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Abstract

The Scottish Wars of Edward III, 1327-1338

Christopher A. Candy

Ph. D. Thesis, Department of History, University of Durham, 2004

The fighting that occurred in Scotland during the first decade of Edward III's reign has often been recognized as important in the development of the strategies and tactics that allowed the English to win major victories against the French during the Hundred Years' War. Despite this, few studies exist that consider the wars as their primary focus, instead using the conflict of the 1330s as either a prologue to the fighting in France to follow or as the addendum to the Wars of Independence waged against Edward's father and grandfather. The major study that does focus solely on these wars only covers the first half of the conflict and fails to address the importance of the final three years.

This thesis aims to demonstrate the importance of Edward III's wars in Scotland as the break from the military practices of Edward II's reign and the key period for developing the English military machine that would fight the Hundred Years' War. Extensive government records are contrasted with English and Scottish chronicles to provide a comprehensive narrative that shows the wars as the primary focus of political events in England at the time along with its role in military innovation. The same materials are also used to examine the numerical composition of the English military year by year and how those numbers changed as new strategies for fighting the wars became more firmly entrenched.

Chapter 1 discusses the broad themes that characterize the decade and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the primary and secondary material available. Chapter 2 covers the approaches to Scotland taken by the regency of Isabella and Mortimer that Edward III and others would move away from starting in 1332. Chapters 3-6 will illustrate the events of the war from the preparations for the Dupplin Moor campaign of 1332 to the battle of Culblean in 1335. These events reopened the previously closed question of Scotland's legal relationship with England while dramatically altering the English concept of what constituted a successful military force, though one with important limitations. Chapter 7 addresses the period after Culblean to the siege of Dunbar, left unexamined by the previous major work on this topic. Not only did these years see both continued fighting and negotiation, but they also created the rapid deterioration in relations between Edward and Philip VI of France that would lead to war in 1337. Chapter 8 is concerned with the particulars of English campaigning forces and the changes in their recruiting and operating patterns. Chapter 9 considers the royal garrisons in Scotland, their individual histories, and the necessities for their operation. The final chapter is an examination of the two main components of supporting forces in Scotland: the naval forces to transport and protect supplies, and the means for gathering those supplies. Two appendices are included giving the strengths of individual retinues of men-at-arms and archers for the 1334-7 campaigns as given by the wardrobe book of Richard Ferriby.

The Scottish Wars of Edward III, 1327-1338

Christopher A. Candy

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Submitted for the degree of Ph.D.

Department of History, University of Durham

2004



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I declare that no portion of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree in this or any other university

Christopher A. Candy

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Last, I would like to thank my parents, Paule Marie Candy and David Candy: my debt to you is beyond my ability to say, and needs no elaboration. There are others who deserve thanks whom I have not mentioned: be assured that I will remember, and you have my gratitude.

Abbreviations

<i>Anonimalle</i>	<i>Anonimalle Chronicle 1333-1381</i> , ed. V.H. Galbraith (Manchester, 1927)
Anonimalle(2)	<i>The Anonimalle Chronicle 1307-1334</i> , ed. Wendy R. Childs and John Taylor. York: Yorkshire Archaeological Society [Record Series vol. 147], 1991
<i>Avesbury</i>	Robert of Avesbury, <i>De Gestis Mirabilibus Regis Edwardi Tertii</i> , ed. E.M. Thompson (London, 1889)
<i>Baker</i>	<i>Chronicon de Galfridi le Baker de Swynebroke</i> , ed. E.M. Thompson. (Oxford, 1889)
<i>Barbour</i>	John Barbour, <i>The Bruce</i> , ed. W.W. Skeat, Scottish Text Society, v. 2 (1894)
<i>BIHR</i>	<i>Bulletin of the Institute for Historical Research</i>
BL	British Library
<i>Bridlington</i>	<i>Gesta Edwardi Terti Auctore Canonico Bridlingtonensi</i> , in <i>Chronicles of the Reigns of Edward I and Edward II</i> , v. II, ed. W. Stubbs (London, Rolls Series, 1883)
<i>Brut</i>	<i>The Brut or the Chronicle of England</i> , ed. F.W. Brie. (London: Early English Text Society, 1906-8)
<i>Capgrave</i>	John Capgrave, <i>Chronicle of England</i> , ed. F.C. Hingeston (London, Rolls Series, 1858)
<i>CCR</i>	<i>Calendar of Close Rolls</i>
<i>CDS</i>	<i>Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland</i> , v. 3, ed. J. Bain (Edinburgh, 1887)
<i>CFR</i>	<i>Calendar of Fine Rolls</i>
<i>CPR</i>	<i>Calendar of Patent Rolls</i>
<i>EHR</i>	<i>English Historical Review</i>
<i>Foedera</i>	<i>Foedera, conventiones, litterae etc.</i> , ed. Thomas Rymer, v.2, part 2 (The Hague, 1739-1745)
<i>Fordun</i>	John of Fordun, <i>Chronica Gentis Scotorum</i> [Historians of Scotland, v. 1] ed. William F. Skene (Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1871)
<i>IHR</i>	<i>Irish Historical Review</i>
<i>Knighton</i>	Henry Knighton, <i>Chronicon</i> , ed. J.R. Lumby (London, Rolls Series, 1895)
PRO	Public Records Office
<i>Rot Parl</i>	<i>Rotuli Parliamentorum</i> , v. 2, ed. J. Strachey <i>et al</i> (London: Records Commission, 1783)
<i>Lanercost</i>	<i>Chronicon de Lanercost, MCCI-MCCCXLVI</i> , ed. J. Stevenson (Edinburgh: The Bannatyne Club, 1839)
<i>Melsa</i>	<i>Thomas Burton, Chronica Monasterii de Melsa</i> , ed. E.A. Bond (London, Rolls Series, 1866-8)
<i>Murimuth</i>	<i>Adae Murimuth: Continuatio Chronicarum</i> , ed. E.M. Thompson (London, Rolls Series, 1889)
Nicholson	R. Nicholson. <i>Edward III and the Scots: The Formative Years of a Military Career, 1327 to 1335</i> (Oxford, 1965)
<i>Original Letters</i>	<i>Original Letters Illustrative of English History</i> , ed. Sir H. Ellis, 3 rd ser'es. v. 1 (London, 1846)
<i>Pluscarden</i>	<i>The Book of Pluscarden</i> [Historians of Scotland, v. 10], ed. and tr. Felix J.H. Skene. (Edinburgh, 1890)
<i>Rot Scot</i>	<i>Rotuli Scotiae in Turri Londinensi et in Domo Capitulari Westmonasteriensi asservati</i> , vol 1: Edward I - Edward III, ed. David Macpherson (London: Record Commission, 1814)
<i>Original Letters</i>	<i>Original Letters Illustrative of English History</i> , ed. Sir H. Ellis, 3 rd ser'es. v. 1 (London, 1846)
<i>Pluscarden</i>	<i>The Book of Pluscarden</i> [Historians of Scotland, v. 10], ed. and tr. Felix J.H. Skene. (Edinburgh, 1890)
<i>Scalacronica</i>	<i>Scalacronica of Sir Thomas Grey</i> , ed. J. Stevenson (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, 1836)
<i>SHR</i>	<i>Scottish Historical Review</i>


Scotichronicon *Scotichronicon by Walter Bower*, v. 7, ed. D.E.R. Watt and A.B. Scott (Aberdeen, 1996)

TRHS *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*

War Cruel and Sharp C. Rogers. *War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy Under Edward III, 1327-1360* (Woodbridge, 2000)

Wyntoun Andrew of Wyntoun, *Orygynale Cronykil of Scotland* [Historians of Scotland, v. 2], ed. David Lang. (Edinburgh, 1872)

Scotland, 1327-1338



Background map taken from S.M. Gardiner, *A School Atlas of English History* (London, 1892)

Introduction

This thesis deals with the events of the Anglo-Scottish wars of the 1330s and the English military machine that allowed Edward III to win numerous successes against the Scots yet was unable to secure a permanent conquest of any portion of Scotland save Berwick-upon Tweed. It fills the gap left by studies focusing upon the reigns of Edward I and II and the wars of the Bruces on one hand and the Hundred Years' War on the other. Specifically, it will demonstrate the importance of Edward III's wars in Scotland in resuscitating English military power and transforming it into a major power in Western Europe, rather than the conflict being an unimportant prologue to the Hundred Years' War or an addendum to the career of Robert Bruce. This chapter will consider the overall significance of the wars and discuss broad themes that will be addressed in the thesis as a whole. It will also detail the various primary sources available and compare the strengths and weaknesses of the existing body of secondary works and the limitations of the previous scholarship. Chapter 2 will cover the regency of Isabella and Mortimer, while chapters 3-7 will illustrate the events of the war from the preparations for the Dupplin Moor campaign of 1332 to the failure of the siege of Dunbar in 1338. Chapters 8-10 are detailed analyses of the campaigning forces, the garrisons in Scotland, and the means by which supplies are gathered and transported to the men in the field.

The Anglo-Scottish wars of the 1330's are of major significance because so many of the English military tactics and methods associated with the English armies of the Hundred Years' War were developed in this period. The 1327 campaign planned by figures that were prominent during Edward II's reign was far different than the campaign carried out by the disinherited lords with claims in Scotland in



1332, or those carried out later by Edward III or his captains.¹ The tactics used at Crécy or Poitiers are little different in description than those seen at Halidon Hill.² During Edward's reign, the English armies moved from forces relying on heavy cavalry provided by the aristocracy in obligatory service, combined with mass numbers of foot soldiers, to a much more lean and efficient force based around a core of mixed retinues increasingly recruited through contractual agreements. These retinues consisted of heavy cavalry and mounted archers, both of whom fought on foot in defensive formations. Though the creation of an army with significant numbers of recruits from contracts is first apparent in 1337, the developments moving English military service in that direction were already evident in the preceding years of the Anglo-Scottish wars.³

It is also during these wars that the machinery needed to allow for such tactics to be adopted was put into place, with a major shift in the number and types of soldiers being sought to serve on campaign. Increasingly, the counties were called upon to provide more and more mounted archers, while men-at-arms became accustomed to fighting while dismounted in a heavy infantry role. After 1335 the number of troops sought by the crown dropped, as its requests were increasingly tailored to match the size of the Scottish force that could be mustered by the partisans of David Bruce.⁴ This also reflected the changing makeup of the force, as the crown increasingly sought mounted archers of higher quality for its infantry and was willing to pay the higher wages such troops required compared to a standard infantryman.

¹ Compare Jean le Bel, *Chronique de Jean le Bel*, ed. Jules Viard and Eugène Déprez (Paris: Société de l'histoire de France, 1904), pp 42-77 to *Bridlington*, pp 103-7

² *Chronique de Jean le Bel*, pp 102-110; *Anonimalle*, pp 35-39; *Lanercost*, pp 279-80

³ N.B. Lewis, 'The recruitment and organization of a contract army, May to November 1337.'

Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 37 (1964) pp 1-19

⁴ See Chapter 8: The Army

Though many old veterans of the earlier Scottish wars such as Henry Beaumont fought in and led English armies, in many ways it is a young man's war. Edward III himself saw his first campaign only a few months after taking the crown and before he held true political power. Others such as Thomas Beauchamp, Henry Lancaster, and household knights such as Reginald Cobham and Thomas Bradeston were of a younger generation than men like the Earls of Lancaster or Kent who had dominated military matters through the beginnings of the Isabella and Mortimer regency. The Anglo-Scottish wars provided the new blood the training ground to learn the skills that would be used later in fighting in France, making the English leadership far more effective than it would be otherwise.

While the wars between England and Scotland provided valuable military experience to Edward III's generation, they also provided the immediate flashpoint for the next war to require that experience. Due to old alliances and similarities between England's claim on Scotland and France's claim on Gascony, Philip VI of France would decide to support the Bruce faction in Scotland diplomatically, and by 1336 would decide to throw its full support behind Scotland and intervene militarily. This choice, which Philip was not compelled to make, was the immediate cause of the Hundred Years' War and the cause of the eventual failure of the English efforts in Scotland.⁵

The significance of the wars goes far beyond the introduction of new tactics and its role as part of the prologue of the Hundred Years' War. In addition to providing the crucible for the English to create and refine a new set of military tactics, the wars were fundamental in defining the political future of Scotland and determining whether it would maintain any independence from England. The failure of the 1327 campaign led to Robert Bruce's rule and the independence of Scotland

being acknowledged in England, while the lengthy conflict after 1332 would help Scotland in the long term by eliminating many of the rival claims for estates in Scotland that had been created by Edward I, up to and including Edward Balliol's claim to the Scottish throne.⁶

The wars could just as easily be seen as the last stage of the conflict that had been fought intermittently since 1296 as being the prologue to the conflict with France that would be fought equally as intermittently until the next century. After decades of suffering defeats at the hands of the Scots, the English were able to redefine the relative military strengths of Scotland and England and dramatically improve the reputation of English arms in the fourteenth century. The war with Scotland had its own causes and peculiar elements independent of any conflicts between France and England, though the combination of alliances and shared interests between France and Scotland meant that if either became embroiled in conflict with England, the other would likely be brought in as well.

To understand the English actions in Scotland and the course they took to defend their gains requires understanding the tools at their disposal. Introducing mounted archers as a sizeable component within the English army was a major change to England's forces, yet these forces did not simply spring out of thin air; changes had been occurring that altered the composition of English forces leading into Edward's reign, and would continue throughout it. These changes were critical. For instance, the chevauchée Edward carried out in 1336 would not have been possible for an army made mostly of foot soldiers, not when he was reported to have

⁵ See Chapter 7 for a more detailed description of the final breach.

⁶ M.C. Prestwich, *Edward I* (New Haven, 1997), p p 369-70, 473-4

covered fifty miles in two days through very harsh terrain and still be in fighting trim.⁷

The speed and mobility that saw its genesis in Scotland was a hallmark of English armies in the Hundred Years' War. How deeply the idea had taken hold can be seen by studying the composition of the army as it adjusts further or not to take advantage of such tactics by the percentage of its troops with mounts. Similarly, an examination of the numbers available through the campaigns allows us to understand the tactical decisions taken by commanders like Edward III or Thomas Beauchamp, and judge when they are taking risks, being prudent, or avoiding trouble. A detailed look at the number of troops with Beauchamp in May 1337 lets us see precisely why he failed to break the siege of Stirling, and had to wait for the arrival of Edward III in June before the castle could be relieved.⁸ A similar look at the existing information for the other campaigns of the wars will shed light on the troops employed each year by the crown, along with the particulars of their actions and the results of the fighting. The fundamentals of pay, recruitment, and desertion will also be examined, as well as the difficulties encountered from any study of the surviving records.

While English armies could cut large swathes through Scotland, it was the garrisons left behind that would make the English occupation succeed or fail. Understanding the costs and manpower involved in maintaining even a few locations and the difficulty in doing so when under Scottish pressure is one of the key elements in understanding the war in Scotland as a whole. The Scots found a strategy that worked, and had worked for the previous generation: avoid set-piece battles, and concentrate on taking then destroying castles. The success or failure of the English

⁷ *Original Letters*, pp 32-9

⁸ See Ch. 8: Army

to counter this strategy would be one of the driving forces behind events from 1334 onwards, and requires examination in detail.

Finally, the processes that supply these troops in Scotland will be addressed. Providing the large amounts of grain, fish, meat, and other foodstuffs necessary to feed hundreds if not thousands of troops in Scotland was a major task, requiring a great deal of organization and planning on the part of royal officials. Though there were often breakdowns in the mechanism of moving supplies from England north to the troops, the ability to produce and move the necessary materials over long distances was a major part of English military strength. Along with understanding the collection of supplies the main method of transporting them needs to be examined: the recruitment and operation of the navy. While the navy did participate in attacks such as that on Berwick in 1333,⁹ its most important function was in transporting supplies, particularly to the stores at Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Berwick. The difficulties and abuses of the rights of purveyance and the impressment of ships will also be discussed, in order to help show the limitations of this system of moving goods to the theatre of war.

There are a few topics that will not be thoroughly analyzed by this thesis, though they could be of importance for examining the wars of the 1330s as a whole rather than the English military machine that fought them. For instance, the structure of the armies of Edward III's opponents will only be handled in passing. While we have a great deal of information regarding the size, cost, composition, and origins of Edward III's forces, little more than chronicle references currently exist to inform us of how many men were fielded by the Scots at any time. The numbers given for Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill by English chroniclers are highly inaccurate, though

⁹ *Pluscarden*, p 268; *Lanercost*, p 273; *Scalacronica*, p 162; *Wyntoun*, p 398; *Brut*, p 281; *Bridlington*, p 112

none of the chroniclers for either side are wholly reliable.¹⁰ The independent forces of magnates such as David Strathbogie's will be handled in the same way, for similar reasons.

The campaign force of 1327 will also be touched on only briefly. It is important for having been Edward III's first military experience and for marking an end to the wars of Robert Bruce, rather than for its composition, deployment, or any other innovation in its operation. It is the changes that begin in 1332 that are important and that require us to examine how the English campaign forces were collected and used.

Edward's financial policies will also not be a major topic of discussion. While the deterioration of his economic situation is important, the reduction in the numbers of troops employed after the 'Great Offensive' of 1335 has only a passing connection to fiscal responsibility. It had far more to do with the reduced importance of the Scottish war in the mindset of Edward III and the English hierarchy compared to the rapidly worsening relations with France and the promise of future conflict on the Continent. The success of that season's campaign and the refusal of the Scots to engage any meaningful English force were powerful inducements not to commit troops who would engage no enemy and be unneeded for any purpose. Meanwhile, by 1337 efforts were fully in gear to create a continental alliance against France, and far more money was being spent or promised to be spent on the future conflict with France than in the north. Even the ban on exporting wool and leather from England in 1336 had as much to do with influencing the Flemish stance between the two powers as any financial aspect.¹¹

¹⁰ See the descriptions of Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill in chapters 3 and 4 for examples of this.

¹¹ J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, v. 1: Trial by Battle* (London, 1990), p 189

The primary source material available for this study falls into two major categories: administrative records, particularly financial ones, and chronicle sources. Each of these has their strengths and their weaknesses. Financial records have far less problems in terms of the accuracy of numbers, while chroniclers are often far off the mark. They also can be used to examine topics that chroniclers would have little interest in recording – for instance, the means by which grain was purveyed from Northamptonshire and transported north to Scotland in 1334.¹²

Chronicle sources, on the other hand, can record details that are simply lacking from administrative record. However fanciful the tale may be, the description in the *Scotichronicon* of Twynam Lourison convincing Edward Balliol to attack Scotland after being hounded out of the country by James Douglas for adultery shows a major strength of chronicles: the ability to address why events occur, rather than just the mechanics of how.¹³ They also provide a useful source of information for checking the veracity of financial records and for introducing first-hand accounts and other eyewitness information into our consideration of events.

Both types of information have been used extensively in order to present as clear a picture as possible regarding English military actions in Scotland during the 1330s. Financial records can be used to help confirm dates and to eliminate the more fanciful elements in the chronicle sources, while the chronicles were instrumental for filling in gaps where no other records exist and for showing how the army actually functioned beyond receipts and expenditures. By using both sources, the analysis is far more accurate and dependable than would be possible by relying upon one single type of material.

¹² PRO E101/577 9

¹³ *Scotichronicon*, pp 64-67

The most useful primary source available for this episode in the Scottish wars is the controller's copy of the wardrobe book of Richard Ferriby, keeper of the wardrobe between 30 July 1334 and 31 August 1337 (BL Cotton Nero C VIII). In clear, concise sections, it lists the expenses incurred by the royal household over four fiscal years ranging from immediate expenditures such as alms or goods purchased to the more general costs of wages and support for those employed by the crown. Not only is the monetary amount listed per expenditure, but a basic summary is given describing the date the payment was recorded and the purpose for it.

Without the wardrobe book's detailed records of army wages, garrison needs, and costs incurred on nearly every aspect of the war, much of this thesis would not be possible. The document's utility was recognized early on by A.E. Prince, and has been regularly used by nearly every scholar examining the period. For all the scrutiny it has endured, this document has lost none of its importance, nor has its usefulness as a mine of new information been diminished. Unfortunately it has not been printed, unlike the wardrobe book of William Norwell for July 1338 – 27 May 1340.¹⁴ In particular, the section of the wardrobe book dealing with the king's messengers has been touched rarely by historians, yet provides much information as to how the king communicated with his subordinates.

There are limitations to the utility of the wardrobe books of either Ferriby or Norwell. The very appearance of completeness that they provide can be misleading. Though both appear to be complete records of all of the financial costs of the periods they cover, this is not actually the case. Both are summaries of the financial activities of the royal household for the period, rather than full copies of every receipt or tally issued or received during the years covered.¹⁵ Many of the particulars of

¹⁴ M. Lyon, *The Wardrobe book of William de Norwell: 12 July 1338 to 27 May 1340* (Brussels, 1983)

¹⁵ See Ch. 8: The Army, for particulars on this problem.

expenditures were never transferred to the wardrobe books, while in other cases only a simple summary of several separate transactions was provided.¹⁶ In addition, both wardrobe books are primarily concerned with the expenditures of the royal household, and not the costs of royal administration as a whole. For instance, none of the records of the Exchequer for 1333-7 are included in Ferriby's wardrobe book, though the inclusion of most of the military costs gives the appearance to the wardrobe material of being a complete financial record for England during that time. While the wardrobe books are the most complete compilation of financial information we have for the time period in question, they are not fully comprehensive and should be supported by other material where possible.

The majority of other unprinted works in this category can be found in the Public Records Office, particularly in the King's Remembrancer Accounts Various (E101) and the Exchequer of Pleas: Miscellaneous Rolls and Papers (E19). Of particular importance is the account of Thomas Cross, paymaster for the Irish expedition of 1335 against Bute and Arran, which gives us the best picture of the resources required for a single campaign in one location.¹⁷ Cross's account resembles the wardrobe books of Ferriby and Norwell in its format, with separate sections for receipts, military and naval wages, ship modifications, and the production of siege engines. It also has the advantage of being comprehensive in describing the costs of a campaign, though one of much smaller size than those carried out by the main royal forces in Scotland. This in turn can help to extrapolate what is missing from the larger financial sources.

For printed record sources, the best source we have is the first volume of the *Rotuli Scotiae*, which contains in one location much of the relevant information for

¹⁶ See Ch. 9: The Garrisons for examples of this.

every aspect of the wars, including preparation for the French conflict.¹⁸ Of greatest importance are the various commissions of array issued by Edward III for the various English counties, allowing a comparison of the intended number for each year's campaign and the soldiers actually receiving wages. It also has the most information on how Edward III attempted to administer the English-held portions of Scotland and organize its defence, especially writs of protection and the assignment of offices such as admiral of the fleet or the commanders of various garrisons.

Of the printed calendars, Bain's *Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland*, volume 3 is another highly useful collection of documentation, particularly the garrison and sheriffs' accounts included in the appendices.¹⁹ These provide much of the detail missing from the wardrobe books on specific expenditures and allow a picture of what was required to maintain the English footholds in Scotland. The usual calendars of Fine, Close, Patent, and other rolls are also highly useful, as they include several writs that apply to the Scottish wars that were not included in the *Rotuli Scotiae* or Bain's *Calendar*, and are necessary to understand the events occurring in England at the same time.

The greatest limitation to the utility of administrative records is the incomplete nature of what has survived to the present day. While the royal records for Edward III survive in large numbers, there are numerous gaps, such as the failure of the wardrobe books before 1334 to survive. In addition, the records for many of the magnates involved in the wars have also failed to survive. The pay records for Edward Balliol, for instance, survive only in the occasional reflection in Edward III's finances. Without them, it is almost impossible to establish accurately the number of

¹⁷ PRO E101/19/16; see also R. Nicholson. 'An Irish Expedition to Scotland in 1335', *IHR* v. 13, no. 51 (1963), pp 197-211

¹⁸ *Rotuli Scotiae in Turri Londinensi et in Domo Capitulari Westmonasteriensi asservati*, vol 1: Edward I – Edward III, ed. David Macpherson (London: Record Commission, 1814)

troops Balliol maintained through the years of the war other than those specifically paid for by Edward III.

Numerous narrative sources exist that cover this decade, and allow us to catch sight of events that would otherwise be missed if looked at only through the prism of administrative or financial accounts. Our understanding of events in Scotland before 1334 would be fragmentary without chronicle sources to lean on, thanks to the lack of wardrobe books or other comprehensive administrative materials from that period. For instance, we have no financial or other records illustrating the makeup of the English army at Halidon Hill, despite it being the most important victory of the entire decade.

At the same time, the various chronicles have to be approached with a great deal of skepticism. No chronicle is wholly objective in its approach, and even the most even-handed of the chronicles will reflect the biases of its author and the limitations of what information they have available to them. This especially applies to military matters, where most of the chroniclers have little first-hand knowledge of military matters or of the battles they describe. There are exceptions to this rule: Thomas Grey, for instance, was a veteran of the Scottish Wars, constable of Norham Castle, and wrote part of his chronicle while in captivity in Scotland.²⁰ There are essentially three categories of chronicles: those written by Scots, those written by English authors in close proximity to the border, and those written by English writers elsewhere.

The choices are relatively limited for the Scottish chronicles: the chronicles of Fordun and Wyntoun, Fordun's continuator Walter Bower, Barbour's *Bruce*, and the

¹⁹ *Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland*, v. 3, ed J. Bain (Edinburgh, 1887)

²⁰ *Scalacronica of Sir Thomas Grey*, ed. J. Stevenson (Edinburgh: Maitland Club, 1836)

*Book of Pluscarden*²¹. Of these, Bower's *Scotichronicon* was of particular use, thanks to the recent translation by D.E.R. Watt and A.B. Scott. Its main drawback is that it is a much later chronicle than either Fordun or Wyntoun, and draws most of its material from the two earlier chronicles. Barbour's *Bruce* is the most unreliable of the Scottish sources due to being poetry rather than prose, and focusing mostly upon Robert I of Scotland. All of the Scottish sources show a significant bias against the English, emphasizing defeats such as Strathbogie's loss at Culblean and generally listing Scottish casualties as much lower than any English chronicle. *They do have* the advantage of the closest proximity and *the greatest interest* of any of the chronicle writers, which helps to reduce the effects of their anti-English slant.

Of the 'English' chronicles, Thomas Grey's *Scalacronica*, the Lanercost and Bridlington chronicles, and the *Anonimalle Chronicle* were of the most use. These four had either were written in the north of England or their authors had access to first-hand knowledge of the events of the 1330s: for instance, the Lanercost Chronicle comes from Lanercost Abbey, on the border between England and Scotland, while Thomas Grey's involvement in the wars has already been mentioned.²² Due to this, *they also had the most realistic estimates of casualties in* battle of any of the English sources, and the most information as to the details of the war. They also resembled the Scottish sources in that their main focus was on events

²¹ John of Fordun, *Chronica Gentis Scotorum* [Historians of Scotland, v. 1] ed. William F. Skene (Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1871); Andrew of Wyntoun, *Orygynale Cronykil of Scotland* [Historians of Scotland, v. 2], ed. David Laing. (Edinburgh, 1872); *Scotichronicon by Walter Bower*, v. 7, ed. D.E.R. Watt and A.B. Scott (Aberdeen, 1996); John Barbour, *The Bruce*, ed. W.W. Skeat, Scottish Text Society, v. 2 (1894); *The Book of Pluscarden* [Historians of Scotland, v. 10], ed. and tr. Felix J.H. Skene. (Edinburgh, 1890)

²² *Scalacronica of Sir Thomas Grey*, ed. J. Stevenson (Edinburgh: Maitland Club, 1836); *Chronicon de Lanercost, MCCI-MCCCXLVI*, ed. J. Stevenson (Edinburgh: The Bannatyne Club, 1839); *Gesta Edwardi Terti Auctore Canonico Bridlingtonensi*, in *Chronicles of the Reigns of Edward I and Edward II*, v. II, ed. W. Stubbs (London, Rolls Series, 1883); *Anonimalle Chronicle 1333-1381*, ed. V.H. Galbraith (Manchester, 1927)

in the north, rather than the terse summaries provided by chronicles such as Baker.²³ These are much more interested in the royal involvement in the wars and its reflection upon Edward III's reign.

There has been an unfortunate tendency in the secondary literature to gloss over the decade preceding the Hundred Years' War as unimportant compared to the events that surround it, or consider it as significant in its own right. Far more attention has been paid by historians to the turmoil of the previous reign and Robert I's successful effort to wrench Scotland free of English control, or the famous struggle of the Hundred Years' War that immediately followed. Colm MacNamee's recent work on *The Wars of the Bruces* is a good analysis of the Anglo-Scottish wars during Robert I's reign, but ends with his death.²⁴ On the other hand, books such as H.J. Hewitt's *The Organization of War Under Edward III 1338-62* skipped straight past the first war of Edward III to his second, despite the fact that the two merge almost indistinguishably into one another in 1337.²⁵

The war received its best early attention from works that were focused on particular aspects of English military history or a particular event within the 1330s. Unfortunately, none of these examined all aspects of the war as a united whole. A.E. Prince's seminal article on the strength of Edward III's armies used Richard Ferriby's wardrobe book to great effect to estimate the armies from 1334-7, though inexplicably dismissed 1336 despite Edward III's notable rush to relieve Kildrummy.²⁶ This work provided the best early analysis of army strengths for the

²³ Galfridi le Baker de Swynebroke, *Chronicon*, ed. E.M. Thompson. (Oxford, 1889)

²⁴ C. McNamee, *The Wars of the Bruces: Scotland, England and Ireland, 1306-1328* (East Linton, 1997)

²⁵ H.J. Hewitt, *The Organization of War Under Edward III 1338-62* (Manchester, 1958)

²⁶ A.E. Prince, 'The Strength of English Armies in the Reign of Edward III', *EHR* 183 (1931), pp 353-371

1330s, but did not consider the shortcomings of Ferriby's accounts or the limitations they imposed on generating truly accurate numbers for troop strength during the war. Ranald Nicholson and N.B. Lewis wrote important articles on specific campaigns in 1335 and 1337, though did not broaden their scope to the military activities of the war as a whole.²⁷

The book that changed this, and remains the classic on the subject, is Ranald Nicholson's *Edward III and the Scots: The Formative Years of a Military Career, 1327 to 1335*. Nearly every book that touches on the 1330s uses *Edward III and the Scots* as the basis of its understanding of the decade. Though more recent scholarship has corrected several points and clarified a number of matters, it still remains the definitive work on the subject, as it is the only previous work that attempts to consider the Anglo-Scottish war of the 1330's as a significant event on its own. Its greatest shortcoming is its brevity, as Nicholson's narrative cuts off rather suddenly in the midst of events in 1335. This creates three major problems that have to be addressed.

While Nicholson's work makes a case for using the battle of Culblean in November as an ending point for this particular phase of the Anglo-Scottish conflict, the importance of the battle is overstated: rather than being the 'turning point of the second war of Scottish Independence',²⁸ it was just one important step to keeping the pretensions of the Bruce partisans alive in Scotland. The end result is the impression of an inexorable march towards the ejection of the English from Scotland that was only assured in hindsight.

²⁷ R. Nicholson, 'An Irish Expedition to Scotland in 1335', *IHR* vol 13, no. 51 (1963), pp 197-211; N.B. Lewis, 'The recruitment and organization of a contract army, May to November 1337,' *BIHR* 37 (1964), pp 1-19

²⁸ R. Nicholson, *Edward III and the Scots: The Formative Years of a Military Career, 1327 to 1335* (Oxford, 1965), p 236

Nicholson is not the only one to have made this error: he notes that the previous work of E.M. Barron halted at Bannockburn, though the Anglo-Scottish wars continued.²⁹ This same criticism applies to Nicholson's work with its halt at Culblean, and even to this work with its last event covered being the siege of Dunbar in the first half of 1338. Rather, it is the problem of trying to separate into segments a conflict that extended from 1296 through 1346 and beyond, though admittedly with some pauses and breaks in the fighting. However, Culblean is at best a convenient point to mark a stage in the Anglo-Scottish wars, rather than as anything more.

Secondly, it gives the impression that military action would be the only form of interaction from that point onward, rather than negotiation or some form of compromise. In fact, both sides immediately returned to the negotiation table and created the most workable compromise to be proposed during the war in January 1336, though other events would overtake this possibility.³⁰ Not only was it not inevitable that the Scots would eventually eject the English, it was not inevitable that the war would end due to one side having achieved a complete victory over the other.

Last, the choice of 1335 for the end of *Edward III and the Scots* is problematic because it prevents any real discussion of the importance of the Anglo-Scottish war being the flashpoint for the Hundred Years' War to follow. Though Nicholson does briefly discuss the diplomacy between England and France regarding Scotland in 1335 and the beginnings of the French raids on the southern coast in that year, there is no thorough examination of how the French insistence on the Scottish issue in negotiations with Edward III helped to lead to full-blown war in 1337 between France and England. While this war is of major significance on its own, one of its major results was the Hundred Years' War, and any work that fails to address

²⁹ Nicholson, p 256

³⁰ See Chapter 7

that issue is missing a key element in understanding the importance that was attached to success in Scotland by the English.

In addition to the problems caused by Nicholson's choice of end date are the missed opportunities for inquiry that excluding results from excluding 1336 and 1337. These years are notable for the appointment of captains to command the English forces in Scotland, rather than depending on the presence of the king himself. Because of this, there is more to draw on in terms of administrative arrangements for the powers wielded by those captains and the contracts that increasingly provided their troops – especially in 1337. As these developments are one of the major innovations of the period, it deserves the appropriate investigation.

More recent works have also looked at the wars, but in the context of wider conflicts. Jonathan Sumption³¹ and Clifford Rogers³² both devote extensive portions of their recent works on the Hundred Years' War and Edward III's strategies to the events in Scotland, and make a point of recognizing the continuity that runs directly from the fight between Edward III and the Scots to the worsening relations with France and eventual war in 1337. Both make a point of recognizing the war with Scotland as the final trigger for the breakdown in Anglo-French relations and the beginning of the Hundred Years' War.

Sumption devotes a good portion of the first volume of his multi-volume work to covering the events of the Mortimer Regency and the war in Scotland, as the first act in the larger Continental war. The work is sound, but suffers from seeing the war as a prologue to later events, and in focusing on the war's connection to the Anglo-French relations. The result is to over-emphasize the effects of France upon the conduct of the war north of the border, particularly after 1335. While France did

³¹ J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War, v. 1: Trial by Battle* (London, 1990)

have a major effect, particularly in the diplomatic sphere, its lack of direct involvement in Scottish territory meant that the impetus for action in Scotland was in the hands of some participants in the war that it had been all along.

Rogers meanwhile goes through the 1330's with a fine-toothed comb to show how it served as the apprenticeship for Edward III and his supporters for the skills they would need in France and how the tactics they would use to such success had their beginnings at Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill. The account is persuasive and the best recent work, though it falls short in certain categories. It is particularly strong in the range and breadth of sources used, and the ability to make connections to events and trends occurring both on the Continent and in the north.

The largest difficulty is its heavy reliance upon chronicle sources for information on events and the conduct of battles. As discussed elsewhere, the biases and inaccuracies that are in even the most objective chronicles make them difficult to use with complete accuracy without other evidence. Rogers does address this problem by being as comprehensive as possible in referring to as many chronicles as possible to compare their numbers where possible, such as the number of Scots who opposed the landing of the Disinherited in 1332.³³ He also does use some administrative sources, such as Ferriby's wardrobe book. However, with the focus of his work being on understanding the strategy and mindset of Edward III, Rogers tends to focus on the chronicles addressing Edward's decisions rather than relying on administrative or numerical evidence. It allows him to craft a convincing argument, but one reliant on a certain degree of speculation.

This tendency can occasionally lead Rogers astray, particularly when combined with occasional problems regarding Scottish geography. A case in point is

³² C. Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy Under Edward III, 1327-1360* (Woodbridge, 2000)

his analysis of the attempts in 1336 to widen the circle of fortifications protecting the English- and Balliol-supporting sections of Scotland. By misidentifying a fortress at Lauriston near Aberdeen as that at Laurieston in Galloway, Rogers then takes a description of a fortification effort on one portion of the eastern seaboard of Scotland and turns it into a large-scale attempt at fortification across the breadth of Scottish territory.³⁴

The last difficulty in using Rogers' work for an independent work on the Anglo-Scottish wars is that Rogers is attempting to prove a specific thesis: that Edward III was intentionally seeking battle against his opponents using the English military system of longbow and dismounted men-at-arms. This on occasion seems to colour his analysis, such as the contradictions in claiming in his introduction that Edward was both modeling his *chevauchées* in France on the Scottish campaign of 1327 and attempting to provoke them into battle.³⁵ Considering the Scottish avoidance of battle in that campaign, it seems an unusual example to choose.

By contrast, this work is more concerned with establishing the makeup of the English forces serving in armies and garrisons in Scotland and their support by the English crown than in proving whether or not Edward III was following a comprehensive strategy of seeking *set-piece battles with opposing forces*. *The large numerical disparity between the English and Scottish forces after 1333 and the careful positioning of Edward's forces at Berwick before Halidon Hill make his seeking battle a given point*. Because of this, the strategic analysis that Rogers has to engage in for the wider period of the Hundred Years' War to determine that pattern is not required for the 1330s. I

³³ *War Cruel and Sharp*, p 36

³⁴ See Chapter 9, Garrisons, for the discussion on Dunnotar, Kinneff, and Lauriston.

³⁵ *War Cruel and Sharp*, pp 6, 8

Perhaps the best work on the nuts and bolts of forming the English army in the period is Andrew Ayton's work on the English aristocracy of the period, seen through the prism of administrative records, including horse valuations and muster rolls.³⁶ Though its scope extends through both the Anglo-Scottish War and the Hundred Years' War, it provides a wealth of detail on the men serving in Edward's armies and is perhaps the best help in understanding the specific administrative records that give us the most information on the armies of the period. The sheer mass of detail and supporting evidence that Ayton provides can be overwhelming, and the focus on the aristocracy and the military machine of England over a long period of time creates the same shortcomings that both Sumption and Rogers suffer. While Ayton's work tries to draw attention to the change in military service over Edward III's entire reign, this thesis is specifically focused on providing a snapshot of the changes that occur due to this specific war and the limits on how far that change has progressed by the end of the siege of Dunbar in 1338.

Both Mark Ormrod's *The Reign of Edward III* and Scott Waugh's *England in the Reign of Edward III* provide solid general overviews of Edward III's reign, but have such a breadth of material to cover that they are unable to provide more than a brief summary of the wars.³⁷ These two works are also much more focused on political and social issues of the time period, leaving military matters to receive less attention than a work specifically focused on those can provide.

Three works were particularly helpful for understanding basic fundamentals of the reign of Edward III. For understanding the financial circumstances of the reign, E.B. Fryde's work is particularly recommended, especially his biography of

³⁶ A. Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III* (Woodbridge, 1994)

³⁷ W.M. Ormrod, *The Reign of Edward III*, updated ed. (Stroud, 2000); S.L. Waugh, *England in the Reign of Edward III* (Cambridge, 1991)

William de la Pole.³⁸ This is especially important for understanding the financial crisis during the Mortimer regency and the general financial straits that Edward III would find himself in as his reign continued through the 1330s. On naval matters, Timothy Runyan's works such as *Ships, Seafaring in Society* provide a solid understanding of where the English crown can draw its naval strength.³⁹ For a more general understanding of the English military machine than the specifics covered in this work, Michael Prestwich's *Armies and Warfare: The English Experience* is the best summation of warfare in this particular theatre of Europe.⁴⁰

³⁸ E.B. Fryde, *William de la Pole: Merchant and King's Banker* (London, 1988)

³⁹ T. Runyan, (ed.), *Ships, Seafaring and Society: Essays in Maritime History* (Detroit, 1987)

⁴⁰ M.C. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience* (Yale, 1996)

2

1327-30: The Regency and the north

Like many monarchs, Edward III was heavily influenced by the policies of his predecessors. To understand the military of his Scottish wars, it is necessary to look briefly at the three-and-a-half year regency of his mother Isabella and her lover, Roger Mortimer. Their policies regarding the north of England and Scotland would provide Edward with his first experiences in dealing with a region that would occupy the first decade of his reign. Edward would see his first military action within a year of ascending the throne in 1327, in an army arranged by Mortimer and relying upon his concepts of military strategy. Its failure would push Edward in a different direction militarily, and lead him to oppose Mortimer's choices of actions for defending the north. Edward would also be influenced by the financial activities of Isabella and Mortimer, both in how they raised revenue, and from their debts that were Edward's legacy to repay. Finally, their diplomacy would shape his, both in terms of direct royal dealings with other countries, and in its effects upon the factions within the English court. In particular, their negotiation of the Treaty of Northampton and its repudiation of Edward's claims to Scotland would cause him to be all too willing to take a course of action in the future to reverse what had been given away by his regents.

Isabella and Mortimer had sailed from Dordrecht with a force of Hainaulters on 23 September 1326, landing at Orwell in Suffolk and rapidly gained control of the country, forcing Edward II to flee into Wales. By 16 November, the coup was complete; Edward and the younger Despenser had been taken at Neath Abbey. The young Edward III had

already been declared keeper of the realm on 26 October and by 25 January 1327 was ruling as king.¹

At first glance, the regency was eager to take steps to deal with the problem of defending the north. Many of the supporters that had brought Isabella and Mortimer back so successfully from exile were the Disinherited: English lords and Scottish exiles with disputed claims in Scotland and interests in the north. If the political support of such men as Henry Beaumont, his brother Louis, and those others whose personal wealth and power were based in the north had been key in toppling Edward II, it was only fair return for the regency to try to defend the regions that had provided such support.

Certainly, the region seemed in dire need of help. Though there had been relative peace in the north since Edward II had arranged the Truce of Bishopthorpe in 1323 with Robert Bruce, there was an awareness of it being only a cessation of hostilities, with the underlying questions of England's sovereignty over Scotland still having to be answered at some point in the future. The damage done to the region during the previous reign was considerable, and is reflected by the large volume of debt remissions, allowances, pardons, and respites granted throughout the north during the three years of the regency. Though the last deep Scottish incursion into England during Edward II's reign occurred in 1322, the region was years in rebuilding from the repeated wasting of its croplands, herds, and structures.² As early in the regency as 12 February 1327, the counties of Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmorland, and the cities of Newcastle and Carlisle were pardoned their debts at the exchequer.³

¹ M. McKisack *The Fourteenth Century, 1307-1399* (Oxford, 1959), pp 83-90

² For more information on the wasting of the north, see C. McNamee, *The Wars of the Bruces: Scotland, England and Ireland, 1306-1328* (East Linton, 1997), especially pp 72-123

³ *CPR 1327-30*, p 23

Several others in a similar vein followed this initial grant. March 6th saw £80 from the Carlisle farm pardoned, while the men of Corbridge received five years of the pontage from the bridge there for its repair on March 16th.⁴ Several individuals, such as John Clavering, Gilbert Toutheby, John Wysham, and Richard Marshal, received either pardons on debts or yearly incomes from the exchequer due to the damage done to their lands, wardships, and offices.⁵ Large numbers of respites were issued for the various northern counties for debts not cancelled or pardoned, while the criminal fines for Lancashire were cancelled outright in recognition of the damages suffered by the county.⁶

The city of Newcastle received special attention, being the main base for resisting the Scottish incursions in Northumberland.⁷ Along with the February debt relief, the city received two years' pardon for the revenues of the city farm to the exchequer for wall repairs on August 19th and £201 6s. 8d. in further farm revenues pardoned due to the city's efforts in defence from the Scots in 1329.⁸ The city was also exempted from the loan on wool in 1327.⁹ Farther north along the coast, the town of Bamburgh was another recipient of royal favour, with several respites and pardons of debts beginning in September 1327.¹⁰

Much like the counties and towns, clerical establishments did not escape either the negative attention of Scottish raiders or the following acknowledgements of their distress. The abbey of St. Mary's in York was granted relief of £170 15s. 9d. because of the ravaging of its lands, and was allowed to stretch out the payments on its remaining debts

⁴ *CPR 1327-30*, pp 32, 35

⁵ *CPR 1327-30*, pp 15, 171, 461; *CCR 1327-30*, pp 2, 166, etc.

⁶ *CCR 1327-30*, pp 6, 59, 294, 72

⁷ The equivalent for Westmorland and Cumberland was Carlisle.

⁸ *CPR 1327-30*, pp 146, 461

⁹ *CCR 1327-30*, p 162

¹⁰ *CPR 1327-30*, p 169; *CCR 1327-30*, pp 265, 387

to the crown at a rate of £100 per year.¹¹ The archdiocese of York received several writs ordering the revaluation of the properties within its boundaries and the collection of the clerical tenth at the new levels.¹² The bishopric of Carlisle was pardoned the clerical tenth outright due to the damage done.¹³ Commissioners were also appointed to determine the charters and muniments stolen by the Scots from the abbey of Ellerton in Yorkshire and replace them.¹⁴

It was in Isabella and Mortimer's best interests to strengthen the north militarily as well as financially, in order to avoid further damage from future Scottish raids. This need was emphasized all too clearly by a coronation day assault on Norham Castle by the Scots on 1 February 1327.¹⁵ A binding truce had previously been agreed on between Bruce and Edward II in 1323, and was not set to expire until 1336. The attack was a signal to both sides that the truce, regardless of the terms, was at an end: in Scottish eyes the change in regime nullified the terms of the truce. Though the attack itself was unsuccessful and was ignored by the English, appointments of commanders for the border marches were made. Anthony Lucy was appointed keeper of Carlisle from February 5th until Whitsunday (May 31), while Henry Percy was given the custody of the marches of Scotland for the same period. Keepers were appointed to the royal castles in the region to defend them against Scottish attack: Robert Horncliffe was entrusted with Bamburgh while Roger Mauduit received Wark-on-Tweed.¹⁶ Further, Henry Percy,

¹¹ *CCR 1327-30*, pp 54, 66

¹² *CCR 1327-30*, pp 188, 191, 280, 307, 325,

¹³ *CCR 1327-30*, p 48

¹⁴ *CPR 1327-30*, p 207

¹⁵ *Lanercost*, pp 258-9

¹⁶ *CFR 1327-37*, p 24; Nicholson, p 15

Ralph Neville, Roger Heron, William Rydell, and Gilbert Boroughdon were given power to maintain the truce with the Scots.¹⁷

From this evidence, we are provided with a neat picture of a new political administration having taken over the country and immediately moving to rectify the errors of the previous reign and protect against new threats on the border. Edward II had been seen as indifferent to the needs of the north of England, if not ready to turn over the region to the Scots as the Lanercost chronicler supposed.¹⁸ Contrast this with the flurry of activity on the part of Isabella and Mortimer, up to the raising of an army including Hainaulter mercenaries to fight the Weardale campaign in June of 1327.¹⁹ But how accurate is this picture? Though the chroniclers later decried the Treaty of Northampton and the regency's apparent greed in securing it, initially the magnates of England seemed supportive of the regency – if only in comparison to Edward II. But were the measures undertaken by Isabella and Mortimer innovative and novel? Did the regency herald a better situation for the north, or was it business as usual?

There is some debate regarding the speed of recovery of the region from the raids of the Scots during Edward II's reign and the claim of damages from their depredations to avoid taxation. For the purposes of the regency, the actual reality had little to do with the perception that the north had been neglected and required whatever financial aid it could get. Since the legitimacy of the regency's displacement of Edward II depended in part upon accusing Edward of incompetence in defending the north and colluding with the Scots, concrete, public effort had to be made to contrast Isabella and Mortimer from the previous regime. Giving respites and pardons of debts to northern burgesses,

¹⁷ *CPR 1327-30*, pp 6, 18, 15

¹⁸ *Lanercost*, pp 256-7

magnates, and clerical institutions provided a happy marriage of political patronage and legitimation of the regency during the time when a Scottish invasion was a threat, rather than a reality. In July 1327, the Scots under James Douglas and the earl of Moray invaded England, advancing into the palatinate of Durham, burning and pillaging as they went before returning unscathed to Scotland. After this calamity, there was no question that the respites and pardons of debts had become a necessity.

Despite the perceived neglect of the north by Edward II, the various remits, pardons, and respites from debt that were granted by the regency had nearly all been anticipated by him. The town of Bamburgh, for instance, received respite from its debts in February 1325, after having its previous debts acquitted in March of the previous year.²⁰ The town of Newcastle was pardoned £100 of its farm in 1325 to help in the fortification of the town, much like the grant given in August 1327 by the regency.²¹ These allowances all followed a general respite from all debts for the counties of Northumberland, Cumberland, and Westmorland until further orders given in December 1325 by the king.²²

If the financial side was to be so similarly prosecuted in both regimes, what about the military? Surely there would be some changes in the military administration, as the regency attempted to promote its supporters in the region and lessen the importance of those in the north who had supported Edward II in the past. If anything, the regency turned to the men whom Edward II had relied on to secure the north. Anthony Lucy was the key man behind Andrew Harclay's arrest and was sheriff of Cumberland for the rest

¹⁹ *CCR 1327-30*, p 118; *Rot Scot*, pp 210, 211

²⁰ *CCR 1323-7*, pp 262, 71

²¹ *CCR 1323-7*, p 432; *CPR 1327-30*, p 146

²² *CCR 1323-7*, p 439

of Edward II's reign, along with being keeper of the king's truce with the Scots.²³ Rather than removing him, the regency confirmed him as keeper of Carlisle and sheriff of Cumberland. He received £500 for custody of Carlisle through the end of May 1327, though was paid only in victuals for the £369 7s 1d owed him for the custody from June through September 7th.²⁴

In the east, such linchpins as Henry Percy, who received orders to repair Alnwick in 1326, was commissioned to keep the peace and the truce in Northumberland in 1325, and was commissioner of the array in Yorkshire in 1326, were kept in place and confirmed in their positions.²⁵ Percy's appointment as chief warden of the march came with the expenses of maintaining the force required to carry out his duties: a fixed fee of one thousand marks was paid for him to serve from the beginning of the reign to Whit-Sunday.²⁶ Roger Mauduit, the keeper of the Umfraville lands in the north after the Earl of Angus' death, was keeper of Wark in 1327.²⁷ Though Mauduit was removed as keeper of the Umfraville lands, Gilbert Boroughdon, the sheriff of Northumberland during 1323-4, replaced him.²⁸

All five individuals granted the power to keep the truce with the Scots by Isabella and Mortimer had served in some capacity in the previous reign. Henry Percy's role has already been mentioned. Ralph Neville was supervisor of array for the North Riding of Yorkshire and later supervised the array of troops from Northumberland for Edward II's

²³ *CDS*, no. 885

²⁴ Nicholson, p 15; *CPR 1327-30*, p 164

²⁵ *CPR 1324-7*, pp 303, 228, 220; *CCR 1323-7*, p 457

²⁶ Nicholson, p 16

²⁷ *CPR 1327-30*, p 163; *CCR 1323-7*, p 485; *CFR 1327-37*, p 24

²⁸ *CCR 1327-30*, p 259; *CCR 1323-7*, pp 99, 272; C.H. Blair, 'The Sheriffs of Northumberland, Part I (1076-1602)', *Archaeologia Aeliana* 20, 4th series (1942), p 43

war in Gascony.²⁹ Roger Heron was constable of Dunstanburgh Castle, in the crown's hands after Thomas Lancaster's defeat.³⁰ William Rydell served on previous commissions to keep the truce and to keep the peace in the north with Percy and Neville and was supervising the array in Northumberland by 1326.³¹ Gilbert Boroughdon as mentioned previously was sheriff of Northumberland under Edward II.³² Heron and Boroughdon had both served with Rydell on several previous commissions to preserve the truce, as early as 1320.³³

Isabella and Mortimer had run up against the classic problem: how to provide the strength and effectiveness to adequately defend the north? The options available came down to four separate solutions, all of which were attempted by the regency. The first was to depend on the local magnates and population to defend itself. As seen, the regency heavily exploited this option, and would surely have done so regardless of what other actions it may have taken. It made sense to have men who knew the region, knew each other, and knew the opposition actively engaged in trying to defend what was their home ground.

The difficulties with this scheme were the same ones facing Edward II when he attempted to use this strategy: there simply were not enough magnates who were effective enough or powerful enough to defend the north on their own without help from outside of the northern counties. Even Andrew Harclay, noted (and ennobled) for his efforts on the border, had proved incapable of stopping the Scottish raids. Edward II was

²⁹ *CPR 1324-7*, pp 9, 53

³⁰ *CCR 1323-7*, p 12

³¹ *CPR 1324-7*, pp 162, 221, 228

³² *CCR 1323-7*, pp 9, 272

seen as having let the north defend itself, and the results of this and his general actions regarding Scotland were one of the reasons behind his downfall. To secure the north, other means had to be used.

If the north could not hold on by itself, the second option was for the king to go north to make sure that it held. Summons to Newcastle for 18 May with their troops were issued to the magnates on 5 April 1327, followed later in the month by the calling up of foot soldiers from London and 42 towns on the 25th.³⁴ As with Edward I, criminals were pardoned provided they served in the army. John of Hainault, the brother of the Count of Hainault whose mercenaries had helped depose Edward II, was persuaded to return with a large body of mercenaries to join the campaign as well. By 23 May, Edward III was in York, his army gathering there for the anticipated fight with the Scots.

The resultant campaign of 1327 is well known through the writings of Jean le Bel, later copied by Jean Froissart.³⁵ The royal army, wracked by dissension between the Hainaulters and the archers of the northern counties even before the campaign commenced, was unable to prevent a Scottish force under James Douglas and the Earl of Moray from raiding its way down from Scotland into the palatinate of Durham, before escaping home. Even when the ungainly English forces had finally come face-to-face with the much more mobile Scots at Stanhope Park, they were unable to force a conflict where their superior numbers could tell.

³³ *CPR 1317-21*, pp 416, 459; *CPR 1324-7*, pp 113, 228

³⁴ *CCR 1327-30*, p 118

³⁵ Jean le Bel, *Chronique de Jean le Bel*, ed. Jules Viard and Eugène Déprez (Paris: Société de l'histoire de France, 1904), pp 42-77

The only tangible result of the campaign was debt – lots of it. The largest debts of the regency outside household operations were those owed to John of Hainault, the uncle of Queen Philippa. Several thousand pounds in wages were owed to the magnate due to his participation both in the coup that ushered in the regency and the failed Weardale campaign. Additionally, John had been granted on 7 February 1327 one thousand marks out of the customs of London for his services. Despite paying £40,540 12s 5 ¾d towards the large arrears in wages, the crown still had to acknowledge £14,406 6s 8d in debt to John in March 1328, with the two halves to be paid by the end of the year.³⁶

Both the Bardi bank of Florence and the merchant de la Pole brothers of Hull loaned funds to pay for John's wages, though the Bardi were by far the greater lenders for this purpose. The de la Poles loaned £2001 5s 11d in late August to help pay John,³⁷ while the Bardi loaned £900 in September and took on the responsibility of paying John the £14,406 6s 8d acknowledged as owed to him in March 1328.³⁸ Since the crown had used all sorts of expedients including pledging the crown jewels to raise funds for paying John, the intervention of both foreign and domestic lenders was indispensable.³⁹ Edward III would take this example of finance to heart, relying heavily on both the de la Poles and the Bardi to keep his finances afloat when his military expenditures far outstripped his resources.

The wages owed by the regency to native soldiers serving in defence of the march was also sizeable. For example, pay to Henry Percy was in arrears as far back as Edward

³⁶ *CPR 1327-30*, pp 10, 247

³⁷ *CPR 1327-30*, p 165

³⁸ *CPR 1327-30*, pp 247, 254; *CCR 1327-30*, pp 463, 470

³⁹ *CCR 1327-30*, p 160

I's reign for his father's services,⁴⁰ and the resumption of hostilities only added to this total. In addition to Percy's stipend as warden of the march, the expenses of the Weardale campaign incurred further debts: September 1327 saw him being paid £330 3s 4d for himself, 159 men at arms and 200 hobelars during the abortive campaign.⁴¹ However, a compromise was found for paying Percy the mounting amounts due him: in August 1328 he was granted the right to be quit of rents from the wardships he held for the amounts he was owed rather than make the mutual payments both parties owed one another.⁴² Several other lords such as Roger Swynnerton, Thomas Weston, Thomas Corbridge, and the Earl of Norfolk also received allowances, grants, or other recompensation.⁴³ Had the campaign been successful, these costs would have been offset by the benefits of victory. However, the lack of results merely made the use of the royal army even more damaging to the regency than had it never gone north.

The inconclusiveness of the Weardale campaign meant that the appointment of competent officers was of even more importance than before the royal army's arrival in the north. Both Henry Percy and Anthony Lucy continued in their posts, while various nobles such as Hugh Turplington, John Multon, and Robert Watville receiving writs of protection during their stays in the border region.⁴⁴ These men were faced with the Scots' continued efforts to subdue Northumberland. Henry Percy was besieged in Alnwick for a fortnight, while Warkworth and Norham also came under assault.⁴⁵

While the campaign was ineffective in protecting the north, it did give the impression of a willingness to engage the Scots. Though Edward II was seen as

⁴⁰ *CCR 1327-30*, p 2

⁴¹ *CPR 1327-30*, p 163

⁴² *CPR 1327-30*, p 309

⁴³ *CCR 1327-30*, pp 160, 172, 264; *CPR 1327-30*, p 145

unwilling to do anything for the north, he did arrange for campaigns to deal with threatened Scottish invasions and to invade Scotland itself in 1310, 1314, 1319, and 1322 after which a negotiated truce in 1323 made further campaigning not an option. Further preparations had been made in 1308, 1309, 1316, 1317, 1318 and 1323 for northern campaigns, though various combinations of foreign and domestic politics had prevented actual military action during these years.⁴⁶ It was more Edward II's inability to accomplish anything with his campaigns north that created his reputation than the lack of campaigns. In this light, the Weardale campaign was a dire prediction of how the regency would fare should it see continued conflict on the northern border.

The third solution was to call on men from the southern parts of the kingdom to come north with men and either take over the defence of the area or supplement the troops already there. Edward II had certainly tried to do this, calling at various times the earls of Lancaster, Pembroke, Arundel, and John Cromwell to bring large numbers of troops northward.⁴⁷ While supporters of the regency such as Hugh Turplington, John Multon, and Robert Watevill did come north to stay in the region, receiving protection from lawsuits to do so, there was not the major movement of troops north by southern magnates that might have been expected.

