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COLONISER AND COLONISED: THE MEANING OF OCCUPATION IN THE WEST BANK

by

Gillian M. Lauder

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1983

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ABSTRACT

The meaning which occupation has for the people of the West Bank encompasses a diversity of experiences and interpretations, and an analysis requires a means of locating experiences and perceptions within a framework which allows the complexities to be understood.

The thesis begins by considering the construction of such a framework, in suggesting a historical interpretation of the kinds of changes which were restructuring the relationship between Europe and the rest of the world during the time of early European industrial expansion, and subsequent governmental involvement in the settling of European colonial populations in the countries of Africa, Asia and the Americas. The theme of the violence of the relationship between coloniser and colonised is developed from this general perspective to the specific Palestinian encounter with Zionism, and the conceptualisation is of a violence which can be economic, social and ideological as well as physical.

The translation of this conceptualisation into the reality of life in the West Bank means that account can be taken of the day-to-day experience of colonisation, as well as the wider historical process. The ways in which people identify their situation and formulate strategies for surviving can therefore be connected to the broader experiences of the Palestinians as a people.

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"for my parents"

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

The first Prime Minister of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, resisted attempts to define the borders of the state following its proclamation in 1948. The significance of this within Zionist ideology has been the ability to redefine the boundaries of 'Eretz Yisrael'; the significance in practice has been the expansion and contraction of the State of Israel from the frontiers it held at the end of the 1948-9 war. In 1956 Israel, in concert with Britain and France, attacked Egypt and occupied Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula in the course of the 'Suez Campaign'. Pressure from the United States enforced a return to the 1949 borders, but Sinai was invaded again during the 1967 war. The conclusion of the 1967 war left Israel in control of all of Palestine, plus the Sinai Peninsula and the Syrian Golan Heights. The 1973 war led to the further expansion of Israeli control on Golan and a withdrawal from part of Sinai. The implementation of sections of the Camp David Agreements has entailed withdrawal from most of Sinai, although twenty months after the official Israeli withdrawal,[1] the final border has not been defined.

In 1978, Israel invaded Lebanon, carrying out the 'Litani Operation' which culminated in the sponsoring of the self-styled Major Saad Haddad in an enclave along the border between Israel and Lebanon. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon again and in August 1983 it was reported that a £25 million scheme of fortifications was being constructed by the Israeli Army along a line some 27 miles north of Israel's 1949 border.

Israel's interest in Lebanon is of long standing. Ben-Gurion wrote in 1948 that the Lebanese Government should be overthrown and "...a Christian state ought to be set up there, with its southern frontier on the Litani" ('The Guardian': 26.8.82). Implicit in this is the idea that Israel's northern border would extend as far as the Litani River. A more detailed policy was suggested by Moshe Dayan and recorded by Moshe Sharett during his time as Foreign Minister of Israel:

> According to Dayan the only thing that's necessary is to find a Lebanese officer, even a major will do. We should either win his heart or buy him with money to declare himself the saviour of the Maronite population. Then the Israeli army will enter Lebanon, occupy the necessary territory and create a Christian regime that will ally itself with Israel. The territory from the Litani southwards will be totally annexed to Israel.
>
> (Jansen: 1982: p.120).

Given the authority vested in Dayan and Sharett, the status of such remarks must be seen as more than matters of opinion.

Parallels between Dayan's 1955 proposal and actual Israeli policy towards Lebanon over the past ten years are clear. By the mid-1970's, Israel had begun to establish relations with the Maronite Phalange Party and during the Lebanese civil war of 1975-76 was supplying them with weapons. The value of arms, equipment and technical advice supplied by Israel to the Phalange has been estimated at as much as $250 million by 1982 (Jansen: 1982: p.121).

The background to this cooperation can be seen in the way in which French Mandatory rule in Lebanon shaped conditions of power, and it is here that the source of Lebanon's internal tensions can be located. In sum, Maronite hegemony was ensured by France while it held the Mandate, and the Maronite community continued to receive support from the West at the end of this period. As Gilmour has pointed out:

> Lebanon's inherent struggle is....between those who want to make the country a psuedo-European enclave (i.e. the Maronites) and those who want to prevent its alienation from the Arab world (i.e. the Muslims, Druses and smaller Christian sects).
>
> ('The Guardian': 26.8.82).

While this is obviously a simplification of a very complex situation it does give some idea of how the political structures built up under French rule are related to the wider geopolitical context, and at least begins to answer the version of Lebanese history which claims that Lebanon had a peaceful society with an institutionalised balance between confessional groups until the disruption engendered by the Palestinian resistance movement.

Most of the Palestinians living in Lebanon are refugees and their dependents from 1948, although smaller migrations also took place following the 1967 war and after the Jordanian attack on Palestinians in Jordan in 1970. The 1980 population estimate is that around 347,000 Palestinians were living in Lebanon, and a third of those were in refugee camps (Palestinian Statistical Abstract: 1980).

By the 1970's, Beirut had become the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. For the PLO the choice of Beirut as a base was almost by default, as they had lost their few bases in Egyptian-controlled territory after the 1967 war, and although Fatah had set up

in the West Bank after the 1967 occupation this was short-lived. The expulsion of Palestinians from Jordan, and the economic and political restrictions placed on Palestinians in other Arab countries led to the regroupment of the PLO forces in Lebanon. The way in which the Palestinian resistance movement developed is of significance, as it was establishing the institutions of a 'government-in-exile'. For example, the Palestine Red Crescent was responsible for medical care; educational facilities were provided in refugee camps through the offices of the PLO; a central archive and research centre was set up in Beirut, and thus a whole range of political and social services were established in addition to consolidating the guerilla bases and building up military support.

At one level, the Lebanese authorities were concerned to prevent Israeli 'reprisal' raids into Lebanon following fighting between Palestinian guerillas and Israeli troops along the border area. These 'reprisals' included the blowing-up of thirteen civilian airliners at Beirut Airport in 1968 and a systematic campaign of terror against the population of South Lebanon. The refugee camps were subjected to aerial bombardment as were villages "suspected of harbouring Palestinians"; bridges, roads and houses were destroyed and villagers taken back to Israel for interrogation (Gilmour: 1982: p.190). However, even when the PLO agreed in 1974 to stop all operations along the Israeli-Lebanese border the 'reprisals' continued, a scenario which was repeated in the Israeli 'retaliatory' invasion of Lebanon in 1982, following a ceasefire negotiated indirectly between Israel and the PLO.

At another level, tensions within Lebanon had been increasing, with challenges by Muslim and left-wing groups to Maronite hegemony and the confessional structure of the state apparatus, and in a sense this was exacerbated by the presence of the Palestinians. Direct confrontations had taken place between paramilitary forces of the Phalange and Palestinians guerillas since the early 1970's, and the Phalangist militias were strengthened with consignments of weapons, with the approval of the Lebanese President.

What this means is that the ruling party was setting up an alternative to the Lebanese Army, for while the majority of the latter's senior officers were Maronite, its junior officers and many enlisted men were not, and the loose alliances forged between the Palestinian resistance and some of the progressive Lebanese groupings led the Maronite leadership to question the loyalty of the army in protecting the interests of the Maronite community.

By 1975 tensions within Lebanon erupted in civil war. At this time the United States was trying to negotiate a 'peace plan' in the region following the 1973 war.[2] As for the Palestinian resistance, a strategy based on a diplomatic offensive had been developed to counter attempts to place the West Bank and Gaza under Jordanian rule in the search for a settlement, and the use of this tactic gained the PLO observer status at the United Nations and the affirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. The civil war in Lebanon strengthened the alliance between the Palestinians and the progressive Lebanese groupings, and by the spring of 1976 the joint front controlled over three-quarters of the country.

The prospect of a joint front victory clarified interests in the region. Israel blockaded the sourthen ports of Sidon and Tyre, preventing weapons and supplies from reaching the Palestinian-Lebanese front, and continued to supply the Phalange with armaments. The United States sent part of the Sixth Fleet to cruise off Lebanon. In May 1976, Syrian troops invaded Lebanon and fought against the Palestinian-Lebanese alliance. Operations such as the siege of Tal al Zaater refugee camp and the massacre of over 2,000 people were condemned by Arab states such as Iraq and Algeria; the invasion of Lebanon was condemned by the Soviet Union, but no attempt was made to stop the Syrian advance. In November 1976 a meeting of Arab states decreed that an Arab 'peace-keeping force' would remain in Lebanon, and this was the Syrian army.

From this brief outline, some indication is given of the way in which power alliances in the region shift and re-align, and the importance of considering this historically. A failure to do so results in the kind of analysis typified by the presentation of the conflict in Lebanon as being a confessional struggle - begging the question of why Syria should intervene on the side of the Maronite Christians, and why Israel should sponsor Saad Haddad's militia.[3] The recognition of Israel's long-standing interests in Lebanon and support for the Phalange denies the spontaneity of Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and requires an analysis which can move beyond the reduction of this complexity to a set of economic, strategic or military imperatives.

Yehoshua Porath has suggested that the successful mediated negotiation of a ceasefire by the PLO, and its ability to maintain it for a year, had given the PLO credibility as a negotiating force. For Israel, this meant that:

> If the PLO agreed upon and maintained a ceasefire they may in the future agree to a more far-reaching political settlement and maintain that too...Won't there be pressure to include the PLO in future negotiations over the future of the territories occupied in 1967?
> ('Ha'aretz': 25.6.82).

In addition to increasing credibility as representatives of the Palestinian people at an international level, recognition of the support for the PLO amongst Palestinians underlies the following statement made by General Sharon during his time as Israeli Defence Minister:

> The bigger the blow and the more we damage the PLO infrastructure, the more the Arabs in Judea and Samaria /the West Bank/ and Gaza will be ready to negotiate with us and establish co-existence.
> ('The Times': 5.8.82).

When the experience of the Palestinians is juxtaposed with a consideration of the various alliances and interests both within the region and internationally, and when what has happened to the Palestinians is seen against a backdrop of a global restructuring, then we can begin to make sense of the meaning of occupation in the West Bank. The Minister of the Liberal Jewish Synagogue in Britain has observed:

> Only a fool or a propagandist would still claim that the brutal war in Lebanon was launched with the defensive aim of bringing peace to Galilee.[4] It was designed to smash the PLO militarily and politically, in order to accelerate the process of colonisation on the West Bank.
> ('The Guardian': 14.2.83).

The construction of an explanation which can identify the connections between the process of colonisation on the West Bank and the meaning this has for the people who have lived under Israeli military rule there since 1967 involves the formulation of a theoretical unity, and this is conceptualised as being the power relation between a colonised people and a

coloniser. The violence of the colonial relationship is generated by the articulation of specific historical circumstances and the way in which these circumstances are explained and defined.

The conception of colonialism is not as an ahistorical descriptive category, but rather as a historically specific process of the disruption of one social formation by another; thus, the emphasis is on the dynamic nature of the colonial relationship rather than on a predefined relation between an active coloniser and a passive colonised. The importance of this is the assertion of the history of the colonised people, a history which has its own ordering and is not merely the response to an external stimulus.

In this way, a distinction is maintained between the level of historical experience and the expression of the experience, as while a theoretical unity is constructed of violence as a colonial power relation, specific forms of violence can neither be reduced to, nor deduced from, this level. The way in which colonialism is defined means that it is a relation which affects all aspects of the social formation, and expressions of violence can therefore be manifested in different forms at different times. Such an analysis of moments in the colonial relationship can consider the diverse ways in which people perceive and interpret their situation and find ways of living with it. In this sense, historical experience can be seen as setting parameters within which different sorts of explanation and strategy emerge, but the form of the interpretation is irreducible to the level of objective experience, and has its own historicity.

The suggestion that an expression of violence has its own historicity which cannot be derived solely from a consideration of the historical development of the colonial process allows a coherent explanation to be constructed at different levels of analysis. That is, if the same form of historicity is attributed to, for example, economic structures, beliefs and political organisations, then these would have to be conceived of as subject to the same type of transformation. It is suggested that rather than adopting a reductionist form in this way, an analysis which can articulate different levels of explanation is more capable of providing a comprehensive understanding of the meaning of occupation in the West Bank.

It can be argued that it is difficult to talk of a unified Palestinian situation in the face of geographical, experiential and social diversity, and this raises questions about the level at which we can talk of a collective Palestinian experience. With reference to the preceding discussion, it is proposed that at a general level of objective experience the Palestinian people have a shared past, and that the unity can be located in the relationship between coloniser and colonised. The meaning which this has will vary between places, times and situations as a diversity of discourses of explanation and definition.

The generation of analytical connections between the level of Palestinian specificity and the context within which Palestinian history can be located is reflected in the structure of the thesis. Chapter One is divided into two sections. The first section adopts a wide perspective in considering the kinds of changes which were restructuring the relationship between Europe and the rest of the world during the time of early European industrial expansion, and examines how this led to governmental

involvement and the move to settle European populations in the countries of Africa, Asia and the Americas. The establishment of colonial settler states is used as a basis for developing the theme of the nature of the relationship of coloniser and colonised, and illustrative examples are used to indicate the permeation of the colonial relationship through to the construction of the idea of the native.

The second section of Chapter One examines the beginning of Zionism as a political movement and relates Zionist ideas to tensions within Europe at the end of the nineteenth century. The aspirations of Zionism within the colonial project are seen firstly at an ideological level, and as Rodinson has pointed out:

> The element that made it possible to connect these aspirations of Jewish shopkeepers, peddlers, craftsmen, and intellectuals in Russia and elsewhere to the conceptual orbit of imperialism was one small detail that seemed to be of no importance: Palestine was inhabited by another people.
> (Rodinson: 1973: p.39).

Secondly, Zionist aspirations were connected to the fortunes of the imperial powers at a practical level as the Zionist leadership sought support for their settlement plans, and Chapter One concludes by returning to the perspective with which it began by discussing the re-alignment of global power relations since the First World War, with reference to the Middle East.

International connections are followed through in Chapter Two, and the focus is narrowed to concentrate on the place of Israel in the historical process outlined in the first Chapter. The analysis of the relationship between Europe and the Middle East is concretised by examining the economic foundations of the State of Israel, and questions are raised regarding the apparent paradox of Israel's status as an

advanced capitalist country, its role as an exporter of military and technical aid and the magnitude of its foreign debt and internal economic problems.

The question of the nature of the State of Israel is picked up in Chapter Three, which is concerned with the colonisation process in Palestine from the time of the British Mandate. It is proposed in this Chapter that the ideological negation of the Palestinian 'native' population which is an element of Zionist philosophy was transformed by Zionist settlers in Palestine under the Mandate into the establishment of institutions and structures which were exclusively for Jews. Thus, the political vision of a Jewish entity excluded from thought the non-Jewish inhabitants of the site where the entity was to be formed; the practices of the settlers served to formalise this.

It is an instance of this formalisation which constitutes the basis of Chapter Four, namely the way in which the exproporiation of land and implantation of a settler population can be seen as an aspect of domination. Land expropriation is considered inside Israel and in the West Bank, and while at one level settlement is considered as a symbol and strategy of domination, it is held that the multiplicity of rationales which underlie Israeli settlement are important for an understanding of the wider dimensions of the colonial relationship.

Chapter Five is organised around an examination of the West Bank labourforce since the 1967 occupation, and through this theme attempts to draw together the main strands of the argument concerning the meaning of occupation in the West Bank. Around half the West Bank workforce is employed inside Israel, and the rapidity of this shift is linked to the

speed with which the West Bank has become a major market for Israeli produce; it is linked to the changes which are taking place in agriculture, and to employment within the West Bank itself. The situation of West Bank labour can be analysed within the matrix of the kind of changes which occur when production is reorganised on a transnational basis; that is, within the framework of a New International Division of Labour.

However, it is suggested that account must also be taken of the specificity of Palestinian workers in a particular colonial relationship, and a discussion of the unionisation of West Bank workers elaborates this level of analysis by examining the way in which West Bank unions constitute a form of resistance to the Israeli occupation. This discussion provides an introduction to the examination in Chapters Six and Seven of instances in the colonial relationship, moments of violence. The self-definition of the West Bank unions and the way in which they perceive the relation between problems in the workplace and the problems of living under occupation leads to the formulation of a strategy for dealing with life under military rule. The instances discussed in Chapters Six and Seven indicate the diversity of interpretations and the very different ways in which Palestinians have come to terms with their situation.

Thus, the thesis is structured in a way which permits an analysis to shift between levels. Chapter One provides a context for Chapter Two; Chapter Three then develops the themes raised in the introductory Chapters within the Palestinian constituency and Chapters Four and Five concretise this by highlighting particular aspects of colonisation. Chapters Six and Seven then use this discussion to concentrate on moments of violence in the relationship between coloniser and colonised.

A final note can be made on the use of source material. In addition to library and archival sources, a seven-month period was spent in the West Bank. Details of the fieldwork are provided in Appendix 1, but it is important to clarify the status of information gathered at this time. While the focus was on five particular areas and the data collected formed the basis of the 'case studies' discussed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, these cases are designed to advance the central argument of the thesis and so do not constitute exhaustive field research in the areas of interest. Similarly, the use of illustrative material from other countries throughout the thesis does not have the status of a 'comparative analysis' in the usual sense of a detailed comparison between societies or social structures - it is there to clarify or provide a counterpoint to the main argument.

Notes

1. Israel officially withdrew from Sinai on 26 April, 1982.

2. The connection between the attempt to negotiate a 'peace plan' and United States oil interests in the Middle East is elaborated in Chapter One.

3. By confessional definitions, an estimated 60% of Haddad's militia are Shi'ite Muslims, and Haddad is Greek Orthodox (Middle East International: 19.8.83).

4. The official name of the invasion was "Operation Peace in Galilee"; the rationale put forward was that it was necessary to push the Palestinians out of artillery range of Galilee. This was estimated to be 40 km north of the 1949 Israeli-Lebanese border.

CHAPTER ONE

THE MIDDLE EAST 'PROBLEM': A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Chapter One

The purpose of this Chapter is to provide a background which will set the parameters of the thesis by suggesting the way in which the Middle East has developed within a global context. This involves the construction of a particular form of historical explanation, one which is thematic rather than chronological, in that its organisation is designed to advance a theoretical and methodological problematic rather than to be restricted to a description of events.

The first section moves from a general discussion of the way in which industrial expansion in Europe generated new kinds of relationships with the rest of the world, to an examination of how this involved governments and later settlers. The section concludes with a conceptualisation of the colonial relationship as one of violence, and this theme is developed in the second section in considering the sense in which tensions within the imperial countries established the conditions for the emergence of Zionism as a political movement with aspirations for settlement. The final part of this section looks broadly at the way in which global power relations have re-ordered and re-aligned over the past fifty years, and how the Middle East can be located in this process.

A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COLONIAL RELATIONSHIP

Trade as Unequal Exchange

Writing on Africa, Gutkind and Wallerstein suggest that:

> The indigenous structures came to serve new ends as African societies were drawn into new commercial and political relationships which during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were controlled by an imperialist outpouring of Western European competition for raw material resources, trade and markets and for outlets for mercantile and, later industrial capital.
> (Gutkind & Wallerstein: 1976: p.11).

The essential characteristics of this relationship is that it was asymmetrical and unequal, a factor which is often overlooked in discussions of "trade". Rodney outlines the nature of trade between Europe and Africa as follows:

> Europe exported to Africa goods which were already being produced and used in Europe itself - Dutch linen, Spanish iron, English pewter, Portugese wines, French brandy, Venetian glass beads, German muskets etc.... the overall range of trade goods which left the European ports of Hamburg, Copenhagen, and Liverpool was determined almost exclusively by the pattern of production and consumption within Europe. From the beginning, Europe assumed the power to make decisions within the international trading system... Above all, European decision-making power was exercised in selecting what Africa should export - in accordance with European needs.
> (Rodney: 1972: p.86)

Similary, Khader notes:

> By the 17th and 18th centuries, products manufactured in Europe were flooding the Syrian and Palestinian markets. The structure of trade with the West was completely weighted to the advantage of the latter.[1]
> (Khader: 1976: p.48)

Thus it is suggested that industrial expansion in Western Europe generated the underdevelopment of most of the rest of the world by destroying indigenous social forces and in their place offering trade. Thomas sums this up as the offer of "participation in the global division of labour

as providers of raw materials and consumers of manufacturing output." (Thomas: 1974: p.58). Such a process involved the emergence of a new set of relationships between Europe and the rest of the world as well as within the constituency of Europe and, importantly, within the countries with which it was trading. This latter point should be emphasised, and will be returned to later, as much writing on the theme of development/underdevelopment casts the countries of Africa, Asia and South America as being passive recipients of historical forces, and moreover as constituting a static and immutable unit. As an example of the way in which indigenous structures articulate with external influences, we can consider the circumstances under which cotton was introduced to Egypt. (Owen: 1981) has suggested that the British occupation of Egypt was preceded by a period of economic imperialism, which involved the transformation of the Egyptian economy. Cotton was introduced to Egypt by Mohammed Ali in the early 1800's, at a time when 70% of Britain's export trade was in the form of cotton cloth sold to the Middle East. A rapid programme was carried out which shifted virtually the entire agricultural system from the production of food to the production of cotton. Mohammed Ali instituted state control of the land, thereby gaining control over Egypt's main source of revenue, and extended this to controlling agricultural produce by prohibiting private trading in grain (in 1811) and eventually private trading in most cash-crops (e.g. rice, sugar, indigo). The entire Upper Egyptian cereal crop was sold for export as demand rose in Europe during and after the Napoleonic wars.

The shift to cotton production contains several elements which should be elaborated. Firstly, it marked the incorporation of Egypt into the European market system as a producer of cotton as a raw material, and as

a market for European-produced goods. The internal structure of Egypt as a land-lord economy meant that there was little industry of the type which would compete with European goods. Secondly, the coincidence of interests between the dominant class in Egypt, i.e. landowners, and the European forces can be noted. The transformation to cotton production was not directly imposed on the Egyptians by foreign powers but was instigated by themselves. Here we can mention the changes in the system of taxation and administrative control brought about by Mohammed Ali. In order to pay the required taxes, increased surplus had to be extracted from the peasant producers and this is easier when a cash-crop is being produced than when it is food.

Taking these elements together, some general points can be made. Owen has suggested that changes in taxation and administration were necessary to cover increasing military expenditure, brought on by the threat seen during the Napoleonic wars, as well as within the region itself (Owen: 1981). Such changes, plus the move to agriculture for export, would be necessary: if a decision was taken to import weapons then they would have to be paid for. On the subject of the change in the system of control, it can be suggested that once a centralised state was established, the changing relations of production sustained the need for its existence. In other words, that in the shift to cotton production, the state operated in the interests of the dominant class in facilitating the extraction of surplus from the peasantry.[2]

An important aspect of a shift to monoculture is that if a cash-crop is being grown then food is not, which means a two-fold dependency, in that a country producing one crop for export is dependent on the demand and price for that crop remaining high and is also dependent on importing

food, which it has to pay for by exporting its cash-crop. This is explained by Thomas as the productive forces of these countries being torn loose from their roots in the domestic market (Thomas: 1974). What this means is that a consequence of entry into the European-dominated market was the lack of a link between the pattern of domestic resource use and domestic demand and also the divergence of domestic demand and the needs of the bulk of the population. In other words that the social relations of production and the use of productive forces are such that there exists a pattern of consumption which does not represent the needs of the community and a pattern of production which is geared towards neither domestic consumption nor domestic need.

Merchant Capital and European Intervention

Samir Amin (Amin: 1974) suggests that from the end of the 19th century, the overseas investment of European capital became an essential aspect of economic relations between 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' countries. The export of capital did not, however, take the place of commercial exchange but supplemented it.

European governments began to actively pursue the interests of their merchants. An increasing number of European merchants were resident in the ports of the Middle East and Africa, and were establishing links between local retailers and Europe. Transactions were carried out such that local crops were purchased in cash - largely to secure access to supplies of local raw material - and imported manufactured goods were sold on credit. This system gave increasing importance to the role of the merchant moneylender, described by Owen as:

> ...the "hinge" between the world market and large-scale commerce and banking on the one hand and small-scale peasant and artisan production on the other. It was such men who, very largely, administered the exchange between the capitalist economies of Western Europe and the pre-capitalist economies of the Middle East, using either their own existing capital resources or money obtained from Europeans to generate the credit required to expand local trade and to purchase local commodities.
> (Owen: 1981: pp.88-9).

This is one example of how indigenously-created capital was used, and Amin argues that local capital was not competing with dominant foreign capital, but was complementary and largely concerned with production for export. Also, he notes the conceptual and historical inadequacy of talking in terms of a transition from subsistence economy to a market economy in such a situation, and suggests that there is a major difference between the development of capitalism in Europe and North America and the development of capital relations in the countries of Asia, Africa and S. America, and that is that in the case of the latter countries the transition to capitalist economic forms is the creation of a periphery within the capitalist system. In other words it is the transition from a pre-capitalist social formation to the social formation of peripheral capitalism (Amin: 1974: pp.137-68). Thus the effect of merchants' capital is seen by Taylor as the:

> reinforcement of already existing forms of extra-economic coercion in agricultural production in the non-capitalist mode of production. Merchants' capital achieved this either by creating forms of landed property and relations of production similar to those dominant during the European feudal period, or by simply utilising and then perpetuating existing relations of production.
> (Taylor: 1979: p.187).

The increasing European government intervention can be illustrated by the pressure put on the Ottoman administration by the governments of France and Britain to change commercial practices in favour of the European merchants. Tax concessions were won which exempted European merchandise from tax, while levying 15-20% on local products (Khader: 1976: p.48). This served to further inhibit any attempts there may have been to set up local production, and made the possibility of competing with European goods even more remote. It is an indication of the power which Europe exercised, and also perhaps of the class nature of the Ottoman regime, in that a policy could be implemented which effectively prevented the establishment any industrialisation or manufacturing. The system of selling imported goods on credit meant that it was necessary for the European merchants to have an effective means of ensuring payment. Pressure was applied at governmental level for the Ottomans to adopt a system of commercial courts and to conduct business according to European business law. The Ottoman Commercial Code of 1850, based on French business practice, was the result of this.

The Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention[3] was renegotiated in 1838, and increasing Ottoman dependence on British military and political support was used to remove 'obstacles' such as the internal duties on the movement of goods within the Empire and the Ottoman policy of encouraging monopolies of purchase and sale within its domain. In 1854, the Ottoman administration signed their first overseas loan. A new form of investment emerged, one which drew on the European public to invest savings in "Oriental" bonds. In Britain, this was largely small-scale investment by individuals, and perhaps had much to do with the imperial ideology of the time.

Amongst other things, the Ottoman military campaign against the Russians instigated heavier borrowing until bankruptcy was declared in 1875. In 1881, representatives of the bond-holders reached a settlement in Istanbul, but while this meant a lessening of financial difficulties for the Ottoman administration, the price was an even greater degree of European financial control. This pattern was repeated in Egypt, where large-scale overseas borrowing led to bankruptcy when the European creditors called in the loans. Again, the resolution was increased European control.

Alliances in the First World War

The Ottoman Empire had internal problems to contend with as well. Owen described its rule in Arab areas as:

> "primarily concerned with the task of maintaining military preparedness, preserving urban and rural security, and raising revenue."
> (Owen: 1981: p.74).

In the Arabian peninsula, for example, the armies of the Ottoman Empire had driven the Wahhabis from the west of the peninsula, the Hijaz, and annexed it to the Empire. At the beginning of the 20th century, Abdel Aziz Ibn Saud's army took over the eastern part of the peninsula.[4] The ruler of the Hijaz, the Hashemite Sharif Hussein of Mecca, requested British aid to fight the Ottomans. Although initially refused, the outbreak of the First World War meant that it would serve British interests to sponsor an Arab revolt within the Ottoman Empire.

The shifting balance of power during and after the First World War also brought a change to the relationship between Europe and the Middle East, resulting in the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires

and a redistribution of territories and rewards amongst the victorious imperialist Allies of Britain, France and Italy. (The Russian revolution in 1917 meant that the USSR was excluded from the territorial claims made by the victors at the end of the war.)

As fortunes and strategies changed during the course of World War I, a series of alliances and treaties was made according to dominant interests at particular times during the war. The way in which the European powers struck up often contradictory agreements in order to advance their war effort has been well documented[5] and need not be repeated here. Discussion will therefore be limited to events at the time of World War I which were to be of direct relevance for the future of Palestine.

Preliminary contacts were established between Britain and the Hijaz in the winter of 1914-15. As was suggested earlier, an initial approach by Sharif Hussein to the British authorities had been turned down. Now, however, circumstances for the British had changed and Lord Kitchener proposed to guarantee Arabia against all exterior aggression. The major participants in the negotiations were Sharif Hussein and Sir Henry MacMahon, then British High Commissioner to Egypt. A series of letters were exchanged and an agreement reached such that:

> ....Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sheriff of Mecca.

> ....Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in these various territories... it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British .
> (Yale: 1958: p.252)

Thus, the agreement entailed British support for the achievement of Arab 'national aspirations' as interpreted by Sharif Hussein, in return for an Arab uprising against the Ottoman administration. In addition, it should be noted that Britain insisted on being the sole foreign influence.

Various interpretations of the Hussein-MacMahon correspondence have been made with regard to both its content and status.[6] The implications for Palestine can, however, be clearly discerned and are at the root of most of the altercation. Firstly, there is a notable vagueness in the definition of the 'Arab Kingdom' in the correspondence and of what its boundaries may be. Several exclusions were made specifically by the British - parts of Syria, and the 'villayet of Bagdad and Basra' where "the Arabs will recognise that the established position and interest of Great Britain necessitate special measures of administrative control..." (Yale: 1958: p.252).

It is noteworthy that Palestine is not mentioned once, neither by Sharif Hussein nor by MacMahon. As much of the subsequent contention was on the basis of whether or not Palestine was included in the 'Arab Kingdom', the peculiarity of this is that other 'exclusions' were explicitly made which were of the same order as could have been expected to apply to Palestine - for example, Beiruti Christians, over whom "France would perhaps wish to exercise control". A British Government committee set up in 1939

to examine the question, later admitted that "...the language in which its /Palestine's/ exclusion was expressed was not so specific and unmistakable as it was thought to be at the time". (Cmd. /Command Paper/ 5479: 1939: p.10).

Khader (Khader: 1976) suggests that the three main powers - France, Britain and Russia - had interests in Palestine and that these interests were irreconcilable. He cites as an example an approach made by France to Russia in November 1914, suggesting that Palestine be included in 'Greater Syria' under French protection. Russia, however, would not agree to a Roman Catholic "protectorate" over Russian Orthodox Christians in Jerusalem and the Galilee.

As territories were conquered - and in some cases anticipating the victory - new treaties were made. In 1915, for example, the Constantinople Agreement provided for the incorporation of Constantinople in the Russian Empire, with the consent of France and Britain. In order to encourage Italian participation in the war, the Treaty of London signed by France, Britian, Russia and Italy made territorial concessions to Italy by giving the latter the rights to the Dodecanese Islands and Libya: "...in the event of a total partition of Turkey, in Asia, she (Italy) ought to obtain a just share of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the province of Adalia..." (Khader: 1976: p.170).

Despite the agreement made in the Hussein-MacMahon correspondence, Britian negotiated an accord with France at the beginning of 1916 which contradicted the basis of the agreement reached by Britain and Hussein. The accord was negotiated by Georges Picot, a nominee of the French Prime Minister, and a British 'expert',[7] Sykes, who was called in after

preliminary negotiations between Picot and Nicholson, the Undersecretary of State at the British Foreign Office, failed to reach an agreement on what should happen to Syria. The agreement was intended to demarcate zones of influence for France and Britain assuming Allied victory in the war and the resulting dismantling of the Ottoman Empire. As for Arab aspirations, the accord stated:

> "By agreement between France and Britain, the zone between the French territories and the English will form a confederation of Arab states, or an independent Arab state in which the zones of influence will be determined at the time."
> (Khader: 1976: p.172)

Palestine was to be put under:

> "....an international administration, of which the form will be decided upon after consultation with Russia and after subsequent agreement with the other allies and the representatives of the Sheriff of Mecca."
> (HMSO No. IV: 1952: pp.241-251).

Neither Hussein nor the Italian Allies were informed of the Sykes-Picot agreement, and it was not until the Bolshevik revolution in Russian that the accord was made public.

Settler Colonialism

So far, discussion has focussed largely on increasing European economic dominance within an evolving world system of economic and political relationships Such a power can be exercised in different forms, from the sponsoring of local "allies" to the enforcement of favourable trading conditions by pressure applied at the level of government. Whatever the form, all indicate the unequal relationship between the imperial powers of Europe and the territories they sought to conquer and dominate.

The nineteenth century saw what Emmanuel has called "the scramble for colonies", with 90% of the continent of Africa being colonised within a period of sixteen years (Emmanuel: 1972). In many cases this involved the implantation of a European population into the countries of Africa and Asia, and the establishment of "settler states".

There is an extensive literature devoted to the subject of colonialism and the theoretical and methodological issues raised in its analysis. As was suggested in the introduction, the concern in this work is to develop an approach which attempts to answer the problems inherent both in an ahistorical conceptualisation of colonialism which collapses specific features of colonial relationships in the construction of a general category, and a particularistic interpretation which does not take the wider context into account. The following discussion of colonialism as violence draws on illustrative material from a range of times and places without elevating this to an analysis of 'comparative case studies'. In other words there is no intention to provide an exhaustive review of what may be described as colonialism in particular areas or times, but rather to utilise examples in a discussion at a more general level which may then be drawn upon in a later examination of specific features of the Palestinian experience in the West Bank and Israel.

British settlement in South Africa was characterised by "the decimation of a population by wars of conquest, followed by the domination and enslavement of those who survive." (Magubane: 1979: p.33). Following Dutch settlement of the area in the seventeeth century, the British Government annexed the Cape in 1795, after the Napoleonic Wars. In 1820, 4000 settlers were brought to the eastern part of the region. It is important to look at this also in terms of tensions generated within

Europe. Marx suggests that, in addition to the 'displaced victims of capitalist consolidation' created by the Industrial Revolution:

> The wheel of improvement /was/ now seizing another class, the most stationary class in England. A startling emigration movement sprang up among the smaller English farmers...who, with bad prospects for the coming harvest, and in want of sufficient capital to make improvements on their farms which would enable them to pay their old rents, have no alternative but to cross the sea in search of a new country and new lands.
> (Marx & Engels: 1962: pp.387-88).

In applying this to South Africa, Magubane suggests that the background of the settlers and their relationship to the tensions within the "mother country" are essential for understanding colonial practices, (see Section B of this chapter). He maintains that the treatment of 'natives' by 'settlers' represented the tranfer to Africa of traditional British practices and institutions for dealing with the poor. The colonial structures are therefore an:

> ...imitation of the English class structure and way of life....Race intruded and gave the class structure in the colonies a special justification and cruelty, but it did not constitute the essence of that structure.
> (Magubane: 1979: p.35).

As an example of this he discusses the status of the villein, a hereditary form of bondage where limits were set on property-holding and the ability to make contracts; the villein could be bought and sold with the land on which he worked and was expected to show total obedience to the lord to whom he 'belonged'. This status existed in Scotland well into the eighteenth century.

The 'Kaffir Wars' in the 1800's and the Boer War between the earlier Dutch settlers and the British were over land first of all. With much loss of life for the African population, the British initiated a process of removing the Africans from their land and replacing them with white settlers, who then employed the Africans as cheap labour. This was a source of friction between Dutch and British as the abolition of slavery throughout the British Empire (including the Cape Colony) in 1833 represented a threat to the Boer usage of slave labour.[8] The Boers' 'Great Trek' (1836-54) was an attempt to establish 'free and independent states' beyond the borders of the British colony. By 1910, the British Army had defeated African and Boer resistance and the British and Boer colonies were united in the Union of South Africa. This conquest is summed up as "the definitive consecration and consolidation of the whites as a ruling and hegemonic class" (Magubane: 1979: p.52).

The development of settler colonial institutions in Algeria was to a large extent unhindered, as military control over Algeria had been consolidated by the armies of France by the 1870's. Land appropriation[9] removed the Algerian peasantry from the land and permitted the formation of large estates by the French colons who, as in the case of South Africa, then employed the previous cultivators as labour on the estates. Farsoun suggests that agriculture was reorganised according to the requirements of "modern, large-scale colonial capitalism ..... in terms of the needs of France as its bourgeois rulers saw them." (Farsoun: 1975: p.3). Most of the land, now owned by Europeans, was planted with cash-crops for export. Over the next fifty years, mining works were set up by French corporations and transport net-works followed. The relationship between France and Algeria is described as follows:

> French investment was largely in extractive industries, while most manufactures were imported from the metropole. The growth of big commerce and finance led to the blossoming of an over-large service sector, and the burgeoning of a public debt which served to make Algeria even more dependent on France.
>
> (Farsoun: p.3)

Coloniser and Colonised: a Conceptualisation of Violence

While the establishment of a British colony in Southern Africa and a French colony in Algeria were both preceded by military campaigns, the complexity of the colonial relationship is more than a martial victory, and this is perhaps best illustrated by considering some aspects of what colonialism means for the colonised. Magubane suggests this as follows:

> The conquest of the Africans was not a momentary act of violence which stunned their ancestors and then ended. The physical struggle against African societies was only the beginning of a process in which the initial act of conquest was buttressed and institutionalised by ideological activities. The supremacy of the whites, their values and civilization, was only won when the cultural and value system of the defeated African was reduced to nothing and when the Africans themselves loudly admitted the cultural hegemony of their conquerors.
> (Magubane: 1979: p.55)

This extends the meaning of colonialism from an initial physical subjugation of a people to the breaking down of the entire fabric of a social formation. Thus it is more than an act of physical violence: it is a violence which has diverse forms and which constitutes the relationship between a colonised people and a coloniser. This is perhaps best expressed by quoting Fawaz Turki, a Palestinian writer:

> To be without a homeland, to be denied access to one's homeland, is violence. To live in refugee camps, to be isolated from the mainstream of events, of spontaneous activities that govern other mortals' lives, is violence. To be occupied, to be dictated to by a military governor, is violence. To be given epithets and names, to be excluded and reviled, to be told that you do not 'exist' is violence. Above all, to be robbed of your sense of worth as a human being, to be expropriated of your national patrimony and national psyche as a people is a form of violence that is extreme in its nature. To be a victim as an individual and as a people, to be all this at a time of quiescence is to create conditions eliciting a response.
> (Davis et al: 1975: p.190)

When violence is conceptualised in this way, the colonial relationship need not be reduced to the deliberate process of exploitation suggested when only the logic behind European expansion is thought to require analysis. For example, European Christian missionaries went to the colonies with the best of intentions and yet in many cases played an important part in the colonial process. Perry Anderson explains this role as follows:

> The conversion of the native population represents, even if only symbolically, its incorporation into the mental and cultural universe of the white ... Christianity in colonial areas is a domestication of the indigenous population .... A colonial system needs a subject population with a certain minimal level of Europeanisation, for the purpose of order and exploitation. On the other hand, too great an assimilation of European culture and techniques would directly threaten the inequality on which religion offers almost the perfect device for securing the fruits of the first without incurring the dangers of the second.
>
> (Anderson: 1962: pp.102-3).

A member of the London Missionary Society, writing of missionary activity in the Cape Colony, described it in these terms "...the missionaries have been employed in locating the savages among whom they labour, teaching them industrious habits, creating a demand for British manufactures, and increasing their dependence on the colony." (Philips: 1828: Vol. 2, p.227). Thus, within the context of the colonial relationship the practices of missionaries served to reinforce the domination of the native population by imposing not simply a religious ethos but a whole system of values and beliefs. As Fanon puts it:

> The Church in the colonies is the white people's Church, the foreigner's Church. She does not call the native to God's ways but to the ways of the white man, of the master, of the oppressor. And as we know, in this matter many are called but few are chosen.
>
> (Fanon: 1978: p.32).

In analysing the way in which missionary activity was situation within the colonial enterprise as a whole, Etherington suggests that:

> The clothing which missionaries recommended for the sake of modesty was for many of their converts an introduction to a new system of production and exchange. Whether a convert earned his new clothes by wage labour or fabricated them with European looms and needles, he was entering new kinds of economic relationships.
>
> (Etherington: 1978: p.35).

What is being suggested, then, is that the practice of missionaries in the colonial context can be seen as an example of the way in which the interests of the coloniser were served in different ways and at different levels, and that this need not be a deliberate manoevre. Similarly, the movement amongst French settlers in Algeria to stop Algerian Muslim women wearing the veil can be cited as an instance of the imposition of cultural norms. Gordon has suggested that the French administration had an interest in actively supporting groups such as the 'Feminine Solidarity Movement'[10] which was set up to establish contacts between French women and Algerian women in order that the former could advise the latter on matters of 'sanitation and education'. Other efforts to 'liberate' Algerian women included attempts to increase education for women, weekly broadcasts on women's rights, and various welfare and medical care schemes (Gordon: 1968).

However well-meaning these aims are in isolation, in the context of French colonialism in Algeria at that time they represent firstly, an aspect of the French administration's policy of encouraging 'assimilation' as a means of frustrating any anti-French feeling, and secondly, the negation of Algerian customs and beliefs regarding the position of women. The point is not whether it is desirable for women to be veiled but rather that the attempt to 'gallicize' Algerian women is an example of the way in which French culture was presented as being infinitely superior.

Jean-Paul Sartre has observed that colonisation is much more than the conquest of a territory:

> It is by its very nature as act of cultural genocide. Colonisation cannot take place without systematically liquidating all the characteristics of the native society; and simultaneously refusing

> to integrate the natives with the mother country
> and denying their access to its advantages.
> (Sartre: 1968: p.38).

Implicit in the liquidation of 'native' society described by Sartre is the denial of the history of the colonised: it is presented as static and of little interest until the impetus provided by colonialism sparks off a reaction. This denial need not be conscious, but in itself constitutes a facet of the colonial heritage and mentality. For example, it can be argued that most academic writing on colonialism has treated the colonised as solely reactive, and this theme will be returned to later. Discussing the relation between 'settler' and 'native', Fanon observes that "... the settler is right when he speaks of knowing 'them' well for it is the settler who has brought the native into existence and who perpetuates his existence." (Fanon: 1978: p.28)

When Fanon speaks of the settler bringing the native into existence, he is not however, implying that the native had no identity prior to his or her encounter with colonialism, but rather that the impetus of colonialism led to the establishment of a particular power relationship between coloniser and colonised. An instance of that power relation, an instance of violence, is the way in which the coloniser constructs an image of the colonised - the way in which the settler brings the native into existence. Fanon describes this image of the native as a 'quintessence of evil'. Native society is seen as not merely lacking in values but is actually the negation of values. It is a process of dehumanisation and as such operates at all levels, from the economic to the language used to describe the 'native'. Fanon's examples of the latter are drawn from his work in Algeria, where he talks of the zoological terms applied to the Algerian population, and the references to "those hysterical masses, those

faces bereft of all humanity ... that vegetative rhythm of life..." (Fanon: 1978: p.33). The main point about the construction of the 'native' is the way in which the image is acceptable to the coloniser. Thus, for example, the kinds of attitudes portrayed in fiction written within the 'mother country' give an indication of a general interpretation of the world and one which need not be consciously constructed. For example, in Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness, the character of Marlow expresses his view of colonialism as follows:

> The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. What redeems it is the idea only. An idea at the back of it; not a sentimental pretence but an idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea - something you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to...
>
> (Conrad: 1981: p.10).

In this sense, it is the entire back-up to the physical process of domination which is highlighted: that is, that Marlow's 'idea' is constantly explaining and legitimising the conquest.

Edward Said has noted the way in which Arabs are represented in Israeli children's literature, and the way in which a 'character' comes to be attributed (Said: 1980: p.191). At a more subtle level, this categoriation can be seen in contemporary fiction such as John le Carre's The Little Drummer Girl, where in spite of the author's painstaking research in the Middle East, his Palestinian characters are one-dimensional, ruthless terrorists, while his Israeli characters are much more appealing, rounded and believable. Similar examples can be drawn from other forms of information dissemination, such as media reporting.[11]

The significance of this is the way in which assumptions and attitudes and beliefs are manifest at many different levels. This is not to propose an extreme form of conspiracy theory; simply to suggest that we can relate formal aspects of economic and political strategies to more diffuse representations of beliefs. To complete the circle, we can note the increasing prominence of 'Arabists' in Israel. Their role as Israeli Jews who are considered experts on the Arab way of life, culture, mentality and so on can be seen as the formalisation of what became generally held views about Israeli's Arab population. One Israeli Arabist is quoted as describing their position as follows:

> ...we have attained a unique position in the State as experts, and no one dares to challenge our opinions or our actions. We are represented in every department of government, in the Histadrut and in the political parties; every department and office has its 'Arabists' who alone act for their minister among the Arabs.
>
> (Jiryis: 1976: p.70).

B. ZIONISM AND THE MIDDLE EAST: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Colonial Europe and the Roots of Zionism

The ways in which the colonial enterprise was perceived in Europe are interesting indicators of sources of conflict and tension within Europe as well as between Europe and its new colonies. It is within the context of late 19th Century European colonialism that we can locate the beginnings of Zionism as a political ideology and the strategies whereby it was translated from a theory and a vision into a set of instruments for holding and developing a colonial territory.

In The Jewish Question, Abraham Leon provides an analysis of the way in which capitalist penetration of Eastern Europe established conditions which facilitated the development of distinctly Jewish politics. In order to provide a basis for considering the strands which make up Zionist thoughts, it is useful to briefly summarise Leon's argument. His starting point is that the impact of capitalist penetration in Eastern Europe was the destruction of the old feudal forms, and that this had a specific effect on the Jewish population who were concentrated in occupations which "appeared as a visible materialisation of monetary economy in a society that rested essentially on use-values" (Leon: 1970: p.226).

This refers to traditional shtetl Jews, who had held a "middle-caste" role between the peasantry and the landed ruling class in administering mercantile interests and leasing trading and estate monopolies. As the feudal order decayed, the effects of capitalist penetration brought about an influx into the cities of enriched as well as proletarianized peasants.

However, the lack of opportunity for the placement of capital or labour precipitated economic crises and unemployment within the countries of Eastern Europe. The shtetl Jews were caught between the hostility of a petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry: hostility taking the form of pogroms, anti-semitism and discrimination, often inspired or at least tolerated by the ruling class. The isolation and impoverishment of the Jewish population of Eastern Europe led many to emigrate.

Leon's argument is based on the notion that Jews constitute an identifiable grouping, and are historically a social group with a specific economic function. This leads him to define Jews as a particular class - a 'people-class'. The extent to which Jews could be seen as a distinct grouping within the societies in which they lived was the basis of the debate over assimilation, and amongst the Jews who remained in Eastern Europe this was the issue which divided them.

In the face of increasing anti-semitism, one response was to join emerging socialist and communist parties, in the belief that the solution to the 'Jewish problem' was indissolubly bound up with the victory of socialism. A second response was to join organisations such as the Bund.[12] The Bund combined socialist principles with ideas of a non-territorial national-cultural autonomy for Jews as being the best means of combatting anti-semitism. A third response was to turn towards ideas of some form of Jewish 'regroupment'. The form varied. For example, Moses Hess (1812-75) had argued for a 'spiritual regeneration' of the Jewish people linked to socialist principles of organisation for agriculture, industry and commerce. Leon Pinsker, the first Chairman of Hovevi Sion (Lovers of Zion) focussed on the need for a homeland for Jews. Auto-emancipation, his

1882 manifesto,[13] notes the increasing turning towards Palestine as a desired homeland following the rise in anti-semitism, but points out:

> We cannot dream about restoring ancient Judea. It would no longer be possible for us to begin anew there once our political life was brutally interrupted and destroyed....The goal of our efforts must not be the Holy Land but a Land of Our Own....which country will permit us to set ourselves up as a nation within the confines of its territory?

