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THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF A PAKHTO SPEAKING COMMUNITY IN AFGHANISTAN

Ph.D. Thesis, 1977

Jeffrey H. P. Evans-von Krbek

Department of Anthropology

University of Durham

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ABSTRACT

The Safi of Afghaniya, one of the tribal sections of the Safi Pakhtuns (Pathans) of Afghanistan, constitute the subject of study in the thesis. They number approximately 3,000 and occupy the lower part of the Pachoghan valley - one of the high mountain valleys of the eastern Hindu Kush. High summer temperatures and abundant water for irrigation make it possible for the inhabitants to pursue a two-crop, intensive agricultural economy. The majority of owner-cultivators can, however, only live at a subsistence level because of the high population density and land shortage in the valley. These two factors together with the increasing influence of the central government are fundamentally altering the Afghaniya Safi's social structure and organization and bringing their identity as Pakhtuns into question.

In the thesis this process of change is traced in a diachronic study starting with an outline of the Pakhtuns as a whole and with the Safi's metamorphosis from what would seem to have been pagan Pashai/ Kohistani to muslim Pakhtuns. The thesis continues with a description of the economic and social conditions in Afghaniya and then deals with those elements of the social organization - descent, family and household relations, and marriage - which reveal most starkly the degree and extent of change per se and of the diminution of Pakhtun ideals and values. In the chapter on political organization, agnation, space and affinity are brought together as the factors primarily utilised by the members of the community for achieving group solidarity in the competition for resources. Finally, in the leadership chapter, they are also shown to play a part as some of those elements - together with traditional ideals and expectations and powers given them by the central government - which the leaders (maliks) manipulate to reduce autonomy and egalitarianism within the community and thereby to achieve a monopoly of power themselves. That these changes in the Afghaniya Safi's social structure and organization have taken the form of a decline in the importance of the lineage organization and patriarchal authority (both essentials of the Pakhtun identity) and of a disregard and neglect of Pakhtun ideals and norms in general would seem to point to an inability of the Safi to maintain their identity as Pakhtuns.

In this latest Safi metamorphosis, however, it is still unclear what will result. It is possible because of the expanding powers of the central government in general that these Safi will not become non-Pakhtuns but will change that which is considered Pakhtun and so be the forerunners of change in Pakhtun society as a whole.

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PREFACE

The field work on which this thesis is based was carried out from August 1970 to September 1971 among the Safi Pakhtuns of Afghanistan.

It was self-financed apart from an award from the Emslie Horniman Scholarship Fund (1969) of the Royal Anthropological Institute for which I am very grateful.

In transliterating Pakhto [1] I have not used any accepted system but have been guided by two principles, firstly that each consonant should have an individual symbol and secondly, that these symbols should all be typable and not involve later insertion by hand. The result is shown on page viii . Whilst such a system solves the problems of re-identification and reproduction other problems could not be solved in this way. Firstly, apart from the long vowels آ ي (and its variants), and ۍ there are no letters or symbols in Pakhto for the short ones. I have therefore attempted in my transliteration to use a standard pronunciation, however, some words, because there is no standard dictionary [2] may have the dialect vowels of my area. Secondly, Pakhto is an inflected language with irregular plural forms. In those cases where I have used but one word then I have ignored the inflection and, where I have not used the plural form, have formed the plural - apart from words such as 'koranai' and 'para' which I made both singular and plural - in the English manner with an 's'. For the

---

1) Pakhto is the hard dialect of the eastern Pakhtuns to which the Safi belong. Most writers refer to Pashto, the pronunciation of the western Pashtuns, because this is considered by linguists to be the older or original pronunciation of the letter ښ .

2) I used throughout the following dictionaries; Raverty, H. G. 1867. A Dictionary of the Pukhto, 2nd ed. Williams and Norgate, London; Afgansko-Russkii Slovar (Pushtu) Akademiya Naik SSSR - Institut Narodov Azii - Institut Etnografii Moskva - 1966 and Russko-Afganskii Slovar Moskva - 1963.

1. The Pakhto Alphabet and Transliteration

ا	--- ā	ش	--- sh
ب	--- b	بښ	--- kh
پ	--- p	ص	--- ṣ
ت	--- t	ض	--- ẓ
ټ	--- ṭ	ط	--- t
ث	--- s	ظ	--- z
ج	--- j	ع	--- ’a
چ	--- ch	غ	--- gh
ح	--- H	ف	--- f (p)
څ	--- ts	ق	--- q
خ	--- dz	ک	--- k
خ	--- x	ګ	--- G
د	--- d	ل	--- l
ډ	--- ḍ	م	--- m
ذ	--- z	ن	--- n
ر	--- r	ڼ	--- ṇ
ړ	--- ṛ	و	--- u, o, w, au
ز	--- z	ه	--- h (a)
ژ	--- zh	ی	--- y, i
ږ	--- g (ĝ)	ي	--- i
س	--- s	ې	--- e
		ے	--- ay, ai

sentences where inflection occurred I have used an approximation of those vowel sounds which I heard used by the Safi. Thirdly, geographical names and certain other proper nouns such as 'khan' and 'mullah' have not been transliterated because I thought that this would only lead to confusion. Finally I have written throughout Pakhto and Pakhtun apart from places where I have referred specifically to tribes which I know speak Pashto and are therefore Pashtuns. Other dialectal differences which affect such letters as ږ and ق and the Pakhtun practice of pronouncing ف as پ - the Safi should in fact be the Sapi - have been ignored.

Where the present tense is used in the text this refers to the period of field work, i. e. 1970-1971. This is important because of the change occurring and because the great drought of that period reached its culmination in that year and undoubtedly was responsible for special responses on the part of the people [1].

Measurements are given in terms of the metric system. Where I have used local terms then these have the following values: 1 jerib = 1950 square metres, 1 pau = 442 grams, 1 ser = 7 kilograms, 1 man = 56,5 kilograms and one kharwar = 565,1 kilograms. The value of the Afghan currency, the Afghani, was at the time of my field work - 100 Afs. = 50p.

That my field work was possible or in any way fruitful is the result of countless people's help only a few of whom I can thank by name here. Among these were the then Royal Afghan Ministeries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs who allowed me to work in Kapisa, the governor and waluswal of the province who showed me considerable hospitality and did all in their power to help me, and the Faculty of Letters and Humanities of the University of Kabul whose members were unfailing in their efforts to support my project and unstinting with their time. That my project got under way at all is due to

---

1) For an account of the really appalling conditions which prevailed in some parts of Afghanistan during the drought (in this case Badghis province) see: Barry, M. 1972. Western Afghanistan's Outback. 60 pages. Duplicated by Communication Media. USAID/Afghanistan - Kabul.

Prof. Dr. Karl Jettmar of Heidelberg University, to thom many thanks, who arranged, through the South Asia Institute's branch in Kabul, for my initial acceptance by the Afghan government. Once in Kabul Heidelberg continued to sponsor, help, feed, and aid me through the good offices of Dr. and Mrs. Peter Snoy to whom my most heartfelt thanks.

During my field work I was accompanied by two 'counterparts' from the University of Kabul Messrs. Bayazid Atsak and Wazir Taniwal who, through their unfailing help and friendship, their aptitude with people and their considerable abilities made my work in Afghaniya possible.

Finally my greatest thanks are due to my supervisor Mr. David Brooks for his encouragement, advice and unwearying interest.

1. INTRODUCTION

The majority of anthropologists before they acquire or settle down to study 'their' particular tribe, village, or people are subject to forces which influence both the place and the nature of their field work. My case was no exception. However as this process of choosing a Pakhtun group for study modified my view of the people and my presentation of the material it is perhaps relevant to give a short account of events leading up to my choice of the Safi of Afghaniya.

The Safi Pakhtuns of Afghaniya were certainly not the group which I had in mind on my arrival in Afghanistan. I wished to do work among settled Pakhtuns, which the Safi were, but preferably in the province of Paktia (see map I p. 4). My reasons for choosing settled rather than nomadic Pakhtuns were the following: I had worked among nomads in north Africa and wished to experience by way of a contrast a settled agricultural economy. Also a certain amount of work had been done and was in the process of being done among Pakhtun nomads whereas apart from a short article by Sigrist [1] very little work had been done among Afghanistan's settled Pakhtuns since Elphinstone's time [2]. Finally a certain challenge emanated from the general opinion that the settled Pakhtuns were unattractive and difficult to study. Penetration of the 'mud curtain' was considered more problematical and time

---

1) Sigrist, C. 1970. Paśtunvali. Das Stammesrecht der Paśtunen. Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Kulturanthropologie. Basel.
2) A modern researcher goes so far as to say: 'The best single source on the Pashtun (i.e. both settled and nomadic) remains Elphinstone's An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, first published in 1815.' (Brackets mine). In: Tribe and community among the Ghilzai Pashtun. p. 575. Anderson, J. 1975 Anthropos 70. pp. 575-601.

consuming than that of the 'hair' one [1].

As far as an area for study was concerned my initial hopes centred, as I have mentioned above, on the Paktia Pakhtuns who represented and still represent the most independent Pakhtun tribes living within the boundaries of Afghanistan. Unfortunately their very independence worked against my plans because the central government felt that it could not guarantee my safety in an area where so much anti-British sentiment still existed - the aftermath of the Anglo-Afghan Wars (1839-42, 1878-81 and 1919). Other border areas, but especially those with Pakistan, were also excluded because of their political sensitivity. A sufficiently large area of Pakhtun settlement nevertheless remained and I spent three weeks travelling around looking for a group and an area which would suit my purposes. Unfortunately two areas, in the provinces of Ghazni and Zabul, which would have been most interesting had to be abandoned because of the opposition of their governors. Finally however I was able to establish myself among the Safi of Afghaniya in the province of Kapisa to the east of Kabul (see map I p. 4).

The two principal reasons for this choice were the following. Firstly Afghaniya gave the impression, as far as I was able to judge from the information received, of a community very dissimilar from that

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1) A view with which as far as the Safi of Afghaniya are concerned I can in retrospect only agree. Promises of help, lodging, support, information etc., given at the time of my survey (mentioned below) were disregarded on my return. The overt opposition experienced at the beginning of my field work remained with only a few exceptions at a covert level throughout my stay. The reasons why I nevertheless remained were the time already invested, the hope that conditions might change and the fear that other Safi communities would be no different. I feel that much interesting material nevertheless emerged but undoubtedly the difficulties experienced had the disadvantage of keeping me tied to one Safi community and thus incapable of making anything other than very rudimentary excursions into other Safi areas for complementary material, and general impressions. This expresses itself in Chapter 3 where I can only talk about THE Safi as a whole from literary sources and in the thesis in general where I write about the Safi of Afghaniya and not about the SAFI full stop.

described by Barth for the Swat Pathan. Afghaniya was politically and economically an egalitarian society with no non-Pakhtun subordinate population such as the Swati. There were leaders, the 'maliks', but these men were elected representatives and not like Barth's khans, hereditary autocrats. There were also landowners with larger than average land holdings but these men were certainly not landlords. The majority of adult males were, as a result, owner cultivators working at a subsistence level - a situation arising apparently from the density of the population and the fractionisation of holdings. Such a community would, therefore, provide different information from that collected by Barth and would broaden the knowledge of the Pakhtuns in general.

Secondly these Afghaniya Safi situated as they were on the periphery of Safi settlement and administratively included in a non-Pakhtun province were increasingly being subjected to the controls and influence of the central government. Such a situation meant that the problem of the response and reaction in social and political terms of a particular Pakhtun group to external pressure could be studied and some light thrown onto the whole complex of the integration of Pakhtun tribes into the wider Afghan society: a problem which has been of central importance since the founding of the Afghan state. This is not, of course, to say that this was the only problem which was apparent or was responsible for change in the social structure. Overpopulation, drought, the division of land on inheritance, etc., were all playing and played a part but the question of the central government's influence on previously autonomous groups seemed at the time of the survey to be of particular interest. In the analysis itself the government's activities emerge as but one factor among a number in an aetiology of change. Together they have had considerable effect on the social structure of Afghaniya as is demonstrated in the thesis by the declining significance of the partrilineal organization and its partial, perhaps temporary replacement in certain spheres by affinal bonds and bonds of residential



I Afghanistan

(after Dupree 1973)



II Pakhtun Areas

(after Dupree 1973)

proximity. The question whether this represents a trend to be followed by other or all Pakhtun tribes or is merely a temporary decline or accomodation, lies of course in the realm of speculation. It is, however, a step in the direction of the non-tribal social organization characteristic of the other ethnic groups in Afghanistan.

Both these reasons for ultimately choosing Afghaniya - working from particular problems in one Pakhtun group towards general conclusions about the whole ethnos - had been presaged by the impressions I received whilst searching for a satisfactory and permitted area for study. The relatively large cross-section of Pakhtun groups which I saw then made me aware of the considerable social and economic differences within and between tribes. It, however, also made me aware of the common attributes e.g. patrilineal organization, customary law, code of honour etc., which exist among the tribes and which make them conscious not only of being, for example, Safi or Ghilzai but also of being Pakhtun. Such social factors furthering a Pakhtun identity have also been supported over a period of more than 200 years by the special political position of the Pakhtuns in Afghanistan. They, or at least one tribe, the Durrani, have provided all the kings of the country. The other Pakhtun tribes whilst rarely accepting the paramount position of the Durrani and constantly seeking to discomfort, and weaken if not replace them nevertheless acted as Pakhtuns in what Dupree has called the policy of 'internal imperialism' [1] i.e. in the conquest and Pakthunisation of non-Pakhtun areas of Afghanistan [2]. Thus the needs of a Pakhtun

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1) Dupree, L. 1973. Afghanistan. p. 417 f. Princeton University Press, Princeton.

2) In the north-west of the country this 'Pakhtunisation', at least during the reign of Abd ar-Rahman, resulted initially rather from the inadequacy of the non-Pakhtuns to populate and hold this border area against Russian expansion than from a policy aimed at spreading Pakhtun control. Nevertheless this was the end result once the Pakhtuns (Ghilzai and Durrani) had established themselves there. See Nancy Tapper, 1973. The advent of Pashtun Maldars in north-western Afghanistan, pp. 55-79. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies. No. 36.

monarchy in a multi-ethnic state (Pakhtuns, Hazara, Turkoman, Nuristani, Baluch, Tajik, Uzbak, etc.) have furthered and strengthened an already existing sense of being Pakhtun so that even today it is unthinkable, at least for Pakhtuns, that anybody other than a Pakhtun could be the head of state [1].

The Pakhtun tribal section, village or community must, therefore, be seen, if an analysis of the social structure is to be understandable and relevant, as embedded in a tribal and Pakhtun background and formed by historical processes. In the thesis this is given expression through a general description in chapter 2 of the Pakhtuns, their political significance, diversity and similarities. It then becomes clear in chapter 3, on the Safi themselves, how peculiarly relevant such a Pakhtun framework is because it appears, from literary sources, that the Safi were originally non-Pakhtuns and most probably an amalgamation of Pashai and Kohistani groups. The actual processes involved in this metamorphosis can only be speculated upon because although the Safi were not the only non-Pakhtuns to become Pakhtuns there is no evidence to show how this was achieved at least for groups of this size. Nevertheless the end result is clear, i.e. that the non-Pakhtun Safi outsiders became insiders in terms of the Pakhtun ethnos.

This binary opposition, outsider : insider, and the process from outsider to insider in which the Safi as non-muslims and non-Pakhtuns were so much involved takes on a special emphasis as the thesis progresses and in fact becomes its central and continuing theme. In chapter 4 after a description of the occupation of Afghaniya by the Safi, settlement is shown to continue through the population increase

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1) An example of this may be given from my own field work. In my first week in Afghaniya I was reading a magazine on the cover of which was a portrait of Mao Tse Tung. A Safi Pakhtun sitting opposite to me asked who it was. When I replied that he was, in Afghan terms, the 'king' of China he said, with obvious amusement at my naiveté, 'that can't be so that's a Hazara'. In Afghanistan the mongoloid Hazara are at the bottom of the ethnic hierarchy whose top is formed by the Pakhtuns. It was, therefore, impossible for this Safi Pakhtun to accept my statement.

of the original settlers (the taxti) and the arrival of newcomers, the outsider rāghli. These outsiders become Safi through their integration into and acceptance of the insider taxti's order and ideals. Of course this adaptation was not as difficult as that undertaken by the Safi themselves because the rāghli were also Pakhtuns or Pakhto-speakers and the social organization met with in Afghaniya was thoroughly familiar to them. Today this process of settlement and adaptation is still continuing with the settlement of strangers, the ājnabiyān (principally families of non-Safi Pakhtun nomads), in Afghaniya and with their aspirations for insidership.

Chapter 5, the physical and social setting, provides the background for the later chapters and for the analysis of the Afghaniya Safi. Chapter 6 takes up the theme of outsider : insider by looking at the occupational activities of the Safi and the non-Safi 'kusubGar' or professionals. These kusubGar were, and still are, designated according to their profession i.e. blacksmith, carpenter and barber. They are thus contrasted to the Safi who refer to themselves in this context as 'siyāl', i.e. an equal or clansman, or Pakhtun. The kusubGar are also trying, with differing success, to change their status and ultimately their identity through the acquisition of land, one of the keys to passing, and through marriage with the Safi, the other, and principal, key. Thus they too are seeking insider status from an outsider position.

Within the kusubGar the barbers constitute a special category because although they are, in relation to the Safi, outsiders their work - shaving, haircutting, nail-pairing, blood-letting and attendance at the Safi rites de passage - brings them into the sort of intimate contact with the Safi usually only granted to insiders. Thus the barbers are outsiders acting as special insiders trying to be normal insiders. A problem and process which is still continuing.

The Afghaniya Safi, whilst being in comparison with the other groups

the high status insiders, are not themselves immune from change, nor are they without aspirations as far as their status is concerned. In chapters 7, 8 and 9 one sees, in terms of descent, residential proximity, and marriage how what the Safi consider as fundamental aspects of their society are breaking down. Patrilineality, patrilineal ideals and the patrilineal ideology, as well as patriarchal authority are being put under pressure, challenged and replaced by individual interests, a greater materialism and by ties based on affinity and proximity. This is perhaps surprising because one would expect the Safi, as the last group to take on the Pakhtun identity, to lay great stress on those characteristics which mark the insider i.e. 'Pakhtuness', patrilineal ideals etc., much in the same way as they have acquired a reputation for religious fanaticism as a result of their late conversion to Islam. But this is not the case. Whilst they may originally have been exemplary Pakhtuns now those very aspects of the identity which were considered essential are being neglected or disregarded.

The external causes for the Safi's difficulties are the extension of the central government's authority into the community, overpopulation, land shortage and, in the short term, drought. All these elements are given expression in chapter 10 which is concerned with the political groups and the competition for resources. Here the factors marriage, descent, and residential proximity, can be seen interacting and competing in the formation of political groups and the rewards, land and power, emerge as the primary interests of the Safi. This debilitating struggle for land is, however, only really being won by one group in Afghaniya, the maliks, or leaders. They, as is shown in chapter 11, are the only ones who have taken up the external challenge successfully apart perhaps from the Safi mullahs. They are proving to be the most adaptable to the government's requirements and institutions, the most aggressive in their pursuit of land and power and the most effective as Pakhtuns. Thus they may turn out to be, although there are still mechanisms for impeding this, the fore-runners or instigators of a new Afghaniya society.

This would be one where distinctions would be based on the economic domination of the landless many by the landed and powerful few and where the maliks themselves would represent the 'maximal' insiders.

In the light of the changes per se, the disappearance of many ideals and norms, the institutionalization and aristocratisation of leaders, and shortage of land etc., the question then left to answer is: what are the Safi becoming? Can they continue to be Pakhtuns or is another metamorphosis in progress or necessary? Some answers to these questions are given in the conclusion and it is through them that the deductive process beginning with the Pakhtuns and continuing with the Safi as a whole and the Afghaniya Safi in particular is finally reversed. It becomes an inductive one with the question of the Afghaniya Safi's place in the Safi and Pakhtun societies and in the Afghan society at large. In Tambiah's words it is 'to use the particular to say something general' [1]. This revelation of the general in the particular was the guiding concept and is the ultimate aim of the thesis.

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1) Tambiah, S. J. 1975. Buddhism and the Spirit Cults in North-east Thailand. p. I. Cambridge University Press.

2. THE PAKHTUNS

The Safi of Afghaniya are members of the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, the Pakhtuns [1]. These Pakhtuns number approximately 7 million - a further six million live in Pakistan - and occupy the south and east of the country (see map II p. 4). They are divided up into a number of tribes (ca. 15) whose size varies considerably. The two largest and for the history of the country most influential ones are the Durrani (ca. 2 million) and the Ghilzai [2] (2.5-3 million) whose territories stretch from Farah in the west to Kabul in the east (see map II p. 4). The Ghilzai were the first in 1709 to obtain independence from the Persian Safavids but it was the Durrani (Abdali [3]) who, under Ahmad Shah (1747), founded modern Afghanistan and members of the Popalzai and Barakzai clans of the Durrani [4] who provided the kings of Afghanistan and the present founder of the new republic [5]. The other Pakhtun tribes to whom the Safi belong are mainly resident in the east of the country and were able to achieve varying degrees of independence from Durrani rule with the weakness or strength of the central government.

External pressure, for example, from British-India was, however, usually sufficient to unite the tribes at least temporarily. This unity arose not out of national fervour but principally because the foreign forces, at least those coming from the south, needed in order to reach Kabul to penetrate and pass through Pakhtun areas. In the

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1) Also known as Pashtuns (see Preface), Pathans and Afghans.

2) May also be, and according to some is more correctly written 'Ghilji'. See, for example, Caroe, O. 1965. The Pathans 550 BC-AD 1957. p. 131. Macmillan, London., and Dupree, L. 1973.Op.cit. p. 322., footnote 7.

3) The Durrani were known as the Abdali until 1747 when Ahmad Shah added to his name the title Durr-i-Durran and his tribe became the Durrani.

4) The Popalzai Saddozai were in power from 1747-1818 and the Barakzai Mohammedzai from 1826 to the present.

5) For an account of the change from kingdom to republic see: Dupree, 1973. Op.cit. Epilogue. pp. 753-760., and Deutsch, K. 1975. Republik Afghanistan. Zum Machtwechsel in einem Entwicklungsland des Orients. pp. 408-415. Geographische Rundschau, Jahrgang 27, Oktober 1975, Heft 10.

absence of a large and independent Afghan central army the Pakhtun tribes, because of their geographic position and warlike disposition, thus became essential in times of war for the defence of the country, the preservation of the reigning monarch and the existence of the state and were correspondingly courted by the various kings. This lead among other things to the conscious preservation of the tribal organization and the Pakhtun tribes acquired a position of influence and power in the state which only began to weaken after the Second World War. The other ethnic groups, apart from the Tajik and Qizilbash who were essential as craftsmen, tradesmen, shopkeepers, entrepreneurs, minor government officials, professional soldiers etc., had relatively little to say in the affairs of the country. It is only now that an attempt is being made to break the ethnic consciousness and inequalities of the groups, and to substitute for them a national consciousness independent of external pressure, and equality.

Social and Cultural Forms / Diversity

The Pakhtuns as might be expected from an ethnic group which is so numerous and which covers a large and diverse - desert, mountain, and fertile valley floor - geographical area exhibit a great range of social and cultural forms. This fact is well documented by Elphinstone [1] and Caroe [2] but achieves its clearest expression in Barth's analysis of 'Pathan Identity and its Maintenance' [3]. Barth divides Pakhtun communities into five major categories.

In the first category are 'villages of mixed agriculturalists, organized in egalitarian patrilineal descent segments with an acephalous political form' occupying a central belt of barren hills.

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1) Elphinstone, M. 1972. (reprint from 1815). An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul. 2 vols. Oxford University Press, London.
2) Caroe. 1965. Op. cit.
3) Barth, F. 1970. Pathan Identity and its Maintenance. pp. 117-134. In: Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. George Allen and Unwin, London.

The second category consists of 'Pakhtun landowners or owner cultivators' with 'tenant Tajiks or servile tenant and menial castes'. These Pakhtuns and their tenants are politically organized on the basis of lineally structured segmentary systems which are either acephalous or quasi feudal. The latter are partially integrated within the state systems of Pakistan and Afghanistan and are 'increasingly subject to bureaucratic administration'. This category as a whole occupies 'favoured localities in the mountains, and in the broader valleys and plains' where 'more intensive agriculture is practised, based on artificial irrigation'.

The third category is composed of Pakhtun administrators, traders, craftsmen or labourers in the towns of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Pakhtun nomads constitute the fourth category and are 'politically organized as tribes with, in part, very great autonomy'.

Finally groups practising 'extensive labour or trading migrations which bring individuals and small groups periodically far outside the geographical boundaries of Pathan country' form the basis of the fifth category.

Common Attributes

In spite of this great diversity of social and cultural forms Pakhtuns possess attributes which are to be found represented to a greater or lesser extent within all the tribes. It is these attributes which according to Barth [1] preserve and maintain the Pakhtun identity and which Pakhtuns themselves regard as indispensable to the Pakhtun ethos. These attributes are the Pakhto language [2], patrilineal

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1) Barth, F. 1970. Op. cit. p. 119.
2) Barth himself (1970. Op. cit. p. 119) regards Pakhto (Pashto) as but part of Pathan custom: 'it is a necessary and diacritical feature, but in itself not sufficient: we are not dealing with a linguistic group', I consider it to have more importance for the Pakhtun identity and, therefore, make it a separate and major attribute.

descent, orthodoxy of belief and the Pakhtun code or custom. The Pakhto language would seem to be a self-evident attribute requiring no further explanation but Barth [1], as indicated in footnote 2 (p. 12), challenges this and also rightly comments that there are Pakhto speakers who possess no other Pakhtun attribute than that of language whereas Pakhtuns say, 'he is Pathan who <u>does</u> Pashto, not (merely) who <u>speaks</u> Pashto'. One should also add that there are Pakhtuns in Herat and Kabul whose language is Farsi-Dari [2] and some of these are members of the royal/ruling Mohammedzai clan. Nevertheless I think that Pakhto must be included under the indispensable attributes of the Pakhtun identity [3] because, apart from some extreme examples, Pakhtun and Pakhto are inextricable and also because modern trends will force more and more Pakhtuns into a twilight zone where only their mother tongue will remain as a symbol of their ethnic identity.

The significance which patrilineal descent has for the Pakhtuns is apparent to anyone who has had anything to do with them. This fact is well documented in the works of Elphinstone, Raverty, Bellew, Caroe and Barth who all refer to the tribal genealogies which link all Pakhtuns to their eponym 'Qais' [4]. Thus ca. 13 million Pakhtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan have their ethnic unity corroborated by an all embracing genealogy. However this ethnic genealogy is only one aspect of the concept of patrilineal descent as a Pakhtun attribute. For the majority of Pakhtuns patrilineality and agnation are elements which structure social and political organization and order ownership of land, residence and inheritance. As may be seen patrilineal descent is a central attribute of the Pakhtun identity.

The third attribute, orthodoxy of belief, does not mean that the Pakhtuns

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1) Barth, F. 1970. Op.cit. p. 119.
2) Farsi-Dari, or Dari is Afghan persian.
3) Caroe. 1965. Op.cit. p. 65 considers Pakhto to be 'the most obvious symbol today of Pathan identity and the measure of Pathan pride'.
4) These writers draw for their information about the tribal genealogies and the eponymous ancestor Qais (Pathan) on 'Makhzan-i-Afghani' from Nematullah and the later 18th century re-issue of this work entitled 'Khulasatul-Asab'. See Caroe. 1965. Op.cit. pp. 4 & 8.

must be religious in the sense of being devoted to religion and piety. Nor does it mean that they constitute some puritanical islamic body such as the Wahabi. They must, however, be Sunni [1] and are generally for legal matters Hanafi which is the official school both for Afghanistan and Pakistan. In fact they generally know very little about their religion which is partly the fault of their Mullahs who are nearly all illiterate and themselves often ignorant of the true tenets of Islam and partly the result of their belief that Islam and Pakhtun customs are complementary thus obviating them of the need to learn something they already practice. Nevertheless the Pakhtuns more than make up for their nescience by religious fanaticism expressed in intolerance towards and repression of the Shias, and fervour in the Jihads [2]. This latter activity has been pursued by the Pakhtuns, at least according to their traditions, since the very initiation of Islam. They believe that Qais, their founding ancestor, was converted to Islam by the Prophet himself - a version of history probably obtained from Nematullah's chronicle [3] the contents of which were probably spread by word of mouth - and that from that time onwards Pakhtuns carried their faith into all the countries of the infidel. Other accounts, however, from what Caroe [4] has described as 'reliable Muslim sources' indicate that the majority of Pakhtuns had not been converted in the 11th century and even at the end of the 12th century 'infidel' Pakhtuns were fighting against their Muslim brothers. In spite of its historical inaccuracy this legend of Qais's conversion is of considerable importance to the Pakhtuns because, as Barth notes, 'thus, Pathans have no infidel past, nor do they carry in their history the blemish of defeat and forcible conversion' [5]. Their orthodoxy of belief is, therefore, not only a question of being Sunni

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1) One Pakhtun tribe the Turi are, however, Shia.
2) This characteristic is well illustrated in the Pakhtun involvement in the fighting between India and Pakistan for Kashmir, 1947-48. The tribes-people refer to it as the 'Kashmir Lakhar', or Kashmir Jihad'.
3) See also above p. 13 footnote 4.
4) Caroe. 1965. Op. cit. p. 9. The 'sources' are Al-Biruni and Al-Utbi.
5) Barth. 1970. Op. cit. p. 119.

but of being bound up inextricably with Islam from the beginning of their history. Thus they consider themselves to have an exclusive purity not shared by the other ethnic groups in Afghanistan.

The Pakhtun code or custom constitutes the final attribute of the Pakhtun identity. This is not an attribute in itself but a complex of concepts of honour and justice which emanate from specific value orientations of the Pakhtuns. These value orientations may be summarised as autonomy, equality, contumacy, individuality and aggressiveness and find expression in the complex of concepts mentioned above which the Pakhtuns themselves call Pakhtunwali. Pakhtunwali has been variously translated as Pakhtun code, custom or way and is a body of customary law generally regarded as the epitome or yardstick of 'Pakhtuness'. The number of components considered to belong to this body of law varies from observer to observer [1] and often from tribe to tribe. Similarly great variety is shown in the content, interpretation [2], and execution of these 'laws'. The Pakhtuns themselves, however, believe that there is an intertribal consistency in the components constituting their code and strongly reject any suggestion of variability. All would consider being a good i.e., lavish host, being hospitable, giving asylum, taking blood revenge, possessing manhood and chivalry, defending

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1) See for example, Spain, J. W. 1962. People of the Khyber. F. A. Praeger, New York; Klimburg, M. 1966, Afghanistan. Oesterreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst. Wien; Sigrist, C. 1970 Op. cit.; Barth, 1970 Op. cit.; Kieffer, C. M. 1971/2. Über das Volk der Paśtunen und seinen Paśtunwali. pp. 614-624. In: Mitteilungen des Instituts für Orientforschung. Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR. Band XVII; Janata, A. & Hassas Reihanodin. 1975. Ghairatman - Der gute Pashtune. Exkurs über die Grundlagen des Pashtunwali. Afghanistan Journal No. 2 pp. 83-97 and Khadim, Q. ad-D. 1931 (Islamic Calendar). Pakhtunwali. Pakhto Tolena, Kabul, No. 101 (in Pakhto).

2) Confusion seems to reign as far as the interpretation of Pakhtunwali by external observers is concerned. 'Nanawati', for example, is considered by Spain (p. 47) and Sigrist (p. 3) to be associated with 'badal' (revenge) and is translated as 'conciliation' or 'conciliatory procession'. Caroe (p. 351) regards 'nanawatai' (translated as a verbal noun meaning 'coming in') as an extension of the idea of 'melmastia' (hospitality). Barth (pp. 120 & 121) in his discussion of 'melmastia' does not mention 'nanawatai' at all.

property and honour and defending the honour of woman as indispensable elements of their code. They would agree that there are some differences as to content and execution but these they regard as differences of degree rather than kind. The sanctions, for example, practised by Pakhtun tribes do vary from tribe to tribe and in some cases from section to section of the same tribe. Nevertheless the members of a particular tribe or section who regard their own sanctions as the ideal responses to the infringements of rights are also willing to consider the sanctions of other Pakhtun groups, providing they do not differ too radically from their own, as valid and permissable variants and thus in agreement with the general tenor of Pakhtunwali. There is, therefore, among the Pakhtuns a general concurrence of opinion as to what does constitute Pakhtunwali and within this agreement there is room for the various localized differences of interpretation.

I have shown above something of the dispersion and history of, as well as something of the diversity pertaining to, and the similarities or common attributes shared by all Pakhtuns. It is with this as an explanatory backcloth that I will now turn to one of these Pakhtun tribes, the Safi.

3. THE SAFI, A GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Present Area of Safi settlement

The Safi with a total population of ca. 80, 000 [1], of which the Afghaniya Safi number 3, 000, belong in the category of the smaller Pakhtun tribes. Their territory stretches from the Pech valley [2] in the east along the Kunar and Kabul rivers to the Nijrao and Panjshir [3] valleys in the north-west and thus forms a sort of semi-circle around Nuristan (see map III p. 18). This is not, as may be seen in other Pakhtun areas, an uninterrupted band of Pakhtun settlement but rather an area in which the Safi population, numerically speaking, has areas of dominance and some continuity. The two main concentrations of Safi settlement are the Tagao and Kunar valleys where perhaps more than half of the total Safi population is settled. Settlement otherwise occurs as groups of villages and single villages scattered among non-Safi and non-Pakhtun groups [4] in all the valleys running down from Nuristan into the Kunar and Kabul rivers [5]. Thus Safi settlement appears rather like a cupped hand with the palm formed by the Kunar and Kabul river and the fingers by the valleys pushing up into the Nuristan massif.

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1) This figure of 80, 000 is an approximation because there has never been a census in Afghanistan. It is based on an assessment by Bellew (H. W. 1880. The Races of Afghanistan. p. 70. Calcutta.) who considered the Safi to number 12, 000 families. The population will inevitably have increased since then but the very high infant mortality as well as the low life expectancy in Afghanistan must have meant that the population only increased slightly until very recently. This would seem to make an estimate for 1970-71 possible based on the 1880 figure. I have, therefore, multiplied Bellew's figure by six and rounded it off to 80, 000. The result is in all probability conservative, especially in the light of the present population explosion.

2) Humlum, J. 1959. La géographie de l' Afghanistan. p. 159. Scandinavian University Books. Copenhagen. He reports that the village of Gousalik (see map III p. 18) is the highest point of Afghan/Safi settlement in the Pech valley.

3) See, The 1967 University of Tokyo Expedition to South-West Hindukush, 1969. Water and Village Life in East Afghanistan. p. 105. University of Tokyo Press.

4) See Bellew, 1880 Op. cit. p. 70.

5) ' They also have villages in Laghman, both in the Alishang and Alingar valley, and large numbers dwell in Tagao and the other valleys running down to the left bank of the Kabul river.' In Gazetteer of Afghanistan. p. 448. Part 4. Kabul. 4th Ed. Calcutta. 1910.



III Safi Tribal Territory

Apart from this area of relatively continuous settlement Safi are also mentioned by Caroe as being 'in the recesses of the Bajaur dales between the hill Mohmands and the Tarklanris of Bajaur' (Pakistan)[1] (see map III p. 18). Strangely enough Caroe does not refer to the Afghan Safi at all although these would appear to be far more numerous than their Pakistan counterparts.

Another area of settlement for groups and families of Safi was and is the plains of northern Afghanistan. Schurmann [2], for example, refers to Safi in the region of Balkh; Dupree [3] mentions a Safi family in the Tajik town of Aq Kupruk (near Mazar-i-Sharif); and Grötzbach [4] lists 'Qandahāriha',[5] Pakhtuns as being settled in towns and villages in north-east Afghanistan. It is clear that other Safi settlements could be found in northern Afghanistan if the necessary information were available and that families of Safi no doubt reside in all the major cities of Afghanistan [6]. It is also reasonably clear

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1) Caroe. 1965. Op. cit. p. 19. Words in brackets mine. See also: Wylly, H. C. 1912. From the Black Mountain to Waziristan. pp. 225 and 226. Macmillan, London., and Barton, Sir W. 1939. India's North-West Frontier. pp. 26, 27, 34 & 108. John Murray, London.

2) Schurmann, H. F. 1962. The Mongols of Afghanistan. p. 48. Mouton & Co., 'S-Gravenhage.

3) Dupree, L. 1970. Aq Kupruk: A town in North Afghanistan, pp. 348 and 376. In: Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East. vol. 2 Ed. Sweet, L. The Natural History Press, New York.

4) Grötzbach, E. 1972. Kulturgeographischer Wandel in Nordost-Afghanistan seit dem 19. Jahrhundert. Afghanische Studien, Band 4. Verlag Anton Hain.

5) Grötzbach considers these 'Qandahāriha' to be Durrani because the city of Qandahar, from which he presumes the name is drawn, is in a Durrani area of settlement, (see p. 94.1972 Op. cit.). However it seems to me that these 'Qandahariha' are much more likely to be Safi because this is the name of one of the principal Safi clans and members of this clan when asked about their tribal membership refer to themselves as Qandahari rather than Safi. Also I know from my own field research that Safi are settled in north-east Afghanistan as owner cultivators and labourers.

6) Kakar (Kakar, H. 1971. Afghanistan. A study in internal political development, 1880-1896. p. 14. Kabul.), for example, refers to 'Safays' as being among the Pakhtun population of Kabul in 1876.

how they came to be scattered in the towns and in the north of the country i. e. through forced settlements [1] and migration for work. What, however, is not clear and by no means certain is who the Safi were and how they came to settle in their principal area of occupation between the Pech and Panjshir valleys.

Origin of the Safi - Hypotheses

From the very meagre material on the subject four hypotheses emerge which on closer examination cease to be mutually exclusive and seem to be complementary in many points. The first suggested by Raverty [2] is that the Safi, or at least those settled in the Panjshir valley, are a clan of the Parnis (also referred to as Panri). These Parnis are according to Caroe [3] Scythian nomads who were allied to the Saka. As the Saka were the tribe which ca. 97 B.C. overran Bactria and Gandhara it is possible that the Parnis moved south with them. Later overpopulation, according to Raverty, caused the Parnis during the reign of Akbar (1556-1605) to migrate from Gandhara and for one of their clans, the Safi, to settle in the Panjshir valley. This Parni/Panri origin of the Safi is only supported by very meagre evidence [4] and would seem to me to be based on the Nematullah genealogies [5] which show the Safi as descendants of 'Parni'. However should it be correct, and we shall see below some further possible connections with the Parni, it only gives some explanation for the Panjshir Safi which as far as I know now only consist of the village of Khodaidad-khel [6] (near Jabal As-Saraj, see map III p. 18) and two small communities between Mahmud-i-Raqi (the provincial capital of Kapisa), and the Qul-i-Gharau gorge

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1) See, for example, Dupree. 1970.Op. cit. p. 348., and Dupree, 1973. Op. cit. p. 537.
2) Raverty, H. G. 1880. Notes on Afghanistan and part of Baluchistan, geographical, ethnographical, and historical. p. 7. London.
3) Caroe, 1965. Op. cit. p. 64 & 65.
4) For example in the 'Baluchistan District Gazetteer Series', p. 61 vol. 3. Sibi District. Bombay 1907.
5) Caroe, 1965 Op. cit. pp. 4 & 19.
6) Studied by the University of Tokyo Expedition. 1969. Op. cit. pp. 101-133.

(to the south of Mahmud-i-Raqi). The principal Safi settlements in Tagao and Kunar are not mentioned and it, therefore, seems that an explanation which includes these two areas is more worthy of consideration.

Such an explanation is provided by the second theory put forward in this case by Bellew [1]. He suggests that events leading to the establishment of the ancestors of the Safi in the territory which they now occupy were set in motion by the Yusufzai and Mohmand Pakhtuns. These two tribes having been forced out of their own territory near Kandahar by the Tarin Pakhtuns in the first half of the 15th century settled at the beginning of the 16th century on the edges of the Peshawar plain. Whilst the Yusufzai expanded onto the plain the Mohmand penetrated into the hill country between the Kabul and Swat rivers. Here they were attacked by the indigenous population, the Gandhari, a people composed of 'several distinct nations or tribes, of which the predominant Gandhari themselves occupied as their central seat the interfluvial tract enclosed by the Kabul, Swat, and Kunar rivers' [2]. The fighting proved to be fierce and prolonged but finally the Gandhari were defeated and the whole of their country came into the hands of the Mohmands. 'In their victorious war with the natives the Mohmand appear to have acted with such fierce barbarity that the majority (of Gandhari) fled the country, and, crossing the Kunar river, found refuge and escape, among an apparently kindred people, in the fastnesses of Kama and Katar (Kafiristan), and in the valleys opening from them upon the Kabul river as far west as Tagao' [3].

It is these people i.e. the Gandhari and related tribes who having settled in the area between the Tagao valley and the Kunar river

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1) The information which will follow is taken principally from Bellew's publications of 1880 (cited above) and 1891. An Inquiry into the Ethnography of Afghanistan. Oriental University Institute. Woking.
2) Bellew, 1891. Op. cit. p. 64. This is not the ancient Gandhara but a new Gandhara possibly settled by refugees from the old state.
3) Bellew.1880 Op.cit. p. 69.Brackets mine.

were to become the Safi. This metamorphosis was brought about, at least according to Bellew, by the slow but steady advance of Islam. The Gandhari although safe from the predatory Mohmand were nevertheless on one of the frontiers of an expanding islamic world. Initially they, like all non-muslim tribes, were referred to by the muslims as 'kafirs' irrespective of origin and linguistic and geographical differences [1]. But as those Gandhari with direct territorial and/or trade contacts with the muslims gradually began to accept Islam they became known as 'nimchas' or half and halves. This was the result of their geographical position between the muslims and the kafir, their personal and trade dealings with both groups and the jealousy of each for his own religion. Thus they were muslim for the muslims and kafir for the kafirs. This situation continued until the 'nimchas' felt themselves strong enough to become full muslims without fearing the vengeance of their kafir neighbours. This was the decisive step because those who remained pagan were referred to as kafirs or nimchas whilst those who were converted 'were distinguished by the original patronymics of their race', i.e. they reverted to their old tribal names one of which was Safi. 'Thus the converted Gandhari are now divided into two great sections, named Safi and Gandhari' [2].

The third hypothesis is that advanced by Masson [3]. He suggests that the Safi were 'Siaposh', i.e. one of the major divisions of the Kafirs. Masson seems to base his argument on two pieces of

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1) The term 'kafir', i.e. unbeliever, was a word used by the muslims to describe non-muslims. The 'kafirs' of course used their own tribal and village names for themselves. However the struggle which went on over a number of centuries between the muslims and kafirs lead the latter to adopt the name 'Kafir' as a sort of symbol of their common solidarity. Nowadays the term is used to designate the languages of the people occupying the province of Nuristan.

2) Bellew 1880 Op. cit. p. 70.

3) Masson, C. 1840. Papers on Afghanistan, containing the narrative of journeys performed in that and the adjacent countries, between 1827 and 1830 etc. In: Transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society from Sept. to Nov. 1840, Vol 5. pp. 54-61 Bombay.

evidence [1]. Firstly that the people of Tagao were reported by Babur (1482-1530) as being kafirs and secondly that the Safi of his (Masson's) time (1830's) spoke languages generally regarded as belonging to the kafir group, i.e. Kohistani and Pashai. This latter view is upheld by a report in the Gazetteer of Afghanistan [2] which states that the Safi of Jelalabad 'speak among themselves a peculiar language which may be called the kohistani dialect.' It is, however, possible that this report does not represent independent research but is merely a repetition at a later date of Masson's material.

Unlike Bellew, who traces the name 'Safi' to an original patronymic, Masson considers it to be either a 'siaposh appellation' (see above) or to have been the result of their conversion to Islam. In the latter case those Siaposh, he says, who seceded from the Siaposh community because of their acceptance of Islam [3] were given the name 'Safi' or 'pure' by the muslims. This was done both as an indication of merit and as a means of distinguishing them from their pagan cousins. Thus the 'pure' people became the Safi.

The fourth and final hypothesis is not propounded by any single person but is a compilation of notes and comments from different sources. These state that the Safi or at least some of them used to be Pashai. We have already seen that Masson refers to the Siaposh as speaking Pashai and Bellew states elsewhere that the Pashai 'formerly included a number of tribes around them of similar speech and of probably kindred stock, but who are now known by different names such as Safi, Lughmani, Dehgani, Dara Nuri etc. [4] He also traces the Pashai back to the Pasiani 'mentioned by Strabo as one of those Skythian tribes who deprived the Greeks of Baktriana' [5]. This is particularly interesting because if we compare it with

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1) Masson's arguments are often very unclear and although he was an excellent observer some of his information loses its value because of this lack of clarity.
2) 1910. Op. cit. p. 448.
3) They accepted Islam, Masson says, because of reasons of security or convenience.
4) Bellew. 1891. Op. cit. p. 143.
5) Bellew. 1891. Op. cit. p. 142.

Raverty's supposition that the Parnis/Safi were Scythian nomads then a link is established between the Parnis/Safi and the Pashai/Safi on the basis of their common Scythian origin. If they were not the same people they may well have been related tribes/peoples. Also as the Scythian/Sakas overran Gandhara and settled there a further connection is made with Bellew's theory that the Safi or a section of them were Gandhari.

Modern research would also seem to establish a connection between the Pashai and the Safi. Buddruss, for example, says that Pashai territory 'stretches from the Kunar valley in the east some two hundred kilometres along the southern slopes of Nuristan to the Panjshir valley" [1]. In other words Pashai settlement is in the same geographical area as that of the Safi [2]. And Snoy states that 'a group in the eastern Pashai territory use the Pakhtun tribal designation 'Safi' and differentiate themselves consciously from the other Pashai who call themselves Sum' [3]. There, therefore, would seem to be good cause for believing that at least one section of the Safi were at one time part of the Pashai.

General Conclusions

It seems that there is a similar vein of argument running through all four theories which makes it possible to reach some general conclusions about the origins of the Safi.

The first would be that the Safi settled in the area where they are now after having been ejected or having fled from an area or areas of previous settlement. Such an area could have been the Peshawar

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1) Buddruss, Georg. 1959. Beiträge zur Kenntnis der Pasai-Dialekte. p. 22. D. M. G. Kommissionsverlag. Franz Steiner G.M.B.H. Wiesbaden. My translation.
2) Pashai are, for example, to be found, together with Afghaniya Safi, in the Pachoghan valley.
3) Snoy, Peter. 1972. Die ethnischen Gruppen. p. 177. In:Afghanistan. Herausgeber W. Kraus. Horst Erdmann Verlag. Tübingen und Basel. My translation.

plain and its surroundings because these have undoubtedly been for times immemorial areas of upheaval and movement principally because of their location at the gateway to India. Caroe [1], for example, refers to the Peshawar valley as a 'boiling cauldron' where it would be hopeless to predict any purity of tribal stock. Under these circumstances Bellew's theory that the Safi were Gandhari may not be very far from the truth. Certainly one of the Safi clans is called Qandhari. It is also true that the Mohmand whom Caroe says were responsible for driving the Gandhari to the borders of Nuristan were in and around Muqur in Babur's time [2] and are now settled between the Kabul and Swat rivers, i.e. the former Gandhara. Also information from Wylly [3] states that the Safi of Bajaur were (1912), and probably still are, vassal clans of the Mohmand - a factor pointing to forcible subjugation. Finally large parts of Safi territory have the appearance of places of retreat and refuge a fact strengthened by the late date of the Safi's conversion to Islam. If, therefore, we can see the Peshawar plain as the centre of more or less incessant activity then it is not difficult to presume that descendants of peoples such as the Saka/Scythians who thrust out autochthonous people in the Gandhara area were themselves, as Gandhari, ejected, much as Bellew portrays, by following tribes, i.e. Mohmand and Yusufzai, and either subjugated (Bajaur) or forced to flee. Whether they settled initially in the valleys leading up to Kafiristan, appropriated these areas by force themselves, or were thrust there by another or other waves of invaders is now impossible to say.

Another conclusion is that the Safi were made up of a least two related tribes which had a common language but different dialects and whose major and dominating element was formed by the Pashai Safi. That they were not originally one tribe or group but a number

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1) Caroe.1965.Op.cit. p. 192.
2) Caroe.1965.Op.cit. p. 184.
3) Wylly. 1912. Op.cit. pp. 225 & 226.

of tribes or groups is, I think, shown by the evidence. Firstly the utilisation of the name Qandhari often in preference to the name Safi by one of the largest Safi clans seems to indicate the attachment of a separate but related group whose size or unwillingness prohibited the degree of assimilation achieved by other clans. Secondly Masson reports the Safi as speaking different languages in different areas of their territory, for example, an Afghan dialect and/or Pashai in Tagao, and Kohistani in the valleys opening upon the Kunar river. Whilst I am not prepared to accept the fact that they were different languages it seems probable that they were different dialects. Kohistani and Pashai belong to the same group of languages spoken by peoples in the mountainous areas of either Swat- or Indus-Kohistan. The comment, therefore, from a non-linguist that the Safi spoke Kohistani says very little i.e. it could just as easily have been a different Pashai dialect. This conclusion is supported by Buddruss's research. He says that Pashai dialects can be so different from area to area that speakers of one dialect cannot understand speakers of another [1]. This would indicate as far as the Safi are concerned the existence of different but related peoples i.e. different through dialect but related through language.

One of and presumably the most dominant of these peoples must have been the Pashai Safi. It cannot be accidental that Safi and Pashai are to be found in the same areas, that the Safi name is used by both and that the Safi were reported by different people as speaking Pashai. The Safi, therefore, must have been either a number of Pashai sections which came together under the Safi name or different tribes who became Safi because of the political and/or numerical dominance of the Pashai Safi [2]. The latter would seem more probable because of the existence of the Qandhari section and because of the multi-tribal and multi-linguistic status of the area from Tagao to the Pech valley.

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1) Buddruss. 1959. Op. cit. p. 30.
2) Presumably in the way that the Yusufzai have taken the name of their dominant section as their tribal name.

Finally I think the conclusion may be reached that the Safi have always used and retained the name Safi. Bellew's imputation that they reverted to the name Safi on becoming muslims and Masson's contention that the Safi were given this name on the basis of their new found purity seem very unlikely. There was no reason for the Safi to give up their name just because they were referred to as kafir by the muslims. Of course seen from the view point of a non-Safi muslim the Safi would seem to have reverted to their old patronymic on becoming muslim because prior to that they would have been only kafir for him. Secondly Afghanistan would be full of 'Safi' if people had achieved this designation through conversion alone. Thirdly Masson's conclusion hat the Safi are the 'pure' people seems to have little linguistic foundation because the word for pure is 'ṣāf' whereas the sāf of Safi is written 'sāf'.

The Metamorphosis: Safi to Pakhtuns

Throughout the above discussion we have been concerned with answering the two main questions as to whom the Safi were and how they came to settle in the territory they now occupy. Nowhere, however, have authors or reports considered the question which would also seem to be very relevant as to how the Safi came to be what they are now i.e. Pakhtuns. In the general obscurity surrounding the Safi it is perhaps too much to expect that the ambiguity should be added to by a discussion of the ways and means by which the Safi could have become Pakhtuns. Nevertheless an answer to this question would be very valuable because of the light it would throw on the present structure and organization of the Safi. It is possible by utilising material which also deals with changes of identity to make some assessment of the processes which might have lead up to this second Safi metamorphosis. The procedure which I will follow will inevitably be speculative but I think that the speculation can be held within bounds and the greater understanding of the Safi which emerges makes the attempt worthwhile.

It is clear from the literature that the Safi were not the only people to have changed their ethnic identity and to have become Pakhtun. One of the best known examples [1] is that of the Ghilzai who according to Schurmann were 'a tribal group built upon a Turkic ethnic base but subsequently Afghanized in language and perhaps culture' [2]. Other examples of groups who became Pakhtuns by incorporation or adoptation into Pakhtun tribes are numerous as are reports about Pakhtuns who lost their status as such and were excluded from the society [3]. All these examples provide information as to some of the processes involved in either achieving or losing Pakhtun identity and may be used as a basis from which to work.

It seems from what we know about the Safi and about changes of tribal and group identity in general that this change took time, was variably effective and most probably occurred step by step. A necessary first step for integration was that the Safi should have been in contact with Pakhtuns otherwise no sort of integration could have taken place. If we can presume that this process of change occurred when the Safi were settled in their present territory and not before then the Pakhtun tribes which would have influenced them would have been the Mohmand, Shinwari and the nomadic and settled Ghilzai of Tagao all of whom are now their neighbours.

Another step or precondition, I feel sure, was the presence of some hostility between the Mohmand and Shinwari on one side and the Safi on the other. This was first of all inevitable because the Safi were in possession of land which the other tribes must have coveted [4].

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1) Other examples would be, according to Bellew (1880. pp. 62 & 63), the Yusufzai and Mohmand.
2) Schurmann. 1962. Op. cit. p. 43. By 'Afghanized' Schurmann means pakhtunized. Many authors and the non-Pakhtun Afghans themselves refer to the Pakhtuns as Afghans. A more complete analysis of the Ghilzai/Ghilji's supposed Turkish origin is given by Fraser-Tytler in his book: Afghanistan. pp. 51-54. O.U.P. London.1967.
3) See for example Barth, Caroe, and Dumont. (cited below footnote 1 p. 29)
4) Some of the best rice land in Afghanistan is in the Jelalabad plain and Kunar and Tagao valleys.

Secondly it was necessary because in this way value orientations and ideals could be compared which would lead to change on the part of the Safi or acceptance on the part of the Mohmand and Shinwari.

A further step or condition for integration must have been the similarity of value orientations and ideals which existed between the Safi and the Mohmand and Shinwari Pakhtuns. If we look at the material on groups which have taken on Pakhtun identity it is evident that all of them had similar values to those of the Pakhtuns prior to acceptance and incorporation. Dumont [1], for example, says that the number of Pathans (Pakhtuns) is constantly being increased by Rajput accretions and Caroe [2] writes about the Rajputs and Pathans that only Islam and Brahmanism divided them, as far as their personalities are concerned they are identical. If this is true and necessary for groups to become integrated into tribes it must have been similarly applicable for tribes to 'pass' into ethnic groups. In the case of the Safi we have seen above that they were regarded as, confused with, and may well have been Kohistani [3]. It is, of course, impossible to know now what the values and ideals of the Kohistani were at the time of the Safi's change of identity but it seemsreasonable to presume that they were not very different from those of the Kohistani of today. Barth has written about them that '... in general value orientation, Kohistanis are not unlike Pathans; and analogies to the institutional complexes (hospitality, councils, seclusion) I have described as fora for Pathan activities are also found' [4]. The 'largely compatible basic value orientations' [5] of both groups (Pathan and Kohistani) mean according to Barth that the impediments to

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1) Dumont, Louis. 1972. Homo Hierarchicus. p. 253. Paladin, London.
2) Caroe. 1965. Op.cit. p. 87.
3) I use the term 'kohistani' here in its widest possible sense just as Barth has done: e.g. '... a congeries of diverse tribes collectively referred to as Kohistanis.' (Barth. 1970. Op.cit. p. 130). Also Dupree (1973. Op.cit. p. 63) lists the Pashai under the general heading 'kohistani'.
4) Barth. 1970. Op.cit. pp. 130 & 131. The brackets are mine.
5) Barth. 1970. Op.cit. p. 131.

passing, i.e. from one identity to another, are low [1]. Thus if the Safi were Kohistani there does not seem, as far as values and ideals are concerned, to have been any barrier to them becoming Pakhtuns.

This does not mean that the social organization of the Safi and Pakhtuns in general was, or must have been, the same. The factors, for example, responsible for creating political groups among the Safi today bear more resemblance to those which are causative among the Kohistani - descent, alliances, co-residence, co-ownership, and standing friendships [2] - than they do to those of the Yusufzai Pakhtuns. On the other hand the Kohistani have a rotation system of land ownership and land utilisation which seems from what Barth [3] writes to be identical with that of the Yusufzai, i.e. the 'wesh' system. But both the Yusufzai and the Safi have all embracing tribal genealogies whereas the Kohistani only have lineages whose apical ancestors are not ordered into a single genealogy. There are thus differences and similarities in social organization between the Safi and other Pakhtun tribes but these were probably not critical for determining or deciding Pakhtun membership then, just as they are not today, although similar values and ideals seem always to have been essential.

Opportunities for assessing the value orientations and ideals of the Safi on the one hand and the Mohmand, Shinwari and Ghilzai on the other must have been multitude. Trade between Kafiristan and the Muslim community would have provided contacts and the inevitable hostility between the Safi and the Pakhtuns must have lead to the clearest assessments of values and ideals. This hostility was inevitable, as I have mentioned above, because the Safi were, and are, in possession of land which the Mohmand, Shinwari and Ghilzai Pakhtuns could just as well have exploited themselves. That the

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1) Barth is of course here working from the view point of Pathans becoming Kohistanis but what is possible in one direction should also be possible in the other.
2) Barth, F. 1956. Indus and Swat Kohistan. An Ethnographic Survey, p. 28. Forenede Trykkerier. Oslo.
3) Barth. 1956. Op.cit. p. 31.

