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**AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVOLUTION OF MALTESE
GEOPOLITICAL THOUGHT:**

Its heritage, renaissance and *rejuvenation* ?

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Ian Robert Baggett

Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Geography

University of Durham

December 1998



23 AUG 1999

**AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVOLUTION OF MALTESE
GEOPOLITICAL THOUGHT:**

Its heritage, renaissance and rejuvenation ?

Ian Robert Baggett, December 1998

ABSTRACT: An increasing number of theorists are involving themselves in the historical evolution of geopolitical thought, although most are concerned only with the development of conventional western thinking* . This thesis derives from the idea that it may be interesting and useful to investigate the evolution of geopolitical thought from a non-western or non-mainstream perspective. Given the current demands by the new generation of "critical" political geographers for alternative research and more viable historical perspectives on the evolution of geopolitics** ,it was intended that such an investigation would also prove to be a useful contribution to wider geopolitical knowledge and thinking. Malta was deemed to be the perfect case study from which to conduct such an investigation.

The thrust of the thesis can be explained in terms of three sub-aims. It aims to conduct a thorough investigation into **the heritage of geopolitical thought in Malta**. It then aims to utilize this investigation to propose a viable and thorough historical perspective on **the current modes of geopolitical thinking in Malta**. Third, by keeping current thinking in its historical context, it then aims instead to generate a number of insights and ideas for **future geopolitical thinking in Malta**.

The three sub-aims introduced above are contrived to satisfy the single overriding aim of the thesis, which is; to highlight and substantiate the insights that new and alternative research into the history of geopolitical thought can bring about, not at the conventional global level of the mainstream meta-theorists but instead at the less-grandiose and more practicable levels. It is in this respect that the thesis sets out to make a new and alternative contribution to wider geopolitical knowledge and thinking.

* Most notably Parker 1985, but also see Agnew and Corbridge 1989, and O'Loughlin and Heske 1991.

** For more on the demands that this new generation of "critical" political geographers make with regard to the future nature of the discipline of geopolitics see the introduction to this thesis. Also see the literature on "critical geopolitics"; Dalby 1990, 1991, 1994, Dodds and Sidaway 1994, O'Tuathail 1994a, O'Tuathail 1994b, Luke and O'Tuathail 1994, and O'Tuathail 1997.

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Declaration

I confirm that no part of the material offered has previously been submitted by me for a degree in this or in any other University.

Statement of Copyright

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Dedication:

I dedicate this thesis to my Grandad Bob who sailed in the merchant convoys to Malta.

Bob Stafford of Durham City
1915 - 1997

Long may his ditt's of bravery be re-spun.

Acknowledgements:

There are a great many people I need to thank for helping with my research. I must start with my friends in Malta. From Emanuel at the Kingsgate Arms to the Prime Minister Edward Sant, the Maltese I met were only too willing to help me with my learning. After the welcome I received, I soon understood why Malta seems to be one of the most researched places on earth.

I would also like to mention a number of my commanding officers in the Royal Navy (RN). I am particularly grateful to my Divisional Officer at Britannia Royal Naval College, Captain de Corvette Choissy, who, through a genuine interest in my work and development as an RN Officer, did everything in his power to ensure I was not forced to drop my studies. Also, I thank my 'appointer', Lieutenant Commander Pearce, for recommending that I be appointed on deployment to my area of study, the Mediterranean. Finally, I am especially grateful to Rear Admiral Wilkinson for hosting me at the Joint Services Defence College in Greenwich and allowing me to use the excellent library there for a number of weeks before its closure. Although I have decided not to resume my commission, it is through working alongside men such as these that the Royal Navy has gained my life-long respect and gratitude.

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As an afterthought I would like also to thank anyone who sets out to read this thesis. I realise that PhD theses can be heavy going; this one, I suspect as much as most. I concede that for reasons largely beyond my control, the study plan I have followed has lacked direction. I make no apology for this and believe that ultimately this lack of direction has contributed to the value of the thesis. I only hope that the many hours I have spent marching up blind alleys and churning out text that will never be read will reveal themselves in this thesis and that the study will in turn prove to be of interest to someone, somewhere.

INTRODUCTION

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The last two centuries have witnessed more fundamental changes than any of those previously recorded in history. To anyone concerned with politics or geography, the extent of these changes is most readily apparent in the complete metamorphosis of the world's geopolitical surface. This surface has transformed from the Euro-centric world of colonial times, through the anarchic world of the two World Wars, to the bipolar order of the Cold War which, despite proclamations to the contrary¹, has recently given way to a more complex and unpredictable labyrinth of geopolitical forms.

Throughout this transformation a rich heritage of geopolitical thinking evolved as geopoliticians attempted to describe, explain, predict and even influence the world's geopolitical surface. Nevertheless, both their intellectual credibility and their subject's investigative objectivity were often in question. Following three decades, at least, in the academic wilderness the subject of geopolitics has recently undergone a renaissance based mainly on traditional western oriented modes of thought and out-dated global meta-theories. Such a bias has drawn attention to the large question mark that continues to linger over the subject's investigative objectivity.

This thesis is based on the premise that any classical renaissance in geopolitics is not only of limited use to those who are genuinely concerned with understanding the vagaries of the modern world but also imprudent, since by definition it can only be based on the same biased modes of geopolitical thought as those used to justify some of history's less savoury acts of state-craft. Its point of departure is that the majority of those engaged in geopolitical thought would benefit more from a *rejuvenation* of geopolitics, based on new

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but less grandiose ideas generated from more viable historical perspectives, than they would from a *renaissance*, based on the old subjective ideas of western meta-theorists.

In the case of Malta, one of the oldest and best known geopolitical victims/subordinates, the above point holds particularly true. Malta is located in one of the most strategically sought-after locations in the world and the Maltese, whether knowingly or not, have long been engaged in geopolitical thought. The recent world-wide renaissance in geopolitical thinking, although having a profound influence on Malta's post-Cold War foreign policy, has failed to address the vagaries of Malta's contemporary regional geopolitical environment. In short, Malta represents an ideal case study through which to explore the issues highlighted thus far.

This thesis conducts an investigation into the historical evolution of geopolitical thought in Malta between 1800 and 2000. The investigation provides a coherent and thorough historical perspective on the heritage of geopolitical thought in Malta. If the Maltese are to draw on the lessons of history it is important for them to see the way they think about their current geopolitical circumstances in an historical context. As it turns out, Malta has experienced its own mini-renaissance in geopolitics with contemporary thinking being heavily influenced by a concoction of classical-style western meta-theories and historically-biased modes of thought deriving from Malta's heritage as a geopolitical outpost. This concoction, despite having triggered a heated and emotive domestic debate, has done little to instigate pragmatic discourse on the vagaries of Malta's current regional geopolitical environment. If such a discourse is to occur, it is a rejuvenation of geopolitical thinking in Malta that is required. Or in other words, a renewed willingness for those Maltese engaged in geopolitical thought to drop their quest for the ultimate and all-answering foreign policy solution to possible future conflict scenarios, discard their apparent pre-

occupation with policy decisions at the ideological level (see for example the attention devoted to the alignment/non-alignment debate), and instead begin to address the first-order geopolitical issues that are already threatening Malta's stability.

In summary the thrust of this thesis can be explained in terms of one overriding main aim and three sub-aims. 1) it aims to conduct a thorough investigation into the heritage of geopolitical thought in Malta. 2) it aims to utilize this investigation to cast a viable and thorough historical perspective on the current modes of thinking which constitute the renaissance of geopolitics in Malta. 3) by keeping current thinking in its historical context, it aims instead to generate insights and ideas for future geopolitical thinking in Malta. Finally, the three sub-aims introduced above are mobilised to satisfy the single overriding aim of this thesis, which is; to highlight and substantiate the insights that new and alternative research into the evolution of geopolitical thought can bring about, not at the conventional global level of the global meta-theorists but instead at the less-grandiose and more practicable levels. It is in this respect that this thesis intends to make a new and alternative contribution to the required rejuvenation in wider geopolitical knowledge and thinking.

I DEFINITIONS: GEOPOLITICS, GEOPOLITICAL CHANGE GEOPOLITICAL THOUGHT AND GEOPOLITICAL THINKERS

One of the main difficulties with attempting a thesis on geopolitics is that the term 'geopolitics' itself is prone to a range of differing interpretations and definitions. Furthermore, as a search on any database confirms, its adjective 'geopolitical' has an even greater range of usage. The confusion regarding the exact sense in which both terms are used, although undoubtedly more acute today than before, is no new predicament. Since

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its accouchement, the term 'geopolitics' has been attributed a multitude of different meanings which on occasions has given rise to controversy. Perhaps most famously, Kjellen bemoaned the Germans for misusing the very term he himself had coined². Later another geopolitical theorist, Thermaenius, felt compelled to conclude that in 1938 the term "geopolitics" had at least five different meanings and it was therefore not surprising that; "a certain amount of obscurity has accompanied its use"³. Such obscurity has stuck with geopolitics since 1938, leading Schmidt to muse more recently that a term with such a wide variety of uses can have little meaning at all⁴. Around the same time, Haglund who was concerned primarily with the geopolitics of minerals propagated his very own lengthy and specific meaning of the term and responding in advance to the criticism he anticipated was moved to write that;

"the difficulty with geopolitics is that it is conceptually so broad that it can and does mean all things to all people"⁵.

It therefore follows that in choosing to study geopolitics one is also consenting to grapple with the problem of definition at some stage or other. In this thesis the term 'geopolitics' is defined quite simply as being the study of the international political scene in a geo-centric or spatial context. It follows that the adjective 'geopolitical' is used to refer to anything which relates to the spatial or geographical aspects of the international political scene. Or as East and Prescott saw it, the geopolitical world is "a delicately interlocking mechanism", and geopolitics is the study of how and to what end this mechanism operates⁶. 'Geopolitical change' therefore refers to the changing spatial aspects of this delicately interlocking mechanism as opposed to say the changing technical aspects of it. Finally the term 'geopolitical thought' alludes to the perceptions or interpretations we may harbour on the political space which hosts this mechanism. A wide range of actors can be

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said to be engaged in geopolitical thinking at any one time. For instance, political and military leaders along with their policy-makers, advisors and decision-makers, as well as theorists, academics and even informed observers or commentators engaged in any remotely related intellectual activity. These actors are defined as being 'geopolitical thinkers'.

The above definitions may appear very broad-based but it has to be remembered that this thesis is concerned with the panorama of geopolitical thinking since 1800 rather than the dominant mode of thought at any one snap-shot in time. For this reason, a working definition more implicit than explicit is preferable since it must be applicable to the variety of modes that Maltese geopolitical thinking has taken on at a number of different phases in the country's political history. Such a preference for uninhibitory working definitions can also be justified from previous studies into the history of geopolitical thought⁷ and is understandable since, after all, geopoliticians that take on such studies are in the unenviable position of having to examine phenomena which have been and are continuously liable to sudden and largely unforeseen changes.

II INVESTIGATING THE HISTORY OF GEOPOLITICAL THOUGHT: APPROACHES AND CONCEPTS

Equipped with a working definition of geopolitics, it is now possible to explore some of the approaches and concepts which have been employed to investigate the evolution or history of geopolitical thinking. Two approaches, involving four quite different concepts need elucidating here. The first approach is used by theorists to compare and contrast the changing forms that the subject of geopolitical thinking, the geopolitical surface of the globe, has taken on at each of the various stages in history. This approach involves the

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concepts 'order' and 'disorder' and all of the ambiguities that go hand in hand with their usage. The second approach is used by theorists to differentiate between the way that the geopolitical thinkers of the various stages in history have reacted to and interpreted the particular geopolitical situations of their day, be they relatively ordered or disordered situations. This approach involves using the contrasting concepts of 'realism' and 'idealism' to depict the dominant mindset or mode of thinking behind a given interpretation, reaction or policy response.

By utilizing the concepts of order and disorder, parallels can be drawn between the different geographical and political conditions that the world has experienced throughout the various phases in its history. On a cautionary note, however, the concepts of order and disorder are somewhat ambiguous. Painter has warned that as descriptions of the world they are not neutral, value-free terms and that although they are used by theorists they feature heavily in the discourse of practical politics too⁸. An ordered world helps people, but probably more specifically governments, feel secure, simply because things seem more predictable and altogether easier to deal with. Contrastingly, throughout political history the notion of disorder has gone hand in hand with fear and the prospect of threatened futures. Quite simply, the problems of ambiguity arise when one group's order either depends upon or is oblivious to another group's disorder.

Heeding the above cautionary note, throughout this thesis the contrasting concepts of order and disorder are used only to shed light on the various stages of geopolitical change that Malta has passed through. For instance, the nineteenth century is represented as having been a period of relative geopolitical order, since for the most part the relationship between colonial powers and their colonies, unjust though it was, had the effect of stabilising the majority of the globe and injecting an element of predictability into most

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conflicts. As the process of colonialism faltered, anarchy in the form of the two World Wars took over and so the concept of disorder best represents the geopolitics of the wider-world throughout this phase in history. Following on from this, the Cold War which came after the 'Hot Wars' can best be represented by the concept of order. This is because the two sides in the bipolar equation at least seemed to know where they stood in relation to the other, even if this was only because of a balance of terror which resulted from the threat of mutual nuclear annihilation. Despite talk of new world order based on either US leadership, UN supervision or a new geo-economic hierarchy, the phase which followed the Cold War was relatively disordered and most certainly offered less predictability than bipolarism had. The demise of the Warsaw Pact, the ongoing disintegration of the Soviet Union and the success of the US-led coalition in the Gulf War (1991) bred a new confidence within the West. It was this confidence that led many commentators there to herald the dawning of a new peaceful era and some even talked of the coming of a "boring phase"⁹ in political history. Their smugness, however, was only short-lived as their proclamations of new world order were proven to be at best premature but more probably flawed for all time. The triumphant troops did not return from their futuristic and mechanised battlefield to bask in a period of US-led global geopolitical order, UN-style universal security, or an economically contained world, but in 1993 were instead re-deployed on their second major global policing mission to the Balkans quagmire in which they faced a completely different set of circumstances. Rugged mountain ranges and near-Arctic conditions had replaced flat desert plains but also, and most significantly, there was no easily identifiable enemy in the web of conflicts which accompanied the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. These conflicts and others elsewhere in the world¹⁰, which had been contained for decades by the bipolar confrontation, flared up around the globe and in doing so brought to an end to any hopes of a new geopolitical world order. The models and meta-theories that had been proposed to instigate a new world order were

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more imagined than real and it was not long before the true facts emerged for all to see. In 1993 alone, two years after the Cold War had ended, twenty-two hot wars were still being fought around the world; about twenty-five million refugees were fleeing from these wars and at least four million had died as a direct or indirect result of them, two-hundred thousand in 1993¹¹; taking internal turmoil into account the world went on to suffer seventy conflicts in 1994 and then a record seventy-one in 1995¹². The above facts point to the most recent and ongoing phase in the history of global geopolitical change in which the disorder, which has been denied so vehemently since the end of the Cold War¹³, has finally been acknowledged by the majority of theorists. This phase is defined by the wide range of different interests, states, social movements and individuals that are attempting to pursue strategies and exert influence in the international arena. Straight forward geopolitical order appears to be a dated concept as issues such as the environment, economics, religion, nationalism and transnational crime have all come to the fore, making the world a far less predictable place. Commenting on the above issues, Alexander Kennaway has stated,

"Did you ever believe that the Warsaw Pact was going to attack NATO, or vice versa? I didn't, and I think the world is a more dangerous place now because of the absence of coherent policy in the former Soviet Union"¹⁴.

Having established the validity of the approach which uses the concepts of order and disorder to shed light on the vacillating process of global geopolitical change outlined above, it is now possible to turn to the other approach which is used to explain the way we interpret and react to different geopolitical situations, be they relatively ordered or disordered situations. As mentioned, the two concepts most commonly used to describe the way geopolitical thinkers respond to a particular set of geopolitical circumstances at a

given time are realism and idealism. Once again, rather like the concepts of order and disorder, these twin concepts contrast directly with each other. There follows a brief outline of them both.

Fundamental to realism (the political variant, as there is another form of realism¹⁵) is the idea of the nation-state, which is seen as the building block and main subject of international politics¹⁶. The role of other international actors, be they multi-national firms or inter-governmental organizations, is played down and in this respect the realist reaction or interpretation of geopolitical circumstances can be said to be state-centric¹⁷. In fact, so much so that even some of the most pervasive and influential non-state actors tend to be considered as instruments of the state rather than as international actors *per se*¹⁸. In terms of their motivations, all nation-states are assumed to be primarily concerned with survival and self interest¹⁹. Hence, the realist sees the globe as a mosaic of individual and autonomous units, which interact and compete with other units²⁰. Wars and conflicts are seen as the inevitable culmination of this interaction or competition and realism focuses in on such potentialities²¹. Put otherwise, the object of realism is the power politics developed by each state in pursuit of its interests, including, above all else, war and preparation for war. The realist approach therefore accepts that it is legitimate for states to monopolize the means of violence and that this provides one of the key means through which states pursue their interests²². Realist interpretations of geopolitical situations are thus tantamount to a tendency to view international politics in terms of a power hierarchy, leading certain adherents to use various forms of game theory to model state behaviour and the outcomes of potential international conflicts²³.

The concept which scholars of political geography and international relations have repeatedly utilised to express their embarrassment and disdain with the realism inherent in

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both theoretical and practical geopolitics has traditionally been referred to as idealism. The concept of idealism grew up in the respite after the First World War as a response to the widespread perception that everything should be done to prevent a recurrence. Mackinder was the first to draw the distinction in his celebrated paper, "Democratic Ideals and Reality"²⁴. At the outset idealism was based on the conviction that international conflicts could be resolved peacefully and indeed prevented if new international institutions and legal processes were developed. Hence, the appellation 'idealism' arose because adherents sought to change the world for the better, rather than merely react to and interpret it as it was. In the inter-war period (1918-1939) idealism matured as an intellectual approach and evolved into a critique of what was perceived as a reverie in geopolitics with the concept of the nation-state. An assumption implicit in this concept is that states are unified and that their governments speak and act in the national interest. Idealism holds that, even if there were such an interest, it is by no means certain that governments have the capacity to identify it, and even then they frequently lack the desire or capacity to pursue it. The extent of the devastation during the 1914-1918 war and the widespread dismay as to its overall purpose meant that the idealists, with their characteristic optimism, were received relatively well. Nevertheless, their first innings was short-lived since their opener, the League of Nations, failed to prevent the Second World War which was paralleled with a resurgence of realist geopolitics. All the same, idealism as a means of reacting to and interpreting geopolitical situations never died and its theoretical underpinnings were never buried. First, it resurfaced in the period immediately after the Second World War but prior to the onset of the Cold War and, since then, although in a less obvious guise, it has done so once again in the post-Cold War era. This, the latest and most vociferous in a series of idealist revivals, has been subsumed under the rubric of 'critical geopolitics'²⁵. Advocates of critical geopolitics²⁶ are representative of the new generation of modern political geographers and, although they may make

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extravagant claims to the contrary, their interpretations are essentially based on a form of idealism, if for no other reason than their typical point of departure is a critique of the realism at the heart of traditional state-centred geopolitics.

The intellectual rivalry between realists and idealists has been described as the first 'great debate' in the study of international relations²⁷. As the outlines in the above two paragraphs suggest, it is a debate which has gone on for several decades. For the duration the basic theoretical underpinnings of both the concepts of realism and idealism have remained fundamentally unaltered, with the realists portraying a world dominated by an inevitable continuity and dogged with incessant conflict and dispute and the idealists pushing unrelentingly for change for the better. Along the way, however, the basic theories and ideas of members of both academic camps have been modified so as to reflect changing global geopolitical circumstances. The relative state of order or disorder that the world found itself in has tended to determine the way in which thinkers have reacted to prevailing geopolitical circumstances and so support has veered between realism and idealism as the preferred conceptual tool for geopolitical interpretation. For instance, in the colonial phase prior to World War I the world was characterised by a form of order based on European domination of the periphery. Throughout this phase, although it had not yet been conceptualised as an intellectual mindset, the dominant method of reacting to and interpreting geopolitical circumstances was realism²⁸. The sweeping process of global colonisation had served to convince most observers that the nation-state was the main building block in international relations. In addition to this, the obvious readiness of the European colonial powers to utilise force in the fulfilment of their expansionist desires meant that realist world-views became established as the norm throughout this phase in history. As the colonial order broke down into World War I, the support for the realism that had dominated geopolitical thinking for at least the previous century intensified.

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
Despite increasing calls for idealist reactions and interpretations to world-wide geopolitical circumstances in the inter-war years, such thinking continued to dominate the practical strategies of governments throughout World War II also²⁹. Once again, the brief respite after World War II witnessed a resurgence of idealism³⁰ but this resurgence was only short-lived and soon subsided as the realist driven balance of terror which constituted the Cold War set in. Since then the great debate between realists and idealists has continued with as much vigour as ever but it has to be concluded that in recent years the extreme versions of both concepts have lost most of their support to some of the more moderate variants. The concept of "neo-realism"³¹ has gained credence as a softer form of realism which takes into account the contemporary relevance of a whole host of new factors, such as the so called 'institutional' inputs from the international system which were no where to be seen on orthodox realist agendas. It is the representatives from the neo-realist school of thought who are currently advocating a renaissance of geopolitics which is essentially based on a revival of classical models and classical modes of thought. On the other hand the notion of "critical geopolitics" accepts that geopolitics, traditionally the realist sub-discipline within political geography or international relations, is a relevant approach but encourages the more civilised and receptive geopolitical discourses³². More than a renaissance, proponents of this notion are calling for a rejuvenation of geopolitics based on new ideas which are essentially less realist. In short, few people now see the geopolitical face of the globe in either solely realist or idealist terms³³.

III THE CASE STUDY: MALTA AND GEOPOLITICAL THOUGHT IN MALTA

The previous paragraph contains a brief description of the evolution of the so called great debate; or in other words the way that the dominant method of reaction and interpretation within mainstream geopolitical thought to global circumstances has shifted between variations of realism and idealism depending on the relative state of order or disorder which the globe finds itself in. But it has already been suggested that one man's order is another man's disorder and vice-versa. It follows that the dominant method of reaction or interpretation to geopolitical circumstances at any one stage in history is not necessarily the right method of reaction or interpretation for all international actors. The history of geopolitical thought in Malta is demonstrative of this fact. To begin to understand why geopolitical thought in Malta has not always served the best interests of the Maltese or of Malta's integrity we must consider Malta's location. On this Luke wrote:

"If anything shaped as differently from a circle as the Mediterranean can be said to have a centre, that centre is Malta. The Maltese archipelago is equidistant from the Mediterranean's western and eastern extremities; it is its half-way house between Occident and Orient, historically no less than geographically; it has been its nerve-centre - and more than its nerve-centre, its magnet - from the time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary"³⁴.

Figure 1: Malta's geopolitical centrality in the Mediterranean basin



Source: Baggett 1997, p.166

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Malta's geopolitical centrality articulated by Sir Harry Luke and illustrated in figure 1 meant that for a great many years the Maltese archipelago was a sought-after strategic possession. The main European powers were all motivated by a similar classical interpretation of the geopolitical surface of the globe which was not indifferent to the one spelled out by Parker:

"Just as the giant Antaeus, offspring of Ge and Poseidon, the gods of Earth and Sea, drew his mighty strength from contact with the ground on which he stood, so the power of the modern state is derived from the territory which it occupies."³⁵

Although in recent years the clear-cut interaction between geography and power succinctly captured in Parker's deduction has become increasingly dishevelled, Malta has remained in the eyes of most international actors a worthwhile confederate³⁶. Moreover, whether we talk in terms of centuries or more recent decades, there have been few major international political developments which have not implicated Malta in some way or another. Or as Blouet has put it,

"ever since the archipelago was first colonised it has never been very far from the centre of events and has often played a critical part in the making of history"³⁷

Blouet wrote of Malta's involvement in the major events of history in a positive light and certainly most Maltese are proud of their country's coveted history. In fact it is difficult to find an account of Malta's colonial history which is anything but praising of the overall role that the succession of colonisers have played in facilitating all aspects of Malta's development. Such a situation would appear to be somewhat atypical, with the majority

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of native historians of former colonies opting instead to pour scorn on their former rulers through blatantly subjective accounts. Nevertheless, a truly objective assessment of Malta's colonial history would also draw attention to some more negative aspects and in all probability conclude that the history of Malta is the history of pawn in power games of the world's major political players. Furthermore, and of more relevance to this thesis, the history of geopolitical thought in Malta has been the history of concession to outside impositions or the history of concession to dominant mainstream interpretations of geopolitical circumstances and developments. Certainly, with the exception of one phase in the Cold War, when Maltese geopolitical thinkers generated their own ideas on the political space which Malta found itself in, geopolitical thinking in Malta has rarely deviated from the course followed by mainstream western geopolitical thought, regardless of whether or not concession to such an interpretation was in Malta's best interests at a given time. In effect, such unquestioning concession to mainstream western geopolitical thought has contributed to Malta's seemingly permanent state of geopolitical subordination and all the hardships that have come with this. Even since the end of the Cold War, despite having the benefits of hindsight over a history of geopolitical subordination and having other tried and tested courses of thought readily available to them, Maltese geopolitical thinkers have in many ways toed the line with the realist inspired renaissance in geopolitics. It is for this reason that Malta makes such an intriguing and worthwhile case-study from which to conduct an investigation into the history of geopolitical thought.

Whilst it is difficult to be critical of the geopolitical thinking which has dictated the policy responses of the main international players who have for centuries been unavoidably caught up in the world's major power games, it is easy to be critical of the thinking behind Malta's policy responses to the changes which have occurred in the configuration of her political space. In addition to this, whereas the history of global geopolitical change and

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mainstream western thought on it is the focus of a number of well known texts³⁸ and is covered in some way or another in most introductory publications on political geography, histories of geopolitical change and thoughts on it from the perspective of smaller international actors are not well documented at all. By making a new and alternative contribution to the required rejuvenation in wider geopolitical knowledge and thinking this thesis goes some way to redressing this imbalance. What is more, such a contribution can also be used to highlight and substantiate the insights that non-conventional research into the history of geopolitical thought can generate at the smaller more practicable and useful levels; thus satisfying the main aim of the thesis.

IV RESEARCH

Much of the preliminary and secondary research for this thesis was carried out in the former library of the Joint Services Defence College, Greenwich. It was here that I first delved into disciplines such as international relations and international politics and acquired an understanding of the historical evolution of geopolitical thought. This period of prefatory research was crucial since it allowed me to combine my newly acquired understanding of these more 'hard-line' disciplines with my grounding in geography; a combination which I now believe to have been this undertaking's main catalyst.

A more general overview of the contemporary regional geopolitical situation was obtained whilst on a Mediterranean deployment in HMS BATTLEAXE. This entire deployment proved a most invaluable experience and I am particularly grateful to my appointer for the foresight he showed in presenting me with this opportunity to serve in my study area. As a relatively junior officer I felt privileged to be part of what was, courtesy of Saddam Hussein and his seemingly unrelenting provocative stance towards the West, a particularly

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challenging and interesting deployment. Aside from the operational aspects of the deployment, a number of official visits to embassies, naval academies and NATO bases, as well as a number of multi-national exercises in the months of September, October and November of 1996, all served as invaluable experiences at the practical level³⁹. Furthermore, such visits enabled me to discuss in detail with learned professionals many of the wider issues incorporated in the thesis, particular those more recent issues relating to the regional situation that are incorporated in the concluding chapter.

The primary research for this thesis took place on a six week long field trip to Malta which commenced in April of 1995; an eventful period in the sphere of Maltese foreign and security policy, which witnessed the signing of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme by the then Prime Minister, Dr. Edward Fenech-Adami. The heated domestic debate which ensued polemized, but also clarified, the contrasting political arguments. Commentators, both those in support and those against this policy initiative, were only to willing to talk in depth about Malta's contemporary foreign policy and so reveal the thinking behind the main post-Cold War policy courses available to them. In addition to this, the national newspapers were full of articles and commentaries on many of the issues I had elected to study. Hence, I was left to adopt the research methods which would best take advantage of this exciting climate of openness in the limited time I had available to me.

Since it was imperative that I spoke to as many people as possible about the way they perceived Malta's international relations or indeed the way they thought about Malta geopolitically, I embarked on an intensive programme of both formal and informal interviews, which incorporated interviews with senior ministers, decision-makers, political lobbyists, journalists, academics as well as informed members of the public. In order to

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make contact with the diverse range of interviewees it was necessary to attend conferences and symposiums on a variety of issues, even though often they were not strictly related to my particular field of research.

In addition to these interviews, I also deemed it important to take advantage of the plethora of articles and commentaries on geopolitically related issues appearing in Malta's national newspapers at this time. Although the independence of Malta's main newspapers can be, and indeed frequently is, called into question, the standard of reporting in them is generally of a very high level, especially when one considers the relatively minute scale of their operations. A thorough examination of all of the main newspapers was conducted throughout the research period and any relevant articles were filed. In addition to this, back-copies of Malta's two main serious newspapers (*The Times* and *The Malta Independent*) covering the period between 1990-1995 were examined in the main library in Valletta and any relevant articles were also photocopied and filed. Finally, since the main research period in 1995 I have managed to ensure that this file has been continually updated with the many relevant articles I have had sent to me by contacts working for the *Malta Independent*⁴⁰. It is the discourse from the many articles in this file that is drawn on and analysed throughout the thesis.

As well as the more general articles that have appeared in the Maltese press in recent years, throughout the research period I tracked down a number of more specialised texts on some of the wider issues relating to current geopolitical considerations in Malta. For instance, I managed to obtain a draft copy of the Labour Party's foreign and security policy document which proved to be especially important in establishing the kind of geopolitical thinking behind their approach to policy in recent years. In addition to this, I collated various datum and information pertaining to the many wider issues that currently

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affect geopolitical considerations in Malta. This material was used in a paper I wrote on the macropolitical threats currently facing Malta and is further analysed and drawn on in the concluding chapter of this thesis. For instance, international criminal activity, although previously not typically thought of as a high priority issue, is shown to be one of the wider issues now affecting geopolitical considerations in Malta. To aid my appreciation of the extent of Malta's involvement in international criminal activity, or more specifically the laundering of the proceeds of international crime, I conducted a unique examination of the government's own record of property transactions which is available in the main library in Valetta. Information about other issues which currently exert influence on geopolitical considerations in Malta was also sought throughout the research period and every effort has been made to update this information in the time that has elapsed since then. This information includes a range of commentaries (written and spoken, published and unpublished) by specialists in environmental, boundary, economic and religious issues as well as from experts on illegal immigration and terrorism.

Finally, a large part of the thesis is devoted to establishing a coherent perspective on Maltese geopolitical thought over the last two hundred years. For this reason it was necessary to conduct a thorough investigation of the archives in both the main library in Valletta and the university's library. Although there was little information which related directly to historical geopolitical thinking in Malta, closer examination of the policies through which Malta's past leaders reacted to world developments meant that it was possible to establish the particular modes of geopolitical thinking they adhered to. The extensive and detailed archives investigated in the research period provided more than enough material for the sections of this thesis which are devoted to Malta's policy responses to the geopolitical changes that have occurred throughout history.

V FORMAT

The main body of this thesis comprises four chapters which are arranged around four phases in the history of global geopolitical change. Each of these four chapters covers a particular and distinct phase in the history of global geopolitical change. As a result of Malta's geopolitical centrality, or more specifically her long-standing record of involvement or entanglement in the process of global geopolitical change which has resulted from this, these four phases in world history also correspond with four easily distinguishable phases in the history of geopolitical thinking in Malta.

So that the phases can eventually be compared and contrasted, and for purposes of clarity and consistency, each of the chapters is split along the same lines into three separate sections. The first of these sections is devoted to an examination of the major geopolitical changes that were effecting the wider world throughout that phase. This section not only serves to paint a picture of the wider-world which Malta was a part of but also to introduce the global geopolitical setting of the day, be it one of relative order or disorder. Building on this, the second section of each chapter assesses Malta's place or role in this wider-world geopolitical setting, outlining the various policy responses through which Malta's rulers or leaders reacted to their particular situation. Finally, a third and concluding section in each chapter is devoted to an investigation into the specific interpretations or modes of geopolitical thinking behind these policy responses to wider world geopolitical change. It assesses whether the dominant mode of geopolitical thinking in Malta at that stage in history erred more towards realist or idealist interpretations of the geopolitical surface of the globe. In addition to this it considers what the main influencing factors behind the particular mode of geopolitical thinking were, be they external factors

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derived from mainstream geopolitical thought and imposed on Malta or internal factors generated from within by native geopolitical thinkers.

The structure outlined above is devised to enable a number of more esoteric conclusions about the history of geopolitical thought to be drawn in the final chapter. This concluding chapter is obviously devoted to drawing together the findings of the entire study. Having conducted the investigation into the history of geopolitical thought in Malta in the main body of the thesis the final chapter sets out to utilize this investigation to cast a coherent and thorough historical perspective on the current modes of geopolitical thinking in Malta. Such an historical perspective enables me to introduce a number of hitherto overlooked issues and ideas on Malta's contemporary geopolitical circumstances. Crucially, however, in addition to this it presented me with the opportunity to contribute some alternative research to the required rejuvenation of geopolitics. The extent to which I can be said to have grasped this opportunity is for the reader to decide over the course of the remaining chapters.

Endnotes

¹ I refer here to the numerous and varied proclamations of new world order which accompanied the end of the Cold War (see sec. 3, ch. 4).

² Thermaenius 1938, p. 166.

³ *Ibid.* p. 165.

⁴ E.g. Schmidt 1985.

⁵ Haglund 1986, p. 223.

⁶ East and Prescott 1975, p. 8.

⁷ See for e.g.

⁸ Painter 1996, p. 135.

⁹ Most notably Fukuyama 1992.

¹⁰ Outlined in sec. 1, ch. 4.

¹¹ Gurr and Harff 1994 detail these statistics and more to make the point that the world is less ordered in the aftermath of the Cold War.

¹² These two statistics were provided by an American group that opposes military spending cuts in the United States. The tally for 1994 was double the number logged by the National Defence Council Foundation in 1989, the year the Berlin Wall came down. They draw a now familiar conclusion; that the world is a far more unpredictable place than it was in the Cold War (See Prentice 1995, p. 12).

¹³ I refer here to the proponents of new world order who have tried everything possible since the end of the Cold War to portray and even instigate a new world order of some sought (their attempts are covered in sec. 3 of ch. 4).

¹⁴ Professor Alexander Kennaway (senior lecturer at the Conflict Studies Research Centre at Sandhurst) made these comments in a lecture I attended as an officer cadet in May 1996.

¹⁵ It should be noted at the outset that the use of the terms realism and idealism may be particularly confusing for those versed in philosophy. As Caedel notes, in philosophy, realism and idealism have somewhat crude designated meanings regarding material (matter) and ideational (mind), respectively, as conceptions of reality (Caedel 1987, p. 15.).

¹⁶ Realism has been present within, and in fact constituted, geopolitics since its inception as an academic discipline at the turn of this century. Today, it lives on in the work of a number of theorists of geopolitics and international relations (See for e.g. Art 1983, Keohane 1984, Gaddis 1987, Nye and Keohane 1989, Keohane 1989, Mearsheimer 1990, Krauthammer 1990-91, Art 1991, Gaddis 1991, Russett and Sutterlin 1991, Nye and Keohane 1992, Nye 1992, Gaddis 1992). It is the crux of their work that is portrayed in the following summary.

¹⁷ Although there are those that acknowledge that the state-centricity of realism overlooks the increasingly significant 'institutional' and industrial inputs to the international system (see the recent work from the so called Harvard School of neo-realism, in particular Keohane and Nye who specifically acknowledged the role that institutions such as the EC, the OECD and GATT now play in international affairs), the idea of uninhibited pursuit of power- political national interest still forms the bedrock of most realist geopolitical thinking (Art 1991)

¹⁸ See Art *op. cit.*

¹⁹ This assumption was made more confidently in the past when states adhered to starkly contrasting ideologies but even now realists such as Mearsheimer (*op. cit.*) point to the continuing primacy of survival and self interest to democracies, rubbish claims that democracies 'don't or won't fight each other' (p.55).

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 55. Realists tend to hold that this is still the case, even in an increasingly democratic world.

²¹ See the work of Mearsheimer *op. cit.* which is based mainly on pessimistic interpretations of the post-Cold War world and its anticipated wars and conflicts.

²² Krauthammer takes this one step further and argues that it is in fact more legitimate for developed states to monopolize the means of violence than say "Third World Weapon States" (p. 31).

²³ For an introduction into the principles behind the zero-sum game and a comprehensive bibliography of its early usage by geopolitical theorists as well as its more recent usage by theorists concerned with economics and business see Amin 1992.

²⁴ Mackinder 1919, title of paper.

²⁵ Dalby 1991, is usually judged to have coined this term.

²⁶ See for e.g. *Ibid.*, Dalby 1990, Dalby 1994, Dodds 1994, Dodds and Sidaway 1994, O'Tuathail 1994a, O'Tuathail 1994b, Luke and O'Tuathail 1994, and O'Tuathail 1997.

²⁷ Painter *op. cit.*, p. 140.

²⁸ As will be shown in chapter 2, realism, although it was not known as such, formed the basis of all geographical thinking about the international political scene in colonial times. See for example the work of Mahan, Ratzel and Mackinder (all referenced in chapter 2).

²⁹ This wartime intensification of realism in geopolitical thinking is most readily apparent in the work of Haushofer, but also in the theories of his predecessor, Kjellen, and his US 'counterpart', Spyckman (all referenced in chapter 3).

³⁰ For one of the most radical idealist viewpoints in the closing years of W.W.II see Edmund Walsh (1943); also see Whittlesey (1942), Lattimore (1943) and Weigert (1942).

³¹ Neo-realism was conceptualised by the Harvard lecturers of International Relations, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (see Keohane 1986, and Keohane and Nye 1989, 1992). Other less realist versions of realism which might also be called neo-realism have been proposed by Art 1991, Russett and Sutterlin 1991, Gaddis 1991, Mearsheimer 1990 and Krauthammer 1990-91.

³² See endnote 24, particularly the work of Dalby.

³³ For further discussion on the declining support for the most polemical of realist and idealist stances see Stern 1995 which contains, amongst other things, a convincing indictment into the not so realist attributes of the thinking of supposed contemporary arch-realists such as Kenan and Kissinger.

³⁴ Luke 1949, p. 19.

³⁵ Parker 1985, p. 1.

³⁶ Witness for example the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) efforts in the wake of Labour Party election victory to retain Malta in its Partnership for Peace (PFP) programme (The Times [Malta] 2 November 1996, p. 6., see also sec. 2 of ch. 4 for more details).

³⁷ Blouet 1992, p. 11.

³⁸ Most notably Parker *op. cit.*

³⁹ I participated in official visits to the British embassies in Lisbon (Portugal), Tunis (Tunisia) Valletta (Malta), naval academies in Brest (France) and Tunisia, and led a three day educational visit to the high security base of NATO's Commander in Chief Iberian Atlantic Area (CINCIBERLANT) which is located in Oeiras, Portugal. I was also involved in a number of multi-national exercises with the various arms of the US, French, Spanish and Portuguese armed forces. These exercises also incorporated 'officer exchanges' which proved most useful for exchanging ideas and opinions on a number of the more contemporary issues covered in this thesis.

⁴⁰ I thank one journalist in particular, Raymond Cassar, who has worked for the Malta Independent and has been most useful in keeping me updated with relevant articles in the Maltese Press since 1985. I must also thank my initial contact at the Malta Independent, Nathalino Fenech (Durham PhD, 1998).

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PHASE 1:

**MALTA AS A SUBORDINATE IN THE
COLONIAL GEOPOLITICAL WORLD ORDER**

1.

MALTA AS A SUBORDINATE IN THE COLONIAL GEOPOLITICAL WORLD ORDER

Malta's dependent identity can literally be measured in millennia¹ because she has existed as a subordinate in some form or another since at least Roman times and probably long before that. Nevertheless, this thesis is concerned with Malta's historical development as seen in the context of the wider-world geopolitical change which began with the age of global discovery and colonialism. As such, the onset of this age is therefore taken as the start date for the first phase of this study. At the outset of this modern colonial age, Malta assumed a role in the colonial geopolitical world order when in July 1800 British troops succeeded in taking her capital, Valletta, from the French. The end of phase one is taken as being 1914, the outbreak of the First World War, since it is in this year that the colonial world order can be said to have been on the verge of disintegration.

The forthcoming chapter is devoted to this time-period (1800-1914) which was in many ways a formative phase in Malta's geopolitical development. In keeping with the structure outlined in the introduction, the chapter is split into three different sections. Initially, it is necessary to outline the international scene which Malta was a part throughout the nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries. The first section is concerned with this wider-world scene and presents an investigation into the colonial geopolitical world order. Following on from this, the second section traces the details of Malta's role in this world order. It is shown that, just as it had become utilized for the various causes of countless previous colonizers, Malta became a most important outpost for British colonial interests. Section three turns to the geopolitical thinking which dominated British interpretations

and reactions to wider-world geopolitical change on Malta's behalf. Since it was based on the assumption that there was no perceived alternative to the continuity of colonization or expansionism by whatever means necessary, it was most definitely realist in nature. In addition to this, however, a degree of perceptiveness to the wants and needs of the Maltese is also discernible within this general mode of realism. For this reason the label "perceptive realism" is propounded.

1.1 THE WIDER WORLD 1800-1914: COLONIAL GEOPOLITICAL WORLD ORDER.

Throughout phase I of Malta's political history the international scene was dominated by the phenomenon of colonialism. This section investigates the reasons and motives behind this phenomenon before going on to present a thorough overview of the policies which were ultimately responsible for the consolidating colonial geopolitical world order which Malta found itself very much a part of between the years 1800 and 1914. At the outset, however, two explanations are necessary.

First, the following paragraphs are concerned with colonization as a phenomenon related to the emergence of the so called colonial geopolitical world order. Hence, the focus of this section and this chapter is the European scramble for colonial possessions. It should, however, be remembered that expansionism and territorial acquisitiveness are not unique to the modern European states of the past two or three centuries; a fact that any comprehensive study of Malta's long history as a dependent territory verifies².

Second, as with many terms in geopolitics, colonialism is not well defined and is often misconstrued as being synonymous with the term imperialism. On this matter, Cohen's definition is worth citing:

"Colonialism, as a process, involves the settlement from a mother country, generally into empty lands and bringing into these lands the previous culture and organization of the parent society. Imperialism, as distinct from colonialism, refers to rule over indigenous people, transferring their ideas, institutions and goods."³

The distinction Cohen makes between the terms colonialism and imperialism is not particularly relevant to the phase of world history we are concerned with here. This is because in the international scene between 1800 and 1914 colonialism and imperialism tended to go hand in hand. Nevertheless, for reasons that will become clear, when considering Malta's experiences at the hands of their British colonisers, colonialism would appear to be the most fitting of the two terms since Malta was undoubtedly colonised as opposed to merely being subjected to imperial rule. Technicalities and semantics aside, this section now turns to its main focus; investigating the reasons for and motives behind the policies which were ultimately responsible for the colonial geopolitical world order.

A number of reasons have been put forward to explain why a few relatively small European states were able to establish ascendancy over a huge area of the globe⁴. Contrasting explanations have alluded to the higher levels of technological development in Europe than elsewhere, political rivalry between European states, western Europe's naval traditions and expertise and the triumph of capitalism. Rather than any one particular explanation it is probable that a combination of the above gave rise to the phenomenon known as colonization. Certainly, the escalation of capitalism cannot stand alone as a

reason for European expansionism as certain theorists would have us believe⁵. Closer attention to European colonial expansionism reveals that it was rarely practised for solely economic reasons, even though one of its products was unquestionably the colonial economy. A far more plausible explanation is the rivalry and political conflict that undoubtedly existed between the main European world powers. During the nineteenth century there was great and continual competition between the major European states (and later others also) for colonies as bases and trading posts as well as for spheres of influence around the world. The frequent changes of territorial ownership, boundaries and alliances stand as testimony to the significance of such rivalries as a factor in the process of colonialism. In addition to this, the significance of the "industrial revolution" as a reason for colonization is also often overlooked. By increasing demands for commodities (foods, fuels and raw materials) and generating surplus population in Europe as well as efficient transport, communications and weapons, the role of the "industrial revolution" in explaining European expansionism cannot be overstated.

Just as the reasons for the success of European domination were manifold and complex, so too were the motives behind colonialism. Undoubtedly, geostrategic motives played their part, with the main strategic theorists of the day inspiring and encouraging the rapid acquisition of colonial possessions as a means of enhancing or retaining their country's international standing. While the British achieved success on all continents, establishing the greatest colonial empire ever to exist, the French acquired a vast contiguous colonial territory in Africa and another in south-east Asia. Germany's colonial activity was for the most part representative of a strategically motivated attempt to thwart the designs of Britain and France⁶. In addition to this, as European overseas expansion progressed, Russia felt compelled to expand eastwards and the United States westwards. Neither was deterred by the barrier created by the Pacific Ocean, with the Russians establishing

communities as far away as San Francisco and the Americans as distant as the Philippines. Such expansions were essentially fuelled by the same strategic motives as the European expansions, although in both cases there were other stimuli⁷.

As well as the geostrategic aspect, religion can be thought of as having been another great inducement. Considering the Spanish penetration of the Americas, for instance, Glassner acknowledged "God, glory and gold" as having been the main motivating factors⁸. Through this statement, Glassner implied that the Spanish were not only there to gain wealth but also, with a typically imperialist condescension, to make a contribution to the spirituality of their subordinates. Such a self-righteous approach was not unique to the Spanish in America. Indeed, 'reconnaissance missionaries' were often used to establish the initial stations from which colonial control was eventually executed⁹. The most obvious example were the German missionaries in south-west Africa who paved the way for a German occupation of the area¹⁰.

Man's will to explore has also been cited as a motive for colonization¹¹. Such will, coupled with want of national honour and approval, led a relatively small number of European explorers to make an enormous impact on the process of European expansionism. Most famously, Cecil Rhodes and his small party of adventurers who charted the region around the Zambezi River on behalf of the British Crown in the late nineteenth century. In doing so, he strongly influenced the course of events in southern Africa, so much so that in Northern and Southern 'Rhodesia', his name was reflected in the world political map¹². Similarly, F.A.E. Luderitz, a wealthy German merchant, helped initiate the German thrust in south-west Africa in a similar way, whilst Karl Peters did the same in east Africa¹³. In a similar fashion Pierre de Brazza represented France in the area of the lower Congo River, although his exploits are less well recounted¹⁴.

Finally, no account of the motives behind imperialism can ignore the influence of trade. Throughout the colonized world the major motive that drove the colonial power to control was more often than not an economic one. For example, the Netherland's East Indies generated huge revenues for the Dutch government for almost three centuries from the sale of rubber, coffee and petroleum, amongst other things¹⁵. However, as mentioned, the economic reasons for colonialism did not always transpire and as a motivating factor, economic considerations alone rarely sustained the colonial impetus. In a very short time some colonies even became liabilities rather than assets; Surinam, Laos, New Guinea, Somalia, Mauritania and Chad yielded net economic losses for their colonial powers over the duration of the colonial era¹⁶.

Having summarized briefly the reasons for the European colonial expansion and the motives behind it, we now turn to the resulting policies which shaped the international scene; or the colonial geopolitical world order. Between 1800 and 1914 there were just eight European colonizing states but only five of these can be said to have adopted policies which resulted in major colonization. The main colonizers were Portugal, France, Netherlands, Spain and Britain/England. To these we can add three more colonizing states whose policies had a later and less significant impact on the colonial geopolitical world order; Belgium, Germany and Italy. The following examination of the colonial policies of these eight states shows clearly the nature and extent of the dominance that they came to exert over the rest of the world at this stage in history.

Portugal's vast empire was reduced by the granting of Brazilian independence in 1822. This move was unique in the history of Portugal's colonial empire since traditionally Portugal had adopted a policy of holding on to its colonies at virtually any cost. Indeed,

for almost a century and a half after this unique act of retribution, Portugal superintended its empire through war, revolution and nationalisms without any concessions to the native populations whatsoever. Its rule was autocratic and based on rigid economic, political and social policies. In short, economic policies were of a mercantilist nature and for much of the twentieth century sought to boost the slave trade; political policies sought to transform the colonies into overseas provinces of Portugal; and social policies bestowed the status of 'assimilados' on a small native elite, effectively conferring on them Portuguese citizenship and representation by the Portuguese government¹⁷.

France's colonial policy in the early years was one of assimilating a *France d'Outre Mer* (*Overseas France*) but that idea was discarded with the demise of the Fourth Republic towards the end of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, like the Portuguese, the French continued to impose rigorously their culture on their acquired territories. Socially, at least, such policies tended to be particularly divisive since efforts at instilling levels of patriotism towards the colonising powers typically focussed on the educated elite. To this day, many of the leaders of ex-French colonies in south-east Asia are products of this educated elite and the policies that helped shape it. It was, however, the dependencies in Africa that emerged from the colonial era with the greatest similarities to the French culture. To understand why we must look at the policies used to effect rule over these colonies.

Algeria was always administered with great attention from Paris because of its large French settler population and its proximity to mainland France¹⁸. The rest of French Africa was divided into two main areas, French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa. Within both of them a number of separate administrative units were formed and capitals were established in each. The headquarters of French West Africa were in Dakar. In

addition to this, however, each individual territory was delimited and had its own administrative capital. Hence, the four territories of the former French West Africa, now the Republics of Senegal, South-Eastern Cote de'Ivoire, Guinea and Benin, each obtained close representation in Paris through their capitals Dakar, Abidjan, Conakry and Porto Novo-Cotonou, respectively. Similarly, French Equatorial Africa consisted of Gabon, Congo, Ubangi-Shari and Moyen, with their respective capitals of Banqui, Libreville, Fort Lamy and Brazzaville. Although Brazzaville was the regional headquarters, and its present day size reflects this, decisions regarding each individual territory were implemented directly through local capitals.

In summary, French colonial policy, although somewhat aggressive in the sense that it sought to impose French cultural values on the indigenous populations, was far more meticulous than Portugal's and as a result of this their dominions can be said to have been managed with a great deal more circumspection¹⁹.

