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**POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN JORDAN: THE
IMPACT OF PARTY AND TRIBAL LOYALITIES SINCE**

1989

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED BY
AMIN ALI ALAZZAM**

**Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirement for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Durham University**

DURHAM UNIVERSITY

May 2008

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DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

In the light of the internal and regional crises in the 1980s, Jordan found itself under pressure, and various ideological and political factors pushed the country towards political reform. As a result, Jordan has undergone several transformations, and a certain degree of political liberalization has made political participation the main objective of the Jordanian political system and its various institutions. This development in turn has required participation of all segments of the society, including political parties, minorities, and women. This participation demonstrates how far the political system has been liberalized. Therefore, nobody can argue that there is no political participation in Jordan. However, important questions remain. What is the form of this participation? What is its scale? What factors influence political participation, and what are its main objectives?

Therefore, the purpose of this study was to explore the issue of political participation in Jordan. In particular, it investigated the impact of party and tribal loyalties on political participation in Jordan since 1989. This is undertaken through examining the basic forms of political participation, particularly participation in parliamentary elections. Accordingly, this study is divided into two main parts. The first part aims to shed light on the historical development of Jordanian parliament, electoral laws and systems, and political parties' participation and in addition to examine these in context of the socio-economic, political, and cultural environment. The second part was carried out through a survey involving the distribution of 400 questionnaires to five groups of political elite in Jordan.

It is concluded in this study that despite the fact that political parties in Jordan date back to the establishment of the state in 1921, the social relations of kinship and the tribe are still dominant and constitute the main motives for Jordanians to participate in parliamentary elections. Several factors explain this, but it is argued here that the most important is legislations, particularly the emergency laws which have heavily restricted political freedoms and activities.

ABBREVIATIONS

- BVS Block Vote System
- HBM His Britannic Majesty
- HRO Human Right Organization
- IAF Islamic Action Front
- PCM Professional Council Members
- PLO Palestine Liberalization Organization
- PR Proportional Representation
- SES Socio-Economic Status
- SNTV Single Non-Transferable Vote
- TJ Transjordan
- TVS Two Vote System

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the living memory of my mother Haifaa Naji Alazzam who provided me with love, earliest encouragement, and prayers, but sadly did not live to see its completion. Dedication also with love and respect to my father Ali who provided me with unlimited support and prayers.

I dedicate this work also to my beloved wife Marryam, who provided me with sacrificial support and the constant encouragement I needed to achieve my goal, and she was patient in taking care of our children during my study.

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
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Map of Jordan

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The Purpose of the Study

The route to healthy, democratic engagement lies through extending the participation rights of all citizens. Therefore, political participation has become a key component for establishing democracy, and is one of the most important indicators of political development in any society. Moreover, political participation is an effective tool through which the social and political forces in the society are able to articulate their ideas, present their demands and programs, and influence the political decision making process. The importance of political participation at the present time stems from its role in the achievement of political development, modernization, and reform at both the political and socio-economic levels.

There are three prominent schools of thought in debates explaining how and why people participate in political life. These include the social structure school, which focuses on socio-economic factors such as the wealth of a nation, its population size, and its level of human development; the political culture school focuses on political values and attitudes; and the institutional school focuses on how institutional affiliations create incentives for political participation and focuses as well on the impact of the electoral system on political participation. This study seeks to investigate the direct impact of these factors upon the participation of Jordanian citizens.



1.1 Objectives of the Study

The main aim of the study is to explore the reality of political participation in Jordan and to determine the main obstacles that prevent real and effective participation in political life in general and parliamentary elections in particular. Therefore, this study is divided into two main parts. The first part aims to identify the following:

1. The demographic, social, and political characteristics of Jordanian society.
2. The political culture associated with the social and political reality.
3. The main factors and motives shaping individual decisions to participate in political life.

The sources of data for this part of the study include books, articles, and other available documents. In some instances secondary sources have been used, including material from Jordanian government ministries, its parliament, and newspapers, in collecting data and statistical reports concerning elections results and the participation of various social and political organizations in parliamentary elections.

The second part is an empirical study which aims to identify:

1. The opinions of the study sample concerning the level of political freedoms in Jordan, and the effectiveness of political parties in political field.
2. The main obstacles preventing real and effective participation.
3. The dimensions of political participation and the main factors that motivate Jordanian citizens to participate in political life.
4. The effect of the current electoral system on political participation and its impact on voter turnout.

1.1.1 Research Questions

The main questions posed in this study are:

1. What is the nature of political participation in Jordan?
2. What are the main obstacles that prevent real and effective participation in parliamentary elections?
3. What are the forms of political participation practised by Jordanian citizens?
4. To what extent do Jordanian citizens become involved in the political process?
5. Does the Jordanian political system facilitate citizen participation in political life?
6. What are the main affiliations that shape Jordanian citizens political behaviour?
7. What are the main factors that motivate Jordanian citizens to participate in political life?
8. Is the performance of Jordanian political parties successful in the political field?
9. Does the design of the current electoral system promote political participation in Jordan?
10. What would be the electoral system in Jordanian society most suitable to increase political participation?
11. What is the level of women's political participation in Jordan?

1.2 The Structure of the Thesis

Chapter One explains different approaches to understanding political participation concept and its forms. Moreover, this chapter provides a review of the literature, discussing previously published work on political participation and the main issues which are connected to the study topic.

The aim of Chapter Two of this study is to provide a historical outline of the Jordanian legal framework, including the constitutional, political, legislative and electoral systems. This chapter also highlights the historical development of the Jordanian parliament and the role played by political parties and Jordanian tribes in parliamentary elections.

Chapter Three explores in some depth the concepts and reality of political culture in Jordan, investigating political attitudes and the political culture which prevails in Jordanian society. This chapter also explains how Jordanian citizens perceive politics, and asks whether or not they trust political decision-makers, and are satisfied with the democracy in which they live.

Chapter Four assesses the major factors surrounding Jordanian elections including tribalism and its role in the political and cultural development of Jordanian society in addition to its role in parliamentary elections. Moreover, this chapter investigates the religious dimension and the participation of Islamist parties in Jordan's elections.

If political participation is a key component of democracy, the participation of political parties is considered vital for stable and effective democracy. Therefore, Chapter Five investigates the performance of political parties in the light of the political changes witnessed in Jordan. Moreover, this chapter reviews the historical background of the development and participation of political parties in parliamentary life.

Chapter Six discusses the research methodology adopted in this study to examine political participation in Jordan and to investigate the main obstacles to effective participation in political life in general and parliamentary elections in particular. This

chapter also provides an overview of the data collection instrument, the study design, population and sampling.

Chapter Seven provides an extensive descriptive analysis of the data obtained from the questionnaires distributed by the researcher.

Chapter Eight provides an in depth discussion of the analysis of the quantitative results in terms of the study's objectives. Therefore, this chapter provides explanations of the important findings and their relevance in the context of the aims of the study.

The final chapter of the thesis provides the conclusions of the study in addition to some suggestions and recommendations.

Theoretical Approaches to understanding Political Participation in Jordan

1.3 Literature Review

In *Research Methods in Librarianship: Techniques and Interpretation*, Busha and Harter state that in order to conduct a meaningful enquiry there is a need for “sound theoretical knowledge about the problem are from which the research task originated”.¹ Therefore, this chapter gives an overview of the literature and debates on democracy and political participation, examining the key themes of this study which are political participation in Jordan and the role played by political parties and tribes in parliamentary elections since 1989. Therefore, the literature review starts by discussing the main terms and issues concerning the topic of the thesis: democracy, political participation, liberalization. Then closer attention is given to the issue of political participation which is conventionally associated with democratization.

1.3.1 Democracy

While there is consensus on the desirability of democracy and political freedoms, there is no universally accepted definition of democracy. Sartori argued that democracy has become a ‘diffuse, multifaceted’ term², and that it has been turned into an empty and meaningless concept.³ Furthermore, besides using the term democracy with reference to systems of government, it is used also to refer to other social relationships.⁴ Collier and Levitsky have argued that as a result of recent dramatic trends towards democratization, scholars have been faced with a major conceptual challenge in dealing with these new cases of democracy. Consequently, there are hundreds of subtypes of democracy such as ‘neopatrimonial democracy’, ‘military-

¹ Busha and Harter, *Research Methods in Librarianship: Techniques and interpretation* (1980), p. 17.

² Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited* (1987), p. 6

³ Sartori (1987), p. 3.

⁴ Birch, *Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy* (2nd edition, 2001), p.72.

dominated-democracy', 'pseudo-democracy', 'semi-democracy', 'protodemocracy' and 'electoral democracy'.⁵

The term democracy is derived from two Greek words: "demo", meaning people, and "kratos" meaning rule. Therefore, democracy means rule by the people. Huntington stressed that democracy is often used as a symbolic concept associated with the future of freedom in the world. He declared that there is a strong correlation between the existence of individual liberty and the existence of democracy.⁶ O'Donnell and Shmitter list the minimum requirements for political democracies as, secret balloting, universal adult suffrage, regular elections, partisan competition, associational recognition and access, and executive accountability.⁷

Thus some have defined democracy as "a form of government where the legislature is elected directly by universal adult suffrage and the executive government is chosen either directly in the presidential system or indirectly from among elected representatives of the people, as is the norm in the parliamentary system".⁸ Another definition of democracy was given by Lipset as: "A political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision-making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political office".⁹

In an article entitled 'Liberalization versus Democracy: Understanding Arab Political Reform', Brumberg mentioned three essential elements for democracy: "political parties that speak for organized constituencies, parliaments that have the constitutional authority to speak on behalf of the electorate, and constitutions that

⁵ Collier and Levitsky, Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research, *World Politics*, Vol. 49, No. 3 April, pp. 431.

⁶ Huntington, Will More Countries Become Democratic, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 99, No. 2, Summer, 1984), p. 194.

⁷ O'Donnell and Shmitter, *Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (1986), p. 8.

⁸ Nehru, Western Democracy and the Third World, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 1, Issue 2, April 1979, pp. 53-70.

⁹ Lipset, Some Social Requests of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 53, 1959, p. 71.

impose limits on executive authority".¹⁰ He argued that these democratic elements are missing in the liberalized autocracies of the Arab World. On these grounds no government in the region could claim a truly democratic mandate.¹¹

It is clear that the fundamental features of democracy include government based on the rule of the majority through the election of representatives, free and fair elections, and respect for basic human rights. However, the terms freedom and democracy are often used interchangeably, because in real democracy all citizens have the right to participate in the decision making process. Accordingly, for democracy to be sustained a number of certain basic demands should be met: political competition and equal voting rights in free and fair elections; freedom of opinion; freedom of expression and freedom of the press; the right to join political organizations; and the right to form parties and to participate in elections.

Although democracy is the only solution to the problem of tyranny, Huntington argued that there are three paradoxes for democracy. Firstly, the initiation of elections forces political leaders to compete to win votes within their own narrow circles such as tribal, ethnic, and religious constituencies. Thus democratization promotes communalism and ethnic conflict. Secondly, in the transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and more prone to war and fighting against foreign countries. Thirdly, democratization treats state constraints on individual behaviour by relaxing social inhibitions, leading to uncertainty and confusion about standards of morality.¹² Furthermore, he argued that the electoral victory of parties or movements apparently committed to antidemocratic ideologies constitute a potential threat to new democracies.¹³

¹⁰ Brumberg, Liberalization versus Democracy: Understanding Arab Political Reform, Democracy and Rule of Law Project Working Paper, No 37, (May 2003), web of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (www.ceip.org), p. 8.

¹¹ Brumberg (2003), p. 8

¹² Huntington, Democracy for the Long Haul, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (1996), p. 6.

¹³ Huntington (1996), pp. 8-9.

1.3.2 Democratization, Liberalization, and Political Participation

According to Huntington, in his book *Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* three waves of democratization have taken place in history. The first was a long slow wave which brought democracy to Western Europe and Northern America in the 19th century. The second wave began in World War II from 1943-1962. The latest wave began in 1974 and is still ongoing. The process of democratization has been defined by Huntington as a process of moving from nondemocratic or authoritarian to democratic regimes which occurs within a specific period of time.¹⁴

Brynen, Korany, and Noble have defined democratization as “political democratization which entails an expression of political participation in such a way as to provide citizens with a degree of real and meaningful collective control over public policy”.¹⁵ This definition focuses on the expansion of public space through the recognition and guarantee of civil and political rights, particularly the ability of citizens to engage in free expression. However, O’Dennell and Schmitter define democratization as “the processes whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles (e.g., coercive control, social tradition, or administrative practice) or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations (e.g. ethnic minorities, women, foreign residents, etc.) or extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subject to citizen participation (state agencies, military establishments, etc.)”.¹⁶

The term political liberalization is connected with democratization. In his book *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* Huntington has defined political liberalization as “The partial opening of an authoritarian system, short of choosing governmental leaders through freely competitive election. Liberalising authoritarian regimes may release political prisoners, open up some issues for public debate, loosen censorship, sponsor elections for offices that have little power, permit some renewal of civil society, and take other steps in a democratic direction, without

¹⁴ Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Twenty First Century* (1991), pp.16-24.

¹⁵ Brynen et al (ed), *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: Theoretical Perspectives* (1995), p. 3

¹⁶ O’Dannell and Schmitter (1986), p. 8

submitting top decision makers to the electoral test”.¹⁷ O’Dennel and Schmitter define liberalization as “the process of making effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties. On the level of the individual, these guarantees include the classical elements of the liberal tradition On the level of groups, these rights cover such things as freedom from punishment for expression of collective dissent from government policy, freedom from censorship of the means of communication, and freedom to associate voluntarily with other citizens”.¹⁸

Thus, political liberalization is only a step towards democratization, as liberalization can exist without democracy. Therefore, liberalization should be accompanied by institutional reform to achieve democracy, where the most important factors are: the government accountability to public control, a strong parliament that is derived from democratic elections, the broad possibility of public participation, the rule of law, and full respect for human rights.¹⁹

Furthermore, modernization theory explains the relationship between the degree of democratization and socio-economic development. Lipset found a positive correlation between economic development and democracy, and he argued that the chance of the survival of democracy in prosperous countries is higher than in poor countries.²⁰ He also argued that giving opportunities for the middle class to exert power and the spread of education through society will lead to the weakening of the power of the ruling elites in authoritarian countries. Accordingly, the middle class will obtain enough economic and political power to demand democracy.²¹

Huntington explained the third wave of democratization (which began approximately in 1974) as a result of socioeconomic development. He listed three economic factors which have affected this wave. First, the rise in the price of oil had an adverse impact on oil-consuming countries, which led to an economic downturn and the weakening of authoritarian regimes. Secondly, the state of economic development that many

¹⁷ Huntington (1991), p. 9

¹⁸ O’Dannell and Shmitter (1986), p. 7

¹⁹ Panebianco (ed.), *A New Euro-Mediterranean: Cultural Identity* (2003), p. 101.

²⁰ Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (1960), p. 27.

²¹ Lipset (1960), p. 28.

countries had achieved paved the way for democracy. Thirdly, the rapid economic growth achieved within some countries destabilised their authoritarian regimes, forcing them either to become liberalized or to intensify repressive legislation and other measures.²² Furthermore, Huntington listed twenty-seven factors that contribute to the consolidation of democracy and the democratic process. These factors include economic development and social modernization, a relatively equitable distribution of income and/or wealth, a high overall level of economic wealth, high levels of literacy and education, and the development of political contestation before the expansion of political participation.²³

1.3.3 The Concept of Political Participation

As political participation is the most prominent term in this study, it is therefore necessary to discuss the various definitions of the term in order to identify a reliable definition in the context of this study. Despite the fact that participation plays a vital role in both political and public life, the concept is still controversial. The first classical definition of political participation was proposed by McClosky, when he defined political participation as “Those voluntary activities by which members of a society share in the selection of rulers and, directly or indirectly, in the formation of public policy”.²⁴ This definition confines political participation to relations between citizens and their government.

Other scholars such as Verba and Nie have defined political participation as the legal activities exercised by ordinary citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the process of selecting governmental personnel and/or the actions and decisions adopted by the government.²⁵ This definition is also narrow, because it restricts the activity of political participation to legal activities and excludes demonstrations and sit-ins. Moreover, it considers political participation to be limited to ordinary citizens only.

²² Huntington (1991), p. 59.

²³ Huntington (1991), pp. 37-38.

²⁴ McClosky, Political participation in David L. Sills (ed) *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 12 (1968), p. 252.

²⁵ Verba and Nie, *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality* (1987), p. 2

The classical definition of political participation has been subject to scholarly criticisms and reconsideration, because it confines the objectives of political participation to the government. However, there are many other activities which could be included in the definition of political participation. In *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*, Norris argues that the term political participation should be broadened since the political prospect has changed. He states that instead, it is suggested, “not only is the obituary for older forms of political activism premature, but multiple forms of civic engagement may have emerged in modern societies to supplement traditional modes. Political participation appears to have diversified over the years, in terms of agencies (collective organizations), reporters (the actions commonly used for political expression), and targets (the political actors that participants seek to influence”).²⁶

Other scholars discern increases in the variety of forms of participation. Lam refers to political participation as “lawful or unlawful activities of support, making demands, debates, and other forms of expressions communicated verbally and /or through the media... Acts of political participation also include political activities that are targeted at private institutions, such as university administrations and business, and that they are designed to pose challenges to existing rules, norms, and practices”.²⁷ Bahry and Silver define political participation as “a multidimensional concept; involving far more than voting in elections, it includes election campaigning, collective action around policy issues, contacting political representatives, and direct action like protests and demonstrations”.²⁸ It is clear that these definitions are much broader than those of Verba and Nie and McClosky, because the activities involved include demands and debates as well as lawful and unlawful activities.

In his article ‘Democracy and the Arabic Human Rights’ Borhan Ghalyoon stated that political participation means and presupposes pluralism, which forms a natural framework for the devolution of power freely between the various parties of the social elite. Political participation does not necessarily mean inevitable change in the

²⁶ Norris, *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism* (2002), p. preface.

²⁷ Lam, Alternative Understanding of Political Participation: Challenging of the Myth of Political Indifference in Hong Kong, *International Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 26, No. 5 (2003), p. 491.

²⁸ Cited in Bratton, Political Participation in a New Democracy: Institutional Considerations from Zambia, *Comparative Political Studies*, 1999, Vol. 32, No. 5, p. 552

political system or values prevailing in the state, but rather it means a redistribution of power and authority within the moral influence and effective control positions in the community.²⁹

It seems that, in defining political participation, series of activities linked to political processes should be involved, whether these are conventional activities within political system or unconventional activities. Political participation can take many forms and therefore the activities that should be included in its definition should include these forms, such as voting in elections, joining political parties and other non-governmental civil organizations, campaign activity, standing as a candidate in elections, working for a party or a candidate, talking about politics, and participating in demonstrations.

Therefore, for the purpose of this study political participation is defined as Shetwi and Al Dagstani have defined it. Their definition is more satisfactory because it includes various different kinds of political activities. They defined political participation as “The overall political activities aimed at influencing the decisions taken by the political powers such as the executive power, legislature, and political parties. These activities include nomination to elected councils, voting to elect representatives, participation in the election campaigns of the candidates, joining political parties and participation in various community activities as well as participation in non-traditional activities such as demonstrations, sit-ins, and writing in the newspapers about important political issues”.³⁰

1.3.4 Mechanisms of Political Participation

There are many means and methods to participate in political life. These methods differ in terms of their importance and effectiveness as well as in their requirements, obligations, and legitimacy. Furthermore, these means vary both within the same society and from one society to another, from one political system to another or from time to time within the same society or the same political system. This diversity in the

²⁹ Ghalioun, *al-Dimoqratiyyah wa Hoqooq al-Insan al-Arabi* , [Democracy and the Arabic Human Rights], *al-Mostaqbal al-Arabi* Magazine, No. 13 May, 1990.

³⁰ Shetwi, and al- Dagstani , *al -mr 'a al-Urduniyyah wa al-Musharakah al-siyasiyyah* [Jordanian Women and Political Participation] (1994), p. 6

mechanisms of political participation is in accordance with the requirements of or the level of development achieved by the community, or according to the nature and quality of the objectives and goals which the individual seeks to achieve through his involvement in political life.

In *An Introduction to Political Sociology*, Rush and Althoff supposed a hierarchy of participation covering all levels of political participation, and at the same time appropriate for various political systems³¹ (see table 1.1). They assumed that each level of the hierarch would have a specific importance which might vary from one system to another. Moreover, certain of the levels may be of great importance in one system and less relevant or even absolutely irrelevant in another system.³²

Table 1.1: The Hierarchy of Political Participation

Filling a political or administrative post
Seeking to fill a political or administrative post
Active membership in a political organization
Non-active membership in a political organization
Active membership in semi-political organization
Non-active membership in semi-political organization
Participation in public meetings and demonstrations
Participation in the informal political discussions
Public interest in political matters
Voting
Political apathy

Source: M. Rush and Ph. Althoff., *An Introduction to Political Sociology*, (London: Nelson and Sons LTD, 1971), p. 76

³¹ Rush and Althoff, *An Introduction to Political Sociology* (1971), P. 76

³² Rush and Althoff (1971), p. 76

There are several criticisms which have been directed at this hierarchy. The first of these concerns the summit of this hierarchy, where Rush and Althoff put the office-holders of political and administrative posts all at the same level. In fact the role of politicians is different from that of administrators, in addition to the subordination of the latter to the political authority.³³ Furthermore, politicians hold decision-making power, while the role of administrators is limited to implementing these decisions or taking action to implement them. Therefore, there is no equality between them in the degree of power, influence, and consequently their involvement in the political participation process.

Regarding participation through membership in political and semipolitical organizations, this is not a real indicator of popular political participation. Behind these organizational affiliations may be personal motives or selfish aspirations but not the public interest.³⁴ Moreover, these organizations may be merely political tools in the service of the political system, or may reflect the interests of groups that belong to, or seek to occupy positions of power. In addition, these organizations might be merely cosmetic facades designed to contain the masses or strong opposition groups to keep them away from real participation in political life or from resistance to the existing system.³⁵ Finally, political apathy cannot be seen as a method of participation, but it might be as described by Ali Abd al-Raziq, as an expression of a crisis of participation.³⁶

In *Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?* Milbrath argues that once a person is involved in one political activity he will be likely to also participate in all of the activities below it on the hierarchy. He argued that citizens' behaviour in political life is expected to be hierarchic and cumulative, with the lowest levels involving exposure to political stimuli and voting, and at the highest levels holding public and party office. Milbrath's proposed hierarchy includes the most common political activities in three main categories see figure 1.1. Moreover, he asserts that smaller numbers of citizens are involved in any activity other than

³³ Sa'ad and Al-zayat. *al-Mujtama' wa al-Siyasah*, [Society and Politics] (2003), p. 465


³⁴ Sa'ad and Alzayat (2003), p. 466

³⁵ Sa'ad and Alzayat (2003), p. 467

³⁶ Jalabi, et al., *Majalat 'ilm al-Ijtima' al-Mu'asir: Nadariyyat wa Dirasat Waqi'iyya*, [Areas of Contemporary Sociology: Theoretical Fundamentals and Field Studies] (1982), pp.532-533

voting, and that voting appears to be a predictor of other more active forms of participation.³⁷

Figure 1.1 Milbrath's Hierarchy of Political Involvement



Source: Milbrath, Lester W. *Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?*, (Chicago : Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1965), p. 18

³⁷ Milbrath, *Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?* (1965), p. 18

Accordingly, political participation involves much more than just voting. It derives from the freedom to speak out, assemble and associate; the ability to take part in the conduct of public affairs; and the opportunity to register as a candidate, to campaign, to be elected and to hold office at all levels of government. At the forefront of political participation patterns are electoral activity, partisan action, and union work which are linked to the principles of political pluralism, freedom of opinion, freedom of peaceful assembly and the right to form associations and political parties.

1.3.5 Why Do People Vote? Theories of Political Participation

Milbrath asserts that “Taking any political action generally requires two decisions: one must decide to act or not to act; and one must also decide the direction of his action. For example, a person not only decides to vote or not to vote, but also decides whom to vote for”.³⁸ There are three prominent groups of theories of political participation: the socio-economic or socioeconomic status (SES) school; the political culture school; and the institutional school.

1.3.5.1 Socio-Economic Development and Political Participation

The socio-economic school takes three basic economic factors as the main factors explaining individual differences in political participation. These factors are income, education, and occupation.³⁹ The scholars in this school claim that there is a positive relationship between these factors and political participation. Therefore, those with higher incomes, better education, and respected jobs or occupations, alone or in combination, are expected to show higher degrees of political participation.⁴⁰

Therefore, people who have high incomes can apply those resources to their political activity: “for instance, they can make greater contributions to political campaigns and, of course, they have a greater property stake at risk in the political sphere that they

³⁸ Milbrath (1965), p. 6.

³⁹ Schlozman, Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation. (Socioeconomic Status as Explanation for Political Activity), *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 89, No. 2. (Jun, 1995), p. 271

⁴⁰ Conway, *Political Participation in the United States* (2nd ed.), (1991), p. 21

may wish to protect by participating in politics”.⁴¹ Regarding the role of education in political participation, Conway argues that it is the most important factor in SES that influences political participation because education enhances political interests and civic skills.⁴² Almond and Verba argue that education is an important factor in the development of the active political participation which is necessary for democratic politics. They further argue that educated citizens have the key to be involved to produce high degree of political participation and therefore have more political influence than those who are less educated and accordingly less involved in political participation.⁴³

Sidney Verba states that the effects of education on political participation might operate in at least two ways: “formal education itself fosters organizational and communication skills that are germane to political activity and impart attitudes such as a sense of civic duty or political efficacy that are associated with political involvement. In addition, those with high levels of education are in a position to acquire further political resources: they are much more likely to have the kinds of jobs that pay high salaries and ...to have opportunities in several arenas to develop skills that are relevant to politics”.⁴⁴

1.3.5.2 Political Participation and Political Culture

Despite the fact that some theories rely on structural factors such as socioeconomic development that affect the processes of political participation, the political culture school emphasizes political values and attitudes. Here it is believed that political participation is initiated in the values, attitudes and motivations of citizens. They argue that political culture and attitudes towards political efficacy and political trust for example, affect political participation more than other factors.

Inglehart argued that “There is no question that economic factors are politically important, but they are only part of the story. I argue that the different societies are

⁴¹ Klesner, Social Capital and Political Participation in Latin America: Evidence from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru, *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (June 2007), pp. 1-32

⁴² Conway (1985), p. 20

⁴³ Almond and Verba (1963), pp. 381-382.

⁴⁴ Verba, et al. Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States, *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23, No. 4, (1993), p. 457

characterized to very different degrees by specific syndromes of political culture attitudes; that these cultural differences are relatively enduring, but not immutable; and that they have major political consequences, being closely linked to the viability of democratic institutions".⁴⁵ Hudson stresses that political culture is the most important factor in understanding politics regardless of the country, whether in the Arab World or elsewhere.⁴⁶

Almond and Verba have argued that "the development of a stable and effective democratic government depends upon more than the structure of government and politics: it depends upon the orientations that people have to the political process upon political culture".⁴⁷ Ayubi, states that, "Democracy is not simply a form of government; it is also a cultural and intellectual tradition".⁴⁸ Ideas, attitudes and beliefs constituting political culture are derived from the broader culture of society itself. Therefore, Huntington argues that political culture and democracy are closely linked to religion, and that protestant societies have historically enjoyed more democracy than Catholic or Islamic societies.

Peteman argues that one of the most important correlations between political culture and participation is the sense of political efficacy or sense of political competence. She stresses that, "people who have a sense of political efficacy are more likely to participate in politics than those in whom this feeling is lacking.....Persons who feel more effective in their daily everyday tasks and challenges are more likely to participate in politics".⁴⁹

Some argue that Arab culture is incompatible with democracy. Patai argues that Arabs are seen as "ambitious and eager to be the leader"⁵⁰, and that Arab culture has developed a state of mind that is not open to change because of its traditionalism.⁵¹

⁴⁵ Inglehart, The Renaissance of Political Culture, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 82, No. 4, December 1988, 1203.

⁴⁶ Hudson, Democratization and the Problem of Legitimacy in the Arab World, In *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin*, Vol. 22, No.2 (1988), pp. 161-163.

⁴⁷ Almond and Verba, *The civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (1963), p. 498.

⁴⁸ Ayubi, *Over-stating the Arab State* (1995), p. 397.

⁴⁹ Peteman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (1970), p. 46

⁵⁰ Patai, *The Arab Mind* (1973), p. 20

⁵¹ Patai, *The Arab Mind* (1976), pp. 294-296.

Kedourie argues that, as a result of the nature of Arab culture, a vibrant civil society is not possible in the Middle East. Moreover, he doubts democracy's future prospects: "those who say that democracy is the only remedy for the Arab world disregard a long experience which clearly shows that democracy has been tried in many countries and uniformly failed".⁵²

In *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society*, Sharabi argues that modernisation in the Arab region has not replaced traditional, patriarchal structures, and that on the contrary these structures are becoming stronger.⁵³ Sharabi attributes this situation to the halting of the development process half way between the traditional and modern.⁵⁴ He argues that Arab societies are characterized by neopatriarchal values which often coexist in contradiction with modern values. "Whatever the outward (modern) forms material, legal, and aesthetic of the contemporary neopatriarchal family and society, their internal structures remain rooted in the patriarchal values and social relations of kinship, clan, and religious and ethnic groups. The modern and the patriarchal coexist in contradictory union."⁵⁵

1.3.5.3 Electoral System and Political Participation

Scholars in the third approach, the institutional school have focused on the role of political institutions, such as the sets of rules constituting electoral laws in providing incentives and sanctions for parties and candidates in political participation and therefore in increasing voter turnout.⁵⁶

The electoral system concerns the rules and procedures by which votes cast in an election are translated into legislative seats. Therefore, choosing the type of electoral system is one of the most important institutional decisions for any democracy. This is because the design of the electoral system has a profound effect on the future political life of the country and influences the nature of representatives. Reynolds and Reilly argue that, "Any new democracy must choose (or inherit) an electoral system to elect

⁵² Kedourie, *Democracy and political Arab Culture* (1992), p. 105.

⁵³ Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy, A theory of Distorted A change in Arab Society* (1988), pp. 4-5.

⁵⁴ Sharabi (1988), p. 8

⁵⁵ Sharabi (1988), p. 8

⁵⁶ Jackman, Political Institution and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies, *American Political science review*, Vol. 81, No. 2 (June., 1987), p. 405 pp. 405-424

its parliament, but such decisions is often affected by one of two circumstances. Either political actors lack basic knowledge and information so that the choice and consequences of different electoral systems are not fully recognized or, conversely, political actors use their knowledge of electoral systems to promote designs which they think will work to their own partisan advantage”.⁵⁷

Reynolds and Reilly argue that, political institutions shape the rules of the game under which democracy is practiced, and it is often argued that the easiest political institution to be manipulated, for good or for bad, is the electoral system, because in translating the votes cast in a general election into seats in the legislature, the choice of electoral system can effectively determine who is elected and which party gains power.⁵⁸ Moreover, these authors identified eight criteria that should be followed by the electoral system designer when designing an electoral system:

1. Ensuring a representative parliament.
2. Making elections accessible and meaningful with ease of voting and the ability of the electorate to understand the electoral process.
3. Providing incentives for conciliation.
4. Facilitating stable and efficient government.
5. Holding the government and representatives accountable, so that state elected officials or parties are responsible to their constituents to the highest degree possible.
6. Encouraging “cross-cutting” political parties.
7. Promoting a parliamentary opposition.
8. Cost and administrative capacity of the country should be taken in consideration when designing any electoral system.⁵⁹

These criteria can be employed to determine which electoral systems are most effective for any given society. In addition, it is argued that elections are the key factor in evaluating whether or not the political system is representative, because the electoral system reflects the ideological divisions within the society “Electoral system

⁵⁷ Reynolds and Reilly, *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design* (1997), p. 1.

⁵⁸ Reynolds and Reilly (1997), p. 7

⁵⁹ Reynolds and Reilly (1997), pp. 9-13.

consequences depend upon factors such as how a society is structured in terms of ideological, religious, ethnic, racial, regional, linguistic, or class divisions; whether the country is an established democracy, a transitional democracy, or a new democracy; whether there is an established party system, whether parties are embryonic and unformed, and how many 'serious' parties there are; and whether a particular party's supporters are geographically concentrated together, or dispersed over a wide area".⁶⁰

1.3.6 Democracy and Political Participation

Citizen participation in democracy is one of the main issues in democratic thought. In debates about the role citizen participation should play in a democracy, there are two different views which can be characterized as participatory or representative democracy. In the first view 'Schumpeterian view', citizen participation in representative democracy is seen as not essential to democracy and can be limited to voting in elections.⁶¹ Schumpeter is the main representative of this view. In the second view, theorists of participatory democracy see citizen participation as an essential element of democracy which means more than just voting in elections.

Schumpeter defines democracy as "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote".⁶² The main element of political democracy, according to Schumpeter is the competition for leadership. Hence, according to this opinion democracy is first and foremost a process that takes place among leaders, and direct citizen participation in the decision making process is not essential to democracy. The role of the people is to produce a government, and Schumpeter argued that, once voters have elected their leaders, political action is the leaders' business not the voters'.⁶³

In *Democratic Theory* Sartori argued that the people's massive participation in the political process would lead to totalitarianism. Therefore, the political activity of

⁶⁰ Reynolds and Reilly (1997), p. 8.

⁶¹ Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (1942).

⁶² Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (1976), p. 269.

⁶³ Schumpeter (1976), p. 295

people should be minimized, and he argued that the people should react and not act.⁶⁴ A similar view of the role of citizen participation in democracy can be found in Dahl's work. He argued that the massive participation of ordinary citizens in political activity could be dangerous as it might lead to a decline in consensus about the basic principles and norms of democracy.⁶⁵

On the other hand, there are many thinkers who see that citizen participation in political life is more than casting votes in elections and has a meaning much wider than producing a government. This view sees democracy, "first and foremost as the people's business; citizens are the central agent not the political leaders"⁶⁶. Rousseau argued that participation is not only voting in elections, it covers every other aspect of participation in the political decision making process⁶⁷. Table 1.2 shows the main elements of the two different views representative and participatory democracy.

Table 1.2 Two Different Points of View on Political Participation and Democracy

Participation plays only a marginal role in democracy	Participation is an essential feature of democracy
Representative democracy	Participatory democracy
The focus is on political leaders	The focus is on citizens
Participation is instrumental	Participation is expressive
Participation has no educative or social functions	Participation has both educative and social functions
There is no relationship between participation and good government	Participation is a way of ensuring good government
Massive participation is not desirable	Massive participation is desirable

Source: Michels, Ank., Citizen Participation and Democracy in the Netherlands. In *Democratization*, Vol 13, No. 2, 2006, pp. 323-339.

⁶⁴ Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (1962), p. 77.

⁶⁵ Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (1956), p. 89.

⁶⁶ Michels, Citizen Participation and Democracy in the Netherlands. In *Democratization*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006, pp. 323-339.

⁶⁷ Michels (2006), p. 3

In 'The Diffusion of Democracy, 1946-1994', John O'Loughlin and his colleagues defined democracy as widely "meant to refer to systems that encourage inclusion, participation, open competition, and institutionalized constraints".⁶⁸ They argue that there are four basic elements in political democracy: (a) the regulation and competitiveness of political participation; (b) the extent of competition among various groups of the political forces; (c) constraints on the decision-making powers of the executive; (d) the openness of recruitment into the decision making bodies.⁶⁹ They also mentioned that some scholars have specified indicators to measure the level of democracy; the extent to which these indicators are identified and protected the extent of democracy is embraced in the state. For example, Gastil mentioned two components, political rights and civil liberties; Downs mentioned the presence of free and fair elections; and Lerner stressed on the extent of political participation in terms of voter turnout.⁷⁰

Democratization is clearly a complex and long-term process that requires procedural changes, and in addition its outcome needs time to be achieved. Moreover, there are several basic criteria which can be used in judging whether or not the performance of any political system is democratic and successful:

1. Commitment of the political leadership to accountability.
2. Standards of honesty and efficiency of government officials.
3. Transparency and openness of political decision making.
4. Level of public awareness that is appropriate to enhance participation in political affairs.
5. The capability of various civil society movements to represent the citizenry in the political sphere.⁷¹

⁶⁸ O'Loughlin, et al., The Diffusion of Democracy, 1946-1994. *Annals, Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 88, No. 4, (December 1998), p. 547.

⁶⁹ O'Loughlin, et al. (1998), p. 548.

⁷⁰ O'Loughlin, et al. (1998), p. 548.

⁷¹ Harris, Democratization of the State: A Global Perspective and South African Case Study, *International Journal of Public Administration*, 2004, Vol. 27, Issue. 13/14, p. 1066

1.3.7 Jordan's Political Development

This section introduces the literature on democracy and political participation in Jordan in order to find out whether there are any components which may contribute to this study. The review covers the most significant publications with relevance to the study.

1.3.7.1 Democracy in Jordan: Literature Review

“Building Democracy in Jordan” is a significant recent report in Arabic by Ibtissam Al-Attiyat, Musa Shteivi, and Suleiman Sweiss. Published in 2003 this study was carried out by the International IDEA in cooperation with Arabic NGO for Development (ANND) and discusses democratic reforms in different Arab countries, Jordan was one of these countries, detailed national data in this report was collected from laws and official publications. Such as, the Political Parties’ Law no.15 of 1955, the Political Parties’ Law no. 32 of 1992, the Constitution of Jordan of 1952, and other books and reports addressing Jordan’s democratization.

The first paper by Suleiman Sweiss discusses the evolution of Jordan’s electoral systems and the main obstacles to democracy in Jordan. The paper starts with a comprehensive introduction to legislative and parliamentary life in Jordan and the most important changes to the electoral system since the establishment of TJ in 1921. In his evaluation of the electoral situation and the democratic process Sweiss argues that after the 2003 elections the conviction grew among different official and public sectors that Jordanian democracy was passing through a crisis. This was not only due to low voter turnout but also due to ineffective role of the Chamber of Deputies in terms of both political issues and legislative role, so that the credibility of the legislature and the elections in general were weekend.

The second paper by Musa Sheitwi provides an analysis of the Jordanian political parties from (1921-2003). He critically highlights their activities and the main problems that led to their limited effective role in political transformation and participation in Jordan. The third paper by Ibtissam Al Attiyat examines the impact of

women's participation in public life on their position in the society focusing on women's participation in public life, elected councils, and political parties.

Al Attiyat conducted interviews with female deputies and activists in women's rights and other women organizations to assess their political experience, quota system, and women's general role and participation in civil society and political life. Al-Attiyat outlines the most significant factors and the obstacles to an effective role for women in public affairs and elections. She reveals that women are unsatisfied with their political participation due to several factors. These include many social obstacles, as Jordan is a very conservative society and traditionally favours men candidates and hinges on tribes. Legal obstacles further obstruct women from becoming involved in political participation, and the author argues that the SNTV system supports tribalism in such a way to enhance male candidates' chances over those of women candidates.

Jordan in Transition: from Hussein to Abdullah by Curtis R Ryan is a valuable book about the economic, social and political changes that Jordan has experienced since 1989, offering a persuasive analysis of Jordan's domestic and international politics. Ryan argues that Jordanian politics has undergone four transitions. The first stage started in 1989 with liberalization and democratization programme when Jordan's regime first allowed competitive elections. The second transition also started after 1989 when Jordan implemented policies to improve its economic situation and, in response to globalization, to embark upon economic reform and restructuring. The third transition occurred between the 1991 Gulf War and the Jordan-Israel peace treaty which was signed in 1994 fundamentally altering these countries' relationship. The final transition started when King Abdullah ascended to the throne in 1999 after the death of King Hussein who had ruled Jordan from 1953 to 1999. Ryan argues that King Abdullah took major steps towards domestic political reform, and author provides an analysis of the 1999 democratic elections which were the first to be held under this monarch.

Democracy in Jordan? by Tujan Faisl and Ian Urbina was published on July, 2003. Tujan was the first woman to be elected Deputy in the 12th Jordanian parliament in 1993. The authors argue that the most important reasons for Jordan being a long way off from real democracy and have had serious effect on the electoral process are the

temporary laws which have been decreed from 2001 to 2003 contain a wide range of restrictions. Faisal and Urbina argue that these elections went smoothly with a voter participation percentage of 52%, in addition to allocating a quota for women with six parliamentary seats. Nevertheless, non-partisan candidates won the majority of the seats in the lower house of parliament, and this precludes Jordan having embraced a true democratic reform.

Finally, the researchers wonder if, with this type of deputies, the parliament will be able to deal with the current political issues and important challenges and to do what is right. The researchers did not evaluate the performance of the 2003 parliament as they wrote their article one month after these elections, but they recommended that the parliament should review all of the temporary laws and decide whether to approve or reject them.

Kamel S. Abu Jabir and Schirin H. Fathi.. *The 1989 Jordanian Parliamentary elections* (1990) provide an in depth analyse of the 1989 elections. This was the first general election since 1967, occurring two months prior to Israeli occupation of the West Bank. The authors argue that the 1989 election should be interpreted in the light of the important issues which formed its background. An analysis is then given to Jordan's electoral law after the disengagement decision in 1988 which redraw the electoral districts and were subject to lengthy discussions.

The 1993 Elections in Jordan by Abla Amawi (1994) discusses the main significant points in the 1993 election and the impact of election law amendments on the electoral campaigns and results. Amawi points out in her Article that these elections constituted a significant step in Jordan towards the consolidation of democracy, particularly because they were the first elections to be held under Political Parties' Law issued in September 1992. She added that the 1993 election were also significant because women succeeded in this election and one woman succeeded in becoming the first and only Jordanian woman yet to be elected to the lower house of parliament.

The Process of Democratisation in Jordan by Katherine Ruth assesses the political reforms which took place in Jordan from 1989 to 1992 concentrating on the 1989 elections. Ruth argues that the economic riots accompanied by the precise limits of pluralism and political freedom triggered a political liberalisation process in Jordan, and she notes that the Gulf crisis was a major crisis in Jordan after the initiation of liberalisation in 1989. Ruth concludes that the crisis improved the relationships between the regime and parliament and led to greater national unity.

Al-Hawmdeh carried out a study about the political development in Jordan from 1988 to 1994. Al-Hawmdeh's 1994 study entitled *Political Development in Jordan from 1988 Until the Present*⁷² investigated the effects of education, economics, and urbanisation on political development in Jordan. Al-Hawamdeh used a quantitative method to collect data and to identify the factors which encouraged the political development process in Jordan. Al-Hawmdeh's study sample was 510 respondents selected randomly from the population. He concluded that tribalism and communalism strongly influenced political development, in addition arguing that Jordanian citizens appeared to be relatively highly politically informed, interested and active.

However, it is worth noting that Al-Hawmdeh and Katherine conducted their studies examining Jordan's program of political liberalization in 1992, less than two years after the initiation of political liberalization in Jordan. I argue that it was too early to know whether the development of political liberalization in Jordan has progressed or fallen backward, particularly after two decades of parliamentary suspension.

Political Liberalization in Jordan: A Study of the Democratization Process 1989-1993 by Mohammad Kanosh Al-Sharah. Al-Sharah investigated whether or not the process of political liberalization which began in 1989 had led to democracy in Jordan. Al-Sharah used a qualitative method of research, interviewing senior government officials and political party leaders, and argued that the 1989 riots motivated Jordanian citizens to participate actively in the 1989 elections. Al-Sharah's study examined the role of parliamentary councils in the transition towards democracy in

⁷² Present refers to 1994 when he completed his thesis.

Jordan. He argued that following the 1989 elections, parliamentary councils became the centre of political development. Moreover, he added that many steps have been taken on the road to democracy after 1989 elections such as 1992 Political Parties' Law and 1993 Press and Publication Law. Furthermore, Al-Sharah argues that all political groups and tendencies, including the Islamists, can participate freely in the political process.

More importantly, al-Sharah argues that the only significant setback in the democratization process was the change in the electoral law in the absence of a parliament. Therefore, he argued that the Jordanian case can be characterized as democracy without a full transfer of power. However, it was too early to assess the impact of parliamentary councils on the liberalization process and judge whether the parliament became the centre of political development after only two parliamentary elections. Particularly that the two elections were held under two different laws and consequently produced two different kinds of parliamentarians.

Moreover, Al-Sharah argued that the promulgation of the 1993 Press and Publication Law is considered as a positive step on the road to democracy. However, the period between 1993 and 1997 elections witnessed a decline in political freedoms as a result of the major amendments -in 1993, 1997, 1998, and 1999- that the government introduced to the Press and Publication Law which gave the authorities sweeping powers to reduce the degree of press freedom.

Is It Democratization? The Rule of Law and Political Changes in Jordan since 1989 by Anu Leinonen presented in 2006. The main aim of the study was to investigate the rule of law in democratization and whether the political changes that Jordan had witnessed since 1989 indicated the presence of a successful democratization process in Jordan. Leinonen argues that modern political democracy is not possible without embedded rule of law practices. Moreover, he asserts that one of the first conclusion to be drawn that political changes that have taken place since 1989 cannot be correctly understood as indicating a process of real democratization.

Conclusion

This review of the most important studies about democratization and political development in Jordan was looking for anything can be used to assess the liberalization process through real indicators. Disappointingly, the reviewed literature offers early studies in 1992 after only two parliamentary elections and some before the issuance of the political parties' law. In view of that, I argue that it was too early to judge whether the process of liberalization has been fully consolidated and achieved the ambitious goals or not, as most of the dramatic and important events that have had a dramatic impact on the political liberalization process occurred after 1992, such as the consequences of the peace treaty with Israel, economic consequences of Iraq war, and the September 11th attacks and their consequences.

Moreover, to measure transformation towards liberal democracy, different criteria can be used, the most important are through moving towards greater degrees of political participation; moving forward in terms of legislation to provide more opportunities for Jordanian citizens to participate in political life; through evaluating how effective the elected parliament is considered to be; the level of involvement of Jordanian citizens in the political process; and the level of political freedoms. However, most of the reviewed studies focused on participation in parliamentary elections only, while the current study aims to focus on conceptual and analytical issues such as political parties, political culture, tribalism, international context, and the socio-economic situation that led the political system in Jordan to liberalization and at the same time pushed it to reverse this liberalization.

Additionally, from this review it is clear that there is a lack of comprehensive and empirical studies providing a thorough explanation of political participation in Jordan. Therefore, this study aims to provide different approaches to understand the main factors which affect political participation in terms of both the individual characteristics of Jordanian citizens and the external factors.

Therefore, this study is important for both academic and practical reasons and considerations. In terms of academic considerations, despite the multiplicity of writings on democratization, political parties, parliamentary elections, and the

political system in Jordan, there is a paucity of research and field studies on the political participation in Jordan. There are no empirical studies identifying the reality of political participation in Jordan and investigating the most important factors associated with participation concerning the economic situation, social structure, religion, and political culture.

From a practical viewpoint, the importance of this study lies in the following:

1. Fifteen years have passed since political pluralism was initiated in Jordan.
2. Despite the social, economic, and political transformation that Jordan has witnessed, the transition to democracy has not been linked to improvements in political participation, even though the regulation and competitiveness of political participation is one of four basic elements of political democracy according to O'Loughlin et al.
3. During the period in which the empirical research for this study was conducted⁷³, intense public debate in Jordan occurred concerning issues linked to political participation, and particularly about the next parliamentary election scheduled to take place in 20/11/2007.
4. This study is also important because participation in Jordanian parliamentary elections is not only a political phenomenon but also a social phenomenon where the political and electoral behaviour of both voters and candidates is affected by many political, social, economic, and cultural factors.

⁷³ from 1/5/2007-10/7/2007

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Historical Development of Constitutions and Parliaments in Jordan

2.1 Introduction

From the beginning of the twelfth century A.D Jordan, like other neighbouring Arab countries, was ruled by the Ottoman Empire through local administrative councils. In 1921, however, Jordan came into being when the British reached a political agreement with Emir Abdullah in Amman in 1921, and the first national government was formed under his leadership. The following years witnessed crucial changes and in 1923 Britain recognised Transjordan (TJ) as a national state under the rule of Emir Abdullah, which they would grant independence if a constitutional regime was established. Since then a series of agreements were signed between Emir Abdullah and the British government, leading to the announcement of Jordan's independence in 1946.

After 1921 the country continued to develop its political and constitutional structures. The constitutional journey started with the Jordan's first constitution (The Organic Law) promulgated in 1928 during the British mandate. This law stipulated a hereditary monarchy with elected legislative councils, and was followed by elections for five legislative councils. The constitution was transformed in 1946 when Jordan gained its full independence and a new constitution was promulgated adopting the bicameral system. Only one election was held under this constitution, in November 1947. A few years later a new constitution was instituted on January 1, 1952 after the West Bank was engaged with TJ. This constitution stipulated that the system of Jordanian government was a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system adopting the bicameral legislative council.

This chapter covers the constitutional framework and the political developments in Jordan from 1928, and provides a historical background to Jordan's legislative structure and participation in Jordanian elections.

2.2 The Establishment of the TJ State

The territory constituting present day Jordan was conquered and ruled by the Ottoman Empire from 1516 until 1917, in which time it was a neglected governorate (*mutasarrifiyyah*) under the Syrian *vilayet* (an administrative division of the empire). The Ottoman Turks did not wish to rule the area east of the Jordan River directly because it was so difficult to rule being inhabited by Bedouins.⁷⁴ During the World War I, Sharif Hussein ibn-'Ali, ruler of Mecca and Hijaz, was promised by British and French and their allies an independent Arab state if the Arab revolted against the Turks. On July 14, 1915, the British High Commissioner in Cairo Sir Henry McMahon acting on behalf of the British government began a correspondence with Sharif Hussein.⁷⁵

In this correspondence Sharif Hussein was promised Arab rule in all of the areas liberated from Turkey except "The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo which cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded".⁷⁶ On May 16, 1916 during World War I, an agreement concluded between British and France concerning the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was called Sykes-Picot agreement.⁷⁷ Sir Mark Sykes represented the British and Georges Picot of France agreed that the Arab areas would be divided as follows⁷⁸ (see figure 2.1):

1. "Great Britain and France prepared to recognise and protect an independent Arab state or a confederation of states in the A and B zones (A included the interior of Syria; B comprised most of the hinterland of Mesopotamia and some part of eastern Palestine) under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. France in zone A and Great Britain in zone B were to have the right of priority in enterprises and local loans. In their respective zones France and Great Britain

⁷⁴ Salibi, *The Modern History of Jordan* (1993) pp.35-36.

⁷⁵ Aruri, *Jordan: A Study in Political Development 1921 -1965*, (1972), p.16.

⁷⁶ <http://www.wzo.org.il/home/politic/d148a.htm>

⁷⁷ The agreement took its name from the negotiators.

⁷⁸ Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: the Story of the Arab National Movement* (1938), pp.428-430

the anger and tension in society and led to a further crisis of trust between the people and governments.²⁶⁸

The Prime Minister, Dr. Marouf al-Bakhit, acknowledged in May 2007, that there is a crisis of confidence between the state and the society.²⁶⁹ Therefore, the Jordanian citizens believe that the successive governments have been unable to assume the responsibilities of the serious stages that Jordan has passed through. They have neglected the five basic issues which concern the internal life of the citizens: problems of poverty and unemployment, improving standards of living in general, the application of the principles of equal opportunities, and fighting corruption.

The results of an opinion poll conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan in 2005 showed that a majority (86%) of Jordanians are not optimistic that the current government will be able to solve the basic problems. The general trends of Jordanian public opinion have not changed, and there is a growing lack of confidence among citizens about government in general.

Moreover this poll also revealed that the confidence gap might increase during the present government or subsequent government if policies were not pursued to successfully reduce poverty, unemployment, corruption, and price rises. These are the most prominent problems in Jordan which the citizens believe that their government must deal with immediately.²⁷⁰

More importantly, the Jordanian citizen believes that the government is not serious about strengthening the democratic process or undertaking political reform in Jordan. Zaki Bani Irshaid, Secretary General of the Islamic Action Party has stated that there is no governmental will for reform: "I do not trust that the government intends to achieve political reform and fight corruption".²⁷¹

²⁶⁸ Live dialogue with Jamil Abu Bakr the Assistant Secretary-General of the Islamic Action Front on www.aslamonline.net , Saturday 30/11/2002

²⁶⁹ <http://www.ikhwan-jor.com/modules.php?name=News&file=Article&sid=465>, May 22, 2007

²⁷⁰ Jordanian Opinion Survey regarding measurement the performance of the government of Dr. Adnan Badran after the 200th day of formation (Amman: Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, 2005)

²⁷¹ Dialogue conducted by Shaker Al-Johari in Amman with the Secretary General of the Islamic Action Front Party on 22/6/2006. to read the full text see <http://www.nazmi.org/media/report40.html>.

3.5.4.3 Culture of Fear “Politically”

The culture of fear is one of the biggest obstacles to political reform and change in the Arab world. Moreover, this culture is one of the dilemmas facing political opposition forces and makes them unable of paying people to support them to claim their rights and interests in the face of political power. Consequently, this culture leads to fear of power, lack of political participation, lack a strong liberal political culture and value for individuals, and lack of a strong opposition which contradicts all principles of democracy.

Moreover, the culture of fear presents fetters and constraints on the ability of the Arab people to face political reality and reform. Despite the prevalence and depth of the discontent and a popular rejection of the current political reality, the Arab peoples are still in a state of passivity, unable to take clear steps towards the process of achieving their usurped rights to meet the internal political challenge.²⁷²

Although the 1952 constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan guaranteed a set of rights and freedoms to be enjoyed by Jordanian citizens, the constitutional provisions that protect the individual’s rights and freedoms often lack safeguards in practice. Moreover, various policies, resolutions and amendments have followed which have deeply violated these freedoms and rights.