The principle assumption on which Zionist thought is based is explained by Pinsker as the conviction that anti-semitism is both inevitable and eternal. Implicit in this is the suggestion that anti-semitism confirms the identity of Jews, whether this identity is spiritual, as suggested by Hess and Achad Ha'am, or Leon's 'people-class', or as a nation. This latter proposition was put forward by Theodor Herzl in The Jewish State, published in 1896. With the formation of the World Zionist Organisation the following year, the goal of Zionism was defined as the creation of a homeland in Palestine for the Jewish people to be guaranteed by public law. In order to attain this, the following propositions were adopted:

1. The promotion on suitable lines of the colonisation of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers.
2. The organisation and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country.
3. The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness.
4. Preparatory steps towards obtaining Government consent where necessary to the attainment of the aims of Zionism.

(Stein: 1932: p.62).

Given the global power structure outlined earlier, it is no surprise that in attempting to bring about such a political transformation, the Zionist leadership turned towards the imperial powers. Herzl tried to gain support from the German Kaiser, promising to protect German interests in the Middle East in return for assistance. In 1901, negotiations began with Sultan Abdul-Hamid of Turkey, to be followed by appeals to the Tsar of Russia, Pope Pius X, Victor Emmanuel III of Italy and Edward VII of Britain (Khader: 1976). Also in 1901 the Jewish National Fund was established to act as a focus for funds for Jewish colonisation (see Chapter Three).

In October 1902, the British Government offered the Zionists the region of Al Arish in the Sinai peninsula but this was rejected, partly because of the difficulty of irrigation, partly because of the oppositon of Lord Cromer, then Viceroy of Egypt. In 1903, part of Kenya was suggested (the project was known as the "Uganda" project). However, by this time the focus of the Zionist movement was on Palestine and despite consideration of the "Ugandan" offer, it too was rejected.

In 1917, the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, issued what has become known as the 'Balfour Declaration' in the form of a letter to Lord Rothschild. The text of this letter is as follows:

I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of His Majesty's Government the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations, which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet:

> 'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.'

> I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.
>
> ("Report of the Palestine (Peel) Commission": 1937: p.22)

The text was ambiguous enough to generate dispute over what was meant by, for example, "National Home' and in spite of clarifications issued by the British Governemt,[14] its importance and contentiousness were such that its date of issue is still marked by demonstrations and protests by remaining members of the 'non-Jewish Communities' in Palestine.[15] Moreover, it should be noted that the Balfour Declaration was made by a European power about a non-European territory over which, at that time, it had no control, and as such provides an illustration of the way in which assumptions held by colonial powers became actual strategies and practices. The appeal for the assistance of the imperial powers represents a deliberate attempt by the early Zionist movement to identify itself with the general wage of European territorial acquisition and occupation. The very idea of overseas colonial settlement for Jews as a means of solving anti-semitism is indicative of this, and the way in which Zionist settlement was perceived within the European colonial framework was expressed by Herzl as follows:

> If His Majesty the Sultan were to give us Palestine, we could undertake to regulate Turkey's finances. For Europe, we would constitute a bulwark against Asia down there, we would be the advance post of civilisation against barbarism. As a neutral state, we would remain in constant touch with all of Europe, which would guarantee our existence.
> (Herzl: 1972: p.95).

Herzl's view of colonialism was that it "signified the spread of progress, of civilisation and of well-being". The "civilising" effect of colonialism brings us to the most crucial aspect of the colonial enterprise and the one where we can locate the nature of the future Israeli state, and that is the attitude towards the people who already lived in the land to be colonised.

In 1895, Theodor Herzl wrote:

> We shall have to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our own country. Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly.
> (Herzl: 1960: Vol. 1, p.88).

Fifteen years previously, Earl Grey made a statement concerning Britain's role as a colonial power in Africa. On its treatment of the 'natives' he said:

> The coloured people are generally looked upon by the whites as an inferior race, whose interests ought to be systematically disregarded when they come into competition with their own, and should be governed mainly with a view to the advantage of the superior race.
> (Magubane: 1979: p.71).

Two years after the Balfour Declaration, Arthur Balfour wrote a Cabinet Memorandum concerning the various treaties and agreements made amongst the Allies during the First World War. On the case of Palestine, he wrote:

> ....For in Palestine, we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country... The four great powers are committed to Zionism and Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long tradition, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desire and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.
> (Sykes: 1973: p.5.)

What these quotations indicate is the pervasive notion in 19th Century Europe of the superiority of Europeans and of their unquestionable right to take over what remained of the world and do with it what they pleased. It is within this context that early Zionist plans for a Jewish state took shape, and the plans were formulated within the ideology and language of European expansion. The reasoning behind British support for Zionist settlement in Palestine was summed up by Winston Churchill as follows:

> The Balfour Declaration must, therefore, not be regarded as a promise given from sentimental motives; it was a practical measure taken in the interests of a common cause at a moment when that cause could afford to neglect no factor of material or moral assistance.
> (Hadawi: 1968: p.20).

Lloyd George provides the detail, in stating that:

> There is no better proof of the value of the Balfour Declaration as a military move than the fact that Germany entered into negotiations with Turkey in the endeavour to provide an alternative scheme which would appeal to Zionists.
> (Hadawi: 1968: p.20).

The End of World War 1 - Europe's Plans for the Middle East

Earlier, an outline was given of the various treaties and agreements made between Britain, France and Russia in the course of the First World War, and of those made between the imperial powers and power blocs in the Middle East. At the end of the War, the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference decided that the Arab provinces were not to be restored to Turkish rule. The Hussein-MacMahon agreement was circumvented, despite Arab participation in the War, and the Treaty of Versailles (1919) and newly-established League of Nations provided a means of implementing the Sykes-Picot agreement. This was the Mandate system, whereby:

> ....certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.
> (Article 22, Covenant of the League of Nations)

Instead of the united independent state which had been promised to Sharif Hussein, Arab territory was divided between the "Protectorates" of Britain and France; Britain assuming control of what is now Iraq, Jordan,

Egypt and Palestine as well as much of the Peninsula, while France took Syria and Lebanon. Italian participation was rewarded by allocating them Libya. The Arab delegate to the Peace Conference, Hussein's son Faisal, submitted a statement reading:

> As representing my father, who, by request of Britain and France, led the Arab rebellion against the Turks, I have come to ask that the Arabic-speaking peoples of Asia... be recognised as independent sovereign peoples..
>
> (Antonius: 1961: p.286)

Under pressure from the US, who had entered the War towards the end, an international commission was proposed to visit the area and "determine the wishes of the people." However, the British, French and Italian delegates backed out and the remaining American delegates submitted the King-Crane Report which recommended an American mandate for the area with two provisions. Firstly, that the unity of Syria (Palestine, Syria and Lebanon) ought to be preserved in accordance with "the earnest petition of the great majority of the people of Syria". Secondly, they recommended "serious modification of the extreme Zionist programme." However, the report was ignored and in 1920 France took a single Mandate for Syria and Lebanon and Britain took two Mandates; one for Iraq and one for Palestine.

Arab reaction to the contravention of agreements made during the war was strong. In 1919, the Syrian National Congress claimed political independence for a 'united Syrian state' covering Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Faisal, Hashemite son of Hussein, was proclaimed King. A meeting in Iraq named Faisal's brother Abdullah king. The British Mandate for Palestine had included a section providing for the implementation of the Balfour Declaration. In 1920 a Palestine Arab Congress was set up

in Haifa, electing an Executive which issued a statement calling for an end to British support for Zionism, an end to Jewish immigration, and for the formation of a representative national government in Palestine. An indication of the level of opposition from Palestinian Arabs is that the British Government felt it necessary in 1921 to appoint a Commission of Enquiry into the "disturbances" in Palestine. This Haycroft Commission suggested that the cause of the "disturbances" was Palestinian anger at increasing Zionist immigration and at the goal of a "national home" for Jews in Palestine (People's Press: 1981: p.37).

The treatment of Arab objections and protests against Europe's plans for the Middle East clearly illustrates how the power relationship operated. While the wording of the Mandates may have implied that they had been conceived of as a means of aiding the transition from Ottoman occupation and administration to independence for the Arab territories, the way in which they were assumed made the intentions of Britain and France quite clear. France issued an ultimatum to the newly-appointed King Faisal of Syria and despite its being accepted and Faisal leaving the country, French troops marched on Damascus. It has been suggested that the original British plan was to establish a series of states under British influence with a member of the Hashemite family in each. Despite Britain's refusal to recognise the validity of the appointments of Faisal and Abdullah to the thrones of Syria and Iraq, their subsequent reorganisation was such that Faisal became King of Iraq while Abdullah was made Emir of 'Transjordan'[16] suggest that this was in fact the British plan.

In short, the outcome of the shifting balance of imperial power brought on by the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires after the First World War in conjunction with changes occurring within the Middle East itself, created new conditions. As Fred Halliday points out:

> The number of forms that imperialism took, and the divisions between British and French rulers, compounded economic and political divisions rooted in the history of the region. As a result, separate state structures emerged, each with its own ruling class and each with a separate state apparatus, whose interests lay in preserving their separate identity.
> (Halliday: 1979: p.20)

It is important to make the point that divisions and differences were not simply the creation of imperialism, and it was not only imperial intervention which sustained divisions and has prevented 'Arab unity'. While such divisions were undoubtedly manipulated and intensified in the encounter with imperialism, it can be argued that they existed before imperial penetration of the area.[17] The reasons for stressing this point are firstly, it is important to understand why these states had "interests in preserving their separate identity"; secondly it is important to recognise that the area has its own past and that this history was not merely a creation of European dominance; and thirdly, given these two points, why the notion of Arab unity should have arisen.

The Importance of Oil

In order to draw out these points, we can briefly consider the significance of the discovery of oil in the Middle East and the attendant shift in spheres of power and influence. In 1933 Ibn Saud sold an oil concession for the whole of eastern Saudi Arabia to Standard Oil in California (SOCAL). A subsequent merger with three other American oil companies led to the formation of ARAMCO - the Arabian American Oil Company. Exploitation began in the eastern part of the region, and in 1938, the production of Saudi Arabian oil began. By this time Britain had already acquired a controlling interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and had demanded agreements from the British Colonies on the Gulf that no exploitation rights would be granted to non-British companies without prior British consent.[18]

After the First World War, concessions were acquired from Iraq which amounted to a compromise by American, British and French oil companies, and which opened the way for cartel agreements on competition and pricing. Since this period, the world petroleum industry had been dominated by the same seven or eight companies controlling production, refining and marketing. Halliday points out that in exchange for paying for the initial concession and a nominal royalty per ton of oil produced, the oil companies could do virtually as they pleased: "They were untaxed; they had huge areas of concession at their disposal; they staffed their firms with foreign nationals; and they exerted political power in the producer countries" (Halliday: 1979: p.405).

The involvement of Western powers in the Middle East was not restricted to isolated efforts on the part of individual companies. Tim Niblock notes that: "To achieve his security goals, with the consequent economic objectives, King Abd al-Aziz was drawn increasingly into contact with foreign interest." (Niblock, (ed): 1980: p.29). Due to declining production during the Second World War, the Saudi regime required finance. SOCAL requested aid from the US government, suggesting that without it "this independent kingdom and perhaps with it the entire Arab world" would be thrown into chaos (O'Connor: 1962: p.327).

Finance was provided via a loan to the British Government, but by 1943 the US was providing funds direct to Saudi Arabia. 'Military aid' was included, in the shape of training missions and the construction of an Air Force base near the oil wells. By 1947, Saudi Arabia had received an estimated $100 million in US aid. In 1950, ARAMCO finished construction of a pipeline from the oil wells in the eastern part of the peninsula to the Mediterranean, an enterprise initiated by the US Navy whose Sixth

Fleet operated there. In this period, ARAMCO payments to the Saudi regime increased from $44 million to $110 million. However, it was revealed that all money paid to the Saudi government was deducted from the company's US taxes.[19]

In the case of Algeria, independence entailed the attempt to develop new forms of economic and political relationshps. However, the question of the relationship with the former coloniser was channelled into the Evian agreements which represent an attempt to maintain French aid and trade and in practice operated in the interests of France:

> The Evian agreements had assured France a privileged position in independent Algeria in return for a sizable amount of aid. The Algerian nationalists had been forced to guarantee respect of French interests in the Sahara oil fields and protection of all other French properties in the country: in addition, they had been obliged to accept the presence of French bases, in one case for as long as fifteen years after independence. For its part, the French government had pledged to maintain for three years an aid program equal to the one in effect at the time of independence and to provide Algeria with considerable technical assistance.
> (Ottoway: 1970: p.150)

The military link between the industrial powers and the oil-producing countries can be seen to operate on two related levels. Firstly, the provision of weapons and military training. The oil-producing states' requirement for the maintenance of a military apparatus is an aspect of both the internal structure of these states and their geopolitical context in the Middle East, as was indicated by the controversy over the US sales of AWACS to Saudi Arabia in 1981. The benefits to the arms industries of the industrial countries should also be noted. The scale on which arms are sold to the countries of the Middle East amounts to support for local allies (see Chapter Two).

Secondly, the direct military presence of Western powers in the area. In the first half of this century, British Forces were based along the coast of the peninsula, and indeed it was not until 1968 that the British Government announced a withdrawal from the Gulf by 1971. The past 20 years have seen a strengthening US presence in the area - for example, the agreement made with Bahrain to increase the US base there, the increasing number of US Naval visits to the Gulf and the situating of the Rapid Deployment Force. While this must be seen in the context of American foreign policy and the generation of a 'New Cold War' it is indicative of the way in which Gulf security has become synonymous with assuring Western access to Gulf oil.

Access has not gone unchallenged. For example, in 1951 President Mosadeq nationalised Iran's oil supply and expropriated the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. "The imperialist firms answered with an attempt to sabotage the Iranian economy" (Halliday: 1979: p.401). Following the ousting of Mosadeq in 1953, the Shah of Iran came to an agreement with the oil companies which gave the Iranian government a share of the profits. In 1971 Algeria nationalised 51% of the French oil companies' holdings and all natural gas concessions, gas and oil transport facilities (although compensation was offered), France responded by shutting down oil production, boycotting Algerian imports and preventing immigration. Such challenges are perhaps best described as the formation of new kinds of partnerships between oil companies, the governments of the industrial countries and the oil-producing states, and do not represent major shifts in the balance of power or of control.

The events of the early 1970's are generally presented as a major challenge by and victory for the oil-producing states of the Gulf. The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which had been founded in 1960, began to negotiate for participation in the running of the oil industry in their respective member states. Fred Halliday has identified the main issues as being those of prices, ownership, supply, and the disposal of revenue. He suggests that while the changing nature of these questions coincided with the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 and subsequent Arab oil embargo, the war merely precipitated and accentuated processes which were inherent in the developing relations between the advanced industrial countries and the oil producers (Halliday: 1979: p.409).

The rise in the price of oil and the agreements made as regards ownership after 1973 can be seen as substantial changes in the allocation of the surplus gained from selling oil and its derived products, and in heralding a new political role for producer states. The oil companies paid more and lost some control but gained security of supply. The impact of this change must be seen in the context of the region as a whole. The most immediate effect was the increased supply of money available in the Gulf. New types of consumption were created, most of which demanded imports from the West: luxury items, manufactured goods of all kinds and, as was mentioned previously, weapons.

Within the region, non oil-producing states such as Egypt and Lebanon took over 'service' functions. While it can be argued that Lebanon had historically been a principal point for the economic penetration of the Arab countries, its role as such was magnified with the emergence of the Arab oil economy, and the Lebanese services sector operated as a point

of contact between the oil-producing states and the international capitalist market. The financial collapse[20] of the major Lebanese banks in 1966 resulted in increased activity on the part of the multi-national banks to buy further into the Lebanese banking sector. Thus, the number of Lebanese banks has dropped from 55 in 1966 to 25 in 1974, and their relative share of total banking activities decreased from around 30% in 1966 to 15% in 1975 (Nasr: 1978: p.4). Over half of the banks' resources are invested outwith the area, either by transferring capital to the central headquarters or by investing through the international financial markets. Credit distribution was allocated largely according to the interests of Western finance capital, with the commercial sector receiving over twice as many credits as all the productive sectors. It should be no surprise that Nasr points out that: "The Lebanese banking sector ... behaved, in general, like the foreign banks, financing almost exclusively the real estate and domestic trade sectors." (Nasr: 1978: p.4).

The response of the Lebanese finance sector can be linked back to the previous discussion of the formation of new kinds of partnerships between oil companies and the oil-producing states, and the point can be emphasised that while new alliances can be discerned both within the Middle East and between the Middle East and the industrialised countries, this cannot be translated into the proposal that such alliances represent major shifts in the balance of power and control.

The kind of historical explanation which has been constructed in this chapter has been an attempt to find a way of explaining the interplay between a changing global situation and the Middle East, and as such has raised theoretical and methodological problems about how an analysis of this sort

can proceed. The adoption of a general perspective on the trade relationship between Europe and the countries of Africa, Asia and the Americas allows the process of increasing inequalities to be traced, and the interleaving of particular instances of this process leads towards a suggestion of the relationship between economic, political and ideological elements which does not rely on the reduction of one to the other. In this way, the practices and beliefs of missionaries in European colonies can be analysed as an instance of the violence of the colonial relationship - as an instance which has its own particular logic. In other words, while the motivation and even the language of missionaries can be located within attitudes and strategies of European expansionism, the simplistic reduction which then accords missionary activity the part of colonial conspirator could not grasp the way in which a reality was built up which could incorporate ideas about Christianity, about Europe's position as regards the rest of the world, about charity and morality and duty, and which could be sustained in practice in newly-colonised areas.

The use of this example highlights the complexity of the analysis which is required, and suggests that an examination of the relationship between coloniser and colonised must take into account conditions in the 'home country' of the coloniser; the colonial relationship is a power relationship and the logic of the coloniser is therefore an intrinsic element. The application of this argument will be seen later in considering Israel's occupation of the West Bank, and by extension the economic and ideological basis of the State of Israel.

The discussion with which this Chapter began of trade as unequal exchange is as pertinent to-day as it was in the 18th and 19th centuries, and its relevance remains as an indicator of forms of domination. For example, according to Fröbel et al., foreign investment originating in the Western industrialised countries has been steadily increasing, and an ever-increasing share is flowing into the developing countries. The world-wide increase in turnover and profits of private companies can be contrasted with the crisis being experienced within the industrialised countries of high unemployment, low domestic investment and decreasing state income (Fröbel et al.: 1980).

The investment in the developing countries has been, to a large extent, the relocation of certain types of production which can reap the benefits of an apparently inexhaustible supply of cheap labour and other economic inducements extended by the governments of developing countries. Alongside this is the importance of the developing countries as a market and this is inextricably entwined with the way in which 'development' is being carried out. For example, the growth in the supply of telecommunications equipment to the Middle East is almost double the growth rate of the North American telecommunications market (OECD: 1983). This indicates firstly, a possible saturation point in the industrialised countries; secondly, the kinds of industries which are being set up in the Middle East and the kinds of consumer 'demands' which are being created; and thirdly, the mechanisms of control underlying the transfer of technology, where the skill as well as the hardware remains in the hands of the west.

NOTES

1. Bichara Khader, Histoire de la Palestine is published in French. All quotations are my translations.

2. The change in production produced serious unintended consequences. For example, growing cotton requires irrigation which in Egypt was water drawn from the Nile. This slowed the flow of the river with a resulting increase in diseases such as Bilharzia, which ultimately affects the central nervous system and is carried by a bacteria in water snails. The Egyptian Government is still trying to bring this disease under control.

3. The military treaty imposed on Egypt in 1840 after British defeat of the Egyptian army was contingent on Egyptian acceptance of the Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention.

4. During World War 1, the British Government paid the Saudis, in the east of the peninsula, a monthly subsidy in order to prevent them attacking the Hijaz under the control of Hussein. However, the Saudis attacked after the war ended, and by 1925 had conquered the western part of the peninsula and forced the Hashemites into exile. In 1926 Abdel Aziz Ibn Saud proclaimed himself King of the Hijaz, and in 1932 announced that the entire territory was to be called Saudi Arabia.

5. For example, John & Hadawi, The Palestine Diary, Vol. 1, (1970); Levin, (ed), The Zionist Movement in Palestine and World Politics, 1880-1918, (1974); Main, Palestine at the Crossroads, (1937); Kimche, The Unromatics, (1968).

6. See Ingrams, Palestine Papers 1917-1922, (1972), and Antonius, The Arab Awakening, (1961).

7. Although Sykes had the authority to negotiate at this level, he had no formal status within the government and was not attached to the Foreign Office or Diplomatic Corps.

8. Magubane argues that slavery, as practised by the Boers, would have inhibited the developing capitalist relations of production and large-scale capitalist exploitation of the land and people of southern Africa, and for this reason, slavery was not a necessary condition for the success of British colonialism (Magubane: 1979).

9. The process whereby property was expropriated in Algeria is interesting in the light of the discussion in Chapter Four of Israeli expropriation of Arab lands, and so can be described in greater detail here:

1830	state lands taken over
1833	all lands not legally deeded
1839	the lands of 'several rebellious tribes'
1843	religious foundation land
1851	woodlands
1861	all uncultivated land not used as pasture
1870's	clan and communal lands

(Farsoun: 1975).

10. As an indication of the extent of French administration support, Gordon notes that leading exponents of the movement to 'liberate' Algerian women were the wives of high-ranking officers in the French army (Gordon: 1968: p.56).

11. See, for example, the discussion of American media coverage of the hostages held in the American Embassy in Iran, in Edward Said's Covering Islam, (1981).

12. The 'Bund' was the "General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland and Russia". Founded in 1897, it was destroyed during the Second World War.

13. The quotes from Pinsker's "Auto-emancipation" are reproduced from Maxime Rodinson, Israel: A Colonial-Settler State, (1973: pp.40-1).

14. In 1922 the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, issued the following statement:

> Unauthorised statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become 'as Jewish as England is English'. His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view....the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine. "(Cmd. 1700 "The White Paper of June 1922", known as The Churchill Memorandum. Cited by Hadawi: 1968: p.23).

15. In 1981, Balfour Day was commemorated in the West Bank by a general strike and demonstrations. After participants were arrested, the protest escalated and Bir Zeit University received its first three month closure order of that year.

16. 'Transjordan' was the British Mandatory territory which became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Its name is in itself an example of the colonial attitude.

17. See, for example, Camille Mansour, Palestine and the Gulf: An Eastern Arab Perspective, Khalidi & Mansour, (eds): 1982.

18. Kuwait acceded in 1913; Bahrain in 1914; the lower Gulf States and Oman in the 1920's (Halliday: 1979: p.399).

19. During Congressional hearings in 1974, a Former Assistant Secretary of State revealed that on orders from the National Security Council, the United States Tax Authorities allowed ARAMCO to make this deduction. Between 1950 and 1951, ARAMCO's US taxes fell from $30 million to $5 million. (Cited by Halliday: 1979: p.51).

20. "Political divisions in the region contributed to the massive withdrawal of capital. An international monetary crisis, and a rise in the rate of interest in the West, exposed the low level of concentration of the Lebanese banking sector (33 of the 55 banks had deposits of less than LL 10 million), and the short term nature of the bulk of deposits." (Nasr: 1978: p.4).

Chapter Two

ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS

Chapter Two

It has been argued that the construction of an explanation which encapsulates the interrelatedness of territorial expansion, the colonisation of the West Bank and wider regional and global restructuring involves the generation of analytical connections between the level of Palestinian specificity and the context within which Palestinian history is located. The discussion in the introduction of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon served as a schematic presentation of the themes which are raised in this analysis, and can now be elaborated in considering the international setting with which the Palestinian experience of Zionism can be juxtaposed.

Chapter One provided a background at a general level of the way in which power relations between the advanced capitalist countries and the Middle East have developed, and the following discussion of the place of Israel in this historical process can be set against this.

The starting point is the way in which a territory was carved out to become the State of Israel, and the meaning of this at an international, regional and local level provides the basis of understanding the nature of the Israeli state. Having put forward in Chapter One an interpretation of the history of the Middle East as a region, the intention now is to move to a more specific examination of how power relations operate, and the purpose of this Chapter is to locate Israel in the analysis outlined in Chapter One. This begins with the local level which underlies Israel's wider relationships, and that is the plight of the people who were displaced.

The Expropriation of Arab Property

For the Arab population of Palestine, the conclusion of the 1948-49 war left an estimated 120,000 within the borders of the new State of Isreal,[1] while those remaining in what was left of Palestine - the West Bank and Gaza Strip - were placed under Jordanian and Egyptian rule respectively. Around three-quarters of a million Palestinians were refugees, many of them in camps around the borders of the State of Israel. As will be argued in Chapter Three, the Zionist project during the Mandate years had been to build exclusively Jewish structures in Palestine, and in terms of Zionist ideology the necessity for the physical exclusion of the population of Palestine in order to establish a Zionist polity can be seen as the next logical step. Thus, in the framework of the development of Zionist thought and action about how their sovereignty was to be realised, we can trace the notion of exclusivity which can be linked back to the colonial roots of the movement discussed in Chapter One.

However, if we look at how this related to other concerns of the new Israeli state, then it can be noted that over 90% of the land within its 1949 frontiers was owned by Arabs. Of this, the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine estimated that more than 80% of the territory governed by Israel in 1949-50 was land owned or otherwise held by external refugees (Abu-Lughod, ed.: 1971: p.135).

The economic importance of this property is illustrated in the following quotation:

> Abandoned property was one of the greatest constributions toward making Israel a viable state... Of the 370 new Jewish settlements established between 1948 and the beginning of 1953, 350 were on absentee property. In 1954, more than one-third of Israel's Jewish

> population lived on absentee property and nearly one-third of the new immigrants (250,000 people) settled in urban areas abandoned by the Arabs. They left whole cities like Jaffa, Acre, Lydda...containing nearly a quarter of all the buildings in Israel. 10,000 shops, businesses and stores were left in Jewish hands...Arab fruit sent abroad provided nearly 10% of the country's foreign currency earnings from exports in 1951. In 1949, the olive produce from abandoned Arab groves was Israel's third largest export....
>
> (Peretz: 1958: pp.143 & 146).

It can be suggested that the expropriation of Arab property on this scale was a crucial element both politically and economically: politically because it was an attempt to wipe out the remnants of the existence of the indigenous population and their 'right' to Palestine, and economically because it helped to ameliorate the financial difficulties faced by the Israeli state.[2]

An additional dimension is the regional reaction to the establishment of the State of Israel. One of the economic problems was the Arab boycott of Israel and Western firms trading with Israel. Perhaps the main importance of the boycott was that it hindered the development of the role which had been projected for Israel, in the words of Chaim Weizmann as the "new Switzerland, supplying consumer goods to the untapped markets of the Middle East." (Ryan: 1974: p.5). In this context, the economic significance of the Camp David Agreements between Israel and Egypt in 1978, and the trade agreements which formed part of the conditions for an Israeli-Lebanese ceasefire in Lebanon in 1983 can be seen in a new light, as both have involved large Israeli export contracts (see Chapter Five).

As Joe Stork has pointed out, the conflict in 1948 directly linked the fortunes of Zionism and Western oil interests (Kayyali, ed.: 1979: p.219). As an indication of how the link operated, he refers to a Saudi Arabian blockage of an Arab League plan to cut off all oil production following the United Nations decision in 1947 to partition Palestine, and a promise made by the Saudis to the American Ambassador that if other Arab states broke relations with the US over Palestine, then Saudi Arabia would sever relations with those states. The limited nature of economic sanctions imposed by the Arab states must be related to the character of the regimes in question as well as to their potential economic power, and reference can be made to the relationship between oil-producing countries and the West outlined in Chapter One. In a similar vein, the treatment of Palestinian refugees by Arab 'host' countries[3] - for example, only in Jordan can they become citizens of the host country, and this can be seen simply as a different form of political expediencey - and the reaction of Arab states to continuing Israeli expansion in the area, must be placed in this context.

This serves as a brief indication of the complexity of Israel's place in the Middle East, and of the conflicting nature of the connections between the Palestinians and the Arab countries as well as between Israel and the Arab world. It is suggested that a means of understanding these contradictions may be to examine in more detail the relationship between Israel and the western capitalist countries, and this begins by looking at the role of foreign capital in Israel's development.

Israel and Foreign Capital

According to a former head of the Bank of Israel, in addition to the value of expropriated Arab property, foreign capital in Israel has been responsible for financing not only investment, but to a considerable extent, consumption (Horowitz: 1972: p.1313). From the early days of its settlement programme in Palestine under the Mandate, the Zionist movement has been dependent on foreign capital, and its realisation of sovereignty strengthened that dependency: according to 1980 statistics, Israel has the highest foreign debt in the world (Glick: 1982: p.108). As a result of the economic difficulties faced immediately after its inception, the new Israeli state quickly set up facilities to encourage foreign investment. For example, in 1950 an Investment Centre was established and privileges such as taxation benefits provided (Rodinson: 1982: p.56). In the mid-1970's, a 'Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investments' was introduced in the Knesset. This expanded financial incentives and was intended to provide similar tax benefits for American subsidiaries in Israel as are available in zero-tax countries (MERIP 49: 1976).

Some foreign investment has been in partnership with Israeli capital, notably among Histadrut-owned enterprises (see Chapter Three), but it has been estimated that investment by private companies accounted for only around one-eight of capital imports to Israel between 1950 and 1967 (Ryan: 1974: p.5). It is the form which the remaining seven-eighths of capital imports take which provides some insight into the links between Israel, the Arab states and the industrialised capitalist countries.

A considerable proportion of the import surplus has been donations from non-Israeli Jews, and as early as 1928 over 60% of foreign donations were from Jews in the United States. The major collection agency, the United Israel Appeal, estimated that in the late 1970's its contribution to Israel was around $220 million per year, and that the raising of this sume was facilitated by the willingness of American banks to give prior loans should Israel's requirements exceed UIA funds (Glick: 1982: p.109). As well as donations to the Appeal, over fifty charitable organisations collecting for specific purposes such as Israeli universities, museums and health services are registered in the United States, and contributions to these are tax-deductible.

West German war reparations had a significant economic effect in the 1950's, being in the form of:

> ...goods and services, not foreign exchange, except for two yearly German payments of DM75 million due in pounds sterling so that Israel could pay for the oil delivered by the British company, Shell.
> (Balabkins: 1971: p.144).

It was equipment delievered as reparation which was used to establish, for example, the Negev phosphates industry and much of the chemical industry.

The issuance of State of Israel bonds, begun in 1951, has proven to be a lucrative source of revenue - 80% of Bonds are sold in the US, and in 1979 accounted for $394.5 million (Glick: 1982). Revenue from Bonds has been used for a variety of purposes, such as building oil pipelines from Eilat to Haifa and Ashkelon; establishing 'development towns' (see Chapter Four); and developing solar and atomic energy. Glick has noted the 'remarkable popularity' of State of Israel Bonds - only US Savings Bonds and issues of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company are held in

greater quantities - as the rate of interest is comparatively low. In spite of this, corporate buyers include the Coca-Cola Company, Allied Stores Corporation and the Michigan National Corporation. In addition, the participation of American trade unions in buying Israeli Bonds for pension, health and welfare funds is striking.

The efficacy of the Zionist lobby in the United States is often cited as a reason for the strength of US support for Israel. Unquestionably this is a well-organised and influential pressure group. For example, following the 1975 United Nations Resolution equating Zionist and racism:[4]

> The American Jewish community and the Presidents' Conference were so enraged at Mexico's Zionism-equals-racism vote .... that individual Jews and those Jewish organisations which sponsor tours to Mexico through their travel departments stopped going there for their vacations and holidays. Mexico's tourist industry suffered terribly as a result.
>
> (Glick: 1982: p.99).

However, the power of the Zionist lobby should not be over-estimated, and US Government aid to Israel cannot be explained as a result of their efficiency alone.

A former chief of the United States Air Force Intelligence has been quoted as saying that Israel's contribution to the United States has been worth "$1,000 for every dollar's worth of aid we have granted her." To givan an example, firstly, of the extent of aid given by the United States to Israel, between 1970 and 1978 almost 24% of US military aid went to Israel (Glick: 1982: p.154). Since 1973, US aid (in grants and loans) has totalled between $1 billion and $2.5 billion per year. In addition, $3 billion of 'special aid' was made available to help finance the withdrawal from Sinai in 1982. Of this 'special aid', $800 million was in the form of an outright grant, and the remaining $2.2 billion as military credits (Economist Intelligence Unit: 1982).

The historical background to American interests in the Middle East was discussed in Chapter One and it is in this context that the apparently contradictory elements of contemporary US policy in the area can be reconciled. The simultaneous support given to Israel and states such as Saudi Arabia with which Israel is still 'at war' extends to supplying weapons to both, and as an illustration of how these apparently conflicting interests are resolved, reference can be made to the dispute within the US Government over the provision of a 'package' of jet fighters to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia in 1978.

The arguments put forward by President Carter in favour of the package deal are illuminating in the way in which they pose no conflict of interest in the supply of weapons. In surveying Congressional debates during this period, Bishara (Bishara: 1978) has outlined the main strands. Firstly, the notion that a strong Israel is necessary for the survival of 'moderate' Arab regimes - an example of this being the Israeli threat to invade Jordan should Hussein's regime have been threatened during the 1970-71 war with the Palestinians.[5] Secondly, the need for Arab regimes defined as 'moderate' to be supplied with weapons as a reward. This was seen as necessary for prestige as much as actual combat capability, in the light of the Camp David negotiations taking place at that time, and also to bolster opposition to the 'radical' regimes in the area.[6] Thirdly, it was argued that Arab countries had the means to purchase weapons, and that it was in both Israeli and American interests for the US to supply them as conditions could then be attached to the sale. And fourthly, arms supply to Israel should continue - "on the sensible principle that it is better to help Israel to defend itself that to have to intervene with US forces on Israel's behalf in time of war" (Harold Brown, US Defence Secretary, quoted by Bishara: 1978: p.70).

The use of aid, in this case military aid, as a means of control is indicated in this outline and is clarified in a consideration of what it was decided to provide in this arms package deal. Thus, for example, while both Saudi Arabia and Israel were provided with F-15's, the Saudi version was not fitted with sophisticated electronic equipment such as advanced radar nor the special fuel system which extends the range of the F-15. Egypt was supplied with the F-5E, described as "a fighter plane to be used in a minor local conflict ... It couldn't hold its own at all in a large-scale sophisticated war of the Arab-Israeli type." (Ashkar & Jaafer: 1978).

Around one-third of Israel's budget is spent on 'defence' and it has been suggested that this proportion is steadily increasing. While US aid to Israel is more or less earmarked for military purposes, Israel can spend the aid as desired and is not restricted to spending the money in the United States alone. Thus, for example, the $3,500 million surplus between 1976 and 1980 has been used to finance settlements and their infrastructure on the West Bank ('8 Days': 21.6.80).

As for the part played by the Ministry of Defence in the Israeli economy, its control of aid money and status as one of the largest employers makes it very influential. The Israel Aircraft Industry employs over 20,000 people, and concerns such as the Tadiran electronics company come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence. It can be noted that all forms of employment connected with defence are closed to Palestinians, whether or not they are Israeli passport-holders (see Chapter Five).

The distortion arising from the size of the defence sector is compounded by the type of products which Israel exports and the market to which they are sent. Two qualifications must immediately by made. Firstly, indicators point to the increasing importance of the export of weapons, but information on this is difficult to come by.[7] Secondly, an important factor which is seldom taken into account is that when talking of Isreali exports and imports, it must be remembered that since 1967 Israel and the territories occupied then in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights have to a large extent constituted a 'common market' with a single customs barrier. Before discussing the significance of this (see Chapter Five), it may be useful to present a brief outline of Israel's foreign trade, in the light of the qualifications noted above.

Around 70% of Israel's exports are shipped to North America and Europe, the main products being as follows:

Table 2.1 Israel's Main Exports

Main Exports (1981)	$ Million
Polished diamonds	1,397
Chemicals	736
Textiles, clothing, leather	395
Citrus fruit	247
TOTAL (including others)	5,640

(Economist Intelligence Unit: 1983)

As can be seen from this, the main exports require the importation of raw materials. For example, rough diamonds are imported from South Africa through the Central Selling Organisation in London. Since the diamond polishing industry was established in 1949, the export of polished stones has provided from one-third to one-half of Israel's total exports (Kayyali, ed.: 1979: pp.288-9).

In 1977 the tariffs on Israeli products entering the EEC were removed, following a period of progressive reduction. The duties on imports from the EEC to Israel are expected to be eliminated by the mid-1980's. However, as a RAND study observed:

> ... in all cases, competition on the world market has been very fierce, partly with other developing countries... The most important factor in their /i.e. Israeli exports/ past growth was the fact that they were promoted by artificial means such as bilaterial trade agreements, very high effective exchange rates ... and protective market sharing agreements on the domestic market. With time, this protection was mitigated.
>
> (Bruno: 1970: p.51)

In short, in addition to funding on a huge scale in the form of donations from non-Israeli Jews, and US grants and loans for the purposes of 'defence', Israel has been afforded special status also in foreign trade. The latter has relied to a large extent on importing raw materials and exporting manufactured goods, but despite special status the trade deficit in 1980 had increased by 43% since 1979 ('8 Days': 21.6.80) and the rate of inflation at the end of 1983 was 130.7%.[8]

Military and Technical Export

The reason why this state of affairs has been maintained, in particular by the United States, must be seen in the context of power alliances and interests at both the regional and global levels. Earlier, several reasons were suggested for why a militarised State of Israel has been perceived as being in the interests of the West. To these can be added Israel's role as a supplier of arms. It has been noted that a comprehensive survey of arms export which attempted to quantify its share in the export trade is not possible. However, enough information is available to suggest some important aspects of Israeli arm trading.

Research by Ignacio Klich into Israeli weapons sales in Central America draws information from various military publications and reveals the following:

Table 2.2

MAJOR ISRAELI MILITARY SALES TO CENTRAL AMERICA
(exclusive of small arms, artillery and military electronics)

	1973-81			1982
RECIPIENT	AIRCRAFT	BOATS	ARMOURED CARRIERS	NEW ORDERS
El Salvador	18 Ouragan (1) 6 Magister (1) 5 Arava ? Helicopters (2)			3 Arava
Gautamala	10 Arava		10 RBY-1	
Honduras	12 Super-Mystere (1) 4 Arava 1 Westwind	Dvora-class (3)	14 RBY-1	Kfir planes (2) RBY vehicles (2)
Nicaragua	14 Avara ? Helicopters (2)	4 Dabur-class		
Panama	1 Westwind			

(1) Ex-Israeli Defence Forces equipment

(2) Numbers unknown

(3) Unconfirmed

(Middle East International: 23.12.82)

In addition to the supply of military hardware, it has been claimed that Israeli personnel have been active in Central America: in the case of Guatamala, questions were asked in the Knesset regarding the part played by Israeli electronics experts in counter-insurgency operations.[9] Klich's conclusion is that:

> ... the disclosure last year (1981) by Israel's economic coordination minister, Ya'acov Meridor, that Israel was ready to be Washington's surrogate wherever political considerations prevented the US from providing all the military assistance that was

> needed, puts into context the mounting evidence of the presence of Israeli military personnel in Central America. (Middle East International: 23.12.82).

An Israeli newspaper exhorted its readers to:

> ...spare a thought for the nature of the Israeli role in Guatamala: once again, we are the sub-contractors for US foreign policy, employed as long as the Reagan Administration is being prevented by Congress from extending direct military aid to Guatamala... I am not claiming that there is some signed treaty between Israel and the United States, or that the Reagan Administration invited tenders from potential sub-contractors and Israel won the job. In practical terms, however, that is exactly what happened.
>
> (Yediot Aharonot: 1.6.83)

The charge that Israel acts as the West's 'policemen' in the Middle East is not new, and in one sense arms dealing of this kind is merely a geographical extension of this role. The same newspaper report which questions Israel's involvement in Guatamala also cites other cases of weapons being supplied by Israel to regimes with which the United States finds it too diplomatically sensitive to deal. For example, it is claimed that the Reagan administration's unwillingness to create any tensions with China led to their proposing that Israel should supply M-48 tanks to Taiwan (Yediot Aharonot: 1.6.83). Similarly, the United States Congress rejected the Reagan Administration's request for military aid to be allocated to Zaire, the reasons given being that country's systematic violation of human rights. A few days later, diplomatic relations were established between Israel and Zaire, and it has been reported that not only are arms being supplied to Zaire but that weapons have been shipped to other African countries via Zaire. For example, 'Davar' quotes the American weekly 'Defence and Foreign Affairs' as claiming that Israel sold weapons captured during the Lebanese war to the forces of the President of Chad.[10] The

report states that this will not result in the opening of formal relations between Israel and Chad, since the latter depends on aid from Saudi Arabia and Libya ('Davar': 9.5.83).

As evidence of US approval for Israel supplying aid where the United States itself had decided against this policy, Klich cites the case of the arms deal with Honduras which included Kfir planes, armoured vehicles, missiles and personnel training. The Kfir fighter has American-made components, which means that the US could veto the sale. In addition, Honduras' reliance on US aid for survival means that the Israeli weapons would be purchased with US aid money (Middle East International: 23.12.82).

It must be pointed out, however, that Israeli involvement in arms dealing is not some philanthropic act on behalf of the United States, and that while there does seem to be evidence of Israel supplying aid in countries which may embarrass the US, Israel does gain in certain ways. For instance, Israelis are said to be building an electronic surveillance system for Costa Rica on its border with Nicaragua, and Israeli experts to be assisting Costa Rica's civil guard in setting up a counter-insurgency unit ('Al-Ha'mishmar': 29.5.83). Klich notes that American military aid to a country which disbanded its armed forced in 1948 is problematic, and that US law bans direct aid to police forces (Middle East International: 23.12.82). Israel has no such restrictions, and in addition to the economic importance of exporting weapons the President of Costa Rica announced on entering office that Costa Rica's embassy would be moved back to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv.[11] Following this announcement, the American Jewish community donated $500,000 to Costa Rica for the construction of a new railway line ('Al-Ha'mishmar': 29.5.83).

Diplomatic recognition has frequently been extended to Israel by the beneficiaries of its technological or economic aid. Until 1953, only Turkey amongst the Asian countries had established diplomatic relations with Israel. In 1953 Burma exchanged diplomatic representation and shortly afterwards Israel sent teams of medical personnel, engineers and technicians to Burma. Joint enterprises were established, such as a public construction company formed in partnership with the Israeli Solel Boneh,[12] and agreements were made for Israel to market Burmese products in Asia and Africa (Safran: 1963: p.265).

The package of aid and diplomatic representation has also taken place in Africa. The extent of this has been described as follows:

> ...the arrival of Israeli diplomatic missions and technicians became almost an integral part of the independence ceremonies marking the birth of each new African State. According to the Israeli Foreign Office, over 900 Israeli experts in a score of fields were engaged in technical assistance projects throughout Africa by the middle of 1962...one thousand Africans were at that time undergoing training in Israel...three thousand had already completed courses of varying duration and returned to their respective countries. Altogether, Israel was said to be lending assistance of one sort or another to sixty-five countries in Africa, Asia, and Central and South America.
>
> (Safran: 1963: p.266).

Given Israel's huge foreign debt noted earlier, it must be asked why such an extensive aid programme is being carried out. Without denying the importance of diplomatic recognition, reference can be made to the critical questioning in Chapter One of the nature of aid supplied from advanced industrial countries to underdeveloped countries. In the case of Israel, its technical and military aid to other countries is a major export. The sale of weapons to countries benefitting from Israeli aid

has already been discussed and other sectors of the Israeli economy reap the rewards of finding a market created amongst the countries of South and Central America, Africa and Asia. For example, while the export of military electronic and metal products fell by 26.3% in the first four months of 1983.[13] the export of civilian metal goods and electronic equipment rose by 15% in the same period ('Ha'aretz': 10.5.83). As these figures were derived from Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics reports, they exclude exports to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and both the economic crisis and level of technological development of Israel's major markets in North America and Europe suggest it would be unlikely for them to import technology from Israel.[14] This leaves the only possible market to be found amongst the recipients of the aid programme. This is borne out by the statistics of Israeli export to the South American sub-continent. Excluding military hardware, the volume of which has already been noted, Israeli exports have been rising steadily from $23,685,000 in 1973, to $48,656,000 in 1974 and $51,139,000 in 1975 (Sharif: 1977: p.100).

In order to draw together the themes under consideration, relevant aspects of the relationship between Israel and the countries of Central and South America can be briefly summarised. The increasing volume of Israeli weapons sold in this area has been noted, as has the increase in the level of non-military exports. At the diplomatic level, the United Nations Resolution which admitted Israel to membership was passed with 37 nations in favour, 12 against and 9 abstentions and of these, 18 South American states voted in favour, none voted against and 2 abstained. Sharif suggests that this reflected both the cohesion of the Organisation of American States (and the preponderant influence of the US in it) and Israel's own efforts in South America[15] (Sharif: 1977: p.99). Changing circumstances

within the countries of Africa and Asia, as well as within Israel, led to many severing ties with Israel during the 1960's and 1970's and former aid to Africa was redirected to South America, to the extent that the latter was the major recipient of Israeli aid by 1974 (Sharif: 1977).

Thus, an analysis of the complexities of the relationship between Israel and the countries of the 'Third World' involves a consideration of these countries as a market for Israeli produce, both military and non-military, which at a general level is comparable with other 'trading links' between advanced industrialised countries and developing countries, and at a specific level can be seen in terms of the particular nature of Israel. It involves the consideration of the influence of the capitalist powers in the 'Third World' and the extent to which Israeli interests can be seen as part of this. It involves looking at the question of aid to developing countries, and the way in which aid can be a form of domination. And it involves the way in which all those considerations percolate through to support in international forums such as the United Nations and the Organisation of American States, to diplomatic recognition, and to the decision to defy the United Nations and locate an Embassy in Jerusalem rather than Tel Aviv.

Israel and the EEC

It has been suggested that European countries have to some extent distanced themselves from American policy on the Middle East, and that consequently the links between Europe and Israel and Europe and the Arab countries need to be examined separately. Tatu, for example, notes the changing perceptions in Western Europe regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and suggests that this culminated in the EEC's 1980 Venice Summit

Declaration on the Middle East (Khalidi & Mansour, eds.: 1982). Issued two years after the Camp David Agreement, the Venice Declaration called for the 'recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people' and stated that the PLO would have to be involved in peace negotiations. This was read as a challenge to the Camp David accords, and as an indication of a distinct European initiative on the Middle East.

The French Foreign Minister, M. Cheysson, has for instance been quoted as saying that any future Palestinian state would "necessarily be in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip" and that he knew of no Palestinians who could take part in peace negotiations with the Israelis other than the PLO - "the fighting force of the Palestinian people" ('The Guardian': 24.2.82). The Greek Government has accorded the PLO representative in Athens ambassadorial status, and it was reported that immediately after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Greek, French and British delegations in the EEC favoured strong economic sanctions against Israel. While this was not generally approved, the EEC did decide against proceeding with the signing of a five-year £22 million financial aid programme for Israel ('The Guardian": 14.6.82).

The historical background to European interests in the Middle East discussed in Chapter One and the continuity between the colonial past of the region and the current power structures within and between the Arab countries provide the basis for an understanding of relations between Europe and the Middle East. Tatu describes this as "a duality of position - close to the Arab position as far as Israel is concerned, close to the US in regard to the Gulf issues" (Khalidi & Mansour, eds.: 1982: p.117).

In order to explore this apparent duality, we can look firstly at the growing importance of the Arab world in relation to the world economy, and pick up some of the points raised in Chapter One.

