When Lin, in his capacity as the Minister of National Defence, proceeded with "missionary works", a movement to worship Mao, he had many chances to accompany Mao on public appearance, and thus promoted his personal prestige. The term "Comrade Mao Tse-tung and his close comrade-in-arms Lin Piao" could best describe their growing intimate relationship, and the CCPCC was then called "the CCPCC led by Chairman Mao and Vice-chairman Lin"

Finally, when Sino-Soviet relations were deteriorating, the PRC had to expedite the modernisation of national defence through its own efforts so as to gain sufficient self-defensive capability in the deployment of its defensive strategy. Consequently, the development of nuclear weapons followed the policy of professionalisation, and the navy as well as the air force began a new stage of army building based on the same policy. In the early 1960s, the PRC promoted a five-year plan of modernisation for the air force and began to build their fighter planes in the style of the MIG-21 in 1965 and produce bombers

modelled after "TU-16" in the late 1960s.¹³² With regard to the navy, a shipbuilding plan was also in progress and the focus was placed on the production of missile-firing speedboats and submarines.¹³³

It was obvious that Lin Piao would satisfy most of the army's needs when this series of arms development was carried out. These were prime measures to balance politics and military, and a temporary compromise between Soviet threat and the political control over the army. However, as the inner-party struggle was brought into the open and the army's intervention in politics grew, such compromise gradually began to disappear and was finally replaced by the army's overall interventionism in politics. With the advent of the Cultural Revolution and the incident of Liu Shao-ch'i, the political role of the army reached its climax step by step.

On 9 December 1969, the *Liberation Army's Daily* published an important article written by its editorial department, which, by the brilliant use of double-talk, coded works, and veiled allusions - the Aesopian mode of communication - unmistakably gave support to a "treasonable" professional military viewpoint. Asserting that the United States and Soviet Union threatened the PRC with a "large scale aggressive war", this article called for greater attention to military preparation in order to "defend the socialist motherland". In so doing, it paid token obeisance to Mao's military thought that ideology is more important than weapons, but it also stressed, "We should not think that by putting politics in command, military affairs can be neglected... We must not think that being good in political and ideological work is everything". Accordingly, it underlined the need for "daily practical training" in military techniques in order to harden troops for "fighting big and

¹³²Richard M. Bueschel, *COMMUNIST CHINESE AIR POWER*, (New York: Praeger, 1968), Chapter II and III.

¹³³John R. Dewenter, "China Afloat", *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, No. IV, (July, 1972), pp. 738-751.

fierce battles and fighting under the most difficult circumstances". In an obvious thrust at the Maoist ideologies, who insist on intensive political indoctrination of the army, it said: "It will not do to rely solely on political lectures, more time must be given to professional military training."¹³⁴

This article represented that military professionals had been reinforcing their voice within the military establishment headed by Lin Piao when the nation faced a threat from the Soviet Union and the United States. Nevertheless, the Maoist response to the *Liberation Army's Daily* article of 9 Dec. 1969 had been swift, direct, and intense - a renewed major broadside against military professionalism. The Maoist press and Chinese internal broadcasts, since 10 Dec. 1969 had renewed the campaign to canonise Mao's military thought and had levelled severe attacks on the "bourgeois military viewpoint" advocated previously by P'eng. One Maoist publication said bluntly: "Chairman Mao's military thinking is the magic weapon in defeating the enemy".¹³⁵ The dispute between Mao and the modernising military professionals about how best to deal with the Soviet menace or possible attack, it was, in fact, the related problem of political control of the army versus exclusive military professionalism.

The professionally-minded military officers attempted to turn the PLA's line from "politics takes the lead" back to that of professional army building, but they did not succeed. The PLA had to stick to the political road, this situation remained unchanged until the death of Lin Piao.

It was noteworthy, however, at the time when the PLA was extensively intervening in the Cultural Revolution, Sino-Soviet border clashes rose sharply. Long-simmering Sino-

¹³⁴Tai Sung-an, *THE SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL DISPUTE*, op. cit., pp. 142-143.

¹³⁵PEKING REVIEW, 9 Jan. 1970, p. 15.

Soviet hostility exploded on 2 March 1969, in a brief but bloody battle over a disputed obscure island in the icebound Ussuri River, called Damansky by the Russians and Chenpao (Treasure) by the Chinese.

III. Sino-Soviet Chenpao Island Military Clashes

Around 9:00am on 2 March and 4:00am on 15 March 1969, Chinese and Soviet military units clashed on a disputed Chenpao island. There is a reason for thinking that the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969 were undertaken in order to overcome unrest in domestic politics and to create unifying atmosphere for the forthcoming Ninth CCP National Congress rather than to deal with a territorial dispute that was a non emergency issue.

After Chenpao island clash on 2 March, a series of large-scale demonstrations against "Soviet revisionist renegade clique" was quickly spread out throughout the PRC. "The works, peasants commanders and fighters of PLA, students, government functionaries and city dwellers taking party in the demonstrations on 4 March 1969, numbered from over 100,000 to several millions. Demonstrations were held in all the 29 cities... The mammoth demonstrations showed that the 700,000,000 Chinese people, the army men and civilians throughout China, guided by the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung, 'are united as one' against the enemy and are determined to safeguard the sacred territory of the motherland".¹³⁶

It is noteworthy that in less than a month after the Chenpao island military clash, the CCPCC convened the Ninth CCP National Congress in Peking between 1 and 24 April, Lin Piao delivered a "political report" in which he revealed the CCP's position on Sino-Soviet boundary question. Lin pointed out, "Like boundary questions between China and some of her other neighbouring countries, the Sino-Soviet boundary question is historical, as regards these questions our party and government have consistently stood for negotiations through diplomatic channels to reach a fair and reasonable settlement... The

¹³⁶"The Sino-Soviet Border Incident", *SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, BBC, part 3, 6 March 1969 FE/3017/A2/1*.

Sino-Soviet boundary question is the product of Tsarist Russian imperialist aggression against China,... We still maintained that these treaties be taken as the basis for the settlement of boundary question".¹³⁷

Since the CCP decided to maintain the old treaties as the basis for the settlement of boundary question, and prior to 2 March 1969, there had been many cases of military encounters in the same area between the two nations, as the CCP proclaimed, "between 23 Jan. 1967 and 2 March 1969, Soviet frontier guards intruded into the area of Chenpao island on 16 occasions and on several occasions wounding Chinese frontier guards... Between the end of Nov. 1967 and 5 Jan. 1968, Soviet frontier guards on 18 occasions intruded into the area of Chilichin island (north of Chenpao island, Heilungkiang province), on many occasions killing and wounding Chinese people... Soviet frontier guards also intruded into the area of Kapotzu island (south of Chenpao island)... on many occasion, and , on a still greater number of occasions, Soviet military planes intruded into Chinese air space over Heilungkiang province".¹³⁸ If Sino-Soviet border clashes could arouse nation-wide anti-Soviet movements, then this should have been in the 1967 case or even earlier.

Furthermore, from the military point of view, Chenpao island did not possess a major strategic position. Yet, according to the scale of fighting, which "with two armoured vehicles, a lorry and a command car, sent by the Soviet frontier authorities, flagrantly intruded into the area of Chenpao island on 2 March ";¹³⁹ "the Soviet sent dozens of tanks

¹³⁷"Lin Piao Report to the 9th Party Congress (1 April 1969)", *CHINESE POLITICS - DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS*, Vol. II, (South Carolina: Uni. of South Carolina Press, 1986), pp. 70-82.

¹³⁸"Chinese View of Frontier Incident", *SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS*, BBC, Part 3, 4 March 1969, FE/3015/A2/2-3; Feng Ying-chun & Huang Wei-min, "We Witnessed the New Tsar's Anti-China Atrocities", *CHINA RECONSTRUCTS*, Vol. XVIII, No. 8, Aug. 1968, pp. 28-29.

¹³⁹*Ibid.*, FE/3015/A2/2.

and armoured vehicles intruded into the Chenpao island on 15 March ",¹⁴⁰ it neither possessed any strategic or tactical significance. Nevertheless, from the political point of view, it is undoubtedly that the Chenpao island military clashes have special significance, that is, Mao seized on the event, arousing the masses to "safeguard the territory of the motherland", to create a unifying atmosphere for the convene of Ninth CCP National Congress and, more important, to solve the social upheaval and soothe chaos situation brought by the Cultural Revolution and the purge of Liu Shao-ch'i.¹⁴¹

Unity, Mao said in his remarks to the first Plenum of the Ninth CCPCC, on 28 April 1969, was indeed the theme of the congress. The desire to avoid further chaos may have been made more urgent by the tense situation which existed on China's Northeast border with the Soviet Union,... In order to attain victory, it is necessary to have more people... people from all quarters no matter which mountain stronghold they are from, no matter which province they are from, and no matter which direction,... It is always better to unite more people. there are people who do not necessarily share our opinions.¹⁴²

Mao recognised, "Our foundation is not solid... neither all nor the absolute majority, but, I'm afraid, a considerable number of factories are not under the leadership of genuine Marxists and the masses of workers".¹⁴³

Furthermore, from the "July 23 Notice" and "The August 28 Directive of the CCPCC" could also realise the political importance of the Chenpao island military clashes. It was

¹⁴⁰"Chinese Account of 15th March Incident on the Ussuri River", *SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS*, BBC, Part 3, 18 March 1969, FE/3027/A2/1.

¹⁴¹The 12th Plenum of 8th CCPCC between 13 and 31 Oct. 1968 ratified the "Report on the Examination of the Armies of the Renegade, Traitor, and Scab Liu Shao-chi". See James T. Myer (ed.), *CHINESE POLITICS-DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS*, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 389.

¹⁴²Mao Tse-tung, "Speech to a Central Committee Meeting (28 April 1969), *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 2216.

¹⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 2215.

quite obvious that Mao attempted to seize Sino-Soviet border clashes to re-establish social order and to soothe discord situation.

"July 23 Notice", which was personally approved by Mao, was one of many reasons for believing that the crisis was started and kept in being by Peking for the purpose of promoting domestic unity. The notice indicated a series of extremely serious counterrevolutionary crimes as follows:

1. "Organising professional teams for armed struggle to engage in beating, smashing, robbing, and unwarranted arrest, thus endangering the life, property, and security of the people and destroying the order of the social revolution".
2. "Refusing to implemented the Central Committee's policy of great revolutionary alliance and the revolutionary 'three-in-one' combination... by creating mountain strongholds and splinter groups; putting forward the counterrevolutionary slogan of 'seizing political power by arms' to launch a counter-power seizure struggle against the proletariat".
3. "Attacking PLA organs and troops, seizing PLA's weapons and equipment, and beating up, kidnapping, and killing PLA commanders and fighters".
4. "Sabotaging railways, highways, and bridges, mounting armed attacks on trains; seizing transportation facilities; robbing the travellers of their property".
5. "Robbing without permission,... Seizing the state property in large quantities".
6. "Occupying areas by force, constructing position for armed struggles".

7. "Inciting and threatening workers into work and production stoppage, inciting peasants to come to cities for armed struggle"¹⁴⁴.

Soon after the "July 23 notice", the CCPCC issued a directive, also known as "The August 28 Directive", to Revolutionary Committees at all level in the provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions along the border; revolutionary people of all national minority groups; all commanders and soldiers of the PLA in border area. The Directive pointed out: "In order to safeguard our mother country, our border, and the great achievement of our Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution... the Central Committee of the party commands you:"

1. "Resolutely respond to chairman Mao's great call to safe guard the mother country and prepare for war".

2. "In the face of powerful enemies, unite all the army and the people as one person,... strengthen the unity within the army, between the army and the people, the army and the government, among revolutionary people of different national minority groups, and consolidate the leadership of the revolutionary committee, all actions disrupting unity, bourgeois factionalism, and to firmly and thoroughly attack and eliminate all class enemies who instigate and disrupt unity between the military and the people and unity of the national minority groups... no violation of discipline is allowed in the army; no one is allowed to leave his post without the consent of his superiors; no one is allowed to travel to exchange revolutionary experience. Those who will not correct themselves in spite of persuasion shall be punished severely".

¹⁴⁴"The Central Committee's 23 July 1969 Notice", *PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1969 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 2218.

3. "All mass organisations which have membership of different professions shall be disband membership, any organisation which tries to rebuild a "mountaintop" or recruit new rank and file should be disbanded at once".
4. "Resolutely and thoroughly implement the 'July 23 Notice' stop factional armed struggle, immediately and unconditionally, disband professional armed struggle pots, and confiscate weapons, if armed struggle troops offer persistent resistance at points which they have occupied by forces, the PLA should encircle them, launch political warfare against them and confiscate their weapons by force".
5. "No one is allowed to attack the PLA; no one is allowed to loot weapons, military equipment, and vehicles".
6. "Any disruption of railway, highway or waterway transportation or telecommunications should be regarded as counterrevolutionary acts and should be investigated and punished accordingly".
7. "Resolutely grasp revolution and stimulate production and support the war front,... all who left their production and work posts should return to their units to grasp revolution, stimulate production, promote work and war preparedness".
8. "Landlords, the rich, traitors, bad elements, and rightists who have not yet been properly reformed should be corrected through labour under the strict control of the revolutionary masses"¹⁴⁵.

¹⁴⁵"The 28 Aug. 1969 Directive on Preparations for War", *PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1969 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. IV, *op. cit.*, pp. 2219-2220.

The "July 23 Notice" and the "August 28 Directive" had, in fact, revealed the true state of Chenpao Island military clashes. Mao used "safeguard motherland " as a card to "safeguard great achievements of Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution". With the exception of item one, all regulation was formulated to steady social order in view of the social and army turmoil since the Cultural Revolution. The real aim behind the border clashes was "for the purpose of promoting domestic unity".

Not surprisingly, the PLA's elite did not express their military standpoint in Chenpao island military clashes. However, the PLA joined the masses and openly supported the Mao and Lin Piao's foreign policy against "Soviet revisionist renegade clique". For lack of direct evidence, it is not possible to say that the Sino-Soviet military clashes on 2 and 16 March were incited by Mao Tse-tung, but, it was undoubtedly that Mao seized this opportunity to conduct political campaigns throughout the country to achieve his political purpose.

IV. The Crisis of the Vietnam War and the Development of the Section Army's Role

During the developing crisis of the Vietnam War in 1965, a controversy over a military with strong political flavour broke out among the PLA leadership.

In February 1965, the Vietnam war crisis began when the U.S. bombarded North Vietnam on a large scale and dispatched more troops to aid South Vietnam. In view of the fact that the situation was deteriorating and the possibility that the war could extend to mainland China, an article *The People of Vietnam Are Bound to Win, whereas U.S. imperialism Is Bound to Lose* was published by *Red Flag* in the name of "commentator". It indicated that "China and Vietnam are two closely related and mutually dependent neighbouring countries. The U.S imperialist invasion of Vietnam means the invasion of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese people would neither ignore such provocation nor sit back and watch without going to the rescue. Six hundred and fifty million Chinese people have made all the necessary preparations to aid Vietnam against U.S. imperialism with a counter-attack in self-defence".¹⁴⁶

In the meantime, the *Red Flag* carried five articles about revolution in Asia from the viewpoint of Lenin, including *Asia is the New Source of World Revolutionary Storm*, *The Awakening of Asia*, *The Backward Europe and Advanced Asia*, *The People of All East Nations Begin to Intervene in the World's Destiny*, and *The Masses of the Labour of All Colonial Countries Will Definitely Bring About a Gigantic Revolutionary Influence at the Next Stage of World Revolution*.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁶"*The People of Vietnam Is Bound to Win, whereas U.S. imperialism Is Bound to Lose*", *RED FLAG*, No. 2, 1965, p. 11.

¹⁴⁷*RED FLAG*, No. 2, 1965, pp. 3-8.

In addition, *Red Flag* carried an article entitled *Expel U.S. aggressor from Vietnam*, again, in the name of "commentator", it indicated that "The U.S. imperialist invasion of Vietnam is an important step for carrying out its global counterrevolutionary strategy. The 'specific war' that U.S. imperialism conducted in the south of Vietnam was not only for enslaving the southern Vietnamese, but for strengthening the suppression of national liberation and the people's revolutionary movement in other areas of the world".¹⁴⁸

Unlike previous articles, this paper also made a serious condemnation of the Soviet Union. It pointed out "the modern revisionists mixed up with the rest of the world in the line of supporting the Vietnamese by raising the flag of 'supporting the Vietnamese', nevertheless they still insisted on the general line that the world is dominated by two superpowers. Their act towards the Vietnamese patriotic struggle to resist U.S. aggression was a false support, and real betrayal. The real intention was agitating against U.S. imperialism to conduct an aggressive war policy".¹⁴⁹

There was great divergence in the policy to aid Vietnam among the high-ranking leadership of the PLA. Lo Jui-ch'ing, Chief of the General Staff, issued a paper *Commemorate the Victory over German Fascism, Carry the Struggle against U.S. Imperialism through to the End*¹⁵⁰ in May of the same year, Lo asserted in this paper that the PRC should adopt vigorous line in dealing with Vietnamese issues, he pointed out: The Chinese people resolutely support the struggle of the Vietnamese to resist U.S. aggression, and save the nation and the people of all other countries against U.S.

¹⁴⁸"*Expel U.S. Aggressor out of Vietnam*", *RED FLAG*, No. 4, 1965, p. 10.

¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

¹⁵⁰Lo Jui-ch'ing, "*Commemorate the Victory over German Fascist, Carry the Struggle against U.S. Imperialism through to the End*", *RED FLAG*, No. 4, 1965, pp. 1-14; "*Peking's Chief of Staff Urges a Hawkish Line on Vietnam (10 May 1965)*", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 1205-1213.

imperialism. We not only fully support these struggles politically and morally, and help them materially to the limit of our capabilities, but are also prepared to send our men to fight together with the people of Vietnam when they need us. This attitude of ours is firm and unshakeable. We will go on supporting and aiding the Vietnamese people, whether or not it enlarges the war, we are not frightened by the U.S. imperialists bombing threats or their clamour for enlarging the war. Our opposition to U.S. imperialism has always been clear-cut.¹⁵¹ History has taught us that fear cannot prevent wars, to say nothing of eliminating them. In order to eliminate wars, it is necessary to wage wars. In order to eliminate counterrevolutionary wars, it is necessary to wage revolutionary wars.¹⁵²

What deserves most attention is that in this paper, Lo stressed: The historical experience of the anti-fascist war also teaches us that it is imperative to distinguish enemies from friends, make use of contradictions, win over the majority, unite with all the forces that can be united, and form the broadest possible united front against the main enemy.¹⁵³

Lo did not express clearly that the pro-Soviet line would be reapplied to oppose U.S. imperialism as the main enemy, but what it implied was the intention to unite with Soviet forces and form the broadest united front against the main enemy. Lo indicated: Holding aloft the banner of Lenin and Stalin, the Soviet Red Army fought valiantly in an indomitable revolutionary spirit, advanced wave upon wave, and brilliantly performed immortal deeds in playing its glorious role as the main force against fascism.

The people of the world will always honour the heroic exploits of the Soviet people and army, who reared such heroes as Zoya Kosmodemiyanskaya and Aleksandr Matrosov.

¹⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 14, and *ibid.*, p. 1212.

¹⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 10, and *ibid.*, p. 1210.

¹⁵³*Ibid.*, p. 6, and *ibid.*, p. 1208.

They will always honour that valiant record of the CPSU headed by Stalin in leading the war.¹⁵⁴

One of Stalin's major contributions was that he correctly analysed the current situation in the international class struggle, identified the principal contradictions in the world arena and the principal enemy of the world's people, and was therefore able to advance the correct slogan of an anti-fascist united front and to rally all the anti-fascist forces in a united force. As a result, the imperialist anti-Soviet alliance was shattered with the establishment of an anti-fascist alliance, and the imperialist encirclement of the Socialist Soviet Union was broken with the achievement of counter-encirclement of the fascist forces of aggression by the world-wide forces against aggression; thus a fundamental change was brought about in the strategic situation which became favourable to ourselves and unfavourable to the enemy. This was a vitally important factor in the great victory of the anti-fascist war.¹⁵⁵

Since Lo Jui-ch'ing implied that the PRC should form a united front with Soviet forces, he therefore manifested his resolution to fight in Vietnam war crisis. Lo reaffirmed one of Mao's principles, "We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack". "We shall wipe out anybody who dares to attack us. On whatever scale the United States attacks us, we will reply on the same scale".¹⁵⁶

When Lo published this paper, the *People's Daily* also carried an article *The Historical Experience of Anti-fascist War* under the name of the "editorial department", and reprinted Lo's article *Commemorate the Victory over German Fascism! Carry the*

¹⁵⁴*Ibid.*, p. 2, and *ibid.*, p. 1206.

¹⁵⁵*Ibid.*, p. 6, and *ibid.*, p. 1208.

¹⁵⁶*Ibid.*, p. 14, and *ibid.*, p. 1212.

Struggle against U.S. Imperialism through to the End. The former had a most critical condemnation of "Khrushchev's revisionists" by saying, "they don't mean to unite with all the forces in the world against U.S. imperialism, but on the contrary, unite with U.S. imperialism wholeheartedly against the people of the whole world", "what Khrushchev is yelling now - the slogans such as 'unite to oppose the enemy' and 'make joint actions' - is sheer lies", "Khrushchev's revisionists flattered Khrushchev in a great deal, and try very hard to deny and belittle Stalin's influence in the anti-fascist war", "they turn Khrushchev the clown into the hero of the anti-fascist war"¹⁵⁷.

Lin Piao, in his capacity as Minister of National Defence issued an article *Long Live the Victory of People's War*¹⁵⁸ in September of the same year. Outwardly, this article was in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the victory of anti-Japanese war, but inwardly it had substantial political significance. It was directed against Lo's paper *Commemorate the Victory over German Fascism! Carry the Struggle against U.S. Imperialism through to the End*, and explicitly stated PRC's official stand. The focal points of this article included:

1. The war of resistance against Japan constituted a historical stage in China's new democratic revolution. The line of our party during the war of resistance aimed not only at winning victory in the war but also at laying the foundation for the nation-wide victory of the new democratic revolution making it possible to carry out socialism.
2. The concrete analysis of concrete conditions and the concrete resolution of concrete

¹⁵⁷"The Historical Experience of Anti-fascist War", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 9 May 1965; *RED FLAG*, No. 5, 1965, pp. 15-25.

¹⁵⁸Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War (3 Sep. 1965)", *RED FLAG*, No. 12, 1967, pp. 17-47; "Peking's Defence Minister States the Maoist Line on Vietnam (3 September 1965)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 1222-1239.

contradictions are the living soul of Marxism-Leninism. Mao Tse-tung has invariably been able to single out the principal contradiction from among a complexity of contradictions, analyse the two aspects of this principal contradiction concretely, and, "pressing on irresistibly from this commanding height", successfully solve the problem of understanding and handling the various contradictions.

3. Correctly apply the line and policy of the united front. Within the united front the communist party must maintain its ideological, political, and organisational independence, adhere to the principle of independence and initiative; and insist on its leading role.

4. To rely on the peasants, build rural base areas, and use the countryside to encircle and finally capture the cities. As far back as the period of the first revolutionary civil war, Mao Tse-tung had pointed out that the peasant question occupied an extremely important position in the Chinese revolution, that the bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism was in essence proletarian and the bourgeois-democratic revolution was to give leadership to the peasant struggle.

5. During the anti-Japanese war, the PLA staunchly performed the three tasks set out by Mao Tse-tung, namely, fighting, mass work, and production, and it was at the same time a fighting force, a political work force, and a production corps. The essence of Mao Tse-tung's army building is that in building a people's army prominence must be given to politics, that is, the army must first and foremost be built on a political basis. Politics is the commander, politics is the soul of everything. Political work is the lifeline of the PLA.

6. Carry out the strategy and tactics of people's war, Mao Tse-tung enumerated the basic tactics of guerrilla warfare as follows: "The enemy advance, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue". Mao has provided

a masterly summary of the strategy and tactics of people's war. You fight in your way and we fight in ours; we fight when we can and move away when we can't.

7. Adhere to the policy of self-reliance. The liberation of masses is accomplished by the masses themselves - that is a basic principle of Marxism-Leninism. Revolution or people's war in any country is the business of the masses in that country and should be carried out primarily by their own efforts; there is no other way. The people of the world invariably support each other in their struggle against imperialism and its lackeys. Those countries which have won victory are duty bound to support and aid the peoples who have not yet done so. Nevertheless, foreign aid can only play a supplementary role. To make a revolution and to fight a people's war and be victorious, it is imperative to adhere to the policy of self-reliance, rely on the strength of the masses in one's own country.

8. The international significance of the theory of people's war. Mao's theory of the establishment of a rural revolutionary base area and the encirclement of the cities from the countryside is of outstanding and universal practical importance for the present revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed nations and peoples, and particularly for the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America against imperialism and its lackeys. The Chinese revolution provides a successful lesson for making a thoroughgoing national-democratic revolution under the leadership of the proletariat; it likewise provides a successful lesson for the timely transition from the national-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution under the leadership of the proletariat.

9. The Khrushchev revisionists are now actively preaching that socialism can be built without the proletariat and without a genuinely revolutionary party armed with the advance proletarian ideology, and they have cast the fundamental tenets of Marxism-

Leninism to the four winds. The revisionists' purpose is solely to divert the oppressed nations from their struggle against imperialism and sabotage their national-democratic solution, all in the service of imperialism. The Khrushchev Revisionists are betrayers of people's war. The fundamental reason why the Khrushchev revisionists are opposed to people's war is that they have no faith in the masses and are afraid of U.S. imperialism, of war, and of revolution.

10. Defeat U.S. imperialism and its lackeys by people's war. History has proved and will go on proving that people's war is the most effective weapon against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. All revolutionary people will learn to wage people's war against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. They will take up arms learn to fight battles, and become skilled in waging people's war though they have not done so before.

Lin Piao adhered to the anti-superpowers policy, i.e., anti-U.S. and anti-Soviet Union. Lin said: "U.S. imperialism proclaimed that they have replaced Germany, Japan and Italian Fascism after World War II, attempting to build a great Empire of United States of America and put the whole world under their enslavement and control", "they are the most arrogant aggressors and the most fierce common enemy to the people of the whole world". As for "Soviet revisionists", Lin Piao accused them of being "the accomplices of imperialist bandit", "closely colluding with U.S. imperialism", he also argued "the substance of Khrushchev's revisionist general line is nothing but asking the oppressed people and oppressed nation to disarm themselves, and asking the nation which had already obtained independence to disarm itself, allowing themselves to be killed by the fully armed U.S. imperialists"¹⁵⁹. The strongly worded criticism against the Soviet Union revealed that there was no possibility of the PRC compromising with the Soviet Union in

¹⁵⁹*Ibid.*

any way.

Lin also reaffirmed the PRC's determination to wage a people's war against U.S. imperialism. He indicated, "Chinese people have their own ways to resist U.S. imperialist aggression, our ways have no secret really. The most important one is to mobilise and rely on the people, to carry out the policy of the whole nation in arms and to conduct a people's war". To counter the U.S. nuclear threat, Lin made the following comments, "What U.S. imperialism use to scare people is no more than its nuclear weapons", "nuclear weapons should never be applied without deliberate consideration", "U.S. imperialism no longer controls the monopoly of nuclear weapons, she has it, so have others. If she should threat others with nuclear weapons, this means she also puts herself under the threat of nuclear weapons from others"¹⁶⁰. As a matter of fact, Lin Piao had expressed explicitly that the PRC would wage the defensive strategic plan of people's war against possible U.S. aggression.

Apparently there was a great divergence between the viewpoints of Lo Jui-ch'ing and that of Lin Piao. Lo asserted, "The historical experience of the anti-fascist war also teaches us that the strategy of active defence is the only correct strategy for socialists countries in fighting imperialist wars of aggression".¹⁶¹ Lo applied the definition "active defence" from Mao's article *The Strategic Issue of Chinese Revolutionary War* to support his own argument. According to Mao's classification of defensive operations, "active defence is also known as offensive defence or defence through decisive engagement. Passive defence is also known as purely defensive defence or pure defence. Passive defence is actually a

¹⁶⁰*Ibid.*

¹⁶¹Lo Jui-ch'ing, "Commemorate the Victory over German Fascist, Carry the Struggle against U.S. Imperialism through to the End", *RED FLAG*, No. 12, pp. 6-7; "Peking's Chief of Staff Urges a Hawkish Line on Vietnam (10 May 1965)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. II, *op. cit.*, p. 1208.

spurious kind of defence, the only real defence is active defence, defence for the purpose of counterattacking and taking the offensive".¹⁶² Lo further pointed out "Operationally, the strategy of active defence should not have the holding or capturing of territory as its main objective. It should be to concentrate superior forces to destroy the enemy's effective".¹⁶³ "The strategy of active defence does not stop with driving the aggressor out of the country, but requires strategic pursuit to destroy the enemy at his standing point, to destroy him in his nest".¹⁶⁴

In comparing Lo Jui-ch'ing and Lin Piao's different arguments. Lo believed that once war between the PRC and the U.S. broke out because of the Vietnamese issue, PRC should learn from Soviet experience of how she counterattacked Germany during World War II so as to carry out the strategic pursuit and bring the battlefield to U.S. territory when the situation was turned. Whereas Lin Piao argued that the eight years experience that the PRC had accumulated in the anti-Japanese war would be a valuable weapon to fight against the U.S. In his paper *Long Live the Victory of People's War*, Lin gave a wide coverage in analysing the environment and condition at the time of the anti-Japanese war, and introducing the strategy and tactics of people's war in depth, Lin advocated proceeding with the struggle line of a "united front" and relying on peasants' strength to build the bases of agricultural society, organising a new style of people's army and carrying out the strategy and tactics of "people's war", insisting on self-reliance and waging "people's war" against "U.S. imperialism and its lackeys".¹⁶⁵ What's more, Lin indicated:

¹⁶²Ibid., p. 7; "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War (Dec. 1936)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. I (1965), op. cit., p. 764; "Peking's Chief of Staff Urges a Hawkish Line on Vietnam (10 May 1965)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, op. cit., p. 1209.

¹⁶³Ibid., p. 7, and *ibid.*, p. 1209.

¹⁶⁴Ibid., p. 7, and *ibid.*, p. 1209.

¹⁶⁵Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War (3 Sep. 1965)", *RED FLAG*, No. 10, 1967, pp. 12-13; "Peking's Defence Minister States the Maoist Line on Vietnam (3 September 1965)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 1229-1230.

"Why were the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies able to grow big and strong from being small and weak and to score such great victory in the war of resistance against Japan? The fundamental reason was that the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies were founded on comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of army building. They were armies of a new type, a people's army which wholeheartedly serves the interests of the people... The essence of comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of army building is that in building a people's army, prominence must be given to politics, that is, the army must first and foremost be built on a political basis, politics is the commander, politics is the soul of everything. Political work is the lifeline of our army... The experience of the people's war in China shows that a people's army created in accordance with comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of army building is incomparably strong and invincible... Guided by comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory on building a people's army, our army was under the absolute leadership of the CCP and most loyally carried out the party's Marxist-Leninist line and policies"¹⁶⁶.

While Lo Jui-ch'ing asserted, based on strategic considerations, that the PRC should reconcile with Soviet Union to a certain extent to avoid the inferior strategic position of making enemies with both sides in the course of the increasing crisis of the Vietnam war. Lo also asserted that instead of waging a people's war to lure the enemy in deep, the PRC should take the offensive initiative, dispatching troops to Vietnam to prevent the war from spreading to mainland China. This was the main reason why Lo didn't mention a word of people's war in the entire paper. However, if the PRC should follow the example of the Korea war to aid Vietnam against U.S. aggression, it would be of the first importance that the military training must be reinforced in the army to increase its fighting capacity. In that case, the army would treat the handling of external threat as a task of top priority, and

¹⁶⁶*Ibid.*

correspondingly reduce their non-military affairs in the domestic realm. It was predicated that this development would raise military professionalism and weaken the political role of the PLA.

While Lo Jui-ch'ing issued the paper *Commemorate the Victory over German Fascism! Carry the Struggle against U.S. Imperialism through to the End*, Lin Piao had been promoting the "movement to learn from Mao Tse-tung's thought" for a long time and setting off a nation-wide movement "the whole nation should learn from the liberation army". The purpose of these two non-military political campaigns were not only for the establishment of the supreme authority of Mao himself, but for the strengthening of Lin's own political position. By publishing the article *Long Live People's War* in his capacity as the Minister of National Defence, Lin was in fact negating the assertion of Lo Jui-ch'ing, the Chief of General Staff. Lin's reaffirmation of Mao Tse-tung's theory of political army building revealed that the army would continue to play an important role in non-military affairs and to carry out its political tasks.

At the day when Lin issued the article *Long Live the Victory of People's War*, Lo also delivered a talk *The People Have Defeated Fascism And Will Certainly Triumph Over U.S. Imperialism* at the conference in celebration of the 20th anniversary of the anti-Japanese war,¹⁶⁷ nevertheless, departing from his usual stand, Lo approved Lin's viewpoints and highly praised his article *Long Live the Victory of People's War*. He indicated: In his (Lin Piao's) article *Long Live the Victory People's War* written in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of victory in the war of resistance against Japan, Lin Piao has given a systematic and penetrating explanation of the rich experience gained

¹⁶⁷Lo Jui-ch'ing, "The People Defeated Japanese Fascism and They Can Certainly Defeat the U.S. Imperialism Too (3 Sep. 1965)", *NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY*, 4 SEP. 1965; "The Chief of Staff Compromises (3 Sep. 1965)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 1239-1246.

by the Chinese people in their more than 20 years of people's war and of comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's war and its profound international significance. In connection with the present struggles against U.S. imperialism and modern revisionism, he has shown that the Khrushchev revisionists are betrayers of people's war and that the people's war waged by the revolutionary peoples is the victorious path for defeating U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. We should all study his article seriously. We must firmly oppose the Khrushchev revisionists perfidy in trying to deceive the people of the world.

This talk of Lo's in fact had abandoned his earlier arguments in the paper *Commemorate the Victory over German Fascism! Carry the Struggle against U.S. Imperialism through to the End*. As a matter of fact, the controversy between Lo and Lin over the policy of the Vietnam war stemmed from their conflict over political power as early as 1960 when Lin Piao put forth the "Summit Theory" and leftist slogans about the "Highest and Liveliest", Lo disputed these as saying "In that case, Marxism-Leninism and Maoism won't develop any more. If we regard the revolutionary theories of leaders as summits, this will go against Maoism. If say anything is the highest and liveliest, then it means there is second to it. I don't think Chairman Mao will agree with this".¹⁶⁸ Lin emphasised politics and the theory that the "pen is mightier than the sword", while Lo laid emphasis on military training and strategy by saying, "It is significant to do well in military training. We are now depending on military training for the preparation of war". Lin denigrated the "Grand Military Contest" in 1964, saying it had negative effect on politics. He trumpeted that politics should take command. Lo refuted the proposition that with politics in the lead, and military mission could be completed. "Otherwise", Lo said, "if we talk about the prominence of politics and have no progress in our work, then that brand of politics is no

¹⁶⁸Yen Chia-ch'i and Kao Kao, *THE TEN-YEAR HISTORY OF THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION*, (Taipei: Institute of Current China Studies, 1988), p. 176.

good".¹⁶⁹

Outwardly, the conflict between Lin Piao and Lo Jui-ch'ing could be regarded as the conflict between two different directions of army building, i.e., Lin laid the stress on revolutionisation, while Lo emphasised the importance of modernisation. But, inwardly, it was the conflict of their personalities and of power distribution. When Lin Piao was appointed by Mao Tse-tung to replace P'eng Te-huai as the Minister of National Defence for expediting the army-building program, Lo Jui-ch'i also succeeded Huang K'e-ch'eng as the Chief of General Staff at the same time. In addition, Lo had enjoyed the trust of Mao Tse-tung for he was in charge of Mao's personal security affairs for a long time, which made Lin feel insecure in his climbing up the political ladder. Lo once said, "just because I don't care a damn of what Lin Piao said, I become the stumbling block in his seizure of power, he tried to suppress me a few times, but he failed, so he has made up his mind to destroy me".¹⁷⁰ However, the final arbitration of their conflict did not lay in how the army should be built up, but whose course of action could better meet the political goal of Mao Tse-tung and who could be most beneficial to Mao's control over the army. Lo ran counter to Lin Piao and closely collaborated with Liu Shao-ch'i, this laid himself open to the fate of elimination. Mao considered that military power was all for himself to monopolise and that the military commander should be his reliable cadet who would never collude with the enemy. And thus the tragic lot of Lo was doomed at the time when Liu Shao-ch'i openly expressed that "Lo Jui-ch'i is the successor to the Minister of National Defence". Lin Piao was a pawn that Mao used to control and reorganise the army, Mao relied on him for bringing a strong political colour to the army in order to ensure that the army would carry out the political task Mao entrusted. Above all, one of his targets was to overthrow Liu Shao-ch'i. Since Lo opposed Lin, Mao had no other choice but to

¹⁶⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 192-193.

¹⁷⁰"Commemorate the Respectful Comrade Lo Jui-ch'ing", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 1 Sep. 1978.

sacrifice Lo. The big debate over the military policy of the Vietnam war was merely another confrontation in the power struggle.

In March 1966, Lo Jui-ch'ing was eliminated under the charge of "being opposed and hostile to Maoist thought, slandering and attacking comrade Mao Tse-tung", "promoting the military line of the bourgeoisie to go against that of Chairman Mao's, and launching the "grand military contest" without authorisation to resist putting politics in command".¹⁷¹ Lo's fall from the power proved the fact that the influence of professionalism advocated by the army had once again being suppressed after the fall of P'eng Te-huai.

Lin set off the "movement to learn from Lei Feng" among soldiers beginning in 1963. The so-called "to learn from Lei Feng" was in fact designed to conduct a series of propaganda campaigns such as "study Chairman Mao's writing, follow his teachings and act according to his instructions, be chairman Mao's good fighters" etc., - a campaign to follow Mao Tse-tung blindly. Subsequently in early 1964, Mao appealed to the movement "the whole nation should learn from the Liberation Army". This series of movements was aimed at achieving the goal that the PLA emulate Lei Feng and the whole nation emulate the PLA in a way of political socialisation in the hope that the entire army and the people of the whole country could be Chairman Mao's good fighter like Lei Feng. After Lin took the post of Minister of Defence, in addition to the political tasks that the army executed had increased by greatly, the army's system of political work was introduced to schools, factories, enterprises, and even to the party and political organisations, and military cadres were sent to these newly established departments of political work,¹⁷² thus military

¹⁷¹ "The CCPCC's Report about the Faults of Lo Jui-ch'ing (30 April, 1966)", *THE COLLECTIONS OF THE ORIGINAL DATA OF CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION*, (Taipei: Chinese Communist Studies Press, 1979), pp. 67-77.

¹⁷² *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 7 June 1964.

influence expanded throughout the whole country. This trend would inevitably bring the army to the road of universal politicisation, which was in conflict with Lo Jui-ch'ing's attempt of promoting the "grand military contest" among the army. The army-building policy during that period was "red commands expert", the importance of "expert" fell more dramatically when the military rank system was abolished in May 1965. Since Lo Jui-ch'ing could not understand the real intention of Mao Tse-tung regarding the role of army, his fate of being eliminated was inevitable.

When the power-seizure struggle and the debate over "red" and "expert" between Lin Piao and Lo Jui-ch'ing reached an end, at the time of the rising Vietnam war crisis, an incomparable "political storm" was brewing inside the PRC, that was the world-famous "Great Cultural Revolution". Mao Tse-tung was able to set off this movement precisely because that the PRC didn't send troops to aid Vietnam against U.S. aggression, he used the army as a means to intervene in the Cultural Revolution for achieving the supreme political aim of purging dissidents, and thus the army's political influence expanded unprecedentedly during the period of the Cultural Revolution. Mao allied himself with Lin Piao, and the army became the most powerful weapon for the seizure and preservation of power.

Chapter IV. The Party Line and the Political Power and Role of the PLA

Since an obvious hierarchical character existed in the PRC's structure, the elite's decision-making and the behaviour of the army and party were closely linked with the transition of the political system. It brought about a change of political regime to a certain degree, when a vehement factional conflict occurred and different viewpoints emerged among the elite, and vice versa. The transitional changes in the political system also influenced the elite's viewpoint and their behaviour.

In a communist society, wealth, privilege and power were always connected to one another. Discrepancy of power distribution also reflected the distribution of wealth and privilege. After their success in revolution, the communists transformed themselves into a new class by the use of their special status, usurping state property and turning it into that of the party's and those of the bureaucratic clique gathering around the party. This direct link between wealth, privilege and power meant that the power pursuers in the communist society had stronger motivation than the politicians in multi-societies.

The high risk competitiveness of the political structure meant that the degree of conflict and violence among the PRC elite or political line reached an astonishing level. Once the elite's demand for power was greater than their conscious and objective judgement, the line struggle became inevitable. Since there was no so called rule of "power competition" in the PRC regime, it became very risky to win power, because the price paid when losing power could be everything, even a person's life. The situation was complicated at the time when the power struggle confronted political right of succession or involved the possession of final and supreme authoritative leadership.

The PRC was a state with a rudimentary political system and primitive structure differentiation. This characteristic restricted the development of the rule of law and judicial review of arbitration organs or groups, and yet the arbitrator of the state was cast into a moral authority by rigid ideological dogmatism. Consequently, given the lack of arbitration organs or groups, line conflict or struggle in the PRC relied on a supreme moral authority (Mao Tse-tung, the "wise leader", the "greatest teacher" and the "great helmsman") to be the final arbitrator. The character of such decision-making carried a strong personal colour in solving the internal conflict. The standard between right and wrong was controlled by the personal opinions of Mao or the authorities led by Mao.

After the establishment of PRC's regime, Mao possessed a dual role of arbitrator and competitor in the Chinese Communist Party.¹ Generally speaking, Mao almost singly played the sole role of arbitrator from the Seventh CCP National Congress to the commencement of the Lushan conference in July 1959. After the Lushan conference, the function of Mao's status as arbitrator began to fall, whereas his status as competitor assumed importance. After Mao played the role of the inner-Party competitor, he became the factional leader and allied temporarily with other elites of the party and army to carry out power-seizure struggles against those who threatened his leadership.

The outstanding positions that the leaders of revolutionary generation possessed in the party and army and the power they had was not given by Mao, but gained by their own outstanding personal achievement during the revolutionary period, when they were basically in equal position with Mao before the Seven CCP National Congress which brought Maoist thought into the Party Constitution. However since that conference, Mao was cast as an "ideological authority", and because of the special function of ideology in

¹The so-called "dual role" was a classification of an ideal type, and in the actual political campaign this dual role overlapped.

China, as argued in the Third section of Chapter One, this enabled Mao to occupy a dominating position in confrontation with inner-party elite. No rivals could attack Mao in the ideological superstructure for this would have caused the destruction of the "ideological authority" and would have shaken the structural legitimacy of the PRC's regime. This accounted for Mao's unshakeable position even at the time when he faced counterattack from the inner-party elite. Under this form of political structure, any specific line, faction or power struggle could not have totally defeated Mao.

Moreover, because of the specific characteristics of China's peasant society, the attitude of keeping aloof from all political affairs characteristic of the intellectuals, and the blind worship of Mao's personal charisma by the low educational broad masses gave Mao great opportunity to play politics. Apart from the above-mentioned reasons, another more important reason giving Mao the power to set off a nation-wide political campaign, manipulating the PLA and arousing the masses to carry out power-seizure struggle during the Cultural Revolution, was that the PRC's elite of the party and army offered Mao this opportunity to do so for they wanted to maintain structural legitimacy and attempted to obtain some personal interest from it.

According to Mao Tse-tung's discussion with responsible local comrades during his tour of inspection between mid-August and 12 September 1971, there were ten major line struggles in the history of Chinese Communist Party. These discussions were later conveyed to the following units in the name of Chung-fa No.12 top-secret document of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist - each province, municipality (directly under the Central Government), autonomous region, party committee of each military region, provincial military district and field army, party committees of each general department of the Military Affairs Commission and each service branch, leading groups of each department and ministry under the Central Committee and the State council, and core

groups of the party.

The ten major line struggles³ in the history of Chinese Communist Party were stated by Mao as follows:

1. Ch'en Tu-hsiu's right opportunism. After the "7 August" conference in 1927 "Ch'en and people such as Liu Jen-ching and P'eng Shu-chih organised a 'Leninist left-wing opposition clique'. Eighty-one people published a statement in order to split our party".
2. Chu Ch'ü-pai who made a mistake in line. In Hunan they seized a small pamphlet which had in it statements of mine like "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun". They got very excited and asked how political power could grow out of the barrel of a gun.
3. Li Li-san, from June to September 1930, promoted the Li-san line for over three months. He advocated attacking the big cities and achieving victory first in one or several provinces. I didn't approve of his method.
4. Lo Chang-lung rightist clique, from 1930 to 1931, established a separate central committee in an attempt to split the party.
5. Wang Ming. He began his sectarianism in Moscow, where he organised the "twenty-eight Bolsheviks". Relying on the strength of the "Third International", they seized power

²"Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks To Responsible Local Comrades During his Tour of Inspection (Mid-August to September 12, 1971)" - Document of the central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chung-fa, 1972, No. 12, *THE LIN PLAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, (New York: International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc., 1975), p. 55.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 57-61

of the party for four years, from 1931 to 1934. I had no right to speak in the Central committee.

6. Chang Kuo-t'ao. In the course of the Long March, after the First and Fourth Armies had joined up, Chang Kuo-t'ao tried to split the party by establishing another separate Central Committee, but he failed.

7. Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih. After we achieved a nation-wide victory, Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih formed an anti-party alliance in order to seize power, but they failed.

8. P'eng Te-huai. At the Lushan conference of 1959, P'eng Te-huai maintained contacts with foreign countries and tried to seize power. Huang K'e-ch'eng, Chang Wen-t'ien⁴ and Chou Hsiao-chou⁵ also popped up in opposition to the party. They set up a military club, but never talked about military affairs, they said things like "the communes were set up too early", "the gain didn't make up for the loss", etc., P'eng Te-huai even wrote a letter, which amounted to an open challenge to seize power, but he did not succeed.

9. Liu Shao-ch'i and his company also tried to split the party, but they didn't make it either.

10. Lin Piao clique.

⁴Chang Wen-t'ien, often known by his pen name Lo Fu, was awakened to an interest in Marxism during the May Fourth movement. Before becoming a highly influential polemicist for the CCP, he worked in the USA and studied in Moscow during the 1920's. In the Soviet Union he became a leader of the "28 Bolshevik" group, which played so important a role in the political controversies which led to Mao Tse-tung's becoming the head of the CCP. See Donald W. Klein & Anne B. Clark (ed.), *BIOGRAPHIC DICTIONARY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM, 1921-1965*, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 61.

⁵He was serving as a personal secretary to Mao Tse-tung when the communists moved to Yen-an in 1936.

Mao had always firmly believed in the necessity of class struggles, which could be clearly seen in his paper *On Contradiction*. Mao stated, "Opposition and struggle between ideas of different kinds constantly occur within the party; this is a reflection within the party of contradictions between classes and between the new and the old in society. If there were no contradictions in the party and no ideological struggles to resolve them, the party's life would come to an end".⁶ With regard to the phenomena of contradiction in the Communist Party, Mao explained as follows: "Contradictions between correct and incorrect ideas in the Communist Party are reflections within the party of class contradictions. At first, with regard to certain issues, such contradictions may not manifest themselves as antagonistic. but with the development of class struggle, they grow and become antagonistic".⁷

Since "contradiction", "struggle" and "antagonism" were defined by Maoist thought and Mao possessed the ideological authority in the Party, no one could dispute it when the ideological authority judged who had correct and who had incorrect ideas. Therefore, whether a basic line was correct or not was largely decided by Mao's personal opinion. Mao himself was the independent variable of line struggle, while the ten major struggles over line was merely dependent variables.

If one interprets these ten struggles over line as an aspect of power struggle, then the political opposition in the Chinese Communist Party could be classified into four kinds, namely, structural opposition, line opposition, fundamental opposition, and specific-event opposition.⁸ "Structural opposition" was directed against the system itself.⁹ "Line

⁶"On Contradiction (August, 1937)", *THE SELECT WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. I (1975)*, op. cit., p. 317.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 344

⁸Skilling H. Gorden, "Background to the Study of Opposition in Communist Eastern Europe", Leonard Schapiro (ed.), *POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN ONE PARTY STATE*, (London: The MacMillan Press, 1972), pp. 75-79.

opposition" was the struggle among decision-making groups in the government and in the high level organisation of the party, it usually appeared in a form of power struggle, and each side possessed abundant political and social resources and had regular supporters. "Fundamental opposition" was to oppose or criticise most of the governing authorities' major domestic and foreign policies, but not to oppose the system itself, this kind of opposition would not necessarily challenge any leading class, but when the scope of opposition expanded, it was likely to transform into "structural opposition". "Specific event opposition" refers to the opposition of a single or specific policy only, not against any leading class, or the system itself.