Afghan Safi managed to survive as an independent tribe and generally to defend their lands points to the possession of characteristics - aggressiveness and independence - which are highly prized by the Pakhtuns themselves. The Safi's later history, i.e. from the time onwards that they were recognised as Pakhtuns, is full of examples of contumacious activities that would gladden the heart of any Pakhtun [1]. In fact in modern times (1956) the Safi are singled out by Wilber [2] as being among the 'more vigorous pushtun tribes' where 'the royal prerogative (established by Abdur Rahman) of appointing and dismissing tribal chiefs' is 'either absent or ineffective, due to the internal democracy of the tribes in question. The more powerful tribes cannot be cowed or dictated to'. In other words if the Safi were not in full possession of those values so admired by the Pakhtuns from the beginning they soon acquired them and established themselves as the equals of any of the other Pakhtun tribes.

If these were the small, preliminary steps to becoming Pakhtun one of the first major steps which the Safi took must have been to learn Pakhto. Initially Pakhto must have been the language of contact between the two communities exactly as it is the lingua franca of the area today. It was obviously easier for the non-Pakhtuns to learn Pakhto than for the Pakhtuns to learn the many languages and dialects spoken on the southern and western borders of Kafiristan. Also the Pakhtuns were politically, militarily and economically dominant [3]. As trade and contacts increased Pakhto must have

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1) Accounts, records and newspaper reports about the Safi show that from 1830-1949 hardly a year went by without a disturbance, rebellion or uprising in some part of their territory. Probably the best known rebellion was that of 1948-49 which on its, for the Safi, unsuccessful conclusion lead to the forcible settlement of many of them in Afghan Turkestan.

2) Wilber, D. N. ed. 1956. Afghanistan. p. 103. Human Relations Area Files. Newhaven.

3) In a similar situation of linguistic confrontation in Africa Tonkin (E. 1971. Some Coastal Pidgins of West Africa. In: Social Anthropology and Language. pp. 137-139. ASA Monographs 10. Ed. Edwin Ardener.) says that commercial exigency, the superior wealth and technology and the desire for the 'supernatural power' of the Europeans were responsible for the acceptance of the dominant (european) language by the Africans.

spread relatively rapidly first of all to the more accessible areas and then later to those less accessible. The speed and manner with which it was learnt may be ascertained from Buddruss's research [1]. He shows that the vocabulary is learnt first in the sense that common Pakhto words are introduced and gradually replace those of the native language whilst the grammar and sentence structure is maintained. The latter is then also replaced, for example, by the substitution of Pakhto suffixes and finally the language is fully accepted. It is then only a matter of time before the native language itself disappears. This can apparently happen in one generation and men who spoke their own language in their youth have either forgotten it or have great difficulty in recalling it in old age. Women, however, who in all these societies have minimal or fewer contacts with the outside may well have retained their language the longest and the men may have spoken Pakhto in 'society' as it were and Pashai/Kohistani at home [2] until Pakhto became the language for both [3]. These two factors of accessibility and sex-limited acceptance of Pakhto may have been responsible for some of the confusion which surrounded the Safi. Masson's reports of the 1830's show some Safi speaking Pashai, Kohistani and an 'Afghan dialect', the last of which may have been Pakhto and thus indicate that the Safi were still in a period of transition at least as far as the language is concerned. He may, of course, have confused the Pakhtun Safi with the non-Pakhtun Pashai Safi mentioned by Snoy because by the middle of the 19th century the Safi, if we are to believe Bellew, had had about 300 years contact

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1) Buddruss, Georg. 1960. Die Sprache von Wotapur und Katarquala. Bonner Orientalische Studien. Hrsg. von Otto Spies. Band 9. Selbstverlag des Orientalischen Seminars der Universität Bonn. pp. 1-12. and 1967. Die Sprache von Sau in Ostafghanistan. Beiträge zur Kenntnis des dardischen Phalura. Münchener Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft. Beiheft 14, in Kommission bei J. Kitzinger, München. pp. 7-10.

2) Women in Afghanistan are, because of their seclusion and their exclusion from all forms of education, the carriers of tradition. It is my own experience that when questioning Pakhtuns who had lived for some time in Kabul about kinship terms they needed to resort to their wives for information about some of the more obscure ones.

3) Compare Fishman's concepts of 'H' and 'L' languages and 'domains', in: Pride, J. B. 1971. Customs and Cases of Verbal Behaviour. Social Anthropology and Language. pp. 97 & 98. ASA Monographs 10.Ed. Edwin Ardener.

with the Pakhtuns. Whatever the case, and it would seem to me that Masson's reports deal principally with the least accessible areas of the Safi territory Pakhto could and would seem to have been learnt quickly. Today the Safi are unable to speak Pashai and those who can speak Farsi-Dari do so in the manner typical of Pakhtuns.

Another major step towards the change of identity and one which obviously took much longer to penetrate all Safi areas was conversion to Islam. Although the last Safi were only converted in 1896 and were nevertheless regarded as Pakhtuns ever before this the acceptance of Islam by at least a majority of Safi must have been a prerequisite to achieving Pakhtun status. This is because Islam is one of the essential attributes of the Pakhtun identity. It was obviously not so from the beginning but by the time the Safi came to change their identity, i.e. in the 16th century, it must have been indispensable. The process by which conversion was achieved was most probably very similar to that described by Bellew, i.e. first passing from Kafir through an intermediate stage (nimcha) to full acceptance of Islam. By whatever means conversion occurred the Safi, typically, more than made up for being one of the last Pakhtun tribes to embrace Islam and now have the reputation of being among the most fervent and fanatic exponents of the faith [1].

The elements and processes which are outlined above - contact with Pakhtuns and hostility, similarity of value orientations and ideals, language and Islam - seem to be sufficient when taken together to at some point in time have altered the balance so that the Safi 'passed' and became Pakhtuns. Of course it is impossible to say whether these processes and steps were the ones which were responsible but it seems most probable that they would have played a part in the change of identity and possible that they were also essential.

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1) See Caroe. 1965. Op.cit. p. 20.

The final catalyst bringing about change may well have been one of the many raids or uprisings in which the Safi took part along with the Mohmand and Shinwari [1]. Certainly it seems to me that, as Barth says, '... ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves' [2]. Thus parallel processes leading to change would be at work. One would be the Safi's realisation that their values and actions were basically and essentially those of the Pakhtuns and the other would be the Pakhtuns acceptance that their basic values and those of the Safi were identical or so similar as to be acceptable. Thus the cultural features that signalled the boundary between the two groups would have disappeared because '... the identification of another person as a fellow member of an ethnic group implies a sharing of criteria for evaluation and judgement. It thus entails the assumption that the two are fundamentally 'playing the same game.' [3] As the Safi were most obviously 'playing the same game' and playing it extremely well then they became accepted by the Pakhtuns as Pakhtuns and were also seen by non-Pakhtuns as being Pakhtuns. Thus the Pashai/Kohistani Safi became Safi Pakhtuns [4] and the area from the Pech valley in the east along the Kunar, Kabul and Tagao rivers to the Nijrao and Panjshir valleys in the north-west became an area of Pakhtun settlement.

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1) See for example 'Ekonomicheskaya zhizn' (Economic Life) No. 21/ 26. 1. 1929.
2) Barth. 1970. Op.cit. p. 10.
3) Barth. 1970. Op.cit. p. 15.
4) This is not to say that the Safi were identical with their Pakhtun neighbours. As I have indicated above there are among Pakhtuns many social and cultural forms but the essential attributes which are recognised and accepted by other Pakhtuns and non-Pakhtuns as indispensable to the Pakhtun identity were present among the Safi.

4. THE OCCUPATION OF AFGHANIYA AND THE PROCESSES OF SETTLEMENT

In the last chapter I was able to make some statement about the Safi's origins, their occupation of their present tribal territory and the possible processes which lead to their change of ethnic identity. In this chapter I will be dealing with similar subjects but on the micro level of the tribal section, i.e. of the Afghaniya Safi who form the subject of the thesis.

The questions as to when and how one small section or group of Safi came to occupy what was to become Afghaniya in the lower part of the Pachoghan valley are not quite as difficult to answer as the similar questions asked above about the whole tribe and its territory. This is because although there is a complete lack of historical information about the Pachoghan valley other sources of information are available which make an assessment possible. One such source, and the one used here as the basis for a reconstruction of settlement, is the Afghaniya Safi's own account of events. This is supported firstly by linking the Safi's narrative (a) with the actual topography of the Pachoghan valley and the surrounding valleys and (b) with the present distribution of tribes, ethnic groups and named groups within the community. Secondly it is complemented by drawing parallels with other Pakhtun areas where the processes of settlement are historically verified or where the nature and time of settlement have been retained in oral traditions. Taken together this information makes it possible to draw a number of conclusions which, I think, present an acceptable reconstruction of settlement in Afghaniya.

Occupation

The Safi's own myth or tradition of settlement states that in the distant past the forefathers of the present settlers together with

their families moved up from Tagao into the Pachoghan valley (see maps IV & V pp. 37 & 38). There they were met by the determined opposition of the kafir inhabitants. After a fierce struggle the Safi succeeded in driving them out and occupying their lands.

This story is very short and very general nevertheless it provides most of the essentials necessary for a reconstruction when each element is analysed step by step.

The Safi's conclusion that the original settlement took place in the distant past comes, I am sure, from two factors. One is that most Afghans consider Islam to have been introduced into their country at the dawn of time and, therefore, any reference to conflict with kafirs, apart from the conquest of Kafiristan which is still remembered vividly, must imply a date in the distant past. The other factor is that the Safi of Pachoghan have no more exact tradition of settlement, i.e. the version which they give is very short and notable for its lack of detail. As stories are usually passed on relatively accurately the simplicity of this story would suggest an ancient origin. This latter factor is supported by other origin stories from people in the Pachoghan valley who have settled recently. They know when they came and how, with whom and from where, and this is equally true of other recent Safi settlements elsewhere, for example, at Khodaidad Khil [1]. The fact, therefore, that even the Safi's elders, the 'greybeards', do not know more exactly when settlement took place is sufficient for the Safi to conclude that it must have taken place in the distant past.

A more precise date of settlement than that given by the Safi may,

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1) See University of Tokyo Expedition to South-West Hindukush. 1969. Op. cit. Accounts from other areas of recent (1900-1910) Pakhtun settlement also indicate that the details of the movement and the persons involved are known accurately. See Glatzer, B. 1977. Nomaden von Gharjistan. pp. 26 & 27. Beiträge zur Südasienforschung. Band 22. Franz Steiner Verlag. Wiesbaden.



IV THE PACHOGHAN VALLEY

AND

NEIGHBOURING VALLEYS



(after Fairchild Aerial Surveys 1959)

V The Pachoghan Valley: physical setting

however, be reached. According to the Safi genealogy the original settlers, the sons of musawad, i.e. ṣaliH, maghdud, piroz, bahadur, and Haji 'arab with their families and dependents, arrived in Afghaniya some nine generations ago [1]. Although genealogies are not always very reliable alterations over such a relatively small number of generations, i.e. nine, seem unlikely. Also genealogies if they are altered at all are usually shortened (telescoping) or broadened by the addition of collaterals and not lengthened. Nine generations would, therefore, seem if anything to be a conservative number. Nevertheless if we take it as correct this would place the date of the original settlement at about 1700.

Such a date is supported by another factor indicating the age of settlement - the field shape. The central and lower areas of Afghaniya are divided up into fields whose small size and irregular shape indicate long usage and the parcelling of fields over a number of generations. Whilst this factor must not be conclusive - in some areas small, irregular shaped fields also result from topographical necessity - it does in the majority of cases where Pakhtuns are concerned denote long settlement and partition. This is because new settlement by Pakhtuns in areas such as the Pachoghan valley, i.e. on valley floors, is characterised by long strip fields [2]. These result from the principle of equality practised by Pakhtuns in the division of new land. All heads of households must be given equal shares of the acquired land in terms not only of area but also of quality and this is best achieved by a division into strips which enables each householder to have a share of all types of land. Thus long parallel strips have become the hall mark of recent Pakhtun settlement.

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1) See diag. 7 p.121 and also Barth. 1965. Op.cit. p. 25.
2) See Grötzbach (1972. Op.cit. pp. 192-199) and Wald (Hermann-Josef. 1969. Landnutzung und Siedlung der Pashtunen im Becken von Khost (östl. Afghanistan) pp. 66-81. C. W. Leske Verlag, Opladen). This is also supported by my own observations among Atsakzai Pashtuns of Uruzgan who settled in this area (Uruzgan) at the end of the 19th century.

How long it takes for inheritance, population growth and the sale of land to reduce these strips to irregular parcels it is impossible to say. The present complexity of field patterns in the central area of Afghaniya and the size of holdings would indicate that quite a few generations had passed since the original division and nine, as indicated by the Safi genealogy, could well have been the number necessary. Whilst 1700, as the approximate date for the initial settlement of Afghaniya, does not represent the 'distant past' for us it certainly would fall into the Safi's conception of a distant past. Thus there is no real anachronism between the Safi's account of events and what seems to have been a much later date of settlement.

That the Safi came from Tagao, as their tradition relates, would also seem to be very probable. Tagao, the major valley to the south of the Pachoghan is, as we have seen, one of the two major centres of Safi settlement in Afghanistan. It is also reachable from the Pachoghan valley by way of a gorge which leads down to the wider plain of the Tagao river (see map IV p. 37). The Safi could therefore, without too much difficulty have advanced up the gorge from Tagao and settled in the Pachoghan valley.

Why they did so is more difficult to answer but at least three reasons may be postulated. One is that the pressure of the expansionary Ghilzai Pakhtuns [1] created a chain reaction through the Safi community which dislodged a group on the perimeter of Safi settlement and forced it to expand into the Pachoghan valley. Another is that population pressures in the Tagao valley lead to Safi expansion northwards. A final reason may have been population growth combined with drought. In these circumstances peripheral groups often take up a semi-nomadic existence and on one of their

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1) 'They (the Safi) then (1730-1747) inhabited a larger tract of country, and were in hostility with the Ghiljis (Ghilzai) who had previously expelled them from the lands to the south of Taghow and between Kabul and Jelalabad.' Masson, 1840. Op.cit. pp. 58 & 59.

movements - the journey up the Tagao northwards and along the Panjshir towards Badakhshan is followed today by nomads and by semi-nomadic harvesters - they discovered and forcibly occupied the Pachoghan valley [1]. Whichever reason was responsible for their movement it seems most probable that it occurred from Tagao especially as the Safi of Tagao also refer to Afghaniya not as Afghaniya but as 'Sarboli' which literally means, 'head squad' or 'top/highest detachment'. Thus the Safi of Afghaniya formed, as they do now, the head or furthest detachment of the Safi of Tagao.

If the Safi moved up from Tagao round about the beginning of the 18th century then the inhabitants of the Pachoghan valley at that time would in all probability have been 'kafirs' as the story of settlement suggests. The present population of the valley, apart from the Afghaniya Safi, is made up of Parachi (a mountain people speaking an East-Iranian dialect) in the middle and higher regions of both the Pachoghan and Ghain valleys, and Pashai in the highest and least accessible parts of these valleys [2]. From the present geographical position of the Parachi and Pashai and from the information mentioned above about the Pashai and Kohistani it would seem reasonable to assume that the ancestors of these Parachi and Pashai constituted the 'kafirs' against whom the Safi needed to struggle so fiercely. Such an assumption is supported by Morgenstierne's work [3] among the Pashai. He states that certain Pashai tribes remained pagans until 'modern times' and other authors have written that peripheral areas of Kafiristan, which must have been similar in terms of accessibility to Pachoghan, were held by kafirs until the conquest and conversion of that country in 1896 [4].

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1) Most of the new Pakhtun settlements result from nomadic or semi-nomadic expansion.
2) There are also hamlets of settled Pakhtun nomads but these Pakhtuns came much later than the Safi, Parachi and Pashai and will be dealt with in greater detail below.
3) Morgenstierne, G. 1932. Report on a Linguistic Mission to North-Western India. p. 24. Instituttet for Sammenlingnende Kulturforsk-ning. Serie C III - 1 Oslo.
4) See Kakar. 1971. Op. cit. pp. 101 & 102.

If this was the case for the 19th century then the Pashai and Parachi of the 18th century must almost certainly have been kafirs although influenced by Islam. This religious difference and the fanaticism of the Safi as new converts, as well as the fact that the Pashai and Parachi would have been fighting for their own lands may have been responsible for the reported fierceness of the fighting in the occupation of the Pachoghan valley [1]. Whether these were the reasons or not, and they may really only have been introduced to dramatise the situation and glorify Safi arms, it seems most probable that the Pashai and Parachi were kafirs and 'the' kafirs mentioned in the tradition of Safi settlement.

We have seen so far that this tradition seems to offer a very plausible account of events when seen in terms of the historical, ethnic and topographical background of the area. It does not, however, provide the only possible method open to the Safi firstly for having settled in the valley, and secondly for having acquired the land.

In the first case it is possible, in the light of what we know about the Safi as a whole, that the Pachoghan Safi constituted as Pashai - there are still Pashai in the valley - or a related people (Kohistani) the indigenous population of the valley and that their ethnic 'reincarnation' as Pakhtuns lead them to appear, at least to the outside observer, as new settlers. This seems most unlikely principally because the present tripartite ethnic composition of the Pachoghan valley, i.e. Pakhtun, Parachi and Pashai and the geographical distribution of these groups seems to exclude such a possibility. If the Safi were Pashai then it is strange that the predecessors of the present Pashai should not have become Safi as well. It is also unusual that these Pashai should have been separated from their

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1) This struggle would seem to be commemorated in the shrine of the holy man Baba Sangu (see map VI p. 50) who is supposed to have been killed whilst fighting against the kafir. None of the Safi, however, make a link between him and their own settlement in the valley. Perhaps this was, therefore, an earlier attempt at settlement and/or conversion.

fellows, the (Pashai) Safi, by an area of Parachi settlement, which is the case now, and that they should occupy the most infertile extremes of the valley whilst the dominant (Pashai) Safi should enjoy the richest land at the mouth of the valley. Finally the Parachi cannot be seen as providing a connecting link between the Safi and Pashai because they, the Parachi, are an entirely different people who speak an East-Iranian language unrelated to the Dardic Pashai. The possibility that the Safi might have constituted part of or the indigenous population would therefore seem to be remote and the three ethnic groups would appear to have arrived separately in the Pachoghan valley.

If they did so then this would be further support for the Safi's own account of events because the present position of the Pakhtun, Parachi and Pashai settlements suggests occupation by at least two waves of conquest. The Pashai would appear to have been pushed into the highest and least fertile areas of the valley [1] by the Parachi and the latter would in turn seem to have relinquished the lower and most fertile areas to the Pakhtun Safi.

In the second case, i.e. of alternative ways of acquiring the land, the Safi could have gained possession by purchase and/or the repayment of debts. Such methods can be extremely effective as is well documented by Ferdinand [2] for the Hazarajat (central Afghanistan).

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1) Keiser (R. L. 1974. Social Structure in the Southeastern Hindu-Kush: Some Implications for Pashai Ethno-History. pp. 449 & 450. Anthropos. vol. 69. pp. 445-456.) reports from other Pashai areas a reverse order of conquest; 'In both these valleys, according to local tradition, the latest inhabitants came from across major mountain divides and, after much fighting, forced the original inhabitants down the valley leaving the upper section to the invaders'. Whilst this was obviously the case it nevertheless seems strange in the light of the considerable difference which altitude makes to the number of crops and size of harvests that a superior force should voluntarily choose a higher and therefore less productive area.

2) Ferdinand, K. 1969. Nomadism in Afghanistan. pp. 127-160. In: Viehwirtschaft und Hirtenkultur. Ethnographische Studien, Ed. Laszlo Foeldes. Akademiai Kiado. Budapest.

The Pakhtuns involved in this case are not Safi but Ghilzai and Durrani trade and sheep nomads who move up into the Hazarajat in summer. In the normal process of trade a debt is created through the credit offered to the Hazara by the nomads, or through advance payment which the nomads give for the future deliveries of, for example, wheat. As the Hazara are in no position to acquire cash, repayments are more or less impossible to make and as crops may fail the purchased wheat cannot always be supplied. This means that either further credit is given or the wheat which could not be delivered becomes a debt whose repayment because of a special profit system used by the nomads [1] results in the eventual loss of peasant's fields. Even an ordinary debt once it has started escalates extremely rapidly because of the 100-200 % interest charged by the nomads and it is only a matter of time before animals and then finally land is sold [2].

Similar processes may well have been at work in the Pachoghan valley because, as was mentioned above, one of the nomads' routes from Jelalabad to the Panjshir valley and Badakhshan passes the mouth of the valley. The Pashai and Parachi must have been just as dependent upon nomad traders for certain articles as the Hazara and as they also cannot have had access to money, credit and wheat sold in advance would have been the necessary methods to acquire such products as tea, cloth and metal goods. The slow purchase and acquisition of fields by the Safi could have provided the foothold necessary for the ultimate occupation of the whole of the lower section of the valley.

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1) ' Very often debt is converted to wheat to be delivered in the following year, and if a debt runs more than one year it is usually doubled or tripled every year, following the discrepancy between current and advance payment prices for wheat - a most profitable system for the nomads.' Ferdinand. 1969. Op. cit. p. 142.
2) Interestingly enough Wald (1969. Op.cit. p. 54) indicates that in Pakhtun areas (Khost) it is very difficult for the creditor to receive his money or the debtor's land in exchange because money lenders receive no support from their fellow tribesmen or the society. The political power and dominance of the Pakhtuns enables them to coerce the Hazara into redeeming their debts with land. The fact that Islamic law forbids interest on money lent whilst known both in the Hazarajat and Khost does not seem to play a role.

This method of settlement, however, seems unlikely principally because it would not have lead, in my opinion, to an exclusively Pakhtun community such as Afghaniya. Some Pashai or Parachi peasant farmers must have been able to resist falling into debt and thus an ethnic chequer board would have resulted similar to the situation which now exists higher up the valley and in Ghain, a side valley of the Pachoghan. In these areas Pakhtun nomads who have acquired land in the ways mentioned above have settled and the hamlets have Pakhtun, Pashai and Parachi inhabitants. There are, of course, hamlets in which only one ethnic group is represented but there is no community composed of a number of hamlets where all the members belong to one named ethnic group. This distinction is held by Afghaniya alone [1] and it is proclaimed by the name Afghaniya which means place of the Afghans or Pakhtuns [2].

Another reason why the acquisition of land by purchase and/or re-payment of debts seems unlikely is because if Safi settlement took place in the 18th century the Pakhtuns were not, as in the Hazara-jat, dealing with a conquered population but one which was still independent and still very warlike. Added to this were the religious differences between the two groups which would not have made peaceful settlement easy if at all possible. It is difficult at the best of times for an outsider to purchase land in a community and the chances of doing so by way of claiming a debt in an ethnically and religiously alien community must have been very small. It would presuppose a force which the nomads cannot have constantly

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1) One of the thirty-four hamlets of Afghaniya is called Tajik and I presumed at the time that the founders of this hamlet would have been Tajiks who settled in this area from outside. Since my field work I have found out that Pakhtuns in the Kunar area refer, according to Buddruss (1960. Op. cit. pp. 2 & 3.) to people who are not Nuristani (Jadidi) or persian speakers (Farsiwan) as 'Tajik". Thus this hamlet might be of Pashai or Parachi origin and have survived Safi acquisitions of land.

2) Afghaniya is called Afghaniya by outsiders, but particularly by government officials and the non-Pakhtuns of the Pachoghan valley. The Safi themselves refer to it as Sarboli.

exercised because they were nomads or an acceptance of laws by the Pashai and Parachi which no outside government was in a position to enforce.

It, therefore, seems to me that the original settlement and the acquisition of land by the Safi in Afghaniya resulted from the use of force as the Safi's history of settlement relates and was not the product of a protracted piece by piece acquisition as would be indicated by Pakhtun land procurement elsewhere. This is not to say that later settlement did not occur in the latter manner but that the original settlers acquired their land by conquest.

Processes of Settlement

So far then the Safi's account of the settlement of Afghaniya and the interpretation of the individual elements involved have provided a relatively comprehensive picture of events. The account, however, stops at the conquest and occupation of Afghaniya and does not afford any information about the division of land among the new settlers, the establishment of hamlets or the processes of later settlement. These procedures may, nevertheless, be reconstructed by reference to the settlement traditions of later settlers, by parallels drawn with other Pakhtun areas, and, principally, from the existence in Afghaniya of groups whose names - the 'taxti' or original settlers, the 'rāghli' or newcomers, and the 'ājnabiyān' or strangers [1] - indicate the chronological nature of settlement.

The 'taxti'

The first stage of settlement, the division of land among the household heads, would have been carried out at the instigation of the

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1) These are, of course, not only categories indicating the time of settlement but also social categories. The significance they have and the roles members play will be explained in greater detail below (see pp. 119, 126, 132 & 133).

original settlers, the forefathers of the present 'taxti'. Such a division is customary among Pakhtuns on the acquisition of new lands as I have mentioned above.

Initially a survey, as is usual among Pakhtuns, would have been made so that the quality of the land and the availability of water for irrigation could be assessed. The division itself would have been carried out by a neutral, i.e. non-tribal, person, generally a Pir (holy man) or Sheikh (descendant of the Prophet) [1] who would have tried to ensure that each extended family head received not only an equal share in terms of area but also in terms of the quality of the land, i.e. irrigated and non-irrigated arable, and pasture. Thus a single share would be made up of one strip incorporating all types of land or a number of strips of land located in different areas but with a total area and overall quality identical to that of the other shares [2].

Once this division had taken place settlement could begin. It would (most probably) have taken the form of 'qalās' or fortified houses [3] placed in the middle of the valley on the most fertile areas of each household head's share of land. Such a house form and its location would have arisen for the following reasons. Firstly qalās are the preferred form of residence for Pakhtuns wherever they are viable, i.e. where there is sufficient land, because they are excellent for defence and can house a number of families consisting ideally of a father and his married sons. The defensive aspect would have been especially relevant in an area which had just been conquered and

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1) This is similar, but on a much smaller scale, to the division of Swat among the Yusufzai Pakhtuns. The Swat division was carried out by Sheikh Malli, 'a prominent holy man' (Barth. 1965. Op.cit. p. 9.) and took some five years to complete.
2) Such a division is still visible in areas of new settlement e.g. among the Atsakzai Pashtuns of Uruzgan.
3) See also Wald. 1969. Op.cit. pp. 76-79.

which was also open to attack from Kafiristan. Secondly the need to have the best fields close to the house both for the ease of access and for the establishment of 'palez' (vegetable gardens) and gardens (orchards with fruit and nut trees) would have meant that the qalās would have been built in the middle of the valley where generally the best land and the best possibilities for irrigation are located. Subsequent expansion triggered off by the death of the founding 'fathers' would have lead the sons/brothers to build separate qalās on their parts of the original shares. Finally, however, a point would be reached - according to the genealogies in the third or fourth descending generation from the founders - where there would have been insufficient space to expand, at least in the extensive form of individual qalās, because the land could not be sacrified for buildings when it could be used for crops. In this case the qalās would have been divided and/or smaller ones would have been attached so that the net result would have been the establishment of hamlets or small villages.

As the taxti population increased further more distant fields would have been cultivated, the fallow periods would have been reduced and the majority of the pasture turned into arable or sold. The last factor would probably have followed relatively soon after the settlement because both the desire and the need for sheep and goats - a relic of the nomadic or semi-nomadic invaders past - would have been reduced by sedentarisation and only those animals which were essential for an agricultural economy, e.g. oxen and milk cows, would have been retained.

The 'rāghli'

At the same time as the taxti were expanding, establishing hamlets and utilising their fields more intensively newcomers, the 'rāghli' must have been arriving in the valley. These were principally groups of Pakhtun nomads and semi-nomads, both probably of non-

Safi origin [1], who had been able to buy or acquire fields from the taxti through the redemption of debts in the manner outlined above. These rāghli settled mainly on the sides of the valley and in the less fertile areas because there the land was cheap and because the taxti were more willing to part with land which they had only used as pasture or which, through lack of irrigation, had hardly been exploited at all. This situation most probably suited the nomads as well because they were able, at least initially, to retain their herds. However as they too expanded then they began either to buy more and better land from the taxti or to improve that which they had by the extension and improvement of the irrigation system. There were also rāghli who were able to acquire land in the main areas of taxti settlement either by the purchase of good land or by the exploitation of swampy or stony areas near the rivers. Thus the present eighteen rāghli hamlets are found both scattered among the sixteen taxti hamlets and as separate groups of hamlets on the edges of Afghaniya (see map VI p. 50).

The 'ājnabiyān'

The last stage of settlement, which is continuing today, was that of the 'ājnabiyān' or strangers. These men or families have acquired land either by purchase or marriage.

Those who have purchased land, principally non-Safi Pakhtun (xaroti Ghilzai) nomads, have done so in the last remaining pastoral areas

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1) When asked today they say that they are Safi who came originally from what are now the provinces of Laghman and Wardak. Whereas Laghman is an area of Safi settlement Wardak is not as far as I know. Wardak and its capital, Maidan, are the principal areas of settlement for the 'Wardak', a group whose ethnogenesis is completely unknown. They are divided into three sub-tribes and speak Pakhto without, however, claiming Pakhtun identity or appearing in the Pakhtun genealogy. They could, if they wished, 'pass' easily especially amongst a tribe like the Safi with its relatively lax genealogy. See Kieffer, C. 1975. Wardak, toponyme et ethnique d'Afghanistan. In: Hommages Et Opera Minora Mounumentum. H. S. Nyberg, Acta Iranica. Teheran-Liége. pp. 475-483.



VI Afghaniya–settlement

of the valley because there, as we have seen above, the land was cheap and also there was no competition from the other inhabitants of Afghaniya as there would have been for the more fertile, irrigated areas. They were also most able to cope with these marginal areas because they could leave parts of their flocks and herds with brothers or relatives in other areas and improve their own lands whilst still having an income from the animals. Many were and are satisfied with the amount and the nature of the land they have because they have retained their tents, and in spring and summer move up the mountain sides to exploit the spring pasture and to escape from the heat of the valley floor. They live generally in large qalās which are built on the purchased fields away from the taxti and rāghli hamlets.

Those 'ājnabiyān' (mainly Tagao-Safi) who have married land, i.e. who have acquired it through their wives' inheritances [1], are not restricted to the sides of the valley and the cheapest land but are to be found also in long established taxti and rāghli hamlets working the best land. Nevertheless because of their origin they are referred to, at least in the first generation, as strangers and only later become fully or partially integrated depending upon the amount of bad will which has been created through their acquisition of the land. They normally live in their father-in-law's qalās and thus unlike those ājnabiyān who purchase fields are, as far as the settlement types are concerned, indistinguishable from their taxti or rāghli neighbours.

In summary, therefore, the settlement of the Safi in Afghaniya began with the conquest of the lower section of the Pachoghan valley by a group of nomadic or semi-nomadic Safi who moved up from Tagao round about 1700. These men, after overcoming the indigenous Pashai and Parachi kafir population, divided the land among them-

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1) This will be explained more fully below p. 207.

selves and established houses in the most fertile and best watered areas of the valley. The settlement process was continued not only by the expansion of these original settlers, the later taxti, but also by the addition of newcomer groups, the rāghli, who initially acquired land in the poorer areas of the valley but then later also purchased land within the areas of taxti settlement so that now their hamlets are indistinguishable from those of the original settlers. The final phase of settlement brought the 'ājnabiyān' into the Pachoghan valley. They either purchased or married land throughout the community or, if they were nomads - the majority of these 'strangers' -, they moved to the most marginal areas of the valley which were the cheapest and which they could most readily exploit with their mixed agricultural/pastoral economy.

5. PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL SETTING

Today these three groups, irrespective of their origins, constitute what is now known as the Safi of Afghaniya and occupy the lower section of the Pachoghan valley (see maps VI & VII). This valley is only 60 kms, north north-east of Kabul by air but due to the difficulties of the intermediary terrain some 210 kms. by road (see map III p. 18). The valley is some 19 kms. long and runs from north-east to south-west. In the north and east the valley is bounded by the mountains of Kohistan and Nuristan which reach heights of up to 5,000 metres and in the south-west by the hills (ca. 2,000 metres high) which form one side of the Panjshir valley (see maps IV & V pp. 37 and 38).

The climate of the area varies according to the altitude. In the Pakhtun section of the Pachoghan valley, which lies at a height of ca. 1,500 metres [1], summer temperatures are high - June, July and August all average about 30 degrees C. - and are increased by the sheltered nature of the valley and winter temperatures drop to freezing point (see diag. 2 p. 56). Precipitation occurs between November and April and is principally in the form of snow followed by rain at the end of February and throughout March. Total annual precipitation is about 350 mms. There is no monsoon.

The natural vegetation of the valley has more or less disappeared because of the intensive agricultural utilisation of the area, the grazing of flocks and herds on the hill sides and the need for fire-wood. Nevertheless some low bushes of sage and juniper are to be found as well as dwarf and other varieties of pine.

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1) This height would support Barth's hypothesis that the limit of Pakhtun settlement lies at about 5,000 ft., an altitude above which it is impossible to raise two cereal crops a year (Barth. 1965. Op.cit. p. 8).



VII Afghaniya

Social Setting

The Safi population numbers about 3,000 and is settled in an area i.e. Afghaniya, of some 14 sq. kms. The population density is thus very high at about 214 per sq. km. Settlement takes the form of 34 (16 taxti and 18 rāghli) nucleated hamlets (average population of 85 inhabitants) which are scattered fairly evenly throughout Afghaniya with perhaps a slightly greater concentration in the western corner of the valley. The hamlets are readily distinguishable from their surroundings because they are the only places in the valley, apart from shrines and the mountain sides of the Ghain valley (see map V p. 38), where there are concentrations of trees. The trees planted in gardens, in the middle of the hamlets and along the hamlet paths provide fruit - principally mulberries, but also apricots, apples and cherries, and wall nuts - and shade in the summer. This shade is utilised by all in the intense summer heat but there, where the trees are thickest and there is a natural or artificial mound commanding a view, are the men's meeting places, the 'suri'. Here they come to talk, smoke, gossip and on occasion to hold their 'jirgas'. Jirgas are deliberative assemblies where landed heads of households meet, or met, to settle disputes, reach compromises and work out the problems of the hamlet or of a number of hamlets [1]. The suri, or shady places, are replaced in winter by the 'petawi'. These are open places facing south usually sheltered from the winds by walls or buildings on two or three sides.

Apart from a suri and a petawi each hamlet also has a mosque with an imām responsible for prayer and religious education. The mosques are generally built in the centre of the hamlet where the hamlet's paths come together. Some (3), however, are built near

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1) Jirgas now hardly come together because they are being steadily replaced firstly by a small jirga, the 'maraka', formed from a small number of high status men from the community, secondly by the activities of the maliks and thirdly by the waluswal and the Department of Justice in Nijrao.

2. CLIMATIC CHART

	Mean Max. Temp.	Mean Min. Temp.	Mean Temp.	Rain-fall in mm.
Oct.	30.1	13.0	21.4	12.2
Nov.	22.6	7.3	14.1	24.1
Dec.	16.3	0.9	6.4	21.4
Jan.	18.0	1.1	8.6	0.7
Feb.	18.0	7.1	12.4	65.7
Mar.	18.9	7.7	13.1	142.6
Apr.	23.6	11.5	17.8	62.5
May	32.7	15.6	25.4	5.8
June	38.7	22.5	31.4	Tr
July	36.3	24.2	31.5	Tr
Aug.	37.6	24.4	29.9	0
Sept.	31.8	17.7	25.2	0

Temperature in degrees centigrade

figures for the province of Laghman for the year from October 1965 to September 1966

Source: The Kabul Times Annual, 1967.

'holy' trees which were, according to the Safi, the places where muslim martyrs were buried and where men, 'in the past' [1], used to gather for prayer. Now the dead branches of these trees, once they have fallen to the ground, are collected and used for heating the mosques.

Many hamlets also have 'shops'. These are mostly just rooms in qalās where the little which is for sale is stored but a few are separate buildings with a relatively wide range of goods. If the villagers requirements cannot be met there, there is also a bazaar, held on Fridays, at the junction of Afghaniya with the rest of the Pachoghan valley and with Ghain. There members of hamlets buy and sell commodities and the shopkeepers also have stands. The two principal bazaars for the Safi are, however, those in Nijrao, near to the sub-province capital, and in Tagao. The former is more popular than the latter because it is more easily reached.

A few hamlets (5) have water driven mills and these are either collectively owned by the hamlet or are in the hands of two or three of its members. These mills do not have a monopoly because many cultivators, for whom the price in Afghaniya [2] is too high, have their crops ground in the upper part of the Pachoghan valley or in Nijrao.

Apart from these buildings hamlets of course consist primarily of a number of semi-fortified clay houses or small qalās. These qalās have two or three rooms, a number of outhouses for the storage of crops, green fodder, hay etc., stalls for the milk cows and the oxen, and coops for the chickens and ducks. They also have a courtyard which is either planted with trees and vegetables or is of beaten clay. Surrounding the whole complex is a 5 metre high wall.

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1) The men of the hamlet of kando xel still pray on occasion under their 'holy' tree.
2) Maize costs 1 pau per ser = 1/2 kilo for every 7 kgs. and wheat 3/4 pau per ser = 372 gms. for every 7 kgs.

Some qalās, but particularly those of the ājnabiyān nomads, which are built separately away from the hamlets, are very large and have towers at each corner where lookouts could be posted and from which, should it be necessary, a good field of fire could be obtained. All qalās whether small or large have small channels from the irrigation ditches to the qalās so that, when irrigation is in progress the gardens may be watered and the women do not have to leave the qualā to collect water from the rivers.

Paths exist only within the hamlets and communications between hamlets take place, with two exceptions, along the low mud walls which mark the boundaries of fields. The exceptions are the motorable track constructed to facilitate exploratory mining running from the mouth of the valley to its head where the exploration is taking place and the path leading from the middle of Afghaniya over a low pass to the Nijrao valley and to the local government centre at Nijrao (see map VII p. 54).

Sixteen of the thirty-four hamlets of Afghaniya are occupied by the present descendants of musawad (the taxti) whose five sons and their families are supposed, as we have seen in chap. 4, to have forcibly occupied the territory. Four of these sons subsequently became the founders of major lineages or 'khels' and their sons or grandsons in turn became the founders of minor lineages. Within these minor lineages are smaller local descent groups called 'koranai'. Thus all the musawad Safi are ordered into a descent system of decreasingly small units, i.e. musawad Safi, major lineage, minor lineage and local descent group. As members of descent groups also live proximately all the local descent groups of one minor lineage are to be found within one hamlet and the hamlet is seen, in descent terms, as being a minor lineage. Also all minor lineages/hamlets of a major lineage are to be found within the territory of the major lineage - a territory which is the summation of the minor lineages'/ hamlets' territories. This will be explained in much greater detail below and just serves here as an introduction.

The one non-musawad Safi major lineage in the community was founded by raghli and its three minor lineages also constitute hamlets and are divided into smaller local descent groups. None of these descent groups either at the koranai or minor lineage level are integrated into the musawad Safi's lineages. The other fifteen raghli hamlets are also seen as being composed of men who are related to one another as members of one minor lineage but they cannot be and are not connected lineally to any of the five major lineages of the community. However as they live on the territory of the major lineages they are seen as being 'of' but not 'in' their respective major lineages.

The non-Safi and non-Pakhtun professionals, the blacksmiths, barbers and carpenters who also live in Afghaniya do so either as families in taxti or raghli hamlets or as groups of families in their own hamlets. In the latter case they are also organised on a descent basis as minor lineages but they have no descent connection with one another nor, of course, with any of the Pakhtun taxti or raghli lineages.

The majority of Safi are the owner-cultivators of the land which surrounds their hamlets. The fields are not owned or, with the exception of tasks which are too arduous for the owner alone, worked collectively but are in the hands of individual household heads. These men are generally referred to as elders, greybeards or 'spingirai' and they pass the ownership of the fields on to their sons at an agreed division or, on their deaths, when the sons in turn become elders. Fields are also share-cropped by those who have insufficient land or by landless labourers who come from outside the community.

The larger landowners have more say in the hamlet's affairs than do those with average holdings. As a result they usually constitute the members of the small jirga, the 'maraka', and hold the largely honorific position of hamlet elder, the 'de kuli mashr'.

Some of those landowners with above average holdings who also possess leadership qualities and the confidence of others are elected to the office of 'malik' of which there are nine in Afghaniya. This position originally meant lineage head but has now, through government intervention, become largely disassociated from the lineage. It is a position which can bring considerable power to the holder and these maliks will probably, in the future, be responsible for introducing major change in the community.

One might think that the hamlet's imām could provide a counter-weight to the maliks but this is not the case. The imāms' dependence on the hamlet's elders for their office and income and their enforced political neutrality ensure their acquiescence to the wishes of the hamlet's de kuli mashr, or to the malik himself.

Not all Safi support themselves from the land or have positions of influence or power. Many hunt, are seasonal labourers outside the community, have shops or, are salesmen, and those who have also become mullahs, work, on occasion, as imām in areas outside the Pachoghan valley.

Apart from the Safi there are also, as mentioned above, non-Safi, non-Pakhtun professionals living in Afghaniya. There are two families of blacksmiths, eighteen families of carpenters and seventeen families of barbers. Fifteen of the seventeen barber families live in their own hamlet, dumān, as do ten of the eighteen carpenter families (see map VI p. 50). The blacksmiths' and carpenters' work is principally involved with the construction and repair of agricultural equipment but they also do work for the mills and in the qalās. The work of the barbers is mainly barbering but they also take part in the rites de passage of the Safi. All these professionals are concerned to improve their status but so far only the blacksmiths and carpenters have succeeded in any way.

Whilst these are the only professionals living permanently in Afghaniya there are other itinerant professionals who come to Afghaniya in the spring and summer months. These are individual salesmen who barter and sell guns, dried fruit, vegetable oil, jewellery and trinkets; weavers, potters, shoemakers and cotton-carders who spend some days or months in Afghaniya; harvesters who come for the harvesting; mendicants, the 'malanG', who sell charms and amulets; and finally followers of Holy Men, the muridān, who collect offerings from the areas near to their shrines.

Afghaniya and the whole of the Pachoghan valley are parts of the 'waluswali' or sub-province of Nijrao [1]. This sub-province together with a number of others makes up the province of Kapisa whose capital, Mahmud-i-Raqi, is 33 kms. to the north-west of Nijrao. Nijrao's sub-province capital, Nijrao, is a new foundation some two kilometres from the old centre of Nijrao at Badakshi [2] (see map IV p. 37) and 15 kms. from Afghaniya. Nijrao consists of one large building for the administration which is divided up into offices for the various departments, the waluswal's house, a barracks for the gendarmes, a number of small shops, two tea-houses and a bus-'station'. One bus a day goes from Nijrao to Kabul stopping at Mahmud-i-Raqi, Gulbahar and Charikar on the way and another bus links Nijrao with Tagao and with Sarobi, an important settlement at the junction of the Tagao, Panjshir and Kabul rivers (see map III p. 18). The buses apart from bringing people to the provincial and

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1) The Afghan constitution of 1964 brought administrative changes which lead to the provinces being increased in number and the names of their divisions being altered. 'Waluswali' became the name for a sub-province of which there are four grades and 'alakadari' the name for a district. For an account of governmental and administrative changes following the constitutional changes of 1964 see: Gochenour, T. S. 1965. A new try for Afghanistan. M.E.J. 19:1 pp. 1-19, and Akhramovich, R. T. 1966 Outline History of Afghanistan after the Second World War. Moscow. Nauka Publishing House pp. 132-186.

2) Governors of provinces and sub-provinces have a tendency in Afghanistan to change their provincial, sub-provincial, or district capitals when they come into office. In the case of the waluswali of Nijrao, Nijrao was the third sub-province capital in recent times although all the sites remained within the Nijrao valley.

state capital and enabling shop-keepers to purchase supplies in the main centres have ended the isolation of what was up to then a relatively inaccessible region and have greatly increased the administrative control of the area.

Local Government

The chief executive of the waluswali is the waluswal or governor. He is appointed by the governor of the province and was, at the time of the field work, a wealthy Tajik [1]. The waluswal is responsible for law, order and the general administration of the sub-province. He is also the magistrate and all complaints and petitions are submitted in the first instance to him. The complaints are then dismissed as irregular, solved - in the sense that a compromise is found, although cases brought to the waluswal are usually so complex that no easy or ready solution can be given - or referred by the waluswal to the appropriate department or departments of the administration.

The most important of the departments is that of Taxation and Revenue (māliya). It is headed by a director of finance who is also the second in command in the waluswali and who acts for the waluswal in his absence. The principal tasks of the department are the collection of taxes on land (irrigated and non-irrigated, arable and orchards) and on mills, bazaars, shops and tradesmen, and the financing of public works i.e., roads, schools, bridges, public buildings etc. As might be expected all these activities impinge considerably on the lives of the people in Afghaniya and represent for the majority the most pervasive and obvious aspect of the administration.

Another major department is that of Security or Public Order

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1) The governor of the Province was a Pakhtun as are the majority of provincial governors in Afghanistan.

(āmniya). Its head is the 'commandant', a police officer trained and educated at the police college in Kabul. Under his command are ten policemen or gendarmes all of whom are conscripts doing compulsory military service. They usually come from the province if not from the sub-province itself, i.e., they have a good local knowledge both of the people and the area. In Nijrao the gendarmes generally function as the strong arm of the magistrate and the department of Justice being responsible for arrests and the delivery of summons, but they also protect the main bazaars, guard property and inhibit the activities of bandits and robbers [1].

A third large department and one which works closely with both the waluswal and the Security department is that of Justice (maHukma) [2]. It is headed by a 'qazi' or judge usually only trained in islamic law (shari'at) of the Hanafi school [3]. All those cases in Afghaniya which are not concerned with breaches of administrative law or regulation come before the qazi. These usually involve land, property, assault and homicide [4].

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1) Incidents of banditry increase whenever periods of drought, crop failure and famine occur. Such conditions existed in the summer of 1971.
2) Art. 97 of the 1964 Constitution places the judiciary as 'an independent organ of the State' which 'discharges its duties side by side with the Legislative and Executive Organs'.
3) The Hanafi School is the official school for Afghanistan (see: Art. 2 of the 1964 Constitution: Islam is the sacred religion of Afghanistan. Religious rites performed by the State shall be according to the provisions of the Hanafi doctrine. Art. 69: Excepting the conditions for which specific provisions have been made in this Constitution, a law is a resolution passed by both Houses, and signed by the King. In the area where no such law exists, the provisions of the Hanafi Jurisprudence of the Shariaat of Islam shall be considered as law.
4) After the promulgation of the 1964 Constitution all legal decisions were transferred (at least theoretically) to the qazi, but secular law has supremacy (See art. 102:). Before that a case generally first went to a qazi who gave his judgement on the haq-ul-Allah (Rights of the State and Religion). The local provincial council, including the governor and his staff, however, could change the decision in accordance with the growing body of secular law (see: Dupree, 1973. Op.cit. p. 581). For an interesting analysis of the role and sphere of activity of the qazi in Andarab (observations made between 1959 and 1961) see Singh Uberoi, J. P. 1968. District Administration in the Northern Highlands of Afghanistan, in: Sociological Bulletin, Vol. XVII-I, March 1968.

The three other departments in the waluswali, Property (imlāk), Actuarial Statistics (iHsālin) and Post (muxābirāt) are the most minor of the departments as far as size is concerned but they nevertheless, with the exception of the Post whose services are only used by the members of the administration, play an important role in the lives of the people. The department of Property, for example, is responsible for the registration of land and for the registration of its division, its inheritance and its sale. It is thus concerned with one of the principal interests of the Pakhtuns of Afghaniya. They, however, seek wher-ever possible to avoid registering their land and do not notify the department of divisions of land or alterations in its ownership unless they are forced to do so by circumstances. In this way they evade the costs of registration and taxation but as will be shown below (p. 274) they may create difficulties for themselves which are out of all proportion to the considered impositions which they elude.

The department of Actuarial Statistics is also of significance for the Safi because of the consequences its activities have on their lives. The department, as the name suggests, is principally concerned with the registration of births and deaths and this information is collected either from the maliks [1] or from the identity cards of the adult males. Apart from providing useful census material this information enables the local authorities to elicit the names of boys for compulsory schooling [2] and of young men for military service [3]. As both activities create disturbances and can lead in some cases to hardship for the families involved the Safi are very unwilling to give information and avoid registration wher-ever possible.

This attitude, at least as far as schooling is concerned, may seem

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1) The definition, role and duties of the malik will be explained below in chapter 11 on leadership.
2) There is no schooling for girls at least among the Pakhtuns.
3) Compulsory military service was formerly considered to be a sort of death sentence and those affected have always tried to avoid it or to find a substitute. Present conditions in the army are very much better nevertheless all potential recruits try to avoid service.

surprising but it does not represent a rejection of education as such. The Safi fully appreciate how much can be achieved through schooling and place occupations which require a high standard of education at the top of any list of occupational preferences [1]. At the same time they recognise the futility of their own or their children's participation in the educational system. 'What', they say 'can we do with our education here in Pachoghan? We can't eat it and there is no other use to which we can put it.' In fact for those fathers who do send their sons to the preparatory school in the Pachoghan valley [2] it is a liability because not only do the children not gain anything from it but the parents also lose some of their available labour which could otherwise have been used in the household or on the land. Under the circumstances, therefore, it is not surprising that the educational facilities offered by the administration are generally regarded as an imposition which if possible is to be avoided.

The local administration, i.e. the waluswali, is not responsible for this situation because educational matters, such as compulsory schooling, are in the hands of the Ministry of Education in Kabul. Also all the teachers are appointed by the ministry and their periods and places of employment are all determined by the minister. Should consultation be necessary between the teachers and the waluswal then the head master of the most senior school in the waluswali acts as the representative of all the teachers and indirectly of the ministry in the discussion. Such consultation became necessary, for example, when the Safi opposed the plan to establish a girls' school in the

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1) For example in the lists of occupational preferences which I collected the top three occupations - pilot, government official (governor, sub-governor etc.) and judge - all require above average educational qualifications. 'Farmer' usually came in the fourth or fifth place.
2) The 'school' which is situated by the track and on the border between Afghaniya and the rest of the valley has not yet been built although the foundations have been laid. Lessons take place in the open air near the teacher's house, a building which has also not been completed forcing the teacher to travel backwards and forwards between the Pachoghan and Nijrao valleys.

area. This opposition combined with the general agitation in other Pakhtun areas lead to the abandonment of female education at least in Afghaniya. We can thus see that should a large enough group come together for the purpose of opposing a governmental measure success can be achieved and that the people when faced by such measures are not completely helpless but can apply a certain amount of pressure on the central government via the local authorities [1].

Such pressure, however, marks the limits of the Safi's influence on the administration. The days when inaccessibility, the use of force or the weakness of the monarch in Kabul enabled them to evade taxation and military service are gone. Now the central government is firmly established and it is increasingly able to extend its influence into the more intractable Pakhtun areas. Nevertheless its actual interference in the affairs of the population, although growing, is still minimal in comparison with the ubiquity of european bureaucracy. Most Safi have come to terms with its presence in Nijrao and with its demands and, for those who have not, there always remains the possibility of eluding what they consider its more pernicious aspects. Nevertheless the administration represents an alien system which with its established hierarchy of officials and chain of commands is totally foreign to the social and political system of the Safi themselves. Their principles of independence, egalitarianism, and self-help constitute the polar opposites of the system represented by the government. It is because of this that governmental institutions are only made use of in the last resort when a solution cannot be

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1) This 'pressure' takes the form of petitions, protests and ultimately disorders. As it is a major principle of the Afghan administration that law, order and quiet should be maintained at all costs disorders lead to the speedy removal and replacement of officials. They, the officials, are therefore vulnerable and consequently open to compromise on matters which the inhabitants of a district consider important and which is not in direct conflict with the administration's principal interests. Thus a subject such as girls' schooling which in a traditional and conservative muslim country such as Afghanistan was a risky project anyway could be safely dropped or suspended in areas where opposition arose.

reached within the framework of the traditional system or when a solution can only be achieved by force. Already, however, this recognition of an outside arbitrator or external force is altering traditional kinship based institutions and the leadership. These aspects will be discussed in detail below but in general it may be said about the administration that it represents for the Safi a system whose disadvantages - registration of land, taxes, schooling, military service - far outweigh its advantages and whose influence is bringing structural and organizational change.

6. SUBSISTENCE ACTIVITIES AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES

Subsistence Activities

The Safi support themselves principally from the intensive cultivation of small irrigated fields. Although high yields (ten to fifteen fold) and two crops a year are usual overpopulation [1], debt and inheritance have lead to the parcelling of the land into smaller and smaller lots so that now (1970-71) many owner-cultivators (ca. 25 %) [2] cannot support themselves and their families from the products of their fields alone and a further 15 % of the population is landless. The situation is alleviated to some extent, at least for the men with some, if insufficient, land by the addition of products obtained by share-cropping the excess land of the larger landowners. For the landless, however, such a solution does not bring any amelioration because the special patron-client relationship which results from a contract between landless share-cropper and landowner is socially unacceptable for them (see below pp. 82-85). Even if it were acceptable it would bring no real improvement because if the total amount of arable in Afghaniya were divided among all the families each would only receive 4 'jerib' [3] (ca. 2 acres) whereas the minimal area of irrigated land needed to support a family of four is 5 jerib [4]. It is obviously impossible, therefore, even for those

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1) Most Pakhtun areas but especially those in the east of Afghanistan are undergoing a population explosion caused by a greatly reduced death rate - newly available medical facilities and medicines - and a continuingly high birth rate - a response to the earlier very high infant mortality. It is probable, however, that these areas were always overpopulated but raids and subsidies from the British - Indian and Afghan governments for keeping quiet or causing disturbances made it possible to maintain a larger population than the land alone could support.

2) I was only able to collect statistical material about the size of land-holdings from one hamlet but as conditions and processes are relatively uniform in Afghaniya I think the percentages may be used safely for purposes of generalization.

3) Again this figure is obtained from only one of the ten hamlets from which I collected statistical material.

4) See Grötzbach, E. 1972 Op.cit. p. 211. Grötzbach is referring to well-watered land in Badakhshan, i.e. an area physically comparable with Afghaniya.

sharecroppers with some land to always acquire sufficient extra land for their needs. Thus these cultivators and the landless men have to supplement their yearly requirements [1] or obtain them entirely by other means than from the land.

One of the principal methods of doing so is by hunting. This must originally just have been an enjoyable pursuit to which all Pakhtuns are addicted but it has become, at least in this area, an important economic activity without which many families could not exist. Another important source of income is the seasonal labour/work done by the younger men of the household either on roads or in mines in the province or in the rice fields to the north of the Hindu Kush. Some farmers also open 'shops' in their hamlets where they sell the few necessities which the people themselves cannot produce such as 'niswār' [2], tea, sugar, soap, matches etc. There are, of course, other shops in Afghaniya but these are owned by men who have invested the profit which they have made from their land in the shop and thus are interested not in supplementing an inadequate income but increasing an above average one. Other men try by the sale of meat or flour which they purchase in the bazaars or from other farmers to support their families. Finally there are the men who migrate for a number of years to the rich rice and cotton areas of Baghlan and Kunduz in northern Afghanistan where they work as labourers and send part of their earnings back to Afghaniya.

Not all non-farming activities in Afghaniya are, however, the result of inadequate land holdings. The carpenters and blacksmiths, for example, are or were primarily dependent upon carpentry and blacksmithing for their livelihood and not on farming. Now they are

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1) The amount of grain considered necessary to support a family of four for one year is 3 kharwar, or ca. 1,700 kgs.
2) A sort of finely ground, moist snuff which instead of being inhaled is placed in small quantities under the tongue and behind the lower front teeth.

nearly all landowners as well but their original starting off point was that of their specialist activity. Similarly the barbers came to and settled in Afghaniya as barbers and it was only after a number of generations that they were able to purchase land so that now none are alone dependent upon barbering for their livelihood.

Finally there are the mullahs. They occupy a somewhat intermediary position because in Afghaniya there are two kinds: the imām, the leader of prayer in the mosque and the mullah who has received a priestly education but who does not practice. In the first case these are non-Pakhtuns coming from outside Afghaniya who take up posts as imāms in the various hamlets of the community. They do not own land and are entirely dependent for their livelihood on the payments of the villagers. In the second case, that of the mullahs, these are Afghaniya Safi who have undergone a religious training at the instigation of their fathers and carry the title of mullah. They generally come from families of mullahs or Hajis who have sufficient land and thus only practice their office in times of economic difficulty and in areas, for reasons which will be explained below, where they are unknown.

In spite of the variety of these non-farming activities only about 15 % of the population of Afghaniya is involved with them exclusively. 60 % on the other hand are able to support themselves and their families from their land alone and 25 % must share-crop additional land or act as part-time hunters, salesmen, shopkeepers and labourers to secure their families livelihoods. The dominant activity, therefore, in Afghaniya is, in spite of an ever-increasing percentage of Safi who seek employment elsewhere, agriculture.

Agricultural Activities

Distribution of Land and Water

Land

The basis of the agriculture is the land and the water. The land, as shown above, was initially divided among the original settlers so that each had an equal share. Subsequent divisions of the land took place either as the result of inheritance among the descendants of these men or as the result of purchase and sale both among the original settlers and the newcomers and strangers. This, however, has not lead to a chaotic land situation with bits and pieces being owned in all parts of the valley. The rights of those men with adjoining fields, the 'shaf' a' [1], to first purchase and the difficulties of cultivating fields which are part of another hamlet's land - i.e. different irrigation system, distance to the fields, difficulty of countering the expansionary tendencies of neighbours etc., - have inhibited the uncontrolled splintering of holdings. Instead alterations in hamlet ownership have been confined to the peripheries of hamlet lands where fields are often purchased and worked by men from other hamlets or may be share-cropped by men whose fields are contiguous or close. Generally speaking, however, the land which surrounds a hamlet is owned and worked by the hamlet's inhabitants.