According to Papayannakis, in the years between 1970 and 1979, Arab countries (with the exception of Lebanon, South Yemen and Sudan) have experienced a growth in their imports which has greatly exceeded the world average (Khalidi & Manour, eds.: 1982). A general characteristic of these imports has been the increasing importance of capital goods, and this sort of reorientation opens up possibilities for the countries which export these goods - for the most part, the developed capitalist countries. Thus, this constitutes an important element of the economies of the capitalist countries: it is represented in their employment, trade and overall production. In other words, exporting to the Arab world has become a vital factors in the attempt to sustain the production of exportable goods; this being a decisive part of the struggle taking place in the current world crisis. From the data collected by Papayannakis, the member countries of the EEC have achieved a general expansion in the area in the period 1970-1979, as has Japan, while the relative importance of the United States has remained static.

In sum, at this analytical level, the links can be perceived between the economies of the advanced capitalist countries and the oil-producing states in the Gulf: links which are seen in terms of the need for oil - which in itself is a demand created by the nature of advanced capitalism - and the desire to enter the Arab market. Against this can be set the differences within the capitalist countries, and for the purposes of this discussion this has focussed on differing attitudes towards Israel, for

while the EEC has provided favourable trade terms and financial packages for Israel, it has censured actions carried out by Israel in a way in which the United States has not.

Israel's place in this scenario is as an advanced capitalist country, which has the highest foreign debt in the world, inflation running at over 140% by July 1983 and living on a United States subsidy; while Brazil, with half the population living below the poverty line and an inflation rate of 120% has its loan called in by the International Monetary Fund and causes reverberations through the international banks on threatening to declare a moratorium on repaying the interest on its loans ('The Guardian': 22.7.83). Such issues which are apparently paradoxical when considered at one level of analysis may be resolved at another, suggesting that different levels of analysis encounter different forms of conflict and contradiction.

The consideration of expropriation of Arab lands and property with which this Chapter began will be elaborated later in the thesis: the concern at this point has been to outline some of the apparent contradictions in Israel's external relationships, and the suggestion is that these are underpinned by the internal colonial relationship. For example, sense can be made of Israel's provision of military and technical aid to countries in Africa, Asia and South America coterminously with the large foreign debt and domestic economic problems at the general level of Israel's role as an advanced capitalist country and the place which capital interests have in the 'Third World'. The role of foreign capital in Israel's development and the continuing support of the United States, can also be seen in this light.

However, it can be argued that this explanation in itself cannot provide a comprehensive understanding, and that the situation is too complex to be explained solely in terms of global economic imperatives. In this sense, more attention must be paid to the particular nature of the State of Israel and to the way in which that level of analysis can be linked up with the level of regional and international relations, and Chapter Three will go on to consider how Palestine was colonised.

In 1981, Moshe Dayan, who had been Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Likud Government until a few months previously, expressed some of the contradictions in Israel's regional and global position as follows:

> Israel - government and opposition - has seized every opportunity to announce that it sees in the US a faithful ally, and that it will be ready, at any time, to put its facilities at the disposal of the US, if and when the latter requests that... Israel wants very much to gain a slice of American military products, as well as perform the required management, maintenance, and repair work...However, the emphasis, the headlines, and some plans of the strategic cooperation glide far beyond this. Joint ground, air and sea exercises are definitely intended to secure joint military action. Where would such action take place? In defence of Israel or of Saudi Arabia? Are we a party to an alliance with the Americans to defend the Persian Gulf?... where is the alliance?
>
> (Yediot Aharonot: 18.9.81).

In this article on 'strategic cooperation', Dayan summed up his concern by asking "The mighty, serious and central question in the whole matter, which is - what is Israel?"

NOTES

1. As estimates obviously vary, those used here are from the 1980 Palestinian Statistical Abstract, produced by the Central Bureau of Statistics of the Palestine National Fund.

2. The Jewish population of Israel more than doubled between 1948 and 1952, and the cost of bringing new immigrants to Israel, receiving them and housing them has been estimated at $2,250 per head (Rodinson: 1982: pp.39-41).

3. See, for example, Helen Lackner, A House Built on Sand - a Political Economy of Saudi Arabia, (1978). Also, Walid Elias Moubarak, Kuwait's Quest for Security: 1961-1973, (1979).

4. November 10, 1975, the General Assembly of the United Nations determined that 'Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination'. The 'Presidents' Conference' referred to in the quotation is the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organisations, which acts as an umbrella organisation in the USA. They had sent letters requesting UN delegations to vote against this resoltuion.

5. It can be noted that the current situation is very different, and according to sectors of the Likud coalition, Jordan in fact constitutes the 'Palestinian State' - all that is required is the replacement of King Hussein ('The Guardian': 8.4.83).

6. For example, Syrian and Libyan opposition to the Camp David process.

7. The difficulty is in guaging what proportion of Israel's exports can be classed as military, for while instances of arms sales can be found there is obviously no itemised list. One instance is arms exportation to South Africa, revealed in United Nations Resolution 31/6E of 9.11.76, condemning the sale of warships and other war materials. According to newspaper reports, this refers to the sale of Gabriel sea-to-sea missiles to South Africa in 1974 ('The Daily Telegraph': 8.9.74) and sales of Reshef missile boats and the Israel Aircraft Industry's Kfir fighter ('The Middle East': June 1976). Other examples are discussed in the context of Israel's relationship with the 'Third World'.

8. According to the 'Quarterly Economic Review of Israel', No. 1, 1983 (Economist Intelligence Unit: 1983).

9. The claim was made by Civil Rights Movement Knesset member Shulamit Aloni (allied to Labour in the Alignment coalition), who also asked how many Israeli military advisers were in Guatemala. Although the President of Guatamala had told an ABC television reporter that the coup which brought him to power was successful due to many of his soldiers having been trained by Israelis, Aloni's enquiry was dismissed (Middle East International: 23.12.82).

10. The "New Statesman" quotes the director-general of Israel's Foreign Ministry as proposing that Israel should "sell back to the United States its obsolete and surplus equipment for possible third country transfer". This concerns America financing the Central American purchasing of weapons captured in Lebanon - as the report says:

> "...this type of US financing is a back-door way of increasing US aid to Central America. It can substitute for direct US aid if congressional opposition succeeds in reducing or cutting it off altogether."
> ("New Statesman": 4.8.83).

11. Israel's annexation of Jersualem has not been recognised by the United Nations nor by most of the countries with which it has diplomatic relations, so that in spite of Israeli declarations that Jerusalem is the capital city, the embassies remain in Tel Aviv (see Chapter Four).

12. Solel Boneh is the Histadrut-owned construction company (see Chapter Three).

13. Israeli military exports decreased immediately after the 1982 inva$ion of Lebanon, and have continued to decline. It is not clear whether this is due to an international reluctance to purchase Israeli weapons, or to an increase in domestic demand.

14. Israel's new science-based industries are being sited in the West Bank, and the Minister of Science and Development has reportedly revealed plans to create an Israeli 'Silicon Valley' there. He announced financial incentives for the establishment of technologically advanced research and development projects, and plans to create a 'science city' near the settlement of Ariel ('Davar': 7.12.82).

15. It has been suggested that Israel has a demographic interest in South America, as the Jewish communities there provide a relatively untapped source of immigration, and one which is 'western-oriented' and easily absorbed, therefore economically attractive (Sharif: 1977).

Chapter Three

THE COLONISATION OF PALESTINE

Chapter Three

The complexity indicated in the examination of how Israel fits into the changing pattern of global and regional conflicts and contradictions suggests that Israel's position cannot be simplified to that of an actor mechanically operating in the interests of the West. In order to answer the question raised at the end of Chapter Two regarding the nature of Israel, it is necessary to move from the broad perspective which has been used to provide a historical backdrop, to a narrower focus on how the Zionist aspiration came to be fulfilled in a sovereign state.

In Chapter One, the roots of Zionism as a political philosophy were identified within nineteenth century Europe, in the context of the historical relationship between the European imperial powers and the countries of Africa, Asia and the Americas which they sought to dominate. It would be misleading to present the range of ideas and beliefs defined as 'Zionist' as unchanging encompassing as they do a multiplicity of interpretations, interests and assumptions which developed in particular ways at particular historical conjunctures. The concern of this chapter is to examine the way in which the visionary theory which was nineteenth century Zionism was translated into what Said has called "a matrix of organisations... a set of instruments for holding and developing a Jewish colonial territory ..." (Said: 1980: p.97). In order to elucidate the processes of the colonisation of Palestine, an instance will be highlighted of the relation between interpretations generated within one strand of Zionist thought, that of 'labour-Zionism' and the operation of Zionist practices in Palestine.

The Organisation of the Zionist Movement

The aims set out by the First Zionist Congress, described in Chapter One, served as a general outline which the movement would follow. The Second Zionist Congress in August 1898 began to detail the form in which the aims would be pursued by setting up interconnecting organisations which would implement the drive for Jewish emigration to Palestine. The first organisation set up by the Second Zionist Congress was the Jewish Colonial Trust Ltd., with a subsidiary, the Anglo-Palestine Company, being set up in Jaffa in 1903. Out of the Colonial Trust came the Jewish National Fund (Keren Keymeth), founded in 1901 with the objective of acquiring land in Palestine. The first land purchases were made in 1905. As an agency of the World Zionist Organisation, the JNF was responsible for buying, developing (through the offices of the Palestinian Land Development Company) and leasing land in Palestine. In 1920 the Palestine Foundation Fund (Keren Hayesod) was created to organise Jewish immigration and colonisation.

Thus, by the time Britain assumed the Mandate for Palestine in 1922, the Zionist movement had established institutions which were engaged in acquiring land and promoting Jewish immigration. The importance of this lies in the status of land purchased by the Jewish National Fund. It is stipulated in the JNF constitution that:

> ...land is to be acquired as Jewish property and ... the title to the lands acquired is to be taken in the name of the Jewish National Fund, to the end that the same shall be held as the inalienable property of the Jewish people.
>
> (Hadawi: 1968: p.28)

One of the conditions on which land was leased to settlers stated:

> .....the Agency shall promote agricultural Colonisation based on Jewish labour, and in all works or undertakings carried out or furthered by the Agency, it shall be deemed to be a matter of principle that Jewish labour shall be employed.....
>
> (Article 3, Section (e) of the Jewish National Fund Constitution, quoted by Hadawi: 1968: p.28)

What this meant was that non-Jews were totally excluded from land purchased by the Jewish National Fund. The way in which this organisation formulated its land-holding was that it secured land 'for the Jewish people in perpetuity'. Once a lease contract had been signed, the settler had undertaken not to hire or employ non-Jewish labour, under the penalty of a fine and fore-closure. The lease could not be passed in any way to a non-Jew, and if the heir to a lease-holder was not Jewish then the Jewish National Fund reserved the right to repossess the land and cancel the lease.

As early as 1930, J.H. Simpson observed that the land acquired by the JNF was "...extra-territorialized. It ceases to be land from which the Arab can gain any advantage either now or at any time in the future." (Said: 1980: p.98). This extra-territorial aspect is a cornerstone of the ideological underpinnings of the State of Israel, a peculiarity of which is that it defines itself not as the state of its citizens, but as the state of a people most of whom live outwith its area. It is behind the idea of a national home to which all Jews have the right to belong, institutionalised, for example, in the Law of Return.[1] Thus, the territory which was designated as a national home for the Jewish people was to have as its constituents Jews all over the world. The complementary aspect within the territory itself was the need for the creation of exclusively Jewish structures and institutions, and the nature of the Jewish National Fund is one example of how this was to be implemented.

The desire for Jewish exclusivity in Palestine is consistent with the assumptions which underlie Zionist thought, and it can be suggested that the various means whereby this exclusiveness could be secured, and the accompanying rationales, reflect the differing tendencies within the Zionist movement. In discussing difficulties faced by 'labour-Zionists' on their emigration to Palestine, Flapan maintains that:

> It was against this background /of the demoralization arising from the exploitation of cheap native labour/ ...that new concepts of colonization took shape: the concept of the Jewish economy as a closed circuit, in which Jews would fulfil all the functions and would become independent of Arab labour and food supplies ... (Flapan: 1979: p.200).

This 'new concept of colonisation' is linked to what Theodor Shanin has called the aim of 'productivisation', which was initiated mainly by the left-wing of the Zionist movement[2] according to their analysis of the Jewish population in Europe, and their programme of how emigration should proceed (Davis et al., eds: 1975: p.25).

The starting-point was the conception of the social structure of Jews in nineteenth century Europe as being over-weighted in particular strata such as merchants and intellectuals, and under-weighted in the number of 'productive' workers. Thus, the imaginary transfer of European Jews to a 'national home' in which they retained their previous class position in Europe would mean a form of society which was described as an inverted pyramid, with a disproportionate number at the top. In order to overcome this and create a 'normal' society, it would be essential for emigrating Jews to engage in some sort of productive labour.

The vision of pioneers returning to build a new society with their own hands gained support from outwith 'labour-Zionism', as it served to confirm the doctrine of the Chosen People returning to the Promised Land. The idea of a 'return' rather than conquest is an important element of Zionist ideology, often used to indicate the legitimacy of the Israeli state. As Khader points out, it is based on a perception of Palestinian history which erases all but the times when Palestine was ruled by the Hebrews (i.e. until the destruction of the Temple in 70 A.D.) or by the Israelis (Khader: 1981: p.2).

Feeding into the developing 'labour-Zionist' tendency were attempts made by theorists such as Borochov and Syrkin to synthesise elements of Marxist theory and Zionist thought. Borochov's argument was that the Jewish working class was handicapped by the 'abnormal' Jewish social structure described previously. Because of this the Jewish proletariat was unable to engage in class struggle and the petit bourgeois masses could not see the need to join a proletarian struggle. In proposing a means of creating a 'normal' Jewish society, Zionism therefore appeared as a 'historical necessity' (Khader: 1976: p.113). The first priority suggested by Borochov was the creation of a Jewish agricultural and industrial proletariat; a situation which could only be brought about by having political autonomy within a territory. Unlike many Zionist theoreticians, Borchov recognised that the territory in question was already inhabited. However, he viewed the Palestinian population as having no particular economy or culture and as not constituting a nation. He concluded that the Arab population was not to be subjugated or colonised but would be assimilated culturally and economically as the Jewish initiative launched new 'conditions of production'.[3]

On emigrating to Palestine, the European Zionists were faced with the reality of its Arab inhabitants. To give some idea of the scale on which early Jewish migration took place, the total number of migrants between the years of 1882 and 1914 is estimated to be 60,000. In terms of land-holding, the number of Jewish settlements increased from 14 in 1895 to 71 in 1919, an increase from 0.5% of the land to 2.5% (Palestinian Statistical Abstract: 1980).

Zionist settlement had no immediate economic impact on the population of Palestine. Land which was acquired by the Jewish National Fund was placed under Jewish ownership in perpetuity and could only be worked by Jewish labour. In 1920 the General Federation of Hebrew Labour (Histadrut) was established as an over-arching union for Jewish workers in Palestine. The central tenets of the Histadrut are indicated by the nature of the two compulsory levies - one for 'Jewish labour', which collected funds for organising against the employment of Arab labour, and the second to fund a campaign for 'Jewish produce'. This was, in effect, a systematic boycott of Arab produce.

Organising around the principles of Jewish land, labour and produce was not seen by the 'labour-Zionists' as being inconsistent with socialist principles. The major difficulties facing the realisation of a socialist society in Palestine was stated by Tabenkin[4] as being "foreign capital, private enterprise and cheap Arab labour." (Flapan: 1979: p.202). Attention was focussed on existing Jewish settlements in Palestine which employed Arab labour at low wage rates and with poor conditions. Condemning this exploitation, the 'labour-Zionists' argued that the exclusion of Arabs from a Jewish sector would serve two purposes. Firstly, Jewish workers would be able to organise without competing against cheaper and

non-organised labour, and secondly, by forcing Arabs to seek employment only in the Arab sector, class conflict within Arab society would be stimulated. This is explained as the need to 'insulate the Jewish economy' from the cheaper Arab labour supply until Arab rates had risen to the same level as Jewish (Lucas: 1974). What this meant for the Arab labour supply was that they were excluded from owning renting or being employed on any land once it had passed into the hands of the JNF; as the Histadrut gained strength, they were increasingly excluded from Jewish enterprises so that those who had lost land could not find employment in Jewish concerns, and the Histadrut campaign for 'Jewish produce' meant that those who remained on the land could not sell their produce on the Jewish market.

For the 'labour-Zionist' settlers, their criticism of settlers exploiting native labour, and their insistence on the necessity for Jews to perform manual labour led to the impossibility of working out a relationship with the Arabs in Palestine once 'exploitation' had been rejected. In other words, at an ideological level the need for the separation of Jews and Arabs in Palestine was necessary for 'labour-Zionism' because the assumptions underlying the theory could not conceive of a relationship between the two which would be consistent with the ways in which socialism and Zionism were formulated. The only solution was the conception of a socialism which would be internal to a Jewish sector.

A similar kind of rationale underpins the kibbutz movement. Here, too, there is agenuine attempt to implement thinking about socialist relations, but the attempt is confined to the kibbutz in itself and cannot take account of the wider social system within which the kibbutz is located, nor of the means whereby kibbutzim were established.

The way in which the doctrines of 'labour-Zionism' came to be translated into practices in Palestine has been summed up as follows:

> The Jews who gloried in the name of Socialist worker interpreted brotherhood on a strictly nationalist, or racial basis, for they meant brotherhood with Jew, not with Arab. As they insisted on working the soil with their own hands, since exploitation of others was anathema to them, they excluded the Arabs from their regime... They believed in equality, but for themselves. They lived on Jewish bread, raised on Jewish soil that was protected by a Jewish rifle.
> (Abu Lughod, ed: 1971: p.220).

Palestine under the British Mandate

The Mandate for Palestine granted to Britain differed from the other Mandates being assumed by the victorious powers after the First World War. The Balfour Declaration was recognised in Article 2 of the Mandate, which charged the British Administration with the responsibility for "placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home". Article 4 of the Mandate made provision for the establishment of a 'Jewish Agency' which would be recognised as "a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home." The participation of the Jewish Agency in the administration was set out in Article 11 as the construction and operation "upon fair and equitable terms of any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country." (Hadawi: 1968: p.26).

Following the British entry into Jerusalem in 1917, a provisional structure had been set up by the Zionist settlers to operate as a means of government. The provisional committee gave way to Va'ad Haleumi (Assembly of Deputies) in 1920, and was formally ratified by Mandatory Regulation in 1927. The level of organisation is described by Quandt et al., as follows:

> The Zionist Organisation developed autonomous executive institutions in Palestine which paralleled the government departments, as well as a separate elected general assembly and executive....for the Jewish 'millet' (religious community)
>
> (Quandt et al: 1973: p.13).

For those who recognised its authority, Va'ad Haleumi could, for example, levy taxes, organise social, religious and educational life and acquire major economic concessions. Among the latter were the provision of hydroelectric power from the Jordan and Awja Rivers, extraction of mineral salts from the Dead Sea and drainage and settlement of the Hulah marshes.

In 1922-23, the Palestine Arabs rejected the British Mandate Administration's offer of a similar facility, and it has been suggested that this was because they hoped the Mandate would still be rescinded (Quandt et al: 1973: p.21). When the Arab leadership decided in the late 1920's to support the establishment of a council, it was opposed both by the Mandate Administration and by the Zionist organisations. The stumbling block was Arab opposition to the Mandate. The British Administration had already refused to recognise the Arab Executive and later, the Arab Higher Committee[6] as official representatives of the Arab population, in effect because neither could accept the stipulation that no resolution or statement would be issued which was contrary to the principles embodied in the Mandate, including the Balfour Declaration.

David Waines has suggested that the Palestinian response to the Mandate showed "unity of purpose, unity of goal, but never unity of action." (Aruri, ed: 1970: p.28). In order to explain why this was the case he considers the nature of the Palestinian leadership at the time of the Mandate. The leadership was mainly drawn from the large, urban-based land-owning families and mirrored factional rivalries, this being a continuation of the situation under Ottoman rule. Waines suggests that it was:

> natural that the nationalist movement should reflect the perspective of its leadership, and hence the particular class interests it represented .... The Palestinian leadership was a product of the times and was therefore no more or less reactionary or progressive simply because it failed than the leadership in other areas which succeeded.
> (Aruri, ed.: 1970: p.28).

Opposition to the Mandate during the 1920's was expressed in petition to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, and by dispatching delegations to bodies such as the British Colonial Office. There were occasional bouts of street fighting such as that in Jaffa in 1921 which prompted the appointment of the Haycroft Commission, and the anniversaries of the Balfour Declaration and of British entry into Jerusalem in 1917 were marked as days of mourning.

The rioting which took place in 1929 was ostensibly sparked off by the "... long-festering difficulties between the Muslim and Jewish communities over the Wailing Wall, which was legally Muslim property and sacred to Muslims ..." (Quandt et al.: 1973: p.30). Fighting broke out in several towns in the country and left around 250 people dead. It can be suggested that the rioting was related both to the inability of the Mandate authorities to deal with the grievances of the peasant population, and to the failure of the Arab leaders to obtain any meaningful concessions from the Administration.

The representation of the Mandate period in terms of the political confrontation of two national communities[7] is both misleading and analytically problematic, and Asad has identified some of the difficulties inherent in such an approach (Asad: 1976). In addition to basing an analysis on the criteria by which groups define themselves - thereby taking as given precisely that which requires explanation - such a representation is problematic in its treatment of 'national communities' as homogenous and undifferentiated entities.

The nature of the Palestinian Arab response to the Mandate Administration indicates the specific structure of the Palestinian social formation at that time, and the existence of classes with contradictory interests. Thus, for example, the rioting in 1929 was condemned by the Arab Executive. The inability and unwillingness of the Arab leaders to co-opt the full support of the peasantry in order to oppose the Mandate has been noted, as has the continual selection of the option of non-violent resistance by the Palestinian leadership. When the choice of violent protest was forced on them, the Arab leadership opted out of the struggle. This is clearly indicated in the part they played in the 1936 General Strike, where the promise of a British Royal Commission of Enquiry, and the intervention (by British request) of King Abdullah of Transjordan and King Ghazi of Iraq persuaded the Arab Higher Committee to call an end to the 6-month strike (People's Press: 1981).

While an understanding of the way in which different class interests operated within the Palestinian Arab community is important in considering why certain forms of protest emerged and not others, an explanation for the ineffectuality of this protest must be located in the developing power relations of Palestine under Mandatory rule. The political domination

of both Arabs and Jewish settlers by the Mandate authorities has led most writers to characterise the Mandate period as a struggle between two autonomous and mutually exclusive communities seeking independence from a colonial apparatus. The tendency to assume homogeneity has already been mentioned. A second problem arising from this conceptualisation is the assumption that the exercise of power has only one form - in other words that relations between the Mandate authorities, the Jewish settlers and the Palestinian Arabs can be reduced to the nature of the British Mandate Administration, and its treatment of two competing groups of equal status under its domination.

The first point to be made is that British interests in the region did not diminish with victory in the First World War. Khader considers the strategic importance of Palestine in the context of British foreign policy as being situated in the "hinterland of the Suez canal and on the transit route of the Iraqi Petroleum Company" (Khader: 1978: p.10). This latter point refers to the construction of a pipeline from the Iraqi oil-fields to Haifa, on Palestine's Mediterranean coast. As for the importance of the Suez canal, Hobsbawm has pointed out the relationship of Britain with its imperial possessions, whereby the 'Empire' was a set of economies dependent on and complementary to that of Britain itself. Each colony was to exchange its primary products: thus, wool for Australia, wheat and beef for Canada, gold and diamonds for South Africa. The importance of the Suez Canal within this system was as a major trade route (Hobsbawm: 1966: p.112).

The second point is the way in which the British Administration attempted to implement its obligations under the Mandate; in particular the implementation of the principles embodied in the Balfour Declaration. In a confidential memorandum, Lord Balfour had stated: "In Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country ... The Four Powers are committed to Zionism ..." (FO: 371/4183/2117/132187: 19.9.19). Zionism meant Jewish settlement. In 1918, Palestine had a population of about 700,000. Of these, 644,000 were Arabs, and 56,000 were Jews. A census was taken in 1922 which numbered the total population as 757,182 of whom 83,794 or 11.1% were Jewish. By the time of the second census in 1931, the total population was 1,035,821. The Jewish population was 174,610, or 16.9%. The 1944 population figures are estimates based on "Survey of Palestine" figures and the population growth rates, and indicate that the total population had reached 1,764,000, of whom 554,000 (30%) were Jewish (Government of Palestine: 1946: p.144).

The White Paper of 1939 marked a change in British policy. It stated that the obligations contained in the Balfour Declaration had been fulfilled and the Jewish National Home had been established. The White Paper then suggested that after a final quota of 75,000 Jewish immigrants over five years, immigration should stop, and that within this time the acquisition of land by Jews should be restricted. At the end of the five-year period, self-governing institutions should be set up. (Cmd. 6019: 17.5.39: p.34). The White Paper was issued during a wave of immigration (5th Aliya)[8] which brought over 200,000 immigrants to Palestine in 7 years. The 1935 Nuremburg laws had codified anti-Jewish legislation in Germany and played a large part in provoking the large-scale emigration of German Jews. The choice

of Palestine as a destination was facilitated by the restrictive immigration policies of many Western countries. Thus, for example, in 1935 the United States granted visas to 6,252 Jewish immigrants while the number entering Palestine was 61,854 (Khader: 1978: p.13).

The fifth Aliya was more than quantitavely important, however. The Mandatory system of classifying immigrants according to wealth indicates how immigrants in this period differed.

Table 3.1

Jewish Immigrants According to Wealth

YEAR	NUMBER OF CATEGORY 'A'*
1932	727
1933	3250
1935	6309
1937	1275
1939	1626
1941	314

* Category 'A' described those in possession of LP (Palestine pounds) 500 which was later raised to LP 1000. The figures shown above exclude dependents (Khader: 1978: p.14).

Investment of Jewish capital in industrial projects in Palestine amounted to LP 2,500,000 in the years 1930-32. Between 1933 and 1939 the amount invested reached LP 7,000,000. To give some idea of scale, investment in Arab enterprises during that decade never went above LP 704,000, which given the proportionate representation in the population is a large disparity (Khader: 1978: p.18).

The importance of this lies in the distortions resulting from the representation referred to earlier, whereby power relations in the Mandate period are reduced to the nature of the Mandate Authorities in the treatment of two competing groups, the equal status of which is taken as given. Asad has suggested that a different set of concepts is necessary; namely that with the establishment of European rule over Mandate Palestine, the preconditions were set for the implantation of a European capitalist sector, and that it is in terms of the articulation of a capitalist with a non-capitalist mode of production mediated by the colonial state that developing power relations can be understood (Asad: 1976).

The domination of the non-capitalist mode was expressed in the systematic flow of surplus from the Arab peasantry to the growing European community, and the political tension both within the Arab community and between it and the Zionist settlers and Mandate state. The process of surplus extraction was mediated by the Mandate apparatus and the non-productive Arab classes - in the case of the former via the maintenance of a fiscal structure which facilitated this process; in the case of the latter, as a result of the pattern of income and expenditure.

If this argument is extended, it may be possible to explain why, despite the efforts of the Jewish National Fund and its agencies, the area of land in Palestine held by Jews at the end of the Mandate in 1948 amounted to only around 6% of the total.[9] In 1940, the Mandate authorities restricted Jewish land-ownership to certain areas, comprising 35% of Palestine. However, it is certain that illegal land purchases and sales were made, as when the United Nations partition plan of 1947 was promoted, it included land held "illegally" by Jews in the Mandate-designated Arab

areas within the borders of the proposed Jewish state. In 1946, the Palestine Government estimated that while Jewish land-holding amounted to around 6%, "the Jews held over 15% of the cultivable area of Palestine." (Government of Palestine: 1946).

The form of Arab land-holding is of significance. The Royal Commission Report of 1937[10] indicates that the Zionists were aware that one of the obstacles in the way of land purchase was the pattern of communal land tenure among Arab peasants. (Report of the Palestine (Peel) Commission: 1937: p.268). Asad has discussed the importance of the Ottoman attempt to register titles in land for tax purposes as an instance of the intensification of the extraction of surplus from peasant producers, as the Land Code served to institutionalise and reinforce pre-existing relations of dependence. He quotes Smilianskaya on the actual way in which the Land Code was implemented:

> The villagers fearing that the registration was a preliminary to a call for military service, or for taxation purposes, falsified the returns, registering the property either in the name of the head of the tribe or in the name of a member of the family who would not be liable for military service. In practice they disregarded the titles granted ... and continued to farm on the 'musha'a' system, recognising the customary quota-holders as the real owners.
>
> (Asad: 1976: p.4).

It is interesting to note how legal forms originating in the capitalist industrialised countries come to be imposed. While the question of land registration and ownership makes sense, for example, given the requirements of the British socio-economic system, in Palestine earlier this century it is appropriate mainly as a means of implementing certain kinds of

policies consistent with the domination by a colonial state. In other words, it has no relevance to the internal dynamic of Palestinian society. A similar procedure was noted in Chapter One in the way in which Algerian land was expropriated by the French, and again Palestinian land in the West Bank under Israeli occupation. The latter case will be discussed in Chapter Four; for the time being, it is sufficient to note the application of a legality outwith the context within which it has developed.[11]

The kind of fiscal structure set up by the British Administration contributed to increasing peasant indebtedness, whether through the imposition of direct rural property tax or through indirect taxation, the burden of which fell on the poorer population. This resulted in increased dependence on the Administration as a source of credit, and constituted both a heightened dependence on the land as a means of paying off debt and a considerable incentive to sell the land. Khader notes that up until the early 1930's, of the total land sold to Jewish settlers, 88.6% was sold by absentee landowners. However, after 1932, the majority of land acquisitions were purchases from resident landowners (accounting for 62.7% of sales) or from indebted peasants. Of the total land acquired in the period 1933-36, 22.5% was acquired from peasants who were in debt (Khader: 1978: p.17).

Hadawi has argued that it is an indication of how strong resistance to Zionist settlement was, that land "was mostly purchased from Lebanese and Syrian absentee landowners living outside Palestine... in spite of the high prices offered and the legislation that was designed until 1939 to facilitate transfer of land to Jews." (Hadawi: 1968: p.28). On the meaning of land loss for a peasant population under colonial rule, Fanon

has said: "For a colonised people the most essential value, because the most concrete, is first and foremost the land: the land which will bring them bread, and, above all, dignity." (Fanon: 1978: p.34). Where land is the source of livelihood, to sell it to an organisation which precludes even the possibility of future employment on the land would mean the loss of the means of survival. As Stork has pointed out:

> For the peasants and poor workers of Palestine, the political conflict with the Zionists was felt most acutely and most frequently on an immediate economic level. It was not an abstract or mystical 'love of the land' that motivated the Palestinians to struggle against great odds, but their utter dependence on the land which was only reinforced by the pauperisation and sub-proletarianisation of the Zionist project.
>
> (Kayyali, ed.: 1979: p.216).

The worsening economic position of Palestinian Arabs under the Mandate was not restricted to agriculture. For example, Himadeh points out that:

> real wages of Arab labour, in September 1937, fell by 10 per cent as compared with wages in 1931, while wages of Jewish labour increased by 10 per cent ... Actual earnings in 1935 and 1937 decreased more than is shown by the index numbers of the daily wage rates, because of periods of unemployment and reduced hours of work...
>
> (S.B. Himadeh, quoted by Asad: 1976)

As the rural areas were depressed, unemployment rose in the towns - in 1935, in Jaffa alone, out of a population of 71,000, 2,270 were out of work. By 1936 this had reached 4,000. This was linked to decreasing Jewish unemployment. "The Jewish Frontier" noted:

> ...unemployment among Jews at the end of 1938 was much reduced owing to the replacement of Arab labour in plantations..... This year for the first time only Jewish workers are employed in Jewish owned orange groves.
>
> (Cited by Asad: 1976)

In 1947 the Report of the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) was issued.[12] As part of its summary, it stated: "There are considerable differences between the rates of wage for Arab and Jewish workers in similar occupations, differences in the size of investments and differences in productivity and labour costs" (UNSCOP: 1947). Khader notes that on average, a Jewish worker earned around one and a half times as much as an Arab worker. In some cases, such as for women employed in the manufacture of clothes, wages in the Jewish enterprises were as much as four and a half times higher (Khader: 1978: p.19).

The UN report maintains that this situation was the result of a lack of direct competition between the two groups. However, several points should be made. Increased capital investment in the 'industrial sector' during the 1930's was noted earlier, and this was facilitated by favourable tax concessions for large-scale enterprises, which were mainly Jewish. However, the definition of what constitutes an 'enterprise' may lead to the obscuration of important differences in the comparison of Jewish and Arab workers and enterprises during the Mandate. For example, it could not distinguish between the manufacture of clothes as craft manufacture supplementing the domestic peasant economy, and a factory mass-producing clothes for export.

In addition, such a comparison veils the kinds of changes which were taking place; changes which are illustrated by the following quote:

> A great transformation has taken place in the structure of enterprises, methods of production, and character of production. Home industries producing articles for trade have almost disappeared. What remains of these industries is limited practically to needlework in all its forms. The relative number of independent craftsmen in workshops or factories has increased. Traditional methods of production are giving way to machine production.
>
> (S.B. Himadeh, quoted by Asad: 1976)

This differentiation applies also to agricultural production.

Point 3 of the UN Report indicates this clearly:

> Arab agriculture is based to a considerable extent on cereal production and tends to be of a subsistence kind. Only about 20%-25% of Arab agricultural produce (excluding citrus) is marketed - Jewish agriculture is largely intensive and cash crop farming. About 75% of Jewish agricultural produce is sold on the market.
>
> (UNSCOP: 1947).

In arguing that while certain features of Israeli-Arab relations since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 have resembled a 'colonialist pattern', such a pattern was not evident during the Mandate period, Flapan compares land ownership in Palestine with several countries in North Africa which were subject to colonisation. Thus, for example, figures for Algeria in 1955 show that 10.3% of the population were European, and of the cultivated land, 40% was owned by Europeans. In Morocco in 1955, comparable figures indicate 6.7% of the population being European and owning 18% of the land. The figures for Palestine in 1946 show 34% of the population being European, owning 12% of the cultivated land (Flapan: 1979: p.195).

The extent to which Zionist settlement in Palestine depended on the acquisition of land and development of agriculture must therefore be questioned. Ruedy has suggested that the "...physical possession of, and intimate relationship to, the land by Jewish colonists were seen by them /i.e. Zionist settlers/ as the only certain method of possessing Palestine..." (Abu-Lughod, ed.: 1971: p.127).

As was suggested earlier in the discussion of 'labour-Zionism', this was an important ideological component of the way in which 'labour-Zionist' doctrine sought to establish settlement. However, in the same article Ruedy points out that most Jews actually settled in the cities, and there were never more than 19.3% of them on the land.

'Conquest of Labour' - the Histadrut

Having discussed the development of industrial enterprises and the increased investment of capital during the 1930's, we can now consider the way in which the Histadrut grew during the Mandate. The part it was to play was explained by Ben-Gurion as being "not only to organise the working class, but to create it, mould it and settle it in Palestine" (Weinstock: 1979). The campaign for "Jewish land, Jewish labour and Jewish produce" described earlier intensified during the 1930's. Flapan's explanation is that:

> The paradox of the situation was in the fact that Arab labour in the Jewish colonies increased ...due to the shortage of Jewish labour, in the rural sector in particular. The economic boom in towns... drew thousands of Jewish workers away from agriculture and no moral appeal to Zionist ideals and national interest could persuade the workers in the colonies and the new immigrants to renounce a higher standard of living and lucrative employment offered by the economic boom in the cities.
> (Flapan: 1979: p.205).

In 1933, the Histadrut organised a campaign to evict by force if necessary all Arabs employed in town-based Jewish enterprises. At the same time a nation wide picket of citrus groves employing Arabs took place. Through the 1920's proposals had been put forward within the Histadrut by parties such as Poalei Zion Left and Hashomer Hatzair for some form of joint Jewish/Arab trade union, originally based on a union

of separate 'national sections'. However, after 1929 the issue of '100% Jewish labour' was presented as an aspect of the need for increased Jewish immigration. At the Histadrut National Council in 1929, Ben-Gurion attacked the advocates of joint Jewish-Arab organisation by proclaiming: "... we do have to exploit this moment /after the riots of 1929/ for the consolidation of the Hagana /militia/ for speeding up our enterprise, and for the imposition of Jewish labour." (Flapan: 1979: p.204). Histadrut control of the labour exchanges ensured that policies for the hiring of exclusively Jewish workers in Jewish concerns were followed. As noted in the above quote, in 1929 the Histadrut was responsible for establishing an illegal militia, the Hagana, which by the time of the 1948 war had become an underground army. According to Lucas, the greater part of Histadrut finance during the Mandate came not from its members but from the labour movement of the United States (Lucas: 1974: p.123).

The Histadrut did not restrict itself to representing its members. During the Mandate years it began to establish an economic infrastructure according to the policy of a separate and autonomous Jewish sector in Palestine. Thus, for example, Tnuva was set up to market agricultural produce. This in turn provided more jobs for new Jewish immigrants as well as revenue for the Histadrut. The range of Histadrut activities is summed up by Maxime Rodinson as serving as "capitalist entrepreneur, banker, insurance agency, and landowner, and /it/ operated a kind of social security." (Rodinson: 1973: p.64).

As Nikitina has pointed out, Histadrut enterprises were patterned on joint-stock companies. The workers take no part in the management of Histadrut enterprises and have no share in the distribution of profits, although all Histadrut members are members of Hevrat Ovdim (The Workers' Commonwealth), as the economic branch is known (Nikitina: 1973: p.247). The Secretary-General of Hevrat Ovdim is reported to have described its philosophy as follows:

> We believe in socialist ownership - but a capitalistic way of management... (the workers' role is as).... laymen; they do not grasp the wider implications of running a business... But they contribute mightily in another field: they understand management's viewpoint much better and they pass this message on... generally without even thinking about it, to their fellow workers... The result? Strikes in our enterprises are few and far between...
>
> (Lockman: 1976: p.7).

By the time the State of Israel was proclaimed in 1948, the Histadrut was a major employer.[13] It has been described as "the state within a state" due to the diversity of economic interests and the control it has of important sectors of the Israeli economy. Appendix 2 details the various Histadrut holdings. Several of the enterprises characterised as 'partially-owned' are joint Histadrut-State concerns, for example Mekorot Water Company. The Solel Boneh Construction Company carries out over a quarter of all building in Israel, and engages in partnership in mixed enterprises. Nikitina notes that of 30 such enterprises, 15 were partnerships with private capital on a 50-50 basis; 7 were partnerships with state finance, where Solel Boneh invested over 50%; and 8 were jointly financed with foreign capital where Solel Boneh invested less than 50% (See Chapter Two).

Palestinian Arab Opposition to the Mandate

Thus, the Histadrut sought to achieve the exclusively Jewish structures proposed by the Zionist theorists by not only organising Jewish labour, but establishing enterprises in key sectors of the economy and setting up a network of educational, health and social facilities for the Jewish community in Palestine. It is ironic that the campaign for Jewish labour was strengthened by the Arab strike in 1936 and the subsequent Arab revolt.[14] Flapan has pointed out that for the Arab population, the strike was a political weapon used as a protest mainly against continuing Jewish immigration, and it did not reflect the economic interests of the Arabs: "It spelled economic ruin for the landowners citrus growers and merchants. It brought unemployment for Arab workers and caused great losses to the peasants..." (Flapan: 1979: p.220). The strike lasted for six months, during which time a total boycott of Jewish goods in the Arab sector was imposed and all other forms of economic contact between Arab and Jew were broken. A programme of civil disobedience began, including the non-payment of taxes and the stoppage of municipal government. The Mandate authorities reacted by announcing an increase in the immigration quotas, cutting all telephone and telegraph wires from Palestine to the surrounding Arab countries and initiating collective punishment. Two months after the strike began, Palestine was placed under martial law, and Zionist settlers were formed into night patrols, patrolling Palestinian villages.

As was suggested earlier, opposition to Zionist immigration had served to unite the Palestinian Arabs during the Mandate, although as Waines has noted, for the landowners this represented an attempt to resolve the question of political power whereas the peasantry struggled to alleviate

their economic problems (Aruri, ed.: 1970). At the end of the strike, the Arabs had gained the promise of a Royal Commission. Most of the Arab Higher Committee were deported. However, it was noted by a British Official that this served merely to eliminate all the 'responsible' local leaders who had been relied on to "control mobs, cool passions, and articulate grievances" (Kirkbride: 1956: pp.100-1).

The Royal Commission (Peel Commission) Report published in 1937 recommended the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and a Palestinian Arab state, both of which would remain under British control. It was later revealed that dicussions had taken place with Zionist leaders as to what boundaries would favour the Jewish community. As a measure of how this was done, Acre subdistrict was included in the Jewish sector. Its Jewish rural population was 0.001% (Quandt et al.: 1973: p.37). The Arab insurrection continued until 1939, despite measures taken by the Mandate authorities such as the destruction of 5,000 houses within a four month period, mass deportations and the execution of 148 prisoners in Acre prison alone (People's Press: 1981: p.49).

As an indication of how the Arab strike was seen by the Zionist settlers, Flapan quotes statements made at Mapai /Labour Party/ Political Committee meetings in July and August 1936. A strong current of opinion was against the return of any Arab workers to the Jewish sector and against the normalisation of economic relations. The General Strike had served to realise the Zionist aim of a 'closed' economy. Baur describes the economic benefit as follows:

The strike led to a paradoxical development in the Jewish community. Its economic independence was strengthened. The port of Tel Aviv was built, and the expansion of the port of Haifa was speeded up. Strategic roads were built, which were very useful to the Jewish community. Jewish agriculture no longer had to face the competition of abundant and cheap agricultural products, which the Jewish sector could not meet.

(Quoted by Zureik: 1979: p.62)

Arab jobs in sectors such as the railroads and shipping were taken over by Jewish workers, and an end to the renting of Arab houses had boosted the Jewish construction industry. The Zionist position is summed up by Ben-Gurion:

> Boycott was never our policy - Zionism is in favour of Jewish-Arab co-operation and a (declaration) of boycott will harm us abroad. The Arabs prepare now to declare an economic boycott against the Jews - I pray to God that they should do it...
>
> (Flapan: 1979: p.221).

The Nature of Zionist Settlement

It is due to the specific nature of Zionist settlement that by the mid-1940's under 10% of the land was owned by Jews. Flapan is correct in his comparison of the colonisation of Palestine and the colonisation of countries in the Maghreb in that Zionist settlement did not initially depend on land or 'native' labour. The final point in the United Nations report on Palestine in 1947 states that:

> The occupational structure of the Jewish population is similar to that of some homogenous industrial countries, while that of the Arabs corresponds more nearly to a subsistence type of agricultural society.
>
> (UNSCOP: 1947)

The sense in which Zionist settlement in Palestine represents a colony is in its position as an extension of European-centred capitalism as a production system and a power structure. It is for this reason that it is important to clarify the nature of enterprises set up by Zionist

settlers, and the nature of the agriculture which was carried out. The example of the manufacture of clothes was given earlier in order to highlight the difference between 'industry' as a supplement to a non-capitalist economy, and 'industry' as the introduction of capitalist forces and relations of production.

The establishment of kibutzim and moshavim are frequently used as examples of alternative forms of agricultural production. The kibbutz has been described by an Israeli Government-sponsored publication as: "....a voluntary socio-economic association founded on common property, production and work, on the one hand, and on common living arrangements on the other" Hashomer - Hatzair: 1960: p.2). While social relations may be communal, kibbutzim are an integral part of the development of capitalist agriculture in Palestine and later in the State of Israel.[15]

The land on which kibbutzim and moshavim were established was land leased from the Jewish Agency; the significance of this is pointed out by Warriner as follows:

> ...the farmers on the cooperative settlements are not free to cultivate or invest or sell except as dictated from above ..... Minor details of the farm operations are decided by a committee of the settlers, but every major decision as to production, technical methods of cultivation, and finance is taken by the experts of the Jewish agency...
> (Issawi, ed: 1966: p.68)

The aim of Zionist settlement in Palestine was the establishment of Jewish sovereignty, and it is through an examination of the particular historical circumstances of which this settlement was part that subsequent developments may be explained. The basis on which settlement was carried out has been summed up by Arthur Koestler as follows:

> ...one nation promised another nation the territory of a third nation: the nation to whom the promise was made was not a nation but a religious community, and the territory, at the time of the promise, belonged to a fourth nation...
> (Quoted by Khader: 1976: p.201)

Thus, a peculiar feature of Zionist settlement in Palestine was that the occupying forces and state administration were not the Zionists themselves but the British Mandate Authorities. Earlier, it was suggested that the fiscal policies implemented by the British administration served to facilitate the development of capitalist structures, which were Jewish, at the expense of non-capitalist, which were Palestinian Arab. It must be emphasised that this represents a coincidence of interests rather than a deliberate policy, and it is important not to reduce conflict at the level of the political to conflict arising from the articulation of a capitalist and non-capitalist mode of production.

The Mandate State

As has been suggested, the need for exclusively Jewish structures formed the basis of Zionist thinking and this was translated into organisations such as the Jewish National Fund, the Histadrut, Va'ad Haleumi - all designed to maintain a Jewish entity in Palestine. The way in which the native Palestinian Arab population was excluded, both as a factor in the original settlement proposals and in Palestine as settlement progressed has been discussed within the context of the colonial mode of thought of 19th century Europe and within Zionist discourse itself.

The conditions which permitted this exclusion to continue can be explained, to a large extent, by the fact that conflict arising, such as Arab protest at immigration, and peasant grievances, had to be managed by the Mandate State apparatus. In other words, the Zionist settlers did not have to conquer the native population and did not have to concern themselves at all with that population as that was the task of the 'Government'. Thus, for example, in a discussion of the 'land situation' by the Jewish Agency Executive in 1936, Ben-Zvi is quoted as saying that they should not be arguing to improve the conditions of the fellahin - that was the job of the government (Flapan: 1979: p.222).

The cost of this for the Mandate Administration is evident in the expenditure on defence. This reached as much as 36.6% of the total expenditure of all government services in the year of the Arab General Strike. Between 1933 and 1937 defence spending constituted 43.1% of the total increase on all items. It should be noted that this expenditure is concerned with maintaining an apparatus for 'defence' solely within Palestine (Asad: 1976: pp.5-7).

While it is argued that the operation of the Mandate State represented an important condition for the growth of exclusively Jewish economic, social and political concerns through its management of the native population, the operation of the Mandate apparatus must be seen in accordance with the interests of British Foreign Policy. British interests in the Middle East and their confluence with those of the Zionist movement at the beginning of this century were discussed in Chapter One. The discovery of oil and the need to ensure favourable conditions for its extraction sustained interest in the area and the outbreak of World War 2 made the

protection of the oil resources of the Gulf and the security of shipping routes imperative for the British war effort. In addition, an estimated one-third of all British troops had been drafted to Palestine during the Arab strike and rebellion.

The 1939 White Paper which attempted to impose a ceiling on Jewish immigration in preparation for the introduction of 'self-governing institutions' can therefore be seen not as British acquiescence to Arab demands made during the 1936-39 rebellion, but in consonance with the needs of the British State at that time. The Arab rebellion had been economically beneficial for the Jewish settlers and, as was noted, military aid had been given to the authorities in attempting to crush the insurrection. However, with the threatened curtailment of immigration contained in the 1939 White Paper and the announcement in 1940 that Jewish refugees would be diverted "to an alternative place of refuge in the Colonial Empire" (Sykes: 1973: p.223), British policy seemed directly opposed to Zionist aims.

Initially, Arab reaction to the White Paper was mixed, but the terms were eventually rejected. Zionist reaction was unanimously condemnatory. A general strike was called for the day after the publication of the White Paper and in the "Survey of Palestine" it is reported that Arab shops in Jerusalem were looted, the police were stoned when trying to maintain order and a British constable was shot (Government of Palestine: 1946: p.54).

