Durham University

# Durham E-Theses

## *Christology and anthropology in the spirituality of Maximus the Confessor : With special reference to the Expositio Orationis Dominicae.*

James Nicholas Madden

**How to cite:**

Madden, James Nicholas (1982) Christology and anthropology in the spirituality of Maximus the Confessor : With special reference to the Expositio Orationis Dominicae. Doctoral thesis, Durham University.

**Use policy**

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

- a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
- a https://etheses.durham.ac.uk/id/eprint/1613/ is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
- the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.

Academic Support Office, The Palatine Centre, Durham University, Stockton Road, Durham, DH1 3LE
e-mail: e-theses.admin@durham.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
https://etheses.durham.ac.uk

# C H R I S T O L O G Y  A N D  A N T H R O P O L O G Y
# I N  T H E  S P I R I T U A L I T Y  O F  M A X I M U S
# T H E  C O N F E S S O R

<u>With special reference to the Expositio Orationis Dominicae</u>

by

James Nicholas Madden, O.C.D.

A thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of
Divinity in the University of Durham

Durham
1982



The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without his prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.

# CONTENTS


| | | page |
|---|---|---|
| PREFACE | | iv |
| CHAPTER I | MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR - HIS LIFE | 1 |
| CHAPTER II | MAXIMUS THE THEOLOGIAN: HIS METHOD AND HIS WORKS | 40 |
| | The Methodology of Maximus the Confessor | 46 |
| | (i) Scripture | 50 |
| | (ii) Fathers and Councils | 56 |
| | (iii) Logos | 64 |
| | The Works of Maximus the Confessor | 74 |
| | (i) Exegetical Writings | 75 |
| | (ii) Liturgy | 79 |
| | (iii) Commentaries on the Fathers | 83 |
| | (iv) Dogmatic-Polemical | 86 |
| | (v) Ascetic-Spiritual | 91 |
| CHAPTER III | LANGUAGE, MEANING AND STRUCTURE IN THE EXPOSITIO ORATIONIS DOMINICAE | 116 |
| | (i) Language | 117 |
| | (ii) Structure | 128 |
| CHAPTER IV | EXPOSITIO ORATIONIS DOMINICAE | 139 |
| | The Prologue | 140 |
| | Introduction a. The Divine Counsel | 154 |
| | Introduction b. The Plan of the Divine Counsel reflected in the plan of the 'Our Father' | 177 |
| | The Mediator, aim of the Divine Counsel | 178 |
| | The Five Divisions | 188 |
| | Mediation Effected in the Church by the Spirit | 204 |
| | The Seven Mysteries | 222 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (i) | Theology and Sonship by grace | 223 |
| | | The Ultimate Source of Christ-ology and Anthropology | 257 |
| | (ii) | Equality of honour with the Angels | 264 |
| | (iii) | Participation in Divine Life | 291 |
| | (iv) | Restoration of Nature to itself | 318 |
| | (v) | Purification from the 'law of sin' and abolition of the tyranny of the Evil One | 350 |
| | | Conclusion | 382 |
| CHAPTER V | THE CHRISTOLOGICAL DIMENSION | | 385 |
| | (i) | The Hypostatic Union | 385 |
| | (ii) | The Body-Soul Analogy | 410 |
| | (iii) | Composite Hypostasis | 423 |
| | (iv) | Operation and Will in Christ | 432 |
| CHAPTER VI | THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL DIMENSION | | 447 |
| | (i) | Virtue | 448 |
| | | Formal Concepts in the <u>Expositio Orationis Dominicae</u>, | 448 |
| | | Praxis | 460 |
| | | The Three Laws | 473 |
| | (ii) | Prayer | 486 |
| | | Formal elements of prayer from the <u>Expositio Orationis Dominicae</u> | 486 |
| | | The Contemplative Life | 498 |
| | | <u>Aisthesis Noera</u> | 508 |
| EPILOGUE | | | 516 |
| FOOTNOTES | | Chapter I | 522 |
| | | Chapter II | 534 |
| | | Chapter III | 555 |
| | | Chapter IV | 559 |
| | | Chapter V | 604 |
| | | Chapter VI | 620 |
| APPENDICES | I | Chronological Table | 630 |
| | II | <u>Expositio Orationis Dominicae</u> - A Literal Translation | 632 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| APPENDICES | III | The Expositio Orationis Dominicae of St. Maximus the Confessor - a schematic presentation | 651 |
| | IV | Genesis, Kinesis, Stasis. | 665 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | | | 673 |

# PREFACE

The purpose of this thesis is to throw into relief the principal ideas about Christology and Anthropology in the thought of St. Maximus the Confessor. This has been undertaken from the point of view of spirituality, which may be described as theology lived. I have chosen the Expositio Orationis Dominicae as the basis of this study because it is one of the most synthetic of Maximus' writings and I believe that an examination of its implications is a way into his theology as a whole. When I undertook this work, there was no English translation of the Expositio Orationis Dominicae, so that I translated it as an exercise in the understanding of the thought of Maximus and with the intention of having a Maximian text in English to hold my own reflections together. Since then an English translation has appeared. I have decided to persist in my intention of including a translation of the Expositio Orationis Dominicae as an alternative to the already published one and because many of my observations stem from the nuances in my version. Two studies of the Expositio Orationis Dominicae have already appeared, one by G. Walther in 1914, the other by I.-H. Dalmais in 1953. The former is so redolent of the spirit of the Enlightenment that it has little value as a theological statement; the latter is a splendid essay of permanent interest. I have asserted my independence by commenting on the Expositio Orationis Dominicae from a different point of view, with more attention to terminology and structure and in a more extended way. I have been able to avail myself of scholarship devoted to the study of Maximus since 1953, not least that of Dalmais himself, in my effort to grasp the significance of this important work. Since I believe, with Collingwood, that the intellect has to be most critical in the positive appropriation of truth, I have tried to enter the thought of Maximus in a comprehensive way and refrained from negative criticism of those with whom I disagree, apart from the occasional passing comment where interpretation requires it.

In Chapter 1, I have presented the evidence for the life of Maximus as a way of answering the question: 'who is Maximus'? We find that the personal character of his thought reflects his Christian identity so that his spirituality was indeed theology lived. Chapter 2 is an investigation of the way in which he did theology and provides as well a short account of his works and their contents. Again it becomes obvious that his theology was the fruit of his way of life, both because of the way he understood it as a science and because of the subjects that engaged his attention. In Chapter 3, I examine the Expositio Orationis Dominicae in order to grasp something of its linguistic and structural qualities. This affords an opportunity of observing Maximus in profile, so to speak, and complements Chapter 2 because of the unconscious way in which he reveals his spiritual approach to the task of doing theology. Chapter 4 is the principal part of the thesis. It examines the five areas of theological interest that emerge in the Expositio: theology and sonship by grace; equality of honour with the angels; participation in divine life; restoration of nature to itself; purification from the law of sin and the abolition of the tyranny of the Evil One. The Prologue and Introductions to the Expositio provide an opportunity of prefacing the main commentary with Maximian insights into agape and the place of mediation in the divine plan. Chapters 5 and 6 treat of the Christological and Anthropological dimensions respectively. The Expositio is constructed on the basis of the notions of kenosis and theosis, which on scrutiny are seen to be parallel to theology and life. Therefore spirituality will be theology lived in such a way that kenosis will issue in theosis through agape exercised in virtue and prayer.

I should say that part of this thesis has already been published as 'The Commentary on the Pater Noster: An Example of the Structural Methodology of Maximus the Confessor' in HEINZER, F. & SCHONBORN, C. (eds.), Maximus Confessor (Paradosis 27, Editions Universitaires,

Fribourg, Suisse, 1982), pp. 147-155. All the translations in the text of the thesis are mine, apart from a few taken from the work of Polycarp Sherwood, which I distinguish in the notes by the addition of '(S)' to the relevant citations.

It is now my pleasant duty to express my gratitude to those who made it possible for me to undertake and finish this work. Firstly, I wish to thank the Faculty of Divinity in the University of Durham for having accepted me as a post-graduate student. I am especially indebted to my Supervisor, The Very Reverend Father George D. Dragas, not only for having provided me with the conventional direction required by his office, but above all for the confidence I was able to place in his judgment as a theologian and in his inspiring knowledge of the Tradition. I would also like to thank Mr. Peter Macardle, Dr. Jan Rhodes, Dr. Peter Rhodes, Dr. Fred Tibbals of the University of Durham and Dr. Noreen Hunt of New College, Durham, for having put their skills at my disposal.

Next, I gladly acknowledge the favour done me by the President and Staff of Ushaw College in admitting me as a member of their Senior Common Room. I would like to thank them for their unfailing courtesy and the encouragement I drew from their goodwill. I must mention in particular Mr. John Saward and thank him for the pleasure and profit which I derived from innumerable theological discussions. I wish to record too my indebtedness to Miss Teresa Mulhall, Secretary at the College, for her generosity and patience in typing the script.

Finally, I wish to thank my Brethren of the Carmelite Order, who ungrudgingly gave me the leisure to complete this work during a time when they might have reasonably expected other services from me. I owe a lot to Father Jerome Lantry, Father Michael Buckley and

Father Finnian Monahan, Provincials, in that respect. Last but not least, I would like to express my thankfulness to Father Norbert Cummins, who gave me the first intimation of what a love of wisdom might be and who has kept me reminded of it for thirty three years.

Nicholas Madden, O.C.D.

Feast of St. Thomas the Apostle, 1982.

# CHAPTER I

## MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR - HIS LIFE.*

When Maximus the Confessor was being interrogated during his trial at Constantinople in 654, he said that he was seventy five years of age.[1] This enables us to fix with certainty the date of his birth in 579 or 580. From a letter written in 632 we know that he had arrived in Africa and apparently had settled at Carthage.[2] Between the date of his birth and that of his sojourn in Africa we have to be content in regard to chronology and residence with hypothesis and probability, apart from knowing that Anastasius the monk became his disciple in 617.[3] Until recently the main source for a biography of Maximus was the Vita ac Certamen[4] of a eulogistic hagiographer, thought to have been composed about the time of the Sixth Ecumenical Council at Constantinople in 680-681, together with the Acta that comprised the Relatio motionis[5] from the trial of 654, a letter of Maximus,[6] letters of Anastasius,[7] the dispute of Bizya in 656[8] and the Hypomnesticon of Theodore Spoudaeus.[9] Lackner would seem to have shown conclusively that the Vita is of much later origin, probably from the tenth century, and that, apart from information gleaned from the Acta, conciliar acts and contemporary correspondence, what was thought to have been historical fact is now seen to have been nothing more than pious rhetoric based on a stylized life of Theodore the Studite.[10] This critical analysis demands a Revision of the work of Sherwood[11] on the chronology of Maximus'

* See Appendix I for a chronological table of the Life of St. Maximus.