For example, Article 15/1 of the constitution stated that “The State shall guarantee freedom of opinion. Every Jordanian shall be free to express his opinion by speech, in writing, or by means of photographic representation and other forms of expression, provided that such does not violate the law”. Jordan has passed through years of martial law where opinions were confiscated and accountable. Although this has improved and the citizens can now express their opinions through television, radio, and press, the control over these institutions is still exerted by the security agencies.²⁷³ Additionally, although Article 16/2 of the constitution guaranteed the rights to

²⁷² Abu Roman, *Thaqafat al-khaouf Siyasian*, [the Culture of Fear Politically], *Al-Ghad* newspaper, 26/04/2006.

²⁷³ Al-Emoosh, *al-Hoqooq al-Madaniyyah wa al-Siyasiyyah li al-Muwatin al-Urduni*, [*The Civil and Political Rights of the Jordanian Citizen*] in *The National Symposium on Human Rights* (1997), p. 107

establish societies and political parties, and to hold meetings within the limits of the law, prevention and hunting down political parties and punishing every citizen belonging to the political parties continued until the beginning of the 1990s.

Jamil Al-Nemri, a writer and political analyst, wrote that the culture of fear concerning the criticism of governments and participation in the opposition activities developed through a long history, and grew up during generations of people, pointing out that this culture will not disappear unless the government provides and adopts tools and laws guaranteeing and enforcing freedom of opinion and expression.²⁷⁴

Zaki Bani Irsheid, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) leader, stressed in the *Alsabeel* newspaper that the government is enacting legislation that would make people afraid to express their opinions, even feared over mere thoughts. The continual fear of Jordanians about criticizing the government indicates that the national environment does not allow the expression of strongly dissenting opinion. Legislations and official procedures, and particularly the laws on public meetings have created a culture of fear. Irshid, added that with the existence of such a culture of fear, Jordanians will not achieve political development and reform, and which might threaten the future of the political parties and organizations of civil society.²⁷⁵

3.5.4.4 The Political Culture Concerning Political Parties

An analysis of the political and legal reality of partisan action in Jordan confirms that until 1957 the establishment of political parties was permitted, but during the 35 years since then until the issuance of the Parties' Law 1992, the establishment of political parties was actually banned under martial law. In addition, the partisan activity was punishable by law and many party members were confined in prisons and detention centres due to their political activities.

Therefore, the political parties witnessed a decline in the number of their members and affiliates due to the security consequences which faced them, in addition to the general harassment by the government of those involved in political activities.

²⁷⁴ *Al-vifaq* Magazine, No 2545, Saturday, 29 2004.

²⁷⁵ *Al-Sabeel* newspaper, 02/08/2006.

Moreover, many of the members left the party's activity due the authority threats to the parties' members especially since getting any public job requires prior approval of the security agencies.²⁷⁶

Such collections from criminalization of partisan action, was settled in the minds of generations of Jordanians and planted fear and terror in the conscience of those generations from practising partisan activity. So, in spite of the existence of a law allowing the establishment of political parties and partisan activity the Parties Act of 1992 and the abolition of martial law, this could not overcome what had been planted in the minds of Jordanians as a result of past practices. Each generation handed down to the next the fear of partisan action.²⁷⁷

The Jordanian Prime Minister, Marouf al-bakheet, stated that the entrenched culture of fear about party affiliation is an obstacle for Jordanian society to the establishment and evolution of real partisan life, and prevents the expansion of political development and democracy. Therefore, the Jordanian citizen wants, and wishes to join political parties but he fears the security consequences.²⁷⁸

In the prevailing political culture the executive authorities in Jordan have adopted clear and negative attitudes for several decades towards political parties, and have tended to consider them as responsible for threats to the security and stability of the country's political life. Even after the issuance of the political Parties' Law in 1992 which decreed the legitimacy and plurality of political parties, these negative attitudes continued. In addition, the government has shown caution, and sometimes hostility toward social movements and non-governmental organizations led by the opposition forces that play a political role, and which seek to mobilize their members and public opinion to take political positions that do not agree with the policies of government.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁶ Fregat , '*Ala Tareeq al-Tanmiyah al- Siyasiyyah* , [On the Road to Political Development], (2005) , pp. 86-87.

²⁷⁷ Al-Hamouri, Qanoon al-Ahzab al-Jadeed 2007, [The Parties' Law for 2007], *al-Arab Alyoum Newspaper*, 2/4/2007.

²⁷⁸ In al-Basheeti, *Thaqafat al-khouf men al-intima' al-hizbi fi al-Urdun*, [Culture of Fear of Party Affiliation in Jordan], *Al-Watan Newspaper*, 09/06/2006. at <http://www.al-watan.com/data/20060609/index.asp?content=writer2>

²⁷⁹ Al-Hourani and Al-Soboh, *al-Harakat al-Ijtima'iyyah fi al-Urdun*, *al-Dour al-Rahin wa al-Mustaqbali* , [Social Movements in Jordan: its Development, Infrastructure, the Current and Future Role], Word Document (2003).

Therefore, given the prevailing political culture, the political parties have remained a dubious enterprise, if not deserving of the absolute or covert hostility of the organs of the executive authority. The MP Zuheir Abu Ragheb said that the martial law mentality still prevails in dealing with the parties, and Jordanians have not escaped from the conviction that affiliation to parties means being taken to prisons and detention centres. He added that the government has put obstacles in the new political parties' law. This necessarily means moving away from political development and also means that a large proportion of the practitioners of political activity have to work secretly and underground, which can be considered a decline in public freedoms and a great setback for democracy.²⁸⁰

Therefore, the persistent culture of fear is clear evidence that the Jordanian political parties are still experiencing crisis reflected in the reluctance of Jordanian citizens to engage in partisan activities. This is a fundamental reason for the lack of growth of political parties in terms of the number of members.

3.5.4.5 Culture of Political Participation

Political participation means the contribution of citizens and their active role in the political system to influence the official decision-making process. At the forefront of political participation patterns are electoral activity, partisan action, and union work which are all linked to the principles of political pluralism, freedom of opinion, freedom of peaceful assembly, and the right to form associations and political parties.

Democracy is the best mechanism for effecting change for the better, through the peaceful rotation of power. This devolution of power is usually conducted through the empowerment of the people to exercise their right to elect their representatives in full freedom and fairness on the basis of the candidates' programmes. The electoral process provides the opportunity for the owners of these programmes to exercise their role in the executive branch and therefore apply their programme, thus providing a chance for people to judge their success or failure. Accordingly, success in the application of these programmes demonstrates confidence, or, to the contrary, failure

²⁸⁰ The eighth meeting of the Parliamentary Media Forum held on 08/04/2007 entitled "The New Parties Law and its Impact on Development and Political Reform".

is reflected in the ballot box by withdrawing confidence. All of this guarantees the rights of individuals and groups to participate in public affairs, with devolution of power, and the possibility of change.

The Jordanian citizen tends to refrain from political participation. Therefore, the electoral process for elections to the House of Representatives 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th has witnessed reluctance among voters to participate. Table 3.1 shows statistical comparisons and the proportions of the participants in the electoral process for the years 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2003.

Table 3.1 Participation of Jordanian Citizens in the Electoral Process from 1989-2003

	1989 elections	1993 elections	1997 elections	2003 elections
Population estimates by the General Statistics	3,370,867	4,152,000	4,580,234	5,255,677
Number of registered voters	12,204,45	15,012,78	1,838,199	2,505,882
The ratio of the number of voters to total population	36.21%	36.16%	40.13%	47.68%
The number of election cards	1,049,582.7	1,201,022	1,479,934	2,505,882
The proportion of registered voters obtaining election card	86%	80%	80.51%	100%
The number of voters	541,426	822,294	824,664	1,252,941
The ratio of the number of voters to the number of the election cards	51.58%	68.47%	55.72%	50.00%

Source: Al-shikhani, Musa., the citizen and elections and the crisis of participation in the electoral process. <http://www.electionsjo.com/ESubject/DefaultSub.asp?seid=82>

It is clear from table 3.1 that the populations has steadily grown as has in the percentage of registered voters approved in the records of the electoral process. However, there is also a decrease in the proportion of those obtaining election cards to register on the electoral rolls. Furthermore, the turnout for the selection of members of the Chamber of Deputies is as low as half of electoral card holders. In other words the proportion of voting participants is around 25%-28% of all registered voters according to the voter lists declared for those years. There are several reasons which have led to the reluctance of citizens to participate in the electoral process.

3.5.4.6 Election Culture

Since the return of electoral politics to Jordan in 1989, the Kingdom has held five parliamentary elections, in 1989, 1993, 1997, 2003 and 2007. These polls have established clear indicators to measure the perceptions of Jordanians on their priorities and concerns, voter attitudes and electoral culture. The parliamentary season has come to be filled with excitement and interest for Jordanian society, particularly for those groups who are interested in participating in elections, such as tribes and parties. These elections have established various types of practice and ritual connected with the election process, creating a new type of electoral culture and campaign practices.

3.5.4.6.1 Election Campaigns

In modern democratic societies, election campaigns are important parts of deciding election outcomes. Furthermore, they are integral to the process of political programmes being reviewed and government policies discussed. In addition campaigns provide voters with important information that enables the m to make decision. According to Gelman and King, “campaign activities increase the amount of information that voters have available to them about the type of things that are important and the candidates’ position on these things. In this way, campaigns do two things, they help voters make sense of the agenda and they reduce voter uncertainty about candidate positions or real conditions of important variables”.²⁸¹

²⁸¹ In Stevenson and Vavreck. Does Campaign Length Matter? Testing for Cross-National Effects, *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Apr., 2000), pp. 217-235.

During the pre-election period candidates undertake organized efforts to influence voters' decisions to secure victory in parliamentary elections. In the case of Jordan, some candidates start their campaigns months before the official period in order to attract the voters to vote for them. Some candidates continue their campaigns right up till the polling day itself. Therefore, the candidates intensify their visibility in society and try to improve their relationship with the public, especially by making visits to *Madafas* (Guest Houses), and home visits particularly in rural areas and small districts, including meetings, visits both for congratulation and condolence, and presenting gifts in important occasions such as weddings. Moreover, the candidates attend and participate in all public meetings whether of a political, artistic, cultural, religious, commemorative, recreational or sporting nature in order to contact citizens during these public activities.

3.5.4.6.2 Election Themes

The campaign themes and slogans in Jordan vary from one place to another and according to the voters' cultural, economic, political, and educational circumstances. Moreover, the election campaigns reveal the complex political atmosphere in Jordan in addition to the attitudes and priorities of candidates and voters alike. Therefore, some of the slogans are tribal, or Islamist, and some seek the votes of Palestinian refugees and Jordanians of Palestinian origin.

Accordingly, the candidates in Amman and other major cities and high neighbourhoods pronounce slogans including reform promises, such as for constitutional and political reform, strengthening the separation of powers, children's and women's rights, and other freedoms in various forms that will minimally satisfy popular sentiment in these areas. In other neighbourhoods and communities particularly in districts which have a large population of Palestinian origin, the candidates raise slogans such as 'no to normalisation with Jews', 'yes to the right of return and supporting of Palestinian issue' and 'liberation of Al-Aqsa Mosque'. In places with people from mixed roots and origins, the candidates focus on national unity, such as 'yes to national unity', and 'all Jordanians have equal rights and duties'.

In other poor areas the candidates focus largely on economic slogans 'no to corruption', 'no for raising prices', 'no for more poverty', 'yes for supporting the poor and combating unemployment', 'yes to governmental accountability', and 'yes for Justice and equality'. The party candidates advocate their political programmes and focus on political issues and on strengthening the national opposition and democracy. However, in terms of Islamist slogans in parliamentary elections, Islamist candidates campaign with their traditional slogans such as "Islam is the solution", and "the Quran is our constitution".

Accordingly, electoral slogans in Jordan can be classified into two categories: first, the slogans of representatives of political parties calling for political reform and to create platforms concerning important issues. The second category reflects the population composition of each district, and these slogans cover various issues; they can include questions of political and economic reform, normalization with Zionism, and promises of a better life.

Generally, electoral campaigns play the role of intermediary between candidates and voters. Candidates present their issues, agendas, and information. The voters, in turn, select their preferred candidates according to the information provided during the campaigns. The reality in Jordan, however, is that electoral campaigns and slogans play only a limited role in influencing voters' behaviour and attitudes in choosing candidate, especially in rural and tribal areas.

In tribal areas, slogans are no more than hackneyed clichés, emptied of political content. A tribal candidate from a large tribe is the most likely to win his district seat, because tribes now conduct internal votes to choose their candidates for parliament, and most candidates have a clear idea of how many votes they will get because this is the same as the size of their tribe in the district. Fahd Alkhetan in *Al-Arab Alyawm* declares that "with the approach of the parliamentary elections due to be held on Nov 20, 2007 any observer of parliamentary life can predict the names of 70% of the winners right now", and he attributes this to the tribal unanimity which decisively settles the results in many electoral districts.²⁸²

²⁸² *Al-Arab Alyawm* newspaper, Nov 11, 2007.



In the second meeting of 'Election dialogues 2007', organized by International Fact for Studies and Information in collaboration with Jordanian society for the Rights of Voters, the participants concluded that most of the electoral campaigns and themes are individualized and focus on the service dimension at the expense of aspects of political reform.²⁸³

3.5.4.7 Gender Culture (Masculine culture)

Although Jordan has witnessed democratic transformation over the last decade, this requires the effective participation of women who constitute almost half of Jordanian society. Despite the growing role of women in social and economic life, however, their role in the political sphere is still weak. Like other Arab societies, Jordanian society from its inception and social composition is still a patriarchal society, where women are treated in such a way that hinders their access to the decision-making centres in the community.

Therefore, the head of the family, the tribal leader (Sheikh), and sometimes the Secretary-General of the political party has the final say in deciding whether or not to participate, in guiding public opinion, and defining the direction of the electoral votes, in addition to the identification of the candidates and ensuring their access to the council of deputies.²⁸⁴

Women have a limited presence in political positions due to the tribal nature of Jordanian elections. Consider the paradox in the last municipal elections in Jordan. A woman candidate who ran for a seat in the municipal council in Mafraq was appointed a council member even though she did not obtain a single vote. She did not vote for herself and neither did her husband and five children.

Although the number of people registered for voting in her district was 144 men and 207 women, and voter turnout was 95 per cent, she got no vote at all. She justified the result by saying "I did not vote for myself because of my commitment to my tribe and

²⁸³ <http://www.factjo.com/fullNews.aspx?id=1902>

²⁸⁴ Rantaoui, The National Conference to Support Women in the Parliamentary Elections / Support Women in the Parliamentary Elections, 2003.

the residents of my town to vote for another candidate, who unfortunately did not win... I would not break my commitment to the tribe. We are a tribal community and the priority is for electing a man".²⁸⁵

3.6 Women's Political Participation

Women have been deprived of political participation for many decades since the founding of the Emirate of TJ in 1921. However, the right to political participation in the pre-independence period, which was restricted to males, has not really changed since independence, even during the 1960s and 1970s.

Although women had no political and legal right to vote and to be elected for parliamentary elections until 1974, their struggle to be granted the right to vote and run in municipal and parliamentary elections started in the early 1950s. This struggle was led by the Women's Awakening Association, founded in 1952, which has been resolved as a result of its activities.²⁸⁶

The establishment of the Arab Women Federation (AWF) in Jordan in 1954 played an important role in raising women's political awareness. The AWF presented many memorandums to the government, Senate, and House of Deputies calling for the granting of political rights to women, and for changes in electoral law. However, when the government amendment to law was issued, the amended law gave the right to vote only to educated women but not those were illiterate.²⁸⁷ In the meantime, women continued to send memos until they got the full right to vote in 1974. Accordingly, women in Jordan were granted the right to vote for parliamentary elections in 1974 and for municipal elections in 1982.²⁸⁸

Since parliamentary life was suspended between 1968 to 1984, women exercised their right to vote for the first time in the 1984 supplementary elections. However, women did not participate as candidates for parliamentary elections until 1989.

²⁸⁵ *The Jordan Times*, New Female Council Member Wins Seat with Zero Votes, 3 August 2007.

²⁸⁶ <http://www.electionsjo.com/Esubject/DefaultSub.asp?seid=240>

²⁸⁷ Al-Atiyat, *The Women's Movement in Jordan: Activism, Discourses and Strategies* (PhD theses), (2003), p. 57

²⁸⁸ Al-Atiyat (2003), p. 59.

3.6.1 Women's Participation in Jordanian Parliamentary Elections

The Jordanian constitution never distinguished between women and men in term of rights and duties, and in addition the 1974 election law granted women the right to vote. However, the theoretical equality in the constitution and election law did not reflect the reality of women's situation in the political sphere. Women remained subject to the effects of social values, traditions, and the prevailing culture.

Over the last decade Jordan has witnessed important economic, social, and political transformations. At the political level, a new climate of political openness and pluralism encouraged women- as they accounted 49% of the Jordanian community according to the department of statistics in 2004- to strengthen their political role and participate in political life.

1989 Parliamentary Elections

The 1989 parliamentary elections was a turning point for women's political participation, because they have showed more interest in running for parliamentary elections. In 1989, women participated for the first time as candidates in elections to the lower house, where 12 women out of 647 candidates ran in the parliamentary elections. The proportion of women candidates was low at about 1.85% (see table 3.2). Although none of them were able to win seat in these elections, this was an important step to break the norm of excluding women from elections. Furthermore, some women candidates achieved better success than men in some districts, even though the total votes they received was only 20,539 (1.01% of the total votes).²⁸⁹

²⁸⁹ Al-Zubi, et al, *Musharakat al-Mar'ah al-Urduniyyah fi al-Hayah al-Siyasiyyah* , [Jordanian Women Participation in Political Life] , (United Nations Development Fund for Women, 2007), p. 52

Table 3.2 Lower House Candidates by Sex, and Women Candidates' Proportion of the Total Candidates for the Years 1989, 1993, 1997, and 2003

Year	Men	Women	% of women candidates
1989	635	12	1.85%
1993	531	3	0.6%
1997	544	17	3.1%
2003	765	54	7.1%
Total	2475	86	3.47%

Source: Ministry of Interior

1993 Parliamentary Elections

The 1993 elections were the first parliamentary elections in which political parties were allowed to compete legally and freely since the election of 1956. In addition, while voter turnout in the 1989 parliamentary election was 41%, the 1993 elections witnessed a modest improvement to 51%.²⁹⁰ Moreover, there was an active participation by civil society organizations in the 1993 elections, in addition to the participation of 20 political parties. However, the 1989 results discouraged many women from running in the 1993 elections, and only three women ran.

Meanwhile, the 1993 elections produced the first woman parliamentarian in Jordan's history, Toujan al-Faisal. She won the seat in the third district of Amman, despite the fact that she had no previous involvement in politics. She nominated herself as an independent candidate and her platform was based on the concept of human rights.²⁹¹

1997 Parliamentary Elections

The 1997 election witnessed more women's participation than had previously been the case. Tojan's victory in the previous election encouraged 17 women candidates


²⁹⁰ Lust-Okar, The Decline of Jordanian Political Parties: Myth or Reality, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. Vol. 33, No. 4 (2001), pp. 545-569

²⁹¹ Abu-Zayd, In Search of Political Power-Women Parliament in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon., in Azza Karam (ed.), *Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers* (International IDEA: Stockholm, 2000), www.int-idea.se/women.

including Tojan Faisal herself to stand for the 1997 elections. Encouraging women to participate in parliamentary elections, Faisal stated that; “women should not be frustrated. Instead, women who are qualified should learn from my victory and know that in the end they will win”.²⁹²

The 1997 elections were boycotted by the IAF, and other seven political parties. In addition the number of political party candidates decreased from 93 in the 1993 elections to 37 as a result of opposition to the one-person one-vote electoral system. Despite such a large-scale boycott by civil society, women candidates constituted about 3% of the total candidates as figure 3.1 shows. However, women MPs were totally absent from the 1997 parliament, although they obtained a total of 13,087 or 1.6% of all votes.²⁹³

Figure3.1 Participation as Candidates in 1997 Parliament, by Sex



Source: Jordanian Parliament Council

2003 Parliamentary Elections

In June 2001, the King dissolved the parliament at the end of its four-year term. Furthermore, as a response to the political instability in the region, including the outbreak of the second Palestinian Intifada and the American threat of war on Iraq, King Abdulla postponed the elections due in 2001 until 2003.

²⁹² *Jordan Times*, Saturday, April 18, 1998

²⁹³ Al-Zubi, et al (2007), p. 53

Since King Abdullah II assumed his constitutional powers as the monarch of Jordan, he has led a broad and comprehensive reform process. In the political sphere, one of the most important prominent aspects of this was the formation of the 'Jordan first commission' to present a set of recommendations to the king to advance the reform process in all fields. One of the commission's committees was the Women's Parliamentary Quota Committee. The document prepared by the Committee suggested the introduction of a parliamentary quota for women.²⁹⁴

The situation of women in parliament from 1989-2003 is shown in table 3.3 which clearly indicates that no women candidates had been able to win seats in the elections except in 1993 since the resumption of parliamentary life in 1989. The suggestion presented by the Women's Parliamentary Quota Committee was to guarantee at least six women in the House of Deputies. Consequently, a new electoral law was issued, lowering the voting age from 19 to 18 and creating a special quota system by adding six seats for women. Moreover, election law now allows women to win more seats if they were able to collect enough votes in their districts and win outside of the quota. Accordingly the new electoral law opened the door wider to women's participation in the electoral process.

As a result, 54 women candidates ran in the 2003 elections. None of them succeeded in being directly elected, however 6 women became members of parliament by quota system, comprising 5.5% of the lower house. Furthermore, women in these elections received more than twice the votes their counterparts received in the 1997 elections. In 1997 women candidates received 13,128 votes, compared to 36,382 in the 2003 election.²⁹⁵

²⁹⁴ Al-Zubi, et al (2007)., p.56

²⁹⁵ Al-Zubi, et al (2007)., p. 74

Table 3.3 Jordanian Parliament Members by Sex, 1989-2003

Year	Men	Women	Women%
1989	80	0	0%
1993	79	1	1.25%
1997	80	0	0%
2003	104	6	5.5%
Total	343	7	2%

Source: Ministry of Interior

3.7 Conclusion

Despite the launching of political openness in Jordan which was crowned by the 1989 parliamentary elections, and despite the fact that the democratic process has received and still receives considerable interest from successive governments at the level of writing and slogans, the same level of success has not been achieved in terms of practical application. Addressing the issue of democracy in Jordan requires a search for the real reasons that hinder the fundamental building of a democratic society rather than simply focusing on external manifestations of this problem.

There is a series of subjective and objective factors that have led to drawing the development of the political culture of Jordanian society. One of the most prominent of these factors is the political and intellectual despotism that led to the fall of the society since many centuries in the quagmire of civilization underdevelopment. Those factors led to a revival of negative values such as lack of interest, introversion, intolerance, refusal of dialogue, encouragement of the narrow loyalties, hypocrisy, preference for self-interest rather than the public interest, and the promotion of male dominance.

CHAPTER FOUR

Tribal and Religious Factors in the Jordanian Elections

4.1 Introduction

What is a Tribe?

The term tribe may be used loosely to refer to “a localised group in which kinship is the dominant idiom of organisation, and whose members consider themselves culturally distinct (in term of customs, dialect or language, and origins); tribes are usually politically unified, though not necessarily under a central leader, both features being commonly attributable to interaction with states”.²⁹⁶

One definition of a tribe from an online English dictionary is: “A unit of socio-political organization consisting of a number of families, clans, or other groups who share a common ancestry and culture and among whom leadership is typically neither formalized nor permanent”.²⁹⁷ In ‘Who Is An Indian’, Warren states that “Ethnologists define a tribe as a group of indigenous people, bound by blood ties, who are socially, politically, and religiously organized according to the tenets of their own culture, who live together, occupying a definite territory, and who speak a common language or dialect”.²⁹⁸

The best definition of the concept of tribe that corresponds to Arabic culture was that given by Ghazi bin Muhammad bin Talal in *The Tribes of Jordan at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century*. He states that, “What traditionally makes a person belong to a tribe is not merely successive degrees of genetic relationship....which, after all, every family in the world has....but rather that a person and his/her tribe think the same way; believe in the same principles; assimilate the same values and ethos; act according to the same unique rules and laws; respect the same hereditary *shaykh*

²⁹⁶ Khoury and Kostiner, (ed). *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East* (1991), p. 5.

²⁹⁷ <http://www.powersource.com/cocinc/ancest/whois.htm>

²⁹⁸ Warren, Who Is An Indian, online <http://www.powersource.com/cocinc/ancest/whois.htm>

(tribal Lord); live together; migrate together; defend each other; fight together.....in short it is the consciousness of belonging to that tribe and behaving accordingly”.²⁹⁹

However, few Jordanians follow the traditional nomadic Bedouin way of life, and the cultural traditions based on this life-style have greatly declined. Nevertheless, a conception of cultural and national identity related to archaic Bedouin characteristics still exists in modern Jordanian society. Moreover, the role of tribes and tribalism remain a basic pillar of both society and the political culture in Jordan.

Since the establishment of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the state has had pivotal social, tribal structure, demographical and political changes affected on the political system and parliamentary representation. Therefore, the political representation process in Jordan has witnessed continual progress and changes. As discussed in chapter two, parliamentary democracy as a transformative idea was introduced to Jordan during the British mandate and developed when Jordan promulgated the 1946 constitution which established the bicameral parliamentary system.

Moreover, the Jordanian election system whether the current or the one that is expected to be drafted by the government will have a great effect on the elections' results and in the long run on the political and ideological structure of the Jordanian parliament. Therefore, this chapter assesses the major factors surrounding the process of political participation and Jordanian elections. It considers the role of tribalism in the formation of political culture of Jordanian citizens and consequently its role in political development in Jordan, as well as the religious dimension and the Islamist parties' participation in Jordan's elections.

4.2 Jordanian Tribes (the Jordanian Identity)

In 1983, Gubser classified the population in Jordan into nomadic or sedentary groups; as nomadic, semi-nomadic, sedentary, and semi-sedentary.³⁰⁰ Nomads or Bedouins were a fully nomadic group who might move thousands of miles wandering from one

²⁹⁹Bin Muhammad, *The Tribes of Jordan at The beginning of the Twenty-First Century* (1999), p. 13

³⁰⁰ Gubser, *Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events* (1983), p-p.22-25

place to another, and whose livelihood was based on animal herding.³⁰¹ The relationship between animals and tribes men was symbiotic; the animals supplied food and fulfilled other needs of the Bedouins, while the tribes' people assured the animals' survival by locating in green pastures.³⁰² The semi-nomadic populations move only twice a year and within a limited area, while the settled population consists of dwellers in rural areas such as farmers or peasants, or in urban areas.³⁰³

The tribe (*qabilah*) in Jordan is divided into two or more sub-tribes (*ashirah*). Each sub-tribe is usually divided into two or more parts (*hamulah*), and the *hamulah* is divided finally into two or more related extended families. The *hamulah* consists of a group with which the individual identifies himself.³⁰⁴ As the society in Jordan is built along patriarchal and hierarchic lines, the tribe as a whole is consequently led by a leader (*sheikh*), and any competent male might be the head of his own extended family. When the sheikh dies one of the tribe's senior males inherit the title of sheikh. This is usually the first born son or nephew or other close relative or the most experienced member or one who has special features such as strength, wealth, and reputation for ability.

The tribesman is bound to other members of the tribe by mutual obligations which have great force within the extended family. Family ties are extended into the structure of the tribe, which works as a unit and clearly shows the individual's identity. The tribesmen view themselves as members of this tribe in relation to each other and in dealings with other tribes.

Tribes in Jordan involve an extremely complicated set of ideas, identities and structures that resemble the traditional set of loyalties bound by honour. The social structure of tribes is based on patrilineal ties among men. These ties dominate the ideology of family life and are most important when they marry within their group (endogamy). The preference for endogamy existed historically very commonly in the

³⁰¹ Bin Muhammad (1999), p. 9

³⁰² Gubser (1983), p.25

³⁰³ Bin Muhammad (1999), p. 9

³⁰⁴ Harris, George L. *Jordan: its people, its society, its culture* (1958), p. 54.

Middle East, choose to marry others especially if they are cousins at the first level and in descending levels of relatedness.³⁰⁵

In the pre-1948 East Bank, the main solidarity group and the basic form of the social organization in TJ was the tribe. This was true not only of the Bedouin nomads and semi nomads, but also of many people in the villages and even urban dwellers. The social relations between the nomadic and semi nomadic tribes and between them and villages and towns were based on trade, selling animals and their products and buying goods they did not produce.

4.3 The Relationship between Jordanian Tribes and the State

King Hussein sent an open letter to his nephew Prince Ghazi Ben Mohammad, appointing him adviser to the King on tribal affairs in July 2, 1998. In it he stated that “the tribes of Jordan have always been at the centre of our confidence, a source of our pride and a target of our attention since the very beginning. The tribes of Jordan are our kinsmen who have served the Kingdom under the most adverse conditions and circumstances, always performing their duty to the nation. The tribes had supported the Great Arab Revolt since the start and helped the late King Abdullah to found the Kingdom, offering great sacrifices to attain this objective”.³⁰⁶

The promotion of tribalism has gone hand in hand with the monarchy in the Hashemite regime and into the machinery of the state. Many factors have threatened the survival of tribes as such in the Middle East, including the imposition of colonial government, establishment of new international borders, dramatic economic changes, and the spread of national ideologies. However, tribes in Jordan have remained the main solidarity groups since the establishment of the state in 1921. Tribal identity did not vanish and tribes remain prominent social and cultural units.³⁰⁷ Furthermore, the tribal population of Jordan has been the bedrock of support for the regime since its

³⁰⁵ Harris (1958), p. 133.

³⁰⁶ *Jordan Times*, Saturday, July 4, 1998

³⁰⁷ Alon, The Tribal System in the Face of the State-Formation Process: Mandatory Transjordan, 1921-46, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (2005), p. 213.

establishment and continues to play an important role to be reckoned with, not only in Jordanian politics but also in the daily lives of the citizens.³⁰⁸

The monarchy had always depended on tribesmen as the most important aspect of the monarchy's strategy. They were vital for the regime's survival and for supporting and strengthening the political system through high-ranking members in the military forces, police officers, and the intelligence service officers who originated from Bedouin tribesmen.³⁰⁹ Richard L. Taylor argues that, "One advantage of employing the organizational strength of tribes is that historically they have provided valued assistance to intelligence, security and law enforcement, combat arms, and civil affairs capabilities".³¹⁰

One of the most important policies of Emir Abdullah throughout his reign to ensure the integrity of the regime and as the cornerstone for a new state was the establishment of the Desert Mobile Force. This was raised in 1923 under the British Army officer Colonel Fredrick Gerard Peake. The legion later becomes the Jordan Arab Army (*al-Jayesh al-'Arabi*) which is considered significant because of its role in the development of Jordan in addition to its composition mostly of soldiers from the Transjordanian tribes.³¹¹

The most prominent Bedouin tribes of Jordan, which have played a political role historically, "al-Huwaytat" Tribes, which inhabit in the southern regions of Jordan, "Bani Sakhr" tribes which inhabit in the middle badiyah (*al-Badiyah al-Wista*), The tribes of "al-Adwan" one of the largest Balqa' tribes, and "Bani Hamida" tribes, one of the largest tribes of Jordan but are distributed among different regions of Jordan, "al-Ajarmah" tribe, one of the most known Balqa tribes.³¹² There are other tribes which contributed significantly to support and consolidate the influence of Prince

³⁰⁸ Alon (2005), p. 213.

³⁰⁹ Massad, *Colonial effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan* (2001), p. 243.

³¹⁰ Taylor, *Tribal Alliances: Ways, Means, and End of Successful Strategy*. (August 2005). On <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil10.pdf>

³¹¹ Jureidini and McLaurin, *Jordan: The Impact of Social Change on the Role of the Tribes* (1984), pp. 19-20.

³¹² Abu Roman, *Dawr al-'Amel al-'Ashari fi al-Intikhabat al-Barlamaniyyah*, 17/may/2006, available at www.aljazeera.net/indepth/Jordanian_elections./2003/6/6-14-2.htm - 63k

Abdullah at the Emirate of TJ, and continue to play an important political role in Jordanian political life. Table 4.1 shows the most prominent tribes in Jordan.

Table 4.1: The Main Jordanian Tribes

Tribe Name	Main Cities and villages of Residence
Al-Abbadi	From Amman and Balqa' tribes
Al-Adwan	Tribe of the Balqa'
Al-Azzam	North of Jordan, mainly in Irbid villages and (Liwa Al-Wustiyah)
Al-Batyneh	North of Jordan, mainly in Irbid city and Kufryuba
Al-Bsharat	Christian tribe, inhabit in Amman City
Al-Dababneh	Christian tribe, inhabit in Ajloun and al-Balqa'
Al-Garmseh	South of Jordan, mainly in Ma'an city
Al-Ghazzawi	North of Jordan, Mainly in al-Ghor and Mashare'
Al-Hajaya	Bedouin tribe, South Badiyah (<i>Badu al-Ganub</i>)
Al-Hassan	South of Jordan, mainly in Ma'an
Al-Huwaytat	Bedouin tribe, South Badiyah (<i>Badu al-Ganub</i>)
Al-Khaswneh	North of Jordan, Mainly in al-Noaemeh, Idoun
Al-Lawzi	Amman
Al-Mahamid	South of Jordan, mainly in Ma'an
Al-Majali	South of Jordan, mainly in al-Karak
Al-Masaeed	Bedouin tribe, inhabit in al-Mafraq
Al-Momani	From Ajloun tribes
Al-N'emmat	South Badeouin (<i>Badu al-Janub</i>), mainly in Ma'an
Al-Nawayseh	South of Jordan, mainly in Al-Karak
Al-Omari	They inhabit different cities and villages, Mainly in the north of Jordan
Al-Qadi	North Bedouin, mainly in al-Mafraq
Al-Rossan	North of Jordan, mainly in Om Qayes and Sama villages
Al-Sarhan	Bedouin tribe, inhabit in al-Matraq
Al-Saryreh	South of Jordan, mainly in Al-Karak
Al-Shreideh	North of Jordan, mainly in (<i>Liwa Al-Kora</i>)
Al-Smadi	From Ajloun tribes

Al-Su'odeyin	South of Jordan, mainly in al-Tafieleh
Al-Tarwneh	South of Jordan, mainly in Al-Karak
Al-Zubi	They inhabit different cities and villages, Mainly in the north of Jordan (<i>Liwa Al-Ramtha</i>)
Bani Hassan	They inhabit different cities and villages, mainly in Zarqa and al-Mafraq
Bani Khalid	North Badiyah (<i>Badu al-Shamal</i>)
Bani Sakhor	Bedouin Tribe, Central badiyah (<i>Badu al-Wast</i>)
Bani-Hani	North of Jordan, mainly in Irbid city, and Kufryuba
Batarseh	Christian tribe, inhabit in Jarash city
Ma'ayah	Christian tribe, inhabit in Madaba City
Malkawi	North of Jordan, mainly in Malka
Obeidat	North of Jordan, mainly in Kufersoom

In *Jordan: the Impact of Social Changes on the Role of the Tribes*, Jureidini and McLaurin articulate that there were three main important reasons which were behind the tribal support for the monarch, and these are considered at the same time as major forces for Jordanian stability and national unity. Firstly, beside the nature of tribes as conservative, their support for the Jordan Hashemite rulers occurred partly because the latter enjoyed religious legitimacy by alleging direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad's family. King Hussein has noted through a meeting of tribal heads that "I am al-Hussein from Hashem and Quraish, the noblest Arab tribe of Mecca, which was honoured by God and into which was born the Arab Prophet Mohammad".³¹³ Secondly, the Kings of Jordan have worked strongly with the tribes and are viewed themselves as tribal leaders. Lastly, they have ruled through legal process rather than illegal acts or coups.³¹⁴

The conflict by the early 1970s in September, which was between Palestinian guerrilla organizations, supported by the Palestinian refugees in the camps and in the other side King Hussein and the army (which is composed mostly from tribesmen) supported by

³¹³ *The Jordan Times*, January 28, 1985.

³¹⁴ Jureidini and McLaurin (1984), p.37.

Jordanian tribes ended with the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan. This conflict came to be known among Palestinians as 'Black September' and was considered a pivotal sign in Jordanian political history. Moreover, these events supported and firmly rooted the relationship between the regime and the tribes.³¹⁵ On the other hand, Jordanian tribes has benefited from the support of the monarchy, which provides a welfare service including financial support, land, clinics, education and good relations with and access to the palace.³¹⁶

4.4 The Role of the Tribes in Jordanian Society

In the absence of political parties and civil society organizations for more than thirty years as a mechanism to organize and moderate political life, social institutions like tribes have played effective political, social, economic and cultural roles in Jordanian society. Despite the political, social, and economic changes that the society has witnessed since 1989, including the emergence of new political forces, the tribes still enjoy great importance and play a significant role in Jordanian society.

4.4.1 Cooperation and Social Solidarity

Tribes are characterized by cooperation and social solidarity among their members assisting those who need help or are exposed to harm or danger, in addition to protecting those who are threatened or assaulted. If one of a tribe's members is wronged or attacked, his kinsmen must either take revenge on the aggressor or seek compensation. This phenomenon played an important role in the past. One of the tribal modes of conflict resolution is what is known as 'tribal exile' which is a venerable practice that entails a permanent collective movement of a tribe from a city, village or settlement to another area of the country in the event of a crime committed by one of its members against a member of another tribe living in the same area. This practice was adopted in order to prevent acts of revenge on the part of the victim's tribes.

³¹⁵ Abu Roman, 17/may/2006

³¹⁶ Jureidini and McLaurin (1984), p. 39

On Saturday, November 15, 1998 prominent tribal leaders representing all tribes in the Kingdom signed a document to restrict the practice of 'tribal exile' to involve only the close relatives of the murderer — his father, sons and brothers — who must leave their residences and relocate elsewhere in the country to avoid acts of revenge. Uncles, cousins and nephews are not required to move, as had previously been required.³¹⁷

4.4.2 Overseeing the Process of Social Control

The tribes played a significant role in the social control process by providing internal security among members and protecting them against foreign attacks through the application of tribal law, customs and social systems under the tribal leader's supervision. These functions have now vanished, and the state plays this role by providing internal and external security for individuals through the different security agencies.

However, tribes still play an important informal social role in the adjudication of disputes and conflicts that occur between individuals. The sheikh represents his tribe in the process of tribal conflict resolution and he plays an important role when he acts as arbiter or judge following various mechanisms such as intermediation (*wasta*), delegations (*jahas*), and in matter of compensation truce (*atwa*), and final reconciliation and peace-making (*sulha*). These tribal mechanisms for resolving conflicts by arbitration and the mediation of local disputes are much quicker than those of the state. Moreover, they were efficient due to their greater simplicity.

4.4.3 Organizing Political Activities

Jordanian tribes have played a pivotal and major role since the founding of the TJ Emirate in supporting the political system. Moreover, tribes were one of the main pillars that formed political stability, and were adopted by the government in the face of internal and regional political crises.

³¹⁷ *Jordan Times* newspaper, Tuesday, November 17, 1998.

Therefore, the Jordanian tribes have maintained a political and security role, which was strengthened by the state in its cognition of tribal leaders who are named by royal decree. Furthermore, the government routinely highlights of tribal leaders' role in national, religious, and social events. Moreover, the state co-ordinates many services in the communal areas together with the tribal leaders as well as in employment, especially in the security services.

The political activities of the Jordanian tribes include the election process for tribal leaders and the selection of those who contest parliamentary and municipal elections. The change in the law in 1992 to SNTV also affected the way the tribes organized themselves. To succeed in the elections, the tribes had to devise modern political tactics. Many of these tribes democratically and unanimously elected one candidate to represent them by conducting internal elections. The tribes gather in a meeting of all branches of the tribe in the tribe guest house (*madafa*) to choose who is the most appropriate and efficient candidate to represent them in front of tribes and other political forces in the same region. Thus, the candidate who has the greatest chances of success is the candidate who possesses the largest tribe. The winners in these elections are the consensus candidates who will therefore get all the tribe's votes. However, if the tribes failed to field a single candidate to compete against other tribes' candidates in the same district, as a result, by dividing the vote, these tribes decreased their prospects of winning seats.

Therefore, in the regions dominated by tribes, political and intellectual considerations diminished in front of tribal competition. The competition becomes balance of forces between the most powerful tribes located in the same electoral district. Thus, the competition in the elections between the candidates within the tribe is not different from what happens at the national level. The personal considerations and services dimension (either the financial or the social services) plays an important role and has a strong effect on voters' choices to vote for one candidate over another regardless of the political and legislative efficiency of the candidate.

4.5 Social Change and its Impact on the Role of Tribes in Jordanian Life.

The importance of the tribal aspect of social change in Jordan comes from the special relationship of the tribes with the Hashemite monarchy and their important role in supporting the Hashemite regime. In addition, stability in Jordan has based on the tribal nature of politics and social relations in Jordan. However, the winds of social change that have swept across the Middle East have affected the role of tribes in Jordanian life.

The main forces of change that have accelerated the rate of social change in Jordan and have affected the tribes' role have combined two factors. Firstly, the political system attempted to extend its authority, imposing the concept of the state on tribal society which was fragmented between several local authorities. In addition to gain the support of the tribes and various social forces, and quell the sporadic revolts against the new ruling. Therefore, the government concentrated on policies to sedentarize the tribes mainly through education and communication. Secondly, the establishment of Israel and subsequent Israeli-Arab conflicts caused the migration of Palestinians to Jordan, forming a large and influential part of Jordan's population.

4.5.1 Sedentarization

When the Emirate of TJ was established in 1921, the basic form of social organization was the tribe and the vast majority of the Emirate's population consisted of a variety of tribally organised and oriented groups. The state thereafter attempted to join the tribesmen in the country and encouraged the settlement process.³¹⁸

In 1922 the total population in TJ was 225,350, less than half of which (46%) were nomadic Bedouins numbering 102,120 people. The government designed policies to encourage the settlement process through sedentarization campaigns and a variety of other techniques, mainly through the Arab Legion and through the reduction in Bedouin mobility within the country and internationally. A nomad loosely defined the

³¹⁸ http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/jordan/SOCIETY.html

percentage of Bedouins in the general population then decreased to 23% by 1946.³¹⁹ By 1967 the percentage of Bedouins in the country had decreased further to constitute no more than 6%, and by the late 1970s, to less than 3%.³²⁰

Sedentarization in Jordan had a great influence on the tribes. Jordan gradually changed to what Tarwneh called a 'salary-based society' and it is now very rare to find families depend only on the farming and herding of animals. However, they turned toward military or civil posts in the central state domain.³²¹

One of the effects of the settlement process which was part of government policy was to create a national identity in Jordan and to unify the Jordanian population under one identity 'the Jordanian national identity'.³²² Moreover, sedentary groups are assumed more willing to invest in their communities physically, financially, and psychologically. Jureidini and McLaurin describe the effect of sedentarization in Jordan thus, "the settled population tend to develop new means of cooperation and tend to redefine their concepts of community. The redefinition does not exclude old and perhaps still primary identities and associations, but may supplement those established patterns with new interactive links in accordance with new perceptions or needs and interests foreign to a nomadic lifestyle".³²³

4.5.1.1 Education

The British mandate period from 1921-1946 was considered as a period of training and practice for Transjordanians to enable them to govern and administer the country by themselves according to modern scientific methods and through institutions, laws and regulations.³²⁴ The Europe relations with TJ led to important developments and

³¹⁹ Massad (2001), p. 56

³²⁰ Jureidini and McLaurin (1984), p. 31

³²¹ Tarwneh, Public Land Between the State and the Tribes: A Dilemma of Rural Development: A Case from Southern Jordan., *Zaragoza : CIHEAM -IAMZ (Options Méditerranées)* , 1999, p. 348. Available at <http://ressources.ciheam.org/om/pdf/a38/99600176.pdf>

³²² <http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres>

³²³ Jureidini and McLaurin (1984), p. 32

³²⁴ Al-Musa, al-Tahawwulat al-Ijtima'iyah fi al-Urdun (1945-1970), [The Social Changes in Jordan (1945-1970)], in *Dirasat fi Tareikh al-Urdun al-Ijtima'i* , [Studies in the Social History of Jordan] (2003) ., p. 343.

changes which affected traditions, values, culture, and social life in general through education and use the English of language as a second language in the country.³²⁵

The development of the educational system in Jordan can be described as dramatic, starting from nothing at the time of the establishment of Jordan, after which the state paid great attention to it. The plans for education were intensified in the 1950s and 1960s to incorporate male and female tribes people to the state and to engage them in the civil domain of the state. In addition, education provided a wide range of employment opportunities that became more important and prestigious than herding animals or farming.³²⁶

After Jordan's independence in 1946 Jordan's school system expanded rapidly. The number of students aged 18-23 in 1996 was 28%, which was the highest in the Middle East. Since the 1970s the demands for bachelor's degrees increased to enable students in Jordan to continue their higher education. That policy of higher education in Jordan has brought about a major socio-economic transformation, with extremely important political ramifications.³²⁷ The formation of an educated middle class included increasing numbers of educated and working males and females, and this led in the late 1980s to some strains in the traditional patterns. Men and women now interacted in public at school and in universities, in the workplace, on public transportation, in voluntary associations, and at social events.

Education has had a profound impact on the attitudes, beliefs and perceptions of the population. Moreover, it has changed the nature of social interaction at the levels of both individuals and groups, and is considered as an instrument of control, participation and influence for the government.³²⁸ However, tribalism in Jordan has also been transformed through many other factors, such as modernization, sedentarization, urbanization and development of Jordan's cities, the socioeconomic impacts of the oil boom, and the social changes occurring as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict. These challenges affected tribalism as a lifestyle which has now

³²⁵ Al-Musa (2003), pp. 343-344.

³²⁶ Tarweh (1999), pp. 347-348.

³²⁷ Reite, Higher Education and Socio-Political Transformation in Jordan. *British Journal of Middle Eastern studies*. Vol. 29, No. 2. (Nov., 2002), p. 142

³²⁸ Jureidini and McLaurin (1984), p. 32

almost disappeared, but at the same time there is no doubt that tribalism as a culture never disappeared. The people of Jordan continue to practise of tribally based activities, such as in the tribal models of conflict resolution, and the establishment of family and tribal leagues, along with the role of tribes in local politics.

4.6 The Palestinian Factor

In 1947 there were about 1.3 million Palestinians in the West Bank, the great majority of whom lived in villages or were Bedouins, while the rest lived in towns and cities. The creation of Israel changed everything for this largely rural people. The period 1948-1951 was a turning point in the traditional relations between the East and West Banks of Jordan and Jordan's involvement and engagement in the Palestine issue. Jordan was involved in the 1948 war and the West Bank became part of Jordan, where upon Jordan absorbed a considerable number of Palestinian refugees who became part of the Jordanian population.³²⁹

Several hundred of Palestinian refugees fled to Jordan in 1948 and 1967 as a consequence of the Arab Israeli wars. In addition, the annexation of West Bank to Jordan in 1950 increased the numbers of Palestinians, and Jordan became the primary host of Palestinian refugees. Between 1948 and 1961, Amman's population increased from 30,000 to 250,000 and just before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war reached 350,000. After the 1967 war an estimated 200,000 to 250,000 Palestinians from the West Bank sought refuge in Jordan.³³⁰

The immigration to Jordan thereafter continued, but at a lower rate. Prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, there were approximately 40,000 Palestinians living in Kuwait. As a result of the Gulf crisis and war 1990-1991, Kuwait and Saudi were angered by PLO support for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and cut off aid and expelled about 300,000 Palestinians from Kuwait, who fled to Jordan.³³¹

³²⁹ Al-khazendar (1997), p. 3

³³⁰ Bannerman, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Long D E and B, in Reich (ed.) *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa* (1980). p. 225

³³¹ Lesch, Palestinians in Kuwait, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Summer, 1991), pp. 42-54.

As a result of the wars of 1948 and 1967, the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank in 1950, and the Gulf crisis, Palestinians by most estimates composed more than 50% of Jordan's population. Most Palestinians who fled to Jordan were granted full Jordanian nationality, and this affected Jordan's politics, demographics, socio-economics and cultural life. In addition, these events set the scene for what later came to be identified as the general social and political characteristic of Jordan's society.³³²

It is clear that the influx of Palestinian refugees had a direct impact on Jordanian life. Kamel Abu Jabir has pointed out that the Palestinian immigrants into Jordan have played a key role in the country's politics, economy, and society: "The Palestinians brought with them to Jordan a healthy respect for modernity, and knowledge and an awareness of the twentieth century. Their frustration and anger was also accompanied by ... hard work [and an orientation to] achievement. As politically mature people they began placing demands on the machinery of the state for services, job opportunities, facilities, and other amenities of life".³³³

Historically, Jordan had faced domestic structural dilemmas that affected the process of state formation, and led to the development of a plural society divided along deep reinforcing cleavages. In the early 1920s the segmental composition of the Emirate of TJ was differentiated along four cleavages concerning lifestyle and economies, religious, ethnic and tribal affiliations.

As a result of the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967 and subsequently the significant influx of Palestinian refugees from the Israeli-occupied territories,³³⁴ the entire country changed from having a vast indigenous majority East Jordanian majority to one with a Palestinian majority. Henceforth, in Jordanian society the segmental cleavage was the sociopolitical cleavage and national distinction between the politically dominant Transjordanian and the Palestinian refugee and immigrant communities whose loyalty and faith to the kingdom has been deeply suspect.³³⁵

³³² Al abed, FMO Research Guide: Palestinian Refugees in Jordan. Forced Migration (February 2004) online. <http://www.forcedmigration.org/guides/fmo025>

³³³ Abu Jabir, *The Jordanians and The People of Jordan* (1980), p. 12.

³³⁴ Sayigh, *al-Urdun wa al-Filastiniyyun: Dirasa fi Wihadat al-Masir wa al-Sira' al-Hatmi*, [*Jordan and the Palestinians: A Study of a United Destiny or the Certain Struggle*]. [1987], pp. 12-14.

³³⁵ Salloukh, State Strength, Permeability, and Foreign Policy Behavior: Jordan in Theoretical Perspective, *Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ)*, Vol. 18, No. 2, (Spring 1996): pp. 37-65.

Following the annexation of the West Bank in 1950, the Jordanian government has tried seriously to absorb the West Bank Palestinians into Jordanian society and to create a common identity, but these continuing efforts have been only partially successful. Some Palestinians still live in refugee camps and in addition the Palestinians' national movement is still struggling for an independent state. These two factors contributed to Palestinians retaining a strong sense of Palestinian separateness leading to two distinctive identities: Palestinian and Transjordanian.³³⁶

4.6.1 Transjordanian Identity

The creation of Transjordanian identity was achieved by mixing and joining the nomadic and sedentary tribes into a state system, the demarcation of the borders and the establishment of central authority in the capital of the state, which supplied a framework of national identity. The tribesmen based their identities upon their tribes, and there is no doubt that the *ashira* is considered as a primary base of affiliation and source of prestige and patronage. Moreover, *ashira* has played an important role in the identity of a majority of Transjordanian citizens. This is shown by the results of the parliamentary elections that prove the continuing importance of the tribe in Jordan.³³⁷

After the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which stated that the British government supported the Zionist plans for a Jewish 'national home' in Palestine, one of the earliest attempts of the Transjordanian elite was the Um Qays³³⁸ conference on September 2, 1920. The aim of this conference was to avoid the implications of the declaration which might affect their prospective state in TJ. Moreover, they demanded forcefully the formation of 'an independent national Arab government' under the leadership of an Arab Emir. Such a demand could have disconnected this government from the Palestinian's government completely, therefore avoid including Jordan in Balfour Declaration.³³⁹

³³⁶ Morse, Palestinian Identity and the Jordanian State: Old Dilemmas, New Manifestations. *The Brandies Middle East Reviews*. Vol. 1 issue 1, Fall 2005), pp. 10-24.

³³⁷ Laurie, Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crises of identity. *Journal of Palestine studies*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Summer,1995), pp.46-61

³³⁸ An ancient city at the northern tip of Jordan.

³³⁹ Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process* (1999), pp. 14-15.

4.6.2 Palestinian Identity

Since the establishment of international boundaries between TJ and Palestine, people on both sides of the Jordan River began to be aware that there were two identities: Transjordanian and Palestinian. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of Palestinians living in Jordan enjoyed citizenship rights, but continued to identify themselves as Palestinians with a deep-rooted attachment to the West Bank.

In *Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crises of identity*, Laurie classified the Palestinians in Jordan into different socio-economic groupings. The first group comprises those in Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan as a result of the 1948 and 1967 wars. This group maintains a strong sense of 'Palestinianness' while their sense of being 'Jordanianness' is absent except for the convenience of having a passport. The identity of this Palestinian sector was defined as hostility to a Jordanian identity. The second group consists of middle-class Palestinians, most of whom were merchants and lower level governmental employees. This group has a strong sense of Palestinian identity but their hostility to a Jordanian identity is less pronounced due to their economic success.

The third group was composed of elite groups of Palestinians who have achieved business success. This group identify themselves as Palestinians and Jordanians and became, with fellow Jordanians, the bedrock of support for the regime. The fourth group consists of Palestinians who have moved to other Gulf countries to work. These Palestinians used the Jordanian passport as a convenience rather than as a basis of their identity.³⁴⁰

In September 1970, the PLO's growing military power and the wide political support it enjoyed amongst Palestinians threatened Jordan's cohesion and the Hashemite rule. Therefore, King Hussein decided to take military action to protect his regime. The ensuing conflict affected Jordanian society deeply, and the Transjordanian-Palestinian

³⁴⁰ Laurie (1995), p. 49.

relationships suffered a major setback due to the sense of a Palestinian national identity amongst Palestinians in Jordan.³⁴¹

4.7 The Tribalism Debate in Jordan (the pros and cons of tribalism)

Tribalism in Jordan is used sometimes in a positive sense concerning the establishment and maintenance of certain moral values to distinguish the Jordanian people and their opinion, convictions and principles which are seen as the legacy of tribal social life. On the other hand, tribalism is also sometimes used to criticize aspects of contemporary society and culture as backward and standing in the way of progress.