The earls of Lancaster and Kent did receive commissions as captains of the English army in the March of Scotland, and took a force to Newcastle including a number of the Disinherited; however, the commission is dated June 6, and indicates a need to bolster the

⁴⁴ *CPR 1327-30*, pp 102, 107, 114

⁴⁵ Nicholson, p 44

⁴⁶ McNamee, *The Wars of the Bruces: Scotland, England and Ireland, 1306-1328*, pp 124-5

⁴⁷ McNamee; *The Wars of the Bruces*, pp 147-52

regional defence due to the delay of the royal army rather than these lords having been convinced to remain in the area without direct royal military assistance being forthcoming.⁴⁸ Once the royal army had disbanded, most magnates from the south returned home. The earl of Kent was the only major magnate to stay in the region longer, receiving a writ of protection in October 1327 – the same period of time that saw Robert Bruce besieging Norham Castle.⁴⁹

The final solution available to the regency was the most humiliating – negotiating a peace with the Scots. Any attempts to create a permanent peace of this sort would require an acknowledgement of Robert Bruce's claim to king of Scotland, free of any claims of sovereignty by the English Crown. Diplomacy had been ongoing from the very beginning of the regency: Ivo Aldeburgh, the constable of Barnard Castle in the palatinate of Durham, was commissioned in December 1326 to treat with the Scots, acting in that capacity throughout the first half of the year.⁵⁰ On 25 April 1327, he received an appointment to arrange safe-passage of ambassadors from Scotland to arrange a peace.⁵¹

However, these discussions had not had any success by the time of the Weardale campaign. Once the military option had been tried and found wanting, diplomacy became the only means for peace available to the regency with any chance of success. The Scots besieged Norham, Warkworth, and Alnwick in the last half of 1327, though none fell. Letters in the fall from the king to John Darcy, then sheriff of York, and to the

⁴⁸ *Rot Scot*, p 213

⁴⁹ *CPR 1327-1330*, p 178

⁵⁰ *CCR 1323-6*, p 624; *CPR 1327-30*, pp 25, 33

⁵¹ *CPR 1327-30*, p 95

supervisors of the array in seven northern counties indicated the belief that Robert Bruce intended to fortify his men in Northumberland and hold it permanently.⁵² Archbishop Melton of York expressed the same belief in letters to Lewis Beaumont, bishop of Durham, claiming Bruce had already been granting parts of Northumberland to his vassals.⁵³ No campaign in the north was forthcoming; despite ordering the able-bodied men of the north to prepare for campaign in October, the regency was in no position to move again to conflict.⁵⁴

Both Stones and Nicholson have covered in detail the diplomacy of the following six months.⁵⁵ William Denholme and Henry Percy were sent to negotiate with Bruce on 9 October. A flurry of negotiations ensued, with preliminary points of discussion for a full treaty fleshed out by the end of October and ambassadors for the final negotiations appointed by 23 November.⁵⁶ Truce was arranged to allow for the necessary diplomacy to be carried out. By 1 March, matters had advanced far enough that Edward issued his formal quitclaim of his rule and superiority over Scotland, in excruciating and exact detail.⁵⁷ Immediately after, delegates for the English crown left for Edinburgh, to treat for the first time with the Scots in Scotland. The final details were hammered out by 17 March, and agreed to by the Scottish parliament. The English parliament ratified the

⁵² *Rot Scot*, pp 221-2

⁵³ J. Raine (ed), *Historical Papers and Letters from Northern Registers* (Rolls Series, 1873), pp 344-6, 349-50

⁵⁴ *Rot Scot*, pp 221, 222

⁵⁵ See E.L.G. Stones, 'The Anglo-Scottish Negotiations of 1327', *SHR* 30 (1951), pp 49-54; E.L.G. Stones, 'The English Mission to Edinburgh in 1328', *SHR* 28 (1949), pp 121-32; Nicholson, pp 46-56

⁵⁶ *Rot Scot*, p 223; E.L.G. Stones, *Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1174-1328: Some Selected Documents* (London, 1965) pp 158-160

⁵⁷ *Foedera*, p 730; Stones, *Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1174-1328: Some Selected Documents*, pp 161-63

treaty at Northampton on 4 May 1328, leading to peace and a Scottish king recognized by the English for the first time since John Balliol.⁵⁸

The treaty, known as the ‘Shameful Peace’, provided for alliance between the two countries, the lifting of the excommunication for Bruce, the marriage of Edward’s sister Joan to Robert’s son David, and a payment of £20,000 to the English king to sweeten the deal. Unfortunately, the deal was such that no payoff would make it acceptable to certain parties – the king being foremost amongst them. Politically dominated by Isabella and Mortimer, Edward was in no position to block the treaty from going forward. However, his absolute refusal to attend his sister’s wedding was keenly felt on both sides of the border. Though Nicholson indicates that the lack of dowry from the English was an insult to Bruce, the agreement made at Edinburgh indicates that the Scots themselves had taken on the responsibility for providing £2,000 worth of lands as dower, which Roger Mauduit and Robert Tughale were empowered to receive on her behalf on 21 May 1328.⁵⁹ The lack of Edward’s attendance was slight enough, and matched in turn by Robert Bruce’s absence.

The treaty received little favour in the eye of the English chroniclers, receiving near universal condemnation. Geoffrey le Baker wrote of the ‘disgraceful peace made between the English and the Scots’, while the author of the *Brut* called the parliament at Northampton ‘accursed’.⁶⁰ The Scottish chroniclers, by contrast, reacted positively to both the treaty and the marriage. Walter Bower’s *Scotichronicon* lists the full text of Edward’s quitclaim to Scotland and notes the £20,000 payment to be made by Robert and

⁵⁸ *Foedera*, pp 740-42

⁵⁹ Stones, *Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1174-1328: Some Selected Documents*, pp 165; *CPR 1327-30*, p 272; Clifford Rogers also notes this point in his *War, Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327-1360* (Woodbridge, 2000), p 25

the Scots to Edward and the agreement to the wedding.⁶¹ Much more ado is made regarding the death of Robert Bruce than regarding the treaty with the English, though the author does mention how Bruce ‘vanquished the king and people of England with such courage and forcefulness that they established a pretended peace with him only out of fear for their other kingdoms.’⁶²

The £20,000 payment by the Scots did little to increase happiness with the treaty. Instead, it increased the resentment of Isabella and Mortimer. It was never returned in any fashion to the northern counties from where it had been bled during the previous reign. Initially, it was assigned towards paying the huge debts owed to John of Hainault and the Bardi of Florence, as mentioned. However, the exchequer was forced to find the funds elsewhere when Isabella selfishly reassigned the Scottish payment to herself.⁶³ It is little wonder that the treaty was so disliked when the one tangible gain on the part of the English ended up enriching the individuals seen as betraying the country.

Though Edward II had found himself negotiating truces with the Scots, including a thirteen-year truce at Bishopthorpe in May 1323, even he had refused to budge on the issue of English sovereignty over Scotland. The truce had provided for occupied territory to be surrendered, new fortifications not already begun in the March to be banned, and restriction of contact between subjects of the two sides of the conflict. What it did not address in the slightest was the issue of whether Robert Bruce was due the title of king.

Simply put, no English king was going on his own merits to give away his claims to Scotland. Such a diminution was not to be accepted, certainly not by choice. The only

⁶⁰ *Baker*, p 40; *Brut*, p 258

⁶¹ *Scotichronicon*, pp 38-9

⁶² *Scotichronicon*, p 45

⁶³ *CPR 1327-30*, p 418, 470, *CCR 1327-30*, pp 470, 490; *Foedera*, pp 477, 485

way this could happen would be if the king were forced to, either through disastrous defeats or by not controlling his own fate. Even Bannockburn was not able to convince Edward II to back down and grant Robert what he wished... but Isabella and Mortimer had full and total control of the political direction of the crown at the time of the Treaty of Northampton. They personally were losing nothing by bargaining away the king's sovereignty over Scotland. Only Edward III, helpless to do much more than fume, was going to lose by their acceding to the Scottish demands.

Isabella and Mortimer had benefited from and taken full advantage of Edward II's perceived indifference to northern England. However, the perception of activity was at variance with the reality of what was being done for the north. This is not to say that Edward II was effective in dealing with the northern problems – the chroniclers seem fully justified in their anger at years of devastation and destruction visited on the north before the Truce of Bishopthorpe was concluded in 1323. While the regents may have engaged in a great deal of visible activity for the north, none of it was innovative. All the policies that Edward II had pursued – respites and pardons of debts to help financially, commissioning local magnates to defend the north, royal campaigns to crush Scottish opposition, the appointment of major magnates from the south as captains on the march, and the negotiation of truces – all of these were tried in quick succession by the regents, with little success.

For Edward III, the regency had provided some harsh lessons on ruling the country. He had participated in an utterly fruitless military campaign, seen his claims to Scotland signed away by his own mother for her personal gain, and became acquainted with the damage done to the north and the damage done in turn to his royal reputation.

There were benefits, however. Isabella and Mortimer's time in power created a lengthy separation between Edward III's reign and that of his father. This allowed the problems that carried over from Edward II's reign to be blamed on the regents rather than the young king. Edward was then able to start afresh once he could wrest power away from Isabella and Mortimer, without being held responsible for either the aftereffects of his father's inability to defend the north or for the 'Shameful Peace' which he vocally opposed. Those three-and-a-half years also allowed him the time to garner further support and take advantage of the animosity that Mortimer in particular was generating, an animosity Edward would use to the fullest in 1330.

1332: Dupplin Moor

It is a sad irony that the only means that Isabella and Mortimer were able to use to create a peace with the Scots was the one guaranteed to generate conflict in the near future. The Treaty of Northampton left the regency with the first solid peace in the north since the time of the Edward I's adjudication between Balliol and Bruce for the Scottish crown, and Isabella greatly richer. It also left a body of deeply dissatisfied nobles with unfulfilled claims in Scotland; only Henry Percy had received satisfaction in terms of his Scottish claims, and there he gained only the right to regain his father's forfeited titles through the courts.¹

When changing circumstances provided the opportunity for these men to take dramatic action to resurrect their claims in Scotland, they would embrace the chance wholeheartedly and set off the chain of events that would put England and Scotland at war after 1332 and lead eventually to the war with France in 1337. By supporting Edward in his coup of 1330, they later gained his tacit support to carry out a private campaign against Scotland to unseat the young David Bruce and replace him with Edward Balliol, whose father had been removed as king of Scotland by Edward I in 1296.²

This group of magnates is commonly referred to as the Disinherited.³ Their claims to lands in Scotland varied widely. Some, like Percy, were related to family

¹ Stones, *Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1174-1328: Some Selected Documents*, p 171

² M. Prestwich, *Edward I*, pp 473-4

³ The name was originally attached to them by the chronicler William Dene, as pointed out by Rogers: *War Cruel and Sharp*, p 31

estates and titles held before the start of the Anglo-Scottish Wars that had been forfeited due to the holders' allegiance to the English crown, rather than the Bruce cause. Others had claims arising through marriage to heiresses, such as Henry Beaumont's claim to the earldom of Buchan through his wife, Alice Comyn, or other more dubious claims arising from the conflicting grants given during the latter years of Edward I's reign after the deposition of John Balliol. Most found these claims reduced to posturing by the Treaty of Northampton: only Thomas Wake of Liddell, Henry Beaumont, and William la Zouche even had the option of taking Percy's path, though none achieved any success.

The political affiliations of this group were utterly dictated by this vision of lost riches in Scotland. Henry Beaumont had been a major supporter of Edward II until the Truce of Bishopthorpe, after which he became an exile and one of Isabella's plotters in Hainault. After their triumphant return, they supported the regency, with Wake, Beaumont, and John Mowbray being part of the garrison at Newcastle just prior to the Weardale campaign.⁴ Again, the instant that the official policy changed towards some form of reconciliation with Scotland and the abandonment of support for their personal claims, the group moved into the arms of the opposition. Beaumont, Wake, and David Strathbogie, the claimant to the earldom of Atholl, joined with Lancaster during his opposition to the regency in 1328-9.⁵ The defeat of the Lancastrian cause was a setback for the faction: Beaumont once again found his way overseas to plot coups, while Wake and Strathbogie paid dearly to receive back their English possessions.⁶

The days in the wilderness were soon to be over for the Disinherited, as a sea change came about in English political life. The characters in the drama of the regency

⁴ *Scalacronica*, p 153

⁵ *CCR 1327-30*, pp 528-9; *Brut*, p 260; *Baker*, p 42

were in great part those of the old guard, the generation in power during Edward II's reign – characters such as Lancaster, Mortimer himself, Beaumont, the royal earls of Norfolk and Kent. However, a new generation was appearing, along with men who had not been at the forefront. David Strathbogie, for instance, was just coming into his majority during the events of 1328, as was Gilbert Umfraville, titular earl of Angus. These men could provide a new energy to the political landscape, provided an exit could be found from the factionalism that had prevailed under Edward II and the regency. At the same time, the leadership in Scotland was changing. Bruce, ailing even in 1327, was dead by 7 June 1329, with James Douglas to follow the next year, fighting in Spain.⁷ Thomas Randolph, the Earl of Moray, was left as Guardian for the young David Bruce, but few obvious leaders were visible should Moray founder. Both Bruce and his heir, Robert Stewart, were minors.

The exit from factionalism was provided in November 1330, as Edward III with the help of William Montague and other supporters succeeded in surprising Mortimer at Nottingham and eliminated the regency. With the removal of Mortimer, Edward III was able to make a new start, placing the blame for the previous difficulties of his minority firmly on Mortimer's shoulders. Edward was known to abhor the Treaty of Northampton, and was much more sympathetic to the Disinherited as a whole, due to their opposition to Isabella and Mortimer. He would not push the claims of those not mentioned in the Treaty of Northampton, but it must have been seen as some improvement to have a monarch who did not see opposition to the Treaty as a threat to his security.

⁶ *CCR 1327-30*, pp 437, 528-9; *Foedera*, p 796

⁷ *Barbour*, pp 178, 188-91

The last payment of the money owed by the Scots via the Treaty and the general failure of any further negotiations regarding Beaumont or Wake also signalled a change, as it removed both any further vested interest on the part of Edward to maintain the Treaty beyond honour's sake and any reason for Wake and Beaumont to keep their interests apart from the other Disinherited. Despite an exchange of official correspondence,⁸ Wake and Beaumont received nothing, leaving them no choice in their minds but to consider other options. As for Edward, no further material advantage could be expected from a treaty he had opposed and which limited what he felt were rightful claims in regards to Scotland.

Unable to retrieve his lands in Scotland, Beaumont instead took advantage of circumstances to retrieve something else from Picardy. While on travels there, he arranged to bring back Edward Balliol, the eldest son of the former King of Scots, living in relative obscurity in Picardy.⁹ Balliol had on previous occasions attempted to regain lands and income from Edward II, but had not succeeded. Here was an opportunity to regain a much grander title than those of his estates in England, and to have aid and help in doing so. Balliol set up residence at Sandal in Yorkshire, as a guest of the lady Vescy, Henry Beaumont's sister Isabella.¹⁰

Gaining the support and participation of Edward Balliol was a great coup for the Disinherited lords in their efforts to regain their lands in Scotland. His claim to the Scottish throne had stronger legal precedent than that of the Bruces, at least in theory, through the results of the Great Cause that had selected his father as King of Scotland

⁸ *Foedera*, pp 804, 809; *CDS*, no. 1023

⁹ *Brut*, p 274; *Baker*, p 49; *Scotichronicon*, pp 64-67, lays blame for Balliol's entry into the adventure on one Twynam Lourison, an adulterer hounded from Scotland taking revenge

¹⁰ *Wyntoun*, pp 381-2; *Pluscarden*, p 263

after the death of Alexander III's only remaining heir, the Maid of Norway.¹¹ The Bruce claim rested more upon the conquests of the first part of the fourteenth century than the legal wrangling at the end of the thirteenth. Additionally, Balliol would be attractive to many of those opposed to the Bruce regime, either through their support of the Comyns or other similar rivalries, such as those of the men of Galloway with the Bruce holding of the earldom of Carrick. Rather than simply revolting or carrying rivalries into the military sphere without any legitimacy, these combatants would be legal combatants supporting legitimate claims to the kingship in Scotland.

One legal problem with Balliol's claim via the Great Cause was the subsequent war in Scotland carried out by Edward I. Faced with an alliance between France and Scotland against England, despite the putative vassalage of Balliol to the crown of England, Edward I invaded Scotland in 1296. After an initially successful campaign, John Balliol had to relinquish his claims to the Scottish throne to Edward, and was removed to the Tower and eventually went into exile in Picardy.¹² The Balliols would play no further part in the wars either during Edward I's reign or the reduction and elimination of English control in Scotland by the Bruces under his son. While the forcible deposition of John Balliol did call the claim of his son Edward into question, the difficulty could be surmounted provided that the current holder of that authority, Edward III, would be willing to recognise Balliol's claim as the legitimate one. Implicit in this circumstance was the subordination of Scotland as a vassal state of England – both by John Balliol's acknowledgement of it to Edward I and by Edward Balliol resurrecting the exact claim through Edward III.

¹¹ The particulars of the Great Cause are nicely detailed in M.C. Prestwich, *Edward I* (New Haven, 1998), pp 356-375

There is no conclusive proof that Edward had given full approval to plans to remove David Bruce militarily before the Disinherited moved north at the end of July 1332. However, all evidence points to this being likely. Certainly, Edward could not have missed the signs that major plans were afoot. Major efforts to provide financing for the expedition were undertaken by the various Disinherited lords, requiring numerous licenses from the crown. Henry Beaumont gained licenses to lease out the manors of Loughborough and Whitwick in Leicestershire, while sharing permission with his sister for Edenham, Barton, and Folkingham in Lincolnshire.¹³ Richard Talbot enfeoffed his relative Thomas with three manors in Gloucestershire, while granting another manor in Hertfordshire outright to Roger Chauntecler. David Strathbogie rented out the manors of Stiffkey, Holkham, and West Lexham in Norfolk.¹⁴ Thomas Wake made various arrangements to raise funds,¹⁵ including granting his Norfolk estate of Stowe Bydon to Thomas Roscelyn and borrowing 500 marks from the Bardi.¹⁶

Wake may have also engaged in more creative methods to finance his part in the upcoming invasion. May 1332 saw complaint being made by the abbot of Croyland that Wake and his men had attacked the abbey's fair and lands, stealing massive numbers of livestock and demanding £500 ransom for their return. The ensuing escalation of

¹² M.C. Prestwich, *Edward I* (New Haven, 1998), pp 473-4

¹³ *CPR 1330-4*, p 283

¹⁴ *CPR 1330-4*, pp 305-6

¹⁵ Although Nicholson, p 77 points to Wake's dealings with the priory of Haltemprice in Yorkshire as an example of his efforts to raise money, it is more likely the alienations made in 1332 were continuations of the dealings of the early part of the year before, when Wake granted lands and meadows worth 64s (*CPR 1330-4* p 67), a toft and the advowson of the church in Belton, Haxholm Island (*CPR 1330-4*, p 151), and arranged the transfer of the advowson of the church of Elvele to Haltemprice from the abbey of Selby (*CPR 1330-4*, p 84).

¹⁶ *CPR 1330-4*, p 367; *CCR 1330-4*, p 614

problems between Wake and the abbot led to Wake having to stay in England to avoid armed conflict between his men and the abbot, as ordered by the king.¹⁷

Nor did Edward completely ignore the evidence of activity. Writs were issued as early as October 1331 to prevent the gathering of troops, either under the guise of tournaments or for transport overseas.¹⁸ Men-at-arms gathering for invading Scotland in the northern counties were to be arrested by the sheriffs by royal order, according to orders sent in March of 1332. However, this was counterbalanced by gifts made by the king such as £500 to Henry Beaumont¹⁹ and the appointment of several prominent members of the adventure to be commissioners of the peace under the Statute of Winchester.²⁰ That the king would appoint several of the men who were ‘suspected’ of gathering troops to break the peace with Scotland to keep the peace shows either a remarkable amount of optimism on Edward III’s part or a tacit acceptance or approval of these men and their choice of action.

As a whole, the Disinherited had a great deal of good will to draw on with Edward. As mentioned previously, they had been supportive of Edward’s attempt to throw off Mortimer’s regency, particularly in the case of Henry Beaumont; most had had their lands confiscated and fines imposed during the abortive Lancastrian opposition to Mortimer in 1329, while Beaumont fled overseas in a well-practised manoeuvre to plot in France against those in control of the crown of England.²¹ They also advocated a martial policy in respect to Scotland much more in tune with the feelings of Edward, who keenly felt the disappointment of the defeat of the Weardale campaign and the humiliating

¹⁷ *CPR 1330-4*, p 351; *CCR 1333-7*, p 116

¹⁸ *CCR 1330-3*, pp 397-8

¹⁹ *CPR 1330-4*, p 270

Treaty of Northampton that followed. Considering that Edward hated the Treaty so much that he deliberately snubbed his sister's marriage to demonstrate this disapproval, any supporters of a more hostile course with the northern neighbours would be seen as fellow travellers, especially when this had placed them in opposition to Mortimer and his policies.²²

Further approval than the appointments to keep the peace, if less public, was likely given by Edward directly to the Disinherited. Recognising this opportunity to eliminate the 'Shameful Peace' that he had so opposed during his minority, he agreed to the invasion according to various chronicles, albeit with certain conditions. First, the invasion could not be carried out overland from England; such movement would require Edward's permission to cross the border in violation of the current treaty. However odious the Treaty of Northampton may have been to Edward, he was bound by its terms until such time as it was invalid – such as the deposition of David Bruce and a more acceptable alternative such as Edward Balliol was in his place. Though the gathering of men and munitions in Yorkshire must have been equally as obvious, Edward could claim a thin veneer of deniability as to their destination as long as they were merely 'passing overseas.' This also allowed for Edward to possibly profit even if the gamble failed – by the confiscation of the Disinherited's property in England for violating the treaty.²³

Second, Edward likely received the homage oath of Balliol for Scotland, though for obvious reasons did not do so publicly. Later letters patent issued by Edward Balliol in November 1332 indicated that Balliol had already given his homage oath before his

²⁰ Richard Talbot (Gloucester), Thomas Wake of Liddel (Lincoln), Henry Beaumont (Lincoln), Fulk FitzWarin (Shropshire); *CPR 1330-4*, pp 285-8

²¹ *Foedera*, p 796; *CCR 1327-30* pp 425, 437, 528, 529

²² *Pluscarden*, p 257

departure from England, with full acknowledgement of the sovereignty of England over Scotland and the oath itself quoted in full.²⁴ This was a sensible precaution, as Edward III would have little to gain from the deposition of his brother-in-law, no matter how odious a treaty they had between them, without material gains promised and sworn to for the English crown. With this oath also came more material enrichments, which would come to light after the dust had settled in the summer of 1332.

Having gained the crucial acquiescence of Edward, the Disinherited prepared their force in Yorkshire through the first part of 1332, with the March proclamations against the gathering of forces to attack Scotland in the northern counties apparently being ignored by all and sundry.²⁵ Despite the efforts to raise funds for the expedition, the number of troops that assembled was rather small. Unlike many battles narrated by chroniclers, the Disinherited's numbers were not exaggerated at all in the telling. Most reports put their numbers at about fifteen hundred men, one-third of whom were cavalry.²⁶ Such numbers only highlight the necessity of Balliol's participation in the effort, since the conventional thinking would require that such a group receive large amounts of local support on landing in Scotland, support that would require a legitimate claim to back.

Support was expected from Donald of Mar, whose long career had intersected Beaumont's at numerous points. Both had been major supporters of Edward II until Beaumont's falling out with the king after the Truce of Bishopthorpe, and both were named as conspirators to restore Edward II to the throne in 1330 in the confession of the

²³ *Baker*, p 49; *Lanercost*, p 267

²⁴ *Foedera*, pp 847-8

²⁵ *Foedera*, p 833

Earl of Kent. Though their political interests had differing motivations,²⁷ their mutual interest in the same causes had given them a long history and acquaintance to draw upon. Mar was also heavily involved in the Disinherited's original plotting according to the Lanercost and Bridlington chroniclers, having encouraged Balliol to participate and assured the Disinherited of his support.²⁸

Mar's possible sympathies for the Disinherited became much more important with the death on 20 July 1332 of the Earl of Moray, acting as the Guardian of Scotland during David Bruce's minority. Numerous stories circulated hinting at poison being used by the Disinherited, as Moray had been the main driving force in maintaining a united front in opposition to Beaumont and his allies.²⁹ The timing of the expedition was probably based in part on Moray's lingering illness, as his death would leave few strong accepted leaders in Scotland to oppose any strong, well-conceived and well-executed action. Mar, one of the commanders of the 1327 campaign and closely related to the Bruces through his mother, was one of the few choices available with both the experience and the status to be chosen as Moray's replacement.

The need for a replacement to be selected hurriedly was well known. Grey's *Scalacronica* tells of the Disinherited petitioning to have their grievances redressed by Edward III or let them take matters into their own hands. According to the chronicle, the response from Moray when presented with the threat was to 'let the ball roll'.³⁰

²⁶ *Scalacronica*, p 159; *Bridlington*, pp 102-6; *Lanercost*, p 267; *Anonimalle*, p 150, refers to the force as 2,500 rather than 1,500.

²⁷ Beaumont's motivation appears solely to be the recovery of the earldom of Buchan, while Mar's status as Earl of Mar was secure. Beaumont's participation in the plot of 1330 would have been triggered by the Treaty of Northampton and the obstructions that Isabella and Mortimer through it had placed upon his ambitions.

²⁸ *Lanercost*, p 267; *Bridlington*, p 104

²⁹ *Wyntoun*, p 383; *Barbour*, p 196; *Pluscarden*, pp 262-4; *Scotichronicon*, pp 72-3

³⁰ *Scalacronica*, p 159

Regardless of the veracity of the report,³¹ the gathering of men south of the border was well known, and few doubted the necessity to prepare for military action. Mar was eventually chosen to fill the post of Guardian, though not without some difficulty.³²

The Disinherited sailed from the Yorkshire ports of Ravenser, Barton and Hull on 31 July 1332 northward towards the Firth of Forth, with the intention of landing at Kinghorn in order to assemble their force and move on Perth, the *de facto* capital of Scotland. Invading by sea allowed Beaumont to keep the exact destination secret, forcing Mar to consider the defence of several different locations. From the Firth of Forth, the fleet could attack Edinburgh or Stirling, or move farther up the coast to threaten Fife or Perth. Mar split the forces available to him, placing the southern troops under Patrick, Earl of March, while taking command of those north of the Firth of Forth himself.

The selection of Mar, despite his previous connections with those he was to defend the country against, secured his loyalties firmly for the Bruce cause. Any help that he might have been expected to give the Disinherited was not to be forthcoming, despite any sympathies he might have felt for their circumstances. Unfortunately for him and the Scots, the taint of the associations would still linger.

Overall, the adventure held a surprising similarity to that undertaken by Beaumont, Isabella, and Mortimer in 1326. Both had a relatively small force of veteran, hand-picked troops at their command, transported by sea to a location near enough to make a direct march on the political centre of the country in question, yet far enough to avoid overwhelming initial opposition while local support or waverers could choose to switch sides and join the army in its procession towards political ascendancy. Both

³¹ Letters were sent to Moray by Edward in April 1332; *CDS*, no. 1050; *Foedera*, p 837; see Nicholson, p 77

operated under the figurehead of a man with obvious claims to legitimacy to head the nation, while supported by others with their own agendas. Both expected serious support from major magnates upon landing, and did not expect a long, drawn-out conflict to occur. That Beaumont was involved in the planning of both adventures lends credence to his Scottish attempt in 1332 being modelled on the effort in 1326. The key factor missing in the Scottish example was the loathing that Edward II had engendered in a wide swathe of the English political spectrum, and the numerous examples of his incompetence. Though the minority lent itself to weakness, it also kept David Bruce free from any negative reactions attached to his Guardians and removed that push towards Balliol that had existed in England forcing the opposition towards Isabella, Mortimer, and the young Edward III.

The naval force reached Kinghorn on 6 August 1332, where it was met upon landing with a local force from Fife under the earl of Fife, Alexander Seton the younger and Robert Bruce, the illegitimate son of Robert Bruce and Mar's main rival for the Guardianship. The number of Scots involved is uncertain, varying widely from chronicle to chronicle; however, the presence of both Fife and Bruce implies a large force, in line with accounts such as the Lanercost Chronicle which numbers them at around four thousand. This force was repulsed by archery and a charge by the footmen of the invaders, killing Alexander Seton the younger.³³ This minor victory was followed up with a rapid disembarkation of the invading force, which then immediately moved to Dunfermline Abbey while the fleet made its way around Fife to the Tay. At Dunfermline

³² *Scalacronica*, p 159; *Pluscarden*, p 264; *Wyntoun*, p 384; *Scotichronicon*, pp 72-3

³³ *Pluscarden*, p 265; *Lanercost*, p 267; *Bridlington*, p 104; *Scalacronica*, p 159; *Wyntoun*, p 384; *Scotichronicon*, pp 72-5

the force spent two days gathering food and supplying itself for the upcoming march, while arming with five hundred pikes found stored there.

It has been suggested that marching on the abbey at Lindores could have served the same purpose, but that Beaumont and the other leaders of the invaders avoided this in order to provide them with no escape but victory in marching to Perth via an inland route.³⁴ It is unlikely that the Dunfermline march was for navigational purposes, as several of the leaders of the expedition and likely many of the troops had fought previously in Scotland and were well acquainted with its terrain. Another possible factor in the choice of Dunfermline is a strategic one, wrapped up in the debatable loyalties of Donald of Mar. While Beaumont and the others had hopes for Mar's support, they had at times been on opposing sides and were well aware that their goals simply coincided at times, rather than were true bedfellows. Because of this, the Disinherited had to balance finely their actions to allow for Mar to support them should he wish to, while not compromising their own plans by informing him of them without safeguards. Considering that Mar was selected Guardian after the Disinherited sailed, they would have no way to know precisely what Mar's position was upon landing, nor where precisely where he would be or the amount of forces he had to hand. Travelling to Dunfermline would allow them to ascertain Mar's location and whether or not he would support them, without deviating from their aim of taking Perth.

After the two-day delay at Dunfermline, Balliol and Beaumont moved north, to find on 10 August their path across the Earn River blocked by Mar, while Dunbar had rapidly moved his southern force through Stirling up to Auchterarder, less than a day's

³⁴ See *War Cruel and Sharp*, pp 37-8; *Brut*, p 275

march away from the Disinherited at Forteviot.³⁵ Any hope for Mar's support was eliminated upon contact with the Scots, and his expressed pity for their plight.³⁶ The mismatch in numbers was apparent to all, and the Scots seemed willing to wait until Dunbar's force had completely cut off any retreat before attacking the Disinherited. They passed the time carousing and taunting the English. Unfortunately for the partying Scots, their prey were shown an unguarded ford by a Scot,³⁷ allowing them to cross the Earn and use the surprise to mount a night attack on one of the Scottish encampments at Gask, to great success. The cheer at this initial victory was tempered by morning, as scouts led by Thomas Vescy and Ralph Stafford discovered the main Scottish force drawn up in two large battles and moving to engage.

Though Dunbar's southern troops were not in position to join the fight, the numerical disadvantage the English faced was extreme. No administrative records exist to give us independent figures from chronicle sources; however, the English chronicles estimated forty thousand, while the Scots grant thirty thousand.³⁸ Among these were the earls of Fife, Moray (the young heir of the deceased Guardian), Menteith, and Mar himself, along with Mar's rival Robert Bruce and Alexander Fraser. Regardless of which figure is accepted as to the number of Scots, the disparity was still that of greater than ten to one. On the other hand, the English troops were of much better quality than those of the Scots, specialised soldiers rather than the levies that comprised the main force under Mar's command. The efforts of the English scouts and Mar's decision to move to engage also allowed the Disinherited the choice of ground, dismounting the men-at-arms to form

³⁵ *Wyntoun*, pp 385-6; *Pluscarden*, p 265; *Brut*, p 276; *Scalacronica*, p 159; *Lanercost*, pp 267-8; *Scotichronicon*, pp 74-77

³⁶ *Bridlington*, p 105

³⁷ *Wyntoun*, pp 387, *Scotichronicon*, pp 76-77

a narrow front line flanked by archers in a form to become extremely common in English military practice over the next century. Only a small body of cavalry was kept in reserve, though the horses of the men-at-arms were kept at hand to the rear. The entire force was situated at one end of a narrow glen, restricting the approach path that the Scots would have to take.³⁹

The haste of the engagement also served to stiffen the resolve of the invaders, as it gave no opportunity to seek options other than fighting. The sheer size of the opposing force had caused some trepidation amongst the Disinherited, especially as the promised support from within Scotland failed to materialise. That same disparity however made the Scots overconfident, preventing negotiations other than Mar's refusal to support Balliol and Beaumont, and moving them to engage at dawn on 11 August before any further discussions could be undertaken between the two forces.⁴⁰

Though Mar had given over any thought to support the Disinherited, his previous associations with them came brutally to the fore. According to the *Brut*, Mar suggested giving the Disinherited a chance to surrender; this gave to Robert Bruce, Mar's failed rival for the Guardianship, the opening to accuse Mar of treason in the face of battle. Mar denied the charges, swearing to strike the Disinherited first as proof. Out of rivalry or his own failure at Kinghorn, Bruce declared the same, causing the commanders of the two Scottish battles to order a headlong rush into the enemy and lose the cohesion crucial to such a battle.⁴¹

³⁸ *Wyntoun*, p 385; *Fordun*, p 355; *Brut*, p 277; *Lanercost*, p 268; *Anonimale*, p 148; *Bridlington*, p 106; *Baker*, p 49

³⁹ *Bridlington*, p 106; *Scalacronica*, p 160

⁴⁰ A speech by Fulk Fitzwarin may have also helped morale, but the situation had essentially been one of 'fight or die' since Dunbar's force had moved into position at Auchterarder; see *War Cruel and Sharp*, pp 41-2 regarding Fitzwarin.

⁴¹ *Brut*, p 276

Bruce's smaller battle reached the English lines first, forcing the wall of men-at-arms back twenty or thirty feet. At this point came the curious command from Ralph Stafford to turn their shoulders to the pikes, not their chests: whether meant figuratively or literally, it put heart into the English at a desperate point. Unfortunately for the Scots, the line held, while the arrow storms slashing into the flanks of the formation forced those men towards the centre, crushing the formation into an immobile mass. The *coup de grace* was delivered by Mar, as his force slammed into the rear of Bruce's battle, attempting to push it forward but accomplishing nothing more than crushing the entire force together too tightly to manoeuvre, fight, or even breathe. Those who lost their footing were trampled, and those who did not suffocated while still standing.⁴²

The Disinherited kept their cohesion, and continued the slaughter as long as they could. Many of the men-at-arms remounted to hunt down survivors attempting to retreat under Duncan, Earl of Fife. Those not involved in the pursuit continued the bloody work of killing any in the mass of bodies still alive, leaving a pile of dead several feet high.⁴³ The number of Scots lost, much like the number that came to the field, is uncertain and varies widely: Scottish chroniclers tend to put the numbers at two or three thousand,⁴⁴ while the English sources give far higher numbers, with thirteen thousand being the low figure.⁴⁵ English casualties were light: two knights and thirty-three esquires being named, and none of the common soldiery at all.⁴⁶

What is certain is the high number of casualties at the top of the Scottish command. Mar died in the press of his own making, with Bruce also paying the price for

⁴² *Wyntoun*, p 388; *Bridlington*, p 106; *Brut*, pp 278-9; *Scalacronica*, p 160; *Lanercost*, p 268; *Pluscarden*, p 266; *Scotichronicon*, pp 75-9

⁴³ *Lanercost*, p 268; *Brut*, p 279; *Scalacronica*, p 160; *Scotichronicon*, pp 78-9

⁴⁴ *Wyntoun*, p 388; *Pluscarden*, p 266

his temper. Menteith, Moray, and Alexander Fraser were also caught in the debacle, along with a good portion of the Scottish baronage and gentry. Only Fife managed to escape the death trap, only to be captured during the pursuit. This decimation of the Scottish force's leadership and its rout at the hand of a tiny force was stunning to the Scots, who had generally been the winners in conflicts with the English for the past twenty years. Chroniclers laid blame either on divine providence or the pride of the Scots.⁴⁷

Though much has been made of the new generation coming up during this period, such as Ralph Stafford,⁴⁸ it is worth noting that the driving force and the *de facto* leader of their expedition was Henry Beaumont – a man whose career had spanned the entire extent of the Anglo-Scottish wars, and who was by no means a member of the new generation of Edward III. Though the rise of this new generation of warriors, including a new monarch untainted by the failure of his father, had set the stage for the changes in tactics and fortunes of the English, the experience of older fighters such as the earlier Harclay and Beaumont allowed for the development and initial use of the innovations.

The psychological blow that this loss inflicted on the Scots coloured the reactions of the other Scottish host advancing on the Disinherited and its leader, Patrick, Earl of March (Dunbar). While the Disinherited moved into an unresisting Perth and frantically shored up the defences in preparation for Dunbar's assault, the earl paused for several days to gather more men and prepare siege equipment. An attack on the English ships supporting the force in Perth on 24 August was the final straw, as the pirates under the

⁴⁵ *Anonimalle*, p 150; *Melsa*, p 364

⁴⁶ *Anonimalle*, p 150; *Knighon*, p 463; *Melsa*, p 364

⁴⁷ *Wyntoun*, p 389; *Bridlington*, p 107; *Lanercost*, p 269; *Scalacronica*, p 160; *Scotichronicon*, p 79

Fleming John Crabbe were routed after an initial success against Beaumont's personal ship.⁴⁹ Faced with rapidly dwindling supplies and no ability to cut off the Disinherited from further outside support, Dunbar chose to disband his force rather than assault a force with the benefit of Perth's palisade that had so readily beaten the Scots already without such an advantage.⁵⁰

The dissolution of the last major force opposing the Disinherited signalled the beginning of a rapid retrenchment of magnates in eastern Scotland wanting to protect their personal interests and side with the now victorious interlopers. The Earl of Fife, already having retreated from two conflicts with Balliol's forces, now came over to Balliol's side, as did a major portion of the ecclesiastical community in the region.⁵¹ By 24 September, Balliol was sufficiently secure to have himself crowned as King of Scots at the abbey of Scone, the traditional coronation site. The Bishop of Dunkeld, William Sinclair, carried out the ceremony, with Duncan, Earl of Fife, as the major lay representative in the ceremony. James Ben, the Bishop of St. Andrews who normally would have carried out the coronation, refused to, preferring exile.⁵²

Elsewhere, the conflict was only beginning. Encouraged by the return of a Balliol to a semblance of power in Scotland, the men of Galloway rose up under Eustace Maxwell and engaged the Bruce supporters in the south, particularly Patrick Dunbar and Alexander Bruce, earl of Carrick.⁵³ As Dunbar and Bruce were joined by Mar's replacement as Guardian, Sir Andrew Murray, John Randolph, earl of Moray, and

⁴⁸ See J. Bothwell, 'Edward III and the 'New Nobility': Largesse and Limitation in Fourteenth-Century England', *EHR*, v. 112 no. 449 (1997) pp 1111-1140, as an example

⁴⁹ *Bridlington*, p 107-8; *Wyntoun*, pp 389-91; *Anonimalle*, p 150; *Baker* p 49; *Lanercost*, p 269

⁵⁰ *Bridlington*, p 108; *Brut*, p 279; *Scalacronica*, p 161

⁵¹ *Brut*, p 280; *Wyntoun*, p 392; *Lanercost*, p 269; *Scotichronicon*, pp 80-1

⁵² *Pluscarden*, p 267; *Lanercost*, p 269; *Scotichronica* pp 82-83

⁵³ *Lanercost*, p 269; *Anonimalle*, p 152

Archibald Douglas, the Balliol partisans were overmatched. Despite this, they were left to their own devices until after the coronation of Balliol, who then moved quickly south to rescue one of the few overt movements of support for his new reign.

The effectiveness of Balliol's forces earlier came into play again, as their presence over the next two months caused many to submit rather than try their arms directly against the Disinherited army. Among these was Alexander Bruce, though others had to be subdued by more forceful means. An attempted ambush at Jedburgh at the beginning of October achieved little more than the capture of Robert Lauder the younger,⁵⁴ while an even bolder action at Roxburgh cost them even more dearly. Balliol's forces had taken up residence in the ruins of the castle there, while Balliol visited the abbey of Kelso, across the Tweed via a single bridge. Murray attempted to catch the English unawares and smash the bridge to isolate Balliol away from his forces. The attempt was detected, and Murray was captured during the reverse. Also captured was John Crabbe, who had led the Flemish pirates who had attacked the Disinherited's fleet in August.⁵⁵ With yet another Guardian eliminated from action by Balliol's forces and the loss of one of the few mercenary captains of skill available to the Scots, a crisis of leadership was brewing for the Bruce partisans that would have to be answered in the coming months for their cause to survive. For the moment, the role of Guardian fell to Archibald Douglas, brother of the famous James Douglas who had made his name during the fight against Edward II and who died carrying Robert Bruce's heart into battle in Spain.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ *Scalacronica*, p 161

⁵⁵ *Scalacronica*, p 161; *Lanercost*, p 270; *Anonimalle*, pp 152-4; *Bridlington*, p 109; *Wyntoun*, pp 396-7

⁵⁶ *Scotichronicon*, pp 82-83; *Fordun*, p356; James's death: *Scotichronicon*, pp 66-73

While Balliol's army was achieving successes, his partisans elsewhere, lukewarm or otherwise were suffering reverses. Though Balliol had gone a long way towards securing the south, the cost was paid on 7 October 1332 with the loss of Perth to an assault by forces of Simon Fraser, Robert Keith, and John Lindsay. Unsurprisingly, the Earl of Fife switched sides once again, and the town's defences were destroyed.⁵⁷ Balliol's writ ran only where Balliol himself was; the native support he had hoped to gather appeared only in the south where he was now operating, and the anaemic support of turncoats such as Fife seemed guaranteed to disappear at the first contact with an opponent.

All of this martial activity on behalf of both Bruce and Balliol did not go unnoticed or unremarked upon south of the border. Edward III appointed Henry Percy warden of the March on 10 August, after receiving a report from Roger Mauduit and Roger Heron that the Scots were alarmed at Beaumont's expedition, which was at that moment reaching the Earn river in its move towards Perth and Dupplin. This report from the Northumberland knights allowed Edward to take precautions without appearing in collusion with the Disinherited.⁵⁸ Edward was not yet ready to involve himself directly in events in Scotland, but kept a keen eye on events.

October brought further action in Edward's court, alongside the preparations for a possible policy change away from the relative aloofness with which the new conflict north of the border had been treated to this time. Parliament had been called into session on 8 September in order to make arrangements for a campaign in Ireland in support of the English administration there. The events north of the border necessitated a change in

⁵⁷ *Wyntoun*, p 394; *Scotichronicon* pp 82-3; Lanercost pp 269-70

⁵⁸ *CDS*, no. 1057

these plans: the planned expedition to Ireland was cancelled while a tenth and fifteenth tax was issued for the specific defence of the realm against the Scots.⁵⁹ Regardless of Edward's attempts to stay publicly aloof from the fighting north of the border, the English origins of the invaders made England vulnerable to possible counterattack. Writs for the array of two thousand troops in Lancashire, Yorkshire, Derbyshire and Cheshire were issued on 7 October, to further bolster the defence of the north, while summons were issued on 20 October for a new parliament to discuss the rapid change of events in Scotland in December.⁶⁰

While Balliol settled into Kelso Abbey to begin dealing with the administrative work of securing his hold and that of his followers on Scotland, Edward III continued playing his game of wait-and-see. The former justiciar of Ireland, John Darcy, was sent to meet for negotiations with two envoys from the Bruce faction in late October.⁶¹ At the same time, Edward had little difficulty accepting the captives Andrew Murray and John Crabbe whom Balliol sent south to him, taking the opportunity to subvert Crabbe to his own service after purchasing the Fleming's captivity from his own household knight, Walter Mauny.⁶² The appearance of relative impartiality was severely marred on 23 November, when Balliol issued letters patent detailing the supposed agreement between himself and Edward III, reached before the Disinherited's departure from England.⁶³ This agreement acknowledged that the kingship of Scotland was held of the King of England by homage and fealty, with the exact form supposedly used at the time of swearing given. Further details outlined the relationship and defined its terms, including

⁵⁹ *CPR 1330-4*, p 323; *Rot Parl*, pp 66-7

⁶⁰ *Foedera*, p 846; *Rot Parl*, p 69

⁶¹ *Foedera*, p 847

⁶² *Wyntoun*, pp 396-7; *Bridlington*, p 109; *Lanercost*, p 270; PRO E403/270 (1 October 1333)

the military service owed to the English crown and the renewal of the bonds of homage by both Edward's heirs.

Key to this agreement was the tangible repayment of Edward III's covert approval of the coup. Land worth £2000 was to be transferred permanently into English control to be part of England proper, including the rich port of Berwick. The port was the largest town in Scotland at the time, along with having the highest income from customs duties due to the wool trade from Lothian, Tweeddale, and Teviotdale - £640 a year on average.⁶⁴ There were few alternatives to Berwick, as the nearest major port was Perth. Unfortunately, the cession of lands to England had the same difficulties for the Scottish crown as ceding sovereignty over Scotland had had for the English crown – any monarch willing to make the concession would heavily damage their own legitimacy in collaborating with his foreign rival.

In November 1332, this did not appear to be a great worry for Balliol. The victory at Roxburgh and Murray's capture there had apparently put an end to Scottish resistance for the moment: according to English chroniclers, Archibald Douglas and Patrick Dunbar entered into a truce with Balliol until 2 February so that a parliament could be held to reconcile the two sides. With hostilities disposed of, Balliol's army could disperse, having dealt with the military opposition.⁶⁵ So far, Balliol and Beaumont had had little occur differently in their campaign than had occurred for Isabella and Mortimer. Beaumont and Strathbogie made their way south to the English parliament in December, in order to present the changed circumstances in Scotland to the Parliament

⁶³ *Foedera*, pp 847-8

⁶⁴ J. Campbell, 'England, Scotland and the Hundred Years' War', in *The Wars of Edward III*, ed. C. Rogers (Woodbridge, 1999), p 206

⁶⁵ *Anonimale*, p 152; *Knighton*, p 465; *Melsa*, pp 366-7

and Balliol's letters regarding his deal with Edward III.⁶⁶ Beaumont, in turn, was appointed to deal with Balliol on Edward's behalf on 17 December.⁶⁷

Edward had received little support for direct involvement in the war north of the border: memories were too strong of the previous reign's wars, along with the campaign of 1327. The September parliament had granted a tax of a tenth and a fifteenth for the defence of the realm against the Scots, although by no means was this an endorsement for offensive action north of the Tweed.⁶⁸ The parliament in early December failed to provide Edward III either with support for reclaiming direct lordship over Scotland or in becoming directly involved with the civil war then brewing. Edward, despite Balliol's letters to the contrary, was claiming not to have taken sides: even after three days of deliberations, neither could parliament.⁶⁹ The parliament was recessed until 20 January, as it appeared that the situation in Scotland was well in hand.

In the short space of two years the Disinherited had succeeded in completely reversing their fortunes in Scotland, thanks to the death of leaders such as the Earl of Moray in Scotland and the tacit support of a newly independent Edward III chafing to be rid of the 'Shameful Peace'. They had won a major victory over a far superior Scottish force using tactics that were a departure from those seen in 1327, and had succeeded in eliminating or capturing most of the competent Scottish leaders. However, the retaking of Perth by Bruce partisans in October signalled that the support for Balliol's regime was not nearly as secure as the Disinherited could wish. This weakness would be highlighted all too well by events in the upcoming months.

⁶⁶ *Lanercost*, p 270; *Bridlington*, p 109; *Scalaonica*, p 161

⁶⁷ *CDS*, no. 1071

⁶⁸ *Rot Parl*, pp 66-7

⁶⁹ *Rot Parl*, p 67

1333: Berwick and Halidon Hill

By December of 1332, the Disinherited had made great strides towards taking control of Scotland and regaining their lost lands and titles. They had successfully defeated the main Scottish army under Donald of Mar at Dupplin Moor and forced the young Scottish king, David Bruce, to flee to Dumbarton to avoid capture. Edward Balliol, having asserted his claim to the Scottish throne at Scone, then moved southward to support his adherents in Galloway against remnants of the Bruce faction. This wave of success was fragile, as the support for Balliol amongst the native Scottish magnates was lukewarm at best, and the English parliament showed scarce more interest providing aid for his regime. Only a major reversal in Balliol's fortunes in December 1332 convinced Edward and the English Parliament to intervene to defeat the Scots, restore Balliol and gain a great deal of territory in the bargain.

Edward had been treating Balliol's faction with more warmth as their fortunes improved in the fall of 1332, though he was not supporting Balliol openly with the fate of Scotland still not fully settled. The ability to take such a middle course ended abruptly on 17 December, when an *attack by Archibald Douglas and the earl of Moray caught Balliol* by surprise at Annan, killing his brother Henry amongst a number of other supporters and sending him flying across the border to Carlisle.¹ Alongside the previous loss of Perth and the dispersal of his faction, the ambush at Annan left Balliol without any of the gains the Disinherited had made in the previous year, and the aura of invincibility that had

followed him from Dupplin Moor was gone. Having dissipated much of their wealth and ability to raise troops earlier in the year, the Balliol faction was dependent on the intervention of Edward III to reverse the tide.

Such a reverse as Annan was not likely to make the English parliament more amenable to armed intervention in Scotland. When the December parliament reconvened on 20 January, it singularly failed to support any intervention north of the border.² Any actions Edward wished to take either on his own behalf or that of Balliol would not have the support of new taxes levied to help pay for them. This did not deter Edward, as he began ordering the raising of troops before the month was out.³ While parliament had been put off adventuring in Scotland, Edward III realised that the failure of Balliol and his 'English' supporters would irretrievably damage any future attempt to reverse the Treaty of Northampton and reassert sovereignty over Scotland.

A rapid flurry of decisions gave permission for Balliol and the Disinherited to invade from England while the necessary machinery for Edward to invade Scotland himself was put in place. On 20 February, the exchequer and chancery were transferred to York as had become customary during the active campaigning periods of the Scottish wars, while Manent Francisci of the Bardi was entrusted with the purveyance and collection of over 15,000 quarters of wheat and 22,100 quarters of oats as the core supplies of what promised to be a major campaign.⁴ The tenth and fifteenth agreed on in September 1332 proved providential; the abbot of St. Mary's was appointed receiver of the moneys from the northern counties in order to provide the funds necessary for

¹ *Wyntoun*, pp 394-5; *Lanercost*, pp 270-1; *Scalacronica*, p 161; *Scotichronicon*, pp 82-5; *Bridlington*, pp 109-10; *Pluscarden*, p 267

² *Rot Parl*, p 69

³ *CPR 1330-4*, pp 400-1

prosecuting the preparations for war.⁵ The grant meant to be spent defending the realm from the Scots would instead be used to campaign against them. Much of it was immediately disbursed as gifts to both the Disinherited and English lords without a direct stake in Scotland who planned to join in the upcoming campaign.⁶

Of necessity, the terms of homage that had been published by Balliol in November 1332 but not confirmed by Edward III at the December parliament were now put fully and publicly into effect. On 12 February Balliol confirmed the letters patent from November, with Alexander Mowbray and John Felton acting as proxy, swearing upon Balliol's soul to uphold the provisions of the homage oath.⁷ Combined with the large amount of funds being channelled to Balliol, this oath-taking allowed Edward to cast the campaign as the reclamation of rights unfairly removed from Balliol's grasp. Though a heavy price was expected later for that support, there was not the attempt at taking Scotland solely for the English crown that Edward may have been contemplating during the winter parliament.

Balliol's force was large, with a number of prominent magnates from the Disinherited and England proper, including a number of Edward's own household bannerets such as William Montague and Ralph Neville. It even included Henry Lancaster (the earl of Lancaster's son, also known as Grosmont), Richard FitzAlan, earl of Arundel, and Henry Percy, who had avoided dealings with the Disinherited after settling his grievances in Scotland in previous years. Despite this preponderance of royal and baronial influence, this group did operate independently of Edward's army, being the

⁴ *CCR 1333-7*, pp 18-19; *CPR 1330-4* p 409

⁵ *CPR 1330-4*, p 395

⁶ *CCR 1333-7*, pp 7-8

⁷ *Bridlington*, p 111; *Murimuth*, p 67; *Foedera*, p 853

first to enter Scotland in either late February or early March.⁸ The suggestion that the confusion of dates was due to several contingents entering Scotland separately is credible.⁹ With the large force financed by both the crown and the resources of the English lords not present during the previous year, Balliol and his troops could expect circumstances to be more like the triumphant procession into Galloway of the previous year, rather than the ignominious retreat forced upon them after the premature dispersal of their forces. In addition, any checks would likely receive the full attention of the royal forces soon to follow.

Though Balliol's army had gathered at Carlisle, the expectation all round was that Berwick would be the focus of the campaign. While the lands to be handed to Edward III had not been defined, the one notable exception to this was Berwick and the surrounding countryside. Combined with its economic importance, its port, its population, and its fortifications, few other targets would have made immediate sense. Both Roxburgh and Edinburgh were ruins, having been slighted by Robert Bruce; the nearest major strong point on the east coast was Stirling.¹⁰ As it was to be handed to Edward III, his primary goal would be to get it into English hands as quickly as possible, both for garrisoning it and for supplying the army, who otherwise depended on supplies shipped in either at Carlisle's port at Skinburness or Newcastle-upon-Tyne.

By 13 March, the army from Carlisle had reached Berwick and begun the siege. The defences of Berwick had been entrusted to Patrick Dunbar, earl of March and

⁸ *Anonimale*, p 154; *Lanercost*, p 272; *Scalacronica*, p 162; *Wyntoun*, p 298

⁹ *War, Cruel and Sharp*, p 59

¹⁰ Dunbar was in need of repair at this time, and would not be strengthened until the following year. *CDS*, no. 1115, 1126

Alexander Seton.¹¹ Defending Berwick was an important, though inevitable departure from the Scottish defensive strategies south of the Firth of Forth of the previous thirty years. Under Robert Bruce, the majority of fortifications in southern Scotland had been slighted and rendered as indefensible as possible. Experience had shown that the castles provided little advantage against the vastly larger resources of the English crown and provided bases for the English to extend their power over the countryside once they had been taken. Operating on their own ground, the Scots did not require such a strong fallback position, but could avoid conflict and strike at the supply lines of the invaders or into England itself on destructive raids. Defending Berwick therefore was against the grain of Scottish military policy. However, its economic importance required the Scots to hold it for their long-term prospects, and denying the English its use as a forward supply base would greatly lengthen their supply lines and complicate their activities in Scotland.

Berwick was not the only exception to the destruction of fortresses in the south. Lochmaben, on the river Annan in eastern Galloway, was also kept intact and garrisoned, though it lacked the economic importance of Berwick. Despite the concentration on Berwick's riches as the reason for its defence, it seems likely that both Berwick and Lochmaben were meant to be actively defended, as both sat on the main invasion routes from Northumberland and Carlisle, respectively. Also, the occasional mention of smaller keeps and towers such as that taken by Balliol's forces at Oxnam just before besieging Berwick points to the policy of destroying castles being focused on those large enough to provide bases for large garrisons and significant supplies.¹²

¹¹ *Scotichronicon*, pp 88-9

¹² *Knighton*, p 466; Nicholson deduced the actual fortress taken in *Edward III and the Scots*, p 110

Rather than attack Balliol's force during its siege, the Scots under Archibald Douglas resorted to the tried and true tactic of raiding into Northumberland and Cumberland and attempting to force a lifting of the siege in order to try to halt the damage being caused by raiding.¹³ The tactic had been very successful in 1319 when Edward II had attempted to regain the town after its loss the previous year. Unfortunately for Douglas, he failed to take into account the exact nature of the force then besieging Berwick. Though many of the men attacking Berwick held lands in Cumberland and Northumberland, that army was not an army of the English crown with responsibilities of defending Northumberland; the rationale was that it was an army of 'Scots', or men with Scottish claims, prosecuting a siege on behalf of a claimant to the Scottish crown. Their overriding interests were in Scotland, and had no responsibility to respond to attacks on England.

Because of this, the besiegers ignored the raids, while Edward III finally had his *casus belli* with which to change opinion in England to fully support the war. Technically, England had not entered the war: it merely had allowed Balliol to re-enter his own kingdom from English territory, and to allow Englishmen to go with him should they so wish. That the logic was completely specious and self-serving was irrelevant for Edward III's purposes: regardless of the validity of the claims, it allowed him to portray the Scottish raids in the worst possible light. Whether in letters to other European monarchs or in writs issued within England, the claim that the Scots had broken the peace was used repeatedly to justify the upcoming and fully-planned campaign.¹⁴

¹³ *Lanercost*, p 273; *Knighton*, p 466

¹⁴ *Foedera*, pp 855-7, 860, 862

While the forces being collected were to be at Newcastle by 30 May, Edward had decided to move north weeks earlier, arriving at the siege by 9 May. Balliol's party had already done much of the initial preparation for the siege before the king's arrival. The town's outside water supplies had been cut off by the destruction of four water conduits leading to the town, while the besieging force's camp and siege lines had been fortified to reduce the possibility of successful relief effort.¹⁵ English ships, in case of any attempts by either Scottish vessels or a rumoured French relief force, were also blocking resupply lines by sea.¹⁶

With the arrival of the royal reinforcements, the siege moved from a relatively lukewarm stage of blockade and local raiding to a hot stage of assaults and bombardment from siege weapons, including guns.¹⁷ Two major attacks on 18 and 20 May signalled a period of regular assaults and bombardment that would last until 27 June. Interspersed with these attacks were negotiations with the town's garrison to convince Dunbar and Seton to surrender before an assault carried Berwick by storm.

It was in the best interests of Edward III for a negotiated settlement to be carried out: the bombardment was causing heavy damage both to the walls of the town and the buildings within it, while the privations of the siege and the lack of food from several weeks of hardship were taking a toll on the town's populace.¹⁸ As Berwick was to be handed over to the English crown, damaging such an economic prize when avoidable made little sense. For the garrison's part, arranging a truce preceding surrendering on terms would allow them relief from the constant pressure of attacks and bombardment,

¹⁵ *Brut*, p 281; *Melsa*, p 378

¹⁶ The French force never sailed; see *War Cruel and Sharp*, p 63

¹⁷ *Brut*, p 281

¹⁸ *Brut*, p 282

along with safeguarding their lives should no relief be forthcoming. Such negotiations were not unusual, and no chronicler describes them as out of the ordinary. The key for the English was to place the garrison in dire enough straits so as to convince them of the need to come to terms; thus the continued assaults and bombardment, rather than simply resorting to blockade.

The breaking point came on 26 June. A large-scale attack commenced by both the besiegers on land and the fleet blockading the harbour, which assaulted the sea wall at high tide. The garrison had foreseen such an attack, and had made preparations to burn the ships when they closed. Unfortunately, they did not make adequate preparations for protecting the town's buildings while carrying out the attack. The resulting inferno devastated much of the town, forcing the garrison to seek a truce while trying to bring it under control. This was granted, with the besiegers believing that the town would be surrendered to them in return on the next day. This belief was dashed when Alexander Seton refused to surrender the town after the garrison successfully controlled the flames.¹⁹ An additional assault caused another change of heart; a fifteen-day truce was soon agreed on, backed up with the giving of twelve hostages to Edward as surety that the town would be surrendered if not relieved by outside forces by 11 July.

This arrangement suited Edward III perfectly. It forced Archibald Douglas, who had been gathering as large a force as possible while the English were occupied at Berwick, to take one of three courses of action. He could either allow the garrison to surrender, invalidating the strategy that saw Berwick defended in the first place; he could engage the English army head-on with the forces at his disposal; or he could find a way

¹⁹ *Pluscarden*, p 268; *Lanercost*, p 273; *Scalacronica*, p 162; *Wyntoun*, p 398; *Brut*, p 281; *Bridlington*, p 112

to bypass the English and relieve the town through another route. The last would be difficult with both land and sea approaches covered, but was the path Douglas resolved upon. Crossing the Tweed at the Yair Ford upstream from the besiegers,²⁰ the Scots made a demonstration of Tweedmouth by razing it to the ground. The demonstration went unheeded; despite threats by the Scots to continue the raiding southward, Edward was firmly committed to taking Berwick.²¹ Even the threat of besieging Bamburgh to capture Queen Philippa was ineffective.