The above-mentioned four kinds of opposition were not a mechanised but an organic classification. One thing that could be certain was that the situation of "structure opposition" did not exist in the PRC's political and military struggle. As a matter of fact, the following movements - the Liquidate and Suppress Counterrevolutionaries movement¹⁰ in 1950, the Ideological Remoulding movement¹¹ in 1952, the Three-anti movement¹ in December 1951 and June 1952, the Five-anti movement¹³ in 1952 and , the

⁹Robert A. Dahl (ed.), *POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 332.

¹⁰The movement launched in 1950 to liquidate anti-Communist elements and opposition parties immediately after the take-over of the mainland by the communists; See Warren Kuo (ed.), *A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY*, op. cit., p.554.

¹¹In 1952, the ideological remoulding movement was widely pushed forward in educational, literary and art, scientific and technological circles. The three basic activities of the movement were: 1. Study the basic theory of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought which integrates Marxism-Leninism and the Chinese revolution so as to understand the prospect of the revolution in China and to correctly grasp revolution and idea; 2. Study government policies such as the common program (1949) and important documents of the central organs and of various administrative regions; 3. Carry out criticism and self-criticism so as to rectify the erroneous idea and behaviour which do not benefit the state, the people and the revolution. See Warren Kuo (ed.), *A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY*, Ibid., p.525.

¹²A movement against corruption, waste, and bureaucratism carried out between Dec. 1951 and June 1952. See Warren Kuo (ed.), *A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY*, Ibid., p. 428.

¹³The Five-anti movement developed from the Three-anti movement. It was first presented to the "congress of the cadres of the CCP, government, PLA, and mass organisations at their first level" by Po I-po, Minister of Finance, on 2 Jan. 1952. Five-anti were the action against "capitalist bribery of

Socialist Transformation of Agriculture movement¹⁴ in 1955 - carried out at the early stage of PRC's regime had eradicated five black elements of "landlords, kulaks, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements and Rightists" left by the Kuomintang government, and thus secured the structure of the system and purified the communist society.

It is noteworthy that the above-mentioned four kinds of opposition were easily dominated by the subjective viewpoints of the authorities. In order to destroy the opposition completely, it was very likely that governing authorities positioned the opposition at the level of "structural opposition" and classified it as "the contradiction between ourselves and the enemy". This was the means used by the winning part to acquire the legitimation of power in all past PRC's power-seizure struggles.

In fact, even the most violent power struggle among the leading class of the Chinese Communist Party since 1949 only involved the level of "fundamental opposition", the "structural opposition" remained untouched. In other words, the recognition of the legitimation of the leadership of Chinese Communist Party remained the proposition of all power struggles among the leading class. Their real aim was directed at power redistribution.

government workers, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts and stealing economic information from government sources". Warren Kuo (ed.), A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, Ibid., p. 671.

¹⁴*Socialist reform in the rural areas in the shop of co-operation and collectivisation. Agriculturally backward communist China chose to push ahead with social revolution at top speed, with technical revolution to follow later. See Warren Kuo (ed.), A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, Ibid., p. 379; DECISIONS ON DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS' CO-OPERATIVES ADOPTED BY THE CCPCC AND OTHER RELATED DOCUMENTS, (Peking: People's Publishing House, 1965), p. 34.*

I. Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih Anti-Party Clique

Of the ten big struggles over line that Mao mentioned, four had direct links with the army, namely, "Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih Anti-party Clique", "P'eng Te-huai and Huang K'e-ch'eng Anti-party Clique", "The Case of Liu Shao-ch'i" and "Lin Piao Incident". The nature of "Kao Kang and Jao shu-chih anti-party Clique" ought to be categorised at the level of "specific-event opposition". The Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih case was the first major inner-party conflict leading to the expulsion and dismissal of members of the top military hierarchy since 1949. The first intimation of it came at the fourth plenary session of the Central Committee in February 1954, when Liu Shao-ch'i made a report. It contained three parts in all, the most important one was "The Fight to Strengthen Party Unity",¹⁵ in which he indicated, "The greatest danger to the party is the danger of the enemy creating divisions and causing sectarian activities inside the party, and making use of a faction in the party.... Among some of our cadres, even certain high ranking cadres within our party, there is still a lack of understanding of the importance of party unity... They exaggerate the role of the individual and emphasise individual prestige. They think there is no one equal to them in the wide world.... They even regard the region or department under their leadership as their individual inheritance or independent kingdom".¹⁶

The national conference of the Chinese Communist Party between 21 and 31 March 1955 heard a report from Teng Hsiao-p'ing, on behalf of the Central Committee, concerning the "Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih anti-Party alliance", and unanimously passed the "Resolution

¹⁵The other two parts were: "Work of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee Since the Third Plenary Session" and "Concerning the Convening of A Party Conference". See *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I, op. cit., 156.

¹⁶"Communiqué of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Communist Party of China Central Committee (Feb. 1954)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 157-158; *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 18 Feb. 1954.

on Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih Anti-party Alliance" in 31 March 1955.¹⁷ This agreed that the measures taken by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee after the Fourth Plenum session of the Seventh CCPCC in regard to the question of this anti-Party alliance. The main points of the resolution are as follows:

1. "From 1949 Kao Kang engaged in conspiratorial activities aimed at seizing the power of leadership of the party and the state. In Northeast China and other places, he created and spread many rumours slandering the Central Committee of the Party and lauding himself, to sow discord and dissension among comrades and stir up dissatisfaction with the leading comrades of the Central committee of the Party, engaged in activities to split the party and in these activities formed his own anti-party faction".
2. "Kao Kang's anti-Party faction violated the policy of the Central Committee of the Party in the work in the Northeast area, trying its utmost to belittle the role of the Party, undermining party solidarity and unity and making the Northeast area the independent kingdom of Kao Kang".
3. "Kao Kang tried to instigate Party members in the army to support his conspiracy against the Central Committee of the Party. For this purpose he raised the utterly absurd 'theory' that our party consisted of two parties -one, the so-called 'party of the revolutionary bases and the army', the other, the so-called 'party of white area'¹⁸ - and that

¹⁷*WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, (Shanghai: People's Press, 1983), pp. 377-378; Wang Yuan, *PRC'S STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE*, (Taipei: Department of East Asia Studies, National Cheng-chi University, 1982), pp. 149-150; "Resolution on the Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih Anti-party Alliance (31 March 1955)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I, pp. 160-161; *NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY*, 4 April 1955.

¹⁸White area means the area was controlled by Kuomintang government. The most active branch of the CCP in the white area before the war of Sino-Japan war in 1937 was the North China Bureau. The CCP secret organisation in the White area also called "underground party".

the party was created by the army. He claimed himself as the representative of the so-called 'party of the revolutionary bases and the army' and claimed that he should hold the major authority, that the Central Committee of the Party and the Government should therefore be reorganised in accordance with his plan and that he himself should for the time being be General-secretary or Vice-chairman of the Central Committee of the Party and the Premier of the State Council".

4. "Jao Shu-shih was Kao Kang's chief ally in his anti-Party conspiratorial activities. It is fully established that in the ten years between 1943 and 1953 Jao Shu-shih on many occasions resorted to shameless deceit in the party to seize power. After his transfer to the Central Committee in 1953, he thought that Kao Kang was on the point of success in his activities to seize power in the Central Committee. Therefore, he formed an anti-Party alliance with Kao Kang and used his office as Director of the Organisation Department of the Central Committee to start a struggle aimed at opposing leading members of the Central Committee and he made a conscious effort to split the Party".

5. "Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih anti-Party alliance have deep historical and social roots, the activities of the Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih anti-Party alliance are a reflection of the growing complexity and sharpening class struggle in China"¹⁹.

Moreover, the "resolution" raised Kao and Jao's opposition to the level of "anti-Party" and accused them of attempting to "overthrow the long-tested nucleus of leadership of Central Committee of the Party headed by comrade Mao Tse-tung" so as to "seize power of leadership of the Party and the State. Their anti-Party activities undoubtedly conformed to the wishes of the imperialist and bourgeois counter-revolutionaries. In fact they became

¹⁹*Ibid.*

the agents of the bourgeoisie within our party". The characteristic of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih anti-party alliance was the fact that "they never openly put forward program against the Central Committee of the Party in any party organisation or at any party meeting or among the public. Their only program was to seize the supreme power of the Party and the State by conspiratorial means. They did their utmost to cover up their true character before the party organisations and party meetings, and changed their methods at different times and under different circumstance while carrying out their conspiratorial activities".⁰

Teng Hsiao-p'ing made a summary of "Kao-Jao anti-Party clique", entitled "Remarks on Successive Drafts of the 'Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China'", in which he indicated that "It was correct to expose Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih. Whether this struggle can be regarded as one between two lines is something that can be looked into further. I am quite clear about the whole story. After comrade Mao Tse-tung proposed at the end of 1953 that the work of the Central Committee was to be divided into a 'front line' and a 'second line', Kao Kang became very active.... At that time, he was in charge of Northeast China, while Lin Piao was in charge of Central-south China and Jao Shu-shih of East China. so far as Southwest China was concerned, he tried to win me over and had serious talks with me in which he said that comrade Liu Shao-ch'i was immature. He was trying to persuade me to join in his effort to topple comrade Liu Shao-ch'i... Kao Kang also approached comrade Ch'en Yün and told him that a few more vice-chairmanships should be instituted, with himself and Ch'en each holding one of them. At this point, comrade Ch'en Yün and I realised the

²⁰Wang Yüan, *PRC'S STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE*, op. cit., pp. 150-151; "Resolution on the Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih Anti-party Alliance (31 March 1955)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I, op., cit., p. 161; Tseng Yung-hsien, "An Analysis of Kao-Jao Anti-Party Event", Yao Meng-Hsüan (ed.), *A SUMMARY OF INNER-PARTY STRUGGLE OF THE CCP*, (Taipei: National Cheng-chi University, 1975), p. 208.

gravity of the matter and immediately brought it to comrade Mao Tse-tung's attention. It was highly irregular for Kao Kang to engage in behind-the-scene deals and conspiracies in his attempt to bring comrade Liu Shao-ch'i down.... But so far as Kao Kang's real line is concerned, I can't actually see that he had one, so its hard to say whether we should call it a struggle between two lines".¹

Teng's remarks on the "Kao-Jao anti-Party Clique" only revealed a fraction of the truth. Indeed, Kao Kang did try to topple Liu Shao-ch'i and did assert to divide the Chinese Communist Party into two parts - "party of the revolutionary bases and the army" and "party of the white areas" as it was stated in the "Resolution on the Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih Anti-Party Alliance". Kao's assertion, however, was aimed at using "the party of the revolutionary bases and the army" to appeal for the PLA's support and to show his intimate relationship with Mao, and thus crippled the "party of the white areas". Until 1945, out of the five secretaries of the Central Secretariat, Mao Tse-tung, Chu Te and Kao Kang had never conducted any espionage in the white areas, while Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai had long worked in the white areas. Kao's assertion of the "party of the white areas" undoubtedly was directed at either Liu Shao-ch'i or Chou En-lai. Since Kao didn't consider Chou as chief contender for the supreme leadership, the possibility of directing it at Chou decreased. As far as Liu Shao-ch'i was concerned, there had long existed discord between Kao and Liu as early as 1945 when Kao Kang and Lin Piao worked in Northeast China. At this time, P'eng Chen, Liu's confidant, was sent there in his position as secretary of Northeast Bureau of the CCPCC, but was soon transferred in 1946 for not getting along well with Kao and Lin.³ Kao intentionally ruined Liu's personnel

²¹"Remark on successive Drafts of the 'Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China' (March 1980-June 1981)", *THE SELECT WORKS OF TENG HSIAO-P'ING* (1975-1982), Vol. I, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), pp. 278-279.

²²Hu Sheng (ed.), *THE SEVENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, (Peking: The History of Chinese Communist Party Press, 1991), p. 365.

²³Wang Yüan, *PRC'S STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE*, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-156.

deployment in Northeast China, and moreover, in spite of lacking manpower in the PLA, Liu occupied a high position as vice-chairman of the Party. This annoyed Kao, and such resentment caused Kao-Lin relations to deteriorate. Consequently, Kao's assertion of "party of the white areas" was really aimed at Liu Shao-ch'i.

Although Kao advocated that he was one of the leaders of the "party of the revolutionary bases and army", this could only have had limited appeal to the army. Kao had been a guerrilla leader in Shensi between 1928 and 29 and did not take part in the Long March. During the Yen-an period he held important party posts, including the Secretaryship of the Shenkanning Party Committee. He was especially concerned with economic mobilisation and cadre training, but did not hold a military office until 1946, when he became both commander and political commissar of the Northeast Military Region. At this stage, his appeal to the army, if it was made, could thus only be directed towards his former guerrilla associates in Shensi or towards his colleagues in the Northeast Military Region. Kao was not a first rank army leader, and was unlikely to have won particular loyalty outside the units and staff under his own command. This also applied to Jao Shu-shih.

It should be noted that in the Kao-Jao incident, as Liu's position in the party at that time, coupled with his disapproval of Kao's theocratic assertion of "party of the revolutionary bases and the army" and the "party of the white areas", which referred to the power distribution, the purge of Kao Kang was, undoubtedly, initiated by Liu Shao-ch'i, while Mao only used the struggle of Liu and Kao to weaken the influence of local military leaders and to profit from it.

The Kao-Jao incident also revealed that there existed discord between Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai. Jao Shu-shih was originally from the Southern Bureau under the leadership of Chou En-lai. The reason that he could succeed Liu Shao-ch'i as political commissar of

New Fourth Army was because of Chou's support, and until 1953, Jao had been promoted all the way by the arrangement of Chou.²⁴ During that period Jao held many important posts. These included being a member of the Central People's Government, and of the People Revolutionary Military Commission, chairman of the East China Military-Administrative Committee, and political commissar of East China Military Region (Third Field Army). In October 1952, Jao was chief representative of Chinese delegates led by Liu Shao-ch'i attending the 19th conference of party representatives of the CPSU. Shortly after his return, he became the director of the Central Committee's Organisation Department, which had been vacant for three years since the death of Jen Pi-shih, and by 1953, he became chairman of the Administrative Committee of Eastern China, Chairman of the State Planning Committee, and member of the Drafting Committee for the Constitution.

It was noteworthy, however, that since the death of Jen Pi-shih, the role of director of the Central Committee's Organisation Department had been partially enacted by An Tsu-wen⁵, originally from Liu Shao-ch'i's Northern Bureau, in his capacity as the deputy director from 1950 to 1952.⁶ After Jao became the director, many of his personnel

²⁴Shih Chia-lin, *THE PURGE OF KAO KANG & JAO SHU-SHIH*, (Hong Kong: Freedom Press, 1955), p. 36.

⁵An Tsu-wen is one of the party's top organisational specialists. He worked in north China during the Sino-Japanese war and since the PRC was established in 1949 he has devoted most of his time to the CCP Organisation Department, becoming the director in 1957. He headed the Ministry of Personnel from 1950 to 1954 and was elected a party Central Committee member in 1956. Although a member of the elite, An does not appear to be a policy maker, but he frequently serves as the party's spokesman at important meetings, particularly during important ideological campaigns. Some of An's more important speeches and articles are: "Strengthen the Work of Party Reform and Party Expansion on the foundations of the Victory in the Three-anti and Five-anti Movement (1 July 1952)", "Collective Leadership Ensures the Victory of the CCP (July 1957)", "Refutation of the Rightists over the Question of Cadres' Policy (20 Sep. 1957)", "Further Strengthen the Directing Role of Party Organs in People's Communes (16 Dec. 1959)", "The Cultivation of Successors to the Revolutionary Cause in a Strategic Task of the Party (23 Sep. 1964). See Donald W. Klein & Anne B. Clark (ed.), *BIOGRAPHIC DICTIONARY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM, 1921-1965*, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 3-5.

²⁶Michael Y. H. Kau (ed.), *THE WRITINGS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 1946-1976*, Vol. I, (New York: M.E. sharpe Inc., 1986), p. 543.

arrangements conflicted sharply with Liu Shao-ch'i.⁷ Soon after Jao Shu-shih was purged, An Tsu-wen was dismissed from his concurrent post as director of the Personnel Department of the State Council, under the leadership of Chou En-lai, at the time when the State Council was reorganised in 1954.

On the whole there were many doubts in the CCP concerning the Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance. These were, "Is there, after all, such an alliance? or perhaps it is not really an alliance, but rather two separate independent kingdoms, two-go-it-aloners? They have not seen any document, and if they were an alliance, they should have had an agreement of some sort and with the agreement there would be documents, and what is the conspiracy of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih?"⁸

In view of the above, Mao spoke at the National Conference of the CCP in 31 March 1955, in which Mao clarified the doubts with the following: "Indeed, there were no-written agreements; we were not able to discover any. We say, however, that Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih did form an alliance. First, in the joint activities of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih at the time of the conference on finance and economic work (12 June - 11 August 1953). Second, from the collaboration between Jao and Chang Hsin-shan⁹ in carrying out anti-party activities at the time of the conference on organisation work (March - April 1951). Third, in Jao Shu-shih own words, 'From now on the Centre's Organisation Department should have Kuo Kang³⁰ as its core'. the Organisation Department had Jao Shu-shih as its director, and then Kao Kang's confidant, who made up

²⁷Shih Chia-lin, *THE PURGE OF KAO KANG & JAO SHU-SHIH*, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

²⁸Michael Y. M. Kau (ed.), *THE WRITINGS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 1949-1976*, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 534, 537.

²⁹Chang Hsin-shan, in the early 1950s he held several posts in the Northeast administration then under Kao's direction. In 1955 he was second secretary of the Northeastern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

³⁰Kuo Feng participated in the occupation of the Northeast under the command of Kao Kang in 1947 and returned to the region in 1951 as director of the Northeast People's Administrative Affairs Office.

its nucleus. Fourth, we can see it from the fact that Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih distributed everywhere a slate of candidates for the political bureau, put together in private by An Tsu-wen, An Tsu-wen was given a disciplinary warning for this. Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih, and their people distributed this list of names to everybody who attended the conference on organisation work and to each of the southern provinces. What was their motive for distributing this thing everywhere? Fifth, from Kao Kang's expression to me on two occasions of his desire to protect Jao and Jao's insistence on protecting Kao to the very last. Kao Kang told me that Jao was in big trouble and asked me to bail him out. I said to him, why are you speaking on Jao's behalf? I'm in Peking, so is Jao; why should he want you to represent him and not come directly to me? He has legs, doesn't he? The second time was on the day before Kao Kang was exposed (6-10 Feb., the Fourth Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee). Kao was still expressing his desire to protect Jao Shu-shih. To the very last, Jao Shu-shih wanted to protect Kao Kang, he wanted to redress the injustice against Kao Kang. So, I said that there were two headquarters in Peking. One was a headquarters led by myself, we blew a Yang (open) Wind and set a Yang fire. The other was a headquarters commanded by someone else; it blew Yin (conspiratorial) Wind, set a Yin fire, and was a subterranean stream... It can be seen that they had an anti-party alliance and were not two unrelated independent kingdom or 'go-it-aloners'".³¹

As for the doubts concerning the "document" and "conspiracy", Mao explained: "Do you need a written agreement when you are forming a conspiracy?... It was through the Finance and Economy Work conference, the conference on Organisational Work and the various problems prior to the Finance and Economic conference that one could see that they were abnormal... People can understand the essence of the thing only through the

³¹Michael Y. M. Kau (ed.), *THE WRITINGS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 1949-1976, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 534.*

analysis and study its appearance."³

The above explanation on the doubts concerning the Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance, in fact, did not justify the real truth of it, especially in so far as the "document" and "conspiracy" are concerned. Mao explained the whole thing from metaphysics, this would only further expose his real motive.

Mao acknowledged the fact that Kao and Jao had never openly acted against the Central committee of the Party on any occasion, but he maintained his subjective belief that they had a program to seize the supreme power of the Party and the State. As a consequence of this, it was natural that Mao classified Kao and Jao as "anti-Party alliance". His intention was to "execute one as a warning to hundred of people" and to establish his authoritative leadership in the Party. This was all very obvious. Nevertheless, It was Kao Kang's attempt to "made the independent kingdom" and "to overthrow Mao so as to seize power of leadership of the party and the State" that caused Mao's greatest dissatisfaction and concern. Mao could never allow Kao and Jao and similar people to live if he wished to establish an absolute leadership of the Party. Another significant impact of this event was Mao's obvious attempt to remould non-Maoist factions. As stated in the National Conference of the CCP, Mao indicated, "There were two headquarters in Peking", said Mao, "one was a headquarters led by myself, the other was a headquarters commanded by someone else".³³ Mao intentionally raised Kao Kang's issue from the level of "specific-event opposition" to that of "line or factional opposition". Since Mao subjectively believed "the appearance of the Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih alliance was not an accidental phenomena but a incisive manifestation of violent struggle in our country at the current

³ *Ibid.*, p. 537.

³³ "Study the Speech at the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party", *RED FLAG*, No. 5, 1955, p. 56.

stage",³⁴ he therefore had to purge all those persons who had close relationship with Kao and Jao for eradicating Kao-Jao's faction. Persons who were purged on the charge of involvement in the Kao-Jao anti-Party clique included Hsiang Ming and six others.³⁵

However, the command of Kao Kang was in itself the least important of the six military regional commands. Apart from local forces, it possessed no armies of its own. As of March 1954, only one army group was stationed in the Northeast, and two of its four armies were in Kwangtung province. This army group, the Fourteenth, formed party of the Fourth Field Army, whose commander was Lin Piao, with its headquarters and staff in Kwangtung. The positions held by the seven officials named with Kao as implicated in the plot suggested that his power depended on the party rather than on military support.

To sum up, the incident of "Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance" had the following impact on the development of the political role of the PLA:

Firstly, Mao took the first step of weakening the regional commanders so as to

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 51.

³⁵(1) Hsiang Ming: 2nd secretary, Shantung Sub-bureau, 1950-54; vice governor, Shantung, 1951-55. (2) Chang Hsin-shan: deputy secretary, NE Bureau, 1952-54; director, NE Organisation Dept., 1950-53; Chairman, NE Supervision Com., 1950-54; secretary, NE Discipline Inspection Com., 1950s; deputy political commissar, NE Military Region, early 1950s. (3) Chang Ming-yüan: 3rd deputy secretary and secretary general, NE Bureau, 1952-54; vice-chairman, NE Govt., 1953-54; secretary-general, NE Govt., 1952-54; vice-chairman, NE supervision Com., 1950-52. (4) Chao Te-tsun: Secretary, Heilungkiang, 1950-54; governor, Heilungkiang, 1952-53; deputy director, NE Organisation Dept., 1951; director, NE Rural Work Dept., 1954. (5) Mao Hung: deputy Secretary-general, NE Bureau, 1952; member and secretary-general, State Planning Com., 1952-53. (6) Kao Feng: Secretary, Liaosi, 1950-54; deputy director, NE Organisation Dept., 1952-53; director, NE Organisation Dept., 1953; director, NE Personnel Dept., 1952; deputy secretary, NE Discipline Inspection Com., early 1950s. (7) Ch'en Po-tsun: 2nd secretary, port Arthur-Dairen, 1952-53; deputy secretary, NE Organisation Deputy., 1950-51; director, NE personnel dept., 1952; deputy secretary, NE Discipline Inspection Com., early 1950s; member, NE Procurator's Office, 1951

See Frederick C. Twiwe, *POLITICS & PURGES IN CHINA*, (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1979), p. 185; John Gittings, *THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE ARMY*, op. cit., p. 278; Wang Yüan, *PRC'S STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE*, op. cit., p. 105; and "Resolution on the Kao Kang & Jao Shu-shih Anti-Party Alliance (31 March 1955), *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I. op. cit., p. 161.

consolidate his control over the local armies. There was a close relationship among military headquarters, regional districts and administrative committees between 1949 and 1953. In that period the Central party organisations were apprehensive about the rise of warlordism. The party was especially alarmed by the potential of the field armies to establish regional independence. Up to the end of 1953 the commanders of the four field armies also headed the regional military-administrative committee.

When the Kao-Jao anti-Party Clique was purged, Mao, at the same time, successively abolished six great regional administrations and six central bureaux - North China, East China, Northeast, Northwest, Southwest and Central-South from June 1954, and in September, Mao deactivated and reorganised the six great military regions (under the occupation of the field armies, namely 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, North China and Northeast China), into ten first level military regions - Peking, Shenyang, Tientsin, Nanking, Foochow, Wuhan, Kwangtung, Kunming, Chengtu and Lanchow, and three autonomous military regions - Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang.³⁶ These regions were dominated by united and military leaders from the following field armies.³⁷

<i>Military Region</i>	<i>Dominant Field Army System</i>	<i>Military Districts</i>
<i>Kwangtung</i>	<i>4th Field Army</i>	<i>Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan</i>
<i>Chengtu</i>	<i>1st & 2nd Field Armies</i>	<i>Szechuan</i>
<i>Foochow</i>	<i>3rd Field Army</i>	<i>Fukien, Kiangsi</i>
<i>Kunming</i>	<i>2nd Field Army</i>	<i>Kweichow, Yunan</i>
<i>Lanchow</i>	<i>1st Field Army</i>	<i>Tsinghai, Kansu, Ninghsia, Shensi</i>
<i>Nanking</i>	<i>3rd Field Army</i>	<i>Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsu</i>
<i>Peking</i>	<i>5th Field Army</i>	<i>Hopei, Shansi</i>

³⁶William W. Whitson, *THE CHINESE HIGH COMMAND - A HISTORY OF COMMUNIST MILITARY POLITICS 1927-1971*, (London: The MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1973), p. 507; John Gittings, *THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE ARMY*, op. cit., pp. 307-308; Yeh Hsiang-chi, "The PLA and the Organisations of the Party and Government", *CHINESE COMMUNIST STUDIES*, Vol. IX, (Taipei: Chinese Communist Studies Press, 1975), p. 10; Chiang I-shan, *THE MILITARY AFFAIRS OF THE CCP - THE FIRST DECADE OF THE CCP*, (Hong Kong: Yiu Lien Press, 1960), p. 372.

³⁷William W. Whitson, *THE CHINESE HIGH COMMAND - A HISTORY OF COMMUNIST MILITARY POLITICS 1927-1971*, op. cit., pp. 506-507; John Gittings, *THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE ARMY*, op. cit., p. 308.

<i>Shenyang</i>	<i>4th Field Army</i>	<i>Kirin, Liaoning, Heilungkiang</i>
<i>Tsinan</i>	<i>3rd & 5th Field Armies</i>	<i>Shantung</i>
<i>Wuhan</i>	<i>2nd Field Army</i>	<i>Honan, Hupeh</i>
<i>Inner Mongolia</i>	<i>1st & 5th Field Armies</i>	
<i>Sinkiang</i>	<i>1st Field Army</i>	
<i>Tibet</i>	<i>2nd Field Army</i>	

One of the reasons for increasing the number of military regions was to decentralise the military power from the original 5 to 13 persons. Mao's aim was to disperse the controlled regions of the field armies so as to avoid the over-expansion of local military commanders with the possible result of the gun commands the party.

In addition to the decentralisation of factional force brought by the field armies in the PLA, Mao ordered that no commander or political commissar of military regions or military districts was to be allowed to take any concurrent post in the local party or local government with the exception of the three autonomous military regions of Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet where ethnic minorities were concentrated. However the first secretary of the regional party committee must also be the concurrent first political commissar of the military region or various positions of equal status³⁸ to ensure the party's control over the army.

By 1954, with the convening of the National Defence Council (NDC) and Ministry of National Defence,³⁹ Mao was made concurrent chairman of the NDC; P'eng Te-huai, the vice-chairman of State Council, was made concurrent Minister of National Defence; Chu Te, P'eng Te-huai, Lin Piao, Liu Po-ch'eng, Ho Lung, Ch'en I, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Lo Jung-huan, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, Yeh Chien-ying, Nieh Jung-chen, Chang Chih-chung, Fu Tso-i,

³⁸Yeh Hsiang-chi, "The PLA and the Organisations of the Party and Government", *CHINESE COMMUNIST STUDIES*, Vol. IX, op. cit., p. 10.

³⁹"Constitution of the People's Republic of China (20 September 1954)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 102, and *NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY*, 20 September 1954.

Ch'eng Ch'ien and Lung Yün were made Vice-chairmen of the NDC.⁴⁰ The Council was mainly composed of responsible leaders of the various field armies. This was because Mao intend to group them together in Peking by offering a vice-chairmanship so as to weaken their military power. It was a refurbished version of "depriving one's military power with the temptation of high position and handsome salary in return" applied by the founding emperor of successive dynasties.⁴¹

Secondly, Liu Shao-ch'i was classified by Kao Kang as the representative of "party of the white areas", this had, indeed, seriously damaged Liu's prestige in the PLA. Until September 1954, the chairman of People's Revolutionary Military Council (PRMC) was Mao Tse-tung, with five vice-chairmen under him, Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai were both named.⁴ However, in September 1954, the NDC assumed the role of the PRMC, Mao remained the chairman of NDC, with fifteen vice-chairmen under him, but both Liu and Chou fail to be named this time. It is noteworthy that the investigation of the "Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance" by the CCP was also conducted during this period. Mao took this opportunity to deprive Liu and Chou of their leadership in the army. Liu occupied important posts in the CCP, but he had never had an intimate relationship with the PLA. Apart from the party representative of the Red Eighth Army Regiment and of Red Fifth Army Regiment, and the political commissar of the New Fourth Army, Liu occupied no important posts in the army. In the CCP, Liu had been promoted from the organisational system of the party. His party background was far stronger than that of his military background. The assignment as vice-chairman of the PRMC since 1949 was his best opportunity to build up organisational affiliation in the PLA, however, this opportunity

⁴⁰Li K'e & Hao Sheng-chang, *THE PLA IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION*, (Peking: The History of the CCP Press, 1989), p. 538.

⁴¹Chen K'uan-ch'iang, *THE FATE OF FOUNDERS OF PAST DYNASTIES*, (Taipei: Chiao Hsin Cultural Press, 1966).

⁴²Shih Chia-lin, *THE PURGE OF KAO KANG & JAO SHU-SHIH*, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

was lost because of Kao Kang's attack on him. The PLA chose Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao to side with immediately after the advent of the Cultural Revolution. This explained how enormously Liu was affected by the incident "Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance".

Finally, Lin Piao successfully got away from the incident of "Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance" and preserved the actual strength of the Fourth Field Army which was led by him. This contributed to his rise because Mao had to rely on him and the PLA's force to carry out the struggle against Liu Shao-ch'i. The rise of Lin Piao also put an end to the professional army-building program promoted by P'eng Te-huai in his tenure as Minister of National Defence.

As mentioned before, Kao Kang had most intimate relations with Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army, and the seven who were purged with Kao and Jao were all promoted by Lin Piao during the period in the Northeast. Strictly speaking, Lin was responsible for the incident of Kao and Jao, but eventually he escaped the consequences. Three reasons could account for this.

First, Kao Kang was only an unimportant regional leader, with no close relations with the PLA. Mao could tolerate Kao occupying a high position as chairman of the Northeast People's Government because it was only a temporary arrangement based on the concern of political stability. Sooner or later, Mao would have to purge figures like Kao Kang if he wished to consolidate centralised leadership. While Lin Piao was Mao's direct line of descent, and possessed real military power, Mao relied heavily on him to secure his political power. Mao just wouldn't sacrifice Lin Piao because of Kao for Lin was much more important than Kao at this stage.

Second, according to the five-point explanation on the doubts concerning the "Kao-Jao

anti-Party alliance" that Mao reported to the National conference of the CCP in 31 March 1955, none of the points were made through Mao's personal understanding with the exception of the fifth point. It was to be believed that apart from Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao played an important role in the supply of relevant information. The CCPCC was convinced that Kao Kang's final attempt was to draw the army over to his side and "to instigate Party members in the army to support his conspiracy against the Central committee of the Party". Nevertheless, Lin Piao's power-seizure ambition was far greater than Kao could provide. In this incident, Lin didn't support Kao with his Fourth Field Army, but instead he sacrificed Kao to gain the trust of Mao Tse-tung, from which was the core interest Lin could benefit from.

And the last, at that time, Liu Shao-ch'i's position in the CCP was below that of Mao Tse-tung, but higher than Lin Piao. Mao could agree with Liu in the purge of regional leaders like Kao Kang, but would not agree to involve Lin Piao in this. As mentioned before, Liu had few supporters and close followers in the PLA. if he insisted to purge Lin Piao, he would have to face possible resistance from the Fourth Field Army or from the PLA. Although there existed many factional problems in the PLA, they could only be regarded as internal affairs in the closed system of the PLA. As for their political stand, they would unanimously pledge their loyalty to Mao instead of Liu Shao-ch'i.

The incident of the "Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance" was the first important power-seizure struggle since the founding of the PRC. In this high-ranking power struggle, the PLA wasn't involved in any political operations, on the contrary, Mao seized the opportunity to reorganise military regions and deactivate administrative regions. Moreover, with the establishment of Ministry of National Defence and National Defence Council, Mao transferred responsible leaders of the field armies to Peking. This series of measures, in a sense, was a prerequisite for the professional and regular army-building program, but this

was not Mao's real aim. The series of measures was aimed at depriving the military power of regional commanders and consolidating the army-building principle of the absolute leadership of the party over the armed forces. The political role of the army remained the same as defined by the resolution of the Kutien conference. After the incident of "P'eng-Huang anti-Party alliance" (to be discussed shortly), Mao's attempt to apply the army as a political means for his power-seizure struggle was exposed entirely.

Although members involved in the "Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance" were confined to regional cadres who had close relations with Kao and Jao, the event of "Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance" had profound significance for it was Mao's first step to establish the "Maoist Dynasty". Mao eradicated all elements that would threaten his authority starting from a local level. He personally believed there were many people like Kao and Jao inside the Party, and therefore he should make full use of this opportunity to purge Kao and Jao so as to warn the others.

It was noteworthy that since this event, Mao always linked his opponents with "Kao-Jao anti-Party Alliance" in every power struggle to reveal the wild ambition or conspiracy of his opponents and the inevitable of power struggle. For instance, in August 1958, when Mao purged the "P'eng Te-huai and Huang K'e-ch'eng anti-Party Clique", P'eng was denounced and it was said that "his behaviour at the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC was a true continuation and development of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih anti-Party Alliance";⁴³ in the beginning of Cultural Revolution, when the Red Guards criticised Chu Te on 10 Feb., 1967, Chu was accused of "having participated in the conspiracy of Kao

⁴³"Resolution of the 8th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Concerning the Anti-Party Clique Headed by P'eng Te-huai (16 August 1959)", *RED FLAG*, No. 13, 1967, pp. 18-20; "Central Committee Resolution on P'eng Te-huai (16 August 1959)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 754-756; *NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY*, 16 August 1967.

Kang and Jao anti-Party alliance" and "having advocated that everybody should in turns be the leader".⁴⁴ Moreover, at the later stage of the Cultural Revolution, the so-called "Gang of Four" were accused of the following crime: "not only had they carry forward the reactionary legacy of Kao-Jao and Lin Piao, but that they further developed it viciously and acted more vigorously".⁴⁵

⁴⁴Wang Yuan, *THE PRC'S STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE*, op. cit., P. 156.

⁴⁵"Study the Speech at the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party", *RED FLAG*, No. 5, 1977, p. 53.

II. P'eng-Huang Anti-Party Clique

The "P'eng (Te-huai) and Huang (K'e-ch'eng) anti-Party Clique" should be classified as a combination of "specific-event opposition" and "line opposition". P'eng's "specific-event opposition" was outwardly directed against the movement of the "Three Red Banners" but inwardly was expressed his dissatisfaction of involving the Army in non-military affairs. P'eng's line opposition was referred to as the conflict between members of military professional system and that of the party system over the nature of PLA's political role.

In February 1956, the "programme enforcing the army's participation and support in agricultural collectivisation and agricultural production" promulgated by the PLA's "General Political Department" regulated that "All armies, military organs and schools should contact Party Committee and People's Council of the same base, according to their own condition to spare few labour days in each year to participate in socialist construction in a planned way".⁴⁶

Since the Eighth CCP National congress, the political commissars deliberately increased compulsory labour days. According to data, the PLA carried out a total of 20 million people's labour days,⁴⁷ and in 1958 PLA proclaimed that "The number supporting the Great Leap Forward in agricultural production will increase to 30 million people's labour days".⁴⁸ In the meantime, the CCPCC Military Commission also reached the decision that the "army should spare one or two months of each year to participate in production", saying that "the army may spend about half of its service participating in local construction works of various kinds, but the rest of its time should engage in the industrial and

⁴⁶"Programme Enforcing the Army's Participation and Support in Agricultural Collectivisation and Agricultural Production", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 9 February, 1956.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*

⁴⁸*Ibid.*

agricultural production".⁴⁹ This policy of enforcing the army to support the Great Leap forward movement had an important political significance, in that it represented the party system which overwhelmed the army professionals.

After the convening of the Lushan conference on 2 July 1959, P'eng spoke to the Northwest group 7 times between 3 and 10 July consecutively, criticising the failure of the Great Leap Forward movement. The focal points of his speeches were as follows: First, the establishment of People's Communes is too hasty. Second, the campaign of refining steel by the whole people, conducted after the Peitaiho conference (also known as Enlarged Meeting of the Politburo of the CCPCC, held between 17 and 30 Augst 1958), was too much a "left" deviationist line. Third, the realistic problems for increasing industrial production by the whole people. Fourth, it is difficult for every region to accomplish an industrial system in just one or two five-year plans. Fifth, it is easy to correct "Right", but difficult to correct "Left" in the Party. Sixth, there are quite a few faults in the "Great Leap Forward" policy. Seventh, everyone including Chairman Mao has to take responsibility for the failure of the "Great Leap Forward" policy. And finally, nowadays, the decision-making is done by one individual, instead of the party's collective leadership.... It is very unusual and also dangerous to establish only individual's prestige, but collective prestige is usual.⁵⁰ The last two points of P'eng's speech obviously launched a fatal attack on Mao.

On 14th July 1959, P'eng Te-huai wrote a personal letter to Mao, setting out his views in his capacity as Minister of National Defence in the early stage of the Lushan Conference. However, P'eng's personal letter was entitled "Comrade P'eng Te-huai's Letter of Opinion"

⁴⁹PEOPLE'S DAILY, 26 February, 1959.

⁵⁰Li Jui, *THE TRUE RECORDS OF LUSHAN CONFERENCE*, (Taipei: Hsin Jui Publication, 1994), pp. 110-111.

in big-sized characters by Mao and made public and distributed to all participants in the conference on 17th July.⁵¹ P'eng once asked the conference to recall this "personal letter" which had been made public, but on 23rd July, Mao criticised P'eng's letter of opinion as being the program of anti-Party and the program of the Rightist opportunists, it was a well prepared, planned, organised, and purposeful. Mao also castigated P'eng for making mistakes on warlordism, great-power chauvinism and line.⁵² Mao further pointed out "Some people will not give their views. It will go on for one year, two years, three to five years. It won't do if you cannot listen to strange sayings. You must get accustomed to them. I myself always listen to them with a stiff upper lip. They cannot do more than throw dirt at your past three generation. don't blame them ... I never attack others if I am not attacked. If others attack me, I always strike back. Others attack me first, I attack them later. I have never given up this principle until this very day".⁵³

Mao attacked P'eng by saying, "Historically, there have been four lines, the Li-san line, the Wang Ming line, the Kao-Jao line, and now again this line.... These people (meaning P'eng Te-huai) do not mention adventurism, but they just smell opposition to adventurism. For instance, they say that 'there have been losses and gains', to place 'gains' in the second position is obviously done after much deliberation.... Under the pressure of imperialists and the bourgeoisie, they tend to become rightists".⁵⁴

Finally, Mao threatened, "If we have done ten things, nine of which have been bad, and are reported in the papers, we must perish, and if we deserve to perish, then I shall go, I shall then go to the countryside to lead the peasants to overthrow the government. If you from

⁵¹THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF P'ENG TE-HUAI, (Peking: People's Press, 1981), pp. 269-270.

⁵²Ibid., pp. 270-276.

⁵³Jürgen Domes, P'ENG TE-HUAI - THE MAN AND THE IMAGE, (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1985), p. 94.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 95.

the PLA do not follow me, I shall find myself a Red Army".⁵⁵ In addition, as his guards remembered, Mao told Lushan "If P'eng Te-huai's army won't follow me then I will go down to the countryside, reorganise the guerrillas and reorganise my army".⁵⁶ This revealed Mao's great disapproval of P'eng Te-huai.

Moreover, Mao opposed P'eng's viewpoint about "petty-bourgeoisie fanaticism" in the meeting. He said, "You are all criticising me although not by name. I admit I have two crimes. First, it was my idea to set an output target for steel production to ten million and seven hundred thousand tons, and thus some ninety million labour force were thrown into production, and four billion yuan was lost. Second, the whole world even the Soviet Union are against the establishment of People's Communes. I know there are many voices against it as well in China. Your attack on me are quite enough. If anyone should take the responsibility, it is I whom should be blamed. I used to blame someone for the mistake he made, and now it is my turn to be blamed. There is a saying, 'The one who takes the lead in doing evil only to end up without male offspring'. I had two sons but now look, one is killed (An-ying, elder son, was killed in a bombardment in Korea War), the other is mad (An-ch'ing, second son, was mad for an unknown reason), I am doomed to have no male offspring. I am the one who took the lead and should end up this way".⁵⁷

In this speech, Mao explicitly expressed his disapproval of P'eng Te-huai. He forced the participants to declare their stands by threatening to go to Chinkang mountain and fight as a guerrilla. He further evoked participants towards anti-P'eng's sentiment by making caustic remarks of himself about no offspring. The background of this accusation was because when the Korea war broke out in 1950, Mao sent his elder son, Mao An-ying, to

⁵⁵*Ibid.*

⁵⁶Harrison E. Salisbury, *THE NEW EMPERORS - MAO & TENG: A DUAL BIOGRAPHY*, (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992), p. 183.

⁵⁷Li Jui, *THE TRUE RECORDS OF THE LUSHAN CONFERENCE*, *op. cit.*, p. 155, 158.

follow P'eng Te-huai. His intention was to build up political prestige for his son. P'eng, however, did not fulfil his duty to protect Mao's son, and let him be killed in one UN bombardment on 25 November 1950.⁵⁸

In his conversation with Chou En-lai on 23 June afternoon. P'eng expressed his disapproval of Mao's talk on that morning and commented "it is against the fundamental principle of the Communist Party if the Party can not be criticised".⁵⁹ On 26 July, Mao gave a new order, that was, the criticism of P'eng's "letter of opinion" should not only be directed at the letter, but also directed at the person who wrote it. From then on, the Lushan conference entered into a new stage, the atmosphere to struggle against P'eng was elevated. The "letter of opinion" that P'eng wrote to Mao became an issue of the person rather than that of the letter itself, which suggested it was not done by one individual and a loosen attack, but that it was a well-organised and programmed attack directed at the Party.⁶⁰

From then on, a series of attack on P'eng were made in the meeting by all groups, the points of their attack can be summarised as follows: First, P'eng always vacillated his stand whenever the Party faced a fatal crisis. Second, P'eng is a heroic individualist, he opposes Mao's military command. Third, P'eng has always dampened the spirits of the masses movements, and acted wilfully. Fourth, P'eng's attack on the Party was neither a matter of the stand, nor for the interest of the Party, his attack was to set off a inner-Party struggle to oppose the General Line and attack Chairman Mao. Fifth, his speech at the conference and the "letter of opinion" carried strong anti-Party nature, it was directed at the Party authority and Chairman Mao. Sixth, Mao instructed that the party must refrain

⁵⁸THE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF P'ENG TE-HUAI, *op. cit.*, p. 428.

⁵⁹Li Jui, THE TRUE RECORDS OF THE LUSHAN CONFERENCE, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, p. 164.

from being split both at the second meeting of the Eighth CCP National Congress and Shanghai meeting (December 1957), his remarks were actually directed at P'eng Te-huai. Seventh, P'eng's disapproval of building up only individual's prestige was aimed at attacking Chairman Mao. And the last, P'eng had illicit relations with foreign countries.⁶¹

Presided over by Mao Tse-tung, two meetings of the Standing Committee of the CCPCC Political Bureau were held in the proceedings of the Lushan conference on 31 July and 1 August respectively. The participants included Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Lin Piao, P'eng Te-huai, P'eng Chen and Ho Lung, persons in the visitors' seats included Huang K'e-ch'eng, Chou Hsiao-chou, Chou Hui and Li Jui⁶². The two meetings formally declare the nature of P'eng Te-huai's crime. Some important points of Mao's talk about P'eng's crime are as follows: First, we must oppose right opportunism. Second, P'eng has always vacillated his stand in all previous line struggles in the party. This is because he had been criticised and thus held a grudge against Mao and the Party. Third, the relationship between Mao and P'eng is 30 percent co-operation and 70 percent opposition. and the Fourth, P'eng's open letter to Mao is a purposive action. His aim was to assemble the masses and organise the army.⁶³

The important points of Mao's talk about P'eng at the second meeting included, First, what P'eng called the "petty-bourgeois fanaticism" was directed at attacking the leading organs of the Party.... It was to oppose the Party. Second, the aim of P'eng's open letter was to assemble the masses, organise the party and reconstruct the Party and the world according to his will. Third, P'eng is and has always been obsessed with ambition. Fourth. I am 66 and you (P'eng) are 61, I will be dead soon. Many comrades are scared

⁶¹Li Jui, *THE TRUE RECORDS OF LUSHAN CONFERENCE*, op. cit., pp. 188-189.

⁶²Li Jui, *Mao's personal secretary during the period of "Great Leap Forward" movement*.

⁶³Li Jui, *THE TRUE RECORDS OF LUSHAN CONFERENCE*, op. cit., pp. 201-209.

of you. You are difficult to tackle and they feel dreadful. Fifth, Among all six billion Chinese people, You are the fiercest person. You called me teacher and yourself the pupil, this hypocrisy. And the final, Mao restated his relationship with P'eng as 30 percent co-operation and 70 percent opposition.⁶⁴

All participants made their attacks on P'eng in the two meetings. Chou En-lai criticised that P'eng's open letter as "a fierce onslaught on the Party's General Line and a right deviationist line". It was aimed at "attacking the Party authority and Chairman Mao". He also claimed that P'eng's activity "is well programmed and can trace back to a long history".⁶⁵ Lin Piao criticised P'eng as "a careerist, conspirator and a double dealer", he commented, "Nobody tries to be a hero, Chairman Mao is the only hero in China".⁶⁶

The "letter" that P'eng wrote to Mao on 14 July was called a "letter of opinion". In it P'eng systematically criticised the policy of "Three Red Banners". Some of the focal points were as follows:

Firstly, "It now seems that some projects for capital construction in 1958 were too hasty or excessive with the result that a portion of capital was tied up and some essential projects were delayed".

Secondly, "In the course of refining steel by the whole nation, a number of small blast furnaces were unnecessarily built, and thus a certain amount of resources (material, financial, and in terms of manpower) was wasted, two billion yuan tuition fee were spent".

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, p. 219.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. 250.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, p. 221.

Thirdly, "The habit of exaggerating, spread rather universally. Last year, at the time of the Peitaiho Conference, a higher estimate of grain production was made than was warranted. This created a false impression: everybody felt that the problem of food had been solved, and that our hands were free to engage in industry,... At that time, from reports sent in from all directions, it would seem that communism was just around the corner".

Fourthly, "Petty-bourgeois fanaticism. Strategic planning was often confused with concrete measures, long term policies with immediate steps, the whole with the part, and the big collective with the small collective".

Finally, "In the view of some comrades, putting politics in command could be a substitute for everything,... putting politics in command is no substitute for economic principles, much less for concrete measures in economic work, equal importance must be attached to putting politics in command and to effective measures in economic work, neither should be over-stressed or neglected".⁶⁷

The defects of "capital construction" indicated by P'eng's "letter of opinion" on 14 July had indeed reflected the real situation at that time. However, in his status as Minister of National Defence, P'eng did not discuss many problems in defence affairs at the conference instead he criticised on the policies of "Great Leap Forward" and opposed Mao "openly". The motives for his action can be concluded as follows, Firstly, P'eng the former peasant's son had been deeply moved by what he had seen on his inspection tour (Oct., 1958) particularly in Kansu and in his home village in Hunan, and he felt emotionally compelled to act as spokesman for the suffering Chinese peasantry.⁶⁸ Secondly, P'eng the politburo member convinced that he spoke for many, if not the

⁶⁷THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF P'ENG TE-HUAI, *op. cit.*, pp. 281-287.

⁶⁸Jürgen Domes, P'ENG TE-HUAI - THE MAN AND THE IMAGE, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

majority, of his colleagues, and that Mao himself wanted open criticism in order to ameliorate the crisis of the PRC which became ever more obvious.⁶⁹ Thirdly, and the more important one was that P'eng had realised that a continuation of the Three Red Banner movement would lower the morale of the men serving in the Army, since most of them came from the villages,⁷⁰ and that the movement of army professionalisation would be influenced by the politics and thus bring about the phenomena of imbalance.