Those who are critical of tribalism argue that tribalism and democracy are antithetical; they see tribalism as incompatible with full participation in a modern state. One who is against tribalism argued in *Al-Rai* newspaper³⁴² that, “such a system was appropriate and good at the time of no state? Then it was one of the means for peaceful existence in the absence of a state, but today tribalism is a kind of illness and affliction which eats at the fortunes and sustenance of the people”.³⁴³

Marwan al-Musher³⁴⁴ was a Jordanian politician who had criticized tribalism. He expressed his concerns about the bases of affiliation in Jordan as follows: “I wish to see people proud because they are part of a professional organization, not because they are members of a big tribe. I wish to see people proud because of their personal achievements, not those of their cousins. And, above all, I wish to see people proud because they are Jordanians not only because of their surnames”.³⁴⁵

Arguments put forward to discuss the situation have focused on the political culture of Jordan and concentrated on tribalism as one of the predominant factors that is not

³⁴¹ Yorke, *Domestic Politics and Regional Security: Jordan, Syria and Israel: the End of an Era?* (c1988), p. 39

³⁴² Daily newspaper and the most read paper in Jordan.

³⁴³ Layne, The Dialogics of Tribal Self-Representation in Jordan, *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Feb., 1989), pp. 24-39.

³⁴⁴ He was the Deputy Prime Minister of Jordan in Adnan Badran's cabinet from October 25, 2004 to November 28, 2005. He had been the Foreign Minister from January 2002 until October 2004.

³⁴⁵ *Jordan Times* newspaper, January 19, 1985.

conducive to greater freedom and democracy, particularly in the absence of a developed party system. Iman Al-Hussein, a professor at Al-Balqa University, has talked about the influence and importance of tribalism in Jordanian political life, arguing that “We can’t separate tribalism from politics as long as political parties are weak”.³⁴⁶ Jamil Nimri is a specialist on parliamentary issues and the Democratic Party of the Left (DPL) spokesperson. Focusing on an electoral system based on individual and tribal features, Nimri stated that, “We need a system that would mitigate the effects of the one-person, one-vote formula, leading the chorus of those accusing the current system of encouraging already strong tribalism”.³⁴⁷

Bater Mohammed, a journalist in *Addustour* newspaper, stated that with the current election law (SNTV) and the distribution of election districts, Jordan would never be able to achieve the political progress and free and fair elections on which any democratic system ultimately depends. On the contrary, he argues, such a system supports tribalism and opens the door for real conflicts between families and tribes.³⁴⁸

On November 3, 1997 Marwan Muasher, Jordanian ambassador to the United States, addressed the Institute’s Special Policy Forum regarding Jordan’s November 4 parliamentary elections as follows: “The Jordanian parliament has assumed a greater role in legislating and monitoring the executive branch in the last eight years, but there has not yet been adequate time for the evolution of a strong party system in the country. Jordanians have never liked political parties; indeed, other than the Islamists, Jordan has no major political party. In fact, of more than 500 candidates, only twenty-five are running on a party ticket. Tribalism remains a much more important political force than party affiliation”.³⁴⁹

On the other hand, those who argue in favour of tribalism and are positive about organizations based on tribalism represent or describe these as the embodiment of a valued past. King Hussein publicly supported the role of the tribe and tradition in Jordan’s past and future, stating, “Whatever harms tribes is considered harmful to us.

³⁴⁶ *Jordan Times*, Friday-Saturday, April 28-29, 2006

³⁴⁷ *Jordan Times*, Thursday, December 31, 1998

³⁴⁸ *Addustour* newspaper, Thursday, March 15, 2007

³⁴⁹ <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1155>
Policy Forum Report was prepared by Rachel Ingber.

Law will remain closely connected to norms, customs, and traditions. . . . Our traditions should be made to preserve the fabric of society. Disintegration of tribes is very painful, negative and subversive”.³⁵⁰

Nabeel Gheshan, a journalist on *Al-Arab Alyoum* newspaper, argues that there have been so many false charges against tribalism and its role in Jordanian society, because some people try to link Jordanian tribes with backwardness and illiteracy in our society. He insisted that Jordanian tribes have developed socially and politically and contribute to a state of civil stability. Moreover, the increased number of educated tribesmen with experience led them to play an important role in the renaissance of the country.³⁵¹ Sabri Rbeihat, a doctor at Philadelphia University, argued that tribalism in Jordan was an obstacle to modernity in the previous years, but it was at the same time a social and economic necessity and the government preserved it for its own purposes.³⁵²

4.8 Tribes and Political Participation

There is no doubt that the tribes in Jordan have accommodated to the new political events. In addition, the tribes present themselves as political alternatives to civil society institutions such as the political parties. Even after the return of political parties to the Jordanian arena after 1990, they have not been able to operate properly, and have failed to gain the confidence of most Jordanians (except for the Muslim Brotherhood party).

This tribal presentation in political life came from the government’s support to the tribal organization and ideology. Massad noted that Jordan’s stability depends to a very large extent on the tribal nature of socio-political relationships, and despite the social changes that have decreased the effect of tribalism it still has an effective role in government systems, and the government seeks tribal support when facing any problems.³⁵³

³⁵⁰ *Jordan Times*, 28 January 1985.

³⁵¹ *Al-Arab Alyoum* newspaper, Sunday, 7 May, 2007

³⁵² Reibhat, Government and civil society, in *Government and Civil Society*, Workshop Seven, 3 November 1996, *PASSIA, Jerusalem*. P. 221

³⁵³ Massad (2001), p.243.

In terms of political participation and the electoral process, tribal affiliation has played an important role in most of the electoral districts, which reflects nature of Jordanian society. The political participation in 1989 and 1993 elections was very high in the electoral districts which were based on tribal affiliation as table 4.2 shows. On the other hand, the voter turnout was particularly low in Amman, (Jordan's capital), and in the other populated urban areas such as Irbid and Al-Zarqa as shown in table 4.3.

Table 4.2 Numbers and Percentages of Votes in the 1989 and 1993 Elections

District	1989 elections				1993 elections			
	Population	No of RV*	No of votes cast	% of total votes	Population	No of RV	No of votes cast	% of total votes
Ma'an	23,592	19,427	14,427	69.4	36,467	35,824	26,534	74
Al-Tafilah	54,589	21,908	15,364	70.1	61,156	25,985	19,787	76
Al-Mafraq	124,046	21,825	14,622	67	170,903	32,389	22,928	70.8
Al-Ramtha and BaniKanana	122,164	41,360	26,727	64.6	130802	58,403	38,457	65.8
Badu Al-Ganub	35,510	18,476	12,191	66	45,869	24,186	20,205	70.7
Badu Al-Wasat	43,551	18,155	12,243	67.4	75,000	25,203	14,993	59.5

Source: Khazaileh, Abd El-Aziz., Researches of Jordanian Studies Center, (Yarmouk University, 1996), pp. 94 - 98. *RV Registered Vote

Table 4.3 Numbers and Percentages of Votes in Amman, Irbid and Zarqa in the 1989 and 1993 Elections.

District	1989 elections				1993 elections			
	Population	No. of the RV	No. of votes	Total votes %	population	No. of the RV	No. of votes	Total votes %
Amman	1207838	330812	157541	47.6	1567908	3896014	213057	45.3
Zarqa	494680	116371	58153	50	623943	180719	90949	50.3
Irbid	414769	126903	53400	42.1	468548	172026	93896	54.6

Source: Hani, Al-Hourani, et al. *Dirasat fi al-Intikhabat al-Niyabiyyah al-Urduniyyah 1997*, [Studies in the Jordanian Parliamentary Elections 1997], Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center (UJRC), (Amman: Dar Sindibad lil-Nashr, 2002), p. 173.

It worth noting that the parliamentary elections of 1989 witnessed an overall voter turnout of 53%, although the political parties were still illegal and candidates ran without official party affiliation. Although a new law legalising political parties was issued in 1992, the 1993 elections witnessed a voter turnout only of 55.6%.

More importantly, although the 1997 elections were boycotted by eight political parties led by the Muslim Brotherhood, voting turnout was still high in districts based on tribal affiliation, while the overall turnout was 43.4%.³⁵⁴ The highest turnout, of 70.7% was registered in the constituency of Ma'an, followed by 69.9% in Al-Tafilah, while the lowest ratios of 24% were in Amman, 26.9%, in Zarqa, and 50.3% in Irbid.³⁵⁵ These data confirm that tribal and rural regions witnessed a higher interest in voting more than the populated urban areas. In the 2003 parliamentary elections nine political parties participated, wining 33 seats 30% of MPs, while the majority of parliamentary seats went to candidates who stood as independents and with tribal support.

³⁵⁴ Abu Rumman, Boycott of the Parliamentary Elections of the 1997, (Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center (UJRC).

³⁵⁵ Al-Urdun AL- Jadid Research Center (UJRC), *Dirrassat fee al-Entikhabat al-Barlamaniah al-Urduniah 1997* (2002),, p. 173.

4.9 The Religious Factor in Parliamentary Elections

4.9.1 The Religious Dimension in the Arab World: Islam and Democracy

Islam is not only a religion, but also a socio-political entity which includes basic religious beliefs, practices and norms of behaviour usually associated with it, and it is considered as a major source of legitimization of political power.³⁵⁶ Muslims believe that Islam is a complete way of life and that there should be no separation between religion and politics. Jerrold wrote that, "In Islam there is no separation between temporal and spiritual life. The two are synonymous. Thus, the involvement of Islamic activists in daily political life is not aberrant but, by Islamic standards at least, normal, desirable, and *de rigueur*".³⁵⁷

Defining the relationship of Islam to democracy has been problematic and is one of the most hotly and sensitively debated topics. It is argued that democracy is basically a western concept and ideology and therefore Islamic values are fundamentally at odds or incompatible with Western liberal values (antithetical). It is argued also that because most Islamic countries are monarchies or dictatorships, or due to certain events that have taken place in these countries, Islam is incompatible with either democracy or modernity. On the other hand some argue that there are no contradictions between Islam and Democracy, and that on the contrary they are compatible, and that democratic ideals and principles coincide with Islamic ideals and principles.

Huntington asserts that "Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures".³⁵⁸

³⁵⁶ Jeffery, The Political Importance of Islam, *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 4 9, October 1942, pp. 383-395.

³⁵⁷ Jerrold, Islam, Ideology, and Democracy in the Middle East, paper presented at the BRISMES Annual Conference, University of St Andrew, 8-10 July 1992.

³⁵⁸ Huntington (1984), p. 208

Many contemporary Muslim scholars believe that Islam is completely compatible with democracy, Rashid Ghannoushi, the leader of a Tunisian Islamist party, said that “If by democracy is meant the liberal model of government prevailing in the West, a system under which the people freely choose their representatives and leaders, and in which there is an alternation of power, as well as all freedoms and human rights for the public, then the Muslims will find nothing in their religion to oppose democracy, and it is not in their interest to do so anyway.”³⁵⁹

Abdul Karim Soroush, has also argued that there is no contradiction between Islam and the freedoms inherent in democracy: “Islam and democracy are not only compatible, their association is inevitable. In a Muslim society, one without the other is not perfect.”³⁶⁰ Furthermore, “Islam and democracy are not contradictory to each other. Democracy is the form of government based on the will of the people as well as run and changed with their consent only. This is also the form of Islamic government. But the values of western democracy are not identical with those of Islam”.³⁶¹ Radwan Masmoudi asserted that there is no inherent contradiction between Islam and democracy and that democratic ideals and principles are also Islam’s ideals and principles. Thus, the explanation of why so many Muslim countries are not democratic depends on historical, political, cultural, and economic factors, and not religious ones.

Many Muslim scholars have tried to prove that Islam is compatible with democracy on the grounds of the Islamic principle of ‘*Shura*’ or consultative decision making, and they agree that the principles of *shura* are the source of democratic ethics in Islam.³⁶² Therefore, again, the fact that the Muslim World is as large in population as the Christian world but is less developed and many Muslim countries are not democratic, is something related to historical, cultural, and economic obstacles that are not related to religion.

³⁵⁹ Esposito and John, *Markers of Contemporary Islam* (2001), p. 114.

³⁶⁰ Abootalebi, Islam, Islamists, and Democracy, *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (March 1999), pp. 14-24.

³⁶¹ Zakir Aijaz, (ed.), *Selected Speeches and Writings of Maulana Maududi*, (1982), p. 198.

³⁶² Sidahmed, and Ehteshami (ed), *Islamic fundamentalism* (1996), pp. 12-13

Some countries in the Muslim world are in uproar, and could not embark upon political advancement for several reasons. The first and most important reason for this is that these Muslim countries have been engulfed in major social and political convulsions whether internally or externally that have led to a lack of community stability and settlement consequently leads to the decline of democratic reform.³⁶³ The Arab region was under Ottoman domination for more than four centuries, then under French and British colonial rule. Subsequent international actions starting with the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916 and the promise to create a Jewish state in Palestine according to the Balfour Declaration in 1917 make the origin of the present conflicts in the region.³⁶⁴

Moreover, the oil boom in the Arab peninsula has attracted many groups with contradictory interests, all seeking to control a region with exceptional strategic significance. Many have embraced Islamism in the face of the states' neglect of their responsibility for meeting basic needs.³⁶⁵ In addition, legitimacy crises in some Arabic countries mean that the political regimes do not enjoy the trust and goodwill of the governed. Therefore they have resorted to coercion and force to maintain their power.³⁶⁶

This series of regional destabilizations, foreign interventions, unresolved regional conflicts and the accumulation of socioeconomic crises in the Islamic World and Arabic region in particular have created explosive regional tensions leading to the delaying of political reforms and a decreased desire to embark on democratic reform. That is why Arabic societies live in superficial democracy.

4.9.2 The Religious Dimension in Jordanian Political Life

The considerable importance of Islam in Jordanian political life springs from the fact that Islam is the predominant religion in Jordan. The overwhelming majority of the population are Sunni Muslims, comprising 92% of the population. 6% are Christians

³⁶³ Lane and Hamadi, *Religion and Politics : Islam and Muslim Civilisation* (2004), p. 13

³⁶⁴ *Democracy in the Arab World, Challenges, Achievements and prospects*, published by IDEA in 2000, which is available at www.idea.int.

³⁶⁵ Beinun, The Political Islam and the New Global Economy: The Political Economy of an Egyptian Social Movement, *The New Centennial Review*, Vol. 5, No. 1, (Spring 2005), PP. 111-39.

³⁶⁶ Lane, and Hamadi. (2004), p. 108.

while the Shia Muslims, Sunni Circassians, Chechens, Druze, and Bahai comprise 2%.³⁶⁷ Moreover, Jordan's constitution stipulates that the country is a constitutional monarchy based on the constitution promulgated on January 8, 1952, which defined Islamic law (*Shari'ah*) as one of the pillars of the legislation in the state, and stipulated that Islam is the official religion and that the king must be a Muslim and a son of Muslim parents.³⁶⁸

The religious dimension in Jordanian elections is considered the second biggest factor after the tribe effect which dominates the political scene. Moreover, Islam is an important factor in Jordan and it acts sometimes as "motivator, legitimator, or simply a justifier for any particular foreign policy".³⁶⁹ This situation was particularly acute in the 1980s when Jordan experienced a crisis with political, social, and economic dimensions that led to an increase in the popularity of the Islamic movement. Other background factors also helped the rise of Islamic movements, including the failure of the national liberation movement to offer a democratic environment when it was in power, the success of revolutionary Islamic movements such as in the Iranian revolution that boosted its morale, and lastly the failure of Arab nations to combat Israel.³⁷⁰

The Muslim Brotherhood (*Jama' at al-Ikhwan al-muslimin*), popularly known as (*al-ikhwan*), is regarded as the oldest and the most important Islamist movement in Jordan. Its political wing, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) (*Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami*) is the country's biggest party and played a prominent role in the parliamentary elections, both during the campaigns and by supporting certain candidates in some cases securing them resounding success.³⁷¹

4.9.2.1 The Historical Record of Loyalty (Islamist – Regime relations).

Islamist movements are not simply political actors; they function also as major social actors and religious organizations committed to spreading a set of beliefs, values, and

³⁶⁷ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jordan>.

³⁶⁸ See the Jordanian Constitution. Online see http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html

³⁶⁹ Dawisha (ed), *Islam in Foreign Policy* (1983), p.5

³⁷⁰ Al-Khazendar (1997), p. 137

³⁷¹ Majed Ziad (ed), *Building Democracy* (2003) p. 87.

practices. Therefore, Islamism plays a significant role whether as religious organizations in the society or as a political force in advocating active participation in local politics.

It is clear that the relationship between the monarchy and religion started with the establishment of the Emirate of Trans-Jordan, when it was considered as the cornerstone of security in Jordan. Furthermore, the Hashemite ruling family has enjoyed religious legitimacy by alleging direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad's family which was an important source of legitimacy for its rule in Jordan.³⁷²

Historically, King Abdullah I, the founder of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan granted the Islamic movement the legal status of their establishment in January 1946. Moreover, the movement's secretary Abd al-Hakim al-Din has been a member of the cabinet, and the King has stated that Jordan is in need of the Brotherhood's efforts. Furthermore, the king supported the Brotherhood in creating branches throughout the country, enabling them to exercise considerable influence during the initial phase of state-formation.³⁷³ The Brotherhood has also actively participated in the building of the new Jordanian entity and played a pivotal role in shaping the national affairs of the country. In addition, the movement came to be seen as an essential source of stability throughout Jordan's tumultuous history.³⁷⁴

The relationship between the traditional Islamic movement and the government was one of wariness but was based on co-operation more than conflict. In the 1950s and 1960s the government built a tactical alliance with the Islamic movement to combat the growing strength of leftist and nationalist parties that were dominating the Jordanian street supported by Baathism in Syria and Iraq and Nassirism in Egypt.³⁷⁵

³⁷² Jureidini (1984), p.37.

³⁷³ Wiktorowicz, Islamists, The State, And Cooperation In Jordan. *Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ)*, Vol. 21, fall, 1999.

³⁷⁴ Wiktorowicz (1999)

³⁷⁵ Abu Roman, Dinamikiat al- Azma bayn al-Hukoma wa al-Ikhwan fi al-Urdun, [The Dynamic of Conflict between Regime and the Brotherhoods in Jordan]. 7/7/2006.

<http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres>

Despite Islamists as a political movement define themselves as part of the opposition and has always criticized the regime and disagree with policies, it desired-as a moderate reform movement- to act through the political system and the institutions, assuring their loyalty to the throne and they had no interest in overthrowing the regime but they decided to integrate themselves by participating in the political process.³⁷⁶

The Muslim Brotherhood's former leader Abdul Majid Thunaybat, describes the movement's approach to change: "Our approach to education is to begin with the individual and then move on to the family and then ultimately the Islamic government that rules as provided for in God's *sharia*. Our mission does not envisage an overthrow of the regime in the sense of holding the reins of power, regardless of people's temperament or whether they approve of this regime or not. We seek the creation of faithful grassroots that receive these instructions and this order, and government by Islam comes later. We renounce violence and say that the alternative is political reform and respect for Islamic *sharia*, which constitutes the base of powers as approved by all Arab and Islamic constitutions".³⁷⁷

In the two most critical political crises that had arisen in the country, between the palace and the leftist/nationalist opposition in the 1950s and between the regime and the armed Palestinians resistance in the early 1970s, the Brotherhood acted as a loyal opposition and stayed out of the conflict or neutral.³⁷⁸ As a result, the government allowed the Brotherhood to operate openly, without interruption or suppression, while restricting the other parties that were operating in secret and who were subject to arrest.³⁷⁹

Despite the mutual cooperation between Brotherhood and the regime, the relationship has experienced periods of tension, particularly in 1956 when street protests were organized by the Muslim Brotherhood to oppose policies that permitted a substantial British military presence in Jordan. Furthermore, in 1979 and after the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt, King Hussein when he refused to break ties with

³⁷⁶ Wiktorowicz. (1999)

³⁷⁷ Wiktorowicz (1999)

³⁷⁸ Abu Roman (2006)

³⁷⁹ Majed (2003), p. 87.

Egypt, despite an otherwise unanimous Arab boycott of Egypt. This dismayed the Muslim Brotherhood and they considered the King's condemnation as inadequate.³⁸⁰

In the late 1980s and early 1990s the gap between the Islamists and the regime widened particularly after the 1989 elections and the considerable successes achieved by the Islamists which were stronger than expected. The conflict reached a turning point when the government opened peace negotiations with Israel and a treaty was signed in 1994 at the southern border crossing of Wadi Araba.³⁸¹

Since the 1989 elections the government has planned to weaken the rising power and popularity of Islamism; meanwhile the government was preparing to start negotiations to produce a treaty of peace with Israel, which the Islamists oppose due to ideological religious doctrine.³⁸² Therefore, the government changed the electoral law adopting a one-person, one-vote formula instead of the former system of multiple votes. As Jordan is a tribal society this resulted in most Jordanians voting along tribal lines rather than according to ideological considerations.³⁸³

The year 2006 has witnessed two major conflicts between the Muslim Brotherhood and the government. As a result of the Hamas' surprise victory in the last parliamentary elections, by this victory the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan became more self confident and saw a path to political power. The chief of the Islamic Action Front's parliamentary bloc stated that "his party will be qualified to form the government after getting a majority of seats in the coming elections".³⁸⁴ This statement has sparked a strong reaction by the government.

These events followed by the Hamas' weapon file when the government has announced in April while the Palestinian foreign minister Mahmoud al-Zahar was planning to visit Jordan that it caught Hamas members engaged in smuggling

³⁸⁰ Wiktorowicz (1999)

³⁸¹ Abu Roman, *Dinamikiat al- Azma bayn al-Hukoma wa al-Ikhwan fi al-Urdun* [The Dynamic of Conflict between Regime and the Brotherhoods in Jordan] (2006)

³⁸² Sabbagh, *Electoral Process in Selected Countries of the Middle East : A Case Study*. 12 January 2004.

³⁸³ Amawi, The 1993 elections in Jordan. *Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ)*. Vol. 16, No. 3, (Summer), 1994, pp. 15-27.

³⁸⁴ Al Rantawi, One Eye on Hamas, the Other on the Brotherhood, bitterlemons-international organization, *Middle East Roundtable*, May 04, 2006 Edition 16 Volume 4.

weapons from Syria, consequently the government cancelled the planned visit. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan denied the truth of the government statement and considered the government's position a result of American and Zionist pressure to isolate the Palestinian government. The government subsequently arrested some Brotherhood members.³⁸⁵

The second conflict came when the government arrested four Brotherhood members who paid condolences to the Zarqawi family at the Zarqawi's death. Consequently, the relationship between the government and the Islamist movement has been characterized by increased tension, and the government described that action: "the Muslim Brotherhood group has trespassed the red lines in the traditional relation with the government".³⁸⁶

Regardless of any differences that may have surrounded the Ikhwan-regime relationship, the Muslim Brotherhood has remained within the law and entirely loyal to the monarchy and it has never operated underground. Moreover, the vast majority of the movement's leaders articulate themselves as reformists or modernists and not revolutionaries. They argue that their strategy of change or reform is through evolution not through violence.

4.9.2.2 Islamist Participation in Parliament

Since its establishment in 1945, the Muslim Brotherhood has had a general social focus, with charitable and educational activities that helped them to have a deep impact on Jordanian society.³⁸⁷ The Islamic movements avoided political activities and participation in government until 1956 when the Islamic movement in Jordan

³⁸⁵ Al-Najar, 2006 'Am al-Azamat bayn al-Hukoma al-Urdunniyyah wa al-Islamieen, [2006 the Year of Conflicts between the Jordanian Government and Islamism], 29/12/2006 on Aljazeera.net. <http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/64F66DCF-05AB-420F-BEB6-7E5C9C196BD7.htm>. (access at 5:00pm)

³⁸⁶ *Al-Haya* magazine, 2006 by Ghassan Charbel.

³⁸⁷ Brown, Jordan and its Islamic Movement: the Limits of Inclusion?. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. No. 74. (November 2006), p.5.

moved into political affairs to participate in elections and parliamentary life and won 4 of the 40 seats to be the second largest faction in parliament.³⁸⁸

The Islamic movement in Jordan represented by the Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing the (IAF) grew steadily and gained even more international attention after the April 1989 disturbances.³⁸⁹ In the subsequent November 1989 parliamentary elections the Islamist candidates established a strong presence winning 34 of the 80 parliamentary seats: 22 seats went to the Brotherhood's candidates and were backed up by 12 Islamist independents.³⁹⁰

In Jordan's 1989 parliamentary elections the Islamic Action Front (IAF) occupied 22.5 percent of seats, having won 15.6 percent of the overall vote. Therefore, in 1991 when he appointed a new 21 member cabinet, King Hussein nominated among them 6 members who belonged to the Islamist movement. This high level of representation in government achieved by the Islamist reflects the influence of the movement in the parliamentary elections. In addition, the King was in need of Islamist support to contain public hostility to the coalition of forces stationed in Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq.³⁹¹

Although the 1993 elections were held after the legalization of political parties, and with the participation of twenty parties, the number of IAF parliamentarians declined from 22 to 16 (17.3 percent), but their percentage of the overall vote increased to (16 percent).³⁹² These results were obtained after the adjustments in the electoral law that limited each voter to one vote.

³⁸⁸ Gharaibeh, al-harakah al-Islamiyyah fi al-Urdun wa al-Intikhabat *al-Niyabiyyah* [The Islamic Movement in Jordan and the Parliamentary Elections]., published at 17/05/2006, on <http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/8B64F9D0-5737-40E7-BC6F-6989D03EFA7D.htm#0>

³⁸⁹ When riots broke out in a number of towns after the increases in prices announced by the government.

³⁹⁰ Robins, Jordan's Election: A New Era?., *Middle East Report*, No. 164/165, Intifada Year Three. (May-Aug., 1990), PP.55-57.

³⁹¹ Kepel, *Jihad : the Trail of Political Islam*, translated by Robert, Anthony F, (London : I.B. Tauris, 2002), p. 334

³⁹² Piscatori, Islam, Islamists, and the Electoral Principles in the Middle East. An article was based on presentations he gave at a conference held by the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) in Leiden, the Netherlands. Published 2000. online http://www.isim.nl/files/paper_piscatori.pdf

The 2007 parliamentary elections results showed Islamists losing more than half of their parliamentary seats. The Islamic Action Front had won 17 seats in the 2003 parliamentary elections, but won only seven of the 22 seats they fought in the 2007 elections for the 110-seat assembly.³⁹³

4.10 Conclusion

As a result of a long period in which the political parties were banned for about 30 years³⁹⁴, the tribes were the most prominent political organizations and played the most decisive role in the formation of the new state. Accordingly, the state dealt with the society through the tribes as the most important channel for people to contact the authorities, offer services and to help them to solve their problems. In addition, the state supported the tribes' role in becoming the pillars of society and did not allow other institutions such as political parties to play the same role, instead keeping them outside of the political development process.

Regarding the participation of the Islamic movements, despite the strong presence of the *Ikhwan* in Jordanian elections, most of their candidates and even the IAF leaders still had to get support from their tribes. One of the things that drew attention in those elections was the number of partisan candidates who denied their partisanship and declared their tribal loyalty in order to gain a seat in parliament. This perhaps explains the resort of several parties to keeping their lists secret or undeclared and believing in the wisdom of the saying, 'The tribe's sword is sharper in the elections than the swords of political parties'.

Some of the partisan candidates interpreted their failure to declare lists of candidates as electoral tactics. In some cases candidates in tribal regions could not announce that they belonged to particular parties, because that would affect their electoral chances. Even for the candidates for quota seats in the 2003 Parliamentary elections, tribal support had a major say in the voting process and five of the winner were fielded as tribal candidates.³⁹⁵

³⁹³ Ministry of Interior

³⁹⁴ Since the early 1960s until 1992.

³⁹⁵ Sabbagh (2004).

were to supply advisors or foreign officials at the request of the Arab state or confederation of states.


2. France was to control, directly or indirectly, the blue zone (coastal belt from a little north of Haifa to point west of Mersina, including Cilicia and Mosul), and Great Britain was to control the red zone (southern Mesopotamia from the Persian Gulf to a line south of Baghdad, and an enclave around Haifa and Acre). Both powers were to set up administrations in the Blue and Red zones respectively after they had reached an understanding with the Arab state or confederation of states.
3. The brown zone (Palestine south of Haifa) was to remain under international administration, the form of which was to be decided after consultation with Russia and other allies and with the Sharif of Mecca.”⁷⁹

According to the Sykes–Picot agreement, TJ fell under British administration, but without a government or forces to maintain security. This situation led the British High Commissioner in Palestine to appoint British officers to the districts of Ajlun, Salt, and Karak in order to help the Trans-Jordanians to organise their government and to give advice.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Shwadran, *Jordan A State of Tension* (1959), p. 110.

⁸⁰ Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan* (1987), p.45.

Figure 2.1 Sykes–Picot Agreement, 1916



Source: <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/sykesmap1.html>

In November 1920, Emir Abdullah arrived at Ma'an at the head of 2,000 strong of tribal forces declaring his intention to conquer Syria from the French mandate and to return his brother Faisal to his throne. The British High Commissioner in Palestine intervened and called for a conference in Salt attended by Arab leaders. The High Commissioner concluded an agreement with Emir Abdullah, offering him the leadership of TJ and financial support. In addition the Iraqi throne would go to his brother Emir Faisal, who became King in November 1921. The advantages to Britain from this agreement were that it stopped his invasion and provided protection to British interests in Palestine and Egypt.⁸¹ Consequently, at the Cairo conference between Emir Abdullah and Winston Churchill on March 27, 1921 the British decided to name Emir Abdullah, Emir of Trans-Jordan as part of the British mandate, providing TJ with a permanent constitution and a trial period of six months rule to Emir Abdullah.⁸²

2.3 The Era of the Emirate, 1921-1946 (Creating a Government in TJ)

In 1921 the Emirate of TJ was established under the British mandate by the prince Abdullah bin Hussein who established the first centralised government in April 11, 1921.⁸³ As TJ was not a state at that time, the government council was called "a Council of Consultants (*Majlis Al-Mushawirin*) which was composed of eight members. Three were from the Arab nationalists of the Freedom Party (*Hizb Al-Istqlal*), one was the Transjordanian Ali khulqi Al Sharayri, and the other members were chosen from among men who had served in different parts of Syria.⁸⁴

May 25, 1923, was the day Great Britain formally recognized an independent government in TJ under the rule of Emir Abdullah Ibn Al Hussein. This is regarded as the beginning of the establishment of the Emirate of TJ, which remained under the British mandate until 1946. The treaty stipulated TJ as a national state preparing for independence.⁸⁵

⁸¹ <http://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/transjordan>.

⁸² Dangoor, *The Cairo Conference of 1921. The Scribe*, 1989.

⁸³ Salibi, *The Modern History of Jordan* (1993), p. 93.

⁸⁴ Salibi (1993), p. 93.

⁸⁵ Salibi (1993), p. 94

2.4 The Constitutional Structure and Parliament in the Emirate of TJ in the Mandate Period, 1923 - 1946

The first experiment in representative politics started on June 11, 1923, when Prince Abdullah issued a decree (*Iradah*) allowing elections for twelve representatives to form the Consultative Council (*Majlis al-Shura*) under the mandate rule. For this election the country was divided into six districts; two deputies from each district were elected by local municipal councils and district administrative councils. The responsibility of this Council was to debate and discuss with civil servants concerning the drafting of laws and regulations, but it had no authority to make laws.⁸⁶

2.4.1 Constitutional Structure: The Organic Law of TJ.

“The constitution is the defining document of any political system. It sets up the main institutions of the polity, organizes the relationship between the population and the state, and decides the distribution of power and roles within that state.”⁸⁷ TJ was ruled without a constitution until the first was set up on April 19, 1928 according to the Anglo-Trans-Jordanian treaty, which was signed on February 20, 1928 in Jerusalem between HBM and Chief Minister Hassan Khalid Pasha Abul Huda for TJ.⁸⁸ The agreement was imposed on TJ by Britain without consultation or discussion.⁸⁹

The agreement consisted of preamble and twenty-one Articles. In the first and second Articles the Emir agreed that Britain would be represented in TJ by a British Resident who exercised the legislative and communicative powers through a constitutional government.⁹⁰

⁸⁶ Abu Nowar, *The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: the Creating and Development of Transjordan: 1920 -1929* (1989), p. 92

⁸⁷ Salem, Constitution Building in Iraq. Paper presented at the Friedrich Naumann Foundation Conference, Amman, Jordan, June 2005

⁸⁸ Shwadran (1995), p. 167.

⁸⁹ Al-Madi and Al-Musa, *Tarikh al-Urdun fi al-Qarn al-'Ishrin*, [*The History of Jordan in the Twentieth Century*] (1959), p. 279.

⁹⁰ Shwadran (1995), p. 167.

Article 2 stated that “The power of legislation and of administration entrusted to his Britannic Majesty as Mandatory for Palestine shall be exercised in that part of the area under Mandate known as Trans-Jordan by His Highness the Emir through such constitutional Government as is defined and determined in the Organic Law of Trans-Jordan and any amendment thereof made with the approval of His Britannic Majesty”.

Moreover, the agreement placed upon the Emir’s powers several restrictions, and enabled Britain to control the Emir, while the Emir had the power to govern the country through the Organic Law.⁹¹ For example, the agreement retained a degree of British control over foreign affairs, financial issues, armed forces and communications. Article 3 stated that the Emir could not employ any civil servants other than those of Transjordanian nationality without the approval of the British government.

The Emir also agreed in Article 5 to be guided by the advice of the British government in financial and international matters. Furthermore, the Emir was required to seek the advice of the British government in setting the annual budget, currency rules, custom duties, the construction and operation of railways and the raising of loans, as declared in Articles 6 and 17.⁹² Consequently, the two countries agreed to promulgate an Organic Law of seven parts and 72 Articles on April 16, 1928.⁹³

Part I dealt with the rights of the people. It proclaimed in Article 5 that “There shall be no difference in Rights before the law among Trans-Jordanians although they may differ in race, religion and language”. According to Article 6, personal freedom should be granted and no arrest should be performed except in accordance with the law as stated in Article 6: “The personal freedom of all dwellers in TJ shall be safeguarded from aggression and interference and no person shall be arrested or detained or punished or forced to change his residence or submitted to bonds or compelled to serve in the Army except in accordance with law. All dwelling houses shall be safe from aggression and no entry therein shall be permitted except in the

⁹¹ Aruri (1942), p.77.

⁹² Text of the 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian agreement in Abu Nowar (1989), pp. 286 - 290.

⁹³ Text of Organic Law 1928 in Davis, *Constitution, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East* (1947), pp.303 – 314, and Abu Nowar (1989), pp. 291- 299.

circumstances and in the manner prescribed by law.” Article 11 of the 1928 constitution granted to all Transjordanians the right to express and publish their opinions: “All Trans-Jordanian shall be free to express and publish their opinions and assemble together and to form and be members of associations within the provisions of law”.

Part II dealt with the Emir’s rights. It proclaimed in Article 16 that “Subject to the provisions herein powers of legislations and administration are invested in Emir Abdullah Ibn Hussein and his heirs after him. The Heir-Apparent shall be a male descendent of the Emir in accordance with a special law of succession to which the provision of Article 70 and 71 of this Organic Law regarding variation, annulment and amendment shall apply.”

According to Article 18 the Emir was immune from legal responsibility “The Emir shall be immune from Liability and responsibility.” And the Emir was to be the head of the state and the Organic Law granted to him all sanction to promulgate all laws but he was not to suspend or modify the laws. “The Emir is the head of the state. He sanctions and promulgates all laws and supervises their execution. He is not entitled to modify or suspend laws or to give dispensation in their execution, except in the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by law.”⁹⁴ Furthermore, the Organic Law granted to the Emir the power to appoint and dismiss the Executive Council consisting of the Chief Minister and not more than five members appointed by the Emir according to the Chief Minister’s recommendation.⁹⁵

Part III of the constitution dealt with the Legislature. According to Article 25 the legislative powers were vested in the Legislative council with the Emir. According to the 1928 constitution the Legislative council was to have three ordinary sessions, one session each year beginning on November 1 after the election.⁹⁶ The Emir was to summon, dismiss and dissolve the Legislative council, and if he dismissed the Legislative Council new election should take place and the new council should assemble not later than four months in extraordinary session.

⁹⁴ The Organic Law, Article 19 provision 1.

⁹⁵ The Organic Law, Article 21.

⁹⁶ The Organic Law, Article 28.

2.4.2 The Legislative Council Electoral Law, 1928

The Organic Law that followed the Anglo Trans-Jordanian agreement stipulated a hereditary monarchy with elected legislative councils, and adopted the one chamber system with two-thirds of its members elected by an indirect balloting system through two levels of primary and secondary elections.

In the primary elections all Trans-Jordanian males (except Bedouins) of eighteen years of age or over were eligible to vote to select the secondary electors. In the secondary elections, the secondary electors selected the representatives to the council.⁹⁷ Seats for the Bedouins were filled in two stages: in the first stage by the appointment of two committees, with every committee composed of ten tribal leaders (*Sheikh*) selected by the Emir. In the second stage each committee was to nominate one member to sit on the Legislative Council. The Electoral law which came into effect on June 17, 1928 divided TJ into four districts; *Ajlun* in the north, *Balqa* in the centre and *Karak* and *Ma'an* in the south (see table 2.1).⁹⁸

According to Article 5 the electoral system had some form of quota or reserved number of seats for ethnic and religious communities (see table 2.1), and the council seats were divided as follows:

1. Non-Bedouin Muslim Arabs were awarded nine seats.
2. Circassians received two seats.
3. Christians received three seats in the legislative council.
4. The Bedouin received two seats.

⁹⁷ Amawi, Jordan, in F. Tachau (ed.), *Political Parties of the Middle East and North Africa*, (1994), p. 260.

⁹⁸ Electoral Law, 1928. Article 5.

Table 2.1: Distribution of Seats in the Legislative Council According to the Electoral Law, 1928

District	Muslim Arab	Muslim Circassian	Christian	Total
Balqa	3	2	1	6
Ajlun	3	-	1	4
Karak	2	-	1	3
Ma'an	1	-	-	1
Total	9	2	3	14

2.5 Legislative Elections and Political Parties Participation in the First Phase 1921–1950 (Traditional Parties)

In the early beginning of the political parties' life in Jordan, and before the unification of the East and West banks of Jordan in 1950, political parties had been an expression of the social structure without any clear ideological programme. Most of the political parties' demands focused on independence and development concerns.⁹⁹ Therefore, the political parties in the Emirate of TJ until 1946 were depended mainly on traditional leaders, landowners and tribal leaders (*sheikhs*) without popular participation in these parties. As a result, the political parties lacked practical experience and political ideologies, and tended to survive only for short period of time.¹⁰⁰

Nidam Assaf pointed out in *al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyyah al-Urduniyyah (1992-1994)* [*The Jordanian Political Parties*] that party development reflects that of the civil society. Consequently, the features of the Jordanian political parties represented the features of the country - the Emirate of TJ- that suffered from wide spread illiteracy, poverty, colonization, and general backwardness.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Khaza'aleh, , *al-Musharakah al-Siyasiyyah fi al-Urdun* , [*Political Participation in Jordan*] (1996), p. 80

¹⁰⁰ Al-Zu'bi, *al-Murshid ila al-Hizb al-Siyasi* [*A Guide to the Political Party*] (1995)., pp 91-92.

¹⁰¹ Assaf, *al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyyah al-Urduniyyah (1992-1994)* [*the Jordanian Political Parties (1992-1994)*] (1998), p. 26.

During this period, the country was under the Mandate rule and political parties were formed and exercise their activities without laws regulating them. Despite this, several political parties were formed in this period as table 2.2 shows.

Table 2.2: Jordanian Political Parties, 1921-1950

Name of Party	Year of founding	Notes
Jordanian Freedom Party Aharar al-Urdun	1921	Formed by Jordanian intellectuals under the slogan 'Jordan for the Jordanians'
Arab Covenant (al-Ahd al-'Arabi)	1921	Pan Arab nationalists, competing with the Independence Party
Arab Levantine Association (Jam'iyat al-Sharq al-'Arabi)	1923	A political association formed by leaders (Jam'iyat al-Sharq al-'Arabi) of the Liwa of Ajloun
People's Party (al-Sha'b)	1927	The first opposition political association springing from the local environment
Executive Committee of the National Conference (al-Lajna al-Tanfiziyya lil-Mu'tamar al-Watani)	1928	Formed after the first National Conference of Jordanian opposition to the treaty with Britain
Free Moderate Party (al-Hurr al-Mu'tadil)	1930	Included traditional leaders; set up to combat the opposition
Jordanian Workers' Party (al-'Ummal al-Urduni)	1931	
Jordanian Solidarity Party (al-Tadamon al-Urduni)	1933	Pro-government
Association of Jordanian Intellectual National Youth (Jam'iyat al-Shabab al-Watani al-Urduni al-Muthaqqaf)	1933	Youth organization, later led political opposition
Jordanian National Party (al-Watani al-Urduni)	1936	Opposition party established in exile (Damascus)
National Brotherhood Party (al-Akha' al-Watani)	1937	Pro-regime party comprising notables and tribal sheikhs
Executive Committee of the National Conference (al-Lajna al-Tanfiziyya lil-Mu'tamar al-Watani)	1944	Re-formation of older party, dissolved at the end of the year
Muslim Brotherhood (Jama'at al-Ikhwān al-Muslimin)	1946	Formed by a number of merchants, a branch of the mother party in Egypt
Jordanian Free Youth Association (Jama'at al-Shabab al-Ahrar al-Urduniyyin)	1946	Opposition group with headquarters in Damascus
Jordanian Arab Party (al-'Arabi al-Urduni)	1946	Opposition party comprising Jordanian intellectuals, but did not receive licensing from the government
Arab Revival Party (al-Nahda al-'Arabiyya)	1947	Pro-regime; set up to support Prince Abdullah's Greater Syria project
Jordanian People's Party (al-Sha'b al-Urduni)	1947	Opposition party dissolved after a number of months, on the pretext of extremism

Source: Majid, ziad (ed)., Building Democracy in Jordan. (Stockholm : Arab NGO Network for Development and International IDEA, 2005), p.7

2.5.1 The First Legislative Council (1929–1931)

The first legislative elections were held in February 1929, bringing the first Legislative Council to power. The Council was composed of 21 members; fourteen of the members were elected and five executive councillors were appointed by the Emir in addition to the two Bedouin members. This composition of the council made it easily influenced by executive control given that five of the members from the executive council (non elected members) sit with the elected members, and the Chief Minister acted as chairman in Legislative Council meeting.¹⁰²

The Council was elected to a 3-year term, and would sit in ordinary session for three months a year. The powers of the Emir were virtually unlimited, since he could dismiss the Chief Minister and his cabinet. Moreover, the Legislative Council had no power to propose legislations and could be dismissed by the will of the Emir.¹⁰³

2.5.1.1 Political Parties' Participation in the First Legislative Council

On July 25, 1928 the opposition parties convened a National Congress (*Al-Mutamar Al-Watani*) in Amman attended by 150 representatives of all districts, representing Syrian Nationalists, tribal leaders, and various notables and thinkers. The Congress established an executive committee and agreed to abide by a National Pact (*Al-Mithaq Al-Watani*).¹⁰⁴ The National Pact declared that the Emirate of TJ is an independent sovereign Arab state ruled by Emir Abdullah and his successors. Moreover, the pact included many important proposals:

1. The pact called for direct responsibility of the government to the Legislative Council instead of the Emir.¹⁰⁵
2. The opposition called for a boycott of the registration for the February 1929 elections because of its strong opposition to the Anglo-Trans-Jordanian Treaty of 1928 and the electoral law which was deemed incompatible with the

¹⁰² Robins, *A history of Jordan* (2004), p. 37.

¹⁰³ Robins, (2004), pp. 37, 38

¹⁰⁴ Aruri (1972), p. 81

¹⁰⁵ Aruri (1972), p. 81

principle of representation, especially since the distribution of seats was based along ethnic and religious lines.¹⁰⁶ Voter participation was considered an indication of the level of political consciousness. The first elections of February 1929 witnessed a very low percentage of voting where only 3% of the electorates participated in these elections.¹⁰⁷

3. The opposition further called for a separation of powers between the executive and Legislative Councils in accordance with the constitutions in other countries.¹⁰⁸

However, the opposition parties were divided, and five members of the National Congress who had opposed the electoral law went back on their attempted boycott and decided to run in the elections, and winning five seats. Meanwhile the People's Party won one seat and the rest of the seats went to non ideological representatives.

The members of the National Congress who won seats in the first Legislative Council carried on their struggle in the Council and formed the opposition bloc demanding the separation of powers and freedom of speech within the Council.¹⁰⁹ On April 2, 1929 the Emir summoned an extraordinary session of the Legislative Council and the major order of business was to approve the Anglo-Trans-Jordanian agreement which was the first confrontation between the opposition members and the government. After lengthy debate and under pressure, the Council approved the agreement on June 4, 1929.¹¹⁰

The first crises occurred on February 9, 1931, when the Legislative Council refused to approve the annual budget, when the government requested approval for specific sums of money to create the desert military force (*Qywwat Al-Badiyah*). Emir Abdullah then dissolved the Legislative Council and explained his decision on the basis of lack of cooperation between it and the government.¹¹¹ The chief minister Hassan Khalid Pasha Abu Alhuda who had been the Chief Minister from 1926,

¹⁰⁶ Amawi, Jordan (1994), p. 261

¹⁰⁷ Vatikiotis, *Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921 – 1957* (1967), p. 48.

¹⁰⁸ Abu Nowar (1989), p. 208.

¹⁰⁹ Amawi, Jordan (1994), p. 261.

¹¹⁰ Abu Nowar (1989), p. 234.

¹¹¹ Aruri (1972), p. 84.

resigned and the Emir appointed a new Chief Minister Abdullah al-Sarraj who organized a cabinet of ministers composed of three Muslims, one Circassian and one Christian.¹¹²

2.5.2 The Second Legislative Council (1931–1934)

Elections for the second Legislative Council were held on June 1, 1931, with the government hoping that the new election would bring more cooperative deputies. The results of the election revealed that only four of the sixteen members from the previous council were re-elected.¹¹³ Moreover, none of the members who had previously voted against the 1928 Anglo-Transjordanian treaty were elected, and the opposition parties' representatives in the previous council vanished from public life.¹¹⁴

The second Legislative Council was not as cooperative as the government had hoped, and difficulties between the legislative council and the government re-emerged when the Council failed to appoint members to the financial, legal and administrative committees of the Legislative Council. Subsequently, the legislative council prevented the transaction of activities by failing to form a quorum.¹¹⁵

The members of the Legislative Council boycotted meetings and called for separation between the executive and legislative authorities that led to disagreement between the Chief Minister and the Legislative Council. The legislative process was halted. Consequently, the Emir dismissed the Chairman of the Executive Council, Abdullah al-Sarraj and his cabinet and replaced him with Ibrahim Pasha Hashim, as the Chief Minister.¹¹⁶

¹¹² Shwadran (1995), p. 176.

¹¹³ Three tribal shiekhs; Hamad Ben Jazi, Saleh al-Quran and Rfaifan al-Majali; and the Circassian leader Said al-Mufti.

¹¹⁴ Aruri (1972), p. 84.

¹¹⁵ Shwadran (1995), p. 182.

¹¹⁶ Al-Hurani, *Tareikh al-Hayah al-Niyabiyyah fi al-Urdun: 1929-1957* [The History of Parliamentary Life in Jordan: 1929-1957], (1989), p. 23.

In August 1933 the Executive Committee of the National Congress of the Jordanian People held a congress.¹¹⁷ The main objective of the Congress was “to question the authenticity of the Executive Council of the National Congress and refute the accusations of land sales to Jewish people”.¹¹⁸ The most important issue presented to the second Legislative Council was an amendment to the Organic Law to give the Emir more legislative power which weakened the legislature’s power. The amendment was as follows: “If the Legislative Council refused to pass any law affecting the fulfilment of the treaty obligation, His Highness-in-council shall have the power to enact the necessary legislation which shall not be submitted to the Legislative Council”.¹¹⁹

In 1934, while the second Legislative Council was not in session, the Emir issued a decree which provided that no public meeting should be held without permission from the Executive Council. This weakened the role of Legislative Council members and opposition forces and strengthened the powers of the Executive Council. The second Legislative Council completed its full constitutional term on January 31, 1934.¹²⁰

2.5.3 The Third Legislative Council (1934-1937)

Elections for the third Legislative Council were held on October 16, 1934. The Chief Minister Ibrahim Pasha Hashim got along with the new council, and the elections controlled by the government that led to successes of pro-regime members.¹²¹ The Council approved the Defence Law of 1935 which provided the Emir with another way to serve British interests.¹²² During the second Council the Government had demanded modifications to the 1928 agreement to give some relief, releasing TJ from paying for the Resident’s staff, and proposing locally recruited armed forces. The British Government agreed to these demands two years later in 1939.¹²³

¹¹⁷ The Congress was attended by 300 Tribal sheikhs and notables and was led by sheikh Naji al-Azzam.

¹¹⁸ Amawi, Jordan (1994), p. 262.

¹¹⁹ Aruri (1972), p. 86.

¹²⁰ Shwadran (1995), pp. 182-184.

¹²¹ Al-Hurani (1989), p. 24.

¹²² Aruri (1972), p. 87.

¹²³ Al-Madi and Al-Musa (1959), pp. 355-357.

The Jordanian Solidarity Party (*Hizb Al-Tadamun Al-Urduni*) was organized on March 24, 1933. The party was a coalition of landowners and tribal sheikhs and declared itself in favour of the protection of the status of TJ by building mutual cooperation between them. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 36 of the Party's constitution, the members of the party should be settled in TJ before 1922.¹²⁴ The third Legislative Council completed its full legal life on October 16, 1937.

2.5.4 The Fourth Legislative Council (1937-1942)

The fourth Legislative Council was elected on October 16, 1937.¹²⁵ In December of that year the Council passed a bill amending the Organic Law, limiting the Emir's powers to enact legislation while the Council was not in session.¹²⁶ In February 1939 the Palestine conference was held in London, where all important Arab countries were represented except for Syria and Lebanon as they were under the French mandate. During that conference, negotiations were carried out by the Chief Minister Abu al-Huda -who represented TJ with Emir Abdullah- and the Colonial Secretary, Malcolm Macdonald. As a result the Transjordanian delegation gained a number of concessions: The Executive Council was replaced by a Council of Ministers, where each Minister was a head of department responsible to the Emir. The second concession was the deletion of Article 10 of the 1928 Anglo-Trans-Jordanian agreement, which restricted the Emir's power to maintain military forces.¹²⁷

On September 25, 1937 the Brethren Party (*Hizb Al-Ikha' Al-Urduni*) was established. Its aims were the unity of the Arab countries, and it called for freedom and the independence of the country.¹²⁸ In the fourth Legislative Council the government of Trans-Jordan decided to cooperate with British forces during World War II, and the council approved several amendments to the Organic Law. The fourth Council completed its full legal term in October 1940, but the Emir extended the Legislative Council for two more years due to the ongoing World War II.¹²⁹

¹²⁴ Al-Madi and Al-Musa (1959), p. 328.

¹²⁵ Al-Madi and Al-Musa(1959), p. 360.

¹²⁶ Shwadran (1995), p. 184.

¹²⁷ Shwadran (1995), p. 185.

¹²⁸ Al-Madi and Al-Musa (1959), p. 361.

¹²⁹ Al-Madi and Al-Musa (1959), p. 375

2.5.5 The Fifth Legislative Council (1942-1945)

The election for the Fifth Legislative Council was held in October 20, 1942.¹³⁰ The most important developments which took place in this council term were the new Anglo-Transjordanian treaty which signed on March 22, 1946, ending the British mandate and gaining the independence for TJ.¹³¹ In addition, the Legislative Council approved a new constitution on November 28, 1947 which was published in the official *Gazette* on February 1, 1947.¹³²

On May 25, 1946, the Transjordanian Parliament proclaimed the title of King for Emir Abdullah, officially changing the name of the country to the Hashemite Kingdom of TJ.¹³³ The fifth Legislative Council completed its full constitutional term on October 20, 1945, but the Emir extended its term for more two years until October 20, 1947.¹³⁴

2.6 The Era Between 1947-1950: Constitutional Structure and the Jordanian Parliament

The first Jordanian Constitution, the Organic Law, remained in effect from 1928 until 1946 when Trans –Jordan finally acquired its independence through the Anglo-Trans-Jordanian Treaty in March of that year.¹³⁵ Accordingly, a new constitution was formulated which provided for two legislative chambers. Moreover, the government changed the name of the country to the Hashemite Kingdom of TJ, which was changed three years later after the unification of the East and West Banks of the Jordan River to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

¹³⁰ Al-Hurani (1989), p.25

¹³¹ Shwadran (1995), p. 240.

¹³² <http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/government1.html>

¹³³ Sinai and Pollack (ed), *The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank* (1977),p. 26

¹³⁴ http://www.parliament.gov.jo/ummah/history_a.htm

¹³⁵ Text of the Anglo-Tran Jordanian Treaty in Davis (1947), pp.333-338.

2.6.1 The 1946 Constitution

The government published the new constitution on February 1, 1947. It was composed of seven parts and seventy-nine Articles.¹³⁶ This constitution adopted the principle of two houses a parliament (*Majlis Al-Ummah*) consisting of an elected Council of Representatives (*Majlis Al-Nuwab*) comprising 20 members to be elected for four years. The second house, the Council of Notables (*Majlis Al-A'ayan*) comprised 10 members appointed by the King for an eight year term, arranged so that their number should not exceed one half that of the Council of Representatives.¹³⁷ The King's powers in the 1946 constitution were stated in Article 26:

- The King is Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Army, and Air force.
- The King declares war, and concludes treaties with the agreement of the Council of Ministers.
- The King issues orders for the holding of elections to the Council of Representatives, summons the National Assembly, opens it, adjourns it, prorogues it, and dissolves it in accordance with the provisions of the law.