In May 1942 the 'Biltmore Conference' was convened in New York. The conference served to establish a programme for the Zionist movement and to issue a series of demands to the British Government as a means of rejecting the 1939 White Paper. The most important resolution was that which demanded "the immediate establishment in Palestine of a Jewish Commonwealth as an integral part of the new democratic world". It was made clear that this was a thinly-veiled call for a Jewish state in all of Palestine. As for immigration, it was to be placed under the control of the Jewish Agency, and an autonomous Jewish military force was to be established under its own flag (Hadawi: 1968: p.12).

Flapan has suggested that the Biltmore Programme marked a change in Zionist policy: a change which was based on the assumption that the war would leave millions of Jews destitute and ready to emigrate to Palestine, as the Programme was issued before the horrors of Nazi genocide had become known (Flapan: 1979: p.282). With the conflict with the British administration in Palestine, Ben-Gurion stated:

> For my part, I had no doubt that the center of gravity of our political efforts had shifted from Great Britain to America, who was making sure of being the world's leading power and where the greatest number of Jews, as well as the most influential were to be found.
>
> (Bar-Zohar: 1968: p.69).

The End of the Mandate

The background to American interests in the Middle East has already been discussed, and the aim of US policy in the immediate post-war years has been describedas an attempt to "push Britain out of the area without inflaming Arab nationalism in the process" (People's Press 1981: p.61). Of the top five American corporations which had reaped the economic

benefits of a war economy, three were oil companies involved in the Middle East. In the course of the war, Britain had borrowed extensively from the United States to finance the war effort and had, in effect, mortgaged what remained of its empire. By the end of the war, US oil companies controlled 42% of the known oil reserves in the Middle East, the strategic and economic importance of which had become evident.

As was discussed in Chapter Two, American oil interests have not precluded American support for Israel, and the extent of this support is indicated in a 1944 Congress Resolution, when 411 of the 534 members called for America to back the establishment of a Jewish state (Halpern: 1961: p.325). Pressure was put on Britain by the US government to accede to Jewish Agency demands and permit unrestricted immigration to Palestine. During the war, military insurrection and sabotage had been carried out by the Hagana and groups such as Irgun and Lehi (the Stern Gang). The British authorities had detained around 2000 people from the Zionist community and refused to agree to Zionist demands. However, in 1947 Britain announced that the problem of Palestine would be taken to the United Nations.

The United Nations Special Commission on Palestine recommended partition such that 57% of Palestine would be a Jewish state inhabited by 498,000 Jews and 497,000 Arabs and 42% would be an Arab state whose population of 735,000 would include 10,000 Jews. Jerusalem was to be declared an international zone. While the partition plan was approved by the required two-thirds vote at the United Nations on 29th November, 1947, no plan for implementing partition existed. In December 1947, Britain announced that its troops would be withdrawn from Palestine by 15th May 1948 and this precipitated a Civil War between Zionist Settlers

and the Palestinian Arabs The latter had rejected partition on the grounds that the Jews constituted around one-third of the total population and owned around 6% of the land, yet under partition they stood to gain over half of Palestine including the most fertile lands.

Zionist acceptance of the partition plan has been represented as a compromise of the Biltmore Programme, as indicated by the readiness to accept less than the total area of Palestine.[16] However, by the beginning of May 1948 Jewish forces controlled most of the territory assigned to a Jewish state by the United Nations, and were moving into Arab areas. By April 1948, an estimated 30,000 Palestinians had left the country and an unknown number were refugees inside Palestine itself.

In 1943, General Hurley (Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in the Middle East) had reported that:

> The Zionist organisation in Palestine has indicated its commitment to an enlarged programme for:
>
> 1. A sovereign Jewish State which would embrace Palestine and probably eventually Transjordan.
>
> 2. An eventual transfer of the Arab population from Palestine to Iraq.
>
> 3. Jewish leadership for the whole Middle East in the fields of economic development and control.
>
> (Government of the United States of America: 1964: Vol. 4., pp.776-7)

In this report, the territorial ambitions of the Zionist movement are made clear, as is the part which the future Jewish state was expected to play in the Middle East. As for the 'transfer' of the Arab population, the idea had been revived in Jewish Agency discussions about Mandate proposals to introduce legislation in 1936 which would preserve minimum land-holdings for Arabs. Before this, the idea of transference had retained some notion

of a voluntary abandonment. However, in 1940 the head of the Jewish Agency's Colonisation Department wrote:

> There is no room for both peoples together in this country... We shall not achieve our goal of being an independent people with the Arabs in this small country. The only solution is Palestine, at least Western Palestine /i.e. west of the River Jordan/ without Arabs... And there is no other way but to transfer the Arabs from here to the neighbouring countries, to transfer all of them: not one village, not one tribe should be left.
> (Weitz: 1965: Vol. 2, p.181)

Within one week in April 1948 the Arab population of Jaffa (which had been included in the UN proposed 'Arab state') was reduced from 80,000 to 3,000. Following the flight of the population, it was reported that: "... the soldiers commenced to loot in wholesale fashion... Everything that was movable was carried from Jaffa... What could not be taken away was smashed ..." (Kimche: 1950: p.233). By 15th May 1948, when British troops were withdrawn from Palestine, an estimated 300,000 Palestinians were refugees (People's Press: 1981: p.71). The State of Israel was proclaimed on the date of British withdrawal and was rapidly recognised by both the United States and the Soviet Union. As was noted in the introduction, it was a state without fixed frontiers, and the offensive continued. O'Ballance describes this as follows:

> The Arab inhabitants were ejected and forced to flee into Arab territory, as at Ramleh, Lydda and other places. Wherever the Israeli troops advanced into Arab country, the Arab population was bulldozed out in front of them.
> (O'Ballance: 1956: pp.171-2)

The newly-formed League of Arab States took a decision to send Arab armies to Palestine. Flapan notes that the:

> ... David and Goliath legend surrounding the birth of Israel ... /was based on the belief that/ one community of 600,000 with local defence confronted five regular armies of the Arab states. This image was to a large extent deceptive...
> (Flapan: 1979: pp.317-8).

Quandt et al. describe the:

> ...intervention of a small number of regular army troops from surrounding Arab states, most notably Egypt and Transjordan. In no sense was this a massive, coordinated onslaught. In fact, inter-Arab rivalries seriously affected the conduct of the war.
> (Quandt et al.: 1973: p.48).

The Transjordanian Arab Legion was still under British command - 45 of its 50 officers were British.[17] It has been suggested that a series of agreements had been reached between Emir Abdullah and the British; between the Arab Legion and the Hagana; and between Abdullah and Golda Meir, which arranged for the annexation of part of the designated 'Arab' area of Palestine by Transjordan, conditional on the Arab armies not attacking Jewish settlements.[18] In any event, formal armistice agreements were concluded in July 1949 leaving Israel in control of over 77% of the area of Palestine instead of the 57% allotted to the 'Jewish state' under the UN partition plan. An additional 450,000 Palestinians were now refugees, bringing the total number to 750,000 (Hadawi: 1968: p.61). Around 120,000 Palestinian Arabs remained in what was now the State of Israel. The West Bank was occupied by the Arab Legion and formally annexed in 1950 in the creation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, while the Gaza Strip was occupied by Egypt and placed under Egyptian administration.

A great deal has been written about the Palestinian 'exodus' during the 1948 war, and explanations of it range from propositions that Arab leaders ordered mass flight, to emphasising the mood of failure and terror due to the relative lack of Arab organisational response to Zionist

effectiveness.[19] What is inescapable is that at the conclusion of the armistice agreements, a territory which had had an Arab population of over 1¼ million was virtually emptied of that population, and machinery was quickly established for sustaining this. Joseph Weitz recounts a conversation with Moshe Shertok (Sharrett) of the Israeli Foreign Ministry:

> Transfer - post factum: should we do something so as to transform the exodus of the Arabs from the country into a fact, so that they return no more?... His /Shertok's/ answer: he blesses any initiative in this matter. His opinion is also that we must act in such a way as to transform the exodus of the Arabs into an established fact.
> (Weitz: 1965: Vol. 3, p.293).

The Palestinian exodus took the negation of the Palestinian 'natives' to the level of physical exclusion. The creation of political, social and economic institutions which were specifically for Jews had entailed the exclusion of the non-Jewish population, and formalised the ideological negation of the Palestinian people which was implict in the political vision of a Jewish entity. This formulation encapsulates the violence of the Palestinian encounter with Zionism. It is a violence which in different moments has meant ideological non-existence and physical displacement. Chapter Four will examine the particular issue of land and settlement as an instance of the colonial relationship in operation, and the way in which the expropriation of Arab lands and properties has served to institutionalise the exclusion of Palestinians from the State of Israel.

NOTES

1. While the idea of the 'return' had always had a religious significance for Jews, the Zionist movement was attempting to make it into a political reality. This was not unanimously approved by Jewish populations. Khader quotes a statement issued by the Conference of Orthodox Jews in Pittsburgh in 1885 stating:

> We no longer consider ourselves a nation, but a religious community. Thus, we are awaiting neither a return to Palestine, nor the restoration of the sacrificial cult of the sons of Aaron, or anything else concerning the Jewish state.
> (Khader: 1976: p.109)

The Law of Return, passed in the Israeli Knesset in 1953, provides for any Jew to claim immediate Israeli citizenship and residence without necessarily relinquishing previous citizenship. However, opposition has continued, and the Jewish Neturei Karta movement, for example, are opposed to the very idea of a Jewish state, arguing that "... the creation of a secular, so-called Jewish state is treason to the Jewish people... the Holy Land is and always has been beloved by religious Jews and that land, and the city of Jerusalem, are mentioned innumerable times every single day in prayers said by Jews everywhere... they have nothing to do with the atheists who founded the State of Israel or with their state..." (Printed from a radio broadcast on Station WBAI - FM New York, 27.8.69)

2. The importance of 'labour-Zionism' is that it provided the ideological frame within which the institutions were established which were to become the backbone of the State of Israel, and also was the political tendency which provided Israel's leaders for the first forty years.

3. Borochov's concept of 'conditions of production' was intended to supplement Marx's 'relations of production'.

4. Itzhak Tabenkin was one of the founders of the Legion of Labour (Gdud Avoda) which envisaged the immediate realisation of Zionism as a socialist society through the establishment of kibbutzim.

5. Flapan suggests that competition was made more difficult in that the new immigrants were generally unaccustomed to manual labour and to conditions in the continent they had come to settle. (Flapan: 1979: p.200).

6. The Arab Higher Committee was established in April 1936, with Hajj Amin al-Husseini as president. It served to loosely unite the political groupings which had divided on the dissolution of the Arab Executive in 1934 and acted as a coordinating body for the organisations and societies participating in the 1936 General Strike.

7. See, for example, Israel, Palestine and Socialism by Mervyn Jones (1970), where his definition of Zionism as a nationalist ideology and subsequent conceptualisation of 'nationalist ideologies' lead him to argue on the question of whether the Jewish people constitute a nation. The answer, however, is implicit in the way in which he defines his terms.

8. 'Aliya' is literally 'ascension' and was used to describe Jewish immigration to Palestine, and later to the State of Israel.

9. Hadawi's estimate, calculated from Government of Palestine statistics is 5.67% (Hadawi: 1968: p.28). Ruedy has calculated the percentage of cultivable land as 9-12% (Abu-Lughod, ed.: 1971: p.134).

10. A Royal Commission on Palestine, known as the Peel Commission, was appointed in May 1936 to investigate the causes of unrest. Its findings, published in July 1937, declared that the Mandate's obligations were irreconcilable and recommended partition into a Jewish state and an Arab state, the latter to be united with 'Transjordan'. The plan failed, but the principle of partition was established (Cmd. 5479, 1937: cited by Flapan: 1979; p.239).

11. Noting the application of the Israeli tax system to East Jerusalem after the 1967 war, Hirst points out that it was inapplicable to East Jerusalem:

> "Israel, unlike Jordan, has a high-taxation economy - high wages with a high rate of fiscal recovery. Were the librarian in Saladin Street, the little grocer in the Old City, the civil servant from Shaikh Jarrah really the same, for tax purposes, as their counterparts in Western Jerusalem? Could the Arab citizen who had no assistance for educating his children or building his house on an instalment plan be put on the same footing as the Israeli who enjoyed welfare services from the cradle to the grave?"
>
> (Hirst: 1977: p.239).

12. This report picked up the idea of partition after Britain had announced its intention to relinquish the Mandate, and was the basis of the United Nations 1947 Partition Plan, voted on 29th November, 1947.

13. See Elia T. Zureik, The Palestinians in Israel: a Study in Internal Colonialism, pp.60-64, for a discussion of Histadrut activities during the Mandate.

14. For an account of the 1936 strike, see Barbara Kalkas, The Revolt of 1936: A Chronicle of Events in Abu-Lughod, ed.: 1971. Also, Ghassan Kanafani The 1936 Revolt: Details, Analysis and Background, PFLP Bulletins, 1974-75.

15. Settlements have been engaged in the production of exchange-values, which has led many to expand into manufacturing, labour often being supplied by the Arab population.

16. The 22nd Zionist Congress in Basle in December 1946 rejected the idea of participating in negotiations with the British over partition, and deposed Weizmann as leader (Flapan: 1979: pp.289-95).

17. For an account of the 1948 war from the memoirs of a British Commander of the Arab legion, see Sir John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, (1957).

18. For an account of the agreements which were struck at this time, see Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians.

19. Rodinson suggests that the main cause for the exodus was similar to that operating in Spain during the Civil War - simply to get away from the theatre of military operations (Rodinson: 1982: p.45). The fear of Jewish terrorist groups also played a major part, for example after the massacre of Deir Yassin, although the Jewish ruling bodies condemned such acts.

Chapter Four

LAND & SETTLEMENT AS A FORM OF DOMINATION

Chapter Four

It was argued in Chapter Three that during the Mandate years the make concern of the Zionist enterprise was the building of exclusively Jewish structures in Palestine, and that the Mandate apparatus facilitated this process, for reasons which must be located in the conjuncture of British interests in the area and the interests of the settlers. A suggested means for the ideological and practical exclusion of Palestinian Arabs by the Zionist settlers was that the responsibility for governing lay not with the settlers but with the Mandate Authorities, so that conflict arising from colonisation, such as the Arab General Strike of 1936, did not have to be dealt with by the settlers but by the state.

British withdrawal from Palestine and the Zionist successes in the 1948-49 war permitted, with the establishment of the State of Israel, the consolidation of the exclusionary fabric as the Zionists realised their aspirations for sovereignty in Palestine. Instances of the ways in which aspects of visionary Zionism were translated into organisations and strategies have been discussed; vision, however, is more than an idealistic dream in this context. The vision of a sovereign Jewish entity in Palestine incorporated a view of the native population in the way in which it negated that population. Thus the significance of the vision is that the exclusion of the Palestinian Arabs becomes the policy for dealing with the Palestinian Arabs - for example, when Weitz says "There is no room for both peoples together in this country", in speaking from within the Zionist concensus at that time, and holding the position of Director of the Jewish National Land Fund (see Chapter Three), his comments can be seen both as constituting elements of policy and as indicating the way in which the Zionist constituency conceived of its relationship with the indigenous population.

The logic of the Zionist thesis that the colonisation of Palestine was to be accomplished for and by Jews can be seen in the way in which Israel developed as a polity. The attention paid to Jewish self-betterment, the need for safety after the horrors of Europe during World War 2, the concern to fuse a 'national identity' and an 'Israeli culture', Ben-Yehuda's work on forging Hebrew as a common language - all have entailed the nullification of non-Jews. As Edward Said has noted:

> There are Zionism and Israel for Jews, and Zionism and Israel for non-Jews. Zionism has drawn a sharp line between Jew and non-Jew; Israel built a whole system for keeping them apart.....
>
> (Said: 1980: p.107).

Mechanisms of Expropriation

The political and economic significance of property belonging to Arabs who had fled in the course of the 1948-49 War was discussed in Chapter Two, and the magnitude of Arab property-holding in what became the State of Israel was noted. The mechanism whereby Israel ensured that this property could not revert to its owners was the formalisation of procedures which had been operating since before the establishment of the state, by incorporating these procedures into new legal statutes. For example, the Absentee's Property Law of 1950 provided legislation to continue the work of the Committee for Arab Property in the villages which had been set up at the beginning of 1948 to deal with Arab possessions which fell into Zionist hands in the course of the 1948 war. In July 1948 this function was taken over by the appointment of a General Custodian of Absentees Property, the office of which marked the beginning of large-scale land expropriation and the use of legal instruments to promote this.

To give one example of this process, Sabri Jiryis has described the operation of the Development Authority (Transfer of Property) Law, passed in 1950, which stipulated that:

> ....the authority could release property in its control.... on condition that it be offered for sale first to Keren Keymeth /Jewish National Fund/. While these formal arrangements were being made, ownership of the land was transferred from one Israeli organisation to another...On September 29, 1953, the custodian of absentee property signed over his 'rights' to all the land he was responsible for, in return for a 'price' to be paid by the development authority. This sum was then returned to the authority in the form of a loan.
>
> (Jiryis: 1976: p.78).

These complicated transactions are an indication of the concern in the new Israeli state to develop 'legal' procedures to deal with the Arab population and the property they left behind. However, the definition of 'absentee' on which the laws were based backdated the time from which absentee status could be conferred to the date of the United Nations decision on partition - 29 November, 1947. Peretz explains the effects of this as follows:

> Every Arab in Palestine who had left his town or village after November 29, 1947, was liable to be classified as an absentee.... The thirty thousand Arabs who fled from one place to another within Israel, but who never left the country, were also liable to have their property declared absentee. Any individual who may have gone to Beirut or Bethlehem for a one-day visit during the latter days of the Mandate, was automatically an absentee.
>
> (Peretz: 1958: p.152).

A similar construction of legality has taken place on the West Bank, which as a militarily-occupied territory is technically still under the jurisdiction of the previous Jordanian legal system. Jordanian law can be amended by order of the Israeli Military Governor, and Military Order

No. 10 of July 23, 1967 is virtually identical to the Absentees' Property Law enacted inside Israel. This order, entitled "Abandoned Property of Private Individuals Order" defines as abandoned property all where "the legal owner or occupier of which left the Region /for any reason/ on or before the appointed date /operative date of 7.6.1967/ or subsequently thereto..." (Report of the National Lawyers' Guild: 1977: p.6). As under the Israeli law, Military Order No. 10 created a 'Military Custodian of Absentee Property' under the aegis of whom the classification of those to whom this law can be applied has been further expanded. In the initial form, property was taken to be abandoned if the owner was in a 'hostile' country. According to the Report of the National Lawyers' Guild, the working definition now includes all property owned by persons resident outwith the area - a considerable amount, as it has been estimated that the holdings of West Bank Palestinians who are living neither in the West Bank nor in a 'hostile' Arab country amount to over 100,000 acres of land and 11,000 houses (Report of the National Lawyers' Guild: 1977: p.6).

Once property has been passed into the hands of the Military Custodian then it is very difficult for it to be regained, largely because of the difficulty for West Bank residents who left during the 1967 war to re-enter the area. Immediate application to return was made to the Israeli Government by 150,000 people out of an estimated 420,000 who left, and of these only some 14,000 have been permitted to return. Gerson has noted that:

> Repatriation of refugees to their homes, once in possession of the Custodian of Enemy Property, / sic / has been permitted only in very limited circumstances.... the military has not excluded the use of absentee property for its own purposes. (Gerson: 1978: p.141).

One of the limiting circumstances has been previous residence in Jerusalem. The detail of the way in which the status of Arab Jerusalem was changed following its annexation at the conclusion of the 1967 war will be discussed later in this chapter; for the time being, it can be noted that no application to return has been accepted from a citizen of Jerusalem (Schleifer: 1972: pp.218-9). The same strictures have been applied to refugees who had already been displaced in 1948. According to a report by the International Red Cross, none of the 1948 refugees who had been displaced for a second time in 1967 were permitted to return to the West Bank (International Committee of the Red Cross: 1971: p.448).

Expropriation of Land

While similar practices can be seen in colonisation inside Israel after 1948 and in the West Bank after 1967, it can be misleading to overrate Israeli exceptionalism. Salim Tamari has suggested that the extension of what may have been true in one epoch to succeeding epochs is commonly presented in the depiction of Jewish colonisation as having a fixed character; namely, that the impact of Zionism can be reduced to the displacement of peasants from their land (Nakhleh & Zureik, eds.: 1980). Such a reduction treats the Palestinian population as constant objects of a process, and ignores the changing conditions and realities within which Israeli policies are formulated.

An instance of the latter is given in a consideration of the expropriation of property from Arabs remaining within Israel after 1948 and expropriation of land in the West Bank since 1967. Institutionalized means of property deprivation were not restricted to 'abandoned' property after 1948 and a series of laws were passed which effectively provided for the

dispossession of Arabs remaining in Israel. These have been fully documented and will not be reproduced here.[1] As an illustration of how the various laws operate, the village of Ikrit in Western Galilee was occupied by Israeli forces in October 1948 with no opposition from its inhabitants. A week later, Emergency (Security Zones) Regulations were applied and the villagers ordered to evacuate to Central Galilee for two weeks. After two years of negotiation, the Ikrit villagers appealed to the Supreme Court and in 1951 were granted permission to return to their villages. This was followed by a month of referral between the military governor and the Minister of Defence leading to a second appeal in the Supreme Court. However, before the case could be heard, the Israeli army blew up all the houses in the village. The expropriation of the village's lands - 15,650 dunums - was announced shortly afterwards (Jiryis: 1976: p.92). The case of Ikrit is no isolated example.[2] According to research carried out under the auspices of the Israeli League of Human Rights, of the 475 Palestinian villages existing before 1948, some 385 have been destroyed.[3]

Areas classified as 'security zones' included a strip along the border, almost half of Galilee, the entire Triangle and a corridor along the Jerusalem-Jaffa railway line. This covered much of the remaining Arab population. In addition, areas could be declared 'closed' and entry forbidden except by the permission of the army Chief of Staff or the Minister of Defence. As land in 'closed' areas necessarily remained uncultivated, the Minister of Agriculture, under the Emergency Regulations (Cultivation of Waste Lands) Ordinance of 1949 was empowered to "assume control of the land in order to ensure its cultivation". The final step was the official transfer of land and property to the State of Israel and its various agencies.[4]

The basis for the laws providing for land expropriation and for the continuing military government to which the Arab population were subjected until 1966 were the Defence Regulations promulgated by the Mandate Administration: regulations which were strongly condemned by Zionists living under them. It is ironic that the application of Defence Regulations by the Mandate Administration elicited the following response from the Hebrew Lawyers' Union in 1946:

> The powers given to the ruling authority in the emergency regulations deny the inhabitants of Palestine their basic human rights. These regulations undermine the foundation of law and justice, they constitute a serious danger to individual freedom and they institute a regime of arbitrariness without any judicial supervision (Zureik: 1979: p.120).

Of the Mandate Regulations, Article 125 has been applied in Israel, and continues to be applied in the West Bank. It states that:

> A Military Commander may by order declare any area or place to be a closed area ... Any person who, during any period in which any such order is in force.... enters or leaves that area or place without a permit in writing issued by or on behalf of the Military Commander shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.[5]

On the West Bank, Article 125 is incorporated in Article 90 of the Security Provisions Order. It has been used in a similar way to the Israeli "Cultivation of Wastelands" law, in that under Jordanian law, land which is not used for cultivation for three consecutive years must be re-registered with the government. Areas can therefore be declared 'closed' and then confiscated by applying Jordanian law (Report of the National Lawyers' Guild: 1977: p.5). As for land purchases in the West Bank, after 1967 the Israeli Government delegated authority to the Jewish National Fund and the Israel Land Authority to purchase land in the occupied territories. There is no official information on how much land has been purchased.

According to the Jerusalem Post, in April 1973 the ILA reported that it had acquired a total of 30,000 dunums in the West Bank excluding Jerusalem, with an additional 18,000 dunums inside Jerusalem municipality.[6] The JNF reported 10,000 dunums purchased in the West Bank ('Jerusalem Post': 9.4.73). David & Lehn have reproduced an announcement made on Radio Israel quoting the claim of the Director of the JNF that during 1975-6, the JNF had spent IL 50 million ($6.6 million) on land and occupied territories.[7]

Land purchase in the West Bank on behalf of the Jewish National Fund is carried out by a wholly-owned JNF subsidiary, Hemnutah Company. The latter was registered as a company in Palestine in 1938 in order to provide a means of investment in Palestine for German Jews (Davis & Lehn: 1978: p.31)- In 1971 Hemnutah was registered as a "private company limited by guarantee" under the Jordanian Companies Law, with a head office in Bethlehem and the minimum required share capital. Davis and Lehn point out that the device of registering as a foreign company utilised by Hemnutah, with registration in both Israel and the West Bank, was also employed by the JNF which registered in England and in Israel (Davis & Lehn: 1978: p.32).

In the early years of the occupation of the West Bank, private purchase of land by Israeli citizens or companies was illegal. However, it has been pointed out that,many sales took place especially around Jerusalem. This was done either by granting an irrevocable power of attorney and postponing the registration of the transfer until such time as the government would permit private land transactions and may retrospectively authorize them, or by using intermediaries. In the case of the former, Davis and Lehn suggest that land purchased by Hemnutah has not been registered, and that under Jordanian law No. 51 an irrevocable power-of-attorney is valid and binding only if notarized and exercised within 5 years of the

date of notarization (Davis & Lehn: 1978: p.30). In the case of the latter, Ruedy has stated:

> The government often uses intermediaries to cover its purchases so that the seller does not know he has sold to Israelis. Transactions are not publicly recorded... As a result of this quieter program of acquisition, Israelis own propoerty in Ramallah, Hebron, Nablus, Tulkarm, Jericho and all over the populated heartland of the West Bank.
> (Report of the National Lawyers' Guild: 1977: p.7).

The area of land registered in the name of "Arab agents" has been estimated as several hundred thousand dunums (Gerson: 1978: p.142). In spite of the punishment for illegal land transactions having been five years imprisonment or a fine of IS 14,000[8] it was reported that: "... it seems that the Military Government ignores all these illegal transactions ... as far as is known not one of the thousands who bought land has been brought to trial." ('Ha'aretz': 4.4.73).

Military Order 59 (1967) gives the Military Custodian of Absentee Property the authority to declare any plot of land state property, it being "the responsibility of the owners to prove the opposite" ('Al Fajr': 4.2.83). The NLG Report describes the way in which Israel has denominated miri land as 'public domain'. This is land held under Ottoman law for common cultivation by villagers, and in addition could be subdivided to village families for cultivation.[9] Its status is explained as follows:

"Although technically state land, the state has no rights of usage to miri land. Such land passes by inheritance to heirs but cannot be transferred by will." (Report of the National Lawyers' Guild: 1977: p.7).

As an example of how MO 59 has been implemented, in February 1983 43,000 dunums in the village of Yatta (near Hebron) were declared 'state land' and expropriated under this order. The land in question had been registered during Ottoman times in the names of 64 residents of Yatta, each representing a village family. In addition, the land was re-registered in 1951 on an individual basis under a Jordanian land registration scheme. ('Al Fajr': 11.2.83). According to other sources, by 1973 730,214 dunums of 'cultivated public land' in the West Bank had been expropriated under this order (Gerson: 1978: p.189).

It was suggested in Chapter Three in discussing the application of law on Arab land ownership and tenure by the Mandate Administration that the logic of such application can be understood only as a feature of domination, as the legal forms are not consonant with the form of property ownership to which they are being applied. Inside Israel this dissonance is evident in, for example, the treatment of Waqf property.[10] The definition of land in the West Bank as 'state land' as proposed by Military Order No. 59 is further complicated by the system of land registration in the area. A spokesman for the World Zionist Organization, Ze'ev Ben-Yosef, has been quoted as describing WZO activities in the West Bank as "making order out of chaos" (The Guardian: 4.2.82). His contention is that due to the corrupt inefficiency of the Ottoman empire, only half of the West Bank land is registered and therefore Arabs are cultivating and building on land which does not belong to them. Unregistered plots can be declared 'state land' and unless documentary evidence of ownership can be produced there is no recourse to the courts and no right to compensation.

According to Shehadeh, land was registered in the West Bank only if the title was disputed - the procedure of settling land disputes was by a settlement court which recognised the right of one of the parties to the land. Only about a third of West Bank land has been registered in this way (Shehadeh: 1980). In addition, Military Order 291 abolishes this system so that, in effect, there is no means whereby West Bank land can be registered. The point is that the demands made by the Military Government for proof of 'ownership' of land represent the transplantation of legal definitions - such ownership does not exist in terms of West Bank (Jordanian) law, or practice.[11]

Perhaps the most common means of land expropriation in the West Bank is to declare it necessary for reasons of 'security'. The discretionary powers of the Military Governor in interpreting what constitutes security requirements are wide, and it is part of the nature of security that a definition need not be given.

Earlier it was suggested that it was important not to reduce Israeli policies and rationales to an action having an ahistorical character. While the similarities in Israeli treatment of Palestinian Arab property in Israel after 1948 and in the West Bank after 1967 can be seen in, for example, the way a form of legality is constructed to provide for the expropriation of property, the context within which this occurs may differ as may the meaning it has for the people against whom this particular legality operates. In order to illustrate this, we can consider how settlements were established inside Israel and on the West Bank.

Settlements

> ....there exists in the JNF a method for legally metamorphosing 'neglected' land into the property of the Jewish people. Once Jewish settlements are built and peopled, and once they are hooked into the state network, they become properly extra-territorial, emphatically Jewish, and non-Arab. To this new land is added as well a strategic rationale, that it is necessary for Israel's security.....their effectiveness lies in how they Judaize territory coterminously with de-Arabizing it.
>
> (Said: 1980; p.99)

This quote illustrates what was commonly called in Israel the "creation of facts". While it has been argued that before 1948 the establishment of settlements was not a necessity for the Zionist movement, "creating facts" has been an important strategy for the Zionist state, both inside Israel and in the territories occupied in 1967.

Inside Israel post-1948, the "strategic rationale" behind the settlement programme can be seen in their location in border areas and in the remaining centres of Arab population - Galilee, the Triangle and the Negev. The meaning of strategy and security can be illustrated by the kind of functions settlements were supposed to perform. In proposing rapid settlement in Galilee, the head of Keren Keymeth pointed out in a memorandum to the then Minister of Defence, Ben-Gurion, that this would involve:

"....creating faits accomplis which will make it impossible for the government, for all its good intentions, to give up any of the uncultivated land for the Arabs to live on" (Jiryis: 1976: p.106). According to his reasoning, it was important to build settlements in areas which did not have a Jewish majority in order to remove any future question regarding rights to sovereignty.[12]

The "security" aspect of settlement at this time was as a means of controlling the remaining Arab population. The "Project for the Development of Galilee" (originally called "Project for the Judaization of Galilee") was intended to "...break up this concentration of Arabs through Jewish settlements... The Arab minority centred here presents a continual threat to the security, of the nation..." (Quoted by Jiryis: p.105), and in the late 1950's a decision was made to 'graft' a Jewish town onto Arab Nazareth with the aim of eventually creating a Jewish majority. In 1962-3 land belonging to the villages of Deir al-Asad, Bi'na and Nahaf were confiscated for the construction of the city of Karmiel, a city in which non-Jews are not permitted to purchase apartments nor to invest in its Industrial Park (Amun et al.: 1977: pp.46-8). As Davis has noted, the designation of development areas in Israel, graded 'A', 'B' and 'Others', cover most of the Arab villages in Galilee and the Triangle, yet no Arab village has been classified as a development settlement and so cannot benefit from the privileges this bestows (Davis & Mezvinsky, eds.: 1973). For example, investors in Karmiel are granted subsidies and tax concessions as inducements to establish business in the town. The following quotation indicates the encouragement given to prospective residents in 'development areas':

> Upper Nazareth is a development city, with all the financial benefits this entails. Its establishment is aimed at giving a 'Jewish answer' to empty Galilee, to populate it by Jews. Among the benefits given to those who want to settle in the city are special housing terms. Young couples who come to settle in this city receive loans at advantageous conditions and special mortgages. Such housing for young couples is limited by several conditions. One of them ... is that only those who have served in the Israeli army are eligible....
>
> ('Al-Ha'mishmar Supplement': 8.12.78)

In spite of these benefits the target populations have not been reached. Karmiel, for example, was expected to have a population of 20,000 by the early 1970's, but by 1975/6 it remained slightly less than 10,000. However, the plans for 'Judaization' continue, being particularly clearly expressed in a report prepared for Prime Minister Rabin by the 'Arabist'[13] District Commissioner for Galilee, which was leaked and published by 'Al-Ha'mishmar' in 1976. Known as the 'Koenig Report', it proposes several solutions for the demographic problem posed by the higher birth rate among the Arab population. In Galilee, it suggests the necessity to:

> ...expand and deepen Jewish settlement in areas where the contiguity of the Arab population is prominent, and where they number considerably more than the Jewish population; examine the possibility of diluting existing Arab population concentrations. Special attention must be paid to border areas in the country's northwest and to the Nazareth region..... the state law has to be enforced so as to limit 'breaking of new ground' by Arab settlements in various areas of the country.
>
> (Quoted by Said: 1980: p.108).[14]

Security was the reason given for the initial settlement of the territories occupied in 1967. This was done by the establishment of 'Nahal' outposts, described by Gerson as 'paramilitary agricultural centers' (Gerson: 1978: p.135). The Israeli Government position at the end of the 1967 war was that civilian settlement in the occupied territories was illegal, as it contravened Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which states: "The occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies." Under the Convention, however, the establishment of 'security outposts' are permitted.

Arab Jerusalem[15] had a different status under Israeli law, as a series of three bills passed in the Knesset on 27th and 28th June 1967 served to annexe it,[16] the entire area being proclaimed the 'eternal capital' of the State of Israel. Settlement in the Old City of Jerusalem was announced with an expropriation order published in April 1968. This provided for the confiscation of about 28 acres, and included over 1,000 apartments with a total of 6,000 inhabitants and 437 shops and workplaces. Of the 700 buildings involved, 465 were Islamic waqf. Around 600 homes were reallocated to Israeli families, on the site of what had been the 'Jewish quarter' (Al-Abid: 1969: p.134). Those around the Western (Wailing) Wall were demolished to make a piazza and car park.

Outside the Old City walls, a chain of settlements has been built which encircles East Jerusalem. As MK Sharon has stated:

> .... Jerusalem will not be the capital of Israel if it does not have a Jewish majority. The answer is to establish "satellite towns" around Jerusalem - in Gush 'Ezyon, Teqo'a, Ma'ale Ha'adumin, Rimonim, Kokhav Hashahar, Bet El, Giv'on Within 20 to 30 years we must reach the point where there will be a million Jews in greater Jerusalem, with the towns surrounding it.
>
> ('Ha'aretz': 20.10.79)

As has been pointed out in the National Lawyers' Guild Report: "The 'military disguise' /of settlements/ is not an innovation of the Likud Government which came to power in 1977.....The Israeli Government's encouragement of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza is not a Likud innovation." (Report of the National Lawyers' Guild: 1977: pp.10-12).

In 1973, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan stated that Israel should remain forever in the West Bank "because this is Judea and Samaria, this is our homeland" (Jerusalem Post': 15.5.73). However, as will be argued

later, the policy of the Labour Coalition until 1977 and the Likud since then has been the annexation of the resources of the West Bank without annexing its Arab population. The differences in the detail and emphasis of their policies reflect changes taking placing within the Israeli political sphere and in Israel's global relations rather than indicate fundamentally different attitudes towards the occupied territories. For example, the Allon plan orchestrated by the Foreign Minister of the time provided for a belt of Nahal settlements along the Jordan Valley, with a parallel belt along the 'Allon Road'.[17] This was intended to divide the more populated areas of the West Bank from Jordan. Harris has pointed out that of the two north-south dissecting lines, the belt along the valley floor would appear to have no military use whatsoever. "The chief raison d'etre of the valley-floor line appears to be economic. Valley temperatures, with a midwinter mean of 14°C, allow the production of lucrative out-of-season crops for the European market." (Harris: 1977: p.325).

The classification of all government-initiated settlement as military posts may partly be explained by the need, in the uncertainty following the 1967 war, to appease international opinion, particularly that of the United States. However, 11 years after the occupation of the West Bank the Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. wrote that:

> ...out of regard to the delicate negotiations /i.e. Camp David/ ... the government of Israel itself decided, and so conveyed to the President /of the U.S./ in September 1977, that new settlements within the next year would be confined to military camps. We have fulfilled that promise. (Quoted in Report of the National Lawyers' Guild: 1977: p.10)

Of the 48 settlements established in the West Bank between 1967 and 1977, Lesch's classification indicates that 20 were originally set up as Nahal posts and 12 of these are now agricultural, either kibbutzim or moshavim (Lesch: 1977).

Under the Likud Government there has been little ambiguity as regards the status of the West Bank. Yitzhak Shamir, Israeli Foreign Minister, addressed the Knesset on 2nd March 1983 as follows:

> We did not conquer the territories from their legal owners but liberated them from countries that conquered them in 1948. We have not 'annexed' them and we shall not 'annexe' them. They are parts of Eretz Yisrael, and what is part of your country, you do not annexe.
> ('The Times': 4.3.83).

Prime Minister Begin has spoken of the 'perfect and inalienable right' of Israelis to live in the West Bank, and asks:

> What is a nation without its history? We were born as a nation in Judea and Samaria. Will any Israeli government forbid Jews to live there? It is utterly fantastic.
> ('The Times': 31.1.83)

Hirst has described recent Israeli attitudes towards settlement in the occupied territories as: "... a torrent of biblico-strategic, clerico-military antics and imagery..." (Hirst: 1977: p.219). However, underlying the 'antics and imagery' is a strategy for the development of Israel and the occupied territories which has its own logic. The apparent change in settlement policy following the election of a Likud government in May 1977 can be explained in terms of a changing relationship between Israel and the occupied territories and of shifting alignments within Israel itself. The nature of the relationship between Israel and the West Bank is the subject of Chapter Five; for the purposes of an examination of the importance of settlement in the West Bank after 1967, the intention is to

highlight the basis of one of the most active extra-governmental initiators of settlements, Gush Emunim, and the relationship of this organisation to changes taking place within Israel.

The imagery of both Likud rhetoric concerning the West Bank and the philosophies of Gush Emunim have their roots in Jabotinsky's brand of 'revisionist Zionizm' and his elaboration of a militant concept of Zionist realisation. A detailed analysis of the development of the 'revisionist' branch of Zionist thought is outwith the scope of this work, and comments will be restricted to a brief general description of the principal tenets.

Firstly, the notion of 'Eretz Yisrael' embodies the idea of a Jewish state on both banks of the River Jordan - that is, covering the territory of Palestine and Jordan. After 1967, this became a campaign slogan for groups such as the Land of Israel Movement which argued for the retention of all territories occupied in 1967 irrespective of conditions which were seen by, for example, Begin's Herut party, as grounds for compromise. The Land of Israel Movement, which was ostensibly organised on a non-party basis, joined the Likud grouping in 1973. An instance of the importance of what is taken to constitute 'Eretz Yisrael' is the way in which Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and the dismantling of the town of Yamit was cited as evidence of how far Israel would go in pursuit of peace. That is, that an Israeli settlement in an occupied territory was given up and Israeli forces were withdrawn, the argument being that further colonisation on the West Bank need not necessarily be an impediment to a 'peaceful solution'. However, in terms of Likud thinking, Sinai was not necessarily part of historical 'Eretz Yisrael' and therefore compromises could be made. As

was illustrated in the statements of the Likud Prime Minister and Foreign Minister quoted earlier, neither envisages any ideological compromise over the West Bank.

A second tenet of 'revisionism' was its slogan of "social justice without class struggle". This in effect was a challenge to the hegemony of the 'labour-Zionist' tendency during the Mandate years (see Chapter Three). Flapan notes:

> The Revisionists consistently demanded the endorsement of the principle of private land ownership, the revision of the Zionist budget in favour of industry and commerce, the encouragement of private initiative in agricultural colonisation, subsidies and loans to artisans, the prohibition of strikes and lock-outs..." (Flapan: 1979: p.110).

The settlement strategy of Gush Emunim, described as being"...based on a fundamentalist religious viewpoint....a radical extension of /the Likud/ view..." (Newman: 1982: p.7), adopted a method of establishing settlements which involved squatting until evicted by the Military Authorities, and persistently returning (Hitnachalut). In spite of apparent blatant disobedience of governmental demands, Gush Emunim established three settlements in the West Bank between the official funding of the organisation in 1974 and the end of Labour rule in 1977. These were Ma'ale Adumim (1974) on the Jerusalem-Jericho road, Kaddum (1975), on the Nablus-Qalqilya road, and Ofra (1975), east of Ramallah. In the cases of Kaddum and Ofra the settlements underwent "gradual, but unofficial development" (Newman: 1982: p.34).

The application of the revisionist demand for privatisation can be seen in the type of settlement which was established. Newman notes the

"new private enterprise type of settlement" known as Yishuv Kehillati (community villages) where many of the settlers are in fact commuting to work inside Israel's 1949 borders (Newman: 1982: pp.39-40).

The settlement of Ma'ale Adumim is an interesting example of the way in which various group interests have meshed. At the end of 1974, the Israeli Cabinet had allocated $1.4 million towards the construction of facilities such as roads, drainage and electricity for a proposed industrial complex on a site 7 km from Jerusalem. This was in line with the Labour Government's Allon plan, in that the site was defined as strategic, being on the main Jerusalem-Jordan road. The situation of Ma'ale Adumim on the outskirts of Jerusalem also fitted with the interpretation of security requirements as including territorial control by encircling Arab residential areas. An initial 70,000 dunums were declared 'closed' in 1972 and additional expropriations have taken place since then. Plans for the site included the construction of a 'work camp' to house employees of the industrial complex (Lesch: 1977: p.45). Gush Emunim attempted to establish a settlement by squatting in the area in March 1975, and the Israeli Cabinet reached a compromise on who was entitled to live in the 'work camp'. By December 1974 settlers had begun to move in, and, as Newman notes, this included:

> ...a group associated to the Histadrut...and interested in eventually settling in the proposed urban quarter...
> (Newman: 1982: p.45).

Given the relationship between the Mapai-dominated Labour Government and the Histadrut (see Chapter Three), this amounts to tacit governmental support.

The success of the venture can be judged by the text of the advertisement which appeared in the "Jerusalem Post" in February 1983.

> Following the success of the earlier stages, the Ramet company is building another stage - at the top of the hill ... Modern luxury apartments, with coordinated landscaping. Join those who have already decided to enjoy the special advantages of Ma'aleh Adumim.
>
> .... For those with housing rights: mortgages plus loans up to IS 1,720,000 /prices start at IS 1,150,000/.

The complex includes schools, kindergartens, a multi-level shopping mall, municipality buildings and a planned "Israeli Studios for Film and Television Inc." complex, which will incorporate an amphitheatre ('Al Fajr': 4.2.83).

It can therefore be suggested that while the complexion of government in Israel may affect the means whereby settlements are established, and the type of settlement which is set up, the principle has remained constant. Although the Labour Government did not officially 'recognise' Gush Emumin settlements established illegally under its jurisdiction, this is perhaps more to do with the fact that they lay outwith the strategy of the Allon plan than that they represented a contradiction of Government policy. Benefits offered to Israelis willing to settle in 'development areas' such as Galilee were noted earlier. In spite of the official Labour Government view of settlement after 1967, tax exemption for Jewish settlers in the occupied territories averaged $1,500 per year by 1975, and Government loans for building expenses were accorded on 'very good terms' (Report of the National Lawyers' Guild: 1977: p.11). Government finance was also used to construct basic amenities, prepare land and in some cases buildings. For example, it has been estimated that the settlement of Sadot in Northern Sinai which was established as a Labour moshav in 1971 required an initial Government/Jewish Agency contribution of around $275,000 per family (Lesch: 1977: p.28).

Following the Likud election victory in 1977, financial encouragement was most commonly done by direct subsidy to the settlement. Having 'recognised' the existing Gush Emunim settlements and the right of Gush Emunim to be considered as a settlement organisation[18] the Likud Government provided considerable funds directly for an increased settlement programme in the occupied territories. It has been claimed that in its first month of office alone, this amounted to $400 million (Report of the National Lawyers' Guild: 1977: p.11).

In October 1978 the World Zionist Organization's Department for Rural Settlement published its "Master Plan for the Development of Settlement in Judea and Samaria 1979-1983". This plan, known as the 'Drobles' plan, called for the establishment of 46 new settlements in the West Bank with a total of 16,000 families, plus 11,000 families to 'thicken' existing settlements. The estimated cost of implementing this plan was IL 54 billion (Will: 1982).

The 'Jerusalem Post' reported in 1979 that the Ministerial Committee on Settlement had passed a settlement budget of IL 150 billion - an amount which was almost half the entire state budget ('Jerusalem Post': 16.11.79). While this covered expenditure on all Israeli settlements, the importance attached to settlement in the West Bank is indicated by an update of the Drobles plan, published in September 1980. Titled "Settlement in Judea and Samaria - strategy, policy and plans", this report proposed that:

> In light of current negotiations on the future of Judea and Samaria, it will now become necessary for us to conduct a race against time.... the state-owned lands and uncultivated barren lands in Judea and Samaria ought to be seized right away, with the purpose of settling the areas.....There mustn't be even the shadow of a doubt about our intention to keep the territories of Judea and Samaria for good.
> (UN Document A/36/341: 23.6.81)

The settlement goal was now set at establishing between 60 and 75 new settlements with a total population of 120,000-150,000 (Will: 1982: p.45).

Israeli Settlers in the West Bank

In discussing settlements established in Galilee, the link was noted between the location of settlements and means of controlling the remaining Arab population. Thus, for example, the creation of 'development areas' designed to increase Jewish habitation in areas with a relatively large Arab population can be seen as a means of ensuring that the Arab population in Israel would remain a minority even on a regional basis. The construction of towns such as Karmiel and Upper Nazareth serve to confirm this, as they are intended to be restricted to Jewish residents and investors. While the same restrictions obviously apply to Israeli settlement in the West Bank, the specific conditions under which colonisation is being carried out require elucidation.

In Chapter One it was suggested that colonialism is more than the initial subjugation of a people, in that it involves the generation of a power relation between coloniser and colonised. The way in which this relation is expressed will differ with time and circumstance, and it is for this reason that the problems arising from an ahistorical conceptualisation of the colonisation process were noted. As an instance of the meaning of occupation for the occupied, we can consider the way in which settlement in the West Bank constitutes more than the implantation of a physical presence, by focussing on the tensions between Israeli settlers, the local population and the Military Authorities.

To give a specific example, we can consider the case of settlers in Kiryat Arba, which is the oldest and largest Israeli settlement in the West Bank. Kiryat Arba was founded in 1968 and many of the original members were active in the establishment of Gush Emunim. The settlement was intended to be urban and was built on the edge of Hebron, on land expropriated from Hebron and Halhoul (Lesch: 1977). Like all the settlements in the West Bank it is heavily fortified, including a high perimeter fence and patrolled entrance and exit.

In 1979 settlers from Kiryat Arba occupied the Daboya (Hadassah) building in the centre of Hebron, and according to a petition brought before the High Court of Justice have since engaged in a campaign of harrassment in an attempt to force people living around the area to leave. It has been claimed that settlers have been responsible for breaking windows, stone-throwing, setting dogs on passers-by and breaking into businesses on the ground floor of the Daboya building and in adjoining buildings. On 29 March 1980 a petition[19] was filed on behalf of eleven Hebron appellants, headed by the acting Mayor, to request the Court to compel the Military Commander of the area and the Minister of Defence to give reasons for not having evicted the Kiryat Arba settlers from the Daboya building. In addition, questions were asked in Court about the deferring of complaints made by inhabitants of Hebron against the settlers. In summing up, the judge noted: "The Appellants have no preferential judicial status, as to occupying the place, than the settlers, and it is not the concern of the appellants whether the settlers' occupancy is legal." The final ruling was that the petition should be rejected.

