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# **Pansophia and Perfection**

## **The Nature of Utopia in the Early Seventeenth Century**

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**A Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for  
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

**University of Durham**

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**- 8 MAR 2002**

## Abstract

My thesis argues that the pansophist utopia is a more coherent model of the ideal society than has previously been recognised. It investigates the ideal societies of Tomasso Campanella (1568-1639), Johann Valentin Andreae (1586-1654), Johann Amos Comenius (1592-1670) and Francis Bacon (1561-1626). It argues that despite appearances, Bacon's utopia is not to be considered as part of the pansophist canon. The model of the pansophist utopia rests on four foundations: a perfect political system, a universalist view of human nature, a belief in universal knowledge and an acceptance of magic. In each of these key areas Bacon provides a qualitatively different approach.

Chapter one offers an overview of the many ways in which utopia has been defined. It also outlines the desire for reform in the early seventeenth century, and explains why utopia was suited to the pansophist vision. Chapter two explains why utopia was the political theory of pansophism. Chapter three looks at the utopian vision of man as a universal creature. Chapter four identifies the ways in which knowledge was incorporated into the ideal society. Chapter five deals with the magical theories of pansophia.

My thesis will address important historical questions, such as the role of the Rosicrucians in the pansophist movement, as well as key issues in utopian theory, for example the role of human nature in the ideal society. By revealing the coherence of Campanella, Andreae and Comenius, my thesis will provide insights into the nature of both the pansophist movement and the utopian ideal.

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## **Declaration**

This thesis results entirely from my own work and has not been previously offered in candidature for any other degree or diploma. Material from the published or unpublished work of others, which is referred to in this thesis, is credited to the author of the text.

## Acknowledgements

Composing a PhD thesis is a strange business. Not many tasks can be both soul destroying and simultaneously life affirming. I owe a debt of thanks to so many people for helping me through these past few years that to name them all would be an impossible task. From Durham University I would especially like to thank Bob Dyson and Ian Adams for their advice, encouragement and moral support. A big thank you also goes to Jean and Wendy who have been helping me ever since my original interview. Esther, Mike, Dale and Heather, my office mates over the years, have also shouldered a great deal of stress with more grace than was deserved. I would also like to mention the late Henry Tudor for presenting me with the opportunity to study at Durham in the first place. Thanks are also due to all of my friends who are sadly scattered across the country, particularly Colonel, Colin and Tom. Most importantly I would like to let my family know how grateful I am for their love and support. Both my mam and dad, as well as my brother Simon and sister Jenny, have all been unbelievably kind and considerate. My love to you all. Finally a special thank you to Kathleen who really has made the final year of my thesis far happier than I could have ever expected.

## Abbreviations

Full citations can be found in the bibliography

<i>Bon.</i>	<i>Tomasso Campanella, Renaissance Pioneer of Modern Thought</i> (references are to page numbers)
<i>Chrs</i>	<i>Christianopolis</i> (references are to page numbers)
<i>Confessio</i>	<i>Confessio Fraternalis</i> (references are to page numbers)
<i>CS</i>	<i>City of the Sun</i> (references are to page numbers)
<i>Diatyposis</i>	<i>A Pattern of Universal Knowledge</i> (references are to chapter and paragraph numbers)
<i>Dil</i>	<i>Dilucidatio</i> (references are to page numbers)
<i>DV</i>	<i>De Vita</i> (references are to book and chapter numbers)
<i>Fama</i>	<i>Fama Fraternalis</i> (references are to page numbers)
<i>GD</i>	<i>Great Didactic</i> (references are to chapter and paragraph numbers)
<i>Hep</i>	<i>Heptaplus</i> (references are to chapter and paragraph numbers)
<i>LW</i>	<i>The Labyrinth of the World and the Paradise of the Heart</i> (references are to chapter and paragraph numbers)
<i>Man and Man Utopian Thought in the Western World</i>	
<i>Met</i>	<i>Metaphysica</i> (references are to book and chapter numbers)
<i>Modell</i>	<i>A Modell of a Christian Society</i> (references are to page numbers)
<i>Mon</i>	<i>Monarchy of the Messiah</i> (references are to page numbers)
<i>Myth</i>	<i>Mythologia Christiana</i> (references are to book and chapter numbers)
<i>Nat Phil</i>	<i>Natural Philosophie Reformed by Divine Light</i> (references are to chapter and paragraph numbers)

<i>Oratio</i>	<i>Oration on the Dignity of Man</i> (references are to paragraph numbers)
<i>Pam</i>	<i>Pampaedia</i> (references are to chapter and paragraph numbers)
<i>Pan</i>	<i>Panorthosia Vols. 1 &amp; 2</i> (references are to chapter and paragraph numbers)
<i>Prod</i>	<i>Prodromus</i> (references are to page numbers)
<i>TP</i>	<i>Theologia Platonica</i> (references are to book and chapter numbers)
<i>VL</i>	<i>Via Lucis</i> (references are to chapter and paragraph numbers)

## **Dedication**

This thesis is respectfully dedicated to my beloved nan,  
Joyce Lilian Brown (1921-2000).

## Introduction

My thesis will demonstrate that there is a greater coherence to pansophist utopian thought than is presently recognised. It suggests that the ideal societies of Campanella, Andreae and Comenius outline the same essential theories of politics, man, knowledge and magic. It then contrasts this model of utopia with Bacon's *New Atlantis*, which despite appearance, is qualitatively different to its pansophist counterparts. My thesis installs Bacon almost as an experimental control: by highlighting the anomalies in his own ideal society, my thesis will reveal the consistency among the utopias of the pansophists. This section will introduce the thinkers and their ideal societies. After some brief biographical details it will identify their shared utopian heritage, as well as their acknowledgement of each other's work. It moves on to an overview of each subsequent chapter, before outlining the general aims and objectives of the thesis.

### **i. Who Were the Pansophists?**

The pansophists were a seemingly disparate group of thinkers who came to prominence in the early seventeenth-century. They came from a wide variety of social, political and religious backgrounds but were united in their desire for far reaching reform. Their primary goal was to establish a new system of knowledge, which would in turn cleanse Christian Europe of factionalism and schism.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Chapter 1 will deal with the pansophist project in more detail, along with the major interpretations surrounding it.



The Manuels<sup>2</sup> suggest that the pansophists were not, strictly speaking, scientists although they hailed recent scientific developments with great enthusiasm. Nor were they philosophers as such, despite the presence of Leibniz among their constellation. Pansophia was a middle ground; an amalgam of schools that ultimately wished to unite Europe. The pansophists were visionaries:

who were the trumpeters of the new science, men who were not themselves virtuosi or investiganti, but who either heralded the new creators or drafted ambitious programmes for them.<sup>3</sup>

Pansophia was shunned by the great figures at either end of the intellectual spectrum, from Descartes to Newton.<sup>4</sup>

This study focuses upon Campanella, Andreae and Comenius as the prominent pansophist theorists, but many more potential candidates could be placed under consideration. The Manuels suggest six principal thinkers - Bruno, Campanella, Andreae, Bacon, Comenius and Leibniz – all of whom influenced or interacted with a host of secondary characters:

its pre-eminent figures ... are the great planets in the Pansophic system; in turn each is surrounded by satellites that play subsidiary roles as supporters or transmitters – men such as Wilkins, Hartlib, Drury, Alstead, Besold, who sometimes divert attention from the luminaries.<sup>5</sup>

The reason that the Manuels accept such a large group is because, for them, “the whole issue of priority is trivial.”<sup>6</sup> It does not matter where influences came from, as the utopians each promoted a noticeably different vision of the ideal

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<sup>2</sup> F. E. Manuel and F. P. Manuel, *Utopian Thought in the Western World* (London: Blackwell, 1979), see ‘Pansophia: a Dream of Science’, pp. 205-21. I will discuss the Manuels’ work throughout this thesis.

<sup>3</sup> Man & Man (1979) p. 206.

<sup>4</sup> Man & Man (1979) p. 212.

<sup>5</sup> Man and Man (1979), p. 212. It is unclear why the Manuels do not consider figures such as Leibniz to be philosophers.

society. Therefore the Manuels ignore the coherence of the core pansophist philosophy that my thesis will identify.<sup>7</sup>

The reason that I have chosen to include Campanella, Andreae and Comenius is quite simply for their adherence to utopian theory. They all conceived of an ideal society that corresponded to an accepted tradition. By acknowledging a specific genre of writing, the pansophists placed their work within parameters. They depicted detailed, complex and self-contained visions of an established society in a way that other pansophists did not. Bruno and Leibniz, for example, offered world-views of a peaceful and harmonious earth, but they did not provide a formal picture of their utopian idyll, showing the principles of their philosophy in action. As we will see, the three pansophists in this study also regarded their utopias as political treatises, which sets them apart from some of the thinkers included in the Manuels' constellation.<sup>8</sup>

The role of Bacon is problematic as his *New Atlantis* is undoubtedly a foray into utopian literature. It presents a picture of an ideal society and even acknowledges the same utopian tradition that Campanella, Andreae and Comenius do. The important argument here, however, is that Bacon does not incorporate the same pansophist features into his utopia. In short, many pansophists were not utopians whereas Bacon was utopian in a sense, but should not be considered a pansophist.

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<sup>6</sup> Man and Man (1979), p. 273.

<sup>7</sup> The Manuels (1979), p. 209, admit that even these general ideas were disseminated throughout the continent by the secondary figures in the pansophist circle. Alstead introduced Andreae to the work of Bruno; Adami and Wense spread Campanella's ideas; Bacon secretly interacted with Europe through Toby Matthew and his brother Anthony.

<sup>8</sup> We will address the political nature of utopia in Chapter 2.

## ii. The Utopian Works

Like so many of Campanella's works, *Civitas Solis* was composed while its author was in jail. Indeed Campanella spent almost half of his seventy one years incarcerated on various charges. Born in Calabria in 1568, he became a member of the Dominicans at the age of fourteen and was first arrested in 1591.<sup>9</sup> He was imprisoned several times between 1593 and 1597, before his arrest for taking part in a conspiracy to cause a revolt in Calabria in 1599. He remained in prison for the next thirty years and was finally released in 1629. In 1634 he was suspected of taking part in another Calabrian conspiracy and fled to France, where he died five years later. *Civitas Solis* went through four editions during Campanella's lifetime.

Campanella wrote the original Italian version (*Citta del Sole*) in 1602/3, and this was revised in 1611. Between 1613 and 1614 Campanella produced a Latin edition which became the first version to be published<sup>10</sup> Campanella wrote a final revision in 1630, which was published shortly before his death in 1639. The story comprises a dialogue between a Genoese Mariner and a Master of the Knights Hospitaller. The mariner explains that, for some unspecified reason, he landed on the island of Taprobane<sup>11</sup> and is taken to Civitas Solis. The city is on the top of a hill and is built in a series of seven concentric ring walls. The walls serve defensive purposes, but also have the store of Solarian knowledge drawn upon them.<sup>12</sup> The Solarians are highly organised: they practice communism to combat sin, and engage in eugenics to help improve human nature. Finally, the

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<sup>9</sup> He was tried on charges of heresy but managed to escape punishment.

<sup>10</sup> This Latin version was published by Wilhelm Wense in 1623.

<sup>11</sup> Taprobane has been identified as Ceylon.

<sup>12</sup> See pp. 161-66..

Solarians are not practicing Christians, although their religion is very similar to Christianity and they have a knowledge of Jesus Christ.<sup>13</sup>

Individual interpretations of Campanella's utopia abound.<sup>14</sup> Some have identified a connection with twentieth-century communist regimes, others view it as inextricably linked to Campanella's other political works, most notably *Monarchy of the Messiah*.<sup>15</sup>

Campanella offered a defence of *Civitas Solis* in his *Quaestiones Politicae*, published in 1609, which consisted of four questions. The final question refers explicitly to the utopia<sup>16</sup> and sees Campanella begging for understanding and tolerance. He stresses that the Solarians had not yet received revelation and could not, therefore, be blamed for their more unusual practices. This was clearly meant to deflect criticisms over the more controversial aspects of the work, notably sexual practices and the programme of eugenics.

Bonanssea offers a more orthodox interpretation, based on Campanella's subsequent work. He concludes that the principles outlined in *Civitas Solis* are suitable for men blessed with reason alone but that many of them, especially the communism of the society, are also applicable to practicing Christians:

according to Campanella, community of goods is an ideal system for man, both in the order of grace and the order of nature.<sup>17</sup>

He sees Campanella's utopia in terms of early Christian groups and the proto-socialism found in the Acts of the Apostles. His interpretation stands in stark contrast to the Hermetic approach favoured by Yates and Walker.<sup>18</sup> For these

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<sup>13</sup> See pp. 73-75.

<sup>14</sup> Discussed in Bon. pp. 270-79, and p. 393, n. 56.

<sup>15</sup> Bon. p. 274. See also Held's introduction to *Chrs* p. 37.

<sup>16</sup> See Bon. or J. M. Headley 'On the Rearing of Heaven, the Machiavellianism of Tommaso Campanella' in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XLIX, (no. 3, 1988) pp. 387-404.

<sup>17</sup> Bon. (1969) p. 277.

<sup>18</sup> See pp. 198-202.

commentators, *Civitas Solis* was founded on the principles of Renaissance magic. Astrological knowledge permeates the society, and its leaders all engage in a variety of occult practices.<sup>19</sup> Bonansea unquestionably plays down any occult imagery in *Civitas Solis* and does his best to bring Campanella back into the fold of the Christian church.

What all of these interpretations ignore is the deeply metaphysical nature of Campanella's utopia. *Civitas Solis* owes far more to *Metaphysica* than to *Monarchy of the Messiah*. The Solarians believe in the same philosophy as Campanella, and their religion is based on his most important metaphysical principles, which even lie at the heart of the utopia's government.<sup>20</sup> *Civitas Solis* is, as this thesis will demonstrate, the political conception of Campanella's metaphysical perfection.

Andreae's life is to this day shrouded in mystery despite the fact that he composed a detailed autobiography. Occultists believe that he was responsible for the Rosicrucian manifestos while others argue that he was a thoroughly orthodox Lutheran pastor. His background lends weight to both theses. Andreae's grandfather, Jacob Andreae, was a leading member of the Formula of Concord and his father was an abbot at Koenigsberg until his death in 1601. Conversely, some commentators point out that Jacob was familiar with

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<sup>19</sup> See F. Yates *Giodarno Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965) and *The Rosicrucian Enlightenment* (London: Ark, 1982). A neat summary of her thesis can be found in her essay 'The Hermetic Tradition in Renaissance Science' in *Ideas and Ideals in the North European Enlightenment: Collected Essays, Volume III* (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984). Similar ideas are also found in the works of D. P. Walker, *Spiritual and Demonic Magic: from Ficino to Campanella* (London: Warburg Institute, 1958) and Hugh Trevor-Roper, 'The Paracelsian Movement' in *Renaissance Essays* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1985) and a number of other commentators. This interpretation forms the basis for discussion in Chapter 5.

<sup>20</sup> See pp. 73-79.

alchemy.<sup>21</sup> As an apocathory, Andreae's mother will have certainly been well versed in the iatro-chemical properties of alchemy. Andreae was educated at Tubingen from 1601 until 1607, when his sudden expulsion<sup>22</sup> gave rise to an enforced period of travelling. Probably his most important experience at this time was a visit to Geneva in 1611, which had a great influence on his religious and political views. He returned to Tubingen in 1612 and was ordained two years later. Andreae worked his way up through the church and was finally made abbot of Adelburg in 1654. He died the same year.

*Christianopolis* was published in 1619, the same year in which Andreae also produced another important tract, *Mythologia Christiana*. Unlike *Civitas Solis* the story is a monologue, telling the story of an unknown narrator. The narrator had set sail on a voyage after turning his back on a world riddled with "tyranny, sophistry and hypocrisy".<sup>23</sup> He is shipwrecked in the Antarctic zone and is washed up on the island of Caphar Salama.<sup>24</sup> From here he is taken to the city of Christianopolis, which was founded by a group of religious exiles. The city is home to four hundred people, and is economically self-sufficient. As in *Civitas Solis*, the community practices communism (although not to the same extent as the Solarians) and education is given the highest priority.

For Montgomery,<sup>25</sup> *Christianopolis* is the Lutheran utopia *par excellence*; a view shared by Held<sup>26</sup> (who also thinks of Andreae's trip to Calvinist Geneva

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<sup>21</sup> For example see Dickson, *The Tessera of Antilia Utopian Brotherhoods and Secret Societies in the Early Seventeenth Century*, Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, vol. 88, (Leiden: Brill, 1998).

<sup>22</sup> Evidence surrounding the expulsion is scant, but it appears to either have some connection to prostitutes, or to the spreading of licentious gossip over a member of staff.

<sup>23</sup> *Chrs* p. 142.

<sup>24</sup> Caphar Salama is named after the site of a battle in the apocryphal 1 Maccabees 7:31. Dickson (1998), p. 53, suggests that Andreae's use of the Arabic name is significant for the potentially occult roots of *Christianopolis*.

<sup>25</sup> J. W. Montgomery, *Cross and Crucible*, 2 vols., (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), I, p. 200.

in 1611 as a particularly deep influence) and Elizabeth Hansot.<sup>27</sup> More recently, Thompson has suggested that the work mirrors a Benedictine monastery.<sup>28</sup> Montgomery's interpretation rails against any attempt to involve Andreae in mystical activities, and he is particularly vitriolic with regard to Andreae's alleged Rosicrucianism.<sup>29</sup> In one sense he is quite correct: *Christianopolis* is not a specifically Rosicrucian utopia although it does contain some important allusions to occult practices. In other ways Montgomery is wide of the mark. He denies *any* similarities between Andreae and Campanella, for example, and as we will see this view is simply untenable.

Comenius led an eventful life that was often quite tragic. Born in 1592, his parents died when he was twelve. The next few years at school were traumatic, and had a profound influence on his future educational reforms. In particular Comenius hated the tedium of teaching methods and the brutality of teachers. He was ordained a Minister in the Bohemian Brethren in 1608 and married soon after.<sup>30</sup> In 1622 the Thirty Years War exacted a terrible price on Comenius when his wife and children were killed by invading troops and for the rest of his life Comenius travelled extensively. He visited England in 1641, France the following year and Sweden the year after that. Moving to Poland, he

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<sup>26</sup> *Chrs* p. 27.

<sup>27</sup> E. Hansot, *Perfection and Progress: Two Modes of Utopian Thought* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1974), chapter 5.

<sup>28</sup> Thompson *Christianopolis J V Andreae* (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999) p. 65.

<sup>29</sup> One third of the first volume of Montgomery (1973) is devoted to refuting these arguments. The Rosicrucians were the secret fraternity whose two principal manifestos, *Fama Fraternalis* and *Confessio Fraternalis*, appeared anonymously in 1614 and 1615 respectively. Andreae has long been suspected of being the author of these mysterious texts. These arguments are assessed on pp. 225-37.

<sup>30</sup> Gutek and Gutek, *Visting Utopian Communities, a guide to the Shakers, Moravians and Others* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998). The Guteks show that the Bohemian Brethren actually set up small-scale communities in the US (such as Old Salem in North Carolina) which they regard as utopian.

was ordained bishop in 1648 and spent the last thirteen years of his life in Amsterdam. He died in 1670.

Comenius wrote extensively, and his utopianism is often overlooked in the light of his vast output. Indeed, it is even occasionally denigrated by utopian commentators. The *Manuels*, for example, offer him a rather backhanded compliment:

One finds in his works insights of genius; practical educational plans of immediate applicability that reveal a knowledge of children and men, but also much sheer nonsense and a great utopian's jungle profusion of plans whose density would not be equalled again until the nineteenth-century.<sup>31</sup>

Certainly Comenius' utopian thought was slightly different from Campanella's and Andreae's. His most formally utopian work was *Labyrinth of the World and the Paradise of the Heart* (1623) but this showed the evils of seventeenth-century Europe rather than an imaginary perfect community. Yet in works such as *Via Lucis* (1641, published 1660) and *Panorthosia* (1657) Comenius offered his true utopian vision: the harmony of all mankind, perfected through a universal knowledge, as the fulfilment of human history. Thus Comenius demonstrated his appreciation of the form of utopian writing, before planning schemes that reflected a utopian content.

Comenius argued that man must actively seek the favour of his Creator and that throughout history, man has had to please God through his actions.<sup>32</sup> One of the most crucial ways of achieving this in Comenius' own era was to create pansophia, the universal knowledge, based on Scripture, sense and reason. Pansophia involves a synthesis of all previous knowledge under the banner of Christian truth. Comenius repeatedly expresses the sentiment that a universal

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<sup>31</sup> *Man and Man* (1979) p. 309.

and unified knowledge is the key to man's utopian dreams. It will unite all men, paving the way for a universal religious and political system. Comenius also describes his political ideas in more detail than is usually credited in individual surveys. He desires a harmonious system of assemblies, which will govern mankind across the world.<sup>33</sup>

Bacon's *New Atlantis* was published posthumously in 1628 and constitutes the single biggest piece of evidence in the case for his involvement in the pansophist movement. It was originally published alongside *Sylva Sylvarum*, which was to be the second part of the *Great Instauration*, indicating that it may well have been considered a serious addition to the project.<sup>34</sup> Debate over the date of its original composition is varied though it is now widely believed to have been written in the early 1620s.<sup>35</sup> It primarily offers an outline of Bacon's ideal scientific institution, the college of Saloman's House, which is certainly the most detailed feature in the narrative. More recently, however, there has been a growing awareness of Bacon's interest in the utopian form. Vickers, for example, has suggested:

Bacon was at least as much involved with the fable itself as with the ostensible philosophical function ... the voyage and utopic frame of *New Atlantis* is grossly disproportionate if we take its main purpose as being to introduce the description of Salomon's House.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Comenius' favourite example is Noah, see p. 141.

<sup>33</sup> See pp. 91-96.

<sup>34</sup> It has also been suggested that because *Sylva Sylvarum* was Bacon's most occult text then *New Atlantis* displays magical leanings. See Charles Webster *From Paracelsus to Newton Magic and the Making of Modern science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) p. 61.

<sup>35</sup> This places the work antecedent to both Campanella and Andreae. *Chrs* pp. 48-71, makes out the case that Bacon must have been aware of *Christianopolis* although he never admitted as such.

<sup>36</sup> Brian Vickers, ed., *Francis Bacon* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. xxiv.

This opinion is reinforced by Bacon's own attitude towards fiction. As Rossi<sup>37</sup> points out, in the *Advancement of Learning* Bacon discusses poesy, the category of learning that relates to the imagination. Unlike other areas, poesy is devoid of any deficiencies and is divided into three further categories: narrative, representative and allusive. The latter division relates to parables or allegories, and Bacon adopts various positions over its true nature. In the *Advancement of Learning* he is unsure as to the role of parables. They revealed some truths that were too complex to be understood by the average person, but they could also conceal hidden meanings. Bacon is hesitant over this esoteric role: "I do rather think that the fable was first and the exposition devised, than the moral was first and thereupon the fable framed."<sup>38</sup> Yet by 1609 he was composing his own allegorical expositions in his *Wisdom of the Ancients*. In the preface to this reinterpretation of ancient myths he expands upon this new position:

I find a conformity and connection with the thing signified so close and evident, that one cannot help believing such a signification to have been designed mediated from the first and purposefully shadowed out.<sup>39</sup>

Finally, in *De Augmentis* Bacon affirms his faith in the hidden knowledge of allegories: "for my own part I am inclined to think that a mystery is involved in no small number of them."<sup>40</sup> By the time he composed *New Atlantis*, then, Bacon seemed confident as to the veracity of imaginative works and placed his utopia in this context: a specific genre of fiction that could be used to convey important truths.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> *Collected Works* III p. 344. See Rossi, *Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science* trans. Rabinovich (London: Routledge, 1968).

<sup>38</sup> *Collected Works* III p. 355.

<sup>39</sup> *Collected Works* VI, pp. 695-96.

<sup>40</sup> *Collected Works* IV, p. 317.

<sup>41</sup> McKnight suggests that *New Atlantis* is: "a fable, which transmits secrets and mysteries of religion, politics and philosophy." See McKnight, "The Wisdom of the Ancients and Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis*" in Debus and Watson, eds., *Reading the Book of Nature the Other Side of the Scientific*

The story can be divided into specific components. It begins with a description of a doomed voyage from Peru that ends in severe hardships such as illness and starvation. After praying to God the stricken crew are delivered to an island named Bensalem, where they are attended to by a race of kindly Christians. The islanders have almost miraculous healing powers that are the result of assiduous experimentation. Their experiments are conducted by an elite band of scientists, who reside in the college of Saloman's House. The narrative explains the story of the Christianisation of the island, which is followed by a retelling of Plato's Atlantis myth. The sailors then hear about a Bensalem feast day (the *Feast of the Family*) before they gain access to the college itself. Once this section is finished the story comes to an abrupt end with the words "The rest was not perfected".

### iii. The Movement of Pansophist Knowledge

There is ample evidence to illustrate the extent to which the pansophists acknowledged each others' work, and we can trace the interplay of their ideas fairly easily. Two of the crucial figures here are Tobias Adami and Wilhelm Wense, who were both disciples of Campanella as well as close personal friends of Andreae. They were also to become members of *Societas Christiana*,<sup>42</sup> which Andreae attempted to found in 1620. *Societas Christiana* was to be formed from a group of Andreae's closest friends. It sought the reform of man through a

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*Revolution* (Missouri, Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1998) p. 97. Bacon included Plato's *Atlantis* and the Rosicrucian myths in his utopia and for a fuller discussion of Bacon's attitude towards myths see P. Rossi (1968), ch. 3.

<sup>42</sup> Details of its structure can be found in *A Modell of a Christian Society*, which along with *The Right Hand of Love Offered* was thought to be lost, and only rediscovered in the 1940's. For a

system of perfected knowledge. Wense first met Andreae around 1611 and introduced him to Adami about two years later.<sup>43</sup> These are the men who were responsible for bringing the works of Campanella to the wider attention of Europe. Andreae acknowledged this channel of influence at the funeral of Wense. At the funeral he delivered an oration, but curiously, when Andreae mentions *Societas Christiana* he renames it:

The society was called 'Civitas Solis' and the two of us had as our goal to unite ... a certain number of Germans who were orthodox in the Lutheran faith.<sup>44</sup>

It is not at all clear why Andreae did this. It is possible that he intended to highlight the connections between Campanella's utopia and his own plans for reform. It is equally likely that the name was used out of respect for Wense's own admiration for the Dominican. Dickson suggests that the name was used as a password (or 'tessera') for the various secret societies established by Andreae and Wense.<sup>45</sup> Whatever the case may be, it is clear that Andreae reveals his own debt to Wense in reference to Campanella's work.

Campanella's influence becomes more obvious when Andreae openly praises him in *Mythologia Christiana*. Campanella is described as "the great artist"<sup>46</sup> who has helped to battle tyranny, sophistry and hypocrisy,<sup>47</sup> the same three evils from which the narrator of *Christianopolis* was attempting to flee and which the *Societas Christiana* was set up to combat.<sup>48</sup> Also in 1619, Andreae translated six of Campanella's sonnets and again singled out the triumvirate of

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list of potential members of the *SC* see Montgomery (1973) I, p. 176. They are discussed throughout my thesis due to their intimate connection with *Christianopolis*.

<sup>43</sup> Andreae acknowledges this in his autobiography. See Montgomery (1973) I, p. 49, n. 115.

<sup>44</sup> Quoted in Montgomery (1973) I, p. 215.

<sup>45</sup> Dickson (1998).

<sup>46</sup> *Myth* 1/10.

<sup>47</sup> *Myth* 6/16.

<sup>48</sup> *Chrs* p. 142; *Modell* pp. 154-57.

evils for attack.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, Thompson suggests that the triadic formula is adopted as the structure for the government of Christianopolis, the structure of *Societas Christiana* as well as the basis for the mythical poem, *Christenberg*.<sup>50</sup>

Not everybody finds this evidence very striking. Montgomery is particularly suspicious of its possible implications:

it should be carefully noted that the above evidence demonstrates only that Andreae, in 1619, had a high appreciation for Campanella's poetry and for his stand against ignorance, self-love, and their attendant evils; it by no means allows the conclusion, presented by some writers, that Andreae early and uncritically absorbed the Dominican monk's utopian conceptions or his penchant for occultism and magic.<sup>51</sup>

Against such interpretations, Montgomery cites a letter written late in Andreae's life in which he expressed his "detestation" of Campanella's astrological beliefs.<sup>52</sup> Montgomery also states that instead of looking for philosophical go-betweens such as Wense and Adami, we must directly compare *Civitas Solis* and *Christianopolis*. He cites Held as an example of just such a comparison, which had shown that the two utopias were qualitatively different:

Held shows that the *Christianopolis* is a distinctively Protestant utopia, differing markedly from Campanella's ideal state which lacks such an outlook.<sup>53</sup>

But Held's analysis has some serious flaws.

Held presents his anti-Campanella thesis in the introduction to his admirable translation of *Christianopolis*.<sup>54</sup> His work is partly a response to those nineteenth-century commentators who had assumed a Solarian influence, and it

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<sup>49</sup> In *Geistliche Kurtzweil*. See Montgomery (1973) I, p. 49, n. 117.

<sup>50</sup> Thompson (1999) pp. 36-57.

<sup>51</sup> Montgomery (1973) p. 50, n. 117, challenges writers such as Peuckert and Arnold, who offer a pro-Rosicrucian interpretation of Andreae's work.

<sup>52</sup> In the same letter Andreae compares Campanella to Machiavelli and Nostradamus. See Montgomery (1973) I, p. 50, n. 117.

<sup>53</sup> Montgomery (1973) I, p. 50, n. 118.

<sup>54</sup> *Chrs* pp. 16-40.

is clear from the outset that Held thinks of Andreae's utopia as unique.<sup>55</sup> He cites three pieces of evidence to show that any similarities are purely accidental. First, the education system of Christianopolis was far more sophisticated than that of the Solarians: "It should be noted that in the *civitas* of Campanella the *observation* of the pictures *is* the education."<sup>56</sup> Held is simply incorrect here. The Solarians do not rely solely on their city walls for an education: children are trained from an early age in laboratories, workshops and classrooms.<sup>57</sup> His second argument relates to competing notions of the utopian family. Unlike Campanella, who presents a calculated system of eugenics and forced sexual activity, Andreae values the family: "the family is the unit of social life."<sup>58</sup> However, this contrasts with Andreae's own words regarding the upbringing of children in utopia:

When they have completed their sixth year, the parents give them over to the state, not without prayers or pious vows.<sup>59</sup>

Although Andreae does not advocate public meals or state-controlled breeding, he does not value the family for anything more than rudimentary child rearing. The state looks after education and welfare until adulthood. Families are not as important as Held suggests.

Held's final argument makes a mockery of Montgomery's support. He suggests that it is sheer coincidence that some elements of *Civitas Solis* and *Christianopolis* agree. Andreae did not receive his ideas from Campanella,

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<sup>55</sup> Held opposes writers such as Gussman, Sigwart and Mohl. For a full list of such theorists see *Chrs.* p. 26.

<sup>56</sup> *Chrs* p. 35. Held is referring here to the walls of the city, which depict all of man's knowledge of the world. For a fuller description see pp. 56-60.

<sup>57</sup> See p. 158. This contradicts Held's bold claim, *Chrs* p. 36: "the introduction of experimental investigation and inductive teaching in utopias, practically begins with Andreae."

<sup>58</sup> *Chrs* p. 38.

<sup>59</sup> *Chrs* p. 208.

because he had written them down before he had ever read the Dominicans work:

This will be evident from an inspection of the *Fama* and *Confessio*, which were in print respectively in 1614 and 1616, and the former of which was circulated in manuscript form as early as 1610.<sup>60</sup>

The *Fama* and *Confessio* were the same Rosicrucian manifestos from which Montgomery so vehemently distances Andreae. In short, Held's evidence relies on Andreae being the founding father of Rosicrucianism, which blatantly contradicts Montgomery's entire thesis. This is why we should be wary of the goodwill he shows towards Held:

Held's results should teach interpreters of Andreae a lesson: that the prime explanation of Andreae's ideas should be sought in his own central religious convictions, not in alleged "influences" upon him.<sup>61</sup>

Arguing from a quite different perspective, Dickson has suggested that the utopias of Andreae and Campanella should not be interlinked. This is because they both write from different occult traditions. Andreae was closely involved in the Rosicrucian movement, which cannot be derived from Campanella's beliefs:

Andreae's circle of friends before had paid tribute to the imprisoned visionary through their use of the name *Civitas Solis*, but they were by no means his followers.<sup>62</sup>

As we will see, however, Dickson misjudges the nature of the pansophists' involvement in magic.<sup>63</sup> There are much closer links between *Civitas Solis* and *Christianopolis* than any of these commentators give credit for, and my thesis will demonstrate these throughout.

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<sup>60</sup> *Chrs* p. 39.

<sup>61</sup> Montgomery (1973) I, p. 50, n. 118.

<sup>62</sup> Dickson (1998) p. 52.

<sup>63</sup> See pp. 230-37.

Comenius' acceptance of Campanella can also be traced through the influence of his followers. In his *Naturall Philosophie*, he explains that he had read Campanella "with incredible joy" and goes on to acknowledge its source:

And for the first we make three principles of Philosophy with *Campanella*, and his happy interpreter *Tobie Adams*, *Sense, Reason and Scripture*.<sup>64</sup>

Comenius borrows many elements from Campanella's philosophy, incorporating several prophetic passages into *The Labyrinth of the World* and *Panorthosia*,<sup>65</sup> as well as the principles of natural philosophy.

Comenius' friendship with Andreae is well documented. The two were close friends and corresponded for many decades. Cizevsky has suggested that much of the imagery found in *Labyrinth of the World* is taken from Andreae's *Mythologia* and *Peregrinus*:

It may be considered a demonstrated fact that the works of J V Andreae furnished the immediate stimulus for the composition of the *Labyrinth*.<sup>66</sup>

Elsewhere Comenius is more explicit, explaining that Andreae was the only man to have responded to his pleas for universal reform.<sup>67</sup> In fact he is given almost sole credit for providing the foundations for pansophia.<sup>68</sup> Andreae is singled out from among numerous contemporaries:

I here allude to men like Ratke, Lubin, Helwig, Ritter, Bodin, Glaum, Vogel, Wolfstim, and he who deserves to be placed before them all, Johann Valentin Andreae (who in his golden writings has laid bare the diseases not only of the church and the state, but also of the schools, and has pointed out the remedies).<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> *Nat Phil*/Preface.

<sup>65</sup> See pp. 249-52.

<sup>66</sup> D. Cizevsky 'Comenius' *Labyrinth of the World: its Themes and Their Sources* in *Harvard Slavic Studies* (Harvard University Press, 1953) p. 91. Andreae employs the labyrinth metaphor in *Mythologia* 4/15. See Cizevsky (1953) p. 96.

<sup>67</sup> *GD* Greeting to the Reader/14.

<sup>68</sup> Sadler *J A Comenius and the Concept of Universal Education* (1966) p. 95, quotes from a letter to Andreae in which Comenius thanks him for showing "almost the very elements of pansophic thought".

<sup>69</sup> *GD* Greeting to the Reader/10.

Comenius held Andreae in such high regard that he credited him with the preface of the *Great Didactic* even though the passage (entitled “The Use of the Art of Teaching”) was composed by none other than Comenius himself.<sup>70</sup> It is clear, then, that Comenius took much from our other two utopians.

If Bacon was in any way influenced by the pansophists, then he singularly failed to credit them. Whereas the three utopians readily acknowledged their influences (especially each other’s), Bacon did not. He never discussed Andreae or Comenius,<sup>71</sup> while Campanella was only once mentioned in an attack upon his natural philosophy.<sup>72</sup> To be fair, Comenius certainly acknowledged Bacon on numerous occasions. In his plans for a universal college, for example, Comenius cited him as a leading light in intellectual societies.<sup>73</sup> He also appropriated some of Bacon’s terminology, discussing the ‘idols’ that beset modern science.<sup>74</sup> Moreover, Comenius explicitly linked Bacon to the work of Campanella and Andreae:

“JOANNES VALENTINUS ANDREAE, a man of a nimble and cleare braine, as also CAMPANELLA, and LORD VERULAM, those famous restorers of philosophy.”<sup>75</sup>

This appears to be a fairly clear indication that Bacon was accepted as a member of the pansophist circle. We will see, however, that Comenius’ praise was not entirely fulsome, and he disagreed strongly over vital matters regarding knowledge and science.<sup>76</sup> In particular he disagreed with the role Bacon had

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<sup>70</sup> *GD* pp. 171-73. See also *GD* p. 462, n. 11.

<sup>71</sup> Admittedly this would be unlikely as Comenius wrote the vast majority of his works after Bacon’s death.

<sup>72</sup> *Collected Works*, V p. 132.

<sup>73</sup> *VL* 18/10.

<sup>74</sup> *Pan* 6/5. As Dobbie remarks, Comenius also accepts the three principles of causation (Efficient, Formal and Final) that Bacon adopted from Aristotle. See *Pan* 1/23.

<sup>75</sup> *Prod* p. 47. The preface to Comenius’ *Naturall Philosophie* is nothing other than a eulogy to Campanella and Bacon.

<sup>76</sup> See p. 194.

assigned to religion. But if Bacon is writing from the same tradition as his utopian counterparts, he is the least generous of any of them.

#### iv. The Utopian Heritage

The nature of the utopian influence was primarily that each writer identified an ideal society tradition whose origins were found in Thomas More. Although there were certainly additional influences<sup>77</sup> it is More that provides the common thread. This is especially important in the light of those commentators who question the originality of the whole utopian approach. Skinner, for example, argues that Thomas More's *Utopia* was itself far from novel. It was simply another Renaissance discussion on the good state and the best life for man:

More's text is sometimes approached as if he introduced a completely new topic into Renaissance political thought. But in fact the question of what constitutes the best state of a commonwealth was a common subject of debate throughout the Renaissance era.<sup>78</sup>

If utopia has no unique characteristics, the question as to *why* the pansophists created ideal societies loses much of its force. Their works would no longer constitute a distinct branch of political theory.

But it is evident that the pansophists *do* recognise utopia as a genre in its own right<sup>79</sup> and it was at the feet of Thomas More that the pansophists laid the

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<sup>77</sup> Campanella cited Doni in his *Quaestiones Politicae* whereas Andreae shows similarities to *Wolfaria*. See Thompson (1999) p. 28.

<sup>78</sup> Q. Skinner 'Sir Thomas More's *Utopia* and the Language of Renaissance Humanism', in *The Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe*, ed. A. Pagden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 125.

<sup>79</sup> Indeed, theorists well beyond the confines of the pansophist circles held a similar view. In his *Elements of Law*, for example, Hobbes writes:

But for an utmost end, in which the ancient philosophers have placed felicity, and have disputed much concerning the way thereto, there is no such thing in this world, nor way to it, more than to utopia.

origins of utopian thought. Campanella compared *Civitas Solis* to *Utopia* in his *Quaestiones Politicae*, and repeated his allegiance in the later *Monarchy of the Messiah*.<sup>80</sup> Andreae dedicated one of the dialogues from *Menippus* (1617) to a discussion on utopias<sup>81</sup> while in his own ideal society he makes his debt to Thomas More explicit. In the preface to *Christianopolis* he writes:

let me say, it is a public show, a thing which has not been said to the disadvantage of the famous Thomas More. As far as concerns my own work, it ought to be more easily laid aside as not being as serious or clever as his. I have written to my friends, since one can more easily joke with them.<sup>82</sup>

The use of the word “joke” opens up some potential difficulties here. The statement could be taken at face value: Andreae might simply see his utopia as a piece of fun. But this is cast into doubt by the subsequent tone of the work, and by the utopia’s obvious importance to *Societas Christiana*.<sup>83</sup> Yates argues that the term “joke” provides the shield behind which Andreae hides his Rosicrucianism.<sup>84</sup> I suggest it is more likely to be an ironic remark on More’s own work. *Utopia* is awash with comic references and these would not have been lost on Andreae. In extolling the seriousness of the work, Andreae is prolonging the joke. But this does not mean that *Christianopolis* is either a comedy or even particularly light-hearted.

Comenius comes to the same conclusions as to the origins of utopia, though his recognition of More is a little more circumspect. During Comenius’

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*Elements of Law*, ed. J. C. A. Gaskin, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 1/7/6. This shows that by 1640 utopian thought was already being identified and criticised as promoting unobtainable ideals.

<sup>80</sup> In this latter text he also acknowledges Doni, see J. Kelly-Gadol ‘Tommaso Campanella: The Agony of Political Theory in the Counter Reformation’, in *Philosophy and Humanism*, ed. E. P. Mahoney (Leiden: E J Brill, 1976) p. 180, n. 31.

<sup>81</sup> *Menippus* 69.

<sup>82</sup> *Chrs* p. 141.

<sup>83</sup> See p. 238.

<sup>84</sup> For a fuller discussion see pp. 238-40.

stay in England (in which he composed *Via Lucis*), his associate Samuel Hartlib produced a minor utopian tract entitled *A Description of the Kingdom of Macaria*.<sup>85</sup> This was clearly named after the neighbouring kingdom to utopia, which earned the praise of Raphael Hythloday.<sup>86</sup>

Even Bacon accepts More's role. Indeed, possibly the most telling indication of Bacon's utopian intent is that he followed the lead of Campanella and Andreae, in acknowledging the influence of Thomas More. A citizen of Bensalem explains to the shipwrecked crew that potential spouses can spy upon one another whilst bathing naked in "Adam and Eve" pools, which is preferable to the more coarse practices of the Utopians:

I have read in a book of one of your men, of a feigned Commonwealth, where the married couple are permitted, before they contract, to see one another naked.<sup>87</sup>

This clearly refers to the pre-wedding arrangements in *Utopia* and seems to be a sly joke from Bacon; a member of his own imaginary community pours scorn upon More's society for being a mere fiction, and a seemingly lewd one at that. Whether comical or not, it does show that Bacon recognised the utopian tradition and situated his own work within it.

The pansophists therefore clearly identified a utopian mode of thought, of which Thomas More was seen as the originator. Furthermore, they placed their own work within this tradition. What were the special qualities, then, that they brought to the genre?

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<sup>85</sup> *Samuel Hartlib and the Advancement of Learning*, ed. C. Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) pp. 79-90.

<sup>86</sup> Thomas More *Utopia I*, eds. G. Logan and R. M. Adams, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) pp. 34-35.

<sup>87</sup> *Collected Works III*, p. 154.

## v. Pillars of the Pansophist Utopia

Four of the five chapters in this thesis deal with an individual element of the pansophist utopia. First, it deals with politics. Unlike the ambiguous approach of Thomas More, the pansophists identified utopia as a truly perfect society, based upon the principles of unity and harmony. Accordingly, Campanella, Andreae and Comenius provide a political state that is fully constructed and complete. The politics of utopia allow man to be harmonised with the state, with his fellow man and ultimately with himself. Bacon provides no such theory of perfection. *New Atlantis* is incomplete and offers very little detail as to the political structure of Bensalem. Consequently Bacon differs structurally from the pansophist utopia.

The totality of the pansophist view of the state often incurs accusations of totalitarianism but Campanella, Andreae and Comenius offer a view of human nature that negates such interpretations. They see man as a perfectible creature and utopia the self-imposed mechanism for this development. Man can attain this lofty status because he has a metaphysically universal character containing elements of beast, angel and God. By exercising his full range of essences man can attain his perfection. In this way the pansophists attacked the Augustinian orthodoxy of original sin. Conversely, Bacon accepted the validity of original sin, and consequently has a quite different view of human nature, a different conception of the purposes of utopia, and a different understanding of the nature and role of knowledge.

The third and most famous element of the pansophist utopia is the promotion of knowledge. Pansophia literally means universal wisdom and it is

no surprise that learning was regarded as a key to man's perfectibility. Of primary importance was the syncretic nature of pansophist wisdom, seeking a unified truth through disparate traditions. This unity of truth provided the mechanism by which man can gain an understanding of his Creator, which was the goal of the pansophist utopia. Again Bacon denies such a synthesis of religion, secular knowledge and the political. He consistently distinguishes between science and religion, this demarcation being clearly visible in *New Atlantis*.

Finally, each of the four thinkers praised some form of magical or occult practices. *Civitas Solis*, for example, contains a very strong astrological influence. Andreae also accepts astrology and praises the Kabbalah. Comenius believes in, among other ideas, prophecy and numerology. The most important debate here, however, is whether or not any of the thinkers were involved in the Rosicrucian furore of the early seventeenth-century. Andreae in particular is regularly cited as a leading Rosicrucian, a claim which has been recently reasserted by Dickson. My thesis argues that the only real candidate for a Rosicrucian utopia is Bacon. His use of Rosicrucian imagery is another crucial difference between *New Atlantis* and the pansophist utopia.

The principal aim of this Introduction has been to show how the pansophist ideas spread from thinker to thinker. It has also insisted upon the coherence of their utopian vision. Campanella, Andreae and Comenius all thought of their work as utopian: they identified a utopian tradition within which they situated their own ideal societies. Their utopias, therefore, cannot be thought of merely as entertaining fictions, or as digressions among wider pansophist schemes. Utopia must be taken seriously as a genuine theoretical

construct with recognisable boundaries. Also, unlike Bacon, the pansophists give a central role to politics in orchestrating man's achievement of his utopian ideal. The remainder of this thesis shall simply show that the pansophist utopia rests on certain metaphysical assumptions.

My thesis thus helps to clarify the inaccuracies and inconsistencies prevalent in present interpretations. Most pansophist studies generally look individually at each thinker and his ideal society. Unfortunately, this approach tends to highlight the differences between the utopian visions. As a result, the coherence of the pansophist project is mistakenly called into question. More general views of the pansophists tend to be either restricted to one or two consistent utopian features, or else are so broad that no real model of the ideal society emerges.

Frances Yates is an example of the first interpretation. She argues that the pansophist utopias can be linked together by their use of Hermetic and Rosicrucian ideas, and that these can be traced back to the Renaissance. Marsilio Ficino, for example, translated Hermes and composed the magical text *De Vita*. Pico added the Kabbalah, and numerous other magical influences abound, including Agrippa, Paracelsus and Telesio. Yet although her work is undeniably challenging, Yates' thesis is limited: it relies on a narrow view of magical theory and overlooks other utopian concerns with politics, knowledge and the nature of man. She denies the broader implications of the acceptance of utopianism.

The Manuel . . . offer the second major discussion. As we have noted, they suggest that the pansophist circle was much wider than argued for in this study, encompassing a broad spectrum of thinkers. Pansophist thought, they

argue, involved a fairly loose collection of ideas. Despite a few common trends there was little to connect them. In other words, the Manuels play down the consistency of the pansophist utopia.<sup>88</sup>

There is another more general reason why this thesis is important. Despite an undoubted revival of interest in the last three decades, pansophia and utopia remain overlooked in surveys of philosophy and political theory. Although they are popular in themselves, they are seldom incorporated in wider studies. Apart from a brief discussion on Thomas More,<sup>89</sup> for example, no discussion of utopian thought can be found, in either *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy* or the more recent *The Cambridge History of Seventeenth Century Philosophy*.<sup>90</sup> Pansophia only merits one or two paragraphs in the latter, and of the individual thinkers only Campanella is subjected to any substantial discussion.<sup>91</sup> There are a few notable exceptions in works concerning the history of science, but these do not emphasise coherence of the pansophist utopia in anything more than a cursory way. I do not mean to imply that this amounts to purposeful neglect, but there is a genuine need to take utopian theory seriously. One way to begin this is to place ideal societies in their proper historical and intellectual context, which is a primary objective of my thesis.

I am conscious that my thesis is primarily a contribution to the study of utopian thought. Consequently I have wherever possible limited my argument to

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<sup>88</sup> See pp. 36-40.

<sup>89</sup> Quentin Skinner, in *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, eds. C. Schmitt *et al*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 447-52. This work will now be abbreviated to *CHORP*.

<sup>90</sup> *The Cambridge History of Seventeenth Century Philosophy*, eds. D. Garber and M. Ayres (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). This will now be abbreviated to *CHSP*.

<sup>91</sup> Campanella is discussed in terms of his contribution to occult philosophy in both books. Andreae is only mentioned in *CHSP* as being the son of a clergyman (p. 12) with absolutely no

the parameters established in previous surveys. By demonstrating the coherence of the pansophist utopia, I hope to show that it is possible to narrow down our conception of utopias into more specific groups. These groups are not based on mere surface similarities, nor on chronological proximity, but on an underlying philosophy that makes them unique.

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discussion of his life or work. Comenius warrants a few sentences based on his encyclopaedic tendencies (*CHORP*) p.803 or prophetic character (*CHSP*) p. 395.

## **Chapter I: Pansophism and Utopia**

The aim of this chapter is to investigate the relationship between pansophia and utopia more fully. In particular it will show how the assumptions behind the pansophist vision of universal knowledge were reflected in the conventions of their view of the ideal society. It will therefore expand upon the previous chapter in order to illustrate how the pansophists held a specific view of what a utopian society would look like. The chapter begins by addressing the nature and background of the pansophist project. It moves on to a discussion of utopian theory in general, focussing upon the difficulties surrounding definitions of the concept. Finally, it will look at how these two traditions collided and why the pansophists chose the utopian genre to express their ideas. I suggest that this choice reflected the need for universality and unity, which were integral to both pansophia and the utopian society.

### **1) The Pansophist Project**

Pansophia was literally the universal wisdom, the system that would perfect knowledge and elevate man to his full potential. Once pansophia had been achieved, man would effectively be returned to the position of pre-Fall bliss, and paradise would return to earth. Although previous thinkers had planned to discover ultimate truth through the unification of knowledge, the pansophist movement was very much born out of the problems of the seventeenth century. It was regarded as the key to healing the divisions of the Thirty Years War, the effects of which had been felt personally by many of the

pansophists. Andreae's library was destroyed in 1634, a fate which befell Comenius twice. More tragically, the Moravian's wife and children had been murdered by marauding troops in 1622, an event that greatly influenced his *Labyrinth of the World* written the following year. The pansophist project was profoundly religious; one of its goals was to remove the antagonisms established by the Reformation, and reunite Europe under one true Christianity. Finally it was also a reaction to the prevailing intellectual orthodoxy of the day, namely Aristotelianism. Each of the pansophists was opposed to the continuing educational supremacy of Aristotle, although some were less virulent than others were.

The systems of knowledge promoted by each thinker were not identical, but two themes run consistently throughout all of them: universality and unity. Pansophia was to cover all areas of knowledge and would be applicable to all men around the world. It would bring peace, harmony and stability to warring nations, and unite mankind in wisdom. Ultimately these dreams would prove unsuccessful, defeated by those who wished to keep science and religion separate.<sup>92</sup> But what of its origins? Where did the pansophists get their inspiration from, and how did their beliefs come to fruition?

### **i. Origins and Influences**

The word pansophia is most commonly associated with Comenius, who employed it frequently throughout his works. Comenius claimed that he appropriated the term from a rather obscure philosophical treatise by the Swiss

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<sup>92</sup> The Manuels refer to two competing traditions of seventeenth century knowledge as the "Two-Books" metaphor. See p. 195.

thinker Peter Laurenberg, entitled *Pansophia sive Paedia Philosophia*, published in 1633. Laurenberg's work disappointed Comenius as it only succeeded in revealing his peripatetic sympathies:

Rather than revealing any universal wisdom it described certain succinct abridgements of the Aristotelian philosophy.<sup>93</sup>

Comenius repeated this story in a short autobiographical tract published in the collection of works known as *Comenius in England*,<sup>94</sup> and the Manuels have asserted his claim as fact.<sup>95</sup> But it is not necessarily true, as Andreae had employed the term fifteen years before Laurenberg's work was published in his *Mythologia Christiana*.<sup>96</sup>

Despite the ambiguity of its origins, the word pansophia has been used generically to cover a number of thinkers, even if they did not employ the term themselves. Campanella, for example, did not refer to himself as a pansophist although it is clear that his vision of universal knowledge brings him into this fold. The Manuels offer a brief glimpse as to the extent and diversity of the pansophist circle:

Under the Pansophic canopy one could include the works of the Italians Bruno and Campanella, the Englishmen Francis Bacon and John Wilkins, the Rhinelanders Alsted, Besold and Andreae, the Moravian Comenius and the expatriate Comenians in London, Hartlib and Drury.<sup>97</sup>

Such a broad spectrum of intellectuals seems to be at odds with the Manuels' earlier assertion that the "Pansophic vision of the seventeenth century had a deep

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<sup>93</sup> *Dil* p. 64.

<sup>94</sup> *Comenius in England* ed. R. F. Young (London: OUP, 1932).

<sup>95</sup> Man & Man (1979) "Comenius, the major link in the chain, borrowed the term from a now forgotten book by Peter Laurenberg published in Rostock in 1633". p. 207.

<sup>96</sup> *Myth* 1/36.

<sup>97</sup> Man & Man (1979) p. 207

Germanic and Lutheran coloration”,<sup>98</sup> but it is certainly reasonable to suggest that the associates of the principal pansophists also qualify as members of the circle themselves. Adami and Wense, for example, both endorsed the universalist philosophical outlook as both Campanella and Andreae, as did the myriad members of Andreae’s various Christian Societies. Often these visions challenged one another over specific details<sup>99</sup> but they shared similar assumptions about the nature and purpose of knowledge. They also shared a common heritage.

A belief in the attainment of universal wisdom may hardly be seen as revolutionary: the quest for ultimate truth is as old as philosophy itself. Pansophia differs from these earlier systems in two respects. First it was, as we have seen, a direct reaction to the specific political and social problems of the time. Second, it embraced elements such as sensual knowledge and natural philosophy to a greater extent than before. Despite their originality, however, numerous precursors can usefully be identified.

The Manuels cite Ramon Lull (1232-1316) as a leading influence on the pansophist project. Lull was a philosopher and an occultist, although his mystical *De Audio Kabbalístico* is now widely regarded as a fifteenth century forgery. He was gravely concerned with the conversion of heathen nations (particularly the Jews) to Christianity, and was killed during the Crusades. His most famous works, *Ars Magna* and *Ars Generalis Universalis* were republished during the sixteenth century. For the Manuels these works allowed Lull to become:

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<sup>98</sup> Man & Man (1979) p. 14.