UNIV DUNEDIN

life and writings to the extent that it was based on the Vita and used its sequence for framework. This is especially true of Maximus' earlier life, up to his arrival in Africa. With Brock's publication in 1973 of 'The narrative concerning the wicked Maximus of Palestine, who blasphemed against his creator and his tongue was cut out under the title of 'An Early Syriac Life of Maximus the Confessor',[12] we have possibly a new source, this time from an unsympathetic author, which if it is genuine, throws new light on Maximus' life, especially on that earlier period concerning which the Greek Vita has been shown to be unreliable. This Syriac Life of monothelite provenance, ascribed to George of Resh'aina, is to be found in a manuscript of the seventh or eighth century[13] and its matter of fact tone as well as its surviving the test of comparison with other sources apart from minor and explicable inconsistencies, strengthens its claim to be contemporary with the events it describes and inclines scholars to accept its author's credentials.[14] If the author was an eyewitness, then it would be possible to accept the substance of the account of the early life while making room for a sceptical attitude to what seem to be mythical accretions. Until the Syriac Life is entirely discredited, an unlikely eventuality, it will have to be taken into account in Maximian biography, albeit with circumspection.[15]

Whereas the Greek Vita would have us believe that Maximus was born into an aristocratic family at Constantinople and having completed a course of study, that he entered the imperial service and quickly rose to the

position of first secretary to the Emperor Heraclius and eventually became a monk in the monastery of Chrysopolis,[16] the Syriac Life, on the other hand, would have him the bastard son of a Samaritan father and a Persian slave-girl, born and reared in Palestine, taken into the Palaia Lavra, the monastery of St. Chariton near Tekoa where he was given the name Maximus in place of Moschion and educated by Pantoleon the abbot.[17] The only thing of which we can be entirely certain with regard to this period of his life is that, as we have seen, he was born in 579 or 580. These versions of his early life may provide nothing more fruitful than a study in contrasting styles of wishful thinking, the one by an admirer, the other by an hostile critic. That Maximus was well educated goes without saying; his writings display a remarkably wide knowledge as well as depth and brilliance. But it is the kind of learning that would not necessarily have required the sort of teaching given at the imperial or patriarchal schools in Constantinople, where it was thought Maximus received his intellectual formation, on the assumption that the Vita was trustworthy.[18] The so-called 'neo-platonic' cast of his mind did not necessarily require a first-hand acquaintance with Plato or the Neo-Platonists; nor did his familiarity with Aristotle demand a reading of the works of the philosopher himself; the same holds good for a study of Proclus and Iamblicus, their commentators and the staple diet of the philosophical students at the schools of Constantinople.[19] His knowledge of patristic literature would have been sufficient to give him command of a language that was partly drawn from Greek philosophical sources, while in common with the Fathers his

usage was not limited to merely philosophical semantics. His familiarity with the Pseudo-Denys and Leontius of Byzantium would, for instance, account for his awareness of the philosophical dimensions of theological reflection, but would not necessarily imply that his 'love of the supernal world', evidenced by his interest in Denys, was fired by neoplatonism[20] nor that he had made a close study of the categories of Aristotle in order to grasp the teaching of Leontius.[21] It would seem that Maximus was educated in a monastery and that patristic and biblical sources would be sufficient to account for his culture.

The Vita says that he was a monk at the monastery of Chrysopolis (Scutari), the Asiatic suburb of Constantinople; on the basis of his correspondence with John of Cyzicus biographers have suggested that he spent some time in the monastery of St. George there;[22] the Syriac Life assigns him to the Palaia Lavra at the age of ten, where he eventually became a novice.[23] Since Origenism was rampant in the monastic world of the Middle East, Maximus might have encountered it in any of these three possible settings for his life as a monk. Although we know little or nothing about the tradition of theology and spirituality in any of these monasteries, during the life-time of Maximus, it is true that he recalls for John of Cyzicus the time when he worked on problems raised by the works of Gregory Nanzianzen as part of their examination of the tenets of Origenism; he speaks of 'passages that caused you difficulty and to which I devoted a labour of love when I was with the others'.[24] This evokes a picture of Maximus living with his fellow-monks and theologians in the bishop's community

at Cyzicus (Erdek). In one of his letters he expresses the desire to be able to return from his exile to the monastery of St. George.[25] Garrigues suggests an alternative identity for John of Cyzicus which would invalidate the theory of Maximus' stay at Cyzicus. A John of Cyzicus was abbot of the monastery of St. Abraham on the Mount of Olives[26] and may have become a bishop in the patriarchate of Jerusalem. He would have known the monk of the Palaia Lavra, then at the monastery of St. George in Jerusalem. He strengthens his suggestion by pointing out the concern of the John of the Epistles for the re-organization of monks dispersed, possibly by the Persian capture of Jerusalem in 614, which would seem to imply more than one community,[27] a factor that would be true of Jerusalem and not Cyzicus. Besides, we know otherwise that there was a twin monastery of nuns under the title of St. George of Jerusalem[28] and the correspondence of Maximus furnishes evidence of his relationship with Eudocia,[29] the head of a community that may possibly have been that of St. George of Jerusalem.

Although this makes for interesting speculation, the evidence is so fragmentary that it scarcely can be hammered into a coherent historical pattern and leaves the evidence for the site of the monastery of St. George, tenuous though it may be, pointing to Cyzicus on the Propontis. Eusebius, bishop of Cyzicus had protected Leontius of Byzantium (500-543) during the Origenist crisis,[30] which would indicate a sympathy with the Origenistic Chalcedonians and the likely continuation of that sympathy until the time of Maximus' arrival there. Here too he would almost certainly have found the works of Leontius. Chosroes, the Persian ruler,

having begun his successful conquest in 609, took Antioch in 611, Damascus in 613 and strengthened his grip on the eastern provinces with the fall of Jerusalem in 614. Since we have reason to think from the evidence of the Syriac Life that Maximus was a monk at the Palaia Lavra, and that Pantoleon the abbot was a protagonist of Origenism,[31] it is not beyond the bounds of probability that Maximus may have fled from the Palaia Lavra in 614 with the fall of Jerusalem and arrived in Cyzicus asking for asylum in a monastery that would have been well disposed to a monk from the Palaia Lavra with its Origenistic reputation. The complexity would border on the intolerable if, on the assumption that Garrigues' theory about John of Cyzicus, abbot of St. Abraham, were valid, Maximus had fled from the monastery of St. George in Jerusalem, under the pastoral care of John of Cyzicus and arrived in the monastery of Cyzicus on the Propontis, again dedicated to St. George.

According to the Syriac Life if it can be trusted, it seems that Maximus knew Sophronius (550-639) in early life while he was a monk at the Palaia Lavra.[32] The author tells us that 'Sophronios used to praise Maximus as someone endowed with a lofty understanding'[33] and, as we shall see later, he suggests that Maximus swayed the theological opinions of Sophronius,[34] something clean contrary to the conclusions of historians writing before the publication of the Syriac Life. Perhaps this allusion to Sophronius' admiration for Maximus is meant to prepare the way for a subsequent and, to the author, lamentable dependence of Sophronius on Maximus, the implication being that the poisonous seed had been sown as early as the period before

the departure of Sophronius in a spirit of ξενιτεία from Palestine in 603. It is impossible to date exactly the time of Maximus' influence on Sophronius, but the possibility of such a young man having impressed the seasoned monk and theologian of the neighbouring monastery of St. Theodosius[35] in such an influential way is a fascinating one.

Besides the possibility that we are touching bed-rock with the claim of the Vita that Maximus was a monk at Chrysopolis, there is independent evidence that he was on terms of easy familiarity with court officials like John the Chamberlain,[36] Peter the Illustrious[37] and George,[38] apart from knowing that Anastasius his disciple had been 'secretary to the Emperor Constans' grandmother', the wife of Heraclius.[39] This would seem to indicate that he had known John the Chamberlain personally before their correspondence took place and that his access to Imperial Governors like Peter and George was based on his reputation at court so that he must have been in or near Constaninople before his trial in 654. There is, of course, the off-chance that the author of the Vita concluded that Chrysopolis was the monastery of Maximus' conventuality because of this evidence rather than from a more explicit and exact source. But it is hard to account for the convergence of the evidence just mentioned unless Maximus had resided, if not in the court, at least somewhere nearby. Again there is the outside possibility that it was at Cyzicus that Anastasius came to know Maximus and it is sufficiently near Constantinople to have been the cynosure of courtly attention for not entirely imponderable reasons because, apart from the possibility of Anastasius the ex-civil servant residing

there, the growing reputation of Maximus as a theologian, in an age when theology was a political consideration of the first magnitude, would have been enough to forge links between the court and the monastery at Cyzicus. At the time of his trial Constans attested to his association with the court when he said that Maximus 'had been close to his forbears and dear to them',[40] which would indicate that he must have lived somewhere accessible to the imperial family, and Chrysopolis is more probable in this respect than Cyzicus. The monastery there, dedicated to the Mother of God, had been built by a brother-in-law of Emperor Maurice in 594[41] and would have been a likely place for the development of the kind of relationship that Constans implies.

On the assumption that Maximus had never been in the imperial service himself, it is possible that he had been introduced to the court by Anastasius after the latter had become his disciple in 617. Pyrrhus, with whom Maximus was to have subsequently his famous dispute, was a monk at Chrysopolis before becoming patriarch of Constantinople. In fact, he had been hegoumen of the monastery and yet in the course of the dispute he submitted that he had not known Maximus previously.[42] This would indicate that Maximus had either never been a monk there or that he had left before the arrival of Pyrrhus. If we are to settle for the latter possibility, then Pyrrhus must have climbed the hierarchical ladder in the monastery with, even for him, remarkable speed. At all events, whether Maximus had been in Cyzicus or Chrysopolis when he had become the familiar of John the Chamberlain, we know that in 628 he is no longer near his

friend.[43] Devreese would seem to have proved definitively that Maximus was referring in his Epistola VIII to the forced baptism of Jews and Samaritans in Africa at Pentecost 632, which had been ordered by Heraclius, and so that he was in Africa at that time.[44] It has been suggested with some cogent argumentation that the occasion of his leaving his monastery was the Persian invasion which culminated in the siege of Constantinople in 626.[45] Sherwood would have Maximus leave Chrysopolis for Cyzicus in 624 or 625[46] and in this way he hopes to reconcile the Vita's saying that Maximus was at Chrysopolis and his concluding from the letters to John of Cyzicus that he was also at Cyzicus. Devreese thinks that Maximus went into exile from Chrysopolis[47] while it suits Sherwood to say that he left from Cyzicus.[48] This must have been about the year 626. Unless further evidence comes to light it is doubtful if a history of the early years of Maximus can be anything more than a tentative and tortuous account, based on meagre and conflicting material.

## II

The data from a secure account of the years between his having left his monastery and his writings from Carthage in 632 is equally tenuous, and the attempts at reconstructing his life at this time equally hypothetical. He says himself that he was in Crete where he engaged in controversy with a group of Severian bishops[49] and it is not unlikely that he would have put in at Crete on his journey from Asia Minor to Africa. It is worth noting, in passing, that he would have merited the controversial attention of the Cretan bishops

because of his reputation as a theologian, not merely of the Origenistic debates that had claimed his industry while with Bishop John and his fellow monks, but also presumably as a peritus in Christology. He would soon write his celebrated Quaestiones ad Thalassium, concerned primarily with a Christian cosmology and anthropology, but if his debate in Crete took place at this time, then he would have already studied the great Christological questions of the day sufficiently well to be a doughty defender of Chalcedonian positions. Was it at this time too that he made the acquaintance of the Bishop of Cydonia?[50] The possibility of his having visited Cyprus is put forward by biographers on the basis of his correspondence with Marinus[51] and the assumption that such a relationship points to Maximus' having known him personally. This period would again provide the opportunity for such an encounter. Similarly, if he had known Bishop Arcadius personally, it is possible that it was during a stay in Cyprus at this time that he made his acquaintance.[52] As we shall see, the Syriac Life speaks of a synod in Cyprus,[53] but that would seem to have been later than 632, and besides Maximus is said to have declined the invitation to attend,[54] so that the hypothesis of a visit in the interval between his flight from his monastery and his being at Carthage in 632, flimsy though it be, still stands.