In addition to the occupation of the Daboya building, Kiryat Arba settlers have constructed a gift shop in the market area of Hebron and like the settlement itself this is surrounded by steel fencing. The shop is intended to take advantage of the tourist trade and specifically for visitors to the Ibrahimi Mosque (Tomb of the Patriarchs), where the prophet Abraham is said to be buried. An official of Hebron Municipality claimed that plans were being made to demolish the buildings between the shop and the Mosque, the reason being that the security of tourists could not be guaranteed in an enclosed area. The buildings in question are Arab houses and businesses in the old part of Hebron, and these would be replaced by gardens and a car park (Interview: 27.9.81).

The initial justification behind Israeli settlement in Hebron was that Jewish families had owned property there before 1948, and present day settlers in the city itself claim that they are repossessing this property.[20] A similar rationale underlay the permission granted in 1967 for the establishment of a settlement at Kfar Etzion (between Bethlehem and Hebron). Kibbutz Kfar Etzion was one of the few Jewish settlements outwith Israel's 1949 borders,[21] and it was families of original members of this kibbutz who applied for permission to form a new settlement there, as a "redemption of an obligation to their parents". Gerson notes that in evicting 200 Arab farmers and requisitioning 1200 dunums (300 acres) of land for the settlement: "The stated reason was that a large number of terrorist incidents had occurred in the area, although it was not denied that the settlement may have been the cause of terrorist activity." (Gerson: 1978: p.137). Despite appeals by the Mayors of Hebron, Bethlehem, Beit Jalah and Beit Sahour the requisition order was not rescinded, and by the mid-1970's Kfar Etzion had a population of around 200, their livelihood largely being based on poultry breeding (Lesch: 1977).

An unofficial curfew is frequently imposed on Hebron by settlers from Kiryat Arba, who can be seen patrolling the streets, shouting slogans and occasionally firing in the air. One slogan heard regularly was translated as "This land is ours". The difference between such confrontation and the tactics of exclusion and negation discussed previously is illustrated in the following comment about the way in which Palestinian Arabs are considered within the framework of revisionism:

> Of all the Zionist formations, the Revisionists were the least interested in the Arab question. The Arabs concerned them only as enemies, and as enemies they had to be treated without pity. In other words to be smashed as there was no room for compromise.
>
> (Flapan: 1979: p.114).

The notion of settlement as a means of territorial and population control has been discussed with reference to settlements inside Israel. In this context, however, control has been of a small minority - the Arab population is now around 17% of the total population living in Israel. For Israeli settlers in the West Bank, it is they who are the minority. Excluding the settlements encircling East Jerusalem[22] the number of settlers was estimated as 25,000 at the beginning of 1983 (Economist Intelligence Unit: 1983). There are some important differences between the settlements around East Jerusalem and those in other parts of the West Bank. The East Jerusalem settlements are not fortified in the way of those outside the city and resemble large housing estates made up of 3 and 4 storey blocks of apartments. Apart from the type of settlement, the settlers who have moved into the East Jerusalem "satellites" tend to be recent immigrants taking advantage of the favourable terms offered by the government, and the proximity to the main Israeli centres of employment. This difference can be explained within the Israeli government perspective as regards the annexed status of Jerusalem, such that the East Jerusalem settlements are

seen as Israeli towns.

Of great significance for the Palestinian Arab population of the West Bank is the way in which Israeli settlers constitute a paramilitary presence, and their relationship with the Israeli Military Authorities. A report in the 'Jerusalem Post' in 1980 stated that:

> 'West Bank settlers are preparing to fight the Arab terrorists with or without the army's help... Settlement leaders have decided to form 'regional security committees' which will obtain arms, train settlers and collect information on Arab riots, stone-throwing and incitement....well-informed settler sources indicated they would act if the army should be curbed by political factors.
> ('Jerusalem Post': 11-17 May, 1980).

The disturbing aspect of the last part of this report is that the settlers are also part of the Israeli Defence Force, carrying out reserve duty in common with other Israeli citizens. However, West Bank settlers are organised within a framework of 'area defence' which means that they serve in the occupied territories. Ramallah, for example, is patrolled primarily by settlers from Ofra, Beit Horon and Beit El.

Apparent conflict between the settlers and the Military Authorities has taken place. It was reported that: "When the governor of Ramallah demanded the arms back from the settlers from Ofra following their 'police action' last year, the settlers simply refused." ('Ha'aretz': 16.5.80). However, nothing came of this refusal. There have also been cases of the Military Authorities carrying out enquiries into the mistreatment of civilians, and the settlers accused of mistreatment being seen patrolling the West Bank in uniform, on reserve duty. A notable example is Meir Kahane, whose 'Kach' movement was described by 'Newsweek" as "...a dumping ground for young thugs. Some of them never bother to learn Hebrew and they

often return home /i.e. USA/ after a few months of hell-raising on the West Bank." ('Newsweek', International Edition: 16.6.80).

The imposition of an unofficial curfew on Hebron by Kiryat Arba settlers has been mentioned. It has also been claimed that during demonstrations and strikes in Hebron, groups of armed settlers have broken up the protest and taken prisoners back to Kiryat Arba. A Hebron resident said that on one occasion the local people had erected a roadblock in protest at the military occupation. "The settlers forced the Sheikh, who is an old man, to clear the stones by himself, all the while shouting insults at him and pushing and pulling him..." (Interview: December 1981).

The dividing line between military and para-military in the West Bank is confused by the fact that Israeli settlers are both protected by the occupying army and serving in it. In addition to this, they retain their civilian status.

Ott has suggested that in the wake of the Camp David Agreements, Israeli settlement in the West Bank was increased in order to pre-empt any political option of autonomy for the occupied territories (Ott: 1980). He describes a case in the Israeli High Court in autumn 1979, when a ruling was made that the Gush Emunim settlement of Elon Moreh, near Nablus, contravened international law. The distinction drawn in the judgement was between military settlements established under political pressure and Gush Emunim settlements motivated by political goals. However, as Ott points out: "...these aspects are clearly two sides of the same coin. The ultimately political repercussions in the occupied territories are implicit in both instances." (Ott: 1980: p.76).

Uri Davis has noted that the 'successful' Israeli settlements are those which are linked to the economic centres of Israel, and where the settlers can commute to work inside Israel. He describes the motivations behind settlement as:

> ...idealism supported by very strong material benefits. When you talk with people it is first of all the idealism, the promised land in the fundamentalist Biblical sense of the term, and then, of course, ecology, less taxes - all kinds of environmental and material considerations.
> (Davis: 1979: p.15)

However, in spite of these incentives, it has been suggested that the number of Israelis who have gone to new settlements in the occupied territories has fallen far short of expectations,[23] and Ott has related this to renewed Israeli efforts to attract immigrants, suggesting that a motive for large-scale immigration is the provision of necessary manpower for territorial expansion through settlement (Ott: 1980: p.78).

This illustrates very well the sense in which the interests of Israeli settlers in the West Bank are interwoven with governmental strategy to implement a settlement drive, and the shades of ideological and material considerations which underlie this. While at one level Ott's point can be upheld in that all settlements in the West Bank represent the implantation of the coloniser, at another level it is important to maintain the multiplicity of rationales which underpin Israeli settlement.

This is important also in explaining what settlement means for the population of the West Bank. Tamari argues that while the issue of settlement has been one of the most explosive aspects of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, settlements themselves have had a marginal impact on structural change, due to their revivial of the notion of 'Jewish labour'[24] (see Chapter Three) and to their unsuccessful attempts to attract settlers

(Nakhleh & Zureik, eds.: 1980: pp.88-9). This leads Tamari to conclude that the mechanisms of Israeli control must be sought elsewhere, and Chapter Five of this thesis will be concerned with an examination of the nature of the relationship between Israel and the West Bank.

However, while the settlers in the West Bank may be numerically weak, and the 'exclusive' nature of the settlements precludes a strong direct impact on the West Bank economy, their importance as a symbol and as a strategy should not be underestimated, and their very location is an indication of this. The role of the settlers as a flexible paramilitary force is also becoming more significant, and supports the thesis that the expropriation of land and establishment of settlements in the West Bank represents an instance of a colonial power relationship.

NOTES

1. In The Arabs in Israel, Sabri Jiryis describes the series of laws passed following the establishment of the State of Israel, and the way in which they served to institutionalise the expropriation of Arab property (Jiryis: 1969).

2. Appeals against expropriation continue to be made. For example, villagers from Bir'am, a Maronite Christian village in Upper Galilee, petitioned the Israeli Prime Minister, the Pope, the Ambassadors of Britain, USA and France, and the United Nations when they were removed from their village in 1948. As with Ikrit, they took their case to the High Court which decided in favour of their return conditional on the approval of the Military Authority. This was refused, and in 1953 the village was destroyed by the Israeli army. Two-thirds of the original land held by the village is now a kibbutz; the remaining third is unused and fenced off to prevent trespassing. Bir'am villagers are still requesting permission to return to the third of their land which is unused, and have pressed no claims for the rest.

3. An attempt to document the destroyed villages has been made by Aref el Aref and Israel Shahak, as frequently no trace remains (Khader: 1981).

4. This was the Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts and Compensation) Law of 1953, which served to legalize the process of expropriated land being transferred to the State or to the JNF via the Development Authority.

5. Article 125 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations 1945.

6. The total land area of the West Bank is 5.5 million dunums, 1.4 million acres (Abu Ayyash: 1981).

7. The money had been spent through a subsidiary company jointly owned by the Jewish National Fund and the Israel Land Authority. Purchases included buildings, public institutions and church property. According to the report, the purchases had to remain secret, as "many of the Arab inhabitants, living on the acquired lands, do not yet know these lands are in the possession of the Israel Land Fund /i.e. JNF/" (International Organisation for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: 1976: p.86).

8. Under Jordanian law, the death penalty can be invoked for Palestinian Arabs selling land to Israelis (see also Chapter Six).

9. In The Land Law of Palestine: an Analysis of the Definition of State Lands, Shehadeh notes that of the five categories of land ownership under the Ottoman land code, the basis of miri matrouk and mawat holdings to the Sultan. However, this gives him no rights to land usage. In describing this separation of legal rights to ownership and to usage, Shehadeh suggests that the nearest equivalent under English law is the idea of a trust (Shehadeh: 1982).

10. Waqf property is regarded as belonging to God, and income derived from this property may only be used for charitable ends. Under the Mandate, the British Administration had authorised the leaders of the Islamic community to manage the Islamic waqf. According to Jiryis, the Israeli government simply declared waqf property to be absentee property (Jiryis: 1976: p.118).

11. In terms of Israeli law there are four categories of land-holding: state, Development Authority, JNF and private. The conditions attached to leasing land owned by the JNF were noted in Chapter Three. Davis & Lehn point out that these restrictions in fact apply to all 'publicly-owned' land in Israel and indeed to an unknown proportion of privately-owned land. The significance of this is that of a total 20,255,000 dunums, 18,775,000 (92.6%) is designated as 'national lands' (Davis & Lehn: 1978). As was explained earlier, national in Israel means Jewish rather than Israeli.

12. In addition to its Arab majority, Galilee did not fall within the boundaries allocated to Israel under the original partition plan, and it was felt that Israel's 'right' to it may be questioned on these grounds.

13. The role of the Israeli "Arab expert" has been examined by Said (Said: 1980: pp.106-7), and the power which the "Arabists" wield through their representation on government bodies, Histadrut committees and so on. In effect, it is an acceptable form of Arab representation without the Arabs, and is perhaps comparable to the part played by European 'experts' in the 19th Century (see Chapter One).

14. In addition to the proposals to increase settlement, Koenig recommended changes in areas such as Arab education; changes which would encourage either emigration or acceptance. For example, to make it easier for Arabs to study abroad and more difficult to return; to channel Arab students into subjects such as natural sciences which "leave less time for dabbling in nationalism and the dropout rate is higher."

15. As used here, 'Arab Jerusalem' refers to the Old City within the walls and the area known as East Jerusalem ; in other words, those parts of Jerusalem which remained outwith Israel's 1949 borders.

16. The first bill authorised the Government of Israel to apply Israeli law and administration 'in any part of Palestine to be determined by decree'. The second concerned freedom of access to and protection of the Holy Places. The third authorised the Government of Israel to extend the jurisdiction of municipalities without the existing lengthy procedure, and to appoint additional councillors ('Keesings Contemporary Archives': 1967-8: Vol. XVI). United Nations Resolutions 2253 (4.7.67) and 2254 (14.7.67) condemning the annexation were adopted by 99 votes to 0, with 20 abstentions. The status of Jerusalem as capital of Israel remains largely unrecognised (see also Chapter Two).

17. The 'Allon Road' is an unpaved 25 meter wide highway, officially known as the 'Road of the Country of the Manhunts' (Davis: 1979: p.13).

18. This put Gush Emunim on the same footing as the established kibbutz and moshav settlement organisations, in that they could be represented on national settlement committees and were eligible for the same proportion of grants and loans.

19. Details from the petition filed by Acting Mayor Al Natshe and 10 other Hebron residents are from unpublished papers of Advocate Felicia Langer who, with Advocate Abed al Asali, presented the petition.

20. Advocate Langer quoted a statement made by the expelled Mayor of Hebron, Fahd Kawasmeh, which asked that if this reasoning was to be applied and settlers permitted to occupy houses which were owned by Jews before 1948, then would the same reasoning apply to property owned by Arabs in Israel before 1948.

21. Kibbutz Kfar Etzion was a kibbutz from 1943 till 1948.

22. Citing a United Nations Report, David Ott gives the total number of settlers in East Jerusalem and the West Bank as 90,000 by mid-1979. They were distributed amongst 17 settlements in and around Jerusalem and 62 settlements in other parts of the West Bank (Ott: 1980: p.73).

23. Tamari quotes a report in 'The Observer' which revealed that in 1977, the average population in each settlement in the occupied territories was 100 (Nakhleh & Zureik, eds.: 1980: p.88).

24. With the exceptions of Kiryat Arba and Rafah, settlements in the occupied territories do not employ local, or non-Jewish, labour.

Chapter Five ·

ISRAEL & THE WEST BANK

Chapter Five

The consideration of the expropriation of land and establishment of settlements in Israel after 1948 and in the West Bank after 1967 has served to illustrate the dynamic nature of the colonial relationship. While the continuity of the relation between coloniser and colonised can be seen in an analysis of colonialism as a historical process, a fixed character should not be attributed to this process. For example, the widespread expulsion of the Arab population and expropriation of property which took place after 1948 has not taken place in the West Bank - the context has changed and the requirements have changed. Aspects of the changing context and requirements have been discussed; the concern of this Chapter will be to examine the nature of the relationship between Israel and the West Bank since the 1967 occupation. In Chapter Two, it was suggested that the creation of a single customs barrier was of significance, in that the formation of a single barrier towards other economies helped establish new conditions between Israel and the occupied territories, and an elaboration of this provides a useful starting point.

The Nature of Trade

On the movement of goods and services between Israel and the occupied territories, a report issued by the Bank of Israel states that:

> The rising share of trade with Israel in the areas' /i.e. 1967 occupied territories/ total foreign trade expresses the expansion of ties between the three economies in fact, it is more in the nature of trade between adjacent regions within a single economy than of international trade.
>
> (Bregman: 1975: p.90).

Within the period considered in the Bank of Israel report, 1968-73, the occupied territories had become Israel's second largest export market - for the West Bank, this meant that 90% of all imports came from Israel (Hilal: 1976). Although the links between the West Bank and Gaza and their former trading partners in the Arab world were severed immediately after the 1967 war, the Allenby bridge from the West Bank to Jordan was soon re-opened. However, an increasing share of exports from the occupied territories goes to Israel, either for consumption there or to become part of Israel's exports overseas.

The main drawback in approaching the analysis of such changes using concepts like 'trade' was discussed in Chapter One, and it is that the significance of what is actually being 'exchanged' and how it is exchanged is glossed over. As Van Arkadie suggests: "Once the appropriate environment was established by Israeli public policy, the market dynamics lent to the resulting economic process an apparent naturalness and logic..." (Van Arkadie: 1977: p.43). Thus, for example, the emphasis placed on economic growth, higher wages and the possession of consumer goods as defining features of the relationship between Israel and the territories occupied in 1967 implies the notion of exchange between partners of equal status. The possibility of linking economic growth, higher wages and consumption of consumer products with the demands of Israeli industry for cheap labour and a market for produce is outwith the boundaries of such an approach. By insisting on the centrality of 'market forces', the fact that they have been operating under the control of a military government for sixteen years becomes of little significance.

The conceptualisation of the relationship between Israel and the occupied territories as that of the relationship between coloniser and colonised is the attempt to construct an interpretation of the meaning of occupation for West Bank Palestinians which can take into account their specific experiences under the detail of implemented Israeli policy and the experience of the Palestinian encounter with Zionism. By approaching the analysis in this way, we can look more closely at what is involved in trade between Israel and the occupied territories. Of all exports from the West Bank to Israel, in 1973 the proportion defined as 'industrial' had risen to over 80% (Bregman: 1975). According to Bregman, 'industrial' meant construction materials, textiles and clothing, and furniture. Referring back to Chapter One, it was noted that the definition of industry on the basis of product rather than the form of production can lead to anomalous conclusions being drawn, with no differentiation being made between, for example, a home-based workshop run as a supplement to subsistence farming and a high technology factory. In the West Bank, only three enterprises employ over 100 people,[1] and perhaps the most significant change to have taken place since 1967 has been the increase in subcontracting for Israeli manufacturers. This has been particularly so in the textile industry, and the position of Palestinian workers in textiles in the West Bank will be discussed later in this Chapter. For the time being, we can note that textiles and clothing has become an increasing constituent of Israel's exports overseas, and suggest that the use of cheap labour employed in workshops in the occupied territories has contributed to this. As an example of the extent to which subcontracting is taking place, Ryan has noted that the value of subcontracted work in the West Bank rose from IL 810,000 in 1968 to IL 3,800,000 in 1970 (Ryan: 1974) p.15).

In 1969, the 'Jerusalem Post' reported:

> Sewing shops are sprouting up to do jobs for Ata, Rex, Barbir, Elastex and others. 'We have another eight clothing factories ready to give orders if there are takers', Mr. Bechar /of the Israeli Ministry of Commerce and Industry/ said. Contracts are given out by furniture factories: Rahat of Lydda has booked orders with companies in Nablus and Bethlehem. An Israeli company was planning to build its own foam mattress plant, but instead placed orders with a factory on the West Bank to the sum of IL 400,000 in 1968 and will double this amount this year.
> ('Jerusalem Post', Overseas Weekly: 7.2.69).

The Israeli government has offered investment incentives for Israelis who wish to establish enterprises in the occupied territories by extending the 'Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investment' (see Chapter Two). It should be noted that this applies only to Israelis, and residents of the West Bank and Gaza cannot take advantage of these benefits. The privileges offered to Israeli investors include a loan of up to 50% of working capital at low interest, a government grant of up to a third of the investment in building and development, and exemption from income tax for five years (cited in Ryan: 1974). In addition, the potential cost of labour is lower in the occupied territories than in Israel.

The shift of capital to areas sharing economic features with the West Bank, such as a supply of cheap labour and government-sponsored inducements and benefits for investors, has been documented throughout the world, and is at the core of research into the New International Division of Labour. Fröbel et al. discuss the way in which parts of the production process are relocated according to the supply of reserve armies of potential workers at a low price:

> The first shifts of US industry were to Western Europe and to countries 'south of the border'; West European countries transferred production to other regions in Europe, such as Eire, Greece, Portugal and the south of Italy; Japanese industry moved into South Korea and Taiwan. At the same time, industrial firms recruited labour from countries with high rates of unemployment and drew it in to the traditional sites of industrial production. Hence the appearance of Gastarbeiter in Western Europe, and Mexican and Puerto Rican immigrant workers in the USA.
>
> (Fröbel et al.: 1980: p.14)

While the West Bank exhibits the characteristics thought to be favourable in the reorganisation of production, there has been no large-scale Israeli investment in the occupied territories outwith their own settlements there (see Chapter Four). The reasons for this can be seen in the specific conditions operating in the area. Firstly, there is the political uncertainty as regards the future of the occupied territories, and as will be discussed later, it has been in Israel's interests to maintain such uncertainty. Secondly, there has been no need to establish enterprises in the West Bank as geographical proximity has made it easy to employ West Bank labour in concerns inside Israel's 1949 borders. This also means that West Bank workers employed in Israel remain under the control of the Israeli Military Authorities, as the particular political strictures which have been applied do not permit residents of the occupied territories to remain overnight in Israel.

It can be suggested that for Israeli capital the location of enterprises in the West Bank, or subcontracting to small local concerns, represents a 'mopping-up' of elements of the workforce, and this point will be elaborated later. For the time being, a consideration of the New International Division of Labour can be linked with previous discussion of trade as a means of domination, as the main feature which is hidden in most studies of 'trade' between Israel and the occupied territories is that the main export from the territories to Israel is labour.

West Bank Labour in Israel

In July 1968 the Israeli Knesset approved a draft bill permitting a fixed quota of Arab workers from the West Bank and Gaza to be employed in Israel. The requirements were security clearance of the prospective employee, plus a certificate from the Labour Exchange stating that there would be no replacement of Israeli labour, and Israeli law was applied to channel everyone seeking employment through the Labour Exchanges (Rekhess: 1975). By September 1968, around 5,800 West Bank residents were employed in Israel; by July of the following year this had risen to 9,000, and it is estimated that by this time there were a further 9,000 'illegal' workers who had not been employed through official channels (Ministry of Labour: 1976). There has been a continued increase, both amongst those following the legal procedure and those not. According to the Israeli Ministry of Labour, in 1980, 40,200 people from the West Bank were employed in Israel - 28% of the West Bank workforce - and the Ministry of Labour's estimate is that these 'legal' workers constitute about two-thirds of the total. A more realistic percentage of the West Bank labour force employed in Israel is therefore 40-50%.[2]

The importance of this for the Israeli economy is that while Palestinians from the occupied territories constitute around 20% of Israel's civilian industrial workforce and from 12-30% of the agricultural workforce,[3] they are heavily concentrated in certain sectors such as construction. Statistics compiled in 1981 by the Israeli Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs indicate that 65% of construction workers inside Israel are Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza ('The Times': 9.4.83). Given that this figure excludes residents of East Jerusalem, 'illegal' labour,[4] and Palestinian Arabs resident inside Israel, then the extent of the total participation in construction can be seen to be considerable.

It has been suggested by Farjoun that the need to sustain a settler society involved the maintenance of a relatively high standard of living for Israel's Jewish population in order to prevent emigration or political instability, and that this imperative imposed constraints on action against the Jewish proletariat (Farjoun: 1980). In addition, military and political developments after 1967 entailed the expansion of all sectors concerned with the administration of the newly-occupied territories, and the constantly increasing defence sector has already been noted (see Chapter Two). Farjoun's argument is that as defence and related industries have demanded more and more of the Jewish workforce, and as the perpetuation of the State of Israel in its present form requires the maintenance of a Jewish majority - and consequently the granting of privileges and special status to that majority - the Israeli civilian economy has become largely dependent on Arab labour.

The significance of this for Farjoun's argument is that Arab workers constitute a 'reserve army of labour' in the sense that the Arab labour force must absorb the fluctuations in the Israeli economy. In other words, while Jewish workers in Israel have the advantages accorded to organised labour and are protected by the requirements of the state regarding Jews in Israel, no such advantages pertain to Arab workers. This enforced flexibility described by Farjoun can be seen to some extent as a characteristic shared by migrant labour in other parts of the world. For example, in West Germany, Turkish workers are imported during periods of economic expansion and are the first to be made redundant when they are no longer of use. Similarly, the current trend in the oil-producing states of the Gulf to utilise Asian labour, which can be obtained as part of a total contract and is cheap and relatively free of problems.[5] Such workers have no 'rights' and can make no claims.

There is, however, an important sense in which Palestinian workers in Israel differ from migrant labour in other parts of the world and that is the way in which their situation is constantly modified by their national status. It is for this reason that the context in which we can discuss the position of Palestinian labour in Israel is conceptualised as a colonial relationship. Tamari talks of the "daily confrontation with Jewish contractors, bosses, workers and Israeli culture in general" (Tamari: 1981), and this confrontation is not restricted to the workplace. To give an example of this, we can consider the type of work, for the most part defined as 'unskilled', and the actual work processes involved. Tamari points out:

> Traditionally, Arab construction, which constituted a job with an elaborate hierarchy of skills and stages of initiation, has been transformed by Israeli building firms into a relatively mechanised industry with a tremendous thirst for unskilled labour.
> (Tamari: 1981)

While this process of deskilling is familiar from other parts of the world, and can be explained at one level as a common problem faced in the disruption brought about by the introduction of capitalist forms, at another level the analysis must consider the sense in which this is a facet of the Palestinian experience of colonisation. The process can be traced back to the position of Arabs inside Israel after the establishment of the state. It has been described as follows:

> In the period 1948-58, the Arab worker was driven into the unskilled, manual jobs that were the most exhausting and least well paid, jobs shunned by the Jewish worker such as mixing plaster cleaning jobs, unskilled jobs in quarries and construction....
> (Jiryis: 1976: p.221)

The reason why the Arab worker took this kind of employment is that there was little option. The expropriation of land (see Chapter Four) meant that income from agriculture was much restricted and often involved Arab wage-labour on land which they had owned prior to the 1948-9 war,

as all Arab towns and villages inside Israel were dispossessed of considerable portions of the land on which they had depended for their livelihood. Until 1966 Arabs inside Israel were under the jurisdiction of Area Military Governors. In order to leave their villages, travel permits had to be granted and these were with-held from Arabs wishing to travel to Jewish areas to find work (Jiryis: 1976). While Arab labour was cheap and unorganised, it was more important for the Israeli state at that time to prevent competition from Arab labour and, as in the time of the Mandate, Arabs were excluded from all but the bottom end of the scale.[6]

For the Arabs in the 1967-occupied territories, agriculture is becoming less and less viable and alternatives within the occupied territories themselves are few. Research carried out in the West Bank indicates that in construction there is a preference shown by West Bank workers for employment in Israel rather than the West Bank, and building contractors have complained about the difficulty in recruiting local labour, even when the same salaries are offered (Tamari: 1981). The explanation suggested is the difference in the conditions of work, in that Israeli contractors are generally working for large construction companies, the West Bank workers are being employed illegally, and payment is prompt and regular. Arab construction firms in the West Bank are mostly small family concerns and the work process differs in the way mentioned previously, so that the workers required are traditionally 'skilled' craftsmen, and the work is neither regular nor dependable.

The closing of opportunities as regards employment has implications also for education amongst Palestinians both inside Israel and in the occupied territories. There are few employment prospects for people going through higher education, and as will be discussed in Chapter Seven, there

is increasing pressure on children not to complete schooling due to their early entry into the labour market. What this means is that Arabs who have undertaken formal education must either accept such work as they are allowed to do, and this is extremely unlikely to be consonant with their qualifications or abilities,[7] or else they must emigrate to find work.

The Arab worker is Israel shares many of the problems faced by migrant labour in other parts of the world, and also by many peoples of the 'Third World' who are experiencing the shift of certain types of production from the industrialised countries. At this level, the relationship between Israel and the West Bank can be analysed within the matrix of the kind of changes which are brought about when production is reorganised on a transnational basis. However, for Palestinian workers, their experience is modified by particular aspects of their experience of Zionism. To provide an example of this level of analysis, we can consider the establishment of trade unions amongst West Bank workers.

The Unionisation of West Bank Workers

(i) Position of Arab workers in Israel

The main differentiation made by Israel in its treatment of Arab labour is between those who are considered Israeli citizens and those who are not. As East Jerusalem has been annexed, (see Chapter Four), residents of East Jerusalem are defined as having Israeli citizenship.[8] This affects mainly how the worker is paid, his/her conditions of employment and his/her position as regards organised labour in Israel. These factors further divide the 'legal' West Bank worker from the 'illegal'.

Workers from the occupied territories who have gone through the Labour Exchanges are not paid directly by the employer. The gross wage is transferred to the Payments Section of the Employment Service where deductions are made for income tax, National Insurance and 'social benefits'.[9] According to the Ministry of Labour, this ensures equal pay for the West Bank worker and the Israeli worker, preventing both the erosion of the income of unskilled Israeli workers and the exploitation of West Bank employees. To prevent the West Bank worker from receiving a higher net wage, any balance in the deductions (e.g. for pensions) is credited to each worker's account in a 'special fund' to finance social and development projects in the West Bank. This is linked to the cost-of -living index. The Ministry of Labour does not carry out these projects; in budgetary year 1973-74, IL 112 million was lent to the Ministries of Finance and Defence for "undertakings of a progressive intent in the Administered Areas" (Rekhess: 1975).[10] The 'illegal' worker does not pay tax or insurance, and is usually hired and paid on a daily basis (see section iii). The Ministry of Labour blames the persistance of illegal labour largely on the "lack of understanding on the part of the worker regarding the advantages of organised labour" (Ministry of Labour: 1976). Organised labour means the Histadrut, and we can look briefly at Arab workers in the Histadrut.

(ii) Arab members of the Histadrut

In 1973, there was a Histadrut proposal that occupied territories workers in permanent employment in Israel should be made members of the Histadrut. The proposal was defeated (although East Jerusalem residents were admitted to membership at this time), and criticised as a policy of 'creeping annexation'. The situation remains that while not members,

"the Federation /Histadrut/ has taken upon itself the responsibility of protecting the wages and social benefits to which workers from the (administered) areas are entitled" (Ministry of Labour: 1976). What this means is that a 1% levy is deducted from the wages of workers from the occupied territories and transferred to the Histadrut. Thus, they are paying dues to an organisation of which they cannot be members in order to have their 'interests' protected. As for East Jerusalem residents, they are liable for full Histadrut dues.

It can be noted here how the Histadrut operates with regard to Arab labour. The background to its formation, and its mode of operation during the Mandate were discussed in Chapter Three. According to official Histadrut publications, Arabs (including Druzes)[11] were admitted as members in 1959. However, this was to a separate 'Arab section', and full membership was not granted until 1966. There is still a 'Department of Arab Affairs' within the Histadrut, the aim of which is stated as follows:

> This special department was brought into being in order to bring about its own elimination. It is planned to incorporate its various activities within the scope of the general agencies of the Histadrut when the time is ripe...The main reason for the continued existence of this framework arises mainly from the difference of language and partly due to the wide dispersal of Arab members throughout the land.
> (Histadrut, Executive Committee: n.d.).

Until now this aim has not been realised.

Histadrut statistics regarding the distribution of Arab members over types of occupation provide a useful general outline of the composition of the Arab labour force in Israel. Table 5.1 is based on government figures and shows the percentage employed in various fields

(percentages of the total are in the usual Israeli governmental division of Jewish and non-Jewish citizens). Table 5.2 is based on Histadrut membership figures and gives the number of Arab members employed in certain areas as a percentage of all Arab members, compared with the overall percentage of members. Table 5.3 gives details of the distribution of employment inside Israel amongst workers from the occupied territories.

It should be noted that the classification of categories of employment differs between the data provided by the three sources, and there are difficulties in all statistics of this kind in deciding which occupations belong in which category. The figures used in Table 5.2 refer only to Histadrut members, while those in Tables 5.1 and 5.3 refer to all workers (i.e. all registered workers). It could therefore be argued that workers in certain areas are more likely to joint the Histadrut, for example those employed in industry as opposed to agriculture. However, there appears to be no significant disparity in proportions between Tables 5.1 and 5.2.

Table 5.1

Occupational distribution of Jews and Arabs employed and resident in Israel, by percentage of total

	JEWS			ARABS		
Year	1973	1975	1976	1973	1975	1976
Total (thousands)	981	995.2	1018	107	107.8	109
academic-scientific	6.2	7.2	7.4	0.7	1.2	1.1
professional-technical	11.7	13.2	13.3	7.6	7.1	7.1
managerial	3.5	3.4	4.2	0.7	0.4	0.3
clerical	17.1	18.5	18.4	4.6	3.8	4.1
tradesmen, salesmen	7.95	7.9	8.0	7.0	6.2	6.8
services	12.5	11.8	11.4	10.7	8.9	9.3
agricultural	6.1	5.1	5.3	14.5	16.1	15.6
construction & industry-skilled	28.4	26.3	25.3	35.5	40.2	40.5
construction & industry-unskilled	5.6	5.2	5.4	15.6	12.6	11.4
unknown				3.7	3.1	3.2

Computed from original statistics quoted in E. Farjoun Palestinian Workers in Israel - a reserve army of labour, from Israel Statistical Annuals, 1973, 75, 76.

Table 5.2

Arab Members of the Histadrut: Distribution According to Branches (1971)

Category of employment	Arab members (total no)	% of total Arab members	Overall %
building & construction	13,000	31.8	8.9
industry & crafts	8,600	21.0	24.1
government employees	1,200	2.9	24.3
agriculture & forestry	4,500	11.0	8.5

Source: Jacob M. Landau, The Arabs and the Histadrut Department of Labour Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1976.

Table 5.3

Workers from Occupied Territories employed in Israel*, by economic branch, 1976

Category of employment	Total No.	%
construction	32,500	50.3
industry	12,800	19.7
agriculture	10,000	15.4
other	9,500	14.6

* This is restricted to registered workers

Source: International Labour Office, Report of the Director-General, 1980.

In spite of these problems, several general points can be made. The separation of construction and manufacturing in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 highlights the concentration of Arab labour in the construction sector, and the significance of this has already been noted. Histadrut ownership of a wide range of economic concerns was discussed in Chapter Three, and while Palestinians resident in Israel and East Jerusalem are technically full members of the Histadrut, they are excluded from employment in any area connected with the production of military items. As Israel currently spends over 20% of the GNP on military use,[12] this is a considerable part of the economy (see Chapter Two). It includes much of the electronics industry, aviation, steel production - in fact, anything connected directly or indirectly to the production of arms, ammunition and weapons systems. The Histadrut is a major employer in this field. According to Farjoun, around half of all Jewish industrial workers are employed in the military and aviation industries (Farjoun: 1980).

Referring back to comments made earlier about the process of 'deskilling', in 1979 the International Labour Office drew attention to what it described as "the gradual introduction of a kind of division of the employment market not only on the objective basis of the type of jobs but also in fact to a large extent along ethnic lines" (International Labour Office: 1980). This refers to the lack of Palestinians in what could be classified as skilled or professional employment. According to information in the ILO Report:

> ...no serious effort has been made to implement a policy of occupational promotion for workers from the occupied territories who are employed in Israel. Some marginal cases of occupational promotion were mentioned but it was pointed out that they were the exception proving the principle still in force whereby these workers are used to do jobs refused by Jewish labour, and according to these sources, the desire

> to protect the latter against any possible competition from workers coming from the occupied Arab territories explains the refusal to consolidate their position in employment and in the Israeli economy. (International Labour Office: 1980).[13]

While non-Israeli Histadrut members are entitled to benefits in the workplace, they are excluded from certain benefits outside the workplace, even although deductions have been made from their wages in respect of these. For example, they are entitled to benefits of the National Insurance Scheme which are based on the criterion of employment, such as employment injury and bankruptcy of the employer, but are not entitled to National Insurance benefits based on criterion of residence. This latter category includes invalidity, unemployment, and children's allowance (International Labour Office: 1980). Although an agreement has been made with the West Bank health authorities that West Bank residents employed in Israel be given free medical treatment,[14] the provision of services in the West Bank is very poor (see Chapter Six).

(iii) Illegal Labour and the Employment of Children

As was suggested earlier, in addition to workers registered through the Labour Exchanges, there are at least another third employed in Israel illegally. These workers are hired either through an Arab contractor or middle-man,[15] or at a recognised pick-up point. In Jerusalem for example, lorries and vans arrive each morning at a spot opposite Damascus Gate and the drivers select workers from the people waiting there. The overt nature of the hiring operation makes official claims of attempts to stop illegal employment questionable.

A report on an ILO on-the-spot examination of the situation of workers from the occupied territories revealed that around 20% of those illegally employed in Israel are minors, defined as children under the age of 14.[16] The main area of employment is in agriculture, and it has been suggested that:

> Many moshavs permanently rely for their profits on the nimble-fingered 10-year-olds from the refugee camps, who can be hired for less than £1.00 per day at the unofficial labour market at Erez junction, near the pre-1967 border of Israel. ('The Guardian: 26.2.82).

As a general rule, work permits are not granted to children under the age of 17, but much younger children are openly hired illegally. Articles reproduced by MERIP describe the scenes at the established 'markets' in the Gaza Strip, Erez junction and Ashkelon junction, where children between the ages of 10 and 14 gather each morning from 3.00 a.m. onwards hoping to be hired for work in Israeli settlements. Wages are fixed in negotiations between the Israeli contractor and the Arab middle-man, who takes a percentage of the children's earnings (MERIP: 1979).

Child labour is not restricted to Israeli enterprises, and it is common to see young children working in shops and fields in the West Bank. As has been pointed out by the ILO, the persistence of a system whereby workers employed illegally can be fined and yet employers escape legal action suggests that there has been no concerted effort to end the practice (International Labour Office: 1980).

While the employment of children is common throughout the Middle East, and indeed outwith the advanced industrialised countries, the employment of children in the circumstances outlined above can also be

seen as an instance of their experience of colonisation. Thus, for example, we can relate child labour to particular policies implemented by the Israeli state regarding the status of non-Jews, also to the kind of agricultural production which has developed in Israel. The fact that 680,620 Palestinians are still registered as refugees[17] in the West Bank and Gaza Strip means that: "...as long as a third of Gaza's 500,000 inhabitants are supposed to exist on UNRWA hand-outs of sugar, flour and cooking-oil, child labour will be difficult to stamp out, even by a more concerned authority." ('The Guardian': 26.2.82).

(iv) Employment in the West Bank

As Table 5.4 indicates, the main trend in employment in the West Bank has been the shift from agriculture towards services, and to a lesser extent, industry.

Table 5.4 Employment in the occupied territories (excluding Jerusalem)

	1970		1979	
	'000	%	'000	%
TOTAL	152.7	100	137.7	100
Agriculture	59.2	38.8	38.4	28.0
Industry	21.0	13.8	23.2	16.8
Construction	12.9	8.4	13.9	10.1
Services	59.6	39.1	65.7	45.1

Source: International Labour Office: 1979: Appendix, p.44.

It was noted earlier that an increasing amount of work was produced in the West Bank under contract for Israeli manufacturer, particularly in textiles and clothing. This is organised in small workshops set up by Arabs, and is prevalent around Ramallah, el-Bireh and Bethlehem. There are 25 workshops in the Ramallah area,[18] most of which are producing clothes under contract for Israeli factories. Each workshop employs between 50 and 70 workers, and around 95% of the workforce are women, the majority of whom come from the surrounding villages and refugee camps. The working day is 8-10 hours, with one 30 minute break and compulsory overtime when necessary to fulfil orders. Women employees are paid less than half as much as men.

This can be compared with clothing factories in Nablus and Hebron which are producing largely for the local market, and which employ a lower percentage of women. The pressure of working to meet contractual agreements is absent in these cases. It can therefore be suggested that the nature of the work in the subcontracting workshops requires a workforce which can be hired very cheaply and which is docile. The women employed in Ramallah have very few alternative employment prospects, especially so close to home, and the significance of this will be brought out in the discussion of West Bank trade unions.

The rapidly increasing entry of women into the wage labour market has had not only an economic impact but has effected disruption within the family as the traditional unit of family production breaks down. Attitudes towards, for example, a female member of the family moving outwith the home and often the village to find work have had to be modified in the face of economic necessity.[19] This has been exacerbated by the number of

men in the West Bank who have emigrated to find work, and also the number of men who have been imprisoned or detained for 'security offences'.[20]

What can be suggested, then, is that since the 1967 occupation, the changing opportunities for employment inside the West Bank indicate a shift between sectors, and that the decreasing number of people involved in agriculture can be related to the expropriation of land (see Chapter Four), and to the application of Israeli policies and techniques in agricultural production, and this latter point will be elaborated in the section on West Bank agriculture.

However, when the situation of women employed in workshops in the West Bank is seen in the light of previous discussion about 'deskilling' and ideas about a New International Division of Labour, then there has also been a change in the process of production.

(v) West Bank Trade Unions

When Israel occupied East Jerusalem and the West Bank there were seventeen unions, the majority of which were Jerusalem branches of Amman-based organisations.[21] By 1970, only seven unions remained - all outwith East Jerusalem. According to one unionist, this was not due to an explicit ban on trade union organisation but rather a combination of factors such as a decreasing membership as many of the population were employed inside Israel,[22] and the harassment of trade union members and officials by the Military Authorities. By 1981, there were thirty unions based in the Jerusalem-West Bank area, and around half of these were based in East Jerusalem. Several are organisations which closed in 1967 and have reopened within the past few years.[23] Their legal status is

complicated by the fact that membership includes residents of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, with the former being defined as 'Israeli citizens' (see Chapter Four), and the unions attempt to represent members employed in Israeli enterprises as well as in the West Bank.

As far as Israeli law is concerned, "all persons employed in Israel are completely free to establish trade union organisations, regardless of race, creed or sex" (International Labour Office: 1980). However, the structure of Israeli labour relations is such that a union must join the Histadrut.[24] The Histadrut position regarding workers from the occupied territories was discussed earlier, and the ILO reports their attitude towards Arab organisation as limited to the following:

> ...the Histadrut had held a meeting with several hundred workers from the territories to hear their grievances but had no intention of asking them to affiliate and had not accepted any such affiliation. It had suggested that the workers from the territories should elect a committee which would represent them in the Histadrut and enable them to belong to works committees. (International Labour Office: 1980: para.63).

This means that West Bank unions attempting to operate inside Israel are not recognised by employers or government, and so cannot fulfil any representative functions.[25]

Inside the West Bank, unions are constituted according to Jordanian law, subject to Israeli Military amendment. An important amendment has been that regarding election to union posts, as anyone convicted of a 'security offence' by a court having jurisdiction in the West Bank or in Israel is ineligible for election. Further, a list of nominees for election must be submitted to the Army Area Commander at least 30 days before the election, and names can be deleted without appeal and with no reason for

The deletion being given.[26] This has led many unions to postpone elections as they claim interference by the Military Authorities would prevent free elections.

Direct action has been taken by the Military Authorities against trade union members and officials. For example, it was reported that an armoured car was placed outside the home of George Hasboun, the Deputy General Secretary of the General Federation of Trade Unions in the West Bank in order to prevent him from attending a meeting in Nablus which was to discuss the East Jerusalem Electricity Company[27] ('The Middle East': March, 1980). The wife of a member of the Jerusalem Catering Workers' Union said that in 6 months of marriage, her husband had spent four months in prison. In all, he has been in prison five times, for periods of 6 months; 3 months; 2 months; 18 days and at the time of the interview had been imprisoned for 4 months. In addition, 1½ years were spent under city arrest. At no time were any charged preferred.[28]

The basis of the conflict is not workplace activity, but the sense in which the West Bank Unions are perceived as a political force, and the way in which they constitute opposition to the Israeli occupation. A spokesman for the Military Government has been quoted as saying:

> Permission is given to mayors, trade unionists and others to hold meetings, if these meetings will bring peace closer and build bridges to our neighbours. But if they only want to discuss settlements, land and the Electricity Company... if the meetings are to speak against normalisation, and about politics, then we will not give them permission to hold their meetings.
>
> ('The Middle East': March, 1980).

Inquiries carried out by the ILO into cases of arrest and imprisonment of trade unionists in the West Bank were answered by the Military Authorities that "the persons concerned had been sentenced by the courts or were on trial not because of trade union activities but on specific charges relating to illegal political activities" (International Labour Office: 1980).

Given the way in which the West Bank unions define themselves, there can be no division between political and union activities. Their perceived remit of representing all Arab labour irrespective of residence or place of employment cuts across the Israeli categorisation of Arab workers discussed earlier. In addition, the unions have operated in concert with the professional associations representing doctors, dentists, traders and so on and have participated in the National Guidance Council in the West Bank. This is a body made up of representatives from political parties, municipalities, charities and trade unions which serves to coordinate opposition to the occupation (see Chapter Six), and the trade union representation is through their own coordinating body, the General Federation of Trade Unions.[29] Under Jordanian law, any 21 workers can apply for an association provided they obtain a permit which serves as a license to operate as a trade union and qualifies the union for membership in the GFTU. As application for a permit must now be made to the Military Authorities and there have been long delays in them being granted, the GFTU now admits as members unions which are 'waiting' for a permit.[30]

Under 25% of the West Bank workforce are union members.[31] This can be seen as partly due to there being insufficient unions to cover all trades - the Baker's Union,[32], for example, estimates that 95% of its potential membership are in fact union members, suggesting that where

unions exist they are supported - and partly because of the difficulties outlined above, in that it is difficult to show workers what advantages they would have by joining a union. In the case of the Ramallah textile workers discussed earlier, a Tailor's Union was set up in April 1981 and by October 1981 had a membership of 85 out of a potential membership of 1,500. The problems in generating support for the union were outlined by its full-time organiser as being firstly, workers finding time to attend meetings. As was noted earlier, most of the employees are from surrounding villages and refugee camps and are bussed back at night. Also, compulsory overtime means that a 12-hour day is not uncommon, and this does not leave much time for union meetings. Secondly, discouragement from the families of the women workers. The organiser felt that the idea of a trade union was not accepted by the families, and it had been hard enough for them to accept the women working in the first place. Family opposition is linked to the third point, which is the attitude taken by the owners of the work-shops towards the union. Workers attempting to gather support for the union in the workplace have been dismissed, and the owners have threatened dismissal to anyone who joins.

The members of the Ramallah Tailor's Union are almost all women, and it is interesting in this context to look at the formation of Working Women's Committees in the West Bank.[33] Working Women's Committees were first established early in 1981, and after six months there were 14, aiming to cater for all working women.[34] The membership is composed mainly of teachers, nurses and factory workers. One of the organisers defined their long-term goal as "the raising of awareness in order to fit women for their role in the struggle to liberate Palestine" and explained that

their reason for coming into being was the belief that an organisation was needed which would focus on problems which specifically affected women. Discrimination against women is seen to operate on three levels. The first is racial, and this applies to all Palestinians under occupation. The second is economic, as women are paid less than men, and the third is social, which is a questioning of the role of women in Palestinian society.

The approach of the Working Women's Committees emphasises practical help, as "people are more ready to listen to theories if you help on their farm", and the committees have been involved in setting up medical centres, illiteracy programmes and arranging speakers and discussion groups. In this way, they are filling in the gaps in the provision of social and health services in the West Bank.

One issue which has been debated within both the Working Women's Committees and the trade unions is the extent to which what is perceived as conflict within Palestinian society - social discrimination - should be postponed during the wider resistance against occupation. The WWC's argue that the two are inseparable, but some unionists have criticised the existence of separate organisations for women, and suggest that women should work through their relevant trade union.

The attempt to organise labour under occupation cannot isolate the work-place from the wider context, as was illustrated in the discussion of the position of West Bank workers in Israel and in the West Bank itself. West Bank trade unions have to formulate strategies to deal with the conflict arising from the contradictions between capital and labour, and their struggle to organise in the workshops of the West Bank is an example of this. Although they are excluded from operating within Israeli enter-

prises, the insistence on drawing no distinction between categories of Palestinian worker is an important political point.

In this context, it is interesting to note the way in which other kinds of distinction between categories of worker are made. The economic basis of Israel's attempt to emphasise a distinction between West Bank Arab labour and 'Israeli Arab' labour has been discussed, and the political and ideological components noted of maintaining a workforce under military government and continuing the enforced disintegration of the idea of a Palestinian people. While strategies have been worked out in the West Bank to overcome and deny this, groups such as the Working Women's Committees are arguing that the differentiation between men and women must be dealt with, as women face particular problems in Palestinian society. Thus, the apparent attempt to oppose divisiveness and prejudice against women by requiring them not to organise separately is in this sense a reinforcement of divisions between men and women, and the call to postpone the 'internal' differentiation effectively justifies existing attitudes and practices towards women.