P'eng's view was in contrast with Mao's, and yet P'eng couldn't realise that the campaign of "the whole nation in arms" carried out vigorously by Mao during the movement of "people's communes" was aimed at suppressing P'eng's professionalised army building. Even worse, P'eng trusted what Mao said at the opening speech of the Lushan Conference on 2 July, where Mao exhorted the audience to "criticise and offer opinion on the mistakes and shortcomings which still exist in our party's work" and at the same time promised that he would not "put a hat (scapegoat)" on anybody for any criticism.⁷¹

Although P'eng expressed his dissatisfaction with the point of "putting politics in command" in his letter to Mao, "the letter of opinion" basically was a kind of "opposition in policies". P'eng's "specific event opposition" was in fact a kind of loyal dissent, while Mao personally believed that "At the Lushan conference of 1959, P'eng Te-huai maintained contacts with foreign countries and tried to seize power. Huang K'e-ch'eng, Chang Wen-t'ien and Chou Hsiao-chou also popped up in opposition to the party. They set up a military club, but never talked about military affairs; rather, they said things like 'the communes were set up too early', 'the gain didn't make up for the loss', etc., P'eng Te-huai even wrote a letter, which amounted to an open challenge to seize power, but he did

⁶⁹*Ibid.*

⁷⁰*Ibid.*

⁷¹*Ibid.*, p. 89, and Huang K'e-ch'eng, "Please, Give Comrade P'eng Te-huai his Reputation back" - Letter to the Organisation Department of the CCPCC, 29 November, 1978.

not succeed",⁷² "The struggle of Lushan conference is the kind of class struggle. It is the continuation of a life-and-death struggle between bourgeois and proletariat the two contrasting class in the course of socialist revolution of the last decade".⁷³

On 2 Aug., Mao spoke at the Eighth Plenary of the Eighth CCPCC, held in Lushan between 2 and 16, 1959, in which he indicated that the Lushan conference was an anti-Rightist instead of anti-Leftist struggle. It was an attack directed at the Party leading organs made by the right opportunists. From then on, all speeches made by the participants were aimed at struggling against P'eng in accordance with Mao's talks on that day. Their attacks are summarised as follows: Firstly, the aim of P'eng's disapproval of "politics takes the lead" was directed at Chairman Mao. Secondly, P'eng's open letter made a notorious attack on Mao, it was an anti-Party programme. Thirdly, P'eng's negation of the General Line was aimed at nullifying the Party's leadership. Fourthly, P'eng plotted to reorganise the Party, party authority and the army. Fourthly, The inner-Party struggle this time was in fact a class struggle in the Party. And Finally, P'eng revealed his viewpoints to foreign countries during his visit abroad. He maintained illicit relations with foreign countries.⁷⁴

Prior to the Lushan conference on 24 April 1959, while the National People's Congress (April 18-28), was still in session, P'eng started on a "military good will" mission to the capitals of the Warsaw Pact powers, which was to keep him out of the country for some seven weeks. On arrival in Moscow, and again on 2 June, P'eng met Marshal

⁷²"Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks To Responsible Local Comrades During his Tour of Inspection (Mid-August to September 12, 1971)" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, *Chung-fa*, 1972, No. 12, *THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS ND MILITARY COUP*, op. cit., p. 59.

⁷³"A Interrogation of P'eng Te-huai", *YEARBOOK OF THE PRC*, 1969, Vol. I, (Taipei: Bureau of Military Intelligence, Ministry of National Defence, 1970), p. 84.

⁷⁴p. 266.

Moskalenko, on 25 May, P'eng had a cordial meeting with Khrushchev in Tirana, when he got back to Peking, via outer Mongolia, on 13 June, having travelled from Moscow to Ulan Bator in the company of Marshal Koniev.⁷⁵

When P'eng criticised the fault of Mao's "Great Forward Leap", Nikita Khrushchev, in Moscow, also chose this moment to make same pungent remarks about the Great Leap Forward.⁷⁶ Mao suspected that P'eng colluded with Soviet Union in this matter, and that P'eng "contacted with foreign countries and tried to seize power". The participants of the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC had showed no objection to this condemnation. Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai, in principle, respected P'eng's right to "express his viewpoints at the party meeting", but they couldn't refute Mao's accusation of P'eng's being "in contact with foreign countries". In Mao's view, he suspected P'eng not only was against him but was allied with his foe in Moscow.

On 11 August, Mao spoke at the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC, again he not only didn't loosen his attack on P'eng, but further accused P'eng of the following charges: 1. P'eng is a Capitalist instead of Marxist. 2. P'eng colluded with the Kao Kang anti-Party clique and took Kao Kang's line. His act in this meeting was even worse than those of Kao Kang and Li Li-san. 3. The Kao-Jao anti-Party clique was developed between 1951 and 1953, P'eng involved himself deeply in it. Is it a Kao-Jao anti-Party clique or a Kao-P'eng anti-Party clique? The most serious mistake P'eng made was involving himself with the Kao-Jao anti-Party clique. 4. P'eng's disapproval of "putting First Secretary in command of everything" was, in fact, attempting to put his thoughts in command of

⁷⁵David A. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Te-huai", *THE CHINA QUARTERLY*, No. 8, Oct.-Dec. 1961, pp. 66-67; John Gittings, *SURVEY OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE*, (London: Oxford Uni. Press, 1968), p. 105.

⁷⁶Harrison E. Salisbury, *THE NEW EMPERORS - MAO & TENG: A DUAL BIOGRAPHY*, op. cit., p. 179.

everything. The "collective leadership" P'eng proclaimed was in fact the leadership under his command. 5. The meeting must have reached certain resolutions. First, the resolution on the campaign to raise production and practice economy. It should be made known to the public. Second, the resolution to struggle for defending the party's General Line and against right opportunism. It would not be published openly, but would be put to the Party for discussion.. Third, the resolution on the anti-Party clique headed by P'eng Te-huai. This would not be discussed in the party, and should be distributed only to the leading cadres of the county in the Party and those of the regiment in the army.⁷⁷

It was noteworthy that only three among the twenty full politburo members (Ch'en Yün, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Ch'en I)⁷⁸ and six alternates didn't attend the politburo meeting of the Eighth Plenary Session of the Eighth CCPCC concerning the issue of P'eng Te-huai. Of the remaining twenty-three, Mao could safely reckon on the support of seven: himself, Lin Piao, Lo Jung-huan, K'e Ch'ing-shih, T'an Chen-lin and the politburo alternate Ch'en Po-ta⁷⁹, and K'ang Sheng. It seemed that P'eng was fully supported by the politburo members Chu Te and Lin Po-ch'u, and the alternate Chang Wen-t'ien - not forgetting himself. This meant the decision of punishing P'eng was depended on the remaining twelve: the politburo members Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, P'eng Chen, Li Fu-ch'un, Tung Pi-wu, Li Sien-nien, Ho Lung, Liu Po-ch'eng, Li Ch'ing-ch'uan and the alternates Lu Ting-

⁷⁷Li Jui, *THE TRUE RECORDS OF THE LUSHAN CONFERENCE*, op. cit., pp. 330-345.

⁷⁸Ch'en Yün, who was on vacation in Talien; Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who had left the conference because of his "ailing legs".

⁷⁹Ch'en was born into a poor peasant family in Hui-an Hsien in the mid-twenties. Ch'en worked as a clerk in Fukien army units and in 1927 engaged in political work during the Northern Expedition among forces led by KMT General Chang Chen. That year he joined the CCP and went to Moscow where he enrolled in Sun Yat-sen University (redesignated the Communist University of the Toilers of China during his stay there), the leading interpreter of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung". He was relatively obscure professor and a member of the Communist underground in north China in the thirties, but he emerged as a leading Maoist ideologue and polemicist in the early forties. A key figure in the propaganda Department since then. One of Ch'en's major tasks in the early PRC years was to interpret Mao's contributions to Marxism, and in particular to reconcile them in light of Stalin's writings and policies. See Donald W. Klein & Anne B. Clark (ed.), *BIOGRAPHIC DICTIONARY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM, 1921-1965*, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 122.

i, Po I-po and Ulanfu.

With the exception of Mao's 7 votes and P'eng's 4 votes, the remaining all gave priority to preserving the outward unity of the party, thus avoiding the split which Mao had threatened to create, and wanted to make further revisions to the Three Red Banner policies. Consequently, P'eng was punished and forced to undergo self-criticism. However, Mao couldn't remove P'eng from all his positions in the party and army, he was even to officially remain a member of the politburo and of the CCPCC.

The Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC closed on 16 August. It passed three resolutions in accordance with Mao's instruction, namely the "Resolution on the Struggle for Defending the Party's General Line and for Opposing Right Opportunism", the "Resolution on the Campaign to Raise Production and Practice Economy", and the "Resolution of the Eighth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Concerning the Anti-Party Clique Headed by P'eng Te-huai".⁸⁰

In the "Resolution of the Eighth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Concerning the Anti-Party Clique Headed by P'eng Te-huai" passed on 16 August 1959, Mao further pointed out the following few points:

Firstly, "During the Lushan meeting, a fierce onslaught on the party's general line, the Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes was made inside our party by the right opportunist anti-Party clique which was headed by P'eng Te-huai and which included a handful of others. This onslaught came at a time when the reactionary forces at home and abroad were exploiting certain transient and partial shortcomings in our great movement

⁸⁰Li Jui, *THE TRUE RECORDS OF THE LUSHAN CONFERENCE*, *op. cit.*, pp. 363-365.

to intensify their attack on our party and people... The Eighth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Party holds that to take resolute action and crush the activities of the right opportunist anti-Party clique headed by P'eng Te-huai is absolutely necessary not only for safeguarding the party's general line, but also for safeguarding the leadership of the party's Central committee headed by comrade Mao Tse-tung".

Secondly, "P'eng Te-huai aims at splitting the party have been going on for a long time. The letter setting out his views which P'eng wrote to Mao on 14 July 1959, in the early stage of the Lushan meeting and his speeches and remarks in the course of the meeting represented the platform of the right opportunists in their attack on the Party. P'eng was against the party, against the people, and against socialism".

Thirdly, "The facts brought to light at Eighth Plenary Session of Eighth Central Committee prove that activities of the anti-party clique headed by P'eng Te-huai prior to and during the Lushan meeting were purposive, prepared, planned and organised. They represent a continuation and development of the case of the anti-Party alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, of which they were important members... P'eng's activities could and did mislead a number of people; they were fraught with danger for the future of the party and the People's Liberation Army".

Fourthly, "P'eng Te-huai's present mistake was not accidental. It had deep social, historical, and ideological roots. He and his accomplices and followers were essentially representatives of the bourgeoisie who joined the Party during the democratic revolution. P'eng joined the Party and the Revolutionary Army led by the Party with the idea of 'investing in a share'. He only wanted to lead other, to lead the collective, but did not want to be led by others, to be led by the collective... Indeed, his anti-Party activities reflected the kind of class struggle in which the Chinese bourgeoisie opposes the

proletarian socialist revolution in an attempt to mould the party, the army, and the world in its own bourgeois image".

Finally, "The true nature of their attack on the party represented as they did the interests of the bourgeoisie and the upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie. They sought to sabotage the dictatorship of the proletariat and undermine the socialist revolution by splitting and demoralising the vanguard of the proletariat and organising opportunist factions".⁸¹

At the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the CCPCC, Mao classified P'eng's behaviour at the Lushan conference as a "class struggle". Taking P'eng to be the leader of the right opportunist anti-Party clique, it was considered that he was the representative of the bourgeoisie, that he represented a continuation and development of the case of the anti-Party alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, and that his mistake was not accidental, it had deep social historical and ideological roots.

Moreover, the "Communiqué of the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC" pointed out that "The imperialists and hostile elements within the country will continue to slander and try to sabotage the socialist construction of our country. Nevertheless, this will only serve to stimulate the whole of our people to raise their revolutionary enthusiasm to a higher level, and impel our whole party and the people of all our nationalities to strengthen unity. Finally it would uphold the brilliant banner of the general line, and steadily develop, the great socialist cause of our country", "the principle danger now confronting the achievements of a continued leap forward this year is the arising right opportunist ideas among some cadres. They underestimate the great achievements made by hundreds of

⁸¹ "Resolution of the 8th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China concerning the anti-Party clique headed by P'eng Te-huai", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 754-756; *RED FLAG*, No. 13, 1967, pp. 18-24; *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 16 August, 1967.

millions of working people and revolutionary intellectuals in the Great Leap Forward movement and the people's commune movement, and overemphasise the seriousness of certain defects which occurred in the two movements owing to lack of experience and which have been overcome quickly. They slander as 'petty bourgeois fanaticism' the great leap forward and the People's Communes movement, in which hundreds of millions of working people have been vigorously engaged under the leadership of the party".⁸² The communiqué did not say a single word about the convening of the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau between 2 June and 1 August.

On 17 September, P'eng was removed from his post as Minister of National Defence and replaced by Lin Piao. Along with P'eng, Huang K'e-ch'eng was dismissed as Chief of the General Staff, with General Lo Jui-ch'ing, the former Minister of Public Security, being appointed as his successor. Also dismissed and criticised including Chang Wen-t'ien and 11 others.⁸³

During the course of Eighth Plenum, on 16 August 1959, three resolutions were passed. One of them, published only on 16 August 1967,⁸⁴ condemned the "anti-Party clique

⁸²"Central Committee Communiqué on the 'Readjustment' of Claims and Targets (26 August 1959)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. II, p. 758, and *RED FLAG*, Vol. XVII, 1958, p. 3.

⁸³Chang Wen-t'ien, Vice-minister of foreign affairs and alternate member of the Politburo; Hsi Chung-hsün, Vice-premier, Secretary General of the State Council, and member of the CCPCC (in 1960); General T'an Cheng, Director of the PLA's General Political Department and member of the CCPCC (in 1960 or 1961); General Hsiao K'e, Vice-minister of National Defence and member of the CCPCC; General Teng Hua, Commander-in-Chief of the Shenyang Military area and member of CCPCC; Chou Hsiao-chou, First Party Secretary of the CCP's Hunan provincial party committee and alternate member of the CCPCC; General Hung Hsueh-chih, director of the PLA's General Rear Services Department and alternate member of the CCPCC; General Li Ta, Vice-minister of National Defence; Lieut.-general Nieh He-ting, Vice-commander of the PLA armoured troops; Lieut.-general Han Chen-chi, Military Attaché to the Soviet Union; Lieut.-general Wan I, director of Staff Operations, PLA; Lieut.-general Ch'en Chang-hsiang.

See Jürgen Domes, *P'ENG TE-HUAI - THE MAN AND THE IMAGE*, op. cit., pp. 99-100; Wang Yüan, *THE PRC'S STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE*, op. cit. p. 162.

⁸⁴Li Jui, *THE TRUE RECORDS OF THE LUSHAN CONFERENCE*, op. cit., p. 366.

headed by P'eng Te-huai" and called for P'eng's removal from his position as Minister of National Defence and first Vice-chairman of CCPCC's Military Commission, while preserving his membership in the CCPCC and the politburo. The "Resolution on the Struggle for Defending the Party's General Line and for Opposing Right Opportunism" did not make public.

The other resolution which was soon to be published, concerned the "development of the campaign to increase and practice economy". It again paid lip-service to the Three Red Banners, but in fact confined the authority of the rural communes to administrative and planning duties, while the centre of gravity of social policy for the countryside now shifted to the production brigades, which was entrusted with the ownership of land and became the "basic accounting unit".⁸⁵

The substance of these two resolutions revealed the nature of the factional compromise. The first point of significance was that Mao's attack on P'eng was accepted. P'eng was to be removed from his positions and forced to undertake self-criticism at the forthcoming Eighth Plenum. However, P'eng was not to be expelled from the party, as Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih had been in 1955. He was even to remain officially a member of politburo, although he was to be excluded from its meetings. Finally, Mao accepted the revisions of the Three Red Banners policies proposed by the civilian leaders in the Party machine leaders and the economists.

On 17 August, the next day after the close of the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC, a Working Conference of the Central Committee was presided over by Mao at the same place as the Lushan conference. At the conference, Lin Piao was appointed Minister of

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, p. 97.

National Defence and the First Vice Chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission. Liu Shao-ch'i strongly sided with Mao with the following remarks: 1. The best and most accurate leadership is under Mao's command, even Marx could not perform better. 2. P'eng Te-huai opposed the cult of the individual, refused to sing "East is Red" and hail "Long Live Chairman Mao", while I myself vigorously engaged in promoting the personality cult of Mao. Prior to the convening of the Seventh CCP National Congress, I propagated the prestige of comrade Mao Tse-tung with all my efforts, and thus the General Program of the Party Constitution of the Seventh CCP National Congress embodied Mao Tse-tung thought as the guiding principle for the Party. 4. After the 20th CPSU Party Congress, some comrades disputed the personality cult of Mao, while I think such actions is absolutely wrong. It is sabotage of the Party.⁸⁶ Liu Shao-ch'i learned lessons from the case of P'eng Te-huai and thus anxiously tried to express his support of Mao.

The conflict between Mao and P'eng revealed that there existed a high degree of risk in the CCP when formulating a policy, and that there was no space for the so-called "loyal opposition". Basically, prior to the Lushan conference, the CCP could still maintain its harmony inside the party, the removal of the remainder of the Kuomintang and the reformation of Chinese society into a socialist society remained its consistent goals. While after the Lushan conference, the structure of upper strata's power struggle was formed, Mao successfully purged the "P'eng-Huang anti-Party clique" by making compromises, but this move towards purges undermined the completeness of the CCP and blocked the possibility of allowing discussion on policy at later days.

Mao's greatest achievement at the Lushan conference was P'eng's removal from the post

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, p. 369.

as Minister of National Defence and his replacement by Lin Piao. Lin, closer in spirit to the party leadership, and also personally popular with the rank and file of the army, was in a better position to modify the more extreme policies which had affected the PLA. The major task facing Lin was to restore the PLA's political morale, to strengthen party control over it, and to resolve the "struggle between bourgeois and working class ideology" which resulted from military concern about the effect of the Great Leap Forward policies upon its own position. In his first major policy speech Lin called for intensified political education, stricter party control, and more contact with the masses, attacking those who took a "materialistic" view of modern warfare, he nevertheless emphasised the importance of technique and modernisation.⁸⁷

From the year 1960 onwards a determined and uninterrupted drive has been under the close supervision of Lin Piao and Mao Tse-tung himself, to raise the PLA's political loyalty and ideological commitment from the low level to which it had sunk at the time of the dismissal of P'eng Te-huai.

An extraordinary conference of the enlarged meeting of the CCPCC Military Committee, was held from 14 September to 20 October 1960. It was at this meeting that Lin Piao called for a "breakthrough" in ideological work. "It is impossible to fight other battles well", he said, "if the ideological battle is not fought victoriously". He propounded four basic principles -subsequently know as the "Four firsts" - which provided the theoretical foundation for the renewed emphasis upon political work. These were:

First, the relation between weapons and men. "Human and political ideological factors are

⁸⁷Lin Piao, *"March Ahead Under the Red Flag of the Party's General Line and Mao Te-tung's Military thinking"*, *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 29 September, 1959; *RED FLAG*, No. 12, 1959, pp. 16-25; *"Lin Piao on the Maoist Line in Military affairs (29 September 1959)"*, *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, op. cit., pp. 777-784.

primary factors affecting fighting strength".

Second, the relation between political work and other work. "Politics is the soul and supreme command. Political work is the life line of the army".

Third, the relation between routine political work and ideological work. "Special emphasis should be placed on ideological work... to establish proletarian thinking and wipe out non-proletarian thought".

And Fourth, the relation between theory and practice. "Education from books must be combined with reality".

The "Four firsts" were formulated by Lin Piao after criticism of the "capitalistic military road of P'eng Te-huai". By 1960, according to the "Resolution of the Enlarged Military Committee" of 20 Oct. 1960,⁸⁸ there were no party branch committees in approximately one-third of all PLA campaigns. Party control was even faultier below company level, where most platoons had no party cells, and most squads had no party members.

In April 1961, the party branch had been restored to all companies, 30 percent of the platoons had organised party cells, and over half of the squads had party members. About 2000 unreliable regular and probationary party members in the PLA had been dismissed and 229,000 new party members had been recruited.⁸⁹

⁸⁸"Resolution of the Enlarged Military Committee Concerning the Strengthening of Political and Ideological Work (20 October 1960", *BULLETIN OF ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY*, Vol. IV, 1961, p. 219; J. Cheng (ed.), *THE POLITICS OF THE CHINESE RED ARMY: A TRANSLATION OF THE BULLETIN OF ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY*, (California: Stanford University, 1966), pp. 480-487; "Reindoctrinating the People's Liberation Army (October 1960), *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. II, *op. cit.*, pp. 882-897.

⁸⁹Ralph L. Powell, *POLITICO-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP IN COMMUNIST CHINA*, (U.S. Dept. of

With Lin Piao, Mao dragged the army into the road of "politics takes the lead". Lin initiated a series of political campaigns based on the PLA, and henceforth, the army took part in the political arena of the PRC. The fall of P'eng Te-huai, the representative of professional army building, marked an end of one stage of the PLA, and the beginning of another.

After Mao entrusted Lin Piao with all the routine duties of the CCPCC Military Commission, Lin launched a series of political campaigns under Mao's instruction and ordered the PLA to "march ahead under the red flag of the party's general line and Mao Te-tung's military thinking",⁹⁰ and resolutely support the leadership of the party and Mao, and serve as the most faithful and reliable tool in implementing the party line and policy, and the most resolute defender of the people's democratic dictatorship of the socialist cause under the party leadership. In addition to this, the PLA itself, possessed a high degree of political consciousness and resolute party character. To the Communist Party members and cadres who were working in the armed forces, a resolute party character was to express itself in the form of determination to defend the unity of the party at any time and under any circumstance, and in wholeheartedness in carrying out the struggle for the program and line of the party. This would call for constant concern for and attention to the political situation, policy, line, and other such matters pertaining to decision.

Mao reversed the adverse circumstances, successfully turned the anti-Leftist struggle into the anti-Rightist struggle at the Lushan conference. By doing this he won the final victory.

State: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 1963), pp. 7-8.

⁹⁰Lin Piao, "March Ahead Under the Red Flag of the Party's General Line and Mao Te-tung's Military thinking", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 29 September, 1959; *RED FLAG*, No. 19, 1959, pp. 16-25; "Lin Piao on the Maoist Line in Military affairs (29 September 1959)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. II, *op. cit.*, p. 783.

However, the consequence did not represent the end of struggle, but the beginning of another even bigger struggle.

The situation at that time seemed very good for Mao, but Mao was aware of the fact that Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai had posed a political threat to him and that they were two important rivals in the power-seizure struggle.

Since Liu Shao-ch'i did not try his best to save P'eng Te-huai at the Lushan conference, it meant that he lost his best ally against Mao. Liu was destined to failure when he contended against Mao at the early stage of the Cultural Revolution.

III. The Case of Liu Shao-ch'i

The nature of "the case of Liu Shao-ch'i" could not be categorised as "structural opposition", although it was above the level of "line opposition". Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i had no conflicts in their socialist belief, but there existed a serious controversy on the major policies of how to carry out this ideology.

It was Liu Shao-ch'i's suggestion that the Seventh CCP National Congress in May 1945 brought Maoist thought into the Party Constitution. On 14 May, Liu made a report on the revision of the Party constitution, in which he indicated the following few points:

First, having adopted Mao Tse-tung thought - the theory which integrates Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution - as the guide in all its works, our party has formulated a revolutionary programme and revolutionary policies which fully represent the interests of the Chinese nation and people.... It is under the guidance of the great Mao Tse-tung thought that our party has gathered together the most loyal, courageous, politically conscious and well-disciplined representative of Chinese working class and labouring people.⁹¹

Second, Mao Tse-tung thought is communism and Marxism applied to China.⁹²

Third, Mao Tse-tung thought is the development of Marxism with regard to the national-democratic revolution in the colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal country of the present period. It is an outstanding example of how Marxism is applied to a given nation.⁹³

⁹¹"On the Party (14 May 1945)", *SELECTED WORKS OF LIU SHAO-CH'I*, Vol. I, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), p. 315.

⁹²*Ibid.*, p. 331.

⁹³*Ibid.*, p. 332.

And the last, Mao Tse-tung thought has evolved through the application of the Marxist world outlook and social outlook, specifically, dialectical materialism and historical materialism. In other words, it has evolved through careful, scientific analysis of the exceedingly rich experience of all modern revolution.⁹⁴

However, 11 years after Mao Tse-tung thought was included in the 1945 Party Constitution, the Eighth CCP National Congress, held in September 1956, adopted Liu Shao-ch'i's opinion to remove "Mao Tse-tung thought as the guiding principle for our Party" from the Party Constitution. The General Program of new Party Constitution stated:

"The Communist Party of China takes Marxism-Leninism as its guide to action. Only Marxism-Leninism correctly sets forth the laws of development of society and correctly charts the path leading to the achievement of socialism and communism". "The organisational principle of the communist party of China is democratic centralism, which means centralism on the basis of democracy and democracy under centralised guidance. The party must take effective measures to promote inner-party democracy, encourage the initiative and creative ability of all party members and of all local and primary party organisations and strengthen the lively contact between the higher and lower party organisation".⁹⁵

Furthermore, in article 2 entitled "party members have the duties", it specified "to study Marxism-Leninism" instead of "to study Mao Tse-tung thought". The authority of Maoist

⁹⁴*Ibid.*

⁹⁵"Constitution of the Communist Party of China (26 September 1956), *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I, *op. cit.*, pp. 406-407; *NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY*, 26 September 1956.

ideology faced a serious challenge in the new Party Constitution.

At any Communist Party Congress, the major document used is the report to the congress on the work of the outgoing central committee. It is normally delivered by the first or second ranking figure in the party leadership. Liu Shao-ch'i had been the second ranking figure, at least de facto, since 1945.

Liu's "Report on the work of the Central Committee, 16 Sept. 1956" contained far fewer references to Mao and his "thought" than had his report on the Party Constitution to the Seventh Party Congress in the Spring of 1945. Liu indicated in one section of his report, entitled "international relation", that "The 20th congress of the communist party of the USSR held last February, was an important political event of world significance. It repudiated the cult of the individual which had grave consequences inside the party".⁹⁶ The other section, "The Leadership of the party", of his report also pointed out the following:

First, "The line followed by the party since its seventh congress has been correct and this has been proved by facts. But it must be admitted that, in shouldering the increasingly heavy tasks of today, the party is not without difficulties, nor free from mistakes. One of the tasks confronting the party leadership is to study and analyse past mistakes, draw lessons from them, so as to be able to make fewer mistakes and as far as possible, avoid repeating past mistakes, and prevent small mistakes from developing into big ones... To enable our party to continue to maintain its correct and sound leadership in the future, the main thing is to see to it that party organisation and party members make fewer mistakes stemming from ideological understanding... If a person does not understand that a correct

⁹⁶Liu Shao-ch'i, "Report on the work of the Central Committee (16 September 1956)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I, *op. cit.*, p. 381.

view can only be based on an objective and all-round reflection of reality, but insist on doing things according to his own subjective and one-sided approach to things, then he will go on making mistakes".

Second, "In order to bring the party's role of leadership in line as much as possible with the objective realities, to facilitate the summing up of the experience and opinions of the masses, and to reduce the possibility of making mistakes, party organisation at all levels must, without exception, rigidly adhere to the party's principle of collective leadership and broaden democratic life within the party. All important questions must be thoroughly discussed by the proper collective bodies before decisions are taken, and argument and debate on diverse viewpoints must be allowed without any restraint, in order that various opinions from the masses, both inside and outside the party, may be more or less fully reflected - in other words, in order that the various aspects present in the course of development of objective realities will be more or less fully reflected".

Third, "Every leader must be good at listening patiently to and taking into deliberate consideration, opinions contrary to his own, in order to resolutely approve opposing views if reasonable, or whatever is reasonable in them; he must continue to work amicably with, but never turn his back on, any comrade who, with the correct motives and in accordance with normal procedure, may have put forward any opinion contrary to his own. Only in this way can we achieve collective leadership and party unity indeed, and not in name only, and assure greater flourishing of its organisation and cause".

Fourth, "The question of thorough application of the party's principle of collective leadership and the extension of inner-party democracy is given full attention in and new draft of the constitution of the communist party of China put forward by the Central Committee. The draft constitution makes some new provisions in respect of the rights of

party members and of party organisations at lower levels. It is provided in the draft constitution that party members have the right to give full play to their creative ability in work and, while unconditionally carrying out party decisions, have the right to reserve and submit their own views to a leading body of the party, in case they should disagree with them".

And finally, "A correct attitude toward comrades who have committed mistakes is one of the necessary conditions of correct party leadership. It is very easy to take severe disciplinary measures against comrades who have committed mistakes up to expelling them from the party. But if the ideological cause of those mistakes is not removed, severe disciplinary measures not only cannot insure that the party members will not again make the same mistakes, but may lead to their making even greater mistakes"⁹⁷.

The formulation of the General Program of the Party Constitution by the Eighth CCP National Congress had seriously crippled Mao's power, and relatively increased Liu Shao-ch'i's power. Furthermore, Mao was forced to resign from his post as the chairman of State at the Sixth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC in December 1958 because of the failure of "Three Red Banners" movement. The chairmanship of the State was relieved by Liu Shao-ch'i at the forthcoming "Fourth National People's Congress" in April 1959, which also appointed Teng Hsiao-p'ing as General-secretary of the CCPCC and stipulated that the "central secretariat" was directly under the leadership of the Political bureau and its standing committee, no longer responsible to Mao alone. Mao therefore retreated to the "back benches" of politics.

In May 1961, Liu Shao-ch'i approved the *Inspection Report on Certain Questions of*

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 384-387.

Propaganda Concerning Mao Tse-tung Thought And His Revolutionary Deeds proposed by Lu Ting-i, who was then the chief of the Propaganda Department of the CCPCC. The report indicated that the movement to study Mao Tse-tung's writings at that time was indeed very "simplified", "vulgar" and "nominalistic".⁹⁸ Subsequently in July 1963, the Propaganda Department's *Report on Certain Questions Concerning the Situation of Seminar on Publishing Works And the Improvement of Publishing Works* was approved and then issued to localities by Liu Shao-ch'i in the name of CCPCC. It stipulated that all localities were prohibited to compile and publish Mao Tse-tung's writings, and were asked to control the printing of copies and to distribute only inside government units, not to the public". In February 1964 the *Notification on the Procedures of Approval to Compile and Publish Chairman Mao's Writings* was again issued, which indicated "All selected works of Mao Tse-tung, if published, should be reported to the central committee. Without the central committee's approval, any printing is forbidden".⁹⁹

In addition, the Ninth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC, held in January 1961, discussed the *Report on the Achievements of the 1960 National Economic Plan and the Main Targets for the 1961 National Economic Plan*,¹⁰⁰ and was critical on some economic issues. It started that the economic adjustment was aimed at overcoming the left adventurism of agricultural and industrial policies, and further encouraged the policy of "three freedoms and one contract" - the three freedoms were (1) extension of plots of land for private production; (2) free market; (3) increase of private enterprise, and one contract required each household to assume a contracted obligation toward the state to produce a fixed quantity of grain - which in fact had nullified Mao's "general line for socialist construction". In September, the *Central Decision Concerning the Cadre's Training of*

⁹⁸Wang Yuan, *THE PRC'S STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE*, op. cit., p. 167.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 168.

¹⁰⁰*WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, op. cit., p. 407.

the Whole Party was stipulated under Liu's guidance. It clearly laid down allowing "free thinking", "free discussion", and "three no's"¹⁰¹ - "no seizure on mistake", "no putting on hat (scapegoat)" and "no punishment", in the hope of reducing the impact on the movement of the idol worship of Mao which was initiated by Lin Piao.

Strictly speaking, prior to the establishment of PRC's regime, Liu Shao-ch'i held a different viewpoint on "socialist society" to that of Mao, which could be seen in his *Report on Some Issues of Current Situation* delivered on 1 February 1946. Liu argued in his report that "the new stage of peaceful democracy" was "through parliament the legal struggle road", "the trend of major struggle of Chinese revolution has turned into a peaceful and parliamentary struggle", said him, "It is a legal mass struggle and parliamentary struggle". "The entire party works have to be changed, and all organisations have to be changed, change into a form based on non-armed struggle...., able to do propaganda, to make speech, and to carry on a election campaign, persuading everyone to vote for you".¹⁰

However, Liu Shao-ch'i's viewpoint of "legal struggle and parliamentary road" in 1946 was serious criticised and was raised to the level of the struggle between bourgeoisie and proletarian and the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism in the paper, *The Bankruptcy of Chinese Parliamentary Enthusiasts*,¹⁰³ issued by CCPCC in August 1967 at the early stage of Cultural Revolution. The paper quoted Lenin as saying, "if class struggle is restricted to only parliamentary struggle, or even to think parliamentary struggle is the supreme, decisive and dominating struggle of all. This is tantamount to shifting to the side of bourgeoisie and opposing the proletarian".¹⁰⁴ The paper therefore concluded that "parliament is only an ornament or a screen of bourgeois control. By no

¹⁰¹ Wang Yuan, *THE PRC'S STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE*, op. cit., pp. 176-177.

¹⁰² "The Bankruptcy of Chinese Parliamentary Enthusiasts", *RED FLAG*, No. 13, 1967, p. 29.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-34.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

means should the proletarian substitute parliamentary struggle for armed revolution".

The question "whether the power seizure of the proletarian should be through armed struggle or through parliamentary road" was the fundamental difference between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism. "The historical movement of international communism has showed us that all revisionists have always been the 'parliamentary enthusiasts'. They all deny the fact that without exception armed revolution is the general way of proletariat revolution. They also use the bourgeois parliament as a place to do the dirty deal of betraying the fundamental interests of the proletarian, and become the most shameful traitors to the working class".¹⁰⁵

Mao also gave serious condemnation to Liu Shao-ch'i's assertion of "parliamentary road", but, in reality, his purpose was to defend the prevailing myth of "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun". This was created by him, to eliminate the heretical viewpoints of non-Maoist ideology, and to consolidate his absolute leadership". The paper *The Bankruptcy of 'Chinese Parliamentary Enthusiasts'* had clearly expressed Mao's concern by saying, "While advocating 'parliamentary road', China's Khrushchev also opposed armed struggle openly, and urged that the guns to be handed over to the Kuomintang (the ruling party in Taiwan) and that the reorganisation of army was necessary. He attempted to reorganise our army into a national defence army, a security troop and self-defence troop, to abolish party organisation in the army, and to terminate army under the direct leadership, command and unity of the Ministry of National Defence".¹⁰⁶

At the beginning of the fifties, Liu Shao-ch'i promoted the slogan "Consolidate the new-democratic system". However, Mao considered this to mean "consolidating" and

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, p. 29.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, p. 30.

developing the forces of capitalism and taking the capitalist road instead of carrying out the socialist revolution, Mao promptly criticised this slogan and pointed out that it was an error in the nature of a bourgeois program. He published *On the Question of Agricultural Cooperation* and other works to criticise the view of Liu Shao-ch'i, which was "mechanisation before cooperation" and of expanding the rich-peasant economy.¹⁰⁷

By 1956, with the basic completion of the socialist transformation of the ownership of the means of production, Liu Shao-ch'i commented, "In China, the question of which wins, socialism or capitalism is already settled", "the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie has been basically resolved", and the principal internal contradiction "is the contradiction between the advanced socialist system and the backward social productive forces".¹⁰⁸ Mao pointed out that Liu Shao-ch'i and his gang inserted "this sinister trash" into the resolution of the Eighth National Congress of the Party in their attempt to impose on the whole party the line of taking the capitalist road. The words that Liu Shao-ch'i and his gang had inserted into the resolution were wrong and anti-Marxist. Shortly afterwards, Mao made his work public *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People*, which systematically answered the question of class, class contradictions, and class struggle in socialist society. Mao pointed out: In China, although on the whole socialist transformation has been completed with respect to the system of ownership... there are still remnants of the overthrown landlord and comprador class. There is still a bourgeoisie, and the remoulding of the petty bourgeoisie has only just started. The class struggle is by no means over. The class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the class struggle between the different political forces, and the class struggle

¹⁰⁷"Commemorate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Communist Party of China", *RED FLAG*, No. 7/8, 1971, p. 12; *PEOPLE'S DAILY & LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY*, 1 July, 1971; "The Communist Party's Fiftieth Anniversary (1 July 1971)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. V, op. cit., pp. 2329-2330

¹⁰⁸"The Communist Party's Fiftieth Anniversary (1 July 1971)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. V, op. cit., p. 2330.

in the ideological field between proletariat and the bourgeois will continue to be long and tortuous and at times will even become very acute.. the question of which will win out, socialism or capitalism, is still not really settled.¹⁰⁹

An enlarged works conference was held by the CCPCC in Peking between 11 January and 7 February 1962, and was attended by more than 7,000 cadres representing certain departments and bureaux of the CCPCC, central committees, various provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions, and the Liberation Army. At the conference Liu Shao-ch'i delivered a written report on behalf on CCPCC, in which he made a preliminary summary on the fundamental experiences and lessons from the socialist construction since 1958 and analysed the major errors and mistakes in the works of the recent years.¹¹⁰ However, in the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, the editorial *From the Failure of P'eng Te-huai to the Bankruptcy of China's Khrushchev* directed against Liu Shao-ch'i's report at the enlarged works conference of the CCPCC starting from 11 Jan. 1962 was published by the *Red Flag* in 1967. The editorial denounced "China's Khrushchev, Liu Shao-ch'i, was the chief boss of the bourgeois headquarters. He openly tried to reverse verdict on P'eng Te-huai, and spoke in defence of P'eng by indicating that some of P'eng's anti-party program 'conformed to reality', other statements included 'it should not be regarded as a mistake' and 'the struggle against P'eng Te-huai anti-Party clique is a erroneous and excessive struggle'.¹¹¹

At the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC, held on 24 and 27 September 1962 in Peking, Mao delivered the speech, *Never Forget Class Struggle*. In this he appealed to the people of the whole nation to attack bourgeois headquarters under the leadership of Mao's class

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*

¹¹⁰WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, *op. cit.*, p. 410.

¹¹¹"From the Failure of P'eng Te-huai to the Bankruptcy of China's Khrushchev", RED FLAG, No. 13, 1967, p. 23.

struggle and class contradiction.¹¹ Shortly afterwards, Mao intentionally turned the aim of "socialist education movement" from the original economic level of "consolidating the collective economy of People's Communes" to the political level of "purging those power holders within the party who take the capitalist road", thereby attempting to eradicate Liu Shao-ch'i's "reactionary forces" by means of mass movements. Mao further expressed in the *Directive on the Socialist Education Movement* in May 1963 that he would "never fight a war which has not been prepared for. This fight is a nation-wide revolutionary movement", shortly after, a new regulation was added to this directive. It was the "Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the Present Rural Works", which emphasised the "question of which will win out, socialism or capitalism? Marxism-Leninism or revisionism?"¹¹³

By July 1964, the struggle between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao ch'i had been raised to the theoretical level. In his speech *On the Philosophical Issue* delivered on 18 July 1964, Mao repudiated Yang Hsien-chen¹¹⁴, the principal of the Advanced Party School, of his viewpoint "Two Combine into One" as saying:

"Yang derived from a classic novel of the Ming Dynasty Tung-hsi-ch'un written by Fang I-

¹¹²*Ibid.*, p. 22, and "Mao Tse-tung's Speech at the 10th Plenary Session of the 8th CCPCC", *LONG LIVE MAO TSE-TUNG'S THOUGHT*, (Taipei: National Cheng-chi University, 1974), pp. 430-436.

¹¹³Wang Yüan, *THE PRC'S STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE*, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

¹¹⁴He was an important party philosopher and ideologue until the early 1960's when he was removed from the presidency of the higher party school and denounced. He studied at the Russian Language Institute and Peking Normal University. In 1936, he was head of the China Department of the Soviet Unions foreign Language Press, where he was in charge of translating Soviet ideological works into Chinese. Throughout the 1950's Yang seems to have been engaged principally in writing and lecturing on Marxism, Yang's most important article in these years "Collective Leadership is the Highest Principle of Party Leadership". In May 1954 he was identified as deputy-director of the Party Propaganda Department's Theoretical Education Division. In December 1954 Yang was appointed a member of the preparatory Committee of the Academy of Science's Research Institute of Philosophy, which was established in 1955. In May 1959 he attended three academic forums sponsored by the China Philosophy Association, where problems in logic and philosophy were discussed. Donald W Klein & Anne B. Clark (ed.), *BIOGRAPHIC DICTIONARY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM, 1921-1965*, Vol. II, *op. cit.*, pp. 973-974.

chih the idea of combining two opposites into one whole and he applied this traditional idea to the analysis of dialectics. He holds that things that oppose each other also complement each other; that is, things opposed to each other can be united into one. Things that contain no contradictions may later develop two contradictory aspects and then again be united into one"¹¹⁵. Opposed to Mao's theory of "one divided into two", Yang's theory recognises the universality and absoluteness of unity rather than contradiction. Moreover, Yang applied his theory to analysis of social phenomena, thus opening prospects for the conciliation of classes and the unity of opposites.

In August of the same year, the *Red Flag* carried a report of the *New Polemic on the Philosophical Front*, and pointed out that Yang's theory of "Two combine into one" "is a struggle between those who are for and those who are against materialist dialectics". It stated the following: "Philosophy is a part of social ideology. It has its distinct party character, that is, class character. The struggle on the philosophical front invariably reflects class struggle on the economic and political fronts. In class struggle, different classes, proceeding from their respective class interests, are bound to put forward different points of view and make philosophical generalisations of these viewpoints, which are either revolutionary or reactionary. There is the revolutionary philosophy of the proletariat, and there is the reactionary philosophy of the bourgeoisie. Thus, the struggle between the two antagonistic groups is reflected on the philosophical front. Those individuals within the ranks of the proletariat who have a bourgeois world outlook or who are influenced by the bourgeois world outlook, like wise often use bourgeois philosophy to oppose the revolutionary philosophy of the proletariat".¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵"One Divides into Two Combine into One", *KWANG MING DAILY*, 29 May, 1964; Warren Kuo (ed.), *A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY*, op. cit., pp. 152-153.

¹¹⁶One of the signs of Mao's efforts to raise the level of ideological and political militancy in China in 1964 was a propaganda campaign against the philosopher Yan Hsien-chen, who held the conciliatory and allegedly nondialectical view that "two combine into one", as against the allegedly correct and struggle-oriented view that "one divides into two". See "New Polemic on the Philosophical Front", *RED FLAG*,

The *Red Flag* further emphasised the following "At present time, the central question in the debate is whether or not to recognise the law of the unity of opposites as the fundamental law of objective things, and materialist dialectics as the world outlook of the proletariat".¹¹⁷ "Yang Hsien-chen has done this with the aim and plan of pitting the reactionary bourgeois world outlook against the proletarian world outlook of materialist dialectic" "The concept that 'One divides into two' is the kernel of the revolutionary philosophy of materialist dialectics, the world outlook of the proletariat. Using this world outlook to apprehend things, the proletariat recognises that contradictions are inherent in both of unity and struggle, and that contradiction is the motivation force in the development of things. While the identity of opposites is relative, their struggle is absolute. Therefore, the task of materialist dialectics has never been to cover up contradictions, but to disclose them, to discover the correct method for resolving them, and to accelerate their transformation, in order to bring about the revolutionary transformation of the world. Using the world outlook of materialist dialectics to analyse class societies, the proletariat recognises class contradiction and class struggle; it recognises class struggle as the motivation force of social development; it firmly maintains that the proletariat must carry the class struggle through to the end and so bring about the transformation of society".¹¹⁸

Yang Hsien-chen applied the theory of "Two combines into one" to oppose Mao's "One divides into two" with the aim of attacking the myth of "struggle" philosophy and of "continuous revolution" advocated by Mao so as to support Liu Shao-ch'i's theory of

No. 16, 1964, pp. 7-11; PEKING REVIEW, No. 37, 11 September, 1964; "A Reaffirmation of Dialectics", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, pp. 1293-1296.

¹¹⁷"New Polemic on the Philosophical Front", RED FLAG, No. 16, 1964, pp. 9-10.

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*

"class reconciliation".

A lecture on *How To Be A Good Communist*¹¹⁹ (also known as *Communist Self-cultivation*) was delivered by Liu Shao-ch'i at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Yen-an as early as July 1939, and was later included in the *Documents for the Rectification Movement*. The paper pointed out in its Section 7, "Examples of wrong ideology in the party", and said that "Fairly strong individualism and selfishness are still to be found in some members of our party.... This type of self-seeking individualism often manifests itself inside the party in unprincipled quarrelling, factional struggle, sectarianism and departmentalism; it manifests itself in disrespect for and wilful violation of party discipline. Most unprincipled struggles originate in personal interests. Those who go in for factional struggle and are given to sectarianism usually place their own individual interests, or the interests of a small minority, above those of the party".¹²⁰ The paper continued, "A small number of comrades are deeply imbued with the ideology of the exploiting classes. They are usually unscrupulous in dealing with comrades and in handling problems inside the party, and are utterly devoid of the great and sincere proletarian communist spirit of mutual help and solidarity.... People with this ideology always want to climb over the heads of others in the party and, to this end, resort to attacking others and doing them harm.... They always try to pull down those who are moving ahead of them".¹²¹

Furthermore, in Section 9 "Attitudes towards wrong ideology in the party and towards inner-party struggle", Liu advocated "Do not take mechanical and extreme viewpoints combine irreconcilability and clarity properly in matters of principle with flexibility and

¹¹⁹"How to Be A Good Communist (July 1939)", *SELECTED WORKS OF LIU SHAO-CHI*, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 107-168; "Communist's Self-cultivation - A Speech at Yen-an Marx-Lenin Academy In July 1939", *RED FLAG*, No. 15/16, 1962, pp. 1-38.

¹²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 144.

¹²¹*Ibid.*, p. 148.

patient persuasion in methods of struggle; in the course of prolonged struggles, educate, criticise, temper and remould comrades who have committed errors but who are not incorrigible. Such inner-party ideological struggles on matters of principle as are necessary at different periods should be waged in a concrete and proper way; inner-party struggles should not be waged indiscriminatingly, subjectively, mechanically or on shadowy pretexts, do not become 'struggle addicts'".¹

Basically, Liu Shao-ch'i objected to a subjective and mechanical inner-party struggles. However, the *Red Flag* where the messages of the power holder were carried reached a conclusion on Yang Hsien-chen's theory of "Two combines into one" in saying "the contradiction and struggle between Marxism-Leninism and modern revisionism are irreconcilable".¹³

The *Red Flag's* criticism of Yang, in fact, was to open fire on Yang's puppet master - Liu Shao-ch'i. Mao had showed explicitly that the struggle between he and Liu Shao-ch'i was irreconcilable.

Mao convened a working conference of the Central Committee in December 1964, he pointed out that the direction of struggle was aimed at "rectifying those power holders within the party who take the capitalist road".¹²⁴ It was Mao's attempt to purge this power holder who took the capitalist road but who also had strong party background. However, this attempt would be rather difficult to achieve in that period if Mao applied the party's own force to carry forward a party rectification because, for one reason, Liu was then chairman of the PRC, with his prestige in the party, He was capable of uniting

¹²²*Ibid.*, p. 159.

¹²³"A Reaffirmation of Dialectics (August 1964)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. II, p. 1294.

¹²⁴Wang Yuan, *THE PRC'S STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE*, op. cit., p. 182.

the power of party's system to oppose Mao's attack if he intended to launch one. An other reason was that, the criticism of Liu Shao-ch'i taking the wrong line was the main pretext of Mao's attack on Liu, however, this criticism wouldn't be generally recognised without a long-term ideological education. Under such circumstances, Mao had to resort to "the barrel of a gun" to secure his power. He took two steps, the first, to put Lin Piao in an important position, having him employ military as a backup force, to reinforce political and ideological works among the army, and to spread the slogan "raise high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung thought" throughout the country; the second, to set off nationwide political campaigns to seize power from Liu Shao-ch'i.

An editorial *Never Forget Class Struggle*¹⁵ was carried by the *Red Flag* and *Liberation Army's Daily* at the same time on 4 May 1966. It pointed out, "The noteworthy thing is that in the present new situation of class struggle, the attacks launched against us by this handful of anti-party and anti-socialist elements have new features. They are waving 'red flags' to oppose the Red Flag and donning the cloak of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought to oppose Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought".¹⁶ "Our struggle with them is a life and death one. We must be fully aware of this and maintain sharp vigilance".¹⁷ "We must keep the teaching of chairman Mao Tse-tung's firmly in our minds and never forget the class struggle. We must never ignore the battle against the enemies without guns". "Let us hold ever higher the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought, resolutely destroy the black anti-party and anti-socialist line of the bourgeoisie and the revisionists".¹⁸

¹²⁵"Never Forget Class Struggle", *LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY*, 4 May, 1966; *RED FLAG*, No. 7, 1966, pp. 20-23; "The PLA Implies Intervention Against P'eng Chen (4 May 1966)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. III, pp. 1435-1438.

¹²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 23, and *Ibid.*, p. 1436.

