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Citizenship: A Multi-Faceted Concept?

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September 1997

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## Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to challenge the universalistic concept of citizenship. Throughout the thesis it will be argued that citizenship is a multi-faceted concept irreducible to a singular explanation. Arguably, the universal nature of citizenship has been called into question by the process of globalisation from 'above' and by regionalism from 'below'.

However, the belief that the nation-state is moribund is a fallacious assumption, and it will be shown that although the power of the nation-state has indeed been curbed - through, for example, the activities of 'Transnational Corporations' and 'Global Communications Networks' - it is still a key player in determining citizenship rights. To consider the nation-state to be irrelevant is to undermine the strong psychological influence it still exerts.

Nevertheless, citizenship must begin to look beyond the universal to the particular, and begin to encompass the notion of 'difference', as arguably citizenship as well as being a legal status is also a source of identity. In its present state, citizenship is militating against certain groups, and if harmony is to be maintained within society then citizenship must be an inclusive category.

This thesis does not pretend to provide the definitive answer to 'what is a citizen', it is an exploration of a highly complex concept, which is not reducible to one snappy sound-bite. However, ultimately, because of the complex nature of citizenship, there must be a reconsideration of the universality of citizenship, and 'difference' must be encompassed to fit with the diversity of cultures experienced within societies.

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## Introduction

Of late, the concept of citizenship has been amongst the key political debates, with politicians from all parts of the political spectrum claiming they have the definitive answer to 'what is a citizen', and what is the 'role of a citizen'?

However the notion of citizenship is not only confined to the realm of the politician, but has now become the topic of discussion amongst academics, (Kymlicka & Norman: 1994, Dahrendorf: 1996, Roche: 1992). The philosophical musing of academics about what constitutes a citizen seems to be fairly inconsequential when dealing with day to day issues, though realistically nothing could be further from the truth. Day to day experiences are altered according to whether we are afforded citizenship status or not.

Considering the abundance of debates surrounding citizenship, such as do individuals have to perform duties as well as being claimers of 'rights'? are we, for example, in Britain, citizens of the United Kingdom alone, or of a greater unit such as Europe? Does being a citizen imply we have equality before the law, or is it the case that the old adage of some being more equal than others applies? All these questions impact upon our lives, and also show the true nature of citizenship, that it is multi-faceted and problematic to define.

This thesis will therefore examine the difficulties encountered by attempting to retain a universal concept of citizenship in modern society, and will argue that it is only by analysing the many facets of citizenship - how notions of citizenship have been affected by globalisation, how new issues of nationality and belonging affect the whole debate, and finally how the changing position of

women has encouraged new definitions of what it means to be a 'citizen' - that we can arrive at a fuller understanding of the multi-faceted nature of the term.

There is little consensus amongst academics as to which 'realm' the citizen should belong. Some say the citizen should be active and responsible to an autonomous region, though the devolution debate is hotly contested between those who want to see regions independent of the nation-state, (Tassin: 1992, Salmond: 1997), and those who believe that the citizen will be best served by the regional bodies that remain within the remit of the nation-state, (Healey: 1996, Mulgan: 1996). There are other commentators who would argue that the nature of citizenship should be firmly anchored within the nation-state as a whole, (Thatcher: 1993), whilst others proffer evidence of the nation-state being in decline, and therefore citizenship should be defined in supra-national terms, such as citizenship of the European Union, (Tindale: 1996, Meehan: 1993). To add to the profusion of arguments, there is also the debate about whether citizenship is entering a 'post-national' phase, which even renders supra-national identity as obsolete, with citizenship being found not within a territorially defined sphere, but being attached to individuals under the auspices of human rights, (Soysal: 1996), and of course intersecting all these debates are concerns of class, gender and race.

This thesis will therefore begin by examining some of the history behind citizenship. The debate will commence with an examination of Greek citizenship, in particular the work of Aristotle, as arguably, his work on citizenship can be described as seminal. The discussion will then leap forward to consider the beginning of the modern concept of citizenship, that being the 'liberal tradition'. It is not the intention to negate the importance of the period between Greek

citizenship and the 'liberal tradition', especially the period of Roman citizenship, but space does not permit anything but the briefest foray into the ancient roots of the idea. The impact of the 'three revolutions' as Roche (1996) describes the upheavals in France, USA and England, will be discussed to assess their impact on how the three countries have developed varying styles of citizenship. The three philosophers connected mostly with the varying models of citizenship, Rousseau, Montesquieu and Locke will be examined.

The evolution of citizenship will then be considered, that is, how citizenship became to encompass social rights along with civil and political rights. Again, whilst acknowledging the contributions of earlier authors, the debate must move swiftly to more modern influences, in particular the work of T H Marshall and how he perceived citizenship as a universal condition. There is currently a debate raging as to whether social citizenship has created a dependent client group, where citizenship is not an Aristotelian ideal of civic duty, but has been aligned consistently with the notion of entitlement. Therefore the chapter will conclude with a discussion about whether this is really the case, or perhaps we are now experiencing a true Marshallian concept of citizenship, where the burden of social care is considered not to be primarily the burden of the state, and that assistance should come from other sources such as voluntary agencies, family and community as well as the state.

Chapter two, will then consider the impact of globalisation on citizenship, and how the process of globalisation has undermined the notion of universality. It will be argued that globalisation has fragmented societies, and this has created the conditions for considering notions of 'difference'. The chapter will begin by defining what is meant by 'globalisation', as the concept of globalisation

sometimes does seem to be much used but seldom defined, with commentators such as Hutton (1997) describing the term as the new 'buzzword'. Two key issues of globalisation, the activities of Transnational Corporations (TNC's) and global communications will be examined to assess their impact on citizenship. The final discussion in this chapter will centre around whether in the face of globalisation, the nation-state can be the custodian of citizenship rights. The aspect of human rights will be explored and it will be queried whether we have really reached a stage where human rights supersede citizenship rights, and whether citizenship is truly in a 'post-national' phase.

Chapter three, will look specifically at the European issue and citizenship and how the issue of who can rightly claim to be a member of a European country, has seemingly sparked some of our worst traits of petty nationalism. How citizenship has normally been defined within the member states will be considered, so the reader has at least some knowledge of how history has informed the current debates. It is within this section that the debate concerning regional citizenship will be explored. In particular the work of Tassin (1992) will be examined, as thus far, research carried out for this thesis, has revealed that he has proffered some of the most radical arguments for developing autonomous regional bodies.

The European issue has arguably brought notions of 'difference' to the fore. Each layer of society from sub to supra has a different expectation of citizenship. Therefore this chapter will also discuss whether the three 'tiers' of government, sub, national and supra can ever be reconciled, and the needs of the various levels be articulated harmoniously, rather than what appears to be at present, a purely antagonistic relationship between the three. Therefore, there will be an examination of what the three tiers can 'offer', the supra-

national body can offer protection in the form of the 'Social Charter', and the sub-national can provide a more intimate bond, therefore it is envisaged that the nation-state will be used because it has a strong psychological link with people, and also it can act as a mediator between supra-national and sub-national to oversee the equitable distribution of resources.

Chapter four will deal specifically with feminism and citizenship. The rationale behind keeping women and citizenship as a subject for discussion on its own, is that it will be shown how many feminist writers believe that women are not being afforded equal rights to men, and under the current regime of liberal democracy probably never will. Thus this chapter will further consider the notion of 'difference', and how within feminism there are even different theories about 'difference'. Alternate strategies will be discussed to see whether a more equitable citizenship can be reached, one which encompasses the notion of 'difference' rather than universality.

Whilst not wishing to labour the remark, the aim of this thesis is to consider the facets of citizenship, and how citizenship is informed by debates as varied as globalisation to feminism. Therefore this work should be considered as a challenge to the notion of universality, almost a journey, exploring the term rather than something which can provide a definitive answer to what is a citizen.

## Aristotle to Present

### Examining the History of the Citizenship Debate

Debates on citizenship have raged through the centuries, though some would argue that the genesis of citizenship began in the Greek Polis, (Oliver & Heater: 1994, Heater: 1990, Manville: 1990). Therefore, in order to understand the meaning of citizenship as now known, it is essential the historical roots of the debates about citizenship are explored. If as stated earlier, citizenship began with the Greeks, then the starting point of this discussion will be the thoughts and works of Aristotle, as he has been described as being, "ranked amongst the greatest works of political philosophy... No philosophy before Aristotle has attempted to provide such a coherent and systematic study of the science of politics", (Everson, 1992, pix),

For Aristotle, citizenship is about exclusion. Slaves, for example were not given citizenship, as they were thought to be incapable of exercising any power of free choice or of making rational decisions. The ability to make rational decisions was important to Aristotle, as ultimately he likened irrational behaviour to that of animals, who did not have the power to reason. Citizens needed to have the power of reason as this meant that the excesses of nature were held in check, leading to harmony within the polis, where each citizen worked and acted for the good of others, (Manville: 1990, Russell: 1991).

Women and children were also excluded from full citizenship. Aristotle believed that women were hindered by their own biological make-up, their power to exercise any form of rationality being thwarted by their own bodies, (De Beauvoir: 1988). Women and children were given protection under the law, but were not allowed to

own property. Their relationship to the polis was via their male protector who could be a husband, father or other male relative. It is this sort of exclusion which marks Aristotle's work. Of slaves he states, "the master is only the master of the slave; he does not belong to him, whereas the slave is not only the slave of the master, but wholly belongs to him", (Everson, 1992 p6), and of women and children "a husband and father, we saw, rules over wife and children, both free, but the rule differs, the rule over his children being a royal, over his wife a constitutional rule", (Everson, 1992, p17).

Citizenship was awarded to men on the grounds of 'jus soli'. This means that in order to be granted the status of citizenship within the polis, a person had to be born in the polis. However in order to participate in the running of the polis, even Athenian males had to satisfy further obligations. They had to own property. Property ownership inferred a good solid character, (Oliver & Heater: 1994)

The cornerstone of Aristotle's polis, must be that the citizens shared an identity - albeit an elite exclusive one. They understood the laws and regulations of the polis, and by virtue of their moral and ethical code, were willing to abide by them. In effect then as Manville states,

"the polis of citizens requires a formal standard to distinguish who is a member and who is not. In other words, if set criteria for membership in the polis are lacking, the polis itself lacks identity... Aristotle's criteria for citizenship still points to the need for a fixed standard; there must be agreed upon rules (or laws) to determine who can and who cannot participate in the deliberative and judicial decisions", (1990: 40).

By understanding the regulatory codes of the polis, and by sharing a collective identity, it was hoped that harmony would be maintained. Aristotle believed men should work towards a

state of happiness, the citizen body should strive to reach this state by using moral, intellectual and ethical reasoning. Aristotle, it is thought, believed "by being compelled to acquire good habits we shall in time... come to find pleasure in performing good actions, (Russell, 1991, p185). Therefore, Aristotle's citizens were not 'rights' claimers, but were actively engaged in working for the good of the community.

The state of citizenship proposed by Aristotle was based on a strict social hierarchy, and on rigid boundaries of exclusion. Citizenship was therefore a much prized status, only available to a select few. Indeed when Aristotle discusses democracy in Book vi of *Politics*, he always links democracy with citizenship. Aristotle does seem to believe that all citizens should be treated equally, and that the will of the majority will always take precedent over the minority, he also states that citizens should have a right to vote irrespective of whether they are rich or poor, as stated,

"democracy and demos in their truest form are based upon the recognised principle of democratic justice, that all should count equally, for equality implies that the poor should have no more share in the government than the rich", (Everson, 1992, p145).

However, Aristotle does make a distinction between Athenian democracy, where everyone is afforded equality as long as they are a citizen, and what he describes as "extreme democracy", (Everson, 1992, p57), where the master learns the crafts of the "working classes", (Everson, 1992, p57).

This distinction is extremely important and axiomatic to the concept of Athenian citizenship. Democracy to Aristotle is only available for the select few upon whom citizenship has been conferred, the Athenian property owning male. Aristotle did not want 'extreme democracy' as this would dilute the hierarchy upon which Athenian citizenship was decided, the rigid class distinction between

free men and slaves, as Aristotle states if 'extreme democracy' was in operation then "there will cease to be a distinction between master and slave", (Everson, 1992, p57).

So to sum up , citizenship was a status enjoyed by an elite few. Women enjoyed certain privileges through their attachment to men, whilst foreigners only acquired certain rights, through their attachment to a sponsor, whilst slaves had no rights at all, being wholly owned by their masters. The good citizen was therefore a property owning native born male, willing to strive to reach a state of excellence in matters of intellectual, moral and ethical, so he could serve the Athenian community. He was not a rights claimer, but was duty bound to serve his fellow citizens, (Selbourne: 1994, Trigg: 1993).

### Citizenship and the Liberal Tradition

Citizenship during the period of the Greek City States was relatively easy to define, as the parameters were clearly marked, the City States were also small and manageable. With the onset of capitalism, the notion of citizenship became immediately more complex. The advent of the nation-state seemingly linked citizenship with national boundaries. Arguably, capitalism also heralded perhaps the biggest intellectual challenge for citizenship - the 'liberal tradition'. This concept pushed the boundaries of citizenship away from an association with the performance of duties, towards an association with entitlement to receive civil and political rights, though it must be noted that this did still exclude many - citizenship, for example, not being extended to women.

The advent of capitalism also called into question the validity of the notion of the 'Divine Right' of the monarchy. The reigning sovereign still had the Royal Prerogative and could

constantly undermine the wishes of Parliament. However by this time, Parliament was made up of amongst others, industrialists and others well versed in domestic and foreign policy.

Thus it was the case, that the men of money - although owning land and having status and prestige - still did not have any real rights of citizenship. They could still be dealt with arbitrarily according to the whimsical fancies of the monarch. There needed to be a contractual relationship between the governed and the governors. As Roche states,

"the practical emergence of modern understandings of citizenship in the West was associated particularly with the advent of capitalism and of centralised nation-states in the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries. Citizenship was finally given voice as a massively influential political concept in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by the world-historical events of the English, American and French revolutions", (1996: 16/17).

However, although Roche mentions the three revolutions together, apropos citizenship, there were some very differing ideas. The English citizen always equated itself with the propertied classes. As Hill (1963) states, "when members of parliament spoke in defence of 'liberty and property', they meant something more like 'privilege and property' than is conveyed by the modern sense of the word liberty", ( 1963: 38). Therefore like the citizens discussed by Aristotle, citizenship for the English remained a privilege enjoyed by an elite few. By contrast French citizenship was based on liberty, equality and fraternity', the qualities held by the person and not imbibed in property ownership. As Maclver states, "liberty, equality and fraternity were watchwords liable to diverse and dubious interpretations, but whatever else they implied they clearly stated that personality and not property was the true basis of representation", (1966: 144). This was significant as pre-revolutionary France, which theoretically did have a

concept of citizenship, was more likely to grant citizenship in "an ad-hoc manner in particular cases to make it accord with legal requirements about inheritance rights", (Brubaker, 1994, p39). France was riddled with a growing disaffection for the ruling aristocratic class and an immigration policy which was considered ill defined and unfair, (Brubaker: 1994).

Some commentators argue that Rousseau's philosophy influenced how the French constructed their 'model' of citizenship (Oliver & Heater:1994, Russell: 1991), whilst the Americans favoured the philosophy of Montesquieu (Heater: 1990). In order to understand more clearly the complex nature of citizenship, and particularly how difficult it is to discover an agreed definition transcending spatial and historical boundaries, we will consider the influential work of Rousseau and Montesquieu in the development of citizen identity in post-revolutionary France and America.

Rousseau's main philosophy and belief about human nature was that the individual was naturally good, but had become corrupted by society. Society for Rousseau, had created a situation where man could only form an identity in relation to others, he had lost the ability to exercise free will. Man was filled with the desire constantly to acquire what others had, this desire often outstripping the power to achieve greater power, wealth and so on, consequently, leaving him in a state of wretchedness.

Rousseau believed that, although man could not change the fact that he was a social being thus unable to exercise purely his individual will, he maintained the belief that individuals could achieve some form of internal harmony by realising that all actions had consequences. The 'doer' of a particular deed is answerable for the outcome and consequences of his actions.

Citizenship for Rousseau, was therefore about every man participating, and every man being bound by the same laws. Rousseau advocated the construction of a constitution, one which had been agreed upon by the whole citizen body. In Rousseau's society, every man is equal. As Oldfield states,

"as citizen, he is the equal of his fellows; as a body, they collectively determine the laws they are going to live under and acknowledge in obligation to obey... They achieve both civil and moral liberty and, in the process render themselves once more whole, but this time as morally autonomous beings", (1990: 75).

The genesis of the concept of 'liberty, equality and fraternity' as a political idea, can be seen as a coherent thread running through the philosophy of Rousseau. Meanwhile much the same can be said of Montesquieu's influence on the 'Founding Fathers' of America.

Montesquieu, believed in the idea of civic virtue - man should exercise moral power over his own urges for the good of others. Here individual and common good are intrinsically linked. However, the idea of civic virtue was according to Montesquieu really only able to function in the smaller city states known in history, as these units were considered to be the only places sufficiently intimate in order for one to appreciate and understand, that individual good does share a symbiotic relationship with collective good. For Montesquieu, individual and collective good existed in its purest form within the realms of the aristocracy. As Bellah et al state,

"for a specialised ruling group, an aristocracy, this conjunction of private and public identity is, other things being equal, more likely than it is in a democracy whose citizens spend most of their time in private affairs, taking part in government only part-time", (1985: 255).

Montesquieu's notion of civic virtue was accepted by those who were attempting to form the American

Constitution, excepting they had to somehow merge the ideals of civic virtue into an accepted working model for a burgeoning capitalist society. The 'Founding Fathers' therefore attempted to build on the ideal of 'goodness', linking it with merit, they hoped to replace the aristocracy with meritocracy, where people who deserved success got it and those who deserved to run the country were elected to office.

The ideal of civic virtue, as stated earlier, had to be adapted, for the new American Republic was a far different animal to the Greek city state. Americans, unlike the Greeks, prized liberty and freedom of will, believing that the individual was free to perform duties for others, only when his own needs and desires were satiated. For America, the ideal of freedom and individual rights has to be tempered with duty. It was Tocqueville who transformed Montesquieu's concept of civic virtue into 'enlightened self-interest'. Tocqueville argued that Americans were not particularly interested in being good and virtuous, but agreed that being a reasonably dutiful citizen was useful in that it ordered society, keeping it peaceful. Perhaps then the strong individual identity of the American was actually being given credence and sanctioned at this point.

Perhaps the most influential British writer on liberalism's concept of citizenship is John Locke. Locke believed that in the state of nature man is free, and that men are equal. He rejected the notion of divine right, but argued that while men are born free and equal, each individual has a responsibility not to let his actions impinge upon the liberty of others. Locke, therefore, proposed that it was every man's duty to control his own behaviour so as not to affect the next man. If this could not be done voluntarily, and Locke believed such harmony could not be achieved by voluntary action alone, because the state of nature is too unstable, then he proposed that men should affect

a way in which laws can be made to temper behaviour. Locke proposed a 'social contract', where a civil society is propagated and the rights of citizens are protected by those governing, but should those governing ever break the conditions where the rights of citizens are endangered, then the government can be disposed of and a new government can be elected, (Seliger: 1968).

Locke also believed that the ownership of property was of paramount importance. He linked the idea of property ownership with the idea of justice, he stated "where there is no property, there is no justice", (cited in Russell, 1991, p594). Locke persistently demonstrated that the key to freedom was ownership of property and that no authority should be able to take away a man's property without consent, as one commentator states, Locke perceived "private property as the epitome of the individual rights consecrated by the law of nature, which is the law of reason and of God", (Seliger, 1968, p18).