When eventually Maximus reached Africa he joined Sophronius and a group of exile monks who had settled in a monastery entitled 'Eucratades'[55] derived from the surname of Sophronius and also that of his friend John

Moscus, 'Eucratas'. Maximus says that Sophronius 'stayed with me and many foreign monks in the land of the Africans'.[56] Elsewhere he speaks of him as 'my blessed master, father, teacher, lord abbot Sophronius'.[57]

It seems then that Sophronius was hegoumen of the monastery and that Maximus became his disciple there. We have seen already, on the basis of the evidence of the Syriac Life, that Maximus may have known Sophronius in Palestine and even have exercised some influence on his theological reflections. The roles would now seem to have been reversed. The mutual influence of men of this stature on each other is hardly matter for trivial speculation. While we are certain that the Syriac Life insists that Maximus stiffened the resolution of Sophronius in his opposition to the monoenergists on the occasion of his participation in the synod in Cyprus,[58] biographers are generally inclined to think Maximus was influenced considerably by Sophronius in the sphere of Christology, especially with regard to the threats to orthodoxy that the politico-religious manoeuvring created at that time, well versed as he was bound to be with church affairs in Africa and so in a position to brief Maximus on current deviations in doctrine.[59] With regard to the tradition of spirituality to which Sophronius gave his allegiance, we are well informed, especially about his attachment to sinaitic monachism as exemplified particularly in the teaching of St. John Climacus.[60] The influence of this on the thought of Maximus would have incalculable importance for the future development of Byzantine theology and spirituality.[61] We know that

Sophronius was at Alexandria in 633 where he upheld orthodoxy.[62] We do not know for certain if Maximus accompanied him on that occasion. Maximus describes Sophronius pleading with Cyrus, the patriarch of Alexandria, about the terms of reconciliation with the monophysites,[63] but this is not necessarily an eye-witness account. The putative 'Origenist crisis' in the thought of Maximus was considered to have occurred about this time, when he was described as having had a period of intensive study of the works of Origen at Alexandria, the upshot of which was said to have been a profound personal theological self-questioning.[64] Sherwood has shown definitively that Maximus was in fact constructively critical about Origen and that there was no 'crisis' of the kind supposed by Von Balthasar.[65] The only other piece of information that may be linked with this period of the life of Maximus is his reference to Conon as his superior[66] and it has been concluded that he succeeded Sophronius at the monastery of the 'Eucratades'. If this is so, then Maximus must have continued as a member of the community there, and even if he had accompanied Sophronius[67] to Alexandria in 633, he would have returned to resume his monastic life there. However, the attempt to establish a probable sequence is further bedevilled by the evidence of the Syriac Life, which postpones Maximus' stay in Africa until after the death of Sophronius. Brock suggests the possibility of two sojourns in Africa.[68] In that case Maximus would have returned to Syria-Palestine some time before 633 and 641 where he is said to have begun 'to sow his teaching among certain individuals in the regions of Syria'.[69]

To appreciate the Pact of Union and its consequences it is necessary to keep in mind the predicament of Emperor Heraclius in 633.[70] When he became emperor in 610 Byzantium was invested on the north by Avars and Slavs, to the south and east by the Persians. With the fall of Jerusalem in 614 the collapse of the old order seemed imminent, but due to the administrative and military reforms initiated by Heraclius and the character of a crusade taken on by the war after the capture of the relics of the Holy Cross and in spite of the nadir touched by imperial fortunes in 626 with the siege of Constantinople by Avars, Slavs and Persians combined, Heraclius succeeded in driving back the Persians and containing the Avars and Slavs. He finally defeated the Persians in a decisive battle and had brought the relics of the Holy Cross back to Jerusalem by 630. The efforts of Heraclius to consolidate his empire were rendered more difficult by the disaffection of his Monophysite subjects, who for centuries in Armenia, Syria and Egypt had resisted the verdict of Chalcedon. Now that he had gained at least a temporary respite in his struggle for mastery, the emperor decided to renew his efforts to bring about a unity of faith among his subjects. In this design he found a ready ally in Sergius, Patriarch of Constantinople. It was not the first time that the emperor had relied on the patriarch. Since his appointment in 610 Sergius had been the willing collaborator of Heraclius, bringing to his task intelligence, courage and diplomatic skill; he was a considerable theologian.[71] It was due to his constancy that Heraclius had not fled from Constantinople

and it was his faith in Christianity that was able to transform the military operations of the emperor into a holy war after the fall of Jerusalem. He also put the patriarchal treasury at the disposal of his political master.

In his Dispute with Pyrrhus, Maximus has given us a thumb-nail sketch of the origin of the monoenergism that subsequently gave place to monothelitism.[72] On the basis of this evidence we know that before 619 Sergius had been in correspondence with Theodore of Pharan, then George Arsas of Alexandria, in an effort to hammer out a formula that would be acceptable to the Monophysites, but consistent with orthodoxy. Serving Heraclius' desire to win over Paul the Akephalos of Cyprus to the cause of politico-religious unity Sergius entered into theological negotiations with Paul and the kernel of the debate was the 'unique energy' of Christ. He succeeded in winning to his views the ambitious Cyrus, Bishop of Phasis, who in spite of having discerned that Heraclius' decree against Paul the Akephalos was not consistent with the Tome of Leo, became the accomplice of Sergius, and for his pains was installed as patriarch of Alexandria in 631, obviously to further the imperial cause of religious unity in the interests of political stability. The Pact of Union of 633 was the outcome of this strategy, when Cyrus and his sponsors hoped the Severian Monophysites would accept a neo-chalcedonian theology which they contrived to pivot on their own contribution of Monoenergism.[73] Sophronius, as we have seen, arrived in Alexandria just in time to contest the formula of union, especially the seventh

chapter which speaks of: 'the same one Christ and Son, operating in divine and human things with one theandric operation, according to St. Dionysius'.[74] Although Sophronius is represented to Pope Honorius as a trouble-maker,[75] he succeeded in preventing the publication of the Pact of Union by going to Constantinople himself and making representations to Sergius, who as a result of this issued his famous Psephos, ordering Cyrus 'to allow no one, from then on, to speak of one or two operations with regard to Christ our God'.[76] It can be noted now that in the course of his investigations, prior to the formulation of the Pact of Cyrus, Sergius had not confined his interest to the 'operation' of Christ, but also, according to Maximus, he had asked for advice on the 'one will' of Christ.[77] While imposing an eirenical silence on the disputants with regard to the 'one operation', he discreetly introduces the subject of the 'one will' by rejecting the implication of two wills in two operations, so that Monoenergism is now twinned by Monothelitism and would eventually be superseded by it. Sergius sent the text of his Psephos to pope Honorius and Pyrrhus, probably at the behest of Sergius, sent a copy to Maximus, presumably to win the approbation of an influential theologian.

The celebrated reply of Honorius contained the fatal phrases: 'Whence we confess one will of Our Lord Jesus Christ, because evidently our nature was assumed by the divinity, there was not sin in it .... there was not in the Saviour another law nor a different or contrary will, since he was born above the law of human nature'.[78] This was a windfall for Sergius, confirming his theology of

Christ's will and strengthening his political designs. Against the probabilities, Sophronius was made patriarch of Jerusalem in 634 because of 'the great constraint and violence on the part of clerics beloved of God, pious monks, faithful layfolk and all the citizens of the most holy city of Christ our Lord'.[79] On the occasion of his installation he issued his famous Synodicon,[80] a statement on the Christological positions of the time with special reference to Monoenergism, in the context of an exposition on the doctrine of the Trinity and Creation, as well as an elenchus of heresies. Although Sophronius deferred to the will of Sergius in not mentioning the number of wills in Christ, the Synodicon was the first orthodox riposte to the heretical teaching of Sergius and his followers.

It is not so easy to interpret the initial reaction of Maximus to the Psephos. In his reply to Pyrrhus[81] who had sent it to him he praises both Pyrrhus and Sergius enthusiastically. He was obviously relieved that the doctrinal crisis precipitated by Cyrus' Pact of Union had been seemingly averted; the quality of his enthusiasm for both Pyrrhus and Sergius is hardly compatible with serious doubts about the orthodoxy of the Psephos. It is impossible to say whether or not he was maintaining a prudent silence about its monothelite implications or whether his theological awareness at that time was sufficiently acute to discern embryonic heresy. Sherwood argues from a passage in his letter to Pyrrhus: 'He works humanly what is divine ... and divinely what is human',[82] that Maximus, while avoiding overt controversy,

was reminding Pyrrhus of the basis of true teaching in the matter in hand.[83] Later on Maximus was to insist that although he was mistaken with regard to personalities, he had not been ambiguous in doctrine.[84] Lethel has subjected the texts of this debate to minute analysis and he is of the opinion that at this juncture Maximus was still reflecting theologically in the style of the neochalcedonians and was not yet sensitive to the refinements required to spell out the function of the sacred Humanity of Christ in the economy of the Redemption.[85] Sherwood finds corroboration for his own views in the later Ambigua,[86] written about this time; Lethel reads the Ambigua in a sense that is consistent with his interpretation: that 'the natural operation of the flesh' referred to by Maximus at this juncture was no more than the 'natural movement of the flesh' of Sergius. Maximus asks Pyrrhus for clarification on the distinction between ἐνέργεια and ἐνέργημα .[87] He is alert to the need for elaboration and we have ample evidence of the development of his thought until the issue is clarified beyond doubt.[88] At first he seems to have been content to rely on the Synodicon of Sophronius, but gradually he forges his own theology of the wills of Christ, until the problem set by Sergius is finally solved by 641.

Much of the anti-Monoenergistic and anti-Monothelite writing is to be found in letters written by Maximus to his friends who asked for clarification of the questions that were causing such theological ferment at the time. His exchanges with Thomas,[89] a monk at Chrysopolis, are particularly instructive, because they illustrate his

initial caution giving way to explicit formulation and so finding himself at variance not merely with the doctrine of Sergius, but also with his patriarchal authority, which he had used to forbid mentioning the number of operations in the activity of Christ. Maximus could no longer keep silence and proclaims that to be justified it is necessary, not merely to give an interior assent to faith but that 'we are saved by confessing rightly by word of mouth everywhere and before all men'.[90] The name of Maximus would one day be identified with that confession in a singular way. With the publication of the imperial Ecthesis in 638, the lines of opposition between the orthodox and the unorthodox were drawn without ambiguity, because the Ecthesis is overtly and unambiguously monothelite. Before we come to that, it is necessary to turn again to the Syriac Life which introduces an episode in the history of the church at the time, for which we have no other evidence, and which involves Maximus.