<sup>99</sup> The Manuels (1979) concede that “often their inner conflicts and intellectual contradictions must be left in the raw” p. 212.

posthumously recognised as an eminent forerunner in quest of a logic that would unify the sciences ... and an encyclopaedia that would illustrate the unity of the basic ideas in the diverse branches of knowledge.<sup>100</sup>

Lull's philosophy, coupled with his desire for a universal Christianity became a beacon to those trying to heal the wounds of seventeenth-century Europe.<sup>101</sup>

Commentators such as Menn believe that the pansophists were simply continuing the philosophical ideas and practices of the Renaissance:

While Renaissance philosophers had not succeeded in constructing a new philosophy immune to these objections, the philosophers of the seventeenth century continued to repeat the same criticisms of Aristotle and continued to be moved by the same religious and scientific concerns in working out their 'new philosophies'.<sup>102</sup>

During the Renaissance, philosophers were regularly concerned with all branches of human knowledge. As Schmitt argued: "the Renaissance thought of philosophy as a unity"<sup>103</sup>, and there are numerous examples of this approach. Blackwell identifies Poliziano's *Panepistemon* as an attempt to make a systematic universal knowledge:

Philosophy is then divided into three parts: speculative, which includes natural philosophy, metaphysics, psychology and four branches of mathematics (arithmetic, music, geometry, and the study of spheres, which in turn included astrology, optics and mechanics); actual, which included moral philosophy, economics and civic ethics; and finally rational, which included grammar, history, dialectic, rhetoric and politics.<sup>104</sup>

Two other pre-eminent Renaissance philosophers, who were both deeply concerned with universal knowledge, were Marsilio Ficino (1433-99) and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-94). Ficino's was one of the period's most

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<sup>100</sup> Man & Man (1979) p. 208.

<sup>101</sup> It may be noted, however, that direct acknowledgement of Lull is difficult to discern in the works of Campanella, Andreae or Comenius.

<sup>102</sup> Menn (1998) p. 67.

<sup>103</sup> C. Schmitt 'Towards a History of Renaissance Philosophy' in *Reappraisals in Renaissance Thought* (London, Variorum Reprints, 1989) p. 13.

influential thinkers.<sup>105</sup> As well as being a great philosopher in his own right, he trained as a doctor, was ordained priest in 1473, and his translations of Plato remained the standard Latin texts for many centuries. Under the patronage of Cosimo de Medici, Ficino founded the Florentine Academy.<sup>106</sup> In 1463, one year after founding the Academy, Ficino completed his translation of Hermes Trismegistus, which had been assigned to him by Cosimo. He went on to translate the entire Platonic corpus and offered numerous commentaries, the most famous of which, the *Symposium*, appeared in 1469. For the next five years he composed *Theologia Platonica* before turning to Plotinus and the Neoplatonists. The Plotinian translations were published in 1492, three years after Ficino had produced *De Vita Triplica*.<sup>107</sup> He died in 1499.

Pico was thirty years younger than Ficino but died five years before him. His brief life, coupled with the controversy surrounding his work, has given him a somewhat romanticised air.<sup>108</sup> In the winter of 1496, after an already turbulent career, Pico produced his notorious *nine hundred theses*, which were composed for a public disputation to be held in Rome in December of that year. They were

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<sup>104</sup> Blackwell 'Reflections in Histories of Renaissance Philosophy', *Bulletin for the Society of Renaissance Studies* 6 (no. 2, 1989) p. 17.

<sup>105</sup> There are several worthwhile studies of Ficino. The starting-point remains Kristeller's *The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino*, trans. V. Conant (Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1964). M. J. B. Allen's *The Platonism of Marsilio Ficino* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) and *Plato's Third Eye: Studies in Marsilio Ficino's Metaphysics and Its Sources*, Variorum Collected Studies Series, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1995) are also useful. N. A. Robb's *Neoplatonism in the Italian Renaissance* (New York: Octagon, 1968) provides an interesting overview of the general movement of ideas. Many passages in *CHORP* are also useful here.

<sup>106</sup> This famous institution was not an educational establishment, as we would understand it, but a rather informal collective under the general guidance of Ficino. The members of the Academy discussed philosophy, celebrated Plato's birthday and lived the contemplative life to the full. For an overview see A. Field, *Origins of the Platonic Academy of Florence* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988)

<sup>107</sup> Although ostensibly a medical tract, *De Vita* is renowned for its contribution to Renaissance magic and astrology. See pp. 203-06.

<sup>108</sup> A useful starting-point for Pico is Cassirer's 'Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: A Study in the History of Renaissance Ideas', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 3 (nos. 2 & 3, 1942). Craven's *Pico della Mirandola, Symbol of his Age* (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1981) is an invaluable revision of much of the work on Pico. Craven is extremely critical of practically all previous interpretations but he argues that his work does not go far enough.

the propositions that Pico believed would resolve all philosophical conflicts. Unfortunately for him, pope Innocent VIII seized them; seven were declared unorthodox and six more were classified dubious. Although Pico responded with his *Apologia* in the following year, the entire nine hundred propositions were banned.<sup>109</sup>

This led to a period of flight for Pico until he was finally granted permission to rest at Florence. He finally settled at the Academy in 1488 and became a firm friend of Ficino, whom he had met some years previously, although the two did not always agree.<sup>110</sup> Pico remained at the Academy until his death in 1494. His most celebrated work, *Oratio*, was meant to serve as the introduction to the *nine hundred theses*; a slightly revised version formed the majority of *Apologia*. In it, Pico claimed to have discovered concord between numerous disparate thinkers including Avicenna and Averroes, Aquinas and Scotus, the Kabbalah and Christianity.<sup>111</sup> In 1489 he composed *Heptaplus*, a commentary on the opening chapters of Genesis, which purported to explain the hidden mysteries of Creation that had eluded thirty-four separate thinkers.<sup>112</sup> Two other major works were published posthumously: *De Ente et Uno* (that sought to harmonise Plato and Aristotle) and the anti-astrological *Disputationes*.

Each of the pansophists acknowledged Ficino and Pico as influences. Campanella consistently expresses his admiration for Ficino throughout his *Metaphysica*,<sup>113</sup> and describes him as “The Florentine Canon, Great Theologian

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<sup>109</sup> For an overview see Craven (1981) ch. 3.

<sup>110</sup> See p. 208.

<sup>111</sup> *Oratio* 37.

<sup>112</sup> These include Ambrose, Origen, Bede and Albertus Magnus.

<sup>113</sup> *Met* III/ 15.

and Philosopher”.<sup>114</sup> His acceptance of Ficino’s astrological doctrines is well known and equally well documented. Andreae described Pico as one of the few thinkers “who investigate the wisdom of his Creator in His creatures and the construction of this so wonderful mechanism”.<sup>115</sup> Ficino was valued even more highly: Andreae placed him at the apex of philosophy in his *Compendium of Universal Knowledge*.<sup>116</sup> Comenius does not openly acknowledge Ficino or Pico, but several authors suggest that he was strongly influenced by traditional Neoplatonism, especially with regards to the more mystical nature of his philosophy. Sadler, for example, concludes:

this concept of mysticism ... came into Christianity through Plotinus’ interpretation of Plato in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century AD and Comenius was much influenced by it.<sup>117</sup>

Plotinus was of course, reintroduced into Europe by the same route that brought Plato, Hermes and many others. They all emerged from the pen of Marsilio Ficino. It is almost certain, therefore, that Comenius was equally as in debt to Ficino as his fellow pansophists were.<sup>118</sup>

The most important influence on the pansophists, however, would probably be St Thomas Aquinas. As the Manuels suggest:

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<sup>114</sup> Quoted in Walker (1958) pg. 221. This is taken from the unpublished work, *Apologia* (1629), in which Campanella justified many of the magical practices used in protecting pope Urban VIII. See pp. 218 of this thesis for an outline of this incident. But Campanella was not so fond of Pico, whose attack on astrology he found irritating.. See Walker (1958), Yates (1964, 1984), I will discuss this particular connection further on p. 225.

<sup>115</sup> *Menippus* 101. He also includes Reuchlin and Cardano in this list.

<sup>116</sup> See pp. 173-74.

<sup>117</sup> Sadler (1966) p. 41.

<sup>118</sup> Two other utopians are worth mentioning here. Thomas More was greatly influenced by Ficino’s translation of Plato’s *Republic*, and was so fond of Pico that he translated his biography into English. See *Life of Pico* in *The Complete Works of Thomas More* vol. 1, eds. A. S. G. Edwards, K. G. Rodgers and C. H. Miller (London: Yale University Press, 1997) Francis Bacon did not acknowledge either Ficino or Pico. His only reference to either of them was an indictment of Ficino’s medical practices in *De Vita*. See *Collected Works* V p. 307.

[pansophia] was characterized, particularly in Protestant lands, by the need to present a unified system of thought comparable to the formally approved synthesis of Aristotelianism and Thomist theology that had emerged at the Council of Trent.<sup>119</sup>

This synthesis was seen as failing because Aristotle was regarded as an empty, tautological system:

The Christian-scientific utopians of the time ... were unanimous in their rejection of dogmatic allegiance to scholastic Aristotelian philosophy, though there were different degrees of vehemence in their denial.<sup>120</sup>

Menn agrees that the pansophist project was a response to the dominance of scholasticism, and that this attitude was a continuation of Renaissance practices. As we have noted, the Renaissance witnessed an expansion of the range of philosophers open for discussion. The pre-eminence of Aristotle was challenged by the re-emergence of Plato, the Neoplatonists and others. The pansophists simply continued this tradition. In attempting to create a new synthesis the pansophists were responding to what they perceived to be the failure of the old.

As such they were one of several competing seventeenth-century intellectual groups who were all concerned with building a new science upon the foundations of Renaissance thought:

The philosophers of the seventeenth century took over their predecessors' criticisms of scholasticism, and they happily made use of the ancient materials which Renaissance scholarship had published and translated and digested; but they were not satisfied that any of the proposed 'new philosophies' had filled the intellectual vacuum, and they looked in other directions for the new philosophy their predecessors had taught them to expect.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> Man & Man (1979) p. 220. The Manuels accept that Catholics like Campanella suffered because of their opposition to Aristotle. My brackets.

<sup>120</sup> Man & Man (1979) p. 208.

<sup>121</sup> Menn, *CHSP*, (1998) p. 34. Menn insists that Renaissance Neoplatonism was itself only one of several intellectual orientations that were competing for dominance during the Renaissance. Pico originally studied at the University of Padua where he received a fairly traditional scholastic

Thus the pansophists took the principles of the Aristotelian/Thomist synthesis and expanded it to include a wider range of ideas, philosophies and the emerging scientific breakthroughs.

## ii. Elements of Pansophist Knowledge

The Manuels provide the most useful starting point for a discussion on the pansophist project. They suggest that, despite the apparent irrelevance of immediate influences, a number of “identical elements and shared ideals”<sup>122</sup> can be discerned among the pansophists. First, the pansophists all wished to extend the utopian vision of Thomas More from the fictional to the programmatic. Campanella moved away from *Civitas Solis* to his plans for a universal monarchy; Andreae founded a Christian society; and Comenius urged *Panorthosia*. The utopia was only a fictional device that afforded protection to revolutionary ideas: one could avoid charges of heresy or treason simply by offering them in narrative form.<sup>123</sup>

As a motivation, this seems eminently sensible, especially with the proliferation of secret societies and Rosicrucian ideas prevalent at the time. But it raises a number of issues. First, this fictional disguise came rather late for at least two of the Manuels’ constellation. Bruno was burned at the stake for heresy, while Campanella was already imprisoned when he composed *Civitas Solis*. Second, as the pansophists went on to outline their ideas in non-fictional programmes for reform, why did they bother with utopia in the first place?

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education. This influence remained with him, for Pico was far more receptive to Aristotle than Ficino and other associates were.

<sup>122</sup> Man & Man (1979) pp. 210-11.

<sup>123</sup> Man & Man (1979) p. 206.

Andreae admitted that *Christianopolis* inspired his *Societas Christiana*, so what purpose did his utopian disguise serve?

The Manuels also identify a shared heritage of millennialism and magic. Prophets such as Joachim of Fiore<sup>124</sup> held great sway over the pansophists, particularly Campanella, but the most important of these traditions by far was alchemy:

Philosophical alchemy translated into a Christian myth, was more readily assumed into the Pansophist orbit.<sup>125</sup>

Again this may be slightly overstated. As we will see, alchemy was of little concern to the utopias of Campanella, Andreae or Comenius in comparison with other mystical elements. *Chymical Wedding* aside, none of the utopians incorporated alchemical myths (Christian or otherwise) into their ideal societies. In their defence, the Manuels play down the importance of the occult tradition, but even so they perpetuate a misleading occult interpretation of alchemy.<sup>126</sup>

The pansophists were all deeply affected by the discoveries of their age, from the voyages to the New World that opened up the possibility of recapturing Eden, to the scientific breakthroughs that promised new wisdom. Finally there was a longing for the reunification of Europe under one religion. The two desires of pansophia were to increase knowledge and to benefit mankind.<sup>127</sup> Altogether the pansophists sought nothing less than the transformation of the international order: “it implied the total reordering of European society.”<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> Joachim of Fiore (c. 1135-1202) was probably the most influential millennialist of the Middle Ages.

<sup>125</sup> Man & Man (1979) p. 210.

<sup>126</sup> See chapter 5 for a full discussion.

<sup>127</sup> Man & Man (1979) p. 211.

### iii. Universality and Unity

This thesis argues that the pansophist transformation of Europe was to be achieved by the twin paths of universality and unity. Pansophist wisdom was to be universal most obviously in the sense that it would embrace *all* forms of knowledge: it was to move away from the rigidity of Aristotle and branch out into every area of learning. Pansophia would take the traditional tools of sense, reason and revelation and apply them to all sources of inquiry:

Perhaps a new method will discover everything we really are capable of knowing, collecting the true sources of knowledge – sensations, or pure rational intuitions, or scriptural revelation, or all three together – and systematising them into a new *pansophia*.<sup>129</sup>

Sense knowledge became especially important to the pansophists but more importantly, they would integrate all forms of knowledge: philosophy, natural philosophy, mathematics, magic, and so on. There was nothing that would remain unknown to man.

Pansophia was also to be universal in that it was applicable to all men, despite their nationality, religion or social standing. It would reunite Europe under one faith and restore man to his former glory. As such it was not an elitist road to redemption. The pansophists' optimism was reflected somewhat in the quest for universal languages that were prevalent throughout the seventeenth century. Numerous thinkers attempted to create a new language during this time, which could be used to bring the whole of mankind together. Comenius published his own universal language, *Panglottia*, in 1646 and was a crucial

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<sup>128</sup> Man & Man (1979) p. 211.

element in his utopian output to the necessity of language for the transformation of man.<sup>130</sup> Among others who attempted such a language were Mersenne, Wilkins and Leibniz.<sup>131</sup>

Of greatest importance, however, was that pansophia was to pave the way for a new universal Christianity, whose orthodoxy would forever shatter the scourge of sectarianism. In so doing, pansophia would ultimately lead man to knowledge of God Himself:

Even the pansophic utopias ... with their stress on science, were conceived, within a framework of Christian philosophy; science was the means both to a better knowledge of the God and to the creation of a truly Christian society.<sup>132</sup>

It was this crucial belief that united the religiously diverse pansophists: the Dominican Campanella, the Lutheran Andreae and Comenius, the Bishop of the Unity of Brethren. The universalisation of Christianity becomes an even more essential factor when looking at the pansophists' attitude towards utopia. These three envisaged a land without factionalism; their ideal societies were the embodiment of the new universal Christianity.

Inextricably linked to the principle of universality was the pansophist notion of unity. For the pansophists, unity was the means by which man achieved perfection. God created the universe as a unity, and the more man could replicate this, the closer to God he became. Knowledge could only be

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<sup>129</sup> Menn (1998) p. 46. Menn is insistent, however, that the three categories of sense, reason and revelation were not unique to the pansophists, but were commonly used by most seventeenth century thinkers.

<sup>130</sup> *Panglottia* was translated into English and published in 1660. A reproduction is now available, ed. A. M. O. Dobbie (Shipston-on-Stour: Peter Drinkwater, 1989).

<sup>131</sup> For a list of the thinkers that attempted to create a universal language see Mungello in *CHSP* (1998) p. 93. For a full discussion see M. M. Slaughter *Universal Languages and Scientific Taxonomy in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) ch. 5.

<sup>132</sup> Kumar (1987) p. 20. See also the Manuels (1979) p. 214.

Knowledge of God held the foremost place in the pansophist hierarchy ... and there is nothing to confirm a supposition that this was merely a politic position maintained out of fear of religious persecution.

universal once it had been unified, which involved bringing various branches of learning together. The three paths of sense, reason and revelation were to be fused to provide a direct route to the truth.

The emphasis on unity explains the necessity of pansophist syncretism. Each thinker sought to bring disparate philosophical and religious traditions into the fold of true Christianity. Campanella illustrates this by depicting numerous ancient thinkers on the outermost wall of *Civitas Solis*. Andreae makes his syncretic attitude explicit in his description of the role of philosophy in his *Societas Christiana*. Comenius sees the unification of philosophy as an important step on the road to religious toleration<sup>133</sup> but for the pansophists, once wisdom had been unified into truth, it could be disseminated throughout the world:

The Pansophists also sought to restore Eden by a combination of piety and knowledge.

They aimed at a Christian synthesis of all forms of truth.<sup>134</sup>

Pansophia was to unite science and religion, ultimately bringing man to a full knowledge of God. It was this set of goals that attracted the pansophists to the utopian genre. Before we understand why this was so, it is necessary to investigate some of the ways in which the ideal society has been approached.

## 2) Discovering Utopia

Defining utopia is without doubt the central problem facing any study of ideal society thought. The sheer range of potentially utopian works makes it

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It was no longer acceptable to rely solely on faith and prayer. Science must seek God in nature and man.

<sup>133</sup> See pp. 179-84.

unlikely that any broad agreement over meaning will ever be attained. Many commentators are opposed even to the pursuit of a definition. Not only is the quest for meaning overwhelming, but it may also be ultimately self-defeating:

It would be an ambitious, and perhaps a self-contradictory, task to trace the boundaries of the modern study of utopia. Indeed, one of the most obvious features of utopia, as it has been understood in the twentieth century, is that it does not constitute an accepted field of study, divided and traversed by well-established disciplinary boundaries.<sup>135</sup>

Yet such an approach seems intuitively flawed: how can we successfully discuss a concept we cannot properly identify? This section will assess various ways in which the problem of definition has been faced, concentrating primarily upon two approaches: the *formal* and *functional*. The formal approach looks at the structure of utopia in relation to other forms of ideal society<sup>136</sup> whereas the functional approach asks what a utopia is trying to achieve: is it critical, satirical, political or simple fantasy?<sup>137</sup> It will then go on to concentrate upon the political nature of utopian thought, to see how it can be regarded as a distinct political theory. First it will illustrate some of the difficulties that arise from a rejection of definition.

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<sup>134</sup> Thomas, 'The Utopian Influence in Seventeenth Century England' in Baker-Smith and Barfoot, eds. *Between Dream and Nature: Essays on Utopia and Dystopia* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1987) p. 34.

<sup>135</sup> Bann (1998) p. 1.

<sup>136</sup> Millennium is the most common counterpoint in this definition, though by no means exclusive.

<sup>137</sup> I must stress that although these two definitions cover many commentators' works, several other approaches exist. The formal and functional definitions are, however, the most usual and once these have been developed we may begin to situate the pansophists in ideal society thought.

## i. Rejecting Meaning

The immediate problem confronting any definition of utopia is that the very word is cloaked in ambiguity. Does it refer to the *eu*-topian good place or the impossibility of discovering the nowhere of *ou*-topia? Thomas More's original work offers no fundamental distinction between the two<sup>138</sup> and the open-ended nature of the word makes definition extremely difficult. As Hansott suggests:

Any attempt to confine the variety and complexity of utopias within one definition is an invitation to failure.<sup>139</sup>

Subsequently many commentators argue that the only sensible option for any discussion of utopia is to keep its meaning as flexible as possible.

Kumar adopts precisely this tactic. He suggests that we can only investigate utopias individually so that we may comment more generally on the development of the genre over time:

As so often with concepts in the human sciences, it seems best not to insist on some 'essentialist' definition of utopia but to let a definition emerge: by use and context shall we know our utopias.<sup>140</sup>

The most any student of ideal societies can do is to group certain works together in order to assess their "family resemblances".<sup>141</sup> Kumar argues that one area that can be studied successfully is that of influences. He believes that we may ascertain the traditions that have helped shaped modern utopias, citing the

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A useful overview can be found in Donnelly *Patterns of Order and Utopia* (London: Macmillan, 1998).

<sup>138</sup>See pp. 65-69.

<sup>139</sup>Hansott (1974) p.2.

<sup>140</sup>Kumar (1987) p. 26.

<sup>141</sup>Kumar (1987) p. 26.

Judaeo/Christian tradition and Classical Greek sources as the most important of these.

The Manuels also accept that the word utopia “became laden with meanings as it moved through time.”<sup>142</sup> As a result they forego any strong definition, choosing instead to adopt what they call a “fluid identity”.<sup>143</sup> As with Kumar, they recognise Christian and classical sources as the foundation for utopian thought, although they also insist that it is not an exclusively Western tradition.<sup>144</sup> The Manuels place different utopias into “constellations”, groups that share a chronological and intellectual proximity. Constellations allow the student of ideal societies to:

identify historical constellations of utopias with reasonably well-marked time-space perimeters and common elements that are striking enough to permit framing generalisations, while still respecting the concreteness of the individual experience.<sup>145</sup>

By grouping utopias together into historical categories (pansophia, enlightenment) the Manuels chart the development of the meaning of utopia from Thomas More onwards.<sup>146</sup>

Avoiding a basic definition may be sensible for anthologies of utopian works, but it encourages potentially serious criticisms. Most obviously, the lack of definition makes any choice of particular utopias difficult to justify. If we cannot identify what utopia is, how can any given survey include some works and exclude others?

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<sup>142</sup> Man & Man (1979) p. 4.

<sup>143</sup> Man & Man (1979) p. 5.

<sup>144</sup> “Neither pictorial nor discursive philosophical-religious utopias are exclusive to the Western world. Taoism, Theravada Buddhism and Medieval Muslim philosophy are impregnated with utopian elements. There are treatises on ideal states and stories about imaginary heavens of delight among the Chinese, the Japanese, the Hindus and the Arabs.” Man & Man (1979) p. 1. This position contradicts Kumar, who believes that utopia is overwhelmingly the property of the West.

<sup>145</sup> Man & Man (1979) p. 13.

Davis criticises the Manuels for this very reason. He argues that the idea of constellations is itself too ambiguous to be of any real use:

At what level are connections being made between these rather slippery semantic constructs and specific utopias? And what type of influence are we discussing? Is it the details, the fashionable finish, that is conditioned by the intellectual climate or is it the essence of the utopian structure that is influenced so that each intellectual movement of European history recasts the shape of utopia?<sup>147</sup>

For Davis, the shadowy nature of the Manuels' constellations leads to some glaring omissions: the section on the Enlightenment for example, excludes any discussion of the Scottish Enlightenment, for no apparent reason.<sup>148</sup> Furthermore the Manuels claim that any thinker who created constitutions should be thought of as utopian whilst ignoring such crucial figures as Machiavelli, whose *Discourses* seem to place him within this tradition.<sup>149</sup>

A lack of substantive definition gives rise to two further problems. First, one can reach a situation whereby practically all thought becomes in some way utopian: anybody who envisages the slightest improvement to man and society could conceivably be mapping the eutopian good place. So many thinkers are offered up as utopian that it is often difficult to identify any further common threads that run throughout their thought. Keith Thomas, for example, attempts to distinguish various forms of utopianism in seventeenth century England. He begins by separating utopia from millennium (which we will approach in more

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<sup>146</sup> The Manuels do discuss pre-More utopias, but the vast majority of their work is concerned with those who followed More.

<sup>147</sup> J. C. Davis 'The History of Utopia: the Chronology of Nowhere' in *Utopias*, ed. Alexander and Gill (London, 1984) p. 5.

<sup>148</sup> Davis (1984) p. 6.

<sup>149</sup> Davis (1984) p. 6.

detail shortly) and proceeds to identify eight different types of utopian thought.<sup>150</sup>

First there is the traditional picture-book vision of the ideal land, which writers such as Bacon used to introduce practical scientific ideas into the community.<sup>151</sup> Second, Thomas identifies the non-fictional utopias of Winstanley and to a lesser extent Hobbes.<sup>152</sup> Closely connected to this group are the constitutional utopias of groups such as the Levellers, as well as the communities established by the Diggers. Then there were those who promoted ideal colonies and also thinkers who reflected upon England's mythical past (for example, the myth of Saxon life before the Norman yoke). There was also a prevalence of secret societies (such as the Rosicrucians) that developed ideas as to how society could be improved upon.<sup>153</sup> Finally, Thomas singles out a group of thinkers whom he labels "visionaries", men who are best represented by the scientists that Swift mercilessly satirised on the flying island of Laputa.

These categories are not, of course, mutually exclusive. Winstanley's *Law of Freedom*, for example, often cited the myth of Anglo-Saxon England in justification of its ideas for a new society. Thomas also accepts that many of these utopias were heavily influenced by millennialism.<sup>154</sup> What is more striking, however, is the sheer range of thinkers (or groups) that can conceivably be called utopian. Thomas attempts to do so by outlining some common themes, which include the removal of social evils and "the attainment of peace and

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<sup>150</sup> Thomas (1987) pp. 24-30.

<sup>151</sup> Thomas also includes the works of Burton and Gott in this category.

<sup>152</sup> As we have seen earlier, Hobbes clearly had an understanding of the term utopia, although he was scathing in his assessment of the genre.

<sup>153</sup> We will look more closely at the Rosicrucian brotherhood in Chapter 5.

<sup>154</sup> Again Winstanley comes under this category, as Thomas himself acknowledges.

harmony between men”.<sup>155</sup> But these are extremely broad goals, and one must ask whether such generalisations truly constitute a deliberate commitment to utopianism?

Thomas’ approach leads us to the second, and potentially more harmful, criticism of many utopian studies. If we keep the definition of utopia deliberately vague, then the justification for inclusion or exclusion may become purely arbitrary. This is a charge levelled at the Manuels<sup>156</sup> but it also applies to numerous other discussions. One example will suffice here.

Sington and Sington’s *Paradise Dreamed*<sup>157</sup> is a survey of a variety of supposedly utopian works. The Singtons begin their study by identifying how difficult it is to reach an acceptable definition of utopia. They propose three general themes: the ahistorical nature of utopia, its conformist approach to individuals, and its generally comprehensive system of laws. The principal criterion for inclusion, however, is neither of these. The Singtons concentrate instead on “those utopias that have had the greatest impact on the modern world”,<sup>158</sup> without any further definition of what constitutes an “impact”. This elicits a number of questions. What is an impact? Can it be quantified or measured in any way? Who does a utopia impact upon? Because answers are not forthcoming, the reader is left to wonder how and why the Singtons’ selection of utopian works has been made.

More curious still is the appendix to the book entitled “A Gallery of Utopians”, which includes Campanella and Bacon, but excludes Andreae and Comenius. It also classifies such diverse figures as Kellogg and Cadbury as

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<sup>155</sup> Thomas (1987) pp. 37-8.

<sup>156</sup> See Davis (1984) p. 6.

<sup>157</sup> Pamela Neville-Sington and David Sington, *Paradise Dreamed: How Utopian Thinkers Have Changed the Modern World*, (London: Bloomsbury, 1993).

utopians, which suggests that the authors do not fully subscribe to their original three defining criteria. They also omit to mention Isaac Newton, despite having dedicated a chapter to his ideas earlier in the book. The net result is that the Singtons' study is, at best, rather confusing to the reader.

It is clear, then, that omitting a definition throws up as many problems as it seeks to avoid. Thus we can begin to investigate some of the ways in which meaning has been sought.

## **ii. Formal and Functional Definitions**

Formal definitions identify utopia as one element of a wider genre that can be defined by comparison with other types of ideal society. Accordingly, utopias are afforded a more fixed system of rules and conventions than in the interpretations we just already discussed. The most common formal distinction is between utopia and millennium, and there are a variety of competing explanations for this. First, utopias are seen as man-made constructs, unlike millennium, which relies on an external or otherworldly force.<sup>159</sup> Traditionally, the millennium was seen in terms of God's actions towards the earth: the day of judgement, the Second Coming of Christ, or even the rise of Antichrist. A broader view suggests that this external force need not be religious: environmental disaster, war, revolution or even the crowning of a new king are all possibilities.<sup>160</sup> The important point is that mankind and the world is

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<sup>158</sup> Sington and Sington p. xii.

<sup>159</sup> See for example Thomas (1987) p. 23, or Russell *Touring Utopia* (New York: Dial Press, 1932) p 53.

<sup>160</sup> To avoid its strongly Christian connotations, the word millennium could perhaps be superseded another term. Apocalypse, while still somewhat religious, could be one of alternative.

transformed by a power outside of man's immediate control. Whereas utopia is within man's own grasp he is powerless to prevent the millennium.

Another view separates utopia and millennium on the basis of space and time respectively.<sup>161</sup> Millennial society is the culmination of the path of history: it is an idealisation of the future life. Utopia, on the other hand, exists outside of temporal boundaries: it "exists in a timeless state of unchanging equilibrium".<sup>162</sup> Millennialists are thus overwhelmingly concerned with the earth-changing event; rather what the new society/world order will look like. Utopia, because it is concerned with place rather than time, is far more detailed; it shows exactly how society will be run with all its necessary institutions and rules. Utopias are complex systems of social order<sup>163</sup> whereas millennium offers a far more vague vision of bliss.<sup>164</sup> The difference in detail is, for Harrison, crucial. It shows that utopians are interested in solutions whereas millennialists are happy to simply identify what these problems are, rather than do anything about them. Millennium offers an understanding of the world, but utopia provides a remedy.<sup>165</sup>

Hansott agrees with the space/time distinction and applies it to competing notions of utopia and progress. She suggests that utopias were seen as timeless entities until the Enlightenment, when ideas of progress began to filter into the ideal society.<sup>166</sup> This is a useful notion, primarily because the boundaries of time

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<sup>161</sup> For example, see Harrison 'Utopia and Millennium' in Alexander and Gill, eds. *Utopias* (London: Duckworth, 1984) pp. 61-68.

<sup>162</sup> Thomas (1987) p. 24.

<sup>163</sup> See Donnelly (1998) for a discussion on the role of order within utopian societies.

<sup>164</sup> In this sense one could call a theorist such as Marx a millennialist. He viewed history as a linear progression through various epochs. He identified an apocalyptic event in the proletarian revolution, and claimed that this would be followed by a period of harmony and happiness. Crucially, Marx never specifies what he thinks the future communist society will look like, leaving it to be shaped by man's own consciousness.

<sup>165</sup> Harrison, (1984) p. 63.

<sup>166</sup> See Hansott (1974) pp. 9-10.

and space are very often blurred in utopian literature. It is not always easy to label one writer utopian and another millennial. One need only think of the great utopias of the late nineteenth century, (for example, Bellamy's *Looking Backwards*, Morris' *News From Nowhere*) which all describe distinct places but are also set in the future. In this way time and space are reunited: "utopia and futurology are siblings, even if their methods differ."<sup>167</sup> It is also apparent that many of the earlier utopians, the pansophists included, integrated millennial prophecies into their works. Webster has shown how millennial prophecy influenced a broad range of seventeenth century thinkers.<sup>168</sup> Bacon and Comenius both incorporated Biblical prophecy, notably the book of Daniel, into their reforms of knowledge. Indeed, this is why they were so popular with English Puritans.<sup>169</sup> Campanella was also deeply eschatological, and this was a further influence on Comenius.<sup>170</sup> But at the same time, they also offered extremely detailed pictures of the ideal society, which places them firmly in the utopian camp. The differences between utopia and millennium are interesting, therefore, but they are not as clear-cut as some commentators may think. There is always the potential for overlap.

J C Davis offers a more complex typology, which springs from his criticisms of the Manuels and others. He suggests that utopia is one of five different species of ideal society thought along with Cokaygne, Arcadia, millennium and the perfect moral commonwealth. He makes these

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<sup>167</sup> A. Morrison, 'Uses of Utopia', in Alexander and Gill, eds. (1984) p. 148.

<sup>168</sup> Webster *The Great Instauration Science, Medicine and Reform 1626-60* (London: Duckworth, 1975).

<sup>169</sup> Webster (1975) p. 22 "Although neither Bacon nor Comenius is customarily regarded as sympathising with the millenarian position, it was entirely legitimate for the Puritans to draw attention to this aspect of their philosophies." For a discussion on the relevance of Daniel see Webster (1975) pp. 22-27.

<sup>170</sup> See pp. 251-52.

classifications on the basis of each society's attitude towards the universal problems found in any political society:

If politics is about the distribution of opportunities, rewards and satisfactions, the setting of norms of human behaviour and policing the abnormal, then ideal societies are, in a sense, all about the end of politics. But the terminus is arrived at in different ways and those differences are instructive.<sup>171</sup>

The land of Cokaygne is the ultimate in wish-fulfilment fantasies, dating back to the folk traditions of the Middle Ages. Cokaygne is a place where all men experience total material satisfaction:

A world of instant gratification, of wishing trees, fountains of youth, rivers of wine, self-roasting birds, sexually promiscuous and ever available partners.<sup>172</sup>

Here the misery of poverty is replaced with the joy of excess; the solution to the problem of distribution is simply natural super-abundance.

Arcadia also promotes natural abundance as the means to the ideal society, but it relies on man's restraint in order to work successfully. It is a pastoral ideal in which nature is bountiful without reaching saturation point; man must exercise moderation in order to live in harmony with his environment.<sup>173</sup>

The perfect moral commonwealth is a somewhat different entity. It assumes that man may be made good, to such an extent that the problems of distribution are passed over: "if we were all good then all would be well".<sup>174</sup> Davis cites Kant as a leading proponent of this view, his philosophy posited a model of man who was so individually perfect that political problems become irrelevant.<sup>175</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> Davis (1984) p. 9.

<sup>172</sup> Davis (1984) p. 8.

<sup>173</sup> For this reason Lukes, who accepts Davis' typology, identifies Marx as a predominantly Arcadian thinker. See *Marxism and Morality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) pp. 39-41.

<sup>174</sup> Davis (1984) p. 9.

<sup>175</sup> J. C. Davis *Utopia and the Ideal Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) p. 528, or (1984) p. 8: "Kant's society betokens final adherence to this ideal society type."

For his description of millennium, Davis follows many of the conventions we have just outlined. Millennialists look for an external source of earthly perfection, and are more concerned with the conditions leading up to the millennium rather than the state of the world after its arrival. Again he suggests that they are usually, but not always, orientated towards religion. Utopian societies, on the other hand, are extremely detailed because they are generally man-made. Unlike the perfect moral commonwealth, however, utopia sees man as intrinsically corrupt and therefore he cannot be perfected in any way. Society must instead be designed to curb the worst of his excesses. This necessitates the detail of utopian society: every possible measure must be taken to nullify mans' sinful nature.<sup>176</sup>

Davis' five ideal societies thus all share the same ideas as to the problems of politics, but are markedly different in their attempts at reaching a solution. They disagree as to the most basic of assumptions: is man corrupt or can he be perfected? Can man design an ideal society or is he powerless to do so? Each society idealises a different element:

Arcadia and Cokaygne idealise nature. The perfect moral commonwealth idealises man. The millennium envisages an external power capable of transforming nature. The utopian idealises not man nor nature but organisation.<sup>177</sup>

Utopia can thus be recognised by its attention to detail, its attitude towards mans' limitations and the rigidity of its structure.

Not everybody finds this typology entirely satisfying. Baker-Smith suggests that Davis' "attempt is stimulating rather than successful".<sup>178</sup> In particular, he rejects the separation of utopia and millennium. Although he

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<sup>176</sup> The debate over human nature is extremely important for the pansophists, and forms the basis for Chapter 3 of this present discussion.

<sup>177</sup> Davis (1984) p. 9.

agrees that the categories are not the same, but that they are not mutually exclusive. Utopias can be descriptions of post-millennial society and as we have seen are often set in the future. As we find with Comenius, the utopia may also be the final stage in history *before* the millennial event.

There are also difficulties with Davis' idea of the perfect moral commonwealth, which Baker-Smith labels "too banal to merit a separate category".<sup>179</sup> Although this judgement may be rather harsh, one can understand that the perfect moral commonwealth does not sit easily alongside the other categories. If the major problem tackled by the ideal society is, as Davis asserts, one of distribution then the perfect moral commonwealth seems to ignore this central goal. As Davis admits, in the perfect moral commonwealth distribution is simply not an issue, thus bypassing the very criteria by which his definition is established. Therefore either the perfect moral commonwealth should be removed from the typology or else the defining standard of utopia should be changed.

Despite these various difficulties, the notion of a formal definition of utopia remains a useful one. Anything that narrows the potentially vast scope of utopian works, even though it may be flawed, deserves to be taken seriously. The formal definition provides conventions by which we can recognise utopia, as well as distinguishing between various forms of the ideal society. It shows that utopia is a distinct form of ideal society, with its own parameters and regulations. None of the definitions are perfect, nor do they apply universally to all utopian texts, but they do provoke a clearer idea as to what utopian society looks like.

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<sup>178</sup> Dominic Baker-Smith 'Introduction' in Baker Smith and Barfoot, eds. (198) p.7.

<sup>179</sup> Dominic Baker-Smith (1987) p.7.

This is especially useful when used in conjunction with the functional approach to utopia.

The functional interpretation looks at what utopia is trying to achieve. It views utopianism primarily as a specific branch of political philosophy, and compares it to other theories such as social contract.

Finley argues that we cannot make firm definitions but that we *can* establish distinctions between various utopian works.<sup>180</sup> He suggests that although utopia has qualities of fantasy, it can be distinguished from pure fantasy because of its perspective of social commentary. Utopias are critical of current society, which is why many of them have apparently negative qualities such as a lack of individual freedom.<sup>181</sup> Strict social controls are the only way to defeat the problems faced in our present society.

Goodwin and Taylor<sup>182</sup> adopt the formal distinction of space and time to establish the functional definitions of several types of political theory. They identify utopia as one of six branches of political theory that idealise place and time. In the first of these theories, the past may be invoked to criticise the present (as in the Christian tradition of the Fall).<sup>183</sup> In contrast, social contract theorists such as Locke invoke the past to justify the present. A tactic favoured by satirists is to offer a purely critical theory that inverts the present in order to condemn it.<sup>184</sup> Dystopias justify the present by invoking an horrific future. Philosophers such as Rawls idealise the present in order to justify it. Utopias are

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<sup>180</sup> Finley *The Use and Abuse of History* (London: Penguin, 1990) p. 178. He advocates a "narrowing of the field" to give us a degree of clarity.

<sup>181</sup> Finley (1990) p. 179.

<sup>182</sup> Barbara Goodwin and Keith Taylor, *The Politics of Utopia* (London: Hutchinson, 1982) pp. 22-27.

<sup>183</sup> They cite Augustine, who outlined a vision of Eden, and Rousseau whose idealisation of the state of nature was strongly critical towards what he saw as the corruption within his own society. See Goodwin and Taylor (1983) pp. 22-23.

similar in that they present an idealised present in order to criticise current social problems. The utopian offers a scheme that is both critical and constructive. He: “constructs criticisms of the present via an ideal alternative (future or present)”.<sup>185</sup> This duality of criticism and construction provides dynamism between the utopia and the reader, allowing the reader to make a conceptual leap into a wholly novel world. The immediacy of the perfect world makes it progressive: we are forced to reflect upon our own society.

The formal definition of utopia allows a contrast with other ideal societies, whereas the functional perspective shows what the utopia is trying to achieve. The most important conclusion that we can draw from these two distinctions is that utopia can be identified from other fantasy societies because of its political nature.

### **iii. The State of Utopia**

Several commentators identify politics as the key attribute of utopian thought. It is this political dimension that, for Negley and Patrick, separates utopia from fantasy.<sup>186</sup> They argue that utopian societies can be recognised primarily through their adherence to politics. Whereas other ideal societies engage in wish-fulfilment fantasies, utopia builds up a picture of how desires can be satisfied via laws and other social controls. Utopia thus extends beyond mere fantasy: it provides a distinct political system by which man can attain his best life. Davis agrees with this argument: “Utopia is thus political in a fuller sense

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<sup>184</sup> Goodwin and Taylor (1983) p. 25, The links between utopia and satire are explored more fully by Elliott, who concludes that the two are “indivisible”.

<sup>185</sup> Goodwin and Taylor (1983) p. 25.

<sup>186</sup> Glen Robert Negley and J. Max Patrick, *The Quest for Utopia* (New York: Schumann, 1952) pp. 3-4.

than the other ideal society types".<sup>187</sup> A utopia must be fictional, describe social cohesion and illustrate the political institutions necessary for this to be successful. Tudor and Sorel both distinguish utopian thought from mere myth:

Utopias are programmes for reform. They can be discussed 'like any social Constitution', and they can be refuted 'by showing that the economic system upon which they have been made to rest is incompatible with the necessary conditions of modern production'. Myths are, in all these respects, quite different.<sup>188</sup>

Although political structure is seen as crucial, there are differing conceptions as to what a utopian politics looks like.

It is commonly asserted that utopia requires a static state system. We have already approached the work of Davis, who again suggests that utopia is, strictly speaking, the most political form of ideal society. Its strict codes of law and other social controls create a totalitarian regime:

Such systems are inevitably bureaucratic, institutional, legal and educational, artificial and organisational.<sup>189</sup>

Bureaucratic strength is necessary because utopian man is, for Davis, naturally flawed and cannot overcome his inherently corrupt nature. It is also vital in preventing change. If one assumes that a utopia pictures a perfect society (even if it may appear otherwise to our modern perspective), then it cannot logically be altered in any way. Developments within the perfect society will inevitably be for the worse, which is why "the dynamic utopia is a myth".<sup>190</sup>

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<sup>187</sup> Davis (1984) p. 10.

<sup>188</sup> H. Tudor, *Political Myth* (London: Pall Mall, 1972) p. 15, or Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, (New York: Collier Press, 1961).

<sup>189</sup> Davis (1984) p. 9.

<sup>190</sup> Davis (1984) p. 10.

Dahrendorf<sup>191</sup> agrees, identifying five pillars of the utopian state. First. It is an ahistorical construct; utopias are created instantly with a state system that exists fully constructed and complete. It is also a uniform society whose citizens are in agreement as to the benefits of its social organisation. In this respect social contract theories, with their stress on agreement and conciliation, share a utopian element. Similarly all social activities are designed to maintain the existing status quo. Controls through reproduction, education and law seem severe, but are only elements of system management. The arrival of a stranger or the actions of a nonconformist creates narrative tension. This also provides an inner dynamism, bringing the values of utopia into question. Finally, utopia exists in isolation. Travel is limited within its walls and very few travellers ever reach the perfect world; this limits outsiders who may bring a potentially unsettling influence. Together these are the characteristics that help forge the utopian identity:

All utopias from Plato's *Republic* to George Orwell ... have one element in common; they are all societies from which change is absent.<sup>192</sup>

A utopia is also generally a community in isolation, cut off from the rest of the world and completely self-sufficient. Progress is excluded from utopia; stability is seen as the key to the society's success, because it does not need to be improved upon. Utopia is a vision of the good life, and in this sense it is an end in itself, but the rules and regulations of utopia demonstrate the exact means by which this end is maintained.

Defining utopia, then, entails a number of considerations. First, a utopia has to have formal boundaries. Instead of just offering a vaguely optimistic plan

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<sup>191</sup> R. Dahrendorf, 'Out of Utopia' in *Essays on the Theory of Society* (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1968) pp. 107-11.

for future reform, it should present a picture of the ideal society in action. It must secondly fulfil the functional criteria of presenting both critique and constructive theories. Finally, it will be political. It will show the governmental, legal and economic requirements necessary to maintain and run the ideal society. I suggest that the pansophist utopias fit all of these requirements.

### 3) Pansophia and Utopia

Our understanding of these different definitions of ideal society thought helps to clarify our understanding of the pansophist utopia. Yet recent discussions have again eschewed any substantive definition. Dickson's thesis discusses the utopianism of Andreae and Comenius in some detail. Indeed his book is subtitled *Utopian Brotherhoods and Secret Societies of the Early Seventeenth Century*. Dickson's only definitional requirements, however, is that utopia must have a practical (and often revolutionary) motivation.<sup>193</sup> Thus he cites both Rosicrucian manifestos, *A Model of a Christian Society* and *The Right Hand of Christian Love Offered* as instances of Andreae's utopian canon. He also suggests that Comenius' *Labyrinth of the World* is a clearly utopian text.<sup>194</sup> Dickson fails to take into account that only *Christianopolis* has any formal utopian claims (as Andreae himself recognised) or that *Labyrinth of the World* is a deeply pessimistic work that offers no practical solutions to the world's ills. We need to be more careful with our definitions.

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<sup>192</sup> Dahrendorf (1968) p. 110.

<sup>193</sup> Dickson (1998) p. 4. He also endorses Thomas' typology that we discussed on pp. 43-44 of this chapter.

<sup>194</sup> Dickson (1998) pp. 3-4.

Campanella, Andreae and Comenius all display elements of both formal and functional approaches to utopia. By acknowledging a specific genre of writing, the pansophists placed their work within a certain set of conventions. They depicted detailed, self-contained visions of an established political society in a way that other pansophists did not. This is why only these three thinkers qualify for inclusion in this study.

### **i. Refining Utopia**

By insisting on a tighter definition than is usual, we can omit Bruno and Alibis from the utopian fold. Although they certainly both offered optimistic world-views of a peaceful and harmonious earth, neither of them provided a formal picture of their utopian idyll. Perhaps more importantly, their works did not produce the political mechanisms needed to carry out their reforms. Even the Manuels, who we must remember bracketed these thinkers together, accept these premises. About Bruno they concede:

Bruno's reform was of a universal psychic character, and the mechanics of enclosed utopias in the Morean manner did not much concern him...[Bruno] did not commit himself to a specific social or political order. He never wrote a *Civitas Solis* or *New Atlantis*.<sup>195</sup>

The Manuels offer a similar assessment of Leibniz: "Leibniz never composed a 'proper utopia' in the Morean manner."<sup>196</sup>

One potential problem may surface here. Exactly which writings of Comenius' do we classify as utopian? The most obvious candidate is *The Labyrinth of the World and the Paradise of the Heart*, which may be regarded as

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<sup>195</sup> Man & Man (1979) p. 233.

formally utopian. Here Comenius offers a picture of society designed as a self-enclosed entity; it is both detailed and highly descriptive, showing the world as a city in which all aspects of life are visible.<sup>197</sup> Apart from this formal structure, however, *The Labyrinth of the World* is clearly non-utopian: it offers a pessimistic view of man that stands in contradiction to Comenius' later works. Indeed the work is critical in all respects. The institution of marriage is a sham; knowledge and education are beset on all sides with petty squabbles; work is both destructive and demeaning to man. In short, the entire world is littered with vanity, depravity and vice. Comenius fails to present any constructive alternative to this society. Quite the opposite, he suggests that the only escape is inward contemplation and love of Christ. Hence the 'paradise of the heart'.<sup>198</sup>

*The Labyrinth of the World* therefore shows neither the no-place nor the good-place; it is not a utopia in this sense. The work is best read as an allegory explaining the horrific state of Europe in the 1620s. This is not to say that the work has no serious intent; its critical tone is an obvious spur for the later reforms. From the ashes of the *Labyrinth of the World* rises Comenius' utopian vision of *Panorthosia*.<sup>199</sup>

*Panorthosia* is both the name given to Comenius' dream for a universal reformation and the title of a book whose theme is closely paralleled by his earlier work, *Via Lucis*. *Panorthosia* will create the perfect society so that the age of Christ's kingdom will finally be ushered in. For it to take place other foundations must first be laid down. *Pansophia* and *pampaedia* are to be installed throughout the world, backed up by the universal language of

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<sup>196</sup> *Man & Man* p. 392.

<sup>197</sup> Yates (1982) p. 161, suggests that it is in the tradition of memory systems found in Campanella and beyond. It is unclear, however, exactly what one is to remember from the text.

<sup>198</sup> See pp. 134-37.

*Panglottia*. Comenius was so serious about this language, which he identified as the new apostolic gift of tongues, that he composed it himself though to little lasting effect.<sup>200</sup> Following these, *Panorthosia* will return the world to basic principles of universality, simplicity and agreement.<sup>201</sup> It will be universal as it covers all mankind and relates to all human affairs. Simplicity will be founded in the three components of human understanding: sense, reason and revelation. Agreement will be a natural product of universal reform as all conflicts will instantly be resolved. It will be man's highest achievement.

*Panorthosia* covers three broad areas. Universal reform also requires a new universal Christianity, with its own structures and rules<sup>202</sup> while accepting the need for religious toleration. Finally *Panorthosia* requires a universal political system.

The three pansophists in this study accepted the formal constraints of the utopian construct and they also qualify as utopian in the functional sense. Their works are simultaneously both critical and constructive. The pansophist utopia contained implicit attacks on seventeenth century Europe, while also providing an immediate alternative for the reader to consider. More importantly, utopia embodies the same essential values of the pansophist project. They are both universal in their outlook, they are both ends in themselves and they both promote unity.

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<sup>199</sup> See also Cizevsky (1953).

<sup>200</sup> There are chapters on *Panglottia* in both *Pan* and *V L* but for the fullest exposition see *Panglottia* trans. A. M. O. Dobbie (1989). It was originally composed around 1660 and reflects a common aspiration of the time. Many, including members of the Royal Society, actively sought such a universal language. For an overview see M. M. Slaughter (1982) ch. 5.

## ii. The Pansophists as Utopians

Pansophist and utopian thinking collide in a number of ways. On the most basic level, utopia allowed Campanella, Andreae and Comenius to depict their pansophist principles in a working environment. Thus universal knowledge is built into the very fabric of utopia, whether it is in the walls of *Civitas Solis*, the college of *Christianopolis* or in the bedrock of *panorthosia*.

More importantly, utopia embodied the pansophist belief in universalism. Utopian society is already formed and fully functional: it reveals a society in which divisions are already removed and conflict has been conquered. Campanella, Andreae and Comenius adopted the utopian genre to show how man can live as one by adhering to a few simple rules. They do not have to relate to specific peoples, nationalities or religions: their vision took man as a human being, shorn of any unnecessary or enforced identity.

The universalism of the pansophia utopia is perhaps best illustrated by the example of religion. The most obvious source of conflict between Campanella, Andreae and Comenius lay in the religious orientations of each man. In utopia, however, any conflict is strenuously avoided.

Campanella circumvents this problem by making his Solarians practice religion in accordance with natural law.<sup>203</sup> He consciously followed the lead of Thomas More in the respect that his islanders had not yet received revelation. But this does not mean that the Solarians rejected Christianity. As we will see, their religious beliefs mirrored Campanella's own, and in this way he avoids

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<sup>201</sup> *Pan* 2/18. Universality, simplicity and agreement are Comenius' watchwords throughout his various projects, notably *pansophia* and *pampaedia*.

<sup>202</sup> *Pan* 13, 18.

<sup>203</sup> *CS* p. 34, 61.

sectarianism while allowing the pansophist vision of universal Christianity to be exposed.

Andreae's utopia may, on the face of it, seem to embody the Lutheranism of its author. Commentators such as Montgomery and Hansott insist that it is a testimony to Andreae's orthodoxy.<sup>204</sup> They point out that the citizens of Christianopolis acknowledge only two sacraments and that upon studying the creed of city, the narrator remarks, "I saw nothing foreign to our so-called Augsburg confession".<sup>205</sup> But though the narrator finds several points of agreement between his own faith and that of Christianopolis, Andreae is keen to point out that there is no set religion in the city. Despite similarities, his utopians are *not* nominally Lutheran:

Moreover they avoid the names of sects, especially, nor do they at all willingly pronounce them; and though they love to hear the name Luther yet they strive first of all to be Christians.<sup>206</sup>

This is an important passage. Andreae is showing that Christianity goes beyond any specific denomination: it is the preserve of the truly righteous. The founders of the island of Bensalem were religious exiles, and it is apparent that they will greet any fellow Christian so long as he is sincere, devout and honest. In creating a utopia, Andreae could show this true Christianity in action, without recourse to any discussion on the conversion of non-believers. Despite his devotion to the unity of Brethren, Comenius also consistently called for a true purified Christianity.

The pansophist utopia also reflected the unity beneath this universalism. As we will see, the pansophists regarded their ideal societies as truly perfect:

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<sup>204</sup> Again Held suggests that Andreae is more in line with Calvinist Geneva.

<sup>205</sup> *Chrs* p. 232.

<sup>206</sup> *Chrs* p. 246.

there is no ambiguity as to whether the pansophists promoted a vision of utopia. The pansophist utopia was perfect because it is the fully unified political system that reflected God's own unity, effectively proposing a heaven on earth. Every aspect of society - economics, religion, political - was part of an integrated whole, which put man in perfect harmony with his surroundings

Finally, both utopia and pansophia were ends in themselves. They were non-progressive. Nothing could be added to pansophia because it was the ultimate system of knowledge, which is the principal reason why so many opposed it during the seventeenth century. Proponents of the new experimental science were forward looking and progressive; the pansophists were attempting to take man *back* to his former greatness. Once pansophia had been reached, then man could not improve his earthly life any further.<sup>207</sup> Any subsequent change would only come from God.

In the same way, utopia could not be internally developed any further. All laws and regulations were designed to prevent change from occurring in the society. Progress is discouraged because utopia is the ultimate community. It illustrates just how society can be maintained along the proper lines indefinitely: how pansophist principles can provide lasting peace and stability. Utopia provides the stable system that would result in man attaining his earthly goals. It was the bridge between his temporal and spiritual self.