In summary, the differences between the three theorists are quite marked. Rousseau believed that it is the duty of every man to participate in public life, and that the whole of society should be bound by the same laws. Montesquieu held the view that citizenship was linked to the notion of civic duty, and it was the case that the aristocracy were in a better position to perform their civic duties. The American people, whilst accepting the basic tenets of Montesquieu's philosophy had to somehow adapt it to their needs. They bonded the notion of civic duty to merit and thus replaced an aristocratic conception of society with a meritocratic conception. Whilst Locke, believing all men are born free and equal, maintained that it was everyman's duty to act in a way that did not impinge upon another man's freedom.

## The Development of Social Citizenship

As it has been shown, political and civil citizenship had become to be a subject of debate during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, though it must be noted, that although citizenship was, as Roche has already stated, "a massively influential political concept in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries", (1992, 16/17), there was little consensus about the role. To an Englishman, citizenship was a status conferred on those with land; it was ultimately there to give those with economic interests a voice in parliament. In France citizenship was about freedom and equality, their society was ordered on citizens being caring social beings, whilst the American citizen was accepted as being someone with sufficient freedom to pursue their own goals. One thing they did all share was that citizenship was not a status given to women, this will be addressed in subsequent chapters.

It has been argued, certainly by commentators such as Marshall, that political and civil citizenship emerged during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, whilst social citizenship was a feature of twentieth century society. Whilst doubting the veracity of any claim which can so neatly sub-divide such a complex issue, Marshall's divisions do allow for the scrutinisation of citizenship, a condition he believed to be of universal importance. The bulk of this chapter so far has indeed considered the evolution of political and civil rights, so it is now an important time to consider social citizenship, and in particular the impact of the welfare state

The most significant event in the evolution of social citizenship, certainly within this country, was the introduction of the welfare state, this compounded the idea that full citizenship was linked with social rights. The right to receive benefits - and by benefits it

is not to be thought of simply as social security benefits, but the benefit of receiving education and housing - was made possible by the reciprocal agreement of others to pay taxes. Marshall believed that the welfare state would address issues such as poverty and inadequate health care, and would give people the right to a decent standard of living, or at least a standard equal to the rest of society. However in practice, the welfare state was never meant to equalise society, but to equalise within a person's class (Marquand:1988). The right to welfare benefits was largely restricted to those who had contributed to the system. Buttressing the whole concept of the welfare state was the need to maintain full employment, the system was based upon the male breadwinner supporting his wife and family. Non-contributory benefits for those who had paid the relevant National Insurance Contributions were there as a safety net only, and were not meant to be paid for any substantial length of time (Marquand : 1988).

The immediate post-war economy was sufficiently capable of maintaining full employment, and indeed for many this was 'boom' time for Britain. Jobs for men were plentiful and strong trade unions meant the working man had adequate resources to negotiate sound wage settlements. However, the right to benefit was still intrinsically linked with the right to work. Non-contributory benefits were paid, but to a greater degree the recipients of the non-contributory benefits were met with disdain, the old divisions between worthy and non worthy poor still remained. As Titmuss states,

"Many of the services which were born in this period - perhaps the most formative period in the evolution of the British social services - had their character moulded by the moral assumptions of the nineteenth century" (1974: 18)

Despite the emergence of a fully-fledged welfare state, it was hoped that the new arrangements would not erode

'neighbourliness', or damage the role of family and volunteer workers as providers of assistance. Yet as the welfare state developed, it became clear that the public realm was encroaching on the private. As Roche states, "the combined effects of state organised and market based insurance were already, by the late 1940's, fundamentally and fatally undermining the previously important role of voluntary action in the provision of welfare", (1992: 27).

This process had the effect of linking citizenship, not with duty but with rights and entitlements, (Etzioni: 1995), a feature which was to have severe consequences as unemployment rose during the 1970's and 1980's. Hutton has pointed to the "segmentation of the labour market", (1995: 10), and there now exists what has been coined as the 'dual labour market', where there is an increasingly clear divide between those in low paid and insecure employment and those in better paid secure work. Unemployment obviously increases demand for welfare, but low pay can have similar effects, as it has consequences for 'top up' benefits such as Family Credit.

So the client group originally considered to require benefit has changed from those needing short-term assistance for periods of short term unemployment, to people needing, for various reasons, long term assistance. The changes in the client groups did bring about some changes in attitude. It was no longer considered a deviant act to be unemployed or requiring assistance over long periods of time (Campbell: 1992). Therefore in Britain citizenship means equal access to the benefits offered by the welfare state. However during the 1990's the situation has begun to change, with citizenship once again being openly discussed. The debates surrounding citizenship are seemingly, though not exclusively centring on social citizenship. The

'new right' perspective is challenging the notion of social citizenship, but that said arguments about the definition of social citizenship are not restricted to the followers of the new right, being increasingly dominant on most political agendas. As McCormick argues,

"New Labour orthodoxy holds that extending social justice is a requirement for economic efficiency... The 'Intelligent Welfare State' proposed by the Commission on Social Justice is rooted in improving opportunities to earn... Social justice is not just about cash transfers", (1997: 109).

Therefore before drawing this section to a close the 'right' and 'left' perspectives on citizenship in the 1990's will be considered.

### **Citizenship in the 1990's**

Wolfe (1991) has identified two strands of conservatism, one he calls the 'social conservative' and the other 'laissez-faire' conservative. Both strands of conservatism purport to want to get rid of 'big government', but there are some distinct differences between the two strands. The social Conservatives attempted to 'demonise' welfare. They dismissed the type of citizenship espoused by Marshall, arguing that welfare payments induced dependency. Welfare benefits have undermined family responsibilities, making it possible for 'undesirable' family forms to flourish, (Murray: 1990). The most worrying developments so far as the new right is concerned is that the state has taken over the territory that would have previously remained in the remit of the family, the 'private space' of family responsibilities becoming incorporated within the parameters of public control. As Kelly, Kelly and Gamble argue "State intervention is regarded as an evil which always produces inferior results", (1997: 239).

By contrast, laissez-faire Conservatives believe that it is only by giving people absolute choice, for example in

schools opting out of local authority control, that true citizenship can be achieved. This group maintain that only through the free market will people realise their full potential. Hoy (1984), describes how Hayek recognises the value of individual freedom. He states of Hayek that "Not only does Hayek believe that the individual will best serve himself if he is free, but he also believes that if he is free he will best serve his fellow man", (1984: 23). Therefore, social cohesion can only be attained through the absolute freedom of the individual. It is only when individuals have satiated their desires that harmony will be achieved.

So important elements of social citizenship in the Marshallian sense have come under assault. The notion of the welfare state being a protector now seems untenable and unrealistic. Frictional unemployment has given way to long-term structural unemployment, exacerbated by free market liberalism, (Dore: 1996). Full employment was the cornerstone of the welfare state, without full employment the system is seemingly grinding to a halt, with "universal social programmes.... dying a death by a thousand cuts", (Mishra, 1996, p316). An example of this is the erosion of services to the elderly. With the inception of 'Care in the Community', many elderly people, who will have possibly contributed for most of their adult life to the state system for services, will now have to rely on the good will of friends, family and neighbours for such care. Their right to receive services for which they have paid has been taken away, as Finch states, "People should have the right not to have to rely on their families", (1996:206).

However, Marshall did not believe that the state should take over all the duties previously performed by families and communities, (Roche: 1996, Halsey: 1996), and indeed the welfare state was always supposed to be premised upon a 'mixed economy' of welfare, with state assistance intersecting with voluntary and familial

duty. It is this theme which has been revived by the 'New Labour' gurus, and arguably their ideas are now closer to those of Marshall than are those of the 'far left'. Therefore in principle, 'Care in the Community' would not have been so far removed from Marshall's notion of achieving social citizenship within a framework of assistance from the state and from the other sources.

If Hutton is to be believed, that "social cohesion is deteriorating year by year", (1995: 323), if this is indeed the case, then how can a community able to look after those requiring care and assistance be maintained? Perhaps it is the case, that the welfare state has exceeded Marshall's expectations, and social citizenship rather than being based on an overlay of mutual rights and obligations has come to signify a purely contractual relationship between the individual and the state.

Therefore the question that begs answering is what does being a citizen entail, and what should a citizen expect? It appears that we are now at a critical phase in deciding what can rightly be expected from the state as the world is now a different place to the world of the Marshalls and Beveridges of 1948. Can governments be expected to *guarantee* a job for life or is the most we can now hope for simply a job for life? If the welfare state is dying from a thousand cuts as Mishra intimated and society is now deteriorating year by year as Hutton suggests, then is it not plausible to argue, that those without work and assistance from the state and community will simply be 'disenfranchised' from certain aspects of citizenship? Are we simply fostering the notion of second class citizens or maybe even an 'underclass' separated from society per se? Or maybe a more pertinent question is, can governments actually change anything in the face of global pressures, and is citizenship really a universal condition?

It is with these questions in mind that chapter two will begin by examining the influence that globalisation has exercised on citizenship status. Chapter two will therefore consider how the term might be defined, before moving on to discuss the impact of two global factors - communication networks and trans-national corporations - on our conception of citizenship. The chapter will also discuss whether citizenship should be considered in a global context.

## Citizenship and the Globalisation Process

This chapter will answer three key questions. The first task is to define what is meant by 'globalisation'. The second question, will consider the impact of globalisation upon the universal nature of citizenship, and whether the fragmentary nature of globalisation has created the conditions for 'difference'. To illustrate this point, global communications and TNC's will be examined to assess their impact upon the universality of citizenship. The third question will ask whether, if after considering the nature of globalisation and its effects on citizenship, we are currently moving into a 'post-national' phase of citizenship, where the sovereign state cannot guarantee universal citizenship rights and has less stake in setting standards for such rights.

### What is 'Globalisation'?

Globalisation, has been described as being "the new buzzword casting gloom or delight depending on your perspective", (Hutton, 1997, p29). However, there is little consensus as to what globalisation means. Some commentators such as Pocock (1990) describe globalisation as "the process by which the whole world has for many purposes become a single, rapidly interacting system", (1990: 319). This implies a consensual arrangement between the countries of the world, almost mirroring a functionalist approach. By contrast Waters (1995) would argue, that this image of consensuality is premised upon the spurious notion of harmony, Waters states that globalisation "appears to justify the spread of Western culture and of capitalist society by suggesting that there are forces operating beyond human control that are transforming the world", (1995: 3). Waters

argues that globalisation is not a force majeure, it is not something which is happening to the world, but is being actively created by it, he argues, "the global political economy is organised by the interaction of states" (1995: 33).

Although Hutton describes globalisation as the new 'buzzword', some such as Wallerstein (1979) would argue, that globalisation developed alongside capitalism, that the modern world has evolved from the syntheses between economic affairs of nation-states, and that ultimately there is a single world capitalist economy which subjugates that of the nation-state. The world systems theory purports that no country can act or be understood in isolation, that the events which happen in one country has ramifications for other countries in the world.

Wallerstein's theory, is not however without its critics. As Worsley (1983) points out, nation-states did not adopt the capitalist model of economics simultaneously, and Wallerstein does not explain how socialist states fit into his notion of a capitalist world system. Where Worsley does agree with Wallerstein is that certain countries, essentially those which industrialised earlier, have the ability to keep other newly industrialised countries in a state of dependency.

This notion of dependency is discussed by commentators such as Strange (1995) who argues that there has been a "great increase in the asymmetries of state authorities", (1995: 63). By this she means, that economies of countries such as the USA may have to cede some authority to global markets, but smaller countries not only have their economies challenged by global markets, but are also challenged by stronger economies such as those of the USA.

George & Sabelli (1994) argue that even institutions which claim to be 'global' are really acting in the interests of

America. They quote, as an example, the 'World Bank', which in their view has become a tool of American foreign policy. George and Sabelli argue that, "the US has been able to prevent loans for its blacklisted countries (eg Nicaragua) from reaching the board of the World Bank" (1994: 214). The idea of 'Americanisation' will be picked up again later in this chapter.

Arguably, some of the key players in the globalisation process are the spread of the Trans-national Corporations (TNC's), (Petrella: 1996). Some TNC's have been described as having "assets and annual sales far in excess of the Gross National Product of most of the countries in the world", (Sklair, 1993, p7). The need to move capital now seemingly takes precedence over the need to maintain strict border controls. As Schmidt (1996) states, "capital has become increasingly mobile and business increasingly international as borders that act as barriers to trade fall and as regulations that constrain commerce are lifted" (1995: 75). This argument is supported by Van der Gaag, who believes "the world corporations are becoming stateless. They move factories and labs around the world without particular reference to national borders" (1996: 9).

In essence the TNC has been courted by state governments. The TNC provides access to international markets, also they could be used as guarantors for loans for countries whose credit ratings were poor, (Strange: 1995). Governments used policy measures to encourage the settling of TNC's. 'Free trade zones' were set up, this is where outside corporations can work without having recourse to the normal protective legislation in force. There are no trade unions and generally there is a repository of cheap labour. In order to attract a TNC, tax 'holidays' are given, in some cases no local taxes will be paid for some considerable time, with all profits being repatriated, that said, as

capital now moves so freely "it is often impossible for governments to find it, let alone tax it", (Swift, 1994, p5)

The TNC is an advocate of the free market principle. Government interference is supposedly anathema to the nature of the TNC. It is espoused by those advocates of the free market principle that, global capital will generate sufficient profits in order to service the needs of citizens, without the need for government control. It is propounded by those who subscribe to the free market theory that left to its own devices, the market will always provide the most satisfactory solutions, (Hutton:1995). The main thrust of this view is that if products and services are desirable they will sell, if not then the company supplying will go out of business. However the 'Asian Tiger' economies are often heralded as the icons of free trade, even though, their governments have ignored the free market principle and have, as Swift suggests, "been very active: protectors of domestic markets", (1995: 5). The net result of TNC activity has certainly increased global trade and the flow of capital, but as Livingstone notes, "globalisation has not produced an even development of economic flows", (1996: 31), nor have they reduced the need for government interference, as the case of the 'Tigers' has illustrated. This point has not gone unnoticed by commentators like Petrella (1995). In his view the state and large companies form a symbiotic relationship, the TNC's need states to go 'global', and the state needs TNC's as they provide a "continuity of legitimacy", (1995: 76).

Of course, economic activity alone cannot adequately explain the process of globalisation. Some say that globalisation is about the relative standardisation of culture. Mass immigration has certainly added to the idea of most societies in the world being described as 'multi-cultural', and also the spread of

products such as 'Macdonalds' and 'Pepsi Cola', adds to the belief that we are living in a global context, (Ritzer: 1996).

One of the chief ways in which we learn about other cultures is via the media and other global communication networks, such as telephones, fax machines and the Internet. Some such as Featherstone would argue that we are now,

"global citizens in the sense that we participate in a global society which transcends any nation-state boundary. We are fused between the local and the global, having little use for the machinations of the nation-state, which had been consigned to surviving within 'historical imaginaries'", (1995: 99).

Featherstone places more emphasis on the idea of culture being the globalising feature, culture for him takes precedent over economic and political features. The growth of mass communications and media means that everyone in the world has the ability to see images that transcend time and space. For example, we can all see people competing in world events such as the 'Olympic Games', at the time that they happen. People all over the world can simultaneously be exposed to the same images.

The globalisation of culture debate, has also informed discussions about the nature of post-modernity, (Sklair: 1993). 'Cyber space', suggests that in the post-modern world, we have the ability to create identities which are not shackled to traditionally accepted notions of territoriality. Robins (1995) argues that cyber space can recreate fantasies. Everything we are denied in the material world can be obtained from the cyber world. He states that,

"the technology is invested by omnipotence fantasies. In the virtual world, it is suggested, we shall receive all the gratifications that we are entitled to, but have been deprived of; in this world, we can reclaim the [infantile] illusion of magical creative power", (1995: 139).

Furthering this discussion, Robins adds that cyber space cannot only satisfy the desires which are unavailable in the material world, but it can cut across ethnic and gender boundaries. The body itself may be longer the repository of identity; in cyber space it can be secondary to the social identity constructed by the mind. This statement has important ramifications for the study of citizenship, which will be considered in the next part of this chapter. If we can really transcend the physical limits of our bodies, then on what basis can 'rights' be ascribed to individuals simply because physical 'selves' are located within certain geographical boundaries.

However, Giddens (1990) would argue that globalisation is a product of modernity and not post-modernity, as he argues that the globalisation process is far from completion. We have, he explains reached a point where people no longer root themselves in tradition. The process of late modernity means that social life is constantly questioned, we can no longer simply take for granted actions carried out because 'that's how we always do things'. Giddens calls this process 'reflexivity', in the reflexive process, he states "the routinisation of daily life has no intrinsic connections with the past at all", (1990: 38).

In summary, globalisation has been described as a functionally coherent system, a system which has emerged in its own right, something orchestrated through inter-governmental action, a 'by-product' of capitalism, a system of Westernisation, the spread of global culture, a way to re-invent ourselves, and the smashing of tradition. So which explanation is the correct one?

In a sense globalisation encompasses all of these discussions and because the arguments surrounding citizenship are informed by the debates about globalisation, it is understandable, that citizenship cannot be so neatly defined in one snappy sound-bite.

That is why, we can only really explore the different possible facets of citizenship as opposed to providing a generally agreed definition of the idea. The next part of this chapter will consider the nature of the relationship between globalisation and the concept of citizenship.

### How Does Globalisation Inform Our Understanding of Citizenship?

After examining academic arguments and debates about globalisation, there is a tendency to believe that the process subsumes all in its path, that globalisation is an inexorable force which renders the nation-state 'useless'.

If the nation-state is moribund, (Thrift: 1994), then, there is an argument for citizenship to be discussed not within the remit of nation-state boundaries but as something which is an attribute of membership of the human race. The debate therefore about 'what is globalisation?' must now be entwined with 'what are the ramifications of globalisation on citizenship?'. It must be noted, that some academics, for example Hirst and Thompson (1996), believe that the impact of globalisation has been overstated, and that the nation-state is still a key player in the world order. Therefore this section will look at the overlay between globalisation and citizenship. The final section will ask whether or not we are entering a period where the nation-state can remain a suitable custodian of citizenship rights.

This section will look to two areas of globalisation: global communications and TNC's, beginning with a discussion about how global expansion of communications may have affected citizenship. Global communications have deeply impacted into our lives, from Rupert Murdoch's 'Star TV' network, to the computer and Internet.

One must of course be careful to make the distinction between the ownership of the varying communications networks. The media, (by the media, it is meant television stations and newspapers), is owned by relatively few individuals. As Hoffman states, "there has been a concentration of ownership and a concomitant uniformity of product.... The concentration of political and commercial power in the hands of such media groups as Murdoch's News International is well documented", ( 1994: 60).

However, it has been mooted that the fastest growing communications network, the 'Internet' is the ideal vehicle for freedom of speech and freedom from interference from any political or economic source.

The Internet has indeed stirred some very deep emotions. It has been hailed as either the saviour of democracy or some sort of malignant force able to smash communities and spy on individuals. As Davidson says, "some have predicted they [the modem and the Internet] will lead either to greater democracy and participation in intellectual discussions or to greater fragmentation of society", ( 1995: 38).

The Internet, because communication is via text rather than pictorial images, masks the identity of the sender. In a world where gender and race are perceived as being important factors in how we deal with each other, then the banality and the anonymity the text provides are powerful equalising tools. As Davidson notes, the "blandness of text should cut through sexism, racism and obsession with class or status that is so prevalent in more traditional forms of interactive communication", (1995: 38).

To this extent then, the 'net' can be considered an 'egalitarian' form of communication, people are judged on the merits of their thoughts, which have been translated into the written word, rather than judged any other aspect of identity. In its most direct sense

a democratic way of communication has been formed: everyone engaging with the net does so by direct access and not, as in the case of democracy within nation-states, via indirect representation. Therefore the net affords individuals the right to engage in freedom of speech, and more importantly the freedom of movement of such speech throughout the globe, therefore satisfying one of the basic tenets of a democratic society.