Part three of the 1946 constitution dealt with the Jordan Legislative Branch and its powers. According to Article 33 legislative powers were shared by the King and the National Assembly "The legislative power is vested in the National Assembly and the King. The National Assembly consists of the Council of Notables and the Council of Representatives elected in accordance with the Electoral Law, which shall have regard to the proper Representation of minorities. The duration of the Council of Representatives shall be four years." The 1946 constitution did not rise to national expectations as it failed to make the Executive Cabinet responsible to the Legislature, but kept governmental responsibility to the King as heretofore in the Organic Law.¹³⁸

¹³⁶ Shwadran (1995), p. 241

¹³⁷ Text of the 1947 Constitution in Khalil, *The Arab State and the Arab League; Constitutional Developments* (1962), pp. 43-53.

¹³⁸ Abu Jabir, *The Hashemite Kingdom Of Jordan*, in Ismael, Y.T and Ismael, J.S (edit), *Politics and Government in the Middle East and North Africa* (1991), p. 243.

2.6.2 The Electoral Law, 1947

The Chamber of Deputies' Electoral Law was issued on April 5, 1947.¹³⁹ The Jordanian Electoral System was then based on the proportional representation, and provided for the election of Muslims and deputies from the minority communities of Christian, Bedouin tribes, Chechen, and Circassians¹⁴⁰ (see table 2.3). According to Article 18 of the Electoral Law the Kingdom of Trans-Jordan was divided into nine electoral districts:

1. Amman District (the Qada of Amman), including the Qasabat ¹⁴¹of Jerash and Madaba.
2. Al-Salat District (the Qada of al-Salt).
3. Madaba District (the Qada of Madaba excluding the Qasabat of Madaba).
4. Irbid District (the Qada of Irbid including the Qasabat of Ajlun).
5. Ajlun District (the Qada of Ajlun excluding the Qasabat of Ajlun).
6. Jerash District (the Qada of Jerash excluding The Qasabat of Jerash).
7. Al-Karak District (the Qada of Karak).
8. Al-Tafileh District (the Qada of Tafileh).
9. Ma'an District (the Liwa of Ma'an).

¹³⁹ Text of the Chamber of Deputies' Electoral Law in Davis (1947), pp. 253-262.

¹⁴⁰ Abu Jabir, *The Hashemite Kingdom Of Jordan* (1991), pp. 242-243

¹⁴¹ Qada, Qasabat and Liwa are administrative divisions in Jordan.

Table 2.3: Distribution of the Seats in the Legislative Council According to the Electoral Law, 1947

District	Muslims	Muslim Circassian	Christian	Total
Amman	2	2	1	5
Al-Salat	1	-	1	2
Madaba	1	-	-	1
Irbid	2	-	1	3
Ajlun	1	-	-	1
Jerash	1	-	-	1
Al-Karak	2	-	1	3
Al-Tafileh	1	-	-	1
Ma'an	1	-	-	1
Total	12	2	4	18

The number of seats of the Bedouins under this Electoral Law remained the same as stated in Article 16 of the 1928 Electoral Law. The Bedouins were to be represented by two deputies, one from the Bedouins of the North and the other from those Bedouins of the South. The seats were filled in two stages. In the first stage the King appointed two committees with each consisting of ten Sheikhs. In the second stage each committee nominated one representative to sit in the Council of Representatives. Article 31 explained the representation process for the Bedouins in Jordan as follows: "His Majesty the King shall by proclamation published in the official Gazette appoint from the Bedouins of the North and the Bedouins of the South respectively two commissions each composed of ten Sheikhs, and each commission elects one member."

2.6.2.1 The First House of Representatives, 1947 - 1950

The elections for the first House of Representatives were held on October 20, 1947. Only independents and the pro-government Revival Party (*Hizb al-Nahda*) ran in these elections, because this was the only legal party at the time, and the other

opposition parties were banned.¹⁴² The Revival Party was established by the government on May 7, 1947 to support King Abdullah's plan for Great Syria. The Revival candidates won four of 20 seats, and the rest of the seats had gone to the independent candidates.¹⁴³

In 1947 there were 100,000 registered voters in TJ about sixty percent of these cast their ballots. The first House of Representatives was the same as the previous Council and was composed of land-owners, and tribal leaders.¹⁴⁴ In May 1948 the first Arab Israel war occurred after Israel proclaimed itself an independent state on May 14. Following this declaration, armies from Egypt, Syria, TJ, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Iraq entered Palestine and clashed with Israel forces. In December 1, 1948 after the Arab-Israeli War ended, King Abdullah annexed the West Bank and declared himself King of Jordan both West and East Banks.¹⁴⁵

The first Council of Representatives was dissolved on February 1, 1950, prior to the completion of its legal term in order to arrange for the holding of new elections following the unification of the East and West Banks. As a result of the annexation of the West Bank an amendment to the Electoral Law was issued on December 13, 1949 in order to double the number of seats from twenty to forty seats to cover both banks of the Jordan.¹⁴⁶

2.7 The Constitutional Structure and Jordanian Parliaments From 1950 – 1974

Two important events took place in the early 1950s. The first was the formal union between the two banks of the Jordan on April 24, 1950, when King Abdullah extended his control and influence throughout TJ, Jerusalem and the West Bank.¹⁴⁷ The second event was the assassination of King Abdullah on July 20, 1951, as a result of his policies which were strongly opposed by the Palestinians. There were several grounds for this opposition, the most important of which were his annexation of West

¹⁴² Shwadran (1995), p. 241

¹⁴³ Aruri (1972), p. 93.

¹⁴⁴ Lanczowski, *The middle East in World Affairs* (1980),p.478

¹⁴⁵ Sinai and Pollack (1977), p. 27.

¹⁴⁶ Abu Jabir, *The Jordanian Parliaments* (1972), p. 92.

¹⁴⁷ Aruri(1972), p. 89.

Bank, in addition to his engagement in secret negotiations with the Zionist leaders for a treaty, and his acceptance of the UN partition Resolution.¹⁴⁸

These two events contributed to the initiation of the political liberalization process in Jordan following the independence. The unification between the two banks and the annexation of Palestine, with its well-developed middle class, led to an increase the effect of West Bank opinion on Jordanian politics. Moreover, the assassination of King Abdullah led to a transfer the power from the King to the Palace as a group.¹⁴⁹

2.7.1 The 1952 Constitution

Following the assassination of King Abdullah, his son Talal ascended the throne on September 6, 1951. Although the reign of King Talal was short,¹⁵⁰ he was responsible for the formation of a new liberalised constitution that made the government responsible to Parliament.¹⁵¹ The new Constitution -the one in current use today- was promulgated in the official *Gazette* on January 1, 1952 to replace the 1946 Constitution.¹⁵² The 1952 Constitution composed of nine Chapters with 131 Articles, and avoided the provisions of the 1947 Constitution that had been subjected to criticism, including the provisions that made the Cabinet responsible to the King and not to parliament and those denying parliamentary control over financial policy.

Chapter one relates to the State and System of Government. Article 1 declares that the country is an independent Arab State and the people of Jordan form a part of the Arab Nation. Moreover it stipulates that Jordan is a hereditary monarchy with a parliamentary form of government. However, the 1952 Constitution also contains most important principles concerning respect for human rights and basic freedoms. These are as follows:

¹⁴⁸ Al-khazendar, *Jordan and the Palestinian Question: The Role of the Islamic and Left Forces in Foreign Policy-Making* (1997), p.4

¹⁴⁹ Aruri (1972), p. 89.

¹⁵⁰ Until September 1952.

¹⁵¹ Al-Madi and Al-Musa (1959), p. 539.

¹⁵² Text of the 1952 Constitution in http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html. (The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, January 1, 1952. pp. 5-68.

- **The principle of separation between authorities:**

This Constitution adopted the principle of a separation between the executive legislative and judicial authorities. The constitution established that there would be a need for cooperation and coordination between the Legislative and the executive, but it gave parliament the right to oversee the government performance. The new constitution adopted more democratic principles based on the government's responsibility to the Council of Representative which should approve the Prime Minister and his cabinet. Moreover, parliament had some authority to regulate or approve budgetary issues (Article 51).

- **The balance of power between the authorities:**

One of the most important improvements in the current constitution is the authority granted to the Representative Council to dismiss the Cabinet or a Minister by a two-thirds vote of no confidence. Article 53 states the following: "(i) A motion of no confidence in the Council of Ministers or in any Minister may be raised by the Chamber of Deputies. (ii) If the Chamber of Deputies casts a vote of no confidence in the Council of Ministers by an absolute majority of all its members, the Council of Ministers shall resign. (iii) If the vote of no confidence concerns an individual Minister, he shall resign his office."¹⁵³ But the King still has the power to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister, dissolve the Representative Council and appoint the members of the Council of Notables.

- **The Constitutional guarantees of equality and political freedom**

Chapter Two of the constitution outlines the rights and duties of Jordanians. "(i) Jordanians shall be equal before the law. There shall be no discrimination between them as regards to their rights and duties on grounds of race, language or religion. (ii) The Government shall ensure work and education within the limits of its possibilities, and it shall ensure a state of tranquillity and equal opportunities to all

¹⁵³ Article 53 was amended on April 17, 1954.

Jordanians.”¹⁵⁴ Article 16 of the Constitution stipulates the rights of Jordanians to hold meetings and form societies and political parties“(i) Jordanians shall have the right to hold meetings within the limits of the law. (ii) Jordanians are entitled to establish societies and political parties provided that the objects of such societies and parties are lawful, their methods peaceful, and their by-laws not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. (iii) The establishment of societies and political parties and the control of their resources shall be regulated by law”.¹⁵⁵

- **The principle of sovereignty of the nation**

In the Organic Law and the 1946 Constitution the sovereignty was concentrated in the hands of the Council of Ministers and the King. However, according to the new constitution, sovereignty is transferred to parliament. Chapter Three of the constitution defines the power of the State; Article 24 defines the people as the source of all powers. Articles 25 and 26 define the powers of the legislature and executive; legislative powers are vested in the King and the National Assembly, and executive power is vested in the King who exercising his powers through his Council of Ministers.

- **The Parliament has the right to propose laws**

The new constitution gave ten of Deputies or Senators the power to propose legislations: “(i) Any ten or more Senators or Deputies may propose any law. Such proposal shall be referred to the committee concerned in the House for its views. If the House is of the opinion that the proposal be accepted it shall refer it to the Government for drafting it in the form of draft law, and to submit it to the House either during the same session or at the following session.¹⁵⁶ (ii) Any law proposed by Senators or Deputies in accordance with the preceding paragraph and rejected by either House shall not be presented for a second time during the same session”.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴ Constitution, 1952 Article 6.

¹⁵⁵ Constitution, 1952 Article 16.

¹⁵⁶ As amended in the Official Gazette No. 1380 of 4/5/1958.

¹⁵⁷ Constitution, 1952, Article 95.

2.7.1.1 The Government in the 1952 Constitution (The Executive Branch)

- **The King**

Chapter Four of the Constitution is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the king's powers and rights, and declaring that the King is the head of the State, the head of the government and the commander of the armed forces (Articles 30, 32). The King exercises executive authority by appointing the Prime Minister and his cabinet according to the Prime Minister's recommendation. Furthermore, the King has the right to dismiss the Prime Minister and his cabinet or accept their resignation.¹⁵⁸

According to Article 34, which was amended on November 10, 1974, and Article 36 of the Constitution, the King issues orders for the holding of elections to the Council of Representatives, and he has the right to dissolve the Council. Moreover, he appoints the Senators and the speaker of the Council of Notables, and he has the power to dissolve it or relieve any Senator of his membership according to the amendment of Article 34. Although the 1952 Constitution stipulates that the King should approve laws before they can take effect (Article 31), it limits his power of veto by giving parliament the power to override his veto by a two-thirds majority of both houses of parliament (Article 93 Section IV).

- **The Executive**

Part two of Chapter Four deals with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, The King appoints the Prime Minister who organizes the Council of Ministers according to interest or general need, to be appointed by the King (Article 41). Articles 51 to 56 specify the accountability of the Council of Ministers before the Chamber of Deputies. The Constitution made the Prime Minister and his Cabinet collectively accountable and answerable to the Chamber of Deputies and not to the King, as Article 28a of the previous Constitution stated. Article 51 states that: "The Prime Minister and Ministers shall be collectively responsible before the Chamber of Deputies in respect of the public policy of the State. In addition, each Minister shall

¹⁵⁸ Constitution, 1952, Article 35.

be responsible before the Chamber of Deputies in respect of the affairs of his Ministry.”

On the other hand, in cases that parliament is dissolved or is not sitting the Council of Ministers with the approval of the King has the power to issue temporary legislations (provisional laws) which has the force of law. However, the constitution specifies the conditions that should be met before enacting these temporary laws and this lawmaking should take place only when concerning urgent matters. Article 94 ¹⁵⁹ Section 1 of the Jordanian Constitution states that :“(I) In cases where the National Assembly is not sitting or is dissolved, the Council of Ministers has, with the approval of the King, the power to issue provisional laws covering matters which require necessary measures which admit of no delay or which necessitate expenditures incapable of postponement. Such provisional laws, which shall not be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, shall have the force of law, provided that they are placed before the Assembly at the beginning of its next session, and the Assembly may approve or amend such laws. In the event of the rejection of such provisional laws, the Council of Ministers shall, with the approval of the King, immediately declare their nullity, and from the date of such declaration these provisional laws shall cease to have force provided that such nullity shall not affect any contracts or acquired rights.”

2.7.1.2 The Legislature in the 1952 Constitution

Chapter five of the Constitution deals with the legislative powers and the National Assembly. The National Assembly is comprised of two Houses, the House of Notables (*Majlis Al-A'yan*) and the House of Deputies (*Majlis Al-Nuwab*). While the members of the House of Deputies are directly elected by secret ballot in general elections for a four-year term, the Notables are appointed by the King, when their the number should not exceed half that of the lower house.

Legislative powers are shared by the King and Parliament. The King has extensive lawmaking powers in that he appoints the Notables, signs and executes all laws, and

¹⁵⁹ Article 94 was amended on May 4, 1958.

can postpone parliamentary elections (Articles 31, 93). Legislative power rests in the bicameral National Assembly. Both Houses of Parliament have the power to initiate discussions, reviews, proposals, and the enactment of legislations. Furthermore, the new Constitution gave parliament the power to discuss and approve the annual budget where it might reduce and suggest expenditure.¹⁶⁰

The process of lawmaking in the 1952 Constitution is explained in Articles from 91 to 96. The process starts by referring proposals from the Prime Minister to the House of Deputies, where the deputies have the power to accept, amend or reject them. If the House of Deputies accepts the proposals, it refers them to the government to draft them in the form of a bill and to return them back to the House for approval.

A bill is passed on to the House of Notables for debate and a vote. Then if the bill is approved by both councils it should be submitted to the King to ratify it, or he might return it with justifications for his refusal. In this case both Houses should hold joint meeting to pass the bill by a two-thirds majority, where upon it becomes constitutionally in act and effective.¹⁶¹

2.7.2 Jordanian Parliaments and Parties Participation (1950 to 1974).

This stage of Jordan's parliamentary life witnessed the unification between the West and East Banks of the Jordan River. Thereafter, political life was influenced by the presence of many political parties that helped to make the parliamentary life more effective. In the field of political reform Jordan during this stage had moved forward and entered an important stage of implementation; achieve separation between the authorities and made the government accountable to Parliament.

This period began after the announcement of the Emirate of Trans-Jordan's independence followed by the unification of the East and West banks of Jordan in 1950, in addition to the 1948 war and the establishment of the state of Israel. These events led to significant changes in Jordan's population as a result of the arrival of

¹⁶⁰ Constitution, Article 112 Section 4

¹⁶¹ Constitution, Article 93

Palestinians which affected Jordan's politics, demographics, socioeconomics and its cultural life.

This period witnessed a new and important stage of political reforms. Indeed, a new constitution was created in 1952 that adopted various democratic principles and stated the right of citizens to set up and join political parties¹⁶², and this was confirmed by the passing of the first Political Parties Law of 1955. In the 1950s and as a result of the political events and challenges that the Arab world had passed through such as the loss of Palestine and issues concerning liberation from the oppression of colonialism, the emergence of Communist parties and other socialist movements was observed throughout the world.¹⁶³ Jordanian political life then witnessed the birth of many ideological trends and the formation of nationalist, religious and leftist parties,¹⁶⁴ as table 2.4 shows.

Table 2.4: Jordanian Political Parties, 1950-1956

National Front	Hizb Al Jabha al-Wataniyya
Jordanian Communist Party	Hizb Al Shiyu'i al-Urduni
Arab Baath Party	Hizb Al Ba'th al 'Arabi
Liberation Party	Hizb Al Tahrir
National Union Party	Hizb Al Ittihad al-Watani
National Front	Hizb Al Jabha al-Wataniyya)
Arab Nationalist Party	Hizb Al Qawmiyya al 'Arabi
Syrian Nationalist Party	Hizb Al Qawmi al-Suri
National Socialist Party	Hizb Al Watani al-Ishtiraki
National Party	Hizb Al Umma)
Arab Constitutional Party	Hizb Al 'Arabi al Dusturi)

Source: Majid, (ed.), (2005), p. 75

¹⁶² See Article 16 of the Jordanian constitution. Text of the 1952 Constitution on http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html

¹⁶³ Majid Ziad (ed), (2005). P. 16

¹⁶⁴ Al-Abdullat, *Kharitat al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyyah al-Urduniyyah [Map of the Jordanian Political Parties]*, (1992), p.20.

All of the parties established in this phase were influenced by the unification of the two banks of the Jordan, which created a new national reality, and new Jordanian–Palestinian relations. In addition, those Jordanian students who had returned from their studies in Soviet Union, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Iraq often held Communist, Nassirist and Ba’athist ideologies. Consequently, the country moved towards a restructuring of civil society based on increasing and reactivated political participation.¹⁶⁵

The most remarkable event which occurred in this phase was the 1956 parliamentary elections, which were the freest and fairest elections Jordan had experienced since its independence.¹⁶⁶ In addition to the seats that gained by opposition political parties, the elections saw the formation of the government of Suleiman Nabulsi 1956-1957¹⁶⁷, which was the first, and to date the only left-wing government in Jordan’s history. Al-Nabulsi promised during his government to enact more liberalizing legislation relating to the political parties, freedoms and the press.¹⁶⁸

2.7.2.1 The Second Chamber of Deputies, 1950 – 1951

After the unification between the East and West Banks of Jordan, an amendment to the electoral law was issued to reflect the new demographic development, and the number of lower house seats was increased from twenty to forty seats divided equally between the two banks. The first election after the unification was held on April 20, 1950, and this election was free and fair in comparison with the previous elections.¹⁶⁹

Five political parties competed in this election although they were not officially recognized. Three of them were opposition parties and had most support in the West Bank, and the two were pro-regime parties based in the East Bank.¹⁷⁰ The opposition parties won fourteen seats while the pro-regime parties won ten seats and independents took the rest (see table 2.5).

¹⁶⁵ Naqrash, *al-Tajribah al-Hizbiyyah fi al-Urdun [The Partial Experience in Jordan]* (1991), p. 51.

¹⁶⁶ Abu Jabir, *The Jordanian Parliaments* (1972), p. 105.

¹⁶⁷ Assaf (1994), p. 30.

¹⁶⁸ Aruri (1972), p. 134.

¹⁶⁹ Abu Jabir. *The Jordanian Parliaments*. (1972), p-p. 92-98.

¹⁷⁰ Aruri (1972), pp. 93-94.

Table 2.5: Distribution of Seats in the Second Parliament 1950.

The political Party	Number of seats
The Jordanian Communist Party	2
The National Front Party	10
The Jordanian Resurrection Party	2
The Arab Constitutional Party	8
The Community Party	2
Independent candidates	16

Source: Aruri, N.H., *Jordan: A Study in Political Development 1921 -1965*, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1972), p.94

On April 24, 1950, the Houses of Deputies and Notables adopted in a joint session a Resolution for complete unity between the East Bank and the West Bank and Jerusalem. The resolution declared: "First, its support for complete unity between the two sides of the Jordan and their union into one State, which is the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, at whose head reign King Abdullah Ibn al Husain, on a basis of constitutional representative government and equality of the rights and duties of all citizens".¹⁷¹

The 1950s elections showed a considerable evolution of the political parties through their effective role in the legislative council to realize their objectives. The political parties' objectives at that time included: amendment of the 1947 constitution so as to be more democratic, rejection of the annexation between two banks, which was not generally approved, and a refusal of British military and financial support and a call for Arab aid as an alternative.¹⁷²

On May 3, 1951, the King dismissed Parliament after the 1951/52 budget crisis.¹⁷³ During the debate in parliament in a joint session of both houses, the deputies refused to approve the new budget which was the first to cover both banks as two-thirds of the

¹⁷¹ Shwadran (1995), pp.296-297.

¹⁷² Amawi, Jordan (1994), p. 263.

¹⁷³ The King explained his decision on the basis of lack of cooperation between the legislative and executive powers.

proposed expenditures were dedicated to the Arab Legion and other defence costs.¹⁷⁴ Consequently, King Abdullah dissolved Parliament and announced new elections within three months in both banks. Moreover, the King promised to revise the Constitution to make the government accountable to Parliament instead of to the King.¹⁷⁵

2.7.2.2 The Third Chamber of Deputies, 1951 – 1954

The third Chamber of Deputies was elected on August 29, 1951. The main objectives after the dissolution of the second Parliament, was to have a new Parliament with less bothersome and more cooperative legislators. But King Abdullah was assassinated six weeks before the new elections, which completely change the significance of these elections.¹⁷⁶

The results of the 1951 elections revealed that there was little difference between the third Parliament's structure and the Parliament that had been dismissed. More than half (twenty three out of forty) of the previous Council were re-elected, and no changes occurred in terms of the political parties' representation.¹⁷⁷

The 1951 elections witnessed a high representation of East Bank (60%) compared to West Bank deputies (35%), which reflected the progression of political background of the Transjordanians. Furthermore, 1951 witnessed a voter turnout of 37% in the East Bank (58% of the total vote's cast) despite the lack of participation among Amman's citizens, whereas only 30% voted in the West Bank.¹⁷⁸

The same political parties that had competed in the previous election ran in the 1951 elections. Only two parties won more than two seats in the lower house; the National Socialist and the Ba'ath parties (see table 2.6).

¹⁷⁴ Satloff *From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition* (1994), pp. 10-11.

¹⁷⁵ Shwadran (1995), pp. 308-309.

¹⁷⁶ Satloff (1994), p. 33.

¹⁷⁷ Satloff (1994), p. 35.

¹⁷⁸ Satloff (1994), P. 35

Table 2.6: Distribution of Seats in the Third Parliament 1951, by Parties

The Political Party	Number of Seats
National socialist Party	11
Communist Party	2
Resurrection Party	3
Community Party	1
Arab Constitutional Party	9
Independent candidates	14

Source: Abu Jabir, *The Legislature of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: A Study in Political Development*, in *Muslim World*, Vol. LVIII, Nos. 3-4, July-October 1969, p. 231

The third Parliament immediately started to press for the fulfilment of King Abdullah's promise to revise the Constitution. In January 1952 the opposition achieved its goal and a new Constitution was issued. This was one of the highlights of King Talal's rule.¹⁷⁹ On August 11, 1952, King Hussein was proclaimed King of Jordan at the age of 16 years old. Because he was under the legal age, a Regency Council¹⁸⁰ was appointed which ruled until he ascended the throne in May 1953.¹⁸¹ On June 22, 1954, the third Parliament was dissolved due to its opposition to the government's strategy, and the government explained the dissolution in terms of the lack of co-operation with the executive.¹⁸²

On August 16, 1954, after the third Parliament had been dissolved and before the formation of a new Parliament, the government issued new Defence Regulations empowering the authority of the Ministry of Interior to ban political meetings, and to suspend any newspaper without any explanations.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁹ Aruri (1972), p. 104

¹⁸⁰ The Regency Council was composed of Ibrahim Hashem, Sulayman Tuqan, and Abd al-Rahman al-Rashidat.

¹⁸¹ Kostiner (Ed), *Middle East Monarchies* (London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., 2000), p. 98.

¹⁸² Abu Jabir, *The Jordanian Parliaments*. (1972), p. 104

¹⁸³ Aruri (1972), p. 111.

2.7.2.3 The Fourth Chamber of Deputies, 1954 – 1956

The elections for the fourth Chamber of Deputies were held on October 17, 1954.¹⁸⁴ The 1954 election results were positive for the government, and only 50% of members in the dissolved Chamber were re-elected. For instance, the National Socialist Party won only two seats whereas it had eleven in the third Parliament.¹⁸⁵

The 1954 elections were characterized by widespread violence, and the government tightened its control on the opposition parties. Moreover, the government used the military army to cast ballots in support of government candidates, and they voted in their own camps instead of voting at polling booths.¹⁸⁶ Accordingly the results were favourable to the government and the opposition parties' representation in the fourth council was smaller than in the third Council see table 2.7.

In *Jordan: A State of Tension*, Shwadran pointed out that the political parties withdrew from these elections alleging that the government was interfering in the electoral process. Demonstrations were held, and fourteen persons were killed and 127 injured in these clashes.¹⁸⁷

Table 2.7: Distribution of Seats in the Fourth Parliament 1954, by Parties

Political Party	Number of seats
National socialist Party	1
Communist Party	2
Resurrection Party (Ba'ath)	0
Community Party	0
Arab Constitutional Party	17
Muslim Brethrenhood	4
Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir)	1
Independent candidates	15

Source: Abu Jabir, *The Legislature of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: A Study in Political Development* (1969), p. 23

¹⁸⁴ Abu Jabir, *The Jordanian Parliaments*. (1972), p. 104.

¹⁸⁵ Aruri (1972), p. 112.

¹⁸⁶ Satloff (1994), p. 96.

¹⁸⁷ Shwadran (1995), p. 323.

The results revealed that the Constitutional Party won Seventeen seats while two of the opposition parties were left without representation. On November 8, 1954, the government submitted a ministerial statement to obtain a vote of confidence in parliament. The Council of Deputies voted overwhelmingly in favour of the government, and the no confidence motion received three votes from the National Socialist and the Communist Deputies. In the previous Council, eighteen deputies voted for no confidence in the same government.¹⁸⁸

During the fourth parliamentary period, Iraq signed a mutual defence treaty with Turkey in February 1955. Called the Baghdad Pact it was supported by Britain and was formed as part of the Cold War to undertake political and military action to face the Soviet threat in the Middle East. Jordan was encouraged to join this pact, but pro-Nasser elements and Syria refused and many demonstrations were held to condemn it.¹⁸⁹ The King dissolved the fourth Parliament on June 26, 1956, and the government announced that Jordan did not intend to join Baghdad pact.¹⁹⁰

2.7.2.4 The Fifth Chamber of Deputies, 1956-1957

The election for the fifth Chamber of Deputies was held on October 21, 1956. The 1956 election was the freest and fairest Jordan had experienced since its independence. Moreover, the government created a degree of political liberalization so that main issues could be discussed in preparation for the elections.¹⁹¹

The political party candidates captured twenty-six of forty seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The National Socialists under the leadership of Suleiman Nabulsi won eleven seats and became the major party in the fifth Council see table 2.8. The King subsequently assigned the chairman of the National Socialist although he had not won a seat in Parliament to form a new government.¹⁹² Three political parties were

¹⁸⁸ Aruri (1972), p. 113.

¹⁸⁹ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2801487.stm.

¹⁹⁰ Abu Jabir, *The Jordanian Parliaments* (1972), p. 105.

¹⁹¹ Aruri (1972), p. 134.

¹⁹² Aruri (1972), p. 134.

represented in the Nabulsi government, which had seven National Socialist ministers, a Ba'athist, a communist, and two independents.¹⁹³

Table 2.8: Distribution of Seats in the Fifth Parliament 1956, by Parties

The Political Party	The number of seats
National Socialist Party	11
Communist Party	3
Resurrection Party(Ba'ath)	2
Arab Constitutional Party	4
Community Party (al-Umma)	1
Muslim Brethrenhood	4
Liberation Party (al-Tahreer)	1
Independent candidates	14

Source: Abu Jabir. *The Legislature of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: A Study in Political Development*, (1969), p. 231.

The election results revealed that the opposition parties were victorious (The National Socialist, Communist, Muslim Brethren and the Ba'ath parties). On the other hand the Arab Constitutional Party (pro-regime party) won four seats, whereas it had seventeen in the former Council. In November 1956 during the fifth parliament, the opposition parties recommended the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty and British financial subsidies.¹⁹⁴

Accordingly, a new agreement was signed in January 19, 1957, between Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia which stipulated financial aid to Jordan to replace British aid.¹⁹⁵ The Nabulsi government fulfilled most of its manifest to promises including an open and free political environment, and termination of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty on March 15, 1957. Al-Nabulsi announced that the country would build diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and communist China.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹³ Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of the Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955- 1967* (1989), p. 41.

¹⁹⁴ Britain was the main financial source to Jordan.

¹⁹⁵ Shwadran (1995), pp. 242-243.

¹⁹⁶ Aruri (1972), pp. 135-136.

The King was dissatisfied with the al-Nabulsi government's relations with Communist regimes. For that reason, on February 2, 1957, the King issued an open letter¹⁹⁷ to al-Nabulsi warning him against the danger of communist infiltration.¹⁹⁸ On April 10, 1957, the King asked al-Nabulsi to resign from office.¹⁹⁹ After the Jordanian parliament was dissolved and the Nabulsi government was dismissed, clashes between the government and the parties developed. Therefore, all political parties were outlawed and the government banned party activity. In addition to this, the government imposed the martial law, and froze the Political Parties' Law. The latter measure lasted until 1992 when a new law was issued which repealed the law of 1955.²⁰⁰

In the long run these laws led to a political vacuum within the community and made the monarchy as the sole concern for its loyalty.²⁰¹ Political life in Jordan entered an unprecedented period of repression, leading the political parties to work underground.²⁰² Voting for political party candidates in 1950, 1951, and 1954 elections had not been extensive. The parties' candidates had received less than 20% of the total popular vote, as table 2.9 shows, which reflects the lack of confidence in elections in general and in political parties in particular, who did not represent the voters' political, social, and economic aspirations. However, voting patterns were different at the 1956 elections, and in particular the national socialist and communist candidates obtained noticeable proportions of the votes.

¹⁹⁷ For full text of King Hussein's open letter see Hussein, King of Jordan, *Uneasy Lies the Head*, (London: Heinemann, 1962), pp.159-160.

¹⁹⁸ Aruri (1972), p. 138.

¹⁹⁹ Abidi, *Jordan: A Political Study: 1948-1957* (1965), pp.160-162.

²⁰⁰ Abidi. (1965), p. 30.

²⁰¹ Salloukh (1996): pp. 37-65.

²⁰² Kilani, (editor), 2001. The National Integrity Systems, Country Study Report: Jordan 2001, p. 7

Table 2.9 Number and Percentage of Votes for all Party Candidates: 1950s Election

Party	1950 Elections		1951 Elections		1954 Elections		No of votes	Total votes%
	No of votes	Total votes%	No of votes	Total votes%	No of votes	Total votes%		
Ba'th	5,061	1.6	21,120	6.2	10,474	2.3	34,000	8.4
Socialist Nationalists	–	–	–	–	29,427	6.6	72,467	17.9
Communists	–	–	37,902	11.05	21,250	4.8	51,398	12.7
Nation Party	–	–	–	–	17,113	3.8	–	–
Arab Constitutional Party	–	–	–	–	–	–	32,083	7.9
Liberation Party	–	–	3,596	1.04	6,920	1.6	6,130	1.5
Muslim Brotherhood	–	–	–	–	–	–	33,518	8.3
Total voters	304,000		342,714		445,928		405,000	
Total votes for party candidates %		1.6		18.29		19.1		56.7

Source: Lust-Okar, Ellen M., *The Decline of Jordanian Political Parties: Myth or Reality?*, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Nov., 2001), p.

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2.7.2.5 The Sixth Chamber of Deputies, 1961-1962

On October 22, 1961, elections to the sixth Jordanian Parliament were held. However, political parties were not permitted to participate, and the government disallowed any candidate from standing as representative of political party. The 1961 election witnessed a lack of participation by the electorate, with a voter turnout of about ten percent.²⁰³

²⁰³ Abu Jabir, *The Jordanian Parliaments*, (1972), p. 109

On January 28, 1962, Wasfi al-Tall was appointed as Prime Minister. "Wasfi al-Tall was the most controversial figure in the history of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. His supporters believed he was Jordan's greatest statesman, whose first government in Uriel Dann's words marked the birth of modern Jordan."²⁰⁴ Wasfi al-Tall formed a new Cabinet of Ministers who had not served before as ministers, and only one of them had been a deputy in Parliament. His government was composed of educated and professionals members (Technocratic government).²⁰⁵ However, although the sixth parliament was unpopular, the government was very progressive, and consequently the Prime Minister took steps to offer substance to the parliamentary system and persuaded the King to dissolve Parliament as it was not representative of Jordanians and had been elected under repressive conditions. In response, the sixth Parliament was dissolved on October 1, 1962.²⁰⁶

2.7.2.6 The Seventh Chamber of Deputies, 1962-1963

The elections to the Seventh Parliament were held in November 24, 1962. Voter turnout was estimated to be around seventy percent of the 450,000 registered voters and 166 candidates ran for the seventh parliamentary elections. Most candidates were independents because political parties were again banned and did not compete in these elections. Fifty nine percent of parliamentary seats were captured by representatives running for the first time.²⁰⁷

The seventh Parliament did not complete its constitutional period and was dissolved on April 21, 1963 due to lack of cooperation between the two authorities and as a result of a vote of no confidence in Samir al-Rifai's government.²⁰⁸ The seventh Parliament was the first parliament in the history of Jordan to force the government to resign when the parliament voted no confidence in the al-Rifai cabinet to replace the government of the nationalist Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tall.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁴ Tal, Friend or Foe, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.25, No. 1. (Autumn, 1995), pp. 110-112.

²⁰⁵ Robins (2004), pp. 108-109.

²⁰⁶ Dann, *King Hussein and the challenge of the Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955- 1967* (1989), p. 122.

²⁰⁷ Aruri (1972), p. 179.

²⁰⁸ Abu Jabir, The Jordanian Parliaments, in Jacob M. Landau (ed), *Man State and Society in the Contemporary Middle East* (1972), pp. 109-110.

²⁰⁹ Aruri (1972), p. 180.

2.7.2.7 The Eighth Chamber of Deputies, 1963-1966

On July 8, 1963, the eighth Parliament was elected. Only twenty deputies of the former Council were re-elected, while most of those who had voted for no confidence in the previous government were not re-elected in the eighth council.²¹⁰ The eighth Parliament did not complete its constitutional term and the King dissolved it on December 22, 1966 after demonstrations that followed Israeli operations in the West Bank village of Sammu in November 1966.²¹¹

2.7.2.8 The Ninth Chamber of Deputies, 1967

The elections for the ninth Chamber of Deputies were held on April 18, 1967, and it completed its constitutional term in April 1971, but was extended several times as a result of political conditions and Israeli occupation of the West Bank.²¹² The 1967 elections were held two months prior to the Six-Day War with Israel that started on June 4, 1967 which resulted in Israel capturing the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem from Jordan. As a result, new elections could not be held in Jordan and parliamentary life was frozen until the 1989 elections. Furthermore, in 1974 the Arab Summit of Rabat was held and the Arab league recognised the PLO²¹³ as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, so the King issued an *Iradah* to dissolve the ninth parliament in November 23, 1974.²¹⁴

2.8 Freezing of Parliamentary Life from 1974 -1989: The Martial Law Period

Parliamentary life in Jordan was frozen due to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank of Jordan, in addition to other Arab and international issues such as the resolution of the Arab Summit in Rabat. The decisions that had been adopted by Arab heads of state in the Rabat Summit raised question about the political relationship between the two banks of the Jordan. For this reason, King Hussein dissolved the Chamber of Deputies in November 1974, half of whose members were from the West Bank.

²¹⁰ Abu Jabir, *The Jordanian Parliaments* (1972), pp. 110-115.

²¹¹ Dann (1989), p. 158.

²¹² <http://www.jordan-parliament.org/date.html>.

²¹³ Palestine Liberation Organization.

²¹⁴ <http://www.jordan-parliament.org/date.html>.

Parliament was replaced by the National Consultative Council (NCC), which was created in 1978 to fill the void resulting from the suspension of parliamentary life. This was an attempt by the King to allow limited public participation in the political process. The role of the NCC was to debate public policy, discuss the temporary laws issued by the government in the absence of parliament and offer advice and consultation to the Executive Authority.²¹⁵

The King explained the aims of the creation of these councils. “It became obvious that it was unnatural for the country to remain without one of its main foundation while waiting for circumstances to improve”, he said adding that, It is not possible for the burden of legislation to be borne by the Executive alone.²¹⁶ The Council was composed of members appointed by the King representing various sectors of Jordanian society, in addition to those from different localities and minority communities; Christians, and Circassians. The National Councils were composed of educated members and political leaders, professionals, Bedouins and women (see tables 2.10 and 2.11). Moreover, the first Council included three members from the Muslim Brotherhood and six were known to be leftists.²¹⁷

Table 2.10: Occupations of NCC Members

Tribal leader (<i>Shaikh Ashira</i>)	11
Businessman	9
Farmer/Landowner	14
Teacher/Educator	4
Professional	22
Total	60

Source: Khoury, N.A., *The National Consultative Council of Jordan: A Study in Legislative Development*, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 1981, p. 432.

²¹⁵ AL Rashdan, *al-Tatawwur al-Dimuqrati fi al-Urdun, 1952-1989* [The Democratic Development in Jordan, 1952-1989] in *Qira'at Siyasiyyah* [Political Readings], Vol. 4. No.2. Spring 1994, pp. 88-113.

²¹⁶ Khoury, N.A., *The National Consultative Council of Jordan: A Study in Legislative Development*, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 1981, p. 430.

²¹⁷ Khoury (1981), p. 433.

Table 2.11: Academic and Professional Degrees Held by NCC Members

High School Diploma	21
BA or BS	11
M.A	1
PhD	2
Law Degree	13
Engineering	5
MD	7
Total	60

Source: Khoury,N.A., The National Consultative Council of Jordan: A Study in Legislative Development, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 1981, p. 432.

Women were also represented in the NCC. In the first Council which was formed in 1978 three women were included as members, and four women were appointed to each of the second and third councils (1980-1982) and (1982-1984).²¹⁸ The NCC was dissolved by royal decree in January 1984 as a part of a return to parliamentary life. The ninth Parliament was called to convene in an extraordinary parliamentary session to amend Article 73 of the Constitution by adding an extra paragraph. This amendment was to allow direct elections to replace those members who had died since 1967 or who were unable to attend due to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank.²¹⁹

The ninth Parliament that had been called for an extraordinary session was called the tenth Chamber of Deputies and was sustained until 1988 when it was dissolved with the aim of preparing for new elections and as a result of the disengagement between the two banks of the Jordan.²²⁰

²¹⁸ Al-Jraibi, Women and Political Participation in Jordan: The Development of Attitudes Towards Allocating a Quota of Parliamentary Seats for Women, Case Study:2, (Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center (UJRC).

²¹⁹ Robins (1991), p. 191.

²²⁰ <http://www.jordan-parliament.org/date.html>

2.9 Conclusion

This chapter has revealed that despite the extended history of parliamentary life in Jordan since 1929, and in addition to establishment of three constitutions, five Legislative Councils, nine parliaments and three Consultative Councils, the legislative processes and political reforms were ineffective. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, even a quick reading of parliament history in Jordan and the history of conflicts between the parliament and the executive branch indicate the tendency of the balance to tilt in favour of the latter.

Such conflicts led the government to repeatedly dissolve seven Chambers of Deputies out of nine before they had finished their Constitutional terms (see table 2.12). This impacted negatively on the main duties of being performed parliament. On the other hand, the parliaments did not exert their authority to withdraw confidence from the government or any minister except on one occasion in the seventh parliament because there was always the threat of dissolution if parliament went too far in opposition to government policy, withdrew confidence, or did not pass laws suggested by government.

Secondly, parliaments were composed predominantly of members without substantial organizational power. This was an important cause of an ineffective parliament, along with the absence of an effective role for political parties in political reform and in society in general due to continual interference by the government in the parties' issues and in the electoral process and its attempts to control parliament and political parties.

Table 2.12: The Status of Jordanian Parliaments during the Period 1947–1974

Parliament No	Year	Status
First	1947-1950	Dissolved
Second	1950-1951	Dissolved
Third	1951-1954	Dissolved
Fourth	1954-1956	Dissolved
Fifth	1956-1961	Extended
Sixth	1961-1962	Dissolved
Seventh	1962-1963	Dissolved
Eighth	1963-1966	Dissolved
Ninth	1967-1974	Extended

Overall, the constitutional developments that made the government responsible to parliament and gave the latter the right to dismiss either the government or any minister, in addition to the implementation of regular elections can all be considered positive limited steps towards representative democracy and real parliamentary reform, and furthermore, rather advanced steps in comparison with other neighbouring countries at that time.

Moreover, during the period from 1950-1957, and due to the unification between the East and the West Banks Jordan had witnessed a short period of liberalisation and further reform in the political field as a result of embracing the Palestinian political parties and the Palestinian elite in the political process.

CHAPTER THREE

POLITICAL CULTURE

3.1 Introduction

Political participation is linked to three major elements which constitute the political environment for general elections; the economic and social situation of the citizens, the laws governing elections, and the prevailing political culture. Chapter three discusses the political culture as a factor in and precondition of democratic change, in addition to exploring the major factors affecting the formation of a political culture in Jordan.

Political attitudes and political culture are important concepts, as these factors have a strong influence on human behaviour, which plays an extremely important role for the stability and performance of a political system. Since the evolution of the science of politics and the emergence of the behavioural movement, the world has paid more attention to human behaviour, attitudes, beliefs, customs and traditions. Therefore, political culture in any society relies on certain values, beliefs, practices and psychological attitudes among a country's citizens.

There have been many trends in the study of political culture. Some authors have focused on the historical experience of the industrial societies and have felt that the political culture responds to changes in political, economic and social circumstances; others have stressed the analysis of political trends in communist societies by demonstrating the continuity and stability of certain aspects of the political culture in the face of changes. In the Arab World, studies have shown the importance of culture in economic and political behaviour, and that the Arab democratic experiences reflect political patterns which in turn are affected by religious and cultural factors.²²¹

²²¹ Al-quraan, *al-Thaqafah al-Siyasiyyah fi al-Reef al-Urduni*, [Political Culture in the Jordanian Countryside] (2005) p. 5

3.2 The Concept of Political Culture

Elkins and Simon stated that “political culture is one of the most popular and seductive concepts in political science; it is also one of the most controversial and confused.”²²² The term ‘political culture’ did not appear until 1956, when Gabriel Almond attempted to introduce this term in his Article ‘Comparative Political Systems’. He stated that “every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action. I have found it useful to refer to this as political culture”.²²³ Almond added that the political culture “does not coincide with a given political system or society. Patterns of orientation to politics may, and usually do, extend beyond the boundaries of political systems”.²²⁴ For Almond, the political culture is part of the general culture in society, despite being characterized by a degree of independence and, as described by Almond, “it is a differentiated part of the culture and has a certain autonomy”.²²⁵

The spread of democracy within the past decade has positive implication for political culture studies, but political scientists are divided on the relevance of political culture. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba carried out an important empirical study and survey of political attitudes in five countries, which was published in their work, *The Civic Culture* (1963). They define political culture as “the political system as internalized in the cognition, feelings, and the evaluations of its population”.²²⁶ Here, political culture refers to “the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations toward politics among the members of a political system; attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system. Orientation refers to the internalized aspects of objects and relationships”.²²⁷

Lucian Pye defines political culture as a set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give order and meaning to the political process and provide stable rules governing the

²²² Obeidi, *Political culture in Libya* (2001), p. 8

²²³ Almond, Comparative political Systems, *Journal of politics*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (August, 1956), pp. 391-409.

²²⁴ Almond (1956), p.396

²²⁵ Almond (1956), p.396

²²⁶ Almond and Sidney, *The Civic Culture : political attitudes and democracy in five nations* (1963), p. 13.

²²⁷ Almond and Bingham, *Comparative Politics: A Development Approach* (1966), pp. 16-17.

behaviour of the political system's members.²²⁸ In 'The Individual and the Government in Islamic Political Culture' Dawood Feirhi defines political culture as a set of values, beliefs and ideals that show the conditions under which political activities can take root.²²⁹ Moh'd Almagreebi defines political culture as authorized patterns of orientation and adaptation to the political activities in any society.²³⁰ Mohammad Berroween adds that political culture is the sum of beliefs, values, and patterns exercised by citizens in a particular community, concerning political affairs and the system of governance in the State.²³¹

Despite some differences, all of the above definitions share the idea that all of the values found in the political system are part of the political culture. Moreover, the term political culture refers to the political orientation and attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system. As Verba wrote, political culture "regulates who talks to whom and who influences whom".²³²

3.3 Types of Political Culture

Each country has its own form of governance and political system that affect the nature and concepts of its political culture, due to the fact that any political system needs to build a particular political culture in order to be sustained. In a democratic country where the political system is based on the rule of law, the system needs a political culture that stresses the democratic values of equality, participation, justice, and freedom. Under authoritarian rule, however, the political culture is centred on the fear of power, a lack of inclination to participate in the political process, and the oppression of political opposition.

²²⁸ Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (1966), p. 104

²²⁹ Feirhi, Dawood., al-Fard wa al-Hokumah fi al-Thaqafah al- Siyasiyyah al-Islamiyyah, [The Individual and the Government in Islamic Political Culture] , on http://feirahi.com/ar/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13&Itemid=33

²³⁰ Almgeerbi, , al-Arab bayn Thaqafat al-Tasllut wa Thaqafat al-Demoqratiyyah ,[Arabs Between the Culture of Dictatorship and the Culture of Democracy], on

<http://www.kwtanweer.com/Articles/readArticle.php?ArticleID=266>

²³¹ Berroween, Thaqaftona Alsasyah , [Our Political Culture], on H:\political culture\ثقافتنا السياسية\INTRODUCTION.htm.

²³² Verba, Comparative Political Culture in Pye and Verba (eds), *Political Culture and Political Development* (1960), p. 517

Almond and Verba assert that the orientations of individuals towards the political system can be measured through awareness, sentiments, and assessment to four aspects of political life: Firstly, the system in general through its components, elements, and constitutional forms. Secondly, input cognition refers to an awareness and understanding of politics and political issues in the society. Thirdly, the output cognition, or the citizens' knowledge of the results of the government action, includes the ability of individuals and their effectiveness in the political life, in addition to how to develop and implement public policies in the community; finally, the individual himself (what is the role of the individual in political life? the extent of his knowledge about his rights, duties, political abilities and how to participate in political life).²³³ According to these four variables Almond and Verba identify three typical types of political culture and three corresponding citizenship orientations; parochial, subject and participant political cultures.

3.3.1 Parochial Political Culture

This type of political culture is associated with citizens who have no real understanding of their political system or are ignorant about politics in general. The parochial citizen tends to be unaware, or only dimly aware, of the political system in all its aspects, having no knowledge of how the political system works, no effective orientations, and as a result a lack of political participation.²³⁴ The best example of this type of culture is isolated tribes, whose presence or survival is not affected by central government decisions.²³⁵ Therefore, it is impossible for this type of political culture to lead to democratic stability.

3.3.2 Subject Culture

In this type of culture the citizens are characterized by high levels of political knowledge. They are aware of and oriented to the political system, furthermore, there is a high frequency toward a differentiated political system and toward the output aspects of the system, but are low in terms of input and show resentment towards

²³³ Almond and Verba (1965), p. 15

²³⁴ Almond and Verba (1965), p. 19

²³⁵ Al-Rashed Abdullah., al-Thaqafa *al-Siyasiyyah*, [Political Culture], at H:\political culture\الثقافة السياسية - منتديات انتخاب _ كوم

political participation. It is essentially passive relationship.²³⁶ Furthermore, in this political culture citizens perceive themselves to be uninvolved in the political process, but instead as subordinate and subject to authority, as is the case with people living under a dictatorship.²³⁷ Thus, this type of political culture is considered inefficient in building stable democracy, since citizens have no understanding of their democratic political power.

3.3.3 Participant Culture

The citizens in this culture are oriented to the system as a whole that encourages them to participate in political affairs. In this culture it is assumed that the citizen is educated and has a positive sense about the political system in which they live. It is an active and influential culture, which means that citizens participate in and are affected by the political process.²³⁸ It can be argued that participant political culture is inefficient because in such a culture the combination of high levels of political knowledge and participation might produce a danger of “democratic overload” which could lead to political instability.²³⁹

These patterns or models are theoretical models or ideals, and there is no society controlled by one of these cultures in full. However, the three types of culture can exist in all human societies, and one can determine the political culture of any society by measuring the distribution of these patterns in the community, and whichever is the controlling or dominant, taking into account the existence of individuals or groups within the same community with any one of the other types of political cultures along with the prevailing culture.

Almond and Verba assert that these three types of political culture can combine to create the most effective political culture to promote political stability. This is the “civic culture” which is a type of political culture that mixes the best elements of subject and participant types with high levels of political knowledge and a feeling of

²³⁶ Ben-Dor, Political Culture Approach to Middle East Politics, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 1. (Jan,1977), pp. 43-63

²³⁷ Al-Rashed, *al-Thaqafa al-Siyasiyyah* , [Political Culture]

²³⁸ See Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture* (1963).

²³⁹ Huntington, Crozier and Watanuki, *The Crises of Democracies* (1975).

effective political power among citizens. This culture, therefore, is the most favourable culture for the maintenance and development of democracy because it is based on the congruency of political culture with the political structure.²⁴⁰

3.4 The Democratic Political Culture

The modern democratic system is the outcome of general intellectual, social, historical and political transformations which came together to establish guidelines and limits for the behaviour of citizens and political leaders, enhance the legitimacy of political institutions, and articulate the thoughts and feelings of the majority of the population. Therefore, democracy is much more than the relevant formal institutions: a party system, a parliament, and universal suffrage. Democracy requires a special set of basic values of tolerance, political pluralism, practices and political orientations and free speech.

The democratic political culture involves cognitions and feelings toward the basic democratic principles such as political tolerance, an appreciation of liberty, support for the norms of democracy, realization of civil and political rights, support for an independent media and support for free, fair and competitive elections.²⁴¹ Accordingly, democratic citizens should also recognize that they have responsibilities as well as rights, believe in political tolerance and individual liberty, be aware of their political rights and able to make choices and decisions and participate in competitive elections to govern themselves democratically.²⁴²

Democracy is about genuine freedom and the empowerment of the individual, in addition to a participating public with a reasonable understanding of the political process. The democratic political culture, as a set of values, attitudes and behaviours influenced by substantive changes in society, plays a crucial role in a democracy which shapes human behaviour, and it is considered to be an important factor in

²⁴⁰ Strazay, The Incongruent Culture? Nationalist-populism and Democratization of Post-Communist Central Europe, 2003 online text <http://www.newschool.edu/tcds/Tomas%20Strazay.pdf>

²⁴¹ Gibson, Reymond and Kent, Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union, *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 54, No. 2, 9May, (1992), pp. 329-371.

²⁴² Verba, Nie, Kim, *Participation and Political Equality* (1978), p. 71.

establishing guidelines and legal parameter for the behaviour of citizens and political leaders.²⁴³

The present researcher adopts definition, which does not differ in essence from many common definitions of the concept of culture, which is looking to this concept as a pattern of values, attitudes and behaviours acquired by individuals as members of the community. The political culture then, is the dominant culture in the community concerning the relationship between community members with the political system whether direct or indirect. Furthermore, the political culture is affected by, and at the same time affects, the nature of the prevailing culture and it is considered as a sub-component of that culture.

3.5 The Political Culture in Jordan

Each country has its own cherished values and special cultural features which differ from those of other countries and from one time to the next. Furthermore, these values are dynamic phenomena which change over time and may be replaced by new values. Alternatively, previously-held values may be reverted to, perhaps due to socio-economic changes. The historical framework and the current economic, social or political reality have played an important role in the formation of the political culture in Jordan. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on those factors that have most shaped the existing political culture in Jordan. This entails an analysis of economic characteristics, the roles of religion, and the role of social institutions such as the family and tribe, in addition to the political characteristics of Jordanian society.

3.5.1 The Economic Characteristics of Jordanian Society

Social, economic, and political characteristics have a profound impact on the nature and structure of the political system, and therefore democratic governance needs a political and democratic culture just as it needs economic prosperity, fairness in the distribution of wealth, the expansion of education, and the maturity of political awareness.

²⁴³ Leis, *Reflections on Popular Education*, 2005 online text at http://www.iiz-dvv.de/englisch/Publikationen/Ewb_ausgaben/64_2005/eng_leis.htm.

The economic level of Jordanian citizens is low, particularly in the countryside. Therefore, many people try to abandon agriculture for other governmental occupations such as military and administrative jobs. That is because they aspire to a stable source of income, and turn against the low economic capacity and lack of motivation to stay in the countryside, in addition to the negative cultural attitudes towards manual labour.²⁴⁴

Although Jordan has enjoyed one of the highest rates of human development in the Arab World in terms of levels of education and health, it is facing the problem of worsening unemployment. This affects young people in particular, and is threatening to have serious consequences. Experts attribute this to both internal and external causes and events. The most important is the shame culture (*Thaqafat al-'ayeb*) through which society views certain professions as inferiority especially those involving manual labours. Many families and young people desire to work only in professions with higher status such as medicine, engineering, and law.