More effective was the crossing of a force of two hundred by the ford leading from Tweedmouth to Berwick's southern gate that evening. Though cavalry under William Montague attacked this force before it reached safety, enough of the troop made entry into the town for the Scots to consider the town 'relieved', and for the head of the relief force, William Keith, to take over as warden.²² The difficulty lay in the interpretation of 'relieved', and in the particular manner in which it was carried out. Specifically, the truce agreement had specified entering the town from the Scottish side; as a result, Edward demanded the surrender of the town. When Keith and the garrison refused, Edward emphasised his position by hanging Thomas Seton, son of the just-relieved warden of the town, and threatening further reprisals. The hurried negotiations resulting from such harsh tactics led to a new agreement being hammered out that left no possible room for disagreement. Further hostages were given to Edward, and the truce was to last until the morning of 20 July. The town could be relieved in three ways; either by crossing the Berwick stream to the west and engaging the English successfully; from

²⁰ This lies (appropriately enough) by the village of Yair, upstream and to the west of the current town of Galashiels. The route was later known as a favoured reavers' route in the sixteenth century. It was sufficiently far west that the English army would have had no ability to intercept the Scottish army until it was in England and moving east along the south bank of the Tweed.

the north, between the Tweed and the sea; or by forcing a company of two hundred men-at-arms through the English into Berwick with less than thirty losses. No relief by sea or from England would count. William Keith was given leave to ride to Douglas to inform him of the terms, to allow him to engage as he would to attempt to relieve the town. Should the relief fail, the town would then surrender. The terms were lenient; the garrison would be spared, as would their goods, buildings, offices, etc. No laws would change, and those who wished to continue in the town could do so without any fines, while those who wished to leave had forty days, and the ability to do with their property as they saw fit.²³

This indenture eliminated the last room for manoeuvre available to Archibald Douglas. He had to engage the English on ground of their choosing and their timing. Perversely, this indenture also served the purposes of one of Douglas's rivals; it freed the Earl of March to be in a position of power regardless of who succeeded in winning the upcoming fight. Douglas had no such reassurances, and the short period between William Keith's departure to find Douglas on 16 July and the anticipated surrender date on the 20th meant that he had little time to pull his troops back from ravaging Northumberland and prepare for battle at Berwick.

Moving quickly, Douglas reached Duns by the end of 18 June, setting the stage for the battle the next day.²⁴ Edward chose his ground with care, preparing his lines on Halidon Hill, a rise to the northwest of the town that covered both approaches to the city and guaranteed that both armies would clash well before Berwick could be reached by

²¹ *Scalacronica*, p 162-3; *Wyntoun*, p 399; *Melsa*, p 369

²² *Bridlington*, p 113; *Scalacronica*, p 163; *Foedera*, pp 865-6

²³ *Foedera*, pp 864-5

²⁴ *Wyntoun*, p 399

any Scottish troops. In a nod to the two hundred picked Scots sure to try to break through to Berwick, two hundred English men-at-arms stood by to engage them.²⁵ The rest of the men-at-arms, bar a rear guard of five hundred to block the Berwick garrison from sallying forth,²⁶ formed into three battles of dismounted men-at-arms, each flanked in some manner by wings of archers.²⁷ Edward III commanded the centre, while his brother John of Eltham and the constable Edward Bohun commanded the right-hand battle. As the putative King of Scots, Edward Balliol had command of the left-hand battle. There seems to have been no distinction made between the various *Disinherited magnates* or those directly under Edward III, as Henry Beaumont and the earls of Atholl and Angus were in Eltham's battle, rather than with Balliol. The tactics were essentially those of Dupplin Moor, on a larger scale. The Scots in turn moved around under the cover of hills to the north of Berwick to take up positions on the hill north of Halidon, before making their final assault.²⁸

The size of the two opposing forces is indeterminate; no direct records exist for the Scottish force at all, while the English army, though well documented from 1334 onward, does not have any pay roll records surviving. The Scottish force must have been large, though not nearly so large as the fanciful numbers recounted by chroniclers such as Wyntoun or Bridlington.²⁹ Seven earls fought alongside Douglas, and he had had several months to gather troops from across Scotland. The most reasonable chronicle puts the

²⁵ *Bridlington*, pp 114-5

²⁶ *Baker*, p 51

²⁷ *Bridlington*, pp 114; *Brut*, p 285; *Lanercost*, p 274

²⁸ Kelly DeVries' statement that the Scots chose the battle site on Halidon hill is erroneous; Edward III had had two months to choose precisely where to fight an opposing army should one appear, and the nature of the agreed terms of surrender of Berwick meant that Douglas and the Scots had to force the issue and attack the English, as a standoff or draw would still leave the town in English hands by the next day. Kelly DeVries, *Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Woodbridge, 1996), pp 121-4

²⁹ 60,000: *Wyntoun*, p 369; *Bridlington*, p 115

Scots at roughly 15,000 men.³⁰ These were arrayed in three separate schiltrons, or battles. The earl of Moray, John Randolph, led the first, Robert Stewart, David Bruce's Scottish heir the second and Archibald Douglas the third.³¹

It is similarly hard to determine the size of the English army, though most chroniclers agreed it was noticeably smaller than the Scottish force.³² Rogers' supposition of thirteen thousand as a high point seems plausible, as does his estimation of less than ten thousand men by the time of the battle. In 1300, Edward I undertook a similar campaign close to the border to attack *Caerlaverock Castle in Galloway*; though no major engagements other than that brief siege occurred, the army suffered a forty percent loss in troops in two months due to desertion and combat loss.³³ Considering the repeated assaults on Berwick in addition to a similar time spent in the field, it would seem highly likely that Edward suffered similar casualty rates, if not greater. This would have left under eight thousand men by the time of the battle in July. Edward's concern about desertion and loss reinforces this feeling, as several letters and writs made clear his feelings regarding the shrinking army.³⁴

The proceedings began with a single combat in which Robert Benhale, one of Edward's household knights, killed a Scottish champion named Turnbull.³⁵ The combat between the armies promised to be less equal. The English were well placed for battle on Halidon, blocking the approaches to Berwick and holding the high ground. The Scots, on the other hand, had to descend from their hill, cross a bog at the saddle between the hills, and then struggle up the slope of Halidon before even engaging the foe. In addition, the

³⁰ *Hemingburgh*, pp 308-9

³¹ *Brut*, p 283; *Bridlington*, pp 115-6; *Lanercost*, p 274

³² *Scalacronica*, p 163; *Wyntoun*, p 399; *Brut*, p 285; *Hemingburgh*, p 308

³³ *Liber Quotidianus Controtulatoris Garderobiae 1299-1300*, ed. J. Topham *et al* (1787), pp 249-54

Scots chose to dismount their men-at-arms as well, which would slow the attack and exhaust the men having to struggle over the difficult terrain. Had more time been available, the Scots could perhaps have manoeuvred to make for a more equal contest; unfortunately for them, the deadline of the truce precluded anything other than a frontal assault.

The net result was that the English forces would be significantly outnumbered, although without the crushing ratio that had been defeated at Dupplin Moor. However, the English forces were almost certainly of better quality, raised to fight an offensive war rather than for home defence, and were likely to be overall more heavily armed and armoured than their opposing counterparts. Also, the makeup of the English forces was eminently suited for fighting the mass of foot infantry that comprised the Scottish force, with the large wings of archers allowing great damage to be done well before the spearmen of the Scottish army could engage their opponents.

The result was a slaughter. Left exhausted by the difficult terrain and the climb up the high hill,³⁶ the Scots found themselves on the receiving end of a brutal drubbing delivered by storms of arrows and the spears and swords of the English men-at-arms. Moray's battle engaged Balliol, while Stewart's troop hit the centre and Edward III. Neither lasted long under the hail of arrows and the impact with the waiting English men-at-arms; Moray's battle had fallen apart before Stewart's had even engaged, though the latter soon followed, either from the losses it was suffering or from the morale loss it took on seeing Moray's forces break and attempt to leave the field. Douglas fared somewhat better, as his battle contained those two hundred men chosen to try to break through and

³⁴ *CCR 1333-7*, p 117; *Rot Scot*, pp 244, 249

³⁵ *Baker*, p 51

enter Berwick in fulfilment of the third condition of the siege terms. As the battle fell apart around the Scots, a remnant under Hugh of Ross made a last stand; this earned the admiration and note of chroniclers on both sides, though it failed to do more than provide a last heroic note to Ross's death.³⁷

The rout became total as the English men-at-arms mounted their horses kept near their lines for such an opportunity and pursued the dissolving Scottish host for six to eight miles, killing many and turning the defeat into an utter catastrophe.³⁸ Any Scots leaving the field had to do so on foot, as the grooms holding the horses of the dismounted soldiers fled as the defeat became apparent, using the horses for their own escape and leaving the others including the magnates to their fate.³⁹ Only nightfall caused the slaughter to cease, but the damage had already been done. The English had decimated the Scottish force, especially its leadership. The five earls of Carrick, Lennox, Ross, Sutherland, and the Scottish claimant to Atholl, John Campbell, were all left dead on the field, as was Archibald Douglas, three brothers of Robert Stewart, several of the prominent Fraser family, and others the chroniclers felt it too lamentable to name in full.⁴⁰ The rank and file also suffered severely, though the chronicles widely differ in the numbers reported. Scottish sources tend to put the number at around ten thousand all told, while the English chroniclers tend to use far more inflated figures.⁴¹ Regardless of the numbers, there was no doubt in either side's mind that the Scottish army had been singularly ill-used.

³⁶ *Scotichronicon*, pp 92-3

³⁷ *Wyntoun*, p 401; *Scotichronicon*, pp 92-3 (though Bower has Ross's contingent fighting Balliol, not Eltham and Beaumont); *Bridlington*, p 116; *Lanercost*, p 274

³⁸ *Baker*, p 52; *Melsa*, p 370

³⁹ *Brut*, p 285; *Murimuth*, p 68; *Bridlington*, p 116; *Baker*, p 52; *Melsa*, p 370

⁴⁰ *Scotichronicon*, pp 92-3; *Fordun*, p 356

Their opponents, on the other hand, seem to have barely suffered at all. English sources tell of only a handful dead during the battle, either seven or fourteen men depending on the chronicle.⁴² The contrast was striking, and numerous reasons were given as to why the Scots suffered such a defeat. Scottish sources focus on their pride, or the ‘stupid reasoning’ of the people of Berwick to convince Douglas to fight.⁴³ Nearly all mention the deadly work of the archers. While the usual attributions to divine favour were often given,⁴⁴ few appear to have missed the more corporeal tactic behind the Scottish rout.

The consequences were immediate, and sizeable. With the destruction of the Scottish relief force, Keith, Seton and Dunbar were left with no recourse but to surrender Berwick by the terms of the truce agreement. The Earl of March profited handsomely, receiving vast sums in return for changing allegiance to Edward’s side and supporting the newly ascendant regime. In addition, he profited from the intransigence of his own tenants; those who did not come over with Dunbar to the king’s peace saw their lands forfeited and placed in the earl’s all too willing hands.⁴⁵ A major portion of these proceeds went to rebuilding his castle at Dunbar, apparently at the behest of Edward III.⁴⁶ It would prove to be a worthwhile investment for Dunbar in future years, though it is questionable, considering his unique position straddling both factions, whether he would have chosen to do so without the pressure from the English crown.

⁴¹ *Scotichronicon*, pp 92-3; *Wyntoun*, p 402 for the Scot sources; the English sources vary from the *Brut*’s 35,712 to Baker’s 60,000; *Brut*, p 286, *Baker*, p 52

⁴² Fourteen: *Melsa*, p 370; *Bridlington*, p 116; Seven, *Brut*, p 288. Baker does not list the English losses; neither do the Scot sources.

⁴³ For the former, *Wyntoun*, p 403; the latter, *Scotichronicon*, pp 90-1

⁴⁴ see *Lanercost*, p 274 for a prime example

⁴⁵ *CDS*, nos. 1115, 1121, 1126

⁴⁶ *Scalacronica*, p 163; *Scotichronicon*, pp 92-3

In contrast was Edward III's ordering the execution of those taken captive during the battle, rather than allowing negotiations for individual ransoms. Neither side had shown an inclination for the siege and attempted relief to be anything more than a fight to the death,⁴⁷ so those not protected by the terms of the surrender had to face the consequences of being the loser in a conflict purportedly between two men claiming the crown of Scotland. The severity of this order was likely influenced by the resounding nature of the victory involved, the consideration of the men fighting as essentially being rebels against the lawful king, and by the unlikelihood of the men who had fought the relief effort of being capable of reconciliation with Balliol and his adherents. Dunbar and the garrison of Berwick, by making terms for their surrender, had demonstrated an ability to come to some understanding with Balliol and Edward III, regardless of the coercion involved.

Numerous other rewards were handed out by both Edward III and Balliol, ranging from the usual grants to military supporters such as Henry Percy, William Montague, and John Warenne, to new positions and exemptions, to fees and tolls for various administrators and merchants who had aided in the running of the campaign.⁴⁸ The most important of these were the speculative grants by Balliol of lands being held by those still adhering to the Bruce cause. Most of these were made to Disinherited lords already hell-bent on reasserting control over the lands already claimed by them. David Strathbogie received the offices and lands of Robert Stewart, while Richard Talbot gained claim to Mar – despite the fact that its centrepiece castle of Kildrummy was still holding out for

⁴⁷ *Bridlington*, p 115; *Melsa*, p 369; *Baker*, p 50; *Lanercost*, p 272, etc.

⁴⁸ PRO E159/109; *CPR 1330-4*, p 462; *Foedera*, p 868; *CPR 1330-4*, pp 456-8, 483

the young David Bruce.⁴⁹ Further grants were made to other prominent English nobles who had entered into Balliol's service or were now aligned with him, such as Henry Percy. Percy had arranged an indenture for life with Balliol for 2,000 marcates of land, which now translated into large swathes in Annandale and Moffatdale, including the other large fortress still existing in southern Scotland, Lochmaben.⁵⁰

Following Halidon, the various Balliol supporters strove to consolidate their new supremacy in Scotland, and to make what personal gains they could. The Bruce-held lands were rapidly overrun over the next year, with few fortifications holding out against the tide. Only Dumbarton, Loch Leven, Kildrummy, Urquhart, and Loch Doon escaped, according to chroniclers.⁵¹ Balliol appeared to be rapidly securing his position in Scotland, with Perth as the centre of his administration.

Archibald Douglas's success in surprising Balliol at Annan and expelling him from Scotland in December 1332 proved all too short-lived. It provided Edward III the necessary propaganda to intervene in Scotland on behalf of Balliol and his adherents with the full support of Parliament. The result was an even more devastating victory for the English at Halidon Hill than that scored by the Disinherited at Dupplin Moor. This occurred despite the Scots once again outnumbering their opponents, validating the new tactics being employed by the English and shattering Scottish morale. It also guaranteed that the English would stay involved in Scotland for years to come in order to secure Balliol's throne and to secure the vast part of southern Scotland ceded to Edward III as his reward for the English intervention.

⁴⁹ *Wyntoun*, pp 407, 413

⁵⁰ J.M.W. Bean, 'The Percies and their estates in Scotland', *Archaeologia Aeliana*, (4th Series) 35 (1957), p 94

⁵¹ *Scotichronicon*, pp 92-3; *Wyntoun*, p 404

1334: Reverses and Roxburgh

With the English victory at Halidon Hill and the capture of Berwick, the main military strength of the Bruce partisans had been destroyed. Balliol and the Disinherited now had a major opportunity to snuff out the last of the Bruce support and put an end to the fighting that was ravaging Scotland for the second year running. Unfortunately, several problems existed that would prove fatal for a lasting peace in Scotland and acceptance of Balliol as a replacement for the minor Bruce. These problems would see the Disinherited position erode in Scotland so severely that by September 1334, they had been expelled once more from Scotland. An attempted winter campaign by Edward III was unable to retrieve the situation, with the only results being the capitulation of Henry Beaumont at Dundarg and the defection of Patrick Dunbar to the Bruce cause.

The first and most obvious problem facing the Disinherited was the continued activities of Bruce supporters to retake Scotland. Key in this was two failures: the inability to capture David Bruce himself, and the escape of several key figures of the new generation of Scottish leaders from Halidon Hill. Bruce was successfully evacuated from Dumbarton via a French fleet, was welcomed by the French king and given sanctuary out of either Balliol or Edward III's reach.¹ Robert Stewart had not been captured at Halidon Hill, and had successfully made his escape to Dumbarton via Rothesay before Balliol took the latter in his western procession.² July 1334 saw major successes on Stewart's part, as he used supporters of his in the Isles to retake Dunoon castle on the Isle of Cowal.

¹ *Scalacronica*, p 164; *Lanercost*, p 278

This in turn triggered an uprising that took Rothesay castle and set the stage for further uprisings in Carrick, Renfrew, Clydesdale, and Cunningham after John Randolph, the earl of Moray, returned from escorting David Bruce to safety and negotiating for French support.³

Though the older generation of Bruce supporters had been comprehensively thinned by the defeats at Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill, the failure to eliminate the younger generation typified by Stewart and Randolph allowed the Bruce faction to operate under vibrant, competent leadership. Another error compounding this problem was the release of Andrew Murray, captured at Roxburgh Bridge, after the payment of ransom. The decision was odd, considering that it came after the execution of prisoners at Halidon Hill in part to eliminate the leadership possibilities in Scotland.⁴ It would also prove horribly shortsighted, as Murray would be very active in resurrecting Bruce's hopes.

The second problem for Balliol was in the nature of the men supporting him, and what had to be done in order to garner their support. Essentially two groups were supporting the bid for power in Scotland: the Disinherited lords attempting to resurrect their old claims, or English lords seeking to earn a new stake in Scotland and seeing an opportunity for advancement. The two groups are essentially indistinguishable, for both were rewarded for their loyalty in the same manner – by the forfeiture and reassigning of lands from Bruce partisans. By necessity, this required major upheaval and conflict, and

² *Scotichronicon*, pp 96-7; *Wyntoun*, p 404

³ *Wyntoun*, p 415; *Scalacronica*, p 164; *Lanercost*, p 278; *Melsa*, p 373; *Scotichronicon*, pp 102-5

⁴ *Fordun*, p 357; *Wyntoun*, p 407; *Bridlington*, p 119 for Murray's release; *Melsa*, p 370; *Wyntoun*, p 401; *Murimuth*, p 68 for the execution of prisoners

the tearing apart of the political framework in Scotland that allowed for concerted action amongst its aristocracy.

These men were also far more interested in their individual advancement and enrichment than in loyalty to Scotland or to Edward Balliol. Most of the Disinherited had proven in past actions their willingness to oppose their lawful sovereign in England if it would further their ambitions. Beaumont, Wake, and Strathbogie had all been implicated in plots against either Edward II or Isabella and Mortimer, whenever the English crown was not supporting their personal interests north of the border regardless of its effect on England as a whole. Events would prove that this attitude of self-centred partisanship would not change when the issue was Scotland, rather than its southern neighbour. The best example of this was the dispute that arose between the brother and daughters of John Mowbray, who had been one of the casualties of the Christmas attack at Annan. In and of themselves, Alexander Mowbray and the daughters were not a widespread danger to Balliol's regime; however, each side had allies that took the problem from an inheritance dispute to a major controversy. Balliol vacillated, first supporting Alexander against the three major Disinherited magnates, and as a result lost their immediate support as they left for their own domains in August 1334. In a panic, he threw his support the other way, doing even more damage to his own cause. Having already alienated the supporters of the daughters, his intention to now deprive Alexander caused him to defect to Andrew Murray, who was leading the resurgent Bruce faction in north and west Scotland.⁵

Those English lords coming north suffered the same problems of any foreigner coming in and gaining power at the expense of local magnates; they did not have the web

⁵ *Bridlington*, p 119; *Scotichronicon*, pp 94-95; *Wyntoun*, pp 406-7; *Brut*, p 280; *Scalacronica*, p 164; *Melsa*, p 372

of relationships with others in the region who had been in place previously, and therefore aroused suspicion. Additionally, many of these were much more likely to support Edward III's program in Scotland than Balliol's, due to Edward III's greater power and influence (and money), and their greater interests in England. Balliol desperately needed the support of magnates who had been part of the Bruce regime, such as the earls of March and Fife, in order to gain any legitimacy as a king of Scotland, rather than the leader of a group of quarrelsome foreign adventurers without cohesion. Getting this support on a long-term basis, as opposed to the short-term consideration of fear for life and limb, meant being King of Scotland first and foremost, with the responsibilities of the position as well as its rights. This included among other things the need to be even-handed in his support, rather than narrowly focused on a particular faction, however important it was initially for his ascendancy. The more lands that Balliol had to grant away to his English supporters, the greater the difficulty he would have in convincing those in Scotland of his legitimacy.

In addition, he also had to balance their rivalries brought with them from the English political milieu, and keep them directed towards the wider goal of securing the country. The prototypical example is the feud that brewed up between Henry Percy and Edward Bohun over Lochmaben castle. Balliol had originally promised it to Percy in August 1333, though it was still in Scottish hands. It fell not to Percy, but to Bohun, who was intent on pursuing a grant by Edward I to the previous earl of Hereford of Annandale and Lochmaben. The resulting conflict of two of Balliol's major supporters further sapped his ability to exert authority and to stamp out the last embers of rebellion.⁶

⁶ *CDS*, nos. 1099, 1101; *CCR 1333-7*, p 185

The third difficulty, and arguably the hardest to overcome, was the introduction of the English crown into the political scene of Scotland, and Edward III's diverging agenda from Balliol. While certain goals were the same for both – the pacification of Scotland, the entrenchment of Balliol's administration and authority – many of Edward III's personal goals and priorities were either a distraction for Balliol or a direct hindrance to his rule.

Most problematic was the financial settlement required in exchange for Edward III's support in the Halidon Hill campaign. The huge land grant that had accompanied Balliol's giving homage to Edward had not been forgotten, nor was Edward very patient in terms of enacting the particulars of the relationship already spelled out. An English administration was installed in Berwick immediately upon its capture, both to run the town permanently as an English holding and to use it for a supply base in case of later military action. Henry Percy was appointed warden of the town and castle, while Robert Tughale became chamberlain of the town, its sheriff, and the keeper of the king's victuals. A new mayor and chancellor were also appointed and the customs collection was placed into English hands.⁷ Though the precise lands to be given to Edward still had to be determined and agreed on by a Scottish parliament, he had already built the framework for their administration.

When that parliament did meet at Holyrood in July 1334, the pain that would accompany specifying those lands became immediately apparent. Eight separate counties – Berwick, Roxburgh, Selkirk, East, Mid, and West Lothian, Peebles, and Dumfries were to be handed over permanently to the English crown as a permanent alienation from Scotland. That the Scottish parliament was meeting in lands that were to be handed to

the English must have been rather ironic to many at that session. Though Balliol did have previous agreement from the parliament to the cession of the lands,⁸ it was a far cry from agreeing to unspecified grants to watching the entirety of the lands east of Wigtown and south of the Firth of Forth disappear forever from Scottish hands.

The £2000 of lands granted after the crushing victories of 1333 and the Holyrood parliament of 1334 were rather different than those envisioned in the agreements published by Edward Balliol in November 1332. The 1332 agreement was focused upon Berwick and its immediate surroundings as the necessary cost of resurrecting a dormant claim to the Scottish crown and the acquiescence of Edward III to Balliol's pursuit of the same. Berwick therefore was the prize granted by a newly crowned Scottish monarch who had won his position through his own martial activities and those of his supporters. The huge swathe granted in 1334 came from very different circumstances. Where in 1332 Edward III was to receive the rewards for his support in the legal sphere and his passive support, in 1334 he was taking the large slice owed him for having thrown the entire might of England behind Balliol and resurrecting an otherwise doomed attempt to claim the crown. That Balliol's supporters seemed to have gained a crushing ascendancy through the latter half of 1333 and the first part of 1334 was immaterial; none of it could have occurred without Edward III.

Balliol was given no real choice in the matter: the price had to be paid, and this was how it was specified. However, the grant severely compromised his attempts to gain legitimacy; it gave the impression that his crown rested solely upon the power of England and could not be sustained otherwise. For some chroniclers, the grant was the catalyst to

⁷ *Rot Scot*, p 256

⁸ *Foedera*, p 888

the risings that would follow.⁹ Other questions hung over the relationship between the English and Scottish crowns, and the duties of the relationship to one another. After some equivocation, Balliol was granted special concessions as part of his station; he did not have to attend the English king in parliament, nor did Edward III have the right to hear appeals from Balliol's Scotland. His military service was specified in detail. In return for all of this, Edward III promised to uphold Balliol's title at his own expense.¹⁰

In reality, Balliol's crown relied in the long term upon English arms and English support. The majority of those witnessing the cession to England were Disinherited lords; even the strongest of the Bruce faction to come over to Balliol, the Earl of March, was receiving large sums from the English exchequer to keep him loyal.¹¹ Should that support waver or the English crown be distracted by events elsewhere, the effects could be disastrous, and would prove to be so in years to come. At the same time, it allowed Edward to apply undue influence upon decisions north of the border. All of the Disinherited had major interests in England, and Edward was not afraid to distribute money to more than the Earl of March. Further evidence of Edward III's willingness to intrude on events when it suited him was the Bohun-Percy dispute, which was pushed to a settlement by Edward.¹² Combined with the large sums Balliol himself was receiving from Edward III, the impression is that Balliol was little more than a pawn, in place to deal with the mess created by Edward III's self-centred priorities.

These defects in Balliol's regime rapidly led to reversals for its supporters. Beaumont, Strathbogie, and Talbot, having dispersed after Balliol's decision against their

⁹ *Hemingburgh*, pp 309-10; *Melsa*, p 372

¹⁰ *Rot Scot*, pp 261-2

¹¹ *CDS*, nos. 1115, 1126; PRO E403/271/4

claimant in the Mowbray affair, each found themselves the particular target of Bruce activity in September 1334. Talbot was captured by Godfrey Ross and William Keith as he headed through Lothian towards England;¹³ Beaumont would find himself besieged in his Buchan keep of Dundarg by Murray and Alexander Mowbray, who by this point had turned coat, forcing Balliol to flee to Berwick;¹⁴ and Strathbogie would find himself the quarry in a long-drawn out chase by a vengeful John Randolph, earl of Moray. Beaumont would not escape Dundarg for months; Talbot survived to be ransomed along with John Felton and John Stirling, but the rest of his party was executed; and Strathbogie was brought to heel and forced to switch sides and support David Bruce.¹⁵

Much of the difficulty of securing Scotland was the unwillingness of the newly enfeoffed Disinherited to see the need to put aside their personal feuds and staunchly support Balliol. As their grants derived their legitimacy solely from his hold on the throne, leaving him weak while pursuing their own feuds or petty goals merely endangered their own holdings in the face of a small but united opposition who could pick and choose their targets and take advantage of their isolation. None of these three magnates could have been so neatly eliminated from the playing field had they stayed on with their supporters in Perth and provided a united front. Instead, spread about piecemeal and unwilling to combine to deal with threats, they found themselves overtaken by an enemy willing to strike where they were weak and use their strength to their best advantage. Balliol's inability to recover without regrouping first in England

¹² Edward convinced Percy to give way, in exchange for other lands and offices at Jedburgh. Nicholson, p 170; *CCR 1333-7*, p 327; *Rot Scot*, p 280

¹³ *Fordun*, p 357; *Wyntoun*, p 433; *Scalacronica*, p 164; *Melsa*, p 372; *Foedera*, p 904

¹⁴ *Melsa*, p 372; *Bridlington*, p 119; *Lanercost*, p 278; *Scotichronicon*, pp 94-5; *Fordun*, pp 357-8

¹⁵ *Bridlington*, p 119-20; *Scalacronica*, p 164; *Wyntoun*, p 417

was also a major hindrance; by the end of that horrible September, he had essentially been expelled once again from Scotland.

Edward III was aware of the situation in the north, but did not instantly raise a new army and rush north to counteract the growing rebellions. His administration had been long on officials and short on actual troops, with twenty to forty troops commonly assigned to the sheriff of each county.¹⁶ The numbers appear small, but were not the only forces within the area. Several magnates were operating in the English-held areas to secure their own grants and titles, with considerable forces of their own. The most notable of these would have been Edward Bohun and Henry Percy, as mentioned previously. With the most influential local magnate in southern Scotland in the person of the Earl of March now in the English camp, one can see how Edward would have thought that what little force he provided was enough. Those magnates already *in situ* were given full rights to deal with the rebellion on 3 August, with Henry Percy and Ralph Neville taking military charge of the marches.¹⁷

Some have faulted Edward III for not taking quicker action to raise an army to march north. However, this would be unduly harsh, especially in light of what little information Edward III had, and the effort required for gathering any significant numbers of troops to aid the forces already in Scotland. Many of the soldiers that could be called upon at very short notice were already in Scotland, serving with various magnates such as Percy if not in the royal garrisons. Any further troops would have to be arranged through

¹⁶ PRO E404/3/18, E403/276, E403/282; while Rogers has pointed out that Ferriby's wardrobe book shows no payments for garrisons before September 1334, this is unsurprising as the first entries by month occur in August of the same year; any previous payments would almost certainly have been accounted for in previous accounts. An example of this practice can be seen in Ferriby's book, as several contingents have their pay recorded through November 1337, despite Ferriby's office ending on 30 August 1337. *War Cruel and Sharp*, pp 77-8n; BL Cotton Nero VIII, fos. 248r, 262v-263r

¹⁷ *Rot Scot*, p 276

new indentures or commissions of array. The earliest arrangements for troops were made on 20 August, with the bulk sent during September. Supplies for campaigning and ships for support were ordered up by 1 September.¹⁸ The earliest that any royal force would be able to enter Scotland was October, and the vagaries of military preparation made it likely to be later than this. It is hard to see Edward's reactions as slow or underestimating the importance of events north of the border, when only a month passed between hearing of the rebellion and the machinery for creating the army to deal with it being put fully in motion.¹⁹

In addition, a session of parliament had already been called for 19 September;²⁰ it made little sense to hurriedly put together an army and throw it into the field when many of the magnates who would participate would also be attending the parliament and its business. The parliament itself was a profitable one, as a tenth and fifteenth was granted to help cover the expenses of the Halidon Hill campaign and the upcoming winter engagement.²¹ The granting of the tax was a bright spot in an otherwise dismal month of news. What remained to be seen was whether the situation could be reversed as decisively as it had been the previous year.

Winter campaigning is difficult at the best of times, and both the English and Scots were well aware of its importance for English control north of the Tweed. The weather was especially harsh on horseflesh, and the Scots were accustomed to using the seasonal withdrawal of English arms to reclaim the momentary gains made during the royal army's summer campaigning season. Edward I had had difficulty in keeping his

¹⁸ *Rot Scot*, pp 276-9; *Foedera*, p 892

¹⁹ see Nicholson, pp 167-8; C Rogers takes a much more balanced view; *War Cruel and Sharp*, pp 81-2

²⁰ *CCR 1333-7*, p 349-50

horses alive while wintering at Linlithgow in 1301-2, but had felt it necessary to winter again in Scotland in 1303-4 in order to secure the country.²² Edward Balliol advised carrying the war through winter, and the Lanercost chronicler mentions both the difficulties and the necessity of the strategy at multiple points.²³

This campaign had two widely disparate goals. First was securing the newly received counties in southern Scotland and eliminating the disturbances and rebellions that were making it immensely difficult for the English administration to carry out its functions. *The chamberlain at Berwick would refuse to answer for the issues of the town* for 1334 and 1335 due to the disturbances interfering with his officers,²⁴ while the capture of Richard Talbot, albeit at the hands of sudden turncoats, showed the difficulties of having few local garrisons to provide refuge and control over the surrounding lands. If the southern counties could be made secure, it would move the area of conflict northward into the lands providing the bulk of the support for the Bruce faction that had not been heavily involved in the fighting.

To do this, Edward aimed to repair the slighted fortress at Roxburgh, just across the Tweed from Kelso Abbey. If the castle could be made habitable and defensible, its position at the upper reaches of the Tweed would in theory allow the garrisons based there and at Berwick to secure most of the Tweeddale region and push the disputed regions farther north and west, away from the English border and restricting their geographical scope. Until the walls were repaired, a large force would be necessary to

²¹ *Rot Parl*, p 447; Mark Ormrod estimates the total yield as £36,600. W.M. Ormrod, *The Reign of Edward III*, updated ed (Stroud, 2000), p 189

²² Prestwich, *Edward I*, pp 494, 499

²³ PRO C49/6/29; *Lanercost* pp 214, 287

²⁴ PRO E372/180

secure the site and avoid the work party being overrun by a raiding force. Once the site was secure, a far smaller garrison would be able to maintain itself just as effectively.

Second, Edward needed to help secure the position of those men supporting Balliol in Scotland, with a sufficient show of force to quell the rebellion then gathering speed. Though most of the rebellion was diffuse and hard to target, there were two areas that were obviously in trouble; the western seaboard, with the losses of Rothesay and Dunoon, and the far north, where Henry Beaumont was besieged at Dundarg. While there is no explicit evidence that a long-range campaign was specifically intended, Edward's actions, both in planning the campaign and in his demands during the winter, indicate that far more was intended than simply securing the most southerly portion of his own Scottish lands.

The most likely target for this show of force would have been Dundarg. The fortress was the centrepiece for Beaumont's earldom of Buchan; relieving him would both secure his control over an important northern lordship and force his besiegers Andrew Murray and Alexander Mowbray from the field for a time, if not result in their capture or death. It also would extend English power northwards into areas that had not been entered by English royal armies since the time of Edward I. Most of the Disinherited's claimed lands were in this region, with Buchan, Mar, Atholl, Strathbogie, Angus, and Strathearn taking up the bulk of the lowlands north of Perth.²⁵ This was especially important after the disastrous outcome of the Mowbray affair and the elimination of many of the Disinherited from the field of play, at least for a time. With David Strathbogie's turning coat and Richard Talbot's capture and imprisonment, the

only major holdout of the Disinherited north of Perth was Beaumont. Unless he could be relieved, Balliol and his partisans were in severe danger of being completely removed from Scotland north of the Firth of Forth.²⁶

The west, on the other hand, was an area with strong associations with Robert Stewart and the Bruces. The uprising had begun in lands held by Stewart, after all, and the major holdings of the Bruce family were centred on the earldom of Carrick. It would not have the possible affinities to Balliol that the eastern seaboard north of Perth could if sufficiently controlled. Also, the relatively easy loss of Rothesay showed that any gains in the area were in danger of simply being lost again the instant the royal army departed once more.

Further, the large number of ships one would expect for actions in the Isles or to resupply campaigners in Carrick and Clydesdale was not requested, and those ships that did participate in the winter's campaign were not from the west coast of England or Ireland, as one might expect if Rothesay or any of the other recent Bruce gains were the target. All of the nine ships under household pay during the winter campaign came from the eastern ports of Gosford, Kingston-upon-Hull, Newcastle, King's Lynn, Ravenser, or Grimsby.²⁷ Ships were also being sent directly to Beaumont for his resupply and for his defence against Murray and Mowbray;²⁸ although this is no indicator of the intended target of the campaign, it does show that Beaumont was firmly in Edward's mind in terms of the winter's priorities.

²⁵ Henry Beaumont claimed Buchan; Richard Talbot through his wife claimed Mar. David Strathbogie claimed Strathbogie and Atholl, while Gilbert d'Umfraville claimed Angus. Strachearn had been recently conferred upon the earl Warenne, though he made relatively little effort to secure the title.

²⁶ *Lanercost*, p 278; *Anonimale*, p 2; *Bridlington*, p 120

²⁷ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 264r

²⁸ The orders were given on 20 September, after planning for the campaign had begun: *Rot Scot*, p 279

By 14 November, Edward had sufficient forces in hand for the first goal to be carried out, and moved north to cross into Scotland. The army was a small one, though far larger than anything that could be raised by the Bruce partisans at the time, consisting of 1258 men-at-arms, 1408 mounted archers, 1117 foot archers, 100 'armati' from York, and 25 miners from the Forest of Dean. In addition, contingents drawn from the royal lands in Wales provided another 879 foot, 27 vintenars, and 108 horse of different types. 180 royal servants of varying stripe and a work party of 55 masons, 35 carpenters, 3 smiths, 4 tilers, and 106 workmen supported this martial element.²⁹ Whatever might happen with the northern trek, Edward certainly intended to make sure his southern goal was well and truly achieved.

The army did not arrive at Roxburgh until 23 November, due to a slow pace of just under ten miles per day.³⁰ While the two hundred workmen that had accompanied the army got to work, Edward and his army waited for further reinforcements to swell their numbers and allow for sufficient strength to strike northward.³¹ The reinforcements were to be relatively few and far between, much to the chagrin of the king. Though a few contingents such as the 173 from Richmondshire and the 318 under Roger Corbet from South Wales did join the army at Roxburgh after the king's arrival, not enough were forthcoming to do more than carry out pacification efforts in the local region.³²

This was not for lack of the king demanding more soldiers; if anything, his strident calls for expected service may have put off potential troops. Writs to absent knights and contingents were issued on 15 and 20 November, while over a thousand

²⁹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII fos. 233r-235v, 252r-254v

³⁰ BL Cotton Nero C VIII fo. 234r; *CPR 1334-8*, p 48

³¹ Workmen: BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 254r

³² BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 254, 254v

hobelars and five thousand archers were called up from Yorkshire to be mustered by 22 November. As the demanded numbers failed to appear, the severity of the writs demanding service increased. 15 December saw 29 knights threatened with full forfeiture if they did not show by New Year's Day, and the sheriffs of Yorkshire, Lincolnshire, Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire were to order any men-at-arms not already serving in Scotland to do so under similar threats.³³ Similar writs were sent to the commissioners of array in Yorkshire, demanding well-armed and armoured archers from those ordered arrayed by 22 November. The latter demands showed how aware Edward had become of the difficulties in recruiting troops: only a fifth of the numbers previously ordered arrayed were told to come north.³⁴ The results were decidedly mixed. Though some contingents did arrive to reinforce Edward – 30 from Lancashire, 211 from Nottinghamshire, 120 hobelars from Durham, and 254 from Derbyshire – little else was forthcoming.³⁵

The difficulties in gathering troops were mainly due to the weather. As previously mentioned, winter campaigning is difficult at the best of times and the winter of 1334-5 was one of the worst.³⁶ It was difficult enough to convince men to come north and serve during winter in the previous fall; it would have been immeasurably more difficult to do so once the full severity of the winter had become apparent to those receiving the king's demands from afar. The end result was Edward having to abandon his strike north and disband his relatively useless army after using them to comb Lothian

³³ *Rot Scot*, pp 292-4, 302

³⁴ *Rot Scot*, pp 302-4

³⁵ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 254r

³⁶ *Knighton*, p 472; *Wars of Edward III*, ed. C. Rogers (Woodbridge, 1999), p 44

and Ettrick forest for Bruce partisans, without success.³⁷ Further damage was done to southern Scotland by the earls of Warwick, Oxford, and Edward Balliol as they raided the lands passed through on their way to Carlisle.³⁸ By 11 February, the king's army had fully dispersed, leaving the defence of the region in John of Eltham's hands with 221 men-at-arms and 48 mounted archers through 19 March in addition to the garrisons at Roxburgh and Berwick.³⁹

The failure of Edward to make his northern sally was costly for Henry Beaumont. Faced with effective siege weapons and no relief, he had little option but to surrender two days before Christmas.⁴⁰ In addition to the heavy ransom he was required to pay, his parole also removed him from play until the next summer, and eliminated the last major supporter north of Perth in Balliol's camp.⁴¹ The Scots had succeeded in the equivalent goal to that of Edward's in the south – eliminating the enemy support in the core areas so that attention could be turned to expanding those regions outward.

The bad news only got worse, with the defection of Patrick Dunbar to the Bruce camp even before the army had disbanded.⁴² Faced with the apparent inability of Balliol and Edward III to defend adequately or rescue their strongest partisans from Bruce supporters, and the second expulsion of Edward Balliol in as many years, earl Patrick acted as he had consistently done: going with whichever side he felt would protect his control over his lands and titles in the long run, preserving his livelihood and power. A personal element may have been part of this, as one chronicle blames the failure of Edward III to prosecute robbers who had attacked earl Patrick as the cause of his

³⁷ *Lanercost*, p 279; *Scalacronica*, pp 164-5; *Anonimalle*, p 3

³⁸ *Anonimalle*, p 3

³⁹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 233r

⁴⁰ *Wyntoun*, pp 427-8; *Fordun* p 357; *Scalacronica*, p 164; *Lanercost* p 278; *Bridlington*, p 121

betrayal.⁴³ If this factored into his thinking, it would simply have confirmed the impression that the English crown was unwilling or unable to provide Dunbar security and protect his power. The indiscriminate harrying of southern Scotland once Dundarg had fallen would have been further evidence of this, as the failure to target selectively the ravaging would indicate a callous disregard for Dunbar's position as an English supporter.⁴⁴ The destruction was certainly counterproductive, as it showed that any magnate in southern Scotland was at risk from the English forces, regardless of whom they supported or whether their lands were in the areas ceded to England.

Dunbar likely had been contemplating a transfer of allegiance for some time, as there was little more than a month between the surrender of Dundarg and the confiscation of his lands due to rebellion. The loss of his support was nearly as devastating as Beaumont's ejection from Buchan, as it removed the only major native Scottish magnate supporting Edward in the lands nominally ceded to England.⁴⁵

The year 1333 and Halidon Hill had demonstrated the capability of English arms and confirmed its ability to defeat any Scottish army in the field. Yet the events of 1334 showed that however successful the English army had been in individual engagements, the Disinherited were unable to keep their conquests in the face of constant Scottish pressure. Nor were the English effective in exerting their military strength either outside the main campaigning season or in the far northern reaches of Scotland. The loss of Patrick Dunbar showed the weakness of support for Balliol and the difficulties the

⁴¹ *CPR 1334-8*, p 165

⁴² Anonimale, p 2; *Melsa*, p 375; *CDS*, nos. 1142, 1145, 1146

⁴³ *Scalacronica*, pp 164-5

⁴⁴ *Capgrave*, p 203, *Melsa*, p 373

⁴⁵ While Eustace Maxwell, lord of Caerlaverock was in Edward's service by this point, his position as a staunch Balliol partisan and his Galloway origins made his support without the political impact that Dunbar's had.

English would face in garnering any significant loyalty north of Berwick. With the loss of Dundarg and Scotland north of Perth, what had been a civil war was rapidly turning into a prolonged foreign invasion.

6

1335: The Great Offensive and Culblean

The collapse of Edward III's campaign into Scotland over the 1335 New Year was the capstone of another dismal showing by the Disinherited in maintaining their foothold in Scotland. With Strathbogie's defection to the Bruce cause, Beaumont's capitulation at Dundarg, and Richard Talbot's capture, many of the greatest of the Disinherited lost everything in Scotland. Meanwhile, by September 1334, Balliol had once again fled to England after the defection of Alexander Mowbray. It was increasingly obvious that without major English royal assistance, the Balliol faction was incapable of maintaining itself in Scotland in the face of Bruce opposition. Limited assistance would not be enough, as the failure of the Roxburgh campaign during the winter showed. Edward III would demonstrate precisely how effective that English assistance could be with the largest show of English military strength of the war. Balliol's position would be mostly restored by the campaign, leading to both sides entering serious negotiations by autumn to find a compromise on the war. However, the entry of France into the diplomatic negotiations in January promised trouble in the future, and the defeat and death of David Strathbogie at Culblean after returning to Balliol's camp gave the Bruce camp good news to end the year.

The military failures of 1334 and early 1335 were accompanied by equally worrying developments in the diplomatic realm. While Edward's personal attention was focused on his northern military efforts, others carried out the delicate diplomatic dance with France necessitated by rising tensions regarding Aquitaine. The Archbishop of

Canterbury, John Stratford, was dispatched in October 1334 to carry out negotiations with Philip VI over the Agenais, still held in French hands after the War of St. Sardos in 1324-5, and for a possible crusade to the Holy Land.¹ While previous negotiations to this point had gone well, the introduction of the Scottish question proved to be a point of major contention. French interference and support for the Bruces was a serious concern, and gaining an agreement to end French involvement was one of Stratford's main aims. However, the level of support in France for Scotland kept Stratford from approaching the topic directly.

When Stratford sought to get final French agreement on the disposition of the Agenais and the crusade, he found himself having to address the issue, as the French made clear that the Scots had to be part of any agreement between Edward III and Philip. The resulting breakdown in negotiations imperilled Philip's hoped-for crusade and set the stage for a rapid degradation of relations between France and England. With Edward unwilling to give up his Scottish adventure and the French having committed their support to the restitution of David Bruce to his kingdom, Stratford had little choice but to return to England in January.² Further negotiations with the bishop of Avranches and Pierre Tierlieu in England similarly failed to give Edward any peace, as they continued to press the issue and arranged a delegation to Scotland and negotiations at York with a similar Scottish mission.³ The negotiations resulted in a truce being declared on 4 April to last through Midsummer, and the allowance of four Scots to come to the parliament at York on 26 May to further present their case.⁴

¹ *Baker*, p 55; A brief but cogent description of the negotiations is given in *War Cruel and Sharp*, pp 87-96

² *Foedera*, p 915

³ *Fordun*, p 358; *Wyntoun*, p 405; *Rot Scot*, p 323

⁴ *Rot Scot*, p 336; *CCR 1333-7*, p 481; *Foedera*, p 904

The truce through Midsummer was not a problem for Edward III and his plans; if anything, it allowed him the time to arrange for a massive summer campaign to crush the resurgent Bruce faction once and for all. No delays occurred in the planning of the campaign while the truce was in effect. Commissions for array were sent out calling for over 3,200 hobelars and 7,000 archers from England, and 7,500 foot from Wales. Ten earls and 126 other magnates received summons.⁵ In the end, 2768 men-at-arms, 3,630 mounted archers, and 7,020 foot would cross the border later that summer.⁶

That there was a truce did little to stop the warfare on the seas, with both sides preparing or carrying out attacks on the other. Scottish pirates at the mouth of the Seine took an English ship named the *Little Lechevard*; the resulting difficulties in gaining recompense from the stolen cargo impounded by French authorities further soured relations.⁷ At the same time, all ships over forty tons were to be gathered to sail against Scotland in the summer, while ships were ordered north both to block supplies from Dumbarton in the west and to retake the *Beaumontscogge* in the east.⁸ The English still were far superior on the seas, and fully intended to use that advantage to block supplies and support from reaching Scotland.

Meanwhile, David Strathbogie was proving to be a problematic convert to the Scottish cause, quarrelling with Moray, Mowbray, and William Douglas and causing a rift between them and Robert Stewart.⁹ Between their internal dissent, reminiscent of that which had afflicted Balliol before his second ejection from Scotland, and the massive forces at Edward's command, the Scots could do little but attempt to evade Edward's

⁵ *Rot Scot*, pp 328-33

⁶ See Ch. 8: The Army

⁷ *CCR 1333-7*, pp 462, 484, 620; *CCR 1337-9*, p 53; *Foedera*, pp 912-3

⁸ Dumbarton: *Rot Scot*, pp 340-1; Beaumontscogge: *Rot Scot*, pp 320, 322

forces and hope for either external support or the end of the campaign and the return of the mass of Edward's forces to England.

The two-pronged assault crossed the border on 12 July, with Edward III sweeping north through Annandale and Galloway while Balliol took the eastern coastal route from Berwick along the southern coast of the Forth.¹⁰ While Balliol had demonstrated little ability to gain more than the most lukewarm support in Scotland on his own, neither was there much support in Scotland for fighting him when supported with a large English army behind him. Neither force encountered much resistance until Balliol reached Cumbernauld, where a 'fortalice' of David Strathbogie under the command of David Marshal was assaulted and captured in the latter part of July.¹¹ No other major resistance was encountered before the two armies rendezvoused at Glasgow, where the two Edwards chose to pursue their advantage and move on to Perth.¹² After taking advantage of the English supremacy at sea to resupply from ships bringing supplies north from Berwick at Airth, the army moved north to Perth by 7 August, where it devastated the surrounding areas.¹³ It also retook without a fight the castle of Cupar on 7 August with the surrender of the Earl of Fife, who had returned to the Bruce camp after Balliol's 1334 ejection.¹⁴

The armies of the two kings were not the only active military endeavours operating in and around Scotland that summer. The large naval forces gathered for the campaign not only resupplied the land forces at Airth, but also sacked both the abbey on

⁹ *Fordun*, p 358; *Wyntoun*, p 421

¹⁰ Rogers suggests Inveravon near Falkirk for Edward III's stop at 'Irewyn' on 15 July; it is far more likely to be Irvine in Ayrshire. BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 202v; *War Cruel and Sharp*, p 99

¹¹ The chronicles give differing dates for the actual capture, with Knighton claiming 23 July and Bridlington 28 July. *Knighton*, p 473, *Bridlington*, pp 122-3; *Scalacronica*, p 165

¹² *Wyntoun*, p 412; *Scalacronica*, p 165

¹³ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 272r



the isle of Inchcolm in the Firth of Forth and the town of Dundee.¹⁵ In the west, the expeditionary force from Ireland under John Darcy, the justiciar of Ireland attacked Bute, though failed to take Rothesay Castle.¹⁶ The overall effect was much as Edward had intended: the Scots were overawed by the massive military force Edward had brought to bear, and could do little more than strike at supply lines and any groups that strayed too far from the main armies.¹⁷

At this they could be quite effective. One of Edward's continental allies, Guy, Count of Namur, arrived in England too late to join the king before he entered Scotland. Anxious to join the campaign as quickly as possible, Namur strengthened his party of a hundred men-at-arms at Berwick with 117 foot archers and a smattering of mounted archers and English knights before departing on 30 July for a quick march to the head of the Forth where Edward's army was at the time.¹⁸ Unfortunately for Guy, the passage of Balliol's force along a similar route earlier in the month did not guarantee the security of the region, especially with both the earls of Moray and March operating in the region. Ambushed near Edinburgh, Guy's men were forced in a fierce fight to take refuge in the remnants of Edinburgh Castle, which had been slighted under Robert Bruce and not rebuilt or garrisoned. Reinforced by William Douglas, the Scots forced Namur to surrender, promising £4,000 in ransom and his departure from the war.¹⁹

It had become apparent that further garrisons other than Roxburgh and Berwick were a necessity to secure any permanent control over Scotland not enforced by the

¹⁴ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 239r

¹⁵ *Pluscarden*, p 278; *Lanercost*, p 282

¹⁶ PRO E101/19/16

¹⁷ *Fordun*, p 359; *Wyntoun*, p 419; *Scotichronicon*, pp 110-113

¹⁸ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 239v; *Scotichronicon*, pp 112-3

¹⁹ *Fordun*, p 359; *Wyntoun*, p 420; *Scotichronicon*, pp 112-3; *Lanercost*, p 282; *Scalacronica*, p 165; *Pluscarden*, pp 278-9

immediate presence of an English army. The effectiveness of garrisons was further highlighted when Moray's force was itself ambushed on its way to return Namur to English lands. Men from the garrisons at Jedburgh and Roxburgh surprised the Scottish party, forcing William Douglas to flee, killed his brother James, and captured Moray.²⁰ Though others such as Dunbar and Douglas remained in the field to keep fighting, Moray's capture was a major coup for the English.

While there were setbacks such as that suffered by Guy of Namur, overall the campaign was successful. Where the winter campaign had done little to demonstrate the effectiveness of English arms, the summer efforts effectively cowed any resistance in the immediate vicinity of the armies. The show of force also convinced those equivocal lords in the Bruce camp to open negotiations with Edward III and Balliol to protect themselves from another perceived change of fortune. The Earl of Fife changed sides for the third time in nearly as many years, while David Strathbogie began to see the prudence in returning to his earlier loyalties. This undoubtedly was helped by his conflict with Moray and March. Using the offices of two Scottish Dominican Friars, Strathbogie opened negotiations with Edward III on behalf of a large faction of Bruce supporters, including Robert Stewart.²¹ Further negotiations carried out by Alexander and Geoffrey Mowbray, Godfrey Ross, Eustace Lorraine and William Bullock led to an agreement for the surrender of Strathbogie's group of recalcitrants on 18 August, after receiving several guarantees. Not only would their lands, lives, and offices be protected, but the laws and customs of Scotland were to be upheld, the Scottish church guaranteed its liberties, and

²⁰ *Scotichronicon*, pp 112-3; *Bridlington*, pp 123-4; *Melsa*, p 376; *Fordun*, p 359; *Wyntoun*, pp 420-1

²¹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 272r; *Avesbury*, p 298; *Knighton*, p 473; *Bridlington*, p 124; *Scalacronica*, p 165

the officeholders Balliol appointed should in the main be Scots.²² Many of these men had been placed in trusted positions by Balliol before and had changed sides either when their interests had been threatened (Mowbray), when the opportunity for gain presented itself (Ross), or when forced to in order to survive (Strathbogie). That these self-interested men saw it expedient to return to Balliol says much as to the low morale amongst the Bruce faction at the time.

As the campaign season was drawing to a close, the final efforts to secure the gains of the summer were put into motion. Strathbogie's reward for bringing such a large group of men back to the king's peace was to be appointed Balliol's lieutenant beyond the Forth, a role he took to with particular harshness.²³ After overseeing once again the rebuilding of Perth's fortifications, Balliol left on 23 September for a flying three-week expedition through the Highlands along with several hundred troops from the English army, including four earls and Henry Lancaster.²⁴

Finally, Edward addressed the need to garrison the areas just brought under control. Edinburgh would provide the safety not available to the count of Namur, as a workforce of 116 men began work during Edward's stop there in the second week of September.²⁵ A garrison of sixty men-at-arms and sixty archers was left in place to secure the area.²⁶ *Cupar was held temporarily by Henry Ferrers before being turned over*

²² *Avesbury*, p 298; *Knighton*, pp 473-5; *Rot Scot*, p 381; *Wyntoun*, p 421

²³ *Scotichronicon*, pp 114-5; *Scalacronica*, p 166

²⁴ The pay for the men-at-arms of the expedition ended on 11 Oct, though it may have ended by 7 Oct, when William Clinton's archers left service. Rogers' date of 23 September is more likely than Nicholson's 31 August: not only would it make sense for the earl of Hereford's pay record, but it would have made sense for retainers such as the men from Lichfield or Wells to join the expedition had it started on 31 August, as they were still *in situ* and receiving pay at this time. BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 236r-239r, 256v; *War Cruel and Sharp*, p 104; Nicholson, p 222

²⁵ Edward was in the vicinity of Edinburgh from 10 September to 27 September: *CCR 1333-7*, pp 439-442

²⁶ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 249r

to Balliol, while Eustace Maxwell, Edward Bohun and Henry Percy held the castles at Caerlaverock, Lochmaben, and Jedburgh, respectively.

What all of this could not do was to bring to heel immediately those magnates determined to carry on fighting regardless, specifically the Earl of March, Andrew Murray, and William Douglas.²⁷ They avoided direct conflict with the royal forces, taking the lessons of the successful ejections of Balliol at Annan and on the western seaboard to heart along with the more obvious lessons of Halidon Hill and Dupplin Moor. *Gaining peace with these men would require a negotiated settlement with David Bruce.* The men newly returned to the king's peace were eminently suited to the role, and Edward did not hesitate to use them. Alexander Mowbray and William Bullock were sent on 17 October to arrange a truce with Andrew Murray to discuss a peace settlement, and matters proceeded well enough for hostilities to cease temporarily on 22 October to allow for full negotiations including French representatives, a truce extended several times as the discussions continued.²⁸

Both sides took the discussions seriously, as it was the first time that both sides had met to attempt negotiations for each side of the conflict as a whole, rather than individuals making piecemeal agreements to safeguard their own interests independently of either claimant of the crown. William Montague, Robert Ufford, and Ralph Neville – all bannerets of the household and major magnates in their own right in differing regions of England – represented Edward.²⁹ On the Scottish side, Andrew Murray, William Douglas, William Keith, and Robert Lauder represented Bruce; of the leaders of the

²⁷ *Scotichronicon*, pp 116-7

²⁸ *Rot Scot*, pp 384-5

²⁹ Montague and Ufford would be created Earls of Salisbury and Suffolk respectively in 1337, while Neville was the pre-eminent lay landholder in the palatinate of Durham and arguably one of the two most

Bruce faction, only Patrick Dunbar was missing.³⁰ The two sides met at Bathgate in the first week of November, with matters proceeding well enough to see the truce extended several times as negotiations continued, from 26 November to 3 December to 9 December.³¹ Further evidence of the good faith the English were acting in came in the appointment of Geoffrey le Scrope, Nicholas Beche and Richard Bintworth to join the negotiations set for late November at Newcastle.³² All three had extensive legal experience, and their appointment suggests that matters had progressed far enough to consider specific proposals and legalities.

While this process of negotiation was beginning, the warfare in Scotland continued north of the Forth, despite the truce that had been agreed on. Part of this was due to the specific nature of the truce; agreed to by Edward III and the Bruce faction, it was ambiguous as to whether it specifically included a truce between the two Scottish factions. Acting on behalf of Balliol since his appointment as guardian north of the Forth, David Strathbogie had been crushing resistance north of Perth with particular brutality, according to various chroniclers.³³ His chief target was Kildrummy, one of the few holdouts for the Bruce faction throughout the war and held by Lady Christian Bruce, the wife of Andrew Murray. Learning of the siege while in negotiations with Montague and the others that first week of November, Murray successfully gained Montague's acquiescence to an attempted rescue.³⁴ Montague likely had little choice if he was to act in good faith. If the truce did not apply to Balliol, then Murray was in his rights to

powerful of the far northern landlords, along with Henry Percy. All three were seen as specifically 'king's men', without conflicting loyalties to confuse negotiations.

³⁰ *Foedera*, p 926; *Rot Scot*, p 385-7

³¹ *Rot Scot*, p 385-7; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 239v for Montague's whereabouts.

³² *Rot Scot*, p 388

³³ *Scotichronicon*, pp 114-7; *Fordun*, p 359-60; *Pluscarden*, p 279

³⁴ *Fordun*, pp 359-60

attempt a relief effort. On the other hand, if the truce did apply to Balliol's men, then Strathbogie was in violation of the truce and therefore outside of its protection.

Having assured himself that no English forces would be reinforcing Strathbogie or intercepting his troops, Murray moved quickly to gather what forces he could for Kildrummy's relief, arriving at the Dee in the last week of November. Bower describes his force as eight hundred men from Lothian and the Borders; among them were Patrick Dunbar, Alexander Ramsey, William Douglas, and the young William of Ross.³⁵ That this was the largest force that could be arranged is striking, though the short period of time to raise the troops possibly reduced the size of the force that could be gathered. Strathbogie's force was larger, though not likely to be the 3,000 half-heartedly given by Wyntoun.³⁶

Strathbogie, being warned of the approach of the relief party, moved south the ten miles from Kildrummy to Culblean Hill, where he could set up his forces to take full advantage of the heights, yet strike the flank of any force attempting to move northwards past him to Kildrummy. Rather than attack yet another Balliol force in a prepared position on a high hill, Murray opted for another approach. The timely arrival of 300 men from the Kildrummy garrison not only gave a significant boost to the Scottish numbers but also gave Murray useful advice from its commander, John Craig. Following his advice, Murray's force circled to the south to attempt to approach Culblean from Strathbogie's rear on 30 November. Thanks to his alert scouts, Strathbogie was able to shift his forces to block the manoeuvre at the Burn of the Vat. However, when the vanguard under Douglas halted, Strathbogie abandoned the tested tactic of allowing the

³⁵ *Scotichronicon*, pp 116-7; *Wyntoun*, p 424; *Lanercost*, p 284. Ross was underage, continuing the Scottish trend in this war of underage leaders rising to the fore.

opposition to attack a defensive position, and instead ordered the charge, disordering his forces and leaving them open to counterattack. While fully engaged with Douglas and his countercharge, Strathbogie's force was flanked by the main body under Murray and broken. Most of the force fled, but a small group including Strathbogie and Walter Comyn were surrounded and died fighting.³⁷

Culblean was not the defining moment for the Anglo-Scottish wars, nor was it the turning point, as Rogers has pointed out.³⁸ Its main effects were psychological; it gave a needed boost to Scottish morale, and likely improved their negotiating position by proving they were not a spent force on the verge of annihilation. The removal of David Strathbogie was also of great benefit, in more ways than one. Not only did his death remove one of the major supporters for the two Edwards, but it also removed one of the more contentious players in the Balliol court. Considering Strathbogie's history in creating feuds in both the Balliol and Bruce courts and his exceedingly harsh reputation amongst the Scots, it may have been a relief for all concerned to have him no longer able to cause division, or to be a stumbling block for reconciliation.