The author of the Syriac Life tells us that: 'Now Sophronios, in that he held a grudge against Arkadios, readily accepted all that the rascal had to say, and Maximus (then) told Sophronios: "Send and gather for me those who are in doubt about this, and I will unite them with a defence" '.[91] This introduces a description of the summoning of a synod at Cyprus by Arcadius, whom, we have already seen, Maximus may have known personally. The Syriac Life tells us that although Honorius did not attend, he sent a deacon, that Sergius was represented by an archdeacon, that Cyrus travelled from Alexandria and that Sophronius with nine of his suffragans, including George

the author of the Life attended. Although Maximus did not go to the synod in Cyprus he is portrayed in the Syriac Life as a major influence in the performance of Sophronius and his tome, composed for the occasion, was the centre of debate and eventually the basis of a letter sent to the emperor which elicited from Heraclius an 'Edict'.[92] We have an independent source to assure us that Sophronius had in fact some altercation with Arcadius, Archbishop of Cyprus, on the occasion of his having rebuked the Archbishop for tolerating the christological interpolation of Peter the Fuller in the Trisagion.[93] This may have complicated an already delicate situation in which the Archbishop found himself, asked as he was by Heraclius to deliver the emperor's decree of condemnation to Paul the Akephalos when Paul failed to comply with the imperial designs.[94] This took place about 626. By the time the synod was being convened in Cyprus, Sophronius was probably patriarch of Jerusalem, but being unacceptable to Sergius and Cyrus, he may have asked Arcadius to act as mediating convener. Arcadius, from what we know of him, was a persona grata with Sergius and the establishment and in spite of his ambivalence with regard to the Trisagion interpolation, Maximus was of the opinion that he was a convinced chalcedonian.[95]

The Syriac Life summarises the theological position of Maximus accurately: 'And he wrote four books, acknowledging in them two wills and two energies and two minds, acknowledging everything to do with Christ to be double, apart from the matter of the persons only'.[96] Although this description may be enhanced by hindsight on the part of the author, and display a theology later than the date of the

presumed synod of Cyprus, it could approximate to the Maximus who encouraged Sophronius to resume his assault on the interpolation of Trisagion, bound, as he must have seen it, to Monoenergism in the logic of Severian Christology.[97] This portrays Maximus as exercising considerable ascendancy over Sophronius at this juncture, something that seems improbable in the light of what we know from other sources, which shows us Maximus relying on the Synodicon and referring his correspondents to Sophronius for guidance.[98] A priori there is no inconsistency in the possibility of reconciling the two views seen against the complex dynamics of human relationships, especially of men of this quality in a situation that demanded from them total self-forgetfulness in the interests of the truth. We have to keep in mind, however, that the author of the Syriac Life had a genuine reverence for Sophronius which may have inclined him to play down his part in the affair and to highlight that of the 'rascal' Maximus. He does not tell us the title of the 'four books' written by Maximus, but he is adamant that it was Maximus' 'tome' that was central to the debate in Cyprus and we may possibly see in that an effort to father the authorship of the embarrassing Synodicon on Maximus. The 'Edict' mentioned in the Syriac Life is probably the Ecthesis of 638,[99] so that if the Syriac Life is reliable, the synod at Cyprus will have taken place before that date.

The publication of the Ecthesis in 638 did not mark a doctrinal development. It was for all practical purposes a repetition of the Psephos, but it represented a new stage in the evolution of Monothelitism as a heresy because of the twofold authority with which it was

invested; it bore explicitly the signature of the emperor Heraclius and the Psephos' reliance on theological principle of contradiction gave way to the implicit authority of Honorius, containing as it did his formulation of the 'one will' of Christ, interpreted in a Monothelite sense.[100] Maximus, in his tome to Marinus,[101] written before the Ecthesis had reached him, had already interpreted the letter of Horonius to Sergius in an orthodox sense and stood out unambiguously for dyotheli-tism in circumstances that were potentially public. So that we can conclude with Sherwood that: 'In the east therefore, and consequently for Maximus, the issue was well joined before the Ecthesis. Between Rome and Constantin-ople, however, it was the Ecthesis that brought the question to a head'.[102] Honorius died in 638, as did Sergius shortly after the promulgation of the Ecthesis. Sophronius died in either 638 or 639.[103] This left Maximus as the champion of orthodoxy. Severinus became pope, Pyrrhus succeeded to the patriarchate of Constantin-ople and Sophronius was replaced by a monothelite. The apocrisaries sent by Severinus for imperial approval for election skilfully won the approval without committing themselves on the question of the Ecthesis. They returned to Rome with the Ecthesis in 640. It is matter for debate whether or not Severinus condemned it before his death a short time later:[104] for his successor, John IV, condemned it authoritatively in 641. Later that year Heraclius died, but not before he had recanted, become reconciled to Rome and put the blame for the Ecthesis on Pyrrhus.[105] Phyrrhus, who had convened a synod to ratify

the Ecthesis on his accession to the patriarchate, was deposed and fled in disgrace to Africa. After an unstable interval which witnessed the fall of the empress-regent Martina and her son, Constantine III, Constans II came to power, and whatever hope had been engendered of Pyrrhus, was destroyed, because the new emperor espoused the heretical cause with the vigour that characterized him. Theodore I became pope in 642 and upheld the orthodox position taken by his predecessor John IV.

Presumably with reference to the occasion of the publication of the Ecthesis, the Syriac Life says: 'Now Maximus confined himself in a small cell out of fear of the emperor and the patriarchs who had anathematized his teaching'. But the Life goes on to relate that with the increase of Arab dominance in the Middle East and the curtailment of the imperial power, Maximus 'manifested his fraudulence once again openly' in propagating his own teaching in Syria. He is then said to have set out with Anastasius for Africa because it was 'in rebellion against the emperor at this time'. The goal of their journey is said to have been a monastery at Hippo Diarrhytus where there were eighty seven 'Nestorian' monks. 'Thus they led astray the whole of Africa', even 'deceiving the eparch there, whose name was George'.[106] The normal assumption, until the publication of the Syriac Life, was that Maximus remained in Africa from his arrival there in circa 630 until his departure for Rome after his 'Dispute with Pyrrhus'. The Syriac Life has him in Syria after the appearance of the Ecthesis, first lying low and then boldly proclaiming his theological views. If the Syriac

Life is reliable, then we can assume, as we have seen already, that Maximus returned to Syria-Palestine sometime after 633 and that he remained there until after 638. George, the eparch of Carthage, was recalled in 642, so that Maximus' departure for Africa must have been before that. We know that both he and Sophronius were on terms of friendship with George whose political career foundered on the displeasure of Martina because of his antimonophysite attitude and activity.[107] It is probably to this that the Syriac Life refers in imputing 'rebellion' in Africa as the motive for Maximus' going there. He is further portrayed as having been an evil influence with regard to George.

If Maximus arrived in Africa in 641 at the latest, then the hypothesis is that he stayed at the monastery of 'Hippo Diarrhytus' until his dispute with Pyrrhus in 645. We know of Maximus' first reactions to the Ecthesis from a mutilated letter of his to Thalassius in which he approves of the way in which Severinus' apocrisaries handled the emperor, and so enabled the pope to evade committing himself on the Ecthesis, while winning approval for his election.[108] The set of short anti-Monothelite treatises from these years that have come down to us show the single-minded effort of Maximus to clarify and develop his own theology and at the same time stem the development of heresy.[109] He sent Anastasius to Rome to gain first-hand information on the Letter of Honorius to Sergius that had played into the latter's hands and was gratified to learn that the pope had been concerned with the moral relationship of the two natural wills.[110] Sherwood shows

some surprise that one of the letters that has to do with the recall is so concerned with Severian Monophysitism and overlooks the current Monothelitism.[111] While it is to the point to take into account the circumstances which evoked this letter as accounting for this seeming anomaly,[112] it must be remembered too that in the mind of Maximus one heresy spawns another and that Monothelitism is bound to Severian Monophsitism by an inevitable logic, and not merely to that, but to every false doctrine that destroys the reality of the assumed human nature of Christ, so that for Maximus this perversity is the title to membership of 'the chorus of frenzied drunkards' that includes: 'Simon, Valentinus, Mani, Arius, Apollinarius, Eutyches, Dioscorus, Timothy and Severus'.[113] Maximus sees this danger epitomised in the 'one composite nature' of Severus. To his opponents Maximus was an 'Origenist' and a 'Nestorian' as we can gather from the tendentious Syriac Life. This improbable association of epithets is derived from the opposition of Maximus and those of like mind to theopaschism. It overlooks entirely the grandeur of the Christology of Maximus with its growing appreciation of the function of the Hypostasis of the Word in the union of the natures.[114] We are not surprised to find no mention of the Dispute with Pyrrhus in the Syriac Life, where Maximus's teaching found such clarity of expression and in circumstances that could not have been more public.

Since the deposition of Pyrrhus had been popular but not canonical his presence in Africa was the source of problems to Peter the Illustrious, among them by what title he should be called. Peter consulted Maximus who

replied that it was inappropriate to call him 'holiness' or 'venerable' as he was not in communion with the Roman See.[115] Pope Theodore had already insisted that Pyrrhus should be canonically deposed, sent to Rome to account for himself and denied the title 'most holy'.[116] Pyrrhus is by now credited with having composed the Ecthesis. He admitted to Maximus that he had contributed to its authorship[117] and we can take it that this had facilitated his promotion from being hegoumen at Chrysopolis to being patriarch of Constantinople. The protagonist of Monothelitism and his oppnnent Maximus finally found themselves face to face in Carthage, whither Pyrrhus had fled before the Arab incursions into Africa. The Dispute[118] took place in the presence of the governor Gregory, successor to George, and high officials of church and state. After the debate Pyrrhus determined to be reconciled to Rome and Gregory became reconciled to Maximus and his views. His subsequent revolt against Constans was attributed to the influence of Maximus.[119] Pyrrhus went to Rome to renounce Monothelitism in the presence of Theodore and he was given a reception in keeping with his patriarchal status. When he again defected to Monothelitism a short time later, probably influenced by the Typus of Constans, Theodore anathematised him in terrifying style, even going so far as to sign the document with ink mixed with the sacred species taken from the communion chalice.[120] Maximus also went to Rome about this time. One of his letters implies that he had been in Sicily where he had to defend his teaching, possible against the charge of professing three wills in Christ and the Syriac Life says explicitly that: 'they then removed from there (Africa) and came to Sicily ... And when they

had made the rounds of all the islands of the sea, they went up to Rome itself'.[121] 'They' refers to the monks who accompanied Maximus and are seen by the author of the Syriac Life as his agents in the dissemination of heterodox teaching. In 646, presumably after Maximus had departed, three councils were convened in Africa to deal with the Monothelite question[122] and the condemnations of the heresy which issued from these gatherings are a testimony to the prophetic character of the theological leadership of Maximus, in spite of the fact that, far from being a bishop, he was a mere monk.