For example, Jordan has achieved the highest rate of education and literacy in the Arab world, according to a report released by the United Nations Development Program in 2000. It has doubled the rate of literacy from 47% in 1960 to 87% in 1995, and also provides 67% of Jordanian families with medical services close to their places of residence.²⁴⁵

But this positive picture is combined with a massive unemployment crisis, with official figures showing a current rate of around 15%. Moreover, unemployment rates are higher for females than males and much higher among young people under 24 years, who account for about 60% of the total unemployed. One of the most serious repercussions of unemployment is its effect on the system of social and moral values that might lead to deviations as a result of looking for ways to satisfy material needs such as drug abuse and trafficking, gambling, fraud and theft.

²⁴⁴ Abu Jabir, Shabeeb S, *al-Mujtama' al-Urduni, Dirasah Ijtima'yyia Tarbawiyya*, [The Jordanian Society, A Social-Educational Study (1979)], pp. 61-62

²⁴⁵ See report at <http://www.undpjordan.org/JordanHumanDevelopmentReport/tabid/81/Default.aspx>

The continued decline in economic conditions and a widening gap between per capita income levels and real purchasing power as well as the worsening unemployment crisis have led to serious weaknesses in the institutional and real political participation.²⁴⁶

3.5.2 The Role of Religion

Religion is a dynamic force in the lives of many peoples of different races, nationalities, and ethnicities. It interacts with the socioeconomic and political spheres and influences patterns of social change.²⁴⁷ It can be argued that the greatest influence on Jordanian society historically has been that exerted by religion. It significantly affects the structure, values and attitudes prevalent in Jordanian society because it forms the primary unit of loyalty and identity. Furthermore, whether as an ideology or a model of social organization, Islam plays an important role in the life of the individual in Jordan throughout his life, including his personal relationship to the universe, private and social affairs, customs and ceremonies, and ritual prohibitions.

However, the Jordanian state has not been religious in the sense that others have been such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which was established in the same period, or the Islamic Republic of Iran founded in 1979, or Pakistan based on Islamic nationalism in 1947. The state of Jordan was founded in 1921 based on a religious legitimacy derived from the leadership of the Sharif of Mecca, Al Hussein Ben Ali, to Arab revolution on the Ottoman State during the First World War. Islam was the major reference point for the government, culture and traditions of the state, and for King Abdullah Bin Al Hussein, the founder of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.²⁴⁸

Generally, the role of religion in Jordanian society has created features which can be identified in people's beliefs, patterns of behaviour, and values. Hammam Saeed executive officer of the Islamic Action Front Party (*Hizb Jabhat Al-Amal Al-Islami*) has asserted that "we do not differentiate between a political party and a religious

²⁴⁶ *Islamic Action Front: A National Program to Protect Jordan Report* (2003).

²⁴⁷ Abootalebi, *Islam and Democracy: State-Society Relations in Developing Countries, 1980-1994*, (2000), p. 55

²⁴⁸ Gharaibeh, al-Urdun...al-Dawlah al-Marji'iyyah wa al-Harkat al-Islamiyyah , [Jordan .. State, Authoritative source and the Islamic Movements]. 17/05/2006 at www.aljazessra.net

party. In Islam, there is no separation between religion and politics, because Islam has comprehensive guidelines for all aspects of life”.²⁴⁹

3.5.3 The Role of Social Institutions

Each society reflects the prevailing culture among its citizens. That culture developed according to the sets of values, concepts and knowledge gained through the historical and cultural heritage, geographical reality, the social structure, and the nature of the political and economic system. Unlike in Western societies, traditional social institutions such as the family and tribe in Jordan, as in most Arab countries, have played and continue to play a significant role in political culture. Focusing on the social structure and characteristics of Jordanian society is therefore useful in understanding the role of social institutions and how they influence the elements of political culture.

3.5.3.1 The Social Characteristics of Jordanian Society

According to the General Census of Population and Housing 2004²⁵⁰, Jordan’s population was estimated at 5,323,200 persons (2,628,717 of whom were male (51.5%) and 2,472,264 (48.5%) female) distributed among the various governorates of the Kingdom. Furthermore, Jordan has one of the world’s highest population growth rates. According to government statistics, the national population growth rate between 1994 and 2004 was about 2.52 per cent, with an annual rate of increase of 3.96 per cent.²⁵¹

Like many other developing countries, Jordan has a very young population; about 37.3 per cent of the total population was under 15 years of age in 2005 (constituting 42.5 percent of the total male population and 43.0 per cent of the total female population), and 59.4 percent of the total population was aged between 15-64 years. Persons over 65 years of age constitute 3.3 percent.²⁵²

²⁴⁹ <http://www.ammannet.net/look/Article>

²⁵⁰ The latest census in Jordan

²⁵¹ Department of Statistics, 2004 at http://www.dos.gov.jo/home_e.htm

²⁵² Department of Statistics, 2004 at http://www.dos.gov.jo/home_e.htm

Jordanian society can be classified according to several criteria, such as lifestyles, social class and religion. According to lifestyle Jordanian society has been divided into three divisions: the urban population, the rural population, and the population in the desert (the Bedouin who live in Badiyah).

- **The urban population** is inhabitants of the major cities in Jordan such as Amman, Zarqa, Irbid, al-Karak, Ma'an and other Jordanian cities. The proportion of urban population in Jordan was 36% of the total in 1952, increasing by 1961 to 44%. Currently over 82.3% of the population live in urban areas. Over 63% of the population reside in the central provinces, about 28% in the provinces of the Northern Territory, and 9% in the governorates of the South. Amman is the most populated province, where about 38% of the population is concentrated, followed by Irbid Governorate (18%), and in Zarqa (15%), the least populated provinces is in the Governorate of Al-tafilah about (1.5%).²⁵³

Urban life is characterized by stability and work in the field of industry and trade, and standards of living are better than those of the rural population and Badiyah. Jordan is one of the fastest urbanizing countries of the world, due to rapid population growth, internal migration from rural and Badiyah to the main cities especially Amman, and external migration to Jordan from neighbouring countries such as the migration of Chechens, Circassians, Armenian, and the Druze, in addition to the Palestinian migrations since the establishment of Israel in 1948. The majority of these migrants preferred to settle in major cities and large conurbations, thus leading to rapid population growth there.²⁵⁴

- **The rural population** live in villages and work in agriculture. The rural population is less stable and fortunate than urban dwellers. According to government statistics the rural population in Jordan constituted about 41.5% of the national total in 1979. But this percentage has subsequently decreased to

²⁵³ Department of Statistics, 2004 at http://www.dos.gov.jo/home_e.htm

²⁵⁴ Al-Khatybeh and Bani Nasor, *al-Mojtama' al-Urduni. [The Jordanian Society]*, (2005), pp. 96-98.

about 17.7 percent²⁵⁵ due to the shifts of the rural population to urban areas where the level of services provided is higher. In addition to standards of living and incomes are much higher for urban residents.

- **The Badiyah population** live in the Jordanian desert in tribes outside of the urban and rural areas. Their nomadic lifestyle is distinguished by mobility and constant travel in search of water and food. Therefore, they live in tents which are easily transported from one place to another, and rely mainly on herding cattle and sheep. Standards of living among this social group are lower than those of the urban and rural populations in Jordan.

In *The Closed Unites: the Family, Clan and Tribe*, Ahmad Rabayah mentions that the population of rural and Badiyah have been reintegrated due to the government's policies encouraging the settlement through its sedentarization campaigns and a variety of other techniques. The Bedouin lifestyle has changed as a result of the engagement of the vast majority of the Bedouins in agriculture, and so that their mobility as a fundamental aspect of nomadic life has declined.²⁵⁶ The percentage of nomads has therefore decreased from 8% in the 1960s to less than 3%.

In terms of religion, more than 92% of Jordanians are Sunni Muslims, and about 6% are Christians who live mainly in Amman, Madaba, Karak and Salt. The majority of Christians belong to the Greek Orthodox Church, but there are also Greek Catholics, a small Roman Catholic community, Syrian Orthodox, Coptic Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox and a few Protestant denominations found mostly in Amman.²⁵⁷ In addition, there are Circassians, the descendants of Muslim refugees from the Tsarist Russian invasion of the Caucasus in the 19th century, and a much smaller group of Chechens. Jordan also has a small Armenian population, and several small Shi'a and Druze populations can also be found.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁵ According to 2004 census.

²⁵⁶ Al-Rabay'eh, *al-Wihdat al-Qaribah: Osra wa 'Ashirah wa Qabilah, (al-Sukkan wa al-Hayah al-Ijtima'yyah)* [*The Close Unites: the Family, Clan and Tribe (Population and Social Life)*] (1991), p. 74

²⁵⁷ Haddad, Culture and State in Jordan: Religious Freedom and Citizenship, *Ecumenical Review*, Vol. 50. October, 1998.

²⁵⁸ See more details on <http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/people.html>

3.5.3.2 Social Structure in Jordanian Society

The social structure in Jordan is affected by historical lifestyles, where the vast majority of Jordanian society remains attracted to the social patterns of the nomadic life, especially in the social relations among members of the family, or between people in general. Therefore, Jordanian society is dominated by the culture of the Bedouin community, and the most important characteristic of the Jordanian family is the continuation of the basic patterns of tribal relations in the organization of the family and its relationships.

Jordanian society is a patriarchal society, where power is concentrated in the father's hands, and he is responsible for the maintenance and supervision of the affairs of his family. In addition, the social structure is based on the ramification of patrilineal ties among men. As in other Arab societies, Jordanian society includes two major elements in its social structure: the family and the tribe.

3.5.3.2.1 The Family

Jordanian society has two types of families: the large extended family and the small nuclear family. The traditional Jordanian family is a parental and extended family consisting of husband, wife and their children; male and female married and unmarried and other relatives such as uncles, nephews or cousins, grandfathers and grandmothers. All of the family members reside in the same housing and constitute an economic, social, and political unite.

Furthermore, the absolute and inherent power in the family is concentrated in the father's hands, as he is at the top of the pyramid of authority. He makes important decisions, supervises the distribution of work among the members of his family within certain criteria based on gender, age and social status. This authority demands the absolute obedience, submission and loyalty by all the family members.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁹ Al-Rabaye'h and Hamoudeh, *al-Sukkan wa al-Hayah al-Ijtima'yyah*, [*Population and the Social Life*], (1991), pp. 51-52.

The Jordanian family has been exposed to many changes in size, structure, and social relations between its members, and there is a continuing shift from the pattern of the extended family to the nuclear family pattern. This has resulted from several factors such as migration, whether from the countryside to the city or abroad, increasing the demand for education for both males and females. Urbanization has led to a greater independence of children from their extended families in forming their own nuclear families. In addition greater diversity in the forms of economic activities has led to greater social mobility for individuals, who may not need to rely on their extended families to meet their basic needs.²⁶⁰

Moreover, the authority of the father over family members is moving toward democracy and children now enjoy some freedom and independence in discussing some family and social matters. More importantly, marriage patterns have undergone profound changes. It is no longer a family affair determined and planned by the family, as was traditional, but has become a matter for the individual parties. In other words, there is a new direction towards marriage from outside the lines of kinship to which the person belongs.²⁶¹

Although the family has faced a number of challenges, it still plays a prominent role in education and in the socialisation of its members. Moreover, in a society where family and tribal roots are highly valued, the family remains a vital means of preserving and transmitting social and cultural values, including those concerning religion and social heritage. Despite the changes from the extended family to the nuclear family, the Jordanian family still maintains strong familial, clan, and tribal ties, particularly in the economic, social and political fields.²⁶²

3.5.3.2.2 The Tribe

The tribe system is a social unit and an extension of the family. It links a group of individuals and descendants of the 10th grandfather who is said to have founded the tribe. The tribe usually inhabits certain territories, speaks one language and has among

²⁶⁰ Al-Khatybeh and Bani Nasor (2005), pp. 124-125.

²⁶¹ Al-Rabaye'h and Hamoudeh (1991), p-p. 61-62.

²⁶² Khazaleh, *Muqaddimah li Dirasat al-Mujtama' al-Urduni*, [An Introduction to the Study of Jordanian Society]_(1999), pp. 78-79.

its members a common culture. This participation among tribal members in one location, language and culture facilitates social interaction and creates a sense of belonging to one community dominated by the manifestations of friendship, cooperation, and social cohesion.²⁶³

Each tribe has a leader (*sheikh*) who represents his tribe and supervises the tribe's political, economic, and social affairs. The sheikh can be selected in several ways; often genetically moving from father to son or brother. In addition, the sheikh might be another close relative, the most experienced member or one who has special features such as strength, wealth, or a reputation for his ability to inherit the title of sheikh.

The tribal system in Jordan has had to confront great social, economic, and political challenge such as the greater government presence in welfare provisions, and the migration of people from rural to urban areas. However, the tribe still has an important role in the life and behaviour of individuals and continues to play a crucial role in forming identities. Moreover, the Jordanian monarchy bases its political legitimacy on tribal connections.

3.5.3.3 The Structure of Jordanian Society and its Diversity

Jordan historically has been, and is still, influenced by the multi-rooted nature of the population in terms of national, ethnic, religious and cultural dimensions. Until 1948 Jordanian society consisted of two main segments: the rural segment which were mainly dependent on agriculture; and the Badiyah segment mainly dependent on grazing and moving in search of water and food. In both segments the basic social unit was the tribe. This is in addition to a number of towns and small cities such as Amman, Irbid, Al-Salat, and Al-Karak which included different urban agglomerations and proportions of Chechens, Circassians, Syrians, and Palestinians.²⁶⁴

Following the establishment in 1948 of the state of Israel and the Arab-Israeli War, and after the annexation of the West Bank by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,

²⁶³ Al-Khatybeh and Bani Nador (2005), pp. 135-136.

²⁶⁴ Nusairat, *al-Shakhsiyyah al-Urduniyyah Bayn al- Bu'd al- Watani Wa al-Bu'd al-Qawmi*, [The Jordanian Character Between the Native and National Dimensions] (2002), pp. 33-34.

Jordanian society changed dramatically in 1950 when the population doubled to one million due to the immigration of Palestinians. Moreover, not only were the external and internal policies of Jordan radically affected by these events, but the country became one with a bilateral identity; both Jordanian and Palestinian.

This development led the political system to become more democratic, and the most important manifestations of this were the modern constitution of 1952, a law regulating political parties introduced in 1953, and the emergence of new political parties representing leftist, nationalist, and religious tendencies, in addition to the election of eight representative councils between 1950 and 1967.

After the 1967 war, Jordanian society was deeply affected by the stressful relationship between the state and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). In the 1970s the emergence and devote of Palestinian identity at the Jordanian arena that was regarded as a considerable challenge to the Jordanian political system. These events reflected not only on the PLO's relationship with the state but also on the relationship between the state and Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin.²⁶⁵ Therefore conflicting identities led to political instability in Jordan and the resulting conflict led to dissolution of parliament and resort to martial law. Civil society institutions were paralyzed and prosecuted and the movements of their leaders restricted.

Consequently, these developments raised several issues; firstly, the electoral constituencies' weight with the population density from Palestinian origin compared with the constituencies that enjoy a majority of citizens of Jordanian origin. Secondly, the possibility of enacting a fair electoral system which achieves equality between citizens on the basis of percentage of population.²⁶⁶

In addition to the bilateral Palestinian-Jordanian national identity, Jordanian society is deeply pluralist and diverse in terms of its ethnic, religious, and cultural conditions. This pluralism required translation into a democratic system. This raises important issues about the need to adopt quotas for some ethnic minorities such as Circassians

²⁶⁵ Al-Hourani, al-Tajrubah al-Demoqratiyyah fi al-Urdun bayn al-Tatallu'at wa al-Mu'awwiqat, [the Democratic Experiment in Jordan between Aspirations and Constraints] in *Impediment to Democratic Transformation in the Arab world* (1997), p. 208

²⁶⁶ Al-Hourani (1997), p. 211

and Chechens, and religious minorities such as Christians, and cultural groups such as the Bedouins.

At the same time Jordanian society has a very young population and high levels of education and higher education. These advantages raise many questions. The most important of these is the contradiction between a modern social infrastructure and the old laws and regulations. This is reflected in the increase in the number of civil society organizations and the diversity of their activities, which may conflict with laws restricting their activities and the governmental control mechanisms in their work.²⁶⁷

3.5.4 The Concept and Reality of Political Culture in Jordan

Democracy is a political system based on human rights and the devolution of power. Without doubt these features are totally inconsistent with the rule of the individual which is reflected in the absence of a state of law and institutions, a lack of respect for the opinion, and lack of democratic human rights such as freedom of association, parties and freedom of movement. Therefore, democracy is not a set of regulations and laws, but it is a practice and a behaviour that must be with the person since childhood in the home, school, street, party and other civil institutions.

The political culture is considered to be an indicator of the progress of political and democratic life and a reflection of political maturity, and participation in the political process. The first step in building democratic governance in Jordan requires changes in the nature of the prevailing political culture in society, in addition to removal of the values and behavioural patterns that interfere with building democracy.

In order to be able to achieve these changes requires determining what the prevailing cultural stereotypes, and what is the reason for its existence. Therefore, the following sections shed light on the prevailing culture in Jordanian society and its values and behaviour patterns that affect political life.

²⁶⁷ Al-Hourani (1997), pp. 211-212

3.5.4.1 The Cultural Awareness of Jordanian Citizens

The first step in building an effective civil society is to raise awareness among people, so as to educate them about their rights. For that reason, some argue that the Jordanian citizen enjoys advanced political awareness and abroad political culture due to the rise in the proportion of education in Jordan, and the proliferation of schools, institutes, and universities, in addition to the margin of freedoms available and the stable social and political environment. On the other hand, others argue that the objective indicators do not support that viewpoint stressing instead that the political culture of the Jordanian citizen in general is shallow.

Khalid Suleiman argues that the Jordanian citizen does not have a mature political awareness. He provides many examples to prove his argument. For example 26 parties out of 34 were recognized by no more than 5% of respondents in an opinion poll conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan. Suleiman added that 82.3% of total respondents opposed the idea of amending the current electoral law (SNTV), although there is near unanimity of politicians and observers dissatisfied with this law as it does not facilitates the participation of many political parties, representing a broad spectrum of interests and a variety of views.

3.5.4.2 Culture of Doubt Towards the Jordanian Governments

Jordanian citizens do not exhibit much confidence in governments, on the contrary tending to doubt, fear, and mistrust of government. Jamil Abu Bakr, Assistant Secretary-General of the Islamic Action Front stated in 2002 in live dialogue that there are many actions carried out by successive governments to marginalize the citizens' right to manage their own communities and their role in politics and other public decision making processes. That the government's acts against civil institutions were confirmed by the number of temporary laws that had reached more than one hundred in number during a one-year period. Moreover, many of these laws were aimed at important political and social forces such as political parties, student unions, and professional associations. He concluded that there is no doubt that these acts increased

4.10 Conclusion

As a result of a long period in which the political parties were banned for about 30 years³⁹⁴, the tribes were the most prominent political organizations and played the most decisive role in the formation of the new state. Accordingly, the state dealt with the society through the tribes as the most important channel for people to contact the authorities, offer services and to help them to solve their problems. In addition, the state supported the tribes' role in becoming the pillars of society and did not allow other institutions such as political parties to play the same role, instead keeping them outside of the political development process.

Regarding the participation of the Islamic movements, despite the strong presence of the *Ikhwan* in Jordanian elections, most of their candidates and even the IAF leaders still had to get support from their tribes. One of the things that drew attention in those elections was the number of partisan candidates who denied their partisanship and declared their tribal loyalty in order to gain a seat in parliament. This perhaps explains the resort of several parties to keeping their lists secret or undeclared and believing in the wisdom of the saying, 'The tribe's sword is sharper in the elections than the swords of political parties'.

Some of the partisan candidates interpreted their failure to declare lists of candidates as electoral tactics. In some cases candidates in tribal regions could not announce that they belonged to particular parties, because that would affect their electoral chances. Even for the candidates for quota seats in the 2003 Parliamentary elections, tribal support had a major say in the voting process and five of the winner were fielded as tribal candidates.³⁹⁵

³⁹⁴ Since the early 1960s until 1992.

³⁹⁵ Sabbagh (2004).

CHAPTER FIVE

Parties and Political Participation in Jordan

5.1 Introduction

A political party is an association created to enable citizens to participate in the political life of society by shaping and expressing their political will, participating in public and political events, gaining political power within a government, and also for representing the interests of citizens in the bodies both of state power and local government. Article 3 of the current Jordanian Political Parties Law defines a political party as follows “every political organization which is formed by a group of Jordanians in accordance with the Constitution and the provisions of the Law, for the purpose of participating in political life and achieving specific goals concerning political, economic and social affairs, which works through legitimate and peaceful means”.³⁹⁶

In almost all contemporary democratic systems, political parties are considered to be the fundamental mechanism for political participation (*Musharkah*), political pluralism (*Ta'addudiyya*), the rotation of power, and the creation of political elites. Moreover, political parties are considered vital for democracy to be stable and effective. On the other hand political parties have been organized to advance their own social and economic interests in the society and to support particular political figures. Therefore, the number, nature and constellation of political parties differ from one state to another and from one phase to another.

Political parties in Jordan date back to the establishment of the state in 1921. They have gone through various experiences, phases of growth and turning points reflected also in the country's social structure and the conditions at the domestic, regional, and international levels. Accordingly, the experience of political parties in Jordan can be divided into four phases:

³⁹⁶ Political Parties' Law Number 32 for the Year 1992.

- The first phase from 1921–1950, Traditional parties (discussed in chapter two).
- The second phase from 1950–1967, Ideological parties (discussed in chapter two).
- The third phase from 1967–1989, The Martial Law Period (discussed in chapter two).
- The fourth phase from 1989–2003, The Initiation of Political Liberalization.

5.2 The Initiation of Political Liberalization: 1989- 2007

Economics has played an important role in the transition to democracy. Quintan Wiktorowicz stated that, “Most explanations of democratic reform in the Middle East link the process of political change to economic crises”.³⁹⁷ At the end of the 1980s, Jordan’s government opened its political system in the face of the repeated popular demands for political and democratic life, and as a result of other socio-economic and political changes. During the 1980s and 1990s Jordan (like other Arab countries such as Egypt, Morocco, and Algeria), lived beyond its means and the economy was eroded by an accumulation of high levels of foreign debt and inflation, which increased poverty and unemployment.³⁹⁸ These economic difficulties affected the country’s ability to provide for basic needs goods and services and undermined what had become an accepted political right to economic security.³⁹⁹

Consequently, the government began impressive efforts to implement economic reforms under World Bank supervision, which led to price increases in fuel leading to a popular uprising that erupted in Ma’an city in southern Jordan. A significant feature of these riots comes from the special importance of this city, because it has been one of the main tribal supports for the monarchy, and any disturbances in regime-tribal

³⁹⁷ Wiktorowicz, Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Oct., 2000), pp.43 -61.

³⁹⁸ Wiktorowicz (2000), p. 44

³⁹⁹ Farson, Class Structure and social Change in the Arab World: 1995, in Sharabi, Hisham (ed), *The Next Arab Decade : Alternative Futures* (1988), p. 231.

relations, in a country where the Palestinian population comprises approximately 50% of the population could lead to completely uncontrollable problems.⁴⁰⁰

In this context, community leaders from Al-Karak city submitted demands for the resignation of Zaid al-Rifa'i's government, changes to electoral law, and for democratization to be given a greater chance of implementation by granting broad civil liberties and freedom of political participation. These demands were endorsed by several cities, villages and professional organizations, and the demands were expanded to include the termination of martial law as the first step in political reform.⁴⁰¹

All of these events coupled with the climate of the first Palestinian uprising (*Intifada*) of 1987 just across the Jordanian river in the West Bank which embarked the region Palestinians, Jordanians, Arabs, and Israelis on a new phase of the Palestinian issue.⁴⁰² In addition to the disengagement from the West Bank on July 31, 1988 severed the legal and administrative ties between the two banks of Jordan.⁴⁰³ The disengagement resolution came as a response to the Arab Rabat Summit that called for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State under the leadership of the PLO.⁴⁰⁴

From 1967-1988 Jordan had not been able to hold any parliamentary elections while a major portion of its territory had been seized and was under Israeli occupation. However, the disengagement decision made it possible for Jordan to return to a full parliamentary life and for the democratic process to start, since a major barrier to the holding of general parliamentary elections had disappeared.

In response to these severe internal and regional crises, the monarchy took important steps toward political liberalization in order to ensure its political survival, strengthen the regime, gain public support, and control the possibility of unmanageable changes.

⁴⁰⁰ Richani, *Political Parties, Justice Systems and the Poor: the Experience of the Arab States*, Human Development Report 2002

⁴⁰¹ Andoni, *the Five Days that Shook Jordan*, *Middle East International*, April 28, 1989, pp. 3-4.

⁴⁰² Al-khazendar (1997), pp. 57-58

⁴⁰³ Robins, *Shedding Half a Kingdom: Jordan's Dismantling of ties with the West Bank*, *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 16, No.2, 1989, p. 162.

⁴⁰⁴ Address by His Majesty King Hussein I to the Nation, July 31, 1988 in *American Society of International Law*, Washington, D. C., Vol. 27, No. 6, November, 1988. online: http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/speeches_letters.html

These series of pre-emptive measures have been termed by Glenn E. Robinson a 'defensive democratization'⁴⁰⁵, and described by other scholars as 'controlled pluralism', 'Managed liberalization', and 'Façade democracy' to explain that the impact on democratic change in Jordan has been limited for the stability of the regime surrounded by regional and economic challenges.⁴⁰⁶

Political reform in that period was seen as a bargaining tool for the regime to outlast the strike period, and the regime refused to use force to quell the rioting. Moreover, by adopting reforms that would allow some political participation through general parliamentary elections, the regime wished to turn the tide of public criticism away from the head of the state to the legislative body. Kamel Abu Jabir⁴⁰⁷ stated in the New York Times on October 26, 1989, that "the King has come to the conclusion that he cannot control the country in the way he did in the 1960s and 1970s..... if he wants to maintain the continuity of the regime, he must share power with the people".⁴⁰⁸

5.2.1 The Parties' Participation in the 1989 Elections

On November 8, 1989, Jordanian voters went to the polls in the first general elections in twenty-two years. Their fairness was acknowledged by international observers, domestic monitors and by both winners and losers alike. Although political parties were still illegal, party members were allowed to stand in the elections although not on a party platform.

⁴⁰⁵ Robinson, Defensive Democratization in Jordan, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 30, No 3, (August 1998), pp 387-410.

⁴⁰⁶ Timothy, *Islam and Democracy in Jordan: the Limits of Political Inclusion*, in *Islam, Democracy and the Secularist State in the Post-Modern Area* (Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, Second Annual Conference in Georgetown University, Saturday, April 7, 2001), p. 12

⁴⁰⁷ served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Jordan

⁴⁰⁸ In Amawi, Abla, *Democracy Dilemmas in Jordan*, Middle East Report, No. 174, Democracy in the Arab World. (Jan.-Feb., 1992)pp. 26-29

5.2.1.1 Candidates' Platforms in the 1989 Elections

The 647 candidates⁴⁰⁹ registered to contest the 1989 elections can be categorized in three major groups. The main political tendencies which actively participated in the elections were: the Islamists' representing the influential Muslim Brotherhood as well as Islamic independents⁴¹⁰; and leftist and pan-Arab nationalists such as those affiliated to the Jordanian Communist Party (*al-Hizb al-Shiyu'i al-Urduni*), the Jordanian People's Democratic Party (*Hizb al-Sha'b al-Dimuqrati al-Urduni, Hashd*), and other independent leftists.⁴¹¹ Loyalist politicians, ex-ministers and tribal leaders formed a third or centrist trend.⁴¹²

Generally, in spite of the different platforms of the 1989 elections candidates, their campaigns concentrated on the same issues relating to political reform, political party legislation, the release of political prisoners, and economic issues such as unemployment and increases in prices. The 1989 elections were held under a multi-vote system, in which voters could cast a number of votes equal to the number of seats designated in their districts, which gave voters the chance to cast ballots both tribally and politically affiliated candidates. The result was that Islamists won 40% of the 80 parliamentary seats, as shown in table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Distribution of Seats in the 1989 Election, by Political Affiliation

Political Affiliation	No of seats
Muslim Brotherhood	22
Islamist (Independent)	12
Nationalist	8
leftist	4
Communist	1
Centrist	33
Total	80

Source: Jordan times, 9-11 November, 1989.

⁴⁰⁹ Robins (2004), p. 56

⁴¹⁰ Timothy, Parliament, Politics, and Pluralism in Jordan: Democratic Trends at a Difficult Time, *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 1, Part 8, 1992, p. 40.

⁴¹¹ Andoni (1989), p. 9

⁴¹² Andoni (1989), p. 10

5.2.2 The Parties' Participation in the 1993 Elections

The second landmark in the fourth phase of party life in Jordan was the 1991 National Charter (NC) (*al-Mithaq al-Watani*). This was a key element in the process of political reform, which laid the foundation for political pluralism in Jordan. Chapter two of the NC outlines the guidelines for the legitimizing of political parties' activities in Jordan, opening the way for multi-party competition in the next parliamentary elections.⁴¹³ Accordingly, on August 31, 1992, the Political Parties' Law No. 32 was issued by Royal Decree to replace the 1955 law. Party activities were allowed, and by June 2003 there were 31 licensed parties in Jordan, as table 5.2 shows.

⁴¹³ Text of the National Charter at <http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/charter-national.html>

Table 5.2: Jordanian Political Parties, 1989–2003

	Name of Party	Year of formation
1	Jordanian Arab Baath Socialist Party	1993
2	Jordanian Communist Party	1993
3	Islamic Action Front	1992
4	Jordanian People's Democratic Party	1993
5	Future Party	1992
6	Jordanian Popular Democratic Unity Party	1993
7	Progressive Party	1993
8	Arab Baath Progressive Party	1993
9	Arab Islamic Democratic Movement	1993
10	National Action Party	1994
11	Jordanian Constitutional Front	1994
12	Freedom Party (Hizb al-Ahrar)	1994
13	Jordanian Democratic Left Party	1995
14	Jordanian Arab Ansar Party	1995
15	Jordanian Peace Party	1996
16	Nation Party	1996
17	Arab Land Party	1996
18	National Constitutional Party	1997
19	National Popular Democratic Movement	1997
20	Jordanian Labour Party	1998
21	Jordanian Generations Party	1999
22	Jordanian Arab New Dawn Party	1999
23	Jordanian Renaissance Party	1999
24	Jordanian Green Party	2000
25	Jordanian Citizens' Rights Movement	2000
26	Jordanian Communist Workers Party	2001
27	Jordanian People's Committees Movement	2001
28	Jordanian Rafah Party	2001
39	Islamic Center Party	2001
30	Jordanian Arab Party	2002
31	Mission Party	2002

Source: Majid (ed.), *Building Democracy in Jordan*, (2005), p. 78

5.2.2.1 Candidates' Platforms in 1993 Elections

5.2.2.1.1 The platform of the Muslim Brotherhood (Islamic Action Front IAF)

The Muslim Brotherhood had been established in order to liberate the Islamic world from foreign domination and to apply the Islamic *Sharia*. The MB goal, as stated by Brotherhood founder, Hassan al-Banna was to reclaim Islam's manifest destiny. He stated in his message to the fifth Conference of the Muslim Brethren in Cairo, 1938 that "Some people think of us as a group of preachers, concerned only to call people to practice virtues and abstain from sins. Others believe it is a mystical trend. We are not any of these. We call to return to true Islam, which is a belief and an application, a home and a nationality, a religion and a state, a spirit and a body, and a Quran and a sword."⁴¹⁴

The IAF the political arm of the MB was licensed on December 8, 1992. Its General Secretary is Zaki Bani Irshid. The most important objectives of this party as stated in its constitution are:

- Resuming Islamic life in the society and seeking to apply Islamic law (Sharia) in various fields of life.
- Contributing in building the nation morally and materially, and preparing the nation for Jihad (armed conflict) against Zionist and Imperialist enemies.
- Seeking to achieve the national unity, and resistance to the colonial and foreign influence.
- Consolidating the national unity among citizens, and consolidating the principle of *shura*, and combating ethnic, tribal, regional, sectarian conflicts that threaten the national unity.
- Fighting political, administrative and financial corruption in the state.
- Establishing the Jordanian economy on Islamic principles, which ensures social justice, respect individual property, and fighting corruption, poverty and unemployment.

⁴¹⁴ Al-khazendar (1997), p.136.

- Supporting the Palestinian issue, and fighting to liberate the whole of Palestine.
- Supporting women role in the development of society and allow them to participate in public life. ⁴¹⁵

5.2.2.1.2 The Leftists' and Nationalists' Platform

The leftists' and Arab Nationalists' platform generally concentrated on issues of fair distribution of wealth, Arab solidarity and social justice. The parties of the left share certain values, beliefs, and doctrines that shape their attitudes towards the Jordanian Government's domestic and foreign policies. This ideology provides these parties a guide for political activity and a socio-political programme. The most influential parties to be considered are the Ba'ath party with two divisions: one pro-Iraq (the Jordanian Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party), the other pro-Syria (The Arab Ba'ath Progressive Party); and the Jordanian Communist Party.

5.2.2.1.2.1 Jordanian Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party (JABSP)

The JABSP was founded on January 18, 1993, it is an Arab nationalist party with a socialist ideology. The main party principles and orientations is to achieve the Arab unity within the framework of a social economic system which secures justice and benefits the Arab nation and humanity as a whole. Moreover, the party beliefs that Arabs were one nation and that their existing political boundaries were artificial and inconsistent with the cultural boundaries.⁴¹⁶ The JABSP spokesman summarised the main aims and objectives of the party as the following:

- “1. Arab nationalism is a firm reality and the relationship between the individual and Arab nation is sacred, and requires sacrifice and responsibility.
2. The authority of the state derives from the people, and the people are the source of power.
3. The party aims to enhance equality of rights and duties among citizens, regardless of religion, colour or race.

⁴¹⁵ <http://www.jabha.net/body4.asp?field=doc&id=2>

⁴¹⁶ Al-khazendar (1997), p.103

4. The party believes in popular struggle for reviving Arab nationalism and building an economic, socialist, humanitarian order which realises social justice and fair distribution of wealth.⁴¹⁷

5.2.2.1.2.2 The Arab Ba'ath Progressive Party (ABPP)

The party was licensed on April 13, 1993 and was formally close to the Syrian Ba'ath party. Similar to the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party, ABPP is a nationalist party struggle for:

- The supremacy and institutionalization of democracy prevalence of law and the constitution and the liberation of publics from exploitation and conducting political, economic reforms to serve the interests of the peoples.
- The party struggle for the Arab unity and the reflexion of the Arab peoples will and desire to live freely.
- The party believe that the sovereignty belong to the people who alone are the source of every authority and leadership, and that the state should represent the popular will.⁴¹⁸

5.2.2.1.2.3 The Jordanian Communist Party (JCP)

The main objective of this party is to unify the Arab peoples' struggle against conservatism and imperialism. The main aims and objectives of JCP can be summarized as the following:

- The consolidation of the country's political independence and the development of the Jordan economic independence.
- Realize the country's comprehensive and balanced progress through independent and balanced economic and social development to attain social justice.
- Raise and qualify society for building socialism as the most equitable system.

⁴¹⁷ Al-Sharah 1997, p. 262.

⁴¹⁸ <http://www.arabdecision.org/show>

- Defend the interests of masses, voicing their inspirations and spreading consciousness within their ranks.
- Protecting and spreading democracy and political pluralism.⁴¹⁹

It is worth mentioning that this party was subjected to various kinds of restrictions and consequently operated under different names. Abidi stated, "The Government's attitude towards the Communist Party has been consistently uncompromising and intolerant ... The Anti-Communist Law prohibited publication, issue or circulation of Communist Literature. The Anti-Communist Law was based on the assumption that communism in Jordan aimed at replacing the existing Government in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan by the system prevalent in the communist countries".⁴²⁰ Furthermore, the JCP was the only opposition party which accepted UN Resolution 181, a resolution which laid the legal foundation for the creation of the state of Israel.⁴²¹

5.2.2.1.3 The Centrist Platform (Conservatives and traditionalist's)

Conservatives and nationalist parties represent the traditional support group for the Jordanian state. This political grouping almost by definition represents Eastern Jordanian nationalists. These parties consist of the tribal and bureaucratic forces (former officials and loyalist politicians) who mainly share ideals, visions and approaches to participate in setting up a national reform current that fulfils public aspirations and is based on the political system vision for political advancement. The most effective parties to be considered are the Jordanian National Alliance Party, and the National Constitutional Party.

5.2.2.1.3.1 The Jordanian National Alliance Party (JNAP)

JNAP was legally registered on December 1, 1992 immediately following the legalization of political parties in Jordan for the first time since the 1950s.⁴²² The Secretary General of this party is Mijhim al-Khraishah, a bedouin from the Bani

⁴¹⁹ <http://www.arabdecision.org/show>

⁴²⁰ Abidi 1965, p. 207.

⁴²¹ Al-Khazendar 1997, p. 103.

⁴²² Al-Sharah 1997, p. 258.

Sakhor tribe. The JNAP is a coalition of central and southern Bedouin tribes, with a pro-establishment alignment. The main objectives and principles of this party summarised by the Secretary General as the following:

- “1. Defending the integrity of Jordanian land, national sovereignty, the Jordanian identity, adhering to the Constitution, protecting the constitutional institutions including the Hashemite regime, and preserving Jordan’s security and stability.
2. Emphasising and consolidating unity, harmony and brotherhood among all classes of Jordanian citizens, respecting human rights, and a commitment to democratic methods and political pluralism.
3. Supporting the Jordanian Armed Forces and the Security Forces.
4. Supporting the Palestinian issue as a national and an Arab issue.
5. Respecting individual rights to ownership, work, freedom of opinion and expression, and giving care to the youth and protecting the rights of women.”⁴²³

5.2.2.1.3.2 The National Constitutional Party (NCP)

The National Constitutional Party formed in May 1997. Its president is Abdel Hadi al-Majali (Speaker of the Lower House of the Parliament). This party is a merger of nine pro-government centrist parties: the Jordanian National Gathering Party, Popular Unity Party, al-Ahd (Pledge) Party, Progress and Justice Party, al-Yaqatha (Reawakening) Party, United Arab Democratic Party (al-Watan (Homeland) Party, Jordanian Arab Popular Party, and Jordanian Popular Movement Party.

The main principles and orientations of this party as following:

- Stressing that national belonging is not restricted to any particular group , region or ethnicity.
- Jordan is an indivisible and inseparable part of the Arab nation and the Arab unity is a firmly established reality for the protection of the nation and the guarantee for its development.

⁴²³ Al-Sharah 1997, pp. 258-259.

- Underlining the fact that Islam is the religious of the majority of the Arab society, and the Sharia' is capable of assimilating new developments in human civilization.
- Democracy is the method and way of life that enable people to exercise their sovereignty and make the ruling power expressing their will and achieving their aspirations.
- Everybody is entitled to decent and free life and everybody has the right to enjoy sovereignty, independence, the right to self determination and the choice of the governing system.⁴²⁴

The 1993 elections took place in a different political and economic atmosphere in the Arab and wider worlds. At the international level, as a result of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States found itself the sole international leader declared the advent of a 'New World Order'. Consequently, America found itself engaged in multiple overseas military interventions, wars of liberation, and wars against terrorism that led to its intervention in the Gulf War.

As a consequence of the second Gulf War, about four hundred thousand Jordanian citizens who had been working in Gulf States returned to the country, which increased the unemployment in Jordan from 16.8 to 18.8 percent.⁴²⁵ Furthermore, the population of the country increased by 10%, and the number of registered voters increased after about 100,000 returnees registered to vote.⁴²⁶ Most of the returnees were businessmen, professionals, and technicians whose vote tended to be cast for liberal and moderate candidates.⁴²⁷

The New World Order also provided the United States of America with the basis to restart the Middle East peace process negotiations in Madrid culminating in the signing of the peace treaty between Palestinians and Israelis followed by the establishment of diplomatic negotiations for a peace treaty between Jordan and Israel.

⁴²⁴ <http://www.arabdecision.org/show>

⁴²⁵ Annual report, Ministry of Labour, 1991, p. 18

⁴²⁶ Amawi, the 1993 Elections in Jordan (1994).

⁴²⁷ Al-Sharah, Political liberalization in Jordan: A study of the Democratization Process 1989-1993, (1997), p278

The Jordanian opposition parties opposed this strongly. More importantly, the 1989 election results surprised the government, when the opposition parties together won some 60% of parliamentary seats.⁴²⁸ The government responded by changing the electoral law to a one-man one –vote formula in a multi-candidate district system that forced the voters to choose between the tribal affiliation and political candidates.⁴²⁹

Although the 1993 parliamentary elections were the first multi-party elections since 1956, the results saw the Islamists losing nearly half their seats while independent centrists won 50 of the 80 parliamentary seats,⁴³⁰ as table 5.3 shows.

Table 5.3: Distribution of Political Party Candidates and Representatives in the 1993 Elections

Political Party	Trend	No of candidates	No of representatives	Percentage
The Islamic Action Front	Islamist	36	22	27.5
Jordanian National Alliance Party	Centrist	8	3	3.75
Future Party	Centrist	4	3	3.75
Reawakening Party	Centrist	4	1	1.25
Jordanian Democratic Socialist Party	Leftist	3	1	1.25
Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party	Leftist	4	1	1.25
Jordanian people's Democratic Party	Leftist	4	1	1.25
Total		63	32	40

Source: *Dirassat fi al-Intikhabat al-Niyabiyah al-Urdunniyah 1997*, [Studies in the Jordanian Parliamentary Elections 1997], Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center (UJRC), (Amman: Dar Sindibad lil-Nashr, 2002)., pp. 167-168

⁴²⁸ Curtis and Schwedler, Return to Democratization or New Hybrid Regime?: The 2003 Elections in Jordan, *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 11, No. 2, Summer 2004, pp. 138-151

⁴²⁹ Schank, Is Jordan's Islamic Action Front Next?, Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies, September 2006. online

http://www.eicds.org/english/publications/civilsociety/06/september/is_jordan.htm

⁴³⁰ Russell, Deliberalization in Jordan, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 14, No. 1, (January 2003), pp. 137-144

5.3 The Electoral Law Amendments and Distribution of the Electoral Districts

After Jordan embarked on the gradual process of liberalization in 1989, when the regime started holding regular and periodic competitive elections, some level of pluralism and the emergence of opposition political parties and civil society groups was observed. However, since 1994, when Jordan signed the Jordan-Israel peace treaty, the regime has shown increasingly less tolerance of the level of pluralism that had spread across the country since 1989-1993.⁴³¹

Accordingly, as the electoral system has a powerful impact on the nature and structure of parliament, the government amended the electoral laws several times. In 1986, the House of Representatives Election Law no. 22, 1986 was issued, and this was amended four times in 1988, 1989, 1993 and 1997 to change the number of parliament seats or the criteria for eligibility to vote. However, the most important changes that affected election results were those to the electoral system itself, particularly concerning electoral district boundaries. Such amendments enabled the government to keep the parliamentary elections' results and the parliament councils under its control.

5.3.1 The Electoral Law Amendments

“The electoral system is considered to be one of the most important pillars of the democratic structure in any state”,⁴³² and the means by which the electors choose between candidates, thus enabling voters to reflect their views. Moreover, all electoral systems that claim to produce more representative systems, and therefore more democratic legislatures, and free expression and participation should respect certain fixed principles such as free and fair elections reflection of the level of democracy achieved.

The issue of electoral system has obviously been the subject of one of the most heated debates in Jordan since multi-party competition for elected legislatures was initiated

⁴³¹ Curtis and Schwedler (2004), pp. 138-139

⁴³² Majed (ed) (2005), p. 103

and the political parties have had limited access to the media and some degree of participation in parliamentary elections.

Accordingly, election law has undergone important changes and amendments that have affected significantly on the basic legislature functions of representation, lawmaking, and oversight, the essential elements and qualities of democratic governance. A wide range of questions have arisen concerning whether Jordanian election law serves the democratic process and encourages political party participation, or is instead used to support pro-government candidates. In other words these amendments have been designed as cosmetic window dressing for the benefit of government, or have they had a real impact on democratic life in Jordan?

The 1989 elections were significant because they were the first since the initiation of the liberalization process and, to date, the last conducted under the Block Vote electoral system (BVS). In this system voters could choose as many candidates as there were open seats to be filled within their district. Voters in the 1989 elections cast some votes for candidates with whom they had close relationships based largely on kinship or family ties, and others cast for Muslim Brotherhood candidates⁴³³.

Therefore, opposition voices won a clear majority in the 11th Jordanian parliament, as noted above in table 5.1. Accordingly the government discovered that the (BVS) gave advantages to opposition parties and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, as they were the most organized movement. For that reason election law was changed just months before the 1993 elections to a one-person one vote formula.

Unfortunately, the period between 1993 and 1997 elections witnessed a decline in political freedoms as a result of the major amendments that the government introduced to the press and publications Law.⁴³⁴ These amendments, accompanied by the IAF's poor showing in 1993, denied them to bloc the passage of the peace treaty with Israel.⁴³⁵ So, in the 1997 elections, eleven political parties headed by the IAF boycotted the elections on the basis that the law discriminated against political parties.

⁴³³ Reynolds et al., Jordan, in *Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook*, (Stockholm: International IDEA, 1997).

⁴³⁴ Curtis and Schwedler (2004), p. 142.

⁴³⁵ *Jordan Times*, Saturday, October 23, 1999, By Suha Ma'ayeh.

They demanded the redrafting of the Election, and Press and Publication laws and an end to normalization with Israel.⁴³⁶

5.3.1.1 Electoral District Boundaries Changes

In 1989 elections and according to article two of the provisional law No. 23 which amended the electoral law to redrawn the East Bank constituencies only as a result of disengagement from the West Bank. Jordan has been divided into twenty electoral districts, but the seats were not allocated proportionally.

The major Jordanian governorates in the 1989 elections were: Amman, with an estimated population of 1,207,838 comprising 40.5% of Jordan's population; Zarqa with 494,680 and Irbid with 414,769.⁴³⁷ These cities had an urban population of around 2,117,187 accounting 63% of the total population. These governorates received only 36 seats about (45%) out of the total of 80 parliamentary seats. The capital city Amman was divided into six districts, and the number of registered voters in the second district of Amman was 73,435. However, they received only three seats, while Tafieleh district, with 21,908 registered voters obtained the same number of seats, and Ma'an district with 27,981 registered voters received five seats.

In the 2003 Parliamentary election, the number of registered voters in the second district of Amman was 209,025, receiving the same number of seats as in the 1989 elections, while Ma'an district with 32,822 registered voters received four seats (see table 5.4). At the same time when the government increased the number of seats for the 2003 election from 80 to 110 seats, the new seats were concentrated in districts where support for the regime was strong, as the table 5.4 shows. So Amman, for example, has roughly one parliament member for each 40,286 voters, while the district of Karak has a member for each 12,217 voters.

The distribution of seats in terms of the ratio of candidates to the population depends on two major factors. Firstly, the Palestinian factor is used as a proxy for the distribution of the seat district. As a large proportion of refugees and Jordanians of

⁴³⁶ *Jordan Times*. newspaper October 23, 1999.

⁴³⁷ Khazaileh (1996), pp. 94-95

Palestinian origin are concentrated in the urban constituencies,⁴³⁸ therefore the percentage of candidates of Palestinian origin in these districts is high. For example, in the 1997 elections in the second district of Amman, 11 candidates out of 15 (73%) were Palestinian in origin, and in the first district 12 out of the 19 (63%) are Palestinian in origin. In Karak, 3 of 40 candidates (7, 5%) were Palestinian in origin, with about 6% in al-Tafielah.⁴³⁹

Table 5.4: Parliamentary Seats Distribution in the 2003 Parliamentary Elections

Governorate	No of registered votes	No of districts	Muslim	Seats for Circassian	Seats for Christian	Total
Amman	926,575	7	20	2	1	23
Irbid	516,975	9	15	0	1	16
Balqa	201,935	4	8	0	2	10
Karak	122,164	6	8	0	2	10
Ma'an	32,822	3	4	0	0	4
Zarqa	375,378	4	8	1	1	10
Mafrq	75,050	1	4	0	0	4
Tafieleh	41,953	2	4	0	0	4
Madaba	72,476	2	3	0	1	4
Jerash	72,500	1	4	0	0	4
Ajloun	72,658	2	3	0	1	4
Aqaba	30,279	1	2	0	0	2
North Badiyah	45,494	1	3	0	0	3
Central Badiyah	32,458	1	3	0	0	3
South Badiyah	34,639	1	3	0	0	3
Seats for women		-	-	-	-	6
Total	2,843,483	45	92	3	9	110

Source: Hourani, Hani, et al, *Who is who in the Jordanian Parliament: 2003-2007*, (Amman, Sind bad Publishing House, 2004), p.195, p. 199.

⁴³⁸ Faisal, and Urbina, Jordan's Troubling Detour, *Los Angeles Times*, July 07, 2003 online: http://www.merip.org/newspaper_opeds/jor_oped070603.html

⁴³⁹ Hourani et al, *Who is who in the Jordanian Parliament: 1997-2001* (1998. p. 207

Secondly, the government concentrated the new seats in the districts where the regime's support was strong. Moreover, the government alleged that the system of distribution adopted was a device to enable the government to treat the demands from underprivileged areas of the country on an equal footing with those from more privileged areas. For example families living below the poverty line represented 39.5% of the total in Al-Karak governorate, and 39,3% in al-Mafraq governorate, while only 20.9% in Amman.⁴⁴⁰

5.3.2 The Parties' Participation in the 2003 Parliamentary Elections

The 2003 parliamentary elections were held on 17 June, 2003 after a 2-year cessation of parliamentary life⁴⁴¹, and were the third elections held after the issue of the Political Parties' Law. The 14th parliamentary elections occurred under the new election law that was issued by Royal Decree on July 22, 2001 as a response from the government to the Muslim Brotherhood's call for a repeal of the election law and a fundamental review of electoral districts. The changes that were adopted by the government were said to be just to simplify the voting and counting processes, but without any fundamental changes to the voting system or distribution of districts.⁴⁴² The controversial one-person one-vote formula was retained.

The rate of participation in the 2003 elections was 58.9%.⁴⁴³ Only ten of 31 existing political parties ran in the elections with a list of candidates numbering 75 who won 33 out of the 110 seats (30%) (see table 5.5). Independent candidates representing tribes, clans, ex-government, businessmen and retired military officers won the majority 84 of the seats.

⁴⁴⁰ Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan., (Washington, D.C), Domestic Politics and reform. at <http://www.jordanembassyus.org/new/aboutjordan/ph4.shtml>

⁴⁴¹ While parliament was suspended (between June 2001-June 2003)

⁴⁴² Choucair, Illusive Reform: Jordan's Stubborn Stability, Middle East Series, *Carnegie Endowment for international Peace*, No. 76 December 2006. p. 14.

⁴⁴³ Hourani , et al, *Who is who in the Jordanian Parliament: 2003-2007* (2004), p. 197

Table 5.5: Political Party Participation in the 2003 Elections

Political Party	No of candidates	No of seats	Percentage
Islamic Action Front	30	17	51.5%
National Constitutional Party	13	11	33.3%
Jordanian Democratic Leftist Party	4	2	6.1%
Islamic Moderate Party	9	2	6.1%
Popular Committee Movement Party	3	1	3.0%
Welfare Party	2	0	0
Communist Labour Party	1	0	0
Arab Land Party	1	0	0
Arab Party	1	0	0
Democratic National Movement	11	0	0
Total	75	33	100

Source: Hourani, et al, *Who is Who in the Jordanian Parliament: 2003-2007* (Amman, Sind bad Publishing House, 2004), p.115, p. 201

5.3.3 The New Political Parties' Law

Later the Jordan upper house of parliament has been approved the amendments of the long-awaited political parties' law that endorsed by the lower house of parliament on March 19, 2007. The new Political Parties Law amended article five of the 1992 Political Parties' Law, which stipulates that "The number of the founding members of any party shall not be less than fifty persons".⁴⁴⁴ According to the amendments, the number of founding members required for political parties increased from the current number of 50 up to 500 in order to receive an official license. Moreover, the founding members of the party should come from at least five governorates.⁴⁴⁵

In addition, the new draft law stipulates for the first time in the kingdom's history that the licensed parties will get funds from the government. However, the law requires parties to rely on known local sources, and it imposes government monitoring of their

⁴⁴⁴ Text of The Political Parties Law, Number 32 for the Year 1992, available at <http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/pol-parties.html>.

⁴⁴⁵ Text of The Political Parties Law, Number 19 for the Year 2007 available at http://www.pm.gov.jo/arabic/index.php?page_type=gov_paper&part=3&id=4821

accounts. Moreover, the new law transfers supervision of political party activities from the Ministry of Political Development to the Ministry of Interior, and according to this law political parties are able to set up partisan media outlets without prior permission but it has been kept under the jurisdiction of the interior ministry as set out in 1992 law.⁴⁴⁶

This draft has raised a heated debate concerning whether these changes will improve political participation in Jordan or are considered an obstacle to the political reform process. Some argue that, the amendments especially that related the increase in the number of the founding members required-which is the most controversial amendment- threaten the existence of two-thirds of the existing political parties in Jordan that are already weak, marginalized and struggling with low levels of popularity.

The Minister of Political Development stated that “this law is a crime against Jordan”⁴⁴⁷, because by such amendments few of the existing political parties would survive. As a result of these amendments many parties would leave the political arena without this being accompanied by the emergence of large parties, because none except the Muslim Brotherhood case would be able to meet the requirements of the law in the existing political climate.

On the other hand, some consider that the new draft of the Parties’ Law will encourage the existing parties to consolidate together to form large parties that might have a wider popular base. This might ultimately be a healthy development, particularly since many of the existing political parties lack a solid base of public support. Therefore, these amendments are said to be designed to make political parties more financially and politically viable. IAF secretary Zaki Bani Irshid replied to this argument, saying that “The government wants to enforce a merger in parties, but you cannot impose mergers, it has to happen by choice”.⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁶ Political Parties’ Law No. 19, 2007

⁴⁴⁷ Wardam, *The Law for Political Party Darwinism in Jordan*, *Jordan Watch*, Thursday, March 22, 2007. On <http://www.jordanwatch.net/archive/2007/3/181616.html>.