With the French beginning to take a much more active role diplomatically in the conflict and the failure of the winter campaign of 1334-5, major gains in the summer of 1335 were necessary by Balliol and the English in order to avoid French intervention and the exhaustion of English military resources. The campaign itself was highly successful in eliminating resistance in the southern reaches of Scotland, and even managed to extend Balliol's power even into the northern reaches of the country for a brief period. While

³⁶ *Wyntoun*, p 422

³⁷ A far more detailed description of events is found in Nicholson, pp 230-6; see also *Scotichronicon*, pp 116-7; *Wyntoun*, pp 422-7; *Fordun*, pp 359-360; *Pluscarden*, p 280; *Knighton*, p 475; *Melsa*, p 376; *Lanercost*, p 284; *Scalacronica*, p 166; *Baker*, p 57

many of the rebellious Bruce faction were willing to rejoin Balliol and the English, the defeat of David Strathbogie at Culblean meant that the north would stay out of Balliol hands and allow the Bruce faction to recover its position.

This is not to say that 1335 saw only fighting. It also saw the results of four years of war on both sides, as negotiations opened up between the Bruce and Balliol supporters to find a compromise to end the war, rather than a dictated peace after achieving military supremacy. While much of this was due to the unique position of David Strathbogie before his return to the Balliol fold, it does indicate a shift in the priorities and interests of both parties. In particular, as the French began taking on an increasingly larger role in the conflict and pursuing its own interests in regards to Gascony, the English focus would shift ever more southwards. This would leave Scotland increasingly on the periphery of Edward III's interests and less likely to see the investment of English soldiers or funds made in 1333 or 1335.

³⁸ *War Cruel and Sharp*, p 108

1336-8: Diplomacy and Dissolution

The end of the 1335 campaigning season saw the Bruce faction pushed back by the massive campaign forces of the English during the summer, but by no means defeated. Andrew Murray had proven that Scottish arms could defeat a smaller Disinherited force, even if the Scots did not have the resources to take on a major campaigning army of the English. The following two years would see the rapid shift by the English of resources away from Scotland towards the south, as France finally committed to fighting the English on Scotland's behalf in 1336.

Though there were moves towards a negotiated settlement, including an actual compromise agreement, the inability of either side to accept its terms meant that the war would continue through 1338 and the beginning of major campaigning in the Hundred Years' War. The English would content themselves with arranging a far smaller but more professional force for both 1336 and 1337, as the Bruce faction was still incapable of gathering a large army. Most importantly, the English forces would be assigned to captains, rather than led by the king himself. Though he would return to Scotland for hurried attacks in both 1336 and 1337, his attention would be increasingly held in the south. The initiative would move permanently to the increasingly successful Scots, with the English once again losing ground.

David Strathbogie's defeat at Culblean was not the seminal event that some chroniclers and modern historians have made it out to be.¹ The rise in Scottish spirits did not spur new military endeavours on the part of the Scots; instead, they returned to the negotiations started in November. It is highly unlikely that Edward would

have been willing to extend the truce for negotiations into December had the Scots begun sieging the castles of Cupar and Lochindorb immediately after the battle as indicated in certain chronicles.² The draft agreement worked out between the two parties after Culblean by 25 January was not a punitive document: instead, it attempted to balance the claims of Balliol and Bruce and find a middle ground to accommodate both. This was greatly helped by Balliol's age, single status, and lack of heirs. According to the agreement, Balliol would adopt Bruce as his heir, passing Scotland onto the young David upon his death. In the meantime, Bruce would live at the English court while Balliol lived, then would rule Scotland under the same terms with Edward III as had Balliol.³

Balliol would have lost relatively little with such an agreement: while the chroniclers differ as to what would occur if he had a son, it was not that likely a concern. David Bruce would have had much more to lose. His pretensions to rule would have to be deferred for several years, and perhaps permanently if Balliol produced a son. Once he did take the crown, he would be saddled with the subordinate relationship with England from which his father had fought so hard to free himself. He would also have to accept the permanent loss of the southern counties and the largest sources of income available to the Scottish crown. The biggest winner was Edward III, unsurprisingly; as his armies were the major lever in the relationship between the three sides, he had by far the best negotiating position. He would get to keep the southern counties of Scotland, formalise the subordinate relationship of Scotland to England, and secure in some fashion the livelihood of his brother-in-law. It would also end the massive drain on Edward's treasury in

¹ Nicholson, pp 230-6; see also *Scotichronicon*, pp 116-7; *Wyntoun*, pp 422-7; *Fordun*, pp 359-360; *Pluscarden*, p 280

² This is in contradiction to Rogers, p 108, though he gives the proper date for the siege on p 115; for the chronicles, see *Scotichronicon*, pp 116-7; *Fordun*, p 360

supporting the war and Philip VI of France's use of the ongoing war and his alliance with Scotland to pressure Edward in Aquitaine.

When the Scottish envoys returned David Bruce's answer to the parliament at Westminster in March 1336, the fragile movements towards peace ended abruptly. The proposed agreement had been rejected out of hand. Whether or not the minor had been persuaded by the French king or by his Scottish advisors is open to debate.⁴ However, in the end the main stumbling blocks to a negotiated peace were the inability of Bruce to compromise Scottish sovereignty or of either side to release contested lands and titles in order to facilitate a peace. The same difficulty that had begun the war, the contestation of titles such as Angus and Atholl, was now partly responsible for its continuance.

The failure to reach an agreement also sent Anglo-French relations into a downward spiral, as the elimination of a possible peace settlement injected the constant menace of French military action in aid of Scotland. The continuing war saw the planned crusade abandoned in the same month as the Westminster parliament;⁵ the upcoming war would not be over freeing the Holy Land, but instead for control of Gascony. Edward III was certainly aware of the French plans for intervening militarily in Scotland, though both sides avoided armed conflict in Gascony - for the moment.⁶ While French ships had raided the south coast of England in 1335, the threat now was of a much greater magnitude. Invasion forces were planned by Philip VI for Scotland in May 1336 to support a strike by the Scots

³ *Bridlington*, p 127; *Anonimalle*, p 6; *Knighton*, p 477

⁴ French king: *Knighton*, p 477; Scottish advisors, or 'pride of the Scots', *Anonimalle*, p 6; *Bridlington*, p 128. Rogers' description of Dunbar as easily restored to his lands after his submission is inaccurate; his forfeited lands in Northumberland had been granted to Henry Percy, and his previous betrayal of Edward III (as opposed to Balliol) would have made him very suspect. Considering the dire circumstances of 1335 for the Bruce cause and Dunbar's previous opportunistic behaviour, it seems likely that he would have switched sides again given the capacity to do so.

⁵ Eugène Déprez, *Les préliminaires de la guerre de Cent ans: La papauté, la France et l'Angleterre (1328-1342)* (Paris, 1902), pp 410-3

on northern England, while other troops would be landed at Portsmouth.⁷ The two-front war was about to begin.

The expiration of the last truce extension on 6 May saw the immediate resumption of conflict. The castle at Cupar was attacked by Dunbar, the earl of Sutherland, and the inconstant earl of Fife, who once again made had made his yearly change of allegiance. The garrison system set up the year before by Edward III proved its worth, as the commander of the Edinburgh garrison, John Stirling, was able to quickly cross the Forth and attack the besiegers by surprise, breaking the siege and routing the Scots.⁸ The widow of David Strathbogie was also besieged at her dead husband's castle at Lochindorb by Andrew Murray, though she would have to wait for relief somewhat longer than had the garrison at Cupar.⁹

For the first time in this war, Edward III did not lead the English forces in person. Henry Lancaster was appointed captain of the English forces on 7 April 1336,¹⁰ bringing 100 of his men-at-arms and 70 mounted archers as his retinue while leading an English army of 405 men-at-arms, 744 hobelars and archers and twenty foot. In addition to Lancaster's force, Balliol operated his own army in the lowlands, fighting with Andrew Murray's troops successfully near Stirling, though not in the set-piece fashion of Halidon Hill, Dupplin Moor, or Culblean.¹¹ There had been other losses through the winter and spring; upon reaching Perth on 19 May, they found the city burnt to the ground, necessitating the rebuilding of its fortifications yet again.¹²

⁶ *Rot Scot*, p 404; *Foedera*, p 936

⁷ *War Cruel and Sharp*, p 113; *Original Letters*, pp 30-1

⁸ *Anonimalle*, p 6

⁹ *Wyntoun*, p 428; *CDS*, no. 1221

¹⁰ *Rot Scot*, pp 414-5

¹¹ *Original Letters*, pp 32-3

¹² *Anonimalle*, p 7; *Scalacronica*, p 166. Unfortunately, there is little information as to when the city was attacked or what became of the garrison that Balliol would have left there after attempting to fortify it during the 1335 campaign.

While Edward III may have been willing to let Henry Lancaster run the war for most of summer, he was not fully quit of the wish to participate personally. The deteriorating situation with France gave him the opportunity, as rumours of French intervention in order to strike at Balliol in Perth promised a chance to bring the Scots to battle.¹³ Relying on speed rather than numbers, Edward dashed northwards to reach Perth to take over command of the forces there before Murray and the French could rendezvous and attack the town. He made the passage from Berwick to Perth in only two days with a guard of 198 men-at-arms and 247 mounted archers, stunning those at Perth with his unforeseen arrival on 28 June.¹⁴ The race north certainly enhanced Edward's reputation, though it was probably a relief to know that there was a strong garrison at Edinburgh to help avoid any incidents such as Guy of Namur's capture the year before. The anticipated French force failed to appear, threatening to render the entire dash anticlimactic.

Having made the madcap dash north, Edward was determined to make some use of his presence, and chose to do so in an equally daring fashion. On 12 July Edward left Perth with eight hundred men, half archers and half men-at-arms, in order to relieve Catherine Beaumont, Strathbogie's widow, in Lochindorb.¹⁵ The force undoubtedly was fully mounted, and of a size sufficient to match any Scottish force in the field without the burden of a heavy supply train or baggage. It could also move quite rapidly when pushed by Edward; after a lazy start, Edward made twenty miles through rough terrain to Blair Castle and thirty more miles after a day's rest at Blair.¹⁶ An attempt to catch Murray unawares at Kincardine failed, despite Murray's

¹³ Knighton, p 477; *Scalacronica*, p 166; *Bridlington*, p 128; *Lanercost*, p 286

¹⁴ Drawn from BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 241r-242v, 259r; *Foedera*, pp 940-1; *Scalacronica*, p 166 describes the guard as '100 men-at-arms': see Army chapter

¹⁵ *Original Letters*, pp 33-9

¹⁶ *Original Letters*, p 35; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 279r

pause to finish Mass before retreating towards Ross.¹⁷ Edward's other efforts were far more successful. He reached Lochindorb on 15 July, just before the castle's supplies ran out. Having relieved Lochindorb and Catherine Beaumont, Edward took steps to make sure that its loyal garrison was supplied and that the local region was not. Forres was burned, while Kinloss Abbey was stripped clean to resupply Lochindorb. Edward's troops then proceeded eastward along the coast, burning everything they could reach except for the town of Elgin, granted a reprieve due to the church of the Holy Trinity in the town. The culmination of this destruction was the burning of Aberdeen on 22 July, before Edward turned south to Dunnotar and lands in English hands.

Though the chroniclers attribute the destruction of Aberdeen to revenge for assaults on English sailors or the death of Thomas Roscelyn,¹⁸ there were also more practical reasons for destroying the town. Aberdeen was the last major port on the eastern seaboard not in English hands, and was by far the best port available to the Scots after the fall of Berwick. Until it could be rebuilt, the Scots would not be able to support any fleets looking for harbour, nor ship any large amounts of wool to Flanders – greatly reducing the economic capabilities of the region. Combined with the general destruction of the countryside, the intent was much like that of the Harrying of the North under William I: to destroy the economic ability of any opposition to survive or support foreign intervention. It also served notice that removing David Strathbogie did not make the northern reaches of Scotland immune to the ravages of the war.

After his raid through the north, Edward further expanded his program of creating garrisons and fortifications to hold on to English gains to include Fife and

¹⁷ *Wyntoun*, pp 429-30

the northeast coast. Kinneff and Lauriston were added to the deceased Thomas Roscelyn's former command at Dunnotar to try to hold the Kincardine coast,¹⁹ while Perth was heavily fortified by shifting the expense of the work onto six abbeys in the region.²⁰ Edward also guaranteed a proper defensive force by installing a garrison, initially but briefly under Ralph Neville.²¹ The defence of Fife was shifted out of royal control and onto various magnates. Henry Beaumont was assigned the castle of St. Andrews, while Henry Ferrers received Leuchars; the major castle in Fife, Cupar, was still held for Balliol by William Bullock. The last major link in the chain between Berwick and Perth was Stirling, with Thomas Rokeby put in command.²² John of Eltham reinforced Lancaster's forces on 28 July, shortly before Edward returned to Perth from his raid the next day.²³ Matters were secure enough to allow many of the forces in Scotland to disperse in late August and early September.

Edward's presence was soon required in the south, as matters with France had gone from bad to worse during his absence. The English embassy sent to Paris in July by the king's council during his absence made no progress, despite having broad powers to make agreements in Edward's name. Instead, its members were bluntly informed on 20 August that Philip VI intended to assist the Scots in all respects and intended to invade Scotland in support of Bruce's forces and England itself for good

¹⁸ Roscelyn: *Wyntoun*, p 430; *Anonimale*, p 7. Sailors: *Original Letters*, p 37. See also *Fordun*, pp 360-1; *Scalacronica*, p 166; *Baker*, pp 57-8

¹⁹ *Scotichronicon*, pp 126-7; *Fordun*, p 361. Rogers incorrectly identifies Lauriston with the town of that name in Galloway; however, the castle is always mentioned in combination with Dunnotar and Kinneff, and others have identified it as south of Kinneff. *War Cruel and Sharp*, p 119; Peter G.B. McNeill and Hector L MacQueen (ed.), *Atlas of Scottish History to 1707* (Scottish Medievalists and Dept. of Geography, Univ of Edinburgh, 1996), p 105

²⁰ St. Andrews, Dunfermline, Lindores, Balmerino, Arbroath and Coupar Angus

²¹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 250r-250v

²² Chroniclers report the castle being granted to William Montague, but only Thomas Rokeby is mentioned in the wardrobe book regarding munitions and pay for the garrison beginning 25 October 1336: BL Cotton Nero C VII, fo. 249r; Generally, *Scotichronicon*, pp 122-3; *Fordun*, p 361

²³ *Original Letters*, p 39; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 240r. The letter from the queen states that Eltham brought 400 men-at-arms and 7,000 hobelars and archers; however, pay records in the wardrobe book show only 85 men at arms in Eltham's retinue and no other troops beginning pay for several days either way from the beginning point of 28 July.

measure. The period of diplomacy was over; the fight north of the border had spilled over into what would prove a much larger conflict.

The clerk William Tickhill was sent to rush back to England, informing Archbishop Stratford and the royal council in Northampton on 24 August before flying north. The unsettled nature of Scotland prevented Tickhill from arriving at Perth until the second week of September, making Edward's departure almost immediate upon hearing the news. This exit was marred by the death of John of Eltham on 13 September, which Scottish chroniclers attribute to the unlikely cause of Edward killing John himself.²⁴ Accompanying Edward were many of the magnates with retinues in Scotland; though most of their retinues remained in Scotland, their presence was also required in the south. Stratford had called a parliament for Nottingham on 23 September in the king's name to deal with the dire news, though undoubtedly this was a decision Edward fully concurred with.²⁵

By the time of the Nottingham council, French actions had underscored that full hostilities had begun. French ships raided the port of Orton, Walford Roads, and the Isle of Wight.²⁶ With such proof of the seriousness of the French threat, the parliament was all too willing to grant Edward another tenth and fifteenth in tax on the country and an increase in the wool subsidy despite having done so just a few months previously in March.²⁷ Though no further clashes occurred with the French that year, no one in England believed that anything but war was in the immediate future.

²⁴ Even more oddly, it was claimed Edward killed his brother because he had been burning lands in western Scotland that had entered the king's peace; considering the indiscriminate burning of lands in and out of the king's peace in previous years, it seems highly unlikely Edward would start taking such violent exception to it now. *Scotichronicon*, pp 122-3; *Fordun*, p 361; Date of death: BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 240r. Curiously, Edward appears to have left the day after that recorded as John's death: see the entry for William Kildsby, BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 242v

²⁵ *War Cruel and Sharp*, pp 119-122; J Sumption, *Trial By Battle v. 1* (London, 1990), pp 161-165; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 240r-242v; *Foedera* pp 944-5

²⁶ *CCR 1337-9*, pp 43-5; *Rot Scot*, pp 450-3

The Scots certainly had war on their mind. Andrew Murray wasted no time whatsoever upon Edward's departure for Nottingham. In October he destroyed Dunnotar, Kinneff, and Lauriston, and spent winter raiding through Gowrie, Angus, and the Mearns, along with destroying another fortress at Kinclaven at some point. Though a number of magnate retinues and county levies were still in service through November and even into December, they appear to have done little to disrupt Murray's efforts. The disheartening truth was that, barring Lochindorb, the English and Balliol had no support whatsoever north of Perth.²⁸

In the south of Scotland matters were somewhat better, though this was a matter of degree due to the increased activity on the part of the Scots. Edward returned to the north for one last effort, leaving Newcastle on 14 October to make his way to the remnants of Bothwell Castle with the remnants of Lancaster's force and some reinforcements led by the earl of Arundel. Left unmolested by the Scots, he remained there until 10 December overseeing its repair.²⁹ During his absence the Channel Islands were raided by the French, while diplomatic pressure was stepped up by Philip VI ordering that Robert of Artois, whom Edward was harbouring, be extradited to France, specifically tailoring the demand to be one from the King of France to the Duke of Aquitaine, rather than as one king to another. As Robert was not in Gascony, nor receiving harbour from Edward in any fashion as Duke of Aquitaine, this demand placed Edward between accepting that his vassalage could be extended to affect England or denying the petition and having Gascony declared forfeit.³⁰

²⁷ *Anonimale*, p 8; Ormrod, *The Reign of Edward III*, pp 189-191

²⁸ *Scotichronicon*, pp 124-5; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, *passim*

²⁹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 214r, 241r-244r, 259r-260r

³⁰ *War Cruel and Sharp*, pp 123-4

Unsurprisingly, the new year brought little but bad news. The one bright note was the creation of six of Edward's most ardent military supporters as earls of the realm on 16 March 1337 during the Westminster parliament of that year. The men represented a broad cross-section of political interests, and their appointment was obviously meant to both secure their place in the political scene and to secure their interests along the same line as Edward's. Foremost of all, they represented the king's household. All four of the bannerets receiving robes and fees in 1336 were made earls: William Montague became earl of Salisbury, Robert Ufford earl of Suffolk, William Bohun earl of Northampton, and William Clinton earl of Huntingdon. Bohun also represented the entrenched, older families in England, as his older brother John was earl of Hereford. The two remaining earls created were also major magnates. Henry Lancaster, son of the earl of Lancaster, became earl of Derby, while Hugh Audley received the revived earldom of Gloucester. All were heavily active in the Scottish wars and willing to support further military ventures on the part of the king. Considering the war that was all but fully declared with France and the constant fighting in Scotland, such men were desperately needed amongst the highest ranking of the land.³¹

This one bright spot did not by any means make the year a positive one. February saw the resumption of Scottish successes, as Murray successfully bypassed Perth and began a rampage through Fife. The tower at Falkland was destroyed, followed quickly by a three-week siege of St. Andrews including siege weaponry. The castle surrendered on the last day in February, and was immediately slighted. The castle at Leuchars had also been levelled at some point in February, leaving only Cupar in English hands. In March Murray moved to Clydesdale and besieged

³¹ Baker, p 58; *Scalacronica*, p 167; *Anonimalle*, p 9; The best work to date on this specific event and the preceding events is J. Bothwell, 'Edward III, The English Peerage, and the 1337 Earls', in J.

Bothwell, forcing it to surrender on terms. By the beginning of spring, the entirety of the gains Edward had made in 1336 outside of Perth had already been lost. The necessity of focusing on the French threat had permanently shifted the initiative to the Scots.³² For better or worse, English attention had become riveted on France. February saw an attempt to seize the strategic town of Saint-Macaire in Aquitaine by one of Philip VI's commanders. The parliament of March 1337 agreed to one last diplomatic mission to avert war, though diplomatic efforts to gather allies in the Low Countries had already begun. The mission failed utterly, as Philip VI had fully committed himself to full war – a fact highlighted by the calling of the *arrière-ban* throughout France on 30 April.³³

The English had not completely forgotten about Scotland, merely had put it on the back burner. The Earl of Warwick, Thomas Beauchamp was appointed commander of the army in Scotland on 25 March 1337, as Edward had no intention of coming north to fight that year. Plans had been made to provide him with 580 men-at-arms and 4,000 archers, along with the right to call for reinforcements from the northern counties should they be required.³⁴ The forces he was promised he needed, as Murray had no intention of lessening the pressure. Stirling was besieged in April 1337; though the siege was unsuccessful, it was worrisome enough to force Edward to once again race north with reinforcements to lead an army to relieve the castle at the beginning of June. Continuing his policy of not engaging sizeable English forces, Murray withdrew before Edward's arrival, allowing Edward to reach Stirling by 14 June unmolested. The king stayed in the region until the end of June,

Bothwell (ed.), *The Age of Edward III* (Woodbridge, 2001) pp 35-52

³² *Scotichronicon*, pp 124-127; *Fordun*, p 362; *Bridlington*, p 128; *Lanercost*, p 288; *Wyntoun*, p 435; *Melsa*, p 378; *Rot Scot*, pp 483, 485

³³ Sumption, *Trial By Battle*, pp 184, 196

³⁴ *Rot Scot* pp 487, 488, 495; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 245r-247r, 261r-264v; See Ch. 8: The Army

then hurriedly departed to deal with preparing for campaigning against France.³⁵ Though he saved Stirling, there was not much else that could be done to halt the slide downwards. The situation in Galloway became critical when Eustace Maxwell, an early supporter of Balliol and Edward's sheriff of Dumfriesshire, switched sides. Further rescue efforts were required in October, when the Scots raided Cumberland and Edinburgh became Murray's newest target for besieging the following month.³⁶ As much of Beauchamp's small army had disbanded in November, Edward was forced to route troops that had been meant for an invasion of France that never occurred northward. This force, including the earls of Arundel, Salisbury, and Gloucester had over 750 men-at-arms, 2300 hobelars and horse archers, and 500 Welsh foot.³⁷

After this force relieved Edinburgh without a fight, it turned eastward to attempt to remove one of the largest thorns in the side of the English in southern Scotland. The castle of Dunbar had been refurbished by the Earl of March in 1334, under pressure from Edward. It now was serving as a centre of resistance under Dunbar's wife, known as 'Black Agnes'. More importantly, its small port was serving as an entry point for French supplies and money to enter the country. With the loss of Fife except for the lone garrison at Cupar, English control of Scotland north of the Forth consisted for all practical purposes only of Perth. Unless measures could be taken to somehow stabilise Scotland south of the Forth, there were no means by which Perth could be reliably relieved and reinforced except by sea. Such a situation would leave the town isolated and essentially harmless while the Scots

³⁵ *Scotichronicon*, pp 130-1; *Fordun*, p 362; *Anonimalle*, p 10; *Scalacronica*, p 167. Henry Pledour, leading the king's bodyguard, saw his contingent begin receiving pay on 27 May and end on 29 June, while certain of the garrisons' reinforcements on 14 June are listed as after the siege: BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 261r; 249v

³⁶ *Scotichronicon*, pp 130-1; *Fordun*, p 362; *Anonimalle*, pp 10-12; *Scalacronica*, pp 167-8; *Lanercost*, pp 305-6; *Rot Scot*, pp 499, 501-13

continued to roll up the English garrisons. Montague and Arundel began their siege of Dunbar on 13 January, complete with stone-throwers and a sow.³⁸ The siege did not go well for the English. The sow was destroyed by a stonethrower in the castle; and the attempts to starve out the garrison were partly set back by a daring blockade run by Alexander Ramsey. Another attempt to subvert a gatekeeper nearly resulted in Montague's capture, narrowly avoided by the actions of John Coupland, who would later be the captor of David Bruce at Neville's Cross.³⁹

In the end, the events in the south took precedence. Both the leadership and the troop contingents of Montague, FitzAlan, and Audley were needed to try to prosecute the war with France. Montague was ordered south with his entire army, leaving Dunbar untaken and only a relatively few of the garrisons in Scotland still in English hands. All but Perth had been lost north of the Forth; only Berwick, Roxburgh, Edinburgh, and Stirling were in royal hands, while Lochmaben, Jedburgh, and a scattering of smaller fortifications remained in English hands. The Scottish chroniclers were entirely correct when they said the advent of war with France saved their country, and it is striking how fragile the English military machine proved to be when faced with enemies on two sides.⁴⁰ It also aided the Scots greatly that France was seen as the more important foe, leaving little interest in England for fighting in the north when greater prizes loomed in the south.

³⁷ A.E. Prince, 'The Strength of English Armies in the Reign of Edward III', *EHR* 183 (1931) pp 359-60

³⁸ *Scotichronicon*, pp 126-129; *Scalacronica*, p 168; *Lanercost*, p 295; *Wyntoun*, pp 431-5; *Anonimalle*, p 13; *Fordun*, pp 362-3

³⁹ Details taken from *Scotichronicon*, pp 128-131

⁴⁰ *Fordun*, p 363

The Army

Understanding why the Disinherited and the English were so successful in battle during the 1330s requires a lengthy analysis of the composition of their armies. It was their campaign forces that scored the major military successes of the war, from Dupplin Moor until the failure of Montague at the siege of Dunbar Castle. These armies were not based on the same tactical model as the campaign of 1327 or earlier years. Instead, they employed new tactics, effectively using dismounted men-at-arms and large numbers of archers to defeat numerically superior foes on more than one occasion, as was shown in earlier chapters.

Several different factors have to be looked at to succeed in understanding the success of the army. The first is the primary material that exists on the English forces of the time, from chronicle accounts to financial records to commissions of array. By examining the problems inherent in these documents and the limits that places on what can be drawn from the material, we can be more certain about the conclusions that can be made.

Second, the recruitment of the troops that make up the campaign forces will be looked at, both in terms of numbers and in terms of their origins. By looking at the type of troops requested and changes from year to year in those requests, conclusions can be drawn about the success and acceptance of the new tactics appearing in the 1330s, the most dependable sources of manpower, and the changed aims of the English for each campaign. Of major importance is the comparison between the recruitment from older sources of manpower such as obligatory service and newer methods such as contracts and mixed retinues.

Third, the size and pay of each campaign force has to be calculated, from the start of the campaign to the army's dispersal. This is necessary to understand the tactical and strategic choices taken by the commanders in the field and the resources they had at their disposal. An idea of the overall military strength of England can be drawn from these numbers, as can an idea of what size forces the country could maintain over a number of years of constant campaigning.

Last, the contributions of individuals have to be considered, particularly of the magnates who provided retinues of men-at-arms and mounted archers. In considering the origins of these men and the numbers they could provide, conclusions can be drawn about the breadth of support for the war over time, the limits of their recruiting power, and the sources of leadership that Edward III could depend on for his military forces.

For ease of analysis, these questions are considered separately for the cavalry and infantry. While there were trends towards the recruitment of mixed retinues and a blurring of lines between cavalry and infantry due to the new tactics being employed, the social origins and recruitment methods of the soldiers were different for each category. These differences were significant enough that it makes little sense not to consider them in the same way.

The Sources

Unfortunately, we have no surviving pay records or administrative materials for Edward's reign before 1334 that would give us the evidence to estimate the numbers on each campaign. Though we know of the occasional groups retained, such as Henry Percy's guard of himself and another banneret, eleven knights, 47

squires, and eighty hobelars beginning in June 1327,¹ we do not have enough to craft an overall picture solely from these sources.

The main evidence on the composition of the English forces in Scotland during the Roxburgh campaign and the years immediately following comprises the detailed pay lists and expenses recorded in the controller's copy of the wardrobe book of Richard Ferriby. Through this we have much more information to work with than we do for previous campaigns, such as the Halidon Hill campaign of 1333. Unfortunately, the wardrobe book, while providing a wealth of information on names of participating magnates and the numbers of troops that England could provide, has its problems.²

The most glaring of these is the apparent lack of evidence of desertions during the campaigns. The recorded payments to both men-at-arms and archers, mounted and unmounted, are almost pristine in terms of the numbers receiving wages and their serving out the full service recorded. While a number of entries do record the occasional soldier as 'vacatus', or not receiving wages due to being absent, the rate is nowhere near what is usual for English armies campaigning in Scotland. Edward I's Caerlaverock campaign in 1300, for instance, suffered a forty-percent loss of forces due to desertion in the month of July alone.³

By contrast, Ferriby's wardrobe book lists few if any such losses for the Roxburgh and following campaigns. The reduction of troops with the king over time was recorded as entire units being released from service, rather than widespread attrition of manpower across the board. From the *vadia hobelarum, sagittariorum et peditum* section of the wardrobe book for winter 1334-5, a total of 7 mounted archers

¹ PRO E372/173, m. 10d

² Andrew Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy Under Edward III* (Woodbridge, 1994), pp 146-155 is the best discussion on this particularly annoying difficulty.

and 13 foot archers are 'vacatus' in the pay records for fifteen days each on average – this from a total of some 3400 archers under the king's command, in the midst of a winter campaign noted for its brutal weather.⁴ Edward certainly believed there was a problem with desertion during this winter. Writs were sent to the sheriffs of seven counties ordering the incarceration of deserters from the army as early as 16 November 1334, just as the army was heading into Scotland.⁵

The reasons for these discrepancies are unclear. Nicholson speculated that the problems of desertion were either exaggerated by the king, or that the wardrobe book concealed considerable peculation and graft.⁶ Even if it is assumed that only the levies from the northern shires would be prone to desertion, with the Welsh and the archers from the magnates' retinues immune from leaving without permission, a sizeable proportion of the armies throughout 1334-6 should have suffered noticeable erosion. Unfortunately, this does not occur, or occurs in highly uneven fashion. What absences do occur must be either 'with leave' vacancies or otherwise accepted departures, rather than desertion. The wardrobe book does not specify whether the absences are at the beginning, end, or middle of the service period, which would seem to rule out illegal departure from the army.

A telling example of this can be found in the pay records of Henry Percy for the 1337 campaign under Thomas Beauchamp, earl of Warwick. He is listed as 'infirmatus', or ill for nine days during the campaign. While the entry is unusual for listing why Percy was not receiving pay for those days, it is otherwise comparable

³ *Liber Quotidianus Controtulitoris Garderobiae 1299-1300*, ed. J. Topham *et al* (1787), pp 245-57

⁴ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 252r-254v, *passim*; *Bridlington*, p 120

⁵ *Rot Scot*, p 293

⁶ Nicholson, p181

with the other various entries regarding missing or absent men on the campaign, including the one squire listed as absent for two days in the same entry as Percy's.⁷

It is unlikely that the crown would be paying the captains of contingents for troops that were not with the army, even if obligated to do so by indenture. In addition, the portion of the army collected through commissions of array in the shires would have no such contractual agreement. It is also highly unlikely that Richard Ferriby was so unfamiliar with military matters that he would pay the wages out of hand without questioning if the men were actually with the army – he was the recipient of several writs pertaining to wages and victuals for the army, and was actually with the army during the 1335 summer offensive accompanied by six men-at-arms.⁸

There are surviving partial or company muster rolls from the period, and the listed numbers of troops for companies differ, often widely, from the entries in the account book. The most complete of these is the muster roll for Henry Lancaster's campaign during summer 1336.⁹ Andrew Ayton pointed out that Ralph Neville in 1336 is recorded as serving with 36 men-at-arms throughout the summer, but the muster rolls indicate a fluctuating number of men-at-arms from thirty to 39 to twenty actually with Neville at any point in time, and never the precise number listed in Ferriby's book.¹⁰ The existence of such musters eliminates the likelihood of the contingent captains being responsible for the discrepancies.

The important factor in the discrepancies is the source of the material. With the muster rolls, the importance is in noting the day-to-day numbers participating in the campaign, and the number of men immediately available for military action. The

⁷ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 245r

⁸ *CCR 1333-7*, pp 448, 463, 538, 542, 553, 586; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 239r

⁹ PRO E101/19/36

account book, though appearing to be a single complete source, is meant for financial accounting first and foremost. The exact number receiving pay does not matter provided that the amounts recorded equal the actual sum of payments made to the various contingent captains. The structure of the *vadia guerre* record supports this, with initial entries for a campaign or a page of payments being heavily detailed, listing all the information possible, and following entries containing only the differing number of men and amounts paid. Take for instance a page from the Roxburgh campaign.¹¹ The initial entry gives all the relevant information for the Earl of Warwick's service – his serving with the king in the Scottish war with 40 men-at-arms from 14 November in year 8 (1334) until 11 Feb year 9 (1335), etc., etc. By the end of the page, only the individual being paid, their rank, the number of men, and that they were being paid 'as before' is recorded for bannerets such as Giles Baddlesmere and John Multon. This is in part a reflection of the fatigue involved in recording several thousand men at once via hand-written records on parchment. However, it also reflects the lack of necessity in having the precise, fully detailed information recorded for each and every contingent, since this information is already abridged and abbreviated.

This does limit the usefulness of the information in the wardrobe book. However, with only partial or incomplete muster rolls existing, it still is our best source of information for the military activities of 1334-7. Though day-by-day numbers cannot be computed as they can for campaigns with the musters recorded, the listings we do have provide reasonably accurate averages of the troops that were available and participating in the war in Scotland. Difficulties only arise when the abbreviation of the pay records changes the types of men serving. One example is

¹⁰ Andrew Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy Under Edward III*, pp 152-153; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 240r; PRO E101/19/36 (muster roll)

John Tibitot in 1336, where 12 mounted archers are listed as providing the service of four men-at-arms.¹² However, such cases seem relatively rare, and the advantages provided by the internal consistency of the wardrobe book make up somewhat for this.

Another difficulty is the various campaigning forces that did not receive the king's wages or leave behind documentary evidence of their own. The best example of this are those forces in Edward Balliol's pay. Though he received numerous prests and payments from Edward and the exchequer throughout the wars, his claimed title as King of Scotland meant that he could not accept wages in the same fashion as any magnate of less than royal status could. Our best glimpses of those in Balliol's company are when the English crown is providing them, as in the expedition into the Highlands in 1335, or when Balliol fails to pay them their wages and relies upon the English crown to do so as with Bartholomew Fanacourt in 1336.¹³ Neither do we have anything but chronicle references to most other military activity, such as David Strathbogie's.

Cavalry

The men-at-arms who served in the armies of Edward III have more in common with those of Edward's father and grandfather than the archers who served under each. Though there were some important alterations in how these men fought on the battlefield, their origins as the elite of the land still remained the same. Many of the names – Percy, Neville, Lestrangle, Beauchamp, Umfraville, Baddlesmere

¹¹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 233v

¹² Andrew Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy Under Edward III*, p 153

¹³ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 236r-237v, 255r-256v (Expedition); 241r (Fanacourt)

were the same, the sons and grandsons still carrying out the same roles on the battlefield and on campaign. However, there were some sizeable differences between the generations.

The reluctance of magnates to accept pay from the crown had long since passed.¹⁴ Those magnates who did participate in the war in the north had no problems accepting wages from the crown, whether they were simple knights and bannerets or important earls such as John Bohun, earl of Hereford, John Warenne, earl of Surrey, or Thomas Beauchamp, earl of Warwick. Even the king's brother, John of Eltham, accepted wages up until his death in September 1336.

Several factors account for this. One was the economic cost of equipping and maintaining retinues to bring on campaign. Rising costs of equipment, mounts, and supplies made it increasingly difficult to support 'private' forces in the field. The granting of prests, or advancements on future wages from the crown, is a good indicator of economic necessity on the parts of magnates in order for them to carry out their service. Edward III used them for several individuals to make sure their retinues made it to campaign, much as Edward I had done. John Norwich, Edward Monthermer, Peter Dounedale, Adam Well, and Thomas Hastangs all received £5 prests per twenty men-at-arms in 1335 for the summer campaign.¹⁵ Such prests were not restricted to minor magnates or those with obvious financial woes. John St. Albans's account from 1337-8 lists several prests to individuals such as Edward Balliol, the king's uncle and earl Marshal Thomas Brotherton, the bishop of Carlisle, and Richard Talbot. These prests ranged from the £50 given to Richard Talbot on 7 November 1338 to the £364 received by Thomas Brotherton on 29 July 1337.¹⁶

¹⁴ For reluctance, see M.C. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience* (New Haven, 1996), pp 97-99

¹⁵ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 237r-237v

¹⁶ PRO E101/20/19

Second was a sea change in the political attitude of the country, and of those magnates who participated in Edward III's campaigns. His grandfather and father had been opposed by magnates such as Roger Bigod, Earl of Norfolk and Thomas of Lancaster – powerful nobles, seasoned to political infighting, and all too aware of their personal rights, privileges, and position in opposition to the wishes of the crown. They felt the need to defend themselves and their rights from the encroachment of the crown. In practice, this meant serving militarily under the old feudal terms, carrying out their unpaid service and paying their own way on campaign. Accepting wages from the crown was tantamount to accepting a subordination that an earl of the realm was not subject to. When novel terms of service were put into place, they met with vociferous objection.

By the 1330s, the political situation had changed dramatically. The active magnates in military service were not the old dragons of the previous generation, barring John Warenne; they were a younger generation, of the same age as Edward III. Rather than seeing the crown as the opposition, it was the fount of opportunity held by a man of the same age and interests, capable in war, and more accommodating than his predecessors. This was not a king to whom the magnates were opposed vociferously while there were occasional disagreements, it was not the intense conflict of the previous reign, and would not be until 1341. Taking wages had become much more practical and acceptable, rather than the anathema it had been to previous generations.

The rates of pay were standardised at the usual levels for the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries in England.¹⁷ An earl or bishop would receive eight shillings a day for his presence on campaign; a knight banneret, 4 shillings; a knight bachelor, two shillings; and a squire or simple man-at-arms one shilling, or twelve

pennies a day. Though noted separately as *vexillatores* or standard-bearers, the individuals entrusted with the banners of St. Cuthbert, St. John of Beverley, and the Virgin Mary from York received the same wages as those of equal rank elsewhere in the army: 2s per day for the knight carrying St. Cuthbert's banner on campaign in 1335, while the two men-at-arms carrying the lesser banners from Beverley and York received a shilling each.

The pay records in Ferriby's wardrobe book do not vary from this formula except for during the Roxburgh campaign and the summer campaign of 1335. Magnates during these campaigns were paid a lump sum of £100 per 20 men-at-arms for one quarter's service, essentially 90 days. As Andrew Ayton pointed out, this pay scale is not very favourable to the men receiving it,¹⁸ though it provides roughly for a banneret and 19 men-at-arms, most retinues maintained a 1:3 to 1:6 ratio of knights earning 2s/day to men-at-arms earning 1s/day. Assuming even the latter ratio, there would likely be three knights in a retinue of twenty, leaving the retinue leader £13 10s short per 20 men.¹⁹ This assumes, of course, that the full wage is passed on to the men in the retinue, and that they are not contracted with the retinue leader giving him more favourable terms.

Gaining the manpower necessary to carry out Edward's campaigns often depended upon the resources of a very small group of magnates. The bulk of the men-at-arms for the Roxburgh campaign were provided for by only twelve men. Six of these were earls, and one of these the brother of the king. The largest contingent was not that of an earl: instead, it was the 120 men-at-arms of Henry Percy, carried

¹⁷ M.C. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience*, p 84

¹⁸ Andrew Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy Under Edward III*, p 104

¹⁹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, *passim*

over from his service holding custody of the March until 10 November 1334. John of Eltham, the king's brother and Earl of Cornwall came close to matching this, with 100 men in his retinue. The other four earls were Richard FitzAlan (Arundel), Thomas Beauchamp (Warwick), John de Vere (Oxford), and Gilbert Umfraville (Angus). A large contingent from John Warenne (Surrey) also participated, though the earl himself did not. The others had similar financial stature, if not perhaps the titles. Ralph Neville, Steward of the Household and one of the most powerful of the northern lords had sixty men in his retinue, partly from having just finished the same duty as Percy in holding custody of the March, while Henry Lancaster, son of the Earl of Lancaster, matched these numbers. Ebulo Lestrangle and John Mowbray were both northern lords, while James Audley was strong in the west. Overall, these twelve men provided 664 of the 818 men-at-arms provided by the magnates. Most of these men received £100 for each twenty men they provided or some fraction thereof. Gilbert Umfraville and John Warenne received only 100 marks for each twenty they provided; the difference was attributed to the titles each man held as earls of Angus and Strathearn, respectively.²⁰ The reduction by a third is in line with a similar pay modification for the mounted archers of several magnates, who saw their pay reduced by a third upon entering Scotland from 6d/day per mounted archer to 4d/day.

Most of the rest of the force was comprised of the royal household, though to actually describe it as such is misleading. Many of those regularly receiving robes and fees for serving with the household did participate in the campaign, with only three bannerets and two knights not receiving pay at some point in the campaign. Many, however, did not receive robes and fees, and appear to have had little enough connection with the royal household other than to be in its pay for the campaign.


²⁰ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 234r

The most likely explanation is that these men and their small retinues were simply included in the household lists as theirs would have been individual or small contracts, rather than the large scale of the greater magnates.²¹ The one exception was William Northwell, who acted as paymaster for a large contingent of 84 men-at-arms, including Thomas Wake of Liddell, a major Disinherited lord in his own right. Also notable among these were William L'English and John Brocaz, two squires of the household who would regularly bring contingents equal to those of more important household knights like Reginald Cobham and Thomas Bradeston throughout the campaigns of the 1330s.²² These forty-nine listed groups provide only half of that the major magnates contribute, totalling some 379 men. The largest of these, barring Northwell's and the large conglomerate of individually named household squires, were the eight of Maurice Berkeley and the seven of Reginald Cobham, a number far below what the major magnates could each individually gather.

The final group, and by far the smallest, were those men-at-arms provided directly by the counties in response to the initial military summons. The three ridings of Yorkshire provided 58 men between them. As the main focus of recruitment in the counties was on hobelars and mounted archers rather than men-at-arms, this turnout is unsurprising. This group was the only one to receive any real number of reinforcements during the campaign, as 34 men-at-arms from Nottinghamshire and Lincolnshire joined Edward in January, though they did so for

²¹ I have chosen to follow Nicholson (*Edward III and the Scots*, pp 175-6) in creating this distinction; though it is somewhat artificial, it makes sense considering that it is how they are organized in the actual pay records and the somewhat fluid nature of membership in the household. For instance, Rhys ap Gruffydd did not receive fees during the winter of 1334, but did receive robes. He was on the campaign, but not grouped with the household for pay purposes as he was leading the contingent from South Wales, though Walter Mauny was when serving in the same capacity with the men from Merionydd. The general indication is that membership in the household does not follow any hard and fast rule, when on campaign. BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 234r-235v (wages), 223r (fees), 225r (robes)

little more than a month. These certainly would have come thanks to the pointed and threatening letters sent by Edward from Roxburgh complaining of desertions and the failure of many to join the campaign despite earlier requests.²³



Despite this, the number of men-at-arms gathered was a respectable one, especially by the standards of a winter campaign. A total of 1255 men-at-arms had been gathered by the end of November at

Roxburgh, a total not including the retinues of Balliol and others not receiving the king's wages.²⁴ Another sixty-two men-at-arms and centenars were part of the sizeable Welsh contribution to the campaign, with fully half of these originating from North Wales.²⁵ Combined with those arriving late such as Thomas Wake of Blisworth, the total number of men-at-arms receiving pay was 1354 over the course of the campaign. Unfortunately, the lump sums recorded for pay limit our understanding of the makeup of the contingents; only John de Vere and John Grey of Rotherfeld have the number of knights and bannerets in their contingents recorded for the magnates. While the information for the household contingents is much more complete, the small size and low rank of each retinue reduces the amount of information we can draw from them. Of the 379 men in the household, 42 were knights and 337 men-at-arms, giving a ratio of roughly 8:1 of men-at-arms to knights. This is likely to be at the high end of the typical ratio, as these contingent

²² BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 235r

²³ *Rot Scot*, pp 292-4, 302

²⁴ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 233r-235v

²⁵ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 254r-254v

leaders were all of knight or lower rank, and would not have the financial resources or personal rank to recruit as many of equal status as themselves.

Where many of Edward's Scottish campaigns after Halidon Hill would show restraint in the number of troops assembled, the summer campaign of 1335 was an exception.²⁶ Sheer mass was obviously the aim, in an effort to crush all opposition and forestall the growing French diplomatic interest in including Scotland as a factor in Anglo-French relations. Particularly worth noting are the differences in retinue sizes for those who participated in both this campaign and the earlier one to Roxburgh; these differences give us an idea as to the differences between the number of men these magnates could draw on reliably in any circumstances, such as Roxburgh, and the largest numbers possible for these individuals to call on. These changes are especially notable for the greatest magnates, as would be expected; their greater overall resources allowed them to throw far more men into the field when pressed than when trying to operate with retinues of sustainable size year after year. Thomas Beauchamp brought forty men-at-arms with him to Roxburgh, but was able to double the size of his retinue to 92 men-at-arms for the summer campaign. Henry Lancaster managed a similar feat, increasing his retinue size from sixty to 113 men. The largest increase by far is that from John Warenne, earl of Surrey. Despite providing only forty men-at-arms in November 1334, Warenne was able to bring a huge contingent of 242 men-at-arms, including himself, the Earl of Oxford, six bannerets, and forty-seven knights in its number.²⁷

²⁶ Both the 1336 and 1337 campaigns would have only a small fraction of the men-at-arms and infantry in comparison to the numbers gathered for 1335; see Appendices 1-2.

²⁷ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 233v, 236r (Lancaster, Beauchamp); 234r, 326r (Warenne)

Retinue enlargements, 1334-5

Magnate	Winter 1334	Summer 1335	% increase
John Warenne	40	242	505.0%
John of Eltham	100	135	35.0%
Thomas Beauchamp	40	92	130.0%
Richard FitzAlan	80	106	32.5%
Gilbert Umfraville	30	40	33.3%
Henry Lancaster	60	113	88.3%
Ralph Neville	60	85	41.7%
Henry Percy	120	140	16.7%
Ebulo Lestrangle	40	60	50.0%
James Audley	26	40	53.8%
John Mowbray	40	43	7.5%
Anthony Lucy	30	30	0.0%
Ranulph Dacre	20	30	50.0%
Gilbert Talbot	20	32	60.0%
Roger Swynnerton	20	20	0.0%
Hugh Freyne	20	28	40.0%
John Grey of Rotherfeld	14	20	42.9%
Totals	760	1256	65.3% ¹
			42.6% ²

¹ Raw percentage change

² Adjusted for atypical Warenne increase

Taken from BL Cotton Nero C VIII, 233f-239r

This difference between all-out effort and deliberate selection is less striking for others, both on the higher and lower ends of the scale. Roger Swynnerton and Anthony Lucy brought the exact same number to both campaigns; John Mowbray could only scrape together an additional three knights, and the unfortunate John de Vere, earl of Oxford had to join Warenne's retinue in order to appear at all.²⁸ Still, after discounting Warenne's highly exceptional increase in retinue size, the magnates that participated in both the Roxburgh campaign and the Great Offensive were able to increase their retinue size by just over forty percent.

²⁸ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 233v, 236r-237r

Of the magnates listed individually for the Roxburgh campaign, only Giles Baddlesmere, Henry FitzHugh, and John Multon did not participate the following summer.²⁹ The loss of their thirty knights was more than offset by the large number of additional magnates and soldiers who signed onto the campaign, including the large retinues of Hugh Audley, William Montague, Henry Beaumont, and William Latimer. These four men brought 463 men-at-arms between them, and overall the total from individual magnate contingents was 2242 men.

There was also a sizeable foreign contingent, which would echo the cross-channel connections that Edward III would rely heavily upon during the initial stages of the Hundred Years' War. The earl of Juliers brought a large contingent of 92 men-at-arms with him, along with 51 crossbowmen. Jean de Jens, a Savoyard who had served during the Roxburgh campaign, also joined the king in 1335, though his retinue consisted only of himself and two others.³⁰ Two other contingents were described as coming from Germany, though this may have referred to the Low Countries rather than to areas farther east.³¹ These four contingents provided 119 men-at-arms to the campaign. While this is a relatively small proportion of the men-at-arms in the army, it did mean the largest use of foreign troops since John of Hainault and the lacklustre Weardale campaign.³²

While the magnate contingents increased greatly in size and number, the household contribution did not. Though a few managed to increase the size of their contributions, such as Reginald Cobham and Maurice Berkeley, the household actually shrunk in size, from 379 to 334 men-at-arms. This is not all that surprising;

²⁹ Though we have no basis for comparison for John de Vere, due to the previously mentioned service with John Warenne.


³⁰ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 237v

³¹ One of these contingents includes a Dietrich Mauny, which suggests a connection to Walter Mauny and Hainault.

³² Nicholson, *Edward III and the Scots*, pp 20-21

with the difficulties of a winter campaign, Edward III would have relied heavily upon his household to provide whatever troops they could. The reduction is mainly due to the removal of several contingents to a separate accounting category as

Men-at-Arms Sources - The Great Offensive, 1335



forinsec, or non-household troops. Fifty-four men-at-arms are listed either in this category or other miscellaneous

entries, where in the previous winter they would have been included in the household. The most explicit example of this was Robert Boswell, who received pay for 10 men-at-arms in the winter campaign as part of the household but received pay for seven men-at-arms in summer as a miscellaneous contingent not associated with the household.³³

In part, this may explain why Edward was so assiduous in cultivating the careers and fortunes of his bannerets and other favourites.³⁴ Along with all of the benefits that political allies may provide, he also was faced with the difficulties of a limited manpower pool whose limit was about 350 men, excluding what his bannerets and favoured men could bring with them on campaign. While in the long term the solution to this problem was to expand permanently the household numbers, it could be helped in the short term by increasing the financial and economic wherewithal of those already serving as household knights.

As usual, the counties provided little in the way of men-at-arms, with only nineteen from Lancashire making an appearance. The Welsh contribution was also

³³ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 235r, 239v

much lower than during the winter campaign; what men-at-arms came with their contingents acted as leaders and centenars, rather than as a separate mounted force. Edward did not miss their minor absence; overall, he had 2768 men-at-arms at his disposal, more than enough for both his force moving north from Carlisle and for Balliol's force beginning their march up the east coast from Berwick. Balliol was reinforced with the retinues of John Warenne, Richard FitzAlan, Gilbert Umfraville, Ralph Neville, Henry Percy, Thomas Berkeley, and William Latimer, providing him with 732 men-at-arms in addition to his own contingent.³⁵ Such a move made sense: it guaranteed that Balliol would have the force necessary to succeed in his sweep up the eastern seaboard, without seriously weakening the force at Edward's command. The choice of men to stay with Balliol also made sense; Warenne, Percy, and Umfraville in particular were close to Balliol. Warenne and Umfraville had their disputed earldoms, to which Balliol was the key, while Percy had his indenture for life with Balliol.³⁶

Balliol would later make another independent sweep, this time a run through the Highlands in late September. Sent to accompany him was a good-sized force, all of experienced men. The four earls of Hereford, Buchan, Angus, and Warwick brought their 258 men-at-arms, as did Henry Lancaster and his 113 men. Ralph Neville, William Clinton and Robert Ufford represented the royal household, while William Latimer and John Norwich rounded out the party. This gave Balliol 580 men-at-arms in addition to his own men, sufficient enough to manage his flying raid without difficulty.³⁷

³⁴ J. Bothwell, 'Edward III and the 'New Nobility': Largesse and Limitation in Fourteenth-Century England', *EHR*, v 112 no. 449 (1997) pp 1111-1140

³⁵ *Scalacronica*, p 165; *Lanercost*, p 281; *Bridlington*, p 122

³⁶ J.M.W. Bean, "The Percies and their Estates in Scotland", *Archaeologia Aeliana*, 4th ser, 35 (1957), pp 97-8

³⁷ Cotton Nero C VIII fos. 236r-237v

The third English army to strike Scotland that year was the expeditionary force from Ireland under the justiciar of Ireland, John Darcy. The expectations of how many men-at-arms could serve was high; 600 were requested, though not without extensive efforts to include Irish bishops and native leaders in order to reach this total.³⁸ Though this number was not reached, the results were respectable. By 26 August, 485 men-at-arms were part of the force meant to overrun the Clyde estuary, one-third of whom were provided by Maurice FitzThomas, earl of Desmond. Their service was short, running only through 15 September, though 114 men including Darcy, Desmond and Thomas Wogan stayed on through 14 October.


The armies after 1335 differed in several respects from those before. The experiment with paying lump sums per quarter per twenty men was abandoned; from this point, wages were computed at the standard daily rates. More importantly, the move away from direct royal command of the fight in Scotland altered the number of men-at-arms required. Instead of the king commanding, a 'capitaneus' with the same powers of enforcement as the king over the army was commissioned to serve in his stead. While sizeable forces were still needed and assigned to Henry Lancaster in 1336 and Thomas Beauchamp in 1337, the level of resources being put towards Scotland had definitely been reduced.

Lancaster's responsibilities in 1336 were to secure the lowland areas as far north as Perth, alongside Edward Balliol, who once again we know was operating in the area, but have no pay records for.³⁹ The resumption of computing pay by days served rather than in lump sums gives us a clearer picture of how the force changed over time, though the abridgement of the original pay records in the wardrobe book

³⁸ *Rot Scot* pp 340-3, E101/19/16; see also R. Nicholson, 'An Irish Expedition to Scotland in 1335', *IHR* vol 13 no. 51 (1963), pp 197-211

limits this. Still, we can gather a general idea of the numbers under Lancaster's command. By 21 May, two days after reaching the remnants of Perth, Lancaster had 446 men-at-arms under his command, half of whom were provided by himself, Thomas Beauchamp, and Henry Percy. The army's cavalry core was essentially the retinues of a few key supporters of the king, most of whom already had ample reason to be fighting in Scotland to begin with. Percy and Ughtred had previously made indentures with Balliol. Umfraville and Beaumont had their earldoms to defend, while William Bohun had Annandale. Neville was serving out an indenture with Percy, though his northern interests would have pushed him to serve, much like

Ranulph Dacre.⁴⁰ In total, there were four earls, twelve bannerets, and sixty-eight knights among the 450 under Lancaster.



This would increase to 718 men-at-arms by 28 June

with the arrival of 198 men-at-arms as part of the king's party in its race north to Perth. The king's guard were mostly members of the household, though it included Henry Ferrers, one of the Disinherited, and John Grey of Rotherfeld. Montague, Robert Ufford, and Thomas Bradeston were recorded separately as individual

³⁹ *Original Letters*, pp 32-3

⁴⁰ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 240v-241r

magnates; Walter Mauny and 151 other members of the extended household were recorded in their own section of the *vadia guerre*, as was usual.⁴¹

It is uncertain how many men-at-arms accompanied the king north in his chevauchée. The Queen's letter describing the event claims four hundred men-at-arms went with him,⁴² and it seems likely that the entire royal household including William Bohun and Ralph Neville would have gone north. This only accounts for roughly 290 men, leaving 150 in addition to Bohun and Neville's contingents to be drawn out of Lancaster's troops. Henry Percy was recorded as losing horses at Elgin; if his entire contingent of 74 men-at-arms had gone with him, it would have made up the bulk of the remainder necessary to fulfil the 400 mentioned. Further precision is difficult, though some individuals can be named;⁴³ what seems likely is that Lancaster would have not been on the chevauchée, instead commanding the rump of the forces left supporting Balliol at Perth. Further reinforcements were few and far between, though Montague's contingent would balloon from the six with which he began the journey from Newcastle on 14 June to a height of 58 in mid-August, before slowly being reduced to 47 by 8 October. The only other sizeable addition to the forces in the north was the retinue of John of Eltham on 28 July.⁴⁴

It is questionable how many troops John of Eltham brought north with him to Perth in 1336, especially the 400 men-at-arms and 7000 hobelars and archers mentioned in the Queen's letter. The wardrobe pay records record no other retinues coming under pay at the same time as John on 28 July, and only the five retinues of

⁴¹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 241r-242v, 243v-244r; *Scalacronica*, p 166 describes the king's guard as '100 men at arms', about half that listed as receiving pay as part of the king's household or as accompanying the king north. However, if one discounts the lists of squires other than the retinues of William L'English and John Brocaz, the total comes to 95, about that suggested by Grey. The 100 may also have been a conscious echoing of the 100 men-at-arms that Guy of Namur had with him during his similar rush north the previous year.

⁴² *Original Letters*, pp 33-9

⁴³ Details of horse losses and valuations can be found in John Houton's horse valuations: E101 19 36, discussed in A. Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses* (1994), pp 63-4

William Guilford, Giles Beauchamp, William Stury, Walter Facomberge, and John Molyns enter service in July at all. Additionally, no contingents from any of the counties begin receiving pay in July, and the contingent from six counties starting on 5 August is likely to mostly be a remnant from a similar multiple-county force that immediately precedes it. This date of 5 August also makes it further unlikely to be a new force, as one would expect it to have been entered into the books on a date far closer than the nine days separating it from Eltham's. On 28 July seven separate counties are recorded as having contingents,⁴⁵ and the strength of these continues to be recorded through August. Their presence makes it more unlikely that further large contingents were being drawn from the northern counties, or that they would not be recorded in the pay records if they were. The most likely explanation for John's large force described both by the Queen's letter and by the chroniclers is his meeting and merging with Lancaster's force in the field; all that we can be certain of is the eighty-five men-at-arms recorded by Ferriby.⁴⁶

The urgency of the September parliament at Nottingham stripped Edward and many of the contingent leaders from the force at Nottingham for a month, though it did not drastically reduce the number of men available. The loss of several contingents in September, including that of John of Eltham after his death, was partly counterbalanced by further reinforcement by at least forty of the king's household in August. 17 September, three days after Edward's departure for the south, saw 690 men-at-arms still receiving the king's wages. Some contingents amongst the magnates also suffered a reduction: Lancaster's men-at-arms were cut in half to fifty in early September, Beauchamp went from 74 to 57, and Percy saw a reduction from

⁴⁴ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 240r

⁴⁵ Westmorland, Cumberland, Northumberland, the palatinate of Durham, Yorkshire, Derby, and Lincoln.