Belgian colonial policy can best be defined through the word "paternalism". Decisions regarding the Congo, Belgian's only colonial possession, were made solely in Brussels. Such decisions were relayed through six lieutenant-governors to their provinces and then on to a number of districts where lesser officials were in charge. Thus, neither the representatives of the Belgian government, the settlers, nor the local inhabitants were entitled to any say or political representation in Brussels. Furthermore, while the Portuguese enabled Africans to attain *assimilado* status and the French sought the quick development of an educated cultured elite, the Belgian subjects could never aspire to Belgian nationality or equality.

The colonial policies of both the Netherlands and Spain, two of the most active colonisers, bore much resemblance to both Portuguese exploitation and Belgium's utilization of the Congo. Neither the Netherlands in the East Indies or Spain in South America paid much respect to indigenous cultures or uneven and unfavourable trade balances between their colonies and themselves. Economic and strategic considerations took precedence over all other matters and autocratic rule was the order of the day²⁰.

Both Italy and Germany entered the scramble for territory relatively late in the nineteenth century. Through competition with other colonial powers, Germany managed to acquire a number of Spanish and other islands in the Pacific, north-east New Guinea and a dozen or so territories in west, south-west and east Africa. Italy, on the other hand, was rather less successful, claiming only some of the less desirable remaining areas of Africa. Even with these, Italy encountered a number of difficulties. Most notable amongst these difficulties were the problems the Italians encountered in the conquest of Libya and in the subjugation of Ethiopia²¹. Both Germany and Italy commanded their territories autocratically and were exploitative of and largely indifferent towards indigenous cultures. Italy had considerable success in promoting migration to the colonies but compared with Belgian and French colonies settler numbers were still not particularly large. Nevertheless migration to the territories was not an intended part of colonial policy since both Germany and Italy were primarily interested in the colonies for reasons of strategic prestige.

British colonial policy makers were confronted with a greater diversity of territories and indigenous cultures than any other colonial power. As a result, they were often forced to adapt their policies to the specific requirements of individual dependencies. However, one common policy theme was discernible throughout the whole of Britain's colonial empire. This theme was based on the concept of indirect rule, which was intended to impart a level

of protection to indigenous cultures and organizations. In areas such as law and education the British typically recognised local conventions and more often than not allowed them to continue, initially barring those customs which they judged problematic. This said, however, the extent to which policies of indirect rule prevailed depended on the size and character of the European settler population. The policy of indirect rule was designed specifically for territories with a small immigrant European population and little land alienation. However, in territories where the settler population was large, powerful and confrontational with London, more direct forms of rule had to be imposed from time to time²².

Historical factors also influenced British colonial policies. Any territory invaded, conquered or settled by an immigrant population became a colony. However, those territories whose indigenous leaders had requested and been granted Crown 'protection' became protectorates. Although the settler populations in a colony were conceded a considerable amount of self-determination, the principle of indirect rule from London was adhered to quite strictly in any territory that had been granted the status of protectorate. Finally, in addition to colonies and protectorates, the British administered a few territories in co-operation with other colonial and non-colonial powers (see for e.g. French/British/German Zanzibar, Italian/British Somaliland and earlier in this century Anglo/Egyptian Sudan). Such joint administered territories were referred to as condominiums and the policies applied to them obviously depended on the particulars of the arrangement²³.


In summary, although British colonial policy in the Middle East, Southern Rhodesia and Ireland was a conspicuous failure, it is now widely acknowledged as having been relatively successful elsewhere, at least by the standards set by other colonial powers. Taking into

PHASE I: WIDER WORLD GEOPOLITICAL CHANGE

account the extent, duration and diversity of their empire, it is commendable that British colonial policy retained a sense of fairness. Demonstrative of this fairness is the fact that, of all the British territories within the colonial geopolitical world order, only Burma and those in the Middle East chose not to join the Commonwealth on attaining independence.

Thus, contrary to what some of the more simplistic connotations of the term 'order' might imply, the world order that prevailed in the colonial era was diverse in nature. The diversity which existed within these empires and the differences which existed between the policies through which they were governed should not be overlooked when interpreting figure 2²⁴:

Figure 2: The colonial geopolitical world order (c.1900)




Source: adapted from: Parker, G.: *Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century*. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1985

PHASE I: WIDER WORLD GEOPOLITICAL CHANGE

In addition to this and once again contrary to what the term 'order' might imply, the colonial geopolitical world order was dynamic in nature. The world at this phase in history was, through continual competition and conflict, subject to an ongoing process of change. This process, colonialism, gradually gathered pace and eventually culminated in all-out world war; as can be seen in figure 3.

Figure 3: The expansion of European empires: Europe and colonies as a percentage of world surface area and population, (1860-1914).



Source: adapted from: Short, J.R.: *An Introduction to Political Geography*, Routledge, London 1983, p.24.

Figures 2 and 3 attempt to show the nature and extent of the colonial geopolitical world order. As mentioned, even though by historical comparisons the world can be said to have been in relative order at this stage in history, the diversity and dynamism that were characteristic of this order must be borne in mind. Motives and policies varied between colonizers and often depended on the unique attributes of the sought after territory. Nevertheless, bearing the above caveats in mind, a number of generalisations about the colonial geopolitical world order can be made:

The main powers all sought to expand for reasons relating to economics, strategy and political competition. Expansion was facilitated by advances in transport, communications, weapons and increasing knowledge about the wider world. Religion, patriotism and capitalism were the prime motivating factors, all of which transposed into relationships and policies which were heavily biased towards the interests of the expanding power. Although some colonizers implemented fairer arrangements than others, in summary, it is fair to state that the benefits derived by colonies from their rulers rarely compensated for their troubles.

It was against this backdrop that the first phase in Malta's geopolitical development took place. We now turn to investigate Malta's place in the wider international scene at this phase in her geopolitical development.

**1.2 FROM PROTECTORATE TO COLONY (1800-1914):
MALTA'S FALLIBLE DEPENDENCY ON DISORDER IN THE
COLONIAL GEOPOLITICAL WORLD ORDER.**

This section examines the role that Malta played in the wider world throughout phase one in her geopolitical development. It is worth noting that this role was not one taken entirely by choice but more as a result of British expansionist and colonial policies. As suggested in the last section, however, the policies of the Crown were considerably less austere than those of most other colonial powers. Perhaps it is for this reason that the Maltese welcomed and indeed ushered the British colonizers onto their territory in 1800 to replace the French after their short rule over Malta; hence Malta's status following the arrival of the British as a *de facto* protectorate. Nevertheless, Malta was still ruled from outside and remained very much a dependent subordinate within the colonial geopolitical world order. In this section, the story of Malta's vacillating fortunes as a British possession in the global colonial system is told. It is the story of a pawn in the geopolitical power games of the world's major players. Thus, in the sense that it traces Malta's experiences in the wider world it is, according to our working definition, representative of an examination of Malta's geopolitics in the period 1800-1914.

Britain acquired Malta from the French in September 1800. It was by no means a forceful acquisition, indeed, the British were reacting to earlier pleas for help from messengers sent to Sicily representing the Maltese National Assembly²⁵. In making such pleas the Maltese were merely exhibiting a geopolitical preference to be ruled by Britain rather than France. One must remember that at this stage in history it was somewhat desirable to be a part of the most powerful colonial empire in the world and few of the alternatives available to

Malta were any where near as attractive. In order to understand the circumstances which gave rise to such pleas we must consider the policies with which the French ruled their colony and also appreciate the consequent level of Maltese discontentment.

Unlike Algeria and their other colonies in Western and Equatorial Africa outlined in the last section, Malta bore few fruits for the French colonial economy. As such, Napoleon viewed the territory as little more than a strategic stronghold and this was reflected in France's colonial policies towards Malta²⁶. Paying little attention to Maltese interests he implemented a programme of large-scale re-organization, with the sole intention of making the island a more efficient and robust naval and military base.

At the outset he ousted the Order of the Knights of St. John who had overseen what was probably the richest two and a half centuries of Malta's historical development. Granted, that as the French Revolution had progressed Napoleon had been left with little choice but to eject the Order, which was after all precisely the kind of aristocratic and religious body that the revolutionaries were objecting to in the homeland. Nevertheless, having disposed of the Order, he then proceeded to implement further radical re-organization. He abolished the local nobility, defaced escutcheons on buildings and pillaged many precious objects and materials from the establishments of the Knights. Following this, in a sweeping mis-calculation, he launched a direct assault on the position of the Catholic Church in Maltese society. Foreign clerics were ordered to leave, he restricted religious orders to one convent each and closed any additional establishments. The acceptances of Holy Orders before the age of thirty was forbidden and the ordination of new clerics was banned until all existing priests had been found employment²⁷.

This attack on the Catholic Church was politically imprudent, since the Church was the only body capable of mobilizing wide-scale resistance to the French colonizers. Not for the first time, and certainly not for the last, external geopolitical factors had led to interference with the very social fabric that constituted Maltese society.

Such attempts at undermining the position of the Catholic Church, coupled with careless administration and financial management eventually provoked a rebellion at the close of the century. General Vaubois, who had been placed in command of the four-thousand troops on the island was forced to concede defeat in the countryside. He concentrated his troops around the fortifications of the Grand Harbour, confident that the Maltese would be unable to evict him. He was, however, under-prepared for forthcoming events: At the request of the newly formed National Assembly, the British came to the assistance of the Maltese. Following a protracted but effective naval blockade and a short battle in which the brunt of the fighting was borne by the Maltese, the French were forced to surrender the islands on 5 September 1800²⁸.

The circumstances in which Britain came to acquire Malta, in other words the prevailing feeling of Maltese discontentment with the French, is vital to understanding the formation of the special relationship between the Maltese and the British, which remains in many forms to this day²⁹. Initially, this relationship was best understood in terms of the status Malta acquired as a *de facto* British protectorate. Thus, at this formative phase in Malta's historical political development, this relationship and more specifically Malta's experiences in the wider colonial world system as a British protectorate represent the crux of Maltese geopolitics, and hence the focus of the remainder of this section.

It was only after initial hesitation as to the usefulness of their new acquisition that the British decided to assign Malta the status of a *de facto* protectorate. As alluded to in the previous section, this status entitled the Maltese to certain privileges over the condominiums and more orthodox colonies that constituted the major part of the British Empire. Via their National Assembly the Maltese had requested British protection and so consented to the requisite level of British occupation. Crucially, however, in terms of international law, this meant that that Malta was not strictly the possession of the Crown³⁰. Upon formal agreement, the islands were therefore entitled to British protection without, initially at least, having to succumb to absolute British colonial rule.

From the point of view of the British, by establishing a protectorate rather than a formal colony they sought to achieve the specific objective of excluding the French from this strategic location without making a full commitment to perpetual responsibility. However, as will be shown in this section, the British commitment to Malta changed fundamentally throughout phase one of her geopolitical development. Even if the original aim had been negative - to exclude the French - and there was no expectation that Malta would eventually be administered by imperial agents, British officials soon expanded their functions and encroached on the powers of the Maltese leaders. Indeed, by 1803, the British government had come to realise how Malta could be important to Mediterranean affairs in more ways than just excluding the French. Thus, at this early stage the signs that the British would come to exert a more direct influence over the Maltese were already there. Demonstrative of such increased recognition of Malta's strategic significance was Nelson's refutation of his own earlier dismissal of the islands' strategic worth:

"I now declare that I consider Malta as a most important outwork to India, that it will give us great influence in the Levant and indeed all the southern parts of Italy. In this view I hope we shall never give it up."³¹

Admiral Keith also reflected on Malta's changing geopolitical place in the Mediterranean in 1805; when asked for his opinion on the utility of the region's naval stations, he replied:

"Malta has the advantage over all other ports I have mentioned (Mahan, Elba and Sardinia), that the whole harbour is covered by its wonderful fortifications, and that in the hands of Great Britain no enemy would presume to land upon it, because the number of men required to besiege it could not be maintained by the island, and on the appearance of a superior fleet, that besieging army would find itself obliged to surrender ... or starve."³²

This rekindled strategic interest in the Maltese islands was paralleled with a resurgence of commercial interest. This strategic/economic connection had been apparent as a recurring theme throughout Malta's longer term history and was set to continue to be so for many decades³³. In addition to becoming an important Royal Naval base, the islands were increasingly being used as a storehouse for commodities being sold on to eastern Mediterranean countries and Italy. Malta's role as a break-of-bulk point intensified in 1806 when Napoleon issued the Berlin decree. This effectively closed European ports to British shipping. Consequently, Malta experienced a commercial boom since she was perfectly placed to serve as a base for vessels trading with Europe by indirect routes. Not for the first time, nor the last, Malta was experiencing an economic boom based on short-term, wider geopolitical circumstances. In this particular case, although Malta was a convenient base for traders in the eastern and central Mediterranean, the major proportion

of early nineteenth century trade passing through the harbours was fuelled by the war in Europe.

As the war in Europe drew to a close in 1815 and Mediterranean trade routes began to normalise, and so increasingly preclude Malta, the islands were hit with another blow; a virulent epidemic of the plague. In addition to killing four-thousand people, the plague had the effect of crippling Malta's maritime dependent economy since the harbours were obliged to close and all trade and most naval activities ceased³⁴. These events were perhaps an early indicator that military attack was not all that Malta was exposed to and that Malta's geopolitical circumstances had the potential to become a great deal more complicated than strategic and even economic considerations alone might suggest.

A combination of the plague and the renewed economic hardships that the Maltese had been subject to triggered complaints from small sections of the local population. Since Malta had only been part of the British colonial system for just over a decade, such complaints were taken seriously. In response, a commission of inquiry was sent out from Britain in 1812. Rejecting most of the demands for extra privileges and powers made by the Maltese complainants³⁵, the commission instead recommended that a Crown colony government be established. In so far as this section is concerned, this meant that Malta's place in the wider colonial geopolitical world order had shifted from being that of a British protectorate to that of a Crown colony. Although clearly discernible in terms of Malta's shifting legal status, this development had less of an effect on Maltese political affairs than is often suggested and was certainly not, as is sometimes portrayed, a retrograde step. Nevertheless, it stands out clearly as a noteworthy event in Malta's political history and, more importantly for the purpose of this thesis, a significant policy response to wider world geopolitical change.

In short, the shift towards Crown colony status effectively meant that full administrative responsibility was in the hands of a British governor who was appointed by the Crown on recommendation from the British Prime Minister. For the remainder of this phase in Malta's political history, the British government was able to exact laws for Malta, either directly or through the issue of an order in council³⁶. On this point, however, it is worth citing Blouet:

"To state the situation in [a] legalistic manner ... is to oversimplify the situation, for in practice numerous local considerations operated upon the Governor and resulted in a larger Maltese input than the stark legalities might suggest."³⁷

Soon after his arrival, Sir Thomas Maitland, Malta's first governor and Commander in Chief, managed to negotiate recognition of British presence in Malta with the European powers³⁸. Such recognition culminated in the 1814 Declaration of Peace, which had immediate and obvious implications for military expenditure on the islands. As history had taught the Maltese, and the forthcoming phases of their political history would re-emphasize, peace generally brought little in the way of economic prosperity. Between 1814 and 1840 British defence spending, with a garrison which normally numbered less than two-thousand men, was, by the standards of earlier periods, relatively low. In addition to this, the same period was characterised by a depression in world maritime trade. Once again, the period of economic distress gave rise to a level of local discontentment, which was expressed mainly through a series of petitions in 1836, and, once again, the British response involved sending out a commission of inquiry. This time, however, they were more responsive to Maltese demands. In response to the peace-time economic hardships that they had documented and confirmed, the commission

recommended that more top administrative positions be given to the Maltese. This was not only intended to create more rewarding and profitable careers for capable Maltese, but also to free considerable British funds for use elsewhere. Furthermore, but more as a gesture of good will than concession to demands, the British facilitated the establishment of a free press, primary education and certain other legal and tariff reforms³⁹. Above all else, such developments were demonstrative of Britain's long term interests in Malta and indicative of the perceptive policies of 'indirect rule' which Britain had adopted and then adapted (as outlined in the previous section) to suit the various territories which made up its vast colonial empire. For the remainder of this phase in Malta's political history such perceptiveness was set to continue and was indeed vital to the success of the relationship between Malta and Britain.

By the mid-nineteenth century Republican movements in Italy, Hungary, France and Germany were already threatening to undermine the colonial geopolitical world order. Given Malta's geopolitical location and circumstances it is understandable that the Maltese were aware of such wider-world developments. Furthermore, the island came to harbour a number of influential Italian political refugees who served to further propagate such ideas. Characteristically however, the British were alive to the potential ramifications for Malta's geopolitics and indeed their own colonial strategies. In response, the Governor of the day, Richard More O'Ferrall, introduced the 1849 constitution and his successor, William Reid ensured that over the following decade the Maltese became more involved in the running of their own affairs, declaring that;

"the defence of Malta depends most on good civil government, by which I mean giving the Maltese, as far as discretion will permit, the management of their own affairs. There are

50,000 inhabitants within, or close to the fortifications, who would do nothing to help us, unless they had privileges worth fighting for"⁴⁰.

With convictions such as these it is easy to understand why Reid became such a popular and effective colonial governor. He had made numerous attempts at enhancing Maltese living standards although in hindsight most were of only limited avail. Neither his attempts at introducing the American plough, 'Angus' cattle, a new breed of pig or even Indian silk worms contributed to any meaningful economic diversification and the Maltese remained heavily dependent on flare-ups in the colonial geopolitical world order as their only effective form of income.

The next such flare-up came in the form of the Crimean War (1854-1856). With the onset of the campaign against Russia, spending by the British War Office and the Admiralty increased. As the war progressed, however, and Britain came to offer direct protection to Turkey from the incessant Russian attacks, Malta became vital in British strategy and experienced another economic boom. In addition to the increased spending by the Admiralty and the War Office, one must also take into account the significant contribution that the well paid sailors and soldiers made to the economy in their rest and recuperation periods. As stated by the war correspondent W.H. Russell:

"Money was circulated in profusion ... Every tradesman was busy, morning, noon, and night and the intense pressure of demand raised the cost of supply enormously. Saddlers, tinmen, outfitters, tailors, shoemakers, cutters, and all the followers of the more useful and practical arts, were in great request, and their charges increased till they attained the West End (London) scale."⁴¹

Once again, the immediate post-war years witnessed increasing levels of Maltese discontentment. This time, however, it was less to do with economic decline, since Malta was experiencing unprecedented levels of prosperity, but more to do with a series of rifts between certain eminent Maltese figures and the British Army. The most notable amongst these was the dispute that developed between the Archbishop of Malta and the local army commander. Although the Governor of the day, Gaspard le Marchant, did manage to smooth over this dispute, he himself proceeded to provoke further discontentment with his autocratic style of leadership. Indeed, so much so that by the end of his rule the official majority was block voting in opposition and the 1849 constitution had for all intents and purposes ceased to function⁴². In the same way that the Maltese had felt the need to petition in the depression following the war in Europe, they did so in the period immediately following the Crimean War. In 1887, as a somewhat belated response to this petition, a new constitution was introduced which gave the elected members of the Council a majority. Henceforth, they had the power to legislate on almost all matters relating to internal affairs and crucially internal finance. The British, however, retained the right to intervene if circumstances dictated so. Nevertheless whatever bones of contention there may have been between certain sections of the Maltese population and the British Army or even the Governor, Malta was at this stage in the midst of another economic boom. This time it was not driven directly by a war or a specific flare-up but more by the prevailing climate of strategic fervour and the growing perception amongst the European powers that the colonial geopolitical world order, or the world as they knew it, may well be on the verge of sweeping change.

By the time of the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the strategic fervour that had been anticipated was undoubtedly concentrated around the Mediterranean. Along with Aden, which was acquired in 1830, Cyprus, which was leased from the Turks in 1878, and

Egypt, which was occupied in 1882, Malta held a crucial place in the Crown's strategy towards the Mediterranean, as one of the vital links in the chain from Britain to India. Britain's wider naval strategy at this time was simply to maintain a fleet twice the size of the combination of the next two largest fleets. Malta, with its vast and deep natural harbour, understandably featured heavily in this strategy and resultingly experienced another economic boom through strategic led development⁴³. This boom was dependent on the impending disorder in the colonial world system and it resulted in Malta's resources being pushed to the limit. In response to aggressive French policies in the Mediterranean and particularly the Middle East, the British spent heavily on Malta's fortifications and defence. The garrison was increased in size, new armaments were installed, and the fortifications were repaired and modernised. Furthermore, in an effort to expand the strained harbour facilities, the Royal Navy spent heavily on new commercial port facilities and either took over or constructed a number of new dockyards.

Almost as soon as these modifications had been completed and the Mediterranean route secured, a naval threat began to build up near England. As Germany took up a threatening posture in the North Sea, Britain transferred her Atlantic fleet to home shores, leaving the Mediterranean to be defended by the French fleet. By the turn of the century the Royal Navy's six Mediterranean Dreadnought class battleships had been moved from Malta to Gibraltar to cover both the Mediterranean and western approaches to England⁴⁴. In this time of widespread geopolitical uncertainty the islands were once again rendered almost redundant, albeit temporarily so. Thus, ended the four boom-bust cycles which were undoubtedly the essential defining characteristics of this phase in Malta's political history. Throughout this formative phase of war-driven booms and peace-driven busts the one thing that had become an established certainty about policy responses in Malta to

wider world geopolitical change was that they were ultimately determined by a fallible and dangerous dependency on disorder in what had been a relatively ordered colonial geopolitical world system.

1.3 BRITISH IMPOSED "PERCEPTIVE REALISM"

So far, this chapter has investigated the nature and extent of the wider world colonial order together with the place or role that British colonial policy makers afforded Malta within this wider world order. British interpretations of the international scene determined the policy framework through which they reacted to international developments on Malta's behalf. This section investigates this policy framework, suggesting a number of theoretical interpretations of British policy in Malta.

Between 1800 and 1914 Malta's position in the international scene was one of a British colonial outpost in the wider colonial world-system. It has been implied throughout this chapter that this system was characterised by a certain order, albeit a diverse and dynamic order, at least in relation to other geopolitical situations that have existed throughout history. As explained in the introduction, however, such a view fosters certain ambiguities. First of all, the expression 'colonial geopolitical world order' is value-loaded. This chapter has demonstrated that the colonial geopolitical world order was not all-pervasive. Through examining the case of Malta alone we have seen that, whilst the governments of the main European powers might have felt the world was relatively predictable, secure and indeed 'ordered' throughout this period in history, the Maltese leaders did not enjoy the same peace of mind. In fact, it can even be argued that the Maltese actually developed a seemingly paradoxical dependency on the elements of disorder in the wider-world order for their prosperity, advancement and ultimately their survival. Fortuitously for them, such elements were commonplace and Malta itself was caught up in four wars between 1800 and 1914.

Hence, it is only the fact that these wars were effectively local flare-ups which enables us to refer to the world scene at this particular phase in history as one of order. Such categorisation is further justified in historical terms when compared to the next period in history, which was of course host to the two greatest wars ever known to mankind. By comparison, the colonial wars that Malta had been caught up in over the previous century or so were mere side-shows fought far from the homelands of the European colonial powers; skirmishes that were part and parcel of their power games but were nevertheless unlikely to disturb their domestic repose. It was this fact, that soldiers and sailors were the only real players in these power games, that led to the widespread acceptance of these skirmishes as an inevitable and unavoidable component of the dynamic global colonial system.

Those engaged in geopolitical thinking accepted the *continuity* inherent in this dynamic global colonial system and, rather than seeking to *change* it in any fundamental way, sought only more efficient ways of swinging its evolution in their favour. By accepting the importance of continuity above all else, rather than striving for change for the better, these geopolitical thinkers were subscribing to realist interpretations of the global situation and prescribing realist reactions to global geopolitical developments. In other words, the policy frameworks which they advocated were realist in nature. But, as explained in the first section of this chapter, despite the oft-talked-of commonalties, there were a number of underlying differences between the policy frameworks of the various European colonizers. For instance, the framework through which the Portuguese empire was governed was not only strictly autocratic but also promoted the use of violence as a legitimate means of acquisition and governance. Hence, in present day geopolitical terms it can, without hesitation, be referred to as a particularly rigid policy framework of realism. The framework through which the British governed their empire was, on the

other hand, although consenting of a level of violence, more perceptive to the requirements of indigenous populations. Despite this crucial fact, in as much as it was based on a Eurocentric interpretation of the international scene which envisaged the geopolitical face of the globe as a mosaic of colonial powers and possessions, it was also unequivocally realist in nature. Nevertheless, when talking of underlying differences, it did lack the rigidity of say the Portuguese realist policy framework.

Just as there were differences between the policies through which the chief colonizers governed their empires there were also differences between the policy frameworks imposed on the various colonies by any one ruler. These differences were particularly discernible within the British Empire. As mentioned in the earlier sections of this chapter, the British customised their general realist colonial policy to fit the needs of specific territories. Whereas some of the territories with large confrontational settler populations and high land alienation demanded firmer rule, others, especially the protectorates and condominiums, required a less direct form of rule. For reasons that will become clear, I have labelled the specific policy framework through which the British governed Malta *perceptive realism*. In order to investigate this policy framework it is necessary to tackle its two constituent parts, realism and then perceptiveness, in turn:

Realism can be said to sum up the more general policy framework imposed on all of Britain's empires since, in their decision making, policy makers were governed by a certain set of realist assumptions about the world which existed in colonial times. Fundamentally, within their policy framework of realism it was assumed that the British nation-state accurately represented, and acted in the best interests of, its population. Indeed similar assumptions were made about the entire British empire. Thus with an arrogance that was typical of all colonial powers, the British genuinely believed that they served the best

interests of their colonies, even when this was most definitely not the case. Furthermore, it was assumed that by providing a level of physical security for the British population and the population of the British Empire they were adequately providing for the best interests of their people. In other words, factors such as economic well being took second place to the maintenance of territorial security, and interconnections between the two were given only passing consideration. Hence, through the general British policy framework of realism, and indeed those frameworks of other colonial powers, the colonial world was assumed to be a mosaic of individual and autonomous units, which were in continual and aggressive military competition with each other. Wars and conflicts were assumed to be the inevitable culmination of this competition and the realist policy framework thus focused in on such potentialities. Above all else, the policies imposed on British colonies were influenced by war and the preparation for war. This general policy framework of realism was therefore based on the overall assumption that it was legitimate for the British state to monopolise the means of violence and that this indeed provided the main means through which it could pursue its interests and the supposed interests of its empire.

Such a policy framework, although distinguishable in detail from those of other colonial powers, was not strictly unique to the British empire. The other great European empires, and the minor ones as well, were also administered through policy frameworks which would now be referred to as being realist in nature. The genesis of this pervading realist outlook on the globe was the Eurocentric and expansionist gaze⁴⁵ that the main colonial powers adopted towards the rest of the world. Such a gaze was justified, given credence and eventually even perpetuated by the geopolitical theorists and strategists of the day. In terms of influence, three such geopolitical theorists in particular were outstanding: Mahan, Ratzel and Mackinder.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century Alfred Thayer Mahan enunciated the view that sea power had been the primary influencing factor upon the history of the world. He justified the role that Britain's naval supremacy had played in shaping the colonial world order and advocated the continued strengthening of Western navies; particularly the navy of his native USA⁴⁶. Although approaching the subject from a less nautical tack than Mahan, Friedrich Ratzel was another illustrious colonial explicator. Through his "laws of the spatial growth of states" he cultivated the geopolitical perception that the expansion of a state through war was a natural progressive tendency⁴⁷. Ratzel likened states to biological organisms in a competitive struggle for existence and reasoned that every state with a growing population needed 'living space' (or "*lebensraum*"⁴⁸) in order to sustain its civilization. Finally, in Halford Mackinder, Britain had its very own exonerator of colonialism. Although he later became involved in the geo-strategy of his celebrated 'heartland', his early work stressed the important role that geography had played in the development of the world's political history⁴⁹. This envisaged interaction between what is effectively physical geography and political history has meant that his work, and the work of others like him, has since been referred to as being determinist in nature. It is also, however, important to stress the significance of the realist attributes of his work. Mackinder, like the British colonial administrators whom he sought to influence, saw the world in terms of conflict and competition. He talked in terms of recurring conflict between 'landsmen' and 'seamen' and warned that unless his strategy was heeded the landmen may have the ultimate advantage. As any analysis of his discourse reveals, Mackinder was undoubtedly a staunch realist. For the purposes of this section it suffices to quote his famous dictum which summarises his main strategic propositions:

"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland.

Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island.

Who rules the World-Island commands the World."

In this statement alone, the realism built into his thinking reveals itself in the repeated use of the terms 'rule' and 'command'.

The prevalence of realism in the general policy framework adhered to by the British in colonial times is thus indubitable. Not only is realist thinking apparent in the policies imposed on the British Empire, and indeed for that matter all colonial empires, but also in the thinking which initially gave credence to these policies and eventually helped promote them. However, we must be wary of generalisations since British colonial policy, although essentially realist, has been shown in this chapter to have been apparently more perceptive towards the needs of the colonized than the policies of other European powers were. Furthermore, this chapter has also explained that variation existed between the specific policies imposed on the diverse range of colonies which existed in the British empire. In particular, the policies towards the protectorates tended to be more perceptive towards the needs of the native populations who had after all, in the majority of cases requested British protection. Having investigated the realism that was inherent in the policy framework through which Malta and, all other colonial territories were governed, we can now turn to the perceptiveness which it is argued was peculiar to British colonial administration and especially unique to the specific policy framework imposed on Malta.

As the second section of this chapter elucidated, the assertiveness that the British colonial policy makers displayed towards Malta increased between 1800 and 1914 as the islands relinquished their protectorate status and transformed into the colonial fortress of a nation on the verge of war. One common theme did, nevertheless, remain throughout. This was the theme of perceptiveness which resulted from the British policy of indirect rule outlined

earlier. In other words, as Malta's geopolitical status shifted from being a *de facto* protectorate to a Crown colony the policy of perceptiveness and indirect rule remained unchanged. Certainly, at no stage was a strictly direct or authoritarian policy adopted towards Malta. Even though the various governors clearly adopted their own styles of leadership, some being more assertive than others, the Maltese view, whether it be represented in the form of a petition or the results of a commission of inquiry, was invariably heeded. Not even the prospect of widespread revolt led by the mid-century Republican movement distracted the colonial administrators from their policy of sensitivity to the needs of Maltese society. Indeed, faced by this prospect the British administrators opted to grant the Maltese their first constitution rather than increase the assertiveness with which they ruled.

Nowhere else was the perceptiveness with which the British governed Malta more readily apparent than in the policies adopted towards the Catholic Church by the islands' Protestant colonizers. In fact these policies rarely resulted in any friction. Although the early decisions to introduce laws to limit mortmain (1822), define the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts and curtail sanctuary (1828) may have given rise to some concern in the Catholic Church, it soon became apparent that the British colonial administrators had no intention of implementing policies which would undermine the position of the Church in Malta⁵⁰. In fact the contrary was more true, and the colonial administrators were keen to raise Malta's ecclesiastical status to a one comparable, at least, with Sicily. To this end, in 1831 the diocese of Malta was separated from the see of Palermo. The bishopric of Gozo was created in 1863 and in 1889 a British mission to Rome insisted that the Bishop of Malta always be Maltese⁵¹.

In summary, despite the fact that London had the ultimate say in all policy matters, the wants and needs of the Maltese were rarely overlooked. In comparison to many of the other colonial territories around the world, the Maltese were relatively fortunate in this respect. The British administrators had ushered in a series of key policy developments which, unbeknown to the Maltese at this stage, would prepare them well for their future political maturation. The most notable of these have been outlined in this chapter; the declaration of *de facto* protectorate status (1800); the establishment of a Crown Colony Government (1812); European recognition of British presence in Malta and the subsequent declaration of Peace (1814); the introduction of a free press, primary education and certain legal and tariff reforms (around 1840); the 1849 constitution and finally the 1887 constitutional reforms which gave elected members of the Maltese Council a majority for the first time.

All such developments had been introduced as responses to the periods of depression which had followed wars, some as gestures of good will but some more schemingly as part of the overall effort to mould a level of patriotism and gratitude within the Maltese population. Whilst a level of perceptiveness was always apparent in the way Britain administered Malta, colonial policy makers consistently ensured that they retained an aura of authority. Crucially, for instance, the idea of a Maltese National Assembly made up of a mixture of local religious and political leaders was never conceded. Such an ideal was deemed inappropriate to the geopolitical realities in which the Maltese colony functioned. These were the realities of a pawn caught up in the power games of the world's main political players. And so, although the above investigation has illustrated the strong undercurrent of sympathy which existed in the policies imposed on Malta, it is important to realise that the framework from which these policies emanated remained uncompromising enough to reflect such geopolitical realities. Hence the label *perceptive*

realism, which concurrently portrays both the perceptiveness of the policy framework through which the British governed Malta, yet also the realism which persisted throughout all acts policy making.

In conclusion, it is difficult to severely criticise the policy framework through which the British governed Malta at this phase in her political history or the geopolitical thinking behind it. Obviously the perceptiveness built into it was a major plus-point but even the inherent realism is difficult to criticise. To a certain extent, this is because at this stage in history there were no viable alternatives to realist interpretations of the political world and realist reactions to global developments. In addition to this however, Malta's strategically sought after location could only truly have been interpreted through realism and, furthermore, realist reactions provided the only plausible retorts to the various competitive geopolitical circumstances in which Malta found herself throughout the colonial era. Perhaps the fact that it is difficult to criticise this policy framework, even with the benefit of hindsight and the experience derived from many more years of geopolitical change, helps to explain why the policies imposed on the Maltese by the British were invariably accepted without prevarication. Certainly there is little present day resentment and the very fact that Malta continues to enjoy membership of the Commonwealth would seem to suggest that the policy framework through which Britain exercised colonial rule over Malta was a relatively successful one; therefore rendering this phase in Malta's geopolitical development also a successful one.

This phase was also formative in Malta's international political development, in the sense that it witnessed Malta's projection into the wider world. Although Malta had been involved in many previous great empires, they were all on a relatively local scale or perhaps, as in the case of the Romans, a regional scale. Between 1800 and 1914 Malta

had participated in the most expansive empire that the world has ever known, enjoying British protection for over a century. The Maltese seemed to appreciate that the continued power and indeed supremacy of the British colonial empire was vital if Malta was to retain her respectable position in the wider world colonial system and relished a modicum of stability and security. Hence the realist policies imposed on Malta in response to the continually evolving colonial world order were accepted as a small price to pay for British protection. In the next phase of her international political history, however, Malta was to repay her debt for this protection ten times over.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ This observation is made by Beeley and Charlton 1994, p. 112.
- ² A number of comprehensive studies of Malta's history as a dependent colony have been conducted: The most recent and thorough being Blouet 1992 which traces the history of the Maltese islands from before their first colonial invasion, when the Borg in-Nadur people apparently overwhelmed the Tarxien Cemetery people, to their current international status as a neutral and non-aligned micro-state. Luke 1960, provides another comprehensive study, although it must be acknowledged as being primarily written from the perspective of a colonialist rather than an academic. Furthermore, there are many more works relating to specific periods in Malta's history, particularly the colonial period, which are drawn on and referenced in the second section of this chapter.
- ³ Cohen 1963, p. 204.
- ⁴ See for e.g. Elson 1984, pp. 154 -182.
- ⁵ Theorists who through a form of economic reductionism assume capitalism to be the sole reason for European colonization include Lenin 1928 and Warren and Sender 1980.
- ⁶ Glassner 1996, p. 278.
- ⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹ For a thorough account of the role Christian missions played in the process of colonialism see Neill 1966. Also see Rotberg 1965 for an intriguing case study into the part that British missionaries played in the creation of Northern Rhodesia.
- ¹⁰ See Ch. 1, Schmokel 1964.
- ¹¹ Sanderson 1975.
- ¹² See for e.g. Gross 1957 and Millian 1933.
- ¹³ Easton 1964, see pp. 76 and 100 respectively.
- ¹⁴ For one of the few detailed accounts of his exploits see West 1972.
- ¹⁵ Furnivall 1934.
- ¹⁶ Dixon and Heffernan 1991.
- ¹⁷ See various pages in Easton 1964 (pp. 53-55, pp. 72-74, pp. 278-279 and pp. 320-329) for accounts on Portuguese colonial policy.
- ¹⁸ Pickles 1963 discusses the special colonial relationship that existed between France and Algeria.
- ¹⁹ For the more in depth study of French colonial policy in Tropical Africa from which these summary paragraphs were derived see Suret-Canale 1971.
- ²⁰ Fieldhouse 1981, pp. 38-45.
- ²¹ The Italians were famously routed by the Ethiopians at the Battle of Adowa in 1896.
- ²² Easton 1964, p. 90.
- ²³ For more detailed deliberations on the differences between British colonies, protectorates and condominiums see the introduction to Fieldhouse op. cit..
- ²⁴ Parker appears to have omitted Portugal as a colonizing power, although the territories acquired by Portugal are shaded. This fact should be accounted for when interpreting this map.
- ²⁵ Scicluna 1923.
- ²⁶ See Galea 1959, for a more detailed introduction on the views Napoleon had on Malta.
- ²⁷ Denaro 1909.
- ²⁸ See Hibbert 1973, and his detailed account of this important time in Maltese history, which he refers to as 'The Siege of Valletta, 1798 - 1800'.
- ²⁹ The circumstances in which Britain came to acquire Malta were detailed by Hardman 1909. He also contrasted the approaches adopted by the British and French occupiers.
- ³⁰ Harding 1968, made this point when tackling Malta's legal history under British rule.
- ³¹ Quote taken from Blouet op. cit., p. 142.

³² Ibid.

³³ For a thorough overview of Malta's strategically dependent boom-bust economic cycles see Charlton 1960.

³⁴ The socio-economic and demographic effects of the plague were examined by Price 1954.

³⁵ The list of demands included the restitution of the *Consiglio Popolare* (The Maltese Parliament), trial by jury and the right to appeal and to a free press, see Lee 1972.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Blouet op. cit., p. 147.

³⁸ For further details on the negotiations which led to the recognition of British presence in Malta by the European powers see the biography of Sir Thomas Maitland, Willis-Dixon 1939.

³⁹ See Blouet op. cit., p. 150.

⁴⁰ Although this communiqué is taken from Blouet op. cit., p. 151, there are a number of original letters relating to the concessions that both O'Ferral and Reid made to the Maltese, see *Grey Papers*, Palace Green Library, Durham University.

⁴¹ W. H. Russell, taken from Blouet op. cit., p. 157.

⁴² Lee op. cit.

⁴³ For a thorough account of this strategic-led development see Lee 1972.

⁴⁴ Grenville 1994, p. 43.

⁴⁵ O'Tuathail uses the term "gaze" to refer to the vision the main European colonizing powers had of the rest of the world at this stage in history. O'Tuathail 1997 (throughout introduction).

⁴⁶ See for eg. Mahan 1892 and 1898.

⁴⁷ Ratzel 1896, p. 31.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ For e.g.s of his early work see Mackinder 1890 and 1904. His later work also draws on many of his original principles, see for e.g. Mackinder 1919.

⁵⁰ Callus 1961.

⁵¹ Blouet op. cit., p. 163.

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PHASE 2:

**MALTA AS AN ISLAND FORTRESS IN A WORLD RE-
ORDERING THROUGH ANARCHY**

2.

MALTA AS AN ISLAND FORTRESS IN A WORLD RE-ORDERING THROUGH ANARCHY

In classifying the period between 1914 and 1945 as phase two of Malta's international political history, this chapter lumps the two greatest wars ever known to mankind together. By doing so is not to imply that the Second World War was a mere continuation of the First, which followed a temporary interruption created by the armistice of 1918. Such an approach is not uncommon with certain historians; indeed Hobsbawm refers to the entire period from 1919 to 1945 as the "Age of Catastrophe"¹. From a strictly historical perspective it is easy to criticise this approach not least because it ignores the differing origins and natures of the two wars. Nevertheless, from a geopolitical perspective it is not only acceptable but preferable to lump the two world wars together into a single phase since between them they brought about a complete re-ordering of the globe as it had come to be known. Furthermore, from Malta's point of view, as a British colony, the difference in the origin and nature of the two wars mattered little. Britain and, by virtue of this, Britain's colonies were unavoidably implicated in the global anarchy which was the main characteristic of both wars and characterised this critical phase in the history of the world.

This chapter is concerned with Maltese geopolitical thought throughout this phase of global anarchy. Put otherwise, it is involved with the interpretations behind Malta's changing place in the geopolitical disorder which existed throughout the world at this unprecedented and still unsurpassed stage in history. So that comparisons can eventually be drawn between the various phases, this chapter adopts the same format as the previous chapter. It is split into three separate sections, the first of which examines the wider world

scene between 1914 and 1945, detailing how it was dominated by the two world wars; the second investigates the policy responses which determined Malta's small but significant role in these wider world wars; and the third draws together a number of more theoretical conclusions which relate to the geopolitical thinking behind these policy responses.

This chapter is not subject to the ambiguity that typically accompanies the usage of the concepts of order and disorder in interpreting geopolitical change. This is because, no matter what benchmarks are used, it is difficult to interpret this phase in history as being anything other than one characterised by global geopolitical disorder. In fact the term 'disorder' is arguably too reserved and, as the evidence in the next section will show, the term 'anarchy' may be more fitting.

2.1 THE WIDER WORLD: RE-ORDERING THROUGH ANARCHY

Whereas power, technological ability and expansionist desires had shaped the world in the phase outlined in the previous chapter, the shape of the world between August 1914 and May 1945 was to be decided almost entirely by a concoction of anarchy, force and desperation. The two great wars that occurred between these dates ended not simply by defeats of armies in the field alone, as in the colonial wars of the nineteenth century, but instead with the breakdown of the political, economic and societal structures of the defeated. Such absolute breakdowns were first and foremost to alter the relative order that had developed amongst the European powers. Further to this however, as China, Japan and the USA themselves became involved, the entire geopolitical surface of the globe was to undergo a complete restructuring. The following paragraphs examine the various breakdowns which led to this complete restructuring. In so doing they share the same focus as many great works on the world wars but it should be borne in mind that their scope is necessarily limited to what is of relevance to this thesis. Nevertheless, an

attempt is made to cover in turn the critical events of the two world wars. This attempt is made from the hybrid perspective of geography and politics and is thus specifically interested in the geopolitical restructuring that the anarchy brought about. In addition to this, particular attention is devoted to the events that implicated Malta so that reference can be made to them in the second section of this chapter.

2.11 The First World War

By the end of the colonial era a number of rivalries between the European powers had become apparent². The main ones were between Britain and Russia in Asia and Britain and France in Africa. Britain remained isolated from Europe, while France and Russia signed an alliance in 1894 as a counterweight to the strength of the alliance bloc which had developed around Germany³. This situation had arisen around the turn of the century when Germany had erred increasingly towards expansionist policies. Such policies were not wholly dissimilar to those that other European powers had adhered to for at least a century. However, as outlined in the last chapter, most of the world's uninhabited territories had already been allocated. It was therefore not surprising that the building of a high seas fleet by Germany to rival that of Britain was judged to constitute a threat to the established colonial world geopolitical order. Responding to this threat, Britain resolved its differences with France in 1904 and with Russia in 1907, and France settled its long-standing dispute with Italy in 1902. Following on from this, the so called *Triple Entente* between Britain, France and Russia was orchestrated to form the only firm bulwark against this German threat. Germany, on the other hand, became concerned with the danger of encirclement by a hostile ring which it feared was being constructed by Great Britain⁴.

Germany reacted to this perceived encirclement by strengthening her alliances with Italy, and more importantly Austria, her only truly dependable ally. Demonstrative of Germany's alliance with Austria was the support she gave to the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. The Austro-German alliance (or the *Dual Alliance*⁵) remained intact throughout the Balkans war which witnessed a Russia-sponsored Balkan League (consisting of Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria) attempt to drive the Turks out of Europe. The consequent enlargement of Serbia, which almost doubled in size, was unacceptable to the Austrians, who feared above all else the prospect of Serb agitation for an independent south Slav state⁶.

The assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne in Sarajevo in June 1914 is cited in many of the most thorough works on the First World War as having signalled the start of violence⁷. This event had at last presented the Austrian government with an opportunity to contain Serbia before it grew too powerful, and Germany did not hesitate in backing its ally. Russia opted not to withdraw its sponsorship of Serbia and instead chose to mobilize against Austria. Germany perceived this as a direct threat and also began to mobilize. However, fearing attack from Russia's allies in the West, the German Schlieffen Plan called for an early attack on northern France through Belgium, with the intention of dismantling the French government before Russia had time to mobilise⁸.

The Schlieffen Plan was almost a success. At roughly the time when the Russian armies invaded East Prussia the Germans were within forty miles of Paris. They were forced to divert important reserves from the Western front just as a spirited counter-attack by French and British troops began at Marne in September 1914⁹. The two sides dispersed and dug in, their trenches extending from the Channel coast to Switzerland. The trench wars fought on Germany's western front degenerated into a war of attrition. Continual

offensives were launched by both sides and the efficiency with which reinforcements reached the front line by railway meant that there were heavy casualties throughout¹⁰

The Battle of the Somme typified the unwinnable trench stalemate which had evolved. On the first day of this battle there were 60 000 British casualties. Four months later the battle continued, yet despite pursuing a range of alternative strategies neither side had made any substantial progress¹¹. In an attempt to break the deadlock the British and French attempted a series of offensives from the rear. First, in the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia against the Ottoman empire, which entered the war in November 1914 on the side of the Dual Alliance; then on Austria's southern frontier after Italy declared war in May 1915; and also at Salonika in Greece in support of Serbia¹². All such efforts were in vain and, what is more, the Germans countered by constructing a fleet of submarines with the expressed intention of enforcing a food embargo on the British Isles. Nevertheless, by 1917 this ploy had failed to reduce Britain's food supply in any significant way and succeeded in provoking the United States into war with Germany¹³.

On the eastern front the Austro-German alliance enjoyed far greater success. The battlefield stretched for twice the distance of that in the west and as a result of this mobile combat replaced the trench stalemate¹⁴. In such theatres the supremely equipped armies of the Dual Alliance scored a number of major successes. In 1915 Germany routed a huge area of Poland and set about a wholesale exploitation of its resources¹⁵ and in that same year Austria overwhelmed most of Serbia¹⁶. Two years later, by 1917, a combination of huge losses and economic catastrophe had diminished the morale of the Russian forces and provoked military collapse and in turn revolution. Ultimately, however, the above gains were to contribute to Germany's eventual downfall, since in what has now become known as a famous tactical blunder¹⁷ Germany sent its troops to occupy these new territories whilst simultaneously launching an all-out offensive in the west. Once again it

came close to success but the allied line held strong in July 1918. Aided by tanks and American reinforcements and money, the counter-attack not only pushed the German army back towards the German frontier but soon won the war. By October of that year, with Austria close to disintegration and with Germany facing political turmoil at home, the Berlin government sued for an armistice. This was finally granted on 11 November 1918¹⁸.

At the peace conferences held in and around Paris in 1919¹⁹, the victors imposed upon Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria (the Central Powers) considerable losses of territory, huge reparations, and strict reductions in their armed forces. The draconian nature of the peace settlement made it inevitable that, although over eight million men had died, the resulting re-ordered geopolitical map was unlikely to be accepted in the long term by the capitulators. This phase in history, which was characterised by the re-ordering of the world's geopolitical surface was by no means yet over.

2.12 The Second World War

The collapse of the Central Powers in 1918 and the subsequent peace treaties had brought about major changes to the geopolitical map of Europe. In addition to the obvious frontier changes, several new states had emerged whilst other states on the winning side expanded considerably. Nevertheless, such changes were minor in relation to the pending global geopolitical developments. The demise of the Austro-Hungarian empire, the disarmament and imposition of reparation payments on Germany and her allies and the effects of the Russian Revolution and civil war had left a climate that was conducive to the most colossal and uncontrollable geopolitical changes the world had ever witnessed. These were the changes which occurred during and in the aftermath of the Second World War. They are the focus of the latter paragraphs of this section but first it is important to

examine some of the factors which brought about the Second World War and so provided the catalyst for such massive changes in the wider world.

In terms of population and industrial strength, although weakened, Germany still had no rival in central Europe following the First World War²⁰. This factor meant that the victorious European powers were compelled to maintain an overwhelming collective military strength against any possible revival of German strength. Such commitments placed further strain on the already war damaged economies which in turn translated into widespread political instability. Italy, for example, which had amassed huge debts and lost over half-a-million men in the war but acquired only 14 400 km² in the peace, rapidly became ungovernable. Civil war between left- and right-wing extremists prevailed in many cities until in 1922 the Fascist party, led by Benito Mussolini, seized power²¹. Elsewhere, the costs of war and the inadequacies of the peace settlements fuelled anti-parliamentary and revolutionary movements of both the left and right, the most notable example being the Russian Revolution and subsequent civil war in which over thirty million people are believed to have died and the foundations for the next geopolitical phase in history (the Cold War) were laid²². With the onset of the "Great Western Depression"²³ in 1929 the Communist descendants of the Russian Bolsheviks also found fertile breeding ground for their philosophies in Europe and particularly in Germany which was perhaps hardest hit by the economic depression²⁴. Although they undoubtedly contributed to the downfall of the German Parliament it was the anti-parliamentary movement of the right, not the left, which eventually took power. The German Nationalist Socialist Worker's Party (Nazi Party) had been enjoying rapidly increasing support when in 1933 their leader, Adolf Hitler became National Chancellor and proceeded to absorb or abolish all other parties. Hitler's meteoric rise to power²⁵ combined with the economic weakening of Britain and the political instability of France irretrievably damaged the precarious geopolitical balance in Europe.

