

Durham E-Theses

*Ontologies of freedom and necessity: an investigation
of the concepts of logos in Greek philosophy and
Christian thought*

Vladimir Cvetkovic

How to cite:

Cvetkovic, Vladimir (2001) *Ontologies of freedom and necessity: an investigation of the concepts of logos in Greek philosophy and Christian thought*. Masters thesis, Durham University.

Use policy

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

- a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
- a <https://etheses.durham.ac.uk/id/eprint/4269/> is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
- the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the [full Durham E-Theses policy](#) for further details.

ONTOLOGIES OF FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
An Investigation of the concepts of *logos* in Greek philosophy
and Christian thought

Vladimir Cvetkovic
Degree: MA

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published in any form, including Electronic and the Internet, without the author's prior written consent. All information derived from this thesis must be acknowledged appropriately.


University of Durham
Department of Theology
2001.



24 MAY 2002

CONTENTS

Introduction	2
I Ontological monism of Greek Thought	6
1. The epic era and the primitive meaning of the Greek word <i>logos</i> : Homer	6
2. <i>Logos</i> as universal world of awakening; Heraclitus the Obscure	7
3. Why is there something and not nothing; Parmenides	12
4. The <i>logos</i> of dialectics; Plato	14
5. The birth of logic; Aristotle	21
6. The omnipresent <i>logos</i> : the Stoics	25
II Greeks and Jews	29
1. The forebear of the Christian <i>logos</i> : Philo from Alexandria	29
2. The <i>logos</i> became flesh: St. John the Theologian	33
III <i>Logos</i> as the cosmological principle	39
1. The Sower of the seeds; Justin Martyr	39
2. The Pious Intellectual; Clement of Alexandria	45
3. The cosmological convenience; Origen	51
IV The Zenith of Late Antiquity; Plotinus	61
V Ontology of Freedom	71
1. The witness of faith; Ignatius of Antioch	72
2. The liberation of God; Irenaeus of Lyon	80
3. The triumph of Orthodoxy; Athanasius of Alexandria	89
Conclusion	



Introduction

The mystery which lies in the foundations of Western civilisation is that of *logos*. *Logos* is the only word which defines all epochs in the history of humankind. The only word which can be compared with *logos* is the Chinese *tao*. The birthplace of the word *logos* is in the Greek mind. *Logos* had been used and preserved by the Hellenistic peoples with the consequence that this priceless heritage could be passed on to the peoples of Europe when they were ready to receive it. The Christian civilisation inherited this precious gift, making it the cornerstone of their beliefs. In the modern epoch it introduces structural thinking, which assumes that human reality is intelligible. *Logos* is an incipient logic and it degrades itself into logic. Nowadays our society is passing through a deep crisis - the loss of the original concept of *logos*. This has followed attacks on logocentric thinking. But if Greeks invented and preserved *logos* in its many original forms, and then transmitted it to the Christian cultures, which adopted *Logos* in all its various meanings, in the process creating a valuable synthesis, what are the roots of the *logos* crisis? We do not want to investigate the entire history of humankind looking for the origins of the deterioration of *logos*. Whether *logos* lost its original meaning with Hegel's identification of being with non-being, or even earlier with Descartes' identification of being with the *cogito*, is not the focus of our discussion.

Goethe gives the best account in his *Faust*, using prophetic language to show where the crises of *logos* lie. Doctor Faustus, a physician returning from an Easter ramble, starts to translate the prologue of St John's Gospel into German. 'In the beginning was *logos*'. In the first clause he finds himself in difficulty as to how to translate *logos*. 'In the beginning was the Word'. No, such a complex meaning as contained by the word *logos* cannot be rendered by a single word. He tries to translate *logos* using 'reason', and then with 'power', but finally rejects both solutions. 'The spirit aids me, now suddenly I see my way, and write assuredly, in the beginning was the deed'. When doctor Faustus makes his final choice, Mephistopheles appears. The verses of Goethe describe the misfortune which visits Dr Faustus as a result of translating and interpreting *logos*. The main difficulty is the exact nature of this Greek word. Does *logos* belong to philosophy which gives the primacy to the reason, or is its role as a medium in communication, or is *logos* something else? Different Christian traditions gave the different answers to question of the nature of

logos not just in the Prologue of St. John's Gospel, but in discerning the mystery of *logos*. The earliest Latin translation had not transmitted the full meaning of *logos*, but without losing the essence of its meaning. The early translators chose the Latin word *conventus*, the original meaning of which was 'coming together', and which also covers the meaning 'word'. The latter meaning can be seen in the Romanian word *cuvint*, which is equivalent for "word". *Cuvint* is used to translate *logos* in St. John's Prologue. A Latin word similar to *conventus* is *cognisco* (cum + gnosco), which means that something is known only 'with' (cum) others. That indicates the interpersonal character of knowledge. After a while, the Latin word *verbum* replaced *conventus* as a translation of *logos* and the fullness of the original meaning started to deteriorate. Nowadays those languages which derive from Latin usually adopt a translation of *logos* equivalent to the Latin word *verbum*. Thus, in Italian *logos* is translated with *la parola*, in French with *la parole*, in Spanish with *la palabra*. In Luther's translation into German of the Fourth Gospel, as well as in all other places, *logos* is translated with *das Wort*. The English translator did the same, translating *logos* with *the Word*. *Logos* appears in the other Romance and Anglo-Saxon languages in much the same way. The things are different in the Slavonic tradition. Because they could receive the concept of *Logos* directly from Greeks, we might suppose that the *logos* of the Slavs retains the fullness of its original meaning. The legacy of the Holy Brothers, St. Cyril and St. Methodius, was the translation of almost all Church services as well as the Gospels and the Apostolic writings into Slavonic. The original translation of *logos* by the Holy Brothers was *slovo*. *Slovo* has preserved all the aspects of *logos* – the common meaning of 'word' as well as that of 'reason' or 'mind'. *Slovo* is still in use in most Slavonic tradition, but its meaning gradually moved to refer to a particular written character or letter. Today in languages which are derived from Slavonic, we find only traces of *logos* as 'reason'. Words like *slovesno*, meaning both 'according to *logos*' and 'reasonable' indicate that meaning of the Slavonic *logos* was once much wider. Another substitute for *logos* in the Slavonic tradition, is *zbor* or *sabor*. This word is nearer to the Latin word *conventus*. It covers the sphere of language as well as referring to certain gatherings. The word *sabor* is the root of *sobornost* or *sabornost*. This word is often applied to the Church, referring to its catholic character. It can also refer to the ways in which the Church has adopted some characteristics from *Logos*, such as her role in gathering the faithful together. It is of note that the translation of St. John's *logos*

in the Chinese tradition is *tao*, a word which is the cornerstone of religious and philosophical thought in the Far East.

We will not go so far abroad, but will focus our investigation of *logos* from its early days until its mature use in identification with the God-man in Christianity. *Logos* is the most important word of the Greek philosophical arsenal to have been introduced into Christianity. Its adoption caused Christians many problems, because their new vision of the faith was explained by means of older and current philosophy only with great difficulty. They were caught between a new vision of their faith and existing philosophical language. Etienne Gilson remarks correctly: 'La pensée chrétienne apportait du vin nouveau, mais les vieilles outres étaient encore bonnes'¹. The old skins were the Greek philosophy, limited in their ability to explain the new categories of Christian faith. Thus, much time was to pass before the old terms attained new meanings.

The aim here is to show the transformation of *logos* through history from the Greek philosophical tradition to early Christian thought. The fulfilment of our task is intended to contribute to scholarship about early Christian thought in three ways. First, it will distinguish between Greek and Christian ontology and argue that the theory according to which the development of Christianity implies the continuity of the Platonic way of thinking in Christian circles does not stand. Second, it will argue that Greek philosophy is ontologically enclosed in a monistic pattern and that Christian belief based its ontology in God, who is in movement towards the world. Third, it argues that the essential characteristic of Greek thought is necessity, at a logical as well as an ontological level and that Christianity maintains the concept of a personal God who is absolutely free with regard to the world, and who allows absolute freedom in the world.

In going about this task we will make explicit the central structural themes present in first century Christian authors. To this end, the first chapter will consist of an examination of *logos* concepts in the most prominent Greek philosophers. In this respect it will consider the philosophies of Heraclitus, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. In some of these writers *logos* is the central pillar of their thought, while in the others it plays an important role. The second chapter will deal with two authors, Philo the Jew and St. John the Theologian. The first will be considered in the light of his systematisation of earlier Hellenistic and Jewish teachings, and the second as a forebear of Christian *logos*. The third chapter will consider the concept

of *logos* in Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria and Origen, and their attempts to escape the moulds of Greek philosophy. The fourth chapter will focus on the teaching of Plotinus in the light of the Christian search for meaning. The final chapter will examine the teachings of St. Ignatius of Antioch, St. Irenaeus of Lyon and St. Athanasius of Alexandria. The first two are considered in their episcopal roles as defenders of orthodoxy. Athanasius represents the crown of our work as he unites the two traditions, one Alexandrian and the other derived from the above bishops. Athanasius' global conception of understanding of the incarnation of *logos* effects a new version of the relation between God and the world and provides a solid ground for Christian thought.

¹ Etienne Gilson, L'Esprit de la Philosophie Medievale, (Deuxieme edition revue, Paris, 1944.) p. 82

1. The epic era and the primitive meaning of the Greek word *logos*: Homer

The noun *λόγος* is generated from the Greek verb *λέγειν*, which has many meanings. The oldest meaning of this verb is to collect, to bring together. Some philologists think that primitive usage of this verb is in the context of collecting wood or picking up wood. However, there is a lot of hesitation among experts in this particular area concerning the early meaning of this verb when the noun *logos* was generated². Later, the verb *λέγειν* acquired other meaning, which we can find in many classical and modern Greek texts. These meanings are to count or to be reckoned as the best known meaning of this verb, which is still in use in the modern Greek language, is to speak, to talk or to say.

From the latter meaning of the verb *λέγειν*, *logos* acquired its late meaning of 'speech' in the written and spoken language.

The historical continuity of the meaning of the verb *λέγειν*, from 'to gather' or 'to collect' to 'to speak' or 'to say', gives significance to the fact that for the Greek mind, speaking was the collecting of sounds and reading was the collecting of letters.

Homer's epic poems employ the verb *λέγειν* in its late meaning and this generated the noun *logos*.

The noun *logos* appeared only twice in Homer's epic poems; once in The Iliad and once in The Odyssey. In The Iliad Homer says:

And Patroclus, so long as the Achaeans and Trojans were fighting about the wall aloof from the swift ships, even so long sat in the hut of kindly Eurypylus, and was making him glad with talk (*λόγοις*).³

Logos in Odyssey was mentioned in the following verses:

Ever with soft and wheedling words
(*δέ μαλακοῖσι καί αἰμύλιοισι λόγοισι*) she beguiles him that he may
forget Ithaca.⁴

It is interesting that in Homer's poems *logos* appears, as we have seen with the adjective *αἰμύλος*, which means apparent, deceptive, tricky. Syntagma

² E. Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik*, (v1 ; Allgemeiner Teil. Lautlehre. Wortbildung. Flexion ... 4., unveränderte Aufl., v1 1968.)

³ Homer, *The Iliad*, (with an English translation by A.T. Murray, The Loeb Classical Library, volume II, Cambridge, Mass., London, 1963.) XV, 390-3

⁴ Homer, *The Odyssey*, (Translated by A.T. Murray, The Loeb Classical Library, volume I, Cambridge, Mass., London, 1974.) I, 55.

αίμύλιοισι λόγοισι, which appeared in Homer's *Odyssey*, defined Homer's meanings that of the term *logos*. Concerning this, we can conceive Homer used syntagma to describe trickiness, enchantment or something wheedling. The sense that is given to *logos* in such usage leads to the conclusion that *logos* had for Homer, the meaning of the thoughtful and persuasive word.

Later, in the VI century, *logos* held its old meaning of speaking, and started to be used not only as a spoken word but also as a written word. From that time, the usage of *logos* was closely tied up with larger meaningful entities and distinguished from the partial word (ἔπος).

Nevertheless, the question arises, against the background of ordinary, everyday usage, when did this Greek word, which determined equally ancient Greek as well as Christian thinking, get its philosophical wholeness? It seems that at that moment in history, attention was focused away from the mere conversation itself onto the matter which the conversation concerns. The matter is not only what we can see (λέγειν), but is also something that is in the base of every indication and addressing the indicated itself (λεγόμενον).

2. *Logos* as universal world of awakening; Heraclitus the Obscure

One of the first pre-Socratic thinkers, who introduced the term *logos* in his philosophy, is Heraclitus from Ephesus. The *logos* in his teaching had a complex meaning, which was difficult also for his contemporaries to understand.

For Heraclitus, the *logos* is 'the one and the common world' for all people. Thus, he speaks:

Not after listening to me, but after listening to the account, one does wisely in agreeing that all things are one (οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστὶν ἐν πᾶσι)⁵.

The *logos*, in this place probably expresses the law (νόμος) of existence, which is immanent in all things. This law of existence 'holds sway to the extent that it wishes, and suffices for all, and still left over'⁶. The same *logos* directs people to think reasonably, because: 'thinking is common to all (ξυνόν)'⁷. Although *logos* is the reason in virtue of which people have cognition of universal law, '[the greater

⁵ Heraclitus, *Fragments*, (A text and translation with a commentary by T.M. Robinson, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1987.) Fr. 50.

⁶ Heraclitus, *Fragments*, 114

⁷ Heraclitus, *Fragments*, 113

part of things divine,] escape ascertainment because of people's lack of belief⁸. The people lack confidence that they are capable of cognition of that law, or they are stupid and 'become worked up over every statement (λόγω)'⁹.

This universal principle of the law of existence or 'account, which holds forever, people forever prove uncomprehending, both before they have heard it and when once they have heard it. For, although all things happen in accordance with this account, they are like people without experience when they experience words and deeds such as I set forth, distinguishing each thing according its real constitution, i.e., pointing out how it is. The rest of mankind, however, fail to be aware of what they do after they wake up just as they forget what they do while asleep'¹⁰.

The *logos*, such as it appears (φράζων ὅκως ἔχει), Heidegger puts in connection with a phenomenon of the truth as unconcealment (ἀ-λήθεια). In his commentary on this fragment¹¹, Heidegger's stance is that being in itself stays unknown (λανθάνει), or in concealment to unreasonable people. Being comes back to concealment for those people because they forget it (επιλανθανονται). Heidegger tries to use the *logos* of Heraclitus as a means for establishing his own teaching about the truth. According to Heidegger the truth belongs to the *logos*, i.e. truth only appears through the *logos*. This is only the case when we use the notion of the truth in its pre-philosophical meaning. The following fragment is one in which people must take *logos* as a universal law.

That is why one must follow that which is common. Though the account is common, the many live, however, as they had private understanding.¹²

According to this, Heraclitus say that, 'for those who are awake there is a single, common (ξυσός) universe, whereas in sleep each person turns away into <his> own, private <universe>'.¹³

On this point, for Heraclitus sleepy people are those who have the illusion that they know anything. This kind of hermeneutic explanation supports Heidegger's thesis that the common world is the concealed (true) one whereas private worlds are just illusions.

⁸ Heraclitus, *Fragments*, 86

⁹ Heraclitus, *Fragments*, 87

¹⁰ Heraclitus, *Fragments*, 1

¹¹ Heidegger, Martin, *Being And Time*, (Translated by J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Basil Blackwell, 1988.) h. 219, p. 262

¹² Heraclitus, *Fragments*, 2.

¹³ Heraclitus, *Fragments*, 89.

Apart from this *logos*, which is the law (νόμος), understood by mind (φρονεῖν) and which we can call the *logos* of understanding, there are the other meanings of *logos*.

The *logos* at the same time unites opposites. The *logos* is one which connects the opposites of all beinghood. About this harmony and unity Heraclitus speaks in the following words: 'All things are one (ἐν πάντα εἶναι)'¹⁴. This *logos* we can call the *logos* of gathering because it arranges all things.

However, this *logos* of gathering as a principle of unity stays hidden because 'things' real constitution has a tendency to conceal itself (φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ)¹⁵. Heraclitus proceeds: 'An unapparent connection is stronger than one which is obvious'¹⁶.

According to M. Marcovich¹⁷, Heraclitus takes nature not in its biological but in its mechanical sense. In this way, nature as a mechanical unity (φύσις) shows a harmony (ἁρμονίη), which in a mechanical way unites and holds together two opposite parts in every particular thing.

We can add the following fragment:

They do not understand how, while differing from (or being at variance), it is in agreement with itself. <There is> a back turning connection, like <that> of a bow and lyre.¹⁸

By the internal relationship between bow and lyre, Heraclitus shows that in every nature exist two opposite parts, which establish wholeness and unity according to 'strife' and opposition. Concerning this, if someone wants to find out what is *logos* of gathering, he must separate the thing into its particular, opposite components according to its own nature (κατὰ φύσιν διαρεῖν). According to Heraclitus, the principle of strife rules in the whole of nature:

[Heraclitus said] that what opposes unites [and that finest attunement stems from things bearing in opposite directions, and that all things come about strife]¹⁹

War and strife are not only principles of the unity of concrete thing but also have a cosmological character.

¹⁴ Heraclitus, *Fragments*, 50.

¹⁵ Heraclitus, *Fragments*, 123.

¹⁶ Heraclitus, *Fragments*, 54.

¹⁷ Miroslav Marcovich., *Heraclitus, Greek text with a short commentary*, (The Los Andes University Press, Merida, Venezuela, 1967.) pp. 33

¹⁸ Heraclitus, *Fragments*, 51.

¹⁹ Heraclitus, *Fragments*, 8.

One must realize that war is common, and justice strife, and that all things come to be through strife and are <so> †ordained†.²⁰

According to Heraclitus there is no *logos* without strife of opposites, because: 'things grasped together: things whole, things not whole; <something> being brought together, <something> being separated; <something> consonant; <something> dissonant. Out of all things <comes?> one thing, and out of one thing all things (ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα)',²¹. Moreover, here in fragment 50: 'all things are one (ἓν πάντα εἶναι)'. However, first all (πάντα) probably indicates pairs of opposites, and one is their conjunction. In the second case, πάντα is every concrete thing as a wholeness, which contains few opposite components and en is a universal principle of unity of every pair of opposite notions. This universal principle is the all-gathering *logos* itself.

Heraclitus guides us from existence, which exists in opposition, to opposition as the unity of opposite components, and finally to the godhead as unity encompassing all opposites.

In a few places, Heraclitus mentions a *logos* of the soul: 'One would never discover the limits of soul, should one traverse every road – so deep a measure does it possess'²², and 'soul possesses a *logos* which increases itself'²³. This *logos* of soul can be the human mind according to which man acts, and in that way participates in the *logos* as cosmic constitution. The *logos* of soul is increasing in the measure in which man reveals and understands the great *logos*. The multiplicity of knowledge does not reveal the real knowledge about things, about the whole world and about how to act according to *logos*. Rather, *logos* of the soul, through which we arrive at the universal principle, reveals real knowledge.

The following fragment suggests this: 'All people have a claim to self knowledge and sound thinking'²⁴.

The above analysis of the *logos* is conditional because presumably Heraclitus had thought comprehensively about *logos*. This analysis aims to define and systematise all meanings of the word *logos* in Heraclitus' writings according to the context. Karl Jaspers gives one acceptable definition of the *logos* in Heraclitus:

²⁰ Heraclitus, Fragments, 80.

²¹ Heraclitus, Fragments, 10.

²² Heraclitus, Fragments, 45.

²³ Heraclitus, Fragments, 115

²⁴ Heraclitus, Fragments, 116.

In Heraclitus it is not defined, it carries all these meanings at once and is never limited to any one of them. The *logos* is encompassing, undefined and endlessly definable (like all the great and basic terms of philosophy).²⁵

In the other way, it is unbelievable that such a frequent and semantically polyvalent word has only one meaning in Heraclitus writings, as Edwald Kurtz claims in his doctoral thesis²⁶. Many experts in this problematic have agreed that *logos* can have more than one meaning and that it can represent different things. Thus, for professor Kirk, *logos* is the formula of all things:

From all things (i.e. the plural phenomenal world) one can understand a unifying connexion; from this connexion, the single formula or *Logos* of all things, one is led to turn one's attention back to the many things which are so connected.²⁷

Although, elsewhere he identifies *logos* with fire: 'This *logos*, in material aspect, must be a kind of fire'²⁸.

It is very useful to mention Martin Heidegger's position about the meaning of the *logos* in Heraclitus' writings²⁹. Heidegger tries to separate the meaning of *logos* in Heraclitus from some later meanings, which this Greek word acquired in the Western European tradition from Plato until now. Heidegger characterised this period as the Onto-theological epoch of metaphysical oblivion (concealment) of the primitive *logos*. For Heidegger, the *logos* has the meaning of gatherings (*Versammlung*). In his attempt to describe metaphysically the meaning of Heraclitus' *logos*, Heidegger often makes such phrases as: Laying that gather (*die besende Lege*) or Letting-lie-together-before (*bei-sammen-vorliegen-Lassen*).

The *logos* of Heraclitus is still an inspiration and guiding star to many philosophers. Some of them abandoned the attempt to find out what the true *logos* really is and they interpreted the *logos* as something covered by a veil of mystery. Moreover, they still participate in the mystery of *logos* and whatever they know, they know according to the *logos*. The others did not unconsciously follow the commandments of the *logos*, but they started to search for *logos* in their own opening toward communion. Only through the revealing of communion, do they have an experience

²⁵Karl Jaspers, *The great philosophers*; (Edited by Hannah Arendt. Translated by Ralph Manheim, London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1966.) p. 17.

²⁶E. Kurtz, *Interpretationen zu den Logos-Fragmenten Heraklits*, (Spudasmata, Olms, 1971., pp. 63

²⁷G.S. Kirk,., *The cosmic fragments; Heraclitus* (edited with an introduction and commentary by G. S. Kirk, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954.) p. 178.

²⁸G.S. Kirk, *The cosmic fragments; Heraclitus*, p. 208.

²⁹Martin Heidegger, *Logos*, in: *Vorträge und Aufsätze III*, (Pfullingen, 1967; Heraclit, *Der Anfang des abendlandischen Denkens. Logic, Heraklits Lehre vom Logos*) Frankfurt, 1979.

of the true *logos*, and discover its power of uniting. However, the history of the philosophical *logos* started with Heraclitus.

3. Why is there something and not nothing; Parmenides

Heraclitus' teaching about *logos* was not the only one that appeared in pre-Socratic philosophy. At the same time, the *logos* was revealed to another thinker, to Parmenides from Elea. Although *logos* is not so frequently mentioned in Parmenides' writings as in Heraclitus', it plays a very important, maybe the main role in his poem.

Thus, Parmenides in the introduction to his poem 'On nature' writes that escorted by the Daughters of Sun, he has been driven to the Goddess. The goddess received him kindly and she was talking to him:

Both the steadfast heart of persuasive truth,
And the beliefs of mortals, in which there is no true trust (πίστις ἀληθείης).³⁰

The goddess Dike put Parmenides in a dilemma; he has to decide between two paths; the way of truth and the way of *doxa*. Parmenides introduces the *logos* as a means by which the decision can be made, and he says:

For never shall prevail, that things that are not *are*;
But do you restrain your thought from this route of inquiry,
Nor let habit force you, along this route of much-experience,
To ply an aimless eye and ringing ear
And tongue; but judge by reasoning (κρῖνιν λογῶ) the very contentious
disproof
That has been uttered by me.³¹

However, the decision made by the *logos* would be only one, because it is not determined by just one opportunity but the *logos* suspended the choice and directed us to only one solution. The solution is only one as very truth is only one also. Aristotle claims that Parmenides' concept of *Ananke* contained an important idea of the compelling force of logical proof. Thus, Aristotle presented this conception as the centre of the Parmenidean philosophy. Aristotle states that Parmenides 'saw the One under compulsion of the *Logos*'³².

Parmenides proceeds with the following fragment: 'A single story of a route still'³³.

³⁰ Parmenides, Fragments, (a text and tr. with an introduction by D. Gallop, Toronto: Univ. of Toronto pp., c1984.) 1, 29-30.

³¹ Parmenides, Fragments, 7.

³² Aristotle, Metaphisica, I, 5, 986b

³³ Parmenides, Fragments, 7, 6 and 8, 1

On first sight, this seeming contradiction can be resolved by viewing the true nature of Greek thinking and its linguistic formation. Namely, to think and to speak in Greek is only possible in a situation where the object of thinking and spoken articulation exists. The Greek verb ‘to talk’(λέγειν), from which is generated the noun *logos*, indicates something existing. In this case, speech about nothing or non-being (μὴ ὄν) is not possible. On the other hand, talking was distinguished from the mere pronunciation of voices, because it is meaningful, whereas ‘talking nothing’ (οὐδεν λέγειν) is meaningless. Parmenides says this in the following sentence:

For you could not know what-is-not (for that is not feasible)
Nor could you point it out (ἀνάστον οὔτε φραζεῖν).³⁴

Being is only one and unique object of speaking and thinking or as Parmenides says in his poetic manner:

It must be that what is there for speaking and thinking of is; for (it) is there to be,
Whereas nothing is not; that is what I bid you consider...³⁵

The well-known fragment of Parmenides, where he says: ‘...because the same thing is for thinking and for being (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι)’ indicates that the *logos* directs not only to true thinking and speaking, but also according to the *logos* men decide true being. Parmenides tries to assert that only being (τὸ ἐόν) is and only being can be the object of thinking and speaking and ‘thus it must either be completely or not at all’³⁶. False thinking is different from true thinking in that false thinking lacks substantiality and its conflict with reality becomes contradiction. With his teaching, Parmenides has opened a new epoch in logical thinking. Distinguishing the phenomenal (τὰ δοκοῦντα) from the real world (τὰ ὄντα), Parmenides gave the possibility for Platonic division into opinion (δόξα), which is the product of the senses (τὰ αἰσθητά) and thinking (νόημα) about true reality, which is in the sphere of mind (τά νοητά). Through Parmenides, the prior distinction of *logos* and myth became the opposition between *logos* on the one hand and on the other, myth and sense perception and opinion. Some scientists identify the *logos* in Parmenides’ writings, with a ratio and try to establish that the *logos* lacks some of the gathering and synthesising elements. These elements lead to truth about wholeness in Greek language and thinking. Martin Heidegger is against this

³⁴ Parmenides, Fragments, 2, 8

³⁵ Parmenides, Fragments, 6, 1-2

³⁶ Parmenides, Fragments, 8, 11.

identification of *logos* with *ratio*³⁷. His standpoint is that the genuine unity of the *logos* and of being becomes revealed in thinking as reassembling. Thinking as reassembling according to Heidegger is the possibility to understand being, which is gathered by *logos* in a true way. Thus, being becomes revealed.

After all, in Parmenides' philosophy, people started to judge reality by means of *logos*. However, every time we talk about being and non-being, logic and metaphysics we stand in this Eleatic tradition of *logos*.

4. The *logos* of dialectics; Plato

Heraclitus and Parmenides are not the only thinkers in the pre-Socratic period, in whose teachings the notion of *logos* found a respectable place. The notion *logos* was in usage in the writings of other philosophers in this epoch. However, the *logos* did not have significance as basic pillars of their teaching such that can be investigated and we will not give a lot attention to their writings.

The decrease of interest in cosmology and an increase in searching for the authentic truth of being, which came with the Sophists, was projected onto the conception of *logos*. The subjectivism and relativism of the Sophists brought flexibility in conceiving of *logos*. In the teaching of sophistic thinkers, the *logos* has the meaning of proper reason (ὀρθός λόγος). This reason is located in the realm of speech (λόγοις) and it served to be divided into elements and used for conclusions (λόγους). Thus, Diogenes Laertius says:

Protagoras was the first to maintain that there are two sides in every question; opposed to each other, and he even argued in this fashion, being the first to do so.³⁸

The proper reason of the Sophists was used for true conclusions or rational structures about which there is a conclusion or theory. Although usage of *logos* in that way was only in particular cases, such usage is remote from the possibility of the universal principle to arise³⁹. We will not give here much attention to the

³⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, (English, An introduction to metaphysics / Martin Heidegger ; translated by Ralph Manheim, New Haven, London : Yale University Press, c1959.) and Martin Heidegger, *Was heisst Denken?* (English, What is called thinking? / by a translation of Was heisst Denken? [by J.Glenn Gray] ; introduction by J. Glenn Gray, New York : Harper & Row, 1968.)

³⁸ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, (volume II, with a translation by R.D. Hicks, The Loeb Classical Library, London, New York, 1925.) IX, 51

³⁹ G.B. Kerferd,., *Logos* in *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, (New York, London, 1967., vol 5) pp. 83-84.

Sophist's usage of *logos*, but we will in some cases in the following text compare their understanding of *logos* with Plato's. *Logos* acquired a very significant place in the philosophy of Plato. We cannot speak about the uniform conception of *logos* in Plato's writings. The *logos* appears in many places and very often with different meanings. Plato's usage of *logos* projects exactly the 'hybrid character'⁴⁰ of his philosophy. Namely, the *logos* very often is taken in the meanings in which it appeared in the teachings of Plato's great forebears. His teachings combined the universal *logos* of Heraclitus with Parmenides' *logos* of being, and the sophist's proper reason with Socrates' dialectics as the skill of arguing. Plato emphasised the distinction between myth and *logos*. He also re-established the relationship between *logos* and *nomos*. Nevertheless, his thought brought something new. The new can be seen in Plato's dialectics, which was developed in Academia. The method of dialectics was based on logical divisions and the construction of notions.

For an easier investigation of the usage of the term *logos*, we will define different groups of meaning in which the *logos* has the same or similar meaning. In the first group, we can distinguish these meanings of *logos*, in which those are contrasted to the myth or it is in relationship with myth. This problematic, which Plato revives, is one of the oldest matters in the poetic as well in the philosophical tradition of the Greeks. From Homer and Hesiod, to Pindar and Thucydides the *logos* always abides close to myth, without the tendency to modify it. The standpoint on which myth as an experiencing of reality was the given truth and *logos* as a thinking of reality was the searching truth, was brought into question. Plato supported this opposition and when he spoke about myth, he very often used the term mythical speeches (*λόγοι μυθώδεις*). Thus, Plato through the mouth of Protagoras asked: '... but shall I, as an old man speaking to his juniors, put my demonstration in the form of fable, or of a regular exposition?'⁴¹ Moreover, Protagoras finally decided to do this in the form of myth. In another place, he said: 'On this point, Socrates, I shall give you argument instead of fable'⁴². To the mythical speeches were opposed true speeches (*λόγοι ἀληθινοί*), the former of which Plato demonstrates with the following

⁴⁰ F. Nietzsche, *Die Philosophie im Tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen*, (in Nietzsche Werke, band II, Verlag, Das Bargland – Buch, Salzburg/Stuttgart) p. 1098.

⁴¹ Plato, *Protagoras*, (The Loeb Classical Library, volume IV, with translation by W.R.M. Lamb, London, New York, 1924.) 320c.

⁴² Plato, *Protagoras*, 324d.

words: 'akin to these in the words of tales that are fables and those that are more nearly true (ὅσοι μυθώδεις τῶν λόγων καὶ ὅσοι ἀληθινώτεροι ἦσαν)'⁴³.

However, the result of this hard confrontation between *logos* and myth is not the expulsion of myth. Plato often uses a mythical form of explanation; showing by this that myth takes a part in conceiving reality structured by *logos*. Plato's myths stay in relationship with the *logos*. When the *logos* has to prove and establish that everything is not sufficient, it has to be substituted by myth, because myth is not under the demand of strict proof. The myth of Plato is no longer used in the old sense; its use rather brings an acknowledgement of the heights, which are inconceivable for *logos*. Moreover, the myth ennobled by the *logos* becomes capable to reveal powerfully. The *logos* in relationship with myth best demonstrates the nature of *logos* for Plato. While the myth was the authoritative and objective word and the widespread expression of the collective spirit, *logos* was subjectively defined and was the meaningful and persuasive word and the expression of the one distinction of the individual, his rationality.

The popular and technical meaning of *logos* as speaking is still in usage in Plato's writings, when he refers to some particular speeches⁴⁴.