74 to 46, among others.⁴⁷ The reductions came after much of the region, particularly Fife, had been secured and the fortifications assigned to various magnates with Edward at the time in Perth.

October saw the last military effort on the part of the English, with Edward returning to take control of the remnants of Bothwell Castle and begin its renovation. The sixty-nine men-at-arms from the magnate retinues that had gone home were replaced with seventeen more from the royal household and thirty-five from seven magnate contingents including Richard FitzAlan, earl of Arundel.⁴⁸ As Murray was focusing his attention on destroying the garrisons at Dunnotar, Kinneff, and Lauriston at the time, the English were left unmolested during Edward's stay there until 10 December. Several household members such as Robert Ufford and Walter Mauny provided 45 men to guard supply shipments to the castle. Oddly, Ferriby's wardrobe book specifically states that Ufford received pay for serving in person with these men, despite his being at Westminster to be created earl of Suffolk.⁴⁹ They remained until March 1337, when the castle was surrendered on terms to Andrew Murray as his next siege after his successful reduction of Fife.⁵⁰

The campaign of 1337 has been closely analysed by N.B. Lewis due to the move away from dependence on obligatory summons to provide the men-at-arms for the campaign to a more voluntary system of contracted troops.⁵¹ Rather than

⁴⁶ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 240r-244r; 259r-260r; *Original Letters*, p 39; *Scotichronicon*, pp 122-3; *Fordun*, p 361

⁴⁷ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 240r, 240v

⁴⁸ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 243r

⁴⁹ The wardrobe book shows Ufford being paid through 24 March, though he was created earl on 16 March. *Handbook of British Chronology*, ed. E.B. Fryde, D.E. Greenway, S. Porter & I.Roy, 3rd ed (RHS, 1986), p 483

⁵⁰ *Anonimalle*, pp 9; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 241v-242r

⁵¹ The list of speculative contingents to serve in 1337 is PRO E101 15 17, reprinted as Appendix I in N.B. Lewis, 'The recruitment and organization of a contract army, May to November 1337', *BIHR* 37 (1964), pp 1-19

depending upon using the specific and limited obligations owed to him by his vassals, Edward became more reliant on mutually agreed contracts with magnates to provide troops in return for pay.

Command as 'capitaneus et ductor' was granted to Thomas Beauchamp on 25 March granting him wide powers to call on levies from the lands north of the Trent if necessary and to control all English forces in Scotland during his tenure, with Thomas Uflete assigned as his sole paymaster.⁵² The number of men-at-arms that could participate on the campaign was anticipated by the list of solders available for the war drawn up after an assembly at York in April; though the list simply names contingent leaders and the number that they could bring to the war, it shows an increasing sophistication in the crown's preparations for the war and in its recruitment. As Lewis notes, this would have provided a force of 580 men-at-arms to the earl of Warwick, a number roughly comparable to the manpower available to Lancaster.⁵³ Most were northern lords, though the household continued to provide a fair-sized component despite the planned absence of the king. This is unsurprising: the northern lords had the most investment in the king's success in Scotland, while the king in turn was sure to place a sizeable portion of his military power into securing his gains as long as they were not required elsewhere.

The resulting number of men-at-arms headed north with Beauchamp was rather different in size and composition than the provisional list drawn up at York. Many who had promised contingents did not actually go on campaign, while few except for Robert Clifford and Ralph Hastings actually provided the exact number promised. The largest contingents, unsurprisingly, were provided by those with northern stakes or by Beauchamp himself. Warwick provided 63 men-at-arms at the

⁵² *Rot Scot*, p 488

beginning of the campaign in May, while the Disinherited lords Umfraville and Wake managed 71 men between them in their contingents. Northern English interests were anchored by Henry Percy's 40 men-at-arms and Ralph Neville's 33.⁵⁴ In total, fourteen contingents provided 285 men-at-arms, just under half the original speculations. Of these, 207 belonged to the five men listed above: for an army meant to prosecute the interests of the crown in Scotland, it was dependent on an extraordinarily narrow base to provide its relatively low manpower.

Matters did improve in June, as the existing retinues were augmented by new troops and further contingents arrived to bolster the army's numbers. The most important of these were accompanying the king, who had rushed north in order to break the siege of Stirling.⁵⁵ Two of Edward's new earls, William Bohun and Hugh Audley, brought retinues of 59 and 36 men-at-arms while Walter Mauny, Henry Ferrers, and a number of other household members had their own contingents. Other major contingents not with the king included 44 men from John Kirkby, bishop of Carlisle, and the Disinherited lord John Mowbray. Several of the existing contingents expanded noticeably, with Beauchamp doubling the size of his contingent and Percy and Neville each increasing their retinues to about fifty men. By the time of the king's arrival at Stirling on 14 June, the force in Scotland had swelled to 633 men-at-arms. Not only was the number in the realm of the initial numbers planned for, it also raised it to the low end of the forces commanded by

⁵³ Lewis, 'The recruitment and organization of a contract army, May to November 1337', p 9; for Lancaster, see above

⁵¹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII fo. 245r

⁵⁵ Lewis' statement that 'The force seems, in spite of its palpable defects, to have discharged its main task of beating off Scotch attack as at Stirling and Edinburgh' does not seem to coincide with the military events of 1337. For news to have reached Edward III in the south and for him to make his rushed trip north without Beauchamp having relieved Stirling suggests that Beauchamp had neither the manpower nor the reputation with the Scots to force them to raise the siege; the need to send Arundel and Salisbury north to rescue Edinburgh in November carries much the same implication, though it came at the very end of Beauchamp's term in Scotland. Similarly, the defection of Eustace Maxwell to the Bruce camp and the consequent raids on Cumberland imply a breakdown of control

Lancaster the previous year. Somewhere around 450 men-at-arms, along with the appropriate archers, appears to have been the threshold number for an army to succeed in its mission in Scotland: certainly, the siege of Stirling did not break until after the king's arrival, and had been ongoing since June.⁵⁶

The king's participation in northern matters was brief: having dealt with the acute crisis, he immediately departed for the south, with a good portion of the army doing the same. Eight of the smaller contingents from Beauchamp's army including the banneret John Darcy left service in June, as did Hugh Audley and most of the household that had come north with Edward III except for *William Bohun and John Molyns*.⁵⁷ By 1 July, the number of men-at-arms had shrunk to 460 men, a number that would remain roughly steady through August, thanks in part to 46 arrivals being paid under the aegis of John St. Albans, Uflete's replacement as paymaster of the army, and another 43 provided directly from Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, Lincolnshire, and Northumberland.⁵⁸ Ferriby's wardrobe book ends at 30 August, but does record pay beyond that date for several contingents: seven men-at-arms under William Kellesy, John St. Albans' controller, St. Albans's own three, and the tailings of the men who had arrived under St. Albans in August carry on to the end of November and Beauchamp's tenure. Unfortunately, Beauchamp's own contingent and several others are not recorded in such detail by Ferriby.⁵⁹

north of the border. Lewis, 'The recruitment and organization of a contract army, May to November 1337', p 13; see also below

⁵⁶ *Scotichronicon*, pp 130-1; *Fordun*, p 362; *Anonimalle*, p 10; *Scalacronica*, p 167

⁵⁷ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 245v-246v

⁵⁸ *Rot Scot*, p 497; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 247r, 262r-262v

⁵⁹ Further, see PRO E101 388 5, mm. 12 and 13

Infantry

For the men-at-arms on campaign, the traditional competing sources of supply were from the retinues of magnates and those serving as part of the household. The counties provided very little towards the total, only one or two dozen at most during years of heavy recruitment.⁶⁰ Where the counties had been key was in providing the infantry and light troops that were the bulk of English armies at any time. Until Edward III's time, they were also essentially the only source of non-cavalry troops, at least in any large numbers. The 1300 campaign to take Caerlaverock was mostly dependent on troops from Yorkshire, Lancashire, and several other northern counties, with the only other sizeable contributions coming from various Scottish garrisons and the guards for the royal wardrobe.⁶¹ This reliance on the counties altered under Edward III as a large part of the infantry soldiers began to be provided not through the commissions of array or the counties but from the recruitment of archers directly into the retinues that magnates were contracting to provide to the crown.⁶²

Several factors help to account for this change. The largest was the increasing tendency to recruit a larger percentage of mounted archers, rather than simple foot soldiers. Though both fought on foot and superficially had the same function on the battlefield, their equipment and the economic divide that it represented meant that the nature of the army would change as the proportions making it up altered. There was little concern as to how the infantry was armed

⁶⁰ As mentioned earlier, 58 were provided for the Roxburgh campaign, while all 19 appeared for the 'Great Offensive' of 1335. While the twenties and hundreds provided by the counties often were armoured cavalry, I have chosen to group them with the men they led rather than separate them from those they fought with.

⁶¹ *Liber Quotidianus Controtulitoris Garderobiae 1299-1300*, ed. J. Topham *et al* (1787), *passim*

⁶² See appendix 2 for specific numbers.

during Edward I's time; weapons were provided by the localities, and the quantity of soldiers was the crown's concern far more than the quality of those troops.⁶³ This apathy had disappeared as the utility of a mostly mounted force had become more and more apparent, and as the victories at Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill demonstrated how a smaller body of higher-quality troops were far more effective than reliance on masses of low-quality soldiers to crush the enemy. By the Hundred Years' War, this would extend as far as stockpiling large numbers of arrows and bows at the Tower for later use.⁶⁴

The campaigns being carried out in Scotland emphasised the need for mobility. Some, such as Edward III's hurried chevauchée through northern Scotland in 1336, could not have been done without the speed an entirely mounted force could provide.

Another factor in the movement away from reliance upon the counties was the expanding use of contracts to provide troops of any type for the royal armies, not simply of one category or another. If a magnate had the wherewithal to recruit several men-at-arms to carry out a contract with the crown, they certainly could recruit the far less expensive mounted archers to accompany them. The pools of manpower that each type of soldier came from were quite different: where the men-at-arms came from the upper echelons of society, the mounted archer was still drawn from the commons, though not from as wide a pool as had been the case under Edward I. The increasing costs of equipment, particularly in the horse of the mounted archer, reduced the pool of men who could afford the necessary items and increased the costs on the localities for providing the proper equipment for those sent to war. Where it had cost as little as 5s 6d to equip a soldier for the village of

⁶³ M.C. Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance Under Edward I* (Aldershot, 1972), p 105

⁶⁴ H.J. Hewitt, *The Organisation of War under Edward III* (Manchester, 1966), pp 63-71

Launditch in 1295, by 1338 it was costing the men of Hatfield £1 11s 8d to equip each hobelar they sent to the wars, most of which was the cost of their mounts.⁶⁵

The infantry of Edward III's Scottish wars were recruited through three methods. Troops could be called upon by the crown directly from the counties, either in levies or arrays. Alternatively, the magnates who would be serving on campaign either via contract or obligation could be asked to carry out the recruitment of troops as well, to be included within their retinues. The last was to find others willing to serve for other reasons than simple pay in the armies; the usual example of this was the participation of criminals in the fighting.

The least significant is the recruitment of felons and criminals to serve in the army in return for being pardoned of their crimes upon the completion of the campaign. This practice was not a popular one, for several reasons. The pardoning of criminal elements in return for a relatively short spell of military service reduced the effectiveness of the justice system in the shires, in providing an alternative method for offenders to pay for the consequences of their malfeasance.⁶⁶ This problem was exacerbated during periods of recurring campaigns, such as under Edward I from 1296-1305 and under Edward III from the Halidon Hill campaign until the beginning of hostilities with France. With an army almost guaranteed to be heading north every year, criminals could expect that even if they were caught, they could avoid the punishment due them through judicial proceedings by serving in the army. The deterrence factor of punishment was therefore heavily reduced, especially for such crimes as homicide and manslaughter where the guilty felon had already

⁶⁵ J.R.S. Maddicott, *The English Peasantry and the Demands of the Crown 1294-1341 (Past and Present Supplement, 1975)*, pp 39-40

⁶⁶ R.W. Kauper, *War, Justice and Public Order: England and France in the Later Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1988), pp 126-7

engaged in violent actions. As Hewitt has pointed out, numerous petitions linked the pardons directly to the upsurge in crime carried out by returned felons.⁶⁷

Once the felons had been pardoned, they usually returned to the towns and villages from which they originated. This created great difficulties in many cases. For instance, in August 1333 letters close were sent to the sheriffs of England instructing them to announce the forfeiture of the pardons issued for service to any of the pardoned criminals who broke the king's peace or made illicit gatherings. A similar letter a month later to the sheriff of York ordered him to associate with a 'discreet and lawful man' to find out the names of such men who were re-embarking on a life of crime and arrest them, using the *posse comitatus* if necessary.⁶⁸ The pardoning of such men did little to deter them from their previous pursuits; if anything, it gave them the means to continue carrying on as before.

The existence of such writs was problematic in itself. Felons would attempt to use pardons for previous service for crimes committed later. Some criminals even claimed to have been pardoned for service, despite never having served in any campaign; Richard Willoughby and others of the king's bench were instructed not to pardon men claiming pardons from service unless the service could be proven.⁶⁹ That several writs had to be issued regarding pardoned criminals, those claiming to be pardoned, and their activities indicates that enough men served under such conditions that their existence was known, if not commonplace, and that they returned in sufficient numbers to cause an increase in lawlessness.

It would be an error to say that those seeking pardons made up any significant portion of the armies that marched into Scotland. Even on campaigns with small armies, such as the Roxburgh campaign, criminals made up a tiny portion of the

⁶⁷ H.J. Hewitt, *The Organization of War Under Edward III 1338-62* (Manchester, 1958), p 174

⁶⁸ *CCR 1333-7*, pp 129, 173

troops involved: only three percent of the troops with Edward that winter were felons. The assumption was that their desertion rates would be lower, due to the nature of their service, and that they would be more accustomed to the rigours of the expected conflict and its violence. This, added to the possibility of drawing numbers from another source than the usual ones at the call of the crown, made such recruitment worthwhile to the crown, despite the drawbacks to law enforcement and the peace of the realm.

There are two instances of felons receiving pay in Ferriby's wardrobe book. The first is during the Roxburgh campaign in the winter of 1334. Two hundred felons overseen by two centenars took up pay on 4 November 1334 for 100 days, leaving service on 9 February the next year. Of these, 160 were foot archers, the balance being paid as hobelars.⁷⁰ The following summer, 171 men served as foot archers, though only for 35 days through August and early September.⁷¹ No mention is made of further service for pardons in the rest of Ferriby's book, or in Norwell's wardrobe book for 1338-1340. The combination of smaller forces recruited more via contract than traditional methods and the problems caused by returning pardonees is the likely explanation for the end of this practice.

The second major method for recruiting troops was the use of the connections and recruiting abilities of the magnates who would be on the campaign to recruit archers for their own retinues. Much as the nobility and gentry were being contracted with to provide set numbers of men-at-arms for periods of service, so too were they agreeing to provide the services of archers.

These were invariably mounted; of the numerous collections of archers provided by individual captains, only Arnold Garcy, a household squire, and William

⁶⁹ *CCR 1333-7*, p 158

⁷⁰ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 254r

Norwell provided foot archers in addition to their mounted contingents.⁷² As the archers would dismount for combat and form up as infantry rather than fight on horseback, their mounts were much less costly than the coursers and destriers used by the men-at-arms. Where a good courser could be evaluated at £10, an archer's hackney could be purchased for roughly 20s.⁷³

This method was the most advantageous for the crown, both due to its simplicity and its results. Household manpower and resources were not being tied up in collecting this pool of soldiers, as it was the responsibility of the individual magnates with whom the crown was entering the contracts and agreements to find the men and bring them to the campaign. Further, the crown was not having to concern itself with the equipment and mounting of the archers. In agreeing to provide a set number of troops of a certain type of quality, the individual retinue leaders were also taking on the responsibility to have the troops they were providing match the specifications set by the crown. Beyond contractual obligations, the presence of these men as part of a magnate's retinue meant that his personal reputation was reflected in their preparedness, and not to be neglected.

Prince noted a tendency to recruit mounted archers in equal numbers to the men-at-arms that were brought by magnates in their retinues during Edward III's reign.⁷⁴ This does hold true for a number of bannerets and knights in the Scottish wars. For example, Ebulo LeStrange brought 40 men-at-arms and 40 mounted archers, while Roger Swynnerton brought 20 men-at-arms and 25 mounted archers on the Roxburgh campaign.⁷⁵ While the suggestion of such a trend exists in the

⁷¹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 258r

⁷² BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 253v

⁷³ Andrew Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy Under Edward III*, p 15, 48

⁷⁴ A.E. Prince, 'The Strength of English Armies in the Reign of Edward III' *EHR* 183 (1931), p355

⁷⁵ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 233v, 253r

records, it should not be overstressed. The procedures and customs surrounding the recruitment of archers were just beginning to be formed, and had none of the solidity apparent to us in hindsight. This can be seen by comparison with the summer campaign in 1335. Ebulo Lestrangle did bring the same number of eighty men to service, but Roger Swynnerton had only 5 mounted archers in the retinue for the summer, reducing his men by twenty.

There is a consistency to the number of men that each lord could bring from year to year, though the regularity of service could affect the pool of manpower available to each individual. James Audley nearly doubled the men he recruited between the winter of 1334 and the summer of 1335 from 61 to 104. However, the proportion of men-at-arms to mounted archers remained roughly the same, dropping from roughly 3:4 to 2:3 men-at-arms to archers.

This pool of manpower was limited in size, however. Some of the participants of the Roxburgh campaign were able to increase the size of their men-at-arms contingents, yet had to accept large reductions in the number of mounted archers they could provide. Richard FitzAlan, earl of Arundel, increased the number of men-at-arms from eighty to 106, yet reduced his mounted archer contingent from seventy to 24. The earls of Warwick and Angus each lost three-fifths of their archers, while Henry Percy's contingent dropped from fifty to thirty men. Whether an individual's retinue of archers grew or shrank for the summer campaign does not appear to be dependent upon region.

The rest of the mounted archers and the vast bulk of the foot archers were recruited through commissioners of array. Commissions were extended to numerous individuals, nearly always professional soldiers, to recruit specific quotas of able men from the available troops in specified areas. These areas could be large units,

like the counties specified in the commissions given for the 1335 offensive, or smaller, more specific parcels such as the wapentakes and liberties of Yorkshire two years earlier.⁷⁶ No obvious pattern exists for which method was used: the determination appears to have been made afresh each year.

Comparable to the commissions in England were those given for the raising of Welsh troops. Rather than having to work within a county structure with various liberties and exceptions to the king's writ, the commissions issued to Welsh arrayers were via the lands of various magnates in Wales, or the administrative units of the Principality. An example comes from the levies for the summer campaign of 1335. The commissions for troops were issued to magnates, specifying them both by their accustomed English titles and by the specific lordships that they held in Wales for example, Henry of Lancaster was addressed as 'Lord of Kidwelly and Cranwethlan in Wales'. Such writs were sent to Lancaster, William Montague, John Charlton, the earls of Warenne, Hereford and Arundel, Roger Grey of Rotherfield, Fulk FitzWarin, William la Zouche, Gilbert Talbot, Hugh Audley, John Mowbray, and Ebulo LeStrange. Further writs were issued to royal officials and trusted men for crown lands in Wales, such as Rhys ap Gruffydd in South Wales, Hugh Tyrel in Radnor and Cary, and Gruffydd Vechan in Flintshire.⁷⁷

These commissions usually did not run to the towns and cities of the various counties; often as part of their charters towns were granted the right to be excepted from the county levy, or to have a set quota of the county levy that they themselves would carry out the array for.⁷⁸ Twenty-eight towns received specific requests for

⁷⁶ *Rot Scot*, pp 328-9; pp 242-3

⁷⁷ *Rot Scot*, pp 330-2, 338-9

⁷⁸ A.E. Prince, 'The Army and Navy', in *The English Government at Work, 1327-1336*, ed J.F. Willard and W.A. Morris (Cambridge, MA; 1940), pp 363-4

mounted archers for the 1335 campaign from Edward; of these, nine sent troops, with the others paying fines in order to be exempt from the levy.⁷⁹

The use of commissions of array was certainly not a novel approach to recruiting archers and foot soldiers, having been used heavily by both Edward I and II. Nor can the specification of smaller administrative units for recruitment purposes be considered a new development. What is notable is the continuation of the trend of the previous two reigns in specifying more and more intently numbers of troops of specific quality and type. Rather than asking for several hundred generic men from various counties, Edward and his chancery were requesting detailed numbers of specialised troops such as hobelars and mounted infantry. This is in sharp contrast to Edward I's reign, when the quality of the infantry recruited was not nearly so pressing an issue for the crown.⁸⁰ Though the use of commissions of array would diminish with the growth of contract armies and indentured troops in the Hundred Years' War, they were still the pre-eminent and most dependable method for the collection of the large mass of infantry necessary for English military efforts.

Infantry rates of pay were standardised, much like that of the cavalry. A foot archer (*sagittarius ad pedum*) received two pennies a day, while a mounted archer (*sagittarius ad equum*) received twice that amount. Normally, no difference is made in pay between service north or south of the border. The Roxburgh campaign is an exception, with the king's council agreeing to pay magnates 6d per day for mounted archers while in 'peaceful lands' (*terra pacis*) and 4d per day while in Scotland itself.⁸¹ Presumably, this reflects an assumption that the forces will supplement their wages by living off the land while in 'enemy' territory and the difficulties in recruiting soldiers for a winter campaign.

⁷⁹ *Rot Scot*, p 339; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 256r

⁸⁰ M.C. Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance*, p 105

There were the occasional exceptions to this. The king's bodyguard, commanded by John Ward, John Stanford, and Henry Pledour, ranged from one hundred to two hundred mounted archers in strength and was recruited from Cheshire. They were paid 6d per day, as a reflection of the importance of their duty and of their elite status.⁸² On occasion troops received less per man than the going rate: the 1,031 mounted archers from Cumberland and Westmorland who fought in Scotland in August 1335 only received 3d per day for their services.⁸³ Other exceptions occurred throughout the period, most notably during the Roxburgh campaign and 1337 campaigns.

Hobelars were also heavily used on campaign, though differentiating them from the mounted archers is difficult at best from the financial sources. Several of the entries in the wardrobe books group them indiscriminately with the mounted archers and the vintenars, as they receive the same level of pay (4d/day).⁸⁴ Importantly, few hobelars are mentioned as part of any magnate's retinue. They were raised from the county musters and from the various lands in Wales, areas with writs from the crown determining the numbers recruited there. Where there is a tendency to distinguish them from mounted archers, it is often to grant them a slightly more favourable rate of pay, at 6d/day. The 1335 expedition from Ireland paid its hobelars 6d/day, while the twelve hobelars in John Houton's contingent in 1336 received 6d/day and the 30 mounted archers with him only received 4d/day.⁸⁵ Granting the extra pay to the hobelars makes sense: while the mounted archer is most likely to fight on foot, with their mount not immediately involved in the fighting, the

⁸¹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 252v-253v

⁸² BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 252r, 255r, 259r, 261r

⁸³ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 258r

⁸⁴ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 252v-259v *passim*

⁸⁵ E101 19/16, m. 6; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 259v

hobelar engages in close combat, where the quality of the horse is far more important and the horse itself at far more risk of injury or death.

Unusually for the Scottish campaigns, the magnates and the royal household were the main source of mounted archers at Edward III's disposal during the winter campaign of 1334-5.⁸⁶ Later years would see a dramatic rise in the number of infantry being provided by the counties through commissions of array, but this campaign would be far more dependent upon the contributions of individual magnates for both its heavy cavalry and its infantry components.

There is no direct correspondence between the number of men-at-arms that were in individual retinues and the number of mounted archers; where some magnates were able to provide far more archers than men-at-arms, others were able to offer far less for the infantry. Henry Lancaster provided 100 mounted archers, well in excess of the sixty men-at-arms he brought, while Gilbert Umfraville and John Multon provided eighty and twenty mounted archers each, in comparison with their thirty and ten men-at-arms, respectively. William Bohun provided sixty archers, though any contribution he may have made of men-at-arms is missing from the wardrobe book. By contrast, others provided far fewer archers. Henry Percy only provided fifty in comparison with his 120 men-at-arms, while Ralph Neville provided forty archers and sixty men-at-arms. Several did follow the oft-quoted trend of providing equal numbers of both: Thomas Beauchamp provided forty of each, as did John Warenne and Ebulo Lestrage. Others approximated this, such as Roger Swynnerton's twenty men-at-arms and twenty-five mounted archers, and Richard FitzAlan's eighty men-at-arms and seventy mounted archers.

The twelve magnates who provided the largest portion of men-at-arms also provided the largest part of the mounted archers, despite two of these, Anthony Lucy and John Mowbray, not recorded as providing archers at all. 512 were provided by the ten remaining men, making up 36% of the total force: by comparison, the twelve's contribution to the men-at-arms was 53% of the total number. The other magnates provided only a further 216 men, similar in scope to their contributions to the cavalry.

As mentioned earlier, this campaign differed from most in how the mounted archers were paid. While in England, many of the magnate retinues were paid 6d per day, dropping to 4d per day while in Scotland. Several retinues do not, though this can be explained by the retinues already being in Scotland, or as defending their own lands. Gilbert Umfraville and John Warenne only receive 4d/day for their troops, as they held the Scottish earldoms of Angus and Strathearn. Henry Percy and Ralph Neville were already operating in the area as custodians of the March, while William Tynedale and William Pressen were both northern men and in close proximity to the fighting. In addition, Henry Percy at this point held Jedburgh, just to the south.⁸⁷ The royal household was also exempted from the favourable rates of pay, receiving only 4d/day per archer except in the case of Thomas Wake of Blisworth, the king's standard-bearer, and William Norwell, the king's cofferer, who were paid the same as the majority of magnate retinues.⁸⁸ This included not only Neville, but also William Bohun and his sixty archers, though the latter may have had his brother's acquisition of Lochmaben counted against him.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 252r-254v


⁸⁷ *Rot Scot*, p 280; *CCR 1333-7*, p 327

⁸⁸ BL Cotton Nero C VIII fo. 253v

⁸⁹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII fo. 253v; for Lochmaben, see *Rot Scot*, p 280; *CCR 1333-7*, p 327

Where there are major differences from the patterns seen in contributions to the men-at-arms is in the number of mounted archers provided by the royal household. Foremost among these are the 100 men employed as members of the royal bodyguard under John Ward and 55 men from Cheshire under John Daneport. While the household's strength in men-at-arms was essentially dependent on the retinues of the relatively small collection of men it directly retained as household knights, it had no difficulty in hiring a sizeable body of archers to bolster its strength. It relied on fewer of its knights to provide mounted archers. Where there were forty-nine separate retinues included in household numbers, only ten add additional numbers to the household's archer strength, and nine in relatively little numbers. Only William Norwell's collection of over 100 diverse archers is of any size, and reflects the inclusion of individual recruits under a single heading rather than any personal ability of Norwell to recruit such a large body in his own right. Even considering the lack of secondary contributions from the household knights to the number of mounted archers, the 424 archers provided match the household's contribution percentage-wise that it made to the men-at-arms.

These percentages would be surprisingly high, were it not for the small



numbers of mounted archers from the counties serving with the army. When the army moved into Scotland in November,

only 256 of the 1408 were from the counties, despite the far higher numbers requested in the commissions of array granted in November. Of these, 42 were

criminals serving for pardons. Nearly all were from Yorkshire, and were a far cry from the 1,050 initially demanded from its three Ridings.⁹⁰ The failure of the counties to provide the demanded soldiers was a great irritation to Edward III, who would devote a great deal of his winter to lambasting his officials for their failure to provide the numbers he felt were necessary.⁹¹

Yorkshire was somewhat more successful in providing foot soldiers, though the numbers were the same small fraction of what had initially been requested. Of the 5,310 footmen requested from the county, only 952 are recorded receiving pay by 17 November.⁹² In addition to the normal foot soldiers were 100 'armati' provided by the city of York, probably heavily armed foot soldiers: these men received double the usual pay, earning 4d per day. The remainder of the 1117 foot were provided by four contingents: 124 from the Forest of Dean, 160 felons seeking pardons, 40 volunteers under the aegis of William Norwell, and a single archer under Arnold Garcy, a squire of the king's household.⁹³ The Forest of Dean was singled out for troops as it was also being asked to provide miners to assist the campaign: 25 began receiving pay on 29 October, and all but one continued in service until 4 February, when both miners and foot departed royal service.⁹⁴ The large number of Welshmen who were recruited for the campaign doubled the number of foot. Wales was considered a prime recruiting ground, and a dependable source of men. Four separate contingents were recruited from North Wales, South Wales, Merionydd, and the lands of Radnor and Cary, under Roger Corbet, Rhys ap Gruffydd, Walter

⁹⁰ *Rot Scot*, pp 287-8

⁹¹ *Rot Scot*, pp 289-91

⁹² BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 253v-254r

⁹³ Garcy is listed as receiving robes for winter 1334 from the wardrobe: BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 225v

⁹⁴ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 254r

Mauny, and Hugh Tyrel. They would provide 906 additional foot, 35 hobelars, and a small contingent of 25 hobelars.⁹⁵

Overall, by 24 November there were 1408 English mounted archers, 1117 foot, 100 'armati' from York, and 906 Welsh foot, for a total of 3,531 infantry at Edward III's disposal. Though these numbers are comparable to the armies sent to Scotland in 1336 and 1337, in 1334 it was not yet accepted that a much smaller army than that which took Berwick could operate successfully against the supporters of David Bruce. Considering the length of the supply line to Dundarg if the army were to march north and the need to detach troops to defend it, this caution had some validity. The time of year certainly boded ill for venturing north, as the weather would interfere with shipping supplies and both food and fodder would be in short supply. As it was, Edward III made a reputation for himself by sharing the hardship of the wait at Berwick with his troops.⁹⁶

In addition to the soldiers were the workmen who had to put the slighted castle back into usable form. Richard Goushill, a master mason, is recorded as receiving pay for 55 masons, ranging in pay from his own 8d/day to a journeyman's 4d/day for working through winter from 7 November to 1 February. In addition, there was another mason for a short fifteen days and 106 various helpers, ranging from highly skilled men earning 6d/day down to a more standard 2d/day. 35 carpenters earning from 3d to 6d a day were also employed, along with three smiths and 4 tilers. The cost of their wages would total £189 5s 9d.⁹⁷

Further reinforcements were paltry and much delayed: 120 hobelars from Durham received pay for nineteen days of December, before returning home along with 131 of the 331 Derbyshire foot who had arrived at the same time. January saw

⁹⁵ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 254v-254r

⁹⁶ *Knighton*, p 472

46 mounted archers and 187 foot arrive from Lancashire and Nottinghamshire, and 185 mounted archers from Lincolnshire begin receiving pay on 19 February just in time to disband all of four days later. Despite Edward's calls for reinforcements, only 368 mounted troops and 518 foot made their way north over three months' time. While the 26% increase in mounted archers and 46% increase in foot soldiers from England may have been helpful, the numbers were by no means capable of giving Edward the means to move northwards, and likely would have barely offset the desertions that a winter campaign must have suffered, even if not reflected in the pay records of the wardrobe book. Given Edward's strenuous efforts to gain more troops and the poor results, it is unsurprising that he chose to disband his forces in February.

The Roxburgh campaign was unique for the 1330s in the balance of the infantry being provided by either magnate contingents or by the royal household. The campaigns of the next three years would see the household element disappear entirely from the makeup of the infantry, with only the royal bodyguard being recorded. The focus between different sources of manpower would move away from the household versus the magnates to being between the magnates and the counties, as the latter took on its more traditional role as the primary recruiting ground for the infantry. The one constant would be the role of the lands in Wales, which always provided a sizeable body of troops.

The 'Great Offensive' of 1335 is the one example in the 1330s for which we have pay records of a campaign that attempts to draw on as many men from England as is practical.⁹⁸ The other likely candidate for this type of campaign was the 1333 campaign leading to Halidon Hill, for which we have no payroll surviving. The

⁹⁷ BL Cotton Nero C VIII fo. 254v

⁹⁸ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 255r-258v; see appendix, 'Troop Numbers Summer 1335'

requests sent out on 27 March called for over 2,500 hobelars and 7,000 archers. The crown also undoubtedly expected that large numbers of the 137 magnates who also received summons for service would also bring mounted archers, much as those who attended the winter campaign had.⁹⁹ The intent was without a doubt to make up for the deficiencies of the winter campaign, and the planning that began immediately after Edward's return from Scotland reflects this.

The counties to all intents and purposes had failed to provide the winter campaign the manpower that was traditionally their place to provide within the English military machine of the fourteenth century. The relatively new innovation of magnates providing large numbers of archers via contract had filled the breach, but had its limitations in being the aggregate of the individual capacities of those coming under contract to provide soldiers. As the numbers of archers required far outstripped that of the number of men-at-arms required, this gap had to be filled by the counties.


The limitations to magnate resources come into sharp focus when looking at the contributions of those who had participated in both the winter 1334 and summer 1335 campaigns. Most saw the numbers under their command drastically reduced. Most of those who provided over forty mounted archers during the winter cut their contributions by at least forty percent. John Warenne, John of Eltham, Thomas Beauchamp, and Richard FitzAlan each contributed 24 men, though they had given 40 men in winter except for the 70 provided by the earl of Arundel. Gilbert Umfraville also reduced his contingent by forty percent, providing 48 instead of 80. The regularity of the numbers suggests some conscious action to set them, though for others the pattern does not hold. Roger Swynnerton reduced his contribution to five mounted archers. William Bohun cut his 60 in half to 30 for the summer; Henry

⁹⁹ *Rot Scot*, pp 328-9, 332-3

Percy reduced his contingent from 50 to 20, while Ebulo Lestrangle lost only one archer from the winter campaign's 40 archers. On the other hand, James Audley and Hugh Freyne increased the numbers they contributed, with James providing 64 instead of 35 and Hugh providing 30 rather than 13.

The household element essentially disappeared from the list of mounted archers for the campaign. While the royal bodyguard was still employed and had 162 men in its company, only John Brocaz and his 27 men came from any member of the household under banneret rank. The household was certainly on the campaign in strength, with nearly every member receiving fees and robes participating in person; however, this strength did not extend to providing any sizeable number of mounted archers. This is not all that surprising; much of the household would have been men of relatively little means compared to the magnates, and with the extensive preparations and large quotas of troops being demanded from the counties, there would have been far less need for the household to attempt to make up the difference.

While the contributions of the winter veterans may have dropped, the loss of depth in the contingents was made up for in breadth by the inclusion of a large number of new contingent leaders. John Bohun, earl of Hereford contributed 29 archers, though the future earls William Montague and Hugh Audley would both



contribute larger contingents of 40 and 56 mounted archers respectively. Other large contingents included the 40 men of


William Clinton, the 33 men of John Leyburn, and the 34 men of Anthony Lucy. The largest of the new contingents were not from major magnates, but were instead from northerners recruiting in their local regions. Robert Manners, the constable of Norham Castle brought 54 men, while the Northumbrians Robert Ogle and Thomas Featherstonehaugh brought 126 and 60 men, respectively. Fifteen new contingents were added, providing 675 of the 1206 mounted archers coming from the magnates and the household.

The counties had failed to provide anything close to their normal proportion of the English army during the Roxburgh campaign; that failure was not to reoccur in June 1335. Fifteen counties and the three separate Ridings of Yorkshire sent troops, from as far afield as southern counties such as Sussex and Kent and western counties such as Dorset, Wiltshire, and Gloucestershire. While most of the armies that entered Scotland in the 1330s were made up of troops from the northern counties,¹⁰⁰ the makeup of the summer 1335 force was national in scope, mobilising all of the resources available to Edward III. The northern bias was still reflected in the makeup of the force: the largest number of mounted archers came from Lancaster, Durham, and Derbyshire, while in August Westmoreland and Cumberland would provide reinforcements dwarfing the contribution of any other county. The contribution of the three Ridings of Yorkshire would be somewhat reduced, with 162 mounted archers instead of the 221 that served over the New Year. The largest contributions from southern counties were the 76 from Northamptonshire and the 60 and 67 from Dorset and Wiltshire; the other five that contributed troops¹⁰¹ managed only a paltry 119 between them.

¹⁰⁰ The most southern county to send contingents in 1336 was Shropshire, while in 1337 Derby and Nottingham were the most southerly: BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 259v, 262r

¹⁰¹ Middlesex, Buckinghamshire, Somerset, Gloucestershire, Shropshire.

Northern counties would provide 811 of the campaign's initial force of mounted archers, while the southern counties only contributed 322.¹⁰² This total was augmented by the levy of mounted archers on several towns throughout England. Twenty-seven towns were ordered to provide hobelars and mounted archers, while York was asked for its usual 100 'armati'. The results were not nearly as sizeable as




the initial request would suggest: the six towns of Wells, Gloucester, Ludlow, Lichfield, Northampton, and Pontefract each provided 10 mounted archers and their equipment, while the

city of Lincoln sent sixty mounted archers under John Aldham. This is partly because several towns such as Nottingham and Canterbury paid fines to be excepted from the levy.¹⁰³ Another forty-seven archers are recorded from diverse parts, giving a total of 1300 mounted archers not provided by magnates. Though this represents only 52% of the total number, it was an immense improvement over the winter totals. This contribution was even greater when Edward's army was reinforced in August 1335 by 835 mounted archers from Cumberland and 202 from Westmorland. These later additions, were they to be included in the charts, would have the northern counties providing 52% of all mounted infantry on the campaign. Though the

¹⁰² I have counted Shropshire and Northamptonshire as southern counties, and Staffordshire as northern.

numbers from the initial portion of the campaign show the magnates and the counties providing roughly equal portions of the mounted strength of the infantry, it fails to account for the large proportion of the country that paid fines or were otherwise exempt from providing troops. Though a certain part of Northumberland's available soldiers must have been on campaign with Robert Manners, Robert Ogle, or Thomas Featherstonehaugh, the county as a whole had not been tapped: this pattern is duplicated over several counties and towns.



Foot soldiers were purely the province of the counties and of the recruiting grounds in Wales. Only the

retinues of William Montague and William, Count of Juliers provided any foot, and the 111 men they provided barely accounts for two percent of the total numbers. Even smaller were the foot provided by the towns of Beverley and Doncaster, numbering only 33 men. Surprisingly, the southern counties provided a larger portion of the overall total than they did in mounted archers, the opposite of what would be expected if travel distance to the campaign was the only consideration. Several of the southern counties such as Gloucestershire which had only had a token number of mounted archers equalled the contributions made by the northern counties and each of the Yorkshire Ridings, providing about 200 soldiers each. Admittedly, some such as Surrey or Middlesex were restricted to only 39 men, but the overall impression is far more favourable for their contribution to the total number of foot

¹⁰³ CPR 1334-8, pp 131-3; *Rot Scot*, p 338 specifically for Nottingham and Canterbury.


than it was for the mounted archers. The total number from the south was 1457 men, 71% of the 2046 provided by the north.

One reason why the south likely contributed far fewer mounted archers than the north was the militarization of the north since 1296 and the beginning of hostilities with Scotland.¹⁰⁴ The north had suffered repeated attacks and raids by Scots as well as repeated and regular demands by the crown for military service throughout the early part of the fourteenth century, particularly in the decade immediately preceding the Truce of Bishopthorpe in 1323. The south on the other hand had been relatively free of strife since the end of Edward I's *Welsh campaigns*, barring the occasional upset. Because of the military pressures on the north, the move towards more effective, albeit more expensive, mounted archers and hobelars would have been hastened, making more troops of this type available while the lack of strife in the south would allow for more localities to pay fines for exemption from the commissions of array.

The Welsh contribution in 1335 was immense, providing the largest portion of the foot soldiers in the army, though very little for the mounted archer contingent. Separate requests had been made totalling 45 men-at-arms and over 3800 foot from the lands of fifteen Marcher lords, including such prominent men as the earls of Arundel and Surrey, Henry Lancaster, William Montague, Hugh Audley, William la Zouche, and John Mowbray.¹⁰⁵ Those receiving pay in Ferriby's wardrobe book were grouped into six contingents. The two largest were those from the royal lands in North Wales and South Wales, each providing just over one thousand foot and just under one hundred officers and standard-bearers. The smallest were those from Camois and the earl of Arundel's lands, each providing just over 100 foot soldiers

¹⁰⁴ C. McNamee, *The Wars of the Bruces: Scotland, England and Ireland, 1306-1328* (East Linton, 1997), pp 140-157

including their officers. The officers assigned to lead each group were mentioned for only three of the contingents, all of whom were members of the household: Rhys ap Gruffydd had his usual position as the leader of the South Wales contingent, the



squire Guy Brian commanded the Camois unit, and Hugh Tyrel had charge of the men from Radnor and Cary. South Wales and the earl of Arundel's lands provided 54 of the 87 Welsh 'horse'; these

were likely hobelars due to their pay of 4d per day. Overall, Wales provided 3085 soldiers, 2990 of which fought as foot soldiers, 87 as horse, and the remaining eight being 3 chaplains, 3 doctors, and two heralds or criers (*proclamatores*).¹⁰⁶

Taking into account all of these separate groups, the English crown managed to put 10,780 infantry into the field of which 3,630 were mounted and 7,020 were foot. This does not take into account the eleven messengers under William Dale and John Waltham, or the royal servants and valets, who numbered over 200.¹⁰⁷ Nor does it take into account the following of Edward Balliol or any of his adherents not receiving wages from the English crown. For much of the campaign, many of these troops would not have been in the same location, thanks to several being split off

¹⁰⁵ *Rot Scot*, pp 338-9

¹⁰⁶ BL Cotton Nero C VIII fo. 258v

from the main body to accompany Balliol up the eastern seaboard as mentioned previously. It is unlikely that the retinues of the seven magnates (Surrey, Arundel, Angus, Neville, Percy, Berkeley, and Latimer) were the only ones to accompany Balliol north, as the listed archers under pay would only have provided 128 men, a far cry from the necessary archers to balance the 732 men-at-arms those same retinues provided. However, neither the chronicles that identify the magnates accompanying Balliol nor the wardrobe book identify which retinues or county contingents may have been part of this force. That there were more archers seems likely as Balliol's force did take the *fortalice* of Cumbernauld, suggesting a more balanced force than one meant solely for raiding.¹⁰⁸

The force that Balliol took with him into the Highlands was probably light on infantry, relying on speed and engaging forces in skirmishing rather than set-piece battles like Dupplin Moor or Halidon Hill. Of the ten retinues that accompanied Balliol, only three had archers with them. Though John Bohun, earl of Hereford also had mounted archers as part of his retinue, their early release on 11 September makes it unlikely that they accompanied him until the end of the chevauchée on 6 October.¹⁰⁹ Much like Balliol's previous independent force, the 112 archers were outnumbered at better than 5:1 by the men-at-arms; unlike the previous march, we have no evidence of any siege action undertaken en route.

The plans for the number of infantry to be part of the Irish expedition against Rothesay were as optimistic as those for the men-at-arms in the same campaign. Fifteen hundred hobelars and six thousand foot were requested: in the end, the entire expedition did not quite reach the numbers requested of hobelars, let alone the entire

¹⁰⁷ BL Cotton Nero C VIII fo. 255r

¹⁰⁸ *Knighton*, p 473; *Bridlington*, pp 122-3; *Scalacronica*, p 165

¹⁰⁹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII fos. 255r-255v

force.¹¹⁰ As with the men-at-arms, the earls of Desmond and Ormond provided the bulk of the soldiers who had embarked at Dublin. The 198 hobelars that the two provided made up seventy percent of the light horse and their 411 infantry provided 57% of the foot soldiers. Though none could match either earl in providing light cavalry forces, several could manage the same number of foot as Ormond's 64. Walter Bermingham provided 100 foot soldiers, Robert Tuit managed 80, and John Darcy, the justiciar, paid for 60 to cross with him. The total of 283 hobelars and 715 infantry made the force tiny even by the standards of Thomas Beauchamp's force in 1337, but it proved effective in convincing John of the Isles to enlist in the Balliol cause the next year despite their failure to take Rothesay.¹¹¹

English military activities in Scotland after 1335 no longer depended on large numbers but focused instead upon speed and mobility. Financial restrictions combined with the general unwillingness of the Scots to engage any English force of more than a few hundred made mass armies largely irrelevant and unnecessary. This, combined with the threat from France, meant that the force under Lancaster in 1336 would be considerable smaller than that of previous years.¹¹²

Lancaster's force more closely resembled the traditional makeup of an English army, far more dependent upon its county-supplied troops of archers for the infantry component than upon the magnates who made up the bulk of the men-at-arms. The largest magnate retinue unsurprisingly was the 70 mounted archers of Henry himself, though Henry Percy nearly matched him with 60 men. Including the

¹¹⁰ *Rot Scot*, pp 340-3; PRO E101/19/16; see also Nicholson, 'An Irish Expedition to Scotland in 1335', pp 197-211

¹¹¹ *CDS*, no. 1182

¹¹² BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 259r-260r

collection recorded under the paymaster John of Houton, ten magnates had provided 391 mounted archers by the second day after the small army had reached Perth.

The numbers were not atypical for the participants: of the ten retinues recorded as being in Scotland in May, five had had their leaders participating with similar numbers in previous campaigns. Lancaster had provided one hundred mounted archers for the winter campaign in 1334, though he was not recorded as having any in the 1335 summer campaign.¹¹³ Percy had had 50 with him at Roxburgh, though only 20 the following campaign; Neville's 32 matched well with the 40 he had retained in 1334. Thomas Beauchamp had the same for both Roxburgh and 1336 as well, and Anthony Lucy's 28 was just a shade below the 34 he provided to the summer campaign of the previous year.¹¹⁴

What was atypical were the soldiers that came north with Edward III in June 1336 on his hearing rumours of a French landing. The mounted archers accompanying him were from only two sources: his own bodyguard of 61 men under John Stanford, and the 189 mounted archers brought by William Montague. Both were very different from previous numbers: Stanford's predecessor John Ward had led 100 and 162 men in the royal bodyguard, while Montague had only mustered 40 men the year before.¹¹⁵ As Edward's presence in the north had been wholly unexpected, the best explanation is that both groups were recruited in a hurry, and that Montague was prevailed upon to provide the maximum number of men possible.

Few of the magnates' mounted archers stayed in service beyond August: only the king's bodyguard and the retinues of Montague, John Tibetot, and John Houton remained in service beyond September 1, while the archers of Anthony Lucy and John Denholm had departed in July. Their presence was likely deemed unnecessary

¹¹³ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 252v

¹¹⁴ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 255v

as Perth had been secured, Edward's chevauchée had successfully smashed through Moray, Buchan and Angus, and a sizeable number of archers was still in service from the counties. Though the magnates and household had provided 578 mounted archers at their peak, they would never provide nearly as large a percentage of the army as they had in the previous two campaigns: the counties provided 1,658 for the same period. The only time that the contributions were equal would be a very brief period at the beginning of October during Edward's attempt to rebuild Bothwell.

Unlike previous years, the wardrobe book conflated the separate contingents from York and the Midland counties into a single entry. With the king not leading the campaign force himself for the year, immediate financial responsibility for Lancaster's force fell not on the wardrobe itself but on John Houton, one of the king's clerks acting as paymaster. The combination of the county contingents into one entry likely reflects the summation of the information from Houton's muster roll and recorded expenses, especially as individual leaders are identified for each of the counties so combined.¹¹⁶


The listing of several different periods of service for the York and Midlands contingent allows us to get some idea of the wastage that contingents could suffer over time. It is difficult to tell whether there were any reinforcements that arrived to bolster this group: while the dates are contiguous, the particular leaders named in each entry vary. While certain names such as Peter Neville of Lincoln and Thomas Leek of York recur enough to give us confidence that this is essentially the same unit all the way through the record, some caution should be taken as to how rigid its makeup was.

¹¹⁵ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 259r, 252r, 255r (Ward), 255v (Montague)

¹¹⁶ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 259v; see also Houton's horse evaluations, PRO E101 19 36

The initial period shown, from 1 May to 5 August, encompasses most of the major action of the campaign. In that period Lancaster moved with Balliol north to Perth, skirmishing with Andrew Murray's men, and then were joined by Edward III for his chevauchée. Some of the county's archers may have accompanied the king north: the queen's letter describing the action states he had 400 archers with him, though only 247 would have been available from the men that he and Montague had brought north with them.¹¹⁷ Percy and Neville were likely accompanying the king, providing another 90; even with these men, the king would have been short some sixty men.

The first period was not only the most active, but also the longest: it is no surprise that the force suffered a forty percent drop in numbers during the first three months. This appears to be standard: as discussed elsewhere, forty percent in three months was the wastage rate for both Edward I's Caerlaverock campaign and the



likely rate of loss for Edward III's campaign against Berwick.¹¹⁸ The rate of loss probably was higher: the sudden inclusion of 606 foot soldiers and three counties in the pay records suggests the arrival of reinforcements. However, August follows the same trend in the

shrinkage of the unit, losing fifty-five men at about the same rate as the losses suffered in the previous three months. There is a sudden spike in the number of losses with the loss of 125 men by 5 September, but the timing coincides with an

¹¹⁷ *Original Letters*, pp 33-9

across-the-board reduction in the number of men-at-arms within the army.¹¹⁹ Those who stayed must either have been reinforced or a more professional core, as their numbers did not drop before the Bothwell campaign got underway. After this point the need for troops tails off, before the final disbandment on 21 November.

While the early part of the campaign had been dependent upon York and the Midlands for most of its manpower, the move to rebuild Bothwell was mainly supported by the 825 mounted archers from Westmorland and Cumberland who entered service on 25 October.¹²⁰ Their participation makes sense: Bothwell in many ways was an opportunistic venture, with Edward III taking advantage of a narrow window to advance matters in Scotland after military action versus France was likely to occur that year. The proximity to the target of the campaign and the short time to plan would have made the border counties the best place to look to for providing the necessary infantry.

The counties also provided a smattering of foot soldiers to Lancaster, but their numbers were highly reduced from those of previous years. Only the twenty foot employed by Robert Holm were even with the army when it arrived at Perth in May: until August, the only addition to this were the leader and 50 Welsh foot brought by Montague.¹²¹ On 6 August 606 foot appeared in the county pay record, but saw little campaigning: after 27 August, only 45 were still under pay. Some minor additions were made to shore up numbers in September and October, in particular the 245 who arrived with the Cumberland and Westmoreland contingents to help secure Bothwell. This only brings the foot up to 478 men by 25 October.

¹¹⁸ *Liber Quotidianus Controtulitoris Garderobiae 1299-1300*, ed. J. Topham *et al* (1787), pp 249-54; see Chapter 4 on Berwick.

¹¹⁹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 259v

¹²⁰ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 260r

¹²¹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 259r-259v

Three relatively small Welsh contingents also served during this late period in the campaign season, with their usual concentration on foot rather than mounted archers. Between the groups from North Wales, South Wales, and Powys, the Welsh contributed 590 troops, of whom two were 'horse', 34 officers, ten standard-bearers, and five ancillary support – two doctors, two criers, and a chaplain. Of these, the one hundred men from Powys received pay for only six days, from 5 November through 10 November. Those from North and South Wales served from 18 and 22 October through mid-December.

The impression given by the fluctuating numbers and their small stature is that foot soldiers were increasingly seen as ineffective for fighting in Scotland. Even at the later high water mark of 25 October, the 967 foot were dwarfed by the 1,794 mounted archers serving at the same point. While Wales was still being used as a recruiting ground for foot, the English counties had shifted to providing both in equal measure, with the mounted archers being preferred.

While the forces under Thomas Beauchamp in 1337 have been called a 'contract army', the label is something of a misnomer, as the bulk infantry component of the army was raised via *the standard demands of the counties, rather than via contract*.¹²² The speculative list drawn up in York in April 1337 specified a round figure of 4,000 archers from the counties;¹²³ this translated to requests for 3200 archers and 240 hobelars from the counties on 20 March.¹²⁴ Unfortunately, a large gap from mid-June to mid-August exists in the pay records of the county

¹²² Lewis himself notes that the avoidance of compulsion was in regards to the heavy cavalry: Lewis, 'The recruitment and organization of a contract army, May to November 1337', p 5

¹²³ PRO E101/15/17

¹²⁴ As opposed to the 3500 archers and 40 hobelars named by Lewis, p 10; *Rot Scot*, pp 486-7

contributions, making it hard to fully account for the infantry numbers on the campaign.

Most of the mounted archers provided by personal retinues were those in Beauchamp's own retinue: of the 259 mounted archers in service from magnates on 11 May, 173 were in Beauchamp's pay. Unlike previous years, the magnates provided little in the way of archers; part of this may have been due to archers not being requested at the time that the speculative list was drawn up at York, and part may be due to the very narrow group of men participating in the army that summer. The only other sizeable retinues were the 36 men of John Darcy and Henry Percy's 24 men.¹²⁵ This would not change noticeably for the rest of the campaign, as the king's reinforcements in June brought only 73 mounted archers including the royal bodyguard.¹²⁶

As mentioned, the gaps in the recorded pay for the counties make it difficult to compute totals over time.¹²⁷ However, even these incomplete totals show why Edward III found it necessary to come north in order to break the siege at Stirling. On 11 May, four days after Beauchamp started receiving pay, only thirty four men from Yorkshire under Richard Normanville were receiving wages: this number would not significantly improve until 154 archers from Lancashire and 528 hobelars and mounted archers from Westmorland and Cumberland began taking pay on 26

¹²⁵ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 261r

¹²⁶ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 261r-261v

¹²⁷ Lewis has a number of errors in appendix 3 of his article on the 1337 campaign: Cumberland provided 502 hobelars from 1-7 September, not 52, and 134 from 6-14 Nov., not 185; Northumberland also provided 50 hobelars, 5 vintenars and 3 leaders for 25 August-18 September in addition to 103 horse archers, and 2 vintenars and 40 mounted archers for 19-26 September, not 118 horse archers; Yorkshire provided 8 leaders, 712 mounted archers, 49 vintenars, and 231 foot, rather than the unspecified 992 foot for 15 August-18 September; Nottinghamshire provided 1 leader, 4 vintenars, 51 mounted archers and 29 foot rather than the unspecified 84 foot for 15 August 18 September; and Derbyshire provided 1 leader, 4 vintenars, 63 horse archers and 25 foot rather than 92 unspecified foot for 15 August 18 September.

and 30 May.¹²⁸ Though there were 638 foot under pay at the same period, it is unlikely that Beauchamp felt he could lift the siege with 1216 men. By June 4 the situation had drastically improved with the counties providing 1152 hobelars, 413 mounted archers and 1865 foot,¹²⁹ giving Edward 3430 infantry with which to relieve Stirling - a force larger than Lancaster's at any point in 1336. The presence of so many hobelars, rather than mounted archers, is unusual compared to the previous years, where mounted archers were by far the norm. A clear distinction is made between hobelars and mounted archers in this campaign, as hobelars received 4d/day while mounted archers were paid at a lower rate of 3d/day.

The next reliable date for pay records of the county contingents is mid-August, after a two-month gap. 1308 mounted archers, 7 hobelars, and 614 foot are recorded for 15 August; the implication is that efforts were taken to make sure Beauchamp had the necessary number of men to carry out his role. It may be that these represent entirely new contingents, rather than continuations of those from June: nearly every contingent alters its makeup from being mostly hobelars to mounted infantry by August, with the unit from Durham recorded as having the seven hobelars in addition to its mounted infantry component. Further, the men from Westmorland and Cumberland who begin service on 1 September are recorded as hobelars. If these are in fact new contingents, the best explanation for the gap in the records would be that Edward III dismissed the county contributions immediately after assuring Stirling was relieved, and were then later recalled. This seems unlikely, as it would have left Beauchamp with only enough forces to act as an inflated custodian of the March, rather than having a true army to engage any Scottish forces.

¹²⁸ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 262r

¹²⁹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 261r-263r

Most contingents continued service into September, where much of the force began returning home. By 19 September, only 644 hobelars and mounted archers remained in service, most of whom would dissipate in October. A force of 821 mounted troops appears between 6 and 14 November, undoubtedly to help relieve Edinburgh when it came under siege by Andrew Murray.

Despite the limitations of the sources that are available, a good picture of the English armies of the 1330s can be drawn from the records. The army throughout the wars could be considered a northern army, rather than one reflecting England as a whole. The infantry were drawn mainly from northern counties, due to their proximity and their experience in fighting the Scots, while the magnates most willing to bring retinues tended to be northern lords or those with claims on portions of Scotland. The heavy cavalry was provided by a mix of members of the royal household and the retinues of a relatively small number of magnates. Even the greatest of the latter was willing to serve for pay, as increasing military costs and a changed political climate no longer made refusing the king's wages acceptable. The infantry were drawn from a combination of magnate retinues and contingents drawn from the counties through commissions of array. The archers in magnate retinues were invariably mounted, keeping with the new innovations being developed at this time, while the percentage of mounted archers provided by the counties increased dramatically as their utility was increasingly recognised.

The nature of recruitment changed during the last two years of the war to shift away from large armies towards smaller forces that could still outnumber any opposition that the Scots could raise. Though the process was still not complete

before 1337, an increasing proportion of the army was being provided through contracts with magnates to provide mixed retinues due to the quality of the troops they could provide. This trend would only accelerate in years to come, but had not yet come to provide the majority of the army's personnel.

Not only had the tactics of the army altered by 1337, so had its composition. Where the army of 1327 resembled any of those from the reigns of Edward I or II, the forces Beauchamp and Lancaster in 1336-7 led into Scotland were very different in the proportion of mounted troops and the expected roles in battle of each part of their armies. The means by which their forces were recruited had not yet undergone major change, but a new emphasis on quality rather than mass meant that far more was possible with a force the size of Beauchamp's or Lancaster's than would have been under the same size force in the time of Edward I. These changes would prove to be effective not only against the Scots in the 1330s, but against the far greater military power of France in the war to follow.

The Garrisons

The major difficulty that Edward III faced in Scotland was not defeating the Scottish armies that could take the field against him. Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill had proven that the English forces could defeat the Scots in the field, and England's relative wealth in both men and money gave Edward a definite edge in his campaigns. Taking the land was not nearly so difficult as holding the land after the withdrawal of the campaign forces for the year or garnering the local support necessary to dispense with external military action as the main method of possession.

To try to gain local support and provide a local military presence, Edward III instituted a series of garrisons at key points in Scotland to respond quickly to raids and prevent attacks by Bruce supporters on the territory held by the English after Halidon Hill. While the campaign armies had a major impact for a certain period each year, it was the garrisons that provided the year-round presence and the most obvious sign that the English meant to stay in Scotland.

As garrisons were meant to exert control over a locality, each one had its own unique history, requiring that they be considered on a region by region basis. Without this, it would be difficult to understand why some such as Edinburgh or Cupar found themselves under regular attack, while others such as Stirling rarely received any attention from either side during the wars. There are however four constants to garrisons regardless of location that have to be addressed. The first is the logic behind garrisons, and the reasons for pursuing them as a strategy of exerting control

over territory instead of other means. Second is the set of weaknesses garrisons suffer that can make them ineffective in achieving their goals. Third is the need to rebuild the castles that house the garrisons and the list of supplies and workers necessary to carry out the work. The last is the size to the garrison, and whether any pattern exists across all of the English garrisons in Scotland.

The cost of keeping a large campaign army in the field year-round was simply too prohibitive to be considered seriously by the English crown. Keeping a single banneret, leading nine knights, ninety men-at-arms, and two thousand mounted archers in the field would cost the crown £38 18s 8d per day – or £14,210 13s 4d for an entire 365-day year. Another telling figure: Richard Ferriby listed the cost of the men-at-arms and archers for the massive 1335 campaign as £25,402 6s 19d.¹ If such a small force as that given above would cost as much as three-fifths of the largest army Edward III fielded in Scotland, it becomes immediately apparent that the financial burden would be prohibitively high.