¹²⁷*Ibid.*

¹²⁸*Ibid.*

In addition, Lin delivered the paper *Long Live the Victory of People's War - In Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of the Victory of Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War*.¹²⁹ The paper emphasised the following:

First, "The special feature of the Chinese revolution was armed revolution against armed counterrevolution. The main form of struggle was war and the main form of organisation was the army which was under the absolute leadership of the CCP".¹³⁰ Second, "Guided by comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory on building a people's army, our army was under the absolute leadership of the CCP and most loyalty carried out the party's Marxist-Leninist line and policies. It had a high degree of conscious discipline and was heroically inspired to destroy all enemies and conquer all difficulties".¹³¹ And the last, "The essence of comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of army building is that in building a people's army prominence must be given to politics, that is, the army must first and foremost be build on a political basis. Politics is the commander, politics is the soul of everything. Political work is the lifeline of our army". "Communists do not fight for personal military power but must fight for military power for the party and for the people".¹³²

Mao's conflict with Liu Shao-ch'i was very obvious. In order to actually control "the barrel of a gun", Mao had to remove all obstacles in front of him, such as Kao Kang, P'eng Te-huai, Huang K'e-ch'eng and many more were eliminated by Mao since 1949. Liu Shao-ch'i occupied such a high rank as chairman of the PRC and was in charge of party's works, but Mao would never allow himself to be second to Liu. Besides, Mao remained

¹²⁹"Long Live the Victory of People's War - In Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of the Victory of Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War", RED FLAG, No. 10, 1965; "Peking's Defence Minister States the Maoist Line on Vietnam (3 September 1965)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. II, pp. 1222-1239.

¹³⁰Ibid., p. 1228.

¹³¹Ibid., p. 1229.

¹³²Ibid.

the chairman of the party and military committee of the CCPCC, and realised the importance of the belief that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" in a power struggle. The result of the struggle between Mao and Liu could be foreseen when P'eng Te-huai was removed from the post as Minister of National Defence and relieved by Lin Piao.

On 1 April 1969, Lin Piao delivered the *Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China*.¹³³ In this report, Lin Piao made a final judgement on Liu Shao-ch'i on behalf of CCPCC and Mao Tse-tung which formally put Liu's political career to an end.

One of the main subjects contained in his report to the Ninth CCP Congress was "On the preparation for the great proletarian cultural revolution". The article indicated the following points:

First, "Every single victory of chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line, every victory in every major campaign launched by the party against the bourgeoisie, was gained only after smashing the revisionist line represented by Liu Shao-ch'i, which either was Right or Left in form but Right in essence".¹³⁴

Second, "Now it has been proved through investigation that as far back as the First Revolutionary Civil war period Liu Shao-ch'i betrayed the party, capitulated to the enemy, and became a hidden traitor and scab, that he was a lackey of the imperialists, modern revisionists, and Kuomintang reactionaries, and that he was the arch-representative of the

¹³³Lin Piao, "Report to the 9th National Congress of the Communist Party of China", *RED FLAG*, No. 5, 1969; *THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, op. cit., pp. 518-562.

¹³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 530.

persons in power taking the capitalist road. He had a political line by which he mainly attempted to restore capitalism in China and turn her into an imperialist and revisionist colony. In addition, he had an organisational line to serve his counterrevolutionary political line. For many years, recruiting deserters and turncoats, Liu Shao-ch'i gathered together a gang of renegades, enemy agents, and capitalist-roaders in power. They covered up their counterrevolutionary political records, shielded each other, colluded in doing evil, usurped important party and government posts, and controlled the leadership in many central and local units, thus forming an underground bourgeois headquarters in opposition to the proletarian headquarters headed by chairman Mao. They collaborated with the imperialists, modern revisionists, and Kuomintang reactionaries and played the kind of disruptive role that the U.S. imperialists, the Soviet revisionists, and the reactionaries of various countries were not in a position to do".¹³⁵

Third, "Chairman Mao was the first to perceive the danger of the counterrevolutionary plots of Liu Shao-ch'i and his gang. At the working conference of the Central Committee in January 1962, Chairman Mao pointed out the necessity of being on guard against the emergence of revisionism. At the working conference of the Central Committee at Peitaiho in August 1962 and the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Party in September of the same year, chairman Mao put forward more comprehensively the basic line of our party for the whole historical period of socialism. Chairman Mao pointed out: Socialist society covers a fairly long historical period. In the historical period of socialism, there are still class, class contradictions and class struggle which exist. There is the struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road, and there is the danger of capitalist restoration. We must recognise the protracted and complex nature of this struggle. We must heighten our vigilance. We must conduct

¹³⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 523-524.

socialist education. We must correctly understand and handle class contradictions and class struggle, distinguish the contradiction between ourselves and the enemy from those among the people and handle them correctly. Otherwise a socialist country like ours will turn into that which it opposes and degenerate, and a capitalist restoration will take place. From now on we must remind ourselves of this every year, every month, and every day so that we can retain a rather sober understanding of this problem and have a Marxist-Leninist line. This Marxist-Leninist line advanced by chairman Mao is the life line of our party".¹³⁶

Fourth, "Following this, in May 1963, under the direction of chairman Mao, the 'Draft Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Certain Problems in Our Present Rural Work' (also known as the Ten-point Decision) was worked out, which laid down the line, principles, and policies of the party for the socialist education movement, chairman Mao again warned the whole party: If classes and class struggle were forgotten and if the dictatorship of the proletariat were forgotten, then it would not be long, perhaps only several years or a decade, or several decades at most, before a counterrevolutionary restoration on a national scale would inevitably occur. The Marxist-Leninist party would undoubtedly become a revisionist party or fascist party, and the whole of China would change its colour. Comrades, please think it over. What a dangerous situation this would be! Chairman Mao thus still more sharply showed the whole party and the whole nation the danger of the restoration of capitalism".¹³⁷

And the Fifth, "All these warnings and struggles did not and could not in the least change the reactionary class nature of Liu Shao-ch'i and his gang. At the end of 1964, chairman Mao convened a working conference of the Central Committee and , under his direction,

¹³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 526.

¹³⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 526-527.

the document 'Some Current Problems Raised in the Socialist Education Movement in the Rural Areas' (also known as the Twenty-three Point Document) was drawn up. He denounced Liu Shao-ch'i's bourgeois reactionary line which was 'Left' in form but Right in essence and repudiated Liu Shao-ch'i's absurdities, such as 'the intertwining of the contradictions inside and outside the party', and 'the contradiction between the four cleans and the four uncleans'¹³⁸. For the first time chairman Mao specifically indicated: 'The main target of the present movement is those party persons in power taking the capitalist road'¹³⁹.

To sum up, Liu Shao-ch'i's elimination was decided as early as the Eighth CCP National Congress when he proposed the removal of "Mao Tse-tung thought as the guiding principle for our Party" from the Party Constitution. The Eighth CCP National Congress was undoubtedly the start of CCP attempting to take the road of collective leadership. Mao of course could not bear this growing trend of "fundamental opposition". After the Eighth CCP National Congress, Mao began the deployment of power-seizure struggles, preparing to seize back the barrel of a gun, which laid the ultimate grounds for P'eng Te-huai being dismissed from his post.

To Mao, the Eighth CCP National Congress was a challenge of power. The Lushan conference in 1959, where Mao successfully turned the original anti-Left struggle into the anti-Right struggle, and where P'eng Te-huai's destiny was decided, had clearly confirmed Mao peerless prestige in the army and party. While Mao did not feel conceited because of

¹³⁸*Four cleans, a socialist education movement, began in late 1962. Its specific purpose was to clean away capitalist influence, cadre corruption, and other malpractice through propaganda and education of peasants and basic-level cadres, stressing cleaning up cadres' undesirable work style in handling accounts, granaries, property, and work points. The contents of the movement were confusing and differed from place to place. See "Premier Chou en-lai Reports on the Work of the Government", Peking Review, No. 1, 1965, p. 13.*

¹³⁹Lin Piao, "Report to the 9th National Congress of the Communist Party of China", RED FLAG, No. 5, 1969; THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit., p. 527.

this, the sense of power insecurity impelled Mao to expand militarists' political influence to a even larger extent. Consequently, by Mao's appeal, the militarists had expanded their political role, provided they subordinated to the absolute leadership of Mao. Basically, the political power of the militarists should never endanger the authority of Mao's supreme leadership, otherwise the fate of the purge was inescapable.

However, at the time when Mao entrusted Lin Piao to launch a series of political campaigns to increase his personal leading authority in the army and to expand the political role of militarists, a resisting force incited by Lo Jui-ch'ing, then the Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, emerged from the army itself. While Lo's motivation was not directed against the authority of Mao's supreme leadership, but aimed at increasingly overwhelming the power of Lin Piao. In fact, to analyse the fall of Lo Jui-ch'ing fully, one should take into consideration the whole political situation of Mao's consolidating political power. Mao realised that he could not firmly control the barrel of a gun although he had possessed it. Mao couldn't tolerate any military commanders to run counter to his orders openly even though the orders weren't carried out by himself, but through Lin Piao.

Since the conflict between Lo and Lin was a big threat to Mao in his consolidation of military power, the fate of Lo was therefore sealed. This can be proved when Lin Piao held criticism campaigns against Lo on the following ground on 8 and 15 December 1966, in that he was first, antagonistic to and attacking Mao Tse-tung's thought; and secondly, conducted a "grand military contest" among the entire army without authorisation; thirdly, disregarded law and discipline, and ran his personal independent kingdom; fourthly, held the strong mentality of opportunism and individualism; and finally, turned to the party for help, forcing Lin Piao to resign from his post and to give up his power, and carrying out

activities to usurp military power.¹⁴⁰

From the fall of Lo Jui-ch'ing to the purge of Liu Shao-ch'i in the period of Cultural Revolution, represented an important period of political activity. This centred on the significance of the military role in the power struggles. The failure of Liu Shao-ch'i was due to his neglect of a decisive role of the military in politics; being a professional revolutionist, Liu underestimated the importance of the military. By contrast, Mao held fast to his principle of "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun". The other reason which accounted for Liu's failure was because of his weakness. Not daring to diametrically oppose Mao in the political struggles especially after Mao was cast into a charismatic leader by Lin Piao who was then the Minister of National Defence, however, at the 1959 Lushan conference when the situation was unfavourable to Mao, Liu did not wholly support P'eng Te-huai's stand, the loss of P'eng also meant the loss of the army set up by P'eng's professionalised army building. Since Liu had no intimate relations with the army and since he did not try his best to save P'eng Te-huai at the Lushan conference, it was even more difficult to control the army after the fall of P'eng Te-huai. While Mao had controlled the army for a long time and had even directed Lin Piao to endow the army with political colour after the Lushan conference.

Liu Shao-ch'i incident was not the struggle between "bourgeois headquarters" and "proletariat headquarters" as Mao had said. Liu's being purged and being labelled as "a power holder who took the capitalist road, a defector, hidden traitor, and scab, and a lackey of the imperialists, modern revisionists, and Kuomintang reactionaries", was purely a result of power struggle between him and Mao.

¹⁴⁰Ting Wang (ed.), *The Crime of Lo Jui-ch'ing - An Anti-Revolutionist and Revisionist*, SUMMARY OF THE PRC'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION, Vol. I, (Hong Kong: Ming Daily Press, 1967), pp. 578-584. See Chapter III, Section IV and Chapter V, Section I for details of the Lo Ju-ch'ing incident.

The struggle between Mao and Liu was above the level of "line opposition", and close to the fringe of "structural opposition". Their struggle stemmed from fundamentally different viewpoints in revolutionary transition. Mao firmly affirmed the value of revolution. Mao asserted, "socialist revolution is day-to-day revolution", "it must stress continuous revolution, one after another, take advantage of this favourable situation, and don't let it cool down".¹⁴¹

Even after entering into socialist society, it by no means represented the end of revolution, the continuous revolution must go on. Mao's argument was that class struggle was the motivating force of revolution. When there was still class, the class struggle must carry on, and revolution must continue. As the consequence of this, when the main socialist transformation had been completed with respect to the ownership of the means of production and the economic structure of class basis which was changed in 1956, Mao continued to proclaim that there was still class and therefore class struggle. Continuous revolution must, therefore, carry on in the course of socialist revolution and construction.¹⁴

"Organisational cadres" led by Liu Shao-ch'i discarded revolutionary dialectics after the successful completion of revolution. This could be confirmed by Liu's argument as he said, "In China, the question which wins out, socialism or capitalism is already settled", "the system of class exploitation is basically over", and current "principal contradiction is the contradiction between the advanced socialist system and the backward social

¹⁴¹"Mao Tse-tung's Speech at Supreme State Conference (28 January 1958", *LONG LIVE THE MAO TSE-TUNG'S THOUGHT*, op. cit., p. 157.

¹⁴²"On the Correct Handling of Contradiction Among the People (27 February 1957)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. V, (1977), op. cit., pp. 384-396.

productive forces". Such contradiction could be resolved "through peaceful road".¹⁴³

Since each side evaluated revolutionary transition differently, their viewpoints on the role that a person or a organisation should play in the revolutionary transition would also be different. Mao stressed the potential and power of the masses, and set a high value on the role of workers and peasants in the course of revolution. He thus not only advocated movement of the masses, but also encouraged leaders to go deep into the masses and become a part of them. Party organisation played an important and decisive role in the revolutionary movement, but it was the revolutionary movement and the masses itself that allowed the party to exist and to develop.

While Liu Shao-ch'i didn't possess the quality of a revolutionary leader or the charisma to attract the masses, although he too stressed the importance of the masses, he took a more cautious attitude towards revolutionary transition, paying more attention to the organisations, discipline and elite's influence in the political course. However, when he applied the "individual achievement", instead of the "equalitarianism" which had the nature of masses' revolution, as the standard of social value, it of course ran counter to Mao's principle. In addition to the unbridgeable gap between the ideology of Mao Tse-tung, and Liu Shao-ch'i, their past experience during the period of civil war also differed greatly. The environment of continuous power conflicts during the period in Yen-an or the long-march period formed Mao's struggle philosophy, the inner-party conflicts were regarded as an essential means to seize power or to preserve power. While Liu's experience in the "White Areas", drove him to pay more attention to the party's organisation and discipline. Since the situation was unfavourable to Liu in the structure of China's political culture, it

¹⁴³"A Political Report to the 8th National Congress On Behalf of Central Committee of the CCP (15 September 1956)" & "The Third Time of Self-criticism", *THE SPECIAL REPORT ON THE ISSUE OF LIU SHAO-CH'I*, (Taipei: Chinese Communist Studies Press, 1970), p. 267, 272, 629.

was quite commendable that Liu could have the situation under his control until the Cultural Revolution.

I . The Lin Piao Incident

The nature of "Lin Piao incident" should be labelled as "line opposition". Lin Piao had been the number one political lackey who always "raised high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought" before he was purged. There were many causes of the rise of Lin Piao. His naked political ambition was supreme in bringing about the close link with Mao Tse-tung. Lin Piao was the "trump card" that Mao used to firmly grasp the barrel of a gun. With his support, Lin Piao carried out Mao's political line and cleared away all hindrances that might jeopardise Mao's power seizure. In May 1966 Mao convened the "Enlarged Meeting of the CCPCC Politburo" and published the "May 16 Circular of the CCPCC" which disbanded the Cultural Revolution Five-Man Group and established a new "Cultural Revolution Group".¹⁴⁴ Shortly after, Lin Piao delivered a summarised speech to the Enlarged Politburo Meeting on 18 May, which appealed to the whole party and the army by saying that "We must never forget the class struggle, and the dictatorship of the proletariat. We must not forget to bring politics to the fore, to hold high the great red banner of the thought of Mao Tse-tung".¹⁴⁵ As for political issues, he stressed, "The fundamental problem of revolution is the problem of political power", "Never forget political power and always have it in mind", "Among the areas of the superstructure - ideas, religion, arts, law, and political power, the least is the very centre".¹⁴⁶ With regard

¹⁴⁴WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, *op. cit.*, p. 430; Warren Kuo (ed.), A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, *op. cit.*, p. 678; "Circular of the CCPCC", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 17 May, 1967.

¹⁴⁵Address to the Enlarged Session of the Politburo of the Central Committee", THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, *op. cit.*, pp. 326-345; "Lin Piao's Speech to an enlarged Politburo Meeting (18 May 1966)" & "The People's Liberation Army Proclaims Support for Mao (1 August 1966)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. III, *op. cit.*, pp. 1438-1444 & p. 1453; "Hold High the Great Red Banner of the Thought of Mao Tse-tung, Carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Through to the End", LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY & PEOPLE'S DAILY, 6 June 1966.

¹⁴⁶"Lin Piao's Speech to an enlarged Politburo Meeting (18 May 1966)" & "The People's Liberation Army Proclaims Support for Mao (1 August 1966)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. III, *op. cit.*, pp. 1438-1439.

to the thought of Mao Tse-tung, he interpreted as follows, "Mao Tse-tung's thought is the lighthouse of mankind; it is the sharpest weapon of world revolution", "Mao Tse-tung's thought stand erect. It is genuine Marxism-Leninism. It is Marxism-Leninism combined with realities. It is the ideological basis of the unity and revolution of the nation's labours, and the guideline of the actions of the nation's people", "Mao Tse-tung's thought is an everlasting universal truth, everlasting guideline of our actions, the common property of the Chinese people and the revolutionary people of the world, and is always resplendent. It was not meritorious but a 'must' that the PLA should take Chairman Mao's works as the textbook for cadres and warriors. Using Mao Tse-tung's thought to unite the armed forces and the entire party can solve any problem. Every sentence of chairman Mao's works is a truth, one single sentence of his surpasses ten thousand of ours".¹⁴⁷

The Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC, held between 1 and 12 August 1966 was presided over by Mao Tse-tung. In addition to the adoption of the "Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", Lin Piao played his political role to the full throughout the session. It was at this session that Mao decide to launch an all-out attack on Liu Shao-ch'i, attempting to eradicate Liu's influence in the party. Lin Piao, as Mao anticipated, played a positive role, and suppressed those responsible cadres in the army who were ready to carry on disruptive activities at this vehement political struggle. In the morning and afternoon of 10 August, Lin twice inspected the responsible cadres in the army, and frankly pointed out that "Our cadre policy from now on should be that whoever opposes chairman Mao will be discharged. It does not matter how much ability he may have".¹⁴⁸ In addition to this, Lin also gave instructions on the political attitude of army's cadres

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 1444.

¹⁴⁸"On the Question of the Cadre Line (10 August 1966)", *THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

saying: Two policies and two lines, one is to raise high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung thought, to give prominence to politics, and to exhibit revolutionary zeal. The other is not to raise high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung thought and not give prominence to politics. It represents the purely military viewpoint, the technical viewpoint, and emphasis on the petty and small. We do not want to transform our military forces into a spiritually corrupt army; we do not want our army to wither and stop developing. We should educate and struggle against the cadres in error whenever possible. Those who are incurable should be dismissed.¹⁴⁹

At this session, Mao published a well-known big-character poster, entitled "Bombard the Headquarters - My Personal Big Character Poster", and made it public on 5 August, 1966. In it he expressed his determination to overthrow Liu Shao-ch'i and personally unveiled an unprecedented power struggle. The full text of Mao's poster reads thus:

"China's first Marxist-Leninist big-character poster and commentator's article on it in the *People's Daily* are indeed superbly written! Comrades, please read them again. But in the last fifty days or so some leading comrades from the central down to the local levels have acted in a diametrically opposite way. Adopting the reactionary stand of the bourgeoisie, they have enforced a bourgeois dictatorship and struck down the surging movement of the great cultural revolution of the proletariat. They have stood facts on their head and juggled black and white, encircled and suppressed revolutionaries, stifled opinions differing from their own, imposed a white terror, and felt very pleased with themselves. They have puffed up the arrogance of the bourgeoisie and deflated the morale of the proletariat. How poisonous! Viewed in connection with the Right deviation in 1962 and the wrong tendency of 1964 which was Left in form but Right in essence, shouldn't this

¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p. 353.

make one wide awake?"¹⁵⁰

When Lin Piao became Mao's successor and the number two figure in the party after the Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC, he vigorously and faithfully carried out the movement to criticise and struggle against Liu Shao-ch'i. As the power struggle carried on, the political role of Lin Piao and his followers grew extensively. By 1969, the Cultural Revolution entered a new stage. Mao had successfully struck down Liu Shao-ch'i as expected, no one could threaten his political position any more. Nevertheless, Mao was quite concerned about a fairly large number of military cadres rising in the political arena and the overexpansion of political power of Lin Piao. As the result of long standing army politics and social unrest, which provided the best breeding ground for the military to expand their political role, the army became the only well-organised political power at the local level. However, in the PRC's political system, such development had seriously destroyed the principle that the "Party commands the gun" which Mao had always insisted upon. Moreover, the result of the election at the Ninth National CCP Congress which was held between 1 and 24 April 1969 went so far as to strengthen Mao's concern because among the 170 full members and the 109 alternate members elected to the Central Committee, the army occupied 71 and 48 seats respectively.¹⁵¹

This meant that the powerful local military moved to the central arena and expanded their political influence to the extent of central level through the congress, and once they possessed the title of "full member of CCPCC" or "alternate member of CCPCC", they could conversely reinforce their political authority at the local level. Obviously, such situation had run counter to the basic principle of Mao Tse-tung for the policy of army

¹⁵⁰"Bombard the Headquarters - My Personal Big Character Poster", RED FLAG, No. 13, 1967, p. 3; PEOPLE'S DAILY, 5 August, 1967.

¹⁵¹WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, *op. cit.*, pp. 690-692.

building - that was, "the party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party".

Since Lin Piao took over the post of Minister of National Defence, he had been arranging some of his trusted followers in different levels of the PLA to consolidate and expand both his political and military influence. His status as Mao's successor was clearly stated in the Party Constitution adopted by the Ninth CCP National Congress which stated that "Comrade Lin Piao consistently held high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung thought and has most loyally and resolutely carried out, and defended comrade Mao Tse-tung's proletarian revolutionary line. Comrade Lin Piao is comrade Mao Tse-tung's close comrade-in-arms and successor".¹⁵ However, Lin Piao continued to have some difficulties in having full control of the operation of political power.

Firstly, among the 21 full members and 4 alternate members of the Politburo, full politburo members Hsu Shih-yu, Ch'en Hsi-lien, Yeh Chien-ying, Liu Po-ch'eng, Chu Te, Li Hsien-nien, Tung Pi-wu and alternate members Chi Teng-k'uei, Li Te-sheng and Wang Tung-hsing were not part of Lin's faction; while politburo members, Chiang Ch'ing, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yüan, K'ang Sheng and Hsieh Fu-chih were Cultural Revolutionary Leftists, who took only Mao's orders. It seemed Lin Piao could only rely on seven: full members Huang Yung-sheng - Chief of the General Staff, Yeh Ch'un - Lin Piao's wife and director of the administrative office of the CCPCC Military Commission, Wu Fa-hsien - Air Force Commander-in-chief, Li Tso-p'eng - first political commissar of the Navy, Ch'iu Hui-tso - director general of the Logistics Department, Ch'en Po-ta, and alternate politburo member Li Hsüeh-feng.

¹⁵²"The 1969 party Constitution (14 April 1969)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. IV, *op. cit.*, p. 2239; *NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY*, 28 April 1969.

Secondly, although Lin was in charge of the daily affairs of the CCPCC Military Commission, he could only command Li Te-sheng, while the rest of the vice-chairmen including Liu Po-ch'eng, Ch'en I, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, and Nieh Jung-chen were out of his control. Mao's personnel arrangements among the CCPCC Military Commission had balanced the over-expanded military power of Lin Piao.

Thirdly, since peasants formed the basis of the majority of the PLA, and they possessed strong moral value of "loyalty" in the social structure of China, this traditional morality reflected by the PLA was its absolute loyalty to the supreme authority. As a result of this, Lin Piao's prestige was only limited to the Fourth Field Army although he also held an important post as Minister of National Defence. The other non-Fourth Field Army continued to pledge their loyalty to Mao, and yet, Mao's political prestige and his leader's charisma made Fourth Field Army reluctant to oppose him in public. Therefore Lin Piao's expansion of military power was limited to a certain extent, which meant that all his efforts to expand the military power was not a great enough to threaten Mao's position.

Finally, the power of Lin Piao was based on the army's system, and not on the party's system. Thus at the time when he struggled against Liu Shao-ch'i who had long-standing party background, he also destroyed the possible influence he had in the party system, while Mao could remain control both the party and army because of his supreme position. The only way that Lin could succeed was to ally himself with Chou En-lai. However, given Chou's position in the party, he would never take a subordinate position as Lin's helper. In addition, Chou was recorded as having always joined the stronger side in any intro-elite conflict where he was involved.¹⁵³ Furthermore at the Lushan conference in 1959 at the time when Mao was facing the most unfavourable situation because of the

¹⁵³Jürgen Domes, *P'ENG TE-HUAI - THE MAN AND THE IMAGE*, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

failure of "Three Red Banners" movement, Chou didn't even want to oppose Mao in order to save P'eng Te-huai. Why would he possibly want to ally himself with Lin against Mao?

Lin Piao's military ambition and vigorous political power expansion, in essence, had run counter to Mao's basic principle. His status as "Mao's close comrade-in-arms and successor" and as Minister of National Defence enabled him to possess power both in name and in reality, and thus enlarge his real forces. The fact that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" was exactly what Mao was afraid of.

The overthrow of Liu Shao-ch'i was the one of the important common goals which accounted for the unification of Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao after the Lushan conference in 1959. However, after the fall of Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao took his chance to seize power. This brought about a change in the relationship between Mao and Lin. To analyse it from the viewpoint of "alienation" which came from Marxist doctrine, Lin Piao, as an object, was transformed into an alienating force and conversely threatened the subject Mao's position. Judging from Mao's political ambition and dictatorial personality, he simply refused to accept this fact. Mao decided to fight back. However, since Lin was Mao's close command-in-arms and successor which clearly stated in the "Party Constitution" of Ninth CCP National Congress, and Lin was the chief person who set off the nation-wide personality cult of Mao, Mao found it was hard to launch an attack on Lin. However, to make a first step, Mao adopted the strategy of public opinion. Some signs revealed that the rupture between Mao and Liu had emerged prior to the Ninth CCP National Congress.

On 1 January 1969, an article entitled *Place Mao Tse-tung's thought in Command of Everything*¹⁵⁴ was carried in the editorial of "two newspapers and one periodical", it

¹⁵⁴"Place Mao Tse-tung's thought in Command of Everything", PEOPLE'S DAILY, LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY & RED FLAG, 1 January, 1969; "New Year Editorial (1 January 1969), THE PEOPLE'S

placed special emphasis on "unified leadership" as indicated in the following:

First, "We must consciously use Mao Tse-tung's thought to achieve unified thinking, policies, plans, command, and actions.... We should wage a resolute struggle against all erroneous ideas and actions that run counter to chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line, and we must have absolutely no attitude of liberalism. Provided we act in this way, every scheme and trick of the class enemies will fail completely".

Second, "A handful of counterrevolutionaries in society often use the tactics of supporting an erroneous trend from behind the scenes, to confuse the difference between the two types of contradictions, provoke splits, and create confusion, for the purpose of undermining the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution".

Third, "We should investigate and study sufficiently, and grasp ironclad evidence of crimes, so that the counterrevolutionaries, no matter how sly, cannot escape but their true features are exposed".

And lastly, "Mao Tse-tung's thought should be used to overcome various kinds of erroneous ideas and close unity should be built on the principled basis of Mao Tse-tung's thought. If one has something to say, one must say it promptly to people to their faces and not gossip behind their backs. They must not indulge in petty and mean actions".¹⁵⁵

On 24 August of the same year, an article entitled *Firmly Grasp Revolutionary Mass Criticism* was carried in a joint editorial. It denied that "the movement of mass criticism had nearly reached to an end", and clarified what the target of revolutionary mass criticism

REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. IV, op. cit., pp. 2307-2309.

¹⁵⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 2208-2209.

should be aimed at: these were, firstly, to criticise revisionism in more depth; secondly, to criticise any tendency towards mistakes and any mistaken ideas in the party and army that ran counter to chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line and policies. On no account should the viewpoint of factionalism be allowed to distort the Party's policies, complying in public but opposing in private, and seizing the opportunity to grab everything; thirdly, to criticise factionalism and mountaintopism, the "small group" mentality and anarchism, and liberalism and individualism, insisting on putting the Party's and people's interests in the foremost. On no account should the factionalism (or bourgeois) interests be given priority.¹⁵⁶

Furthermore, on 1 October 1969, in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of PRC's regime, the *Red Flag*, the *Liberation Army's Daily*, and the *People's Daily* published a joint editorial, *Carry out the tasks of Struggle for Further Consolidating the Dictatorship of the Proletariat*. It stressed once more that "We must study and apply the mass movement of Mao Tse-tung's thought in a lively way, and firmly grasp the revolutionary criticism to carry the socialist revolution of superstructure through to an end."¹⁵⁷ On the National Day, the people of the whole nation were guided to shout slogans. There were 29 slogans in total in these were two which reasserted these instructions; These were, the Seventh, "Carry out the tasks of struggle - criticism -transformation conscientiously! Further consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat!", and the Eighth, "Firmly grasp revolutionary mass criticism! Carry the socialist revolution through to the end!"¹⁵⁸

On 8 March 1970, Mao Tse-tung advanced the idea to call for a Fourth National People's

¹⁵⁶"Firmly Grasp Revolutionary Mass Criticism", *PEOPLE'S DAILY & LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY*, 24 August 1969; *RED FLAG*, No. 9, 1969, pp. 5-8.

¹⁵⁷"Carry out the tasks of Struggle for Further Consolidating the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", *PEOPLE'S DAILY & LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY*, 1 October 1969; *RED FLAG*, No. 10, 1969, pp. 5-8.

¹⁵⁸"Slogans for the Twentieth National Day (16 September 1969)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 2258.

Congress and to revise the Party Constitution. Meanwhile, he also put forward the proposal of not establishing a new State Chairman,¹⁵⁹ thereby attempting to suppress the power expansion of Lin Piao. While Lin Piao regarded the forthcoming Fourth National People's Congress as his chance to extend his power, he attempted to take advantage of this Congress and of revising the Party Constitution to have himself established as the new State Chairman.¹⁶⁰ This matter was revealed by Yeh Ch'un, Lin Piao's wife and the director of the administrative office of the CCPCC Military Commission, as she had secret discussion with Wu Fa-hsien, Air Force commander-in-chief, in July 1970. "Just what would happen", she said, "if Lin Piao failed in his intentions to have himself established as the new State Chairman, and what recourse could they then have?"¹⁶¹ In spite of the fact that Mao had expressed his resolution of not establishing a State Chairman many times, Lin Piao confined to advance formally the idea of having Mao appointed as State Chairman on 11 April. However, this suggestion was turned down by Mao the following day as he remarked, "I can't be the State Chairman again, this proposal is inappropriate". Mao once more affirmed his resolution not to establish the State Chairman and refused to take the post at the Politburo Conference of CCPCC in late April.¹⁶² On 2 July, the *Red Flag* published a special article, *Carry Out the Struggle for Strengthening the Party's Ideological Construction*, which carried strong political instruction. The article reaffirmed that people were to "place emphasis on the guidance and the command of Mao Tse-tung's thought".¹⁶³

¹⁵⁹Hu Sheng (ed.), *THE SEVENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, op. cit., p. 514.

¹⁶⁰*Ibid.*

¹⁶¹*Ibid.*, and Yen Chia-ch'i & Kao Kao, *"The Ten Year History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution"*, (Taipei: Institute of Current China Studies, 1988), p. 309.

¹⁶²Hou Meng-hwa & Yin Hou-jan, *THE SIXTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, Vol. II, (Peking: Liberation Army's Press, 1984), p. 613.

¹⁶³"Carry Out the Struggle for Strengthening the Party's Ideological Construction", *RED FLAG*, No. 7, 1970, pp. 11-18.

On 12 July, the CCPCC set up a "Committee for the Draft Revision of the Constitution", Mao Tse-tung was appointed the chairman and Lin Piao vice-chairman. For the fourth time Mao insisted that the State Chairman must not be established, and instructed, "The establishment of State Chairman is only nominal. It must not be set up just because of a particular person". Shortly before the Second Plenum of the Ninth CCPCC, the members of CCPCC politburo held a meeting, in which Lin Piao and Ch'en Po-ta again suggest the establishment of the State Chairman, and asked Mao to take the post. Mao refused, and said, "anyone who wishes to be the State Chairman, please go ahead".¹⁶⁴ Mao began to take an uncompromising stand.

On 3 August, Mao demanded that the PLA study the resolution of Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Army of the Red Army of December 1929 - *On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party*¹⁶⁵ all over again.

In the section "On Individualism", the resolution mentioned that "correcting mistaken ideas of 'small group' mentality is because 'small group' mentality only considers the interests of their own small group and ignores the party's interest at large. Although on the surface this does not seem to be the pursuit of personal interests, in reality it exemplifies the narrowest individualism and has a strong corrosive and centrifugal effect".¹⁶⁶

Nevertheless, in spite of Mao's disapproval and dissatisfaction with him, Lin Piao still carried on his attempt of establishing the post of the State Chairman. On the day when the

¹⁶⁴Hou Meng-hwa & Yin Hou-jan, *THE SIXTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 614.

¹⁶⁵"On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (December 1929)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. I (1975), op. cit., pp. 105-116.

¹⁶⁶*Ibid.*, p. 112.

"Draft Revision of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China" was submitted to the Second Plenum of the Ninth CCPCC for examination and approval, Ch'en Po-ta put forward the proposal to establish the Chairman of the State again on behalf of Lin Piao. He also delivered the "Theory of Genius" at the conference, in which he not only honoured Mao as a "genius", but also described Lin Piao as a incredible genius. "He (Lin Piao) should be listed", said Ch'en, "among Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin as one of the great leaders of the revolution," "for Marx, Lenin and Mao Tse-tung, Engels, Stalin and Lin Piao served as their great assistants, and Lin was the most outstanding of these assistants".¹⁶⁷

In the evening of 23 August, the Central Politburo held a meeting and discussed national economic problems. Wu Fa-hsien, Commander-in-chief of the Air Force, ignored the schedule and did not hold the meetings according to the proposals of Mao Tse-tung, which they had previously approved. At this meeting, Wu had proposed that all members should start trying to learn the ways of Lin Piao, and that they should change the schedule according to Lin's proposal.

On 24 August, Lin's faction including Ch'en Po-ta, Yeh Ch'un, Wu Fa-hsien, Li Tso-p'eng, Chou Huai-tso who all spoke to their respective groups of North China, Central South China, South West China, and North West China, pushing forward the proposal of setting up a State Chairman.¹⁶⁸

Among them all, the No. 6 brief bulletin of the North China group which carried the speech of Ch'en Po-ta concerning his resolution to support the re-establishment of the

¹⁶⁷Yen Chia-ch'i & Kao Kao, *"The Ten Year History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution"*, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

¹⁶⁸Hu Sheng (ed.), *THE SEVENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, *op. cit.*, p. 515.

State Chairman¹⁶⁹ and was distributed to all groups in the meeting.

On 25 August, Mao called a meeting of the enlarged politburo of the Central Committee. At it they decided to stop all debate on the speech delivered on the 23 by Lin Piao, to recall all of the briefs that were distributed at the North China group, and to begin an investigation on Ch'en Po-ta. Mao Tse-tung personally sought out Lin Piao to talk with him, and Chou en-lai sought Wu Fa-hsien, Li Tso-p'eng, and Ch'iu Hui-tso. These people were told to prepare for an investigation by the Central Committee".¹⁷⁰

The confrontation between Mao and Lin manifested itself in the question of the establishment of the State Chairman which was in reality a matter of power, not a matter of constitution. Mao was forced to resign from his post of State Chairman under pressure from the failure of the Great Leap Forward. It would now damage his personal authority if he agreed to re-establish himself as the new State Chairman". If he had considered this rationally and had now agreed to re-establish the post of State Chairman, judging by the situation at that time, Lin Piao was the only person suitable for that position. Once Lin became the State Chairman, his power would certainly have increased dramatically and thus would directly pose a threat to Mao's position.

After the Lin Piao incident, the document of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chung-Fa, 1972, No. 12, "Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks To Responsible Local Comrades during His Tour of Inspection (Mid-August to September 12, 1971)"¹⁷¹ revealed that "At the 1970 Lushan conference, they (the Lin Piao anti-Party

¹⁶⁹Yen Chia-ch'i & Kao Kao, *"The Ten Year History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution"*, op. cit., p. 310.

¹⁷⁰*Ibid.*, p. 311.

¹⁷¹"Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks to Responsible Local comrades during His Tour of Inspection (Mid-August to September 12, 1971)" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, *Chang-fa*, 1972, No. 12, LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit., p. 55-66.

clique) engaged in surprise attacks and underground activities."¹⁷ Mao was quite shocked by this sudden attack. He stated that "At the Lushan conference of 1959, P'eng Te-huai even wrote a letter, which amounted to an open challenge to seize power".¹⁷³ While at the 1970 Lushan conference, the Lin Piao clique "first concealed things then launched a surprise attack. They deceived three of the five standing members (Mao, Chou En-lai, K'ang Sheng) and the majority of comrades in the politburo, except for the big generals. The big generals, including Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien, Yeh Ch'un, Li Tso-p'eng, Ch'iu Hui-tso, and also Li Hsüeh-feng and Cheng Wei-shan, maintained complete secrecy and suddenly launched a surprise attack.... Their coup didn't just last a day-and-a-half, but went on for two-and-a-half days, from 23 and 24 August to noon on the 25. They certainly had a purpose in doing all that!"¹⁷⁴ Mao believed that "P'eng Te-huai set up his military club and issued a challenge, but they didn't even match up to P'eng; so you can see how base their style was,"¹⁷⁵ In addition, Mao pointed out, "their surprise attacks and underground activity were planned, organised, and programmed. Their program was to set up a State Chairman, advocate "genius," oppose the line set forth by the Ninth Party Congress, and overthrow the three items on the agenda of the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee. A certain person was very anxious to become State Chairman, to split the Party, and to seize power."¹⁷⁶

Mao's resentment and dissatisfaction towards Lin Piao was understandable. He remarked, "The struggle at the 1959 Lushan conference with P'eng Te-huai was a struggle between two headquarters. The struggle with Liu Shao-ch'i was also a struggle between two headquarters. The struggle at this Lushan conference was again a struggle between two

¹⁷²*Ibid.*, p. 59.

¹⁷³*Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁷⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

headquarters."¹⁷⁷

As a matter of fact, at the Second Plenum of Ninth CCPCC, Lin Piao was given a political death penalty. Mao had firmly classified him as a class enemy. The struggle against Ch'en Po-ta was a prelude to Mao's purge of Lin Piao. At the Second Plenum of the Ninth CCPCC on 31 August, Mao wrote a paper entitled *Some of My Opinions*, in the article he wrote "Is history created by heroes, or created by slaves? Is what man knows predetermined by heaven, or does it come through genius? Is man's knowledge and wisdom born in us or do we develop it through our lives in the material world? We can only stand on the side of Marxism-Leninism and we must not listen to the rumours being spread by Ch'en Po-ta or fall into the traps he has set for us."¹⁷⁸

After the event, Mao commented, "*Some of my opinions* was meant to specifically criticise the theory of genius. I certainly don't want to talk about genius. Genius does not depend on one person or a few people; it depends on a party."¹⁷⁹ Mao furthermore commented on the Lin Piao clique's behaviour at the Second Plenum of the Ninth CCPCC as saying, "Their courage was enough to level Lushan or stop the earth's turning."¹⁸⁰

On 6 September, the last day of the Second Plenum of Ninth CCPCC, the CCPCC demanded that the errors committed by Ch'en Po-ta brought up within the whole party for open criticism, but Lin Piao expressed his opposition, whereas Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien, Yeh Ch'un, Li Tso-p'eng and Ch'iu Hui-tso all remained silent. As a result, the

¹⁷⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 60-61.

¹⁷⁸Yen Chia-ch'i & Kao Kao, *"The Ten Year History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution"*, op. cit., p. 311.

¹⁷⁹"Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks to Responsible Local comrades during His Tour of Inspection (Mid-August to September 12, 1971)" - *Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chang-fa*, 1972, No. 12, *LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, op. cit., p. 60.

¹⁸⁰*Ibid.*, and Yen Chia-ch'i & Kao Kao, *"The Ten Year History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution"*, op. cit., p. 312.

politburo of the CCPCC was unable to make a decision agreeing to criticise Ch'en Po-ta.¹⁸¹

In view of the situation at that time, Mao decided to take a preemptive attack against Lin Piao. Mao revealed the following afterwards:

"After the Lushan conference (1970), I adopted three methods. One was to throw stones, one was to mix in sand, and the third was to dig up the cornerstone. I criticised the material that Ch'en Po-ta had used to deceive many people, and I commented on reports of the 38th Army and of the Tsinan Military District on opposing arrogance and complacency. I also made critical comments on a document of the long forum of the Military Affairs Commission, which didn't criticise Ch'en at all. My method was to get hold of these stones and make critical comments, and then let everyone discuss them - this was throwing stones. When dirt is too tightly packed, no air can get through, but if a little sand is mixed in, air can circulate. When work groups of the Military Affairs Commission did not have enough people mixed in, more were added - this is called mixing in sand. Reorganising the Peking Military Region is called digging up the cornerstone."¹⁸²

Mao flexibly applied his three methods, - "throwing stones", "mixing in sand" and "digging up the cornerstone". He first convened a "North China conference" (enlarged conference of politburo) at Peitaiho in December 1970. Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien, Li Tso-p'eng, Yeh Ch'un and Ch'iu Hui-tso were forced to make a self-criticism because of the

¹⁸¹"Communiqué of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Lin-Ch'en Anti-party Clique" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, *Chung-fa*, 1971, No. 61, *THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, op. cit., p. 72.

¹⁸²"Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks to Responsible Local comrades during His Tour of Inspection (Mid-August to September 12, 1971)" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, *Chang-fa*, 1972, No. 12, *LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, op. cit., p. 62.

Ch'en Po-ta incident. Even so, Mao continued to think that "After the North China conference was concluded, Lin Piao, while not doing his regular work under the pretext of poor health, held secret meetings with Ch'en Po-ta. He also summoned Huang, Wu, Li and Ch'iu many times hold black meetings in preparation for a counterrevolutionary armed coup d'état, with the intention of usurping the party, army and Government and restoring capitalism in China."¹⁸³ "Lin Piao and Yeh Ch'un also sent Lin Li-Kuo, their son, to Shanghai, Nanking, Hangchow, Kwangtung, and other places to engage in counterrevolutionary liaison activities."¹⁸⁴

One month after the Second Plenum of Ninth CCPCC was concluded, the *Red Flag* published an article against Lin Piao entitled *Reinforce the Party Nature of Proletariat Class*. The article stressed, "oppose the pursuit of only personal interest or interest of their own small group, and oppose class factionalism and individualism", and considered that "correcting any impure party nature is for the continuation of the revolutionary road, preventing it from going stagnant."¹⁸⁵ This article echoed the instruction of studying the paper *On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party* given by Mao on 3 August before the Second Plenum of Ninth CCPCC. Mao's resolution to purge Lin Piao was very clear.

On 24 January 1971, Mao not only reorganised "the Peking Military Region" and dismissed Ch'en Wei-shan and Li Hsüeh-feng who supported Lin from their post as commander of the Peking Military Region and as second political commissar respectively, he also transferred Lin's clique the 38th Army away from the Peking Military Region. On 15 April 1971, Mao presided over a "Ninety-nine-man conference", this was a conference

¹⁸³"Communiqué of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Lin-Ch'en Anti-party Clique" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, *Chung-fa*, 1971, No. 61, *THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, op. cit., p. 72.

¹⁸⁴*Ibid.*, p. 73.

¹⁸⁵"Reinforce the Party Nature of Proletariat Class", *RED FLAG*, No. 11, 1970, pp. 17-20.

called by the Chinese Communist party to exchange results of the "criticise Ch'en Po-ta rectification campaign".¹⁸⁶ Attending the conference were ninety-nine responsible cadres from the Central government, local government, and the armed forces. At the end of conference, Chou En-lai made a summary on behalf of the CCPCC.¹⁸⁷

On 14 September 1971, the CCPCC issued an open letter written by Mao to the whole party. It demanded that the whole party immediately organised reading, discussion, and went to transmit and report the results back to the central authorities. Mao indicated in his open letter, "Ch'en Po-ta is a sham Marxist-Leninist. For a long time Ch'en Po-ta has been arguing with me on the question of genius, holding that a genius is born with natural talents rather than deriving his talents from practice or from among the masses. He wants me to recognise him as a genius, and in so doing he covets nothing less than the chairmanship of the State. In my opinion, he is a careerist.... For a long time he did not report to the party Central Committee on his work and was engaged in secret manoeuvres behind the scene and in splitting activities in its party Central Committee. With regard to his mistakes, the party has conducted criticism in good time.... The question of Ch'en Po-ta must be brought up before and transmitted to the whole party for criticism. This letter has been shown to comrade Lin Piao. comrade Lin Piao basically agrees with my suggestion."¹⁸⁸

Outwardly the struggle carried out by Mao was directed against Ch'en Po-ta, but inwardly it was Lin Piao that Mao aimed at. The struggle between Mao and Lin had been

¹⁸⁶"Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks to Responsible Local comrades during His Tour of Inspection (Mid-August to September 12, 1971)" - *Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chang-fa, 1972, No. 12, LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit., p. 62.*

¹⁸⁷*WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, op. cit., p. 446.*

¹⁸⁸"Chairman Mao's Open Letter to the Whole Party (1971)" - *Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chang-fa, 1971, No. 57, LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit., p. 68.*

converted to an open struggle.

On 1 July 1971, the *Two Newspapers and One Periodical* published a combined article, entitled *Commemorate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Communist Party of China*,¹⁸⁹ calling the people of the whole nation to bear in mind "the few bourgeois conspirators, careerists, renegades, and enemy agents, who have concealed themselves in the party, and the hidden traitors who have illicit relations with foreign countries". In addition, the article also made the following summary drawn from the historical experience of PRC's struggles, and asked the whole nation, the entire army, and the people of the whole nation to take it as a warning and to learn from it.

First, it is necessary to adhere to "the consistent ideological principle of our party", namely, integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. In accordance with chairman Mao's teaching people were to "read and study seriously and have a good grasp of Marxism." This meant combining reading with investigation and study and with the summing up of experience, combining the study of historical experience with the present-day struggle and criticism of opportunism in the past with the criticism of modern revisionism. It is our party's duty to continue the exposure and criticism of modern revisionism with Soviet revisionism at its centre and carry the struggle through to the end.

Second, it is necessary to wage inner-party struggle correctly. It is thoroughly essential to expose the bourgeois conspirators, careerists, renegades, and enemy agents, who have concealed themselves in the party, and the hidden traitors who have illicit relations with foreign countries. Bad people invariably disguise themselves and resort to conspiracy and

¹⁸⁹"Commemorate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Communist Party of China", *PEOPLE'S DAILY & LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY*, 1 July, 1971; *RED FLAG*, No. 7/8, 1971, pp. 5-25.

double-dealing. But since they are engaged in evil-doing, they are bound to expose themselves.

Third, efforts must be made to guard against arrogance. Modesty helps one to go forward, whereas conceit makes one lag behind. This is a truth we must always bear in mind.

Fourth, we should follow the theory of two points, not the theory of one point. While paying attention to the main tendency, we should take note of the other tendency which may be covered up. We must take full notice and firmly grasp the principal aspect and at the same time solve one by one the problems arising from the non-principal aspect. We should see the negative as well as the positive aspects of things. We should see the problems that have already arisen and also anticipate problems which are not yet perceived but which may arise.

Fifth, it is necessary to adhere to the mass political line. Mao regards perseverance in the mass line as fundamental to perseverance in the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge, and regards working for the interests of the vast majority of the people of China and the world as a requirement for successors to the revolutionary cause of the proletariat.

Sixth, it is necessary to uphold democratic centralism. Party committees at all levels must institute and strengthen the party committee system, strengthen centralised leadership, prevent excessive decentralisation, and the practice of "many centres", that is, no centre, and must achieve unity in thinking, policy, plan, command, and action on the basis of Mao Tse-tung thought.

Seven, Mao opposes telling lies and advocates speaking the truth. He makes it a requirement for successors to the revolutionary cause of the proletariat to be hold in making criticism and self-criticism.

And the last, The Chinese People's Liberation Army created and led by great leader chairman Mao. Our principle is that the party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party.

This article was a clear sign of forthcoming struggle against Lin Piao. Mao made this intention quite explicit in his article which he stressed once more, "the principle is that the party commands the gun." and indicated, "We should see the problems that have already arisen and also anticipate problem which are not yet perceived but which may arise". On the surface, this article was directed against Liu Shao-ch'i, but inwardly it alluded to Mao's dissatisfaction and criticism of Lin Piao.