## Conclusion

The Manuels have suggested that one of the principle reasons why the pansophists adopted the utopian genre was because they were working in a climate of fear. They composed fictional societies in order to divert the reader from the more controversial aspects of their work. In the face of widespread suspicion:

Men try to invent myths or metaphors that delimit jurisdictions, prevent factions and encroachments, and ensure mutual forbearance.<sup>208</sup>

But as this chapter has shown the connections between pansophia and utopia run much deeper than this. Utopia was not simply a mask to hide behind: it was a political philosophy that embodied the very essence of the quest for universal knowledge. It showed the possibility of man existing in harmony, and explained the mechanisms by which his transformation could be made. The state was the vehicle by which pansophist ideas could be achieved, leading man to his true destiny. It attacked the Medieval view that church was superior to state. For the pansophists it was all one unified system that allowed man to pursue the good life.

The remainder of this thesis will go on to demonstrate in more detail how the two are symbiotic, beginning with the assumptions behind the nature of utopian man.

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<sup>207</sup> Kumar (1987) p. 36 makes a similar point in direct reference to Campanella: “*all scientific knowledge is supposed to be represented there, for all time: there will be no new discoveries, no new inventions.*”

<sup>208</sup> Man and Man (1979) p. 206.

## Chapter II: The Politics of Pansophia

Utopia is the political theory of pansophism, enshrining the twin values of unity and universalism. This chapter begins by assessing the utopian heritage of Thomas More, before moving on to the pansophist view of utopian perfection. Unlike *Utopia*, which is riddled with ambiguity, the pansophists all conceived of their ideal societies as perfect entities. Moreover, they each offered a specific view of perfection based upon unity, harmony and totality. The analysis moves on to focus upon this model of the state, especially those elements of social control (for example law, religion, economics) that place limits on the development and growth of utopian society.<sup>209</sup> Finally the chapter contrasts the pansophist utopia with Bacon's *New Atlantis*, and will show that despite outward appearances, his work does not exhibit these same values. *New Atlantis* is incomplete and lacks any firm political structure. By making such a comparison we can appreciate the political coherence of the pansophist utopia.

### **1) More's Perfect World?**

The pansophists all cited Thomas More as the inspiration for their own utopias. Yet there is one potentially crucial difference regarding the nature of their ideal societies: the pansophists definitely believed that their utopias were perfect.

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<sup>209</sup> These are the features that persuade many modern commentators that utopianism necessarily involves a totalitarian state, although this charge is somewhat unfair. See previous chapter for a fuller discussion. I respond to these allegations throughout this chapter and also in Chapter 3.

The question therefore arises as to whether or not More shares the same attitude towards perfection as Campanella, Andreae and Comenius? Was *Utopia* a perfect world after all, or was this a pansophist innovation?

The one certainty in addressing Thomas More is that it is impossible to make any firm conclusions as to his true intentions. Many millions of words have already been spent over this problem and a rich variety of interpretations have been put forward. Commentators such as Hexter and Skinner, for example, suggest that More genuinely believed in his utopian vision of the perfect society.<sup>210</sup> Others reject this thesis, arguing that More clearly disagrees with the utopian society, to such an extent that his eponymous character distances himself from Hythloday in the closing sentences of the book.<sup>211</sup> Logan and Adams make a strong case that the work is simply ambiguous:

an “expert in nonsense” condemns Europe and praises Noplace, and his views - many of which are clearly not nonsense - are reported by a character who bears the author’s name, and who does not always approve of them.”<sup>212</sup>

As the truth is so difficult to ascertain, it is my intention here simply to illustrate the minefield of contradictions and controversies surrounding the work. But one thing is certain: one cannot unequivocally conclude that More offers us a portrait of perfection.

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<sup>210</sup> Q. Skinner (1987). See also J. H. Hexter, *More's 'Utopia': the Biography of an Idea* (New York, 1952).

<sup>211</sup> For example see B. Bradshaw, ‘More on Utopia’, *The Historical Journal* XXIV (no. 1, 1981).

<sup>212</sup> G. M. Logan and R. M. Adams in their introduction to *Utopia*, (1989) p. xxi. Logan offers a fuller exposition of these ideas in his *The Meaning of More's Utopia* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983). It may be argued that this question has been overanalyzed. Claeys suggests: “Much ink has been spilt on how serious Thomas More, for example, was in this regard.” *Utopias of the British Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p. ix.

Difficulties of interpretation surround the very structure of the book. It is partly factual, beginning with a diplomatic trip to Antwerp that More had actually undertaken in 1515 and citing genuine historical records as evidence of Hythloday's voyages with Vespucci. *Utopia* is divided into two books, and its dual composition further compounds its obscurity. The dialogue between Hythloday and More in *Book I* outlines two main themes. First it asks whether a man of learning should join the King's Council, and second it offers a damning critique of England's legal and judicial systems. The first argument can be extrapolated out to the ancient debate of the merits of the active and contemplative lives, whilst the second takes into account the burgeoning use of enclosures and identifies poverty as the root cause of crime.<sup>213</sup> *Book II* is, broadly speaking, a monologue and contains the more famous depiction of Utopian society.

How are these two books related? *Book II* does not resolve the opening debate, for the Utopians praise both the active and contemplative lives. Both the nobility of work and the virtue of learning are consistently promoted. Furthermore, whilst *Utopia's* communism may well be a genuine response to the problems of crime, strict laws and social controls are still exercised within its perimeter. Although poverty may have been eradicated in Utopia, the problem of errant human behaviour does not seem to have disappeared. The identification of the two main characters, More and Hythloday,<sup>214</sup> adds to the problem and the constant Latin and Greek puns

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<sup>213</sup> *Utopia I* pp. 15-17.

<sup>214</sup> As has been noted, Bradshaw (1981) sees the character of More as most accurately portraying his beliefs. More the lawyer and pragmatist distances himself from his own creation. Bradshaw bases this on passages such as "I freely confess that in the Utopian commonwealth there are many features that in our own societies I would like rather than expect to see." *Utopia II* pg. 111. But as Skinner

muddy the waters still further. Hythloday is, of course, the “speaker of nonsense”, while the neighbouring tribe of Polylerites, despite their sensible and humane approach to crime and punishment, are the “People of Much Nonsense”. Utopia’s glorious capital Amaurot is actually “made dark” and its main river, the Anyder, translates as “waterless”.

Nothing could be more ambiguous than the very title of the work, and More seems to have actively encouraged this. In his private correspondence with Erasmus he refers to the island by the Latin *Nusquam*, denoting its status as a ‘no-place’ (or *ou-topia*).<sup>215</sup> Yet an anonymous poem, printed in many early editions, clearly identifies the island as the ‘good-place’ of *eu-topia*. This second interpretation is further endorsed by the full title of More’s work: *Concerning the Best State of a Commonwealth and the New Island of Utopia*. Noticeably this title does not, however, specify that the best state of a commonwealth *is* Utopia. More’s correspondence with Peter Giles continues his labyrinthine wordplay:

And so if I had merely given such names to the ruler, the river, the city and the island as would indicate to the knowing reader that the island was nowhere, the city a phantom, the river waterless and the prince without a people, that would have made the point ... if the veracity of a historian had not actually required me to do so, I am not so stupid as to have

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points out (1987) p. 157, this is not an outright rejection of the values in Utopia. It simply expresses pessimism as to their practical application. He suggests that both Hythloday and More present elements of the author’s true opinions. Logan and Adams present a similar thesis. More the character reflects More the practical man whereas Hythloday mirrors his visionary genius. For Kristeller, ‘Thomas More as a Renaissance Humanist’, *Moreana* 17, (no. 65, 1980) p. 10. Hythloday is undoubtedly More’s true voice. His dismissal of Councilors explains why More himself did not join the court until many years after *Utopia* was written.

<sup>215</sup> See Kristeller (1980) p. 10.

preferred those barbarous and meaningless names of Utopia, Anyder, Amaurot and Ademos.<sup>216</sup>

In the same letter he also claims to have news as to the whereabouts of Hythloday and therefore it seems that More is keeping up his pretence to a friend who was a character in the book and surely in on the joke. His smokescreen is a deliberate construct on his own part, which has rendered subsequent debates as to the true meaning of *Utopia* almost impossible. All we can safely claim is that the book is purposefully enigmatic and therefore we cannot make claims that it truly presents the perfect society.

## 2) Campanella's Political Metaphysics

Campanella discusses the importance of politics in various works, and a recent estimation suggests that forty per cent of his surviving output deals with political themes.<sup>217</sup> He was given the title "The second Machiavel" by an early English translator and wrote extensively on the infamous author of *The Prince*.<sup>218</sup> Among other schemes, Campanella promoted a universal monarchy under the rule of the Spanish Hapsburgs and reasserted the rights of the papacy over secular authorities:

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<sup>216</sup> More 'Letter to Giles' published in *Utopia* (1989) p. 113.

<sup>217</sup> Copenhaver makes this claim in his introduction to passages from *Mon*, p. 46.

<sup>218</sup> Campanella was given this title by Edmund Chilmead in his 1651 translation of *The Spanish Monarchy*. For a discussion on Campanella's attitudes towards Machiavelli see J. M. Headley (1988).

[that] the kingdom of the Messiah is one and that it has one head, the lordship of all things temporal and spiritual, and that all the titles of lords, whether by choice or election or succession or purchase or just war, derive from the pope as vicar of Christ our God.<sup>219</sup>

He condemned as tautological the idea that princely power derives from the populace, and cited Aquinas in his defence.<sup>220</sup> Democracy is nothing without God, and the gospel is the only law.<sup>221</sup>

Next to these pronouncements, *Civitas Solis* is an entirely different kind of political theory, one that is far more deeply grounded in metaphysics, especially when dealing with the concepts of harmony and perfection.

Campanella sees perfection in terms of unity and self-sufficiency. This is evident not only in *Civitas Solis* but also throughout his philosophical works, and is most clearly evinced in the doctrine of *primalities*. The primalities are the basis for perfection and are represented in Campanella's utopia in two ways: through the Solarian religion and more importantly in the government of the state itself. For this reason, *Civitas Solis* is the perfect state: unified, completed and self-sufficient. It is a total state system, in which there is a successful fusion of politics and philosophy.

#### **i. Perfection and the Primalities**

First we must address Campanella's ideas on perfection, which can be found in his doctrine of primalities. The primalities are the essential components of Campanella's philosophy. They are the three metaphysical co-principles of being,

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<sup>219</sup> *Mon* (1997) p. 48.

<sup>220</sup> *Mon* (1997) p. 49.

comprising *potentia* (power), *sapientia* (wisdom) and *amor* (love or will).<sup>222</sup> Their relationship is, as Campanella admits, extremely difficult to understand. They are all one and the same, in that they all share fully in each other's essence. Yet they are simultaneously distinct, differentiated by their hierarchical reliance on one another. *Potentia* produces *sapientia*, together they produce *amor* but this is only possible because they already exist in one another. Campanella employs two technical terms to describe this relationship, *toticipation* and *co-essentiation*.

The primalities are, for Campanella, the most logical explanation for the nature of being. He believed that his theory refuted all previous philosophers (in particular Aristotle) and subsequently had great confidence in his own doctrines. The existence of the primalities automatically proved all other theories incorrect. But the relationship between the primalities is extremely complex.

The primalities are not passive principles. Each requires an active force in order to function. *Potentia* has the power of potential, *sapientia* relates to cognition (or understanding) and *amor* produces volition (or will).<sup>223</sup> These powers are the means by which the primalities attain their distinct objects. Existence is the object of *potentia*, for no object can have being unless it exists. Truth is the object to which *sapientia* will always be directed, whereas *Amor* moves towards the good, because we always love what we find to be good. These objects are the *transcendentals* of being, connecting the primalities to existence, truth and goodness. Yet one final object surpasses all of these in importance. *Unity* is the fourth supreme

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<sup>221</sup> *Mon* (1997) p. 49.

<sup>222</sup> Campanella primarily discusses this doctrine in the second book of his *Metaphysica*. For a critical discussion see Bon pp. 138-71.

transcendental, without which the primalities would not be capable of successfully coexisting. Unity is both their bond and final product:

unity refers to the whole being as it is essentiated by the primalities and adds to it a priority over other beings.<sup>224</sup>

In other words, the greater the unity, the more perfect the being. Thus it is the ultimate object of the primalities.

Their role in perfection stems from the fact that the primalities derive from God Himself. Power, wisdom and love are the essences of the Divine nature. He is the transcendental unity, the most perfect being, and He bestows the primalities upon *all* creatures. As all objects participate in God, they must comprise the three primalities. In this way, the primalities are also the foundations of self-sufficiency. Any creature must have the power to exist, but it must also know of its own existence. Without knowledge it does not have the ability to either love or will itself.

For an object to be perfected it must therefore be fully self-sufficient and have a total unity of the primalities. God is clearly the transcendental unity in this instance; He is the source of the primalities for they are His own essence. More importantly, the primalities are the foundation for Campanella's utopia.

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<sup>223</sup> Bon, p. 164.

## ii. The Primalities in *Civitas Solis*

Though it is not openly specified in the text, the religious beliefs of the Solarians are based upon the doctrine of primalities. Debates over the role and nature of religion in *Civitas Solis* are manifold; for example, the nature and function of astrological and Hermetic beliefs within the utopia.<sup>225</sup> As we have noted, Campanella (like More) offers us a vision of a supposedly natural religion that has not yet benefited from Christian revelation:

when they come to know the living truths of Christianity, proved by miracles, they will accept them, for they are a gentle people.<sup>226</sup>

However the Solarians do have some knowledge of Christianity. Jesus and the Apostles are pictured on the outermost wall of the city alongside other great lawgivers such as Moses, Osiris and Hermes.<sup>227</sup> Campanella's citizens also accept many of Christ's teachings, particularly those that prophesy the end of the world.<sup>228</sup> In fact the Solarian religion is so closely related to Christianity, that the Knight Hospitaller, who is listening to the tale, reaffirms his own faith:

If these people, who only follow the law of nature, are so close to Christianity, which adds nothing to natural law except the sacraments, I draw the conclusion that the Christian law is the true one and that, freed from abuses, it will become the mistress of the world.<sup>229</sup>

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<sup>224</sup> Bon. p. 170.

<sup>225</sup> See Chapter 5 for a fuller discussion.

<sup>226</sup> CS p. 35.

<sup>227</sup> CS p. 20.

<sup>228</sup> CS p. 55: "they believe to be true the words which Christ said about the signs of the stars, the sun and the moon, which to foolish people may not seem true, but the end of all things will come upon them like a thief in the night."

<sup>229</sup> CS p. 61.

The importance of Christianity is fully backed up by Campanella's comments in other works. In his *Quaestiones Politicae* he defends the view that *Civitas Solis* is a state founded on reason alone, which accounts for its seemingly non-Christian attributes. Campanella reiterates that the Solarians would no doubt accept the true faith once they had been blessed with revelation.<sup>230</sup>

This goes some way to clarify the Solarian religion, but does not fully encapsulate their belief-system. Put simply, the Solarian religion mirrors Campanella's doctrine of the primalities. It conceives of God as being, and His absence as nothing. From this absence, a state of total negativity, comes evil. To commit a sin, therefore is to be in some way deficient as one is embracing an absence of being. Deficiency is best summed up as the absence of power, wisdom or love, as these are the essence of God. In other words, disunity of the primalities is the cause of imperfection whereas perfection resides in the transcendental unity of God:

they worship God in a trinity, saying that he is the highest Power, from whom proceeds supreme Wisdom, and from both of these supreme Love.<sup>231</sup>

The primalities are further embodied in the Solarian government. The chief officers of *Civitas Solis* are 'Pon' (power), 'Sin' (wisdom) and 'Mor' (love) who, together with their sub-officers, run the Solarian state machine. Because theirs is an active role, the officers require a transcendental power and this is provided by the Head Official and High Priest of *Civitas Solis*, *Sol*. *Sol* provides the unity for the

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<sup>230</sup> Bon p. 257. Some commentators still insist that Campanella was fully orthodox. See Chad Walsh, *From Utopia to Nightmare* (London : Geoffrey Bles Ltd, 1962) p. 47.

<sup>231</sup> CS p. 58.

state; through him each component of the utopia is facilitated. He reigns supreme, dominating all aspects of life:

he is the head of all, in matters both spiritual and temporal, and all transactions are concluded by him.<sup>232</sup>

Politics, religion and knowledge all congregate within him; Sol is all knowing, conducts prayers and rites, and is a permanent ruler.<sup>233</sup> As the primalities are fully embedded in the state, *Civitas Solis* is metaphysically unified: self-sufficient and perfected. A number of features reflect these two principles. Vital elements in *Civitas Solis* include its communism, eugenics and system of law.<sup>234</sup>

### iii. Primalities in Practice

The Solarians link private property directly with original sin.<sup>235</sup> The traditional Augustinian view held that it was Adam's love for himself over God, of course, that was identified as the cause of his ejection from Paradise. The fall of Adam instigated all corrupt human institutions. Prior to this all was well with no need for politics, law or private property.<sup>236</sup> But the Solarians reverse this position. Self-love is not the cause of private property but its result:

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<sup>232</sup> *CS* p. 18.

<sup>233</sup> Unless there is the unlikely event that a more able candidate can be found for the role.

<sup>234</sup> The most obvious element of all is Solarian knowledge, see pp. 151-61.

<sup>235</sup> It would be a mistake, however, to suggest that communism had cured Original Sin. As we will see in the next chapter man is naturally perfectible anyway, and this is reinforced primarily by the Solarian programme of eugenics.

<sup>236</sup> See, for example, St Augustine *City of God* trans. R. W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 14/ 12, 13.

all private property derives from having one's own dwelling apart and one's own children and wife, and out of this self-love is born.<sup>237</sup>

Adam's sin can be rectified, therefore, by the removal of private property, which is why *Civitas Solis* is a communist society. Communism is one of the means by which perfected man maintains his dignity. It presents a moral code for its citizens, having removed the sins of greed and vanity that dominate normal society and it promotes a sense of Solarian identity. Once private property is abandoned people switch their self-love to society at large:

I tell you that they have so much love for their country that it is a thing to marvel at, being much greater than the Romans are said to have had, so free are they from all self interest.<sup>238</sup>

The Solarians all help each other in times of need, encouraged by the commonality of property and so the citizens of Campanella's utopia develop feelings of civic love.<sup>239</sup>

Another crucial feature of the Solarian state, the programme of eugenics further enhance this love:

the only love that is recognised among them is, at the most, that of friendship, not that of burning sexual passion.<sup>240</sup>

Good breeding and controlled sexual experiences have removed vice and promoted communal love.

Eugenics may strike the modern reader as distasteful if not sinister and the passage has caused such controversy that it has been left out of several translations. But breeding is a vital pillar in the well being of Solarian society. It allows physical

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<sup>237</sup> CS p. 21.

<sup>238</sup> CS p. 21.

<sup>239</sup> CS p. 33.

<sup>240</sup> CS p. 33.

and moral strengths to be developed in each individual,<sup>241</sup> producing children of similar psychological attributes:

those of the same generation have similar aptitudes, features and habits. This harmony is a stable element in the state and they have a great love for one another and help each other.<sup>242</sup>

Solarian eugenics is so successful that it has also helped in successfully eradicating original sin. Although it may appear somewhat totalitarian we must remember that it is not used as a tool of coercion. As we will see, the citizens of *Civitas Solis* freely and willingly accept it as the most efficacious method of maintaining stability and cementing perfection.

Solarian law is also aimed at stability, and offers incentives rather than the threat of punishment to motivate its citizens. Of utmost importance is the system of honours. As the Solarians scorn gold and other material goods, they are honoured in other ways. The chief officers of the state grant them honourable names, which reflect virtuous deeds, or enemies that have been vanquished. These honours are so highly esteemed that citizens risk their lives to earn them.<sup>243</sup> But this does not mean that punishments are non-existent and when they do occur they can be severe, including excommunication, exile, flogging or even death.<sup>244</sup> Sol has powers of pardon and free confessions are taken into account. Despite this, executions can take

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<sup>241</sup> This explains why physical and psychological opposites are bred together to produce a suitable child. *CS* p.30: “men of a fantastical and capricious disposition mate with plump, easy-going and mild-mannered women.”

<sup>242</sup> *CS* p. 31.

<sup>243</sup> *CS* p. 32.

<sup>244</sup> *CS* pp. 49-50.

place, and as befits such a community-minded people these executions are a group activity:

no one may be put to death unless all people kill him by a communal act, for they have no executioner, but they all stone him and burn him.<sup>245</sup>

There are three specific crimes that incur this brutal punishment: if there has been a transgression “against liberty, against God or against the senior officials”.<sup>246</sup> Curiously if an official is denounced and the charges against him are proven to be true the instigator is exiled but the officer maintains his position without further question.<sup>247</sup>

One problem here is that although liberty is enshrined in the Solarian law it is never properly defined. Consequently such punishments may appear to restrict citizen activity. Yet Campanella is certain that the crimes found in *Civitas Solis* are not the same as those experienced in other societies:

there are among them none of the thefts, murders, rapes or acts of incest or adultery which occur among us.<sup>248</sup>

Solarian crime is limited to “ingratitude, malice ... and lying”,<sup>249</sup> all else having been bred out in previous generations. The chances of any punishments being needed, therefore, are slim if not wholly unnecessary: the crimes that they supposedly punish do not occur anyway. Communism, eugenics and religion have all served to develop mans’ naturally good impulses to their highest capacity.<sup>250</sup>

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<sup>245</sup> *CS* p. 50.

<sup>246</sup> *CS* p. 50.

<sup>247</sup> *CS* p. 50: “they do not trouble those who have been named.”

<sup>248</sup> *CS* p. 22. Sodomy is also punishable by death.

<sup>249</sup> *CS* p. 22.

<sup>250</sup> See pp. 121-24.

The values of harmony and unity are enshrined in Campanella's theory of the primalities, and this acts as the basis for the state. *Civitas Solis* is thus perfected: it is developed in every detail and presented as man's highest political end. There is a balance between coercive law and perfectible man, which allows a harmony between state and citizen. Although the city is kept under surveillance day and night, for example, nobody views this as an encroachment upon his or her lives; it is designed to perfect the state and protect it from deterioration.<sup>251</sup> The politics of *Civitas Solis* promote stability, unity and harmony. All state mechanisms are geared towards forging bonds of love and friendship, no matter how potentially worrying they may be to the modern reader. *Civitas Solis* is the perfect, fully integrated society.

### 3) Andreae: Totality or Totalitarianism ?

Without doubt *Christianopolis* is the image of Andreae's perfect commonwealth. As a monologue there are no ambiguous secondary characters to cast doubt on the serious intentions of the work.<sup>252</sup> From the moment the narrator arrives at the gates of Christianopolis he is awestruck by his surroundings and his delight continues as he travels throughout the city and he leaves the utopia with the words: "if any other land has better conditions perchance I am not worthy to receive them."<sup>253</sup> Recently, Thompson has further emphasised the idea that *Christianopolis* sought to bring heaven onto earth through the harmonisation of man and state: "there

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<sup>251</sup> *CS* p. 41.

<sup>252</sup> Only Andreae's opening remarks lend an air of uncertainty to the proceedings, but as we have already noted these are of little consequence. See introduction p. 20.

is an underlying unity that holds the community of Christianopolis together”<sup>254</sup> He argues that Andreae forges a utopian identity through a static and egalitarian economy. I suggest that to economics can be added law and institutionalised religion all of which, together, creates a changeless, stable and perfect society.

#### **i. Perfection and Self-sufficiency**

To begin our discussion we must refer back once again to Andreae’s *Societas Christiana*. Here we find a clear definition of perfection:

That nothing approaches nearer God than Unity nor recedes further from him than dissonancy, the consciences and experiences of all men do evince.<sup>255</sup>

Disharmony is the work of Antichrist and is both the cause and symptom of the chaos that engulfs the world. Factions and individualism are its only outcomes. Society must reflect God’s attributes and be perfected through unity. Christianopolis is a model of this very society. It provides a fully integrated system that relies on an interdependence of man and state, reinforced by education, religion and law. As with Campanella, the state’s involvement in the lives of its citizens is complete and it is a remarkably stable system. Christianopolis is resistant to change because any change would inevitably be for the worse. Therefore it is an enclosed society, protected from the outside world and materially self-sufficient. Although this invokes connotations of coercion and social control, these are again largely cosmetic due to

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<sup>253</sup> *Chrs* p. 257.

<sup>254</sup> Thompson (1999) p. 119.

<sup>255</sup> *Modell* p. 152.

Andreae's assumptions about man.<sup>256</sup> Christianopolis is a total, rather than a totalitarian, society.

Elizabeth Hansot has suggested that, in contrast with More and Campanella, Andreae posits a vague and ill-defined picture of society: "he offers very little detail or concrete imagery in describing his ideal city."<sup>257</sup> While it is certainly true that Andreae employs a great deal of religious metaphor it is unfair to accuse him of shying away from the day-to-day details of utopian life. The city of Christianopolis is divided into three sections: "one to supply food, one for drill, and one for looks."<sup>258</sup> All available land outside the city is put to some use; vineyards, arable land and pasture adorn Caphar Salama.<sup>259</sup> Wild animals are also housed in these outlying areas where they are used for the more laborious tasks. A moat surrounds the city, which is always stocked with a variety of fish.<sup>260</sup>

Christianopolis is a small community, home to a mere four hundred inhabitants, and its material needs are easily met.<sup>261</sup> One quarter of the city is given over to agriculture and associated industries, watched over by a triumvirate of experts. Fourteen three-storey buildings provide warehouses for food and a meeting place for citizens.<sup>262</sup> Another fourteen buildings are given over to mills and bakeries in the southern quarter of the city, acting as storage facilities for grain, flour and wine. Paper and timber are the two other essential products manufactured here.

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<sup>256</sup> See pp. 130-33.

<sup>257</sup> E. Hansot (1974) p. 80.

<sup>258</sup> *Chrs* p. 150.

<sup>259</sup> *Chrs* p. 143.

<sup>260</sup> *Chrs* p. 150.

<sup>261</sup> It is the size of the community that prompts Thompson (1999) to offer his monastic interpretation, p. 72.

<sup>262</sup> *Chrs* pp. 150-51.

Slaughterhouses and meat products are situated in the northern quarter of the city. Following the hygienic practices found throughout Christianopolis, the fourteen buildings here are scrupulously clean in order to prevent workers from degenerating into bestial figures.<sup>263</sup> A variety of fats are prepared in this quarter and fish and poultry are also kept in storage. Finally the western quarter of Christianopolis houses the metal, glass and brick industries. The approach here is highly scientific and experimentation is encouraged.<sup>264</sup> Workers do not toil blindly but approach their work systematically and only after having undertaken thorough training. As a consequence work is much less labour-intensive than might be expected.

Christianopolis is thus self-sufficient in all its material needs. It is not forced to rely on any outside society in order to live, or indeed live well, and this reduces the possibility of change.<sup>265</sup> Yet the system is reliant on its citizens and is greatly helped by their moderation:

You will be surprised how a supply of provisions, not at all very great, can be made to suffice for temperate habits in everything. For though no one in the whole island ever goes hungry, yet by the grace of God or the generosity of nature, there is always abundance, since gluttony and drunkenness are entirely unknown.<sup>266</sup>

This is indicative of the harmonious relationship of citizen and state in Andreae's utopia; material distribution is directly linked to the moral nature of its inhabitants.

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<sup>263</sup> *Chrs* p. 153.

<sup>264</sup> *Chrs* p. 155: "to be brief, here is practical science."

<sup>265</sup> Andreae does pay lip service to the idea of trade, but it is inconsistent with the rest of his vision. See p. 82.

<sup>266</sup> *Chrs* p. 152.

The society's communism allows the expression and fulfillment of several moral criteria. The temperance that we have already noted is coupled with rationing of food and other material goods.<sup>267</sup> A lack of money prevents unnatural advantages from occurring, promoting instead a sense of modesty:

in this respect the inhabitants are especially blessed because no one can be superior to the other in the amount of riches owned, since the advantage is rather one of power and genius, and the highest respect, that of morals and piety.<sup>268</sup>

Idleness is destroyed by a profitable use of leisure time. Spiritual contemplation is seen as far superior to bodily pleasures and so the latter are rejected: "you will not expect to find the sporting of fools nor the noise of aimless wandering."<sup>269</sup> The citizens of Christianopolis spend their time accordingly, in deep prayer and meditation. To help this process along they are kept under surveillance from guards dotted all around the city's many watchtowers. The ubiquitous night watchmen have their jobs made easier by a system of street lighting. Citizens guard against vanity by the public works to which all are obliged; these include guard duty, building and farming.<sup>270</sup>

Thompson agrees that Andreae's economic system also has a moral foundation: "it is quite clear that Andreae distrusted what we should now regard as 'economic' behaviour, where this is self-interested, individualistic and competitive".<sup>271</sup>

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<sup>267</sup> *Chrs* p. 159.

<sup>268</sup> *Chrs* p. 161.

<sup>269</sup> *Chrs* p. 162.

<sup>270</sup> *Chrs* p. 168: "There are also public duties, to which all citizens have obligation."

<sup>271</sup> Thompson (1999) p. 103. He labels this system the *Zero-Growth Economy*, whose self-sufficiency is designed to protect stability. See also Thompson (1999) p. 123.

But the interdependence of citizen and state goes beyond simple economics. This affinity is reflected repeatedly in *Christianopolis* and is cemented by the religious bonds of the commonwealth.

## ii. The State and Institutionalised Religion

Unlike Campanella (or More), Andreae's religion is strictly Christian. Although it resembles his own Lutheranism it is not nominally so. As we have seen, a universal religion that removes creeds and sectionalism is the only form of worship that makes sense in the pansophist project.<sup>272</sup> We must also remember that the reason the community was founded in the first place was because of persecution, which suggests that the citizens follow a less established religion than Lutheranism.<sup>273</sup> A common faith forges a strong bond between citizens and is also the bedrock of all laws and politics. It thus harmonises man with himself, his fellow man and his state.

The state structure and religious beliefs of *Christianopolis* are so intertwined that even political debates are couched in religious terms:

questions of the truth of the Christian religion, the cultivation of virtues, the methods of improving the mind; also the need of treaties, war, negotiations buildings and supplies are deliberated upon, with great yet modest freedom, and with a proper appreciation of the gifts of God.<sup>274</sup>

Religion dominates the legal system of *Christianopolis*. Christianity acts as an incentive for good behaviour, for morality is its own reward: "here there is no

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<sup>272</sup> See pp. 61-64.

<sup>273</sup> *Chrs* p. 144.

prerogative except of virtue.”<sup>275</sup> As a consequence crime is barely known and any wrongdoings that should arise are dealt with in a humane and Christian manner. There is no capital punishment. Penalties depend on the severity of the crime, which is graded into three categories. Property crimes are the least significant whereas crimes against fellow-citizens are considerably more so. Most grievous of all are crimes against God. Prevention, however, is preferred to cure: “It is the art of arts to guard against permitting sin to become easy for anyone.”<sup>276</sup>

As religion tailors the legal system, so there are laws ensuring the proper upkeep of the Faith. Christian morals present the greatest safeguard against sin but they are subjected to rigorous enforcement. Censorship is prevalent in Christianopolis. The library, for example, only contains works that pertain to Christian teachings.<sup>277</sup> Similarly, the citizens of Christianopolis produce only Christian books: nothing other than the Bible, prayer books and hymnals are allowed to be printed within the city. Nonconformism is outlawed:

Scattering literature which expresses doubts concerning God, which corrupts the morals or imposes upon man’s mind is not permitted.<sup>278</sup>

State interference even spreads to the act of worship. Public prayers are said thrice daily and attendance is compulsory: “no one may be absent from these prayers, except for the most urgent reasons.”<sup>279</sup> Andreae declines to show us the fate of

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<sup>274</sup> *Chrs* p. 175. See also Hansot (1974) p. 87.

<sup>275</sup> *Chrs* p. 163.

<sup>276</sup> *Chrs* p. 164.

<sup>277</sup> The citizens “admire nothing that is pure babble”, *Chrs* p. 191. The library is a crucial piece of evidence when assessing the syncretic nature of Andreae’s pansophist beliefs, see Chapter IV of this discussion for a fuller discussion.

<sup>278</sup> *Chrs* p. 194.

<sup>279</sup> *Chrs* p. 158.

absentees, though we may presume that the offence would constitute a crime against God. Within prayer meetings citizens are assigned a non-negotiable place to pray.

Religion therefore acts as a unifying force in several ways. It creates an identity in which all citizens happily share, but it also provides the basis for law and politics. In turn, its practices are enforced by this same law, bringing with it notions of potential coercion and social control.

As we noted earlier, however, the state and the individual exist in a symbiotic relationship; each one is equally reliant upon the other. Children are brought up by the state from the age of six and its parental role is metaphorically extended to each citizen: “For there is no one in this republic who has only individual parents. The state itself is a parent to each.”<sup>280</sup> The role of the state is to create and maintain its own perfection; it must preserve its own stability, and the harmony that this entails, at all times. Thus it works hand in hand with the individual; morality, law and social regulation are interdependent.

### iii. Access to *Christianopolis*

To help preserve its perfection still further, Andreae’s utopia is an enclosed society. Unsuitable members are simply not allowed access into the system, so that change and instability are prevented. As a consequence, socialising aspects of the state are largely superficial. Like Campanella, Andreae considers man to be naturally

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<sup>280</sup> *Chrs* p. 263.

good anyway.<sup>281</sup> People are allowed into the utopia only when they have been judged by the citizens to be worthy of entry.

Other traces of outside interference are shadowy and ill defined. As the narrator tours the Council Hall he sees portraits of virtuous men, including contemporaries of Andreae:

Here I saw among them the heroes John Frederick, Elector of Saxony, and of my own sovereign, Christopher, Duke of Wurtemberg.<sup>282</sup>

No explanation is offered as to how these pictures arrived at the city, or how any knowledge was gained of these men. Andreae's discussion of trade, and commerce is similarly misleading. Officers are assigned to the development of trade although they employ variety rather than gain as their commercial standard:

so that we may see the peculiar production of each land, and so communicate with each other that we may seem to have the advantages of the universe in one place.<sup>283</sup>

This is odd in many respects. It is impossible to ascertain whom the citizens of the utopia trade with, as nobody has ever heard of Caphar Salama. The narrator was, after all, the victim of a shipwreck. The variety of goods is also anomalous to the self-sufficiency of the city for citizens do not want what they do not have.<sup>284</sup> Perhaps trade is so difficult because Andreae situates his island in what Held describes as "an impossible place"<sup>285</sup> within the Antarctic Ocean. None of these quirks should be too surprising, however, due to the necessity of stability, Christianopolis cannot be allowed to change.

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<sup>281</sup> See pp. 122-25.

<sup>282</sup> *Chrs* p. 265. These are *not* the same portraits used to educate the young in moral behaviour.

<sup>283</sup> *Chrs* p. 153.

<sup>284</sup> See Thompson (1999) ch.3.

Andreae's utopia bears all the hallmarks of his definition of perfection. It is the fully unified system.

No doubt there may always be room for refinement and improvement of the facilities, but the principal goal of social policy in *Christianopolis* is the maintenance of the stability of the community.<sup>286</sup>

Religion unites men to each other; law is united with morality; the state is united with the individual. *Christianopolis* is closed to outsiders and relies on its own self-sufficiency. Yet although Andreae presents a total and completed system, as with Campanella it would be misleading to see this as totalitarian. Citizens are not subject to coercion; the inhabitants impose regulations upon themselves in order to live their best life. Law is a voluntary procedure. Again it is impossible to conceive how any of the three crimes Andreae mentioned could ever actually arise. Without naturally good men there could not be naturally good laws in the first place.

In this way Andreae's society mirrors Campanella's utopia. *Christianopolis* provides a complete system, enshrining universal religion and cemented by the unity of knowledge. By institutionalising religion, politics becomes divine. This is why Andreae praises his utopian state:

One might think that the heavens and earth had been married and were living together in everlasting peace.<sup>287</sup>

Through the state, man can fully develop his true nature because the true nature of the state is itself wholly worked out. There is no more room for improvement in

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<sup>285</sup> *Chr.* p. 143, n. 1.

<sup>286</sup> Thompson (1999) p. 123.

<sup>287</sup> *Chrs.* p 143.

either law or the individual; it is the final and highest end. This is summed up in the words of the narrator:

Oh, may I some time see better, truer, more fixed and more stable conditions - brief, those which the world promises but never and nowhere produces.<sup>288</sup>

Ultimately, *Christianopolis* presents a heavenly community within which man can flourish on earth.

#### **4) Comenius' Utopian Reform**

Comenius made his views on perfection consistently clear: for anything to be perfected it must be universal, united and complete. He applies this formula most famously to his universal knowledge, but it is equally as relevant to his conception of man and his ideas on politics. Comenius suggests that all human activity, no matter how private, comes under the rule of politics. As such, he continues the pansophist aim of a total political system, self-sufficient and completed, so that man can bring about his own perfection.

##### **i. The Elements of Perfection**

On numerous occasions Comenius identifies discord as the key to the world's ills. He concurs with Andreae that disorder is the work of Antichrist, leading only to conflict, strife and, above all, factionalism:

one common failing among previous efforts at reform has been the tendency of scholars, churchmen and politicians to proliferate into so many different sects.<sup>289</sup>

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<sup>288</sup> *Chrs* p. 145.

This could not have been more evident than during the Thirty Years' War, which brought such deep personal tragedies for the Moravian. The blame for earthly disunity may also be placed at the feet of philosophers who have steadfastly refused to acknowledge "the universal laws of harmony".<sup>290</sup>

Harmony is thus the first component of perfection. It is part of our own essence; man is a harmony of his own external and internal natures, his body and soul.<sup>291</sup> When we perceive anything we do so by observing the harmony of an object through our senses, relating to its size, colour, smell or taste.<sup>292</sup> Consequently we understand truth through harmony; in the twelfth aphorism of the *Prodromus* Comenius suggests, "the knowledge of all things is harmony".<sup>293</sup> Nature and art both reflect the harmonies that God has created to govern the world; to ascertain these is to understand the universe we live in. The second element of perfection is peace:

Any reforms in philosophy, religion and politics must fall short of perfection unless they bring peace and lasting happiness to the minds, consciences and societies of mankind.<sup>294</sup>

Universal peace is the most efficient means by which we can ensure stability in the harmonious world. No dissension can be allowed to threaten this ideal society.<sup>295</sup>

Perfection is only finally achieved once it is total.<sup>296</sup> It will be shown that completeness is essential to universal wisdom<sup>297</sup> and the same applies to society.

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<sup>289</sup> *VL* 4/12.

<sup>290</sup> *Pan* 1/6.

<sup>291</sup> See pp. 137-39.

<sup>292</sup> *GD* 5/13, 14.

<sup>293</sup> *Prod* p. 39.

<sup>294</sup> *Pan* 1 /4. Comenius even tried his hand at diplomacy with tracts such as *The Angel of Peace* (1667), trans. W. A. Morrison (Pantheon, New York, 1944).

<sup>295</sup> *VL* 20/13.

<sup>296</sup> This is why angels are perfect, nothing can be added to their nature.

<sup>297</sup> *Prod*, p. 18: "there must be no starting aside, if a man would even burst himself with desire of change, or disagreement."

This ties in with Comenius' teleological and millennial conception of history.<sup>298</sup> The culmination of time will see a most glorious epoch, a true period of Heaven on earth, and as God left His greatest creation until the seventh day so He reserves the perfect age until the last days on earth. It is up to man, however, to create the proper conditions for this transformation, and these can only be achieved through Comenius' own reforms. The Comenian reformation, therefore, will itself be perfect, complete in all respects and universally applicable to mankind:

we desire not simply Orthosis or Reform, but Panorthosia which is Universal, General and Full Reform OF ALL PEOPLE, IN ALL THINGS, AND IN ALL WAYS.<sup>299</sup>

Comenius' vision is of a radically transformed global community, which will be perfected in all respects. He sums up these ideas when he lists his conditions for "universal good", which must be ordered, secure, agreeable, universal and complete.<sup>300</sup> These are the values of his political system.

## **ii. Utopian Politics**

For a deeply spiritual man, Comenius places great importance on politics, which he describes as "a perfect exercise of human wisdom in governing human nature".<sup>301</sup> Its boundaries are the entire earth, and any form of community, not just the state systems suggested by the Latin *civitas* or the Greek *polis*. All human interaction involves political debate: it is "the art of wise community-life and prudent

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<sup>298</sup> See Webster (1975) pp. 25-27.

<sup>299</sup> *Pan* 1/8. See also *VL* 4/6, 7.

<sup>300</sup> *Pan* 10/5.

<sup>301</sup> *Pan* 12/1.

government of any kind of human society, large or small.”<sup>302</sup> Political life serves a dual purpose, perfecting man on earth and paving the way for his ultimate happiness with God: “the path to the eternal is through the temporal.”<sup>303</sup> It is, therefore, both ends and means and its importance cannot be underestimated.

In Comenius’ own age, however, political problems were rife. Politics is crippled by pride and selfish gain to the extent that “private ambition” has replaced the common good.<sup>304</sup> Intrigue, corruption and suspicion are prevalent in a society that has turned its back on God and looks to human authority in politics. Machiavelli has ousted Jesus Christ as the voice of political reason.<sup>305</sup> Man can only rectify this by rejecting the sectionalism of modern political society and embracing universal politics. Comenius’ *Panorthosia* will remove corruption and prevent war by “establishing what we have introduced” in the pansophic works.<sup>306</sup>

The scope of Comenius’ system mirrors his *Panorthosia* in its universality. It applies to all men, in all affairs, and for all forms of peace.<sup>307</sup> Universal politics will restore man to his true liberty by emulating the hierarchies of good angels in its order, peace and tranquility.<sup>308</sup> Its three goals are to unify disparate nations, abolish war, and prevent the reoccurrence of the causes of war.<sup>309</sup> Man must turn to the image of

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<sup>302</sup> *Pan* 12/1.

<sup>303</sup> *VL* 14/3.

<sup>304</sup> *Pan* 12/10.

<sup>305</sup> *Pan* 12/9.

<sup>306</sup> *Pan* 24/1.

<sup>307</sup> *Pan* 12/2.

<sup>308</sup> *Pan* 12/1, 3.

<sup>309</sup> *Pan* 12/4.

God for inspiration. He must treat his fellow man as if he were dealing with God Himself and accept the natural harmony, which He gives to all creatures.<sup>310</sup>

As politics is an activity it works through active principles. Comenius identifies these as law, reward and punishment. Laws are to be simple, easily understood and universally applicable to all men in all circumstances. Punishments are to be humane and only used as a last resort, for reward is regarded much more favourably. Indeed the virtue of upholding the law should be a reward in itself. The political system must be clearly structured so that each individual knows his place within it; the lines between ruler and ruled must be kept distinct.<sup>311</sup> Government, for Comenius, incorporates the three forms of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. For practical purposes, however, aristocracy is favoured: those who are wise or are of high status will naturally emerge as rulers. Monarchy is a spiritual entity as God is the true head of politics. Democracy refers to man's private life:

because every individual without exception should be allowed, in his home and within his conscience, to act as king, priest, and teacher to his family and himself.<sup>312</sup>

Comenius aims to regulate this new political system through a global governmental body, which he names the *Dicastery of Peace*, or world-senate. Working in close conjunction with the College of Light and the Ecumenical Consistory,<sup>313</sup> the senate is made up of a number of "peace ministers" whose job it is to supervise government at the national and regional levels:

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<sup>310</sup> *Pan* 12/8, 9.

<sup>311</sup> *Pan* 12/7 also *VL* 14/16.

<sup>312</sup> *Pan* 12/12.

<sup>313</sup> These are the bodies in charge of universal knowledge and universal religion respectively.

self-government at every stage and in every situation including the emergencies which tend to interfere with it, for the purpose of keeping human society entirely free from international strife.<sup>314</sup>

Comenius offers no further indication as to how these ministers will be selected other than they will naturally emerge. Nor is it clear how many ministers there will be, although it may be presumed that there must be at least one representative from each nation. This may be regarded as an implicit elitism, which goes against the idea of a *panorthosia* for all men. But the Dicastery will emerge once the principles of pansophia are already in place; it will be a product of man's new wisdom. Thus it is reasonable to assume that who the Ministers will be, and how they will be selected, will be matters that can be discussed rationally and sensibly by a populace who must be active in bringing about their own utopia. To reiterate an earlier point, politics, like pansophia, is an active process.

The world-senate will meet annually in order to discuss how best to avoid war, and a variety of legal matters. Universal law must be constantly updated and the judicial system must be scrutinised at all times. Judges will be appointed during these sessions, though whether this will be at a national or local level is unspecified. The Dicastery's most important task is to cement universal religion, so that harmony and peace will be restored, as "all things return to unity as much as possible".<sup>315</sup>

But government cannot be successful on a purely international level; practicality dictates a devolved structure in order to uphold universal law around the

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<sup>314</sup> *Pan* 17/1.

<sup>315</sup> *Pan* 12/7.

globe.<sup>316</sup> Order is again paramount. Any single area must have only one judge and one power. Supervision over lower orders of government is so important that when necessary it may be carried out by subterfuge: “both personally and through prefects who represent them openly or agents employed in secret.”<sup>317</sup> Furthermore there will be ministries established for trades, craftsmen, commoners, the youth and the poor. Officers must also be established to uphold and regulate marriage. Finally, magistrates must be set up to supervise all social institutions: “in politics, but also in schools and Church, and even in every home.”<sup>318</sup> Regulation rears its head once more, and this passage certainly indicates that man’s individual conscience is *not* sovereign.

Again it is essential to realize that this system arises after pansophist reforms have been established. Philosophy, via pansophia, takes its place at the head of *Panorthosia*, allowing knowledge of the proper order of all things: “it may therefore make good governors for Commonwealths.”<sup>319</sup> In this sense Comenius echoes Plato’s plea for philosopher rulers, and he also suggests that the institutionalisation of pansophia benefits all citizens. It makes everybody aware of the common good. Although pansophia leads Comenius’ reforms, philosophers are not the only group singled out as essential: “it is of prime importance that every state should be well provided with

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<sup>316</sup> Comenius never specifies whether he intends government to be at the national or regional level. His broad definition suggests that it must descend to the lowest possible community.

<sup>317</sup> *Pan* 12/7.

<sup>318</sup> *Pan* 12/7.

<sup>319</sup> *Diatyposis* 1/45.

philosophers, doctors, lawyers and theologians.”<sup>320</sup> In other words *Panorthosia* demands self-sufficiency in terms of the personnel necessary to carry out and maintain the reforms.

Comenius’ utopia differs slightly from those of Campanella and Andreae. He toys with the formal nature of an imaginary society but does so only as an attack on his own society. Instead he chooses to situate his utopia in the real world. But it is still a no-place in the sense that the society he proposes is non-existent, requiring a number of prior reforms in order to be successfully inaugurated. *Panorthosia* is also very definitely the vision of the perfect society: it is the greatest system that man can produce for himself. Man is an active agent in *Panorthosia*: he must create his own Heaven on earth. This can only be done once he has reached a level of universal wisdom, which helps perfect his own character. Then he must transfer this knowledge to a practical role, establishing the perfect political system. The following chapters will show how it is possible for man to achieve these lofty ambitions. Politics must reflect the same unity that man finds in himself and his pansophist knowledge. It must be perfect, and this perfection mirrors that of his fellow pansophists, displaying the unity, harmony and totality of utopianism.

## **5) Bacon’s Incomplete Utopia**

Upon first reading, it appears to be inconceivable that Bacon is not to be classified as a pansophist utopian. His *New Atlantis* was a depiction of an ideal society, dominated by science and learning by the ideal college of Saloman’s House.

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<sup>320</sup> *Pan* 24.

Furthermore, Bacon follows the pansophist trend in acknowledging Thomas More as the progenitor of the utopian genre and he also indicates that Bensalem is a genuinely *good* ideal society.<sup>321</sup> For Campanella, Andreae and Comenius, however, being a good society was not a strong enough qualification for being utopian. As has been shown, they each had a specific and common vision of perfection based upon unity, harmony and totality. Can their vision be identified in *New Atlantis*?

There is some evidence that does, undeniably, support such a claim. For example, King Salomana, the founder of the island, placed limits upon immigration and emigration to prevent any deterioration to the ideal conditions of Bensalem. But caution must be taken here. There is no underlying metaphysical basis for Bacon's utopian politics in the way that Campanella, for example, used the primalities in *Civitas Solis*. More importantly, Bensalem is not a fully worked out, total state system. Bacon famously left *New Atlantis* unfinished. Once the description of Saloman's House is complete the text comes to a close. The reader never discovers how the wider society functions: what its method of government is, what laws are maintained or what constitutes the relationship between state and citizen.

A further investigation of Saloman's House, however, yields interesting conclusions. The college has such a high degree of independence, that Bacon negates much of the necessity of any further state mechanisms. Saloman's House is effectively a state within a state and, as such, Bacon is uninterested in the further mechanics of government or law. He therefore rejects the totality of the pansophist utopian state for the centrality of Saloman's House.

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<sup>321</sup> "We were come into a land of angels, which did appear to us daily and present us with

## i. Bacon the Utopian

Although *New Atlantis* does not provide anywhere near as much detail as the pansophists in regard to state institutions, it does outline some laws. The few that warrant Bacon's attention are all largely restrictive. Access to the island is strictly controlled. The shipwrecked crew is only allowed onto Bensalem after swearing an oath over their Christian faith. After this they are kept on their stricken boat for a while before being quarantined on the island for a further three days. The islanders explain that this allows the sick and injured to be given priority, but the narrator recognises a different motive at work:

who knoweth whether it be not to take some of our manners and conditions? And if they find them bad, to banish us straight away; if good, to give us further time. For these men ... may withal have an eye upon us.<sup>322</sup>

Clearly the assurances of a shared religion are not enough to guarantee hospitality. The Bensalemites keep a watchful eye on the sailors to convince themselves that they have suitable guests. Once the quarantine is lifted the crew are given further instructions. They are only allowed to stay for six weeks, and they must not travel further than one *karan* from the city.<sup>323</sup>

Restrictions on travel are equally strong for the native inhabitants of *New Atlantis*. The citizens of Bensalem are banned from leaving the island at all: "Now for travelling from hence into parts abroad, our lawgiver thought fit altogether to

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comforts." *Collected Works* III p. 136.

<sup>322</sup> *Collected Works* III, pp. 134-35. This recalls Andreae's interviews at the gates of Christianopolis.

<sup>323</sup> Bacon tells us this is the equivalent of one-and-a-half miles.

restrain it.”<sup>324</sup> With passage to and from the island so tightly regulated, the possibility of any rogue elements being introduced into the community are kept to a minimum, and this appears to be a deliberate policy. In the days when the old Atlantis still flourished travel across the globe was much freer and more frequent than in the seventeenth-century. By the time King Salomana founded the island, however, it was understood that Bensalem could not be improved upon:

recalling into his memory the happy and flourishing estate wherein this land then was, so as it may be a thousand ways altered to the worse, but scarce any one way to the better.<sup>325</sup>

Thus *New Atlantis* would perpetuate itself without any significant input from abroad, for this could only lead to the degradation of society. In this respect, Bacon’s utopia seems to be fully self-sufficient and complete.

Yet one problem with this interpretation remains. Saloman’s other great achievement was, of course, to establish the College of Six Day’s Works, and it is this noble institution that is “the very Eye of the Kingdom”.<sup>326</sup> Saloman’s House is, however, experimental and openly scientific, which invokes notions of progress and development. But progress is incompatible with the static society.<sup>327</sup> If Bacon is serious in utopia being an unchanging community, then he may have created a paradox.

Commentators have failed to recognize that Bacon overcomes this by enveloping Saloman’s House in secrecy, which raises important questions over the

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<sup>324</sup> *Collected Works* III, p. 145.

<sup>325</sup> *Collected Works* III, p. 144.

<sup>326</sup> *Collected Works* III, p. 137.

<sup>327</sup> As Davis (1984) p. 9 has asserted: “The dynamic utopia is a myth.”

accepted notions of Bacon's work.<sup>328</sup> One of his most famous innovations was to promote openness and co-operation in scientific research: this was a crucial difference in the transition from secretive magus to modern scientist.<sup>329</sup> But this is not the creed of Saloman's House. It may be a co-operative, but it is by no means accessible to all.

All the fellows of Saloman's House are sworn to secrecy: they "take an oath of secrecy for the concealing of those which we think fit to keep secret".<sup>330</sup> This involves assessing what may or may not be in the public interest and bears no relation to the wishes of the government: "for some of those we do reveal sometime to the state, and some not."<sup>331</sup> In other words, the fellows control all scientific information and can keep anything hidden from anybody. They actually operate outside of government control. Although the ruler may have originally established them they are no longer answerable to him. The entire society is highly secretive: "we know well most part of the habitable world, and are ourselves unknown."<sup>332</sup> How does this ethos sit alongside Bacon's view of an open science?

There are several competing explanations for the secrecy of *New Atlantis*. Channing-Briggs argues that it is an attempt to bridge science and religion: science is the new religion and Saloman's House is its church.<sup>333</sup> But if this is the case then why hide it from the people? One of the benefits of Christianity is that it is for the

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<sup>328</sup> The secrecy of Saloman's House has obviously been noted many times, yet nobody has suggested that this may be directly attributed to Bacon's knowledge of utopianism.

<sup>329</sup> See pp. 199-202.

<sup>330</sup> *Collected Works III*, p. 165.

<sup>331</sup> *Collected Works III*, p. 165.

<sup>332</sup> *Collected Works III*, p. 136.

<sup>333</sup> Channing-Briggs 'Bacon's Science and Religion' in Peltonen, ed., *Cambridge Companion to Bacon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) pp. 194-97.

whole of mankind. If Bacon is proposing a new religion why must its details be hidden from view? Sargent suggests that secrecy is an inevitable result of any co-operative project, citing the development of the Royal Society as evidence. For years, factions who began with the best of intentions inexorably descended into secrecy.<sup>334</sup> This may well be a fact of scientific life, but it seems an odd angle from which to approach *New Atlantis*. If Bacon were simply predicting the inevitability of secrecy why would he disguise his concerns in the form of an ideal institution? It would make far more sense to offer an explicit warning against such procedures rather than impart this same intrigue onto his utopia.