As land cannot be sold or share-cropped without the rights to the water which irrigates it the ownership of water should reflect that of the land. That it does not results principally from the existence in Afghaniya of two water sources, the rivers and the springs, which together and separately feed the irrigation system.

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1) Shaf' a are 'pre-emptors'. For a more detailed explanation see below chap. 10. p. 268.

Water

River Water

The river water comes from the two rivers, the Pachoghan and its tributary, the Ghain (see maps V p. 38 & VII p. 54). The Ghain flows into the Pachoghan at two points the second of which marks the division of the Pachoghan river itself into two major channels. These two channels then run more or less parallel to one another and divide Afghaniya lengthways into three large sections. Together, therefore, the Ghain and the Pachoghan provide a water network which covers the whole valley floor. The water for these rivers comes principally from snow which falling between December and March builds a reservoir on the high mountain peaks. This reservoir is tapped, sometimes well into the summer months, by the sun's heat which melting the snow sends down small daily floods called 'chala'. It is because of these daily floods that the river water is referred to as 'chala' water by the inhabitants. All the hamlets of Afghaniya have dams on the rivers to channel the water on to their lands where it is lead by myriad ditches to each individual field. All members of the community who own land have access to this river water and the right to use it. However these rights, in times of inadequate precipitation, tend to be relative to the geographical position of the hamlets i.e. whether they are closer or further away from the source of water.

In years of normal precipitation this river water flows in quantities and over a period of time which are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of all the villagers and to ensure the growth of two crops a year. During such times hamlets and cultivators channel off water from the river whenever they wish. When, however, the snow reservoir is smaller than usual because of insufficient precipitation and the flow of water is correspondingly reduced the upstream hamlets, who have the right of first usage because of their position

nearest to the source, divert so much water onto their fields that none flows downstream during this time. The downstream hamlets have to wait and whilst this is not so important for the first crop it can mean that the second crop of hamlets which are totally dependent on river water is planted late or that it is impossible to plant rice.

In times of drought caused by consecutive years of inadequate precipitation, such as 1970-71, the situation is initially worse for the downstream hamlets than for the upstream ones because again they have to wait for water. The final consequences, however, for both the downstream and upstream hamlets if these are totally or principally dependent on river water are the same: they can only plant and harvest one crop and rice cultivation, because of its excessive water demands, is abandoned altogether. The economic repercussions, because of the subsistence level size of most land-holdings, are considerable and such families are only able to survive by temporary migration for work and/or the complete utilisation of other sources of income.

In the light of the economic consequences which geographical position has for some hamlets it is surprising, at least for the outside observer, that there is no supra-hamlet mechanism in Afghaniya to regulate the situation and to organize a more egalitarian distribution of water. The villagers themselves say that there is no need for such an institution because it is a general principle that 'sardahana' [1] hamlets have the first right to the water because it flows past their hamlets first. This does not mean that they do not get impatient about delays but generally speaking as there is either plenty of water for all, or, sufficient for one crop and then nothing both for upstream and downstream hamlets this impatience does not generally escalate into conflict between hamlets. The absence of a regulative body is, however, also due to the fact that individual hamlets in Afghaniya are

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1) Sar = head, dahana = inlet, = head inlet, i.e. those who have inlets for channelling off the water at the head of the river.

incapable, apart from the repair of major irrigation ditches, of co-operating with one another because they are interested in the fate of other hamlets only in so far as their difficulties offer potential advantages for themselves. They are also suspicious of power and authority in general except when they wield it themselves and could not possibly call into being a supra-hamlet authority which was neutral because neutrality for them is a relative concept. There is, for example, either less neutrality which means that an arbitrator decides against their party or more neutrality which means that he decides for them.

The Safi are nevertheless capable of regulating the division of water within a hamlet. Once the water supply decreases or members of a downstream hamlet have to wait for water tensions arise. Each feels that he has a prior right to and a greater need for the water. In some cases the problem is solved by the politically strongest taking it but generally members of hamlets come together and choose a 'mirau', or water master. These men are usually respected elders with average sized holdings but with strong political support. They are given the authority to decide which fields are in the greatest need of water, the succession of water users and how long the irrigation should last. Whilst no villager is completely satisfied with this solution nobody feels particularly discriminated against and tensions are diminished.

Spring Water

Hamlets with spring water in addition to river water are in a much better position because they can always supplement or replace the river water with their own spring water and thus ensure the growth of a second crop. The springs which are found near the rivers and on the sides of the valley do not provide large quantities of water, on the other hand they flow throughout the year and are not subject to daily fluctuations. The water is either lead onto the fields via

artificial channels or, when the flow is small, is allowed to accumulate in ponds (dand) from which it is released once the volume is sufficient.

As these springs are unevenly distributed throughout the valley not all hamlets have them on their lands and the rights to use them in hamlets that do are invested, with a very few exceptions, only in the descendants of the original founders of the descent group, i.e. the taxti, among whom the shares to the water like those of the land were originally divided. It is in these hamlets that ownership of land and water become separated from one another. If land is sold to outsiders the purchaser only receives the right to the 'chala' water which irrigates it and not to the spring water which remains in the hands of the original owner. In this way a separate group of people has been created who rent the use of their water or use it to share-crop other people's land.

It is nevertheless possible for hamlets without springs to participate in other ways in the use of this water. As it is impossible for spring water owners to irrigate their fields continually without ruining the crops or producing a swamp, and as the water cannot be turned off or stored in a reservoir, once irrigation is completed the water is turned into the main channel and descends to other, lower, hamlets. These hamlets and that hamlet which owns the spring water thus form what might be called a water community the members being united by the common channel from which they draw their water. These other hamlets have acquired, with time, what might almost be termed a 'right' to the water and the spring owning hamlets have accepted a certain obligation to allow this water to flow down to them. This is reflected in the division of the water in some of these water 'communities' into parts i.e. one day and a night for village 'X', three days and nights for village 'Y' etc., portions which correspond to the size of the land to be irrigated. Once, however, there is a drought and springs begin to produce a small flow of water then only the owners have the right to irrigate their fields thoroughly and the

lower hamlets like the downstream hamlets of the river water system must wait their turn until the water comes down to them.

The system presented so far has, for purposes of clarity, been simplified. In reality, however, it is more complex. Firstly some of what have been termed the 'lower' hamlets also have springs but these are generally of an unreliable type which easily fail and which produce little water. Nevertheless they give a certain independence to their owners. Secondly some families in other, lower, hamlets have purchased shares in the spring water of the head hamlet and thus participate equally with the owners in its use. Finally links, principally marriage ones, can lead to spring water owning hamlets allowing water in times of difficulty to flow to families which previously were not members of the water community.

The division of water within the spring water hamlets themselves is also complex and variable. Those hamlets which possess the springs, for example, often divide the water according to the various 'fathers' of the hamlet. These fathers are the sons of the hamlet founder and the descendants of these men receive a portion of the water, irrespective of their numbers and the area of land owned, in accordance with the original division. Thus if there were four 'sons' then each group of descendants (the 'koranai') whatever its size will receive a quarter of the total water. In other owner hamlets the water is divided according to the area of land owned by each family, i.e. the larger the area the larger the amount of water - a practice also utilised by the 'lower' non-owner hamlets. It is also possible that the strongest political group - often the economically most powerful and thus with the largest land-holdings - will just take as much water as it wishes when it wishes. The others must just wait for a change in political fortunes.

In the process of what has been written it has become clear, I hope, that this spring water has very considerable economic and by impli-

cation political and social significance - a situation which has been furthered by overpopulation and the subsistence level size of holdings. In times of sufficient snowfall and precipitation in general the river or 'chala' water is more than adequate for the needs of the whole community. Once, however, there is a decrease in the amount of snowfall so that the flow and duration of the river water is affected those downstream hamlets without spring water, or access to it, run the risk of having reduced harvests or perhaps no second crop at all. Thus hamlets with spring water, apart from times of extreme drought when their springs can be reduced in volume or fail completely, have a certain guarantee for their second crop and usually for a good rice harvest as well. It is, therefore, not surprising that the boundaries of these springs are fixed by dams, that the sources are constantly checked and that apart from a few exceptions spring water remains in the hands of the hamlet descent groups [1].

Crop System, Ploughing and Threshing

Generally speaking, however, water from whatever source, high summer temperatures, and the sheltered nature of the valley enable all the villagers to work a two crop system of agriculture and to produce a wide variety of crops. The two crop system is based on a three field rotation of crops which is considered to begin in autumn (see diag. 3 p. 78). In one field wheat is seeded, in another clover, and the third is left fallow, i.e. it is cross ploughed and left unseeded. The fallow field is seeded in spring with 'dunya', a kind of spice, or with barley or potatoes and onions, or it is made into 'pālēz'. 'Pālēz' is an intensely worked and watered field used for the production of melons, cucumbers, squash etc. The fallow field may also be planted with early maize, that is maize planted in April, or with cotton. The field which was seeded with clover is later seeded with June maize or rice. The third field, that which

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1) For a good, comprehensive and legally grounded analysis of water rights, access to water and water distribution in Afghanistan as a whole see: Rives, Georges. 1963.Les Problemes Fondamentaux Du Droit Rural Afghan. pp. 63-84. In: Revue Internationale De Droit Comparé 1963.

Autumn	wheat	clover	fallow
Spring (June)	maize rice/mai fallow	maize rice	dunya barley/potatoes/onions pālez maize/cotton

3. THREE FIELD CROP ROTATION

was seeded with wheat is, after the harvest in June, sown with maize, or rice, or 'mai', a kind of pulse, or may be left fallow. (For a complete time-table of agricultural activities see diag. 4 p. 80).

All these crops require water but the number of times a field is irrigated varies from the three times for maize or the six times for 'palez' to the constant watering of clover and rice. Rice because of the large amounts of water needed tends to be a luxury crop and wheat, maize and barley form the staples for the whole valley.

Afghaniya is not entirely dependent upon field crops because a wide range of garden and tree crops are also grown. Tomatoes, carrots, pepper, tobacco, hashish and opium form the majority of garden crops, and walnuts, mulberries, apricots, grapes, cherries and apples the most usual tree crops. Both garden and tree crops are grown in walled gardens in the hamlets or in gardens attached to the houses. Not all villagers have gardens and they tend to be owned by the wealthier families who have excess labour and water. The poorer families often have one or two mulberry trees [1] and these are planted on the sides of the irrigation ditches which separate the fields or by the rivers. Other trees, whose leaves provide fodder for the oxen and sheep and whose branches are broken off for fuel in winter, are planted on the 'pulas' or low walls which divide fields. These 'pulas' demarcate the boundaries of fields and when stones are placed in them the limits of ownership. The stones, one at each end of the 'pula' are there to prevent the common Pakhtun practice of acquiring land by ploughing an extra furrow in the 'pula' and thus moving it over a period of time further and further into a neighbour's field.

Ploughing is done with a team of oxen and an iron tipped wooden

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1) Mulberries eaten fresh, dried or ground into a flour which keeps over the winter, provide an important contribution to the diet of poor families. So close in fact is this association that in Afghaniya the term 'mulberry eater' is a metaphor for a poor man, without land and without power.

January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	
			plant						pick			cotton
		plant										trees
					pick							mulberries
					pick							apricots
					pick							cherries
							pick					grapes
			plant									potatoes
			plant									onions
			plant									tobacco
			plant									peperoni
			plant									tomatoes
			seed		plant			harvest				rice
		seed			harvest							barley
			seed	seed				harvest				maize
		seed			harvest				seed			wheat
		seed		harvest								dunya
			harvest						seed			clover
					seed		harvest					mai
			plant		gather	products						palez

4. CALENDAR OF AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES

plough. This plough can only break open and loosen the surface of the soil but, as the fields are cross-ploughed, this is not only sufficient but also beneficial because the capillary action of the soil is not disturbed. The seed is then sown broadcast. The plough cannot, however, cope with water and sun hardened surfaces which occur, for example, when fields have been used for growing rice. These must be turned over by hand. Even the strongest pair of oxen cannot force the plough share into the ground and generally in spring the oxen are weak from the lack of winter fodder and in summer overworked. Most households only possess one ox and, therefore, need to make an agreement with another household for the use of its ox. Such an agreement termed 'pora' is made in spring and is valid until autumn when the agricultural work is finished. It is generally made with neighbours but the most important consideration for the parties is to match the oxen for size, strength and weight. When this is not possible within the hamlet then the villagers try further afield.

Wealthy cultivators generally have a team of oxen themselves [1] and, therefore, do not participate in 'pora' agreements whereas the poorer people who own no oxen at all have to make use of the day or two when other people's oxen are free and may be borrowed. However continually asking for oxen creates embarassment and bad feelings and is generally avoided where possible.

Once threshing starts all the cultivators need oxen and borrowing is common because a pair of oxen is not sufficient and young oxen, donkies and even cows are forced into service. The harvested corn, whether wheat or barley, is piled up in a field or in the courtyard of the house where it is then threshed by the animals walking round and round in circles over it. Once it is ready for winnowing the kernels and chaff are separated by throwing them up into the air and allowing the wind and gravity to separate them. The chaff is stored

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1) One exception was a rich and powerful malik who, as he had share-croppers for all his land, did not need oxen of his own.

for winter fodder and the kernels, after being thoroughly cleaned by the women of the households, are piled up on the threshing floor for the division or 'rāsha' [1]. This division involves the payment of the debts which have accumulated for a household over the year or since the last 'rāsha' took place and all the creditors who will accept corn rather than money will be there for their share of the harvest.

Share-cropping

Should the cultivator have a share-cropper then the largest single payment will be made to him. The amount or share which the share-cropper receives from the landowner varies according to the nature of the original agreement made between them. This agreement may take many forms and the difference between these forms is indicated by that share of the crop which the share-cropper receives, e.g., a half, a seventh, an eighth, etc. [2] There are in Afghaniya seven forms or systems of share-cropping ranging from one half to one eigth of the harvest. However these seven forms may be and are generally divided into two groups one involving the half, third and quarter shares and the other the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth shares. One reason for these groupings is that the shares in the first group, the half to one-quarter group, vary according to the contributions of commodities which the tenant and owner make. These 'commodities' are land, labour, seed, oxen and equipment [3]. In the

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1) 'rāsha' means in fact a heap or mound of grain but its association with the division results in it being used synonymously.

2) All agreements between landowner and tenant in Afghaniya are on the basis of a share of the harvest. Agreements whereby the tenant provides a fixed quantity, i.e. 'x' kilograms, of the crop yearly to the landowner although occurring elsewhere in Afghanistan do not occur here. Such agreements would seem to result from absentee landlordism a condition not present in Afghaniya.

3) Water is of course also a commodity but in the majority of share-cropping agreements it is not looked upon as such because firstly all the land in Afghaniya apart from the pasture is irrigated and secondly land and (river) water are regarded as indivisible, i.e. the landowner is the water owner. In those cases, however, where land and (spring) water are in separate hands then the type of agreement reached is dependent upon the water situation. If water is very scarce then the water owner's water may be regarded as equivalent to the (p.t.o.)

half share, for example, the share-cropper contributes his labour, the seed, the oxen and the equipment and the landowner provides the land. As the shares become smaller, that is one-third and one-quarter, so too does the share-cropper's contribution of commodities.

In the second group, the fifth to an eighth, the share-cropper only provides his labour for the agricultural process and the landowner contributes land, seed, oxen, and equipment as well as some additional benefits for the share-cropper such as a room or house, bedding, clothing and food. As the contribution of commodities from both sides is constant whether the share-cropper receives a fifth, sixth, seventh, or eighth share the difference in share proportions must be based on another factor or other factors than those for the half to one-quarter grouping. The principle factor is the estimated production from the owner's fields. If this estimate is high then the tenant's share of the crop will be low, i.e. one-eighth, if it is low then the tenant's share will be correspondingly high, i.e. increased to a maximum of one-fifth. The decision whether an estimate is 'high' or 'low' is based on a tenant's minimum requirement of grain for a season's work, i.e. from 'Hamal' (March/April) to 'qaus' (November/December) [1]. If this minimum requirement is, let us say, 80 'ser' [2] and the estimated harvest from the fields is 700 ser then an eighth share of the crop would bring the tenant 87.5 ser which would be a satisfactory share. On the other hand an eighth share of fields producing 400 ser would be totally unsatisfactory because the tenant's portion of 50 ser would be inadequate being below his minimum requirement. The tenant, therefore, would press the owner for a fifth share which would bring him his required 80

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ownership of the land because without the water the land is useless. In this case the water owner would receive a half of the crop and the unusual situation arises where the land owner works his own land as a share-cropper. Generally, however, the water owner works the land and receives a third of the crop.

1) It is a season and not a year because when the new tenant starts his work the winter wheat has already been sown by the old tenant. The new tenant seeds the maize and summer wheat, plants the rice and completes the agreement in autumn by sowing the winter wheat.

2) 80 ser = 560 kgs., an amount which would be sufficient for one man for a year.

ser. The bargaining between the tenant and landowner can be bitter and protracted. The owner, for example, using the additional benefits mentioned above to tempt the tenant into accepting a lower share and the tenant complaining bitterly about the infertility of the soil, the unfavourable distribution of the fields and the inadequate water in order to force the landowner into giving him a larger share. The nature of the final agreement depends to a large extent on the generosity or lack of generosity of the landowner and the supply and demand situation of land and labour. In 1971, for example, there was excess labour because of the successive years of drought and tenants had to accept what they could get which often was very little indeed.

The Afghaniya Safi themselves, however, do not have to accept what they can get because the share-cropping agreements which they make are not in the fifth to one-eighth category but in the half to one-quarter. This is because as owner-cultivators they usually can contribute all or some of the 'commodities' i.e. seed, oxen and equipment, which are necessary to obtain a half or one third share of the crop. But even if they were landless, which some 15 % of them are, and would only have their labour to offer they would not and do not share-crop land for a fifth to an eighth share. The reason is that in Afghaniya they would work the land of their fellow villagers or neighbour villagers and the nature of the fifth to one-eighth share agreements is incommensurate with the sort of relationships which should exist between fellow villagers, friends and acquaintances as well as with the pride, independence and considered status of Pakhtuns. In the fifth to an eighth share contracts the tenant makes an agreement to work the land for one year in return for a share of the crop and a house, clothing, food, etc. No Pakhtun, at least in his home area, would accept food and clothing as part of a payment from a relative or fellow villager. Food is associated with hospitality or dependence [1] and accepting clothing apart from the

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1) Ruth Newman in her book 'Pathan Tribal Patterns' (1965. pp. 17-19. Prentice-Hall. India.) contrary to all other opinion also regards hospitality ('mailmastia') as characterised by 'ascension' on the part of the host and 'submission' on the part of the guest.

turban which is an honoured gift [1] places the recipient in the position of a subordinate. They, therefore, cannot be accepted as part of a share-cropping agreement from people who are considered their equals without complete loss of prestige and ultimately of status as a Pakhtun. Also this fifth to one-eighth contract involves the share-cropper in extra tasks such as helping the landowner with the building of his house, collecting steppe grass for the fires, bringing flour from the mill etc., etc. These, however, are tasks which involve taking orders and being a servant and no Pakhtun is willing to be treated as a subordinate in an area where he is known or to accept orders from relatives, neighbours or acquaintances [2]. The two share cropping categories, a half to a quarter and one-fifth to one-eighth are, therefore, not only distinct on the basis of commodities or labour, as I have indicated above, but they are also different on the basis of the sets of relationships established. One, the half to one-quarter contract, is made between owner and related, landed, share-cropper and the other between landowner and unrelated, landless, labourer. In Afghaniya, as in other Pakhtun areas, the share-croppers are drawn from the ranks of the indigenous owner-cultivators and the landless tenants from strangers and outsiders.

Harvesting

Outsiders and strangers are also responsible for harvesting. These harvesters, the 'lauGuri', are either seminomadic Pakhtuns who move with the crops as they ripen at different altitudes or they are former farmers who having little or no land seek to supplement their

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1) A turban cloth is traditionally given at weddings, at sporting contests or to successful mediators in conflicts.
2) Pakhtuns are extremely sensitive to anything which approximates to an order. A suggestion is about the limit they will accept from people other than their fathers or elder brothers. One Safi, for example, was told by his paternal cousin - a relationship of some tension at the best of times - whose land he was share cropping to leave his work on one field and to work on another. The share-cropper cousin refused and broke off the contract although this involved him - a very poor man - in considerable loss.

livelihood in this manner. Generally both groups come from the provinces of Nangrahar and Laghman or from the Tagao valley. When they arrive in Afghaniya, at the beginning of June, they pitch their small white tents on the land besides the rivers and streams [1]. There they can graze their animals, usually donkeys and cows, and later thresh their share of the crop. The 'lauGuri' make individual agreements with the landowners for a share of the crop. This share varies between one-twentieth and one-thirty-sixth of the cut crop, i.e. stalks and grains [2]. As the crop is harvested it is laid out in bundles or 'sutri' on the ground and each twentieth or thirty-sixth of these bundles belongs to the harvesters. The variety in the shares depends upon the yield, size and density of the crop, the generosity of the owner and the availability of labour [3]. Harvesting is usually completed after two or three weeks and the harvesters move on to other, higher valleys.

Co-operative Work

Harvesting is not the only agricultural task which is not carried out by the owner-cultivators or tenants. In fact there are a number of

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1) This land, although it may be regarded by those farmers with adjoining fields as belonging to them is, because of the danger of flooding, not planted but used as the common pasture land of the hamlet.
2) A twentieth, at least according to my own information and to that of Ferdinand (1969. Op.cit. p. 144) was the ordinary rate for harvesters throughout Afghanistan. That they should have only received between one-thirtieth and one-thirty-sixth in Afghaniya at the time of my field work is indicative of the generally catastrophic agricultural conditions in Afghanistan in that year.
3) It may seem surprising that in an area where the majority of the farmers are living at a subsistence level a portion of the crop whether it should be for harvesting or, for that matter, for share-cropping should be lost for a task or tasks which could often easily be managed with the labour available in the family i.e. wives and children. The reason for this would seem to be that having a harvester or a tenant increases a man's social prestige. The economic loss is outweighed by the social gain. See also Wald. 1969. Op.cit. p. 63 and Hahn 'Die traditionellen Lebensformen'.p. 227. In:Kraus. 1972. Op.cit.

agricultural activities which are beyond the combined forces of owner and tenant. Turning over rice fields or fields where clover was planted, levelling wheat fields for rice, or planting rice, are activities all of which must be completed quickly and with extra labour. In these cases the people of Afghaniya make 'āshar' or cooperative work. The eldest male of the household informs those people of the hamlet whom he requires for the work that on such and such a day he will be having an āshar in order, for example, to plant his rice fields. These people, the āsharGuri, are generally chosen from among both agnatic and affinal relatives and fellow villagers. If the task requires even more labour than that which can be provided by the hamlet then the elder will seek help in other hamlets where he has affines or he will make more than one āshar.

Normally the situation is such that once the elder has obtained sufficient people for his āshar then they gather at his fields on the appointed day at dawn and start to work. The āshar giver directs and encourages them and sometimes music may be provided to add an extra incentive to their labours. At 8 a.m. they are given milk tea (a luxury) with bread, at noon they receive soup, meat (also a luxury) and tea and, generally at 1 p.m., the āshar is completed. The food provides the only 'payment' for the āsharGuri although it is not looked upon as a payment but as part of the festive character of this work. As all owner-cultivators will at some time or other need to make an āshar then payment consists in the return of labour at the next āshar [1].

Sometimes harvesters, the lauGuri, will participate in āshar as will barbers. The harvesters explain this participation, as do the Safi when commenting on the lauGuri's actions, in terms of the obligations attached to neighbourliness. As we have seen above the

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1) There are also hamlet or community 'āshar' when the work needed to be done, for example, the repair of irrigation ditches or canals destroyed by floods, involves the whole hamlet or community. In such cases the maliks or elders choose a day when the work should be carried out and inform the people through their dependents. Musicians are provided by large landowners and each household sends a representative for the work. No food or payment is given.

harvesters pitch their tents on common pasture land and thus become the neighbours (hamsaya) of those Safi with adjoining fields or those whose houses are proximate. One of the obligations this neighbourliness involves is help and this may be expressed through participation in āshar. Whilst this explanation undoubtedly has some validity other factors are also operative. Two which were of special significance at the time of my field work were the following. The harvesters were receiving only a half (a 36th. instead of a 20th.) of their normal share as payment for their work and thus any extra payment such as the food which is given at an āshar was of considerable interest to them. Secondly they were making use of the reciprocity which characterises the āshar. Through their work these harvesters were providing themselves with a future claim to the harvesting work of the cultivator whose āshar they were supporting. A final factor and one independent of the economic situation emerged from a study of those men who utilised lauGuri. These were men whose relations within their hamlets were strained and thus men who usually had difficulties in finding āsharGuri from among their relatives and fellow villagers.

Other Activities

So far I have been concerned with farming as the principal economic activity of Afghaniya but, as I have mentioned above, some 40 % (15 % landless and 25 % with insufficient land) of the males are partly or totally involved in other activities. The most important of these are hunting, seasonal labour, trade - in the form of shops and salesmen - and the specialist activities of the carpenters, blacksmiths, barbers and mullahs/imām.

Hunting

Hunting, as may be seen from diag. 5 p. 89, starts in the second half of January and continues until the end of April. It is thus an activity which to a certain extent complements farming because it occurs in

prices in 1970-71

ducks	- 10-30 Afs.
pigeons	- 12 Afs.
qazalāq	- 1.25 Afs.
starlings	- 2 Afs.
tiqāli	- 1 Af.
zāni	- 50-60 Afs.
luGluG	- 50-60 Afs.
yārmuxchi	- 2 Afs.
karakān	- 10 Afs.
dehqānaki	- 2 Afs.
partridge	- 3 Afs.
2 or 3 chunchuni	- 1 Af.



5. HUNTING ACTIVITIES

the dead season. Later, in March, however, it tends to conflict with ploughing and seeding and becomes for the full-time cultivators and share-croppers a very subsidiary activity. For the others who have no or too little land it remains important right up until the end of April.

Only birds are hunted and these are either netted or shot. Netting is carried out in a number of ways but there are two principal forms. One is where caged birds are used as decoys to bring other members of their species down on to the fields where they can be netted. This type of netting is usually carried out by boys or by the economically weakest members of the community.

The other form of netting is practised on a much larger scale and can be very lucrative at least in Afghan terms. In this case the hunters net the birds in flight as they pass up the gorge leading from Tagao to the Nijrao and Panjshir valleys. The Tagao-Nijrao gorge is on one of the main migratory routes for birds which have spent the winter in India and are passing through to Central Asia. In February they start moving in huge flocks, flying close to the ground, up from Nangrahar province. The fore-fathers of those Safi who now live in the south-west corner of Afghaniya obviously recognised the implications of these movements and built, all the way up their part of the gorge [1], 'kundai', or pairs of small, squat, stone pillars which are used as hide-outs or screens for the hunters. Since then new kundai have been added so that now each family in these hamlets has one and these are inherited in the same way as land or other property. When the birds are sighted ascending from Tagao a shout goes up and two members of the kundai take up positions one each behind a pillar with the net stretched between them. In the split second when the birds pass between and above the two pillars the men stand up and casting the net in an arc net the birds. Not all the kundai are equally favourably situated - the birds follow definite

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1) The other section of the gorge is occupied by the 'kundai' of men from Tagao.

lines up the gorge - and the returns, in terms of birds caught, can vary considerably from kundai to kundai. The income from the best ones is about 2,500 Afs. for three months netting whereas that from a poor one will only be a few hundred Afs. The better kundai are also sold sometimes for as much as 20,000 Afs. and 'graued' - a sort of pawning or usufruct - for between 6 and 8,000 Afs. They thus often represent a considerable portion of a family's total property. In spite of the considerable discrepancy in the earnings and in the value of kundai all families like to have them whether or not they are favourably or unfavourably placed. It is not only the money to be earned but also the excitement and uncertainty of the hunt which attracts the owners and causes them to sit by their hide-outs for as much as ten or twelve hours a day during the season.

No such permanent hide-outs are available for those hunters who shoot their quarry. Some, however, erect temporary screens besides the rivers or make artificial ponds with decoys to facilitate duck hunting. Others, usually the more professional hunters - i.e. those who are totally dependent on hunting -, do not remain in Afghaniya but go to Garmāwa and Bād Asiyā [1] where the flocks are most numerous. There they remain for one or two months and if they are fortunate will return with one or two thousand Afghanis. If they are unfortunate they may only manage to earn some 200 or 300 Afs. Whatever they earn the fact that they are away from Afghaniya and support themselves means that their families at least live better during the last difficult months of winter and spring when grain stocks are running short.

The birds whether netted or shot are brought to the various bazaars in Tagao, Nijrao, and to a lesser extent Pachoghan. There they are either sold directly to interested people or to shop-keepers who specialise in the sale of birds [2]. The prices they acquire vary (see

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1) These are two areas in the Panjshir valley which are famous for their hunting.
2) Some of these men have connections with Charikar and Kabul and take the birds to the bazaars there where they bring a much better price.

diag. 5 p. 89) principally according to size - the smallest are cheapest - and edibility/taste. Some birds, however, are caught and sold because of their singing qualities and others because, when trained, they can be used for fighting. Many men have song birds in Afghaniya and they often take them to the fields so that they can listen whilst working. Also people who are ill will have their favourite song birds near their beds so that they can be distracted both by the birds' movements and their song. Men who have fighting birds - usually the red-legged partridge - also receive pleasure from observing them and it is not unusual to come across men who have placed their caged fighting birds near to where they are working or take them with them when visiting [1]. The prices offered for song or fighting birds are very much higher than those for species captured or shot for the table and in many cases it is impossible to buy them whatever the sum proffered. Generally, however, the people who keep birds of these kinds are hunters themselves so that the exclusive pursuit of song or fighting birds would not provide a better paying alternative.

Seasonal Labour

Seasonal labour by contrast can be much more lucrative and it is not unusual for men to return with 10,000 Afs. for work which they have done in the cotton and rice areas of northern Afghanistan. The need to do such work arises, as has already been indicated, because of the inadequacy of landholdings or the total loss of land in Afghaniya. Thus seasonal labour and the more permanent labour outside the community usually represent the last stages of a cycle which begins with the inheritance of land and ends with its total loss (see diag. 6 p. 93).

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1) It is clear to me that these are very superficial explanations for the obvious attraction which these birds have for their owners. The therapeutic qualities of the birds, for example, is fascinating and would reward investigation along the lines suggested by Lévi-Strauss. Unfortunately I did not concern myself with this phenomenon even though other non-Safi Pakhtuns found the Safi's concern with birds remarkable.

INHERIT LAND
▼
DEBT ——— gambling, marriage payments, funeral costs, shop debts
▼
SELL USUFRUCT RIGHTS OF FIELDS
▼
SHARE-CROP OTHER'S FIELDS
▼
SLAUGHTER AND SALE OF MEAT
OR
SALE OF FLOUR
▼
SALE/LOSS OF LAND
▼
TEMPORARY SEASONAL LABOUR
▼
PERMANENT RESIDENCE ELSEWHERE AS LANDLESS LABOURER

Reversal of Above

Turkestan
▼
Landless Labourer
▼
Savings
▼
Shop/Truck
▼
Land

6. Cycle of the Loss of Land and Migration

The majority of holdings acquired on inheritance in Afghaniya are still, in spite of their reduced size, adequate for subsistence. They can, however, only remain so if the owner-cultivator leads a frugal life and keeps those expenses - marriages, funerals, shop and gambling debts - down which because of their size could imperil his holding.

Once debts have been made it is the size of them and the urgency and political strength of the debtee which determines whether they have to be paid. Gambling debts seem to be the most pernicious in Afghaniya because gambling must be done in secret (it is condemned by the mullahs), is responsible for the largest debts, is usually addictive, and has the most hardhearted, persistent and well-armed collectors.

Such debtors usually sell the usufruct rights of one or more of their fields. Once this is done, because the holdings are only subsistence ones, it means that harvests from the remaining fields are inadequate and more debts have to be made to make up the missing quantities. A temporary palliative is provided by share-cropping the fields of relatives and neighbours but the competition for such fields is very great and often the products are insufficient for the cropper's needs. The decline that then follows is normally rapid: the sale of more land, the pursuit of the professions of meat and flour salesman (see below) and finally the sale of all the fields or of the rights to their products (see diag. 6 p. 93).

At some time during this process the heads or the younger men of the households start taking up temporary or seasonal work preferably in the north of the country because there wages are high and there are many other Afghaniya Safi who have established homes there. The presence of such people and the final loss of all their fields cause the new migrants to take up permanent residence there on the huge new estates created through the extension of the irrigated areas.

The situation for these labourers, as far as the possession of land is concerned, is not completely hopeless. Cases were reported to me of Safi who because of the 'high' wages offered on these estates were able to save money, then to buy a shop or a truck and finally to purchase land. The cycle of the loss of land may, therefore, also be reversed through the new acquisition of land (see diag. 6 p. 93).

Those men who continue to be seasonal migrants largely because they still possess some land in Afghaniya not only increase their families' incomes through their earnings but also enable those who stay behind to share-crop these small parcels and generally alleviate the land situation in the community.

Salesmen and Shopkeepers

Salesmen and shopkeepers do not relieve the pressure on land but they are able to supplement their families' incomes by their activities. The extent to which they need to be successful varies not only from individual to individual but also and principally from one occupation to the other, i.e. from salesman to shopkeeper.

The salesmen are men generally on the edge of poverty with no land or with fields which are so small as to be totally inadequate for their needs. The sale of meat and flour - the only products for which the Pakhtuns of Afghaniya act as salesmen - often represents for them the last attempt to save themselves from landlessness and/or permanent migration. The shopkeepers on the other hand are all landed men whose shops provide an extra but not always principal part of their income. Some shopkeepers in fact are very wealthy whereas others just manage to subsist on the products of their land and their earnings in the shops. Generally speaking, however, the shopkeepers are only partly dependent on the income they receive from their shops whereas the salesmen are totally dependent on their earnings from sales.

The salesmen, of which there are twenty-nine families in Afghaniya [1], support their families from the profit they make by buying in the areas where meat and flour are cheapest and selling in the areas where they are most expensive. Meat, for example, is cheapest in the main bazaars of Nijrao and Tagao and most expensive in the smaller and more distant valleys. The meat salesmen, therefore, are principally concerned with the transport of meat and/or animals from one place to another. The flour salesmen on the other hand have a number of factors to take into consideration. Firstly the yield from harvests in the areas where they operate - Nijrao, Tagao and Koh-i-Daman [2] - can vary considerably from year to year. Secondly getting the grain which they have purchased ground as cheaply as possible involves, as the majority of mills are water driven, going to those areas where water is plentiful or in periods of heavy precipitation to those mills whose shares of the milled grain are the smallest [3]. It can, therefore, happen that flour salesmen buy grain in one valley, have it ground in another and sell it in a third. For this sort of movement they need pack animals and the majority have either donkeys or horses. Those salesmen who do not have their own animals utilise the services of the settled nomads who still have camels.

The initiative required, the relative independence of decision and movement and the uncertainty of the profit to be made are all factors which appeal to Pakhtuns. They are in fact those elements which compensate them for pursuing tasks which had and still have a certain amount of social stigma attached to them. Elphinstone, for example, wrote 'No Afghaun ever keeps a shop or exercises any handicraft trade' [4], and Bellew writing some fifty years later said

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1) Of these twenty-nine families twenty-four sold flour and only five meat the sale of which is generally considered less prestigious. The numbers, at least of the meat salesmen, vary considerably according to the availability of more lucrative jobs.
2) East of the Pachoghan valley.
3) In Afghaniya, at a time when water was very short, wheat was ground for one ser in fourteen or in twenty which even at the time of drought would seem to be a very high share.
4) Elphinstone. 1972. Op.cit. p. 333. vol. I.

'... no Afghan, unless, indeed the very poorest of the poor, will ever engage in any retail trade, keep a shop, or pursue any mechanical trade or handicraft' [1]. These Safi Pakhtuns are the 'poorest of the poor' but Pakhtuns in general have been forced to take up jobs which would not have been considered prior to government control, population increases and land shortage.

Shopkeeping is today generally considered by the Safi a more prestigious activity than that of the sale of meat or flour. This is largely because, as I have mentioned above, shopkeepers have land and some of them are relatively wealthy men. This combination of wealth and land brings power and respect especially at a time when the traditional values [2] are losing their meaning and relevance in the face of increasing poverty and social change. Nevertheless certain reservations about shopkeepers and shopkeeping continue to exist among the population and this, as will be shown below, is reflected in the success of the non-Pakhtun shopkeepers.

There are thirty-three shops serving Afghaniya of which two are owned by Parachis and thirty-one by Pakhtuns. They vary considerably in size and in the amount and variety of goods offered but all are referred to by the inhabitants as 'dukān', shop, and fall under the general category of 'banjāra' or general merchandise shop [3]. This means that they sell a wide range of articles such as niswār, cigarettes, matches, tea and sugar, soap, tooth-paste, rubber shoes, plastic sandles, shoe-laces, combs, needles, buttons and zippers, penknives, contra-

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1) Bellew, H. W. 1862. Journal of a Political Mission to Afghanistan 1857. p. 24. London.

2) For example: ' :that wealth is not for amassing, but for use and is basically without importance, that only the weak man is attached to property and makes himself dependent on it, that the strong man bases his position on qualities within himself and people's recognition of these qualities, and not on the control of people by the control of objects.' Barth. 1970. Op.cit. p. 121. The destruction of traditional values is discussed in greater detail in chap. 8.

3) This is a systematization suggested by Charpentier in his book 'Bazaar-e-Tashqurgan, Ethnographical Studies in an Afghan Traditional Bazaar'. 1972. Studia Ethonographica. Uppsala. pp. 142-149.

ceptives [1], aspirin, penicillin, etc., as well as paraffin and imported biscuits and sweets. Some shops also sell cloth but as the rolls cost a great deal of money only the wealthiest shopkeepers can afford to buy them. All of these articles are bought in the main bazaars of Nijrao and Tagao or in Kabul by the shopkeepers themselves and then sold for a small profit in Afghaniya. Some goods, however, a nd these usually include white paraffin, cigarettes and cloth are bought through smugglers who bring them over the border from Pakistan. This sort of trade used to be very popular and is still very profitable but now because of controls by the army and the increased efficacy of the custom's officials has become a little too harzardous for most shopkeepers. Only those who are starting at the bottom or who need to make a large profit quickly are willing to take the risk of selling smuggled goods.

Generally speaking, however, a shopkeeper's earnings come from three sources. One is the profit made from the difference between the price at which the shopkeeper buys the article and the price at which he sells it in Afghaniya. This price difference the shopkeeper justifies by explaining it as the cost of transport from the bazaars or Kabul to the Pachoghan valley. The customers, unless they are very poor, accept this explanation. They do so not only because it seems credible but because of the convenience of a shop which is close and which opens when the customer wishes compared with the inconvenience of a bazaar which is open only once a week (Friday) and is at least three hours walking distance away i.e. Nijrao. Also customers acquiesce because the majority buy things on credit from the shop and the additional cost which arises from buying at the shop instead of at the bazaar appears in comparison with the total debt to be very small.

This system of credit provides the shopkeeper with his second source of income. Credit which is extended becomes debts which have to be

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1) They would seem to be used exclusively as balloons by the children.

repaid either at the harvest or when some member of the family returns from work outside the valley. Shopkeepers generally prefer a repayment in wheat because shortly after the harvest wheat is very cheap and the amount which the shopkeepers receive for the credit they gave can be very large. When this wheat is stored and then sold in the winter when it is most expensive the profit thus acquired can be considerable.

A profit can also be made by money-lending and this provides the shopkeepers with their third source of income. As they are the only members of the community who have supplies of ready-cash it follows relatively naturally that they should be the ones who function as money-lenders. Although lending money for a profit is forbidden by Islam the shopkeepers can and do circumvent this difficulty by making an agreement to receive the debt in wheat and thus obtain a profit in the manner outlined above [1)].

Although money lending and the giving of credit are expected and in some cases demanded these activities do not endear the shopkeepers to those customers who make use of them. The principal reason for this is the implication of inequality which results from the customer's dependence. Unfortunately most cultivators have to ask for credit or have to borrow money because of the nature of the agricultural system which brings a surplus only at one period of the year and because of the inadequate size of many of the holdings. Cultivators are, therefore, faced with the problem of having to acquire loans and credit and having to do so without too great a loss of independence and prestige. As they have nothing against making debts per se but only against making them, or at least overly large

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1) The economic importance of money-lending for the shopkeepers may be seen from Hahn's figures for Kabul and its surroundings where 57 % of the families were in debt. See Hahn. 1972. Op.cit. p. 230. For amounts of interest (usury) see also Hahn. 1972. Op.cit. p. 234.

ones, with their Pakhtun cousins [1] one solution is to borrow money and to accept credit from non-Pakhtun shops [2]. This they can do because non-Pakhtuns, in this case the two Parachi shopkeepers who serve Afghaniya, are as Parachi not subject to the same norms or competing in the same system as the Pakhtuns. To be dependent on a Parachi has no meaning because the Parachi are not 'playing the same game' [3].

The Parachi are also dependent on the Pakhtuns for their existence both in terms of goods bought and protection given. Any dependence, therefore, which might be considered to exist through the debts is more than compensated for by the political dependence of the Parachi in fact the Pakhtuns can even feel that the credit and money they have received is the just payment for the protection given. In practice this lack of political support or their political neutrality is a benefit to the Parachi because of the extra custom which it brings them.

Pakhtun shops are not just the possessions of their owners but the centres of group interests. When a Pakhtun sets up shop then he does so usually with the financial and physical assistance of his closest relatives who thus have a vested interest in the success of the venture. Also they expect and require, as far as they are able, all their relatives, i.e. both agnates and affines, to utilise the

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1) The Safi use this term to refer both to their real and their putative 'cousins', i.e. members of the same village and community. A man's prestige, as I have mentioned elswhere (above p. 85), is obviously of primary importance in those areas where he is known. In other, generally non-Pakhtun, areas Pakhtun norms lose their validity or at least are seen as being in abeyance because they only affect the individual and not his family and descent group.

2) The incompatability of Pakhtun ideals and capitalist laws was presumably responsible for the rejection, at least up to modern times, of all trading activities by the Pakhtuns.

3) This may be most clearly seen in cases where menials or non-Pakhtuns insult Pakhtuns. The Pakhtun does not himself respond because his honour has not been affected. He rather orders his servants to kill or beat up the offender.

facilities of the shop to the exclusion of others [1]. Acquiescence is then honoured by the extension of long term credit and interest free debts. However other shops offer similar facilities and often the spheres of influence of two shops overlap, for example, when they are situated in the same hamlet so that part of the kinship group of one is also part of the kinship group of another. The rivalry thus engendered operates to the detriment of the Pakhtun shops because many customers then seek the neutrality of the Parachi. Also Pakhtuns who wish to express their disagreement with the actions of, or the personalities in, their interest/political groups without supporting another opposed Pakhtun group can do so by shopping in the Parachi shops. Thus the social and political neutrality of the Parachi has lead to their two shops being by far the most successful in Afghaniya. The Pakhtun shopkeepers by contrast, caught within the bonds of their own social system, are doomed to a limited success.

KusubGar (carpenters, blacksmiths, and barbers) and the Mullahs

The advantages of political neutrality were or are shared by the 'kusubGar' [2], the professionals or craftsmen. They are able to pursue their work throughout the whole community irrespective of political struggles because they too are outside the power structure of the Pakhtuns. These professionals the carpenters, blacksmiths and barbers [3] - the mullahs are also professionals but not kusubGar and will, therefore, be dealt with separately - together constitute the last group involved in non-farming activities [4]. They, however, unlike the hunters, labourers, salesmen and shopkeepers are not Safi

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1) My servant for example was constantly upbraided by his cousin, a shopkeeper, for not using his influence on me to buy exclusively in his shop.
2) kusub = trade, occupation, employment. Gar = suffix of person or actor.
3) There are, of course, other craftsmen such as potters, silver- and coppersmiths, weavers, etc., but these men no longer live permanently in Afghaniya. They move from area to area and stay only as long as it is necessary to complete the work required of them.
4) The carpenters and blacksmiths are, of course, involved in farming because they provide the implements for cultivation. What I mean is that their profession or trades are non-farming in the sense of not being directly involved with the tilling of the soil.

or Pakhtuns [1] who have sought these occupations to supplement an inadequate income but people who have been for at least three generations full-time carpenters, smiths and barbers [2]. They are not members of tribes but of trades or, as Barth has argued, 'castes' whose integrity or corporality was and in the case of the barbers still is preserved by endogamous marriage [3].

This distinctiveness and the difference in status which it involves is explained by most Safi as the result of fate or destiny - 'God sent them' [4]. Others are capable of more complex explanations although these too do not escape from a belief in a predetermined, Godly order. One informant, for example, sought to achieve clarity through an analogy. 'A felt carpet and a knotted carpet are both made from the same stuff - wool. But they are different and have a different value. The same is true of the human kind they are made of the same material but are nevertheless different. So it is with the Pakhtuns and the kusubGar.'

This very illuminating explanation is applied, however, only to the distinction between carpenters and blacksmiths or smiths in general and the Safi and not to the barbers and the Safi. The carpenters, blacksmiths and barbers may be grouped together under the term kusubGar but such a grouping is not tenable under any other criterion. The barbers constitute a special group not only because their work as such is not connected in any way with agriculture but because they fall into the special category of the 'unclean' or 'impure'. Although generally speaking among Pakhtuns and indeed among all muslims no

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1) They may be the descendants of landless Pakhtuns but this is not known and not claimed.
2) See Barth, F. 1960. The System of Social Stratification in Swat, north Pakistan. p. 136. In: Aspects of Caste in South India, Ceylon and North-west Pakistan. Ed. Leach, E. R. Cambridge University Press.
3) Barth. 1959. Op.cit. p. 16.
4) See also Charpentier. 1972. Op.cit. p. 177.

complicated religious or ritual hierarchy exists [1] three categories are distinguishable. These are the sacred and pure, i.e. the holy men and descendants of the Prophet, the profane and impure i. e. the barbers and possibly musicians [2], and the rest, the secular, worldly etc., i.e. those between the two extremes. The barbers of Afghaniya provide no exception and are ordered into the profane category but they have achieved a greater degree of self-sufficiency than is usual by living together in one hamlet, dumān, instead of being scattered as families in all the hamlets of the community and by owning land. These two factors together with the general poverty of the area and the social change caused by government intervention have improved their status. They nevertheless do not and probably will never enjoy the social mobility of the carpenters and blacksmiths who through their ownership of land have achieved in most things equality with the Safi.

Carpenters

The carpenters of which there are eighteen families in Afghaniya live in four separate hamlets. In one hamlet where there are ten families they are the only inhabitants and the hamlet is known, not surprisingly, as 'najārān' or the carpenters. The other eight families live in three separate hamlets together with Safi, a distribution which is more typical for Pakhtun areas at least according to the literature [3]. None of the carpenters whether in najārān or in the other hamlets are, as would seem to be the case in Swat, attached to specific landlords or political patrons. They are free to make or terminate contracts with thom they wish and those which they make with owner-

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1) The Koran in fact propagates equality: 'Surely the noblest among you in the sight of God is the most godfearing of you.' 49:13 Apartments. In: Arberry, A. J. 1964. The Koran Interpreted. p. 538. Oxford University Press, London.
2) Barbers are often also musicians. The word 'dum' used for barber in Afghaniya means musician in Swat (Barth. 1965. Op.cit. p. 17.) As onomatopoeia is especially common in Pakhto it would seem most likely to me that the original meaning of dum - taken from the sound of a drum beat - was musician. Thus the activities of some barbers as musicians - drummers - resulted in them being referred to as such in some Pakhtun areas. In Swat, among the Yusufzai, they are called 'nai'.
3) Barth. 1965. Op.cit. p. 103.

cultivators, share-croppers and landowners are all of a dyadic nature. The carpenters in Afghaniya, therefore, are not part of a cooperating team of specialists such as tenant, carpenter, smith, muleteer etc., headed by a landlord. This is principally because here land holdings are very small and the needs of the owner-cultivators or share-croppers are consequently modest.

Contracts are made by the employer seeking out the carpenter and when agreement is reached shaking hands with him after which the carpenter says 'this has become my work'. The contract lasts from one autumn to the next and involves on the carpenter's side the making and repair of tools and agricultural equipment as well as doors, windows and beds in the house and the construction of the wooden implements used by women. The owner-cultivator or land owner for his part supplies or buys all the wood necessary for the work, provides occasional meals and, after the harvest, hands over the 'dodi' or 'girdai' payment agreed upon in the contract. The dodi payment consists of two ser of wheat and two ser of maize whereas the 'girdai' is that amount of unthreshed wheat or maize which one man can carry away on his back. It is, however, not necessary to make a yearly contract and landless men who work as share-croppers can make agreements with the carpenters for the supply of specific implements in return for money payments. Also millers who require water shoots or water 'turbines' for their mills make individual agreements and pay either in cash or kind. Generally speaking the carpenters now prefer money for their work or when this is not obtainable fixed amounts of wheat or maize. They feel, at least those of them who possess land, that it is incongruous that they should be the subordinates of landowners in their role as carpenters but super-ordinates of others in their role as landowners. They, therefore, would prefer because they do not wish to lose their income as carpenters a more 'business like' attitude and this they feel can be more readily achieved through the exchange of work for money and the elimination of the dodi and girdai payments.

Blacksmiths

The blacksmiths are similarly concerned to improve their status and in fact three families ceased working as smiths two years ago and have become shopkeepers and salesmen both occupations with greater prestige and ones also pursued by Safi. The two remaining families who still carry on with their work find it difficult to subsist on smithing alone and work as share-croppers as well. In spite of their dependence they will only make yearly contracts for the dodi payment and not for the girdai. They feel that the latter payment although generally larger than the dodi is denigrating because it demonstrates their dependence on the goodwill and genero-sity of the landowner and thus perpetuates their lower status. Instead of the dodi payment they would also accept cash.

Again, as in the case of the carpenters, the agreements which are made between the smiths and their customers are dyadic. The cultivators and share-croppers go to the smiths and order what they want there or they bring those implements which need to be repaired to the smithy. One might think that the smiths would be overburdened with work considering how few of them there are but this is not the case, largely because the bazaars also offer the blacksmiths' traditional wares as well as cheap, foreign manufactured goods from the U.S.S.R. and China which are enjoying increasing popularity. The movement from smithing to shopkeeping, therefore, which three families have made may be seen not only as an attempt to improve their social status but also as a response to the increasing external competition and to the impossibility of living from repairs alone. The two remaining families should, however, be able to continue with their profession as they must represent the absolute minimum requirement of smiths for an agricultural community of this size.

Barbers

The barbers unlike the blacksmiths are not troubled by external

competition nor by a decline in the need for their services. This is largely because the services which they offer, shaving, hair-cutting and nail paring and their functions in the various rites de passage cannot be replaced by different methods or different people. Their immunity from economic difficulties, however, does not bring immunity in the social field where discrimination ensures that their low status in the community is perpetuated and has become part of the social order itself, but to this below.

The barbers came, according to their own tradition of settlement together with a Pakhtun, Kando (the later founder of the hamlet of kando xel), from Wardak. The barbers, two brothers, purchased some land in Afghaniya and founded their own hamlet, dumān (barbers), where now 15 of the total 17 barber families live. The other two families reside in two hamlets where their co-villagers are all Pakhtuns. The latter situation is typical for other Pakhtun areas where barbers are dispersed among the hamlets according to the villagers' needs, the former situation, however, where a large group of barbers have their own hamlet, would seem to be unique in Afghanistan and is reminiscent of Indian caste villages.

In spite of being concentrated in one hamlet the barbers nevertheless serve the needs of all the Pakhtun hamlets and in this way each hamlet has its own, though non-resident, barber. The barbers were originally chosen by the inhabitants but are now the descendants of these men. The office has thus become hereditary and there is no competition between barbers for customers. Shaving and hair-cutting are carried out on Tuesdays and Thursdays when the barbers travel from their hamlet to their customers' hamlets and spend the day there going from house to house. When a Pakhtun for some reason requires a shave on another day than those set aside for this purpose then he will request it but he will not always acquire his barber should he be otherwise engaged.

The payment which the barbers receive for barbering is an annual

one and is either one ser of maize and one ser of wheat or, the girdai payment mentioned above. Both types of payment are accepted by the barbers and they do not seek, as have the blacksmiths, to limit their payment to a fixed amount of grain or money. They make use of their right to accept the highest payment in whatever form that occurs and this is usually the girdai. They also receive money for their services in the rites de passage, i.e. birth, circumcision, and marriage, in the 'xerāt' festivities for example, to celebrate a good harvest or a recovery from an illness and for blood-letting. Together these payments have been sufficient not only to support the barbers and their families but also to enable them to purchase fields from their Pakhtun neighbours.

The ownership of land, bought piece by piece and over long periods of time, is but one of the externals which give the impression that the barbers are, in all but their work, indistinguishable from the Safi Pakhtuns. Others are the possession of gardens, fruit trees, and the usual draught and milking animals. They also have, like the Safi, a hamlet, a genealogy, political groups based on descent (the koranai) and personal interest (the para), and the usual struggles and conflicts over land, women and possessions. Below the surface, however, there are differences which reveal their true position and status in the community.

One such difference is the barbers' inability to acquire the rights to the (river) water for the fields which they purchased in spite of the fact that this was and is normally a condition of sale. They, therefore, did not even obtain full rights to their fields and were not in a position through numerical and political weakness to obtain these by force. Although the central government now has the power to support the rights of individuals against the malpractices of groups the situation has not changed and the barbers are still totally dependent on the goodwill of their Pakhtun neighbours for water and thus for their agricultural existence.

However the Safi have until now always allowed their water to be channelled on to the barbers' fields and have not misused their power which is probably one of the principal reasons why the barbers have not appealed to the government to terminate this inequality. Another is, of course, that the barbers do not wish, or are not prepared, to disturb or alter their relations with the Pakhtuns at least as long as water is freely available. Nevertheless it is clear to all that the barbers are in the position of clients and that the difference in status between the two groups is one of political dominance and subordination resulting from the barbers' peculiar situation in the society.

Another difference is that the barbers' marriages are 'caste' endogamous with occasional hypergamy, i.e. barber women given to Pakhtun males [1]. Generally, however, they prefer to marry among themselves because the skills that they require from their women are only taught to their women. A non-barber woman is, therefore, only married for prestige reasons otherwise she is a liability. In this they are very different from the Pakhtuns who take women from all classes and ethnic groups but are very reluctant to give their own women to non-Pakhtuns.

Barber women also do not use their veils [2] with the frequency and alacrity which is usual of Pakhtun women a difference which is indicative of the barbers lower prestige. They, the women, also have a greater degree of freedom in their movements, i.e. they do not only emerge from the house to fetch water but are often underway as midwives and as helpers of their husbands. Finally they often gather in their hamlet, near groups of men, to hear the discussion and sometimes make asides. All of these activities, at least in terms of the dominant cultural form, i.e. that of the Safi Pakhtuns, externalise the fact that their honour or the honour of their men, whether fathers or

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1) See also Charpentier. 1972. Op.cit. p. 138.
2) None of the women in Afghaniya wear veils or 'tsādari' as such but when unexpectedly confronted by unrelated males they will turn away and cover their faces with their headscarves.

husbands, is not held very highly and is or was thus in marked contrast to that of the Pakhtuns [1].

Fourthly their lower status is further indicated by the lack of reciprocity which exists between Pakhtuns and barbers. The barbers, for example, will participate voluntarily in the ā<u>sh</u>ar of their Pakhtun neighbours but the latter will never work with the barbers when they need aid for their ā<u>sh</u>ar.

Finally the relationship which exists between the barbers and the Pakhtuns is very different from that between the Pakhtuns and any other professional group. Hair-cutting, nail paring and shaving bring the barbers into contact, in Mary Douglas's terms, with 'bodily refuse', with dirt, with 'matter out of place' and thus with disorder [2]. This does not mean that they are polluted or capable of polluting others but Hindu ideas are known sufficiently well here for the Pakhtuns to place the barbers in a special if not polluted then impure category. It is this impurity or contact with disorder which places them outside the normal order of the society and enables them both to pursue their barbering activities and to be in contact with people in 'transitional states' i.e. during the rites de passage. It also allows them unhindered access to the domestic sphere of the Safi families and thus they cross internal lines which normally are barriers to all but the closest relatives. Whilst such conditions

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1) There has also been a decline in the Pakhtuns' standards (see p. 97) nevertheless the difference between the two groups is still very noticeable.

2) See Douglas, Mary. 1970. Purity and Danger. p. 48. Penguin Books. Middlesex. The barbers would be, in terms of Mary Douglas's argument, classical 'interstitial persons' both because of their work and their relations to the Safi. They are not, however, accused or even suspected of possessing 'formless' or 'uncontrolled and uncontrollable' power even though the influence of the evil eye, the efficacy of charms and formulas, and the presence of djins and spirits constitute part and parcel of daily life in Afghaniya. Mary Douglas herself writes that 'this three-fold scheme for investigating primitive cosmologies unfortunately comes to grief over exceptions which are too important to brush aside'. (p. 126). Perhaps these barbers also provide an exception.

permit barbers to work at their profession and to fulfil other functions within Safi families which would otherwise be closed to them it also means that as in the case of land they are only allowed to acquire wealth but not power because power is inextricably linked with manliness an attribute which would place them on a level with Pakhtuns and prohibit their activities as barbers. Similarly their women cannot be controlled and confined in the same way and to the same extent that Safi women are because this would also imply on the barbers' part an assertive masculinity which is inappropriate with and inexpedient to their office as barbers. Logically, therefore, barber women, as indicated above, cannot wear veils, have greater personal freedom and generally act in ways which indicate that they are outside the order applicable to Safi women. Thus barber men are emasculated and dependent and they are denied the social mobility which, for example, the carpenters and blacksmiths enjoy.