It was no doubt a blow to Mao when Ch'en Po-ta turned his coat on him and went to Lin Piao for shelter at the Lushan conference during Second Plenum of Ninth CCPCC. Ch'en had long been Mao's personal secretary, and was one of the most important theoreticians in the PRC. He did his best to carry out the plot of power-seizure for Mao at the early stage of the Cultural Revolution. However, things changed when Ch'en viewed the brutal nature of Mao when he purged the "May 16 corps"¹⁹⁰ in the second half of 1967 for the consolidation of his power. Ch'en seemed to perceive that Mao would easily sacrifice him when the situation called for it. He was frightened and decided to seek a defence. Judging from his unfavourable backgrounds, he had no imitate relationship with Mao as

¹⁹⁰For the details of "May 16 Corps" refers to Warren Kuo (ed.), *A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY*, op. cit., pp. 677-678; "Closely Follow Chairman Mao's Great Strategic Plan, Firmly Grasp the General Line of Revolutionary Struggles" & "Comments on T'ao Chu's Two Books", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 3 & 8 September 1967.

Chiang Ch'ing had, although he was a leader of "Cultural Revolution Groups"; he was an "intellectual" lacking in strong political background; and he had no backing of the armed forces as had Lin Piao. The only way he could save himself and preserve his political strength was to resort to the improvement of the unfavourable situation at that time, so he turned to Lin Piao for he thought Lin Piao, Mao's successor as stated in the Party Constitution, was the only person who could provide the protection that he needed at that time.

Ch'en Po-ta didn't intend to betray Mao at the time when he turned to Lin Piao. However, he had to make his stand clear in order to win Lin's trust, and therefore he vigorously encouraged the establishment of the State Chairman at the Lushan conference in 1970. He spoke "openly to oppose the Central Committee and refuted and rejected the resolution of the Central Committee not to establish a State Chairman"¹⁹¹ at the meeting for the draft revision of the Constitution.

Mao couldn't tolerate Ch'en's offence at the Second Plenum of Ninth CCPCC and considered it to be a most vicious attack. It was thus understandable that Mao became determined to purge Ch'en. Otherwise, considering Ch'en's insignificant position in the party, Mao need not struggle against Ch'en so hard. Besides, there were many others more powerful who supported Lin - such as Huang Yung-sheng, Chief of the General Staff, Wu Fa-hsien, Air Force Commander-in-chief, Li Tso-p'eng, first political commissar of the Navy, Ch'iu Hui-tso, director general of the Logistics Department. Considering the way Mao valued the army, these persons were more obvious targets than Ch'en as an object of Mao's attack the struggle between him and Lin Piao.

¹⁹¹ "Communiqué of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Lin-Ch'en Anti-party Clique" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, chung-fa, 1971, No. 61, THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit., p. 72.

After the Lin Piao incident, the CCPCC not only published *Chung-fa*, 1972, No. 4 "Outline of Project 571"¹⁹² to announce Lin Piao's anti-party crimes, but also distributed the following six secret documents to the whole party and the army, declaring CCPCC's attitude towards Lin Piao incident and the way of handling it: The first, *Chung-fa*, 1971, No. 60 "Communiqué of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning Lin Piao's 'September 12' anti-party incident".¹⁹³ The second, *Chung-fa*, 1971, No. 61 "Communiqué of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the Lin-Ch'en anti-party clique".¹⁹⁴ The third, *Chung-fa*, 1971, No. 62 "Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the Lin-Ch'en anti-party clique".¹⁹⁵ The fourth, *Chung-fa*, 1971, No. 64 "Notice of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party concerning the discarding of the 'four- good' and 'five-good' movements and the turning in to higher authorities of the epitaphs and portraits of Lin Piao".¹⁹⁶ The fifth, *Chung-fa*, 1972, No. 24 "Struggle to smash the counterrevolutionary coup d'état of the Lin Piao anti-party clique".¹⁹⁷ And the last,

¹⁹²"Struggle to smash the Lin-Ch'en Anti-party Cliques Counterrevolutionary Coup" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, *Chung-fa*, 1972, No. 4, *THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, op. cit., pp. 78-95.

¹⁹³"Communiqué of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning Lin Piao's 'September 12' anti-party incident" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, *Chung-fa*, 1971, No. 60, *THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

¹⁹⁴"Communiqué of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the Lin Piao's 'September 12' anti-party incident" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, *Chung-fa*, 1971, No. 61, *THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, op. cit., pp. 71-73.

¹⁹⁵"Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the Lin-Ch'en anti-party clique" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, *Chung-fa*, 1971, No. 62, *THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

¹⁹⁶"Notice of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party concerning the discarding of the 'four- good' and 'five-good' movements and the turning in to higher authorities of the epitaphs and portraits of Lin Piao" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, *Chung-fa*, 1971, No. 64, *THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, op. cit., pp. 76-77; *A COMPILATION OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS ON THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR*, (Taipei, Mainland China Studies, 1973), p. 31.

¹⁹⁷"Struggle to smash the counterrevolutionary coup d'état of the Lin Piao anti-party clique" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, *Chung-fa*, 1972, No. 24, *THE LIN PIAO*

Chung-fa, 1973, No. 34 "Report on the investigation of the counterrevolutionary Chinese of the Lin Piao anti-party clique".¹⁹⁸

No. 61, 1971, document condemned Lin Piao as having "colluded with Ch'en Po-ta and took the lead in organising a counterrevolutionary clique in a wild attempt to oppose the Central Committee, to split the party, and to establish another mountaintop."¹⁹⁹

No. 24, 1972 document claimed that "The sinister goal of the Lin Piao anti-party clique in launching a counterrevolutionary coup d'état was to divide our party, to seize the top power of the party and the state by conspiratorial measures ... the line adopted at the Ninth Party congress, fundamentally change the party's basic line and policy during the historical stage of socialism, overthrow the proletarian dictatorship, and restore capitalism. They wanted to revive the landlord-bourgeois class that our party, our army, and all people of our nation under the leadership of chairman Mao smashed with their own hands. Inside the country, they wanted to exercise a landlord-comprador-bourgeois fascist dictatorship in alliance with the landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, undesirable, and rightists; internationally, they wanted to capitulate to the Soviet revisionist social-imperialism, to joint hand with the Soviet Union and the United States to oppose China and communism".²⁰⁰

AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit., pp. 96-105; *YEARBOOK ON CHINESE COMMUNISM*, Sec. VII, 1973, pp. 8-10.

¹⁹⁸"Report on the investigation of the counterrevolutionary Chinese of the Lin Piao anti-party clique" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chung-fa, 1973, No. 34, *THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, op. cit., pp. 110-117.

¹⁹⁹"Communiqué of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the Lin Piao's 'September 12' anti-party incident" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chung-fa, 1971, No. 61, *THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, op. cit., p. 72.

²⁰⁰"Struggle to smash the counterrevolutionary coup d'état of the Lin Piao anti-party clique" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chung-fa, 1972, No. 24, *THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

The No. 24, 1972 document was distributed to the Party Committees of provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions; party committees of military regions, military districts, and field armies; Party Committees of headquarters of the Military Affairs Committee and service branches;; leading groups of Party Committee of ministries and commissions of the State Council; and core groups of the party, covering a wide range of areas.

Mao seized on this incident to deny the resolution and the line of Ninth CCP National Congress, and obstinately asserted that Lin Piao clique colluded with the Soviet Union and the United States as he referred to the Liu Shao-ch'i and the P'eng Te-huai incidents which he connected Liu with the Soviet Union. Mao provoked xenophobia so as to reduce his personal responsibility in the Lin Piao incident.

In addition, to the army, Mao gave them the following special instructions: "The army must be unified, must be put in order, I just don't believe that our army would rebel. I just don't believe that you, Huang Yung-sheng, could lead the Liberation Army to rebel. Each army includes divisions and regiments, and also command and political and logistics department - if you order troops to do evil things, will they listen to you?" "You must be concerned with military affairs; can't just be a civilian official, but must also be a military official. Grasping military affairs means studying the line, rectifying and emphasising unity. The army has always stressed strict discipline, and I agree. But in solving questions of ideology one can't use strict discipline; rather, fact and reasoning must be relied on".⁰¹

Mao explicitly stated that only he could control the army. Huang Yung-sheng, Chief of

²⁰¹"Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks to Responsible Local comrades during His Tour of Inspection (Mid-August to September 12, 1971)" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, *Chung-fa*, 1972, No. 12, LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

the General Staff, meant nothing to him. Mao also warned that the only way to avoid mountaintopism and sectarianism was that army must be unified under his leadership. Mao didn't think that the army's professional training could solve the questions of ideology although he didn't mention that the army should place politics in command of everything either. This was because he was strongly affected by the Lin Piao incident, and thus intentionally understated the importance of politics in the army, but still he continued to believe the importance of ideology in the army.

The rise and fall of Lin Piao manifested the real political and military strength of Mao Tse-tung. In fact, no matter how much Lin had expanded his political and military power, he was still subjected to Mao's control. Once Mao withdrew his support, the power Lin Piao had was the kind of dependent power structure which would be terminated immediately and return to square one. However, it was noteworthy that the expanded political role of the PLA accompanied by the rise of Lin Piao wouldn't possibly return to its original position in a short period of time. This was because from the beginning of the P'eng Te-huai incident in 1959, Mao had intentionally controlled the army through Lin Piao to complete the tasks of purging Liu Shao-ch'i and other cadres in the army and party who advocated reforms and for the consolidation of his supreme authority. After the Lin Piao incident, Mao once more launched a series of political campaigns to remove all of Lin's remaining political and military influence, and to restore the tradition of "party commands the gun".

To begin with, Mao first placed Yeh Chien-ying in charge of the daily routine of the Military Affairs Commission of the Central Committee.⁰ He then set off a nation-wide

²⁰²"Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the Lin-Ch'en anti-party clique" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, *Chung-fa*, 1971, No. 62, *THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

"movement of criticism in the Lin Piao rectification campaign" to eradicate Lin Piao's political and military influence. Furthermore, the CCPCC resolved that copies of the *Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party*, *Documents of the Ninth Party Congress*, and *Long Live the Victory of the People's War* be turned in to the central authorities for disposal. Other works about Lin Piao were to be collected by the low levels and submitted to the country authorities for disposal.²⁰³ In these, the 1969 *Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party* described Lin Piao as Mao's "close comrade-in-arms and successor", as the General Program of 1969 Constitution stated clearly, "Comrade Lin Piao consistently held high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung thought and has most loyally and resolutely carried out, and defended comrade Mao Tse-tung's proletarian revolutionary line. Comrade Lin Piao is comrade Mao Tse-tung's close comrade-in-arms and successor".²⁰⁴ And the "political report" Lin Piao delivered at the "Ninth Party Congress", and *Long Live the Victory of the People's War*²⁰⁵ which wrote by Lin Piao represented the summit of Lin's political influence and Lin's important position in the army. All these documents together with Lin's influence were to be removed at once.

At the fall of Lin Piao, some 60 people of Lin's faction were involved and purged. However, since Lin had been in the position of Minister of National Defence for more than a decade, and the PLA's system hadn't turned out to be a united body as Mao wished. This was clearly indicated by Lin, as he said, "Because of B-52's (code name for Mao) divide and rule policy, the army's internal contradictions are fairly complex; which makes it

²⁰³"Notice of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party concerning the discarding of the 'four- good' and 'five-good' movements and the turning in to higher authorities of the epitaphs and portraits of Lin Piao" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, *Chung-fa*, 1971, No. 64, *THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, op. cit., p. 76; *A COMPILATION OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS ON THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR*, op. cit., p. 31.

²⁰⁴"The 1969 Party Constitution (14 April 1969)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 2239.

²⁰⁵"Long Live the Victory of People's War (September 1965)", *LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, op. cit., pp. 265-319; *RED FLAG*, No. 10, 1965, pp. 1-28.

difficult to form a united force which we can control.... The army has been oppressed; its middle-and higher-level cadres show no respect and are dissatisfied".⁰⁶

The PLA's expanded political role did not fade out because of Lin's death. Another reason which accounted for Mao's slow pace in reorganising the army was because he had to have support and assistance from the high-level commanders other than Fourth Field Army. Before the Tenth CCP National Congress, regional military heads still occupied many seats in the regional "Central Committee", and in early 1972 the PLA continued to control 20 first secretaries of the CCPCC in the provincial level, and among the 118 directors and deputy directors, 63 were from the military.⁰⁷ This situation lasted until after "Tenth CCP National Congress".

The Tenth CCP National Congress was held in Peking between 24 and 29 August 1973. At the congress, Chou En-lai delivered the political speech on behalf of the CCPCC, in which he criticised Lin Piao as the following: "Who never showed up without a copy of Quotations in hand and never opened their mouths without shouting 'long live' and who spoke nice things to your face but stabbed you in the back";⁰⁸ "Who were capitalist-roaders in power working only for the interests of the minority and whose ambition grew with the rise of their positions, overestimating their own strength and underestimating the strength of the people, could no longer remain under cover and therefore sprang out for a trial of strength with the proletariat. When under the baton of Soviet revisionism he attempted to have his 'decisive say' in order to serve the needs of domestic and foreign

²⁰⁶"Struggle to smash the Lin-Ch'en Anti-party Cliques Counterrevolutionary Coup" - Document of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party, *Chung-fa*, 1972, No. 4, *THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, op. cit., pp. 84-85. This passage was purely Lin's own opinion.

²⁰⁷Paul H. B. Godwin, "The PLA and Political control in China's Provinces", *COMPARATIVE POLITICS*, 9:3 (October, 1976), pp. 9-15.

²⁰⁸"Report to the Tenth Party Congress (24 August 1973)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. V, op. cit., p. 2464; *RED FLAG*, No. 9, 1973, pp. 5-17.

class enemies, he exposure and bankruptcy became complete";⁹⁹ "He is bourgeois careerist, conspirator, double-dealer, renegade and traitor".¹⁰

Both Lin Piao and Ch'en Po-ta were expelled from the Party at the congress, and Ch'en was dismissed from all posts inside and outside the party.¹¹ Among the 195 full members and the 124 alternate members elected to the Central Committee of the Tenth CCP National Congress, 58 full members and 36 alternate members were professional militarists, which occupied 29.4 percent of total membership of the CCPCC, less than the result of Ninth CCP National Congress (42.6 percent). The army's political influence were suppressed. In the following First Plenum of Tenth CCPCC, among the elected 25 full members and alternate members of politburo, only 9 were from the military including Yeh Chien-ying, Li Te-shen, Wei Kuo-ch'ing, Hsu Shih-yu, Liu Po-ch'eng, Chu Te, Wang Tung-hsing, Ch'en Hsi-lien, and alternate member Su Cheng-hua,¹ all of them supported Mao.

The Communiqué of the Tenth party congress had the following instructions concerning purging works about Lin Piao: At present, we should continue to put the task of criticising Lin Piao and rectifying our style of work, we should make full use him as a negative example, the Lin Piao anti-party clique, to educate the whole party, army, and people in class struggle and two-line struggle, and should study Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought and criticise revisionism and the bourgeois world outlook.²¹³

²⁰⁹*Ibid.*, p. 2465.

²¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 2463.

²¹¹"Communiqué of the Tenth Party congress (29 August 1973)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. V, *op. cit.*, p. 2477; *NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY*, 29 August 1973.

²¹²*WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, *op. cit.*, p. 696.

²¹³"Communiqué of the Tenth Party congress (29 August 1973)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. V, *op. cit.*, p. 2477.

Mao had learned a lesson from the Lin Piao incident. He transferred the commanders of eight great military regions immediately after the Tenth party congress in late 1973 to suppress the military political influence instantly. His aim was quite obvious: one was preventing military heads from forming the mountain-stronghold mentality which was harmful to Mao's supreme authority; the other was reducing army's political influence in the localities so that party bureaucratic system could reorganise party committees at the local and restore the unified leadership of the party.

Teng Hsiao-p'ing became a member of the Standing Committee of the politburo, Vice-chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission and concurrently Chief of the General Staff on 5 January 1975. Teng delivered a speech entitled *The Army Needs to Be Consolidated* at a meeting of officers of regimental level and above at the Headquarters of the General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

Teng stressed once more that "With this army of ours, the party commands the gun, and not vice versa", he also came to a conclusion on the present situation of the army by saying, "It was thrown into considerable chaos after Lin Piao was put in charge of army work in 1959, and especially in the later period under him. Now, many fine traditions have been discarded and the army is seriously bloated organisationally. The size of the armed force has increased substantially and military expenditures take up a larger proportion of the state budget than before, with a lot of money being spent just on food and clothing.... The Headquarters of the General Staff, the General Political Department and the General Logistics Department bear major responsibility, they should be the first to be consolidated".¹⁴

²¹⁴"The Army Needs to Be Consolidated", *THE SELECTED WORKS OF TENG HSLAO-P'ING (1975-1982) Vol. I (1984), op. cit., p. 11.*

In addition, Teng argued, "Our army has been confronted with a major new problem, factionalism, which is quite serious in some units. It is mainly the officers who are involved... They engage in factional activities both inside the army and in the civilian units where they go to work. In order to achieve stability and unity, we must eliminate factionalism and enhance party spirit". "The discipline in the army is too bad", "An army should act like an army... So to consolidate the army we must both enhance party spirit and eliminate factionalism, and strengthen discipline".¹⁵

One could conclude from Teng's speech that since Lin Piao became the Minister of National Defence in 1959, the party spirit in the PLA was low, factionalism was strong, and discipline was bad. Teng laid most of the blame on Lin Piao ignoring the fact that Mao Tse-tung controlled the army, politics and the party during that period.

On 14 July 1975, Teng spoke at an enlarged meeting of the CCPCC Military Commission. The following comments were made in accordance with the current situation of the army. Teng started, "There are quite a few problems besetting our army... to sum them up in five words: bloating, laxity, conceit, extravagance and inertia".¹⁶ As far as "laxity" and "conceit" are concerned, "This is chiefly manifested in factionalism and inadequate sense of organisational discipline... 'Army support the left', many persons became involved in factional activities, some siding with one faction, some with another. since the army had great authority, they became the real power behind the different factions. Later they brought the same attitudes into the army, and in many of its units this led to the rise of two opposing factions. Now, nine years after the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, a fairly large number of comrades in our army have yet to shake off faction".¹⁷

²¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 12.

²¹⁶"The Task of Consolidating the Army (14 July 1975)", *THE SELECTED WORKS OF TENG HSIAO-P'ING*, Vol. I (1984), *op. cit.*, p. 27.

²¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 28.

"The lack of a sense of organisational discipline is related to factionalism. those who disobey orders have the interests of their own factions in mind instead of the overall interests of the revolution. They place personal and factional interests above everything else. They seek fame, gain and position, and when they fail to secure them, they take offence, and even refuse to obey of transfer".¹⁸

"During the Cultural Revolution, since the army was given the task of 'supporting the left', it wielded great power. Together with other factions, this engendered conceit among a number of army comrades, some of whom became arrogant and overbearing... At present there is not sufficient unity inside the army itself, between the army and the government and between the army and the people. In some cases, relations between some army units, between the army and the government and between the army and the people are rather strained".¹⁹

In view of the serious problem inside the PLA, Mao conducted another large-scale transfer involving 83 military commanders in the autumn of the same year.²⁰ This transfer was aimed at rebuilding the relationship between the army and the party and attempting to eliminate factionalism inside the army.

The Lin Piao incident was brought to a close with Lin's being labelled as a "bourgeois careerist, conspirator, double-dealer, renegade and traitor". Nevertheless, the confrontation between Mao and Lin, in reality, was stemmed from the fact that Lin was extremely anxious to replace Mao, and from Lin's disapproval of Mao's ideology. The

²¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 29.

²¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 30.

²²⁰Hsiung Juai, "To Analyze PLA Inner Affairs From the Viewpoint of PLA's Personnel Arrangement", *THE MONTHLY REPORT OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, 18:7, (Taipei), pp. 28-32.

biggest mistake Lin made was that he really considered himself as Mao Tse-tung's close comrade-in-arms and successor, and the number two figure of the whole nation, expanding his military and political influence without reservation. Lin ignored Mao's real intention and his belief that "political power grow out of the barrel of a gun".

Chapter V. The Influence of Special Events on the Political Role of the PLA at the Early Stage of the Cultural Revolution

The purge of Lo Jui-ch'ing, the event of the February adverse current and Wuhan incident have profound significance in the development of the PLA's political role at the early stage of the Cultural Revolution.

From Lo Jui-ch'ing's allying himself with Lin Piao to gain military power in 1959 till Lo's suicide¹ following his being purged in 1966 unfolded the true appearance of PLA's inner-struggle among the leading class for the seizure of political interests and the process of zero-sum game. Lo's pursuit of "grand military contest" was not a military training to increase the combat effectiveness of the PLA, but, in fact, a political rivalry with Lin Piao.

The "February adverse current" was another factional struggle in the PLA. With Mao's support, Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army monopolised all powers in the PLA after the event. The motive for Mao's support of Lin was very straightforward. It was because Lin was Mao's political ally and Lin's political army-building program accorded with Mao's political interests at that stage.

The "Wuhan incident" in mid 1967 was an important case that the regional military leaders fight against the Central Government at the early stage of the Cultural Revolution. As the proceeding of the Cultural Revolution, the regional military leaders gradually expanded their political power, and by 1969, before the convening of the Ninth CCP National Congress, their control of Provincial Revolutionary Committees had reached to the climax and the relationship between the army and party became "army commands the party"

¹Lo committed suicide by jumping out of a window on 18 Mar. 1966. He survived, however, but broken a leg.

which had serious destroyed the tradition of "party commands the gun". This warning sign had forced Mao to re-establish the party organisations in the locality after the Ninth CCP National Congress, and carry out another power-seizure struggle - this time, the target was directed at Lin Piao, Mao's close comrade-in-arms and his successor.

I. The Purge of Lo Jui-ch'ing

Lo Jui-ch'ing² and Lin Piao were very close as Lo was Lin's old colleague. During the period of Long March, Lin Piao was the commander of the Red First Army, and Lo was the director of the Bureau of Security of the Red First Army and of the Red First Front Army; during the period in Yen-an, Lin was the Principal of Red Army College and the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Military and Political College, Lo was the Dean of Instruction and then the Vice-principal. When Lin Piao replaced P'eng Te-huai as the Minister of National Defence and took charge of the CCPCC Military Commission, Lo was the commander of the Public Security Force of the State Council, Lin Piao transferred Lo Jui-ch'ing to the army and appointed him as the Secretary-general of the Military Commission and the chief of general staff of the PLA.

The real intention behind Lin Piao's promoting Lo Jui-ch'ing was obvious. At that time among the 8 deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lin was only fully supported by Li T'ien-yiu and Han Hsien-ch'u, who were from Lin's Fourth Field Army and would take his orders, while the remaining six: P'eng Shao-huei, Chang Tsung-hsün, Chang Ai-p'ing, Yang Ch'eng-wu, Yang Yung, and Wang Hsin-t'ing were opposed him. Lin hoped that Lo Jui-ch'ing could help him to expand his personal influence among the army by making him

²Lo Jui-ch'ing, one of the earliest members of the Red Army. He took part in the Communist uprising at Nanchang on 1 Aug. 1927. Lo was at Ching-kang mountain in 1928. Serving there in the fourth Red Army, led by Chu Te and Mao. Lo made the long march when the march was ended in the autumn of 1935. Lo became political department director of the first column of a unit known as the Shensi-Kansu Detachment, which was under Lin Piao's First Army Corps. After 1948, Lo was then director of the political department of the North China PLA and political commissar of the 19th Army Group. The operation in which he participated were carried out in coordination with Lin Piao. In Sep. 1959, following the political downfall of Peng Te-huai and Huang Ko-cheng, Lo was appointed and ranking vice-minister of National Defense and Chief of the General Staff under the new Defense Minister Lin Piao. See Donald W. Klein (ed.), *BIOGRAPHIC DICTIONARY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM, 1921-1965*, Vol. II, (Massachusetts: Harvard Uni. Press, 1971), pp. 642-645; Warren Kuo, *A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY*, op. cit., pp. 732-733; Ho Yü-wen, *THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRC'S INTELLIGENT EMPIRE*, (Taipei: Shu Hwa Publishing Co., 1994), pp. 121-132.

Chief of the General Staff. However, Lo disobeyed Lin often bypassing him and reported to Mao Tse-tung in his capacity as the Secretary-general of the CCPCC Military Commission and the Chief of General Staff of the PLA, while kept close contacts with other generals. This deeds of Lo's was considered by Lin as disloyalty, and thus Lin's disapproval of Lo could be anticipated. In addition, there had been many disputes in between the two.

When debating the Lin Piao's speech at the "7000-men conference" in December 1961,³ Yeh Ch'ün, Lin Piao's wife, asserted that the content of "genius" should be added, while Lo disapproved and considered it as inappropriate. Disputes occurred again when discussing Lin Piao's foreword to the Second Edition of the *Quotation from Chairman Mao Tse-tun*, Lin Piao pointed out that "the works of chairman Mao shall be regarded as the supreme guide to all our military undertakings", Lo opposed and contended that "this is not compatible with the system of our country". When Lin Piao suggested that "the thought of Mao is Marxism-Leninism at its highest and most active stage in our world today", Lo countered by stating that "this is not the way to say it, highest - is it possible to have a second highest? Can't it be any higher? Most active - Can there be a next most active? Highest and most active are no easily comprehended, and can not be easily translated by foreigners". When Lin Piao suggested that "We must study Chairman Mao's writing, follow his teachings and act according to his instructions, be chairman Mao's good fighters", Lo opposed the publication of this suggestion and its introduction to foreigners. When Lin Piao wanted that "Mao Tse-tung's thought now represents the zenith of Marxism-Leninism", Lo said that "this is no way to put it, it would not favourably influence foreigners", Lo forbade the contention that "personal genius" was a

³The 7000-men Enlarged Central Work conference called by Liu Shao-ch'i in Jan. 1962 to revile Mao's policy of the Three Red Banners. See *A COLLECTION OF MATERIAL CONCERNING LIU SHAO-CH'I*, (Taipei: The Institute for the Study of Chinese Communism, 1970), p. 524.

factor in the formation of Mao thought, saying, "Nowadays no one dares mention personal genius".⁴

In November 1965, Lin Piao put forth the five-point principle for giving prominence to politics as follows: First, "To study and apply chairman Mao's works creatively and, in particular, to do one's utmost to apply them; to regard chairman Mao's works as the highest instruction on all aspects of the work of our army". Second, "To persist in the 'four firsts' and, in particular, make the greatest effort to grasp living ideas". Third, "To have leading cadres go to the basic units and give energetic leadership in the campaign to produce 'four good' companies and ensure both that the basic units do their work effectively and that a good style of leadership by the cadres is fostered". Fourth, "To promote boldly really good key posts of responsibility". And fifth, "To train hard and master the finest techniques of close-range and night fighting tactics"⁵.

Among the five-point principle, Lo contended that "to regard chairman Mao's works as the highest instruction on all aspects of the work of the PLA" did not conform to a nation's institution.⁶

At the end of 1965, Chiang Ch'ing planned to promote the movement of Cultural Revolution throughout the whole nation by applying the force of the PLA, she suggested to held a symposium on the literature and art in the army, but Lo refused. Nevertheless, Chiang Ch'ing met with Lin Piao on 21 January 1966 at Soochow, Lin Piao ordered the

⁴"A Report on the Purged Chief of Staff (30 Apr. 1966)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 1473; Li K'e & Hao Sheng-chang, *THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION*, (Peking: The History of the CCP Press, 1989). p. 16.

⁵"On the Purge of Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing (Jan. 1966)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 1405.

⁶Li K'e & Hao Sheng-chang, *THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION*, op. cit., p. 16.

General Political Department to send Liu Chih-chien, the deputy director; Hsieh T'ang-chung, chief of the Cultural Division; and Ch'en Ya-ting, the deputy chief; and Li Mant'sun, chief of the Propaganda Division to attend the "symposium on the literature and art in the armed force" convened by Chiang Ch'ing.⁷ After the meeting, an article, entitled *Abstract of the symposium on the Literature and Art in the Armed Forces Convened by Chiang Ch'ing on Behalf of Lin Piao*, which cast an extreme left line on literature and art, was sorted out and was examined and revised by Mao Tse-tung, and then distributed to CCPCC for seeking opinions in the name of the CCPCC Military Commission.

On 19 March Chiang Ch'ing forwarded the "abstract", revised three times by Mao, to Lin Piao, on 22 March, Lin directed the CCPCC Military Commission to carry out thoroughly, and on 10 April, the "abstract" was approved and issued by CCPCC. The editorial department of the *Liberation Army's Daily* published an article, entitled *Hold High the Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thought and Actively Participate in the Great Socialist Cultural Revolution*,⁸ to strongly criticise the "black line on literature and art" in the PLA, and reaffirm the political role of the PLA by pointing out:

"A black anti-party and anti-socialist line running counter to Mao Tse-tung's thought has existed in our literary and art circles. This black line is a combination of bourgeois ideas on literature and art, modern revisionist ideas on literature and art... The struggle between the roads on the front of literature and art in society is bound to be reflected in the armed forces... Our armed forces are the chief instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat... Inevitably, therefore, the enemy will try every means to undermine our armed forces from all sides; and they will inevitably use literature and art as a weapon to corrupt our armed

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁸"Hold High the Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thought and Actively Participate in the Great Socialist Cultural Revolution", *LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY*, 18 April 1966.

forces. We must be very much on our guard against this"⁹.

In addition to this article, the *Liberation Army's Daily* also published the full text of the "abstract".¹⁰ And, in accordance with spirit of the "abstract", the PLA's General Political Department held a "conference on creative works in the army" between 8 April and 11 June in Peking. During the conference, Lin Piao ordered to carry out criticism on those who suspected and resisted the "abstract", and who held different viewpoints against it. The conference seriously criticised six persons including Lo Jui-ch'ing, and some 56 persons were attacked in group meetings.¹¹ After the conference, all units of the PLA carried out similar meetings, many of military cadres of Lo's followers were attacked. Lin Piao and revolutionary leftists attempted to destroy Lo's influence in the PLA by criticising the so-called "black line on literature and art".

In July 1966, the *Red Flag* published a paper, entitled *The Compass of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution*, in the name of its editorial department. It indicated, "Under the control and influence of this black line came a spate of absurd theories and a profusion of poisonous weeds, creating a miasma in literary and art circles. They turned literature and art into tools to attack the dictatorship of the proletariat and into means to restore capitalism".¹² Lo Jui-ch'ing was thus classified "the black line of restoring capitalism and of attacking the dictatorship of the proletariat". This charge, in other words, was what Mao said, "the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the class struggle between the different political forces, and the class struggle

⁹"The PLA Enters the Campaign Against P'eng Chen (18 Apr. 1966)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. III, *op. cit.*, pp. 1430-1431.

¹⁰Li K'e & Hao Sheng-chang, *THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹²"*The Compass of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution*", *RED FLAG*, No. 9, 1966, p. 26.

in the ideological field between the proletariat and bourgeoisie".¹³ And as in all the inner-party struggles in the PRC history, when charged with the above, his fate could be anticipated.

Furthermore, Lo Jui-ch'ing decided to hold a "grand military contest" in the army in January 1964. This move largely increased his prestige in the army but opposed the army-building principle of giving prominence to politics. While Lin considered it had seriously jeopardised the progress of carrying out political movement of the cult of Mao Tse-tung among the army. In the second half year of 1964, Lin took a counter-measure by sending Yeh Ch'ün and many other senior cadres to "squat on the spot"¹⁴ at grass roots and in the army. On 29 Dec. 1964, Lin Piao wrote *Comrade Lin Piao's Directive on Army's Current Tasks* in accordance with Yeh Ch'ün and many others' reports, and forwarded it to Lo Jui-ch'ing, Lo, however, revised it 8 times before issuing it to all units in the army, and strongly disapproved of Lin's negation of "grand military contest" by saying, "The grand military contest were of prime importance". When Lin indicated, "Unless politics is done well, the troops will run backward in war", Lo disputed, "If you cannot shoot accurately, the other side will advance on you. Where else would you run but backwards". In addition, Lo also spoke of "the military training work in 1964 as its best year since the founding of the PRC... and enthusiasm must be enhanced, not dampened... Without good military training, the party and country are doomed when war breaks out".¹⁵

When Lin Piao set forth five principles for giving prominence to politics, Lo was against

¹³"The PLA Enters the Campaign Against P'eng Chen (18 Apr. 1966), *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 1249.

¹⁴"Squat on the spot" - A practice of requiring senior cadres to spend certain periods of time at the grass roots, living and working among the masses in order to obtain a broad and realistic understanding of the conditions at lower levels. The practice of "Squat" is on the one hand aimed at rectifying ranking cadres and, on the other, at strengthening control over the basic level units.

¹⁵"A Report on the Purged Chief of Staff (30 Apr. 1966)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 1476.

making Mao's books the supreme guide for all the tasks of the PLA. Lo regarded the five principles only the principle concerning techniques derived from hard training and techniques of close and night combat was the most important, the others were useless.¹⁶

Lo also refused to put Yeh Ch'ün's name in the "directive" to whole army for whom occupied no army post. Moreover, before issuing "Comrade Lin Piao's Directive on Army's Current Tasks" to all units in the army, Lo requested to enumerate "The Work Group of the General Political Department" instead of Liu Chih-chien and Yeh Ch'ün's name from the following passage of the "directive", "Comrade Lin Piao read few reports written by Liu Chih-chien, Yeh Ch'ün and many others, and heard reports from comrade Yeh Ch'ün"¹⁷.

In early 1965, the struggle between Lin Piao and Lo Jui-ch'ing had become apparent. In November 1965, a joint report signed by Li Tso-p'eng, First Political Commissar of the Navy, Wang Hung-k'un, Vice-commander-in-chief of the Navy, and Chang Hsiu-ch'uan, Director of the Political Department of the Navy was submitted to Mao Tse-tung by Yeh Ch'ün, indicating that Lo plotted to sabotage the navy.¹⁸ The enlarged conference of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCPCC (Shanghai conference) was thereby convened by Mao between 8 and 15 December of the same year to criticise Lo Jui-ch'ing. The conference distributed the joint report signed by Li Tso-p'eng and others, in addition, Wu Fa-hsien, Commander-in-chief of the Air Force also publicised a reference, which indicated:

14 and 15 February 1965, under instructions from Lo Jui-ch'ing, Liu Ya-lou, former

¹⁶*Ibid.*; Li K'e & Hao Sheng-chang, *THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION*, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 18.

Commander-in-chief of the Air Force presented a four-point proposal to comrade Yeh Ch'ün to be forwarded to Lin Piao for his acceptance. The four points were: First, "Sooner or later a person high on the political stage has to bow out. Personal will does not matter. Comrade Lin also will have to leave the political stage in the future". Second, "Comrade Lin's physical health must be well cared for. This has to depend upon you". Third, "Hereafter, comrade Lin need not bother too much about military affairs. Let other people take care of the troops. the troops today have all they need. the principal problem is to do everything properly". And the final, "If it should prove necessary to entrust Lo with the administration of military affairs, give him more respect, and give him a free hand".¹⁹

Lo's four points undoubtedly were to send out an open challenge to seize power from Lin. It was, however, offensive to Mao for Lin was his proxy to carry out Maoist army-building program. Lo not only failed to carry out political army-building program, but attempted to seize power from Lin. This seriously ruined Mao's overall power deployment and thus his fate to be purged was doomed. Mao once wrote the following comments on a report: "Everyone must guard against those who do not believe 'giving prominence to politics', or those who overtly agree but covertly promoting 'the theory of compromise' (opportunism)".²⁰ After the Shanghai conference, Lo was removed from Chief of the General Staff of the PLA and replaced by Yang Ch'eng-wu, acting commander of the Peking Military Region.

PLA convened an Army's Political Works Conference from the end of December 1965 to January 1966. This conference not only continued to carry out struggles against Lo Jui-ch'ing in the spirit of Shanghai conference, it even intensified its attack on Lo and

¹⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 1478-1479.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 19.

classified the struggle into "the line struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie". The conference also restated the importance of Lin Piao's "five-point principle of giving prominence to politics".

Hsiao Hua, Director of the General Political Department of the PLA, delivered a speech at the conference, entitled *Hold High the Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thought and Resolutely Adhere to the Five Point Principle of Giving Prominence to Politics*. The focal points of the speech were as follows:

First, "Classes exist in socialist countries and class struggle definitely exists. Throughout the whole stage of socialism, there exist class contradictions, class struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie, and the struggle between the two roads of socialism and capitalism. Politics is class politics. If the political-ideological battle area is not occupied by the proletariat, it will definitely be occupied by the bourgeoisie".

Second, "Some people say: 'Military affairs are politics', 'Military affairs and politics are of equal importance', and 'military affairs and politics should be given first place in turn'. Such views are absolutely wrong, and such purely military views, which hold that if military affairs are perfected, politics will naturally be perfected and if military affairs are imperfect politics will also be imperfect, were criticised by chairman Mao 36 years ago in a resolution adopted by the fifth plenary session of the CCP Central Committee. Chairman Mao said: 'Military affairs are merely one of the instruments which fulfil political tasks. The Chinese Red Army was an armed group which carried out the political task in the revolution'".

Third, "The five-point principle of giving prominence to politics by comrade Lin Piao constitutes a long term plan for building our army, general principle and task for all

aspects of work of the whole army. comrade Lin Piao's five-point principle was put forward in accordance with Chairman Mao's theory and line of building the army, the historical experience of our army, and the current practical situation. It is a brilliant example for creatively studying and applying Mao Tse-tung's thinking".

And fourth, "We must understand that the relationship between politics and military affairs is that of the commands to the commanded; it is the relationship between the leader and the follower. Politics commands military affairs, and military affairs serve politics. Only by giving prominence to politics and doing political work well will the other work be well done and military training be effective. Giving prominence to politics is the foundation on which to strengthen the revolutionisation and modernisation of the army".²¹

CCPCC held a group meeting between 4 March and 18 April 1966 to discuss Lo Jui-ch'ing's issue. The group meeting was conducted in two phases. the first phase lasted 13 days and the participants, totalling 42 persons included responsible comrades from the various headquarters of the CCPCC Military Commission, the Public Security Ministry, the National Defence Ministry departments, the National Defence Science Commission, the Military Science Academy, most of the Military Regions, and the different branches of the armed services. Lo Jui-ch'ing himself also attended this phase of the meeting. On 22 March the meeting entered upon its second phase. A total of 53 persons joined the meeting on instructions from the Central Committee. These additional participants were responsible comrades from the Central Committee, the concerned departments and agencies in the State Council, and the various bureaux of the Central Committee. The total number of participants in the second phase of the meeting was 95.²² Mao and Lin Piao enlarged the level and sphere of struggling Lo Jui-ch'ing, and Lo was accused of

²¹*Ibid.*, pp. 1405-1412.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 1473; *Ibid.*, p. 20.

"plotting to usurp military power and oppose the party".

Yet, there was another purpose behind Mao and Lin's expansion of their struggle against Lo. They hoped that the struggle against Lo could lure Lo's followers into a trap, smash non-Lin's faction in the PLA, and eradicate all dissidents in the party who were against Lin's "politics takes the lead" so as to boost the development of Cultural Revolution. For instance, P'eng Chen, the mayor of Peking, spoke for Lo Jui-ch'ing when discussing Lo's issue at the group meeting, he requested, "only to point out the facts with good grounds, don't make any conjectures on those utterly groundless, name one when there is a one, don't exaggerate... speak only Lo's issue, don't involve other people". Ho Long who had close relations with Lo, and Teng Hsiao-p'ing objected to the handling of Lo's issue, others like Yang Shang-k'un, Shang Hsiang-jung, Director of Administrative Office of the CCPCC Military Commission, Liang Pi-yeh were also involved. Lin Piao reorganised a power group headed by him through the struggle of Lo. Lin Piao considered a person's loyalty judging by his attitude towards the purge of Lo, people like Wu Fa-hsien, Li Tso-p'eng and Ch'iu Hui-tso became the core of Lin's faction for they took vigorous attack against Lo. Wu and Ch'iu were appointed the commander in the army and became the major force to carry out Mao's political army-building, they shared the victory of power-seizure struggle with Lin Piao and became a member of the Political Bureau of the CCPCC at the Ninth CCP National Congress.

On 30 April 1966, the Work Group of the CCPCC made a *Report on the Issue Concerning the Mistakes of Lo Jui-ch'ing*, which indicated five major mistakes of Lo as follows: First, "Hostility and opposition to Mao Tse-tung's thought, slandering and attacking comrade Mao Tse-tung". Second, "Pushing the bourgeois military line in opposition to chairman Mao's military line and arbitrarily deciding to hold a grand military contest in the entire army in opposition to giving prominence to politics". Third, "Total

absence of organisation and discipline, arbitrary acts, and schemes for an independent kingdom all disrupting the party's centralised democracy". Fourth, "Vicious and low quality; an opportunist clinging steadfastly to the standpoint of the exploiting class; the zenith of bourgeois individualism". And the final, "Solicits favours from the party; forces comrade Lin Piao to 'give way to a better man' and 'give up his power'; conducts treacherous activities to usurp army powers and oppose the party".²³

On 16 May of the same year, the CCPCC approved and issued the "report", and pointed out again the mistakes of Lo, which were the mistake of putting the bourgeois military line in opposition to the proletarian military line; of putting revisionism in opposition to Marxism-Leninism; of opposition to Mao Tse-tung's thought; of opposition to Party's Central; of opposition to Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao; and of plotting to usurp military power and oppose the party. Thus, the Party's Central reached the following decision: (1) Strip and Cancel all the positions held by Lo Jui-ch'ing in the military system; (2) Strip Lo Jui-ch'ing of his position as vice premier of the State Council; (3) Strip Lo Jui-ch'ing of his position as secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the party; (4) Make a statement, politically and organisationally, concerning the errors committed by Lo Jui-ch'ing; (5) Circulate this report of the Central Work Group and certain major speeches made at the group meeting to an appropriate extent so that the evil influence of Lo Jui-ch'ing in the various field will be thoroughly eliminated.²⁴

In six months time, Lo was completely excluded from the CCPCC and removed from all his posts in the party, government and military. Lo was the first leading commander being purged before the advent of the Cultural Revolution. Lo occupied such a high position as Chief of the General Staff of the PLA. Only Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao had the power to

²³*Ibid.*, pp. 1473-1478.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 1480.

remove him from the office at that time. Lin Piao, however, was only a pawn that Mao placed in the army. He would never dare to go ahead and attack Lo without Mao's consent. Consequently, it was quite obvious Mao intended to remove all obstacles that would impeded Mao's plan of power seizure during the Cultural Revolution. For Lo occupied six important posts in the party, government and military at that time, - namely, Secretary of the Secretariat of the CCPCC, Secretary-general of the CCPCC Military Commission, Vice premier of the State Council, Vice minister of Ministry of National Defence, Director of the Office for the National Defence Industry, and Chief of the general Staff of the PLA, - if Mao wished that Lin should control the PLA, Lo's influence must be eliminated completely. A series of power struggles against leading commanders were thereafter carried out during the Cultural Revolution. Many high-ranking generals like Chu Te, P'eng Te-huai, Ho Long, Ch'en I, Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, Nieh Jung-chen, and Yeh Chien-ying and many others were affected, for holding different viewpoints to Mao's, or for the disapproving vigorous attacks on the military organs during the Cultural Revolution.

Apart from Mao's influence, we can attribute the following few points to the fall of Lo Jui-ch'ing:

Firstly, the fall of Lo was not because he promoted the so-called bourgeois military line or plotted to restore capitalism behind Mao and Lin, but because of his attempt to divide power with Lin Piao. This was clearly mentioned in the *Report on the Issue Concerning the Fault of Lo Jui-ch'ing*. Lo contended with Lin for the favour of Mao Tse-tung, but he neither realised the importance of Lin Piao to Mao, nor the political tasks that Lin shouldered at that phase.

Secondly, the reason why Lin promoted Lo to the position of Chief of the General Staff of

the PLA and secretary-general of Military Commission of the CCP was because Lin hoped that Lo would be grateful and therefore pledge his loyalty to Lin and help Lin to consolidate his political influence in the army. However, Lo couldn't understand this, his really thought he was the Chief of the General Staff of the PLA with military power and could do whatever he liked. Lo wanted to pledge his loyalty direct to Mao, but failed to understand Mao's real intention.

And finally, unlike P'eng Te-huai, Lo didn't devote himself to the idea of professional army building. His "grand military contest" was in fact for the seizure of political gains. This can be seen from two things. First, during Lo's term of office as Chief of General Staff of the PLA, he often bypassed Lin and reported to Mao directly. This behaviour was not professionally orthodox; second, in the course of a debate between Lo and Lin on the issue whether to send troops to aid North Vietnam or not, Lo easily changed his stand and followed Mao's opinion when he understood Mao's real intention.

II. The Eight Articles of the CCPCC Military Commission and The Event of the February Adverse Current

After the Cultural Revolution, Mao felt threatened from two sides. One was the mountain-stronghold mentality at locality, the other is from Lin Piao and his "Fourth Field Army". At the early stage of Cultural Revolution, many purges of the high-ranking cadres of the party and army that Lin Piao carried out were in fact with Mao's tacit consent in the hope that he could gain some support from Lin to overthrow Liu Shao-ch'i together. This "befriend with distant states while attacking those nearby" or "draw secondary enemy over to his side to attack prime enemy" was the typical tactic of Mao. In addition, the elimination of the commanders other than Fourth Field Armies carried out by Lin also involved historical factional and power struggle among the army and personal ambitions.

On 8 August 1966, the Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC passed the "Decision of the CCPCC concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", the well-known sixteen articles of the Cultural Revolution, details are as follows:

1. "A new stage in the Socialist Revolution. - at present, our aim is to knock down those power holders who take the capitalist road, criticise the bourgeois reactionary academic 'authorities', criticise the ideologies of the bourgeoisie and all exploiting classes".
2. "The main stream and twists and turns - the broad masses of workers, peasants and soldiers, revolutionary intellectuals, and revolutionary cadres constitute the main force in this great Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution, being a revolution, will unavoidably meet with resistance, which stems mainly from those power holders who have sneaked into the party and who take the capitalist road".

3. "Put the word 'Dare' above everything else, boldly arouse the masses - The Party Central Committee requires Party Committee at various levels to uphold correct leadership, be courageous, mobilise the masses with a free hand, change their state of weakness and impotency, encourage those comrades who have made mistakes but who are willing to make amends to lay down their packs and join the battle, and dismiss the power holders who take the capitalist road, so as to let the leadership return to the hands of proletarian revolutionaries".

4. "Let the masses educate themselves in the movement - in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, it is the masses who must liberate themselves. We cannot do the things for them which they should do themselves. We must trust the masses, rely on them, and respect their creative spirit. We must get rid of the word 'fear'. We must not be afraid of trouble. Chairman Mao has always told us that revolution is not an elegant, gentle, kind, and genial thing. In this great revolutionary movement, the masses must be told to educate themselves".

5. "Party's class line must be executed with resolve - focus should be concentrated on attacking a handful of extremely reactionary bourgeois rightists and counterrevolutionary revisionists. Their anti-party, anti-socialist, and anti-thought of Mao Tse-tung crimes must be fully exposed and criticised and they must be isolated to the maximum extent. The focus of this movement is on the purge of those power holders within the party who take the capitalist road".

6. "Contradictions among the people must be correctly handled - it is necessary to strictly separate the two kinds of contradictions of different character - those among the people and those between the enemy and ourselves. Contradictions among the people must not be treated as contradictions between enemy and ourselves or other way round. That

differing opinions are found among the people is a normal phenomenon. In the course of debate, people may argue with one another but must not use their fists".

7. "Be on guard against those who brand revolutionary masses as 'counterrevolutionaries' - in order to prevent the shifting of the main target of struggle, it is not permissible to use any excuse to instigate the masses to struggle against the masses and students to struggle against students. Even in the case of real rightists, they should not be dealt with in the light of prevailing circumstance at a late period in the movement".

8. "The cadre question - anti-party and anti-socialist rightists must be fully exposed and knocked down. Their influence must be eliminated".

9. "Cultural revolutionary groups, cultural revolutionary committees, and cultural revolutionary congresses - cultural revolutionary groups, cultural revolutionary committee, and cultural revolutionary congresses should not be temporary organisations but should be permanent mass organisation".

10. "Teaching reform - in schools of all types, it is imperative to carry out the policy, advanced by comrade Mao Tse-tung, of making education serve proletarian politics and having education integrated with productive labour".

11. "The question of written criticism in the press - in carrying out the cultural revolutionary mass movement it is essential to combine the dissemination of the proletarian world outlook, Marxism-Leninism, and the thought of Mao Tse-tung with the criticism of the bourgeois and feudal ideologies. Criticism by name in the press must first be discussed by the party committee at the corresponding level and in some cases approved by the higher party committees".

12. "Policy toward scientists technicians, and working personnel in general - scientists and scientific and technical personnel who have made valuable contributions should be protected. They may be assisted in gradually transforming their world outlook and styles of work".

13. "The question of arrangements for integrating the socialist education movement in town and country - the Great Cultural Revolution has made the socialist education movement in town and countryside even richer in content and better. It is necessary to combine the two. However, questions raised by the present proletarian cultural revolutionary movement must at a suitable moment be handed over to the masses for discussion. so that the proletarian ideology may be made to flourish and the bourgeois ideology destroyed".