Some commentators go further. Johnstone, (1994), for example, believes that the need for nation-states to engage in global communications and technological network, has actually precipitated change within certain countries. He cites the example of Singapore, which has "staked its future on becoming a global nerve centre for media and communications", ( 1994: 38). The Singaporean government is in a state of turmoil apropos the global communications network, which challenges its ethos of (not always benign) paternalism, (Johnstone, 1994: 41).

The Singaporean Government needs the technology, so it may have to rethink its approach. Here is a case where the new communications networks have succeeded in changing government attitudes. It is possible that other governments in a similar position to the Singaporeans may be forced towards a more democratic path.

By allowing information to flow freely around the world, it is hoped that people will be more fully informed regarding events and happenings in other parts of the world. For example the power of global communications cannot be negated when considering the role they played in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. By allowing freedom of information, the citizenship rights taken for granted by some, have been conferred onto the South African populace. The

suggestion here is not that South Africa is not now without problems, but at least by accepting the inequalities that were rife within the system, and the total absence of basic citizenship rights for the majority of its population, some attempts can be made to redress the situation.

Being 'on-line' can mean being alert to potential problems occurring globally. As Hoffman states, "members of the 'human rights community' such as Index and Amnesty, have been using bulletin boards, electronic mail and conferencing systems to communicate among themselves and to alert others to abuses requiring publicity", (1994: 60).

Robin's (1995), quotes Rheingold, as saying that with the power of the Internet,

"we shall be able to rebuild the neighbourhood communities, and the small-town public sphere and, in a world in which every citizen is networked to every other citizen, we can expand this ideal [or myth] to the scale of the global village. Virtual communities, are social aggregations that emerge from the net", (1995: 136).

If the argument put forward by Pocock is considered, that is "nationalism, community and sovereignty are psychological in nature", (1990: 318), that is we create our own identities within our own minds, then in this case the net is satisfying the tenets of community spirit by allowing equal access to the arena of public debate and therefore providing the citizens of the net with a mutual support network. Therefore it is arguably the case that the techno-nerds surfing the 'net' may be receiving support, understanding and all the concomitant attributes generally considered as being part of human face to face relationships, they are a citizen body. In this sense the Internet is embracing the notion of 'difference'.

However, so far it has been suggested that global communications have been a favourable aspect of the

globalisation process, it is now time to consider the problems associated with them.

The first thing to consider was mentioned earlier in this chapter, and that is not all means of global communications are necessarily untainted by censorship and prejudice. Rupert Murdoch, for example, controls huge tracts of the media, and is seemingly not against using his power to influence the content of many newspaper and television reports. To this extent then, the democratic right to free speech can be damaged, if the media is only ever given to presenting one point of view.

Although the 'Media Moguls' have the freedom to print and broadcast what they like, because some are so basically inculcated with one set of political beliefs, they are failing to give a more balanced account of what is happening in the world at large, hence the idea of the democratic process of free speech runs into difficult territory. Surely, free speech can only be described as everyone contributing their points of view as opposed to the freedom of speech of a chosen few - those rich enough to be able to purchase and control the media.

One must also query the notion of the 'global' market being truly global in the sense of cultural diversity or rather the lack of cultural diversity offered by the media barons. Hoffman refers to the potential Americanisation of global communications as opposed to being given insights into the varying lifestyles, he uses the 'CNN' network to illustrate this point stating,

"CNN was hailed as a start-up, cable TV rival to the news services of the big broadcast companies, but despite the global span, there is an evident US 'spin' to its news values that flattens as much as it enriches the diversity of global reporting", (1994: 60),

though the point of Americanisation will be considered later in the discussion of whether we have globalisation or Americanisation with global outlets.

Davidson suggests that the Internet is still not without problems. The Internet is purported to be the ideal forum for freedom of speech, and yet is dominated by a few, as Davidson states, "As much as people have wanted to go on talking about how democratic it is, the Internet is still the domain of middle-class, highly educated, white males of a certain age", (1995: 42). In this sense, if the 'net' is dominated by a few, then how can it encompass the notion of difference?

Communication networks also can enhance activities of socially unacceptable groups. Just as the 'human rights community' uses new technology to further its fight against what is considered injustice, so other groups use new technology to muster assistance for their groups - groups which will try and deny citizenship rights to others, as Hoffman notes, "Internet communication is not necessarily benign, a German journalist says 'neo-nazi efficiency has improved dramatically now that they're using electronic communications networks',(1994: 61). It is an inevitable consequence of something which is good, that something bad occurs, it is also naive to assume that those whose intentions are not honourable will not be able to make use of such a system.

The speed at which messages are sent throughout the world can either be considered an advantage or a disadvantage. It would be difficult to doubt the veracity of the claim that Nelson Mandela was surely released from prison in part because of the world's attention being focused on South Africa, nor can it be denied that America was forced to reflect on its activities when a video of

Rodney King being beaten was shown on international television. That said, if the case of the Belgian paedophile ring is considered, then the speed and accessibility of information can be frightening, and ultimately shows how vulnerable the system is to abuse. The paedophile ring used the global network to send images of child pornography world wide, thus denigrating children's right to protection.

This means the question of regulation must be considered. At the moment we have a situation where nobody appears to be certain about how to deal with this problem, though many still do not accept that there is a problem. Do we start censoring information, which means the democratic rights of citizens to engage in free speech will be damaged or do we state that with freedom comes responsibility, and someone has to be responsible for ensuring that one person's freedom of speech does not impinge onto another person's freedom to be protected. Thrift believes that, "for some observers, this is a situation presaging great institutional and regulatory uncertainty", (1994: 368). As yet no solution has been found, as this is the contradiction within liberal democracy, which takes precedent the freedom of the individual or duty to others?

As stated at the beginning, this chapter is essentially concerned with the ramifications globalisation has for citizenship rights, and arguably two key players in the globalisation process are communication networks and TNC's. Having discussed how global communications have impacted upon citizenship rights, the next section will consider the relationship between citizenship rights and TNC's.

### **TNC's and Their Impact on Citizenship**

Earlier in this chapter, the sheer magnitude of the TNC was discussed, here the point of focus will be the part TNC's

play in the globalisation process, and their possible impact on citizenship. A recent article in 'Time Magazine' succinctly sums up the role of the TNC: the article states that TNC's, " were not made to succour the masses", (Time Magazine, 19.08.96, p38). The main function of the TNC is to deliver goods cheaply and efficiently to satiate the desires of the consumer. It appears that the new global scenario is of the consumer as 'king', the economy seemingly driven by the sole interest of the consumer, to such an extent that the needs of the consumer supplants the needs of governments.

In order to meet demand, TNC's inexorably pursue cheap and flexible labour, and often, environmental regulations are ignored, as Swift believes, the TNC's prefer "job-hungry regions with weak trade-unions like Samsung's new electronics plant in Newcastle, Great Britain, or Hyundai's car-production facility in the eastern township of Quebec", (1995: p4). It must be noted though, that the TNC has in part initially orchestrated this scenario. Many factories closed in the West, because production could be relocated to the East where costs are cheaper. As Betcherman notes,

"Although business still faces serious obstacles in locating high-technology, high value added operations in LDC's this is changing. Examples such as state of the art Indian engineers and world class Mexican automakers are becoming more frequent. And, while these workers may be highly paid by the standard of their own countries, their compensation is far below that received by productive workers in.... other developed nations", (1996: 263).

Woolston (1989) draws attention to the notion that flexibility "demands trade union collaboration as the price of survival" (1989: 65). He uses the 'Ford Caterpillar Plant' in Scotland as an example of how large firms engineered the situation where the perceived inefficiencies of the 'Ford' plant in Scotland meant they could relocate, safe in the knowledge that they could justify their actions.

Trades unions were blamed for the closure of the 'Caterpillar Plant'. As Woolston notes, "the backward attitudes of the Scottish trade union movement on Dundee is the main reason for the country's unemployment and the loss of new investment" (1989: 55) and not that "in the face of continued pressure from the company's stockholders to reduce operating costs and in the light of the precipitate fall in the value of the dollar against the pound. This had made it much less profitable to manufacture in Britain" (1989: 53)

The TNC's are not above using their power, which, by comparison to many nation-states is considerable, in order to achieve their aims. As stated in 'Time Magazine', "bullying your host government is only the start. With many Third World states disintegrating, multi-nationals are expected to be ersatz government", (Time Magazine, 19.08.96, p50).

As stated earlier in this chapter, TNC's are proponents of the free market principle, and many governments have succumbed to the perceived pressures to espouse free market liberalism themselves. However as Drache (1996) notes, although TNC's subscribe to the notion of the free market, their business is far from being so, with much trade being within the global corporations, Drache sums the situation up as this "after more than forty years of liberalised trade, experts agree that only one quarter of global trade is considered to conform to the precepts of trade liberalisation", (1996: 38).

Livingstone (1996), argues that the free market ideal has direct consequences for democracy. He states that, "The political implications of the free market model are equally profound because it necessitates a radical reduction in democracy. The organising principle of democracy is that every citizen, regardless of status, has one equal vote. In the free market decisions are taken by unequal agents... One

person supplying capital may decide to dismiss 100,000 supplying labour", (1996: 3).

Indeed this has been seen to be the case. Production globally has increased, but accompanying this has also been an increase in unemployment. As Swift notes, "while total world output has doubled since 1975, employment has actually declined. The global economy with its emphasis on reducing labour costs and on currency or property speculation does not put a high priority on providing sustainable livelihoods", (1994: 6).

With unemployment regarded as the scourge of the west, is it fair to suggest that the practices of the TNC's exacerbate the problem? The debate now rages about whether in the Western world we have a group of people permanently excluded from the labour market - an 'underclass' (Murray: 1990) . In fact the issue has now gone further to discuss whether the working poor can now be considered to be in the 'underclass'.

In the West, especially America, the notion of citizenship is intrinsically linked with employment. In Britain citizenship was linked with the welfare state. The more rights people had, the more inclusive citizenship became. As Amenta & Skocpol note,

"At the end of a decade of war and reconversion, a comprehensive national welfare state had been created in Great Britain; meanwhile the United States had settled into other patterns. Despite the dream of New Deal and early wartime planners for a distinctively American full-employment welfare state, nearly all possibilities for nationalized social policy had been eliminated from the agenda of mainstream politics", (1988: 121).

The globalisation process appears to be changing the way citizenship is viewed. As Lister (1997) notes globalisation is impacting upon social policy limiting the ability of nation-states to set their own social agendas. Moreover, Britain is certainly emulating America, with the universal nature of social citizenship being

called into question. As Lister argues "In a number of societies, European as well as American, there is increasing emphasis on work obligations as a badge of social inclusion and citizenship", (1997: 103). However, as stated earlier, this appears to be disenfranchising people from the system, thus negating citizenship rights.

Global organisations, such as the 'World Bank' and the 'International Monetary Fund' (IMF), have been instrumental in affecting citizenship rights. Their structural adjustment programmes, have forced many nation-states to privatise public utilities, giving control and ownership of essential services to people whose main aim is to make a profit. As Sandberg states,

"The idea that you can take core utilities and sell them on a practically unregulated basis to some group of foreigners to make hay with strikes me as so irresponsible that it is certain to backfire", (1994: p14).

We now have a situation locally in the North East of England, where 'Northumbrian Water' is owned by a French multi-national, and an American company called 'Cal-Energy' - with an appalling safety record - is bidding to purchase 'Northern Electric', and as Sandberg states, "what we are left with in the meantime, however, is a return to the nightmare of private monopolies running essential services. This creates a democratic vacuum with ever sharper divisions between rich and poor", (1994: 15).

Arguably, corporations now have more say in how a country is run, than governments. Accompanying this has been the IMF/World Bank policy of promoting industrialisation as the panacea for poverty. However, industrialisation has not been such an agreeable remedy, as noted in 'Time Magazine', "it sounds unpalatable, but the only chance for developing countries to develop is to accept higher pollution levels or lower wages", (Time Magazine, 19.08.96, p38). So in

order to survive in the market, and to satisfy the 'Structural Adjustment Programmes', which have the effect of being able "to pry open the Southern economies to the world market", (Swift, 1994, p5), many governments have been selling their workers 'short'. The workers have been placed in a 'catch 22' situation: either they accept that they will receive poor wages and environmental damage or they do not work.

Hirst and Thompson (1996), as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter are sceptical about the magnitude of globalisation. For them workers still have bargaining power and nation-states still have the capacity for self-governance. Hirst and Zeitlin (1991), acknowledge that over the past couple of decades there has been an unprecedented change in the world economy. However they argue, that it is incorrect simply to assume that this is due to a transition from Fordist to post-Fordist modes of production. They draw important distinctions between post-Fordism and what is known as flexible specialisms. For them, post-Fordism masks the intricacies involved in such a transition. For them the term 'flexible specialisms' is a more appropriate term to describe the current situation, where there is a need for the nation-state, large corporations and regional bodies to foster cooperation. Arguably then, no one institution has primacy over the other, and in a sense, this challenges the notion of globalisation being an entity which subsumes everything in its path. Therefore nation-states - and indeed if Hirst & Zeitlin's analysis of the situation is correct - local communities are not merely 'victims' of globalisation, they are conscious actors. Brazier (1996), draws attention to the current trend to take direct action. He argues that many workers and active groups have joined forces in order to stave off actions of predatory TNC's, he quotes one example of the "Native American Daniel Zapata who is fighting the open-cast mining of a British multi-national Hanson.....[has], forged

links with the indigenous Igorisi people in the Philippine Cordillera" (1996: 8). For Brazier as well as Hirst and Thompson, whilst there is no intention of drawing links between them on globalisation policies, both parties agree that workers still do have powers of representation and bargaining.

However, globalisation can bring varying problems such as the inculcation of differing working practices. The 'Japanisation' of work is now a point for discussion. As Waters states "the new organisational paradigm can be operated in any enterprise and indeed can be exported beyond the business sector to other types of organisation", (1995: 85). The result is that whether people are working in Japan, Fiji, America or Great Britain, the employer demands that the workers from differing cultures perform to a uniform standard of guiding principles. In effect then, armies of workers are changing their identity to suit a company whose head office may be thousands of miles away. The personality of the worker is being changed and controlled to suit the needs of capitalism, the worker is being primed not to meet the needs of the direct locality or even country, but to meet the needs and standards set by someone whose culture may be very different.

Perhaps it is the case, especially with the demise of trade-unions and the feeling of comradeship, workers may feel a sense of alienation. To elaborate, we now see a division of labour by process and not product. As Van der Gaag states,

"we talk of goods 'made in Britain' or 'made in Japan' or 'made in US'. In fact, they are far more likely to have been made in Korea, assembled in Malaysia, sewn together in Taiwan and then shipped to the country where they are supposed to have been made", (1996: 9).

The division of labour by process, (Hall: 1993) further adds to the impotency of trade unions. In the days when whole products were made at, for example, a car plant, because the whole product was made at

the plant, then any form of industrial action would close down the whole production. Now workers would be merely stopping production on just one part of the whole process. It must also be the case, 'united we stand divided we fall', when it comes to looking at the whole product, parts may be made in countries using non-unionised labour, thus prohibiting any chance of any cooperative action between workers throughout the processes which go to make up the whole product.

Foreign investors are often thought of as the 'saviour' of an area, but really this idea must also be queried. Foreign investors certainly provide employment, that cannot be denied, but they are not loyal to an area and unlike the Victorian entrepreneurs, such as Owen in New Lanarkshire who sought, albeit in a paternalistic way, to improve the social conditions of his workers, the "TNC's have never shown themselves either interested in or capable of looking after the welfare of anyone", (Kneen, 1995, p25). We now have the scenario where labour is rooted locally but capital is not. Decisions pertaining to workers lives may be made thousands of miles away, thus negating local empowerment, (Lloyd:1996).

This raises the question of what has been referred to as 'glocalisation'. How we construct our personal identity is increasingly becoming confusing. As Leadbitter states,

"there is a gap between the global scale of modern economic life and the local terms in which people conceive their identities and make their choices. That gap is disorienting; our sense of ourselves, our plans and expectations can suddenly be uprooted by forces outside of our control", (1996: 17).

Perhaps we are seeking to find the 'old-fashioned' type of community and identity, where the citizen body is relatively homogeneous. If we go on holiday we expect to feel and experience another way of life, hence it could be the case that someone is a Turkish belly dancer by night, entertaining the tourists, and then goes home to sip Coca-cola and

watch some American soap series on the television. Community may have been reduced to something voyeuristic, we can watch the village blacksmith work, excepting he is making wares for the tourist as opposed to making wares for the village. The local is therefore pandering to the global; the very livelihood of 'local' may depend on how they treat the 'other', who has probably arrived via a package tour. As Holtzner and Robertson argue, "Situations which can be defined very broadly as anomic ones of excessive uncertainty may be such that they lead to the destruction of existing identities and the search for substitutes" (1980: 29).

It at this point that the discussion on the ramifications of globalisation for citizenship will come to a close, as the next section must consider where the protection for citizens must lie, with the nation-state or with other supra-national bodies.

### Citizenship Rights or Human Rights?

This section aims to examine the issues behind the notion of citizenship being a status given by merit of being a member of a nation-state, or if citizenship and indeed the nation-state are anachronistic concepts which have no place in the global context of human rights.

It has been previously discussed that citizenship and the nation-state have been historically linked; they share a symbiotic relationship. However, Soysal (1996) suggests that citizenship is now entering what has been described as a 'post-national phase', where rights are accorded to the person in the form of human rights and not because they are citizens of a territorially defined area. She states that, "This emphasis on rights is expressed through a

codification of 'human rights' as a world-level organizing principle in legal, scientific and popular conventions", (1996: 19).

So is it the case that "the nation-state is too small for the big things, and too big for the small", (Van der Gaag, 1996, p10)? Or as Strange explains is, "the proposition in short,... that state authority has leaked away, upwards sideways and downwards", (1995: 56). This chapter has already shown how global organisations such as TNC's have impacted upon traditional forms of citizenship, therefore it is now time to discuss who is actually offering protection to the individual, especially as noted earlier that TNC's "were not made to succour the masses", (Time, 19.08.96, p38).

Turner (1993) argues that there is a need to develop a discourse of human rights within sociology in contrast to a discourse of citizenship. He states that "sociology of human rights is important, because there are obvious limitations to the idea of citizenship, which is based on membership of a nation-state", (1993: 3). Mendus (1995) argues, that the reason behind the lack of discussion on human rights, is because to acknowledge human rights is to place the individual in constant tension with the state, thus discrediting the vision of socialist utopia. She states that,

"where human rights are asserted, they are asserted as claims by *individuals* and *against* the power of the state, or against other individuals. But to assume that rights are needed against the state is to assume that there must always be antagonism between the interests of the state and the interests of individuals, and this is a denial of the kind of ideal society envisaged by socialists and communitarians alike", (1995: 12).

Therefore, if, as argued, communities are made up of citizens, then the citizen body must have regulations in place that have been agreed upon, however, where does this leave the individual who may not agree with the regulations in place? If relying

purely on the nation-state and no other supra-national body to protect the rights of individuals, then there could be a case for relativism. Some countries may have in place extremely harsh measures for dealing with those who disagree with the prevailing political system, if these people are only afforded the protection of citizenship of the nation-state, then there is no case for any other persons to interfere, as it is the case that any punishment meted out will be relative to that country.

This is a problematic situation. If citizenship is intrinsically linked with boundaries, then which rights take precedence? Citizenship rights as proposed by domestic policy or human rights which maintain that "human beings, who in the words of Article 1 of the Declaration, 'are born free and equal in dignity and rights' rather than the national (citizens) of a given state", (Rosas, 1995: 63)?