The League of Nations, created in 1920 to protect member states from aggression and regulate international disputes, was only as effective as long as its member states were stable. Furthermore, its failure to prevent Italy's annexation of Ethiopia in 1935²⁶, or Germany's remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936²⁷ did little to discourage further aggression. Hitler, who immediately set about remilitarizing the German war machine, annexed Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia in 1938, then Bohemia and Memel in spring 1939, whilst, in that same year, Italy invaded and occupied Albania²⁸. Whether an early alliance between the western democracies and the Soviet Union would have halted such aggression remains a topic of debate. However, fearing that his country, which was still in the wake of the civil war, may be next in line and since he was already engaged in open hostilities with Japan (Hitler's ally), Stalin signed a non-aggression pact with Germany in August 1939²⁹. A further cataclysmic re-ordering through force and anarchy of the unstable geopolitical system created after the First World War had, as a result of a combination of the above mentioned factors, become an unavoidable inevitability.

Hitler's accession to power in 1933 had added a new dimension to international geopolitics. As Germany's economic recovery took hold his expansionist designs became unrestrainable. His essentially unopposed annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia (1938-39) and the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939 led him to expect comparable acquiescence when, he invaded Poland in September of that year. This offensive, however, was a miscalculation as it presented the western democracies with little alternative but to declare war³⁰. Undeterred by this, over the next two years Germany overran Denmark, Norway³¹, France, Yugoslavia and Greece, in that order. As mentioned, Italy had already secured Albania, but she also went on to invade Egypt in 1940. Despite the Nazi-Soviet pact, however, it is now widely acknowledged that Hitler's ultimate goal was the conquest of Russia³². In a similar way to the Schlieffen Plan in

1914. Germany's plans in 1939 sought initially to eliminate their foreseen obstacles in the west before the main struggle began in the east. Also similar to the Schlieffen Plan, Hitler's underlying strategy in the Second World War was doomed to failure

Three fundamental strategic oversights can now be identified as having been made by Hitler³³. First, he overlooked the political robustness of Britain which, despite being defeated on the continent and being subjected to sustained aerial bombing, refused to concede defeat³⁴. Second, though he took over three million prisoners of war and made rapid progress into Russia, Hitler's army over-stretched their logistical support and tens of thousands were stranded outside Rostov, Leningrad and Moscow throughout the winter of 1941³⁵. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Hitler elected to back Japan following the Pearl Harbour bombing and himself declared war on the USA³⁶. This final mistake sounded the death knell for the Nazis. US troops not only supported Soviet forces in defeating the Germans at the Volga in Stalingrad in 1942 but also served as vital reinforcements to the British³⁷. In battles which implicated Malta and were to prove decisive in ending the war, Anglo-American troops cleared Axis forces first from Africa and then from Sicily (1942-1943). Following on from this Yugoslavia and then France and Belgium were liberated before allied forces moved into Germany, meeting the Soviets on the Elbe in May 1945³⁸.


Destruction on the scale of the Second World War had never been witnessed before. Over fifty million people had perished within the space of six years and the Germans had murdered prisoners of war, all captured partisans and communist party members as well as more than six million Jews in mass shootings and special extermination camps³⁹.

In addition to the human costs of the war, by 1945 almost all major European cities lay in ruins and their economies in a state of devastation. Furthermore, the destruction which

spread throughout the Asia-Pacific region must also be recalled. Japan's expansionist ambitions over the empires of the European colonial powers and her goal of expelling the USA from East Asia had resulted in a war theatre every bit as destructive as the one on the reverse side of the globe⁴⁰. In the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the conflict here concluded with an act of annihilation which thankfully has yet to be surpassed⁴¹.

In conclusion, although difficult to encapsulate in a few words, this section has examined briefly the geopolitical developments associated with the two world wars. Despite the obvious and significant omissions it serves the purpose of setting the wider world scene in which Malta became entangled throughout this phase in her history. This wider world scene can now be seen to have been characterised above all else by the most spontaneous and all-pervading geopolitical re-ordering that has ever occurred. As far as Europe was concerned, as the Allied forces began to occupy Axis territory, the extent of the re-ordering that the anarchy had invoked could be comprehended.

Figure 4: Europe in a world re-ordering through anarchy



Source: Grenville, J.A.S.: *The Collins History of the World in the twentieth century*. HarperCollins, London 1994, p.314.

As will be seen in the third chapter the re-ordering through anarchy of the world depicted in the previous map sowed the seeds for the next phase in global geopolitical change, which also revolved around events in Europe. And finally, as the fourth chapter will show, not even the cataclysmic geopolitical transformations which resulted from the end of the Cold War were to supersede this phase of re-ordering through anarchy.

The next section (2.2) investigates Malta's role, and the policy responses which influenced this role, in this wider world scene. Although the role may not be readily apparent and at the outset even doubted, the following paragraphs will argue that the minor events which Malta was involved in were not only extremely significant to her own political development but were also reasonably instrumental on a larger scale.

2.2 FROM BRITISH DYARCHY TO BRITISH FORTRESS: MALTA IN A WORLD AT ARMS (1914-1945)

Just as Malta's role in the colonial world system of phase one developed through a series of policy responses to wider geopolitical changes from being one of a British protectorate into being a Crown colony, her role in the rapidly changing anarchical world of phase two shifted from being one of a British dyarchy to an out-and-out British fortress. The transition was not smooth, however, and was only completed following a number of uncertainties regarding Malta's allegiances to the Crown.

The islanders effectively inherited their role as a British dyarchy from the events covered in the first chapter. However, the role they took on as an island fortress in the Second World War drew many parallels with the role they had acquired almost four centuries earlier in 1565, when, under the Knights of St. John and with European backing, Malta's fortifications withstood military bombardment and the Great Siege at the hands of the

Turkish armada⁴². Hence, in many respects, throughout the latter stages of phase two Malta had experienced a reversion to a bygone era in which she was afforded the role of a military outpost by the major warring powers of the day. This is not to say that the Maltese were capable of affecting this reversion. In fact the contrary is more true; given the dangerous dependency Malta had built up on the colonial skirmishes of the nineteenth century, it was inevitable that, as anarchy spawned the globe, Malta would be unwittingly forced to revert back to this historical role as an island fortress.

Whereas Malta's role as an island fortress in inhibiting the westward progress of the Turkish advance (in 1565) is well recounted and often even embellished⁴³, the role that the fortress played as a key British base in the Second World War as the linch-pin in the battle for North Africa (1942) has not always been apportioned its due weight; particularly outside Malta⁴⁴. This section contributes towards redressing this imbalance by presenting an objective investigation into how, in a world at arms, Malta developed into a British fortress of the utmost importance. Along the way, it covers the hardships, the uncertainty over allegiances and finally the glory that the islanders encountered in the fulfilment of this key geopolitical role in the wider world anarchy. Thus, in as much as it details Malta's experiences in the wider world, in accordance with our working definition it covers Malta's geopolitics between 1914 and 1945.

Although the Maltese islands were not directly involved in any of the conflicts of the early twentieth century, they were certainly implicated in many of the most significant developments of the First World War. Unlike in the previous wars in Malta's history (see section 1.2), from which Malta nearly always benefited in a round-about-way, the First World War had a definite de-stabilising effect on the islands. Given that their colonial ruler was one of the main players and casualties of the war this is not at all surprising. British resources were necessarily devoted to the war effort, particularly to the costly

campaigns in the western trenches that were discussed in the last section, and colonial territories not directly implicated in the conflict were understandably neglected⁴⁵. In addition to this, a number of other wider factors combined to have a de-stabilising effect on Malta. In particular, the disruption of trade had reduced government revenue, created food shortages and higher freight rates, with the result that the cost of living in Malta rose dramatically, as it did elsewhere. Obviously this affected different sections of the population in different ways, to the extent that certain working communities were forced to strike⁴⁶. Most notably, in 1917, the dockyard workers were left with no option but to strike following a series of inadequate wage increases. Still, one has to conclude that despite these economic hardships, the Maltese were relatively well off, at least in relation to those countries and colonies directly involved in the fighting. Indeed, it would seem that the Maltese themselves had drawn such a conclusion and certainly less pressure than might have been expected was put on the British government, which was already facing up to the more serious burdens of the war. However, their tolerance to such economic hardships only lasted until the war was over when, being colonial citizens of the victorious power, the Maltese began demanding amelioration. On 7 June 1919, rioting broke out in Valletta, resulting in a number of fatal clashes between British troops and Maltese workers⁴⁷. During the riots flour mills were broken up in a protest against bread prices and the offices of the pro-British 'Malta Daily Chronicle' were destroyed⁴⁸.

By the time Lord Plumer had arrived to take up his appointment as post-war Governor the situation in Malta was rapidly de-generating into a microcosm of the political and economic turmoil which, as outlined in the previous section, was facing the wider world, and most particularly the European powers. Through a range of financial grants and concessions the new Governor ushered in the long requested Maltese National Assembly⁴⁹. The National Assembly was largely responsible for drafting a constitution which provided for two houses: A Legislative Assembly of elected members and a Senate

of nominated members⁵⁰. In addition to this the constitution drafted by the National Assembly under the guidance of L.S. Amery, who was under-secretary of State for the Colonies, also provided for and indeed formalised Malta's relationship with its British colonizers. This was done through the system of 'dyarchy', which was similar to that which had just been adopted for India⁵¹. It represented the third formal geopolitical role that had been imposed on Malta by the British as they reacted to changing wider world circumstances. As will be shown in the following paragraphs there were considerable differences between this role and the ones which had preceded it (i.e. Malta's role as a British Protectorate and then as a Crown Colony).

The shift to a dyarchal system of government was basically representative of a substantial concession to the Maltese by the British. Effectively, the Maltese were given a say in the running of local affairs whilst the British retained control over foreign affairs and defence. Obviously there was a degree of altercation over how and where the line between the two forms of government was drawn but the system of dyarchy did, nevertheless, ensure that Anglo/Maltese relations were relatively smooth throughout the immediate post-war years⁵². The Maltese were satisfied with the concessions that had been made whilst the British were content in the knowledge that they still had a means of controlling the legislative process and preserved ultimate authority over the foreign affairs of the islands.

The system of dyarchy, or more specifically the additional power it had conferred on the Maltese, had paved the way for the emergence of political parties. Given the nature of Maltese society this process was unlikely to be anything other than volatile, on a domestic scale at least. Maltese society retained many of the traditional attributes that were typical of other dependent British colonies⁵³. As discussed in section 1.1, through their policy of indirect rule the Crown had intentionally exerted little influence over the more traditional aspects of indigenous societies. In the case of Malta this meant that, well into the

twentieth century the majority of the work-force were still employed in agriculture, the manufacturing industry remained insignificant and most of the wealth was concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of rich land-owners⁵⁴. Moreover, beyond this wealthy core, literacy levels and general educational standards were low. In addition to this the continuing authority and dominance of the Church had almost been encouraged by British colonial administrators (as outlined in section 1.2). Decades later this had the effect of inhibiting modern secular change since many of the political leaders repeatedly incurred the mistrust and subsequent hostilities of the Church authorities⁵⁵. Finally, one further attribute of Maltese society, which ensured that the emergence of political parties and alliances was a volatile process, was the minuteness of the island society. Proximity continues to this day to affect the islands' geopolitics in as much as it affects the efficient functioning of Malta in the wider international scene⁵⁶. However, in the early days of Maltese domestic politics the problems which derived from the smallness of the islands' society were more acute. Even with the primitive communications and mediums of the early twentieth century Malta's overall population was sufficiently low and her population density sufficiently high for everyone to know everyone else's business. In such a situation the likelihood of public policy remaining distinct from personal interest is slim and as a result of this Malta's early aspiring politicians were faced with an uphill struggle in winning over the trust of the electorate.

The above paragraphs have suggested some of the internal characteristics of Maltese society which dictated that the development of political parties was a stormy process. This thesis, however, is not solely concerned with domestic developments within Malta but more with how they fit into the wider geopolitical scene. Bearing this in mind, it is necessary to consider the developments in Europe which undoubtedly influenced Malta's early political development and were, and still are, in many ways conducive to the volatility which appears to be inherent in the islands' political set up. The developments

which dogged politics in Europe prior to the Second World War were examined in the last section but the situations in the two countries which exerted the greatest influence over Maltese affairs at this stage in her geopolitical development (Britain and increasingly Italy) were not specifically tackled. It was the political influences from these two countries combined with the unfavourable attributes of Maltese society outlined above that brought about the political crisis which spoiled Malta's period of respite in between the two World Wars⁵⁷. The events which led up to, and specifically the influences from both Britain and Italy which contributed to this crisis are thus worthy of further consideration.

Malta's first organized political parties emerged when elections were called under the 1921 constitution⁵⁸. The first party to be formed was the Labour Party (founded 12 April 1921) which was led by Lieutenant Colonel Savona⁵⁹. Following on from this, Sir G. Strickland launched the Anglo-Maltese party and Dr. Bartolo launched the Maltese Constitutional Party. Both of these parties sought to strengthen the British connection and, as a result of this, formed an alliance prior to the election which was named the Constitutional Party⁶⁰. The Partito Nazionalista Democratico was formed on 10 May 1921 by Mr. A. Magri and Mr. G. Micallef, intended as a pro-Italian counterweight to the anglophile Constitutional Party. Portending future volatilities, was the fact that its first leader, Dr. E. Mizzi, had been court-martialled for sedition in the First World War and also been excluded from the Unione Politica⁶¹. The Unione Politica was led by Monsignor Panzavecchia and sought to offer a compromise between the contrasting pro/anti British and Italian stances. It was this compromise that the electorate opted for in the 1921 elections and for five years the Unione Politica served Malta well. In 1926, however, the Unione Politica merged with the Partito Nazionalista Democratico to form the Nationalist Party⁶². Malta's domestic political scene was then dominated by two parties with increasingly polemical stances, and political crisis was not long in coming.

In 1927 the electorate rejected the newly formed alliance, returning the Constitutionalists to office. Their leader, Lord G. Strickland, was a member of an influential Anglo-Maltese family. A graduate of Cambridge University where he was President of the Union, Strickland's British connections were reflected in his strong leanings towards policies of modernization and educational development⁶³. Such declinations (as they were seen) were not appreciated by the traditional interest groups which made up the majority of the upper house. In particular, representatives of the Church frequently used their powers to hinder Lord Strickland's attempts to promote change. Eventually the inevitable conflict occurred, when Lord Strickland made a series of statements which were disdainful towards the Church. The relationship between the political leader and the Church authorities deteriorated to the extent that when the next general election was called for May 1930 the Archbishop of Malta and the Bishop of Gozo issued a pastoral letter imposing spiritual penalties on those members of the Church who voted for Lord Strickland. In short, those who disobeyed were to be denied sacraments⁶⁴. Such a situation was clearly unacceptable to the British administrators and the decision was taken to cancel the election and suspend the constitution⁶⁵. The seeds of Malta's interwar political volatility had been sown.

The radically pro-Italian Dr. E. Mizzi rose to prominence in the Nationalist Party, offering a political viewpoint approved by the Catholic Church. Strickland portrayed the new breed of Nationalist as being anti-British and disloyal and in doing so he received the approval of the British Governor. Responding to this, some Nationalists accused Strickland of anti-Catholic sentiments, thus exploiting religious issues for political gain⁶⁶. Exchanges such as these had reached unprecedented levels of intensity when in 1931 the British established a Royal Commission to examine Malta's constitutional problems. Following this, the constitution was restored⁶⁷ and the Nationalist Party, with the approval of the Church, won the 1932 election. Under the instruction of their leader Dr. E. Mizzi, the Nationalists immediately began to implement a policy of rigorous promotion of the

Italian language. This policy was in direct contrast to the recommendations of the Commission of the previous year, which had expressly stipulated that Maltese be the language of the courts and that Italian should be taught only in secondary schools and not in elementary schools. In addition to this blatant promotion of the Italian language, other policies were adopted which the Governor, Sir D. Campbell, judged to be pro-Italian and in many respects anti-British. Obviously a situation had developed that was wholly unacceptable to the colonial authorities, explaining why late in 1933 the constitution was once again suspended⁶⁸. Care was taken not to implicate the Church in the proceedings since the language question had become agonisingly synonymous with the matter of loyalty to the Church. Italian was also the language of the nobility and the educated and wealthy elite, and once again the colonial administrators were compelled to tread carefully in these areas. A scenario in which an assault by Protestant Britain on the islands' Catholic institutions was perceived by the Maltese as a dangerous yet highly possible prospect⁶⁹.

By 1935, the period of political volatility in Malta was being replaced in significance by threats of war, just as it was being in the wider European scene. Perhaps somewhat ironically, it was the threat of conflict between the two great powers that had inadvertently caused a decade of political volatility to the islands which eventually forced a cooling of the domestic animosities. Although the forthcoming conflict was not in any way over Malta, the split allegiances within Maltese society and the islands' geopolitical location would have ensured that they would have featured heavily in any conflict between the British and the Italians. If such a war, between the two most influential wider European powers in the islands' affairs, had occurred at this stage it would almost undoubtedly have resulted in Maltese civil war. Fortunately, this time, the anticipated conflict between the Italians and the British never materialised. However, the mere fact that the Admiralty had felt it necessary to inform the Commander-in-Chief in Malta of the naval measures to be taken in the event of war with Italy was enough to awaken the islanders to the potentially

severe consequences of such a prospect⁷⁰. Therefore, in all probability, it was no coincidence that in the wake of this scare there followed a period of relative political calm in which moderate liberals came to prominence in all political parties⁷¹ and the cultural polarisation of the previous decade or so took a back-seat, at least for the time being.

The relative tranquillity which had followed the incident enabled the then Governor, Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, to introduce a constitution in 1936. Although this constitution was limited in many respects, it did establish an extremely effective executive council which, despite the world depression outlined in the last section, managed to implement a number of important progressive social and infrastructural measures. Sir Charles also succeeded in containing the pro-Italian groups that remained in Maltese society⁷². Given the global anarchy that was to come after his term in office and the role that the Italians were to play in instigating and perpetrating this anarchy, this was perhaps the most significant of his achievements. As well as intercepting espionage activities by the Italian Consul he expelled two government employees with strong pro-Italian sympathies⁷³, closed what he considered to be the troublesome Instituto di Cultura Italiana and played a large part in the dismissal of the pro-Italian Chief Justice, Sir Arturo Mercieca⁷⁴.

Despite the above successes, there remained one area in which the new Governor struggled to make much progress. This was in diversifying the island's economy⁷⁵. Efforts had been made to encourage small industries, agriculture and tourism as alternative forms of economic activity to the services that the dockyard provided. However, all such efforts recorded only minimal successes and in the period immediately prior to the Second World War, from an economic point of view, Malta remained very much an island fortress that was effectively employed at the discretion of the British. Since the introduction of the dyarchal system of government the Maltese had enjoyed increasing political representation and freedom. Whether or not this had come too early for the Maltese is debatable but it

most certainly had its teething problems. Indeed, so much so, that on the eve of the Second World War the Maltese political experiment had for all intents and purposes been temporarily halted. The Maltese were less concerned with the limitations of their constitution than the imminent World War. Unfortunately for them, however, at this stage the British were not overly concerned on their behalf⁷⁶.

The Crown had squandered earlier opportunities to enhance its colony's preparedness for war when they failed to carry out the plans they had proposed in response to the threat of war with Italy in 1935. These plans had proposed the distribution of gas masks, the establishment of air-raid shelters and the construction of refugee camps in Gozo, measures which if taken would undoubtedly have benefited the Maltese throughout the Second World War. In addition to this, wranglings between the various elements of the British armed forces and certain politicians over the strategic worth of the islands meant that further opportunities to prepare for the forthcoming World War were missed.

In many ways it was only the Royal Navy that was entirely convinced of Malta's strategic worth. To the First Admiral of the Fleet, Malta was an "unsinkable aircraft carrier"⁷⁷ that possessed large-scale dock-yard facilities which were a prime asset in the Navy's world-wide armoury. He believed that, should the growing Fascist movement in Italy join the Axis powers, the islands were ideally placed to sever sea communications between Italy and her North African colonies. The Army and the RAF, however, strongly disagreed since Malta was only sixty miles and thirty minutes flying time from Sicily and therefore likely to be untenable under heavy air attack⁷⁸ and of limited value anyway so long as French territories in North Africa could be used as air staging-points to the east. The final decision went against the expressed wishes of the Admiralty, with British politicians concluding that retaliating air strikes from France and North African territories would counter air raids on Malta from Italian airfields, should Italy become involved⁷⁹. The

British had elected not to fulfil their protectional obligations on which the Maltese had become hopelessly dependent. As will be shown in the following paragraphs, this was to prove a critical and almost decisive tactical mistake in the wider scheme of things.

The first bombs fell on the islands on 11 June 1940, the day after Italy entered the war⁸⁰. The internal wranglings and indecisiveness by the British meant that only forty anti-aircraft guns could be brought into action⁸¹. Furthermore, it was never envisaged that France would be defeated and that its airfields in Algeria and Tunisia, far from protecting Malta, would fall into enemy hands and become an additional threat to the islands. Following France's defeat in 1940 the Axis powers occupied the greater part of the North African coastline and Greece, leaving Malta practically isolated and its dense population exposed to the enemy. Defeat of Malta at this early stage would have given the Axis powers control of all but the eastern and western extremities of the Mediterranean⁸².

By the middle of 1941, the British had acknowledged their tactical error and accepted that the forecasts of the First Admiral of the Fleet had proved accurate. Demonstrative of Britain's changed geopolitical perspective on the islands was the 1941 communiqué that Winston Churchill wrote to the then Governor of Malta, Lieutenant-General Sir William Dobie, which stated:

"You may be sure that we regard Malta as one of the master keys of the British Empire"⁸³.

The battle for North Africa had essentially become a battle of logistics. With the eventual arrival of British supplies and reinforcements Malta was able to dominate the main seaways of the central Mediterranean and cause havoc to the supplies of the Axis armies⁸⁴. However, the islands' inherent geographical vulnerabilities meant that the costs of operating from them were high⁸⁵. The main components of their infrastructure were

concentrated in a few areas and there was a heavy dependency on imported food and industrial materials. In short, supply and logistics were just as important to Malta as they were to North Africa. The Regia Aeronautica, Luftwaffe and German U-boats squeezed the arteries of the fortress just as much as the Allies did the Axis' and during the first half of 1942 the islands came very close to starvation and surrender. By the summer of 1942, flour, rice, olive oil, milk, sugar, jam and beer were practically unobtainable and both soldiers and civilians were undernourished⁸⁶. Also, the lack of natural resources began to take its toll. Hospital casualties, a population inflated by military personnel and the provision of water for shipping meant that there was barely enough water for basic washing and drinking. In addition to this, the main domestic fuel on the islands, kerosene, was in acutely short supply⁸⁷.

In military terms, by March and April of 1941 the air onslaught had reached a new level of intensity. During these two months alone the islands suffered more than twice the weight of bombs which fell in London during the whole of its worst year⁸⁸. In the six months to the end of June 1942, with the exception of one twenty-four hour period, air raids on Malta were a daily occurrence, the most severe of them involving several hundred bombers and escorting fighters⁸⁹. The award of the George Cross on 15 April 1942, with the following citation -

"To honour her brave people, I award the George Cross to the Island Fortress of Malta to bear witness to a Heroism and Devotion that will be famous in History"⁹⁰

- temporarily lifted the spirits of both the garrison and the Maltese people but new fears were soon imparted by reconnaissance reports that preparations for invasion were being made at Sicilian airfields. Although such reports never materialised⁹¹, the air attacks continued and Malta's position in the summer of 1942 was,

"a microcosm of the desperate global situation facing the Allies at that time"⁹².

It was not until November 1942 that the tide began to turn in favour of the Allies. With the landings in French North Africa, allied air power once again came to dominate the sea routes and ensured safe passage for the large convoy from Alexandria that is often credited with having broken the siege.

The "Greater Siege", as it has since been referred to⁹³, had united the Maltese and the British and victory had ended the chances of the Axis powers. Nevertheless, Malta had suffered some of the heaviest bombing of the war and the damage to parts of the island had been immense⁹⁴. By the end of 1942, over 3000 Maltese civilians had been killed or seriously injured and 14,000 tons of bombs, during 3000 air raids had destroyed or severely damaged 25,000 buildings, including many of historical importance⁹⁵.

In the following year the islands were visited by their King, Churchill, Eisenhower and finally Roosevelt, who gave Malta a 'Presidential Citation'. In the summer of 1943, Valletta was utilised as the main base from which the Allies offensive in Sicily was launched and by August 1943 the captured Italian fleet lay at anchor in Malta's harbours.

Following German and Japanese surrender in the summer of 1945, Malta was rewarded with a thirty-million pound war-damage fund by the British Government. Despite the hardships that the islanders had been exposed to under the British the war had the effect of cementing the relationship between Britain and Malta which had now endured both the rise and fall of the colonial world order. Malta's uncertainties over her international allegiances had been quashed, even if only temporarily so.



In summary, this section has investigated the hardships, uncertainty over allegiances and also the glory that the Maltese experienced as a result of the fall of the colonial world order. It has identified Malta's place, and later role, in this demise as having shifted from being one of a British dyarchy to once again effectively becoming one of a fortress. The investigation presented in this section has shown that the shift was not a smooth one. Indeed, such was the extent of Maltese discontent at the interwar economic depression and political strife that the islands almost failed to make it to the Second World War under the British. As the dyarchal system of government swayed in favour of Malta's first generation of politicians many of them used their new powers to express disdain for their British colonizers. The main way in which they did this was to proclaim allegiances to the Italian culture, frequently utilizing the Roman Catholic Church as justification for their enunciations. The closing paragraphs of this section have detailed how this interwar flirtation with Italian culture and politics faded as the Second World War commenced. In short, it has described how, after an initial period of uncertainty by the British administrators, Malta was once again utilised for all its strategic worth. Its newly acquired international role as a British fortress soon relegated domestic political issues to a relatively low priority status. The British/Italian question was finally resolved in favour of the British when Italy entered the war on the side of the Nazis and showed no hesitation in the commencement of bombing sorties over Malta. Finally, the latter stages of this section have shown that this troublesome phase in Malta's geopolitical history ended on a relatively happy note with Malta basking in the glory of her internationally-recognised but hard-earned heroism.

2.3 BRITISH IMPOSED "FORTRESS REALISM"

So far this chapter has investigated the geopolitical nature and extent of the global anarchy which constituted the two World Wars and caused the major periods of economic depression and political instability in between them. It has also examined Malta's place in the First World War, her uncertain allegiances in between the Wars and her pivotal role in the Second World War. Malta's place in these wider world geopolitical developments was still largely determined by the British and the policy framework through which they governed the islands. This section investigates the geopolitical interpretations and reactions behind this distinct policy framework. It does so from a theoretical point of view, elucidating and then labelling the mode of geopolitical thinking behind the policies which were imposed upon Malta throughout the period of global anarchy.

The second phase in Malta's geopolitical development witnessed a shift away from the arrangement which had dominated Maltese/British relationships for the entire previous century. With the introduction of the dyarchal system of government, the islanders' affairs were no longer entirely in the hands of the British colonial administrators. Strictly speaking, two processes (hence the term dyarchy, also spelt di-archy, which means literally twice/double leadership/government) were influential in Malta's policy responses to war-time geopolitical developments. In other words, certain policy responses were undoubtedly inspired from within by those Maltese engaged in geopolitical thought, whereas others were still imposed on Malta from outside. However, as mentioned in the last section, even under the dyarchal system of government the majority of decisions regarding the foreign or external affairs of the islands continued to be made by the British. Hence, the latter of these two processes remained the most influential with regard to the geopolitical thinking behind Malta's policy responses between 1914 and 1945.

As in the last phase, the Crown's impositions on Malta continued to be realist in nature. All considerations short of war were either ignored or discarded or, at best, in peacetime took second priority. However, since peacetime was a scarcity throughout this phase, the former of these assertions is more representative of the prevailing geopolitical outlook in Malta at this time and political considerations short of war were for the most part ignored or discarded. Even in the relative peace of the interwar years Britain (and by virtue of this her dependencies also) was mainly involved with trying to make a rapid recovery from the devastation of the First World War and regaining military preparedness as a means of confirming her status in the re-ordering world. Such reactions were fundamentally realist in nature since they accepted the inevitable continuity of global conflict and the primacy of war ahead of all other matters of state.

This preoccupation with war and the preparedness for war was in all fairness justified in this uncertain period of global anarchy, as were the other assumptions that defined the policy framework of realism in both this and the preceding phase of Malta's geopolitical development. These assumptions were outlined in the last chapter (section 1.3) but in the re-ordering wider world elucidated in this chapter they acquired a slightly modified, more rigid form.

Above all else, the realist conviction that the British nation-state accurately represented and acted in the best interests of all citizens of its empire was more unreservedly assumed between 1914 and 1945 than it had been previously. Whereas in colonial times the alternative to representation by the British nation-state, indigenous or self-rule, was not unequivocally detrimental to the best interests of most colonies, in the period of global anarchy the alternative to representation by the British nation-state was without doubt detrimental to the best interests of colonial subjects. It was this fact that cultivated the

more zealously assumed convictions of British self-righteousness which dominated colonial policy-making throughout and between the two World Wars. For Malta's part, she took on the role of a British fortress or indeed Allied outpost in the most precarious of geopolitical locations. This was assumed to be in the best interests of all concerned since the alternative to this (namely the acquisition of Malta by the Axis powers) were unthinkably bad from the point of view of both the British administrators and the Maltese themselves.

In addition to this, the realist assumption that the maintenance of territorial security is the most important of all a government's tasks, which was discernible but not wholly justified in the earlier colonial policy framework of *perceptive realism*, was no longer in doubt. It would have been difficult to challenge the high priority status that issues of security and territoriality had above all other state and colonial affairs in this period of global anarchy. Certainly the Maltese were under no illusions as to how vital British military support was in safeguarding their territorial sovereignty from an Italian or even German encroachment. In the colonial world order, which was littered with only a few small scale and transitory conflicts, the neglect of social and economic issues in favour of issues of military defence was not always easy to justify in the face of criticism. In a world re-ordering through anarchy, however, pre-occupation with war and military and territorial security was, because of necessity, not open to dispute or even liable to criticism. This meant that the policy framework through which colonial administrators reacted to development in the wider world situation was based on response by military rote. In other words, the military leaders, both in Malta and in Britain, had taken over the role previously played by the governor. In this respect also, the mode of geopolitical thinking through which Britain responded to developments affecting Malta throughout this phase was more rigidly realist in nature than the previous one.

Malta was not the only country in which more rigidly realist geopolitical thinking was influencing policy frameworks in this period. In fact, assumptions similar to those outlined above dominated the thinking and policy-making of other colonial administrators and were even more apparent in the world views of the powers which continued to satisfy their expansionist desires into the twentieth century. Most notable amongst this new generation of aspiring colonialists, for obvious reasons, was Germany. As explained in the first section of this chapter, Germany had joined the scramble for imperial possessions too late to acquire any satisfactory *lebensraum* (living space) and resources. Geopolitical thinking behind German foreign policy in the early decades of the twentieth century reflected their unprecedented and blinkered eagerness to expand by whatever means necessary. It can be said that Germany's geopolitics of war led the way throughout this phase in history since all other variations of geopolitics were essentially designed as responses to it. In addition to this, it has been argued that German geopolitical thinking also led the way throughout and between the wars since responses to it and almost all other geopolitical theories of this era shared the same theoretical underpinnings⁹⁶. Notwithstanding the obvious differences in the extent to which German and other war-time geopolitical thoughts were interpreted literally by politicians and strategists, they were all derived from deeply realist underpinnings.

Whereas in the last chapter the perpetrators of such theories were little more than authoritative-sounding speculators practising an undefined hybrid discipline, by the time that global anarchy set in, geopolitics had become a well established discipline and those practising it enjoyed a new academic credibility. Furthermore, the deep-seated political realism that is now synonymous with traditional geopolitics had become firmly entrenched into their theories. There follows a short investigation into the geopolitical thinking that prevailed throughout and in between the wars, and the main exponents of such thinking. Such exponents were the luminaries, obviously some more directly than others, that

influenced the mode of thinking through which Britain imposed policies on Malta and, for that matter, the modes of thinking through which all of the major fighting powers governed their war-time outposts. For this reason the personalities themselves and more specifically their theories are worthy of further attention.

The work of Rudolf Kjellen is usually acknowledged as a quintessential point of departure for any investigation into this second generation of geopolitical theorists, not least because he is credited with having first coined the term "geopolitics" in an article on the boundaries of Sweden in 1899⁹⁷. Like his predecessors (Mackinder, Ratzel and Mahan) Kjellen emphasized the "natural" and "organic" features of the state. He talked of a "new political science" which must fill "the legal skeleton with social flesh and blood". He went on to argue that his new variant of political science must treat the state as a living organism, acting as a living organism within its own body and in relation to other states as organisms⁹⁸. Indeed, he even went so far as to title his most important book *Staten som Lifsvorm* (The State as an Organism, 1916). It was in this book that he presented his theory that the state was composed of five 'organs'. *Geopolitik* was the first of these and this was seen to involve the study of the territory of the state. The other attributes were *Kratopolitik* (government-constitutional structure) *Demopolitik* (population structure), *Sociopolitik* (social structure) and *Oekopolitik* (economic structure). Kjellen also introduced other aspects of the state concerned with the quality of the population and the nation, whose aggregate he saw as constituting the body of the state. He also perceived that states were in a condition of constant competition. Distinguishing between what he called first-rank "world-powers" (England, Germany, Russia and the United States) and second-rank "great powers" (Austro-Hungary, France, Italy and Japan) he envisioned a future world which would be composed of only a few very large and extremely powerful states. Crucially, however, for Europe he predicted a superstate controlled by Germany.

This was the cue for the German theorist Karl Haushofer, who took Kjellen's concept of *geopolitik* and transformed it into what he promoted as a whole approach to the study of geography and global politics⁹⁹. Rather than being merely one organ of the study of the state, *geopolitik* in Haushofer's writings became a tool for rebuilding Germany into a world power. A career officer in the Bavarian army, Haushofer served in Japan between 1908 and 1910 and rose to the rank of major-general in the army general staff, serving throughout the First World War. Before the war he completed a PhD in geography, geology and history at the University of Munich, addressing the German influence on the development of Japan¹⁰⁰. Haushofer began his academic career at the University of Munich in 1919 at the age of fifty. In his previous career, he had been impressed by what he had seen of the power and expansionist ambitions of Japan, and also by the power of Britain. It was this that had interested him in geopolitics, the subject in which he took up his lectureship in 1919. Throughout his academic career, he gathered around him a group of admirers, including journalists, all of whom helped spread his ideas¹⁰¹.

In the 1920s, Haushofer, along with his collaborators, was involved in the founding of two significant institutions. The first was the German Academy, which was formally opened in May 1925. The aims of the organization, as spelled out in its rules and regulations, were to;

"nourish all spiritual expressions of Germandom and to bring together and strengthen the unofficial cultural relations of Germany with areas abroad and of the Germans abroad with the homeland, in the service of all-German folk-consciousness"¹⁰².

The second was the establishment of the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* (Journal of Geopolitics) in 1924. The aim of Haushofer and his disciples was to create a popular and

influential journal that would address contemporary geopolitical issues and problems. In 1928 the editors of *Zeitschrift* outlined their definition of geopolitics:

"Geopolitics is the science of the conditioning of political process by the earth. It is based on the broad foundations of geography, especially political geography, as the science of political space organisms and their structure. The essence of regions as comprehended from the geographical point of view provides the framework for geopolitics within which the course of political processes must proceed if they are to succeed in the long term. Though political leaders will occasionally reach beyond this frame, the earth dependency will always eventually exert its determining influence. As thus conceived, geopolitics aims to be equipment for political action and a guide-post in political life ... Geopolitics wants to and must become the geographical conscience of state."¹⁰³

As can be seen from the above translation, Geopolitics for Haushofer was seen as being inseparable from practical politics. Haushofer and his group amalgamated Ratzel's theory on the organic state and Kjellen's refinements of it with the geostrategic principles of Mahan and Mackinder. They then went on to impose a level of German jingoism on this amalgamation and arrived at a practical policy of expansionism. For instance, a variant of Ratzel's *lebensraum* was clearly utilised as a rationale for Germany's expansion into its less virile neighbours, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Furthermore, an elaborated interpretation of Kjellen's advocacy of *autarky* was used, this time at the expense of other countries in south-western Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere. Finally, through a revival of the Heartland concept, German geopoliticians argued for the construction of a continental block comprising Germany, Russia and Japan as a counterweight to the sea-based British Empire. Haushofer saw elements of this strategy realised in the Anticomintern Pact of 1936 and the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939¹⁰⁴. However, his influence in German strategic circles was short-lived; the implementation of Operation Barbarossa (Germany's invasion

into the Soviet Union) against his expressed wish being demonstrative of this¹⁰⁵. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War he was pursued relentlessly by the Office of the Chief Counsel of the United States investigating prominent Germans for prosecution in Nuremberg; a pursuit which eventually led him and his wife to take their lives in 1945.

At the forefront of the Allied response to the theories of Haushofer was Nicholas John Spykman (1893-1943). In 1923 he earned a doctorate from the University of California, where he served as an instructor in political science and sociology (1923-1925), before going to Yale. In 1935 he became chair of Yale's Department of International Relations and director of their Institute of International Studies¹⁰⁶. With support from the Rockefeller Foundation, Spykman began research that would result in the publication of *America's Strategy in World Politics* (1942) and *The Geography of the Peace* (1944)¹⁰⁷. Spykman is best remembered within accounts of geopolitical development for his reworking of Mackinder's heartland theory. He offered two basic critiques. First, he believed Mackinder overemphasized the power potential of the Heartland since its importance was in fact reduced by the obstacles to internal transportation which caused major problems, as too did the barriers that surrounded the Heartland. Second, he argued that the history of the heartland could not be seen solely in terms of sea-power/land-power opposition. Instead, Spykman stressed the significance of the "rimland" areas, or what Mackinder called the "Inner or Marginal Crescent". This area, he posited, is vulnerable to both land and sea power and must therefore operate in both modes. Highlighting the point that, historically speaking, alliances have always been made among Rimland powers or between Heartland and Rimland powers, he proposed his own dictum;

"Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia;

Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world."¹⁰⁸

Through such thinking Spykman became instrumental in promoting American interventions in the Second World War. His views, however, were still very much expressed in terms of power geopolitics and in all respects dominated by political realism, as can be seen from the following statement in which he clarifies his position quite categorically:

"Neither the self-evident truth of our principles nor the divine basis of our moral values is in itself enough to assure a world built in the image of our aspirations ... Force is manifestly an indispensable instrument both for national survival and for the creation of a better world"¹⁰⁹

The above investigation into the personalities and theories which influenced the geopolitical thinking of all the major warring factions involved in this period of global anarchy is by no means comprehensive but has, however, served to highlight one common trend towards political realism. As mentioned, it can be argued that in this respect the theories and policy frameworks of the Axis powers were not dis-similar to those of the Allies; although clearly the former were more attack motivated whereas the latter were more driven by the need to defend. In short, a common geopolitical world view had been established as a result of both the practical strategies of government and the theorizing of geopolitical thinkers, although deep seated interconnections between the two make it difficult to distinguish between the relative influence of each of these twin factors. The geopolitical world-view which derived from the above was one of a globe composed of a mosaic of individual and autonomous units, which were in continued and aggressive competition with other units. Wars and conflicts were seen as the inevitable culmination of such competition and were therefore judged to be the primary concern of all governments. In this respect the geopolitical world-view which prevailed throughout the

first half of the twentieth century differed little from the colonial geopolitical gaze elucidated in the last chapter. One crucial modification was, however, discernible. Technological advancements in weaponry, communications and transport meant that the extent to which force could be used in the re-ordering of the global geopolitical mosaic had been realised. It was not so much a case of the expansionist desires of major powers being any different or any more zealously pursued than in the colonial phase, but more a case of vastly improved capabilities. In geopolitical terms the world had undergone the second in a series of shrinkages. The first in this series was represented by the discovery and subsequent colonization of the non-European world; this, the second, by the realisation that it was within the capabilities of a single well equipped and motivated power to conquer and dominate militarily the majority of the globe.

This geopolitical shrinkage and the related new world-view are crucial to our understanding of the geopolitical thinking behind British-imposed policy responses at this stage in history. For purposes of comparison and for want of a less-hackneyed adjective this mode of geopolitical thinking is labelled "fortress realism" (in contrast to the "perceptive realism" of the colonial era). Through "fortress realism" Malta was viewed and governed as a strategic military outpost throughout and between the two World Wars. Even though in the confusion surrounding technological advancements and geopolitical shrinkage referred to earlier¹¹⁰ Malta's significance to the British was not always realised, by the end of this phase Malta was being utilised for all its strategic worth. Throughout this stage in Malta's international political history, she developed from being a mere stop-off on the way to other large British colonies into an "unsinkable aircraft-carrier"¹¹¹ which was the linchpin in securing victory in the vital battle for North Africa. Correspondingly, policy making, although still in the domain of the British and still executed through a realist policy framework, increasingly became the responsibility of military commanders as opposed to their colonial administrators. As a result of this, "fortress realism" was not

surprisingly more rigidly realist in nature than "colonial realism", since above all else it was based on responding to wider world developments by military rote.

Thus to conclude, this chapter has shown that the geopolitical thinking behind Malta's policy responses throughout this phase can be said to have been imposed from outside by both wider world events, and British responses to them. The particular mode of thinking was based on a set of assumptions about the nature of the world and global geopolitical change, which have since become synonymous with the approach known as political realism. Significantly, the continuity of the competitive and conflictual world state system was assumed and little attempt was made to challenge or change this perceived situation. The mode of geopolitical thinking was based on this continuity and tailored to fit Malta's unique strategic position and, moreover, it became more rigidly realist as the situation of global anarchy deteriorated.

In addition to reaching the above conclusions this chapter has achieved its subsidiary aim of highlighting the important role that Malta played in the Second World War. The siege that Malta endured at the hands of the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica mid-way through the Second World War is acknowledged by certain Maltese historians as having been even more intense and even more significant in terms of wider world repercussions than the much publicised and renowned earlier siege which Malta endured under the Knights of St. John at the hands of the Turks (1565)¹¹². Despite this, except perhaps in the tales of the many US and British ex-servicemen who risked their lives in the defence or supply of Malta, the important role that Malta played in the Second World War is not as well recounted as it might be outside of Malta¹¹³.

Clearly, 1914-1945 was a particularly significant phase in Malta's international political history; both in terms of the effect that the wider-world re-ordering through anarchy had

on Malta, and also the small but highly significant effect that Malta ultimately managed to have on the wider world situation. If the last phase was significant in the sense that it marked Malta's projection onto the world stage, this phase was significant because, in the prevailing realist world of clear-cut good and evil, Malta had emerged on the side of the good. However, the Maltese had paid a high price for this and within Malta there was an understandable reluctance for them to ever again have to play such a sacrificial role in wider world geopolitical developments. Certainly, as the next chapter will show, although the wider world soon re-ordered and, arguably, simplified following the Second World War, Malta's geopolitics or place in this wider world was never to be as straight-forward again. A series of changes implemented by Maltese leaders, and designed to free the Maltese of what were in their eyes ultimately doomed allegiances, ensured that British imposed policy responses based on rigid realist geopolitical thinking were soon to be rejected; ushering in a period of drastic change into Malta's international political history.

Endnotes

- ¹ Hobsbawm 1994, p. 19.
- ² For a full overview of the great power rivalries behind the First World War see the introduction to Koch 1984.
- ³ See Kennan 1984, p. 6.
- ⁴ The above paragraph summarizes the main causes of the First World War as outlined by Hinsley 1964 in his classic work.
- ⁵ The Austro-German Alliance is typically referred to as the *Dual Alliance*, see for e.g. Herwig 1997, p. 6.
- ⁶ Hinsley op. cit.
- ⁷ See for e.g. Hardach 1977; or the immensely detailed account of Albertini 1952-1957 (3 vols.).
- ⁸ There is no better indicator of Germany's aggressive intentions than the rapidity with which the Schlieffen Plan was implemented; following the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia on 28 July 1914, Germany declared war on Russia on 1 August 1914, and two days later on France.
- ⁹ Grenville 1994, p. 95.
- ¹⁰ For a detailed account of the protracted war of attrition that developed on the western front see "The Short War Illusion", Farrar 1973.
- ¹¹ For a concise outline of this critical battle see Grenville op. cit., p. 105.
- ¹² For an older but still useful and thorough account of British and French strategy on the Western Front see Hart 1972 (first published in 1930).
- ¹³ Berghahn 1973 provides a critical investigation into Germany's strategic approach to war and discusses how the construction of a massive submarine fleet served mainly to draw the United States into the war.
- ¹⁴ A more detailed assessment of "The Eastern Front" is provided by Stone 1975.
- ¹⁵ Germany's invasion and exploitation of Poland is well recounted. Roos 1966 for e.g. discusses the significance of the German routing in the overall "History of Modern Poland"; whereas Polonsky 1972 examines the influence that the war-time exploitation had on Poland in the interwar period.
- ¹⁶ Dedijer 1967 details the Austrian invasion of Serbia from a Serbian point of view in his book entitled "The Road to Sarajevo".
- ¹⁷ Hunt and Preston 1977.
- ¹⁸ For further details on the armistice treaty see Grenville op. cit.
- ¹⁹ Ibid.
- ²⁰ For a chilling overview of the military and economic might that Germany had managed to retain following the First World War armistice and then consolidate prior to the Second World War see the introduction in Rich 1973-1974.
- ²¹ Lyttelton 1988 has prepared a thorough study into the rise of "Fascism in Italy" between 1919 and 1929. In this study he attributes much of the blame for the astonishing post-war rise of popularity in this phenomenon to the harsh conditions of the armistice. Gallo's "Mussolini's Italy" also provides a useful and critical insight into the domestic political turmoil which resulted from the rise of Italian Fascism (1973).
- ²² For a classic account of the Russian Revolution see Chamberlin 1965 (first published 1935). For a more contemporary "rethink" on the scale of the event and massive human losses which have frequently been overlooked see Acton 1990.
- ²³ Parker op. cit., p. 130.
- ²⁴ Tucker 1990 discusses the effect that the 'trickle down effect' that the Bolshevik Revolution ("The Revolution from Above") had on the rest of Europe in the interwar years.
- ²⁵ Pridham 1973 refers to Hitler's rise to power as being meteoric.
- ²⁶ One recent article that, although it presents a rather favourable view of Italy's military efforts, is particularly informative on Italy's annexation of Ethiopia is Sadkovich 1991.

- ²⁷ See Rich op. cit. (introduction).
- ²⁸ Ibid.
- ²⁹ For a more detailed investigation into the reasons which drove Stalin to sign the non-aggression pact with Russia see Harrison 1985, which discusses "Soviet Planning in Peace and War, 1938-1945".
- ³⁰ The brutality with which Germany invaded Poland is cited by some historians as having pushed the West's tolerance to the limit and thus being a turning point in the course of the war, see for e.g. Parker op. cit., p. 133.
- ³¹ For further information on the overrunning of Denmark and Norway and, for that matter, Germany's other military operations in Scandinavia see Ziemke 1960.
- ³² Cecil 1975 acknowledges this when examining "Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia 1941" and Weinberg 1972 draws similar conclusions when investigating relations between "Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939-1941".
- ³³ Obviously there were other blunders but these were the oversights which I believe provide the most useful summary of Hitler's failure.
- ³⁴ For a thorough account of Britain's stubborn refusal to concede defeat see Calder 1971.
- ³⁵ Two of the best general surveys of the fighting between Germany and Russia and a thorough explanation of how the former overstretched its logistical support see Ziemke 1968 and 1987, and Erickson 1975 and 1983.
- ³⁶ The immediate antecedents of Germany's declaration of war on the USA, specifically the Pearl Harbour attack, are illuminated by Ike 1967.
- ³⁷ Heinrichs 1988 is the authoritative text on "American Entry into World War II".
- ³⁸ These final and resounding successes of the Anglo-American Alliance (A "Very Special Relationship") are best recounted by Danchev 1986.
- ³⁹ Parker op. cit. p. 133.
- ⁴⁰ For the Pacific War, Morton 1962 has produced an excellent one volume introduction.
- ⁴¹ For further information on this concluding act Giovannitti and Freed 1967 have written an intriguing commentary on "The Decision to Drop the Bomb".
- ⁴² For further details of this well recounted earlier geopolitical role Malta had taken on see; Schermerhorn 1929; Bradford 1961; or Porter 1858 for a more romantic account.
- ⁴³ Ibid.
- ⁴⁴ The only obvious exception to this being Gabriele 1965, which is acknowledged as an essential piece of work on the central role of Malta in Mediterranean strategy.
- ⁴⁵ In the years leading up to the First World War annual defence spending was reduced by around £400 000 (Owen 1969, 66). Furthermore, as a result of the impoverished state of the islands and their dependency on the British fleet and garrison a Commission was forced to recommend a number of practical measures, including lowering the bread tax, raising the tobacco and alcohol tax, investigating government spending and letting Malta off with its annual military payment of £5 000 (Ibid.).
- ⁴⁶ Most of the strikes were led by the dockyard workers; see Blouet 1992, p. 180.
- ⁴⁷ Unemployed workers were mainly responsible for the rioting and looting that broke out in Valletta. When the police lost control, troops were called in and three Maltese were killed in the fighting which ensued (Owen op. cit., p. 67).
- ⁴⁸ Blouet op. cit.
- ⁴⁹ Financial grants in the form of a one-off payment of £ 250 000 were used to facilitate the introduction of the new National Assembly. In addition to this Britain provided a number of other subsidies, most notably bread subsidies which amounted to some £ 4000 per week in 1920. The economic problems and other matters relating to the introduction of the National Assembly are discussed in greater detail in Charlton 1960.
- ⁵⁰ Nominated members represented the nobility, the clergy, the trade unions, the chamber of commerce and university graduates (Ibid.).

⁵¹ A thorough explanation on the system of dyarchy and the specific form that post-First World War Anglo/Maltese relationships were to take can be found in Amery 1953. Broadly speaking the term, which can also be spelled di-archy, means literally twice/double leadership/government.

⁵² For an account of this relatively smooth period in Anglo/Maltese relations in the run up to the Second World War see Luke 1954.

⁵³ The authoritative text on Maltese society, past and present, is Sultana 1995. See also Vassallo 1974 who has examined religion and social change in Malta.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ The ongoing conflict between religion and politics is the subject of Boissevain 1965 and is a theme that will be touched on several times throughout the remainder of the thesis.