## III

Maximus would remain at least six years in Rome. It is not necessary to examine in this context the theological significance of the attitude of Maximus to the Roman See, but the historical perspectives require some appreciation of his view of Rome, so that his going there may be intelligible. In fact, it is obvious that the rest of his life and confession would not be entirely explicable without taking into account his understanding of the function of the Roman See in the life of the Church. It would be irresponsibly naive to claim that his decision to go there was merely motivated by political considerations. Maximus had nothing to gain from partisanship in a secular confrontation between Rome and Constantinople, completely devoid as he was of worldly ambition. Orthodoxy was the primary interest and passion of the life of Maximus and it is in relation to that that we must try to grasp his attitude to the Roman See. To him 'the church of the Romans'

was the senior church and it presided always until then over the others;[123] to anathematise those who declared that Pyrrhus was culpable was to anathematise 'the See of Rome, that is the catholic Church';[124] Pyrrhus would make no impression on Maximus and his likes 'if he does not make satisfaction and implore the blessed Pope of the most holy Church of Rome, that is the apostolic see, which from God the Word Incarnate himself as well as from all the holy Synods, according to the canons and sacred definitions, has received and possesses the power in all things and for everything over all the holy churches of God which are in the whole inhabited world as well as the power to bind and to loose'.[125]

Maximus then identifies in some sense the catholic Church with the see of Rome and the primacy of the Roman pontiff is for him tied up with supreme authority in matters of orthodoxy. 'In fact all the confines of the inhabited world, those everywhere in the world who confess the Lord with a right and sincere faith look fixedly, as if to the son of eternal light, to the most holy church of the Romans, towards its confession and its faith, receiving from her the flashing splendour of the holy dogmas of the Fathers, as the six holy Synods, divine in inspiration and eloquence, have explained them genuinely and reverently, proclaiming most clearly the symbol of faith'.[126] He goes on to refer to Matthew 16,18-19 to point up his claim that the Roman See is 'the unique base and foundation' of all the Christian churches.[127] For him it is, in some sense, the guarantee of the tradition of the Fathers and the teaching of the Councils. Incidentally, he accepts

the Lateran Synod of 649 as ecumenical; this is implied in his 'six'. Apart from knowing that he set out for Rome in this frame of mind, we are in the dark for more precise and practical motivation. He may have travelled at the request of Pope Theodore, or of Pyrrhus on the way to his veneration of 'the tombs of the apostles, or rather of the princes of the apostles themselves, then to see face to face the most holy pope, and to give him a memorandum of my errors'.[128] The Syriac Life envisages Maximus going there as a member of a migrating community, 'fear of the Arabs having disturbed them'.[129] Or he may have set out spontaneously in order to put his gifts at the service of the Church in a moment of crisis. We know that before this he had already been concerned with the eschatological aspects of the collapse of the established order before the onset of the Arab incursions and saw the possibility of having to shed his blood for the faith.[130] Whether he divined it or not, his decision to go to Rome was in fact a turning point in his life and involved him in a situation that was to lead ultimately to the sealing of his confession of the faith with a martyr's death.

While in Rome, Maximus probably resided at the monastery of St. Sabbas on the Aventine.[131] Here he engaged in a period of intense research and reflection on the Christological problems of the day. This is reflected in his treatises and correspondence of this time. Especially significant is the florilegium that he provided for Stephen of Dora, containing texts from the Fathers to support the anti-Ecthesis position.[132] In 647 the emperor Constans, seeing that the effort to establish Monothelitism was check-

mated and that the Ecthesis had not achieved the aims for which it was promulgated, tried to push the situation back to a pre-controversial phase by the promulgation of his Typos, which forbade the affirmation of one or two wills, one or two operations.[133] With the severe sanctions with which it was fortified, Constans hoped to consolidate the politico-religious unity of an empire hard pressed by Arab invasions. Insensitive to the fundamental issues implied in what must have seemed to him theological niceties, he failed to evaluate what the Church by then had realised: that she was involved in the upholding of the orthodox faith and that there could be no withdrawal from the public confession of that faith. Martin I became pope in 649 and in the October of that year he convoked the Lateran Synod. We are not certain if Maximus took an active part in the deliberations of the synod, but his theological influence is obvious in its formulations, especially in canons 10 and 11 which reflect his teaching and terminology accurately when dealing with the questions of will and operation in Christ.[134] The theologian has become a Father in whose teaching the Church recognizes her own faith. We find inverted testimony to the theological ascendancy of Maximus at the Lateran Synod in the account of the disaffected author of the Syriac Life:

'they then went up to Rome itself, and by means of their deceitfulness even Martinos the patriarch there was ensnared, and he fully accepted his doctrine, with the result that he gathered a synod of 190 bishops to confirm the doctrine of Maximus'.[135]

## IV

The condemnation of the Typos by the Lateran Synod was interpreted as a political challenge by Constans, a man not to brook opposition. So we find him sending the exarch of Ravenna, Olympius, to Rome to apprehend Martin and bring him to trial at Constantinople. The revolt of Olympius delayed the execution of the imperial order, so that Martin did not arrive in Constantinople until 653, having been arrested and conducted there by the new exarch. Martin, whose election as pope had never been confirmed by the emperor was considered to be a usurper and he was charged with treason and heresy. He was found guilty, condemned and deported to the Crimea, where he died in 655 completely forsaken and alone.[136] Part of his final suffering was the knowledge that the church at Rome had found a new bishop, Eugene I, who was consecrated in 654. It was generally thought that Maximus had been arrested together with Martin and brought to Constantinople with him to be tried once Martin's case had been suitably brought to a close. On the basis of the Syriac Life, the new hypothesis is that he went to Constantinople in 652, probably with the brothers Theodore and Theodosius of Gangres, charged with taking the decrees of the Lateran Synod and that he had availed of the emperor's absence to propagate the Lateran doctrine. 'And when Maximus saw that Rome had accepted the foul mire of his blasphemies, he also went down to Constantinople .... The Emperor Konstans was in Azorbaijan, and at that point Maximus entered Constantinople, hoping to corrupt it too with his deception, just as everywhere else'.[137] We know from the Syriac Life, complemented by its derivative Syriac

Chronicles, that Maximus stayed at Placidia, the sometime residence of visiting Roman apocrisaries, that he was tried and condemned by a synod on the return of Constans from war, that he was sentenced to be confined in a convent as ridicule, but that he won the nuns to his orthodoxy and a refusal of the sacramental ministrations of monothelite clergy. The trial of Martin, the burning of the nuns and the imprisonment of Maximus marked the climax of the emperor's determination to have the Typos accepted.[138]

As the life of Maximus moves into its final phase with the beginning of his first trial at Constantinople in June 654, its basic meaning as Christian existence becomes splendidly apparent.[139] Through the unfolding of the process of political intrigue and passion it becomes obvious that his real life was the faith he had in the Son of God. Everything else about him, not least his theological work, is an emanation from that central fact, so that it is worth our while to review, even briefly, the denouement of his witness with its unswerving purpose and flawless consistency. Maximus was tried for treason before the Senate and, during its second session, before the new patriarch of Constantinople, Peter, and the patriarch of Antioch, Macedoniud. The resilient Pyrrhus, who had regained the patriarchal throne on the death of the remorseful Paul, himself had died in June 654. The apocrisaries sent by the newly elected pope Eugene I had arrived in Constantinople to secure the imperial approval for his election. Their presence strengthened the case for the prosecution and made the dilemma of Maximus more acute by compounding the politico-religious aims of Constantinople

with the ecclesiastical expediency of Rome. Maximus was accused of opposing imperial policy; the evidence was that he had been responsible for the fall of Egypt, Tripoli and Africa to the Saracens.[140] Furthermore, he had affronted the emperor himself, implicitly anathematising him by his rejection of the Typos.[141] He had caused division in the church and prevented the reconciliation of Rome and Constantinople.[142]

While Maximus countered these charges with a vigorous self-defence, the primary thing to emerge from the evidence of the Relatio motionis is the play of Maximus' conscience in function of his fundamental faith. Granted the rightness of that faith, he cannot be accused of subjectivism in conscience; because his faith is relational his conscience is intentional and informed. We are in the presence of a witness. To his prosecutors the Typos was the key to the indispensable unity sought by the emperor and his acquiescent clergy; to Maximus it signified a denial of faith and betrayal of the Church: he was innocent of political intrigue; there could be no union on the basis of heresy. When it was pointed out to him that his refusal to be in communion with the Byzantine church was eloquent of his disapproval and a cause of division, he replied: 'Nothing is more violent than the reproach of conscience and nothing gives more assurance than its approbation'.[143] To reject the charge that he had condemned the emperor and his followers, he replied that, like the three youths in the fiery furnace, his primary concern was his fidelity to God, not the conduct of others; he reminded them that Daniel had been pre-

occupied with his own fidelity and preferred to die than to deny God and endure a bad conscience. He concluded: 'I prefer to die rather than experience a tormented conscience because of having betrayed my faith in God, no matter how.[144] He is then reminded that the Roman legates are about to share communion with the patriarch and so implicitly acknowledge the Typos. Maximus reminds them in turn that the legates have not brought an authorisation of the consecration of Peter the new patriarch, that the action of the legates must not be taken as prejudicial to the will of the Holy See: 'I am in no way persuaded that the Romans wish to be united to the Byzantines if they do not recognise that our God and Lord has by nature the will and energy necessary for our salvation according to each of his natures, of which and in which he is, and which he is'.[145] That is the crucial point. Nor is Maximus worsted when the prosecution asks him what he will do if the Romans join sides with the Byzantines: 'The Holy Spirit, by the mouth of the Apostle pronounces anathema even on the angels, if they should sanction anything contrary to the kerygma'.[146] Earlier in his trial, when accused of causing division in the Church he replied: 'If he who quotes the texts of Holy Scripture and the Fathers causes division in the Church, what will he be shown to do to the Church who suppresses the dogmas of the holy ones, without which this thing itself could not be a Church?'[147]

The Church is identified with its teaching in the mind of Maximus. When he is pressed on the anathematisation of the Typos with its implied condemnation of the emperor, Maximus prays God to forgive those who pushed Constans to compose it and those who approved it, that is

'the representatives of the Church' and the 'political leaders' and declares roundly that it is they who are responsible for besmirching him 'who is innocent and clear of all heresy'.[148] A little further on he denies that he has shown contempt for the emperor, but admits that he anathematised 'a document foreign to the true faith which the Church professes'.[149] Maximus was found guilty of treason and deported to Bizya in Thrace where he was imprisoned late in 654.

With their customary diplomatic skill, the Roman apocrisaries had won approval for the consecration of Eugene I without having approved the Typos, at least formally. They had agreed to take the synodal letter of Peter the new patriarch to Rome for acceptance by the pope in exchange for the imperial approval of his consecration. This letter contained a further theological formula meant to justify the Typos and the whole monothelite episode: there were in Christ two natural wills and one hypostatic will.[150] When, in the course of his trial, Maximus got wind of this latest patriarchal expedient he forewarned the clergy and people of Rome through a letter written by Anastasius to the monks of Cagliari,[151] so that Eugene I, reassured by a revolt of clergy and people against Peter's Synodicon, did not accept it, had himself consecrated without imperial approval and was henceforth considered a usurper at Constantinople.