In order to perhaps provide a solution to this problem, citizenship must be understood in terms of identity as opposed to simply being something conferred upon a person by merit of where they have been born. Gamble (1996) argues that "Democracy in the twentieth century tended to become increasingly centralised" (1996: 129). He believes firmly that there is a need to encompass 'difference'. He states that what is required is "a release of social energy and social imagination, a synergy which new forms of governance and new kinds of market might provide" (1996: 130). The notion of 'difference' is worthy of consideration as it is arguable as to whether any citizen body, whether of a nation-state or sub-national 'community', has such homogeneity of culture - identities are not fixed wholly by nationality, (consider Britain for example, there are many different cultures and identities at work), therefore the argument for relativism is inappropriate, as what is the 'relative culture' of anywhere? Therefore just as cultures are permeable, then so must be boundaries. Human rights discourse is

therefore not simply about transcending boundaries, it is really about deciding where boundaries should be drawn. As Mendus states,

"in some sense, therefore, it is misleading to refer to human rights as reflecting an aspiration to transcend national or cultural boundaries..... rights begin from the political and social realities of all our lives, and address problems about the forms which negotiation may take in circumstances where such boundaries are disputed, or identities fragmented", (1995: 18).

Indeed, as Mahbub ul-Haq, (described by Brazier (1994) as a 'visionary' at the UN), believes firmly global bodies such as the UN must now consider that most conflict is not between nations but within nations. He thinks that " the UN has to do a number of things. First, it has to recognize conceptually that the security of people is just as important as the security of nations", (1994: 21). The lack of war between states has been instrumental in calling to account the nation-state, as citizenship rights were originally conferred onto those who were willing to serve their countries during times of inter-state wars. The majority of the war zones throughout the world are within the boundaries of nation-states, and in some cases violence is used as a justifiable method of bringing rebel forces to heel by corrupt governments, an example of this is the present trouble in Algeria, where it is alleged that the Government is actually at the root of much of the violence.

So human rights must be seen as having a justifiable 'objective' status outside of the remit of the state. As Turner states,

"Human rights, insofar as they are extra-political or supra-societal rights which have their legitimacy beyond the state, are crucial in protecting individuals against state violence, or at least in providing the normative grounds on which individuals could be protected against state violence", (1993:502).

There is now a profusion of governmental organisations such as the 'United Nations' (UN) and the 'European Union' (EU), and non-governmental agencies such as 'Amnesty International' and 'Oxfam', which are seen as key players in protecting the individual from violence, famine and other forms of exploitation.

However, whilst not wishing to negate the power of supra-national bodies, it seems naive to think that they can act as a panacea for the problems experienced by individuals. If a government decides to keep such bodies out of its internal affairs then ultimately, if the nation-state is sufficiently large and strong and wants to resist what is perceived as 'outside interference', then it will be able to do so. Raphael (1991) believes that ultimately, international law is not superior to state law, as international law can only apply if the state chooses to acknowledge such a law. He states that " the present legal position is that many (though not all) rules of international law are binding on a State only if that State voluntarily accepts them as binding", (1991: 53). China is a case in question. Kristoff & Wundon (1994) describe in graphic detail terrible crimes committed against individuals in the name of the state - and China is one of the five permanent members of the U.N Security Council. A threat to cut of China's 'most favoured nation status' did bring about some concessions to human rights, but this was short-lived and eventually there was a disentangling of human rights from the trading benefits of 'most favoured nation'. China is a powerful country and, despite attempts to make it a more open society, it remains largely closed, and therefore able to carry out atrocities with the relative comfort of knowing that its actions will remain largely outside public scrutiny.

It is therefore unwise to underestimate the power of the nation-state. It is also unwise to ignore the pull of

nationalism. Struggles such as those in the former Yugoslavia and Chechnya are a constant reminder of the importance of national identity. It seems an absurd statement to make, but whilst academia engages in apocalyptic warnings heralding the demise of the nation-state, there has been an increase in the amount of new countries being 'born'. As Van der Gaag notes, "nationalist struggles have a long history, but the quest for nationhood - often using the tools of violence - is today at flood level", (1996: 8). The nation-state must still have some role to play in today's world, otherwise why would so many people shed so much blood in either protecting their 'nation' or by striving to form new 'nations'.

Hence the nation-state cannot be simply ignored or written off as an anachronism. Consequently the way forward must be to try and mesh together the supra-national, national and the sub-national. Schmidt (1995) suggests the new role for the nation-state should be as a mediator between the sub-national and supra-national levels. She states that " the nation-state will continue to be the prime interlocutor in an increasingly complex world, and the only one that speaks with authority to both supra-national and sub-national authorities", (1995: 101), however this argument will be further discussed in the following chapter on the European Union.

Geoffrey Howe, (now Lord Howe of Aberavon) (1995), believes the way forward is to employ the notion of 'power-sharing'. He cites South Africa's new regime as an example of 'power-sharing', where all South Africa's ethnic groups are afforded a say in government. However, as Phillips (1993) cautiously warns, power-sharing can produce greater conflict, she quotes Nigeria as an example where varying ethnic groups turned the situation into one of extreme

tension, describing how the groups simply jostled for power and resources. She states that,

"Where societies are divided between advantaged and disadvantaged groups, it does seem crucial to establish mechanisms that will equalize the balance of power. But such mechanisms can perpetuate the problem, and may not respond readily enough to change", (1993: 97).

And of course, the power of TNC's cannot be ignored, they do have a role to play in guaranteeing human rights abuses are stopped or at least minimised, despite the bad press that many TNC's receive. It does appear that the TNC's are in transition, a transition which may result in what has been described as "corporate statesmanship", (The Observer, 11.05.97, p6). Ironically, whilst the TNC has been accused by commentators like Ellwood (1996) of destroying the unique culture of a region and promoting standardisation of product and culture, the other side of the argument is that such standardisation can actually increase the standard of living of the workers - for example, if the standard of living experienced by a car worker in a 'third world' country is brought up to the standard his or her counterpart enjoys in the 'first world'

There is also a tension existing within capitalism between the need to produce profit for shareholders and the need to acknowledge that in today's climate, there is a need for an ethical underpinning of the market. As Lloyd states, "the brusque rejection of other-than-profit criteria falls before the assault (sometimes literally) of rights groups, religious groups, politicians under pressure and even - a new phenomenon - competitors sneakily using ethical means to gain market share", (1997: 28).

Ransom (1994), explains how 'Cafe Direct', a cooperative trying to achieve fair prices for the coffee producers of Peru, has now achieved 2.85 per cent of the market for ground coffee

in the UK. Arguably, there is now a new ethos stirring within business, that companies must also consider people as well as profit. A recent article in 'The Observer' of 15th December 1996, records details of how companies such as 'Disney' are increasingly being drawn into human rights issues, the article states that,

"corporations are increasingly aware of their responsibilities for the protection of human rights in the countries in which they do business... consumers are much more aware now, so companies can't just say 'don't look to us - we're just here to make a dollar'. That argument rings hollow to most people", (The Observer, 15.12.96, p6).

A further article in 'The Observer' of 11th May 1997, states that 'Shell' has included a commitment to 'Human Rights' within their business plan, though it is unsure as to what exactly 'Shell' means by this statement. Indeed companies like 'Shell' with an annual turnover larger than the GDP of many of the countries it does business with, is capable of using its position to secure a commitment from reticent governments to the advancement of human rights.

However, it is not wise to get too carried away with the notion that TNC's are now the world's police force and saviour of the oppressed. As Boyer and Drache (1996) note, "such a form of governance suffers from a lack of democratic accountability" (1996: 7). An article in 'The Observer' of 3rd November 1996, reveals a dark side of the TNC, one which is willing to abuse its power for the sake of profit. It is also noted within the article that the payment of monies from the multi-nationals to the host government, to ensure the relative safety of the property and installations of the TNC, were considered to be a normal part of business, as stated in the article,

"He [the associate president] confirmed, however, that on top of a \$1.25-a-barrel 'war tax' paid to the government, BP also paid a voluntary \$5.6 million (about £3.5m) to the army under a three-year 'agreement on cooperation'. This, he said, was to provide the 16th Brigade with decent uniforms, food and

accommodation, but he admitted BP had no ultimate control over how the money was spent" (The Observer, 03.11.96, p6).

### Conclusion

This chapter has considered the impact of globalisation, particularly the impact of TNC's and global communications upon citizenship; it has also examined whether the nation-state is really the appropriate guardian of citizenship, or whether as has been suggested we have now reached a period of 'post-nationalism' where international law and not national law should determine the fate of the individual.

It has been shown that the nation-state has indeed had its power curbed, for now global capital flows without any consideration for nation-state boundaries, and new technology means that information can speed around the globe, uninterrupted and uncensored. The reality of the situation appears to be that there is very little the nation-state can do to prevent these processes taking their course.

Some commentators, such as Lloyd have an optimistic outlook: TNC's must begin to consider the ethics and morality of their businesses, and move towards a position of 'corporate statesmanship'. But although the power of TNC's may have been a significant factor in advancing human rights, there may be a 'darker' side to the role of TNC's, where profit is valued above other concerns.

The phrase 'post-national' has already been mentioned but now merits further examination. Commentators like Soysal (1996), believe that we have now entered a 'post-national' phase of citizenship, although, as Raphael (1991) has noted, international law, can be frustrated by national law, if the nation chooses

to simply ignore any directives. To this extent then the nation-state *is* still a significant force.

Strange (1995), has pointed out another phenomena, which she refers to as the 'asymmetries of power'. She makes particular reference to the USA, and believes, that whilst the USA has had to cede power in the face of globalisation, many smaller nation-states, have had to cede power to globalisation *and* the USA. Which leads to the consideration that not all nation-states are at the same point, some are weaker than others, whilst some such as the USA appear to be as strong as ever. Though however strong or weak a nation-state is, there are arguments that 'difference' must be an important issue. As Lister (1997) argues, the power of the nation-state may have been curtailed, but that does not mean it is not still a major force in shaping the nature of citizenship. She believes that an active and inclusive style of citizenship comes from carefully considered social policy.

### Europe and citizenship.

As the previous chapter has shown, the nation-state, whilst undoubtedly under pressure from globalisation, is still a strong contender for shaping citizenship rights. Arguably, as this chapter will discuss, the impact of supra-national bodies such as the 'European Union' have helped to strengthen national identity, and thus within the Union, there has been much discussion about who should be considered to be a citizen of the Union by virtue of being a citizen of a nation-state.

The 'European issue' is undoubtedly extremely complex, and whilst the nation states have their own notions of citizenship, the varying layers within Europe, local, national and supra-national also have their own versions of the nature of citizenship. Therefore is it really possible for the 'European Union' to develop a universalistic concept of citizenship, or will the Union have to appreciate that the way forward is to accept that the people of the Union have differing needs which will have to be addressed in order for the Union to be successful?

Milward and Sorensen, (1994), argue that part of the problem Europe now faces stems from an inaccurate account of European history. They contend that much of Europe's recent history has been dominated by the notion that Europe is moving towards further integration, and the "nation-state inescapably had to enter into a network of international functional institutions", (1994: 2). The thrust of their argument is that far from being redundant, the nation-state has always retained power.

Europe has had a turbulent history, and in Vaclav Havel's opinion will have a turbulent future unless decisions are

made about the nature of citizenship and belonging. In an article in 'Time Magazine' of the 4th November 1996, Havel argued that unless Europe begins to act like a community and provide a stable *modus vivendi* for the people of Europe, then "the idea of a Europe of peaceful diversity risks.... falling into the hands of a cast of fools, fanatics, populists and demagogues, waiting for their chance to promote the worst European traditions", (1996: 37)

At the same time, many of the recent problems facing Europe come from the collapse of artificially constructed states such as the former Yugoslavia. Communism in this case provided the *modus vivendi*, until communism collapsed and Yugoslavia was riven apart. Therefore is it sensible to try and weld together such diverse nations into a 'super-state'? Is it sensible to ignore the differences between states, or even between the smaller regional units? In order to understand the future for Europe, we therefore need to understand its past. As Cesarani and Fulbrook note, "many of these ethnic and national conflicts are historically rooted, which underlines the need for an historical perspective to the current fluid and bewildering state of citizenship and nationality", (1996: 7).

This chapter will therefore discuss the issue of the relationship between Europe and the 'Nations', is it the case for example that the quest for European citizenship has provoked a nationalist backlash? Finally this chapter will give an insight into how the three strata's of region, nation and Europe may be successfully integrated - where 'difference' is acknowledged - but with each strata bolstering citizenship and providing concentric rings of identity, so citizenship can become an anchor, an insurance against the potentially anomic arousing features of globalisation.

## Citizenship and Nationalism

The 'Observer' of the 9th February 1997 gave details about the mayoral campaign being ran by Catherine Megret. The heading of the article was "French, fascist and proud of the fight". Further in the article, somebody is quoted as saying, "I am not racist, but I am French". In the grand plan of life, the subsequent election victory of a fascist would not necessarily be too disturbing. In Britain, the 'National Front' gained control of the 'Isle of Dogs'. However, victory was short lived, and it was not long before an effective opposition was mobilised and the National Front was ousted.

However, what is concerning is the aftermath left by such blatant displays of racism. As a serious political force, the 'National Front' is of little significance, but one asks for how long can this situation be maintained? Megret's protestations proffer reasons why there has been a decline in people's standards of living. Her argument is simple and logical, if there are insufficient resources to go around, then get rid of the excess baggage, in this case 'foreigners'.

Migration though, within Europe is not something which is a recent phenomena, Europe has always historically played host to a plethora of people from diverse corners of the world. What is problematic is why, when during the middle of this century, a war was fought to eliminate Fascism, we are now seeing a reoccurrence of the very thing so many people wished to destroy.

Perhaps one of the reasons why Fascism has seemingly reappeared, (though there is scepticism as to whether fascism did disappear or merely laid dormant), could have to do with the construction of the European Union. Much weight has been given to who belongs to the Union. Ironically this has also meant that there has been a re-examination of who does not belong. So whilst there have

been talks of the removal of border controls within Europe - schengenland - there have been other discussions on tightening the borders of Europe per se. This would have the effect of turning the community into 'Fortress Europe', and would also help to placate the fears of those who believe a flood of immigration is imminent.

The 'Maastricht Treaty' (1991), which essentially embraces the tenets of free market capitalism, has as part of the 'Treaty', left the question of citizenship to the nation-states to decide. In other words, rather than developing a coherent policy of who belongs in the community, there is still the sense of the idea of citizenship being piecemeal and haphazard. Meehan (1994), describes how the 'Single European Act' of 1986, did have some content pertaining to the social implications of the internal market. However, although the need to have social rights was acknowledged, they were never included in the 'Act'. As Meehan describes, the social constitution of rights was rejected by some countries, (namely Britain) and therefore "to try to maintain consensus, it was agreed the Charter should not, itself, be legally binding, but should be a solemn declaration", (1994: 76).

This meant that there was no legal weight behind social rights, and therefore the 'Single European Act' of 1986 and the subsequent 'Maastricht Treaty' were primarily concerned with economic integration as opposed to social integration. This has the effect of making the concept of Europe an abstract rather than concrete idea. Money may be a cohesive factor in the fragmentary world of global economics, but monetary union alone cannot assist social stability, and whilst the social aspect of the European Union is neglected, then perhaps the ultra-right wing element found in society may gain further footing.

Harden (1996) points to further complications in the construction of 'Europe'. He argues that within Europe, identity is based on the relationship between the individual and the nation-state. However the nation-state developed more as an historical accident than something with true democratic foundations. He states that,

"In modern Europe, political community and political identity are focused on the state. The states that exist are an arbitrary product of history rather than the result of acts of democratic will. War, marriage and bribery all played a part in their formation. These unpleasant facts are covered up by historical myths that are an important part of what is called 'national identity'" (1996: 135).

Therefore, by requesting that nation-states define their own citizenship policies, has meant that there has been a complete re-examination of what constitutes a citizen of a nation-state, and some old hostilities have seemingly been revived. Recently there has been what appears on the surface to be futile and silly debates over what is 'French' or 'English' in the popular media, but, in reality, these debates have been fuelling people's fears of being overrun by 'foreigners' wishing to dilute the purity of their nation. Only recently, the 'News of the World' of 16th February 1997, ran a story by Alan Clark, stating "Winnie's our answer to Euro-prats", the story went on to depict the problems of printing the potential new Euro-money. Unfortunately, this is quite an ordinary example of the level of debate surrounding European integration, and sadly not restricted to one nation. It is a pity that images of the second world war, which was principally fought to stop Fascism have been evoked decades later to promote nationalism.

The language used by Madame Megret is also highly flammable, and again if we actually look closely at the language she uses, it parodies the language used in war-like situations. She states that, "France is in a state of emergency", (Guardian, 18.02.97,

p12, 1997). By her use of language she has immediately constructed an enemy. Within the same article, she attacks the culture of the enemy, thus extrapolating from this point, that anything which is not French is alien and unacceptable.

The reunification of Germany also had ramifications for extreme nationalism. After reunification many East Germans flooded into West Germany. According to Fulbrook (1996), this was not such a major issue, as they were assimilated into West German society fairly smoothly. This was probably due to the policy of 'jus sanguines', where, as discussed earlier, to be a German citizen does not necessarily mean you have to be born on German soil, as long as you were born to German parents. Those migrating from East to West consequently were granted the legal status of being a German citizen automatically.

Even though German reunification was costly, in terms of absorbing East into West, this was a very successful project. Arguably, this was because the German identity had been maintained during the cold war period, and now because the two parts of the country have been reunited they have good reason to celebrate their identity. They could be proud of their nationality without constantly having to monitor the situation regarding the war, as to many Germans, the war is not a part of their history, they do not constantly have to hang their heads in shame and apologise for being a German, they do not carry with them the collective guilt of their ancestors.

However, even though younger Germans want to bury firmly the spectre of the war, their history is still being scrutinised by other countries. This is still helping to maintain the image of Germany as a bellicose nation. This suggests that in the European context, nations do not really have a full understanding of each others

problems; they are still caught up in categorising nations based on stereotypes.

Chancellor Kohl must be given credit for the way he has conducted Germany's relationship with the rest of Europe. He has not constantly played the 'race-card', and has tried to provide Germany with both a national identity buried within a European identity. As Middlemas states, "the phrase 'European Germany', [has been] assiduously propagated since 1990 by the Kohl Government", (1997: 28).

John Major, unlike Margaret Thatcher, also never directly took advantage of the race issue within Europe. A speech given in India and recorded in 'The Times' of 10th January 1997, appeared to be sincere and dealt with the despair of racism in a positive and constructive manner. Unfortunately though, whilst Kohl and Major (and now Blair) seem intent on publicly berating racism, their governments are still actively producing a racist governmental agenda. For example, in May 1993, the German Government brought in laws to restrict immigration into Germany, and in Britain, the 'Asylum Act' was a blatant attempt to play to those who fear Britain will be over-run by mass immigration.

There are confusing signals being issued, and if the situation is not treated with caution, there may be a problem of credibility with the European Union. Will it stand for racial tolerance and tolerance of 'difference', or will it stand for intolerance of anything not construed as European, and if European integration remains solely on a fiscal and not social level, then the probability will be that Europe will remain divided, with the market driving an 'I'm all right Jack' mentality.

Of course some countries have used the mechanism of introspection in a positive way. An example of this is Eire.

Eire can now establish an identity amongst the other European countries, and not solely in respect of its relationship to Britain, as the Irish President Mary Robinson stated about joining the European Union, "In fact, joining gradually made a deep and positive impact on our Irishness. Ireland welcomed the chance to express its European connection. We were reclaiming our place in Europe", (Time, Winter 1996, p121).

It does appear that Ireland has managed successfully to reconcile its sense of national identity with a European identity, a situation which has seemingly eluded nations such as Germany and Britain. Whilst people are in a state of confusion as to who they are, and their place in the world, it is possible that racism is a defensive act, and a reflex to the perception of being under threat. Chances are, those of us who are content with ourselves are more likely to be content with the idea of diversity. If people do not feel under attack, then people are more likely to be amenable to differing cultures.