⁵⁶ See section 6.2, where it is shown that propinquity not only contributes to Malta's present day geopolitical vulnerability but also creates a number of administrative inefficiencies.

⁵⁷ For a thorough account of the political influences that both Italy and (in more detail) Britain exerted on Malta after the First World War see Bugeja 1973.

⁵⁸ The emergence of Malta's first organized political parties is in Austin 1971, pp. 7-12.

⁵⁹ Dobie 1967 traced the foundation of the Labour Party to this date. His book is one of the few available sources on the origins of political parties in Malta.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Blouet *op. cit.*, p. 183.

⁶² Dobie *op. cit.*

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ For a detailed account of this dispute see Blouet *op. cit.*, p. 185.

⁶⁵ Dobie *op. cit.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ This particular Commission and the subsequent restoration of the Constitution are both discussed in Blouet *op. cit.*, pp. 186-187. With the benefit of hindsight it is possible to argue that in this instance the Constitution was restored too early.

⁶⁸ Dobie *op. cit.*

⁶⁹ The caution with which the British had to treat this matter and Maltese fears of an assault by Protestant Britain on their religious institutions is alluded to by Blouet *op. cit.*, p. 187.

⁷⁰ In addition to the tactical measures that the Admiralty described, plans were laid to distribute gas masks, set up refugee camps in Gozo, establish air-raid shelters and protect art treasures. See Blouet *op. cit.*, p. 188.

⁷¹ Blouet writes that, following 1936, "there developed a time of relative tranquillity in which moderate men on all sides tended to become more influential", *op. cit.*, p. 188.

⁷² See Dobie *op. cit.* for a thorough account of the achievements of Sir Charles Bonham-Carter.

⁷³ Blouet *op. cit.*

⁷⁴ Although the fact that the Chief Justice was an Italian sympathiser was significant, particularly since the British were keen to divide Maltese law from its Italian roots, the real objection was that as well as being the Chief of Justice he was also an active political figure; a dangerous dual occupation in any society but especially in a one as small as Malta's. Dobie *op. cit.*

⁷⁵ For Bonham-Carter's failure to diversify the islands' economy see Blouet *op. cit.*

⁷⁶ I refer here to the prevarication by senior officers in the British Armed Forces and certain colonial administrators, which severely hindered Malta's preparations for war and ultimately her ability to defend herself.

⁷⁷ Taken from Hughes 1969.

⁷⁸ Heavy air attack was thought an inevitable prospect if Italy were to join the war since Sicily was only sixty miles and thirty minutes flying time away. See Dobie *op. cit.*

⁷⁹ For a discussion on the debate over Malta's strategic worth on the eve of the Second World War see Blouet *op. cit.*

- ⁸⁰ Luke op. cit.
- ⁸¹ See Gilchrist 1945; the standard work on Malta's defences at the outset and throughout the Second World War.
- ⁸² Even at this early stage defeat was a distinct possibility and detailed plans for an Axis invasion of Malta had been made. Gabriele op. cit. has examined these plans.
- ⁸³ Churchill 1962.
- ⁸⁴ Macintyre 1964.
- ⁸⁵ The human costs of operating from the islands are well documented. In addition to this, however, Busutil 1965 has provided a useful investigation into the economic costs of Malta's involvement in the Second World War.
- ⁸⁶ Whereas a soldier on active service was supposed to be fed 4000 calories a day, he was fortunate to get 2000 in Malta. The civil population was even worse off, with adult male workers receiving on average 1600 calories and women, 1500. See Blouet op. cit., p. 208.
- ⁸⁷ Blouet op. cit.
- ⁸⁸ Owen op. cit., p. 80.
- ⁸⁹ Ibid.
- ⁹⁰ Taken from Luke op. cit., p. 191.
- ⁹¹ A plan had been devised whereby German paratroopers and Italian commandos were to invade Malta in June 1942. But the Italians, nervous of failure, asserted that the available forces were insufficient and the plan was cancelled in favour of an assault on Crete. See Weinberg 1994, p. 227.
- ⁹² Owen op. cit., p. 81.
- ⁹³ Owen op. cit. p. 73, refers to this episode in Malta's history as the "Greater Siege" and Blouet op. cit. p. 192, believes that the Siege Malta underwent in W.W.II was probably more important to the western world than the previous siege of 1565.
- ⁹⁴ The above paragraphs have covered the details and facts of Malta's experiences throughout the war. For a realistic, although fictitious, flavour of the stresses of life in the islands during the war see Monsarrat 1973.
- ⁹⁵ Owen op. cit. p. 92.
- ⁹⁶ Haushofer (the main instigator of Germany's war-time *geopolitik*) himself argued, in a last ditch attempt to exonerate himself, that German geopolitics had "goals quite similar to American geopolitics", quoting the work of E. Walsh 1943 in particular. See O'Tuathail op. cit.
- ⁹⁷ Holdar 1992.
- ⁹⁸ Mattern 1942.
- ⁹⁹ Dorpalen 1942 has provided the best English investigation into Haushofer's most important works.
- ¹⁰⁰ Ibid.
- ¹⁰¹ For a more thorough review of Haushofer's academic career see O'Tuathail 1997.
- ¹⁰² Ibid., p. 46.
- ¹⁰³ O'Loughlin 1994, pp. 112-113.
- ¹⁰⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁵ See O'Tuathail op. cit. for further details on Operation Barbarossa and how this contradicted the wishes of Haushofer.
- ¹⁰⁶ Parker covers his career more thoroughly than is possible here. See Parker op. cit., pp. 113-115.
- ¹⁰⁷ See references.
- ¹⁰⁸ Spykman 1945.
- ¹⁰⁹ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁰ I refer to the dispute between the various arms of the British military and British politicians over Malta's usefulness in the light of advances in air power prior to the Second World War (discussed in section 2.2).
- ¹¹¹ See Hughes op. cit.

¹¹² Owen op. cit. p. 73, refers to this episode in Malta's history as the "Greater Siege" and Blouet op. cit. p. 192, believes that the Siege Malta underwent in W.W.II was probably more important to the western world than the previous siege of 1565.

¹¹³ Bradford 1962 is the most notable exception to this observation.

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PHASE 3

**CASHING IN ON THE BIPOLAR ORDER:
MALTA 1945-1989**

3.

CASHING IN ON THE BIPOLAR ORDER: MALTA 1945-1989

The bipolar geopolitical world order which dominated world affairs for almost half-a-century (1945-1989) is more commonly known as the Cold War. The seeds of the bipolar order which constituted the Cold War had already been sown prior to the end of the Second World War at the 1944 conference in Yalta¹. It is the date of this conference which is taken as the starting point of the third phase of Malta's international political history. Therefore, strictly speaking there is no transition period between phase two and phase three. On a wider-world scale, the anarchy of phase two was replaced immediately by the antagonism of phase three. To the majority of those engaged in forms of geopolitical thought, who viewed the world through political realism, this unbroken transition from anarchy to antagonism was seen as inevitable since the geopolitical mosaic of competing units which they saw as constituting the globe was in their eyes incapable of producing anything other than variants on a theme of competition and confrontation. For the first time, however, such pessimism was being challenged. A new group of theorists, disenchanted with the cynicism inherent in political realism, were offering an alternative way of interpreting the world's geopolitical space and, more importantly, decision-makers from various spheres were receptive to the alternatives that were being put forward². Through promoting their alternative world view and developing new international institutions and legal processes, this new group of geopolitical thinkers genuinely believed that together they could resolve international conflicts peacefully and prevent future world-wide war. Hence, the appellation "idealism" arose because its adherents sought to change the world for the better, rather than merely describe and investigate it as it was.

Because of their relationship with one of the two superpowers, their geographical location, or their world standing, some states were unavoidably subsumed in the realities of the evolving bipolar confrontation. For such states idealism hardly offered a viable way of interpreting world affairs. To others, however, idealism did represent a feasible and workable alternative to traditional realist approaches to state governance. Whether consciously or not, Malta was one of the states that opted for this alternative.

This chapter thus investigates the phase in Malta's international political history in which she essentially practised idealism in the face of the realism of the bipolar geopolitical world order. Once again, for the sake of drawing comparisons, this chapter follows the same format as the others. Thus, first of all it examines the most significant happenings and attributes of the wider-world throughout this stage in history from a geopolitical perspective. Following on from this, Malta's place in the wider-world bipolarism is probed and the policy responses to wider world developments that shaped this place are examined. The story of how Malta gradually worked towards the ideal of freedom from outside impositions or intervention is told, describing along the way how the islanders freed themselves of British involvement in their own affairs and eventually discarded their dangerous dependency on British defence spending whilst simultaneously cashing in on their new role as a neutral micro-state in the midst of the bipolar confrontation. Finally, the third section draws a number of more theoretical conclusions about the type of geopolitical thinking which led Maltese leaders to take charge from the British of their own national affairs and then go on to govern their country more or less independently throughout this phase in history.

3.1 THE WIDER WORLD: BALANCE AND ORDER THROUGH TERROR

Out of the three ingredients (*anarchy, force and desperation*) which it was argued in section 2.1 had shaped the world throughout the last phase³ only one continued to be relevant in this, the third phase of global geopolitical development. *Anarchy* and *desperation* had no place in the strategies of the two superpowers as they contrived to split the world along calculated ideological lines. However, further technological advances⁴ meant that *force* continued to feature heavily in the strategies that shaped and divided the wider-world. Crucially, the force utilized throughout this phase was more latent than kinetic since rather than being put to destructive use it was intended only to generate an underlying and pervasive sense of terror. Such an air of terror was easily propagated since the technological advances were mainly in the field of atomic weaponry and their destructive potential had already been exhibited to the world when the US bombed Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 and Nagasaki three days later⁵.

This section first describes how this air of terror came into being. It then goes on to investigate the order that it seemed, perhaps somewhat ironically, to impose on global affairs even through varying degrees of entente and détente. Finally, it ends by examining how the resulting "balance of terror" eventually reached fever pitch before ending, in realist terms at least, in victory for the most persistent contender; the US.

Much of the literature on the Cold War designates the Soviet blockade of Berlin in the summer of 1948 as the starting point of the bipolar confrontation⁶. To adopt such an approach, however, is to detract from the significance of the role that the now renowned Yalta conference had in actuating the Cold War. Thus, at the outset the decision to define

the starting point of this phase as being early February 1945, the date of the conference (more precisely 4-11 February), needs justifying and the significance of the conference needs reiterating.

In short, it was at Yalta that the western Allies made the critical decision, albeit reluctantly, to allow Soviet control of eastern Europe after the end of the Second World War⁷. This decision was to prove especially significant to the stand-off that ensued since, amongst other things, it defined the frontier along which the Cold War was eventually 'fought'⁸. Furthermore, it is possible to argue that if the western Allies had not agreed to such concessions the Soviet leaders would have been unable to muster requisite territories, resources or manpower to present a credible second super-power in the bipolar confrontation which followed. In short, if there had been no concessions to communism at the Yalta conference there probably would not have been a Cold War. Nonetheless, there had been a conference and shortly after the defeat of the Axis powers the spread of communism commenced. The defeat of Germany, Italy and Japan in the Second World War meant that, in ideological terms at least, this spreading communism was pitted against western capitalism. Since France and Britain had been severely weakened by their war efforts, the major remaining bastions of the above opposing ideologies, the USSR and USA, respectively, soon emerged as the only two 'superpowers'. Hence, in many respects the 'Cold War' was an inevitable sequel to the 'Hot War' of 1941-1945 with the Yalta conference representing the most significant break between the two phases.

From the perspective of the USSR, they themselves had borne the brunt of the 'Hot War'. Prior to 1944 the Soviets had single-handedly faced the German army in Europe and as a result of this experienced the heaviest losses⁹ of any Allied country. For these losses the Soviets blamed the strategic delaying tactics adopted by the western Allies, which had

meant that a second front was not opened until 1944¹⁰. It is therefore not especially surprising that in the aftermath of the Second World War the communist policy makers were left both resentful and distrusting of the West. Such feelings engendered both a conviction that the Soviet Union had earned a place amongst the world powers by virtue of its sacrifice and a determination that the new international order would afford the USSR access to sea routes, economic resources and, above all else, a substantial defensive buffer¹¹. Initially, confrontation with the USA was centred around Eastern Europe. From the point of view of the Soviets the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine (1947)¹², the implementation of the Marshall Plan (1947)¹³ and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (1949)¹⁴ were all threatening acts aimed at them¹⁵. The Soviets then felt compelled to respond accordingly.

They did so, first of all, by setting up the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in 1947¹⁶. It was at the inception of Cominform that the Soviet delegate Zhdanov first conceptualised the two-camp interpretation of the geopolitical world or the bipolar world order¹⁷. He saw the division between the two camps, one being imperialist and anti-democratic and the other being democratic and anti-imperialist, as being marked by mutual hostility and confrontation. Furthermore, with a cynicism that was to dominate Soviet geopolitical perceptions until Stalin's death, he viewed the USSR as a besieged camp hemmed in by non-communist forces¹⁸. Zhdanov's oration at the inception of Cominform and the subsequent dissemination of the two-camp world view led the Soviet Union to tighten its grip on Eastern Europe¹⁹. It was to this end that the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecom) was set up in 1949 with the stated aim of hauling the satellite states of Eastern Europe further into the Soviet orbit²⁰. Puppet communist governments were set up so as to repress any civil unrest; a task which they pursued with vigour following the 1948 defection of Yugoslavia from the communist camp²¹.

Following the formation of NATO in 1949, particularly after West Germany elected to join, the Soviet Union became aware of the need to tighten its grip on Eastern Europe in more ways than just through the economic terms set out in Comecom. Having ended the US monopoly of nuclear weapons and carried out successful tests on thermo-nuclear (hydrogen) bombs²², Stalin was sufficiently equipped to incorporate eastern Europe into some kind of formal military agreement also. This was done in the form of the Warsaw Pact of 1955 which was set up directly to counter the formation of NATO in the West. By this time confrontation had developed from being primarily over central and eastern Europe into being a more global confrontation and in Asia Cold War moved to real war. The US interpreted the Korean War (1950-1953) as evidence of a world-wide communist conspiracy, and American policy became almost obsessively concerned with the 'containment' of communism by a series of encircling alliances²³. The formation of NATO was followed by the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954²⁴ and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955²⁵. Moreover, the US maintained over 1400 foreign bases, including 275 bases for nuclear bombers, in 31 countries around the Soviet perimeter²⁶.

The early days of the Cold War, however, were not solely about overt displays of force. British and American archives have revealed some of the most bizarre schemes ever planned by western secret services. One of the most intriguing was the planned restoration of King Zog to the throne of Albania²⁷. Of particular interest, Malta was to be utilised heavily in this clandestine manoeuvre, which was intended to trigger a wave of hostility against pro-Russian governments in the Balkans. Although Albanian exiles were actually landed they were quickly rounded up and executed and so understandably the plans faltered at an early stage²⁸. Several other operations did, nevertheless, pass beyond their preparatory stages but generally speaking most fell well short of achieving their aims.

Other supposed operations were concocted by the Soviets as the confrontation took on a petty and propagandist form which was with hindsight especially dangerous when one considers what was actually at stake²⁹. The propaganda war was at risk of escalating into more severe confrontation when on 5 March 1953 Stalin's death signalled a new stage in this period of history.

With Stalin's death came a change in Soviet foreign policy. There followed a three-year period after which Khrushchev emerged as the leader. With this new appointment came a new-look foreign policy, the principles of which were outlined at the celebrated Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956³⁰. Broadly speaking, emphasis was to be placed on peaceful co-existence with the West and Zhdanov's two-camp thesis was for all intents and purposes to be abandoned³¹. This sweeping change in the way that the geopolitics of the wider-world were interpreted was inspired more by the realisation that there would be no survivors following a full-scale atomic war than by any sudden compunction³². It was decided to place an emphasis on the periphery and the crude dichotomy of for and against, capitalist and communist, was abandoned³³. Socialism could be expedited by aiding nationalist movements that were not avowedly communist³⁴. The entire process of decolonization was opening up new opportunities for change in the balance of world forces and the Soviet Union hoped to gain from these changes. Thus, in many respects, the new look foreign policy was less tantamount to a concession than it was to a compromise based on a reassessment of geopolitical realities.

The compromise was initially signalled by the setting up of more equitable economic arrangements within Comecom. This thaw in eastern Europe³⁵ had the effect of giving nationalist communists in Poland the chance to gain control in 1956. Their more liberal counterparts in Hungary, however, were deemed too great a threat to the Soviets and a

series of nationalist uprisings were brutally crushed there in 1956³⁶. Following on from this, Communist leaders sought to regain a tighter form of control over eastern Europe. This tightening of control was an inevitable consequence of the contradictions that existed in the Soviet's new-look, post-Stalin, foreign policy. Above all else, the pursuit of co-existence with the West was not compatible with the aiding of socialism throughout the world. By compromising or accommodating the West the Soviets were failing to aid or uphold the socialist cause³⁷.

The socialist cause and expansionist policy of the USSR finally floundered when in 1962 Khrushchev backed down from the Cuba stand-off. This stand-off, with its real threat of nuclear holocaust, proved a turning point in the Cold War³⁸. In short, in this particular instance the Soviets had been forced into neglecting one of their most valued satellites. There follows a brief outline of the series of events which constituted this vital twist in the deepening bipolar order³⁹.

Castro had come into power in Cuba in 1959 on the wave of a popular rebellion against the corrupt regime of Bastita. Castro's agrarian reforms were of concern to US capitalists at the outset but when Cuba signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union in February 1960 the USA was compelled to respond by severing trade links. With Cuba now firmly established within the socialist camp, the US government were to take things one significant step further. In 1961 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-inspired Bay of Pigs invasion attempted to topple Castro and eject the socialist government. Although this attempt failed it sent clear signals to the USSR about the lengths to which the USA was willing to go to challenge the global expansion of communism. Initially, the Soviets, neither impressed nor intimidated by the US tactics, agreed to provide protection for Cuba, which did after all present them with an excellent strategic foot-hold in the West.

On 14 October 1962, the US president was informed of the presence of nuclear missiles in Cuba. President Kennedy responded by imposing a naval quarantine to thwart any further importations of technology or armaments. The bipolar order which the balance of terror had imposed on the world was at its most fragile and closest to breaking-point and as many a commentator since has noted, "the world held its breath"⁴⁰. Fortunately the balance remained intact and, after numerous diplomatic exchanges, on 28 October Khrushchev announced that the weapon systems would be stripped and shipped back to the Soviet Union. In return, Kennedy agreed to remove some US missile sites from Turkey. However, these concessions by the US were of minor significance and for the Soviet Union this perceived failure marked a great setback, less in her relationship with the West, which was soon mended, but more in so far as her standing in the socialist camp was concerned. Soviet vulnerability and inferiority to US missile power had been demonstrated and further credence had been given to the Chinese argument that the Soviet Union was a mere "paper tiger"⁴¹. Nevertheless, the wider-world beyond the two superpowers could breath again, relieved that sanity had prevailed and the world had not this time, as in 1939, been plunged into a phase of ideologically driven devastation.

Above all else, the Cuban missile crisis had highlighted to the world that the logic of nuclear strategy was fundamentally flawed. Both sides had depended on policies of massive retaliation which effectively amounted to mutual assured destruction (M.A.D.). It was the realisation that the strategic reasoning behind these policies was truly M.A.D.⁴² and that the world had come so close to obliteration led the superpowers to seek means and ways of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. It led to a partial test-ban treaty in 1963 and a nuclear non-proliferation treaty in 1968. Although not all nuclear or potential nuclear powers signed these agreements (notably France, China and India) and others (such as Iraq) later renegaded on their commitments, commentators began to herald the

coming of a period of détente⁴³. This, the first in a series of détetes was still marked by direct intervention by the two superpowers; US military involvement in Vietnam continued and the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 to put down the "Prague Spring"⁴⁴ which had threatened to topple communist party dominance. Nevertheless, in terms of USA-USSR relations détente marked the growth of both the rhetoric and practice of peaceful co-existence.

The tension between the two superpowers was reduced and the threat of direct confrontation seemed to be diminishing. In terms of respective geopolitical strategies this was certainly the case. In so far as US strategy was concerned there was a notable reduction in direct foreign intervention. This was mainly a policy response to the post-Vietnam domestic political scene. US citizens had become increasingly unsupportive of their country's global fight in support of other countries against communism, particularly when, as in the case of Vietnam, their troops were not dying fighting the Soviets but merely their puppet soldiers who were fighting a proxy war⁴⁵. Although US policy on foreign intervention was cut, trade patterns and aid disbursements continued to maintain the position of pro-US elites in most countries of Central and South America and Asia. In so far as the USSR was concerned, their policies also seemed to be aimed at reducing tension. However, the latter years of the period of détente saw an increase in the global capacity of the USSR⁴⁶. Not subject to the same levels of public influence as US politicians, the communist leaders were quicker to forget the scare of the Cuban missile crisis. Nuclear parity with the USA was achieved in the early 1970s and the Soviets used this capacity to aid socialist movements in Africa, where US involvement was minimal⁴⁷. In Ethiopia, for example, the Soviet Union aided the revolution and helped the Ethiopians fend-off the Somalians in the invasion of Ogaden. In addition to this, Soviet airlifts enabled Angola to contain the mercenary forces and counter-revolutionaries from South

Africa⁴⁸. Finally, and most notably although not on the African sub-continent, Afghanistan had been in receipt of massive sums of Soviet aid since 1956⁴⁹. In 1978 a small urban-based, predominantly middle-class, communist party overthrew the Daoud regime. The coup probably owed more to the domestic tensions within Afghan society than to Soviet aid or expansionism. However, Soviet communist leaders were grateful for a socialist neighbour and Moscow showed no hesitation in stepping up economic and military assistance to the new government. Despite this support, the new regime soon ran into trouble. The counter-revolutionaries were, initially at least, well organized and received aid from Pakistan, Iran and China. The new regime, on the other hand, was dogged by infighting and with its growing repression soon lost what little support it had had. As factional fighting broke out the internal situation deteriorated and in December 1979 the Soviets waded in replacing Amin (the leader of the regime) with their choice of leader Babrak Karmal. The troubles that followed were widely covered by the international media and this coverage was used by the West as a rationale for the increased military expenditure which in turn signalled the re-commencement of the Cold War⁵⁰.

In summary, the initial refusal of France, China and India to participate in the two treaties of the 1960s and later the Soviet's reluctance to lessen their role as sponsor of global socialism had meant that the period of détente was brought to an end⁵¹. In addition to this, a number of factors meant that the US was ready for a resumption of the confrontation: Powerful economic interests had to be protected, the arms lobby hated the business vacuum of détente⁵² and the conservative-nationalist backlash in the wake of events in Iran⁵³ and Afghanistan all propelled the USA into what has been referred to as the "Second Cold War"⁵⁴.


The build-up of Soviet arms was seen as a direct threat by the USA. In turn, increased military expenditure by the new Reagan administration in the early 1980s gave added weight to those in the Kremlin arguing for more resources to be devoted to defence. As both superpowers responded to the build-up of the other's arsenal there was a steady escalation in nuclear weaponry and the dialogue of détente was replaced by rougher rhetoric about competition. Within the USA, economic factors clearly featured heavily as the hugely powerful military related industries undoubtedly influenced policy-making⁵⁵. In addition to economic factors, nationalistic sentiments also played a part since through clever manipulation of the western media they were effectively used to justify the USA's possession and right to use nuclear weapons⁵⁶. Within the Soviet Union on the other hand, a different set of factors spurred the continual build-up of arms stockpiles. One has to take into account the fact that since 1917 the Soviet Union had been fearful of attack and subsequently been placed on an almost permanent war-footing. Developments in the international scene were responded to by military rote and the defence forces created to deal with the perceived western threat built up their own momentum. Although economic factors alone did not feature as highly in a communist society the inert presence of the massive Soviet military-industrial complex was strong enough to influence policy decisions⁵⁷.

The rapidity with which the two superpowers were constructing their nuclear arsenals meant that neither was able to reflect fully on the potential repercussions of their policies. By the 1980s both countries were investing the main part of their budgets⁵⁸ into their nuclear projects and had the ability to destroy most of human life on the planet. Although this potential was daunting it did effect a certain restraint over their actions⁵⁹. The Polish crisis of 1980-1981 lasted far longer than the Czech crisis of 1968, but at no time did the US seriously challenge the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. The Iran-Iraq

War raged for almost a decade from 1980 yet despite the well publicised use of chemical weapons and the escalation of world oil prices both superpowers showed immense restraint.

To summarise, the last decade of the Cold War is evidence that, as the title of this section suggests, the wider-world had effectively become constrained and ordered through a balance of terror. The extent of the bipolar order, with the majority of the northern hemisphere aligned to one of the superpowers, is illustrated in figure 5:

Figure 5: The bipolar geopolitical world order: balance and order through terror (1947-1989)



Source: adapted from: Maps and diagrams in Parker, G.: *The Times Atlas of World History*. Times Books, London 1997, pp.154 and 155.

The balance of terror depicted in figure 5 undoubtedly varied in its level of intensity but, following successive periods of entente and détente and ongoing technological developments in nuclear weaponry, by the early 1980s it was at its most delicate. Although the prospect of a bipolar confrontation between East and West had been talked of prior to the end of the Second World War neither the balance nor the order that would eventually derive from it were anticipated. Indeed, it was not until the bipolar balance was dismantled that some of its more positive derivatives were appreciated or even fully realised. However, this is touching on the focus of the next chapter and at the close of this section it suffices to say that this period in history was characterised by a world which, although never as free from regional instabilities, had never before come so close to experiencing absolute armageddon. Whether it had been the intention of the two superpowers or not, this relative lack of sub-global scale wars together with the very real prospect of armageddon combined to impose one of the most rigid phases of order on the world that modern history has known.

3.2 PRACTICAL IDEALISM IN THE FACE OF GLOBAL REALISM: MALTA'S PLACE IN THE WIDER BIPOLAR GEOPOLITICAL WORLD ORDER (1945-1989).

Considering the proliferation of long-range nuclear weaponry, which was the main defining theme in the Cold War wider-world, it becomes all too easy to conclude that the strategic significance of locations such as Malta had waned almost overnight. However, when jumping to such conclusions one has to be cautious. Although throughout this phase in history barely any location continued to possess innate strategic significance in the traditional sense, few areas of the globe escaped the designs of the superpowers in a

more sinister sense. From Malta's point of view this meant that whilst she was no longer of much importance as a colonial outpost or wartime fortress her perceived alignment to either East or West remained of relevance. As it turned out Malta turned her back on the emerging bipolar world which, under a heady influence of political realism, was partitioning between two competing camps. Although their motivations are debatable, Malta's post-war political leaders and policy makers instead launched a steady drive towards self-determination and eventual neutrality and non-alignment. In time, this drive witnessed Malta forging relationships with various states on either side of the partition but crucially the main intention was always to strengthen Malta's autonomy. This effectively meant that Malta evolved into an active member of the developing global non-aligned and neutral movement, avoiding any relationship of dominance which may have implicated her in a biased manner with one superpower or the other.

In the sense that these newly emerging non-aligned and neutral states were advocating and exercising an alternative to the realist-like political confrontation that most of the rest of the world was involved in, their policies can be thought of as having been idealist based policies. Hence, the title of this section which implies that even in the face of the rigid political realism which had compounded the wider world throughout this phase in history, Maltese political leaders and decision makers, whether intentionally or not, were essentially engaged in a form of idealism.

Following on from the last section, which investigated the wider-world geopolitical setting in which realist-driven strategies and policies effected a situation of bipolarism, this section tackles the mode of idealism which shaped Malta's geopolitical development for the duration of the Cold War. It elucidates the main events and policy moves that affected Malta's international relations for the four decades which followed the Second World War.

By doing so it justifies the assertion (made indirectly in the title) that Malta's geopolitics (or place in the wider world) throughout phase three of her geopolitical development was dominated by the manifestation of a practical mode of idealism.

By the end of the Second World War, Malta had a relatively healthy economy and a relatively large accumulation of capital. Throughout the war imports were cut drastically and wages had risen steadily as a result of increasingly generous service departments⁶⁰. However, the air of prosperity merely disguised the same inherited economic vulnerabilities that had de-stabilised Malta repeatedly throughout her history. The islands had once again played an important role in wider-world events but the Maltese economy remained geared towards the occupying power's defence needs and this wartime boom was, like those previously, to prove only transient⁶¹. With the advent of nuclear warfare and the creation of NATO few could foresee any future strategic role for the islands likely to open another chapter in their turbulent history.

The dockyard⁶² and other military installations, which had made economic sense in a wider imperial context, had become wholly disproportionate within Malta alone⁶³. The continued survival of the islands depended on economic diversification and the attainment of a greater level of self-sufficiency. In the immediate post-war years the most obvious and clear-cut solution to the impending problem was to strive towards the ideal of political independence. The islanders had striven for this ideal previously (as outlined in section 1.2) but their efforts had been placed on standby with the commencement of the Second World War. By 1943, however, when good Anglo-Maltese relations were at a peak, the British had pledged to revive plans for internal self-government on the assumed victory⁶⁴. The Maltese National Assembly had already been created when a commission was sent out from Britain to begin work on a new constitution. This new constitution came into force

in September 1947 and restored a dyarchal form of rule in which an elected Legislative Assembly with forty members was empowered to make laws, "for peace, order, and good government of Malta"⁶⁵. A cabinet of not more than eight ministers, including the Prime Minister, was responsible to the Assembly. However, the Assembly's powers were fundamentally restricted since certain areas of policy were to remain the responsibility of the Imperial Government of Malta⁶⁶. As in the pre-war dyarchal system of government⁶⁷ areas such as defence, civil aviation, immigration, currency and nationality were judged by the British to be "matters touching the public safety or defence of our dominions"⁶⁸. As Malta struggled towards self determination these reserved matters were destined to be the cause of many Anglo-Maltese disputes.

The first post-war elections under the new constitution were won by the Malta Labour Party (MLP) under Dr. Paul Boffa. The next eight years saw disagreements and political uncertainties split the Labour Party⁶⁹. Boffa headed a new party, 'The Malta Workers' Party,' whilst the original Labour Party, now led by Dominic Mintoff⁷⁰, remained in power until the elections in 1950. The Nationalists took office after this election, first as a minority government under Dr. Enrico Mizzi, then in 1951 and 1953 under Dr. Giorgio Borg Olivier in alliance with the 'Malta Worker's Party'⁷¹.

In 1953, encouraged partly by Malta's recent appointment as the host for NATO's Mediterranean Command Headquarters, the Nationalists proposed that Malta should attain dominion status. The British Government refused at this stage, stating that Malta remained overly dependent on their investment⁷².

In February 1955 the MLP, under Dom. Mintoff, regained power. Almost immediately, Mintoff put forward certain proposals for Malta's literal integration into the British Isles

which the MLP had begun to advocate in the 1950-53 elections. The British government replied by convening a Round Table Conference which concluded that, "representation at Westminster was practicable and reasonable,"⁷³ but recommended that a referendum be held. A referendum, held on 11 and 12 February 1956, showed that nearly half the population supported the integration proposals. Choosing to overlook the Nationalist boycott of the referendum⁷⁴, the British government accepted the integration plan but only on the premise that a general election be held in Malta before final approval for representation would be given. Mintoff rejected this and insisted that his country deserved firm and clear guarantees of financial help, without equivocation. Anglo-Maltese relations were cooling and the Labour Party vowed not to yield, declaring that they would insist on "immediate and full independence" if integration was to fail⁷⁵.

By April 1958 a British proposal for a five year trial period was rejected and integration talks were abandoned completely⁷⁶. In the same month Mintoff's government resigned after disputes about control of the police force⁷⁷. The Nationalist Party refused to cooperate and once again the constitution was suspended⁷⁸. Rioting in Valletta led the Governor to declare a state of emergency and take over administration. In 1960 a commission under Sir Hillary Blood proposed self-government, subject to consultation with Britain on certain questions⁷⁹. The new constitution was accepted, with some objections to the British right of veto, and came into force in 1962⁸⁰.

The Nationalist party won the elections in February of that same year, with a considerable majority⁸¹. Borg Olivier became Prime Minister of the new 'State of Malta'⁸² and almost immediately opened negotiations with the British Government for a final constitution and the grant of independence. There was disagreement on a number of issues, including the status of the Church, Commonwealth membership and whether to become a republic or

monarchy, and it was decided to hold another referendum⁸³. Sixty-six thousand voted in favour of independence and fifty-five thousand against, while thirty-six thousand abstained or spoiled their ballot papers⁸⁴. Following further negotiations in Britain, the finer details on the constitution and on questions of aid and defence were decided upon⁸⁵. British forces were to remain in Malta until 1974 and in return Britain would provide six hundred thousand Pound budgetary aid for 1964 and fifty-one million Pound over the next ten years⁸⁶.

Malta became independent at midnight on 20 September 1964, and was to be governed, for the first time in its long history, by the Maltese themselves. The final ceremony was performed by HRH The Duke of Edinburgh, who declared:

“And now, Mr. Prime-Minister, it falls to me to perform the concluding act of British Sovereignty in these Islands, as I present to you these Constitutional Instruments which establish Malta’s Independence. Long may it endure.”⁸⁷

British ties were not severed completely and the islands remained within the Commonwealth, acknowledging the Queen as their head of state. The Sovereign was represented by a Governor-General who performed many constitutional functions and the British government was represented by a High Commissioner. Malta remained within the geopolitical sphere of the Western bloc, establishing close links with NATO and Western Europe. These links led Beeley and Charlton to refer to this period in Malta's history as being a phase of "dependent sovereignty"⁸⁸. Indeed, during the Nationalists' years in office, Malta became a member of the Council of Europe (1965) and an associate member of the European Economic Community (1970).

Early in 1967 the British government announced cut backs in military spending and drastically reduced the number of jobs available to the Maltese on the defence installations⁸⁹. The Governor-General, Sir Maurice Dorman (1964-1971), made a forthright speech which spelled out the damaging effects that such cut-backs were likely to have on Malta's economy. Following on from this, Prime Minister Borg Olivier managed to persuade the British government that the Maltese needed more time to allow their development plans to generate more jobs. The British government commissioned a defence review by Duncan Sandys and in response to this review decided to slow down the timetable for reductions. Acting on the advice of Duncan Sandys, they did however reserve the right to re-open negotiations should new employment fail to be created quickly enough.

Although there was never a need to re-open negotiations and the British government appeared content with the implementation of the economic diversification process, the electorate did become dissatisfied with the lack of progress the Nationalists had made and their country's continued dependency on British military spending⁹⁰.

In June 1971 Dom. Mintoff once again led the Malta Labour Party to victory in the general election and immediately began to implement far-reaching changes. He stressed that Malta needed to reclaim her identity from years of subservience and informed the British government that the mutual defence and assistance agreement of 1964 would have to be radically revised in Malta's favour or risk cancellation⁹¹. The islands' strategic position in the Mediterranean had convinced the Labour leadership that Malta could play an independent role with respect to both the West and East. The re-negotiation of the 1964 defence treaty with Great Britain was the initial step towards the adoption of a non-aligned policy⁹².

Following talks, the UK and NATO agreed to pay fourteen million Pounds per annum in return for a new seven-year agreement (1972-70) giving British forces use of the facilities in Malta⁹³. This policy of non-alignment was intended to rid the Maltese of their traditional heavy dependence on British military spending and to help bring in economic aid without the burden of alignment with either bloc. The aid required to implement the "Development Plan for Malta (1973-1980)" soon arrived from sources as diverse as Italy, Great Britain, NATO, Libya⁹⁴ and China⁹⁵. In the words of Dominic Fenech;

“non-alignment was paying in cash, so that Malta’s development plans could proceed”⁹⁶.

On 13 December 1974, the House of Representatives passed, by the necessary two thirds majority, acts which amended the 1964 constitution. Malta became a republic - “Republika Ta’ Malta” - within the Commonwealth and the Head of State ceased to be the British Sovereign but instead became a President of Maltese nationality who would be appointed by the House of Representatives for a five year term⁹⁷.

The next major development of geopolitical significance occurred in 1976 when the Labour government proposed to declare the neutrality of the new Republika Ta’ Malta in return for a quadrilateral security guarantee and financial assistance from Italy, France, Algeria and Libya. Following the departure of the last British forces in March 1979, Malta entered into a bilateral agreement with Italy. By the terms of this neutrality agreement, which entered into force in May 1981, Malta became a neutral state and Italy pledged to act as guarantor to this neutrality. The agreement provided for military assistance in case of a threat to or violation of Malta's neutrality and included a protocol concerning military, economic and technical assistance to Malta⁹⁸.

In 1987 the twin concepts of neutrality and non-alignment were eventually incorporated into Malta's constitution. However, unlike the concept of neutrality adopted by countries such as Austria, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and Switzerland, Maltese neutrality involved an active connotation. At the outset Malta launched several initiatives aimed at promoting Mediterranean security and co-operation; most notably its insistence upon the eleventh hour insertion of the Mediterranean clauses in the Helsinki Final Act⁹⁹; and in its support for the Italian-Spanish Non-paper on a Conference for Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM)¹⁰⁰.

In summary, this was the stage in Malta's international political history in which the Maltese, for various different reasons, eventually took control of their own affairs. Their immediate aim in the post-war years was to regain the level of self-determination that they had become accustomed to prior to the war. They did this through both the established National Assembly and the 1947 constitution. Then, in a step which was counter, but in time would prove crucial as a trigger to the move towards self-determination, Maltese leaders proposed that the islands should attain British dominion status. Following on from this and undeterred by Britain's rejection of this proposal, the next government took a further important step and proposed that Malta should be fully integrated into the Westminster system of government. These proposals too were effectively rejected by the British, so triggering a more spirited push towards Maltese self-determination. This push started with the acceptance of a form of self-government proposed by Britain. The Maltese, however, were never likely to be content with some of the terms of this system of self-government, particularly after their proposals for closer integration with Britain had been snubbed by the Foreign Office and especially since this rebuff had been issued in the immediate aftermath of Malta's courageous and costly war effort in service of the British.

Reasoning such as this led Luke to conclude that Malta's post-war quest for independence was, initially at least, tantamount to, "a stick with which to hit the British"¹⁰¹. In reality, however, the push towards self-determination was probably more calculated and the rationale behind it less to do with seeking revenge against the British for their post-war rebuff of Malta than it was to do with Malta's leaders spotting a potentially lucrative opening in the evolving wider-world order of things.

This opening that Malta's leaders and decision-makers had spotted not only presented them with a number of potential economic benefits but also with the prospect of existing in peace without becoming unnecessarily entangled in the disputes of the superpowers. In other words it provided the Maltese with a compromise between attaining a practical level of economic self-sufficiency and aspiring towards the ideal of peace and freedom from military interference by outside powers. Thus, in the sense that fulfilling such a vacancy in the wider-world bipolarism presented economic benefits that would enhance the islanders' prosperity, it was 'practical'. Furthermore, however, in the sense that the opening presented Maltese leaders with an alternative to competition or participation in wider-world geopolitical power games, it was, in a political sense, 'idealist'. Hence, by opting to fill this opening that had been presented to them in the emerging bipolarism, Maltese leaders were reacting to wider-world developments in both a 'practical' and 'idealist' manner; or to quote the term used in the title to this section, they were interpreting and responding to geopolitical developments through a form of "practical idealism". It was through such "practical idealism" that the Maltese moved away from the intermediate situation of dependent sovereignty, towards republican status and eventual non-alignment and neutrality.

In much the same way that the "perceptive realism" of the first phase of the history of geopolitical thinking in Malta was merely a variation of a more widespread way of interpreting the world geopolitically, this "practical idealism" of phase three was a remaking of what was becoming a more common and extensive method of geopolitical interpretation. Nevertheless, the theoretical underpinnings of this new post-war methodology and how it influenced Malta's specific policy framework throughout the Cold War are matters that are dealt with in the next section. In the meantime, this section is best concluded by reiterating that phase three of Malta's political history saw the Maltese take up control of their own affairs for the first time through a blend of idealist aims and practical politics.

3.3 "PRACTICAL IDEALISM"

So that parallels can be drawn between the various phases in Malta's development this chapter follows the same format as the previous two. In the first section an investigation into the geopolitics of the wider-world was conducted and it was shown that between the years 1945 and 1989 a state of world bipolar order prevailed. Although the relationship between the two superpowers underwent successive phases of entente and détente it always featured in, or indeed adumbrated, all other occurrences and developments around the world. The second section investigated the policy responses to this wider world bipolarism through which Malta's political leaders carved out an international niche for their country. The role that Malta's political leaders envisaged was perhaps less involved than the roles Malta had played in the colonial era and the world wars. Nevertheless, as an active member of the non-aligned camp, Malta and the other neutral countries functioned in such a way as to find an alternative to the apparent inescapability of the

bipolar confrontation. For neutrals such as Austria and Switzerland this meant refusing to get involved in any aspect of the Cold War. For Malta, however, as already mentioned, this involved a more active pursuance of non-alignment through which Malta's idealist-minded leaders and decision-makers sought to promote wider-world security and co-operation.

It is now possible to draw a number of theoretical conclusions about the geopolitical thinking behind Malta's policy responses to wider-world geopolitical circumstances at this stage in history. As in the previous chapters, this is done first of all by investigating whether Malta's leaders were accepting of the continuity of the world-system or more intent on striving for change for the better. In addition to this, the previous two chapters have shown that the extent to which geopolitical thinking in Malta was either imposed from outside or inspired from within can be instrumental in determining whether realism or idealism formed the bases of the resulting policies. It is shown that throughout the Cold War those engaged in geopolitical thinking in Malta adhered mainly to a form of political idealism which can be defined as "practical idealism".

Reference was made earlier in the chapter to the fact that Malta's international relations, particularly her special and long-standing relationship with Great Britain, underwent a series of significant alterations throughout this period in history. These alterations were as much the result of and a reaction to Malta's previous geopolitical experiences (i.e. in the colonial era and the two world wars) as they were a response to the evolving geopolitical circumstances of the Cold War. Nevertheless, regardless of what brought them about, these alterations to Malta's place in the wider-world were so significant that we must conclude that between 1945 and 1989 Malta's leaders were far more intent on striving to change their country's international relations for the better than they were on accepting the

realism which was at the heart of the bipolar confrontation. As the main protagonists of the Cold War were falling into the downward, realist spiral of arms competition, Malta's leaders were acting against this continuity and seeking to alter fundamentally the way their country interacted with the wider-world. As shown in the final section of the last chapter, the converse had been true in the previous phase; in conceding much of the weight of their authority to the military leaders of their colonial rulers throughout both world wars, Malta's leaders had rendered themselves mere bystanders who were accepting of the realist continuity and unshakeable conflictual nature of all geopolitical change.

Thus, although the perceived economic benefits of being a neutral in the Cold War had been a factor which had driven Malta's leaders to be less accepting of the apparent continuity of a world interpreted and governed through realism, historical factors were of most importance. In other words, the main reason why Malta's leaders were striving to change their country's lot for the better between 1945 and 1989 was because of their determination to avoid ever again becoming unnecessarily entangled in the conflicts of the world's major powers.

To succeed in changing Malta's geopolitical lot, Malta's leaders had first of all to take control of their own country's affairs and, as outlined in the second section of this chapter, this they did. Following a history of dependency measured literally in millennia, in which the Maltese succumbed to the wishes and protocols imposed on them from outside by a succession of foreign rulers, they were for the first time evolving policies themselves, or in other words policies inspired from within rather than imposed from outside. Each of these policies moved them one step closer to their twin-pronged ideal of non-alignment and neutrality and one step further away from their historical state of subordination. Subordination had meant that for centuries Malta's geopolitical development had been

shaped solely by foreign impositions. It has to be said, however, that prior to the two world wars such a situation was not wholly unacceptable because of the general sense of physical security that it engendered. Nevertheless, the hardships that Malta endured as a British subordinate throughout the Second World War in particular were too great for the Maltese to ever willingly experience again. Concession to foreign impositions became impermissible in the aftermath of the devastation of the Second World War and the Maltese began their surge towards independence. It was this surge towards independence which can, above all other things, be said to have dominated Malta's post-war international relations. It was most definitely a surge and not a switch since fully fledged independence took around three decades to attain. Although a more detailed account the policy responses to wider-world geopolitical circumstances which led to Maltese independence was provided in the second section of this chapter it is worth providing a summary here.

The drive towards independence commenced in 1960 when Malta's fifth post-war Prime Minister, Borg Olivier, accepted the proposals of the Blood Commission regarding the terms of Malta's self-government. Following on from this, Malta became independent at midnight on 20 September 1964. However, despite the official declaration of independence, performed by HRH The Duke of Edinburgh, Malta remained dependent on British Sovereignty¹⁰², British aid and the economic benefits of hosting British forces. It took the charismatic and controversial leadership of one Dominic Mintoff to end Malta's dangerous dependency on the British. Through his "Development Plan for Malta (1972-1979)" Malta became a republic with its own president. British forces were finally ejected in 1979 soon after which Malta began to fulfil her new role in the wider world as an active non-aligned and neutral state¹⁰³.

The above summary highlights some of the main policy moves which shaped Malta's changing place in the wider-world throughout the Cold War. Clearly the British rejection of Malta after the Second World War influenced the Maltese in their initial quest for independence. However, it was the particular mode of geopolitical thinking generated inside Malta which was the driving force behind the longer term movement towards independence. It is to this mode of geopolitical thinking, the first which had been inspired internally, will now be addressed.

The rubric "practical idealism" has already been proposed and briefly justified but it now requires further explanation, particularly with regards to how the mode of thinking it portrays differs from the thinking emanating from the mainstream idealist movement elsewhere in the world. This mainstream idealist movement had grown up in the respite after the First World War as a response to the extensive perception that everything should be done to prevent a recurrence of the bloodshed¹⁰⁴. It was based on the conviction that international conflicts could be resolved peacefully, and indeed prevented, by developing new international institutions and legal processes. Hence, the appellation 'idealism' arose because adherents sought to change the world for the better, rather than merely describe and investigate it as it was. In the interwar period it matured as an intellectual approach and evolved into a critique of what was perceived as a reverie in geopolitics with the concept of the nation-state¹⁰⁵. An assumption implicit in this concept is that states are unified and that their governments speak and act in the national interest. Idealism holds that, even if there were such an interest, it is by no means certain that governments have the capacity to identify it, and even then they frequently lack the desire or capacity to pursue it.

The extent of the devastation during the First World War and the widespread dismay as to its overall purpose meant that the idealists, with their characteristic optimism, were received relatively well. Nevertheless, their first innings was short lived since their opener, the League of Nations, failed to prevent the Second World War, which was paralleled with and indeed caused by a resurgence of realist style geopolitics. All the same, idealism as an intellectual approach never died and its theoretical underpinnings were never buried¹⁰⁶. In the aftermath of the Second World War, especially for international actors such as Malta who had experienced the harsh realities of both the colonial era and the world wars first-hand, idealism continued to represent an attractive intellectual approach. More than this, however, since the emerging bipolar order had created a geopolitical climate in which those who opted out of bipolarism could be ratified as viable neutrals by either or both of the two opposing sides, idealism represented a feasible and popular policy option. Whereas for the previous century-and-a-half the Maltese had been subject to the realist mode of geopolitical thinking imposed on them by the British, there was now for the first time an alternative on offer. Of course, if the idealist way of interpreting the world was to be incorporated into Maltese policy it had to be adapted to meet Malta's specific geopolitical circumstances and requirements. For instance, some of the agreements that Malta signed in an effort to guarantee her neutrality appeared to have been more motivated by offers of aid and trade than guarantees of peace¹⁰⁷ but then again this was, after all, the era in which geo-economics was seemingly taking precedence over the more traditional geo-politics. Economic aspects of international relations such as trade and co-operation were becoming more relevant than orthodox political aspects such as military preparedness and competition. It therefore comes as no surprise that the particular idealist mode of thought adopted by Malta's geopolitical thinkers was in certain respects a form of compromise. Not only were those engaged in geopolitical thinking in Malta looking to free their islands from any future involvement in the power games of the world's major

powers but concurrently seeking to acquire foreign aid to facilitate Malta's economic modernization. A "Development Plan for Malta 1973-1980" was issued by the Office of the Prime Minister. Closer analysis of this document reveals Mintoff's ambitious plans for economic growth which he set out in a broad social context. His strategy represented a new impetus for the economic management of Malta which would also free the islands of military treaties and bases. Hence, the label "practical idealism" which portrays the two concurrent motives behind the prevailing mode of geopolitical thinking in Malta at this stage in history. As mentioned already, such aid came in from sources as diverse as Great Britain, Italy, NATO, Libya and China.

It was, however, not long before wider-world geopolitical changes demanded a new mode of geopolitical thinking. Indeed, barely a decade passed after Malta's leaders had attained the ideals of constitutional non-alignment and neutrality when the bipolar geopolitical world order on which they were based disintegrated. The disarray over Maltese foreign policy which ensued signified the onset of an era of deep-seated uncertainty over geopolitical thinking on Malta. It is this uncertainty which opens the next chapter in the history of geopolitical thought in Malta, which in 1998 is still running.

Endnotes

¹ Deighton 1990 in his book, which investigates "Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War", cites the conference at Yalta as having been one of the main instigators of the Cold War.

² For a thorough account of the challenges and alternatives that were emanating from this new group of theorists see Parker 1985 (and particularly the latter sections of Ch. 7 which is entitled 'Brave New Geopolitics'). These alternative ways of interpreting the world's geopolitical surface will also be examined in more detail later in this chapter.

³ See Ch. 3 (Introduction).

⁴ Although technological advances in many areas (e.g. transport and communications) can be said to have contributed to an overall climate which was conducive to a global stand-off, it was the technological advances in weaponry, and particularly nuclear weaponry, that ensured that force continued to be the main factor in world affairs. The best account on the extent and significance of the advances in nuclear technology (or "the Nuclear Revolution") is Mandelbaum 1981.

⁵ Combined, these two attacks killed over 100 000 people but the long term effects were comparable if not worse. A similar number were left suffering from radiation sickness and even future unborn generations were affected, deformed by the mutation of genes in the sick. For a concise run-down of these two catastrophic and highly significant attacks see Grenville 1994, pp. 290-291.