This theoretical force of two thousand men was also not considered large enough for campaigning during the early years of the war; Edward was unwilling to move any farther into Scotland than Roxburgh with a force twice this size during his New Year campaign at the start of 1335, while demanding one of the largest armies of his reign for the summer campaign that followed. It was seen as large enough in the later stages, but was not nearly as effective as was needed. Lancaster's force of sixteen hundred men managed its goals in 1336, but did not do more than regain old ground, while Thomas Beauchamp's intended force of twelve hundred did nothing to

¹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 239v, 258v

break the siege at Stirling begun in April 1337 until the king and reinforcements arrived in June.²

Even if the costs of keeping a large campaigning body in the field could be supported, other difficulties would present themselves. While the English campaign forces in Scotland could overmatch any opposition they faced, they could only be in one location at a time when massed. Without a significant pool of local support, any regions taken by the army would be vulnerable once the campaigners had moved on. The Scots were also aware of the disparity between their forces and the English, and for the most part avoided direct large-scale conflict after Halidon Hill. Instead, numerous small-scale actions were taken, making it difficult for the English to pin down their opponents and finish off the opposition.

Logistical support for the army would be another major difficulty. A mobile campaign army would have no set base for supplies, requiring the English crown to arrange a system of transporting supplies from its depots in northern England such as Newcastle and Carlisle to the forces in Scotland as they proceeded around the country. While the English crown had large-scale experience since the time of Edward I in arranging such logistical support, it still was unable to guarantee delivery at all times.³ Purveyances were unpopular, pay for the victuals taken was often slow, and arranging for the transport of supplies north was problematic at best.⁴

The general English response to this difficulty in retaining its campaigning gains was to establish garrisons at key points such as castles and towns through the lands under their control. The advantages of the system were numerous. They provided a strong point for defensive purposes, either behind castle walls or the

² BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 245r-247r, 261r-264v

³ For a detailed description of supply efforts under Edward I, see M. Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance Under Edward I* (Aldershot, 1972), pp 114-136

fortification of a town. These fortifications also provided a location for the safe storage of supplies, protected from the incidental and small-scale raids on supply trains that were a common tactic of the Scots. They provided an administrative centre for the sheriffs appointed to oversee the new English counties and a base for the soldiers who enforced that oversight over the local region.

Though the costs for the soldiers were the same per day as those in a campaigning army, their breakdown into smaller units spread over a number of garrisons allowed for the more effective use of each soldier rather than piling up largely redundant troops in one location. These forces also provided the ability to respond rapidly to any Scottish attacks, blunting large-scale efforts and blocking small-scale actions. While it was relatively easy for the Scots to avoid large campaign armies in the areas with which they were familiar, it was much more difficult to avoid engagement with garrison forces based in the area and with increasing familiarity with the local geography. Once in place, the garrisons could also provide mutual support to one another when they came under attack. The best example of this was the rescue of Cupar Castle in 1336. Upon receiving word that the earls of March, Sutherland, and Fife had placed Cupar under siege, the constable of Edinburgh Castle, John Stirling, led his garrison across the Firth of Forth in support of the defenders of Cupar. Mistaking Stirling's force for the advance force of a major English army, the besiegers fled.⁵

The necessity for garrisons and strong points throughout the new English lands is best shown by the capture and parole of Guy, Count of Namur, in 1335. Having failed to reach Berwick in time to join Edward III's massive campaign of that year, Guy decided to cut overland to Stirling in an attempt to outpace the English

⁴ See J.R.S. Maddicott, *The English Peasantry and the Demands of the Crown 1294-1341 (Past and Present Supplement, 1975)*, pp 15-34

army and join with the main body there. His retinue was sizeable; seven knights and fifty-seven men-at-arms later received payment from the English crown.⁶ At Berwick, an additional 123 archers joined Guy's company as guides.

Despite having a force of over two hundred men, Namur was ambushed near Edinburgh and forced to take refuge in the ruins of the castle there. At that time, no effort had been made to rebuild the castle or provide a garrison for it. The lack of a defended strong point in the region proved crucial, as the Scottish troops under the earls of Moray and March were able to force Guy's surrender at Edinburgh. As a result, they secured the promise of £4000 in ransom and Namur's removal from the war. The same episode also provides evidence of the key role garrisons could play when in place. While escorting Namur and his party to the English border in order to release them, the Scots were themselves engaged by a force from Roxburgh or Jedburgh. Sir James Douglas was killed and the Earl of Moray captured by the garrison's troops.

In addition to the forces assigned to specific castles, the custodians of the Scottish March were also paid to maintain sizeable retinues. While not an army by any means, these forces could be used to supplement the strength of the garrisons in the region or to deal with localized unrest and rebellion. Henry Percy and Ralph Neville spent much of the time between campaigns keeping custody of the march, complete with the men to back up their authority: the two had 181 men-at-arms and 160 mounted archers between them holding custody of the march for the September and October before the 1334 Roxburgh campaign, and joined John of Eltham during his brief spell guarding the march in February and March of 1335 with 221 men-at-

⁵ *Anonimale*, p 6

⁶ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 239v; see also Nicholson, pp 212-4

arms in total.⁷ The royal household often had a significant involvement in these activities. Forty-one of Eltham's force were from the household itself, and the following winter Montague's force of 117 men-at-arms on the border would be entirely from the household and its contingents except for Henry Percy and his thirty.⁸

Few of these assignments lasted for long periods, and they were normally either the prelude to a season's campaign or a measure to prevent immediate counterattack after the withdrawal of the royal campaign forces at the end of the year. Unlike the garrisons or the campaign armies, the forces engaged to protect the march were predominantly men-at-arms, suggesting that they were intended to stiffen local levies called up in defense rather than operating as an independent force. In theory, this should have made it possible for the local custodians to defeat the small forces of the Scots and retain each year's advances. In practice, they were far less successful. Even small forces like these could be costly. Richard Talbot served with six knights, 37 men-at-arms, and 40 mounted archers from 15 August to 30 November 1337, at a cost of £394 4s.⁹ Percy and Neville's force in 1334 cost £647 5s, and Eltham's group £560 11s 2d. Montague's force in winter 1335 earned another £983 5s in wages.

This tactic of deploying garrisons in what was effectively hostile territory was by no means a new one. Edward I had used it successfully in Wales with his ring of fortifications such as Harlech, Caernarfon, Aberconwy, and Beaumaris, and had attempted it to a lesser extent in Scotland with Berwick, Stirling, and other castles.¹⁰ Also, most of the fortifications used as bases in Scotland had already been built by

⁷ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 233r

⁸ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 236v, 237v-238v

⁹ PRO E101/20 18

the Scots before the beginning of the wars, unlike in Wales where several of Edward I's castles were built from the ground up. In general, the maintenance of castles and their garrisons was a successful means of control for both Scots and English, except where the numerical advantages held by the English made maintaining the strong points far more costly than their removal. As a result, the Scots under the Bruces rarely attempted to take castles and strengthen them to withstand English attacks. Instead, they demolished them to the best of their ability, eliminating their military usefulness. The one notable exception to this policy of fortification destruction was Berwick, due to its economic importance.¹¹

While garrisons were key to maintaining a semblance of English control over the southern counties of Scotland, they were by no means a guarantee that the region under their control would be free of threat. If anything, the castles and towns that garrisons were based in found themselves acting as lightning rods, foci for the attacks of the Scots. With a few exceptions – Dunbar, Dumbarton, Lochleven, Kildrummy, Loch Doon and Urquhart – the Scots tended to revert to their old tactics of eliminating strong points. Having a greater familiarity of the local geography and populace, the Scots were more effective in the open, rather than holding onto fortifications that attracted English besieging forces and tied down their troops where the superior numbers the English could field could have major effect.

The English had the opposite problem. Without the static defenses and locations to base their troops, they had no way to maintain local control, nor the regional ties that would allow them to operate safely or effectively without that bulwark. With their ability to field superior numbers, they in theory could afford the

¹⁰ M.C.Prestwich, 'Colonial Scotland: The English in Scotland under Edward I', *Scotland and England 1286-1815*, ed. R.A. Mason (Edinburgh, 1987), pp 11-14 in particular

manpower to defend their fortresses adequately while waiting for relief from other supporting forces. Unfortunately, this theory often broke down in reality. Superior numbers had to be gathered to be effective, and they had to reach the besieged in time to have an effect. If the forces available were inadequate for the task of reaching outlying garrisons under threat, then those outposts would have little option but surrender. The classic example of this was seen in the winter of 1334. Henry Beaumont, the Earl of Buchan and one of the linchpins of the English/Balliol efforts in Scotland, was besieged in Dundarg Castle, the central fortress of his earldom in the north of Scotland.¹² In hopes of relieving Henry and restoring the balance of power in the north, Edward III attempted to carry out a winter campaign to reassert control and to rebuild the fortifications necessary for that control's maintenance. Unfortunately for Edward and Henry, the troops gathered were considered by Edward insufficient for the task, and failed to progress farther into Scotland than the border fortress of Roxburgh. Unable to relieve Henry, Edward was forced to content himself with rebuilding the border fortress while Beaumont was forced to surrender and a major centre of English support was eliminated.

Other garrisons suffered similar fates for different reasons, such as Thomas Ughtred's command at Perth in 1339. Here, the problem was not defeat inflicted by Scottish arms; rather, the final blow was delivered by English logistical difficulties. Many of the supplies required for the garrisons north of the Tweed could not be provided for locally, due either to lack of security or the relative poverty of the region. These had to be brought north via governmental support and shipping, or through independent merchant activity - an unreliable method at best. The English

¹¹ A. Tuck, 'A medieval tax haven: Berwick upon Tweed and the English crown, 1333-1461', in R. Britnell and J. Hatcher (eds.), *Progress and Problems in Medieval England: Essays in Honour of Edward Miller* (Cambridge, 1996), pp 148-167

¹² *Fordun*, p 357; *Melsa*, pp 372-3; *Bridlington*, p 120

government and the officials in charge of supplying Perth did not carry through in delivering the necessary supplies, despite indentures specifically providing for the victualling and reprovisioning of Ughtred's forces.¹³ Without either the proper military or logistical support, no outpost could be expected to survive on its own.

One of the most crucial elements in supplying the castles in Scotland was the steady flow of wages to the defending English forces. Garrison pay was calculated along the same lines as a field army, with earls receiving 8s/day, bannerets 4s/day, knights 2s/day, men-at-arms 1s/day, mounted archers 4d/day, and foot 2d/day. Maintaining these payments was a necessity, as a failure to provide the garrisons with pay risked losing them due to desertion on the part of the garrison. Pay was often doled out in the form of provisions, rather than as direct cash payments. As the purpose of the pay was to provide sustenance to the troops rather than in addition to the same, it made a certain sense to simply arrange and provide for the victuals that the soldiers would be consuming rather than have to make the parallel arrangements to transport both specie and supplies to garrisons that could not in one fashion or another be supported by the local surroundings. One example is that of Guy Ferrers' men in 1337. While serving under contract in the garrison at Perth, Guy and fifteen men-at-arms received two baskets of barley, two of malt, and two tuns of wine in lieu of £12 6s 8d of the £101 owed them as wages for three months' service.¹⁴

This method of pay was also attractive to the crown due to the alternative it provided from emptying the king's coffers. The provisions used could be purveyed from various sources and sent north, with payment promised later. This allowed for the necessary materials to be sent north without the instant production of the necessary silver to pay for the goods. Also, this meant that the goods could be paid

¹³ A. Ayton, 'Sir Thomas Ughtred and the Edwardian Military Revolution' in *The Age of Edward III*, ed. J. Bothwell (Woodbridge, 2001) pp 121-2

for out of the exchequer in England, without the risk of transporting the silver into hostile territory. There was reason for this concern, as the Scots targeted supply columns.¹⁵ To guarantee that the supplies and pay got through, an escort was required, driving up the costs of maintaining the garrisons. Thomas Rokeby paid for 40 men-at-arms and 40 mounted archers to escort supplies to Stirling after the lifting of the siege there in 1337 at a cost of £40, while Robert Ufford and a number of the household did the same for Bothwell immediately preceding its fall.¹⁶

As mentioned previously, most of the strong points usable by the English had been slighted during Edward II's reign. The Bruce strategy of eliminating fortifications in the southern part of Scotland had removed the bases for the year-round forces necessary for the English to maintain their control over the occupied portions of the south. The amount of effort required to rebuild these fortresses was sizeable, as were the expenses incurred in doing so. Numerous specialists had to be brought to the site, often from England, along with their assistants and helpers. Carpenters were needed to create the scaffolding men would use to build the wall, along with building secondary structures both for the work on the fortifications and for the continued maintenance of the castle and its garrison. Masons were required for shaping the stone that would make up the structure of many of the castles and for supervising their erection. Thatchers were needed to roof the buildings constructed by the carpenters and masons. Smiths had to be on hand to maintain the tools being used by the other workmen on site and to create new ones to replace those broken or rendered useless by the work. Additionally, the smiths were necessary to keep the

¹⁴ PRO E101/21/16

¹⁵ *Scotichronicon*, pp 138-9 as an example

¹⁶ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 249v, 241v-242r

garrisons the castles were meant for in fighting shape, repairing equipment and making basic items such as horseshoes and nails.


They were all needed in great numbers, and received payment commensurate with their personal skills. For instance, the eighteen master masons (*cementarii*) engaged in rebuilding the destroyed castle at Roxburgh received 6d per day, while the thirteen less-experienced masons employed only received 4d. The master carpenters (*carpentarii*) and smiths (*fabrii*) received similar wages, though the journeymen were paid 5d per day. The various helpers for all of these individuals (*operarii*) received 3d.¹⁷

Materials of all sorts also had to be purchased and transported to the sites undergoing construction and repair, often in great quantities. Even relatively simple efforts to strengthen a strong point, such as the erection of a wooden palisade, would require great amounts of materials in the way of lumber, nails, and other goods. More complicated, durable structures, such as complex stone walls and buildings, were correspondingly more complex in their requirements and their needs. Timber had to be harvested and brought to the site, where it had to be shaped by carpenters to the requirements of the building. Stone was even more difficult, often requiring the location of a nearby source of stone and arrangements made for the quarrying of suitable blocks to be then carried to the building site for use. Baskets of lime were required for the mortar used to cement stone blocks together, and nails were needed for timber buildings. Sea-coal was needed for burning, and raw iron was a necessary material for the smiths to be able to work their trade.

Like most commodities, these could be available at widely differing prices. Chalders of lime (*celdrae calcis*) could range from the 4s 6d paid by William Felton at Roxburgh in the first part of 1335 to the 20d paid per basket at Stirling by Thomas

Rokeby later in the year. Stones' weight in iron (*petrae ferris*) that cost 10d per stone at Edinburgh for both Thomas Roscelyn and John Stirling cost half that amount at Stirling for Thomas Rokeby.¹⁸ Lead had a similar value, with John Swanlond paying 5½d per stone for the 640 stones consumed by the building works at Berwick during his tenure.¹⁹

Berwick



The key garrison holding the southeast of Scotland was, as always, Berwick. With its importance as a supply depot, river crossing, population centre, and

port for Tweeddale and Lothian, Berwick had to be securely under English control, with the necessary force to extend that control outside of the town walls into the surrounding region.

Before the advent of the wars between England and Scotland in 1296, Berwick had been the largest town in Scotland, and the richest. Situated on the north bank of the Tweed River at its mouth, it was the most southerly of Scotland's eastern seaboard ports, in closest proximity to the seaborne traders of England and the Continent, especially Flanders. Combined with being the focal point of Tweeddale and Lothian, the richest farming and pasturage area in Scotland, this would allow the merchants of Berwick unparalleled opportunity compared to other Scottish ports for successful trade. The lifeblood of the town was the shipment overseas of the

¹⁷ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 248v

¹⁸ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 249r-249v

region's greatest cash crop, wool. In particular, Berwick could rely on being the main port for shipping the products of four major abbeys in the border region Dryburgh, Jedburgh, Kelso, and Melrose.²⁰ The average export of wool per year for the port was over 1800 sacks from 1327-33, nearly one-third of Scotland's total output, while its customs revenue of £640 a year was the largest single source of income for the Scottish crown.²¹

Its position also made it the perfect jump-off point for any military adventures north or south of the border. In Scottish hands, Berwick provided a strong point for leaping into Northumberland, along with a port suitable for the shipment of supplies from the Continent. In English hands, it provided a perfect storage depot and point for reinforcement of any forces in Scotland. With its position on the north bank, its control by the English would allow forces to strike out into Scotland without concern for an enemy force attempting to hold the crossings of the Tweed against them, as well as remove the concern which a strong garrison that could threaten supply lines could cause. In addition, it would allow the storage of victuals much closer to where they were needed. Without control of Berwick, the English had to rely on Newcastle-upon-Tyne as their supply dump, with no other suitable ports closer to the border.

Due to this military and economic importance, Berwick was certain to suffer repeated attack from both sides during any conflict. The wars began in 1296 with Edward I taking Berwick by storm, immediately securing its use for supplies and shipping. The garrison in place in Berwick during the next few years appears to have

¹⁹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 248v

²⁰ A. Tuck, 'A medieval tax haven: Berwick upon Tweed and the English crown, 1333-1461', in R. Britnell and J. Hatcher (eds.), *Progress and Problems in Medieval England: Essays in Honour of Edward Miller* (Cambridge, 1996), pp 151-3

²¹ James Campbell, 'England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War', in *The Wars of Edward III*, ed. Clifford Rogers (Woodbridge, 1999) p 206

been massive by later standards – 741 men from the Berwick garrison were sent to join Edward during his 1300 campaign in Galloway.²² Considering that a suitable number of men must have been left behind to maintain control of Berwick, it only highlights the importance with which the town was held.

English control would be maintained for two decades, but would finally be lost in 1318 when Berwick was taken by treachery and returned to Scottish hands, despite an unsuccessful attempt to besiege the town by the English the next year.²³ Tellingly, the decision was made to repair the defenses of Berwick and garrison it, rather than carry out the normal Bruce policy of demolishing border fortifications after capturing them from the English. The importance of its port for the economic livelihood of both the region and the Scottish crown was simply too great, and the town was of a size that simply eliminating the castle would not remove its value as a defensive site, unlike inland sites such as Roxburgh.

Due to these factors, Berwick became the focus of Edward III's military power upon the expulsion of Edward Balliol from Scotland after the attack at Annan on 16 December 1332.²⁴ Balliol fled to England and secured Edward III's support both for funding his efforts to raise an army of his own to regain control in Scotland and for bringing English forces north. This allowed for Balliol to cross the border in late February or early March of 1333 and begin the actual siege of Berwick in earnest by mid-March, with English naval support.²⁵ Opposing this force was Patrick Dunbar, earl of March, who held Berwick Castle, while the town was under the command of Alexander Seton.²⁶

²² *Liber Quotidianus Controtulitoris Garderobiae 1299-1300*, ed. J. Topham et al (1787), p 253

²³ G.W.S. Barrow, *Robert Bruce & the Community of the Realm of Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1988), pp 238-9

²⁴ *Lanercost*, pp 270-1

²⁵ *Lanercost*, p 272

²⁶ *Scotichronica*, pp 88-9

By 18 May, Edward III had joined the siege with sufficient force for the besiegers to make an assault on the town that day and another two days later, albeit unsuccessfully. The pressure of continued assaults through June, dwindling hope of relief, and a fire sparked by an attempt to burn English ships attacking the town led to a brief truce, followed shortly thereafter by another assault and negotiation for a further truce.²⁷ A fifteen-day period was agreed on, with the surrender of twelve hostages and the agreed surrender of the town and castle should they not be relieved by 11 July. An attempt to relieve the town by crossing into England and then into Berwick via the fort to the south of Berwick was partially successful in moving reinforcements and victuals into the town, but disagreements over whether the exact requirements of the truce indenture had been fulfilled led to Edward III hanging Thomas Seton, the son of the town's commander.²⁸ The severity of the act led to renewed negotiation, with William Keith, the leader of the relieving party, having taken over as warden of the town. The resulting agreement led to the engagement at Halidon Hill, the destruction of the Scottish army, and the following capitulation of the town to Edward III on 20 July 1333.

Keeping a strong garrison at Berwick would seem especially important during the period immediately after Halidon Hill and the cession of much of southern Scotland to the English, as control had to be extended from Berwick outward into the new lands. Unfortunately, the wardrobe books before Richard Ferriby's tenure as keeper of the wardrobe have not survived. Other documents indicate that a large garrison was not put into place at Berwick, though the garrison was certainly not neglected with James Pipe providing 65 men-at-arms and 60 mounted archers.²⁹ Henry Percy was given the custody of the town and castle, while William Burnton

²⁷ *Bridlington*, p 112

²⁸ *Scalacronica*, p 163; *Bridlington*, p 113

was appointed mayor, Robert Tughale became chamberlain of the town and Thomas Bamburgh its chancellor.³⁰

The risings in 1334 necessitated a change in plan, as Balliol rapidly lost control of most of Scotland and military action was again required. Berwick's immediate security was dependent upon developing a network of fortifications to control an ever-widening region. As new garrisons were put into place, the immediate area of conflict would (in theory) move away from Berwick and lessen the need for Berwick to have a sizeable garrison. However, until that time, a large force was a necessity.

The chamberlain of Berwick, John Burghdon paid for a strong garrison of eighteen 'armed men' (*homines armati*) and 140 hobelars and watchmen (*vigiltores*) from 22 September 1334 until 8 February 1335. This seventy-day period was used twice more, with Burghdon followed by Henry Ferrers, Hugh Freyne and Thomas Lathom receiving pay for sixty men-at-arms and 224 hobelars and watchmen until mid-April. At this point, Henry Ferrers and Thomas Lathom were replaced by Nicholas Cantilupe, who along with Freyne served until 28 June overseeing the same number of men.³¹

The increase in the number of men in the garrison of Berwick in mid-February coincides with the failure of Edward's winter campaign to achieve much beyond securing the slighted castle at Roxburgh and beginning a rapid rebuilding of the site. Though the king left his brother John of Eltham in custody of the Marches with some 250 men, the lack of any truly effective field army in the region required an increase in the number of those protecting what garrisons the English had

²⁹ PRO E43/385

³⁰ *Lanercost*, p275; *Anonimale*, p 1; *Rot Scot*, p 256

³¹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 248r

secured.³² This was especially made clear by the earl of March's return to the Scottish side of the war, placing Berwick at risk due to Dunbar's strength in the south and his recently rebuilt castle at Dunbar, just up the coast.³³

With the arrival of summer and the 'Great Offensive' launched by Edward in full swing, the garrison could afford a reduction in its size, paring away twenty men-at-arms and eighty hobelars and watchmen for the rest of the summer. The garrison's participation in the events of the summer appears minimal, barring the count of Namur augmenting his party with one hundred twenty-odd men before heading north on his ill-fated attempt to join Edward III at Perth.³⁴

With Anthony Lucy receiving the custody of Berwick on 20 October 1335, the garrison was further reduced, probably in reaction to the success of the year's campaigns and the establishment of garrisons farther north at Edinburgh, Perth, and other locations in the central and northern regions. Fifty men-at-arms and 60 hobelars received pay through the next two years until 30 August 1337, while 48 watchmen were employed 'on the walls' until 14 December 1337.³⁵ This appears to have been more of a 'standard' garrison, as opposed to a reflection of the state of affairs in the region; many garrisons seemed to hold at sixty men-at-arms and a similar number of mounted archers.³⁶ It certainly does not take into account Dunbar, which remained untaken at this time.

The payments for work at Berwick during this period were recorded slightly differently than at the other outlying garrisons in Scotland. While normally the constable of the castle was responsible for the payments made to the workers

³² *Rot Scot*, p 318; BL Cotton Nero C VIII. fos. 233r-5r, 252v

³³ *Lanercost*, p 278; *Scalacronica*, p 165; *Anonimale*, p 2

³⁴ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 258r

³⁵ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 248r

³⁶ For instance, Roxburgh in 1335 had 60 men-at-arms and 80 hobelars mounted archers, while Edinburgh in 1335 had 60 men-at-arms and 57 archers; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 248v, 249r

working on the structures, the royal clerk John Swanlond is recorded as supervising operations at Berwick in 1337.³⁷ The work was relatively minor, though only in comparison with other castles during the wars £30 was expended for various supplies such as boards, nails, ten baskets of lime, 640 stones of lead and the wages for two masons and four workmen over seven months that year. Having John Swanlond responsible for the works at Berwick would seem unusual were it the only record of its type, but other pay records indicate that he was active in the building work at various castles as a paymaster and supervisor. He received 2s per day in the Edinburgh pay record for supervising the operations at that castle and all the other castles in Scotland from 2 November 1335 through 30 August 1337.³⁸ It should be noted that Swanlond was not the only one to receive money for building expenses: John Crabbe received 100s from Thomas Burgh for work on the town before December 1337.³⁹

It is worth noting the effects of the wars upon Berwick's major attraction to the English crown: the money which the customs of the town added to the coffers of its sovereign. The Scottish king before the onset of the wars received over six hundred pounds a year from the customs of Berwick as previously mentioned. However, between 23 September 1334 and 12 October 1335, the chamberlain John Burghdon only received £134 14s 11d in customs.⁴⁰ Considering that in the same period of time, nearly £2000 was spent maintaining the garrison of the town, it is easy to see that maintaining the English footholds in Scotland was a costly affair.

Future years would still see Berwick being garrisoned by troops, as the English hold in Scotland eroded. For example, in 1339 Richard Talbot was

³⁷ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 249v

³⁸ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 249r

³⁹ *CDS*, no. 1251

⁴⁰ *CCR 1333-7*, p 559

contracted as constable of Berwick, with four knights, sixty men-at-arms, and thirty-one hobelars as the town's garrison.⁴¹ Unlike most of Scotland, Berwick would not fall prey to the Scots for some time, only being taken in 1355, and immediately retaken the next January.⁴²

Roxburgh

Berwick's position as the main port for Lothian and southeastern Scotland as a whole required several difficulties to be resolved. The region immediately surrounding Berwick had to be secured in English hands, to allow for the wool and other goods being shipped in and out of Lothian to be brought to the port safely, and the revenues from the same made available for taxation. Similarly, control had to be exerted over the hinterlands that provided the supplies for the town and the goods for shipment out to the Continent.



Roxburgh's position at the head of the Tweed Valley and at the mouth of Teviotdale was of prime importance to this latter consideration.⁴³ The bridge connecting Roxburgh to Kelso Abbey was one of the major crossing points of the Tweed. A sufficiently large garrison based at Roxburgh would be able

to control the passage of commerce and troops from Berwick and the east coast to Galloway and the rest of southwestern Scotland, either through Teviotdale or along

⁴¹ PRO E101/22/9

⁴² *War, Cruel and Sharp*, p 335

⁴³ Peter G.B. McNeill, Hector L. MacQueen (eds.), *Atlas of Scottish History to 1707* (Scottish Medievalists and Dept. of Geography, Univ. of Edinburgh, 1996), p 238

Ettrick Water. This would also allow for control over the wool production of Tweeddale and Teviotdale, ensuring its passage through Berwick and securing the trade necessary for Berwick's prosperity.

Along with the control of passage from east to west, Roxburgh also could exert considerable control over the passage of troops from north to south, or vice versa. Berwick alone could not control troops moving south, as the main fords used by Scottish raiders tended to be farther inland, such as those at Norham or Wark-on-Tweed. With both Berwick and Roxburgh in English hands and effectively garrisoned, any Scottish forces in southern Lothian could be intercepted or harassed by local English troops, with the general effect of keeping the conflict north of the Tweed in Scotland, rather than spilling over into the north of England.

The strategic and tactical importance of the position was not lost on either side. In October 1332, Edward Balliol took up residence in Roxburgh after a successful campaign in support of his Galloway partisans after Dupplin Moor. Seeing an opportunity, Scottish forces under Andrew Murray attempted to break the bridge over the Tweed while Balliol was visiting Kelso Abbey, on the southern side of the Tweed. A sharp encounter ensued between Balliol's alert troops and the Scots, resulting in the capture of Murray and John Crabbe, whose expertise in military engineering would henceforth serve the English cause.⁴⁴

Roxburgh would be the focus of a much larger scale action in the winter of 1334-5, with the breakdown of relations between Balliol's supporters allowing a resurgence of Bruce support. As part of Edward III's winter campaign to restore Balliol to his kingdom and to cement control of southern Scotland in English-aligned hands, Edward marched a small army from Newcastle to Roxburgh. The intent was to provide protection for a large workforce to rebuild the slighted castle at Roxburgh,

render it habitable, and allow for a permanent, protected garrison to be put in place. Though the relief of Dundarg Castle in Buchan had been in Edward's mind as well, only this southern portion of his campaign was actually carried out.

William Felton took command of Roxburgh's garrison on 2 February 1335, after Edward's withdrawal to England to plan for the summer campaign. Sixty men-at-arms and eighty hobelars joined him until 14 October, when the garrison was reduced to thirty-six men-at-arms and forty hobelars through August of the next year.⁴⁵ This is roughly the same period that the garrison at Berwick was reduced as well, reflecting the change of the focal point of the crown to regions farther north. It may have been nothing more than a cost-cutting measure, as the garrison had already cost £1196 12d to that point. Even so, another £1839 4d in wages would accrue before the end of Ferriby's records, without adding the costs of the extensive building work that Edward III had initiated. Efforts to assure the specific supply of victuals to Roxburgh were also taken; the merchant William Melchbourn received a writ ordering payment to him of £12 8s for 31 quarters of wheat delivered for the garrison.⁴⁶

The rebuilding at Roxburgh required large amounts of materials to be shipped in, along with workers from England to carry out the construction. Thirty-two masons, twenty-three workers, two carpenters, and a smith were employed on reconstructing the defenses from 2 February 1335 through January of the next year, at rates of pay ranging from 6d per day for the master craftsmen to 3d for the lowliest worker.⁴⁷ 403 baskets of lime and ten baskets of sea-coal costing £94 9d were purchased over the same period, along with various other materials. In total, £854

⁴⁴ *Lanercost*, p 270; *Scalacronica*, p 161

⁴⁵ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 248v

⁴⁶ *CCR 1333-7*, p 376

⁴⁷ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 248v

17s 3d was spent on construction costs between 1334 and 30 August 1337. Though the castle appears to have been restored enough to house William Felton's garrison after the departure of Edward III, work continued on for years afterwards. Four masons, six workmen, and a smith were still employed working on the fabric of the fortress through 1340, with over one hundred quarters of lime and several pounds worth of tools being purchased for their work.⁴⁸

The garrison's southern position meant that it stayed outside the main thrust of military action through most of the 1330s. The most notable incident was the capture of the earl of Moray in 1335, on his way to return the count of Namur to England. The castle would stay in English hands only a few years after the siege of Dunbar, falling victim to Alexander Ramsey on 30 March 1342.⁴⁹

Perth



The town of St. John of Perth was a key strategic point for both sides throughout the war, with heavy significance both in military and in political terms. Much as Berwick was the focal point that led to the battle of Halidon Hill, Perth was the focal point of the Disinherited's campaign to unseat David Bruce that led to the battle of Dupplin Moor. Its position at the head of the Tay estuary made it the major port for the central portion of Scotland between the Firth of Forth and the Grampians, much

⁴⁸ PRO E101/22/40

⁴⁹ *Fordun*, p 365

as Berwick served as the major port for the southern portion of Scotland and Aberdeen for the north.⁵⁰ Perth was also the closest major urban centre to the abbey of Scone, the traditional location for the coronation of the kings of Scotland.

The town played an important part in the proceeding conflict, even before any hostilities had taken place. The magnates in Scotland had met there on 2 August 1332 in order to select a successor to the position of Guardian following the death of Thomas Randolph, earl of Moray.⁵¹ Shortly afterward during the aftermath of Dupplin Moor, Balliol and his adherents occupied the town, followed in turn by a brief and half-hearted siege under the Earl of March, Patrick Dunbar. The defences of the town at this time appear to have been either negligible or in need of strengthening, as several chroniclers relate how the Disinherited immediately began building ditches and palisades in expectation of Dunbar's siege.⁵² The siege, however, came to little, as Dunbar withdrew soon afterward from lack of provisions. Balliol was crowned king of Scotland on 24 September, shortly thereafter heading south to support his partisans in Galloway under Eustace Maxwell who were fighting the Earl of March and other Bruce supporters. Duncan, the earl of Fife and recently come into Balliol's peace, was left in command of a small garrison.

The next three years would see the town change hands more than once again, depending on the fortunes of the overall war. The town was recaptured by the Scots on 7 October, with Simon Fraser and Robert Keith taking the Earl of Fife prisoner and leveling what fortifications remained.⁵³ Fortunes turned again with the aftermath of Halidon Hill, and Balliol taking up residence for the rest of the year at Perth. As

⁵⁰ R.M. Spearman, 'The Medieval Townscape of Perth', in M. Lynch et al. (eds.) *The Scottish Medieval Town* (Edinburgh, 1991), pp 42-59; Peter G.B. McNeill, Hector L. MacQueen (eds.), *Atlas of Scottish History to 1707* (Scottish Medievalists and Dept. of Geography, Univ. of Edinburgh, 1996), p 238

⁵¹ *Scalacronica*, p 159

⁵² *Scalacronica*, p 160; *Wyntoun*, p 389; *Bridlington*, p 107

⁵³ *Fordun*, pp 355-6, *Wyntoun*, p 394; *Scotichronicon*, pp 82-3

Balliol once again fled to Berwick in the face of a general uprising in support of the Bruces in September 1334, much of the surrounding area was lost to his control, with Rogers stating 'only Galloway east of the Cree and parts of Buchan... remaining loyal to him.'⁵⁴ However, a certain degree of control must have been maintained, as John Stirling, while Balliol's sheriff of Perth, was able to gather enough forces to carry out a siege of Loch Leven 'in mid-lent 1335', albeit unsuccessfully.⁵⁵ Edward's winter campaign at Roxburgh did not make it farther north than the border region, so would have had little or no effect on the control of the area surrounding Perth. It is highly unlikely that Stirling could have attempted to take an inland fortress so close to Perth without Perth being in friendly hands.

The summer of 1335 saw the 'Great Offensive' smash its way through Scotland to reach Perth, certainly by 7 August when Edward III ordered the purchase of two hackneys for the speedy return of two friars who had come to treat for peace from the earl of Atholl, who had joined the Scots during the preceding year.⁵⁶ The town remained the focus of campaigning activities for the summer, with Edward's forces making a great demonstration of power by devastating the local area. Edward Balliol also used it as the initial base for making a foray into the Highlands with a small force including such as the earls of Warwick, Angus, Buchan, Henry of Lancaster, Ralph Neville, and several others.⁵⁷ Though most of the forces had returned by September, the military activity through much of the year signaled an end to the precarious nature of the garrison for a short span of time. The truce

⁵⁴ *War, Cruel and Sharp*, p 81

⁵⁵ *Scotichronicon*, pp 98-99

⁵⁶ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 272r

⁵⁷ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 236r-237r, 255r-256v

granted on 22 October for three weeks after two months of initial negotiations further reduced the conflict, as did its various extensions.⁵⁸

The failure of a negotiated settlement during the winter of 1336 meant an end to the lull, with the town apparently being burned once again sometime before 19 May, requiring the rebuilding of fortifications once again.⁵⁹ After his chevauchée into the north, Edward ordered the rebuilding of the walls of Perth in stone, charging the costs to the six monasteries at St. Andrews, Dunfermline, Lindores, Balmerino, Arbroath and Coupar Angus.⁶⁰ Some chronicles claim Thomas Ughtred was placed in charge of Perth at this time: however, he only began receiving wages according to the wardrobe book on 12 March 1337.⁶¹

A decision must have been made by Edward to garrison Perth with English troops at this time, however, as the wardrobe book of Robert Ferriby records a large contingent of 337 mounted archers, hobelars, and foot under Ralph Neville as being in place on 25 August 1336.⁶² Though this force was reduced to 176 mounted archers and hobelars and 148 foot when the responsibility for their pay was passed to John Padbury on 13 October, it was larger than any other garrison in Scotland at the time. The garrison was further reinforced by several magnate contingents joining the garrison through October and November of the same year. The largest contingents were provided by the earl of Hereford, Humphrey Bohun, who sent under Thomas Ludlow 30 men-at-arms. Similar numbers came with Ralph Stafford and Robert Morley, while John Leyburn, John Willoughby, Adam Well, William Ros of Helmsley, Thomas Wake of Liddell, and Robert Colville all provided contingents of roughly ten men-at arms each.

⁵⁸ *Rot Scot*, pp 384-387

⁵⁹ *Anonimalle*, p 7

⁶⁰ *Scotichronicon*, pp 122-123

⁶¹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 250v

None of these men, with the exception of Ralph Neville, participated in the summer campaigns of 1336.⁶³ Several had been associated with one another in the past, and were familiar with each other's methods. For instance, Adam Well and John Willoughby were appointed along with the household knight William Frank to arrest the bandit Robert Breton in Lincolnshire in September 1336, while John Mowbray had witnessed the confirmation of an indenture between Robert Morley and Queen Isabella the previous year.⁶⁴ Mowbray, Wake, Bohun, Well, and Neville had all been in previous campaigns, while Colville had been on the Scottish side until captured just before Halidon Hill.⁶⁵

Overall, the garrison at the end of the year saw 156 men-at-arms and another 36 mounted archers defending Perth in addition to the force under Padbury's administration and any forces of Edward Balliol's *resident yet not receiving royal* pay.⁶⁶ A further 43 men-at-arms joined the garrison at the end of January, when John Mowbray's contingent arrived under the command of Robert Halsham and Edward Balliol retained Henry Haneryngton and his contingent of 28 men.

The sheer size of the garrison in relation to any other in Scotland indicated both the importance attached to holding Perth and maintaining it under the permanent control of Edward III and Balliol, and the recognition that the previous measures taken to hold the town had been wholly inadequate to assure its possession. Similarly, the importance of the individuals contracted to hold the town was far more than the usual English garrison. While some of the men receiving the custody of

⁶² BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 250r-251r

⁶³ Robert Morley, for instance, had been on pilgrimage to Santiago: *CPR 1334-8*, p 162

⁶⁴ *CPR 1334-8*, pp 129, 362

⁶⁵ *Lanercost*, p 272; *Scalacronica*, p 162; *Rot Parl*, p 182

⁶⁶ The notations for the garrisons at Perth are unusual in the wardrobe book as no other garrison has individual retinues recorded; the usual format is to record the commander of the garrison and the total number of troops in his care for the listed period of time. The rank of the individuals in question and the existence of a separate 'command' for the garrison likely necessitated the alteration from the norm.

garrisons were of major importance – Anthony Lucy at Berwick, for instance, or the banneret Thomas Roscelyn at Edinburgh and Dunnotar – most were men with strong connections with the royal household and who made their living through military service to others, rather than magnates of the land with their own power base independent of the king. Perth, on the other hand, had several important magnates contracted to provide garrison forces for its defense.

In March of 1337, the garrison was further strengthened by thirty men with the arrival of Guy Ferrers, though this was counterbalanced by the loss of John Leyburn, the first of the magnates in the garrison to depart. More important was the arrival of the new commander of the garrison, Thomas Ughtred.⁶⁷ Having been involved in the conflict in service to both Edward Balliol and Edward III, he seemed a good choice to keep a permanent hold on the town. Commensurate with his status as the holder of the most important town inside the truncated Scotland, he received pay for an immense garrison – 40 men-at-arms, 100 hobelars and 100 archers, easily eclipsing all the forces in the garrison, barring those men taking pay from John Aslagby, John Padbury's successor.⁶⁸ Considering Aslagby's status as a clerk and paymaster, these forces would have devolved to Ughtred's immediate command as well. Ughtred's personal retinue was also far larger than any other royal garrison in Scotland, where sixty men-at-arms and sixty mounted archers was the rough rule of thumb.

Most of those in place at Perth over the winter of 1336-7 left in May, either to return south or to engage in fighting elsewhere in Scotland. Thomas Wake of Liddell, William Ros of Helmsley and John Mowbray all contracted with the crown

⁶⁷ For Ughtred's overall career, see Ayton, 'Sir Thomas Ughtred and the Edwardian Military Revolution', pp 107-132

⁶⁸ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 250v

to be part of Thomas Beauchamp's force in the summer of 1337.⁶⁹ Of those previously employed in the garrison, only Ralph Stafford, Adam Well, Robert Morley, and Henry Haneryngton stayed beyond mid-June and the renewal of Thomas Ughtred's command of the garrison.

The costs of maintaining these forces was considerable. Thomas Ughtred's retinue alone cost over £560 to maintain for just under one hundred days, while the lengthy stays by Ralph Stafford and Robert Morley saw them owed hundreds of pounds in wages as well. All told, the forces held at Perth from its garrisoning by Edward in August 1336 until the completion of Thomas Ughtred's second contract as keeper of the town would cost the household £5813 9s 4d.⁷⁰ Those in the garrison received other considerations as well. Ralph Stafford, for instance, received a pardon on 6 Oct 1337 of £260 owed to the exchequer in consideration for his services in Scotland, while John Mowbray had received similar relief seven months before.⁷¹ Though these gifts and pardons were not made solely for serving in Perth's garrison, the presence of these men in Scotland having not served in the previous year's summer campaigns would have contributed greatly towards Edward's willingness to grant them.

The garrison at Perth continued under Ughtred's direction until June 1339, when the town came under siege by a force led by Robert Stewart, then Guardian of Scotland. Amongst others participating in the siege according to chroniclers were 'a great multitude' of troops from France brought by William Douglas and William Bullock, formerly the governor of Cupar Castle which had fallen the month before.⁷² The town came under heavy attack, including mining by the Earl of Ross. After two

⁶⁹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 245r-245v

⁷⁰ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 250r-251r


⁷¹ *CPR 1334-8*, pp 427, 529

⁷² viz. 'A great multitude', *Anominale*, p 14; Bullock: *Scotichronicon*, p 141

months, despite having made arrangements for the proper resupply of the town in his indenture for its command, Ughtred was forced to make arrangements for Perth's surrender after the necessary supplies to withstand the siege failed to be sent from England by the crown.⁷³ On 17 August, due to 'lack of victuals', the garrison was surrendered to the Scots.

Dunnotar, Lauriston, Kinneff

These three castles were situated along the North Sea coast between the Dee and the North Esk rivers. They lay along the southern coastal route leading to Aberdeen, and were necessary strongholds for trying to secure effective control of coastal Scotland north of the Firth of Forth and to hold on to the earldom of Angus, the lordship claimed by one of the key figures of the Disinherited, Gilbert Umfraville.



Kinneff and Lauriston do not figure prominently in the records of the time, either in chronicle or administrative form; the wardrobe books for the period do not mention either location, while the chronicles of the time mention them but briefly along with Dunnotar.⁷⁴ Clifford Rogers erroneously identifies Lauriston with Laurieston, in Galloway; the

⁷³ *Anonimale*, p 14; *Scotichronicon*, pp 140-4; Ayton, 'Sir Thomas Ughtred and the Edwardian Military Revolution', pp 121-2

⁷⁴ A typical example is *Scotichronicon*, p 123: 'When therefore the king of England had in a hostile manner reduced with fire and sword everything beyond the mountains that was against him, he went back to the town of Perth, after fortifying the strongholds of Dunnotar, Kinneff, and Lauriston.'

sheer distance from Edward's activities in the north of Scotland and Laurenston's mention in the same breath as Kinneff and Dunnotar make it highly unlikely that they are one and the same.⁷⁵

Dunnotar figures more prominently in the administrative records, as its costs are entered as part of the wardrobe accounts during its brief sojourn in English hands. Thomas Roscelyn, previously keeper of Edinburgh Castle, began receiving pay on 1 May 1336 as keeper of Dunnotar, along with sixty men-at arms and 100 mounted archers. The crown made sure that the resources to secure the castle were available: Roscelyn received 250 marks by the king's order from the abbey of St. Edmunds, John Wodehouse, the keeper of the hanaper of chancery, and the bankers of the Bardi during April and May.⁷⁶ It seems likely that Dunnotar was in a state of disrepair similar to that of many castles in Scotland. Accompanying Roscelyn's troops were eleven masons, carpenters, and smiths.

It is unlikely that the entire garrison was in place before mid-June; unusually for a *munitiones* pay record in the wardrobe book, eight ships are also listed as receiving wages for conducting the men, horses, arms, and victuals for the castle from the port of Lynn from 1 May until 11 June. The ships must have been well-prepared and equipped: their pay amounted to £123 10s, for the 42 days, averaging out to roughly twenty-eight sailors per vessel at the usual pay rates for the period.⁷⁷ To put this into perspective, the largest ship used in the 1335 expedition from Ireland into western Scotland – the *Trinity* from Hampton - employed forty-two sailors during the summer, while several only employed seven or eight.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ For Clifford Rogers' identification of Lauriston, see *War, Cruel and Sharp*, p 119

⁷⁶ *CCR 1333-7*, pp 560, 563, 576


⁷⁷ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 251r

⁷⁸ PRO E101/19/16

Unfortunately for the garrison and for Thomas Roscelyn in particular, Dunnotar's position at the furthest extent of English control made it vulnerable to counter-attack. The *Anonimalle* chronicler tells of Edward III putting Aberdeen to the torch during his 1336 campaign in revenge for Roscelyn's death at their hands.⁷⁹ The garrison itself does not appear to have been destroyed at this time; though Edward III is described by chroniclers as fortifying the castle during his chevauchée in July 1336, the pay records in the wardrobe carry through to July and then cease⁸⁰ It is unlikely that having made a successful raid through northern Scotland that Edward would willingly withdraw troops from regions he felt he controlled. This control did not last for any period of time: the *Scotichronicon* tells of Andrew Murray destroying the three outlying garrisons in October 1336 before retreating to the 'very safe places in Angus'.⁸¹

The destruction of the three fortresses laid the way open for operations further south. Perth became the thin edge of the wedge, exposed as the only garrison north of the Firth of Tay in effective English hands. It also freed Moray and others to move southwards, bypassing Perth and entering Fife and areas closer to the heartland of English/Balliol control.

Edinburgh, Dunbar



Edinburgh at this time did not hold near the importance militarily that it would gain in later periods as

⁷⁹ *Anonimalle*, p 7

⁸⁰ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 251r

⁸¹ *Scotichronicon*, pp124-5

the capital of Scotland. In fact, the castle itself was a ruined shell when hostilities erupted in 1332, and did not feature in the conflict at all as a fortification or point of conflict until 1335. It did however feature prominently as the scene of several parliaments and treaty negotiations before this point. After the failure of the Weardale campaign to engage the Scottish raiders that had ranged into Northumberland and the palatinate of Durham, Isabella and Mortimer engaged in negotiations with Robert the Bruce for a permanent peace. Contrary to previous practices, the English sent a delegation north of the border to finish negotiating the treaty after initial discussions at York, arriving by 10 March 1328. Similarly, a parliament called by Bruce met at Edinburgh on 28 February to discuss the peace and other matters.⁸² By 20 March, they had fleshed out the treaty so derisively referred to as 'The Shameful Peace'.

The next parliament Edinburgh would see would also be to ratify agreements between England and Scotland, though of a very different nature, and between very different rulers. Called by Edward Balliol after the victory of Halidon Hill, the purpose of the Parliament that met during February 1334 was to ratify the agreement between Edward III and Balliol that granted much of southern Scotland to Edward III as a permanent annexation to England in exchange for his aid in regaining Scotland for Balliol after his ejection at Christmas 1332. By 12 February 1334, Edward had all that he wanted: letters patent from Edward Balliol essentially agreeing to the conventions drawn up at Roxburgh the year before, albeit without specifying the lands that would be given over.⁸³ That Edinburgh would be included in the lands ceded by letters patent on 12 July 1334 makes this event rather ironic.⁸⁴

⁸² For a concise discussion of the mission to Edinburgh, see E.L.G. Stones, 'The English Mission to Edinburgh in 1328', *SHR* 28 (1949), pp 121-32

⁸³ *Foedera*, p 878

⁸⁴ *Foedera*, p 888

Though Edinburgh was seen as a natural venue for these parliaments, no effort appears to have been taken before 1335 to repair the ruined fortress at the crown of the rock spur that dominated the town. Much like Roxburgh, neither side saw it worthwhile to reconstruct the fortifications despite the town being the local centre of control. For the Bruce supporters, it provided a strong point for the English to concentrate on and then use against them, while the English considered it to be too expensive to rebuild as long as there were no major threats militarily in the area. Two separate events in 1335 would rapidly change this way of thinking.

The first was the capture of the Count of Namur in the ruins of the castle at Edinburgh, as previously mentioned. Forces led by the earl of Moray attacked Namur and his contingent at Burgh Muir, eventually forcing the men from the Low Countries to flee after being reinforced by William Douglas and men from the Pentland Hills. Fighting their way through Edinburgh town, Namur and his men were cornered in the remnants of the castle, which had been demolished 'for fear of the English'. The only means available to block the rents in the walls were with the bodies of slain horses and men.⁸⁵ Despite these efforts, Namur was forced to capitulate the next morning.

To have a high-ranking ally ambushed and taken from the remains of what had been the major English garrison in the area under Edward I was a highly embarrassing situation, all the more so for highlighting the complacency which so often dogged the English military effort in Scotland. What made it even more embarrassing was the certain knowledge that the area could be threatened, due to the second major event to have occurred that year. The failure of the Roxburgh campaign to achieve any major gains north of the Tweed, combined with other grievances, led to the reversion of Patrick Dunbar, earl of March, to the Bruce camp.

By February 1335, his lands had been declared forfeit and granted to various supporters of Edward III's.⁸⁶

Dunbar's particular importance was twofold: he was one of the most important magnates in Scotland both before and after the beginning of the conflict, and was the magnate with the greatest base of support in Lothian and southeastern Scotland – those areas that the English were expecting to incorporate permanently into England as recompense for their support of Edward Balliol in achieving a permanent hold on the Scottish crown. Initially he had been a strong Bruce supporter, with a knack for survival: Dunbar commanded the southern half of the Scottish forces during the invasion by the Disinherited, and so missed the massacre at Dupplin Moor. He chose not to continue a lengthy siege of the Disinherited at Perth, and instead headed southwards with his forces, allowing them to break up and using the remainder to punish Eustace Maxwell and the other supporters of Balliol in Galloway. His command of the castle at Berwick led to his surrender on terms to Edward III after Halidon Hill and his entering into Edward's service, rather lucratively.

Such service was not unknown to the earls of March; Patrick's father had been a supporter of Edward I, and the battle of Dunbar in 1296 was precipitated by the need to take back his castle from the earls of Mar, Ross, and Menteith, who had captured the castle with inside help.⁸⁷ The castle had been in ruinous state since Robert I; now that the southern counties were to be English, Patrick was free to rebuild the castle and make it defensible again.⁸⁸ By the time of earl Patrick's return

⁸⁵ *Scotichronicon*, pp 110-3

⁸⁶ *Scalacronica*, pp 164-5; *Wyntoun*, pp 421-2; *Lanercost*, p 278; *CDS*, nos. 1142, 1145, 1146

⁸⁷ M.C. Prestwich, *Edward I* (New Haven, 1998), p 471

⁸⁸ Nicholson follows *Scalacronica*, p 144 in thinking that Patrick sought Edward III's permission to rebuild Dunbar: Nicholson, p 144; this is contradicted by the Scottish chronicler Bower, who says 'Under pressure from the king of England the earl rebuilt the castle of Dunbar (which had earlier been demolished) at great expense to himself': *Scotichronicon*, pp 92-3

to the Scottish fold, it was again defensible. Its position along the coast midway between Berwick and Edinburgh's port at Leith allowed it to be a threat to any land traffic between the two towns, along with providing a possible landing point for any foreign traders or aid. In addition, the earl's ability to call support from large sections of Lothian greatly reduced the confidence of English control of the region as a whole. To have failed to properly guard against this new threat was a serious failure to adjust to changes in circumstances. Though the main campaign force in 1335 had passed through the region without trouble, smaller forces could be vulnerable, as Namur's fate showed.

Once the 1335 offensive had been concluded, Edinburgh began receiving the same level of attention that had been given to Roxburgh the previous winter. Edward made arrangements with Edward Balliol's former sheriff of Perth, John Stirling, to take command of the garrison with forty men-at-arms and forty hobelars or mounted archers, formalizing the arrangement by 13 October. As was usual with these arrangements, Stirling was also appointed sheriff of the county as well, with the capacity to receive rebels into the king's peace.⁸⁹

In the meantime, Thomas Roscelyn took custody of Edinburgh castle on 8 September 1335 with sixty men-at-arms and fifty-seven archers, 36 of whom were mounted.⁹⁰ Stirling did not take over responsibility for the garrison until 2 November of the same year. Considering that Edward III himself was at or near Edinburgh from 10 September until 27 September, Roscelyn could have done little more than put into motion the efforts to man and repair the castle while Stirling made arrangements to take up the permanent posting.⁹¹ The garrison was essentially unaffected by this rapid changeover of command, maintaining its same forces

⁸⁹ PRO E101/19/24; *Rot Scot*, p 382

⁹⁰ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 249r

through Stirling's tenure until 30 August 1337, though the archers are referred to as hobelars in later pay entries in the wardrobe books of the time. The account for John Stirling lists sixty-seven men-at-arms from Scotland, England, and 'Alemannia' (likely the Low Countries) and 71 hobelars and archers for 1335-6, and eighty-five named men-at-arms and 64 hobelars and archers in 1335-7.⁹² A janitor and two watchmen were also employed under Stirling as per his agreement with the crown, receiving 6d and 4d per day, respectively. While Nicholson states that Edward had to be convinced of the necessity of a garrison half again the size agreed to in their indenture, the existence of the larger garrison under Roscelyn's brief tenure with the king himself in the region argues otherwise.⁹³

Edinburgh required extensive rebuilding, much as Roxburgh had done. After Namur's unfortunate capture at the indefensible ruins of the castle, forty-seven masons, eight carpenters, and sixty-one workmen were put to work in September and October 1335 to return the castle to operation during Thomas Roscelyn's tenure there, at a cost of over £100 for the two months. Work continued under John Stirling, where twenty-nine masons and seven carpenters received pay through 1336 under the supervision of the royal clerk John Swanlond. The amount of materials required was similar to Roxburgh, with 322 baskets of lime, 108 stones of iron, 107 horsecars of sea-coal, and 830 boards being imported for use in the construction. Overall, the garrison and construction work consumed £4766 11s between 8 September 1335 and 30 August 1337.⁹⁴

Stirling did not always have an easy time during his tenure as warden; a petition at the end of 1335 accuses Thomas Burgh, Edward's chancellor in Scotland,

⁹¹ *CCR 1333-7*, pp 439-442

⁹² *CDS*, appendix iv, pp 362-3

⁹³ Nicholson, p 226

of failing to pay Stirling his proper wage as a banneret, warden of Edinburgh castle, and sheriff of the Lothians, along with disallowing many of the expenses he incurred.⁹⁵ Considering the financial losses that the garrisons must have been incurring, it is unsurprising that disputes over expenses would be occurring. Unfortunately, such disputes weakened the garrisons by denying them necessary resources and placed them at risk from attack.

Edinburgh came under siege by Andrew Murray on 1 November 1337, and was sufficiently threatened that Edward III had to send forces under the earls of Salisbury, Arundel, and Gloucester north to disrupt the Scottish attack. They initially had been earmarked for campaigning in Flanders but had not crossed the channel due to delays in gathering troops and financial difficulties relating to the wool scheme of 1337.⁹⁶ Murray broke off the siege, the last of his career, leaving Montague and FitzAlan free to turn eastwards to attempt to take Dunbar. That the castle had been left unmolested until this point seems odd, unless the overall tactics undertaken by the English are considered. The only siege of any duration undertaken before Dunbar was that of Berwick, the single most lucrative target in Scotland. Sieges such as John Stirling's attempt to take Loch Leven in 1334 and Strathbogie's siege of Kildrummy in 1335 were undertaken not by English royal forces, but by men operating on behalf of Balliol. The fall of Lochmaben in the south also follows this pattern. The Irish expedition in 1335 did attempt to take Rothesay, but failed. Fortifications that we do know of were attacked by English forces, such as Cumbernauld or the tower at Oxnam, were small affairs, not requiring great numbers of siege equipment or even more importantly, time. Edward avoided attacking

⁹⁴ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 249r: this figure includes 2s per day for John Swanlond's wages from 2 November 1335 to 30 August 1337. See also *CDS*, no. 1186, appendix iv pp 347-363

⁹⁵ *CDS*, no. 1194

⁹⁶ Sumption, *Trial By Battle*, pp 212-3

Kildrummy during his chevauchée north in 1336, and Cupar never required an English army to besiege it, being surrendered twice by the earl of Fife in 1333 and 1335. Dumbarton, Urquhart, and Loch Doon were never attacked, according to chronicle sources. Dunbar itself was an available option for attack any time after early 1335; that it took three years before a siege was attempted shows how little the English were willing to spend the time and effort on siege warfare unless backed with massive royal force.

Why this should be is uncertain. It should not have been from lack of engineering skill, for the best of the engineers in Scottish service at the beginning of the war, John Crabbe, had been a squire of Edward III's household since his capture by Walter Mauny in 1332. Nor was it from lack of equipment, since they had no difficulty at Berwick in this regard, and it seems ludicrous that matters should change so drastically after 1333. Numbers should not have been a consideration, as both Balliol supporters in Scotland and English magnates such as Edward Bohun were carrying out sieges on their own with far smaller numbers than the royal armies Edward III could provide. The Scottish tendency to raze any fortifications they took may provide a clue. Since their general policy was to destroy fortifications outside of those few that provided refuge, the focus of their strength was in the forces of leaders such as Andrew Murray and Robert Stewart. Edward's military structure, with its few sieges, mounted garrisons. and a mounted, highly mobile field army each year, seems geared to trying to come to grip with the Scots in the field, rather than by eliminating their refuges far away from English power.

If anything, the siege at Dunbar validated this strategy as more effective than trying to eliminate the few castles left to the Scots. The siege began on 13 January 1338, but failed to make any progress before being called off on 16 June, despite a

blockade at land and sea and the use of several siege engines. This failure did not seem to be from pressing the siege halfheartedly; the siege at Dunbar is the best recorded event by chroniclers during the war other than the Berwick campaign of 1333.⁹⁷ However, the spirited defense, combined with the pressures of trying to gather enough troops to carry out a meaningful campaign against France, meant that the siege had to be lifted without any result. The importance given the siege in several Scottish chronicles, combined with the words of the chroniclers themselves,⁹⁸ attests to how key the siege was as the indicator of a turn in the fortunes of the war. Though there would be other major activity in Scotland such as the 1341 invasion by Edward III, the siege at Dunbar was the last instance where the Scottish war took precedence over continental maneuverings. After its failure, the overall thrust of English efforts would be aimed squarely at France.