⁴⁴⁸ *Jordan Times*, Apr 12, 2007

Regarding the new draft, the Interior Ministry would have a considerable degree of control over political parties, which is seen as a negative step from their members' point of view towards political reform and democracy. The relationship between political parties and the state already suffers from a lack of trust. Deputy Abdullah Akaileh stated that "We have a very bad experience with the Ministry of Interior in handling opposition parties", and he noted that, "Jordanians are already shunning political parties for fear of prosecution".⁴⁴⁹ Deputy Zuhair Abu Ragheb stated that "The Ministry of Interior has a dark history in dealing with political parties. The law, as it is, would enhance people's belief that the government is not serious about political reform.....we should encourage people to take part in political life not discourage them".⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁹ Jordan Times, March 15, 2007

⁴⁵⁰ Jordan Times March 15, 2007

5.3.4 The Parties' Participation in the 2007 Parliamentary Elections

The most recent parliamentary elections in Jordan were held on 20 November, 2007. A total of 880 candidates, including 199 women (the highest participation of female candidacy the country has seen to date), competed for the lower house's 110 seats, six of which are designated for women under a quota system adopted in 2003.⁴⁵¹ The average turnout was 54%, slightly lower than at the elections of 2003 (58%). Approximately 2.4 million out of the 3.4 million eligible to vote registered for the elections, and the highest turnout was in the villages and Bedouin districts. The highest turnout was in Al Tafieleh with 82%, and the lowest in Amman with 32% (see table 5.6).⁴⁵²

Table 5.6: Percentages of Votes in Urban, Rural and Bedouin Constituencies

Percentages of Votes in Amman, Irbid and Zarqa in the 2007 elections		Percentages of Votes in rural and Bedouin Districts in the 2007 elections.	
District	% of total votes	District	% of total votes
Amman-1st district	35%	Ma'an	74%
Amman-2nd district	32%	Badu al-Shamal	79%
Zarqa	36%	Al-Karak	72%
Irbid-1st district	47%	Al-Tafilah	82%

Source: International Fact Newspaper available at

<http://www.factjo.com/fullnews.aspx?id=21>

Although Jordan's Interior Minister declared that the elections were free and fair, the Islamic Action Front stated that they were framed. According to their own impressions, the Islamic Action Front should have won 16 seats compared to the outcomes of the elections. IAF spokesman Jamil Abu Bakr called for a rerun of the poll in constituencies where, he said, fraud had occurred: "This is an electoral massacre... violations by far exceeded even the last elections... it will have harmful repercussions on the country's political progress. It will force us to reconsider our participation in future elections".⁴⁵³

⁴⁵¹ Ministry of Interior

⁴⁵² *Jordan Times*, Wednesday, November 21, 2007

⁴⁵³ <http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKL2171443520071121>

In term of the electoral campaigns in 2007 election, and as a result of the economic situation of the Jordanian citizen. Jordanians showed more interest in their daily affairs rather than being concerned with the thorny political files relating to the situation in the Middle East. Therefore, the economic issues dominated most candidates' campaigns, and the majority of candidates for the parliamentary elections preferred to campaign with slogans related to the daily lives of Jordanian citizen contrary to the past when the Palestinian issue and the liberation of the occupied Arab territories and Iraq was occupying large areas in the programmes of the candidates in Jordan. However, apathy, disillusionment, and lack of trust in the parliamentary council are rife among Jordan's 2.5 million eligible voters. One voter justified his decision for not participating in the 2007 election said "I'm not voting for anyone because they're all liars - Islamists and all the others ... They just want to grab seats in parliament and will forget about us and our needs."⁴⁵⁴

Moreover, the 2007 election results were a disappointment to politicians and the Jordanian political parties, since tribal and pro-government candidates strengthened their grip on Jordan's parliament, winning the vast majority of its 110 seats. Meanwhile, the political parties won only seven seats all won by the Islamic Action Front (IAF). The size of IAF presence in parliament however, was reduced from 17 seats previously.⁴⁵⁵ This means that most of the 2.4 million Jordanian voters cast their ballots along family and tribal lines.

However, the official results as follows: tribal candidates and candidates of conservative social forces achieved an important victory by winning a total of 96 parliamentary seats, while leftist and nationalist political parties (the Democratic Block and the National Democratic Current) failed to win any seats in the parliament.⁴⁵⁶ The IAF won 7 seats⁴⁵⁷. While women's seats rose to a record of seven, six of them winning under the quota system, as table 5.7 shows. Compared to the elections of 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2003 there was a clear decline in the representation of the IAF and the leftist and nationalist parties.

⁴⁵⁴ BBC News "Jordan holds parliamentary vote", 20 November, 2007. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7102974.stm

⁴⁵⁵ *Jordan Times*, Wednesday, November 21, 2007

⁴⁵⁶ http://www.europeanforum.net/country/jordan_update

⁴⁵⁷ <http://www.islamonline.net>

Table 5.7 Distribution of Seats in the 15th Parliament, 2007

	% of votes	Number of seats
Islamist	5.5%	7
Leftists and Nationalists political parties	0%	0
Independents and Tribal representatives	89%	96
Women	5.5%	7
Total	100%	110

Source: Jordan Embassy to the U.S

5.4 Conclusion

Generally, the importance and distinctiveness of political parties spring from their useful role in political life, whether through transmission of the needs preferences of the public to the government when they participate in government formation, or by playing an effective role in drawing up government policies that bolster the democratic structure of civil society. In Jordan's case, although political parties have existed since the establishment of the country as discussed earlier, they still have a limited impact in political life. There are several reasons for this, some of which are related to the legal environment and social factors and some to the parties themselves.

The legal environment that has surrounded the political parties can be described as more of an impediment than a help to party work. Since the establishment of the Emirate of TJ until the mid-1950s when all political parties were banned until the late 1980s parties worked under laws that determined how they could demonstrate, set out, and carry out their functions and pursue their activities. In such a legal environment the parties were not able to articulate political objectives. In addition, the law had a negative impact on their ideological performance and on their relationship with both society and the state.

In terms of the relationship between political parties and society, the successive governments designed their policy to deal directly with populace and to listen to its concerns and problems through the tribes, who have been the most important channel for people to contact the authorities, be offered services and in helping them to solve their problems. Meanwhile, society itself has also preferred dealing directly with the state. These policies led to the absence directly dealing with the political parties and weakened the communication between society and political parties. In addition, the parties themselves failed to build a credible alternative to the tribes.

CHAPTER SIX

METHODOLOGY

6.1 Introduction

Research methods concern the methods of used to collect information. Direct or indirect contact is made with the subjects of the study such as (individuals, organizations, communities) by using systematic methods of measurement such as questionnaires and interviews. Methodology is concerned with: what data the researcher collects, how often that data gets collected, why these data are collected where they are collected, and how did it is analysed.⁴⁵⁸ Johnson defined methodology as referring to “the practices and techniques used to gather, process, manipulate, and interpret information that can then be used to test ideas and theories about social life”.⁴⁵⁹

Therefore, the researcher in any study will be unable to draw conclusions or comparisons unless he has adequately designed the study to answer the research questions. Oppenheim stated that “research design is concerned with making our problem researchable by setting up our study in a way that will produce specific answers to specific questions. Good research design should, above all, make it possible for us to draw valid inferences from our data in terms of generalization, association and causality”.⁴⁶⁰

Moreover, the methodology adopted in any study must be properly structured, and highlight the proposed objectives of the study. Frankfort & Nachmias stated that “research design is the program that guides the investigator as he or she collects, analyzes, and interprets observations. It is a logical model of proof that allows the

⁴⁵⁸ Collis and Hussey, *Business Research: A Practical Guide for Undergraduate and Postgraduate Students* (2003), p. 55

⁴⁵⁹ Johnson, *The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology, A user's guide to sociological language* (2000), p. 192.

⁴⁶⁰ Oppenheim, *Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude Measurement* (1992), pp. 81-82

researcher to draw inferences concerning causal relations among the variables under investigation”.⁴⁶¹

6.2 Research Methodology

As tools and instruments used by researchers to collect and investigate data, method can be classified in several ways based upon different criteria. For example there are two main sources of data, primary and secondary, based upon status of evidence classifies research as historical, descriptive, and experimental. Olayan in *Scientific Research: Its Basics, Methods and Procedures* classified research into four categories: (1) Experimental studies to evaluate interventions; (2) Historical studies; (3) Descriptive Studies; and (4) developmental studies⁴⁶². Based upon the type of data collected research is classified as qualitative research relies on qualitative data and quantitative research relies on quantitative data. In social sciences there are two main types of research orientations: the quantitative approach focuses on testing theories and correlations, and the qualitative approach focuses on generating data⁴⁶³.

Accordingly, there are different types of data collection methods that can be used in any study, and each has its advantages and disadvantages, strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, the researcher must choose methods in light of particular factors such as the questions involved and the nature of the study. Brannen states that “where the research issue is clearly defined and the questions put to respondents require unambiguous answers, quantitative methods such as a questionnaire may be appropriate, By contrast, where the research issue is less clear-cut and the questions to respondents are likely to result in complex, discursive replies, qualitative technique such as in-depth interviewing may be called for”.⁴⁶⁴ Table 6.1 shows a comparison between qualitative and quantitative methods.

⁴⁶¹ Frankfort, and Nachmias, *Research Method in Social Science* (5th edition), (1996), p. 98

⁴⁶² Olayan .R. M., *Scientific Research: Its Basics, Methods and Procedures* (2001), p. 41

⁴⁶³ Miller and Brewer, *The A-Z of Social Research* (2003), p. 192.

⁴⁶⁴ Brannen, *Mixing Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Research* (c1992), p. 5.

Table 6.1: A Brief Comparison of Qualitative and Quantitative Methods

Focus of Research	Qualitative	Quantitative
Key Concepts	Quality (nature, essence)	Quantity (how much, how many)
Sampling	Meaning, understanding, description	Statistical relationships, prediction control, description, hypothesis testing
Date	Non-representative, small, purposeful	Large, random, representative, stratified
Methods	Field notes, people's own words	Measures, counts, numbers
Instruments	Observations, interviews, reviewing documents	Experiments, surveys, instruments
Data Analysis	Researcher, tape recorder, camera, computer	Inventories, questionnaires
Findings	Ongoing, inductive (by researcher)	Deductive (by statistical analysis)
Advantages	Comprehensive, holistic, richly descriptive	Precise, numerical
	Flexibility, emphasis on understanding large groups, hard-to-explain anomalies	Controlling intervening variables, oversimplification

Sources: <http://www.mnsu.edu/student/assessment/methods.html>

6.2.1 Advantages and disadvantages of Interviews

Qualitative data collection methods most commonly used to analyze and evaluate data can be classified in three broad categories: in-depth interviews, observational methods, and document reviews. Byren states that definitions of qualitative research would be elusive, vague, and imprecise, because the term qualitative encapsulates such a broad umbrella of research methods. However, he attempted to define qualitative research as “inquiries of knowledge that are outside the framework prescribed by the scientific method, as well as assumptions of inferential statistics”.⁴⁶⁵ The qualitative interview seeks to describe and understand the meaning of central themes in the life world, in addition to understanding the story behind participants’ experience⁴⁶⁶. Rubin and Rubin identify several types of information which can be obtained from interviews: narratives, accounts, fronts, stories, and myths.⁴⁶⁷

Furthermore, interviews can be categorized into two main methods: structured; and semi-structured interviews. The aim of structured interview (also known as a standardised interview or a researcher-administered survey) is to ensure that each interviewee is presented with the same questions in exactly the same format. Semi-structured interview styles are flexible enough to allow new questions to be brought up during the interview that lead interviewees to “develop ideas and speak more widely on the issue raised by the researcher”.⁴⁶⁸ Interview research methods have various advantages and disadvantages (see table 6.2).

⁴⁶⁵ Byrne, Linking Philosophy, Methodology, and Methods in Qualitative Research, *AORN Journal*, 2001b, Vol. 73, Issue 1, p. 207

⁴⁶⁶ Kvale, *InterViews: An introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing* (c1996), p. 1

⁴⁶⁷ Rubin & Rubin, *Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data* (1995), pp. 24-27

⁴⁶⁸ Denscombe, *The Good Research Guide for Small-Scale Social Research Projects* (2nd ed.) (2003), P. 167.

Table 6.2: Advantages and Disadvantages of Interviews

Advantages	Disadvantages
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Usually yield richest data, details, new insights. 2. Permit face-to-face contact with respondents. 3. Provide opportunity to explore topics in depth. 4. Allow interviewer to experience the affective as well as cognitive aspects of responses. 5. Allow interviewer to explain or help clarify questions, increasing the likelihood of useful responses. 6. Allow interviewer to be flexible in administering interview to particular individuals or circumstances 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Expensive and time-consuming 2. Need well-qualified, highly trained interviewers. 3. Interviewee may distort information through recall error, selective perceptions, desire to please interviewer. 4. Flexibility can result in inconsistencies across interviews. 5. Volume of information too large; may be difficult to transcribe and reduce data.

Source: Westat, *The 2002 User Friendly Handbook for Project Evaluation*, (NSF,2003), p, 52.

6.2.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Questionnaire

Quantitative data collection methods are characterized by Bryman as “entailing the collection of numerical data and as exhibiting a view of the relationship between theory and research as deductive, a predilection for neutral science approachand having an objectivist conception of social reality”.⁴⁶⁹

The questionnaire is the most commonly used method of gathering information because it is easy to prepare and analyse. Cohen, Manion, and Morrison, defined the questionnaire as “a widely used and useful instrument for collecting survey information, providing structured, often numerical data, being able to be administered without the presence of the researcher”.⁴⁷⁰ Moreover, it is worth noting that each method of research has advantages and disadvantages, but which method the researcher uses depends on the research question, the researcher, the participants, the goals, and the available resource. Scholars have listed some of the advantages and disadvantages of questionnaires, as shown in table 6.3.⁴⁷¹

⁴⁶⁹ Bryman, A. *Social Research Methods* (2nd ed) (2004), p. 62

⁴⁷⁰ Cohen, Manion, and Morrison, *Research Methods in Education* (2007), p. 317

⁴⁷¹ These principles cited in Aldolaimi, *Investigating the Effectiveness of Training in the Public Section in Saudi Arabia: Case Studies of the Ministries of Education and the Institute of Public Administration* (2006), pp. 115-116.

Table 6.3: Advantages and Disadvantages of Questionnaires

Advantages	Disadvantages
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Cost effective. 2. Relatively easy to analyse. 3. Familiar to participants. 4. Can reduce bias by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uniform question presentation. • No middle man bias. • Not influence by researcher’s opinions. • No verbal or visual clues to influence respondents. 5. Less intrusive than other methods. 6. Respondents can take their own time. 7. Usually anonymous. 8. Preserve Confidentiality. 9. Response implies consent 10. Large amount of data can be gathered 11. Do not usually require a great deal of interviewer training 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Low response rates. 2. Inability to probe responses. 3. Inflexible. 4. Not advised for sensitive topics 5. The intended respondent may not complete the questionnaire due to reading ability, or language skills, or a relative or someone completely different might fill it in. 6. Questions may not reflect the respondents actual concerns

There is a large range of types of questionnaire, and the most common can be described as closed-ended structured questionnaires or open-ended structured questionnaires.⁴⁷² Closed-ended questions limit the range of respondents' answers to the survey. The participants are allowed to choose from either a pre-existing set of dichotomous answers, or a set of multiple choices with an option for "other" to be filled in. The most common ranking scale used for answers is called the Likert scale. The closed questions are quick to answer and easy to code.⁴⁷³ On the other hand, the respondents in close-ended questions are unable to add any comments or explanations to their answer⁴⁷⁴. Open-ended questions are useful if the possible answers are too many or unknown or the questionnaire for explanatory purposes.⁴⁷⁵ Furthermore, open ended questions allow participants to explain and add comments and explanations to their answers.⁴⁷⁶

There are certain principles of questionnaire design that should be considered when producing a questionnaire formalizing the objectives of the survey.⁴⁷⁷ Researchers are advised to follow several principles when formulating questionnaires:

- Clarity. The questions must be carefully designed “The best questionnaires are constantly edited and refined until they have clear questions and instructions, laid out in a logical order”.⁴⁷⁸ Furthermore, the researcher should consider whether the respondents can understand the question, will be willing to answer the question, and are able to answer the question.⁴⁷⁹
- Ensure that questions are without bias. The researcher must avoid putting questions in such a way as to lead respondents to specific answers.
- Simplicity. Questions should be short and simple. The researcher should avoid confusing and ambiguous questions. In addition the researcher should keep the

⁴⁷² Cohen, Louis, Manion, Lawrence, and Morrison, Keith, (2007), p. 320

⁴⁷³ Wilson and McClean, *Questionnaire Design: A Practical Introduction*, (Newtownabbey: University of Ulster, c1994), p. 21

⁴⁷⁴ Oppenheim, *Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude Measurement* (1992), p. 115.

⁴⁷⁵ Bailey, *Methods of Social Research* (c1994), p. 120.

⁴⁷⁶ Cohen, Manion, and Morrison (2007), p.321.

⁴⁷⁷ <http://www.b2binternational.com/files/08-market-research-ch8.pdf>

⁴⁷⁸ <http://www.b2binternational.com/files/08-market-research-ch8.pdf>

questionnaire as short as possible to improve response rates and the quality of data.

- Avoid ambiguous words such as usually, frequently, and words with no specific meanings.
- Avoid embarrassing questions, dealing with private or personal matters.

6.3 Data Collection Instrument for the Questionnaire Survey

- As a result of the political difficulties in having an open discussion because of the politically sensitive nature of the topic, and the sensitive nature of the questions posed. Therefore, disclosure of identifiable data might lead either to negatively affect the respondents' willingness to be interviewed and refrain from publicly expressing their political views and criticizing the political system or respondents by interviews might express views they thought the political system would like to hear.
- Because the survey questions address sensitive issues (e.g., measuring levels of political freedoms, freedom to criticize the government, and exposure to security consequences due to criticizing the government), respondents may perceive that public expressions of their political opinions are circumscribed by the government and might be exposed to negative consequences for answering the study questions frankly and expressing and criticizing the government's practices and policies.
- Thus, it was decided in order to measure political freedoms openly, motivate respondents to respond truthfully, and allow an honest assessment of data and the results of the study questions, and at the same time to preserve confidentiality to the respondents that collecting quantitative questionnaire data was the most appropriate method available.
- Furthermore, as Wimmer and Dominick state "In qualitative research, sample sizes are commonly too small to allow the researcher to generalize the data

beyond the sample selected for the specific study”.⁴⁸⁰ As already mentioned in chapter one, the main objective of this study is to explore properly the reality of political participation in Jordan, and therefore the use of a questionnaire has a considerable advantage because it can produce more representative results.

6.4 Questionnaire Design

The aim of the questionnaire in this study is to collect the necessary data from the study sample to explore the reality of political participation in Jordan and identify the main barriers to real and effective political participation by citizens in political life in general and in parliamentary elections in particular.

The data collection instrument used in this research was a questionnaire developed by the researcher. The questionnaire was designed using mainly closed-ended questions and three open-ended questions (see appendix A). Closed ended questions were used because these are quick to answer and provide respondents choices among possible answers. Respondents were asked to rate their responses to close-ended questions on a five point Likert scale from strongly disagree (scale=1) to strongly agree (scale=5). This type of question may not offer sufficient choices to the respondents to express their real feelings and opinions, and therefore open-ended questions were included to allow respondents to add more information, such as feelings and attitudes. Consequently this allowed the researcher to have better access to the respondents' opinions. Moreover, this type of question gives respondents feelings that they have an opinion on the study issue.

Questions have to be in language familiar to the respondents, preferably in their mother tongue. Thus, special steps were taken by the researcher in designing the final draft of the questionnaire. The first draft was designed in English, and it was then necessary to translate the English version into Arabic because all of the study's sample are Jordanians. Therefore, the draft was submitted to a professional interpreter to translate it into Arabic language. The final draft was then also translated from Arabic to English by the professional interpreter.

⁴⁸⁰ Cited in Niemann, Ilse. *Strategic Integrated Communication: Implementation towards A South African Conceptual Model* (2005), p. 185.

6.5 Study Sample


Selection of the Sample. The quality of the sample often determines the quality of the data. Moreover, the most important factors that determine the appropriate sample for a survey are its survey topic and the nature of the questions posed in the questionnaire. The sample of the current study was drawn from the political elite in Jordan. There are various definitions of the concept of political elite, but in *Mind and Society*, Vilfredo Pareto distinguished between two divisions of political elite in a society. “The governing elites” consist of those who play a key role directly or indirectly in government, exercise power, and make decisions and rules that run the society, and the “non governing elites” are composed of groups with special capacities, and an appreciable influence on political affairs in the society; they might be intellectuals, professionals, partisans or might be individuals who have an economic influence in society.⁴⁸¹

The sample in this study was drawn from the non-governmental elite, represented in five categories selected randomly from the political elite in Jordanian society. These categories were selected to represent purposefully the members of society who are interested, observers, and have a considerable influence on political affairs and the social structure in Jordanian society. Most of the study sample members are known in the community in which they work whether at the level of political party or associations or in politics in general.

The study sample is divided to five categories: (1) members of political parties, (2) academics, (3) professional council members, (4) journalists, and (5) human right organization members (see detail of the list of respondents in appendix B). The total number of research sample members was 237 individuals, of which (183=77.2%) were male, and (54=22.8) female. figure 6.1 depicts the distribution of the study sample according to the main field.

⁴⁸¹ Beardsley, Mr. Burnham on the “Elite”, *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 40, No. 16, (Aug. 5, 1943), p. 439.

Figure 6.1: The Respondents' Main Field



6.6 The Pilot Study (Pre-testing questions)

A pre-test or a pilot study is the process of conducting a preliminary study to identify potential problems in the proposed study and to make sure that questionnaires are understandable and clear to the study sample members. Bryman states that “the desirability of piloting such instruments is not solely to do with trying to ensure that the survey questions operate well; piloting also has a role in ensuring that the research instruments as a whole function well”.⁴⁸²

Why do we carry out a pre-test or pilot study?

A pilot study has several functions that allow problems in the proposed study to be identified, which may mean revising the method or instruments before starting the actual fieldwork. Some of these functions stated in *Research Methods in Education*:

- To check the clarity of the questionnaire items
- To gain feedback on the validity of the questionnaire items.
- To eliminate ambiguities or difficulties.
- To gain feedback if the sequence of questions is logical.

⁴⁸² Bryman (2004), p. 159

- To make sure that translation is accurate.
- To identify misunderstood or uncompleted items.
- To identify how motivating, non motivating, sensitive, or offensive items might be.⁴⁸³

Accordingly, the researcher distributed seven questionnaires to academics at Yarmouk University in the Social and Political Sciences departments and at Jordanian University in the Centre for Strategic Studies. Five more were distributed to PhD politics students, ten to journalists, five to political party members, and five to members of professional associations. The aim of this pilot study was to assess the clarity and acceptability of the questions, and the willingness of the respondents to answer the questions. Moreover, the pilot study was used to assess if there were any poorly worded questions that might lead to confusion for respondents. However, the results showed that the questionnaire covered the important issues, and the completed responses showed that the questionnaire was understood clearly. Some modifications were needed, and some questions were rephrased, and one personal sensitive question was deleted.

6.7 Questionnaire Distribution


The questionnaire was distributed by personally delivering copies to respondents. 400 questionnaires were given to five members of the groups; political parties (100) questionnaires, journalists (100) questionnaires, academics (100) questionnaire, members of human right organization (50) questionnaires, and members of the professional associations (50) questionnaires.

The questionnaire was distributed in Jordan from May 1, 2007 to July 10, 2007. 237 questionnaires were returned directly to the researcher. It should be noted that this method achieved a reasonable response rate of about 60%. Moreover, it is clear from the figure 6.2 that the highest responding rate from the research sample is that of Journalists reaching (80%), and respectively, members of HRO at (72%), members of

⁴⁸³ Cohen, Manion, and Morrison (2007), p.341.

political parties at (64%), members of PCM at (42%), and the lowest responding rate was for academics (36%) see figure 6.2.

Figure 6.2: Overall Response Rate for the Study Sample



6.8 Format of the Questionnaire

Each questionnaire was accompanied by a covering latter explaining the purpose of the study, and the researcher’s personal details (name; address and telephone number) so that the respondents were able to contact him to clarify the questions or for any other reasons.

The questionnaire was divided into five sections as follows:

Section A of the questionnaire was composed of questions related to biographical data, including age, gender, religion, place of birth, marital status, and level of education.

Section B of the questionnaire was composed of questions relating to political freedoms in Jordan.

Section C of the questionnaire included questions relating to the main internal or external obstacles to political participation in Jordan.

Questions in section D of the questionnaire related to the performance of political parties in political life.

Section E of the questionnaire concerned the respondent's participation in the 2003 parliamentary elections and the main motives behind their participation.

Section F of the questionnaire was composed of questions relating to evaluations of the current electoral system (SNTV).

6.9 Confidentiality and Anonymity

Before distributing the questionnaire, all respondents were assured that the information given would be used only for the purpose of this study and that their responses would remain confidential and will be used to generate frequencies and percentages to be discussed in the research only, and that only summaries of results without any personal identification would be published. Moreover, it was stressed that the information collected could not be linked to a particular respondent since the respondent's name was not required on the completed questionnaire.

6.10 Difficulties and Limitations

The researcher faced various difficulties during the distribution of the questionnaire, and the main ones were as follows:

- The problem of time. The researcher distributed 400 questionnaires personally to the study sample in order to gain a high return rate and save money as the researcher is self supporting. Therefore, data collection took more time about 10 weeks.

- One of the main practical limitations was that many respondents did not have much time available to answer the questionnaire. Because the members of the study sample were from the political elite, they were very busy, and much time had to be spent to arrange for a suitable time to deliver the questionnaire and collect it.
- Some members of the study sample hesitated to answer the questionnaire fearing that the researcher (who is Jordanian) might be conducting the research on behalf of the state security agencies. Therefore the researcher again insisted to all respondents that the main aim of this questionnaire is for academic study, and their responses would remain confidential.
- Most secondary references used were small articles, and few scholars have written in detail about political participation in Jordan and the main factors associated with it.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Data Analysis and Findings

7.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings from the primary data collected from the questionnaire survey which was the main research instrument used in this study. The statistical analysis conducted in this chapter is considered to be the first stage in the process of data analysis in this research. This study is a set of stages started by problem definition, research design, data collection methods, sampling, fieldwork, and ended by analysis of data and discussion of the results. Therefore, the following chapter discuss the results in detail.

7.2 Data Analysis

The statistical analysis in this chapter is divided into two sections:

- The characteristics of the study sample
- Descriptive analysis of answers the research questions which will be discussed in five sections.
 1. Indicators of political freedoms in Jordan.
 2. Obstacles of political participation.
 3. The performance of political parties.
 4. The motives for participation in parliamentary elections.
 5. Evaluation of the current electoral system.

7.2.1 Characteristics of the Study Sample

The characteristics of the study sample include:

- Demographic characteristics of the research sample
- Study sample distribution


7.2.1.1 Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

The first part of the questionnaire survey collected data on demographic characteristics of the study sample. The analysis in this section covers age, sex, level of education, religion, and place of birth. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a total of 400 questionnaires were distributed to five categories of respondents from the political elite in Jordan, and a total of 237 questionnaires were returned, a response rate of 59.25%.

7.2.1.1.1 Respondents' Age

The sample was divided into five age groups as shown in figure 7.1. The first group was between 18-30, which comprised 19.9% of the total sample. 30.1% were between 31-40 years, 19.9% between 41-50 years, 24.2% between 51-60 years and 5.9% were 61 years and above. This indicates that the respondents in the 31-40 years age group are involved in political activities more than other age groups, while the oldest group showed little interest in being involved in political activities.


Figure 7.1: Distribution of the Study Sample According to Age



7.2.1.1.2 Gender Distribution

It can be seen from figure 7.2 that the overwhelming majority (77.2%) of the respondents were male, and 22.8% were female. As shown in figure 7.2, the proportion of female respondents was 33.3% in human right organizations, 26.3% of journalists, and 21.9% who participated in this survey were members of political parties. The lower proportion of women's participation was because women are, on the whole, more marginalized or less involved in political activities than men.

Figure 7.2: Respondents' Gender



***PCM Professional Councils Members * HRO Human Right Organizations**


7.2.1.1.3 Respondents' Educational Levels

In relation to education level, respondents were given five choices:

- Below secondary education
- Diploma
- Bachelors degree
- Masters degree
- PhD

Figure 7.3 shows that 198 respondents who participated in this study (83.5%) had a bachelors degree or higher. It is clear that the majority of the respondents (110) held a bachelors degree (46.4%), whereas 45 held a master’s degree (19.0%), and 43 held a PhD degree (18.1%). Therefore, it is obvious that the majority of the respondents were highly educated.

Figure7.3: Level of Education of Respondents




So that result reflects, on average, the characteristics required of the population from which the sample was drawn. The researcher aimed at eliciting the respondents in his sample to be educated, knowledgeable, and aware of social and political affairs and the reality of political participation, in addition to having an impact on social and political life. Accordingly, these respondents’ characteristics enable the researcher to assess properly the reality of political participation in Jordan and generalize the results of the research.

7.2.1.1.4 Religion

Data concerning the religion of the respondents can be seen in figure 7.4. 92% of respondents were Muslims, whereas 8% were Christians. This reflects the nature of the structure of Jordanian society in terms of religion, where 92% of Jordanians are Sunni Muslims, and about 6% are Christians according to the 2004 census.

Figure 7.4: Respondents' Religion




7.2.1.1.5 Place of Birth of Respondents

The researcher asked the respondents to identify their place of birth to ensure that the data reflected all geographical segments of Jordanian society. Moreover, place of birth gives an indication of their geographical affiliation and the area represented by them in the study sample. In this question the respondents were given three choices to reflect the lifestyles of Jordanians:

1. Urban
2. Rural
3. Badiyah

It is worth mentioning that the proportion of the respondents, who live in urban areas (69.2%) as figure7.5 shows, is close to the proportion of the urban population in the main cities of Jordan which is (63%). And the same goes for the respondents who live in rural and badiyah areas.

Figure 7.5: The Place of Birth and Distribution of Jordanian Population According to their Lifestyle



*According to the 2004 census

7.2.2 Descriptive Analysis of the Research Questions

The following sections discuss the results of the descriptive analysis of the research questions. The first section presents the answers to the first five questions concerning levels of political freedoms in Jordan. The second group of questions asked the respondents about the effect of internal and external issues on political participation, in order to identify the main obstacles that prevent real and effective political participation in Jordan. The third section represents the respondents' evaluations of the role and performance of Jordanian political parties in political arena.

The fourth section of the analysis concerns the respondents' participation in the 2003 parliamentary elections and the main reasons behind their level of participation. In relation to voters' behaviour in Jordanian parliamentary elections the researcher will represent in section five the respondents' evaluation of the main motives for participation. The final section of the analysis concerns the respondents' evaluations of current electoral law.

7.2.2.1 Indicators of Political Freedom in Jordan

It is necessary to determine the political elites' belief concerning the levels of political freedom in Jordan as one of the most important signs of political development. The questionnaire asked the respondents a series of questions about equality and the levels of political freedom guaranteed by the constitution, the Political Parties' Law, and the Press and Publications Law. Furthermore, these freedoms are closely related to political participation, and the expansion of these freedoms is considered to be synonymous with political participation. Respondents were asked to indicate how strongly they agreed or disagreed that the following freedoms are guaranteed in Jordan: freedom of opinion; freedom to participate in political demonstrations; freedom to join political parties; equality of citizens' rights regardless of their religion, ethnic origin, and tribal affiliation; freedom to criticize and disagree with the government in public without being subject to security consequences; and freedom to participate in peaceful oppositional political activities without being subject to security consequences.

The results revealed that the freedom to join political parties was considered the most guaranteed freedom by 57.4% of the respondents, compared to 30.8% who disagreed that this freedom was guaranteed, and 11.8% were neutral, as shown in table 7.1. It is worth mentioning that 51.6% of political party members agreed or strongly agreed that freedom of membership in political parties is guaranteed. The second guaranteed freedom is freedom of speech with 37.6%, compared to 54% of the respondents who believed that the freedom of speech was not guaranteed in Jordan.

Table 7.1 Indicators of Political Freedoms in Jordan

Political Freedom	SD		D		N		A		SA		Total
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	
Freedom of opinion	45	19	83	35	20	8.4	82	34.6	7	3	237
Participate in political demonstrations	54	22.9	80	33.9	24	10.2	75	31.8	3	1.3	236
Joining political parties	30	12.7	43	18.1	28	11.8	109	46.0	27	11.4	237
Equality of citizens rights	65	27.5	65	27.5	24	10.2	62	26.3	20	8.5	236
Criticizing the government	65	27.4	88	37.1	24	10.1	53	22.4	7	3	237
Participation in peaceful political activities	45	19.1	84	35.6	25	10.6	71	30.1	11	4.7	236

SD= Strongly disagree D= Disagree N=Neutral SA= Strongly agree A= Agree

The percentage of journalists who believed that freedom of speech was not guaranteed is 46.3%, compared to 43.7% who agreed or strongly agreed that the freedom of speech was guaranteed in Jordan, whereas 10% were neutral. With regard to freedom to criticize and disagree with the government in public without being subject to security consequences, 64.5% of the respondents believed that this freedom was not guaranteed, where 25.4% thought it was.

Approximately 55% of the respondents believed that the freedom to participate in political demonstrations and peaceful political activities was not guaranteed, whereas about 33% agreed that these freedoms were guaranteed. Regarding the equality of Jordanian citizens, a total of 55% of respondents reported that they disagreed or strongly disagreed that there was equality of rights for all Jordanian citizens regardless of religion, ethnic origin, and family or tribal affiliations.


Accordingly, the ranking of political freedoms in Jordan being considered guaranteed according to the data as follows:

1. Freedom to join political parties (57.4% of respondents)
2. Freedom of opinion (37.6%)
3. Participation in peaceful political activities (34.8%)
4. Equality of citizens' rights regardless of religion, and ethnic origin (34.8%).
5. Freedom to participate in political demonstrations (33.1%)
6. The freedom to criticize or disagree with the government (25.4%).

Based on the data presented in table 7.1 only approximately one-third of respondents believed that political freedoms are guaranteed in Jordan, with the exception of the freedom to join political parties.

The fourth question of the questionnaire attempted to explore if the respondents had ever been subject to security or living consequences due to criticizing the government. The results of this question show that 134 respondents (74.4%) stated that they had never been subject to security consequences, while 25.6% stated that they had as figure 7.6 shows.

Figure 7.6: Respondents' Answers to the Question: "Have you ever been subject to security consequences due to criticizing the government?"



It is worth noting that (42.2%) the highest rate from respondents who answered yes were political parties' members followed by journalists (26.0 %), and the third group was members of human rights associations. However, in practice, members of human right associations, journalists, and members of political parties tend to criticize the government and its policies more often than do others.

Table 7.2 Respondents' Answer to the Question: "Have you ever been subject to security consequences due to criticizing the government?" by group.

choice		Political Parties	Academics	PCM	Journalists	HRO	Total
Yes	F	27	5	2	20	6	60
	%	42.2%	13.9%	9.5%	26.0%	16.7%	25.6%
No	F	37	31	19	57	30	174
	%	57.8%	86.1%	90.5%	74.0%	83.3%	74.4%
Total		64	36	21	77	36	234
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Question 5 of the questionnaire asked the respondents who answered (yes) to the previous question to identify the types of punishment they were subject to due to criticizing the government. The respondents were given five choices: custodial sentences, physical punishment, restriction or loss of civic and other rights, others, and refusal to answer.

Table 7.3 shows the frequencies and percentages of respondents' answers concerning the type of punishment they had been subject to. The results indicate that 63.3% had custodial sentences, 16.1% suffered restrictions or loss of civic and other rights, and 4.8% suffered physical punishment. A small percentage of respondents (4.8%, n=3) mentioned another type of punishment, that of dismissal from their job. Six respondents (9.7%), who were exposed to punishment refused to identify its type.

Table 7.3: Respondents' Answer to the Question: "What type of punishment have you been subject to?"

Punishment	GROUP						Total
		Political Parties	Academics	PCM	Journalists	HRO	
Custodial sentences	F	17	3	1	16	3	38
	%	65.4%	60.0%	50.0%	69.6%	50.0%	63.3%
Physical punishment	F	0	1	0	2	0	3
	%	.0%	20.0%	.0%	8.7%	.0%	4.8%
Restriction or loss of civic and other rights	F	6	0	0	2	2	10
	%	23.1%	.0%	.0%	8.7%	33.3%	16.1%
Others	F	3	0	0	0	0	3
	%	11.5%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	4.8%
refused to answer	F	0	1	1	3	1	6
	%	.0%	20.0%	50.0%	13.0%	16.7%	9.7%
Total	F	26	5	2	23	6	60
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%


7.2.2.2 Obstacles to Political Participation in Jordan

There are many obstacles to political participation in Jordan. These obstacles may relate to internal issues such as corruption, economic status, tribalism and the current election law, which have all been frequently mentioned as obstacles to democracy and political participation. Also international and regional events may impede political participation. Therefore, in order to measure the political elite's opinions regarding the main obstacles that impede political participation in Jordan respondents were asked to indicate how strongly they agreed or disagreed that internal factors and international events were considered as obstacles to political participation.

7.2.2.2.1 Respondents' Views about Internal Issues

Question 6 of the questionnaire asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement to explore to what extent internal problems form an obstacle to political participation. According to the results, the majority of the respondents (76.8%) agreed that internal factors are an obstacle to political participation in Jordan. Of the remaining respondents, 13% disagreed and 10.2% were neutral as shown in figure 7.7.

Figure 7.7: Level of Respondents' Agreement that Internal Issues were Considered Obstacle to Political Participation



In addition respondents were asked to identify the most important of the various internal issues which constituted the biggest obstacle to creating a stable environment for political participation. Therefore, the question provided respondents with five main reasons, in addition to an open-ended choice to mention other reasons:

1. Administrative and financial corruption in Jordan.
2. The economic status of Jordanian citizens.
3. Lack of government seriousness to achieve democracy
4. Tribalism.
5. The current electoral system.
6. Other reasons (please specify).

Table 7.4 shows that the largest obstacle, according to 36% of respondents, was the spread of administrative and financial corruption.

Table 7.4 Respondents' Views about the Most Important Obstacle to Political Participation

Main obstacles	F	%
administrative and financial corruption	64	36
Lack of government seriousness to achieve democracy	54	30.3
Economic status of Jordanian citizens	26	14.6
Tribalism	13	7.3
Current electoral system (SNTV)	11	6
Other reasons	11	6
Total	178	100

The second most important internal obstacle, according to the 30.3% of respondents, was a lack of government seriousness to achieve democracy and to open the way for professional associations, political parties, and the media to participate freely in the political sphere. The results revealed also that 14.6% of respondents saw the economic status of the Jordanian citizens as the most important obstacle to political participation. 7.3% saw tribalism as the main obstacle, and 6% cited Jordan's current election law.


As table 7.4 indicates, a few respondents (6%, n=11) mentioned other obstacles to political participation. (3.9%, n=7) of them declared that the low level of political culture to Jordanian citizens was an obstacle to political participation, and (2.2%, n=4) mentioned security reasons.

7.2.2.2.2 Respondents' Views about International and Regional events

Question 8 in the questionnaire aimed to find out the possible impact of dramatic international events on the Jordanian political arena. Moreover, the question aimed to explore whether it was the perceptions of respondents that regional events had a negative impact on political participation in Jordan.

The respondents were asked to indicate how strongly they agreed or disagreed that international and regional events could be considered an obstacle to political participation. 56.1% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that international and regional events were an obstacle as shown in figure 7.8, compared to 33.3% of respondents who disagreed. Overall, then, 76.8% of respondents saw the internal issues as obstacles, while 56.1% considered international and regional events as obstacles.

Figure 7.8 Respondents' Opinion Concerning whether or not International and Regional Events were Considered as Obstacles to Political Participation



The respondents were asked to give their views regarding which of five possible international and regional events or situations were most important in affecting political participation:

1. The ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
2. Present and ongoing conflicts and crises in Iraq.
3. The September 11th attacks and the war against terrorism.
4. The unwillingness of certain parties or states to achieve stability in the region.
5. The unwillingness of certain parties or states to achieve true democracy in the Arab World.
6. Other reasons (please specify).

As can be seen from table 7.5, the largest perceived barrier was the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict (41.2%), whereas the unwillingness of certain parties or states to push up democracy in the Arab World also scored highly (23.7%), while 21.4% saw the unwillingness of certain parties or states to achieve stability in the region was the main obstacle. Only 7.6% thought that the ongoing war in Iraq was an obstacle. In addition, (2.3%, n=3) of respondents have considered the American attacks on the region as the main regional factors that affects political participation in Jordan.

Table 7.5 Respondents' Opinions Concerning "What is the most important reason in your point of view?"

Main obstacles	F	%
The ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict.	54	41.2%
Present and ongoing conflicts and crises in Iraq	10	7.6%
The September 11th attack and the war against terrorism	5	3.8%
The unwillingness of certain parties or states to achieve stability in the region	28	21.4%
The unwillingness of certain parties or states in presence of true democracy in the Arab World.	31	23.7%
Other reasons	3	2.3%
Total	131	100

7.2.2.3 Political Participation through Political Parties (Evaluation of the Role of Jordanian Political Parties).

Political parties became important in Jordanian democratic practice as early as the 1990s when Jordan was in transition from martial law to democratization. In 1989 the regime lifted both martial law and the longstanding ban on political parties as part of the process of democratization allowing the legalization and participation of political parties in political life. As many as 33 parties emerged between 1992 and 2003 to participate in political life and parliamentary elections. The third group of questions in the questionnaire assessed the views of the respondents regarding the performance of political parties.

The questionnaire aimed to assess participation through membership in political parties, the issues of concern of them, their performance and ability to form a government in Jordan. Question 10 of the questionnaire asked the respondents if they belonged to political parties.

The findings in table 7.6 show that the majority of the respondents (63.5%) are not members of political parties. It is worth noting that, with the exception of political party members, only 14.5% of the respondents were members of political parties, while 85.5% of the other respondents did not belong to political parties.

Table 7.6 Respondents' Answers to the Question: "Do you belong to a political party?"

Choices	Political party members		Academics		PCM		Journalists		HRO		Total	
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
YES	60	93.8	7	19.4	5	23.8	10	13.5	2	5.7	84	36.5
NO	4	6.3	29	80.6	16	76.2	64	86.5	33	94.3	146	63.5
Total	64	100	36	100	21	100	74	100	35	100	230	100

Furthermore, the results revealed that the members of the professional councils (23.8%) were more likely than other groups to belong to political parties. 19.4% of academics belonged to political parties, and 13.5% of journalists were party members, while members of human right associations had the lower membership in political parties (5.7%).

Those who said that they were not party members were then asked that if they intended to join any political parties in the future, which of the current political parties would represent their political aspirations so that might join it. If they did not intend to join political party, they were asked to mention the main reason for this.

Table 7.7 below shows that 80.5% of respondents said that they did not intend to join political parties. Only 19.5% answered they would join political parties in the future. Not only were members of professional councils the most likely to belong to political parties, but also the proportion of their members who did not belong to political parties but intended in the future was also highest, at 52.9%.

Table 7.7 Respondents Answer to the Question, “Do you intend to join a political party in the future?”

Choices	Political parties		Academics		PCM		Journalists		HRO		Total	
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
YES	1	25	5	17.5	9	52.9	9	13	5	17.1	29	19.5
NO	3	75	24	82.8	8	47.1	60	87	29	82.9	124	80.5
Total	4	100	29	100	17	100	69	100	35	100	153	100

Then respondents who intended to join political parties in the future were asked in question 12 to indicate which of the current political parties represented their political aspirations so that they might join. (41.4%, n=12) said that IAF the party who represented their political aspirations, and (24.2%, n=7) said that the Arab Socialist Renaissance (Ba'ath) party represented their political aspirations and that they might join it in the future. Ten respondents (34.4%) said that none of the current political parties represented their views or political aspirations.

On the other hand, the respondents who did not intend to join political parties were asked to mention the main reasons behind their decision. From 124 respondents who answered (no) in question 11, (48.4%, n=60) answered this question. The majority of these respondents (70%, n=42) declared that they had no confidence in the current political parties and their programmes as they did not offer clear proposals to address the country's main problems. Seven respondents (11.6%) indicated that they feared of the security consequences if they joined political parties. Another seven said that the absence of democracy was the main reason, and one respondent justified his lack of interest in joining political parties due to his harsh prior experience with political parties and the government. 5% declared that they were not interested in political participation.

Respondents were then questioned about their views about the issues of concern to political parties and whether or not their performance had been successful in the political field. Question 14 of the questionnaire asked respondents if the current political parties in Jordan worked in the service of the people and society. Table 7.8 shows that 49.2% of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with this, while 36% of respondents believed that the political parties did work in the service of the people and the society.

However, it is worth mentioning that 28.8% of the political party members did not believe that political parties work in the service of people and society, as shown in table 7.8. 71.4% of members of professional councils also replied in the negative and 63.9% of members of HRO similarly disagreed or strongly disagreed, as did 52.8% of academics and 21.4% of journalists.

Table 7.8 Respondents' Opinions about Whether or not the Current Political Parties in Jordan Work in Service of the People and Society”

Statement		Political parties	Academics	PCM	Journalists	HRO	Total
SD	F	3	5	7	9	11	35
	%	4.8	13.9	33.3	12.5	30.6	15.4
D	F	15	14	8	28	12	77
	%	23.8	38.9	38.1	8.9	33.3	33.8
N	F	2	6	2	18	6	34
	%	3.2	16.7	9.5	25	16.7	14.9
A	F	30	9	3	15	7	64
	%	47.6	25	14.3	20.8	19.4	28.1
SA	F	13	2	1	2	0	18
	%	20.6	5.6	4.8	2.8	0	7.9
Total	F	63	36	21	72	36	228
	%	100	100	100	100	100	100

SD= Strongly disagree D= Disagree N=Neutral SA= Strongly agree A= Agree

Question 15 of the questionnaire aimed to explore further the respondents' thoughts and opinions regarding the political parties' goals and practices. Therefore, respondents were asked if the current political parties in Jordan worked in the service of their leaderships. Table 7.9 shows that 54.9% of respondents believed that the current political parties work in the service of their leaderships. Only 26.2% of respondents opposed this opinion, and 18.9% were neutral. It is also noteworthy that 35.9% of political party members saw political party leaders as concerned only with their own interests, and further 14.1% did not answer the question.

Table 7.9 Respondents' Opinion on the Statement "The current political parties in Jordan work in the service of their leaderships"

Statement		Political parties	Academics	PCM	Journalists	HRO	Total
SD	F	10	1	1	3	4	19
	%	15.6	2.8	4.8	3.9	11.1	8.2
D	F	22	4	4	8	4	42
	%	34.4	11.1	19	10.5	11.1	18
N	F	9	7	4	15	9	44
	%	14.1	19.4	19	19.7	25	18.9
A	F	16	16	5	32	10	79
	%	25	44.4	23.8	42.1	27.8	33.9
SA	F	7	8	7	18	9	49
	%	10.9	22.2	33.3	23.7	25	21
Total	F	64	36	21	76	36	233
	%	100	100	100	100	100	100

SD= Strongly disagree D= Disagree N=neutral SA= Strongly agree A= Agree

As can be seen from the table 7.9 above, a total of 67.1% of the members of PC, 66.6% of academics, 65.8% of journalists, and 52.8% of members of HROs agreed or agreed strongly with the statement that political parties work in the service of their leaderships.

Question 16 then asked respondents to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement regarding the performance of political parties in the political field. As table 7.10, shows, the level of satisfaction regarding political party performance was very low. Only 14.2% of respondents who agreed, and 3.4% of respondents agreed strongly, that political parties were successful in the political field.

A notable majority of the respondents (64.7%) believed that political parties were unsuccessful in their political performance. From the data presented in the table 7.10 it should be noted that about half of the political party members were not satisfied with the political performance of parties, when with 46.8% of them disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the statement. Moreover, apart from political party members, approximately three-quarters (71.5%) of other respondents were also not satisfied with the political parties' performance.

Table 7.10: Respondents' Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current Political Parties

Statement		Political parties	Academics	PCM	Journalists	HRO	Total
SD	F	7	11	9	19	15	61
	%	10.9	30.6	42.9	25.3	41.7	26.3
D	F	23	14	6	33	13	89
	%	35.9	38.9	28.6	44	36.1	38.4
N	F	13	4	3	16	5	41
	%	20.3	11.1	14.3	21.3	13.9	17.7
A	F	17	6	1	6	3	33
	%	26.6	16.7	4.8	8	8.3	14.2
SA	F	4	1	2	1	0	8
	%	6.3	2.8	9.5	1.3	0	3.4
Total	F	64	36	21	75	36	232
	%	100	100	100	100	100	100

SD= Strongly disagree D= Disagree N=Neutral SA= Strongly agree A= Agree

Respondents were then asked if any of the current political parties would be qualified to form a government. It can be seen from table 7.11 that slightly over half (51.5%) of the respondents believed that the current political parties were not qualified to form a government, while 30.9% of respondents thought that some of the current parties were qualified to form a government. 17.6% of respondents were neutral on this question.

56.3% of political party members believed that some parties were qualified to form a government, while 32.9% thought not and 10.9% were neutral. On the other hand, a majority of other groups' respondents (58.5%) disagreed with the idea that political parties were qualified to form a government, with only 21.3% thinking that some parties were qualified. It is worth noting that a notable proportion of these respondents (20.1%) were neutral on the question.

Table 7.11: Degree of Respondents' Agreement with the Statement "Some of the current political parties are qualified to form a government"

Choices		Political parties	Academics	PCM	Journalists	HRO	Total
SD	F	9	6	8	24	14	61
	%	14.1	16.7	38.1	31.6	38.9	26.2
D	F	12	13	5	17	12	59
	%	18.8	36.1	23.8	22.8	33.3	25.3
N	F	7	7	2	17	8	41
	%	10.9	19.4	9.5	22.4	22.2	17.6
A	F	25	6	5	14	2	52
	%	39.1	16.7	23.8	18.4	5.6	22.3
SA	F	11	4	1	4	0	20
	%	17.2	11.1	4.8	5.3	0	8.6
Total	F	64	36	21	76	36	233
	%	100	100	100	100	100	100

SD= Strongly disagree D= Disagree N=Neutral SA= Strongly agree A= Agree

For those 72 respondents who supported the idea that some of the current political parties were qualified to form a government, the questionnaire in question 18 asked them to identify these parties, 64 respondents answered this question.

These respondents mentioned seven political parties in their answers, while some suggested that a new coalition could form a government. It is clear from table 7.12 below that a majority of respondents (64.1%) named the Islamic Action Front as the party qualified to form a government. On the other hand there was a considerably lower confidence in other parties, and 9.4% of respondents suggested a new coalition

between leftists and nationalists could form a government. The Islamic Centrist Party named as qualified to form a government by 6.3% and 4.7% of respondents said that the Jordanian Arab Ba'ath was qualified.

Table 7.12 Respondents' Answer to the Question: "If did you agree in question 17 could you please mention these parties"

Political Party	Frequency	Percentage
IAF	41	64.1
Leftists and Nationalists*	6	9.4
Islamic Centrist Party	4	6.3
The Jordanian Arab Ba'ath	3	4.7
Renaissance Party	2	3.1
The Jordanian Democratic Unity Party (HASHD)	1	1.6
Jordanian National movement*	1	1.6
The Jordanian Communist Party	1	1.6
National Constitution Party	1	1.6
Total	64	100

*** Suggestions for new coalitions**

The general perception is that tribalism in Jordan is predominant in the political process, urging the researcher in this study to explore the influence of tribalism on political parties in particular and the political spectrum in general. Therefore, respondents were asked to indicate how strongly they felt that tribalism in Jordan constituted an obstacle in bringing political activists and party members into parliament.

The overwhelming majority of respondents (82.3%) saw tribalism as an obstacle to political party members and activists in reaching parliament. Only 13.7% of respondents believed that tribalism was not an obstacle, as is clear from table 7.13. It is also worth mentioning that 87.5% of political party members believed that tribalism is an obstacle preventing their members from gaining seats in parliament.

Table 7.13 Respondents Agreement with the Statement that “tribalism is considered an obstacle to political activists and party members in reaching parliament”

Choices		Political parties	Academics	PCM	Journalists	HRO	Total
SD	F	3	3	1	2	2	11
	%	4.7%	8.6%	4.8%	2.9%	5.6%	4.9%
D	F	3	1	1	11	4	20
	%	4.7%	2.9%	4.8%	15.7%	11.1%	8.8%
N	F	2	2	1	4	0	9
	%	3.1%	5.7%	4.8%	5.7%	.0%	4.0%
A	F	27	12	8	31	19	97
	%	42.2%	34.3%	38.1%	44.3%	52.8%	42.9%
SA	F	29	17	10	22	11	89
	%	45.3%	48.6%	47.6%	31.4%	30.6%	39.4%
Total	F	64	35	21	70	36	226
	%	100	100	100	100	100	100

SD= Strongly disagree D= Disagree N=Neutral SA= Strongly agree A= Agree

7.2.2.4 Participation in the 2003 Parliamentary Elections

The parliamentary elections in Jordan raised many problematic and challenging issues concerning the electoral system, elections management, the results of the elections, and the degree of citizen participation. Therefore, respondents were asked about their participation in the 2003 parliamentary elections, the main reason behind their vote, voting for women in Jordanian parliamentary elections, the voters' behaviour, and their evaluations of the electoral system.