⁶ With the exception of Deighton *op. cit.* who has already been referenced as having identified the conference at Yalta in 1945 as the starting point of the Cold War, much of the literature on the Cold War seems to cite the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948 as the starting point. See for e.g. Davison 1958, Grenville *op. cit.*, Kennedy 1988, Mastny 1979 and Walker 1994.

⁷ For a comprehensive overview of the proceedings of the conference at Yalta and the repercussions of these proceedings see Hobsbawm 1994, pp. 233-234.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ It is not just the fact that 20 million Soviets perished at the hands of the Germans in the Second World War but also the callous, *en masse* manner in which most of the killings took place that generated a degree of bitterness in the post-war Soviet Union. For further details and a justification of the grudges that the Soviets bore against their former allies see Duffy 1991.

¹⁰ See section 3.2 of this thesis for further details.

¹¹ Duffy *op. cit.*

¹² The Truman Doctrine of March 1947 was essentially a statement by the then President, Harry Truman: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures". See Hobsbawm *op. cit.*, p. 229.

¹³ The Marshall Plan of June 1947 was basically a massive American design for European economic recovery which mostly took the form of grants rather than loans and was aimed at restoring Europe into an effectively functioning buffer zone.

¹⁴ NATO, the anti-Soviet military alliance, was the 'logical complement' of the Marshall Plan. See Cook 1989 for an investigation into the "[B]irth of the NATO Treaty".

¹⁵ They would have felt even more threatened had they known that the US joint chiefs of staff produced a plan to atom-bomb the twenty chief Soviet cities within ten weeks of the end of the war. See Walker 1993, pp. 26-27.

¹⁶ Cominform was established in September 1947 to try to bring all the communist parties into ideological conformity as prescribed by Moscow.

¹⁷ Grenville *op. cit.*, p. 385.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ For a thorough account of the Soviet's tightening grip on Eastern Europe see McCauley's "Communist Power in Europe, 1944-49", 1977.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

- ²² The USSR ended the US's monopoly on nuclear weapons in 1949 although the first successful test on a thermo-nuclear (hydrogen) bomb was not carried out until 1952. See Mastny op. cit.
- ²³ For US interpretations of the Korean War see Lowe 1986 or Hastings 1988.
- ²⁴ SEATO included Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand.
- ²⁵ CENTO included Iraq (before the 1958 revolution), Turkey, Pakistan and the Shah's Iran and so completed the anti-Soviet military system whose main pillar was NATO.
- ²⁶ See Gaddis 1982 for further details on American "strategies of containment".
- ²⁷ For a thorough account of the plan to restore King Zog to the throne of Albania, or more particularly to overturn communist rule there, see the BBC documentary, "The Cost of Treachery" (1980).
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*
- ²⁹ Demonstrative of the petty and propagandist form which the Cold War had taken on was the since named 'Doctor's Plot' (1953) which the Soviets concocted as having been carried out by western secret services. Essentially this exercise in propaganda involved blaming 9 doctors (all but 2 Jewish) who had looked after top Soviet leaders for murdering Zhdanov and other members of the Soviet elite. The allegations against the doctors have since been acknowledged as having been a poor attempt by Soviet propagandists to drum up anti-Semitic and anti-British/American sentiments. For further details see Grenville op. cit., p. 493.
- ³⁰ The process through which this new-look foreign policy was enacted soon became referred to as 'destalinisation'. Three texts are particularly useful on the process of destalinisation and Khrushchev's role in it: Khrushchev 1977, Medvedev 1977 and Linden 1966.
- ³¹ Linden op. cit.
- ³² Certain commentators (See for e.g. Davies 1989 and the commentary in his introduction) would have us believe that the USSR was a reluctant participant throughout the Cold War and that on numerous occasions they attempted to promote initiatives aimed more at co-operation than confrontation; this Twentieth Congress of 1956 being the first such occasion. Such beliefs, however, are ungrounded since, regardless of the idealism and compassion that may seem to have been apparent in Soviet foreign policy, decisions continued to be based on realist interpretations throughout the Cold War and were intended to fulfil the realist aim of expanding communism.
- ³³ Medvedev op. cit.
- ³⁴ It was for instance at this time that aid was given to Cuba, Egypt and India (amongst others).
- ³⁵ See for e.g. Fetjo 1974.
- ³⁶ The most comprehensive account of events in "Eastern Europe since Stalin" is provided by Fetjo op. cit.
- ³⁷ Khrushchev himself acknowledged the contradictions inherent in the process of destalinisation. See Khrushchev op. cit.
- ³⁸ Once again, Khrushchev himself has since acknowledged this. *Ibid.*
- ³⁹ The following account is a summary of two of the most thorough examinations of the 13-day crisis written by Kennedy 1969 and Beschloss 1991.
- ⁴⁰ e.g. *Ibid.*
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁴² Møller 1991, p.3, uses the term 'Mutual Assured Destruction' and its acronym (M.A.D.) synonymously to make the point that it was easy to doubt the sanity of Cold War decision-makers at times.
- ⁴³ See for e.g. Hammond 1975, Bown 1976, Yanov 1977 and Stanley 1970.
- ⁴⁴ e.g. Skilling 1976.
- ⁴⁵ The best investigation into the miscalculations of US policy makers in devising policy in Vietnam and the subsequent lack of US public support for this campaign was written by Cable 1991.
- ⁴⁶ See Brown and Kaser 1978 where the post-Khrushchev rekindling of Soviet global capacity is discussed in great detail.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁸ The roles that the Soviets played in Somalia and Angola are also covered in Brown and Kaser op. cit.
- ⁴⁹ In 1956 the first payment of £25 million was made. The following summary of the part the Soviets played in Afghanistan derives from Anderson 1990.
- ⁵⁰ See Donovan and Scherer 1992 for the role that the media, and television in particular, played in shaping public opinion throughout the Cold War.

- ⁵¹ Kaldor op. cit.
- ⁵² The clout that the arms lobby had in US politics throughout the Cold War is discussed in Spector 1984.
- ⁵³ The failure to get the US hostages out of Teheran marked the end of the Carter administration. It was replaced by the more hawkish and conservative Reagan presidency. Gaddis op. cit.
- ⁵⁴ Halliday 1983.
- ⁵⁵ Spector op. cit.
- ⁵⁶ Donovan and Scherer op. cit.
- ⁵⁷ For a thorough account of influence that the scientists of the huge Soviet military-industrial complex exerted over policy making in the Cold War, but also the decline of this influence since the end of the Cold War, see: Kapitza 1992.
- ⁵⁸ By the 1980s the arms race involved the expenditure of about 500 billion dollars per year by the USA and the USSR alone. See Rosecrance 1992, p. 64.
- ⁵⁹ Wells 1992 discusses the restraint that nuclear weapons effected over the actions of the superpowers, using the Polish crisis and the Iran-Iraq war to exemplify this deliberate curtailment of their powers.
- ⁶⁰ See for example Balogh and Seers 1955 for more information on the apparently healthy state of the Maltese post-war economy.
- ⁶¹ Ibid. Balogh and Seers were amongst the first to formally acknowledge Malta's historical dependency on defence spending by successive occupying powers. Following on from this acknowledgement, Britain made a declaration assuming responsibility for attaining diversification of the economy of Malta.
- ⁶² For a separate account of the dockyard troubles see Muirie 1963.
- ⁶³ This observation was made by Jones 1971.
- ⁶⁴ Blouet 1992.
- ⁶⁵ For more on the 1947 Constitution and its elected legislative assembly see Dobie 1967.
- ⁶⁶ The Maltese Imperial Government consisted of the Governor himself, the Lieutenant Governor, the Legal Secretary, the Director of Civil Aviation and the Secretary. Ibid.
- ⁶⁷ The dyarchal system is outlined in more detail in section 2.2.
- ⁶⁸ Dobie op. cit.
- ⁶⁹ Dobie op. cit.
- ⁷⁰ The best known of Malta's Prime Ministers, Dominic Mintoff, trained originally for the Priesthood but after winning a Rhodes scholarship was educated at Oxford from 1939, before returning to Malta. See Blouet op. cit.
- ⁷¹ Dobie op. cit.
- ⁷² Austin 1971.
- ⁷³ *Report of the Round Table Conference on Malta's Integration into the British Isles 1955* (Cmnd. 9 657).
- ⁷⁴ The Nationalists Party called upon its members to Boycott the referendum on the grounds that the guarantees promised to the Church had not been properly spelt out. Also, being much less dependent for its support on the unions and the dockyard workers, the Party had a correspondingly smaller interest in the possible economic benefits.
- ⁷⁵ Austin op. cit. contains the best account of the whole integration issue.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid.
- ⁷⁷ This was a key issue since, in the absence of a local government structure at this time, the police were responsible for important administrative functions in the villages.
- ⁷⁸ The constitution had been suspended on two prior occasions: 1903, when Malta reverted to a form of Crown Colony rule; and in 1933, when the Nationalist Ministry was dismissed from office by the Imperial Government for insisting on parity of the Italian language with English. See Blouet op. cit.
- ⁷⁹ Sir Hillary Blood chaired a commission of four, appointed on 22 August 1960; he submitted his recommendations in December 1960. See *Report of the Malta Constitutional Commission 1960* (Cmnd. 1261).
- ⁸⁰ Blouet op. cit., p. 217.
- ⁸¹ Nationalist Party - 25 seats in the assembly, MLP - 16. Ibid.
- ⁸² This title was proposed by the Blood Commission and borrowed from the "recently created internally self-governing State of Singapore," Cmnd. 1261, Ss 23.90. op. cit.

⁸³ The disagreements are set out in full in the, *Report on the Malta Independence Conference, 1963* (Cmnd. 1261).

⁸⁴ Figures from Dobie op. cit.

⁸⁵ For more on these finer details see *Malta: Independence Constitution* (Cmnd. 2406) 1964.

⁸⁶ 75% of this £51 million would be a gift and 25% on loan at current lending rates of the UK Exchequer. A further £1 million would be made available for the restoration of historic buildings which had been occupied by British Forces. See Craig op. cit. p. 218.

⁸⁷ Quote taken from Dobie op. cit..

⁸⁸ Beeley and Charlton 1994.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Blouet op. cit., p. 219.

⁹² Craig 1971, gives an account of this period in Malta's history under the title 'Towards Non-Alignment'.

⁹³ Blouet op. cit., p. 220.

⁹⁴ Malta received aid from Libya upon the signing of the Mutual Defence Agreement (1974). Although financial assistance from Libya is still apparent in Malta today, the dispute over their median line cooled relations. The main recipients of assistance are the Malta Labour Party and there are still a number of strong business links between the two countries.

⁹⁵ Chinese aid came in the form of technical and financial assistance in the construction of a shipbuilding yard in the inner Grand Harbour (1973-1976).

⁹⁶ Fenech 1993, p. 52.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Neutrality Agreement Malta-Italy 1980 (Valetta: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1980) For a detailed breakdown of the military, economic and technical assistance the agreement guarantees Malta see Ronzitti 1983, pp. 171-201.

⁹⁹ See CSCE 1975 and Groch 1993, pp. 45-47.

¹⁰⁰ See Ordonez 1990.

¹⁰¹ Luke 1949.

¹⁰² This is why Beeley and Charlton op. cit. describe this phase of Malta's history as the period of 'Dependent Sovereignty'.

¹⁰³ For further details on Mintoff's development plan for Malta see *Agreement with respect to the use of Military facilities in Malta*, London March 26, 1972 (Cmnd. 4943).

¹⁰⁴ Most acknowledge that mainstream idealism originated from the thinking of French political geographers in the interwar years. As Parker op. cit. wrote, "In opposition to the 'watertight bulkheads' produced by the Nazi policy of national autarchy, the French geographers advocated a permeability of frontiers based on international co-operation". It was envisaged that all would benefit from such a development. There are two classic works which best epitomise this type of thinking: Demangeon 1932, translated his ideas into an appeal for the settlement of problems on an international level, and for a united Europe; and Ferenczi 1938, concluded that for a Europe in decline co-operation was a far more appropriate response than confrontation. For other examples of idealist thinking by French political geographers prior to the Second World War see Goblet 1936 and Ancel 1938.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Towards the end and more so in the aftermath of the Second World War the American idealist movement became the principal torch-bearer for the kind of ideas that had arisen in France prior to the onset of the Second World War. There were three theorists who became particular eminent within this movement; Walsh, Whittlesey and Lattimore. Walsh was perhaps the most radical of these, concluding in his early works, "[G]eopolitics can ennoble as well as corrupt. It can choose between two alternatives - the value of power or the power of values", (Walsh 1943). Whittlesey also became a well established member of the idealist movement. He believed that the new world order (following the Second World War) should be based upon an improved relationship between the generally passive peoples of the tropics and the aggressive peoples of the middle latitudes, and also between the Occident and the Orient. He also proposed the solution of problems in the context of a world organization (Whittlesey 1943). Finally,

Lattimore also contributed substantially to idealist thought by arguing, amongst other things, that the new world order should provide freedom and justice for the oppressed peoples of the world (Lattimore 1943).

¹⁰⁷ See endnote 92 of this chapter where Fenech is referenced as having made the point that Malta's non-alignment was for a period "...paying in cash, so that Malta's development plans could proceed".

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PHASE 4

**GEOPOLITICAL DISARRAY:
MALTA AND THE WIDER WORLD 1989-2000**

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4.

GEOPOLITICAL DISSARRAY: MALTA AND THE WIDER WORLD 1989-2000

This chapter deals with the current stage in world history which is commonly called the post-Cold War period. It is based on the premiss that the end of the Cold War, or in geopolitical terms the dissolution of bipolarism, has opened an uncertain chapter in world political history in which most international actors have been left in a state of geopolitical disarray, willing a new world order.

The current *fin de siècle*¹ has broadly presented policy-makers with three separate options, each of which is based on a slightly different interpretation of the nature of the current geopolitical surface of the globe. Theorists in the US, inspired by what they perceive as their country's victory in the most massive confrontation the world has ever witnessed, are advocating that the outgoing bi-polar model should be supplanted with their very own uni-polar geopolitical model. Intimidated by the prospect of an orderless world and fearful of any return to anarchy, many political decision-makers elsewhere are also accepting and supporting the idea of the US acting as a global superintendent. Congruent to this, however, there are two additional movements, both of which have reservations about unequivocal US global hegemony, and instead advocate two alternative courses available to policy makers. The first movement argues that the UN, as the only reasonably independent international organization, is more suited than the US to ensuring unbiased international peace and security. The second believe that economic factors and specifically the fiscal powers of Japan and Europe have come to dominate international relations, and hold that geo-economic considerations such as these should form the basis of the new world order.

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War all three of the above courses featured in Maltese policy making. Policy makers, in many ways oblivious to other regional developments, were keen for Malta to fit into one of the above three global meta-theories. The Nationalist government of the early post-Cold War years set about a policy which was based on an acknowledgement of the increased significance of geo-economics, or more specifically Europe's fiscal power, in international affairs. Furthermore, via an intriguing manoeuvre, government policy at this time also simultaneously involved overt support for a new world order based on US geopolitical hegemony. The foreign policy adopted by the Labour Party, both in opposition and more recently in government, instead relies heavily on the UN taking on a more protective and authoritative role in international relations.

Following the same format as the previous chapters, this chapter first paints a wider world geopolitical picture of this short period in history. More so than for any of the other phases investigated it is important that this picture is seen as being dynamic since above all else it was characterised by drastic and unprecedented geopolitical change. The first section examines the events which led to the dissolution of the bipolar order and those which have characterised the post-Cold War era of geopolitical change. Section two investigates Malta's place in this ongoing geopolitical change and the efforts that were made to retrieve a function for Malta in the aftermath of the bipolar order. The policies executed by the Nationalist government immediately following the Cold War, which amounted to a mis-placed fealty for EU economic prowess and support for US global hegemony, are critically analysed. In addition to this, the powerful opposition of the Labour Party to these policies is evaluated and a critical assessment of the alternative UN-dependent policy course which they have opted to follow since their 1997 election victory is also attempted. Finally, the third and concluding section of this chapter draws together

the previous two sections, investigating a number of more esoteric conclusions which relate to the various theoretical frameworks through which Malta's leaders of all political persuasions made policy decisions. These frameworks are shown to have been direct derivatives of the models that were being used by theorists throughout the world to prescribe and indeed will the advent of a new geopolitical world order. The Maltese were once again subscribing to geopolitical thinking imposed on them from outside and it is seen that in many other respects also Maltese geopolitical thinking throughout phase five was and still is historically-biased.

4.1 THE WIDER WORLD 1989-2000: DISSOLUTION OF BIPOLAR ORDER

As with the opening sections in all of the previous chapters, this section is devoted to condensing an event of major global and historical proportions into a few thousand words. The difficulties inherent in this task are obvious and dictate that it is of vital importance that the investigation is strictly relevant to the main thrust of this thesis. To this end, the following paragraphs present an examination of the close of the Cold War and the immediate post-Cold War era from a geopolitical perspective. The purpose of this analysis is first and foremost to track the main wider-world occurrences which Malta was caught up in at this stage in her historical development.

The beginnings of the end of the Cold War can be traced to Mikhail Gorbachev's appointment as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985. He initiated the series of reforms which eventually resulted in the massive revolution in the political and economic organization of the Soviet bloc, which in turn led to the demise of the Warsaw Pact and subsequently the end of the Cold War². He had come to appreciate the extent of the discontent amongst previously good communists that had arisen from

increased contacts with the West and the widespread realisation of the stark contrasts in living standards. As a response to such discontent, which was particularly apparent in eastern Europe, Gorbachev adopted a tripartite strategy to initiate his proposed reforms³.

The first part of this strategy he referred to as *perestroika* (meaning restructuring)⁴. Through his policy of *perestroika* he curtailed the role of central planning, significantly reduced subsidies to industry, encouraged a small co-operative sector and in an unprecedented move gave the go-ahead for a considerable number of joint ventures with foreign investors. In time, Gorbachev's *perestroika* came to permit private ownership and eventually led to the wholesale opening up of the Soviet economy. For the second part of his strategy he coined the term *glasnost* (or openness)⁵. Through *glasnost* he allowed increased freedom of expression, abolished many forms of censorship and authorised open debate as well as reserved levels of criticism for the first time. Finally, and perhaps most significantly given the high level opposition he faced, he implemented *demokratizatsiya* (democratization)⁶. This, the third strand of his strategy, saw the introduction of open elections to numerous candidates, none of which were obliged to be members of the Communist Party.

To back up his tripartite strategy Gorbachev moved towards eliminating the use of military force in maintaining the communist governments in its east European satellite states. His foreign minister, Edward Shevardnadze backed him enthusiastically on this move, spelling out to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1990 why repression in Eastern Europe was no longer acceptable:

"It is only through extensive international co-operation that we will be able to solve our most acute domestic problems"⁷.

Thus, in short, he and Gorbachev were warning that any further use of military force in maintaining the puppet communist governments in Eastern Europe would irreparably harm the more important new Soviet interest, 'socialist internationalism'⁸. Like Britain, and indeed all other colonial powers, the Soviet Union had reached the point where the burdens of empire, and particularly its negative effects on Soviet relations with the rest of the world, far outweighed the advantages which remained to be had. Furthermore, in the missile age, just as strategic outposts such as Malta had been rendered useless, territorial buffers such as those in eastern Europe no longer provided any protection.

The above factors combined to create a climate in which the possibility of Soviet intervention was no longer feared by those masses opposing their communist leaders. Moreover, without the Red Army behind them, the national people's armies of conscripts could no longer be relied upon to support the regimes against their own people. One by one these regimes came to realise that they could no longer safeguard their authority simply by changing the man at the top. Revolts were taking place in Hungary, Romania, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland and crucially the main activists were the educated and the young⁹. Almost overnight the 'Iron Curtain'¹⁰ had lost its robustness and was rendered as incapable of separating the enraged revolutionaries from the centres of power in Budapest, Bucharest, East-Berlin, Prague and Warsaw as it had been shielding people in the East from the conspicuous prosperity of the West. On 9 November 1989 the Berlin Wall, which had become a potent symbol of the division of Europe, fell before an onslaught of the people. If the Berlin Wall had become a potent symbol of the Cold War then the television footage of it being smashed down amidst popular demonstrations¹¹ has since become an equally potent symbol of the tumultuous geopolitical changes which have taken place so far in the post-Cold War era.

Initial changes to the geopolitical map resulted from the weakening or defeat of the various puppet communist governments which had remained in power throughout eastern Europe even up until the Spring of 1989. By the June of 1989 Lech Walesa's solidarity movement had won the free elections in Poland¹²; and by the autumn of that same year a succession of popular revolts fatally weakened or toppled the communist governments in East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia¹³. Although the short transitional period was relatively peaceful in some cases¹⁴, in others it was more problematic. In Romania, for instance, a violent coup included the execution of the communist leader, Nicolae Ceauçescu¹⁵. Violent or not, the above revolutions all had the effect of exposing the previously suppressed underlying cultural and economic differences both within and between the countries of central and eastern Europe. Most notably, such differences resulted in the splitting of Czechoslovakia into two separate states (1992); the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Of the two, the Czech Republic is considerably more advanced, industrially and economically, and is most likely to secure accession to the European Union, along with Poland and Hungary¹⁶. In contrast, other countries such as Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania have been slow to capitalize on their new found freedom and are indeed less well placed to ensure any significant future economic modernization¹⁷.

Following on from these initial changes the geopolitical map underwent a further readjustment, which was every bit as sudden and momentous as the one that had just taken place in eastern and central Europe. This further reshuffling was expected by few, especially so early in the process of *perestroika* (restructuring), since it took place within the boundaries of the Soviet Union itself¹⁸. At the time of writing (April 1998) this has meant that the Soviet Union has crumbled into fifteen separate national republics. The reason why this situation is continually changing is that there are nationalist minorities within these separate republics which are insisting on independence¹⁹. The chances of them attaining independence vary according to the specific circumstances of their

particular case. Whereas the Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which were sovereign states prior to the Second World War, were at the outset able to support their bids for independence most successfully, others were not²⁰. Especially in Soviet central Asia, where there were fewer resources for state-building and fewer gains to be had from outright independence, it was more difficult for nationalist leaders to make feasible bids for independence. Both here and elsewhere, where circumstances are not necessarily conducive to outright independence, the separate republics have remained in a loose alliance with Russia, the central and largest republic. This alliance is known as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)²¹.

The two stages of geopolitical reshuffling outlined above obviously heralded the demise of the East's Cold War defence alliance. The Warsaw Pact, as it was known, was entirely dependent on a tight-knit military alliance between the various administrative regions of the Soviet Union and close military co-operation with and between the communist states of central and eastern Europe. By the end of 1989 the requisite military alliances were no longer in place and co-operation over issues such as the training of and authority over conscripts was, given the extent of public dissent, no longer practicable²².

The Warsaw Pact military alliance was officially dissolved in March 1991, although it had been impotent for at least a year prior to this date and Gorbachev had officially declared the end of the Cold War in 1990. In geopolitical terms the bipolar world order had ended in a spectacular fashion. Negotiations for the diminution of conventional and nuclear arms between the United States and the former members of the Warsaw Pact made astonishing progress²³. Although in NATO the other half of the bipolar geopolitical order remained intact, its member states rapidly set about changing its functions²⁴. The armed frontier which ran through the middle of Germany evaporated. Not only was the theoretical western line of defence pushed eastwards, but to the east of that line there were friendly

countries, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, who were seeking to join the European Union. Shortly afterwards the need to defend frontiers militarily in eastern Europe became as unnecessary and outdated as it was in western Europe.

In short, the tripartite strategy for change inaugurated by Gorbachev, the end of communist rule in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union constituted an unprecedented and wholesale global geopolitical reshuffling. In a round about way this geopolitical reshuffling, and more specifically the alterations in the various regional balances of power it brought about, paved the way for other smaller scale conflicts, many of which had previously been suppressed, to take on global significance.

The most notable of these smaller conflicts which was quick to assume global significance was the expensive but awesomely efficient US-led liberation of Kuwait and invasion of Iraq (1991)²⁵. Following on from this, the "Death of Yugoslavia"²⁶ (1991-1995) was elevated to the world stage and the pitfalls that the West and then the UN encountered in attempting to find a solution to the complex range of conflicts in the Balkans became the cause of major embarrassment and did little to promote an air of global calm or order. The Gulf campaign and Yugoslavia aside, in 1993, two years after the Cold War had officially ended, twenty two 'hot' wars were still being fought around the world. Communal rivalries and ethnic challenges to states which had been suppressed throughout the Cold War contributed to conflict in all but five of these episodes²⁷. About twenty-five million refugees were fleeing from communal conflict and repression, a number equivalent to the entire population of Canada. At least four million people had reportedly died as a direct or an indirect result of these conflicts, two-hundred thousand of them in 1993 alone. The United Nations had thirteen peacekeeping operations under-way, the most ever in its fifty year history²⁸. By 1994, although working under broader definitions, a group of American researchers had recorded seventy conflicts world-wide and by 1995 their tally

had risen to a record seventy-one. This 1995 figure was double the number logged by the National Defence Council Foundation in 1989, the year the Berlin Wall came down²⁹.

Between theorists and practitioners of international relations³⁰ there was little if any consensus over how to interpret or react to the above disarray. As will be explained in the final section of this chapter, some chose to interpret the world as being ordered around US hegemony and reacted to geopolitical developments accordingly; others preferred the idea of order based around a UN-imposed universal security and others saw a more peacefully competitive geo-economically ordered world. In short, as the title of this section suggests, the post-Cold War world was a world in a state of geopolitical disarray.

4.2 RETRIEVING A FUNCTION FOR MALTA IN THE AFTERMATH OF BIPOLAR ORDER: 1989-2000

This section examines Malta's place in the wider world between 1989 and 2000. Whereas in the previous phases investigated there was a degree of certainty over the role that Malta played in the wider-world, throughout this phase Malta's international affairs have been clouded by a dense fog of uncertainty. Politicians and decision-makers alike have been hindered by an overwhelming irresolution over the role that their country should play in the new uncertain world and, in much the same way as many other international actors, Malta is in a state of geopolitical disarray. The islands' immediate surroundings in the Mediterranean have altered drastically, shifting from a compound state of East-West confrontation to a complex state of North-South tension. Malta has struggled to adjust to this over-night transition and has subsequently been left in a state in which there is little consensus of opinion over the two alternative foreign policy courses. The extent of the disarray over Malta's post-Cold War geopolitics has revealed itself in a heated domestic

political debate which has been conducted at a "highly emotive" level for almost a decade³¹. This debate provides the main focus of this section. The contrasting policy responses to global geopolitical change advocated by the Nationalist and Labour Parties are analysed. Such an analysis demonstrates Malta's indeterminate geopolitical place in the post-Cold War world and highlights the uncertainty surrounding the type of international role which Malta has recently sought and is still seeking to fulfil.

4.21 The Nationalist Policy Response: Security through the EU

In June 1994, Maltese Foreign Minister Guido de Marco, pledged Malta's commitment to an evolving European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty³². In this, his first address to the (West European Assembly) WEU Assembly, he contested that neutrality and non-alignment had been superseded by historical events and were no longer viable options. He mentioned Ireland as an example of a country whose policy of neutrality had not prevented EU membership. Also, citing the then prospective membership of Austria, Finland and Sweden, Guido de Marco stated that amendment of the Maltese Constitution would not be necessary³³.

His address summarises the position beheld by the Nationalist Party to this day. They argue that Malta's neutrality is '*sui generis*'³⁴ and simply prevents the use or deployment of military bases, facilities or personnel on the islands. They are adamant that it does not prohibit Malta from seeking alignment with common EU foreign policy positions. Adherents to the Nationalist stance point out that in seeking accession they are, "actively pursuing peace, security and social progress among all nations," and are therefore working in accordance with their constitution³⁵. Although their support for EU membership is mainly for economic and political reasons, the Nationalists expect that Malta's security

would ultimately be enhanced through a CFSP. As the former Foreign Minister, Guido de Marco argued:

"Membership of the Union would guarantee Malta's security, would enhance Malta's role in the search for stability in the Mediterranean region and would see Malta participate in the Union's initiatives for international cooperation"³⁶.

This is why throughout their last term in office the Nationalist's "primary policy objective was [is] their quest for membership of the European Union,"³⁷ and this is still now seen by them as the only viable way in which Maltese security could be guaranteed. Nevertheless, despite their apparent assuredness, a number of obstacles stood in the way of Malta's accession to the EU and will also therefore continue to hinder any possible future Maltese involvement in the evolving CFSP.

Memories of Dom. Mintoff's policy of 'positive neutrality', in which his Labour government distanced itself from the western camp by signing agreements with the Soviet Union (1981), North Korea (1982) and Libya (1984)³⁸, proved too recent for many in the European Commission. Also, concern over the finer details of Malta's neutrality, particularly the level of opposition to EU membership, were such that the European Commission reported that:

"The principle of neutrality and Malta's non-aligned status set out in the Maltese Constitution raise the problem of their compatibility with Title V of the Maastricht Treaty and would lead to difficulties in the area of joint action and future co-operation on defence."³⁹

Thus, no matter how convenient a form Maltese neutrality was to have taken it was never likely to have integrated with a pan-European CFSP, even if the Nationalists had secured another election victory in the October 1997 and accession to the Union. Therefore, neutrality and non-alignment were clearly the main hindrance to the Nationalist Government in their European-based approach to foreign policy and security. Although explicit proposals were never put forward to carry out the necessary constitutional amendments, attempts to drop them would undoubtedly have followed a further election victory⁴⁰. In this respect, Malta came extremely close to discarding her hard-earned neutrality. In order to assess just how close, we now turn to the second political manoeuvre which seriously undermined Malta's international standing as a neutral and non-aligned state.

4.211 Partnership for Peace (PfP)

On 26 April 1995, Malta subscribed to NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. States joining this programme were invited to take part in joint training and planning and possibly to participate in peacekeeping missions under the authority of the United Nations and the OSCE. They were entitled to name representatives at NATO headquarters in Brussels and in return were compelled to make a commitment to transparency in defence planning, sharing information about military spending and forces and the democratic control of their defence forces⁴¹.

The step taken by the Maltese government on 26 April 1995 surprised many; both pro- and anti- European accession. The move appears to have been cleverly calculated and designed to distract the electorate from the main reason (essentially their desire to conform with EU guidelines) why the government had sought to abandon neutrality⁴².

The programme was originally set-up as a compromise formula intended to attract East European countries within the western security sphere of influence without submitting to their initial demands for firm security guarantees or eventual full NATO membership. Crucially, therefore, it is not to be seen as an outright expansion of NATO and as such was ideally suited to testing public opinion and teasing the opposition's interpretation of Maltese neutrality. It presented the government with an opportunity to side-track the frustratingly protracted process of EU accession in favour of a fresh debate on the viability and legality of PfP. The expected objections from the Labour Party would, it was intended, draw attention to the restrictions that constitutional neutrality imposed on the Maltese⁴³. After all, how could the opposition object to a programme which merely amounted to a formula for multinational co-operation and military training? In addition to this, the fact that long-established neutral countries such as Finland and Sweden had become members of PfP would serve to further isolate any objectors.

Subscription to PfP certainly had the effect of stirring up a hotly contested political debate and undoubtedly gave further indication to Brussels of the strength of the then Government's intent. However, it also succeeded in dis-crediting or eroding Maltese non-alignment and neutrality, if only in a transitory way. In a nutshell, as Maltese political commentator Dominic Fenech put it, the Nationalist government had;

"aimed to extricate itself from the potential checkmate posed by neutrality by shifting the burden of justification onto the Labour Opposition"⁴⁴.

4.22 The Malta Labour Party (MLP) Viewpoint:

Security through non-alignment and neutrality

Having been responsible for enshrining neutrality in the constitution in 1987, the MLP has repeatedly pledged to maintain it. Those supporting this stance simply reiterate along these lines:

“Without the necessary two-thirds majority to remove it, neutrality remains entrenched in the Constitution.”⁴⁵

In the interview I conducted with the deputy leader of the Labour Party (and main spokesperson for Foreign Affairs), Dr George Vella, he responded to comparisons drawn between Malta and other neutral countries within the EU by citing the differences between their own “constitutional neutrality” and a “neutral foreign policy” such as the one adopted by the Irish, which can be modified accordingly. Indeed, it is the entrenched nature of Malta's neutrality which means that:

“The Commission cannot rely on Malta being consistent in serving the CFSP and a Common European Defence.”⁴⁶

Throughout the Nationalists' most recent term in office this argument effectively gave the MLP the power of veto with regard to EU membership, a situation that was strongly repudiated by supporters of the government in Malta and certain political commentators⁴⁷. While they recognised that the role of neutrality and non-alignment has altered since the end of the Cold War, the MLP have consistently argued that it is still highly relevant to Malta's particular geopolitical situation⁴⁸. Again, they dismiss the comparisons with Ireland or Switzerland made by those in favour of the European-based approach, neither

of which are located in security environments of comparable volatility to the Mediterranean. The crux of their argument is that the demise of East-West confrontation has failed to enhance stability in the Mediterranean and its immediate hinterlands⁴⁹. As theorist Alberto Bin puts it when investigating "the security implications of Malta's membership of the European Union":

"It is worth pointing out that with the end of the Cold War, more tensions have sprung between North and South. These tensions are not felt anywhere else as much as they are felt in the Mediterranean."⁵⁰

As a response to this situation the MLP has long argued that Malta should persist in its active regional policy by continuing to contribute to fora such as the UN and the CSCE⁵¹. In the words of former Foreign Minister Alex Sceberras Trigona:

"Mediating between non-aligned states, as well as between them and aligned states is a role that Malta should not and cannot afford to give up lightly. It is truly in keeping with Malta's real vocation as well as living up to Malta's constitutional role of being a neutral state actively pursuing peace."⁵²

The document which set out the Labour Party's National Security policy⁵³ prior to their election victory in October 1996 contained a listing of the "various threats which could actively constitute a security threat to the island"⁵⁴. In many ways the report was in touch with the existing security situation, concluding that Malta's geopolitical environment was more likely to present a non-military threat than a military one. However, it then went on to declare:

“There is no indication that in the foreseeable future we can fall prey to any military threat from another country or foreign power with the specific aim to threaten our territorial integrity”⁵⁵

Clearly, any cautious military planner would judge this statement to be misguided, especially in an area as strategically sensitive as the central Mediterranean and in the wake of the occupation of another not too distant micro-state, Kuwait. As well as this unwieldy statement the report had further shortcomings, particularly in the latter section which presents the opposition’s alternative policy on National Security. This policy amounts to little more than maintaining and strengthening the status of neutrality and non-alignment, although a proviso is included which enables the MLP, “to adapt their (our) policies to altered circumstances if the need arises”⁵⁶. On this note, whilst the MLP has never given explicit support for Maltese accession to the EU, it certainly does not rule out Maltese involvement in European affairs, primarily by way of some form of bilateral agreement between Malta and the EU⁵⁷.

In short, the Labour Party report highlighted the right problems but failed to come up with the appropriate policy recommendations. Although emphasis was aptly placed on diplomatic representation, confidence building measures, and dialogue through international fora such as the UN and the OSCE, a pre-occupation with neutrality and associated ideologies prevented the opposition from coming to terms with the very real issues they themselves had highlighted.

To summarise, this section (4.2) has propounded the uncertainties surrounding the policy responses which determined Malta's place in the wider post-Cold War world. All of the policy responses emanating from Malta's political leaders in the last decade have failed to address the specificities of Malta's unique contemporary geopolitical environment. Both political parties have instead attempted to respond to contemporary geopolitical changes through what they intended would be all-inclusive policies; the Nationalists striving for EU accession and closer affiliation with NATO, and the MLP seeking to ensure the continuation of Malta's non-aligned and neutral international status. The final section of this chapter examines the nature of the historically-biased geopolitical thinking on Malta which gave rise to these three blanket policy responses which were intended to ensure a stable geopolitical place for Malta into the next century, but which unfortunately failed.

4.3 MALTA 1989-2000: WILLING A NEW WORLD ORDER OUT OF GEOPOLITICAL DISARRAY

This section is based on the premiss that at the *fin de siècle* Malta, and most other international actors for that matter are longing for the coming of a new world order out of the geopolitical disarray which currently prevails. The ongoing domestic political debate over the geopolitical function Malta should adopt in the post-Cold War era has been shown to be one of starkly contrasting viewpoints. Despite this, there are some who believe that;

“the minds of government and opposition seem to be slowly converging on the fundamental issue of the country's security”⁵⁸.

Or as Dominic Fenech has put it;

"beneath the rhetoric . . . , there exists in Malta much more consensus on the question of security than might appear on the surface, or than there has been during the past decades"⁵⁹.

Despite the optimistic overtones discernible in the above statements, given the vibrancy of Malta's domestic political scene, there are few policy matters over which absolute convergence is a likely prospect and Malta's external security or international affairs is in no way one of these. As this section will show, there is nevertheless a level of convergence, albeit subconscious, over the geopolitical thinking behind the policies through which Maltese politicians have chosen to respond to post-Cold War changes in international relations. As will be seen, however, this convergence does not necessarily direct Maltese foreign policy onto the right course.

This section draws together the findings of the previous two sections, investigating the various modes of geopolitical thinking behind Malta's policy responses to world-wide geopolitical developments. These modes of thinking are shown to be direct derivatives of the models or meta-theories that were and, in some cases, still are being used by theorists throughout the world to prescribe and indeed induce the coming of a new geopolitical world order. It is argued that only in this respect is there any convergence of thought between Malta's opposing political camps. It is shown that the thinking of both Labour and the Nationalist Party policy-makers since the end of the Cold War has exhibited an historical bias if for no other reason than that the Maltese are once again subscribing to geopolitical thinking imposed on them from outside.

4.31 Three Models of New World Order

The end of the Cold War was accompanied by almost instantaneous proclamations in international diplomatic circles of a "new world order"⁶⁰. Like many 'new-' terms it itself is not all that new since commentators have been predicting a new world order for at least a couple of centuries. Already in this thesis, for instance, two very different world orders have been investigated (the *colonial geopolitical world order* and the *bipolar geopolitical world order* which were separated only by the unquestionably relative dis-order of the two world wars) both of which were new at one stage in history. As a further example, the US political geographer Isaiah Bowman chose to refer to the period immediately after the First World War as being characterised by a new world order⁶¹. What we are concerned with here is that several decades after Isaiah Bowman made his historic declarations, in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, many contemporary political geographers are once again heralding the dawning of a new world order⁶². It is, however, important that throughout this section these proclamations are seen in their historical context and also, therefore, to appreciate that they are in no way unprecedented.

The post-Cold War proclamations of new world order are essentially based on simplistic interpretations of the events outlined in the first section of this chapter. Three differing interpretations of the geopolitical reshuffling which accompanied and indeed constituted the ending of the Cold War have established themselves in academic and political circles around the world. These geopolitical interpretations have led to three simplistic forecasts, models or meta-theories of 'new world order'⁶³, each of which is highly subjective since ultimately they serve the purposes of their main perpetrators. Broadly speaking, one is based on US global hegemony, the other on UN global supervision and the other on the fiscal containment powers of international capitalism. Since between them they summarize the wider-world geopolitical thinking which currently influences Maltese decision-makers

this section analyses the three main ways in which theorists interpret the geopolitical reshuffling that accompanied the ending of bipolarism. It also describes how each of the three models are used to prop up their perpetrator's own rhetoric on the supposed new world order. Since it is argued in the concluding chapter of this thesis that these models were at best premature, and more probably flawed for all time, this analysis takes on a critical form.

4.311 The Model of US Global Hegemony⁶⁴

The most significant outcome of the reshuffling which accompanied the ending of the Cold War is that the US has become the world's "only power capable of acting as the stabilising hegemon"⁶⁵, in military and geopolitical terms at least. To contemporary realist commentators, most of whom now represent the United States and her closest allies, this reshuffling has been interpreted as a 'victory' for capitalism, liberal democracy and free-market economies⁶⁶. In a statement which typified the mainstream realist interpretation of the ending of bipolarism Francis Fukuyama pronounced that history had ended since the West had indeed 'won' the Cold War⁶⁷.

The sudden decline of the USSR as a superpower is seen as a rationale for such an interpretation. Racked by internal dissent that made political consensus impossible and riven by economic difficulties which had rendered it incapable of sustaining a global military presence, the Soviet Union is no longer a superpower able to compete in any way with the USA. As mentioned already, the let up in political repression has revealed a still pristine ethnic mosaic that had been preserved for decades⁶⁸. It is the re-emergence of this ethnic mosaic that has sounded the final death knell for the superpower known as the USSR which had constituted one half of the bipolar geopolitical world order. And so, by

1990, the old bipolar structure which had dominated the post-1945 world was a thing of the past.

What is envisaged by the proponents of models based on US global hegemony is the replacement of this old bipolar structure with a new 'unipolar'⁶⁹ structure. As is only to be expected, the most ardent supporters of this particular interpretation or model of the world are representatives from the US or the US's closest allies. What they envisage is a framework of alliances centred primarily, if not exclusively, on US power and strategic leadership. This model, designated by one theorist as "hegemonic peace"⁷⁰, is therefore premised on the preservation or revamping of America's major alliances, in particular NATO⁷¹.

NATO is seen to be capable of providing a continuing and effective bridge between Europe and the United States, maintaining the balance between a unified Germany and the rest of Europe, ensuring Germany's continued adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)⁷², and making it possible for European defence to remain viable with relatively low levels of military expenditure⁷³. So in short, although NATO has been deprived of its primary function (i.e. deterrence to Soviet aggression and expansion), another function is judged to have assumed increasing importance; the containment of German power⁷⁴.

In addition to the containment of German power the US, it is argued, has a more bold and active role to play in the maintenance of international peace and security. With regard to this, the victory of the US-led coalition against Iraq in Kuwait (1991) demonstrated the US's intentions clearly. Krauthammer argued that this victory;

"brought sharply into focus ... the true geopolitical structure of the post-Cold War world ... : a single pole of world power that consists of the United States at the apex of the industrial West"⁷⁵.

He goes on to reason that since the vaunted multipolarity of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm was mainly 'pseudo' and because the United Nations is "the guarantor of nothing"⁷⁶:

"Our best hope for safety is in American strength and will - the strength and will to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them"⁷⁷.

The previous statements summarise as well as any the stance that has been adopted by those who proclaimed a new world order based on US global hegemony.

4.312 The Model of United Nations (UN) Global Policing

Certain non-western academics and politicians⁷⁸, many of whom are sceptical of the US's delusions of geopolitical grandeur, as well as certain liberally-minded commentators in the West⁷⁹, believe that US leadership alone is not a suitable basis for a new world order. They, along with representatives from minor world powers who have long been advocating an expansion of the UN's powers of enforcement⁸⁰, perceive a new world order in which the UN would be able to resume fully its originally intended purpose of securing the peaceful mediation of international conflicts.

Most accept that the US, as the only remaining military superpower, would have an important role to play in facilitating the execution of the Security Council's decisions. Nevertheless, they argue that the UN, which has been freed from the ideological deadlock

which had made it so difficult to act in the past and was after all the only reasonably independent international body, is a more suitable crux for the new world order.

This model, referred to by Jackson as the "Collective Security Model", is thus based on the "utopian hope for a UN system"⁸¹. Jackson, and others who share his beliefs⁸², have argued that since the UN managed to act against Iraq the post-Cold War world was heading towards a period of enhanced collective security which is to be superintended by the UN. Such a model fits in with the UN Charter which does in any case give the Security Council the authority, "to maintain or restore international peace and security," and to enforce the will of the council on a state that has broken the peace⁸³. Hence, use of military force by the Council for these purposes was foreseen by the founders of the UN. Therefore, the advocates of a post-Cold War model of UN global policing are merely prescribing that the facilities the UN has at its disposal be put into action. To an extent their initial prescriptions were heeded, and on 15 November 1989 the UN General Assembly accepted a resolution which pointed to the great powers' commonly shared desire for a revitalised United Nations with a central role in strengthening international order⁸⁴. In July 1991 this resolution was backed up by a Political Declaration of the Western Economic Summit in London⁸⁵, confirming the international communities support for a more potent UN.

Most supporters of the UN Global Policing model, and others like it, believe that even short of direct military intervention across recognised international boundaries, the United Nations would be able to take various initiatives aimed at war prevention, conflict resolution and peacekeeping. Increased utilization of this latter function is seen as being fundamental to the success of a newly empowered UN since it is one which it has previously performed with moderate success, at least in conflicts that have been peripheral to the Cold War⁸⁶. Little time was wasted and as early as 1991 UN personnel in

peacekeeping and related operations were deployed along the Arab/Israeli borders and in the Golan Heights, Lebanon, Iraq/Kuwait, India/Pakistan, Cyprus, El Salvador and Angola⁸⁷. There soon followed a significant deployments to Western Sahara (September 1991) and Cambodia (February 1992) and then, in the largest peacekeeping operation ever attempted, Yugoslavia (March 1992)⁸⁸. Equally indicative of future possibilities was the role that the UN was playing in mediation and conciliation with respect to several long-standing conflicts⁸⁹. Indeed as Camilleri wrote:

"In country after country the UN was acting as the midwife of political transition: supervising elections; overseeing the demobilisation of military units previously engaged in civil war; creating an impartial police force; rebuilding war-torn economies; and sometimes, even when not invited, initiating major 'humanitarian relief' programs."⁹⁰

Although the UN was some way from establishing itself as the pivotal force in a new world order and there were those who doubted its potency⁹¹, for a short time at least, it was fulfilling many of the roles envisaged for it by advocates of UN-based geopolitical models.

4.313 The Model of International Capitalism

What is envisaged here is a global situation in which the increased economic interdependence that followed the opening up of capitalist markets in the former Soviet Union will create a new international trading order which would in turn enhance global security. Three arguments are proposed to support this interpretation or model. First of all, and fundamentally, it is proposed that increased interdependence will directly reduce the incentives to use force as a means of settling disputes⁹². Second, advocates of the model of international capitalism argue that interdependence will increase incentives for

states to institutionalize co-operation and engage in rule-based international behaviour. Finally, it is posited that intensified interdependence will shift economic priorities in ways that will make territorial conquest less desirable⁹³

Two of the earliest proponents of this model were Keohane and Nye who showed in their book, *Power and Interdependence* (1977), how increased economic interdependence among advanced industrial states could enhance security directly by reducing their incentives to use force against one another in settling their disputes. They cited two examples to support their beliefs; Canada abandoning war plans for fighting the United States after World War I and France abandoning its war plans against its European neighbours⁹⁴.

More recently, and particularly in the aftermath of the Cold War, theorists have built on these arguments and two distinct camps have emerged; the so called "economic doves" and their counterparts the "economic hawks"⁹⁵. In short, the economic doves hold that increased international economic activity can only be for the good of the international community. The hawks, on the other hand, point to the new types of conflicts that the typically skewed relationships of economic interdependence which result from international capitalism can generate⁹⁶. Such conflicts are a relatively new phenomenon because they were not possible in the Cold War when adversarial states remained aloof from one another. Proponents of the model of international capitalism generally accept both of these arguments and conclude that even a new geo-economic world order as perceived by the economic hawks would be safer than previous geo-political world orders and disorders have been. As Ruggie⁹⁷ points out, in a bid to reduce these new economic conflicts, states have institutionalized their interdependencies in international regimes and the rules and procedures of these regimes enforce the norm of reciprocity and ensure a convergence of expectations which can lead to compromise⁹⁸. After all, who could

contemplate a scenario involving conflict between member states of the EU. Cable draws similar conclusions, reasoning that even the most hawkish of states will soon deduce:

"that contemporary global conditions require a co-operative rather than confrontational pursuit of an economic security that is a shared condition rather than a goal of individual states"⁹⁹

So, whether one veers towards the perspective of the hawks or doves, the model outlined here depends on competition between states being curtailed at the economic level and geopolitical considerations, therefore, eventually paling into relative insignificance. Out of this competition, advocates of the model of international capitalism foresee the emergence of a new world order based on fiscal power alone. Whereas the traditional ingredient of international power has long been armed force the new fiscal power derives mainly from the "capacity to exploit technological innovation"¹⁰⁰.

It has long been known that governments do not treat national economies only as a means of enriching their citizens. In the 1960s the British economist, Hawtrey, wrote of a world where "the major concern of the state is prestige. The means to prestige is power. Power is economic productivity capable of being applied as a force"¹⁰¹. Samuel Huntington has expressed the same basic point in a modern idiom:

"Economists are blind to the fact that economic activity is a source of power as well as well-being. It is, indeed, probably the most important source of power and, in a world in which military conflict between major states is unlikely, economic power will be increasingly important in determining the primacy or subordination of states."¹⁰²

The model which is implicit in this view is not dissimilar from the zero sum game, discussed in the introduction of this thesis as being one of the favourite tools of traditional realist geopoliticians, in which the gains of one country (primacy) are seen as cancelling out the losses of another (subordination) even if both achieve growing prosperity. It was such thinking that led Hazel Henderson to conclude:

"The Cold War is over, Japan has won."¹⁰³

In summary, this thinking has been called "geo-economics" by Edward Luttwak; "the pursuit of adversarial goals with commercial means"¹⁰⁴. Those concerned with national security in this new geo-economic world order are envisaged as having only to grapple with these less deadly economic 'wars'.

As well as the US, which although possibly in economic decline is forecast to remain a global fiscal power well into the next century, the future pillars of this new geo-economic world order are seen to be Japan and Germany (and/or Europe). In addition to these two pillars some theorists also believe that the potential for fiscal prowess that China and Russia exhibit also has to be taken into account¹⁰⁵. Finally, since economic well-being has a direct bearing on development levels many theorists also bring North-South tensions into play in their models and talk of a switch from East-West military-related confrontation to North-South economically-derived tension¹⁰⁶.

4.32 Malta's three post-Cold War policy frameworks

The three models elucidated above as having dominated post-Cold War geopolitical thinking around the world also reveal themselves in a major way in Maltese geopolitical thinking. They do so in the form of the policy frameworks through which Malta's leaders

and their decision-makers generate foreign policy. Broadly speaking, three separate frameworks can be identified as having exerted influence over Maltese post-Cold War foreign policy, although overlaps exist between them. The following paragraphs examine these three separate policy frameworks and show how they are not only direct derivatives of the simplistic meta-theories outlined above but also how they are in many respects descendants of some of the past frameworks through which Maltese foreign policy has been constructed. For reasons that will become clear, it is proposed to call these policy frameworks *imperceptive colonial realism*, *neo-fortress realism* and *impractical idealism*.