Logos receives Plato's full affirmation in the late dialogues. In Plato's gnoseology, *logos* assumes a very significant role. In taking an anti-sophistic position, Plato wants to overcome the opposition between relativistic opinion and true knowledge and to find the solution of this problem in *logos*.

In his early dialogue 'Cratylus', Plato says that *logos* is 'that speech which says things as they are is true'⁴⁵. Plato defines *logos* in relationship to name (ὄνομα) and things (πράγματα). Here *logos* explains the things to which it relates, as well as the meanings of these things. Thus, *logos* is the definition of the meaning of the names (ὀρθότης τῶν ὀνομάτων). This Plato exposes in his late dialogues, Theaetetus and Sophist, which clears a way to the true knowledge about something

⁴³ Plato, The Republic, (with translation by Paul Shorey, volume II, The Loeb Classical Library, London, Cam., Mass., 1935), VII, 522a.

⁴⁴ Plato mentions 'old tradition' (ὁ παλαιός λόγος) in Laws, IV, 715e (Plato, Laws, volume II, with translation by R.G. Bury, London, New York, 1926) or when he refers to 'doctrine that is taught in secret about matter (ἐν ἀπορρητοῖς λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος)' in Phaedo 62b (Plato, The Loeb Classical Library, volume I, with translation by H.N. Fowler, Cam., Mass., London, 1971.)

⁴⁵ Plato, Cratylus, 385b.

by dialectical *logos*. Plato in *Theaetetus* defines *logos* 'as the talk which the soul has with itself about any subject which it considers'⁴⁶. In the *Sophist* he says:

Well, then, thought and speech are the same; only the former, which is a silent inner conversation of the soul with itself, has been given to the special name of thought'⁴⁷.

In *Theaetetus*, we get some explicit explanation of *logos*. Plato has started from the premise 'that true opinion accompanied by reason is knowledge'⁴⁸. Then he tries to define what explanation (*logos*) really is. The problem arises because the initial parts (elements), in which things are contained, could not be explained; i.e. we could neither have true knowledge about things because we need an explanation for these initial elements. Plato rejects the possibility that 'the combination of names is the essence of reasoning'⁴⁹. Because, if parts which are named did not have their *logos*, i.e. could not to be explained, how is it possible that conjunctions of these elements could be conceived? In addition to this, if somebody acquired true knowledge without *logos*, his soul possessed the truth, but it did not have true knowledge because it was not able to give an explanation (*logos*) about the knowledge that it possessed.

Plato proceeds with giving the definitions of *logos*. Plato gives three possible definitions of *logos*. The first definition, which we can provisionally call the linguistic definition, is based on Plato's words:

The first would be making one's own thought clear through speech by means of verbs and nouns, imaging the opinion in the stream that flows through lips. As in a mirror or water.⁵⁰

In this way, Plato proceeds to describe *logos* as 'the vocal image of thought'⁵¹. In the *Sophist* also, Plato gives a similar explanation:

But the stream that flows from the soul in vocal utterance through the mouth has the name of speech.⁵²

Thus, *logos* is understood as saying that something is and it depends on the vocal potentiality of the speaker. The second definition of the *logos* relates to enumerating the elements, which consisted in one wholeness. Plato defines the *logos* here 'by

⁴⁶ Plato, *Theaetetus*, (in *Theaetetus, Sophist*, with translation by H.N. Fowler, volume II, London, New York, 1921.), 190a.

⁴⁷ Plato, *Sophist*, 263e.

⁴⁸ Plato, *Theaetetus*, 202c.

⁴⁹ Plato, *Theaetetus*, 202b.

⁵⁰ Plato, *Theaetetus*, 206d.

⁵¹ Plato, *Theaetetus*, 208c.

⁵² Plato, *Sophist*, 263e.

describing the whole in terms of its elements' or 'the approach to the whole through the elements'⁵³. However, the problem of such a definition of *logos* is that counting the elements blindly or without any orders takes away from the understanding and explanation of the character of true knowledge. The third and last definition of *logos* indicates some sign (σημείον), by which one thing is distinguished from another. This, Plato expresses in the following: 'explanation was the interpretation of your difference', or in another place: 'Then right opinion also would have to do with differences in the given instance'⁵⁴. However, the last definition is also unacceptable. We enter into a circular situation, because we try to establish our understanding on the basis of difference, which we already know. Thus, Plato makes the conclusion that 'it is utterly silly, when we are looking for definition of knowledge, to say that is a right opinion with knowledge, whether of difference or anything else whatsoever'⁵⁵.

The investigation of meaning of *logos* developed in another of Plato's dialogues, *The Sophist*. Plato exposes the problem of dialectics as the right method of division and construction of notions. In the dialogue *The Sophist*, discussion tends to acquire the nature of the sophist; i.e. to give the specific definition (*logos*) of what the sophist really means. However, the main theme of this dialogue is the determination of notions of genera or classes. In the *Theaetetus*, we concluded that knowledge consisted in acquiring the notion of the species through genera and difference; i.e. through explanation of the *logos*. The main task of the dialogue *The Sophist* is to expose the integration of εἶδη or γένη.

The method of disintegration or separation that determined the notion (διαίρεσις, διαίρειν κατ' εἶδη), which is included in the wider genera or species, is the method by which we can come to the definition. The process, which occurred previously, is the process of conjunction or synthesis (συναγειν εἰς ἐν, συναγωγή). In the process of *diaeresis*, genera are classified into a consistent notion, whereas in the second process of synthesis the specific genera are made on the basis of a common distinction. The guidance through this investigation again belongs to the *logos*. About the synthesis, Plato says: 'there are some elements extending through all and holding them together so that they can mingle, and again, when they separate, whether there are other universal causes of

⁵³ Plato, *Theaetetus*, 207d; 208c.

⁵⁴ Plato, *Theaetetus*, 209d.

⁵⁵ Plato, *Theaetetus*, 210a.

separation'⁵⁶. These elements or ideas can be mingled in communion (κοινωνία) or can participate (μετέχειν) in one another and they do not lose any of their specific idea (ἄτομον εἶδος). According to Plato, the process of 'the division of things by classes and avoidance of the belief that the same class is another, or another the same, belongs to the science of dialectic'⁵⁷.

Dialectics presumes this communion of genera. It also presumes the dieresis if it is a communion established on unity, which is based on forms developed by division. The division enables the communion of genera, which have an ontological possibility to be founded on themselves. The dialectical possibility of synthesis and dieresis are established not only by the epitomising of genera and species in ὀρισμός as communion (κοινωνία), but also by mutual relating of these genera and species based on equality and difference. On the basis of difference, which at the same time presents equality, the oneness of genera yields the last undivided form (ἄτομον εἶδος) of the species. These undivided forms are the cause (αἴτιον) of dieresis (διάρεσις). The assembly of different ideas at the same time and in the same place is the condition for the existence of dialectics.

Plato in his *Parmenides* uses dialectical method to prove that the idea of oneness does not refute the idea of plurality, but it establishes the latter. The purpose of his dialectics is to show that ideas as singular forms do not need to be the oneness, but they can comprehend one plurality of singular forms. Although Plato in *Parmenides* prefers dialectical practising to the Socratic ορίζεσθαι⁵⁸, this dialectics does not stay on the level of giving positive definition, but it finds the possibility of the real defining of being by dialectical dieresis. Defining the oneness, which is not multiplicity, but diversity established in identity, happened in *logos*. In *logos* lies the possibility to understand multiplicity in oneness. Thus, this *logos* (οἰκεῖος λόγος οὐσίας) has no purpose in itself, but it is the only way of thinking about something.

According to this, non-being has not had its own *logos*, because it would be a delusion to think and to speak non-being. Plato says: 'for to think or say what is not, that is falsehood arising in mind or in words'⁵⁹. *Logos* is always

⁵⁶ Plato, *Sophist*, 253c.

⁵⁷ Plato, *Sophist*, 253d.

⁵⁸ Plato, *Parmenides*, 153e.

⁵⁹ Plato, *Sophist*, 260c.

λόγος τοῦ ὄντος or λόγος τινός, because it must be speech about something⁶⁰ or it must be the reason for something concrete. The only way of talking about non-being is to think non-being as something that is different to being, but not as something that is opposite to being. This Plato explains in the following words: 'that non-being was and is non-being, to be counted as one class among the many classes of being'⁶¹.

Moreover, in Plato's *Seventh Letter*, *logos* has a significant place by way of coming to true knowledge. Plato gives three elements, which mediate the process to knowledge, and the fourth element is knowledge itself. The first element is the name (ὄνομα), the second is the explanation or definition of the notion (λόγος), and the third is the image (εἶδολον). These three elements stay on the way to the true knowledge, which is the fourth element in this process. *Logos* does not represent some accidental attitude, but the essential definition of every thing, whose logical structure is established by dieresis. However, the problem arises as a result of entitling or naming, which does not consist of something secure, because a bare definition is composed of words, nouns and verbs. The instability of knowledge comes from the weakness of *logos*, not in a dialectical way but as a means of verbal expression. In spite of the imperfection of these four elements or levels, which are leading to the fifth element, or bare object of knowledge, cognition is possible on the base of a proper mental disposition or just and noble tendency.

Plato repeats in the other dialogues the idea of the division of the elements of which things are composed. Thus, in *The Laws*, Plato says that three elements exist in every thing: 'One point is the substance, one the definition of the substance, and one the name (Ἐν μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἐν δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον, ἐν δὲ ὄνομα.)'⁶².

In *Timaeus* Plato conceives *logos* as the world of ideas which serves as a pattern for the creation of the world. Plato's idea of cosmos (κόσμος) is shaped under the necessity of ontological monism. The idea of cosmos was created on the basis of the unity of three elements: the intelligible world (νοητά), mind (νοῦς) and being (εἶναι). Cosmos signifies beauty and harmony. The truth (ἀλήθεια), which is identical with virtue (ἀρετή) and beauty (τὸ καλόν), belongs to this world. The idea of cosmos establishes a harmonious relationship between beings, and even God cannot avoid the influence of the ontological necessity of this Unity. This cosmos

⁶⁰ Plato, *Sophist*, 262e.

⁶¹ Plato, *Sophist*, 258c.

⁶² Plato, *Laws*, X, 895d.

must have some *arche*. Plato states that ‘it is necessary that cosmos should be a copy of something’⁶³. Cosmos is modelled according to something which is higher and better. The Maker of the cosmos must have something according to which he will create.

For the Cosmos is the fairest of all that has come into existence, and He the best of all the Causes. So having in this wise come into existence, it is to be constructed after the pattern of that which is apprehensible by reason and is self-identical.

(ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δ’ ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων. οὕτω δὴ γεγενημένος πρὸς τὸ λόγῳ καὶ φρονήσει περιληπτὸν καὶ κατὰ ταύτᾳ ἔχον δεδημιούργηται).⁶⁴

The Maker or Demiurge of the cosmos produces the rational system of heavenly bodies, which reflect the world of ideas.

We must declare that this Cosmos has truly come into existence as a Living Creature endowed with soul and reason owing to the providence of God. (οὕτως οὖν δὴ κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δεῖ λέγειν τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῶον ἔμψυχον ἔννοον τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν).⁶⁵

We can conclude that *logos* in the cosmology of Plato represents the place where the world of ideas is settled, as well as the reasoning capacity endowed by God and inherited in souls. For centuries the ideas exposed in *Timaeus* will have the central place in discussion of the origins of the world among both Platonists and Christian philosophers.

In respect of Plato’s conceiving of *logos* with his dialectical path, *logos* apart from its conventional meaning, acquires an onto-logical supposition. This is one of the biggest contributions of Plato to the notional-semantic history of *logos* and to the philosophy of *logos*, as well as to philosophy in general.

5. The birth of logic; Aristotle

Aristotle’s conceiving of *logos* is polyvalent, as is in the case of Plato. Very often, the noun *logos* covers a variety of different notions. The main reason is that *logos* is not defined by some basic meaning.

In the majority of cases, Aristotle uses *logos* in the sphere of language and linguistical determination. For him, *logos* is one of the elements of linguistical

⁶³ Plato, *Timaeus*, 28b.

⁶⁴ Plato, *Timaeus*, 29a.

⁶⁵ Plato, *Timaeus*, 30b.

expression. Thus, every verbal expression has eight parts, and there are: letter, syllable, conjunction, joint, noun, verb, case and phrase (λόγος)⁶⁶. Aristotle explains what a phrase is by these words: 'A phrase is a composite sound with meaning, some parts of which mean something by themselves.' He continues: 'A 'phrase' may be a unit in two ways; either it signifies one thing or it is combination of several 'phrases''⁶⁷. This explanation is Aristotle's definition of *logos* as meaningful speech. In Aristotle's logic *logos* has the following meanings: notion, definition, statement, formula, argument, discourse, reason, judgement, sense and concept. One of the most frequent meanings of *logos* is that of proposition. Nowadays, many scholars criticise the translation of *logos* as proposition or judgement. Their main point is that the fundamental meaning of *logos* is misapprehended in such translations. Undoubtedly, the most significant of these critics is Martin Heidegger⁶⁸.

Heidegger takes the position that *logos* does not mean judgement or proposition primarily in the sense of making some connection or taking a standpoint. *Logos* indicates something conversant or something evident (δηλοῦν). *Logos* shows (ἀποφαίνεσθαι) and makes something known. According to this, *logos* makes something conversant (ἀποφανσις) to someone, through the discourse.

Nevertheless, for Aristotle, not every *logos* is a true one. Every discourse, according to Aristotle signifies something (λόγος σημαντικός), but at the same time every *logos* does not declare and proclaim something (λόγος ἀποφαντικός). For Aristotle, *logos*, which makes something conversant can be true and false. He proceeds with this:

We call proposition (*logos*) those only that have truth or falsity in them (ἔστι δὲ λόγος ἅπας μὲν σημαντικός,... ἀποφαντικῶ δὲ οὐ πῖς, ἀλλ' ἐνῶ τὸ ἀληθευεῖν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχει).⁶⁹

However, there are sentences, which are not true or false:

A prayer is, for instance, a sentence but neither has truth nor has falsity (οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν δὲ ὑπάρχει, οἷον ἢ εὐχή λόγος μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐτ' ἀληθὴς οὔτε ψευδής).⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Aristotle, *The Poetics*, (with translation by W.H. Fyfe, The Loeb Classical Library, Cam., Mass., London, 1982.) XX, 1456b 2.

⁶⁷ Aristotle, *The Poetics*, XX, 1457a 11-13.

⁶⁸ Martin Heidegger, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* Θ 1-3, (translated by W. Brogan & pp. Warnek, Indiana University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, 1995.) pp. 99-110, and Martin Heidegger, *Being And Time*, (Translated by J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Basil Blackwell, 1988.) h. 32-34, pp. 55-58.

⁶⁹ Aristotle, *On Interpretation*, (in, *The Organon*, with translation by H.P. Cooke, The Loeb Classical Library, London, Cam., Mass., 1938.) IV, 17a 1-3.

Heidegger tries to connect Aristotle's *logos* with the possibility of defining the notion of truth. The truth is thought in the primitive meaning of the word ἀ-λήθεια (which consists of ἀ - alpha privative and λήθη, which means forgetfulness or oblivion). Aristotle's standpoint is that *logos* is discourse, which can be true. Heidegger interprets this in the sense that *logos* makes known that of which and about which the discourse is, and simply lets it be seen in itself. The expression 'to be true' (αληθευειν) in Greek means un-cover (ent-decken) something, in the sense to unfold (enthullen) something. The way to understand Heidegger's position is not as something which is uncovered for the first time or something that lets itself be seen, rather as the uncovering of something, which then becomes covered again. The opposite notion, 'to be false' (ψεύδεσθαι), does not indicate falsity, but expresses some deceiving (tauschen) or distorting (verstellen) something about which the discourse is. However, Heidegger translates this ψεύδεσται with covering, because he tends to make this word the opposite to uncovering.

Covering and uncovering are determined by *logos*, the essence of which is to let be seen in itself. Thus, *logos* is ἀποφαντικός and its possibility to be spoken lies in its possibility to be seen in itself. The attribute ἀποφαντικός represents a verbal expression, in which a bare thing becomes accessible and maintained. Heidegger concludes that the proposition does not make the truth possible, but the opposite, namely, the proposition is possible only in the truth.

According to the previous idea *logos* gives the possibility for something to be seen, and in that giving of being becomes accessible. The *logos* shows something as itself. *Logos* indicates something in the basis of every discourse, *hypokeimenon* (ὑποκείμενον). According to this, *logos* itself is at the same time being and existence. Plato always conceived the *logos* as λόγος τινός. Aristotle went a step further. His concept of discourse declares something he determined as affirmation and negation⁷¹. This *logos* is not the choice between two options or between positive and negative propositions, rather it indicates combination and separation and it is at the same time synthesis and dieresis. The combination (*synthesis*) does not manifest the combination of notions or propositions but it expresses something, which can be seen in its gathering. Concerning this Aristotle said in one place:

⁷⁰ Aristotle, On Interpretation, IV, 17a 4-6.

⁷¹ Aristotle, On Interpretation, V, 17a 9-11

As for 'being' *qua* truth, and 'non-being' *qua* falsity, since they depend upon combination and separation, and taken together are concerned with arrangement of the parts of contradiction (since the true has affirmation when the subject and predicate are combined, and negation where they are divided; but the false has the contrary arrangement. How it happens that we combine or separate in thought is another question. By 'combining or separating in thought' I mean thinking them not as a succession but as a unity); for 'falsity' and 'truth' are not in things – the good, for example, being true, and bad false – but in thought; and with regard to simple concepts and essences there is no truth or falsity even in thought; - what points we must study in connexion with being and non-being in this sense.⁷²

Aristotle defines the *logos* as definition or formula⁷³ if it determines some thing. He very frequently uses *logos* with the meaning of argument⁷⁴.

For Aristotle *logos* or 'a definition is a phrase signifying a thing's essence'⁷⁵ and 'in definition words ought to be rendered by account, if possible in every case, or if not, in majority'⁷⁶.

In Aristotle's *Analytics* *logos* has the meaning of conclusion, which is acquired from notions placed in the syllogistic relationship (συλλογισμός). The *logos* of Aristotle's *logic* is the basis of being, which unites all things. His *logos* consists of the essential origin of the whole language and it determines the way of discourse as a logical discourse.

We can also spread the logical foundation of *logos* on an ontological plan. According to his usage of *logos* in the ontological sense, we can understand Aristotle's definition of the soul as human *logos*⁷⁷. The possibility of perceiving the world is equivalent to the possibility of logically relating to the world. The soul is divided into two parts according to *logos*. One part is rational (λόγον) and the other is irrational (ἄλογον). Aristotle proceeds with his classification in the following:

Thus we see that the irrational part, as well as the soul as whole, is double. One division of it, the vegetative, does not share in rational principle at all; the other, the seat of the appetites and of desire in general, does in a sense participate in the principle, as being amenable and obedient to it.⁷⁸

⁷² Aristotle, *The Metaphysics*, (with translation by H. Tredennick, The Loeb Classical Library, Cam., Mass., London, 1967), E, VI, 1027b 15-25.

⁷³ Aristotle, *The Metaphysics*, 996b 5; 1013a 25; 1036a 30; and Aristotle, *The Physics*, in, (with translation by pp.H. Wicksteed & F.M. Cornford, The Loeb Classical Library, volume V, London, Cam., Mass., 1968.) 193a 31; 200a 15; 202b 12; 210a 20.

⁷⁴ Aristotle, *The Metaphysics*, 1002a 25; 1006a 10; 1010a 15; and Aristotle, *The Physics*, 185a 8.

⁷⁵ Aristotle, *The Topics*, 101b 38.

⁷⁶ Aristotle, *The Topics*, 149a 2.

⁷⁷ Aristotle, *On soul*, 414a 13

⁷⁸ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (with translation by H. Rackham, The Loeb Classical Library, Cam., Mass., London, 1975.), I, XIII 1102a 18.

The rational part of the soul, according Aristotle is divided into two faculties, the scientific (επιστημονικόν), and the calculative (λογιστικόν). The former is 'one whereby we contemplate those things whose first principles are invariable, and [the] one whereby we contemplate those things which admit of variation'⁷⁹ is the calculative one.

Logos acquired its usage in Aristotle's ethical and political writings. Aristotle defines *logos* as speech which only man possesses:

For nature, as we declare, does nothing without purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses speech. The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain or pleasure, and therefore is possessed by other animals as well (for their nature has been developed so far as to have sensations of what is painful and pleasant and to signify those sensations to one another), but speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and harmful, and therefore also the right and wrong; for it is the special property of man in distinction from other animals that he alone has perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral qualities; and it is partnership in these things that makes a household and city-state.⁸⁰

We can draw the conclusion that *logos* is the faculty of recognition according to the fact that Aristotle puts *logos* in connection with prudence. In his usage of *logos* in practical matters, Aristotle extends the meaning of this notion from the syllogistical rules of concluding into the sphere in which *logos* establishes the principal premises of practical concluding.

6. The omnipresent *logos*: the Stoics

In the system of Stoic thought, the term *logos* was widely used. Its usage was in logic, which was an autonomous discipline for the Stoics, as well as in their cosmology and ethics. They were very proud of the consistency and coherence of their system.

Logic for Aristotle was the formal *propaedeutic*, (it is in this sense we find the term λόγικος in his writings), whereas in the philosophy of the Stoics, logic occupies one of three main fields of their philosophy. The Stoics divide logic and the object of logic into two parts. The first relates to discourse and its parts. This field was divided again into two disciplines. One is rhetoric and another is dialectics. The Stoics conceived rhetoric as the skill of arguing something through questions and answers. They define rhetoric as:

⁷⁹ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, I, 1139a 5-15.

⁸⁰ Aristotle, *Politics*, (with translation by H. Rackham, The Loeb Classical Library, London, Cam., Mass., 1967.), A2 1253a 10-18.

The science of speaking well on matters set forth by plain narrative, and by question and answers, and by dialectics that of correctly discussing subject by questions and answers; hence their alternative definition of it as the science of statement, of statement true, false, and neither true nor false.⁸¹

The other part of logical investigation concerns the faculty of reason (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος). That is, the sum of conceptions and recognition, which incarnate a part of the universal, cosmic *logos* in human beings. The spoken word (λόγος προφορικός) is the opposite of the faculty of reason.

Logos is the immanent principle of law in the world and the Stoics identify it with God. It is the rational principle of the world and the source of all activity in the world. The Stoics also identify *logos*, which is cosmic and pneumatic power in some cases, with creative fire, and in other cases with Fate (εἰμαρμένη) or Providence (πρόνοια)⁸².

God identified with *logos* is the active principle and governing force of the universe. The second principle in the cosmos is matter, which is incapable of any action of its own.⁸³ The first creative act, the separation of matter into four elements, is not taken by *logos*.⁸⁴

On the level of the universe *logos* is identified with the creative fire (πῦρ τεχνικόν)⁸⁵, which is the true nature of the universe. *Logos* is material, as are the things which are the objects of its activity.

The nature of man is different from the nature of the universe. Human nature is also characterised by *logos*. The duty of the *logos* in man is the development of his rational part on the level of knowledge of the *logos* of the universe. The *logos* of man is the same *logos* which is the governing force of the universe. Thus, the *logos* in man cannot complete his knowledge and fulfill his duty until it comprises the universe and man's place in it. The *logos* in man develops as a distinctive principle as the child grows older. The knowledge of the *orthos logos* of universe is the common law, which is achieved in God⁸⁶. If we identify the *orthos logos* with God the result is that man will reach the *orthos logos* when he conceives the right idea of God. The idea of God and the full possession of *orthos logos* are interrelated. God is

⁸¹ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, volume II, VII, 42.

⁸² H. von Arnim, , *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*. [New ed], v1 ; Zeno et Zenonis discipuli, v1. 1923, II, 913.

⁸³ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VII, 34.

⁸⁴ Achilles, in H. von Arnim, , *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, I, 4, 9.

⁸⁵ Diogenes Laertius, *Vit.* VII, 156; Cicero, *De nature deorum* II 57

⁸⁶ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 7.88.

ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὦν τῷ Δεῖ,

the perfection of *logos* or reason. Man cannot, like God, embrace all things and he thus arrives at a position in which he must choose. Put in position to choose, man must follow the common law (νόμος ὁ κοινός), which does not give much choice. Stoics accept this consternation by reason as a cause of their goodness. The Stoic sage is free because he feels free, because he makes up his own mind about action in accordance with *orthos logos*.⁸⁷

The *physis* and *logos* are the key concepts of moral discourse, and for man they are interchangeable. The principle of morality in the ethics of the Stoics was a life lived according to nature (ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν). The ethical goal is to attain self-fulfilment by living consistently with reason, or as Chrysippus stated 'living in accordance with experience of natural things'⁸⁸. According to Chrysippus 'universal nature' is only the starting point for moral philosophy, and the sole reason for studying physics is to establish the difference between right and wrong⁸⁹. Nature is the product of Reason and at the same time, it is led by *logos*. In this regard we can conclude that the life according to nature is the same as the life according to *logos*. In the ethics of the Stoics, *logos* was the source of law and morality, and the rule and the cause of moral behaviour. According to the Stoics, lack of moral behaviour is the result of deviation from reason and is an exception in the cosmic order. There is no clear distinction between physics and ethics, between factual and moral statements. To be good is much more a physical disposition than a duty. Everything is based on acts according to reason, which is in turn based on empirical principles and grounded in human nature and physical law. The mind of God and the mind of the sage are joined to some degree, because the life of man is causally connected with cosmic events. Stoics draw together the categorical imperative and the *orthos logos* because thoughts and acts are causally linked. Epictetus states that reason in the case of the uneducated leads to errors both of judgement and moral choice.⁹⁰ Moral error can be avoided only by the proper use of *logos* for right purpose. Only the sage is a true logician⁹¹.

⁸⁷ Epictetus, *Dissertationum Epictetearum sive ab Arriano sive ab aliis*, IV, 7.

⁸⁸ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VII 87f.

⁸⁹ Plutarch, *De Stoicorum repugnantiis* 1035 C-D

⁹⁰ Epictetus *Dissertationum Epictetearum sive ab Arriano sive ab aliis*, I, 21.

⁹¹ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 7.83. Καὶ τοιοῦτοι μὲν ἐν τοῖς λογικοῖς οἱ Στωικοί, ἵνα μάλιστα κρατύνωσι διαλεκτικὸν ἀεὶ εἶναι τὸν σοφόν.

Logos in its cosmic sense is interchangeable with Fate (εἰμαρμένη)⁹². The theory of 'seminal reason' probably caused this identification. *Logos* as the active principle contains in itself active forms. Those active forms are more aspects of *Logos* than individual entities. The material and divine forms are seeds (λόγοι σπερματικοί), through the activity of which individual things come into being during the development of the world. Harmony among people is the product of the activity of these seeds, which mediate between the people and the universal *Logos*. These seeds influence the reasonable action in base matter and so fulfil the plan of God. Chalcidus claims that human decisions are completely pre-determined.

We can conclude that Stoics abandon the duality of transcendent and immanent realms. Their philosophical system characterises cosmological immanentism. But at the base of this immanentism lies a duality of the active principle, *logos* and the passive principle, matter. Everything in the cosmos is constrained by *Logos*, including man, whose acts are pre-determined.

⁹² Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantibus, 1050 C.

II Greeks and Jews

Logos appears in Christian writings from two sources. One was Philo from Alexandria, and another was St. John Theologian. The former was a well-educated Jew from Alexandria, who wanted to reconcile the biblical wisdom of the Old Testament with Greek philosophy. The later was the apostle and favourite disciple of Jesus Christ, who wanted nothing else than to reveal the salvation, which came to the world through the *Logos* of God, Our Lord Jesus Christ. The former adopted the Greek ontology, which is established on the basis of the necessity of the world of ideas, and the latter framed a new ontology, one which overcomes every kind of necessity and limitation.

1. The forebear of the Christian *logos*: Philo from Alexandria

The Greek, philosophical conception of *logos* and the Christian conception of this term, appear one to another for the first time in the thought of Philo from Alexandria. In his writings, Philo used the term *logos* in 1306 places and in different senses. The whole thought of Philo is syncretistic and was influenced by the Bible, as well as the philosophical teachings, which were popular at that time in Alexandria. The translation of Old Testament into Greek (Septuagint) enabled Philo to read Moses and Plato in the same language. Philo made the effort to translate the biblical language into the language of Greek philosophy. According to Philo, the thing common to the two traditions, one Greek and the other Jewish, is their source from the divine Reason, i.e. from *Logos*. The reason why the biblical tradition and the Greek philosophy are not opposite is their birth from *logos*. The former is born from *logos*, which is projected in the human mind and the world, and the latter is born from the divine *Logos*, which reveals itself directly to the prophets.

According to Philo's writings, we can make a conditional classification of the three groups, in which *logos* appears with the same or the similar meanings. In the first group are those meanings of *logos*, which came into Philo's writings from Greek philosophy. In the second group belong those meanings of *logos*, which are inspired by the Bible and the usage of the term *logos* in the Pentateuch of Moses. In the third group we can classify the meanings of *logos* which originate from Philo himself.

Philo used *logos* with the meaning of universal law, which is immanent in the world, maintaining order, harmony and beauty in the world. This usage of *logos* is identical to the usage of *logos* in the philosophy of the Stoics. *Logos* is universal Reason, which rules in the cosmos. According to the relationship between man and the world

as the relationship of macrocosm and microcosm, one part of universal *logos* belongs to human mind. Philo, like the Stoics, distinguishes two aspects of *logos*. One is λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, and another is λόγος πρόφορικός. These two modes of *logos*, Philo in the Platonistic manner places into two worlds. The first finds its place in the immaterial world of ideas. The other one, λόγος πρόφορικός is settled in the world of visible things, in so far as they are images or copies of immaterial ideas. The cosmic plan is projected onto the human being. Thus, λόγος ἐνδιάθετος is placed in the sphere of mind, and λόγος πρόφορικός has the function of the spoken word, which is generated from the faculty of reason as a stream is from its source. Philo's use is distinct from the Stoic conception, which places *logos* in nature. Philo, as we can see places *logos* in the cosmos, as well as in human nature:

There is a point, too, in the reason-seat being doubled, for the rational principle is twofold as well in the universe of human nature. In the universe we find it in one form dealing with the incorporeal and archetypal ideas from which the intelligible world is framed, and in another with the visible objects which are copies and likenesses of those ideas and out of which this sensible world was produced.⁹³

Philo was strongly influenced by Platonism. We can see the same in Plato's *Timaeus*, in which God creates the world according to ideas or principles, which serve as the paradigms for creation. In Platonic spirit, Philo writes:

For God, being God, assumed that beautiful copy would never be produced without beautiful pattern, and that no object of perception would be faultless which was not made in the likeness of an original discerned only by intellect. So when He willed to create this visible world He first fully formed the intelligible world, in order that He might have use of a pattern wholly God-like and incorporeal in producing the material world, as a later creation, the very image of an earlier, to embrace in itself objects of perception of as many kinds as other contained objects of intelligence.⁹⁴

Philo claims that *logos* is the place (τόπος), in which is settled the world of ideas (ὁ ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν κόσμος)⁹⁵. A few verses latter, Philo proceeds:

The universe that consisted of ideas would have no other location than the Divine Reason, which was the Author of ordered frame.⁹⁶

According to the former, κόσμος νοητός is *logos* of God 'when he already engaged in the act of creation (οὐδὲν ἄν ἕτερον εἴποι τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον εἶναι ἢ θεοῦ

⁹³ Philo, *De Vita Mosis*, II, 127.

⁹⁴ Philo, *De Opificio mundi*, 16.

⁹⁵ Philo, *De Opificio mundi*, 17.

⁹⁶ Philo, *De Opificio mundi*, 20.

λόγον ἤδη κοσμοποιούντος).⁹⁷ For Philo, *logos* is: ‘the original principle behind all principles, after which God shaped or formed the universe, incorporeal, and discerned by intellect alone’⁹⁸. *Logos* is the image of material creation, which remains incorporeal.

In many places, Philo’s usage of *logos* was inspired by the bible. In Genesis, chapter one, the word of God initiates the acts of creation: ‘Then God said...’. The essential role of the word, which probably guides Philo, we can find in the following verses of Psalms: ‘By the word of the Lord the heavens were made (τῷ λογῷ τοῦ κυρίου οἱ οὐρανοὶ ἐστερεώθησαν)’⁹⁹.