In conclusion, even existing under the restrictions which have been discussed, the West Bank trade unions are still functioning and have not been officially banned - unlike political parties and the National Guidance Committee - so their ability to continue is of importance to a united resistance front.

West Bank Agriculture

The decreasing number of people involved in agriculture in the West Bank has been noted, and the intention now is to examine the kinds of changes which have taken place. Before the 1967 occupation, over half the West Bank population was employed in the agricultural sector, mainly on family farms with some wage labour. The other main sources of income were from tourism, and remittances[35] from members of the family working abroad - an estimated 170,000 people emigrated from the West Bank between 1952 and 1961 (Rekhess: 1975). By 1979, only 24.1% of the total population (N.B. not working population) was living on income derived from agriculture (Tamari: 1981).

The kinds of problems arising in an attempt to explicate what is happening in the West Bank by their very nature give an insight into the relationship between Israel and the occupied territories. For example, the plethora of official Israeli data collected on aspects of living conditions in the West Bank divides the population into categories of 'urban' and 'rural'. However, the people living in refugee camps are subsumed under whichever type of locality they are nearest, with the result that a high proportion of rural families are shown as being without access to agricultural land - the reason is not acute landlessness amongst West Bank farmers but the inclusion of refugee families in the 'rural' section of the statistics, so that refugee status in effect disappears (Tamari: 1981).

The figures on emigration from the West Bank do not indicate how many emigrants have been living in refugee camps since 1948, or 1967, nor whether they are families leaving permanently or some members of

families leaving to find work in order to support those remaining on remittances. No distinction is drawn between households deriving their livelihood from family farms, and those engaged in agricultural wage-labour - all are collapsed under 'agriculture'. Similarly, where women and children work on family farms, this is not counted as productive labour and so is left out of data on the civilian labour force.

Such difficulties would make a detailed statistical analysis of the changes taking place in the West Bank extremely problematic, but the official Israeli sources are of use in a more limited way. For example, data on what crops are grown in the West Bank indicate that significant changes have taken place. The situation of agriculture in the West Bank after 1967 has been described as follows:

> ...Israeli advisers and staff officers encouraged the re-structuring of agricultural production and the modernisation of cultivation methods in the West Bank....The receptiveness of West Bank farmers to change was indicated by their adoption of new cultivation techniques...and by the increasing capitalisation and mechanisation of agriculture. (Migdal, Ed.: 1980: p.189).

It can be suggested that in this case 'restructuring' meant that agriculture in the West Bank was to be brought into line with the demands of the Israeli market, and that this has involved change in what is grown, how it is grown and where and how produce can be sold.

After 1967, the immediate concern of the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture was to protect Israeli agriculture and ensure that there would be no competition from West Bank cultivators, and so restrictions were imposed for a period of what was called "planning and adjustment" (Bregman: 1975). Lesch has pointed out that if agricultural produce from the West Bank had been allowed access to Israel at the end of the 1967 war, it would have

undersold Israeli produce by around 25% (Lesch: 1970). No such restrictions were imposed on Israeli produce entering the occupied territories, and as much of Israel's agricultural output is subsidised by the government this was disadvantageous to the West Bank farmers.

Van Arkadie has stated that Israel intended to reorder the agricultural pattern of the West Bank so that it would complement rather than compete with Israeli produce. This has been limited, and the changes in the types of crops grown indicate a shift towards producing vegetables and tree crops for export, and a shift away from the more labour-intensive field crops, although field crops which could be exported for processing, such as chick peas and tobacco, did show marked increases in production (Van Arkadie: 1977). As an indication of how the 'readjustment' operated, by 1972-3 the cultivation of melons in the West Bank had decreased from 36,000 tons to 3,300 tons - a decrease of 90.8%. By 1975, the West Bank was importing over 11,000 tons of melons from Israel (computed from "Statistical Abstract of Israel", 1977; and from "West Bank Agriculture, 1973", cited by Van Arkadie).

The bulk of agricultural produce for export still goes to Jordan, as it did before 1967, with Israel importing around 12%. While the restrictions on exports to Israel were technically loosened by the early 1970's, as Bregman has shown this operated only if the goods to be exported were in small quantities which could easily be absorbed by the Israeli market, and if a large influx of goods threatened the maintenance of the price of that crop in Israel then it would be prohibited. Thus, for example, dates and grapes could not be exported to Israel (Bregman: 1975).

The exportation of West Bank produce to Jordan was halted after the 1967 war, but the institution of an 'open bridges' policy provided the possibility for trade to be resumed via exports to Jordan and through Jordan to the rest of the Arab world. However, it did not prevent freedom of import into the West Bank, nor for that matter, freedom of movement. It can be noted that the denial of access to the bridges from the West Bank to Jordan has frequently been used as a punitive measure, and this applies to produce as well as people.[36]

In effect, what the 'open bridges' policy provides is a means of dealing with agricultural surpluses in the West Bank without endangering the Israeli economy, as well as keeping a route open to the Arab world. It has been suggested that Israeli produce is being exported to Arab countries by this route (Ryan: 1974: p.13). In this context, it is interesting to note the importance of a market for Israeli goods brought about by the Camp David Agreement as well as by the occupation of the West Bank and South Lebanon. By 1982, Israeli exports to Egypt had reached $15 million - a 50% increase over the 1981 figures. And, according to a report published by the "Economist Intelligence Unit":

> Trade with Lebanon has been much more lively, rising from $4 million worth of Israeli goods sold in Lebanon in July, to $7 million worth in each of August and September, and to $9.3 million in October.
> (Economist Intelligence Unit: 1983: p.18).

At that time, there were no formal trade agreements between Israel and Lebanon, so that all trade which was being carried out was on an ad hoc, cash only basis.[37] However, the establishment of trading ties was a condition of Israel's bargaining position in the cease-fire negotiations, and since this has been agreed then even a token boycott of Israeli produce by Arab countries is difficult, since, as was discussed earlier, Lebanon

is an important funnel for trade in the Arab world and an important interface between the West and the Arab countries.

It was suggested before that changes in how cultivation is carried out in the West Bank have taken place alongside changes in what is actually grown. Ryan has noted the organisational structure established by the Military Authorities, with members of staff from the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture attached to the occupation staff (Ryan: 1974). A network of 'agricultural councils' was set up to deal with marketing guidance, production and liaison with the administration, the councils being composed of "notables and leading farmers" (see discussion of Village Leagues in Chapter Six). In addition, research and surveys were carried out, demonstration plots set up, agricultural field days held and visits to Israeli facilities organised (Migdal, ed.: 1980).

It is impossible to isolate the effect of certain forms of technological innovation on West Bank agriculture. Shift in the pattern of land-use towards less labour-intensive crops, the rapid drop in the number of people engaged in agriculture, the loss of land through expropriation, and the various less direct disincentives attached to farming under military occupation are all instances of a rapid capitalisation of agriculture[38] in the context of the specific colonial relationship in the West Bank. A clear example of this interplay is provided by the use of water.

Water as a Resource

The importance of water as a resource was expressed in the following plan submitted to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919:

> The economic life of Palestine, like that of of every other semi-arid country depends on the available water supply. It is, therefore, of vital importance not only to secure all water resources already feeding the country but also to be able to conserve and control them at their sources...[39]

In Israel, water resources and supplies are administered on a national basis by the Israel Water Commission, which comes under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture. Quotas of water for agriculture and domestic consumption are allocated to towns, villages and settlements and exceeding the allocation can incur a fine. An Israeli journalist, in describing the case of an Arab village in the triangle, has noted that the water allocation for agriculture averaged 200m^3 per dunum, while that for a neighbouring Jewish moshav stood at 1,000m^3 per dunum (cited in Amun et al.: 1977: p.46). Overall, some 22.6% of the cultivated area of field crops in Israel is cultivated by Arab villagers yet according to official statistics, they receive less than 2% of the water allocated for agriculture (Amun et al.: 1977: p.41). Abu Kishk has pointed out that the majority of Arab villages in fact have no water allocated for irrigation. In the Arab sector, less than 9% of the land is under irrigation, while in the Jewish sector this proportion is over 50% (Abu Kishk: 1981: pp.132-3).

This serves firstly to provide an obstacle to the little Arab agriculture which has survived within Israel's 1949 borders and secondly as a means of regulating what can actually be grown. The extent of land expropriation was discussed in Chapter Four, but it has been suggested that in spite of this loss, agricultural output could be maintained given different factors of production, such as capital and water (Abu Kishk: 1981).

The restriction of the supply of water means that Arab farmers are forced to rely on crops which can be grown without expensive irrigation, such as olives, and are unable to compete with Jewish concerns. In other words, capital-intensive agricultural methods which are used to a large extent for the production of goods for the lucrative export market - such as dairy produce and horticulture - are not available to Arab agriculturalists.[40]

It has been estimated that 30% of Israel's water supply now comes from the West Bank, and that the West Bank's underground water resources are being used as a reservoir for Israeli requirements (Khouri: 1980). The importance of this can be seen when the Israeli deficit in water requirements, estimated at 265 million m^3 in 1979, is set against the West Bank water surplus of some 630-775 million m^3 per year (data from the Royal Scientific Society, Amman, cited by Abu Ayyash: 1981: p.123).

In addition to the extraction of water for use inside Israel, Israeli settlements in the West Bank have their own water network. This has involved drilling deep-bore wells and installing powerful pumps in order to supply settlers' domestic and irrigation demands. Around 20 such wells have been sunk in the Jordan Valley alone. The depth of the new wells being drilled means that if they are situated near existing wells or springs then they drain off the existing water supply. Thus, for example, following the drilling of three deep-bore wells on the site of al-Auja spring, the outflow of the spring which had been as average 11 million m^3 per year dried up in 1979. This meant that all cultivation carried out in al-Auja was ruined, at an estimated cost of $3 million (Matar: 1981: p.102).

Water pumped by the settlements is exclusively for use in the settlements and is not available to West Bank Arab towns and villages. Military Order 158 was introduced to amend Jordanian Law No. 31 (1953) which required approval to be sought for the siting of new wells. The Military Order requires a permit to be granted by the Area Commander before a well can be sunk, and also covers irrigation established before 1967 (Abu-Lughod: 1982). However, since 1967 no Arab town, village or individual in the West Bank has been given permission to drill for water for agriculture or public supply and only 7 permits have been granted to drill for personal domestic consumption (Davis et al.: 1980). Hebron, for example, is growing in size and its geographical position, being built on mountains, means that there is a need for pumping equipment and strong water pressure to connect homes being built on the mountains to the water supply. The municipality planned to sink wells in Bani Na'im and Sam'ua villages, and run pipes to the city, but their application for a permit was rejected by the Area Military Commander (Interview, Hebron Municipality: September, 1981).

As is the case with agriculture inside Israel, the application of water policies is a requirement of a particular kind of agriculture, and again in the West Bank this is the introduction of capital-intensive cash-crop farming. The Jordan Valley settlements, as Harris has indicated, are producing out-of-season goods for export, while the economy of the Katif complex in the Gaza Strip is based on the hothouse cultivation of tomatoes (Harris: 1978). In the latter case, the sinking of wells to supply the high levels of irrigation required has drawn water away from Gaza's main industry, which is orange plantations.

Uri Davis refers to an Israeli article on the recommendations made by Begin's advisers on the negotiations with Egypt which included the insistence that, should an 'autonomous administration' come into being in the West Bank restrictions would be placed on the depth to which wells could be sunk. Also, that Israel should have exclusive rights to the deep water bed in the West Bank, as:

> There is unanimous agreement on the fact that should control of water resources in the West Bank slip out of Israeli hands in the process of the establishment of Palestinian autonomy the entire Israeli infrastructure would be placed in immediate jeopardy.
> (Davis: 1979: p.13).

The importance of water also colours Israel's invasion of Lebanon. The Zionist Delegation's submission to the Paris Peace Conference referred to earlier suggested a northern boundary for a Zionist state which would run from "a point on the Mediterranean Sea in the vicinity of Sidon and following the watersheds of the foothills of the Lebanon" (Quoted in Hadawi: 1968: p.12). This would encompass the Litani and Awali Rivers and their sources on Mount Hermon, and in fact closely approximates a line 27 miles north of Israel's 1949 border where:

> ...the Israeli Army has embarked on a £25 million scheme of fortifications, improved roads and consolidation behind an ingeniously protected new front line...The set-up has given the Israeli occupation a new look of permanence.
> ('The Times': 10.8.83).

What is being suggested is that an analysis of the nature of the relationship between Israel and the West Bank can be constructed by highlighting particular instances which are conceived of as being interrelated. Thus, while Israeli policies regarding water in the West Bank and in Lebanon can be seen in the context of strategies adopted by

an occupying force, they are also related, at a more abstract level, in the way in which capitalist forms of agricultural production destroy non-capitalist agricultural production. Similarly, an examination of the problems encountered by Arab labour in Israel can compare this at one level with problems encountered by migrant labour in other parts of the world in the face of a global restructuring, and also maintain the specificity of these difficulties by relating them to the place of Palestinians as a colonised people. The discussion of West Bank trade unions introduces another level of analysis, that of the meaning of colonisation for the colonised, and it is at this level that we can understand the different strategies for survival which have emerged in the West Bank. Chapters Six and Seven pick up this level of analysis by considering particular forms of resistance which have arisen as moments in the colonial relationshp.

NOTES

1. According to Bregman (1975), 90% of all enterprises employ fewer than 10 people. It is not clear if this includes family labour.

2. According to the General Secretary of the East Jersalem-based Bakers' Union, when all categories of worker are included, the percentage employed in Israel is around 60%.

3. This varies according to region and season. Also, see section (iii) on the employment of children in agriculture.

4. This category includes those who have chosen not to go through official channels, as well as those who cannot, such as children under the age of 17.

5. For a discussion of the use of Asian labour in the Gulf states, see Birks & Sinclair, Economic and Social Implications of Current Development in the Arab Gulf: the Oriental Connection, in Niblock, ed. (1980). Also, Enid Hill, Modernization of Labour and Labour Law in the Arab Gulf States, (1979).

6. For a discussion of the divisions within Israeli Jewish society, see for example, an examination of the problems faced by 'Oriental' immigrants in Andrew Mack's Oriental Jews: Class, Ethnicity and Ideology, in Davis et al., eds. (1975). Also, the situation for Israeli women in Avishai Ehrlich's Zionism, Demography and Women's Work in Khamsin 7 (1980).

7. For example, while there is no ban on Arab students studying electronics, they cannot be employed in the Israeli electronics industry for reasons of 'security'.

8. While they are defined as such for the purposes of tax, employment etc., applications for citizenship can be turned down.

9. 'Social Benefits' are entitlements based on the criterion of employment, such as sick pay and accident compensation (Israeli Ministry of Labour; 1976).

10. No details are available on the nature of these projects.

11. For a discussion of Druzes in Israel, see Friendly & Silver, Israel's Oriental Immigrants and Druzes (1981).

12. Comparable figures are: Britain 2.5-5%; USA 5-10%; USSR 10-20%; Algeria 2.5-5%. The only states on a par with Israel are Oman and UAE (Kidron & Segal: 1981).

13. It was claimed by an Arab chemical engineer with Israeli citizenship that he had been offered a supervisory position if he would call himself by a Jewish name, as it would be demeaning for the Jewish workers he would be in charge of to be supervised by an Arab. (Interview: August 1981).

14. Over 55% of the Histadrut's expenditure is on Kupat Holim, their health care scheme, as Israel has no public medical service (International Department, Histadrut: n.d.).

15. For a discussion of sub-contracting and recruitment to Israel's construction industry, see Tamari: 1981.

16. However, education is compulsory until the age of 16 (see Chapter Seven).

17. Statistics from a map of UNRWA's area of operations, 30.6.1979.

18. The information in this section was provided by the organiser of Ramallah Tailor's Union in October 1981.

19. As Birks and Sinclair put it:

> Women have always worked and continue to work in the traditional sector: they are often seen working in the fields... Their labour is of considerable significance in traditional sectors which have experienced the outmigration of labour... In the absence of the male household head, women have been obliged to adopt roles and functions normally reserved for men.
>
> (Birks & Sinclair: 1980: p.347)

20. Under the Emergency Regulations enforced on the West Bank, detention can be imposed for indefinite periods without preferring charges or bringing the prisoner to trial. Examples of the operation of these regulations are provided in Ibrahim Al-Abid, Israel and Human Rights, (1969). See also Naseer Aruri, Resistance and Repression (1978) for a discussion of the torture of political prisoners in Israel and the occupied territories.

21. This section is based on information provided by the General Secretaries of the Bakers' Union and the Printing Union, East Jerusalem.

22. The initial disparity in wages earned by West Bank residents employed in Israel and those employed in the West Bank appears to be decreasing. According to the Israeli Ministry of Labour, in 1970 the average wage in the occupied territories was 54% of the Israeli wage and by 1975 it had risen to 82%. It should be noted that while the absolute wage may be higher in Israel, there are more deductions (Ministry of Labour: 1976). This can be seen as an indication of the degree of integration between the economies of the West Bank and Israel.

23. For example, the Bakers' Union was established in 1957, closed in 1967 and restarted in 1981.

24. The Histadrut differs from organisations such as the TUC in that a worker joins the Histadrut and is then assigned to a relevant trade union, of which there are 43. Around 65% of the total population of Israel are Histadrut members (International Department, Histadrut: n.d.).

25. One strategy which has been adopted with workers employed inside Israel is to take individual cases to the Israeli courts. A Jerusalem lawyer who has dealt with several such cases said that none had been successful. It may seem paradoxical that a union which refuses to accept the legitimacy of the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem should implicitly confer legitimacy by appealling to Israeli legal institutions, and parallels can be drawn with the many attempts since 1948 to take cases of land expropriation to the Israeli courts. It can be suggested that in both instances, the intention was to publicise grievances rather than attempt to secure change through the legal system.

26. Military Order 825 was issued in amendment of Article 83 of Jordanian Labour Law No. 21 (1960). The operation of the MO was backdated such that holders of union office who had been elected prior to the issuance of the MO and who do not fulfil its requirements are declared 'illegally elected' and their position annulled (Shehadeh: 1980).

27. See the discussion of municipal remits in Chapter Six.

28. This information was provided during a day of protest against the conditions in Israeli prisons, during which time the families of prisoners staged a sit-in at the Red Cross Centre in Hebron.

29. The GFTU is affiliated to the General Union of Palestinian Workers, which is represented in the Palestine National Council and has six places reserved in the 21-strong Central Council. In attempting to represent Palestinian workers resident in other Arab countries, the GUPW has faced problems similar to the West Bank organisation. As Peretz explains:

> ....It has not served the same function as usual labour unions to protect the rights and conditions of employment of its members because it has not been recognised by employers in host countries as a bargaining agent.
>
> (Peretz: 1977: p.60).

30. According to the organiser of a newly-formed West Bank Union, if the request for a permit is not answered after three months, it is taken as acceptance.

31. This figure was quoted as including all West Bank workers regardless of residence or workplace (Interview: October, 1981).

32. In September 1981, the Bakers' Union changed its name to the Industrial Food Union, and expected its members to increase to about 1,000, as it now covered all food processing factories (Interview: October, 1981).

33. For a history of women's organisations in the West Bank, see Yvonne Haddad, Palestinian Women: Patterns of Legitimation and Domination, pp.159-63, in Nakhleh & Zureik, eds. (1980). An appendix to the paper consists of a chronology of Palestinian Women's organisations from 1921 to 1969.

34. This section is based on discussions with members of the Ramallah branch of the Working Women's Committee.

35. The significance of income from remittances can be linked back to the increasing import of consumer goods from Israel which was noted earlier.

36. In the summer of 1981, punitive measures taken against Nablus included the refusal to allow lorryloads of tomatoes from the town to cross the bridge for sale on the Jordanian market, and they were instructed to return to Nablus. Tomatoes cannot be stored, and this resulted in two weeks' exports being wasted (Interview: September 1981).

37. According to an Israeli newspaper report:

> Every day, many tons of fruit and vegetables are illegally exported from Israel to Lebanon. According to one authorised estimate, some 10 tons of strawberries alone are now being sent out daily. Most of all the exporting of fruit and vegetables to Lebanon takes place in violation of Israeli law, and bypasses the Agrexco (Fruit Marketing) company and the organised marketing organisation. The directors of Agrexco are aware of the situation, and have asked the army authorities to close the border with Lebanon to agricultural exports, unless these take place through Agrexco. A senior IDF officer... told its directors that the IDF did not regard it as its job to close the border.
>
> ('Ha'aretz': 21.2.1983).

38. For example, we can note the increased use of inputs such as chemical fertilisers, where the amount used rose by 175% between 1968 and 1973. The number of tractors increased from 120 to 866 in the same period (computed from data in Administered Territories Statistics Quarterly, Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics: 1975: pp.52, 71).

39. This quotation is taken from the submission of the Zionist delegation to the Paris Peace Conference (Cited by Hadawi: 1968: pp.11-12).

40. On this point, reference can be made to the discussion in Chapter Three of the development of agriculture under the Mandate, and the way in which the Mandate state facilitated the development of the Jewish (capitalist) sector.

Chapter Six

STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL

Chapter Six

The focus in this Chapter is on what colonisation means for the colonised, and how interpretations are contested and reconstituted in particular historical circumstances. Three instances will be discussed of how the experience of colonisation is worked out at the level of local politics. The first concerns Palestinians living inside Israel shortly after the establishment of the Israeli state, and the other two are drawn from the West Bank after the 1967 occupation. Their conceptualisation as moments in a colonial relationship involves an analysis which is more than a history of types of political organisation, and the problematic set out in the Introduction will be raised regarding the level at which a Palestinian unity can be assumed.

Al Ard (The Land)

The Al Ard movement was formed in 1958, ten years after the establishment of the State of Israel. Its history as a movement was short, as it was banned in 1964 and subject to many restrictions in its six years of existence. However, it is illuminating as a particular interpretation constructed by Palestinian Arabs living inside Israel at that time, and the way in which this was translated into political practice.

Al Ard was set up by a group of people[1] who left the Popular Front, and we can begin by outlining briefly the development which led to the dissolution of the Popular Front. It had come into existence in 1956 as an alliance of communists, nationalists and progressives, and its constitution affirmed its aim to:

> ...abolish the military government, to end the expropriation of Arab land, to effect the return of expropriated property to its owners, to abolish racial discrimination, to introduce the use of Arabic in all government departments, and to work towards the return of all refugees to their homes.
>
> (Jiryis: 1976: p.186)

While these aims were specific to the problems faced by Palestinians remaining in Israel, accounts of both the beginning and the end of the Popular Front accord most weight to external political events. Jiryis, for example, suggests that the support which international communism gave to the 'Arab struggle' encouraged cooperation between communists and nationalists throughout the Arab world, and that it was in this spirit in which the Popular Front was set up in Israel. (Jiryis: 1976). Baransi explains the dissolution of the Front as a result of the "repercussions on us of the situation in the Arab world" (Baransi: 1981: p.19). This refers to the conflict between communists and nationalists over Egypt's union with Syria, and the influence of Nassar's pan-Arab rhetoric can be seen in the location of the struggle confronting Arabs inside Israel within the struggle taking place through the whole Arab region.[2]

The split within the Popular Front is therefore presented as consonant with the divisions between Arab nationalists and the communist parties in Arab countries, notably Egypt. The Front separated into two groups; the smaller consisted of communists and those prepared to continue cooperating with the communist party, the larger issued a new programme under the name of 'Usrat al Ard' (Family of the Land). Application was made to the Israeli authorities for permission to publish an Arabic weekly newspaper, and publishing began pending the granting of the permit.

In understanding the emphasis placed on a pan-Arab perspective, it is important to recognise not only what was happening regionally at that time,[3] but also what was happening to the Arab population inside Israel. As was noted in Chapter Four, in the first ten years of the new state, Isreal established a series of laws which firstly, enabled large-scale expropriation of Arab land and secondly, served as a basis for instituting a legal system which discriminated heavily against non-Jews. Thus, the remaining Palestinian Arab population was cut off from neighbouring countries, in many cases dispossessed, under military government, and their exclusion had been legalised and legitimated. Opposition to these measures depended largely on initiatives taken by the Israeli Communist Party (MAKI). While recognising the relationship between international communism and the formulation of policies by the Israeli Communist Party,[4] it should also be noted that they were the only avowedly non-Zionist political party which legally existed, and as such the main focus of organised Arab opposition was through MAKI.[5]

Some of the Zionist parties also attempted to organise amongst Palestinians inside Israel. MAPAI ran allied lists for the Knesset as early as 1949, and MAPAM has also put forward separate Arab lists for election[6] (Lockman: 1976). However, to look at support for political parties as an indicator of the political perceptions of Arabs inside Israel is misleading on three main grounds. Firstly, the tactics used by the Israeli parties to capture the 'Arab vote' have included the presentation of campaign literature in Arabic which directly contradicts the party's 'official' position (Cohen: 1965), and secondly, votes have been won through the manipulation of a system of patronage and reward.[7] Thirdly, the Israeli authorities prevented the formation of any overtly Arab party, and so opposition to the state was diffused through the Israeli parties, obscuring motivations for voting particular lines.

In one sense, Al Ard represents the first attempt after 1948 to form an independent Palestinian Arab organisation under Israeli rule. The programme drawn up by the founders on their disassociation from the Popular Front was published in the first issue of the newpaper, and contained the following five points:

1. Equal rights for Arabs in all respects, and the repeal of the discriminatory laws designed to destroy the Arab identity. The right of Arabs to develop in the framework of their own customs and national character.

2. Recognition of the right of the Arab refugees to return to their homeland.

3. Recognition that Arab nationalism is the decisive force in the Arab world, and that any other opinion is historically wrong.

4. A call for positive neutrality towards the two world powers.

5. A call to tie the progress and fate of Israel to the progress and fate of the Arab countries in the economic, educational and social spheres (El-Asmar: 1975: p.69).

A delay in the official response to the application for a publishing permit led to Al Ard attempting to circumvent the law[8] by publishing each issue of the paper under a different editor and with a different title - all of which incorporated 'Al Ard'.[9] The permit was not granted, and after the group had published thirteen issues of the newspaper in the way described above, the police closed it down and confiscated the latest issues (Jiryis: 1976: p.188). The members of Al Ard then applied to register as a printing and publishing company, and after an initial refusal for registration on

the grounds of "opposition to the security of the State and the interests of the people" a hearing on appeal in the Israeli Supreme Court led to the company's eventual registration. However, a license to publish a newspaper was again refused (Jiryis: 1976).

The final programme submitted by the group "developed through a bitter internal struggle...between the left and the right" (El-Asmar: 1975: p.73). It contained seven points, as follows:

1. The levels of 'Israeli-Arab' education, science, health, economy and political status should be raised.

2. A true and just social equality among all social strata in Israel must be sought.

3. A just solution to the Palestinian problem in the persepctive of its being one and indivisible to be sought; a solution which would be in accord with the will of the Palestinian-Arab people.

4. Recognition of United Nations decision of 29 November 1947, which would provide a just solution which would maintain the rights of both Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian-Arab peoples.

5. Support of the liberation, unity and socialism in the Arab world in all legal ways.

6. Acting for peace in the Middle East and in the world in general.

7. Support for all progressive forces throughout the world. Opposition to imperialism and support of all the peoples who are trying to free themselves from its yoke (Summarised from El-Asmar: 1975).

The Supreme Court ruled that Article 3 was "utterly destructive of the existence of the State of Israel" (Jiryis: 1976: p.133). The leadership of Al Ard was placed under house restriction, some were taken into administrative detention, and in 1964 the Minister of Defence used the Emergency Regulations to declare Al Ard an illegal organisation. It has been suggested that Al Ard was banned because members had intended to contest the Knesset elections in November 1965 (Interview: July, 1981). In fact, a list was submitted, the 'Socialist List', with ten candidates who were supporters of Al Ard. Four of them were exiled within Israel, and the list was not permitted to contest the election (Jiryis: 1976). Again, the reason was that the 'Socialist List' threatened the security of the State of Israel.

The history of the Al Ard movement indicates the careful emphasis on remaining within the bounds of Israeli legality. The way in which the publication of the newspaper was managed was discussed earlier, and the appeals to the Supreme Court after the refusal of the publication permit and licence to register as a company are further evidence of this. In Chapter Five, note was made of the attempts to contest land expropriation in the Israeli courts, and to some extent this had become an established political practice.

When this is linked with statements made regarding the way in which Al Ard conceived of the State of Israel, then it is clear that the movement defined itself and its aspirations within Israeli hegemony. Their adherence to the United Nations partition plan of 1947 in proposing a Palestinian state to exist alongside the State of Israel did not question the basis of the State of Israel. One founder member is quoted as saying:

> We certainly support the opinion that the Jewish people has a right to its own independent state... The first thing a Palestinian state would have to do would be to negotiate and to arrive at a peace agreement with the State of Israel.
> (Mansur Qardush, quoted by Al-Asmar: 1975: p.74).

There was a degree of cooperation with Jewish organisations, although this was a source of conflict within Al Ard. Fouzi Al-Asmar has said that he favoured cooperation, and helped establish links with the 'Third Force' and the 'Semitic Action Group'. A joint conference was held for Jewish and Arab authors, and at a demonstration which took place in Jerusalem in 1963 calling for the end of military government, "the leaders of Al Ard walked side by side with Jews and behind the Israeli national flag". (El-Asmar: 1975: p.75).

It is suggested that the conditions which establish the parameters within which certain kinds of interpretation emerge do not determine the form of the interpretation, and in the case of the Al Ard movement this can be summed up as the way in which an attempt was made to express a distinct Palestinian identity within the boundaries of a state which excluded the possibility of such an identity existing. An analysis of the history can locate the contradiction of trying to forge an identity based on pan-Arab assumptions regarding the indivisible unity of the problems between the Arabs and Israel, and their particular status as Arabs in Israel. However, while an analysis at this level can delineate contradictions in this way, in Al Ard's own terms the contradistinction of being a non-Jew in Israel was not faced head on, and in a sense the way in which Al Ard's strategies were formulated was as a means of avoiding this issue.

Chronologically, the development of the Al Ard group parallels the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organisation outside Palestinian territory. By the late 1950's, Fatah (Palestine National Liberation Movement) had begun to circulate a monthly publication which called for Palestinians to remember their common identity and purpose. Its programme for the recovery of Palestine pointed out that it was no good relying on others, least of all the Arab states which have:

> ....stopped the Palestinians' mouths, tied their hands, deprived them of their freedom of action in what is left of their country, resisted the idea of this regroupment, turned them into a theatrical claque which applauds this and reviles that...You went with many parties, and fought for many causes...what was the result? Did you restore your honour? Or one inch of your land? ....You remain scattered, without honour, or personal or collective identity. Let us raise the banner of our own unity, of revolution in Palestine, and put this aim above any other.
>
> (Quoted by Hirst: 1977: p.272).

This refelcts the disillusion with the way in which the Arab governments had dealt with the 'Palestine problem', and the scepticism was not dispelled by the incorporation of special Palestinian units into the armies of Syria and Iraq, nor by the 1964 Arab Summit decision to form a Palestine Liberation Organisation. Rodinson described this decision as that:

> ...those who were especially preoccupied by the problem should be given a bone to gnaw to keep them quite...A 'Palestinian entity' was to be created to give expression to the desires of the Palestinians, who were the most interested party, without taking a form which might embarrass the constituted Arab states...
>
> (Rodinson: 1982: p.142)

Fatah retained its organisational independence, and in 1965 began to carry out guerilla raids into Israel.

By the end of 1966, the Arab Nationalist Movement under the leadership of George Habash had set up the 'Heroes of the Return', and according to Hirst, at this time there were no less than forty Palestinian groupings (Hirst: 1977). The defeat in the 1967 war compounded the failure of the United Arab Republic in 1961, and the ANM fragmented. At the end of 1967, George Habash declared in the inaugural statement of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine that "the only language which the enemy understands is that of revolutionary violence." (Hirst: 1977: p.282). The guerilla groups took over the leadership of the PLO in 1968.

The discussion of the Al Ard group has highlighted one interpretation and one strategy for survival articulated by Palestinians at a particular moment, and the political and social location of the group is interesting to note in this context. In terms of Palestinian politics it was a new kind of potential leadership - one which was not drawn from the landed families. Instead, the majority of the founder members of Al Ard were young, and employed as teachers, writers and so on (Interview: July 1981). This background is reflected in the way the position of Palestinians in Israel was perceived, the political strategies which were formulated, and in the kinds of issues which were raised. The emphasis on legality, for example, can be related to Fanon's polemic regarding the emergence of a 'young nationalist bourgeoisie' and the creation under colonialism of the response of non-violence, described as "an attempt to settle the colonial problem around a green baize table" (Fanon: 1978: p.48). In terms of the wider themes raised in this work, a response which tries to find some basis for negotiation and compromise is, in its determined opposition to physical violence, a manifestation of the violence of the colonial relationship.

The task of the PLO has been to attempt to link the experiences of Palestinians, whether they have lived in exile since 1948 or under occupation within the Palestine constituency. It can be suggested that this conceptualisation was clarified after the 1967 war, as the differences of living under military occupation in the West Bank and living as an Arab minority inside Israel suggested different tactics. In this vein, we can turn now to look at municipal politics in the West Bank, and how they have become a form of resistance to occupation.

West Bank Municipalities

In Chapter Five, the relationship between Israel and the West Bank was analysed in terms of the kind of changes which have taken place since 1967, and the discussion of West Bank trade unions examined one instance of how resistance has been expressed through the organisation of labour under particular conditions. The conditions which provided the context within which Al Ard developed were suggested as being the situation of Arabs in Israel in the early years of the state; the way in which the Al Ard movement sought to define a distinct identity can be set against this situation and the ideas about Arab unity which were current regionally at that time. In this was, the discongruity between the level of a historical analysis of the conditions which made Al Ard's strategy possible and the level of the historicity of the strategy itself highlights the way in which the Al Ard movement found a means of surviving, and it was suggested that for Al Ard, survival meant a definition within Israeli hegemony.

For the West Bank municipalities, the conditions under which they have to operate have been summed up as follows:

> Palestinians in the Occupied Territories have enjoyed since 1967 no rights and no representative institutions. There is no authority to which they can appeal, no protection which they can invoke. Their every movement and action is subject to the arbitrary authority of the Israeli military governor. They can be detained, imprisoned, deported, without the intervention of any tribunal. Their houses and property may be destroyed, their lands confiscated, their crops burned and their trees cut down.
>
> (Kayyali, ed.: 1979: p.133)

The operation of the municipalities can be seen as a means of coping with life under the conditions described above, and it can be argued that the 1976 municipal elections indicated a redefinition of how daily life could be managed; one which was based on the recognition that a continued presence is in itself a form of resistance.

The municipal elections held in 1976 were the second round held under Israeli occupation and differed markedly from those in 1972,[10] both in candidature and in the issues on which the election was contested. The decree issued in 1971 by the Military Governor to announce that elections were to be held met with a call to boycott from both the PLO and the Jordanian Government. However, in January 1972, King Hussein withdrew his threat of sanctions against those who participated in the elections, and a fortnight before the first polling day[11] announced a new 'federation plan' for the West Bank and Jordan (Journal of Palestine Studies: 1972: Vol. 1, no. 4, p.167).

It has been suggested that Israel and Jordan had similar interests in the outcome of the elections; namely, that the formation of an entity independent of Israel and Jordan should be prevented (Metzger et al.: 1983). To this end, both were prepared to support the status quo and effect the return to office of the incumbents, who had been municipal officials under the Jordanian administration. The extent to which Israel was prepared to ensure that the elections would take place is indicated by the measures which were taken in Nablus, where no candidates came forward. A former mayor, Hamdi Kana'an, withdrew his name the week before the election, and the incumbent mayor, Ma'zuz Al-Masri, refused to run. According to Metzger et al.:

> ...several leading intellectuals from Nablus were threatened with deportation. Hikmat Al-Masri, a relative of the mayor, was arrested for having contact with terrorists, a grave charge. The businesses of the Masri family were investigated and partially placed under surveillance...Defence Minister Moshe Dayan threatened to place the city and all of its businesses under Israeli control and to put Lieutenant-Colonel Aaron in charge of the administration.
> (Metzger et al.: 1983: p.155)[12]

Under Jordanian law, the franchise was extended only to male residents over the age of 21, who owned property and paid property taxes. A turn-out of around 85% re-elected the traditional leadership,[13] although it can be suggested that the high voting figures were aided by the stamping of identity cards at the polls.[14] When the next round of elections was held in 1976, the franchise had been widened to include women and propertyless males, so that around three times as many people voted as in 1972. In sixteen of the twenty-four localities where elections were held, majorities were won by the Palestine National Front, a coalition of members of PLO groupings, Communists, Ba'athists, progressives, trade unions and cultural, social and professional organisations. Its aim had been to create a

political force on the West Bank which would unite a wide range of groupings, and which would be part of the PLO yet would retain a degree of autonomy in formulating its own policies.

Due to the degree of support shown in the elections, the newly-elected officials were able to claim that their success reflected "the political will of the Palestinians in the West Bank, and the widespread support for the PLO" (Interview: August 1981). This, however, was not a sudden phenomenon, and an explanation must include changes within the West Bank and within the Palestinian constituency as a whole.

The PNF was not formed until 1973,[15] and before this opposition to the occupation had been expressed in sporadic demonstrations, strikes and protests from people who had been Jordanian functionaries.[16] Israeli reaction was to use the range of legal provisions still valid from the Mandate in addition to Jordanian law and Israeli military amendments. In Chapter Five, the use was noted of trade restrictions as a means of collective punishment, and other forms of collective punishment, such as curfews,[17] and the destruction of property,[18] are imposed. Over 500 people had been deported from the West Bank in 1970, all without being charged (Lesch: 1979). Incidents of summary arrests and detention without trail have already been noted; other restrictions on civil liberties include restrictions on travel, censorship of all printed material, the banning of all political parties and restrictions on freedom of association (Shehadeh: 1980).

By the early 1970's, the mainstream PLO groupings such as Fatah were moving to a 'diplomatic approach' as an alternative to armed resistance.[19] It can be suggested that given the organisational structure of the PLO, the massacre of Palestinians in the refugee camps in Jordan in 'Black September' 1971 and the crushing of Palestinian organisations there made this shift inevitable. The regroupment of the remains of the PLO forces and institutions took place in Lebanon and, as was discussed in the Introduction, a second demonstration was provided eleven years later of the way in which Palestinians in exile exist on the whim of the host country.

An example of the attitude of the PLO towards the residents of the occupied territories was indicated by Yasser Arafat in his pronouncement that they were not expected to assume an active military role, but rather to remain on the land awaiting their release from occupation, as "merely holding out for a day is a small victory" (Journal of Palestine Studies: No. 9, 1973: p.192). Other groupings within the PLO expressed concern about the formulation of aims in the Palestine National Front charter in terms of a resistance to occupation in the occupied territories and the suggestion of a possible Palestinian state alongside Israel. For example, George Habash of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) argued that the Palestine National Front should struggle against Israel itself and not only the occupation (Lesch: 1980: p.52), and the PFLP remained less involved with the Front. the PNF charter does not mention the idea of a 'secular democratic state in all of Palestine', and it can be suggested that this reflects the importance of the Communist Party with the Front.[20]

Folowing the October War in 1973, the search for diplomatic intiatives within the PLO intensified and at the 12th meeting of the Palestine National Council[21] in 1974, a majority of organisations supported the resolution that a Palestinian state should be established in "any part of Palestine from which Israel will withdraw or which will be liberated."[22] Later than year, the Arab Summit in Rabat responded to a petition sent by the PNF and representations from the PLO and recognised the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people", whose aim is to "establish an independent power in every liberated part of Palestinian territory." This was followed by United Nations recognition of the PLO, and an invitation for Yasser Arafat to address the UN General Assembly.

The Israeli response in the West Bank was to deport to Lebanon one of the organisers of the PNF petition to the Rabat Summit, and arrest others thought to be involved (Lesch: 1980). A wave of strikes and demonstrations in support of the PLO were held in the West Bank and led to further arrests and expulsions, among them the head of the Communist Party in the West Bank and the President of Bir Zeit University (See Chapter Seven). In spite of the PLO's success in being accepted as representing the Palestinian people, it was excluded from negotiations at the Geneva Peace Conference over the future of the occupied territories, and indeed has remained excluded through the Camp David negotiations and the intiatives proposed by various Arab states.

It was suggested in Chapter Four that Israel's settlement policy in the West Bank has been consistent under Labour and Likud governments, and the broader aspects of Israeli policy can be seen to follow the same pattern. That is, that the aim has been to set up some form of 'civilian

autonomy' which would safeguard Israeli interests in the areas while absolving the Israeli state from any responsibility towards the Palestinian population. For example, in October 1975, the Defence Minister in the Labour Government, Shimon Peres, outlined a 'civil administration' plan which would involve a federation between Israel and the occupied territories leaving Israel in control of defence, foreign affairs and finance (Lesch: 1980). The 'autonomy plan' proposed by Prime Minister Begin[23] in December 1977 as a preliminary to the consultations with the United States and Egypt indicated that military government would be abolished, but that control of security would remain the responsibility of Israel. This plan explicitly claimed Israeli sovereignty over 'Judea and Samaria',[24] and the right of Israelis to settle there,[25] but suggested that due to competing claims the question of sovereignty should be left open (Metzger et al.: 1983).

In arguing that 'autonomy' under these conditions simply means that military occupation becomes permanent, Fayez Sayegh sums up the offering to the Palestinians as follows:

> A fraction of the Palestinian people (under one-third of the whole) is promised a fraction of its rights (not including the national right to self-determination and statehood) in a fraction of its homeland (less than one-fifth of the area of the whole); and this promise is to be fulfilled several years from now, through a step-by-step process in which Israel is to exercise a decisive veto power over any agreement. Beyond that, the vast majority of Palestinians is condemned to permanent loss of its Palestinian national identity, to permanent exile and statelessness, to permanent separation from one another and from Palestine - to a life without national hope or meaning.
>
> (Sayegh: 1979: p.40).

However, even the limited meaning of 'autonomy' defined in Israeli plans for the West Bank requires a measure of cooperation from within the occupied territories themselves. Earlier, it was suggested that before the 1972 elections, Israeli and Jordanian interests in the West Bank were coincidental in seeking the perpetuation of the leadership which had been in power under Jordanian rule, and it will be argued in the discussion of Village Leagues that to some extent Israel has tried to retain that option. The municipal officials who were elected in 1976 had been elected on policies which made it clear that they would not participate in any discussions on 'autonomy', and the way in which they perceive their remit has brought them into direct confrontation with the military authorities.

The role of the municipalities was summed up by one official as "the provision of leadership for West Bank Palestinians in the absence of a sovereign state" (Interview: September 1981). This has involved protest against the Israeli occupation in general as well as against specific measures taken by the military authorities. It can be suggested that initially it was the assumption of responsibility as elected representatives of the Palestinians in the West Bank in opposition to the occupation which brought the municipalities into conflict with the military government. The West Bank mayors in particular have acted as spokesmen both locally and internationally, and have worked to coordinate political activity in the West Bank. For instance, at the end of 1976, Israel decided to introduce VAT in the occupied territories.[26] The municipalities organised a strike as a form of civil disobedience and convened meetings of all groups in their constituencies. The result was a total strike, and the implementation of the new tax law was delayed (Interview: June 1981).

The Israeli censure to which the Mayors have been subjected includes the deportation in 1980 of Mayor Kawasme of Hebron and Mayor Milhelm of Halhul, following an attack on Jewish settlers in Hebron. Also in 1980 Bassam Shaka'a of Nablus, Karim Khalaf of Ramallah and Ibrahim Tawil of el-Bireh were badly injured in car bombings. While the bombings cannot be attributed directly to the military authorities, it is fair to say that little has been done to apprehend the attackers.[27] In 1981, Mayor Shaka'a described the level of restriction against him personally, where he is under town arrest and followed by the military within Nablus, and his home is under constant surveillance (Interview: June 1981).

While the municipalities' self-defined role was widened to include representation and opposition to the occupation, confrontation with the military authorities over the day-to-day running of the municipalities began soon after the 1976 elections and has intensified since then. The administrative remit of the West Bank municipalities includes the responsibility for social services; health provision; libraries; fire brigade; public order; the granting of licences for building and trading (Interview: June 1981). Taxes are raised locally to finance three main areas of service. These are 'cultural tax', a tax for cleaning the town, and a tax for 'safety and protection'. An official in Hebron Municipality said that given the low level of income, revenue for taxation is insufficient to maintain even a basic level of services (Interview: September 1981). The Mayor of Nablus Municipality confirmed that Nablus had a 30% budget deficit overall, and had insufficient financial resources to contemplate improving any services (Interview: June 1981).

Certain taxes must also be paid by the municipalities to the military authorities, for example, for power supplies. Israeli control of the West Bank's water resources was discussed in Chapter Five, and the way in which electricity is controlled provides a similar example of an aspect of domination, as well as illustrating the particular daily problems faced by the municipalities. Before 1967 there were eleven electricity generating companies in the West Bank, and this included private concerns like the Jerusalem Electricity Comapny as well as municipal and cooperative operations (World Council of Churches: 1980). Since then, Israel has attempted to link the West Bank into the Israeli grid. This would facilitate the supply of power to Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and would provide another means of controlling economic activity which relies on electricity. Also Israel would be able to decide on the level of charges for electricity.

According to the World Council of Churches report, the Jerusalem Electricity Company has been compelled to supply electricity to Israeli settlements built within the Company's area of operation:

> "Various pressure tactics applied to the Company have included appointing two Israelis to the Board, subjecting the Company to Israeli laws and forcing it to buy electricity from the Israeli Company so as to supply the requirements of Israeli settlements, and selling it at fixed low prices."
>
> (World Council of Churches: 1980).

Hebron Municipality ordered and paid for generators but permission to import them was refused and the municipality was linked to the Israeli grid. A request to supply electricity to several new houses on the outskirts of Hebron has been refused by the Israeli Company, and there have been complaints from residents of the city about the quality of

service provided. For example, it was claimed that the power is often too weak to like a fluorescent tube light (Interview: October 1981).

The municipalities are responsible for providing facilities for education, such as school buildings, although not for education itself (see Chapter Seven). In Nablus, one new school was opened between 1967 and 1976 - in this area, provision must be made for 700 new pupils annually. Between 1976 and 1981, the municipality had built three schools. When the buildings were half-finished, work was ordered to stop, but following protest the schools were completed (Interview: June 1981). During the same period, Hebron Municipality completed eight new schools. The need for a rapid expansion of facilities is indicated, in that at present 102 classrooms have more than 50 pupils and 43 rooms are in double use (i.e. one class attends school in the mornings and another in the afternoons). When the schools were built, they were leased to the Department of Education, which is under the auspices of the military government, with a proposal that the rent would be used to build one new school every year. However, no rent has been paid (Interview: September 1981).

Due to the problems in raising money noted earlier, the municipalities have relied mainly on donations from other Arab countries. The most important source of finance has been money sent from the Joint Palestinian-Jordanian Committee[28] - the 'steadfastness fund'. The establishment of this fund marked the resumption of formal contacts between the PLO and Jordan, after the break which followed Jordan's attack on the Palestinians in 1970. Both were aligned within the Arab Rejection Front on the Camp David proposals. However, it can be suggested that the new cooperation was not adopted to the same extent in the occupied territories.

In 1978, a National Guidance Committee was formed in the West Bank. It was immediately banned by the military authorities and most of its members placed under town arrest. In a sense, it developed as a result of new conditions in the West Bank with which the PNF was unable to deal. Rather than an alliance of political groupings, the NGC is more like a parliament, with 22 members selected as representatives of regional and political groups. According to Metzger at al., in 1980 the Committee consisted of two trade union delegates; nine mayors; the editors of 'Al Fajr' and 'Al-Tali'ah';[29] representatives from the student organisations, the Muslim Council and two representatives from the Gaza Strip (Metzger et al.: 1983: p.223).