4.321 Imperceptive colonial realism

It is difficult to conclude that the Nationalist Party's approach to policy both in government and in opposition derives from anything other than a realist policy framework. For almost a decade their main foreign policy priority has been to attain accession to the European Union. This quest has had a damaging effect on Malta's relationships with the poorer and more troubled countries to the south and east of their region and so jeopardised the once cherished ideal of pan-Mediterranean co-operation¹⁰⁷.

The policy framework through which Malta was governed by the British in the first phase identified in this thesis was labelled *perceptive colonial realism*¹⁰⁸. The two main defining characteristics of this framework were that the colonial administrators assumed that the British nation-state accurately represented the population of its entire empire and, furthermore, they were acting in the best interests of colonial populations by providing them with a level of physical security. In addition to this, the adjective *perceptive* implies that the framework through which the British governed Malta, although unquestionably authoritative, was decidedly more perceptive towards the needs of the native population than were the policy frameworks imposed on other British and other European colonies.

The interpretations behind all such policy frameworks were such that the colonial world was seen as a mosaic of individual and autonomous units, which were in continual and aggressive competition with each other. As explained in the first chapter of this thesis, policy frameworks such as this were not strictly unique to the British empire. The other great European empires, and the minor ones as well, were also administered through policy frameworks which would now be referred to as being realist in nature. The genesis of this pervading realist outlook on the globe was what Gearoid O'Tuathail referred to as the "Eurocentric" and "expansionist gaze" that the main colonial powers had over the rest of the world¹⁰⁹.

A century on from the colonial era referred to by O'Tuathail and a critical assessment of Maltese foreign policy under the Nationalist administration could plausibly conclude that the islands' policy-makers are once again subscribing to a Eurocentric geopolitical gaze. The only differences between this and the one cast by the main European powers over a century ago being that military aspects of competition have taken a back seat to economic aspects of competition. Through this gaze, the main European powers are seeking to expand their economic influence in a number of different ways. With an arrogance comparable to that displayed by early colonizers, today's major European powers assume that the potential benefits to prospective new recruits vastly out-weigh any possible disadvantages that may accompany their accession to the EU. In other words, it is assumed that by guaranteeing a level of economic prosperity the EU can adequately represent the best interests of any new populations. This is assumed to be the case regardless of the specific circumstances of the would-be economic colonies. Therefore, it is easy to see why to the most cynical of observers it may seem almost as if the western and EU-dominated media acts as an all-pervasive modern day missionary and any doubters are dismissed as retrogressive and undemocratic, the contemporary equivalent of pagan primitives.

The geopolitical thinking behind the Nationalist government's policy responses in the period immediately after the end of the Cold War draws heavily on the model of international capitalism outlined earlier (5.311). In simple terms, thinking is based on the assumption that in the post-Cold War world geo-economic factors have come to be more significant than the more traditional geo-political factors and that Malta must re-align her international relations to take this into account. However, the transition from a geo-political globe to a geo-economic one alone is not seen by advocates of the Nationalist Party's foreign policy stance as being capable of producing a more peacefully competitive world, and so in their interpretation straight-forward economic realism also comes into play. In short, the choice is seen as being between alignment with either an impoverished and volatile southern flank or a prosperous and stable northern flank.

To summarize, such thinking is tantamount to a reversion to the earlier forms of geopolitical thinking exhibited by Maltese policy-makers which also resulted in concessions of self-determination being made to a more powerful international actor. However, this time around there is a danger that the main economic colonizers, convinced as they are of the enhanced regional stability that would accompany an enlarged EU and pre-occupied with the economic efficiency of the elite club within the elite club itself, may fail to be overly attuned to the needs of new and less significant member states. Hence, the term proposed in the title to portray the geopolitical thinking behind the Nationalist Party's main policy responses; *imperceptive colonial realism*.

4.322 Neo-fortress realism

It is argued above that economic realism constitutes the bedrock of the Nationalist Party's post-Cold War foreign policy-making framework or in other words that economic and perhaps politico-economic factors exert the strongest influence over their policy responses to international developments. However, in addition to the economic realism apparent in the Nationalist Party's policy framework the continued importance of hard-headed realist geopolitics to their thinking over policy must also be taken into account.

The policy initiative examined in the second section of this chapter which best illustrates a return to hard-headed realist geopolitical thinking was the signing of the NATO Partnership for Peace accord in 1995. Although, as discussed, the motives behind this manoeuvre were complex (involving an attempt to pander to the demands of the EU and perhaps deliberately undermine Malta's neutral status) the realist military and geopolitical motivations behind this intriguing policy manoeuvre should not be overlooked.

Prior to Malta's involvement with NATO through PpP there had been no significant place in Malta for realism, or policy decisions based mainly on military considerations, since the Second World War. The strain of realism that defined geopolitical thinking in and on Malta throughout the Second World War was labelled in chapter two as *fortress realism*. Like all forms of realism, this particular strain of realism embodied a number of assumptions about the nature of the world and it was these assumptions that determined the geopolitical thinking behind Malta's policy responses to the two world wars. First and foremost, the inevitable continuity of global conflict was assumed, as was the primacy of war and preparation for war above all other matters of the state. It follows that the maintenance of territorial security was taken to be the most important of all of the tasks bestowed on Malta's colonial and native leaders. In addition to this, it was assumed with

conviction that Malta's military guardian, the British nation-state, accurately represented and acted in the best interests of all citizens of its empire.

Although it would be somewhat unrealistic to imply that by signing PfP Malta's leaders had reverted to an historical mode of geopolitical thinking that was identical to *fortress realism*, when making historical comparisons the parallels are impossible to ignore. In choosing to align Malta with the most powerful military alliance the world has known, Malta's leaders were turning their back on their country's hard-earned neutrality and the ideal of a co-operative peace. No matter how tenuous alignment through PfP was intended to be, they projected the islands back into the power games of the world's main players and the reality of inter-state confrontation. In this respect, it is possible to conclude that Malta's leaders were once again subscribing to the realist impositions of outside powers. War, preparation for war and considerations of territoriality had shot up the Maltese government's agenda in the aftermath of the Cold War and the Maltese found themselves a part of the Western security camp almost overnight.

One can only conjecture that the geopolitical thinking behind this policy response derived from a similar kind of interpretation of geopolitical change to the one that had led to the model of US global hegemony (see 5.312). In other words, no matter what other motives the government had at this time (impressing the EU, testing public opinion over Malta's neutrality, shifting the burden of justification over Malta's non-alignment to the opposition) it was confident in the US's ability to lead a new peaceful world order. In Malta's location, pandering to the Western generated model of US global hegemony was especially risky. As will be seen in the concluding chapter of this thesis, in the post-Cold War world it is the more insidious threats that transgress national boundaries that in many ways pose the greatest threat to international peace and security. Malta's closer association with NATO could easily have been interpreted by some of the intra-state

terrorist movements to the south and east of the Mediterranean as gestures that were hostile to their own radical causes. Furthermore, given the lack of any commitment by the US to protect signatories (which was initially included in the programme in an effort to limit the expected Russian hostility to what they may well have perceived as a first step towards the expansion of NATO), Malta may well have been on a hiding to nothing. In short, Malta came very close to once again becoming a scantily protected fortress or outpost on the West's southern flank and for this reason it is feasible to label the geopolitical thinking which almost led to this as *neo-fortress realism*.

4.323 Impractical idealism

There is an alternative strand of geopolitical thinking in Malta to that evident in the policies of the Nationalist Party, developed by the Labour Party's think tank in response to the developments which have characterised the post-Cold War world.

As outlined in the second section of this chapter, the Labour Party have responded to the end of East/West bipolarism by effectively imagining the emergence of a new bipolarism between North and South. The increasing tensions between North and South are used to justify the continued relevance of Malta's neutrality in the post-Cold War world¹¹⁰. They foresee an important role for Malta as a regional arbitrator between the two emerging camps and are critical of any Nationalist policies which stand to interfere with this planned role. To this end, since coming to power in October 1996 they have withdrawn from PfP and made no further efforts to seek accession to the EU¹¹¹. Inspired by a resurgence of idealist thinking and sentiments¹¹², they have set about re-establishing Malta's internationally recognised neutrality and non-alignment.

It is envisaged by the new government that the UN, and perhaps eventually a regional forum for the UN in the form of a CSCM, will be able to offer the requisite protection to Malta in her fulfilment of this role. Hence, the thinking behind the Labour Party leadership, both when in opposition and in government, owes much to the thinking behind the model of universal security which was outlined earlier (5.313). As was spelled out by the deputy leader and foreign affairs spokesman for the Labour Party, they see the UN as the only suitable body around which to base a new world order¹¹³. In short, they hold that if micro-powers or minor international players such as Malta are to retain any meaningful level of self-determination in the post-Cold War world they must be backed up by a more willing and potent UN¹¹⁴.

The conceptual framework through which Maltese decision-makers generated policy in the Cold War was labelled in the last chapter as *practical idealism*, *idealism* because Malta's political leaders opted out of the realism of the bipolar confrontation, choosing instead to strive towards neutrality and non-alignment in their idealistic quest for peace; and *practical idealism* because in their somewhat idealistic quest they were not blind to the more practical requirements of a developing island micro-state.

It can be argued that the geopolitical thinking behind the Labour Party's responses to post-Cold War world developments is similarly idealist in nature. Although official documents setting out their foreign policy, both in opposition and in government, identify the diverse range of potential threats to Malta's security they all tend to draw conclusions along the following lines;

"There is no indication that in the foreseeable future we can fall prey to any military threat from another country or foreign power with the specific aim to threaten our territorial integrity."¹¹⁵

Consequently they choose instead to focus on the less ominous aspects of contemporary international relations. On this, in 1994 former foreign minister Alex Sceberra Trigona spelled out the post-Cold War role that the Labour Party envisaged for Malta:

"Mediating between non-aligned states, as well as between them and aligned states is a role that Malta should not and cannot afford to give up lightly. It is truly in keeping with Malta's real vocation as well as living up to Malta's constitutional role of being a neutral state actively pursuing peace."¹¹⁶

The idealist thinking behind much of the discourse to be found in documents concerned with post-Cold War Labour Party foreign policy is there for all to see. However, whereas in the Cold War few could question the validity of neutrality as an instrument of foreign policy for certain states, there is a large question mark over its continued relevance and indeed practicality in the post-bipolar world¹¹⁷. Throughout the Cold War, states who pursued policies of neutrality or non-alignment could expect backing and endorsement from a range of international actors. As has already been mentioned, at one stage Malta was receiving moneys from as diverse a range of sources as Italy, Great Britain, NATO, Libya and China, as Dominic Fenech stated;

"non-alignment was paying in cash, so that Malta's development plans [referring to the 'Development Plan for Malta (1973-1980)'] could proceed"¹¹⁸.

Since the end of the Cold War support from other international actors for Maltese neutrality has dwindled. It is not that anyone is against Malta's neutrality but more that most actors are apathetic towards declarations of non-alignment and neutrality. After all,

in the post-bipolar world there are no longer two 'poles' between which an effective balance can be created. Even if tensions between North and South are envisaged as becoming more significant in the future, they themselves are never likely to be sufficiently confrontational to justify policies of neutrality for intermediary states¹¹⁹. In short, in terms of security considerations and economic common sense the vigorous re-confirmation of Malta's policy of neutrality and non-alignment is impractical given the regional and global geopolitical environment. Hence to summarize and propose a term for purposes of comparison, such a policy response to the end of the bipolar world derives from a strain of geopolitical thinking which can be thought of as *impractical idealism*.

4.33 Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the post-Cold War era. It has moved from examining the wider-world geopolitical changes which caused the Cold War to end and also dictated the nature of the world after bipolarism, through an assessment of the contrasting policy responses through which Maltese leaders reacted to these changes, and ended with an enquiry into the thinking behind these policy responses. Three labels have been suggested, all of which have some negative connotations. They are each designed to depict the historic parallels that can be drawn between the geopolitical thinking behind Malta's contemporary policy and that behind the policies through which the Maltese were governed at earlier phases in their political history. In addition to this, it was concluded in the last section that this historically derived geopolitical thinking that has dominated post-Cold War decision-making in Malta also draws heavily on one of the three main meta-theories or models that theorists elsewhere in the world have used to interpret assumed new world order.

The three labels used to depict the various strains of geopolitical thinking behind Malta's policy responses in recent years are negatively connotated because each strain of thought has been related to the thinking that dominated a past era, and none of them are strictly relevant to Malta's contemporary circumstances. *Imperceptive colonial realism* has been paralleled with the policy framework labelled 'perceptive colonial realism', which the British governed Malta through in the first phase examined in this thesis. The geopolitical thinking behind *neo-fortress realism* has been shown to equate in many ways with the thinking that inspired British command of Malta throughout and between the two world wars. Finally, the similarities between *impractical idealism* and the mode of geopolitical thinking behind Malta's quest for the ideal of security through non-alignment and neutrality in the Cold War era have also been investigated.

It is possible to argue that in many ways the outdated modes of geopolitical thought that have dominated and dogged Maltese responses to global changes over the last decade are not just related by fluke to past modes of thinking but have their roots in the various historical modes of thought. Although he was not strictly concerned with geopolitical thinking, Sultana has made the point that the events the Maltese as a people have been exposed to are bound to influence their present-day thinking. For instance, he has proposed the idea of Malta's modern "welcoming society" orientation which he argues is most likely derived from a gradual erosion of the islanders' self-confidence caused by the successive colonizers grooming a certain liege mentality. To the rulers, effective control depended on the Maltese harbouring positive dispositions towards their occupiers and such a mentality was therefore an essential ingredient for a secure fortress. Today, however, Sultana points out that this "welcoming society" orientation has the effect of exposing Malta's national integrity, internal cohesion and core values to external political interference. In making such a point Sultana comes close to moving away from the mainly sociological focus of his 'inquiry' and verifying precisely the point being argued here that it

is entirely plausible to assume that in terms of geopolitical thinking about Malta, many of the habits of history transpose into the roles of today. In particular, it is easy to see how a history characterised by dependence, with a succession of foreign overlords making decisions for the Maltese has bequeathed certain legacies which are discernible in the more realist-related thinking apparent in recent Nationalist Party policy responses. Indeed, even the more idealist responses adopted in the last decade by the Labour Party are tantamount to a continuation of the policies that were designed to serve the Maltese throughout the Cold War.

It is thus possible to conclude that all three of the contemporary modes of thinking in Malta are based on a combination of outdated thinking and one of a series of meta-theories. As will be shown in the following paragraphs, each of these meta-theories is arguably fundamentally flawed and the outdated thinking is doomed to failure.

The three meta-theories or models on which Malta's foreign policies (and the foreign policies of many other international actors) were based in the aftermath of the Cold War can be said to have been fundamentally flawed since they failed to materialise. The following three paragraphs explain briefly why this proved to be the case.

The western generated visions of a unipolar world kept in line by the military might of the US were soon seen to be flawed. Although the US-led campaign in the Gulf (1990-1991) may have been cause for some optimism, upheavals in Latin America, coups in Africa and rioting in Asia could not be as easily explained or understood as Islamic-motivated anti-western provocation or the Soviet-inspired plots of the Cold War. Most notably, however, the conflicts in the Balkans between 1991 and 1995 created a problematic too complex for the US to deal with and served to illustrate the limitations of US attempts at global geopolitical hegemony. Regardless of the US-brokered peace settlement in Dayton,

Ohio on 21 November 1995, the credibility of the concept of a new world order based on US unipolarity had been irreversibly undermined. Perhaps more significantly however, as the extent of the US's domestic problems came to light throughout the 1990s, US leaders began to doubt that they had the ability or support to pursue such an ambitious and responsible role.

The second model of new world order investigated in the last section (4.312) was the one based on the utopian hope for an all-encompassing and all-pervading UN system. Although the revitalization of the UN's peace-keeping functions over the last decade or so has proved invaluable, the organization has failed to demonstrate its effectiveness in policing major world problems. It played an insignificant role in the Gulf campaign (1990-1991) yet managed to amass huge debts, it dragged its feet over Yugoslavia (1992-1995), and has suffered a series of humiliations in Somalia (1992), Angola (1991) and Rwanda (1993)¹²⁰. The major factor in this disappointing run of form was that the level of great power consensus over how to react to sudden and unpredictable developments was lacking. Such consensus depends on a neat dividing line between law-abiding and law-breaking states and the use or threat of force by the former against the latter¹²¹. A dividing line such as this was the forlorn hope of the founding fathers of the UN who held that international peace and security could be attained through the rule of international law. In short, their best intentions have always been beyond their reach since even if such a line were to persist in the eyes of the Permanent Five, it may not be perceived by other members of the Security Council or by significant segments of the UN's membership in the same way.

The third model of new world order examined in the last section (4.313) was labelled the model of international capitalism. This model has also failed to establish itself in the decade or so since the end of the Cold War. The model of international capitalism was

premised above all else on the fact that peacefully trading democracies do not fight each other. It was argued that as more countries open their borders to trade and become democratic (witness eastern Europe) a new more stable and secure international trading order would emerge. The above premiss is quite simply flawed since prior to 1914 Britain, France, and Germany were more democratic than many countries around the world are today and intra-European trade was flourishing, yet this did not prevent war. Furthermore, the argument carries no weight because many of the new democracies that have emerged in recent years are little more than facades or transitional democracies and thus represent far too fragile a base around which to plan a new world order. In summary, geo-economic factors have failed to take precedence over geo-political factors as was anticipated by advocates of this model. The clearest demonstration of this was the recent decision (May and June 1998) taken by Pakistani and Indian governments to pursue offensive nuclear weapon building programmes despite being aware that they were increasing the likelihood of a costly arms race and knowing that the atomic tests required by these programmes would almost certainly invite UN-imposed economic sanctions. In addition to this, however, economic progress in the successor states of the Soviet Union has been adumbrated by organized criminal activity, poor accountancy and leadership and, furthermore, the developed nations have failed to address adequately the disparities that exist between them and the world's poorer nations. In short, the spawning of international capitalism would if anything appear to be faltering and is certainly not taking place at anything like the rate that most theorists had predicted in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. This spawning or multi-dimensional expansion of capitalism has been referred to as the "western-centred process of normative convergence"¹²². Quite simply, such western inspired convergence can never form the basis of a more peaceful world order since it will never escape criticism and resistance from that large section of humanity which has contributed little towards it and gained even less from it.

The above models all failed to acknowledge the important role that the new regional specificities or interacting regional trends had in explaining the nature of the contemporary geopolitical surface of the globe. In Malta, however, the recent renaissance in geopolitical thinking was not only based on a preoccupation with such models but also on an reluctance to discard classical modes of geopolitical thinking. Together, this preoccupation with global meta-theories and general reluctance to look beyond classical modes of geopolitical interpretation, has meant that the Maltese are relatively unaware of some of the most vital issues currently affecting their region.

Having just discussed their unhealthy commitment to global meta-theories of new world-order, this chapter now turns to the widespread reluctance that seems to be apparent amongst Maltese geopolitical thinkers to look beyond classical modes of geopolitical thought, which can be explained in terms of a downward spiral in the history of geopolitical thinking in Malta:

THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL OF GEOPOLITICAL THINKING IN MALTA




Figure 6 shows how over the last two centuries or so the dominant mode of geopolitical thinking in Malta has swung clearly between variations of realism and idealism. Throughout the colonialism of the nineteenth century and the anarchy of the two world wars those involved in geopolitical thinking in Malta were heavily influenced by realist interpretations of the global situation. Throughout the bipolarism of the Cold War Malta's geopolitical thinkers leant more towards idealist interpretations of the geopolitical surface of the globe. This time period, which lasted almost two hundred years, can be said to have constituted the "heritage" of geopolitical thinking in Malta. As portrayed on the diagram, the period which followed this witnessed a "renaissance" in classical geopolitical thinking in Malta. The parallels which existed between the dominant modes of geopolitical thinking in this renaissance period and the earlier heritage period are represented by the shaded arrows.

The diagram is also intended to depict the regressive nature of this whole state of affairs. For almost two centuries now the dominant mode of thinking has swung between straightforward modes of realism and idealism. These various forms of realism and idealism dictated Maltese interpretations and responses of the changing global geopolitical situation. The spiral is intended to portray that as time goes on both strict realist and idealist methodologies seem to be becoming further withdrawn from the actual evolving global geopolitical situations. No effort is made on the diagram to forecast future geopolitical situations but the downward spiral does attempt to infer that they are likely to become less predictable. It is this unpredictability that will render both rigid realism and conventional idealism less and less relevant as the global geopolitical situation evolves. Seemingly, however, those engaged in geopolitical thinking in Malta are unaware of the declining relevance of these two traditional approaches. Thus ultimately, geopolitical thinking in Malta is at risk of spiralling on down into a hopeless state of indecision in

which there is no consensus or middle ground between the two orthodox but irrelevant approaches of realism and idealism.

In order to escape from this doomed spiral Malta's geopolitical thinkers must turn their back on the current renaissance of classical geopolitical thinking and seek instead to promote the kind of rejuvenation that this thesis has introduced. Their escape route is indicated by the dashed arrow on the diagram. The current renaissance of classical geopolitical thinking and the apparent pre-occupation with meta-theories of new world order have together effectively become a *sancta simplicitas* for Maltese policy-makers, relieving them of their duty to address the more relevant trends that are specific to Malta's own contemporary geopolitical environment. These less orthodox trends are what pose the difficult first-order questions to Malta's policy-makers. It is only by seeking to answer these more difficult first-order questions that Malta's policy-makers can begin to arrive at the kind of alternative interpretations of their unique geopolitical environment which are required to instigate a rejuvenation in their geopolitical thinking. The following chapter (5) aims to contribute to such a rejuvenation by tackling some of these first-order issues head on, without recourse to any one particular mode of thinking or school of thought.

Endnotes

¹ *Fin de siècle* is a French term which means quite simply 'end of century'. This term is encountered in much of the contemporary literature on geopolitics and political geography. Typically theorists use it to draw attention to the similarities that exist between the end of the current century and the closing years of the last century, both of these periods having set new precedents with regard to the extent and rapidity of the global geopolitical changes which they witnessed. For further explanation and examples of the usage of this term see: Taylor 1989, p. xi; Parker 1985, (throughout) and O'Tuathail 1997 (throughout).

² The most thorough overview of this series of reforms can be found in Sakwa 1990.

³ The following paragraph contains a summary of the introduction to Gorbachev 1988.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Grenville 1994, p. 895.

⁸ Gorbachev April 1985, Gorbachev *op. cit.*

⁹ For more on the revolutions in eastern and central Europe see Batt 1991.

¹⁰ 'Iron Curtain' was the term first used to describe the junction of the two great geopolitical blocs which inherited the territory of a prostrate Europe. Churchill is often credited with having launched this concept in his now famous speech in Fulton, Missouri, (February 1946) when he warned of the dangers which were confronting the West in the aftermath of the Second World War. Interestingly, however, Churchill had borrowed the term off the Nazi Propaganda Minister, Joseph Goebbels, who had coined it in the last days of the war to describe the probable forthcoming confrontation between the Western allies and the Soviet Union. See Trevor-Roper 1978.

¹¹ This footage has since been incorporated into the entrée of the acclaimed BBC Television series and book, *The Second Russian Revolution: The Struggle for Power in the Kremlin*. See Roxburgh 1991.

¹² Batt *op. cit.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Hobsbawm has made the point that for the most part the transitional period in eastern Europe was relatively peaceful because "hardly anyone had believed in the [communist] system or felt any loyalty to it, not even those who governed it". He also states, "[A]t the moment of truth, no East European government ordered its forces to fire ... No groups of communist ultras anywhere prepared to die in the bunker for their faith". See Hobsbawm 1994, p. 488.

¹⁵ For more on the coup which closed Nicolae Ceauçescu's harshly repressive rule and ended in him being shot with his wife beside him see Grenville *op. cit.*, pp. 898-901 and "Romania: Getting Nastier", *The Economist*, 4 February 1995, p. 32.

¹⁶ See *The Economist*, 18 November 1995.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ It should be noted, however, that there were some who have since claimed to have forecast the break-up of the Soviet Union. Most notable of these is Brzezinski who in his book, *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century*, (completed in August 1988) foretold that communism was in terminal crisis and that the 'reform' of communism would fail and result in the break-up of the Soviet Union itself. See Brzezinski 1989.

¹⁹ Kaiser 1996 has provided an excellent account of the *Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR*.

²⁰ Duncan 1995 made this point, p. 3.

²¹ The alliance known as the CIS has now become an established and relatively stable member of the international community. However, commentators continue to warn of the latent nationalisms which exist in the CIS. See for e.g. Kunz (*The Sunday Times*, 24 December 1995) and *The Economist*, How many other Chechnyas?, 14 January 1995.

²² Smith 1990 in his introduction raised the question of *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union* and examined the effects that this was likely to have on the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet military machine.

²³ The best account of the progress made in these negotiations can be found in NATO's basic fact sheet No. 7. See NATO April 1994

²⁴ A plethora of articles, papers, books and official NATO documents spell out how NATO's member states set about changing NATO's functions immediately after the Cold War. See for e.g. Rühle and Williams 1995, Mortimer 7 December 1994 and Cass 1995. Official NATO documents include *The Transformation of an Alliance, 1990-1991*, and *The Future of NATO* (1994 Summit). Maltese commentators have also made an input, although typically to promote their own domestic political views. See for e.g. Calleya's article in Malta's *Sunday Times* entitled "Nato's identity crisis" (12 February 1995) and from the contrasting viewpoint Montanaro's article "Transforming NATO into a partnership for peace" (9 April 1995).

²⁵ For a thorough account of the liberation of Kuwait and the Second Gulf War see Barzilai 1993; and also Baudrillard 1995 for a thorough account of the actual events and an enlightening debate on the almost subconscious propagandist role that the western media played.

²⁶ See Silber and Little 1991 for a thorough investigation into what they call *The death of Yugoslavia* and a critical assessment of the West's belated interventionist efforts.

²⁷ Harff 1994, p. 10.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ See the article by Prentice in *The Times (British)*, 3 January 1995, p.12.

³⁰ The term 'practitioners of international relations' can be taken specifically to mean politicians, particularly those concerned with and involved in foreign affairs, diplomats and members of the armed forces. Increasingly, however, in the age of multi-national corporations and global economics representatives from business are effectively practitioners of international relations.

³¹ It was the student body KSU which first alluded to the emotive nature of this particular political debate. In an article in *The Times (Malta)* 20 April 1995, they hit out at political parties for their campaigns on foreign policy issues saying they were "emotive, based on fear, and bluntly misinformative", p. 8.

³² *Sunday Times of Malta*, 19 June 1994, pp. 9-11.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ European Parliament 1988, p. 14, which quotes the then Nationalist Prime Minister, Dr Fenech Adami as saying, "Malta has not adopted, in the technical sense of international law, a status of permanent neutrality". It is this statement more than any other which led the Nationalist commentators I met to repeated reference to Malta's neutrality as being *sui generis* (meaning one of a kind).

³⁵ Constitution of Malta, Article I (3) (1987 Amendment).

³⁶ Quote taken from *The Times (Malta)*, "Joining EU will guarantee Malta's security - de Marco" (28 January 1994) p. 1.

³⁷ Government publication, 1994, p. 12.

³⁸ Although the 'Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation' between Malta and Libya has been amended since the end of the Cold War, deleting the section relating to co-operation in security, it should be noted that Libya remains the only Mediterranean country with which the EU has no kind of agreement, see: *Agence Europe*, 9 April 1993, p. 12. Also see section 2 of Ch. 4 of this thesis for further details of this significant stage in Malta's international relations.

³⁹ European Commission, April 1993, para. 19, p. 10.

⁴⁰ Dr. George Vella, the then Malta Labour Party's foreign affairs spokesman and deputy leader, made this point (that were the Nationalist Party to secure another election victory they would undoubtedly seek to abandon the Neutrality and Non-alignment clauses in Malta's constitution) when interviewed (12 April 1995).

⁴¹ For further details of the PFP framework document and how it applied to Malta see *The Times (Malta)* "PM says Partnership contributes to collective security under UN, OSCE", 4 April 1995, p. 1; and *The Times (Malta)* "The Partnership for Peace invitation", 5 April 1995, p. 13.

⁴² This line of reasoning emanated from Dr George Vella (Deputy Leader MLP and main Foreign Affairs spokesman) who described PFP membership as "ransom for Malta to join the EU", *The Times (Malta)*, April 5 1995, p. 8. See also, *The Malta Independent*: "Partnership of convenience", 9 April 1995, p. 8.

- ⁴³ Many of the commentaries in Malta's main newspapers at this time had come to focus on the restrictions that entrenched constitutional neutrality placed on Malta's policy makers. See for e.g. "Neutrality: more problems than solutions" *The Malta Independent*, 26 February 1995, p. 46.
- ⁴⁴ Fenech 1997, p. 161.
- ⁴⁵ *Sunday Times of Malta*, 12 June 1994, pp. 8-10.
- ⁴⁶ *Sunday Times of Malta*, 26 June 1994, pp. 5-7.
- ⁴⁷ Redmond describe this situation as undemocratic and totally unacceptable. See Redmond 1993, p. 124.
- ⁴⁸ Leo Brincat spelled out the foreign policy stance adopted by the Malta Labour Party clearly in a lengthy article in *The Malta Independent* entitled "Partnership for Peace and Malta's geo-strategic interests", 26 February 1995, p. 23. See also, *The Times*: "Opposition insists neutrality, non-alignment still relevant" April 7 1995, p. 8.
- ⁴⁹ Bin 1995, p. 3.
- ⁵⁰ Malta Labour Party 1994, p. 34.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 37 and 38.
- ⁵² *Sunday Times of Malta*, 19 June 1994, pp. 9-11.
- ⁵³ Malta Labour Party, *op. cit.*
- ⁵⁴ *Malta Independent*, 18 December 1994, p. 25.
- ⁵⁵ Malta Labour Party, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 36.
- ⁵⁷ See *The Sunday Times (Malta)* "How Labour sees Malta's relations with EU", 8 January 1995, p. 37.
- ⁵⁸ E.g. Bin *op. cit.* p. 13.
- ⁵⁹ Fenech 1997, p. 162.
- ⁶⁰ Although Bush is usually recognised as having been the principal proponent of this rubric and other commentators and theorists (mainly from the West or at least concerned with serving the West's interests) have helped bring it into common usage, it was Carter who originally talked of the "new world". President Carter, speaking at Notre Dame University on 22 May 1977 highlighted the relaxation of the threat of conflict with the Soviet Union, the moral crisis over the Vietnam War, the economic strains of the 1970s, the apparent inability of industrial democracy to provide sustained well-being and the passing of colonialism and declared that these trends had weakened the foundations of the system which the US once predominated. The above deductions led him to conclude that it was "a new world" and if order was to come from it "a new American foreign policy" was required. See Agnew 1997, p. 98.
- ⁶¹ Bowman 1922.
- ⁶² See for e.g. Krauthammer *op. cit.* and Gaddis *op. cit.*
- ⁶³ In truth more than three models were proposed and they were subsumed under many different rubrics. I have chosen to put forward the main three and suggested three general and all-encompassing titles: 'The model of US global hegemony', 'the model of UN global policing' and 'the model of international capitalism'.
- ⁶⁴ Of all of the models that have been based on US global hegemony the one elucidated by Camilleri, which they label the 'Unipolar Security Model', bears the closest resemblance to the one I outline here. See Camilleri 1993, pp. 84-86.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.* p. 85.
- ⁶⁶ See for e.g. Krauthammer 1990-1991 and Gaddis, Spring 1991.
- ⁶⁷ See Fukuyama, 1989 and 1992.
- ⁶⁸ See Smith *op. cit.* for more on *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union*.
- ⁶⁹ The most comprehensive account of *The Unipolar Movement* was provided by Krauthammer *op. cit.*
- ⁷⁰ Brown 1991, p. 210.
- ⁷¹ Two articles which are presented in the same edition of *International Affairs* are useful on the revamping of America's main alliance, NATO: Sloan 1995 and Borawski 1995.
- ⁷² The NPT was signed in 1968 by over 160 states and has since been extended at the 1995 NPT Conference. See NATO Basic Fact Sheet No. 7 for further details.
- ⁷³ For discussions on the assumed mutual benefits of a closer relationship between the EU and an enlarged NATO see Rühle and Williams 1995, Latter 1995 and Sloan 1995.
- ⁷⁴ Camilleri *op. cit.*, p. 84.

⁷⁵ Krauthammer op. cit., p. 24.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 25.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p.33.

⁷⁸ See for example Lieven 1995 who highlighted the strength of *Russian opposition to NATO expansion*. He argued that the US was seeking to attain global military supremacy through the expansion of NATO and that this expansion, if allowed to continue, would, "add the crowning touch to Russia's humiliation"(p. 196). See also Senghaas 1993 who was concerned with how 'global governance' could be conceived in the post-Cold War world and concluded that it was too ambitious a concept for the US alone to talk in terms of. In addition to this Petrovsky 1989, whilst Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, made the point for a 'comprehensive security' based around the UN very persuasively. However, perhaps the most eminent of all sceptics of US attempts at global hegemony was Mikhail Gorbachev who wrote, "It is not likely that NATO could replace common European structures and even the UN in solving Europe's urgent problems. Such attempts, instead of helping to resolve the issues, could rather lead into a dead end and give rise to relapses of suspicion and tensions" (p.252). He then concluded: "I would put it this way: at the threshold of the 21st century *Homo sapiens* should become aware of himself as *Homo globalis* - the human being of the planet earth" and envisaged that the best way to cultivate such an awareness was through a stronger and more involved UN.

⁷⁹ The best example of a liberally minded western commentator is Boyle who as early as 1985 was critical of the realist or Machiavellian power politics which drove the foreign policies of his native US. He argued that such power politics was fundamentally flawed and inevitably doomed to fail because: "The principal (and fatal) defect of modern 'realist' theory is its supposition that Machiavellianism can actually be subordinated to the objective of preserving a balance of power system ... By its very nature, Machiavellian power politics requires the employment of violence against putative adversaries in order to achieve ultimate objectives. This dictate traps governments into an interminable cycle of force and counterforce...". He then goes on to argue that the US's desire to become a global hegemon through "...Machiavellian power politics violently contradicts several of the most fundamental normative principles upon which the United States is supposed to be founded: the inalienable rights of the individual, the self-determination of peoples, the sovereign equality and independence of states, non-interventionism, respect for international law and organisations, and the peaceful settlement of international disputes..." (Boyle 1985, p. 38). For further and more recent critiques of the US's attempts at global military leadership by western commentators see Russett and Sutterlin 1991 who support a permanent (standing) UN military force under Security Council control in order to avoid the kind of multilaterally legitimized unilateralism practised by the US in the Gulf War. See also Cass 1995, who questioned the need for NATO, the very pillar of the US's world domineering foreign policies, and Mortimer who concluded in 1994 that NATO was in trouble since it had been unable to "resolve its identity crisis".

⁸⁰ The most relevant example here is the article in *The Times (Malta)* by the Malta Labour Party's deputy leader and foreign affairs spokesman, Dr. George Vella entitled "The United Nations: Its future as a world body". In this article George Vella considered, "the world's need for the United Nations" (p. 16). He went on to reason: "Admittedly the much promised 'new world order' never really materialised, but there is no arguing the fact that a new world is definitely in the making" (p. 19). And then concluded that in order to fulfil the extremely important role the UN was designed to play, "it does not suffice for it (the UN) to just tick along and simply exist: it has to be alive, it has to be vibrant, it has to show strength, and it has above everything else to be able to command respect from the brotherhood of nations" (p. 19). Rhetoric aside, Malta's long-standing commitment to the UN has been backed up by action: As a member of the UN, Malta inspired the concept of the common heritage of mankind in so far as the Law of the Sea is concerned. Following on from this, when Malta held the presidency of the General Assembly in 1990, it advocated the need to revitalize the concept of collective security under the auspices of the UN (Calleya 1994, p. 138). For further advocacy outside Malta of the important role that the UN should play, but has long neglected, in overseeing the *Security of Small Nations* see Wiberg 1987.

⁸¹ Jackson 1992, p. 8.

⁸² See for e.g. Petrovsky op. cit., Voronkov 1994, Russett and Sutterlin op. cit., and Roberts and Kingsbury 1995.

⁸³ Russett and Sutterlin 1991, p. 69.

⁸⁴ See UN General Assembly Resolution 44/21, 15 November 1989.

⁸⁵ See Camilleri op. cit., p. 89 for further details.

⁸⁶ For further discussion on the *recent developments and current problems* surrounding UN conflict resolution and peacekeeping see James 1994.

⁸⁷ For a comprehensive account of all of these deployments see Parsons 1995.

⁸⁸ These dates were taken from an article in *The Economist* (30 April 1994). The article quotes the annual cost of the peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia as \$ 1.2 billion and notes that as many as 30,500 UN troops were used at any one time.

⁸⁹ In the early 1990s the UN acted as mediator between Iran-Iraq and between the opposing parties in Namibia, Angola, Afghanistan and El Salvador. *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ Camilleri op. cit., pp. 89-90.

⁹¹ The level of doubt over the overall potency of the UN in influencing international events has been well voiced. For examples see two articles that appeared in *The Economist*, both of which were highly critical of some of the organizations more recent peace-keeping operations (*Economist* 20 November 1993 and 30 April 1994).

⁹² To represent this increased interdependence Jackson labels his model of international capitalism the "Global Village Model", portraying the globe as a buzzing village in which trade enriches relationships and ultimately serves to benefit all (Jackson op. cit., p. 8).

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ See Keohane and Nye 1977, pp. 27-29.

⁹⁵ Beverly Crawford has provided the best investigation into the differences and similarities between the so called economic "doves" and "hawks" (Crawford 1994).

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ See Ruggie 1992, pp. 561-598.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ Cable 1995, p. 305.

¹⁰⁰ Richardson 1993, p. 39.

¹⁰¹ Quoted and discussed in Kindleberger 1970 (introduction).

¹⁰² Huntington 1993, p. 72.

¹⁰³ Although at the time of writing (1998) it is difficult to accredit Japan with having won anything, given the economic turmoil that its fledgling economy has triggered off throughout Asia, it is easy to see why Henderson came to this conclusion in the latter years of the Cold War, when the two superpowers were in the aftermath of their huge defence spending sprees and Japan's economy was booming. (Original quote, see Henderson 1988, p. 5.

¹⁰⁴ Luttwak 1990.

¹⁰⁵ See for e.g. Moran 1993, p. 76.

¹⁰⁶ Such a view is particularly apparent in the work of theorists concerned with Mediterranean countries, most of whom argue that the end of the Cold War has rendered their specialist area worthy of more attention. See for e.g. Anderson and Fenech 1994 for more on the shift from East-West military-related confrontation to North-South economically derived tension. In addition to this see Osseiran 1994 who talks extensively of the widening economic gap between North and South as a security concern that reveals itself in the Mediterranean basin more so than in any other area. As a final example see Stanojevic 1994 who is also primarily concerned with the implications that the end of bipolarism has for security in the Mediterranean, which he now believes must be defined in terms of the North-South tensions.

¹⁰⁷ Demonstrative of how vehemently Malta pursued the ideal of pan-Mediterranean co-operation is the prominent role she has played in institutions such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCM). Malta, together with Cyprus, Spain, Italy and the former Yugoslavia, insisted upon the eleventh-hour insertion of the Mediterranean clauses in the Helsinki Final Act (CSCE Final Act 1975 and Grech 1993, pp. 45-47). Malta's proposal at the CSCE follow-up meeting in Helsinki, namely that the CSCE should declare itself the regional arrangement for peace-keeping in terms of Chapter VIII of the UN's Charter, was endorsed by the Helsinki Summit II, and is another example how strongly Malta felt

about the ideal of trans-Mediterranean co-operation and security. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the support Malta has given to the Italian-Spanish proposal for the creation of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) is worth citing (See Fernandez Ordonez, 1990).

¹⁰⁸ See Ch. 1.

¹⁰⁹ O'Tuathail 1997

¹¹⁰ The document which spelled out Malta's post-Cold War foreign policy uses the increasing North-South tensions as justification for constitutional non-alignment and neutrality. It states: "It is worth pointing out that with the end of the Cold War, more tensions have sprung between North and South. These tensions are not felt anywhere else as much as they are felt in the Mediterranean ... Mediating between non-aligned states, as well as between them and aligned states is a role that Malta should not and cannot afford to give up lightly. It is truly in keeping with Malta's real vocation as well as living up to Malta's constitutional role of being a neutral state actively pursuing peace" (Malta Labour Party 1994, pp. 34, 37 and 38).

¹¹¹ The Malta Labour Party withdrew their country from NATO's PFP within two days of assuming office (Fenech 1997, p. 162) and although they have made efforts to ensure that this move and any of their other policy moves for that matter are not construed as efforts to "signify the distancing of Malta away from Europe" (*The Malta Times*, 1 November 1996). EU accession has not been a priority of the new government. For more on this see two articles from *The Times* (October 30, 1996) entitled *Maltese Cross: How 'Brussels' unseated a great European moderniser* and *Alarm at anti-Nato victory in Malta* (p. 17 and 13 respectively). For further background on the events which surrounded the October 26 election see the article in *The Economist* (26 October 1996) under the simple but somewhat poignant title "Malta: European?"

¹¹² This resurgence of idealist thinking was triggered by the Labour-spun public reaction to Malta's membership of NATO's PFP. The strength of feeling about Malta's cherished ideals of neutrality and non-alignment was underestimated and played down by the Nationalist administration but undoubtedly indicative of a resurgence in idealist geopolitical thinking about Malta's role in the wider-world.

¹¹³ Dr. George Vella has clarified his and his party's vision of new world order on numerous occasions through speeches, contributions to manifesto documents and various articles in the media and academic journals. The lengthy article in the *Malta Independent* (10 April 1994, pp. 16-19) is the most explicit in spelling out his stance. In this article he considers the world's need for the United Nations and argues that "a new world order is definitely in the making". He calls on the UN to lead this new world order, stating that: "To be able to do so in the future, it does not suffice for it to just tick along and simply exist: it has to be alive, it has to be vibrant, it has to show strength, and it has above everything else to be able to command respect from the brotherhood of nations"(p. 19). Dr. Vella confirmed these views and spelled out how dependent his party's policy was on a more potent UN in the interview I conducted with him (12 April 1995).

¹¹⁴ The Malta Labour Party has not been alone in recent years in calling for a regenerated UN. Indeed a body of literature has emerged over the last decade which advocates that the UN, should adopt a more readily protective role when it comes to small states or micro-powers. See for e.g. Wiberg 1987, Clarke and Payne 1988, Connel 1988 and McSweeney 1990 all of which are concerned with the politics, security and survival of small states and neutrals in the 1990s.

¹¹⁵ Malta Labour Party 1994, p. 34.

¹¹⁶ *Sunday Times of Malta*, 19 June 1994, p. 10.

¹¹⁷ For a thorough investigation into this large question mark which lingers over the continued relevance and indeed practicality of neutrality as an instrument of foreign policy in the post-Cold War world see, McSweeney 1990 and his examination of *Options for Neutrals in the 1990s*.

¹¹⁸ Fenech 1993, p. 52.

¹¹⁹ Although some would disagree with this statement, and hold that issues such as Islamic fundamentalism in particular constitute the emergence of a kind of bipolar situation (see for e.g. the commentary by Leo Brincat of the Labour Party in the *Malta Independent* on Sunday 17 October 1993, p. 18), the official Labour Party stance is that Malta is not as yet under any foreseeable threat.

¹²⁰ Three articles in *The Economist* cover these failures thoroughly (20 November 1993, p. 69; and 30 April 1994, p. 12 and p. 74)

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¹²¹ Michael Wood described how this non-existent yet frequently imagined "neat line between law-abiding and law-breaking states" was the main conceptual problem facing the UN and its legal representatives. Lecture and interview conducted in the Law Department of Durham University, 10 February 1995 (Michael Wood was the Legal Adviser to the British Delegation at the UN from 1990-1994).

¹²² This is the phrase used by Ali Mazrui 1976 to describe the West's current dominance in setting the priorities of the international agenda. See also Cox 1990, p. 2.

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PHASE 5
BACK TO THE FUTURE 2000 - ?

5.

BACK TO THE FUTURE 2000 - ?

Thus far, the thesis has attained two of its three original sub-aims. First, an investigation into the history of geopolitical thought in Malta was presented in the first three chapters. Second, chapter four went on to examine critically current modes of geopolitical thinking in Malta from the historical perspective that this original investigation had provided. Having put current geopolitical thinking in an historical context, this thesis now turns to its third sub-aim, to explore possible bases for future geopolitical thinking in Malta.

This chapter deals with the forthcoming stage in world political history and examines how Malta is likely to fit into it. It assumes that, despite what certain commentators have been claiming since the end of the Cold War, a credible new world order is unlikely to emerge before the *fin de siècle*. Rather than seek a more traditional global order out of geopolitical disarray, international actors and commentators should instead begin to accept that the world is into a period of geopolitical transition¹. It will not be possible to explain this period of transition in terms of one dominant power or dominant trend, but instead only through analysis of a whole host of new "interacting trends"² and "regional specificities"³. This is why the global meta-theories, introduced in the previous chapter as having done little to further our understanding of the post-Cold War world, will be unable to explain the geopolitical transition which is set to dominate at least the early part of the twenty-first century.

In the Mediterranean, Malta's regional environment, the concoction of new and less orthodox challenges is potentially as complex and virile as in any other regional theatre in

the world. Despite this, those engaged in geopolitical thinking in Malta seem unprepared to rise to these new challenges. Their historically-derived interpretations and pre-occupation with over-simplistic meta-theories of new world order, which have together constituted a mini-renaissance in classical geopolitics in Malta, serve only to cloud the first-order issues that affect the Maltese. Geopolitical thought in Malta is a microcosm of geopolitical thought elsewhere and it follows that, in keeping with the wider developments in geopolitical thinking outlined in the introduction, what is required in Malta is a rejuvenation of geopolitical thought, not a mini-renaissance. This chapter seeks to pave the way for such a rejuvenation. By drawing attention to some of more specific regional challenges (or "regional specificities"⁴) which are concerning the new generation of geopolitical theorists, it encourages those engaged in geopolitical thinking in Malta to discard their narrow and out-dated modes of geopolitical thought. In doing so, as the title of this chapter suggests, it presents geopolitical thinkers in Malta with a course back to the future.

5.1 REJUVENATING MALTESE GEOPOLITICAL THOUGHT

"The Mediterranean is an absurdly small sea; the length and greatness of its history makes us dream it larger than it is."⁵

The Mediterranean is civilisation's uneasy cradle. It has long been the venue for tensions and conflicts. The only period in its history devoid of war was the *Pax Romana*, in which the Romans referred to the Mediterranean as *mare nostrum* (our sea) having conquered the entire littoral by defeating amongst others, the Etruscans, Illyrians, Greeks, Carthaginians, Numidians and the Celts⁶. More recently, in the period after the second World War this region, which comprises less than six per cent of the world's population,

experienced about forty wars and armed conflicts. The Mediterranean basin has witnessed the highest number of wars in the history of mankind⁷. The existing pattern of conflicts has been referred to as the "new arc of crisis"⁸ and runs through the Mediterranean into central Europe, covering the Balkans and South Central Asia, via the Persian Gulf. As long as the Israeli Likud Party remain in power, the Arab-Israeli dispute continues to be the major strategic concern in the Middle East, as too does the continued occupation of Lebanon by Israel and Syria. In addition to this, the delicate balance in the Middle East is further threatened by the ongoing Kurdish problem, the potential realignment of former Soviet republics with either Turkey or Iran and interventionism by the United States (US). In the Balkans, the complex web of disputes knotted into the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia will take many decades to distinguish properly and the potential for conflict in Macedonia and Moldova, as well as the existing conflict in Albania, can be readily recognised. Then there is also the question of Gibraltar and Ceuta and Melilla⁹ and the tensions between the Greeks and the Turks over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. To the south of the basin, conflict continues in Western Sahara and Sudan and the propensity for conflict along the Egypt-Sudan border cannot be disregarded. Finally, many of the developments in the Maghreb since the late 1980s have led to a mounting sense of alarm both within and outside the region, most notably the domestic turmoil in Algeria but also Libya's unpredictable dictatorship. As the French General George Buis surmised:

"The Mediterranean remains at the end of the twentieth century a strategic area of major importance. It can even find in the twenty-first century the importance that it lost three centuries ago. However, this space that seems to be at the centre of the planet has the potential to produce many conflicts, because the rights of some collide with the rights of others."¹⁰

As the brief assessment above has shown, the propensity for conflict in the Mediterranean is undeniable. One specialist has concluded that:

"There is no doubt that the Mediterranean region is one of the most conflict-prone areas in the world".¹¹

However, as the previous section pointed out, strategic considerations represent only one facet of the current multifaceted geopolitical setting. The new setting, reflected in a shift in focus from East-West confrontation to North-South tension, represents a complex phenomenon that is expressed at several levels: economic disparities between the North and South, high indebtedness, disproportionate trade relations, high unemployment levels throughout the region, the population explosion in the South, migrations within the South and from the South to the North, widespread underdevelopment, actual and potential conflicts within and between countries, religious fundamentalism, aggressive nationalism, terrorism, armament proliferation in the South and East, immature democratic institutions, authoritarian regimes and transnational crime. These problems create a diverse and complicated geopolitical labyrinth. They are not confined to the Maghreb, the Levant or the Balkans but their effects can also be discerned, albeit to a lesser extent, in most southern European countries. Being a micro-state in such a central location it is not surprising that Malta is as exposed as any to these problems but, as was discussed in the last chapter, the Maltese government is having difficulties coming to terms with them.

What is required is a more encompassing approach to foreign affairs and foreign policy which takes into account the geopolitical and security implications of the diverse range of problems in question. Theorists concerned with international affairs and such like have acknowledged the importance of broadening their spheres of interest for a number of years

now. As early as 1975, Henry Kissinger, as US Secretary of State, spoke of "progress in dealing with the traditional agenda" as no longer being enough. He reasoned:

"a new and unprecedented kind of issue has emerged. The problems of energy, resources, environment, population, the issues of space and the seas now rank with the question of military security, ideology and territorial rivalry which have traditionally made up the diplomatic agenda"¹².