It is equally likely that the secrecy of Saloman's House is Bacon's attempt at resolving the paradox of the scientific utopia. It acts as a safeguard for both the college and utopian society at large, allowing an internal advancement of knowledge that does not hinder the static conception of utopia. The fellows of Saloman's House are protecting Bensalem from itself. In so doing, Bacon was keeping within the self-acknowledged terms of the ideal society. In this respect, he was following in the footsteps of the pansophists.

## ii. The Independent Class

There is one piece of evidence that goes a long way to dispel the idea that *New Atlantis* is part of the pansophist tradition. Quite simply, Bacon's work is

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<sup>334</sup> Rose-Mary Sargent, 'Bacon as an Advocate for Co-operative Scientific Research' in Peltonen, ed. (1996). There is a great deal of debate surrounding the origins of the Royal Society. Much of this revolves around which of the alleged founding groups was the most Baconian in outlook.



incomplete: there is no substantive discussion of law, church, education,<sup>335</sup> government or state that we find in Campanella, Andreae and Comenius. Only vague points are raised.

For example, we know that Bensalem is Christian, and that it practices a degree of religious toleration (one of the leading characters on the island is Joabin the Jew<sup>336</sup>) but when it comes to the organisation of the church we remain ignorant. Other details are similarly scarce. Constitutionally *New Atlantis* may be self-sufficient but no indication is offered as to how this is achieved economically. All we discover is that the men who attend to the sick refuse to accept payment for their troubles<sup>337</sup> and the narrator concludes that this is because they are already paid by the state. No further discussion takes place. Although Bensalem was founded by a monarch (King Salomana) no other ruler is ever mentioned, and it is unclear whether monarchy remains the accepted political system. The only institution that is described in any real detail is Saloman's House.<sup>338</sup>

This view has recently been reasserted by Donnelly:

*New Atlantis* offers us no theory about the ordering of institutional structures in the state, nor about the origins or purposes of the state.<sup>339</sup>

She suggests that Bacon was only interested in investigating natural phenomena. As the state is very much a man-made creation, he is not interested in studying it.

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<sup>335</sup> Although we discover that there are apprentice fellows, we do not know how else the islanders receive any education.

<sup>336</sup> *Collected Works* III p. 151.

<sup>337</sup> They are offered "pistolets".

<sup>338</sup> Instead Bacon concentrates on the shipwreck and discovery of the island; the conversion myth; the story of Atlantis and the founding of Bensalem; the Feast of the Family. None of these stories offers the same kind of practical and political information that we find in the pansophist utopia.

<sup>339</sup> Donnelly (1998) p. 87.

Donnelly's view is slightly exaggerated, however. As we have seen, Bacon does offer us a theory of origins: the Bensalem state began with the decree of King Salomana. Yet her assessment is generally accurate.

On the most basic level *New Atlantis* is not a whole, completed political entity and this fact has been noted previously. Albanese suggests that the incomplete nature of *New Atlantis* is Bacon's way of enshrining the notion of science within the structure of the text itself:

The *New Atlantis* presents narrative as potential fact, and the work of reading the exercise of an acumen now harnessed to the production of scientific knowledge... The interpretation of any such data within the utopian frame of the text is steadfastly resisted, for there is always more to be known, and that superfluity denies formal closure. Such open-endedness lends Bacon's text the dynamism I have mentioned earlier.<sup>340</sup>

Albanese argues that Bacon addressed his work to King James I (equating him with the King Salomana of *New Atlantis*) and was in effect suggesting means of improving newly colonised areas through scientific means. He used the utopian form, therefore, to produce a skilful piece of propaganda designed to support his own ideas: "it is the product of a Jacobean bureaucrat in search of patronage for his philosophical programme."<sup>341</sup> In other words, Bacon deliberately avoided a fully developed utopia so that he could portray a dynamic and progressive science more fully.

Albanese's view is ingenious, but contrasts almost completely with the original explanation by Bacon's official biographer. Rawley asserted that the lack of ending was simply a matter of time constraints:

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<sup>340</sup> Albanese 'The *New Atlantis* and the Uses of Utopia' in *ELH* vol. 57 (no. 3, 1990) p. 523.

<sup>341</sup> Albanese (1990) p. 516.

His Lordship thought also, in this present fable, to have composed a frame of laws; or of the best state or mould of a commonwealth; but foreseeing it would be a long work, his desire of collecting the Natural History diverted him, which he preferred many degrees before it<sup>342</sup>

If this true then Albanese's explanation gives Bacon too much credit in systematically deconstructing the utopian myth. Perhaps he was simply uninterested in those aspects of society that lay beyond the boundaries of science. We are left to question, then, whether or not Bacon consciously avoided the pansophist utopian format.

These two positions are not irreconcilable, however. I suggest that Bacon certainly understood the nature of utopia, and that he also deliberately rejected the concept. Furthermore he did this *because* his interest in science far outweighed his concerns for political theory. In this sense Rawley correctly interprets Bacon's priorities, while Albanese recognises the intent of his actions. The most logical explanation for Bacon's incomplete narrative is that the status of Saloman's House renders any subsequent political institution irrelevant.

As we have seen, the fellows of Saloman's House act with immunity from state interference, to such an extent that they do not have to reveal their findings to the public or even the government. They are also free from the laws that constrain other inhabitants. Travelling may be banned for the masses, for example, but not so for the fellows. There are twelve 'merchants of light' (comprising one-third of all college Fellows) who travel the world in disguise, and they are never allowed to reveal their true identity or origins. Their task is to collect and impart information

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<sup>342</sup> Weld *A History of the Royal Society* I (London: John Parker, 1848) p 61.

from all over the globe, so that Saloman's House may be kept constantly updated.<sup>343</sup> The thirty-six fellows of Saloman's House thus constitute a caste that stand over and above the rest of the political system.

The pansophist utopia embodies ideas of harmony, unity and stability. Yet Bacon breaks away from these constraints. His utopia is not a fully integrated society but one in which a class of untouchables exists. The status of the fellows strongly undermines any sense of utopian unity: there can be no room for independence in the interdependent society. For Campanella, Andreae and Comenius the state's role is total, nobody is left outside of its jurisdiction, and in this way a common bond is forged between the citizens. Yet for Bacon science is so important that it necessitates an institution outwith state boundaries.

*New Atlantis* concludes with the words "the rest was not perfected",<sup>344</sup> which is especially true from a pansophist perspective. Bacon's utopia cannot be perfect as it enshrines the flaw of Saloman's House. As such it is not a complete entity, even if its constitution is predisposed to prevent change. There is no substantive description of the role of the state or the status of the citizen because such descriptions are logically unnecessary. The fellows of Saloman's House exist outside of the state, which means that it can never reach the same proportions of integration that exists in *Civitas Solis*, *Christianopolis* or *Panorthosia*. Bacon's lack of unity makes *New Atlantis* stand out as being a qualitatively different political model to the pansophist utopia.

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<sup>343</sup> *Collected Works* III, p. 164.

## Conclusion

For each of the pansophists, man and state are interdependent. Man is self-perfecting, but only in the correct conditions: the conditions of the utopian society. The perfect world is a complex model, relying on particular views of man, knowledge and the universe. It is a metaphysically coherent structure that relies, in particular, on a total political system. Thus, Campanella advocates eugenics to increase man's earthly perfection, and state religion to engender a sense of civic love and even a distinctive Solarian identity. Andreae promotes self-sufficiency as the key to prevent change, with religion cementing each citizen's allegiance to the state. Comenius' political vision is similarly static, as he advocates that all aspects of human life, no matter how private, should be controlled by political activity.

Perfection was gauged in terms of an object's development: only when its nature was fully realised could it be said to have achieved perfection. Perfection was not, therefore, a continuum but rather an end point. Man's end was ultimately in Heaven, so the task of utopia was to transpose Heaven onto earth. In so doing it had to present a complete, total and political society, worked out in every detail so that the nature of the society itself was fully realised and perfected. The pansophist utopia is thus a total state-system: it is changeless, as change can only logically be for the worse, and it affects the lives of its citizens in every way.

The pansophist view of perfection cannot be discerned in Bacon's *New Atlantis*. Although he, too, acknowledges the same influences as those of the

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<sup>344</sup> *Collected Works* III p. 166.

pansophists, Bacon does not offer a complete and total state system. Indeed he cannot, because he situates a class of scientists that are above the laws and politics of Bensalem. Bacon establishes a rogue element into the structure of his ideal society, and this prevents *New Atlantis* from ever achieving the same nature of perfection as embodied in the pansophist utopia. Campanella, Andreae and Comenius showed a consistent view of the perfect society, which existed fully constructed and complete. Anything less than that would fail the test of unity and universality that was so central to the pansophist project. Criticisms of the totalitarian nature of utopia are not unfounded, but do not take into account the pansophist view of human nature, which is more optimistic than such an outlook would suggest.

### **Chapter III: Pansophist Man**

This chapter is concerned with pansophist conceptions of human nature. It begins by looking at the role of human nature in general utopian theory before concentrating on the work of Campanella, Andreae and Comenius. It argues that their view of man was essential to both their pansophist and utopian ideas. They each offered an optimistic view of man that renders their utopias less coercive than is commonly considered. In contrast, Bacon's *New Atlantis* is not underpinned by any theory of human nature. This chapter will show that Bacon offered a much more orthodox Christian model of man as the fallen creature. His view of human nature is an important reason for not categorising him as a pansophist utopian.

#### **1) Theories of Human Nature**

Campanella, Andreae and Comenius all hold a view of human nature that is essentially the same. They envisage a metaphysical model of man as the centre of universal hierarchy that has God at its head and material forms at its base. Man is composed of body and soul and his duality marks him out as a unique creature. With his body man can descend towards the bestial and vegetative, but through his soul he can raise himself to the divine. Man's dual nature allows him to embrace all other elements in the hierarchy so that he can become all things: man is truly the universal creature. This metaphysically universal model of man cannot be identified in *New Atlantis*, or in any other of Bacon's works.

This universalist model of human nature challenged the religious orthodoxy of the seventeenth century. As man can ascend towards God through his own volition then he is not as naturally corrupt as traditional Christianity suggests. It also has wider implications for utopian theory in general because the way in which we view man greatly influences our perception of the ideal society. As Watson suggests, if we view man as inherently corrupt then utopia becomes a restrictive and coercive society, designed to suppress mans' naturally base appetites.<sup>345</sup> If, on the other hand, man is seen as generous, benevolent and perfectible then utopia is the place in which his natural goodness can be developed to its fullest. Theorists are divided as to which view is the most persuasive. In other words, some commentators argue that utopia is deeply rooted in traditional Christian teachings and subsequently has a pessimistic view of man as the fallen creature. To others it is the epitome of the teachings of Pelagius.

Pelagianism is the heretical doctrine that rejects the concept of original sin. The British monk Pelagius (who became an opponent of St Augustine around 410AD) argued that the sin of Adam was not passed down to future generations of human beings, and that we are all born in the same state of grace that Adam had originally been created. He taught that many men had lived sinless lives, even before the coming of Christ. Not only did Pelagius reject the necessity of God's grace, but he also opposed the view that Christ's resurrection had conquered sin. In short, he taught that sin was the consequence of each man's actions: it was not inherited and thus man was not automatically

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<sup>345</sup> See Watson 'From Fantasy to Feasibility; or the Romance of the Future', *Science Fiction Studies*, vol. 8, no. 24, (July 1981), <http://www.uiowa.edu/~sfs/watson24.htm>

condemned to Hell from before his conception. He was in effect the tool of his own perfection.<sup>346</sup>

Judith Shklar argues that the Pelagian view of human nature was transposed onto models of utopia. Far from being naturally corrupt, utopian man is wholly perfectible: he is destined for greatness and accomplishes this feat without the traditional help of God's grace:

utopia was a way of rejecting "original sin" ... Whatever else the classical utopians may say or fail to say, all were attacks on the radical theory of original sin. Utopia is always a picture and a moral measure of the heights man could attain using only his natural powers.<sup>347</sup>

Utopia and Pelagianism go hand in hand. Shklar uses Thomas More's original *Utopia* as a defining example of this. Despite a loose endorsement of Christianity towards the end of the book, More's islanders practice a strictly natural religion, which suggests that Christianity is not essential to an ideal vision of man and society.<sup>348</sup> Revelation is not needed in order to create the perfect world: it can be achieved purely through man's own reason. Tuveson offered a similar view some years previously. He suggested that the utopian ideals of the seventeenth century were prevalent in ideas of progress found one hundred years later, ideas that were inextricably linked to the problem of fallen man. He argues that the utopian goal of progress:

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<sup>346</sup> After many years of wrangling Pelagius' ideas were officially confirmed as heretical by the Council of Ephesus in AD 431. For a fuller discussion of his teachings see *Pelagius: Life and Letters*, ed. B. R. Rees (New York: Boydell, 1998) or *Pelagius' Commentary on St Paul's Epistles to the Romans*, ed. T. de Bruyn (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993).

<sup>347</sup> Shklar 'The Political Theory of Europe: From Melancholy to Nostalgia' in *Daedalus* 4, (No. 2, 1965) p. 370. See also her *After Utopia: the Decline of Political Faith* (Princeton, 1957). Shklar identifies "classical utopians" as pre-Enlightenment texts, including the pansophists.

<sup>348</sup> Shklar (1965) p. 370. As we have noted Campanella also adheres to this model.

involved a kind of neo-Pelagianism: the advance of civilisation, the gradual increase in mans' knowledge and moral refinement, in itself constitutes his salvation.<sup>349</sup>

If man can create his own perfect world, then he cannot be bound by original sin or else all of his dreams would be doomed.

This thesis is provocative, but it is not without fault. The central problem is that the Pelagian doctrine cannot be found in such a clear-cut form in all utopian works. Writers such as Andreae, for example, clearly do not openly reject the doctrine of grace, despite the fact that his *Christianopolis* is not as orthodox in this matter as he may have led his readers to believe. On a similar level, although Campanella outlines a utopian religion that is ostensibly based upon reason, he does not reject the notion of grace outright. In short, the pansophist utopias do not accept a *purely* Pelagian stance regarding mans' ability to perfect himself. But nor do they see him as irretrievably fallen.

The inheritance of original sin, and man's inability to overcome it on earth, was very much the orthodoxy in seventeenth century Europe.<sup>350</sup> Perfection was to be found only in heaven and man could not bring it upon himself in this world. For some commentators the pansophists did not attack this tradition, but rather they embraced this view. As we have seen, Davis argues that human nature was necessarily corrupt for utopian society to succeed. He suggests that Thomas More, the pansophists and many others sought to counteract man's sinful nature through strict social controls: law, institutionalised religion, constant surveillance, and so on. In utopia the state is overbearing precisely because man is seen as corrupted:

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<sup>349</sup> Ernest Lee Tuveson *Millennium and Utopia a Study in the Background of the Idea of Progress* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949).

<sup>350</sup> The Augustinian orthodoxy was a particularly strong element of Protestant faith, i.e. Lutheranism and Calvinism. For a fuller discussion of the Augustinian tradition in the early Seventeenth Century see, for example, Thomas (1987) p. 21.

they are so regulated and sanctions provided for enforcement because man cannot be relied upon or even inspired to do well.<sup>351</sup>

As we have noted, Davis contrasts this model with another form of ideal society, the perfect moral commonwealth that assumes a naturally good man.<sup>352</sup> In fact, the perfect moral commonwealth is the *only* ideal society that allows man to be naturally perfected, which also helps distinguish it from Arcadia and millennium.<sup>353</sup>

But there are also difficulties with this argument.<sup>354</sup> It is clear when looking at many utopian works, particularly those of the pansophists, that their authors *do* display a belief in the potential for man's self-improvement. Man is never condemned as *entirely* corrupted and he does possess a capacity to do good for himself. This is not to say that he is his own God, or that grace is ever entirely rejected, but for the pansophists man retains a spark of divinity that sets him apart from other creatures in the universe.

There are further difficulties in relation to human nature that can be seen in other utopian studies. To put it simply, most discussions become so generalised that their conclusions become rather vague. The Manuels provide one example. In their multi-layered discussion, they identify the existence of a "utopian propensity" as a key component in any utopia. This notion is based upon the "religious propensity" heralded by William James that, as the Manuels

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<sup>351</sup> J. C. Davis 'The History of Utopia: the Chronology of Nowhere' in *Utopias*, ed. Alexander and Gill (London, 1984) p. 9. Davis will be approached again in the final chapter of this thesis.

<sup>352</sup> Davis' typology consists of Utopia, Arcadia/Cokayne, Millennium and the Perfect Moral Commonwealth.

<sup>353</sup> Davis cites Kant's ethical beliefs as an illustration of this position. See *Utopia and the Ideal Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) p. 528, or (1984) p. 8: "Kant's society betokens final adherence to this ideal society type."

<sup>354</sup> We have already seen that the category of the perfect moral commonwealth has some flaws. See pp. 51-52 of this discussion.

accept, skirted around the thorny issue of actually defining religion. Their own concept is equally slippery:

The utopian propensity is no more equally distributed among men in all times and places than the religious propensity, though it is doubtful whether anyone is totally devoid of it. There may even be a utopian vocation.<sup>355</sup>

But this concept is difficult to identify and impossible to quantify; no indication is given as to what the propensity consists of. Indeed, one suspects that the Manuels are again sidestepping the issue of firm definitions. Whatever the motivation, the 'utopian propensity' can only be of limited use.<sup>356</sup>

Mannheim offers a more specific vision. He identifies utopian human nature as the revolutionary spark that exists in the hearts and minds of men, a desire that can be contrasted with the inherently conservative notion of ideology, which only seeks to defend the status quo. Utopia as revolution appears to be a more useful concept but again the dice are loaded in favour of the author's own definitions: Mannheim admits that he is only concerned with revolutionary thought to begin with. His work subsequently yields some unexpected results, especially in regard to whom we may identify as a utopian thinker.<sup>357</sup> Bloch's seminal work on utopian philosophy is also troubling. Utopian thinking has been prevalent throughout history in various forms and guises, from the simplest fairy tale through to the most sophisticated technical achievement. Utopia can be discerned wherever man has applied his thoughts and actions: in art, literature, science, architecture or industry. All represent man's utopian dreams.<sup>358</sup>

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<sup>355</sup> *Man and Man* (1979) p. 5.

<sup>356</sup> For similar criticisms see Watson (1981) pp. 1-3.

<sup>357</sup> Mannheim infamously rejects More's *Utopia*, for example, as utopian. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (London: Routledge, 1997) Others have criticised Mannheim's idiosyncratic categorisations, for example, Shklar (1965) p. 370, or *Man and Man* (1979) p. 11.

<sup>358</sup> The seminal discussion is Bloch's monumental *Principle of Hope* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1986). For a more accessible introduction see the essay 'Indication of Utopian Content' in *A Philosophy of the Future* trans. Cumming (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970).

Hertzler offers a similarly optimistic view of our utopian nature that embraces the notion of genius. She suggests that utopianism is

the role of the conscious human will in suggesting a trend of development for society, or the unconscious alignment of society in conformity with some definite ideal.<sup>359</sup>

Utopian thinking is thus a positive expression of mans' desire for social change. But with these theories we encounter a similar problem as to the Manuels' utopian propensity. If utopia exists within us, and is manifested all around us, we should be able to state exactly what it is but in spite of our best efforts the term remains elusive. Unfortunately 'utopianism' remains no more than a vaguely optimistic outlook for the future of humankind.

In a sense, this is a return to the problems of definition we have previously identified. The continual expansion of the meaning of utopia leaves us with an umbrella term that covers any and all philosophical or political aspirations man may have. A neat example is Simecka's defence of utopian thinking, which he offers in an ironic summary:

let us erase everything utopian from our cultural heritage, all the dreams and strivings for a better ordered society, for the realisation of the age-old ideas of equality, fraternity, liberty, and the dignity of human existence.<sup>360</sup>

By this account any hope we may have for a better world is an indication of our utopian human nature. Yet this brings us no closer to what a utopian thought actually is. A list of principles does not necessarily constitute a definition. Any theory that seeks to highlight a "good" definition of human nature must provide a clearer utopian identity. In trying to cover all literature, such definitions inevitably lose a great deal of force.

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<sup>359</sup> Joyce Oramel Hertzler *The History of Utopian Thought* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1923) p.

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<sup>360</sup> M Simecka, 'A World With Utopias or Without Them?' in Alexander and Gill eds. (1984) p.

174.

There is one final position in the debate on human nature, which may usefully be addressed. Kumar accepts some of Shklar's thesis and identifies various strands of perfectibility in utopian human nature. For example, he cites Pelagius as a lasting influence on More.<sup>361</sup> But generally speaking Kumar does not view the debate in terms of naturally good versus eternally corrupted man. What is most relevant is the degree to which utopian human nature can be manipulated:

what does seem necessary is that human nature should be seen as almost infinitely malleable – for practical purposes a *tabula rasa*.<sup>362</sup>

Yet this still overlooks vital questions. *Why* is man so malleable? What is in his make-up that makes him a blank canvas? In the case of the pansophists the answers are easily obtained. Man is malleable because he universal: he contains the essences of all beings of the universe, from the lowest to the highest. Such a definition does not apply to all utopian works, of course, and it may be the case that other ideal societies have different views on human nature. What is important here is that for the pansophists, man's apparently untouched nature is actually a manifestation of a specific model of man: a universal, Neo-Pelagian image of man.<sup>363</sup>

The debate surrounding ideas on human nature in utopia is thus littered with ambiguity and generalisations, especially in relation to the pansophists. As I will now demonstrate, it is inconceivable that Campanella, Andreae and Comenius viewed man as inherently corrupted, but nor did they reject the doctrine of grace outright. Arguments over suspected Pelagianism versus a

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<sup>361</sup> Kumar (1987) pp. 12-13.

<sup>362</sup> Kumar (1987) p. 28.

<sup>363</sup> I use the term Neo-Pelagian here to denote this specific view of man as the central element of a universal hierarchy. I accept that the pansophists did not themselves use this term, but I believe it is the most accurate shorthand for expressing their views on man.

belief in fallen man in this case represent a false dichotomy. Different utopias have different views on human nature. Attempts to provide one all-encompassing model for every ideal society is ultimately impossible. The pansophists accepted that man has a certain capacity for perfection, because they had a *specific* model of his place in the universe. The question that remains is to what extent this perfection could be attained by mans' own powers? And why did he have this power at all?

## 2) Man and the Five Worlds

Campanella outlined a universal hierarchy of being that was central to both his metaphysics and his utopian vision. His doctrine of the *five worlds* suggested that the universe was divided into five grades of being, which was crucial to Campanella's doctrine of *primalities*. Although it was most fully developed in his *Metaphysica*, it was also represented in *Civitas Solis*. As we have noted, the Solarians worship the primalities as their deity and the universal hierarchy is also a fundamental feature of their religion.<sup>364</sup>

Campanella suggests that man is unique because he possesses a soul, which contains elements of each level of being in the universe. Thus man has a fluid identity: he can ascend the universal hierarchy towards God and bring help to bring about his own perfection. The neo-Pelagian aspect of the pansophist utopia is perhaps most obvious in Campanella due to the fact that the Solarians lack Christian Revelation. More importantly they seem to reject the theological basis for Original Sin. As this section will illustrate, however, such an

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<sup>364</sup> See pp. 73-75.

interpretation is unduly hasty. The Solarians do not deny that man cannot exist, or be perfected, without the help of his Creator and their lack of Christianity does not rule out what may be termed a thin doctrine of grace.<sup>365</sup> Utopia enables man to reach his highest level of earthly perfection, but he still requires God to attain the final stage of perfection in heaven.

### **i. Man in the Universal Hierarchy**

Campanella's universal hierarchy is contained in his *Metaphysica* in the doctrine of the *five worlds*.<sup>366</sup> The five worlds are the grades of being that comprise the universe and, as such, reinforce the doctrine of the primalities. As we have seen the primalities are the three principles of *potentia* (power), *sapientia* (wisdom), and *amor* (love). These are the three essentialities of God's own nature and the principles that make up all living creatures.<sup>367</sup> The ratio in which they co-exist determines each creature's nature and position in the hierarchy; they assign an object to *one* of the five worlds.<sup>368</sup>

Beginning with the lowest, Campanella shows that there are two worlds for body, the *Material* and *Localised* worlds. The Material world contains the Telesian principles of cold and heat,<sup>369</sup> and these two principles produce the bodies found in the Localised world. Above them is the *Mathematical* world of space, which is changeless and perpetual. This is followed by the *Mental* world of angels and intellect, which is unending but not eternal, as it is still a God-

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<sup>365</sup> I use his term because Campanella does not specify that he is proposing a doctrine of Christian grace.

<sup>366</sup> *Met II* 10/7/1.

<sup>367</sup> See pp. 70-73.

<sup>368</sup> For an overview see Bon. pp. 220-21.

created realm.<sup>370</sup> At the apex of the hierarchy is God in the eternal world of the *Archetype*, the perfect realm from which all else emanates. In God the primalities are infinite. Campanella explains that the universe is connected by a series of intermediaries: each world contains the essences of the two adjacent to it.<sup>371</sup>

The five worlds are also an integral part of the Solarian belief system, a point that has been too frequently overlooked in previous studies of Campanella's utopia. As we have noted, attempts to find meaning in *Civitas Solis* have sometimes missed the prevalence of the author's own metaphysical doctrines.<sup>372</sup> The Solarians believe that God is all-powerful, and that all things emanate from him in a hierarchical chain of being. The universe thus reflects the harmony of God's power:

Their laws are extremely few, all of them being inscribed on a copper tablet at the entrance to the temple, that is to say, within the columns, on which there are stated briefly all the essences of things: what God is; what an angel is; what the world, or a star, or a man etc. is.<sup>373</sup>

When this passage has previously been discussed it has usually been cited to illustrate Campanella's magical beliefs. Yates, for example, suggests that it indicates the importance Campanella attaches to angelology.<sup>374</sup> But although it is indebted to occult and mystical traditions, *Civitas Solis* is not a purely magical text. Campanella's model of the universe, with its intermediate bodies, reinforces

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<sup>369</sup> Telesio's influence on Campanella is particularly important in regards to the magical theory of affinities. See pp. 223-25 for a fuller discussion.

<sup>370</sup> This is where we may expect to find man because of his intellectual powers of soul.

<sup>371</sup> Angels, for example, connect God with the corporeal world. See *Met III* 12/1 and Bon. p. 221.

<sup>372</sup> This is especially true for the primalities.

<sup>373</sup> *CS* p. 51.

<sup>374</sup> Yates (1964) p. 377.

his entire metaphysical system rather than just his mystical philosophy. The same system forms the basis for the beliefs of the Solarians.

But where is man to be found in the universe? And is his position also reflected in Campanella's utopia?

For Campanella the key to man's nature is his soul, which is divided into two substances: spirit and intellect.<sup>375</sup> Intellect is the highest of man's powers, granting understanding and wisdom and a privileged position within the hierarchy, alongside the angels in the Mental world. But this does not mean that he remains in the angelic realm. The situation is more complex than this, as man does not have a fixed role in the universe.

Campanella's man comprises body and soul and his duality connects him not only to the Mental realm, but also to each one of the five worlds. His soul, (primarily his intellect) clearly brings man towards God and the angels. His body allows him access to the worlds of space and body. A crucial element of man's being here is spirit, which flows through the blood and acts as the intermediary between body and intellect. Thus spirit mediates between the higher and lower reaches of the universe. It is the animating principle that drives man; the mechanism for him to traverse the universal hierarchy.<sup>376</sup>

Consequently man has no fixed essence in the five worlds. His duality of body and soul, with the intermediary of spirit, allows him to transcend his position in the universe. Man is a fluid figure, "he is the epilogue of all worlds."<sup>377</sup> The five worlds are united in man: he is truly the universal creature.

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<sup>375</sup> See Bon. p 71, and *Met III* 14/5/4.

<sup>376</sup> See Bon. p. 72.

<sup>377</sup> See Bon p. 221, and *Met II* 10/1/11.

Campanella also cites a second hierarchy, the six degrees of *sapientia*, through which man can become all things.<sup>378</sup> This chain of wisdom relates to the various forms of sense found in each being. Once again, although every creature has its own fixed position, man contains elements of them all. *Natural* sense is in the elements whereas *Vegetable* and *Animal* sense are self-explanatory. *Rational* sense applies specifically to man's reason, above which is the intellectual *Angelic* sense. Finally there is the *Divine* sense of God. The first three categories apply to the five senses (sight, sound, taste, smell and touch) and are consequently all well within man's reach. The fourth is man's alone and the final categories can be approached by the intellectual soul. Thus man contains all degrees of *sapientia*.<sup>379</sup>

There is nothing particularly uncommon in this dual model of man as body and soul. Campanella himself acknowledges the influences of St Augustine as well as St Paul for the dual vision of man and Telesio is another candidate. Some have traced the model back as far as Epicurus.<sup>380</sup> But in adopting this model Campanella claims more than a simple duality. He is granting man a universal nature, which makes him the ultimate intermediary in the hierarchy of being. Man can become all things through his understanding and as such he assimilates all other creatures in the hierarchy.<sup>381</sup>

## ii. *Civitas Solis* and Original Sin

To what extent is this model of man reflected in *Civitas Solis*? Does Campanella suggest that the Solarians conform to Shklar's ideas on the self-

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<sup>378</sup> See Bon. p 159, and *Met II* 6/7/1.

<sup>379</sup> This is particularly important in terms of the sensual knowledge that Campanella praised. For a fuller discussion on sense see chapter 4 of this discussion.

<sup>380</sup> For a list of these and others see Bon. p. 327, n. 1.

perfected utopian man? On first reading this may appear to be the case, but we should bear in mind that Campanella himself claimed that he did not want grace to become an issue at all. Throughout the text he states that the Solarians practice religion strictly in accordance with natural law despite the fact that they have a good knowledge of Christ and Christianity.<sup>382</sup> Campanella reinforced these claims in his *Quaestiones Politicae* of 1609, invoking man's reason as the main pillar of his defence against attacks on such sinful practices as the common store of women. Without revelation, Campanella argues, the Solarians simply do not know any better: any unsavoury acts are due only to the "weakness of the human mind."<sup>383</sup> This does appear a little incongruous, however, for although the Solarians may not have received revelation, Campanella certainly had. One may question why he would turn his back on his own beliefs, particularly in regard to such a crucial aspect of orthodoxy. The key again lies in Campanella's broader metaphysics: the religion of the Solarians is based around the author's own philosophical doctrines. The two positions are not so distinct as Campanella claimed.

On two occasions *Civitas Solis* appears to reject the fall of Adam and original sin. As we have already noted, the first occurs during a discussion on self-love. The Solarians reverse the tradition of the fall, by insisting that self-love was the *result* of private property rather than its cause. Adam's sin can be rectified, therefore, by the removal of private property, which is why *Civitas*

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<sup>381</sup> See p. 139 for the similarity with Comenius' position.

<sup>382</sup> For example see CS p. 34 and p. 61.

<sup>383</sup> Bon. p. 274.

*Solis* is a communist society. Such measures show that the ability to remove man's failings is within his own grasp.<sup>384</sup>

The second incident offers an even more explicit rejection of original sin. As the Mariner outlines the Solarian view of the fall, he mentions some doctrines that the islanders used to hold but had long since disowned, including the idea that God allows and encourages evil in the world.<sup>385</sup> He goes on to explain why the Solarians condemn the idea of original sin:

they [the Solarians] say that the Christian is happy in that he is content to believe that so much confusion has come about through Adam's sin, and they believe that the sons inherit the misfortune of the punishment rather than that of the guilt of the fathers.<sup>386</sup>

The Christian is a weak individual, complacently blaming all of his own ills on an historical incident. He focuses upon the existence of guilt rather than the means of its removal, and he compounds his foolishness by ignoring the importance of proper breeding:

the guilt returns from the sons to the fathers when the latter have been negligent in matters of procreation.<sup>387</sup>

Thus man seems to have the powers and capacity to achieve his own perfection: the problems associated with original sin can be reversed and bred out through the programme of eugenics. Man is responsible for the sins of his future existence and there is no such thing as an eternally corrupted man. In this way, *Civitas Solis* seems to pour scorn on original sin and claims its Pelagian credentials. Campanella himself reiterates this in the second of the *Quaestiones*

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<sup>384</sup> We have seen in the previous chapter that other means such as adherence to law, religion and the programme of eugenics also prevents the Solarians from descending into sin.

<sup>385</sup> *CS* p. 59. This was one of the justifications for Pico's attack on astrology, see p. 223-24.

<sup>386</sup> *CS* p. 60.

<sup>387</sup> *CS* p. 60.

*Politicae*, in which he states that we would all live like Solarians had it not been for original sin.<sup>388</sup>

But this is not necessarily a complete destruction of Christian orthodoxy. *Civitas Solis* makes it clear that man can never be fully perfected, which is why the utopia has such strict controls. If the programme of eugenics were abandoned, for example, man may revert back to his originally corrupted form.<sup>389</sup> Crime still exists in Campanella's utopia: man has not improved so much that he no longer sins. It is also important to note that despite their lack of Christian revelation, the Solarians hold that God is all-good, and they rely on him for his intercession and help. There are public confessions and daily vigils. Sacrifices are offered, "asking that he grant absolution to the whole city and guide and protect it".<sup>390</sup> The Solarians may not explicitly acknowledge the doctrine of Christian grace but they certainly do not place themselves on a level with God. He has the final decision in man's heavenly perfection.

In *The Monarchy of the Messiah*, Campanella reaffirms the necessity of grace, repeating Aquinas' dictum: "Truly grace does not destroy nature, but it does correct and perfect corrupted nature."<sup>391</sup> Even so, grace requires human assistance. Man must establish the earthly conditions in which it will flourish: he must be active in his own perfection.

Campanella's utopia offers an optimistic image of man based upon the metaphysical ideal of him at the centre of the universe. He has the ability to improve his own nature and social conditions because he understands and can

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<sup>388</sup> See J. M. Headley 'On Reconstructing the Citizenry: Campanella's Criticism of Aristotle's Politics' in *Church, Empire and World the Quest for Universal Order 1520 – 1640* (Norfolk: Ashgate, 1997) p 31.

<sup>389</sup> The social controls of *Civitas Solis* have been discussed in the previous chapter.

<sup>390</sup> *CS* p. 53.

transcend his place in the universe. This knowledge ensures that man does *not* equate himself wholly with God (although he is the universal creature, man remains below the stature of his Creator) but it also prevents him from being the completely corrupted creature of Christian orthodoxy. Campanella provides a Neo-Pelagian model of man, one that increases his capacity for self-perfection while retaining the need for grace. Crucially, it is the conditions within *Civitas Solis* that facilitate the development of this universal man.

### 3) Andreae's Christian Barriers to Perfection

Unlike *Civitas Solis* there seems to be no ambiguity surrounding the relationship between natural religion and Christianity in Andreae's utopia. *Christianopolis* is a republic with Jesus at its head: the citizens of Christianopolis practice the sacraments and fully accept original sin. But Andreae's religious beliefs mask a complex discussion on the nature of man. His Christian ethics seem to posit man as weak and corrupt, an image reinforced by utopian structures such as twenty-four-hour surveillance and strict laws. There seems no use in man trying to perfect himself, still less a universal hierarchy in which to achieve such a feat.

Nobody can deny that these arguments hold a certain validity, and this section begins by expanding them in detail. But a closer reading of *Christianopolis*, along with closely related works such as *A Modell of a Christian Society*, provides a very different interpretation. It becomes clear that Andreae does hold man in the highest esteem. More importantly, he does so

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<sup>391</sup> Mon (1997) p. 50. Compare this with question 109 from Aquinas' *Summa Theologia* in Sigmund, ed. *St Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics* (New York: Norton, 1988).

because man has a universal nature, with the capacity to become both beast and God. Although he is not as explicit as his fellow pansophists, Andreae definitely offers a model of a universal hierarchy, which consists of God, angels, man and lower beings. Andreae's Christianity is undeniable, but this does not preclude an adherence to the pansophist, Neo-Pelagian vision of utopian man.

### **i. Andreae's Christocentrism**

Upon first reading, Andreae's Christocentrism appears to refute the idea of a naturally good man almost entirely. Man cannot exist without God's constant help and intervention: his inherently flawed nature grants him a natural propensity for wrongdoing. Andreae's pessimism is rooted in his Lutheran faith, a view most avidly endorsed by Montgomery:

A more thoroughly evangelical, sane, non-esoteric approach ... could hardly be imagined; as always, Andreae's Christian Cosmexenus has his eyes fixed squarely on the Christ of the New Testament.<sup>392</sup>

Christianity is built into the very title of Andreae's utopia, and is consistently reflected throughout the text. Andreae describes his utopia as a state of "Christian liberty",<sup>393</sup> all laws are directed towards Christ, and consequently are not seen as coercive.

As we began to see in the previous chapter, however, these laws may seem extremely restrictive to the modern reader and they appear to reinforce the apparent lack of faith Andreae has in man's own goodness. One example will suffice here. *Christianopolis* has a sophisticated system of night-lights, which

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<sup>392</sup> Montgomery (1973) I, p. 200. Christian Cosmexenus was the name of the pilgrim in many of Andreae's fables. Andreae does not use it to name the narrator of *Christianopolis*, though, so Montgomery makes his own connections.

prevent the city from ever being in darkness. The narrator is informed that this is for strictly religious purposes, as light discourages the devil from gaining a foothold in utopia:

they would strive in this way to resist the dark kingdom of Satan and his questionable pastimes; and they wish to remind themselves of the everlasting light.<sup>394</sup>

But this spiritual reasoning masks a more down-to-earth concern. Streetlights allow the city guards, who patrol twenty-four-hours a day, to spot miscreants more easily, enabling them “to put a stop to useless wandering about”.<sup>395</sup> Andreae’s Christian liberty seems incompatible with the more modern civil variety, but no matter how regimented life becomes, all actions must look towards God.

The city elders admit that all men are imperfect, which is why *Christianopolis* is designed to obtain maximum grace from God.<sup>396</sup> Baptism is the crucial sacrament, and is taken in the utmost seriousness. Many people are called not only as godparents but also guardians, teachers and witnesses of faith.<sup>397</sup> Man’s corruption is written into the city’s legal code: “it must be confessed that human flesh cannot be completely conquered anywhere.”<sup>398</sup>

Original sin is accepted as an article of faith:

We believe in the same regeneration of the Spirit, the admission of sin, even the brotherhood of our flesh with Him and in Him, and the restoring to dignity, lost by the fall of Adam.<sup>399</sup>

Grace is therefore essential to man’s perfection: he can achieve nothing without God.

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<sup>393</sup> *Chrs* p. 140.

<sup>394</sup> *Chrs* p. 172.

<sup>395</sup> *Chrs* p. 172.

<sup>396</sup> *Chrs.* p. 278.

<sup>397</sup> *Chrs* p. 255.

<sup>398</sup> *Chrs* p. 164.

On several occasions, Andreae's apparent despair cuts even deeper than this. The narrator is frequently reminded that no good at all can be found in earthly life. Man must reject this world and turn himself over to God. Again, this is enshrined in the city's laws:

We strive to disturb nothing of another, nor to confound divine with human things ...  
and to despise the sojourning place of the whole world.<sup>400</sup>

The only men who are happy on earth are those who give themselves over to Christian poverty where humble pleasures are man's only joy: "whatsoever things are considered lowly on earth, so long as they are considered harmless, these they desire."<sup>401</sup> Only in shunning this life can man enter the Kingdom of Heaven.

Thus Andreae appears to reject *any* concession to man's natural goodness or his ability to achieve any earthly perfection. God is his only salvation.

## ii. Andreae's Christian Reform

This pessimism sits oddly alongside what we know of Andreae the great reformer. It is difficult to understand why anybody with such a negative view of man would actively seek to transform him in this life. Instead it would be logically consistent for Andreae to preach the Christian poverty of *Christianopolis* throughout the full range of his work. But we know that Andreae *did* attempt to conduct such reforms. Looking at his *Modell of a*

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<sup>399</sup> *Chrs* p. 176.

<sup>400</sup> *Chrs* p. 178.

<sup>401</sup> *Chrs* p. 239.

*Christian Society (Societas Christiana)* we see a radically different view of human nature, one where it is now the subject of great praise.

*Societas Christiana* was established to overcome the twin evils of individuality and factionalism, the two gates through which Satan spreads dissension among men.<sup>402</sup> *Societas Christiana* will battle these by sowing the seeds of harmony among mankind. The main thrust of these reforms will be to achieve man's full potential, which Andreae now regards as almost limitless. The society will "advance the excellency of man's spirit."<sup>403</sup>

Why did Andreae change his mind? What provided the impetus for this remarkable upsurge of optimism? I suggest that there was no such u-turn. Andreae harboured these sentiments all along and by his own admission he had integrated them into his utopia. He made this revelation at the funeral of his old friend Wilhelm Wense. Wense, we will recall, was one of the men responsible for bringing Campanella's works to the attention of Andreae. In his funeral tribute, Andreae makes it clear that the society was born from the pages of *Christianopolis*. Andreae names his utopia on several occasions and concludes by ruing how the Thirty Years' War had destroyed his dreams for reform:

the storm of the German calamity fell upon us and made trial of all these - in my opinion not unpraiseworthy - endeavours, thus frustrating and overturning my whole 'Christianopolis'.<sup>404</sup>

This passage clearly establishes the link between *Societas Christiana* and the utopia of the previous year,<sup>405</sup> which strongly suggests that *Christianopolis* does, after all, provide a positive image of man. Perhaps this accounts for one of the

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<sup>402</sup> *Modell* p. 152: "everyone wholly applies to his particular, all faint under the general burden and raise nothing but various complaints."

<sup>403</sup> *Modell* p. 152.

<sup>404</sup> Translated in Montgomery (1973) I, p. 215.

utopia's most important maxims: "anyone can destroy a man, but only the best can reform."<sup>406</sup>

Upon closer inspection it is clear that Andreae does indeed praise his utopian man. This begins to manifest itself in a self-effacing passage in the introduction to the book, which sets the tone for the rest of the work. Andreae insists he is writing from an objective viewpoint, as he is determined "not to praise my citizens but to describe them".<sup>407</sup> Yet he cannot help praising his utopian citizens because, unlike the vast majority of men, they are *naturally* good. The inhabitants of *Christianopolis* do not require the seemingly restrictive social controls to guide them, as they are capable of attaining their own goodness. Andreae admits as much in his introduction:

even as the laws almost everywhere are good, and yet the morals of the people loose, so I fear you will suspect the same with the citizens of my state.<sup>408</sup>

Andreae fears that the reader will misjudge his utopian man and assume that he, too, is as naturally corrupt. The reader's suspicions are, of course, unwarranted because Andreae is effectively telling us that his citizens are naturally virtuous. In other words, it is not the law that makes the man good in Andreae's system. He is loading the dice so that only those who *are* good are permitted access to utopia.

This idea is then incorporated into the narrative. As the hero of the story approaches the gates of the city he is subjected to a series of interrogations. If he were to fail any one of these he would automatically be turned away from the society, a measure obviously designed to weed out any unsuitable candidates.

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<sup>405</sup> This is one argument that Montgomery correctly identifies. However he does not accept that any disparity between the two works. See pp. 17-20 of this discussion.

<sup>406</sup> *Chrs* p. 185.

<sup>407</sup> *Chrs* p. 140.

<sup>408</sup> *Chrs* p. 140.

During the course of the second interview the narrator is informed as to which groups are not tolerated within the city. These include among others:

beggars, quacks, stage-players ... busybodies ... fanatics ... drugmixers ... and other like blemishes of literature and true culture.<sup>409</sup>

Andreae's argument here is purely cosmetic. It is irrelevant whether or not these groups of people would be tolerated within *Christianopolis* because they would not be allowed to enter the city in the first instance. Their unsuitability would soon be rooted out during the interviews, leading to their immediate rejection. The implication is clear: one cannot enter Christianopolis unless one is first disposed to become a citizen. Andreae's utopian society requires a naturally perfectible utopian man.

### iii. Man's Universal Nature

One final point needs to be considered here. The argument throughout this chapter is that the pansophist view of human nature cannot be reduced to a simple dichotomy of 'good' versus 'bad' man. It is all well and good to show that Andreae generally holds man in high esteem, therefore, but what we need to discover is whether man is a universal creature who is part of a cosmological hierarchy. I suggest that just such a vision can be discerned in *Christianopolis*.

There is no explicit discussion of such a scheme within *Christianopolis* but the citizens of the utopia appear to accept such a doctrine. During his interviews at the gates, the narrator is told that central to the inhabitants' beliefs

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<sup>409</sup> *Chrs* p. 145. This passage is crucial to our understanding of the Rosicrucian connection, as we shall see in p. 239.

is the “harmony of all the world”.<sup>410</sup> He encounters similar teachings when investigating the mathematical laboratory, where the citizens study “the harmony of the heavenly bodies and their mutual, admirable proportions”.<sup>411</sup> The most revealing passage occurs in the discussion on Mystic Numbers, which proves the impossibility of an accidental creation:

that supreme Architect did not make this mighty mechanism haphazard, but He completed it most wisely by numbers, and proportions, and He added to it the element of time, distinguished by a wonderful harmony.<sup>412</sup>

This harmony is not as obvious as Campanella’s *Five Worlds*, but a close reading of the text shows that a universal hierarchy can indeed be discerned. As is to be expected, God sits at the head of the universe, “the first moving factor of all virtues.”<sup>413</sup> Under Him sit the angels, whom man relies on for protection and guidance.<sup>414</sup> Beneath man are found all lower bodies, whom God has placed within man’s jurisdiction:

who would believe that the great variety of things, in short the utility of the earth, had been granted to man for any other reason than for his highest benefit?<sup>415</sup>

Andreae thus places man in the centre of creation, below God and angels and above all other creatures. He is the bond of the world and possesses a universal nature.

Furthermore despite his allusions to Christian poverty, Andreae does *not* reject the earthly life outright. This world holds a vital place in our gaining knowledge of God, a point elucidated by the city’s Director of Learning:

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<sup>410</sup> *Chrs* p. 148.

<sup>411</sup> *Chrs* p. 204.

<sup>412</sup> *Chrs* pp. 220-21.

<sup>413</sup> *Chrs* p. 166.

<sup>414</sup> *Chrs* p. 248: “And right here there is special need of very eager prayers that they may command their dear ones very carefully to divine custody, whose sole care it is through the angels’ guardian power to avert from them those impure and pestiferous lips.”

<sup>415</sup> *Chrs* p. 231. This passage is also clearly in line with the teaching from Genesis.

He seemed at one time condemning of the earth and praising the heavens, and then again he seemed to be estimating the earth highly and the heavens of less value. For he insisted that a close examination of the earth would bring about a proper appreciation of the heavens.<sup>416</sup>

The importance of this passage lies not so much in its general praise, but in its situating the earth as part of a harmony with the heavens. The earthly life is a critical component of the universal harmony.

In his plans for *Societas Christiana* Andreae outlines the ways in which man may be improved. His advancement is made possible because he is composed of “a sweet Harmony of soul and body”.<sup>417</sup> Man’s excellence therefore resides in the unity of his dual nature, and a detailed analysis of Andreae’s utopia specifies which aspects of this nature are ripe for reform. Man is capable of great artistry, even if he is nominally from a lower social class: “the workmen are permitted to indulge and give play to their inventive genius.”<sup>418</sup> He is also blessed with the power of judgement, which he develops through the study of logic. Those who fail to do so are roundly condemned:

man has within him a great treasure of judging if he prefers to dig it up instead of burying it with mounds of weights and precepts.<sup>419</sup>

Andreae is equally contemptuous of anybody who refuses to seek any form of self-improvement:

if they have no ambition they are to be reproved for keeping on the ground the countenance, which was given to man to be raised aloft. Every excuse carries with it its disgrace which deprives man of his humanity, or if you please, his divinity.<sup>420</sup>

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<sup>416</sup> *Chrs* p. 240.

<sup>417</sup> *Modell* p. 153.

<sup>418</sup> *Chrs* p. 161.

<sup>419</sup> *Chrs* p. 216. Logic for Andreae is one of the eight departments of learning. It is divided into metaphysics and theosophy. See next chapter for more details.

<sup>420</sup> *Chrs* p. 227.

In this crucial passage, Andreae reiterates the belief that man has retained his divine spark, which lies in his ability to transform himself, and this power is unique to him. Andreae's utopian citizen is not simply be a passive Christian, rejecting earth and looking only toward heaven but an active agent, striving independently to achieve his own perfection to the fullest extent possible.

To concentrate solely upon Andreae's Christocentrism is to miss the subtleties that surround his vision of man. His is not a purely anthropocentric model, man is below God and dependent on Him for all his gifts, but this does not mean that Andreae disparages these gifts. Man must use his powers of his own accord. There must be a sphere of freedom within which he may behave as an active agent, in order to achieve his full potential and find rest in Heaven, a freedom that is found in utopia. *Christianopolis* allows man to fulfil his nature by developing his universal characteristics. Far from being a restrictive society, the utopia ignites the divine spark within man, providing a platform from which he can ascend towards heaven.

#### **4) Man's Role Within *Panorthosia***

Comenius' universal hierarchy is more explicit than Andreae's but in works such as *Labyrinth of the World*, he appears no less pessimistic. Man cannot attain any happiness in the mortal world and his true felicity only arises after rejecting this life. Elsewhere, however, Comenius is much more optimistic. Man is praised as God's greatest creation and "the measure of all things".<sup>421</sup>

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<sup>421</sup>VL 1/11.

This aspect of Comenius' writing has not gone unnoticed in the secondary literature. For example, Sadler suggests:

Comenius shows clearly the influence of the Renaissance concept of human dignity as that quality which makes a man complete.<sup>422</sup>

For Comenius, man is once again posited at the centre of the universal hierarchy, with all essences united in him and again his duality of body and soul grants him the necessary power of transcendence. It is this model that, akin to his fellow pansophists, makes Comenian man an active agent. Although he requires God for his ultimate perfection, man must strive to bring grace upon himself. Comenius' Neo-Pelagian man can reap the highest rewards through the use of his own powers.

#### **i. *The Labyrinth of the World* and the Rejection of Man**

We must first address the pessimism of *The Labyrinth of the World*. As we have seen, the aim of this work, which was undoubtedly Comenius' most formally utopian text,<sup>423</sup> is to satirise mankind's supposed achievements. Ignorance, hostility and pain surround man wherever he goes. To make matters worse, he is wilfully blind to the events going on around him. In the story the pilgrim only witnesses the true state of the world because the spectacles of *illusion* and *custom* (given to him by his guide *Falsehood*) have slipped from his eyes.<sup>424</sup>

The intention behind the work is unambiguous. Comenius demands that it be taken seriously because it aims to discuss that most ancient of problems:

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<sup>422</sup> Sadler (1966) p. 56.

<sup>423</sup> See pp. 56-61.

<sup>424</sup> *LW* 4/6.

that every man's mind endeavours to discover where and by what means he can obtain the greatest delight.<sup>425</sup>

Difficulties emerge because man always looks to the external world for a solution but earthly pleasures can never provide the good life. Thus man finds himself in the catastrophic state that is the labyrinth of the world.

Consequently Comenius urges us to follow the example set by Solomon and David: to look inwardly at our hearts and turn to the light of God.<sup>426</sup> It is only during the second section of the book, *The Paradise of the Heart* that the pilgrim takes this advice and subsequently bears witness to the true glory of Heaven, where all corrupted earthly practices are shown in their true spiritual light. For example, the earthly marriages that have shackled unwilling partners together are destroyed, as the pilgrim becomes wedded to Christ:

forsake everything to me; be mine and I thine, let us shut ourselves up together here in this shrine, and thou wilt feel truer joy than can be found in carnal wedlock.<sup>427</sup>

Throughout this passage, Comenius (speaking as the pilgrim) consistently rejects all worldly values, promoting freedom only through Christ. He pledges this even at the expense of the family:

He (the Christian) values neither his friends, nor his foes, nor his lord, nor his king, nor his wife, nor his children.<sup>428</sup>

One may conclude that Comenius is not so much sceptical as openly hostile towards man's abilities. Why should this be so?

There is one perfectly valid historical reason. As we have seen, the *Labyrinth of the World* was completed in 1623 and was clearly a reaction to the devastation of the Thirty Years' War, during which Comenius had experienced a

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<sup>425</sup> LW "To the Reader"/1.

<sup>426</sup> LW "To the Reader"/3.

<sup>427</sup> LW 39/3.

<sup>428</sup> LW 43/2.

number of personal tragedies. Comenius' second obstacle is theological, and seems to discount any notion of potential Pelagianism, for he accepts that the fall of Adam has corrupted man. When he was first created, man had the full range of powers as befits a creature made in the image of God. Original sin has alienated man from this true nature:

the natural desire for God, as the highest good, has been corrupted by the Fall, and has gone astray, so that no man, of his strength alone, could return to the right way.<sup>429</sup>

Consequently man has lost the power of self-transformation and requires grace to bring him back to his perfect state. This is why Comenius asks the rhetorical question: "What is a Christian but a man restored to his own nature?"<sup>430</sup>

Finally, Comenius offers a more metaphysical explanation as to the flaws in human nature. Man comprises body and soul, and the immortal soul can never be happy housed in the mortal body. This is because soul is in perpetual motion: it can only find rest in the felicity of Heaven. In *Via Lucis*, Comenius states:

he finds no resting place for himself in the finite world, but has within his own heart inducements, and indeed relentless spurs, which make him climb and struggle panting onwards towards the very abyss of infinity, i.e., to God.<sup>431</sup>

These internal 'inducements' are the soul's two attributes, intellect and will, which drive man on to his ultimate end.<sup>432</sup> This end is the full comprehension of heaven, which naturally cannot be assumed from earth.

The soul is thus both gateway and barrier to man's perfection. It facilitates his transition into immortality but prevents his perfection on earth. Comenius illustrates the transitory life of man with a three-fold scheme. Man's

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<sup>429</sup> *GD* 5/21.

<sup>430</sup> *GD* 5/1.

<sup>431</sup> *VL* 1/6.

<sup>432</sup> See also *GD* 5/16, 17.

first life is the *womb* where the body is created and endowed with simple motion. It is a preparation for the *earthly* life in which man develops both sense and reason. These two attributes help form the rational soul. With soul, man is made ready for the eternity of his final life, *heaven*, which perfects him:

the first life is preparatory to the second, and the second to the third, while the third exists for itself and is without end ... In the third abiding place the perfection and fruition of both will be realised.<sup>433</sup>

Soul is therefore central to man's perfectibility, but it must first be nurtured and prepared on earth. It appears, then, as if Comenius is rejecting man's abilities of self-perfection.