It is, of course, possible for groups to change their identity by moving away to other areas and by practising other professions. However in the case of the Afghaniya barbers this would involve the loss of their land and an established livelihood in exchange for an uncertain future. Some barber families, therefore, are trying within the limits set for them in Afghaniya to change their status. As the greatest impediment to their plans is their barbering two households have now stopped doing it and replace the lost income by buying and selling animals in the neighbouring valleys and one family from these households has even managed to acquire a Pakhtun daughter-in-law possibly the only case of its kind in Afghanistan [1]. They have, however, been unable through these actions to alter their status in any way so far. The Pakhtuns ignore their pretensions or regard them as ridiculous, rather like trying to make a horse out of a donkey and among the other barbers they have only managed to excite their opposition, an understandable reaction born from the fear

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1) This marriage and its implications will be discussed in greater detail below p. 210).

that they might succeed. Some sort of success could, however, accrue from their efforts if the government succeeds in the future in furthering its educational programme and providing job possibilities which would enable the barbers to escape from their caste-like role.

Mullahs

The mullahs of Afghaniya whether imāms, the last group of the professionals, or non-practising Safi mullahs do not constitute with the barbers binary oppositions of the kind 'pure : impure' or 'sacred: profane'. This is because the concepts of purity and sacredness are reserved for or are associated with, in the Safi's mind, not the mullahs but the holy men, the Pirs and Sheikhs or Sayyids. Although there are no such men in Afghaniya the sphere of influence of one Pir, miyā Gul ṣaHib, extends into the Pachoghan valley. This influence is expressed in the collection of offerings, the 'niyāz', by the Pir's followers (muridan) from among the inhabitants of the valley. The Pir's ability to collect these offerings (money, crops or animals) comes firstly from his spiritual power (baraka [1]) obtained by removing himself through seclusion, silence or fasting from the 'confines of the society' [2]. Secondly and additionally it results from what Mary Douglas has called 'post hoc empirical identification' [3] i.e., the discovery by neighbours, fellow villagers, or visitors that, for example, wishes have been granted or male children born or healed through association with the Pir or his house. The acquisition of followers attracted by his fame is the final step and these supporters bring the Pir secular power as well [4]. It is such men who have purity and sacredness and constitute the opposite pole to the impure and profane barbers.

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1) See Douglas. 1970. Op.cit. pp. 132 & 133.
2) See Douglas. 1970. Op.cit. p. 115.
3) Douglas. 1970. Op.cit. p. 133.
4) See Barth. 1965. Op.cit. pp. 56-63 for a short survey of the acquisition and utilisation of followers by these holy men.

The position of the Afghaniya mullahs both as far as power is concerned and the qualities attributed to them is very different [1] perhaps because they unlike the Pirs remain 'in the control of themselves and of society' [2]. There are, however, in Afghaniya, as I have mentioned above (p. 70), two categories of mullah those who practise their calling, the imām, and those who have received a religious training but who normally pursue other activities, the Safi mullahs.

The imām

The majority of imāms in Afghaniya come from the Parachi and Pashai areas of the Pachoghan valley and the others from neighbouring valleys. They are without exception non-Pakhtuns. This is not the result of a prohibition on Pakhtun imāms because theoretically any person who is qualified as a mullah may apply for and receive the post of an imām in Afghaniya. In practice, however, Pakhtuns are not accepted. This is a consequence of the qualities required of an imām by the villagers, the nature of the office itself and the character of Pakhtuns in general - all elements which will become clear as the discussion progresses.

When the post of imām becomes vacant in a hamlet either through the departure or death of the previous imām then the elders of the hamlet are responsible for finding a new imām. The news that such and such a hamlet is looking for an imām spreads quickly and sometimes there are mullahs in the area seeking positions as imāms. Applicants come to the hamlet and there meet members in

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1) Whilst the present Safi mullahs have very little power it is always possible for an outstanding individual to come forward. Mullahs and holy men in general in both Afghanistan and Pakistan had and still have very considerable influence not only in their 'congregations' but also in the wider political field. In Pakhtun areas their significance lay principally in their ability, because of their non-tribal origins, to unite otherwise competing or warring groups - a quality not shared by the Pakhtun khans or maliks.
2) Douglas. 1970. Op.cit. p. 115.

the mosque. The most basic requirements of the villagers are that the potential imām should be a good person with an excellent character and this, the Safi say, may be established through talking with him and observing him when he leads the prayer. Decisive for them, however, is that all heads of households and all the political factions within the hamlet are in agreement with the choice. Should one individual object then that imām will not be given the position. Unanimity among the factions usually only results when the imām is an outsider and a non-Pakhtun because outsiders cannot be the secret protégés of any person or group and non-Pakhtuns are less liable to involve themselves in the political affairs of the hamlet and are temperamentally more able to accept the dependence and neutrality of the position. Such a situation condemns the imām to political impotency because even when in office he cannot develop leadership qualities or attempt to acquire political power without putting his job at risk. Some compensation, however, emanates from his position as a neutral person and thus as a unifying factor in the hamlet and from the prestige accorded to him for his education and knowledge of Islam. Also those imāms who provide amulets and charms (see below p. 114) have additional prestige from this activity but not all imām engage in it and from those that do not all are equally successful or called upon.

Once appointed the imām is expected to lead the prayer in the hamlet's mosque and to supervise the islamic education of the children. The latter involves the imām in teaching the children how to wash for prayer and to pray, to memorise parts of the Koran, and to understand extracts from certain religious books. He also visits the sick and the dying, leads the funeral prayer, attends to the burials [1], is responsible for marriages and weddings and the

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1) He does not wash the bodies of the dead villagers because this is considered to be a task which would be detrimental to his status and so other mullahs, usually from outside the community, do this and receive as payments trousers and a shirt from the dead man's property.

naming of male children [1], and leads the prayer on days of religious festivals.

Some imāms, although this is not part of their duties, provide charms and amulets - against unfaithfulness, infertility, maltreatment, premature births, various illnesses, the evil eye, etc. - for those in need whilst others just rely for their therapy on blowing on the affected area or person and reciting from the Koran. The efficacy of such actions and amulets is rarely questioned and nearly all the inhabitants of Afghaniya have amulets around their necks or wrists or attached to their clothes. Young children are particularly liable to have them strung around their necks or pinned to their caps - the evidence of anxious mothers - but even animals [2] and fields have them as do prominent men as protection from bullets and knives. The manufacture of such charms and amulets, however, is not a monopoly of the imāms although those of the imams are generally considered to be the most efficacious and are therefore the most called upon. Laymen also may acquire 'permission' (ījāza) to pass on the protection guaranteed in specific charms and formulas to those who require them. In the Pachoghan valley, for example, scorpions, snakes and hornets are considered to be especially prolific and formulas against poisonous bites in general, therefore, especially necessary. Descendants of those holy men whose shrines have proved particularly effective against scorpions and snakes etc. come to the Pachoghan valley and there either cure people who have been bitten or give others the permission, for a small sum (20-50 Afs.), to memorise and subsequently utilise the formulas (mantar) to heal other members

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1) Boys receive their names from their parents but these have to be approved by the imams as being good muslim ones. The imam also recites the call to prayer, the 'azan', into the boy's ear on three successive days after his birth. Girls neither have the azan recited nor do the imams concern themselves with the islamic content of the girls' names.
2) With the exception of donkeys which are considered unclean!

of the community [1]. Amulets or charms which contain quotations from the Koran, however, remain the monopoly of the imāms.

In return for the charms and amulets separate payments are given by the individuals concerned whereas for the official services, outlined above, the imām receives quantities of grain and money. In the case of food if the imām is single or without his family then he is given a room in the mosque and the families in the hamlet take turns in providing him with three meals daily. If he comes with his wife and children then they are usually given rooms in one of the qalās and their food requirements are met by the members of the hamlet. In the case of grain payments these are given to the imām on two occasions in the year - after Ramadan and on the completion of the harvest. The Ramadan payment is called 'sarsāya' and consists of one 'charak' (ca. 2 kgs) of wheat from each man, woman and child in the hamlet. After the harvest the imām receives from each household 2-5 charak (4-10 kgs) from every xarwār (560 kgs) of wheat, barley, maize and rice harvested. As may be seen this is very much less than the 'tenth' ('ashur') which is usual and which is generally given in other Pakhtun areas for the imāms and the poor [2]. This was in its extreme form, i.e. 2 charak, the result of the drought and the poor harvests but as it had been practised on the more generous but still small level prior to this period it was undoubtedly a long term consequence of the overpopulation and minimal size of holdings. Finally money is given to the imāms on the occasion of circumcisions, weddings and funerals. Taken together the money and natural products provide the imām and his family with sufficient both to live on and to purchase extras. Whilst imāms in Afghaniya earn less than imāms

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1) I recorded a 'mantar' against poisons on my tape-recorder and as it had thus received 'permission' to cure people I also had to pay. No one, however, subsequently asked that my tape-recorder should cure them from a bite. In terms of 'post hoc empirical identification' the mantar was nevertheless a complete success because although my house, which had not been lived in for three years, had become a paradise for hornets and scorpions I was not bitten once.

2) In Uruzgan among the Atsakzai the imams go into the fields and harvest their portion of the crop themselves without hinderance from the owners. This is not permitted or possible in Afghaniya.

elsewhere for an area where overpopulation is endemic they are better off than the average owner-cultivator and thus generally satisfied with their lot.

What I have described in the last paragraph is the normal yearly payment for an imām. The agreement reached between the imām and the elders of a hamlet on the imam's appointment is however not a yearly one which must be renewed but a contract which lasts as long as both parties are satisfied with it. In many cases it becomes a hereditary office which is the preferred form and in accordance with the patrilineal ideology of the Pakhtuns. Some imām, however, are not able to balance on the fence of neutrality and are forced to depart whilst others are considered to be poor teachers or are suspected of being too familiar with some man's wife. They too are dismissed usually after the harvest when the yearly payment has been handed over. The number however of such cases is small and most imāms carry out their duties in a way which is to everybody's satisfaction.

Such accomodation and acquiescence to the wishes of others has coloured and formed the Safi's conception of the imāms. They look up to them as educated and knowledgable men but look down upon them because of their economic dependence and political impotence although the latter is forced upon them as a condition of appointment. They also consider them to be sexually inadequate the result, they say, of the mullahs spending too much time praying and too little carrying out their marital obligations. This does not prevent the Safi from, and is not seen as a contradiction in terms when, dismissing them for misusing their office to gain illicit access to Safi women. This anomaly is partly explainable by reference to the Safi's conception of political power. Power is primarily an expression of masculinity, of the successful show of manhood. The imāms because of their economic dependence and their enforced political neutrality are placed from the very beginning in a position where it is impossible to gain power. Lack of power means lack of masculinity and lack of masculinity carries with it the stigma of sexual

inadquacy. The reality of successful escapades with other men's wives, a cause for dismissal, cannot alter this picture in any way because it is not a demonstration of power but an indication of the opportunities granted by the office. Thus the imām is in the anomalous position of being judged on different occasions as both impotent and sexually too active.

The Safi Mullahs

The general situation of the Safi mullahs is quite different from that of the imāms because they, the mullahs, combine both education and intelligence with economic independence and the possibility for the achievement of political power. In spite of their obvious potential and the surprisingly large number of such mullahs in the community - every hamlet has at least two of them and in the hamlet where I lived, admittedly a small one, four from nine household heads were mullahs - their political effectivity does not normally extend beyond the hamlet boundaries and the real positions of influence are occupied by the maliks (elected leaders [1]) and the few large landowners when these are not one and the same men. This would seem to be the result of the very few leading positions available in the community and the more advantageous starting off point of the mullahs' main competitors, the maliks. Within the hamlets, however, mullahs who are also elders usually exercise more influence than do the non-mullah Safi elders because of their greater fluency, self-confidence and broader horizons [2]. They are active in disputes but less likely than the other Safi to utilise the customary procedures for reaching a settlement or bringing a conflict to an end. They prefer to make use of the facilities offered by the government representatives in Nijrao and are more willing to bear the costs and considerable inconvenience of such litigation. They nevertheless uphold traditional values in other spheres for example being good cultivators and extremely frugal. As a

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1) See below chap. 11 on Leadership.
2) This does not prevent them from being extremely bigoted in their beliefs and reactionary in their exegesis of the Koran.

consequence they usually have above average sized holdings and in times of drought and shortage do not have to reduce them through the sale of fields because they always have the possibility of working as imāms and acquiring a substitute income.

This they do, however, only in villages outside the community in areas where they are unknown. The economic dependence and subordination necessary for such a position would they say be unbearable in their own community and would lead, were they to be accepted, which as I have shown would be very unlikely, to a complete loss of face. They, therefore, are only willing to take up the position of imām in times of economic difficulty and then in villages away from the community and for limited periods of time. That they do not lose sight of the positive aspects of their education, for example, the ability to live through periods of hardship better than most members of the community, is evidenced by them always ensuring that at least one son goes away to become a pupil (tālib) of a mullah or Pir and subsequently to acquire the title of mullah himself. This must not mean that in future periods of shortage they will automatically become imāms. The modern trend seems to be for them to become truck drivers - a very prestigious occupation - or officials in Islamic courts. Whatever the case those Safi who acquire a mullah's training are generally more alert, more receptive to change and more able to make use of it than those Safi who remain within the physical and intellectual boundaries of Afghaniya.

7. RELATIONS AND DESCENT - GENEALOGY AND LINEAGE

In the last two chapters the various social categories and groups which are present in Afghaniya have emerged firstly in the presentation of the chronology of settlement and the acquisition of land and, secondly, in the outline of the agricultural and non-agricultural activities of the Safi and of those non-Safi professionals whose work is complementary to, or whose livelihood is dependent on agriculture. The varieties of such categories, the different relations which result from membership in them, the implications for economic success and social standing which stem from birth into them, etc., present a picture of diversity and some complexity. The thread which binds these diverse groups and categories together, which provides a certain corporality for the community, a certain order for relationships and a certain logic for the society is, however, neither time nor economics but is the descent and lineage structure. In Afghaniya the basis for this structure is provided by the largest single group in the community, the musawad Safi. These Safi are the descendants of the original founders of the community i.e. the taxti and see themselves as being related to one another through their common descent from musawad the founding ancestor of one of the subsections of the Safi tribe (see diag. 7 p. 121). Together these musawad Safi constitute a little less than half of the total population of Afghaniya (16 from 34 hamlets), are embraced by a common genealogy and are divided up into a number of major lineages (khels) and minor lineages. The eighteen non-founding Safi hamlets (the rāghli) have integrated themselves into the musawad Safi structure by conforming to the, for them, thoroughly familiar patrilineal ideology and lineage organization and by residing on the territory of the musawad Safi major lineages. Thus it is possible both to see the musawad Safi's structure as the model for the society and to speak about Afghaniya, however tentatively, as a community. We shall see in the succeeding chapters how other facts are necessary to complement and complete an analysis of the Afghaniya Safi's structure and organization but this

model provides one level of understanding and is used by the Safi themselves for explaining their society. In this chapter then the genealogy and lineages in Afghaniya will be considered in terms of their content and function and their ordering properties.

Genealogy and Lineage Structure

Elements and Content.

The Safi genealogy (see diag. 7 p. 121) has a depth of twelve to thirteen generations from the founding ancestor s̄af to the present living adult males. The origin of the name Safi is, as I have indicated in chap. 3, open to speculation. The popularly held belief in Afghaniya is that it comes from the arabic word 'ṣ̄af' meaning 'religiously pure'. Such an interpretation in a community where so many of its male inhabitants are mullahs is probably not surprising but this belief is also held by outsiders who point to the Safi's religious fanaticism [1] as proof of its pertinence. Apart from the objections presented above (see chap. 3) to such a theory an interesting and somewhat profane alternative for the cause of the purity was put forward to me by one Safi. He said that x̄alid b̄ab̄a, the real founder of the Safi tribe, had two wives with one of whom he did not wish to have sexual intercourse. This rejected and unloved wife nevertheless became pregnant by touching the cloth which x̄alid b̄ab̄a used for washing himself after intercourse. x̄alid was greatly enraged by her pregnancy because he thought that his wife had had an adulterous relationship. She prayed to God to help her which he did by sending the Prophet to tell x̄alid b̄ab̄a that his wife was 'clean' or 'pure', i.e. ṣ̄af. As a result the sons of this son became the Safi tribe.

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1) Exactly how this reputation arose I am not sure but it is a spontaneous opinion which outsiders have when the Safi are mentioned. It would seem to me to be based on experiences within Safi territory where the religiosity of the people is immediately apparent and on the large numbers of Safi mullahs both within and outside their tribal territory.

7. SAFI GENEALOGY



tribe	12	major lineage	9
major division	11	minor lineage	6
minor division	10	koranai	5

This story of an immaculate conception is particularly interesting in the light of the Safi's uncertain origin and may well represent an attempt to explain or to cover the tribal graft onto the Pakhtun ancestral tree. The Safi were not alone in this and the story compares favourably with that of the Ghilzai/Ghilji Pakhtuns whose progenitor was, according to tradition, not only a foreigner but also the seducer of a Pakhtun woman and the father of a child conceived prior to marriage [1].

Whatever the uncertainty surrounding sāf there is none involving his sons Gurbaz and wadir (see diag. 7 p. 121) who are the eponymous ancestors of the two major divisions of the tribe. Both these divisions have four minor divisions and in the case of the wadir, which is of relevance here, these divisions are the qandahāri, barizai, sinzai and musawad. This last son of wadir, musawad, ist the ancestor from whom four of the five major lineages or 'khels' of Afghaniya claim descent.

In spite of this real or alleged descent the community, as I have shown, is not named after this ancestor preferring to use sarboli or Afghaniya. Of course there is no cultural compulsion to take a lineage rather than a place name and other sections of other tribes also use place names to designate tribal segments. Nevertheless at this level of segmentation it is perhaps unusual and may be the result, although this was not discoverable, of the mixed nature of the population - probably more than 50 % of the inhabitants are not descended from musawad - and Afghaniya/sarboli's geographical position in relation to the non-Pakhtuns and to the Safi of Tagao. Whatever the reason the name musawad is not applied to the community and thus as far as Afghaniya is concerned the names of

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1) Such stories are not only confined in Afghanistan to the Pakhtuns. Jones (Jones, S. 1974. Men of Influence in Nuristan. pp. 129-133. Seminar Press. London.) presents an interesting one from Nuristan, the 'man who had no father'. He suggest that because the genealogical reality is not in tune with social reality a myth was necessary to achieve the desired social effect.

the major lineages or 'khels' are the first ones on the genealogy which also have a territorial significance (see map VII for khel boundaries).

These major lineages are piroz, bahadur, Haji 'arab, ṣāliH and maghdud. They are seen as being the sons of musawad although only four of them piroz, bahadur, ṣaliH and maghdud have become the founders of khels [1]. This is because Haji 'arab with only one surviving son - represented today by the hamlet of nizām xel - merged with bahadur to become the major lineage of Haidar khel. Why this happened it is impossible to say but such mergers are not unusual among Pakhtun tribes [2] and may have been in this case the result of an attempt to contain the expanding pirozai. What is interesting is that the union of bahadur and Haji 'arab was not followed by alterations on the genealogy to make nizām appear as a descendant of bahadur. These unions of numerically weak khels with stronger ones are not, however, prescribed as is shown by the case of ṣāliH khel. This khel, although like Haji 'arab only represented today by one hamlet, ṣāliH kuli, nevertheless has not merged with another major lineage but has remained independent - again no answer as to the cause was forthcoming. Both these cases would seem to indicate that the Safi genealogy is not changed or reorganised, at least at this level, as are patrilineal genealogies elsewhere to express contemporary social distance between groups but seeks to be a true reflection of historical events.

Such intentions are also evidenced by the existence in Afghaniya of a fifth khel which has not, as might have been expected, been integrated into the Safi genealogy as a sixth son of musawad. This khel,

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1) The term 'khel' is used very loosely by Pakhtuns to refer to agnatic descent groups varying in size from tribes to families. I have given it a specific meaning here for reasons of convenience but it must not be thought that this represents the only meaning of the term. The suffix '-zai', son of, may also be applied to such 'khel' groups but the fact that only one of the five khels in Afghaniya, pirozzai, uses the suffix -zai made 'khel seem preferable.

2) See Barth. 1965. Op.cit. p. 29.

audel khel, has a different origin a situation also indicated by their designation as rāghli. The khel's founding ancestor, 'abdul, was a Safi nomad [1] who purchased and settled on land in the south-west corner of the community (see maps VI & VII). He is said to have had seven sons of whom four died. The remaining three sons akbar, spin and tor became the founders of the three minor lineages in the khel.

Whilst the sons of 'abdul became the founders of the three minor lineages in audel khel, among the musawad Safi such founders were, according to the genalogy, great-grandsons. There is, however, uncertainty concerning the exact identity and order of the two men intervening between the major and minor lineage heads among the musawad-Safi, e.g. in diag. 7 p. 121 nazr and 'asmān, and it is possible that this represents what Peters has called an 'area of ambiguity' [2] i.e. an area where shortening of the genealogy could take place. There is also another area of uncertainty involving the minor lineage head and the ancestor immediately below him. However such shortenings seem unlikely in the light of the exactitude observed elsewhere and the differences in generational depths between audel khel and the musawad khels may just reflect the later date of arrival of the former.

All khels, therefore, are made up of a number of minor lineages whose founding ancestors are at a distance of one to three generations from the founding ancestor of the khel. pirozai has five minor lineages, Haidar khel three, ṣāliH khel one, maghdud khel seven [3] and audel khel, as I have mentioned above, three (see diag. 8 p. 125). These nineteen minor lineages have a depth of between five and six generations, a difference in length of genealogies which does

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1) In the province of Laghman and also in this area Pakhtuns who become detached from their tribal background but have Pakhto as their mother tongue tend, as I have indicated above, to claim membership of the Safi tribe. 'abdul's claim, therefore, may be disputed.
2) Peters, E. L. 1960. The proliferation of segments in the lineage of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica. pp. 40 & 41. JRAI. vol. 90.
3) I am uncertain about the correctness of this figure.

8. KHELS AND MINOR LINEAGES





not, I feel certain, come from the need to maintain, as in Cyrenaica [1], the fixed shape of the genealogy or to provide a place on the genealogy for the attachment and incorporation of proliferating segments. It results rather from the uncertainty surrounding the name and the exact position of the founding ancestors of the minor lineages and possibly from uncertainties about the generations between the founders of the minor and the founders of the major lineages.

This uncertainty, at least at the minor lineage level of Afghaniya genealogies, may be explained firstly by the practice of referring to some lineages not by the name of their founding ancestor but by the name of the hamlet where they are now settled. Such hamlets although founded by lineage members, and where they still form the majority of the population, have taken place names (for example in diag. 7 p. 121 'ziārat') rather than lineage names. This practice, interestingly enough, is more noticeable among the non-musawad Safi hamlets, i.e. the rāghli hamlets, than the musawad ones and possibly reflects the rāghli's weaker genealogical position. In such cases ancestors' names have been forgotten and are, therefore, not included in the genealogy. Secondly the existence within the lineages of local descent groups, 'koranai', has meant that the men directly below the lineage ancestor, when these were not heads of local descent groups, have lost importance and the heads of these 'koranai' are often shown and considered as being the sons of the lineage ancestor whereas in reality they are the grandsons.

Finally interest in maintaining the accuracy of the genealogy in general has been lost by all but the elders. Younger men, by contrast, have difficulty in naming correctly those generations preceding their grandfathers. This inability arises from the general decline in importance of descent formed groups and their replacement by groups whose formative mechanisms are marriage, self-interest

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1) Peters, E. L. 1960. Op. cit. pp. 35-42.

and propinquity.

These nineteen khel minor lineages are, of course, not the only ones in Afghaniya. There are at least fifteen others and these generally, like the musawad Safi lineages, form the core groups in the remaining fifteen hamlets of the community. I have written 'at least' fifteen lineages because most of these hamlets are composed of a number of lineages although one is usually numerically dominant. These lineages have a depth of four to six generations and would seem, therefore, to have modelled themselves on the dominant musawad Safi form because if they had not, and as they came later, then the number of generations between living members and the hamlet founder would be less.

Thus, in conclusion, all i.e. musawad and non-musawad minor lineages have a depth of four to six generations, generally constitute the majority of a hamlet's inhabitants and have a spatial expression which is the hamlet.

Forming parts of, and sometimes independent from and unrelated to these lineages are 'koranai' [1] or local descent groups. These groups take their names from the apical ancestors e.g. bāz etc. (see diag. 7, generation 5) who are between two and five generations from the living male adults. As a result of the different generation depths koranai vary considerably in size from the most elementary unit i.e. father and sons or groups of brothers to groups of twenty to thirty men (see diag. 9 p. 128). All hamlets have such varying sized koranai but the musawad and audel khel minor lineages generally have more extensive and, therefore, larger koranai groups than do other minor lineages.

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1) This is variously translated as 'family; dynasty, kind, generation; group, division, section' and is, like most Pakhto names for groups, a very general designation. It can, however, have a very specific meaning according to the context.

9. EXAMPLES OF KORANAI GROUPS



The eponymous ancestors of koranai are referred to as 'bābās' or fathers and the bābās of one minor lineage are usually talked about as being brothers and thus the sons of the founding ancestor of the minor lineage. Whilst some bābās are according to the genealogies the sons of the minor lineage ancestor the majority are not. This is indicated firstly by the varying generation range between members and ancestors from koranai to koranai which is not only to be found within different minor lineages but also within the same minor lineage. Secondly many hamlets have attached groups and families - attached here in the sense of living in the same hamlet - and these too have their bābās who cannot biologically or historically be seen as the brothers of the other bābās or the sons of the principal minor lineage ancestor in the hamlet.

The reason why these bābās should nevertheless be seen as brothers is, I feel, due to the continuing use of the patrilineal descent ideology to explain the relations which exist within and between koranai and within and between groups per se. The term brothers within Pakhtun society expresses unity, unity of interests, of possessions and unity when faced by external opposition. Thus the hamlet is visualised as being united through its bābās. At the same time brothers represent division. Brothers on the death of their father usually divide the inherited property and land which formerly was owned and worked collectively. The division within the hamlet can, therefore, also be indicated by the same term which expresses unity. Finally the sons of brothers are cousins and it is at this level that the opposition which was suppressed between brothers is socially permissable. Koranai are, therefore, also groups which oppose each other when their interests or members are threatened. Thus when villagers refer to the koranai ancestors as brothers and the sons of one ancestor they are not expressing a biological reality but a structural equality i.e. the level of segmentation is different but koranai are of the same order, and are implying that the behaviour and interaction of these groups is determined by the

strictures associated with groups founded by brothers and based on descent. Now the koranai are no longer the only groups in opposition because other groups formed by other mechanisms, as I will show below, are equally involved in this function. Nevertheless most people of the community still continue to see and explain conflict in terms of the opposition of descent groups.

Summary

In summary the genealogy and lineage structure in Afghaniya may be said to consist of the following elements. Firstly there are the descendants of musawad. These men are grouped into four major lineages or khels whose heads are considered to be brothers and the sons of musawad. Each of these major lineages is in turn made up of a number of minor lineages the eponymous ancestors of which are seen as being the great grandsons of the khel heads. These minor lineage ancestors have, in the majority of cases, given their names to the hamlets in which their descendants now live and where they, the descendants, usually form the largest section of the inhabitants. Within these minor lineages are local descent groups or koranai whose ancestors or bābās are at varying (two to five) generational distances from the living adult members. These bābā are in turn regarded as being brothers and the sons of the minor lineage ancestor.

Secondly there are non-musawad Safi [1] who have either adopted the organizational form of the dominant musawad Safi or, as such an organization represents the Pakhtun cultural norm, have integrated themselves into a system which was from the very beginning completely familiar to them. The largest single group of such people is represented by the audel khel. They have three minor lineages formed from the descendants of the three sons of 'abdul.

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1) Whether they were originally Safi or not is not clear as we have seen above in Chap. 4. Now at least they are considered as such.

Another although unrelated group is formed by people who arriving at different times settled down in various parts of Afghaniya on the land which they had bought from individual musawad Safi. These people are also organized into minor lineages which in most cases are indistinguishable from their musawad-Safi counterparts except that they do not belong as far as descent is concerned to a larger inclusive major lineage. They too have founded hamlets and some have taken the name of the lineage ancestor as the hamlet name whereas others have taken place names. Some of these hamlets are made up of a number of minor lineages the result of simultaneous or later settlement. This, however, does not represent an innovation as some musawad Safi hamlets also have attached non-musawad Safi lineages within their boundaries. All these minor lineages have, as do those of audel khel, koranai groups and thus one may see the musawad-Safi organization with its koranai, minor and major lineages reflected at each level by similar groups formed from people who settled in Afghaniya at later dates.

Finally nearly all hamlets have attached groups and families who have either purchased or married into land. Some of these groups are numerous and strong enough to form independent koranai and others are not. Whatever the case they also are integrated into a system whose blue-print is the musawad-Safi genealogy with its variously sized descent groups.

Genealogy and lineage functions

Genealogy

One function, therefore, of the musawad genealogy is that it acts as a descent charter which organizes all the inhabitants of Afghaniya into a series of descent groups. Whilst this function has remained unchanged other functions have been affected by, among other things, the impingement of the central government on the community's affairs

although it is more than probable that Afghaniya's lineages have never fulfilled those functions which lineages have performed in segmentary societies elsewhere. Nevertheless certain functions still remain which are of vital importance to Afghaniya society.

One such function is to give a 'relative chronology for migration and conquest history' [1]. I have already discussed this aspect above (chap. 4 p. 39) and will, therefore, only mention it briefly here. The musawad Safi genealogy indicates that the original settlement of Afghaniya occurred some nine generations ago, i.e. at the level of the major lineages. All the men who are descended from these five ancestors are, as we have seen, referred to today as the 'taxti', or original settlers. The other members of the population who do not appear on this genealogy, i.e. audel khel and the other fifteen hamlets, are spoken of as the 'rāghli' (newcomers) and the groups and families attached to hamlets as the 'ajnabiyān' (strangers). Whilst such a distinction does not bring any material advantages for the taxti it does imbue its holders with a certain prestige as the founders of the community [2].

The genealogy also indisputably links the musawad Safi with the rest of the Safi tribe whereas other members of the community although claiming Safi identity cannot prove their links. This again increases the status of those men included in the genealogy and gives them the prestige of belonging to a famous tribe [3]. They have the feeling of historical continuity and of having taken part in great events [4]. This greater prestige and status expresses itself - although cause

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1) Barth. 1965. p. 25.
2) Analogous perhaps with Evans-Pritchard's 'aristocratic clan' among the Nuer whose 'predominance gives prestige rather than privilege'. Evans-Pritchard, E. E. & Fortes, M. 1946. African Political Systems. p. 287. Oxford University Press. London.
3) Here I mean famous in a Pakhtun sense of participating in innumerable disturbances, uprisings and rebellions.
4) Two of the more recent 'great events' in which the Safi played an important part where the deposition of Amanullah (1929) and the Safi revolt (1947-1949).

and effect are here very difficult to identify with certainty because of the other factors involved - in their more frequent functioning as arbitrators and in their place at the top of a community ranking system (see diag. 10 p. 134). Seen separately this attribute of genealogical membership would seem to have little significance. Its importance emerges, however, when looked at in conjunction with the prestige which accrues from being the descendants of the original settlers as mentioned above and the descendants of the original owners of the land and water in the community as will be shown below.

The land and water in Afghaniya as we have seen were originally divided among the ancestors of the musawad Safi so that each household head received an equal share of the total land and water. On the deaths of these men their shares were divided equally among their sons, a principle which continues to be followed, so that today each adult male has a part of the original share given to his major lineage ancestor. As brothers divide the land of their fathers the fields of brothers are closer to each other than they are to the fields of other agnates (see map IX p. 242). Similarly the fields of members of one koranai will be closer than those of two individual koranai. This will also be true at the minor lineage and the major lineage level at least theoretically. Thus lineage groups of different sizes are associated with differently sized territories and the lineage structure of society also involves a lineage structure of space.

Such a system, however, can only exist under ideal conditions and in the absence of land sales. As we have seen the raghli and the ajnabiyan obtained land in Afghaniya through purchase and marriage and they also established themselves in independent hamlets or attached themselves to taxti hamlets. Thus hamlet lands ceased to be owned exclusively by one lineage and became the property of a number of lineages or groups, and khel lands became the summation of taxti and raghli hamlet lands. A process was set in motion which removed the emphasis, at least in terms of land ownership, from the

10. COMMUNITY RANKING SYSTEM

owner-cultivators	musawad Safi	(taxti)	1
share-croppers	other Safi	(raghli)	2
	.. ..	(ajnabiyan)	2
priest	mullah	(mullā)	3
craftsmen (kusubGar)	carpenter	(najār)	4
	smith	(lohar)	4
	weaver	(jolā)	4
	potter	(kulal)	4
	cotton-carder	(nadāf)	4
barber	barber	(dum)	5

The weaver, potter and cotton-carder are only temporary residents in Afghaniya. The weavers are Parachi from the upper Pachoghan valley, the potter is an itinerant who arrives in Afghaniya at the beginning of June and stays for about two months, and the cotton-carders come from Tagao in autumn.

minor lineage to the hamlet community and thus from descent to propinquity. Nevertheless people still tend to explain ownership in lineage terms and to support their arguments by pointing to the inclusiveness of the khel concept which incorporates all hamlet lands and not just those of the taxti. Thus a certain prejudice in favour of lineages remains as does the descent ordering of space.

The spatial representation of descent is also observable in the hamlets of the community where qalās are ordered generally according to the closeness of agnatic relations. Such a situation arises from the necessity to build new qalās on land belonging to the new qualā owner. Thus, for example, if a son builds a new qalā after the division of the land between himself and his father, then he does so on to, or close to, the old qalā from which he has segmented himself and where he also has a portion of land. Subsequent expansion follows a similar pattern so that brother builds next to brother and cousin to cousin, etc., and the qalas of a koranai form a group as do those of a minor lineage (see map VIII p. 136). Thus theoretically at least one's closest neighbours are also one's closest agnates and within the hamlet the greater the physical distance between neighbours the greater is the structural distance on the genealogy.

In practice the situation is not quite as clear cut. In the larger and older hamlets the lack of space in the centre of the hamlet has forced some men to build on the outskirts and thus away from their closest relatives. In such cases physical proximity and closeness of relationship are not one and the same thing. Such a movement, i.e. away from the hamlet centre, however, can also lead to the creation of proto-hamlets because expansion there is unrestricted. This will inevitably produce hamlets whose buildings are also distributed according to the closeness of agnatic ties.

More significant numerically and for the descent composition of





VIII Relationship between qalā Location and koranai Membership

hamlets are the qalās of strangers. Strangers who buy land in Afghaniya also construct, as I have indicated above, new qalās there and whilst some build on their newly acquired fields away from the hamlets the majority prefer to erect their homes within the hamlets. This means that the indigenous villagers acquire neighbours who are not only not agnates but are usually in no way related to them (see map VIII p. 136).

Finally alterations in the spatial/genealogical syndrome may occur when, for example, the course and width of irrigation ditches are changed or when shops or mills are built. In map VIII , the mill was moved from the western end of the hamlet to the east because of difficulties and disputes over the water which had to be lead through the centre of the hamlet. The mill also ceased at the time of the move to be a hamlet owned one and became privately owned. The new owners, members of the wali xān koranai, subsequently built new qalas near their mill and thus isolated themselves from their koranai. Their nearest neighbours, as may be seen from map VIII , are not their nearest agnates but consist of two strangers and one qalā from the bāz koranai.

Such changes to what might be called a basic design of hamlet composition have not altered the Safis conception of their hamlets. They see them as being composed of the descendants of one man or of his sons, the heads of koranai, and consisting of a number of qalās so placed that the closest neighbours are also the closest agnates. The consequences of such a view, i.e. of one based on a patrilineal ideology have been that the concepts 'neighbour' and 'agnate' have become interchangeable [1]. Thus strangers who settle down in the hamlets become neighbours and as a result are treated in certain respects like agnates.

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1) I am not referring here to the term 'hamsaya' (neighbour) because this implies quite a different relationship i.e. one of subordination. I mean the general category 'xpulwān' (like oneself, one's own, cousins etc.) which is used by a member of a hamlet about other members.

The genealogy, of course, does not only order qalās and large blocks of land but is primarily used as a record of land ownership and land inheritance with all that this involves in economic and social terms. Claims to land and disputes over land, for example, can generally only be made and solved by a thorough knowledge of genealogical relationships. This is particularly so in the absence of accurate land surveys and the only partial registration of land holdings. A common complaint heard from men who returned to Afghaniya after working for some years elsewhere was that they had had land but that it had become 'lost among our cousins'. This usually meant that the cousins claimed it, legally or illegally, as their own. When complaints were made to the judge in Nijrao then the investigation always began with a discussion of the genealogical relationship of the claimants and the divisions of land which had taken place since their separation from the ancestor who united them all.

Also as the ownership of land represents economic and political power the function which a genealogy fulfills as a charter of ownership is of vital importance for the political and economic aspirations of community members. It is, therefore, not surprising that men who have lost, i.e. sold, all their land, even though they may still live in Afghaniya, are not automatically included in the genealogies [1]. Similarly only men who have land and, therefore, by definition are placed on genealogies have the right to speak at jirgas whilst landless men although allowed to attend just listen to debates. Finally only men who have long genealogies are chosen as maliks, or leaders in the community and are sought out as arbitrators and members of marakas. Prestigious work, therefore, is closed to men who among other things are not placed on the recognised genealogies of the community.

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1) This became apparent to me when I asked about men whom I knew but who were not given by my informants as members of the genealogies.

Lineages

I have written so far more about functions which the genealogy fulfils and about rights or advantages which accrue from being represented on these genealogies than about the functions of lineages. This is principally because in the case of the larger descent groups, i.e. major lineage and minor division, they have rarely if ever acted as corporate groups in political action. It is clear from historical sources that the Safi used to come together in their thousands when occasion demanded [1] and it is probable although there is unfortunately no evidence to support this, that the units of these 'lakhkar' (tribal armies) were lineage based. Today there seems to be no occasion or reason for major lineages or minor divisions of tribes to unite in this way. This is largely because the presence of a modern, well-equipped and well-organised national army prohibits inter or intra-tribal warfare as a method of achieving political or economic ends [2]. It is also the result of the government's conscious efforts to reduce the powers of descent groups by dealing in administrative and legal matters with individuals rather than groups or, when the latter cannot be avoided, with maliks who because of administrative reform (see chap. 11) now represent electors and not, as in the past, lineages.

Whilst the minor division i.e. the musawad Safi level may not have acted corporately in the past, just as it does not today, it has a function in that it defines the social boundaries of the community.

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1) 'Macpherson, before returning to Cabul, made a short reconnaissance north of the Cabul river toward the Lughman valley and into the Tagao country inhabited by the fanatic tribe of the Safis. ... The little detachment on its march was suddenly met by the fire of about 1000 Safi tribesmen.' In: Forbes, A. 1892. The Afghan Wars 1839-1842 and 1878-80. p. 215. Seeley and Co. Ltd. London. See also above chap. 3. p. 31.
2) An exception is formed by the Pakhtun tribes in Paktia who still continue to fight among themselves. Government troops however now intercede when allowed to do so.

From the beginning of the thesis all references to Afghaniya have been to it as a community. This was, and is, justifiable for two reasons. Firstly the musawad Safi genealogy and lineage organization, the elements of the minor division, are utilised by the non-musawad Safi as the means by which they integrate themselves into the community. That was the established order which they found on their arrival and which they either married into or duplicated. One is, therefore, able to define the members of the community in terms of the minor division represented by the descendants of musawad and those who integrated themselves into this order of things. This is one communal boundary.

Secondly all descent groups in Afghaniya are associated with land and the more inclusive these groups become, i.e. a number of koranai constitute a minor lineage, the more inclusive is the territory owned by and considered to belong to them. Thus all the khel lands taken together represent the total land of the minor division/community and Afghaniya is given a territorial expression and boundaries. Such boundaries, i.e. those of membership and territory, are supported by the non-Pakhtuns and the government referring to the community as Afghaniya and the Tagao Safi referring to it as Sarboli. Otherwise the community is, of course, linked and divided by a multitude of relations and transactions with the 'outside world' so that administrative, economic, tribal etc., boundaries run through, overlap and criss-cross in Afghaniya. The community, however, remains.

In the case of the smaller descent units the minor lineage could and most probably did act as a corporate group in the past. Today, however, its functions have been taken over by the hamlet which, as I have indicated above, is not only formed from minor lineage members but is in some cases a combination of minor lineages, and in others, minor lineages plus groups and families. Thus the principal factor which now holds all members of a hamlet together is common residence and not common descent although this of course

continues to be of importance. Even in those hamlets where all the members are descendants of one eponymous ancestor the bonds formed by propinquity are just as important for purposes of solidarity as those of descent. The occasions when hamlet members need to unite as a group to protect their interests or members are rare and arise generally from disputes over water. In spite of the paucity of these political functions the significance of the hamlet for the Pakhtuns is very great and it forms in a number of areas the main focus of their attentions and loyalties as will be shown in greater detail below (see chap. 10 pp. 254-261).

The smallest descent group of all, the koranai, fulfilled very definite functions in the past the most important of which were the obligations to exact vengeance, to engage in common defence, and to accept the possibility of death in vengeance. As I will discuss this group in greater detail below (see chap 10) it is perhaps sufficient to say here that the extension of the central government's power into Afghaniya has through its partial elimination of revenge killings removed the principal bond which held the koranai together. Its significance today, therefore, is waning and some of its secondary functions are being carried out by other groups formed on other principles. Nevertheless because it is still linked in the minds of most Pakhtuns with the defence of honour and thus with the highest attributes of the Pakhtun culture in general its decline is very gradual and, therefore, of all descent groups it still has functions and political significance.

Value as judged by the Safi

Finally the genealogy and lineages function as a system of organization which is used by the members of the community to explain and, to a certain extent, to judge their society. They see their society as being organised in this way because firstly, as I have shown above, the genealogy and lineages act as charters of

settlement and of the ownership of land and water, as well as transmitting property and jural, political and social status. Secondly they are the basis of what might be termed a patrilineal ideology something which is not only shared, although to a lesser extent, by the Safi's non-Pakhtun neighbours but is also stressed and upheld by Islam. To a certain extent, therefore, the genealogy and lineages are a system which has been called a 'native' or 'folk' model but which also has elements of what Ward has termed an 'ideological model' [1], i.e. elements of an ideal form of behaviour or organization which are used as yardsticks for measuring actual behaviour and organization. In the case of the Safi this ideological model is not based on Safi but on Pakhtun ideals which place the greatest emphasis on agnation and its attributes and the Pakhtun code or custom. Thus when people are asked to explain a situation to an outsider they will usually do so in terms of these ideals and then perhaps later concede that in fact the persons or groups were acting on different principles. When talking about or discussing a problem among themselves they will refer to how a person should have acted using generally accepted Pakhtun norms and then how he did in fact act in terms of a changed state of affairs brought about in their own society by agricultural shortages, government intervention etc. As the latter behaviour is perfectly understandable to them they do not condemn it, on the other hand they do not regard it as especially honourable and a man who in spite of these changed circumstances acts in accordance with Pakhtun ideals is assured of considerable prestige in the community even if he should face difficulties outside it.

Such attitudes would seem to benefit the musawad Safi the most because they are the group which most nearly approximates to the ideal. Whilst this is true within limits the raghli and ajnabiyan also accept the values of a patrilineal culture and all that that involves.

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1) Ward, B. 1968. Varieties of the conscious model. p. 135. In: The Relevance of Models for Social Anthropology. Ed. Michael Banton. A.S.A. Monographs 1. Tavistock Publications. London.

They, therefore, cannot deny the significance of something which they themselves value in spite of their reluctance to imply that the taxti are in any way 'better'. Thus the genealogy and lineages represent for all the members of the community an ideological model of worth which is used to explain their society, to measure the activities of its members, and to define its boundaries.

8. RELATIONS AND SPACE - THE FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD

The patrilineal ideology also influences and impinges upon many other elements of Safi society. Concepts which are present in the order represented by the genealogy and lineages are also to be found in the familial and economic fields so that both the form and the content of the family and household are affected. This may be seen in the association which the Safi make between the elementary family and the fireplace (nagharai) and the extended patrilineal family and the qalā. Thus the propensity among them, as we have seen in the last chapter, to see the lineage structure of society reflected in a lineage structure of space is paralleled by their placement of kinship groups in spatial frameworks. The destruction of these physical boundaries would or should represent a rejection of their conceptual content, i.e., the repudiation of the patrilineal ideals and order. This is, to a certain extent, what is now happening in Afghaniya. The patrilineal extended families are breaking up and their physical setting the large, many roomed qalā is splitting and segmenting - processes which admittedly have always been taking place but not on the same scale and with the present frequency. The elementary family has become the most prevalent family form and the fireplace the centre of individual rather than group interests. Thus there is a reduction of both space and relations towards a minimum represented by the elementary family and the one fireplace house. In this chapter, therefore, I will be concerned with the activities and the relations within family groups and with the repercussions these relations have on the groups' physical surroundings.

The Elementary Family / Household

The 'ideal' family in terms of the patrilineal ideology and Pakhtun thought in general is the 'patrilineal extended family' and is made up of the head, his wife or wives and their children plus adult sons, their wives and their children (see diag. 11 p. 145). This type of

11. FAMILY COMPOSITION

	No.	%	
1. Hu & Wi	27	14	elementary families
2. Hu & Wi & Chi	94	49	
3. Hu & Wis & Chi (polygynous)	2	1	
4. Hu & Wi & Chi + Sos & Wis & Chi	18	9	patrilineal extended families
5. Hu & Wis & Chi + Sos & Wis & Chi (polygynous)	1	0.5	
6. Hu & Wi & Chi + HuMo/FaWi	16	8	elementary families with additions
7. Hu & Wi & Chi + HuFa	2	1	
8. Hu & Wi & Chi + HuBr/HuBrWi	11	6	
9. Hu & Wi & Chi + WiBr	2	1	
10. Hu & Wi & Chi + BrWiBr	1	0.5	
11. Hu & Wi & Chi + HuSi	1	0.5	
12. Widow (er) & Chi	6	3	incomplete families
13. Single Man + Mo	5	3	
14. Brothers	6	3	
15. Sisters	1	0.5	
	193	100 %	

family constitutes in Afghaniya, as one may see from diag. 11, only 10 % of the 193 families in the ten hamlets from which I collected statistical information. The most usual family form in terms of frequency of occurrence is the 'elementary family', i.e. husband, wife/-es and children, with 64 % of all families and if the 'elementary families with additional members' are added they constitute together 81 % of the total. This would seem to indicate a very wide dichotomy between actual Safi practice and the Pakhtun ideal. The picture is somewhat "ameliorated' by the statistics for household composition (see diag. 12 p. 149) which show that some 47 % of the families live together as groups of families in the same house and thus preserve to varying degrees - depending upon the degree and extent of political solidarity and economic cooperation etc. - the ideal of an extended family. Nevertheless even when this is taken into consideration 50 % of the households are elementary family ones and the trend is towards the creation of more independent elementary families in economic, social and spatial terms. This is caused principally, as I will show below (see p. 150), by the poverty of the area and the consequent loss of authority by the patriarch. As a result only a rapidly diminishing number of men are still able to hold their extended families together whereas the majority are helpless to prevent the splintering of their extended families into a series of nuclear ones.

The Typical Family Form

The typical Afghaniya family form, therefore, is made up of groups whose members consist of husband and wife (14 %) with children (50 %) and the husband's mother (8 %) and/or father (1 %), i.e. all in all 73 % of the families. This family form is not referred to by the Safi as 'family' (koranai) because, as I have indicated above, this word is used for descent and/or revenge groups. Instead they speak of such and such a man, i.e. the family head, as having a separate 'fireplace' (nagharai). Thus they see the family as that group which gathers around a fireplace, or hearth, and place more

emphasis, at least semantically, on location than on the relations between members. Such a view of the family seems to have arisen for the following reasons.

One is that in the past the normal form of residence for Pakhtuns was the qalā, the fortified house, where the extended family made up of a father, his sons and their families or, a group of brothers and their sons lived. In either case the families were dominated and presided over by the eldest living male. This group was and may still be called 'koranai' [1] i.e. agnatic descent group, and its members formed a social, political and economic entity. The smaller units, the elementary families, within the koranai were only, or principally, distinguishable by their separate fireplaces where food was prepared and cooked. As the 'family' was the koranai these elementary units could only be termed 'hearths' or 'fireplaces' i.e. named after the places where they had a spatial if not a social expression. Today in spite of the decline of the extended family household form (46 % of the households) and the increase in the numbers of elementary family households (50 %) the term 'nagharai' has been retained and is also used both for the elementary family household and for the elementary families in extended family households.

Another reason for emphasizing the location rather than the relations between members is that food is not only prepared and cooked at the fireplace but is, in the absence of guests [2], also consumed there. Such an activity would not be of significance were it not one of the few performed by all the members of a family. Economically there is a sexual division of labour in public and private, politically the

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1) The 'koranai' is not of course only restricted to extended families living in qalas but, as I have shown above, can and does include groups formed from a number of extended families and qalas whose members are united through a common eponymous ancestor.
2) Male or female guests are entertained separately, the women eating in the kitchen and the men in the guestroom.

family's functions are confined to the adult males alone, socially its activities never involve all its members, daughters never belong to it but are the 'ash of another's fireplace' and the sons are the potential founders of new and separate families. Thus commensuality, even if the wife and young children eat after the husband and adult sons, is one of the principal characteristics of the family and the fireplace is the expression of this commensuality.

According therefore to my interpretation of the material the term fireplace/nagharai came, as a result of these various processes, to be associated with the elementary family. Such an association has of course the further implication that the woman as the preparer and cook of the food and the mistress of the fireplace is located unequivocably at the centre of the elementary family.

Thus within the family it is the woman who is its focus and its symbol [1]. Within the household, i.e. within the productive unit, on the other hand her position is somewhat different as will be shown below. First, however, it is necessary to look at the household in general.

The Household

The statistics for household composition (see diag. 12 p. 149) show

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1) This attitude became clear to me at the very beginning of my field work when I proposed to rent a house. Whilst the Safi considered the actual renting to involve no problems as long as it was in somebody else's hamlet the project of living in the house seemed to them to be doomed to failure as I had no woman with me. Without a woman they said the house would be cold and dirty and there would be no warm food or tea. In fact a worthwhile existence would be impossible. To a large extent they were right especially as far as bread and water were concerned. Only women know how to bake bread well, or at least bake it at all, and as this is the staple food such an activity is of considerable importance, and only women bring water. As a result until I could find a family to bake bread for me I was forced to do without it and until I could get somebody else to fetch water I had to bring it myself much to the amusement of the men of the hamlet.

12. HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION

	No.	%
1. Hu & Wi & Chi + HuMo + HuBr + incomplete families	56	50
2. Fa + Sons	13	12
3. Fa + Da	2	2
4. Brots	19	17
5. Brots + Sons	8	7
6. Brots + FaBrSo	2	2
7. Brots + FaBrSo + FaBrSoSo	1	1
8. Brots + FaBrSoSo	1	1
9. Brots + FaBr	1	1
10. Head + FaBrSos	2	2
11. Head + BrSo	2	2
12. Head + WiBr	1	1
13. Head + FaBr	2	2
14. Head + SiSo	1	1
	111	101 %

Developmental Cycle of Household Forms



that 50 % of the households are made up of elementary and incomplete families, 46 % of patrilineal extended families and 4 % do not fall into either category. What is surprising about these percentages, as I have indicated above, is that the ideal Pakhtun household consisting of a number of elementary families living in a single qalā and headed by a patriarch, what I have termed, the paternal or fraternal extended family, now constitutes the minority household form. This form has been replaced, at least in popularity, by the elementary family household, a development which according to my older informants and to the information which I collected elsewhere is relatively new but one which is steadily gaining ground.

The major reason for this would seem to be the diminishing authority of those household heads who have little land and who are no longer capable of holding their extended families together. As a result new elementary families instead of remaining within the father's household/ qala have set up separate households themselves. This situation has been created by the poverty resulting from overpopulation and the fragmentation of landholdings into segments too small to provide sufficient for a family's subsistence. As patriarchs of extended families, apart from having ascribed status from their positions as family heads, also have prestige from their possession and control of property and land the decline in their wealth has also brought with it a decline in their status and prestige. This deterioration is not confined to external relations but is also an aspect of relations within the family. Sons become discontented because their fathers cannot find wives for them or because they have to wait longer than their contemporaries before they can marry. They are also dissatisfied because they know that their inheritances will be even smaller than those their fathers' received and their future status will be prejudiced. This can lead to quarrelling and disputes especially if the fathers seek to better their own fortunes through gambling or sell land to pay debts. 'Poverty', as Mayer says, 'weakens the authority of the head of the household - and the reciprocal obligations of obedience and

respect fall away' [1].

Parallel to this development is the increasing independence of those sons who have sought paid labour outside the valley and it is of course the sons of impoverished fathers with minimal holdings who seek such work. This new independence combined with their fathers' loss of authority has not only meant that they are able to have some say in both the date of their marriage and in the person of their future spouse - both formerly prerogatives of the father - but they are also able to demand and ultimately to finance a greater degree of spatial freedom. This has resulted either in the division of the father's qalā so that an exclusive section is available for the son and his family, the addition of a new section onto the existing building, or the construction of a new qalā. In all these cases an impoverished father is usually in no position to prevent the fragmentation of his extended family. A wealthy father on the other hand retains his control and the obedience and respect of his sons because he has the prestige and the means to enforce his wishes and to preserve the ideal of an extended family household.

This does not mean, of course, that in the 46 % of what I have termed patrilineal extended family households complete harmony reigns. In many of these households there are tensions between the elementary family units and between individual members which create not only social divisions but also physical ones. I will go into this subject in greater detail below (p.156 f) but perhaps it is sufficient to say here that the plasticity of the construction material in qalās [2] has meant that these social differences can have

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1) Mayer, P. 1970. In: Introduction p. XXV of Socialization - the Approach from Social Anthropology. Ed. P. Mayer. Tavistock Publications. A.S.A. Monographs 8.

2) Qalās are made of mud mixed with chaff for the walls, floors and roof, and wood for the doors, window frames and roof supports. The ease with which the material can be made and its cheapness mean that once the original costs for the qala have been met (small qala 7-10, 000 Afs., large one 20-25, 000 Afs.) alterations, in the form of new walls, partitions, extra rooms and enlargements in general, can be undertaken without difficulty. Social distance therefore may be very readily converted into physical distance.

a physical expression and that there is, as a result, considerable congruence between the social relationships in, and the physical structure of, qalās. Even in those qalās, therefore, where an ideal situation is considered to exist there are tensions which given a sufficiently strong impulse can lead to division and to the establishment of new households.

Such tensions do not seem to exist in the majority of newly founded elementary family households because, as I will show below, reasonable treatment by the man of his wife and his absolute authority mean that relations among all family members, at least until the sons become of marriageable age, are normatively ordered and stable. Contributing to this stability is the sexual division of labour and of responsibilities where both husband and wife are generally sovereign in their respective domains.

The Division of Labour and Authority

The man is involved with the work in his fields, i.e. with ploughing, seeding, harvesting, threshing and winnowing etc. as well as maintaining and using the irrigation system. If he has insufficient land himself then he will also be busy share-cropping the fields of his neighbours. In the winter and early spring when agricultural work is non-existent or slack the man usually hunts or spends most of his time sitting in the sunny and sheltered spaces (the petawi) which are the meeting places for the men of the hamlet. There discussions are held, problems touched upon, stories told, the actions of absent villagers criticised and card playing takes place. This is the Safi's equivalent of the Yusufzai's 'hujra', or men's house [1], with the difference that here the territory is neutral ground and membership does not reflect political groupings or fractions but only membership in the hamlet.

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1) See Barth. 1965. Op.cit. pp. 52-56.

Work and meetings do not however represent the limits of a household head's activities. He is also responsible for the settlement of debts, - paid principally after the harvest, - and for the purchase and sale of goods. Generally he sells grain or other agriculture products or exchanges them for household needs, for products he cannot produce himself (tea, sugar, sweets, cloth, shoes etc.), for farming equipment and for animals i.e. oxen, cows, sheep, donkeys, etc. Finally he can make debts and buy, sell or pawn his land. All of those activities are, with the exception of harvesting when the wives of poor men will also help, the sole responsibility of the heads of households.

Wives can and sometimes do criticise the decisions of their husbands. If, for example, a husband exchanges too much wheat for an inferior cow then the wife might be successful in getting this decision changed. She cannot, however, work her own fields nor can she make any kind of a contract without the consent of her husband. As far as her own activities are concerned she is more or less sovereign. She prepares the food, bakes bread twice a day, makes tea, cleans the qalā and the yard and washes dishes and clothes. She also feeds the animals, makes curds, whey, joghurt and ghi, collects fruit and nuts from the garden and makes clothes, cushions, pillows, blankets etc. for her family. Like her husband she too can make āshar (cooperative work) for those tasks which require a lot of labour, for example, separating the maize kernels from the cobs, cleaning the wheat and barley of stones or clay, and smoothing the floors of qalas with mud. She usually receives the help of her female neighbours for such jobs and repays them by working at their āshar and also by providing food and sweets at her own. Such occasions are of course also ideal for gossip and the exchange of news and represent the more pleasurable side of work.