Although of some relevance in the Cold War, such reasoning has proven to be especially relevant in interpreting the post-Cold War world. After ending the Soviet Union's part in the bipolarism which had constituted the Cold War, Gorbachev himself talked of the increasing importance of what he referred to as "regional specificities"¹³ in the new world he had helped create. He explained:

"Signs of crisis are becoming increasingly evident: economic recession, inefficiency of political structures, dramatic problems of migration and breakdown of free market mechanisms"¹⁴.

He also drew attention to the increasing importance of issues such as the more widespread "affirmation of human rights and freedoms and democratic institutions" and concluded that "economic strength and technological skills, rather than military power, are crucial today"¹⁵.

Such reasoning is also mirrored by those that are less directly involved in the process of making policies of major global significance. In particular, a great many theorists of international relations, political geography and other related fields are now exhibiting comparable modes of thinking and advocating a broadening of their spheres of interest so

as to cater for the increasingly complex nature of their subject areas¹⁶. A number of them warn of the dangers of allowing their discourses to get trapped into dealing with only one level (i.e. considerations at the national, which in practice normally means state, level) and one kind of issue (i.e. military issues). To this end, there has been much talk of a reassessment of the dimensions, both horizontal and vertical, of contemporary geopolitical discourse.

Numerous problems, notably the continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disparate financial flows and economic inequalities, massive migrations of people, transborder pollution, ethnic and nationalist conflict, religious fanaticism, and transnational organized crime, are now both sources and consequences of conflict. Such problems have obvious implications for the width of geopolitical discourse, which must become more encompassing if it is to contend with such multi-faceted disorder.

The above problems also call into question the vertical dimensions of geopolitical discourse. They all embrace processes that involve participation by large numbers of citizens that inherently transgress national boundaries and in this sense reflect the increasing interdependence of human affairs. This interdependence derives from processes such as the communications revolution, the emerging global economy, the global-reach of weapons of mass-destruction and the dissemination of technology and ideas. Through international institutions, transnational organizations and transnational movements such integrative processes increasingly undermine the power of states. In doing so they draw attention to the current shortcomings of traditional geopolitical thinking and highlight the need for a heightening of geopolitical discourse above state-level.

To complicate matters further, the forces of integration are not the only ones challenging the autonomy of states. If increasing global interdependence requires a heightening of

geopolitical discourse, its antithesis, fragmentation, calls for a deeper geopolitical understanding of the processes occurring below state boundaries and between actors within separate states. The forces of fragmentation derive from tensions between people and states but provoke responses which cut across national boundaries. Nationalism is undoubtedly the most important of them. The mutual need to display a consorted front had the effect of suppressing nationalist forces on both sides of the 'Iron Curtain' throughout the Cold War but since then they have manifested themselves with unprecedented strength. In addition to this, economic and religious forces alone, although invariably tied in with nationalism, may cause conflicts between people and states.

A number of theorists see a redefinition of the "essentially contested concept of security"¹⁷ as a fundamental part of the reassessment of geopolitical discourse discussed above. Furthermore, theoretical ideas on this matter have filtered into operational circles and been heeded by organizations such as NATO and the UN. The newly defined concept of security which NATO has adopted in response to the changed constellation of the forces in the world has been spelled out in several important documents of recent years¹⁸. Similarly, the UN reacted to the end of the Cold War period by defining a concept of "comprehensive security" and incorporating it in its main policy aims¹⁹. Camilleri has commented on the redefinition of security that has been taking place:

"Security, widely regarded as the centrepiece of geopolitical discourse, has been traditionally understood in terms of national military defence. More recently, theorists and practitioners alike have argued for a more encompassing, less state-centric definition of the concept, which takes into account non-military threats to security as well as non-military responses to both military and non-military threats."

Smith and Kettle²⁰ are proponents of a more encompassing, less state-centric definition of security. They argue that the concept should be redefined in terms of its originally intended usage²¹ and in order to do so they analyse two main semantical problems; the *subject* and *object* of security²². The crucial question of scope which they raise can also be phrased; *security for whom?* and, *security against what?*

If the subject of security is reconsidered in light of its general usage and the question, *security for whom?* is asked, a wider array of vulnerabilities are exposed within a given society. Below the level of the state, individuals and communities can be vulnerable if their basic values are threatened. And beyond this level, there are many threats to regional security, emphasising the interdependence of security with others beyond state boundaries. Such an approach enables the threats to the values of a community, a state, a region or an entire continent to be considered concurrently.

Having exposed a wider array of vulnerabilities by answering the first question, the path is cleared for a consideration of the object of security; *security against what?* If the object of security is now reconsidered in light of its general usage, together with the wider array of 'subjects' established in the answer to the first question, a whole new set of threats to a multi-dimensional security become apparent. In other words, threats to security below and beyond state level that have traditionally been ignored are brought to the fore. A range of environmental, economic, social, cultural, demographic and political-based threats can therefore be considered on the same plane of significance as traditional strategy based threats. This, in turn, raises the problem of how to prioritize and order threats to security. On this, Duke has written:

"In the Cold War it was clear that the biggest threat was that of a global nuclear exchange. In the post-Cold War world a good case could be made for arguing that economic and

social challenges to societies are as important, or more important, than those of a purely military nature when considered in terms of the stability of a given state. The 'invaders' crossing borders into various parts of Europe are no longer storm troopers ... Instead they are refugees stealing across borders."²³

The above semantical discussion was inspired by the work of earlier theorists such as Krell (1979), Stephenson (1982) and Buzan (1983) but has been developed since then by Wiberg and Øberg (1987), as well as Smith and Kettle (1993). Camilleri has also contributed to this discussion by drawing attention to a number of problems that the concept of security gives rise to. Referring to the concept of security, he sought to solve a number of ambiguities:

"Is it a condition to be understood primarily in terms of objective conditions, often equated with protection from physical threat, or in terms of subjective perceptions which we may loosely refer to as the nation's state of mind? It is not possible to entertain security as a policy objective without at least implicitly addressing a number of complex questions: Who or what is to be defended? From what? By whom? How? At what price? Those who find *national security* a convenient short-hand answer to these questions tend to equate security with the defence of national territory, presumably on the assumption that the preservation of territorial integrity, that is the exclusion of others from the physical space delineated as one's own (national) territory, holds the key to the defence of the nation's well-being. But the link between defence of territory and preservation of national well-being is often assumed rather than demonstrated."²⁴

He went on to argue that more issues are involved in the preservation of national well-being than the mere defence of territory:

"Numerous problems, notably international debt, trade rivalries, destabilising financial flows, transborder pollution, human rights abuses, nuclear proliferation, drug trafficking, and massive migrations of people, are now both causes and consequences of conflict."²⁵

He believes that the above issues constitute a "macropolitical agenda"²⁶, the components of which spill over boundaries, are beyond the means of any one country to control, and typically "exceed the problem-solving capacity of existing institutions"²⁷. The function of this new macropolitical agenda is to rejuvenate geopolitical thinking, or as Camilleri puts it "increase consciousness of the scale and multi-faceted character of global disorder"²⁸. It demands that those engaged in geopolitical thinking expand their spheres of interest and concern in order to take onboard the current multi-dimensional nature of their discourses.

This chapter is tasked with contributing towards a rejuvenation in Maltese geopolitical thought. To this end, the remaining section conducts research into four of the non-military issues, or the "macropolitical threats", that are most likely to undermine the preservation of Malta's national well-being in the foreseeable future. These four issues are not given the attention they warrant and in many senses are largely overlooked as a result of the narrow, out-dated modes of geopolitical thinking outlined in the last chapter which prevail in Malta today. Together they can be said to constitute an important part of Malta's new "macropolitical agenda". This agenda represents an alternative basis for geopolitical thought and presents those engaged in Malta's international affairs with a course back to the future. This course back to the future requires that the rigid thinking that still prevails in Malta is discarded and replaced with more innovative thinking which is receptive to the complex nature of the islands' contemporary geopolitical situation.

5.2 MALTA'S NEW MACROPOLITICAL AGENDA

We have seen so far in this chapter that in terms of orthodox geopolitical conflicts the Mediterranean basin exhibits many acute and latent problems. Through a more encompassing and less state-centric interpretation of the geopolitical setting, the region can be seen to have emerged from the Cold War with arguably more geopolitical flash-points than any other theatre in the world. Malta's new macropolitical agenda must take these burgeoning geopolitical flash-points into account. When doing so it is important that neither a solely realist or exclusively idealist mode of interpretation is utilised. This is because, strict orthodox approaches such as these fail to acknowledge the diverse nature of both the origins and range of influence of the "interacting trends"²⁹ (or as Gorbachev prefers, "regional specificities"³⁰) that currently affect the Mediterranean.

Clearly, some of the trends evident in the Mediterranean bear down more ominously on Malta than other states and for this reason a level of prioritization has to be exercised. In terms of imminence and potential ramifications, three issues are immediately identifiable as posing the most serious macropolitical threat to the preservation of Malta's national well-being; mass population movements, international terrorism, transnational crime and disputes over maritime boundary delimitations. Although there are undoubtedly other issues which warrant a place on Malta's macropolitical agenda, these four main issues have been selected for analysis in the remaining paragraphs of this chapter.

5.21 Mass population movements.

Mass population movements are no new problem but in recent years their occurrence has taken on a new dimension. Population exoduses within and towards the European side of the Mediterranean region are commanding the attention of high level policy makers not only on humanitarian grounds, but also because of the serious consequences that mass displacements have for national stability and regional security. As D'Abadie has explained:

"It is not fashionable any more to talk of 'threats' but - according to the new vocabulary of international security in the post-Cold War - of 'challenges' or 'risks'. In this situation developments on the periphery of Europe are at least as likely to affect the security of the region as those more traditional concerns on the East. Events on the southern littoral of the Mediterranean represent the chief security preoccupation of those countries on the southern flank of Europe. The attention of France, Italy and Spain, in particular, is focused more on the South than on other parts of the continent and specific concerns over population movements from the Maghreb have recently taken on a new importance in the formulation of their respective security equations."³¹


The extent of the challenge that D'Abadie spells out is glaringly obvious: Barring Israel, all countries on the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean are net migrant suppliers; six million Maghrebi³² immigrants already live in the EU, up to half of them in France; the vast majority of the estimated 800,000 Africans in Italy, many of whom are from the Maghreb, are illegal immigrants³³; and more than half a million North African immigrants have settled in Spain and the Benelux countries³⁴. Unlike their predecessors, these "jet age"³⁵ migrants are no longer confined to their region of origin, but instead impinge directly upon the Mediterranean's more developed countries. As disparities in

living standards and population growth between the North and South escalate so to do the numbers of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. A commonly used dictum states,

"the Mediterranean is to Europe what the Rio Grande is to the United States"³⁶.

This analogy is illustrated in the following map (figure 7), which also indicates the additional pressure that western Europe is coming under as a result of migration flows from Turkey and eastern Europe:

Figure 7: Immigration flows to the EU from the Mediterranean region (1990)



Source: adapted from Drake, G.: *Issues in the new Europe*. Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1994., p.77.

Anxieties over the phenomenon of immigration as a future security challenge have not arisen from an irrational fear, nor from a political vacuum. Such anxieties are the consequence of a common unease arising from the shared geopolitical situations of France, Italy and Spain³⁷. For these three states, the first consideration is a demographic one. It includes national population levels, but more specifically comparative growth rates and projected total levels (see figures 8 and 9).

The second level of concern centres on global economic development with the wide disparities in wealth and opportunities that prevail between the rich industrialised 'North' and the underdeveloped 'South'. Finally, D'Abadie has written that "the disquiet over inward migratory flows in southern Europe has found a plausible source in a consideration whose origin is quite ancient; an apprehension over the consequences that immigration can create for the health of the body politic and the democratic attributes of Western Europe"³⁸. One of the causes of this common unease is the serious reservations the governments and authorities in these three countries have about the ability of arrivals to adjust to western lifestyles. In particular, increasing support for Islamic fundamentalist movements within host countries has introduced a complicating element to already multi-cultural societies and in many cases is deemed to represent a security risk. Congruent to this, the obscurantist tactics adopted by xenophobic right wing groups which are receiving increasing support in France, Italy and Spain may also induce instability.


This prospect of regional demographic changes in North Africa presenting a challenge to Europe's stability has been fully espoused in a post-Cold War study that addresses the ongoing theme of European Security in the transformed political environment³⁹. The extent of the potential problem can be seen from figures 8 and 9.

Figure 8: Population Growth in the EEC and North Africa (in millions)

Year	EEC	N. Africa	Ratio
1960	279.9	51.8	5.4
1985	321.6	123	2.6
2000	323.8	175.6	1.8
2025	306.4	260.8	1.2

Source: Boyer, Y 1991, p.64.

Figure 9: Population trends in the Mediterranean region



Source: adapted from: Drake, G.: *Issues in new Europe*, Hodder and Stoughton, London 1994., p.229

It can be seen from figure 8 that by the year 2025 the population of North Africa is expected to be almost the same as the population of the EEC⁴⁰. The reason that this explosive increase is cause for concern is that it is unlikely to be accompanied by a comparable improvement in living standards. Although the figures 8 and 9 highlight the differing demographic trends between the South and the North and help explain the migration flows that result from these disparities, the fact remains that South-South migrations may pose an equally severe macro-political threat. The plight of the Palestinians, thrown around the Middle East at a whim for decades is testimony to the instability and antipathy that can ensue from South-South migrations.

Given the penchant for conflict in the region the potential forced migrations that may result from war must also be considered. As witnessed in the Gulf 1990/91, Algeria (1992-present) and the Balkans (1993-present), the vast and unanticipated outflows of people from war zones can proliferate the effects of conflict and transform detached incidents into major regional security concerns. After the Kurdish uprising in March 1991, almost two million Kurds took refuge in Turkey and Iran. Following civil wars in Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Mozambique, Angola and Liberia approaching four million refugees fled to neighbouring countries⁴¹. Clearly, only a small percentage of these refugees would have had to move to Mediterranean EU countries to undermine economic, social and political aspects of security.

Wars and other isolated episodes aside, the International Labour Office (ILO) calculated that by 2025 the Mediterranean EU states may well receive one hundred and twenty million refugees from North Africa and Turkey⁴². Furthermore, northern EU states, coping with persistent migration from East Europe, are unlikely to be able to help with the absorption of such vast quantities. Critics argue that the EU is failing to address such

trends adequately. The exclusionary policies borne out in the Schengen Treaty (1993) and the trend towards isolation in the form of the Single European Market do little to tackle the humanitarian and economic roots of the problem⁴³. All considered, the seriousness of the long term threat posed by massive population movements to the Mediterranean can not be overstated.

Monsignor Philip Calleya, Director of Malta's Emigrants' Commission, is as well placed as anyone to comment on the effect that mass population movements in the Mediterranean region might have on Malta's stability and security. In an interview he explained that it is important to understand and distinguish between three groups of immigrants in Malta (Interview conducted by author 18 April 1995).

First of all, there are the legal immigrants which represent a small but growing proportion of the immigrant population in Malta. Since they have either been invited into the country as guest-workers, granted visas as a result of their profession or citizenship in view of their assets they pose few problems to national stability (although one worrying exception to this generalisation can be identified⁴⁴).

Second, there are the legitimate refugees and official asylum seekers who either turned themselves in on arrival or have been captured. According to Monsignor Calleya this group can range between six hundred and one thousand at any one time. In April 1995 it was made up primarily of Iraqis (300), ex-Yugoslavs (100), Algerians (85) and Sudanese (67), although there are a number of Somalis (7), Liberians (6) and Palestinians (35) as well. Hence, this group basically comprises persons fleeing persecution or political violence elsewhere in the Mediterranean region who have sought temporary protection in Malta. It is important to note that, "Malta is not and can never be a resettlement country"⁴⁵ and that most of the refugees would eventually be settled in either the USA,

Canada or Australia. To date, the Emigrants Commission in Valletta has been relatively successful at assigning refugees to one of these "third countries". Ironically, their successful record may yet prove an enticement to the increasing number of refugees deterred by the more stringent screening of asylum seekers on the southern European mainland⁴⁶. At the moment, however, save for the cost of administering and accommodating them, this group of immigrants pose little threat to national stability and security.

The third group of immigrants in Malta is made up of the refugees and immigrant workers who have not formally requested asylum or have not yet been caught by the authorities. They are, of course, the illegal immigrants that have sought to either merge into Maltese society permanently or find temporary work before returning home or moving on elsewhere. Accurate information on a subject as delicate as illegal immigration is hard to come by in Malta. It has been suggested that the Government may actually play down the size of the immigrant population in Malta since immigrant workers (both legal and illegal) are a necessity on some of the islands' larger construction projects and to fill some of the more menial seasonal posts created by the tourist industry⁴⁷. Estimates are further hindered by the fact that illegal immigrants, of North African origin in particular, blend into Maltese society with moderate ease; English and the Semitic based Maltese language posing few problems to them. Nevertheless, Malta's newspapers often contain articles detailing the arrests of illegal immigrants⁴⁸ and a number of commentators have expressed concern over the potential scale of this problem. In a recent editorial in the Malta Times the issue of "refugees in Malta" was referred to as "no small problem"⁴⁹ and in another article Joseph Abela wrote of "thousands of refugees flocking to Malta"⁵⁰. Although official figures issued by the Emigrants Commission state that there have never been more than one thousand illegal refugees in Malta, it is easy to question such a figure.

Retired AFM Major, Marcel Cassar, now heads security operations at Luqa Airport. When interviewed, he stated that it was extremely difficult to estimate the number of illegal immigrants in Malta at any one time since the majority of them are either passing through on their way to a resettlement location or looking for temporary work before returning home⁵¹. Nevertheless, he went on to explain that the Coast Guard was vastly under funded and undermanned and he suspected that on average for every captured illegal immigrant, another reached Malta's shoreline. In addition to this, he mentioned that checks on merchant shipping are not carried out with the regularity that is necessary to monitor the large number of ships docking in either Valletta or the Marsa Freeport. In conclusion, he asserted that in the current circumstances (time of interview) there could be anything between five hundred and fifteen hundred illegal immigrants in Malta.

With the help of Marcel Cassar, I managed to arrange a day with the Malta Coast Guard. Unfortunately I was unable to witness any boardings or searches but did manage to discuss the procedures in detail with a number of the coast guards⁵². Their anti-contraband and illegal immigration routine comprises a circumnavigation of the islands twice per day. There is little variation to either the timing or course of these circumnavigations. In fact, the patrol vessels disembark coast-guards with regularity at their home ports as they finish their watches. The boarding parties themselves rarely contained more than four sailors and searches below decks were conducted only "now and again". For larger vessels at least six sailors are required to conduct a thorough boarding and searches below decks are imperative since this is where illegal immigrants are most likely to be hidden. In terms of motivation, there appeared to be few incentives in place for the coast guards to maximise arrests; indeed, the majority of them perceived their primary role to lie in fishery protection. Clearly, therefore, only a small level of planning would be required by prospective illegal immigrants or their criminal escorts to breach Malta's diminutive coastal patrols. Following my experience with the Malta Coast Guard,

it is easy to see why Marcel Cassar estimates that so many illegal immigrants escape the Coast Guard. In fact, it is likely that his estimates of between five hundred and fifteen hundred illegal immigrants in Malta in the current geopolitical circumstances probably err on the side of conservatism.

Having established the extent of the problem it is important to determine the nature of the threat illegal immigrants pose to Malta's national well-being. Obviously the main threat derives from the fact that illegal immigrants are in effect citizens of a state who are in all respects unaccountable. Andrew Seychell, Police Superintendent, stated in an interview⁵³ that, largely because they are unaccountable and no one has any definite idea of their numbers, people find it convenient to blame illegal immigrants the kinds problem, which can in turn fuel racism. Certainly, throughout the research period I witnessed a great deal of racism; one charity worker even tried to apportion blame for epidemics and disease in Malta (including Malta's small AIDS problem) on the islands' population of illegal immigrants⁵⁴. Although it is perhaps taking it a step too far to blame immigrants for spreading disease, it is easy to understand why people might assume that they are responsible for fuelling crime. Andrew Seychell explained how the problems of illegal immigration, domestic and international crime are inextricably linked. Many illegal immigrants gain access to Malta through some form of international criminal group, who may also find them illicit work⁵⁵. In addition to this, the very fact that they risked the trip to Malta in the first place would suggest that they would not be shy of the further risks involved in criminal activity. Andrew Seychell stated that it is important not to exaggerate the culpability of illegal immigrants since there are few examples of them being involved in more serious crimes. He also stated, however, that increases in petty criminal activity could be noted following a suspected influx of illegal immigrants. Despite Andrew Seychell's attempts to play down the significance of the crimes committed by illegal immigrants, it is important to note that they are typically desperate people who, although

not always especially organized, will stop at nothing in their bid for survival. For this reason, a scenario in which a large wave of illegal immigrants instigates domestic instability in Malta is entirely reasonable.

This section has shown that Malta is affected by most of the main population flows in the Mediterranean region. Furthermore, the demographic, social and political trends in the Mediterranean would seem to suggest a strengthening of these flows in the next three decades or so. Clearly, policies and procedures adopted by the EU are a major factor affecting these flows. By strengthening Europe's external borders, the Schengen Treaty has undoubtedly made it more difficult for illegal immigrants to enter the EU. It remains to be seen however, whether the lifting of most of the EU's internal border controls which has also been implemented as a result of this treaty has offset any of the benefits that have stemmed from the strengthened external borders.

In so far as Malta is concerned, the scale of the immigration problem there is modest when compared to the extent of the difficulties encountered by larger Mediterranean countries, such as France, Spain or Italy. Malta is not a resettlement country and does not have to deal with the usual long-term problems of integrating large numbers of immigrants into its society. We have seen, however, that the short waves of illegal immigrants that Malta is exposed to pose a threat to the preservation of Malta's national well being. Whether Malta remains a non-member on the outskirts of a more fortress-like EU, and perhaps then a more attractive option to prospective immigrants, or becomes a member of an increasingly borderless EU, and perhaps then a stepping stone onto the mainland, no let up in the problem is anticipated. No matter how small the actual figures may seem, given Malta's micro-infrastructure, micro-economy and small population even slight increases in illegal immigration, and the criminal activity that may ensue, could be debilitating to the islands' internal security and stability. In conclusion, mass population movements in the

Mediterranean region undoubtedly pose a macropolitical threat to Malta of significant proportions and therefore warrant further, more detailed appraisal.


5.22 International terrorism.

If the Mediterranean is civilisation's uneasy cradle so is it the birth place and repose of its antithesis - terrorism. Be it Jewish, Christian, Islamic, secular, nationalist or revolutionary, the Mediterranean has been terrorised since time immemorial. As Paul Wilkinson has written:

"Terrorism is not a recent invention. It was used by the *Sicarii* and *Zealots* against the Roman occupation of Palestine. In the 11th and 12th centuries it was the chosen weapon of a radical Islamic sect, the *Assasins*, in their campaign to overthrow the existing Moslem authorities. Revolutionaries, nihilists and anarchists used the tactics of bombing and assassination in their unsuccessful efforts to destroy autocracy, for example ... in the Balkans. And in the 1940s and 1950s terrorism became the primary weapon of movements engaged in major anti-colonial struggles, for example by the Jews against the British Mandate in Palestine, by EOKA against British colonial rule in Cyprus, by FLOSY in Aden, and by the FLN against the French in Algeria"⁵⁶.

Following on from the above examples, the explosion of modern international terrorism did not occur until the end of the 1960s. Incidents of international terrorism increased tenfold between 1968 and 1990 and now directly affect all of the countries in and around the Mediterranean⁵⁷ (See figure 10).

Figure 10: Terrorist Incidents in the Mediterranean (1960's-1990's)



Source: Data supplied to the author by: RAND - St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism (1995)

As can be seen from figure 10 the macropolitical threat posed by international terrorism to the Mediterranean region is pervasive in nature. On the extent of the problem, Ewan Anderson has written:

"Virtually every Mediterranean riparian country has witnessed acts of terrorism, whether in Southern Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East or North Africa."⁵⁸

While the major concentration of active terrorist organizations can be seen to have been in the Levant, terrorist activities are also clearly of major significance in Turkey, Egypt and Algeria. Even the islands of Corsica and Sardinia, not normally in the front line of terrorist atrocities, have not been immune⁵⁹.

It would appear that the end of the Cold War has quenched the transitory period of Marxist terrorism in Europe and translated the world's attention to the South and the Mediterranean where terrorist violence persists. Rather than examine the roots and causes of various cycles of terrorism in the Mediterranean or the growth of specific groups, this section focuses on the latest trends and patterns of activities in the region and the implications that they have for Malta's security. It is also best to avoid the interminable arguments about what constitutes terrorism. A far-from-exhaustive review of recent literature in the field revealed dozens of definitions. However, for the purposes of this section I shall rely on the definition provided by the US State Department in its latest annual report:

"Terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience".⁶⁰

Since it is unlikely in the foreseeable future that Malta will be subject to any form of national terrorism, this section will focus on international terrorism; that is, terrorism involving citizens or territory of more than one country. It is the growth of international terrorism which John Deutch, the head of the US's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was referring to when he stated:

"I regret that I have come to the conclusion there is going to be tremendous growth in terrorism over the next decade or so."⁶¹

A number of ominous trends ensure that international terrorism, as defined above, should figure highly in geopolitical thinking and foreign and security policy considerations throughout the Mediterranean region:

Clutterbuck has warned of the distinct possibility of a formally organized international terrorist league emerging. In Islamic Fundamentalism, many of the terrorist groups in and around the Mediterranean share a common motive and there are already many examples of the pooling of fund-raising, weaponry, resources and specialist skills⁶². Few countries in the Mediterranean region are without their share of extreme Islamic groups, however marginalized, unrepresentative or alienated they are. The prospect of multi-lateral co-operation between these groups is especially daunting since most support the use of violence as a legitimate tactic in their impulsive quest for drastic political solutions to their problems.

Another trend which has become apparent in and around the Mediterranean is the use of terrorist groups as mercenaries by sponsor regimes to conduct terrorist proxy war against 'enemy states'. The contemporary history of Kurdish guerrilla groups is demonstrative of this trend⁶³. The various régimes of the region have supported separatist activities against

disliked governments abroad whilst simultaneously opposing peaceful protest for separation at home. The attack by Iraqi soldiers and an Iraqi backed Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) on the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan's (PUK) stronghold of Irbil (31 August 1996) is the latest in a series of similar but smaller conflicts. In recent years, Syria, Iran and Turkey have all used Kurds as surrogates for their own hostilities⁶⁴. By doing so, they avoid the risks of open war. Furthermore, through the provision of armaments, training, cash and intelligence they vastly increase the 'clout' of undisciplined and unaccountable militants.

The most dangerous trend in terrorism has been an increase in the lethality of attacks over the last decade or so. Illustrative of this is the shift from hijacking to the sabotage bombing of jumbo jets, or the escalation from small car bombs to huge truck bombs⁶⁵. Many commentators fear that the next stage may even involve a nuclear, biological or chemical attack⁶⁶. For this reason, the proliferation of biological and chemical materials by certain unstable régimes and the status of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal warrant close scrutiny by counter-terrorist bodies. As Margaret Thatcher warned:

"The Soviet collapse has aggravated the single most awesome threat of modern times: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These weapons, and the ability to develop and deliver them, are today acquired by middle income countries with modest populations such as Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria - acquired sometimes from other powers like China and North Korea, but most ominously from former Soviet arsenals, or unemployed scientists, or from organised criminal rings, all via a growing international black market. Add weapons of mass destruction to rogue states, and you have a highly toxic compound. In some instances, the potential capabilities at the command of these unpredictable figures is either equal to or even more destructive than the Soviet threat to the West in the 1960s. It is that serious."⁶⁷

Margaret Thatcher spelled out in the above statement why the macropolitical threat posed by terrorism should feature highly in geopolitical thinking into the next century. The "most awesome threat" is not yet within range of the shores of the United Kingdom but is in fact on the doorstep of the Maltese islands. Although at present it is difficult to envisage a motive for an attack on Malta, terrorist behaviour is notoriously irrational and Malta's increasing involvement in the Western security sphere means that the macropolitical threat posed by terrorism to Malta is worthy of closer scrutiny.

The events of 1985 can be recalled by most Maltese and serve as a constant reminder of their vulnerability to terrorist insurgency. Land based terrorism was no new phenomenon to the Mediterranean but within the space of a month modern terrorists had taken to the air and sea. The hijack of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro in October of that year remains a symbol of terrorism at sea. One month later, Malta became the unwilling host to the hijacked Egyptair flight MS 648 which through the amateurism of Egyptian Commandos was transformed into the "world's worst hijack"⁶⁸. The willingness of the region's extremist groups to terrorise *per mare, per terram, per aer* is particularly relevant to Malta as an island at the cross-roads of the world's busiest air and sea ways. Malta's two major gateways to the Mediterranean, Luqa airport and the Freeport, are therefore the most likely terrorist targets or flash-points.

The "hubbing concept" promoted by Air Malta highlights the role Luqa airport plays in Mediterranean travel. In an interview, Marcel Cassar gave views on Malta's role in Mediterranean air travel and the implications for anti-terrorist security that arise from the promotion of the "hubbing concept"⁶⁹. He explained that, by virtue of its location, Luqa airport serves as an important hub between Middle Eastern and European airports. More specifically, the management's strategy aims to target city pair segments between the

Middle East and Europe which are not already served by direct flights. This means that those involved in security at Luqa airport are left to deal with a high proportion of passengers and baggage from less security conscious provincial airports. In addition to this, and perhaps more significantly, the majority of their flights link the two main source areas of international terrorism, Middle East and North Africa, to the main target area, Europe. Whilst a detailed analysis of the security arrangements at Luqa airport is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worth citing the opinion of one researcher who has looked into the matter in some detail. William Crenshare has completed a PhD on *Terrorism and the Threat to Civil Aviation* and, referring to Malta's Luqa Airport, stated that, "in view of its location there is scope for improved security in the operational area, the hold and cabin luggage check-in as well as through increased segregation of arrivals and departures"⁷⁰.

Malta Freeport is essentially a transshipment seaport which is promoted along the same lines as Luqa Airport; that is as a regional hub. The Freeport is located in Marsaxlokk Bay alongside a number of Malta's other key facilities, including the Delimara power station and the island's only gas storage facility, not to mention a major population and tourist centre. Such a concentration of key facilities yields the bay especially vulnerable to terrorist attack. Unlike the airport, the Freeport receives no mention in the section on National Security in "The Structure Plan: Report of Survey (1991)"⁷¹. Furthermore, when interviewed, Dr. Stefan Micallef of the "Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre" expressed serious reservations about the authorities' ability to cope with an accident in the vicinity of the Freeport; never mind a deliberate attack⁷².

In addition to the airport and Freeport a thorough appraisal of the threat posed by international terrorism to Malta should take into account a number of other potential targets:

If the Maltese government were to offend some of the region's more extreme Islamists in some way the government buildings in Valetta would be an obvious target for a reprisal attack. However, such a prospect is not foreseeable in the immediate future, although moves towards closer association with NATO or even the EU may mean that the government has to be a little more cautious when making commenting in public on sensitive international matters.

Large multinationals with strong US connections may also find themselves targeted by terrorists if in their dealings they have exploited or affronted Islamists in some way. The most likely victims of such attacks are the big oil companies, but fortunately Malta does not play host to any such companies. SGS Thompson is by far Malta's largest multinational company but it is involved mainly in the manufacture of micro-electronics and it is difficult envisage them becoming the target of a terrorist attack.

In the wake of the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (August 1998), Western embassies in Valletta are far more likely terrorist targets. Joseph Paolino, the US Ambassador in Malta, was asked in an interview how seriously he and his fellow diplomats viewed the terrorist threat. He explained that, although to his knowledge other embassies in Valletta were not as wary of the terrorist threat;

"as a matter of course the US embassy adopts various states of alertness to the terrorist threat which are decided by the federal political analysts in Washington who are continually assessing the level of the terrorist threat. The highest state of alertness was adopted following the US's bombing of Libya and throughout the Gulf War but since then only for specific occasions or functions."⁷³

As an example, following the recent embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania (August 1998) it is likely that the state of alertness at the US embassy in Valletta will have once again been raised.

The increasing number of UN centres being set-up in Malta constitute one final group of potential targets⁷⁴. As a body whose main aim is to promote international peace and security the UN and its installations may seem like an unlikely target for terrorists of any type. However, through its increasing involvement in international conflicts in recent years, the UN has exposed itself to a great deal of criticism and earned itself a range of enemies. For instance, by failing to protect the Bosnian Muslims from ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, the UN was the subject of widespread condemnation in the Islamic world. In addition to this instance, both Libya and Iraq are currently suffering UN imposed economic sanctions and offices seen to be representing the UN should be wary of the prospect of reprisal attacks from terrorists sponsored by these countries. On this point, Joseph Paolino, expressed concern at certain entrepreneurs in Malta who seemed to be trying to capitalise on the embargo on Libya by offering services to businessmen who were seeking to breach the UN sanctions⁷⁵. It would seem that even Air Malta is involved in this practice by promoting flights connecting Europe with Tunis or Monastir and arranging transport on to Libya.

Clearly then, if the ominous trends in international terrorism outlined at the beginning of this section are considered alongside the potential targets identified above it is easy to see why the terrorist threat to Malta should feature highly in security planning and contingency preparedness. Since the explosion of terrorism in the Mediterranean, Malta has experienced four aircraft hijackings and has also been implicated in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie⁷⁶ and two other relatively minor attacks; in strictly quantitative terms a minute share of regional activity⁷⁷. Nevertheless, given Malta's heavy

dependence on tourism, even the most minuscule of attacks could have catastrophic effects on the economy⁷⁸. On this note, the aphorism San Tzu used to describe the effects of terrorism two thousand, five hundred years ago is still applicable today,

"kill one - frighten ten thousand"⁷⁹.

As a final thought, the strong anti-Western proclivities of many extremist Islamist groups mean that moves towards closer ties with the EU and particularly NATO should be monitored closely by those concerned with Malta's security in a broad sense⁸⁰.

5.23 Maritime boundary delimitation.

The Mediterranean basin is recognised by theorists as one of the world's biggest problem areas in so far as maritime boundary delimitation is concerned⁸¹. As a semi-enclosed sea, none of its twenty two states can claim a full two hundred nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) without an overlap⁸². Out of a potential forty-six maritime boundaries only eleven have been either settled or partially settled (approximately 24 per cent)⁸³.

Future maritime boundary settlements are primarily hindered by a lack of support from many littoral states for the concepts set out in the Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which are now in force. The first state ratified the Convention in 1982 whereas the majority of Mediterranean states have done so in the last five or so years (with Spain and the UK [which affects Gibraltar and the Sovereign Bases in Cyprus] only ratifying in 1997)⁸⁴. Further demonstrative of this apparent apathy towards UNCLOS III

is the fact that six states have yet to ratify it; Albania, Turkey, Syria, Israel, Libya and Morocco⁸⁵. As Blake noted:

"Altogether the Mediterranean has a higher proportion of non-signatories of the UN Convention than any other region"⁸⁶.

In addition to this, a number of other obstacles to Mediterranean boundary delimitation arise from the region's political and geographical characteristics.

Poor political relations threaten to impede agreement over many of the Mediterranean's maritime boundaries. For example, the faltering Middle East peace process prevents Israel from negotiating its maritime borders⁸⁷. Croatia has a number of obvious political obstacles to overcome if it is to settle its new maritime boundaries with Slovenia and Serbia/Montenegro. Spain and Morocco are unlikely to conclude a maritime boundary agreement while Morocco disputes the sovereignty of the Spanish "Plazas" and Spain itself rejects British sovereignty over Gibraltar⁸⁸. And as the final, and perhaps most significant, example, we turn to the Aegean. Although both states belong to NATO, Greece and Turkey have been locked in dispute on the question of sovereignty over the Aegean Sea for over twenty years and the dispute, compounded with the Cyprus problem, has erupted into numerous bids of violence and brought them close to armed conflict on a number of occasions over the years⁸⁹. In accordance with the 1992 UN Convention signed by Greece, but not Turkey, every coastal state can claim a territorial sea of twelve nautical miles. The main problem is posed by the fact that if Greece were to achieve its full entitlement with respect to this convention it would obtain sovereignty of over 71 per cent of the Aegean⁹⁰. Considering the potential presence of oil in the northern Aegean and given the necessity to protect its shipping, Turkey claims the Aegean presents special


circumstances and should be divided according to a median line boundary. The problem is further complicated by an airspace dispute, which has yet to be fully resolved, and the position with regard to the maritime boundaries around Cyprus⁹¹.

In addition to poor political relationships, geographical characteristics also impede maritime boundary delimitation. Specifically, the shape and dimensions of the basin, the existence of numerous peninsulas and islands and the relative proximity of a large number of states within a constricted area, all cause particular problems. Consummately, the geographical configuration of the basin dictates that the majority of potential disputes and confrontations are between North and South; precisely the axis about which international relations are poorest. On this point, Langford has pointed out;

"Nearly 70 per cent of potentially contentious Mediterranean boundaries are between opposite States"⁹².

Thus, a number of political and geographical complications have combined with a general apathy towards the concepts set out in UNCLOS III to constrict delimitation of the Mediterranean Sea. Although, the delimitation of maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean is ultimately a legal problem, it nevertheless presents a number of implications for the long term security of all riparian states. As has been seen from the examples already discussed, failure to reach a satisfactory legal and equitable agreement can all too easily bring about dispute and even result in conflict. The following map shows the extent of the possible flash-points that may well emerge in the course of the process of maritime boundary delimitation in the Mediterranean basin:

Figure 12: Potential maritime boundary disputes in the Mediterranean Sea



Source: Compiled from research conducted by Langford, S.R. op. cit.

As can be seen from figure 12, the future security and stability of the entire region is clearly at stake from the process of maritime boundary delimitation.

The question we are concerned with here is whether Malta's security and stability is likely to be threatened as a result of any disputes which emanate from the delimitation process and in turn, therefore, whether this process should be the concern of those Maltese engaged in geopolitical thinking. At first glance, it would appear that the prudent answer to this question is most certainly, yes. Not only is Malta's potential area of offshore jurisdiction the central piece in what is planned to be a complex jigsaw of maritime jurisdictions, but Malta is also an archipelagic island group and, as such, the delimitation of her maritime boundaries attracts a great many additional problems⁹³. Furthermore, as Blake explained:

"In some ways Malta has a bigger stake in the Mediterranean than most of the other coastal states. ... Malta is clearly one of the Mediterranean's most ocean-dependent states"⁹⁴.

In addition to this, as Anderson⁹⁵ and Blake⁹⁶ have calculated, when land area is measured in relation to length of Mediterranean coastline Malta ranks second only to Monaco. This measure provides a crude index of "Mediterranean consciousness" since it implies that a high proportion of the Maltese population live close to the coast⁹⁷.


The remainder of this section investigates the problems of delimitation which are brought about by Malta's geographical configuration and location and assesses whether they are likely to become the source of dispute or even conflict.

The quintessential point of departure for any investigation into Malta's maritime jurisdiction must surely be the celebrated speech of Malta's Ambassador to the UN, Arvid Pardot, to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in November 1967. This seminal speech lasted three hours and comprised mainly a plea to the coastal states of the world to end their deeply damaging scramble for control of the oceans. More specifically, he argued for;

"an effective international regime over the seabed and ocean floor beyond a clearly defined national jurisdiction"⁹⁸.

As Blake noted, within six weeks of this speech, which conceptualised the "Common Heritage of Mankind", an Ad Hoc Committee had been formed to look into the matter⁹⁹. In turn, this then led to Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea and the 1982 Convention¹⁰⁰. Despite commendable efforts by successive Maltese governments to enact their small but significant part of Arvid Pardot's vision, figure 13 shows that Malta's potentially complex network of boundaries remains far from complete.

Figure 13: Delimitation of Malta's Maritime Boundaries (as of 1998)



Source: Scovazzi, op.cit..

Through her dispute with Libya, Malta has experienced the high cost and potential duration of arbitration through the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but also the tensions that the delimitation process can cause¹⁰¹. To this backdrop, Maltese authorities are gradually seeking conciliation with Italy and Tunisia as well as pushing for the equitable division of the Ionian Sea (see figure 13).

Professor David Attard, who is the Director of the International Maritime Law Institute in Msida, Malta, was asked about his views on Malta's undelimited boundaries to her north, east and west¹⁰².

Delimitation between Malta and Italy is still unresolved, although there exists a working arrangement which grants concessions up to within five hundred metres of the median line between Malta and Sicily. Professor Attard was quick to dismiss the prospect of any kind of hostile dispute resulting from the delimitation of this boundary. Nevertheless, if looking at worst-case scenarios, which is after all what a great deal of geopolitical thinking is involved with, such a dispute, no matter how mild a form it may take, can not be ruled out completely. The Sicilian Channel is thought to be a potentially rich hydrocarbon area¹⁰³ and the delimitation of this Channel between Malta and Italy has been described as one of the most "complex issues" in the central Mediterranean area¹⁰⁴. The most likely cause of tension between Italy and Malta would be an oil strike close to the existing neutral corridor (500m strip along the notional median line between Malta and Sicily). Although such a strike is unlikely in the immediate future, a fall-out with the Italians could have serious political implications for Malta and more particularly for her relationship with the EU¹⁰⁵. Given the precariousness in Malta of the entire European issue, a settlement for this boundary should be sought to ensure Malta's well-being and stability into the next century. The staunchest of critics of Malta's involvement with the EU must foresee the damage that could be done by any fall-out with Italy and perhaps then the EU over the

matter of this potential boundary. The delimitation of this boundary is, therefore, a matter of some geopolitical significance.

In recent years relations between Malta and Tunisia have been strained by a dispute over the delimitation of their intervening waters. Once again, oil prospecting has taken place in this area and has had the effect of increasing the stakes. Professor Attard believes that given Malta's relatively minute coastline it is extremely unlikely that an equidistant delimitation¹⁰⁶ will be acceded to by Tunisia. To understand why this is likely to be the case we need to analyse the trend in agreements concluded thus far by opposite states and the precedents set in recent years by the cases which have passed through the arbitration procedure provided by the ICJ.

In short, the once established doctrine of equidistance was effectively abandoned after the North Sea cases of 1969. Although there is still an apparent preference amongst lawyers and theorists for commencing proceedings with reference to a median line¹⁰⁷, the ICJ has clearly rejected the strict application of the equidistance/median line rule when it may lead to inequitable results. The findings of two cases, both of which are particularly close to home for the Maltese, are relevant and can be drawn upon here. First of all, in the Libya-Tunisia case (1982)¹⁰⁸ the ICJ ruled:

"Equidistance is not, ..., either a mandatory legal principle or a method having some privileged status in relation to other methods"¹⁰⁹.

Furthermore, it stressed as a central factor the need to reach an equitable result:

"The delimitation is to be effected in accordance with equitable principles and taking account of all relevant circumstances, so as to arrive at an equitable result"¹¹⁰.

As a second example of the adoption of similar reasoning by the court and the trend away from the doctrine of rigid equidistance, it was held in the Libya-Malta case (judgement: June 1985; implementation: November 1986):

"The delimitation is to be effected in accordance with equitable principles and taking account of all relevant circumstances, so as to arrive at an equitable result"¹¹¹.

This means that if a settlement is to be reached between Malta and Tunisia the relevant circumstances referred to above must be taken into account by both parties in their negotiations. These will include, amongst other things, considerations of proportionality as well as a more detailed appreciation of the length and configuration of both coastlines. To date, however, neither of the parties appears willing to compromise and there has been little push for agreement. It follows that the prospects for agreement are poor and a further deterioration in bilateral relations cannot be discounted. Indeed a report on the front page of *The Malta Independent* stated:

"Malta and Tunisia are locked in a bitter dispute over the median line - the delimitation of the Continental Shelf - and the Maltese Government is known to have made very strong representations about the matter. ... Both sources close to the government say the dispute has strained relations between the two countries. ... 'Relations were never so bad,' a well placed source said."¹¹²

Clearly, therefore, the delimitation of this boundary is already developing into an issue whose resolution should feature highly in Maltese geopolitical thinking.

Finally we turn to the east of Malta where the equitable division of the Ionian Sea is not likely to prove an easy exercise. Professor Attard explained that this area is one of the largest expanses of water in the Mediterranean and is thus thought by many theorists to be one of the biggest problem areas. As can be seen from figure 11, complete delimitation will require agreement by states as politically diverse as Libya, Malta, Italy, Greece and Albania, and it is perhaps not surprising that few inroads into the delimitation of this vast area to the east of Malta have yet to be made. The potential complexity of delimiting the Ionian Sea has meant that few countries have been prepared to invest in any oil exploration. It follows, therefore, that in the immediate future at least an oil strike in this area is an unlikely source of dispute. The fact remains, however, that prospective offshore jurisdictions can be exploited in other ways for economic gain and the Ionian's status as one of the deepest and richest fishing grounds in the Mediterranean basin could be sufficient in itself to trigger disputes over the competing national interests that exist there. As a further consideration, culpability for marine pollution is perhaps harder to assign in undelimited waters and this fact should act as a further stimulus for a solution to this problem area¹¹³. In summary, a number of potentially serious problems can be expected to emanate from the Ionian Sea and for this reason the equitable delimitation of this area to the east of Malta should also feature highly in current and future geopolitical deliberations on Malta.

In conclusion, this section has shown that the delimitation of Malta's remaining offshore jurisdiction is a matter of geopolitical significance. According to Blake's rough calculations (i.e. using equidistance only) Malta stands to control 61, 000 square kilometres of the Mediterranean¹¹⁴. Nevertheless, as an archipelagic island group in the centre of a semi-enclosed sea, Malta epitomises everything which is difficult about maritime boundary delimitation. Nevertheless, problematic though the process may be, the delimitation of maritime boundaries has a "regulating effect" on the offshore activities

of the parties involved¹¹⁵ and, for the sake of international relations, is therefore worth giving high priority.

The regulation of oil prospecting has been alluded to already and, because of the large sums of money normally involved, is probably the most important of these activities. However, there are a number of other offshore activities which bring about potential geopolitical implications for Malta and are therefore worthy of closer investigation by those concerned with Malta's stability and security. The role of policing in the management of the various tiers of Malta's offshore domain has already been alluded to in sections 5.21 and 5.24 with reference to illegal immigration and contraband activities, respectively. In addition to this, however, the regulation of any activities which may have a damaging effect on Malta's marine environment is also of paramount importance. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, much attention in recent years has come to be focused on activities that may be damaging to the environment and the increasing influence that such activities are exerting on the geopolitical and security considerations of governments. Although a detailed examination of the whole range of activities that may damage Malta's marine environment is beyond the scope of this thesis, it suffices to say that the main issues in question are potentially significant enough to warrant the attention of high-level policy-makers and should, therefore be incorporated into future geopolitical thinking on Malta. For example, Malta's vulnerability to large scale pollution which may come in the form of a massive oil leak. This matter was discussed in detail with Dr Stefan Micallef who is the chemical expert at the Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the Mediterranean (REMPEC)¹¹⁶. He was of the opinion that, if a wider definition of security is used, Malta is undoubtedly threatened by the prospect of any major spillage in the central Mediterranean. Such a conclusion is not surprising given the islands' location, sandwiched between the two carriage-ways of one of the world's busiest tanker routes, and the population's now heavy dependence on desalination for

most of its domestic water. Besides rendering the desalinisation plants unworkable almost immediately¹¹⁷, the longer term knock on effects of such a spillage for Malta's tourist industry and so also her economic stability would be catastrophic. Through the increased regulation that delimitation of maritime boundaries brings about culpability, blame and so also responsibility for pollution are all easier to establish¹¹⁸. This means that, although the threat of such a catastrophe can never realistically be eradicated, the consequences of such pollution can perhaps be controlled or at least tempered. Hence, in this respect also, the delimitation of Malta's offshore jurisdiction is also a desirable new focus for geopolitical thinking in Malta.

5.24 Transnational crime.

Traditionally organized crime has been seen as a predicament of law and order. In recent years, modern transport and communications systems, economic interdependence and the emergence of the global market have all radically permutated the context within which organized crime operates. Indeed in the post-Cold War era a number of theorists are acknowledging that transnational crime constitutes a security threat *per se*¹¹⁹. Transnational crime, by definition, violates national borders and thus challenges the most fundamental attribute of security; sovereignty. Similarly transnational criminal organizations, through their disregard for law and order undermine a state's authority and ultimately its capacity to govern itself. And finally, at the international level, attempts to establish codes of conduct and regulate international law are continually challenged by transnational crime. As Bearman has summarised:

"Organised crime has taken advantage of new opportunities provided by globalism to become a transnational phenomenon that poses novel challenges to national and international security."¹²⁰

In recent years new patterns of domestic and international co-operation have spawned among criminal organizations. Such co-operation connects groups as dispersed as the Mexican smuggling gangs, the Colombian cartels, the Hong Kong Chinese Triads, the Sicilian Mafia and the Russian and eastern European Organizatsiya. Out of these alliances, the partnership between the growing criminal empires of the former Soviet Union and the better known Sicilian Mafiosi clans is acknowledged as being the most efficacious¹²¹.

One commentator, Nathan Adams, has stated that the Sicilian-eastern connection is nothing new¹²². He has pointed out that there was evidence of eastern involvement, primarily Hungarian, in a number of Sicilian drug refineries exposed in the latter years of the Cold War¹²³. Leo Brincat, the Malta Labour Party's international secretary, confirmed the Sicilian-eastern connection in an article in the Malta Independent:

"At least 15 drug refineries had been discovered over the years in Sicily with evident Eastern links."¹²⁴

Political dislocation and upheaval in the Soviet Union have broadened the operational parameters for the pre-Glasnost collaborators. It is now relatively easy for them to muscle in on the irrepressible strain of capitalism in the former Soviet Union and collude with the speculators which have emanated from the Mediterranean's main growth economies. This coalition would therefore appear to have concocted the perfect formula. Furthermore, political instability in and around the basin completes the perfect formula by providing an environment in which they can function with relative impunity.