## ii. Man and Hierarchy

These difficulties still do not detract from man's unique character. Comenius states time and again that man is the greatest of all creatures: "Man is the highest, most absolute and the most excellent of all things created."<sup>434</sup> He is the image of God and has the highest of ends. More importantly, he possesses the essences of all other creatures:

to thee alone I gave all things in conjunction which to the rest of creation I gave but singly, namely Existence, Vitality and Sense and Reason.<sup>435</sup>

Comenian man is every creature and his multiplicity allows him to develop two unique powers. First, he can become self-conscious:

containing in himself only the perfection of all other things, why should he not at last habituate himself to the contemplation of himself.<sup>436</sup>

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<sup>433</sup> *GD* 2/11.

<sup>434</sup> This is the title from *GD* 1.

<sup>435</sup> *GD* 1/3. See also *Pam* 4/8, where man is composed of all the elements: "mineral, vegetable, animal and angelic."

<sup>436</sup> *Prod* p. 27.

Second, man's universal nature grants him the power of action, which is essential in obtaining God's grace. Furthermore, Comenius shows that man has a crucial role in the universal hierarchy.

He outlines a picture of his universal hierarchy in his *Panorthosia*, in which he writes:

the one and only God shines forth from the depth of things everlasting, and from God come Ideas, and from Ideas the world of Angels, and thence the material world.<sup>437</sup>

There is a slight difference here with the other pansophists, by the addition of an intermediary world between God and angels but aside from this the similarity is startling. God is the One, the True and the Good from whom all else emanates.<sup>438</sup> Through His divine light he disperses ideas throughout the universe. Every creature, including man, has its own idea by which it knows itself:

Everything was made according to its proper idea, that is according to such a conception by which it might be such as it is.<sup>439</sup>

Man perceives these ideas as light in his soul, which is why Comenius labels it "the lamp of the Lord".<sup>440</sup>

Angels follow ideas, as they are wholly spiritual and intellectual.<sup>441</sup> They cannot be entirely perfect due to their multiplicity: only the unified one can be perfect. Yet they were created more perfect than man was, which is why they were brought into existence in their full number, whilst mankind must rely on procreation.<sup>442</sup> They were made before any material bodies and "created out of

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<sup>437</sup> *Pan* 11/11.

<sup>438</sup> *Pan* Intro/7.

<sup>439</sup> *Prod* p. 37.

<sup>440</sup> *VL* 6/7.

<sup>441</sup> *VL* 1/4. This follows the models of Campanella and Andreae.

<sup>442</sup> Angels were: "finished in the same moment, so that nothing may be added to their essence." *Nat. phil.* 18/5, 6.

the Spirit of the World”, which comprises all matter.<sup>443</sup> Angels are to be found around God’s throne,<sup>444</sup> and angelic hierarchies are such an inspiration that Comenius identifies them as a model for reform, which should be: “like the philosophy in Heaven ... still preserved in the hierarchy of good angels.”<sup>445</sup> Man may not have been created as perfect as the angels but they are very similar: “an Angel is nothing but a man without a body: A man is nothing but an Angel clothed in a body.”<sup>446</sup> Crucially, because of his universality man has the power of self-transformation, which is why he can communicate on all levels: with himself, with lower creatures and with God.<sup>447</sup>

### iii. Soul’s Eternal Quest

We must return to the vital element of soul. Man is made up of body, spirit and soul.<sup>448</sup> Whilst his body gives him access to the material world, man’s soul reaches for the highest contemplation. Soul comprises the duality of intellect and will, which brings man to understanding. In reaching understanding, man undergoes a process of assimilation, so that he becomes the object of his investigation: “every agent naturally labours to assimilate its object into itself.”<sup>449</sup> This form of knowledge is not limited to the lower orders of the hierarchy but approaches God Himself because man can contemplate God by looking towards his own being. Man “is able to learn more about his Creator from himself than from all other

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<sup>443</sup> *Nat. Phil.* 18/3, 4.

<sup>444</sup> *VL* 1/4 and *Nat. Phil.* 18/9.

<sup>445</sup> *Pan* 12/3.

<sup>446</sup> *Nat. Phil.* 18/2.

<sup>447</sup> *Pam* 3/10.

<sup>448</sup> Like Campanella, Comenius views spirit as an intermediary between body and soul. *Nat. Phil.* 17/2, 3.

<sup>449</sup> *Prod* p. 38.

created things”.<sup>450</sup> This is why Comenius urges everybody to study the 'Book of Man' as an essential component of pansophia.

Soul moves in a circle through the hierarchy, uniting man's divine origins with his universal essence and making him self-conscious. To attain this state is the highest goal of philosophy:

a meeting of Man with his soul, as the image of God, and with Heaven, and Earth, the Sea and all God's creatures.<sup>451</sup>

Despite the obstacles to man's perfection, it is natural that he both ascends and descends the hierarchy for only then can he truly understand his universal nature. Comenius illustrates this with another familiar metaphor: he suggests man live the vegetative life of body, the animal life of nature and the angelic life of intellect.<sup>452</sup>

Man's perfection resides in both the upper and lower reaches of the hierarchy. The dual nature of soul grants man a natural motion through all other essences. This leads Comenius to make some startling conclusions. Man is a “perfectly free agent”<sup>453</sup> with a natural desire for freedom. This grants him a legitimate right to rebel against unwanted authority:

For there is born in human nature a love of liberty ... Inevitably resistance, opposition, rebellion follows wherever force becomes an element in the governance of man.<sup>454</sup>

As man is Lord over lower creatures, so he harbours a desire to be the same over his fellow man. He “should not enslave himself to any creature, not even to his own flesh and blood”.<sup>455</sup> Man's desire for power is justified by reference to God:

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<sup>450</sup> *VL* 1/11.

<sup>451</sup> *Pan* 1/22 (1).

<sup>452</sup> *GD* 2/4. This mirrors Campanella's comments on p. 120 of this discussion.

<sup>453</sup> *VL* 4/15.

<sup>454</sup> *VL* 3/12.

<sup>455</sup> *GD* 4/4.

man longs for power under the sway of which other things may be brought ... so then, he argues, that his creator must be infinitely powerful.<sup>456</sup>

These sentiments seem at odds with the Christian outlook of Comenius' overall philosophy. How can these goals not be sinful? How do they fit in with the doctrine of grace?

One way in which Comenius brings these disparate elements together is in his *Panorthosia*. Comenius was both a millennialist and a utopian, and his view of man links the two together. His millennialism demanded that man take an active role in bringing about heaven on earth. By instigating universal reform, panorthosia will usher in the golden age; utopia is the final stage before God's judgement. Comenius shows that throughout history man has always needed to respond to God's will in this active way. Noah, for example, was chosen by God to be saved but had to build the ark for himself.<sup>457</sup> Man cannot simply sit back and contemplate, he must also be prepared to use his will. Comenius outlines seven ways in which man can take an active role, including prayer, devotion, material generosity and so on.<sup>458</sup> Only when these necessary actions have been taken can man hope to begin universal reform. Perhaps this leads us to a fuller understanding of the *Labyrinth of the World*. Christian love and piety are the first steps to man's perfection, but they must lead to a programme of active change to cleanse the earth and prepare the way for God.

Metaphysically, we see that Comenius continues with the Neo-Pelagian vision of man. Man is made up of body, spirit and soul, with the latter comprising intellect and will. These attributes find a direct corollary in the

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<sup>456</sup> *VL* 1/11.

<sup>457</sup> *Pan* 1/11.

<sup>458</sup> *Pan* 3/15.

heavens and the earth. Man's body is elemental, his spirit is heavenly and his mind is God-like.<sup>459</sup>

For if he give himself to earthly things he becomes brutish, and falls back again to nothing: if to heavenly things he is in a manner deified, and gets above all creatures.<sup>460</sup>

This also grants him the power to act as a free agent because "he has been given a spirit of infinite capacity".<sup>461</sup> Despite man's mortality and his reliance on grace, he is still self-perfecting. Even apparently sinful attributes are God-given, a fact that actually brought accusations of Pelagianism against Comenius, after the publication of a short tract entitled *Contatuum Comeniamorum Praeludia* (1637).<sup>462</sup> But as we have seen his endorsement of Christian orthodoxy cannot be questioned. Comenius suggests that although man's ultimate end lies in Heaven, he can actively bring this onto the earth: "Man must therefore take an active part in bringing glory to God and serving His will."<sup>463</sup> As we shall see, the best medium for this change is universal knowledge.

## 5) Bacon and the Limits of Man

Bacon's famous dictum that knowledge is power hints at his belief in man's abilities to perfect himself. The development of wisdom is an empowering process that will lead man back to the glory of his pre-fall existence. This was the task that Bacon set himself with his *Great Instauration*:

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<sup>459</sup> *Nat. Phil.* 17/21, 22. See also p. 247 of this discussion.

<sup>460</sup> *Nat. Phil.* 17/22.

<sup>461</sup> *Pam* 4/17.

<sup>462</sup> This tract was amended to become the *Prodromus*. Turnbull illustrates this in *Samuel Hartlib, a Sketch of His Life and His Relations to J. A. Comenius* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1920). The charges were brought in a letter by Hubner, dated 12 June 1637, in which he also accused Comenius of Soicianist sympathies.

<sup>463</sup> *Pan* 3/10.

And so those twin objects, human Knowledge and human Power, do really meet in one; and it is from ignorance of causes that operation fails.<sup>464</sup>

Upon first reading, it appears that *New Atlantis* is the most optimistic of the utopian texts in regard to the development of human nature. The scientific fellows “appear as a species of moral supermen”<sup>465</sup> while King Salomana, founder of both Bensalem’s constitution and Saloman’s House, is described as “a divine instrument, though a mortal man”.<sup>466</sup> Bacon’s utopia seems to be run by godlike scientists with almost angelic natures.

Yet such an optimistic view of human nature may be misleading. Bacon is clear and consistent in his view of the fall: it was caused by man’s love of self and his desire to be more knowledgeable than God was. As a result man is limited. Bacon sets the boundaries of man’s knowledge accordingly. He can only engage in natural philosophy as anything else would only perpetuate the sin of self-love. Bacon’s idea of pre-fall wisdom does not extend to man being able to approach God by his own powers. Even the fellows of Salomon’s House are not allowed to delve into such mysteries of existence.

Moreover we have seen that the Neo-Pelagianism of Campanella, Andreae and Comenius extends to a more subtle metaphysical conception than a crude portrait of a ‘naturally good’ man. He is seen as the centre of a hierarchical chain of being. But such a concept does not exist for Bacon. Although he does, infrequently, mention a universal hierarchy it is not central to his thought, nor does it describe the nature of man. Thus even if we could successfully portray Bacon as completely optimistic about man’s capacity for

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<sup>464</sup> *Collected Works IV* p.32.

<sup>465</sup> Davis (1984) p. 120.

<sup>466</sup> *Collected Works III* p. 144.

self-improvement, it would still not be enough to place him under the banner of pansophism.

In short, Bacon is more reserved than Campanella, Andreae or Comenius regarding the nature of man. Nor does he offer an image of the metaphysically universal man that is crucial to the pansophist utopia. His utopians are strictly Christian and no different to the sailors that are washed up onto the shores of Bensalem. Even the Fellows of Salomon's House can be seen to be naturally flawed.

### **i. Man's Return to Paradise?**

It would be unfair to portray Bacon as wholly antagonistic to the pansophist conception of Neo-Pelagian man: he certainly believed that man is capable of a degree of self-improvement through the advancement of knowledge. Knowledge is intrinsically bound up with power: the development of the former leads to a natural increase of the latter. This is the challenge that Bacon set out to conquer:

Be well assured that I am labouring to lay the foundation not of any sect or doctrine but of human utility and power.<sup>467</sup>

Knowledge, then, is not simply idle contemplation but promotes man as an active agent, a creative force capable not only of understanding but also of harnessing the powers of nature. By building upon his discoveries, man is the agent of his own improvement. He constantly investigates, improves upon and recreates the wonders of nature: man is an active participant in God's creation.

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<sup>467</sup> *Collected Works IV* p. 21.

Bacon thinks that this is possible for two reasons. First, natural philosophy remains unblemished, so it is the most efficient route to the truth. Second man retains some of his natural goodness despite the sin of Adam and the corruption of other forms of knowledge.

There are no limits to which nature can be investigated because natural philosophy is the one branch of learning where there are no great deficiencies.<sup>468</sup> It is the most natural branch of knowledge as it has existed since Creation, and was given to Adam by God Himself, so that:

Man in paradise was able to give unto every living creature a name according to his propriety.<sup>469</sup>

Here Bacon shows that knowledge and power were linked together at the very outset of mankind: it was this natural philosophy that allowed him to have dominion over nature. More importantly, it was not this form of knowledge that led to man's corruption. Only when Adam desired knowledge of good and bad did he commit original sin: it was the creation of *moral* rather than natural philosophy that caused the fall of man.<sup>470</sup>

As a consequence natural philosophy has emerged unscathed from original sin, and therefore it remains the best way for man to attain his former glories. This is why, for Bacon, the end of knowledge is:

A restitution and reinvesting (in great part) of man to the sovereignty and power (for whensoever he shall be able to call the creatures by their true names he shall again command them) which he had in his first state of creation<sup>471</sup>

With the restoration of knowledge, man will once again have power over the earth, enabling him to recreate his former paradise.

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<sup>468</sup> This statement can be seen throughout Bacon's works. For just two examples see *Collected Works* III p.219 or p.297.

<sup>469</sup> *Collected Works* III p.219.

<sup>470</sup> *Collected Works* III p. 217.

Bacon also reveals that he thinks man has retained some natural goodness, which is directly linked to his capacity for knowledge. His essay *On Goodness and Goodness of Nature* is particularly revealing. Bacon begins by explaining that an inclination towards goodness (which he also identifies as charity or philanthropy) is the most Godlike of human tendencies:

This of all virtues and dignities of the mind is the greatest; being the character of the Deity: and without it man is a busy, mischievous, wretched thing; no better than a kind of vermin.<sup>472</sup>

He clarifies some of the elements that make up the philanthropic man: courtesy, humility, gratitude, compassion and forgiveness.<sup>473</sup> We could also add love to this list, which like charity, is another trait that Bacon acknowledges as beyond limit.<sup>474</sup> All of this is possible because man is on some level intrinsically good: “The inclination to goodness is imprinted deeply in the nature of man.”<sup>475</sup>

Not only is man naturally good in these ways, but he also develops his charitable nature through the pursuit of natural philosophy. One of the consequences of Bacon’s pleas for knowledge was that it makes man an active agent, and one of the prerequisites for this activity was that his actions *must be* for the good of others:

The same author doth notably disavow both power and knowledge such as is not dedicated to goodness or love.<sup>476</sup>

By investigating nature, and increasing his power over it, man can develop his capacity for philanthropy and charity.

It is possible to read *New Atlantis* as the embodiment of such beliefs.

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<sup>471</sup> *Collected Works* III p.222.

<sup>472</sup> *Essays* in Vickers ed. (1996) p. 363.

<sup>473</sup> *Essays* p. 364.

<sup>474</sup> *Collected Works* III p. 218.

<sup>475</sup> *Essays* p. 363.

<sup>476</sup> *Collected Works* III p. 222 and p. 266

McKnight suggests that the work:

It contains Bacon's fullest articulation of his vision of the great instauration of learning and the consequent restoration of humanity to its condition before original sin.<sup>477</sup>

Although the island of Bensalem is Christian, it is in a much better moral condition than its fellow nations in Europe. The dissolute life of the courtesan, condemned for its lustful and vice-ridden nature, is contrasted with the chastity and innocence of Bensalem.<sup>478</sup> Marriage is the most sacred of all institutions<sup>479</sup>, whilst the family is so highly valued that it has its own ceremony dedicated to those men who have over thirty living children or grandchildren at any one time.<sup>480</sup> Bensalemites are also the most hospitable of people: they feed and shelter the shipwrecked crew, as well as tending to their sick, and they do all of this for no reward. The fellows of Saloman's House lead them in this task, which is the epitome of the benevolent and useful science that Bacon so desired. Saloman's House is responsible for the creation of numerous devices to help ease the lives of the Bensalemites.

In all, Bacon appears to be creating a utopia of good men, ruled by good scientists, who work purely for the benefit of the citizens of *New Atlantis*.

## ii. Bacon and the Fall

Notably lacking in *New Atlantis* is any discussion of grace, original sin or any of the other concerns about human nature that we find in the pansophist utopia. Bensalem is an orthodox Christian settlement that does not question the

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<sup>477</sup> McKnight (1998) p. 92.

<sup>478</sup> "I have not read of any such chastity, in any such peoples as theirs." *Collected Works* III p. 152, adultery, homosexuality and polygamy are also outlawed on Bensalem.

<sup>479</sup> We may recall that Bensalem's ideas on marriage entail a jibe against Thomas More. See p. 21.

validity of the fall. Mans' natural goodness is not an issue in Bacon's ideal society. Although the inhabitants of Bensalem have better morals than their European counterparts they are not approaching God in the manner of the citizens of *Christianopolis*, nor do they ascend the universal hierarchy via the strength of their earthly achievements.

One explanation for Bacon's reticence over the nature of utopian man is, of course, the incompleteness of the text. Had he finished *New Atlantis* Bacon may well have included a full discussion on the metaphysical attributes of the Bensalemites. A more likely reason can be deduced by looking at the broad range of his other works, which also fail to provide substantial discussion on man as a universal creature. On the contrary, Bacon's analyses of creation and the fall are consistently pessimistic over human capability for improvement. Bacon's pre-fall wisdom is *not* particularly empowering and proof of this lies in *New Atlantis* itself.

As we saw in the previous chapter the fellows of Saloman's House act effectively as a state within a state. Bacon does not describe any constitutional or political arrangements, which means that to all purposes the fellows *are* the state: they take their own oaths of secrecy and, more importantly, adopt a censorial role regarding the dissemination of information.<sup>481</sup> Furthermore these scientists seem to epitomise the newly improved moral man that the *Great Instauration* would encourage.

Yet as Davis shows there is one telling passage that contradicts this righteous image.<sup>482</sup> Among the many laboratories in Saloman's House is the *House of Deceits*, which is designed to show how charlatans and conjurers can

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<sup>480</sup> The 'Feast of the Family' is described in intricate detail. See *Collected Works* III pp. 147-57..

<sup>481</sup> See pp. 99-100.

encroach upon genuine science. Once the fellows understand such tricks they can naturally guard against them, thus consolidating their position as fair and honest men. Bacon shows a glimmer of doubt, however, as to whether or not the fellows can be really trusted with such information:

But we do hate all impostures and lies, insomuch as *we have severely forbidden it to all our fellows, under pain of ignominy and fines*, that they do not show any natural work or thing adorned or swelling, but only pure as it is, and without all affectation of strangeness.<sup>483</sup>

This revelation raises many questions. Who, for example, would levy the fines or ostracise the renegade scientists? In light of their protected status under the Bensalem government, we must presume that Saloman's House would be self-regulating. But this passage casts doubt upon all thirty-six of the fellows. If nobody is ever clear of the suspicion that they may profit from the House of Deceits, and the scientists look after their own affairs, then what is to prevent them from conspiring with each other? The fellows control the output of results from Saloman's House: could they not present deliberately misleading results?

It seems very strange that Bacon should cast aspersions upon the moral fortitude of his scientists or depict them as fallible. Although Bacon fails to address this concern in *New Atlantis*, his hesitancy correlates with judgements made in other works. Elsewhere Bacon argues that too much knowledge will always be a naturally corrupting influence: he wants to limit man rather than setting him free.

Reviewing Bacon's attitude towards the fall, we see that he is greatly pessimistic about man's capacity for self-perfection. The quest for knowledge

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<sup>482</sup> See Davis (1981) p. 121.

<sup>483</sup> *Collected Works* III p. 164. My italics.

will always be hampered by our sinful nature, and this can be traced back directly to Adam:

It was not the pure light of natural knowledge whereby man in paradise was able to give unto every living creature a name according to his propriety, which gave occasion to the fall; but it was an aspiring desire to ascertain to that part of moral knowledge which defineth good and evil, whereby to dispute God's commandments and not to depend upon the revelation of his will, which was the original temptation.<sup>484</sup>

The pursuit of moral knowledge led to the fall of man; because morality can only be left to God's own plan. Man cannot become like God:

It was the ambitious and proud desire of moral knowledge to judge of good and evil, to the end that man might revolt from God and give laws to himself.<sup>485</sup>

Bacon thus reiterates the orthodox Christian position that pride, the act of self-love, was the original sin, and that this was caused by man trying to imitate the Creator. As a result he stresses that knowledge must have boundaries otherwise mankind will simply repeat and perpetuate the evils of original sin. Bacon's *Great Instauration*, designed to reinstate pre-fall wisdom, effectively *prevents* man from gaining too much knowledge because it is limited to natural philosophy. In effect Bacon keeps man from attempting to become godlike by keeping science and religion separate. This is the central argument of the following chapter, and one which clearly places Bacon outside of pansophist thought. Natural philosophy is acceptable precisely because it avoids such controversies. Bacon's reform therefore protects man from his sinful ways.

Campanella, Andreae and Comenius all accept that man is not perfect, but they suggest that he is far more perfectible than Bacon believes. Man is

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<sup>484</sup> *Collected Works* III p. 219. Bacon reasserts his belief that the pursuit of moral knowledge led to the fall throughout his works: for example see also p. 217, p. 265, p. 296.

<sup>485</sup> *Collected Works* IV p. 20.

blessed in this way because of his unique position in the universal hierarchy. For Bacon, such a hierarchy plays no part in his views of man or utopia.

Occasionally Bacon does employ some familiar terminology. In *Valerius Terminus*, for instance, he reminds us that man is a duality of body and soul: “Being a spirit newly inclosed in a body of earth he was fittest to be allured with appetite of light and liberty of knowledge”.<sup>486</sup> Indeed it was the realisation of his bodily limitations that prompted Adam to commit original sin. Elsewhere Bacon echoes the words of Solomon, which again invokes images of pansophist man: “Declaring not obscurely that God hath framed the mind of man as a mirror or glass capable of the image of the universe”.<sup>487</sup>

But these passages are not specific in regards to man’s role in the universe, nor his ability to ascend or descend the hierarchy. They do not address the nature of soul; Bacon does not mention that man contains the elements of every other grade of being in creation. The passage from Solomon only goes on to show that man cannot even enquire into the mysteries of God: he must be content with those that affect his own life.<sup>488</sup> On this evidence, man is hardly the “measure of all things” or “bond of the universe”.

Bacon does make one more specific pronouncement on a universal hierarchy in his *Advancement of Learning*, in which he discusses the angelic hierarchy of Pseudo-Dionysius.<sup>489</sup> He shows that God created the angels in a series of grades that correspond to a number of qualities: Seraphs represent love; Cherubs are light and so on.<sup>490</sup> Under the angels are light and the material forms.

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<sup>486</sup> *Collected Works* III p. 217.

<sup>487</sup> *Collected Works* III p. 265.

<sup>488</sup> Bacon mentions illness and death as two potential ‘mysteries’ here. *Collected Works* III . 265.

<sup>489</sup> Pseudo-Dionysius was reputed to be St. Paul’s companion. His apocryphal works include *The Celestial Hierarchy* *The Celestial Hierarchy*.

<sup>490</sup> Bacon also includes Thrones and Principalities in his angelic hierarchy.

But again Bacon makes no mention of man's position. He does not follow the pansophist lead in showing that man's dual nature connects him intellectually with the angels and bodily with the material world. Instead Bacon simply adapts Pseudo-Dionysius' ideas to a re-telling of the creation story. This hierarchy does not have a universal man traversing its borders.

Bacon cannot be said to be Neo-Pelagian in the way that Campanella, Andreae or Comenius is. He even suggests that man's ignorance is so great that he is incapable of realising a utopia:

For God forbid that we should give out a dream of our imagination for a pattern of the world; rather may he graciously grant us to write an apocalypse or true vision of the footsteps of the Creator imprinted on his creatures.<sup>491</sup>

Bacon is not interested in the metaphysical make-up of man, and his ideas on original sin are strictly orthodox. Although he suggests a means by which the effects of the fall can be rectified, Bacon does so as a limit to curb man's excessive thirst for knowledge. Most importantly Bacon's views on human nature are not essential to the seemingly perfect world of *New Atlantis*. Even the fellows of Saloman's House may succumb to temptation.

## **Conclusion**

Theories of human nature are, therefore, essential to the utopias of Campanella, Andreae and Comenius but not so in Bacon. All four thinkers write of restoring man to his pre-fall state but they do so in qualitatively different ways. For the pansophists it means breaking the bonds of original sin to the extent that man can achieve an earthly perfection through utopia. For Bacon, it

entails the less theologically ambitious task of compiling a new system of natural philosophy. Where the pansophist utopia points a way to transcend our earthly chains, *New Atlantis* is rooted in man's limitations.

The Neo-Pelagian view of man undoubtedly had precursors. Aquinas argued that man had both an earthly and a heavenly end. The former could be fulfilled through politics and law while the latter could only be reached via Christian revelation. Man's nature had not been entirely corrupted by the fall:

Human nature is not so completely corrupted by sin as to be totally lacking in natural goodness, it is possible for him in the state of corrupted nature to do some particular good things.<sup>492</sup>

Many Renaissance figures also valued human nature. Perhaps the most famous of these was Pico's *Oratio*, which also argued that man was the centre of a universal hierarchy. Also important is the Paracelsian vision of man as magus: the microcosmic man was directly attuned to the powers of the macrocosmic universe.<sup>493</sup> But we must remember that the pansophists were addressing the problems of post-Reformation Europe, and the intellectual climate was quite different. Luther and Calvin had reasserted Augustinianism and the pansophists were caught in a savage religious war.

Because of the optimistic attitude of the pansophist utopians, it makes no sense to suggest that they fully embraced the traditions or orthodoxy of the Augustinian view of original sin. Yet at the same time, despite the unusual

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<sup>491</sup> *Collected works* IV pp. 32-33. This passage reinforces Webster's claim regarding the importance of millennialism for Bacon.

<sup>492</sup> Sigmund ed. (1988) p. 60.

<sup>493</sup> For an overview of Paracelsus see Debus *The English Paracelsians* (London: Oldbourne, 1965) pp. 11-41. Debus offers a far more comprehensive survey of Paracelsus and his followers in *The Chemical Philosophy Paracelsian Science and Medicine in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (New York: Science History Publications, 1977) A recent summary of Paracelsus' historiographical interpretations is offered by Stepehn Pumfrey 'The Spagyric Art; Or, The Impossible Work of Separating Pure from Impure Paracelsianism: a historiographical analysis' in

nature of their beliefs, the pansophists were committed to a purer Christianity and this did not involve the acceptance of such an obvious heresy as Pelagianism. Instead they offered a more optimistic view of man that did not betray the validity of essential Christian teachings. Man was capable of self-perfection in his earthly life but not to the extent whereby he actually became God. His universal nature meant that he must be capable of breaking original sin, but remain sufficiently human to experience the vice and corruption of the world.

This has further implications for the pansophist utopia. Whether his religion was explicitly Christian or based on natural law, *utopian* man could not attain his full perfection without the help of his Creator. In this sense, the citizen of utopia is most definitely human. But we cannot underestimate his great powers. Through the intellectual capacities of soul, man raises himself above the earthly world and approaches the realms of heaven. Man's soul puts him on a par with the angels and is the root of his own divinity. Original sin and the fall of Adam are not barriers to man's utopian hopes. He may require grace to finally enter the Kingdom of Heaven, but through his own powers, man could recreate that Kingdom here on earth to a greater extent than had previously been thought possible.

This is why the pansophist utopia should not be thought of as totalitarian. What appears to be a rigidly harsh regime to the modern is quite natural to the utopian citizen. It is natural in that it allows the inhabitants to fulfil their true potential on earth. Although measures are in place in case anybody does lapse, it is notable that the narrators never witness such sinful practices. In

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Greel, ed. *Paracelsus the Man and His Reputation His Ideas and Their Transformation* (Leiden: Brill, 1998).

the pansophist utopia, man is not controlled by draconian regulations but instead he is an active participant in upholding the system because it is the passage to his perfection. *New Atlantis* is quite the opposite. It appears to be the perfect society run by morally righteous, benevolent scientists. In fact the citizens of Bensalem do not have any active role in the state while even the character of the Fellows of Saloman's House is called into question.

Bacon's pessimism over human nature, and its manifestation in *New Atlantis*, only serves to highlight the importance of the Neo-Pelagian model for the pansophists. For Campanella, Andreae and Comenius, utopia is the place in which man can ascend towards God. As we will now see, the principal mechanism for this ascension is universal knowledge.

## **Chapter IV: The Quest for Knowledge**

This chapter looks at the role of knowledge in utopia. As we have previously seen, universal wisdom was the corner of the pansophist project and the single most important mechanism for man's self-perfection.<sup>494</sup> The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the pansophists integrated different forms of knowledge into their utopian vision. Much attention has hitherto been paid to the rejection of Aristotle and the embracing of sense knowledge and the new science. But this was by no means as central as current discussions suggest. The syncretic nature of pansophist wisdom was vital to provide a theological and philosophical synthesis that demonstrated the truth of Christianity. Pansophist wisdom allowed man to approach God, but only after the store of human knowledge had been cleansed of deficiencies. As in previous chapters, Bacon provides a contrast. His reform of science took a very different form, and reached very different conclusions.

### **1) Pansensism and Pansophia**

There can be no doubt as to the importance of universal knowledge for Campanella but he was not the slave to sense-knowledge that is portrayed by the Manuels and others. His work went far beyond the physical realm. Although he famously promoted sense-knowledge on the walls of *Civitas Solis*, this was far from the entire system of Solarian education. Philosophy, he claimed, was "the mistress of

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<sup>494</sup> The background to the pansophist movement is discussed on pp. 27-40 of this dissertation.

science”<sup>495</sup>. Metaphysics was the highest form of this thought as it was the wisdom with which man looked towards God and the cosmos.<sup>496</sup> Not for nothing was *Metaphysica* subtitled *Universalis Philosophiae*. Campanella also established the universality of knowledge through the primalities. Wisdom (*sapientia*) was most fully developed in man and this is one reason why he is the greatest of all creatures. Despite its exaggerated status, sense is still crucial to man’s understanding, providing the best judge for reason. Campanella’s pansensism is the first element under discussion in this section.

Another aspect of Campanella’s universal knowledge was the sheer range of his subjects. Nothing should fall outside the barriers of man’s investigation. This has led Kelly-Gadol to conclude:

he hoped to provide by means of his philosophy a new system of universal knowledge, an *Instauratio scientiarum*.<sup>497</sup>

It is this attitude that is most famously displayed in *Civitas Solis*. As well as the city walls, the three chief officers command an impressive range of sub-officers that cover all branches of knowledge. But also displayed in *Civitas Solis* is Campanella’s adherence to the doctrine of a syncretic philosophy. The Solarians embrace all philosophical and religious traditions and they are proud to display their doctrine of synthesised knowledge.<sup>498</sup> Despite the fact that they have not attained revelation, they still place the teachings of Christ as central in this tradition. Even in the land of non-revelatory wisdom, the Christian synthesis prevails.

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<sup>495</sup> *Met I* / 1, 8, 2., or Bon. p.46.

<sup>496</sup> Bon p. 46.

<sup>497</sup> Kelly-Gadol (1976) p. 167.

## i. The Structure of Knowledge

The first question we must address is the nature of knowledge for Campanella, and more specifically the role that sense plays within it. Campanella's promotion of sense-knowledge is usually traced to his allegiance to Telesio. *Philosophia sensibus demonstrata* (1591) was a defence of Telesian philosophy in which Campanella viciously attacked the pre-eminence of the Peripatetics.<sup>499</sup> Sense was the weapon with which to beat Aristotle: "[sense] allowed Campanella to refute Aristotelian epistemology."<sup>500</sup> It was the only channel for distinguishing the truth in nature and philosophy:

Campanella insisted that form was known directly through the senses. The Peripatetics had prised form away from sensation, so Campanella anchored it to the body.<sup>501</sup>

He incorporated Telesio's principles of heat and cold into his own theory, for these qualities could be distinguished in the stars. This is why Copenhaver and others suggest that Campanella's astrology was a physical, non-occultist doctrine.<sup>502</sup>

But this may be misleading. It indicates the dominance of the physical over the metaphysical, and as I have indicated, Campanella did *not* reject metaphysics. The primalities, for example, are not physical entities. Wisdom is the second of these essentialities and is necessary for all life, though it is still reliant on sense in order to transcend perception and attain understanding.

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<sup>498</sup> Allied to this Campanella occasionally rejects the use of ancient sources other than the hated Aristotle.

<sup>499</sup> For an overview see Copenhaver (1992) pp. 318-19.

<sup>500</sup> Ingengo *CHORP* (1988) p. 256.

<sup>501</sup> Copenhaver (1992) p. 319.

<sup>502</sup> See p. 224.

Bonanssea identifies three ways in which sense-knowledge may be utilised, based upon the tripartite division of man into body, soul, and spirit.<sup>503</sup> First, there is the perception of the external world. This requires the five sense organs (sight, sound, touch, taste and smell) but cannot rely solely upon them, as spirit is also necessary to operate through the five senses. It is “spirit that perceives through them”,<sup>504</sup> the unifying force, without which there would be as many sense perceptions as there are objects of sense. The sensitive soul provides the proof to which sense organs turn when they are in doubt. Second, man uses his internal senses: memory, reminiscence, faith, reason, intellect and imagination.<sup>505</sup> The relationship between this group is complex. Internal sense moves away from the Telesian view and Campanella accepts that some of these categories are much weaker than external sense as tools of perception: memory, for example, is only past perception.<sup>506</sup>

Finally, Campanella discusses intuitive sense. Though it is innate to all creatures, intuitive sense is stronger in man, angels and God. It is the most certain of all knowledge as it brings external objects into direct contact with the knowing subject. Intuitive sense begins with the immediate perception of the sense organs and is transported to intellect by spirit. This contact is full understanding; it allows man to *become* the object of his inquiry.<sup>507</sup> Campanella suggests that it is this intuitive

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<sup>503</sup> Spirit is also known as sensitive soul. See pp. 117-21 for fuller details about the powers of both soul and spirit.

<sup>504</sup> Bon p. 77.

<sup>505</sup> *Met I 5/1/3*, or Bon p. 78.

<sup>506</sup> But Campanella's theory of sense clearly does not abandon reason despite this emphasis.

<sup>507</sup> We may recall that Comenius also believed that man assimilates knowledge to become one with the object of his investigation. See pp. 139-40.

sense that should form the basis for science. In this way science is founded upon sensation.<sup>508</sup>

There are, however, limits to the role of sense. Sense is *not* preferable to wisdom. As a primality, the latter is God-given, and without wisdom there can be no life at all. Sense becomes crucial in terms of proof. Though sense organs can be mistaken, one or other of the senses usually confirms its perception. It also provides the proof for reason, for nobody questions what our sense knows to be true. There is no debate whether water is wet, for example, or if grass is green.<sup>509</sup> Sense shows the fallacies of many arguments based purely on reason: in *Del Senso della Rerum*, for example, Campanella shows that the experiences of Columbus have shattered Augustine's assertion that there can be no antipodes.<sup>510</sup> Man still holds the privileged position in this system, as can be seen with reference to the hierarchy of *sapientia*.<sup>511</sup> Though all creatures possess sense and wisdom only man has the full range of internal senses, through the intellectual capacities of soul.

Campanella's promotion of sense places him in a long and distinguished tradition:

In the larger sense, Campanella's challenge to Aristotle and his promotion of an empiricist naturalism were part of a movement in the Renaissance natural philosophy that began with Achlini, Nifo and Pompanizzi, continued with Cardano, Telesio and Bruno, and bore its richest fruits in the work of Galileo, Mersenne, Gassendi and Descartes.<sup>512</sup>

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<sup>508</sup> Bon pp. 78-82.

<sup>509</sup> Bon p. 79, or *Met I* 1, 8, 2.

<sup>510</sup> Cited in Bon p. 7. *Del Senso della Rerum* p. 144.

<sup>511</sup> See p. 120.

<sup>512</sup> Copenhaver (1992) p. 327.

Yet although his doctrines praise sense they do not reject reason, nor do they abandon metaphysics. Of course, it may be argued that no commentator has gone so far as to suggest that Campanella totally abandoned these avenues of knowledge, but it is fair to conclude that most analyses downgrade the importance of them in Campanella's system, especially in relation to his utopian work. This is a mistake, as *Civitas Solis* is itself heavily reliant on Campanella's own metaphysical beliefs.

Finally, the importance of revelation is worth noting: the Bible alone is the final proof of man's knowledge. Where there is any conflict between nature and scripture, the latter must always be accepted as the truth. The Bible must be placed above all other authorities, which could signify a rejection of the synthesis of pre-revelatory wisdom. For Campanella, the Gospel was the law.<sup>513</sup> Even in the non-Christian *Civitas Solis*, it holds a special significance.

## ii. Knowledge in *Civitas Solis*

*Civitas Solis* embodies many of the themes discussed above. There is the customary rejection of Aristotle (the Solarians "are opposed to Aristotle, whom they call a pedant"<sup>514</sup>) while sense-knowledge is institutionalised in the very design of the city.

The utopia is famously built in seven sections: six concentric ring walls emanate from around a circular temple. Ostensibly for defence, the walls provide an education for each inhabitant of the city. All knowledge is drawn upon them in a

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<sup>513</sup> See p. 69-70.

variety of categories. On the inner and outer walls of the temple are the heavens; all planets, stars, and their respective properties are displayed. Being at the heart of the city it is reasonable to suggest that this is the most sacred of all Solarian knowledge. The first wall of the city is given over to “all mathematical figures – more than were recorded by Euclid and Archimedes – with their meaning”.<sup>515</sup> It also displays a map of the world with every nation and language, as well as their customs and laws. The second wall shows every type of jewel, mineral and metal. Various liquids (lakes, oceans, oils) are also depicted, with special attention being paid to their medicinal properties.

The third wall is again conscious of health, explaining the properties of plants, trees and herbs. Some are grown in front of the wall and their astrological significance is recorded. On the outside of this wall are fish and sea-creatures. Birds (including the phoenix) are shown on the fourth wall, along with lesser animals such as reptiles and insects. “Land animals”, presumably mammals, are portrayed on the inner and outer faces of the fifth wall, whereas the sixth and final wall is dedicated to human wisdom. On the inside is a range of inventions and mechanical innovations. The outer face depicts philosophers, religious leaders and various wise men.<sup>516</sup> Children stroll around the walls as part of their education. Visualisation is clearly a vital method of teaching.

This picture learning leads to a common misconception over Campanella’s utopia, as it is often seen as the *only* method of utopian knowledge. Felix Held, for

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<sup>514</sup> CS p. 55. This was changed to the less offensive “Logician” in the final edition.

<sup>515</sup> CS p. 18.

<sup>516</sup> CS pp. 18-20.

example, makes just such a claim in an attempt to show how sophisticated Andreae's utopia was in comparison to the crude *Civitas Solis*.<sup>517</sup> Held's assumption is, however, simply incorrect. The walls are only one part of Solarian education. Children begin their training at the age of three with the picture knowledge on the city walls and this comes to a close when they reach their tenth birthday.<sup>518</sup> In the meantime they have gone into other branches of learning. They are taken into workshops and laboratories at the age of seven, where they receive instruction in mathematics, natural science and medicine.<sup>519</sup> When children reach the age of twelve they are taken into military service, where they study the various arts of warfare.

*Civitas Solis* thus embodies a wide range of learning. Campanella is not wholly reliant on the senses and happily promotes other forms of knowledge. Mathematics is a valuable intellectual commodity. Not only is it taught as a separate discipline, it is second only to astrology on the city walls. Indeed, it is the final grade of knowledge a student must have before contemplating the sacred mysteries of the universe.<sup>520</sup>

One final question needs to be addressed here. The Manuels assert that the extent of science in Campanella's utopia was its only radical feature:

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<sup>517</sup> *Chrs* p. 36. As we have seen, Held makes a similar mistake over the role of the family in the pansophist utopia. See p. 15.

<sup>517</sup> *CoS* p. 20.

<sup>518</sup> *CoS* p. 20.

<sup>519</sup> *CoS* p. 23.

<sup>520</sup> This goes some way to contradict Ingengo's assertion *CHORP* (1988) p. 260, that Campanella rejected mathematics in astrology.

The categories [of Solarian knowledge] seem quite traditional, with few innovations. What is new is the role scientific knowledge played in the administration of the society. Science occupied a third of the directing personnel of the state.<sup>521</sup>

This is a reference to 'Sin', one of the members of the Triumvirate who along with 'Pon' and 'Mor' administer 'Sol's' rule. 'Sol' is the embodiment of the philosopher ruler who has knowledge of all things:

he has to be the best metaphysician and theologian of them all, with a good knowledge of the basis and practice of all the arts and sciences, and the affinities and differences between things, Necessity, the Fate and Harmony of the world, Power, Wisdom and Divine and Universal Love, and the degrees of all being.<sup>522</sup>

With this in mind it is unclear why 'Sin's' role is so novel: one could easily argue that the eugenic responsibilities of 'Mor' are far more radical. There is certainly little room for the new experimental science in 'Sin's' remit; his sub-officers include the traditional roles of Grammarian, Politician, Poet and Sculptor.<sup>523</sup> Although experiments are encouraged they are not given a particularly high priority, an attitude echoed in the division of knowledge in *Metaphysica* into *philosophiae rationalis* (grammar, dialectic, history, poetry and rhetoric) and *philosophia realis* (physiology, politics and ethics).<sup>524</sup>

Finally it is vital to appreciate the syncretic nature of Solarian knowledge. Campanella first discussed his belief in pre-revelatory wisdom in *De gentilismo non retinendo*, in which he suggested that pagan authorities frequently expressed

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<sup>521</sup> Man & Man (1979) p. 271. My brackets.

<sup>522</sup> CS p. 24. The only thing Sol does not have to worry about is languages. He has a number of translators.

<sup>523</sup> CS p. 49

<sup>524</sup> Kelly-Gadol (1976) p. 167.

Christian teaching. They cannot be fully accepted until confirmed by revelation, but that is not to say they did not access the truth.<sup>525</sup> In *Civitas Solis*, this same belief is expressed on the outermost wall of the city:

On the outside wall are all the law-givers and the inventors of the sciences and of weapons. I saw Moses, Osiris, Jupiter, Mercury, Mahomet and many more besides. There, in a place of great honour were Jesus Christ and the Twelve Apostles, whom they hold in high regard.<sup>526</sup>

The Solarians have not yet received revelation but they have a thorough knowledge of Christian teaching.<sup>527</sup> Biblical sources are placed alongside Hebraic and Egyptian traditions: they are all the same before revelation is granted. This also leads to a degree of religious toleration: “they sing of great feats performed by heroes - Christian, Jewish and pagan, of all nations.”<sup>528</sup> Symbolically, *Civitas Solis* is the land of all knowledge. Anybody approaching the city would see that all schools of thought, all religions, were accepted here. If that same traveller were a Christian, he would be assured that all thinkers share in the truth of his religion. The Solarians recognise that all philosophy must be brought together as a unified doctrine, with theological traditions from ancients to moderns.<sup>529</sup>

Campanella’s pansophia is not based purely on pansensism, nor is his utopian education confined to the city walls. *Civitas Solis* outlines a number of different paths to wisdom. The Christian syncretic tradition is the first of these, proudly

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<sup>525</sup> See Bon. p. 47.

<sup>526</sup> *CS* p. 20. Mercury was another name given to Hermes Trismegistus.

<sup>527</sup> This is why they could discuss doctrinal points such as original sin. See pp. 75-79 and 121-24.

<sup>528</sup> *CS* p. 53.

<sup>529</sup> Campanella also embraces Hermes and other pre-revelation sources in *Atheismus Triumphatus*. Walker acknowledges a similar chain of wisdom, but in relation to astrological and occult knowledge. See Walker (1958) p. 217, and (1972) p. 192.

displayed around the outermost wall of the city. We cannot overlook its importance in Campanella's system. It shows that the Solarians are people of universal learning and that philosophical diversity is the basis for their wisdom. Ultimately it explains how the Solarians can accept Christ without full revelation. His truth is contained in the teachings of the ancients.

## 2) Andreae's Christian Knowledge

Knowledge is both the cornerstone of *Christianopolis* and the subject of praise throughout Andreae's work. A unified system of knowledge was the goal of *Societas Christiana*, much of which, as we have seen, was clearly derived from the utopia. In his later years Andreae compiled his own *Compendium of Universall Knowledge*, highlighting his personal preferences for the key thinkers in fifteen scholarly disciplines. As in Campanella's utopia, *Christianopolis* offers a broad variety of teaching. There are eight departments, each subdivided into two further subjects. Experimental science is practiced and, once again, mathematics is singled out for special praise. As well as being universal, knowledge for Andreae must always be directed towards Christ:

When I inquired as to the sun of all learning, he mentioned Christ and Him crucified, saying that all things pointed towards him.<sup>530</sup>

This leads Andreae to promote a synthesis of ancient philosophy and Christianity along syncretic lines. The task of the philosopher is to establish concord between

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<sup>530</sup> *Chrs* p. 187.

pagan and Scriptural authority that is hidden in the ancients. But before we address this, let us first turn to *Christianopolis* to establish the nature and scope of its wisdom.

### **i. *Christianopolis*' Store of Wisdom**

Andreae explains the role of utopian knowledge in his preface to *Christianopolis* in which he identifies two groups of people. The first group defend the status quo at all costs; they usually hold positions of power and benefit most from the evils endemic in current society. The second group is subjected to these ills. They understand that reform is needed but their ignorance prevents them from discovering any suitable solutions.<sup>531</sup> A barrier of misunderstanding has been erected around the miserable lives of the majority. Knowledge is therefore the key to change. It allows man the power to become an active agent, developing the individual and improving society. Wisdom is the catalyst to perfection.

Utopian knowledge is therefore universal in its application. Each and every member of the community is given access to education without any class or gender divisions: "all the children of citizens in general, children of both sexes, are taken into training."<sup>532</sup> The humblest artisans are fully versed in all forms of knowledge, and are encouraged to indulge their creative spark.<sup>533</sup> Andreae is adamant that knowledge is the province of all:

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<sup>531</sup> *Chrs* p. 133.

<sup>532</sup> *Chrs* p. 208.

<sup>533</sup> *Chrs* p. 157.

For that which other people think is characteristic of the few this the inhabitants argue should be attained by all individuals.<sup>534</sup>

This was the aim of *Societas Christiana*: a reform of *all* men through a perfected system of knowledge. *Christianopolis* is not entirely democratic in its education, however, and Andreae definitely hints at an upper stratum in utopia whose knowledge is more pronounced than others. The ‘Director of Learning’, who is in charge of the education of the citizens, is unelected. His knowledge is naturally superior to others and he has a vocational calling for his job. The Director assumes the job because he is naturally “distinguished” for the role.<sup>535</sup> The teachers within the college are all naturally more virtuous, dignified and learned than the common man.<sup>536</sup> The open nature of utopian knowledge is not adverse to elitist structures.

In *Christianopolis*, Andreae stresses the link between knowledge and self-perfection almost immediately. As soon as the narrator steps through the gate of the college it is clear that knowledge provides the key to man’s greatness: “Never have I seen such great an amount of human perfection collected in one place.”<sup>537</sup> After admitting that, like Socrates, he knows nothing, the narrator is shocked to discover the veracity of this statement. The variety of learning in utopia staggers him, for it includes:

the observation of the heaven and earth, the close examination of nature, in the instruments of the arts, the history and origins of languages.<sup>538</sup>

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<sup>534</sup> *Chrs* p. 157.

<sup>535</sup> *Chrs* p. 175.

<sup>536</sup> *Chrs* p. 207.

<sup>537</sup> *Chrs* p. 173.

<sup>538</sup> *Chrs* p. 148. This occurs during the narrator’s third and final interview at the city gates.

All teaching takes place within the college, generally within the eight departments of learning. Before he reaches these classes, the stranger observes other aspects of Christianopolis' adherence to universal wisdom.

The citizens follow *Civitas Solis* in promoting sensual knowledge. Children learn aspects of nature and morality from pictures and images. In the Natural Science Laboratory, for example, there are representations of all aspects of natural history: astronomical phenomena, gems and minerals, animal and plant life as well as all the races of the world.<sup>539</sup> Elsewhere, portraits and statues show students the virtues necessary to live the good life of the Christian.<sup>540</sup> Andreae praises the efficacy of visualisation: "instruction enters altogether more easily through the eyes than through the ears."<sup>541</sup> But once again we must be cautious, it is easy to overestimate the role of sense-knowledge in *Christianopolis*.<sup>542</sup> Sight is *not* the central method of acquiring knowledge, picture learning is only one small cog in the overall machine.

Similarly we should not exaggerate the role of experimental science. *Christianopolis* encourages a number of experiments in a variety of fields, including, biology, chemistry and physiology. In the blacksmith's workshops each worker is encouraged to delve into the secrets of nature.<sup>543</sup> New instruments have been manufactured to help speed up the process of discovery.<sup>544</sup> The citizens of Christianopolis regard it as essential that all men should understand their own bodies

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<sup>539</sup> *Chrs* pp. 200-01.

<sup>540</sup> *Chrs* p. 202. These noble figures are not named.

<sup>541</sup> *Chrs* p. 201.

<sup>542</sup> Yates (1964) p. 394, for example, argues that picture learning places the utopia within the tradition of memory systems also visible in Campanella's work.

<sup>543</sup> *Chrs* p. 155, "here is practical science".

<sup>544</sup> *Chrs* pp. 203-04. Andreae does not tell us what these instruments are apart from a new type of telescope.

and one laboratory is accordingly given over to dissection. Chemistry is encouraged and many experiments are carried out to improve health:

the properties of metals, minerals and vegetables, and even the life of animals are examined, purified, increased and united, for the use of the human race, in the interests of health.<sup>545</sup>

Again, this is only one facet of a broader system, and we should not attach too much importance to it. A similar story is found in *Societas Christiana*: the ‘Physitian’ (or ‘Naturalist’) is the only one out of nine officials to be concerned with experimentation. Mathematics, on the other hand, is singled out as vital, for without it there is no genuine learning:

until those who profess to be educated without mathematics return to her favour, I shall not believe nor bear witness that they are really educated.<sup>546</sup>

There is a mathematician assigned to *Societas Christiana*, and mathematics qualifies as one of the categories in the *Compendium*.

Finally there are the eight departments of learning: Grammar, Logic, Arithmetic, Music, Astronomy, Natural Science, Ethics and Theology.<sup>547</sup> The departments all add a new dimension to Christian teaching, and each contributes a special gift towards man’s improvement. Astronomy makes man “noble minded”,<sup>548</sup>

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<sup>545</sup> *Chrs* p. 196.

<sup>546</sup> *Chrs* p. 204.

<sup>547</sup> These are subdivided into the following categories: i) Oratory and Languages; ii) Metaphysics and Theosophy; iii) Geometry and Mystic Numbers; iv) Musical Instruments and the Chorus; v) Astrology and Heaven of the Christians; vi) History and Church History; vii) Government and Christian Poverty; viii) Practice of Theology and Prophecies.

<sup>548</sup> *Chrs* p. 228.

natural science grants him dignity;<sup>549</sup> ethics teaches him virtue.<sup>550</sup> Again, Andreae stresses the use of mathematical teaching, especially in music:

one cannot enter into it [the music department] until one has had arithmetic and geometry; for it depends to a considerable extent upon measure and number.<sup>551</sup>

Theology, the final department, is the perfect complement to earthly knowledge. It continues from Metaphysics, which takes man into the realms of “the true, the good, the beautiful, unity, order and the like”.<sup>552</sup> Here Andreae makes it clear that man’s contemplation can bring us directly towards God’s mysteries.

The influence of *Christianopolis* is nowhere more apparent than in the plans for *Societas Christiana*. Under a nominal head,<sup>553</sup> three men would co-ordinate the programme for reform. These leaders, titled ‘Religion’, ‘Virtue’ and ‘Learning’ would each lead another triumvirate. They are clearly modelled on the three heads of the state of *Christianopolis*, ‘Judge’, ‘Minister’ and ‘Director of Learning’.<sup>554</sup> Three of the *Societas Christiana*’s sub-officers, ‘Divine’, ‘Politician’ and ‘Physicist’ were to combat the familiar evils of hypocrisy, tyranny and sophistry, the principles that the stranger was fleeing from when he set off on his voyage to utopia.<sup>555</sup>

In its scope, application and details, it is clear that Andreae posits a doctrine of universal knowledge. It is the central feature of his utopia and reinforces his Christian reforms. With knowledge united, Andreae believed that mankind would

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<sup>549</sup> *Chrs* p. 231.

<sup>550</sup> *Chrs* p. 235.

<sup>551</sup> *Chrs* p. 223.

<sup>552</sup> *Chrs* p. 213. The passage on Metaphysics returns to the individual meditations of Christian mysticism.

<sup>553</sup> Andreae suggested Duke Augustus of Wittenberg. See Montgomery (1973) I, p. 176.

<sup>554</sup> The major posts in *Societas Christiana* are as follows: Religion-Divine, Censor and Philosopher; Virtue-Politician, Historian, Economist; Learning-Physician (or Naturalist), Mathematician and Philologist. See *Modell* pp. 156-61.

soon follow. But how strongly, and in what ways did Andreae desire this unification of knowledge?

## ii The Christian Synthesis

A diversity of learning does not, of course, necessarily mean that Andreae sought universal syncretic knowledge in the manner of the other pansophists. Certainly such a philosophy is never usually highlighted, and in fact, on at least two occasions in *Christianopolis* Andreae appears to reject this concept outright. First he denigrates the idea of pre-revelation wisdom:

where philosophers have groped in darkness, they [the citizens of Christianopolis] consult the divine sun and ascend to the known God, who was *unknown to the pagans*.<sup>556</sup>

Andreae then appears to attack the syncretic method:

rarely has one who can adjust all types of Scriptures according to their differences, who can draw forth prophecies out of their most private shrines, who can reconcile ceremonies of Moses with those of Christ, drawn forth from the Old Testament, or accomplish these things like these, under so many interpreters – rarely has such a one established any faith at all within them.<sup>557</sup>

These appear to be proof positive that Andreae's pansophist aspirations were of a qualitatively different kind to his contemporaries.