14. "Grasp the revolution and promote production - provided the masses are fully mobilised and satisfactory arrangements are made, it is possible to guarantee that the Cultural Revolution and production will not impede each other and that a high quality of work in all fields will be attained".

15. "The army - the cultural revolutionary movement and the socialist education movement in the armed forces should be conducted in accordance with the directives of the military commission of the party central committee and the general political department of the PLA".

16. "The thought of Mao Tse-tung is the guide to action for the Proletarian Cultural Revolution - in the course of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, it is necessary to hold high the great red banner of the thought of Mao Tse-tung and to place proletarian

politics in command. The thought of Mao Tse-tung must be regarded as a compass to the Cultural Revolution. Party committee at various levels must all the more earnestly undertake creative study and application of chairman Mao's works".²⁵

On 10 August, Lin Piao delivered a speech at the conference of central work in his capacity as Vice-chairman and announced "cadre policy", which he indicated, "In judging cadres we first of all want to see whether they support or oppose chairman Mao, whether they emphasise politics, and whether their revolutionary vigour is high, we look at their main current and tributaries.... The cadre policy has no room for men of peace and harmony. Popular persons are afraid of offending people in their work. We cannot choose this kind of cadre. We must select those cadres who support the Chairman, give prominence to politics, and have revolutionary vigour. Our cadre policy from now on should be that whoever oppose chairman Mao will be discharged. Whoever does not give prominence to politics will be discharged. It does not matter how much ability he may have".²⁶

Later in his speech at the first Red Guard rally on 18 August, Lin expressed, "we will energetically eradicate all the old ideas, culture, customs, and habits of the exploiting classes, and transform all those parts of the superstructure that do not correspond to the socialist economic base. We will sweep out all the vermin and remove all obstacles".²⁷

Many senior cadres were attacked by Lin's clique under the "cadre policies" of "eradicate

²⁵"Decision of the CCPCC concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", RED FLAG, No. 10, 1966, pp. 1-9; A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, op. cit., pp. 559-660.

²⁶"On the Question of the Cadre Line (10 Aug. 1966)", THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR -POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

²⁷"Lin Piao's Speech at the First Red Guard Rally (18 Aug. 1966)", RED FLAG, No. 11, 1966, pp. 13-14; "A Great Struggle to Defend Party's Principle", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 26 Feb. 1967.

all", "transform all", "sweep out all", and "remove all". Ho Long was purged, Chu Te and Nieh Jung-chen could not escape either.

On 3 January 1967, Lin criticised Yeh Chien-ying, Ch'en I, Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien and Nieh Jung-chen openly at a conference of the Military Academies.²⁸ On 10 January, Kuan Feng, Wang Li and many other members of the Cultural Revolution Group drew up *Some Suggestions on the Issue Concerning the Propagandist Policies of the Liberation Army's Daily*, coining the slogan "purge the small handful of power-holders in the army who take the capitalist road". On 13 January, Chiang Ch'ing spoke in a meeting, indicating "the struggle between the two lines are very fierce in the army, don't think the struggle between the two lines does not exist in the army".²⁹ On 14 January, the editorial of *Liberation Army's Daily* publicised the slogan of "purge the small handful in the army", asserting "the resistance to carry out the Cultural Revolution is mainly from the handful of power-holders who took the capitalist road and have sneaked into the army, and from few die-hard elements who persisted in capitalist reactionary line",³⁰ and this article was reprinted in the *People's Daily* the following day.³¹ The slogan "purge the small handful in the army" provided a legal basis for the cultural revolution ultra-Left to attack military leaders of Lin Piao's clique. Chiang Ch'ing once appealed to the army to intervene in the comprehensive inner struggles.³²

On 11 January, the CCPCC Military Commission reorganised the PLA Cultural Revolution Group, with Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien to relieve Liu Chih-chien as the chief; Chiang

²⁸"A Great Struggle to Defend Party's Principle", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 26 Feb. 1967.

²⁹Li K'e & Hao Sheng-chang, *THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION*, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

³⁰"Seize New Victories", *LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY*, 4 Jan. 1967; *RED FLAG*, No. 15, 1966, pp. 14-16.

³¹"Seize New Victories", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 15 Jan. 1967.

³²Li K'e & Hao Sheng-chang, *THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION*, op. cit., p. 38.

Ch'ing counsellor; Hsiao Hua, Yang Ch'eng-wu, Wang Hsin-t'ing, Hsü Li-ch'ing, Kuan Feng, Hsieh Ch'üan-chung and Li Man-ts'un deputy chiefs; Yü Li-chin, Liu Hua-ch'ing, T'ang P'ing-chu, Hu Chih, Yeh Ch'ün, Wang Feng, Ku Yen and Chang T'ao group members.³³ The new PLA Cultural Revolution Group was under the direct leadership of CCPCC Military Commission and of Cultural Revolution Group of the CCPCC, no longer subordinated to the General Political Department.

On the same day of the reorganisation, Yeh Chien-ying spoke at the conference of the Standing Committee of the CCPCC Military Commission, discussing the issue on army's stability, which he pointed out, "An army's stability is especially important to the area of turbulence, domestic trouble will lead to foreign invasions, and the stability of the army is the only fundamental interest of the party and the army". On 14 January, CCPCC issued a "Circular on Never Direct the Target of Struggle at the Army", demanding that the army should neither carry out "great democracy", nor establish "militant organisations" or "exchange revolutionary experience".

Shortly after, at a rendezvous of the CCPCC Military Commission at the Ching Hsi guest house, Chiang Ch'ing demanded the army to apply "four greats" of carrying out "struggle by reasoning" in their intervention of the Cultural Revolution - great contending, great blooming, big-character posters and great debates. It was because "only by insisting on struggle by reasoning, and by resolutely opposing those bad people who use force and coercion to provoke conflicts among the masses can true democracy under the proletarian dictatorship be definitely put into effect, only by 'four greats' can the free airing of views be guaranteed and the democratic rights of the masses of the people be protected".³⁴

³³*Ibid.*, p. 39. On 30 March 1967, Hsieh Fu-chih was appointed as a member of the PLA Cultural Revolution Group,

³⁴"Seize New Victories", *RED FLAG*, No. 15 1966, p. 15

On 19 January, Yeh Ch'ün attacked Hsiao Hua, director of the General Political Department, by name at the rendezvours. On 22 January, Mao received members of the CCPCC Military Commission who attend the informal meeting, they reported to Mao personally on the military leaders being attacked by the cultural revolution ultra-Left including Hsiao Hua, Hsü Shih-yu (Commander of the Nanking Military Region), Yang Yung (Commander of the Peking Military Region), Cheng Wei-shan (Vice-commander of the Peking Military Region), Kuo P'eng (Vice-commander of the Sinkiang Military District), Wu Lieh (Vice-commander of the Second Artillery) and many others,³⁵ while Mao replied, "Our fundamental principle is to side with the Cultural Revolution Ultra-Left. The non-intervention of the army we said in the past was not true, as a matter of the fact, many military regions like Sian, Chungking, Lanchow, Chengtu and Nanking have all intervened".³⁶

Consequently, the participants of the rendezvours drew up seven articles on the means of the army's intervention in the Cultural Revolution. The seven articles were examined by Mao, and then submitted to the rendezvours of the CCPCC Military Commission for discussion once again. During the discussion, the passage "the army's intervention in the Cultural Revolution must led by Party Committee, and it must not establish combat organisations for the Cultural Revolutions" was removed from the contents by the insistence of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CCPCC, in addition, military leaders unanimously agreed to add one more article - the cadres of all levels must strictly bring up their children with the thought of Mao Tse-tung, this became the increased eighth article of the CCPCC Military Commission. The total eight articles were submitted to Mao for

³⁵Li K'e & Hao Sheng-chang, *THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION*, op. cit., p. 40.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 41.

his approval on 28 January, Mao commented, "the eight articles are very good indeed, approved for distribution".³⁷

After the rendezvous, the CCPCC Military Commission issued the "eight articles of the CCPCC Military Commission" to the whole army to restrain the PLA's outrageous intervention in the Cultural Revolution and the Cultural Revolution Ultra-Left's excessive oppression of the PLA. The Eight Articles of the CCPCC Military Commission read:

1. "It is necessary to give resolute support to the true proletarian revolutionaries, resolutely oppose the rightists, and the resolute measures of dictatorship against conclusively proven counterrevolutionary organisations and counter revolution elements".
2. "All commanders and fighters, political workers, orderlies, medical personnel, scientific, and confidential and security personnel must resolutely remain at their posts and must not leave their duties without proper authorisation".
3. "In armed forces units where the Great Cultural Revolution has been launched, there should be big contending, big blooming, big character posters, big debates. Handling of contradictions among the people in the same way as dealing with the enemy is not permitted, ransacking and sealing of doors as will is not permitted. It is not permitted to carry out corporal punishment or disguised corporal punishment".
4. "All college and school teachers and students, literacy and art bodies, physical culture work teams, hospital workers, workers of armaments factories, etc., who have gone to outside areas to exchange revolutionary experience should return as quickly as possible to

³⁷THE REMINISCENCES OF CH'EN TSAI-TAO, (Peking: Liberation Army's Press, 1991), p. 278.

their home areas or units".

5. "The question of assaults on military leadership organs should be dealt with differently according to different cases, prosecution should be instituted in the case of assaults made in the past by counterrevolutionaries, but action need not be taken if the assaults were made by leftists. Henceforth no assault shall be permitted".

6. "It is forbidden to assault, or exchange revolutionary experience with, war preparation systems and security systems in the armed forces. It is forbidden to ask for or take by force any document, file, and technical data which do not concern the Cultural Revolution".

7. "Organs at the army and higher levels should carry out the Great Cultural Revolution by batches at different times in accordance with provisions, armies, divisions, regiments, battalions, companies, and special units designated by the military commission must resolutely adopt the policy of positive education, so as to facilitate the strengthening of war preparedness, take care of national defence, and protect the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution".

8. "Cadres of all levels, in particular higher ranking cadres, must strictly bring up their children with the thought of Mao Tse-tung. They must teach them to study hard chairman Mao's works, earnestly unite as one with workers and peasants and regard them as their own teachers, take part in labour training, reform their world outlook, and strive to be proletarian revolutionaries".³⁸

³⁸"Eight Articles of the CCPCC Military Commission", *THE COLLECTIONS OF THE ORIGINAL DATA OF CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION*, (Taipei: Chinese Communist Studies Press, 1979), p. 83.

To thoroughly carry out the "eight article of the CCPCC Military Commission", the CCPCC Military Commission successively issued three orders from 11 to 27 February - "Regulations of the Military Commission of the Central Committee Governing Seizure of Power within the Party (16 Feb. 1967)", "Some Provisions of the Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee Concerning the Great Cultural Revolution in Leading Organs above the Army Level (11 Feb. 1967), and "Additional Regulations for Carrying Out 'Some Provisions of the CCPCC Military Commission Concerning the Great Cultural Revolution in Leading Organs above the Army Level'", and laid down the following provisions for carrying out the Cultural Revolutions within the army.

1. "The Great Cultural Revolution in organs above the army level (the various headquarters, services, and arms; the various military regions, the provincial military districts, and military subdistricts; the Air Force and the fleets of the Navy) must wall posters, and conduct debates stage by stage and group by group according to chairman Mao's instructions".
2. "Units of the Army and Air Force below the army level; units of the navy below the base level; flying schools of the air force; the Peking Garrison district; the garrison districts of Shanghai, Tientsin, and Luta (port Arthur-Dairen); and the special units designated by the Military Commission shall as a rule not carry out full and frank airing of views, write wall posters, and conduct debates".
3. "Leading military organs at all levels (including commands, political departments, logistics departments, and other leading departments) are as a rule not allowed to carry out seizure of power from bottom to top. No person or organisation is allowed to engineer attack".

4. "The sphere in which seizure of power may be carried out within the army is limited to academies and schools (schools for training confidential personnel, schools specialised in pioneering technique, flying schools, and classes and departments charged with the task of training foreign language personnel are expected), literary and art troupes, physical culture detachments, hospitals of military districts and services, and hospitals (for teaching purposes), and military factories (those charged with the task of testing pioneering techniques, factories attached to naval bases, and top secret factories are expected). In these units, whether or not seizure of power is called for depends on the character of the problems connected within the leadership of the Party Committees".

5. "All armed forces of the Production and Construction corps are allowed only to carry out education by positive example and not to engage in 'four big' -big airing, big blossoming, big debate, and big-character posters. This is in order to facilitate war preparations".

6. "The leading organs of the armed forces must preserve a compact, integrated command system, and it is undesirable to form various kinds of militant organisations for the Cultural Revolution, when such militant organisations have already been set up, they must be reorganised as administrative units".

7. "According to the principle of the absolute leadership of the party over the armed forces as defined by the resolution of the Kutien conference and the resolution of the enlarged meeting of the Military Commission in 1960, the Great Cultural Revolution in organs above the army level must be led by party committee".³⁹

³⁹"Directive on the Conduct of the Cultural Revolution within the People's Liberation Army (11 Feb. 1967)", "Establishment of the Peking Military Control Committee (11 Feb. 1967)", "Regulation on the Military Control in Sinkiang (11 Feb. 1967)", "Directive on Power Seizures within the PLA (16 Feb. 1967)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. IV, pp.

The issuing of the "Eight Articles of the CCPCC Military Commission" was a big compromise Mao had made with the military leaders of the PLA at the early stage of the Cultural Revolution. The current task of Mao Tse-tung, however, was the struggle of Liu Shao-ch'i, who had strong background in the Party and was Chairman of the PRC, and achieving such a goal was worth almost any concession. Consequently, the passage "the army's intervention in the Cultural Revolution must be led by the party committees" was removed from the original draft of the "eight articles", but in the subsequent order, "Some Provisions of the CCPCC Military Commission Concerning the Great Cultural Revolution in Leading Organs above the Army Level", issued by the Military Commission, it still laid down "the Great Cultural Revolution in organs above the army level must be led by the party committees". This was the result of compromise, and such compromise was mainly because Mao had to consider the military leaders' resentment aroused by army's involvement in the Cultural Revolution and carrying out the so-called "purge the small handful in the army". Mao had to make such a concession in order to achieve his ultimate goal.

The issuing of the "Eight Articles" had not attained army's stability as it planned, the attack of militant organs, bases and military cadres at various levels remained to happen constantly. There were three reasons accounted for this. First, the struggle was unlikely to cease for the atmosphere had been stirred up by movement of the Cultural Revolution; and moreover, the ultra-leftist added further fuel to the flames; last and the most important, Mao supported the expansion of the struggle to its largest extent.

The CCPCC Military Commission had most vigorous reaction to the political development

1818-1819, 1819-1820, 1820-1821, 1822-1823; Li K'e & Hao Sheng-chang, *THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION*, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

of the Cultural Revolution. With the mixed expectation of stabilising the army and of maintaining their personal interests, the military leaders acted sharply at a conference of Political Bureau held by Chou En-lai at Huai-jen auditorium on 16 February 1967, which evoked the movement of "February adverse current".⁴⁰ At the conference, the military leaders advocated that 16-point decision on the Cultural Revolution adopted in August 1966 at the Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC was not legal and thus should be abolished. They also urged suppression of the "anti-party, illegal" Red guard Organisation.

The conference was mainly composed of two sides, one was formed by Yeh Chien-ying, Ch'en I, Nieh Jung-chen and Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, the vice-chairmen of CCPCC Military Commission, and T'an Chen-lin, Li Hsien-nien, Li Fu-ch'un, Yü Ch'iu-li and Ku Mu, member of the Political Bureau; the other was formed by Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng, Hsieh Fu-chih, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yüan, the ultra-leftist. The two sides had violent controversy over army's interference in the Cultural Revolution. Among all, some issues also touched upon the state system, the focal points of the disputes are summarised as follows:⁴¹

First, whether the leadership of the CCP must be complied - Yeh Chien-ying criticised, "Shanghai was renamed Shanghai commune presumptuously, such a big issue involved state system, but they renamed it even without discussed with the Politburo. What is the meaning of this? Can a revolution be done without the leadership of the Party? Can it be done without the army?"

⁴⁰A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY, *op. cit.*, p. 134; WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, *op. cit.*, p. 437; "Chiang Ch'ing on the Attitude Toward the February Adverse Current" COLLECTION OF IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION (Taipei: Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of National Defence, 1969), P. 238.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, pp. 44-46.

Second, whether the senior cadres should be purged - when Chang Ch'un-ch'iao refused to protect Ch'en P'ei-hsien, First Secretary of Shanghai Party Committee, T'an Chen-lin denounced Chang for holding metaphysics and nullifying the party's leadership by applying mass campaigns, he said, "your aim was to purge senior cadres, and this time is the most brutal one in the history of Chinese Communist Party".

And third, whether the army's stability must be maintained - Yeh Chien-ying criticised the Cultural Revolution Group as saying, "You have messed up the party, messed up the government, messed up the factories and the countryside, and you don't think it is enough, and must mess up the army too, what are trying to do exactly?", Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien also commented, "The army is the pillar of proletarian dictatorship. If you mess up the army, how can you still keep this pillar?"

The ultra-leftists' excessive oppression of the PLA forced military cadres, especially the high ranking officials in the central, to make a last-ditch fight.

Nevertheless, Mao supported the ultra-Leftist in this event.⁴² On 18 February, Mao talked to Yeh Chien-ying, Ch'en I and many others and criticised them. Mao said, "whoever opposes the Central Cultural Revolution Group, we shall oppose him. You may call Wang Ming and Chang Kuo-t'ao back and I and comrade Lin Piao, together with Yeh Ch'ün, will go to the south. Comrade Chiang Ch'ing shall be with you as well the comrades of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. You may behead comrade Chiang Ch'ing and banish comrade K'ang Sheng. All this you may do".⁴³

⁴²WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, *op. cit.*, p. 437.

⁴³Chou En-lai, "On the February Adverse Current", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. IV, *op. cit.*, p. 1812.

On 14 March, a group of demonstrators appeared in Peking, shouting to overthrow the movement of "February Adverse Current", and strike down five vice premiers of the State Council and four vice-chairmen of CCPCC Military Commission, and shouting "defend Central Cultural Revolution Group with one's blood and life".⁴⁴

K'ang Sheng indicated in his speech on 27 March that "The February Adverse Current is denying the correct leadership of Mao Tse-tung for the past decades, denying Chinese Cultural Revolution and denying Chinese Liberation movement".⁴⁵ On 15 July, Ch'en I, then the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was purged, and on 19 August, the masses conducted a movement to criticise T'an Chen-lin at the people's conference auditorium, and later in March 1968 he was declared a "big traitor" by Chiang Ch'ing at the 100,000-man conference. The conference also dismissed Yang Ch'eng-wu, Acting Chief of the General Staff, and Fu Ch'ung-pi, Commander of the Peking Garrison Command, from the office for their attempt to reverse the verdict of "February Adverse Current", arrested Yü Li-chin, and appointed Huang Yung-sheng Chief of the General Staff to consolidate the seizure of power of the cultural revolutionary extreme leftists. At the Twelfth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC congress in October 1968, the event of the "February Adverse Current" was criticised openly, and Yeh Chien-ying, Ch'en I, Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, Li Hsien-nien and Li Fu-ch'un were forced to make a self-criticism.⁴⁶

The event of "February Adverse Current" was a vigorous political counterattack made by central-level commanders of the PLA at the early stage of Cultural Revolution. They tried to restrain extreme leftists' oppression of military heads by applying their military strength

⁴⁴"A Great Victory to Defend the Party's Principle", *RED FLAG*, No. 26 Feb. 1967.

⁴⁵Wang Yüan, *PRC'S STRUGGLE OF POWER AND LINE*, *op. cit.*, pp. 203-204.

⁴⁶WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, *op. cit.*, pp. 441-442; "A Great Revolution to Defend the Party's Principle", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 26 Feb. 1967.

and with Mao's revolutionary sentiment . At this stage, the political role and political function of high-ranking military commanders of the PLA was very distinct. From the beginning of the Cultural Revolution to the occurrence of the "February Adverse Current", there developed a spontaneous alliance among the PLA in an opaque form attempting to counter-balance the force of Lin's Fourth Field Army, which included Liu Po-ch'eng's Second Field Army, Ch'en I's Third Field Army, P'eng Te-huai's First Field Army and Nieh Jung-chen's Northern China Field Army, Yeh Chien-ying's Central Military System and Ho Lung's Red Second Front Army. The overall situation was Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army contended with other field armies. However, one thing could be for sure was that both sides were seeking for Mao's support, instead of taking over Mao's supreme position.

PLA's political campaigns in the early days of the Cultural Revolution lay mainly in the interaction among military commanders. Lin Piao and other vice-chairmen of the CCPCC Military Commission held different opinions on whether or not the army should intervene the Cultural Revolution. Lin Piao advocated that the army overall should support the Cultural Revolution. This attitude of his was expressed clearly in an editorial, *Hold High the Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thought and Cultural Revolution*, of the *Liberation Army's Daily* (18 April 1966), which he said, "Classes and class struggle continue to exist in socialist society, the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the class struggle between the different political forces, and the class struggle in the ideological field between the proletariat and bourgeoisie will continue to be long and tortuous and at times will even become very acute.... Our people's Liberation Army, the people's armed forces created and led by the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman Mao, is the most loyal tool of the Party and the people, and the mainstay of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It has always played an important role in the revolutionary

cause of the proletariat, and it will do so in this Great Socialist Cultural Revolution".⁴⁷ Moreover, in another editorial *Never Forget the Class Struggle* of the *Liberation Army's Daily* (4 May 1966), Lin also demanded "The broad masses of soldiers and revolutionary cadres must show a high degree of revolutionary enthusiasm. We revolutionary fighters should none of us stand aloof or be indifferent to this struggle. We must respond to call of the Party, hold high the Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought, take an active part in this class struggle and resolutely carry the Great Socialist Cultural Revolution through to the end".⁴⁸

The event of the "February Adverse Current" was an important stage for the transformation of the role of the high-ranking militarists. After the event, the demonstration to strike down the "February Adverse Current" and to "defend Central Cultural Revolution with blood and life" appeared many times in Peking. The function of the Central Cultural Revolution overrode that of the Central Political Bureau. The CCPCC Military Commission stopped all its activities, and the Work Group of the Military Commission was formed by Lin Piao to take charge all military affairs.

Furthermore, in the central level, the state of confrontation between the two sides of the PLA was broken and subsequently replaced by the monopoly of Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army when the event of the "February Adverse Current" was over. Mao temporarily sacrificed the stability of the PLA and the principle of "party commands the army" to launch a large-scale campaign for the seizure of power from Liu Shao-ch'i, he ordered the army to intervene in this power-seizure struggle by assigning it the tasks of "three supports and two militaries" - supporting the revolutionary Left, supporting agriculture,

⁴⁷"Hold High the Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thought, Take an Active Party in Socialist Cultural Revolution", *LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY*, 18 Apr. 1966.

⁴⁸"Never Forget the Class Struggle", *LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY*, 4 May 1966; *RED FLAG*, No. 7, 1966, pp. 20-23.

and supporting industry; exercising military control and giving military training.⁴⁹

To prevent the military leaders from intervening in the Cultural Revolution and from standing in the way of his seizure of power, Mao oppressed senior military commanders without restraint and instigated extreme leftists and Red Guards to further attack P'eng Te-huai, Lo Jui-ch'ing, Ch'en I, Ho Lung, Yeh Chien-ying, Chu Te and many others.⁵⁰ The "February Adverse Current" was merely a event by Mao's revolutionary senior cadres to resist Lin Piao and extreme leftist, but under the prerequisite of power struggle, Mao would rather destroy factional balance in the army to support Lin Piao in the fear that the event to resist Lin Piao launched by military heads would thoroughly obstruct his goal to strike down Liu Shao-ch'i. Though the expansion of Lin's political and military influence was rapid, in reality, the substance of his political power was still weak, Mao remained the most autocratic and charismatic leader in China.

⁴⁹The tasks of "Three supports and Two Militaries" was assigned to the PLA at 23 Jan. 1967. By Sep. 1968, revolutionary committees were established in all 29 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions to replaces the old government machinery dominated by Liu Shao-ch'i and his followers. However, the intervention of the army built up defence minister Lin Piao's prestige and influence, which threatened Mao's position. See "Decision Concerning the People's Liberation Army's Resolute Support for the Broad Masses of the Revolutionary Left", *YEARBOOK ON CHINESE COMMUNISM*, (Taipei: Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of National Defence, 1968), p. 587.

⁵⁰"A Great Revolution to Defend the Party's Principle", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 26 Feb. 1967.

III. Wuhan incident

PRC claimed that "the Cultural Revolution is a great political revolution carried out by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes; it is a continuation of the prolonged struggle waged by the Chinese Communist Party and the masses of revolutionary people under its leadership against the Kuomintang reactionaries, a continuation of the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie".⁵¹ The Cultural Revolution aimed at striking down Liu Shao-ch'i and the power he represented because "Liu Shao-ch'i not only had a revisionist political line but had an organisational line which served his political line, only by arousing the broad masses to expose over dark aspect openly, in an all-round way, and from below would it be possible to clean out the Liu Shao-ch'i renegade clique".⁵²

One prerequisite for Mao to eradicate Liu Shao-ch'i's influence was to destroy Liu's organisational line. Lin Piao addressed the enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee on 18 May 1966, he commented, "The fundamental problem of revolution is the problem of political power, once they obtain political power, the proletariat and the labouring people will have everything. Once they lost it, they will lose all. Production is certainly the basis; however, it relies on the change, consolidation, and development resulting from the seizure of political power, otherwise, it will become mere economism, beggarism, and the importuning of favours. Never forget political power - always have it in mind. Once you forget political power, you forget politics and the fundamental view of Marxism, consequently, you serve toward economism, anarchism, and daydreaming. It is just like a fool who has lost his head and doesn't know what to

⁵¹"Commemorate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Communist Party of China", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, *LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY*, 1 June 1971; *RED FLAG*, No. 7/8, 1971, p. 18.

⁵²*Ibid.*

Lin Piao's talk was considered by the CCPCC as an example for creative study and application of Mao Tse-tung thought and an important document for guiding the Cultural Revolution, and hence CCPCC transmitted this document to all units in the party, and army, demanding for fully carrying out the study, discussion and application. This document offered cultural revolutionary leftist an ideological basis for their seizure of power.

On 19 March 1967, because of Mao's directive CCPCC Military Commission reached a resolution "on concentrating all efforts to execute the tasks of supporting the revolutionary Left, supporting agriculture, and supporting industry; exercising military control and giving military training". PLA carried out the task of "three supports and two militaries" in an all-round way, and took over all party, political, army and cultural organisations. In addition, Mao decide to extend the experience of "three bodies operating as one" created by Heilungkiang, the first province to build up revolutionary committee, to form a "three-in-one combination" force - a combination of PLA, revolutionary leadership cadres and revolutionary masses - to facilitate power-seizure, and to set up a provisional organ of power - revolutionary committee - based on this three-in-one combination.

Under the policy of "three-in-one combination", the army using revolutionary committee as backup force easily seized the leading position and replace the old government machinery and became the political dominating forces at the locality.⁵⁴

⁵³Michael Y. M. Kau (ed.), "Address to the Enlarged Session of the Politburo of the Central Committee (18 May 1966)", *THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, op. cit., p. 327.

⁵⁴"Follow Cadres' Order", *RED FLAG*, No. 5, 1967, p. 7; Yen Chia-ch'i & Kao Kao, *THE TEN YEAR HISTORY OF THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION*, op. cit., pp. 223-248.

At this stage, The Central Cultural Revolutionary Extreme Leftists did not obtain great success from this power struggle with the Central military heads. They then transferred their target of power struggle to the regional PLA heads in the hope to advance their power and establish a nation-wide foundation, their slogan at that time was "purge the small handful of power-holders in the army", attempting to purge those "capitalist-roaders" within the army in name, and to seize power in reality. The attack of Central Cultural Revolution against regional military organs brought about the well-know "Wuhan incident" - the struggle of commanders of regional military organs to resist Central government.

After the event of "February Adverse Current", Lin Piao gained Mao's overall support. Generally speaking, the power issue in the central military system was settled on the whole, while the regional army because of individual interest and demand for power had serious difference with central government in mounting a large-scale mass campaign. Though CCPCC ordered PLA to resolutely support the Left, many actions were taken by regional army to oppress leftist masses and leftist organisation. Consequently, on 6 April, 1967, CCPCC Military Commission issued "Ten Articles of the CCPCC Military Commission" to restrain the PLA's excessive oppression of mass organisation during the Cultural Revolution. The ten articles read:

1. "In dealing with mass organisations, be they revolutionary or controlled by reactionary elements, or when their situation is not clear, shooting is forbidden. Only political work may be conducted".
2. "Arbitrary arrests are forbidden, particularly large-scale arrests".

3. "It is forbidden to arbitrarily declare a mass organisation a reactionary organisation and repress it. It is moreover forbidden to call a revolutionary organisation a counterrevolutionary organisation".

4. "No action shall be taken against the masses who intruded into or assaulted military organs in the past, regardless of whether they are the left, the middle, or the right. Persons or organisations should not be classified as left, middle, or right merely on the basis of their having or not having intruded into or stormed military organs".

5. "Before deciding on what attitude to take toward the large mass organisation, profound investigation and study should be made locally and class analysis should also be made. Before taking any important action, a report should be made to the Central Cultural Revolution Group and the All-PLA Cultural Revolution Group and their advice sought".

6. "No mass character 'self-blaming' movement should be launched. Nor should the masses be forced to write self-examination and criticism. Self-examination and criticism voluntarily written by the masses should be returned to the authors themselves".

7. "Education in the struggle between the two lines - the proletarian revolutionary represented by Chairman Mao and the bourgeois reactionary line - must be carried out deeply in the armed forces. Study of chairman Mao's works must be related to the struggle between the two lines".

8. "Cadres sent to local areas or in charge of support the work must be carefully briefed

with regard to policy. counterrevolutionary elements of the Chao Yung-fu type⁵⁵ or persons with ultra-right thought should be prevented from taking charge of support the work".

9. "In supporting the Left, it is necessary to learn to do mass work, trust the masses, rely on them, and consult with them on important matters".

10. "Acts already done which run counter to the above-mentioned points must be rectified immediately, and remedial measures should be actively taken. From now on, resolutely work according to the above-mentioned points".⁵⁶

"Ten Articles of the CCPCC Military Commission" was issued to restrain PLA's suppression of "revolutionary masses", preventing it from further deteriorating. Basically, the "Ten Articles of the CCPCC Military Commission" was the counteraction of "Eight Articles of the CCPCC Military Commission" issued on January 28, 1967, it significantly represented that the revolutionary extreme leftist had gained their control over the PLA. The announcement of "Ten Articles of the CCPCC Military Commission" caused the power upsurge of the revolutionary extreme leftists and masses, and in consequence "the revolutionary masses" seized the army's weapons and faced a head-on confrontation with the army.

⁵⁵Chao Yung-fu, formerly a deputy commander of Tsinghai provincial Military District. Mao condemned him as a counterrevolutionary who had sneaked into the party and army, he usurped army power by adopting underhand and sinister tactics and carried out savage armed suppression of revolutionary mass organisation. See "Ten Articles of the CCPCC Military commission of 6 April 1967", *YEARBOOK ON CHINESE COMMUNISM* 1968, op. cit., p. 591.

⁵⁶"Ten Articles of the CCPCC Military Commission of 6 April 1967", *YEARBOOK ON CHINESE COMMUNISM*, 1968, (Taipei: Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of National Defence, 1969), p. 591; *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. IV, op. cit., pp. 1834-1835; Warren Kuo (ed.), *THE COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY*, op. cit., p. 95.

The violent power-seizure struggle had intensified the "armed struggle" spreading to every corner of the country, and the "Wuhan incident" especially represented a major struggle launched by regional militarists to fight against Lin's faction and Central Cultural Revolution Group. The Wuhan incident had been regarded by the Central Cultural Revolution Group as the most fiercest struggle of regional military heads in resisting the policy of Central Government. It was a serious line mistake in army's supporting the Left, which ought to be criticised, otherwise it would be difficult for Revolutionary Extreme Leftists to seize power in the region. Lin Piao attempted to eradicate opposed forces aiming at regional mountain-stronghold militarists, while the commanders of Wuhan military region considered that Central Government should appreciate their ruling position and the way they supported the Left, recognising their line to be correct.

At that time, the revolutionary masses of Wuhan could be divided into two groups. One was known as the "one million brave soldiers" under the leadership of Wan K'e-wen, secretary of CCP Wuhan Municipal committee, and Hsin P'u, deputy director of the Propaganda Department of Wuhan, this anti-Cultural Revolution Group force was composed of about one million persons from military and civil organisation, and was backed up by the commander of the Wuhan Military Region, Ch'en Tsai-tao, and by the political commissar, Chung Han-hua. Its rival, the "Workers Headquarters", consisted of local Maoist Red Guards favoured the radical cause led by Red Guards from Peking. Numerically inferior, it too, received military backing but from units disloyal to Ch'en.

In the first half of 1967, more than three hundred organisation masses in Hupei province were attacked, more than ten thousand people arrested and some three hundred killed. More than one million workers and peasants were also provoked to take action in more

than three hundred large-scale armed struggle.⁵⁷

On 1 April 1967, the Maoists adopted the first measure to curtail the authority of the army. While retaining responsibility for the maintenance of order and the establishment of Revolutionary committees where they were stationed, the army was forbidden to indict, without prior approval from Central authorities, any Red Guard faction for being "counter-revolutionary" and was ordered to release all imprisoned radicals, including those who had raided military installations. The military was further instructed not to overreact or suppress the radicals under the pretext of "suppressing counter-revolution" after having forced them to admit guilt.⁵⁸

On 4 April, Chiang Ch'ing spoke to a group of Red Guards in Peking, she reproached the PLA for persecuting the radicals, emphasised the "duty" of the army to support the "Left", and urged the military to "respect the Red Guards and other representatives of the masses" and to "join with them in the construction of new revolutionary power structure to replace the shattered party and administration".⁵⁹

On 10 June 1967, "the million brave soldiers" blockaded the Yangtze River Bridge, and two violent armed struggles occurred on 17 and 24 June. Shortly after, on 1 July they took control of several Cultural Revolution Group based organisations.

14 July. The CCPCC dispatched Hsieh Fu-chih, then a vice-premier and concurrently an alternate member of the Politburo, Deputy Chief of the Cultural Revolution Group of the

⁵⁷Warren Kuo (ed.), *A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY*, op. cit., p. 396.

⁵⁸Y. C. Chang, *FACTIONAL AND COALITION POLITICS IN CHINA - THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH*, op. cit., p. 44.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*

PLA, minister of Public Security and chairman of the Peking Revolutionary Committee, and Wang Li, then a member of the Cultural Revolution Group under the CCPCC and concurrently first vice editor-in-chief of *Red Flag* to settle the conflict.

However, "the million brave soldiers" did not submit. Instead Hsieh, Wang and their supporters were under attack near Hansui bridge, and subsequently on 20 July, Hsieh and Wang were arrested by Ts'ai P'ing-ch'iu, political commissar of Ch'en Tsai-tao's 88201 army. The arrest of Wang and Hsieh represented an open defiance of Mao and the central authorities. Lin Piao himself went to Wuhan to mount the offensive against Ch'en. Gunboats and paratroopers took part in the assault, and the city was taken by government forces in late July. Ch'en and some of his supporters were captured and brought to Peking for trial.

After the Wuhan incident, a meeting presided over by Lin Piao and attended by members of the Cultural Revolution Group passed a resolution to confine the "Wuhan incident" to the "Counter-Revolutionary Rebellion". Lin Piao commented "The Wuhan incident was an extremely bad event, at this time it has thoroughly exposed the reactionary line of Ch'en Tsai-tao, exposed counterrevolution, and exposed the acute and complicated nature of class struggle".⁶⁰

After the meeting, Lin Piao issued "a letter to the Wuhan revolutionary masses and broad commanders" in the name of CCPCC, State Council, CCPCC Military Commission and Central Cultural Revolution Group, complimenting on their success in defeating the violent attack of the "small handful of power-holders in the Army who take the capitalist

⁶⁰Michael Y. M. Kau (ed.), "Instruction on the Cultural Revolution (9 Aug. 1967)", *THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, op. cit., p. 432; *COLLECTION OF IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS ON THE GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION OF THE COMMUNIST BANDITS*, (Taipei: Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of National Defence, 1969), pp. 214-219.

road".⁶¹

In the meantime, Chiang Ch'ing coined the slogan of "struggle by reasoning and defend by force", K'ang Sheng highlighted the attack of militant organs with the slogan of "resolutely overthrow the small handful of power-holders in the Army who take the capitalist road". On 22 July, Lin Li-kuo, Lin Piao's son and Deputy-commander of the Air Force Operations Department, delivered a paper *Overthrow the Small Handful of Power-holders in the Army* at *People's Daily* under the pen name "Sharp Red Guard".⁶²

Moreover, in the discussion the propaganda of the "Wuhan incident", the slogan "seize the small handful of power-holders in the army who take the capitalist road" was added at the insistence of Chiang Ch'ing, K'ang Sheng and Ch'en Po-ta. On 25 July, when New China News Agency submitted a news release entitled "millions of masses and soldiers in the capital supported Wuhan revolutionary leftist" for approval, Kuan Feng and K'ang Sheng again added in the slogan "resolutely overthrow the small handful of power-holders in the army who take the capitalist road". At this stage, the struggle level of Wuhan incident advanced from "seize the small handful in the army" to the "resolutely overthrow". This news release and relevant editorials were carried on the front-page of *People's Daily*. Within the following six days, *People's Daily*, *Liberation Army's Daily* and *Red Flag*, published 16 editorials, and 22 new releases and special columns related to the "Wuhan incident", all these articles exercised "the movement to criticise the small handful of power-holders in the army and the party who take capitalist road" as the "general direction of the struggle"⁶³

⁶¹Ch'en Tsai-Tao, "The Whole Story of Wuhan Incident", CHIN DAILY, No. 10, 1984, p. 50.

⁶²"Overthrow the Small Handful of Power-holders in the Army", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 22 July 1967.

⁶³Li K'e & Hao Sheng Chang, THE LIBERATION ARMY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, op. cit., p. 50.

On 1 August, two editorials entitled *Proletariat Must Firmly Grasp The Barrel of A Gun - Celebrating the Fortieth Anniversary of the Founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army* and *Fire Fiercely at the Prime Enemy of the People*, which signed and issued by Ch'en Po-ta, revised by Wang Li and drafted by Kuan Feng, were published at *Red Flag*.⁶⁴

The first editorial brought up again the issue of P'eng Te-huai and Lo Jui-ch'ing, it said, "In order to change the proletariat nature of our army and to seize military power, P'eng Te-huai and Lo Jui-ch'ing, counter-revolutionary revisionists, desperately oppose to give prominence to proletarian politics and copy revisionism from foreign countries, they use bourgeois individualism in opposition to proletarian revolution, they always put military skills in front of everything and deny the fact that political and ideological works are the prerequisite of fighting force. P'eng Te-huai talked something nonsense like 'the performance of army's military training and the performance of cadres of all levels learning military science is the basic standard for judging the fighting capacity of our army'. Lo Jui-ch'ing attack politics by applying 'grand military contest', he spread the absurd theory of 'compromise' or 'opportunism' and opposed comrade Lin Piao's directive of 'giving prominence to politics' and of 'four first'".⁶⁵ The editorial continued, "At this moment, a big movement of criticising the small handful of power-holders in the army and the party who take the capitalist road is surging throughout the country, this is the general direction of struggle. People's Liberation Army should work together with the proletariat revolutionaries, vigorously participate in big criticism and thoroughly eradicate the bad influence created by the small handful of counter-revolutionary revisionists in the army".⁶⁶

⁶⁴"Proletariat Must Firmly Grasp The Barrel of A Gun - Celebrating the Fortieth Anniversary of the Founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" and "Fire Fiercely at the Prime Enemy of the People", *RED FLAG*, No. 12, 1967, pp. 43-49.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, p. 47.

The second editorial indicated, "The chief culprits of Wuhan incident must be exposed, resolutely overthrown, strictly investigated and punished according to law".⁶⁷

In the meantime, the Cultural Revolution Group began to direct its target of attack at regional army. They set off a movement to purge military figures like "Ch'en Tsai-tao", attacking various kinds of regional militant organs throughout the country. Many regional leaders including Hsü Hai-tung, General of the PLA, former member of the People Revolutionary Military Commission; P'eng Shao-hui, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of Chinese People's Liberation Army; Wang Jen-chung, First Political Commissar of the Wuhan Military Region, former First Secretary of the Central South Bureau of the CCPCC; Pa Fang-ting, Political Commissar of the Wuhan People's Armed Troops; were attacked.

In the mid of August, after Mao returned to Peking from his provincial tour to Honan, Kiangsi and Hunan, he criticised the editorial of *Red Flag* vol. 12, "purge the small handful of power-holders in the Army", was a "big poisonous weed".⁶⁸ Mao used the word "big poisonous weed" to express his disapproval of the Central Cultural Revolution Group and Lin Piao for their armed power-seizure from the regional army. No matter what his real attitude was, one thing can be sure Mao would never give up his prime target of struggle, the purge of Liu Shao-ch'i. This was his strategic aim, while the rest was only tactics. Tactics could be adjustable, and their implementation must never violate the accomplishment of the strategic aim.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.

⁶⁸Yen Chia-ch'i & Kao Kao, *THE TEN YEAR HISTORY OF THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION*, op. cit., p. 273.

It was unprecedented in the PLA that the regional military leaders dared to oppose the Central authority. Although Ch'en Tsai-tao, the leading role of the Wuhan incident, was escorted to Peking, he was not punished severely. Mao hadn't repressed the army fully. Two reasons could account for this.

First, Mao had to preserve the actual strength of military regions for counteracting the power expansion of Lin Piao. Second, Mao's power basis in the army would be destroyed if the extreme Left went on attacking regional army without any restriction.

Mao understood very clearly that the army was of the vital importance to him, he would never destroy the symbiotic relationship between himself and the army. Consequently, on the Wuhan incident, Mao's final stand decided the fall of extreme leftist including Wang Li, Kuan Fang and many others.⁶⁹ The most striking feature of this stage was the expansion of the political role of the local militarists. Nevertheless, from the macro-viewpoint, the local military did not continue to expand its political influence following the Wuhan incident although they had the power to do so and the ability to oppose the Central government. Why this was the case stemmed from their respect for Mao's supreme leadership and his long-standing authority in the party and the army, and their loyalty to Mao alone.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 273-274.

Chapter VI. The Influence of the Party Congress on the Political Role of the PLA

In the course of the evolution of the PLA's political role, the Eighth CCP National Congress in 1954, the Ninth CCP National Congress in 1969 and the Tenth CCP National Congress in 1973 represented the re-distribution of the PLA's political influence of different stages. The rise and fall of the political position of the PLA's elites were all dominated by one key role, that is, Mao Tse-tung, and his strategy of struggle at that stage.

The Eighth CCP National Congress was, to Mao, a challenge of power struggle. The Party Constitution of Eighth CCP National Congress discarded Mao Tse-tung's thought as the guiding principle for the party and thus enhanced Mao's determination to reinforce the PLA's political nature and apply it as a political means to carry out his power-seizure struggle.

The Ninth CCP National Congress was a congress of victory to celebrate Mao and Lin Piao's successful power seizure from Liu Shao-ch'i. It was also a congress that formally brought the central and regional military leaders into political arena. This found evidence from the high proportion of the military elected to the Ninth CCP National Congress at the central, and to the Provincial Revolutionary Committees at the local level. Nevertheless, the over-expanded military power of Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army and the disclosure of Lin Piao's political ambition also evoked Mao's determination to purge Lin and to restore the political tradition of "party commands the gun".

The convening of the Tenth CCP National Congress was to deny the importance of Lin Piao's position in the Ninth CCP National Congress, to approve Mao's punishment of Lin

Piao and Lin's clique, and to deprive the military of their political power at the central and the local level. The decline in the number of the military elected to the full and alternate members of the Tenth CCPCC had truly presented the political role of the PLA at that stage.

I. The Eighth CCP National Congress

The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, approved by the CCPCC on 20 September 1954, had brought about the reorganisation of not only the state but the military, economic, and party structures and the radical redistribution of political power among the Chinese leader.

Until 1954, as the official head of Central People's Government, Mao Tse-tung had had the power,¹ established by the "common program" of 1949 as follows:

Firstly, enacting and interpreting the laws promulgating decrease and supervising their execution, annulling or revising any decision or orders of the Government Administrative Council met in conformity with the laws. (Common Program article. 16: The Jurisdiction of the Central People's Government and the Local People's Governments shall be defined in accordance with the nature of the various kinds of affairs and shall be prescribed by decrees of the Central people's Government Council.... Article 17, all laws and decrease protecting the people shall be enacted ...)²

Secondly, ratifying treaties and agreements with foreign countries. (Article 55: The Central people's Government of the People's Republic of China shall examine the treaties and agreements concluded between the Kuomintang and foreign government and recognise or abrogate, or revise or renew them according to their respective contents).³

And Finally, commanding the army and carrying out unified leadership. (Article 20: The

¹"Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (29. Sep. 1949)" *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 -A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-54.

²*Ibid.*, p. 51.

³*Ibid.*, p.55.

People's Republic of China shall build up a unified army, that is, the People's Liberation Army and the People's Public Security forces, which shall be under the command of the People's Revolutionary Military Council of the Central People's Government and which shall institute a unified command, unified system, unified formation and unified discipline).⁴

Under the new structure, from the view of institutional and organisational level, as Chairman of the PRC, Mao's power were severely limited by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, whose chairman was Liu Shao-ch'i. The Chairman could promulgate laws and decrees only in accordance with the decisions of the congress, or, when not in session, of its standing committee. The Constitution of 1954, article 40 laid down the following: The chairman of the People's Republic of china, in accordance with decisions of the National People's Congress or the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, promulgates laws and decrees; appoints or removes the vice-chairman and members of the council of National Defence; ... proclaims martial law; proclaims a state of war; and orders mobilisation⁵.

In addition, Article 41 stated: Chairman of the PRC couldn't annul or revise and decision or order of any government organ, he could ratify treaties with foreign state only in accordance with the decision of the Standing Committee⁶.

Under the restriction of article 40, Mao had no independent power to make appointments to any post. The only power which Mao exercised independently of the Standing

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

⁵"*Constitution of the People's Republic of China (20. Sep. 1954)*" *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY. Vol. I, op. cit., p.102.*

⁶*Ibid.*,

Committee was command of the armed forces⁷, and this, too, was qualified.

The Chairman of the PRC had no veto power over the decisions of the congress and its Standing Committee. The Standing Committee enacted decree, interpreted laws made by the congress, supervised the cabinet, the supreme court, and the persecutor - Generals' office. It had the power to annul laws, and appoint Vice-premier and ministers. When the congress was not in session, the Standing Committee assumed its prerogatives relating to the negotiation of treaties with foreign countries, proclamation of war to decide on general or partial mobilisation, to decide on the enforcement of martial law throughout the country or in certain areas, and so forth.⁸

Essentially what had taken place in the state reorganisation was that the Standing Committee was interposed between Mao and the major administrative organs of the new state structure, the Standing Committee became responsible for supervision of the day-to-day workings of the cabinet, the Defence Council, the supreme court, the office of the prosecutor-general, and the general office.

However, it was noteworthy that the special characteristics of the structure of the party, government and the army, and of the dual-role elite, and the fact that the Seventh CCP National Congress included Mao Tse-tung's thought in its new Party Constitution, and that for many years, propagandist department had been advocating Maoist thought. All these had contributed to the consolidation of the authority of Mao Tse-tung in the party, government and the army, which could not be altered easily simply by the stipulation of the Common Program.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 101-102. See article 31. item 3, 4, 5, 8, 12, 16, 17, and 18.

Mao firmly believed that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun", the possession of the post of Chairman of the PRC and the CCPCC Military Commission meant the control of armed forces. Although Mao lost some power as the result of the adoption of the 1954 Constitution, however, the Constitution still entrusted Mao the right to control military power in organisational level as it laid down in its article 42, "The Chairman of the people's Republic of China commands the armed forces of the country".⁹

In addition, the title, "Chairman of the PRC", was equivalent to that of "king" in the feudal society of China. After the Seventh CCP National Congress, Mao Tse-tung's thought and his authority gained from the victory of Civil war had deeply rooted in Chinese society, especially among those poorly educated peasants, who were absolutely loyal to the monarch. While the leading class of the Party held different views, they preferred collective leadership. The 1954 Constitution was their first step on the road to collective leadership, and the Eighth CCP National Congress marked the climax of their achievement. Furthermore, the attack on Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU on a charge of developing a personality cult encouraged the leading class including Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing to continue their efforts on moving towards collective leadership.

The Eighth CCP National Congress, held from 15 to 27 September 1956, was the first national congress the CCP had called since the establishment of communist regime. It saw a further realignment of political forces and the erosion of the position of Mao Tse-tung. Mao made no major address to the congress.¹⁰ Liu Shao-ch'i delivered the important

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 102.