According to Philo, the word or *logos* is the instrument by which God creates the world from non-being (ἐκ μὴ ὄντων). *Logos* is similar to God because it shares with God the basic divine attribute – the faculty of creating. God through the meditation of *logos* creates the world. The cause of the world ‘is God, by whom it has come into being, its material the four elements, from which it was compounded, its instrument the word of God, through which is framed, and the final cause of the building is the goodness of the architect’¹⁰⁰. The *logos* of God ‘is above all world, and is eldest and most all-embracing of created things (πρεσβύτατος καὶ γενικώτατος τῶν ὅσα γέγονε)’¹⁰¹. *Logos* is the image of God without visible shape and it is the immaterial world of ideas.

Following the prophet Isaiah, to whom the Son of Man is representative of humankind before the throne of God, Philo identifies *Logos* with the first-born Son of God. According to this, *logos* is ‘the eldest son, whom the Father of all raised up, and calls him His first-born, and indeed the Son thus begotten followed the ways of his Father, and shaped the different kinds, looking to the archetypal patterns which that Father supplied’¹⁰². In the same spirit, Philo proceeds: ‘But if there be any as yet unfit to be called a Son of God, let him press to take his place under God’s First-born, the Word; who holds the eldership among the angels, their ruler as it were’¹⁰³. Philo’s identification of the *logos* of God with the Son of God does not imply that Philo, under the name Son of God, thinks of the historical Jesus. Jesus Christ was a contemporary of Philo, but there is no strong evidence that Philo had heard of him.

⁹⁷ Philo, *De Opificio mundi*, 24.

⁹⁸ Philo, *De Migratione Abrahami*, 103.

⁹⁹ *Psalms*, 33.

¹⁰⁰ Philo, *De Cherubim*, 127.

¹⁰¹ Philo, *Legum Allegoriarum Libri*, III, 175.

¹⁰² Philo, *De Confusione linguarum*, 63.

¹⁰³ Philo, *De Confusione linguarum*, 146.

The conception of *logos* in Philo is similar to the conception of wisdom in the wisdom theology. Namely, wisdom has the same attributes as *logos*. Solomon describes wisdom in the following verses:

Though she [wisdom] is but one, she can do all the things, and while remaining in herself, she renews all things; in every generation she passes into holy souls and makes them friends of God, and prophets.¹⁰⁴

Philo makes a clear identification between wisdom and *logos*: 'the wisdom of God, and this is the Reason of God (τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ σοφίας· ἡ δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ θεοῦ λόγος·)',¹⁰⁵

In the light of the previous remarks we can conclude that *logos* or reason has three manifestations: divine, cosmic and human. According to Philo, men by participation in or through union with *logos* attain eternal life.

But it is the lot of man, as we see, to occupy the place of excellence among living creatures because his stock is near akin to God, sprung from the same source in virtue of his participation in reason which gives him immortality, mortal though he seems to be.¹⁰⁶

Logos organises the elements of nature in the cosmos, as well as in the individual soul. *Logos* brings instincts, passions and desires of the soul into rational order¹⁰⁷.

The identification of *logos* with the powers of God, by which God is known, is something quite new and it is undoubtedly an original contribution of Philo to the theory of *logos*. According to Philo's theory of powers, there are two senior powers, the creative and the kingly. He writes: '

The central place is held by the Father of the Universe, who in the sacred scriptures is called He that is as His proper name, while on either side of Him are senior powers, the nearest to Him, the creative and the kingly.¹⁰⁸

Philo repeats the same thing in *De Vita Mosis*:

I should myself say that they [cherubim] are allegorical representations of the two most august and highest potencies of Him that is, the creative and the kingly. His creative potency is called God, because through it He placed and made and ordered this universe, and the kingly is called Lord, being that with He governs what has come into being and rules it steadfastly with justice.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁴ Wisdom of Solomon, 7,27.

¹⁰⁵ Philo, *Legum Allegoriarum Libri*, I 65.

¹⁰⁶ Philo, *De Specialibus Legibus*, IV, 14.

¹⁰⁷ C.H. Dodd,., *The Interpretation of the fourth Gospel*, (University Press, Cambridge, 1955.) p. 57.

¹⁰⁸ Philo, *De migratione Abrahami*, 121.

¹⁰⁹ Philo, *De Vita Mosis*, II, 99.

Philo introduces *logos* as a means to unite these two powers, which becomes the medium of the creation of the world and the medium of its divine government. *Logos* is above those powers and closer to divine being as such.

The voice told me that while God is indeed one, His highest and chiefest powers are two, even goodness and sovereignty. Through His goodness He beget all that is, through His sovereignty He rules what He has begotten. And in the midst between the two there is a third, which unites them, Reason, for it is through reason that God is both ruler and good. Of these two potencies sovereignty and goodness the Cherubim are symbols, as the fiery sword is the symbol of reason. For exceeding swift and of burning heat is reason and chiefly so the reason of the (Great) Cause, for alone preceded and outran all things, conceived before them all, manifest above them all.¹¹⁰

As we can see, *logos* is the instrument of God with the highest rank among other beings and it is a mediator between the transcendent God and the world¹¹¹, as well as between God and man.

The general conclusion is that Philo was not consistent in his teaching of *logos*. Yet, the question remains what is the true nature of *logos*. Is *logos* one power of God, which depends on God, or is it self-existing being, subordinate to God? Concerning powers, we are still in a dilemma: what are the powers? Are they the qualities similar to the ideas of God, or independent entities? All these questions influence our understanding of the Philonic conception of *logos*. The definition of Philo's *logos* remains somewhere between two conceptions. One conceives *logos* as a being, which is an aspect of God and whose powers are qualities of God. The other conceives *logos* as an independent, self-existent being, but subordinate to God, with powers as its aspects.

However, Philo's teaching prepared the ground for the concept of unique personalised *logos*, who is free from the necessity as maintained by Greek ontology.

2. The *logos* became flesh: St. John the Theologian

The mediator between the Greek and the Jewish tradition was Philo of Alexandria. He introduced the word *logos* from the terminological apparatus of Greek philosophy into the exegesis of the Old Testament. Christians such as Clement of Alexandria and Origen, who were interested in appropriating the Jewish tradition, were influenced by Philo's doctrine of the *Logos*. Nevertheless, the concept of *logos*

¹¹⁰ Philo, *De Cherubim*, 27-8.

¹¹¹ Andrew Louth, *The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition*, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981.) p. 27.

was introduced into Christian scriptures by an author who probably knew nothing of the writings of either Philo or the apostle and evangelist St. John the Theologian. The Fourth Gospel was written at the end of the first century. The problem of the origin of the Fourth Gospel is much more complex than the question of whether it has a Hellenistic or a Jewish background. Professor Barrett points out that 'this Gospel contains Judaism, non-Judaism and anti-Judaism'¹¹². The same can be said for the origins of the Johannine *logos*. The most prominent writers of the early Church, such as Clement of Alexandria and Hippolytus of Rome, claimed that the *logos* of the Fourth Gospel is in essence identical with the *logos* of Heraclitus' book *On Nature*. The reason for this identification lies in the fact that both of them give the main role to *logos*. There is no consensus among the scholars about the origins of *logos* in the Fourth Gospel, but the general standpoint adopted by them is that the Johannine *logos* is essentially non-Greek, and that the roots of this term have an oriental or Gnostic background. Eliminating any Hellenistic influence, Brown¹¹³, Bultmann¹¹⁴ and Dodd¹¹⁵ claim that the pre-existent *logos* had its roots in Near-Eastern religion, and more particularly in Jewish mysticism which had penetrated Christian thought. We can distinguish four main categories for the use of the term *logos*. Especially when used in the plural, *logos* has the same sense as *ρήματα*, meaning "that which is said or spoken", words spoken by Jesus or others. When *logos* is used in the singular the meaning is "saying", "statement" or "discourse". Normally, a discourse is composed of *logoi*, used in the sense of *ρήματα*. A third meaning of the singular *logos* refers to what Jesus said to his disciples and to the world. In this case, *logos* is Jesus' message conceived both as revelation and as a command that must be obeyed. Jesus himself makes an important distinction between *λογος* and *λαλία*, where *logos* does not simply mean to hear the words, but to understand the meaning conveyed by those words, (Jn, viii, 43). Finally the most important meaning, the one that is relevant for our investigation, is *logos* used as "the Word of God". Christians saw the Word of God embodied in the Old Testament. Unlike men God does not have a *φωνη* but he does have a *logos*, which can be recognised in the Scriptures. But the most important sense of *logos* as the Word of God refers to Christ. Christ is the *logos* of God, identified with the

¹¹² C.K. Barrett, *The Gospel of John and Judaism*, (London, 1975.)

¹¹³ Raymond E. Brown, , (Doubleday & Company, Inc, New York, 1966)

¹¹⁴ Rudolf Bultmann, *The Gospel according to John*, (translated by G.R. Beasley-Murray, R.W.N. Hoare and J.K. Riches, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1971.)

¹¹⁵ C.H. Dodd, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel*, (University Press, Cambridge, 1955.) p. 247.

eternal truth, ἀληθεια (Jn, xiv, 6), the ultimate reality revealed¹¹⁶. The final, and for us the most important, meaning of *logos* is where *logos* is used as pre-existent *logos*. The Prologue of the Fourth Gospel gives a new and different concept of this term. The possible sources from which the concept of *logos* came into Johannine writings are: the Torah, the *Targums* and Wisdom theology. Some experts think that the Christian background of *logos* is as important as the Jewish background. However, the Prologue was moulded by the many different ideas with which St. John worked. It would be unwise to take into consideration only one source for the extremely complex doctrine of *logos*.

In the Greek translation of the Old Testament (Septuagint), the word *logos* appears many times with similar meanings to those we find in Johannine writings. As mentioned above, the *logos* of God has a creative role in Psalm 33.6 and in Genesis 1.3,6,9. In addition, we find *logos* used in the books of the Prophets to denote the means used to bring the message of God to the prophets. 'The word of the Lord came to...' is to be found in Jer. 1.4, and Ezek. 1.3, or 'Hear the word that the Lord has spoken against you', in Amos 3.1. The commentaries show that the Old Testament *dabar*, understood in the light of speculation on Wisdom, can account for St. John's thought. The Hebrew word דָּבָר (*dābār*), which is equivalent to *logos*, has two meanings. Its primary meaning is an "articulate and intelligible utterance". The second meaning of *dābār* is "matter" or "thing". This meaning is derived from the first, as some thing about which one speaks¹¹⁷. The influence of Wisdom theology on St. John is evident. Thus, the Johannine *logos* has a role parallel to the figure of Wisdom.

Another non-Hellenistic background is constituted by Aramaic paraphrases, known as *Targums*. Some earlier New Testament scholars traced a *Targumic* influence on the Prologue, especially the Aramaic word *memra* (מִמְרָא). After a while the influence of *memra* on St. John was rejected. Thus, according to Barrett, *memra* became 'a blind alley in the study of the biblical background of John's *logos* doctrine'¹¹⁸. For a long time the influence of this term on St. John's Gospel was neglected. There were two main interpretations of this term. Some of the scholars took *memra* as meaning 'divine hypostasis'. The hypostatic nature of *memra* implied the existence of an independent or semi-independent entity between God and

¹¹⁶ C.H. Dodd, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel*, pp. 265-268.

¹¹⁷ G.A. Buttrick, *The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible*, (Abingdon Press, Nashville, New York, 1962.), p. 868.

¹¹⁸ C.K. Barrett, *The Gospel according to St. John*, (SPCK, London, 1962.), p. 128.

creation. The second interpretation talked about this term as a way of avoiding the pronunciation of the name of God. Of these two opinions the latter ultimately prevailed. Thus, scholars have neglected *memra* as a viable solution to the puzzle of the *logos* in the Johannine writings.

However, because of the first interpretation, where *memra* was seen as a hypostatic intermediary between God and the world, this term was considered the only source or one of the main sources of the *Logos* in the Prologue of St. John's Gospel.¹¹⁹ More recently, this opinion was replaced, and *memra* was seen as merely a pious formula to refer to the name of God, thus excluding any connection with *Logos*¹²⁰. Moreover, according to the fundamental monotheism of mainstream Rabbinic Judaism, the Jewish scholars concluded that *memra* is in no way an hypostasis or an intermediary between God and creation, and thus the main argument for the parallel *memra/logos* was abolished.

In analysing Barret's investigation of the relationship between *memra* and *logos*, Professor Hayward highlights several aspects that have to be borne in mind when dealing with such a controversial subject. First, *memra* or any other concept alone does not form the whole source of the doctrine of *Logos*. However, Judaism does represent an important element in the Fourth Gospel. Second, the language of St. John's Prologue is similar to those parts of the Old Testament in which the historical Christ is described. Professor Hayward therefore advances the hypothesis that St. John knew of *memra* and that he used *memra* because this proves a knowledge of the *Targumic* tradition not only in the Gospel but also in the Prologue¹²¹. Hayward compares the Prologue with the *Targum* and relies on this comparison as evidence for the position he adopts.

St. John uses *Targumic* language to identify the 'true bread from heaven' with Jesus Christ, which in turn has its origins in the Palestinian *Neofiti Targum*. *Memra* and *logos* are placed in the same context of creation. Both terms represent God's name. *Memra*, understood as God's Name dwelling among his people Israel (Deut. xii, 5, 11, xiv, 6, xxvi, 2) is a perfect equivalent to Jesus, who is God's Name come in the flesh (Jn, xii, 28). "The Father's glorification of His Name and the glorification of

¹¹⁹ Until 1925. New Testament scholars sustained this position, that *memra* is a sure antecedent of St. John's *Logos*.

¹²⁰ C.T.R. Hayward, *The Holy Name of the God of Moses and the Prologue of St. John's Gospel*, *New Testament Studies*, 25, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, London, New York, 1978-79.) pp. 16-32.

¹²¹ C.T.R. Hayward, "The Holy Name of the God of Moses and the Prologue of St. John's Gospel", p. 26.

Jesus are here equivalent”¹²². Professor Hayward¹²³, analysing the meaning of *memra*, has shown that *memra* was not an hypostasis, but rather is equivalent to God’s mercy, by which the world was created and sustained. Taken in this context, *memra* has similar characteristics to *logos* in the Johannine Prologue. *Logos* taken in the sense of God’s mercy can be interpreted in terms of the merciful and active presence of God. This presence is represented through the self-proclaimed God, Jesus, who took flesh. The meaning of *memra* is *God with us*. This term best describes the presence and activity of God in Jesus Christ and must be taken into account as an essential element of the *logos* doctrine.

Even though Hayward concludes that Jesus is for St John *memra* made flesh, he is nevertheless aware that *memra* is not the sole antecedent for St. John’s doctrine of the *Logos*. The language of the Prologue, although having many similarities with the *Targum*, is also open to other interpretations. The importance of the term *dabar* must not be ruled out and even the influence exercised by Philo’s doctrine of *Logos* must be borne in mind.

Apart from all these influences, John gave his own contribution by his synthesis. The Johannine synthesis is reflected in his teaching that the *logos* would be unknown and incomprehensible but for the role of the historical Jesus

The Prologue uses the term *Logos* in relation to God as an important agent in creation, and it affirms that *Logos* was incarnate in Christ as the unique Son of God. Therefore, broadly speaking, we could say that the prologue presents two aspects, depending on from which perspective the *Logos* is regarded. “In the beginning” the *Logos* was “with God”. “In the beginning” does not refer to the beginning of the creation, for creation will be mentioned later in the prologue. This expression has no temporal character, but is rather a qualitative character. Before time, before creation, *Logos* existed as a hypostasis distinguishable from God, yet not having independent existence. It is interesting to observe also that the expression “in the beginning” reminds one of the Old Testament and is not the only similarity between the Prologue and Genesis. Common points with Genesis run throughout the whole Prologue. Coming back to *logos*, another point needs to be made: not only is *logos* “with God” but St. John states that *Logos* “is God”. *Logos* is involved in creation. The creation was done by the Word πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο (Jn, I, 3). In this

¹²² C.T.R. Hayward, “The Holy Name of the God of Moses and the Prologue of St. John’s Gospel”, p. 29.

¹²³ C.T.R. Hayward, “The Holy Name of the God of Moses and the Prologue of St. John’s Gospel”, p.31

way St. John excludes any possibility of attributing the origin of the world to inferior creators. At this point in the prologue *Logos* reaches a new stage. He is manifested in the world as life and light that cannot be overcome by the darkness. But mankind fails to recognise him. However there were a few who did not reject the word of the God and they become “the children of God”. If in the first verses of the prologue the accent falls on *Logos* as God, the perspective changes completely when St. John affirms that ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο (Jn, I, 14). This is something new, something that cannot be found in the Old Testament. This second stage represents *Logos* God becoming man. Σὰρξ is the word chosen by the apostle to represent human nature as different from God. “Since the word was described as θεός, John’s statement is a full and perhaps the most succinct expression of the paradox of the person of Christ”¹²⁴. The prologue ends with the image of Christ *Logos* as the unique Son of God, μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός (Jn, I, 14), a statement that again distinguishes St. John from all his predecessors, be they representatives of the Jewish faith or of the Greek philosophical tradition.

The original contribution of St John is his introduction on the one hand of the eternal *Logos*, and on the other hand of ‘a man sent from God’, whose name is Jesus. The eternal *Logos* is at the same time both incarnate and a human person.

¹²⁴ C.K. Barrett, The Gospel according to St. John, p.138

III *Logos* as the cosmological principle

1. The Sower of the seeds; Justin Martyr

The attempt to synthesise the Hellenistic tradition with the fundamentals of Christianity was made in the first three centuries by the Greek apologist Justin Martyr and two Alexandrian theologians, Clement and Origen. Thus, as professor Chadwick rightly remarks, the answer on Tertullian's question: "What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?" will be 'Much in every way'¹²⁵.

Philo was the first writer who tried to harmonise the Hellenic ontology with the Old Testament. He claims that apart from Greek philosophers having borrowed their teachings from Moses, they also discovered certain truths through natural reason. Thus, the philosophy is not only a natural predisposition but also a gift from God along the same lines as revelation to Israel¹²⁶. Justin stressed that Hellenistic philosophy and Judaism occupy the same ground, asserting that both are derived from the revelation to Moses. Justin does not deny that philosophers discovered some traces of truth through natural reason. Does it mean that Justin considers Greek philosophy as a divine gift? The answer to this question can shed more light on Justin's thought, revealing the real character of his work.

"I will tell you," said I, "what seems to me; for philosophy is, in fact, the greatest possession, and most honourable before God, to whom it leads us and alone commends us; and these are truly holy men who have bestowed attention on philosophy. What philosophy is, however, and the reason why it has been sent down to men, have escaped the observation of most; for there would be neither Platonists, nor Stoics, nor Peripatetics, nor Theoretics, nor Pythagoreans, this knowledge being *one*."¹²⁷

The first sentence of this quotation can misdirect us to conclude that every philosophy leads us to God. But Justin is clear that only *one* philosophy can reach the truth.

"When he had spoken these and many other things, which there is no time for mentioning at present, he went away, bidding me attend to them; and I have not seen him since. But straightway a flame was kindled in my soul; and a love of the prophets, and of those men who are friends of Christ, possessed me; and whilst revolving his words in my mind, I found this philosophy alone to be safe and profitable."¹²⁸

¹²⁵ Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition, (Studies in Justin, Clement and Origen, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966.), p. 1.

¹²⁶ Harry Wolfson, Philo, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1948.), p.141.

¹²⁷ Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo 2, 1. (in Ante-Nicene Christian Library, volume II, The Writings of Justin Martyr and Athenagoras, translated by M. Dods, G. Reith and B.P. Pratten, Edinburgh, London, 1867.).

¹²⁸ Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo, 8, 1.

Thus, the philosophy which was sent down to men (κατεπέμφθη εἰς τοὺς ἄνθρώπους) can be nothing else than Old Testament revelation¹²⁹. Justin does not allow no room for the truth of philosophies other than Christ's.

There is no doubt that Justin used terminological material of Greek philosophy as well as the same methods of developing an argument, but sometimes his interest in philosophical themes is overestimated by scholars. Justin was much more of a biblical thinker and a man with a mission than an academic philosopher. His intention was not to introduce innovation into biblical beliefs, but to emphasise, as a theological traditionalist, that the whole truth can be found only in the Church. Our task is to elucidate to what extent Hellenism influenced Justin's theology, thus diminishing its evangelical message.

The way he thinks about God shows that Justin remains Platonist even after his conversion to Christianity. For Justin, God is 'that which always maintains the same nature, and in the same manner, and is the cause of all other things (τὸ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ ἔχον καὶ τοῦ εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις αἰτίον)',¹³⁰. Justin does not differ much from Plato, who speaks in the same way about being (τό ὄν), rather than about God (Θεόν). Plato says that true being is something 'which is eternal and unchanging (οἱ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος)',¹³¹. Justin's God is transcendent,¹³² passionless¹³³, incorruptible¹³³, unchangeable¹³⁴ and eternal. Justin's doctrine of the divine reflects two different conceptions, one biblical and the other from Middle-Platonism. The concept of God which Justin adopted is the same eclectic idea very common among Platonists of the second century, especially Albinus. This doctrine of God is a combination of the ineffable God of Plato, the Demiurge of *Timaeus* and the Aristotelian 'unmoved mover'. The way to know God is described in the same terms as the act of knowing the truth. This way of describing the knowledge of God is very common in Middle Platonism and is originally found in Plato¹³⁵.

¹²⁹ Ragnar Holte, *Logos Spermatikos*, *Studia Theologica*, vol. 12, (Lund, 1958.), pp. 164-5.

¹³⁰ Justin, *Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo*, 3, 5.

¹³¹ Plato, *The Republic*, 484b (The Loeb Classical Library, volume II) also in Plato, *Phaedo* 78c, *Sophist*, 248a

¹³² Justin, *Apologia I*, 12.

¹³³ Justin, *Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo*, 5.

¹³⁴ Justin, *Apologia I*, 13.

¹³⁵ Plato, *Epistles*, VII, 341cd. 'As a result of continued application to the subject itself and communion therewith, it [knowledge] is brought to birth in the soul on a sudden, as light that is kindled by a leaping spark, and there after it nourishes itself'.

Thus Justin states that God 'cannot be seen merely by the eyes, but is discernible to the mind alone (νῶ καταληπτόν)',¹³⁶. Justin re-establishes the monistic ontology of Greek thought based on the unity of the intelligible world, the mind and being.

'Plato indeed says, 'replied I, 'that the mind's eye is of such a nature, and has been given for this end, that we may see that very Being when the mind is pure itself, who is the cause of all discerned by the mind, having no colour, no form, no greatness-nothing, indeed, which the bodily eye looks upon; but It is something of this sort, he goes on to say, that is beyond all essence, unutterable and inexplicable, but alone honourable and good, coming suddenly into souls well-dispositioned, on account of their affinity to and desire of seeing Him.'¹³⁷

A few lines later Justin states that συγγένεια between God and us, is 'the soul also divine and immortal, and a part of that very regal mind' (ἡ ψυχὴ θεία καὶ ἀθάνατός ἐστι καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ βασιλικοῦ νοῦ μέρος).¹³⁸ Justin does not intend to establish 'kinship' between soul as a part of divine *Nous* and God, as Plato does. Soul is not divine and immortal, but created and corruptible and as such cannot be ontological (συγγένεια) between God and man.

The soul assuredly is or has life. If, then, it is life, it would cause something else, and not itself, to live, even as motion would move something else than itself. Now, that the soul lives, no one would deny. But if it lives, it lives not as being life, but as the partaker of life; but that which partakes of anything, is different from that of which it does partake. Now the soul partakes of life, since God wills it to live. Thus, then, it will not even partake [of life] when God does not will it to live.¹³⁹

The idea of soul as τοῦ βασιλικοῦ νοῦ μέρος is replaced by idea of soul as μεθέξις τῆς ζωῆς. By denying the pre-existence of the soul which possesses immediate insight into God's essence, Justin abandons the concept of a natural capacity to gain knowledge of God. In his second Apology, Justin introduces another συγγένεια.

For each man spoke well in proportion to the share he had of the spermatik word, seeing what was related to it (ἕκαστος γάρ τις ἀπὸ μέρους τοῦ σπερματικοῦ θείου λόγου τὸ συγγενὲς ὁρῶν καλῶς ἐφθέγγετο).¹⁴⁰

Traditional interpretations of this passage claim that Justin employs the Stoic and Middle-Platonic ideas of συγγένεια and μέρος to describe the relationship between

¹³⁶ Justin, *Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo*, 3, 7.

¹³⁷ Justin, *Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo*, 4, 1.

¹³⁸ Justin, *Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo*, 4, 2.

¹³⁹ Justin, *Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo*, 6, 1.

¹⁴⁰ Justin, *Apologia II*, 13, 3.

Logos as a source of knowledge, and the human mind as inherently rational. Using the term 'sowing *Logos*' (λόγος σπερματικός), Justin describes *Logos* as a Sower, who 'sows the seed' in the human mind. Thus the 'seeds of *Logos*' (σπέρμα τοῦ λόγου) are implants in human beings, which directs them to work and to think according to *Logos*. Justin supports this idea, claiming that Christ 'was partially known even by Socrates for He was and is the Word who is in every man'¹⁴¹. But, does this mean that Justin reintroduces the idea of a natural affinity between God and man, which he had abandoned in his *Dialogue with Tripho the Jew*? As we have seen above, Justin strictly denies any natural kinship between God and soul, and the possibility of an immediate knowledge of God. Does this mean that Justin changed his attitude in his *Apologies* by claiming Greek philosophy as a means of reaching a partial knowledge of God? The ideas of 'sowing *Logos*' and 'seeds of *Logos*' should be considered in light of the coherence of Justin's thought. We must have on mind that Justin is not a philosophical syncretist, but a traditional thinker. If Greek philosophers borrowed their teachings from Moses, their philosophies contain the seeds of truth.

And whatever both philosophers and poets have said concerning the immortality of the soul, or punishments after death, or contemplation of things heavenly, or doctrines of the like kind, they have received such suggestions from the prophets as have enabled them to understand and interpret these things. And hence there seem to be seeds of truth among all men.¹⁴²

Justin does not think in terms of two opposed world-views - Greek philosophy and Old Testament faith. For him it much more a matter of only one faith, transmitted by Moses, and then adopted by Greek philosophers.

Thus, the idea of *Logos spermatikos* should not be considered in the light of similar concepts developed in Stoicism and Middle-Platonism, because Justin does not maintain 'seeds of *Logos*' as a natural property implanted in human minds. Some scholars have already shown that searching in the contemporary philosophies for the source of Justin's doctrine of *logos spermatikos* is futile¹⁴³. It will be convenient to look at Edwards'¹⁴⁴ explanation of the question of real meaning of Justin's theory of 'sowing *Logos*' and 'seeds of the *Logos*'. The Stoic concept of *logoi spermatikoi*,

¹⁴¹ Justin, *Apologia II*, 10, 8.

¹⁴² Justin, *Apologia I*, 44, 9-10.

¹⁴³ R. Holte, *Logos Spermatikos*, 145-6; also in Carl Andersen, 'Justin und der mittlere Platonismus', *ZNTW* 44, 1952-3, 157-195

¹⁴⁴ M.J. Edwards, 'Justin's *Logos* and the Word of God', *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 3.3, 1995, pp. 261-80, esp. p. 275.

apart from their use in the plural, has a completely different context of human moral potential. Edwards emphasises that Stoics and Platonists in their theory accented the potential of seed to grow. Thus, any explanation of Justin's *logos* in the light of Stoic theory should underline the nature of the implanted *sperma* as a vehicle of enlightenment, which is not the case. A possible solution is that Justin applies the term *logos spermatikos* to Christ, having in mind the parable of the Sower who sows the Word of God¹⁴⁵. Thus, the accent is much more on the activity of sowing as implanting something which does not already exist. The vehicle of enlightenment is the words of Scripture, which are sown by *Logos Spermatikos*, who is Christ.

Justin showed that people do not have immediate knowledge of the *Logos* of God, denying again the natural affinity between God and man. He preserves the transcendence of God. The God of Justin remains confined to Middle-Platonistic patterns. Justin distinguishes God the Creator from the God who appeared to Abraham, Jacob and Moses.

Moses, then, the blessed and faithful servant of God, declares that He who appeared to Abraham under the oak in Mamre is God, sent with the two angels in His company to judge Sodom by Another who remains ever in the supercelestial places, invisible to all men, holding personal intercourse with none, whom we believe to be Maker and Father of all things.¹⁴⁶

The concept of God as ineffable being does not allow Justin to identify God the Creator with the God who appeared in the world. Thus, Justin introduces a 'second God', or Jesus Christ as *Logos* of God, who reveals God to the world. Christ is distinct from the Creator 'numerically, not in the will'¹⁴⁷. It is obvious that Justin undermines the divinity of the Son. This subordinationism has the result of endangering the divine economy, because God and man remain remote from each other. The gap between them is filled, not with a number of beings subordinated one to another as in contemporary philosophies of the time, but with the *Logos* of God. Justin numbers all forms in which *Logos* of God appeared in the world.

The Word of God is His Son, as we have before said. And He is called Angel and Apostle; for He declares whatever we ought to know, and is sent forth to declare whatever is revealed... But so much is written for the sake of proving that Jesus the Christ is the Son of God and His Apostle, being of old the Word, and appearing sometimes in the form of fire, and sometimes in the likeness of angels; but now, by the will of God, having become man for the human race... become Man by a virgin, according to the counsel of the Father, for the salvation of those who believe on Him, He endured both to be

¹⁴⁵ *Mat.* 13, 3 also in *James* I, 21

¹⁴⁶ Justin, *Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo*, 56, 4.

¹⁴⁷ Justin, *Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo*, 56, 11.

set at nought and to suffer, that by dying and rising again He might conquer death.¹⁴⁸

The last form in the history of revelation, which *Logos* of God has taken, is human. But the history of revelation is not fulfilled with the earthly life of Jesus Christ, his crucifixion and his resurrection. Justin mentions Christ's second appearance.

Some have reference to the first advent of Christ, in which He is preached as inglorious, obscure, and of mortal appearance: but others had reference to His second advent, when He shall appear in glory and above the clouds.¹⁴⁹

What does Justin have in mind referring to the 'second advent'? Do his words reflect an eschatological perspective, which is common in the early centuries after Christ? Unfortunately, this is not the case. Rather, Justin perceives the 'second coming' as just another event in the history of revelation. Thus, the *Logos* of God is inevitably linked to the world and is temporally confined. We can speak about the *Logos* of Justin in terms of temporalising God. Thus, for Justin the incarnation of *Logos* is just one episode in the long history of God's presence in the world, a history which is not yet completed.

Professor Behr¹⁵⁰ rightly emphasises that the 'first advent' of Christ for Justin has no significance on the plane of the redemption and salvation of humankind. For Justin, Christ's role as teacher is much more important.

Brief and concise utterances (βραχεῖς δὲ καὶ σύντομοι λόγοι) fell from Him, for He was no sophist, but His word was the power of God (ἀλλὰ δύναμις θεοῦ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ ἦν).¹⁵¹

Underlining Christ's role as teacher Justin identifies the words from the scripture and the scriptural Christ. This identification of revealer and revelation inseparably mingles the role of the *Logos* of God, who conveys the message with the message itself.

We can conclude that the history of applying the term *logos* exclusively to Jesus Christ begins with Justin. Thus, Justin's *logos* is not the rational principle of Stoics or world-soul of Plato, but the scriptural Christ. But at the same time his *logos* remains a lesser God, subordinate to the Father and placed in the world and defined as within time.

Representing Justin as a Helleniser is to underestimate both his role as a biblical thinker and his achievement in *logos*-theology. But as Professor Chadwick pointed

¹⁴⁸ Justin, *Apologia* I, 63, 4-16.

¹⁴⁹ Justin, *Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo*, 14, 8.

¹⁵⁰ John Behr, *The Way to Nicaea*, (SVS, Crestwood, New York, 2001.), p. 105.

out: 'For the Platonist to accept Christianity, as Justin himself has done, is no revolutionary step involving a radical rejection of his earlier world-view'¹⁵².