On closer inspection, however, one detects a considerably different story. Andreae does not claim that reconciliation between theological traditions is impossible.

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<sup>555</sup> *Modell* pp. 156-57. These were the sins that Andreae praised Campanella for combating. See p. 113.

<sup>556</sup> *Chrs* p. 216. My italics.

He merely asserts that such a synthesis is *rarely* successful. In his description of the library, for example, there is a tacit acceptance of pagan knowledge. No book is allowed into the library unless it alludes to God, yet all possible races, creeds and philosophies are represented there:

there is no language on earth that has not contributed something of its own to this place, no mind which is not here represented.<sup>558</sup>

We may conclude that to some extent *all* previous wisdom has contributed to Christian teaching, no matter what its philosophical or religious persuasion.

This idea is made more explicit in *A Modell of a Christian Society*. One of the sub-officers in the final triumvirate is the 'Philosopher', whose area of expertise is the written word. His role is fairly traditional; he must study nature, judge right and wrong and contemplate the truth. All of this is to be done through the love of Christianity. Andreae then furnishes him with another task, one that belies the critique of syncretism:

he weighs the endeavours, proceedings and labours of those admired wits, to whom it was given in mid-darknesse, to see somewhat, especially he examines that desired tranquility of the mind, and draws it to Christ, in whose transcendent perfections and excellencies he stands amazed.<sup>559</sup>

This is a clear indication that philosophy is to reconcile ancient, pagan, wisdom with Christian teachings. Many had attempted such a task, but few had succeeded. This does not mean that it was a lost cause: pansophia would be the system to succeed in

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<sup>557</sup> *Chrs* p. 244.

<sup>558</sup> *Chrs* p. 191.

<sup>559</sup> *Modell* pp. 158-59.

this quest. A further connection with syncretism can subsequently be found in his *Compendium*.

The *Compendium* was part of a larger work, *Rei Christianae & Literariae Subsidia* (1642), which also included a harmonisation of the gospels, a chronology of Biblical history, a Christian apology and a Church guide book. The *Compendium* itself was modelled on the encyclopaedia of Christophe Milieu.<sup>560</sup> In it, Andreae lists fifteen categories of learning with four ‘champions’ for each.<sup>561</sup> The champions of philosophy are Scaliger, Ramus, Cardano and Marsilio Ficino.<sup>562</sup>

Andreae thinks it rare that a man manages to achieve a harmony of doctrines, but this does not make its attainment an impossible dream. He admires those who sought it, such as Ficino and his Platonic/Christian synthesis, and he suggests that the citizens of his utopia had also achieved it. It is for the philosopher of *Societas Christiana* to continue the task, and lead man forward towards Christ, as he himself had done in his utopia.

### 3) Comenius’ Pansophist Vision

Comenius was the one utopian who consistently adopted the term pansophist to label his system of knowledge.<sup>563</sup> Pansophia was a prerequisite for *panorthosia*, Comenius’ plan for a universal reform. It shares many of the features we have

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<sup>560</sup> See Montgomery (1973) p. 90.

<sup>561</sup> The categories are Theology, Law, Medicine, History, Mathematics/Astronomy, Philosophy, Rhetoric, Criticism, Poetry, Anthology, Geography, Cosmography, Art, Music and Printing.

<sup>562</sup> Cited in Montgomery (1973) I, p. 93.

<sup>563</sup> See pp. 28-29.

witnessed in Campanella and Andreae and he acknowledges his fellow-utopians as influences upon his work.<sup>564</sup> There is a cautious acceptance of experimental science, and the methodological efficiency of mathematical reasoning is praised. Indeed, every branch of knowledge is given some role. Most importantly, Comenius stresses that we must find concord between philosophical and religious knowledge. All schools must be brought into the Christian fold. Among his universal books we find *pandogmattia*, which attempted to unite all previous thought into a Christian wisdom. Comenius turned this ideal to practical effect, composing dictionaries, textbooks and even stage plays. *Diogenes the Cynic* (1638) and *Schola Lundis* (1640) were dramas designed to teach schoolchildren the history of philosophy.<sup>565</sup>

This should not surprise us if we appreciate the sheer scale of Comenius' own sources, both ancient and modern. Not only did they agree with each other about many points, they were also in concordance with Comenius' own ideas. He displayed a syncretism that helped to unite man and God: his knowledge is both universalised and united.

#### **i. The Boundaries of Pansophia**

The transformation of knowledge was essential to Comenius' overall desire for *panorthosia*, along with a universal language (*panglottia*), universal religion and a

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<sup>564</sup> See pp. 18-19.

<sup>565</sup> *Diogenes the Cynic* trans. Mittelstadt (New York: Czechoslovak Society of Arts and Sciences in America, 1970).

new political order.<sup>566</sup> *Panglottia* was also one of the four pillars of Comenius' original scheme of pansophist reforms. Universal books (*panbiblia*), schools (*panscholia*) and colleges (named the *Colleges of Light*) were also necessary.<sup>567</sup> *Pansophia* was the title of the very first universal book, followed by texts such as *Panhistoria* and *Pancosmographia*.<sup>568</sup> The word was thus used to denote specific aspects of Comenius' plan and also as a generic term, denoting the full range of Comenian reforms.

Comenius' scheme was an attempt to find the universal wisdom that so many past thinkers had tried and failed to compile:

it hath been the endeavour of many worthy men, in times past, to collect a Summary or general Comprehension of all learning ... whose endeavours, though they have been all commendable, yet their success hath been diverse.<sup>569</sup>

Nevertheless he is confident that he has discovered the solution to all of the problems associated with this monumental undertaking, for pansophia will be nothing less than:

the most perfect knowledge of everything which it is mans lot to know, speak about, and do in his lifetime ... This will entitle it to be called the Philosophy of Saints.<sup>570</sup>

In what sense is pansophia universal? Its *object* is universal, as all knowledge "must be united into one".<sup>571</sup> Unity is the only way to guard against the factionalism in knowledge that beset the 'Labyrinth of the World'. Comenius' philosophy will unite faith and reason by bringing together theology and secular wisdom: "neither

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<sup>566</sup> See pp. 91-96.

<sup>567</sup> *VL* 15-19, *Pan* 11, 14, 16.

<sup>568</sup> *VL* 15-16.

<sup>569</sup> *Dil* pp. 69-70. Comenius includes Bacon's *Instauratio Magna* as one such attempted knowledge.

<sup>570</sup> *Pan* 11/1.

<sup>571</sup> *Prod* p. 17.

Philosophy, nor Divinity, may be taught severally, but both joyntly, which is Pansophie.”<sup>572</sup> This ties in fully with Comenius’ ideas on both the perfect society and the perfected man: both must be unified in order to attain their true end.

The *methodology* of pansophia is also universal, beginning with self-evident principles upon which all knowledge can be built. These principles rely on the three intellectual powers that all men possess: sense, reason and faith.<sup>573</sup> Pansophia has a universal *end*: it must be directed towards God at all times. Indeed, Christianity is the only faith capable of embracing the pansophic vision:

all pious and faithful Christians, even the simplest of them, in as much as they are good Christians, are possessed of the Pansophie.<sup>574</sup>

Does Comenius’ Christocentrism present a potential problem here? Comenius appears to reject the notion of placing disparate traditions together (he offers a satirical passage on this practice in his discussion on the library in *Labyrinth of the World*)<sup>575</sup> and on occasions he also attacks the pagan philosophies that for centuries have divided man and shattered knowledge.

Ancient wisdom has promoted disunity, forcing man to turn his back on God. Quoting St Paul, Comenius declares “they changed the Truth of God into a lie and worshipped and served the creature more than the creator, who is blessed forever”.<sup>576</sup> We are reminded of the symbolism of the prophetess Miriam, whose life provided an allegory for the disintegration of philosophy into atheist conceit.<sup>577</sup> Comenius even

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<sup>572</sup> *Dil* p. 76.

<sup>573</sup> *Diatyposis* 1/15.

<sup>574</sup> *Dil* p. 78.

<sup>575</sup> *LW* /11..

<sup>576</sup> *Prod* p. 21. This is from Romans 1. 25.

<sup>577</sup> See p. 249.

goes so far as to dedicate a chapter of his *Great Didactic* to the removal of pagan works from the school system.<sup>578</sup> If pansophia does not allow the ancients, then how can we discern a syncretic sensibility?

We can do so by establishing that, for Comenius, pansophia is universal in its *subject*. All human beings are to be admitted to its reforms: all men, for Comenius, are equal. Humans across the world exhibit the same desires: to live, to have health, honour, wisdom and freedom.<sup>579</sup> Every man has three shared characteristics, equipping him with the tools necessary to receive and disseminate pansophia: speech, reason and the power of action.<sup>580</sup> He has a further five qualities that enable him to commune with God,<sup>581</sup> and his universal nature allows him to become all things in the cosmos.<sup>582</sup> Yet this common nature seems to detract somewhat from the Christocentrism seen above. All men and women possess these traits, whether Christian or not:

the divinely laid foundations of our reason remain the same for man and woman, for the child and the old man, for the Greek and the Arab, for the Christian and the Mohammedan, for the religious and the irreligious.<sup>583</sup>

Comenius' ultimate desire is for a new universal religion; the whole world under one Christian faith. In the meantime, however, he is happy to accept that religious toleration is necessary for pansophia to take root. Toleration must be offered to

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<sup>578</sup> *GD* 25.

<sup>579</sup> *Pam* 3/11. Comenius lists twelve universal desires.

<sup>580</sup> *Pam* 3/6. Comenius acknowledges that he is following Cardano in this scheme.

<sup>581</sup> These are intellect, language, morality, desire for work and piety. *Pam* 3/10.

<sup>582</sup> See pp. 137-42.

<sup>583</sup> *V/L* 4/10.

Mohammedans, Jews and Gentiles alike.<sup>584</sup> This provides the foundation for the unity of thought encouraged in *pandogmattia*.

## ii. Christian Philosophy

What elements permeate this harmonious knowledge? Unlike Campanella or Andreae, Comenius is not quite so virulently opposed to Aristotle, even if he christened his project from a response to Aristotelianism. He does, however, share many of the views of his fellow-utopians.

Comenius accepts the new experimental science. The scientist is one who has power over nature and can make her yield her secrets:

because the Arts, by expressing or rather by compressing and imprisoning Nature, force her again and again to confess her secrets to us and make them better known to us.<sup>585</sup>

Experiments have brought forth many miraculous discoveries:

It is not a thing of nothing that Hermetically Physitians, and others, have by means of Chymistry found out how to extract the qualities of natural bodies, and to separate even the very essences of things.<sup>586</sup>

Yet he is not convinced that all recent developments have been worthwhile. This is particularly noticeable in Comenius' judgement of Bacon: of all his work it is the inductive method that comes in for the greatest criticism.<sup>587</sup>

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<sup>584</sup> *Pan* 8/26 The conversion of the Jews was a strong element of the Millennialist tradition to which Comenius participated in.

<sup>585</sup> *VZ* 14/10.

<sup>586</sup> *Prod* p. 28. This reference is clearly directed towards alchemists, which we will discuss more fully in pp. 249-52.

<sup>587</sup> See pp. 194-95.

Along with Campanella and Andreae, Comenius repeatedly extols the virtues of mathematical learning, which provides the most convincing proofs available to man.<sup>588</sup> The Manuels contend that Comenius was never persuaded by mathematical knowledge and he was unsure as to the proper role it should play in pansophia.<sup>589</sup> Yet it is clear from the utopian texts that he valued its methodological clarity, and wanted to adapt it to his own teaching methods:

that so all things which may be known (whether Naturall, Morall or Artificiall, or even Metaphysicall) may be delivered like unto Mathematicall demonstrations, with evidence and certainty, that there may be no room left for any doubt to arise.<sup>590</sup>

Hence the adherence to the fundamental principles and graded learning that made knowledge easier to impart.

Finally, Comenius provides a favourable discussion of sense-knowledge. He promoted visualisation as a tool of learning in one of his most popular didactic works. His *Orbis Sensualium Pictus* (1672)<sup>591</sup> was a dictionary for the youngest of students, using illustrations to explain the meaning of words. Sense combines with reason and revelation as the three avenues in which to pursue knowledge. Each corresponds to the books of nature, man and scripture, providing the fundamental principles upon which to build pansophia. All of these channels lead directly to

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<sup>588</sup> *Pan* 11/18: "if our philosophy is to be based on proof it would be better *to teach it wholly in the style of Mathematics.*"

<sup>589</sup> *Man and Man* (1979) p. 213: "Comenius was doubtful of its centrality in universal science."

<sup>590</sup> *Prod* p. 25.

<sup>591</sup> *Orbis Sensualium Pictus*, ed. J. Bowen (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1967). The book's popularity ran to several editions.

God.<sup>592</sup> Sense plays a vital role, acting as the conduit of the intellect, into which flows the external world:

ideas of things cannot make their way into the world unless they are united to it by the aid of sensation.<sup>593</sup>

Sense is the “light of the mind”<sup>594</sup> that reveals the innate ideas of objects. As we have noted, however, Nature alone cannot lead to God; she must be approached in conjunction with the books of Man and Scripture. Sense alone is not an adequate basis for knowledge. The book of Man can only be investigated through contemplation of the self:

the reasoning mind is made the measure of all things ... by its own innate notions it measures all things, it is able to get knowledge of God himself.<sup>595</sup>

Man is the universal figure; the secrets of the universe are contained in his own soul. Revelation combines the internal and external powers of man and nature. It is gained inwardly through prayer and meditation and outwardly in the written word of the Bible.<sup>596</sup> Comenius acknowledges his debt to Campanella once more in the formulation of the three pillars of philosophy.<sup>597</sup>

But again, it is important to note that although sense-knowledge is one crucial facet of pansophia, it is not the only foundation for knowledge. Sense must work concurrently with revelation and contemplation. Experimental science is useful and

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<sup>592</sup> *Prod* p. 12, *Dil* p. 65, *Pan* 11/9, *Pam* 2/3, *VL* 14/6. This stands in contrast to Bacon, who only promotes natural philosophy for gaining any kind of insight into God. See pp. 33-40 of this discussion.

<sup>593</sup> *VL* 10/5 (33).

<sup>594</sup> *VL* 8/13 (ii).

<sup>595</sup> *VL* 1/11 or *Nat. Phil* /Preface: “Let it stand: that Philosophy is lame without divine Revelation.”

<sup>596</sup> *Pan* 11/8. Murphy (1995) classifies Sense, Man and Scripture as Physical, Metaphysical and Hyperphysical, p. 76.

<sup>597</sup> *Nat. Phil.* /Preface.

mathematical logic is essential. So, too, is the unification of various philosophical and theological traditions.

Religious toleration was a foundation for pansophist reform and was soon extended to cover all theological schools. One reason for this is because Comenius believes in the utility of *all* knowledge, even that which may be regarded as corrupt and sinful:

all knowledge, even knowledge of evil, is good (for God and the angels also know evil things, but are not on that account evil) and all knowledge is useful and necessary.<sup>598</sup>

One can use such knowledge as a safeguard against sin: if a man knows what evil is then he will be able to avoid it. In this light, Comenius' tirade against pagan authorities seems somewhat cosmetic: even anti-Christian or heretical teachings will provide a useful contrast to the eternal truth. The two principles of toleration and utility explain the reasoning behind this attack. Comenius is not offering a full-scale rejection of ancient sources but is making a simple request that unimportant ideas are left aside. All doctrines contain some truth, but by the same token they do not reveal total truth. Man must separate the wheat from the chaff, and this is the goal of *Pandogmattia*:

we are not urging the destruction of all authors of whatever kind they may be who now exist, but rather the gutting of them by means of epitomes, summaries, indices and collection, part of which it will be easy to learn *the whole mind of every author upon whatever subject he has written*.<sup>599</sup>

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<sup>598</sup> VL 14/14.

<sup>599</sup> VL 16/18.

The universal book, *Pandogmattia*, corresponds to the pansophic principles of truth, completeness and utility.<sup>600</sup> They must also follow the accepted order, proceeding from general principles to specific examples.<sup>601</sup> Other books include *Panhistoria*, *Pancosmographia*, *Pananthea*, *Panchronologia* and *Pansophia*. This latter contains the first principles of knowledge,<sup>602</sup> which all other books will use as a platform for their own teachings.

*Pandogmattia* will seek to unify arguments in natural philosophy (for example, the debate between Empedocles and Aristotle over the nature of light<sup>603</sup>) but it does not stop there. It will cast its net over all possible schools. *Prodromus* offers an indication as to who will be included:

Christians or Mohammedans, Jews or Pagans, and of what sect soever, Pythagoreans, Acadians, Peripatetics, Stoics, Esseans, Greeks Latins Ancient or Modern Doctors, or Rabbins, every Church, Synod and Council, that all, I say be admitted.<sup>604</sup>

All knowledge should be directed towards God, yet all philosophy has offered some truth to the world of knowledge. Far from attacking all pagan philosophy, Comenius rejects that which does not correspond to the Christian faith. We cannot afford to ignore any thinker: “there is no book so bad that it contains nothing of good.”<sup>605</sup>

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<sup>600</sup> *Pam* 6/3, 18.

<sup>601</sup> *VL* 16/19 again Comenius urges man to learn mathematically. See also *Pam* 6/18.

<sup>602</sup> *VL* 16/4 “in effect, the book of Pansophia must be so full and complete that beyond its limits there can be nothing, and nothing can be conceived to be...it must be perfectly solid and firm so that nothing is left outside its foundations.”

<sup>603</sup> *VL* 16/23. Comenius finds some truth in both positions.

<sup>604</sup> *Prod* p. 31

<sup>605</sup> *VL* 16/18. Comenius acknowledges that this is an old expression.

For Comenius “the knowledge of all things is harmony”.<sup>606</sup> Pansophia is the embodiment of this maxim: the Christian reform in which all knowledge will come together to perfect man. As with Campanella and Andreae, pansophia is all-inclusive: no branch of learning is rejected. But within its boundaries, a syncretic conception of universal philosophy holds a key role and this helps Comenius’ own universalism:

Nor shall any one style himself in Philosophy a Platonist or Aristotelian, in Divinity a Lutheran or Calvinist or Papist, but all Philosophers and Christians.<sup>607</sup>

Thus all men can access the truth of Christ no matter what their own personal religious traditions or philosophical backgrounds may be: they can all unite as one. In this way the instigation of pansophia is one of the key methods of actively bringing grace down to earth, providing a direct contact with God’s powers.

#### 4) Bacon the Pansophist?

Bacon is so renowned as a pioneer of science that it seems inconceivable that he can be discounted as a member of the pansophist circle: his legacy is a new approach to knowledge. Like the pansophists, Bacon poured scorn upon the Aristotelian tradition, whom he described as “the worst of sophists”.<sup>608</sup> He also displayed an interest in universal languages as a medium for expressing the new wisdom with clarity<sup>609</sup> and was admired by his contemporaries including, as we have

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<sup>606</sup> *Prod* p. 39. See also *Diatyposis* 1/ 4: “The forms of this Book ought to be an Universal Harmony, or a consonance and agreement of each thing to other.”

<sup>607</sup> *Diatyposis* 1/5.

<sup>608</sup> *Masculine Birth of Time* p. 62.

<sup>609</sup> For a fuller discussion see Slaughter (1982) ch. 4.

seen, pansophists such as Comenius.<sup>610</sup> The scope of Baconian knowledge was certainly universal and the *Great Instauration* was to be nothing less than a scientific revolution:

A total reconstruction of sciences, arts and all human knowledge, raised upon the proper foundations.<sup>611</sup>

Bacon's goal was to replace the factionalism and subjectivity of contemporary science with experimentation and the inductive method. His commitment to the advancement of learning is beyond question, and this attitude is most clearly displayed in his *New Atlantis*. Bacon's utopia, as we have seen, is overwhelmingly concerned with showing an ideal scientific institution rather than the society as a whole.

But this is not enough to classify Bacon as a pansophist. Pansophism sought to unite disparate traditions in order to bring man closer to God. Universal man demanded a universal wisdom. Therefore the pansophists brought together disparate philosophical and theological schools in order to establish a fundamental Christian truth. Bacon's ideas do not correspond to this system. He rejects syncretism in philosophy and spurns the authority of the ancients. Furthermore he distinguishes between natural philosophy and religion as two separate pursuits, and he consistently maintains this distinction. Whereas the pansophists saw knowledge as leading directly to God, Bacon erects a barrier. As we observed in the previous chapter, his *Great Instauration* was applicable only to natural philosophy: he does not attempt to provide any theological answers.

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<sup>610</sup> See *Pan* 6/5, or the Introduction to this current discussion.

This view has been challenged in recent years, especially in relation to *New Atlantis*, where the Fellows of Saloman's House have been portrayed as a caste of pseudo-priests.<sup>612</sup> But I will demonstrate that these assertions are, at the very least, questionable. Ultimately Bacon does not see knowledge as providing a direct path to the Creator, and this is abundantly clear in *New Atlantis*: revelation does not come through science but directly from God. Man can only gain insight into God's mysteries through an investigation of nature, but no more. The pansophists wanted to synthesise philosophy and theology: Bacon urged man to keep religion at a distance from science.

#### **i. The Rejection of Syncretism**

The scope of Baconian knowledge is most obviously visualised in *New Atlantis*, in which the model of Saloman's House is "the very Eye of the Kingdom".<sup>613</sup> The description of the college is broken down into four separate parts: the ends of the foundation, its instruments, the Fellows and the rituals they adhere to. The ends of the college reflect the goals of the *Great Instauration*:

The end of the Foundation is the knowledge of causes, and secret motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible.<sup>614</sup>

The instruments comprise a series of "houses" where experiments are continuously carried out. There is a lower region, which constitutes a series of caves in which

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<sup>611</sup> *Collected Works* IV p. 8.

<sup>612</sup> See John Channing-Briggs (1996) pp. 172-97.

<sup>613</sup> *Collected Works* III p. 156.

<sup>614</sup> *Collected Works* III, p. 156.

mining, soil, and various subterranean phenomena are studied. The upper region houses a number of towers that are home to meteorologists, astronomers and so on. On top of this, the Fellows constantly seek to imitate nature; reproducing various types of weather and utilising lakes, orchards and fields for an early form of genetic engineering:

We make them also by art greater than their nature; and their fruit greater and much sweeter, and of differing taste, smell colour and figure.<sup>615</sup>

Fellows conduct similar experiments on animals, attempting to dwarf or giganticise many different creatures.

There are laboratories for testing food and drink, and areas dedicated to the study of light and sound in which the use of microscope, telescope and microphones are advocated. Mechanics has a separate department and here Bacon predicts both the aeroplane and submarine:

we also imitate the flight of birds; we have some degrees of flying in the air. We have ships and boats for going underwater and for brooking of seas.<sup>616</sup>

A “House of Deceits” guards against false practices and charlatans of all kinds, which as we have seen goes some distance in showing the fallibility of the Fellows. Throughout the college there is an overwhelming preoccupation with medicine: nearly every department is concerned with the health of man. Hermits inhabit the upper region, for example, to gauge effects on their health, and the Fellows possess a “water of paradise” which prolongs life.

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<sup>615</sup> *Collected Works III*, p. 158.

<sup>616</sup> *Collected Works III*, p. 163.

The personnel of the college consist of thirty-six fellows and an unspecified number of apprentices and helpers. Twelve of these make up the mysterious ‘merchants of light’.<sup>617</sup> There are three ‘pioneers’ who conduct new experiments and pass their results on to the three ‘compilers’. This group then frames general laws, and its conclusions are put to the test by the ‘lamps’, who formulate more detailed investigations that are carried out by the ‘innoculators’. Their findings are finally passed to the ‘interpreters of nature’, who establish the fundamental laws of nature.

Little is known of their rituals save that they are essentially Christian and conducted in a hall dedicated to scientific pioneers. The crew is also informed that all Fellows occasionally go into the world to proclaim their latest discoveries.<sup>618</sup>

Bacon seems to acknowledge ancient wisdom with his recasting of the Atlantean myth from Plato’s *Critias*. Although Bacon was less ready to accept this myth in his earlier years, it is a critical element in utopia. He updates the tale, situating Atlantis in what was now understood to be America,<sup>619</sup> which was one of the great civilisations (along with Phoenicia and India) that often visited Bensalem in years past. Atlantis had a great store of knowledge, which was destroyed when floods laid waste to the continent.<sup>620</sup> Survivors fled to the mountainous interior and evolved into the American Indians encountered by voyagers to the New World. But

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<sup>617</sup> We will look more fully at the possible Rosicrucian overtones of the Merchants of Light in the on pp. 257-60.

<sup>618</sup> For a fuller discussion see pp. 257-60.

<sup>619</sup> *Collected Works* III, p. 141: “the great Atlantis ... that you call America.”

<sup>620</sup> *Collected Works* III, p. 142. Here Bacon changes Plato’s story. In the original, an earthquake destroyed Atlantis in a single night following a series of military defeats by the Athenians. Bacon ignores any stories of lost battles and concludes: “For within less than the space of one hundred years the Great Atlantis was utterly lost and destroyed; not by a great earthquake as your man saith, for that whole tract is subject little to earthquakes, but by a particular deluge or flood.”

these were not the founders of Bensalem; the island's original inhabitants came from Peru.<sup>621</sup>

Bacon's principal aim here seems to be to show that ancient cultures were as advanced (if not more so) than those contemporaneous to his own: though they obviously did not possess the pre-fall wisdom promised by the *Great Instauration*. Although the Bensalemites were aware of the Platonic myth, Atlantean wisdom clearly predated his philosophy by many years. Saloman's House was established during Plato's lifetime (approximately 300 BC) and so it is unlikely that his doctrines would have spread to the island until long after his death. This means that the utopia, and Saloman's House in particular, had been untouched by Greek wisdom since its inception. Due to its enclosed and static nature, it is reasonable to suppose that the college would never have been subject to any traditional Western philosophy: there would be no room in Bensalem for Plato, Aristotle, Augustine or any other major thinker. This position is further reinforced by casting an eye upon the Houses in the College of Six Days Works: there is no room for philosophy or theology among the experiments.

This ties in perfectly with Bacon's critique of the state of seventeenth-century knowledge, as it was beset by pagan philosophy and religious superstition: "your philosophers are more fabulous than poets. They debauch our minds."<sup>622</sup> In *Historia Ventorum* (in which he makes his only explicit reference to Campanella) Bacon lists some of those who have corrupted natural science, attacking both ancients and

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<sup>621</sup> Peru was also where the crew had originally set sail from at the beginning of the story.

<sup>622</sup> *Masculine Birth of Time*, p. 62.

moderns.<sup>623</sup> Ignorance is reinforced by public opinion; people place far too much faith in traditional teachings.<sup>624</sup> The Greeks (especially Aristotle) have been guilty of straitjacketing science so that original thought cannot escape.<sup>625</sup>

Bacon is at odds, then, with the pansophist ideas of a synthesis of ancient wisdom, which is in keeping with his attack on the positive image of man that the other utopians held dear. Ancient ideas have given the erroneous impression that man was above both nature and God. Science has succumbed to the idols of the mind. Truth has been viewed as internal to man,<sup>626</sup> which has led to an overwhelming arrogance:

we clearly impress the stamp of our own image on the creatures and works of God, instead of carefully examining and recognising in them the stamp of the Creator himself.<sup>627</sup>

Philosophy, and especially reliance on ancient texts, had stifled knowledge and made man the unnatural centre of his own inquiries.

## ii. Religion and Baconian Science

Bacon continues this line of thought by condemning those who seek to unite science and religion. Man cannot mix faith and reason:

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<sup>623</sup> These include: "Pythagoras, Philolaus, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Parmenides, Anaxoagoras, Leucippus, Democritus, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno ... Patricius, Telesius, Bruno, Severinus the Dane, Gilbert the Englishman and Campanella". *Collected Works IV*, p. 131.

<sup>624</sup> For example see *Thoughts and Conclusions*, p. 80, or *Collected Works IV*, p. 15.

<sup>625</sup> *Collected Works IV*, p. 14. One potential problem here is Bacon's *Wisdom of the Ancients* (1609), which recasts many traditional myths to support Bacon's ideas on knowledge and science. McKnight (1998) links these two texts together. By aligning his utopian text to Plato's Atlantean myth, Bacon conforms his belief in an ancient, pure knowledge. It was this knowledge that was maintained in Bensalem.

<sup>626</sup> *Thoughts and Conclusions*, p. 82.

<sup>627</sup> *Collected Works V*, p. 132.

I humbly pray, that things human may not interfere with things divine, and that from the opening of the ways of sense, and the increase of natural light there may arise in our minds no incredulity or darkness with regard to the divine mysteries.<sup>628</sup>

His own system is quite different. The *Great Instauration* is not founded on “figments of my brain, nor the shadows thrown by words, nor a mixture of religion and science”<sup>629</sup> and he further urges man to “give to faith that which is faith’s”.<sup>630</sup>

But this view has been challenged recently, most notably by John Channing Briggs. Briggs suggests that Bacon’s use of the word “wisdom” provides an unusual conception of knowledge, *Philosophia prima*, which bridges the gulf between religion and science:

In *Philosophia prima* divine, natural and human philosophy meet “in one stem” (III, 346).

With uncommon consistency Bacon uses *wisdom* to invoke this extraordinary idea in numerous passages.<sup>631</sup>

Briggs views man’s restoration to his pre-fall position as the key to Bacon’s religious approach to science. He reiterates Webster’s argument that Bacon is more millennial than he is often given credit for, and in particular regularly utilises the metaphor of the prophecy of Daniel.<sup>632</sup>

Certainly Bacon united religion and science in so far as the former acted as a motivation for the latter. Bacon’s investigation into nature is therefore an almost holy pursuit: it is effectively a means by which man can crack the code that God has hidden in the natural world. The inductive method becomes in this sense, a divine

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<sup>628</sup> *Collected Works* IV, p. 20.

<sup>629</sup> *Masculine Birth of Time*, p. 62.

<sup>630</sup> *Collected Works* IV, p.21.

<sup>631</sup> Channing Briggs (1996) p. 175.

<sup>632</sup> Channing Briggs (1996) p. 176. See Webster (1975) pp. 22-27.

tool.<sup>633</sup> Moreover, Bacon's idea of the scientist is a direct correlation to the traditional role of the priest: the scientist requires a large degree of self-restraint, control, denial, humility and charity.<sup>634</sup> Ultimately science must conduct itself quietly and with reverence in order for it to continue its benevolent mission: "good scientific government is therefore hidden government".<sup>635</sup>

This is, of course, what seemingly occurs in *New Atlantis*. The fellows of Saloman's House are both priests and government officials, conducting their business in the utmost secrecy. More tellingly, Saloman's House was established *before* the island was converted to Christianity, and the chief protagonist in this miracle was one of the fellows of the college. Briggs concludes that:

Bensalemite science precedes the arrival of Christianity on the island, and so it might not need orthodox religion except as a cover for its work.<sup>636</sup>

This thesis is interesting but on closer reading appears to have considerable flaws. To begin, and as we have previously discussed, the restoration of pre-fall wisdom was designed specifically to *prevent* man from approaching God. Natural philosophy is always beneath moral knowledge in terms of divine wisdom and is not, therefore, as empowering as it may first appear.<sup>637</sup> Admittedly, Bacon displays a missionary zeal in his call for a new science:

I interpose everywhere admonitions and scruples and cautions, with a religious care to eject, repress, and as it were exorcise every kind of phantom.<sup>638</sup>

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<sup>633</sup> Channing Briggs (1996) pp. 186-87.

<sup>634</sup> Channing Briggs (1996) pp. 180-82.

<sup>635</sup> Channing Briggs (1996) p. 184.

<sup>636</sup> Channing Briggs (1996) p. 193.

<sup>637</sup> See pp. 147-52.

<sup>638</sup> *Collected Works* IV p. 30.

Enthusiasm alone, however, is hardly enough to prove a substantive link between religion and science.

More seriously, there are problems with Briggs' interpretation of the conversion of Bensalem. The story actually *reinforces* the separation of religion as Bacon makes it clear that its inhabitants did not discover the true God through science. Christianity arrived at Bensalem approximately three hundred years after Saloman's House was established,<sup>639</sup> thanks to a miraculous encounter off the shores of the island. One evening, a column of light stretching from the sea to the sky was sighted off the coast. Several Fellows set out in a small boat to investigate, but before they could reach the light their boats were held fast by a mysterious force. In his panic one of the fellows cried out in prayer. Instantly the light disappeared, leaving behind a small wooden chest. Within it were the New Testament, other Scriptural works and a letter from St Bartholomew explaining the significance of the contents.<sup>640</sup> All of these items were blessed with the gift of tongues so that all islanders could understand the Word of God. The implication here is clear. The Fellows of Saloman's House had toiled for years without gaining any insight into the truth of God. Only when one of their members abandoned his reason for his new-

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<sup>639</sup> This occurred approximately twenty years after the Ascension.

<sup>640</sup> *Collected Works* III, pp. 137-39. The inclusion of St Bartholomew is a singular feature. He is one of the least well known of the apostles. Named Bartholomew in the Synoptic Gospels, St John identifies him as Nathaniel. There is only one record of him in the Acts of the Apostles; he was present when Jesus revealed himself to Thomas. Apocryphal tradition suggests he evangelised throughout Asia and was martyred in the town of Derbend. He is the patron saint of those who work with skins. See *The Martyrdom of the Holy and Glorious Apostle St Bartholomew* trans. A. Walker in *Apocryphal Gospels, Acts and Revelations* (Edinburgh: Ante-Nicene Christian Library, 25 vols., 1870) 15, pp. 429-39. McKnight (1998) p. 103, argues that Bartholomew is connected with the rescue of Adam, which underlines Bacon's commitment to the restoration of pre-fall knowledge.

found faith did he gain such knowledge. Revelation alone provided proof of God's existence.<sup>641</sup>

In *Novum Organon*, Bacon clearly places the limits on man's scientific enquiry:

Man, being the servant and interpreter of Nature, can do and understand so much and so much only as he has observed in fact or in thought of the course of nature.<sup>642</sup>

These instructions are carried out in *New Atlantis* and beyond, without any further contemplation into the mysteries of God. Science can only go so far with any legitimacy: religious knowledge cannot be attributed to the fellows of Saloman's House.

The *Great Instauration* thus overturns the fundamental pillars of pansophia. It distinguishes between science and religion, denigrates man's own abilities and destroys any notion of an ancient synthesis. This is precisely why Comenius found time to criticise the more innovative aspects of Bacon's work. The inductive method, for example, ignores questions of God and its results are never certain anyway:

this requireth the continuall industry of many men and ages, and so is not only laborious, but seemeth also to be uncertain in event and success thereof.<sup>643</sup>

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<sup>641</sup> This passage is at odds with the idea of scientist as priest, which Briggs finds so persuasive. Elsewhere Briggs engages in speculation surrounding the arrival of the sailors to the island, which is equally as inaccurate. He writes:

when we hear later that the Bensalemite researchers have mastered the winds, the possibility arises that the sailors were first brought near death, then saved, by means of a preternatural force that was engineered inside the College of the Six Days' Works.

See Channing-Briggs (1996) p. 193. This is rather fanciful. The crew simply pray out loud to God and are delivered into an orthodox Christian community. There is no indication that this was designed by the islanders of *New Atlantis* and, if anything, reinforced the Christian interpretation. God could have sent them to a land of savages and heathens.

<sup>642</sup> *Collected Works* IV p. 47.

Bacon's concession to religion was as motivation for science.<sup>644</sup> In other words, Bacon's greatest fault was that he simply was not pansophist enough.<sup>645</sup> Though there are undoubted similarities, the evidence suggests that Bacon's ideas come from a different tradition to that of Campanella, Andreae and Comenius.

## Conclusion

The Manuels argued that pansophia arose out of opposition to the prevailing beliefs of the day. Knowledge was viewed in terms of the two books by which man could approach knowledge:

the Book of Nature and the Book of Science, both viewed as equivalent sources of Christian knowledge, both leading to truth but remaining separate, with distinct languages, modes of expression, institutional arrangements, and areas of specialization.<sup>646</sup>

The pansophists attempted to break with this tradition, emphasising that all paths to wisdom were of equal value. Yet there is a problem here with one member of the Manuels' constellation. Bacon consistently stated that science and religion should be kept separate. Man's knowledge can only extend into nature: when he looks to God he does so through faith alone. Only revelation provides proof of God's existence.

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<sup>643</sup> *Prod* p. 35.

<sup>644</sup> Webster (1975) suggests that Bacon believed natural philosophy to be ordained by God as the greatest tool for investigation. In this way he limited science to the study of secondary causes, and avoid looking directly at God Himself.

<sup>645</sup> This is what Comenius was reacting against: "The Christian Philosophy or *pansophia* of Comenius infused into Bacon's empiricism a strong religious element." Webster (1975) p. 108.

<sup>646</sup> Manuel & Manuel (1979) p. 206.

Far from showing any pansophist credentials, Bacon's utopia confirms the metaphor of the two books.<sup>647</sup>

The pansophists demonstrated that every branch of knowledge was vital for the improvement of man and society. The utopians of the early seventeenth century sought to unite science and religion in a dual attempt to forge reconciliation across Europe and reunite man with his Creator.

Campanella, Andreae and Comenius all offer judgements on knowledge that are in broad agreement with one another, though with slightly differing degrees of emphasis. They are in concord over the range of knowledge, the utility of mathematics, the limited role of experimentation and the importance of sense. The significance of this latter element has been greatly exaggerated because crucially, none of the utopians reject metaphysics, as we have seen in their visions of man. In an attempt to reveal their Christian standpoint, they incorporate the syncretic conception of universal philosophy. In showing how all thinkers partake in Christian truth they are demonstrating the potential ease of their own projects.

Bacon on the other hand does not wish to bring man back to God in this manner: he sees man as imperfectible and thus limits his capacity for knowledge. Despite the potentially religious nature of the fellows of Saloman's House, *New Atlantis* stands in stark contrast to the pansophist utopia. Its knowledge may lead to a happy society, but it does not allow man to approach God.

The syncretic tendencies of the pansophists hints at one final aspect of their system. A belief in pre-revelatory wisdom includes an acknowledgment that certain

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<sup>647</sup> Even McKnight (1998) p. 109, who endorses the full millennial interpretation of *New Atlantis*,

mystical and occult traditions are legitimate areas of learning. We must now turn to the more magical side of utopia.

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agrees that the Bensalemites keep religion and science separate.

## Chapter V: Pansophia and the Rosie Crosse

This chapter looks at the pansophist utopia in relation to the occult and magical beliefs of the early seventeenth-century. Commentators such as Yates, argue that the pansophist movement was inextricably linked to the mysterious Rosicrucian fraternity. She suggests that both groups pioneered a system of knowledge that bridged Renaissance magic and modern science. This chapter does not deny that each of the pansophists employed magical motifs in their utopian works, but argues that this is not enough to directly link them to the two Rosicrucian manifestos, *Fama Fraternalis* and *Confessio Fraternalis*. The chapter pays particular attention to the claims surrounding Andreae's involvement in the movement, which have recently been strenuously reasserted. It suggests that *New Atlantis* is by far the most recognisably Rosicrucian text, despite Bacon's apparent rejection of magicians and alchemists and that, once again, Bacon stands in opposition to the pansophist utopias of Campanella, Andreae and Bacon.

### **1) Pansophia and the Magical Tradition**

Secret societies, usually with some claim to arcane and esoteric knowledge, were relatively common in the seventeenth-century.<sup>647</sup> The most prominent of these mystical groups were the Rosicrucians, who first came to notice in 1614 with the publication of *Fama Fraternalis*. This German text, published in Cassel by Wilhelm Wessel, recounted the story of the life and death

of 'CRC', the mystical founder of the Rosicrucian brotherhood. Displaying an eclectic mix of Lutheranism, science and the occult, the *Fama* promised that a sequel would soon appear. One year later *Confessio Fraternalis* appeared from the same publisher. Written in Latin, this was a virulently anti-Catholic polemic that invited potential members to join its ranks. Though many tried none (according to official histories) succeeded.<sup>648</sup> Nevertheless the ideas and symbols of the Rosicrucians have found their way into the works of a great variety of thinkers; the imagery of the rose and the cross has been employed liberally throughout Western literature and philosophy.<sup>649</sup> There is a rite of the Rose and Cross in both Scottish and French freemasonry, and many societies exist today that bear the name Rosicrucian.<sup>650</sup> We must, therefore, keep a sense of perspective when dealing with the myriad hypotheses surrounding the movement. This chapter will concentrate mainly upon the manifestos themselves, simply because these were the texts that the pansophists directly responded to. First we must situate Rosicrucianism in the intellectual milieu of the seventeenth-century.

### ***i. Yates' Rosicrucian Enlightenment***

The best place to begin is the seminal work of Frances Yates, who offers two interconnected hypotheses regarding the Rosicrucians.<sup>651</sup> The first is fairly general. Rosicrucianism is a phase in the history of science, which denotes the transition from magic to science. It had its roots in the doctrines contained in

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<sup>647</sup> For an interesting overview of the proliferation of such societies, see the Introduction to Dickson (1998).

<sup>648</sup> Descartes was among those who sought out the fraternity.

<sup>649</sup> Even Hegel accepted the symbolism, urging thinkers to "recognise reason as the rose in the cross of the present". Preface to the *Philosophy of Right*, trans., Knox (Oxford 1967) p. 72.

<sup>650</sup> There is one such society in the United States whose philosophy is based upon the work of Max Heindel, a mystic from the late nineteenth-century. It bears no relation at all to the original Rosicrucian movement.

Ficino's *De Vita* and Pico's Kabbalistic studies, but only came to the fore with the advent of sixteenth-century alchemy. Alchemists such as Paracelsus led the way in experimental science that eventually gave rise to such modern bodies as the Royal Society.<sup>652</sup> Scientists such as Isaac Newton more than qualify as a Rosicrucian on these terms, due to his interest in Bible codes and his obsession with alchemy.<sup>653</sup> Consequently Yates argues that we should use the word Rosicrucian in the same way we use Renaissance, designating a specific era in the history of ideas. It should not be sneered at by academic snobs and, more importantly, it does not necessarily denote membership of a secret society:

the word Rosicrucian could, I suggest, be used as a certain style of thinking which is historically recognisable without raising the question of whether a Rosicrucian style of thinker belonged to a secret society.<sup>654</sup>

Campanella, Andreae and Comenius are Rosicrucian, therefore, in the sense that they all place Hermetic ideas alongside their more scientific notions. Many historians have accepted this thesis,<sup>655</sup> and it is true to say that the pansophists did incorporate magical ideas into their utopian writings.

The second Rosicrucian thesis is far more complex. It revolves around the political and philosophical activity surrounding the Elector Palatine, who in 1619 briefly became Frederick I of Bohemia. The Rosicrucian manifestos were tracts offering tacit support to Frederick's claim to the Bohemian throne. Andreae and Comenius, both friends and supporters of the ill-fated monarch, were consequently immersed in the movement. Their utopias, therefore, directly

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<sup>651</sup> Yates (1964, 1982).

<sup>652</sup> We will address these influences directly in the next section of this chapter.

<sup>653</sup> Newton's interest in these arcane doctrines has been given increasing prominence in recent studies. See B. J. T. Dobbs *The Foundation of Newton's Alchemy or 'The Hunting of the Greene Lyon'* (Cambridge: CUP, 1975)

<sup>654</sup> Yates (1984) p. 235.

<sup>655</sup> Including Webster (1975), (1982), Trevor-Roper (1985), Dickson (1998).

reflected the Rosicrucian manifestos. This is a much bolder claim, but it too has gained popularity. Johannisson, for example, confidently states:

The Rosicrucian manifestos spread throughout Europe with extraordinary speed and effectiveness during the second decade of the seventeenth century ... Its main points can be found in all the utopians of the time: Johann Valentin Andreae, Johann Amos Comenius.<sup>656</sup>

Once Hapsburg forces at the Battle of White Mountain had defeated Frederick in 1620 the original movement largely broke up. Rosicrucianism fractured and reappeared in many guises throughout the century. Some participants, such as Andreae, subsequently turned on the society in disgust and disillusion.<sup>657</sup>

This is far more difficult to deal with. It suggests that the pansophists were Rosicrucians not in a general pseudo-scientific sense, but that they were intimately involved in the murky political machinations of the fraternity. That is, they personally concocted and spread Rosicrucian ideas. Again we must be cautious. Much of Yates' argument revolves around the symbolism in the art and literature of the time, and it is always possible to read anything into any given text, but we can make some tentative conclusions. Campanella, Andreae and Comenius were without question interested in, and knowledgeable of, the Rosicrucians, but this does not mean they were seriously embroiled in the resulting furore. Their utopias *do* contain a great deal of magical imagery but this is *not* necessarily related to the manifestos. Before any sensible comparisons can be made, let us turn to the manifestos themselves to discern exactly what the Rosicrucian programme consisted of.

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<sup>656</sup> Johannisson 'Magic, Science and Institutionalisation in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Centuries', in *Hermeticism and the Renaissance*, eds. Merkl and Debus (Washington: Folger, 1988) p. 254. Trevor-Roper also accepts that these political machinations were crucial to the development of the secret fraternity.

<sup>657</sup> Yates (1982).

## ii. Forms of Renaissance Mysticism

Yates insists that the Rosicrucian manifestos emerged out of the magical climate of the Renaissance:

The Renaissance magus had his roots in the Hermetic core of Renaissance Neoplatonism, and it is the Renaissance magus, I believe, who exemplifies that changed attitude of man to the cosmos which was the necessary preliminary to the rise of science.<sup>658</sup>

Yet some commentators believe that this entire approach is fundamentally flawed. Many deny the significance of magical beliefs in the Renaissance and the seventeenth-century. In his virulent attack on Yates, for example, Vickers suggested that modern science arose as a direct rejection of irrational magical ideas. He argued that Yates fails to recognise these two distinctive modes of thought: “it is evident that Miss Yates blurred fundamental distinctions, as between mathematics and numerology.”<sup>659</sup>

Vickers may be guilty, however, of straitjacketing an old problem within distinctly twentieth-century parameters. Rational science versus irrational magic are categories that would have been simply unrecognisable to the pansophists. Such a stark demarcation of knowledge did not exist.<sup>660</sup> As Webster argues: “Paracelsus and Newton were not subsisting in intellectual worlds completely alien from one another”<sup>661</sup>.

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<sup>658</sup> Yates (1984) p. 228. By Renaissance Neoplatonism, Yates refers to the philosophies of thinkers such as Ficino and Pico.

<sup>659</sup> Vickers, *Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance* (Cambridge: CUP, 1984).p. 5.

<sup>660</sup> Dickson (1998) strongly disagrees with Vickers' assessment: “the historical record does not support such an easy categorisation”, p. 19.

<sup>661</sup> Webster (1982) p.2.

Many of the figures that were influential on the pansophist movement were certainly proponents of mystical knowledge.<sup>662</sup> Marsilio Ficino, for example, advanced occult thought in two important ways. First, he translated the *Corpus Hermeticum* and second, he composed *De Vita Triplica*. Hermes Trismegistus was the mythical Egyptian priest who was associated with the god Thoth. Works attributed to him include *Asclepius*, *Pimander* and the *Corpus Hermeticum*. He was considered in the Renaissance to have been a genuine historical figure, but his works are now known to be apocryphal and actually date from around AD 200.<sup>663</sup> Hermes was one of a number of figures who had allegedly received pre-revelatory wisdom and his work could be used, therefore, to supplement the Bible.<sup>664</sup> It is worth noting that Ficino began his translations of Hermes before he touched Plato or the Neoplatonists.

*Asclepius* promotes magic through talismans, which attract spirit from the heavens and empower man, a practice Ficino himself discussed in *De Vita*. *De Vita* is of such renown that it has been labelled:

The fullest Renaissance exposition of a theory of magic and the most influential such statement written in post classical times.<sup>665</sup>

At the risk of oversimplification, Renaissance magic can be categorised in two forms. Natural (or Spiritual) magic was beneficial to the life and health of

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<sup>662</sup> A full survey on the extent of Renaissance magic is beyond the scope of this chapter, and indeed this thesis. Attention will be paid, therefore, to those who are recognised as influences, as well as immediate precursors of the pansophists.

<sup>663</sup> For a recent translation, see *Hermetica*, trans. Brian Copenhaver (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

<sup>664</sup> Allen identifies at least two chains of pre-revelatory knowledge in Ficino. The first cites Hermes, Orpheus, Aglaophemus, Pythagoras, Philolaus and Plato. After 1469 Ficino amended this by omitting Philolaus and beginning the sequence with Zoroastrer, author of the Chaldean Oracles. See M. J. B. Allen, 'Marsilio Ficino, Hermes Trismegistus and the Corpus Hermeticum' in *New Perspectives on Renaissance Thought* eds. John Henry and Sarah Hutton (London: Duckworth, 1990).

<sup>665</sup> B. Copenhaver, 'Astrology and Magic', *CHORP* (1988) p. 274.

man.<sup>666</sup> God places his divine ideas in the heavens in a number of grades. In the celestial sphere there are forty-eight figures: the twelve signs of the zodiac and thirty-six others.<sup>667</sup> Beyond these lie three hundred and sixty grades, all containing their own images and figures, which relate directly to material forms: “in the stars, however, and in figures, parts and properties, all species of lower things are contained, as well as their properties.”<sup>668</sup> Therefore through astrology and the magical powers of affinity, man could access material properties through the heavens. Man could thus interact with the living universe.

Conversely, Demonic magic had severe repercussions for its practitioner and was the subject of Ficino’s avowed criticism.<sup>669</sup> Also in the heavens are a number of star demons, which the magus must protect himself from at all times. This is why ostensibly *De Vita* is a medical treatise even though the third book, ‘On Making One’s Life Agree with the Heavens’ is a discussion on how to attract world-spirit.

The work was a mixture of various philosophies. *Book III* is supposedly an exposition of Plotinus but it bears little resemblance to Plotinian magical theory. Plotinus did not distinguish categories of good or bad magic: all magic was natural and so any concurrent evil arose purely from the corruption of the magus. Copenhaver shows that the distinction between good and evil magic first arose with Porphyry and was developed by Iamblichus and Synesius. Ficino took these systems and wedded them to the hierarchies of Proclus, which

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<sup>666</sup> For a summary see Walker (1958) or Webster (1982).

<sup>667</sup> Though not specified these figures probably refer to the thirty-six decans, which were the object of Egyptian astrology.

<sup>668</sup> *DV* 3/1.

<sup>669</sup> *DV III*/Epistle: “if you do not approve of astronomical images, even those that have found to be good for the health of mortals, remember that I, myself, do not so much approve of them as describe them.”

demonstrated the affinities between natural and heavenly bodies.<sup>670</sup> For historians such as Yates, Hermes was Ficino's primary influence and *De Vita* was clearly derived from *Asclepius* and *Picatrix*.<sup>671</sup> This position is also taken up by Garin: "Frances Yates is right in observing that the third book of *De Vita*, full of magic, is an extensive exegesis of Hermes (of the *Asclepius*)."<sup>672</sup>

But such conclusions may be misjudged. The most important magical passage in *Asclepius* concerns the talismanic magic that animated Egyptian statues. Ficino however, often distances himself from this practice:

it would be safer to commit oneself to medicines than to images, and have the heavenly powers that are assigned to images that have their effects in medicines instead. For it is probable that if images have some force they do not acquire it suddenly through the figure so much as they naturally possess it through the affected material.<sup>673</sup>

Ficino, therefore, sees the talismanic approach of *Asclepius*, as primarily demonic rather than spiritual.<sup>674</sup> Apart from two other brief passages, there is no explicit discussion on Hermes and there is certainly no mention of the fourteen books of the *Corpus Hermeticum*.<sup>675</sup> So Plotinus, whose work the book purports to discuss, is barely mentioned, while hermetic references are few and far between. *De Vita* is more original than Ficino would have the reader believe.

Images and talismans do have special powers, but are the weakest way in which to attract world spirit. Other methods include song, odour, diet and medicines. Yet despite his acceptance of such beliefs, Ficino did not set his

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<sup>670</sup> Copenhaver (1988) pp. 278-79.

<sup>671</sup> Yates (1964) ch. 5.

<sup>672</sup> Garin (1990) p. 65.

<sup>673</sup> *DV* 3/18. See also *TP* 13/3 where Ficino is relatively non-committal over the role of images.

<sup>674</sup> Talismanic magic smacks of idolatry and risks deception by evil forces. This was certainly the case in Egypt and the reason why Hermes himself condemned these practices.

<sup>675</sup> This is probably because, as Copenhaver has shown, *CHORP* (1988) p. 280, these fourteen books were not concerned with magical practices. Menn agrees, (1998) p. 84, n. 75, that Yates over emphasises Hermes at the expense of, among others, the Chaldean Oracles, which he regards as far more important.

magical theories against his Christian faith. Man could harness these powers in order to achieve knowledge of God:

Many of the 'mysteries of Christ' to which Ficino refers can be deduced, he argues, through knowledge of astrological principles.<sup>676</sup>

Ficino's occult beliefs were all from the standpoint of the Christian tradition. His astrological and magical beliefs were important, but did not comprise his entire system.

Renaissance discussions on the Kabbalah were also from a Christian perspective.<sup>677</sup> Two of the influences on pansophism were both involved in Kabbalistic studies. Lull allegedly composed *De audio Kabbalistico*, although this work is now commonly regarded as a fifteenth-century forgery. Pico was the leading exponent of Kabbala during the Renaissance, and has been credited for "creating a Christian interpretation of the Cabala."<sup>678</sup>

The Kabbalah was thought to be the secret law of God, first given to Moses on Mount Sinai and finally written down by the prophet Esdras. It provides insight into the deepest mysteries, for it is "the spring of understanding, the fountain of wisdom, and the stream of knowledge".<sup>679</sup> For Pico, the Kabbalah was all part of the tradition of pre-revelatory knowledge that stretched from Zoroastrer to Plato.<sup>680</sup>

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<sup>676</sup> Buhler (1990) p. 352. Ficino also attacked bad astrology much as he did bad magic, especially for the determinism it encouraged, Ficino consistently argued for free will.