Harvesting, threshing and winnowing on the other hand are not considered enjoyable because the wife's participation is an indication

of the poverty of the household and thus brings with it a loss of prestige. Finally the women as mothers are responsible for looking after the male children until they are old enough to run about themselves and for educating their daughters. This last task is particularly important because prospective spouses, or their walis, are interested in having 'well-educated' wives or daughters-in-law. A girl whose mother has died young and, therefore, has received little or no domestic education may have difficulty, unless she has other attributes, in finding a husband. Mothers, therefore, try to ensure that their daughters are proficient in all a woman's tasks. This is not too difficult because daughters are integrated into the household affairs and economy at a very early age. They look after the younger children and then start helping their mothers with those tasks which require extra labour. Daughters do not only learn how best to carry out those tasks assigned to women they also learn from their mothers what decisions women can make independently of their husbands. Wives are allowed to sell their surplus milk products as well as excess eggs, hens [1], fruit and that wheat which they have found on the fields after harvesting for jewelry and cloth. In other words in those areas of the economy where they alone are responsible they are given a certain latitude in the disposition of products providing that the household does not suffer through these activities.

The Patrilineal Extended Family Household

In the extended family households (46 % of the total) the sexual division of tasks (and responsibilities) remains generally the same but the existence of a number of families or fireplaces within the same household brings problems of competence and compatibility. The question of competence, i.e. as to which of the married adult males should make the decisions for the whole household, is usually

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1) All wives have one cow and a number of hens and/or ducks. In polygynous households each wife has her own cow and hens and a certain competitiveness arises between the wives aided by their respective daughters to produce and sell as much milk products and as many eggs as possible.

solved by the presence in the qalā of a 'kandidār' [1], an elder or group elder - the person referred to so far as the 'patriarch'. This person is either the father or the eldest brother although in the sense in which I will use this term initially it will be confined to the father because an eldest brother only in exceptional cases [2] has the power over his brothers that a father has over his sons.

The Paternal Extended Family Household

The Division of Labour and Authority

In such a household, i.e. where the father as kandidār has absolute authority, his sons work for him and thus the household is a productive unit. The sons receive in return, food, clothing - they must even ask for money for their wives' and children's clothing - and whatever extras they may need. They cannot themselves sell land, animals, or agricultural products nor can they purchase these things. They cannot make debts, arrange share-cropping agreements, nor invite guests to the house without the patriarch's prior permission. This, however, represents one extreme of a continuum of authority and although it constitutes the Pakhtun ideal form [3] it has become increasingly rare in Afghaniya.

More usual is a form of shared authority where the kandidār has the ultimate say in things but where the sons may nevertheless make decisions of their own, for example, when to plough or seed the fields and whether grain should be sold or not. The major decisions such as the sale of land still remain the prerogative of the fathers. Also when sons buy animals or sell grain it is usual for the seller

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1) Kandidār may also be spelt kāndidār or kandi dār. 'Dār' is a verbal noun meaning: possessor, lord, or master; and 'kandi' means: part, division, splinter, piece.
2) Such an exception would be where the younger brothers as half brothers, come from a different generation and are very dependent.
3) Newman (1965 op.cit. p. 15) writing about Pakhtuns of the Tribal Territories of Pakistan considers this not an ideal but a norm. 'It is thus possible that during his (the Pathan's son) life, at no time, until his father dies, perhaps not then, that he may ever once exert what he considers his own will in matters that concern himself or those he considers his.'

or buyer to seek out the kandidār afterwards to see whether the contract was made with his knowledge and to ratify the agreement. Thus kandidārs who give greater freedom of choice and independence to their dependents nevertheless retain, as I have indicated above, the power of decision themselves and can always overrule a contract or decision made by their sons. Generally, however, as fathers and sons sit together after meals it is not difficult to know what the other is planning to do and unnecessary to alter or overrule decisions.

This range of authority from absolute to shared is to varying degrees reflected in the construction of qalās. An absolute kandidār eats together with his sons around one 'da star xān' (bread cloth) and the food is prepared in one kitchen by one of the wives - they take turns in planning, preparing and cooking the food - of the men. The number of rooms in this type of qalā is, therefore, limited but their size is greater than in other qalās because they need to cope with the larger numbers of members who use them. In qalās where authority is shared the men usually eat separately and the wives have separate kitchens and fireplaces. The qalā, as a result, is divided up into a number of rooms which reflect the increased independence of the various elementary family units. In some qalās the division may go so far that the only area which is held in common is the yard (see diag. 13 section 2 p. 161) and the unity of the whole, at least for the outside world, is expressed by the retention of a single main door through which all enter and egress.

Separatist Tendencies

Some sons and dependents find even this degree of unity unbearable and pressures build up, not only in those households where the patriarch has absolute power but also in those where power is delegated, for complete separation. Working against such pressures are first of all the social and legal powers which a father has. There is nothing in islamic law (shari'at) which compels the father to give his married sons greater freedom or to provide them with property

and land should they set up separate households against the father's wishes. However without such aid it is impossible for a son to finance the building of a qalā or to acquire land for his subsistence and so he is forced to obtain his father's permission. This he can only do through the good offices of his father's brother or mother's brother who act as intermediaries for him because a son is not allowed, by custom, to ask for separation. Should his request be refused then he can only seek to implement his plan by forcing his father to realise that separation is the only solution. This he does by taking up work elsewhere, by eating separately, by causing trouble, by fighting, by gambling etc. Some sons manage to achieve their ends in these ways but if the father is determined to keep his household united then nothing the son can do will force him to change his mind.

There are, of course, fathers who are prepared to grant their sons wishes, especially if they have other sons capable of looking after them, not because they have been put under pressure to do so but usually because they feel this would be the best for their sons. In such cases the separatist son receives a fraction of his household's land and property. If the family, for example, consists of a father and three sons, he would receive a quarter of the total money, household goods, animals and land. Once this division has taken place the son has, at least according to customary law, no further claim to his father's land and property even if this should subsequently increase in size and value. I was only able to record one case where this principle was not completely followed. This was because of the very considerable difference in the size of the property at its division and on the much later death of the owner and because the people affected appealed to the government's representatives in Nijrao.

Haji A, who felt that he had not long to live and whose six sons were intent on separation, divided what little land and property he had into seven parts. Five sons established new households and the sixth and

youngest remained, as is the custom, with his father to work and provide for him in what all thought would be his last few years. After this division Haji A had a run of good fortune, bought new land, obtained the usufruct rights to other fields, made a Haj and generally became, in Afghaniya terms, a wealthy and propertied man. At a very advanced age he quite suddenly collapsed and died and his youngest son after seeing to the funeral and burying his father in a manner concomitant with his father's newly acquired wealth and status inherited everything. The other five brothers being unable to acquire anything from him and, feeling that they had justifiable cause to make a complaint, formally did so to the Waluswal in Nijrao. After many difficulties they also received a little more land. The youngest brother, nevertheless, retained the lion's share.

The custom, therefore, that nothing more may be inherited after a division which takes place during the father's lifetime may be overcome but as this was the only case I was able to discover and one which was not completely satisfactory for the complainants then this stipulation may well also act as a brake to separatist activities on the part of sons.

Secondly another factor working against pressures for division and separation of the household is the political advantages accruing from household solidarity. Large extended family households are politically much stronger than elementary family ones because the latter can only form blocks when other households are also willing whereas an extended family household controlled as it is by one patriarch has a continuing and unvaried strength. This is particularly important in a community where political influence is still directly related to the number of persons a party can assemble at a time of confrontation. The creation of new households, therefore, leads to political decline which both the patriarch and other members are usually unwilling to countenance.

Thirdly separatist tendencies are often hindered by the realization that the division of the land which is a consequence of separation can bring economic phthisis especially if the original holding is only of medium size. In this case the division of the land would lead to the uneconomic working of the resulting small portions whereas the un-

divided land may be worked by that labour force which is necessary for its cultivation and excess labour can be employed to the benefit of the household elsewhere, for example, in Afghan Turkestan.

Finally the patrilineal ideology works to a certain extent against the fragmentation of extended family households. Islamic and Pakhtun ideals uphold the extended family and gossip and criticism are used against those members of the household who wish to be independent. The strength of such appeals, however, as I have indicated elsewhere, is rapidly diminishing.

Such factors ensuring unity during the life of the patriarch lose much of their strength on his death because their main support, the person of the kandidār, is gone. Sons who were willing to bow to the dictates of their fathers are not always willing to do so to the orders of their brothers. Segmentary forces, therefore, which were containable in the paternal extended family households become much less so in households of brothers and it is normally only a question of time before the fraternal extended family household splits to form a number of elementary family ones [1].

The Fraternal Extended Family Household

Nevertheless as may be seen from the statistics on household composition 29 % of the households are willing to stay together when

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1) Pakhtuns are of course not alone in this. Cohen (1965. Arab Border Villages in Israel, p. 50, Manchester University Press) for example writes 'In the past men continued to live in their father's household, even after they had been married, because the main source of livelihood, land, remained under the control of their father during all of his lifetime. But when the father died, it became increasingly difficult to observe equality as to duties and rights, between the constituent elementary families in maintaining a joint economy, and soon the household split.' Stirling (1965. A Turkish Village. p. 131. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. London.) also writes of Turkish villages: 'On the death of a household head, his sons are expected within a reasonable period to divide up the property between them and establish separate independent households.'

the father is replaced by an elder brother as kandidār. One of the reasons for this is undoubtedly to be found in the political, economic and social advantages, mentioned above, which accrue from the continued solidarity and unity of the household. Another is that the fraternal extended family household represents an interim or transitory stage of development through which households pass between the paternal extended family form and the elementary family one (see diag. 12 p. 149). There is, therefore, generally no clean break on the death of the father but rather a period, often lasting a number of years, during which the cohesive and devisive forces within the household seek supremacy.

The existence and progress of this struggle are obvious to all those who have access to the qalā in spite of the attempts of members to disguise it. This is because as relations deteriorate the heads of the elementary family units try to reduce the numbers of contacts between the families. Such attempts, however, are doomed to failure within the restricted space of the qalā unless they also involve a physical reordering of space. Initially the brothers feel that the construction of walls, the division of rooms and the building of new doors will suffice to reduce both contacts and tensions. Sometimes they do but the lack of contact also leads to the diminution of solidarity and to the strengthening of isolationist tendencies among the families. Thus social distance leads to physical distance and finally to total separation expressed by the division of the land and the construction of new elementary family qalās. The stages and processes briefly outlined here may, I think, be most adequately shown by reference to a case study which contains almost all the elements leading to division and which will show both the reasons for and the consequences of division.

Case Study

The qalā in question (see diag. 13 p. 161) belonged to A and B, the sons of X. On the death of X they had divided the qalā so that each had a living/bed room, a kitchen and a fodder/store room (see diag.















13. Relations in Space and Time : The Segmentation of Household

13 sect. 1). A small dividing wall, an extension of the wall dividing A and B's quarters, had been put up in the yard and in the summer the women cooked there. There was, therefore, in the 'common' land of the yard a place where some privacy could be achieved but also where meetings could take place without them having an official character. Two main doors lead from the qala one to the nearby hill pasture and the other to the spring where the animals were watered. The animals of both brothers were driven out of whichever door was appropriate.

The first major change (see diag. 13 sect. 2) in terms of relations and of construction occurred on the death of A when his three sons A1, A2, and A3 divided their section of the qala so that instead of having one living/bed room and a kitchen each had a separate living/bed room. The common kitchen shared by their wives, however, was retained but built anew on to the strengthened wall dividing A1, A2, and A3 from their father's brother B. Thus the three brothers achieved a degree of independence from one another, expressed their wish for continuing solidarity through the common preparation and consumption of food and increased the social distance between themselves and their paternal uncle B. B was still alive and his section of the qala remained unchanged.

This situation altered on his, i.e. B's death (see sect. 3). B1, and B2, the sons of different mothers, knocked down the wall between the kitchen and the living/bed room and erected two new ones so that each could have a living room with underfloor heating. A common kitchen where their wives took turns in cooking remained. The death of B, however, had not only altered the relations between B1 and B2, it had also removed the last living link between the two sets of cousins. A desire for greater privacy lead to the yard wall being lengthened and to a gate being inserted so that communications were possible but not uncontrolled. Relations between the cousins continued to deteriorate and finally the door was removed and the aperture walled over. The occasion for this change was the accusation by A1, A2, and A3 that the animals of B1 and B2, when they were on the way to the hill pasture, were fouling their section of the yard with their droppings and, because of the inattention of B1 and B2's children, were stealing hay from the fodder room when they passed. B1 and B2 replied much in the same vein and with additional reproaches regarding A1, A2 and A3's children. The gateway was blocked up and the brothers A1, A2 and A3 had a new exterior gate built so that their animals had access to the spring water. Both sides agreed to allow the other to use his 'gulkan' (the area around the walls of a qala from which clay for the building is taken) so that new paths which would have diminished the area of agricultural land would not have to be made.

The brothers A1, A2, and A3 who had been united in their opposition to their cousins B1 and B2 now found that their own problems, which had been in no way diminished but merely suppressed during the

period of opposition, came to the surface once more. The underlying cause for these problems was in the desire for greater autonomy but as this could not be openly expressed struggles took place over very minor events. Finally the situation was considered to be impossible and the brothers decided to divide their land which up to that time had been held and worked jointly. A3, the youngest brother, used the occasion of the division to become completely independent and built a separate qalā at some distance from his brothers (see diag. 13 sect. 4). A1 and A2 then redivided the rooms in their section of the old qalā so that each had a separate living room and kitchen. The relatively amicable period which followed did not last long. A2 who was also a mullah began increasingly to have difficulties with A1 and as he had little interest in his land he finally left his fields to be share-cropped by his brother A1 and went to work as an imam in another community. After a year, however, he returned because he said he was upset about the discord among the brothers. He then took up residence once more with A1. As he, A2, was prepared to accept A1 as kandidar a degree of harmony returned which persuaded them to reunify their land holdings and to share whatever income they received. A2 also sought a reconciliation with A3 and tried to bring him back into the qalā [1] but he refused and even withstood their later public criticism of his action and their mockery [2].

In the meantime the brothers B1 and B2 who had never been on the best of terms because of what B2 felt was B1's autocratic attitude quarrelled with one another about the behaviour of their respective children. B1, the elder brother, said that his wife had complained to him about B2's children urinating in the yard. B2 said that B1's children were inattentive and careless with the animals. The brothers, therefore, decided to erect a dividing wall in the kitchen so that each wife would have a separate kitchen for herself (see diag. 13 sect. 4). The wives, who felt themselves to be blameless, were greatly inconvenienced by this change because the individual kitchens were like passageways where, they said, one could hardly turn round. The alterations, however, did not stop there. As relations deteriorated and no occasion arose for the brothers to form a united front the devisive forces achieved the upper hand. A wall was built to divide the yard, the fodder and store room were divided, a new store house was built on to the qalā and finally the land was divided [3].

Shortly after this division B1 became ill and was unable to leave his bed for many months. In the spring when he was at last able to walk again he spent much of the time sitting on the hillside warming himself in the sun. From there he could contemplate his qalā and he compared the warmth of the hillside with the qalā where he had been ill and which depressed him. He, therefore, proposed to B2 that they

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1) A1 and A2 were rather embarrassed by the split because it not only weakened them politically but it was also, through A3's small and rather ridiculous qalā, obvious to all.
2) These three brothers are well educated and avid radio listeners. When A3 separated from them and built a new qalā they dubbed him 'Ian Smith' because of his 'unilateral declaration of independence'. This nickname stuck and caused other members of the hamlet considerable amusement.
3) p.t.o.

should build a new qalā on the hillside. This they did and in the process destroyed their section of the old qalā and used it for clay for the new one (see diag. 13 sect. 5). Thus from the original household of the two brothers there emerged four separate households consisting of three elementary families and one fraternal extended family. Also instead of one qalā three new ones were constructed. In one the family head, A3, is alone with his wife and children, in the second there are two brothers A1 and A2 who eat separately but who nevertheless share their combined income and the products of their joint land holding, and finally in the third there are two brothers B1 and B2 who still live in the same qalā but whose intercourse is reduced to a minimum and whose property and land are divided.

From the above case study a number of conclusions may be drawn about households based on brothers. The first is that in the absence of external pressures devisive tendencies are stronger than cohesive ones, although just in this case there was the unusual situation of a brother reversing a separatist decision and reunifying the extended family and household. Secondly the principal motive for division and separation, the desire for autonomy, is never expressed instead struggles between wives or trouble with the children, i.e. between affines or minors, are presented as the reasons [1] so that agnatic solidarity may be preserved. Finally the internal structure of the qalā is a relatively accurate reflection of the nature of the relations between the inhabitants.

The progression or cycle from elementary family household to paternal extended family household, to fraternal extended family household portrayed in this chapter is completed when the fraternal extended family household segments into a number of elementary

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3) B1, the elder brother, also felt that he was contributing more to the joint economy than B2. Division is, therefore, not only a question of satisfying a need for autonomy but it is also often a question of seeking economic advantage.

1) A situation not only confined to Afghaniya: 'Disagreements among women' and 'mistreatment of one another's children' are 'more often the occasion and excuse for fission rather than the cause'. Antoun, R. T. 1972. Arab Village. A social structural study of a Transjordanian peasant community. Indiana University Press, London. Similarly Mair (L. 1971. Marriage. p. 125. Penguin Books Litd., London) writes that wives are often used in patrilineal societies as the scapegoats for segmentation so that the pretence of agnatic solidarity may be upheld.

family households. Once the conflicting parties establish new and separate qalās the devisive or segmentary process stops, temporarily at least, until the competition between the fathers and sons or brothers in the individual qalās once more becomes overt and acute.

Prior to this stage, however, the physical and social distance between qalās is sufficient to allow individual development and to maintain and restore ties and contacts between the families of brothers. Thus the original competition and desire for division which was fostered within the confines of the paternal or fraternal extended family qalā is in the establishment of separate but neighbouring elementary family qalās replaced by ease of relations and solidarity. This is furthered by the requirements of mutual help - lending, borrowing, visiting, attending rites de passage, etc. - and whilst these may be demanding during times of economic difficulty (see below p. 256) they are also avoidable because of the physical barriers provided by the separate qalā.

Probably for this reason neighbourliness is regarded as a very positive relationship and is utilised, apart from strengthening agnatic obligations, to bind and integrate strangers and newcomers into the hamlet. These stranger neighbours are also categorised, as are agnates generally, as 'xpulwān' and will be supported in their disputes and struggles with members of other hamlets by men who are genealogically closer to their opponents than to their neighbours. The obligations of propinquity have in these cases become stronger than those of more distant agnation or descent. Thus the hamlet in terms of its components, the proximate qalās, achieves solidarity and its physical expression has a social expression. Also its physical boundaries mark social boundaries beyond which social obligations usually do not operate. However as the hamlet is also viewed as being a descent group, the minor lineage, it is difficult to assess, at times of opposition within the hamlet, which claims and which ties, i.e. those of descent or proximity, are, in any one particular case,

primarily responsible for solidarity. Generally, in disputes, both are utilised and the stress that is laid on one or the other depends upon the requirements of the moment and the assessment of whether an individual's support will be acquired more readily by an appeal to his agnatic or to his neighbourly obligations.

Hamlets are, of course, not only united by descent and proximity but also by ties of marriage so that a third element, that of affinity, enters into decisions made by individuals to support, oppose, or to remain neutral when conflict arises. This third element constitutes the content of the next chapter.

9. RELATIONS AND MARRIAGE - PROCEDURES, TRENDS AND FORMS

'Women are like the stones of a stream', i.e. they are without number and without value, and 'a daughter is the 'kuda' (transportable equipment of a household) of another person'. These sayings and similar ones always crop up when Safi discuss marriage in the 'petawi' or 'suri'. The superficial implications of these comments are clear: the supply of women is considered to exceed that of demand so that women are, materially and socially, without value; and women, as daughters, can never belong to their natal families because they are but temporary residents in transit, as it were, to their true destinations which are their conjugal families. The deeper significance of these statements is, however, much more difficult to uncover because when what the Safi say is compared with the social reality it is clear that they are contradictions. Women are never treated as if they were valueless but are confined, controlled and hidden and few activities are pursued and planned so carefully and few decisions made with such attention and weighty discussion as the giving of daughters and the taking of daughters-in-law. Also few objects which the Safi male possesses have as much monetary value as daughters and the acquisition of a good bride-wealth can never displease a rich man and can alter the fortunes of a poor man fundamentally. Finally men, as fathers, are just as interested, although there are exceptions, in the well-being and welfare of their daughters as are mothers - it is just expressed differently.

A possible explanation for the content of the comments about women, lies in disappointment: disappointment in losing a woman from the family, disappointment in the temporary nature of the relationship and perhaps also resignation that the daughter's ultimate allegiance belongs not to her agnates but to her future husband and sons. But it is also a product or response of a male dominated society. In Afghaniya, but probably in Pakhtun society as a whole, women remain a paradox to the men because in spite of their (the mens')

absolute authority, their possibilities for control and confinement, women continue to be in the last instance uncontrollable, unpredictable and the principal danger to agnation and to male dominated order. Perhaps it is because they wish to belie or belittle this danger that men comment so disparagingly about women in general and accentuate the outsider status or destiny of their daughters.

In this chapter on marriage and relations all these elements will emerge in the course of a discussion which covers marriage procedures, marriage preferences, marriage choices, advantages to be gained from marriage, marriage forms and finally dyadic relations resulting from marriage.

The Marriage Procedure

Islam itself places very few restrictions on possible marriage partners for a man or woman. Marriage is lawful between any muslim male and any muslim or 'kitabiya' [1] female of whatever age unless '(a) the man has four wives living, or (b) the woman has a husband living, or (c) the woman is in an 'iddat' [2] period after a previous marriage, or (d) they are within the prohibited degrees of relationship' [3]. These prohibited degrees may be summarised as follows: any ascendant or descendant to the third generation, any sibling of the father or father's father, any ascendant or descendant of a wife, and any ascendant or descendant of a divorced wife. Also a man may not have intercourse with and, therefore, not marry two women so related that if one were a male they could not have married. All other women are marriageable.

These prohibitions on marriage are comparable with those in the Old Testament [4] with one or two exceptions. Major differences

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1) A follower of a religion promulgated by a Prophet acknowledged in the Koran, i.e. Jew, Christian, Samaritan or some Sabaens.
2) A period of continence imposed on a woman on the termination of marriage in the interests of certainty of paternity.
3) Vesey-Fitzgerald, S. 1931. Muhammedan Law. p. 40. Oxford University Press. London.
4) See Leviticus XVIII 7-18.

arise between Islamic and Christian prohibitions through the stipulations in Islam that the partner can be of any age and that it is possible for men to have up to and including four partners at the same time. Thus the range of possible choices in Islam is considerable. However in spite of, or because of, this range of choice definite preferences are shown. This is not only true in my area of field work but muslim sentiment in general encourages both parallel and cross cousin marriage. In Afghaniya preferences are expressed both by those who will arrange the marriages and by those who will be the subjects of them.

Marriage Preferences

Senior Males

The senior males of households prefer to give their daughters to close agnatic relatives i.e. to the father's brother's son or failing this individual to other agnates or fellow villagers. One of the principles behind this is expressed in their saying "the soil of the bridegroom comes from the father-in-law's fireplace", i.e. the bridegroom's character is the same as his father's. If the father is one's own brother, another agnate, or even a fellow villager his character is known and trusted and in terms of their conception that 'blood and bone', i.e. agnation, is all important and heritable the son or bridegroom must be similarly endowed. The daughter is therefore passing into known and good hands.

Another principle is that of physical proximity. Both parents, but especially the mother, want to be able to see their daughter frequently, to be in a position to help her and to ensure that the life she is leading is not too hard or unhappy. If the daughter, therefore, is married within the hamlet visiting between her conjugal and natal houses can be easy and frequent. But as a woman's movements are very restricted - apart from fetching water she is hardly allowed to go anywhere without the permission of the male, i.e. father,

brother, husband etc., responsible for her - visiting from a hamlet or village which is distant from her natal one is difficult for her, troublesome for the men and, therefore, infrequent.

When taking a woman for a son the preference of the senior males i.e. for the physical proximity of the partner is the same as that for giving a daughter but the reasons for choosing her are different. They prefer a close agnatic relative, i.e. the father's brother's daughter, the daughter of another agnate, or in the absence of these the daughter of a fellow villager. One reason they give for this preference is the desire to make the relations between agnates or at least fellow villagers stronger. This is a principle generally followed by patrilineal societies where the inherent opposition and potential conflict of close agnates is to be countered by additional, affinal, connections.

Another reason given is the need to reduce possible problems over inheritance. They ensure by choosing a girl from within the hamlet that any land which she might inherit on the death of her father or husband will remain within the hamlet and not be alienated. Also the possibility of the loss of a male agnate from the hamlet is reduced by the principle of endogamous marriage because the groom would not follow his wife to her hamlet were she to inherit there. Although patrilocality - residence on the first marriage in the groom's father's house - is the rule in Afghaniya a man who acquires sufficient land through his wife's inheritence to make it worthwhile for him to move will take up residence in her hamlet.

These are the outward public reasons for preferring endogamy but there are also inward, private ones which emerge in Lévi-Strauss's terms from the logical order of the society. The Safi like all the Pakhtun tribes have taken over from Islam the central concept of the opposition between knowledge and feeling, between the mind or

soul and the body [1]. This distinction, expressed here extremely simply, has become - probably inevitably in a patrilineal society - associated with the oppositions male:female and thus the homology knowledge, rationality, mind etc., is male; and feeling, irrationality, body is female. The potential danger which this female, irrational sexuality represents for the males, for their honour, the legitimacy of their sons, their society at large etc., forces them to counteract it and to reserve its potency for their own uses through controls. Thus women in Pakhtun society and to a certain extent in islamic society generally are from the moment of their birth until their deaths or the achievement of asexuality in old age veiled, enclosed, confined and controlled by a series of men. This begins with the father, passes to the husband and descends to the son. In Afghaniya the situation is no different and the controls find their physical expression in the qalā where the women are confined and from where they really only emerge to exchange their fathers' qalās for those of their husbands. The woman's domain is thus the fireplace, house or qala, i.e. the inside and the enclosed, whereas that of the men is the outside, the fields, the meeting places etc. and therefore we may see, in symbolic terms, the female as the centre and the male as the periphery or boundary.

Access is, of course, allowed to the centre but only to those who are insiders, who are known and who present no risk. Such people are close agnates, women in general, barbers and to a limited extent and because of their low status and implied lack of masculinity travelling salesmen. Such persons and groups are controllable and because they generally observe the order of the society are controlled. The situation, however, only remains stable as long as marriages do not take place. Once this occurs the males are forced to remove the boundaries and to allow the outsider access [2]. This situation can be

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1) Ideas put forward and parallels made by Mr. D. H. M. Brooks in his 'Religion' lectures at the University of Durham (1975-1976).

2) 'In a patrilineal system of descent women are the door of entry to the group.' Douglas. 1970. Op.cit. p. 150

overcome if the choice of a husband is confined to a close agnate such as the father's brother's son because he is not an outsider but an insider. As such men are not always available then choices have to be made in ever increasing circles (see diag. 14).

	distance		
centre ——	inside ——	variable inside ——	total outside
	relationship		
centre ——	Fa.Br.So. ——	agnate/villager ——	stranger
	marriage preference		
totally forbidden ——	ideal ——	less ideal ——	least ideal

(after D. H. M. Brooks)

14. Circles of Marriage Choices

Nevertheless the principle of the protection of the centre is manifested by the expressed preferences of the senior males for close agnates as marriage partners.

Subjects of the Marriages

As may be imagined the preferences expressed by the subjects of any possible marriage, the boys and girls [1] of the hamlet, are somewhat different. Both would prefer their partners to come from hamlets other than their own even if this meant for the girl that some distance separated her conjugal from her natal home thus making visiting difficult. One reason for this preference is, they say, that they would not like any future wife or husband to know about their childhood and background. If bride and groom come from the same hamlet there are always rumours and gossip that 'she kissed such and such a boy' or that 'he was seen down by the river with such and such a girl'. They want to start afresh and they want some sort of romance.

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1) I am using 'boy' and 'girl' here in the sense of dependents and not in the sense of physical immaturity.

How, they say, is it possible to have fun as a husband or wife with a boy or girl who prior to marriage was just like a brother or a sister which would be the case if they married a cousin. There is no excitement, there is no enjoyment and there is no love [1].

Also they say why should one marry an agnate with whom one already has a relationship and one which, should it be added to by marriage, would only 'put a shadow on' i.e. darken or dominate in a negative way, the marriage one. It is, therefore, preferable and more enjoyable to make a marriage relationship, 'xekhi', with a new group with whom one has up to then had no more permanent contact.

The boys or young men have a peculiar reason of their own for preferring marriage with girls from other hamlets. The period of time which elapses between the consummation of marriage, i.e. after the marriage, and before the wedding - anything from some months to a couple of years - is potentially for the boys the most enjoyable so far in their lives. The major reason for this, apart from the company of his wife, is the treatment which the young man receives in his wife's home. When he arrives he is treated affectionately and honourably by his mother and father-in-law and respectfully by the younger members of the household. The mother-in-law and sisters-in-law prepare good meals for him, ensure that he is comfortable and generally make his life more pleasant than it has ever been before. The degree of intensity to which this is carried out, however, varies proportionally with the distance which separates the boy's and girl's homes. Should he, for example, be married to his paternal uncle's daughter then his mother-in-law will be his father's brother's wife, a person who since childhood has been in a position of authority over him. The women,

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1) Interestingly enough similar reasons for not preferring parallel cousin marriage ('cannot love him or her as a spouse' and 'need for change') were given by students at the American University of Beirut in a survey conducted by Prof. Levon Melikian. See Table 5, p. 605 and footnote 4 p. 617. In: Khuri, F. I. 1970. Parallel Cousin Marriage Reconsidered. pp. 597-618. Man vol. 5. no. 4.

therefore, who should treat him honourably and hospitably is the same woman who before marriage would have been scolding him and ordering him about. The traditional roles of mother-in-law and paternal uncle's wife are not compatible and lead to the marked preference expressed by male suitors for marriages with unrelated girls from the same hamlet or with women from other hamlets.

Generally we can see that the preferences of the two generations are, at least as far as the physical proximity of the spouse is concerned, diametrically opposed. As the decision is considered by the senior males of households far too important to be left in the hands of the young and inexperienced because it is not merely a question of acquiring a compatible wife or mother-in-law or of having children but of furthering political, economic and social ends or of acquiring material benefit the selection of a marriage partner is made by them and not by the boy or girl concerned [1]. As long as the father's generation controls the sources - land and property - of independence then the right or duty of the father or senior male to choose or to accept the suit of a particular partner for his son, daughter, or ward will remain socially unopposed [2]. At the moment with the exception of sons who have acquired work and thus independence outside the community and who can influence the choices made (see above chap 8 p. 151) this is still the case. Such a situation is also upheld by Islam although this right, according to the Hanafite School of law, terminates with puberty [3]. Thus for all the girls and for the majority

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1) ' Marriage is a matter of serious concern to a much larger number of people than the spouses themselves' . Mair. 1971. Op.cit. p. 19.

2) I am here, of course, talking about those marriages where both partners are young and dependent and not those where the man is contracting his second marriage or in the cases of women who have been divorced or widowed.

3) ' The distinguishing feature of Islamic Jurisprudence is that it empowers a father to impose the status of marriage on his minor children. This power of imposition is called jabr; the abstract right of guardianship wilayat (or wilaya), and the guardian so empowered is known as wali. ... under the Muhammadan law of all schools, the father has the power to give his children of both sexes in marriage without their consent, until they reach the age of puberty - known as bulughiyya.' Fyzee, A. A. A. 1964. (3rd. Ed.) Outlines of Muhammadan Law. pp. 179 & 180. Oxford University Press. London.

of boys the father or senior male, generally referred to as the guardian or 'wali', still makes a decision which serves his, the household's and the group's best interests and not one which respects the boys' or girls' preferences.

One would expect from the above that the preferences of the senior males would be reflected in the marriages actually contracted, i.e. that hamlet endogamy [1] would prevail. In fact the reverse is true. 82 % of marriages in the ten hamlets where statistical material was collected were hamlet exogamous and only 18 % took place between members of the same hamlet (see diag. 15 p. 176). The situation in the individual hamlets is not, of course, as extreme as the figure of 82 % would suggest because this is an average. In one hamlet, for example, 31 % of the marriages were hamlet endogamous. However the percentages of hamlet endogamy in the other hamlets were all smaller and thus support the initial assertion that hamlet exogamy preponderates. Obviously there are factors at work which generally affect the choices made by senior males and which influence and outweigh their stated preferences. It is my intention now to outline the marriage patterns and trends observable in the ten hamlets and to try to explain the predominant hamlet exogamy by a) reference to theories relating to exogamy and endogamy and by b) considering the interests of the senior males to see whether these can best be satisfied through hamlet exogamy.

Statistical Material

The ten hamlets utilised for statistical purposes, although being principally situated in the middle of the community, were nevertheless

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1) I am not using the term 'endogamy' here, or below, in the sense of a rule prescribing marriage within particular groups but merely as a paraphrase for marriages occurring between members of a defined group, in this case 'hamlet' endogamy. Similarly 'exogamy' does not involve a prescription for out-marriages but merely those marriages contracted outside named groups, e.g. 'hamlet' exogamy.

824		population
477		males
347		females
406		marriages recorded
18 %		hamlet endogamous marriages
82 %		hamlet exogamous marriages
100 %		
31 %	hamlet endogamy	women given
69 %	hamlet exogamy	women given
100 %		
23 %	hamlet endogamy	women taken
77 %	hamlet exogamy	women taken
100 %		

15. Totals and Averages for all ten Hamlets

representative of the whole (see map VII. p. 54 where the numbered hamlets represent those used for the statistics). My main reason for thinking this is that their distribution covers most of the special factors which might emerge from geographical locality. For example one of these hamlets, s'aadat xel (1) (see map VII), is located on the border of the non-Safi section of the valley and three hamlets dali xel (8), z̲akir (7) and bat̲an (4) are situated close to the putative khel boundaries, thus it is possible to receive some idea of marriages made by border hamlets and to see how far khel membership affects marriage links.

Unfortunately, however, these ten hamlets are located in only two of the four major khels [1)] and my information from the other two khels is very limited. This is disadvantageous principally because I have thus no detailed information about marriages in those hamlets which border on the two major valleys of Nijrao and Tagao. However it would seem from the comments of villagers in these areas that marriages were made predominantly with the hamlets of neighbouring khels and that the numbers of affinal bonds created with Tagao and Nijrao were not above the general average for the community as a whole. If these comments are correct then marriage connections made in the other two khels would conform, generally speaking, with those made in those khels where I was able to collect detailed information and the representative quality of the ten hamlets would seem to be justified.

Although the hamlets may be representative there are often considerable variations between them in the percentages of marriages made with, for example, other hamlets of their own khels. The marriage patterns therefore - by 'patterns' I mean the flow of

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1) There is a fifth khel, ṣaliH khel, but as this khel only has one hamlet, ṣaliH kuli, within its ḃoundaries it hardly plays a role in the present ḋiscussion.

marriages measured in percentages [1] from one hamlet to another hamlet, to another khel, area, etc. - which are observable are not always as convincing and illustrative as the researcher might have hoped. Also the hamlet of dumān (barbers) cannot be considered in general terms along with the other hamlets because of the special factors (caste-like endogamy etc.) which influence choices. It, therefore, will be dealt with separately. Nevertheless general trends do emerge which provide a basis for analysis and set some limit on speculation.

Patterns and Trends

One such trend is hamlet exogamy. In all ten hamlets inter-hamlet marriage constitutes, as we have seen, 82 % of the marriages and intra-hamlet only 18 %. These figures, however, represent all marriages undertaken by the villagers and not just those contracted by the male residents. The percentages for the latter are somewhat different. 77 % of the women taken as wives by the hamlet members were from other hamlets whilst 23 % were from their own hamlets (see diag. 15 p. 176). If we then look at the statistics for hamlet women given to men from other hamlets (also diag. 15) the percentage of hamlet exogamy is further reduced to 69 %. The overall picture of hamlet exogamy nevertheless remains [2]. There are variations from hamlet to hamlet but only one hamlet, manāp xel (9) (diag. 24 p.187), has a larger percentage of endogamous

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1) As the size of the hamlets varied considerably - from 44 to 141 - it was necessary for comparitive purposes to use percentages instead of numbers when referring to marriages. They do, however, have the drawback that, for example, two marriages made by a small hamlet may represent 15 % of its total marriages whereas the same number of marriages for a larger hamlet will only represent 2 % of its marriages. This can lead to some confusion especially when comparing symmetrical and asymmetrical exchanges of women.

2) It is difficult to say how typical this hamlet exogamy is for Pakhtuns in Afghanistan because there is no comparable material. The information presented by Barth (1965. Op.cit. p. 41) for Swat (Pakistan) is unfortunately not comparable because although the percentages (70 % village exogamy, 30 % village endogamy) are similar the multi-caste nature of Swat villages and caste endogamy lead automatically to high percentages of inter-village marriage.

16. (1) s'aadat xel (raghli) pirozai khel

46	population
26	males
20	females
26	recorded marriages
0	parallel cousin marriages
0	cross cousin marriages
0	polygynous marriages
0	divorces
12 %	hamlet endogamous marriages
88 %	hamlet exogamous marriages
14 %	hamlet endogamy) women given
86 %	hamlet exogamy)
15 %	hamlet endogamy) women taken
85 %	hamlet exogamy)

		khel marriages	
29 %		pirozai . .	w.g.
	15 %	..	w.t.
29 %		Haidar Khel	w.g.
	40 %	..	w.t.
0 %		audel khel	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
0 %		maghdud khel	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
0 %		ṣaliH khel	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
		marriages outside Afghaniya	
13 %		Pachoghan	w.g.
	5 %	..	w.t.
0 %		Ghain	w.g.
	25 %	..	w.t.
29 %		Tagao	w.g.
	5 %	..	w.t.
0 %		Nijrao	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
0 %		Elsewhere	w.g.
	10 %	..	w.t.

17. (2) Hājiān (taxti) Haidar khel

87	population
50	males
37	females
37	recorded marriages
6 (16 %)	parallel cousin marriages
0	cross cousin marriages
4 (14 %)	polygynous marriages
0	divorces
24 %	hamlet endogamous marriages
76 %	hamlet exogamous marriages
38 %	hamlet endogamy) women
62 %	hamlet exogamy) given
33 %	hamlet endogamy) women
67 %	hamlet exogamy) taken

		khel marriages	
19 %		pirozai	w.g.
	14 %	..	w.t.
75 %		Haidar Khel	w.g.
	67 %	..	w.t.
0 %		audel khel	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
0 %		maghdud khel	w.g.
	7 %	..	w.t.
0 %		ṣāliH khel	w.g.
	4 %	..	w.t.
		marriages outside Afghaniya	
0 %		Pachoghan	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
0 %		Ghain	w.g.
	4 %	..	w.t.
0 %		Tagao	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
6 %		Nijrao	w.g.
	4 %	..	w.t.
0 %		Elsewhere	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
100 %	100 %		

18. (3) ā́mām xel (rāghli) Haidar khel

100	population
58	males
42	females
46	recorded marriages
1 (2 %)	parallel cousin marriages
1 (2 %)	cross cousin marriages
2 (7 %)	polygynous marriages
0	divorces
11 %	hamlet endogamous marriages
89 %	hamlet exogamous marriages
21 %	hamlet endogamy) women
79 %	hamlet exogamy) given
13 %	hamlet endogamy) women
87 %	hamlet exogamy) taken

		khel marriages	
21 %		pirozai	w.g.
	14 %	..	w.t.
47 %		Haidar khel	w.g.
	57 %	..	w.t.
5 %		audel khel	w.g.
	6 %	..	w.t.
0 %		maghdud khel	w.g.
	3 %	..	w.t.
0 %		ṣāliH khel	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
		marriages outside Afghaniya	
5 %		Pachoghan	w.g.
	3 %	..	w.t.
0 %		Ghain	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
17 %		Tagao	w.g.
	11 %	..	w.t.
0 %		Nijrao	w.g.
	3 %	..	w.t.
5 %		Elsewhere	w.g.
	3 %	..	w.t.
100 %	100 %		

19. (4) batan (raghli) Haidar khel

58	population
28	males
30	females
26	recorded marriages
0	parallel cousin marriages
0	cross cousin marriages
0	polygynous marriages
2 (8 %)	divorces
12 %	hamlet endogamous marriages
88 %	hamlet exogamous marriages
18 %	hamlet endogamy) women given
82 %	hamlet exogamy)
18 %	hamlet endogamy) women taken
82 %	hamlet exogamy)

		khel marriages	
18 %		pirozai	w.g.
	12 %	..	w.t.
35 %		Haidar khel	w.g.
	47 %	..	w.t.
0 %		audel khel	w.g.
	6 %	..	w.t.
27 %		maghdud khel	w.g.
	17 %	..	w.t.
0 %		saliH khel	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.

		marriages outside Afghaniya	
0 %		Pachoghan	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
0 %		Ghain	w.g.
	6 %	..	w.t.
0 %		Tagao	w.g.
	6 %	..	w.t.
9 %		Nijrao	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
9 %		Elsewhere	w.g.
	6 %	..	w.t.
100 %	100 %		

20. (5) maidāni (rāghli) Haidar khel

102		population
61		males
41		females
66		recorded marriages
1	(1,5 %)	parallel cousin marriages
2	(3 %)	cross cousin marriages
1	(2 %)	polygynous marriages
5	(7.5 %)	divorces
30 %		hamlet endogamous marriages
70 %		hamlet exogamous marriages
35 %		hamlet endogamy) women
65 %		hamlet exogamy) given
33 %		hamlet endogamy) women
67 %		hamlet exogamy) taken

			khel marriages	
4 %			pirozai	w.g.
	15 %		..	w.t.
48 %			Haidar khel	w.g.
	52 %		..	w.t.
4 %			audel khel	w.g.
	4 %		..	w.t.
13 %			maghdud khel	w.g.
	4 %		..	w.t.
0 %			ṣāliH khel	w.g.
	0 %		..	w.t.
			marriages outside Afghaniya	
4 %			Pachoghan	w.g.
	7 %		..	w.t.
0 %			Ghain	w.g.
	0 %		..	w.t.
9 %			Tagao	w.g.
	7 %		..	w.t.
9 %			Nijrao	w.g.
	0 %		..	w.t.
9 %			Elsewhere	w.g.
	10 %		..	w.t.
100 %	100 %			

21. (6) dumān (rāghli) pirozai

51	population
30	males
21	females
17	recorded marriages
4 (23 %)	parallel cousin marriages
1 (5 %)	cross cousin marriages
0	polygynous marriages
0	divorces
23 %	hamlet endogamous marriages
77 %	hamlet exogamous marriages
40 %	hamlet endogamy) women
60 %	hamlet exogamy) given
29 %	hamlet endogamy) women
71 %	hamlet exogamy) taken

khel marriage		
0 %	pirozai	w.g.
7 %	..	w.t.
0 %	Haidar khel	w.g.
0 %	..	w.t.
20 %	audel khel	w.g.
7 %	..	w.t.
0 %	maghdud khel	w.g.
14 %	..	w.t.
0 %	ṣaliH khel	w.g.
0 %	..	w.t.

marriages outside Afghaniya		
0 %	Pachoghan	w.g.
0 %	..	w.t.
0 %	Ghain	w.g.
0 %	..	w.t.
40 %	Tagao	w.g.
29 %	..	w.t.
0 %	Nijrao	w.g.
14 %	..	w.t.
0 %	Elsewhere	w.g.
0 %	..	w.t.
100 %	100 %	

22. (7) z̄akir xel (taxti) pirozai

58	population
36	males
22	females
17	recorded marriages
1 (4 %)	parallel cousin marriages
0	cross cousin marriages
2 (12 %)	polygynous marriages
0	divorces
12 %	hamlet endogamous marriages
88 %	hamlet exogamous marriages
33 %	hamlet endogamy) women
67 %	hamlet exogamy) given
13 %	hamlet endogamy) women
87 %	hamlet exogamy) taken

67 %		khel marriages	
	20 %	pirozai	w.g.
		..	w.t.
33 %		Haidar khel	w.g.
	54 %	..	w.t.
0 %		audel khel	w.g.
	13 %	..	w.t.
0 %		maghdud khel	w.g.
	13 %	..	w.t.
0 %		s̄aliH khel	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
		marriages outside Afghaniya	
0 %		Pachoghan	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
0 %		Ghain	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
0 %		Tagao	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
0 %		Nijrao	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
0 %		Elsewhere	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
100 %	100 %		

23. (8) dali xel (taxti) pirozai

44	population
29	males
15	females
26	recorded marriages
0	parallel cousin marriages
0	cross cousin marriages
2 (12 %)	polygynous marriages
1 (4 %)	divorces
0 %	hamlet endogamous marriages
100 %	hamlet exogamous marriages
0 %	hamlet endogamy) women
100 %	hamlet exogamy) given
0 %	hamlet endogamy) women
100 %	hamlet exogamy) taken

		khel marriages	
33 %		pirozai	w.g.
	12 %	..	w.t.
22 %		Haidar khel	w.g.
	18 %	..	w.t.
33 %		audel khel	w.g.
	29 %	..	w.t.
0 %		maghdud khel	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
0 %		ṣaliH khel	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
		marriages outside Afghaniya	
0 %		Pachoghan	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
0 %		Ghain	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
12 %		Tagao	w.g.
	41 %	..	w.t.
0 %		Nijrao	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
0 %		Elsewhere	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
100 %	100 %		

24. (9) manāp xel (taxti) pirozai

137		population
80		males
57		females
68		recorded marriages
7 (10 %)		parallel cousin marriages
1 (1 %)		cross cousin marriages
5 (8 %)		polygynous marriages
1 (1 %)		divorces
31 %		hamlet endogamous marriages
69 %		hamlet exogamous marriages
65 %	hamlet endogamy)	women given
35 %	hamlet exogamy)	
33 %	hamlet endogamy)	women taken
67 %	hamlet exogamy)	

		khel marriages	
80 %		pirozai	w.g.
	56 %	..	w.t.
5 %		Haidar khel	w.g.
	10 %	..	w.t.
0 %		audel khel	w.g.
	13 %	..	w.t.
0 %		maghdud khel	w.g.
	10 %	..	w.t.
0 %		sāliH khel	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
		marriages outside Afghaniya	
0 %		Pachoghan	w.g.
	5 %	..	w.t.
0 %		Ghain	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
5 %		Tagao	w.g.
	3 %	..	w.t.
5 %		Nijrao	w.g.
	0 %	..	w.t.
5 %		Elsewhere	w.g.
	3 %	..	w.t.
100 %	100 %		

25. (10) wali xān xel (taxti) pirozai

141	population
79	males
62	females
77	recorded marriages
3 (4 %)	parallel cousin marriages
1 (1 %)	cross cousin marriages
10 (17 %)	polygynous marriages
5 (6 %)	divorces
26 %	hamlet endogamous marriages
74 %	hamlet exogamous marriages
48 %	hamlet endogamy) women
52 %	hamlet exogamy) given
38 %	hamlet endogamy) women
62 %	hamlet exogamy) given

khel marriages

53 %		pirozai w.g.
	57 %	.. w.t.
17 %		Haidar khel w.g.
	21 %	.. w.t.
5 %		audel khel w.g.
	5 %	.. w.t.
5 %		maghdud khel w.g.
	3 %	.. w.t.
3 %		ṣāliH khel w.g.
	2 %	.. w.t.

marriages outside Afghaniya

0 %		Pachoghan w.g.
	0 %	.. w.t.
0 %		Ghain w.g.
	0 %	.. w.t.
10 %		Tagao w.g.
	9 %	.. w.t.
0 %		Nijrao w.g.
	0 %	.. w.t.
7 %		Elsewhere w.g.
	3 %	.. w.t.
100 %	100 %	

(1) s'aadat xel		(2) Hājiān		(3) āmām xel		(4) batān		(5) maidāni		(6) dumān		(7) zākir xel		(8) dali xel		(9) manāp xel		(10) wali xān xel		
w.t.	w.g.	w.t.	w.g.	w.t.	w.g.	w.t.	w.g.	w.t.	w.g.	w.t.	w.g.	w.t.	w.g.	w.t.	w.g.	w.t.	w.g.	w.t.	w.g.	
10	29	4	13	--	5	--	--	--	--	7	--	--	--	--	--	2	--	3	2	tājik
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	kochiān
5	--	4	--	--	--	6	--	4	4	--	--	--	--	6	--	2	--	3	--	ziārat
--	--	4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	11	33	65	6	5	manāp xel
--	--	--	--	3	--	--	18	7	--	--	--	7	--	--	23	14	15	38	48	wali xān xel
--	--	4	6	7	10	6	--	--	--	--	--	13	34	6	--	--	--	--	--	zākir xel
--	--	--	--	3	5	--	--	4	--	--	--	--	33	--	--	3	--	3	--	dali xel
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	29	40	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	dumān
--	--	4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	2	ṣaliH xel
--	14	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	mullāyān (u)
15	14	--	--	3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	--	s'aadat xel
5	--	--	--	3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	7	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	bahādur xel
5	--	--	--	7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	13	--	6	--	--	5	3	--	kando xel
--	--	15	19	--	5	6	9	--	4	--	--	7	--	--	--	2	--	3	--	ārsālā xel
10	--	4	--	7	--	--	--	9	4	--	--	--	--	6	--	2	--	2	5	jar kuli
--	--	--	--	7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	dakuri
--	--	--	--	7	--	12	--	33	35	--	--	--	--	--	11	7	--	--	2	maidāni
--	--	--	6	7	5	18	18	2	--	--	--	7	--	--	--	--	--	8	--	batān
5	--	7	6	--	5	--	--	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	3	7	niżām xel
--	--	7	6	13	21	6	--	--	4	--	--	7	--	6	11	--	--	--	--	āmām xel
--	--	33	38	3	10	6	--	--	--	--	--	7	33	--	--	--	--	--	--	Hājiān
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	--	--	--	najārān

26. Marriages between Afghaniya hamlets (1)

(1) s'aadat xel		(2) Hājiān		(3) āmām xel		(4) batān		(5) maidāni		(6) dumān		(7) zākir xel		(8) dali xel		(9) manāp xel		(10) wali xān xel		
w.t.	w.g.	w.t.	w.g.	w.t.	w.g.	w.t.	w.g.	w.t.	w.g.	w.t.	w.g.	w.t.	w.g.	w.t.	w.g.	w.t.	w.g.	w.t.	w.g.	
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	sheixān
--	--	7	--	4	--	6	9	4	4	--	--	13	--	--	--	--	--	3	--	aspa xel
--	--	--	--	--	--	6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	karborai
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	ghundi
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	shāmul xel
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	maghdud xel
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	dinGuk
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	3	--	--	--	mullāyān (1)
--	--	--	--	--	5	--	--	2	4	--	--	7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	spin xel
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	--	--	--	7	--	--	--	8	--	2	--	tor xel
--	--	--	--	7	--	--	--	--	--	7	20	--	--	29	33	2	--	--	--	bada xel
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	axūnzada xel

w.t.--women taken
w.g.--women given

27. Marriages between Afghaniya hamlets (2)

marriages than exogamous ones (65 % to 35 %) and this occurs only in the sector of hamlet women given to male fellow villagers. The male residents by contrast took only 33 % of their wives from their own hamlet preferring to take 67 % of their wives from other hamlets (see diag. 24 p. 187). Interestingly enough in all hamlets the percentages of hamlet women married endogamously (31 %) is greater than that of hamlet men married within the hamlet (23 %) (see diag. 15 p. 176). There would, therefore, seem to be a preference to give daughters to agnates and fellow villagers rather than to take daughters-in-law from them. This is perhaps not surprising because the status of a woman-giving group is, unless there is an exchange of women, generally considered lower than that of the wife-taking one. Marriage among agnates or fellow villagers would not usually involve such questions of status and would thus be a preferred form for the wife-givers.

Other conclusions are possible if one looks a little more closely at hamlet endogamy. Of the nine hamlets (excluding dumān for reasons mentioned above) only one, dali xel (8), has made no hamlet in-marriages at least over the last two or three generations (see diag. 23 p. 186). The other eight hamlets have contracted between 11 % and 31 % of their marriages within the hamlet. As dali xel is the smallest (44 inhabitants) of all the hamlets the availability of suitable marriage partners may have played a role in producing this situation (see also below p. 192). This is supported by the fact that three of the four largest hamlets all with populations over 100 have the highest percentages (26 %, 31 % and 30 %) of hamlet endogamy. The exceptions are āmām xel (3) which, with a population of 100, only has 11 % hamlet endogamous marriages (see diag. 18) and Hajiān (2) whose population of 87 should bring with it a smaller percentage of hamlet endogamy than in fact it does i.e. 24 % (see diag. 17 p. 180). Nevertheless a relationship between population size and the availability of partners would seem to be established.

Hajiān (2) also has, with 16 %, the highest percentage of parallel

cousin marriages. This is not surprising as the hamlet has a high percentage of hamlet endogamy and is made up of one minor lineage with only two attached ājnabiyān households. The chances, therefore, of hamlet internal marriages being also parallel cousin ones are very high. This situation is reflected in those hamlets with a single lineage and only small attached groups, i.e. wali xān xel (10) and zākir xel (7) both with 4 % (see diags. 25 and 22). The exception this time is provided by manāp xel (9) (diag. 24). Although this hamlet has three separate minor lineages it has made 10 % of its marriages with parallel cousins. This may be explainable by its size, i.e. it is one of the largest hamlets, and, therefore, it would fall under the generalization made above about hamlet size and available partners. The three smallest dali xel (8), batān (4) and s'aadat xel (1) have made no parallel or cross cousin marriages and thus give added support to this argument. In summary, if these arguments are correct, then the statistics for hamlet endogamy show firstly that the frequency of endogamous marriages is affected by hamlet size i.e. partner availability and secondly that the frequency of parallel cousin marriages is influenced by both hamlet size and the inclusiveness of the hamlet minor lineage.

Another trend would seem to be the preference to take and give women within their own khels. Thus six of the nine hamlets have higher percentages of marriages, in terms of women given and women taken, with hamlets of their own khels than with those of any other khel. One of the six, wali xān xel (10) (diag. 25) for example, gave 53 % of its marriageable women and took 57 % of its wives from hamlets within its own khel, pirozai. In the three hamlets, where khel endogamy was not predominant, two, dali xel (8) and zākir xel (7), took a larger percentage of their wives (29 % and 54 % respectively) from other khels and s'aadat xel (1) gave an equal percentage (29 %) of its daughters to its own khel, to pirozai and to Tagao (see diags. 23, 22 & 16). As these three hamlets are located close to khel boundaries and s'aadat xel (1) is near

Afghaniya's border with the rest of the Pachoghan valley such preferences may be a consequence of geographical location. In general, however, the clear preference for khel endogamy in six of the nine hamlets would seem to indicate that the senior males are satisfying their wishes for marriages with agnates or fellow villagers (seen in these cases as lineage members) at the level of the major lineage.

A further trend visible is the wide dispersal of marriage connections made by most of the hamlets. The extent of these connections is indicated by the fact that the four largest hamlets - wali xān xel (10), manāp xel (9), maidāni (5) and āmām xel (3) - have links which extend in each case to almost half of the total hamlets of Afghaniya (see diags. 26 & 27 pp. 189 & 190) as well as to numerous hamlets and villages in Tagao and Nijrao. The smaller hamlets have correspondingly less connections nevertheless the smallest hamlet, dali xel (8), with only 44 inhabitants has made marriage links with ten other hamlets nine of which are in Afghaniya and one outside. There would, therefore, seem to be some preference for, or interest in, dispersed ties although, as we have seen above, the dispersion takes place principally with proximate hamlets within the respective hamlet's own khel.

These dispersed inter-hamlet ties would seem generally to be based on reciprocity. In cases where a number of marriages take place between hamlets there is usually some sort of balance in terms of women given and women taken. This fact is somewhat disguised firstly by the considerable discrepancy in all ten hamlets between the numbers of women reported to me as having been given and those reported as having been taken [1] and secondly by my use of percent-

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1) See also Randolph and Coult (R. R. & A. D. 1968. A Computer Analysis of Bedouin Marriage. p. 94. S. W. J. A. vol. 24. no. 1) who observed the same discrepancy among the Hawaashleh. They put this down to the asymmetrical exchange of women between the Hawaashleh and other descent groups based on the higher status and political (p.t.o.)

ages in the statistical material instead of numbers (see also above footnote 1 p. 178). Nevertheless marriages, for example, between wali xān xel (10) and nizām xel, and dali xel (8) and bada xel (diags. 26 & 27) are more or less balanced and the picture may be repeated for a number of other hamlets. This reciprocal inter-hamlet marriage is, according to case histories, often the result of an inter-family exchange of daughters but it also occurs in different generations, i.e. a woman being taken in one generation and her daughter being returned in the next, and between families whose members have met on the occasion of another marriage [1]. It is clear that not all hamlets have this balanced reciprocity but in the majority of the cases where there is an imbalance the percentages represent only one or two marriages. Where, however, a considerable imbalance is indicated, for example, between maidani (5) and jar kuli (see diag. 26) there may be some implicit recognition of the superiority of the women taker's hamlet [2].

There is also generally a balanced exchange of women in the case of marriages made with Tagao. Only two hamlets, zākir xel (7) and Hājiān (2), have no links (see diags. 22 & 17). All other hamlets have connections of varying strengths (3 % to 41 %). By contrast links with Nijrao, the other major valley, are much weaker both in terms of numbers and percentages of the total marriages of hamlets. This

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strength of the Hawaashleh. In Afghaniya, however, this cannot be the case because all hamlets provided similar statistics and somewhere there must be a hamlet or hamlets which are giving more women than they are taking. It would seem, therefore, that either the evidence was being altered in order to give the impression in each case that that hamlet had a high status or evidence concerning women was being withheld.