2. The Pious Intellectual; Clement of Alexandria

The first two centuries were a period in which the Christian Church had to struggle for her existence, resisting attacks by political rulers and, at an intellectual level, those of educated pagans, who considered the new religion predominant only among slaves and ignorant women (Celsus is perhaps the most famous case). The apologists of the Christian faith did not show too much determination in encouraging a closer relationship between the two cultures. On the contrary, their attitude towards the Greeks was one of suspicion and even hostility, and their tendency was more to emphasise the discontinuity which existed between the two worlds, rather than to wish their reconciliation¹⁵³.

Alexandria was the centre of many religious and philosophical schools in the first centuries after Christ. The differing cultural and religious influences created a variety of syncretistic teachings. Philo's teaching was produced in the process of the Hellenisation of Judaism. Clement of Alexandria was among the first Christian writers to have the courage to recognise openly the achievements of Greek culture and to use it in a deep synthesis of Christian and Hellenic thinking. He started the process of Hellenisation not of Judaism but of Christianity. His intention was not only to defend and to justify Christian beliefs and to convert educated pagans to Christianity by harmonising Greek philosophy with the Christian world-view, but also to transform religious faith into a philosophical system.

In Clement's works, we find a different picture of the pagan world, one which values what he considers the good in non-Christian thought. Being both a Greek and a Christian, he tried to bring together his cultural and religious ideals¹⁵⁴. Always questing for true knowledge, Clement of Alexandria built a clear and powerful idea of the development of the spiritual life. Convinced that truth is a unity, he also considered that the history of the truth must be one, and in no way exclusive or applying only to Christians. According to Clement's point of view, there was not a strong opposition between Hellenism and Christianity, especially because both of them participate in absolute truth. He wrote:

¹⁵¹ Justin, *Apologia I*, 14, 5.

¹⁵² Henry Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition*, p. 12.

¹⁵³ Henry Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition*, p. 35.

There is only one way of truth, but different paths from different places join it, just like tributaries flowing into a perennial river.¹⁵⁵

Therefore, he rejected nothing achieved for the benefit of human knowledge before the coming of Christ. Moreover, he integrated the Greek and the Jewish cultures in his conception of the evolution of the spiritual life, considering them both as a *propaideia*¹⁵⁶ to the Christianity, the true knowledge. He wanted all his work to reflect this majestic conception that he held about true knowledge, which leads man to God. Most important, he wanted to show that in our way through life we are never alone. Therefore, in the first chapter of *Pedagogos*, he distinguishes between the divine *Logos* as *Protreptikos*, *Pedagogos* and *Didaskalos*, each of them relevant to a certain level of human spiritual development. *Protreptikos* invites men to salvation. The *Pedagogos* will refine their moral conduct, cleansing their passions, and finally the *Didaskalos* will teach the true gnosis to those who are worthy to receive it¹⁵⁷. This scenario of divine activity is reflected in his most important works considered by some scholars to form a trilogy: *Protreptikos*, *Pedagogos* and *Stromateis*. Some argue that the final part of this trilogy is not *Stromateis*, but another work that Clement intended to entitle *Didaskalos*¹⁵⁸. Greek culture is discussed a great deal in *Protreptikos* where it is both frequently criticised and also praised for catching a glimpse of the truth. A large part of *Stromateis* deals with the same subject and because of this its correspondence with the third description of the activity of *Logos*, the *Didaskalos*¹⁵⁹, has been doubted.

As we have seen above, all human life in Clement's view is marked by the seal of the *Logos*, and by discovering traces of divine inspiration in pagan culture, Clement is ready to accept what is good in it.

One of the paths to gain the truth, apart from 'prophets' and 'advent', is Greek philosophy. Clement maintains that the Greek philosophers are able to discover true

¹⁵⁴ Claude Mondésert, *Introduction*, in Clément d'Alexandrie, *Le Protreptique*, Sources Chrétiennes, Paris, Editions du Cerf, 1949.

¹⁵⁵ Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, I. 5.29, 1; in Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, (books one to three, translated by John Ferguson, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1991.) And Ante-Nicene Christian Library, volume XII, translated by William Wilson, edited by A. Roberts and J. Donaldson, Edinburgh, London, 1867.

¹⁵⁶ Werner, Jaeger, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia*, (London, Oxford University Press, 1962.)

¹⁵⁷ Clément d'Alexandrie, *Le Pédagogue*, tome I, (Paris, Cerf, 1960).

¹⁵⁸ Eric Osborn, *The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria*, Cambridge, University Press, 1956, p.

12

¹⁵⁹ E. Osborn, *The philosophy of Clement of Alexandria*,

doctrines through a 'common human mind' (κοινὸς νοῦς)¹⁶⁰, which is a gift from God, or by divine inspiration, which comes from *Logos*.

Clement gives two other explanations why Greek philosophy is a good way to gain the truth about God. The first maintains that Greek philosophy is beneficial because Greek philosophers have 'stolen' their doctrines from the Old Testament and Moses¹⁶¹. For Clement there was no doubt that Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato had read the Bible:

Pythagoras, and Socrates, and Plato say that they hear God's voice while closely contemplating the fabric of the universe, made and preserved unceasingly by God. For they heard Moses say, 'He said, and was done,' describing the word of God as an act.¹⁶²

The second theory¹⁶³ of the origins of Greek philosophy claims that philosophy is divine property 'stolen' from God by powers or angels who transmitted it to man. This Greek philosophy serves to prepare Greeks for reception of the more perfect Christian philosophy.

...that philosophy includes questions concerning truth and the nature of the universe (the truth of which the Lord himself says, 'I am the truth') τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ζήτησιν ἔχειν περὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως (ἀλήθεια δὲ αὕτη, περὶ ἧς ὁ κύριος αὐτὸς εἶπεν "ἐγὼ εἰμι ἡ ἀλήθεια") (John 14, 6.)¹⁶⁴

Identifying truth with divine *Logos*, Clement maintains the old Greek concept of the Divine, which dates from the pre-Socratic period. In this conception, remarks Werner Jaeger, it claims 'the bold identification of the Divine (τὸ θεῖον) with nature' (ἡ φύσις)¹⁶⁵. In Clement's fragments, which are preserved in the writings of Maximus the Confessor, nature is identified with the truth of things (φύσις ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀλήθεια)¹⁶⁶. Clement replaces the Greek ideal of knowledge of the eternal and unchangeable things with the knowledge of God. We find a good example of this in one of the most cited quotations of Clement.

Could we, then, suppose any one proposing to the Gnostic whether he would choose the knowledge of God or everlasting salvation; and if these, which are entirely identical, were separable, he would without the least hesitation

¹⁶⁰ Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, I, 19, 94, 2.

¹⁶¹ Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, I, 15-28.

¹⁶² Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, V, 14.

¹⁶³ Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, s VII, 6, 4.

¹⁶⁴ Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, I, 5, 32, 4.

¹⁶⁵ Jaeger Werner, *The Theology of Early Greek Philosophers*, At the Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1947, p. 203

¹⁶⁶ Maximus Confessoris, *Opuscula Theologica et Polemica*, 254, PG 91

choose the knowledge of God, deeming that property of faith, which from love ascends to knowledge, desirable, for its own sake.¹⁶⁷

The knowledge of God is the highest bliss and this is the exclusive right of the Gnostic, who is a perfect Christian and who lives in constant communion with God. The only link to the knowledge and contemplation of God is through the intellectual faculty or through the mind: 'For he who hopes, as he who believes, sees intellectual objects and future things with the mind'¹⁶⁸.

Clement distinguishes between knowing *Logos* and knowing God. His intention is to preserve God's transcendence. God is the first principle and by nature remote from us. Divine transcendence implies that he is beyond human intellect. Being unknowable God is also ineffable. He is unlimited and beyond naming. Clement identifies God with *Nous*. This identification has its origins in the teaching of Ammonius Saccas and in that of the main branches of Neoplatonism represented by Origen the Neoplatonist and by Hierokles. For them *Nous* is the highest being and this approach distinguishes them from Plotinus who places 'one' above *Nous*. God reveals himself to us through *Logos*. The Divine *Logos* is the way to God, because *Logos* is the image of God, and 'the *Logos* is contemplated by the mind'¹⁶⁹.

Like Justin, Clement uses *Logos* as a medium between God and man. *Logos* is applied to the Son of God, who is the image of God. Clement needs the identification of God with Mind in order to institute *logos* as the faculty of reason. He actually wants to show that God is the source of all rationality. *Logos* of God has a creative role because 'the Word issuing forth was the cause of creation'¹⁷⁰. Thus, man has been made as an image of *Logos* and that likeness is reflected in human rationality:

For the image of God is the divine and royal Word, the impassible man; and the image of the image is the human mind.¹⁷¹

The divine *Logos* conveys the particles of *logos* in human minds. Clement like Justin uses the same biblical parable of the Sower for *Logos*:

There is only one cultivator of human beings. It is one who from the first, from the foundation of universe, has been sowing the seeds with potential growth, who has produced rain on every appropriate occasion in the form of sovereign Word.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁷ Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, IV, 22

¹⁶⁸ Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, V, 3

¹⁶⁹ Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, V, 3

¹⁷⁰ Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, V, 3.

¹⁷¹ Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, V, 14.

¹⁷² Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, I, 7, 37, 2.

The seeds, which are dropped like a shower from heaven by *Logos*, inspire Greek philosophers. According to this theory human reason is imitation of divine *Logos*¹⁷³. The description of *Logos* in Clement we will follow Salvatore Lilla¹⁷⁴. In his exceptional book about Clement, Lilla detects three phases or three forms of *Logos*. In the first phase *Logos* is totality of divine powers or the realm of intelligibilia, in the second cosmological principle or *arche*, and in third the cosmocratic and hegemonic wisdom of God in the world. In the first phase or stage *Logos* is one with God and it represents the mind of God. The God of Clement characterises noetical activity. God thinks, and the results of his thinking are thoughts or ideas. *Logos* is the mind of God and the realm of ideas. Ideas exist only in mind, which is their source. Clement maintains the transcendence of God even in the state of unity. God remains beyond *Logos*. But the transcendence of God does not mean complete discontinuity between *Logos* and God.

For both are one - that is, God. For He has said, 'In the beginning the Word was in God, and the Word was God' (ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου· ἐν γὰρ ἄμφω, ὁ θεός, ὅτι εἶπεν "ἐν ἀρχῇ ὁ λόγος ἦν ἐν τῷ θεῷ, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος")(John I, 1).¹⁷⁵

In the second stage, *Logos* comes out from God and becomes a being distinct from Him. He creates the world according to ideas, which are in his possession. Clement uses the term idea only when referring to Plato and his doctrine of ideas. He speaks much more about powers, considering them as fulfilling the function of Plato's forms¹⁷⁶.

Logos is a plurality in unity because it contains future beings, which are still undivided. This totality of powers or ideas of God, Clement calls *monas*.

All the powers of the Spirit, becoming collectively one thing, terminate in the same point - that is, in the Son. But He is incapable of being declared, in respect of the idea of each one of His powers. And the Son is neither simply one thing as one thing, nor many things as parts, but one thing as all things; whence also He is all things. For He is the circle of all powers rolled and united into one unity.¹⁷⁷

Logos as the second hypostasis forms κόσμος νόητος which is a unity, comprehending everything in it. *Logos* is *arche* or the principle of the sensible

¹⁷³ Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, I, 4, 26-27.

¹⁷⁴ Salvatore Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, (Oxford University Press, 1971.), pp. 199-212

¹⁷⁵ Clement of Alexandria, *Pedagogues*, I, 8, 62, 4.

¹⁷⁶ E. Osborn; *The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria*, p. 41

¹⁷⁷ Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, IV, 25, 156, 1-2.

world. *Logos* is the instrument of divine activity and the pattern according to which the world will be made.

And since the un-originated Being is one, the Omnipotent God; one, too, is the First-begotten, "by whom all things were made, and without whom not one thing ever was made." "For one, in truth, is God, who formed the beginning of all things; "pointing out "the first-begotten Son," Peter writes, accurately comprehending the statement, "In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth." And He is called Wisdom by all the prophets. This is He who is the Teacher of all created beings, the Fellow-counsellor of God, who foreknew all things; and He from above, from the first foundation of the world, "in many ways and many times," trains and perfects; whence it is rightly said, "Call no man your teacher on earth."¹⁷⁸

The third stage *Logos* of God is the divine wisdom, which is present in the world and governs it. This is the last phase of *Logos* in the process of 'descending' to the world. *Logos* is the cause of order in the world and the supreme law of the universe.

For the image of God is His Word, the genuine Son of Mind, the Divine Word, the archetypal light of light; and the image of the Word is true man, the mind which is in man, who is therefore said to have been made 'in the image and likeness of God', assimilated to the Divine Word in the affections of the soul and therefore rational.¹⁷⁹

Lilla's theory about three stages in the 'life' of *Logos* is not generally adopted by scholars. Thus Osborn argues that Clement's main works do not give a clear two- or three-stage doctrine of the 'emergence' of *Logos*¹⁸⁰. One of the reasons why Clement does not give a more defined theory of *Logos* lies in the very nature of *Logos*. The problem which arises for Christians in the first centuries is how to reconcile the relation between *Logos* as the knowable aspect of God, and *Logos* as agent in itself, capable of becoming identified with a specific material individual. In spite of the fact that Clement avoids this problem it is discernible that he establishes a sort of duality between eternal 'immanent' *logos* and a personalised subject which comes into existence as 'the first born of all creation'.

Clement rejects the conception of Stoics and the later conception of Valentinus, according to which the eternal Word of God begets spoken utterance in every man:

For the word of the Father of the universe is not the uttered word, but the wisdom and most manifest kindness of God, and His power too, which is almighty and truly divine, and not incapable of being conceived by those who do not confess - the all potent will (ὁ γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὄλων

¹⁷⁸ Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, VI, 7, 58, 1.

¹⁷⁹ Clement of Alexandria, *Protreptikus*, 10,79 (in Ante-Nicene Christian Library, volume IV, translated by A. Roberts and J. Donaldson, Edinburgh, London, 1867., p. 91.)

¹⁸⁰ E. Osborn, *The Beginning of Christian Philosophy*, (Cambridge, 1981.), p. 242.

λόγος οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ προφορικός, σοφία δὲ καὶ χρηστότης φανερω
τάτη τοῦ θεοῦ δύναμις τε αὐτῆς παγκρατῆς...¹⁸¹

Clement is against the Valentinian tendency to fragment the divine realm, dividing it into distinct substances. They thought that God begets 'The Male', who is the Only Begotten, Mind and Truth and second after God. The Male then generates, does not create, the angelic seeds. Angelic seeds as children of the Male emanate from the 'spiritual seeds' which are implanted in us. This flow of reality from God down to human beings simply diminishes the fundamental ontological difference between God and the world. Clement abandons such a view, emphasising a stronger unity between Father and Son, and the difference between the Son and the world. Clement denies that the faculty of reason is transferred from the God to the *Logos* of God, and also from the *Logos* to man, as the Valentinians would have it. The means of correspondence between *Logos* and man is the mind in the man or the faculty of the reasoning soul. This does not mean that the distinction between God and *Logos* is the same kind of distinction as between *Logos* and man. Clement rejects the conception of 'seeds' of reason, which are granted as a natural capacity, and any kind of natural kinship between God and man through *Logos*. Thus the knowledge of the first principles issues in faith, which is the product of free will. The affirmation of free will on the part of divine, as well as in humanity, is Clement's great achievement. God is not obliged to reveal or save, yet he does so. We are all also free to be disobedient to God, as well as to overcome this state by voluntary penitence.

In the final analysis, it is difficult to know the exact meaning of *Logos* in Clement. Is he subsistent eternally distinct from God, or the impersonal function of the Father, or something else? As with Justin, we can conclude that Clement perceives *Logos* as a manifestation accidental to the 'real' life of *Logos*, which is in God. But we need to underline that one of positive contributions of Clement's theology, probably the most important one, is the concept of the centrality of freedom, divine and human, in any proper theological account of God's dealing with the world¹⁸².

3. The cosmological convenience; Origen

The Alexandrian school yields another great thinker of early Church, Origen. His thought had had a spring from which many orthodox thinkers as well as heretics

¹⁸¹ Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, V, 1.

¹⁸² Rowan Williams, *Arius; Heresy and Tradition*, (SCM Press, London, 2001.), pp. 124-131.

drunk. The fifth ecumenical council condemned Origen's thought in some points. In the same time Origen's Trinitarian theology was used in the disputes with Arius. Origen made an attempt to establish a system based on dogmas, without rejection of anything that the Church professes. But, his interpretation of Christian tradition was merely on the philosophical manner, according to the Middle-Platonic systems.

We will start with the most controversial part of his teaching, the doctrine of the pre-existence of souls. Origen teaches that there was the unity of the limited number of rational beings with God, which pre-existed from all eternity. The rational beings or τὰ λογικά participated in God's essence before commencement of the world. The original monad consisted of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, the Angels, the Powers, the Dominions, and the Virtues, including man also. The characteristic of rational beings was freedom and mutability. In that monad all rational beings, including the Holy Trinity were equal¹⁸³ in accordance to their free choice. The difference between God and other rational beings was the mutability of the latter. According to their free will, consisting in the choice between good and evil, the rational beings are capable of movement toward God. This movement broke the monistic structure of original unity.

This is the so called second creation or the creation in time. Origen describes this in the following way:

A reason for removal will consist in the movements of souls not being conducted according to right and propriety. For the Creator gave, as an indulgence to the understandings created by Him, the power of free and voluntary action, by which the good that was in them might become their own, being preserved by the exertion of their own will; but slothfulness, and a dislike of labour in preserving what is good, and an aversion to and a neglect of better things, furnished the beginning of a departure from goodness. But to depart from good is nothing else than to be made bad. For it is certain that to want goodness is to be wicked. Whence it happens that, in proportion as one falls away from goodness, in the same proportion does he become involved in wickedness. In which condition, according to its actions, each understanding, neglecting goodness either to a greater or more limited extent, was dragged into the opposite of good, which undoubtedly is evil. From which it appears that the Creator of all things admitted certain seeds and causes of variety and diversity, that He might create variety and diversity in proportion to the diversity of understandings, i.e., of rational creatures, which diversity they must be supposed to have conceived from that cause which we have mentioned above.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³ Jean Danielou, *Origen*, (translated by Walter Mitchell, Shed and Ward, London, New York, 1955.), p. 206.

¹⁸⁴ Origen, *On the First Principles*, II, 9, 2 (being Koetschau's Text of the *De principiis* translated into English by G.W. Butterworth, London, 1936.)

The second creation of universe is the consequence of the fall of rational being. The punishment of God was in dependence of the degree in which the rational beings have moved from God. Thus, some beings who sinned less became the Archangels and Angels and those who sinned heavily became the demons. The man sinned more than Angels and Archangels, but less than demons. For a punishment his soul was bounded with physical body and he was settled in the material world.

There are two theories about the cause of the movement. According to the first the fall of the rational beings was caused by the surfeit (κόρος) of the divine vision. Another explanation is etymological. Origen states that minds lost their rational character in their fall from God. Through the process of cooling (ψυχρινός) from the zeal toward God, minds or intellects became souls (ψυχῆς)¹⁸⁵. Ten years before the Fifth ecumenical council Justinian in his letter to Mennas exposes both ways of explanation.

Souls of man pre-exist, insofar as being first minds, but having a surfeit of the divine vision and turned to the worse and therefore being cooled with regard to the love of God and hence being named souls and sent down into bodies for punishment's sake – let him be anathema.¹⁸⁶

This point of Origen's teaching was criticised a lot and the Fifth ecumenical council condemned it. The name of Origen is mentioned only as an ancestor of *Isochristes*, to whom is originally addressed the anathema.

Origen's idea of rational beings that existed before the world can be interpreted in different ways. But the real matter of the question is why Origen really needs this hypothesis. Is he deeply influenced by Platonism that he could not avoid the theory of the world of ideas? He could not find the support for this theory in Scripture. Why did then he develop such a system and what are the origins of this idea.

The foundation of Origen's teaching is a response to Gnostic ideas of predestination. According to Gnostic teaching there are different kinds of human beings, each of them destined to their own particular fate¹⁸⁷. Origen distinguishes between the first creation or κτίσις, which refers to a primordial 'heaven and earth' (from Genesis I, 1¹⁸⁸), and *cosmos* which refer to the world in the fallen state, which is created in time. The first world of rational spirits was created by the will of God and out of his

¹⁸⁵ J.W. Trigg, Origen, SCM Press, London, 1983., p. 107, and Louth, A, The Origins of Christian Mystical Tradition,(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981.), p. 61

¹⁸⁶ Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum (ed. Schwartz) III, 191; III, 213.

¹⁸⁷ Origen, On the First Principles, I, 6, 2; I, 8, 2; II, 1, 1-2.

¹⁸⁸ Origen, Com. In Ioan, II, 96, 169, 18 – 170, 17.

own goodness¹⁸⁹. The first principle on which is based existence of rational beings is equality. According to J. Danielou, Origen developed this theory to explain diversity of the world, which was the result of free will of rational beings. For Origen it was illogical that the Creator apart of the reason and merits gave to certain created beings superior position than to the others. He found that:

The cause of the diversity and variety among these beings is shown to be derived not from any unfairness on the part of the Disposer but their own action, which exhibit varying degrees of earnestness or laxity according to the goodness or badness of each.¹⁹⁰

The beings created at the beginning as equal, using their voluntary choice and freedom gained a certain state in the movement from God. Thus, the diversity of nature has its root in the diversity of choice and free will. Origen's theory of pre-existence is just his attempt to solve the problem of diversity in the world and to defend the Creator. It was mainly a reply on the attacks of Marcionites, who were accusing God for the injustice, in regard to inequality of the created beings. And, it was also a reply to Valentinian theory of the different kinds of souls. Thus, two main principles of cosmology of Origen, according to Danielou¹⁹¹ are that free nature necessarily implies the mutability of beings and that the diversity of natures is rooted in the diversity of choice.

Cosmos is then the world of diversity, which is the result of the variable wills of creatures. According to Origen the world we know is not 'created' by God, but is conditioned by the choices of its creatures. The consequence of this fall is that certain souls descended into their bodies. Thus, Origen reconciles the inequality of human fate and affirms the justice of God.

The surfeit was a reason for the fall of rational beings from God. But, one of pre-existed souls did not fall from God.

By reason of free-will, variety and diversity had taken hold of the individual souls, so one was attached to its author with a warmer and another with a feebler and weaker love, that soul of which Jesus said 'No man taketh from me my soul', clinging to God from the beginning of creation and after a union inseparable and indissoluble, as being the soul of the wisdom and word of God and the truth and the true light, and receiving him wholly, and itself entering into his light and splendour, was made with him in pre-eminent degree of spirit, just as apostle promises to them whose duty it is to imitate Jesus, that 'he who is joined to the Lord in one spirit'. This soul, then, acting as a medium between God and flesh (for it was not possible for the nature of God to mingle with the body apart some medium), there is

¹⁸⁹ Origen, *On the First Principles*, , II, 9, 6.

¹⁹⁰ Origen, *On the First Principles*, I, 8, 2.

¹⁹¹ Jean Danielou, *Origen*, p. 214.

born, as we said, the God-man, the medium being that existence to whose nature it was not contrary to assume a body.¹⁹²

The soul of Jesus is by nature mutable, like all other souls. But the free will of Jesus' soul remains directed to the good and its choice becomes natural to it. Thus, the soul of Jesus is transformed by God. Origen uses Stoic images of iron and fire, which describe the transformation of iron in the fire¹⁹³. The human soul of Jesus was attached to the *Logos* with mystical devotion and Jesus 'becomes' for us one who exercises the royal power of *logos*¹⁹⁴. It does not mean that Jesus possesses all powers of *logos* by nature, but rather that Jesus remains the recipient of the grace of the divine Son in all his fullness. Christ is one of the manifestations of *logos*, which is indistinguishable from *logos*¹⁹⁵ in the economy of revelation. Williams points out that 'the soul of Jesus is still the paradigm for the relation of the rational beings to the *Logos*, as the *Logos* himself is the paradigm of relation to the Father'¹⁹⁶. Following Williams we can conclude that *christoi* are coming into existence by union with *Christos* in the same way in which we became *logikoi* in *Logos*.

The unity of *Logos* and Jesus Christ became the unity of all creation or the world of τὰ λογικά. The rational beings or τὰ λογικά are λογικά by reason of their participation in *Logos*. They are partakers of the *Logos* of God because they have implanted seeds of reason and *Logos* is the principle of reason.

The Son of God or 'the very *Logos* and wisdom and truth itself'¹⁹⁷ is the intelligible world of ideas and reasons, which are contained in Him. The influences of Stoic theory according to which *Logos* is everywhere in the cosmos and τὰ λογικά are sharers of his rational properties are evident in this place. Origen writes

In this Wisdom, therefore, who ever existed with the Father, the Creation was always present in the form and outline, and there was never a time when the pre-figuration of those things which hereafter were to be did not exist in Wisdom.¹⁹⁸

The Son of God as a *Logos* is the instrument of God in Creation and through Him the ideas and reasons, which are in Him as Wisdom become concrete beings. 'These rational beings, were made in the beginning, were made when before they did not

¹⁹² Origen, *On the First Principles*, II, 6, 3.

¹⁹³ Origen, *On the First Principles*, II, 6, 5-6.

¹⁹⁴ Origen, *Com. In. Ioan.* I, 28, 35 16-21.

¹⁹⁵ Origen, *On the First Principles*, II, 6, 3-6; *Contra Celsum*, IV, 68, 138, 11-17.

¹⁹⁶ Rowan Williams, *Arius; Heresy and Tradition*, SCM Press, London, 2001. p. 146.

¹⁹⁷ Origen, *Contra Celsum*, III, 41 (translated by Henry Chadwick, University Press, Cambridge, 1953.)

¹⁹⁸ Origen, *On the First Principles*, I, 4, 4;

exist, by this very fact that they did not exist and then began to exist they are of necessity subject to change and alternation¹⁹⁹. But did Origen fall in this trap of embedding theology deeply in cosmology?

If we look just at Origen's theory of *Logos* in its relationship with the cosmos we can conclude that Origen's thought is entirely dependent on the existing tradition. From this point of view Origen is nothing more than a philosopher who deals with existing philosophical material, as some scholars intend to show. Thus, his *logos* is envisaged in the relation to the cosmos.

According to another scholar Henry Crouzel²⁰⁰, who devoted all his life to the study of Origen's work, one of the principles of the Origen's cosmology is that at the end is like at the beginning. The similarity between beginning and the end is in the unity of all in God rather than the equality of all. From this notion we can conclude that equality of beings is not a main theme of Origen's concern. Thus, all creation at the end will be freely submitted to God. The whole conception of *apokatastasis* or the universal restoration puts in question the free will of created beings to submit themselves to God. Therefore Origen gives to *Logos* the main role in the *apokatastasis* as well as in the creation. The Son of God as *Logos* needs to persuade the created beings without violation of their free will. The submission of the created being to the God and attaining the union with God is return in the same state as it was in pre-existence. At the same time, the submission of the entire creation to the Son is the condition of the subjection of Son to the Father²⁰¹. This theory of Origen raises some questions about the nature of the relationship between the Father and the Son, or the *Logos* of God and the Godhead. The relationship between the Father and the Son has the essential importance because it is the ground for the relationship between God and the creation.

It was a widely spread attitude that Origen through the idea of the superiority of the Father to the *Logos* falls into subordinationism. The few expressions, according to which the Son is a second God²⁰², or that Son is just 'the image of God's goodness'²⁰³ lead us to conclude that the nature of the Son is less divine than the nature of the Father. If Son as *Logos* is just a sharer of Divinity and not absolute possessor, his nature is different from the nature of the Father and He must be subordinated to the Father. There are many places in Origen's work, which give

¹⁹⁹ Origen, *On the First Principles*, II, 9, 2;

²⁰⁰ Henry Crouzel, *Origen*, (T.&T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1989.), p. 205

²⁰¹ Origen, *On the First Principles*, III, 5, 6-7

²⁰² Origen, *Contra Celsum*, V, 39; VI, 61; VII, 57

support for such assertion. But, what is the real nature of the subordinationism in Origen?

We say that the Saviour and the Holy Spirit transcend all generated beings, not by comparison, but by absolute transcendence, but that he [the Son] is transcended as much and more by the Father, as he and the Holy Spirit transcend other beings, not just ordinary ones.²⁰⁴

The fact that the Father transcends *Logos* implies his dependence of The Father and his lesser hierarchical rank than one of the Father. But, what does it really mean? Origen's subordinationism arises from the fact that the Father is the source from which the Son is generated and the Holy Spirit proceeded. The higher rank of the Father is the conscience of His initiative role in the Holy Trinity. All these differences in the Holy Trinity do not have the ontological character, but they are the consequences of the different roles of the divine Persons. The role of the Father, according to Origen, is to give life to all creatures. The role of the Son is to confer the natural gift of reason or to make the being λογικός. Finally, the role of the Holy Spirit is to distribute the grace, ministered through the Son and put in operation by the Father. Origen especially draws the conclusion that 'nothing in the Trinity can be called greater and less', and that 'the power in the Trinity is one and same'²⁰⁵. The Son and the Holy Spirit are not less Gods than the Father and the differences in activities are more questions of the divine economy than ontology. The only justification for such superior position of the Father, according to G.L. Prestige²⁰⁶ is that Origen has in mind the 'monarchy' of the Father.

In regard to some passages from the work of Origen one can get impression that Father and Son are different by nature.

Therefore we worship the Father of the truth and the Son who is the truth; they are two distinct existences, but one in mental unity, in agreement, and in identity of will (ὄντα δύο τῆ ὑποστάσει πράγματα, ἐν δὲ τῆ ὁμοιοῖα καὶ τῆ συμφωνίᾳ καὶ τῆ ταυτότητι τοῦ βουλήματος). Thus he who has seen the Son, who is effulgence of the glory and express image of the Person of God, has seen God in him who is God's image.²⁰⁷

According to the previous passage we can get impression that Origen made distinction between the nature of the Father and the nature of the Son. Origen introduces the term hypostasis to describe characteristics of Persons in the Holy

²⁰³ Origen, *Contra Celsum*, V, 11

²⁰⁴ Origen, *Com. In Ioan*, 13, 25, in Joseph W. Trigg, *Origen*, Routledge, London, New York, 1998

²⁰⁵ Origen, *On the First Principles*, I, 3, 7.

²⁰⁶ G.L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought*, London, (Toronto, 1936.), p. 133.

Trinity. The meaning of hypostasis has ontological character and its usage in such a delicate way can indicate the ontological difference between the Divine Persons. By applying the term hypostasis to the Son, Origen broke with previous tradition, which conceived *logos* in conceptual terms (κατ' ἐπινοίαν).

The term *hypostasis* was derived from current philosophical tradition and it was used in the ontological sense, similar to *ousia* in the Platonistic tradition. The meaning of hypostasis is real individual subsistence.

Origen, probably familiar with such usage, first time applies this ontological term to individual and concrete being. Thus, Origen gives to this term a new meaning that follows his intention to move the centre of being from the impersonal substance to the personal God. His attempt unfortunately stayed undeveloped and gives a lot of possibilities for misinterpretations. In the other place Origen shows that the Father and the Son have same nature. Origen writes that:

The Father and the Son are not two, but that together they are one, not only as a nature, but also as a subject, that the names of Father and Son are related to different points of view not to their person (ἐκ τούτων παρίστασθαι μὴ διαφέρειν τῷ ἀριθμῷ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ πατρὸς, ἀλλ' ἐν οὐ μόνον οὐσίᾳ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑποκειμένῳ τυγχάνοντας ἀμφοτέρους, κατὰ τινὰς ἐπινοίας διαφόρους, οὐ κατὰ ὑπόστασιν λέγεσθαι πατέρα καὶ υἱόν).²⁰⁸

As elsewhere, Origen speaks of the Son in terms other than *homoousios*. In *Dialogue with Heraclides*, Origen is clearer about the different subsistence of the Father and the Son. The Son has his 'own' proper *ousia*, distinct from the *ousia* of the Father. The distinct subsistence of the Son is derived from God the Father, rather than from his activity as Creator. The Son receives his entire being from the Father and there is an unbroken continuity between them. Origen establishes the Son's kinship with the Father and it becomes the constitutive element of God's being. The Son is never considered without the Father. The different subsistence of the Son does not mean that the Son is divine in a way different from the Father. Origen affirms that the Father and the Son cannot be identical and possess the same properties. Origen's original intention was to preserve the transcendence of God as a first principle. The Father as a first principle cannot be a member of the same class as the Son and the Holy Spirit, because there will then be more than one first principle. This is the main reason why Origen does not apply *homoousios*. Origen

²⁰⁷ Origen, *Contra Celsum*, VIII, 12.