In 656 Constans and Peter tried again to win Maximus to their cause. It was a critical time for Byzantium, at once rebuffed by the pope and under severe pressure from

the Arabs. If they could get Maximus to compromise, and enjoy the support of his ascendancy as a theologian, perhaps the long desired unity would quickly come about. Their representatives went to Bizya with the intention of conciliating Maximus but without admitting the validity of the Lateran Synod and its doctrine of the wills and operations of Christ. The ensuing dispute is a variation on the familiar theme: a confrontation of single-minded profession of faith and resourceful political compromise.[152] For Maximus the Lateran Synod was an ecumenical council and Rome was in some way the guarantee of the orthodoxy of its decrees, so that there could be no union until those decrees were accepted and the position of Rome acknowledged. When it was argued that the synod had no authority because it was not approved by the emperor, Maximus retorted that it was orthodox faith not emperors that ratified synods. He formulates the principle of his view in this way: 'The pious rule of the Church recognizes as holy and approved those synods which orthodoxy of teaching has distinguished to be so'.[153] Orthodoxy is the supreme canon. When Maximus seems to have convinced the bishop Theodosius of the rightness of the Lateran doctrine, so that he professes himself willing to accept it publicly, Maximus insists that the emperor and the patriarch of Constantinople must be reconciled at the price of submission to the 'pope of Rome' on the basis of 'your right confession of faith'.[154] On departing the consul Theodosius wonders if the emperor will consent to send an intercessory rescript to Rome. Maximus can see no problem if the emperor is willing to humiliate himself as God did

for our salvation. Then in a remarkable sentence which sums up Maximian spiritual teaching and points a striking contrast between Maximus and his adversaries he said: 'If God who, by nature saved us, did not save us before willingly humbling himself, how will man, who by nature is saved, be saved or save others if he does not humble himself?'[155]

After a brief interval Maximus is brought to better quarters at Rhegium to where the ambassadors returned to attempt to undermine his intransigence, first by getting him to promise in general to do whatever the emperor would ask, which elicited from him a typical riposte: he was willing to do whatever the emperor asked provided it was of a merely temporal character! He is given a sense of his importance by being assured that if he enters into communion with Byzantium all the West and those 'of bad spirit' in the East will return to unity. The emperor himself will accord him the highest honours; 'we will proclaim you our Father'.[156] But the condition of such tokens of esteem is that he should accept the Typos. After a short exchange with the pathetic Bishop Theodosius, Maximus affirms that: 'Truly, all the power of heaven would not persuade me to act thus'.[157] Then flattery yielded to dramatic vindictiveness as Maximus was buffeted and insulted and found his clothes saturated with courtly spittle. Having failed to force his consent to open agreement with the monothelite position, they then tried to silence him in accordance with the prescriptions of the Typos. Maximus reminded them that: 'God has not confined the whole of salvation to the heart while he says: "He who confesses me before men, I will confess him before my Father who is in heaven". And the

divine Apostle teaches saying: "Faith in the heart leads to justice, confession by the lips to salvation" '. He argues that to attempt to silence him is to endanger his salvation. He is nothing if not consistent. They return to his signature of the Lateran anathema, but this again demonstrates than a man, whose philosophy is the folly of the Cross, cannot but be at cross purposes with those whose vision is hampered by the exigences of a temporal politic.

Since Maximus cannot evade the invitation to share the kenosis of his Lord the protagonists of myopic prudence have to fall back on a final flourish that cannot rise above a brutal threat: 'Know well, sir monk, that if we find a little respite in the political confusion, by the holy Trinity, we shall know how to join you to the pope, who at this moment is puffed up, together with those who are talking over there (in Rome) and with the rest of your disciples; and we will smelt you all as in a crucible, each one in the place that befits him, as Martin was smelted'.[159] From this we can measure the effectiveness of the letter Maximus had written to the monks in Cagliari. He was sentenced to be deprived of the little he possessed and sent to far-off Perberis to be discarded in prison there.

Eugene I died in 657 and he was succeeded by Pope Vitalian who took the initiative by a gesture of reconciliation with Byzantium, sending legates to the emperor in return for which he secured imperial approval for his election. Vitalian, as a sign of communion, sent his synodal letter to the patriarch Peter, in which he did not raise the question of the Typos. The patriarch, assuming

that he had at last contrived the longed for doctrinal agreement which would underpin political unity and the stability of the empire, went to the prison to interview Maximus, who had been again brought to Constantinople. We have an account of this occasion from Maximus himself.[160] The patriarch asks him to what church he belongs and names the five patriarchates which he says are now united. Before Maximus asks what the basis of his confession is to be he gives his remarkable definition of the church: 'The God of all declared the Catholic Church to be the orthodox and saving confession of faith in Him, in calling Peter blessed for the words in which he rightly confessed Him'.[161] The patriarch then proposes the doctrine of two natural wills and one hypostatic will which he had formulated in his synodal letter, but now disguised as a plurality and unity of energies. Maximus cannot accept that; 'You who have the power, do what you like'.[162] The patriarch then threatens Maximus with papal anathematisation.

We have little or no inkling of inner conflict in Maximus. He is a martyr because he clings heroically to what is right, as he understands it, without violating charity with regard to others. At that moment, even if he were spared misgivings about his fundamental stand, he must have tasted the bitter irony of a situation where he is threatened with excommunication by the pope who, for him, ensures that his own confession is in keeping with that of Peter. In fact Vitalian never condemned Maximus nor his companions, but neither did he, in his anxiety to placate the emperor, ever speak out in their defence.[163]

Heroic faith is compatible with such abandonment; out of his dark night of the soul Maximus can say: 'May what was decreed by God before every age find its perfection in me, giving to him the glory known before every age'.[164] Compared to the treasury hidden in a field, the fall of an empire and the human frailty of the institutional church are insignificant to men like Maximus. Finally in 662, Maximus was tried again with his companions Anastasius, his secretary, and Anastasius, a Roman apocrisary. They were found guilty and condemned to be flogged, to have their tongues torn out and their right hands cut off. They were then displayed in their ignominy in all the quarters of Constantinople and sent into distant exile and imprisonment in Lazica. There Maximus died on the 13th of August 662. In retrospect the Church has acknowledged that the right to which Maximus clung so heroically was in fact orthodoxy. For that reason he is a martyr.

# CHAPTER II

## MAXIMUS THE THEOLOGIAN: HIS METHOD AND HIS WORKS

In our first chapter we have seen enough of the life of St. Maximus to realise that he did not avoid the particularity of concrete choice and affirmation as expressions of his faith, even when this witness cost him his life. It is this quality of a theology lived that gives such splendour to his spirituality. In examing his method as a theologian and reviewing his corpus of teaching, we can do so in the confidence that he enjoyed in an outstanding way the advantage of that indispensable preliminary to theological research: profound and even heroic faith.

The context of patristic theology is the response of man in faith to God's self-bestowal in the Word made flesh, where man encounters the mysterious coincidence of the uncreated and the created, of the infinite and the finite in the person of the Word. The theologian attempts to fathom that mystery by submitting to the Spirit in the letter of scripture and for the Fathers that letter was not to be violently torn from its ecclesial setting, but it was to be questioned reverently as it was spoken by the living Church expressed in councils and in patristic tradition. God's self-communication to man was understood by them as continuing to take place in the Spirit-filled Church and not merely through the spoken and written word, but in the complementary modes of sacrament and service. The Church was seen as the Bride in relation to her divine Bridegroom, so that the exercise of faith was understood as an affirmation within the wholeness of that sacred mutuality

merely as an isolated function of sanctified intellect. Faith was certainly an intellectual assent, but beyond that it was required to be a consent of the will that carried with it the promise of total conversion, something that would involve man in all the dimensions of his being. He was a 'new creation' in the Pauline sense[1] and so the exercise of faith was the affirmation of new being, of Christian existence. Because the meaning of the Christian life is to be found in the existential and intentional reference of man to God, the profession of faith implies worship and obedience, the awe-inspired acknowledgement of the presence of God and the will to make him the ground of human existence in such a way that man's activity becomes the unfolding of a participation in divine nature. For the Fathers the practice of theology took place within the consciousness made possible in that kind of commitment. It was at once the property of faith to seek understanding and to remember that its term was not the formulae but the reality expressed in them, so that although theology could not shirk the stringent procedures of critical reflection it was in turn bound to the impulse towards reality immanent to the act of faith and the larger context of that life which we may describe as Christian existence. This was the root of theology and the secret of its orthodox consistency. For them there could be no question of theology without this preliminary of a living faith and its concomitant awareness of divine reality. To have attempted any other kind of exploration of the data of revelation would have been for them merely profane discipline, doomed to failure. Von Balthasar has said of the Fathers that 'their own lives

reproduced the fullness of the Church's teaching, and their teaching the fullness of the Church's life'.[2]

Before we look more closely at Maximus as theologian it may be helpful to consider briefly in a more general way some further aspects of patristic theology. In that theology the presupposition is the Word apprehended in faith and in virtue of that principle the whole of hellenic rationalism can be assumed and put to the service of articulating the implications of revelation. In the Fathers we find all the resources of human intelligence called on to investigate the meaning of the words which are ultimately the language of the Word, the sequence of human thought into which He has poured a content that is coterminous with himself and in this process theology accepts not only the demands of rigorous method, but also the necessary submission to the hegemony of the Word himself. Besides it is a discipline where dialectic is always prepared to yield to silence because the words issue from the Word and vice versa the finite expression is constantly opening on to the infinite; because that infinite is personal, reflection takes place in a climate of prayer. To insist that theology requires more than the play of reasoning intellect is not to belittle that process; it is to admit that there is more to man's encounter with God than the manipulation of concepts, but it is at the same time to recall that because of revelation the cataphatic is the way to the apophatic, that we go through the flesh to the Word, that the letter is the way to the Spirit. As Meyendorff puts it: 'Because the concept of theologia in Byzantium, as with the Cappadocian

Fathers, was inseparable from theoria ("contemplation"), theology could not be - as it is in the West - a rational deduction from "revealed" premisses, i.e., from Scripture or from the statements of an ecclesiastical magisterium; rather it was a vision experienced by the saints, whose authenticity was, of course, to be checked against the witness of Scripture and Tradition. Not that rational deductive process was completely eliminated from theological thought; but it represented for the Byzantines the lowest and least reliable level of theology'.[3]

For Lossky, in the eastern tradition 'the inner experience of the Christian develops within the circle delineated by the teaching of the Church'.[4] It is that circle which ensures access to what cannot be encircled and guarantees that the experience is truly relational and not subjective illusion. In this view of theology the rational process is in function of a more fundamental awareness of divine reality and it is this awareness that releases the reasoning intellect from being condemned to a futile revolution within the bounds of its own possibilities when confronted with mystery and enables it to serve a higher process and in turn find itself transformed. Theology then becomes the exploration of an expanding consciousness of divine reality that is perceived in some way more directly than would be possible to reason left to itself. The theologian must not merely learn divine things but also suffer them[5] so that theology is the product of a higher dialectic where the gulf between the clarity of its conceptions and the brilliance of the mystery, which strikes the mind as darkness, is felt ever more keenly.

