Development through, not despite, crony capitalism: the case of Morocco

This dissertation examines the relationship between crony capitalism and development through a political economy analysis of Morocco. Challenging orthodox views that treat crony capitalism as a market distortion that inevitably undermines growth, it suggests that in late-developing contexts cronyism can function as an informal institution embedded in domestic political settlements and shaped by external constraints. Rather than asking why crony capitalism persists, the dissertation asks how it operates and what kinds of development it enables or constrains.

Morocco presents a compelling case. Despite entrenched state–business networks, the country has achieved selective developmental successes in sectors such as manufacturing, renewable energy, and tourism. These outcomes challenge dominant accounts of crony capitalism in the Middle East and North Africa, which emphasise elite capture and stagnation. Morocco’s experience becomes intelligible once crony capitalism is analysed as a mode of governance, rather than a deviation from idealised market norms.

Drawing on institutionalist political economy, political settlement theory, and heterodox development and international economics, the study conceptualises crony capitalism as an informal institution that manages elite coalitions, coordinates political and economic actors’ actions, and mediates between domestic and international priorities. Under Morocco’s weak dominant coalition centred on the monarchy, crony ties are bidirectional: they protect selected business elites while also enabling the palace to discipline and mobilise them in pursuit of strategic policy objectives.

Methodologically, the dissertation employs a qualitative research design combining social network analysis, semi-structured interviews, and sectoral case studies to uncover opaque governance mechanisms that escape purely quantitative approaches.

The findings show that Morocco’s developmental gains have occurred not despite crony capitalism but through it. Informal ties can complement industrial policy by reducing uncertainty and coordinating investment, while simultaneously entrenching privilege. The result is a hybrid model of selective development that combines visible modernisation with persistent structural fragility.