²⁰⁸ Origen, *Com. In Ioan*, 10, 37, 246.

understood under the term *homoousios* members of a single class, sharing the same properties.

Origen approaches this problem carefully, attacking the Gnostic teaching according to which souls were of one substance with God. The teaching of Heraclitus is that God, being of the same substance as souls, is like them subject to variation and change²⁰⁹. Origen claims that only the Father is 'the one true God' (Jn 17, 3) and he is referred to as 'the God' (ὁ θεός). All other beings called gods are 'made gods by participation in his [Father's] divinity'²¹⁰.

Apart from accusation that the Father and the Son have different natures, Origen is also accused that he does not allow enough difference between *Logos* and the rational beings. The *Logos* is superior to the rational beings because he is the source of rationality in the creation. *Logos* became the principle in which the divine unity is intelligibly mediated in a multiple world.

God is therefore entirely one and simple, but the Saviour, on account of the many –since God 'designated' him 'in advance as a propitiation' (Rom. 3,25) and the first-fruits of all creation – has become many and is doubtless all things that every created being, capable of liberation, has need of from him.²¹¹

First, applying the terms first-fruit of all creation or κτίσμα on *Logos*, Origen does not make clear distinction between generation and creation. But there are another interpretations²¹² according to which the term κτίσις is not strictly used to express created beings, but is applied to everything that comes from God. Second, according to Origen *Logos* or Son came into being by the will of the Father, and in the same time he is identified with the will of the Father. In the first case, when 'the birth from the Father is as it were an act of his will proceeding from the mind'²¹³, must be conceived as a free act of the Father. This free act of the Father should not be interpreted in the categories of human freedom, because then the existence of the Son is completely dependent on the Father's will. The fact that God is Father from all eternity implies that the freedom and the necessity in God are not opposite notions. God as a Father begets his Son from eternity. The second case where the Son is identified with the will of the Father just projects role of the Son as the Father's minister and collaborator.

²⁰⁹ Origen, Comm. In Ioan. 13, 150.

²¹⁰ Origen, Comm. In Ioan. 2, 17.

²¹¹ Origen, Comm. In Ioan. 1, 20.

²¹² Henry Crouzel, Origen, p. 186.

²¹³ Origen, On the First Principles, 1, 2, 6.

The later case is quit clear, but the former originates some interesting solutions. The problem is that generation of the Son is eternal. The fatherhood of God is seen as a continuous and permanent generation of the Son. Origen logically develops his theory. He starts from the notion that God is always the Father of His only-begotten Son. God in the same time always actualises his capacity. The fatherhood of God is projected through eternal generation of the Son. In the same time in the Son as Wisdom is pre-arranged the world of rational beings, created by the Father from eternity. The consequence of these assertions is that creation is co-eternal with God. According to this conception, God's essence is immutable and unchangeable and the rational beings are eternal as a part of God. The key notion in Origen's system is the omnipotence of God.

Now as one cannot be a father apart from having a son, nor a lord apart from holding a possession or a slave, so we cannot even call God almighty if there are none over whom he can exercise his power. Accordingly, to prove that God is almighty we must assume the existence of the universe. For if anyone would have it that certain ages, or periods of time, or whatever he cares to call them, elapsed during which the present creation did not exist, he would undoubtedly prove that in those ages or periods God was not almighty, but that he afterwards became almighty from the time when he began to have creatures over whom he could exercise power. Thus God will apparently have experienced a kind of progress, for there can be no doubt that it is better for him to be almighty than not to be so.²¹⁴

Origen borrows this concept from Middle Platonism, according to which God must always have had a world on which He exercises his power. The problem is in fact that Origen could not think God different than Creator. For Origen it is very difficult to imagine some change in God. The eternal actualisation of God does not leave a room for his potentiality. Therefore Origen deeply roots cosmology in his ontology. The ontological gap between the Creator and creation is overcome by bounding the world closely with God. We do not want to go any further in explaining the system of Origen. Neither do we want to involve in deeper in his theory of the pre-existence of the soul. Even if we adopt the theory, presented by Crouzel that the world created by God is not the world of pre-existed minds but the world of the Platonistic 'ideas' and the Stoic 'reasons', plans and seeds of being pre-arranged in the Son and created by the Father through the eternal generation of his Son, still stays the fact that God needs something to exercise his power. Thus the God of Origen is not absolutely free and he is not released from the 'closed ontology' Greek thinking is based on. The relationship between God and world is based on necessity. Origen's conception

of *Logos* still subsists on the Stoic's theory of *logos* as immanent rational principle. He gives attention largely to the cosmic aspect of the Son as an immanent Thought within the paternal Mind and then as 'uttered in the act of the creation. However *logos* is not only the intermediary between God and the world in the sense of being a 'cosmological convenience', but as bishop Williams states, *logos* is 'the paradigm of our knowing and loving God'²¹⁵.

In spite of the accusation that Origen's thought is 'pressed into the mould of Middle Platonism', he remains the greatest mind of his time and his thought constitutes a clear advance on previous time. Origen was also the common ancestor of the Arian heresy and of Cappadocian orthodoxy. Therefore the attempts to impute to Origen, something which belong to his descendants from the time of the Origenist crisis, are ignorant and stupid.

Unfortunately, the works of Origen have been read largely in the context of heresies. When preconceptions have been laid aside, and Origen studied objectively, it will be found that Christian thought is most indebted to him.

IV The Zenith of Late Antiquity; Plotinus

The development of Christian philosophy did not affect classical thinkers by arousing their interest in Christian themes. Apart from Celsus and Numenius, who were involved in disputes with Christians, the other second century philosophers like Albinus, Atticus, Maximus of Tyre, and Plutarch remain faithful to their great teacher – Plato. Their successor and the greatest thinker among pagan philosophers in late antiquity was Plotinus. His task was not only to preserve and improve Plato's thought, but also to defend his teaching from the attacks of Gnostic and Christian philosophers. Plotinus succeeded in his task, not only reviving interest in pagan philosophy in the great length but also influencing his opponents. It is simply impossible to deny the influence of Plotinus and his successors, usually known as Neoplatonists, on Christian thought.

Plotinus left a written work, called *Enneads*. Edited by Plotinus' disciple Porphyry, it consisted of fifty-four treatises, arranged according to theme into six sets of nine treatises – hence its name, the Greek for "nine". Although Plotinus professes to follow his teacher Plato, he upgrades Plato's teaching by introducing new elements. Plotinus' philosophy is deeply original. Three main principles constitute his system,

²¹⁴ Origen, On the First Principles. I, 2, 10.

if we can apply the term 'system' to his philosophy. The first and supreme principle is "the One", which correlates with "the Good" in Plato. *Nous* or "Intellect" is the second; and the last and the lowest in the chain is "Soul". The One is the ultimate principle and the source of everything. The One is beyond Being; it is simple and infinite. Intellect proceeds from the One, which remains unchanged. This is the first stage of coming into existence from the One. *Nous* is equivalent to the "Forms" of Plato's philosophy. The second stage is derivation of Soul from Intellect. Soul is a second degree of dispersion and is responsible for the structure of the entire universe. Entering into the material world, the Soul is not subject to change as is matter. Soul as a *hypostasis* of True Being organises the world from above. Bodies are the emanations of Soul. The process of emanation from the One has a reverse phase. This is return from Soul to Intellect and from Intellect to the One. This return has as its basis a desire for the Good and for the achievement of union with the One. After a brief introduction we will focus our attention on questions which fall into the field of our interest. These questions are: What kind of relationship exists between the One, Intellect and Soul? Does the One produce by Necessity? And what is the role of *Logos* in Plotinus' teaching?

Let's see first what the One means to Plotinus. He defines the One in negative terms using Plato's terminological arsenal. Like Plato's Good (*ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*)²¹⁶, the One is "beyond being". Being without limitation and finitude the One falls outside the Greek definition of being. There is no name for the One (*οὐδὲ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ*)²¹⁷. The One is absolutely unknowable and cannot be spoken about²¹⁸. Speaking of the One is possible only in terms of speaking about ourselves or other aspects of the world. Speaking of the One merely reflects dependency and a desire to be in relation with something prior to and higher than ourselves. Thus, all things derive existence from the One, the source of all beings.

Plotinus identifies the process of emanation with a process in which existences, according to their essence and power, produce an outward-facing hypostasis, which are continuously attached to them and represent the image of the archetypes²¹⁹. He gives the examples of fire, which radiates heat; and snow, which radiates cold. The general pattern of things is that they produce effects. Thus, it is inconceivable that

²¹⁵ Rowan Williams, *Arius*, p. 139.

²¹⁶ Plato, *Republic* 509b; also Plotinus, *Enneads*, I, 7, 1, 19; I, 8, 6, 28; (translated by Stephan MacKenna, revised by B.S. Page, London, 1969.)

²¹⁷ Plotinus, *Enneads*, V, 5, 6, 12 also Plato, *Parmenides*, 142c.

²¹⁸ Plotinus, *Enneads*, I, 2, 3, 27.

the One, which is the supreme perfection, can remain unproductive and sterile. But the One is not like other existences, which produce effects according to their essence. The One is not subject to his Essence or to himself. The One is absolutely free from his Essence and as such he enters into process of emanation. Everything is a product of the One and there is a radical difference between the One and everything else, including Intellect.

Producing it He left it outside of Himself: He had no need of being, who brought it to be. Thus his making of being is no 'action in accordance with his being' (τοῖνυν οὐδὲ καθό ἐστι ποιεῖ τὸ ἔστι).²²⁰

The One is limited neither in relation to others, nor in relation to himself²²¹. Plotinus introduces distinction between one and many to describe difference between the One and other beings. He claims that the first Principle is different than manifold reality. Being opposite to multiplicity the One possesses unity and self-integrity and as such it is simple. As simple the One is prior to things, which are composite. Plotinus applies the principle of prior simplicity²²² on the One.

Standing before all things, different from all its sequels, self-gathered not interblended with the forms that rise from it, and yet able in some mode of its own to be present to those others: it must be authentically unity, not something elaborated into unity and so in the reality no more than unity's counterfeit.²²³

We see that the other principles, which are derived from the One, must be composite. They consist elements, which exist as components of a whole, and they are dependent on whole and in the same time those elements exist outside the whole, as itself.

Intellectual-Principle is still being but the First is not being but precedent to all being: it can not to be a being, for a being has what we may call the shape of its reality but the Unity is whiteout shape, even shape Intellectual. Generative of all, The Unity is none of all; neither thing nor quantity nor quality nor intellect nor soul; not in motion, not in rest, not in place, not in time: it is self-defined, unique in form or, better, formless, existing before Forms was, or Movement or Rest, all of which are attachments of Being and make Being the manifold it is.²²⁴

²¹⁹ Plotinus, *Enneads*, V, 1, 6, 28-32.

²²⁰ *Enneads* VI, 8, 19, 18-20.

²²¹ Plotinus, *Enneads*, V, 5, 11, 2-3.

²²² D.J. O'Meara, *Plotinus: An Introduction to Enneads*, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1933.), pp. 44-9.

²²³ Plotinus, *Enneads*, V, 4, 1, 5-14.

²²⁴ Plotinus, *Enneads*, VI, 9, 3, 36-45.

This duality is reflected in the existence of Intellect. The constitutive components of Intellect are thinking and object of thought. Being dependent on the First Principle, Intellect necessarily thinks the One. The natural and desirable movement to what is good²²⁵ is in the basis of thinking the One. But, this is not the only way in which Intellect is composite. Intellect is one, as thinking itself, but in the same time Intellect thinks the Forms and the Forms are manifold. The way of thinking variety and multiplicity²²⁶ implies the existence of Intellect as multiplicity. The problem of one and many, Plotinus solves avoiding spatial categories.

Intellectual-Principle is the authentic existences and contains them all – not as in place but possessing itself and being one thing with this its content (Νοῦς μὲν δὴ ἔστω τὰ ὄντα, καὶ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὡς αὐτὸν ἔχων καὶ ἐν ὧν αὐτοῖς).²²⁷

On this level, in the harmonious unity of Intellect and the Forms, the 'true being' reveals itself to us. This true being must be understood as finite being, which has its cause in the infinite being or the One.

The process of the emanation of Intellect from the One has no beginning or end, because it takes place outside time. Time is a category created by Soul within the lower level of existence. The emanation of Soul is from Intellect. Intellect constitutes Soul in the same way as the One constitutes Intellect.

This second outflow is an image or representation of the Divine Intellect as the Divine Intellect represented its own prior, The One. This active power sprung from essence (from the Intellectual-Principle considered as Being) is Soul. Soul arises as the idea and act of the motionless Intellectual-Principle – which itself sprang from motionless prior – but the Soul's operation is not similarly motionless; its image is generated from its movement. It takes fullness by looking to its source; but it generates its image by adopting another, a downward, movement.²²⁸

Soul is an expression of Intellect and the second hypostasis from the One. As the product of the One, the nature of Soul implies an inherited duality. When thinking about herself, Soul looks to what precedes her. Soul differs from Intellect because she is involved in arranging and governing those things which come after her²²⁹. Soul arranges and governs the material world. The second form of involvement implies immediate contact with individual bodies. Thus the nature of the Soul is to

²²⁵ Plotinus, *Enneads*, V, 6, 5, 8.

²²⁶ Plotinus, *Enneads*, V, 3, 10, 39-43.

²²⁷ Plotinus, *Enneads*, V, 9, 6, 1-2.

²²⁸ Plotinus, *Enneads*, V, 2, 1, 14-20.

organise bodies and to be present in bodies. The soul stays pure and unaffected by the world of sense and change. The World Soul governs the material universe, remaining in the same state of contemplation what is above her. Soul, as the immediate cause of the world, creates matter. Matter does not come into existence out of the process of emanation, but is a necessary implication of it. Plotinus puts in question the theory of matter of his Platonic predecessor. Plato teaches that *cosmos* is made of two independently existing levels of reality. One level is the realm of Forms and the other the realm of disorganised matter. The link between these two worlds is Soul, which shapes matter according to the Forms. This theory supposes the eternal existence of matter. The theory of emanation does not suppose the pre-existence of matter, but considers it to be a product of higher levels of reality. Thus, matter is derived from the One, through the intermediary stages of Intellect and Soul. Plotinus tries to solve this dilemma.

If, therefore, Matter has always existed, that existence is enough to ensure its participation in the being which, according to each receptivity, communicates the supreme receptivity, communicates the supreme Good universally: if on the contrary, Matter has come into being as a necessary sequence of the causes preceding it, that origin would similarly prevent it standing apart from the scheme as though it were out of reach of the principle to whose grace it owes its existence.²³⁰

This section from *Enneads* is matter of dispute among scholars. Does Plotinus really solve the problem of matter by denying its pre-existence? The eternal existence of matter can be interpreted in such a way that matter is distinct from the realities which are derived from the One, namely Intellect and Soul. The alternative to this is that matter is the last sequence in the process of emanations from the One in which the productive force of the One dies. Thus, matter can be independent of the process of emanation or it can be its last stage. This kind of interpretation is given by Brehier²³¹. Professor Rist rejects Brehier's view, suggesting that Plotinus does not claim that matter is independent of the One. According to Rist²³², Plotinus sets the problem in the context of a distinction between eternal matter and matter created in time. Thus, the first alternative according to which matter has always existed, does not suppose the existence of matter as a separate reality, but the existence of matter as ultimately connected to the process of emanation. In the second case, where

²²⁹ Plotinus, *Enneads*, IV, 8, 3.

²³⁰ Plotinus, *Enneads*, IV, 8, 6, 18-23.

²³¹ E. Brehier, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, (translated by J. Thomas, Chicago, 1985.), p. 180.

²³² J.M. Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality*, (Cambridge, 1980.), pp. 118-9.

matter has come into being as a necessary sequence of causes (πρὸ αὐτῆς αἰτίας), the term πρὸ αὐτῆς refers to the temporal creation of matter. Plotinus emphasises that even in this case matter is not separate (οὐδ' ὡς ἕδει χωρὶς) from the One. Thus, in both cases matter is not independent of the One.

What according to Plotinus causes the creation of matter in time? Plotinus develops his argument in the context of a "one-and-many" distinction. The multiplicity of Forms, which exist at the level of Intellect is reflected on a lower level, or level of Soul. The particular Forms are represented in the world of matter as particular souls. Soul by its nature overflows and creates material universe. The creation of the world is similar to the creation of Intellect from the One, and Soul from Intellect. The correlative of the Intellect in the material universe is World Soul, which relates to Intellect in the same way as Intellect relates to the One. This is not the case with individual souls. The difference between World Soul and particular souls is in their relationship to body or different bodies. World Soul organises and governs the world, but always remains pure. The individual souls are capable of a 'fall' in their lower aspects, namely in the bodies.

So it is with the individual souls; the appetite for the divine Intellect urges them to return to their source, but they have, too, a power apt to administration in this lower sphere; they may be compared to the light attached upwards to the sun, but not grudging its presidency to what lies beneath it. In the Intellectual, then, they remain with soul-entire, and are immune from care and trouble; in the heavenly sphere, absorbed in the soul-entire, they are administrators with it just as kings, associated with the supreme ruler and governing with him, do not descend from their kingly stations: the souls indeed are thus far in the one place with their overlord; but there comes a stage at which they descend from the universal to become partial and self-centred; in a weary desire of standing apart they find their way, each to a place of its very own. This state long maintained, the Soul is a deserter from the All; its differentiation has severed it; its vision is no longer set in the Intellectual; it is a partial thing, isolated, weakened, full of care, intent upon the fragment; severed from the whole, it nestles in one form of being; for this, it abandons all else, entering into and caring for only the one, for a thing buffeted about by a worldful of things: thus it has drifted away from the universal and, by an actual presence, it administers the particular; it is caught into contact now, and tends to the outer to which it has become present and into whose inner depths it henceforth sinks far.²³³

This passage aptly describes the consequences of the 'fall' for self-centred souls. The souls imprisoned in the bodies represent particular parts of reality. The cause of the 'fall' is a desire to be itself. Thus, the centre of soul is no longer in the true

²³³ Plotinus, *Enneads*, IV, 8, 4, 1-21.

centre of all, the One, but in soul's own nature. However, soul cannot be capable of a 'fall' apart from matter. Matter is the weakness of the soul. When the soul's governing activity over matter starts to fill it with pleasure, soul deliberately moves not to World Soul, but to the material world. Professor Armstrong defines this movement of the soul as 'a desire not to have all things at once so that it can pass from one to another'²³⁴. In her movement the soul spreads out from the unified life of intellect and creates time. Plotinus defines time as 'the life of the soul in movement as it passes from one stage of act or experience to another'²³⁵. Soul remains timeless, because it is eternal, without beginning or end in time. But the movement of soul downward creates the image of soul, which is within time. This image of soul is the immanent principle of life, form and growth, which Plotinus calls Nature²³⁶. Nature is an integral part of soul on a lower level and it has a productive force. The movement of Nature is oriented toward soul, but its contemplation of higher levels is so weak that Nature produces forms in matter. These embodied forms are shadows of supreme reality and they are lifeless images of the soul, incapable of producing further forms. The role of Nature as a lower part of Soul is to give life and reality to bodies, thus making them determinate.

The whole process of emanation from the One is ended in the matter of world of sense, which no longer represents the perfection of its ontological predecessors.

We will now consider the question whether the One produces reality freely or of necessity. The notion of necessity was common in Greek philosophy. In Christian ontology this notion attracted some negative connotations, because the intention of Christian writers was to release God from every kind of constraint and to show that God's creation is a free act of love.

Plotinus likens the process of emanation to the process of deriving light from fire and cold from snow.

All existences, as long as they retain their character, produce – about themselves, from their essence, in virtue of the power, which must be in them – some necessary, outward-facing hypostasis continuously attached to them and representing in image the engendering archetypes.²³⁷

²³⁴ A.H. Armstrong, Plotinus in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, edited by A.H. Armstrong, Cambridge, 1967, p. 251.

²³⁵ Plotinus, Enneads, III, 7, 11, 23-7.

²³⁶ Plotinus, Enneads, V, 2, 1, 18-21.

²³⁷ Plotinus, Enneads, V, 1, 6, 30-4.

Thus, light and cold are derived from their archetypes, fire and snow ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας ἀναγκαίαν. But does Plotinus apply the same analogy to the process of the emanation of Intellect from the One? In the next section of the *Ennead* the compulsion used in the case of fire and snow is replaced with a weaker expression.

The Intellectual-Principle stands as the image of The One, firstly because there is a *certain necessity* (δεῖ πως) that the first should have its offspring, carrying onward much of its quality.²³⁸

Plotinus suggests that the necessity applied in the case of the emanation of Intellect from the One is a completely different kind of necessity. The difference between these two cases lies in the different nature of the One. In the case of fire and snow, their products, heat and cold, are essentially linked with the nature of the fire and snow. Plotinus describes this as the “act of the essence” (ἐνέργεια τῆς οὐσίας), and an act “going out from” the essence which are inseparably bound together. Thus, ‘the second act is an inevitable outflow from the first, an emanation distinct from the things itself (ἦν δεῖ παντὶ ἔπεσθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑτέραν οὐσαν αὐτοῦ)’²³⁹. The act *from* the essence or the productive act is one of necessity, dependant and related to the act *of* the essence. Does the act from essence of the One depend on the essence or nature of the One? Plotinus is strict that an act according Nature (ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὸ εἶναι)²⁴⁰ could not be applied to the One. The One is free of every determination by its essence and from any kind of internal or external constraint. Plotinus states that the One wills itself, as well as what it produces.

If, then, we are to allow Activities in the Supreme and make them depend upon will – and certainly Act cannot be will-less – and these Activities are to be the very essence, then will and essence in the Supreme must be identical. This admitted, as He wills to be He is.²⁴¹

The nature of the One is at the same time its will. The one is ‘what He has willed to be’ not ‘what He has happened to be’²⁴². But at the same time the will of the One produces necessity in the process of emanation. We can conclude that because the One is free from the acts of essence as well as from the acts from the essence. Does it mean that the One could ‘not have created at all’ and that the lower levels of

²³⁸ Plotinus, *Enneads*, V, 1, 7, 1-4.

²³⁹ Plotinus, *Enneads*, V, 4, 2, 29-30.

²⁴⁰ Plotinus, *Enneads*, VI, 8, 7, 49-50.

²⁴¹ Plotinus, *Enneads*, VI, 8, 13, 5-8.

²⁴² Plotinus, *Enneads*, VI, 8, 13, 57-8.

existence could 'not have existed at all'? If we ask the question in that way, the answer will be negative. But Plotinus, probably aware of the possibility that freedom of the One can be questioned, puts this problem in the context of a distinction between 'necessary' (τοῦτο δέον) and 'chance-made' or 'appropriate' (τοῦ ὡς ἔτυχεν) creation. In establishing a distinction between creation by chance and creation by necessity, Plotinus wants to show that term 'by chance' is diametrically opposite not to the term 'by necessity', but to the term 'free'²⁴³. The intention of the One, if we can speak in such terms, was to create not by chance but according to free will.

On the assumption that God wills what should be and that impossible to separate right from realisation and that this Necessary is not to God an outside thing but is, itself his first Activity manifesting outwardly in the exactly representative form.²⁴⁴

The problem of the One for Plotinus is that the process of emanation cannot be pressed into the mould of the Christian theory of creation. The One does not have a positive movement toward creation, as does the Christian God. Even in the process of emanation the One remains focused on itself and 'anything that comes into being after it can be produced only as a consequence of its unfailing self-intention'²⁴⁵.

The self-intention of the One is the act of essence, which is ontologically prior to the act from essence or the emanation from the One. Thus the necessity in the process of emanation is just a consequence of the One's self-concern. Being free from its essence, which is prior to products of essence, the One is also free from every external constraint. Necessity is the One's own will. Following Trouillard²⁴⁶ we can conclude that the voluntarism of the One is a key for understanding the question of necessity and freedom in Plotinus.

The next question is about the role Plotinus gives to *logos* in his teaching. The problem of *logos* is one of the burning questions in Plotinian studies. The main reason for the dispute among scholars is the real nature of *logos*. Is *logos* the fourth hypostasis or is it just an activity of the lower hypostasis. Plotinus also puzzles modern scholars by referring in some places to *logos* as an intermediary between Intellect and Soul and in others as an activity of Soul in the material reality. But what is consistent in Plotinus' teaching about *logos* is the fact that it always appears

²⁴³ J.M. Rist, *Plotinus, The Road to Reality*, p. 82.

²⁴⁴ Plotinus, *Enneads*, VI, 8, 18, 49-52

²⁴⁵ Plotinus, *Enneads*, V, 1, 6, 30-34

²⁴⁶ J. Trouillard, *La Procession plotinienne*, (Paris, 1951.), p.77.

as a unifying principle, which brings order to chaos. Following this line, we will examine the role of *logos* in connection with the material world.

Plotinus states that 'Soul governs the All by the plan contained in the Reason-Principle' (κατὰ λόγον ψυχῆς διοικούσης τὸ πᾶν)²⁴⁷. He follows on by explaining that all process takes place in the cosmos. The cosmos is "ensouled" from above, without the soul descending.

The universe spreads as broad as the presence of soul; the bound of its expansion is the point at which, in its downward egression from the Supreme, it still has soul to bind it in one: it is shadow as broad as the Reason-Principle proceeding from soul; and that Reason-Principle is of scope to generate a cosmic bulk as vast as lay in the purposes of the Idea (the Divine forming power) which it conveys.²⁴⁸

Logos appears as a regulative principle which uses the Forms as patterns and creates particular entities in the material world. The role of *logos* is not only to create, but also to introduce order into the universe. Does Plotinus multiply roles of nature and *logos*, connecting both with lower level of Soul, which is involved in creation?

Yet the offspring of intellectual principle must be a Reason-Principle, that is to say, a substantial existence (hypostasis) identified with the principle of deliberative thought (in the *Timaeus*): such then is that (higher Soul) which circles about Divine Mind, its light, its image inseparably attached to it: on the upper level united with it, filled from it, enjoying, participant in its nature, intellective with it, but on the lower level in contact with the realm beneath itself, or, rather, generating in turn an offspring which must lie beneath; of this lower we will treat later; so far we deal still with the Divine.²⁴⁹

Plotinus makes a distinction between Nature and *logos* on the basis of relationship with Intellect. *Logos* is regarded as an activity not only connected with the lowest level of reality, but also with the level of Intellect. Intellect emanates from *logos* into universe. *Logos* contains the seed or *logoi*, which directs the process of producing embodied forms. These *logoi* possess all the qualities of identity, which create the world of diverse forms²⁵⁰. The emanation of *logos* from Intellect does not mean that *logos* descends into the material world, independently of Soul. But at the same time, *logos* does not descend only from the pure Soul. Plotinus describes *Logos* as radiation from both hypostasis, Intellect and Soul²⁵¹. Thus, *logos* passes through the

²⁴⁷ Plotinus, *Enneads*, II, 3, 13, 4; II, 3, 16, 5.

²⁴⁸ Plotinus, *Enneads*, IV, 3, 9, 46-51.

²⁴⁹ Plotinus, *Enneads*, V, 1, 7, 42-9.

²⁵⁰ Plotinus, *Enneads*, III, 2, 2, 19.

²⁵¹ Plotinus, *Enneads*, III, 2, 16, 14.

pure Soul, transmitting Forms into material world. Apart from this role of linking higher levels of reality with lower, *logos* has creative and regulative functions in the material world. The distinct functions of *logos*, the first of λόγος συνημμένος ἐκείνω, and the second of λόγος ποιητικός are two phases of *logos* according to its presence in the higher and lower realities. In the first phase *logos* is identified with All-Soul and in the second with Nature, becoming the Nature-principle²⁵².

Plotinus identifies *logos* and Nature as elements, which do not possess the full power of contemplation. At the third remove from Intellect, *logoi* in Nature, because of weak contemplation, produce the ghost-world consisting of ever-changing particularities. Thus, professor Rist²⁵³ correctly concludes that the reason why *logos* cannot be the fourth hypostasis is the lack of its contemplation of the real world. Thus, *logos* remains just a function of Soul, like Nature in the multiplicity of the material world.

In spite of similarities with concepts of *logos* in previous philosophical tradition, the *logos* of Plotinus must be considered in the context of his philosophy, as an activity of Soul which conveys the Forms from the level of Intellect into the material universe.

Finally, we can conclude that the philosophy of Plotinus escapes the bonds of monistic ontology of Greek philosophers. Plotinus establishes the sovereignty of the transcendence of the One, refusing to imprison it in the Platonic concept of finite being. His philosophy is a product of the times in which he lived and it carries the answers to the current philosophical problems - problems which bothered both Christian and pagan philosophers.

V Ontology of Freedom

The Church Fathers did not accept that the world was ontologically 'given' because they were guided by the biblical doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*. Thus, the Church Fathers had instituted a completely different ontology tracing world back to ontology outside world, to God²⁵⁴. This ontology overcame an ancient naturalistic standpoint about God as the immanent cosmic power. According to the Fathers, God became absolutely free from every kind of necessity and the freedom the highest

²⁵² Plotinus, *Enneads*, III, 8, 3, 9.

²⁵³ J.M. Rist, *Plotinus, The Road to Reality*, p. 99.

²⁵⁴ J. Zizioulas, *Being as Communion*, (St. Vladimir Seminary Press, New York, 1985.), p. 39.

principle of Godhead. Thus, being became the product of freedom. This teaching was not explicitly given in the Bible, but it was a product of struggle against the ancient viewpoint over centuries. There were many traps which it was needed to avoid. A number of Church doctors had failed in their attempt to repudiate Plato's concept of creation from pre-existent matter, which limited the freedom of God. The others could not avoid the other great danger of Hellenistic thought, the teaching of Gnostic systems about 'gulf' between God and the world. The goal was achieved after centuries of struggle and after many martyrs who witnessed by death the correct confession of the faith, but also after many heretics. Patristic thought revealed a new ontology of freedom. Thus, St. Gregory of Nyssa can say: 'To be God is to be free'²⁵⁵. According to Gregory 'God always wants to be what he is, and he is absolutely what he wants to be'²⁵⁶. A similar standpoint about God, who is free of every definition, and whose nature is best defined by freedom, we find in St. Maximus the Confessor: 'αὐτεξούσιος δὲ φύσει ἡ θεία φύσις'²⁵⁷. The path to this way of thinking was not easy to pass. The trap of the ontological monism of ancient thought could not avoid such great mind as Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria and Origen.

1. The witness of faith; Ignatius of Antioch

The apostolic fathers continued the work of apostles on establishing Christian communities. The period of late first century and early second century characterises appearance of a vast diffusion of local congregations each leading its separate life with its own constitutional structure and officers and each called 'church'. The deep conciseness of these communities that they are the parts of one universal Church needed the doctrinal foundation. The isolated communities were subjected to different cultural and religious influences. In the same time they were the fertile soil for developing the heresies.

Known as the champion of monarchical episcopacy, St. Ignatius, bishop of Antioch made an attempt to establish a foundation for the doctrine of the Catholic Church based not any more on confined districts presided over by the bishops, but on the presence of Christ in body and blood. His letters give the clear evidence of the Church life in early second century. The whole work of Ignatius consisted of seven

²⁵⁵ Gregory of Nyssa, *De Mortuis*, in Jaeger IX, 54.

²⁵⁶ Gregory of Nyssa, *Eun.* III, 1, 125 (Jaeger II, 45-46).

²⁵⁷ Maximus the Confessor, *Dispute with Pyrrhus*, PG 91, 304c.

epistles addressed to the Churches in Asia Minor. Ignatius as condemned prisoner was transported across Asia Minor in the custody of Roman soldiers to Rome. All his epistles, written on the road to his death in Rome, discuss burning problems of the churches in the cities through which Ignatius had passed. They are not academic in style as a part of some intellectual movement but firmly rooted in the every day life of these small Christian communities. The epistles discover the person deeply grounded in the faith not only by concern for practical issues of Church life and order but also by his strong desire for martyrdom. In his letters Ignatius does not leave room for different interpretation and for arguing. His language is authoritative and at the same time prophetic. Being lead by spiritual experience of Church as a community Ignatius does not hypothesize in his letters, but he pronounces.