Presently though, people do feel at risk. And not necessarily from the process of globalisation per se. Britain, because we have simply joined the European Union for economic reasons and have, to date, rejected social integration with our European neighbours, has managed to become the 'sweat shop' of Europe, thus German businesses are being seduced by our low pay, low social cost ethos, and are relocating their businesses from Germany to Britain. As Marsh states, "German companies during the past two years have invested more in the UK than in any other country in the world", (1996: 25).

The effect of maintaining the flow of inward investment into Britain means that British workers now have to accept reduced pay and reduced standards of working conditions. Britain has

also, like its European partners had to keep its economic house in order to keep in line with the demands of the 'Maastricht Treaty'. This has meant the welfare state, has come under attack with all the concomitant social dislocation caused by the erosion of welfare services. Meanwhile, Germany, with its excellent social and economic record since the second world war, is also suffering. Germany did take an economic battering on reunification, and the Bundesbank is now in a weakened state. It is probably only a matter of time before it is forced to follow the same route as Britain, and begin to dismantle some of its social institutions.

And this is where we came in. With new social problems coming to the surface as a result of unemployment it is always possible to blame 'foreign workers' for causing the loss of work amongst 'indigenous' workers. Moreover, because 'citizenship' is determined by the nation-states and is not a European 'entity', many guest workers find themselves in a vulnerable situation, particularly with regard to the strengthening electoral position of avowedly racist parties like the French 'National Front'.

The 'guest' workers have had a 'raw deal'. Many were originally invited over to their host countries to swell the labour force. Many have contributed to the overall wealth of their host countries, and yet many have been denied the right to formal citizenship status. Of course, being given full citizenship rights, does not necessarily mean acceptance by the indigenous population. As Cesarani and Fulbrook note, "racist attacks are hardly prefaced with a polite query as to the victims legal status", (1996: 225).

However, it has been shown in the case of the merging of East and West Germany, that the granting of full citizenship

makes integration far less difficult. To quote from Cesarani and Fulbrook again:

"Whatever the differences of culture, dialect, religion or economy, if immigrants are accepted by host communities as having a legitimate claim to belonging, their integration is infinitely less problematic than if the differences are construed as insurmountable barriers to a sense of common humanity", (1996: 216).

This idea is advanced by Meehan (1994), who believes that if citizenship is principally viewed as a legal status, then integration within the European Union will be more attainable, but if it is seen as being linked to the concept of *gemeinschaft*, then integration will be impeded. *Gemeinschaft*, by its very nature, is built upon homogeneity, and therefore anything which is different will be seen as being 'outside', diversity is not something which is embraced. Thus the assimilation of foreign or guest workers will be made more difficult, and the parameters of the nation-state will become less permeable, as each state will cling to its own version of what constitutes 'English', 'French' or whatever. Whilst not wishing to undermine the nation-state, citizenship should be developed as a coherent European issue and not left to each nation-state to decide.

To achieve this goal, the European Union must look further than economic and monetary integration, and develop a social policy which transcends nation-state boundaries, and is not simply confined to the workplace as at present. European Union should be built on policies of fairness, diversity and acceptance, as this is the only way forward to guarantee that the ghost of war will be exorcised forever. As Liebfried (1994) states,

"When we observe the EU's 'social dimension' today we quickly hit on the basic question: what is the EU's actual capacity for integration?... In today's EU 12, and more is to come, these combined societal structures seem to be gradually destabilized. They shrink slowly, turning into islands

in the rougher Common Market sea. But in place of the destroyed social fabric no new European 'social pact' has surfaced", (1994: 252)

That said, there are commentators such as Tassin (1992), who recommend that the nation-state is destroyed and that Europe should consider breaking down into autonomous regional units. His ideas about regionalism will be examined next.

### The Regions and Europe

The debate about regional identity has been brought to the fore recently, in part due to the fact that, with further European integration, many regions can now by-pass the nation-state and deal directly with the European Union. The process of globalisation also directly impacts upon our lives. Chances are, that even in the most remote corner of the world, local cultures have been subjected to outside influences, and as Giddens (1997) believes, "there's an increasing connection between local life and global change", (1997: 18).

This leaves a question mark hanging over supra-national bodies such as the EU, as lately confusion has arisen over what its prime function will be. Moreover, will the EU render the nation-state anachronistic? Within this section then, the idea of being able to set up regional units with the power to deal directly with the supra-national body of the European Union will be discussed. Thus, again, this thesis must discuss the death of the nation-state, though this time its death will not be because of the process of globalisation per se, but because the nation-state can be broken into autonomy seeking regions.

Tassin (1992), has so far during research for this thesis proved to be the most radical apropos the functions and uses

of regional power, therefore it is his work which will provide the underpinning for the debate on regional power.

Tassin's position is whether harmony within the European Union will ever be tenable within the present structure of nation-states acting in concert with each other. Tassin argues that true harmony, when considering the history of Europe was only ever realised during the period of the Roman Empire, when the whole of Europe was under the jurisdiction of Rome, and we have a form of commonality of cultures, because we had a shared religion.

Tassin then argues that the next significant point in the history of Europe was the battle for hegemony amongst the nation-states. The nation-states, he argues, were not particularly interested in forming an empire, but were intent on gaining imperialistic control, via the use of armed conflict, and this has been the case, continuing to the last world war.

However, Tassin argues that during this period, there has been some resistance to the notion of Europe being simply a set of nations intent on war-mongering. He believes Europe should evolve into a federation, and it is only by recognising this, that peace and prosperity will be realised. He quotes Proudhon as saying that, "the twentieth century will usher in the era of federations, or else humanity will again embark upon a thousand-year purgatory", (1992: 181).

For Tassin, the road Europe must follow is to recognise regional power, and to encourage active participation of citizens within the regional framework. This is akin to the idea of citizenship purported by the Greeks, where citizens had to be active within the Polis. This form of human contact, is, Tassin argues, truly cohesive. People can identify with their local communities, they can share power, and care about each other. Their identity is not subsumed

by the foreboding shadow of the nation-state. Within the context of regions, people can exercise true citizenship, they will have to be dutiful, as they have the power to shape the very existence of their communities.

Tassin relies on an almost Durkheimian sense of organic solidarity. The community is not something born out of tradition nor simply because it covers a certain geographical location. A community for Tassin is something which can transcend the prescribed state boundaries. In fact, this idea of a community being organic rather than prescribed is quite central to Tassin's debate. He states, for example, that,

"This elective dimension cannot be stressed enough. Europe can be reborn only if possibilities are created for a human community, which is no longer defined, like the old nation, by frontiers, physical contours or civil status, but rather in terms of social, cultural or spiritual goals - communities which I shall accordingly call elective, as opposed to the old native communities", (1992: 184).

Tassin, in essence wants to render the nation-state as obsolete. He believes that the concept of the nation-state has rendered the idea of the active citizen as useless, what would in the active life of the Greek Polis, have been carried out by the citizen has been taken over by the apparatus of the nation-state.

By locating power within the smaller regional unit, power can be once again be brought down to the 'human' level. However, Tassin is aware that regions need to develop relationships with other regions. He envisages the European Union as the mechanism for forging harmonious relationships between the regional groups. He wants to see a European identity established, one which transcends the boundaries of nation-states. By producing a European

identity, a true European citizen can be formed, one which is not shackled to the narrow confines of the nation-state boundary.

Tassin is of course not the only commentator who believes there has to be a fundamental change in how citizenship is viewed. Cesarani and Fulbrook (1996), have identified, what is considered by them to be a trend towards the un-coupling of rights from national identity. They argue that global pressures are militating against the nation-state and are piercing its boundaries, forcing a reassessment of the concept of citizenship - though this debate has been considered in earlier chapters.

Tassin's premise that the way forward for Europe lies in developing regional identities is persuasive, and is extolled by key political figures. Recognising a growing dissent within the body of the nation-state, calls for devolution have been made, an example of this is the call for Scottish devolution. Scotland, it is argued, needs an independent Scottish Parliament, and furthermore needs to have these needs articulated within the structure of the European Union, rather than be represented as part of the United Kingdom. There has to be, some argue, a full Scottish Parliament, as opposed to a Scottish Assembly, as the Scottish Assembly would still be ultimately answerable to Westminster and not the people of Scotland who it purports to represent.

However, calls for devolution do not necessarily mean the death-knell for the nation-state. Many who extol the virtues of devolution, such as Dennis Healey (1996), are not necessarily as radical as Tassin, and wish to keep the regions under the aegis of the nation-state. It is hoped by using the process of subsidiarity, where pushing decisions down to their lowest level, will enable citizens to act with sufficient autonomy without the need to

dismantle the nation-state, however the process of subsidiarity will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

An emphasis on regionality, it is also hoped, will give people a chance to develop a collective identity. It will enable people to make sense of their lives and belong to something tangible when everything else appears to be fragmenting. If however as Tassin suggests, regional identities are based not on tradition, but on an amalgam of spiritual and cultural resources, then the stability of the regions will be guaranteed. This is because, the people living within the regions will have been able to make a reflexive choice about their identity. People themselves will have been instrumental in shaping their identity, rather than having something imposed upon them.

Although the argument for regionalism is very seductive, it is not without problems. The ability to construct our own identities reflexively, implies that we can reflexively construct the identities of others. If Italy is used as an example, regional identity in the North was built upon constructing an 'alien' identity for those in the South. Those in the South were effectively cast as the 'other'. The myth of the 'other' was exacerbated by the popular press, they constantly gave media coverage to the idea of a 'them and us' situation. The images kept alive this process, and new demons were constantly manufactured. As Ruzza and Schmidtke state, "These episodes, and the process of public re-interpretation and mythologisation surrounding them, form an important source for an ongoing construction of social boundaries", (1996: 192).

In part, the situation has arisen because the European Union has consistently by-passed the nation-states and encouraged regional development (Cesarani & Fulbrook: 1996) . By the same token, the European Union has also been instrumental in

encouraging a regional identity, and has, by giving regions a certain amount of economic autonomy, militated against a cohesive nation-state. In effect, what has happened in Italy is that the European Union has probably - albeit unknowingly - promoted factionalism (Ruzza & Schmidtke: 1996).

It can also be the case, that both nationalism and 'regionalism', share similar characteristics, both work to determine their own identity by defining the 'other'. Hutton, in an article in the 'Observer' of the 15th September 1996, warns against Europe turning into a "babel of selfish regional nationalisms", (1996: 26). He points out correctly that the new identities being formed in the regions have more to do with financial rather than cultural reasons. The Lega Nord principally wants to declare itself the independent 'State of Padania', because it no longer wishes to be tied to other regions in Italy, which are poor. Italy is not the only nation-state under attack from self-centred regions. Majorca in Spain, as well as there being calls for the break-up of Belgium and Holland, mainly because the regions within these countries wishing to gain independence are affluent regions, and resent paying taxes to support the poorer regions within their countries.

In contrast to Tassin, regions can be just as determined as nation-states to maintain their boundaries. Tassin appears to be almost utopian in his desire for regional autonomy at the cost of ignoring the fact that people can be just as possessive about the parameters of their region - be these territorial, linguistic or 'cultural' as they can be of the boundaries of their countries.

One can also argue the case that if nation-states are allowed to break into autonomous regional units, then the differences between regions may be quite marked. It may be the situation where there will be work poor and resource poor regions next

to those which are resource and work rich. Attempts could be made to prevent such a development by a supra-national body such as the European Union, but there is a danger that such a body may be too remote from the regions or the bureaucracy involved may be too unwieldy to maintain inter-regional stability.

It may also be the case, that people may not want to see the end of the nation-state, and the nation-state could provide a cohesive quality between regions. However, if regional units can be encouraged within the boundaries of the nation-state, with the nation-state itself integrated within 'Europe', then in effect, multi-layers of identity could be created, securing social cohesion and not social dislocation.

### **Supra-national, National and Sub-national Can They Co-exist?**

Undoubtedly the nation-state is under assault from globalising forces and regional ambitions, however this thesis has argued that to declare that the nation-state is now simply a 'figure head' is fallacious, and that although as shown in chapter two, human rights do at times supersede citizenship rights, the nation-state does still, and indeed should be a key player in offering protection to the individual.

This section will therefore provide a way forward in which the differing needs of region, nation and the European Union can be articulated in a harmonious way, instead of what seems at times to be an openly antagonistic relationship displayed between the three tiers of authority.

Within Europe it is increasingly difficult to define citizenship along the lines of nationality, as mass migration has altered the ethnic and national composition of most of Europe, whereas during the formation of the European nation-states this was not the

case. As Turner notes, the European states "were relatively homogenous in ethnic terms", (1993: 59). As discussed earlier, the issue of immigration and who belongs within Europe has now seemingly unleashed a tide of petty nationalism, and whilst Europe seems to concentrate purely on economic integration at the expense of social integration, then perhaps we will receive a Europe we deserve. As noted in 'Time Magazine', of the 23rd June 1997,

"A European Union whose sole objective is the euro - and a euro whose sole attributes in the minds of the people are austerity and social suffering - would be the ideal feeding ground for far-right anti-immigrant parties like France's National Front", (1997: 30).

As noted within the same article, many Europeans are now fearful of having their jobs sacrificed at the altar of monetary union. One of the main fears expressed is that if Europe continues down the road it is taking then there could be a situation where Europe will be made up of work rich and work poor areas, as one commentator is quoted as saying "Economic Europe doesn't mean much if you are excluded through joblessness", (1997: 27).

So how can this problem be addressed? Freeman and Soete (1994) believe the problem of joblessness, has arisen within the European Union because the member states have adopted a policy of 'negative integration'. The adoption of free trade, has deregulated and de-stabilised existing economic structures particularly the commitment to full employment, with consequent social dislocation. Freeman and Soete therefore maintain that the States of Europe should be trying to achieve a position of positive integration, where there is an adherence to a 'social charter'. They argue that "free trade in this social deregulation sense has undoubtedly a negative connotation. The benefits of trade should lead to better international

allocation of resource thus increasing welfare at world level", (1994: 164).

Teague and Grahl (1990) argue that the social charter is perceived as being a sign of positive integration between the member states of the European Union, a safeguard written into the initiative for monetary union to balance against the possible turbulence of the free market. However, there was a disagreement as to whether such an agreement could be reached, as this was considered to be a move towards federalism at a time when further integration was being resisted, especially by the British. As Teague and Grahl note "it was questioned whether such an essentially federal arrangement as a social constitution could be adopted by the community, a pre-federal body" (1991: 212).

Cook (1996) argues that social provision must go hand in hand with open markets. He is also an advocate of the social charter, seeing it as an imperative to guard against the ravages of unemployment, he states,

"as we move to open markets we must do so in a way that maintains standards of social provision. That's why the European Social Charter is so important, not because of what it says in itself but because it's one of the first attempts by an international community to reach a minimum standard of social provision" (1996: 17).

Tindale (1996) also argues about the importance of adopting the 'Social Charter'. He accredits Delors with the idea of the 'Social Charter', and goes on to argue that unless the member states of the Union accept a common standard for social protection then there is a good chance that some member states with low social costs will attract investment, but that will be detrimental for all the other member states, thus eventually all the member states will be potential areas of falling social provision.

The question that now begs answering is what protection can the 'Social Charter' afford to the citizens of Europe? A recent article in 'The Observer' of 11th May 1997, gave details of the implications of the 'Social Charter'. Whilst acknowledging that many employers and employees see the charter as simply a talking shop or a prelude to industrial havoc, others see the charter in very positive terms, especially the setting up of the works councils, where companies must now consult elected members of their workforce to discuss key issues of company policy. Trade unions, according to this article, whilst having some misgivings have been largely involved with the works councils. As well as the works councils, the 'Social Charter', according to this article, includes provision for a minimum wage, leave from work to care for young children, a maximum working week and recognition of trade unions.

What is problematic is that although the 'Social Charter' appears to be of some significance for the workers of Europe, there is no provision in the charter for non-workers, and as Goldblatt and Held (1997) point out, many problems that have arisen in Britain are actually shared by our European partners. They state that

"some problems that Blair will face are peculiar to Britain, but four are common to all European Social Democrats: sluggish, jobless growth; the mounting threat of environmental crisis and the steady erosion of the social and environmental fabric are the backdrop to all mature capitalist economies", (1997: 24).

Rhodes (1996) argues that the needs of the citizens of Europe are in flux, and calls into question the basis of welfare provision. He argues that the demographic changes occurring within Europe such as the emergence of differing family forms and an increasingly aging society are "altering the gender/family/work nexus in which western welfare states have traditionally been based" (1996:

301). Rhodes, however, perceives a general malaise on the part of the European Union to any sort of supra-national welfare state, but he does acknowledge that some sort of protection is offered to the citizen via the European Court of Justice, (ECJ). The ECJ has acted to ensure that welfare benefits are made available to claimants from all of the member states of the Union.

Vobruba (1995) argues, perhaps contentiously that the European Union needs to have a strong social security system in order to become economically strengthened. He believes the two are intrinsically linked, as in order to exercise flexibility of approach we need to have in place a system which encourages employment stability, good health and high educational standards. He believes that,

"the economic strength of the European model (even if perhaps concealed right now) are also based on - in comparative terms - high standards of social security. The fact is that social security is a precondition for flexibility", he believes firmly in the "economic value of social policy", (1995: 307).

Vobruba further discusses how the implementation of a European wide social policy is an economic as well as a social imperative. At present the problem with European social policy is that it is stymied by the nation-state. The nation-state still has the power to halt any sort of supra-national social policy, another problem is as mentioned earlier, social integration appears fixated with the notion that a citizen is a worker. As Vobruba states "European integration policy has, for historically obvious reasons a strong tendency to reduce citizens to employees", (1995: 312). Therefore social policy as a European issue must also address the non-worker as much as the worker, otherwise the risk of an emergent 'underclass' may become increasingly real, with implications for citizenship.

It was mentioned above that the nation-state appears to be in an almost antagonistic position to the making of EU policy. As discussed in previous chapters the nation-state is still very much a force to be reckoned with, but also the nation-state, as the introduction to this section implies, can and indeed should be involved in providing protection and security to its citizens. Europe is a collection of very different cultures and ethnicities. As Hall (1993) remarks, we all have very different histories - and it would be unwise to ignore history and try to join together people tempered by different histories - ignore Yugoslavia at our peril.

Pocock (1990), believes we must always take into account the affection people have for the nation-state. He argues that "the desire for sovereignty is based on fundamental human needs, it will not go away. Deflecting it from its traditional focus in the nation-state means finding a focus for it elsewhere", (1990: 324). Pocock warns against simply signing up the member states to a federalist future just because we want to have "geographical tidiness", (1990: 324) - as if countries making up a federal state have no common ground, the federation will soon fall apart. Yugoslavia was mentioned earlier; Pocock also reminds us of Russia and the constant tensions that exist within India.

Pocock also observes that the European Union does not have a common language, nor does it share a common religion. The nation-state will need to be the arbiter between the citizens of the country it represents and the bureaucracy of the supra-national body. The nation-state undoubtedly needs to function as the middle tier of government as Guild (1996) suggests that many people do not even understand the concept of a European Union, let alone look to it to protect their needs. The nation-state in this case could act as a 'glue'

adhering the regions together, and a sensible tier of government to act as a mediator between region and Union.

Teague and Grahl (1991) suggest that full integration of all systems would be an impossible task, as the labour markets and social welfare systems across the Union are far too diverse. They state, "it is now widely accepted that harmonisation is an impracticable and even undesirable policy goal, given the diversity of labour market institutions across the community", (1991: 218). The European Union though, could provide a *modus vivendi* for the citizens of Europe, but it could be the function of the nation-state to 'translate' any directives from Europe and taper them to suit the circumstances of its people, taking into account such things as culture, language, history and differing labour markets.

One must also remember, as this chapter began, that feelings of national belonging are deeply entrenched - almost lodged in the individual 'psyche'. It would be foolish to ignore or underestimate the strong psychological influence of the nation state. As stated earlier in this chapter, efforts to marginalise the nation-state have resulted in increasing 'Euro-sceptism', which on occasion has displayed Fascist tendencies.