The rapprochement between Jordan and the PLO was reflected in the decreasing significance of differences between the pro-Jordanian factions in the West Bank and the supporters of a mainstream Fatah line. For example, when asked about Jordan's role in efforts to find a 'solution' for the West Bank, the Mayor of Bethlehem, Elias Freij, who is generally regarded as pro-Jordanian, replied that:

> "...it must be made clear that terms such as 'pro-Jordanian' are obsolete. Today there is no difference between Jordan and the PLO, between King Hussein and Yasser Arafat, where the way to a solution to the conflict in our region is concerned...We are all united in our basic demands for a Palestinian state under PLO leadership...I am for a confederation between the two states..."
> ('New Outlook': Jan/Feb. 1980).

However, ties with Jordan were not unanimously supported by the more left-wing of the PLO groupings, who remained suspicious of American involvement in Jordan and of Jordanian designs on the West Bank.

The National Guidance Committee has defined its relationship with the PLO as one where the Committee considers itself to be part of the PLO, but not as representing the PLO in the West Bank. This means that the NGC expects to be able to make decisions on events occurring within the West Bank without necessarily referring them to the PLO leadership, and on occasion this had led to tensions. For instance, when the Joint Palestinian-Jordanian Committee was set up the NGC wanted control over the allocation of resources, for while a grant was made to the municipalities, finance was also awarded to individual projects. The NGC argument was that they were in the best position to judge the relative merits of projects applying for funding (Interview: June 1981), but the Joint Committee did not relinquish financial control.

In August 1981, Military Order 973 was announced which effectively banned the municipalities from accepting donations, and this was later extended to prevent any West Bank institution, charity or club both from spending money which had been gained from external sources and from accepting money sent to the West Bank. This applied whether or not the proposed project already had approval from the military authorities. The Mayor of Qalqilya was reported to have received a written directive dated August 16, 1981, stating "The (military) command forbids any money to be brought in from Amman." In this case, the money was JD22,500 from the Jordanian Government which had been sent specifically to buy a fire tender and a garbage truck. Permission to bring the money from Amman had been requested and approved prior to the military directive ('Al Fajr': 6-12 September, 1981).

In September 1981 the municipalities were ordered to pay tax to the military authorities of 7% on all financial transactions. This was back-dated to the date of occupation, which meant an accumulation of 14 years of tax (Interview: October, 1981). Israeli financial assistance has been used as a reward. The Mayor of Beit Jala Municipality and four council members were 'excluded' from the town following a dispute over the construction of an Israeli settlement on land owned by Beit Jala. The remaining council members resigned in protest. Rather than hold new elections, the military authorities appointed a Mayor and councillors, and immediately awarded them a grant of IS 1 million. According to an ex-council member of Beit Jala, the townspeople refused to go to the appointed officials (Interview: June 1981).

As well as exercising financial control over the municipal councils, all projects must be submitted to the military government for approval. The case in Nablus was noted earlier where the construction of a school was ordered to be halted when it was nearing completion, and . Metzger et al. cite examples of approval being given for projects and then withdrawn when costly preparations have been made (Metzger et al.: 1983: pp.179-80). Despite the punitive measures taken against municipal officials and the restrictions placed on the way in which the municipal councils can operate, the Israeli Military Administration has not secured the cooperation of the West Bank municipalities, and the latter have remained firm in their opposition to the occupation. Before examining more recent consequences of this, we can look at the way in which a different sort of strategy was formulated in the West Bank with the establishment of Village Leagues.

Village Leagues

The first village league formed after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank was in Hebron district in 1978. It consisted of fifteen village mukhtars[30] under the leadership of Mustafa Dudeen, a former government official in Egypt and cabinet minister in Jordan. By 1979 only three mukhtars remained in the league. However, by 1981 the estimated membership in Hebron district was 120, 48 of whom were mukhtars.[31] By early 1982, leagues had been set up in Ramallah, Bethlehem, Qalqilya and Silat el-Thaher (Jenin) districts, and unsuccessful attempts made to establish branches in Jericho and Nablus. The increase in the number of leagues and in the level of participation has helped to encourage claims that the leagues constitute a new 'moderate' leadership in the West Bank, and criticism has been made that village leagues are mere creations of the Israeli military authorities: created in order to facilitate the imposition of the restricted 'civilian autonomy' described previously.

The intention here is to move beyond a descriptive history to an examination of how the kind of political reality constructed by the leagues operates in conjunction with the dominant power relation in the West Bank, which has been analysed as that between an occupying, colonising force and an occupied, colonised people. In the light of the discussion of the Al Ard movement and municipal councils, it is hoped that through the examination of a very different attempt to accommodate to life under military rule, and the kinds of interpretations and perceptions which form the basis of and rationale for this accommodation, an understanding may be reached of the contradictions generated by occupation.

The permit which was granted to the Hebron league by the Israeli military authorities was permission to set up a cooperative organisation to improve social and economic facilities in the villages in the area. According to Mustafa Dudeen, the impetus for organising in this way was provided when, on his return to the West Bank from Jordan in 1976, many of his friends and family complained of the low standard of living in the villages. The way he defines the league is as a 'rural self-help group.' The kinds of projects which have been carried out so far include the building of schools, clinics and roads, and the supply of water and electricity to some of the villages (Interview: December 1981).

There is a precedent for organisation of this kind in the West Bank, as Village Leagues were set up under both British and Jordanian rule. The Chairman in both cases was Mustafa Dudeen, and it was stated that many of the present league members had been involved in leagues operating under previous regimes. The continuity of the leagues in representing the interests of the rural population is emphasised by their supporters, to the extent of claiming that "the urban dwellers have exploited the peasantry for centuries."[32]

League members emphasise the economic nature of the conflict between urban and rural,[33] and cite the disparity in the provision of services between towns and villages as evidence of the lack of concern shown in the urban centres of administration for the level of services in the villages. There is some confusion over who is supposed to provide services to the villages. According to the mayors of the municipalities, it is their responsibility. According to the leagues, they are ready to assume responsibility for services in the villages, leaving the municipalities to manage the towns.

The definition of conflict proposed by the leagues is presented in this way as an attempt to redress the exploitation of a rural peasantry by an urban administration. However, underlying this is tension between two very different perceptions of the situation in the West Bank. In the discussion of municipalities, it was suggested that as the occupation began to exhibit features of permanence, new definitions emerged of ways of living under occupation which focussed on resistance to military rule. For the leagues, the rightness or desirability of the occupation is not an issue - the main concern is the formulation of a strategy for working within the parameters imposed by the occupying authorities. As Mustafa Dudeen explained:

> We are realistic. There is an occupation here, it is a fact. It can't be denied. We still have to live. If, to help the villages means we must deal with the Israelis, then we deal.
> (Interview: December 1981).

The emphasis on the continuity of league activity under British, Jordanian and Israeli rule which was referred to earlier is an important element of acceptance of the status quo, in that such an emphasis excludes a consideration of the specific nature of each regime.

There is some evidence to suggest that the leagues were set up under Jordanian auspices in 1978. Ex-Jordanian officials make up the bulk of league membership, and in 1981 Mustafa Dudeen claimed that Jordanian money was being provided for league projects. Jordan's influence in the West Bank was noticeably weakened by the 1976 election results, and it was not until after 1978 that relations were renewed between Jordan and the PLO. This latter connection is perhaps indicated in Jordan's change of position, when it was reported that:

> The Prime Minister of Jordan, Mr. Moder Badran, gave Palestinians who have cooperated with the Israelis via the Leagues one month to sever their links with the organisations. The ultimatum was backed by the threat of treason charges carrying penalties from death to confiscation of property. ('The Guardian': 5.3.82).

While this threat is largely academic in that Jordan is unable to impose its sovereignty in the West Bank, it could affect league members who still receive salaries from the Jordanian Government, or those who have business interests in Jordan.

The basis of this attitude, and indeed the major criticism of the leagues, has been the way in which they cooperate with the Israeli authorities. As was noted earlier, all proposed projects in the West Bank must be submitted to the military authorities for approval, whether the proposal is made by village leagues, charities, individuals or municipalities. At this level, the leagues are following the same procedures as everyone else, and it is on these grounds that the leagues criticise municipal councils for their refusal to 'face facts.' However, 50% of league funding is a direct grant from the Israeli authorities (Interview: December 1981). It was claimed that IS 40 million (approximately £1,350,000) had been provided in the first six months of 1981,[34] and the Israeli administration has openly encouraged the leagues by, for example, refusing to accept applications for trading licences and mukhtar appointments unless processed through the village leagues (Interview: September 1981).

The policies adopted by the military authorities towards the municipalities have had the effect of further strengthening the leagues' position. The Israelis have made no secret of their search for 'moderate' Palestinians with whom they can negotiate the form of autonomy proposed

for the West Bank, and in addition to the restrictive policies imposed on the municipal councils, the military government has tried to find an 'alternative leadership' to the elected officials. Thus, for example, it was reported in the Israeli press that:

> Dr. Milson, with the approval of the commander of the territory ... attempted to enlarge the power of other representative bodies in the West Bank, for example, of the chambers of commerce, thereby limiting the influence of the elected city councils as the only representatives of the people.
> ('Ha'aretz': 3.8.77).

In November 1981, Dr. Milson was appointed as 'civilian administrator'[35] for the West Bank, and again attempts were made to create a suitable negotiating partner. According to reports:

> This is to be done by judicious use of patronage and funds to the Village Leagues, shadowy local organisations on the West Bank, whose Palestinian membership is prepared to cooperate with the Israelis and is hostile to the PLO.
> ('Financial Times': 17.4.82).

The introduction of the 'civilian administration' sparked off a series of protests and demonstrations in the West Bank, and municipal official refused to deal with the new administrative staff, arguing that to do so would be to legitimise the permanency of Israeli occupation.

In March 1982, the Mayor of el-Bireh, Ibrahim Tawil, was sacked from office and replaced by an Israeli army officer. The reason given was his refusal to meet with Dr. Milson, and the Israeli Defence Ministry issued an explanatory statement that:

> They /the municipality/ have refrained from discussing municipal and city affairs with the civil administrator. This situation has seriously harmed the interests of the city and its inhabitants.
> ('The Sunday Times': 21.3.82).

The dissolution of the el-Bireh council precipitated a three - day general strike. One week later, Bassam Shaka'a, Mayor of Nablus, and Karim Khalaf of Ramallah were also dismissed, and all three Mayors were placed under house arrest.[36] When the Dura council was removed from office, it was not replaced by an Israeli army officer but by a four-man council appointed by the military government from within the ranks of the village league ('Al Fajr': 15.6.82).

In their attempt to undermine the local support enjoyed by the municipal councils, the Israeli military authorities strengthened the village leagues in that they became virtually the only channel of securing the approval of the authorities for any project in the West Bank at both individual and community levels. In other words, initially the leagues were indirectly supported by the military administration, as their organisation was concomitant with Israeli plans for the West Bank. This had little to do with specific aspects of local government, but rather with the practices of municipalities in opposing the occupation.

Overt support was shown by the end of 1981, when weapons were provided to league members, and in some cases Israeli army escorts.[37] The new branches of the league which were set up in 1982 were opened by Menachem Milson, and financial aid was granted. For example, in June 1982, a new village league was opened by Milson in Asirah al-Shamiliyah in Nablus district, and at the opening ceremony IS 1.5 million was promised for a water project ('Al Fajr': 30.6.82). Claims have also been made that the leagues have assisted the Israeli military in carrying out 'security actions' in the West Bank. A statement was issued in June 1976 by residents of Beit Kahil (Hebron District) following the shooting of a teacher who had been taking part in a demonstration. This was in opposition to attempts to

erect electricity poles on village land with the intention of connecting the village to the Israeli grid. It was reported that: "The workers were accompanied by armed guards from the Israeli-backed Village Leagues, who opened fire on the demonstrators." ('Al Fajr': 25.6.82).

It can be suggested that village leagues serve to further Israeli interests in two main ways. Firstly, they do not challenge the legitimacy of Israeli authority in the West Bank, but rather accept it as a 'fact' which must be dealt with, thereby fulfilling Israel's criterion for 'moderate' Palestinians. Secondly, they act as a focus for criticism of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which is at least implicit and usually explicit in league criticisms of municipal councils. The conflict which the leagues perceive between urban and rural, between themselves and the municipalities extended to the PLO ties in with the Israeli interpretation of the relationship between the PLO and the Palestinians in the occupied territories as being based on an external minority organisation imposing its political will.

It was this kind of rationale which provided much of the impetus for Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The Israeli Defence Secretary at that time, General Sharon, was quoted as saying: "...quiet on the West Bank requires the destruction of the Palestine Liberation Organisation in Lebanon." ('The Guardian': 12.7.81). In Chapter Five the economic logic underpinning the occupation of the West Bank and the invasion of Lebanon was elaborated; this statement by General Sharon illustrates the ideological continuity. The translation into Israeli control of the south of Lebanon has been dubbed the creation of a "North Bank" and according to newspaper reports:

> ...the Israeli military is foisting pro-Israeli village leaders on the Lebanese...The Israelis' scheme is modelled on their 'village leagues' in the occupied West Bank, with a village committee for administration backed up by a village militia... Their proposals represent a direct challenge to the long-established muktars, the traditional local leaders, and to the eventual return to sovereignty of President Amin Gemayel...
> ('The Sunday Times': 6.2.83).

So far, the concern has been to show how the village leagues have come to terms with the Israeli presence on the West Bank and how Israeli interests and league interests have coincided at various times - albeit for different reasons. However, it is important to look at what happens when these interests do not coincide. Mustafa Dudeen has been quoted as saying:

> Jews and Arabs are doomed to live together. The Arabs cannot throw the Jews into the sea. The Jews cannot throw the Arabs into the desert. For this reason, I am satisfied to build a bridge of trust. We must co-exist.
> ('The Sunday Times': 21.3.82).

In the first month of 1982 alone, more than 2,000 acres of Arab land in the West Bank were expropriated by the Israeli military authorities ('The Guardian': 4.2.82). Chapters Four and Five outlined the forms of Israeli colonisation in the West Bank, and examined the way in which occupation has involved the domination of the resources of the West Bank as well as settlement on the land. Mustafa Dudeen has publicly protested against land seizures, and the impression is that league protest has been treated by the military administration in the same way as protests against land expropriation from any other source - totally ignored.

It is in this context that we can set claims that the village leagues are an alternative or 'moderate' power base. The real relation of power is between the occupying forces and the occupied population, however sectors of that population attempt to accommodate themselves to their situation. The Israeli authorities have encouraged the development of village leagues insofar as the leagues' interest and practices coincide with their own. Non-coincidence can be ignored, as this is not a relationship based on equality in any sphere. As for the leagues, the way in which they perceive the power structure, and attempt to come to terms with the occupation, precludes a consideration of the specific nature of the Israeli regime, and this is illustrated by their powerlessness in the face of rapid, and increasing, expropriation in the West Bank.

Taken together, the three instances which have been discussed in this chapter highlight particular moments in the colonial relationship and share an underlying concern with the search for ways to continue existing under occupation. For the municipalities, this has involved the recognition that a continued presence in the West Bank is in itself a form of resistance, and the significance of this can be assessed by referring to the earlier discussion of the way in which Zionism has excluded the Palestinian people physically, and negated them ideologically. In this light, the kinds of opposition which have been carried out on a day-to-day basis within the municipalities assume a greater importance, not least for the way in which they have acted as a focus and a representation for the West Bank population.

Issues of this nature raised by the municipalities can perhaps be used to answer Fanon's critique of the non-violent option selected by the 'young nationalist bourgeoisie'. His description of a membership drawn from the intellectual and economic elite, and the desire to enter

some form of negotiation, is applicable to the majority of West Bank municipal officials as well as to Al Ard. It can be argued that Fanon's conclusion, that only greater violence can destroy the violence of colonialism, is borne out by the fact that the adoption of 'non-violence' has not protected those involved from the wide range of punitive measures utilised by the military authorities, and, indeed, even the extent to which the village leagues have been prepared to compromise has not been sufficient to alter the nature of the colonial relationship.

However, the derivation of prescribing spontaneous acts of physical violence as the remaining desirable option neither takes into account the realities of the situation in the West Bank nor the value of managing to survive. The issue of how means can be found to deal with a colonising power while opposing that power will be raised again in Chapter Seven, when discussion will focus on education in the West Bank.

The examination of Al Ard, the municipalities and the village leagues indicates that at different times and under different conditions, attempts have been made to come to terms with the occupying forces. In the case of the village leagues this involved open sponsorship by the military government; in the case of Al Ard and the municipalities it has meant treading a very fine line between the need to oppose occupation and the need to survive, and in a sense this is a dilemma faced by the entire Palestinian population.

NOTES

1. The sources on which this information is based are interviews with a founding member of Al Ard who is still resident in Israel; interviews with people who were members of the Israeli Communist Party in the 1950's and 1960's; books written by two founders of Al Ard, Sabri Jiryis and Fouzi Al-Asmar.

2. See the discussion of the genesis, development and political role of the Arab National Movement in Walid Kazziha, Revolutionary Transformation in the Arab World, (1975).

3. See, for example, Maxime Rodinson, Marxism and the Muslim World, (1979), and Israel and the Arabs, (1982). Also, Samir Amin, The Arab Nation, (1978).

4. The history of the Palestine Communist Party is of interest both for the part it played during the British Mandate, and for the way in which it has fragmented and reformed since 1948. For an account at a regional level, see Suliman Bashear, Communism in the Arab East 1919-1926, (1980). An analysis of the attitude of the Palestinian Communist Party towards the Arab population, and their political activity during the Mandate, is provided in Musa Budeiri, The Palestine Communist Party 1919-1948, (1979), and a chronological presentation of the evolution of left-wing politics in Palestine and Israel is carried out in Zachary Lockman, The Left in Israel : Zionism vs. Socialism, (1976).

5. The situation is virtually unchanged, and the present official Communist Party, RAKAH, is well supported by Arabs in Israel. See Sixty Years of the Communist Party of Israel, published by the Central Committee of RAKAH (1980).

6. MAPAI is the social-democratic Labour Party which dominated the ruling Israeli coalition from 1948 until 1977. MAPAM, the United Labour Party, is more to the left amongst the Zionist parties.

7. Jiryis describes the rewards given to members on MAPAI's Arab list as follows:

> ...he might be appointed to the board of a company marketing Arab agricultural products, or he might be allowed a deferment in the payment of his taxes, or he might be granted a license to carry arms. He might be allowed to rent a few hundred dunums of farmland from the absentee properties...
> (Jiryis: 1976: p.167)

8. According to a founding member of Al Ard, under British Mandatory law, any citizen could publish a newspaper without a permit, as long as it was a single issue and not a regular publication (Interview: June 1981).

9. For example, 'This Land', 'Call of the Land' and so on.

10. Under Jordanian Law, municipal councils are elected every four years. Elections had been due in 1967, but were postponed following the occupation. The elections which were scheduled to take place in 1980 have been postponed indefinitely.

11. The elections were to be carried out in two stages, with the towns in the north of the West Bank voting four weeks before the towns in the south.

12. Ma'zuz al-Masri ran for office, the economic restrictions on Nablus were lifted, and the Mayor's relatives were released from prison.

13. For a discussion of the West Bank under Jordanian rule, see Jamil Hilal, Class Transformation in the West Bank and Gaza, (1976). Saul Mishal, West Bank/East Bank: the Palestinians in Jordan 1949-1967, (1978), draws on material from Jordanian archives captured by the Israel Defence Forces during the 1967 war, covering political events in the West Bank from the mid-1950's to the mid-1960's.

14. Identity cards must be carried at all times and are frequently requested, for example at road blocks.

15. The first attempt to establish a broadly-based opposition to the occupation was the Higher Commission for National Guidance, set up in September 1967. The three founding members were deported three months later. Several other attempts were made, but according to Metzger at al., these failed "not only because of Israeli counter-measures, but also because of differences of opinion among the various factions." (Metzger et al.: 1983: p.150).

16. The refusal to cooperate with Israel and advocacy of reannexation by Jordan led to the deportation of several 'notables'. For example, Sheikh Abdel Hamid el Sa'eh, the President of the Islamic Higher Council, was deported on 23.9.67. The Mayor of Jerusalem, Ruhi el Khatib, was deported on 7.3.68, and Kamal Dajani, a former Member of Parliament, on 6.9.68 (Al-Abid: 1969: pp.109-114).

17. "In May 1979 the 4,000 inhabitants of the Jalazoun camp north of Ramallah were subjected to a twelve-day curfew after some youths from the camp were suspected of throwing stones at Israeli military vehicles. The curfew lasted for twenty-two hours a day..." (Gilmour: 1982: p.133).

18. Al-Abid provides details of the destruction of the villages of Beit Nuba, Amoas and Yalu in November 1967 (Al-Abid: 1969: pp.123-5). An ex-prisoner interviewed in the West Bank revealed that his house had been blown up when he was arrested, although he was not charged (Interview: September 1981).

19. This was formalised in the programme approved by the 12th session of the Palestine National Council in 1974 as follows:

> "The PLO will struggle by every means, the foremost of which is armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian land and to establish the people's national independent and fighting authority of every part of Palestinian land to be liberated..."
> (London Office of the Palestine Liberation Organisation: 1983).

20. For a summary of the programme of the Palestine National Front, see MERIP Reports, No. 25. The Communist Party retained the notion of a 'two-state' solution, in that they proposed self-determination within the West Bank. For a discussion of the Jordanian Communist Party in the West Bank under Jordanian administration, see Amnon Cohen Political Parties in the West Bank under the Hashemite Regime, in Ma'oz, ed.: 1975.

21. The Palestine National Council is the equivalent of a parliament, and has members nominated as representatives of political groupings, labour organisations and various interest groups. The membership varies from 100-180, and meetings take place twice a year. The National Council is responsible for electing an Executive Committee, which is in permanent session and is charged with the implementation and execution of National Council policies. Members of the Executive Committee have individual responsibilities and portfolios, like members of a cabinet (London Office of the Palestine Liberation Organisation).

22. The idea of the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza continues to be referred to as a 'transitional stage'.

23. The Begin Plan is reproduced as an appendix in David H. Ott, Palestine in Perspective, (1980).

24. In 1977, Menachem Begin's Counsellor for Foreign Information gave instructions that Israeli officials were to use the terms 'Judea and Samaria' when speaking of the West Bank ('Al Fajr': 29.9.77).

25. In Begin's proposals, the right to acquire land and settle in Israel was extended to Arabs from the occupied territories who became Israeli citizens. However, as was noted in Chapter Four, over 90% of the land in Israel is held by the Jewish National Fund and its agencies, and is held exclusively for Jews.

26. According to the Geneva Convention, an occupying authority does not have the right to alter existing tax laws. However, Israel denies the Convention's applicability to the West Bank and Gaza on the grounds that prior to the Israeli occupation these territories were not held by the 'legitimate sovereign'. See, Report of the National Lawyers' Guild Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli-Occupied West Bank and Gaza (1978), and Allan Gerson Israel, the West Bank and International Law (1978).

27. Questions were asked in the Knesset by a member of the Labour Party, as to why no progress had been made in the search for the attackers ('Jerusalem Post': 26.9.81).

28. The Joint Palestinian-Jordanian Committee functions as a collecting point for funds from Arab governments, and administers the fund. According to Metzger et al., it amounts to $150 million (Metzger et al.: 1983: p.228).

29. 'Al Fajr' is an Arabic daily newspaper, published in East Jerusalem, which also issues a weekly English edition covering news from the occupied territories. 'Al-Tali'ah' is the Arabic weekly publication of the Communist Party.

30. For a discussion of the position of Mukhtar in the West Bank from Ottoman times until the 1967 occupation, see G. Baer The Office and Functions of the Village Mukhtar, in Migdal, ed.: 1980.

31. Of the 48 mukhtars, 17 were from Dura villages, which is the home of Mustafa Dudeen. According to the Information Office in Hebron Municipality, the remainder are "representatives of the intelligentsia and local bourgeoisie" (Interview: September 1981).

32. This explanation was given by a full-time official of Hebron Village League in December 1981.

33. It can be argued that the separation of urban and rural in the West Bank is difficult to sustain - socially, politically and economically. Factors such as the geographical proximity of villages to the main urban centres, and the way in which family connections provide social and political support across distinctions between urban and rural areas make this a problematic basis of analysis. See, for example, Talal Asad's critique of Abner Cohen's Arab Border-Villages in Israel (1965), where the reliance on this sort of explanation is analysed as an aspect of the colonial relationship. Asad Anthropological Texts and Ideological Problems: an Analysis of Cohen on Arab Villages in Israel in Review of Middle East Studies, No. 1.

34. The late Chairman of Ramallah District Village League, Yusuf al-Khatib, was quoted in 'Al Anba', an Israeli Arabic newspaper, on 26.7.81.

35. Menachem Milson holds the rank of General in the Israeli Army.

36. Mayor Khalaf's house arrest was specified as in his home in Jericho, rather than his home in Ramallah, so he is excluded from the municipality ('Financial Times': 29.5.82).

37. The official announcement that members of Hebron, Ramallah and Bethlehem Village Leagues would be armed was reported in 'Al Fajr' on 4.2.82. However, on a visit to the league headquarters in Hebron in December 1981, initial questioning and search were carried out by Israeli Army soldiers. An army jeep is permanently assigned to Mustafa Dudeen, and during an interview with him, three armed Arab supporters were in the room. At that time, Dudeen claimed that he already had enough weapons to "protect all 4,000 members of my family and all of my league."

Chapter Seven

EDUCATION UNDER OCCUPATION

Chapter Seven

Since 1967, education in the West Bank has been a source of direct conflict, and one which is not restricted to those immediately involved with educational institutions. This Chapter will examine education as a form of politics which has significance for coloniser and colonised, and will extend the discussion of Chapter Six of particular responses to occupation in a consideration of some of the more diffuse aspects of the colonial relationship. Thus, it is not an exhaustive study of the history of educational institutions, nor a catalogue of the actions which the military authorities have taken. Rather, it is an attempt to utilise an analysis of what is happening to education in the West Bank under occupation in advancing the general themes which have been raised in the thesis concerning the operation of the relationship between coloniser and colonised.

The first section of this Chapter is concerned with the importance of education to the coloniser, and as Gerson points out:

> Perhaps the most powerful instrument an occupying power has at its disposal in attempting to permanently redefine existing institutional and social structures of occupied territory is the power to initiate broad educational reforms involving curricula, texts and teachers.
> (Gerson: 1978: p.178).

In addition to the ideological role of education, it can be argued that education policies are an essential part of the general economic 'restructuring' which was discussed in Chapter Five, and this is suggested in the second section by relating the kinds of changes which have been imposed on educational institutions to changes in the economic structure of the West Bank. The first two sections are therefore concerned primarily with the way in which power has been exercised on education by the military

authorities, and the way in which this can be located within a consideration of Isreal's occupation of the West Bank.

The third section focusses on the significance of education for the colonised, and examines the sense in which we can talk of education as politics. Of particular importance is the way in which educational institutions have created an environment within which political forms can develop, and the way in which the academic milieu interrelates with the West Bank population in general, and student politics is used to explore these aspects.

Restrictions imposed by the Military Authorities

(i) Universities

The announcement of Military Order 854 in July 1980 and related amendments made to Jordanian laws[1] served to institutionalise over-arching military control of education. While the order had not been implemented in its entirety by October 1983, it has been partially enacted and remains on the Statute books, and the implications and effects of its promulgation are important. The full text of Military Order 854 and the amendments to Jordanian Education and Culture Law is provided in Appendix 3.

A report published by the University of Birzeit notes that the extension of Jordanian law was in fact the application to higher education of a law designed to govern kindgergarten and school level education (University of Birzeit: 1982). This means that control is extended, such that a permit must be granted annually for an educational institution to continue to operate, teaching certificates can be awarded and cancelled,

and the curricula and text-books come under the supervision of the 'authority'. The authority was transferred from the Jordanian Education Ministry to the Israeli 'supervising officer' (University of Birzeit: 1982).

In addition to restrictions placed on the functioning of institutions, MO 854 brought academic staff and students under the direction jurisdiction of the authorities. One section of MO 854 which has been applied requires all 'foreign' staff and students to obtain an individual permit certificate from the Military Commander of the West Bank. Those classified as 'foreign' include residents of other occupied territories, Israeli citizens and all foreign passport-holders, and the latter category contains Palestinians who are holding foreign passports (Interview: November 1981). A consider-ation of the geographic origins of Birzeit's student population indicates the effects of this law. According to a University newsletter, 21.3% of the students are from Gaza, 16.3% from Jerusalem[2] and 0.3% from Galilee (Birzeit University Newsletter: March 1983). Therefore, 37.9% of Birzeit students are classified as foreign.

As for members of staff, the West Bank universities have relied heavily on recruiting foreign faculty members, to the extent that they constitute about a quarter of staff members at Birzeit University and are represented to a lesser degree in the others. In August, 1982, the military government announced that all faculty members who were not residents of the West Bank would be compelled to sign a statement dissociating them-selves from the PLO, and that this would be a condition in granting a work permit. The text of the statement ran as follows:

> I hereby declare that I am fully committed against indulging in any act and offering my assistance to the organization called the PLO or any other terrorist organization that is considered to be hostile to the State of Israel as indicated in the Act for the Prevention of Acts of Belligerence and Enemy Propaganda...such acts being of a direct or indirect nature.
>
> ('The Guardian': 1.10.82).

The faculty members involved refused to sign this statement and as a result, 22 out of 26 foreign staff at Al-Najah University, including the President and Vice-President, were deported.[3] All the deportees held Jordanian passports. The remaining 4 foreign lecturers were barred from teaching. At Birzeit Univeristy, 3 members of staff were deported and the remaining 27 foreign faculty members barred from teaching; and at Bethlehem and Hebron Universities, all foreign staff were barred from teaching and one British lecturer was deported from Bethlehem.

The requirement to sign the 'loyalty oath' attracted international protest, and this extended to Israeli-military sources being quoted in the Israeli press as saying that the document the teachers were being asked to sign did not have a significant security motivation ('Ha'aretz': 26.9.82). Furthermore, the Israeli military administration in the West Bank already has wide-ranging prerogatives which confer the ability to both define and deal with infringements of Israeli security.[4] A study carried out by five professors from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem into conditions in the Universities in the occupied territories[5] points out that if someone is permitted to enter the West Bank but then banned from teaching there, it must be inferred that they cannot be a threat to security given their free movement in the area, and this is the position regarding foreign passport holders employed by West Bank universities.

In November 1982, the Israeli government withdrew the requirement to sign the 'loyalty oath' and instead amended the work permit application form so that any non-resident who applied for a work permit was required to sign a form which, according to an Israeli Government Press Office Release, "contains no commitment on the part of the applicant..... /but/.. lists certain conditions whose non-fulfilment will lead to the cancellation of the permit" (Cheverton: 1983). The text of item B(3) of the amended form states:

> During the period in which the permit is valid, the permit holders will refrain from any action harming security and public order and in this context will obey all the law's stipulations and security legislation forbidding any action or providing any service that can be construed as aiding or supporting the PLO or any other hostile organisation...
>
> (Cheverton: 1983).

The similarity of this clause to the original pledge left the position of foreign faculty members unchanged in their refusal to sign a statement which is seen as political, or at least as being of political use.[6] Many have defied the ban on teaching but are subject to continuing anxiety about their futures in the West Bank, and also to the harassment imposed on all residents of the occupied territories. In this way, the different levels at which Military Order 854 affects the academic community become apparent. Firstly, there is the effect on the institutions themselves, in terms of licensing and appointing staff. Secondly, there is the control over which staff and students can be in the universities, and thirdly the strain and tension which these conditions engender.

(ii) Schools

Restrictions have also been imposed on the schools in the West Bank. For example, the Military Officer in Education sets a limit on the number of teachers who can be recruited to government-administered schools in each district in any one year. Nasru provides details of the deficit in recruitment for each district, and calculates the overall deficit in the West Bank to be 47% (i.e. between teachers required and teachers recruited).[7] What this means in real terms is that in 1976/77, 927 applicants out of 1101 were rejected (figures exclude Ramallah district). As for the number of teachers required, she calculates that this would be around 800, over and above the 200 replacements needed for resigned places, rather than the 173.5 teachers who were actually employed (Nasru: 1977).

Of the applicants for teaching posts, 30% were University graduates and the remaining 70% were graduates of teaching training colleges. The significance of this is that a teaching qualification does not give much scope for employment outside the teaching profession. It may also be possible to suggest that this is significant for the employment of women in the West Bank. Philip Davies (Davies: 1979) suggests that education is by far the largest area of employment for women who have completed university, and his figures on the employment of graduates of Bir Zeit University in the period 1962-70[8] break down as follows:

Table 7.1 Bir Zeit University Graduate Employment

Sector	Male %	Female %
Education	47	35
Commerce	5	0
Professional	16	0
Clerical	0	19
Managerial	32	16
Unemployed	0	30

It is difficult to find out what happens to those who train as teachers and cannot be employed. Davies' figure of 30% unemployment amongst female Bir Zeit graduates at a time when they were not barred from government schools[9] suggests that for women there is little alternative. Nasru suggests that a high proportion of rejected applicants actually leave the West Bank in order to find work, and emphasises that this is a consequence of recruitment policy rather than an excess in the number of teachers trained relative to the number required. She takes this further in suggesting that there is a relationship between the Military Officer's recruitment policy and the deportation policy; especially since in both cases the target group is educated young people. In other words, that the recruitment policy implemented by the Military Education Office in the West Bank serves to increase the pressure on the educated young population to leave due to their inability to find work.

(iii) Curriculum

Following the 1967 occupation, teachers in the West Bank threatened to strike over the proposed changes in the school curriculum and texts used. The kind of changes which were envisaged would have brought West Bank schools into line with Arab schools inside Israel[10] and, according to Gerson (Gerson: 1978), West Bank educators criticised this on the grounds that international law demands that the existing institutions of an occupied territory be maintained.[11] The importance of this threatened strike was that in many ways it was the first organised opposition to the Israeli occupation - a fact recognised by the new Military Government's attempts to reach some compromise. However, the concessions which were suggested were too late, as a call for teachers to strike and pupils to boycott classes had already been issued. The strike ended with a compromise -

and also because as one ex-teacher suggested, even 'deformed' education was better than none.[12]

If we look first at the changes which were demanded in the textbooks, of the 134 Jordanian texts used in West Bank schools, 78 were considered so politically biased as to be unacceptable. The only texts approved were foreign language and scientific textbooks published abroad ('Jerusalem Post': 15.8.67). A spokesmand for the Israeli Ministry of Education and Culture stated that: "All teaching of the hatred of peoples and the destruction of states, including, of course, the State of Israel, must be eliminated. Those teachers who cannot accept this principle will be asked to leave.: (Nasru: 1977: p.18).

Some examples of what this means should illustrate how demands for textbooks alterations work in practice.

- Two textbooks used in the 3rd preparatory class (i.e. approx. age 14-15) were banned. These were "Geography of the Arab World" and"Jordanian Society", a history text. The books which were issued to replace them had the same content with the omission of all geographical concepts which relate to political concepts - the title 'Palestine' was replaced by 'Israel'.
- An Arab Grammar for grades 4-6 (age 10-12) was described as being "full of hate propaganda" and so banned. Examples given are "the enemy was routed....the number of survivors is very small", "Holy war is duty", "the homeland has been stolen", "the Arabs will not rest until their Paradise is returned to them" (Gerson: 1978: p.201).

The major change in curriculum after 1967 - and one of the concessions made by the West Bank teachers in ending their strike - was the dropping of a subject called 'The Palestinian Problem'. This was basically a history of Palestine and the Palestinian people. Other ares which had some changes made were religion, Arabic literature, history and geography. A 'West Bank educator' quoted in Nasru says: "Israel seems to direct its educational policy against the core of our culture and tradition. They drain the national heritage from our libraries." (Nasru: 1977). It should be noted that the above restrictions on curricula and textbooks apply to private and UNWRA schools as well as government-run institutions.

As for institutions of higher education, there is no direct interference in the curriculum or in the use of specific texts, although MO 854 includes this provision. However, it is likely that any proposed text which the Military Authorities would find objectionable is on the list issued by the Israeli Military Officer of Education (K. 330/24/611) on 19.1.1977 prohibiting 1188 books, and subsequent updatings of this. The list is composed exclusively of books printed in Arabic although this includes books translated from other languages. According to a report by an Israeli journalist, volumes of poetry, short stories, novels, historical and political analyses are amongst those banned.[13] One example is the Arabic translation of "The Creation and Development of the Israeli Army" by Yigal Allon, a former major-general in the IDF (Israel Defence Force) and Israeli Foreign Minister, reputedly because of objectional cover notes ('The Times Higher Education Supplement': 30.4.82).

The majority of the banned titles are freely available inside Israel, but although East Jerusalem has been 'annexed' since 1967, the censorship rules of book buying and distribution which apply on the West Bank also apply in East Jerusalem. The Hebrew University report describes this anomaly, and points out that where security censorship exists, as it does in Israel, this is generally to prevent the publication of material which is thought to be of potential damage to state security, rather than to prevent access to material which has already been published (Gavison et al.: 1981). The difficulty of obtaining permission to import periodicals and journals from Arab countries[14] has also been noted, and the difficulty of carrying out academic activity without free access to information sources (Gavison et al.: 1981).

Non-completion of Schooling

Education in the West Bank is compulsory to the level of grade 9. This covers the elementary cycle of grades 1-6 (age approx. 6-12) and the preparatory cycle of grades 7-9, or ages 12-15. The third level of schooling is the secondary cycle which takes students up to age 18 (grades 10-12). In the secondary cycle students begin with one general academic year after which they are separated into academic and vocational specialisations. The academic specialisation is further divided into science and arts streams, while the vocational areas include commerce, agriculture and industry. A secondary certificate is issued on the completion of 12 grades and the student is expected to sit the Tawjihi, a uniformly-administered national examination. Success in the Tawjihi is the necessary university entrance qualification.

After 1967, a West Bank Examinations Board was established to take over supervision of the exam from the Jordanian Ministry of Education. According to Mahshi and Rihan, the West Bank Board continues to cooperate closely with the Jordanian Ministry in registering candidates, selecting examiners and issuing results, and while the Board officially reports to the Israeli Education Officer for the West Bank, the certificates awarded are exchangeable in Amman for Jordanian certificates which are admissable entrance qualifications for universities in other Arab states (Nakhleh (ed): 1980). Nasru suggests that the West Bank education departments are subjected to two often conflicting types of instruction: one issued directly by the Military Officer of Education within the Israeli administration and the other issued indirectly from the Jordanian Ministry of Education. She suggests that the problem of coping with conflicting policies is especially clear in the areas of curriculum content, teacher training programmes and the evaluation of examination results (Nasru: 1977).

There are three types of school in the West Bank. Government-run schools are those which are administered by the Jordanian Government prior to 1967 and which now come directly under the jurisdiction of the Israeli Education Office. UNWRA operates its own schools, but provides education only at the elementary and preparatory levels. Thirdly, private schools, which unlike UNWRA and Government-administered institutions generally charge tuition fees.

Table 7.2 represents the distribution of pupils between the three categories of school for selected years since 1967.

Table 7.2

The distribution of pupils according to type of School attended, 1968-77

	1968/9	1971/2	1974/5	1976/7
total number of pupils	162,750	196,161	213,684	230,736
government institutions	120,968	147,183	162,588	175,627
% of total	74.32	75.03	76.08	76.11
UNWRA schools	25,690	29,277	31,054	34,078
% of total	15.78	14.92	14.53	14.76
other	16,092	19,701	20,042	21,031
% of total	9.88	10.04	9.37	9.11

Source: Computed from Statistical Abstract of Israel (1968-1978).

When statistics of school attendance are broken down according to grade, the disparity between the number of pupils in the elementary cycle and those in the preparatory cycle - both within compulsory education - is striking.

Table 7.3

School registration according to educational cycle

	1967/8	1971/2	1974/5	1976/7
total	142,893	195,208	212,131	227,149
kindergarten	4,709	7,786	7,379	7,789
elementary	104,064	135,139	144,231	146,592
preparatory	23,625	35,590	41,056	48,683
secondary	10,495	16,693	19,465	24,085

(kindergartens are all privately-run)

Source: Mahshi, K. & Rihan, R., Education: Elementary and Secondary in Nakhleh (ed): 1980. Table compiled by them through "personal contacts with some education directorates and from the office of UNWRA in East Jerusalem."

While the nature of the data collection means the figures cannot be taken as absolute, as a general illustration they suggest that a significant number of children in the West Bank do not complete compulsory education.

Nasru's attempt to correlate the rate of dropping out of school with sex, district and years of schooling indicate some useful general points. Her findings as regards a correlation with sex were that there is little difference between the ratio of girls dropping out and boys to the total number enrolled. As regards years of schooling the highest level of school-leaving is in the elementary cycle (ages 12-15). The attempted correlation on district is interesting, as she suggests that the West Bank districts bordering on Israel may have a higher incidence of premature school-leaving due to children being employed in Israeli enterprises. While the figures quoted do back this up, care must be taken with the conclusions drawn as several other factors could be significant, for example, families losing land as a source of livelihood, or areas with a high proportion of the population already employed in Israel. Also the proximity of all West Bank areas to Israel is such that most areas are within easy travelling distance. However, when reference is made to the discussion of child labour in Chapter Five, then the degree of non-completion of compulsory education is confirmed. One West Bank teacher interviewed said he had seen Israeli labour contractors outside the school making arrangements to employ children in agriculture. For the first few days many of the children tried to cope with attending school in the morning and working in the fields in the afternoon, but most dropped out of school after that. He described them as appearing at school "tired, and smelling of onions" (Interview: August 1981).

What this means is that almost half the potential workforce of the West Bank has no formal education after the age of twelve. To some extent this can be compared with the situation in other parts of the 'Third World' but particular aspects of the situation in the West Bank can be seen as modificatory. In a Bank of Israel Research publication, Arie Bregman states:

> An analysis of employment rates in correlation with education levels inidcates that, unlike the situation among the Jewish population of Israel, the employment rate in the administered areas goes down as the level of education (measured in years of schooling) rises..A similar problem exists among educated non-Jews in Israel, who have a relatively high unemployment rate."
> (Bregman: 1975: pp.34-5).

In other words, it is when the non-completion of schooling is set in the context of the West Bank under occupation, and factors such as the restrictions on educational institutions are juxtaposed with forms of economic transformation, that education can be seen as an instrument of power.

University Structure

In 1967 there were 8 institutions in the West Bank and Jerusalem offering post-school education. None of the courses lasted more than two years, and the vast majority of the students were doing teacher-training. A West Bank resident who wanted a university education would have to go abroad; either to study a complete degree programme or to upgrade the associate degrees awarded by private colleges such as Birzeit after two years' study.[15]

Birzeit itself was upgraded to a 4-year degree-awarding institution in 1972 to become the first university in the West Bank.[16] Bethlehem University was founded by a Christian (Roman Catholic) Order in 1973, and in 1977 al-Najah University was set up in Nablus. Founded as an Islamic college, Hebron is now the fourth university in the West Bank and, like the others, is a privately-financed institution. Table 7.4 indicates the comparative sizes:

Table 7.4

West Bank University Students & Staff, 1983

University	Students	Staff
Birzeit	2,037	224
Bethlehem	1,360	99
al-Najah	3,181	275
Hebron	1,789	35

Source: 'Middle East International': 19.8.83

The West Bank Universities have been criticised for failing to provide the sort of training thought necessary for the West Bank. Davies for example, suggests that there is a deficiency in technical and vocational training courses. As an illustration he points out that there is little attention paid to the acquisition of skills relevant to rural planning and development in an area where 70% of the population live in villages of under 5000 inhabitants. He concludes that, finding it difficult to adapt to the social and economic development needs and the employment realities of the West Bank, many graduates emigrate in order to "market their skills in a wider Middle East labour market, at the expense of the West Bank." (Davies, 1979: p.69).

In discussing curricula followed by the universities, the problems faced by schools should be noted. For the 9,915 secondary school pupils who are studying sciences, there are 19 physics, 20 chemistry and 9 biology teachers who are university graduates in the whole of the West Bank. Thus, most science instruction in schools is given by unqualified teachers. As for facilities, out of 99 secondary schools only 47 have even one-roomed laboratories.[17] In the Tawjihi examinations the number electing to sit the literary option is increasing at 7.8% per annum while the scientific candidature increases at 5.2%. The number choosing the 'non-academic' option is less than 4% of the total. Obviously this has implications both for the types of courses offered by universities and for the labour market in general (Nasru: 1977).

The cost of different types of education is another factor, both in schools and in universities. It is much cheaper to provide arts and social science courses than to provide the necessary facilities for the study of natural sciences, and the shortage of qualified teachers in sciences helps perpetuate the imbalance.

In speculating on why students choose to study particular subjects, it can be suggested that in addition to factors mentioned previously, vocational training is more geared towards a precise job market than is a more general academic training. The uncertainty of the West Bank makes this kind of planning for the future very difficult, both for the intending student and for the institutions. In academic year 1980/1, staff at the University of Birzeit were still teaching in July to make up for the time lost through closures. The university was closed again at the beginning of November, after having completed three weeks of term, and this time the closure was for two months. In all, Birzeit University lost seven months of academic year 1981/2.

Closure involves the military authorities instructing the university administrator to order all teaching and research activities to cease, and the physical prevention of students and staff from entering the campus.[18] The Hebrew University report concedes that if "serious incidents and disturbances" have taken place, then there may a case for closing the university for a short time in order to "calm tempers and prevent repetition". However, it suggests that the universities are frequently closed as a punishment rather than as a preventative measure, and as such, university closure constitutes an unacceptable collective punishment (Gavison et al.: 1981).

Education as Politics

In the discussion in Chapter Six of strategies for survival, it was suggested that there is a dilemma in finding means of opposing occupation while continuing to live in the West Bank. This is clearly seen in the case of the municipalities, where the nature of local administration under the sovereignty of the military authorities in conjunction with resistance to that authority, gives rise to a range of contradictions and tensions. While education institutions have to cope with some of the same problems - for example, in securing a permit to operate - they are in a different position, and this can be seen partly as arising from the different nature of academic activity and partly as the special position of universities in the West Bank.

In a letter to "the Jerusalem Post", an Israeli academic noted that educational institutions in the occupied territories are national, Palestinian institutions and deduced that:

> it is not only natural, but entirely appropriate that calls for self-determination and attempts to articulate a national consciousness should emanate from academic centres, intellectuals traditionally being among those entrusted with preserving the rights and traditions of their people.
> ('The Jerusalem Post': 6.1.83)

The assumption of such a role, however, takes on different connotations when placed in the context of an attempt to generate and define an identity which is in direct conflict with the Israeli authorities, and reference can be made to previous discussion of the link between the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the process of colonisation on the West Bank.

In this sense, what is being suggested is that the universities in the West Bank are able to create a political forum and also to anchor this in the wider community, and an elaboration of this can begin by looking at the student movement.

A member of staff at Birzeit University, herself a former student there, suggested that after 1967 the nature of the student intake changed - a change which was intensified by the gaining of university status by Birzeit College and the establishment of Bethlehem and al-Najah Universities. Higher education had previously been the preserve of those from wealthy families. Now, many of the students were attending university and college in the West Bank itself and were drawn from a much wider background. The students had direct experience of occupation before starting university and were more 'political' than the previous student body (Interview: July 1981).

This had consequences within the institutions themselves, as the students demanded participation in the running of the establishments and raised questions as to the way in which educational institutes could and should operate under conditions of military occupation. The demand for student participation led to some conflict with the administration in the universities; the latter fearing that open hostility to the occupation forces would lead to greater interference from the authorities and pressure for them to 'control' their student population. The questioning of the role of educational institutions involved an exploration of the relationship between the universities and the rest of society and was one which refused to accept that education could somehow be separated from other areas of life in the West Bank.