Ignatius does not give only the answers on practical problems in the cities of western Asia Minor but he develops theological perspective, which will be of the great significance for later doctrinal struggles against heretics. Ignatius' contribution to the correct confession of faith is timeless although his teaching is the product of the struggle against the particular heresies. We shall discuss his theological achievement in the text to follow. The major problem, which confronts Ignatian studies today, is the understanding of the background of the Ignatian epistles. The matter of dispute among scholars is the number of different heretical teachings against which Ignatius had fought. The standpoint of some scholars is that Ignatius was combating two distinct heresies rather than one form of Judaeo-Gnosticism. The problem lies much deeper than it looks on first sight. According to the opinion of the scholars of German religious-historical school (Religionsgeschichtliche Schule), the traces of the widely known Iranian myth are evident in Ignatian epistles. Thus, Schlier²⁵⁸ thinks that Gnostic influence on Ignatian thought is so strong that it fully explains his theology. The view of Christ as descending and ascending redeemer and the conception of church members as *pneumatikoi* who are by nature redeemed and ontologically related to Christ are the elements which support Schlier's standpoint. The other scholar from the same school, Bartsch²⁵⁹ holds that Gnostic influence is predominantly shown in the Ignatian idea of the unity of God and he distinguishes three levels in Ignatian thought. The first level is ungnosticised early Christian

²⁵⁸ H. Schlier, *Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu den Ignatius-briefen*, Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, 8, Geisen, Topelmann, 1929.

²⁵⁹ H.W Bartsch, Gnostisches Gut und Gemeindefradition bei Ignatius von Antiochien, Gutersloh, Werner, 1940.

preaching; the second an indirect Gnosticism mediated through the Johannine theology and the third a direct Gnostic influence.

From the Ignatian letters his standpoint toward Docetic heresy is evident. Ignatius combats their position according to which Christ was not born in human flesh but on the contrary he only appeared to have a fleshly body and was really ἀσώματος. The Docetists denied the physical birth of Christ, his death and his resurrection. For them, according to Ignatius, Christ is 'without body and demon-like'²⁶⁰ and 'bearer of a corps (νεκροφόρος)'²⁶¹ and 'He suffered only in semblance'²⁶². Ignatius refuses to mention their names because they are unbelievers and not worthy to be mentioned, but it is evident that he talks about the Docetists.

But is this the only heresy against which Ignatius fought. He does not give any direct indication that he is fighting on two fronts, but indirectly suggests that there are two heresies defining them as the 'strange doctrines' and the 'antiquated fables'²⁶³. The first heresy is docetic and Ignatius describes them in the following way:

But certain persons ignorantly deny Him, or rather have been denied by Him, being advocates of death rather than of the truth; and they have not been persuaded by the prophecies nor by the law of Moses, nay nor even the very hour by the Gospel.²⁶⁴

The second group is 'those who had walked in ancient practices'²⁶⁵ and observe Sabbaths. It is obvious that the first group who denies the authority of Old Testament can be mingled with those who live according to the Jewish law.

These elements, according to some scholars strongly define the position of Ignatius. Virginia Corwin²⁶⁶, following C.C. Richardson²⁶⁷ and Bartsch distinguishes two distinct groups of heretics and locates the position of Ignatius in the middle. On the one side was the group of Christians deeply influenced by the Old Testament with strongly pro-Jewish orientation. On the other side stood the Docetist. Ignatius was the leader of the centrist party, which was maintaining the balance between two extremes.

²⁶⁰ Ignatius of Antioch, Smyr. 2.

²⁶¹ Ignatius of Antioch, Smyr. 5.

²⁶² Ignatius of Antioch, Tral. 10.

²⁶³ Ignatius of Antioch, Magn. 8.

²⁶⁴ Ignatius of Antioch, Smyr. 5.

²⁶⁵ Ignatius of Antioch, Magn. 9.

²⁶⁶ V. Corwin, St. Ignatius and Christianity in Antioch, (Yale University Press, New York, 1960.), pp. 52-64

²⁶⁷ C.C. Richardson., The Christianity of Ignatius of Antioch, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1935.), pp. 81-5

According to other opinions Ignatius was confronted to only one form of Judeo-Docetism. L.W. Barnard²⁶⁸ develops his position on the basis of the recent discoveries of the Dead Sea Scrolls, which supplied proof that Judaism was not so monolithic in its structure, but open to outside influences. Thus, one of various forms of Judaism known as Essene Judaism influenced incipient Gnostic thought. The Judaism invading Hellenistic thought creates a new form of Judaeo-Docetism or Judaeo-Gnosticism. The partisans of Judaeo-Gnosticism had their own interpretation of the Old Testament in which they based their christological position. The Ignatius was familiar with this form which is evident in his epistles to Magnesians and Philadelphians. The question is in which measure did Gnosticism influence him. He is well rooted in the tradition of Syrian Catholicism, which is based on incarnational and sacramental issues, but the terminology, which he uses is parallel to Gnostics. The Christian background in Ignatian epistles is the Gospels of St. Matthew and St. John and St. Paul Epistles.

The tradition embodied in St. Matthew Gospel is opposed to the Pharisaic Judaism, and does not leave any room for any Judaic influence on Ignatius. But maybe as Bartsch suggests the influence, which came through Fourth Gospel and Johannine teaching, carried by oral tradition, introduced certain Gnostic elements in Ignatian epistles.

However, Ignatian thought stays uninfluenced by Gnostics although the language of Ignatian epistles is marked by Gnostic terminology.

Following St. John, Ignatius develops his own teaching about *logos*. The relationship between *Logos* and Silence is one his key conceptions. Using the language of Gnostics Ignatius avoided one of biggest 'trap' of Gnostic system – insuperable gulf between God and the world.

Ignatius does not fully develop the doctrine of *Logos*. *Logos* in his epistles is used directly to Jesus Christ. *Logos* in Ignatian language is not just a figure of speech but it is a hypostasis. Ignatius is very clear about that in the following passage:

There is one God who manifest Himself through Jesus Christ His Son, who is His Word that proceeded from silence, who in all things was well-pleasing unto Him that sent Him.²⁶⁹

In this place Ignatius introduces the notion silence, in which many scholars have seen the Gnostic insight. The Silence-*Logos* concept belongs to the late

²⁶⁸ L.W. Barnard, The Background of St. Ignatius of Antioch, in *Vigiliae Christianae*, volume 17, 1963., pp.193-206.

²⁶⁹ Ignatius of Antioch, *Magn.* 8.

Valentianism. According to the Gnostic system, from the supreme Father, *Bythos*, the unbegotten Monad and *Sige* (Silence), who is his *Ennoia* (Thought) proceed by successive emanation, three pairs of aeons, *Nous* (or *Monogenes*) and *Alitheia* (Truth), *Logos* and *Zoe* (Life), and *Anthropos* (Man) and *Ecclesia* (Church). The association of *Sige* with the Godhead is not only confined to Valentianism, but belongs to the Greek cosmological speculations and in the system of earlier Gnostics. However, the Ignatian Silence-*Logos* paradox is completely different in form from the imaginative tale of late Valentianism. The Ignatian form is pregnant and more suggestive, revealing not the way in which *Logos* proceeded from the God but the fact that the hidden God discloses Himself. The notion Silence is not just a figure or a metaphor, but a technical term which reflects the hidden realm. The idea that such hidden world exists behind the world of visible and tangible things was spread among the Christians in Ignatian times. This hidden world of transcendent God is revealed through Jesus *Logos*:

It is better to keep silence and to be, and to talk and not to be. It is fine thing to teach, if the speaker practise. Now there is one teacher, who spoke and it came to pass and even the things what He has done in worthy of the Father. He that truly possesses the word of Jesus, is able also to hear his silence, that he may be perfect, that through his speech he may act and to through his silence he may be known.²⁷⁰

The idea of Silence is not applied only to deity but for Ignatius has implications in the ethical life which shows analogy between the silence of the bishops²⁷¹ and God as Silence. Silence is something active and positive, not just an attribute of the God but God Himself. The notion Silence expresses the transcendent nature of the God, who is unknown and inaccessible. However, God does not stay unknown and finally inaccessible because *Logos*, which proceeds from Silence, reveals the way to attain to God. Ignatius in his epistle to Romans appeals to them not to try to rescue him or to obstruct his martyrdom in any way and let him to be the word of God.

For neither shall I myself ever find an opportunity such as this to attain unto God, nor can you, if you be silent, win the credit of any nobler work. For if you be silent and leave me alone, I am a word of God; but if you desire my flesh, then shall I be again a mere cry.²⁷²

Logos is the utterance, not the divine reason. The way in which Ignatius uses *logos* in the relation to Silence shows that *logos* is also the meaningful declaration of God

²⁷⁰ Ignatius of Antioch, Eph. 15.

²⁷¹ see H. Chadwick, The Silence of Bishops in Ignatius, Harvard Theological Review, vol. 43, 1950.

²⁷² Ignatius of Antioch, Rom. 2

to the world. The concept of the God as silence provides a ground for the work of Christ.

The ontological gap between God and the world is overarched by the *logos* of God, his Son Jesus Christ, who offers something to humankind.

In this point Ignatius is different from academic theologians interested in Christianity as revelation. Ignatius approaches to the being of God through experience of ecclesial community. Ignatius was not interested in developing theological system but on the contrary he was concerned above all with what was the crucial problem of humankind, the experience of destruction and death.

The biggest Ignatian contribution is his teaching that the being of God could be known only through personal relationship and personal love. Being means life, and life means unity with God. These two points are key conceptions.

Ignatius develops the new concept of life. As an existentialist Ignatius gives the answer to the central questions of human life in the very form in which they were worrying man in the Hellenistic world. He proclaimed the message of the newness of eternal life and of the abolition of death. Ignatius stands in Johannine tradition, according to which knowledge of God is 'eternal life'²⁷³. By the identification of being with life, Ignatius creates a basis for a new ontological approach to the idea of life and completely changes the Hellenistic concept of life. First, the term, which he uses, for life ζωή has the essentially different meaning from βίος, which is usually used for life. He even makes distinction between these two words based in their relationship to death. The term ζωή is the principle of life taken in its spiritual meaning and as such is in opposition to death. The second expression is inseparably connected with death²⁷⁴ because it describes physical sphere of existence. It was not the case in Aristotle, who uses βίος as higher term of these two.

Second and most important is that Ignatius gives the new notion of life. In the Hellenistic mind, from the time of Aristotle life is something added to being²⁷⁵, but not being itself. Thus, it is correct to say that stone and bird are, but it is not correct to say that they live. The lifeless stone can claim the verb 'to be', but not 'to live'. Life is just the quality of being or something possessed by being.

²⁷³ John, 17:3

²⁷⁴ Ignatius of Antioch, *Rom.* 7

²⁷⁵ J. Zizioulas, *Being as Communion*, p. 79

For Ignatius life means 'being for ever', it means something which is not subjected to destruction and death, but it is everlasting. He teaches Ephesians:

Be not anointed with the ill odour of the teaching of the prince of this world, lest he lead you captive and rob you of the life which is set before you.²⁷⁶

Ignatius' concept of life implies immortality and incorruptibility and the abolition of death. What kind of life is this? Ignatius declares that the eternal and everlasting life is only life in (ἐν)²⁷⁷ Christ, or through (διὰ)²⁷⁸ Him or toward (εἰς)²⁷⁹ Him.

According to the Ignatius, the practical means for the achievement of eternal life are discipleship and imitation (μίμησις). Discipleship implies devotion to the spiritual teachers and the following of the pattern. The Christians are the disciples of Jesus Christ who is 'the only teacher'²⁸⁰. He was also the teacher of prophets in the Spirit as well as teacher of his living disciples. Discipleship includes following the pattern, which prepares man for life and death and whatever sufferings may come. For Ignatius his discipleship implies readiness for martyrdom.

Now am beginning to be a disciple. May naught of things visible and invisible envy me; that I may attain unto Jesus Christ. Come fire and cross and grappling with wild beasts, [cuttings and mangling], wrenching of bones, hacking of limbs, crushing of my whole body, come cruel tortures of the devil to assail me. Only be it mine to attain unto Jesus Christ.²⁸¹

The sacrificing aspect of the discipleship is not only one. The obedience to the bishop is also a form of discipleship. But this does not imply just obeying the commands of bishop and presbyter, but a much deeper relationship.

Do you all follow your bishop, as Jesus Christ followed the Father, and the presbytery as the Apostles; and the deacons pay respect, as to God's commandment. Let no man do aught of things pertaining to the Church apart from bishop. Let that be held a valid Eucharist which is under the bishop or one to whom he shall have committed it. Whatsoever the bishop shall appear, there let the people be; even as where Jesus may be, there is universal Church.²⁸²

The bishop is the head of community and if one ignores the bishop, he cuts himself from community and loses contact with God. Bishop is a 'type' of God' but only as a head of eucharistic assembly. Miss Corwin wants to show that discipleship is just a matter of ethics. Her interpretation of the Ignatian notions of discipleship is focused

²⁷⁶ Ignatius of Antioch, Eph. 17.

²⁷⁷ Ignatius of Antioch, Tral 9.

²⁷⁸ Ignatius of Antioch, Phil. 8.

²⁷⁹ Ignatius of Antioch, Eph. 14.

²⁸⁰ Ignatius of Antioch, Magn. 9.

²⁸¹ Ignatius of Antioch, Rom. 5.

²⁸² Ignatius of Antioch, Smyr. 8.

on the historical and incarnate Christ as a central issue in ethics as in theology. Thus, Christ is much more ethical ideal, which needs to be followed.

Another concept central for Ignatius' teaching is an imitation. There is disagreement among scholars, what is the real nature of the Ignatian notion of imitation. Thus, the standpoint of Bartsch²⁸³ is that Ignatius uses the term imitation to describe the eucharistic μίμησις. Miss Corwin²⁸⁴ thinks that Ignatius suggests the ethical imitation of Christ rather than eucharistic. There is no doubt that Ignatius teaches about life based on goodness, gentleness and benevolence of Christ. The possible reason why Ignatius gives much more attention to this aspect can be the sufferings facing him. We must be aware of facts that the teaching of Ignatius is overshadowed by his desire to imitate Christ in the passion.

Being imitators of God, and having your hearts kindled in the blood of God, you have perfectly fulfilled your congenial work – for when you heard that I was on my way to Syria, in bonds for the sake of the common Name and hope, and was hoping through prayers to succeed in fighting with wild beasts in Rome.²⁸⁵

Ignatius goes beyond the notion of ethical imitation and he declares that imitation of Christ can be achieved only within church community. This is the product of his pastoral care for communities.

Do nothing without the bishop; keep your flesh as a temple of God; cherish union; shun divisions; be imitators of Jesus Christ, as He Himself also was of the Father.²⁸⁶

Ignatius introduces us to the concept of Eucharistic imitation, which leads to the notion of Eucharistic unity or the event of communion.

Assemble yourself together in common, every one of you severally, man by man, in grace, in one faith and one Jesus Christ, ... breaking one bread, which is medicine of immortality (φάρμακον ἀθανασίας) and the antidote that we should not die but live for ever in Jesus Christ.²⁸⁷

Some biblical scholars interpret the Ignatian concept of 'the medicine of immortality' as similar to the pagan notions of Eucharist. In that way Eucharist as the medicine of immortality is something which as such possesses the possibility for life. If we take in consideration the whole Ignatian opus, we are inevitably led not to the notion of Eucharist as something that in its nature implies a potential for life, but

²⁸³ H. W. Bartsch, Gnostisches Gut und Gemeindefradition bei Ignatius von Antiochien, p. 124.

²⁸⁴ V. Corwin., St. Ignatius and Christianity in Antioch, pp. 229-32.

²⁸⁵ Ignatius of Antioch, Eph. 1.

²⁸⁶ Ignatius of Antioch, Phil. 7.

²⁸⁷ Ignatius of Antioch, Eph. 20.

to the idea of Eucharist as unity of eucharistic assembly or rather the event of communion. The identification of life with unity of God and man as unity in Eucharist is the second great achievement of Ignatius. The notion of unity or union with God takes a very important place in Ignatian epistles. The unity with God is possible only as unity of Church in bishop as a president of eucharistic community.

Not that I have divisions among you, but exceeding purity. For as many as are of God and of Jesus Christ, they are with the bishop; and as many as shall repent and enter into unity of the Church, these also shall be of God, that may be living after Jesus Christ.²⁸⁸

Ignatius' approach to the notion of unity is not from the point of ethical experience but from the existential one. Achieving the unity of God is not just a lack of sin but overcoming the divisions. God is not archetype of goodness, which needs to be a paradigm for moral behaviour, but One from whom man are separated. Virginia Corwin correctly emphasises that the core of Ignatian teaching is that the disunity can be transcended²⁸⁹.

Ignatius has given the significant contribution to Christian thought. He avoided the traps of Hellenistic thought as well as Gnostic systems. He did not confine God in the closed ontology of Hellenistic thought and he preserved the transcendent nature of God's being. His God was free of all limitation. At the same time he overcame the Gnostic teaching of the gulf between God and world, by identification of being with life. The concept of life in Christ as the ground for Christian ontology was the core of the Ignatian preaching and the core for foundation of unity between God and world. God ceased to be a remote abstraction but He fully entered into human life as the scene of history. The contribution of Ignatius is not the result of his academic speculations but the result of his pastoral care in struggle with heretics.

2. The liberation of God; Irenaeus of Lyon

Irenaeus of Lyon belongs to the group of Christian writers in the early Church known as the apostolic fathers. Originally, Irenaeus was from Smyrna. The memories of his childhood are connected with Polycarp, Bishop of Smyrna. He moved from his birthplace toward the West, and he took a part in the world-wide mission of the church. First he arrived in Rome, at the same time Polycarp was there. According to some sources he became a disciple of Justin Martyr, who at that time was teaching in Rome. After a while he proceeded further to the West, and

²⁸⁸ Ignatius of Antioch, Phil. 3.

²⁸⁹ V. Corwin, St. Ignatius and Christianity in Antioch, p. 284.

became a missionary among the Celts in Gaul. Christianity in Gaul was based in the thought and manners characteristic of Asia Minor. At the beginning he was a presbyter, but after the martyrdom of Bishop Potheinos, he succeeded him in that post. During the period of his episcopate he produced five books against the heresy of Gnosticism, especially its late form of Valentianism. In his first book he detects all forms of Gnostic teaching going far back to Simon Magus. The second book is the refutation of Gnostic heresy, with the rational proofs that its doctrine is false. The third, fourth and fifth books are supplements to the refutation, which begins, in the second book. The content of the other three books is gradually exposition of the true doctrine, where Irenaeus provides the proofs from apostles, Jesus' teachings, the parables from Gospels and letters of Paul. 'On the Discovery and Refutation of Gnosis falsely so-called' or 'Adversus haereses' in five books is a brief compendium of Christian doctrine with additional instruction for catechumens.

Some scholars consider Irenaeus as systematic theologian. But he did not write as a systematic theologian. He was much more concerned with the practical life of Christian communities than in academic work. He writes with pastoral care for his flock, protecting them from the influence of false teaching. He is primarily a pastor and a teacher of the Church and his writings serve as a manual for behaviour toward the Gnostic heresy, addressed to other pastors.

His teaching consists of the influences of the different Christian traditions with which Irenaeus was familiar. This is mainly a combination of tradition from Asia Minor, Syria, Rome and Gaul, though it lacks elements from the Palestinian, Greek and Egyptian traditions.

Irenaeus like his fellow bishop Ignatius of Antioch does not belong to the intellectual movement of the early Church, but to the tradition which formed the foundation of the church life on common experience of liturgical and Eucharistic practice. Irenaeus cited Ignatius in a few places without naming him. He does not use the Ignatian concept of the monarchical episcopate. Nevertheless, Irenaeus as well as Ignatius was involved in a struggle against heretics and both through liturgical devotion and eucharistic practice created an identical approach to doctrine of Church. The theme, which concerned the identification of being with life and communion, reappears in more elaborate form in the philosophy of Irenaeus.

Before we take into consideration the key concepts of Irenaeus' work, we will give a brief exposition of Gnostic doctrines. The doctrine of the Gnostics was a mixture of Greek philosophy, theosophy, speculative cosmology and mythology mingled with

their dualistic conceptions and mysterious and spiritualising teaching about Christ²⁹⁰. It is very difficult to determine the real origins of Gnostic ideas but it is obvious that they were products of cultural interchange between Judaism and Christianity. The esoteric doctrines of Wisdom were especially attractive for the well-educated middle class of Christians, which at the same time read the works of Gnostics and the writings of the Apologist. These teachings²⁹¹ consist of doctrines, which Jesus taught in confidence to the small group of privileged and Gnostics kept them in secrecy. This was the reason why Gnostics believed that they knew the real meaning of Christianity.

The method of Irenaeus was not only dealing with the contemporary Gnostic heresy of Valentinians, but he went back to their forerunners, showing the origins of false doctrine. The common thing for all Gnostics' system was that they found orthodox Christianity, based on straightforward creed, too simple. The mystery of the universe, according to the Gnostics is much deeper and complex than orthodox Christianity confesses. Depending on system, there are different explanations of the riddle of universe. The most popular was the Valentinian conception of the Fullness or Pleroma of deity, the least and feeblest of whom had, as a result of some fatal error, departed from the world above and brought into being this physical universe.

We will give the brief exposition of Valentinian system without taking into consideration other parts of its teaching, namely exegesis or moral doctrine. The common thing for all Valentinians is that they distinguished themselves from the Christians, but they maintained the names of Jesus, the Father and the Spirit as well as the other Christian terms. Establishing their identity, different than Christian they broke the tradition of Marcion and the other Gnostics. Although a heretic and the so-called 'first-born of Satan' Marcion and his followers declared themselves as real Christians. They stressed the ascetic aspect of Christianity, teaching that real Christian and believer have to break with the world and its affairs.

Valentius and his followers have a very developed conception of emanations from prior Aeons. According to Valentinian myth the Prior Aeon or Pre-Father/Pre-Beginning/Abyss and Thought/Grace/ Silence emit Mind/Father/Beginning and Truth, which compose a Pythagorean *Tetrad*. Mind then emitted *Logos* and Life, which emitted Man and Church. Abyss, Mind, *Logos* and Man exist in pairs of male and female and they compose the firstborn *Ogdoad*. *Logos* and Life emitted ten

²⁹⁰ Robert M. Grant, *Irenaeus of Lyon*, (Early Church Fathers, London and New York, 1997.), p. 11.

Aeons more composing *Decad*, and Man and Church emitted twelve Aeons, the last of which was Sophia, composing *Dodecad*. *Ogdoad* including Silence and Abyss, *Decad* and *Dodecad* compose the invisible and spiritual Pleroma of thirty Aeons²⁹². This myth is known as Ptolemaeus' system or 'Great notice'. Irenaeus finds the origins of Gnostic conception of Aeons in Plato's theory of ideas²⁹³. Of course, he does not go too far in his speculation looking for every stage of emanations counterpart in Plato's theory, but he stays on the position that Plato's theory of ideas was the source of inspiration for Gnostic system of Aeons. Thus, Gnostics Aeons constitute an ideal world, which serves as 'figure' or 'pattern' or 'image' for the sensible world²⁹⁴. Irenaeus proceeds with the question about the origin of the ideal world: Did God make it out of himself or did He receive it from some power above him. This is for Irenaeus the core of the problem. If the patterns or images are accepted from above then God is forced by some higher principles to act and his freedom is limited. This is not acceptable for Irenaeus, because it denies the creative freedom of God and at the same time it gives the eternal existence to the world apart from Him. He accuses those who 'are ignorant of God, poets and historians' maintaining that 'God is the slave of necessity'²⁹⁵. Irenaeus confesses that: 'God, the Creator, who made the world, is the only God, and that there is no other God besides Him, He himself receiving from himself the pattern (exemplum) and figure (figurationem) of those things which have been made'²⁹⁶.

In the Valentinian teachings large parts of reality stay out of God's influence. Being independent of God, these parts possess a certain degree of sovereignty. This implies that God is not sovereign and that he does not contain everything. It creates a gulf between God and beings not contained by Him. The starting point of Irenaeus' refutation of such concept is that God 'freely made everything, not moved by another but on his own initiative' and that He is 'the only Creator and the only Father, the only one who contains all and provides being to all'²⁹⁷. Irenaeus opposes to the Gnostic multiplicity of mutually limiting principles or little creators. The Gnostic conception of Aeons or little creators is unacceptable for Irenaeus because

²⁹¹ Hans Lietzmann, *A History of the Early Church*, (Volume II, Lutterworth Press, London, 1963.), p. 207.

²⁹² Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Haer.* I, 1, 1-3; in Robert M. Grant, *Irenaeus of Lyon*

²⁹³ Harry Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1956.), pp. 261-262.

²⁹⁴ Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Haer.* II, 16, 1-2.

²⁹⁵ Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Haer.* II, 14, 4.

²⁹⁶ Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Haer.* II, 16, 3.

²⁹⁷ Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Haer.* II, 1, 1.

such a principle could not be called God and it could not be omnipotent. According to Irenaeus' conception fullness and omnipotence are two main principles, which he applies to the divine nature. These two principles serve as a foundation stone for God's freedom. First, the fullness or pleroma of God based on the fact that he 'contains everything' implies that there is nothing outside him. The Irenaean standpoint is that God is enclosing (περιέχειν) all being in the sphere of his being and in the stays unenclosed²⁹⁸. Valentinians apply the notion 'unenclosed'²⁹⁹ to God, but at the same time they maintain that there is more than one fullness of God. Irenaeus rejects this because if there is a something outside him He is not fullness anymore. This being according to Irenaeus 'will have beginning, middle and end in the relation to those outside of him'³⁰⁰. The relationship between fullness and what is out of fullness can be twofold. In the first case the fullness will be enclosed in some other fullness, which is outside of it. In the second case it will separated from it by same distance. This includes that there is a third kind of thing, which is between the first fullness and the second one and this 'tertium quid'³⁰¹ will limit and contain the other two.

God's divine nature does penetrate all things. But the portions of divine benefits do not depend on the distance from him. If we apply this concept the Christian God would not be different from the Aristotelian God³⁰², and law, which rules in the cosmic hierarchy, will limit his power. God must be all encompassing and his power must be extended to all beings. The term 'enclosing' serves to express not only transcendence but also immanence. The notion that God is all encompassing means that there is nothing out of him, which can limit him externally. At the same time God stays unlimited internally. This means that God, who 'containing all things' is 'unified, not composite, without diversity of members, completely similar and equal to himself'³⁰³.

The idea of God's inclusiveness leads Irenaeus to introduce the second element of God's nature his omnipotence or his unlimited power. At this point Irenaeus makes a clear distinction between his conception of God and the conception which yields Greek monistic ontology. His God is not subject to necessity and his freedom is

²⁹⁸ William R. Schoedel, *Enclosing, not Enclosed: The Early Christian Doctrine of God*, in *Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition*, edited by, W.R. Schoedel and R.L. Wilken, Paris, 1979., pp. 75-86.

²⁹⁹ Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Haer.* I, 1, 1.

³⁰⁰ Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Haer.* II, 1, 2.

³⁰¹ Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Haer.* II, 1, 2.

³⁰² Aristotle, *De Mundo*, 397b 30-35.

³⁰³ Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Haer.* II, 13, 3

reflected in his unlimited power. The power of God is extended equally to all beings and everything depends on the will of the all-inclusive God. Thus the freedom of God becomes an aspect of his power. The aim of the doctrine of God's freedom is the refutation of Gnostic theory, which makes God the slave of necessity. Although God is the highest factor in an order, he remains subjected to this order, which includes and surpasses him. For Irenaeus God is not God if he is not almighty and free (αὐτεξούσιος). Richard Norris³⁰⁴ insists on the position that Irenaeus failed to express or conceptualise in a clear fashion the Gnostic concept of God. Instead of this he developed his own doctrine of God without awareness of doing so, which he directed against the Gnostic concept of God. However, this theory of Irenaeus is the great achievement in liberation of God from the necessity of Greek thought. Irenaeus rejects the Gnostic concept of redemption as reassertion of the unchanging natural structures of the cosmos. He introduces a new doctrine based not on the given world in which rules static and inviolable order, but the doctrine of the world as a creature of the all-encompassing God. This idea of God's freedom is the key notion for Irenaeus' meaning of redemption and it forms the frame for human history with God.

All-encompassing God through his *Logos* created everything, which includes mankind and the world³⁰⁵. Irenaeus introduces the notion *Logos*. However, his *Logos* concept does not have anything in common with *logos* theology of the Apologist. He rejects the analogy between the generation of the *Logos* and the uttered *Logos* of Stoics, made by Philo and Justin Martyr.

'In Greek, *Logos* as the directive faculty which elaborates thought is one thing, and another is the organ by means of which 'word' is emitted³⁰⁶. For Irenaeus this analogy is the source of Gnostic erroneous conception of the generation of the *Logos* as a physical process. Thus, he criticises the Gnostic conception of the generation of *Logos* as a physical emanation:

Those who transferred the generation of the expressed word of man to the eternal *Logos* of God and give the expressions a beginning and a genesis as they would give it to their own word. But how will the *Logos* of God, or rather God himself since he is *Logos*, differ from the word of man, if it has the same order and manner of generation.³⁰⁷

³⁰⁴ Richard Norris, *The Transcendence and Freedom of God*, in *Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition*, edited by, W.R. Schoedel and R.L. Wilken, Paris, 1979., p. 98

³⁰⁵ Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Haer.* IV, 20, 1-3

³⁰⁶ Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Haer.*, II, 28, 4

³⁰⁷ Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Haer.* II, 14, 1.

The Monarchianism of Irenaeus' native land determines his *Logos* concept and he would have nothing to do with any essential separation of *logos*, or nous from the Father.

But since God the Mind, all World, all operative Spirit, all Light, always identical and like himself (as it is right to think God and learn from the scriptures), processes and distinctions of this kind do not exist in him.³⁰⁸

Thus, the relationship between Father and *Logos* is described in favourite paradoxes about the Invisible becoming visible and the Impassible undergoing suffering³⁰⁹, underlying the same nature of *Logos* with the Father.

He thinks of *Logos* in biblical terms, following the Proverbs 8: 23 of the Septuagint and St. John the Theologian. Irenaeus maintains that *Logos* or as he calls it Son is always coexisting with the Father at the first, before the beginning³¹⁰. He conceives that the generation of the *Logos* was from eternity and explicitly denies a beginning of generation of *Logos*. Irenaeus knew of the Philonic twofold stage theory³¹¹, according to which the generation of the *Logos* precedes by an eternal existence in the mind of God. The teaching of the Gnostics is different in the point of external existence of *Logos* in the mind of God. They thought that *Logos* had a beginning of generation which was not preceded an eternal existence in the mind of God. By refutation of the Gnostic theory, Irenaeus develops his theory according to which the generation of *Logos* had no beginning at all. Moreover, the beginning was not preceded by an eternal existence in the mind of God. For Irenaeus any conception of generation, which had a beginning and cannot be described as eternal, is unacceptable. His position is not as it is in the twofold stage theory to emphasise the eternity of *Logos*, but rather to show that generation is eternal or without beginning. At this point Irenaeus stops and he does not go further in explanation of the generation of *Logos*. For him it remains the unique miracle: 'If any one, therefore, says to us, 'How then was the Son produced by the Father?' we reply to him, that no man understands that emission, or generation, or utterance, or manifestation, or by whatever name one may describe His generation, which is in fact indescribable'³¹².

Irenaeus makes a clarification between *Logos* and *Sophia*, which are identified in some of his predecessors. Before Irenaeus, Theophilus identified the Spirit with

³⁰⁸ Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Haer.* II, 28, 4.

³⁰⁹ Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Haer.* III, 16, 6.

³¹⁰ Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Haer.* II, 30, 9.

³¹¹ Harry Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, p. 200.

³¹² Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Haer.* II, 28, 6.