In August 1338 Thomas Rokeby took over the position of warden at Edinburgh in addition to Stirling, receiving a prest of 300 marks at that time.⁹⁹ Edinburgh would remain in English hands until 16 April 1341, when a Scottish party led by William Douglas and William Bullock successfully disguised themselves as victual merchants in order to gain access to the castle and take it by surprise.¹⁰⁰ The Scots had proven adept at these sudden strikes over the years, especially during Robert I's reign. Edinburgh itself had fallen to Robert by a similar surprise, when Robert's men climbed the supposedly impassible cliffs behind the castle at night to catch the garrison unawares.¹⁰¹ Unlike the fighting decades before, the Scots did have the wherewithal to bring siege weapons to bear on their targets: Andrew Murray

⁹⁷ *Anonimalle*, p 13; *Scotichronicon*, pp 126-131; *Lanercost*, pp 295-6; *Fordun*, pp 362-3


⁹⁸ Such as *Scotichronicon*, p 131: '... a war broke out between the kings of France and England, which was cruel and fearful enough, but yet a fortunate thing for Scotland. For if the aforesaid king had continued his war in Scotland, he would (as far as human judgement is concerned) have occupied it wholly and without difficulty'.

⁹⁹ *CDS*, no. 1284

¹⁰⁰ *Scotichronicon*, pp 144-7; *Fordun*, p 365

showed this to great effect in 1336 during his Fife campaign. However, subterfuge was a very familiar and very successful tool, and the Scots saw no reason to forego its use.

Bothwell



The castle at Bothwell was one of the victims of Robert I and was only remnants by 1336, when Edward III decided to include it in the web of fortifications that he was attempting to erect that year. Its position in upper Clydesdale made it a good complement to Stirling in attempting to bisect the country and prevent the north-south movement of Scottish troops to reinforce one another. This had proven costly, when eight hundred men from the south had gone north into Mar with Andrew Murray and successfully defeated David Strathbogie, resulting in the latter's death and the relief of Kildrummy, one of the major strongholds for the Bruce cause. It would also extend English power north and west, covering the southern counties and allowing more English power to be exerted towards those western areas under Scottish sway.

Edward made his quick trip north in October 1336 in order to begin the reconstruction of the fortress, gathering up the remainder of Lancaster's force and staying in the region until 10 December.¹⁰² Unusually for a castle manned by royal troops, Bothwell does not feature in the *munitiones* section of the wardrobe books.

¹⁰¹ Barrow, *Robert Bruce & The Community of The Realm of Scotland*, pp 275-8

¹⁰² BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 214r, 241r-244r, 259r-260r

However, there are traces elsewhere. Several household knights of Edward III, including Robert Ufford and Walter Mauny, received wages with their retinues for continuing on at Bothwell through March of the following year, totaling forty-five men-at-arms.¹⁰³

Meanwhile, the repairs of the castle were placed in the hands of the future Bishop of Durham, Thomas Hatfield, whose efforts and costs are recorded in the *Necessaria* section.¹⁰⁴ Between October and December, Hatfield spent £87 17s 8d on repairs, employing nineteen carpenters, twenty-eight masons, two thatchers, two smiths, and seventy-five ‘diggers’ (*fossatores*) to render the castle defensible and habitable. The pay for work ended on 4 December, a week before Edward III returned to England.

Bothwell’s history as a royal garrison was to be extremely short-lived. The castle fell under siege in March 1337 from Andrew Murray, after he had spent the winter destroying the English garrisons north of Perth and February reducing the buildup of fortifications in Fife to the sole surviving garrison at Cupar.¹⁰⁵ According to Walter Bower, the siege was carried with vigour, naming two men-at-arms who died in the fighting. The garrison surrendered on terms, probably due to the half-finished state of the defenses and the time of year guaranteeing that relief would be months away; it may also have been due to the ‘Bostour’, a siege engine employed by Murray that supposedly caused great fear amongst the English.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 241v-242r

¹⁰⁴ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 241v-242v (wages), 215 (Hatfield)

¹⁰⁵ *Scotichronicon*, pp 124-127; *Fordun*, p 362; *Bridlington*, p 128; *Lanercost*, p 288; *Wyntoun*, p 435; *Melsa*, p 378

¹⁰⁶ *Scotichronicon*, pp 124-5

Stirling

The most remarkable thing about Stirling during the 1330s is not its part in the war, but rather the lack of any major part in the fighting. The defining battles of the 1330s, Dupplin Moor, Halidon Hill, even Culblean, all occur elsewhere; the same goes for the defining sieges, at Berwick, Dunbar, Kildrummy, or Lochindorb. Its position at the lowest crossing point on the Forth would seem to make it the key to Scotland, but such prominence on a national scale was missing during the Balliol/Bruce conflict. Even in regional terms, Stirling was not heavily involved in the war; the focus by far was on Berwick and Lothian to the south, and Fife in the north. Both the Scots and the English seem to have had little difficulty in bypassing Stirling with their armies. The pattern of the previous two reigns, which saw Bannockburn, Stirling Bridge and Falkirk all fought on the castle's doorstep and multiple sieges carried out, changed to one where the castle was important and worth holding, but not an immediate priority for either side to control.

The castle did not come into Edward III's hands until August 1336, when William Montague was assigned custody of the castle. The choice of Montague is unsurprising: even with the lack of conflict over Stirling, the potential for it being a strategic chokepoint still existed, and Edward would have wished it to be in the hands of someone who could be utterly relied on to be loyal. Montague in turn assigned the holding of the castle to Thomas Rokeby, the knight who had delivered the news on the whereabouts of the Scottish raiders during the 1327 Weardale campaign.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ *Scotichronicon*, pp 122-3; *Fordun*, p 361; Weardale: *Scalacronica*, p 154; *Foedera*, p 717

Rokeby took command on 25 October 1336, having served out the summer with the royal forces.¹⁰⁸ Though the castle had been assigned to Montague, payment for the garrison evidently was not, as its wages were recorded in the wardrobe beginning in October. Under Rokeby was a garrison with forty-four men-at-arms, eighty hobelars, and thirteen watchmen until June of the next year. Restoration work was also undertaken, with seven carpenters, eight masons, a smith, two thatchers and 73 other workmen being paid for nearly a year's work from October through 30 August 1337.¹⁰⁹

These men must have earned their pay well, as Andrew Murray attempted to take the castle in April 1337, after his success at Bothwell in March. Rokeby had either more time or more warning to prepare his defenses, along with the advantage of one of the strongest castles in Scotland. Rather than surrendering like Bothwell, Stirling held out for three months until 14 June, when the castle was relieved by a hurriedly organized rescue force led by Edward III.¹¹⁰ In order to avoid a repeat of this episode, the garrison was reinforced, increasing the number of watchmen to twenty-one and the force of men-at-arms to eighty. An additional forty men-at-arms and forty mounted-archers guarded the victuals brought in to resupply the castle during the king's residence there until 28 June, an effort which saw two ships from Kingston-on-Hull paid £12 to ferry supplies to the castle. Another £22 9s 10d was spent on improvements to the castle and construction materials, including 25 baskets of lime, 390 stones of iron, and 1160 nails.

The repairs and heavy garrison did their job, as Stirling would come under siege again in 1340, though a truce declared during the summer of that year gave the

¹⁰⁸ Rokeby served with himself and eight squires from 11 June to 25 October, having come to Scotland with the king during his rush north. BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 244r

¹⁰⁹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 249v; see also *CDS*, appendix v, pp 364-368

castle relief until October.¹¹¹ After this point the siege resumed, but failed to make any headway until Rokeby was convinced to surrender the castle on terms on 10 April 1342.¹¹²

Caerlaverock, Lochmaben, Jedburgh

Not all of the major castles in southern Scotland received royal garrisons, nor was it English royal policy to make sure that they did. Though certain key positions were held in royal hands, others were placed into the hands of magnates who could use their own resources to defend them and the surrounding lands. This spared the royal treasury from having to absorb the costs of pacifying and protecting those regions while still seeing them incorporated into a web of defensive garrisons capable of maintaining the peace and defending the newly won areas against attempts to retake the region by the Scots.

Caerlaverock never technically fell into English hands at all, yet was a key part in the maintenance of English and Balliol interests in Galloway. Located in southern Galloway, west of Annandale and just east of the Nith estuary, it was in a key position from which to raid the main western route from Carlisle north into Scotland, and to threaten the castle at Lochmaben and the shire centre of Dumfries. It was the focus of Edward I's campaign in 1300, after its garrison had repeatedly

¹¹⁰ *Scotichronicon*, pp 130-1; *Fordun*, p 362; *Anonimalle*, p 10; *Scalacronica*, p 167; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 249v for the date of the siege's end.

¹¹¹ *Rot Scot*, pp 600-1

¹¹² *Scotichronicon*, pp 144-5; *CDS*, no. 1383

struck at Lochmaben and threatened to destabilize Galloway despite the capture of Dumfries and Lochmaben by the English the previous year.¹¹³

More importantly, it was by the 1330s the focus of those opposed to the Bruce dynasty in Galloway. After the defeat of Donald of Mar at Dupplin Moor and the crowning of Balliol at Scone in 1332, an uprising in support of Balliol began in Galloway under the leadership of Eustace Maxwell, lord of Caerlaverock. In part this was due to the connection of Balliol to the local region, being the heir through his grandmother of the last Celtic lord of Galloway. These historical ties also nicely coincided with the feud many of the Galwegians had with the Bruce family and their supporters, as the Earldom of Carrick to their north was central to the Bruce holdings and Annandale and Lochmaben to the east were held by the earl of Moray. Alexander Bruce was also the current holder of the title Lord of Galloway, as the Balliol family had been relieved of it during Robert I's reign. Unfortunately for Maxwell and his supporters, those still loyal to the young David Bruce chose to move south instead of continuing to siege Perth, and began to extract a high price from Galloway for its support of Balliol.¹¹⁴ This pressure was relieved in the fall when Balliol moved south in support of the uprising, forcing many of the Bruce supporters to capitulate until the ambush at Annan forced him to flee.

Maxwell stayed in the Balliol camp, and was willing to transfer his loyalties to Edward III to some degree, a key figure in Galloway's continued support for Balliol and Edward III despite the inclusion of Galloway east of Wighorn in the lands transferred to England in 1334.¹¹⁵ Household wardrobe records show Maxwell being paid one hundred marks per quarter-year for twenty men-at-arms through 1334 and 1335 and an additional twenty pounds for 20 mounted archers during the winter

¹¹³ Prestwich, *Edward I*, p 483

¹¹⁴ *Lanercost*, p 269; *Anonimalle*, p 152; *Melsa*, p 366; *Wyntoun*, pp 395-6

campaign to rebuild Roxburgh in 1334.¹¹⁶ In addition, he also became sheriff of Dumfriesshire, accounting for the office from 15 October 1335 through 29 September 1336.¹¹⁷

Despite his affinities to Balliol and willingness to serve Edward III so as to maintain his leading position in Galloway, Maxwell was not completely averse to the Bruce camp, especially when faced with a deteriorating situation for the English and a necessity to keep his own position secure. In 1337 Maxwell abandoned the English cause and transferred his allegiance to David Bruce, severely damaging the English position in Galloway and opening the way for raids to hit Cumberland later that year.¹¹⁸

Lochmaben, Caerlaverock's rival during Edward I's time, was the largest castle still standing in southwestern Scotland during the 1330s. It was the key to upper Annandale and the route northward into Scotland. It was held by Thomas Randolph, earl of Moray at the beginning of the wars in 1332, but was not taken during the immediate aftermath of Dupplin Moor. Its garrison was still loyal to the Bruce cause in 29 July 1333, when it was granted to Henry Percy as part of the two thousand marks' worth of lands stipulated in the life indenture that Percy had made with Balliol in May 1333.¹¹⁹ Percy was assigned in August to take the castle and keep it, provided it was taken at his own cost; unfortunately for Percy, the castle surrendered to Edward Bohun under terms protecting the garrison and leaving the castle in Bohun's hands.

¹¹⁵ *Foedera*, p 888

¹¹⁶ Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 239v, 253v

¹¹⁷ *CDS*, appendix iii, pp 317-21

¹¹⁸ *Anonimalle*, p 10

¹¹⁹ J.M.W. Bean, 'The Percies and their Estates in Scotland', *Archaeologia Aeliana*, 4th ser, 35 (1957), p 97

The difficulty in Edward Bohun's capture of Lochmaben came from the grant given by Edward I to Humphrey Bohun in April 1306 of Annandale and Lochmaben.¹²⁰ Though Humphrey had died at Boroughbridge, the claim still existed and was valid for the Bohun family, leaving two of the largest of Balliol's supporters wrangling over who was the valid owner of the castle. The resultant dispute was beyond the ability of Balliol to solve, requiring Edward III to intervene. Neither claimant was willing to back down, and Edward had to threaten forfeiture in order to get Lochmaben turned over to Henry Beaumont and Ralph Neville as neutral parties until the dispute could be resolved.¹²¹

The matter lingered until September 1334, when Edward III was able to force a compromise solution on both parties. In essence, Percy gave up his claims to Lochmaben in return for the castle at Jedburgh, control of the surrounding lands, five hundred marks a year from the customs of Berwick, and the custody of the town's castle and one hundred marks a year as stipend for the same, except for in war when he would receive £200. Bohun meanwhile was granted Lochmaben and Annandale. All parties gained from the proposal, as Edward would have had far more in costs and manpower drain attempting to garrison both Lochmaben and Jedburgh than he would have gained from keeping Jedburgh in his own hands. It left him free to put his resources into garrisoning Berwick and later Roxburgh, while guaranteeing that both Bohun and Percy would be putting their resources into defending the English control of the region.¹²²


Jedburgh itself would remain in Percy hands far beyond this particular war. Its position south of Roxburgh in Teviotdale made it the closest castle to England in the southeast, and thus the most shielded from Scottish attacks. Its relative proximity

¹²⁰ Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance under Edward I*, pp 238-9

¹²¹ *CDS*, no. 1101; *CCR 1333-7*, p 185

to Roxburgh meant that the two garrisons were often covering the same ground, strengthening the English position in the upper Tweeddale region. It figures little in the chronicle reference or royal accounts for the war, except for one incident. William Pressen, the keeper of the castle in July 1335, helped intercept the earl of Moray's party as it brought the recently captured Guy of Namur south to English lands. Pressen was credited with capturing Moray, ending the latter's involvement in this stage of the Anglo-Scottish wars.¹²³ The crown did take an interest in the repair and defense of Jedburgh, as Pressen was granted 56s 4d in 1336 for money spent on the repair of the castle.¹²⁴

Dundarg, Kildrummy, Lochindorb



The three castles of Dundarg, Kildrummy, and Lochindorb were the major flashpoints north of the Tay, and the focus of campaigns in 1334, 1335, and 1336, respectively. Unlike the south, this northern region had no castles with royal garrisons; the fortunes of the English efforts to defeat the Bruce supporters in the region depended upon the castles of magnates friendly to Edward III and Balliol and their ability to hold out against much more intense pressure than faced by the more southerly garrisons.

Dundarg was the centerpiece of the Earldom of Buchan, claimed by Henry Beaumont. Its location east of Banff on the north shore of Scotland allowed it to resupply by sea and exert control over the northernmost of the English-speaking

¹²² *Rot Scot*, p 280; *CCR 1333-7*, p 327; Nicholson, p 170

¹²³ *Scotichronicon*, pp 112-3; *Bridlington*, pp 123-4; *Melsa*, p 376; *Fordun*, p 359; *Wyntoun*, pp 420-1

lowland areas on the eastern seaboard. Henry was able to reclaim control of the earldom after the battle of Halidon Hill in 1333, and began refortifying Dundarg to bring it up to modern standard.¹²⁵ As Henry was seen as the greatest of Balliol's Disinherited supporters and the driving force behind their attempts to take Scotland, he was guaranteed to attract the unwelcome attentions of Bruce partisans operating out of the lands of the earl of Moray, whose earldom abutted Buchan to the west. Such attention came in the winter of 1334, as Beaumont retreated from Perth and a noisy, heated debate over the inheritance of the John Mowbray killed in 1332 at Annan.¹²⁶ Much like Richard Talbot and David Strathbogie, his allies in the dispute, Beaumont found himself the target of the remaining Bruce partisans as they took opportunistic advantage of his isolation. Andrew Murray and Alexander Mowbray, his opponent in the dispute before Mowbray's defection to the Bruce cause, had him under siege at Dundarg by September. With the failure of the Roxburgh campaign to gather enough men for a relief effort, Beaumont had little choice but to surrender on 23 December, eliminating Buchan from areas that could support the Balliol faction and Dundarg from further involvement in the war.¹²⁷

Kildrummy was never in the hands of the English or any Balliol supporters during the 1330s: while it had been taken by the future Edward II in September 1306, no English force would have such luck three decades later.¹²⁸ It was one of the few fortifications that remained outside of English or Balliol hands after Halidon Hill, along with Dumbarton, Urquhart, Loch Doon, and Loch Leven.¹²⁹ It was the major castle in Mar, located on the Don River near the headwaters of the River Bogie.

¹²⁴ *Rot Scot*, p 434

¹²⁵ *Wyntoun*, p 406

¹²⁶ *Bridlington*, p 119; *Scotichronicon*, pp 94-95; *Wyntoun*, pp 406-7; *Brut*, p 280; *Scalacronica*, p 164; *Melsa*, p 372

¹²⁷ *Wyntoun*, pp 427-8; *Fordun* p 357; *Scalacronica*, p 164; *Lanercost* p 278; *Bridlington*, p 121

¹²⁸ *Prestwich, Edward I*, p 508

¹²⁹ *Scotichronicon*, pp 92-3; *Wyntoun*, p 404

More importantly, it had been the centre of Donald of Mar's earldom and was defended through the wars by Christian Bruce, Murray's wife, sister of Robert I and Donald's mother.¹³⁰ Where Dumbarton was the major stronghold in the west upholding the Bruce cause, providing sanctuary for David Bruce before his escape to France, Kildrummy was the centerpiece of defense in the east, preventing the easy reclamation of the lowlands north of the Tay.

The most notable incident involving Kildrummy came in 1335, when David Strathbogie began besieging the castle as part of his efforts to reduce Scotland north of the Forth and bring it to submit to Balliol. Negotiations at the time were occurring between the Bruce supporters and Edward III's deputies, complete with truces and cessation of hostilities. It is uncertain whether or not this extended to those acting on behalf of Balliol, rather than Edward III. What is certain is that Murray received Montague's permission to attempt a rescue of his wife, which led to the defeat and death of Strathbogie on 30 November at Culblean.¹³¹ The castle would be bypassed during Edward III's strike north in 1336, and otherwise remained free from attack for the rest of the war.

Kildrummy's counterpart was the Atholl stronghold at Lochindorb, an island fortress in the lake of the same name between the Rivers Spey and *Andhorn* at the headwaters of Dorback Burn. It was not to fall to the Scots in this stage of the wars, though it was threatened in 1336. After his victory at Culblean, Andrew Murray took advantage of the chance to take the initiative and began a siege of Lochindorb in March 1336, hoping to capitalize on the lack of an English royal army in Scotland capable of interfering with the siege and the garrison's relative isolation compared to other Balliol- or English-held lands. Taking Lochindorb was of particular

¹³⁰ *Wyntoun*, pp 317, 319

importance for Murray, as it lay directly between his wife at her castle of Kildrummy and his lands in Ross. If the castle could be taken, it would allow him to link up his lands and provide an unbroken chain across the north to allow supplies and reinforcements to move freely eastward and push the areas of conflict further south.¹³²

Instead of winning Lochindorb, Murray provided Edward III with a splendid piece of propaganda. Lochindorb was held at the time by Catherine Beaumont, daughter of Henry Beaumont and widow of David Strathbogie. Given the opportunity to rescue “ladyis, that ware luvly”,¹³³ Edward rose to the occasion. Taking eight hundred men north from Perth, he reached Lochindorb in only three days on 15 July, forcing Murray to retreat into Ross and relieving the garrison. After resupplying the nearly starved garrison by raiding the surrounding countryside and plundering Kinloss Abbey, Edward left to burn most of the northern coast.¹³⁴ Murray’s focus after this point would shift eastwards and southwards, leaving Lochindorb behind for more successful attacks that winter on the Kincardineshire fortifications and Fife. Edward, meanwhile, had the tale of his wild ride through northern Scotland told far and wide in a news letter sent out by the Queen emphasizing the bravery and care Edward III showed in rescuing and resupplying Lochindorb and its inhabitants at great risk and effort.¹³⁵

¹³¹ *Scotichronicon*, pp 116-7; *Wyntoun*, pp 422-7; *Fordun*, pp 359-360; *Pluscarden*, p 280; *Knighton*, p 475; *Melsa*, p 376; *Lanercost*, p 284; *Scalacronica*, p 166; *Baker*, p 57


¹³² *Wyntoun*, p 428; *CDS*, no. 1221

¹³³ *Wyntoun*, p 428

¹³⁴ *Wyntoun*, pp 429-30; *Fordun*, pp 360-1; *Scalacronica*, p 166; *Baker*, pp 57-8; *Original Letters*, pp 33-9

¹³⁵ *Original Letters*, pp 33-9

Cupar



Cupar is centrally located in Fife, the peninsular region between the Firth of Forth and the Firth of Tay. The castle was the main seat of the Earls of Fife, and was the strongest of the fortresses within the earldom in the 1330s. The

county had a central role in the campaigns of the 1330s, *seeing action in most years*. Partly this has to do with the proximity to Perth, and its position as the *de facto* capital of Scotland at the time. The Disinherited landed at Kinghorn and passed through Fife to approach Perth before Dupplin Moor, while later years saw the Scots fight to try to cut Perth off by controlling Fife and the English fight to guarantee the ability to travel overland to Balliol's chosen capital.

Another reason to attempt to control Fife was the relative fickleness of Duncan, earl of Fife. One of the more significant magnates in Scotland before the wars, Fife would change sides four separate times, all in the face of military defeat. After losing to the Disinherited at their landing at Kinghorn and the disaster at Dupplin Moor, Fife transferred his loyalty to Balliol, being granted custody of Perth during Balliol's campaign southwards as a reward. He would transfer it again in October 1332 when Simon Fraser and Robert Keith assaulted and took Perth, capturing the Earl and forcing him to switch sides. In 1335, he would surrender without a fight to Edward III, and by 1336 was already back in the Scottish camp. While the betrayals and defections of Patrick Dunbar and David Strathbogie have

received far more attention, the earl of Fife surpassed them both in his willingness to transfer loyalties due to expediency and survival.¹³⁶

Cupar was bypassed during the Disinherited's initial invasion of Scotland, and saw no action in either 1333 or 1335. The reason was simple: in all three cases, control of Cupar and the rest of Fife was gained by converting the earl, without any need to besiege the fortifications within Fife itself. Western Fife saw English armies pass through in 1332 and 1335, but only in order to reach Perth, rather than as the territorial focus of either campaign.

Cupar was assigned to the control of William Bullock, Balliol's chamberlain after Halidon Hill; however, he went over to the Bruce side upon Balliol's second expulsion in 1334.¹³⁷ The castle was returned to the earl of Fife, who had it in his keeping when he surrendered without any conflict to Balliol and Edward III after their massive invasion that summer. After Fife's surrender, the castle was temporarily placed in the hands of Henry Ferrers, a Disinherited lord with interests in Fife who would later briefly hold the castle at Leuchars in 1336.¹³⁸ Ferrers only held it with fifteen men-at-arms for three weeks before returning the castle to Edward Balliol on Edward III's orders.¹³⁹ Balliol then assigned the castle once again to William Bullock, who had negotiated a return to Balliol's side along with David Strathbogie on 18 August 1335.¹⁴⁰

Though Cupar was held in nominally Scottish hands, funds were given by the English exchequer for its repair and rebuilding. William Bullock received 100 marks for his journey to the Westminster parliament in March 1336 and for the repair of

¹³⁶ Both Nicholson and Rogers emphasize Dunbar and Strathbogie's defections, mainly due to the relative importance of both individuals at the time of their changing sides. Dunbar: Nicholson, pp 143-144, 190; *War Cruel and Sharp*, pp 79, 86; Strathbogie: Nicholson, pp 170, 215-216; *War Cruel and Sharp*, pp 81, 100-1

¹³⁷ *Pluscarden*, p 272; *Wyntoun*, p 406

¹³⁸ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 239r (Cupar); *Scotichronicon*, pp 123-4 (Leuchars)

¹³⁹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 239r

Cupar, which had been ordered by the king's council.¹⁴¹ By the same token, Cupar was part of the web of garrisons such as Edinburgh, Roxburgh, and Berwick that were attempting to maintain the interests of both Edward III and Balliol. When Cupar came under siege in March 1336 by the earls of March and Fife, Bullock was rescued not by a Balliol force, but by a lightning strike from Edinburgh. Upon hearing that Cupar was under siege, the constable of Edinburgh, John Stirling, arranged for boats to transport his entire garrison across the Forth, then made a surprise attack upon the besiegers. Thinking that Stirling's force was the vanguard of Edward III's army, the besiegers scattered, ending that year's threat to the castle.¹⁴²

Cupar was apparently left alone in March 1337, when several garrisons which had been set up during August 1336 were captured and leveled by the Scots, leaving Cupar the only significant fortification left in the county.¹⁴³ A somewhat apocryphal story in the *Scotichronicon* tells of sixty of the garrison attempting to force a local boatsman to ferry them across the Forth at some later date and being stranded on a sandbank at Cramond Isle in recompense for their ill treatment of them. While the tale can only be dated as between 1336 and 1339, it does show that the garrison was undertaking long-range sweeps outside the immediate environs of Cupar.¹⁴⁴

Cupar would remain in Balliol's hands via William Bullock until 1339. In June, Perth would be besieged, and William Douglas was sent on behalf of Robert Stewart to negotiate with Bullock in the hopes of him surrendering Cupar and joining the Bruce faction. Bullock had at the time several offices, including chamberlain to

¹⁴⁰ *Avesbury*, p 298; *Knighton*, pp 473-5; *Rot Scot*, p 381; *Wyntoun*, p 421

¹⁴¹ PRO E 43/195 (25 March 1336)

¹⁴² *Anonimalle*, p 6

¹⁴³ *Scotichronicon*, pp 124-127; *Fordun*, p 362; *Bridlington*, p 128; *Lanercost*, p 288; *Wyntoun*, p 435; *Melsa*, p 378; *Rot Scot*, pp 483, 485

¹⁴⁴ *Scotichronicon*, pp 134-5

Balliol. However, he was successfully induced to switch sides in exchange for a number of land grants, and joined in the siege of Perth, which fell on 17 August.¹⁴⁵

Maintaining the garrisons in Scotland was a difficult task, and an expensive one. Even the smallest garrisons, or those held for a brief time, could cost a great deal: the castle at Dunnotar had £576 8s 2d in expenses for the brief period of 1 May 1336 to 16 July, while Stirling generated £1959 18s 8d in costs from 25 October 1336 through 30 August 1337. Larger garrisons such as the one at Perth were amazingly expensive, and generated costs far in excess of what the local revenues were bringing in. Even assuming that Berwick could still somehow manage the £640 annually it forwarded to the Scottish crown before the Disinherited invasion, it would only generate roughly three year's worth of income, or £1920, against the £5551 10s 8d of expenses that manning and repairing its walls cost.¹⁴⁶ Granted the city had other sources of income, but the sheer scale of the imbalance indicates precisely how much of a drain maintaining the English conquests in Scotland was to the Exchequer. For the cost of £22,140 12s 7d¹⁴⁷ for 1334 through 1337, the English gained seven garrisons receiving funds from the wardrobe, only to lose the two at Dunnotar and Bothwell within a year of their establishment and all but Berwick within ten years. This does not even include the £87 17s 8d spent by Thomas Hatfield at Bothwell, or the work of royal clerks like Nicholas Uffton in arranging work crews for the various garrisons in southern Scotland.¹⁴⁸

The English did try to take advantage of circumstances as they could. Many of the garrisons had only one or two commanders throughout their existence, like

¹⁴⁵ *Scotichronicon*, pp 140-4; *Anonimalle*, p 14; *Fordun*, pp 363-4;

¹⁴⁶ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 248r

¹⁴⁷ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 251r

¹⁴⁸ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 215r

William Felton at Roxburgh or Thomas Rokeby for Stirling. This allowed them to gain a deep familiarity with the local surroundings and offset somewhat the difficulty of being an outsider without local roots. Even where transfers were made, they seem to have been done with an eye on maintaining that pool of knowledge. When John Stirling took over command of Edinburgh from Thomas Roscelyn, the latter was sent to garrison and rebuild Dunnotar. The men chosen also were veterans of Scottish or northern service. Thomas Ughtred was a major Balliol supporter before taking over the garrison at Perth, while John Stirling had been Balliol's sheriff at Perth before his capture with Richard Talbot in 1334 saw him in a Scottish cell for a year. Talbot himself would become a custodian of the March and keeper of Berwick. Northerners such as Felton and Anthony Lucy commanded garrisons such as Roxburgh and Berwick, while the custody of the March as mentioned previously was often in the hands of Henry Percy and Ralph Neville. The choice of all these individuals shows that Edward III was not blind to the advantages of previous experience and familiarity.

In the end, the garrisons the English put into place in Scotland only delayed the inevitable. Some successes were scored by these troops: the garrison of Roxburgh captured the Earl of Moray in 1335 and John Stirling relieved the besieged garrison of Cupar the following year. However, these bright spots were few and far between, especially once the initiative had passed to the Scots after 1335. The failure of these garrisons was their inability to stop the movements of Bruce supporters such as Andrew Murray and prevent them from mounting attacks on the English and their few supporters. If anything, they provided targets for the Scots to attack, allowing them to pick and choose garrisons that they could isolate and capture before they could be relieved by other English forces. Without gaining the local support that

would allow the garrisons to control the countryside beyond their castle walls, these garrisons were incapable of preventing the erosion of the English position and their eventual expulsion from Scotland.

The Navy

The previous two chapters have discussed in detail how the fighting men that made up Edward III's armies and manned his garrisons were recruited, paid for, and employed. No examination of a fighting force is complete without an examination of how that force is supplied with the necessary food and supplies to continue operating effectively. Estimates from Edward I's time suggest that at a minimum over a quarter of wheat was necessary for every twenty men under arms, while cavalry forces would also require a peck of oats per horse per day in addition.¹ When discussing hundreds or thousands of men serving in Scotland, this adds up to incredible amounts that had to be collected in England and brought to those troops in the field and garrisons.

To understand this process, two separate elements have to be examined. First, the navy has to be looked at with the same attention given to the forces on land in the previous chapters. The ships in royal service during the campaigns not only fought against Scottish ships and ports, but also were the means for transporting supplies to the forces in Scotland. To understand their effectiveness in either role, a thorough examination of the ships in royal pay has to be made, along with the means by which they were acquired. Second, the methods of collecting supplies have to be discussed, along with their storage and distribution. With the fighting occurring almost exclusively in Scotland, the purveyance of supplies from English counties would have the most wide-ranging of the immediate effects of the war. Comparing the process of purveyance to other ways of supplying the troops will demonstrate

why it was the preferred method of supply. In addition, a brief description of the stores set up at Newcastle and Berwick will illustrate how the supplies were distributed once in Scotland.

Shipping

The armies and soldiers on land did not fight in isolation. Both England and Scotland have long coasts for their relative size, and their position as island kingdoms guaranteed that both would have a *major seafaring element to their populations*. The sea was vital for their economic welfare: Berwick's wealth, for instance, came mainly from the shipment of wool to Flanders and the Low Countries.² With the slowness of land transport and the rugged terrain of much of Scotland, the sea was also essential for resupplying the English-held towns and garrisons. This necessity was only made worse by the difficulties of moving through areas where the English had little overt support.

Ships were acquired for the fleet through various methods. The most reliable were those ships owned directly by the king and operated by his trusted officers. The maintenance of any sizeable number of such vessels year-round was costly, though several monarchs contemplated doing so at several points.³ In practice, the numbers paid for this way were rather limited. During the 1330s, wardrobe accounts list the *Cog Edward*, *Welfare*, *Maudeleyn* and the *Rodecog* under Thomas Springet, John

¹ M.C. Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance Under Edward I* (Aldershot, 1972), p127

² A. Tuck, 'A medieval tax haven: Berwick upon Tweed and the English crown, 1333-1461', in R. Britnell and J. Hatcher (eds.), *Progress and Problems in Medieval England: Essays in Honour of Edward Miller* (Cambridge, 1996), pp 148-167; James Campbell, 'England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War', in *The Wars of Edward III*, ed. Clifford Rogers (Woodbridge, 1999), p 206

³ See W. Stanford Reid, 'Sea-power in the Anglo-Scottish War, 1296-1328', *Mariner's Mirror* 46 (1960), pp 7-23 for examples from Edward I and II's reigns.

Pettoritis, John Gectoir, and Hugh de Reppes.⁴ The costs of outfitting the ships could mount up rapidly. Hugh de Reppes spent £43 9s on various goods for the *Rodecog* including casks and anchors, while John Gectoir purchased a single sail at £8 and other sundry goods at a further £2 10s. There is further mention of ‘the king’s barge’ in the wardrobe accounts, commanded by Thomas Springet before his time on the *Cog Edward*, and of the ‘king’s barge of Westminster’ in writs allowing for the press-ganging of forty sailors in late 1334.⁵ It is unlikely that these two barges are the same vessel, as the writ allowing for the press-gang of sailors for the ‘king’s barge of Westminster’ came at the time that Thomas Springet was receiving pay for captaining ‘the king’s barge’.

This is above and beyond the wages spent for the sailors and masters on board. Most of these ships were medium-sized vessels for the time. The *Maudeleyn* and *Rodecog* both took a mate and thirty-odd sailors according to pay records. The *Welfare* was a smaller vessel, with 19 sailors on board. The *Cog Edward* was probably the largest of the king’s vessels, taking 76 sailors north during the 1335 season. The ‘king’s barge’ commanded by Thomas Springet would have been comparable to the *Maudeleyn* and *Rodecog*, if not the *Rodecog* itself: both ships took one mate and 38 sailors to man, and the *Rodecog* does not appear in the wardrobe accounts until one week after Springet moved from the king’s barge to the *Cog Edward*. The ‘king’s barge of Westminster’ captained by Thomas Spigurnel would also be comparable in size, if forty sailors were being required to man the ship.

There were no real means by which the king could provide on his own the mass of vessels required to carry out the supply of his forces and garrisons in Scotland and to provide for those supplies’ protection en route. Even if the king

⁴ BL Cotton Nero VIII, fos. 264r-266v, *passim*

⁵ *Rot Scot*, p278

could afford the fleet during its activities, the time between campaigns would still require men, money, and material in greater quantities than the king's coffers could afford. The circumstances were rather similar to those that shaped the policy of establishing garrisons to hold areas in Scotland rather than maintaining a large field army year-round. The ships owned by the crown provided a small but dependable core that could be used at will and at any time, while the larger number of vessels drawn from elsewhere did most of the major work. The drawbacks were the same as well: it required serious effort to mobilise the ships not under crown ownership, along with taking time and planning to move them northward. This reduced the flexibility of the crown's naval policy.

The crown did have other means to garner the ships it needed. Along with its own vessels, it could also call upon the obligatory service owed by the collection of ports in the south-east of England referred to as the Cinque Ports, centred mainly in Kent and Sussex. These ports were obliged to provide fifty-seven ships for 15 days per year at their own expense, for which they received tax exemptions and other privileges. After the fifteen days had passed, the king was obliged to pay the wages for any additional service. Other ports could also be relied upon to make agreements with the crown to provide ships in a similar fashion, though without the longstanding agreement in place with the Cinque Ports.⁶

The major sources for the ships that Edward used for his Scottish wars were the large ports of Norfolk and the eastern seaboard – Yarmouth, Lynn, Kingston-upon-Hull, Hartlepool, and Newcastle. Distance and familiarity were certainly the determining factors in the choice of where to draw ships. Drawing vessels from the southern coast for operations on the eastern seaboard and off Scotland was

⁶ T Runyan, 'Fleets in Medieval England', in T. Runyan, (ed.), *Ships, Seafaring and Society: Essays in Maritime History* (Detroit, 1987), pp 38-42

needlessly expensive in the costs of wages, due to the time it would take for those ships to travel from the south to the theatres of operation. In addition, these captains would not have the familiarity with the waters and ports of the North Sea that the local shipowners would have. Another reason not to draw too heavily from the southern ports was the need to defend against French and Flemish raids on the south, a point driven home with the burning of Portsmouth in 1338.⁷

Also at the crown's disposal was the right to arrest ships in port, order their cargoes offloaded, and then use them for their requirements in defending the country. Three clerks were tasked with arresting ships of over 40 tuns throughout England and Wales in 1335, while nine ships were arrested at Newcastle and Skinburness in late 1335 and 1336 by Gilbert de Halghton and Walter Wetwang to carry supplies north.⁸ While this provided the crown with badly needed ships that could not be arranged through obligation or voluntary service, this forcible impressment into service was disruptive to shipping and commercial activity, and must have been seen as the least preferred means by which the crown could arrange shipping. There was also the question of the cargoes: the *Grace de Dieu* was arrested at Waterford in 1335 and its cargo allowed to deteriorate while the vessel was employed on the king's business. In this case, compensation was granted.⁹

The ships themselves were used for two major purposes. With the large number of troops that would be campaigning in Scotland and the garrisons that would be required to hold the areas under English control, the crown needed to provide large amounts of supplies and victuals in order to avoid starvation among the troops, such as that that hit Edward I before Falkirk. Many of the ships in the wardrobe accounts received pay specifically for the carrying of victuals, such as

⁷ *Bridlington*, p 135; *Anonimalle*, p 13

⁸ *Rot Scot* pp 305-9; BL Cotton Nero VIII, fo. 265v

sixteen vessels from various ports that served the crown for periods in the summer of 1335.¹⁰ No viable alternative existed, as land transport via cart from England's eastern seaboard could not hope to match the carrying capacity or speed of shipment by sea to the supply depots at Newcastle and Berwick, let alone further to the garrisons and armies operating in Scotland.

The second capacity in which the fleet operated was the protection of the supplies from what there was of Scottish naval activity, piracy, and raids upon various targets in Scotland. While there is little enough mention of naval opposition, it certainly did happen. During the Disinherited's attack on Scotland in 1332, John Crabbe, then working for the Scots, attacked the Disinherited's fleet with ten Flemish vessels, taking Henry Beaumont's *Beaumontescogge* before the Disinherited fleet fully engaged his ships and burnt them.¹¹ There was also constant worry of Flemish and French intervention, and simple prudence to argue for the protection of ships loaded with cargo and supplies for the north.

While offering protection, these ships also could and did attack various places in Scotland. Ships from the English fleet participated in assaults on Berwick in 1333 before the truce that led to Halidon Hill.¹² English ships also were responsible for the sack of Inchcolm Abbey and the burning of Dundee in 1335.¹³ Ships could also be sent specifically to intercept other vessels, such as those meant to catch ships providing supplies to Dumbarton in February 1335 and the three vessels sent to recapture the *Beaumontescogge* in May of the same year.¹⁴

⁹ CCR 1337-9, p 27

¹⁰ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 265r

¹¹ *Bridlington*, p 108; Nicholson, p 92

¹² *Pluscarden*, p 268; *Lanercost*, p 273; *Scalacronica*, p 162; *Wyntoun*, p 398; *Brut*, p 281; *Bridlington*, p 112

¹³ *Lanercost*, pp 272, 282; *Liber Pluscardensis*, p 278

¹⁴ *Rot Scot*, pp 320, 340

Management of the actual fleet was handled by the appointment of individuals as admiral for short periods, usually no more than a few months at most. Furthermore, responsibility was often split between two or more men, along geographical lines.¹⁵ The Thames was the usual boundary line, with an admiral being appointed for 'North of the Thames' and 'West of the Thames'. Admirals assigned to the north were responsible for the naval efforts of carrying supplies to the northern ports for action against Scotland and for the use of the fleet against the Scots. Those assigned to the 'west' were tasked with defending the southern coast against the French fleet and any raiding activities coming from Brittany, Normandy, or Flanders.

Between April 1327 and July 1338, nine separate appointments were made to the admiralty of the northern fleet, and eight to the western fleet.¹⁶ The shortest of these was the appointment of Thomas Ughtred to the admiralty of the north in February 1336. He would hold the appointment only for two months, before giving over his duties to John Norwich. Others would hold the posts given them for several months, though rarely years. Thomas Ughtred's predecessor, John Howard, had held the post since April of the year before.¹⁷ With only a small number of vessels owned by the king, no standing navy, and no sustained effort to maintain one by other means, there simply was not the necessity for appointing admirals permanently for the navy. That admirals were appointed consistently through this period speaks to the sustained nature of the wars.

These admirals were not sailors first and foremost. Most of them were soldiers and captains, often with other duties and responsibilities to the crown and other magnates. Thomas Ughtred, admiral of the north for two months during 1336,

¹⁵ E.B. Fryde, *et al* (eds.), *Handbook of British Chronology*, 3rd ed (Cambridge, 1986), p 137

¹⁶ E.B. Fryde, *et al* (eds.), *Handbook of British Chronology*, 3rd ed (Cambridge, 1986), pp 137-8

was keeper of Perth in 1337. Two of Edward's closest household men, William Clinton and William Montague, served as admirals of the western fleet, while carrying out numerous other duties as bannerets of the household and as the earls of Huntingdon and Salisbury after 1337. Robert Ufford and Walter Mauny, also trusted household knights, served as admirals of the north. Barons such as John Ros of Watton, Geoffrey Say, and Bartholomew Burghersh also served time as admirals.¹⁸ Social standing was as important for the leaders of the fleets as it was for military captains on land.

That they did develop some specialization in handling the navy is obvious from the repeated appointment of several men to be admirals at different periods. John Norwich served in the northern fleet for three months in early 1335, then took up the job as Thomas Ughtred's replacement in April 1336 for another eight months. Peter Bard was in charge of the western fleet along with John Cobham for nearly a year in 1335, and later was vice-admiral for the western fleet in the summer of 1338. John Perbroun, who had commanded the northern fleet during the Weardale campaign, was put in charge of the fleet heading to Scotland in 1333. Other appointees had complementary offices which explained their competency. William Clinton, heading the western fleet in 1333, was a baron of the Cinque Ports, constable of Dover Castle, and eminently familiar with the main source of ships for that fleet.¹⁹

Pay for vessels employed by the navy from 1334-7 was computed using one of two relatively simplistic systems. The first was that which had been in common

¹⁷ *Rot Scot*, pp 403-4 (Ughtred), 415 (Norwich), 335 (Howard)

¹⁸ A full list of the admirals of England at this period can be found in E.B. Fryde *et al* (eds.), *Handbook of British Chronology*, 3rd ed (Cambridge, 1986), pp 137-8

¹⁹ For examples of writs naming Clinton as either baron of the Cinque Ports or constable of Dover, see *CCR 1330-33*, pp 553-555; *CCR 1333-37*, pp 327-8

use from before Edward I's time, pay by sailor.²⁰ Rather than computing a fee based on a ship's size or character, the captain of the vessel was paid a set, traditional daily wage per crewman. Sailors commonly received 3d per day, while captains and their mates (listed as 'constables') received 6d per day. No other mention of the capabilities of the ships exist, other than the occasional separation of some entries into lists for the carrying of diverse victuals of the king, rather than simply 'in the king's service' or 'over northern seas in expedition to Scotland'.²¹

The other entry format is even more vague regarding numbers. Rather than a set amount per sailor, pay was issued in a lump sum per week at a fixed rate set by the king's clerks acting as commissioners. The rates set could vary widely, from ten to one hundred shillings a week. While the lack of numbers is unfortunate, the negotiation that must have gone on to set the rates allowed other factors to be shown in the records. For instance, the *Cuthbert* from Hartlepool was receiving almost 66 shillings a week, in its 3d and 6d allotments, for its service during the summer of 1335. In the winter of 1336, its captain was receiving 100s per week for a two-week run to Scotland.²² While this second entry does not give us the number of crew, it is safe to assume the crew sizes would be similar for such a run. The marked increase in the hiring costs are from three factors; the participation of the *Cuthbert* in one royal expedition already the summer before, the dangers of sailing far afield in the winter season, and the manner of selection for the second expedition – the ship was arrested in Newcastle by Walter Wetwang to provide the ships for the flotilla heading north.

²⁰ M.C. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: the English Experience* (New Haven, 1996) p 275

²¹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 264r-266v

²² BL Cotton Nero VIII, fos. 264v, 265v

Though not stated explicitly, the relative sizes of the ships and the nature of their role in the navy can be worked out by the crew sizes recorded in the *vadia nautarum* portion of Ferriby's wardrobe book and from individual pay sheets such as Thomas Cross's account for the Irish expedition of 1335. William de Melchbourne's ship *Magdalene* out of King's Lynn had one of the smallest crews of the ships that went north to Scotland in 1335, with one mate and 38 sailors.²³ While this number seems like a large one for the size of the ships at the time, it makes sense given the king's preference for doubly manned ships and the need for extra crew in case of trouble or conflict. In comparison, the king's own *Cog Edward* under Thomas Springet carried a mate and 76 men in the same sailing, while the *Cuthbert* of Hartlepool had 98 sailors aboard. The same could be done with the periods when lump sums per week were used for pay, though the more subjective nature of these payments makes it harder to determine even relative sizes with any accuracy. Unfortunately, only one vessel - the previously mentioned *Cuthbert* from Hartlepool - appears with both types of pay recorded, leaving us without enough material for a proper comparison.²⁴

While the nature of maritime service makes the entries in Ferriby's wardrobe book much more reliable than they are for land forces, the presence of the same type of shorthand notation that plagues the *vadia hominum ad arma* and *vadia hobelarum* sections of his accounts introduces a small degree of uncertainty. For example, Thomas Springet, captain of the king's barge, received the pay for himself, one mate, and 38 sailors from August 1334 to May 1335, excepting the pay for one sailor, *vacantus* for 21 days during the pay period.²⁵ This precisely mirrors the same sort of notation found for retinues of individuals such as Ralph Neville, where independent

²³ BL Cotton Nero VIII, fo. 264v

²⁴ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 264v, 265r

pay records demonstrate that the pay listed by Ferriby is a summation of the fees owed and paid, rather than an exact statement of the number of men serving per day. However, the same argument for accepting the figures for the land forces also applies to the ships employed: the numbers listed provide a useful average of the manpower during the periods listed, especially for naval vessels where the crew can only depart while in harbour.

In 1333, the attack on Berwick mandated a naval force be available to seal off the city from outside intervention and also to participate in assaulting the town itself. John Perbroun and Henry Randolf were appointed admirals of the fleet on 6 April, while several towns received requests for aid in terms of ships and men. Great Yarmouth received a request for four warships, Bristol for three vessels, and Ravenser for one.²⁶ By the end of the month, it had been determined they should be at Newcastle for 17 May along with a single ship each from the ports of Little Yarmouth, Gorleston, Hartlepool, Scarborough, Barton, and Lynn.²⁷ Newcastle also received a request for a warship to be ready on this date. The force was small in comparison with those used in similar circumstances during the previous two reigns, but operations in support of the victualling efforts and commissions from Edward Balliol had reduced the number of ships available for action.²⁸ Though participating in a failed assault on the town in late June, the fleet's role was mainly to supply the soldiers maintaining the blockade by land and to prevent any Scottish ships from reaching Berwick.²⁹ As Balliol had been besieging Berwick since 13 March, the fleet blockading Berwick must have been comprised both of the royal ships which

²⁵ BL Cotton Nero VIII, fo. 264r

²⁶ *Rot Scot*, pp 225-6

²⁷ *Rot Scot*, p 232

²⁸ Nicholson, p 116; *CPR 1330-4*, pp 418,429

would have joined it in May and those ships that had already taken service with Balliol previously.

At the same time, efforts were being taken to protect the southern coasts and to make advances on other fronts. The Isle of Man was taken in May, which Nicholson attributes to the three ships from Bristol. Considering the unlikelihood of the vessels from Bristol participating in the activities of the eastern seaboard without the participation of the much closer southern coast ports, it is a likely supposition.³⁰ Meanwhile, the south was ordered to prepare against possible invasion and raiding by the French, with numerous writs sent out for the array of men in the maritime counties and the preparation of ships to counter any threat under William Clinton as admiral of the western ports.³¹ Though nothing came of this, the concern of invasion from France while engaging in conflict in Scotland would be a recurring theme during the wars.

The second expulsion of Balliol from Scotland in 1334 resulted in another flurry of writs preparing for further campaigning in Scotland, including preparations for the proper supply of the fleet. Writs on 1 September mandated Richard de Suthorp to collect four warships and two barges from the western ports to be at Skinburness by 16 October, while two 'large ships' were to carry supplies from Hull to Berwick for the same date. Thomas Spigurnel was granted the right to press-gang forty men to man the king's barge of Westminster. Two ships were requested from Newcastle, Hartlepool, and Kingston-upon-Hull for operations in Scotland, with another from Ravenser and four from the counties of Lincoln, York, and Northumberland.³² Nine ships in the end received pay from the wardrobe during the

²⁹ *Lanercost*, p 272

³⁰ Nicholson, p 123; *Rot Scot*, pp 226, 231, 233

³¹ *Rot Scot*, pp 248-250, 254

³² *Rot Scot*, pp 277, 278

time of the Roxburgh campaign, beginning 22 November. Two ships, the *Elene* from Grimsby and the *Saint Mary Cog* out of Ravenser had departed within two weeks, stopping pay on 7 December. The *George* and *Fleming* from Kingston-upon-Hull, the *Katerine* from Lynn, and the *Nicholas* from Newcastle had departed by 19 December, while the remaining three, the *Isabelle* of Gosforth, *Ceale* of Kingston-upon-Hull, and the *Blithe* of Newcastle received pay through 4 January 1335.³³

With only 352 sailors and 20 officers, the fleet was anything but large. Other means for bolstering the naval presence in the area were taken, if only to provide more impetus to private activities to interfere with Scottish shipping and maritime activity. Thomas Guyot and Nicholas Caldecot received protections from the crown while they preyed on Scottish shipping in October 1334, with Laurence Baldswell receiving similar license in the following month.³⁴

Summer brought a much stronger effort to the war effort, both on land and sea. Planning began as early as 24 December 1334, with the clerks Richard Wolyngham, Thomas Geyrgrave, and John Percebrigg each being assigned a large section of the country's ports from which to draw ships for the summer's fleet. All ships over 40 tuns were to participate in the summer sailing, following the usual formula of *eskippamentum duplex*. Further notices of these orders were sent to William Clinton in his capacity as custodian of the Cinque Ports, John Langford holding the Isle of Wight, and the bailiffs and barons of most ports.³⁵ Their activities were supplemented by the appointment on 1 February of James Kingston and John Crabbe to select two ships in Great Yarmouth and one each from Little Yarmouth, Ipswich, Lynn, Kingston-on-Hull, Ravenser, Hartlepool, Scarborough, and Newcastle, with a thousand mariners between them. They were to arrive in

³³ BL Cotton Nero VIII, fo. 264r

³⁴ *Rot Scot*, pp 283. 286

Newcastle for 1 March.³⁶ The ports of Bristol, Liverpool, and Dartmouth were ordered on 7 February to provide two ships each to intercept ships meant for the Bruce stronghold of Dumbarton, while the Cinque Ports, Bristol, Falmouth, Southampton, and Plymouth were to provide a squadron of twelve ships to further block supplies from the west coast of Scotland on 18 February.³⁷

A diplomatic row resulted from the taking of an English ship, the *Little Lechevard*, in the Seine on 20 April by some Scots, souring relations between Edward and the French.³⁸ Meanwhile, Richard Holand was appointed admiral in the west and the ports in Ireland were ordered to provide transport for troops and victuals to Scotland, with John de Atholl appointed as their admiral. Lynn and Blakeney received immunity from the year's call-up of hobelars in lieu of providing warships.³⁹ Further ships were called up from Bristol in May, while three ships were to be outfitted in Kingston-upon-Hull and Ravenser to take the *Beaumontscogge*, taken by John Crabbe during 1332 during his service with the Scots and still in Scottish hands.⁴⁰ While the period was one of truce, neither side seemed to extend the truce to maritime activities.

By June, the year's flotilla had sailed north in support of the massive offensive Edward was carrying out on land. Thirteen ships from the eastern seaboard, along with the *Cog Edward* and the *Rodecog*, received pay starting in late June. A further nine vessels joined the fleet in July, replacing eight of the original ships which had ended their period of service. Their activities were mainly victualling the army on the eastern seaboard, though a ship did sack the abbey of

³⁵ *Rot Scot*, pp 305-9

³⁶ *Rot Scot*, p 316

³⁷ *Rot Scot*, pp 320, 322

³⁸ Nicholson, p 195

³⁹ *Rot Scot*, pp 336-8

⁴⁰ *Rot Scot*, pp 340-1

Inchcolm and some raided Dundee, burning much of the town to the ground.⁴¹ Chroniclers exaggerated the size of the fleet, some naming the fleet as two hundred or more vessels.⁴² While other ships than those in the wardrobe accounts probably participated, the numbers were unlikely to be so high.

Naval activity was not confined solely to northern waters. Worries ran high that the French were planning an invasion of the south of England in support of the Scots, and rumours had it that 700 ships had been gathered for the task.⁴³ Orders to arrest ships of 40 tuns or more in ports on the southern and eastern seaboard to counter possible French invasion were sent on 22 July and 29 August.⁴⁴ The ships gathered at this time were not recorded in the wardrobe book, but some do appear elsewhere. The clerks John Windsor and John Tunford oversaw the collection of thirty vessels in the Cinque Ports, while other clerks such as Ambrose Newbury, John Bridgewater, and Matthew Craithorn canvassed the southern and eastern coasts. The defence of North Wales' coast was put in the hands of Nicholas Acton, while the two guardians of the coast in South Wales, Philip Clanvow and Owen Montgomery, made arrangements with eight vessels of large size to be manned for action.⁴⁵ Most ships saw delays in putting to sea, but did sail in later August and early September, though without meeting the French.

In the west, an Irish expedition had been organised to coincide with the summer campaigns originating from northern England, necessitating the collection of a fleet to transport the Irish to their target of Bute. Richard Holland was appointed admiral in the west to oversee the gathering of the fleet at Carlingford, while orders

⁴¹ *Pluscarden*, p 278; *Lanercost*, p 282

⁴² *Pluscarden*, p 278; *Wyntoun*, p 412; *Scotichronicon*, pp 108-9, and *Fordun*, pp 358-9, put the fleet at 180 vessels

⁴³ J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War: Trial By Battle* (London, 1990), pp 147-8

⁴⁴ *Rot Scot*, pp 364-5

⁴⁵ Nicholas, p 208

were given to arrest all ships in the Irish ports and have them at the muster by 11 June.⁴⁶ £22 16s 4d was spent preparing ships to transport the army's horses and to build cabins for John Darcy and the earls of Ormond and Desmond. Due to the delays in sailing, Cross was allowed to distribute £10 in wages to the sailors of seven sequestered ships.⁴⁷

John of Athy took over as admiral of the actual fleet in April, and was still in command in August when the fleet descended on western Scotland. The fleet has been well described by Nicholson in his article on the expedition: forty-nine separate vessels received pay from Thomas Cross, of which eighteen were Irish, one from Bayonne, and the balance from English ports, mostly on the western and southern coasts.⁴⁸ The sheer size of the flotilla required for just under fifteen hundred soldiers underscores the limited size of the vessels being used; on average only thirty men per ship could be managed, though this varied widely depending on the size of the particular vessel. Most ships varied between fifteen and 30 sailors, though seven ships had under ten sailors. 83 masters and mates and 788 sailors were needed to man the fleet, nearly two-thirds the size of the small force it had to transport.⁴⁹

After 1335, the thrust of naval activities was in defence of England against attacks by France, rather than activity directed against the Scots. Relatively few ships were taken under pay by the household, and their usage was for moving supplies to Scotland. Most of the ships were taken under wages individually, or in small numbers: the large collection of ships seen in 1335 was not repeated. Seven vessels were arrested at Newcastle at the beginning of January 1336, but were only employed for two weeks. Individual vessels were arrested and impressed to send

⁴⁶ *Rot Scot*, pp 33-8

⁴⁷ PRO E101/19/16, m. 2; see also *CCR 1339-41*, p 518

⁴⁸ Thomas Cross's account is PRO E101/19 16; see also R. Nicholson, 'An Irish Expedition to Scotland in 1335', *IHR* vol 13, no. 51 (1963), pp 203-4

supplies, such as *Trinite* and the *Seinte Anne Bot* of Chester, which had the misfortune to be at Skinburness when Gilbert Halghton required ships to send supplies north.⁵⁰ Nine ships did begin receiving pay in May and June 1336, but the beginning dates were widely disparate, and the notations attached indicate that they were specifically ferrying supplies in this period, rather than acting as a fleet in direct support of Henry Lancaster's troops. For example, William Bronn's vessel *Leonard* from the port of Hull is recorded as carrying supplies to Perth from 26 May to 14 September 1336.⁵¹

This diminution in the need for ships is unsurprising, considering the reduction in the number of available ports and refuges for Scottish vessels. By 1336, only Aberdeen was available as any sizeable port to provide an anchorage: Dundee had been burnt the year before, and the entire coast south of Perth was essentially in English hands, barring the small harbour at Dunbar. Even Aberdeen would be unavailable for a time, thank to Edward III's deliberate destruction of the town during his northern chevauchée in July.⁵² What Scottish raiding was being carried out was likely to be in conjunction with the French on the southern coast.

Ships were retained for other purposes, usually in support of individual garrisons by their commanders. Thomas Roscelyn engaged eight vessels to transport him and his garrison from King's Lynn to his new command of Dunnotar in May 1336, paying £123 10s over the six weeks of the operation.⁵³ Thomas Rokeby employed two ships to resupply Stirling after it was besieged unsuccessfully by Andrew Murray in 1337, costing £12. Naval resupply was key for any coastal

⁴⁹ PRO E101/19/16, mm. 3 and 4

⁵⁰ BL Cotton Nero C VIII fo. 265v

⁵¹ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 266r

⁵² *Wyntoun*, p 430; *Anonimalle*, p 7; *Fordun*, pp 360-1; *Scalacronica*, p 166; *Baker*, pp 57-8; *Original Letters*, p 37.

⁵³ BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 251r

garrison – even those held by the Scots. Part of why Montague’s siege of Dunbar in 1338 failed was that a small ship under Alexander Ramsey managed to avoid the two galleys blockading Dunbar and land supplies and men at the castle.⁵⁴

Further evidence on the precise numbers of ships employed are patchy, though the alarms in the south saw orders for the arrest of ships sent out in most years and admirals appointed every year for the latter part of the 1330s. The raids on Orford and the Isle of Wight in 1336 saw a panicked series of orders to arrest and collect ships for the latter part of the year: though the force did little, it was representative of matters versus France for the time.⁵⁵ Other orders for double-manned ships went out in January 1337 to eighty-two ports;⁵⁶ from this point onward, naval activity was focused upon France.

Victualling

Napoleon’s famous phrase ‘An army marches on its stomach’ holds as true for the fourteenth century as it does for the nineteenth. Without the proper supplies to keep it going, an army or castle garrison will rapidly break down, with morale rapidly dropping and disease setting in. The concept was a well-understood one by the English crown, especially Edward III: his first taste of campaigning in the Weardale campaign of 1327 was plagued by insufficient supplies and poor food, despite being within England itself.⁵⁷ By the fourteenth century the crown’s bureaucracy had evolved complex and far-reaching tools for providing the necessary

⁵⁴ *Scotichronicon*, pp 128-9

⁵⁵ *Rot Scot*, pp 467-468; Sumption, *Trial By Battle*, pp 164-5

⁵⁶ *Rot Scot*, pp 477-8

supplies to its soldiers when on campaign, requiring a great deal of effort, time, and money to administer.