¹⁰Mao Tse-tung "Opening Speech to the Eighth Party Congress (15. Sep. 1956)" *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*. Vol. I, *op. cit.*, pp. 359-360; *NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY*, 15. Sep. 1956.

political report,¹¹ and Teng Hsiao-p'ing reported on the revision of the party constitution.¹² After the congress, both made significant advance in the political hierarchy.

Liu's report on this occasion contained far fewer references to Mao and his "thought" than had his report on the Party Constitution to the Seventh Party Congress in the spring of 1945. In his political report, Liu from an organisational viewpoint, stressed the importance of reinforcing supervision by the National People's Congress and its standing committee over the departments of the Central Government, and supervision by all the local people's congress over all the local government organs.

When reporting on "the leadership of the party", Liu negated his previous arguments made at the Seventh CCP National Congress in May 1945, when he said, "Our party has developed in strict adherence to the Marxist-Leninist teachings signified by comrade Mao Tse-tung and the political and organisational line formulated by him... to study Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung thought".¹³ Although Liu still stressed the importance of ideology, he did not include the words "Mao Tse-tung thought", but instead he used "Marxism-Leninism", in his report. It stated, "The strength of the leadership of the Chinese Communist party lies in the fact that it is armed ideologically with Marxism-Leninism,... one of the tasks confronting the party leadership is to study and analyse past mistakes, draw lessons from them."¹⁴

Teng Hsiao-p'ing also rejected Mao Tse-tung in his report *On the Party Constitution*,

¹¹Liu Shao-ch'i "Report on the Work of the Central Committee (16 Sep. 1956)" *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*. Vol. I, op. cit., p. 3.

¹²Teng Hsiao-p'ing "Report on the Party Constitution (16 Sep. 1956)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*. Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 389-406.

¹³"On the Party (14. May 1945)", *SELECTED WORKS OF LIU SHAO-CH'I*. Vol. I (1984), op. cit., pp. 323-325.

¹⁴Teng Hsiao-p'ing "Report on the Party Constitution (16 Sep. 1956)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 384.

when he commented, "Democratic centralism is the organisational principle of Marxism-Leninism, the basic organisational principle of the party. In all important questions of the party, Lenin advocated collective decisions and not individual decisions. The great significance of upholding the principle of collective leadership and opposing the cult of the individual has been powerfully elaborated at the 20th Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. Such elaboration has not only influenced the communist party of Soviet Union, but also the communist parties throughout the world... ..It is quite evident that an individual decision on an important question is against the party build-up policy of communist parties and as much is necessarily wrong. Only collective leadership based on associations with the people conforms to the principle of democratic centralism and is capable of reducing the chances of error to the minimum... One of the major accomplishments of the 20th Congress of the CPSU was to tell us the possible serious adverse efforts of deifying individuals... any party and any individual cannot always avoid mistakes.. Thus, our party also posts guards against deification of individuals".¹⁵

As to the leadership among the PLA, Teng pointed out, "The decision also mentioned that the system of collective leadership of party commissioners had long been established in the Chinese People's Liberation Army - in other words, this collective leadership of commissioners was actually a system of division of labour and responsibilities among army commanders".¹⁶

In addition, the Party Constitution of the Eighth CCP National Congress laid down, "The Communist Party of China takes Marxism-Leninism as its guide to action, only Marxism-Leninism correctly sets forth the laws of development of society and correctly charts the

¹⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 384-397.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 396.

path leading to the achievement of socialism and communism".¹⁷ This undoubtedly had formally discarded Mao Tse-tung's thought as the guiding principle for the Party. The background of the convening of the Eighth CCP National Congress, in essence, was waged by Liu Shao-ch'i with the advocating of "collective leadership" to seize power from Mao Tse-tung.

Ideologically, collective leadership was emphasised over the role of the leader. However, to the "Eighth CCP National Congress", it was undoubtedly in part a reaction to the de-stalinization campaign begun by Khrushchev earlier in the year at 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Organisationally, shortly after the Eighth CCP National Congress, in the First Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC, several key changes took place, the Central Committee was enlarged from 13 to 17 with 6 alternate members. Liu Shao-ch'i became first vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the Party politburo. This first six personnel in politburo composed the politburo Standing Committee. They were: Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Committee; Liu Shao-ch'i, first vice-chairman; Chou En-lai, vice-chairman; Chu Te, vice-chairman; Ch'en Yün, vice-chairman; and Teng Hsiao-p'ing.¹⁸ The seventh person was Lin Piao, who did not become a member of the Standing Committee until May, 1958.

Clearly, among the six member of the Standing Committee, Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing were in the same side, to view from the "collective leadership", anyone from the remaining three (excluding Mao), Chou En-lai, Chu Te or Ch'en Yün, sided with Liu and Teng, it would have been impossible for Mao to obtain a majority vote. Mao's power

¹⁷"Constitution of the Communist Party of China (26 Sep. 1956)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I, *op. cit.*, p. 406.

¹⁸*WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, *op. cit.*, p. 689.

would therefore be seriously suppressed. And the situation was in favour of Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, because Teng was placed at the head of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and was charged with "attending to the daily work of the Central Committee".¹⁹

The personnel arrangements of the Eighth CCP National Congress and at the First Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC contributed to Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing's successful suppression of Mao Tse-tung's thought as guiding principle for the Party, and to the reinforcement of the theoretical foundation of "collective leadership". Collective leadership was in fact organisational leadership. Judging from Mao's political ambition, he would not yield himself to these arrangements, especially to Liu's attempt of carrying out collective leadership among the PLA, and thus his resolution to struggle against Liu was determined. Mao waged a series of power-reseizure struggle and masses' social movement throughout the country to purge dissidents after the First Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC when Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing were setting about carrying out the system of collective leadership.

After the First Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC had ended. Mao moved to bolster his sagging political position. On 27 February 1957, Mao delivered a speech, *On the Correct Handling of Contradiction among the People*, which he pointed out: "We are confronted with two types of social contradictions - those between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people... Today, matters stand as follows. The large-scale, turbulent class struggles of the masses characteristic of times of revolution have in the main come to an end, but class struggle is by no means entirely over... At the same time as we criticise dogmatism, we must direct our attention to criticising revisionism. Revisionism, or right

¹⁹"Mao Tse-tung's Talk at a Central Work Meeting (25 Oct. 1966)", *FACTS AND FEATURES*. Vol. II, No. 9, Feb. 1969 (Taiwan), pp. 25-27.

opportunism, is a bourgeois trend of thought that is even more dangerous than dogmatism. The revisionists, the right opportunists, pay lip-service to Marxism; they too attack "dogmatism". But what they are really attacking is the quintessence of Marxism. they oppose or distort materialism and dialectics, oppose or try to weaken the people's democratic dictatorship and leading role of the Communist Party, and oppose or try to weaken socialist transformation and socialist construction".²⁰

Mao's speech initiated and provided the justification for his step. The speech itself represented Mao's first move in a long-run drive to re-establish his image as supreme leader, one who stands above the Party. In actuality, the contest for control over the mass media was joined at this time.

The Eighth CCP National Congress was indeed a great challenge to Mao. In order to prove the masses' loyalty to him and to lure the opposition into a trap, Mao launched the movement "A Hundred Flowers Blossom and a Hundred Schools of Thought Content" in 1957,²¹ hoping to elicit an honest response. This movement, however, triggered intellectual's attack on Mao which was harmful to Mao's prestige. At this point, Mao took repressive reassures to rectify dissident intellectuals in the so-called "anti-Rightist campaign"²² lasting for more than a year.

By the Second Plenum of Eighth CCPCC in May 1958, Mao, presumably as a result of the purge of the lower level party organisation, was able to enlarge the politburo and the

²⁰"On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People (27 Feb. 1957)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG*, Vol. IV, op. cit., pp. 384-421.

²¹"Let A Hundred Flowers Blossom, A Hundred Schools of Thought Contend", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 13 June, 1956.

²²"Follow the Communist Party or Follow Chang Po-ch'ün and Lo Lung-chi?" and "Oppose Chang Po-ch'ün Who Leads Astray the Peasant-Worker Democratic Party", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 16 June, 1957; "All of Us Should Join Criticism of Rightists", *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 17 June, 1957.

politburo standing committee, added to the politburo at this time were K'e Ch'ing-shih, party first secretary of Shanghai city; T'an Chen-lin, member of the Central Committee Secretariat; and Li Ching-ch'üan, party first secretary of Szechuan province, added to the politburo-standing committee was Lin Piao. Now, Mao's influence in the politburo and politburo-standing committee was largely increased, and he could do whatever he liked. The Second Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC adopted the "General Line" and its "Basic Points",²³ promoted by Mao, for "building socialism by exerting our utmost efforts, and pressing ahead consistently to achieve greater, faster, better, and more economic results". After the session, PRC set off "Three Red Banners" movement - namely, the Great Leap Forward, the General Line, and the People's Communes - throughout the country.

The "Great Leap Forward" symbolised China's, in particular Mao's group determination to back free of Soviet controls, to disengage the Chinese economy from the USSR, and to reject what the Chinese have since asserted were "unreasonable" demands designed to bring China under Soviet military control.²⁴

If successful, the Great Leap Forward would have emasculated the military "establishment", the break with the Soviet Union meant the end of the military modernisation program, which depended on Soviet Military assistance. In addition, Mao had attempted to create a military force which he could employ for political purpose by greatly expanding the militia in 1958 as part of the commune plan. The issue of party control of the militia was discussed in the 10 December 1958, Party Resolution, the same meeting at which it was decided that Mao would not stand for re-election to the

²³The basic points of the General Line called for the mobilisation of all positive factors and the correct handling of contradictions among the people. See *COLLECTED LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA*, Vol. VII, (Peking: Law Publishing House, 1958), p. 4.

²⁴"The Origin and Development of the Difference between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves (6 Sep. 1963)", *THE POLEMIC ON THE GENERAL LINE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT*, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 77.

chairmanship of the state. The connection of those events suggests the possibility that Mao agreed to step down from the post in return for acceptance of his commune and militia proposals.²⁵

As mentioned before, the militia under the commune system had greater political than military significance. Since the militia was to be an independent military organisation, the armed instrument of the self-supporting commune, which was directly responsible to the party centre, that is, Mao Tse-tung, Mao had to carry out People's Commune for the suppression of party organisation headed by Liu Shao-ch'i, and of transplanting Soviet military system of professional and regular army-building program advocated by P'eng Te-huai. Mao had great confidence in his leader's charisma, as he mentioned at the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC to criticise P'eng Te-huai, "We are said to have departed from the masses, but the masses still support us", Mao asserted "the loyalty of the PLA rank and file was to him personally", "if you the Liberation Army don't follow me, I'll go find a Red Army, I think the Liberation Army will follow me".²⁶

The Eighth CCP National Congress had largely deprived Mao of his power, and thus evoked Mao's determination to re-seize power and purge the opposition. The professional army-building programme of the PLA was terminated owing to Mao's disapproval of P'eng Te-huai's learning from Soviet army-building policy and of Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing's pro-Soviet behaviour for supporting Khrushchev and opposing a personality cult.

²⁵After full and all-round consideration, the plenary session of the Central Committee has decided to approve this suggestion of comrade Mao Tse-tung, and not nominate him again as candidate for Chairman of the PRC at the first session of the second nation people's congress. See Richard C. Thornton, *CHINA, THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER 1917-1972*, (Indiana: Indiana Uni. Press, 1973), p. 245; "Central Committee Decision on the Status of Mao Tse-tung (10 Dec. 1958)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 720.

²⁶"Mao Tse-tung Speech at the Eighth Plenary Session of the CCP's Eighth Central Committee", *ISSUE AND STUDIES*, Vol. VI, No. 7, (April 1970), pp. 80-86.

Until Lin Piao replaced P'eng Te-huai as the Minister of National Defence after the Eighth CCP National Congress, and could vigorously carry out the military line of "politics takes the lead" according to Mao's will, the movement of People's Communes and the organisation of militia was a powerful weapon to oppose P'eng Te-huai's professional army-building program. Mao certainly realised that he must reconstruct social structure if he want to organise and efficiently operate the militia, and the People's Communes were an important means to achieve it. Mao's attempt to seize the power was so clear and strong even at the cost of changing the policy of land distribution at the early stage of PRC's regime, and returned to the cycle of "annexation of land holdings", which was one of the tasks carried out by the People's Communes, at the last stage of past dynasties. His chief aim was to organise the world's biggest militia system, attempting to minimise the importance of the PLA led by P'eng Te-huai and take over its political and military tasks, by applying the organisation of people's commune. The "Central Committee Resolution on the People's Communes", approved by the Sixth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC on 10 October 1958 clearly stated, "A new social organisation appeared fresh as the morning sun above the broad horizon of East Asia. This was the large-scale people's commune in the rural areas of our country which combines industry, agriculture, trade, education, and military affairs.... The people's commune is the basic organisation of our country's state power. It is absolutely not allowed to use 'getting organised along military line' as a pretext to make use of the militia system, which is directed against the enemy".²⁷

It is noteworthy, however, at the same day of announcing the "Central Committee Resolution on the People's Commune", the Sixth Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC also

²⁷"Central Committee Resolution on the People's Communes (10 Dec. 1958)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. II, *op. cit.*, p. 720, 729; Robert R. Bowie & John K. Fairbank (ed.), *COMMUNIST CHINA 1955-1959: POLICY DOCUMENTS WITH ANALYSIS*, (Massachusetts: Harvard Uni. Press, 1971), pp. 490-503.

approved Mao Tse-tung's proposal that he would not stand as candidate for Chairman of the People's Republic of China for the next term of office.²⁸ The resolution embarrassed Mao by stating that "he may also be enabled to set aside more time for Marxist-Leninist theoretical work".²⁹

Mao gave up his chance to be nominated again as candidate for chairman of the PRC at the First Session of the Second National People's Congress to gain the approval of carrying out the policy of people's commune and militia organisation. Thus it can be seen how deeply Mao was hurt at the Eighth CCP National Congress and how strongly his ambition to regain power was, and Mao's anger can be realised when P'eng Te-huai "openly" criticised the faults of the movement of "Three Red Banners" at the Lushan conference in 1959. As a result of such inner-party struggles, the professional army-building program of the PLA after the Eighth CCP National Congress was doomed to failure. Mao began to show his resolution to remove P'eng Te-huai and replaced him with Lin Piao as the Minister of National Defence at the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth CCP National Congress.

²⁸Robert R. Bowie & John K. Fairbank (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 487-488.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 487.

II. The Ninth CCP National Congress

The PLA's involvement in the Cultural Revolution was neither an attempt at the seizure of political power, nor intended to oppose Mao's policy of "party command the army". It was Mao Tse-tung himself who instructed the PLA to become involved in the Cultural Revolution for the restoration of his falling military power. However, after PLA's intervention in politics, the phenomena of a "Praetorian Political Guard" appeared. The local military leaders not only dominated organs of provincial and county's power, but also became members of the CCPCC, and so expanded their political influence at the state level.

At the early stage of Cultural Revolution, Mao used the PLA as a weapon to destroy party organisations for the purpose of striking Liu Shao-ch'i. This course of action, however, had landed him in an unpredictable situation. The power of Lin Piao and local military commanders had apparently expanded to the extent far beyond than Mao could originally expected. To suppress the army's political influence, Mao had to restore the party organisations. His first step was to make preparation for the convening of the Ninth CCP National Congress. After repeated delays, congress was finally held from 1 to 24 April 1969. Apart from rebuilding the party organisation, the other reason for the convening of Ninth CCP Congress was to celebrate the successful power seizure from Liu Shao-ch'i. The agenda of the Ninth CCP National Congress was quite simple. It was as follows: First, Lin Piao was to deliver the "political report"; second, revise Party constitution, and third, elect full and alternate members of the Ninth CCPCC.

Mao was received with enthusiasm at the opening session.³⁰ At the end of his opening

³⁰Mao addressed the opening session, and he said, "Comrades! The Ninth congress of the Chinese Communist Party is now in session", all delegates gave "long and enthusiastic applause", and shouted:

speech, Mao stressed: From the Eighth CCP National Congress up to now we have become more clear about them (Liu Shao-ch'i, P'eng Chen, Po I-po... etc.). We are clearer about their political line, their organisational line, and their ideology. therefore we hope that this congress will become a congress of unity. Can we win victory on the basis of this unity? Can this congress become a congress of victory? After the congress, can we win still greater victories throughout the country? I think we can. I think this will be a congress of unity and a congress of victory. After the congress we can win still greater victories throughout the country.³¹ When Mao finished the speech, all delegates gave him "prolonged enthusiastic applause" and shouted "long live chairman Mao! A long, long life to chairman Mao! May chairman Mao live forever!" once again.³²

Lin Piao's "political report"³³ delivered on 1 April and adopted on 14 April, it was discussed by the congress "sentence by sentence". Moreover, the congress sent both Lin's report and the revised constitution to the secretariat of the presidium for "modification in wording" and the report was not made public until 27 April.

Lin reiterated that the Ninth CCP National Congress was a congress of victory in his report, which he indicated, "Our present congress is convened at a time when victory has been won in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution".³⁴

Lin Piao also mentioned the new Party constitution in his report, which he said: "The

"Long live chairman Mao, a long, long life to chairman Mao" in an enthusiastic fashion. See Stuart Schram (ed.), THE CHAIRMAN MAO TALKS TO THE PEOPLE - TALKS AND LETTERS 1956-1971, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), p. 24.

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 281.

³²*Ibid.*

³³James T. Myers (ed.), CHINESE POLITICS - DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 57-85; NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 27 April 1969; Lin Piao, "Political Report to the Ninth Party congress (1 April 1969)", THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, Vol. V, op. cit., pp. 2224-2238.

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 2224.

revision of the party constitution is an important item on the agenda of the Ninth National Congress of the Party. the Central Committee has submitted the draft party constitution to the congress for discussion. This draft was worked out jointly by the whole party and the revolutionary masses throughout the country. Since November 1967 when chairman Mao proposed that basic party organisation take part in the revision of the party constitution, the Central Committee has received several thousand draft. On this basis, the enlarged Twelfth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the Party drew up the draft constitution, upon which the entire party, the whole army, and the revolutionary masses throughout the country once again held discussions".³⁵

The new constitution adopted by the Ninth congress was essentially the same as the draft except for certain changes affecting the PLA, they were:

First, article 5: The People's Liberation Army... must all accept the leadership of the party.³⁶

Second, the party attempted to tighten its control over the political activities of the PLA as it stated in article 6, "The highest leading body of the party is the national party congress and, when it is not in session, the Central committee elected by it. The leading bodies of party organisations in army units ... are the party congress or general membership meetings at their respective levels.... The convening of party congresses... in the army units... are subject to approval by the higher party."³⁷

And third, the statement that primary party organs must "persevere in the four firsts, and

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 2234.

³⁶"The 1969 Party Constitution (14 Apr. 1969)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. V, *op. cit.*, p. 2240.

³⁷*Ibid.*

foster the three-eight working style in the big way", a slogan coined by Lin for the military, was dropped, as was a section that called upon the party to learn from the political work of the PLA.³⁸

Overall, it appears that the party intended to reassert its authority and persist in implementing the doctrine of "politics in command". Mao like Lin Piao was pressured into compromising on these issues, and hard bargaining was probably the reason for delayed publication of the constitution, in *People's Daily* on 29 April, despite the fact that it was adopted "unanimously" on 14 April.

It was noteworthy that the new party constitution stressed "the PLA was under the leadership of the party", and removed "party to learn from the political work style of the PLA", this was the restriction and the warning that Mao placed on the PLA for its over-expanded power during the Cultural Revolution, and a prelude to his party consolidation and the reorganisation of the party committee at provincial level after the Ninth CCP National Congress. Mao's attempt to weaken the political power of the PLA was now very clear.

In item 6 "On the Consolidation and Building of the Party" of his political report, Lin Piao indicated: "Discussing the consolidation and building of the party, chairman Mao has said, 'A human being has arteries and veins through which the heart makes the blood circulate, and the breathes with his lungs, exhaling carbon dioxide and inhaling fresh oxygen, that is, getting rid of the stale and taking in the fresh, for only thus can it be full of vitality. Without eliminating waste matter and absorbing fresh blood the party has no vigour', with this vivid analogy, chairman Mao has expounded the dialectics of inner-party

³⁸Y. C. Chang, *FACTIONAL AND COALITION POLITICS IN CHINA - THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND IT AFTERMATH*, op. cit., p. 62.

contradiction. 'The law of contradiction in things, that is the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics'. Opposition and struggle between the two lines within the party are a reflection inside the party of contradictions between classes and between the new and the old in society. If there were contradictions in the party and no struggles to resolve them, and if the party did not get rid of the stale and take in the fresh, the party's life would come to an end. Chairman Mao's theory on inner-party contradiction is and will be the fundamental guiding principle for the consolidation and building of the party".³⁹

However, this idea of "getting rid of the stale and taking in the fresh" Lin advocated was not Mao's real intention, in fact Mao was hoping that the participants of the Ninth CCP National Congress could "select more delegates from the army, workers, poor and lower-middle peasants, and the Red Guards", on the basis of the principle of 'three-in-one combination' - the combination of 'army, revolutionary cadres and the organisational representatives of revolutionary masses', of 'workers, peasants and soldiers', and of 'the old, the middle-aged and the young', and the principle of "selecting from high to low, from the combination of high and low, of inside and outside, and consulting all sorts of opinions" to convene a real "conference of ten thousand people"⁴⁰ under the leadership of Mao. Nevertheless, only 1512 representatives attend the Ninth CCP National Congress,⁴¹ and among which, nearly three fourth wore the uniform of the Liberation Army.⁴²

³⁹Michael Y. M. Kau (ed.), *Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Delivered on 1 April and Adopted on 14 April 1969)*, *THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR - POWER POLITICS AND MILITARY COUP*, op. cit., p. 546; *RED FLAG*, No. 5, 1969, pp. 24-25.

⁴⁰"A Circular of the CCPCC and CCP Cultural Revolution Group Concerning the Enquiries for the Convening of the Ninth Party Congress (27 Nov. 1967)", *THE COLLECTIONS OF THE ORIGINAL DATA OF CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION*, op. cit., p. 13.

⁴¹"Communiqué of the Secretary Office of Chairman Group on the Ninth Party Congress (1 April 1969)", *THE COLLECTIONS OF THE ORIGINAL DATA OF THE NINTH PARTY CONGRESS*, (Taipei: Chinese Communist Studies Press, 1979), p. 75.

⁴²Jürgen Domes, *CHINA AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION*, (Berkeley: Uni. of California Press, 1977), p. 16.

Because of their contribution to the downfall of Liu Shao-ch'i, coupled with the rise of Lin Piao, a sharp increase in military representation in all bodies of the Ninth CCP National Congress and especially in the Central Committee resulted. From the background of members of the presidium, one can clearly understand the role that PLA played in this congress. The delegates to the congress elected a 176-man presidium (an increase of 113 persons than the Eighth CCP National Congress), occupying 11.6 percent of all 1512 participants, with Mao as its chairman, Lin Piao, its vice-chairman, and Chou En-lai, its general secretary. In the presidium, military representation⁴³ amounted to over 35 percent

⁴³The list of names was as follows: Huang Yung-sheng (chief of the general staff, commander of the Canton Military Region); Wu Fa-hsien (Air Force commander-in-chief); Wen Yü-cheng (commander of the Peking Garrison Command); Wang Ping-chang (vice commander of the Air Force); Wang Huai-hsiang (political commissar of the Kirin Military District); Wang Hui-ch'iu (vice political commissar of the Air Force); Kung Shih-ch'uan (political commissar of the Canton Military Region); Wei Kuo-ch'ing (first political commissar of the Kwangsi Military District); Lung Shu-chin (commander of the Sinkiang Military Region); Pi Ding-ch'ün (vice commander of the Foochow Military Region); Liu Feng (political commissar of the Wuhan Military Region); Liu Hsien-yüan (political commissar of the Canton Military Region); Liu Hsien-ch'uan (commander of the Tsinghai Military District); Jen Jung (political commissar of the Tibet Military District); Hsü Shih-yu (commander of the Nanking Military Region); Tu Ping (political commissar of the Nanking Military Region); Yang Te-chih (commander of the Tsinan Military Region); Wu Tao (political commissar of the Inner Mongolia Military District); Wang Chia-tao (commander of the Heilungkiang Military District); Hsiao Ching-kuang (Navy commander-in-chief); Li T'ien-yiu (deputy chief of the general staff); Li Tsai-han (first political commissar of the Kweichow Military District); Li Tso-p'eng (first political commissar of the Navy); Li Te-sheng (commander of the Anhwei Military District); Hsien Heng-han (political commissar of the Lanchow Military Region); Cheng Wei-shan (acting commander of the Peking Military Region); Chang Szu-ching (second political commissar of the Shansi Military District); Chang Ta-chih (commander of the Lanchow Military Region); Chang Chiang-lin (commander of the Tsinghai Military District); Chang Kuo-hua (first political commissar of the Chengtu Military Region); Ch'en Shih-ch'ü (commander of the Engineer Troop); Ch'en Hsi-lien (commander of the Shenyang Military Region); Nan P'ing (political commissar of the Chekiang Military District); Yüan Shen-ping (political commissar of the Tsinan Military Region); Liang Tien-tsu (commander of the Chengtu Military Region); Tseng Shao-shan (political commissar of the Shenyang Military Region); Tseng Szu-yu (commander of the Wuhan Military Region); Tseng Yung-ya (commander of the Tibet Military District); Han Hsien-ch'ü (commander of the Foochow Military Region); Cheng Shih-ching (first political commissar of the Kiangsi Military District); Li Yüan (commander of the Forty sixth Army); Teng Hai-ching (commander of the Inner Mongolia Military District); Pan Fu-sheng (first commissar of the Heilungkiang Military District); Tan Fu-jen (political commissar of the Kunming Military Region); Wang Tung-hsing (chief of the guards regiment of Mao Tse-tung).

Others included 9 low-rank military officers, they were Wang Shih-fan, Wang Ke-ching, Nien Szu-wang, Fan Ching-min, Chang Yin-tsai, Hu Hsiu-tao, Shu Chi-cheng, Chang Ying-tsai, and Ma Yi.

See "The Chinese Communist Party after the Ninth Party Congress", *STUDY ON CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, No. 15, (Taipei: The Secretary Office of the National Assembly, 1969), p. 13.

of its all.

On 15 April, the congress entered the final stage, that was, the election of members of the Ninth CCPCC. However, the convening of the third meeting of whole delegates had a substantial delay for settling the matter of "power distribution", it was finally presided over by Lin Piao on 24 April, and elected 170 full members and 109 alternate members of the Ninth CCPCC. An total increase of 86 members than the Eighth CCP National Congress, which elected 97 full members and 96 alternate members of Eighth CCPCC. Among the newly elected full members and alternate members of the Ninth CCPCC, 119 (71 full members and 48 alternated members), or 42.6 percent were military commanders; 76 (57 full members and 19 alternate members), or 27.6 percent were cadres, and 63 (37 full members and 26 alternate members), or 22.6 percent were the so-called revolutionary rebels.⁴⁴

On 28 April the First Plenum of the Ninth CCPCC was held in Peking, and elected Mao Tse-tung as chairman, Lin Piao as vice-chairman, Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, Yeh Ch'ün, Yeh Chien-ying, Liu Po-ch'eng, Chiang Ch'ing, Chu Te, Hsü Shih-yu, Ch'en Po-ta, Ch'en Hsi-lien, Li Hsien-nien, Li Tso-p'eng, Wu Fa-hsien, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Ch'iu Hui-tso, Chou En-lai, Yao Wen-yüan, K'ang Sheng, Huang Yung-sheng, Tung Pi-wu and Hsieh Fu-chih as members of the Politburo, and Chi Teng-k'uei, Li Hsüeh-feng, Li Te-sheng and Wang Tung-hsing as alternate members of the Politburo.

Excluding Mao, 13 of the Politburo members, that is to say over 50 percent, were military men, which included Lin Piao, Yeh Ch'un, Chu Te, Yeh Chien-ying, Liu Po-ch'eng, Hsü Shih-yu, Ch'en Hsi-lien, Li Tso-p'eng, Wu Fa-hsien, Ch'iu Hui-tso, Huang Yung-sheng,

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 39.

Hsieh Fu-chih and Tung Pi-wu, in sharp contrast to only the 7 of 27 members in the Eighth Politburo who could be so described. In addition, among the four alternate member, Li Te-sheng and Wang Tung-hsing were military men.

Included in the total 21 Politburo members, 10 were reappointed and 10 newly-elected, plus Hsieh Fu-chih was promoted from alternate member to Politburo member. And among the Eighth Politburo members, six (Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, T'ao Chu, Ho Lung, T'an Chen-lin and Li Kan-Ch'üan) were purged, five (Ch'en Yün, Ch'en I, Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, Nieh Jung-chen and Li Fu-ts'un) failed to be re-elected, and only managed to keep their membership of the CCPCC.

These politburo members produced five different political groups:⁴⁵

First, the Cultural Revolutionary extreme left until the end of 1969 and in the central committee by Mao Tse-tung, Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng, Chiang Ch'ing, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yüan, Hsieh Fu-chih, as well as by alternate members Chi Teng-k'uei and Wang Tung-hsing.

Second, the cadres of the Administrative apparatus with Chou En-lai, Tung Pi-wu and Li Hsien-nien.

Third, the Central Military Group with Lin Piao, Huang Yung-sheng, Ch'iu Hui-tso, Li Tso-p'eng, Wu Fa-hsien, Yeh Chien-ying, Yeh Ch'un and the alternate member Li Te-sheng.

⁴⁵James T. Myers (ed.), *CHINESE POLITICS - DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS*, Vol. II, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

Fourth, the Regional commanders with Hsü Shih-yu, Ch'en Hsi-lien.

And fifth, the Group of Party Veterans whose public appearances and become increasingly rare and who probably only occasionally took part in the decision-making process. These included Chu-Te and Lin Po-ch'eng.

The General Staff Department of the PLA elected Huang Yung-sheng chief of general staff, Wu Fa-hsien, Li Tso-p'eng, Ch'iu Hui-tso, Li T'ien-yiu, Wen Yu-ch'eng, Wang Hsin-t'ing, P'eng Shao-hui, Han Hsien-ch'u, and Yen Shen-ch'üan vice chief of general staff. All of them were from Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army except Wang Hsin-t'ing and P'eng Shao-hui,⁴⁶ in which Wu Fa-hsien soon became commander-in-chief of the Air Force, Li Tso-p'eng first political commissar of the Navy, and Ch'iu Hui-tso director of the General Logistics Department.

The military occupied a high proportion not only at the Central, but also at the local level. 20 of the total 29 chiefs of "revolutionary committee" at provincial level were military men, and most of the remaining 9 had a concurrent post in the army (shown as follows).⁴⁷ In addition, among all chiefs and deputy chiefs of the revolutionary committee at county level and above, 5193 were military men, occupying 78 percent in Peking city, 81 percent in Kwangtung province, 84 percent in Liaoning province, 95 Shansi province, 97 percent in Yunnan province and 98 percent in Hupei province.

⁴⁶Ting Wang, *THE ORGANISATIONAL AND PERSONNEL ISSUES IN THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION*, (Hong Kong: Contemporary China Research Institute, 1970), p. 160.

⁴⁷Li K'e & Hao Sheng-chang, *THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION*, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-26; Livio Maitan, *PARTY, ARMY AND MASSES IN CHINA - A MARXIST INTERPRETATION OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH*, (London: NLB, 1976), pp. 162-163.

Establishment of Provincial Revolutionary Committees

<i>Date of Establishment of Rev. Com.</i>	<i>Province</i>	<i>Chief</i>	<i>Post in the Army</i>
31 Jan. 1967	Heilungkian g	Pan Fu-sheng	political commissar of the Shenyang Military Region; first political commissar of the Heilungkiang Military District
3, Feb. 1967	Shantung	Wang Hsiao-yu	first commissar of the Tsinan Military Region
13 Feb. 1967	Kweichow	Li Tsai-han	vice political commissar of the Kunming Military Region; and concurrent first commissar of the Kweichow Military District
23 Feb. 1967	Shanghai	Chang Ch'un-ch'iao	first political commissar of the Nanking Military Region; first political commissar of the Shanghai Garrison Commands
18 Mar. 1967	Shansi	Liu K'e-p'ing	political commissar of the Peking Military Region; first political commissar of the Shansi Military District
20 Apr. 1967	Peking	Hsieh Fu-chih	General; member of CCPCC; political commissar of the Peking Military Region; first political commissar of the Peking Garrison Command
12 Aug. 1967	Tsinghai	Liu Hsien-ch'üan	Major General; commander of the Tsinghai Military District
1 Nov. 1967	Inner Mongolia	Teng Hai-ching	Lieutenant-general; vice-commander of the Peking Military Region; concurrent commander of the Inner Mongolia Military District
6 Dec. 1967	Tientsin	Hsieh Hsüeh-kung	political commissar of the Peking Military Region; concurrent first political commissar of the Tientsin Garrison Commands
5 Jan. 1968	Kiangsi	Ch'eng Shih-ch'ing	Major General; deputy political commissar of the Foochow Military District; concurrent political commissar of the Kiangsi Military District
24 Jan. 1968	Kansu	Hsien Heng-han	political commissar of the Lanchow Military Region
27 Jan. 1968	Honan	Liu Chien-hsün	first political commissar of the Honan Military District
3 Feb. 1968	Hopei	Li Hsüeh-feng	political commissar of the Peking Military Region
5 Feb. 1968	Hupei	Teng Ssu-yu	Lieutenant-general; commander of the Wuhan Military Region
21 Feb. 1968	Kwangtung	Huang Yung-sheng	commander of the Canton Military Region
6 Mar. 1968	Kirin	Wang Huai-hsiang	Major General; political commissar of the Sixteenth Army
23 Mar. 1968	Kiangsu	Hsü shih-yu	General; commander of the Nanking Military Region
24 Mar. 1968	Chekiang	Nan P'ing	Major General; political commissar of the Chekiang Military District
8 Apr. 1968	Hunan	Li Yüan	Major General; commander of the Forty-seventh Army
10 Apr. 1968	Ninghsia	K'ang Chien-min	Major General; commander of the Lanchow Military Region

18 Apr. 1968	Anhwei	Li Te-sheng	Major General; commander of the Twelfth Army
1 May. 1968	Shensi	Li Jui-shan	political commissar of the Lanchow Military Region; concurrent first political commissar of the Shensi Military District
10 May. 1968	Liaoning	Ch'en Hsi-lien	General; commander of the Shenyang Military Region
31 May. 1968	Szechwan	Chang Kuo-hua	Lieutenant-general; political commissar of the Chentu Military District
13 Aug. 1968	Yunnan	T'an Fu-jen	Lieutenant-general; political commissar of the Kunming Military Region
19 Aug. 1968	Fukien	Han Hsien-ch'u	General; commander of the Foochow Military Region
26 Aug. 1968	Kwangsi	Wei Kuo-ch'ing	General; first commissar of the Canton Military Region
5 Sep. 1968	Tibet	Tseng Yung-ya	Major General; commander of the Tibet Military District
5 Sep. 1968	Sinkiang	Lung Shu-chin	Major General; commander of the Sinkiang Military Region

The convening of the Ninth CCP National Congress represented a new stage of the interaction among the party, government and the army. Thirteen years after the Eighth CCP National Congress, Mao finally regained power. After the Ninth CCP National Congress, Mao began another cycle of reconstruction in the party, government and the army. As an important congress in the history of Chinese Communist Party, the convening of the Ninth CCP National Congress, serving as a link between past and future, had the following distinguishing features:

First, it was a secretive congress.

During the proceedings of the Eighth CCP National Congress, every decision reached at the session including speeches and documents were made public day by day. While a certain degree of secrecy was maintained throughout the proceedings of the Ninth CCP National Congress. The opening session was held at "People's Assembly Hall", but was then moved to "Chungnanhai" the next day. No official announcement regarding the convention was made until 9:00pm on 1 April, following the completion of the opening session, which had begun at 5:00pm. Nothing more appeared in the mass media until the communiqué of 4 April, and all in all, only four communiqués, Lin's "political report", and

the Party Constitution were published; yet the Eighth CCP National Congress had printed over 715 pages of various speeches and documents.⁴⁸ None of the three "most important speeches" made by Mao at the opening session of the Ninth CCP National Congress, the plenary session on 14 April, and the plenary session of Ninth CCP, was ever made known.

Second, it was a congress of isolation.

For the Eighth, 56 invitations were sent to the so-call "democratic party"⁴⁹, people's group, responsible cadres of the PLA, and at least 47 foreign delegations came and delivered congratulatory speeches subsequently published in the *People's Daily*,⁵⁰ while this time, no nonvoting delegate attended.

Third, it was a congress of purge.

At the Ninth Congress, cadres from Liu Shao-chi's "party in the White area", the intellectual, or those who opposed Mao and Lin were largely purged, and replaced with the rise of cadres from the "party in the base area", and from the "party in the army" in power.

Fourth, it was a congress of inner-party factional reorganisation.

In addition to the influence of the Cultural Revolutionary extreme left was substantially expanded. A series of power-seizure struggle was carried out inside the PLA, the military

⁴⁸Y. C. Chang, *FACTIONAL AND COALITION POLITICS IN CHINA - THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH*, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

⁴⁹The democratic parties were 1) the Revolutionary Committee of the KMT, 2) the China Democratic League, 3) the China Democratic National Construction Association, 4) the China Association for Promoting Democracy, 5) the Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party, 6) the China Chih Kung T'ang (reorganized from Chih Kung T'ang in the United States), 7) the Chiu-san (3 Sep.) Society, and 8) the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League. Another party called the KMT Association for Promoting Democracy was later merged into the Revolutionary Committee of the KMT. These democratic parties were put under the CCP leadership and were prevented from any independent moves or platforms. See *A COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY*, op. cit., p. 362.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 61; *PEOPLE'S DAILY*, 22 Sep. 1956.

cadres from the non-Fourth Field Army, or related to P'eng Te-huai, Ho Lung and Lo Jui-ch'ing's and many others were attacked, while the central and local militarists from Fourth Field Army were promoted to important posts.

And fifth, it was a congress largely expanding the political role of the military.

The Ninth Congress promoted some regional military to the central political arena and therefrom reinforced their political authority at the local level. The Ninth Congress was in fact a celebration of central and regional military. Until the Cultural Revolution, the regional party's and political affairs were usually conducted by the first secretary of the party committee, who was also a concurrent first political secretary of the provincial military district or military region, responsible for the supervision of the policy of 'party commands the gun'⁵¹. While after the Ninth CCP Congress, military men constituted the major force of the Party Committee, and became secretary or first secretary, and usually a concurrent first political commissar of the Military Region, and monopolised all powers in the regional party, government and military. The regional military power expanded rapidly, while the party's power began to decline.

⁵¹John Gittings, "Army-party Relations in the Light of the Cultural Revolution", in John Lewis (ed.), *PARTY LEADERSHIP AND REVOLUTIONARY POWER IN CHINA*, (London: Cambridge Uni. Press, 1970), pp. 373-403.²

III. The Tenth CCP National Congress

Since military men headed by Lin Piao colluded with Chiang Ch'ing's Cultural Revolutionary extreme left during the Ninth CCP Congress, with the consequence that among the members of the Ninth CCPCC elected by the congress, the military were of prime importance, the Cultural Revolutionary extreme left came second. This result, however, ran counter to Mao's principle of consistency, that is, the principle of "party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party". After the Lin Piao incident, the political and military situation of the PLA began to change. On 1 Jan. 1973, an editorial *New Year's Speech*, carried by two newspapers and one periodical, had revealed the appearance of Mao's deployment of political strategy. The editorial indicated, "the masses' organisations - namely, labour unions, the Communist Youth League, the Red Guards and the Little Red Guards, poor and lower-middle peasant associations, and women's federation - must be consolidated step by step. The leading organs of all levels must pay attention to fostering new cadres on the basis of "three-in-one combination of the old, the middle aged and the young", especially promoting new cadres from among labour unions, women's federation and minority nationality, and helping those cadres on the job to improve their theoretic level and working capability. Every cadre regardless of old or new, army or local must learn from the masses modestly".⁵² It was quite obvious Mao's intention was to replace PLA's political influence with the five masses' organisation - labour unions, the Communist Youth League, the Red Guards and the Little Red Guards, poor and lower-middle peasant associations, and the women's federation.

After the publication of the *New Year's Speech*, the conference of various kinds were

⁵²"*New Year's Speech*", *PEOPLE'S DAILY, LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY*, 1 Jan. 1973; *RED FLAG*, No. 1, 1973, p. 8.

convened one after another throughout the country. The first conference of the Communist Youth League at the provincial, municipal, and autonomous district's level were held in Shanghai from 12 to 19 Feb. of the same year; the conference of labour unions at the provincial, municipal and autonomous district's level were convened in Shanghai and Peking between 16 and 21 April; the conference of the women's federation at the provincial, municipal and autonomous district's level were convened in Tientsin and Anhwei between 27 and 30 June; the conference of the poor and lower-middle peasant associations at the provincial, municipal and autonomous district's level were held in Hunan on 17 November. By the mid July, the conference of the Communist Youth League in 29 provinces, municipalities and autonomous districts had also come to an end.⁵³

The aims for the convening of the above masses' organisations were as follows:

First, change the political ecology in the PRC, replacing PLA's political influence at the local level with that of the regional masses' organisations, and terminating the phenomenon of "the gun commands the party" during the Cultural Revolution.

Second, provide a better environment for restoring the unified leadership of the party. The so called unified leadership was in fact the leadership of the party over the troops.

And third, attempt to balance the influence of the PLA in the central and the locality by integrating the forces of the Cultural Revolutionary extreme left headed by Chiang Ch'ing with that of the local masses.

⁵³Chang Chin-wen, *"The Inner-Party Struggle of the Chinese Communist Party after the Tenth Party Congress"*, in Warren Kuo (ed.), *THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AFTER THE TENTH PARTY CONGRESS*, (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, National Cheng-chi Uni., 1974), p. 37.

As the provincial conference was developing into a national movement, Mao decided to convene the Tenth CCP National Congress before the due date.

The Tenth party congress met in Peking again under conditions of extreme secrecy from 24 to 28 August 1973. The congress was held before the end of the five-year constitutional term of the Ninth CCP National Congress. According to article 8 of the Ninth Party Constitution, a party congress could be convened earlier than prescribed only under "special circumstance",⁵⁴ which in this instance was certainly the Lin Piao incident, the name of Lin Piao had to be removed from the Party Constitution. There was, moreover, a need to replace those top leaders who had fallen with Lin Piao.

The Tenth CCP National Congress, like the Ninth, received no advance publicity despite the fact that delegates were elected to this important gathering as early as May 1973.⁵⁵ The session of the Tenth CCP National Congress was extremely brief in comparison with those of the Eighth and Ninth CCP National Congress, which had lasted 13 and 24 days, respectively.

The agenda of the Tenth CCP National Congress was as follows: First, Chou En-lai delivered the "political report" on behalf of the Central Committee of the CCP; second, Wang Hung-wen delivered the report on the revision of the party constitution on behalf of the CCPCC and submitted to the congress the *Draft of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China*; third, the Tenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was elected.⁵⁶

⁵⁴"The 1969 Party Constitution (14 Apr. 1969)", *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 2240.

⁵⁵*CHINA MONTHLY*, No. 697, (1 Oct. 1973), p. 17.

⁵⁶James T. Myers (ed.), "Communiqué of the Tenth Party Congress", *CHINESE POLITICS - DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS*, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 225.

Other important reasons for the convening of the Tenth CCP National Congress before the due date were; to subsequently approve the resolution of the CCPCC on "Lin Piao anti-Party clique", and to nullify Lin Piao's position and stress that of the Mao's throughout the proceedings of the Ninth CCP National Congress. There was, moreover, a need to solve some important issues brought by Lin Piao incident, including the re-verification of the relationship between the party and the army, and the reconstruction of the army and party's organisations.

In the "political report" that Chou En-lai delivered to the congress revealed publicly a full, official explanation of the rise and fall of the "Lin Piao anti-Party clique". Chou frequently referred to Mao's writings and used a certain amount of radical rhetoric.

As to the denial of the importance of Lin Piao's position and stressing that of Mao's during the Ninth CCP National Congress. Chou made the following comments: "The party's Ninth Congress was held when great victories had been won in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution personally initiated and led by chairman Mao... the political report to the Ninth Congress was drawn up under chairman Mao's guidance. Prior to the congress, Lin Piao had produced a draft political report in collaboration with Ch'en Po-ta. they were opposed to continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, contending that the main task after the Ninth Congress was to develop production. This was a refurbished version under new conditions of the same revisionist trash that Liu Shao-ch'i and Ch'en Po-ta had smuggled into the resolution of the Eighth congress, which alleged that the major contradiction in our country was not the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, but that 'between the advanced socialist system and the backward productive forces of society'. Naturally, this draft by Lin Piao and Ch'en Po-ta was rejected by the Central Committee. Lin Piao secretly supported Ch'en Po-ta in the

latter's open opposition to the political report drawn up under chairman Mao's guidance, and it was only after his attempts were frustrated that Lin Piao grudgingly accepted the political line of the Central Committee and read its political report to the congress".⁵⁷

As to the issue of political line, Chou En-lai asserted once again in his report as saying:⁵⁸ "Chairman Mao teaches us that 'the correctness or incorrectness of the ideological and political line decides everything'. If one's line is incorrect, one's downfall is inevitable, even with the control of the central, local and army leadership. If one's line is correct, even if one has not a single soldier at first, there will be soldiers, and even if there is no political power, political power will be gained... Lin Piao wanted to 'have everything under his command and everything at his disposal', but he ended up in having nothing under his command and nothing at his disposal. The crux of the matter is line. This is an irrefutable truth".

Wang Hung-wen also indicated the importance of strengthening the party's centralised leadership in his *Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution*, he said: "The state organs, the PLA and revolutionary mass organisations 'must all accept the party's centralised leadership'. Organisationally, the party's centralised leadership should be given expression in two respects. First, as regards the relationship between various organisations at the same level, of the seven sectors - industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education, the army, the government and the party, it is the party that exercises overall leadership; the party is not parallel to the others and still less is it under the leadership of any other. Second, as regards the relationship between higher and lower levels, the lower level is subordinate to the higher level, and the entire party is subordinate

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 207-208; Chou En-lai, "Report on the Tenth Party Congress (24 Aug. 1973)", *RED FLAG*, No. 9, 1973, pp. 5-6; *THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. V, op. cit., pp. 2463-2469; *NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY*, 31 Aug. 1973.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, p. 212; *Ibid.*, (*RED FLAG*), p. 10.

to the higher level, and the entire party is subordinate to the Central Committee... The most essential thing about the party's centralised leadership is leadership through a correct ideological and political line. Party Committees at all levels must, on the basis of chairman Mao's revolutionary line, achieve unity in thinking, policy, plan, command and action".⁵⁹

On these grounds, the article 7 of the Tenth Party Constitution laid down: "State organs, the People's Liberation Army and militia, labour unions, poor and lower-middle peasants associations, women's federation, the communist youth league, the Red Guards, the Little Red Guards, and other revolutionary mass organisations must all accept the centralised leadership of the party".⁶⁰

As the result of new Party Constitution, the phenomena of the gun commands the seven sectors, - industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education, the army, the government and the party - formed by the PLA for carrying out its tasks of "three supports and two militaries" - supporting the revolutionary Left, supporting agriculture, and supporting industry; exercising military control and giving military training - during the Cultural Revolution, would cease. As to the relationship between the party and the army, the Tenth CCP National Congress had clearly stated that the Central Committee must thoroughly carry out the principle of "party commands the gun", and "the gun must never be allowed to command the party".

Mao's intention to reinforce the unified leadership of the Party was aimed at restoring Party's control over the central and local military leaders of real power, and eradicating the mountain-stronghold mentality. According to the rule of the system of leadership, the

⁵⁹James T. Myers (ed.), *"Wang Hung-wen's Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution"*, CHINESE POLITICS - DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 223; RED FLAG, No. 9, 1973, p. 22.