There also needs to be more people involved in the political process, and local government is perhaps best placed for this. A sense of belonging is arguably very important, and participation in local democratic processes which work in harmony with the national and supra-national tiers will probably provide the most effective way of dealing with 'difference'. The next section will therefore look at the role of local government, and the importance of the civic bond.

## Why is Local Government and the Civic Bond Important?

So the next question to be answered, is why is the civic bond so important? Kymlicka and Norman (1994), have identified four perspectives on citizenship. First, 'the left and participatory democracy', whose adherents believe in local empowerment, and the general decentralisation of state power; second, 'civic republicanism', which is akin to the Athenian notion of citizenship, and advocates the direct involvement in public life: third, 'civil society theorists', who believe in the value of voluntarism, and argue that voluntary groups teach people to be virtuous, and accept that they have a responsibility for the wider community. Lastly, 'liberal virtue theory' theorists maintain that in a 'democratic' society, individuals cannot simply make demands, but must be willing to enter into open and frank debate with fellow citizens whose needs they may consider repugnant at worst or strange at best. In each case a rather different balance is struck between rights and responsibilities.

Whilst noting that the above descriptions are very brief, they do give an insight into the complexities of the citizenship debate and the arguments surrounding the citizen as both a rights claimer and a dutiful person. Perhaps the most vociferous exponent of this debate is Amitai Etzioni. Etzioni (1995), argues that more commitment to building communities will be achieved by strengthening the civic tie. He equates participation in public life with rebuilding 'communities', and states that,

"the more opportunities we provide of both kinds to allow people to apply their civic commitment, the more powerful it will grow to be, and the more the moral and social order will be carried by the community rather than the state", (1995: 160).

Etzioni's notion of citizenship is very much tied to the notion of civic duty, and if civic duty is not carried out then he

argues "the readings of social ill health are far too high for a civic society", (1995: X). Phillips, in a recent 'Observer' article of 03.08.97, also argues that more people should be involved with the political process, she worries that people have become removed from the political process, they are no longer involved with local politics and are estranged from national politics. She states "people have become dangerously alienated from the whole process of government." (Observer, 03.08.97, p4), and like Etzioni advocates a strengthening of local activity in order to strengthen community ties.

### The Structure of Local Government

First, it is wise to remember that all the nation-states within Europe have differing structures. For example, Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1989), point out that Germany has a strong tradition of decentralised authority, partly because, after the second world war, Germany was actively encouraged to embrace federalism as an active "check against the possible future abuse of central authority", (1989: 17). They also argue that France, although not a federal state in the true sense (like Germany or the USA), has "elected regional governments with enhanced responsibilities and sources of finance", (1989: 19), whilst in Britain,

"local authorities are entirely the creatures of parliament, which is controlled by the party in power, and dependent on central government not only for the bulk of their income but for their very existence. The abolition in 1986, of a whole tier of local government, the Metropolitan County Council, including the Greater London Council (GLC), is evidence of the disproportionate distribution of power in the United Kingdom", (1989: 20).

## The State of Local Government in Britain

Mulgan (1996), believes it is a sad indication of the sterility of the British system, that after the collapse of communism, "not one of the new democracies that emerged out of the collapse of the Soviet Union choose to follow Britain. For them the models were the USA and France, Germany and Spain", (1996: 220). So what is it that Britain is doing so wrong? Arguably by having such a strong centralised state, the ethos of citizenship is damaged. Participatory democracy is not tenable under these circumstances. As Smith (1996) notes Governments will simply work for the 'common good' and not attempt to encompass the notion of 'difference'. He states that "a number of factors... may undermine local government and local democracy, especially centralisation... formalistic participation, skewed representation... and official attitudes" (1996: 163). Marquand (1996) believes, that in Britain since 1945, the layer of government between the individual and the state has steadily been eroded - with dire consequences. He states "in the last fifty years, however, the intermediate institutions of civil society have steadily lost autonomy... As a result British local government is probably the weakest in the democratic world", (1996: 72/72). Mulgan also shares this view, he states, "more than most countries, Britain has a notoriously weak local government", (1996: 224).

Selbourne (1994), argues that the civic bond must be strengthened and citizens must once again be prepared to participate in performing civic duties. Selbourne recognises that in this country, the civic bond has taken a battering. He states that, "Today, the civic order as a citizen-body can barely lay claim in the corrupted liberal orders... its ethical status and practical authority usurped 'from above' by supra-national bureaucracies and state apparatuses, and 'from below' by the undermining of the civic bond", (1994: 40).

What appears to have been happening of late, is that many decisions are being made about local services by unelected bodies. As Rustin (1997) notes ,

"Power has mostly been transferred from imperfectly democratic public bodies, to considerably less representative private ones... Meanwhile the elected local authorities who had previously had statutory control over these institutions were denied even a right of representation on the governing bodies" (1997: 79).

So, to sum up before moving the debate further, within Britain it has been argued that the 'civic bond' has been severely damaged. Unlike many of our European neighbours, (such as Germany and France), we have a weak system of local government. It has been shown that the decline in the 'civic bond' has been mourned by commentators such as Marquand and Selbourne, because they see the situation as being instrumental in eroding the democratic process. Meanwhile, Etzioni believes that the civic bond needs to be repaired, simply because as people we have a need to form interdependent relationships, to form communities, where the local citizen body is active in promoting democratic principles.

### **What Form *Should* Local Democracy Take?**

Mulgan (1996) and Milne (1996) discuss the relative merits of 'citizen juries'. This is where a cross section of the local population is recruited to debate issues pertaining to, for example, planning and NHS matters. It is hoped by having citizen juries, that there is an element of consultation between those in power and the local populace. However, as Milne states "so far, citizen's juries do not have a good record of effecting change", (1996: 8). She further describes how eventually a member of a citizen jury will metamorphose into an 'expert', and thus be subject to the same lobbying techniques

normally reserved for members of parliament, thus negating the "dream... of an Athenian style democracy which is small-scale and uncontaminated", (1996: 9). Citizen juries could also undermine the notion of local democracy. They may be selected because they satisfy the statistical representation required, for instance, the jury may be balanced correctly in terms of class, ethnicity and gender, but the jury is still not an elected body, therefore how can they be held responsible for any decisions made? Marquand (1996) believes that, "the right response to the gathering crisis of community is to adopt the old 'Christian Democratic' principle of subsidiarity - the principle that decisions should be taken at the lowest level of government appropriate to the decision concerned", (1996: 77).

However, subsidiarity does have its opponents. Teasdale (1993), states that historically subsidiarity was linked with federalism, as in the case of the USA and Germany. In relation to some countries in the Union, subsidiarity was perceived as being a safeguard to the erosion of national sovereignty. Britain supported the notion, but only in so much as power was devolved from supra-national to national levels of government. The Conservative government, which was instrumental in negotiating the terms and wording of the 'Maastricht Treaty', was keen to fudge the real meaning of subsidiarity. As Teasdale notes, "the references to subsidiarity in the new Maastricht Treaty on European Union proclaim the concept without defining it in a conclusive or definitive way" (1995: 190). Mainly this was due to the fear that the nation-state would fragment into autonomy seeking regions, who would demand the right to negotiate their own deals with the Union, thus turning whole of Europe into a federation. Now it appears that the process of subsidiarity is frequently perceived as being about relocating power from national to sub-national units, and about community empowerment, as discussed by Marquand but, as Teasdale states,

subsidiarity really concerns attempts to discover the correct level of government from supra-national to sub-national units; it is not about shifting powers to enhance local communities.

Phillips (1993), draws attention to the notion of consociationalism, which guarantees the economic, social and political rights of permanent minorities. However, she does question the power of consociationalism to effect change. Consociationalism is about keeping the peace rather than effecting change, and therefore does little to break down group barriers. As Phillips states "consociationalism is driven by the requirement of political stability... It accepts as more or less inevitable the continuing hostilities between such groups", (1993: 17/18).

So what should be the form of government at this level? Phillips acknowledges the attempts made by local government to represent minority groups. She discusses how certain attempts have been made at local level to try to give some representation to minority groups, and states that

"in British politics, related questions have surfaced most directly in the numerous local government initiatives of the 1980's which sought to establish some mechanism of representation for groups whose specific needs had been inadequately addressed. Thus the decision by many local authorities to establish women's committees or women's units, anti-racist committees or ethnic minorities units, or to appoint officers with special responsibilities for disadvantaged groups", (1993: 130/131).

However, whilst such initiatives are laudable, as Phillips notes, they are soon scuppered by the argument of universalism - often portrayed as the 'common good', which negates any chance of further forays into pluralism. Of course by chanting the mantra of universalism, one should ask, who are the people wanting the 'common good'? If there is a 'common good', then there must be

common morals and values, and therefore communities serviced by the 'common good', could become exclusive enclaves, possibly only allowing admittance to those it deems will serve the 'common good'. In this sense there is a chance that 'common good' communities will evolve into nasty, petty little places, intolerant of anyone who cannot fit with the standards that have been set. An example of this has recently occurred in Jordan, Montana, USA, where a group decided to declare part of Montana 'Justus Township', (Guardian, 02.04.96). This group decided to form its own citizen body, and formulated its own set of laws which were that "white men have special rights above those of blacks and women - and a dollop of anti-semitism.... Then they rendered the lot into a hokey, latinate legalese and declared their independence", (Guardian, 02.04.96, p3). This example shows what should *not* happen, that is, that local government should take into account minority groups and that local government should never be above the laws of the land, communities and citizen bodies are important as a source of neighbourly interdependence, but they should not be declared a 'polity', they are not separate self-governing societies in their own right, they are part of society.

Giddens (1996) believes we should therefore promote "dialogic democracy" (1996: 76). By this he means people being given the chance to voice their opinions and participate in decision making. He states that "it will often be the case that controversial issues cannot be directly resolved; yet discussion can allow us to agree to disagree and therefore be a powerful medium for tolerance and conciliation", (1996: 76). Hutton (1995) believes that the "public realm must be reclaimed", (1995: 290), and points to how there should be an overhaul of the current system of governance between the levels of local and national, where there should be more power drawn

from the centre, but that the recipients of such power should act in a more open and accountable way. He states that, "The devolution of power within lines of accountability must be clear... Instead on mini-versions of the secret, centralised and powerful executive state they must become components of a more pluralistic society in which power is devolved away from the centre", (1995: 290). Williams (1981) also advocates a more open style of politics, where there is a full and frank exchange of ideas, she believes that national government must be prepared to devolve power to the lower tiers of government. Phillips (1993) maintains we should acknowledge a 'politics of difference', where difference is not merely something to be simply defended or represented, but difference is to be discussed, and should difference cause inequality, then changes must be made to counteract such inequalities.

So, to sum up before up before moving to the final question of how can regional, national and supra-national layers of government be reconciled. Of late, local government within the UK has been progressively weakened and is therefore in need of urgent attention. The process of subsidiarity has been discussed, and whilst the British view of subsidiarity has thus far been about the relocation of power from supra-national to national government, subsidiarity must be embraced in its truest sense, and that is power must be devolved to locally elected bodies. That said, at the same time local government must become more transparent and inclusive, and must learn how to deal with difference, with a motivation to change direction and policy if inequality is encountered. This means a firm commitment to a policy of equal opportunity, as noted earlier consociationalism is fine, but it does little to effect change, it encourages a feeling of indignity within minority groups and essentially encourages a victim mentality. Generally, this

means there needs to be a *financial* commitment to the notion of equal opportunities. Local authorities need to have powers to raise money locally, and that means central government will have to trust local government to act responsibly, and get rid of 'capping'. As Richards states "the instinct of central government is nearly always *not* to trust the councils", (1997: 31)

### Conclusion

As ever, within the British system of governance, Richards has noted, there is antagonism between local and national government. So how can there be a system which satisfies all tiers from sub to supra? The first point to note is, that all tiers of government are of equal importance, arguably in the scheme of life, the collection of household rubbish once a week will be as of equal importance to most people as discussions about the 'ERM', excepting the collection of rubbish is something that can be observed happening but discussions about 'ERM' are sometimes so convoluted as to be beyond comprehension. As local politics is about 'grass roots' issues, then it is possible to involve more people in the decision making process at this level. Local politics are, after all mainly about local issues, and as such can have the most impact upon people's lives. Also people may engage more with a process that they understand rather than the somewhat abstract issues debated at national and supra-national levels.

Another point to note, as Kymlicka and Norman (1994) believe, citizenship is not merely a status, it is an identity, inclusion in local citizenship projects provides another ring of identity, as stated, "Marshall saw citizenship as a shared identity that would integrate previously excluded groups within British society and provide a

source of national unity", (1994: 369). The idea behind such a notion is that identities of locality, nation and supra-nation form concentric rings of identity, anchoring people, as Ascherson (1996) argues "children... imagine their concentric spreading rings of identity reaching out to all humanity and beyond" (1996: 95).

In order to keep nationalistic tendencies at bay, there needs to be firstly a strengthening of European institutions. Europe needs to be bolstered to withstand global pressures. Europe also needs to strive for both financial and social stability, as ultimately the two are inextricably linked, secondly, the power of the nation-state must not be underestimated. As Pocock (1990) states, inevitably "we are left with the nation-state. This should not surprise us. The nation-state has been around a long time, and presumably survived because it is the best means of meeting certain needs" (1990: 326). The nation-state does have a very key role in providing citizenship rights, identity and provision, the nation-state provides a strong glue which can keep people 'secure'. And thirdly, the last tier of government, regional and local, though they must not, as discussed earlier, be considered inferior. Many of the services provided locally are of enormous significance, for example, within schools children can be encouraged to explore their own cultures and to share the process of exploration with others, it is perhaps, more probably at this level that we can achieve a 'politics of difference', where there is communication between groups, for example, politicians from national and supra-national bodies can come up with solutions to the troubles in Northern Ireland - in theory, but the real test will be if the local communities accept and implement change; for example, if local authorities cease discriminating against Catholic minorities for housing and other resources. It is possibly the case as Meehan (1994) suggests that we are now experiencing a 'different' form

of citizenship, where identities are not fixed but are overlapping. She states that,

"a new kind of citizenship is emerging that is neither national nor cosmopolitan but that is multiple in the sense that the identities, rights and obligations, associated... with citizenship, are expressed through an increasingly complex configuration of common Community institutions, states, national and transnational voluntary associations, regions and alliances of regions", (1994:1)

However, it must be noted that probably out of the three tiers of authority, the nation-state as Pocock as stated earlier, is the most resilient. Although there has been many debates discussed within this thesis about the impotency of the nation-state, it is probably provides the most enduring quality. Consider British history: the 'Act of Union' of 1707 effectively dissolved government in Scotland, that was over three hundred years ago, but the essence of Scottishness still abounds today. In order to keep nationalism and potential civil unrest at bay, we cannot deny that the nation-state is of vital importance. Therefore we should be a member of the local citizen body, and have representation and discussion about what should happen locally. We should be *citizens* of the nation-state and ultimately we should be *citizens* of the larger unit of Europe. Meehan (1994) whilst noting the complexity of this situation also sees it as a challenge .She states that,

"our political actions are now having to be carried out through a web of common institutions, states, regional and local authorities and voluntary associations on the domestic front and simultaneously, in nation and/or transnation alliance.... while the complexity of this framework is intimidating in the demands it makes... it can provide many openings for challenging authority, for expressing our various loyalties associated with our various identities and for exercising our rights and duties in more than one arena" (1994: 160/161).

Let us all hope that Meehan is right. However, whilst she does seem to be relatively optimistic about the future, the next chapter will discuss whether there should be a reassessment of

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Let us all hope that Meehan is right. However, whilst she does seem to be relatively optimistic about the future, the next chapter will discuss whether there should be a reassessment of

the whole citizenship project, as citizenship defined by the terms of a liberal democracy has managed to curtail and sometimes exclude some groups of people, namely women.

### Exploring women and citizenship

The examination of the relationship between women and citizenship has been deliberately kept as a separate chapter. The reasons underpinning this decision are because citizenship is discussed mainly in terms of its 'democratic foundations'. However as Pateman argues, democracy has little to do with the role of women, and more to do with keeping, "liberal society as a series of male clubs", (1990: 210). This argument has several champions. Phillips is quoted as stating, "liberal democracy has not served women well", (1992: 68), whilst Lister (1993), appreciates citizenship, although masquerading as gender-neutral, is far from being so.

Williams (1993) argues that feminism questions the universality of citizenship. However, feminists are divided about the meaning and nature of the idea of citizenship, as citizenship in contemporary society is multi-faceted, and therefore varying theories around the theme of 'difference' are emerging. The first section of this chapter will therefore consider the problems citizenship within a liberal democracy poses for women, whilst the second section will consider the contribution feminism can make towards a clearer understanding of the nature of citizenship, bearing in mind, that women cannot be treated as an homogenous mass, and that this debate is intersected by issues such as class and race, as any contemporary notions of citizenship must consider these issues.

#### The Problems Liberal Democracy Poses for Feminism.

This section will argue that universalistic approaches to citizenship actively undermine the participation of women within society.

The liberal tradition is based upon the notion of the primacy of the individual. The individual can engage in such practices as to enable their own advancement, also within the tenets of liberalism is the charge on others to properly maintain the freedom of others. Dietz (1992), discusses the legacy of Adam Smith. Smith believed liberalism was the ability of the individual to compete in the economic markets, which means everyone should have the ability and freedom to exercise such rights.

This category of 'rights' assumes that activities are performed in the public sphere, linking citizenship with public life. Family life was considered something to be kept private, as Finch states, "both physically and ideologically, home and family were conceived of as a private place where - among other things - members of the family could be free from external pressures and interference" (1996: 196). Because family life was considered to be outside the public arena, then it was also outside the remit of government legislation, moreover the idea of the public/private dichotomy, with the family being presented as naturally belonging in the private sphere had begun to be taken for granted, (Lister: 1993).

Pateman argues that within the liberal tradition "only men count as individuals" (1990: 213), and that this state was again considered 'natural'. Women were supposed to belong to their husbands or fathers, and had hardly any redress in law. As Laurence states "common law did not normally acknowledge the existence of any woman who was not under the protection of a man" (1996: 227).

Dietz (1992) would argue that the best way to change women's situations is to involve them as effective actors in the democratic system, getting involved with public life and becoming 'active citizens'. But how easy would that be? Initially, as Chapter One

has shown, to become a politically active citizen meant, in this country, that it was necessary to own property. Laurence (1996), indicates that on marriage, any property the women owned immediately came under the jurisdiction of a husband, and on widowhood property owned by the husband did not automatically pass directly to the wife, but was shared equally between wife and children. This lack of property ownership meant women were not given full citizenship rights. They had no right to vote, and as Laurence states "women have no voice in Parliament, they make no laws they consent to none, they abrogate none", (1996: 227).

When women did become active in the political arena, it is often as Fraser (1990) describes in the 'weak' areas as opposed the 'strong' areas where public policy was formed. Laurence describes how women's representation in the recognised areas of power such as the 'Guild' membership was eroded by liberal democracy. Liberal democracy as has been shown in Chapter One, has as its basic tenet, the contractual agreement between citizenship and the right to hold office. The 'Guild System', was a series of associations based on patronage and tradition. Primarily the function of the guilds was to regulate apprenticeships and to ensure that 'trade secrets' were passed on to future generations. Women could be members of the guild based on hereditary rights. With the inception of liberal democracy, there was a decline in the 'Guild System' based on tradition and an increase in formal office holders which meant women were 'frozen' out of this process.

Early feminists hoped that universal suffrage could provide women with equal status to that of men. Unfortunately this did not prove to be the case. Women do have equal rights in so far as they have the ability to vote, but this has not mitigated the impact of social factors which may create a situation in which women cannot

claim their political rights - for example, lower levels of political involvement due to child rearing responsibilities (Phillips: 1992).