Although illicitness of such activity makes quantitative assessments difficult, the involvement of transnational criminal organizations in the trafficking of armaments, drugs, money and even people is beyond doubt.

Criminal involvement in weapons trafficking has become a staple feature of the post-Cold War world. Such transactions can have significant impact both on local conflicts and on the capacity of terrorist groups to create mischief. The most likely source of weaponry is the former Soviet Union, where the upsurge in organized crime has led one theorist to conclude that the communist state is;

"less likely to be replaced by a democratic state than by a one that is either dominated by organised crime or in which there is a symbiotic relationship between government and major criminal organisations."¹²⁵

In his best-selling and highly believable futuristic novel, Frederick Forsyth spells out his idea of what is in store for Russia:

"... a new world - of poverty and luxury, hunger and feast, of politicians, gangsters, private armies, prostitutes and priests"¹²⁶.

Fiction aside, there are an estimated 5,700 criminal gangs in Russia with a total membership of over 100,000¹²⁷. Stephen Handleman has conducted a thorough study into these gangs and concluded that while many of them are small and disorganised, others are more sophisticated and have links to the political and economic elite¹²⁸. What makes all this even more disconcerting is that Russia remains a nuclear superpower in possession of vast quantities of loosely controlled nuclear material in a wide variety of installations and facilities.

If the former Soviet Union is the world's major provider, the Mediterranean is likely to be the world's main recipient of illegal armaments. Stanojevic has explained that:

"In recent years about four fifths of the world trade in arms and military equipment ended up in developing countries. Of this, half of the entire world trade in arms goes to the Near East. Islamic countries are currently the biggest buyers of this merchandise."¹²⁹

The legal stockpiling of armaments in the Mediterranean region, or more specifically the trend towards parity between the North and South of the basin, has long been the concern of traditional geopolitical theorists. However, a more recent and insidious macropolitical threat has been the availability of a whole range of armaments on the black market. One analyst has referred to this threat as;

"the most dangerous threat to security in the nineties"¹³⁰.

International drugs trafficking is perhaps the primary vocation of the world's main organized criminal groups. Bearman has suggested that:

"Although estimates of the value of the global drugs trade vary considerably, it may be second only to the global trade in oil"¹³¹.

In recent years the Mediterranean has assumed a new role in the drugs trade between the world's principal zones of production and consumption. Post-Cold War instability in the Caucasus region has meant that criminal gangs in Georgia, Abkhazia, Chechnya, Armenia and Azerbaijan have drawn the traditional drug smuggling routes from the "golden crescent" down towards the Mediterranean¹³². In addition to this, heroin and cocaine

from the "golden triangle" are increasingly passing through African countries, where there is less impediment from corruptible and inexperienced authorities, en route to Europe and North America; again bringing the Mediterranean into play¹³³. It also seems to be the case that the drug trafficking and arms trafficking businesses are becoming increasingly intertwined, with cases of criminals representing specific ethnic groups becoming involved in the drug trade in order to acquire armaments¹³⁴.

International criminal organizations also pose a macropolitical threat to the region through money laundering. They do so by undermining the integrity of the region's financial and commercial institutions. Money laundering has become a major business in its own right, with criminal organizations taking advantage of bank secrecy laws and offshore tax havens, as well as the electronic capabilities that facilitate the rapid transfer of funds around the global financial system. Despite the current extent of the problem, most commentators agree that the threat to international stability posed by money laundering should not be exaggerated. As Bearman has explained:

"Even though the amount of laundered money is staggering in absolute terms, in relative terms it remains a very small percentage of the money circulating in the global financial markets."¹³⁵

Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate the potentially drastic implications that money laundering can have for some of the more vulnerable economies. By laundering their money in such an economy the criminals are likely to push up currency values and perhaps even stoke inflation to uncontrollable levels. Also, it is conceivable that by moving their money out of a particular institution or national economy at a key moment they could cause severe problems. Although organized criminals were not involved, the collapse of the UK bank Barings in February 1995 highlighted the vulnerability of even venerable

financial institutions to the rapid withdrawal of funds, and drew attention to the impact of disruptive and unexpected events on the stability of financial markets. A further consideration is that measures designed to counter money laundering ordinarily involve banking restrictions which in turn would tend to impede economic growth.

Finally, some of the more enterprising organized criminal groups are latching onto the potential of trading in people. This suggests that the commodity they trade in is more or less irrelevant so long as it yields high profit and does so at acceptable risk. Certainly from my experiences whilst serving in Hong Kong, this particular strand of international crime is particularly horrific especially in terms of the disregard the criminals appear to have for their forlorn immigrants. Clearly, the criminals are contributing to the problem of illegal immigration but in addition to this there are far more issues at stake here. Not only does this phenomenon threaten a basic ingredient of national sovereignty, it also places in jeopardy the immigrants themselves, who sometimes end up in poverty-stricken or war-torn countries rather than their desired destinations. Moreover, the would-be immigrants are highly vulnerable during transport, and on arrival are often forced to resort into criminal activity or highly undesirable or dangerous work. If the problem intensifies in certain areas it may also begin to provoke a backlash against legal immigrants and legitimate refugees.

Given Malta's proximity to Sicily, in geographical, historic and, increasingly, cultural terms, it is perhaps with a sense of inevitability we now arrive at the macropolitical threat that organized crime poses to Malta. Although as yet there is only limited evidence of criminal involvement in illegal immigration into or via Malta, Malta's entanglement in the trafficking of arms and drugs as well as the laundering of money in the state's economy are all reasonably well recounted. The following paragraphs attempt to establish the nature

and extent of the threat that these phenomena pose to Malta's stability and the preservation of her national integrity.

In 1995 Malta was mentioned as one of the main staging points for criminal arms running into Bosnia. Xavier Gautier wrote in the French newspaper *Le Figaro* (15 March 1995);

"The Croats have bought 10,000 Beretta 92-FS revolvers in Malta, the same amount of Heckler, Koch or Glock machine guns made in Austria and 18,000 uniforms for soldiers of the Croat-Muslim Federation."¹³⁶

The above allegations came to the fore in Malta following a series of articles, responses and editorials in the *Malta Independent* in the middle of my field research¹³⁷. Marcel Cassar, gave his views on the allegations¹³⁸. He stated that in his opinion they were highly plausible. He even went on to point out the fact that cost in Malta of an American-made Beretta had risen from 1,000DM to 1,800DM in the first four months on 1995 and that this could well be indicative of the increased demand brought about by the smuggling. Maltese Police Superintendent, Andrew Seychell also believed the allegations to have been grounded and conceded that it would be relatively straightforward for a well organized criminal gang to gather together and smuggle the number of small arms in question out of Malta. He did state, however, that it would be unlikely that any larger arm shipments would escape the security procedures currently in place and I am inclined to agree with him in this respect. The problem with monitoring the movement of smaller arms in Malta is that there are vast quantities of firearms and ammunitions in the hands of recreational hunters and, in addition to this, Malta has very lax gun laws. Nathalino Fenech of the *Malta Independent* is currently (1998) conducting a PhD on "Bird Hunting in Malta" and believes that the number of unregistered firearms in Malta is well in excess of ten thousand¹³⁹. Although it would seem that to date, Malta's entanglement in the smuggling

of armaments to Bosnia was an isolated incident this event is clearly demonstrative of the islands' vulnerability to this particular threat.

Malta's involvement in arms trafficking is a relatively new phenomenon, but for a variety of reasons, however, the islands have long been especially disposed to transit traffic in drugs¹⁴⁰. For instance Malta's relatively long shoreline which is indented with numerous harbours, inlets and yachting berths, means that smuggling is difficult to control. The tourist trade and busy Freeport and airport, both of which have established themselves as "hubs" of regional travel and trade, further perplex those involved in counter-smuggling efforts. Despite the 1993 amendment to the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance¹⁴¹ and an increase in international co-operation aimed at combating the problem (most notably with Italy and Libya¹⁴²), trafficking still creates serious difficulties for the Maltese authorities. Hillary Caruana, the research and development executive of "sedqa", which is a Maltese governmental "agency against drug and alcohol abuse", and inferred how serious he thought the problem was. He did so through the use of a software package which he has designed to increase awareness of the problem of drug addiction in Malta. The fact that he himself is a rehabilitated addict may go some way to explaining why he is extremely well-motivated in his work and his heart-felt frustration at the widespread ignorance and apathy towards the drug problem in Malta. He explained that in recent years there have been between fifty and eighty substantial seizures of narcotics per annum but that this is in no way indicative of the true scale of the problem. Malta is at the heart of a number of major smuggling routes and he fears that at any one time there are substantial quantities of all the major drugs either passing through or *in situ* in Malta. This leads to the existence of what he refers to as "a supply-driven black market" in which drugs are continually being pushed onto Malta's youth and even tourists by experienced and professional criminal groups. This market is made up mainly of heroin¹⁴³ and cocaine, although seizures of ecstasy are on the increase¹⁴⁴ and cannabis has made a "comeback" in recent years¹⁴⁵. On

paper, figures may seem relatively small but it is important not to overlook the fact that only a few kilograms of one of the harder drugs is sufficient to cause havoc in both Malta¹⁴⁶ and Gozo¹⁴⁷.

The drug problem in Malta is undoubtedly of significant proportions, but nowhere are the Mafiosi-Organizatsiya connections so apparent as in the practise of money laundering. Money laundering within Malta's banking sector is well documented¹⁴⁸ but the main area of concern is within the domestic property market.

Whereas it is difficult to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate Italian property purchases on the islands, the explosion of Russian acquisitions cannot be mistaken for a sudden interest in retirement or holiday villas. There may well have been a few members of the Soviet *nomenklatura* who decided to incorporate Malta into their multinational investment portfolios, but the recent upsurge of property purchases by Russians in the post-Cold War era leads to a more obvious interpretation. Between 1992 and 1994 Russian property acquisitions in Malta increased tenfold and in the first month of 1995 alone twenty six villas were bought by Russian citizens¹⁴⁹.

The problems are clear. Criminal money laundering is directly pressuring internal demand for property and if allowed to continue unchecked will ultimately drive up the value of the Maltese Lira, elevating inflation rates. Also, association with organised crime erodes Malta's standing in the international business community. Finally, legitimate growth and development are hindered through the restrictive measures, set out in the 1994 Money Laundering Bill, which are required to constrain the laundering.

Although often tempered, the macropolitical threat posed by transnational crime to Maltese security cannot be overstated and, what is more, accession to the EU may well

augment the threat. Although co-ordination through CELAD¹⁵⁰ and the Pompidou Group¹⁵¹ is designed to counter criminal activity in Europe, such illicit dealings are far harder to trace within the expanse of the EU. Furthermore, an open border with Sicily would have untold consequences for transnational criminal activity. In summary, Malta's vulnerable location within this regional geopolitical environment which is conducive to transnational crime has meant that the islands are fast becoming an unwitting cache for the Mafiosi-Organizatsiya coalition.

5.3 CONCLUSION

This chapter has focused on the forthcoming stage in world political history and examined how Malta is likely to fit into it. It has done so through the analysis of four international issues which, despite having previously received only limited attention in Malta, are likely to take on geopolitical significance into the next century. These international issues are tantamount to the "regional specificities" which Gorbachev referred to¹⁵² and, to use the words of Camilleri, form Malta's very own "new macropolitical agenda"¹⁵³. This chapter has proposed that further analysis of the nature and extent of the challenges thrown up by this macropolitical agenda would surely compel those Maltese engaged in geopolitical thought to discard their narrow and out-dated approaches.

Thus, as it set out to do, this chapter has presented geopolitical thinkers in Malta with a course back to the future or an opportunity to look beyond historically-derived interpretations of their geopolitical environment. The recent renaissance in Maltese geopolitical thought discussed in the introduction to this chapter is a direct derivative of such historically-derived interpretations. The three traditional policy responses to wider political developments which have emanated from this renaissance (i.e. security through

the EU, NATO or strict neutrality) do little to protect Malta from the more stealthy macropolitical threats which form a major part of her current security environment.

Although in no way constitutive of an exhaustive analysis, since there are undoubtedly more relevant issues and other macropolitical threats, this chapter has attempted to outline the four main macropolitical threats to Maltese security and well-being. Through these outlines it has sought to show that, even though they may be too insidious, multifaceted and pervasive to be acknowledged as being geopolitical according to traditional theoretical convention, taking account of the latest innovative thinking in the field these threats can in fact be classed as geopolitical phenomena in their own right.

Hence in a way, this chapter has prescribed a blue-print for the required rejuvenation of Maltese geopolitical thought. It has highlighted the importance of considering the less conventional geopolitical issues in the contemporary Mediterranean environment and in doing so, concurrently drawn attention to the impotence of the current renaissance of traditional geopolitical thinking in Malta. The macropolitical agenda presented in this chapter can thus feasibly be used as an alternative basis for geopolitical thought and so eventually even the making of foreign policy in Malta. The constituent ingredients of this alternative basis for future geopolitical thinking in Malta are set out in the following chapter, which summarises the findings of the thesis.

Endnotes

¹ Gorbachev referred to such a period of geopolitical transition in 1994: "It was clear from the start that between the old and the new order there must be a transitional period, with both elements of the old system of international relations and the embryo of a new one." See Gorbachev 1994, p. 248.

² Camilleri uses the term "interacting trends" when making the point that the emerging international security system is not likely to conform to any one global model. He states that instead it reflects, "a mosaic of relatively fluid arrangements, a transitional architecture of competing yet overlapping global and regional designs". See Camilleri 1993, p. 91. A year later Mikhail Gorbachev referred to these interacting trends as regional specificities and wrote, "Certainly, hardly anyone was so naive as to assume that the end of the Cold War and of the division of the world would immediately produce a new world order ... Every region also has its specificities that have to be taken into consideration in trying to move forward and develop new co-operation". Gorbachev p. 248, op. cit..

³ Gorbachev 1994, p. 248.

⁴ Gorbachev op. cit.

⁵ Lawrence Durrell, *Balthazar*, quoted at the start of Theroux 1995.

⁶ Calleja and Wiberg 1994, p. 1.

⁷ Calleja and Wiberg, 1994.

⁸ Joffe, 1991/2 p. 54.

⁹ Gibraltar and Ceuta and Mellila are the subject of a three way dispute between Britain, Spain and Morocco. In short, Morocco wants sovereignty of the so called "Spanish Plazas" (Ceuta, Mellila and a number of other "minor plazas") on its northern coastline. Spain has rejected the Moroccan case yet is itself arguing along similar lines with the British in a bid to regain sovereignty of Gibraltar. A solution to this three-way deadlock is unlikely since jurisdiction of one of the busiest sea-lanes in the world is at stake and most of the world's main maritime powers prefer the current *status quo* to either a Spanish or Spanish/Moroccan controlled Strait of Gibraltar. For further discussion see O'Reilly 1992 and 1994.

¹⁰ *Le Monde Diplomatique*, October 1987, p. 3; quoted in Osseiran, p. 19.

¹¹ Stanojevic 1994, p. 63.

¹² Kissinger 17 Feb. 1975, p. 199.

¹³ Gorbachev op. cit., p. 248.

¹⁴ *Ibid*.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 249.

¹⁶ The list is now endless but three groups of theorists can be identified. The first contains the more traditional theorists of international relations and geopolitics who have advocated a general broadening of their spheres of interest in order that they remain in touch with the nature of the modern world. The second includes those theorists who advocate a more particular broadening of the international relations syllabus so as to take account of the specific influence that environmental factors now have on security related issues. Finally, the third group, is made up of a number of theorists who contest that a whole range of economic factors should be taken into account as well as the more traditional military factors. Some of the most notable examples from each of these three groups are listed below:

Rosenau 1994 discussed the vital "new dimensions of security" and the importance of "interacting globalizing and localizing dynamics", p. 255. Romm 1993, emphasised the importance of "non-military aspects" in "defining national security", p. 5 onwards. Buzan 1982 identified three levels of analysis (individuals, states and the international system) and seeks to integrate them into one vantage point from which to observe the sources, effects and dynamics of the "systematic security problem", chapter 1. Stephenson 1982 investigated a number of alternative methods for international security. Keohane 1985, has talked of the need to tailor traditional approaches in international relations to tie-in with the modern world. Art 1991 has advocated not only a broadening but a humanising of America's "grand strategy after the Cold War". Towards the end of the Cold War, Hoffman 1990 assessed in some detail what he referred to as "a new world and its troubles" and discussed the importance of broadening our approaches to

understanding this world. Gaddis 1991, presented a thorough account of the difficulties and complexities that he supposed the world's security institutions would be left to deal with in the post-Cold War world. Mearshcimier 1990, although concentrating mainly on Europe, adopted an all-encompassing approach when investigating the "instability in Europe after the Cold War". As a final example, Schmidt 1985 has analysed the anachronism of national strategies in the "unpredictable and interdependent modern world".

Dewitt and Evans 1993, typify the views held by the second group of theorists by proposing the all-encompassing concept of "human security" and referring particularly to the environmental dimensions of this concept. Westing 1989 has referred to the "environmental component" of what he refers to as "comprehensive security", p. 4. Bedeski 1992, has also analysed in great detail the potential effects of "unconventional security threats" and particularly the threats which may derive from our physical environment. Johansen 1991 explained how real security can only come through "democratic security", which in Scandinavia and other environmentally aware regions invariably means through "environmental security". Galtung 1984, made similar proposals but instead referred to a broader concept of security which he labelled "alternative security". In a similar vein, Harvey 1988 referred to "natural security" and Sorroos 1994, Brock 1991, Porter 1995, "environmental security", as did Sara Parkin in a lecture she presented at Newcastle University (9/2/1995) which I attended. Mathews 1989 has written in detail about the importance of "redefining security" and re-directing security-related studies so as to take on board environmental influences. Myers 1989 and 1993 introduced the term "ultimate security" mainly through consideration of what he referred to as "the environmental basis of political stability". Homer 1991, conducted a thorough investigation into "environmental changes as causes of acute conflict", p. 77. Dalby 1991 and 1992 (particularly noteworthy) has written extensively on the need to "rethink the security discourse" and the dilemmas that "security, modernity and ecology" pose for post-Cold War discourses on international relations, p. 97. Carrol 1989 has taken advocacy of environmental issues as security issues one step further and proposed that phenomenon such as acid rain may actually constitute a threat to certain groups of people. As a final example from this group of theorists, Prins and Stamp 1993 have actually gone so far as to consider threats at more personal levels, such as the impact of traffic and passive smoking, as threats to individuals' security.

In so far as the final group of theorists is concerned, Crawford 1994 is typical. Crawford criticised the "economic dove's theory", which distinguished between economic security (or societal well-being) and traditional military security (or protection of territorial integrity), and instead argued that it is entirely possible for some of the forces of interdependence to actually enhance the security of a society even as they undermine traditional military security (that is the state's autonomy or capacity to protect its territorial integrity). Geopolitical theorists who have adhered to similar principles as Crawford when analysing the earth's surface have arrived at the concept of "geo-economics" (originally proposed by Luttwak 1990). For more work on the importance of incorporating economic factors into security considerations see Smith 1993, pp. 71-79; Shuman and Harvey 1993, p. 33; Keohane and Nye 1977, pp. 27-29; Ruggie 1992, pp. 561-598; Cable 1995, p. 305; and Richardson 1993, p. 39.

¹⁷ Buzan 1983, referring to the work of Gallie 1962, describes security as "essentially contested concept". This is well illustrated by the UN study by an expert group (UN Research Project 1989) on "concepts of security", where the contributors from east, west and south make or presuppose vastly differing definitions of security.

¹⁸ NATO summit held in London on 6 July 1990 adopted a Declaration, whose many propositions have later been included into the CSCE Paris Charter for a New Europe. The NATO Council held in Copenhagen on 7 June 1991 adopted a final communiqué that contains the main elements of this strategic and military-political concept of the Alliance. Also, the mentioned NATO summit was held in Rome on 7-8 November 1991.

¹⁹ See UN Doc. A/43/629, 23 September 1988.

²⁰ Smith and Kettle 1992.

²¹ Smith and Kettle, argue that the "originally intended usage of the concept of security" differs vastly from the military/state-related definitions which most people now use. They quote the definition printed in Webster's International Dictionary 1898 as being more representative of the common and originally

intended usage of 'security'. In this dictionary, security is defined without mention of the military or the state as "freedom from apprehension, anxiety or care; confidence of power and safety; hence assurance, certainty". See Smith and Kettle *op. cit.*, p. 25.

²² The terms "subject" and "object" were first used in this sense in Wiberg and Øberg 1984 and in Wiberg 1987. The semantical discussion has also been inspired by Krell 1979, Buzan 1983 and Stephenson 1982.

²³ Duke 1994, p. 4.

²⁴ Camilleri 1995, p. 4.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²⁶ Camilleri and Falk 1992.

²⁷ Camilleri 1995, p. 16.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Camilleri 1993, p. 91.

³⁰ Gorbachev 1994, p. 248.

³¹ D'Abadie 1995, p. 122.

³² Although the Maghreb is generally used to denote North Africa, it is important to note that the geographic and cultural area of the Maghreb actually consists of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Libya and Mauritania are spatially, culturally and historically on the periphery of this unit. Throughout this section, the terms Maghreb and Maghrebi are used in their more general senses.

³³ Loescher, 1992.

³⁴ Stewart, 1992.

³⁵ Loescher *op. cit.* uses this term to highlight the vastly increased mobility of immigrants and refugees over the last three decades or so, p. 16.

³⁶ *The Times*, 5 February 1992, p. 12.

³⁷ Aliboni 1991, p. 48.

³⁸ D'Abadie *op. cit.*, p. 123.

³⁹ Boyer 1991.

⁴⁰ These estimates by Boyer do not take the populations of the latest three members (Austria, Sweden and Finland 1995) into account. It should be noted, however, that these three countries have all recorded zero or negative population growths in recent years and for the purposes of the trends portrayed in figures 8 and 9 they are of little relevance.

⁴¹ Stewart, *op. cit.*

⁴² ILO figures cited in International Organization for Migration (IOM), background document for Ninth IOM Seminar on Migration, (Geneva: IOM, December 1990) p. 31.

⁴³ Despite the commonly held belief that the Schengen Treaty is primarily about abolishing checks on persons at Europe's internal frontiers, its main aim was to bring order into the exchange of information about asylum seekers in order to prevent multiple applications in member states. It was the first step in keeping some check on rate of entry of migrants (Stewart, *op. cit.*, p. 19).

⁴⁴ See section 5.25 which tackles the problem posed by members of the Russian Organizatsiya buying up property and retiring in Malta.

⁴⁵ Buttigieg (Chairman, Refugee Section, Malta's Emigrant Commission) 1994, p.25.

⁴⁶ Joseph Abela made this point in an article in the Maltese current affairs magazine, *First Sunday*, where he stated that the Emigrants Commission in Valletta was guilty of "at least in mistakenly fostering the assumption among the world's refugees that it has a refugee programme with assurances of international placing in Canada, Australia and the USA". See Abela 1994, p. 12.

⁴⁷ Raymond Xerri, formerly First Secretary to Malta High Commission currently Deputy High Commissioner in Australia, made this assertion in an informal interview I conducted with him (16 April 1995). He cited Luqa Airport as an example and stated that it was likely that the Government had turned a blind eye on illegal immigrant workers because successful completion depended heavily on the labour they supplied. In addition to this he talked of how the domestic work-force was simply unable to satisfy the huge demand for cleaners and workmen in the generated by the tourist industry in the summer season.

⁴⁸ See for e.g. "Iraqi refugees in Malta" *The Times (Malta)*, 1 Feb. 1994, p. 4; "Illegal immigrants sought after boat hits reef at Gnejna" *The Times (Malta)*, 28 Mar. 1994, p. 8; "19 escaped illegal immigrants caught" *The Sunday Times (Malta)*, 19 Feb. 1995, p. 1; "Somali illegal immigrant pleads for stay of

deportation order" *The Times (Malta)*, 10 Apr. 1995, p.2: "Algerian stowaway seeking refugee status refuses to go back home" *The Malta Independent*, 21 August 1994, p. 1.

⁴⁹ Editor (*The Times, Malta*) 6 Feb. 1995, p. 4.

⁵⁰ Abela op. cit.

⁵¹ Interview conducted by the author at Luqa Airport, 15 April 1995.

⁵² Having since served operationally as a "Boarding Party Officer" in Hong Kong in the run up to the 1997 hand-over, I feel I am now reasonably well placed to comment on the procedures adopted by Malta's Coast Guard with a level of authority.

⁵³ Interview conducted by author at Malta Police General Headquarters in Floriana, 19 April 1995.

⁵⁴ Joseph Gatt of "Caritas Malta" was the charity worker who made these assertions about the islands' illegal immigrants in an interview I conducted with him about the drug problem in Malta (7 April 1995). In addition to this, during my stay in Malta I was shocked to witness my flatmate, a fellow research student who was of Asian descent, being turned away from bars and night-clubs. Indeed, one evening a youth even pulled a knife out on us in the St Julienne's Bay area in a racially motivated attack.

⁵⁵ See section 5.24 for further discussion on the involvement of international criminal groups in illegal immigration to Malta.

⁵⁶ Wilkinson December 1990, p. 2 (Abbreviations: EOKA, Ethniki Organosis Kypriakon Agoniston; FLN, Front de Liberation Nationale; FLOSY, Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen.)

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Anderson 1994, p. 17.

⁵⁹ *The Economist* 22 August 1992, p. 38.

⁶⁰ Quoted in Miller Spring 1988, p. 58.

⁶¹ Deutch, 19 December 1995, in *The Times*, 20 December 1995.

⁶² Some of the most recent results of multi-national co-operation between terrorist groups were witnessed in Sudan and Tanzania where Islamic motivated militants from a number of countries and thought to have been sponsored by the dissident Saudi Prince Osama Bin Laden are the prime suspects in the bombings of the US embassies (August 1998). As a further example, extreme Palestinian groups are thought to have been trained in Libya for a number of years now and sympathisers from all over the world are suspected of having funded much of their terrorism in recent years.

⁶³ For thorough overview of the roots of the Kurdish problem see Hyman September 1988.

⁶⁴ For further details of the see: Gunter May 1994.

⁶⁵ This shift has been detailed by Campbell 1995 who explains how the "terrorism fight has changed tack" and investigated the prospect of "millennium" terrorists who may be prepared to go to unprecedented lengths in support of their cause.

⁶⁶ See for example: Frost who has written, "do not dismiss predictions of ballistic terrorism as alarmist ... At present, as many as 25 countries, many hostile to the West, have, or are in the process of acquiring, weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them." 1996, p. 9; Muhnaimi who has warned, "Iran builds biological arsenal" 1996, p. 14; An article in the economist has warned of the possibility of terrorists benefiting from Russia's booming arms industry, *Economist* December 2 1995; Alison et. al. 1996, who has described Russia as "a vast potential supermarket of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade uranium and plutonium"; Dando 1995 has investigated the prospect of Chemical and Biological weapons falling into the hands of terrorists; Ikle 1996 has detailed the entirely plausible scenario which involves the world's international terrorist organizations accessing nuclear weaponry and labelled it "The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age"; and Aliboni 1990 has analysed the nature of the terrorist threat to Southern European Security in the 1990s.

⁶⁷ Quote taken from report on Margaret Thatcher's Fulton lecture; see *The Sunday Times: Why we need a nuclear shield*, 10 March 1996, p. (3)9.

⁶⁸ Mizzi, 1989.

⁶⁹ Interview conducted by author at the Regional Marine Pollution Response Centre on Manoel Island, 12 April 1995.

⁷⁰ Crenshare 1987, p. 246.

⁷¹ See Volume 2, part R, Sub-study 8 on National Security.

⁷² Interview conducted by author at the Regional Marine Pollution Response Centre on Manoel Island, 12 April 1995.

⁷³ For instance, when I first met Joseph Paolino it was at a lecture on Islam in the Centre for International Studies in Valletta and this must have been deemed one of the risky occasions he was referring to since he was accompanied by an armed bodyguard. Interview conducted by author, 21 April 1995.

⁷⁴ Malta seems to have been chosen by the UN as a suitable location for locating many of its administrative offices, perhaps because of its neutrality but also, most definitely because of its central location. These include for e.g. a number of regional response centres such as the highly impressive Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the Mediterranean Sea (REMPEC) which was set up as part of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1989 on Manoel Island in Malta. Another recent example is the Centre for Ageing in Valletta.

⁷⁵ Adverts can often be found in *The Times* of Malta promoting business trips to Libya by ferry and many hotels seek to host business meetings between Libyans and Europeans, particularly in the off-season.

⁷⁶ The Lockerbie bombing occurred on 21 December 1988, killing all 259 passengers and 11 people on the ground.

⁷⁷ Data extracted from the database at St. Andrews Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence.

⁷⁸ Bell 1996, has written that "tourism is haunted as never before by the spectre of the terrorist", p. 74. Whether tourists are targeted in a terrorist attack on Malta or not, they are likely to be deterred by any terrorist activity.

⁷⁹ Clutterbuck, 1994, p. 1.

⁸⁰ Leo Brincat of Malta's Labour Party has made this point in an article in the *Sunday Times* (of Malta) 19 February 1995, p. 14. He argued that to facilitate Malta's foreign policy-making a deep study is required into the threat posed by fundamentalism. He wrote it is important not simply to "dismiss fundamentalism as something unquantifiable and undefinable" and instead "take the bull by the horns ... and gauge the threat dispassionately".

⁸¹ See for e.g. Marston 1984, De Guttry 1984, Conforti 1988, all of whom go to some length to explain the highly problematic nature of their study area.

⁸² Carrera 1993.

⁸³ Blake 1997, p. 179.

⁸⁴ United Nations 1998, p. 5.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁸⁶ Blake 1997, p. 174.

⁸⁷ Barzilai, G. and Peleg, I. 1994: Although the disputes over land territories are the main focus of this paper, the problems that are likely to accompany the delimitation of Israel's maritime boundaries in the near future are also alluded to.

⁸⁸ For a full explanation of these disputes see O'Reilly 1992 and 1994.

⁸⁹ Beeley 1990.

⁹⁰ Anderson 1994, p. 16.

⁹¹ For a thorough overview of the Greek-Turkish dispute see Beeley 1990 and Langford 1993, pp. 882-911.

⁹² Langford 1993, p. 681.

⁹³ For an investigation that the specific problems that islands cause in maritime delimitation in the Mediterranean see: Malintoppi 1993.

⁹⁴ Blake 1997, p. 173.

⁹⁵ Anderson 1992 calculated the ratio in question in relation to Malta's National Defence and made the assertion that a high land area in relation to coastal length, such as is apparent in the case of Malta, can be broadly taken to indicate an increased potential for problems with regard to National defence.

⁹⁶ Blake 1997, p. 173.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ Quoted in Blake 1997, p. 174.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ Sanger 1986, from Blake 1997.

¹⁰¹ For the original report of the case see ICJ 1985.

¹⁰² Interview conducted by author in Professor Attard's office at the University, 19 April 1995.

¹⁰³ Langford op. cit., p. 837.

¹⁰⁴ Francalanci and Scovazzi 1989, p.181.

¹⁰⁵ Wary of any accusation of doom-gloom prophecy, it should be noted here that Greece's veto on Turkey's membership of the EU is partly motivated by their dispute over the Aegean and that this veto has, in recent years, developed into one of their biggest bones of contention in the stalemate between the two parties.

¹⁰⁶ An equidistant delimitation is in short a delimitation by way of a Median Line between the two opposing states.

¹⁰⁷ Malintoppi has made the point that no matter how redundant the rule of equidistance has become it is still the preferred point of departure for cases passing through the ICJ. Malintoppi 1993, p. 50.

¹⁰⁸ It should be noted that, although the ICJ ruled on the Libya-Tunisia case on 24 February 1982, the two countries have not yet implemented the decision.

¹⁰⁹ Quoted in Malintoppi op. cit., p. 50.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² *The Malta Independent: Malta - Tunisia median line dispute*, 6 March 1994, p.1.

¹¹³ Shinn 1974 discusses the difficulties involved with assigning culpability for international marine pollution.

¹¹⁴ Blake 1997, p. 179.

¹¹⁵ For a thorough explanation of this regulating effect see the introduction to Brubaker 1990.

¹¹⁶ Interview conducted by author at the Regional Marine Pollution Response Centre on Manoel Island, 12 April 1995.

¹¹⁷ I discussed the suitability of the contingency plans for a major spillage with Patrick Murgo, Tony Mallia and Mariello Spiteri of the Pollution Control Co-Ordinating Unit on Manoel Island, (20 April 1995) and all eventually conceded that their response to a major spillage would be entirely dependent on the use of booms to protect the desalinisation plants, of which there were insufficient to cover the whole island. What is more, as Duncan Whittaker who is the Maltese representative of a Norwegian company called Framo who manufacture an advanced oil recovery system, confirmed to me (21 April 1995), all such booms and the dispersants that would be used in conjunction with them would be rendered virtually useless in sea-states any higher than 'calm'. This threat has also been acknowledged by Italian experts in an outline report on Malta's risk-areas who have warned of the dangers of the "steadily increasing sea-traffic close to Malta of oil and petroleum cargoes, and the risk ... from an accident involving one of these ships". For report see; *The Malta Independent: Planning for the unthinkable*, 18 September 1994, p. 14.

¹¹⁸ See Brubaker op. cit. who discussed the regulating effect that international law can have on marine pollution.

¹¹⁹ See for e.g.: Buckwalter 1990, who has compiled a range of international perspectives on organized crime and concluded that the threat this phenomenon poses to international security and stability is "ever more serious", p. 23; Orenstein 1993, who has defined organized criminal activity as a "non-traditional threat to security" and concentrated specifically on the implications for Central and Eastern Europe; Goldstock 1993, who spelled out how "organized crime and corruption" can "when it is pervasive ... affect the public's belief in the integrity and legitimacy of government" and so pose a threat to national stability and security, p. 137; and finally

¹²⁰ Bearman 1995, p. 25.

¹²¹ Adams, 1994.

¹²² Adams, 1994, p. 104.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ *The Malta Independent: The Russian Connection*, 26 March 1995, p. 30.

¹²⁵ Bearman op. cit., p. 25.

¹²⁶ Forsyth 1996, inset.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ See Handleman 1994, p. 34.

¹²⁹ Stanojevic 1994, p. 65.

¹³⁰ Klare 1993, p. 160.

¹³¹ Bearman 1994/95, p. 29.

¹³² *The Economist*, 29 October 1994, p. 59.

¹³³ The main opium producing regions are commonly referred to as the "golden crescent" (Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan) and the "golden triangle" (Myanmar [formerly Burma], Laos and Thailand).

¹³⁴ For e.g. on 10 August 1994, a Colombian dentist and two Spaniards were arrested at Munich airport in possession of 330g of enriched plutonium and 1kg of Lithium-6. Although the connection was never proven, the authorities suspected that they had revealed a link between Colombian drug traffickers and a Basque terrorist group. There are similar examples of Kosovan criminals seeking to raise the funds to pay for illegal arms shipments by getting involved in drugs trading. See Bearman 1994/95, p. 26.

¹³⁵ Bearman 1994/95, p. 30.

¹³⁶ *Le Figaro* 15 March 1995, p. 4.

¹³⁷ For the original article see "Malta mentioned as one origin of Bosnian arms" *The Malta Independent*, 16 April 1995, p.7. See also the follow-up editorial and responses.

¹³⁸ Interview conducted by the author at Luqa Airport, 15 April 1995.

¹³⁹ Nathalino Fenech is also writing up his PhD at the University of Durham. I interviewed him at the Malta Independent offices in Sliema, Malta (7 April 1995).

¹⁴⁰ An article in *The Sunday Times of Malta* states that there was evidence of a drug problem in Malta as long ago as the 1970s: "Drugs are evreybody's business", 26 June 1994, p. 5.

¹⁴¹ The 1993 amendment to the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance introduced a wide range of measures aimed at helping the authorities investigate, punish or rehabilitate drug traffickers and abusers. For a more detailed discussion of its contents see the article entitled "New measure against drug abuse" *The Times (Malta)* October 1 1993, p. 15.

¹⁴² In recent years Malta has entered into co-operation with Italy. As Brigadier Claude Gaffiero explained in an interview published in *The Sunday Times (Malta)*: "International co-operation in the fight against drugs", 29 January 1995, p. 49: "The AFM has been given two Nardi Hughes helicopters and three *Guardia di Finanza* patrol boats by Italy as well as marine radar and other equipment by the UNDP in Vienna to assist in the war against drugs." In addition to this a Libyan delegation concluded a joint agreement on preventing and controlling the illicit trafficking of drugs and organized criminality in April 1995. See *The Times (Malta)*: "Malta and Libya in drive to fight drug trafficking", 12 April 1995, p.7.

¹⁴³ See article in *The Malta Independent*: "Heroin: the killer drug", 26 June 1994, p. 1.

¹⁴⁴ The increasing ecstasy problem was the subject of an investigation presented in *The Times (Malta)*: "Adam and Eve join the party and dance the last waltz", 29 March 1994, p. 14.

¹⁴⁵ *The Malta Independent*: "Cannabis makes a comeback", 30 January 1994, p. 1.

¹⁴⁶ This point was made by the prosecutor in the trial of a man accused of smuggling 1kg of cocaine into Malta; see *The Times (Malta)*, 28 March 1998: "Defendant carried enough cocaine to cause havoc in Malta", p. 48.

¹⁴⁷ Joseph Rapa has drawn attention to the fact that Gozo is just as vulnerable as Malta is to the drug problem and argued that it is important not just to focus on the main island: *The Sunday Times of Malta*: "The Drugs Menace in Gozo", 12. June 1994, p. 16.

¹⁴⁸ See for example: *The Malta Independent*: "Guilty by association", 10 April 1994, p. 18; *The Times (Malta)*: "Money laundering bill", 22 April 1994, p. 15; and a report presented on the TV documentary, *Panorama* (5 April 1994), which exposed two Maltese lawyers as being involved in money laundering in the banking sector.

¹⁴⁹ These figures are based on research I carried out on the Maltese Government's monthly gazette on property sales, back-copies of which are available for consultation in the main library in Valletta.

¹⁵⁰ The European Committee to Combat Drugs (CELAD).

¹⁵¹ The Pompidou Group is the main policy forum in Europe for all aspects of transnational crime.

¹⁵² Gorbachev 1994, p. 248.

¹⁵³ Camilleri and Falk 1992, throughout.

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OVERALL CONCLUSIONS:

THE EVOLUTION OF MALTESE GEOPOLITICAL THOUGHT

I CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has investigated the evolution of Maltese geopolitical thought from its early, formative years, when those engaged in geopolitical thinking were probably not even aware of it, to its present day maturation, when it features highly in all types of political discourse in Malta. This final section draws conclusions that refer to the changes in the geopolitical attitudes and outlooks of the Maltese which have characterised this entire period of evolution.

The thesis has shown that the history of geopolitical attitudes and outlooks in Malta has been a history of concession to dominant mainstream interpretations of geopolitical circumstances and developments. With the possible exception of Phase 3, when Maltese geopolitical thinkers generated some of their own ideas on the political space which Malta found itself in, geopolitical thinking in Malta has rarely deviated from the course followed by mainstream western geopolitical thought. This has been the case regardless of whether or not concession to these mainstream interpretations was in Malta's best interest at a given time.

In the first chapter the clear distinction between responsibility for inside and outside issues was introduced. In short, whilst the Maltese were granted a considerable say in the running of their own internal affairs (pp. 55-57), all issues arising off their shores were handled by the British. In turn, the British dealt with wider world circumstances and developments in the only way they knew how at this stage in history, through a policy framework of strict realism. It follows, therefore, that the geopolitical outlook imposed on the Maltese at this stage in their history was realist in nature. The various petitions and disputes between the army and the Church would seem to indicate that, from time to time, there were members of Maltese society that objected to their islands being used as a

colonial base for power projection by the British. Nevertheless, on the whole there is little evidence to suggest that, from their invitation to colonise to the start of the First World War, there was anything but acceptance of the mainstream realist interpretation of wider world geopolitics. Nor would we expect anything other than such acceptance since, in a world in which territorial competition and conflict played such a major role, there were after all few alternatives to the realist global outlook. Subordination to a major power was expected by the Maltese and whatever downfalls might come with this were accepted as a small price to pay for the level of protection they received. So, in terms of independent Maltese geopolitical thought at this stage in history there was little, if any, to talk of. However, as the other chapters in the thesis have shown and the remaining paragraphs of this section will argue, this phase was in many ways a formative and influential phase in the broader evolution of Maltese geopolitical thought. The British-imposed realist outlook took hold in Maltese mindsets at this early stage in the evolution of their geopolitical thought and was not to be uprooted easily.

In the second chapter, Maltese geopolitical thought, as discerned from policy responses in Malta to the two World Wars, was examined. It was seen that the realist outlook to the geopolitical world that had been imposed on the Maltese throughout the colonial era was upheld in its most rigid form throughout this period of global anarchy. The typical trademarks of realism such as preoccupation with war and the preparedness for war were, even in the more severe forms that they had taken on, justified at this stage in history. Above all else, the realist assumption that the British nation-state accurately represented and acted in the best interests of all citizens of its empire was more unreservedly accepted by the Maltese between 1914 and 1945 than it had been previously. Whereas in colonial times the alternative to representation by the British, self rule, was not unarguably detrimental to the Maltese, the general consensus in Malta throughout this period of world war was that the alternative to representation by the British (i.e. Axis invasion) was most

definitely not in their best interest. In addition to this, the realist assumption that the maintenance of territorial security is the most important of all government tasks, which was discernible but not wholly justified in the colonial period, was no longer open to question. It would have been difficult to challenge the high priority status that issues of security and territoriality had, above all other state and colonial affairs in this period of global anarchy. Certainly those Maltese who gave thought to their geopolitical situation were under no illusions as to how vital British military support was in safeguarding their territorial sovereignty from an Italian or even German encroachment. In the colonial world order, which was littered with only a few small scale and transitory conflicts, the neglect of social and economic issues in favour of issues of military defence was not always easy to justify in the face of criticism. In a world re-ordering through anarchy, however, pre-occupation with war and military and territorial security was, through necessity, not open to dispute or even liable to criticism. As world-wide war took hold twice in only three decades there was no alternative for the Maltese but to follow the orders of the British military command. It is therefore possible to conclude that the prevailing geopolitical outlook of the Maltese at this stage in history, although once again imposed on them from outside rather than inspired from thoughts generated within Malta, was in many ways more rigid than the realist outlook which characterised the earlier colonial era. Realism, and the set of assumptions that tend to go with it, had been further instilled in the Maltese psyche as a result of their experiences in the two world wars.

The third chapter examined the phase in history when Malta's leaders embarked on the process of ridding the islands of their long-standing dependency on foreign protection. The geopolitical outlook and thought which proved the catalyst to this process was characterised by desire for change rather than acceptance of reality. As the main protagonists of the Cold War were falling into the downward, realist spiral of arms competition, Malta's leaders were acting against this continuity and seeking to alter

fundamentally the way their country interacted with the wider-world. The opposite had been true in the previous phase; in conceding much of the weight of their authority to the military leaders of their colonial rulers throughout both world wars, Malta's leaders had rendered themselves mere bystanders who were accepting of the realist continuity and unshakeable conflictual nature of all geopolitical change. As explained in the previous paragraph, however, there was hardly an alternative to subscribing to British rule throughout the two world wars. In contrast, just as the Cold War set in, the idealist vision was establishing itself as a viable alternative to the traditional view of the nature of the international political scene offered by realism. Chapter three showed that although there were economic advantages for Malta in following the idealist route, historical factors provided the main motivation for the wide scale adoption of idealist geopolitical thought in Malta throughout the Cold War. There was a common desire to ensure that Malta should never again become unnecessarily entangled in the conflicts of the world's major powers, and idealism provided the perfect course, in both thought and practice, to fulfilment of this desire.

Although phase three represented a significant phase in the evolution of Maltese geopolitical thought, its importance should not be overplayed. Whilst on the one hand it witnessed the discarding of one mainstream approach to geopolitical thought, realism, it also saw subscription by the majority of Maltese geopolitical thinkers to the other mainstream approach which was emerging, idealism. So although there had been a departure from the realism that had dominated ideas throughout Malta's earlier dependent history, this departure had merely pointed the dominant geopolitical outlook in Malta towards the next trend in geopolitical thinking. Maltese geopolitical thought remained under heavy influence from outside with few ideas directly applicable to Malta's unique set of circumstances being generated from the inside.

Chapter four brought the evolution of Maltese geopolitical thought up to date. This chapter identified the three modes of geopolitical thinking behind the three main foreign policy courses offered by today's political parties to the Maltese electorate. It was argued that these courses are all derivatives of some of the more antiquated geopolitical outlooks which have, over the years, become established in the majority mindset of the Maltese. Moreover, it was shown that the thinking behind these outlooks is no longer relevant to Malta's contemporary geopolitical situation. In explaining these historical parallels the work of an eminent Maltese sociologist, R. G. Sultana was drawn on. Sultana has made the point that the events the Maltese as a people have been exposed to are bound to influence their present-day thinking. More specifically, in his "sociological inquiry" which he published in 1994 he introduced the concept of the "welcoming society orientation", which he argued was a significant characteristic of Maltese society. He argued that this characteristic derived from a gradual erosion of the islanders' self confidence caused by the successive colonizers grooming a certain liege mentality. To the rulers, effective control depended on the Maltese harbouring positive dispositions towards their occupiers and such a mentality was therefore an essential ingredient for a secure fortress. Today, however, Sultana argues that this "welcoming society orientation" has the effect of exposing Malta's national integrity, internal cohesion and core values to external political interference. In making such a deduction Sultana comes close to verifying precisely the line of argument being put forward in chapter four; that it is entirely plausible to assume that, in terms of geopolitical thinking about Malta, many of the habits of history transpose into the roles of today.

It is thus easy to see how a history characterised by a succession of foreign overlords making decisions for the Maltese has bequeathed certain legacies which are discernible in the more realist-related thinking apparent in recent Nationalist Party policy responses. In addition to this, the more idealist responses adopted in the last decade by the Labour Party

are tantamount to a continuation of past modes of thinking in as much as they were designed initially to serve the Maltese throughout the Cold War. It is therefore possible to conclude from the examination presented in chapter four that each of the three common geopolitical outlooks in Malta today are based on the legacies of the past geopolitical thinking. Once again, continuing a theme which had become common throughout the evolution of Maltese geopolitical thought, the Maltese were subscribing to outside interpretations of their geopolitical situation rather than inspiring independent geopolitical thought from within.

Chapter five turned the thesis away from the past and towards the future by generating a number of insights and ideas for the next step in the evolution of geopolitical thinking in Malta. Whereas the first three chapters were concerned with the heritage of geopolitical thinking in Malta, and the second its renaissance, this chapter was concerned with a possible rejuvenation of geopolitical thinking. For the first time it drew together four issues that are likely to feature in Maltese geopolitical thinking in the next century, which have nevertheless been largely overlooked to date. They were referred to as macropolitical threats and, coining Camilleri's term, together they can be said to make a new "macropolitical agenda" for Malta. In tackling these macropolitical threats, chapter five delved beneath the simplistic ideological geopolitical considerations that have dominated geopolitical thinking and discourse in Malta throughout the entire course of its evolution. Although this chapter provided no hard and fast solutions to the problems Malta is likely to face in the short-term future, it has presented geopolitical thinkers in Malta with a course back to the future; an alternative to the narrow and outdated agenda that remains the main focus of their attention.

Considering the above conclusions and thinking back to the original aims of the thesis set out in the introduction (p.4) it can be concluded that they have each been satisfied. The

first three chapters presented a thorough investigation into the heritage of geopolitical thought in Malta. The fourth chapter utilized this investigation to cast a viable and thorough historical perspective on the current modes of thinking which constitute the current renaissance of geopolitics in Malta. Finally, by keeping current thinking in its historical context, the fifth chapter succeeded in generating a number of insights and ideas for future geopolitical thinking in Malta. To complete the overall conclusion we must now assess the extent to which the main aim has been satisfied and in order to do this we must consider the wider implications of the study.

II WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

As mentioned in the introduction, the three sub-aims were in a sense contrived to satisfy the one overriding main aim, which was; to highlight and substantiate the insights that new and alternative research into the history of geopolitical thought can bring about, not at the conventional global level of mainstream meta-theorists but instead at the less-grandiose and more practicable levels. In other words, is there a place or use for studies such as this one?

Given the fact that I have spent the last four years thinking in some way or another about this study, the above question clearly represents a severe test of my intellectual objectivity. Nevertheless, I do firmly believe that there is not only a place for more innovative and small scale geopolitical studies such as this one but in fact a need for them. What is more, I am clearly not alone in this belief. The entire "critical geopolitics" movement, which is discussed and referenced in the introduction, arguably arose as an antidote to a perceived reverie in geopolitics with global meta-theories and more specifically the realism inherent in such meta-theories. In some way or another, geopolitical phenomena affect people and

groups of people at a whole range of different levels. It follows that people and groups of people at a whole range of different levels from time to time engage themselves in geopolitical thinking. Why then should it only be the mainstream thoughts of western intellectuals and those in positions of world power that are researched.

I have no hesitation in concluding that this thesis has succeeded in satisfying its single main aim. That is to say, it has undoubtedly made a new and alternative contribution to wider geopolitical knowledge and thinking. Obviously the contribution it has made will be appreciated by some more than others and so, finally, I touch on the matter of the audience I perceive for my work.

This piece of work is of relevance to anyone who thinks geopolitically about a minor power, particularly those minor powers that were once ruled by realist colonial policies or those which, through their strategic location, have in the past become entangled in global power games. After all, geopolitical thinkers from minor powers such as this are the ones most likely to have problems discarding out-dated modes of geopolitical thinking and tailoring their new thoughts to suit their specific needs. In addition, this work serves as an example of research into one specific history of geopolitical thinking or as a case study of the history of non-mainstream geopolitical thinking. Finally, and perhaps most pertinently, this thesis will be of value to anyone with particular regard for Malta or, more specifically, anyone who is concerned with the context in which important decisions are made on behalf of the Maltese.