The way in which this is reflected in student politics provides a starting-point from which the emergence of different types of perspective can be considered. The formal political divisons within the student body are those between the Islamic bloc and a united grouping of Fatah, PDFLP, PFLP, Communists and non-aligned 'progressives' and 'nationalists'. Elections to student posts usually involve a straight contest between representatives of these two main bodies. It was not until the late 1970's that Islamic student groups appeared. Since then, they have gained support and are the majority on al-Najah student council. In Birzeit University the secretary of the Islamic bloc said that no attempt had been made to organise as a distinct group prior to the student elections in 1979. In this election the Islamic bloc ran against a united front and achieved 43% of the vote. In 1981 their percentage was 35%: a substantial proportion when it is considered that the opposition is an alliance of several groups.

Two points can be introduced here. Firstly, student elections in the West Bank have an importance greater than their actual status - in other words, they are of more significance than simply deciding which students will serve on the student council. In the absence of other kinds of political indicator, the elections in the universities highlight the kinds of issues which are being discussed as well as the support which various groupings have. The second point concerns the Islamic student groups, and their success within the universities. It has been pointed out that student elections are held shortly after the start of the academic year, and that over one-third of the student body are in first year with many having come from backgrounds where religious sentiments and practices are strong. Support for the Islamic bloc was strongest amongst first-year students, and those on science and engineering courses (MERIP No. 103: 1982). Nevertheless, the kinds of interpretations put forward by the Islamic groups were not suggested in any area other than the universities, and it is because of this that their position requires elucidation.[19]

For the student Islamic groups, the current situation in the West Bank is described in terms of the process of Islamic history; in particular the repression of Islam by the west. According to one member of Birzeit University's Islamic bloc, Birzeit itself is under western influence - evidence for this being the administration's refusal of an application to publish an Islamic journal in the university. Further, the practice of teaching in English and the 'western' dress worn by students and staff are cited as examples of the infiltration of western culture.

Interpreting the occupation of the West Bank as a stage in the process of Islamic history leads to the rejection of resolutions such as UN 242,[20] and indeed any attempt to retrieve less than the entire area of Palestine on which to build an Islamic state. It was suggested that there could possibly be some common elements in the perspectives of Islamic bloc students and the others, given their common situation under occupation. The description of the 'secular' organisations as "a germ in the blood of our people" and the denial of any common ground illustrate the way in which the Islamic bloc view other interpretations and strategies and also give some indication of the way in which their own perception of their reality comes about.

It was emphasised that the Islamic blocs are not the Muslim Brotherhood: an emphasis intended to dispel any notion of a co-ordinated organisation. The influence of events in other parts of the world - particularly in Iran - was evident, the Khomeini was used as an example of what could be achieved: "...in Palestine, as in Iran, the people are returning to Islam. We are an Islamic people."

The way in which these perceptions are expressed excludes the kinds of interpretations and strategies put forward by other Palestinian groupings in the West Bank - particularly those involved with or sympathetic to the PLO. The main contention is over dealings with the Israelis, and it is this which causes divisions, even amongst PLO sympathisers of a religious persuasion and those inclined to the Muslim Brotherhood, and those embracing Islamic bloc ideals.

The paradox is that Islamic bloc doctrine will not accept dealing with the Israelis in any form - no cooperation with progressive elements, for example - justifying this on religious grounds. However, the way in which they talk of the so-called secular groupings sets them up as being opposed to the Palestinian leadership both inside and outside the West Bank. They are arguing for a quite different approach - one which emerges from a particular view of history and demands particular kinds of action. In this, their interests have at times converged with those of the Israeli authorities. Thus, while condemning any communication with the Israelis, the nature of their kind of organisation and the kind of ideas promulgated by them are seen by the Military Authorities as being no threat, and while it is difficult to imagine a direct relationship between Islamic bloc groups and the Military Authorities, it is true to say that the authorities have not discouraged these groups. While appearing the most ideologically extreme, in practice they are allowed to flourish.

An example of this is a demonstration held in Gaza in 1980, reputedly the only demonstration held by Palestinians in the occupied territories which the authorities have not tried to stop. The demonstrators were from the Islamic University in Gaza and in the course of their protest burned a library, a clinic and a restaurant. Explanations range from charges of collusion between authorities and Islamic groupings, fuelled by the Islamic bloc dislike of the PLO, to charges that they are financed by various 'reactionary' Arab regimes anxious to prevent the spread of radical ideas. It is difficult to see what interest the Israelis could have in encouraging the spread of Islam other than an encouragement of the type of political practices fostered in Islamic groupings and the divisiveness this promotes in the Palestinian community. The exiled

President of Birzeit University, Dr. Nasir, has been quoted as saying:

> The Israelis are indirectly supporting the Islamic revival by failing to arrest young fundamentalists after occasional clashes with our supporters. But we also believe that outside funding is also reaching the Islamic groups.
> ('The Guardian': 17.3.82).

The paradoxical nature of the divisions between the Islamic bloc and students from the alliance indicates that this cannot be seen as a division between 'religion' and 'politics';[21] rather, it highlights conflicting ways of interpreting the Palestinian past and the context of Palestinian history.

On the question of a general 'Islamic politics' in the West Bank, it was noted earlier that the ideas put forward by Islamic bloc student groups seemed to be of little significance outside the universities, and in this sense the Islamic bloc can be seen as a particular reponse within education. The lack of significance of this form of politics in the West Bank has nothing to do with the absence of religious devotion, and in fact evidence of the strength of Islam as a religion can be seen in towns such as Hebron and Nablus and in the villages - for example, in Nablus during the fast of Ramadan, to be seen eating, smoking or drinking in public constitutes an offence against public decency.

With reference to the discussion in the Introduction of the way in which the conflagration in Lebanon has been represented as being a conflict between "Christians" and "Muslims", the difference in the level of analysis involved in discussing Islam in the West Bank and the construction of a particular kind of reality illustrated in Islamic bloc politics is indicative of the inadequacy resulting from a confusion of these levels. In other words, Islam is not an unchanging monolith; like other systems

of beliefs and practices it differs in different contexts. Edward Said has advanced an explanation for the absence of an 'Islamic resistance' in Palestine, and points out that while Palestine always had a Christian community, it differed from most other countries in the Middle East in that it did not have one dominant sect (unlike, for example, the Maronite Christians in Lebanon). However, in addition to this, he notes that since the 1880's, the Palestinian people, whether Christian or Muslim, have had a common enemy and it is in their direct encounter with Zionism that their experience differs from other parts of the Arab world (Said: 1980).

As for the emergence of the Islamic bloc within the universities, it may be possible to locate this within the education sector in the West Bank. For example, the emphasis on "western values" has been noticeable, particularly in Birzeit. In the time spent in the West Bank, the language of instruction in Birzeit, and on some courses in Bethlehem, was English. The explanations for this were that firstly, members of staff had been appointed who could not teach in Arabic; secondly, the source material used was in English, and thirdly, any student wishing to continue in education would have to go abroad to do so, and the English instruction would be an advantage for this (Interviews: July/August 1981).

While these reasons are valid in themselves, underlying them is a set of assumptions based on particular values which have wide-ranigng implications. Instances which can be cited as examples of this include ideas about the 'superiority' of western academic thinking and the western way of life, and the advantage for students who have attended a school which teaches in English - these tend to be private schools. Also, dress is an immediate differentiating feature between Islamic bloc students and the others, as the latter tend to dress like European students while the

female Islamic bloc students wear ankle-length dresses and head-coverings.

What is being suggested, then, is that the kind of reality presented in student Islamic bloc politics may be located in the education system itself and in the control and emphasis within it. There has recently been a shift in Birzeit towards teaching in Arabic, and this is a recognition of the issues discussed earlier. That these division have intensified, and the way in which they have been manipulated by the Israeli authorities, provides another instance of the violence of the colonial relationship.

Postscript

In July 1983, three Arab students were killed in Hebron University and over thirty were injured. Although no arrests were made, it was suspected that the attackers were Israeli settlers from Kiryat Arba ('The Times': 28.7.83). A series of demonstrations and strikes were held in the West Bank; in East Jerusalem all businesses and shops closed, while Hebron and Halhoul remained under military curfew. At Birzeit University, stone barricades were erected and tyres set alight, precipitating a day-long battle between students and Israeli troops. According to newspaper reports, the students were throwing stones at the soldiers and were in turn being attacked with tear gas, rubber bullets and live ammunition - four students were shot ('The Times': 28.7.83).

As a form of politics, education in the West Bank involves the kinds of restrictions which are placed on academic institutions, staff and students over and above the rules which govern the rest of the population. It is suggested that this can be related to the importance of 'education' for both coloniser and colonised. For the coloniser, it is a means of extending ideological control through, for example, restricting what can be read. For the colonised, it provides an environment for the negotiation of a national identity and culture, and this constitutes a challenge to the coloniser.

At another level, the significance of education under colonial rule can be seen in the way in which particular policies are linked with underlying objectives. An instance of this is the policy of teacher recruitment in schools and the effect this has on the kind of education which is provided, as well as being a contributory factor in encouraging emigration. In this context, the discussion in Chapter Five of the West Bank labour force assumes additional importance.

The violence of education under occupation can therefore be manifest in very different ways. One student from Birzeit University described his impression of his first year as being made up of tear gas, barricades and a constant fear, rather than classes and books, and this was at a time when clashes between students and troops were sporadic (Interview: July 1981). Thus, education as politics involves students armed with stones fighting soldiers who are armed, and using, military hardware. Following the incident described at the beginning of this postscript, the same newspaper article quoted a shopkeeper in the West Bank as saying: "It is wrong, but what else can our young people do? They are being attacked by settlers with guns, they have to put up some sort of a fight." ('The Times': 28.7.83).

NOTES

1. As will be seen in Appendix 3 Military Order 854 applies only to the first part of the series of pronouncements which were made. However, public discussion and media reporting refer to the collective as 854.

2. Residents of Jerusalem are defined by the Military Authorities as Israeli citizens.

3. The information on deportations and teaching bans in West Bank Universities is provided in a review circulated privately by Mark Cheverton, a British lecturer who was deported from Bethlehem University in November 1982.

4. See also the discussion of security as a rationale for legal provision in Chapter Four.

5. The report was prepared for an ad hoc faculty meeting, at the Hebrew University in December 1980. The committee which was responsible for preparing the study consisted of: Ruth Gavison (Law), Yehoshua Kolodny (Geology), David Kretchmer (Law), Eliezar Rabinovitch (Physics) and Menahem Yaari (Economics).

6. A report was prepared for the Committee of Concerned Scientists and the Committee on International Freedom of Scientists of the American Physical Society by Dr. Edward Witten of Princeton University's Physics Department, following a visit to the West Bank in December 1982. He summed up the feelings of foreign passport-holders as being willing to sign a commitment to abide by the law of the land, but being unwilling to sign a statement of their own beliefs (Witten: 1983).

7. The recruitment conditions for each district are as follows (1976/77):

Hebron:	asked for 60 new teachers. Limited to 55, but 44 vacancies arose in addition due to resignations.
Bethlehem/Jericho:	asked for 33, got 17.
Jenin:	asked for 60, got 15.
Tulkarm:	asked for 55, got 15.
Nablus:	asked for 67, got 31.5.

Nasru suggests that this was a change of policy initiated after 1973, and that before then requirements were generally agreed by the Military Authorities (Nasru: 1977).

8. During this period, Birzeit was a college awarding a two-year associate degree. (See section on University Structure in this Chapter).

9. By 1981, no graduate of Birzeit Univerity was permitted to be employed in a government school (Interview: September 1981).

10. As evidence of this, Gerson comments on an interview with Mr. Gadish, then Assistant Director General of the Ministry of Education in charge of Arab education inside Israel; since 1967 he has been coordinator of West Bank education and expressed the view that similar subjects and teaching methods were appropriate. For a discussion of eudcational provision for Palestinians with Israeli citizenship, see Sami Khalil Mar'i, Arab Education in Israel (1978).

11. As was noted in Chapter Six, Israel does not accept the applicability of the Geneva Convention to the territories occupied in 1967.

12. It was suggested that it would have suited the Military Authorities to close all educational facilities in the West Bank at this time (Interview: September 1981). Similarly, the implementation of MO 854 which was discussed earlier has been described as a means of "destroying the universities, or reducing them to mediocrity, without having to close them officially" (Witten: 1983).

13. The legal justification for this is derived from the 1945 Defence Regulations (Emergency Powers), a British Mandatory law which empowers the state, in this case the IDF censor, to ban at its discretion anything thought to interfere with 'the security of the state and public order'.

14. The distribution of several of the Arabic language daily newspapers published in East Jerusalem is also prohibited in the occupied territories.

15. Birzeit introduced an associate degree programme in 1962. Prior to this, Birzeit had been a private school.

16. Gerson quotes from an interview with Dr. Nasir, the deported president of Birzeit, that the upgrading was at his instigation. He carried it out without asking prior permission of the Military Governor, and consequently was threatened with disciplinary action unless all unauthorised changes were rescinded. Despite the threat being ignored no disciplinary action was taken specifically on this, in that the university continued to function as such. However, Dr. Nasir was deported after the 1973 war for allegedly "failing to cooperate with the Israeli authorities in preventing the teaching of anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish material." (Gerson: 1978).

17. There is a discrepancy in the provision of facilities between boys' and girls' schools. An unpublished survey from Bethlehem University reports that 53% of schools have libraries (60% of boys' schools, 35% of girls') and 47% have laboratory facilities (51% for boys, 39% for girls).

18. There is a difference between closing a university and closing the area where the university if located. For example, in July 1981 a commemoration was to be held in Birzeit University on the date of the murder of the Palestinian writer Ghassan Kanafani. At 8.00 a.m. Birzeit village was "closed" until 5.00 p.m., with the result that noone who was off Birzeit campus at 8.00 a.m. could attend the meeting.

19. The information in this section is drawn from interviews carried out in the West Bank universities from June-December 1981.

20. United National Resolution 242 (22.11.67) calls for an Israeli withdrawal to the 1949 borders, and the termination of all 'states of belligerency'. The latter clause included the recognition of territorial integrity of 'every state in the area'. (London Office of the Palestine Liberation Organisation: 1983).

21. The way in which the Islamic bloc conceive of Islam also posits no division between 'religion' and 'politics' - Islam is politics. The organiser of Birzeit Islamic bloc has been quoted as saying:

> "Islam is a comprehensive way of life. It is not just praying and fasting when required. It is living the religion every minute of your life...We need to be more doctrinaire if Israel is to be overthrown - we need an Islamic state founded on the principles of the Koran."
> ('The Guardian': 15.3.82).

Conclusion

In November 1983, representatives of the armies of France, Italy, Britain, USA, Syria and Israel were in Lebanon. While the American and European troops formed part of the United Nations consignment stationed in Lebanon to strengthen President Gemayel's rule, Israel continued its occupation of the southern part of the country, and Syrian forces fought what remained of the Arafat-led PLO in the north. President Reagan issued a statement that:

> ...stability in Lebanon is central to /American/ credibility on a global scale. If Lebanon ends up under the tyranny of forces hostile to the West, the western allies will be threatened with loss of the Arab oil supplies.
> ('The Economist': 29 Oct.-4 Nov. 1983)

In the Introduciton to the thesis, an outline of the situation in Lebanon was used to raise the main issues and advance the themes which were to be discussed, and the quote from President Reagan is a forceful restatement of the kinds of connections which have been analysed. For the Palestinians in Lebanon, the end of 1983 saw the PLO led by Yasser Arafat being beaten back towards the Lebanese coast by the combined forces of the Syrian Army and Palestinian dissident groupings. The complexity of the alliances in Lebanon serves again to highlight the need for an analysis which can build up a coherent picture from the array of apparent paradoxes and conflicts.

For instance, the Arab governments were instrumental in setting up a Palestine Liberation Organisation, and have proclaimed the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. Yet Rodinson suggests that:

> "The Organisation /i.e. the PLO/ had been created to enable the Arab states, acting in concert, to canalize the claims and aspirations of the Palestinians, to keep a close watch over them and render them harmless, except when the common interest of all dictated otherwise."
> (Rodinson: 1982: p.145)

In 1970, an estimated 5,000 people were killed and 20,000 wounded when the Jordanian army attacked Palestinian refugee camps and guerilla bases in Jordan, and the remainder of the Palestinian organisation was expelled (People's Press: 1981). In 1976, the alliance between Syria and Lebanon's Maronite rulers during the Lebanese civil war carried out actions such as the siege and massacre of Palestinian refugees in Tal al Zaatar camp. Over 1,000 people were killed in the final assault and another 1,000 executed immediately afterwards (Gilmour: 1982). In 1982, Israel's invasion of Lebanon left an estimated 12,000 people killed and 40,000 wounded, amongst these the victims of the massacres in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Chatila; massacres perpetrated by Lebanese militia while Israeli troops sealed the area and illuminated the scene with flares (Jansen: 1982).

Arab governments have expressed verbal support for the Palestinians, and have extended financial aid, albeit with strings attached. The reasons which underpin this ambivalence can be discussed at two related levels - in terms of the class nature of particular Arab states, and in terms of power alliances within the region and internationally. Chapter One attempted to suggest an interpretation of how these levels are related, through a consideration of the historical background to the Middle East 'problem'. The kind of historical account which is constructed to provide this order of explanation cannot be restricted to a description of events; rather, it stands as a theoretical and methodological base for the work as a whole.

The analysis which was carried out looks at how economic changes within Europe generated new relationships between Europe and the rest of the world: relationships which came to involve governments, and later the implantation of settler populations from Europe in the countries of Asia, Africa and the Americas. The nature of these relationships is conceptualised as being one of violence. In this way, the problems identified with an ahistorical conception of colonialism are answered, and the conceptualisation of a violence which is manifest in different forms allows the diverse aspects of the colonial relationship to be explored in the context of a power relation between coloniser and colonised.

Violence is apparent in the destruction of the history of the colonised as well as in physical destruction; it involves language, and literature, and culture, and permeates through to attitudes and ideas. The impact of violence can be seen in the society of the colonised as well as of the coloniser, and can be seen in the country which is settled as well as in the settlers' 'homeland'.

While the focus of this thesis has been on the meaning of colonialism for the colonised, the issue of violence for the coloniser was raised in Chapter One with regard to the roots of Zionism in late 19th century Europe, and the relationship was elaborated between the imperial powers and the attempts to translate Zionism from a political philosophy to a set of strategies. The importance of the Middle East as a region for the imperial powers can be seen to take on added significance with the discovery of oil, but this represents a change in the form rather than in the substance of the unequal relationship.

When Israel is placed in this scenario, a new matrix of interests is overlaid, and Chapter Two begins to explore this by examining specific aspects of Israel's international connections in the light of the analysis suggested in Chapter One. Israel's existence was made possible by the cooperation of imperial powers earlier this century, and has been guaranteed by these powers, in particular by the United States of America, since the proclamation of the state. The relaince on overseas aid, the overblown defence sector and the internal economic problems connected with this, such as the high inflation rate and foreign debt, combine to make Israel an economic anomaly. Chapter Two, therefore, moves towards a particular instance of how the power relations analysed in Chapter One actually operate.

In order to draw out these contradictions, consideration then focusses on the historical development of the State of Israel, from the perspective of the impact which Zionism has had for the Palestinian people. This inovlves an examination of the ideologies which formed Zionist thinking, the ways in which they were translated into practices, and the processes which consolidated rule over Palestine. It is argued that the main objective of Zionist settlement was the creation of political, social and economic institutions which were specifically for Jews, and that the institutions which were established at this time formed the backbone of the State of Israel.

The translation of institutional exclusivity, which is consistent with the assumptions on which Zionist thinking is based, into a set of strategies for holding a colonial territory was facilitated by the British Mandate authorities. However, this is not seen as a direct sponsoring of the Zionist project in Palestine: rather, it is suggested

that there was a coincidence of interests between Zionist settlers and British policy in the region, and it is the conjuncture of these interests which provides the rationale underlying British Mandate strategies. The presentation of Palestinian history in the Mandate period in this way draws on the form of analysis which was suggested in Chapters One and Two, and Chapter Three therefore locates in this framework the processes whereby Palestine was colonised.

The creation of institutions which were speficially for Jews entailed the exclusion of the non-Jewish population. This, in effect, was the formalisation of the ideological negation of the Palestinian people which is implicit in the political vision of a Jewish entity. The establishment of the Israeli state and the Palestinian exodus in 1948 extended the negation of the indigenous population to the level of physical exclusion. As an encapsulation of the violence of the colonial encounter, for the Palestinians, Zionism as a political vision entailed their ideological non-existence; Zionism as institutional exclusivity entailed political and economic negation in Palestine; and Zionism translated into a political entity entailed their physical exclusion and displacement from Palestine.

The physical exclusion of the Palestinian population was institutionalised in the new State of Israel, and Chapter Four focusses on land expropriation and settlement as an instance of domination. In addition to the economic and political significance of the expropriation of Arab property, this chapter considers the establishment of colonial settlement as an aspect of the process of colonisation, and as such draws on the continuity of the process in Israel and in the West Bank. The continuity which is suggested is, however, at the level of a power relationship.

Settlement inside Israel is different in several ways from Israeli settlement in the West Bank, and while the continuity of the relationship between coloniser and colonised can be seen in the analysis of colonialism as a historical process, this does not necessitate the attribution of a fixed character to this process.

The numerical weakness of Israeli settlers in the West Bank does not belie their importance symbolically, and as an increasingly-used flexible paramilitary force, and central to an understanding of their importance is the nature of the relationship between Israel and the West Bank. From the continuous process of colonisation analysed in Chapter Four, Chapter Five moves to examine specific aspects of what colonisation means for the people of the West Bank. This analysis is organised around the theme of labour, and as such, considers the effect of occupation on work, both in terms of the effect on types of employment, and the effect on workers.

The highlighting of details of colonisation facilitates the discussion of the way in which strategies are formulated which enable the people of the West Bank to survive. In Chapter Five, the case of Palestinian trade unions is an example of this, and Chapters Six and Seven develop this theme in different ways. In Chapter Six, three instances are discussed of how the experience of colonisation is worked out at the level of local politics, while Chapter Seven turns to more diffuse facets of life under occupation in considering education as a form of politics.

The use of 'case studies' in this context is not intended to provide exhaustive reviews of the study area, but, as has been argued throughout the thesis, has a particular theoretical and methodological status within the work as a whole. The kind of explanation which is sought is one

which can formulate a unity between colonialism as a historical process and the meaning which it has for the people who are colonised.

The distinction between historical circumstances and the way in which these circumstances are experienced, explained and defined is seen as important for two main reasons. Firstly, the emphasis is placed on the dynamic nature of the colonial relationship and this assures the integrity of the history of the colonised people. Secondly, by maintaining that while a theoretical unity is constructed of violence as a colonial power relation, specific forms of violence are neither reduced to nor deduced from this level, an analysis can consider the diverse ways in which people perceive and interpret their situation. Taking those two points together, this means that an explanation can be constructed at different levels of analysis.

The discussion of particular instances of how Palestinians have perceived and explained their experiences has served, therefore, to highlight the different meanings which occupation has for the occupied. The theme which runs through these diverse moments is the way in which a reality is constructed and it is at the point where this reality touches the objective experience that we can locate the violence of the relationship between coloniser and colonised.

Neither Al Ard nor the village leagues addressed themselves to the specific nature of Israel and what Zionism means for Palestinians. The exclusion of this consideration must not be seen as naivety or a lack of awareness; the exclusion is, in itself, a constituent of the construction of a form of explanation which has its own internal logic.

In this sense, the significance is realised of both the issues which are focussed on and the silences. Al Ard attempted to define an identity which was Arab, and Palestinian Arab, within Israeli hegemony. The context within which this identity was perceived was related to the pan-Arabism of the time, and as such is related also to the reliance on Arab states to solve the problems faced by Palestinians. When this is juxtaposed with the position of Palestinians inside Israel at that time, with the institutionalised means of discrimination which were introduced after the proclamation of the state, the retention of military government in Arab areas, and the range of formal and informal restrictions which were imposed on the Arab population, then the dissonance of the experience and the interpretation exemplifies violence.

Through the organisation of local politics, questions were asked by the municipalities regarding means of resisting the Israeli occupation and attempts were made to connect the struggle of Palestinians in the occupied territories with Palestinians in exile. It can be suggested that the importance of the Palestine National Front and the National Guidance Committee lies in the two-fold role of coordinating action in the West Bank and of providing an organised link between Palestinians living under occupation and Palestinians outside. Furthermore, this link was crucial to the existence of the Palestine Liberation Organisation which has tried to overarch the histories and aspirations of all Palestinians. It was the interconnectedness at this political level of the Palestinians as a people which Israel sought to break by destroying the Palestinian institutions in Lebanon, and it is in this context that the events which have taken place in Lebanon since Israel's 1982 invasion can be understood.

What is being proposed, then, is that the meaning of occupation in the West Bank involves the generation of analytical connections betweeen the level of Palestinian specificity and the context within which Palestinian history can be located, and that an understanding of this complexity requires an analysis which can articulate different levels of explanation. This is suggested in the theoretical and methodological framework of the thesis, and the structure of the thesis itself represents an attempt to follow this through, as the Chapters are tightly integrated in a sequence which facilitates the shifting between levels of analysis.

For the Palestinian people, the encounter with Zionism has involved a violence which has ranged from ideological to physical negation, and it is this shared experience which connects the diverse moments of violence. The thesis began by noting the significance of the refusal of the first Prime Minister of Israel to define the boundaries of the state. A fitting end is the comment made by Menachem Begin on announcing his retirement. At a time when Israel is in control of the entire area of Palestine, the Syrian Golan Heights and about half of Lebanon, Prime Minister Begin wants to be remembered as "the man who set the borders of the Land of Israel for all eternity" ('The Guardian': 31.8.83).

APPENDIX ONE

Fieldwork

The field research which was carried out in Israel and the West Bank between June and December 1981 arose from the conviction that an understanding of what was happening on the West Bank could not be gained solely from an external historical account. The methodological and theoretical implications of this have been argued throughout the thesis; the importance of retaining the meaning which colonialism has for the colonised has been emphasised - both theoretically, in that the reduction of an expression of an experience to the experience itself is a confusion of levels of analysis, and in the sense that to omit a consideration of the meaning of colonialism is the deny the past of the colonised people. The different levels of analysis which are involved in building up a coherent picture require different kinds of information, and the purpose of this Appendix is to provide a background to the information which was collected in Israel and the West Bank.

It is one thing to state that the meaning of occupation is important, and quite another to think about how to get at this "meaning", and indeed about the significance of whose meaning you get. The way in which the fieldwork was designed bore these questions very much in mind, and this underlies the status which the fieldwork has in relation to the rest of the thesis. The intention was to examine instances of a colonial relationship rather than carry out detailed demographical studies, and in this way the focus was on the location of information in a particular framework rather than on the collection of information as an activity in itself.

Following from this, the type of information and the means of collecting it can be considered. The objectives were deliberately left very broad, partly due to specific limitations, and partly to avoid imposing predefined categories. Within the general analytical framework of the thesis, I wanted to retain maximum flexibility in terms of what areas or topics would prove important. I had not been in the Middle East before, and the scarcity of research on the contemporary West Bank meant that it was difficult to predict what would be the areas of most interest. Above all, the continuing military government of the area made a predefinition of what research could be carried out impossible.

The main limitations on the work can be noted here. One limiting factor was language. I spoke very basic Arabic which was inadequate for carrying on a discussion. This meant that there was a choice between using an interpreter or restricting the orbit to English speakers. While having an interpreter was useful on initial visits to a town or village, the loss of immediacy in the conversation and in many cases the presence of another person were hindrances, so in general interviews were only carried out with English speakers. This ruled out the possibility of extensive work in villages, but for the most part did not seem disadvantageous as English is widely spoken in Palestine.

Language also played a part in the selection of written source material as no Arabic or Hebrew literature could be used. Again, however, there much available in translation, and translations from Arabic and Hebrew newspapers and magazines are provided by various sources (see Bibliography). In sum, it has been possible to carry out the research without using Arabic sources and interviews because the project was designed with that as a limiting factor, and because of the status of

the fieldwork in relation to the thesis as a whole. While empirical material is important, it is felt that interpretation is a vital part of the account - in other words, the use to which material is put.

To give an example of the importance of the location of "facts", processed cheese and white bread are subsidised in Israel by the Israeli government. By comparison, Arab bread and goats' milk cheese, which are not subsidised, are expensive. People therefore begin to eat Kraft cheese and sliced bread, and dietary choices adversely affect Arab agriculture which is geared towards the production of different kinds of food by different methods, and does not receive government subsidies. Marlboro cigarettes are widely thought to have a higher social cachet than locally-produced cigarettes which taste similar and are one-third of the price. At Arab wedding parties, guests are not offered local cigarettes, they are offered imported or manufactured under licence American brands.

As "facts" in themselves, these appear to be items of domestic trivia. However, when they are set in the context of the analysis which has been carried out in the thesis, details like this provide graphic descriptions of economic processes, political forces and ideas about western (as opposed to Arab) culture. When people begin to prefer to eat mass-produced food, and prefer to smoke identifiably American cigarettes, then that is a statement about the nature of the colonial relationship.

At another level, it can be seen also as an indication of how the economic is related to the political, social and ideological. It is unlikely that food subsidies were introduced deliberately to undermine the pattern of Arab food consumption and so affect Arab agriculture. However, this is what has happened. The significance of the examples

which have been mentioned is that they present cameos of the way in which the kinds of changes which have taken place percolate through to attitudes about culture, and consumption, and status - they are, in effect, instances of how colonialism actually works.

Aside from linguistic restrictions, no initial selection was made of areas of interest, and the first three months in the West Bank were spent getting to know the area and talking to as many people as possible. While this may be a useful general procedure in carrying out field research, the particular situation of the West Bank heightens the necessity to become accepted. The people of the West Bank are living under a military occupation where a verbal statement of support for the PLO can incur a three year prison sentence, and to be seen talking to a foreigner can incur suspicion at the very least. I was usually introduced to new contacts by mutual acquaintances and this was reassuring both for the new contact and for me. The majority of the people I met were very cooperative, and a recurring theme was the importance of presenting an account of what is really happening in the West Bank. The feeling is strong that the situation is misrepresented, or worse, ignored.

The reality of living under a military occupation also heightens my responsibility towards the people who assisted me. General sociological practice concerning the protection of the privacy of informants is brought sharply into focus when these people live with such dangers. It is for this reason that individuals are not named in the text, and this affected also the kinds of research methods which could be used.

Given the political difficulties and the kind of information I was interested in, questionnaires or formal survey methods would not have been suitable. Instead, the fieldwork data is a series of unstructured conversations and impressions and this links in with the status which fieldwork is accorded in the thesis. The material which was collected therefore represents the accounts of a range of people, and makes two main contributions to the thesis. Firstly, it stands by itself as statements which were made, and ideas which were discussed, outwith an imposed framework. In this sense, it provides information about people and events. For example, the information on West Bank organisations such as municipalities and trade unions is the result of conversations in the West Bank, both with people who are involved, and with those who are not involved in these areas but commented on them. This contribution, therefore, is empirical in that it is a collection of data. The second contribution of the material is evident in the way in which ideas and events are set in a framework, and this involves my interpretation.

While research had been carried out prior to staying in the West Bank, reading cannot adequately prepare you for the feeling of living under a military occupation, where even the military presence is intimidating. One of the more striking things is the casual way in which submachine guns are carried by soldiers and civilians, and the way in which weapons are used against demonstrators is frightening. The reality of these dangers is quickly learned. However, in addition to having first-hand experience of the physical violence of military rule, the stay was important for the way in which local information and contacts built up, and the way in which this shaped the sort of interpretations which were made.

To give one example of this. The decision to include material on the Al Ard movement (see Chapter Six) was intended to advance the argument which had been made regarding the level of Palestinian unity, as Al Ard was formed by Palestinians inside Israel and over twenty years before the cases considered in the West Bank. The use of this material meant that some time was spent in Arab villages in Israel in order to talk to people who had been involved with Al Ard, and to get some idea of the conditions of Palestinians with Israeli citizenship.

The immediate impression in the Arab villages which I visited in the Triangle was of the contradiction between the affluence suggested by the number of very large houses, and the poverty suggested by unpaved roads, poor sewage facilities and the lack of community services. To a certain extent, this is happening also in the West Bank, and the road from Jerusalem to Ramallah, for example, is dotted with very large villas under construction. The explanation is that the houses are built by families who may have several members working in Israel, but more importantly are sent remittances from family members who have gone to work abroad. It is rarely possible to invest this money in land, so it is invested in a house. The poor facilities are the result of Israeli policy towards Arab towns in Israel: with the exception of Nazareth, all Arab towns in Israel are classified as 'villages' for the purposes of the allocation of municipal grants and services, with the result that the latter are barely adequate to maintain existing services, let alone instigate new ones. A similar situation is faced by the municipal councils on the West Bank, and the restrictions which have been imposed on them are detailed in Chapter Six.

The seven months which were spent in the area allowed me to get to know people and places, and to be accepted, although it must be emphasised that this was due in a large part to the assistance I had, and the introductions I was given. More time would have been useful, as it was really only in the last three months that I had clear ideas of what I wanted to do. Plans were made to return for six weeks in summer 1982, which would have given me around six months to go through all the material which had been collected, sort the fragments into some sort of order, and then return to fill any gaps. However, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in that year and its aftermath meant that these plans could not be realised.

It is doubtful, however, whether similar fieldwork methods could have been carried out then. During the time I spent there, I travelled alone to towns and villages and generally talked to as many people as possible. The only place hostility was shown was in Hebron. This happened on an early visit when I was alone in the town and several people shouted 'Israeli'. When I visited the town a few times and had been seen with local people there were no problems. It can be explained by the location of Kiryat Arba settlement on the outskirts of Hebron and the particular problems faced in the encounter with settlers in the town. Many of the settlers there are American, and on appearnce this was obviously the easiest group to identify me with. From accounts of people who have been in the area recently, it would not now be possible to move around so easily, as the whole situation has become much more tense and volatile.

While being foreign means you are conspicuous in Arab towns and villages, it is an advantage with regard to dealing with the military authorities. I had no official dealings with the Military Government, but as a foreign passport-holder I was not subject to the same restrictions on movement imposed on Palestinians. This privilege is evident, for example, at roadblocks. Passengers with ID cards must leave the vehicle for questioning while others remain inside, and this can happen many times on a short journey. It is not, however, the formal differences in treatment which are remarkable but the way in which the treatment is carried out. For instance, travelling on a bus from the Israeli part of Jerusalem to the Old City, two Israeli soldiers stood up and began to check ID cards. It didn't seem like an official check, as they had been on the bus for some time, and this was confirmed as they only checked the cards of two old men sitting opposite me, both wearing keffiyahs (traditional Arab cotton scarves or head-covering). I automatically offered my passport but it was politely declined. The whole episode was made as humiliating as possible for the old men. The soldiers joked in Hebrew, which the old men evidently did not understand, and others on the bus joined in.

While I was shown courtesy, except on the few occasions when travelling to non-tourist areas aroused some suspicion, it is impossible to be unaware of this difference in treatment. It is evident in attitude, and in conversation with Israelis about the Palestinian population. An American university lecturer who had recently emigrated to Israel commented that when she was in the US, her views on Israel were thought to be "hard" and on the political right. However, amongst colleagues at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem these same views have labelled her as a liberal "dove".

In conclusion, the purpose of the time spent in the West Bank was to collect material constituting instances of the colonial relationship. Given the analytical and methodological framework which underpins the thesis, the nature of this material emphasises its location in a framework rather than the collection in itself, and this in turn affects the way in which material is collected and the status accorded to the data. Weight is accorded to my own impressions and interpretations, and comments made for example in general conversation are seen as important for the insight which is given into ordinary day-to-day life in the West Bank. This, coupled with the military occupation, means that fieldwork methods were necessarily unstructured.

Despite the limitations of time, language, and the situation on the West Bank itself, the fieldwork period did provide a wealth of useful material, both as basic information and in aiding my understanding of the meaning of occupation in the West Bank.

A final note can be made on the geographical terminology used in this work. Many terms commonly used are implicitly political, and as clarification, 'Israel' refers to the State of Israel in its 1949 borders. 'Palestine' refers to the territory of Mandate Palestine irrespective of the time of reference. In other words the area which, in 1983 is the State of Israel, and the territories occupied in 1967 on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

APPENDIX TWO

Enterprises owned, and partially-owned, by the Histadrut

Hevrat Ovdim Enterprises and Relationships of Hevrat Ovdim to Them

Legend: 1 - wholly-owned 2 - partially-owned 3 - effective-voice

Enterprise	Activity	Relationship
MANUFACTURING		
Koor Industries	Manufactures industrial products within Ceramics, Chemicals, Food, and Science-based Divisions, metals, appliances, electrical and electronic items.	1
Solel Boneh Building and Public Works Company	Manufacturing Division manufactures metal products, building compenents, furniture etc.	1
Te'us Development Areas Industrialization	Holding company of 17 individual enterprises located in development areas which manufacture textiles, medical products, plastics, and electronic equipment.	1
Kibbutz Industry	Consists of about 200 industrial plants engaged in food processing, and manufactruing agricultural equipment, plastics, electrical equipment, footwear, furniture, wood, etc.	3
Regional Enterprises	26 regional organisations, operating about 50 regional factories.	3
Yakhin Hakal	Inter alia, operates 5 industrial plants which process citrus by-products, do canning, make pectin, and manufacture citrus fruit boxes.	2
Cooperative Centre of Producers	Consists, inter alia, of 90 industrial enterprises which engage in printing, woodwork and baking, and manufacture electrical equipment, vehicles, metal products, gas containers, metal sash, metal office furniture, boxes for citrus fruit, forklift platforms etc. Includes Ha'Argaz, the largest industrial cooperative, which has a one-third interest in Amcor Industries.	3
BUILDING AND CONTRACTING		
Solel Boneh Building and Public Works Company	Engages in building and road construction, quarrying, overseas construction, as well as in the financing and planning of housing.	1
Shikun Ovdim	Plans, promotes, and finances the construction of popular housing and shopping centers and engages in their sale.	1
WHOLESALE MARKETING		
Hamashbir Hamerkazi	Supplies at wholesale the Cooperative Movement (kibbutzim and other cooperatives in Israel) with items for agriculture, industry and the home, through five divisions: Grocery, Consumer, Agricultural, Technical and Building Materials.	3
Tnuva-Central Cooperative for Marketing of Agricultural Products	Processes and markets agricultural and dairy products.	1
RETAIL MARKETING		
Hamashbir Lazarhan	Supplies consumers with basic consumer items exclusive of food, through a chain of 13 department stores. Owned both by Hamashbir Hamerkazi and by the Consumers Association.	1
Consumer's Cooperative Union	Operates a chain of 220 supermarkets.	3

AGRICULTURAL		
Yakhin Hakal	Cultivates and supervises groves and packages the product for the domestic and foreign markets.	2
Tnuva Exports	Sorts and packages fruit for export.	3
Regional Enterprises	The constituent regional organisations work in the field of sorting and packaging fruits and vegetables, operate slaughterhouses, serve as stations for heavy equipment, etc.	3
EXPORT AND IMPORT		
Alda	Offers full export and import services, the largest firm of its kind in Israel.	1
Hamashbir Export and Import	Serves as general export company for all sectors of the Israeli economy.	3
WATER		
Mekorot Water Company	Explores and develops water sources, supplies water to consumer and manufactures related industrial items.	2
INSURANCE		
Hassneh Israel Insurance Company	Offers comprehensive insurance and reinsurance services.	1
TRANSPORTATION AND TOURISM		
Arkia Airlines	Operates a fleet of aircraft within Israel and serves El Al with flights to some points outside of Israel.	2
Histour	Offers comprehensive tourist and travel services to individuals and groups.	1
The Development Company for Hotels and Vacation Centers	Develops and operates chains of hotels, guest houses, vacation villages and restaurants.	1
Public Carriers	Several cooperatives, including Dan, Egged, and Shelev, which engage in hauling passengers and freight.	3
BANKING AND FINANCING		
Investment Fund of Hevrat Ovdim	Mobilizes funds for investment in enterprises of the Hevrat Ovdim economy.	1
Bank Hapoalim	Offers full banking services to the public and serves as the financial arm of Hevrat Ovdim.	1
Major Affiliates of Bank Hapoalim		
Ampal-Americal Israel Corporation	Mobilizes capital in the United States for investment in Israel.	1
Housing Mortgage Bank	Finances housing activities of Hevrat Ovdim and offers housing mortgages to the public	1
Gmul Investment Company	Invests severance pay, pension funds and other funds.	1
Japhet Bank	Specialises in foreign currency and securities.	1
Israel-American Development Bank	Specialises in long term loans for industrial development	1
PUBLISHING AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES		
Davar	The Histadrut daily, which offers comprehensive newspaper services	1
Cultural and Educational Enterprises	Supplies cultural and educational services (books, records, motion pictures) on a community basis, produces films, operates recording studios, operates matriculation preparatory classes, conducts adult education programs, organises shows and exhibitions, etc.	1
Am Oved Publishing House	Publishes original and translated work, one of the largest publishing houses in Israel.	1

Source: "Hevrat Ovdim in the Israeli Economy", Economic Department, Hevrat Ovdim, Spring, 1973.

APPENDIX THREE

Military Order 854 and
Related Legal Amendements

ISRAELI DEFENCE ARMY

ORDER No.854

Order concerning Education and Culture Law Number 16 for the year 1964 (Amendment) (West Bank)

In accordance with the authority vested in me by virtue of the law of Culture and Education, Law Number 16, for the year 1964 (hereinafter "the Law"), I hereby order as follows:

1. Amendment to Article 2 of the Law: In the definition of "Institute" occurring in Article 2 of the Law, the phrase "on condition that the period of study should be less than four years" shall be deleted.

2. Amendment to Article 8 of the Law: In Article 8 (c) of the Law, the phrase "and its duration is less than four years" shall be deleted.

3. Amendment to Article 20 of the Law: In Article 20 of the Law, the phrase "at intermediate level of specialization between secondary and university education" shall be deleted.

4. Amendment to Article 26 of the Law: At the end of Article 26 the following shall be added:- "The mentioned Ordinance may included regulations concerning teachers who are convicted of committing a crime in accordance with security legislation, or who are placed under administrative detention."

5. Amendment to Article 59 of the Law:
   a) In Article 59 of the Law, the word "Ministry" shall be replaced by the following phrase, "the responsible official by virtue of the Order Concerning Powers Regarding Laws of Education (West Bank Area) (Number 11) for the year 5727 - 1967 (hereafter - the "responsible official")

   b) Paragraph (c) of Article 59 of the Law will be referred to by the letter (d) to be preceded by the following:

   c) "The responsible official may,in consultation with the District Chief of Police and the Military Governor of the area directly concerned, may take into account considerations of public order among other considerations, in granting the licence mentioned in this Article."

6. Transitional Provisions: Every educational institution operating in the Area mentioned at the end of this Order will be considered as having obtained a temporary licence, in accordance with the Law as amended in this Order, as of the date when this Order comes into force.

7. Effective Date: This Order shall come into force as of 24th Tammuz 5740 (8th July 1980).

8. Name: This Order shall be called, "Order Concerning Education Law Number 16 for the year 1964 (amendment) (West Bank) (Number 854) for the year 5740-1980".

ISRAELI DEFENCE ARMY

EDUCATION AND CULTURE LAW NUMBER 16 OF 1964

Regulation Regarding Teacher Certification Number 23 of 1965 (Amendment)

In accordance with the authority vested in me by virtue of Article 117 of the Education and Culture Law Number 16 of 1964 (hereafter - "the Law") I issue the following Regulation:

1. Amendment to Article 8: The provision of Article 8 of the Regulation Regarding Teacher Certification Number 23 of 1965 (hereafter - "the Regulation") will be referred to by the letter (a), and to this the following will be added:

   b) The responsible official may cancel the teaching certificate granted to whoever was convicted of committing a crime in accordance with a security legislation, or to whoever was placed under administrative detention.

2. Addition of Article 9: After Article 8 of the Regulation comes the following:

   9. "No teaching certificate of whatever kind shall be granted to anyone who has been convicted of committing a crime in accordance with a security legislation, or to anyone who has been placed under administrative detention except with the approval of the responsible official".

3. Effective Date: This Regulation will be called the "Regulation Regarding Teacher Certification Number 23 and 1965 (West Bank) (amendment) for the year 5740-1980."

22 Tammuz 5740
6 July 1980

Benjamin Ben Eli'ezer
Tat Aluf - Commander of the
Area of the West Bank

ISRAELI DEFENCE ARMY

ORDER CONCERNING CLOSED AREAS (WEST BANK) (NUMBER 34) 5727 - 1967

GENERAL PERMIT TO ENTER (Inhabitants of the Administered Territories) (Number 5) (Amendment) (West Bank) 5740 - 1980.

In accordance with the authority vested in me in my capacity as Commander of the Area, I issue the following declaration:

1. Amendment to Article 2:
   a) Article 2 of the General Permit to Enter (Inhabitants of the Administered Territories) (Number 5) (Judea and Samaria) for the year 5732 - 1972 will be referred to by letter (a), and at its beginning the following phrase shall appear, taking into account the contents of Paragraph (b):

   b) After Paragraph (a) of Article 2 this will follow:

   "(b) No one who enters the Area, from the inhabitants of any administered territory, may work as a teacher or principal of any educational institution, or be a student of any educational institution unless he obtains a personal permit issued in writing by a military commander.

   c) Paragraph (b) is not intended to derogate from the provisions of any legislation or security legislation which imposes the requirement of obtaining a licence, or the acquisition of a permit to reside or work, but it was included as an addition to any such provisions.

2. Transitional Rules: This amendment does not apply during the scholastic year 5740 (1979/1980) to a teacher or student who has already started teaching or studying as the case may be, at any educational institution, before the coming into force of this amendment.

3. Effective Date: The Order shall come into force as of 24 Tammuz 5740 (8 July 1980)

4. Name: This declaration shall be called "General Declaration for Entry (Inhabitants of the Administered Territories) (Number 5) (Amendment) (Judea and Samaria) 5740 - 1980."

22 Tammuz 5740
6 July 1980

Benjamin Eli'ezer
Tat Aluf - Commander of the
Area of the West Bank

ISRAELI DEFENCE ARMY

ORDER CONCERNING CLOSED AREAS (West Bank Area) (Number 34) for the year 5727-1967.

GENERAL PERMIT TO ENTER (Number 5) (Israeli and foreign inhabitants) (West Bank Areas) 5740-1980.

In accordance with the authority vested in me in my capacity as Commander of the Area I issue the following Order:

1. Amendment to Article 2: In Article 2 of the General Permit to Enter (Number 5) (Israeli and Foreign Inhabitants) (West Bank Area) of 5730-1970 (hereafter - the General Permit to Enter), the following shall appear after Paragraph 9.

   10. a) No Israeli or foreign inhabitants entering the Area may work as a teacher or principal at any educational institution unless he obtains a personal permit issued in writing by a military commander.

   b) Paragraph (a) is not intended to derogate from the provisions of any legislation or security legislation imposing the requirement of obtaining a licence or the acquisition of a permit to reside or work, but it was included as an addition to any such provisions.

2. Transitional Rules: This amendment does not apply during the scholastic year 5740 (1979/1980) to a teacher or student who has already started teaching or studying, as the case may be, in any educational institution before the coming into force of this amendment.

3. Effective Date: This amendment shall come into force as of 24 Tammuz 5740 (8 July 1980).

4. Name: This Declaration will be called "General Permit to Enter (Number 5) (Israeli and foreign inhabitants) (Amendment Number 2) (West Bank) 5740 - 1980."

22 Tammuz 5740
6 July 1980

Benjamin Ben Eli'ezer
Tat Aluf - Commander of the
Area of the West Bank

APPENDIX FOUR

Maps

1. The Middle East - Palestinian Refugees.



* The Figures for Lebanon are from 1981.

2. Israel and Israeli-controlled Territory, 1982.



3. The West Bank.



4. The West Bank - Population Distribution and Israeli Settlement.





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