The victuals that were required were varied and sizeable. Estimates from Edward I's time suggest that a quarter of wheat, two quarters of malt, and large amounts of meat and fish were required for every twenty men in a garrison, with similar amounts being required for forces in the field. Any cavalry forces would also require a peck of oats per horse per day.⁵⁸ The wheat was used to make bread; malt and barley were brewed into beer, or replaced with wine. Beans and peas were used to make pottage. Such numbers added up quickly: an army of 30,000 would need nearly 5,000 quarters of grain a week and 2,000 quarters of fodder.⁵⁹

While the army could attempt to forage from the land to supply itself, doing so had severe difficulties. For one, the Scots were old hands at hiding food supplies and using a scorched earth policy against the English. The land was relatively poor in comparison with its southern neighbour and any effort to hide or destroy supplies in an area would make foraging for supplies an essentially useless endeavour. Second, for much of the time Edward III and the English were not engaging in punitive expeditions with the ability to destroy randomly wide swathes of the countryside. Initially they were acting in support of one claimant to the Scottish throne, Edward Balliol; later, they would be acting in defence of both Balliol and Edward III's new possessions of the southern Scottish counties transferred in 1334 to England. Indiscriminate destruction could alienate the very people whom Edward was trying to win over. In fact, the indiscriminate destruction carried out in Lothian at the end of the Roxburgh campaign in 1334-5 was one of the reasons Patrick

⁵⁷ *Chronique de Jean le Bel*, ed. Jules Viard and Eugène Déprez (Paris, 1904), reprinted in *The Wars of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations*, ed C. Rogers (Woodbridge, 1999) pp 10-11

⁵⁸ M.C. Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance Under Edward I* (Aldershot, 1972), p127

⁵⁹ M.C. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages* (New Haven, 1996), pp 247-8

Dunbar, earl of March returned to the Bruce camp after having made peace with Edward III after Halidon Hill.⁶⁰

This is not to say that such foraging did not take place: if anything, it was depressingly common, with numerous descriptions of the countryside being put ‘to fire and sword’ by both English and Scots. The stripping of Kinloss Abbey in 1336 to resupply Edward III’s chevauchée and the garrison at Lochindorb was just one incident of many.⁶¹ Such methods of supply are not sustainable: any troops using them would need to move on to new supplies, an option not available for garrisons or an army of occupation. *Both politically and practically, other options had to be exercised.*

There was considerable effort to induce merchants to carry supplies to Scotland for sale to the army in the field and the various castle garrisons. The crown did not have a separate duty to provide victuals as well as pay: wages were assumed to include the costs of provisions. Since the wages of the army were meant in part to feed them, it would save the crown considerable expense, effort, and depletion of its stores if independent merchants could be convinced to transport supplies and offer them for sale. Writs encouraging such activities were commonplace, and had been well before Edward III’s time.⁶² Those merchants willing to carry out this trade could profit handsomely: the merchants who came to the army in 1328 found the soldiers willing to pay twenty times the normal cost of bread from hunger.⁶³

Other times the crown engaged more directly with merchants for supplies. Manent Francisci of the Bardi was employed as an agent of the crown on 26

⁶⁰ *Capgrave*, p 203; *Melsa*, p 373

⁶¹ *Original Letters*, p 36

⁶² For two early examples from Edward III, see *Rot Scot*, p 206; *Foedera* p 855

⁶³ *Chronique de Jean le Bel*, ed. Jules Viard and Eugène Déprez (Paris, 1904), reprinted in *The Wars of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations*, pp 11-12

February 1333 to purvey 15,600 quarters of wheat and 22,100 quarters of oats.⁶⁴ Unfortunately for Francisci, his efforts were unable to match Edward III's expectations: by April, the crown had reverted to directly administering its attempts to gather victuals.⁶⁵ The matter showed the shortcomings of depending on private enterprise, especially when dealing with the machinery of government: part of Francisci's failure was due to the exchequer failing to pay him an ordered advance on the ordered victuals.⁶⁶ Without the legal mechanisms the crown had to acquire supplies, a merchant's abilities to gather foodstuffs were limited by his own resources, and by the hesitancy to spend those without signs that payment was forthcoming. Francisci had more options than the usual merchant in acting as an agent of the crown, but still found himself in difficulty from lack of funds.

The most successful but intrusive method the crown had at its disposal for gathering victuals was purveyance, or the mandatory purchase of foodstuffs by royal officials at a standardised price.⁶⁷ This right had initially extended to providing supplies for the king's immediate household: in Edward I's reign it had become well entrenched as a tool for supplying the king's army as a whole. It was arbitrary, much like tallages on royal lands: the crown could levy it at will, without the necessity for prior consent.⁶⁸ Writs were issued to the sheriffs of various counties demanding a set amount of goods from each county;⁶⁹ these numbers were also arbitrary, though normally were set to fit the capacities of a given shire to actually be able to provide the requested materials. The means for determining where the supplies from within each county came from varied, from the use of local juries to the county court. The

⁶⁴ *CPR 1330-4*, p 409

⁶⁵ *Rot Scot*, pp 229-30

⁶⁶ *CCR 1333-7*, p 27; Nicholson, pp 113-4

⁶⁷ J.R.S. Maddicott, *The English Peasantry and the Demands of the Crown 1294-1341 (Past and Present Supplement*, 1975) is the standard on this subject, and the following discussion draws its substance from it.

⁶⁸ Maddicott, *The English Peasantry and the Demands of the Crown 1294-1341*, pp 15-16

process was intended to cream off the surplus food from the country, leaving those forced to sell with the means to continue their livelihood and avoiding the poor altogether.

The system by its arbitrary nature could be abused on several levels, and often was. The practice of issuing tallies for purveyances, rather than paying immediately was very common; these payments could be delayed for years, essentially putting the burden of the purveyance on the shoulders of those it was taken from, rather than the crown. This was an increasing problem as the crown's financial situation worsened due to the costs of the war and as the amount of ready cash available to make immediate payment dwindled. The officials making the purveyances also engaged in abuses, taking bribes in order to overlook individuals or institutions, or reserving a portion of what they gathered for themselves without reporting it to the crown. The fixed cost of the goods could also be an abuse: as the men in Scotland were expected to spend their wages on the victuals transported to them, the crown could make money by purveying foodstuffs at low cost and selling them at market price to the garrisons and armies in Scotland.⁷⁰

Not only were foodstuffs purveyed, but the transport necessary to move the goods was also taken. The purveyances from Northamptonshire in 1334 required 117 carts to move the goods to Peterborough, all drawn by four horses, for a total cost of £7 3s 1d in transporting 380 quarters of wheat, oats and peas.⁷¹ Another £3 4s 5d was spent on river transport to King's Lynn, and £10 11s 6d for loading and shipment on the *Lytfort* and *Massanger* to Berwick. When looked at in monetary terms, the effort to transport the goods to Berwick cost a full fifth of the value of the goods being shipped north.

⁶⁹ *Rot Scot*, pp 229-30, 278-9, 297, 316-7, 409, 436-7, 444

⁷⁰ J. Maddicott, *The English Peasantry and the Demands of the Crown 1294-1341*, pp 25-28

As with Edward I's reign, most of the supplies purveyed were shipped to either one of two stores placed as close as possible to the border to facilitate supplying the military endeavours in the north. In the west, Carlisle's port at Skinburness took on its accustomed role, with Robert Barton being appointed receiver of the king's victuals at the port in April 1333.⁷² In the east, Newcastle served briefly as the major supply depot for the campaign leading to Halidon Hill, with Gilbert Halghton being appointed keeper of the victuals in March.⁷³ This depot was then transferred to Berwick after its surrender in 1333 and placed under Robert Tughale, also appointed chamberlain of the town; supplemented by Robert Tong as receiver.⁷⁴ Supplies were shipped into Berwick on a regular basis: the previously mentioned *Lytfort* appears in Tughale's account for July-October 1334 along with three other ships, delivering 840 quarters of wheat, while agents of Richard de la Pole, the king's butler, delivered 52 tuns of wine. Other supplies kept on hand include cider, flour, horseshoes, and salt.⁷⁵

These goods could either be sold to troops, sold to individuals in the area, or simply given away. Guy de Ferrers received £12 6s 8d of the wages owed to him and his men for serving in the garrison at Perth in 1337 in the form of two chalders of wheat, two chalders of malt, and two tuns of wine.⁷⁶ Tughale sold grain and wine in 1334 to varied parties such as Anthony Lucy, Henry Ferrers, John Kingston, and the Carmelite, Augustinian, and Franciscan orders of friars.⁷⁷ He also gave away

⁷¹ PRO E101/577 9

⁷² *CFR 1327-37*, p 353

⁷³ *CCR 1333-7*, p 29

⁷⁴ *Rot Scot*, pp 257, 260; PRO E101/19/3, E101/20/4, E101/612 35

⁷⁵ PRO E101/18/31

⁷⁶ PRO E101/21/16

⁷⁷ PRO E101/18/31

sixty-nine quarters of wheat by the king's orders to several individuals including the earl of March and Joanna Comyn in the same year.⁷⁸

Though the commissariat arrangements of the English crown were mostly successful, the system was not without flaws. Supplies at Berwick were useless for a garrison at Roxburgh or Stirling unless they could be safely transported to the more distant garrison. While supplies sent by ship were relatively secure, the Scots targeted supply shipments going overland, as part of their general tactic of harrying and raiding the English. William Douglas was a keen proponent of this strategy, leading guerrilla groups in Lothian beginning in 1335, raiding supply lines, and helping to capture the unfortunate Guy of Namur.⁷⁹ Supplies could also be hampered by bureaucratic complacency, especially after the conflict with France began in earnest. The garrison at Perth was forced to surrender due to lack of victuals on 17 August 1339, despite Thomas Ughtred having secured a detailed indenture guaranteeing his garrison would be fully supplied by the crown.⁸⁰

Edward III was able to supply the victuals necessary for his troops in Scotland thanks to a well-established system of purveyance. This guaranteed the crown access to the supplies it needed to continue the campaigning in the north and garrison the strongholds which would keep the newly won territory. The system was not without its problems: abuses at home created resentment while the unsettled circumstances in Scotland meant those supplies did not always make it to the men who needed them most. At the same time, Edward used a combination of personal resources and royal compulsion to arrange the naval forces necessary to support his

⁷⁸ PRO E 101/20/10

⁷⁹ *Scotichronicon*, pp 112-5, 134-7

⁸⁰ *Anonimale*, p 14; *Scotichronicon*, p140-4; Andrew Ayton, 'Sir Thomas Ughtred and the Edwardian Military Revolution', in *The Age of Edward III*, ed. J.S.Bothwell (Woodbridge, 2001) p121-2

campaigns and transport the bulk of the purveyed supplies north to the stores at Newcastle and Berwick for distribution. These ships contributed to the success at Berwick, the capture of the Isle of Man, and the strangulation of Scottish trade. Without either his supply system or his ships, Edward III would not have been able to project his power far enough into Scotland to carry on his war against David Bruce and his partisans. Where new innovations in tactics and troop recruitment allowed Edward to create armies that could effectively defeat the Scots in battle, the navy and the supplies they carried made it possible to keep the gains they had made – for a time.

Conclusion

The Anglo-Scottish War of Edward III, while not being as revolutionary as it would appear from the sudden appearance of new troop types, tactics, and victories, was a watershed. England entered 1327 with an underage king under a self-serving regency, a legacy of defeat against both its northern and southern neighbors. Ten years later, England had shed the regency and its legacy of defeat, had developed a cadre of experienced, battle-tested leaders, and had nearly managed to conquer the smaller of its two neighbors before the other intervened.

Part of this was simply the passing of generations: Edward III was too young to have been tainted by the factional battles of his father, and did not have the political baggage of the previous reign, thanks to the short regency under Mortimer. Edward had strengthened his position by promoting a broad spectrum of the nobility, especially among those of his age.¹ Another part was simply luck: the Disinherited's thrust into Scotland allowed him to repudiate the Treaty of Northampton and reopen the entire question of sovereignty. Once Scottish raiders had crossed the border in 1333, he was able to gain widespread popular support for such a plan, leading to the Berwick campaign and the battle at Halidon Hill.

There was little difference between the tools that Edward III had to gather an army and those his grandfather used. Both relied on commissions of array to gather set quotas from the counties, though there was more consideration of the type of troop being arrayed in Edward III's time than in Edward I's. Both relied on

summonses to magnates, though Edward III used personal summonses rather than the broader feudal summons wielded on several occasions by Edward I.

In methods of recruitment, Edward III had two advantages that his grandfather had not enjoyed. First, by the 1330s the concept of magnates serving under pay had become well-entrenched and had lost any controversy once attached to the notion. While under Edward I the earls would not accept pay during his Scottish campaigns, by Edward III's they had no difficulty whatsoever in serving for pay, including their entire retinues.² Secondly, the utility of hobelars or mounted archers for the purpose of *speed and agility* had been hammered home during the repeated raids by the Scots through Edward II's reign. By the 1330s, Edward could rely on both individual magnates and the counties providing large numbers of appropriate equipped hobelars and mounted archers, rather than simple foot soldiers. Though counties still provided the largest part of the infantry, the magnates were now using their resources to bring mounted archers as part of their retinues, giving rise to the 'mixed retinues' of the Hundred Years War and further expanding the pool of higher quality archers available for the campaign. The increase in the proportion of mounted troops allowed Edward III's troops to move more quickly, taking advantage of their speed to cover more ground and carry out devastating raids, as he did north of the Tay in 1336. Though the use of dismounted men-at-arms and wings of archers was not apparently used before Dupplin Moor in 1332, its use the next year at Halidon Hill suggests that the tactic had been adopted as standard by the English.

Edward was reliant on a relatively small body of men to carry out his military activities. The household in the 1330s could muster somewhere around three

¹ see J. Bothwell, 'Edward III and the 'New Nobility': Largesse and Limitation in Fourteenth-Century England' *EHR*, v. 112 no. 449 (1997), pp 1111-1140

² M.C. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience* (New Haven, 1996) p 98; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 233r-247r

Conclusion

hundred and fifty men between its individual members and their retinues, and was reliant on magnates willing to serve for further troops. Twelve men provided the bulk of the men-at-arms for the Roxburgh army: a similar pattern occurred for all four campaigns from 1334-7. It is unsurprising that Edward was able to get the men to serve: many were Disinherited lords like Gilbert Umfraville, Henry Beaumont and John Mowbray, with interests of their own to protect. Others were prominent northern lords like Henry Percy and Ralph Neville, and a third group fit into the category of 'new men', such as Hugh Audley.

The counties were still the main source of infantry, though the non-mounted element of the contingents was in decline. Northern counties provided the majority of the troops, though this was due to proximity and several southern counties purchasing exemptions from hobelars being arrayed in the summer of 1335. Wales was another large source of men, and continued to send masses of foot soldiers despite the trends from the English counties.

Though the army had been successful during the early part of the war, by 1336 cutbacks in numbers due to the French threat and financial concerns and the increased self-assurance of the Scots meant that Lancaster and Beauchamp were having to regain lost ground, if they were not actually stopped from having too few men. While Lancaster was successful in retaking the remnants of Perth, Beauchamp was unable to rescue Stirling without royal reinforcements due to the lack of numbers in his command. As resources were turned increasingly southward, matters in the north suffered. The six-month-old siege of Dunbar was called off in July 1338 due to the army being summoned south to cross over the Channel and provide some sort of active force to oppose France that year.

Conclusion

All things considered, the Anglo-Scottish war was not very successful in terms of territorial expansion. The turning point was the entry of France into the conflict as an interested party. The failed siege of Dunbar, though appearing to be an obvious turning point, was well after matters had already begun their downward slide. Even when hostilities had not yet broken out, the worry of French raid or invasion was sufficient to begin the diversion of attention and resources southwards, though doing so gave the Scots precisely the chances they required. Every garrison except for Berwick, Jedburgh and Lochmaben had been eliminated by 1342, David Bruce had returned from France, and four years later would be secure enough to invade England before being defeated and captured at Neville's Cross. In terms of tactical development, the war greatly aided the English military machine, helping to confirm the trend of moving towards an all-mounted force for both cavalry and infantry, and proving that the formation of dismounted men-at-arms flanked by archers was effective when provided the proper proportion of troops. Those lessons would be put to great effect in France.

Appendix 1: Men-at-arms, 1334-7

1334 Men At Arms

Contingent Leader	Total	Earls Knights		Squires	Dates	Cost		
		Bannerets				£	s	d
Magnates								
Ralph Neville	60			60	11 Nov - 9 Feb	£	300	
Henry Percy	120			120	11 Nov - 11 Feb	£	600	
John of Eltham	100			100	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	500	
Richard FitzAlan	80			80	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	400	
Thomas Beauchamp	40			40	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	200	
John de Vere	28	1		22	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	140	
Henry Lancaster	60			60	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	300	
Ebulo Lestrangle	40			40	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	200	
James Audley	26			26	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	130	
John Mowbray	40			40	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	200	
Anthony Lucy	30			30	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	150	
Ranulph Dacre	20			20	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	100	
Gilbert Talbot	20			20	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	100	
Roger Swynnerton	20			20	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	100	
Hugh Freyne	20			20	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	100	
Giles Baddlesmere	10			10	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	50	
Henry FitzHugh	10			10	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	50	
John Multon	10			10	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	25	
John Grey of Rotherfeld	14		1	2	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	70	
Gilbert d'Umfraville	30			30	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	100	
John Warenne	40			40	4 Nov - 20 Feb	£	133	6s 8d
	(Nov) 818	1	1	7			£3,948	6s 8d
Household								
Reginald Cobham	7		2	5	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	40	10s
Robert Ferrers	4		1	3	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	22	10s
Wulfard Gifthil	6		1	5	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	31	10s
Thomas Bradeston	6		1	5	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	22	10s
Thomas Rous	2		1	1	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	13	10s
John Sturmy	4		1	3	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	22	10s
Gawain Corder	4		1	3	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	22	10s
Maurice Berkeley	8		2	6	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	45	
John Neville of Hornby	6		2	4	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	36	
Giles Beauchamp	6		1	5	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	31	10s
Amaneuo Fossato	4		1	3	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	22	10s
William Gillesford	4		1	3	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	22	10s
John Sully	3		1	2	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	18	
Robert Benhale	3		1	2	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	18	
William FitzWarin	6		1	5	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	29	6s
John Montgomery	5		1	4	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	27	
John Ufford	4		1	3	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	22	10s
John Lovel of Tithmarsh	4		1	3	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	22	10s
Nicholas Langford	4		1	3	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	22	10s
Edward Chandos	3		1	2	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	18	
John Melton	2		1	1	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	13	10s
Ralph Soforil	2		1	1	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	13	10s
Ralph Ufford 'frer'	4		1	3	50 days	£	12	10s

Appendix 1: Men-at-arms, 1334-7

Contingent Leader	Earls Knights			Dates	Cost		
	Total	Bannerets	Squires		£	s	d
Household							
Edmund Ufford 'frer'	3	1	2	43 days	£	8	12s
Walter Mauny	4	1	3	54 days	£	13	10s
Norman Darcy	3	1	2	73 days	£	18	5s
Richard Denton	6	1	5	69 days	£	24	3s
Gerard Audeno, etc.	8	2	6	84 days	£	42	
Jean de Jens	3	1	2	58 days	£	11	12s
Terence Synyngfeld	2	1	1	28 days	£	4	4s
Geoffrey Upsalo	4	2	2	20 days	£	6	
Robert Honel	20		20	87 days	£	43	10s
William Trussel	6		6	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	27	
John Brocaz	6		6	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	27	
Robert Boswell	10		10	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	54	
William L'English	4		4	64 days	£	12	16s
Arnold Garcy	3		3	77 days	£	11	11s
Hugh Grisel	1		1	70 days	£	3	10s
William Pressen	6		6	70 days	£	21	
William Exchequer	3	1	2	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	18	
Thomas Hugate	1		1		£	4	10s
John Langton	1		1		£	4	10s
Stephen Batterly, etc.	2		2		£	9	
Robert Middleton, etc.	3		3		£	18	11s 3d
William Trussel, etc.	62		62		£	104	12s 6d
William Standerwyk, etc.	15		15		£	42	3s 9d
Roger de Northell, etc.	5		5		£	8	8s 9d
William Northwell	84	5	79	53 days	£	232	8s
	13		13	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	58	10s
Thomas Wake of Blisworth	3	1	2	24 Dec - 11 Feb	£	15	
(Nov)	379	0	0	42	337	£1,379	13s 3d
Counties							
North Riding	18	1	17	30 Oct - 11 Feb	£	99	15s
East Riding	28	1	27	9 Nov - 11 Feb	£	152	5s
North Riding	12		12	14 Nov - 3 Feb	£	49	4s
Nottinghamshire	10		10	1 Jan - 15 Feb	£	23	
Lincolnshire	24	4	20	19 Feb - 23 Feb	£	7	
(Nov)	58	0	0	2	56	£	301 4s 0d
Totals as of November: 1255 men-at-arms					£5,629	3s	11d
Welsh contingents: 62 men-at-arms and centenars					£	349	
Entire campaign, Oct-Feb: 1354 men-at-arms					£6,023	3s	11d

Appendix 1: Men-at-arms, 1334-7

Men-at-Arms summer 1335

Contingent Leader	Total	Earls		Knights		Cost				
		Bannerets	Squires	Bannerets	Squires					
Magnates										
John of Eltham	135	1	3	24	107	£	675	0s	0d	
John Warenne	242	2	6	47	187	£	1,210	0s	0d	
Richard FitzAlan	106	1	1	20	84	£	800	0s	0d	
John de Bohun	135	1	3	21	110	£	675	0s	0d	
Thomas Beauchamp	92	1	2	17	72	£	575	0s	0d	
Gilbert d'Umfraville	40	1		5	34	£	250	0s	0d	
Henry Lancaster	113		2	19	92	£	706	5s	0d	
William de Bohun	43		1	10	32	£	215	0s	0d	
Ebulo Lestrangle	60		1	10	49	£	300	0s	0d	
Hugh Audley	110		3	18	89	£	550	0s	0d	
James Audley	40		1	8	31	£	200	0s	0d	
John Mowbray	43		2	8	33	£	215	0s	0d	
Henry Percy	140		2	28	110	£	700	0s	0d	
Ralph Neville	85		1	15	69	£	531	5s	0d	
Robert Ufford	43		1	10	32	£	268	15s	0d	
Gilbert Talbot	32		1	5	26	£	160	0s	0d	
Thomas Berkeley	38		1	6	31	£	190	0s	0d	
Roger Swynnerton	20		1	6	13	£	100	0s	0d	
Edward Monthermer	15		1	1	13	£	75	0s	0d	
Peter Dundale (Dounedale)	17		1	3	13	£	85	0s	0d	
Adam Welle	14		1	4	9	£	70	0s	0d	
Thomas Hastangs	16		1	2	13	£	80	0s	0d	
John Grey of Rotherfeld	20		1	3	16	£	100	0s	0d	
Anthony Lucy	30			4	26	£	150	0s	0d	
William FitzWarin	40				40	£	100	0s	0d	
William la Zouche	20			1	19	£	100	0s	0d	
William Kilsby	10				10	£	50	0s	0d	
William Latimer	81		1	6	74	£	303	15s	0d	
William Clinton	66		1	12	53	£	97	10s	0d	
John Norwich	26		1	6	19	£	97	10s	0d	
Hugh Freyne	28		1	5	22	£	87	10s	0d	
William Montague	180		2	24	154	£	1,012	10s	0d	
	50		2	10	38	£	15	12s	6d	
John Kirkby (B Carlisle)	40			4	36	£	150	0s	0d	
Ranulph Dacre	30		1	3	26	£	112	10s	0d	
Henry Beaumont	92	1	2	16	73	£	611	1s	0d	
(July)	2242	8	46	371	1817	£	11,603	11s	0d	
Foreign										
William Count Juliers	92	3	1	24	64	£	791	0s	6d	
Jean de Jens	3			1	2	£	32	0s	0d	
Gerard Andeno +named	21			7	14	£	124	10s	0d	
Cornelius Hapstalus	3			1	2	£	18	0s	0d	
	119	3	1	33	82	£	965	10s	6d	

Appendix 1: Men-at-arms, 1334-7

Contingent Leader	Total	Earls		Knights		Cost		
		Bannerets	Squires	Bannerets	Squires			
Household								
Reginald Cobham	9		2	7	£	52	5s	0d
Walter Mauny	8		1	7	£	40	10s	0d
John de Moeles, John Sully	6		2	4	£	36	0s	0d
Maurice Berkeley	11		2	9	£	50	10s	0d
Wolfard Gisthill	5		1	4	£	27	0s	0d
Robert Ferrers	8		2	6	£	45	0s	0d
Nicholas Langford	3		1	2	£	18	0s	0d
Amaneo Fossato	5		1	4	£	27	0s	0d
Norman Darcy	5		1	4	£	27	0s	0d
Warin, Giles Bassyngburn	9		2	7	£	49	10s	0d
William Frank	4		1	3	£	22	10s	0d
Edward Chandos	3		1	2	£	18	0s	0d
Robert Benhale	4		1	3	£	22	10s	0d
John Lovel	4		1	3	£	22	10s	0d
John Kyryel	3		1	2	£	18	0s	0d
Thomas Lucy	3		1	2	£	18	0s	0d
William Ellford	5		1	4	£	27	0s	0d
John Melton	3		1	2	£	18	0s	0d
Ralph Sefoul	3		1	2	£	18	0s	0d
John Ufford	6		1	5	£	31	10s	0d
Thomas Wake of Blisworth	5		1	4	£	36	0s	0d
Thomas Bradeston	6		1	5	£	31	10s	0d
Ralph Ufford	4		1	3	£	22	10s	0d
Edmund Ufford	3		1	2	£	18	0s	0d
Robert Ufford (jr), Edmund Ufford	7		2	5	£	38	14s	0d
John Sturmy	5		1	4	£	27	0s	0d
Gawain Corder	4		1	3	£	22	10s	0d
Thomas Saunford	3			3	£	10	16s	0d
Diverse household squires	92			92	£	412	9s	0d
Stephen Bitterle+1	2			2	£	9	0s	0d
Robert Middleton, +2	3			3	£	18	11s	3d
Various squires	70			70	£	118	2s	6d
Various squires	18			18	£	50	12s	6d
William Exchequer	3		1	2	£	18	0s	0d
Thomas Hugate	2			2	£	9	0s	0d
	334	0	0	34	300	£	1,431	10s 3d

Appendix 1: Men-at-arms, 1334-7

Contingent Leader	Total	Earls		Knights		Squires	£	Cost		
		Bannerets		Bannerets				0s	0d	
Non-Household										
Henry Illary	3			1		2	£	12	0s	0d
Richard Denton	10			1		9	£	33	0s	0d
William Gramary	6			1		5	£	27	3s	0d
Robert Langton+1	8			2		6	£	22	10s	0d
Nicholas Wortle	3			1		2	£	13	12s	0d
William Willoughby	3			1		2	£	3	16s	0d
John Marshal	4			1		3	£	19	0s	0d
Edmund de la Beche	10					10	£	35	10s	0d
Robert Boswell	7					7	£	23	16s	0d
	54	0	0	8		46	£	190	7s	0d

Contingent Leader	Total	Earls		Knights		Squires	£	Cost		
		Bannerets		Bannerets				0s	0d	
Counties										
Lancashire	19					19	£	5	9s	3d
Total as of July:	2768	11	47	446		2264	£	14,196	8s	0d

Balliol chevauchée										
John de Bohun	34			2		6	£	34	0s	0d
Thomas Beauchamp	92	1		2		17	£	115	0s	0d
Gilbert d'Umfraville	40	1				5	£	50	0s	0d
Henry Lancaster	113			2		19	£	141	5s	0d
Ralph Neville	85			1		15	£	106	5s	0d
Robert Ufford	43			1		10	£	53	15s	0d
William Latimer	21			1		5	£	52	10s	0d
William Clinton	47			1		12	£	117	10s	0d
John Norwich	13			1		1	£	32	10s	0d
Henry Beaumont	92	1		2		16	£	114	19s	0d
	580	3	13	106		458	£	817	14s	0d

Appendix 1: Men-at-arms, 1334-7

Men At Arms 1336

Contingent Leader	Total	Earls		Knights		Dates	Cost	
		Bannerets	Squires	Bannerets	Squires		£	s
John of Eltham	85	1	2	14	68	28 Jul - 12 Sep	£ 252	4s
Henry Lancaster	100		2	16	82	1 May - 7 Sep	£ 793	
	50		2	11	37	8 Sep - Nov 15	£ 234	10s
Thomas Beauchamp	74	1	2	9	62	1 May - 7 Sep	£ 624	
	57	1	1	6	49	8 Sep - Nov 15	£ 255	10s
John de Vere	20	1		5	14	13 May - 8 Aug	£ 137	12s
	17	1		4	12	7 Aug - 1 Sep	£ 36	8s
	10	1		2	7	2 Sep - 24 Oct	£ 50	8s
Gilbert d'Umfraville	30	1		3	26	14 May - 3 Sep	£ 226	
	23	1		3	19	4 Sep - 6 Oct	£ 156	15s
Henry Beaumont	36	1	1	5	29	17 May - 5 Dec	£ 499	4s
Henry Percy	74		2	13	59	1 May - 3 Sep	£ 581	9s
	46		2	11	33	4 Sep - 5 Dec	£ 296	2s
Ralph Neville	36			5	31	14 May - 5 Dec	£ 390	11s
Giles Baddlesmere	20		1	4	15	4 May - 3 Sep	£ 166	1s
	14		1	3	10	4 Sep - 11 Dec	£ 99	
John Segrave	18		1	3	14	14 May - 7 Nov	£ 213	12s
Thomas Ughtred	12		1	2	9	9 May - 16 May	£ 6	16s
	15		1	2	12	17 May - 29 Oct	£ 166	
Ranulph Dacre	15		1	2	12	21 May - 8 Sep	£ 112	
Bartholomew Fanacourt	7			1	6	1 May - 8 Sep	£ 52	16s
John Tibetot	15		1	3	11	5 May - 18 Oct	£ 209	
William Bohun	56		2	9	45	1 May - 15 Sep	£ 489	18s
	43		1	8	34	16 Sep - 9 Dec	£ 232	4s
William Montague	6		1	1	4	14 Jun - 15 Jun	£ 1	
	15		1	2	12	16 Jun - 18 Jun	£ 3	
	19		1	2	16	19 Jun - 2 Aug	£ 54	
	34		1	3	30	3 Aug - 9 Aug	£ 14	
	58		1	10	47	10 Aug - 24 Aug	£ 53	5s
	55		1	9	45	25 Aug - 28 Sep	£ 117	5s
	52		1	8	43	29 Sep - 7 Oct	£ 28	7s
	47		1	6	40	8 Oct - 19 Nov	£ 120	8s
	51		1	8	42	20 Nov - 2 Dec	£ 40	6s
	49		1	7	41	3 Dec - 17 Dec	£ 44	5s
Robert Ufford	3		1		2	14 Jun - 2 Aug	£ 15	
	6		1	1	4	3 Aug - 16 Sep	£ 22	10s
	11		1	2	8	17 Sep - 29 Sep	£ 10	8s
	7		1	1	5	30 Sep - 14 Nov	£ 25	6s
	19		2	3	14	15 Nov - 10 Dec	£ 36	8s
	16		1	2	13	3 Jan - 14 Jan	£ 12	12s
	34		2	7	25	15 Jan - 13 Mar	£ 136	6s
	47		2	10	35	14 Mar - 23 Mar	£ 34	13s
Henry Ferrers	7		1		6	14 Jun - 13 Oct	£ 55	
	16		1	2	13	14 Oct - 10 Dec	£ 60	18s
John Grey of Rotherfeld	4		1		3	14 Jun - 26 Oct	£ 47	5s
Thomas Bradeston	3			1	2	14 Jun - 10 Dec	£ 28	13s
Richard atte Wood	1				1	14 Jun - 10 Dec	£ 9	
Ademar Athelia	1				1	8 Aug - 10 Nov	£ 4	15s
Hugh Savenalus	1				1	12 Sep - 10 Dec	£ 4	10s

Appendix 1: Men-at-arms, 1334-7

Contingent Leader	Total	Earls		Knights		Dates	Cost		
		Bannerets	Squires	Bannerets	Squires		£	s	
Henry Herth	1		1			31 days	£ 1	11s	
Edmund de la Beche	8			8		12 Sep - 23 Oct	£ 16	16s	
John Eleydon	5			5		12 Sep - 13 Nov	£ 15	15s	
Geoffrey Mortimer	8	1		7		15 Aug - 10 Nov	£ 42	17s	
John Molyns	7		1	6		20 Jul - 15 Sep	£ 23	4s	
John Houton	7		1	6		9 Apr - 28 Sep	£ 68	16s	
Thomas Rokeby	9		1	8		11 Jun - 25 Oct	£ 68		
<hr/>									
21 May:	446	4	12	68	362				
28 June:	562	4	18	84	456				
11 August:	701	5	20	108	568				
17 September:	484	4	16	76	388				
14 October:	415	3	16	65	331				
25 October:	407	2	14	63	328				
						Total Cost:	£ 7,496	19s 0d	
<hr/>									
Household									
Walter Mauny	7		1	6		14 Jun - 6 Aug	£ 27		
	7		1	6		7 Aug - 13 Oct	£ 24	4s	
	14		1	13		14 Oct - 10 Dec	£ 43	10s	
	6		1	5		3 Jan - 19 Apr	£ 40	8s	
Ralph Ufford	3		1	2		14 Jun - 10 Dec	£ 39	16s	
	1			1		76 days, inc above			
	5		2	3		3 Jan - 26 Mar	£ 29	1s	
Robert Ufford jr.	6		3	3		14 Jun - 10 Dec	£ 81		
Thomas Lucy	6		2	4		14 Jun - 10 Dec	£ 60		
Maurice Berkeley	3		1	2		24 Jun - 10 Dec	£ 28	16s	
William Gillesford	4		1	3		15 Jul - 10 Dec	£ 37	5s	
Giles Beauchamp	4		1	3		15 Jul - 19 Oct	£ 24	5s	
Edmund Ufford 'frer'	4		2	2		1 Aug - 10 Dec	£ 39	12s	
William Stury	2		1	1		5 Jul - 10 Dec	£ 23	17s	
William Kilsby	3			3		14 Jun - 11 Aug	£ 5	18s	
	3			3		12 Aug - 13 Sep	£ 4	19s	
	6			6		14 Oct - 10 Dec	£ 17	8s	
John Brocaz	12			12		14 Jun - 10 Dec	£ 100	16s	
William L'English	13			13		14 Jun - 10 Dec	£ 111		
Walter Facomberge	3		1	2		22 Jul - 6 Oct	£ 15	8s	
William FitzWarin	6		1	5		7 Aug - 10 Dec	£ 33	12s	
Thomas Wake of Blisworth	4		1	3		7 Aug - 10 Dec	£ 41	8s	
Robert Athol	4		1	3		7 Aug - 10 Dec	£ 30		
John Sturmy	5		1	4		7 Aug - 10 Dec	£ 34	11s	
Gawain Corder	3		1	2		7 Aug - 10 Dec	£ 25	4s	
John Leukenor	4		1	3		7 Aug - 10 Dec	£ 31	10s	
Ralph Darcy	5		1	4		7 Aug - 10 Dec	£ 37	10s	
Robert Boswell	5			5		14 Jul - 31 Aug	£ 19	15s	
William Daumers, Walter Wetwang	2			2		14 Jun - 10 Dec	£ 18		
Thomas Baddeby, etc.	16			16		90 days	£ 45		
John Scot, etc.	8			8		58 days	£ 17	8s	
William atte Wood, etc.	3			3		168/134/53	£ 17	15s	
John Alspath, Peter Brugge	2			2		140/90	£ 15	16s 3d	
Robert Lucy, etc.	8			8		14 Jun - 10 Dec	£ 27		

Appendix 1: Men-at-arms, 1334-7

Contingent Leader	Total	Earls		Knights		Dates	Cost		
		Bannerets	Squires	Bannerets	Squires		£	s	d
Household									
Robert Maule, etc.	10			10		150 days	£	99	18s
John Garcy, etc.	7			7		126 days			
Hugh Garton, John Perot	2			2		104 days			
William Trussel, etc.	4			4		92 days			
Oliver Ingham, etc.	20			20		90 days			
Roger Beauchamp, etc.	7			7		58 days			
Guy Brian, Walter Sewall	2			2		40 days			
Thomas Hatfield, etc.	2			2		20 days			
William Skelton, etc.	5			5		126 days	£	38	16s 3d
Richard le Guturer	1			1		90 days			
William Standerwyk, etc.	9			9		58 during 7 Aug - 10 Dec			
William Frank	4		1	3		14 Oct - 10 Dec	£	14	10s
28 June:	152	0	0	8	144				
11 August:	213	0	0	21	192				
17 Sep:	202	0	0	21	181				
14 Oct:	219	0	0	20	195	Total Cost:	£	1,287	6s 6d
25 October:	205	0	0	20	185				
Counties:									
Westmoreland, Cumberland	41		6	35		25 Oct - 3 Nov	£	23	10s
Bothwell:									
Richard FitzAlan	10	1		3	6	14 Oct - 30 Oct	£	17	
	50	1	1	13	35	31 Oct - 10 Dec	£	150	13s
	1				1	20 days, inc above			
Thomas Berkeley	19		1	2	16	17 Nov - 10 Dec	£	28	16s
John Beauchamp+2	6			3	3	14 Oct - 10 Dec	£	26	2s
Robert de Ros+2	8			3	5	36 days	£	16	4s
William Redeness	2			1	1	44 days	£	6	12s
John Sutton	2			1	1	14 days	£	2	2s
Roger Burton	2			1	1	23 days	£	2	9s
Hugh Scolles+4	5				5	20 days	£	5	
14 October:	35	1	0	12	22	Total Cost	£	254	18s 0d
25 October:	35	1	0	12	22				
Totals:									
21 May:	446	4	12	68	362				
28 June:	714	4	18	92	600				
11 August:	914	5	20	129	760				
17 September:	686	4	16	97	569				
14 October:	669	4	16	97	548				
25 October:	688	3	14	101	570				
Total Cost Overall:	£	9,062	13s	6d					

Appendix 1: Men-at-arms, 1334-7

1337 Men At Arms

Contingent Origin	Total	Earls		Knights		Dates	Cost		
		Bannerets	Squires	Bannerets	Squires		£	s	
Personal Contingents									
Thomas Beauchamp	63	1	1	7	54	7 May - 31 May	£	100	
	117	1	4	16	96	1 Jun - 30 Aug	£	690	2s
Gilbert d'Umfraville	31	1		2	28	7 May - 20 Jun	£	90	
	10	1		2	7	21 Jun - 30 Aug	£	67	9s
Henry Percy	40		1	8	31	7 May - 31 May	£	63	15s
	50		1	12	37	1 Jun - 30 Aug	£	293	17s
Ralph Neville	33		1	4	28	7 May - 31 May	£	50	
	48		1	7	40	1 Jun - 30 Aug	£	259	16s
Thomas Wake of Liddell	40		1	9	30	7 May - 30 Aug	£	298	4s
John Kirkby (b Carlisle)	44	1		3	40	13 Jun - 30 Aug	£	213	6s
Ranulph Dacre	15		1	2	12	13 Jun - 30 Aug	£	79	
Robert Clifford	20			3	17	1 Jul - 15 Aug	£	52	18s
	17			2	15	16 Aug - 29 Aug	£	13	2s
John Mowbray	44		1	4	39	31 May - 30 Jun	£	79	1s
	20			2	18	1 Jul - 14 Aug	£	49	10s
	53		2	8	43	15 Aug - 30 Aug	£	53	12s
William Ros of Helmsley	20			3	17	7 May - 30 Aug	£	133	8s
John Darcy	27		1	4	22	7 May - 25 Jun	£	83	7s
Ralph Hastings	10			1	9	17 May - 17 Jun	£	17	12s
Roger Swynnerton	10		1	2	7	7 May - 15 Jun	£	30	
Household knights (4)	17			4	13	7 May - 13 Jun	£	39	1s
Brabant knights	5			1	4	7 May - 18 Jun	£	12	18s
Robert Littlebury	3			1	2	7 May - 18 Jun	£	8	12s
John Mourez	6			1	5	11 May - 16 Jun	£	12	19s
Roger Rile, etc.	5				5	24 May - 17 Jun	£	6	1s
William Kellesy	3				3	25 May - 27 Jul	£	17	1s 4d
	7				7	29 Jul - 30 Nov	£	58	6s 8d
Thomas Ufflet	1				1	27 Mar - 27 Jul	£	20	10s
	6				6	7 May - 27 Jul	£	24	12s
John St. Albans	6				6	15 Aug - 30 Sep	£	23	8s
	3				3	1 Nov - 30 Nov	£	4	10s
William de Bohun	59	1	2	7	49	4 Jun - 31 Jul	£	229	2s
Henry Ferrers	14		1	2	11	24 May - 16 Jun	£	22	16s
Edward Monthermer	4		1		3	14 days	£	4	18s
Walter Mauny	12			2	10	22 May - 17 Jun	£	18	18s
John Molyns	7			1	6	14 Jun - 11 Jul	£	11	4s
	12			2	10	21 Jul - 30 Aug	£	28	14s
William Kilsby	6				6	4 Jun - 17 Jun	£	11	4s
	12			1	11	15 Aug - 30 Aug	£	10	8s
John Brocaz, etc.	10				10	4 Jun, 14 days	£	7	
Household squires	23				23	14 days	£	6	9s
Diverse squires	27			9	18	17 Aug - 26 Sep	£	92	5s
John St. Albans	13				13	17 Aug - 31 Oct	£	49	8s
	6				6	25 Aug - 26 Sep	£	9	18s
	5				5	6 Nov - 13 Nov	£	2	18s 6d
	9				9	5 Oct - 5 Dec	£	28	
	1				1	2 days, inc above			
Hugh Audley	36	1	2	7	26	25 May - 16 Jun	£	63	7s

Appendix 1: Men-at-arms, 1334-7

Totals:	Total	Earls		Knights				
		Bannerets	Squires					
11 May:	285	2	5	43	235	Total Cost:	£3,456	3s 0d
1 June:	509	3	14	78	414			
1 July:	460	4	10	67	379			
29 July:	462	4	10	68	380			
 Counties:								
Derbyshire	10				10	15 Aug - 18 Sep	£ 17	10s
	10				10	19 Sep - 10 Oct	£ 11	
Nottingham	9				9	15 Aug - 18 Sep	£ 15	15s
	9				9	19 Sep - 17 Oct	£ 13	1s
Lancashire	21				21	15 Aug - 18 Sep	£ 36	15s
	4				4	19 Sep - 11 Nov	£ 10	16s
Northumberland	3				3	25 Aug - 18 Sep	£ 3	15s
	10				10	6 Nov - 14 Nov	£ 3	

Appendix 2: Infantry

Troop Numbers Winter 1334

Mounted Archers						
Contingent Origin	Total	Dates	Cost		Days in England	
John Ward (Royal Guard)	100	20 Oct - 23 Oct	£	10		
	124	24 Oct - 5 Nov	£	40	6s	
	174	6 Nov - 19 Nov	£	61	5s	
	181	20 Nov - 17 Dec	£	126	14s	
	215	18 Dec - 18 Feb	£	340	4s	
	175	19 Feb - 25 Feb	£	30	16s	6d
	2	19 Feb - 22 Feb				
Cheshire (John Daneport)	55	20 Nov - 24 Dec	£	47	18s	
John of Eltham	40	10 Nov - 4 Feb	£	63	13s	4d 17
Richard FitzAlan	70	4 Nov - 4 Feb	£	118	3s	18
Ebulo Lestrangle	40		£	69	13s	4d 23
Thomas Beauchamp	40		£	68		18
Henry Lancaster	100	27 Oct - 4 Feb	£	188	6s	8d 24
Ralph Neville	40	11 Nov - 4 Feb	£	57	6s	8d
Henry Percy	50	13 Nov - 4 Feb	£	70		
John de Vere	12	11 Nov - 24 Jan	£	16		10
John Warenne	40	10 Nov - 4 Feb	£	58		
Gilbert d'Umfraville	80	22 Nov - 8 Jan	£	64		
James Audley	35	11 Nov - 4 Feb	£	54	16s	8d 16
William de Bohun	60	16 Nov - 7 Jan	£	53		
	1	15 days of above			5s	
Roger Swynnerton	25	4 Nov - 9 Feb	£	45	8s	4d 22
John Multon	20	4 Nov - 9 Feb	£	32	13s	4d
Hugh Freyne	13	26 Oct - 1 Feb	£	24	5s	4d 26
William Tynedale	40	24 Nov - 25 Dec	£	21		
William Pressen	22	20 Nov - 28 Jan	£	25	13s	4d
William FitzWarin	7	4 Nov - 22 Jan	£	9	5s	
Nicholas Langford	15	24 Oct - 3 Feb	£	25	15s	
John Neville of Hornby	6	4 Nov - 23 Jan	£	8	2s	
John Montgomery	10	7 Nov - 11 Feb	£	16	3s	4d
Thomas Wake of Blisworth	6	8 Nov - 25 Dec	£	5	15s	19
Robert Boswell	15	7 Nov - 14 Feb	£	25	12s	6d
	3	51 days	£	1	5s	6d
Arnold Garcy	7	14 Nov - 11 Feb	£	10	10s	
William Stransale	4	4 Nov - 29 Jan	£	5	16s	
Richard Castle	12	14 Nov - 8 Feb	£	17	8s	
William Northwell	60	3 Nov - 18 Feb	£	120		24
	43	39 days	£	27	19s	
(24 Nov)	1152		£	1,421	1s	8d
Eustace Maxwell	20	4 Dec - 1 Feb	£	20		
William L'English	4	3 Dec - 4 Feb	£	4	5s	4d

Appendix 2: Infantry

County Contingents - Hobelars, Mounted Archers, Vintenars

Contingent Origin	Total	Dates	Cost		
West Riding	103	30 Oct - 11 Feb	£	180	5s
	2	19 days			12s 8d
East Riding	82	9 Nov - 11 Feb	£	129	16s 8d
North Riding	32	13 Nov - 3 Feb	£	43	14s 8d
	2	20 days			13s 4d
Richmondshire	15	17 Nov - 4 Feb	£	20	
Forest of Dean	20	29 Oct - 4 Feb	£	33	
Criminals	42	4 Nov - 9 Feb	£	73	15s 1d
	<u>256</u>		£	<u>481</u>	<u>17s 5d</u>
Palatinate of Durham	120	1 Dec - 19 Dec	£	38	
	53	20 Dec			17s 8d
Lancaster	17	15 Jan - 4 Feb	£	5	19s
Nottinghamshire	20	1 Jan - 15 Feb	£	23	
	9	1 Jan - 15 Feb	£	6	18s
Lincolnshire	185	19 Feb - 23 Feb	£	15	6s 8d
Derbyshire	17	8 Dec - 20 Dec	£	3	13s 8d
	10	21 Dec - 3 Feb	£	7	10s
	<u>368</u>		£	<u>92</u>	<u>17s 4d</u>
Total (24 Nov)	1408				
'Armati'					
York	100	4 Nov - 10 Feb	£	165	
Foot					
Arnold Garcy	1	14 Nov - 11 Feb			15s
William Northwell	40	3 Nov - 18 Feb	£	36	
West Riding	359	30 Oct - 11 Feb	£	314	2s 6d
East Riding	258	9 Nov - 11 Feb	£	204	5s
North Riding	177	13 Nov - 3 Feb	£	120	19s
Richmondshire	158	17 Nov - 4 Feb	£	105	1s
Forest of Dean	124	29 Oct - 4 Feb	£	102	6s
Criminals	160	4 Nov - 9 Feb	£	133	5s
Total (24 Nov)	<u>1117</u>		£	<u>1,016</u>	<u>13s 6d</u>
Lancaster	13	15 Jan - 4 Feb	£	2	5s 6d
Nottinghamshire	174	1 Jan - 15 Feb	£	66	4s 6d
Derbyshire	331	8 Dec - 20 Dec	£	35	17s 2d
	200	21 Dec - 3 Feb	£	75	
	2	4 Feb - 11 Feb			2s 8d

Appendix 2: Infantry

Troop Numbers Summer 1335

Mounted Archers							
Contingent Origin	Total	Dates	£	s	d		
John Ward	162	5 Jun - 12 Oct	£	530	16s	8d	
John Eston	40	3 Jul - 13 Sep	£	48	13s	4d	
Thomas Beauchamp	24	30 Jun - 7 Oct	£	40			
John de Bohun	29	30 Jun - 11 Sep	£	35	15s	4d	
Gilbert d'Umfraville	48	12 Jul - 7 Oct	£	70	9s	4d	
John Warenne	24	3 Jul - 23 Sep	£	33	4s		
Richard FitzAlan	24	26 Jun - 23 Sep	£	36			
Ebulo Lestrangle	39	28 Jun - 10 Sep	£	48	15s		
Henry Percy	20	26 Jun - 23 Sep	£	30			
William Montague	40	11 Jun - 23 Sep	£	70			
		26 14 Jul - 29 Jul	£	6	18s	8d	
		18 30 Jul - 26 Aug	£	8	8s		
William Clinton	40	27 Jun - 6 Oct	£	56	4s		
Hugh Audley	56	3 Jul - 9 Sep	£	67	4s		
James Audley	64	3 Jul - 9 Sep	£	72	13s	4d	
William de Bohun	30	1 Jul - 7 Sep	£	34	10s		
Anthony Lucy	34	27 Aug - 7 Oct	£	24	3s		
Thomas Berkeley	12	2 Jul - 23 Sep	£	16	16s		
John Leyburn	34	30 Jun - 9 Sep	£	43	4s		
Hugh Freyne	30	23 Jun - 20 Aug	£	29			
Richard Denton	18	12 Jul - 9 Sep	£	18			
Thomas Lucy	20	23 Jul - 23 Sep	£	21			
Thomas Ughtred	12	23 Jul - 7 Oct	£	15	8s		
Robert Manners	54	30 Jul - 26 Aug	£	25	4s		
		40 27 Aug - 7 Oct	£	28			
John Deping	12	27 Aug - 7 Oct	£	8	8s		
William Felton	36	30 Jul - 26 Aug	£	16	16s		
Walter Creik	40	30 Jul - 12 Aug	£	9	6s	8d	
Thomas Featherstonehaugh	60	30 Jul - 26 Aug	£	28			
		7 26 Aug - 7 Oct	£	11	18s		
Robert Ogle	126	30 Jul - 5 Aug	£	14	14s		
	100	6 Aug - 12 Aug	£	11	13s	4d	
Stephen Swynnerton	34	30 Jul - 12 Aug	£	6	18s	8d	
Roger Swynnerton	5	10 Jul - 30 Aug	£	4	6s	8d	
John Brocaz	27	3 Jul - 30 Sep	£	40	10s		
St. Mary's, York	12	10 Aug - 26 Aug	£	3	8s		
		5 27 Aug - 7 Oct	£	3	10s		
	1206		£	873	13s	8d	

Appendix 2: Infantry

Mounted Archers						
Contingent Origin	Total	Dates	£	s	d	
Wells	10	23 Jun - 11 Sep	£	13	9s	
Gloucester	10	21 Jun - 28 Sep	£	16	7s	8d
Ludlow	10	27 Jun - 7 Oct	£	17	3s	4d
Lichfield	10	23 Jun - 12 Sep	£	13	11s	4d
Northampton	10	3 Jul - 14 Sep	£	12	5s	
Lincoln (John Aldham)	60	23 Jun - 7 Sep	£	79	5s	8d
Pontefract	10	26 Jun - 23 Sep	£	13	5s	8d
	<u>120</u>		£	165	7s	8d
Middlesex	8	23 Jun - 10 Sep	£	10	13s	4d
Buckinghamshire	17	23 Jun - 14 Sep	£	26	7s	
Northamptonshire	76	23 Jun - 1 Sep	£	89	18s	8d
Nottinghamshire	28	23 Jun - 30 Aug	£	32	4s	
Derbyshire	110	28 Jun - 30 Aug	£	119	3s	4d
Somerset	55	23 Jun - 30 Aug	£	64	3s	4d
Dorset	60	23 Jun - 6 Sep	£	77	16s	8d
Wiltshire	67	23 Jun - 30 Aug	£	80	8s	
Gloucestershire	16	23 Jun - 23 Aug	£	16	10s	8d
Shropshire	23	23 Jun - 21 Aug	£	23		
Staffordshire	57	27 Jun - 30 Aug	£	59	5s	
Lancaster	232	27 Jun - 3 Sep	£	265	6s	8d
North Riding	54	25 Jun - 27 Aug	£	57	12s	
East Riding	54	30 Jun - 20 Aug	£	46	16s	
West Riding	54	30 Jun - 25 Aug	£	51	6s	
Palatinate of Durham	190	10 Jul - 26 Aug	£	153	12s	0d
		32 8 days of above	£	4	5s	4d
Cumberland	835	8 Aug - 26 Aug	£	199	5s	3d
Westmorland	202	7 Aug - 26 Aug	£	50	8s	
Diverse archers	47	3 Jul - 18 Sep	£	61	2s	
	<u>2217</u>		£	3,326	5s	3d
Total Mounted Archers:	3543					
'Armati'						
York	100	25 Jun - 9 Sep	£	128	8s	1d
Foot						
William Montague	60	11 Jun - 23 Sep	£	78	15s	
William Count Juliers	51	4 Jun - 25 Sep	£	144	1s	6d
Beverley	21	26 Jun - 23 Sep	£	15	16s	2d
Doncaster	12	28 Jun - 23 Sep	£	7	19s	
	<u>33</u>					

Appendix 2: Infantry

Foot Contingent Origin	Total	Dates	Cost		
Surrey	39	23 Jun - 29 Aug	£	23	2s 6d
Sussex	120	10 Jul - 22 Aug	£	46	4d
Kent	174	5 Jul - 28 Aug	£	86	17s 6d
Middlesex	39	23 Jun - 10 Sep	£	26	6s 8d
Essex	107	10 Jul - 20 Aug	£	40	16s 4d
Hertford	56	23 Jun - 22 Aug	£	30	10s
Northamptonshire	191	23 Jun - 1 Sep	£	120	12s 7d
Nottinghamshire	216	23 Jun - 30 Aug	£	136	6s
Derbyshire	250	28 Jun - 30 Aug	£	145	11s 2d
Somerset	156	23 Jun - 30 Aug	£	100	6s 2d
Gloucester	215	23 Jun - 23 Aug	£	110	16s 8d
Shropshire	178	23 Jun - 21 Aug	£	97	12s 6d
Staffordshire	202	27 Jun - 30 Aug	£	120	1s 6d
Hereford	182	2 Jul - 16 Aug	£	75	8s 6d
Lancaster	641	27 Jun - 3 Sep	£	476	13s 2d
North Riding	260	25 Jun - 27 Aug	£	157	7s 10d
East Riding	202	30 Jun - 20 Aug	£	96	5s 2d
West Riding	275	30 Jun - 25 Aug	£	144	10s 8d
Cumberland	127	8 Aug - 26 Aug	£	27	17s 8d
	67	4 days	£	2	4s 8d
Westmorland	31	7 Aug - 26 Aug	£	8	8s
Criminals	171	4 Aug - 7 Sep	£	52	2s 8d
Diverse archers	60		£	40	19s
Totals	3959		£	2,413	8s 11d
Total Foot:	4092				
Total English Infantry:	7735		£	5,868	2s 3d
Total Infantry:	10820				

Appendix 2: Infantry

Troop Numbers Summer 1336

Mounted Archers and Hobelars Contingent Origin	Total	Dates	Cost
Personal Contingents			
John Stanford	61	14 Jun - 31 Aug	£ 122 9s
Henry Pledour	57	1 Sep - 9 Dec	£ 142 10s
Henry Lancaster	70	1 May - 13 Aug	£ 123 10s 4d
Thomas Beauchamp	40	19 May - 13 Aug	£ 57 8s
Henry Percy	60	7 May - 17 Aug	£ 102 4s
Ralph Neville	31	14 May - 14 Aug	£ 48 1s
	1	6 days of above	2s
Anthony Lucy	28	20 May - 4 Jul	£ 21 2s 4d
Giles Baddlesmere	12	7 May - 17 Aug	£ 20 12s
	1	3 days of above	1s
John Denholm	13	12 May - 3 Jul	£ 11 7s 8d
William Montague	186	14 Jun - 16 Oct	£ 387 10s
	3	5 days of above	5s
Richard FitzAlan	13	25 Oct - 27 Nov	£ 7 7s 4d
Robert Holm	20	1 May - 11 Aug	£ 51 10s
John Houton	42	1 May - 29 Sep	£ 121 18d
John Tibetot	12	5 May - 18 Oct	£ 33 12s
21 May:	391	Total Cost:	£ 1,250 13s 2d
28 June:	578		
11 August:	534		
17 September:	297		
14 October:	255		
25 October:	70		
Counties			
Lincoln, York, Derby	744	1 May - 5 Aug	£ 1,235 6s
York, Northampton, Leicester, Staffordshire, Shropshire, Nottinghamshire	457	6 Aug - 26 Aug	£ 159 12s
Lincoln, York, Derby	402	27 Aug - 4 Sep	£ 60 6s
Lincoln, York, Derby, Shropshire, Northampton, Leicester	277	5 Sep - 24 Oct	£ 229 15s 8d
	271	25 Oct - 7 Nov	£ 63 4s 8d
	61	8 Nov - 21 Nov	£ 14 4s 8d
Northumberland	467	3 Jun - 17 Aug	£ 591 4s 8d
	628	25 Oct - 14 Nov	£ 218 11s
Westmorland, Cumberland	261	22 May - 17 Aug	£ 382 2s 8d
	825	25 Oct - 3 Nov	£ 137 10s
	553	4 Nov - 10 Nov	£ 64 10s 4d
	396	11 Nov - 20 Nov	£ 66
Palatinate of Durham	186	8 Jun - 17 Aug	£ 222 8s 8d
21 May:	744	Total Cost:	£ 3,444 16s 4d
28 June:	1658		
11 August:	1371		
17 September:	277		
14 October:	277		
25 October:	1724		

Appendix 2: Infantry

Totals, Mounted Archers and Hobelars

	21 May:	1135	Total Cost:	£ 4,695	9s	6d
	28 June:	2236				
	11 August:	1905				
	17 September:	574				
	14 October:	532				
	25 October:	1794				

Foot

	William Montague	51	14 Jun - 16 Oct	£	58	6s	8d
	Robert Holm	20	1 May - 11 Aug	£	16	10s	
	York, Northampton, Leicester, Staffordshire, Shropshire, Nottinghamshire	614	6 Aug - 26 Aug	£	114	6s	4d
	Lincoln, York, Derby	45	27 Aug - 4 Sep	£	4	10s	
	Lincoln, York, Derby, Shropshire, Northampton Leicester	124	5 Sep - 24 Oct	£	65	14s	8d
		177	25 Oct - 7 Nov	£	24	14s	8d
		24	8 Nov - 21 Nov	£	6	17s	8d
	Northumberland	56	25 Oct - 14 Nov	£	9	16s	
	Westmoreland, Cumberland	245	25 Oct - 3 Nov	£	20	8s	4d
		65	4 Nov - 10 Nov	£	3	15s	10d
		21	11 Nov - 20 Nov	£	1	15s	
	21 May:	20		£	326	15s	2d
	28 June:	71					
	17 Sep:	175					
	14 Oct:	175					
	25 October:	478					

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E372 Exchequer, Pipe Rolls
E403 Exchequer of Receipt: Issue Rolls and Registers
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