Question 19 of the questionnaire asked respondents if they had voted in the last elections to explore their participation in parliamentary elections. Respondents were given two choices:

1. Yes (please move to question 20) or
2. No (please move to question 21).

As shown in table 7.14 a majority of the respondents (77.4%) had voted in the last parliamentary elections compared with a ratio of 22.6% who did not participate. It can be also noted from the table that the ratios of those who participated in the last elections among professional councils' members (85.7%) and political party members (84.4%) were higher than those in other groups of the sample.

Table 7.14 Respondents' Participation in the 2003 Parliamentary Elections

Choices	Political parties		Academics		PCM		Journalists		HRO		Total	
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
YES	54	84.4	25	69.4	18	85.7	59	75.6	26	72.2	182	77.4
NO	10	15.6	11	30.6	3	14.3	19	24.4	10	27.8	53	22.6
Total	64	100	36	100	21	100	78	100	36	100	235	100

In general, the participation rate of respondents was around three-quarters, ranging from a low of 69.4% academics to a high of 85.7% of PCM. On the other hand, the ratios of those who did not participate in the last elections ranged from 14.3% of PCMs to 30% of academics.

Question 20 of the questionnaire asked respondents who said they had voted to identify the main reason behind this decision. The respondents were given five choices:

1. National duty and constitutional right,
2. Tribalism and social ties,
3. To put the right person in the right position,
4. To enhance democracy in Jordan,
5. Others (please specify)

However, it is clear from table 7.15 below that national duty and constitutional rights represented the main priority for many of the sample. Over half of the respondents (52.2%) declared that this was the most important reason behind their decision to vote in the last elections.

Table 7.15: Respondents' Reasons for Participating in the 2003 Parliamentary Elections

Main reason	Frequency	Percentage
National duty and constitutional right	95	52.2%
To enhance democracy in Jordan	33	18.1%
To put the right person in the right position	27	14.8%
Tribalism and social ties	22	12.1%
Other reasons	5	2.7%
Total	182	100%

Only 18.1% of respondents supported the issue of enhancing democracy in Jordan, and putting the right person in the right position was third with 14.8% of responses. Tribalism and social ties was cited by 12.1%, and 2.7% of the respondents declared that their participation was a partisan decision.

Question 21 asked respondents who did not participate in the last elections about the main reason for their decision not to vote. The respondents were given five choices:

1. I am not satisfied with the ability of the Parliamentary councils,
2. I'm not satisfied with elections' results,
3. I'm not satisfied with the candidates available,
4. I am not interested,
5. Other reasons (please specify)

45.3% of respondents said that they did not participate because they were not satisfied with the ability of the parliamentary councils to play an effective role in political life. 18.9% of respondents were not interested in the election process in general, as shown in table 7.16.

Table 7.16 Respondents' Reasons for Non-participation in the 2003 Elections

The main reason	Frequency	Percentage
I am not satisfied with the ability of the Parliamentary councils	24	45.3%
I am not interested	10	18.9%
I am not satisfied with elections' results	6	11.3%
I am not satisfied with the candidates available	7	13.2%
Other reasons	6	11.3%
Total	53	100%


11.3% of these respondents declared that they did not participate because they are not satisfied with election results. The respondents who did not participate due to their dissatisfaction with the candidates available in their districts totalled 13.2%. Six (11.3%) of respondents gave other reasons for not voting. Four respondents said that they boycott elections, and another two were below voting age in the 2003 parliamentary elections.

7.2.2.4.1 Voting for Women Candidates in Jordanian Parliamentary Elections

The number of women candidates for Jordanian parliamentary elections has increased steadily since women won the right to run for parliamentary elections in 1980s. But it will also be noticed that the increase in the number of women candidates has not accompanied by an increase in the number of women MPs.

To explore the problematic relationship between the number of women candidates and women MPs, the respondents were asked two questions to provide an overview about the reality of women participation in parliamentary elections. Question 22 of the questionnaire aimed at finding the reality of voting for women in the 2003 elections. Based on data presented in figure 7.9 the results revealed that an overwhelming majority of the 234 respondents (84.2%) had not voted for women, compared with only 15.8% who had.

Figure 7.9 Respondents' Voting for Women Candidates in the 2003 Parliamentary Elections



79.6% of the respondents who had participated in the last elections but did not vote for women candidates, compared with 20.4% who did. It is also worth noting that the ratio of respondents who did not vote for women in different groups of sample study


ranged from 79.7% of political party members to 88.9% of HRO members as shown in table 7.17.

Table 7.17 Voting for Women Candidates in the 2003 Parliamentary Elections by Group

Choices	Political parties		Academics		PCM		Journalists		HRO		Total	
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
YES	13	20.3	5	13.9	3	14.3	12	15.6	4	11.1	37	15.8
NO	51	79.7	31	86.1	18	85.7	65	84.4	32	88.9	197	84.2
Total	64	100	36	100	21	100	77	100	36	100	234	100

More importantly, the results revealed that the ratio of women who voted for women candidates was very low (18.9%) compared with 43 women respondent (81.1%) who did not vote, as figure 7.10 shows.

Figure 7.10: Respondents' Answer to Question 22 According to Gender



As a consequence of concern at the low rates of voting for women candidates in Jordanian parliamentary elections, as shown in the figure above, question 23 of the questionnaire aimed at discovering an explanation for women's low representation in parliament, asking respondents for their main reason for not voting for women candidates. Respondents were given five main choices:

1. Lack of women experience in political affairs.
2. Social obstacles (culture and traditions)
3. Religious dimension (for example urging women to be more conservative and calling for the separation of the sexes in the workplace).
4. Women do not have enough experience in public affairs
5. Tribal dimension (women could not get support from their tribes)
6. Other reasons (please specify)

Table 7.18 sets out the main reasons respondents gave explaining their decisions to not vote for women. A majority of respondents (43.8%) concluded that the absence of women candidates with political experience was the main reason for their decision. Women not having enough experience in public affairs in general was the second most common reason (17.3%), and 6.1% cited social obstacles, 5.1%, the tribal and 4.1% the religious dimension.

Table 7.18: Respondents' Reasons for Not Voting for Women Candidates

Statement		Political parties	Academics	PCM	Journalists	HRO	Total
lack of women experience in political affairs	F	22	17	9	29	9	86
	%	42.0%	54.8%	50.0%	44.6%	28.1%	43.8%
Women do not have enough experience in public affairs	F	8	4	3	12	7	34
	%	14.0%	12.9%	16.7%	18.5%	21.9%	17.3%
Social obstacles (community's culture and traditions)	F	5	1	1	2	3	12
	%	10.0%	3.2%	5.6%	3.1%	9.4%	6.1%
Tribal dimension (women could not get support from her tribe)	F	4	1	1	1	3	10
	%	8.0%	3.2%	5.6%	1.5%	9.4%	5.1%
Religious dimension (religion urging women to be more conservative)	F	4	1	2	0	1	8
	%	8.0%	3.2%	11.1%	.0%	3.1%	4.1%
Others	F	9	7	2	21	9	46
	%	18.0%	22.6%	11.1%	32.3%	28.1	23.5
Total	F	50	31	18	65	32	196
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Moreover, 46 respondents (23.5%) cited five other reasons for not voting for women candidates. 22 (11.2%) stated that there were no women candidates in their electoral districts, and 10 (5.1%) indicated that they were committed to their tribal candidates. Some respondents (3.5%, n=7), said that they opposed the quota system and therefore they did not vote for women candidates, and another four respondents (2%) declared

that there were no partisan women's candidates in their districts. The current electoral law cited by (1.7%, n=3) of respondents as a reason not to vote for women candidates.

It is also important to note that 42% of political party members who did not vote for women believed that women do not have enough political experience to be elected to parliament. In addition, 54% of academics, 50% of PCMs, and 44.6% of journalists gave the same reason for not voting for women. More importantly, table 7.19 shows that 50% of women respondents who did not vote for women candidates justified their decision in terms of lack of women's experience in political affairs.

Table 7.19 Respondents' Reasons for Not Voting for Women Candidates, by sex


Statement		Men	Women
lack of women experience in political affairs	F	64	21
	%	41.6%	50.0%
Women do not have enough experience in public affairs	F	30	3
	%	19.5%	7.1%
Social obstacles (community's culture and traditions)	F	9	3
	%	5.8%	7.1%
Tribal dimension (women could not get support from her tribe)	F	8	2
	%	5.2%	4.8%
Religious dimension (religion urging women to be more conservative)	F	6	2
	%	3.9%	4.8%
Others	F	37	11
	%	24.0%	26.2%
Total	F	154	42
		100.0%	100.0%

7.2.2.5 Voters' Motives for Participation in Parliamentary Elections

When voting takes place in parliamentary elections one important basic question is why do voters vote? In other words do voters vote according to their personal interests or for the interest of the community? In order to produce a clearer picture of parliamentary voting behaviour in Jordan the respondent were asked in questions 25 and 26 about voting behaviour in Jordan.


In question 25 respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with the statement “Voting behaviour in Jordan is directly linked with the primary affiliations (tribal or familial) of voters”. As figure 7.11 shows, nearly all respondents (91%, n= 211) either agreed or strongly agreed that voting behaviour was linked to tribal and familial affiliation. Only 15 respondents (6.5%) disagreed, and 6 (2.6%) were neutral.

Figure7.11 Respondents Opinion Regarding Voting Behaviour in Jordanian Parliamentary Elections



In Question 26 the respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with the statement, “The service dimension in the relationship between voters and candidates and the proximity of the latter from the authorities and the centres of power lead voters to vote for one candidate over another”. In figure 7.12 the results reveal that about four-fifths (77.9%, n=180) of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the service dimension plays an important role and has a strong effect on voters’ choices in the elections. 10% of respondents disagreed with the idea, and 12.1% were neutral.

Figure 7.12 Respondents’ Opinions with Regard to the Effect of the Service Dimension on Voters’ Preferences.



7.2.2.6 Evaluation of the Jordanian Electoral System (SNTV)

The electoral system issue has become the subject of the most heated and controversial debate in Jordan since the return of multiparty politics in the 1980s. The major political changes started with the reintroduction of multi-party parliamentary elections in 1989 following the adoption of a new electoral law (the (BVS). However, after these elections the electoral law underwent several further changes. In 1993 the government issued a new electoral law for the subsequent elections, and the new formula (SNTV) has been used until the parliamentary elections in 2007.

Accordingly following set of questions aimed to explore the evaluations of respondents of the current electoral law; whether or not suitable for political parties, women, and Jordanian society in general. Furthermore, the questions aimed to evaluate if the current electoral system was thought to enhance democracy through encouraging political participation by all segments of society.

In the first item of this section (question 27), respondents were asked to assess the suitability of the current law for the Jordanian society by stating their level of agreement or disagreement with the statement that, "The current electoral law (SNTV) is suitable for the structure of Jordanian society". As can be seen in table 7.20, 44.8% of respondents strongly disagreed with the statement, and another 22% disagreed; this compares with only 23.7% who agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. It appears that the majority of respondents 66.8% think that this law is not suitable.

Moreover, the results also revealed that 81% of members of professional councils indicated that the current electoral law is unsuitable for Jordanian society, and 0% of them were neutral and 0% agreed strongly with the statement. In addition to 82.8% of political party members, and 62.6% of journalists, however, lower proportions of academics (55.6%), and HRO members (50%) indicated that they disagreed with the statement. On the other hand, 41.7% of members of HROs indicated that the current law is suitable for Jordanian society.

Table 7.20 Respondents' Evaluations of the Suitability of the Electoral System for Jordanian Society.

Choices		Political parties	Academics	PCM	Journalists	HRO	Total
SD	F	43	10	11	28	12	104
	%	67.2%	27.8%	52.4%	37.3%	33.3%	44.8%
D	F	10	10	6	19	6	51
	%	15.6%	27.8%	28.6%	25.3%	16.7%	22.0%
N	F	2	5	0	12	3	22
	%	3.1%	13.9%	.0%	16.0%	8.3%	9.5%
A	F	6	6	4	11	15	42
	%	9.4%	16.7%	19.0%	14.7%	41.7%	18.1%
SA	F	3	5	0	5	0	13
	%	4.7%	13.9%	0%	6.7%	.0%	5.6%
Total	F	64	36	21	75	36	232
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

SD= Strongly disagree D= Disagree N=Neutral SA= Strongly agree A= Agree

In the second item of this section the respondents were asked to identify their opinions regarding the fairness of current electoral law to women. The results indicate that slightly less than half of respondents 48.9% thought that the current electoral law is unfair to women compared to 37.8% who thought that the quota system is fair as table 7.21 shows. 31 (13.3%) of respondents were neutral on this question.


Table 7.21: Respondents' Opinions Concerning the Current Electoral Law and the Quota System being Fair to Women”

Choices		Political parties	Academics	PCM	Journalists	HRO	Total
SD	F	17	8	4	12	5	46
	%	26.6%	22.2%	19.0%	15.8%	13.9%	19.7%
D	F	21	11	10	20	6	68
	%	32.8%	30.6%	47.6%	26.3%	16.7%	29.2%
N	F	5	6	2	15	3	31
	%	7.8%	16.7%	9.5%	19.7%	8.3%	13.3%
A	F	19	8	2	22	17	68
	%	29.7%	22.2%	9.5%	28.9%	47.2%	29.2%
SA	F	2	3	3	7	5	20
	%	3.1%	8.3%	14.3%	9.2%	13.9%	8.6%
Total	F	64	36	21	76	36	233
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

SD= Strongly disagree D= Disagree N=Neutral SA= Strongly agree A= Agree

The majority of women respondents (48.1%) believed that the current law is fair to women, whereas 40.4% disagreed as figure 7.13 shows. On the other hand 51.4% of male respondents believed that the quota system is unfair to women, whereas 34.8% believed that electoral law is fair to women.

Figure 7.13: Respondents' Opinions Concerning the Fairness of Current Electoral Law and the Quota System to Women, by sex



The electoral system has important consequences for the political system in general, and on the electoral fortunes and representation of political parties in particular. Therefore, the next question aimed at assessing the respondents' views regarding the fairness of electoral law to political parties.

Question 29 of the questionnaire asked the respondents to identify their level of agreement or disagreement with the statement that, "The current electoral law (SNTV) is fair to political parties in Jordan". The results in table 7.22 show that almost three-quarters of respondents (70.8%, n=165) opposed the idea that the current electoral law is fair to political parties, compared with only 25.5% (n=36), who supported the idea that the current law is fair to political parties.

It is also worth pointing out that nearly all political party members (90.7%) believed that the current electoral system is unfair to parties. Only 7.9% of political party members believed that the current law is fair.

Table 7.22: Respondents' Opinions Regarding the Statement "The current electoral law (SNTV) is fair to political parties in Jordan"

Choices		Political parties	Academics	PCM	Journalists	HRO	Total
SD	F	44	13	7	32	11	107
	%	68.8%	36.1%	33.3%	42.1%	30.6%	45.9%
D	F	14	11	8	17	8	58
	%	21.9%	30.6%	38.1%	22.4%	22.2%	24.9%
N	F	1	6	1	17	7	32
	%	1.6%	16.7%	4.8%	22.4%	19.4%	13.7%
A	F	4	4	4	10	8	30
	%	6.3%	11.1%	19.0%	13.2%	22.2%	12.9%
SA	F	1	2	1	0	2	6
	%	1.6%	5.6%	4.8%	0%	5.6%	2.6%
Total	F	64	36	21	76	36	233
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

SD= Strongly disagree D= Disagree N=Neutral SA= Strongly agree A= Agree

In the final item of the questionnaire the respondents were asked to indicate their views about the most suitable electoral system for Jordanian society. Respondents were provided with a list of electoral systems to choose from or they could suggest another system:

1. One-vote System (SNTV)
2. Multi-vote system (BV)
3. Two votes system, one vote for the district and one vote for a national candidate (TVS)
4. Proportional Representation (PR)
5. Other (please specify) _____

7.3 Conclusion

This chapter has presented a descriptive analysis of the data collected through an empirical study through the research instrument used in this study, a self-administered questionnaire. This survey aimed to discover the political elite's opinions and factual information relating political participation in Jordan.

The study sample in this survey provided important and valuable information regarding political participation in Jordan, the main elements that affect it, the main barriers that confront real and effective participation in Jordan, the role of political parties in political life, voting behaviour, and the role played by electoral law. In view of these responses, the following chapter will present discussion and evaluation of the research results in order to provide answers to the research questions in this study.

CHAPTER EIGHT

DISCUSSION

8.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the results of the survey of a limited sample drawn from the political elite in Jordan, to characterise the sphere of political participation in Jordan and to identify and summarize the main challenges facing political participation, and especially the participation of political parties as one of the main elements of democracy. In addition, it evaluates the electoral system, which is one of the most important institutional arrangements in a democracy, in addition to its having a profound effect on political life.

Furthermore, this chapter aims to identify the greatest challenges Jordanian women face in political participation, and the barriers faced in implementing and safeguarding their political rights. Finally, this chapter interprets the respondents' answers to questions concerning the degree to which the present obstacles particularly external and internal obstacles at the national level affect the Jordanian political environment.

8.2 Political Freedoms in Jordan

Understanding the status of political participation in Jordan requires an understanding of the political context in which political participation takes place. This involves, in particular, the elements of basic human rights and freedoms if these are guaranteed and protected by the constitution, and legislations concerning political parties, and media and expression. Importantly, the Jordanian constitution, as described in chapter two, entitles 'the rights and duties of Jordanians' guarantees the rights of Jordanian citizens, including freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, academic freedom, and the right to elect parliamentary and municipal representatives.

On the other hand, those rights and freedoms are closely allied with individual rights, and therefore very important for the exercise of all rights relating to political participation. These rights and freedoms include freedom of expression and speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of association and membership of political parties, equality between all citizens, and the freedom to participate in demonstrations.

8.2.1 Freedom of Expression

Freedom of expression and ensuring the protection of the expression of opinions from abuse, are the root of all other freedoms at all times, to all peoples and in all societies. Most constitutions in the world regulate freedom to express opinions and provide some protection of this freedom. The Jordanian constitution states that, “The State shall guarantee freedom of opinion. Every Jordanian shall be free to express his opinion by speech, in writing, or by means of photographic representation and other forms of expression”.⁴⁸⁴

Moreover, this freedom is guaranteed in article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that, “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”⁴⁸⁵, and this is also guaranteed in article 19 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.⁴⁸⁶

Unlike the other forms of political freedoms, the importance of freedom of expression stems from the fact that this freedom is considered in itself as a form of political participation and at the same time it is important in engaging in other forms of political participation. For example, at the level of electoral participation and voting which is the most frequently used form of political participation, elections without free speech would have no meaning since voters and candidates need the right to communicate and convey consistent messages to each other.

⁴⁸⁴ Constitution, Article 15.

⁴⁸⁵ <http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm>

⁴⁸⁶ http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm

Furthermore, in term of the participation of political parties in political life, parties should be able to communicate with the public in order to inform them of their views and platforms relating to specific domestic issues and foreign policy matters which must be dealt with. This communication strengthens political parties through citizens' support for their agendas and platforms. Consequently, the political parties will get more support from citizens for their candidates in elections, in order to elect candidates who can advance the parties' platforms.


In Jordan there is a fierce debate concerning whether or not freedom of speech, especially without fear of punishment, really exists and, if it exists, what are the limits of this freedom. As seen in the previous chapter, 37.6% of questionnaire respondents agreed that freedom of opinion is guaranteed. This result indicates that freedom of speech exists and is guaranteed to a certain extent.

The government generally respects the rights of its citizens, at least in some respects. However, in practice the government places some restrictions on freedom of speech. Generally individuals in Jordan are able to express their opinions and criticize the government privately without reprisals. However, citizens are tending to criticize the government in public less. The government imposes certain restrictions which impede political criticism, particularly on opposition political activists, and members of political parties, and other groups (such as journalists, and members of human rights organizations) who criticise the governments' policies and practices.

Furthermore, the restrictions on the level of freedom to criticise and disagree with the government in public without being subject to security consequences are varying from group to another according to their practice of criticising and opposing the governments' policies, in addition to the effect of this criticism on the public. Therefore, if those who criticise the government, such as the members of political parties and journalists have wide popular support they tend to face more limits and restrictions than others, as figure 8.1 shows. In its annual human rights report released 2007, Amnesty International published reports highly critical of government policy and practice to restrict civil liberties particularly freedom of expression. The report indicated that "There were new violations of the rights to freedom of expression and association. The Public Assemblies Law was invoked to deny permission for some

demonstrations, including those in opposition to Israel. Several people were arrested, apparently after exercising their right to freedom of expression. Some of these were arrested for criticizing the king and inciting sectarian or racial strife”.⁴⁸⁷

Figure 8.1: Percentages of Respondent Groups who Agreed that Freedom of Speech is Guaranteed



The results also revealed that the members of political parties who believed that the government does not guarantee freedom of speech in Jordan had been subjected to security consequences more than other groups, where 42.2% of them declared that they had been subjected to security consequences as a result of criticising the government in public. In addition 26% of journalists were subjected to security consequences due to their criticism of the government’s policies, as had some members of human right organizations. In addition, some respondents who had not been subject to security consequences explained that they had never exercised this freedom; in other words they believed that they could not criticise the government in public without anticipating punishment.

The Jordanian governments have shown intolerance of public criticism, as evidenced by the series of amendments to Press and Publications Laws in 1993, 1997, 1998, and 1999. All of these amendments gave the authorities sweeping powers to reduce the degree of press freedom. The temporary 1997 law which were ratified by royal decree

⁴⁸⁷ For more details see <http://report2007.amnesty.org/eng/Regions/Middle-East-and-North-Africa/Jordan>.

without parliamentary debate, give the government broad powers to fine, suspend, or permanently close newspapers found to be in violation of the new law's provision, and also impose on publications arbitrary and discriminatory financial obligations. According to the current law, it is prohibited to publish any information, news, cartoons, or commentaries about Jordan's armed forces and security services, offends the King and the royal family, harm national unity, general ethics, religion, security apparatus, and insults the head of Arab and friendly states. This is in addition to the last controversial amendment that allowed the jailing of journalists who break the press law.

Moreover, under the new law, weekly newspapers were required to increase their capital from 15,000 to 300,000 JD. These requirements forced many of Jordan's critical weeklies, which had a circulation of just a few thousand, to fold. Additionally, Jordanian publications and research institutions are not allowed to accept funding from foreign sources.⁴⁸⁸ Although government research centres have been permitted to accept foreign funding from the same resources, in 2000 and 2001 four journalists Nidal Mansour, a journalist and Director of the Centre for the Defence and Protection of Press Freedom, Mahsen Imam, George Hawatmeh, and Bilal Tal were detained for questioning concerning the acceptance of foreign funding of their research centre. In 2001 Nidal Mansour was interrogated and banned from writing for one year for receiving foreign funding.⁴⁸⁹ Furthermore, the press law provides for the government licensing of publications, and these licenses may be revoked for a number of reasons such as if the license conditions or requirements related to specialization, are breached.⁴⁹⁰

In conclusion, without free speech no political reform is possible, and no resistance concerning domestic issues is possible such as the financial and administrative corruption which the country is suffering from. Furthermore, free speech is very important for any government claiming a serious commitment to enhancing democracy and political participation in order to know what the people actually feel and think.

⁴⁸⁸ Press and Publication Law (1999), Article 40.

⁴⁸⁹ Kialni, Sa'ada . Press Freedoms in Jordan. Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, p. 23. www.euromedright.net/english/Download/press%2book-eng-work%20version.doc

⁴⁹⁰ Press and publication Law (1998), Articles 12, 15, and 17.

8.2.2 Freedom to Join Political Parties

Political parties are the only political organizations able to provide comprehensive national views and agendas about the challenges facing society. More importantly, the way that political parties deal with these challenges enables citizens to choose among them concerning what meets their aspirations and interests. In addition, joining political parties enables citizens to influence the political process and deepen political participation to a greater extent than just casting the ballot every four years.

With regard to the freedom of assembly and the right to join political parties in Jordan, the Jordanian constitution guarantees the right of citizens to set up and join political parties:

- (i) “Jordanians shall have the right to hold meetings within the limits of the law.
- (ii) Jordanians are entitled to establish societies and political parties provided that the objects of such societies and parties are lawful, their methods peaceful, and their by-laws not contrary to the provisions of the constitution”.⁴⁹¹

Moreover, this right was confirmed by Article 4 of the Political Parties’ Law No 32 for the year 1992 which repealed the 1955 law and stated that, “Jordanians have the right to form political parties and to voluntarily join them according to the provisions of the Law”.⁴⁹² The sample surveyed in this study confirmed this right when 57.4% of the respondents agreed that the freedom to join political parties is guaranteed. On the other hand, although this right is guaranteed by constitution and law, the results showed that although the freedom to join political parties was considered the most guaranteed freedom, Jordanians are reluctant to join political parties. The results revealed that, excluding political party members, 85.5 % of the sample had not joined political parties. Moreover, 80.5% of them did not intend to join political parties in the future. This reluctance of Jordanians to join political parties is discussed below in the evaluation of political party participation.

⁴⁹¹ Constitution, Article 16.

⁴⁹² On line http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/pol_parties1-14.html

8.2.3 Free Participation of Jordanian Citizens in Demonstrations and Peaceful Oppositional Political Activities

As discussed in chapter four, political participation is defined by most political scientists as any kind of behaviour which aims at helping citizens to play a role in political life and to influence the public decision making process. The level of political participation varies from one political system to another, according to the political development achieved by the system. Accordingly what might be relevant in one political system might be completely irrelevant or even illegal in another. What might be guaranteed to a large extent in one political system might be guaranteed only to a little extent in another.

Generally, there are many limits and restrictions on the freedom of Jordanians to participate in oppositional political activities without being subject to security consequences. After the dissolution of the Jordanian parliament in June 2001, the Jordanian political system postponed parliamentary elections twice before they finally took place in June 2003. This step was taken in order to avoid election campaigns and demonstrations which would have concentrated mainly on the topics of the Palestinian Intifada, peace and normalization with Israel; in addition to other political events in the Arab and international arenas, particularly after the events of September 11th 2001.

By dissolving parliament and postponing the elections the Jordanian government violated the constitution and disrupted parliamentary life, in circumstances which did not warrant such actions. The Jordanian constitution identifies these circumstances as a “force majeure”, in article 73, paragraph 4.

This violation was followed by a series of other violations, starting with the Prime Minister’s resolution on October 6, 2000 (which is still in force) to prevent political marches as a result of the demonstration that swept Jordanian streets supporting the intifada and demanding the closure of the Israeli embassy in Jordan. Moreover, as a result of the dissolution of parliament and the postponement of elections, the government created a political and legislative vacuum. Consequently, in the absence

of a Jordanian parliament the government enjoyed absolute power and began issuing temporary laws which the constitution permits only in cases of strong necessity.

One of these temporary laws issued by the government during this period and adopted by parliament in February 2004 was the Public Gatherings Law. According to this law the Ministry of Interior clamped down on the right of citizens to freely assemble, whether gathering in public demonstrations or in smaller group meetings. The new temporary law that was issued on August 22, 2001 by Abu Ragheb's government, which issued more than 200 temporary laws in two years, stated that the Ministry of Interior must give its written approval for any public gatherings or meetings debating political issues at least three days prior to their scheduled start. Moreover, the government's decisions concerning specific meetings are often made without giving reasons, and are not subject to appeal. In addition, the government has the authority to use force to disperse even an officially approved meeting as well as to punish or suspend those taking part from the practice of their profession, and to impose prison terms or fines on those violating the law.⁴⁹³

Beside these temporary laws affecting basic freedoms, they also seriously affect the protection of human rights. Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East Director at Human Rights Watch, declared that "This law is a naked attempt to silence the vocal and often critical public debate that the professional associations foster. It is a major step backwards in Jordan's commitment to human rights".⁴⁹⁴


When the survey sample were asked about the level of freedom to participate in public demonstrations in Jordan, the respondents confirmed that this freedom is guaranteed to only a certain extent. 56.8% of respondents disagreed that this freedom is guaranteed. Moreover, none of the political party members, journalists, or professional council members and a total of only 3 out of 236 respondents strongly agreed that this freedom is guaranteed. It is clear from figure 8.2 below that members of groups who engage in demonstrations, or hold meetings and other political

⁴⁹³ The Public Gatherings Law (2004), Articles 3-4.

⁴⁹⁴ For more details see Human Right watch at <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/04/06/jordan10430.htm>

activities, opposed the idea that this freedom is guaranteed more strongly than academics, who might be expected to be less engaged in political activities.

Figure 8.2 Evaluations of Study Groups of the Level of Freedom to hold Political Demonstrations



Additionally, 54.7% of respondents also confirmed that freedom to participate in oppositional political activity without being subject to punishment is not guaranteed. Although the question specified the peaceful nature of these activities, the majority of respondents still disagreed with the statement. These results also revealed that the Jordanian government has applied the Public Gatherings Law to prevent political activists from the right to assemble peacefully, to hold meetings and demonstrations in order to prevent its critics from publicly assembling. According to this law political parties, professional associations, journalists, or other professional groups do not have the right to criticize the government, hold a meeting or arrange demonstrations without government permission.

8.3 The Main Obstacles to Political Participation in Jordan

Contrary to what some have argued, the present study's results have established that the obstacles to political participation in Jordan essentially stem from within Jordanian society. As for external factors, the impact of regional and international events is secondary. Therefore, the obstacles facing political participation in Jordan

can be divided into two categories. Internal obstacles and challenges have arisen from within the society, such as barriers facing many development projects due to financial and administrative corruption, and lack of trust in government commitment to achieving democracy and taking serious steps to encourage citizens to participate in the decision making process. Meanwhile, external regional and international events and situations surrounding Jordan affect society as a whole.

8.3.1 Internal Obstacles Facing Effective Political Participation in Jordan

The study's findings showed that 76.8% of survey respondents attributed lack of effective political participation to internal issues and their consequences. The results also identified these internal obstacles and challenges that deter Jordanian citizens from participating in political life. These obstacles are economic, political, social, and legal.

8.3.1.1 Administrative and Financial Corruption

Financial and administrative corruption ranked as the most important reason that the study sample considered an obstacle to political participation in Jordan. 35.4% of respondents stated that this reason constituted a major obstacle to political reform and participation. Jordanian society is a society based on family and tribal ties which control the various spheres of life and are considered as a major force in both Jordanian politics and society. Sometimes tribalism and social ties are held to be a major obstacle to democratization and the rule of law. Nepotism, favouritism, and intermediation (*wasta*) are the most common forms of administrative corruption in Jordan where the members of large families and tribes with influence can hold office and gain more benefits than others. Smuggling, tax evasion, counterfeiting, commercial fraud, and the manipulation of standards and specifications are the most common forms of financial corruption in Jordanian society.

There is a close relationship between administrative and financial corruption and favouritism, nepotism and *wasta*. This has created a climate of distrust because of the adoption of personal and family ties rather than standards of competence, experience, and the proper evaluation of ability and suitability in recruitment for public office.

Therefore, such corruption has not only economic consequences, but also serious social consequences, because it leads to the disruption of relations between the members of community and establishing it on illegal basis.

Therefore, the majority of members of human rights organizations (59.3%) considered corruption in its various forms to be the most common source of human rights violations and a major obstacle to political participation. This is despite the provisions of the Jordanian constitution which stipulate the principle of equality of Jordanians before the law in rights, duties, and equal opportunities. This equality assumes no person can gain public benefits at the expense of others. In practice, more than half of survey respondents disagreed that Jordanian citizens are equal in rights and duties before the law.

There are many reasons behind the emergence and spread of the phenomenon of corruption in Jordanian society. These include widespread poverty, unemployment and other difficult socio-economic conditions experienced by citizens; the rule of traditional values and ties based on families and tribes; the control of the executive authority over the legislative branch due to the weaknesses and lack of independence of parliamentarians who seek to derive services and funds from government for their own voters, which leads to breaches of the principle of control and encourages corruption; the lack of government commitment to combating corruption by taking serious preventive and punitive action; and inequality in the rights between citizens such as equal access to services, and the right to free competition for jobs.

Accordingly, corruption is a phenomenon which has very negative implications and consequences that directly touch the life of individuals socially, politically, economically, and culturally. This is because nepotism, wasta, and other forms of corruption lead to unqualified people holding public office at the expense of efficiency. Normally such corruption can be expected to increase budget deficits, leading to rises in foreign debt. These events put the country in an even more difficult economic, social, and political situation and eventually the ordinary life of citizens is adversely affected, since they have to pay for these costs.

All of this has led citizens to doubt the effectiveness of the law, and eroded trust and confidence in the political system which disregards such important issues, and consequently this has led Jordanians to have less trust in the ability of political parties and parliament to resolve national problems. Disappointment and frustration prevail among ordinary Jordanians and cast a shadow on the process of political participation, particularly participation in parliamentary elections. Elections have become a matter of voting based on criteria of familial and social ties rather than concerning the substantive issues relating to democracy and political reform.

8.3.1.2 Political Obstacles

The second obstacle to political participation in Jordan, as the study's results have revealed, is a lack of governmental seriousness in achieving democracy and increasing the participation of Jordanian citizens in political life. 30.3% of respondents said that lack of government willingness to achieve democracy was one of the main obstacles to political participation. Jordanian citizens do not trust that successive governments have had the serious intention to adopt political reform. Because the political reform needed to achieve democracy and to restore public faith in government can be achieved only by adopting modern laws which include Political Parties' Law, law of political freedoms, law permitting public gatherings, modern electoral law, in order to achieve political participation to all institutions of civil society. Furthermore, real political reform can be achieved also by activating the means of political participation, as well as combating the sense of apathy and marginalisation felt by the great majority of ordinary citizens.

In fact, the situation is the opposite, as all indicators show that the successive governments are not serious in achieving political reform. The government has increased the restrictions upon civil society in many ways as follows:

- Insisting on the single vote system in parliamentary elections, even though most political parties and activists opposed this law and feel disadvantaged by it.

- The Public Gatherings Law prohibits public freedoms and peaceful public meetings without getting advance permission from the authorities. More importantly, activists know that if they apply for permission to hold meetings or marches it will be denied as such events have been routinely banned by the government. For example, “in September 2004, Amman’s governor denied permission to hold a women’s protest, organized by the IAF, in solidarity with women’s right to wear the Islamic headscarf in France; In July 2006, Amman’s governor denied the Unity Party (*Hizb al-Wihda*) permission to hold an artistic memorial on the 37th anniversary of the death of the literary figure Ghassan Kanafani; in May 2007 Amman’s governor denied permission for a planned demonstration by 28 opposition parties against the proposed new Law on Political Parties; Most recently, in June 2007, the governor of Balqa’ denied the IAF permission to hold a demonstration marking the 40th anniversary of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza”.⁴⁹⁵
- The new Political Parties’ Law approved on March 19, 2007 added further restrictions, contradicts on political parties and undermines political pluralism. The new law raised the required number of founding members of parties from 50 to 500 in order to be registered, imposes government monitoring of party accounts; puts political parties under the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry instead of the Ministry of Political Development, and in addition sets a 10% minimum representation from at least five governorates. Jordanian political parties unanimously opposed the new law which was described by many as a death warrant for the country’s political life.

Accordingly, under such legislation the Jordanian citizens do not trust that the governments have a serious willingness to achieve political reform, as they feel that the democratic process has not moved forward in terms of legislation or in providing more opportunities for Jordanian citizens to participate in political life.

⁴⁹⁵ For more details see Human Right Watch wide web site on http://hrw.org/reports/2007/jordan1207/2.htm#_ftn33

8.3.1.3 Economic Obstacles

The rise in unemployment and growing poverty are threatening Jordan's society economically, socially and politically. Therefore, if the government cannot address these challenges through a comprehensive reform process the society will face a real threat to its social, economic, and political stability. Political frustration especially is linked to such unresolved problems in the economy.

The economic status of Jordanian citizens ranked as the third most important obstacle to political participation in the questionnaire survey. The economic status and conditions of citizens constitute an obstacle to their playing a political role in their country, which has a significant impact on the local decision making process. Economic factors affect the process of political participation, and particularly participation in the electoral process where the economic situation affects voters' and candidates' decisions. The increased incidence of poverty and unemployment and poor living conditions experienced by many Jordanian citizens have led to a fundamental change in political behaviour. Citizens vote for candidates believed likely to provide personal services, leading, in effect, to the widespread buying and selling of votes.

Economic difficulties have led to the phenomenon of political apathy and a decline of trust and engagement in political life and consequently in political participation. Therefore, many citizens have no intention of voting because they conclude that nothing will be changed. As a result many Jordanian citizens do not concern themselves with political participation and parliamentary elections due to this lack of trust in the effectiveness of the electoral process, which is believed incapable of having a real and direct impact on their lives or in improving their economic conditions.

The lack of citizen trust and respect for the electoral process and its political importance has been reinforced by the weakness of Jordanian parliaments and candidates, where the latter run for elections motivated by personal interests and benefits not necessarily linked to citizens' priorities and general social issues. Most of the deputies in Jordanian parliaments from 1989 until 2007 could be categorized as

retired military officers, young businessmen, independent tribal representatives, and Islamists. Accordingly, some deputies reach parliament through political money (buying votes), some are elected by their tribes, some due to support from the government, and only a few after running on political platforms.

As a result, Jordanian citizens believe that the Jordanian parliament remains a feeble body and unable to play an important role in the public policy making process or political reform, or even to express the people's interests and claims. Moreover, the government practises a certain amount of control over the Jordanian parliaments and its MPs through many temptations and services to their voters. This has led to a further loss of the legislature's prestige and reputation among the people.

Furthermore, civil society institutions such as political parties, and other organizations remain largely ineffective and extremely weak, as the regime consistently intends them to be. In addition, their role in supporting political reform is totally inadequate. Accordingly, Jordanian citizens do not trust these institutions either in terms of their ability to play a pivotal role in public life and to improve the conditions of citizens.

8.3.2 International and Regional Obstacles to Political Participation in Jordan

International and regional factors were regarded by the survey respondents as another barrier which negatively influences the political participation process in Jordan. 48.9% of respondents believed that international issues were an obstacle to political participation, while 48.8% declared that regional instability was considered an obstacle.

8.3.2.1 Regional Instability

Jordan has a unique strategic position and is in a special situation demographically politically and geographically which has created various dangers and disturbances. Regional security disturbances and the situations in Palestine, Iraq, and Lebanon, in addition to pressures faced by some countries in the region after the launching of the so-called war on terrorism and since the entry of American forces into Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, have all had a significant impact on the national security of

Jordan. Jordanians are in a permanent state of stress as a result of the serious and continuing disturbances in neighbouring countries.

8.3.2.1.1 The Ongoing Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

The most significant situation that has had a profound impact on Jordan is the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This conflict has led to successive waves of Palestinian refugees entering Jordan since 1948. According to an official statement in 2002 Jordan's population equally divided between Jordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin.

Since Jordan hosts the largest proportion of Palestinian refugees, the repercussions of Palestinian disturbances extends to the Jordanian arena. The study's results confirm this fact, when the majority of respondents declared that the most regional obstacle which affects political participation in Jordan is the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

There is a considerable interaction between Jordanians and Palestinians not only socially and demographically but also politically and this interaction between the two banks of the River Jordan has a great impact on Jordan, both in terms of domestic issues and foreign policy. Domestically, the disturbances in Palestine particularly (Intifada) have created fears to the Jordanian governments and security agencies from rising popular unrest in Jordan. Furthermore, due to increased fears that the regional situation and economic recession might lead to the electoral success of opposition parties, the government has suspended parliamentary life and postponed elections several times. Recently, the victory by Hamas (which has strong ties with the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan) in the last Palestinian parliamentary elections and its formation of a government encouraged the IAF (where Palestinians are heavily represented) to announce publically their readiness to form a government.

This statement has led to an ongoing confrontation between the government and Islamists in Jordan which has also had a negative influence on political participation. IAF members and their supporters in urban areas that are heavily populated by Palestinians have suspected election fraud and claimed that the government will

manipulate election outcomes to marginalize Islamist representation in municipal councils and parliament, so as to avoid the “Hamatisation” of the IAF. Therefore, this has led to high levels of voter dissatisfaction and consequently traditionally low turnouts. Accordingly, Palestinian events and disturbances are not confined to the Palestinian territories but also eventually affect the Jordanian arena because of the structure of Jordanian society.

8.3.2.1.2 The Iraq War

Another serious regional disturbance is the series of wars in the Gulf culminating in the present Iraq war, also known as ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’. Jordan is one of the countries most affected economically, politically, and in terms of national security due to its strategic and economic relationship with Iraq. According to the study’s results the ongoing conflict in Iraq was considered the second most important regional issue that has affected political participation in Jordan.

Economically, the Iraq War of 2003 affected Jordan very negatively and has created many challenges and serious economic consequences. Jordan has limited natural resources, a high budget deficit, and high unemployment. The invasion of Iraq by the United States disrupted traditional trade with Iraq, and spelled the end of subsidized oil that Jordan had previously received (in addition to an annual Iraqi oil grant to Jordan of \$350 million). Moreover, as Iraq had been the market for about 21% of Jordanian exports, the Jordanian economy had long been linked to the Iraqi market because large numbers of Jordanian manufactures had been created to meet its needs.

As a result, the Iraq war has led to inflation in Jordan due to rising fuel and food prices, increased debt, poverty, and unemployment. In addition, large numbers of Iraqi refugees have fled to Jordan, leading to even higher prices and unemployment. All of these economic conditions and repercussions have reinforced political repression in Jordan.

Politically, Jordan is squeezed between the most volatile countries in the Middle East: Israel and Palestine to the west and Iraq to the northeast. Moreover, Jordan’s political development is strongly affected by regional disturbances, and conflicts and violence

sometimes spill over into Jordan. Jordan has also paid a high price for the political stand of the Jordanian government on the Iraq war and as a result of the strong relationship between the Jordanian government and the USA that led Jordan to be among the first countries that adopted the slogan of the 'war on terrorism' after the 11th September attacks. This position increased popular opposition to the government's foreign policy.

Accordingly, and as a result of anti-American sentiment, Jordan has faced many of the threats, for example in the events of November 9, 2005 when three Iraqi suicide bombers linked to Al-Qaida attacked three international hotels in Amman, killing 60 people and injuring 115. These events gave the government justification to issue strict legislation to combat terrorism. The controversial new Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) endorsed by parliament became law on November 1, 2006. This law negatively impacted on public freedoms and exposed the government to a high tone of criticism and calls for amendments from human rights activists, political parties, lawmakers, and the media.

The new law gave broad powers to security forces to arrest suspects without charge or trial for up to 30 days without access to a lawyer or juridical review. Moreover, Article 8 of the anti-terrorism law gave the military courts rather than ordinary civil courts jurisdiction over terrorism cases. This led to an expansion of the role of military courts which is contrary both to the constitution and human rights.

More importantly, the definition of terrorism in the law is vague and overbroad. It criminalises acts such as gatherings and demonstrations which should not be regarded as terrorism. Moreover, this law could be used to punish peaceful critics and opponents of the government on the grounds that their activities - such as participation in peaceful demonstrations - resulted in minor property damage and could be considered a kind of 'public disorder' or 'endangering public safety risk'. All of these acts fall under the definition of 'terrorist acts' in the new law. In conclusion, the law restricts public freedoms and particularly freedom of expression which was already heavily restricted by other legislation.

8.3.2.2 International Events

Regarding the impact of international events on political reform and participation in Jordan, the study results revealed that there are two main international factors which affect the Jordanian political arena. These are the unwillingness of certain parties or states to pursue true democracy and stability in the region, and the events of 11th September 2001 and their consequences.

Political reform and real change towards democracy in the Arab World has become more necessary than ever before and is a major internal requirement. In addition, since September 11th events the Arab governments are under increasing international pressure to undertake political reform and relax their strict control over civil society. However, although some Arab governments have taken tentative steps towards reform, these remain limited and did not live up to sensitive issues such as political power. Hence, restricted political participation remains a most prominent feature in Arab political life.

Political reform and transition still faces difficult challenges. Arab regimes that enjoy absolute power and which rule without accountability are not really eager to improve civil society. On the contrary, they are fighting back to protect themselves, their security, stability, and sovereignty. Therefore, some political regimes in the Arab world do not have real intention to reform or in other words they are reluctant to take serious steps toward political reform. Thus, governments resort to depriving opposition forces and political parties of full political participation and the opportunity to contest elections. In addition they pass emergency laws, institute military courts, and design legislations that do not keep pace with time and the enhanced requirements.

For example, on October 8, 2001 after the September 11th attack, the government of Abu Ragheb amended the Jordanian Penal Code without any public or parliament debate. According to this amendment the government imposed more restrictions on the press and freedom of expression as well as tougher penalties for breaking the law. The amendment threatens with prison anyone who writes or makes a speech that is intended to, or results in harming national unity, disturbing the society's political

situation through promoting delinquency or immorality; or stirring up sectarian or racial tension or strife among different elements of the nation.⁴⁹⁶ Consequently, four parliamentarians Muhammad Abu Faris, Ali Abu Sukkar, Ja`far al-Hurani, and Ibrahim al-Mashukhi were charged under article 150 of Jordan's Penal Code with inciting sectarianism after paying their condolences to the family of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

External factor also play an important role in impeding political reform in Arab countries. 45.1% of the study sample declared that one of the international obstacles for political reform in Jordan and the Arab World in general was the unwillingness of some parties, and especially the United States of America, to pursue political reform or stability in the region. For example, the USA has used the issue of reform in the Arab World as a pretext to achieve political and economic gains.

The United States calls for reform came only after the events of September 11th as part of the American project to reform the Greater Middle East. This aims to achieve American control over this strategic part of the world and to protect its close friends and partners in the region such as Israel and some of the Arab political states. Accordingly, these objectives necessarily entail calls for political reform in specific forms to be achieved. However, achieving the Western concept of democracy in the Arab world might lead to the emergence of popular elected leaderships mainly the Islamist trends, which have popular support in many Arab countries. Such leaderships would not be in favour of America in the region, as Islamists tend to have strong anti-American sentiments.

As a result, the Arab populations are aware that their governments do not have a real intention to achieve political reform and effective political participation, because this threatens or contradicts their absolute power. In addition, democracy cannot be imposed from outside, but there is instead a need for it to be built from inside. Therefore Arab citizens doubt the motives and seriousness of international initiatives for reform. In particular, the American policies in Iraq have undoubtedly confirmed the failure of this method in achieving democracy and political reform.

⁴⁹⁶ Penal Code (2001), Article 150.

8.4 Evaluation the Participation of Political Parties in Jordan

Political parties are the cornerstone of democracy-building, representing social interest and providing a structure for political participation. As Lipset noted in *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, “democracy in a complex society may be defined as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office, that is, through political parties”.⁴⁹⁷

In fact, political parties engage in democracy building by taking part in parliamentary elections to elect candidates and then to achieve positions in legislatures and governments where the implementation of democratic reforms takes place. There is no doubt that Jordanian parliamentary elections are a strong indication to identify the actual position of the political parties, and whether these parties are expressions of active political trends in the community or merely reflect the phenomenon of personal political allegiance by individuals or groups to achieve personal benefits.

At present there are more than thirty political parties in Jordan, but unfortunately, as the study’s results reveal the impact of most of these parties on political life is still weak and they do not play a critical role in promoting political reform. Moreover, many of these parties only appear at specific times such as for general elections, and give the same speeches and promote the same slogans and before disappearing again and not working actively in public life.

8.4.1 Membership of Political Parties

According to the present study’s results, the freedom to join political parties in Jordan is considered to be one of the most guaranteed freedoms. Jordanian citizens do have the right to join political parties. However, the results also clearly revealed that 63.5% of the respondents had not joined political parties. Furthermore, excluding party

⁴⁹⁷Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (1981), p. 27.

members, only 14.5% of other respondents were members of political parties. Perhaps more surprisingly, 80.5% of respondents who were not political parties' members had no intention of joining political parties in the future.

The roots of partisan life in Jordan date to the founding of the state of Jordan in 1921, and political parties have been allowed to work openly since 1992. Moreover, although the party political map in Jordan includes Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood (IAF) and The Islamic Centre Party; leftist such as the Jordanian Communist Party; political parties which are an extension of some Palestinian factions such as the Popular Front is an extension of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and HASHD Party is an extension to the Democratic Front; and parties might be associated with parties in other countries such as the Ba'ath party (Syrian) and Ba'ath Party (Iraq). However, the political parties have not been able to achieve significant political and parliamentary gains and are unable to attract Jordanian citizens to join them in adequate numbers.

8.4.1.1 Reasons for the Reluctance of Jordanian Citizens to Join Political Parties

The reluctance of citizens to join political parties is one of the most important obstacles to political development in the country. It stems from various reasons; some of which are related to the political parties themselves and their performance in the political arena. Other reasons relate to political obstacles, given the narrow margin of political freedoms and the fact that the government does not allow them to participate in the formation of government. There are also legal obstacles under the election law which does not give adequate opportunity for parties to have access to parliament; and some social obstacles relate to social and cultural factors and the relationship between the parties and society.

8.4.1.1.1 Reasons Related to the Political Parties Themselves

As shown in the previous chapter the majority of survey respondents disagreed with the statement that Jordanian political parties work in the service of citizens and the society. Moreover, even some party members thought that the current political parties did not work in the service of society and its citizens. In addition, 54.9% of

respondents overall supported the idea that the political parties work in favour of their leaderships, and 35.9% of political parties' members also supported this idea.

The motives of citizens to join any political party are linked to the ability of these parties to provide political and economic programmes to meet the hopes and aspirations of members. This is reflected therefore in the primary desire of citizens to join parties and in the loyalty of their members. Accordingly, since some Jordanian political parties are deemed incapable of providing such programmes, citizens were reluctant to join them. In addition, even party members may feel dissatisfied, disloyal, to their parties if they are unable to achieve the desired ambitions. Therefore, loyalty to and membership of these parties may be influenced by personal interests.

The survey results revealed that some Jordanian political parties suffer from the phenomenon of 'personalization', where the personal interests of the leaders or the founders of the parties override the national and citizens' interests. Moreover, the loyalty of party members may be to their leaders and not to the party's espoused principles or objectives. This led Shteivi to argue that the parties' exercise of internal democracy is weak. He backed this up by adding that, "1. There has been continuity in their leadership for long periods of time (except in the IAF, whose internal regulations forbid the Secretary General from serving for more than two consecutive terms). 2. Schisms have emerged, particularly between top leaders, which could indicate that splitting off to form a new party is the only way for members to express themselves and achieve change".⁴⁹⁸

There are two major ideological trends in the Jordanian political arena: Nationalists, and Islamists. However, the personalization phenomenon has led to the emergence of many political parties which are very similar to each other in objectives and principles. The period from 1992-2003 witnessed the establishment of thirty-three political parties, which represents an annual average of about three new parties per year. However, even if the number of political parties increased, the size of their membership is still very low. Some political parties did not even exceed the minimum number of 50 members required to form a political party under political parties' law.

⁴⁹⁸ Majid (2005), p. 91

Some political parties reflect or represent the interests only of their leaderships and do not offer policies and programmes to revive political life and to encourage the spirit of participation and interaction between all members of the community. Therefore, some political parties are known only by the names of their Secretary-Generals or founders who are already high-level governmental and political figures. Some other parties are hardly known to the citizens at all. For example, 26 parties from 33 were recognized by no more than 5% of respondents in an opinion poll conducted by the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan in 2003. The Islamic Action Front Party was the most recognized but only by 14.7% of respondents, while the second most recognized was the National Constitutional Party with 1.0%. None of the other parties exceeded 0.2% recognition.

The study's results also revealed that the political performance of political parties has been considered very weak. Only 17.7% of respondents saw the parties as successful in the political field, while the majority (64.7%) declared that they were unsuccessful. More importantly, about half of political party members (46.8%) declared that the political performance of the existing political parties was unsuccessful.

Representative democracy can be achieved through strengthening political participation at the grassroots by all segments of society, particularly through political parties which provide programmes and are held accountable to the public. The survey results showed that the majority of respondents deemed the political parties unsuccessful, implying that they have failed to develop social policies and programmes which were felt to contribute to solving the economic and social problems of citizens. Consequently they failed to gain the support of citizens in parliamentary elections and had not provided comprehensive reform programmes qualifying them to gain seats in the Jordanian parliament.

Each political party has the desire to obtain political power to control or influence the policies of the government in order to achieve its principles and objectives in a pluralistic political system and with the peaceful rotation of power among political parties through elections. Since the return of political parties to the Jordanian arena after 1990, political parties have not been able to work seriously to provide comprehensive programmes. Therefore, they have not gained the confidence of the

Jordanians (with the exception of the Muslim Brotherhood Party) that they would be able to participate effectively and form a government in Jordan. 51.5% of the respondents declared that the current political parties were not qualified to form a government. Moreover, 32.9% of political party members agreed that the current political parties were not qualified to form a government.

Moreover, the political parties' calls to participate in power serve only one political party. From the thirty-three political parties at present, only one (the Muslim Brotherhood Party) would be able to form a government, according to the survey respondents. 64.1% of respondents who believed that some of the current political parties might be able to form a government declared that the IAF was the only party able to provide a comprehensive programme. None of the other six parties were named by more than 10% of respondents.

8.4.1.1.2 Legal Reasons

The electoral system is considered to be one of the most important pillars in building democracy and political stability in any state. In addition it is considered an important indicator of the evolution of democratic political life in any country. The electoral system has become the subject of one of the most heated debates in Jordan since multi-party competition for the elected legislature was initiated and political parties have had permission to gain limited access to the media.

Jordan's election law has undergone important changes and amendments that have significantly affected the basic legislative functions of representation, lawmaking, and oversight of the essential elements and qualities of democratic governance. These amendments, however, prompt a wide range of questions. The most important of these is whether or not the electoral system is designed to exclude political parties from representation in parliament and thus inevitably leads to electoral support according to family and tribal ties at the expense of political and ideological affiliation.

Jordan started peace negotiations with Israel in 1992 and was preparing to sign a peace treaty which needed to be endorsed by parliament. As a result of the opposition of Jordanian citizens to the peace treaty and normalization with Israel, the government

feared that these feelings might push Jordanian people to elect a parliament with a hard-line policy towards Israel, and that the election results might lead to success for those opposing peaceful resolution with the Jewish state.