1) A marriage sets forces in motion which lead to reciprocity because the girl giving group then have a 'claim' to a woman from the girl takers. See also Marx, E. 1967. Bedouin of the Negev. p. 120. Manchester University Press, Manchester.
2) In a society where women are only given to equals or superiors a hamlet which gives a considerably larger number of its women to another hamlet than it receives from that hamlet should, one would think, regard itself as possessing lower status. See also Randolph and Coult. 1968. Op. cit. p. 94.

preference for Tagao may be the result of the Afghaniya Pakhtuns considered Tagao origins and their desire to marry, where possible, within the Pakhtun community. It is also partly the result of those 'ājnabiyān' living in Afghaniya who continue to maintain marriage links with their villages of origin in Tagao. Whatever the reasons they have proved strong enough to, in general, offset the advantages of Nijrao - proximity to and accessability for Afghaniya, local government centre etc. - as a potential area for marriage connections.

A factor influencing the overall picture but not apparent from the statistics are the groups and families of ājnabiyān who are attached through marriages to the core members of their hamlets. In four hamlets marriage connections have provided the reasons for the ājnabiyān settling or have strengthened the political position of these groups after the purchase of land. Thus in these hamlets the percentages of hamlet endogamy have been artificially highered by the temporary needs of newly attached groups. This means that the actual percentages of hamlet endogamy among the taxti and rāghli are smaller than the statistics would indicate.

So far we have looked at trends observable in nine of the ten hamlets from which material was collected. The tenth hamlet, dumān, was considered too atypical to be utilised for generalizations because of the constraints on marriage choices. This is particularly apparent in terms of khel endogamy. Although dumān (6) is geographically located in the khel of pirozai it has only made one marriage connection (7 %) with this khel. Marriages with hamlets in other khels have been made, with one exception, with other barber families living in these Safi hamlets or with low 'caste' people such as weavers. The majority of their marriage links have been made within the hamlet (40 % women given and 29 % women taken) or with Tagao (40 % w.g. and 29 % w.t. see diag. 21 p. 184). The reasons for these trends are the low status of the barbers, explained above, and the resulting reluctance of other groups to intermarry with them. It is also, however, a

consequence of the special needs of the barbers themselves because they prefer to have wives capable of fulfilling those duties expected of barber's wives. The result is a caste-like endogamy with occasional hypergamy.

Excluding the case of the barbers six general trends emerge from the statistical material. Firstly hamlet exogamy constitutes the vast majority of marriages made in all nine hamlets. Secondly hamlet endogamy and parallel cousin marriage occur with the greatest frequency in those hamlets which have the largest populations and therefore there would seem to be some relationship between the availability of partners and hamlet in-marriages. Thirdly khel endogamous marriages are preferred to khel exogamous ones. Fourthly marriage connections generally lead to reciprocal marriage ties, i.e. there is approximate parity in numbers of women being given and taken between any two hamlets. Fifthly marriage links are widely dispersed both within and outside Afghaniya. Sixthly and finally Tagao, the Pakhtun and Safi centre of the region, is Afghaniya's principal external source and recipient of wives.

This hamlet exogamy and the wide dispersion of marriage links are the opposite of what one might expect from the preferences expressed by the senior males of Afghaniya. It is true that there is a high percentage of khel endogamy and it would seem that the senior males are fulfilling their preferences in this way, i.e. through marriages in the major lineage. But such an intention was never expressed by them and marriages made within the khel are not always with major lineage members but with families and hamlets which merely reside within the khel's boundaries. Whilst khel endogamy may function as an 'alibi', or represent a compromise between preference and practice, it certainly does not explain the predominant hamlet exogamy or provide answers as to why the senior males take the majority of their daughters -in-law from, and give the majority of their daughters to, men from other hamlets. It is, therefore, necessary to provide

some explanations and answers for these phenomena.

Explanations for Exogamous Marriage

One of the classical explanations for exogamy, at least for its function in unilineal societies is 'to bind together, through affinal - and later kinship - links, the separate groups which taken together make up the social aggregate.' [1] Were these groups, it is argued, not to be linked by marriages then the 'society' as such could no longer be said to exist because there would be nothing to bind the isolates together. In Afghaniya the social aggregate consists of a number of nucleated hamlets the members of which are considered as being united through their common patrilineal descent. The tenuousness of ties above the hamlet/minor lineage level have become clear from what has been written so far and thus one might expect that the political structure could be strengthened by exogamous inter-hamlet marriages. Also the integrity and identity of the community could best be upheld by such ties. One might, therefore, expect the exogamous marriages to be at least in part due to the desire to unite the community politically and to preserve its identity in the face of the contiguous non-Pakhtun communities. If this is the case it certainly is not the result of a conscious process on the part of the senior males of hamlets or a societal norm established to preserve the community. As we have seen there is no expressed preference for exogamy in fact the reverse and no organization or leadership complex exists within Afghaniya which could induce the heads of households to make marital links which would serve the community's interests rather than those of the senior males. It is also questionable whether the Pakhtuns of Afghaniya would consider it important or necessary to unite or strengthen the community politically or socially through marriage. Certainly at the moment Afghaniya does not, and perhaps since its foundation has not,

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1) Beattie, J. 1964. Other Cultures. p. 122. Cohen and West. London.

required larger political groupings than those which could be provided by the hamlet [1]. It would, therefore, seem that although exogamous ties and the network of affinal and kinship links which they create do strengthen and integrate the community this function, at least in Afghaniya, has taken place accidentally as a side product of other interests.

Another explanation for the preponderance of exogamous marriages in Afghaniya could be the dearth of suitable partners within the hamlets themselves. Thus exogamy would result not from preference but from necessity and would be judged by the villagers themselves more as a negative aspect of endogamy than as a positive alternative to it. This explanation corresponds with the expressed preferences of the senior agnates for endogamous marriage as well as with the low percentages of intra-hamlet marriages among the small hamlets. Among the smaller hamlets, as we have seen, dali xel (8), z̄akir xel (7), baṭ̄an (4), and s'aadat xel (1) all have lower percentages of endogamous marriages than the larger ones thus indicating that where only a few partners are available more suitable choices may be made outside the hamlet. This information might seem to be conclusive were it not for duṃ̄an (6) which with a population of 51 may be considered as belonging to the smaller hamlets (populations between 44 and 58) but whose percentage of endogamy (23 %) equates it clearly with the larger ones. However it is clear for reasons given above that duṃ̄an is an exception within the community and that 'unsuitable' partners may be chosen within this hamlet because of the lack of alternatives outside a situation which would not be accepted or applicable to the other small hamlets. On the other hand one might argue that with the external and internal pressure exerted on duṃ̄an to marry endogamously 23 % endogamy is a relatively low figure and

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1) It is possible, however, that men from Afghaniya took part in the foray between Safi tribesmen and British soldiers in 1879 (see above p.139 footnote 1) and they may well, therefore, have organised themselves on a supra-hamlet level. Unfortunately there is no evidence to say whether they took part or not.

that the advantages of exogamy must be considerable for them to provide 77 % of the total marriages of that hamlet. Whichever way it is argued, I think, one may draw the conclusion that inspite of the senior males' expressed preferences for endogamy the suitability [1] of the available partners both within and outside the hamlet plays a considerable role in choice. Thus within a small hamlet the range of choice is obviously more limited and where more is to be gained from an external link than an internal one then it is not surprising that an external marriage should be made. This would be considered sensible and logical by the villagers themselves and would not be seen as in opposition to their preference for endogamy. It is after all a preference and not an imperative. I think, therefore, that one can safely say that the relative availability of partners within the hamlet both in a demographic sense and in the sense of suitability for the interests of the household heads explains to a certain extent the preponderant exogamy.

Exogamy may also be preferred in practice because the advantages of endogamy, or at least of parallel cousin marriage [2], are insignificant in, or irrelevant to, the Afghaniya situation. One example of this is the case of inheritance. Throughout the islamic world, and Afghanistan provides no exception, one of the major arguments for parallel cousin marriage is that it keeps property within the family. However, this argument is only relevant when daughters inherit and this, at least as far as land is concerned, occurs very rarely in any islamic country. In Afghaniya women can and do inherit land [3] and thus it would seem that there would be some incentive for endogamy. However if daughters can inherit so too can daughters-in-law, i.e. from their fathers, and thus exogamous marriages may equally enhance family fortunes not by the retention of existing land but by the acquisition of

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1) Suitability not only in terms of age and physical maturity but also in social, political and economic terms.
2) I use parallel cousin marriage here in its broadest connotation, i.e. as in Rudolph and Coult's article (1968. Op.cit. p. 92) where they write: 'In a simple sense, descent group endogamy implies parallel cousin marriage.'
3) See also below pp. 264-266.

new. Also if women can inherit land then marriage among cousins brings a further threat [1] to their land through the claim that the women as sisters can make to it. They become so to speak Trojan horses which must be kept out at all costs. Although such a reason was never given a marriage between cousins can only strengthen the potential claim to fields which cousins already have through their relationships of descent and neighbourship.

Another example may be seen in Barth's suggestion that parallel cousin marriage '... plays a prominent role in solidifying the minimal lineage as a corporate group in factional struggle.' [2] In Afghaniya it is true that parallel cousin marriage strengthens the immediate group concerned by multiplying the ties between members but it is also clear as we have seen that only a small percentage of such marriages take place. One reason for this is that armed factional struggles or cases of extreme physical violence both of which would unite the local descent groups (koranai) now occur relatively rarely. Another reason may be that the government, to a large extent in such cases, interposes itself between conflicting parties and as a result the direct physical support of agnates which was formerly of vital importance is no longer as decisive as it used to be. Thus marriage links which previously were reserved for strengthening the immediate agnatic group are relieved for other purposes and utilised to meet the demands of changing circumstances. This is not to say that parallel cousin marriage as a means of uniting and strengthening the agnatic group is no longer valid but that the decline of the koranai has lead to a reduction in the number of marriages made to solidify it for factional struggle.

A final example for the relative insignificance of endogamy for Afghaniya is that of Murphy and Kasdan [3] who suggest that parallel

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1) The others are inheritance in general and having adjoining fields, the shaf'a.
2) Barth, F. 1954. Father's Brother's Daughter's Marriage in Kurdistan. SWJA. No. 10 p. 171.
3) Murphy, R. F. & Kasdan, L. 1959. The Structure of Parallel Cousin Marriage. A. A. vol. 61. pp. 17-29.

cousin marriage underlies an extreme fissional process one function of which is to promote segmentation. This segmentation they say is necessary for the persistance and viability of, in their case, Bedouin society because it integrates larger social units vertically, through patrilineal descent, but at the same time allows them to fractionate into microsections giving the whole resilience and adaptability. As we have seen the percentages of parallel cousin marriage in the hamlets of Afghaniya are small nevertheless segmentation occurs and the Safi tribe as a whole although split up into a number of geographically separate units maintains its identity. It would seem, therefore, that other mechanisms are at work here or that those created by parallel cousin marriage are not necessary in the Afghan situation. As the Pakhtuns in Afghanistan play a significantly different role in their society than do the Bedouin in theirs the latter suggestion may be the most relevant.

It is evident from the above that the lack of suitable partners in the hamlets themselves and the relative unsuitability or irrelevance of hamlet endogamy for Afghaniya provide only part of the answer for the proponderant hamlet exogamy. The other and perhaps major part of the answer is, I feel, to be found in an analysis of the interests pursued by the heads of households when contracting marriages for their sons or daughters. If these interests can best be satisfied by inter-hamlet rather than intra-hamlet connections the dominance of exogamy in Afghaniya would, I think, be explained. I propose, therefore, to portray the possible advantages to be gained through affinal connections and to see whether these may best be achieved through exogamy or endogamy.

Interests pursued by Senior Males

In Afghaniya, as I have shown above, both partners to a marriage have 'walis' or guardians who are responsible for them. These men are generally the senior agnates of households and in the majority of

cases the fathers of the boys and girls concerned. As islamic jurisprudence 'empowers a father to impose the state of marriage on his minor children' [1], the decision as to whom the future marriage partner will be is firmly in the hands of the senior males of hamlets. This is also upheld by custom and tradition and by sanctions which inhibit independent marital activity on the part of sons and daughters [2]. The almost total exclusion of the wishes of the subjects of marriages - the exceptions being the economically independent sons - enables the senior males to pursue their interests undisturbed and to create and manipulate relationships by the monopoly which they have in choosing wives for sons and accepting sons-in-law for daughters [3]. The potential gains to be made from marriage connections which are carefully and judicially created are considerable. But much depends upon the skill and abilities of the senior males to make the correct choices and these choices, in turn, are based on a careful calculation of the advantages which will accrue from one particular connection rather than from another. Of course the advantages which the senior agnates hope to gain through marriage connections will vary to some extent from household to household according to the needs or interests being pursued. Also differences in status, wealth, and political strength do exist among the families of Afghaniya and these are reflected in the choices being made. However in comparison with other Pakhtun areas (Swat, Uruzgan) these differences are small because the majority of the heads of families are owner-cultivators and generally speaking the interests or gains which I will present below are applicable to and attainable by most households. This is not to say that they are always realised because competition between households does exist and circumstances change but in general the motivation for finally choosing a bride or accepting a groom is to be found among the interests listed below.

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1) See above p. 174 footnote 3.
2) It is, however, not totally excluded because forms of marriage contracted without the consent of the walis do exist. See below pp. 223-226.
3) See also Marx. 1967. Op.cit. p. 102.

xekhi

The minimal gains which both groups involved in a marriage expect from the relationship are expressed on the day of the 'final decision' or prekruh by the ruibar. In order to open the discussion he says to the girl's father: 'these people (the boy's father and two or three other senior males) have come for a purpose, namely for the purpose of 'xekhi' and 'dosti'.' 'xekhi' may be translated generally as 'marriage relationship' but it also refers specifically to a series of obligations which, at least initially, are to be fulfilled by both agnatic groups involved in the marriage. These obligations are complementary visiting and reciprocal attendance at the births, circumcision ceremonies, deaths and religious festivities of the two families. [1] These obligatory activities start after the 'final decision' has been made, continue through the various marriage proceedings - kozda, wāda, etc. - and are pursued for an obligatory period of some three years after the bride has taken up residence in her conjugal home. Because of the obligatory nature of these activities 'xekhi' forces both agnatic groups to abandon a little of their independence and to allow, even if only for a short time, representatives of another group access into their internal affairs. They are forced to get to know each other and given the opportunity to assess the potential benefits which might acrue from the relationship. Whether the relationship continues on the same level of intensity after this obligatory period is over depends principally on the willingness of the senior agnates to propogate and further it. Every ceremony or festivity of the two groups is a testing point and should one side not be invited or having been invited fail to attend then the relationship is in danger. But to keep

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1) This is similar to the obligations which arise from 'teltole' associations mentioned by Barth among the Swat Pathan, see Barth. 1965. Op.cit. pp. 31-35. However in Afghaniya there are no 'associations' as such but the presence of affines and cognates at 'rites de passage' is more or less obligatory and the demands of neighbourliness usually mean that neighbours are there also. The 'actors' therefore at births, marriages or deaths in both Swat and Afghaniya are the same but in Afghaniya they have no corporate identity as members of a named association.

on inviting and visiting is to keep the tie alive and thus they say 'the marriage relationship is an unspun thread, if you spin it it will become stronger if you let it go it will break'. If the senior males of both groups have found it to their advantage, i.e., in terms of aid or help received [1] from the other group, or should the element of friendship have entered into it, then the bond will be strengthened and pursued. Otherwise the tie will be loosened and, allowed to gradually wither. Generally speaking however 'xekhi' acts as a bond between the two families or groups and enables both sides to assess the possibilities of the relationship and to utilise it to an extent which is agreeable to both.

'dosti'

Should the frequency of visiting be maintained beyond the initial, obligatory period then it is evident that the relationship has turned into something stronger and more stable. One reason for this stability may be the element of 'dosti' or friendship which has converted the affinal link into something else. 'Dosti' is a word used both for the marriage relationship or an aspect of that relationship and, for friendship in general. Unlike 'xekhi', however, it is not obligatory or prescribed but is an element which it is hoped, or presumed, will enter into the relationship with the passage of time. 'Dosti', as the concept which arises from marriage, results generally from personal attachment between members of both families or emanates from the realisation of the mutual benefits to be gained from the relationship. Both parties therefore have a genuine desire for its continuance and the resulting friendship may be and often is held more dearly than agnatic connections. Generally this is because one can choose one's friends but not one's agnates, secondly the support of one's friends is usually more whole-hearted and thirdly the demands of one's friends are, unlike those of one's agnates, not associated with a right or an obligation. A marriage which results

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1) Both these elements will be discussed below.

in friendship either between the fathers of the subjects involved or between the husband and his wife's brother(s) ensures the continuance of the marriage relationship and leads generally to co-operation between the two families at what ever level necessary or desirable. This is the second or other minimal gain which both parties to a marriage hope to acquire. It is of course difficult for senior males to plan for the element of friendship prior to the marriage but it is clear that common interests or activities which can be assessed beforehand provide some indication of what may be expected after the marriage. Once the marriage has taken place then it is up to the participants themselves to initiate the friendship, although this has usually been set in motion during the exchanges attached to the various ceremonies of kozda, wāda and the transference of the bride to her conjugal home etc.

'Dosti' as the concept for friendship in general may also, and often does, result from contacts other than those of a marital nature. These contacts may be brought about through work, through contact in the bazaar or tea-shops, through seasonal labour or travels etc. The friendship that is thus established may lead to a marriage which is then seen as a deepening and strengthening of the existing relationship by the added tie of affinity. Although in this case the marriage stems from the friendship and not the friendship from the marriage the expected gains or advantages from the relationship usually have instigated it and influence its continuation. Where, for example, one partner is a shop-keeper and the other a buyer or merchant and there is an exchange of services such that one supplies the other at cheaper rates or with smuggled goods and the other provides certain and continuing custom then the relationship is assured and may bring with it further marriage connections.

One of the principal uses to which affinal links are put is the creation, maintenance and consolidation of political groupings. In Afghaniya two forms of political grouping are the 'koranai' and the

'para', the interest group or faction. Both groups have in common the need, for reasons which will be given in detail in the next chapter, to overcome internal difficulties and to strengthen the ties between members. In the case of the koranai the internal friction between members caused by proximity of residence and competition for resources and the unreliability of support in other than the most extreme cases, i.e. physical violence or murder, forces those koranai members who feel that something is to be gained from the organisation to increase the cohesion of the group through internal marriages. The bonds between members are multiplied in this way and the tone of the relationship is changed from obligation to inclination by the aspects of dosti and xekhi. Similarly within the para where the members are only tied to each other by temporary mutual interest the added bond of marriage between members brings a degree of permanence and cohesion otherwise unobtainable.

As koranai membership does not extend outside the hamlet and para rarely ramify beyond neighbouring hamlets those senior males who wish to strengthen their koranai or para ties can only do so by hamlet endogamous marriages or marriages with proximate hamlets. Although the effectiveness of such ties is constantly demonstrated in the struggles over fields, debts, etc., (see below chap. 10 pp. 263 f.) their numbers, at least those made within the hamlet, are small. This would seem to indicate that the number of marriage links being made at present is sufficient for the senior males' needs, the result, as tentatively suggested above, of the koranai being replaced in some of its functions by the para, the maliks and the local government.

This does not mean that political links are only made with or within groups. Heads of families and households also seek political support by contracting marriages with other families or individuals where these have political power or authority. For example marriages with maliks, clerks, policemen etc., do occur and these secure both temporary political help and long term benefits. In these cases

proximity of residence, although desired, does not play such an important role - the rapid gathering of forces in times of need typical for koranai and para is in such cases excluded by the fact that the connection is on an individual rather than a group basis - and more distant marriages are contracted.

Economic Interests

Proximate marriages but not necessarily hamlet endogamous ones would occur if fathers were to place economic interests at the head of possible gains to be made from marriage. This is because economic support in whatever form and aid and help can best be given when both households are geographically close to each other.

That economic advantages do play a part in the choice of partners is evidenced by case studies which indicate that prior to, during and after marriages money, goods and services are being exchanged between the two parties. The actual weight given to economic interests by the fathers of marriageable boys and girls when choosing partners is difficult to assess especially as decisions are made on the basis of a number of factors. In some cases, however, it is clear that economic advantages were paramount. In two, for example, of the ten hamlets mentioned above senior males have presented their sons-in-law with land on marriage. This is not unusual but results generally from situations where the fathers-in-law have no sons and often no brothers, and can expect no sons from additional marriages [1]. The presentation of land binds the son-in-law to his father-in-law in the way that a son is bound to his father. In order that this bond may be as strong as possible fathers-in-law without male children often choose strangers or landless men from other hamlets as husbands for their daughters. Landed men or men from the hamlet would have other interests and

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1) See also E. Friedl. 1971. Dowry, Inheritance and Land Tenure. p. 135. In: Kinship. ed. J. Goody. Penguin Modern Sociology Readings. Penguin Books.

be independent of their fathers-in-law whereas strangers and landless men would live in their wives' hamlets where the fathers can ensure that they, i.e. the daughters, are treated well and where the uxorilocal residence would lead to complete integration. The economic advantages for the landless men are of course considerable and their material advancement more than compensates them for the economic and social dependence on their fathers-in-law.

Not all marriages have such clear economic advantages but the majority do serve economic interests at one stage or another. Sons-in-law, for example, are often given monetary support for the purchase of household goods or agricultural stock or equipment by their fathers-in-law and the former are usually engaged in helping the latter when extra hands are needed for ploughing, harvesting, etc. Marriage generally also facilitates borrowing of animals, equipment, radios, pots and pans etc., and jobs requiring additional labour such as house building, harvesting and 'āshar' call heavily upon affinal links. More specifically marriages enable affines, in periods of drought, to make a claim to water from an affinally related hamlet where spring water, i.e. constant water, is available. Also an owner cultivator with insufficient land for his own purposes may well be able to use his affinal connections to lay first claim to share crop the extra land of a father-in-law, son-in-law, or brother-in-law. Finally alliances between shopkeepers or between shopkeepers and buyers or truck drivers play an important role in improving the economic situation of both in the sense that I have mentioned above (see p. 205).

Monetary Gains

The monetary gain to be made from marriage, i.e. from the bride-wealth payment, does not, by contrast, benefit both sides or at least does not satisfy all parties to the contract. This is largely because there is a certain amount of shame and embarrassement attached to

both trying to obtain a wife as cheaply as possible and to trying to give away a daughter as expensively as possible. The fathers or guardians would of course never openly admit to trying to do either at least if such actions could be construed as an attempt to further monetary interests. To demand a large bride-wealth for a daughter is not shameful in itself but is rather indicative of the high prestige of the family and the honour of the girl. However to ask for too high a bride-wealth payment or to give the girl to social inferiors is dishonourable because it indicates that pecuniary interests are being placed above those of honour. Nevertheless a certain number of such marriages have taken place in Afghaniya and will continue to take place. This is understandable, given the economic conditions in Afghaniya.

The valley, as we have seen, is overpopulated, holdings are too small and job alternatives outside the community are largely inadquate. Many men are, therefore, in Afghan terms 'hungry', and it is not surprising that when the opportunity arises to acquire what is for them a very considerable sum of money and goods, i.e. the bride-wealth, that they should seek to obtain the maximum possible amount even if this should be considered dishonourable. Similarly when sons have to be married it is understandable that the fathers should, in some cases, choose non-Pakhtun girls because, as the bride-wealth payment is smaller, these can be acquired more cheaply.

In practice the monetary interests of the fathers or guardians can be pursued in a number of ways. If the 'walis' require money urgently and no other possibility for acquiring it is open to them then they will try to obtain it through the bride-wealth for their daughters. This means that the amount of the bride-wealth will play a superordinate role in the 'final decision' and that all other factors which normally would be considered, such as economic and political support, status etc., will be subordinated. This often leads to marriages between families of differing social status because those families with lower status see an opportunity in such marriages for increasing their

standing in the community and as they are prepared to sacrifice more, i.e. pay a higher bride-wealth or give a higher proportion than is usual of the bride-wealth payment in money [1], they are often successful in their suit. Similarly the girl's family's need for money and for its acquisition in a relatively short period of time make the courtship of lower status families acceptable and break down the usual inhibitions of the girl's father. The actual percentage of such marriages which take place is understandably difficult to assess because of a certain reluctance to talk about them but also because the status difference between the two families need not be and often is not so very great. The most notable exception to this was the marriage between a Pakhtun girl and a barber boy. This would seem to be the only recorded case of its kind in Afghanistan but I should think that it will not long remain so. Drought, overpopulation, and migration to cities have already begun to alter attitudes especially in areas which are not so remote and where the tribal structure is breaking down or already has broken down. In Afghaniya the marriage of a Pakhtun girl to a barber although unthinkable in other Pakhtun areas (Swat, Uruzgan, Paktia) received little public sanction, at least from the reports I received, and now (1970) there is even understanding for the Pakhtun's position, 'the barber was wealthy and aHmad Gul needed money.' In spite of this outward indifference and the attempts by some Safi to excuse or justify the Pakhtun's action by pointing to the economic imperatives of the situation - the barbers paid twice the normal amount of bride-wealth - the marriage of a Safi woman, a 'siyāla', [2] to a barber man involves the destruction of one of the most significant social boundaries in Pakhtun society.

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1) A bride-wealth payment usually consists of money and goods and the 'wife givers' always try to obtain as large a proportion of the bride-wealth as possible in money whereas the 'wife-takers' seek to give as small a proportion as possible in cash. This is because the non-cash part of the bride-wealth has a subjective value which may be raised or lowered according to need. See also below p. 235.

2) 'siyal' (f. -a) means an equal, peer; clansman, kin; like, resembling; and is used by Safi to distinguish themselves from the non-Safi professionals.

I have indicated above (p. 194 footnote 2) that women among Pakhtuns are only given to equals and superiors and the giving of a woman to the socially most inferior and least prestigious group in Afghanistan indicates the degree to which Pakhtun ideals and values have deteriorated in Afghaniya. The consequences of such an action do not, of course, stop there but have repercussions for the community as a whole. How was, for example, the Safi mother's brother going to be integrated into the barber's rites de passage, or, could economic cooperation take place even though all other Safi rejected such activities with the barbers, etc., etc. Part of the answer has been provided by the barber family itself because it has ceased doing barber's work and has attempted to change its identity (see above pp. 110 & 111) - so far without success. However a precedent, i.e. the marriage itself, has been established and may lead to further marriages between the two groups especially if the economic situation in Afghaniya continues to deteriorate.

Monetary interests may also be served, as we have seen above, by marrying sons to women for whom a lower bride-wealth will be accepted. This is most apparent in cases where Pakhtun men have married Parachi or Pashai women. Generally speaking the bride-wealth for non-Pakhtun women in the Pachoghan valley is, at the most, half that for Pakhtun women and there is, therefore, a considerable incentive for poorer men to marry their sons to such women. What prevents more men from following suit is the loss of face involved in marrying a woman purely for monetary gain and in taking a woman without 'nasb', i.e. without a genealogy and, therefore, without a lineage, factors which are of so much importance to the descent conscious Pakhtuns.

It is also possible by marrying an agnate for example the daughter of a father's brother to save money. The bride-wealth payment itself is the same or a little lower than average but the principal saving comes from the entertainment costs. These are much smaller when

both parties to the marriage are agnates because the number of people who attend the various ceremonies is much smaller than if they come from different hamlets.

A third possibility for penurious fathers is to marry their sons to widows or divorced women. Widows who are not remarried by brothers and cousins of their dead husbands (the 'levirate') - because, for example, these relatives already have wives or cannot support additional people or have no interest to marry again - generally return to their natal homes [1]. There unless they are still very young they enjoy, at least for women, a considerable degree of independence. This independence is expressed in the saying 'a widow is the 'wakil' (mandatory, envoy, or representative of one side in the marriage) of her own body or soul.' This means that she is personally responsible for accepting or rejecting offers of marriage and is thus released from the judicial authority of her father or brothers at least in this matter. This independence together with the fact that she is older - important both for its influence on her beauty and her child-bearing capability - generally mean that she chooses out of inclination or is herself chosen out of parsimony. In both cases the bride-wealth is smaller than usual and may sometimes only be a nominal sum [2].

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1) A widow may also refuse to marry a brother or other relative of her dead husband but this requires considerable courage and the support of her father and brothers if she is to be successful. If she succeeds her success only means that she must not marry certain people not that she can marry others. Her ex-husband's agnates having themselves been refused would then prevent her from marrying someone of her own choice. Generally speaking, however, widows in Afghaniya in comparison with other Pakhtun areas enjoy a considerable degree of freedom in the sense of being able to return to their natal homes and being allowed to remarry. This arises, as far as I can see, from the relatively low bride-wealth (in Uruzgan and Paktia the amount is ten times larger) paid and the perhaps less complete transference of authority and rights from the father to the husband on marriage. This however varies from family to family.
2) The bride-wealth for a widow is given partly to the dead-husband's relatives and partly to the girl's father.

Divorced women may also be acquired for smaller bride-wealth payments than other categories of women. This is not because of some stigma attached to divorced women or some condemnation of adultery (adultery is responsible for some 90 % of all divorces) although this is condemned and was formerly punished by death when the culprit(s) could be caught but rather stems from the fact that these women, like widows, have been married before, are generally older than other marriageable women and are not expected to be as fecund as younger women. Their 'value' to put it crudely has deteriorated. This is not to say that they have difficulty in finding new spouses in fact the reverse is true. In Afghaniya there is very little prejudice against divorced women - apart of course from that emanating from the ex-husbands - and the general attitude towards divorce now is one of amusement and, where the individuals concerned are known to the observers, often of malicious pleasure. When blame is attached to anyone it is generally to the husband because he, through marriage, accepted the responsibility for such a fickle being, i.e. his wife, and it was up to him to control her movements and not up to her to protect his honour. It is, therefore, easy for divorced women to remarry but when they do so the bride-wealth is usually lower than average and sometimes there may be no bride-wealth paid at all. The latter is likely to happen when the women have no fathers or responsible males and/or when the men they marry were their partners in the charge of adultery and thus brought about the divorce. These women, therefore, also provide a source of marriageable partners who can be acquired for a lower bride-wealth.

Finally fathers who have no possibility of raising sufficient money even for a minimal bride-wealth may, if they have daughters, exchange them for wives for their sons. This system 'badlun' or 'badlun' with 'sar' which will be explained below (p. 221) is not widely practised but nevertheless provides an outlet for those fathers who are obliged to find wives for their sons but have not sufficient capital to pay for the bride-wealth.

With one exception, i.e. lower costs from parallel cousin marriages, all these methods of obtaining larger bride-wealth payments or of acquiring women cheaply involve exogamous marriages. This is because the pecuniary situation of a family is generally well known in their own hamlet and the chances of succeeding in obtaining more money or a woman more cheaply there are thus very small. Also such manoeuvres elicit considerable criticism from other members of the hamlet and damage the status of the family so that they prefer to pursue these activities with other hamlets where a certain secrecy can be preserved and the result is hamlet exogamy.

I have sought so far to answer the question if senior males have the legal and socially accepted right to choose marriage partners for their sons and daughters and if hamlet endogamy is the summation of their preferences why hamlet exogamy should in practice result. No single answer or explanation could be found in the discussion which probably was not surprising. However a number of half answers emerged - lack of suitable partners in the hamlets, the relative unimportance of endogamy for the structure and organization, the adequacy of hamlet exogamy for economic needs, and the superiority of hamlet exogamous alliances for those men seeking monetary benefits. Added to this are the new, but difficult to estimate, elements of declining patriarchal power and increasing economic independence of those sons who work outside the community. Both are forcing the senior males to give greater attention to the marriage wishes of their sons and therefore increasing the frequency of hamlet exogamy. Also the rising importance and influence within the society of political organizations not based on descent, i.e. para, maliks and the local government authorities, have brought a decrease in the need for koranai, and thus for hamlet endogamous marriages. Taken together these factors have obviously been sufficient to give rise to the present preponderant hamlet exogamy and to overcome the preferences of the senior males which may now, because of the rapidity of economic change, just represent an anachronistic vestige of other needs and times.

Marriage Procedure

Initial Steps

Whatever the reasons for the difference between the preferences of the senior males and the actual marriages made, when a boy is to be married then the person responsible for him, the 'wali', usually his father, looks around for what he considers to be an eligible and desirable partner. Some of the factors involved have been already mentioned but the beauty, wit, wealth and status of the girl also play a role. The question whether the mother of the girl is alive or not is also of importance. This is relevant because if she is not it could indicate that the girl has been treated badly in her household and/or not trained well in the duties and tasks of a woman. In the light of the information which the boy's wali collects he chooses a particular girl. He then consults the rest of the family and asks for the boy's consent. The latter is usually conveyed through the mother who speaks for the boy in family consultations because if he is young he is normally too 'ashamed' to speak about the choice of a wife himself.

Having received the general approval of the family the father or wali makes contact with a friend or relative of the girl's father. This person must be someone who has always had close contact with the father of the girl and whom he respects, whose decisions he often follows and with whom he often has secret consultations, i.e. a brother, paternal or maternal uncle, or a very close friend. This person who is to become the go-between between the two families is called the 'ruibār'. It is not possible for the boy's father to go to the girl's house himself because of the 'shame' which would be attached to such an action [1]. After contact has been made the boy's wali informs the ruibār of his desire to 'have or make xekhi', a

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1) An adult male on the other hand wishing to marry may and usually does go to the girl's father without a 'ruibār'.

marriage relationship, between the two families. He then gives the boy's name to the ruibar and if the girl's father has more than one daughter he specifies which one [1].

It is now up to the ruibar to find some occasion to speak to the father of the girl and to convey the boy's father's wish to make a marriage relationship. The girl's wali if the girl has not already been promised, or is engaged, generally agrees in principle but asks for time for thought and consultation. This time is not used to persuade the girl because, providing she is young and has not been married before, she generally agrees to her wali's decision. It is the father and the other males of the household who need the time to consider the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed marriage. The ruibar, who by his acceptance of the boy's father's wish to act as a go-between demonstrates his approval of the match, uses his influence to bring about a positive outcome in the consultations. Once a decision is reached this is conveyed to the boy's father by the ruibar. They, the ruibar and the boy's father, then choose a certain day for a face to face meeting between the respective walis when the final decision or 'prekruh' will be made. It is at this stage in the proceedings that the boy tries, should his prospective bride live at some distance from him, to see her unobserved e.g. when she goes to collect water, or is near the river. Alternatively two or three women, including the boy's mother, may go to her house and there make sure that she has no physical disabilities, is well mannered, works well etc. If the two families are neighbours there is of course no need for this because the boy and the girl will, in all probability, have spent a number of years of their childhood together.

On the day of the final decision or 'prekruh' the boy's father

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1) Whereas sons are married according to age i.e. the eldest first and the youngest last - unless of course some physical disability precludes the marriage of an elder son - among sisters there is no preferred sequence of choice and the one who is asked for first is married first.

together with two or three other senior males go to the girl's father's house. The girl's wali, some males of the household and the ruibār are there. Food has been prepared and after this has been eaten the discussion starts. It is opened by the ruibār who says (roughly translated): "these people who have come, come for a purpose, namely for the purpose of xekhi and 'dosti'. Now you (the father/wali) should talk to them and decide directly what you wish". The father says, when he is willing to accept the suit: "God brought them and I am happy that they have come. I will give my daughter to them according to our custom". Then with special emphasis he says: "when I am leaving (i.e. giving) a person he should leave property" (i.e. the marriage payment). The boy's father then replies: "I am yours and my property is yours".

The discussion then begins as to the actual amount of bridewealth or 'walwar' to be paid [1]. As it is considered shameful for the father of the boy to bargain he does not participate but is nevertheless interested because he usually brings half of an estimated total with him which must be paid to the girl's father should he demand it. The men who came with the boy's father and the ruibār do the bargaining for him and try to keep the payment low. Both sides know more or less what the amount of the bride-wealth should be (1970 ca. 16,000 Afs.) and it is largely a matter of custom which does not allow the father to agree quickly and prestige which forces him into trying to persuade the other side to go above that sum which both know would be reasonable. The discussion tends to be endless but finally agreement is reached [2] and the girl's father is asked when he wishes the first payment to be made. At this point there is no bargaining and should the father so require then the boy's father will place the amount which he has brought with him in front of the girl's father's group. Otherwise payments are made at the marriage and before the wedding.

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1) 'Walwar' corresponds to the arabic 'mahr'.
2) It is possible that both fathers agree to keep the real amount of the marriage payment secret and to make public an artificially high one. In this way both families will gain prestige.

The discussion does not end there but turns to the amount, the 'xal'at' [1], which the girl's mother's brother will receive and to the 'tikri' [2] which the girl's father's sister, mother's sister and the girl's sisters will be given [3]. The date of the marriage and the question of whether the prospective bridegroom will be allowed to come to the marriage ceremony or not is also agreed upon. The absence of the groom normally occurs when the bride has not reached puberty because the marriage is generally consummated after the marriage ceremony. At the conclusion of the prekruh the girl's group gives a blessing: "we hope that she will bring grace for you and your family and that your relations will be good, and long and full of luck." Good wishes are then expressed by both sides.

The initial steps taken in acquiring a wife have been described in some detail above because I felt that they gave some idea of the processes which are involved and show with what care the marriage relationship is embarked upon. The marriage, 'kozda', and wedding, 'wāda', ceremonies [4] because of their relative complexity and the period of time which elapses between them similarly indicate that the relationship is slowly being formed and that the two groups are frequently provided with opportunities in which the suspicions and barriers to intercourse are broken down. It is perhaps not necessary to relate these activities, i.e. the marriage and the wedding, in detail here because they will be generally familiar to those who have read about or witnessed muslim marriages and weddings elsewhere. In order, however, to show the whole as a process of establishing a relationship which can be of considerable importance for the group involved a short outline of the ceremonies will be given.

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1) Also spelt 'xalāt', and means dress of honour, award, present.
2) These payments are called 'tikri' after the woman's headcloth and used to be the conventional or traditional gift. Now this has been replaced by a sum equal to the price of a tikri.
3) It is not an invariable practice to give all these women a payment.
4) The translations 'marriage' for kozda and 'wedding' for wada have been used in the absence of better ones. Neither is ideal.

Marriage

The marriage, kozda, begins with a meal for the groom and his agnates after which the various payments, xal'at and tikri, are made to the girl's relatives. Then follows the marriage ceremony itself, 'the asking and answering' [1], in which both the bride and the groom [2] establish their identities and agree formally and publicly to the choices which were made for them. The groom stays overnight and on the following day consummates the marriage [3].

A week later he returns to his father's house accompanied by some of his new affines with gifts (the kajāwa [4] consisting of chicken and bread) from his father-in-law. After a week spent at his home he goes back to his father-in-law's house this time accompanied by his father, mother and other relatives and a 'kajāwa'. From this time onwards he can visit his wife openly and freely without an escort and without gifts i.e. normal (insider) relations have been established and he has been integrated into his wife's family.

Wedding and Transfer of the Bride to her Conjugal Home

The wedding, 'wāda', follows some months or even a couple of years after the engagement depending on when the boy's father is in a position to complete the marriage payment. On the day of the wedding the boy's agnates come, shooting into the air, to the bride's house and there together with the girl's agnates have a meal. Afterwards the 'asking and answering' ceremony is repeated. The girl is then taken with an escort and with much shooting and shouting to her new conjugal home.

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1) Generally translated in law books as the 'offer' (ījāb) and the 'acceptance' (qubūl).
2) If they are young then they will have representatives who will answer for them: 'The declaration and acceptance may be made by the parties, or by their agents, if both are competent. In case of legal incompetency, like minority or unsoundness of mind, the guardians may validly enter into a contract of marriage on behalf of their wards.' Fyzee. 1949. Op.cit. p. 75.
3) Of course only when both subjects have reached puberty. 'kozda' thus corresponds to the arabic 'nikāH'.
4) Literally a camel litter.

'Freeing of the legs'

The final act of the marriage, if marriage is seen as the creation of a relationship between two previously strange and potentially hostile groups, is the "freeing of the legs", i.e. the return of the girl to her natal home. Before she can do this the girl must obtain her husband's permission because the transference of the girl to her conjugal home has also marked and involved the transference of authority from her father to her husband. She then goes with gifts to her father's house and after a stay of some days or weeks returns to her new home again bringing with her gifts [1] this time from her father. After this ceremony she may return to her parents' and natal home whenever she has received her husband's permission to do so but without the ceremony and gift giving which accompanied it previously. Thus she too has normalised her relations with her husband's family and has been at least outwardly accepted.

Alternative or Aberrant Forms of Marriage

The marriage, consisting of prekruh, kozda, wāda and the 'freeing of the legs' ceremonies, which I have briefly described above, may be seen as the standard form of marriage occurring among the Safi of Afghaniya. Not all marriages, however, follow these lines and some vary quite considerably from the 'typical' form. Four forms are interesting because of the influence which they may and sometimes do have on the relationships which are supposed to be established through marriage. The first two differ principally from the norm because the marriage payment instead of being a sum of money consists of the woman herself or of groom service. The other two are different because they come about, at least initially, Without the consent of the wali's.

1) These gifts are a cow and a 'dostar xān' or bread cloth. The symbolism of these gifts is interesting. As milk is vital for young children the girl's father is indicating his interest in them as well as ensuring their survival. The 'dostar xān' is linked with bread, a woman's activity, and is a symbol of commensuality the family gathering around it for meals.

Exchange Marriage

The first form is the 'badlun' [1] or exchange marriage. Here a marriage is contracted by the walis of the women coming to an agreement whereby their daughters or sisters are exchanged without bride-wealth changing hands. The persons of the women themselves are regarded as the 'walwar' or bride-wealth. This system has the practical advantage of enabling an impecunious father to marry his son through the exchange of his (son's) sister for another woman. It is of course necessary to find a man in a similar position and with a daughter of marriageable age but this latter difficulty may be overcome. In the case of one girl in the exchange being too young to consummate the marriage an exchange called 'badlun' with 'sar' is arranged. The guardian of the immature girl will give an agreed sum of money [2], the 'sar' or head, to the other wali. This is then held as a form of surety that the girl will in fact be given. When the girl reaches puberty and the arrangements are being made for the wedding the other girl's wali must return the sar payment.

Generally this form of marriage whether badlun or badlun with sar is disliked especially by the women concerned and their mothers because if one girl is treated badly then the family of the other feels forced to reciprocate. Even where the woman may be a good wife and dutiful daughter-in-law the bad treatment of one leads inexorably to the bad treatment of the other.

According to the law books this form of marriage, called 'shighar' in arabic, is illegal. This is because of the absence of the bride-wealth payment [3]. In Islam the most important clause of the

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1) 'Badlun' means literally exchange. It also means 'revenge' or 'retaliation' which is, of course, also an exchange. The association of badlun with exchange marriages and with revenge may, however, also be the result of the earlier practice of using women as blood money to prevent retaliation or to bring a feud to an end.
2) This sum is usually between 2,000 and 5,000 Afs. It may, however, be as high as 10,000 Afs.
3) See Levy, R. 1969. The Social Structure of Islam. p. 105. Cambridge University Press.

marriage contract is that concerning the value and character of the 'mahr' or bridewealth. Where the person of the woman is the bridewealth then the marriage is regarded as invalid. However as the 'mahr' is also regarded by the legal schools of Islam as a payment to the bride and not, as in pre-Islamic times and in Afghaniya, to the father or kinsmen of the bride the 'walwar' payment practised among the Safi is also illegal [1]. The point is perhaps that as in other matters concerning Islam deviations do occur and the demands of the law books are either ignored or are contravened in innocence of the existence of such laws.

A similar situation arises when a wife is acquired through groom service (pa xidmat lor war kawal). Here again the marriage payment, mahr, does not consist of a fixed sum but is the service (xidmat) carried out by the potential groom for his father-in-law. The length of this service can be from two to eight or even ten years and involves working the land of the father-in-law free of charge until the agreed number of years has been fulfilled.

Sometimes, in the past, a future son-in-law would do his father-in-law's military service for him and afterwards receive his daughter in return. Such service no longer occurs and seems to have been replaced by work as a landless labourer, often together with the girl's father, in Afghan Turkestan. This, because of the higher wages paid, can mean that a fatherless and/or penniless or propertyless man can acquire a wife after two years work.

As may be imagined the relations between son-in-law and father-in-law are generally not the same when a wife has been obtained through work rather than through a normal walwar payment. The prestige of the son-in-law is from the beginning lower and the father's right to

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1) In pre-Islamic times the bridewealth payment consisted of two parts: the 'mahr' paid to the father or nearest kinsman of the girl and the 'sadaq' paid to the girl herself. At the time of the Prophet the payments were to the girl alone and 'mahr' and 'sadaq' became interchangeable terms. See Levy, 1969. Op. cit. p. 95.

give orders to his future son-in-law does not produce the best of relationships and often causes strain. However this is tempered by the fact that the father-in-law is usually of low status himself, i.e. has little economic and political power, otherwise he would not accept groom service as a substitute for the walwar. Whatever the subsequent relationships both groom service and 'badlun' marriage fulfil the important function of enabling men without fathers and/or property to marry and to have children processes which otherwise would be closed to them.

Marriage without the Consent of the walis

The other two forms of marriage or of making marriage contracts may be classified as those occurring without the consent of the walis or guardians of the principals. Both forms are motivated by a hinderance or hinderances to the marriage of a boy and girl who are mutually attracted to one another. The hinderance may be caused by the poverty of the boy's family, the desire by the girl's father to give her to someone else, or the lack of interest or lethargy on the part of the boy's father. Whatever the reason the boy and girl determine to take matters into their own hands.

In one form the girl, on a pre-arranged night, leaves her father's house taking her clothes and jewelry with her and goes, accompanied by the boy, to his father's house where she remains until the marriage. This is called 'posi takhtedal' or to 'fly out after' because when it becomes known that the girl has left her own home then the people say "that girl flew out after such and such a person". The girl may also, if she has the opportunity, go during the daytime to the boy's house and, once there, say that the boy is her husband.

The second form called 'nārah' (proclamation or announcement) although achieving the same end is in one respect fundamentally

different from the one mentioned above. The girl in this case does not leave her own home but says to all and sundry that such and such a person is her husband and that all other men are like brothers to her, i.e. as she cannot marry her brothers she cannot marry them either.

In both these cases, although the girl's father is obliged to give his daughter to the boy, a 'maraka', or conciliatory delegation, consisting of the boy's father, elders of the hamlet and a malik, is sent to his house. The maraka is, or may be, seen as a substitute for the ruibār in the normal marriage and also it is there, especially when the 'posi takhtedal' form has occurred, to save the father's honour [1]. This is clearly indicated when the maraka on meeting the father says: 'We become (or, are) your face', i.e. their presence retrieves the father's lost honour by giving the impending marriage a more official and normal character. They then decide with the father on the amount of the marriage payment. This is usually in such cases half the normal sum but always less than the full price [2].

After the maraka and the father have come to a decision about the amount of bride-wealth to be paid the next stages of the marriage get under way. These are, however, different for the 'nārah' and 'posi takhtedal' forms. In the case where the girl has already left her father's or guardian's house, i.e. in the 'posi takhtedal' form only the 'kozda', or marriage ceremony is performed because the wedding ceremony, involving as it does the transference of the bride from her natal to her conjugal home and the transference of authority from the father to the husband has lost its function. In the nārah form the girl has remained within her own home and the

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1) It is also in the best interests of the boy's father to assemble a maraka otherwise the girl's father could complain to the government that his daughter had been removed forcibly from his house.

2) The situation among the Atsakzai Durrani nomads would seem to be very different (see Glatzer. 1977. Op.cit. p. 140). There the bride-wealth, at least in the nārah case, can be as high as the family of the girl wish to demand and the family of the boy must pay it. As a result as soon as the boy's family become aware of the possibility of such an action they do all they can to prevent it.

marriage and wedding can proceed in the usual manner.

Such marriages contracted as they are through coercion cannot lead to the sort of relationships which should exist between families after a marriage. In the case of the 'posi takhtedal' marriage the removal of the girl from her father's qalā, even if this was achieved through the daughter's flight, represents, because it could only be made with the boy's and the boy's father's concurrence, both a violation of the sanctity of the qalā and of the girl's father's honour. This is the rape of the centre and arouses the strongest possible feelings. In the 'nārah' case the situation is not quite so extreme because the girl at least remains within her own qalā and the father is not subjected, to the same extent, to the sarcasm and schadenfreude of neighbours and villagers. Nevertheless nārah represents initially a challenge to, and because it is successful, the temporary destruction of the father's authority within his family and assures a loss of face within the hamlet.

In both cases then the logical order of the society has been overthrown, boundaries have been ignored and barriers breached. The order needs to be reestablished and the effectiveness of the boundaries reaffirmed. In Afghaniya, however, after the initial shock and anger the reaction of the girl's family is rather one of disappointment. They feel that they have been black-mailed by the girl and outwitted and treated badly by their prospective son-in-law. The boy's father, they argue, although he must have known what his son was proposing to do did not interfere obviously placing monetary advantage, i.e. a smaller bride-wealth payment, above the girl's father's honour. This rather 'tame' reaction from members of an ethnic group famed for their explosive, uncompromising and bloody temperament is rather surprising but is explainable because of the poverty and decline in authority of some patriarchs in Afghaniya and increasingly because of the government's presence in Nijrao. In the four cases of such marriages which I recorded (from a total of 406 marriages) all the

fathers of the girls were poor and it was generally agreed in the community that 'posi takhtedal' or 'nārah' marriages would be unthinkable in economically and politically powerful families. The daughters of such men just did not run off or attempt to challenge their fathers' authority.

In other families, then, where it is possible, and these would seem to be on the increase, the girl's action involves the father in considerable loss of honour and prestige. It is true that during the marriage and, where this takes place, the wedding, the two families become relatives and the father's honour and the order of society are to some extent restored nevertheless only the passage of time can put this loss to rights. What, however, sometimes happens is that where relations are proving to be satisfactory between the two families a further marriage with a woman going in the other direction will be made to finally reestablish the disturbed balance.

After a normal marriage where the procedure is dominated by the respect for social boundaries, by the ritual removal of barriers and by the maintenance and substantiation of the order of the society no such reestablishment is necessary.

At the beginning of these procedures it is true that the formality is so considerable that a go-between, the ruibār, is required but then later the senior agnates of both sides meet to decide upon the amount of bride-wealth to be paid. It is interesting here that although the boy's father is present he does not bargain because it is considered shameful to do so. It would also lead, although this is never expressed, to a head on collision between the two fathers over the bride-wealth payment which would not be conducive to the establishment of good relations. Later the agnates meet less formally at the marriage when the girl's agnates act as the hosts and at the various bride-wealth payments prior to the wedding. Finally, at the wedding itself, they sit and eat out of the same bowls

thus proclaiming their compatability and friendship. During this whole period gifts, the 'kajāwas', and people are going backwards and forwards between the two houses. The path between them is literally worn smooth by the passage of people and, as the boy's 'legs are untied' and then later those of the girl, a degree of informality enters into the relationship which is characteristic of affinity. After the marriage, i.e. both kozda and wāda, these visits continue as we have seen and form the basis of the relationship between both families.

Dyadic Relations

Of central importance, of course, to the ultimate success of a marriage relationship between the two affinally linked groups is the degree of compatibility between the two principals, the husband and wife. No matter how good the relations, for example, between the two fathers (of the bride and groom) may be, should the couple be antipathetic and should this lead to incessant quarrelling and fighting, then the whole relationship will be affected [1] and may finally be destroyed.

The husband because of his social and legal majority - he is generally responsible for his wife, for the formation of her character and for the consequences of her actions - as well as the latitude allowed him by the society, is the one primarily responsible for any discord which occurs in the marriage. The wife is younger, economically dependent, physically and normatively constrained and is brought up to have much greater tolerance for her husband's actions than he has for hers. Nevertheless should this tolerance level be reached then she can make life very unpleasant for him. Such a situation can arise if the husband

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1) The conflict is removed outside the limits of a marital squabble once the girl appeals for support to her father and/or brothers. The extent of their response depends on the importance of the tie and the justice of the girl's complaint. Should the link be important then they usually reject her appeal. They cannot, however, and do not remain continually indifferent to her needs and if the conflict continues and the girl's complaint is justified then they intervene more rigorously and take her part.

constantly ill-treats her - i.e. goes beyond the limits of his socially recognised rights to scold or beat her should she cook his food badly, disregard his orders, fight with his brothers' wives or neighbours' wives etc. etc. - or has a girl friend elsewhere. In these cases the wife has a range of possibilities open to her to show her displeasure. She can work badly, secretly use her husband's grain to buy jewelry and cloth from travelling salesmen [1], sell other household objects, spend her husband's money without necessity, struggle, quarrel and fight with him and in the last resort take a lover herself. Such drastic action is, however, not always necessary and in the case of her husband's adultery she can often receive the help of her father and brothers who put pressure on the husband to alter his ways or set his wife free. Of course in spite of the husband's absolute authority over his wife, there are hen-pecked husbands and dominant wives but such cases rarely lead to the break up of the marriage and the destruction of the relationship.

Generally speaking although discord, cases of adultery and divorce would seem to occur more frequently in Afghaniya than in other Pakhtun areas [2] the vast majority of marriages would seem, at least outwardly, to be satisfactory for both parties and, therefore, to be conducive to the furtherance of the relationship between the two groups. This is due in part to the husband's absolute authority but it is also due to the modesty of the girl's wishes as regards her future husband's character and the ease with which the husband's ideals concerning his future wife may be met.

In the former case the wife hopes that her husband will grow fond of her, not beat her without reason, not be quarrelsome with

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1) All women secrete a certain amount of grain, in order to purchase hair pins or jewelry for themselves, but this is grain which they have gathered from among the stubble after the harvest. To sell the husband's grain for this purpose is considered a grave misdeed.

2) 'Divorce, though legally simple for the man, is regarded as very shameful and in fact extremely rare'. Barth. 1965. Op.cit. pp. 39 & 40.

others, do his work, and concern himself with his own affairs, i.e. with the running of the household and the proper cultivation of his land holding. Were she to be given a choice then she would prefer in addition a young and handsome husband but as the girl's father is often primarily interested in the size of the marriage payment a wealthier but older man is usually her lot. A wealthy man, however, also has positive attributes because the girl will generally have an easier life in his household with less work, better food and more expensive clothes.

In the case of the boy's wishes as to the character of his future bride these are usually taken into consideration, - especially if the father is wealthy and the prospective father-in-law has more than one daughter - because they represent norms accepted by all the men and as it is the men who do the choosing then the chances of them being fulfilled are considerable. These characteristics are beauty [1], fidelity, gentleness and tractability, she should also be good at her work and treat her husband with honour. If these characteristics are present and the husband treats his wife considerately then there is every chance of the marriage being a stable and even perhaps a happy one. Such a marriage link based on stable ties between the principals waits to be used and can be of considerable importance to the groups thus joined.

This is, of course, not the only relationship established by marriage. Sets of dyadic relations are brought into being some of which can and often do prove to be valuable and others, when they are satisfactory, ensure that at the very least relations are maintained. One such set are the relations between the married couple and the respective 'xusarGani', the father-in-law's side or relatives. This term distinguishes these relatives from the bride's or groom's 'plārGani' (father's relatives, or agnates) and 'xpulwān' (own

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1) Whereas men with physical or mental disabilities are able to acquire wives without difficulty women who are ugly usually go unmarried.

relatives [1] [2] (see diag. 28 p. 231).

Woman's xusarGani

The amount of contact which a woman has with her 'xusarGani' (see diag. 29 p. 231) depends on whether she lives in an extended family household or an elementary family one. In both cases, however, because of the proximity of agnatic households her principal contacts through her daily activities are with her mother-in-law, sisters-in-law and where present co-wives, rather than with the males of her 'xusarGani' [3]. Her relations with her husband's mother are of primary importance, because she is the most influential person in the women's domain and with her son and the one who can be most critical and, therefore, most damaging to the girl's reputation as wife and mother. The girl usually seeks to gain her mother-in-law's favour by being helpful and pleasant and by deferring in all things to her. However the husband's mother cannot be too hard or too dictatorial because she knows that a time may come - on the death of her husband - when she will have to take up residence in her daughter-in-law/son's house where past ills can be repaid with interest [4]. Relations, therefore, are generally equable.

Similarly relations between co-wives, at least initially, would seem to be satisfactory. This occurs because husbands usually seek the permission of their wives before marrying again and also because the presence of another woman means less work for the first wife.

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1) This is a broad term which seems to include agnates and cognates, (although there is an extra term for mother's male relatives, 'mamaGan'), as well as fellow villagers.
2) The boundaries of these groups, especially in cases of village endogamy, are very difficult to establish with any accuracy and members can and do belong to all three.
3) The girl behaves to her husband's father as she would to her own father, i.e. with respect and deference and to her brothers-in-law as she would to her brothers even addressing them, i.e. in the vocative form, in the same way.
4) The wife is responsible for the division of food after the men have eaten and the amount and quality which the mother-in-law receives depends on the warmth of the relations between them.



28. plārGani and related xpulwān



29. A Woman's 'xusarGani'

Trouble, however, often arises when the new wife, referred to by the first wife as 'nawakai' (bride), has a son and the mothers begin to direct their attentions to promoting the interests of their respective sons [1]. Under such circumstances relations can be strained and even the actions of a strong and authoritarian husband only mean that the hostilities are suspended in front of him but are otherwise carried on behind his back.

No such tension exists between a girl and her husband's sisters because there are no grounds for tension. They are not competitors in any way and the sisters are not permanent residents in the households but the future founders of families elsewhere. Their relations, therefore, are similar to those between real sisters, warm but short.