<sup>677</sup> There are several alternative spellings to Kabbalah, including 'Cabala' and 'Kabul'. I have used these alternatives only as they appear in quotations from other texts. For a theoretical overview of the Kabbalah see Z. B. S. Halevi, *The Way of the Kabbalah* (Bath: Gateway, 1990). A useful historical view is offered by J. J. Blau, *Christian Interpretations of the Cabala in the Renaissance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944).

<sup>678</sup> Blau (1944) p. 27.

<sup>679</sup> *Oratio* 35. This quotation is taken directly from the apocryphal book of Esdras II 14: 5-6.

<sup>680</sup> There can be little doubt that Pico was an enthusiastic supporter of Ficino's natural magic, although he does not appear to have been such an open practitioner. In the *Oratio* he admits to having studied Hermes and other mystical writers, concluding that the magus is one who "weds earth to heaven"(33). Pico identifies two forms of magic: natural and demonic. Whereas the latter is roundly condemned, Pico praises the former as "the utter perfection of natural philosophy" (32). Natural magic was familiar to all great thinkers, encouraging man to participate in nature and conquer evil forces.

Pico employed a Kabbalistic analysis at the very end of his *Heptaplus*. In this work he includes an appendix entitled “In the Beginning” which offers an interpretation of the first three words of Genesis. It rearranges the phrase in its original Hebrew in order to decode its secrets. For example, Pico dismantles the word *Beresit* in such a way as to construct the phrase:

The father, in the son and through the son, the beginning and end of the rest, created the head, the fire, and the foundation of the great man with a good pact.<sup>681</sup>

Pico accepted Hebrew as the secret language in which God had codified His word. Although it is not named, this passage places Pico within the tradition of the *Path of Names*, the Kabbalistic method of exegesis based upon a cryptographic approach to the Hebrew tongue.<sup>682</sup>

Pico identifies the Kabbalah as a tool for revealing Christian truth. The passage we have seen in *Heptaplus*, for example, illustrates the divinity of the Son of God. Pico acknowledges that the Kabbalah is “a very great foundation of our faith” but is adamant that “taken together, there is absolutely no controversy between ourselves and the Hebrews on any matter”.<sup>683</sup> The Kabbalah shows the truth of the Trinity, original sin, angelic hierarchies, the divinity of Christ and many other articles of faith.<sup>684</sup> It was Pico who first sought to rid the Kabbalah of its arcane reputation: his adherence to Christianity was itself an innovation. Pico’s allegiance to Christian orthodoxy explains the true nature of the

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<sup>681</sup> *Hep* / ‘In the Beginning’. ‘Beresit’ is the Hebrew word that translates as “In the beginning”.

<sup>682</sup> The second major tradition was the *Path of Sephiroth*, which studied the ten names given to God. For a fuller explanation see Yates (1964) ch. 5 or Blau (1944). Dresden’s *Humanism in the Renaissance* trans. King (London, World University Library, 1968) pp. 33-35, offers a useful summary. Recently commentators have begun to once more acknowledge the Kabbalistic nature of *Heptaplus*. Menn, (1998) p. 84, for example, calls it “a tour de force of Kabbalistic commentary”, arguing that all seven of the books owe their origins to Hebraic mysticism. As these books do not rely on an exegesis based on the Hebrew language I do not see them as Kabbalistic in the strictest sense, although they do proclaim to explain the secrets of Moses.

<sup>683</sup> *Oratio* 36. Craven is absolutely correct here to highlight the Christian context of the Kabbalah.

<sup>684</sup> See Menn (1990) p. 84, n. 78, for further correlation.

condemned thesis: “no science makes us more certain of the divinity of Christ than magic and the Kabbalah.”<sup>685</sup>

There can be little doubt as to the importance that Pico attaches to his studies of the Kabbalah. He accepts that these doctrines contain the true word of God, spoken to Moses on Mount Sinai and that they show a synthesis with Christian teachings. But Pico never entirely agreed with all branches of Renaissance magic. His *Disputationes* published posthumously, represented a broad attack on astrology as an unscientific tool of determinism.<sup>686</sup> The *Disputationes* offers a useful warning: we should not lose sight of the inconsistencies in the Renaissance outlook.

Paracelsus popularised alchemical theories, but these too were rooted in the traditions of Renaissance magic. He accepted Ficino’s sympathetic astrology and developed it through his belief in macrocosm and microcosm. This philosophy stated that man and universe were analogous: every aspect of the heavens was contained inside man, which allowed him to harness its powers for himself.<sup>687</sup> The ultimate goal of Paracelsus was a revolution in knowledge; he attacked Aristotle for being a pagan; he rejected mathematics as an empty

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<sup>685</sup> Trans. In Craven (1981) p. 57. Craven’s work is crucial in understanding the Christian significance of Pico’s work. Opposing this interpretation is Frances Yates. She suggests that Pico included the Kabbalah as an extension of Ficino’s natural magic. In *Conclusiones* Pico offers a familiar distinction between ‘allowable’ Kabbalistic practices and those which delve into darker territory. She labels these theoretical and practical Kabbalah. In his *Apologia* the practical Kabbalah is further divided into *ars combinandi* and *powers above the moon*. Yates argues that this latter practice elevates Ficino’s system by granting man direct lines of communication with God. Yates describes this process as “an intensely religious and mystical version of conjuring.” (1964) p. 108. But there is a lack of evidence regarding the content of these Kabbalistic practices, a fact that Yates freely admits:

though I am certain that by ‘practical Cabala’ Pico meant Cabalist magic, I shall not be able to elucidate what procedures he used for this.” (1964) p. 87.

<sup>686</sup> For a useful summary see Garin (1990).

<sup>687</sup> As Webster (1982) p. 4 states: “The study of man was unthinkable without an appreciation of his place in the physical and spiritual macrocosm”. We have approached this idea in pp. 152-56.

exercise in logic; and he sought to overturn the accepted Galenic view of medicine.<sup>688</sup> Most importantly of all, however, was his promotion of alchemy.

As Debus has shown, alchemy and chemistry were regarded as the same discipline for Paracelsus and his followers. They believed that the chemical process was one of purification.<sup>689</sup> Although this most famously expressed itself in gold-making, it was far more relevant to knowledge of man: humans could be distinguished as pure or impure. Paracelsus even thought of the Creation as a chemical act of distillation: each of the seven days was a stage in the purification of the world.<sup>690</sup> Paracelsus outlined many innovations in alchemy, most notably the addition of the three substances to the four elements. The four elements of fire, earth, air and water had been accepted since Aristotle. To these Paracelsus added sulphur, mercury and salt. However, he did not regard any of these materials as physical but rather as spiritual substances that have an approximation to the natural materials of the world. He also argued that all of these substances took on different forms in different objects.<sup>691</sup>

Alchemy was thus concerned with new attitudes to chemistry and medicine, but it was overwhelmingly concerned with God and man's path to his creator. Paracelsian alchemy was ultimately a Christian pursuit. He even prophesied that a new magus, Elias the Artis, had been foretold in the Bible and would bring secret wisdom in order to cleanse the earth.<sup>692</sup> More importantly he encouraged the magus to conduct his own research, and this experimental

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<sup>688</sup> Galen proposed the theory of the four humours, which is the basis for the medical theory in *De Vits*.

<sup>689</sup> See Debus 'The Chemical Philosophers: Chemical Medicine from Paracelsus to Van Helmont', *History of Science* 12 (1974) p. 236.

<sup>690</sup> See Debus (1965) pp. 22-23.

<sup>691</sup> This is just one of the complex, and contradictory, aspects of Paracelsus' system. See Debus 'Fire Analysis and the Elements in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', *Annals of Science* 23 (1967) pp. 129-30. Also Debus (1965) pp. 24-28, and (1974) pp. 237-39.

approach was Paracelsus' single greatest contribution to Renaissance magic. Paracelsian philosophy urged that man should investigate nature.

Renaissance magic is therefore based on a complex system of magic, astrology, Kabbalah and alchemy. All of these were related to each other but were to some extent distinctive. Paracelsus agreed with much of *De Vita* but added a more chemical and experimental approach. This web of ideas forms the background for the Rosicrucian manifestos.

### iii. The *Fama* and *Confessio*

The Rosicrucian manifestos are curious texts. Though published in 1614, the *Fama* was undoubtedly in circulation before this date; its original edition also contained a reply to the Rosicrucians from Adam Haselmeyer, which was dated 1612. In his reply Haselmeyer mentions that a copy of the *Fama* was existent in the Tyrol as early as 1610.<sup>693</sup> The original *Fama* was also published with another tract entitled *Universal Reformation*, which turned out to be a German translation of a passage by the Italian writer, Boccalini.<sup>694</sup> Unlike the Rosicrucian plans for reform, Boccalini's tale was decidedly pessimistic. It was a satirical look at the grandiose schemes such as that proposed in the *Fama*, showing that man's natural folly would always render these ideas doomed to fail. Dickson argues that the German mystic Christopher Besold produced the translation of Boccalini's work.<sup>695</sup>

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<sup>692</sup> For a fuller discussion of the Elias prophecy see Hugh Trevor-Roper 'Paracelsianism Made Political, 1600-1650' in Grell, ed. (1998) pp. 119-35.

<sup>693</sup> Dickson makes a great deal of this information. See Dickson (1998) p. 18.

<sup>694</sup> An English translation is reprinted in A. E. Waite's *The Real History of the Rosicrucians* (London, Redway, 1887) pp. 36-63.

<sup>695</sup> Dickson (1998) p.18.

Explanations as to why these contrasting works should have been bound together remain unsatisfactory. It has been variously described as a joke, a mistake or a means to boost sales. The leading mystics Maier and Fludd held the latter view and both championed the manifestos whilst simultaneously denying their own links to Rosicrucianism.<sup>696</sup> Whatever the genuine reason may have been, there has never been any serious suspicion that Boccalini, who died in 1613, was personally embroiled in the furore.

It is also interesting to note that the *Fama* is usually considered to be the story of Christian Rosenkreutz, yet nowhere is this name offered in the text. In fact, names of any kind are steadfastly refused, presumably to keep the true identities of the brethren secret. The central figure is given a variety of titles. He is originally referred to as 'CR' from the family of 'RC'.<sup>697</sup> He is later named 'RC', which is somewhat confusing, as this is also the title of another member of the fraternity. He is given further titles including 'CrosC', 'Fra RC' and 'CRC', which suggest that the name Christian Rosenkreutz was a later addition to this early mythology.<sup>698</sup> This becomes particularly significant in our discussion of Andreae's exact involvement with the group. For the purposes of this discussion I will refer to the character by his fuller title of 'CRC'.

The *Fama* is anti-Catholic and anti-Aristotle.<sup>699</sup> It boasts of having perfected knowledge, which will precipitate man's full understanding of himself:

so that man might thereby understand his own nobleness and worth, and why he is called  
Microcosmus and how far this knowledge extendeth into nature.<sup>700</sup>

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<sup>696</sup> This is also Waite's (1887) p. 221, own view, which he offers when discussing Maier and Fludd. See also Montgomery (1973) I, p. 165. Fludd in particular was a keen contributor to the Rosicrucian outcry, see Debus (1965).

<sup>697</sup> *Fama* p. 248.

<sup>698</sup> Unless we accept that Andreae's *Chymical Wedding of Christian Rosenkreutz* was fully completed in 1605, before the *Fama* was written. This is an essential component of Dickson's work. See pp. 225-230 of this thesis.

This does not seem too far removed from the general goals of pansophist universal philosophy, but there is a marked difference in the occult beliefs involved.

The *Fama* tells us that at the age of five ‘CRC’ was sent from his German home to live in a monastery. He was a moderate scholar and was sent on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem when he was sixteen years old. His travelling companion died on the way (in Cyprus) and despite his own failing health, ‘CRC’ made it to Damasco.<sup>701</sup> Here he met the magi, who evidently saw him as a chosen leader for he was welcomed “as one whom they had long expected”.<sup>702</sup> As a result ‘CRC’ turned his back on Jerusalem and headed to Damascus where he studied physics, mathematics and Arabic. He also translated the mysterious *Book M* into Latin. At the age of nineteen, ‘CRC’ left for Egypt but was disappointed by its philosophy and left immediately for Fez. In this new city ‘CRC’ was still unhappy with the magical doctrines of the priests and wise men:

of those of Fez he did confess that their magia was not altogether pure, and also that their Cabala was defiled by their religion.<sup>703</sup>

‘CRC’ did incorporate some of their magic into his own studies before returning to Europe in order to embark on a reform of mankind. In Spain, and all over Europe, his new knowledge was rejected for the Scholastic teachings prevalent in universities. Dejected and bitter, he retreated to Germany and went into hiding for five years.

During this time he continued his study of mathematics and experimentation until he was convinced he could begin his reform once more. This time it was to be conducted in secrecy, so he chose three brothers from his

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<sup>699</sup> *Fama* p. 238.

<sup>700</sup> *Fama* p. 238.

<sup>701</sup> It is very difficult to tell where this city is. It is unlikely to be Damascus as ‘CRC’ goes there *after* meeting the magi.

<sup>702</sup> *Fama* p. 239.

original cloisters and together they built a hidden headquarters, named *Sancti Spiritus*.<sup>704</sup> Four other members were recruited and the eight men began compiling a series of books: a dictionary, a revised version of *Book M* and “a book or volume of all that man can desire, wish or hope for”.<sup>705</sup> They set out in disguise to heal the sick,<sup>706</sup> reporting back to *Sancti Spiritus* once a year. The *Fama* continues by explaining that ‘CRC’ has been dead for one hundred and twenty years, and that a third-generation brother<sup>707</sup> had recently discovered his tomb.

The vault is awash with occult symbols. Paracelsus is praised, and the vault contains “the *Vocabulary of Theo. Par. Ho.*”<sup>708</sup> An inscription, accredited to ‘CRC’, describes it as “a compendium of the universe”,<sup>709</sup> and the tomb is divided into three sections. The ceiling is triangular, housing an eternal light so that it may never fall into darkness.<sup>710</sup> The walls are divided into ten compartments with figures and inscriptions adorning them. They each house numerous chests, books, and instruments, including “little bells, burning lamps and chiefly artificial songs”.<sup>711</sup> The floor is also triangular and depicts the stars. No further detail is added here because the author seeks to protect himself (and

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<sup>703</sup> *Fama* p. 240.

<sup>704</sup> *Fama* p. 242.

<sup>705</sup> *Fama* p. 242. They also composed a dictionary of a “magical language”. This may reflect the growing concern for universal languages that certainly permeated Comenius’ thought.

<sup>706</sup> One of the brothers allegedly came to England and cured the Duke of Norfolk’s son of leprosy. No historical evidence exists to show the validity of this story.

<sup>707</sup> Each member hand-picks his successor

<sup>708</sup> *Fama* p. 247. Paracelsus’ real name was Philippus Aureolis Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim.

<sup>709</sup> *Fama* p. 246.

<sup>710</sup> The ceiling is of such secret wisdom that it cannot be described to the reader, though potential initiates are promised that they will see it in time.

<sup>711</sup> *Fama* p. 247.

the reader) from practising evil astrology.<sup>712</sup> In the centre of the vault lay ‘CRC’ underneath a circular altar.

Once this narrative is complete, the *Fama* gives three more pieces of information. First, the movement is definitely Lutheran:

we confess to have the knowledge of Jesus Christ (as the same now in these last days and chiefly in Germany, most clear and pure is professed, and is nowadays cleansed and void of all swerving people, heretics and false prophets) ... and we use two sacraments, as they are instituted with all forms of ceremonies of the first reformed church.<sup>713</sup>

Second, their new knowledge is *not* that of the pre-fall Adam. It is philosophy “as Adam *after* his fall hath received it”.<sup>714</sup> Finally, there is an attack on false alchemists, who are only concerned with money: “the true philosophers are far of another kind, esteeming little the making of gold, which is but a parergon.”<sup>715</sup> At this, the *Fama* finishes, promising more information in the next manifesto.

Unfortunately the *Confessio* adds very little to the myth of ‘CRC’. It provides some dates for his birth and death, 1378 and 1484 respectively,<sup>716</sup> which puts the date of his tomb’s rediscovery at 1604. None of these dates has provided any real clues as to the origins or meaning of Rosicrucianism.<sup>717</sup> The work is more millennial and more anti-Catholic than its predecessor, denouncing followers as “Romish seducers who have vomited forth their blasphemies against

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<sup>712</sup> *Fama* p. 247: “therein is described power and the rule of inferior governors we leave manifest the same, for fear of the abuse by the evil and ungodly world.”

<sup>713</sup> *Fama* p. 249.

<sup>714</sup> *Fama* p. 249, my italics, although it does correspond to the ancient wisdom promoted in the Renaissance: “whereas Plato, Aristotle, Pythagoras and others did hit the mark, and wherein Enoch, Abraham, Moses did excel.” They also use the metaphor that their knowledge is like a globe or a sphere.

<sup>715</sup> *Fama* p. 250.

<sup>716</sup> *Confessio* p. 255.

<sup>717</sup> The year 1604 does coincide with the appearance of two new constellations, Cygnio and Serpentarium, which the *Confessio* forecast would bring revolutionary changes. Other Millenarians predicted that a new Star of Bethlehem would become visible in that same year. See Trevor-Roper (1986) p. 183. Montgomery (1973) I, p. 169, has suggested that 1378 and 1484 represent the Great Schism and the birth of Luther respectively.

Christ".<sup>718</sup> Written in Latin as opposed to German, Yates<sup>719</sup> concludes that the *Confessio* was designed to attract a wider audience. However, the text occasionally pre-empts potential brethren from applying, as it states that suitable candidates will be made known by revelation alone.<sup>720</sup> It also contradicts the *Fama* in that Rosicrucian wisdom is now that granted to Adam before his fall. Finally, the *Confessio* fails to make good on the promise set out in the *Fama*:

hereof more in our confession, where we do set down 37 reasons wherefore we now do make known our fraternity, and proffer such high mysteries.<sup>721</sup>

Despite anybody's best efforts, these thirty-seven reasons are still to be deciphered. The overall tenor of the *Confessio* remains the same: a combination of Lutheranism and the occult in a general philosophy. Broadly speaking, this represents the Rosicrucian manifestos of 1614/15. As we will see in 1616 a third manifesto was published in Strasbourg. The *Chymical Wedding of Christian Rosenkreutz* was definitely written by Andreae, and its status as a Rosicrucian document becomes critical to this discussion.

#### **iv. Foundations of the Fraternity**

The Rosicrucian manifestos show specific leanings to particular forms of Renaissance magic. Astrology is largely ignored,<sup>722</sup> while natural magic and Kabbalah are only briefly mentioned in order to show how defective they had been before 'CRC' had found them. It may also be significant that 'CRC' turned

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<sup>718</sup> *Confessio* p. 258.

<sup>719</sup> Yates (1982) p. 45.

<sup>720</sup> *Confessio* p. 252: "the worthiness of those who shall be accepted into our Fraternity are not esteemed and made known to us by Man's carefulness but by the rule of our Revelation and manifestation."

<sup>721</sup> *Fama* p. 244.

his back on Egypt, the home of Hermes Trismegistus. The most important occult practice in the manifestos is, overwhelmingly alchemy.<sup>723</sup> Alchemical references permeate throughout the manifestos. ‘CRC’s tomb can be seen as a recreation of an alchemist’s laboratory, with its lamps and instruments.<sup>724</sup> Even the ‘artificial songs’ are more alchemical than Orphic. It was a popular notion that music would aid the production of the philosopher’s stone: Maier, for example, produced several alchemical compositions.<sup>725</sup> Though it has not, to my knowledge, been suggested before, the life of ‘CRC’ could be an allegory for the spread of alchemical knowledge into Europe.<sup>726</sup>

So where can we look for the origins of the Rosicrucian manifestos? One strong candidate is Simon Studion, whose immense astrological prophecies, the *Naometria*, were completed in the key year 1604. Montgomery sees him as the prime candidate, and it is a curious coincidence that he predicted the apocalypse for 1620, the year of the fateful Battle of White Mountain.<sup>727</sup> Fludd and Maier are two other strong candidates, despite their repeated protestations of innocence. Agrippa and Paracelsus were notable for their alchemy and, of course, Paracelsus is also praised in the *Fama*, although he is explicitly excluded

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<sup>722</sup> The possible exception here is in the vault of ‘CRC’. The predictions in *Confessio* bear no relation to the physical astrology of the Neoplatonists.

<sup>723</sup> Ficino used alchemical metaphors to describe Plato and other philosophical works. See *Letters* 1/13.

<sup>724</sup> As, indeed, Yates has: (1986) pp. 38-39.

<sup>725</sup> See Read *From Alchemy to Chemistry* (Bell, London, 1961). Read also quotes the English alchemist Norton: “joyne them together also *Arithmetically*, By suttil numbers proportionally ... Joyne your elements *Musically*” pp. 71-73. For a useful overview see Holmyard *Alchemy* (Pelican, 1957).

<sup>726</sup> Though it is now acknowledged that alchemy arose in China, it was considered for centuries to have been developed in Islamic countries. It passed into Europe principally through Spain due to the Moorish invasion, and was spread further by the Crusades. Alchemical fortunes then took a downturn and were forced underground for many years before reappearing with such practitioners as Paracelsus and Agrippa. This allegorical explanation also accounts for the Rosicrucian preoccupation with curing the sick. Aside from gold making (which the fraternity rejected) health and longevity were the chief purposes of the philosopher’s stone. Possibly this is their great discovery; the elusive stone itself. I must stress, however, that this is purely suggestion, and only seeks to illustrate that many interpretations can be read into a myth.

from the roll-call of members.<sup>728</sup> Luther himself has been mentioned as a possible candidate: not only does his date of birth roughly coincide with the death of 'CRC', but also his family crest bore both the rose and the cross. Leibniz believed it was the mathematician Joachim Jungius.<sup>729</sup> Yates' prime candidate is John Dee. A great admirer of Pico della Mirandola,<sup>730</sup> his occult science was both mathematical and angelic. He travelled extensively throughout Europe and was an acknowledged influence on Studion, Fludd and Maier. More tellingly, the original edition of the *Confessio* presented an end-piece entitled *A Brief Consideration of More Secret Philosophy*, which repeated Dee's *Monas Hieroglyphica*. Thus Dee provides the "more secret philosophy" behind the Rosicrucian movement.<sup>731</sup> This is an interesting piece of evidence, but by the same logic we may deduce that Boccalini was the architect of the *Fama*, a view nobody takes seriously.

Another man we must consider is Campanella. It has been suggested that his ideas underpin the movement, spreading into Germany via Andreae.<sup>732</sup> Like the Rosicrucians, Campanella championed a universal reform based upon a synthesis of religion and philosophy. Working against this are Campanella's religious beliefs. Despite his lack of orthodoxy, he was opposed to the Reformation and would not have instigated a Lutheran movement.<sup>733</sup> Nor was Campanella alchemical; indeed alchemy is notable by its absence in the occult

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<sup>727</sup> Montgomery (1973) I, pp. 202-04.

<sup>728</sup> Trevor-Roper (1986) pp. 182-183, places great emphasis upon this connection: "All the Rosicrucian manifestos were impregnated with Paracelsian ideas. Indeed without the Paracelsian idea – the form of its message and the extraordinary echo of that little voice – is unintelligible." He goes on to show that 'CRC' was identified as a possible manifestation of Elias the Artist, whom Paracelsus had predicted would arrive as an alchemical messiah-figure.

<sup>729</sup> See Yates (1984) p. 252.

<sup>730</sup> As Yates shows, Dee praises Pico in his 1570 preface to *Euclid*, (1984) pp. 233-34.

<sup>731</sup> Yates (1982) p. 39, 45-47.

<sup>732</sup> Montgomery (1973) I, p. 50, n. 117.

<sup>733</sup> See pp. 38-40 for universalist views on religion.

practices of the Solarians.<sup>734</sup> Though the Rosicrucian manifestos emerged more or less simultaneously with Campanella's work, there are too many dissimilarities between them to constitute a genuine connection. Whereas the Dominican linked his own system to the magical inheritance of the Renaissance, any Rosicrucian connections seem, at best, indirect. Let us turn, then, to the Solarian system of magic.

## 2) *Civitas Solis* and Renaissance Magic

Campanella's belief in astrology and magic is well documented and by his own admission he was a practitioner of various arts. In 1628 he worked alongside Pope Urban VIII to prevent the latter's death, which had been predicted to coincide with the lunar eclipse of January that year. To counterbalance the evil influences, Campanella recreated the heavens in a single room: seven candles represented the planets and the stars were depicted in symbols of the zodiac. Music and odour invoked the protective properties of Venus and Jupiter.<sup>735</sup> Urban VIII was so grateful for what he perceived to be a success, that he granted Campanella a pardon in the following year.

Campanella openly acknowledged the influence of Ficino's *De Vita*. As Walker establishes, much of his *Metaphysica* was a repetition of the key points of *De Vita*, including:

what odours, tastes, colours, temperature, air, water, wine, clothes, conversation, music, sky and stars are to be used for breathing in the Spirit of the World.<sup>736</sup>

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<sup>734</sup> See pp. 219-223.

<sup>735</sup> Campanella describes this incident in *Astrologia VII*, a work that was probably not intended for a widespread audience. Walker (1958) explains the full episode, see pp. 206-07.

<sup>736</sup> Walker (1958) p. 211.

Nowhere is this more clearly visible than in *Civitas Solis*. The utopia is so heavily laden with astrological imagery that Yates has compared it with Adocentyn, the mythological Hermetic city in *Picatrix*.<sup>737</sup> Although Yates exaggerates, astrology is undoubtedly a central pillar in Campanella's utopian thought. It is prevalent both symbolically and ideologically throughout the city. The Solarians engage in a number of other recognisably Ficinian practices relating to odours, medicines and images. Telesio is another very important influence on Campanella's magic, dominating such works as *Del sensor cose et della magia* (1590) and *De sensu rerum et magia* (1620). What *Civitas Solis* lacks is the alchemical leanings and call for experimentation that we found in the Rosicrucian manifestos.

#### **i. Astrology in Utopia**

The very name *Civitas Solis* indicates Campanella's preoccupation with the heavens. The city is built upon the equator, and is designed to honour the sun and stars. The sun is praised as "the emblem and face of God",<sup>738</sup> and the city was created with the heavens in mind:

when they built the city, they placed the fixed stars in the four corners of the world. The sun in the ascendant in Leo; Jupiter in Leo, east of the Sun, and Mercury and Venus in Cancer, but close together to form a satellitium; Mars in the Ninth House in Aries, watching from his house with a favourable aspect the Sun in ascendant and the aphetic planet and the Moon in Taurus ... Fortuna, with the Head of Medusa, was nearly in the Tenth House from which these people hope for dominion, stability and greatness.<sup>739</sup>

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<sup>737</sup> Yates (1964) p. 376.

<sup>738</sup> CS p. 56.

<sup>739</sup> CS p. 45.

The city is also protected from harmful astrological influences: the benevolent forces of Jupiter and Virgo, for example, counteract Mercury.<sup>740</sup> In short, the Solarians have given their city the most solid astrological foundation possible.

Indeed, looking at the plan of the city we see that astrological knowledge is built into the very architecture of *Civitas Solis*. The seven concentric ring walls that divide the city are all named after the planets.<sup>741</sup> As we have seen, these walls display all knowledge known to man and astrology covers the innermost wall of the temple. It is at the very heart of the utopia. On the outer wall of the temple “are depicted in order all the stars, with three lines of verse for each one”.<sup>742</sup> Inside the temple this information is expanded to show the properties of the heavenly bodies “giving their names and the influences they have on earthly things”.<sup>743</sup> Other astrological imagery abounds in the temple. There are two globes, one of the earth and the other of the sky. Seven lamps are kept constantly lit to represent the planets.<sup>744</sup> The temple seems to be an image of the universe, and it certainly stands comparison with the room used for the protection of the pope.

The overall picture is clear. Knowledge of the heavens is the most sacred element of Solarian knowledge and their system of education may therefore be seen almost as a process of initiation. The student is admitted to increasingly esoteric wisdom until he reaches the innermost secrets of the

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<sup>740</sup> CS p. 45.

<sup>741</sup> CS p. 16. The significance of the walls for Solarian knowledge is discussed more fully on pp. 156-61 of this thesis.

<sup>742</sup> CS pg 18.

<sup>743</sup> CS p. 17.

<sup>744</sup> CS p. 17. There is one other curious instrument. The Solarians possess a weather vane that displays thirty-six directions instead of the usual thirty-two. This is reminiscent of the thirty-six decans, which sit alongside the twelve symbols of the zodiac (see p. 204 of this discussion). Of course, one cannot draw a firm conclusion, but it seems odd to place this instrument alongside blatantly astrological devices. Yates certainly wondered if Campanella had hidden a representation of the deacons somewhere within the walls of *Civitas Solis* (1964) p. 370.

temple. Perhaps this is why so few progress to the final stage. At any one time there are only forty priests in the city, and of these only twenty-four are engaged in astrological activities.<sup>745</sup> Sol is elected from this elite band of scholars and he has complete knowledge of “Necessity, the Fate and Harmony of the World”.<sup>746</sup> Sol is the highest initiate, and only he may conduct public ceremonies, which the Solarians “regard as a great mystery”.<sup>747</sup>

The importance of astrology is underlined by the Solarian eugenics programme. Men and women are brought together for procreation by the medical officer and chief astrologer, who ensures that the heavens are amenable for conception:

they always take great care to choose a time when the Sun is in a favourable house, and Jupiter looks upon them in a propitious aspect.<sup>748</sup>

Cosmic harmony must be attained before breeding commences and Campanella fears the harmful influences of Mars and Saturn: “neither Mars nor Saturn must have primacy unless it is in a good aspect.”<sup>749</sup> Even animal breeding is dominated by astrological considerations, although the astrologer’s task is considerably easier here, as each animal has its own distinct sign: “for oxen; Taurus; for sheep; Aries.”<sup>750</sup> All earthly creatures are therefore subject to the influences of the heavens.

Moving away from astrology, we find a number of other instances of Renaissance magic in Campanella’s utopia. Medicines are essential to the well-being of the Solarians, so long as they work in accordance with the four

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<sup>745</sup> CS p. 17, 52.

<sup>746</sup> CS p. 24.

<sup>747</sup> CS p. 54.

<sup>748</sup> CS p. 29.

<sup>749</sup> CS p. 29. Compare this with *DV* 3/2: “we are subject to Saturn through idleness, solitude ... we are subject to Mars through anger and struggles.”

<sup>750</sup> CS p. 44.

humours.<sup>751</sup> Solarian medicine is evidently a closely guarded mystery; for example, there are “certain marvellous secrets” that frighten a patient back to health, though no indication is given as to how this might work.<sup>752</sup> Music is used alongside medicines, especially to combat fevers, and is also utilised for agricultural purposes. When used in conjunction with astrology, music provides a system of “great secrets for making crops germinate quickly and multiply”.<sup>753</sup> Animal breeding uses other “magical procedures”: horses, sheep and oxen are all shown images of their respective species whilst breeding in order to procreate more effectively.<sup>754</sup> This is not exactly the same as the talismanic magic recorded in *De Vita* but there is a connection: both employ images to produce a physical effect upon the essence of an object. Scent and odour are used for purposes of health, again in conjunction with music. The elders keep books of secrets, the *Georgias* and *Bucolics*.<sup>755</sup> In the temple there is a volume written “in letters of gold, dealing with extremely important matters” of which nothing else is written.<sup>756</sup> Clearly esoteric wisdom is a key element of *Civitas Solis*, but there is noticeably few alchemical practices, nor any secret brethren to enact them.

## ii. Sources of Solarian Magic

Although Campanella placed himself within the tradition of Renaissance magic, his ideas frequently clashed with those of his predecessors.

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<sup>751</sup> This shows a reliance on Ficinian rather than Paracelsian medicine. We may recall that in spite of astrological significance, *De Vita* was a medical treatise, and Ficino strove to protect the humours in *Books I and II*.

<sup>752</sup> *CS* p. 47.

<sup>753</sup> *CS* p. 44.

<sup>754</sup> *CS* p. 44.

<sup>755</sup> *CS* p. 45.

<sup>756</sup> *CS* p. 17. There is no indication as to what these matters are, although as the book is in the temple we must presume they are deeply spiritual and astrological.

Walker<sup>757</sup> accepts that there are important distinctions to be made, for example, between Ficino and Campanella. Campanella's magic, as evidenced by his exploits with the pope, seems more concerned with avoiding demonic influences than attracting spirits. This attitude is possibly connected with Campanella's millennialism: as the world was about to perish then man must rid himself of evil influences. Indeed, the prophetic character of Campanella's work is itself a differentiating factor. Ficino did not believe the world was on the brink of an apocalyptic event. Furthermore, Campanella was interested in magic as a means for global reform whereas Ficino saw it as a process of individual spiritual enlightenment. Campanella was much more practical:

Campanella proposed notions of structural resonance and physical force that were only distantly related to Ficino's metaphysical *figurae* yet served as well as them to uphold a theory of magic.<sup>758</sup>

Campanella can thus be distinguished from Ficino by the aim, scale and content of his system.

Similarly Campanella strongly disagreed with Pico's occult ideas, particularly the *Disputationes*. The Dominican was frequently hostile towards this work:

His [Pico's] philosophy went more above the words of others than into nature, from which he learned almost nothing, and then he condemned the astrologers because he did not look at their experiences.<sup>759</sup>

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<sup>757</sup> See Walker (1958) p. 236 for an overview. It should also be borne in mind that he rejects any other attempt to label Campanella Neoplatonic outside of the magical system.

<sup>758</sup> Copenhaver *CHORP* (1988) p. 295.

<sup>759</sup> Campanella formulated this particular criticism in response to a friend who had made a favourable comparison between him and Pico. See Copenhaver, 'New Philosophies of Nature' in *Renaissance Philosophy*, eds. C. Schmitt and B. Copenhaver (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 322. My brackets.

Pico's system was too metaphysical. Instead, Campanella wanted to ground astrology in sense perception and the physical world, and this perspective is often attributed to Telesio's influence.<sup>760</sup>

Ingengo suggests that Telesio provided Campanella's system with two vital elements: universal animation and sensual knowledge.<sup>761</sup> These make the magus' power affinitive: he is participating in natural forces rather than dominating nature herself. Telesio showed Campanella that the world was a living creature; in order to harness its forces man and universe must become as one. This idea is presented in Campanella's *De Sensu rerum et magia*, where the magus transcends the object of his enquiry to become that very thing he is investigating.<sup>762</sup> Telesio thus provides Campanella with a platform for a more physical magic.

In *Civitas Solis*, however, Campanella appears to alter his position once again. There is a crucial passage at the very end of *Civitas Solis*, which rejects astrology based on sense alone. Such practices make man subject to the vagaries of simple determinism, forcing him to be the plaything of the heavens: "in the sensual person the stars bring about an inclination towards it."<sup>763</sup> Campanella is so incensed by this that he has the narrator declare "heresy is the work of the senses".<sup>764</sup> The Solarians believe in free will; only one who is in command of his reason can overcome these negative heavenly forces. Astrology is more spiritual than deterministic, guiding man towards God on a theological quest:

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<sup>760</sup> Many other candidates have been discussed as influences upon the Dominican, including Cardano and Della Porta.

<sup>761</sup> Ingengo *CHORP* (1988) p. 257.

<sup>762</sup> Copenhaver *CHORP* (1988) p. 294. Copenhaver also shows that Campanella justifies his astrology through citing Aquinas. It should be noted that Ficino also used Aquinas in *DV* 3/18.

<sup>763</sup> *CS* p. 64.

<sup>764</sup> *CS* p. 64.

“the holy law of the First Cause.”<sup>765</sup> Such a position is difficult to reconcile with a total reliance on Telesian sense-knowledge.

We can conclude, then, that despite his own acknowledgements, Campanella’s magical ideas were a fairly original amalgam of previous ideas. Occasionally this originality can be exaggerated. Yates contends, without fully backing up the claim, that the citizens of Christianopolis “are practisers of astral magic.”<sup>766</sup> In large, Campanella drew from a wide variety of sources to create a theory of magic that embraced sensual knowledge although not exclusively. He rejected Paracelsian medicine and lacked any serious concern for alchemy. His was not a chemical utopia. Campanella can therefore be distinguished from the Rosicrucians not only in terms of his religion, but also by his occult beliefs.

### 3) Andreae: Rosicrucian or Reformer?

Since his death Andreae has been subjected to a wealth of insinuation surrounding his allegedly occult beliefs. Though he was not as open as Campanella in his adherence to mystical doctrines, they are visible in some works. His *Christianopolis* definitely shows knowledge of mystical practices but simultaneously offers a damning rejection of the Rosicrucians. Why? Yates contends that it is all an elaborate charade, and that Andreae was tacitly supporting the movement.<sup>767</sup> To this day, many occult histories state his authorship of the Rosicrucian manifestos as a fact.<sup>768</sup> Yet his contemporaneous works such as *Invitatio* and *Turris Babel* make a mockery of this position. He

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<sup>765</sup> CS p. 64.

<sup>766</sup> Yates (1984) p. 235.

<sup>767</sup> Yates (1984) p. 235. See also this thesis pp. 238-40.

certainly came into contact with many important mystical figures, having been taught by Besold, Weigel, Hess and Hoekel, all of whom were associates of Simon Studion.<sup>769</sup> But this section will show that the evidence for an occult interpretation is unreliable.

Three crucial questions need to be addressed. First, what is the status of the *Chymical Wedding*? Is it a third manifesto or the work of a Christian apologist? Second, in what sense is *Christianopolis* a Rosicrucian text? Yates<sup>770</sup> suggests it can be traced directly to the *Fama* and *Confessio* through the *Chymical Wedding*. She does not argue that Andreae was a Rosicrucian in the sense of her first general definition, but that he was intimately connected to the manifestos themselves.<sup>771</sup> Finally, if *Christianopolis* is *not* a Rosicrucian text then why does it contain mystical passages? There are favourable discussions of both astrology and Kabbalah, which clearly indicate some kind of occult belief. The following section will attempt to steer a path through this potential minefield and offer some new answers to these age-old problems. Particular attention must be paid here to the most recent developments in this debate, as put forward by Dickson in his *Tessera of Antillia*.

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<sup>768</sup> See, for example, Trevor-Roper (1986) p. 182, n. 41, Roob *The Hermetic Museum* (Italy: Taschen, 1997) p. 344 and most recently Dickson (1998).

<sup>769</sup> Montgomery (1973) I, pp. 175-78 for a list of potential influences. Dickson makes this same point.

<sup>770</sup> Yates (1982) pp. 144-50.

<sup>771</sup> This can be profitably contrasted with Montgomery, who dismisses any such links: Andreae was simply the noble, pious and orthodox Lutheran. Montgomery (1973) I, ch. 4.

*i. The Chymical Wedding of Christian Rosenkreutz*<sup>772</sup>

The *Chymical Wedding* was published in Strasbourg one year after the *Confessio* appeared. It tells the story of Christian Rosenkreutz and his journey of alchemical discovery in an episodic narrative. After several unusual encounters he forgoes his mission, accepts Jesus Christ and is married. At the end of the story he is initiated into the 'Order of the Golden Stone' and sets sail on a voyage into the unknown. The pilgrim is recognisably Rosicrucian by his costume: he wears a red sash in the shape of a cross, and his hat has four roses sewn into it. More importantly, he is identifiable as 'CRC' because Andreae incorporates the birth-date from the *Confessio* into the story.<sup>773</sup> There is a deep level of alchemical knowledge that singles the author out as an expert in the field. To many, it proves Andreae's Rosicrucian credentials.<sup>774</sup>

There are problems with the history surrounding the book. Almost immediately after publication Andreae became openly antagonistic towards the Rosicrucians. In 1617 he published *Menippus*, a scathing dialogue criticising the heretical nature of the movement. The following year he produced the even more aggressive *Invitatio* and in 1619 he unleashed *Turris Babel*, which had as its subheading *Judiciorum de Fraternitate Rosacrae Crucis Chaos*.<sup>775</sup> Andreae consistently maintained his hostile stance until his death in 1656. If he was so unrepentant in his hatred, why did he publish the *Chymical Wedding* at all?

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<sup>772</sup> The original translation by Foxcroft is reprinted in a facsimile edition in Montgomery (1973) II, pp. 288-487.

<sup>773</sup> Montgomery (1973) II, pp. 388-89.

<sup>774</sup> See Yates (1982), Trevor-Roper (1986).

<sup>775</sup> See Montgomery (1973) I, pp. 186-88 for a full list of published works in which Andreae attacked the Rosicrucians.

Although he admitted authorship, Andreae passed the work off as youthful folly. He claimed to have written it in 1605 when he would have been approximately eighteen years old, although there is debate as to whether he revised it before final publication. Montgomery is particularly scathing of its magical reputation, arguing that Andreae took the figurehead of the Rosicrucian movement and made him a true Christian, by incorporating marriage and the other sacraments into the Rosicrucian myth. For Montgomery, these twists place Andreae's hero outside the boundaries of the *Fama*. His interest in alchemy was purely as a Christian; it was an interest that was not discouraged even by Luther.<sup>776</sup> Montgomery considers it monstrous to suggest that Andreae would have lied or covered up his involvement in the furore. The pastor was renowned for his honesty and integrity.<sup>777</sup> The very fact that Andreae confessed his authorship distances him from the other manifestos; for why would he admit to writing one manifesto and not the other two? These are sensible arguments that need to be considered carefully.

Andreae's autobiography was written late in life and remained unpublished until many years after his death, which begs two crucial questions. First, if he was so keen to distance his work from the real Rosicrucians, why did he not claim responsibility sooner and in public? Second, if the text is so obviously detached from the *Fama* and *Confessio* why was it published anonymously? Considering Andreae's forthright views only a few months later, it seems odd that he would go to such enormous lengths to disguise a work and then keep it a secret for decades. If Andreae was such an upstanding individual, why did he engage in deceit?

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<sup>776</sup> As we have noted Paracelsian alchemy was directed towards Christian truth. It was not an opposing doctrine. For Luther's acceptance of alchemy see Montgomery (1973) I ch. 1.

There is one very reasonable explanation that seems to have missed the attention of supporters and critics alike. I suggest that the *Chymical Wedding* was neither a bona fide Rosicrucian manifesto, nor an allegorical condemnation of the movement. In 1615 the *Confessio* had opened the floodgates of common interest resulting in a deluge of potential members across the continent. Hundreds wanted to contact the society; even such luminaries as Descartes admitted to trying to find the Rosicrucians. Yet in order to avoid persecution their attempts at communication were all kept anonymous or disguised. I suggest that Andreae was as intrigued by the manifestos as anybody was. In a spirit of curiosity he took a previously written text, possibly embellished it with greater alchemical imagery, published it anonymously and then waited for a reply. Unfortunately his anticipation was in vain; like every other willing candidate his tract went unanswered. This accounts for Andreae's violent change of heart: he had been personally slighted and no longer accepted the fraternity.

Montgomery and Waite are in a sense both correct: it does not make sense for a man of Andreae's reputation to attack that which he created and then deny all responsibility. It does, however, make perfect sense to suggest that his anger is the response of a man taken in by empty promises and then scorned for a reply. Andreae was not the founder of the Rosicrucian movement despite his natural interest in their ideas.

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<sup>777</sup> An argument advanced many years earlier by Waite (1887) p. 236.

## ii. *The Tessera of Antilla*

The most recent pronouncement on Andreae's involvement in the Rosicrucian furore is Dickson's *Tessera of Antilla*, which is a comprehensive study of various secret societies of the seventeenth-century. Dickson argues that Andreae was central to the Rosicrucian manifestos, and that these texts had acted as an influence to the myriad societies that arose after the publication of the *Fama*, *Confessio* and *Chymical Wedding*. He suggests that the reason so many previous commentators have been mistaken in this matter is because they have studied Andreae's ideas in isolation. Yates simply aims to show Andreae's Rosicrucian tendencies whereas Montgomery is only concerned with justifying his adherence to Lutheran orthodoxy.<sup>778</sup> In contrast, Dickson situates his study in the context of the development of European secret societies prior to the seventeenth-century. His thesis suggests that the *Fama* and the *Confessio* were jointly authored by Andreae and his friends at Tübingen.

Dickson believes that as a young man Andreae was torn between his Lutheran background and his interest in the magical tradition.<sup>779</sup> Upon arriving at Tübingen he made friends with a number of others who were also pursuing mystical interests. The most important of these were Besold and Hess, who were both associates of Simon Studion.<sup>780</sup> By his own admission, Andreae composed the *Chymical Wedding* in 1605, which first revealed his desire to instigate a new reformation through a spiritual brotherhood. After his expulsion from the school, Andreae continued his education informally on his European travels. By

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<sup>778</sup> In this latter respect, Dickson argues that "Montgomery denies the obviously nascent Rosicrucianism of the *Chyische Hochzeit* in order to save appearances." Dickson (1998) p. 20.

<sup>779</sup> Dickson asserts that Andreae's father was a practicing alchemist, and that his mother was trained in iatro-chemistry.

the time he returned to Tübingen in 1612 he was sure of his need for an orthodox faith:

His real maturation took place at the Stift from 1612-1614. He now believed that he had mended his ways and put an end to the errors and vicissitudes of his life in his twenty-eighth year.<sup>781</sup>

Despite this resurgence of faith, Dickson suggests that Andreae then oversaw the publication of the *Fama* (which he suggests had previously been written around 1607), and also co-authored the *Confessio*, which was published in 1615. After the publication of his very own *Chymical Wedding*,<sup>782</sup> Andreae grew suspicious of the clamour surrounding the Rosicrucians. He began to distance himself through the publication of increasingly hostile responses that we have alluded to; *Invitatio*, *Mennipus*, *Turris Babel* and so on.

Crucially, Dickson argues that Andreae always maintained the ideals of the manifestos: from the *Chymical Wedding* through to the Christian societies of his mature works, Andreae never lost sight of his goal of a spiritual elite. Dickson concludes that the Rosicrucian fraternity:

was plainly an earlier phase of his lifelong hopes for a Christian utopia that was appropriated by others and so abandoned.<sup>783</sup>

There is no real mystery, then, surrounding Andreae's involvement in the movement. He offered an original myth that brought the world the name of Christian Rosenkreutz and the symbolism of the rose and cross.<sup>784</sup> He then contributed to the subsequent manifestos before turning his back on the movement following the publication of the *Chymical Wedding*.

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<sup>780</sup> See pp. 215-18.

<sup>781</sup> Dickson (1998) p. 27.

<sup>782</sup> Dickson argues that there is no evidence to suggest that Andreae supervised the publication of this third manifesto, nor that he even wanted it to be published.

<sup>783</sup> Dickson (1998) p. 88.

Dickson raises some interesting points, particularly his insistence on dating the *Chymical Wedding* at 1605. This date allows the *Fama* and *Confessio* to be seen as an extension of this original myth, rather than the other way round. Authors such as Montgomery, for example, rely very much on the idea that the *Chymical Wedding* was a response to the earlier manifestos and this may be misleading. Problems arise, however, in relation to much of Dickson's evidence.

Crucial for Dickson is Andreae's circle of friends at Tübingen. Many of them were named as members of Andreae's *Societas Christiana* long after he had rejected the Rosicrucians.<sup>785</sup> Therefore Andreae attempted to maintain a relationship with those who had co-authored the manifestos.<sup>786</sup> But even Dickson accepts that this evidence is not entirely reliable. He admits that the intellectual groups at Tübingen were far from homogenous, and displayed considerable diversity in ideas and outlook.<sup>787</sup> More importantly, he also acknowledges that during the crucial years 1607-12, Andreae was not even present at Tübingen, engaged as he was upon his enforced travels.<sup>788</sup> Finally, as Montgomery has persuasively argued, one cannot accuse Andreae of guilt by association. Just because he knew some mystics does not in any way mean that he was one himself. Accordingly, Dickson concludes that this evidence "however strong, remains circumstantial".<sup>789</sup>

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<sup>784</sup> Dickson maintains the argument rejected by Waite a century earlier that the symbol was based upon the Andreae coat-of-arms, which was itself based upon that of Luther.

<sup>785</sup> Dickson shows that at one point Andreae names Hess as a member of the 1620 *Societas Christiana* despite the fact that he had died in 1614. For this reason Dickson concludes that: "The fact that most of those listed were long time members of the Besold-Hess circle, in my estimation, indicates that he thought of the *Societas Christiana* as an ongoing initiative." (1998) p. 45.

<sup>786</sup> Besold had, of course, translated Boccacini, a segment of which served as the first part of the *Fama*.

<sup>787</sup> Dickson (1998) p. 38, argues "Neither Hess nor Besold were the centre of a "pansophical circle" to which Andreae paid fealty".

<sup>788</sup> Dickson (1998) p. 38.

<sup>789</sup> Dickson (1998) p. 38.

Dickson provides no further substantive evidence for Andreae's involvement in the *Fama*. Indeed, he glosses over the need for any precision in this claim.<sup>790</sup> He also accepts that in "content, form and style" the *Fama* is wholly different to any of Andreae's other works.<sup>791</sup> In fact its only stylistic similarities are with works that Andreae did *not* write:

When compared to the later Rosicrucian writings (of others) its kinship's with the riddling, enigmatic and above all playful method of the *Chymische Hochzeit* is evident.<sup>792</sup>

Not only is the *Fama* radically different to his known writings, but Dickson then also suggests that Andreae's reticence helps to identify him as its author:

While Andreae never avowed authorship of the *Fama* as he did for the *Chymische Hochzeit*, neither did he disavow it nor name anyone else.<sup>793</sup>

This is an unusual argument. First, nobody disavowed writing the *Fama*,<sup>794</sup> so by Dickson's logic authorship of the manifesto can be levelled at practically any early seventeenth-century figure. Besold, for example, is recognised as having contributed the first part of the text: why should Dickson not suspect him of a more substantial involvement? Second, Dickson's argument fails to address the charge that we have already noted; why would Andreae admit writing one manifesto and not the others? If Andreae was claiming responsibility for the composition of all three manifestos then it would make far more sense for him to simply state this as the truth. There is no reason for him to make the claim at all

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<sup>790</sup> Dickson (1998) asserts "Since we now are much more aware of how frequent composite authorship was in such friendship circles, we need not fret over Andreae's precise contribution". See p. 63. It is useful to note that Dickson does not refer to any *specific* friendship circles here, and certainly not to the Tübingen circle.

<sup>791</sup> Dickson (1998) p. 72.

<sup>792</sup> Dickson (1998) p. 72. Brackets in the original text.

<sup>793</sup> Dickson (1998) p. 72.

<sup>794</sup> With the possible exception of Michael Maier, who disclaimed any knowledge of authorship.

unless, that is, his admission arises from the fact that he really did only write one of the works.

Finally, one must ask what exactly did Andreae need to distance himself from? Dickson admits that nobody named Andreae as the founder of the Rosicrucians until long after his death. He was only directly accused in 1700 when a certain Gottfried Arnold cited a missing (and presumably apocryphal) letter as proof of his guilt.<sup>795</sup> Therefore there was nothing for Andreae to deny. He did not disavow the *Fama* in order to tacitly accept authorship but simply because nobody challenged him over it. In effect there was no charge for Andreae to answer.

Dickson's evidence for Andreae's involvement in the *Confessio* is more challenging. In 1616 Andreae compiled a tribute to his friend Hess, who had died two years previously, entitled *Theca gladii spiritus*. *Theca* featured extracts from Andreae's own works (including the anti-Rosicrucian *Invitatio*) alongside passages from the *Confessio*. Dickson suggests that this proves that Andreae co-authored the manifesto with Hess, and that *Theca* was a tacit admission to the deed.<sup>796</sup> Dickson also invokes the familiar argument that the *Confessio* can be linked to the *Chymical Wedding* because the date of CRC's birth, 1378, is visible in both works.

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<sup>795</sup> It is Dickson who recounts the story of Arnold's accusation. See p. 63. He follows this argument with the equally unsatisfactory assertion that "his [Andreae's] friends seemed to know". Dickson is referring here to the prefatory letter in the *Fama*, which he assumes was written by Besold, despite the fact that he initially identifies the publisher as its author. The preface mentions how Adam Haelmeyer (whose response of 1612 was published alongside the *Fama*) was currently imprisoned by Jesuits. For Dickson this passage is a clear reference to Andreae's anti-Jesuit beliefs. Yet in the same paragraph he states: "Most of the utopian societies we shall examine ... set themselves against the Jesuits explicitly". Again, there seems to be little reason to suggest that the preface was directly levelled at Andreae, nor indeed any single thinker. See p. 72 for the full argument.

<sup>796</sup> See Dickson (1998) p. 21 and pp. 62-63.

The second argument can be dealt with fairly easily. Accepting Dickson's argument that we should date the *Chymical Wedding* in its final published draft to 1605, then all the date's re-occurrence in the *Confessio* tells us is that its author had read Andreae's work first. If the author (or authors) of the *Confessio* were associates of Andreae then they would certainly have had access to his original story. Perhaps they even deliberately aligned their dates to those in the *Chymical Wedding*. But we cannot deduce any more from this fact. Anybody could have added the date, there is no firm reason to suggest the hand of Andreae. Again the evidence is purely circumstantial.

Andreae's *Theca* is more problematic but what is important to note here is that the dates of Dickson's interpretation are troubling. They do not seem to tally with his interpretation of Andreae's life. Dickson suggests that the *Confessio* was composed in 1614, in order to capitalise upon the success of the *Fama*.<sup>797</sup> Yet by this time Andreae had supposedly reached his "real maturation" and was devoting himself wholesale to his Lutheran ministry.<sup>798</sup> Furthermore, Dickson concedes that in 1616 Andreae was "struggling to come to terms with himself as an orthodox churchman"<sup>799</sup> and for this reason he was not involved in the publication of the *Chymical Wedding*. It is strange, then, that he chose this moment to compose an even more inflammatory text in the *Theca*. If Andreae refused to have anything to do with the *Chymical Wedding* in that year, then there seems no logical reason why he would admit to the controversial *Confessio*.