The government wanted to make sure that the deputies in the 1993 parliament would be more pliant on the peace process than the deputies of the 1989 council had been. Consequently, a new electoral system was introduced for the 1993 parliamentary elections in the absence of parliament. The law was changed from a multiple voting system in which voters had as many votes as there were seats for their respective (multi-member) parliamentary districts, to a 'one-person one-vote' system. The main goal of these amendments was to reduce the parliamentary presence of a strong opposition to the peace treaty (which was signed in October, 1994), particularly of Islamists in parliament. Accordingly, tribal leaders and pro-governmental candidates won a majority of the seats in the 1993 parliament and endorsed the treaty as planned. Moreover, this treaty imposed on the successive governments to impose normalization with Israel which requires silence of opposition voices against normalization.

The survey results in this study showed that the current electoral system is not considered fair to political parties. 70.8% of the respondents declared that the current law is not suitable for political parties and does not give the proper opportunity to political parties to be represented in parliament. Moreover, 90.7% of political party members thought that the current law was unfair and that this constitutes a major obstacle to participating effectively in parliamentary elections.

The election law undoubtedly constitutes a major obstacle preventing Jordanian political parties from reaching parliament. This is particularly true in a tribal society like Jordan. The current electoral law has led to the retreat of political factors in parliamentary election campaigns in favour of tribal and personal allegiances. This is a setback for principles of competition and participation in the electoral process. That is what happened in the 1993 parliamentary elections and the next elections, where the electoral system played a vital role whether in voter turnout which was low or in the reluctance of some candidates, especially those who do not have tribal support from nominating themselves. For example, in the 1993 elections in spite of the

participation of all political parties in this election, but its share of seats in Parliament did not exceed 30 seats out of a seat 80.

In 1993 after the adoption of the new electoral law the number of Islamists deputies decreased to 18 deputies, then to 17 deputies out of 110 in the 2003 elections, and finally 7 out of 110 in the 2007 elections. This confirms that the single vote system had the desired effect for the government, contributing significantly to the reduction of the role and presence of political parties in parliament and strengthening the role of the various tribes and families. And what made it more complicated before any political party to succeed is the distribution of the parliamentary seats. These seats are divided between a large number of constituencies. As a result, the chances of success are associated with place and social relations rather than with partisan and political trends.

8.4.1.1.3 Political Reasons

The imposition of martial law in 1957 led to the disappearance of political organizations, and the dissolution of political parties. Their activities were prevented, members were arrested and partisan activities were criminalized. The negative impact of that period is still being felt, as Jordanians remain sceptical about and apathetic towards political parties.

Furthermore, the relationship between political parties and the government can be described as suffering from lack of confidence. Both groups view each other with deep suspicion and fear. On the one hand, the government believes that political parties seem unconcerned with the public interest, often having organizational ties with parties outside of the country. On the other hand, the parties see the government as carrying out political programmes that are against the national interest, and that it will continue to do all it can to weaken political parties by ignoring their existence and opinions.

This view is supported by the gradual decline in the democratic climate and the extensive restrictions on political parties which began by criminalizing certain types of peaceful expression, and preventing political parties from conducting

demonstrations, meetings, gatherings, and sit-ins. In addition to the marginalization of the political parties' role, the government does not encourage political parties or consult them in respect of political and economic issues important to the citizens and does not involve them in the formation of governments. Although to date 90 governments have been formed since the establishment of the Jordanian state, only one of them was formed on the basis of parliamentary elections.

More importantly, despite the importance of the partisan press, most Jordanian political parties do not have their own partisan newspapers. The press plays an important role in achieving objectives such as making citizens aware of the existence of political parties and their programmes, through which they can express their points of view about particular issues. As political propaganda during elections, this helps in creating political culture among the masses. Moreover, the importance of the partisan press for Jordanian political parties arises from the fact that government does not allow them to use the official media to present their programmes and policies. For all of these reasons the participation of political parties becomes weak, consequently, this has led Jordanian citizens to avoid them along with other political activities and even from having any contact with persons involved in political activities.

8.4.1.1.4 Social and Cultural Reasons

In terms of the relationship between political parties and society, the Jordanian governments have followed a policy of dealing directly with society and listening to its concerns, problems, where the tribes have been the most important channels for people to contact the authorities, be offered services and be helped to solve their problems. Meanwhile, citizens themselves have preferred dealing directly with the state. This has led to little direct contact with the political parties and weakened the communication between them and society in general. In addition, the parties themselves have failed to build a credible alternative to the tribe.

Therefore, the overwhelming majority of survey respondents (82.3%) in this study considered tribalism an obstacle to political party members and activists reaching parliament. Voters often do not support political candidates as they believe that they oppose the government and therefore will be unable to provide services to members of

their tribes. In a conference held on 2-3 July, 2007 at the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, researchers presented the results of fieldwork visit to one of the Jordanian tribes (Al-Azzam tribe). The tribe's leader (*Sheikh*) declared that we will not support any political candidate who opposes the government, and we do not support political party members. Political candidates thus may hide their political affiliation and stand for their tribes rather than parties in order to be elected to parliament.

Moreover, the parties' political, social, economic and cultural address no longer enjoys feasibility or credibility among Jordanians. Because the Jordanian Communist Party became weak after the fall of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the communist system in Eastern Europe, the Ba'ath party whether the Syrian or the Iraqi do not have trust in Jordanian street as they fail to achieve freedom, democracy and political pluralism in Syria and Iraq. The other parties which are linked to Palestinian organizations such as the Democratic Front and the Popular Front were in disagreement with the government as a consequence of 1970 conflict between the Jordanian government and PLO.

In term of Islamist parties, in addition to the scenario and technique to exclude Islamist from politics and prevent them from reaching representative councils for protecting the interests of the ruling elite and preventing change by placing carefully engineered legal hurdles in the way of any new political movement. The internal conflict and contradiction in IAF between doves or moderates and hawks or extremists which ended with control of extremists over the resolution sites led to weakening of the Muslim Brotherhood activities and weaken their role as a leader to the Jordanian opposition. Moreover, as a result of extremists control and Zaki Bani Irshid becomes the head of the IAF who is loyal and a strong ally to Hamas that led to their exaggerated focusing on Hamas agenda and ignoring of Jordanian citizen' problems. All of this has led to a decline in the popularity of the largest Jordanian political group (IAF) in Jordan.

8.5 Voting Behaviour and Motives in Parliamentary Elections

Individuals differ in their perceptions and behaviours of the same events. Therefore, an important factor in the voter's political behaviour in an election is the way he perceives that election. He may see it as important or unimportant; he may think his vote does or does not count. Therefore, when voting takes place in parliamentary elections one important question is raised: why do voters vote? in other words, do voters vote according to their personal interests or for those of the community?

Elections could not be separated from the goals and objectives of the electorate that determine the quality of the members of parliament. In Jordanian parliamentary elections, voters vote for candidates representing their interests reflected in, for example, party affiliation, national duty, tribal affiliation, and for personal benefit.

8.5.1 Political Motives

Many candidates stand in parliamentary elections as independents rather than under the banner of their political parties, as they then have a better chance of getting into parliament. Therefore few Jordanian citizens vote for political reasons. According to the survey results only, 2.7% of respondents who participated in the last elections declared that their participation reflected partisan commitment. The majority of respondents voted because they felt that participation was a duty and obligation towards the society in which they lived.

8.5.2 Tribal and Social Relations

The tribal nature of Jordanian society contributes significantly to the adoption of candidates with social and tribal ties reaching parliament. It is clear from the composition of the House of Representatives from 1989 to 2007 that the majority of elected deputies are not members of political parties, with the exception of the Islamic Action Front. Therefore, 91% of respondents confirmed this when they declared that voting behaviour in Jordan is directly linked with the primary tribal or familial affiliations of voters.

In the 2003 parliamentary elections the tribal and conservative candidates won 86 out of 110 seats, while the political parties failed to win any seat, with the exception of IAF who won 18 seats for the 30 represented candidates. Moreover, it has been noted that voter turnouts increased in the tribal more than urban areas. Besides, under the current one-person, one-vote election system and in a tribal society like Jordan, tribalism has played and continues to play a major role in parliamentary elections.

8.5.3 Voting for Personal Benefit

8.5.3.1 Voting for Services and Intermediation (*Wasta*)

77.9% of survey respondents in the present study declared that the services dimension in the relationship between voters and candidates and the proximity of the latter to authorities and centres of power led voters to vote for particular candidates. Voters tend to cast their ballots for candidates whom think they will afford them services and intermediation (*Wasta*). Such voting patterns are not for issues or reasons of ideology or policy preferences. Many Jordanian voters vote for representatives who have good relationships with the authorities to enable them to obtain patronage, rather than those who reflect their political views.

Therefore the electorate has come to view members of parliament as ways (*wasta*) to get jobs, or university seats. One voter who had asked his deputy *wasta* to get a job said “I came to seek a job from the deputy of our district. He told us that the government does not listen to them these days. I wonder why the deputies oppose the government. They should comply with and obey the government’s policies so that we can take our rights, because it is up to the government to pass anything. Frankly speaking, I will not elect anyone unless the government approves of him because we want to survive”.⁴⁹⁹

Thus, from a functional point of view, the ‘service deputy’ phenomenon results from pressure from the constituencies to provide services. This has turned parliament from being a legislative and monitoring device to a services provider. The ‘service deputy’

⁴⁹⁹ *Alarab Alyawm* Newspaper, April 13, 2000 cited in Basem Sakijha, and Sa’eda Kilani, *Wasta in Jordan: The Declared Secret* (2002), p. 59.

phenomenon has arisen for several reasons. The first and most important stems from the fact that most candidates in Jordan are independents and nominate themselves for elections personally rather than representing parties who have programmes and political agendas. Therefore, as they are unable to provide integrated economic and political programmes they offer services to meet voters' demands and needs.

The second reason for the spread of *wasta* is due to the fact that the government does not provide services on a fair basis to all regions and citizens. Former MP Dr Odeh Kawas has said from my experience the reason people resort to *Wasta* is that they feel aggrieved. Moreover, *Wasta* has unfortunately become part of the culture of Jordanian society.⁵⁰⁰ Lastly, the rise of the 'service deputy' phenomenon is also due to the electoral system itself. In a workshop organized by the Jerusalem Centre for Political Studies under the title 'Jordanian Political Parties and the Requirements of the New Law' the Secretary General of IAF party, Zaki Bani Irshaid, stated that "The weakness of the current parliament is due to the law of single vote, which conceals partisan political activity on behalf of the service deputy".⁵⁰¹

8.5.3.2 Votes Buying (economic factor)

Another dangerous phenomenon that has surfaced in Jordanian parliamentary elections is the usage of 'political money' in securing victory for some candidates. The increased incidence of poverty and unemployment, and the poor living conditions of many Jordanian citizens, in addition to their frustration about the possibility of achieving minimal levels of reform, lead some voters to focus merely on what benefits they can get from the electoral process.

In an article in *Al-Arab Al-Yawm* newspaper, Fahad Alkhitan wrote that, "there is no opportunity for competition among independent and national candidates in most districts because of tribal and other narrow affiliations and the rush of businessmen and rich candidates to buy votes from citizens, in an unprecedented vote-buying

⁵⁰⁰http://www.antymagazine.com/magazine2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=54&Itemid=2

⁵⁰¹ http://www.alqudscenter.com/arabic/pages.php?local_type=122&local_details=1&idd=75

process that has never ever taken place in the country before”.⁵⁰² Moreover, Taher Al-Edwan stated in the same newspaper that, “It has become clear to everybody that most parliamentarians in Jordan win parliamentary seats through the art of buying votes and raising the speculative price of votes”.⁵⁰³ One voter declared that “I gave my vote in exchange for JD10. I voted and so did all my sisters and we went home with JD40 in total”.⁵⁰⁴

The vote-buying process takes place in many forms, and the buyers of votes have developed various ways to cover up their vote-buying activities. Even with the enforcement of Article 20 of the Jordanian electoral law, which criminalizes such actions, vote-buyers have found ways to evade prosecution with the help of voters who are ready to sell their votes. Accordingly, vote-buying process sometimes occurs under the pretext that this money is used for charitable purposes, or in the form of payments of housing rent or water and electricity bills, as well as getting jobs.

8.6 Women’s Political Participation

The Jordanian constitution does not distinguish between women and men in terms of rights and duties, and in addition, the 1974 election law grants the rights of women to vote in elections. However, equality in the constitution and election law does not reflect the reality of women’s equality in the political sphere.

Although the sample in the present study was drawn from the political elite in Jordan, 79.6% of the respondents who participated in the 2003 parliamentary elections did not vote for women candidates. Most researchers have attributed the restricted access of women to political life, and therefore to parliament, to social and religious constraints. However, contrary to most previous results the present results revealed that the main obstacle limiting the ability of women to improve their position and become involved actively in political life is a lack of confidence in the ability of women, whether in political or public life generally.

⁵⁰² *Al-Arab Alyawm* Newspaper, September, 15 2007.

⁵⁰³ *Al-Arab Alyawm* Newspaper, May 27, 2007.

⁵⁰⁴ *Jordan Watch* Friday, November 30, 2007.

8.6.1 Women's Electoral Support of Women

The traditional and conservative culture prevailing in Jordanian society depends on values, customs, and traditions which identify a stereotypical image of women through socialization and cultural beliefs determining what is appropriate and inappropriate in the roles of men and women. In addition, gender culture and patriarchal dominance is supported by social and religious institutions which reinforce the traditional role of women. This results in many decisive manifestations of political participation in favour of men and the marginalization of women. Therefore, no woman candidate has ever been elected to represent a Jordanian tribe in the internal votes which they conduct to decide their candidates. Moreover, participation as candidates or voters in the tribe's internal elections is confined to men only.

Although the number of registered women in the election records is sometimes close to or even higher than the number of men, women have always failed to win municipal or parliamentary seats apart from under the quota system. This means that women do not elect women candidates. From the survey 81.1 per cent of respondents said that women tended not to vote for women candidates in the 2003 elections. Most believed that women candidates are weak and do not have enough political experience to be elected to parliament.

Women themselves do not elect women because their electoral decisions are still not independent, instead being subject to masculine authority and to the customs and traditions that promote the status of men and reduce or marginalize the public presence of women. Zeenat Algerari, a candidate for the 14th parliament stated that the main reason that women refrain from supporting female candidates is the subordination of women to men, in addition to women's lack of self confidence that led to lack of confidence in women candidates.⁵⁰⁵

⁵⁰⁵ <http://ammonnews.net/arabicDemo/article.php?issue=&articleID=7467> (access at 12:30 pm).

8.6.2 Jordanian Women and Political Parties

Despite the growing role of women in economic, social, and political life in Jordan, the extent of women's participation in political parties is still very low. Jordanian women are reluctant to join political parties or, if they do, they are marginalized. According to the Ministry of Interior's 2002 records, the proportion of women in political parties represents no more than 8% of the total number of members. Women's presence among the founding committees of various political parties also varies from 0.4% of the Jordanian Democratic Left Party to 51% in the Liberal Party. Moreover, 3 parties out of 31 parties had no women among their founding members.

Among respondents in this study 79.7% of political party members did not vote for women candidates, and 56% of them explained their decision in terms of women not having enough experience in political and public life. Furthermore, most of the current political parties are not headed by women directly, nor deal with their issues seriously and effectively through their programs. Moreover, not all political parties support the parliamentary participation of women. In a survey conducted by the Jerusalem Centre about the status of women in Jordanian political parties, the results showed that only five out of twenty responding parties supported allocating seats in parliament to women in the quota system. This indicates that the goal of women's political participation is not a priority for most of the parties, even though most of the parties claim to deal with women's issues in order to win their votes.

8.6.3 The Women's Quota System in Jordan

In the quota system adopted in Jordan in early 2003, six parliamentary seats were reserved for women. In addition women are legally allowed to run in open competition for all seats. The system has come under criticism from various groups. Some support the allocation of a quota for women in the House of Representatives based on several considerations, and as a result of the benefits and the advantages achieved by this system that gives women access to the House of Deputies. At the same time, others object to the quota system as a result of the negative aspects involved.

37.8% of all survey respondents and 48.1% of female respondents in this study were in favour of allocating seats to women in parliament and considered the quota system to be fair to women. Those who were in favour of allocating seats to women in parliament gave various reasons. Firstly, on democratic justice, the arrival of women to parliament will devote the principle of real participation to all citizens in the political life. In addition they stressed the necessity of adopting such a system in order to push women forward since they make up about 50% of the population. Consequently women need to be included and represented in the political realm.

Secondly, women know their problems and needs better than men, therefore, it seems logical to be represented to stand for their rights themselves. Moreover, Jordanian electoral law has adopted the comprehensive representation of all segments of the society including Christians, Chechens, Circassians, and Bedouins. Therefore, in this context it is only just that women should also be represented through a quota system. Finally, many modern electoral systems adopt quota systems or allocations of parliamentary seats for specific social groups. This may occur through electoral law forcing political parties to allocate a specific proportion of candidates to women in their electoral lists such as Germany (40%-45% of party lists), and in the USA (15.2% of party lists).

On the other hand, 48.9% of respondents and 40.4% of female respondents in the survey thought the Quota system unfair to women. In Jordan many opponents of the quota system argue that it contradicts constitutional articles and basic democratic values which clearly stipulate that voters should be able to choose their representatives freely. The quota system is hence considered to discriminate between men and women because originally voting and nomination for elections followed principle of social justice and equality. Moreover, they argue that parliament “is not a cake to be divided between tribes, sects, ethnic groups, and women by means of quotas, but an organization that comprises elected representatives of the citizenry, who in turn represent parties”.⁵⁰⁶

⁵⁰⁶ Majed (2005). p. 21

It can be argued that adoption of a quota for women is necessary and justified for a certain period during a transitional phase until society comes to believe in women's political abilities. The quota system can be seen as a first step in order to demonstrate the efficiency of women in politics, so that in the future women could gain access to parliament through competition instead, which would depend on the ability of society to elect representatives without regard to race, ethnic identity, sectarianism, tribalism or gender.

8.7 Evaluation of the Current Electoral Law

As the electoral system translates the votes cast in a general election into seats in the legislature, the choice of electoral system can effectively determine who is elected and which party gains power. It is also known that electoral systems can also be utilized for the development of narrow loyalties and affiliations, such as those based on tribalism, regionalism, and ethnicity.

The Jordanian government issued five electoral laws and many amendments between 1923 and 1986. As discussed before, most of these amendments were designed by political actors as tools to be used to promote the interest of their own supporters. Therefore, there is considerable apprehension about the adoption of other electoral system such as BV or PR. These could give more opportunities for the masses of Jordanians of Palestinian origin to control the Jordanian parliament and thus threaten the Jordanian identity, or Islamists' control which would increase the size of opposition representation in parliament that would hamper the government in passing some of the agreements and laws.

The 1989 elections were held under the multi-vote system, and produced a parliament which manifested various aspects of pluralism. It included Islamist, nationalist, leftist, and conservative representatives. Therefore, the 1989 parliament played a prominent role in emphasizing the importance of democratization, the principle of parliamentary independence from the executive branch, its exercise of control and accountability over the performance of government, participation in the decision-making process, and issuance of new democratic legislations. The latter included the lifting of martial law and the legalization of political parties; cancelling legal immunity for any action


or decision of the government. In terms of political freedoms and citizens' rights, the 1989 parliament restored jobs to people who had been dismissed for political reasons, released political detainees, and returned passports to tens of thousands of citizens which had been withdrawn for political reasons.

Despite near-unanimous partisan and popular rejection and criticism of the current electoral system, the government insists on retaining the same system used since 1993. According to this law the Chamber of Deputies is comprised of 110 seats spread over 45 electoral districts. Parliament includes six seats reserved for women, nine for Christians, and three each for the Circassian and Chechen minorities. Furthermore, most of the electoral districts are allocated one each. However, many political parties and activists, professional associations, and civil society institutions have boycotted parliamentary elections because they argue that such system promotes tribalism at the expense of modern civil society, which has led to a conservative, traditionalist-dominated Chamber of Deputies since 1993.

The adoption of SNTV has led to several negative repercussions, such as an atmosphere of tension and lack of political dialogue between the government and opposition, and an absence of political party deputies and activists in Jordanian parliaments. Consequently this has led to the poor performance of the Chambers of Deputies, as well as the domination of the executive authority over the legislature. In light of such parliaments the successive governments have issued various legislations and temporary laws (such as the current electoral law, the Public Gatherings Law, and Press and Publications Law) which have increased restrictions on political freedoms and had a negative impact on the election process and levels of public participation in political life. Some even argue that 1993 -when the SNTV was introduced- was the beginning of the end of the political democratization process.

All of these circumstances have led Jordanian citizens to feel that parliament and electoral participation will not lead to positive results in their daily lives, and that the ability of parliament to influence government policies is very limited. This impression has a negative impact on voter turnout in parliamentary elections. Figure 8.3 shows that voter turnouts in countries adopting SNTV are lower in comparison with other electoral systems.

Figure 8.3 Voter Turnout Categorized by Electoral System Type.



Key: VAP = voting age population

Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), (2005)

The two cases of STV come out well ahead with a turnout rate of 83%, while Jordan and Vanuatu are the only two countries using SNTV system and they both have voter turnouts of only 54%. This suggests that electoral system choice may have some impact upon overall turnout rates.

Reynolds and Reilly have argued that, “when designing an electoral system, it is best to start with a list of criteria which sum up what you want to achieve, what you want to avoid and, in a broad sense, what you want your parliament and government to look like”.⁵⁰⁷ There are hundreds of electoral systems currently in use in the world which fall into three broad families; the plurality-majority, the semi proportional, and proportional representation and each system has potential advantages as shown in table 8.1.

The most suitable electoral system for Jordanian society would be one which builds trust between commentators, politicians, civil society organizations, and, above all, among the citizens of the country. Accordingly, the electoral system should: give voters choices to elect individual candidates and political parties; and provide an opportunity for popular independents to be elected while at the same time

⁵⁰⁷ Reynolds, et. al. (1997), p. 9.

encouraging participation of political parties. No electoral system is perfect, each having its own properties, its own weaknesses, and its own strengths. However, the current electoral system (SNTV) provides more opportunity for independent candidates to be elected in Jordan, particularly since the Jordanian political parties are still weak as discussed and candidates are selected based on kinship or patronage.

Therefore, the majority of survey respondents in this study suggested that two votes system (TVS) or mixed system is the most suitable system for Jordanian society. Under this proposal each voter has two votes: one for a district candidate, and one for a national list. The latter would mean a party list or at least several individuals working under one platform. This proposal would encourage political parties to merge into larger parties to form one list so as to gain more seats in parliament. Consequently this might lead political parties to be whittled down to three or four major parties. This system is praised by Jordanians for being simple to use and understand, and at the same time commensurate with the fact that political parties are weak, as it provides an appropriate opportunity for independent candidates.

Table 8.1: Comparison of Advantages of Electoral Systems

Plurality-Majoritarian (PM)	Proportional Representation (PR)	Semi-Proportional
Simple method that also links representatives with particular geographic areas.	Reduces the disparity between a party's share of the national vote and number of seats in parliament.	Combines the positive elements of both the purely proportional and majoritarian systems
Tends to encourage the existence of two or three major parties with ideologies leaning left and right. It is argued that this creates a clearer choice for voters. Whereas in a PR system, voters may be confused by a multitude of parties with narrow interests.)	Facilitates the participation of many political parties, representing a broad spectrum of interests and a variety of views. The argument is that this allows for greater voter choice (than in the PM system).	The PM elements allow for direct representation, while the PR elements allow for some minority representation, more voter choice and party accountability (as described below).
Because there are fewer and more distinctly different parties, this system encourages coalition governments, leading to a stronger and more vibrant parliamentary opposition. Some argue that such a system is more efficient in forming broad based coalitions in terms of decision making, both within the legislature and between the executive and legislature.	Because there are more participating parties than in the PM system, the likelihood of coalition governments is greater. This is considered a favorable development in some cases, because broad coalition governments must achieve consensus and therefore can foster stability in policy making.	In theory, a this system should lead to a less fragmented party system than a pure system of proportional representation, but possibly a broader based government than in a PM system.
Benefits broadly-based political parties, who must try to attract a majority of voters in a given race by acting as spokesmen to different interests -- rather than encouraging smaller parties that might exacerbate ethnic, religious or regional differences.	Facilitates minority party representation. (Cited as potentially important in divided societies, whereby certain ethnic, regional or religious interests would otherwise be completely locked out of the political process by a dominant party or parties.)	Small minority parties who have been unsuccessful in the plurality-majority elections may still be rewarded for their votes received by winning seats in the proportional allocation. Further, in highly divided societies a semi-proportional system would likely lead to less polarisation than in a PR system.

<p>provides for a stronger link between representatives and their constituents, since representatives represent particular geographic areas rather than just parties. This is a way to hold the members more directly accountable to their constituents.</p>	<p>If candidates are elected based on the appeal of a party platform, rather than the popularity of a given candidate, the entire party can be held accountable for adhering to the platform.</p>	<p>The PM elements allow for direct representation, while the PR elements allow for some minority representation and party accountability.</p>
<p>provides an opportunity for popular independent candidates to be elected, particularly important in developing countries where parties are weak and candidates may be selected based on patronage or family connections.</p>	<p>Can encourage the election of women (and minorities). If a party puts a woman on the electoral list, she may get elected based on the party's overall popularity. Women are less likely to get elected in some countries if they are directly facing a male candidate in election. PR lists also allow parties to establish gender quotas for nominations.</p>	<p>The system can allow for more women or minorities on the list portion of the system, while also allowing for independent candidates.</p>

Source: The Impact of Electoral Design on the Legislature,
<http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/Parl-Pub-impact.htm>

CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

9.1 Political participation in Jordan

To diagnose correctly and address the challenges of and main obstacles in the way of real and effective participation in Jordan, this study has aimed to investigate the reality of political participation. This has been achieved through an evaluation of basic human rights, particularly political freedoms (freedoms of opinion, speech, press, and mass media); the participation of political parties and women; and of the electoral system. Therefore, this study derived from the findings and discussion some conclusions regarding the reality of political participation in Jordan.

According to Maslow, human needs start with needs for survival, especially economic and security needs, or what Maslow called 'deficiency needs' or 'D-needs'. Therefore, higher needs in Maslow's hierarchy only come into focus once all the lower needs are satisfied. Once an individual has moved past a level, needs in the lower level will no longer be prioritized. However, if a lower set of needs is continually unmet, the individual will temporarily re-prioritize those needs until they are reasonably satisfied. Moreover, as discussed in the literature review in this study many scholars have found a positive relationship between growth in socioeconomic development and a stable political environment that helps to enhance political participation and therefore to promote democracy.

- The most important conclusion to be drawn from the research findings in this study is that participation in parliamentary elections in Jordan has become a socio-economic rather than a political process. In addition Jordanian parliamentary elections have traditionally related to social representation rather than political transformation. The political liberalization since 1989 has had no profound impact in deepening democracy and increasing political participation in Jordan. After 18 years of democratic openness in Jordanian

society, economic needs still dominate in the Jordanian community as a result of the continuing effects of economic crises, and increased poverty and unemployment. This economic situation coincides with the internal congestion due to the drop in the climate of national reconciliation. There has also been disruption of dialogue between the government and the opposition, increasing restrictions on political freedoms. The weak performance of Jordanian parliaments has left a deep impression that the electoral participation of citizens will not lead to positive results in their daily lives.

- Thus, Jordanian citizens have a sense of political inefficacy and therefore they tend to not participate in politics because, as Peteman argued, people who have a sense of political efficacy are more likely to participate in politics than those in whom this feeling is lacking. As a result this led to the need for service deputies and to take advantage of the opportunity in the election campaigns that give preference to money by selling and buying votes which eliminate all opportunities for political candidates.
- As outlined in the literature review, there are two views on democracy and participation. The first view sees citizen participation as unimportant to democracy, and that it is limited to voting to choose the leadership and to produce governments. The second view supports the importance of citizen participation and considers it an essential element for democracy. According to the present analysis and discussion it is clear that views concerning citizen participation in the Jordanian political system are closer to the first view. The role of Jordanian citizen participation is limited only to electing representatives, and not to producing a government. Thus, it is argued that from the viewpoint of the political system, citizen participation is not regarded as of value in itself or as an essential element of democracy, and instead its role in Jordanian parliamentary elections is mainly an instrument aimed at showing that the state is moving towards democracy and political reform.

- According to the material discussed in chapter one, political participation refers to political activity by individual citizens. It can be either conventional (voting, writing letters, working in campaigns) or unconventional (demonstrations, protests, boycotts). It is obvious that the opportunities for Jordanian citizens to participate in political and policy processes have substantially decreased. Moreover, the dominant view held by Jordanian governments since 1992 is that the mass participation of citizens is undesirable. Therefore, it can be argued that although the most basic form of participation in Jordan is conventional, mainly involving voting, many Jordanian citizens do not even participate in this basic activity. Voter turnout in parliamentary elections has been declining for the last three elections. Meanwhile other forms of political participation are severely restricted.
- Additionally, one of the clearest conclusions to be gleaned from the analysis in this study is that participants in Jordan can be categorized into three categories:

>>The first category includes participants who exercise their election rights in order to support tribal, ethnic, regional, and demographically-based candidates. This segment has a significant impact on the electoral process and includes the majority of participants. Furthermore, many members of political parties win seats in parliament by focusing on the demographical or tribal dimension and not on ideological positions. Data on the composition of the Jordanian parliament supports this argument, where tribal and pro-government candidates have swept the polls in all Jordan's parliamentary elections.

>>The second segment includes a minority of Jordanian citizens who exercise their political rights because they are interested and aware of events and issues happening around them. Therefore, they support candidates who have a real agenda to enhance democratic deliberation and participation in Jordan. This segment consists of some political activists, and members of various organizations and political parties. This fact can be demonstrated by the limited number of political and partisan MPs in parliament.

>>The third segment includes passive citizens who are not interested in political events and activities happening around them. This large segment of the population suffers depressed economic conditions which have serious effects on their daily lives. Therefore, this segment refrains from participating in political life whether in parliamentary elections by voting or joining political parties. This fact can be realized from the low voter turnout in all Jordanian parliamentary elections and the limited number of members of political parties.

- Brumberg argued that one of the most essential elements of democracy is the existence of a constitution to impose limits on executive power. Since 1993 there have been no substantial political or legal reforms. Although the Jordanian constitution adopts the principle of the separation of powers to ensure freedom and prevent tyranny, this principle is not effectively applied and the constitution has been broken several times. Political power is still in the hands of the political system, which can dissolve parliament and delay elections. In a special report released by Freedom House entitled “Country background and analysis reports about human rights and freedom issues in Jordan”, the report indicates that Jordanians cannot change their government democratically and Jordan is not an electoral democracy. “The King holds broad executive powers and may dissolve parliament and dismiss the cabinet at his discretion; the king appoints members of the cabinet, led by a prime minister”.⁵⁰⁸ Moreover, the government has power to rule by issuing temporary laws despite these laws not meeting the conditions stipulated in the constitution. Between 1999 and 2004 more than 230 temporary laws were issued by the government, many of which were designed to consolidate their power and to impose new restrictions on political freedom. Moreover, Jordanian citizens enjoy little protection from arbitrary arrest, and suspects may be detained for up to 10 days without formal charge.
- Political liberalization in Jordan has not led to successful democratization due to the absence of meaningful political participation. The meaningfulness of participation in the parliamentary elections is determined by how effective the

⁵⁰⁸ For more details see <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm>.

elected parliament is considered to be. Thus, citizens do not tend to participate in elections when parliament has no real influence on the formation of governments or on government policy. But it becomes more important when parliament has the power to control executive authority and makes decisions relevant to issues which affect people's daily lives. Although five parliamentary elections have been held since 1989, these cannot be considered a part of democratization because the executive is still the dominant law-maker, and the powers of parliament are limited. According to Beverly Milton-Edwards democratization signifies a move toward greater degrees of political participation in existing governmental systems. In essence, it enhances the collective freedom of the citizen, especially in terms of the public's ability to participate in and influence the government.⁵⁰⁹

- It is also argued that the participation of political parties in political life and parliamentary elections reflects the political and social reality in which they work. The existence of political and intellectual vacuum in Jordanian society has contributed greatly to the strengthening of tribal and economic dimensions in parliamentary elections. In addition, the ways in which Jordanian citizens interpret the existence of political parties and the importance of their role in society is that they are still weak due to many reasons. The most important of these is irrelevance of political parties to the political, economic, social and cultural issues and problems experienced by Jordanian citizens.
- It is also argued here that although the large number of parties in the Jordanian political arena is an unhealthy sign, political development cannot be achieved through legislation on parties, but rather through the development of electoral law and other laws which dispel the culture of fear and stimulate participation. By the last amendments to the political parties' law many parties will come out of the arena without leading to the emergence of large parties. Therefore, it is argued that political parties still have a long way to go to reach a significant

⁵⁰⁹ Beverly, *Contemporary Politics in the Middle East* (2000), pp. 150-152.

level of political participation under such certain, performance, culture, constraints, and laws.

- The current electoral system has contributed significantly to the reduction of the role and presence of political parties in elections, and has strengthened the role of the various tribes and families. What has made things more complicated is the distribution of parliamentary seats to a large number of constituencies, making the chances of success associated with place and social relations more than opportunities are given to partisan and political trends. Therefore, it is clear that the design of the current electoral system has not met most of the eight criteria that should be followed according to Reynolds and Reilly's criteria. On the contrary electoral systems have been designed by the way which designer think will work to their own advantage.
- In relation to political culture in Jordan, it seems that there can be no real democratic system in Jordan without the establishment and consolidation of democratic values in the political culture of Jordanian citizens. As Ayubi stated, "Democracy is simply not a form of government; it is also a cultural and intellectual tradition".⁵¹⁰ This culture is the key element in the formulation of political relationships between the government and the population, because democracy is not just laws, political institutions and electoral processes, but first of all it is a set of values and principles which provide the cultural framework for a democratic system.
- Despite the remarkable progress witnessed by Jordan at the end of the 1980s, the culture of fear in Jordanian society still poses a fundamental challenge to democratic participation. The fear of the security agencies and the consequences of criticizing governments in public and disagreeing with them based on perceptions and impressions generated among citizens. Additionally, the culture of fear makes the Jordanian citizens afraid of complaining about violations of their rights on one hand, and the lack of the government's response to cope with these complaints on the other hand. Hani Dahleh, the

⁵¹⁰ Ayubi, *Over-stating the Arab State* (1995, p. 397).

chief of The Arab Organization for Human Rights (AOHR), said that the human rights situation in Jordan continues to decline. Furthermore, in its annual report about the human rights situation in Jordan in 2007, the organization accused the Jordanian authorities of failure to show adequate seriousness in dealing with human rights violations as reported by citizens. The report said that “the AOHR office in Amman received 122 complaints last year about violations mainly pertaining to bad treatment, torture at police stations and abuse of authority. This number of complaints is an indication that the violations of human rights in the country were on the rise in 2007 because complaints received in earlier years did not exceed 100”. The AOHR chief added that “The government dealt only with four out of the 122 complaints we reported”.⁵¹¹

- The present study also concludes that the subject political culture still prevails in Jordan. Democratic values do not represent a major component in the structure of the political culture of the majority of Jordanians, which has led to the prevalence of an apathetic political culture. On the other hand, negative values and abstention from participation are common among the majority, in addition to the sense of their inability to influence national events and developments. Moreover, as Sharbi argued, Arab societies are characterized by patriarchal values. Patriarchal culture still dominates the culture of Jordanian society. The social relations of kinship and the tribe are still dominant and constitute the main motives for Jordanians to participate in parliamentary elections. Furthermore, there is a culture of doubt and lack of confidence prevailing in society that the government has no serious intention to combat corruption or to achieve democracy, since the government has not adopted any substantive laws nor created institutions to tackle these issues.
- Finally, regarding women’s participation in Jordanian parliaments, although the quota system has brought women into Jordan’s parliament, the presence of women there really only represents a facade of democracy and is purely

⁵¹¹ For more details see The Arab Organization for Human Rights (AOHR) website www.aohr.org.

cosmetic, as the majority of citizens do not believe in the importance of the political role of women.

9.2 Recommendations

To deepen and consolidate political participation in general in Jordan, and electoral participation in particular, a number of recommendations can be made from the results of the study, which can be summarized as follows:

1. Financial and administrative corruption must be combated, because it has adverse affects directly or indirectly on political participation. Policies should be drawn up to prevent the use of national wealth and public funds for personal interests. Moreover, the government should pay more attention to tackling combating practices of electoral bribes and vote-selling in favour of some candidates, which leads to the corruption of the entire electoral process.
2. It is crucial to alleviate the economic problems that citizens are suffering from particularly in low wages, unemployment and the widespread poverty in the society. These problems constitute an obstacle to real political participation as the citizen cannot be active in the political arena while he is suffering from poverty and thinking and concentrating his attention to securing the basic needs of life.
3. Restrictions on political freedoms should be relaxed particularly the freedoms of expression, association and assembly in order to achieve the goals of political reform. In addition the doctrine of separation of powers should be applied to protect individual rights and freedoms from abuse by the government. This means not only the separation of sovereign powers, but also of the exercise of that power.
4. The government should support political parties and their activities in the political arena by consulting and involving them in the implementation of national policies, in addition to involving them in the formation of governments in order to achieve true democratic transformation. Political parties are the main tool of democratic transformation, and for promoting

political knowledge and an awareness of democratic empowerment across society.

5. Jordanian political parties have to adopt practical and realistic national programs to participate in and contribute to political and economic life. Moreover, parties should be established through popular bases and not through individuals or groups pursuing personal interests, if they are to gain credibility and play a role in institutionalising and developing political life and participation.
6. Political parties should review their political and electoral performance and work to unify their perspectives about necessary reforms. This requires, above all, reducing the gap between themselves and the masses, which would depend on their responsiveness to people's needs and on the ability of their programmes to reflect the feelings of the people, their hopes, and their aspirations.
7. After its application for more than 14 years, it is clear that the current electoral system has not improved the political experience. On the contrary it has been used to serve and support the social reality that prevailed in the society. Therefore, modifications to the current electoral system or the adoption of a completely new electoral system are essential requirements to ensure an equitable representation of the political forces and parties in society. It is suggested here that a mixed system could give voters two votes each, the first vote in an individual electoral district, and the second for a nationwide political list. Such a system could lead to the expansion of political participation and the development of political and democratic experiment.
8. The electoral districts should be reviewed because their current boundaries are unfairly drawn, and have not succeeded in providing representation in proportion to population.

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APPENDIX (A)

COPPIES OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE IN ARABIC AND ENGLISH

Demographic data

1. Age:

- 18-30 years 31-40 years 41-50 years
 51-60 years 61 and above

2. Gender:

- Male Female

3. Religion:

- Muslim Christian Other

4. Place of birth:

- Urban Rural Badiyah

5. Marital status:

- Married Single
 Divorced Widowed

6. Education:

- Below secondary education Diploma
 Bachelors degree Masters degree PhD

For each of the items below, please tick where appropriate to show your agreement or disagreement with the following statement:

Q1	To which extent do you agree that the following is guaranteed in Jordan?	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	Freedom of speech is guaranteed in Jordan					
2	Freedom to participate in political demonstrations					
3	Freedom to join political parties					
4	Equality of citizens rights regardless of their religion, ethnic origin, and tribal affiliation.					

Q2	The Jordanian citizen can criticize and disagree with the government in public without being subject to security consequences.	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

Q3	The Jordanian citizen can participate in the peaceful oppositional political activities without being subject to security consequences	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

Q4) Have you ever been subject to security consequences due to criticizing the government?

- Yes (Move to Q5) No

Q5) What type of punishment that you have been subject to?

- Custodial sentences
- Physical punishment
- Restriction or loss of civic and other rights
- Others (please specify) _____
- Refuse to answer

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Q6 The internal issues are considered obstacles to political participation.

***The internal issues such as**

- Administrative and financial corruption
- The economic status of Jordanian citizens
- Lack of government seriousness to achieve democracy
- Tribalism
- The current electoral system
- Other reasons (please specify) _____

Q7) What is the most important obstacle to political participation in your point of view?

Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly Agree

Q8 The international and regional events are considered as obstacles to political participation

*** The International and regional events such as**

- The ongoing Palestinian –Israeli conflict
- Present and ongoing conflicts and crises in Iraq
- The September 11th 2001 attacks and the war against terrorism.
- The unwillingness of certain parties or states to achieve stability in the region.
- The unwillingness of certain parties or states to pursue true democracy in the region.

Q9) What is the most important reason in your point of view?

Q10) Do you belong to a political party?

- Yes (please mention the name of the party) _____
- No (move to questions 11,12,13)

Q11) Do you intend to join a political party in the future?

- Yes
- No

Q12) Which of the current political parties represent your political aspirations so that you might join?

The name of the party _____

Q13) If you do not intend to join any political party can you please mention the main reasons behind your decision _____

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Q14					
	The current political parties in Jordan work in service of the people and society				
Q15					
	The current political parties in Jordan work in the service of their leaderships				
Q16					
	The performance of the current political parties is successful in the political field				
Q17					
	Some of the current political parties are qualified to form a government				

Q18) If did you agree in question 17 could you please mention these parties

Q19) Have you participated in the last parliamentary elections?

- Yes (move to question 20)
- No (move to question 21)

Q20) What was the main reason behind your decision to vote?

- National duty and constitutional right
- Tribalism and social ties
- To put the right person in the right position
- To enhance democracy in Jordan
- Others (please specify) _____

Q21) Why did you not participate in the last parliamentary elections?

- I'm not satisfied with the ability of the Parliamentary councils
- I'm not satisfied with elections' results
- I'm not satisfied with the candidates available.
- I'm not interested
- Others (please specify) _____

Q22) Have you voted for women candidates in the last parliamentary elections?

- Yes
- No (move to question 23)

Q23) What was the main reason for not voting for women candidates (in your point of view?)

- Social obstacles (community's culture and traditions such as, women stay home and raise children).
- Religious dimension (religion urging women to be more conservative and calling for separating the sexes in the work place).
- Lack of women experience in political affairs.
- Women do not have enough experience in public affairs.
- Tribal dimension (women could not get support from their tribes).
- Others (please specify) _____

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Q24 Tribalism is considered an obstacle to reach the political activists and parties' members to the parliament

Q25 Voting behaviour in Jordan is directly linked with the primary affiliations (tribal or familial) of voters

Q26 The service dimension in the relationship between voters and candidates and the proximity of the latter from the authorities and the centres of power lead voters to vote for one candidate over another

Q27 The current electoral law (SNTV) is suitable for the structure of Jordanian society

Q28 The current electoral law (SNTV) is fair to political parties in Jordan

Q29 The current electoral law and the quota system are fair to women

Q30) In your point of view what is the most suitable electoral system for Jordanian society.

- One-vote System (SNTV)
- Multi-vote system
- Two votes system (TVS), one vote for the district and one vote for national candidate.
- Proportional Representation
- Other (please specify) _____

عزيزي المشارك

أنا الطالب أمين علي العزام طالب دكتوراه في جامعة دُرم/ بريطانيا أقوم بإجراء دراسة حول المشاركة السياسية في الأردن.

عزيزي المشارك كلي أمل أن نتاج هذا البحث سوف تساهم في تحديد مؤشرات ومظاهر المشاركة السياسية في المجتمع الاردني والوقوف على القضايا الداخلية والاحداث الإقليمية السياسية والدولية التي تشكل عائقا أمام تحقيق تنمية ديمقراطية تقوم على المشاركة الفاعلة لذا أتمنى منك تفضلاً ولطفاً إعطاني بعضاً من وقتك لملىء هذه الاستبانة والإجابة على الأسئلة.

يتعهد الباحث للمشاركين بأن تكون جميع الإجابات سرية وأن يتم المحافظة على خصوصية المشارك و كما يؤكد الباحث أن جميع الاستبانات سيتم فتحها من قبله فقط.

عزيزي المشارك أرجو توجيه أي تساؤل يمكن أن يساعدك في الإجابة على الاستبانة و في حال عدم وجودي يمكنك الاتصال بي على الرقم التالي ٠٧٧٧٢٥٤١٢٣ أو عبر البريد الإلكتروني aminazzam34@yahoo.com

عزيزي المشارك.. الشكر الجزيل لمشاركتك القيمة و لوقتك الثمين لقراءتك للأسئلة والإجابة عليها.

الباحث : طالب الدكتوراه أمين علي العزام

المعلومات الشخصية

١. العمر:

٣٠ - ١٨ ٤٠ - ٣١ ٥٠ - ٤١ ٦٠ - ٥١ ٦١ فأكثر

٢. الجنس:

نكر أنثى

٣. الدين:

مسلم مسيحي غير ذلك

٤. الحالة الاجتماعية:

متزوج أعزب مطلق أرمل

٥. مكان الولادة:

المدينة القرية البادية

٦. التعليم:

ثانوي أو أقل دبلوم

بكالوريوس ماجستير دكتوراه

لكي تجيب على الاستبانه يجب وضع علامة (✓) أمام الرقم الذي يرتبط بإجابتك من ١ إلى ٥.

موافق بشدة	موافق	لا رأي	غير موافق	غير موافق قطعا	س ١ إلى أي درجة توافق أن كل من الحريات التالية مضمونة في الأردن؟
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١ حرية التعبير عن الرأي مضمونة في الأردن

					٢ حرية المشاركة في الاعتصامات والتظاهرات السياسية
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٣ حرية الانتساب إلى الأحزاب السياسية

					٤ المساواة بين المواطنين في الحقوق بغض النظر عن الدين أو الأصل أو الانتماءات العائلية
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موافق بشدة	موافق	لا رأي	غير موافق	غير موافق قطعا	
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٢س يستطيع المواطن الأردني انتقاد الحكومة علنا

والاختلاف معها في الرأي دون التعرض لعواقب أمنية

					٣س يستطيع المواطن الأردني المشاركة في الفعاليات والنشاطات السياسية السلمية دون التعرض لعواقب أمنية
--	--	--	--	--	--

س (٤) هل حدث وأن تعرضت لعقوبات أمنية بسبب انتقاد الحكومة والاختلاف معها

١. نعم (انتقل للسؤال ٥) ٢. لا (انتقل للسؤال ٦)

س(٥) ما هي العقوبة التي تعرضت لها

الاعتقال والاحتجاز

عقوبات جسدية

مراقبة وتقييد الحريات

عقوبات أخرى (حدد)

رفض الاجابة

موافق بشدة	موافق	لا راي	غير موافق	غير موافق قطعيا		
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س٦ القضايا الداخلية تشكل عائقا أمام تنمية المشاركة السياسية في الأردن

* القضايا الداخلية مثل:

انتشار الفساد الاداري والمالي

الوضع الاقتصادي للمواطن الاردني

عدم جدية الحكومة في تعميق الديمقراطية

وجود العشائرية

قانون الانتخاب الحالي (قانون الصوت الواحد)

أسباب أخرى (حدد)

س (٧) ما هو أهم سبب برأيك (حدد الرقم أو أي سبب اخر)

موافق بشدة	موافق	لا رأي	غير موافق	غير موافق قطعا		
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س٨ تعتبر الأحداث الإقليمية والدولية عانقا يحول دون خلق بيئة ملائمة للمشاركة السياسية الفاعلة

* الأحداث الإقليمية والدولية مثل:

- الصراع الفلسطيني الاسرائيلي
- الحرب على العراق وتداعياتها الوخيمة من الأزمات والصراعات الداخلية
- تداعيات أحداث ١١ أيلول/سبتمبر، ٢٠٠١ والحرب على الارهاب
- عدم رغبة بعض الأطراف (أو الدول) في استقرار وأمن الوطن العربي
- عدم رغبة بعض الأطراف (أو الدول) في وجود ديمقراطية حقيقية في الوطن العربي
- أسباب أخرى (حدد)

س (٩) ما هو أهم سبب برأيك

س(١٠) هل أنت منتسب إلى أي حزب سياسي

نعم أرجو ذكر اسم الحزب

لا (انتقل إلى سؤال ١١، ١٢، ١٣)

س(١١) هل تنوي الانسحاب مستقبلا إلى أي حزب سياسي

نعم لا

س (١٢) أي من الأحزاب السياسية القائمة يعكس تطلعاتك السياسية وبالتالي يمكن أن تنتسب إليه مستقبلاً

س (١٣) إذا كنت لا تنوي الانتماء إلى أي حزب سياسي ما هو السبب الرئيسي وراء ذلك

موافق بشدة	موافق	لا رأي	غير موافق	غير موافق قطعياً	
					س ١٤ الأحزاب السياسية الأردنية القائمة تعنى بالدرجة الأولى بشؤون الوطن والمواطن الأردني
					س ١٥ لأحزاب السياسية الأردنية القائمة تعمل على خدمة مصالح قياداتها
					س ١٦ الأحزاب السياسية الأردنية القائمة ناجحة في أدائها السياسي
					س ١٧ بعض الأحزاب السياسية الأردنية القائمة قادرة ومؤهلة لتشكيل حكومة

س (١٨) إذا كانت إجابتك بالموافقة في سؤال ١٧ أرجو تحديد هذه الأحزاب

س (١٩) هل شاركت في الانتخابات النيابية السابقة

نعم (انتقل إلى سؤال ٢٠) لا (انتقل إلى سؤال ٢١)

س (٢٠) ما هو السبب الرئيسي وراء قرارك في المشاركة في التصويت

- واجب وطني وحق دستوري
 - العشائرية والعلاقات الاجتماعية
 - لوضع الرجل المناسب في المكان المناسب
 - تعزيز مسيرة الديمقراطية
 - أسباب أخرى (حدد)
-

س (٢١) ما هو السبب الرئيسي وراء قرارك في عدم المشاركة في التصويت

- عدم الثقة بالمجالس النيابية
 - عدم الثقة بنتائج الانتخابات
 - عدم الثقة بأي من المرشحين في دائرتي الانتخابية
 - غير مهتم
 - أسباب أخرى (حدد)
-

س (٢٢) هل منحت صوتك لمرشحة في الانتخابات السابقة

- نعم
- لا (انتقل إلى سؤال ٢٣)

س (٢٣) ما هو السبب الرئيسي لعدم منح صوتك لامرأة

- النظرة الاجتماعية للمرأة والعادات والتقاليد
 - أسباب دينية
 - عدم كفاءة المرأة للعمل السياسي
 - عدم وجود تأييد عشائري للمرأة
 - عدم وجود مرشحات ذات كفاءة سياسية
 - أسباب أخرى (حدد)
-

موافق بشدة	موافق	لا رأي	غير موافق	غير موافق قطعا	
					س ٢٤ تعتبر العشائرية عائقا أمام وصول كفاءات سياسية وحزبية للبرلمان
					س ٢٥ السلوك الانتخابي في الاردن مرتبط بالانتماءات الاولية (العشائرية والعائلية) للناخبين
					س ٢٦ البعد الخدمي في العلاقة مع المرشح وقرب الأخير من السلطات ومراكز النفوذ يرجحان تصويت الناخب له أو لغيره
					س ٢٧ قانون الانتخاب الحالي (قانون الصوت الواحد) يناسب تركيبه المجتمع الأردني
					س ٢٨ قانون الانتخاب الحالي ونظام الكوتا النسائية منصف بحق المرأة
					س ٢٩ قانون الانتخاب الحالي منصف بحق الأحزاب السياسية

س (٣٠) ما هو رأيك النظام الانتخابي الأمثل الذي يناسب المجتمع الأردني

- نظام الصوت الواحد
- تعدد الاصوات بتعدد المقاعد في الدائرة الانتخابية
- نظام الصوتين : صوت على مستوى الدائرة و صوت على مستوى الوطن
- نظام التمثيل النسبي: منح كل قائمة أو حزب عددا من المقاعد يتناسب مع الاصوات التي حصل عليها في الانتخابات
- نظام آخر ((حدد))

APPENDIX (B)

LIST OF RESPONDENTS BY GROUP

List of respondents

- **Civil Society Organizations**

1. Political Party Members

1. Islamic Action Front
2. The Jordanian Arab Ba'ath party
3. The Jordanian Communist Party
4. The Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party
5. Islamic Centrist Party
6. The Jordanian people's Democratic Party (HASHD)
7. Pan-Arab Democratic Popular Party
8. Ansar" Arab Jordanian Party
9. Citizen's Rights Movement
10. Renaissance Party
11. Communist Workers Party

2. The Professional Associations' members

- Jordan Medical Association
- Jordan Solicitors Association
- Nurses and midwifery council
- Jordan Engineers Association

3. Associations

- The National Centre for Human Rights (NCHR) المركز الوطني لحقوق الانسان
- Law Group for Human Rights (MIZAN) مجموعة القانون من أجل حقوق الإنسان
- Jordan Society Human Rights (J.S.H.R) الجمعية الاردنية لحقوق الانسان
- The Arab Women Association جمعية النساء العربيات في الأردن

4. Journalists

1. *Alrai* (daily newspaper)
2. *Addustour* (daily newspaper)
3. *Al-Arab alyoum* (daily newspaper)
4. *Alghad* (daily newspaper)
5. *Al-Sabeel* (partisan political weekly newspaper)
6. *Al-Watan* (partisan weekly newspaper)
7. *Al-Badeel* (partisan weekly newspaper)
8. *Al-Hilal* (weekly newspaper)
9. *Al-Ahali* (partisan political weekly newspaper)
10. *Al-Hadath* (political weekly newspaper)
11. *Al-Mowjaha* (weekly newspaper).
12. The Center for Defending Freedom of Journalists
13. *Petra* (Jordan News Agency)
14. *Al-Diyar* (daily newspaper)
15. *Al-Watan* (weekly newspaper)
16. *Al-Wihdeh* (partisan weekly newspaper)

5. Academics in Jordanian Universities

1. Yarmouk University
2. The University of Jordan
3. Al-albeit University
4. Jerash University
5. Philadelphia University
6. Muta University
 - Faculty of Law
 - Socio-Politics Department
 - Press and Media Department