In order to enter this formidable region the Fathers required that profound reformation of sense and spirit that Scripture calls 'renewal of mind'.[6] For them, unless apatheia within the context of naked faith has set the mirror of the soul in order, there can be no question of theologia, simply because unruly emotion distorts the truth and inhibits that passivity to the divine that is made possible by a developed charity and is the basis of an energetic exercise of reasoning intellect. The language of their theology was a complex of spirit-chosen words. Its function was not so much an attempt to translate divine reality into the language of a secular culture, as the plastic use of language, especially philosophical language, under the control of a creative vision beyond the possibility of any merely secular resource, so that it was transformed and rendered capable of conveying divine truth. It is the Holy Spirit who is the guarantor of the verbal tradition of truth in the theology of the Fathers and the Spirit for them was not thought of as in any way set over against the Church. The Church was, as it were, the locus where the intervention of the Spirit was guaranteed to take place for the sanctification of man and his guidance into all truth. Because of this approach to theology there was no clearcut distinction between theology and spirituality in the mind of the Fathers.

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the function of anthropology and christology in the spirituality of Maximus the Confessor, so that it is well at this stage to say that 'spirituality' is understood in the contemporary sense of 'the personal assimilation of the

salvific mission of Christ'[7] 'present in the Church and transmitted through its preaching and sacraments'[8]. While it is the province of theology to listen to the revelation of God in words, to reflect on their implications and to systematise - at least inchoatively - its findings while maintaining its alertness to the mystery hidden in the words, it is the special province of spirituality to be concerned with 'the core of Christian existence' and 'with the wisdom of God in a mystery'[9] and with the realization in practice of revelation in a concrete living experience of faith, hope and love. While spirituality can be said to be the subjective aspect of dogmatics in general, here we shall concentrate on Maximus' view of man and his redemption finding that his anthropology and soteriology are synthesized in his christology. Spirituality will be concerned not only with the enhanced appreciation of revealed truth made possible by γνῶσις, but also with πρᾶξις, not merely as an indispensable preliminary for γνωσις, but also as the expression of that γνῶσις in the concrete as the translation of the possibility of truth into the actuality of Christian living. Thus the adoration and obedience that flow from the fundamental engagement of faith inform this theology and manifest the counterpointing of hellenic idealism with the realism of the gospels where truth goes beyond ideas and requires existential realization. Spirituality is governed by the conviction that man must do the truth in charity.[10] In this way man enters the Πνεῦμα[11] and becomes πνευματικός.[12] The Spirit ensures that he yields to the dynamism of his nature and

becomes the fullness of his destined truth. Von Balthasar might have been describing the Christian existence of Maximus when he wrote that 'the Word in this world has the power to turn speculation into actual living, the exercise of authority into holiness of life, theology into Christian practice, reflection into irrefutable witness to the point of martyrdom.[13]

## The Methodology of Maximus the Confessor

In the Fathers the word θεολογία has two meanings:[14] it can designate an extended reflection in faith on the mystery of the Blessed Trinity in contrast to a comparable meditation on the redemptive incarnation οἰκονομία . Maximus very rarely uses the term in this sense. He generally intends by the word its second meaning: the final phase of the way of perfection as it was schematized by Evagrius of Pontus: practical philosophy, natural contemplation and theology.[15] 'Theology' here is meant to convey an aspect of 'divinization', the culmination of the process of man's being transformed in his relation to God, something that will be perfected posthumously, but of which there is granted a foretaste in experimental knowledge of God and divine things in this earthly condition.[16] Maximus would not have used an expression like 'passive contemplation', but for him 'theology' was something in that order. 'Practical philosophy' and 'natural contemplation' were a preparation for that, the one a vigorous asceticism, the other an approximation to what we would now describe as 'theology'. 'Natural Contemplation' referred to a comprehensive reflective exercise by a thoroughly christened mind

over the whole field of human experience, mediated by the phenomena of nature as well as by the words of Scripture.[17] For Maximus the attempt to appropriate intellectually the realm of nature cannot prescind from the Incarnation;[18] the philosopher must enjoy a purification 'in the Spirit'[19] if his mind is to function genuinely. 'Natural contemplation' for Maximus then corresponds to what we mean by philosophy, except that he presupposes a rectification of man's reason by a Christian asceticism or 'practical philosophy'.[20]

As we have just seen, it would also include a systematized reflection on revelation and so be equivalent to our 'theology'. The contemporary notion of theology as systematized reflection on revelation is a broader idea than Maximus' 'theology' as reflection on the Trinity, while for the most part, especially in the West, his 'theology' in the sense of contemplative knowledge, is something outside normal usage nowadays. In a recent study of his methodology, Vittorio Croce has subjected the theology of Maximus to careful scrutiny.[21] He excludes 'theology' in the sense of mystical knowledge from his review of the theological method of the Confessor and confines himself to 'natural contemplation'. It must be said by way of introduction that just as wonder as a πάθος was the beginning of wisdom for a Greek philosopher, so a monk of Maximus' spirituality would never be deprived of a comparable wonder in the field of theology. Heidegger has pointed out that wonder as πάθος is always the beginning of wisdom, in the sense that it is the fundamental astonishment that energizes philosophical reflection, the basic noetic relationship to reality that supports the grind of philosophical discourse.[22] In the

same way contemplative prayer was the primal relationship of spiritual theologians like Maximus with divine reality and even if Croce cannot incorporate it into a scientific schema of his method, it can undoubtedly be presumed to be there as the form of Maximus' personal openness to the Christian mystery in faith, a mystery that is expressed verbally in a living tradition. It is this openness to the Spirit that enables him to have insight into the written record of what Jesus said and did as the core of the Christian tradition.

It is the 'knowledge of God' spoken of in Scripture and it is received at the depth of consciousness and responsiveness in man described in the bible as the 'heart'.

We have explicit statements from Maximus himself on his method and it can be said straightaway that this method applies both to his spiritual writing and to his polemical-dogmatic treatises and that he used the same method all through his career as a theologian and spiritual master. In his 6th Epistle, an early piece, he says that he intends 'to demonstrate with natural arguments, without biblical or patristic evidence, that the soul is an incorporeal creature'.[23] Here we have the three elements of theological method as understood by Maximus, the one he intends to use in his reply to Bishop John and the other two which he will not employ in this case. Towards the end of his life he holds, in his argument against 'hypostatic energy', that 'new expressions should not be coined which lack scriptural, patristic or natural force, but have a value that is extraneous and the invention of perverse men'.[24] Between these two significant instances there are two other explicit references to this threefold proof. In the Ambigua, in a

refutation of origenism, he uses a proof that he qualifies as φυσικῶς καί γραφικῶς καί πατρικῶς ἀποδεδειγμένον .[25] The same triad appears in his Dispute with Pyrrhus in 645 A.D.[26] Another proof was adduced by him, that from the Councils.[27] We shall see later on how he relates the Fathers to the Councils.

Even though the method of his spiritual writing is less rigorously scientific it is basically the same kind of appropriation and expression of the data of revelation as that found in his strictly polemical and expository work. Conversely all the theological endeavour of Maximus, the effort to find certainty in theology, is situated in his view of the spiritual life as a whole, schematized as we have seen in the triad of Evagrius:[28] 'practical philosophy', the mastery of the passions, which disposes man for a perception of the λόγοι of things, unclouded by the distortions of passion, that is for 'natural contemplation'; the third phase, to be realized eschatologically, is that of 'theology', participation and vision of God, anticipated in some way here in 'pure prayer'.[29] 'Natural contemplation' is ordered to 'theology'[30] as Maximus sees, so that research and demonstration are ordered to contemplation. In fact, for Maximus, discourse and contemplation are incompatible, at least when it is a question of the perfection of contemplation as will be granted to man after death: 'In fact, the wise men say that it is not possible that the experience of God and reasoning about him should coexist, or that a conceptual activity about him should coincide with the perception of him.[31] It has already been suggested that the perception of him possible in this life would seem to have an enriching influence on reflection about him.

(i) Scripture

It is not difficult to understand why a man like Maximus, whose intellectual life was caught up in the dynamic of a search for God, should find in Scripture the basis of his noetic. For him it is the divine word, 'words divinely inspired'[32] 'the word spoken by God',[33] 'the voice of God who speaks by means of the prophets'.[34] It is the word of God because it is inspired by the Holy Spirit;[35] it is the word of Christ[36] and in the Gnostic Centuries he sees the scriptures as an incarnation of the Logos, so that in this work the Logos as a human being and the Logos as expressed in words are identical: 'there are not two Logoi'.[37]

For Maximus three things offer themselves to man's consideration: himself, creation and Scripture;[38] in the three he finds two levels of reality, or if you wish an outside and an inside. To grasp the meaning of reality it is necessary to move from level to level, to penetrate the outside in order to lay hold of the inside. In self-understanding man must move from sense-knowledge to intellect, in the understanding of creation he must discern the intelligible in the phenomenal, the logos in the manifestation and in scripture he must transcend the letter in order to find the spirit. Knowledge then is not the discarding of what we may call the 'outside' but a use of it that enables the knower to find the intelligible and finally God himself. The quest of the meaning of scripture must respect the objective character of all created reality as we encounter it; exegesis cannot free itself from a human epistemology, so that we cannot receive the light of

the Logos except through his spoken words, the formation of the Spirit except through its formulation in scripture. Knowing is a matter of accepting the forms of expression woven into the human condition, and of not being restricted to those forms, but of appropriating their deeper content. Maximus did not neglect the letter of Scripture and he could use a literal interpretation of the text with splendid effect,[39] but the principle of his interpretation was an acceptance of Christ in faith and so he relentlessly sought to understand scripture by an analysis of its language in the light of the previous acceptance of Christ in faith.[40] Everything for him was linked to the mystery of Christ, everything in scripture the revelation of some aspect of that mystery.[41] There was no question of apprehending Christ and scripture in the light of that apprehension without the intervention of the Holy Spirit, so that his counsel is: 'Seek with the Spirit that which is of the Spirit',[42] a fundamental principle of exegesis for him. He is aware of the Spirit within who 'searches and scrutinizes the knowledge of beings in us'[43] so that exegesis for him has to be 'spiritual' in its subject who knows, the object known and the path of that knowledge.[44] Just as the Logos is at the origin of the scriptural word so He is the source of the light in which it is understood: the <u>logoi</u> of the words of scripture find their source in the Logos from which they derive their meaning.[45] Croce suggests a useful formula to summarize the principle of maximian exegesis: 'Seek according to the spirit the logos of the narration'.[46] Here for

Maximus 'spirit,' is the way of research, the 'logos' is the object of research. This approach is rooted in the conviction that all scripture is divinely inspired and is given to us for salvation.[47] In short, it is an analytical application, to every passage of Scripture, of the global significance of the revelation that the Spirit has already led us to accept in faith. It may be pertinent to suggest again that 'theology' as Maximus understands the term, contemplative knowledge, can be understood to have a function here, within faith, but as giving it a maturer quality in the form of experience. This kind of interpretation of scripture launches us into a totally spiritual world. It takes for granted the habitual exercise of faith in the exegete and so is in striking contrast to the exegesis that is done in the light of secular historical principles only. It is of course the exegetic style of the alexandrian school, with Origen as its greatest exponent and the exegesis of Maximus has all the characteristics of that great exegetical tradition: consciousness of the transcendence of the word of God, its spiritual relevance, the combination of universal significance and the word of God, its spiritual relevance, the combination of universal significance and personal applicability, the contrast of literal and spiritual interpretation as that between the possibility open to Jew as against Christian and so the invitation to the Christian to surpass the literal by seeking the spiritual meaning.[48]