Andreae's tribute may reveal that he sympathised with some Rosicrucian aims (although even this possibility is unlikely given his inclusion of the

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<sup>797</sup> Dickson (1998) p. 76.

<sup>798</sup> See p. 231 of this discussion. Dickson (1998) p. 22.

*Inivitatio*) but it does not show that he founded them. A more likely explanation is that he simply identified Hess as a prime mover in the fraternity.<sup>800</sup>

In short, Dickson asks us to accept that by 1616 Andreae had embraced the life of the Lutheran pastor. At the same time he subtly aligned himself to the Rosicrucians (which for Dickson is an admission of guilt) in the *Theca* whilst simultaneously ignoring the text he later admitted to writing. This position is so complex as to push the boundaries of plausibility. Indeed, Dickson's entire argument is riddled with inconsistencies. As we have noted, Dickson argues that Andreae's co-authorship of the *Fama* is so certain that it is unnecessary to look for any specific input. But then he gives Andreae sole responsibility for the work:

Edighoffer has proposed that Andreae ... wrote the *Fama* just after his expulsion from Tübingen (in 1607) as compensation for his disappointments. This seems about right.<sup>801</sup>

In fact the whole essence of Dickson's argument appears to be rather slanted. His thesis argues for the necessity of situating Andreae as one single member of a broader movement. Yet the structure of Dickson's argument is set up to establish that Andreae was solely responsible for the central ideas behind the Rosicrucian furore. He is singled out as the lynch-pin when no genuine evidence suggests that this was the case.

Ultimately, Dickson relies on the unsteady foundations of Andreae's associates to connect him with the *Fama* and *Confessio*. The only further link is that these two manifestos, the *Chymical Wedding* and Andreae's later works all

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<sup>799</sup> Dickson (1998) p. 78.

<sup>800</sup> It does not necessarily even mean anything as strong as this. The *Theca* may only show that Hess had some sympathy with the movement, rather than being personally involved in it.

urged a small band of deeply spiritual men to enact reform across the continent. This is as far as the evidence takes us. No direct link can be discovered to show Andreae's authorship of the *Fama* and his connection to the *Confessio* is based upon a tribute composed while he was already in the process of attacking the Rosicrucians.

At the beginning of his book, Dickson outlines the folly of traditional esoteric versus exoteric approaches to Andreae:

If one attempts to settle the question of whether Andreae was indeed a 'Rosicrucian', the battle has already been conceded by accepting this terminology.<sup>802</sup>

He circumvents this problem by simply asserting Andreae's involvement as a fact, which negates the need for any demarcation of magic and Christian orthodoxy. Dickson praises Andreae for bringing the name Christian Rosenkreutz to public attention, so it is odd that his other supposed manifestos do not employ it themselves. It would have been without doubt the clearest method of identifying the true author. Instead no firm identification can take place. There is nothing other than the friends Andreae kept to link him with the *Fama* or *Confessio*. Until such evidence appears he cannot be named as the mind behind the Rosicrucian outcry. Dixon's argument, though interesting, is limited.

### iii. A Rosicrucian utopia?

*Christianopolis* was published in 1619, the same year as *Turris Babel*, and the hostility displayed in the latter had not diminished in utopia. In his

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<sup>801</sup> Dickson (1998) p. 72. Dickson is referring here to Edighoffer 'Johann Valentin Andreae. Vom Rosenkreuz zur Pantopie', *Daphis Zeitschrift fir mittlere deutsche Literatur* 10, (1981):

preface to *Christianopolis*, Andreae launches another broadside at the Rosicrucian plans for reform:

A certain FRATERNITY, in my opinion a joke has brought forth evident proof of this very thing.<sup>803</sup>

All that has arisen is a tumult of intellectual confusion. Andreae criticises any potential members for sitting around expecting great things from the “unrest and commotion of impostors and swindlers”.<sup>804</sup> Any reforms that would truly benefit mankind should be open and public, so that man may accomplish them immediately. Rosicrucian secrecy has prevented any real reforms: man has been discouraged from rooting out the vices plaguing both church and society. Andreae urges us not to trust:

some society (if there really is such a one) – hazy, omniscient, only in the eyes of its own boastfulness, with a sewn shield for an emblem and marred with many foolish ceremonies.<sup>805</sup>

This accounts for the importance of Andreae’s utopia: it would reveal true reform in the light of the Gospel. It appears that Andreae is distancing himself from the movement clearly enough, so why do rumours of the Rosicrucian utopia persist?

The strongest case can be found once again in the work of Yates,<sup>806</sup> who connects *Christianopolis* to the two manifestos through the *Chymical Wedding*. In the final paragraph of the preface to his utopia, Andreae indicates that his

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211-39.

<sup>802</sup> Dickson (1998) p. 5.

<sup>803</sup> *Chrs* p. 137.

<sup>804</sup> *Chrs* p, 137.

<sup>805</sup> *Chrs* pp. 138-39. For Dickson, Andreae’s argument should not be taken at face value: “mentioning the secret brotherhood in the preface confirms that his ideas were coincident with the Rosicrucian fable”. See Dickson (1998) p. 56. There is no reason to accept this, however, except once again in the most general of terms. That is, The Rosicrucian manifestos and the utopia both desired spiritual reform. Closer connections must be found.

<sup>806</sup> Yates (1982) p. 150.

work is not entirely serious: “I have written to my friends for one can joke with them.”<sup>807</sup> He then makes an astrological reference:

embark upon your vessel which has the sign of Cancer for its distinctive mark, sail for *Christianopolis* yourself.<sup>808</sup>

Yates reminds us that the final act of the *Chymical Wedding* saw Christian Rosenkreutz sail away in boats marked with the signs of the zodiac.<sup>809</sup> Andreae is thus playing his own joke upon the reader. Whilst denying the existence and validity of the Rosicrucians he is presenting a sequel to the *Chymical Wedding*. Christian Rosenkreutz is transformed into the anonymous narrator of *Christianopolis*.<sup>810</sup>

The joke becomes more evident as the story unfolds. As we have previously noted, when the narrator approaches the gates of the city he is interviewed as to his beliefs and personality.<sup>811</sup> Among the groups rejected by the citizens are “impostors who falsely call themselves BROTHERS OF THE ROSICRUCIANS”.<sup>812</sup> According to Yates,<sup>813</sup> Andreae is *not* suggesting that the Rosicrucians are fictitious but simply that those who falsely claim to be members will not be allowed into the city. Genuine Rosicrucians will gladly be admitted. This accounts for the ease in which the narrator passes the test: there can be no more genuine a Rosicrucian than Christian Rosenkreutz himself. *Christianopolis* is therefore a Rosicrucian utopia.

This is a compelling hypothesis, but there are too many questions left unanswered. The first is historical. Why did Andreae wait until 1619 to publish

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<sup>807</sup> *Chrs* p. 141.

<sup>808</sup> *Chrs* p. 141.

<sup>809</sup> Yates (1982) p. 146.

<sup>810</sup> Yates (1982) pg. 61, also stresses a connection between *The Chymical Wedding* and John Dee through the use of the Monas symbol.

<sup>811</sup> See p. 130.

<sup>812</sup> *Chrs* p. 145. Capitals are in the original

yet another veiled manifesto? Between the *Chymical Wedding* and *Christianopolis* he produced a wide range of works, none of which offered any support for the Rosicrucians. Instead, all are notable for the vitriol with which they attack the fraternity. Even Yates accepts that Andreae changed his mind<sup>814</sup> arguing that in later years he strenuously disassociated himself from the movement. But the crucial date for Yates' Rosicrucian collapse is 1620 with the Battle of White Mountain, and Andreae's change of heart preceded this by three years. One can understand him rejecting the movement out of the disillusion of a heavy defeat, but why would he do so *before* 1620? If we accept his post-1616 attacks as sincere, and there seems little reason not to, the situation becomes even more complex. It would mean that in *Christianopolis* Andreae had changed his mind back again for one final work, before Frederick's defeat. His utopia would stand as the only pro-Rosicrucian work among masses of hostile material: it would be an aberration in his entire output.

Then there are textual difficulties. Unlike the *Chymical Wedding*, Andreae's utopia does not incorporate any aspect of the original Rosicrucian myth. There is no symbolism of the rose and cross, no birth-dates and no coded names. In fact, *Christianopolis* reverses the events of the *Fama*. In the original manifesto, the fraternity are already among us promoting their knowledge and the *Chymical Wedding* ends with men setting forth to chart the world. The narrator of *Christianopolis*, however, is fleeing the world in despair. He is not a missionary but a refugee, escaping from "tyranny, sophistry and hypocrisy".<sup>815</sup> Nor do the citizens venture from beyond the shores of the island: as religious

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<sup>813</sup> Yates (1982) p. 150.

<sup>814</sup> Yates (1982) p. 143.

<sup>815</sup> *Chrs* p. 142.

exiles they have cut themselves off from the world. They seek sanctuary before global reform.

Finally there is the occult problem. There is a marked absence of alchemical interest in *Christianopolis*. If the utopia were intended to be a sequel to *Chymical Wedding* then why would it choose to ignore its central theme? The only vague reference to alchemy takes place in the laboratory: “here men learn to regulate fire, make use of the air, value the water and test earth.”<sup>816</sup> He also stresses that these are not to be thought of in terms of Aristotelian beliefs, but as relating only to the true Christian God.<sup>817</sup> This is very sketchy indeed.<sup>818</sup> There is none of the imagery or symbolism of the *Chymical Wedding* and it must be extremely dubious to classify Andreae’s utopia as part of the Rosicrucian canon: it overturns the accepted mythology and largely ignores alchemy. The historical evidence is insubstantial: it does not provide a sensible solution to Andreae’s dazzling u-turns. But this does not imply that he rejected all occult beliefs, for there are without question important mystical passages in *Christianopolis*

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<sup>816</sup> *Chrs* pp. 198-97. There is also an earlier reference to Macro/Microcosmic philosophy on p. 154 in which he describes the human body as “a miniature example, an epitome of the world.” To be fair, Andreae does discuss alchemy in *Myth 1/ 2*. He praises Paracelsus in 2/36 of the same text and in his *Compendium of Universall Knowledge*, trans. Montgomery (1973) I, pp. 88-91.

<sup>817</sup> *Chrs* p. 218.

<sup>818</sup> To show how any mystical interpretation is possible I now offer a numerological argument in favour of institutionalised alchemy in *Christianopolis*. Several numbers were important in alchemy (as with other branches of the occult) including four, seven, and ten. The latter represented the Philosopher’s Stone. It was made by the sum of the four elements, three principles (salt, sulphur and mercury), two seeds (masculine and feminine) and the one act of creation. (See Read (1961) p. 70). Andreae’s utopia is designed in a series of four, square walls, surrounding a circular temple. This building is naturally the most sacred part of utopia. When adding together the fourth, third, second and last wall we reach the number ten. The temple, which is already circular like the stone, is 100 feet in diameter. Could it be that *Christianopolis* is a manifestation of the alchemical table, with the temple as its philosopher’s stone? I would like to stress that this is effectively a figment of my imagination, but again highlights how such a complex subject can be favourably interpreted by supporters of the occult thesis.

#### iv. Astrology and Kabbalah in *Christianopolis*

In the section on Mystic Numbers, the narrator learns universal harmony and the importance God attaches to mathematics. Mystic numbers are the measures with which God has designed the cosmos and cannot be made known except through revelation:

these matters cannot be understood through human skill but rest upon revelation and are communicated to the faithful and from one another.<sup>819</sup>

The narrator is told to be careful when investigating such numbers; he must avoid the words of false prophets at all costs and look only towards Jesus Christ. This passage is used by Montgomery<sup>820</sup> to disparage any occult interpretations of *Christianopolis*, especially in regard to the Kabbalah. But in the same section Andreae makes a specific reference to such practices:

In this *Cabala* it is advisable to be rather circumspect, since we have considerable difficulty in present matter, grope in events of the past, and since God has reserved the future for himself.<sup>821</sup>

This is extremely revealing. Andreae is clearly *not* attacking the Kabbalah itself but simply urging caution on behalf of the part of its practitioners. We should not use it to forecast the future or prophesy, but only to seek Christ. Andreae is asserting that the true role of the Kabbalah is in fact to confirm Christianity. In *Mythologia Christiana*, also published in 1619, Andreae singled out the *Hebraica Lingua*. He describes the Hebrew language as:

Consecrated to Divine converse - crowned with mystery, supremely eloquent and above all, the mother of all wisdom and prudence and the sole guardian of truth.<sup>822</sup>

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<sup>819</sup> *Chrs* p. 222. As Dickson (1998) points out, the passage on Mystic Numbers also refers to the Key of David, which was a concept employed by Studion's *Naometria*.

<sup>820</sup> Montgomery (1973) I, p. 200.

<sup>821</sup> *Chrs* p. 222.

In short, Andreae's utopia reasserts the same Kabbalistic tradition of the Renaissance: it is an acceptable tool of Christian revelation.

A similarly cautious approach can be seen in Andreae's attitude towards astrology. He warns against its misuse but praises investigation of the heavens as an essential pursuit in man's overall development.<sup>823</sup> What any astrologer must guard against is communication with star demons, which has successfully been avoided so far in Christianopolis. The utopia's astrologers are unafraid of such accusations:

The inhabitants of Christianopolis set much store by it, nor do they fear falling away from the motion of the earth or being thrown off by unheard of star dwellers.<sup>824</sup>

Aside from this, astrology is an important branch of knowledge. Citizens accept that the heavens and earth are not independent, and "the governing influence of the stars is noted".<sup>825</sup> The narrator is even told that, similar to *Civitas Solis*, the city was built with astrological purposes in mind:

as they founded their city under its blessed auspices and on a favourable anniversary they know that the ill will of the heavens will never come upon the city as long as it honours God.<sup>826</sup>

Like the Kabbalah, it is essential that astrology be within a Christian framework: if this is the case then no harm can result.<sup>827</sup> Andreae concludes by rounding on those who are dismissive of astrology:

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<sup>822</sup> *Myth* 3/20. Andreae also mentions other thinkers such as Reuchlin and Scaliger, who were interested in Mosaic philosophy.

<sup>823</sup> This refers to both astrology and astronomy. At one point the narrator is unsure about the role of the former in the city *Chrs*, p. 238: "I could not understand ... what the inclination of the inhabitants of Christianopolis were,"

<sup>824</sup> *Chrs* p. 227.

<sup>825</sup> *Chrs* p. 228.

<sup>826</sup> *Chrs* p. 228.

<sup>827</sup> For another approach to Andreae's astronomy see *Myth* 1/6.

For he who does not know the value of astrology in human affairs or who foolishly denies it, I would wish that he would have to dig in the earth, cultivate and work the fields for as long a time as possible, in unfavourable weather.<sup>828</sup>

Despite its prominent position in *Chymical Wedding*, alchemy is overlooked in Andreae's utopia. Instead there are recommendations for astrology and the Kabbalah, both of which are used in a Christian context. It is clear from his *Mythologia*, published the same year as *Christianopolis*, that Andreae had considerable admiration for many of the occult beliefs of the Renaissance. I suggest that after suffering disillusion with Rosicrucianism Andreae became increasingly aware of *Civitas Solis* and the magical sources that inspired it. When he writes his own utopia, Andreae acknowledges these with favourable passages on astrology and the Kabbalah: hence *Christianopolis* is mystical without being Rosicrucian. Yates is, of course, correct in that Andreae does owe a mystical debt to the Renaissance, but this was not through any involvement in the Rosicrucian movement. Andreae's mysticism is only *one* component of a complete metaphysical system, which along with man, knowledge and perfection makes up the foundations of his utopia.

#### **4) The Moravian Prophet**

Comenius' work frequently alludes to his mystical beliefs. He also indicates a belief in astrology and the Kabbalah, and accepts the validity of esoteric knowledge in scripture and philosophy. Comenius' main concern is with prophecy, and a major influence here is Campanella whom the Moravian

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<sup>828</sup> *Chrs* p. 229.

praised as a true visionary.<sup>829</sup> His most notorious work on prophecy was *Lux in Tenebris* (1657), a compilation of the prophetic visions of Christopher Kotter.<sup>830</sup> It may also be noted that Comenius accepted the validity of hermetic doctrines, quoting Hermes on a number of occasions as a genuine authority. Most importantly, Comenius followed Andreae's lead in frequently attacking the Rosicrucians and their alchemical practices. Nowhere is this more prominent than in *Labyrinth of the World*.

### **i. The Rejection of the Rosicrucians**

As well as being deeply pessimistic, the *Labyrinth of the World* is also partly autobiographical. Many of its tragedies had befallen the author and at least one of these, an incident involving a shipwreck, was added after the first edition appeared. Another passage is more curious, pointing to close personal links with the Rosicrucians. During the pilgrim's tour of the labyrinth, he witnesses the accession of a new monarch who promises a golden reign. The pilgrim is so impressed that he decides to help:

Now I, thinking it well to act for the common welfare (for thus they called it) came nearer and contributed a nail or two to strengthen the new throne.<sup>831</sup>

No sooner had the pilgrim done so, than the throne was attacked and destroyed by opponents and after receiving a blow the pilgrim fled in terror. It is widely

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<sup>829</sup> Both of these pansophists were markedly more millennial than Andreae.

<sup>830</sup> These were compiled between 1616 and 1624 and included some discussions on Frederick I and the Hapsburg empire. They were published in a compendium of prophecies entitled *Revelationes Christianae Poniatovice* (np. 1659).

<sup>831</sup> *LW* 19/11.

accepted that this passage retells the story of the reign of Frederick I.<sup>832</sup> If Frederick was, as Yates contends, the focus of Rosicrucian activity then Comenius could well have been revealing his credentials as a member of the fraternity.<sup>833</sup>

The Rosicrucians appear in a favourable light in another brief reference. Walking through the library, the pilgrim notices that one of the most bizarre faults in knowledge is the grouping together of seemingly opposing philosophies; for example “Hus, Luther and others with the Pope and the Jesuits”.<sup>834</sup> He finds the Rosicrucians placed alongside “philosophasters”.<sup>835</sup> Bearing in mind the ironical nature of the passage, it seems that Comenius is indicating that the Rosicrucians have a claim to genuine truth. But if this implies sympathy for the movement, two subsequent passages shatter the illusion.

First, the pilgrim encounters the alchemists among other men of learning. Alchemy, he is told, is “the summit of human wit”.<sup>836</sup> Not only does the philosopher’s stone turn base metals into gold but it also grants the owner health and longevity. The alchemist is one who:

does not admit death (except after two or three hundred years). Indeed he ... could make himself immortal.<sup>837</sup>

These claims naturally excite the pilgrim, especially after the previous disappointments on his journey. On closer observation, however, he notices that not one single alchemist has met with any success. Instead, many have suffered horrific injuries and some have even died as a result of the toxins they have

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<sup>832</sup> Lutzow suggests, “The allusion given by Komensky to the cause of King Frederick is somewhat obscure, as he naturally did not refer to it in any of his other writing. His sympathies were, of course, with the Elector Palatine.” *LW* p. 196, n. 2.

<sup>833</sup> See Yates (1982) ch. 12.

<sup>834</sup> *LW* 10/11.

<sup>835</sup> Philosophaster was a term of ridicule, much the same as pseudo-scientist is today.

<sup>836</sup> *LW* 12/1.

created. Everybody complains of running out of funds. The alchemists have ready-made excuses for this widespread failure; they blame their instruments, the impurity of their raw materials or unfavourable astrological conditions.<sup>838</sup> To compound his disillusionment, the pilgrim is also told that anybody who is successful must then go into hiding for their own safety. As a result, no practical benefits can ever come from such knowledge. The pilgrim offers a bitter judgement:

I see no one who obtains the stone. I see, instead, that smelting gold and broiling the element of life, these men squander and dissolve both.<sup>839</sup>

Yet this disappointment is as nothing compared to the charade of Rosicrucianism.

Comenius' attack on the fraternity shows a deep knowledge of the historical events surrounding the manifestos. The subheading of the chapter reads *Fama fraternis anno 1612, Latine ac Germane edita*, and this early dating of the *Fama* lends weight to the idea that unofficial editions had been in circulation before the publication date of 1614.<sup>840</sup> The pilgrim is alerted by the sound of trumpets (an obvious reference to the opening lines of the *Fama*) and a messenger appears on the street. He announces that several wise men, under the leadership of Hugo Alverda,<sup>841</sup> were about to return knowledge to its pre-fall perfection. They knew all the secrets of alchemy and could speak every language of the world: they could even see what was happening at any point in time and space all over the globe. Upon this, the messenger disappears, leaving the crowd restless with excitement.<sup>842</sup>

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<sup>837</sup> LW 12/2.

<sup>838</sup> LW 12/5.

<sup>839</sup> LW 12/4. As we noted on p. 174, Comenius did occasionally give some credit to the alchemists. He also once hints at macrocosm-microcosm beliefs in *Nat Phil* 17/21-22, in which he argues that the seven planets can be equated with the organs of the body.

<sup>840</sup> LW 13/1.

<sup>841</sup> Hugo Alverda was the pseudonymous author of *Foralilitium Scientiae* (1617) an alleged Rosicrucian text. See Yates (1982) p. 165.

<sup>842</sup> LW 13/1-3.

A few are sceptical but most are delighted at the news and set about trying to find the group. As in real life, however, all attempts at communication are in vain. Just when people are beginning to give up hope, more trumpets sound and boxes appear claiming to contain the world's most arcane secrets. They bear such titles as *Portae Sapientiae*, *Gymnasium Universitatis* and *Buom Macro-Micro-cosmicon*, all of which are replicas or puns on titles of real pamphlets that were published during 1617-1620.<sup>843</sup> But the boxes are empty and the anguished crowd informed that only initiates could see them. The pilgrim is left furious:

Am I then to wait for this? I said. I who, among so many thousand who are more learned than I, know not a single example of one who succeeded? I do not wish to continue gaping here.<sup>844</sup>

As in real life, the Rosicrucian furore has come to nought, collapsing under the weight of its own empty promises.

It is clear that Comenius was well read in the Rosicrucian literature but it is also apparent that his disappointment and anger at the movement was genuine. Is this enough to accuse him of a deeper involvement with the fraternity? As with Andreae, there is not enough evidence to suggest a membership of the society. All we can conclude with any certainty is that his hopes had been raised and dashed, along with those of many others. Comenius was a disappointed outsider, not a disillusioned brother.

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<sup>843</sup> LW 13/4.

## ii. Christian Mysticism

Comenius offers an example of his mystical preferences at the end of *Labyrinth of the World*. The vision of the pilgrim during his ‘paradise of the heart’ is striking, and suggests a variety of influences that continue throughout Comenius’ works.

He fully accepts, for example, the legitimacy of esoteric knowledge especially in scripture. God has written His deepest mysteries in nature and these can only be decoded through Biblical exegesis: “Nature and Scripture serve each other as commentator and interpreter.”<sup>845</sup> This is a symbiotic relationship, which works equally well in reverse. The nature of fire, for instance, can help to explain the importance of burnt offerings. The light, heat and movement of fire represent “the light of knowledge”, “warmth of devotion,” and “movement of good intentions” that the sacrifice brought forth.<sup>846</sup> This is just one of many examples of the interrelation between Bible and nature:

Scripture is full of similar passages which cannot get the true light of understanding except from the knowledge of natural objects.<sup>847</sup>

Some Biblical characters even possess an allegorical role, designed to represent social and historical movements. The prophetess Miriam portrays philosophy turning its back on God in Comenius’ own times.<sup>848</sup>

Comenius elaborates on the idea that Genesis, more precisely the story of creation, holds many of God’s deepest secrets. He follows Pico’s *Heptaplus* by offering his own mystical interpretation with a more millennial tone. Each of

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<sup>844</sup> *LW* 13/5.

<sup>845</sup> *VL* 14/8.

<sup>846</sup> *VL* 14/8.

<sup>847</sup> *VL* 14/8.

<sup>848</sup> *Pan* 12/32-33.

the seven days of creation represents one thousand years of human history.

Comenius suggests that the fourth day represents the coming of Christ:

the fourth day is a prophecy of what is to happen in the fourth millennium of the world  
... it was in the fourth millennium that Jesus appeared.<sup>849</sup>

But Comenius' millennialism finds full voice in his most ubiquitous mystical belief: the truth of prophecy.

Angels hold the keys to any prophecy, as they are the intermediaries between man and God. They provide direct access to divine ideas through dreams and visions. This is particularly prevalent in the hearts of the humble:

how some plain little fellow speaks wondrous mysteries, prophesies the future changes in the world and in the Church, as if he saw them before his eyes; mentions the names of yet unborn kings and heads of state.<sup>850</sup>

Angelic visions such as those of Kotter were essential to Comenius' mysticism.<sup>851</sup> Numerology was another efficacious method of prophecy. Comenius attached great significance to the number forty as it occurred in the New Testament seven times, another important number.<sup>852</sup> By multiplying the number forty by itself, Comenius shows that approximately sixteen hundred years have passed since Christ returned to heaven. The new age was therefore surely at hand.<sup>853</sup> A similar prediction revolves around the number three:

Again if we take the thirty three and a quarter years of Christ's earthly life and multiply by forty nine Jubilee years, the total is 1629, the year the Church was taken captive and slain.<sup>854</sup>

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<sup>849</sup> *Hep* 7/5.

<sup>850</sup> *LW* 48/2.

<sup>851</sup> For Comenius' most lucid exposition of angels see *Nat. Phil* / 18.

<sup>852</sup> Jesus spent forty days in the wilderness, there were forty days between the Resurrection and Ascension, etc.

<sup>853</sup> *Pan* 2/36.

<sup>854</sup> *Pan* 2/37.

Comenius is confident that the church will rise again as successfully as Jesus rose from the tomb.

We should not underestimate the importance of Campanella for Comenius' own prophecies. In *Labyrinth of the World* Comenius suggests that mankind is entering an Age of Women:

as men had for so many thousand years had supremacy, it was time that they should cede it to women.<sup>855</sup>

Proof of this includes the recent reign of Elizabeth I in England. Campanella makes this very same claim in *Civitas Solis*.<sup>856</sup> Comenius even cites the Dominican as justification for his own beliefs:

Thomas Campanella ... has the following passage: "the prophets promise the world a stable and prosperous political system, free of war, famine, disease and heresy" ... I prophesy that this golden age will follow closely upon the fall of antichrist in the near future.<sup>857</sup>

Campanella is, of course, only one influence but his involvement is crucial. It shows that Comenius, who has already rejected Rosicrucianism, allies himself with his pansophist predecessor.

It is essential to realise that although he shifted the emphasis of mystical belief, Comenius still retained the more traditional strands of Renaissance mysticism. Astrology, for example, was one of the few practices not condemned in *Labyrinth of the World*. After being told that it is an evil practice, the pilgrim declares "it did not seem to me fitting to heed so one sided a judgement, if but the art itself is a true one".<sup>858</sup> Problems lie with the majority of astrologers, who

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<sup>855</sup> *LW* 32/15.

<sup>856</sup> *CS* p. 62: "So it is seen that in this age women rule as did the Amazons in Nubia and Monopotapa, and among Europeans Roxelana in Turkey, Bona in Poland, Maria in Hungary, Elizabeth in England." Lutzow also recognised this, *LW* 23/15 n.2.

<sup>857</sup> *Pan* 2/54.

<sup>858</sup> *LW* 11/14.

cause unnecessary trauma with their false predictions of ill-fated events. There is nothing wrong with astrology itself.

Comenius also accepts Hermes as a source of pre-revelatory wisdom. He is listed as one of many important thinkers:

And there want not examples of some, out of the bounds of the Church, whom, the spirit of wisdom hath severally inspired as Job, Eliphaz, Mercurius Trismegistus, Socrates, Epictetus and Cicero.<sup>859</sup>

Comenius quotes Hermes in order to justify his pleas for a universal religion. Such religion would harness the power within man, granting him almost supernatural abilities: "Hence the saying of Hermes Trismegistus 'you will not attain God unless you match his power to transcend place and time'."<sup>860</sup> The only occasion when Comenius rejects Egyptian magic is non-hermetic: he condemns the illusions of the Pharaohs' magicians.<sup>861</sup> Along similar lines, Moses is another whose authority is unquestionable. Comenius accepts that he received the hidden word of God on Mount Sinai.<sup>862</sup> Thus Comenius laces himself outside of the Rosicrucian manifestos and within the utopian magical theory of Campanella and Andreae. Once again the symbolism of the brotherhood is rejected, and their alchemical ideas are pushed aside in favour of other occult beliefs.

## 5) Bacon's Theory of Magic

Bacon's attitude towards magic and mysticism was highly contradictory, and commentators such as Paolo Rossi have made an inestimable contribution to

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<sup>859</sup> *Prod* p. 31.

<sup>860</sup> *Pan* 13/2 (III).

<sup>861</sup> *Pan* 9/18.

our understanding of his position. Bacon lauded many of the achievements of the Renaissance magus, yet detested the secrecy and individualism that went with it. Whilst attacking alchemists, for example, for holding back the fields of knowledge, he simultaneously praised them as “the Sons of Chemistry”.<sup>863</sup> The dismissal of hermetic practices is evident in Bacon’s earliest works and formed part of the wider attack on philosophy. Yet strangely his *New Atlantis* displayed many Rosicrucian elements; so much so, in fact, that the tale was later adapted as an overtly Rosicrucian text. Unlike the pansophists, Bacon seems to have embraced the manifestos as his ideas developed.

#### **i. Bacon, Magic and Science**

Bacon attacked magic for adding to the superstition surrounding current knowledge. When the magus fails to achieve the goals he has set himself, he never accepts his responsibility. Such is his self-delusion that the magus fools himself even when proven successful:

The *Magician*, for his part, when he manages (according to the understanding of the matter) to produce some supernatural effect, thinking that he has now got nature in his power, gives wings to his imagination, loses his sense of proportion, and supposes there is nothing any longer to which he may not aspire.<sup>864</sup>

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<sup>862</sup> VL 6/4.

<sup>863</sup> *Thoughts and Conclusions* trans. Farrington in *The Philosophy of Francis Bacon* (Liverpool University Press, London, 1964). This edition also includes *The Masculine Birth of Time* (1603) and *Refutation of Philosophy* (1609). All of these early works were omitted from Spedding’s edition of *Collected Works*.

<sup>864</sup> *Thoughts and Conclusions* p. 74.

Bacon accepted that the magus does occasionally yield results through the theory of affinity and sympathy, but these are happy accidents. In the main these two presuppositions are dismissed as “idle and supine”.<sup>865</sup>

He also considered magic to be morally reprehensible. It encourages men to be vainglorious and seek to dominate nature for their own reputation, and their experiments are therefore a triumph of style over substance. Beneath the brilliant façade lies an empty shell of ignorance: “presented with too much pretension and show.”<sup>866</sup> The magus makes empty promises to the gullible and despite his hollow guarantees he delivers nothing. Among such worthless promises, Bacon cites:

prolongation of life, postponement of old age, relief from pain, repair of natural defects, deceptions of the senses, inhibitions or excitement of the emotions, enlightenment of the intellectual faculties.<sup>867</sup>

These have all proven fruitless. In raising the hopes of the innocent, the magus has damaged natural science almost irreparably.

Yet Bacon was in no small debt to the magical tradition. As part of his *Historia Ventorum*, he outlined a work, which was never completed entitled *The History of the Sympathy and Antipathy of Things*.<sup>868</sup> In this summary he repeats his standard criticisms: that the magus’ own inflated self-worth has corrupted magic and misled innocent people. Bacon contrasts this with his own work, which was to be thorough and diligent, where fanciful notions would be replaced by genuine experimentation. Bacon now accepts the basic premises of natural magic. Far from being “idle and supine”, they are “the spurs of motions and the keys of works”<sup>869</sup>

Through these principles Bacon promised a true *magnalia naturae*.

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<sup>865</sup> *Thoughts and Conclusions*, p. 88.

<sup>866</sup> *Thoughts and Conclusions*, p. 75.

<sup>867</sup> *Thoughts and Conclusions*, p. 87.

<sup>868</sup> *Collected Works V*, pp. 203-04.

<sup>869</sup> *Collected Works V*, p. 203.

This formed the title of a fascinating document that made up an end-piece to the original edition of *New Atlantis*.<sup>870</sup> As we have noted, this may be the result of its having been an addition to Bacon's most magical text, the *Sylva Sylvarum*.<sup>871</sup> *Magnalia Naturae* comprises a list, or a page of contents, of various experiments that Bacon claims to have attempted. The thirty-two propositions contain all of the idle promises that Bacon had earlier attacked. These include:

the prolongation of life, the restitution of youth in some degree, the retardation of age, the altering of features, and the increasing and exalting of the intellectual parts.<sup>872</sup>

Was Bacon claiming to have finally discovered the answers to these perennial problems? Had he transformed himself into the true image of the scientist-magus?

His attitude towards alchemy was similarly double-edged. Whereas the magus is in awe of his own grandeur, the alchemist is one who too easily finds fault with himself. When his transmutations invariably fail he blames his own deficient character instead of the basic inadequacies in his ideas. This is compounded by the manner in which alchemical ideas are handed down; bound up in secrecy and reliant on "the superficial whisperings of an oral tradition".<sup>873</sup> Again, the alchemist may occasionally stumble upon some meritorious discovery but only by chance.<sup>874</sup> Bacon reserves a particularly vitriolic attack for Paracelsus:

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<sup>870</sup> This possibly suggests an even closer link to *Sylva Sylvarum*, which has been criticised as Bacon's most overtly magical work. Farrington (1964) p. 43, passes it off as "that hasty compilation".

<sup>871</sup> See n. 10, p. 33.

<sup>872</sup> *Collected Works* III, pp. 167-68. Some of these aims were also those of the Fellows of Saloman's House.

<sup>873</sup> *Thoughts and Conclusions*, p. 74.

<sup>874</sup> *Thoughts and Conclusions*, p. 87: "An old man bequeathed to his sons a treasure of gold buried in some unknown spot in his vineyard. The sons set to digging the vineyard and found no gold but won a fine harvest as the fruit of their labours."

your utterances are too silly to be random. You seek out the most absurd authorities to swear allegiance to. As for man, you have made him a pantomime.<sup>875</sup>

In a wider sense, this also represents an attack on the doctrine of man as microcosm. Not only had this term been used incorrectly, but also as a cosmological and natural structure it was patently false.<sup>876</sup> The presupposition of the four elements was another absurdity, which revealed the arbitrary nature of the pseudo-science: “this imaginary ordering of nature no true philosopher would admit even in his dreams.”<sup>877</sup> Once more, Bacon offers a moral objection. The alchemist is to be despised for his laziness in experimentation, his towering ambition and his ultimate vanity. He compares the alchemist to one who finds a plank of wood and dreams of using it as a ship.<sup>878</sup>

But again he borrows heavily from the successes that alchemy has produced. The triad of salt, sulphur and mercury that Paracelsus employed as “first principles” was admirable enough. Following his intended discussion of magic, Bacon outlined an alchemical treatise entitled *The History of Sulphur, Salt and Mercury*. In this he admits: “their [the alchemists’] terms I accept, but not their opinion, which appear unsound.”<sup>879</sup> The deficiencies of the three principles lay only in their ambiguity. Bacon intended to distinguish them into more exact categories “as the oily, the watery, the fat, the crude, the inflammable, the non-inflammable, and the like”.<sup>880</sup>

Therefore Bacon dismissed the magus and alchemist although he did not disagree with all of their ideas. Generally speaking, he approved of their experimentation but not when it was based upon false premises or conducted in an

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<sup>875</sup> *The Masculine Birth of Time*, p. 65. See also Purnfrey (1998) p. 38 for Bacon’s attack on Paracelsus’ interpretation of the role of Scripture.

<sup>876</sup> In his *Refutation of Philosophy* he describes the doctrine as a “misapplication”, p. 122.

<sup>877</sup> *Thoughts and Conclusions*, p. 89.

<sup>878</sup> *Refutation of Philosophy*, p. 122.

<sup>879</sup> *Collected Works V*, p. 205.

<sup>880</sup> *Collected Works V*, p. 205.

inappropriate manner. Science should be open to all, not shrouded in occult symbolism. But this presents a problem. As well as the secretive elements that we have previously noted,<sup>881</sup> *New Atlantis* contains a good deal of mystical imagery. Unlike *Christianopolis* or *Civitas Solis*, however, this is flavoured with Rosicrucianism.

## ii. *Voyage to the Land of the Rosicrucians*

The Rosicrucian symbolism is without doubt one of the most puzzling aspects of Bacon's utopia. Along with Andreae, Bacon is a prime candidate for the authorship of the Rosicrucian manifestos, but such claims are usually accompanied by the most spurious of evidence. Cipher theorists find Bacon's name in the *Fama* and *Confessio* as well as the complete works of Shakespeare.<sup>882</sup> Others have suggested that the myth of Christian Rosenkreutz is an allegory of Bacon's own life. Both began their quest for knowledge at the age of sixteen (this was the age when Bacon left Trinity College in disillusionment) with an unceasing hatred of Aristotle. Both waited many years before revealing their philosophies to the world.<sup>883</sup> By their very nature these theories do not require firm evidence, as they rest on the assumption of an elaborate cover-up. Obviously they cannot be relied upon. Yet despite the fact that Bacon never openly acknowledged the Rosicrucians, *New Atlantis* makes it inconceivable that he did not possess some knowledge of their existence.

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<sup>881</sup> See pp. 101-106.

<sup>882</sup> Shakespeare's Rosicrucian origins are visible in the symbolism of the rose and cross. The rose appears over seventy times in Shakespeare's work. See Wigston *Columbus of Literature* (Chicago, 1892). For other cypher theories see A. F. Wigston *Bacon, Shakespeare and the Rosicrucians* (London, 1888), H. Pott *Francis Bacon and his Secret Society* (London: Sampson Low, 1891), B. G. Theobald *Francis Bacon Concealed and Revealed* (London: Cecil Palmer, 1930), A. Dodd *Francis Bacon's Personal Life Story* (London: Rider and Co., 1949)

<sup>883</sup> This is usually evidenced by the lack of Baconian publications until 1597.

Yates follows the work of Wigston (the cipher theorist whom she dismisses as a “crank”<sup>884</sup>) in revealing the similarities between the *Fama* and *New Atlantis*. When Bacon’s crew near Bensalem they are met by two representatives who present them with a document declaring the conditions for access to the island. The document echoes the closing words of the *Fama*: “this scroll was signed with a stamp of cherubim’s wings, not spread, but hanging downwards, and by them a cross.”<sup>885</sup> Another visual clue comes in the form of the official’s dress. He wears a white turban adorned with a red cross, the very badge of the fraternity.<sup>886</sup> Like the Rosicrucians the Bensalemites are preoccupied with curing the sick and this care is also free,<sup>887</sup> which recalls the first rule of the Rosicrucians, that the sick must be healed “and that gratis”.<sup>888</sup>

The most striking image in Saloman’s House is that of the twelve ‘merchants of life’. Their resemblance to the Rosicrucians is startling. Both their mission and methods are identical. Like the eight brethren, the ‘merchants of light’ roam the world in disguise, adopting whatever costume is most suitable:

we have twelve that sail into foreign countries under the names of other nations (for our own we conceal) who bring us the books and abstracts, and patterns of experiments of all other parts.<sup>889</sup>

Could it be that Saloman’s House is the real Rosicrucian stronghold?

One apologist was convinced. The English mystic John Heydon published many works purporting to be Rosicrucian, including such titles as *The Rosie Crucian Infallible Axiomata* (1660) and *The Harmony of the World* (1662).

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<sup>884</sup> Yates (1982) p. 129.

<sup>885</sup> *Collected Works* III, p. 130. The *Fama* closes with the expression: “Under the Shadow of Jehovah’s Wings”.

<sup>886</sup> *Collected Works* III, p. 135.

<sup>887</sup> “He must not be paid twice for one labour” is an expression that is used throughout the island.

See, for example, *Collected Works* III, 132.

<sup>888</sup> *Fama*, p. 243.

<sup>889</sup> *Collected Works* III, p. 164. Compare this with the *Fama*, p. 243.

In that same year he also published *The Holy Guide, Leading the Way to the Wonder of the World: A Compleat Phisitian, teaching the knowledge of all things past, present and to come*. As a preface to this work, Heydon constructed a fable entitled *Voyage to the Land of the Rosicrucians*. Apart from a few cosmetic changes, this new utopia is a direct reproduction of *New Atlantis*.<sup>890</sup> In Heydon's version, when the official greets the crew he declares "I am by office governor of the house of strangers and by vocation a Christian priest of the Order of the Rosie Cross."<sup>891</sup> King Salomana is renamed Eugenius Theodidactus,<sup>892</sup> whose seal is the letters RC. Bacon's "Feast of the Family", is transformed into the "Feast of the Fraternity" although the ceremony itself is virtually unaltered. Bensalem is rechristened Apuanna or Aquanna (Heydon uses both titles) and the myth of Atlantis is appropriated into Rosicrucian folklore:

For through the narration and description made by a great man with you, that the descendants of Neptune planted there, and of the magnificent temple, palace, city and hill (see my *Rosie Crucian Infallible Axiomata*).<sup>893</sup>

Saloman's House is now the College of the Rosie Cross and its fellows are in the possession of the Book M. The city of Damcar, where 'CRC' was first initiated into occult mysteries, is situated on Bensalem. It is the location of the miraculous conversion of the island.<sup>894</sup>

There are two competing explanations as to the reasoning behind Heydon's plagiarism. It could be that he was using Bacon to add some much-needed respectability to a fading and forgotten movement. Bacon's name would

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<sup>890</sup> Heydon's work is reprinted in Waite (1887). Waite does not acknowledge its similarity to *New Atlantis*, preferring to read it as an extension of *Fama*. Wigston, the cypher theorist, was the first to investigate these ideas. See (1888) and (1892).

<sup>891</sup> Waite (1887) p. 354.

<sup>892</sup> He appears in an earlier Heydon work: *Eugenius Theodidacticus the Propheticall Trumpeteer* was published in 1655. See Waite (1887) p. 331.

<sup>893</sup> Waite (1887) p. 360.

<sup>894</sup> Waite (1887) p. 356.

bring some scientific *gravitas* to the mystical enterprise. Yet Heydon avoids any recognition of Bacon at all, and never suggests that Bacon's ideas were simply compatible with Rosicrucianism. If he was looking for an intellectual champion he kept his search to himself. It is equally as likely, therefore, that Heydon recognised the latent Rosicrucian imagery in *New Atlantis* and was only attempting to make Bacon's debt explicit.

It is very difficult to avoid the conclusion that Bacon deliberately included Rosicrucian imagery in his utopia, though why he should do so remains a mystery. He did not envisage a vaguely occult philosophy but actually incorporated the *Fama* into his work. This places Bacon in a different framework to Campanella and Andreae: despite their acceptance of astrology and Kabbalah, neither linked their work to the Rosicrucians. Bacon's magical beliefs are similar but distinct from the pansophists.

## Conclusion

The Manuels argued that the pansophists embraced the mystical tradition of the seventeenth-century<sup>895</sup>, and this has been accepted by many commentators. Webster notes:

For the most part they [Campanella, Andreae and Bacon] relied on natural magic to provide the sources of social amelioration.<sup>896</sup>

But they misjudge the mysticism of the pansophist utopia. The utopias of Campanella, Andreae and Comenius did not accept all traditions, although they did embrace some elements of magical theory.

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<sup>895</sup> Manuel & Manuel (1979) p. 210.

As we have seen, the tradition of Renaissance magic was not homogenous. Although links between natural magic, astrology, Kabbalah and alchemy did exist, distinctions between each school can still be drawn. The pansophists simply accepted some elements of this earlier philosophy and abandoned others. With the rejection of alchemy came the attack on the Rosicrucians. As Andreae's disillusion with the movement grew he became increasingly attracted to Campanella's magical sources and Comenius continued the trend.

In Yates' broader sense, the pansophists can all be labelled Rosicrucian as they entertained a variety of astrological and magical beliefs. Yet as she accepts, on this basis most intellectuals of the seventeenth century qualify for the same title. In the narrower definition Campanella, Andreae or Comenius cannot be implicated on anything more than a removed level. Only Bacon can be linked further to the movement, although the extent to which this is possible remains a mystery. All we can say with any certainty, is that an acceptance of occult ideas in the seventeenth-century does not necessarily make one a member of the Rosicrucian fraternity. The pansophist utopia is proof positive of this.

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<sup>896</sup> Webster (1982) p. 58, my brackets. Webster considers Comenius to be outside the boundaries of these three utopias.

## Conclusion

My thesis has demonstrated that the pansophist utopia is a more coherent vision of the ideal society than has previously been recognised. It has shown that if we delve beyond surface similarities, we discover that Campanella, Andreae and Comenius offer a consistent view of utopian politics, human nature, knowledge and magic. Conversely, Bacon's *New Atlantis* resembles the pansophist model in several ways but differs in each of these four crucial areas. We have seen that the three thinkers in this study all regarded utopia as a perfect society, and that they each took utopia seriously as a distinct genre of political theory. This theory embodied their pansophist beliefs: utopia offered both a universalist and unified doctrine of man and the state. My thesis thus has a number of implications for the individual thinkers concerned here, as well as for utopian theory in general.

Beginning with Campanella, my thesis has suggested that the metaphysical nature of *Civitas Solis* has too often been overlooked. Commentators have treated Campanella's utopia as separate to his metaphysical works: in this sense it is almost seen as an anomaly in his prodigious output.<sup>897</sup> Where it has been linked to other works, *Civitas Solis* has generally been bracketed alongside other strictly political writings. Although Bonansea, for example, views *Civitas Solis* as the least important of all Campanella's works, he insists on referring to it as part of his political canon.<sup>898</sup> This approach gives rise to a number of questions. Was utopia the goal of the Calabrian conspiracies?

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<sup>897</sup> As we have seen, Campanella himself occasionally singled out the utopia for special consideration. See pp. 5-6.

<sup>898</sup> Further examples include Man & Man (1979) and Kelly-Gadol (1976)

How did *Civitas Solis* correspond to the *Monarchy of the Messiah's* call for a universal papacy? My thesis has shown that although interesting, these ideas are not without flaws. *Civitas Solis* is equally as reliant on Campanella's broader philosophy than on his various schemes for political reform.

At no point has my argument denied that *Civitas Solis* is a political text, but it suggests that Campanella's utopia is the political manifestation of his metaphysical beliefs. As such, *Civitas Solis* should be considered alongside *Metaphysica* and other philosophical works. The Solarians embrace Campanella's doctrine of the *five worlds* and their religion is founded upon the trinity of the *primalties*. More tellingly, the *primalties* are embodied in the political structure of the utopia, providing the unity that ensure the perfection of both man and state. The magical and astrological practices of the Solarians should also be seen as one part of this wider metaphysical framework. They should not be singled out as the essence of *Civitas Solis*, but be recognised for providing good breeding practices and promoting the general well being of the society. Allied to this is the Solarian system of knowledge, which grants utopia a further privilege. Taken together these elements provide a unified society in which man can flourish and let his universal nature develop. One cannot, therefore, ignore the metaphysical constructs built into the very walls of *Civitas Solis*: they reveal the philosophical nature of Campanella's utopian political theory.

My reading of Andreae's *Christianopolis* yields several important historical conclusions. My thesis has sought to clear a path through the extremes of the debate surrounding this much misunderstood text. As we have seen, opinion has always been sharply divided over the mystical and orthodox

interpretations of Andreae's work, and they remain so to this very day. While many commentators assert the Lutheran and Christian influences on Andreae, recent scholarship has sought to reaffirm Andreae's Rosicrucian credentials. My thesis has attempted to draw these competing strands together.

The evidence linking *Christianopolis* to the Rosicrucian manifestos is, quite simply, too tenuous to be truly convincing. Yet as we have also noted, we cannot overlook the mystical and occult references that are visible in the utopia: This combination of mysticism and Christianity may well, of course, signify that Andreae was Rosicrucian in Yates' more general definition of the term, but this was not how Andreae understood the movement. He discussed Rosicrucianism in terms of a specific fraternity rather than a general intellectual trend.<sup>899</sup> He also consistently attacked the brotherhood, despite the fact that his *Chymical Wedding* has been adopted as part of the Rosicrucian canon.

My thesis has shown that there is no real need to choose between a magical and orthodox interpretation of Andreae: his pansophism embraced both traditions. Andreae accepted astrology, Kabbalah and other mystical ideas as a means of establishing Christian truths. As such, they were to be included as part of a broader synthesis of philosophical and religious schools. Like Campanella, Andreae incorporated magic into a much wider system. Thus the two positions were thought of as complementary rather than antagonistic.

Andreae possessed a universalist outlook: any creed could be admitted as long as it advanced the true Christian faith. The universalism of *Christianopolis* is reflected in the role of the philosopher in *Societas Christiana*: he must create a syncretic knowledge that declares the Christian faith. Again it is worth pointing

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<sup>899</sup> See pp. 199-200.

out that despite the sincerity of Andreae's own religious beliefs his utopia is not nominally Lutheran. It accepted all true Christians. Admittedly, Andreae's work was markedly more Christian than *Civitas Solis*, but it portrayed the same essential optimism over man, and the same view of the unified state in which he could flourish. Andreae created a political system in *Christianopolis* that demonstrated his pansophist principles in action.

Comenius' reputation is so diverse that it is very difficult to categorise his work. He was a teacher, reformer, linguist, prophet and priest.<sup>900</sup> Political thought is not an area that is usually considered to be part of his polymathic portfolio, but my thesis has demonstrated that this is precisely how we should judge *panorthosia*. Indeed, Comenius was arguably more politically orientated than either of his fellow pansophists. Whereas *Civitas Solis* and *Christianopolis* were blueprints for an ideal but fictional society, *panorthosia* was geared towards the realities of the seventeenth-century world. Comenius took the principles of the faraway models of perfection and transposed them onto the here and now of his own society.

Comenius' adoption of the utopian genre was clearly linked to his belief in prophecy and the millennium. What distinguished his apocalyptic vision was the idea that mankind could simply not sit back and wait for God's judgement. Man must pave the way for the millennium through universal reform. He was to establish utopia so that the Lord may return: political transformation would instigate the Second Coming. This necessitated many simultaneous reforms. A perfected language would break down the barriers to knowledge. The new understanding between men would facilitate a universal Christianity that would,

in turn, serve as a guide for the new political institutions. Taken together, these reforms would enable man to attain his highest perfection before God could complete His work. A perfected political system was, for Comenius, a path to man's salvation.

Like the pansophists, Bacon's *New Atlantis* accepted the utopian tradition of Thomas More. It portrayed a seemingly ideal society that was presided over by righteous men. His society housed Saloman's House, which embodied the principles of the Great Instauration, Bacon's plan for the reformation of knowledge that was to restore man to his pre-Fall paradise. Looking at the work in these terms, it seems inconceivable that Bacon is not to be seen as part of the pansophist utopian tradition. But at each stage his work undermines the utopias of the other thinkers in this study.

My thesis has shown that Bacon does not offer a vision of a fully integrated, unified political system. In fact he does not offer any detailed political system at all. Instead he outlines a completely independent class that needs not obey or even inform the government of its actions. Thus Bacon negates the political dimension that was so central to the pansophist vision. Furthermore he does not offer any universal model of human nature either in *New Atlantis* or in other works. He does inform us that the morals of the Bensalemites are superior to Europeans, but not so much as to prevent restrictions to the independent class of scientists. They are as fallible as other men. The system of knowledge that Bacon promotes suggests that he is not even particularly optimistic about man's natural capacity for improvement. The

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<sup>900</sup> Mandrou describes him as "the incomparable savant, tormented both by his fate and by his ambitions." Robert Mandrou, *From Humanism to Science*, trans. Brian Pearce, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., (London:

restored wisdom of the *Great Instauration* is comparable to that of Adam before Original Sin, but it does not allow man to exercise any great freedom. He is certainly prevented from attaining the moral knowledge that enables political activity to occur: man cannot be allowed to make judgements on good and evil.

It is the *Great Instauration* that leads to a further separation between Bacon and the pansophists. Bacon's restored knowledge allows man to interpret God through nature alone: it does not facilitate any deeper, more personal understanding of his Creator. Even though the conversion of Bensalem is channelled through a Fellow of Saloman's House, it was still a clear act of Revelation. The scientist did not discover God by his own actions.

Bacon therefore offers a different model of utopian society, a rather pessimistic view of human nature, and a system of knowledge that keeps man and God separate. This is why he should not be considered to be a member of the pansophist utopian canon.

More generally, we can conclude that for any student of utopia, looks can be deceiving. It is not enough to argue that just because an author outlines an outline society, then he necessarily becomes a member of any particular utopian subset. Campanella, Andreae and Comenius all offered a much more rigidly structured and interdependent model of utopia than did Bacon. *New Atlantis* undoubtedly displays utopian traits, but these are not those of the pansophist construct. The difference here proves to be crucial. It shows that we can move away from broad generalisations regarding early seventeenth-century ideal societies, to a closer inspection of the internal workings of utopia.

In so doing we can gain a deeper insight into the nature of the utopian construct. My thesis shows that in the case of the pansophists, we need to approach utopia from a number of angles simultaneously. To single out any one of the four pillars of the pansophist utopia misrepresents the totality of the construct. The pansophist utopia is an interdependent model of society that requires each component to be in its proper place. There is a symbiotic relationship throughout. For example, it is only by considering the role of man that we can truly understand the nature of utopia's political institutions. As we have seen, it is a fairly common view that utopias are totalitarian, and that they restrict liberty in a number of ways. But we have also noted that the pansophists' view of man is an optimistic image of a universal creature who ascends to God through his own powers. Coercion is not necessary. Thus, the pansophist utopia is static rather than restrictive, for it is the channel by which man leads the good life and most closely approaches God on earth. The citizens of utopia understand this, and they appreciate their position.

The study of utopia is blighted by inconsistency and generalisation. My thesis cannot solve the eternal conundrum of what utopia is (or is not). It does, however, show that we can establish greater consistency, coherence and ultimately meaning behind one acknowledged subset of utopian literature. There seems no reason why the same cannot be done for other utopias. It will require an analysis of the author's intentions, as well as his opinion of the ideal society. It will also entail the use of various typologies and explanatory schemes. It will certainly lead to a sharper and fuller understanding of ideal society thought.

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