⁶⁰"The Party Constitution of the Tenth Party Congress (28 Aug. 1973", RED FLAG, No. 9, 1973, p. 27; NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 1 Sep. 1973.

leadership of the army was controlled by the CCPCC Military Commission. However, after the Cultural Revolution, most of the members of the CCPCC Military Commission were attacked or purged by the Cultural Revolutionary extreme left. Apart from Mao, the leadership of the army fell into the hands of Lin Piao and other regional military leaders, which mainly composed of the original Fourth Field Army. If we take Canton Military Region for example, Ting Shen the commander; Kung Shih-ch'üan and Jen Szu-chuang the political commissar; all 11 vice-commanders included Huang Hai-lung; and 3 deputy political commissars included Hsiao Yüan-li, were all from Fourth Field Army. In other words, among the total 22 military leaders at the rank of vice-commander and above, and the rank of deputy political commissar and above, in the Canton Military Region, 17 people, or 77.3 percent were from Fourth Field Army.⁶¹

In view of the strong force that the Fourth Field Army had at the centre and the local level which could not be ignored, and for the concern of army's stability, until the Tenth CCP National Congress, Mao handled the replacement or the transfer of military leaders of Lin Piao's faction with great care except for those who had direct connection with Lin Piao incident. Mao's approach was to carry out the replacement or the transfer by stages and in groups. To take Canton Military Region for example again, only Liu Hsin-yüan the first political commissar was transferred to the Chengtu Military Region and took charge of the same responsibility, while Hua Kuo-feng and Chung Han-hua were transferred in and became the political commissar and deputy political commissar of the Canton Military Region respectively, besides this, no other transfers or replacements were made. This situation also applied to the other military regions. Under such circumstance, if Mao attempted to restore the principle of party commands the gun, and to secure the army at the same time, the only effective way was to conduct ideological works first, and

⁶¹"The Party-Army Relations after the Tenth Party Congress", in Warren Kao (ed.), *THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AFTER THE TENTH PARTY CONGRESS*, op. cit., p. 179.

moreover, with the revision of the Tenth Party Constitution and the personnel arrangement of the full and alternate members of the CCPCC, the political power of the army could be thus gradually weakened. It was noteworthy, however, Mao still agree to reserve considerable seats to military men to stabilise the army.

A total of 1249 delegates were elected to the Tenth CCP National Congress. Tenth Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party, was elected at the congress, consisting of 195 full and 124 alternate members, a 40 members increase over the Ninth CCPCC. 35 of the 170 full Ninth CCPCC members were not reelected and 3 were demoted to alternate status, while 10 had died. 55, or 28.2 percent, became full CCPCC members for the first time. The turnover was even more striking among the alternate members of the Tenth CCPCC, where those newly elected totalled 58, or 46.7 percent. While 18 of the 109 Ninth CCPCC alternates were promoted to regular status, 28 were dropped.⁶²

The persecution of Lin Piao's clique was evident in the Tenth CCP National Congress; 22 of the 35 full and 15 of the 28 alternates not reelected can be classified as Lin's accomplices.⁶³ Some of Lin's supporters, such as Ting Sheng, Liu Hsing-yüan, and Han Hsien-ch'u, still retained their seats in the Tenth CCP National Congress, but their importance as a viable political group is rapidly diminished. Among the 195 full members of the Tenth CCPCC, 58 (28.8 percent) were military persona; 36 of the 124 alternate members, or 29 percent, were military personnel.⁶⁴

The following four points are significant concerning the growth and decline of the

⁶²Y. C. Chang, *FACTIONAL AND COALITION POLITICS IN CHINA - THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH*, op. cit., p. 92.

⁶³*Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁶⁴For the list of full and alternate members of the Tenth CC, please refers to *RED FLAG*, No. 9, 1973, pp. 34-35.

influence of military representation in the Tenth CCPCC and Politburo.

First, the majority of the top military leaders of Lin Piao's clique were not reelected in the Tenth Congress. These included: Huang Yung-sheng (Chief of the general staff), Wu Fa-hsien (commander-in-chief of the Air Force), Li Tso-p'eng (first political commissar of the Navy), Ch'iu Hui-tso (director of the General Logistics Department), K'uang Jen-nung (vice commander of the Air Force), Wu Jui-lin (commander-in-chief of the Navy), Tseng Kuo-hua (vice-commander of the Air Force), Wen Yu-ch'eng (deputy chief of the General Staff), Wang Ping-chang (vice-commander of the Air Force), Lung Shu-chin (commander of the Sinkiang Military Region), Liang T'ien-tsu (commander of the Chengtu Military Region), Cheng Wei-shan (commander of the Peking Military Region), Liu Feng (political commissar of the Wuhan Military Region), Chou Chih-p'ing (political commissar of Foochow Military Region), Nan P'ing (first political commissar of the Chekiang Military District), Ch'eng Shih-ch'ing (deputy political commissar of the Foochow Military District and concurrent political commissar of the Kiangsi Military District).⁶⁵

Second, with the exception of those top military leaders who had fallen with Lin Piao, the influence of Lin's faction, however, was not completely eliminated. With Lin Piao, as a group, they were still very much entrenched in the party, evidenced by the fact that every leading figure in the PLA headquarters was elected to the Tenth Central Committee. Moreover, with the exception of 3 political commissars, Yang Sheng-p'ing (Tsinan Military Region), Yeh Cheng (Chengtu Military Region), and Ts'ao Su-ming (Sinkiang Military Region), the commanders and political commissars of the 11 military regions were selected for positions in the new Central Committee.⁶⁶ In short, the military still wielded

⁶⁵THE COLLECTIONS OF THE PERSONNEL DATA OF THE TENTH PARTY CONGRESS, (Taipei: Institute of Chinese Communist Studies, 1973), pp. 187-189.

⁶⁶Y. C. Chang, *FACTIONAL AND COALITION POLITICS IN CHINA - THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH*, op. cit., p. 95.

considerable power, which they could bring to bear in future controversies.

Third, the person who occupied an important military post was usually a member of the Tenth CCPCC, this was relevant to the above point.

And fourth, Most of the military leaders of outside Lin's clique, who were purged during the Cultural Revolution, were liberated and reinstated.

Furthermore, the number of members in the Tenth politburo had remained the same as that of the Ninth CCP National Congress. With the exception of Lin Piao (purged) and his clique including Yeh Ch'un, Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien, Li Tso-p'eng, Ch'iu Hui-tso and Ch'en Po-ta (purged), and Hsieh Fu-chih (died), all Ninth Politburo members were elected. They were: Mao Tse-tung, Yeh Chien-ying, Liu Po-ch'eng, Chiang Ch'ing, Chu Te, Hsü Shih-yu, Ch'en Hsi-lien, Li Hsien-nien, Chou En-lai, K'ang Sheng, Tung Pi-wu, Yao Wen-yüan, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, a total of 13 members. Of the 4 alternates of the Ninth Politburo, only 1, Li Hsüeh-feng, was purged; the other three Li Te-sheng, Chi Teng-k'uei and Wang Tung-hsing, were elevated to the status of full members. all 8 purged were connected in one way or another with the military.

In addition, 8 new full members, Wei Kuo-ch'ing, Wang Hung-wen, Hua Kuo-feng, Chi Teng-k'uei, Wu Te, Chiang Tung-hsin, Ch'en Yung-kuei and Li Te-sheng, and 4 new alternate members, Wu Kuei-hsien, Su Chen-hua, Ni Chih-fu and Sai Fu-ting were elected to replace those eliminated; all can be categorised as cadres with the exception of Li Te-sheng, Wang Tung-hsing and Su Chen-hua.

Of the 9 members of the standing committee of the Tenth politburo, Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, and K'ang Sheng retained their seats, the remaining six: Wang Hung-wen, Yeh

Chien-ying, Li Te-sheng, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Chu Te and Tung Pi-wu were newly elected. The list of order was:⁶⁷ Mao Tse-tung, Wang Hung-wen, Yeh Chien-ying, Chu Te, Li Te-sheng, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Chou En-lai, K'ang Sheng and Tung Pi-wu.

The number of vice-chairman was increased from 1, Lin Piao, to 5 in the Tenth Congress - Chou en-lai, Wang Hung-wen, K'ang sheng, Yeh Chien-ying and Li The-sheng.⁶⁸ The ordering was a subtle indication of their relative status and ranking. Of five vice-chairmen, Yeh Chien-ying were military men, Wang Hung-wen, K'ang Sheng, belonged to Cultural Revolutionary extreme left, only Li Te-sheng covered the both.

The special feature of the Tenth Congress and its influence includes:

First, The Tenth Congress eradicated Lin Piao influence from the Politburo, openly declared Lin Piao's "crime" and subsequently approved the "Resolution of CCPCC concerning Lin Piao anti-Party Clique". The "Communiqué of the Tenth Party Congress" clearly stated: The congress indignantly denounced the Lin Piao anti-Party clique for its crimes. All the delegate firmly supported this resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: Expel Lin Piao, the bourgeois careerist, conspirator, counterrevolutionary double-dealer, renegade and traitor, from the party once and for all; expel Ch'en Po-ta, principal member of the Lin Piao anti-Communist, Kuomintang element, Trotskyite, renegade, enemy agent and revisionist, from the party once and for all, and dismiss him from all post inside and outside the party. The delegates unanimously supported the decisions made and all the corresponding measures taken by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of china with regard to the other principle members of

⁶⁷"Communiqué on the First Plenum of the Tenth Party Congress (30 Aug. 1973)", *RED FLAG*, No. 9, 1973, p. 36.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*

the Lin Piao anti-Party Clique.⁶⁹

Second, the Tenth Congress did not appoint the successor to Mao Tse-tung. Among five vice-chairmen of the Eighth CCPCC were Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Ch'en Yün and Lin Piao, Liu Shao-ch'i ranked the first and was appointed the successor to Mao, while in Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth CCPCC, Lin Piao became Mao's successor, and moreover, the Party Constitution of the Ninth Congress clearly stated that Lin Piao was Mao's successor and the only vice-chairman. Of five vice-chairmen of the Tenth CCPCC, Chou En-lai ranked the first, but he was not appointed the successor to Mao Tse-tung, Wang Hung-wen (from working-class, and a member of Cultural Revolutionary extreme left) ranked the second, K'ang Sheng (with the background of secret service, and a member of Cultural Revolutionary extreme left), Li Te-sheng (from the Second Field Army, and a member of Cultural Revolutionary extreme left), after Yeh Chien-ying, ranked the last of all. Such personnel arrangement by Mao was to counterbalance the force of Chou En-lai with that of the above three. Mao chose Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao to be his successor at the Eighth and Ninth CCP National Congress respectively, but omitted Chou En-lai intentionally. While at the Tenth CCP National Congress, under the stress of circumstance, Mao had to use Chou En-lai for his prestige in the party and army. However, the intention to contain Chou's force was quite evident, although Chou ranked the first of all vice-chairmen, his political space was rather small, and moreover, of 9 full members of the standing committee of Politburo, Wang Hong-wen ranked the second, while Chou only ranked seventh, after Li Te-Sheng and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao.

Third, for the concern of army's stability, Mao had not eradicated completely the political influence of the army in the Central. After the Tenth Congress, however, Mao began to

⁶⁹"*Communiqué of the Tenth Party Congress*", *RED FLAG*, No. 9, 1973, p. 31; James T. Myers (ed.), *CHINESE POLITICS - DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS*, Vol. II, *op. cit.*, pp. 226-227.

counteract the expansion of military power with the force of Cultural Revolutionary extreme left stage by stage.

PLA had considerable influence in the Chinese Communist Party in the past. Of the ten marshals, Chu Te, Lin Piao, Yeh Chien-yin was the vice-chairman, and all of them had been members of the Politburo. In the Eleventh Plenum of Eighth CCPCC, with the exception of Lo Jung-huan, who died, and P'eng Te-huai, who was purged, all 8 commanders were the members of the Politburo.

In the two struggles against Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao during the Cultural Revolution, many military cadres from Red First Front Army, First Field Army and Red Fourth Field Army, who could be counted as Mao's direct line of descent, were purged. Consequently, after the incident of Lin Piao's, the military power was mainly controlled by the cadres from Fourth Front Army, Second Field Army and Third Field Army. Strictly speaking, these cadres, however, were not Mao's direct line of the descent. Thus, the arrangement of Cultural Revolutionary extreme left headed by Chiang Ch'ing to enter the political arena of the Central at the Tenth Congress was, to a certain extent, for containing the influence of non-Mao's direct line of descent.

Mao depended on the army to settle the social unrest and chaos accompanied by the Cultural Revolution, but to do so, the prerequisite was to have a stable army. Moreover, Mao had responsibility for the occurrence of Lin's Piao's incident, to restrict the attack to the range of Lin's clique, would only be too beneficial to himself.

And the fourth, the Fourth Field Army was seriously destroyed before and after the Tenth Congress, and consequently, the other field armies regained power, which laid the foundation for a series of army consolidation program in later days. In addition, Mao

retained certain amount of military representation in the Central units at the Tenth CCP National Congress, which constituted the major failure of the Cultural Revolutionary extreme left in their subsequent power-seizure struggle. Moreover, by taking the opportunity to transfer the commanders of eight military great regions, Mao successfully restored the party's control over the army⁷⁰.

To avoid any panic in the army, the purge of military leaders of Lin's clique was carried out by stages and in groups. After the Tenth CCP National Congress, apart from the continual purge of Lin's clique, an order of transfers among the commanders of eight great military regions in ten days was issued by the CCPCC Military Commission on 22 December of the same year.⁷¹ The detail of transfers were made as follows: the transfer

⁷⁰Prior to the Tenth Congress, the major military cadres of Lin's clique being purged included: Huang Yang Sheng (chief of the General Staff), Wu Fa-hsien (commander of the Air Force), Li Tso-p'eng (first political commissar of the Navy), Ch'iu Hui-tso (director of the General Logistics Department), Yeh Ch'un (director of the Administrative Office of the Military Commission), Yen Chung-Ch'uan (deputy chief of the General Staff), Ch'en Chi-te (deputy chief of the General Staff), Huang Chih-yung (deputy-director of the General Logistics Department), Wang Hsi-ke (deputy-director of the General Logistics Department), Ch'en Pan (deputy-director of the General Logistics Department), Chou Yu-chen (deputy-director of the General Logistics Department), Yen Ch'un (deputy-director of the General Logistics Department), Chang Ming-yuan (deputy-director of the General Logistics Department), Han Chen-chi, (deputy-director of the General Logistics Department), Chang Ching-i (vice commander of the Navy), Chang Hsiao-chuan (vice-commander of the Navy), Tseng Kuo-hua (vice-commander of the Air Force), Wang Ping-chang (vice-commander of the Air Force), Tan Chia-Shu (vice-commander of the Air Force), Ho Cheng-ya (vice-commander of the Air Force), Liu Chin-ping (deputy political commissar of the Air Force), Yu Wen (deputy political commissar of the Air Force), Yang Chin (deputy political commissar of the Air Force), Ch'en Shih-ching (first political commissar of the Kiangsi Military District), Yang Tung-liang (commander of the Kiangsi Military District), Lan Yi-Nung (first political commissar of Kweichow Military District), Pu Chan-ya (deputy political commissar of the Canton Military Region and concurrent first political commissar of the Hunan Military District), Wei Tsu-ling (political commissar of the Kwangsi Military District), Nan P'ing (political commissar of the Chekiang Military District), Hsiung Ying-tang (commander of the Chekiang Military District), Liu Feng (political commissar of Wuhan Military Region), Chou Chih-p'ing (political commissar of Honan Military District), Liang Tien-tsu (commander of the Chengtu Military Region), Lung Shu-chin (commander of Sinkiang), Wang Hsin (political commissar of the Honan Military Region) and so on.

See Chang Chin-wen, "The Inner-Party Struggle of the Chinese Communist Party after the Tenth Party Congress", in Warren Kuo (ed.), *THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AFTER THE TENTH PARTY CONGRESS*, op. cit., p. 44.

⁷¹Li K'e & Hao Sheng-chang, *THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION*, op. cit., p. 146; "Speech at a Plenary Meeting of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the CCP (28 Dec. 1977)", *THE SELECTED WORKS OF TENG HSIAO-P'ING*, op. cit., p. 97.

between Li Te-sheng (Peking Military Region) and Ch'en Hsi-lien (Shenyang M. R.); Hsü Shih-yu (Nanking M.R.) and Ting Sheng (Canton M.R.); Yang Te-chih (Tsinan M.R.) and Tseng Szu-Yu (Wuhan M.R.); Han Hsien-ch'u (Foochow M.R.) and Pi Ting-ch'un (Lanchow M.R.). In addition, Mao also appointed first political commissars of 3 great military regions, Peking, Canton and Tsinan, at the same time.

On 2 January 1974, *People's Daily* reported this transfer, but the additional title, secretary of the provincial party committee, of these commander was not added.⁷² The Party's Central could select appropriate persons to fill the vacancies in the provincial party committee caused by this transfer, and thus restored party's control over the regional army.

The Tenth CCP National Congress was one of the key conferences in the transformation of political role of the PLA. The congress subsequent approved the resolution of the CCPCC on Lin Piao anti-Party clique. It was, in reality, to approve Mao's purge of Lin Piao, and to openly criticise Lin Piao for his betrayal of Mao.⁷³ Lin Piao and his followers were criticised as follows: Lin Piao and his handful of sworn followers were a counter-revolutionary conspiratorial clique who never showed up without a copy of Quotations in hand and never opened their mouths without shouting long live and who spoke nice things to your face but stabled you in the back.... They pursued the criminal aim of the counterrevolutionary armed coup d'état they launched in order to usurp the supreme powers of the party and the state.⁷⁴

⁷²PEOPLE'S DAILY, 2 Jan. 1974.

⁷³James T. Myers (ed.), "Chou En-lai Political report to the Congress", CHINESE POLITICS - DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 209-213; NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 31 Aug. 1973.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 210.

After the Tenth CCP National congress, *People's Daily* and *Red Flag* published a series of articles for carrying out ideological works so as to eradicate the party and political power of the regional military cadres. Among all, some important paper were as follows:

In October 1973, the *Red Flag* published a paper, entitled *On Esteeming Confucian and anti-Legalist*. The paper indicated, "Ch'inshihhuang (the First Emperor of the Ch'in Dynasty) abolished the feudal system after he unified China in 221 B.C., bring the status of split to an end. However, the overthrown masters of the slaves and feudal nobles resolutely opposed the system of prefectures and counties of the centralism of the state. Wang Kuan, the Prime Minister and their political representative, suggested the restoration of the feudal system, while Li Szu, the well-known representative of Legalist School, reputed this was an backward and reactionary assertion, and stressed that the system of prefectures and counties was the only way to consolidate the stability of the feudal dynasties, if the feudal system should be restored, the status of split and chaos would happen again. Ch'inshihhuang adopted Li Szu's suggestion, considered the feudal system was the origin of split and civil war, and, consequently, persisted in the system of prefectures and counties".⁷⁵ The above viewpoint was reasserted in the paper, *On the Struggle between the restoration and anti-restoration in the course of the establishment of Ch'in Dynasty - The Social Structure of The Polemic between the Confucian and Legalist Schools*,⁷⁶ of the *Red Flag* in November of the same year.

In May 1974, the *Red Flag* carried a paper, entitle *Study on Salt and Iron -Big Polemic between the Confucian and Legalist Schools in the Middle Western Han Dynasty*.⁷⁷ The

⁷⁵Shih Lun "On Esteeming Confucian and anti-Legalist", RED FLAG, No. 10, 1973, p. 38.

⁷⁶Lo Shih-ting, "On the Struggle between the Restoration and Anti-restoration in the Course of the Establishment of Chin Dynasty - The Social Structure of The Polemic between the Confucian and Legalist Schools", RED FLAG, No. 11. 1971, pp. 30-40.

⁷⁷"Study on Salt and Iron - Big Polemic between the Confucian and Legalist Schools in the Middle Western Han Dynasty", RED FLAG, No. 5, 1974, pp. 12-19.

paper once again applied the method of "using ancient matters to satirise the present", and indicated: The conference on salt and iron held in 81 B.C. (6 years after young Emperor Chao succeeded to the throne of Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty) was virtually a big polemic between the Confucian and Legalist schools in the political, economic, military and cultural fields.... The theme of the conference on salt and iron was the question of whether to persist in or alter Emperor Wu's political line on consolidating national unity and strengthening the Central government.... As soon as the conference on salt and iron began, they (Prime Minister, General Huo Kuang and many others) ferociously launched their attack. The aim of their attack was the government salt and iron monopoly policy during the reign of Emperor Wu. They appeared to be attacking an economic problem, but hiding behind the attack was a vicious and dangerous political motive. It is known that the implementation of the government salt and iron monopoly policy was one of Emperor Wu's important measures to strengthen the Central government's power and cope with the Huns during the Han Dynasty. Nullification of this policy meant destruction of the material base for a series of other domestic and foreign policies to strengthen the Central government. At the conference on salt and iron, the debate between the Legalist and Confucianists on domestic policy centred on the question of whether the state should remain unified or be divided.... Carrying on the cause started by Ch'inshihhuang, Emperor Wu of Han Dynasty resolutely suppressed local tyrants in order to strengthen the centralism of the state and insure the smooth implementation of the policy on the government salt and iron monopoly.

These papers highly praised Ch'inshihhuang for his suppression of Confucians as well as the substitution of the system of prefectures and counties for the feudal system, and emphasised the importance of strengthening the centralism of the state by applying the case of the conference on salt and iron in 81 B.C. Its aim was, applying the method of "using ancient matters to satirise the present", to criticise Lin Piao and commanders of

military regions, who were usually the concurrent first secretary of the Provincial Party Committee and director of the Revolutionary Committee, for arrogating all powers in the party, government and the army to themselves. Moreover, the papers intended to lay the theoretic basis for a series of measures, the transfer of commanders among the 8 great military regions and the assignment of the first political and first secretary by the CCPCC, to ensure the centralised control of the party over the regional party, government and the army.

In addition to the above, in February 1974, the *Red Flag* carried a paper, *The Study 'On Feudalism' by Liu Tsung-yüan of the T'ang Dynasty*. The paper constantly mentioned "The vassals' occupation of territory", and "the arrogant and imperious vassals often quarrelled with Central Government in Changan for the independence of it's territory", and concluded that "the cause for their rebellion was "having the armed forces", and thus "the control of the army was of the most important".⁷⁸

Shortly after, the *Red Flag* carried another article, *What Determined Ch'in's Unification of China?*, in No. 3 in the same year, arguing that "Ch'in's unification was determined by Ch'inshihhuang's correct line, not by commanders' military success", and "under the correct line, the victory can be achieved even without capable commanders".⁷⁹

This two article was aimed at stressing the importance of the correct line, nullifying the military achievement of Lin Piao and other regional commanders. The so-called "correct line" was, of course, Mao's line of "party commands the gun", of "politics takes the lead", and of "opposing purely military viewpoint". In other words, only party commands the

⁷⁸Chou Yi-liang, "The Study 'On Feudalism' by Liu Tsung-yüan of the Tang Dynasty", *RED FLAG*, No. 2, 1974, pp. 32-39.

⁷⁹Li Shih, "What Determined Chin's Unification of China?", *RED FLAG*, No. 3, 1974, pp. 15-21.

gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party.

After the Tenth CCP National Congress, the political role of the PLA began to weaken. The phenomena of military representation in all bodies, of making no distinction between the party and the army, or even of "the army control the party" during the Cultural Revolution was gradually diminished. Nevertheless, the historical background of the dual-role elite of the PLA, the political role of the army could only be weakened, but would never be rooted out. One of the best proofs was that among the full and alternate members of the Tenth CCP National Congress, over 25 percent were military men.

It was noteworthy that Mao had not encountered much resistance from the army in weakening the party and political power of militarist in the central and locality. Of course, Mao's approach of carrying out the purge or transfer by stages and in group, paying attention to the stability of the army, had much to contribute to it, but, moreover, there were another two important factors.

The first, Mao's authority had made him became the "supreme leader" worshipped by the military. Be loyal to the "supreme leader" became a part of the doctrine of the PLA. This personality cult enabled Mao to carry out his personnel changes in the PLA smoothly, and thus when Mao issued a order to transfer or dismiss some high-rank military leaders, it undoubtedly carried absolute authority and legitimacy.

And the second, Lin Piao's clique purged many military leader other than Fourth Field Army for the seizure of power during the Cultural Revolution. This had caused the disapproval of outside Lin's faction and made too many enemies. Once Lin had fallen, Lin's clique would certainly became the prime target of attack. Consequently, when Mao issued an order to transfer these people, the great majority would only be too happy to see

it done.

Chapter VII. Conclusion

Characteristically, although not universally, the political structure in a developing country came to be marked by three salient phenomena: the repeated emergence of armed patron - client sets, cemented by personal ties of dominance and sub-mission, and by a common desire to obtain wealth by force of arms; the lack of institutionalised means for succession to offices; and the use of violence in political competition.¹ Furthermore, civil-military relations in any society reflect the overall nature and level of development of the society and its political system. The key question is the extent to which military men and interests are differentiated from non-military men and interests. This differentiation may take place on three levels, namely, the relation between the armed forces as a whole and society as a whole; the relation between the leadership of the armed forces as an elite group and other elite groups; and the relation between the commanders of the armed forces and the top political leaders of society.²

In addition to all of the above, the political role of the military appeared differently according to the special features of a nation's structure. For example, the function of the PLA, basically, was to firstly to defend the nation from external attack and to deter such an attack if possible; secondly to counter internal threats to the regime in order to maintain order and stability, by directing police forces and public security forces, which in turn were backed up by army regulars; thirdly to provide inspiration for the people as a symbol of ideological and political devotion which the leadership expects; fourthly to exercise an important portion of political leadership, particularly through its inter-looking systemic connections with the party hierarchy; and finally to guarantee and support Chinese foreign

¹Eric R. Wolf & Edward C. Hansen, "Caudillo Politics: A Structural Analysis", *COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY*, No. 9, 1967, p. 169.

²*INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE*, Vol. II, (The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, 1968), p. 487.

policy.³ The function of the PLA covered a wide range of areas, and as in most developing countries, it could not remain politically neutral. The PLA, however, had never intervened in politics, and this was a major difference from other developing countries. It always followed the leadership of the Party. Moreover, the special characteristics of PLA's organisational structure and of its dual-role elite had direct and influential significance to the development of the political role of the PLA.

It should be noted that the formation of the political role of the PLA was derived from Mao's principle of "party commands the gun". Although Mao continually stressed the political functions of the PLA, his view different from Carl von Clausewitz's assertion that "War is the policy by other means".⁴ The main function of the army, fundamentally, was to safeguard national security. In Mao's view, however, politics were the highest priority as he said before, "politics is the commander, is the soul", all policies must be subordinate to politics. Mao's concept of politics was also nothing like that of the democratic countries. His politics, in reality, is another word for struggle and clearly still remained at the stage of people's war. Mao regarded the military as merely the peasant in uniform. Since the peasant was the tool for revolution, the military, without a doubt, could only be a tool as well.

Like the army of those successive dynasties since the Ch'in (221B.C. - 207B.C), the peasant also constituted the major force of the PRC's army. However, if one compares it with that of each successive dynasty in Chinese history, the cardinal difference was that, the army of Mao's was imbued with the thorough teaching of political ideology and was given a high degree of political responsibility. This political function of the PLA was

³Jason C. Hu, "On the Influence of the PLA in Post-Mao PRC Politics" in Jürgen Domes (ed.), *CHINESE POLITICS AFTER MAO*, (Cardiff: University College Press, 1979), p. 88.

⁴For details of Clausewitz arguments refer to C. Reynolds, *THE POLITICS OF WAR*, op. cit., pp. 59-83.

gradually strengthened when Lin Piao replaced P'eng Te-huai as the Minister of National Defence in 1959 and reached its peak during the Cultural Revolution. As mentioned in Chapter II, the function of the PLA in politics was determined at the "Sanwan Reorganisation" in September 1927 and the "Kutien Conference" in December 1929. The "Sanwan Reorganisation" was the foundation of the PRC's implementation of a Party Committee System in the army. Although it also touched upon the system of political works of the PLA, in reality the quality of the constituent members of the PLA was poor, the system of political works was not sound enough to put into practice. The "Kutien Resolution" clearly declared that "military affairs are only one means of accomplishing political tasks, the army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution". In the "resolution", Mao explicitly opposed the "purely military viewpoint" and stressed that "the Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution".⁵

The military policy of integration between soldiers and peasants was an important policy in the history of China. It was debatable whether "all soldiers are peasants" or "all peasants are soldiers", The army based on peasants was likely to be restrained by the characteristics of Chinese social structure and by Confucian morals. Most soldiers possessed the following traits: being loyal to autocratic authority or central authority, and "Loyalty" as perfect morality; having certain respect and fear towards autocratic authority, fear of punishment by superiors; and the army, in name, is the nation's army, but, in reality, is the autocratic authority's army, and therefore they potentially play an important role in politics.

Moreover, the CCP's Revolution was one based on peasant support and led by a small


⁵"On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party (Dec. 1929)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. I (1975), op. cit., p. 105.*

number of intellectuals. In the initial stage of party-building, an intellectual usually had to be in charge of party's work, or to be a commander to direct the peasant uprising. At the stage of army-building, the responsible cadres of the party in the central or the locality were normally political commissars in the army. Therefore, among leaders of the CCP revolutionary generation, most of them were dual-role elites from a political and a military background. The party and military leadership had no significant differentiation and were controlled by the same organisation. After its regime was founded in 1949, the party leaders of the revolutionary generation not only occupied important posts in the party and the army, but also became administrative bureaucrats of various government organisations. Based on such a unique structure combination of party, military, and government, hence, the overlapping between various roles and functions in the PRC political system can be seen in many cases.

The unique structure of dual or multi-role elites accounts for the reason why the ultimate political principle of the "party commands the army" or of the "party commands the gun", on which Mao insisted was never opposed publicly by the military bureaucrats. This also accounts for one of the reasons why the praetorian political system did not appear during Mao's regime. PRC is a typical nation of "party commands the army". It should be noted that the scope and depth for PLA to participate in politics depended entirely on how much the leader or the authorities had to rely on the army. The army never took the initiative, but was, rather, passive in its participation in politics.

To analyse from the intensity of military intervention in politics, civil-military relations can normally be illustrated by the application of the Mathematical concept of a continuum, shown as follows:⁶

⁶*Occupational opinion group, which expresses or lobbies for certain interests and policies, but exerts relatively little or no political pressure. Pressure interest group, which exerts pressure on decision-*



Note: → Increase of Military Influence
 ← Decrease of Military Influence

At left end, the complete civilian rule represents the non-existence of military participation in political affairs, at right end, the direct military rule represents all the political power controlled by the military. Because of Mao's supreme position in the Party and the PLA's unique structure, neither the complete civilian rule, nor the veto elite group or the direct military rule appeared in the PLA. The PLA simply raised from the occupational opinion group to the competitive elite group according to Mao's wish.

Mao's view concerning military power was quite candid and straightforward. He indicated that "every communist must grasp the truth, 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun', our principle is that the party commands the gun and the gun must never be allowed to command the party".⁷ In order to guard against the appearance of the "gun commands the party", Mao deliberately controlled the army through the direct involvement of a power system and personnel arrangement in politics, the military as well as the Party. He further intensified his control over the army to the extent of absolute loyalty to himself alone by developing a personality cult in all political campaigns. It was because of this that Mao held a special viewpoint about the political role of the military, he in reality did not care for the importance of the political role of militarists, or whether they were strong

making in political affairs but remains outside the decision-making elite. Competitive elite group, which produces considerable influence. Veto elite group, which having the might to veto any decision that goes against its interest but falling short of the decisive power to realise a new decision totally on its own initiative.

See Jason C. Hu, "On the Influence of the PLA in Post-Mao PRC Politics" in Jürgen Domes (ed.), *CHINESE POLITICS AFTER MAO*, op. cit., p. 86.

⁷"Problems of War and Strategy (6 Nov. 1938)", *SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE TUNG*, Vol. II (1965), op. cit., p. 224.

or weak, what he insisted on was the effective control of the army and to ensure his supreme position in the army. The political campaigns of the PLA, he argued, at all times should follow his absolute leadership and should proceed under the general principle of consolidating Maoist ideology. Any political movements in the army should stick to the principle of "safeguard chairman Mao's military line" and "support the central committee led by chairman Mao". Any militarist showing a slight difference in his political standing or anyone whom Mao subjectively believed did not or possibly would not follow his leadership absolutely was criticised. The incidents of Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih, P'eng Te-huai, Lo Jui-ch'ing and Lin Piao were examples of this.

The national conference of the Chinese communist Party, passed the "Resolution on the Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih anti-party Alliance" on 31 March 1955.⁸ Kao and Jao were denounced on the grounds that "Their only program was to seize the supreme power of the party and the state by conspiratorial means".⁹

The incident of "Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance" had two impacts on the development of the political role of the PLA: firstly, Mao took the first step of weakening the regional commanders so as to consolidate his control over the local armies, and finally, Lin Piao successfully escaped the consequences of the purge of Kao-Jao, and preserved the actual strength of the Fourth Field Army which was led by him. This contributed to his rise because Mao had to rely on him and the PLA's forces to carry out the struggle against Liu Shao-ch'i. The rise of Lin Piao also put an end to the professional army-building program promoted by P'eng Te-huai in his tenure as Minister of National Defence.

⁸"Resolution on the Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih Anti-Party Alliance (31 Mar. 1955)", *PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1979 - A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY*, Vol. I, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-161; *WHO'S WHO AND EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY*, *op. cit.*, pp. 377-378. For details of Kao-Jao Anti-party event please refer to Chapter V, Section I.

⁹"An Analysis of Kao-Jao Anti-Party Event", Yao Heng-Hsüen (ed.), *A SUMMARY OF INNER-PARTY STRUGGLE OF THE CCP*, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

Following the Kao-Jao incident, other important events, which had substantial impact on the development of the political role of the PLA, were P'eng Te-huai's appointment of Minister of National Defence in September 1954 and the convening of the "Eighth CCP National Congress" in September 1956. The Eighth CCP National Congress passed the resolution to enumerate Marxism-Leninism instead of Mao Tse-tung's thought as the guiding principle for the party in the "General Program" of the new Party Constitution, and thus the General Program of the old Party Constitution adopted by the Seventh CCP National Congress stating "Mao Tse-tung thought - the theory which integrates Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution - as the guide in all its work".¹⁰

Both military and politics are the same sub-system of the state, and there exists a relationship of transaction between them, but in a well democratised country, the role of the military should be in military instead of political affairs, that is, apart from the task of national defence, the military should not intervene in political or social movements, and the military should not wield their armed forces to seize political power. Furthermore, the recruitment of military elite should have standard procedures and confine to laws. The army can only belong to the state, not to any political party, and should pledge its loyalty to the government, instead of an individual.

Prior to the Eighth CCP National Congress, after P'eng Te-huai became Minister of National Defence, he had attempted to reconstruct Maoist revolutionary and politicised army into a modernised armed force, This had offended Mao. Moreover, Mao's crisis consciousness was further strengthened at the Eighth CCP National Congress when it passed the resolution to remove Mao Tse-tung's thought from the Party Constitution of

¹⁰*"On the Party", THE SELECTED WORKS OF LIU SHAO-CH'I, Vol. I (1984), op. cit., p. 315.*

Seventh CCP National Congress, which was considered as the prerequisite for turning the PLA in a professional and regular national army and for the discarding of personality cult. In view of this, after the Eighth CCP National Congress, Mao began to reconstruct the army to ensure "red" above "expert" and the long-standing tradition of "party command the gun", and to further secure his supreme leadership.

The Eighth CCP National congress was undoubtedly the beginning of the CCP's attempt to take the road of collective leadership. To Mao, it was a challenge to his power, Mao of course could not accept this. After the Eighth CCP National Congress, Mao's reconstruction of the army was aimed at consolidating the control of the "barrel of a gun". The Lushan conference in 1959, where Mao successfully turned the original anti-left struggle into the anti-right struggle and where P'eng Te-huai's fate was decided, had clearly confirmed Mao's peerless prestige in the Army and the Party. The removal of Mao Tse-tung's thought in the Party Constitution of the Eighth CCP National Congress did not violate Mao's authoritative leadership. While Mao did not feel enhanced because of this, the sense of power insecurity forced Mao to expand military political influence to a even larger extent. Consequently, by Mao's appeal, the military had expanded their political role, provided they were subordinated to the absolute leadership of Mao. Basically, the political power of the militarists should never endanger the authority of Mao's supreme leadership, otherwise a purge was inescapable. In other words, the army only played a dependent variable in politics, Mao himself was the real independent variable.

The experience of the Korean war undoubtedly had a profound effect on the army-building program of the PLA. P'eng Te-huai, who once was the commander of "Chinese People's volunteers" for the "struggle to resist US aggression and aid Korea", ordered all members of the PLA to study intensively all the advanced experiences of the Soviet forces, to acquire the art of modern war, to obey orders, observe discipline, and struggle to assure

victory in each military operation. This marked the beginning of a concentrated effort thoroughly to professionalise and regularise the armed forces in imitating soviet military ethic and style.

During the Korean war, the advent of extreme-professionalism in the PLA seriously undermined the credibility of the commissars especially at the unit level, his traditional right to countersign all orders was frequently ignored, especially at the company level where battle pressures were most acute.

The accomplishment of military tasks was an essential prerequisite of Pang's army-building program of regularisation and professionalisation. Military training therefore had to increase considerably, while other political and non-military tasks must decrease in proportion. Based on this condition, not only the role of political commissars and members of the party committee must be restricted, but their power and responsibility must also be reduced, and thus the principle of "party commands the army" and the fundamental essence of the "army is the fighting group as well as working team", which were determined by the "Sanwan reorganisation" and "Kutien conference", would also be questioned. The army-building program of Pang's was in essence in confrontation with the principle of Mao's "party commands the gun" and "politics takes the lead".

At the Lushan conference in 1959, P'eng was classified as the "anti-party group" and of being a "representative of rightist opportunism attacking the party". Mao accused P'eng of "recruiting men and buying horses" and being "overweeningly ambitious".¹¹ On 1 June 1966, the editorial of the *Liberation Army's Daily* clearly pointed out the reason for P'eng's fall from power, it stated "the chief members of the anti-party group that were

¹¹"Mao Tse-tung's speech at the Eighth Plenary Session of the CCP's Eighth Central Committee", *ISSUES AND STUDIES*, Vol. VI, No. 7, (April 1970), pp. 80-86.

exposed by the party in the Lushan conference, making use of their power that seized from the army, attempted to abolish the absolute leadership, of the party in the army and political work,... abolish local forces and militia, and fundamentally negating Mao's people's army and the ideology of the people's war".¹²

After P'eng fell from power, Lin Piao replaced him as Minister of National Defence and was promoted to the post as the First Vice-chairman of the CCPCC Military Commission, and handled its day-to-day works. Immediately after Lin Piao assumed power, he delivered the paper *March Ahead Under the Red Flag of the Party General Line and Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking*,¹³ this was an important article in determining the political role of the PLA. The paper criticised and nullified P'eng's professional and regular army-building program, and re-established the political tradition of "party commands the gun".

It was noteworthy, the PRC fell into a strategic predicament facing a possible pincer attack from the United States and the Soviet Union as two potential enemies. This was the biggest threat to the PRC's national security which Lin had to encounter after he becoming the Minister of National Defence. On the one hand, Lin had to pacify the army's morale and eradicate P'eng's influence in the army, terminate the army-building policy of learning from the Soviet Union, and brought the army back to the traditional line of Maoist "political army building", On the other hand, Lin had to find a way to deal with the military threat from the United States and the Soviet Union to safeguard it's national security. Within these circumstances, at the early stage of Lin's tenure as Minister of National Defence, the relationship between the military line and politics was in practice some kind of compromise. However, this situation changed as the inner power struggle

¹²LIBERATION ARMY'S DAILY, 1 June, 1966.

¹³"March Ahead Under the Red Flag of the Party General Line and Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking", PEOPLE'S DAILY, 29 Sept. 1959.

expanded and Lin Piao promoted the personality cult of Mao. The PLA entered an era of being a "political tool".

During Lin's tenure as Minister of the National Defence, his struggle with Lo Jui-ch'ing, the Chief of the General Staff, had profound political significance. The fall of Lo Jui-ch'ing and the purge of Liu Shao-ch'i at the early stage of the Cultural Revolution both represented an important course of political operation. That was, the significance of the military role in the power struggles. The failure of Liu Shao-ch'i was due to his neglect of a decisive role of military in the politics; being a "professional revolutionist", Liu underestimated the importance of militarists. Moreover, at the 1959 Lushan conference when the situation was unfavourable to Mao, Liu did not wield his power in the army to support P'eng Te-huai's stand wholly, the loss of P'eng also meant the loss of the army set up by P'eng's professionalised army building which could had been a supporting force to his power consolidation. Lo opposed Lin's army-building principle of "giving prominence to politics", which means, from Mao's viewpoint, he also opposed Mao's principle of "politics takes the lead". Lin was Mao's proxy to carry out Maoist army-building program. Lo not only promoted "Grand Military Contest" in the armed forces, but his policy to aid Vietnam war was in opposition to that of Lin's. Lo's fate to be purged was doomed.

At the time of rising crisis of the Vietnam war in 1965, in the policy to aid Vietnam, outwardly, the conflict between Lin Piao and Lo Jui-ch'ing could be regarded as the conflict between two different directions of army building, that was, Lin laid the stress on revolutionisation, while Lo emphasised the importance of modernisation. But, inwardly, it was the conflict of their personalities and of power distribution. Lin Piao was a power that Mao used to control and reorganise the army, Mao relied on him for bringing a strong political figure to the army in order to ensure that the army would carry out the political

task Mao entrusted to it. Above all, one of his objectives was the overthrow of Liu Shao-ch'i. Lo failed to appreciate the true situation and opposed Lin, Mao had no other choice but to sacrifice Lo. The debate over military policy towards the Vietnam war had nothing to do with the real military issue. It was merely another confrontation in the power struggle.

Yet, the intensity of the struggle against Lo had an ulterior motive, Mao and Lin hoped that the struggle against Lo could lure Lo's followers into a trap, smash the non-Lin's faction in the PLA, and eradicate all dissidents in the party who were against Lin's "politics takes the lead" so as to boost the development of Cultural Revolution.

After the fall of Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao took his chance to seize power. His status as "Mao's close comrade-in-arms and successor" and as Minister of National Defence enabled him to possess power both in name and in reality, and thus enlarge his real forces. Lin's ambitions and vigorous attempt to extend his political power, in essence, had run counter to Mao's principle. This brought about a change in the relationship between Mao and Lin. To analyse it from the viewpoint of "alienation" which came from the Marxist doctrine, Lin Piao, as an object, was transformed into an alienating force and conversely threatened the subject Mao's position, he simply refused to accept this fact. At the Second Plenum of Ninth CCPCC, Lin Piao insisted on the issue of re-establishing the chairman of the PRC, the struggle between him and Mao was brought out into the open. One month after the Second Plenum, On 14 October, The *Red Flag* published an article *Reinforce the Party Nature of Proletariat Class*¹⁴ to criticise Lin and clearly express Mao's standpoint.

The rise and fall of Lin Piao exemplified the real political and military strength of Mao. In

¹⁴"Reinforce the Party Nature of Proletariat Class", *RED FLAG*, No. 11, 1970, pp. 17-20.

fact, no matter how much Lin had expanded his political and military power, he was still subjected to Mao's control. Once Mao withdrew his support, the power of Lin Piao had been based on the kind of dependent power structure which could be terminated immediately. The biggest mistake Lin made was that he really considered himself as Mao's close comrade-in-arms and successor, and the number two figure of the whole nation expanding his military and political power without reservation. Lin ignored Mao's real intention and his belief that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun".

Moreover, if one observes from the election of full and alternate members of the CCPCC, one could roughly reveal the evolution of the political role of the PLA. In summary, the "Seventh CCP National Congress" in 1945 and the "Ninth CCP National Congress" in 1969 were the two stages that militarists occupied highest political status in the central government. The two stages provided the PLA best opportunity to expand its political role. 1945 was the year that the CCP started an overall civil war with the Kuomintang government. Since the Military elite were the real heroes who fought to win the PRC's regime and in view of their dual role of the party and army, the importance of the military elite in the Party grew as the war became more vigorous. This was confirmed from the numbers of the election of full and alternate members of the Seventh CCPCC. Among the 44 full and 33 alternate members, 23 full and 18 alternate members were militarist, occupying a high proportion of approximately 50 percent of the total numbers.

The Ninth CCP National Congress convened in April 1969. It was a victorious conference for Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao in their struggle against Liu Shao-ch'i. Lin, as Mao's prime proxy, had rendered great service to Mao, Mao had to give Lin and Lin's faction certain tangible benefits, and thus the military were allowed to enter into the arena of the CCPCC. The Ninth CCP National Congress elected 170 full and 109 alternate members of the Ninth CCPCC. Among all, 77 full and 50 alternate members were from the military,

occupying approximately 45 percent of the total numbers.

The "Eighth CCP National Congress" and "Tenth CCP National Congress" were two stages that produced a dramatic fall in the PLA's political status. By 1956, the CCP had gone through the Korean war and began its first five year plan. In politics, it had established a solid ruling foundation and could effectively control the whole nation; in economics, the preliminary socialist reform had been completed on the whole, and it was regaining its strength that was seriously damaged during the civil war; On the military front, the Korean war had just finished, Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan and no longer constituted an important threat to mainland China, and the Sino-Soviet friendship treaty and military co-operation was on the way. Such was the background to the convening of the Eighth CCP National Congress. Since the Eighth CCP National Congress was focused on the economic works of the socialist society and the inner-party struggle was not yet brought out into open, it was natural that the political status of the PLA declined and its political role shrank. Among the 97 full and 73 alternate members of the Eighth CCPCC, 36 full and 24 alternate members were military men, occupying about 35 percent of its all. A decrease of 22 percent compares to that of the Seventh CCPCC, and of 10 percent compared to that of the Ninth CCPCC. This ratio remained on the high side, because of the phenomena of dual role elite of militarist in the CCP, and that Mao had to look after those military cadres who followed him for many years and who had rendered great service to him.

The background for the convening of the Tenth CCP National Congress was to eradicate Lin Piao's influence and re-establish the political tradition of "party commands the gun". Therefore, among the 195 full and 124 alternate members of the Tenth CCPCC, 52 full and 25 alternate members were military men, occupying only about 24 percent of its all, a 33 percent decrease compared to the Seventh CCPCC, and a 21 percent decrease

Compared to the Ninth CCPCC. The reason that army remained able to maintain 24 percent was because Mao still depended on the army to settle the social unrest and chaos accompanied by the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, Mao had responsibility for the occurrence of Lin's Piao's incident, to restrict the attack to the range of Lin's clique, would only be too beneficial to himself.

The above personnel arrangement of the CCPCC reflected two characteristics of the political role of the PLA.

1. The change of the proportion of the PLA in the Central Committee reflected Mao's recognition about what kind of the political role that PLA should play at each stage. Mao's attitude determined the political role of the PLA.

2. The phenomena of the dual role of military elite and party elite and the special character of the homogeneity of the army and party brought militarists entered into political arena. The principle of the "party commands gun" was still highly respected, and thus, militarists still restrained under the control of the party although they occupied a high proportion in the members and alternate members of the CCPCC.

Furthermore, the proportion of the PLA in the central and local organs could only briefly sketch the political role of the PLA. It is uncertain how much the function could be elaborated by this role in its power operation. This was because they remained constrained by the following reasons:

1. Military had different factional interests. Military of different faction arranged in a same personnel organisation represented not only the significance of the expansion of political role of the PLA, but also had a symbolic meaning of mutual power balance.

2. Although the military entered into the political arena of the central and the local government, the scope of its power operation was still highly depended on Mao's attitude. There may be a situation that the military did not handle political tasks properly, but it was only a special case, Mao remained control the final arbitration.

Generally speaking, in a high political institutionalised country, the army should have loyalty to the government, not to the ideological or military leader. However, this was not applicable in the case of China under Mao's domination for Mao was a charismatic leader. He played an important role in the political development of the PLA, and therefore had the ability to change the style of power operation. Mao in practice faithfully practised Ludwig Feuerbach's concept of "religious alienation" during his domination of China. By the hand of Lin Piao and the PLA, Maoist thought and *The Quotation of Mao Tse-tung* became almost the bible of the Chinese people. His image was cast in the mould of an omnipresent, mighty God, and became the sword of Maoist domination and Maoist religion, whether in the army or in politics. After Mao was cast in the mould of God, he used this power and position as God to transform his criticism of the old society, class, party line and the viewpoint of purely military, into criticism towards his close comrade-in-arms and his successor. Neither Kao, Jao, P'eng, Lo, nor Lin had denied the fundamental principle of "party commands the gun", or dissented from the authoritative leadership of Mao in essence. All of them recognised Mao's parental position in the Chinese communist family. Nevertheless they were eliminated for transmitting their discontent of certain Maoist policies, or attempting to acquire more power from him, indeed this made Mao suspicious of their loyalty and thus adopted vigorous measures to deal with it. The evolution of the political role of the PLA had nothing to do with the matter of political intervention. The PLA's participation in the politics, whether weak or strong, was always restrained by the supreme leadership of the party. The principle of "party commands the gun" was not only what Mao personally insisted on, but it was also highly respected by all military elites.

Furthermore, with regard to the PLA, since the countryside and social infrastructure constituted its source, only if it didn't run counter to Mao's ideology and his authority of leadership, could it continue to enjoy its special position in society and the status arising therefrom. Although Mao constantly advocated the importance of the proletarian revolution, the PLA would never apply "class suicide" to return to the vagabond proletarian class on its own accords, under such circumstances, a unique bureaucratic system had thus formed, the PLA had to follow Maoist thought and thus became his personal political weapon. Since Mao controlled the distribution of class interest in the army, it became necessary for PLA to give their absolute support if they wished to secure its vested interests. The political tradition of the PLA formed under such a structure, worshipping an idol, not a institution. Mao at all times controlled the military power of the PRC and directed the development of the PLA.



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