Man's xusarGani

The relations of the man with his xusarGani (see diag. 30 p. 233) also vary but whereas the girl as an 'outsider' is dependent and must accomodate herself to the wishes of her new relatives in her conjugal home the boy initially remains within his natal home and can, therefore, regulate his relations with his affines as he or his father sees fit. The two principal sets of relations for him are those with his father-in-law and with his brother(s)-in-law.

In the former case their first official contact is at the engagement and here they have little to say to each other [2]. Afterwards when the boy visits his wife there is a degree of formality which may never really disappear. This is indicated by the fact that the son-in-law always addresses his father-in-law as 'xusar' (father-in-law) whereas the girl calls her husband's father 'akā' [3] (father's

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1) Afghan history, but especially that of the royal family is full of the intrigues and struggles between co-wives and half-brothers.
2) I am not referring here to the marriages of adult males but to the first marriages of dependent youths.
3) p.t.o. to p. 234.



Diag. 30. A man's xusarGani

brother) showing respect but also a greater warmth of relationship. In some cases where, for example, the girl's father has no sons of his own the relationship may be very different. Generally, however, the boy and his father-in-law can and do help each other economically and practically as we have seen above at least during the period, which may be some years, between the marriage and the transference of the girl to her conjugal home. Generally the strength of the relationship between the two is dependent on the needs of the participants, on the distance which separates their houses, and on the extent to which the father-in-law exploits his son-in-law in the initial stages of marriage. The saying "when a person finds a son-in-law he sells his donkey" is perhaps significant.

As far as needs and propinquity are concerned much the same may be said for the relations between the husband and his brother(s)-in-law. If both require help and live close to one another then the affinal tie will be of use to them. There is usually no formality between them although if one is older than the other then he will be called 'dādā' a term used otherwise for elder brother. At its best this relationship is characterised by reciprocal help, at its worst by absence of intercourse.

Probably the most unusual relationship between the boy and a member of his xusarGani, at least seen from the viewpoint of our culture, is that between the son-in-law and his mother-in-law. I have mentioned above that boys prefer to marry girls from other hamlets because in these cases the mothers-in-law are kinder and more thoughtful in their treatment of their sons-in-law than those who are physically and structurally close. As the majority of marriages are

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3) Pakhto has both descriptive kinship terms and terms which are used when addressing these kin. The girl's father-in-law, for example, is also her 'xusar' but she addresses him as 'akā', father's brother. This form of address is particularly interesting in terms of the discussion above about the preference for the Fa.Br.Da. marriage. Its usage by the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law may reflect this ideal.

hamlet exogamous then the mother-in-law/son-in-law relationship is usually good and one which is remembered, especially by the men, with pleasure and has important repercussions for the relations between husband and wife. The reasons for this were mentioned briefly above but I would like here to go into a little more detail.

After the marriage ceremony is over the groom consummates the marriage in his bride's house and remains there for some three to seven days. It is during this time that the mother-in-law endears herself to the son-in-law. The bride's house is generally full of curious younger children and possesses no special bridal suite. Normally one or two rooms serve as the sleeping quarters for a family. The consummation of a marriage with a young, shy and often frightened girl by an unsure and embarrassed boy is under these circumstances rather difficult. It is the mother-in-law who keeps the brothers and sisters away, calms the wife, looks after the lamp so necessary for finding the way, brings the girl to her husband's bed when the others are asleep, wakes them up before dawn, provides them with water and privacy for washing after intercourse and before prayers etc., etc., in fact she makes most things possible and generally smooths out all the problems which arise. This she continues to do during the period which elapses from the 'untying of the boy's legs' until the wedding and the transfer of the bride.

It is also the mother-in-law who tries to reduce her husband's demands over the matter of the bridewealth. This is particularly important in the later stages of the payment when the funds of the boy's father are running low and when there is much debate and discussion over the estimated and real value of an ox, radio, gun etc. In the family consultations which precede payments it is the mother-in-law who temporizes the wishes of her husband and sometimes manages to get the price of the animals or objects in question set well above the bazaar price, i.e. so that the payment

is more easily fulfilled [1]. Her main argument and that which often tends to be successful is that if her husband takes so much property and money from the boy's father then their daughter will only be able to look at the four bare walls of her new home [2]. Although the mother is principally concerned for the welfare of her daughter this concern also works to the advantage of the son-in-law. Whatever the amount the mother-in-law manages to get reduced from the marriage payment the mother-in-law/son-in-law relationship is certainly the warmest and least selfish relationship which emerges from an affinal connection. It is, however, of short duration because although it is never forgotten it is difficult to put to use once the girl has left her natal home.

All dyadic relationships established through marriage will be impermanent if they are neglected. A weak tie, however, may be revived on the birth of children because through such births the two groups come together again not only for celebrating the birth but, in the case of a male child, for the later circumcision as well. The family which gave a daughter may also use the occasion to claim a daughter in return thus strengthening the bond. Of course such an action is only taken when the previous affinal bond is considered worthy of continued cultivation.

The opposite effect is achieved by divorce. The majority of divorces in Afghaniya result from adultery (see above p. 213) and this leads not only to the break up of the family but also to the destruction of the relationship between the girl giving and girl taking groups.

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1) If, for example, the bazaar price of a good ploughing ox is 5,000 Afs. and of a sheep 1,500 Afs. then those may together be considered as having a bride price value of 8,000 Afs. although in reality their worth is only 6,500 Afs. Thus the boy's father is saved 1,500 Afs. marriage payment when he hands over the ox and the sheep to the girl's father.
2) In Afghaniya unlike other Pakhtun areas the bride receives no dowry from her father. The carpets, bedding, pots etc. must also be purchased or provided by the boy's father. It must be noted, however, that the marriage payment in Afghaniya is very much smaller than that, for example, among the Atsakzai in Uruzgan where the father may be on the verge of poverty after completing bride-wealth payments.

Conclusion

In general it would seem that the strength and utility of an affinal link depends upon the willingness of the families or individuals concerned to foster that link. The marriage itself can only bring the members of the two families together, eliminate formality, and establish relations, it cannot force the affines to utilise the bond. If they do use it, and this is usually what they intend to do otherwise they would not have made it, it can be of considerable importance both for mutual help in the economic and social fields and for providing alternatives to agnation in the political field. Paradoxically just because it is so strong and is of such value the men are wary of it because they feel that it may strike at, what they consider to be the very roots, the essential support and ordering element of their society - agnation. This is why they generally allow the affinal links to weaken over the years by neglecting the obligations of visiting and prestations, why they put forward the excuse that these obligations are oppressive and burdensome and why they also say about marriage: 'xekhi is the way of a thousand years', i.e. it takes a thousand years of visiting to establish the relationship.

10. POLITICAL GROUPS AND COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES

If the relationship established by marriage is as difficult and arduous to maintain as Safi males suggest and if agnation constitutes the central element of their society then political groups founded on the common descent of members from one ancestor should be the dominant political groups in the community. Whilst this may have been the case in the past (see above p.139) the political aspects of descent groups are now only represented by the minor lineage and the local descent group, the koranai. Other groups created by individual interests, proximity of residence and marriage ties, the 'para', and those formed by and surrounding the leaders of the community, the maliks, have become just as important and are usurping some of those functions which used to be the prerogatives of descent. Whether these new groups will ultimately replace the old ones it is impossible to say, but certainly the senior males' ideal of political groups formed only by the ties of agnation is faced now by a reality in which groups are brought into being not only by common descent but also by the ties and obligations of marriage, spatial proximity and personal interest.

This does not mean that the political structure of Safi society is only now in the process of change. The Safi have never really been politically isolated from the 'wider society' but have been influenced by it and have on occasion influenced it themselves. However the present governmental penetration into, and administration of, the area must represent the most direct and most profound political change so far experienced and this has brought a loss of political autonomy and a period of political instability reflected in the proliferation and impermanence of political groups. It is, therefore, impossible to talk about a political 'system' in the sense of a harmonious, homogenous and timeless entity but only of a system characterised by fluidity and ambiguity.

In this chapter I will look at the political groups in Afghaniya, - the

descent group or koranai, the faction or para, and the hamlet - and omit for the next chapter the groups formed by and around maliks. Then I will turn to the causes and cases of conflict and through these case studies convey the functions and something of the essentially dynamic nature of the political system.

Political Groups

The koranai

The koranai has been discussed in some detail in chapter 7 and to some extent in chapter 9 and although the aspects analysed were mainly non-political they also have relevance here because it is through them that the koranai acquires the cohesion and solidarity necessary for political action.

The first and most evident aspect creating cohesion in the koranai is common descent from a founding ancestor. This ancestor is at some two to five generations from the living members and gives his name to the group. As a result of the different generational depths koranai vary considerably in size and in power, those with the most members generally being the most powerful, although there is now a tendency for the largest koranai to be particularly susceptible to fragmentation. Such powerful koranai are usually to be found in hamlets where the vast majority of the inhabitants are members of one minor lineage and where the non-lineage members consist of only one or two families. Where there are a number of minor lineages or large stranger groups the numbers of koranai are large and their membership consequently small. Nevertheless in all hamlets if a koranai is small but united and determined it can generally achieve just as much as a larger but less well-knit group.

The second factor furthering solidarity among koranai members is proximity of residence. Most members, as we have seen above,

live in the same qalā, in adjoining qalās or neighbouring ones (see map VIII p. 136 and map IX p. 242). In this way agnates are also neighbours and the ties binding neighbours, i.e. lending and borrowing, visiting, attending marriages and funerals, and religious festivities also bind them.

Thirdly as the land-holdings of members are contiguous (see map IX p. 242) solidarity is also promoted by a common place of work. When working their fields or irrigating their crops members are usually in sight and sound of one another and consequently gossip and occasionally eat together. Proximity also means that if disputes occur with members of other koranai about times and turns for irrigation water members are near at hand and ready to support their party. Also when āshar are to be held it is the agnates/ neighbours who constitute the most reliable and most consistently used āsharGuri [1].

Finally koranai are held together by their members' respect for agnatic/Pakhtun ideals and values. The 'real' relationship (as opposed to that of affinity), they say, is the 'relation of the bone', i.e. agnation. A person who has honour (nanG) and courage (gherat) and wishes to be a good muslim and a good Pakhtun must whole-heartedly support the principle and fact of agnation. If he does so then he receives all the accolades and approbation of the society, if he does not, then criticism and censure are his part. Whilst this may have been the case in the past it now represents an ideal which few follow. Most men admit this freely and see it as a reaction to the changed economic circumstances, the presence of the central government in Nijrao and, in their opinion, the increasing persuasiveness and effectiveness of affinal connections. All, however, say that when blood is flowing and there is killing then all those who 'share the bone must follow the bone'. There is then no excuse or reason strong enough to absolve members from this responsibility.

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1) See above chap. 6 pp. 86-88.

Koranai groups, therefore, are principally united by common descent, by proximity of residence, by place of work and by Pakhtun/agnatic ideals. Nevertheless these are not always sufficient to hold the group together or to ensure total support in all political activities. This is because the very forces which bring cohesion - agnatic and spatial proximity - also cause division in daily life. Those with whom one is continually in contact, for example, are the ones with whom one has the most frequent opportunities for quarreling. Also problems of inheritance principally arise between those who are agnatically related. Finally members are more interested in acquiring the adjoining fields of agnates than the fields of members of other hamlets because the former are easier to work and irrigate and are a natural extension of their own fields (see map IX p. 242). For these and other reasons members who feel that greater cohesion and solidarity are necessary will marry their daughters into their koranai. The numbers of such ties is not great, as we have seen, but they would seem to have an effect, at least initially, out of all proportion to their frequency binding members together in a way which does not seem possible merely through bonds of descent. It is, therefore, surprising that they are not more frequently initiated. Part of the reason may be that just because they are so strong they do not need to be created to excess. Also, of course, koranai and village exogamy, as we have seen, would seem to offer more than koranai endogamy to the senior males. Another reason is undoubtedly the unwillingness of many patriarchs to strengthen the links to people with whom they most frequently quarrel which is the case with agnates. Finally many members argue that the koranai functions adequately without additional connections and that these can be better used to create relationships elsewhere. Nevertheless when marriages are made within koranai they can be of considerable importance for the cohesion and political effectiveness of these groups.

Such solidarity was of major importance in the past when the koranai's principal functions were to revenge the death of



Map IX. The Relations between koranai Membership and the Location of qalās and Fields.

PAGE

MISSING

IN

ORIGINAL

members [1], to defend the group's honour and to provide support in struggles over land, women and money. Today the presence of the local government in Nijrao has inhibited killings and when they nevertheless occur the tendency now is, in spite of Pakhtun ideals exhorting koranai solidarity and vengeance, not to take revenge but to place the case in the hands of the waluswal. As a result the revenge aspect of the koranai has atrophied but assistance when members are involved in dissension and conflict is still forthcoming. It would seem, however, in the largest koranai that the elimination of revenge as the most demanding function of the koranai has weakened its whole structure because the ties between more distant members are no longer as imperative as they were. Help is, in these cases, no longer automatic and wholehearted, although there are exceptions, and the koranai's internecine struggles are often allowed to reach a destructive level which inhibits any unity of action against outside forces. Members, therefore, tend increasingly to turn to other groups where support is exchanged for the achievement of particular interests and goals, or where members are bound through marriage alone.

The para

Such groups are generally called 'para' although the term 'junba' may also be used on occasion. Both terms mean group, grouping or faction and refer to groups which have a purely political function. Para are to be found within all hamlets in the community and like koranai they vary considerably in size. They nevertheless have structural and functional equivalence. Membership in para is not acquired by birth but results from participation in political action. Once, for example, a dispute or struggle occurs within a hamlet then those members who are not automatically involved, such as the minimal koranai (father, son(s) and brothers) of the disputants,

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1) This still continues to be the koranai's principal function in other Pakhtun areas notably Paktia. '... man kann jedoch mit Sicherheit sagen, daß der Kreis der Blutrachepflichtigen auf jeden Fall innerhalb der joined family (koraney) zu suchen ist. Fa, So, Br und FaBr und BrSo gehören dazu, obwohl die vorzügliche Fehdeeinheit Fa, So, Br sind.' Sigrist. 1970. Op.cit. p. 8.

may take sides. It is this process of taking sides which creates the para.

The reasons why fellow villagers should participate are multiple and vary from case to case but there would seem to be five principal ones. Firstly there are the concrete gains members hope will accrue from their support. As most struggles involve land, i.e. the control over resources, the successful conclusion of such conflict brings rewards and villagers who take part are usually promised some monetary recompense. Whether they receive it or not is another matter but the chance of acquiring something is in most cases sufficient incentive. Also when support is given but the promised reward withheld the supporters nevertheless have a claim to reciprocation which they can utilise on some other occasion.

Secondly assistance will be given if it is considered by potential supporters that participation will serve their own interests best. If, for example, they can thus secure a powerful ally or a person who is in a key position or what they consider to be a key position i.e. clerk, policeman, etc. then they will see their support as furthering these interests and as a sort of investment for the future.

Thus and thirdly support in general creates an obligation in those who are supported. At some future date when their supporters are themselves involved in strife then this backing must or should be reciprocated. It is therefore a kind of insurance which families, whose alternative political support is weak, can take out.

Fourthly participation in a para can be used as a means of opposing, weakening or diminishing the political importance of a particularly powerful man or group. It is also a method whereby dissatisfaction can be expressed with one's own leadership or koranai by opposing them, when occasion arises, in a para. As will be shown below in chap. 11 on leadership this is a method commonly used for checking the power of maliks and it can be very effective.

Of course the reverse can happen i.e. should people's interests be coupled with the social or political advance of a particular person then when he is involved in disputes they will bolster his following in order that his success will also ultimately be theirs.

Finally and probably the strongest cause for participation are marriage links between members. This may be most clearly seen in the case of outsiders. The majority of strangers who settle down in a hamlet feel themselves obliged, if a marriage was not the original cause of settlement, to marry into the hamlet. Such ties usually ensure that when one family is under pressure support will be given by the other. Thus a para may be created by marriage. Marriage may on the other hand strengthen and make more permanent relations between groups of families which have on other occasions joined in the pursuit of particular goals. They thus imbue what we shall see as the impermanent para with some degree of stability.

The degree of permanence exhibited by para varies considerably. Generally once the conflict is past then the para having served their purpose break up. This is because the para normally has no non-political functions and because members make choices in time and according to specific gains to be made and to the constellation of opponents. Other conflicts usually occur at other times, over other interests and between different disputants. The para should reflect this impermanence in its own transience and to a large extent it does but there are exceptions and not only those caused by ties of marriage.

The para is rather like a nut, i.e. a kernel surrounded by an outer shell. The outer shell is represented by the supporters who make choices about participation only when confrontation has arisen. They respond to rather than initiate action. The kernel on the other hand is made up of the initiators of the action to which the others respond. Whilst it is true that conflict can occur between any individuals or groups case studies of disputes showed that confrontation happened more frequently between certain individuals and groups than between others and that some groups rarely if ever involved themselves as

initiators or supporters in confrontation [1]. There are therefore specific individuals or groups - usually the larger landowners - who are more involved in competition for resources and power than are the others and who, as a result, require support more often than do the others. Whether the support comes as the result of hoped for gains, or of self-interest, an obligation, as I have indicated above, is nearly always created. Thus when confrontation reoccurs there is a tendency to support the same core individual or group again whether the obligation was reciprocated or not rather than to cancel the debt or the new relationship by supporting one's previous opponents. In this way, but especially if ties of marriage also exist, some para in some villages achieve a high degree of stability.

The majority, however, continue to be impermanent which is both the weakness and the strength of the para. It is its weakness because it results in uncertainty of support. Whereas koranai members are obliged by agnatic ideals to assist their fellow members - whether they do or not is another matter - para members may chose to give aid. It is its strength because of the resulting flexibility, the ability to adjust to situations and events and to combat the ambitions of individuals or groups which have become too powerful. Also it is this flexibility which enables para to cope so successfully with the present rapid change and as a result to provide feasible and realistic alternatives to the koranai [2]. They would, therefore, seem to be, at least within hamlets, the political group of the future although the 'minimal' koranai - father, son and brothers - will continue to provide in the majority of cases the hard core around which, should more supporters be neccessary, the para will be formed.

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1) This is also the case with koranai, see below p. 249.
2) 'In situations of rapid social change, factions frequently arise - or become more clearly defined - because factional organization is better adapted to competition in changing situations than are the political groups that are characteristic of stable societies'. Nicholas, R. 1966. Segmentary factional political systems. p. 55. In: Political Anthropology. Eds. Swartz, Turner, and Tuden. Aldine Publishing Co. Chicago.

Mechanics of Amalgamation and Division

At the moment para and koranai exist side by side and are utilised or called into being by members at need. There is no division whereby koranai only compete with koranai or para with para. Groups form, combine with others, i.e. para with koranai or vice versa, and divide and disintegrate at will. The latter situation when it involves a koranai is generally registered with dismay at least by those not directly profiting in political terms from the division. This is because it points, especially when its cause is the opposition of brothers, to a further decline in agnatic and Pakhtun ideals. The splintering of a para, or of combinations of para and koranai, elicits no such response because it is expected. As a result of the fluidity and impermanence of the para and combinations of para and koranai one would think that political groupings within hamlets, apart of course from the pure koranai, would be difficult to educe. In fact most hamlet elders in the community are able to outline, with varying degrees of accuracy depending on their own interests, their physical proximity to the hamlets in question and the existence of affinal connections with these hamlets, the possible political groups and combinations of groups which should form in any of the hamlets should dissent and/or conflict arise. This results from their knowledge of koranai membership, their cognisance of ties and obligations between members of hamlets - the result of the public nature of marriages, debts, transactions etc. - and their familiarity with the history of past competitions. But it also results from political necessity. A knowledge of political groups and possible alliances especially, of course, in neighbouring hamlets, is essential for the competition for resources and power. Nevertheless villagers' assumptions and assessments about group formation may sometimes be incorrect because factors are constantly arising which affect membership in groups and alliances. Before, however, I come to this topic I will illustrate the general mechanics of amalgamations and divisions of groups by reference to one of the hamlets.

In this hamlet, manāp xel, there is no single lineage encompassing all the villagers but instead a relatively large number (seven) of distinct koranai. Not all of these koranai, however, participate in the internal struggles of the hamlet. This is because two of them, the koranai BK and K, feel that involvement would negatively influence their economic activities - BK are 'alāf', i.e. wheat and flour salesmen and 'strangers', and K are carpenters. Their abstinence is also, however, the result of the covert pressure exerted by the Pakhtuns of the hamlet to prevent their participation in political activities - a field considered the prerogative of the Pakhtuns alone [1]. Whilst this situation will change through the influence of external forces, at the moment the political aspect of these two koranai is in abeyance.

Apart from the five politically active koranai there were (1970-71) also three para discernible in the hamlet. The members of these groups were drawn from sections of one koranai and not, as is more usual, from a number of different koranai. These men were generally more involved in conflict than other members of their koranai because, as in one case, they were the inheritors of a very large land-holding which needed to be defended or because, as in the other two cases, they were men who wished to expand both their land-holdings and their fields of influence. As might be expected in all three cases their principal rivals and competitors and those most affected by their ambitions were the other members of their own koranai. It is, therefore, not surprising that since the almost complete cessation of revenge killings these koranai rarely act as units.

Such a situation forces these para into alliances with other groups

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1) This is comparable with the situation of the barbers (see above chap. 6 pp. 105-111). Some carpenters, however, i.e. those in the hamlet of najāran, have a degree of political autonomy obtained through their relative wealth and the absence in their hamlet of Pakhtun fellow villagers.

should conflict or dissent arise for example over land. Para AK, for example, allied itself principally in the past with koranai M and acquired a steadfast ally because M is neither competing for power - it is too small - nor pressing a claim to AK's fields - it neither has agnatic connections with AK nor adjacent fields. M after whom the hamlet is named has become small and unimportant both in numbers and land. The unqualified support which M extends to AK created an obligation which is repaid through assistance given to M when the koranai is involved in dispute and by access to fields for share-cropping and thus is not a one-sided agreement but is also of value to M. The ties between the two groups, however, are not only of an economic and political nature but have been strengthened, if not to a large extent been formed, by three marriages in the present generation. (See diag. 31 p 251)

Marriages in general play a very important role both in holding individual groups together and in creating and cementing alliances between groups. They are, however, not all given the same value. Newly created bonds tend to take precedence over older ones in the sense that the latter lose on 'actuality' or more numerous ties are given preeminence over less numerous ones. Something of this process may be shown by reference again to koranai M. When para AK was in conflict with para T then M, as I have already indicated, supported AK with whom it had and has three marriage connections rather than T with whom it only has one. But when AK was involved in a struggle with koranai R, M who also has two affinal links with R remained neutral neither supporting AK nor R and tried to bring about a reconciliation between the two groups. However when AK was in conflict with koranai MK with whom M has no relations of marriage and koranai R joined sides with MK, M supported AK without hesitation. Although a certain consistency of intent may be discerned it would be too easy and incorrect to presume that marriage links were the only factors determining allegiance. Apart from the weakening of affinal ties with time there are also many short term

M = koranai

ak = para

~ = opposition

= = alliance

— = neutrality

2 = marriage



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

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

(3)

Diag. 31 Amalgamation and Division

factors such as shortages of money or crops and the possibility of share-cropping agreements which influence the choices of koranai and para. Nevertheless it is still possible, with exceptions which will be outlined below, to say which koranai will act as units, which will divide, which people will form a para under whom and which groups will make alliances with others.

The exceptions result from a number of factors some of which have already been touched upon above and others that have not been mentioned so far. In the former case the lack of continuity of para and the weakening of koranai through the atrophy of the revenge/feud aspects of their activities continue to make prognoses about group formation uncertain. In the latter case i. e. of factors not mentioned, one factor responsible is the break up of a koranai through the opposition of brothers. Such opposition is sometimes discernible as, for example, in the case of the brothers, mullahs A and T.

Mullah T (a Safi mullah) had been able to obtain extra spring water from the hamlet of wali xan xel. He was able to make a claim to the water because his son was married to a woman from that hamlet but decisive in its acquisition was his willingness to provide the cultivator from wali xan xel, whose water share he utilised, with a third of the crop. His brother, mullah A, could also have purchased water from the hamlet of wali xan xel. In order to irrigate his fields, however, he would have had to have lead the water along mullah T's ditches because mullah T's fields lay between his, i.e. mullah A's, fields and wali xan xel's water. As mullah T would not allow this, mullah A's fields became burnt and bare whereas those of mullah T were luxuriant with rice shoots. The difference and the opposition were clear to all.

This was an extreme case and generally opposition between brothers is kept secret as long as possible because of the social and political repercussions which result from its being made public (see above p. 160) and also because of the criticism and censure which follow.

Also incalculable in assessments of political groupings are the secret agreements of individuals and parties. All contracts and agreements in Afghaniya are made in public or made public. This is a situation which results no doubt in part from the difficulty of making transactions and agreements away from the interested eyes and ears of relatives and neighbours. Outside the qalā it is more or less impossible for two men to talk together without being seen or being joined by a third. Indoors there is a total lack of privacy of word and action although this does not mean that everything said and done will percolate to the outside, at least not immediately. As a result men only utter comments publicly which are for public consumption and make public agreements which are 'fair' and 'just' and generally in accord with Pakhtun ideals. Their true intentions and the essence of agreements are the subject of 'secret' meetings and clauses held and drawn up in spite of the difficulty of maintaining their secrecy. Initial secrecy is achieved by taking an opportunity for a private aside or by walking away for a few minutes from the group of witnesses and interested onlookers. As secret clauses are always suspected by and usually with time known to others in the hamlet they are an accepted element of behaviour especially as they also make agreements possible whilst preserving the illusion of having acted in accordance with Pakhtun ideals. In terms of political behaviour where the principal ideal is the unquestioning support of closest agnates secret clauses and agreements create uncertainty both in the parties and onlookers. People who have promised help may in fact suddenly be found to be supporting the opposing side. One elder, OK, for example, chosen by one party to act on their behalf at a settlement did his uttermost to bring about a resolution in favour of the opposition. Later it was found out that he had been offered a substantial part of the money which was in dispute if he would change sides. Such cases occur with sufficient frequency to make forecasts uncertain. They do not, of course, make them superfluous because much political activity is based on a prior knowledge of potential political strength and the possibility of groupings and combinations. Such intelligence can be vital,

even if on some occasions it is incorrect and it is not surprising that hamlet elders should be cognisant not only of the different koranai and possible para groups in their own hamlets but also those of most of the hamlets in the community.

The Hamlet as the Limit of Political Solidarity

I have shown so far that the internal politics of hamlets are dominated by the struggles of the koranai and para or combinations of such groups. No hamlet in Afghaniya is exempt from such altercation or disputes. One reason for this is that like koranai members the people with whom villagers most frequently have contact and, therefore, occasion for conflict are fellow villagers. Another reason is that the principal object of contention, land, is only of interest when it is adjoining or near to a villager's own fields which is mainly the case with fellow villagers' fields [1]. In spite of such internal divisions, often pursued with considerable bitterness and over long periods of time, hamlets in Afghaniya do not disintegrate into un-unifiable factions. This is because they are held together by numerous bonds which make hamlets in a number of areas the focus of their inhabitants' attentions and loyalties and enable hamlets to act as units when faced by external opposition. The devisive tendencies are therefore counterbalanced by cohesive ones.

One such cohesive factor is common descent which in a society pervaded by a patrilineal ideology such as Afghaniya is inevitably seen by the members as being of primary importance. This ideal picture of their society is retained in spite of the fact that only

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1) It is of course true that a hamlet's fields will be surrounded or bordered by the fields of other hamlets and therefore there must be opportunity and cause for conflict there as well. Competition for land does occur in these border areas but it is, by comparison, infrequent because the working of fields obtained from other hamlets is more problematical in terms of the different irrigation systems and the distance to the fields.

three of the thirty-four hamlets in the community are exclusively united in this way. In the other hamlets groups of varying sizes and families which are not patrilineally related to the majority of the hamlet's population testify to the inexactitude of the Safi's views. Nevertheless the significance of patrilineality for hamlet solidarity has not been reduced. This is partly because these stranger groups also have their bābās (patronymic founders) and are termed koranai so that they appear to be and are considered as being, in general terms, identical with the other koranai and like them to have founders who are also the descendants of the founding ancestor of the hamlet. It is also the result, as I have shown above, of the binding forces of neighbourliness and common residence - both very important in their own right for producing solidarity among villagers - which utilise agnatic and descent concepts or terms to explain the bonds created with the stranger groups.

Another factor or factors furthering cohesion are the rights and obligations which are concomitant with being neighbours or fellow villagers. One such obligation is helping or sharing. Neighbours when they have guests may be short of cushions, flour, cups, utensils etc., and it is expected that such commodities will be freely provided by those living close to them. Or when a new qalā is being built, and āshar being planned, or oxen are ill then neighbours are obliged to help or to provide animals or implements. In nearly all cases such help is given without question because these are obligations which will be reciprocated when the donor or his family are themselves in need. People, therefore, only demand as much as they can, at some future date, afford to repay and the relationship in general remains unencumbered and thus of importance.

Difficulties can, however, arise when, as at the time of my field work, the economic situation is bad. In 1970-71 the villagers,

because of the continued drought, were confronted with the dilemma of wanting to share for social reasons and for purposes of prestige [1] but at the same time of needing to be personally acquisitive in order to survive. They needed to appear as if they were acting generously but could not afford to share too lavishly. As a result everybody hoarded secretly - my neighbour used my empty storerooms to hide part of his crop - whilst pretending in public to share with as much liberality as his limited means would allow [2]. This situation was unusual and my informants said that in normal times the ideals of sharing and helping were upheld. I am, however, a little sceptical and believe that the drought had merely made a situation which was already deteriorating through overpopulation and land shortage etc., worse. Nevertheless the situation can now after the reportedly [3] good harvests only be better than it was then and, therefore, sharing and helping, even on a reduced scale, continue to strengthen solidarity among villagers.

A further obligation emanating from common residence is visiting. Whilst such visits are particularly important for families which are affinally linked (see above pp. 203 & 204) they are also important for those who live close to one another, and, as hamlets in Afghaniya are very small (av. pop. 85), such visits usually involve all the inhabitants. This is especially the case when men return from military service, when they have bought something - a watch or a radio means a tour of honour -, on religious holidays, and on the occasion of all rites de passage. It is true that the hospitality offered has also suffered from the drought but the visiting still continues and its role as a binding force for villagers is still of considerable importance.

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1) Generous giving brings the donor standing in the community.
2) See also Canfield (R. L. Faction and conversion in a plural society. Religious alignments in the Hindu Kush. Anthropological Papers. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan. No. 50 1973 p. 77 f.) who gives a very similar account for conditions prevailing among the Hazara of Bamian.
3) From private correspondence.

All these factors i.e. agnation, neighbourliness, and common residence with, of course, the bonds formed by hamlet marriages mean that every villager sees himself ideally [1] at the centre of increasingly comprehensive circles of relationships until the boundary of the hamlet is reached (see diag. 32 p. 258). Those relationships which are closest to 'ego' are, of course, the most intense nevertheless those which are at the periphery of his interest, i.e. hamlet members, are sufficiently strong for combined action to be taken by the hamlet when, for example, its water rights are threatened, or when hamlet members are involved in disputes on neutral territory. In the latter case this occurs at the time of the two big islamic festivals, i.e. after Ramadan and the Prophet's birthday. These festivals are held on the territory of Bāba Zangu's shrine which is not only a place of pilgrimage for the members of Afghaniya but also for people from Nijrao and Tagao. The gambling which is an accompaniment of the festivities can and often does lead to conflict and on such occasions hamlet members present a united front.

There are, however, also occasions when responsibility is felt for people who do not live in the hamlet. This occurs when fellow villagers take up residence in another, neighbouring, hamlet either because of land inherited there or because of marriage to a landed woman from that hamlet, or when people who are resident elsewhere are considered to be 'tribal' members and to belong to what they refer to as a 'separate leg' [2]. In both these cases support, mainly of a moral rather than a physical nature, will be extended should these people be in conflict

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1) I questioned ten male villagers about relationships asking them for whom they felt the most affection, to whom they felt most close in kinship terms, and to whom they were most obliged. The result was, in every case, one which favoured agnates rather than affines or matrilateral relatives. In practice, however, they often favoured the latter to the former.
2) It is written 'jola pukha' but pronounced 'jola khpa'. Pakhtuns compare the tribal genealogy to a man and the legs represent the dividing point(s) of sons, i.e. brothers. Members referred to as belonging to a separate leg in Afghaniya would be members of the major lineages, the khels.



Diag. 32. Circles of Relationships

but only when their opponents are not fellow villagers. The significance of these extra-hamlet ties, however, has also decreased with the general decline in importance of the larger patrilineally organised groups and now they have an ideal rather than a real value. Thus the effective boundary of political solidarity is provided by the hamlet. In the absence of external pressure this solidarity is indicated and reinforced by the presence of the hamlet imām, of one meeting place - in winter the petāwi and in summer the suri - and of hamlet representatives - the 'de kuli mashr' or hamlet elder.

The hamlet imām is significant, as has been seen in detail above (pp. 112-117), because he can only be appointed when all the hamlet elders and thus all the various factions in the hamlet are agreed upon his appointment. When they are not unanimous then he cannot be installed. At the time of my field work there was only one hamlet without an imām the result of a bitter conflict between the two major koranai. No appointment could be made because no agreement could be reached. As a result the mosque had fallen into disrepair and all the males prayed separately in their fields or houses. This struggle also completely paralysed all political activities on the hamlet level and the hamlet became the much quoted example of the debilitating effects of internal struggle. This is not to say that where there are imāms there is an absence of strife but the situation is different. The mosque functions as a social centre and it is a place where all the men assemble for Friday prayers. Hamlet solidarity is thus concretely indicated.

This does not mean that the places of assembly, the petāwi and suri, are neglected. Here men gather daily, as we have seen, to exchange gossip, to discuss prices, to sell animals or products etc., and on occasion to judge issues in the jirga. The presence or absence of certain men does, of course, indicate the existence of tensions, nevertheless the petāwi and suri function as centres of contact where

hamlet unity can be corroborated.

The existence of one hamlet representative or elder, the 'de kuli mashr, also expresses internal unity because if the members are willing to allow one person to represent them they are either not involved in dispute or are prepared to subordinate their internal dissensions to the need of presenting a united front. Not all hamlets are willing to do so and, therefore, send more than one elder so that the factions or descent groups are equally represented. The occasions when such hamlet representatives are needed are few, for example, for the organization of communal activities after floods, or for buildings and roads, etc., or for the clearing and cleaning of irrigation ditches at the beginning of spring. Nevertheless these are occasions when the hamlet can be represented by one or two men and serve to show its compatibility and unanimity.

Situations when the hamlet can act politically as a corporate group are few and involve, as mentioned above, either disputes over water or struggles occurring at the shrine of Bābā Zangu. As the festivities at the shrine only occur twice a year occasions for violence there are rare. In the case of water disputes, trouble occurs throughout the community when there is a water shortage. Otherwise it is confined to those hamlets which are either at the end of an irrigation ditch which serves a number of hamlets - there the people have to wait the longest for the water to descend to them - or to hamlets whose springs are close. Charges of using the water too long, of diverting the water of another hamlet's springs, or letting the main ditch become clogged so that water intended elsewhere overflows onto the fields of a hamlet whose turn has already passed, bring conflict and hamlet solidarity. Whereas previously such fights would have been pursued with firearms they are now generally confined to fists, stones, and sticks and if protracted and bitter finally placed in the hands of the waluswal and local government. Presumably this trend of accepting an outside authority's decision will become in

time the accepted procedure in spite of the elders' and maliks' injunctions (see below p. 291) that strife should be resolved in the community and by its members. At the moment, however, conflict is still carried out on a hamlet level and the hamlet is thus the largest political group in Afghaniya.

Causes and Cases of Conflict

I have described so far those three groups - excluding those formed by maliks - which still have political significance in Afghaniya, i.e. koranai, para and the hamlet and have sought through the use of one hamlet, MK, to illustrate the mechanisms of confrontation and of alliance formation. It remains now to look at the causes and cases of conflict.

The traditional objects of conflict in Pakhtun society are 'zan, zar, and zamin' i.e. women, gold, and land. In Afghaniya the small size of the bride-wealth [1], the relative ease and frequency of divorce [2], the relative commoness and acceptability of adultery [3] all point to a relative decline in the capability of women through their actions to damage the honour of their husbands' families or male relatives [4] and therefore to a decline of women as a primary object of strife. They are, however, still the subject of central interest when they inherit land or when there is the possibility that they will inherit it. The second object 'zar', or gold is now used to denote movable property and money. Both are important and the subject of conflict but they are of secondary significance in themselves and often only have real value, in the eyes of the people, when used to acquire land.

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1) See above chap 9. p. 217.
2) See diags. 16-25 pp. 179 188.
3) Common and acceptable only by comparison to Pakhtun society as a whole where its occurrence is very rare or at least considered to be so.
4) It also indicates of course a general decline in ideals per se.

It is, therefore, the third element of contention, 'zamin', land which has by contrast lost none of its explosive nature but has remained or become the primary cause of dispute and conflict in Afghaniya. There are two reasons for this. One is that, as we have seen, some 25 % of the population are not able to support themselves and their families from their land alone but must also share-crop the land of other larger landowners to acquire sufficient for subsistence. Those who have sufficient land, i.e. 60 % of the population (15 % are landless), nevertheless live, with the exception of perhaps 5 % of the cultivators, at a subsistence level. Thus some 80 % of the Safi must participate, in the absence of large scale employment outside the community and with the pressure of overpopulation in the valley itself, in a debilitating struggle to increase that amount of land which they possess. Of course if all participated there would be chaos. In fact many just try to keep that which they have intact, whilst others do not possess the financial resources or political support necessary for competition, and some leave the problem to be solved by their sons or by fate. Nevertheless sufficient cultivators remain to pursue a bitter struggle for the acquisition of additional land.

The second reason is that through the possession of land nearly all those things which are considered socially desirable, i.e. status, prestige and power, are achievable. Without land the villager has little standing in the community, no say in the jirga, difficulty in finding a marriage partner, a smaller chance of successors, and less honour in death [1]. Very considerable social pressures are, therefore, at hand which force members of the community into competing for land or at least defending that which they have.

Methods of Acquiring Land

Generally speaking additional land may be acquired in four ways -

1) The richness of burial clothes and the amount of money distributed to those attending the funeral are subjects of comment and expressions of status. The poor man has little to show and little to distribute. See also below p. 269.

by inheritance, purchase, marriage and force. Whilst force would appear to be the only method of the four which directly requires the formation of political groups in practice, because of the intense competition for land, attempts to obtain fields by inheritance, purchase and marriage can often only be successful if they are also backed up by strong political support. Similarly the maintenance of a land-holding in the face of external pressure is only possible with agnatic or other forms of backing. Such factors must not mean, and usually do not mean, that actual conflict is necessary, often the threat of the use of force, or the knowledge that one party has very strong backing is sufficient for the competitor to abandon his bid for the fields. To a certain and increasing extent such force may be counteracted by an appeal on the part of the weaker party to the local government. In cases where the legal situation is clear, for example, in inheritance then a decision favouring the politically weak group may be given. Generally, however, such decisions are difficult to reach, because of the complexity of the cases, and often of long duration and expensive so that parties utilise the administration's facilities only in the last resort and political groups, i.e. para and koranai within the community continue to be decisive.

Inheritance

In the case of inheritance the general principles followed in Afghaniya are still similar to those of pre-islamic customary law, i.e. land should only be inherited by the nearest male agnate or agnates, females or cognates are excluded, descendants are preferred to ascendants, and ascendants to collaterals [1]. Thus most males in Afghaniya inherit land from their fathers the amount varying with the size of the original holding and the number of male siblings. It is this land which forms the working capital with

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1) See Fyzee. 1964. (3rd Ed.) Op. cit. p. 333. Fyzee also writes (p. 333) that 'Hanafi law (the official school for Afghanistan) to a certain extent, retains the principles of ancient tribal law', i.e. custom and law would seem to be complementary.

which the competitive landowner starts and to which he hopes to add extra fields.

One means of acquisition and one which has the advantage of not involving political confrontation, at least not initially, is when the land which is inherited is not divided among the brothers but is maintained as a single unit. In this way the full potential of the land-holding can be used and the extra products set aside for buying land. Such a method is especially effective when one brother is much older than the others because then the marriages of the younger and dependent brothers can be postponed - saving bridewealth payments - as can the division of the land so that maximum returns may be achieved for as long as possible. However once the other brothers have reached maturity it is increasingly difficult to deny them both wives and their shares of the land. Land can also, of course, be inherited from brothers should they die without issue. Even if they have children the land which these children inherit can be worked by their uncles or guardians during their minority and the capital gained invested in the purchase of new fields [1]. Utilisation of these fields, however, rarely remains unopposed because many people feel that they have a claim to them - most people in a hamlet are related in one way or another - and sometimes the most legitimate claimants are ousted by those with fewer rights but with more powerful support.

A further possibility of obtaining inherited fields but one which has only recently begun to play a part in the competition for land is the realisation of women's claims. The right of women to inherit was one of the major reforms introduced by Islam [2]. This was conveniently forgotten, or ignored in Afghaniya in the past at least as far as the inheritance of land was concerned. However since the

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1) The social and legal position of fatherless children is very weak and should the land not have been divided among the brothers prior to the father's death then the children generally do not inherit.
2) Fyzee. 1964. Op.cit. p. 333.

central government has been able to extend its effective control into the Pachoghan valley and people have begun to use the facilities offered the situation has changed [1]. Now women who make a claim to a share of their father's land or that of their dead husband will receive the support and backing of the local government's authorities. Nevertheless many make no such claim because firstly women are not made aware of their rights unless it is to the men's advantage, and secondly even if they are cognisant of the laws it is very difficult for a woman secluded and restricted in her movements as she is to approach the authorities in Nijrao [2]. Most women, therefore, if they are alone, i.e. without a husband or sons forego their right to inherit and brothers or other collateral males, i.e. half-brothers or cousins appropriate the women's shares. Thirdly even if the women are married they may not make a claim to their shares if they either live at some distance from their natal hamlets so that the utilisation of the land claimed would be difficult if not impossible or, if they have affines who are politically weak. If, however, the women are supported by husbands who are either politically strong or confident enough to appeal directly to the local government judge then they can and will inherit. The result is that now those men who are able to command sufficient political support within the community prevent their sisters from inheriting but press the claims of their mothers and/or wives. Those who have insufficient support but who are nevertheless willing to face the dissatisfaction of the other interested party can carry their wives',

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1) A change not only confined to Afghanistan. Stirling (1965. Op. cit. p. 131) writing about a Turkish village describes a situation which mirrors that of Afghaniya: 'Decreasing village autonomy, the decline in the power and importance of lineages, and the increase of administrative control and interference have increased the chances of establishing and enforcing a claim to female inheritance. ... Moreover, the motives for claiming female inheritance grow stronger as land grows scarcer.'

2) The only exceptions are older women whose social asexuality allows them a greater degree of freedom. I have myself witnessed such women making appeals directly to the waluswal.

mothers', or widowed sister's claims to the local government centre where if these are legitimate they will be established and enforced. Such a situation and one which is very illustrative of some of the processes outlined above occurred when T of the hamlet of MK made a claim to his wife's, ah1's, share of her father, AH's, inheritance (see diag. 33 p. 267). AH had died more or less at the same time as his two sons AH1 and AH2. Some months later AH's brother, R, also died so that the only inheritors remaining for AH's property and land were his four daughters ah1, ah2, ah3 and ah4 (see diag. 33). ah1 was, as we have seen, married to T from the neighbouring hamlet of MK. T who had very little land himself and no agnatic support was nevertheless self-assured and ambitious enough to press his wife's claim for a share of both the moveable property and the land. His principal opponent was the equally ambitious R1 who was, apart from being the husband of ah2, the son of R and the brother's son of AH. R1 had further strengthened his position, in terms of the inheritance, by marrying his son RR to the youngest daughter of AH, ah4. After the death of R, R1 felt that his position had become unassailable because apart from his and his son's marriages to two of AH's four daughters, ah3, the fourth daughter of AH, was married to a Safi in Tagao. This meant that because of the Tagao Safi's geographical position he could, at the most, make some claim to AH's property but certainly not to the land - in fact he did neither. Also R1's opponent T had no agnatic or other support from his own hamlet whereas he, R1, could, should the utilisation of force become necessary, count on the help of his three brothers R2, R3, and R4, and his son RR. When, therefore, T placed his claim to his wife's share R1 rejected it and said that 'it was not their custom to allow women to take land from the father's family'. Instead, however, of giving up or of bowing before R1's superior force T presented his case to the judge at Nijrao. After much litigation T won because the judge said that the shari'at permitted women to inherit.

In spite, however, of T's success merely obtaining the ownership of the land does not guarantee its use especially when the fields are in another hamlet's territory. T's lack of political support meant that he could not work his newly acquired fields himself and, as R1 would not allow anyone else from his (R1's) hamlet to share-crop them, T ultimately had to allow R1 to do this. T, of course, gained the landowner's share of the crop but, as we shall see below in the section on force as a method of land acquisition, all the elements were present for further competition between R1 and T. Also as a general principle men such as T, i.e. without political support, lose



33. The Relationship of Actors in an Inheritance Dispute

through their sisters - because they cannot impede their claims - what they have gained through their wives and mothers. It is, therefore, usually more expedient to have backing within one's own hamlet than to rely solely on the judge when claims are made to women's inheritances.

Purchase

The second method of acquiring additional land, purchase, is also most successful when the purchaser is supported by his koranai or achieves the backing of a para. Such support is not necessary to force the seller to lower his price, although this may also be attempted, but to counter the activities of other interested people and to overcome the objections and obstructive actions of the 'shaf'a', the pre-emptor, i.e. those who have adjoining fields and who must according to islamic law be given the first opportunity to buy the field or fields offered for sale [1].

Fields in Afghaniya come up for sale for four main reasons. Firstly landowners here like those everywhere in Afghanistan run up debts [2] with shop-keepers, specialists, neighbours, money-lenders, etc. They generally manage to avoid paying them at least in their entirety so that the debt is passed on to their children but the land is saved. Some men, however, are forced to sell their fields because the amount of their debts is so large that no other way is

1) Fyzee writes that: '(i) the pre-emptor must be the owner of immoveable property; (ii) there must be a sale of certain property, not his own; (iii) the pre-emptor must stand in a certain relationship to the vendor in respect of the property sold.' The 'relationship' to which Fyzee refers gives three classes of persons the right of pre-emption: '(i) Shafi'-i Sharik, i.e. a co-sharer in the property' (brothers etc.),' (ii) Shafi'-i Khalit, ... a person who is entitled to such easement as a right of way, or discharge of water', '(iii) Shafi-i Jar, i.e. the neighbour, the owner of an adjoining property.' 'If these conditions are satisfied, he (the pre-emptor) has the right to be substituted for the purchaser.' Fyzee, 1949. Op.cit. pp. 282, 288, and 289. See also above chap. 6.

2) 'In den untersuchten Dörfern waren 57 % aller Familien verschuldet.' Hahn. 1972. Op.cit. p. 230. See also footnote 1 p. 99.

open to them and no more credit is available. In Afghaniya most of these men are secret gamblers who after loosing large sums of money in Tagao or Nijrao first 'gerao', i.e. sell the usufruct rights of their fields and then, because the reduced returns from the smaller holdings lead to further debts and/or because they become compulsive gamblers, they sell their fields. Many seek to avert the inevitable by taking up other activities such as meat or flour salesmen but usually this is only an intermediary stage prior to the complete loss of all their land (see diag. 6 p. 93). Secondly as men are morally obliged to find wives for their sons when no other source of income is available and no daughters are at hand then fields are 'geraoed' or sold to provide money for the bride-wealth payments. In this way fields also become available.

Similarly and thirdly the pomp demanded by and the distribution of money necessary at a funeral often force sons to sell land so that the expectations of status may be fulfilled. This comes about because sons who remain with their fathers to provide for them and to look after them in old age are required by custom to utilise, when the division of land and property has taken place before the father's death (see above pp. 157 & 158), a third of the father's share for the 'kafan', the shroud or winding sheet, and for the 'isqāt', the monetary distribution. In some cases sufficient money is not available nevertheless as the body is displayed publicly at a special place in the hamlet and as relatives and friends from the hamlet gather in concentric circles around the body - the closer the relationship the closer the physical proximity - for the distribution of the money, considerable social pressure is brought to bear on the sons of the dead man to provide if not a resplendent then at least an 'adequate' funeral commensurate with the dead man's considered standing and status. The subjectivity of the estimate demands that more is spent than can often be afforded and fields have to be sold.

Finally land is sold by women i.e. unmarried daughters or childless widows who are the sole heirs of their dead fathers or husbands. They have to sell their fields because without males they cannot work them. In these ways then fields become available for those who have the money to buy them.

Money, however, is not easy to acquire in Afghaniya because very few owner-cultivators, as we have seen, produce a surplus above and beyond that necessary for subsistence which can then be sold in the markets of the area. Those who can and can also live on an absolute minimum are able to accumulate capital for the purchase of fields. Others lend money or products and with the very high interest rates (often 50 to 100 %) which are usual in Afghaniya either acquire sufficient money to buy or are able, with the backing of their agnates, to take possession of fields or gardens. Finally some cultivators use the money sent by sons working in other areas of Afghanistan to purchase extra land but this form of capital accumulation is still rare because of the scarcity of work opportunities and because only the sons of very poor Safi do such work and their earnings are required principally to ensure subsistence and not to buy fields.

Once sufficient money is saved then the occasion must arise when others wish to sell. This occurs, as I have shown, as the result of debts, bride-wealth payments, funerals, and unsupported female inheritance. Generally that person who has the largest portion of his offer in cash will be the one to succeed. The reason being that oxen, guns, radios etc., which are also used as part payments are not readily accepted by the vendor because of the subjectivity surrounding their real values, the long and bitter haggling which goes on to ascertain their price and the uncertainty surrounding the date of their addition to the payment. The deposit, however, of a certain amount of cash may not alone resolve all problems connected with the purchase because, as I have indicated above, the

shaf'a also must be given the opportunity to buy the field or fields for sale. Of course had these pre-emptors been in a position to purchase them they would have done so. As they often cannot, but would like to, they either try to persuade their cousin, relative or neighbour to sell the fields to them especially cheaply, to dissuade the purchaser from his purpose, or to block the whole procedure by officially stating their intention to buy. Such procedures lead to confrontation and occasionally to conflict, and the purchase of land like its inheritance is often only possible through the threat of, or the use of, force [1].

Marriage

The third method of obtaining land, marriage, has been touched upon above in terms of inheritance and elsewhere (chap. 9) and therefore only requires brief mention here. In order to acquire fields by marriage participants need both above average abilities and more than average standing in the community. The abilities necessary are principally foresight to plan sufficiently far ahead, the intelligence and capacity to outmanoeuvre competing agnates and other competitors and the self-assurance to marry what may be less-attractive and older spinsters or widows [2]. Standing in terms of wealth or position (malik, mullah, teacher, clerk etc.) are important because such men will be preferred as suitors by the walis of the women and further have the advantage that bride-wealth payments may be smaller because the girl's relatives hope for benefits from such favourable connections. It is also necessary to have sufficient sons

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1) Sometimes a stalemate occurs when neither side can achieve an advantage. In such situations the land may be bought by strangers who because of their neutrality and lack of power are acceptable to the disputants and do not arouse the hostility of the other villagers.
2) The youth and beauty of a woman are considered indispensable qualities for a marriage (see also above p. 229) and it is, therefore, an exceptional or a very poor man who chooses primarily because of the land involved.

and daughters - the latter to balance the bride-wealth payments for the sons - and to utilise to the full the four possible marriages open to all males.

One malik, M, for example, married the widow b and the daughter a1 - by another wife - of the landowner K (see diag. 34 p. 273). He also married his son, M1, to the daughter, b1, of the widow b whom he had himself married. In this way, with the exception of K's daughter's (a2's) inheritance, he obtained all of K's land because K's son and grandson had died and a1's son, N, was persuaded by the malik to desist from making a claim by the promise of help in his difficulties with the government. The land thus 'married' represented a one hundred percent increase in the malik's own landholding and no drain upon his own resources because he managed to acquire all three women without paying bride-wealth for any of them.

Of course, there is often considerable uncertainty surrounding marriage aimed at the acquisition of land - the women may die in child birth [1], or the girl's father may, even at an advanced age, marry again - but with sufficient support to ensure that wives and daughters-in-law gain their inheritances and daughters and sons-in-law do not then marriage can be extremely lucrative.

Force

Force, the final method of obtaining land, apart from backing up legitimate claims to fields can be used to obtain land where claims are much less legitimate. A debt, for example, which has not been honoured may lead to the forceful occupation and utilisation of the debtor's fields. Land may also be appropriated merely on the basis of the weakness of the owner's position i.e. he is without agnatic or other support. Sometimes force may be used to 'readjust' the positions of fields so that the more powe rful landowner can have all his fields adjoining one another. The form of land aggrandisement which, however, is now most widely utilised in Afghaniya is the calling into question of agreements made about land.

In Afghaniya land is pawned (gerao) or sold generally in accordance

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1) The mortality rate among women is because of their ignorance of the relationship between hygiene and infection especially high.



34. The Acquisition of Land through Marriage.

with customary law which means that a contract, called the ''arfi qabāla', is drawn up by a mullah or malik and is witnessed both by them and by friends or relatives of both parties. Whilst such agreements used to go unchallenged in the past they are now coming more and more into disrepute principally because the competition for land is causing participants and witnesses to increasingly disavow the true content of the contract in the hope of gain of one kind or another. This is particularly prevalent with those contracts made by people who leave Afghaniya to work elsewhere. Prior to departure, if they have any land left, they 'gerao' or sell it. When they return after one, or a number of years, they either insist that the land which they sold was only pawned or they are confronted by people who assert, because they have come in the meantime to regard the fields as their own, that the pawned land was in reality sold to them.

Such a case arose when Q prior to leaving for Afghan Turkestan sold his land and qala to his paternal cousin AW by ''arfi qabala' i.e. customary law. AW worked the fields and improved the qala by putting in new windows and building extra rooms to accomodate his larger harvests and his family. Five years later Q returned to Afghaniya and demanded the return of his house and fields which he said he not only did not sell to AW but to whom he did not even sell the usufruct rights of the fields. AW, he insisted, had merely had the right to use them as long as he, Q, was away in Turkestan. AW denied this and there was such a heated argument that Q and AW came to blows and had to be separated by other members of the hamlet. Support was then extended by both men's koranai and there the matter remained until Q acquired, through the promise of monetary reward, the support of malik N. The disturbed balance was restored when malik M who is affinally related to one of AW's supporters agreed to bolster their forces with his political weight. This final stalemate was broken when Q after another fight with AW made a complaint ('arz) to the government in Nijrao. There the matter stood at the completion of my field work.

Some of the struggles which thus arise are solved by a show of force on the part of the stronger party but most remain unresolved as we have seen in the case of Q and AW because the parties are equally balanced or because a resolution which might in the past have been achieved through outright conflict is now, because

of the government's presence in Nijrao, avoided. Appeals to the local government also do not bring solutions but tend to complicate matters. The waluswal and/or judge can generally only recognise those contracts drawn up in accordance with shari'at law [1] and these are usually avoided by the Safi because of the tax involved and because they feel that the authorities would gain too much insight into their affairs in this way. Nevertheless an increasing number of people are using the government's facilities for the sale of land and for the sale of the usufruct rights to fields because they have seen that in this way many of the complications which are now concomitant with customary law contracts can be avoided. Force or at least overt force, therefore, as a means of acquiring land is gradually losing ground in the face of government power and governmental facilities. Competition for land in the future will tend to be concentrated around inheritance, purchase and marriage with covert force being used where possible and to lend weight to claims.

I have concentrated above on land because it is the principal cause of conflict and sought by looking at it as a problem of acquiring extra fields to show the background of political confrontation, the strategies which are followed and how political groups can play a decisive role. The division into specific areas of conflict, i.e. inheritance, purchase, marriage and force, was only for purposes of clarity and is rather artificial because in reality disputes over land are very complex and may well involve all the four elements of acquisition. This arises because it is but a minority of disputes which find rapid solutions. Generally they drag on and in the process of dissension new elements arise and are woven into the fabric of the struggle.

One dispute, for example, started as the result of the claims of two husbands, Q and N, of sisters to a garden, the inheritance from the sisters' father. One of the husbands, Q, then left for Turkestan leaving the garden and a debt behind him. When the other husband, N, with his koranai tried to claim the whole garden

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1) This means that they are drafted and witnessed by a judge in Nijrao.

he was stopped by Q's creditor, the malik R, with his koranai who claimed half the garden as security for the debt. The garden was then sold to the wealthy G. The husband N and the creditor R divided the money secretly so that no one knew that the creditor R had received his money. The ex-creditor, malik R, then asked the purchaser of the garden, G, for the money saying that he, G, as the new owner of the garden was responsible for the debt of the old owner, Q. G denied responsibility and refused to pay. Malik R then on the pretext of needing extra carpets and a radio to entertain a particularly large group of guests borrowed these from G. When G asked for them to be returned R refused saying that he would only do so when G paid the debt. In the confrontation that followed R's koranai split because they had in the meantime discovered R's duplicity and the majority joined G and his koranai in a coalition against malik R.

Although this example is very condensed it is nevertheless possible to see many of the elements which have been discussed above, i.e. inheritance, debt, force, the use of koranai, a secret agreement and the creation of an alliance and to be aware of the complexity of disputes.