Wisdom³¹³ and he was the first to apply the term 'triad' to the Godhead. He replaced the baptismal formula of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, with a triadic formula of God, *Logos* and *Sophia*. Following Psalm 33.6, Theophilus states that the three days which preceded the creation of the sun and moon 'were types of the Triad, that is, of God, and of His Word and of His Wisdom' (τύποι εἰσὶν τῆς τριάδος, τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῦ)³¹⁴. Irenaeus writes in the same spirit:

We have provided many proofs to show that the Word, that is, the Son, was always with the Father. ...the Wisdom, which is the Spirit, was with him before all creation.³¹⁵

A few passages after, Irenaeus defines the Godhead: 'Therefore there is one God who by Word and Wisdom made and harmonised everything. He is the Creator, who assigned this world to the human race'³¹⁶. The role of the Spirit is to prepare man in the Son of God, who brings man to the Father, and finally the Father confers on man the incorruptibility (ἀφθαρσία) of eternal life³¹⁷. The incorruptibility of eternal life is the core of Irenaeus' thought. The idea of incorruptibility initially appeared in the epistles of Ignatius of Antioch. The same pastoral zeal leads Irenaeus to develop such an idea, which is not a product of intellectual speculation but the real experience of liturgical life.

'But, being ignorant of Him who from the Virgin is Emmanuel, they are deprived of His gift, which is eternal life; and not receiving the incorruptible Word, they remain in mortal flesh, and are debtors to death, not obtaining the antidote of life'³¹⁸.

The idea of immortality locates the life force directly in human life and it is in connection with the Eucharist. His conception of incorruptibility was derived from the relationship, which Irenaeus establishes between creation and Eucharist. Irenaeus as well as Ignatius gives the central place in his teaching to the Eucharist. He argues that fleshly bodies must inherit eternal life, because they partake of the Eucharistic bread.

For as the bread, which is produced from the earth, when it receives the invocation of God, is no longer common bread, but the Eucharist, consisting of two realities, earthly and heavenly; so also our bodies, when they receive

³¹³ Theophilus of Antioch, *Ad Autolyicum*, 1, 7; 2, 18.

³¹⁴ Theophilus of Antioch *Ad Autolyicum*, 2, 15.

³¹⁵ Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Haer.* IV, 20, 3 .

³¹⁶ Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Haer.* IV, 20, 4 .

³¹⁷ Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Haer.* V, 2, 3.

³¹⁸ Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Haer.* III, 19, 1, the similar idea in Ignatius, Ephesians 20, 2: 'the drug of immortality, the antidote not to die but live forever in Jesus Christ.'

the Eucharist, are no longer corruptible, having the hope of the resurrection to eternity.³¹⁹

According to the opinion of some modern scholars mainly from Anglican circles the Eucharist is an extension of the Incarnation. Montgomery Hitchcock³²⁰ maintains that the Eucharist is extension of Christ's creative energies. He makes a link between the Incarnation and the Eucharist. Gnostic disbelief in Incarnation implies that their celebration of mysteries cannot extend the divine power into human life. Gnostics treat gifts of creation as something created by the Demiurge and not God the Father. For them the bread and wine of Eucharist remain the food and the nourishment, without any relation to Christ. This is the reason why the spear of Irenaeus' critic was against occult and esoteric Gnostic practices. For him by the Eucharist, the Church handed to mortal man the 'medicine of life' which united them with Godhead. The life or the new life is the key conception of Irenaeus teaching.

'It is not possible to live apart from life, and the means of life (ὑπαρξις) is found in fellowship (μετοχή) with God'³²¹.

The Eucharistic experience leads Irenaeus to an identification of existence with life. This identification of being with the life is the same as in Ignatius. The origins of this identification lie on the one hand, in the biblical roots of the relationship between Eucharist and life, and on the other hand in combating heresies. The life of the Eucharist is the life of God. Only by participation in God, through the Eucharist man can gain life. Irenaeus' concept of life is not life in the sense of Aristotelian movement which flows out mechanically from the interior of existence. Moreover, this is not the concept of life which modern individualism proclaims. The conception of life as a certain length of time between birth and death, is established on the idea that man is a creature who exists by himself. Irenaeus thinks initially of life as a separated existence, which has not its being in itself, but in communion with God. This kind of life exists within the Trinity and it is actualised within the members of the Eucharistic community. With the identification of life with communion Irenaeus locates the source of being in God. He does not proceed further and his interest mainly remains on created being.

³¹⁹ Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Haer.* IV, 18, 5.

³²⁰ F.R.M. Hitchcock, *Irenaeus of Lungdunum*, Cambridge, 1914., p. 87.

³²¹ Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Haer.* IV, 20, 5.

Irenaeus' teaching about God and his world opens the way to the further philosophical development of Christian thought. The formulation of the tradition was carried on by the bright boy who was already reading the books in Alexandria when the old bishop finished his task in Lyon. Origen was the logical successor of Irenaeus, but his philosophy did not surpass the contribution of the theology of Irenaeus.

3. The triumph of Orthodoxy; Athanasius of Alexandria

'The innocent speculations of the Apologists came to provide support for the Arian school of thought'³²². This remark of Prestige pointed out the source of the teaching which had shaken the Church in the fourth century. To put it more precisely, the teaching of Arius and his supporters was the fruit of the garden of Origen's theological legacy. Origen's thought carries significant tensions and inner contradictions, which gave rise to varying interpretations. His teaching about God implies the principle of necessity, which always exists in the relationship between God and the world. This was unacceptable for some of Origen's successors because it correlates God and the world too closely. Methodius of Olympus³²³ repudiated Origen's doctrine of an eternal creation, accusing him of trying to establish a self-subsistent reality alongside God. The blade of Methodius' criticism was directed against Origen's 'dualism' having the aim of preserving God as a being wholly sufficient to himself as well as his freedom of action in creation. The essence of the problem lies in the fact that Origen linking God's Being too closely with creation of the world diminishes the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*. The strong tendency to emphasise the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* demanded belief in an absolute unlikeness between God and creation. This was the common starting point for two different theological world-views, that of Arius and the other of Athanasius.

First I will elucidate the standpoint of Arius. He was a priest in Alexandria. In the time of bishop Alexander of Alexandria, shortly before 320, he began to preach a doctrine which attracted many supporters. Alexander, finding those teachings dangerous in some points, deposed him from his post in the council of the Egyptian Church in 323. A few years later, in 325, his teaching was condemned by the Council of Nicaea. Finding supporters among the very influential bishops as well as in the court of Emperor Constantine, Arius' party began to recover, and was soon

³²² G.L. Prestige, *God in the Patristic Thought*, p. 123

³²³ Rowan Williams, *Arius; Heresy and Tradition*, (DLT, London, 1987.), pp. 167-71

ready to strike back at the Nicene party. Arius' death was surrounded by uncertainties, but the episcopal and imperial uproar which Arianism provoked kept both Church and Empire in a state of constant theological and political uncertainty for the next 60 years.

The main written source of Arius' doctrine is his poem *Thalia* (Θαλία), meaning "banquet" or "dinner party"³²⁴. The reconstruction of a profile of Arius' doctrine is difficult because written evidence of his teaching is available only through the reports of his enemies. The first source upon which we can build an opinion is the credal letter presented to Alexander of Alexandria, signed by Arius and eleven supporters. The second source is Arius' letter to the Eusebius of Nicomedia and the third is the Confession of Athanasius and Euzoius addressed to the Emperor in 327³²⁵. Athanasius gives brief extracts of Arius' *Thalia* in his *Contra Arianos* I.5-6 and *De Synodis* 15. As we noticed before Arius is deeply rooted in the Alexandrian theological tradition. The theological ideas of Arius were developed in the light of Methodius' and Alexander's repudiation of Origen's theory of the eternity of God and creation. Also maintained the idea of eternity of God as well co-eternity of the Father and the Son³²⁶. The need to clearly delineate the difference between God and creation was the origin of the problem of the nature of *Logos*. The problem was on which side of the ontological gulf between God and creation *Logos* is situated - on the side of God or on the side of creation. Arius chose the second solution. By rejecting the eternity of the world Arius rejected the eternity of *Logos*. He decided to place *Logos* among other created beings. Following Philo, Arius gave *Logos* a twofold role. *Logos* is an attribute of the divine essence and the being created by the will and act of God. In Arius teaching is inherited the dual concern so typical of Alexandrian tradition. The first concern is to preserve God's freedom and the second is how to avoid the concept of *Logos* as divine rationality, which implies the presence of pre-existent ideal forms. According to Athanasius, Arius wrote:

...the Word of God Himself was 'made out of nothing,' and 'once He was not,' and 'He was not before His origination,' but He as others 'had an origin of creation.' 'For God,' he says, 'was alone, and the Word as yet was not, nor

³²⁴ Athanasius, *De Synodis* 15, *Orat.* I. 2-5; *de Sent. D.* 6; Athanasius states that Arius wrote 'as if in a the Song for dinner party' and Socrates in his *Ecclesiastical history*, I. 9 'Arius had written a treatise on his own opinion which he entitled *Thalia*; but the character of the book is loose and dissolute, similar in its style and metres to the Songs of Sotades'. The Arian Philostorgius tells us that 'Arius wrote the Songs for the sea and for the mill and for the road, and then set them to suitable music'. See also R. Williams, *Arius*, pp. 62-81.

³²⁵ R. Williams, *Arius*, p. 95.

³²⁶ Peter Widdicombe, *The Fatherhood of God from Origen to Athanasius*, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994.), pp. 129-30.

the Wisdom. Then, wishing to form us, thereupon He made a certain one, and named Him Word and Wisdom and The Son, that He might form us by means of Him.' Accordingly, he says that there are two wisdoms, first, the attribute co-existent with God, and next, that in this wisdom the Son was originated, and was only named Wisdom and Word as partaking of it.³²⁷

Thus, Arius defines *Logos* of God as rational structure of the world but without existence independent of the world. He underlined two principles. The first one is that 'there was [a time] when the Son of God was not' (ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ) and the second that God created all things, including the Son 'out of nothing' (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων). Arius gave a solution for the unsolved tension of previous Alexandrian theology. Establishing the *Logos* as an individual being distinct from God, he preserves God's liberty from every contingent and mutable reality. At the same time, Arius solved the problem of immanent rationality breaking the necessary connection between *Logos* of God and the existence of an ordered world. According to the principle that *Logos* does not exist before the divine decision to make the world (in other words, that *Logos* has a temporal beginning). Arius states that *Logos* or the Son owes his being to an act of will by the Father. As Bishop Williams pointedly concludes, Arius by combining and reorganising traditional ideas 'presses them to their logical conclusions – God is free, the world need not exist, the Word is other than God, the Word is part of the world, so the Word is freely formed ex nihilo'³²⁸.

By rejecting the eternity of *Logos* and making him a part of created reality, Arius establishes God as a monad, and God's being as uniquely self-subsistent. In his credal letter to Alexander, Arius expresses the nature of God's being by attributing to Him ingenerateness, eternity and without beginning.

'We acknowledge one God, the only unbegotten (ἀγέννητος), the only eternal (ἀίδιος), the only one without cause or beginning (ἀναρχος)³²⁹.

Being unbegotten (ἀγέννητον) God is by definition simple and single, indivisible and what is necessary and eternal³³⁰.

God, being the cause of all things, is without beginning and supremely unique, while the Son, timelessly begotten by the Father, created and established before all ages, did not exist prior his begetting, but was timelessly begotten before all things; he alone was given existence directly

³²⁷ Athanasius, *Contra Arianos*, 1, 5

³²⁸ R. Williams, *Arius*, p. 177

³²⁹ The statement of faith and his Alexandrian supporters (from Opitz, U. 6) in R. Williams, *Arius*, pp. 247-8, also in Athanasius, *De Synodis* 16

³³⁰ Rowan Williams, *The Logic of Arianism*, *The Journal of Theological Studies*, volume 34, Oxford, 1983., p. 70

by the Father. For he is not eternal and co-eternal or equally self-sufficient with the Father, nor does he have his being alongside the Father, [in virtue] as some way, [of] his relation with him, thus postulating two self-sufficient first principles. But it is God [only], as monad and first principle of all things, who exists in this way before all things.³³¹

The Arian logic is that there is no room for two ingenerate realities (δύο ἀγέννητα) and the Son must be classified as γέννημα or κτίσμα. The concept of God the Father as absolute unity and God the Son as multiplicity imposes the conclusion that the Son is not the same in essence (οὐδὲ ὁμοούσιος) with the Father. If the Son is of the same essence as the Father, he must then have the same attributes as the Father - he must be ingenerate, eternal, and without beginning. The Son 'is not equal, no, nor one in essence with [the Father]' (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἴσος, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὁμοούσιος αὐτῷ).³³²

Arius does not want to accept a concept of God understood generically. God according to him cannot be the essence in which the Father and the Son participate equally. They have distinct essential properties, and as such are completely different in nature.

The essences of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, are separate in nature, and estranged, and disconnected, and alien, and without participation of each other;' and, in his own words, 'utterly unlike from each other in essence and glory, unto infinity'.³³³

The names Father, Son and Holy Ghost are more metaphor than essential characteristics. Arius does not think God as the Father and Fatherhood is essential to God's being. The same can be said for the Son. The Son cannot be eternal. Rather, he is a creature who came into being out of nothing. He was used by God to create humanity. The Son participates in God's *Logos* and Wisdom, but he is neither *Logos* nor Wisdom, but just named like that after God's attributes³³⁴. Like all γενητά he is ontologically different from God and dependant on his will. Thus, he is called the Son only by grace (κατὰ χάριν), not by nature. Arius applied the same concept of participation to *Logos*, calling him God 'by participation in grace'. *Logos* is 'God in name only' (λέγεται ὀνόματι μόνον θεός)³³⁵.

Arius' intention was to clearly distinguish the uncreated and the self-subsistent, between God and the world. He achieved this by abolishing any intermediate zone

³³¹ Opitz, U. 6 in Williams, *Arius*, pp. 248, also in Athanasius, *De Synodis* 16

³³² Athanasius, *De Synodis* 15

³³³ *Contra Arianos*, I, 6

³³⁴ Athanasius, *Contra Arianos*, I, 5.

between God and the world, which would otherwise necessarily link them. By abolishing the intermediate zone between God and the world, *Logos* ceased to be an intermediary. Arius classified *Logos* in the created realm, identifying him with other created beings. Thus, Arius avoided the trap of Greek monistic ontology, but in doing so he courted another danger - jeopardising the whole concept of salvation through Jesus Christ, the true Son of God. His name would thereafter remain closely related to the first dogmatic crisis of early Christianity, which was not rooted in Greek philosophical thought.

This completely different approach to the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* had a worthy opponent in Athanasius of Alexandria. He is well known as a champion of Nicene Orthodoxy. In spite of the fact that Athanasius was just a deacon when he attended Council of Nicaea as a follower of Bishop Alexander, whom he was to succeed as Bishop of Alexandria, his role was significant in the condemnation of Arius' teaching. The condemnation of Arius at Nicaea could not contain the influence of Arius and his supporters among the churches. As a result, the Alexandrian bishop was to spend his entire life struggling against the Arian heresy. In witnessing to the faith in a true God, Athanasius became involved in imperial and ecclesial intrigues and spent many years in exile. Emperor Valens in 366 invited Athanasius to resume his place as Bishop of Alexandria. Athanasius spent the last years of his life in tranquillity, remaining faithful to his beliefs in the divine *Logos* who became flesh. From his early apologetic writings *Contra Gentes* and *De Incarnatione* is evident that the central place in his interest is occupied by the doctrine of relationship between God and the world. In *Contra Gentes* Athanasius is still under the big influence of Origen and previous Alexandrian tradition. In another treatise of this time, *De Incarnatione* he develops his own style and the influence of Origen decreases³³⁶. It has become a commonplace view³³⁷ that Irenaeus of Lyon influenced Athanasius by distancing him from Origen and Alexandrian catechetical tradition. This is evident in the language, which Athanasius adopted from Irenaeus to describe the relationship between God and the world. Athanasius approaches this problem in the same way as the Bishop of Lyon. Making a clear distinction between the Creator and created beings, Athanasius speaks of God the Father as a Creator³³⁸.

³³⁵ Athanasius, *Contra Arianos*, I, 6.

³³⁶ Andrew Louth, *The origins of Christian Mystical Tradition*, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981.), pp. 77-80

³³⁷ Khaled Anatolios, The Influence of Irenaeus on Athanasius, *Studia Patristica*, volume 36, Peeters, Leuven, 2001., pp. 463-76

³³⁸ See also in Irenaeus, *Epideixis* 6

He abandoned Origen's theory according to which God and world, distinct in their intrinsic nature, are connected by mediatory role of *Logos*. Athanasius emphasises the significance of the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*, which from Athanasius onwards was adopted as a principle of patristic theology. The relationship between created and uncreated nature governs the paradigm of Athanasius' ontology³³⁹. His early works indicate that Athanasius' starting point is the relationship between God and humanity. His cosmology is always in function of his anthropology.

For God, the creator of the universe and king of all, who is beyond all being and human thought, since he is good and bountiful, he made mankind in his own image through his own Word, our Saviour Jesus Christ; and he also made man perceptive and understanding of reality through his similarity to him, so that as long as he kept his likeness he might ever abandon his concept of God or live the company of the saints, but retaining the grace of him who bestowed it in him, and also special power given him by the Father's Word, he might rejoice and converse with God, living an idyllic and truly blessed and immortal life.³⁴⁰

In Athanasius' ontology the convergence between immanence and transcendence of God's being is underlined. The concept of God who transcends all beings and thinking belongs to Platonic³⁴¹ and Middle-Platonic world-views. Athanasius probably follows Irenaeus³⁴², who provides the same concept of divine transcendence. Athanasius' God is 'incorporeal and incorruptible and immortal, lacking nothing whatever'³⁴³. The divine being according to Athanasius is real, true being (τὸν ὄντως ὄντα Θεὸν)³⁴⁴. To the existence of God as a true being Athanasius adds the existence of something that is completely opposite to God, or non-being as such. He situates the world between two fundamental and diametrically opposite ontological categories. Thus the world has two possible directions - toward God or toward non-being, from which it came to being³⁴⁵. Establishing the divine transcendence, Athanasius does not diminish God's accessibility. On the contrary, he affirms the divine accessibility through creation. Athanasius states that God 'who is invisible by nature, (...) might nevertheless be known to people through his

³³⁹ Khaled Anatolios, Athanasius, The coherence of his thought, (Routledge, London, NY, 1998.) 31-5.

³⁴⁰ Athanasius, Contra Gentes 2, (in Athanasius, Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione, edited and translated by Robert W. Thompthe Son, Oxford, 1971.)

³⁴¹ Plato, Republica, VI, 509b, see also in E.P. Meijering, Orthodoxy and Platonism in Athanasius: Synthesis or Antithesis, Leiden, 1968., 6-9.

³⁴² Irenaeus, Epideixis 3.

³⁴³ Athanasius, Contra Gentes 22.

³⁴⁴ Athanasius, Contra Gentes 30.

³⁴⁵ Athanasius, De Incarnatione 2.

work'³⁴⁶. We find in Irenaeus the same way of establishing divine accessibility³⁴⁷. He moves from God's self-contained transcendence to a conception of God's goodness. Thus he provides ontological presuppositions for accessibility in the very being of God. Apart from the apophatic descriptions of God as a being defined by many negative attributes, Athanasius gives some positive statement about God. God is 'good' (ἀγαθός) and 'lover of mankind' (φιλόανθρωπος)³⁴⁸. It means that God by his goodness and loving-kindness, which is in his nature, has bridged the ontological gulf between created and uncreated nature. God creates in order to manifest his love and his creative agency is integral to his being. The relationship between God and creation is articulated on the basis of a distinction *in se* and *ad extra*. God is 'in all creation, he is in essence outside the universe but in everything by his power, ordering everything and extending his providence'³⁴⁹. Employing the distinction essence-power, Athanasius shows the presence of God in the world by his power. The crucial point in the relationship between God and creation is the total dependency of the creation on God, because God brought creation from nothing into existence. The divine sovereignty characterises the relationship between God and the world and preserves his transcendence. On the other side is divine 'goodness', which keeps the relationship between divine immanence and transcendence in balance, maintaining the nearness of God. Being outside creation by his essence God allows creation to share in his power. Athanasius, like Irenaeus, uses Platonic categories of participation:

Being good, he [God] governs and establishes the whole world through his Word who is himself God, in order that creation, illuminated by the leadership, providence and ordering of the Word, may be able to remain firm, since it shares in the Word who is truly from the Father and is aided by him to exist.³⁵⁰

Being ontologically impoverished, creation is constantly in the state of a potential dissolution back into nothingness. Athanasius shows that the activity of God in the world is to maintain creation in existence by his *Logos*. He makes no distinction in Godhead by prioritising the Father over the Son, or God over his *Logos*. The *Logos* is fully divine for Athanasius.

³⁴⁶ Athanasius, *Contra Gentes* 35.

³⁴⁷ Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adv. Hear.* 11, 9, 1 'For even creation reveals Him who formed it, and the very work made suggests Him who made it, and the world manifests Him who ordered it'.

³⁴⁸ Athanasius, *Contra Gentes* 35.

³⁴⁹ Athanasius, *De Incarnatione* 17.

³⁵⁰ Athanasius, *Contra Gentes* 41.

His holy disciples teach that everything was created through him and for him, and that being good offspring of a good The Father and true The Son, he is the power of the Father and his wisdom and Word; not so by participation, nor to these properties accrue to him from outside in the way of those who participate in him and are given wisdom by him; but he is absolute wisdom, very Word, and himself the Father's own power.³⁵¹

Athanasius defines *Logos* in a completely different way from Arius. For him *Logos* is not on the side of creation, as it was in Arius, but on the side of the strictly divine. *Logos* is other than creation, but he is powerfully present in it. He keeps the role of mediator between God and creation, but there is no subordinationism. Athanasius clearly distinguishes the *Logos* of God from λόγος σπερματικός of Stoics.

By word I do not mean the word involved and innate in every creature, which some are accustomed to call seminal; it has no life of its own neither can it reason or think, but it acts merely by an extrinsic art according to the skill of him who set it in the creature. Nor do I mean the word of human kind which is composed of syllables and expressed in the air. But I mean the living and acting God, the very Word of the good God of the universe, who is other than created things and all creation; he is rather the sole and individual Word of good The Father, who was ordered all this universe and illuminates it by his providence. He is the good Word of the good The Father, and it is he who has established the order off all things, reconciling the opposites and from them forming a single harmony.³⁵²

Athanasius does not only distinguish *Logos* from the seminal *logos*, but his *Logos*, as in Irenaeus³⁵³, differs from the human word or λόγος προφορικός because *Logos* is not composed and therefore not dissolvable. Despite the fact that Athanasius openly attacked the Stoic doctrine of λόγος σπερματικός in previous citation, for some scholars it remains an open question how Athanasius saw the relation between human reason and divine Reason in his early treatises³⁵⁴. It is obvious that in *Contra Gentes* we can trace the frequent influence of Stoicism, but this is not the case with the Stoic doctrine of λόγος σπερματικός. Using the same vocabulary and conceptual tools of Stoics, Athanasius replaced the doctrine of λόγος σπερματικός with faith in the Creator *Logos*³⁵⁵. Athanasius interpreted the Stoic doctrine about rationality as a way to know God in the Christian sense in terms

³⁵¹ Athanasius, *Contra Gentes* 46.

³⁵² Athanasius, *Contra Gentes* 40

³⁵³ Irenaeus, *Adv. Hear.* II, 17, 4 'If, again, the Aeons were derived from *Logos*, *Logos* from *Nous*, and *Nous* from *Bythus*, just as lights are kindled from a light-as, for example, torches are from a torch-then they may no doubt differ in generation and size from one another; but since they are of the same substance with the Author of their production, they must either all remain for ever impossible, or their The Father Himself must participate in passion'.

³⁵⁴ E.P. Meijering, *Orthodoxy and Platonism in Athanasius*, p. 34

³⁵⁵ Andrew Louth, Reason and Revelation, *Scottish Journal of Theology*, volume 23, 1970, p. 386.

of his strong belief that *Logos* in creation is the Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ. The knowledge of *Logos* is at the same time the knowledge of God.

As looking up to heaven and seeing its order and the light of the stars one can form an idea of the Word who sets their order, so when thinking of the Word of God one must also think of his The Father, God, from whom he proceeds and therefore rightly called the interpreter and messenger of his The Father.³⁵⁶

The universe is constructed reasonably by the *Logos* of God. But this *Logos* is not the impersonal and immanent Reason of the Stoics, but *Logos* is the Son of God, the incarnate Jesus Christ. Athanasius does not deny that the order, meaning and intelligibility in the world is arranged and governed³⁵⁷ by the *Logos* of God. Athanasius develops this argument through the analogy between reason and order in the world and *Logos*, who is the Son of the Father³⁵⁸. In his second treatise *De Incarnatione*, Athanasius develops his theological argument in *Contra Gentes*. Thus the knowledge of God is presented in the context of grace. Athanasius asks the question:

What advantage would there be for those who had been made, if they did not know their own Maker? Or in what way would they be rational, being unaware of the Word of the Father by whom they had also been created? (Ἡ πῶς ἂν εἶεν λογικοὶ μὴ γινώσκοντες τὸν τοῦ Πατρὸς Λόγον, ἐν ᾧ καὶ γεγόνασιν)³⁵⁹.

Answering the question how λογικοὶ are rational if they do not know the *Logos* of God, Athanasius combines the Stoic argumentation with typically Christian themes. The Stoic argumentation is that λογικοὶ are rational if they participate in *Logos*, which is Reason. In Athanasius interpretation *Logos* is the Son of God, who was the incarnate Jesus Christ. Thus, real λογικοὶ are those who recognise the full revelation of *Logos* in Jesus Christ.

Therefore, lest this should happen, since he is good he bestowed on them on his own image, our Lord Jesus Christ and made them according to his own image and likeness, in order that, understanding through such grace the image, I mean the Word of the Father, they might be able through him to gain some notion about the Father, and recognising the Maker, might live a happy and truly blessed life.³⁶⁰

³⁵⁶ Athanasius, *Contra Gentes* 45

³⁵⁷ Athanasius, *Contra Gentes* 40

³⁵⁸ Khaled Anatolios, *Athanasius*, p. 49

³⁵⁹ Athanasius, *De incarnatione* 11.

³⁶⁰ Athanasius, *De incarnatione* 11.

As we see the Stoic idea of λόγος σπερματικός is completely changed with the Christian orientation. Athanasius employs the Platonic category of participation to show in which ways man can be truly λογικός. Through participation in the image and the likeness of incarnate *Logos* of God, we can be truly rational and have knowledge of God.

It is very interesting to mention that Athanasius in his *Contra Gentes* proposes another way to know God. Apart from the way of knowing God which is based on faith in the Creator, there is one based on the rational and immortal soul. The soul has the faculty of independent contemplation God³⁶¹. Athanasius describes soul as τὴν φύσιν εὐκίνητος³⁶², using the same term as Origen³⁶³. Following Origen, who teaches that the soul falling from the level of *nous* to the level of *psyche* is imprisoned in the body, Athanasius links *nous* and the soul in reverse process. Thus *nous* as the superior pole and principal director of the soul³⁶⁴ always turns the soul back into communion with God³⁶⁵. Conceiving the soul as self-motivating by nature, Athanasius nearly establishes the existence of an eternal reality alongside God, which is not dependent on God's grace. But in *De Incarnatione*³⁶⁶, Athanasius neglected the idea of self-moving soul, teaching that man, including his soul, is mortal by nature because he is created by nature. The purity of the soul still remains the way to gain the eternal life and knowledge of God³⁶⁷. The original contribution of Athanasius is the doctrine of the soul as mirror of God the Father³⁶⁸.

‘When the soul has put of every stain of sin with which it is tinged, and keeps pure only what is in the image, than when this shines forth, it can truly contemplate as in mirror the Word, the image of the Father (ἐν κατόπτρῳ θεωρεῖ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ Πατρὸς τὸν Λόγον), and in him meditate on the Father, of whom the Saviour is the image’³⁶⁹.

Being a mirror-image of the Father means to reflect the image of God. But purity of soul is a condition for being formed in such an image. It is important to underline that there is no ontological connection or the natural kinship between God and the soul. The soul can reflect the image of God only when it is pure. Although dealing with a Platonistic theme, Athanasius nevertheless retains a Christian position.

³⁶¹ Athanasius, *Contra Gentes* 2. 33.

³⁶² Athanasius, *Contra Gentes* 4. 9.

³⁶³ Origen, *On the First Principles*, I, 8, 4.

³⁶⁴ Charles Kannengiesser, Athanasius of Alexandria and the foundation of traditional christology, *Theological studies*, 34, Baltimore, 1973., p. 109.

³⁶⁵ Athanasius, *Contra Gentes* 26.24; 39.19; 34.14 .

³⁶⁶ Athanasius, *De Incarnatione* 4.

³⁶⁷ Athanasius, *De Incarnatione* 57.

³⁶⁸ Andrew Louth, *The origins of Christian Mystical Tradition*, pp. 79-80.

³⁶⁹ Athanasius, *Contra Gentes* 34.

He achieved some progress in his early treatises in comparison with the previous tradition not just by deplatonising it, but also by giving answers to some current theological problems. Athanasius emphasised the transcendence of God the Creator over creation, which came from nothing as well as God's action to protect creation from the corruption inherited in its ontological poverty. The absence of anti-Arian polemics is evident in his early works. The necessity for the Son to be fully divine and fully human is not a central theme of *Contra Gentes* and *De Incarnatione* though it is of more concern in his anti-Arian writings.

Now we focus our interest on the theological implication of Arian teaching and Athanasius' refutation of it.

As we saw before, Athanasius and Arius agreed that the relationship between God and the world must be conceived in the light of the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*. The need to stress the ontological difference between God and the world common to both authors was the logical response to Origen's teaching. Thus God became absolutely free and sovereign in relation to the world and the world became dependent on God. The abolition of an intermediate zone between God and creation was achieved in different ways in Arius and in Athanasius. With the intention of preserving an ontological gulf between God and the world, Arius applied a radical disjunction between God and the world to the relation between God and *Logos*. Thus *Logos* or the Son of God was downgraded to the level of creaturehood. Athanasius on the other hand distinguished the relationship between God and the world from the relationship between God and *Logos*. He placed *Logos* in the divine realm. Athanasius, like Arius, divided reality on two distinct realms, the uncreated and the created. By positioning *Logos* in the divine realm, Athanasius points out dissimilarity between the Son and the creation.

The Son is Offspring of the Father's essence (γέννημα τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας), and He is Framer, and other things are framed by Him, and He is the Radiance and Word and Image and Wisdom of the Father, and things originate stand and serve in their place below the Triad, therefore the Son is different in kind and different in essence from things originate, and on the contrary is proper (ἴδιος) to the Father's essence and one in nature (ὁμοφυσῆς) with it.³⁷⁰

Athanasius uses terms as 'offspring of the Father's essence', 'proper to the Father's essence', and 'one in nature' to underline the divine nature of the Son. Those terms are correlatives to ὁμοούσιος.

³⁷⁰ Athanasius, *Contra Arianos* I, 58

The word 'Coessential' has not this meaning when used of things immaterial, and especially of God, and acknowledging that the Word was not a creature, but an offspring from the essence, and that the Father's essence was the origin and root and fountain of the Son, and that he was of very truth His The Father's likeness.³⁷¹

Anatolios³⁷² in his book pointed out that ὁμοούσιος is not a positive statement telling us something about God's being; rather it is a negative one telling us that *Logos* is not a creature. Athanasius' qualification is based on the difference between God and the created order. Athanasius introduces "apart" ὁμοούσιος, another technical term to describe how the Son relates to the ἴδιος, the Father. ἴδιος is a biblical³⁷³ term, which was used by Alexander, his predecessor as Bishop of Alexandria. It describes the Son's relation to the Father as a relation of intimacy and inseparability. To 'be proper' with the Father means to be "from his essence" (ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας). The Son is 'proper to' the Father, while the relationship between creation and God is defined in the terms of 'externality'. Thus, creation is 'external to' or 'from outside' (ἐκτός, ἔξωθεν) the Father.

When then was God without that which is proper (ιδίου) to Him? Or how can a man consider that which is proper (ιδίου), as foreign (ξένου) and alien in essence (ἀλλοτριουσιος)? For other things, according to the nature of things originate, are without likeness in essence with the Maker; but are external (ἔξωθεν) to Him, made by the Word at His grace and will, and thus admit of ceasing to be, if it so pleases Him who made them; for such is the nature of things originate.³⁷⁴

By using the terms 'proper to' and 'external' or 'alien', Athanasius emphasises the ontological difference between God and creation as well as the identity in essence between the Son and the Father. Arguing against Arius' belief that the Son is 'called the Son and God and Wisdom only by participation'³⁷⁵, Athanasius makes another pair of oppositions to describe the relationship between God and creation. Being 'proper to' means to be from same essence, and being 'external to' means to 'be by

³⁷¹ Athanasius, *De Synodis* 45

³⁷² Khaled Anatolios, *Athanasius*, p. 96

³⁷³ *John* 5:18 'This way why the Jews sought all the more to kill him, because he not only broke the Sabbath but called God his own The Father (πατέρα ἴδιον), making himself equal God', and *Romans* 8:32 'He who did not spare his own The Son (τοῦ ἰδίου υἱοῦ), but gave him up for us all, will he also not give us all things with him'.