Phillips is also concerned with why women were given suffrage. As Elshtain (1982) has noted, in a liberal democracy, citizenship was usually equated with military service, men were willing to go and fight for their country and therefore had citizenship status conferred on them. However, as Pateman (1990) and Phillips (1992) note, women were also providing a public service, providing such services as giving birth and educating and rearing children - services without which a society cannot survive never mind function. Although women's contribution to society was recognised accordingly by being given the suffrage, women have been given citizenship status in relation to their roles as wives and mothers, their citizenship is not therefore granted as an individual acting and reacting as a free agent with society, but via the third party of children and husbands.

So for women there has been a long and arduous haul to achieve any sort of political and civil rights. At the last general election, women were elected to one fifth of the parliamentary seats, but as stated recently

"let's not get too carried away. Britain still has fewer female MP's than the likes of Sweden (40 percent) and Norway (39 percent). In the past 100 years we have had 4,500 male MP's and only 169 women", (The Guardian, 06.05.97, p7).

Whilst not wishing to suggest that direct political action is useless, there has to be consideration given to the reasons why women are not more politically active.

One reason already noted within this chapter is women are restricted by the lack of quality childcare. Women are still considered to be the main carer, also now women are moving more into

paid work because of financial pressures, this means a constant juggling act between commitment to the home and family and a commitment to work. This leaves very little time for political engagement, as Lister states, "poverty itself is a very time-consuming condition and even in two-parent families it is largely women's time that it consumes", (1993: 9).

Lack of mobility can also play a part in keeping women away from organised political activity. Derounian (1993) notes that women living in rural areas have access to only limited resources, for example, the public transport service can be unreliable and infrequent. This hampers attempts to join groups. However, this argument is not necessarily restricted to women living in rural locations. Many suburbs are not sufficiently resourced as far as public transport is concerned, and women living in towns and cities are often simply too fearful to venture out in case of violent attacks. As Lea and Young state, "women in particular are very restricted in their use of public space. Fear of crime and harassment forces them into their homes", (1993: 37). Again, although notice has already been drawn to this point already, it cannot be stressed too much that for many women, civil and political citizenship is 'underwritten' by social citizenship. Without social aspects being taken into consideration such as transport policies, policing policies and childcare policies, then the effects of civil and political citizenship are quite often negated.

Women are therefore largely restricted to entering the political arena at a local level. Many community initiatives are started by women. Parker's (1986) study of the aftermath of the miner's strike shows in rich detail how women did band together to form a miners' support group. However, what is most revealing about his study is how the women did not see their actions as being political, their

actions were not about gaining public recognition per se, but about gaining public understanding for the plight of the miners. The women interviewed by Parker admitted they enjoyed being part of a collectivity fighting for a cause, and stated they felt the process made them question their traditional roles. However as much as the strike heightened the women's awareness of their own nascent political 'careers', ultimately their actions were about anything but themselves. As one woman revealed her reasons for forming the women's group were principally about social justice. She stated that, "there was a principle in it, the principle that we wanted to save jobs, not have our men put out of work and thrown on the dole. And we wanted to have a future for our communities where we lived and for our children" (1986: 134).

Greer, in a recent article in 'The Observer', pointed out that even when women transcend the division between 'weak' and 'strong' politics (ie. from local to national politics), then there are now further divisions between back-bench MP's and front bench MP's. Her argument is that an unprecedented number of female MP's have been elected to the back bench, but media focus has been of the male front bench MP's rendering the female profile as invisible. She states that,

"It is the crowning irony that just as women begin to appear in Parliament in number, back bench MP's enter deepest obscurity and all the attention is focused on the top males.... Women can expect little from their new female representatives, who may find their membership of the raucous boys' club that is Parliament a dubious privilege at best", (Observer, 04.05.97, p3).

The welfare state has provided some social rights, but from the beginning it has always been premised upon the notion of male breadwinner and female homemaker. Figes (1994),

argues that the benefit system renders women invisible. She states that women are "falling through the net designed to prevent the worst forms of poverty. They form the majority of those claiming non-contributory social security and means tested benefits, which are of lower value than contributory benefits", (1994: 146). The social security system is biased against those with a blemished record of paying national insurance contributions, and specifically women who have taken time away from work to care for their children or perhaps elderly parents, as the burden of care still falls predominantly on women. As Rees notes, "British social security still marches falteringly to the beat of a Beveridgean social order resting on the life time earnings of male breadwinner, and treating many women as appendages to men" (1996: 11).

Williams (1993), gives details about the hard fought battle for such benefits as 'Child Benefit', formerly known as 'Family Allowance'. Family Allowance was a benefit paid directly to the mother, and was supposed to provide her with some sort of income to guard against the possible unpredictability of an income from her husband. However as Williams notes, the achievement of the family allowance could be described as a pyrrhic victory for women, as it is a way for employers to lower wages as women had another source of income. More damaging, however was the fact that women were still being seen only in relation to their mothering role. The ethos behind 'Family Allowance', that of protecting women from possible financial hardship, also sought to engage women in the role of potential victims of male ineptitude. It propagated the idea that men were able to fend for themselves, but women needed to be looked after by someone, be it an individual husband or the state. This again seemingly reduced women's role to that of child-like dependency.

Murray (1990), argues that the welfare system has been liberating for women, as women no longer have to rely on men for money. Murray argues that there has now been a change in the mood of relationships. Young women have a natural propensity to procreate, but they can now have their children but do not have to accept that children go with marriage, as the state provides them with an income. However, in order to qualify for such benefits, the young women must first divulge some extremely intimate details regarding her private life. In a sense then, women in this case have replaced one patriarchal institution - marriage - for another patriarchal institution - the state. As one commentator notes, welfare payments are a "super-sexist marriage, you trade in a man for *the* man", (Ms, Vol 5, p50).

As with any doctrine, liberal democracy is riddled with contradictions. It was stated earlier in this chapter, how the family was considered to be outside of the remit of government interference, but, with the inception of the 'Child Support Act', this premiss was seemingly based on a spurious foundation. The 'Child Support Act' came into being in 1991 (Thatcher: 1993), and from the beginning has been controversial. It seeks to obtain maintenance for children from the absent parent. The act shrouds itself in value-free language, discussing the obligations of the 'absent' parent and the 'caring' parent, when really they mean the responsibility of the father for the mother. Since the change in legislation, even when men and women are not married, the law states that the man has to provide income to support the mother of his child. If the woman refuses to give information about her child's father, and the CSA deem her not to have a sufficiently plausible excuse for not naming her child's father, then her benefit can be reduced. As Lister notes, "in this way, women's economic dependency on men that they do not even live with is being

enforced", (1993: 7). So the government is well able and willing to violate the privacy of the family when it suits, but still maintains that areas such as child care costs rest within the remit of the family and should not be met by the state. Such are the contradictions of liberal democracy.

Evidence provided by Morris (1987) suggests that even when men are out of work and having to rely on state benefits, this does not equalise the status between the sexes. Women are still accepted as being the primary carer, and for men, unemployment is perceived as a temporary hitch to the normal breadwinner role. As many women cluster around the low pay section of the labour market they do not earn enough to support a family. If their unemployed husband claims income support, the bulk of the women's pay is deducted from her husband's benefit, therefore there is little incentive for a women to keep on working. As Morris notes,

"in the current circumstances, it is only worthwhile for the wife of a man in long-term unemployment to seek, or remain in, employment herself if she can earn substantially more than she and husband claim in .... benefit", (1987: 4).

It is the case then that male unemployment can take the female 'hostage'.

Liberal democracy does not adequately provide for women in the work place. Although some women have entered the labour market in a position of strength, this situation does tend to be an exception rather than a rule. Women cluster around jobs which are still considered to be of secondary value, those in the service sector such as cleaning and low status office jobs, (See Labour Force Survey, Spring Quarter, 1993). Women as a percentage of the whole workforce now make up 49.5 percent, but still only account for a total of 2.9 percent of the jobs considered to be the 'top jobs', (The Economist,

1997, p83), this is despite the plethora of rhetoric spouted on equal opportunities.

Figes, (1996) argues that where discrimination was once quite open, the legislation on equal opportunities has merely spawned underhand ways of discrimination. She states that,

"the rhetoric of equal opportunity has merely forced discrimination to become covert where once it was unabashed and easier to detect. It has also deflected attention from a host of measures in recent years which have made it harder, rather than easier, for a women to achieve economic independence and thereby equal citizenship", (1994: 7).

One fundamental way in which women are not treated in a just manner is the payment of maternity benefits. Women's pregnancy is equated to male sickness, with the exception that a man does not have to give written notice of his impending sickness. By linking childbirth with sickness, it does appear that creating the next generation is treated with contempt, and what should be a cause for celebration is relegated to sympathy for the women's 'illness'. As Young (1990a) argues "Assimilating pregnancy into disability gives a negative meaning to these processes as unhealthy", (1990a: 131).

Mackinnon (1989) believes that the problem with 'Equal Opportunities' legislation is that women are compared with men. In order to be found to have been discriminated against because of her sex, a women must prove that a man would be treated the same in those circumstances. She argues that such legislation treats "likes alike and unlikes a like" (1989: 225). In effect, Mackinnon argues, men receive entitlements because they are men, whilst women to receive the same entitlements have to prove that they are really the same as men. She states,

"Why does maleness provide an original entitlement, unquestioned on the basis of its gender, while women who want to make a case of unequal treatment in a world men

have made in their image... have to show in effect that they are men in every relevant respect, unfortunately mistaken for women on the basis of an accident at birth", (1989: 225).

Cornell (1992) argues that where the concept of citizenship is failing in its dependency on the word 'equal'. She believes that equality presupposes a universal identity, a rigid measurement against which everything is judged. The law then has to use as a guide-line concepts which do not accurately reflect reality. The thrust of Cornell's argument, is that we should not be looking for equality but for *equivalence*. By looking for equality, women somehow have to 'measure up' to men, for example in the case of women's maternity and men's illness. However, equivalence allows an acknowledgement of 'difference', but nevertheless provides for treatment on an equitable basis.

It is important for there to be an acknowledgement of 'difference'. The law should have as its basic tenet, a respect for gender differences, be it heterosexual male/female or gay/lesbian differences. At present, as in the case of those claiming maternity benefits has shown, women have to show how their situation is equal to that of a males. Equivalent rights would therefore have the ability to make pregnancy a worthy category in its own right, without having to link it with the male concept of illness. By allowing equivalent rights it would hopefully get rid of the notion that women are being treated in some sort of privileged way, as some people feel that by accepting the idea that people are treated differently from a specified 'norm' that this constitutes preferential treatment.

Haraway (1992), argues that as we near the end of the twentieth century, then the great programme of modernity encompassing rights and the power of representation has simply failed. She is, she states, if the situation does not change fearful for the future.

Haraway believes that "humanity is a modernist figure; and this humanity has a generic face, a universal shape. Humanity's face has been the face of a man" (1992: 86).

It is on this apocalyptic note, that this section will end. If modernity and its projects such as liberal democracy and its universalistic concept of citizenship have failed woman-kind, then the next section will consider in what ways feminism should be addressing the question of citizenship and 'difference'.

### **Feminism: the Challenge for Citizenship**

As stated earlier in this chapter, 'women' are not an homogenous mass, their needs cannot be dealt with simply by one over-arching version of citizenship. It is perhaps the case that the feminist schools offer the most potent arguments against universality. This section will therefore consider the various debates put forward by feminist authors as to how citizenship should be formulated. The debates proffered about citizenship are very varied indeed, ranging from the 'radical' to the 'maternal' as well as encompassing 'difference'.

One of the chief protagonists of the 'radical feminist' school, Firestone (1971), perceives the major issue with society to be that of oppression, with reproduction being the primary source of oppression. Firestone argues that women should be freed "from the tyranny of their reproductive biology", (1971: 233). and sees an increasing role in society for reproductive technology, as ultimately she hopes, women will be relieved of the burden of childbirth. She hopes that by removing childbearing from women, women will be free to participate in public life. Assistance with child-care costs, she argues is simply a sop, giving short term relief only, instead of addressing the more complex pressures placed upon women.

Firestone discusses the need for replacing work as it is now known. Her intention is to make society more equitable by making "wage labor, no longer relevant", (1971: 235). This means every person, adult and child alike, would be entitled to money from the 'social pot' irrespective of their contribution. She argues that the family as we know it should be abolished. She deplores the 'nuclear' family, blaming this institution for breaking down society into selfish, individualistic units, arguing that marriage and the nuclear family should be replaced by communal living. She also challenges the notion of 'childhood', believing this to be a modern concept, devised to strip children of their democratic rights.

By removing the load of childbearing from women, by 'communal' living instead of 'family' living and by the redistribution of wealth, then "women would be identical under the law with men" (Firestone, 1971: 264), and children's rights would not be diluted by their label as 'minors', they too would have full rights. Firestone advocates such radical policies, because she sees the 'liberal tradition' of citizenship as being riddled with contradictions for women, she states "on the one hand, they [women] had most legal freedoms, the literal assurance that they were considered full political citizens of society - and yet they had no power.", (1971: 34).

The 'radical liberal' school of feminism, represented here by Eisenstein (1981) argues "while the liberal underpinnings of feminist theory are essential to feminism, the patriarchal underpinnings of liberal theory are also indispensable to liberalism", (Eisenstein, 1981: 5). She likewise, sees motherhood as being problematic. Women, because their distinguishing feature is their ability to give birth, have been excluded consistently from any other role within society. Family life and marriage have been used to control

women, and even when women have entered the arena of work, they are still in a vulnerable position, being paid less than their male counterparts, and being involved in a lower calibre of work. However, she takes a very different stand to Firestone.

Eisenstein argues that any feminist discourse must take into account the needs of the 'working mother', where there is a double demand on her, her role within the capitalist market, and her role within the patriarchal institution of the family. She further argues that the state, because it is a patriarchal institution, consistently reduces women to their biological condition of child-bearer, and will not recognise that in fact, motherhood is a politically constructed category. Therefore the State, has locked women into the role of mother and has denied any other public role. Eisenstein believes that whilst the law should be used to challenge behaviour this is not enough. She believes that there is a difference between "formal 'rights' reform and reforms of 'substance'", (1981: 232). Essentially she is arguing that 'rights reforms' are more of a symbolic importance to women than of 'real life' changing importance, and that the inequalities existing within society are not simply because of how women are identified within society, but because of the structural underpinnings of society, which work to keep women out of positions of power. The way forward for Eisenstein then, is not simply to discuss the matter and bring in laws to try and strengthen women's positions within society, but that women should be involved in direct action. She states that "At this stage of struggle, when women's equality is not left to theory but fought for in practice, women will be involved in the revolutionary process of struggling for their liberation", (1981: 234/235).

So to sum up before moving the debate further. The family and motherhood have come under criticism from Firestone

and Eisenstein. Their challenge for citizenship is radical, and based on equality with men. Firestone eventually wants to see childbearing dealt with by new reproductive technology, and for every person irrespective of whether they are man, woman or child to have equal rights, and to have equal access to funds irrespective of their contribution to such a fund. Eisenstein, is less radical than Firestone, though she does challenge the 'family', and believes that the family is a source of patriarchal power. Eisenstein not only wants equal status with men, through the process of equal opportunities legislation, she wants the whole structure of society to be challenged.

The 'radical' schools of feminism have at times seemingly placed all the blame for women's lack of status and power on the family and childrearing. Lovenduski and Randall (1993), describe in detail how the family and motherhood are often scorned and paraded as tools of the patriarchal power system, and that being a member of a 'traditional' family entailed a life of drudgery and misery. Charges levied against the family were that,

"it helps to perpetuate social inequalities by facilitating the transmission of maternal and cultural advantages. It encourages individualism by focusing loyalty on the family unit rather than on a wider collective: it permits all kinds of physic abuse of the weaker family members by the stronger under cover of privacy: and finally it embodies and maintains the sexual division of labour", (1993: 271/272).

Of motherhood itself, "Being a mother meant losing control - specifically, of the conception, of the birth, and of the children's upbringing, but, in a broader sense, of oneself and of one's own life", (1993: 278). These are arguably hefty charges levelled at family life and motherhood, and it will be argued that such claims are actually undermining women by not allowing them any sort of sense of agency or choice in making a decision to be either a mother or a wife. The

argument will now continue by examining what has been coined as 'maternal feminism', to see what form citizenship should take for this group.

Radical feminism is not without its critics. There are some who believe that feminism should be wary of attempts to dismantle women's roles within the family arguing that it is not necessarily advantageous to constantly strive for women's participation in the public world of men (Elshtain: 1982). Elshtain maintains that the debates surrounding citizenship and women have within the feminist perspective, historically taken the view that women have suffered because they have not been allowed into the arena of male power and authority, women have not been allowed a public persona. She argues that women should strive for an identity of their own, one that has no need to align itself with "overweening state power and public identity in its terms" (1982: 46/47). Elshtain proposes that instead of hankering constantly after inclusion in the public domain of political life - which she argues places very little value on life anyway - women should start to acknowledge that their greatest virtue can be that they are capable of literally bringing forth life, they can give birth. She maintains that the argument pertaining to the public-private divide is too simplistic and fails to take into account the richness of women's lives.

Family and motherhood - the private domain - should take primacy over the public domain. Family life and motherhood form a morally superior existence, and it is ultimately the case that family life will always take precedence because we are family minded creatures - that includes both men and women. This is of course in total contrast to the citizenship promulgated by Aristotle. As discussed in Chapter one, Aristotelian citizenship was based on the notion of man being a political animal. Elshtain hopes to achieve a feminist discourse

which did not negate the vibrancy of women's lives, and accepted that citizenship should not be based simply on the contractual agreement between the individual and the state. By rejecting the idea of individualism, and imbibing the values consistently found within a mothering relationship, then ultimately she hopes, the civic bond would be strengthened.

Advancing this argument, Ruddick (1983) believes that by nature women avoid anything that purports to be 'clear cut', and have a natural abhorrence of anything which is rigid and closed. Women as mothers have a responsibility to bring up children to be virtuous, commenting that, "They want the child they produce to be a person whom they themselves, and those closest to them, can appreciate", (1983: 220). However, she further states that the act of socialisation of children occurs in a society where women have less power than men. The socialisation process is therefore highjacked from its original position of rearing a child who can be 'appreciated', to rearing a child contingent on the practices of society, which regards male values as being of greater significance than female values. For Ruddick, maternal thought is a "social category", (1983: 225), and as such men can also find themselves capable of 'maternal thought', as they too can find themselves being in the position of a primary carer. Ruddick argues that there is a need for social change, men should be willing to yield power and accept a more equitable role in caring for children. The experience of relinquishing public power for a heightened role in private might make men more sympathetic and willing to change the inequalities experienced within the public sphere. Ruddick hopes that by raising men's awareness surrounding the problems experienced by women such as the lack of childcare facilities, then they would argue for reform.

Conversely, many feminists have actually campaigned to be included in the military (Ruddick: 1990) . The inclusion of women in the military, is supposed to mean that they have absolute equality with men. Earlier in this chapter it was noted that citizenship was given as a status to men because they were willing to go to war for their country. By engaging in armed forces, many women have argued that they are now also willing to go to war. As Ruddick states, "many feminists believe that it is a part of citizenship in a democratic society to assume the privileges and burdens a military state imposed on its citizens", (1990:235). To be willing to engage in combat, means women are satisfying the tenets of civic duty.

However, Ruddick challenges the merits of such action, she abhors the fact that men and women are trained to kill, sometimes for a cause that they neither support nor understand. She believes that women do enter into hostilities, but only when the threat is tangible, something which threatens them or their children. What is consistently ignored in time of war, is that war is not waged only on a battlefield - especially in today's climate when wars tend to take place within states rather than between states. As Ruddick notes, many women do get sucked into the melee. She states that,

"But in war 'homes' have always been battlefields; now 'battlefields' can be brought home by soldiers high in the sky or behind computers miles away. It may be the soldier who is somewhere else, on the other side of the missile or bomb, when cities burn, the food rots, and the children sicken and die", (1990: 251).