The principal actor was R, a large landowner and a malik. It is clear, from other case studies, that maliks in proportion to their numbers play an unproportionately large role in the politics of Afghaniya the result partially of them combining the roles of large landowner with that of malik. It is also, however, the result of the new powers given to maliks by the central government and of the maliks' use of these powers to escape the controls of their electors and supporters. These factors combined have given rise to a new political element in Afghaniya without which an understanding of the political organization as a whole is impossible. This new element is the malik.

11. LEADERSHIP - THE MALIK

The anthropologist's conception of Pakhtun leadership has inevitably been formed by Barth's book on 'Political Leadership among Swat Pathans'. It is inevitable because of the excellence of Barth's portrayal which makes it ideal for purposes of example and cross-cultural comparison and because of the absence of comparable material on other Pakhtun tribes. Nevertheless it must be remembered that Barth's monograph is an analysis not of Pakhtun leadership but of leadership among the Yusufzai Pakhtuns of Swat and must not, therefore, be typical of leadership among the Pakhtuns as a whole [1]. The contrary would in fact seem to be indicated by the evidence because, although there is a dearth of anthropological material about the Pakhtuns, there is a wealth of non-anthropological literature which testifies to the multiform and multifunctional nature of Pakhtun leadership.

Probably the most comprehensive information on this subject is provided by Elphinstone's 'An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul'. Although the information about leadership is unsystematically presented - it appears as part of general ethnographic accounts of the individual tribes [2] - it covers most of the Pakhtuns and all the named forms of leadership. It also has the advantage of giving a picture of Pakhtun leadership at a time (1809) when the central government was involved in internecine struggle and was, therefore, in no position to alter the forms and functions of this leadership [3].

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1) Barth himself, of course, never implied that his picture of Yusufzai leadership had general validity for all Pakhtuns.
2) Elphinstone. 1972 (reprint from 1815). Op.cit. vol 2 pp. 1-174.
3) From the creation of the Afghan state under Ahmad Shah Durrani until the present day the central government has always tried to influence, control and later rule the tribes through their leaders. One cannot, therefore, speak about an unadulterated form of Pakhtun leadership - probably no such thing ever existed - but during periods of governmental weakness the autonomy of the Pakhtun tribes was at its greatest and at such times the leadership would conform more to a Pakhtun ideal than to a central government one.

Elphinstone distinguished four types of leaders: khan, malik, kandidar, and spingirae. These he tentatively equated with variably sized, patrilineally organized, named groups. For example the khan would be the head of a tribe or 'ulus' and the malik leader of a sub-division of a tribe or 'khel'. In this way he suggested that a hierarchy, according to importance of leaders and size of groups, could be created which would be a 'model on which the governments of all the tribes are formed'. He, however, had to admit that this 'system of government ... is so often deranged by circumstances' that it cannot be 'a correct description of any one of them' [1]. The 'system of government' was, therefore, an abstraction which served only as a point of orientation or, and as we would now probably designate it, a model of Pakhtun leadership. The actual organization was very different and it becomes clear from Elphinstone's account how complex and variable Pakhtun leadership was. Methods of selection varied not only from tribe to tribe but also within the tribe; clans of the same tribe had different forms of leadership; leaders' functions were dissimilar; their power and authority differed and some tribes had types of leaders - the 'tsalwechti' - which could not be comprehended by Elphinstone's model.

In spite of the fact that Elphinstone's material was collected at the beginning of the 19th. century the diversity of form and function which he described would still seem to exist today largely because the Pakhtun tribes in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and on the Afghan borders with these tribal areas have been able to maintain their autonomy. Other Pakhtun tribes, however, have been and are increasingly being affected by the activities and institutions of the central government. The principles of 'find the chief' and deal with 'persons of authority' [2] although always present in Afghanistan have

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1) Elphinstone. 1972. Op.cit. vol 1. p. 215.
2) See Barth. 1962. Nomadism in the Mountain and Plateau Areas of South West Asia. p. 349 In: Problems of the Arid Zone. Arid Zone Research. vol XVIII. UNESCO.

now lead to a certain uniformity of function, a certain institutionalization of office and a certain centralization of political organization at least at the level of village leadership.

In this chapter on leadership I will be dealing with this form of leadership, i.e. government influenced, and this may well constitute the type of leadership which will become standardised and therefore also representative in other Pakhtun areas. Nevertheless it is very important to remain cognisant of the variety of leadership which still is to be found among Pakhtun tribes.

The Malik - Origins and History

In Afghaniya there is only one form of leadership that of the 'malik'. When and why this term was applied to this form of leadership it is impossible to say but like 'khan' it is obviously of foreign origin. Bellew relates the story that the Pakhtuns who originally embraced and fought for Islam in the Arabian peninsular were rewarded by the Prophet with the promise that 'the title of malik = 'king', which they had inherited from their great progenitor, Sarul Malik Talut (Saul king of Israel, "Prince of great stature") should never depart from their nation, but should be the title of their chiefs and princes to the end of time' [1]. Caroe, somewhat more realistically, suggests that as 'malik' was an honorific used widely throughout the khorasani world it was merely picked up and utilised by the Pakhtuns in the same way that 'khan' has now 'been usurped by all and sundry' [2].

Whatever its origins what is interesting is that 'malik' is an arabic rather than a Pakhto word which would seem to suggest that the original Pakhtun tribal organization did not possess a leader with the functions which came to be associated with the malik. This office

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1) Bellew. 1891. Op. cit. p. 20.
2) Caroe. 1965. Op. cit. p. 8 and p. 440 note 11.

would, therefore, seem to be a later development possibly in response to pupulation increases, greater complexity of social and political organization or to wars and expansion.

If its origins are obscure its historical functions, at least those based on Elphinstone's report, are not. The malik of Elphinstone's account was generally speaking elected to office either by the elders, or the people of his lineage or clan. Once in power he usually retained his office until his death when it was passed on to the most able of his sons. There was, therefore, a tendendy towards hereditary office but not primogeniture. His powers varied from tribe to tribe but usually, because he worked in conjunction with the jirga, these were very limited and he was considered as a 'primus inter pares'. He might, however, be responsible directly or indirectly with the jirga and/or elders for settling disputes and inflicting punishment, and in some tribes he acted as a counterbalance and breaketo the khan's power. In the last case Elphinstone recorded accounts of maliks who opposed and deposed khans who were considered as endangering the autonomy of individuals and groups by seeking autarchy. The malik, of Elphinstone's time, therefore was an elected leader of variously sized descent groups whose office might become hereditary and whose powers varied from representative of groups to remover of khans. In all cases his support came from the people, as elders or as a jirga, and not from independent non-kin or non-tribal supporters so that he himself was never in a position to seek or obtain absolute power and was thus the instrument for maintaining an anarchic, acephalic political organization.

The Malik of Afghaniya

Necessary Characteristics or Requirements

The present maliks of Afghaniya [1] are elected into office by the

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1) There are nine altogether: three in maghdud khel, two in pirozai, two in audel khel and two in Haidar khel. ṣāliH khel has none.

elders or household heads of the community. In order to be selected in the first place potential candidates must possess certain qualities. Firstly they must be wealthy or at least be able to support themselves and their families without difficulty. This is an important point for potential supporters because they want to have a malik who is ideally independent of, or at least not too dependent on, bribes. Secondly maliks should be able to talk confidently and to present their arguments clearly in front of other maliks, khans, clerks, the district governor, etc.: attributes desirable because of the representative capacity of the malik. Thirdly potential candidates should be 'drund', that is heavy or weighty, characteristics which do not necessarily refer to bodily build, although this is often also the case among Pakhtun leaders [1], but rather to their manner and the presentation of themselves before others. Fourthly maliks should and usually do come from 'good' families, i.e. those with long patrilineages containing men who distinguished themselves and were influential in the affairs of the group in the past. Finally maliks should not be authoritarian nor impinge upon the personal freedom of their supporters - they should be leaders but not rulers [2].

Government Requirements and Standardisation

These characteristics which candidates for the post of malik must possess show the continuity of basic ideas and ideals about leadership from the Pakhtun past, as portrayed by Elphinstone, to the Safi present, i.e. independent in temperament and egalitarian in principle. This continuity has been seriously disturbed by a factor, i.e. government influence, which although present in Elphinstone's

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1) Jamroz Khan was 'an enormous man, powerful, with a bristling moustache. He used to eat a whole ox-liver for breakfast'. Barth. 1965. Op.cit. p. 82.

2) An attitude which would seem always to have had validity among Pakhtuns although varying in intensity from tribe to tribe. 'We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are content with blood, but we will never be content with a master'. Elphinstone. 1972. Op.cit. vol 1 p. 231.

time was not formative to the degree which it is now. Now the central government, in the pursuit of greater influence and authority in tribal areas, has incorporated the malik into its system of administration [1]. However, because Pakhtun leadership differed from locality to locality and because the government wished to have officials whose functions did not vary from area to area they standardised certain elements of the office and these changes whilst maintaining the outward form of the office have altered its content.

One such change has been to make it obligatory for all members of a community to come under the auspices of a malik. Voluntary representation has thus been replaced by a compulsory form and the individual freedom of the tribesman has been reduced.

Another change has been that maliks may now draw their supporters or electors from the whole community and not, as was the practice before, just from their lineages or hamlets. Although in Afghaniya the majority of a malik's supporters still come from his lineage or khel - largely for reasons of convenience but also because of accessability and a lineage malik's better 'local' knowledge - this measure has extended the limits of choice for potential electors beyond the boundaries of the lineage. It has also, however, had the result of weakening the patrilineal organization of the society because now choices are being made, or may be made, when all other factors, e.g. the attributes mentioned above, are equal, on other than purely lineage, i.e. descent principles. Maliks are now chosen not out of lineage solidarity but for reasons of individual or faction advantage.

A further change has been instigated by the regulation that a malik's supporters must number at least fifty except in those areas where

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1) 'At the lowest administrative level are the villages and settlements (called 'qaria' in Persian). Each village and settlement elects a 'malik' as go-between for the administration.' Hahn. 1972. Op.cit. p. 285. (My translation).

the population is below that figure. Although this is not the case in Afghaniya it has nevertheless effectively reduced the number of maliks and the range of choice in the community. It has also inhibited expressions of dissatisfaction with the established leadership which earlier took the form of splinter groups under new maliks. Now these groups can only be formed with titleless leaders who cannot obtain the aura and kudos associated with the title 'malik' and as a result are weak and ineffective.

Finally change has been caused by the need to have the malik confirmed in office and his supporters registered by the waluswal and the judge. This ratification of nominations has meant that the control over the choice of leaders has passed from the people to the government. So far this power has not been misused in the sense of nominations being rejected or maliks being proposed by the government but this has been the result rather of inability - the replacement of waluswals every four years gives them insufficient time for exact local knowledge and for the judgement of candidates - than of intent. However waluswals can and do support 'strong' or 'effective' maliks, i.e. those who ensure that peace and quiet are maintained and that the dictates of the government are carried out punctually and without disturbance. Once the government's control in Afghaniya is complete then the maliks may well cease to be the representatives of the people and become the instruments of the government through which the community is ruled.

In spite of these changes maliks are still elected [1] by the elders of the community to office [2] and the majority of a malik's electors still come, as I have indicated, from his major lineage or khel. But if the changes introduced by the central government have not diminished the democratic rights of election they have altered or extended the procedure for election because now the elders and heads

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1) They are not elected by a process of secret ballot but candidates emerge in informal meetings and discussions and are then put forward for office or supported in their pretensions.
2) In Swat the office and situation would seem to have changed. See Barth, F. 1965. Op.cit. p. 82.

of households who have chosen a particular malik have to go with him to Nijrao. There they present the waluswal with a paper bearing their names and that of their candidate and ask that their choice of malik should be authorised. Usually, as I have mentioned above, the district governor accepts their choice and ratifies the candidacy. He then sends them to the judge who asks each elector separately whether he really wishes the candidate to be his malik or whether he was forced to elect him. If the proposed man has been freely elected then the judge enters the names of the supporters and the numbers of their identity cards on to a list and the malik is finally installed.

The Malik's Duties

On taking office the malik is confronted by duties, functions and obligations which have increased in number and in complexity since the time when a malik was mainly a spokesman of his group and occasionally an opponent of khans. The principal reason for this is the incorporation of the malik's office into the central government's system of administration. Whereas in the past he only had to cope with the needs and expectations of his supporters he now not only has to fulfil these functions but also has to deal with the duties imposed upon him by the local government [1] as well as to act as an intermediary between the government and his electors. His roles, therefore, have become multiple and are often conflicting largely because he is expected to serve the best interests of both groups i.e. the local government and his electors although these are often opposed. Under these circumstances and as the malik's functions or duties are nowhere defined or regulated it is difficult to delimit his official activities. However both parties i.e. local government and electors are able to list their expectations with varying degrees of precision and I have, therefore, separated the malik's duties into two parts: the expectations of the local government and those of his electors and illustrated in both the malik's responses to them.

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1) A situation which has many parallels with other areas. See Mair. 1971. Op. cit. p. 65 ff.

Expectations of the Local Government

The local government's expectations revolve principally around the assistance which the maliks give to the various departments in the waluswali. Maliks, for example, are used by the department of Taxation and Revenue to assist their clerks in the collection of taxes. Their guest rooms become collecting centres [1] and their knowledge and expertise are used to ensure that all heads of households appear and pay the amounts assessed [2].

It is also through maliks that statistical information for the various departments is gathered. The malik is responsible for reporting all cases of male births among his electors to the department of Actuarial Statistics. This information, as we have seen (p. 64), is of considerable importance both for the government and the people concerned because it governs the issue of identity cards, compulsory schooling and military service. Maliks also report and register marriages, sales of land, and those complaints which are to be brought to the waluswal or qazi (judge). In the last case, i.e. of complaints, it is of course possible for complainants to bypass the malik and appeal directly to the waluswal which is what the majority do. Some, however, feel that they are not capable of presenting themselves and their case well in front of the waluswal and place the case in the malik's hands.

Maliks are also empowered to recommend exemption from military service. When the call-up papers arrive conscripts may appeal to the local government for exemption on the grounds of being the only adult male in the family, of being ill or of being physically disabled. It may also happen that conscripts 'disappear' or are 'not to be

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1) This is not the practice all over Afghanistan and in some areas the people go themselves to the nearest local government centre to pay their taxes.
2) In spite of the malik's help the correct amounts are not always paid. The initial government assessment, for example, is very difficult to make because of the people's understandable reluctance to cooperate. Also some maliks and clerks receive shares in unpaid taxes and, therefore, have a vested interest in evasions.

found' i.e. they either leave to avoid conscription or they go for work elsewhere prior to the call-up. When nothing is heard from or about them they are presumed to be in Pakistan or to be dead. In all these cases the malik is the one who establishes the validity of the appeal or the absence of the conscript and his decision is then accepted by the government.

Maliks further have the duty of organizing the labour and providing the raw materials, as far as this is possible, for government projects such as the building of roads, schools, bridges etc. Such community tasks used to be the responsibility of the communal 'āshar' but now this traditional form of cooperative work has been absorbed into the machinery of government and has assumed the nature of a duty which members must fulfil whether they regard the project as relevant or not. The maliks inform the heads of households and ensure that each household provides labour or materials in quantities which are appropriate to the numbers of members or to the wealth of the household.

Finally the maliks have been given the duty of informants. They both provide the government with information and convey the government's wishes and directives to their electors. The former duty may stem from the time of Abd-ar-Rahman (1880-1901) when a dense information network was established and was used both to receive warning of discontent and to control the country. Now the maliks are still expected to supply information about political unrest but they are mainly concerned with reporting disturbances, fights, theft and cases of murder to the local government.

In the case of the government's wishes and directives which the maliks convey to their electors these usually concern the whole community. The maliks are told to report to the local government centre in Nijrao where the viewpoint and ultimately the commands of the government are put to them. When confronted by the waluswal there is general acquiescence from those maliks who attend but once

in the Pachoghan valley they vie with one another to disclaim such acquiescence. In the end the majority of the government's wishes are carried out albeit after considerable lapses of time and often in much weakened and watered down forms.

Many of the malik's governmental duties outlined above are considered by the people of Afghaniya to be impositions which invade their privacy, disturb the routine of their lives and diminish their autonomy. Unfortunately, as they see it, there is very little which they can do to alter the situation apart from protests and disturbances and the manipulation of the maliks.

In the former case such measures were successful in opposing the introduction of female education largely because of the general discontent in most Pakhtun areas and the support of the mullahs. Such tactics, however, used against, for example, taxation and schooling in general, would bring little external sympathy because these aspects of governmental control and administration have become widely accepted and are generally regarded as the minimum of administrative interference. Such attitudes in areas outside Afghaniya arise among other reasons from habituation and the realisation that the negative aspects of governmental administration are at least balanced by positive aspects. In Afghaniya the process of becoming accustomed to a non-tribal administration has obviously not gone as far as in these other areas and the Safi have not as yet discovered the positive aspects of the administration. What they have, however, realised is that if they cannot influence the local government's administrative measures they can at least try to dilute or avoid them through the good offices of the malik.

Maliks are not paid for their duties either by the government or by the people who elect them to office [1] although the latter bring them

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1) This is not the case everywhere. In Uruzgan, for example, maliks receive as payment one 'man' of wheat for every three 'jerib' of land owned by their electors.

presents when they return from work outside Afghaniya and provide them with 'lungi' or turbans [1] at festivities, and money on the successful conclusion of struggles or at the signing of contracts when maliks have played a major part. These payments, however, are usually small and only cover in a symbolic manner the malik's traditional duties and not the extra ones acquired through the government. Maliks are, therefore, in spite of their wealth - we have seen that they are preferably chosen from among wealthy families - open to bribery or at least not indifferent to additional sources of income. The people themselves are aware that very little can be achieved without some pecuniary incentive and are, as a result, prepared and pleased to pay or to promise to pay the malik some sum of money so that, for example, births are not reported, schooling is avoided, marriages and the sale of land are not registered and military service is evaded. Whilst this system has very definite advantages for some people and the majority feel that they have regained some of their lost independence and outwitted the government through these actions it has had the considerable disadvantage of investing the malik with powers over his supporters which are incommensurate with the role he was originally assigned. It has, therefore, altered the traditional conception of leadership and lead to dissymmetry in social relations between leaders and lead.

It was, of course, not only the needs of the malik's supporters which brought about this dissymmetry but the use or misuse which the maliks or some maliks have made of a situation whose source was the extra duties and thus powers given to the maliks by the government. Now irrespective of the initial causation it is the maliks who benefit most and who know how best to utilise their newly acquired powers.

I have already mentioned above how maliks may enrich themselves

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1) This is the general term for an honourable gift and must not of necessity be a turban. Most such gifts now usually consist of money.

by accepting money so that births will not be reported, military service avoided etc. These, however, do not exhaust the possibilities open to maliks for acquiring money and extending their power. Another opportunity, for example, is provided by the organisation of labour and of contributions for government projects. Perhaps the best way to illustrate this is through a case history.

The malik who was responsible for the transport of my belongings from Nijrao to my qalā in Afghaniya ordered a settled nomad, one of his supporters, to carry out the transport with his camels. This he did. The malik then asked me for the camel-driver's pay saying that I should be especially generous as the nomad was a poor man with a large family to support. After I had given the malik the money I met the camel-driver by chance outside the malik's qalā. When I asked him whether he was satisfied with the amount of money I had given him he replied: 'well, no.' Before, however, he could say anything more he became aware of the malik's son who was working within hearing distance on the roof of the qalā. He then completed his reply by saying: 'of course one is always happy with more but you were very generous.' Later I met him alone near Nijrao and wished to engage him for transport again. I then discovered that he had in fact received nothing from the malik but had been afraid to tell me when I asked him because he had seen the malik's son and knew that he would report our conversation to his father. The malik had told the camel-driver that the transport of my belongings had been a government task (which it was not) for which there was no payment. He, the malik, however, would ensure that as compensation for the use of the camels for government purposes the camel-driver would be relieved at some future date of work on a government project.

This was not an isolated incident but is indicative of the general situation where the poorest families and those without political support are constantly misused [1].

Another opportunity is the non-reporting of fights, theft, murder etc. to the waluswal or qazi. Such services represent supplementary wealth and increased power over certain members among the malik's electorate.

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1) This situation is not only confined to Afghaniya. Gregorian (V. 1969. The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan. Politics of Reform and Modernization. 1880-1946. p. 271. Stanford University Press, Stanford) writes about military service in Afghanistan as a whole that the rich were exempted by the maliks and the poor and those with whom they were at feud were recruited.

Finally maliks often use the government's directives as a means for furthering their own ends. As it is not always clear to the malik's electors which orders emanate from the local government centre and which do not (see also the case history above) maliks can utilise the waluswal's authority by implying that the action they take or the misuse they make of their power is dictated and supported by the coercive power of the local government. To a certain extent this is true because the government is most willing to support what it terms 'effective' leaders and these are usually the ones who are authoritarian and dictatorial and most consistently overstep the limits of traditional leadership. However, in many cases, as for example in that of the camel-herder and the malik, no such governmental sanction or support exists nevertheless maliks act as if it did and thus are able to manipulate men and situations to their advantages.

Expectations of the Electors

Settlement of Disputes

One of the major expectations of the electors is that their malik should settle disputes. Disputes in Afghaniya are, as we have seen in chap. 10, principally concerned with land, money, and women and arise because of the competition for resources among the members of the community. Not all of these disputes require the duties of the malik as arbiter because solutions may be achieved in other ways. Where, for example, one party either koranai, para or combination of both is obviously dominant in political and economic terms - they are usually concomitant - then the result is predictable i.e. the stronger is successful.

A solution may also be reached when one or both disputants appeal to the local government for support. This is a tactic often used by the weaker group and whilst it usually has success in straightforward, legally uncomplicated cases such as T against R1 (see above p. 266)

in more complex ones it prolongs the case so that the result is dependent more on the resources and stamina of the parties than on any objective criteria.

As a result and where one party is not overly dominant the dispute is usually laid in the malik's hands for arbitration. This can, however, only occur when both parties in the dispute are interested in peace and are willing to accept an arbitrated decision; and/or where the situation is affecting the daily lives of neutrals to such an extent that intervention is thought necessary and public opinion forces the parties to bring their problem before the malik. Such a reaction on the part of interested neutrals may also occur when they think that the ripples of conflict will come to the attention of the local government and bring about its intercession. Apart from the inconvenience which this would incur for all the inhabitants - i.e. the presence of officials in Afghaniya for weeks on end - it is generally felt as a principle, at least by those not directly involved, that problems, disputes and conflicts should both be kept within the community and solved by the community i.e. through the offices of the malik and where necessary the jirga. Traditional mechanisms for conflict settlement are therefore nearly always preferred to those which would involve the intervention of strangers [1]. Whatever the case when a dispute is placed in the malik's hands for settlement then his electors expect a solution satisfactory to both sides to result and not a prolongation of the struggle for the malik's benefit or monetary gain.

The actual procedures for achieving any solution vary considerably with, among other things, the group membership and political and economic strength of the parties involved, with the nature of the dispute itself and with the role which the malik plays i.e. whether

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1) It was largely the fear of outside, i.e. government, interference which disunited the groups who were opposed to my work in Afghaniya. They knew that any action on their part would bring in the government and a sort of 'occupation' would result. My continued presence was, therefore, the lesser of two evils.

he genuinely seeks a solution or whether he is only concerned with his personal gain [1].

The normal procedure in cases where the parties come from the same 'maliki' (that area and those people under one malik) is for the malik to act as a mediator in the real sense of one who interposes between the parties as a friend of both. He alternately visits the house of the disputants relating the suggestions and condition of one side to the other and hopes that some compromise will be reached. When both parties are evenly balanced in terms of resources and political support there is little else that the malik can do because he has no real coercive power. He can threaten to withdraw his good offices should in the future one or both sides have difficulties with the local government but this situation as far as the parties are concerned can always be coped with when it arises. He can also arrange for a jirga to be called and bring together the disputants, interested people, people concerned to settle the matter, and those who are known for their expertise. But even the jirga cannot enforce a settlement because the only sanction it can exercise is the pressure of public opinion otherwise it can only appeal to the common sense and community feeling of the disputants and stress that the alternative - an appeal to the local government - is costly both in time and money. Only in cases where on side is somewhat weaker is it possible for the malik to influence the proceedings to some extent and then only because the weaker group does not wish in addition to being weak to lose his support. Of course some maliks do have considerable power over some individuals, when for example they have avoided conscription or committed murder, but this happens rarely and these individuals are not always the ones involved in disputes. Should therefore the parties really desire an end to the dispute then this will be achieved but more often only a cessation of hostilities can be agreed

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1) A malik who has been involved in the settlement of a dispute will of course always receive something. It is the size of this something which has repercussions for the settlement.

upon and a state of 'urān', of destroyed relations, i.e. of no intercourse, takes its place.

A different procedure is followed when a solution is required rapidly. When, for example, a young girl leaves her father's house without his permission and takes up residence in that of the boy whom she proposes to marry (see chap. 9 pp. 223-226) the malik is expected to act quickly and effectively. Usually he does so by calling together a 'maraka' or conciliatory group which consists of elders, mullahs, Hajis etc., and the boy's father. These men then proceed to the girl's father's house and there seek to pacify the enraged father and bring about a settlement.

Marakas, however, are not called together only for the purpose of reaching a rapid settlement. Sometimes they are constituted by the need to break a continual deadlock in a dispute of long standing and complexity. When the normal procedures have been tried, when government officials have been called in without success and when Holy Men have been suggested and rejected a maraka is often formed on the initiative of the malik and includes the notables of the whole community as well as sometimes Holy Men from neighbouring areas. In spite of the obvious qualities of such a group, settlements are not always achieved largely because the members are rarely disinterested - they are open to and willing to accept bribes - and also because when faced by politically strong or equally balanced opponents there is little coercive power which they can exercise which will force the disputants to agree to some sort of compromise. If a settlement, called a 'jora' (peace, amity, concord), is reached then this is because, as has been indicated above, one or both parties are ready for an agreement [1].

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1) In spite of the maraka's inability to force or impose a settlement on the disputing parties its usefulness is not in question. In fact the maraka is tending to replace the jirga. This is probably because the jirga is too large, too ponderous and more representative of lineage interests than of those resulting from affinity and common residence. (p.t.o.)

This is also the situation in all those disputes and conflicts which have become complicated by the bitterness with which they are pursued and where the membership of the parties in different malikis necessitates the services of two maliks. In these cases the malik instead of being required to achieve a 'just' settlement is expected to support the cause of his own electors and to try to effect a solution which is advantageous for them. A malik who has considerable experience in the settlement of disputes may well, if he knows that he will also be well rewarded for his efforts, be able to reach an agreement which is more remunerative for his group than for the other. This is naturally easier when the other malik is not so capable and/or does not possess sufficient experience. In all these cases, however, much depends on the subjective assessment or interpretation of the solution by the parties concerned and clever maliks can and will present agreements in such a way that they are seen to be more satisfactory for their respective groups than for the others and thus filfil their electors' expectations.

If all these traditional means of settlement fail then one or both parties appeal to the local government for a solution. In the simple straightforward cases there is a real chance of a solution being found even if this is a dictated one rather than a solution based on compromise. In other, more complex, cases however this appeal just adds an extra element or dimension to the already labyrinthine nature of the dispute itself. Nevertheless this process even in these cases has its positive aspects because firstly for those who are politically and economically weak it is often the only way to obtain justice. Secondly the procedure involved in bringing the case before the magistrate or responsible department is often so ex-

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The maraka is certainly smaller, more flexible, potentially more representative and more readily brought together. It, the maraka, would seem to be more in tune with 'modern' times. Afghaniya is not the only Pakhtun area where such an attitude is discernible. Janata and Hassas report for Paktia that there the word 'maraka' is also now being used for 'jirga' and that the maraka is really a small jirga which deals with the less complex problems. (Janata & Hassas. 1975. Op.cit. pp. 93 & 95.)

hausting and debilitiating that both parties are happy to have their complaints withdrawn and to seek a solution through the traditional methods. In this latter case the malik plays an all important role and one which has only emerged since the Safi have started increasingly to use the local government's facilities and institutions.

When the initial complaint is made it is put directly to the waluswal because it both allows the disputants to give public vent to their dissatisfaction - there are usually other interested complainants in the waluswal's office - and to feel that they have the 'ear', i.e. the personal attention and interest, of the highest possible official in the waluswali. If, as is usually the case, the waluswal cannot resolve the problem there and then, then he passes it on to the appropriate department or departments. Once there and having been noted down it soon disappears among the piles of similar complaints from which it can only be extracted for processing on the payment of money to the clerk or clerks responsible. Then witnesses need to be called and evidence collected. During these necessary procedures weeks and months may pass and the disputants become weary from walking to and from Nijrao and poor from handing out bribes. Gradually the ardour of the parties dwindles and they begin to regret having not heeded the advice of friends and relatives to keep the dispute within the hamlet or community. Finally this regret gives way to despair that the case will ever be resolved and the contrite disputants ask the malik to intervene on their behalf at the local government centre.

Most maliks through their years in office have had considerable contact with the different departments in the local government and know how best to proceed. Usually they seek out the clerk or clerks responsible for handling the dispute and see what can be done to stop the proceedings. Normally these cannot be stopped, at least according to the clerks, because the complaint having been recorded has set the administrative machinery in motion and nothing, they say,

can now impede it in its inexorable progress. The case can, however, under certain circumstances be 'removed from the books' i.e. deleted from the official documents. This task is much easier than the clerks would have the villagers believe because complaints are entered onto separate sheets of paper which are easily destroyed. However as the clerks have much more to gain by implying that the difficulties and risk involved are much greater than they in fact are these sheets are referred to as 'books' and thus comparable in the minds of the villagers, with THE book, the koran. The malik who is an accomplice to this deceit because of what he himself hopes to acquire does not disillusion the disputants. It is then only a question of how much money needs to change hands before the desired object is achieved. If the case was particularly complex then it might well have been recorded in a number of 'books' and each has its price for removal. Whatever the situation the villagers are usually pleased to pay and both the malik and the clerks receive their share. The papers are ripped up and the case is finally removed from the 'books'. The malik then tries to reconcile the two disputing parties himself and because of their disenchantment with the government's efforts and their gratefulness to the malik for his intervention a settlement is often reached. Such a settlement apart from bringing the malik a further payment, the traditional 'lungi', also demonstrates his skill and strengthens his authority among his electors.

This role as intermediary is not the only occasion when the malik acts as a go-between between the members of hamlets and the local government. As the administrative control increases so too does the villagers' involvement with the various departments (military service, taxation, schooling, etc.) in Nijrao. Generally villagers cannot cope with the situation and feel helpless when confronted by the clerks and the latter do nothing to diminish this feeling. As a result the villagers now expect the malik to represent them when they have difficulties and to do all he can to further their interests. In return they demonstrate their gratitude not only with gifts but

also with increased personal support of the malik in situations which both concern the malik as malik and those which involve him as a normal member of the community.

Witnessing of Transactions

Apart from seeking settlements and acting as the representative of his electors the malik's duties for his electors also include the witnessing of various transactions. Although in Afghaniya, as I have indicated above, the sale of land, the 'geraoing' of fields, the borrowing of money etc., should normally be witnessed by the judge in Nijrao this may be and often is just witnessed by the malik and one or two elders. This was presumably a pre-Administration, customary law activity essential both for the authorisation and validation of important contracts. Now the villagers' reasons for continuing to utilise the malik's services in preference to those of the judge are the following: Firstly when a document of whatever kind is witnessed by a judge in Nijrao then there is a tax to be paid on the document itself as well as a charge for the judge's work and time. No such official tax or charge is made by the malik although it is customary to give a small payment, the 'shirini' (sweetener). Secondly when money is lent by one individual to another a tax of so many Afs. per 100 Afs. lent is charged when the transaction is witnessed by the judge and the Safi see this as an extra, unwarranted, burden. Thirdly when land or property are to be sold or the usufruct rights to fields given for a certain sum of money the public nature of the transaction in Nijrao could mean that other interested parties could object or impede the procedure. Also when such agreements are undertaken, as is sometimes the case, even though the fields have already been sold or geraoed to someone else, there is a need for secrecy which can only be assured when the malik's good offices are utilised. Finally all transactions and agreements which have to be witnessed or documented in Nijrao take more time and effort than do those carried out in Afghaniya itself. There are, therefore,

considerable incentives to continue to use the malik's powers as witness and guarantor.

In spite of these advantages such transactions often lead to trouble because they can be, and are, disputed easily as I have shown above pp. 273 & 274 . Decisive in such disputes are the political support which can be rallied and the attitude of the malik. Were the malik to remain impartial in these disputes and to support the justice of the case and not the person promising the greatest reward then this traditional system of legalization would have been able to withstand the encroachment of alternatives offered by the local government. But he has not. As a result although many customary law contracts remain unchallenged and others fulfil their functions completely the percentage which do not is increasing and will continue to increase until the traditional system ceases to have any value.

Representation

Finally the malik's supporters expect him to be the representative of the 'maliki' when contact is necessary with other groups and with the local government; and to entertain outsiders who visit the 'maliki' for various reasons. In the former case the malik represents the group when, for example, measures for coping with floods or drought are to be coordinated or when objections to the local government's activities are to be presented. As such situations arise relatively rarely they do not constitute more than a minor part of the malik's functions.

Hospitality on the other hand takes up more of the malik's time both because it is a Pakhtun ideal which can only be avoided with difficulty and because it is necessary to entertain the members of marakas, visiting sheikhans [1] and the government officials who have

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1) The representatives of Holy Men and Pirs. See above p. 111.

business in the 'maliki'. This hospitality might not seem like representation because it is carried out by the malik in his guest room but that it is representation is clearly demonstrated by the contributions which other members of the 'maliki' make to the food which is prepared for the guests. In spite of these contributions the general poverty of the area has caused the content of the hospitality to be considerably diminished whilst the outward form has been preserved. For those Pakhtuns, for example, members of marakas and sheikhans who come from the surrounding areas such treatment is usually understandable because they themselves have to act in a similar way. The officials on the other hand expect something better and generally receive something worse.

All officials but especially those on the lower levels of the hierarchy, clerks and gendarmes for example, like to spend some time in the 'countryside' because it frees them from the restraints and demands of their superiors, gives them a feeling of power and enables them to eat food which they otherwise would only eat at festivals and on religious holidays. The maliks of Afghaniya are aware of this and view the visits of officials with some antipathy because of the inconvenience they cause and the resources which the maliks consider are squandered in entertaining them. The maliks, therefore, try to dispose of the motive for the visit prior to the officials' arrival, e.g. by bringing about a settlement, or, if that is not possible, by inducing the parties concerned to reach some compromise at least before it is necessary to provide food for the officials. If all these measures fail then the hospitality which the malik eventually offers the officials is of such a poor quality that it borders on an affront and discourages any prolongation of their stay. The officials themselves are, of course, cognisant of the mixed feelings aroused by their visits and often consciously use them to put pressure on the maliks by implying that they might extend their visit so that a, for them, advantageous agreement or regulation of affairs emerges.

Sources of and Checks to the Malik's Power

So far I have outlined the malik's duties in terms of the expectations of the local government and those of the malik's electors. At the same time the malik's response to or manipulation of these duties has emerged. This indicated that he was using them, wherever possible, to obtain material benefit and to increase his own powers in ways that were contrary to the egalitarian principles which formerly, according to Elphinstone, constituted the basis of the malik's office. I would like now to look at the sources of and checks to the malik's power, his motivation for seeking office and finally to try to define this new form of leadership which has arisen principally through the change brought about by the influence of the central government.

The sources of a malik's power vary from individual to individual principally because a malik does not have powers ascribed to him but has to achieve them. Nevertheless it is possible to list the malik's potential sources of power even though it is probable that no one malik will have the use, or control, of all of them at any one time.

Wealth, as I have mentioned above, is a prerequisite to the acquisition of office and all maliks in Afghaniya are wealthier than the average farmer. It is, however, not so much the wealth itself which is a source of power but what it represents and can be used to acquire, i.e., land, and the control of resources. Land, as we have seen, is very scarce in Afghaniya and a large proportion of the population is either landless or has insufficient land for its needs. As a result those people who have excess land such as the maliks can acquire power over others by accepting or refusing requests to share-crop their surplus fields. The malik used to be very circumspect in his dealings with would-be share-croppers because solicitations came principally from those men who had adjoining fields and these were usually cousins and members of the

hamlet. Such men did not, once they had been given permission to share-crop the fields, accept commands easily even though they were dependent and any display of authority by the malik resulted in the dissolution of the contract by the share-cropper and enmity or urān between them. Now, however, the necessity for agnatic support is decreasing and the competition for land increasing so that agnates cannot afford to be quite so proud as they used to be, although they are in no way subordinate, or they are replaced by men from neighbouring hamlets who because of their agnatic and physical distance are more able and willing to accept orders. Once this subordination has been established and the share-cropper's economy has become dependent on the share from the malik's fields the malik has acquired a source of power which can be used for many purposes. Up to the present time (1970-1971), however, no malik had so much land that he could assemble around him a body of supporters strong enough by itself to coerce other groups and to make him totally independent of kin support. Also demographic factors such as polygyny among wealthy men, the resulting large number of sons and inheritance mean that the ownership of a large area of land only represents temporary power which in the next generation disappears [1]. Nevertheless, although the land itself is fragmented, some hereditary maliks seem to survive this process and the concomitant loss of power and support. One of my case histories shows that such a malik starting with an average land-holding was able through his expertise, intelligence and office to re-establish himself over a number of years as a larger landowner so that the size of initial land-holdings does not seem to be always of crucial significance for the acquisition of power. Nevertheless dependent share-croppers represent a source of power which within certain limits and when combined with other sources can be decisive.

Cousins and fellow-members of hamlets although in no way subordinate to the malik can also under certain circumstances provide

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1) There is no 'pargai sīrī' in Afghaniya as there is in Swat, i.e. land which a leader receives for his services, and which is not divided on his death but passes, as a unit, to his successor. See Barth. 1965. Op. cit. p. 75.

additional support and thus a source of power. One such circumstance would be when they are also share-croppers on the malik's land and he is, for example, engaged in a struggle for the purchase of a field which although adjacent to his own is on the land of another hamlet. If his protagonist is an outsider then the malik's cousins are generally prepared to help. This is not so much because they are cousins, although this might play a part, but because their interests are often better served by the assistance and backing which they give to the malik than they would be by abstaining from the struggle. For, should the malik acquire the field then they may well have the opportunity to sharecrop it later. Another circumstance which leads to physical support for the malik is that he as the most powerful man in the hamlet has generally more to offer than other members and can further members' interests better. As a result villagers will support him even in conflicts with their closest relatives if it is clear that their needs and requirements will be optimally served in this way. Although such support is, as I have indicated above, usually not sufficient to bring about settlements in disputes where both parties are intransigent it can turn the balance when the malik is personally involved, i.e. is one of the parties himself. Then the imbalance is often so great that the other party has no alternative but to capitulate.

Most struggles with the malik, or at least with the more powerful maliks, do not reach the stage of a confrontation of forces because the malik is able, either by his influence with the local government or through the government's support of him as an 'effective' malik and by his manipulation of his numerous duties, to overcome the opposition at an early stage. Not all maliks are, of course, able to draw upon all these sources of potential power but their duties alone, as we have seen above, provide sufficient scope for most maliks to at least influence and often manipulate their supporters and fellow villagers. The difficulties, for example, which one fatherless boy in his late teens had with the local government

enabled a malik to force him into exchanging one of his fields which bordered on the malik's land for a less valuable one of the malik's which in addition was on the edge of the hamlet's lands and thus troublesome to work and to irrigate. (The promise to solve the boy's difficulties had not been fulfilled at the time I left the area.)

Once such tactics succeed and when the malik has success in other areas as well as support and wealth he can, unless faced by very strong opposition, exercise real power over others. It would seem probable that the numbers of such powerful maliks will increase because the traditional mechanisms such as loss of support and removal from office which previously could have weakened and deposed an overly strong malik can now be safely ignored when the malik has the local government's approval and support. Also the government which gave him these additional powers has provided, as yet, no mechanisms for inhibiting their misuse and death and the segmentation of the malik's estate by his sons would seem to be the only answers for the future.

Present Checks to the Malik's Power

At the moment, however, the traditional checks to the malik's powers would still seem to be sufficient for all but the most powerful of hereditary maliks. In Afghaniya where four of the nine maliks are hereditary only one may be put into the category of most powerful and the other three although possessing permanence in office would share the middle of a power continuum along with some of their non-hereditary colleagues. The reasons for this diversity of power among the malik's are as has become clear firstly differing amounts of wealth and land, secondly variable degrees of support from fellow villagers, electors and the government, thirdly differing possibilities for the utilisation of duties, and finally varying age, experience and expertise. Concomitant with these variables are, of course, the sanctions which the electors can use against the maliks for what they

consider misuses of power. Such sanctions or checks also vary in efficacy according to the acquired powers of the individual malik. Social criticism, for example, is not sufficient to inhibit a strong malik from pursuing his objectives whereas it might be adequate to counteract the activities of a weaker one. The checks, therefore, to power, which will be outlined below, must be judged in the light of the differing potential among the maliks to ignore or resist them and not in terms of any absolute power which perhaps one or two maliks may possess under certain circumstances.

Criticism

Social criticism constitutes one of the principal, in the sense of most commonly used, checks on the malik's power. It takes the two forms of negative and positive criticism and is usually informally expressed by individuals rather than by groups and is thus similar to what Radcliffe-Brown [1] has called a 'diffuse sanction'. The yardsticks which the malik's electors use for justifying their approval or disapproval and for judging the malik's actions are Islam, Pakhtun ideals, and traditional conceptions about a malik's function. When, therefore, a malik is seen to violate these ideals or misuse his power then he can face very considerable negative criticism. The extent to which he reacts depends, of course, on the security of his position. Most maliks, however, cannot completely ignore such criticism and it is obviously more pleasant for them to live among people who approve rather than disapprove of what they do. They, therefore, try where possible to harvest favourable comment and this of necessity influences their actions as well. Unfortunately the poverty of the area made acute by the drought and poor harvests of the last years has produced a certain indifference towards all ideals of behaviour on the part of the people. Men are principally interested in becoming 'mōr sarī' (satisfied men) rather than remaining

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1) Radcliffe-Brown, A. 1952. Structure and Function in Primitive Society. p. 205. Cohen & West Ltd., London.

'wuge sarī' (hungry men) and, as they themselves are willing to do more or less anything to achieve this condition, they cannot criticise the malik too much for utilising his position to reach what are in reality the same ends even if these are on a grander scale. This catastrophic economic condition should, however, as a result of the more favourable weather conditions have now changed to some extent so that the old ideals are once again playing a significant role in people's assessment of behaviour.

Ostracism

Should social criticism prove to be of little value in bringing to an end a malik's misuse of power then the next step in the confrontation is a form of boycott or ostracism. The lengths or extremes to which this is carried depends on the cause but when the provocation is sufficient then the most extreme form of ostracism will be practised. This means that all forms of communication with the malik cease and followers do not attend his 'rites de passage' or his religious festivities or entertainments. This total boycott generally proves to be effective even when the malik concerned is a powerful one. In other cases a less extreme approach can also be successful depending upon the relative power of the malik and the amount of support which still remains after his opponents have boycotted him.

A conditional and therefore temporary withdrawal of support which would result from a boycott can also be a very potent check to a malik's power. This is especially effective in those cases where maliks are more or less dependent on the support of relatives and electors rather than on share-croppers to accomplish personal goals. When such support is withdrawn as a result of a malik's actions then he is unable to achieve anything and must pacify his supporters through actions which further their interests or which counteract the initial misuse of power or violation of ideals.

Loss of Followers

Should a malik, however, fail to react to a temporary renunciation of support or should he continue to abuse his power then he may ultimately lose his supporters to another malik. Before this can happen the discontented supporters have to find another malik who is willing to accept them and this is not always so easy because maliks do not wish to be accused of 'stealing' another malik's supporters. They are interested in stability of support and should electors be able to chop and change too easily it would be detrimental to their own interests because no malik, if he is to extend his field of power, can be constantly popular with everyone and today's new supporters can be tomorrow's defectors. Also maliks are not always willing or in a strong enough position to disturb their relations with other maliks by accepting their supporters at least when these are only one or two persons. It is, therefore, easier for groups to change their allegiance than for individuals because the former represent a worthwhile addition to the new malik's supporters and are adequate compensation for the inevitable hostility which will arise with the old malik. Obviously the more powerful maliks are more willing and able to accept changelings than less powerful ones although it is the latter who are most in need of additional support. It is certainly true to say among Safi maliks that success breeds success.

Once the supporters have found a malik then they need to go with him to the judge, have their names deleted from the list of followers of the old malik and have them added to the list of supporters of the new one. Sometimes the group can be so large that the withdrawal of their support leads to the deposal of the malik because the number of his supporters drops below fifty. This is then the ultimate check to a malik's power. Interestingly enough, as I think has become clear, it is not the most powerful maliks who are thus deposed or threatened but those who are in the initial

stages of establishing and extending their powers. These are the ones who are vulnerable because they have a small number of followers and also have little to offer them. Consequently they are often deposed after only a few months. The more powerful maliks on the other hand who would be less effected by losses of supporters are less troubled by such changes of allegiance because they have more to offer. Beyond a certain point, therefore, a malik's powers begin to have a snowball effect the ultimate size and extent of which is only limited by death and the division of his land or by jirgas / marakas which minimise the malik's power by transferring problems from his private sphere of influence to that of the hamlet, the lineage or the maliki. To reach and cross this threshold of power, however, requires considerable ability and expertise and many fail before they have reached it. Those who succeed find further progress relatively easy and come to enjoy all the fruits of power.

Motives and Rewards

These fruits represent the motivating forces which cause individual Safi to seek office as maliks and consist, as I think has become clear, of power, prestige, political support, wealth and land. They, of course, also constitute the goals of all political activity in Afghaniya but the realisation of such ends is generally more possible from the position of malik than it is from that of a landowner with an average holding. Most maliks, therefore, once they have achieved office utilise their duties to acquire payments and bribes which can in turn be used to acquire land. Through their wealth and land they can increasingly acquire political support and with this support they can aggrandise that land which is adjacent to their own. Using all the possibilities open to him, one malik, for example, although starting as a small landowner has managed to procure a third of his hamlet's total land and there would seem to be no reason why he should not continue to extend his ownership further. Such a malik has achieved real power and he can more or less dictate events

within his maliki as well as impinge upon the power fields of other less powerful maliks. The special position of this particular malik is also reflected in the imputation that he has supernatural powers over women. He is believed to possess a 'de kage kus', a lupine vulva, which when shown to young girls at sunrise and sunset of the same day is supposed to make him irresistable to them [1]. He has, in other words, become a 'maximal male'. Although men who commit adultery or who seduce unmarried girls should, according to the norms of the society, be killed those who disregard or are contemptuous of the danger elicit admiration because their actions, whilst striking at the order of the society, also uphold another Pakhtun ideal that of potent manhood. One of the most famous Pakhtuns, Khushkhal Khan Khattak, was not only a renowned warrior and the most illustrious Pakhto poet but also a person who took his pleasures where he could with little regard for danger or local feeling as is shown in one of his poems:

'When does a hungry man pay heed
To whether what he eats is lawful?

Take her mouth, Khushal, in secret;
The falcon steals flesh from the game.' [2]

Thus this Safi malik in Afghaniya has not sullied his reputation as one might expect through his illicit amorous activities but has rather added lustre to his already high-status image.

With such a malik before their eyes and with the realisation that the traditional checks to a malik's power are, beyond a certain point, largely inadequate it is hardly surprising that others should see in the abuse of power and office the best way to obtain real power.

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1) A sort of cestus of Aphrodite.
2) Leka badzen che halwa khwri. Translated by D. Mackenzie. 1965. Poems from the Divan of Khushal Khan Khattak. In: Dupree. 1973. Op. cit. p. 89.

Thus the malik in Afghaniya instead of being the support and symbol of an egalitarian and anarchic system has become the instrument through which inequality and centralisation will be implemented.

Conclusion

At the moment, however, the malik's position in general lies somewhere between these two extremes. Elements of what may be called the traditional form of leadership when seen in terms of Elphinstone's account still remain in the duties which the malik performs for his electors and the reciprocal support which these electors give to the malik. Also the traditional checks to the malik's power continue to be operative and effective up to a certain threshold of power beyond which they cease to have much influence. At the same time changes have been taking place which have fundamentally altered the traditional conception of the office of malik. Firstly drought, poor harvests, and overpopulation have lead to a general scepticism about the value and importance of ideals and standards of behaviour and this has been reflected in the malik's abuse of power. Secondly the government, although trying to steer a middle course and to preserve certain elements of traditional leadership - at least at the level of the malik - whilst adapting it to modern requirements, has, as Lucy Mair writes about Africa, 'altered by its mere presence both the nature and the basis of the chief's authority' [1]. In addition, although most certainly at an unconscious level, the government has largely removed the malik out of reach of the traditional sanctions which he would have faced for the abuse of power in his community. And it has given him extra duties and powers which when misused as they are by the more expert and charismatic of maliks to achieve personal political goals have brought about a dysymmetry in social relations and an accentuation of inequalities [2].

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1) Mair, L. 1969. Op. cit. p. 65.
2) Compare Gluckman, M. 1965. Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society. Oxford. p. 119. "Big men' are more liable to become bullies where the imposition of colonial rule has given them powers which were not inherent in their offices traditionally'.

The type of leadership which has thus emerged is, therefore, neither wholely traditional nor charismatic but something of both. It is no longer lineally based because present membership cuts across lineage boundaries but agnates may provide a core of support in political confrontation if their interests are best served in this way. It is not comparable with leadership in Swat because in Afghaniya there is no non-Pakhtun, subordinate, indigenous population which can be used for achieving power and no men's houses (hujra) where political strength can be demonstrated and largesse distributed. It is not institutionalised leadership [1] although the attributes necessary for office, the procedure for election, the authorisation of power and the duties to be performed are all generally known and to a certain extent standardised. The Safi malik would, therefore, seem to be in summary a form of leadership possessing both traditional and charismatic attributes and moving in the direction of increasing authority, independence from electors, and institutionalisation. As a result if no adequate sanctions arise in the future then the most powerful maliks may well be able to assemble around them dependent, unrelated, share-croppers who would provide the backbone for independent, leader orientated, political groups and these would bring about major social change in the community.

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1) See Gluckman's quotation from Maine: 'The capacity or office is here considered apart from the particular person who from time to time may occupy it, and, this capacity being perpetual, the series of individuals who fill it are clothed with the leading attribute of Corporations - Perpetuity'. Gluckman. 1965. Op.cit. p. 118.

12. CONCLUSION

The social structure and organization of the Safi of Afghaniya seemed initially to be lineally organised and segmentary. Almost half the population were united through their common descent from an apical ancestor, musawad, and the other half, the non-musawad Safi, ordered themselves in accordance with this dominant group; the territory of the community could be seen as being divided into four areas occupied by four major lineages or khels; and the hamlets constituted minor lineages within which were and are politically active local descent groups, the koranai. Leadership was non-institutionalised and apparently lineage based, i.e. the malik was the lineage head. Land, property and water, jural, political and social status were all attached to and transmitted by descent. Finally patrilineal ideals and a patrilineal ideology were used as the yardsticks for ideal behaviour. As a result it was tempting to see and utilise patrilineality as the basis for social relations and activities especially as so much of Afghaniya's society could be explained in this way. On closer examination, however, it became clear that this was a patrilineal system in decline in an, or some, intermediary stage between a segmentary system, described by Freedman as 'the purest form of unilineal descent group' [1], and a village/family organised system whose members were united through agnation but also and equally through affinity, propinquity and common residence; and whose actions were governed by individual interests or at the most by those of the family/household.

The symptoms or symbols of this decline became apparent as the thesis progressed. The larger descent organised groups, the minor division and major lineage, had no corporate function and the smaller ones, the minor lineage and koranai, whilst constituting the most important groups in the society were held together almost as much

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1) Freedman, M. 1958. Lineage Organization in Southeastern China. p. 138. Athlone Press, London.

by marriage, common residence, neighbourliness, etc., as by agnation. It is, of course, very difficult to say how much political support is the result of ties of descent or of ties of proximity of residence when close agnates also live contiguously. Certainly the links of descent have chronological precedence over those of closeness thus making the ties of propinquity a result of agnation rather than a separate cause of solidarity. Nevertheless it became clear that koranai, especially the larger ones, were not being used or brought together when situations arose which in the past would have necessitated their functioning. This is certainly a consequence of the almost complete disappearance of what used to be the koranai's primary purpose, revenge killings - the result of the local government's activities in Nijrao. Now ties between members are being neglected, obligations are being disregarded, a minimum of new marriage links are being made, the para, the alternative political group, is being preferred and the present young men, the future elders, are talking about agnation as having, in their opinion, a negative influence on the more favoured affinity.

The reasons for this disenchantment with agnatic ties and relations did not alone lie in the alternatives offered to the principles of revenge and self-help by the local government in Nijrao. They also came from over-population, land shortage and, in the short term, drought, i.e. economic and demographic factors.

There has been relative over-population in this area for at least the last fifty years - a situation indicated by the occupational diversity in Afghaniya, the disappearance of families from the genealogies through migration, and the contacts of the present migrants with earlier ones in the areas to the north of the Hindu Kush. The over-population and the resulting division of many holdings into unworkably small units observable at the time of my field work was, however, not just the further advance of a process which had been under way for years but was the dramatic

aggravation of the situation. This was caused by a series of years of drought. The relative suddenness and extreme nature of the water shortage caught the people or at least the elders unprepared. Whilst cultivators can always cope with one or two years of below average precipitation a series of such years, especially in areas where reserves are minimal, bring and, in the case of Afghaniya, brought catastrophe and sudden change. Those who could or had been able to survive on a minimum became destitute first. Then as the drought continued other problems arose among those initially better situated. The absolute powers and authority of the fathers based as they were on their control of resources crumbled once these resources failed. Sons could not be married at the usual age and holdings could only be passed on which were totally inadequate. The number of sons of destitute fathers migrating for work increased and these became economically independent or brought back sums of money to the community which placed them in a position to make a claim to some of their fathers' authority and to be responsible for their own marriages and futures. Interests became individual or at the most family orientated. The splintering of families and households became, and have become, common and the elementary family household has replaced the extended family one as the most common form.

In households where the land situation was not so acute but certainly not optimal latent tensions between brothers became manifest and paternal authority, social pressures and criticism increasingly proved not to be sufficient to suppress them. Overt hostility between brothers arose and thus the unthinkable in Pakhtun terms - conflict within the agnatic core - became not only possible but practised.

Admittedly this involved and involves only part (some 40 %) of the population but the process had begun. The other 60 % of the population remained relatively undisturbed by these difficulties

because even in the period of extreme drought they had sufficient land to survive. Their ideals and norms, their patrilineal ideology have been preserved, not untouched, but have remained relatively intact. Nevertheless the process of change was put in a higher gear and the high protective wall of patriarchal power and patrilineality, the logical order of Pakhtun society at large, had been cracked and partially breached. Thus the other symptoms of patrilineal decline - the acceptance of divorce and adultery, the marriage of a Pakhtun girl to a barber, the marriage of girls in the face of the opposition of their walis, the concentration of interests on the family and household, the pursuit of individual rather than group interests, the erosion of egalitarian principles, the increasing influence of the central government on the community's affairs, the increasing use by members of the community of the local government's facilities, and the acceptance and furtherance of an established and authoritarian form of leadership - were not only possible but inevitable.

This has not, however, resulted in a vacuum. Adjustments have been made by some if not by all and alternative ideals and groups have been created or been given broader functions. Now material interests are uppermost in most men's minds, and the sphere of attention has been reduced to that of the family and the household. Larger groupings, the para etc., form where interests cannot successfully be pursued otherwise, but they are impermanent. Of the more permanent groupings, the koranai has become restricted in its functions but is in no danger of disappearing - Cohen's experience shows how remarkably resilient descent groups are [1] - and the hamlet and the hamlet boundary have become the absolute limit of obligations and more than superficial interests.

In other words a structure and organization is emerging whose largest corporate unit is the hamlet, whose political functions are

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1) See Cohen. 1965. Op.cit. p. 2.

pursued by the para, koranai and increasingly by groups around maliks and whose minimal units are the nuclear family and elementary family household. Such an organization represents the norm for the non-Pakhtun groups in Afghan society, i.e., for the Tajiks, Hazara, and Uzbeks, and only the Pakhtuns and the Turkmen still retain their lineally organised tribal society. As I have shown, in the chapter on the Pakhtuns, how diverse their social and cultural forms are, one might think that this development in Afghaniya represents but one more form. It seems to me, however, that it is a development which may well presage the course to be taken by other Pakhtun tribes once similar factors initiating change are present.

This decline of the patrilineal system of organization and its evolution towards one based on kinship and common residence also, of course, implies a failure on the part of the Safi to be Pakhtuns and perhaps will bring with it a change of identity. So far this has not happened even in those Safi villages in other areas (Jabal as-Saraj) where the process of change would seem to be most advanced, i.e. where they no longer speak Pakhto. This would seem to mean that, as Barth suggests [1], where many choose to maintain their claim to Pakhtun identity in spite of their failure to live up to, for example, Pakhtun ideals, patrilineality and Pakhtunwali then the basic content of the Pakhtun identity itself and its characteristics start being modified. In the case of the Safi of Afghaniya no new metamorphosis may be necessary because they will remain Pakhtun by changing that which is considered Pakhtun.

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1) Barth. 1970. Op.cit. p. 134.

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Abbreviations

A. A.	American Anthropologist
A.S.A.	Association of Social Anthropologists of the Commonwealth
J.R.A.I.	Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute
S.W.J.A.	South Western Journal of Anthropology

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