³⁷⁴ Athanasius, *Contra Arianos*, I, 20.

³⁷⁵ Athanasius, *Contra Arianos*, I, 15.

participation'. Thus, 'the Son Himself is not the Son by participation, but is the Father's own offspring'³⁷⁶.

Athanasius makes a fundamental distinction between God and creation, articulating the distinction in terms of what partakes and what is partaken as well as in the terms of what is external and what is proper to divine essence. The Son is related essentially to God, and not by participation, for there is nothing of the Father in which the Son does not participate. Being proper to the Father's essence means that God as God is wholly participated in (ὅλως μετέχεσθαι)³⁷⁷ by the Son. The full participation of the Son in the Father indicates that there is no gap between that which partakes, and which is partaken, because there is no gap between the being of the Father and the being of the Son. This is not the case with the creation. Athanasius applies the category of participation to the relationship between God and the world in such a way that creation is related to God by participation in the Son. Athanasius' usage of participation differs from that of Arius. Arius teaches that the Son is a creature among other creatures, but not the same as them.

We consider that the Son has this prerogative over others, and therefore is called Only-begotten, because He alone was brought to be by God alone, and all other things were created by God through the Son.³⁷⁸

Arius offers a hierarchical model of participation, giving a mediatory role to the Son. All things participate in the Son, who alone participates in the Father. God is involved in the world through the Son, who protects the world from direct contact with God. Athanasius criticises this position with a series of arguments. The first argument against the Arian position is that God is not so weak that he needs help from the Son in the act of creation³⁷⁹. The second argument is against the standpoint that God created only the Son and left the rest of the creative act to the Son. According to Athanasius, the God of Arius is too proud to be involved directly in the creative act³⁸⁰ for the direct force of God cannot create the creatures so weak by nature³⁸¹. The third argument is against mediatory role of the Son. If the Son is a creature like any other, how can he endure 'God's hand', and how can the Father create him directly? If the Son is a creature, existence of yet another mediator for the creation of the Son is implied. Every created mediator requires another mediator,

³⁷⁶ Athanasius, *Contra Arianos*, III, 1.


³⁷⁷ Athanasius, *Contra Arianos* I, 16.

³⁷⁸ Athanasius, *De Decretis* 7.

³⁷⁹ Athanasius, *Contra Arianos* II, 24.

³⁸⁰ Athanasius, *Contra Arianos* II, 25.

³⁸¹ Athanasius, *Contra Arianos* II, 31.



and so on *ad infinitum*³⁸². We can find the same argument in Irenaeus' refutation of Gnostic doctrine³⁸³. Irenaeus argues that God needs no assistance or helper in creation³⁸⁴. Irenaeus uses the same argument against those who says that God is 'careless, or inferior, or paid no regard to those things which took place among his own possessions'³⁸⁵. The logic of infinite regress³⁸⁶ is also criticised by Irenaeus. The conclusion of both Irenaeus and Athanasius is that all things were created by the Father, through *Logos*, who is his 'hand', and without whom nothing can be made: 'ὁ Πατήρ, ὡς διὰ χειρὸς, ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ εἰργάσατο τὰ πάντα, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ποιεῖ.'³⁸⁷.

Through this metaphor Irenaeus and Athanasius emphasise that the world was created from nothing by an immediate act of God, without a mediator. The role of *Logos* or the Son is not the role of a mediator, but because he is no less fully divine than the Father he is also no less truly the Creator. The role of the Son is to bridge the gap between creation and God, not through functional mediation, but rather through the immediate presence of the Father in creation. Being consubstantial with the Father, the Son reveals his presence in creation. Thus, the incapacity of creation to know God is bridged by partaking in the Son's knowledge of the Father. Not only the Son, but also Holy Spirit plays the role of mediator between God and the world. This mediation is based on the divine status of the whole Holy Trinity and their immediacy in the world.

Athanasius introduces another model of participation, completely different from that of Arius'. This model of immediate participation implies that through participation in the Spirit, creation participates in the Son and by participating in the Son, also participates in the Father. This model of participation is called 'immediate participation'³⁸⁸ different from hierarchical participation of Arius according to which the Son 'alone partakes the Father, and all other things partake the Son'³⁸⁹. Athanasius states:

³⁸² Athanasius, *Contra Arianos* II, 26.

³⁸³ E.P. Meijering, *Orthodoxy and Platonism in Athanasius*, pp. 89-90.

³⁸⁴ Irenaeus, *Adv. Hear.* IV, 7, 4 '...The Father being in no want of angels, in order that He might call the creation into being, and form man, for whom also the creation was made; nor, again, standing in need of any instrumentality for the framing of created things'.

³⁸⁵ Irenaeus, *Adv. Hear.* II, 2, 1.

³⁸⁶ Irenaeus, *Adv. Hear.* II, 2, 3.

³⁸⁷ Athanasius, *Contra Arianos* II, 31; *De Decretis* 7 also in Irenaeus, *Adv. Hear.* IV, 20, 1.

³⁸⁸ Khaled Anatolios, *Athanasius*, p. 115

³⁸⁹ Athanasius, *De Decretis* 9

The Son is not such by participation, but, while all things originated have by participation the grace of God, He is the Father's Wisdom and Word of which all things partake, it follows that He, being the deifying and enlightening power of the Father, in which all things are deified and quickened, is not alien in essence from the Father, but coessential. For by partaking of Him, we partake of the Father; because the Word is the Father's own.³⁹⁰

Athanasius is against Arius' model of hierarchical participation because such a model puts in question the divinity of the Son as well as the omnipotence of God. The categories of participation can be explained in the terms of grace. Arius' gradualist model of transmitting grace to creation implies two steps. In the first step, the Son receives grace from the Father, and then distributes it to the rest of creation. It is unacceptable to Athanasius that one who receives by participation can grant participation to others. Athanasius does not deny the possibility that one creature can give to another creature, but he wants to underline the role of creatures as receivers and the role of God as the ultimate Giver.

In that way the world is fully dependent on God and the gap between God and the creation is bridged by God's initiative and not by that of the creation. This positive step by God toward creation does not abolish the ontological difference between God and the world. The immediate participation of creation in the life of the Holy Trinity implies a certain correspondence between God and the world. The 'likeness' between God and creation cannot be described in terms of analogical similarity. Their difference in nature causes an asymmetrical relationship between God and the world, because creation partakes and God is partaken of. The asymmetrical structure of this relationship, based as it is on absolute dependence of the world on God, emphasises their 'likeness' much more than their otherness. The 'likeness' and the otherness between God and the creation lead us to the question of continuity and discontinuity between God and the world. It puts in question the relation between God's essence and his will.

The denial by Arius that the Son is fully divine separates God's creative activity from his being.

God being Maker, to say, that His Framing Word and His Wisdom once was not? It is the same as saying, that God is not Maker, if He had not His proper Framing Word which is from Him, but that that by which He frames, accrues to Him from without, and is alien from Him, and unlike in essence.³⁹¹

³⁹⁰ Athanasius, De Synodis 51

³⁹¹ Athanasius, Contra Arianos 17.

By making *Logos* dependent of creation, Arius identifies the function of the Father with the function of the Creator³⁹². If the Son is not Son by nature, but belongs to the realm of created beings, then God cannot be called the 'Father' but only 'Maker' or 'Creator'. The generative nature of God correlates with his creative activity.

But if there be not a Son, how then say you that God is a Creator? Since all things that come to be are through the Word and in Wisdom, and without This nothing can be, whereas you say He hath not That in and through which He makes all things. For if the Divine Essence be not fruitful itself, but barren, as they hold, as a light that lightens not, and a dry fountain, are they not ashamed to speak of His possessing framing energy? and whereas they deny what is by nature, do they not blush to place before it what is by will?³⁹³

Athanasius distinguishes between the relationship of God with creation and the relationship of the Son with the Father. Crucially, Athanasius cuts the connection between *theologia* and *oikonomia*, giving absolute priority to God's being over his will.

For the Word of God was not made for us, but rather we for Him, and 'in Him all things were created.' Nor for that we were weak, was He strong and made by the Father alone, that He might frame us by means of Him as an instrument; perish the thought! it is not so. For though it had seemed good to God not to make things originate, still had the Word been no less with God, and the Father in Him.³⁹⁴

Two different names can be applied to God. He is simultaneously the Father and the Creator. Being the Father entails much more than being the Creator³⁹⁵. Athanasius establishes a distinction between generation and creation on the basis of a distinction between divine essence and will. God's essence precedes his will, because God is 'The Father of an offspring from his proper essence' first and then he 'frames things that are external to him and before were not, by willing them'³⁹⁶.

Arius establishes a relationship between God and the word on the basis of divine will, which relates to the world. Athanasius, on the other hand, starts from the position that God is always Maker, but this does not lead him to conclude that his works necessarily must be eternal, as is the case with Origen. Being Maker implies the power to make and it does not constitute a relationship between God and the world, as in the case of God's Fatherhood, which is constitutive of his relationship

³⁹² Athanasius, *Contra Arianos* I, 29.

³⁹³ *Contra Arianos* II, 2

³⁹⁴ Athanasius, *Contra Arianos* II, 31.

³⁹⁵ Athanasius, *Contra Arianos* I, 33.

³⁹⁶ Athanasius, *Contra Arianos* II, 2.

with the Son. 'And a man may be and may be called Maker, though the works are not as yet; but he cannot be called the Father, nor can he be, unless a Son exists'³⁹⁷.

The Fatherhood of God tells much more about God's being than his creaturehood. God's Fatherhood does not imply temporal sequence in its being, as is the case with his creaturehood. God's Fatherhood implies logical order in his being. The Father and the Son are the ontological characteristics of God's being³⁹⁸ and it necessarily connotes an actual relation by which God's very being is constituted.

Athanasius refutes Origen's concept of God as παντοκράτωρ by defining God's power to make intrinsic to divine being and defining the creation as necessarily temporal because it has come from nothing.

God always had the power to make, yet the things originated had not the power of being eternal. For they are out of nothing, and therefore were not before their origination; but things which were not before their origination, how could these coexist with the ever-existing God?³⁹⁹

Only God's power to make is eternal. The creation has its beginning in time and it does not co-exist with God. It depends on the power of God the Creator, because of inherent limitations of its-nature. The relationship between the Father and the Son has priority over the relationship between God and the world. Athanasius concludes this on the basis of the priority of nature over will.

Now it is a something that surpasses will, that He should be by nature, and should be the Father of His proper Word. If then that which comes first, which is according to nature, did not exist, as they would have it in their folly, how could that which is second come to be, which is according to will? For the Word is first, and then the creation.⁴⁰⁰

The Son is proper to the Father's essence and not foreign to God as is the case with the creation. The Son feels the same delight as the Father seeing the world made after his own image⁴⁰¹ because he is one in being with the Maker. The relationship between God and the world is contained in the relationship between the Father and the Son. God mediates the ontological distance between God and the world in a twofold way. First, God is essentially the Father of his only-begotten Son and only subsequently the Maker of the world. Second, through the incarnation of his Son,

³⁹⁷ Athanasius, *Contra Arianos* I, 29.

³⁹⁸ G. Florovsky 'The Concept of creation in St. Athanasius', *Studia Patristica* 6, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 1962, pp. 45-6, reprinted in G. Florovsky, *Collected works*, (volume 4, Northland Publishing company, Belmont, Massachusetts, 1975.), pp. 52-3.

³⁹⁹ Athanasius, *Contra Arianos* I, 29.

⁴⁰⁰ Athanasius, *Contra Arianos* II, 2.

⁴⁰¹ Athanasius, *Contra Arianos* II, 82.

God becomes the Father of humanity by grace and the Maker of the Incarnate *Logos*.

Athanasius links God with creation in one positive relation based on divine creative agency. The creation has its being only in God. But it does not mean the abolition of the ontological poverty of creation and the establishment of the world as independent being. The being of the world remains 'foreign' and 'external' to God's being, because it participates in God 'from nothing'. The creation receives being from participation in God through his *Logos*. Participating in the *Logos*, the creation participates in the Father, because '*Logos* is the Father's own'⁴⁰². Thus, the relationship between God and the world becomes dialectical, through an incarnate *Logos* who effects transformation of created reality.

Athanasius in defending the Nicene formula made an exceptional contribution to Christian belief in the divinity of *Logos*. By establishing *Logos* as a fully divine, Athanasius developed the Christian conception of the relation between God and the world. Under the influence of certain philosophical schools, earlier doctrines posited God either too close to the world, resulting in the divine being linked with the world by necessity, or by emphasising the divine transcendence created a totally independent world. Thus God either absorbs the world into his own being or is unable to influence the world. A realm of subordinate mediators filled the gap between God and the World, and protected the world from the hand of God, or helped God to deal with the world. With the Gnostics the schema of intermediaries became more complex, because God the Creator employed demigods. Origen and the Alexandrian catechetical school could not avoid the cosmological patterns of Middle-Platonism establishing one eternal hierarchical chain of beings, which put at risk God's transcendence. Athanasius clearly distinguished God from creation, putting on the one side the world, which could 'not exist at all' and on the other God the Creator, who could 'not have created at all'.

Athanasius' argument is sometimes traced back to Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyon. Athanasius followed Irenaeus in establishing the relationship between God and the world based on the divine love and the divine presence in creation.

Another great achievement of Athanasius is the complete identification of *Logos* with Jesus Christ. In that way he brought to a complete stop the long history of philosophical doctrines of *Logos* and their influence on Christian thought. *Logos* ceased to be the cosmological principle, the Divine Reason, the reason inherited in

creatures, God's instrument in creation, God's power etc. *Logos* in Athanasius is *Logos* who became flesh. Thus Jesus Christ as incarnate *Logos* preserves the role of Mediator, but not as a functional one. He brings the world near the Father. *Logos* accomplishes his divine status through the communion of God and the world in him. Otherwise, if he is merely a creature, he would not be able to bridge the ontological gulf between God and the world.

With Athanasius of Alexandria started a new era in the history of Christian thought, an era of dogmatic theology. In his thought Athanasius successfully united two different Christian traditions, one Alexandrian with Clement and Origen, and another of Ignatius of Antioch and Irenaeus of Lyon, giving the advantage to the latter.

⁴⁰² Athanasius, De Synodis 51.

Conclusion

The common outlook for many centuries has been that the Hellenistic teaching about *logos* found an heir in the Christian *logos*. Greek philosophers, according to this widely accepted opinion, were the ancestors of Christian thought. That implied that all the achievements of Greek philosophy were simply adopted wholesale by Christian writers and then arranged in accordance to the demands of its canons, without any original contribution. On the other hand, some Christian philosophers have seen the Old Testament prophets as Hellenistic thinkers, who had a glimpse of the truth before the incarnation of the *logos* as the divine-human person of Christ. Therefore, the matter of a possible affinity between Greek and Christian *logos* always hangs unresolved in the air. Modern rationalism is preoccupied not with similarities of the two perspectives about *logos*, but with the primacy of the Greek over the Christian *logos*. The modern rationalist thought tends to come out against the dependence of Greek philosophy on Christian revelation. The result of this tendency has been the theory that the Christian *logos* is a plain falsification, a feeble philosophical imitation. The old identification of two *logos*-concepts is put in question. Martin Heidegger in his *The Introduction in Metaphysics*, was one of the first to abandon a thousand-year-old tradition and to neglect the idea that two *logos*-concepts are fundamentally one. Thus, a clash of duplicates is introduced at the centre of European thought. There were various attempts to make a clear distinction between the two *logos*-concepts.

It has been the aim of our thesis to investigate both *logos*-concepts. In the first chapter of our thesis, which dealt with Greek philosophers, we investigated the *logos*-concepts in a wider perspective. Our investigation covered not only the usage of *logos* at an ontological level, but also at both a logical level and at the level of language. There are various complex meanings of *logos* in Greek thought and it is very difficult to give a single definition of the term. But every level of our investigation, whether logical, linguistic or onto-logical it has been shown that the Greek *logos* always has as its function to 'bring together', to 'unite opposites', to be an element of unity in multiplicity. In every case, what is characteristic of the Greek

understanding of this concept is that *logos* acts by necessity, having in itself an element of force by which it unites.

It is more difficult to define the Christian *logos* because every effort to define it ends up with a philosophical-mythological *logos*. Thus, the Christian *logos* is often identified with the Son of God, whose role is to be messenger and instrument of a self-willed tyrant.

In the second, third and fifth chapter of our thesis we investigated the role of *logos*, mainly in Christian thinkers. The fourth chapter returned to Greek philosophy and it demonstrates how Plotinus stands outside the central paradigm of our thesis. In the first chapter our interest spread to the different uses of *logos*. The other chapters are primarily interested in making a clear distinction between Greek monistic ontology, and a Christian ontology in which God became an ontological ground. The questions of God's freedom in the creation of the world are particularly emphasised. The focus from the second chapter to the end of the thesis is on the questions of necessity and freedom in the context of the doctrine of *logos*, with an intention to show in the final analysis that the Christian God is absolutely free with regard to the world.

In the first part of the second chapter we showed that Philo, despite the difficulty of defining his use of *logos*, remains bound by a supreme ontological necessity. Philo sees the *Logos* as being brought forth by God, because He decided to create the world. But on the other hand, Philo shows an interest in divine freedom and grace, insisting on a beginning for creation, and the mind's need to be raised up by God. Second, *Logos* is not a messenger of God's commands but mediator of divine gifts, reflecting also God's simplicity. Third, *Logos* reveals both God's gifts and God himself. Both the continuity and the gulf between God and his gifts is reconciled in Philo's thought. In the Gospel of St. John the term *Logos* appears to be a synthesis of two traditions - the Jewish, from which it probably translates *memra* or *dabar*, and the Greek philosophical tradition. St. John's *Logos* acquires at the same time a completely new meaning, for he affirms that *Logos* is God, that He became flesh and lived among us. Thus, he reconciles *Logos* as the eternal power of God with *logos* as a complete human being, whose name is Jesus.

In the third chapter, which deals with Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria and Origen, *Logos* is described in terms of 'temporalising' God. The incarnation of *Logos* is just one episode in the long history of God's presence in the world, a history that is not yet complete. With Justin starts a long history of applying the term *logos* exclusively to Jesus Christ. In Clement, *Logos* is identical with God and

distinct from God-as-such, and the forms in which he appears, like the incarnate Jesus Christ, are just accidental to him. Origen completed the identification of Jesus Christ with the divine *Logos*. But, *Logos* remains for him a 'second God', lesser in divinity than the Father because Origen could not allow two first principles. Apart from the fact that *logos* in Justin and in the two Alexandrians was imprisoned by the 'systems' of Greek philosophy, the movement toward a new ontology is visible in their teachings. Thus, was set up the centrality of freedom, and both the divine and the human and *logos* ceased to be just a cosmological convenience and became a real pattern for affection to the Father.

We dedicated the fourth chapter to Plotinus because he deals with the same themes, as do Christians. Although he uses the same concepts as freedom or necessity, he remains a monistic thinker. His *logos* retains the role of a unifying principle. *Logos* introduces order in the multiplicity of the material world and serves as mediator between higher and lower realities. Plotinus' *logos* is subject to necessity because it acts in the lower levels of realities, but Plotinus' necessity must be conceived as the will of the One, like everything which emanates from it.

The final chapter shows the full affirmation of God's freedom as well as the full divinity of Jesus Christ as *Logos* of God. Ignatius of Antioch, responding to Gnostic heresies, initiated the process of the 'liberation' of God from the 'chains' of monistic ontology. At the same time he bridged the gap between God and the world by identifying being with life in Christ, which became the basis of Christian ontology. Irenaeus of Lyon continued in the same direction as Ignatius. He identified the *Logos* of God with Jesus Christ. But he did not understand this identity in terms of the continuity of a personal subject, as Justin did. Irenaeus conceives identification of *Logos* with Jesus Christ without placing the eternal *Logos* of God within time. He understood the same *Logos*, who was invisible and incomprehensible, as becoming visible and comprehensible. Athanasius of Alexandria considers *Logos* as being fully divine. The incarnate *Logos* is Jesus Christ, who accomplishes his divine status through the communion of God and the world in him. Athanasius affirmed the transcendence of God and his freedom in creation, claiming that the world could 'not exist at all' and that God the Creator could 'not have created at all'.

Attempts to distinguish between the Greek and Christian *logos* ended in religious and philosophical forms, concealing the fundamental distinction between them. By revealing the fundamental distinction between the two *logos*, the nature of the Christian *logos* is revealed. The Christian *logos* as the *logos* of love and freedom is

passive and he reveals himself as entirely different from the Greek *logos* of necessity. The Greek *logos* lies within the Christian *logos*; but is merely parasitic upon it. The Christian *Logos*, our Lord Jesus Christ, is *logos* of love and *logos* of gathering, but not gathering by necessity. This gathering is a gathering based on free will, gathering in the free love of God. He is not a force which brings together something which is opposite by nature. He does not use force even if this is the only way to participate in some supreme idea of justice and goodness. Christian *logos* is a call for participation in the love of God.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Anti-Nicene Fathers, volume XII, transl. by William Wilson, edited by A. Roberts and J. Donaldson, (Edinburgh, London, 1867).

ARISTOTLE, *The Metaphysics*, with translation by H. Tredennick, The Loeb Classical Library, (Cam., Mass., London, 1967).

--, *On Interpretation*, in, *The Organon*, with translation by H.P. Cooke, The Loeb Classical Library, London, (Cam., Mass., 1938).

--, *The Poetics*, transl. by W.H. Fyfe, The Loeb Classical Library, (Cam., Mass., London, 1982.)

--, *The Physics*, transl. by H. Wicksteed & F.M. Cornford, The Loeb Classical Library, volume V, (London, Cam., Mass., 1968.)¹¹

--, Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* transl. by H. Rackham, The Loeb Classical Library, (Cam., Mass., London, 1975).

--, *Politics*, transl. by H. Rackham, The Loeb Classical Library, (London, Cam., Mass., 1967.), A2 1253a 10-18.

ATHANASIUS, *Contra Gentes* and *De Incarnatione*, edited and transl. by Robert W. (Thompson, Oxford, 1971.)

CLEMENT of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, vol. 1-3, transl. by John Ferguson, (The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1991).

--, *Le Pédagogue*, tome I, SC, (Paris, Cerf, 1960).

--, *Protreptikus*, in *Ante-Nicene Christian Library*, volume IV, translated by A. Roberts and J. Donaldson, (Edinburgh, London, 1867., p. 91).

DIOGENES Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, (volume II, with a translation by R.D. Hicks, The Loeb Classical Library, (London, New York, 1925.)

EPICTETUS, *Dissertationum Epictetearum sive ab Arriano sive ab aliis*, (Leipzig Schenkl, H., 1916).

GRANT, Robert M., *Irenaeus of Lyon*, (Early Church Fathers, London and New York, 1997.).

HERACLITUS, *Fragments*, transl. by T.M. Robinson, (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1987.)

- HOMER, *The Iliad*, transl. by A.T. Murray, The Loeb Classical Library, volume II, (Cambridge, Mass., London, 1963.)
- , *The Odyssey*, transl. by A.T. Murray, The Loeb Classical Library, volume I, (Cambridge, Mass., London, 1974.)
- JUSTIN, *Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo* in *Ante-Nicene Christian Library*, volume II, The Writings of Justin Martyr and Athenagoras, transl. by M. Dods, G. Reith and B.P. Pratten, (Edinburgh, London, 1867.).
- , *Apologia* I-II, in *Ante-Nicene Christian Library* volume II, The Writings of Justin Martyr and Athenagoras, transl. by M. Dods, G. Reith and B.P. Pratten, (Edinburgh, London, 1867.)
- KIRK, G.S, *The cosmic fragments; Heraclitus*, transl. by G. S. Kirk, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954).
- LIGHTFOOT, J.B. *The Apostolic Fathers: St. Ignatius and St. Policarp*, Part II, , (London, Macmillan, 1885).
- MARCOVICH Miroslav., *Heraclitus*, (The Los Andes University Press, Merida, Venezuela, 1967.)
- MAXIMUS Confessoris, *Opuscula Theologica et Polemica*, Migne, PG, 91.
- , *Dispute with Pyrrhus*, Migne, PG 91,
- ORIGEN, *On the First Principles*, transl. by G.W. Butterworth, (New York, Harper&Row, 1966).
- , *Contra Celsum*, transl. by Henry Chadwick, (University Press, Cambridge, 1953.)
- PARMENIDES, *Fragments*, transl. by D. Gallop, (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto, 1984).
- PHILO, *De Vita Mosis*, trans. by F.H. Colson, Loeb, (London, 1935).
- , *De Opificio mundi*, trans. by F.H. Colson, Loeb, (London, 1935).
- , *De Migratione Abrahami*, trans. by F.H. Colson, Loeb, (London, 1935).
- , *De Cherubim*, Trans. By F.H. Colson and G.H. Whitaker, Loeb, (London, 1979).
- , *Legum Allegoriarum Libri*, trans. by F.H. Colson, Loeb, (London, 1935)
- , *De Confusione linguarum*, trans. by F.H. Colson, Loeb, (London, 1935).
- , *De Specialibus Legibus*, trans. by F.H. Colson, Loeb, (London, 1984)
- PLATO, *Protagoras*, The Loeb Classical Library, volume IV, transl. by W.R.M. Lamb, (London, New York, 1924.)
- , *Theaetetus. Sophist*, transl. by H.N. Fowler, volume II, (London, New York, 1921).
- , *Laws*, volume II, transl. by R.G. Bury, London, New York, 1926 Plato,

- , *Phaedo* The Loeb Classical Library, volume I, with translation by H.N. Fowler, (Cam., Mass., London, 1971).
- , *The Republic*, transl. by Paul Shorey, volume II, The Loeb Classical Library, (London, Cam., Mass., 1935).
- , *The Collected Dialogues*, ed. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, Bollingen Series, LXXI,, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).
- PLOTINUS, *Enneads*, transl. by Stephan MacKenna, revised by B.S. Page, (London, Faber, 1969).
- PLUTARCH, *De Stoicorum repugnantiis in Plutarchi moralia*, vol. 6., (Leipzig, Westman, 1959).
- THEOPHILUS of Antioch, *Ad Autolyicum*, ed. R.M Grant, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970.)

Secondary Literature

- ANATHOLIOS, Khaled, *Athanasius, The coherence of his thought*, (NY, Routledge, London, 1998.)
- ARMSTRONG, A.H., *Plotinus in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, edited by A.H. Armstrong, (Cambridge, 1967)
- BARRETT, C.K, *The Gospel of John and Judaism*, (London, 1975.)
- *The Gospel according to St. John*, (London, SPCK, 1962.)
- BEHR, John, *The Way to Nicaea*, (New York, Crestwood SVS, , 2001.)
- BREHIER, E. *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, transl. by J. Thomas, (Chicago, 1985.)
- BULTMANN, Rudolf, *The Gospel according to John*, transl. by G.R. Beasley-Murray, R.W.N. Hoare and J.K. Riches,(Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1971.)
- CORWIN, V., *St. Ignatius and Christianity in Antioch*, (New York, Yale University Press, 1960.)
- CROUZEL, Henry, *Origen*, (Edinburgh, T.&T. Clark, 1989.)
- CHADWICK, Henry, *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition, Studies in Justin, Clement and Origen*, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966)
- DANIELOU, Jean, *Origen*, transl. by Walter Mitchell, (New York, Shed and Ward, London, 1955.)
- DODD, C.H, *The Interpretation of the fourth Gospel*, (University Press, Cambridge, 1955.)
- GILSON Etienne, *L'Esprit de la Philosophie Medievale*, (Paris, 1944.)

- HEIDEGGER, Martin, *Being And Time*, transl. by J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, (Basil Blackwell, 1988.)
- , *Logos*, in: *Vortrage und Aufsätze III*, (Pfullingen, 1967; Heraclit, Der Anfang des abendlandischen Denkens. Logic, Heraklits Lehre vom *Logos*) Frankfurt, 1979.
- , *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, transl. by Ralph Manheim, (New Haven, London, Yale University Press, 1959.)
- , *Was heisst Denken?* English, *What is called thinking?* translation of *Was heisst Denken?* by J. Glenn Gray ; (New York : Harper & Row, 1968.)
- , *Aristotle's Metaphysics Θ 1-3*, transl. by W. Brogan, (Bloomington & Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1995.)
- JASPERS, Karl, *The great philosophers*; trans. by Ralph Manheim, Edited by Hannah Arendt. (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1966.)
- JEAGER, Werner, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia*, (London, Oxford University Press, 1962.)
- , *The Theology of Early Greek Philosophers*, (Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 1947.)
- KERFERD, G.B., *Logos in The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, vol 5 (New York, London, 1967.)
- KURTZ, E. *Interpretationen zu den Logos-Fragmenten Heraklits*, (Spudasmata, Olms, 1971).
- LILA, Salvatore, *Clement of Alexandria*, (Oxford, University Press, 1971.)
- LOUTH, Andrew, *The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition*, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981.)
- MEIJERING, E.P., *Orthodoxy and Platonism in Athanasius; Synthesis or Antithesis*, (Leiden, 1968.)
- NIETZSCHE F., *Die Philosophie im Tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen*, (in *Nietzsche Werke*, band II, Verlag, Das Bargland – Buch, Salzburg/Stuttgart)
- NORRIS, Richard, *The Transcendence and Freedom of God*, in *Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition*, edited by, W.R. Schoedel and R.L. Wilken, (Paris, 1979.)
- O'MEARA, D.J., *Plotinus; An Introduction to Enneads*, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1933.)
- OSBORN, Eric, *The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria*, (Cambridge, University Press, 1956.)
- , *The Beginning of Christian Philosophy*, (Cambridge, 1981)

- PRESTIGE, G.L. *Prestige, God in Patristic Thought*, (London, Toronto, 1936.)
- RIST, J.M. *Plotinus; The Road to Reality*, (Cambridge, 1980.)
- SCHLIER, H., *Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu den Ignatius-briefen*, Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, 8, Geisen, Topelmann, 1929.
- SCHOEDEL William R., *Enclosing, not Enclosed: The Early Christian Doctrine of God*, in *Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition*, edited by, W.R. Schoedel and R.L. Wilken, (Paris, 1979.)
- TRIGG, J.W. *Origen*, (London, SCM Press, 1983.)
- WIDDICOMBE, *Peter, The Fatherhood of God from Origen to Athanasius*, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994.),
- WILLIAMS, Rowan, *Arius; Heresy and Tradition*, (London, SCM Press, , 2001.)
- WOLFSON, Harry, *Philo*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1948.)
- , *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1956.)

Periodical article:

- ANATHOLIOS, Khaled, *The Influence of Irenaeus on Athanasius*, *Studia Patristica*, volume 36, Peeters, Leuven, 2001., pp. 463-76
- ANDERSEN, Carl, 'Justin und der mittlere Platonismus', *ZNTW* 44, 1952-3,
- BARNARD, L.W, *The Background of St. Ignatius of Antioch*, in *Vigiliae Christianae*, volume 17, 1963.
- HAYWARD, C.T.R., *The Holy Name of the God of Moses and the Prologue of St. John's Gospel*, *New Testament Studies*, 25, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, London, New York, 1978-79.) pp. 16-32.
- HOLTE Ragnar, *Logos Spermatikos*, *Studia Theologica*, vol. 12, (Lund, 1958.)
- EDWARDS, M.J., 'Justin's *Logos* and the Word of God', *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 3.3, 1995
- FLOROVSKY, G. 'The Concept of creation in St. Athanasius', *Studia Patristica* 6, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 1962.
- LOUTH Andrew, *Reason and Revelation*, *Scottish Journal of Theology*, volume 23, 1970.

WILLIAMS, Rowan, The Logic of Arianism, *The Journal of Theological Studies*,
volume 34, (Oxford, 1983).