In summary, Phillips (1993), further discusses Elshtain and Ruddick, and draws attention to how these authors have opened up further discussion on how the public world can be tempered with the compassion found in the private world of women. By incorporating the values held in the private sphere, especially the bond

between a mother and her child, where generally mothers do have their child's interest at heart, it is hoped will lead to a kinder, gentler form of public life. Citizenship for Elshtain and Ruddick is about realising that the liberal view has harboured a selfish individualism, whereas their 'brand' of feminism - 'maternal feminism' is about caring and collectivity.

As Phillips states,

"Both these writers had turned to women's experience as mothers as an antidote to a male metaphysics, and Elshtain in particular saw mothering as the basis for a new politics of compassion that would reconstruct the political sphere", (1993: 82).

Carter (1992) also calls into question the veracity of the claim that family life is oppressive and an unfulfilling experience for women. She challenges calls that have been made for the dissolution of the family. As mentioned earlier some argue that family life should not be about the 'nuclear' style of family, but that children should be brought up by adults unrelated to the child, the notion is that your family should be determined by choice, (Firestone: 1971). However as Carter notes this type of communal living was never really sustained for any length of time, because ultimately family life and marriage,

"in modern society... is a sphere of privacy, affection and intimacy; and in the home women and men can find a degree of dignity and self-fulfilment which may be denied to them at work and by society as a whole... The ideal of love and constancy between husband and wife is a genuinely attractive ideal, and not simply a myth to subjugate women", (1992: 181).

By contrast, Dietz (1985), is vehement in her rejection of 'maternal feminism', because "it harbours some serious problems for feminist political discourse and democratic political action" (1985: 20). Her criticism of 'maternal feminism' is that it is inherently conservative in its approach, with its emphasis on tradition and family.

Challenging the over romantic notion of family life, she believes that further investigations about the usefulness and integrity of family life should be carried out before accepting the family as a panacea for the all the ills in society.

It is misleading, Dietz argues, to assume that the private sphere is comfortable and secure whilst the public sphere is harsh and uncaring. Arguably, in order to have any bearing on family life, women must begin to enter the political arena. Policy relating to the family is not generally made in private, it is made through political debate, which in turn impacts onto the private. She states that,

"family life and privacy, as well as social practices and economic issues, are matters of political decisions making. Family practices, control over family property, the rights of children, the nature of schooling and child labour laws, benefits for single mothers, the regulation of birth control - all of these things, whether we like it or not, are potentially open to political control and may be politically determined", (1985: 27).

Dietz (1992) places value on participatory democracy. She rejects the notion that all politics can be reduced to "the arrogant, male, public realm", (1992: 75). Democracy is empowering, it does not reduce people to a single identity of mother or an individual with certain rights, democracy is about the ability to share in the public world, democracy means that we can interact with people in an equal relationship, that of citizen, untainted by other identities we may hold. Dietz is uncomfortable with the notion of maternal feminism because it relies on the superiority of motherhood. For Dietz, democracy is about sharing concerns and developing mutual respect, and that no person's point of view is more valid than the next. She has no time for the sentimentality of the argument of developing loving bonds between citizens. Citizens she argues "are not intimately, but politically involved with each other", (1985: 31). Intimacy must remain

within the private realm, as the word suggests it is a product of privacy, and should not be held up for public - and therefore - political scrutiny.

Women should be challenging society, and should start to exercise their rights as citizens in the political world. As stated earlier, Dietz is an advocate of participatory democracy, where women do get involved in making speeches and organising political debates. Recognising the absolute pivotal role of politics in effecting change, she states that "My basic point is a straightforward one: for a vision of citizenship, feminists should turn to the virtues, relations and practices that are expressly political and, more exactly, participatory and democratic", (1992:75).

Also attesting to the power of participatory democracy for women is Summers (1991). She is adamant that women must be involved with the political process to ensure that they are not pushed into the background, or worse still into the role of the "passive client", (1991: 40). Summers argues the need for citizenship dialogue went hand-in-hand with the onset of capitalism, excepting that once the notion of citizenship had been introduced, it began to challenge the very bed-rock of capitalism by demanding liberty and equality. She maintains that the recent forays into citizenship, may, for women bring about similar results. Certainly debates have abounded within the feminist camp about how to bring about a more equitable society. She states that,

"In other words, just as the concept of the 'free and equal individual' was used to create the conditions necessary for the development of capitalism but then began to challenge the very foundations of the system which had created it by encouraging expectations of 'real' equality and freedom, so might the 'active citizen' turn against its creator by encouraging people to demand the concrete rights behind the rhetorical sham", (1991: 40).

Disagreeing in part with Dietz, Young (1990) maintains that no one should lose their identity, and people should engage with politics as part of a group, because generally groups have a shared history and shared interests, and can articulate needs more effectively. However, Young agrees with Dietz on the importance of participating in politics. She believes that there needs to be a re-appraisal of the prevailing system for group participation in the political sphere. Like Phillips (1993), she has little faith in the process of consociationalism, arguing that it does not follow the tenets of democracy. Young also argues that it is not merely women who require such representation, discrimination also occurs against groups such as gays and lesbians, blacks and disabled people. She advocates that all people should have access to community forums or assemblies, and everyone should have the chance to voice their opinion and participate in the general discussions. Young differentiates between, what she describes as the "heterogeneous public" and "interest group pluralism", (1990: 128), for her the 'heterogeneous public' is a group of people that can substantiate their claim that they are oppressed, also this group is not defined by some single interest, as is the case of for example the 'gun club'. This differentiation is important, the interest group, is as the name implies, only interested in furthering its own end. Young believes such interest groups will attempt to stifle any debate in order to promote their own agenda, and does not have to justify its actions, as it is not acting in the interests of social justice, merely group advancement.

In order to have a truly equal society, Young believes that we must begin to give "special rights for oppressed or disadvantaged groups", (1990: 131). Universality does not take into account the varying needs of differing groups. She argues that the need exists because at present the notion of equal treatment presupposes

that there is a neutral measurement of equality. Yet in society, groups are not equal, some are oppressed and discriminated against, so there is no such thing at present as a neutral measure of equality, differences between groups should be considered. She believes that society should consider ways in which to overcome this problem, such as the implementation of 'Affirmative Action' programmes, and even something as simple as producing government information literature in other languages to take into account the needs of those who may not speak the dominant language of the country.

Whist acknowledging that 'difference' has to be considered and that feminism can no longer purport to speak for a 'sisterhood', Barrett (1987) is concerned by the concept of 'difference'. She argues that difference can indeed be used to marginalise groups. 'Difference' presupposes choice, where as a free agent we choose our own 'difference', instead of perceiving 'difference' to be a category chosen for us in order to exclude. She states "it presupposes a notion of human subject, seen as an active and effective social and political agent, that has been extensively criticised in much recent theory", (1987: 33).

Gordon (1991), is also concerned with the notion of the 'politics of difference'. She argues that by concerning ourselves with difference, we are not looking at the deeper problem of inequality. Instead of scrutinising the power relationships between groups the 'politics of difference' looks simply at the differences. She states "From this perspective it is a step backward to think about the experiences of minority and white women as merely different", (1991:106). 'Difference' still carries with it the stigma of the 'other', and can therefore be used to exclude. She uses as an example, how white feminists, by using 'difference' felt unable to cover minority interests in

their work, on the grounds that they, because they were not in the minority group, could not begin to comprehend their experiences of life. Taken to its ultimate conclusion, Gordon argues that this reasoning could be applied in most situations, and leads to a lack of understanding of others, she states " 'difference' comes full circle to justify introspective scholarship and the reproduction of racist ignorance" (1991:107).

Aligning herself with Gordon, Benhabib (1992), is concerned that the notion of universalism has been discredited unfairly. She defends the concept of universality against 'difference', and is worried that the politics of 'difference' will be used to cloud the issue between receiving equal treatment and that of being treated as the 'other'. However Benhabib does challenge the 'accepted' version of universality. She states that,

"my purpose is to develop a universalistic moral theory that defines the 'moral point of view' in light of the reversibility of perspectives and an 'enlarged mentality'. Such a moral theory allows us to recognize the dignity of the generalized other through an acknowledgement of the moral identity of the concrete other" (1992: 164).

To refresh the reader before drawing to a conclusion. This section began by examining the work of the radical feminist, Shulamith Firestone. Firestone's discussion centred around women no longer being defined by their roles as mother and wife. Firestone believed reproductive technology will eventually be so advanced that as a race, humans will be able to reproduce themselves without the need for women to give birth. This means everyone will be free to choose where they live and with whom. She argues that children should be rights bearers and not as at present be the responsibility of anyone be it parent or guardian. She also advocates that there is a need for work to be restructured, and that people should be able to

draw an income from a 'social pot' irrespective of if they have contributed.

Eisenstein, is described as a radical liberal feminist. She also abhors, what she considers to be the patriarchal institution of the family, which she believes ties women to a 'double shift'. Eisenstein wants a more inclusive set of social rights, this means the government being more committed to issues affecting women such as child care arrangement. She believes that unless the structure of society is reformed radically then any attempts to legislate for equality will be mere rhetoric.

Elshtain and Ruddick, have been described as 'maternal feminists'. Elshtain argues that the private sphere is morally superior to the public sphere, and reasons that women should not try to define themselves in relation to the male dominated public sphere, but should attempt to build their own identity based on the caring nature of mothers. It is her contention that if the mother-child relationship was projected onto society in general then the bond of civil society will be strengthened.

Ruddick believes that men can and should be involved in 'maternalism', that not all men have a propensity for war-mongering. She argues that originally citizenship was a conferred status on men because they went to war for their countries, Ruddick argues, that as many wars are now civil wars, then women are involved in the process of war, and therefore there should be a re-examination of the notion of citizenship.

Dietz, rejects maternal feminism on the basis that it is inherently conservative. She challenges the notion of the security of the private space of the family, for her the private sphere is political, as policy made regarding family life automatically has

ramifications for the family. She believes that women should be involved in the democratic process, as this means that citizenship will become a truly egalitarian way of life, independent of a person's status in for example the field of employment.

Young however challenges Dietz, whilst agreeing that people should become involved with the democratic process, they should do so as part of a group. She believes that society should start to recognise a 'politics of difference' where oppressed groups are given special rights in order to participate in public life.

However, Barrett, Gordon and Benhabib are wary of promoting difference. They believe that to concentrate on 'difference', is to promote a sense of the 'other', which can be construed as a category of exclusion.

### Conclusion

This chapter has brought to the reader's attention the profusion of debates from feminist authors regarding citizenship and feminism. There are so many women writing about how 'citizenship' as a universal concept has seemingly failed women, and how 'citizenship' should be constructed for the future, that a decision had to be made about who to discuss and who to leave out. On the basis of this information, this thesis does not pretend to be the definitive piece of work regarding women and citizenship. The intention is to draw the readers attention to the fact that citizenship, whilst purporting to be neutral is indeed far from being so.

Whilst Firestone's style of feminism may appeal to some, it fails to understand that some women might actually like to be a wife and mother. Her demands for communal living are also called into question, as mentioned earlier, communal living did have a

short and inauspicious life. Her idea of people receiving an income without having to contribute must be queried, does she mean that people who cannot work will receive money or does she mean anybody can receive money? If it is the latter rather than the former, then who will finance this, she did mention a redistribution of income, but once that income has been redistributed then where will continuing funds come from? She also proposes that children should be accorded full citizenship rights, without the need for any one person to take responsibility for them. This is a most naive proposition. How can a child who may be too young to speak, articulate its needs? She presupposes that the whole of society will act in a way that does not exploit, but unfortunately whilst not wishing to be pessimistic about the nature of humanity, this is not the case, we do exploit, we do cheat, we do lie and we do commit heinous acts of violence for pleasure. Therefore children do need someone who will take responsibility for them, for their own protection.

Whilst Elshtain and Ruddick are laudable in their contempt of the 'public' insofar as the 'public' does at times encompass a selfish individualism, their theory of 'maternal feminism' is a highly romanticised notion of mothering and the family. Not all mothers have their child's best interests at heart, and not all families are safe and secure. Also the relationships operating within the family and between a mother and child are presumably based on the bond of love. Love is a private emotion, can love really form the basis of civil society? As shown, the use of emotion as a basis for forming citizenship is inevitably flawed. Citizenship needs to be something outside of the remit of emotion. Citizenship is ultimately a *public* status and as such needs to be based on egalitarianism, where, personal antipathies will

not cloud judgement, and where individuals can be treated according to publicly agreed rules of fairness and justice.

Eisenstein has seemingly winkled out the root of the problem, and that is that no matter how much legislation is passed unless there is a consideration of the power base then any attempts at trying to gain an equal say for women will be pointless. Lister (1990 & 1993) concurs, she argues that unless the public-private dichotomy is challenged then nothing will change. Lister envisages that women will have to fight for change, she states "Citizenship rights are not going to be handed down to women on a plate. They are going have to be fought for", (1993: 13).

Dietz and Young, whilst disagreeing on certain issues already discussed in this chapter, both agree that women should enter the public domain, whether as Dietz believes as individuals or as Young would argue as part of a group. Dietz proposes that women should become involved in the political realm, they should claim what is theirs by right, but seldom comes to fruition in practice, they should begin to exercise their rights as citizens to become involved in the public realm.

However, women have to be careful not to be too hasty. As mentioned earlier, Eisenstein remarks on the dissonance between what is said in law and what is actually practiced in reality, and there is undoubtedly truth in her remark. But to say legislation will not work and that it is merely paying lip-service to the notion of equal citizenship is negating the power of law. Young (1990) believes that the policy of 'affirmative action', should be considered in order to take into account the imbalances prevalent within society.

'Affirmative action' policies should be written into law. Those in positions of power should be made to recognise that

there is a need to give special dispensation to minority groups. Policy such as this cannot be left to voluntary codes of practice, it needs to be enshrined into law, for two reasons. The first is obvious, anyone not adhering to the law can be prosecuted, but second, it sends out signals that oppression and discrimination will not be tolerated. Critics will point out that there is much equal opportunities policy in operation at present which is flouted, the answer to this is that where it is flouted, people must be prepared to challenge this situation. Another criticism levelled at 'affirmative action' will be that minority groups will be, for example, given jobs simply because they are a member of a minority group and not because they merit the job. The answer to this must be 'so what', if for example we look at British society, then how many men have got into the positions of power by flashing the 'old school tie'? Can it really be said that they were recruited or promoted purely on merit?

Most of the arguments contained within this section are equally applicable to men. It is nonsense to suggest that every male has more chances in life than every female, subscribing to the theory that 'all men are bastards', is not a very constructive argument. Power is held by some men, and it is their power which should be challenged. Also by increasing social rights for men as well as women ultimately means men and women can contribute equally to society. For example, the right to paternal leave would ease the women's burden whilst probably increasing man's satisfaction with his home life, after all why should the pleasure of nurturing a child be considered solely for women? Women would then have more time to spend in public pursuits, whilst men would be more engaged in private pursuits, and perhaps this situation would presage a greater understanding of the roles ascribed to people by merit of gender by society.

Ultimately this chapter has shown that political and civil rights are negated if social rights are missing or flawed. To create a more equitable society means that there has to be an emphasis on social citizenship, and this does mean, despite warnings from Gordon, Barrett and Benhabib, that difference must be considered. Universal concepts of citizenship do not take into account the richness and diversity of people's lives.

## Conclusion

### Citizenship: a multi-faceted concept?

As stated in the introduction, this thesis has challenged the notion that citizenship can be understood as a single integrated idea, of which attempts to 'universalise' social and political rights are a foremost example. It has been primarily a journey examining the facets of citizenship beginning with the utopian ideal of Aristotle and ending with some sign-posts as to how citizenship may be understood in the future, which is likely to include the need to encompass 'difference'.

One aspect of this exploration has been concerned with the nation-state. The nation-state whilst certainly in a weakened position remains an important means of ensuring citizenship rights. Arguably it is the case, that whilst globalisation has been a fragmenting force, the nation-state has continued to provide a source of identity. It appears at times that the more the pressures associated with globalisation seem to eradicate traditional social, economic and political boundaries, the more individuals cling on to the 'boundaries' of identity, particularly, perhaps, those that provide a sense of affiliation on 'membership'. Nevertheless, the nation-state must guard against becoming too insular. Patriotism is healthy, nationalism is not. States can be made up of varying nations and it seems unfeasible to declare that the particularisms of language and culture will be swept away and replaced by an over-arching identity. Likewise, citizenship must begin to encompass the notion of 'difference'. The 'particular' in order to survive must be bolstered by the social, legal and political rights of citizenship.

Citizenship must be an inclusive, but not an 'assimilative' project. The notion of 'difference' has to be a

consideration. This does not necessarily mean that the whole political process is high-jacked by interest groups determined on getting their 'difference' recognised at the expense of other 'difference' groups. There is a fear that by encompassing difference then the whole citizenship project will be called into question. Some would argue that citizenship must remain a universal concept guaranteeing equality before the law. However universality fails to take into consideration the plurality of modern life. The world is not made up of 'stand-alone' societies, and traditional modes of existence are increasingly being called into question. There now has to be some forum for discussing how previously excluded groups such as Aborigines and Black Americans - and women - can become part of the democratic process. That said this does not mean that they have to forsake their cultures, the analogy of the 'melting-pot' is anachronistic, particular needs have to be satisfied and not eroded. Giddens' (1996) 'dialogic democracy' may be worthy of consideration. There needs to be an inclusive 'mechanism' in public discussion about the legal rules and methods of representation, as citizenship clearly operates on many dimensions.

Citizenship as now proposed within Liberal democracies, is not addressing the interests of certain sectors of society, for example, women. The adherence to a universal concept of citizenship means that a rigid standard has been set in place, and for women to 'measure up' to that standard they must be judged, not in the context of their own needs, but to have their needs compared to those of men. This means that women are extended citizenship rights as 'second-rate' men. Therefore the notion of 'difference' must be considered, and within this context even the notion of different 'differences' must be explored. However, 'difference' is not only

gendered, 'difference' operates on other axis too, such as race, age and disability.

A further problem with the notion of liberal democracy is that it deems 'citizenship' to be a legal concept only, therefore negating the richness of civic life. However, one must be aware of the problems that will be encountered by simply attempting to replace liberalism with communitarianism and their argument of the 'common-good'. Ultimately citizenship is a multi-faceted concept and as such, should not be simply about finding the common ground. Within the current meaning of citizenship as a majoritarian system, 'differences' were either ignored or efforts were made to assimilate those with differing needs into the mainstream. This ignored the subtleties of human life. Whilst accepting the fears of some that the politics of difference may encourage either a victim mentality or provoke outbreaks of violence, surely there is a counter-argument for this. It is often the case when needs are ignored or people are not encouraged to communicate that tensions build up. More than anything else, people will probably fight over their right to be heard and included in the political process.

Being multi-faceted, citizenship, is effectively a prism reflecting different forms of inclusion and belonging which are not necessarily commensurate but which are equally valid and therefore need to be taken into account. Time and time again, we see a false dichotomy at play, that of public -v- private. As individuals, we cannot disassociate our actions from society at large. As Young implies, what we do and say in private has ramifications for what is done and said in public, any lines drawn around our actions, in an attempt to demarcate the 'public' from the 'private' sphere must be arbitrary. The whole notion of citizenship must consequently remain in a constant state of flux.

Ultimately the citizenship project must be about flexibility, open to challenge and modification as and when necessary.

Of course, the suggestion here is not that change will happen overnight - it will not. The notion of citizenship being a universal concept does still continue to be a very powerful idea, but if 'difference' is to be recognised it will be by rejecting the supremacy of universalism and engaging with pluralism. Multi-faceted problems need multi-faceted answers.

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