The sacred writers bear witness to events rather than present us with a system. The events point beyond themselves to the realm that is accessible to faith and so it is quite

legitimate to interpret the events in the light of the further reality. In fact, a reading of scripture that would exclude this reference to the whole mystery of Christ, would be less than a christian interpretation. There would seem to be the possibility of a further distinction within the faith-approach to the meaning of the bible. It is a distinction made by Origen when he says that there is faith and χυρίως πιστεύειν ,[49] which are successive phases of the same faith, the former is a faith that is experienced as being over against its object in some way, an external observation of the mystery, the latter is a development of γνῶσις , a new realization of the intimacy of the mystery of Christ's being with us and in us. Exercising faith in the former way, an exegete could work up a very worthwhile biblical theology, a satisfactory statement of the Christian mystery as it is expressed in the bible. But with the latter kind of developed faith the writing should take on a new dimension; it would become spiritual in the sense that the mystery would be apprehended in a superior way because of the action of the Holy Spirit in the believer, making his faith to be enlightened faith. Croce does not seem to visualise the possibility of this distinction in this context. It would mean the influx of 'theology' into the composition of a work that took the form of a 'natural contemplation' to use the language of Evagrius. This kind of exegesis is consistent with all that Maximus has to say about the possibility of knowledge in a purified mind. In a remarkable passage in his Mystagogia he says: 'If the invisible things are contemplated through the visible things, in a much greater measure the visible things are understood

through the invisible things by those who give themselves to contemplation'.[50] This makes it evident that for Maximus to have sight of the logoi of creatures is to take hold of them at the source of their intelligibility and ultimately in and through the Logos who is the locus of the logoi. It is to be noted that this is the prerogative of those who give themselves to contemplation. Very obviously this can be referred to 'natural contemplation'. But if the knowledge is so radical and so comprehensive it looks as if it has something gratuitous about it, that it is in some way a gift of God, that some dimension of 'natural contemplation' in this context is not merely acquired by personal effort even in faith.

The language of Scripture corresponds to the 'visible things', it is the normal manifestation of the Logos to the man of faith, a record of the Incarnation.[51] In fact it is Maximus' contemplative appreciation of the formula of Chalcedon that gives him insight not merely into scripture, but into all creation.[52] He in some way has knowledge of the conclusions in their principles and so he can, before Aquinas, 'dispose the phantasms'[53] with anticipatory discrimination. We can see his method in these two passages: 'The mystery of the taking flesh of the Logos has the force of all the enigmas and types of Scripture and the knowledge of creatures visible and intelligible. And whoever has understood the mystery of the cross and burial, has understood the logoi of the above mentioned things. Whoever has been initiated into the unspeakable power of the resurrection, has understood the purpose for which God initially gave sustenance to all

things'.[54] 'When the Logos of God becomes clear and luminous in us and his face shines like the sun, then also his garments appear to shine, that is the words of holy Scripture, of the Gospels appear evident and manifest, having nothing hidden. But Moses and Elias also come with him, that is the most spiritual logoi of the Law and the prophets'.[55] For Maximus the mystery of Christ is the unique object of the spiritual sense of scripture; it is not so much a case of understanding something of Christ through the scriptures as of understanding the scriptures through Him and beyond them the whole of the created realm.[56] It also puts into perspective how Maximus understands the literal sense of scripture, an understanding that could accommodate the most exacting critical standards, but which would not be bound by them. There is something of the interplay of cataphaticism and apophaticism in his exegesis.[57] Maximus always uses scripture with a theological purpose but this means that it must be used critically; he intends 'to examine with intelligence'[58] the scriptural text. For him the Bible has absolute authority: 'in itself it gives a sure foundation to discourse'.[59] He will when required have recourse to the literal sense, as for instance in Quaestiones et Dubia 71,[60] but at the other end of the spectrum he maintains that 'the logoi of all beings are contained by the word of God, while it is not contained by any being'.[61] For Maximus the language of scripture rests on an inverted and created apex, but opens out to infinity.

(ii) Fathers and Councils

While it is obvious that for Maximus Scripture is the expression of the mind of God and so an irreplaceable means of entering into that mystery, he does not use the Scriptures out of relationship to the Church. The fissiparous principle of sola scriptura is entirely foreign to him. The Scripture is always in his case the final court of appeal when it comes to ascertaining some facet of revelation,[62] but he would never have thought it possible to take up the Bible, open its pages and discover tout court its divine meaning. For him it is the Fathers of the Church who 'draw from the divinely inspired words the wisdom of the divine mysteries'.[63] The authority of the Fathers comes from the fact of their docility to the Holy Spirit: 'really it was not for them to speak, but the grace of the Holy Spirit which enveloped them completely.[64] They too are θεόπνευστοι [65] and so 'approved by God',[66] 'inspired by God',[67] 'made wise by God',[68] 'divinely eloquent'.[69]

The genitive case in the expression 'Fathers of the Church' can be either objective or subjective. In the former sense it is an application to the bishops of the church of the pauline begetting in the Lord through the gospel; in the latter sense it means that they belong to the Church, are approved by the Church. This twofold semantic possibility can give rise to what may look like vicious circles in argumentation. If they beget the Church by their teaching, how can the Church claim the right to approve or disapprove of them? As we shall see the formal principle of orthodoxy is the faith of the Church, of which the Fathers are the brilliant exponents,[70]

but of which the Church under the Holy Spirit is the ultimate judge[71] and she exercises this function in times of doctrinal crisis in Councils so that the term 'Father' is not reserved in the usage of Maximus to the great patristic figures of the past[72] but is also applied to the bishops of his day 'to whom is entrusted the guidance of the holy and catholic Church of God'.[73] When he uses the term of those in the past he does not apply it to all the bishops but only to those of whom the Church has approved - οἱ ἔγκριτοι Πατέρες ,[74] a group of outstanding teachers commonly accepted in his time. It is the writings of these Fathers that express the true faith of the Church for Maximus. They express the Church's understanding of the revelation contained in Holy Writ, so that occasionally we find them used paratactically with scripture in Maximus, but more frequently as a secure way back to its interpretation, reliable links with the apostolic age, genuine expositors of the apostolic intentions: 'animated indeed by the one and identical Spirit, they passed on to the people the right profession of faith'.[75]

In his final trial Maximus challenges his adversaries by inviting them to search for 'the meaning of the expressions of the Fathers and' he concludes, 'we shall know the truth'.[76] All through his polemical career he was at pains to emphasize that he was not introducing novelties, but always seeking to find the meaning of the patristic texts: 'we therefore do not introduce new modes of speech ( λέξεις ), as our adversaries say, but we profess the expressions of the fathers, nor do we manipulate the terms for personal reasons - that would be indeed rash and the

work and invention of an heretical and lunatic mind, - but we dutifully use them as they were understood and expressed by the same saints'.[77] Fidelity to tradition was fidelity to concepts and meaning, not to terminology divorced from that.[78] Not that terminology was unimportant to Maximus. His principle of reciprocal immanence was valid here too: the meaning was immanent in the words, so that it is necessary to use the words to find the meaning, but to divorce the words from the meaning was to make them meaningless.[79]

The Christian's knowledge of God is inseparable for Maximus from the Church. He thinks of the Church primarily in relation to the faith which ensures the discovery of God and participation in his life.[80] Faith for him means the virtue of faith and the content of faith. It is the acceptance by each one of the doctrine proposed by the Church as a faithful expression of revelation: 'I learned this faith and was instructed in it by the holy and blessed fathers who were among us before and those who remain now, to whom was entrusted the guidance of the holy catholic church of God and who guide it rightly to the port of the divine will'.[81] He describes the function of the Fathers accurately when he says that 'animated by the one and identical Spirit they passed on to the people the right profession of faith. I have found also all those who hold the reins of the Church, by the grace of the Spirit, in agreement with them, those who have preserved the right logos of the pious faith and have in no way changed its meaning'.[82] The Church teaches what she believes; Maximus speaks of 'ecclesiastical faith'[83] and 'ecclesiastical teaching'.[84] Faith here does not necessarily mean

primarily the attitude of accepting revelation; it can mean the content of the formulae. Nor is it possible to find in Maximus an explicit statement about 'consulting the laity'[85] even though he was aware of their heroic performance during the Arian heresy, when the accredited teachers were confused and in disarray. But it is the whole church that professes the faith; in fact he identifies the church with the 'right and salvific profession of faith in Christ'.[86] 'The Church is indeed pure and uncontaminated, faultless and genuine, complete and capable of the true light'.[87] For him, the notes of the Church can be seen in relation to the faith of the Church: her sanctity is the 'piety' of her faith; her catholicity can be understood as communion in the same faith that is itself complete; her faith is apostolic because of the unbroken continuity between her actual profession of faith and that taught by the Apostles; the faith is the principle of her unity.[88] What may look like vicious circles in argument to the formalist become intelligible when the faith of the Church is appreciated from the inside: it is the faith that founds and constitutes the church; it is for the Church to regulate the dogmas of the true faith.[89] The Church is alive with the Spirit that scans the depths of God and his economy for man; it is the Spirit who ensures that the Church will preserve the mind of Christ; it might be even said that the Church knows her own mind which is the mind of Christ and so she is in a position to say what is and what is not a genuine expression of that mind, who is and who is not a true father of the Church. The Fathers for

Maximus, to be credible and reliable, must be approved by the Church. This approval is expressed for the Confessor in the form of ecumenical councils: 'the whole of christianity: that is indeed in reality the most holy council of the orthodox fathers'.[90] The 'ecclesiastical faith' received by the Church is preserved and passed on in 'ecclesiastical teaching'.[91] The whole Church is in some way actualized in the Council as the teaching Church, a church that is already a believing one.[92]

Maximus tells us much about his theological method when he says of the monothelites: 'not having any usage of any council or father or scripture as testimony in favour of their affirmations, they manipulate the dogmas of piety, which they, who from the beginning were eye-witnesses and ministers of the Word (Lk. 1,2), have passed on to us and afterwards their disciples and successors, the masters of the truth inspired by God, that is to say in the five ecumenical councils of the most holy and divinely inspired fathers'.[93] The revelation expressed in Scripture is fundamental: it comes from eye-witnesses; it accepts the kind of testimony claimed by John the evangelist in his first epistle as well as by Luke cited by Maximus. It is passed down as 'dogmas of piety'; the revelation is formulated in authoritative teaching that ensures its identity with the primitive revelation. It has been 'passed on to us' not merely by the eye-witnesses but by their disciples and successors, so that continuity is maintained with the original witnesses of the revelation. The successors are described as 'the masters of the truth' which for Maximus is equivalent to 'father of the Church'. He visualises the

fathers 'in the five holy ecumenical councils'. The council on its own, because of its embodying continuity with the past would have been sufficient for Maximus to ensure the truth of its pronouncements as is evident from his declaration that 'even if there were none (i.e. patristic texts to confirm the Chalcedonian formula), when really there is an abundance of them, what would prevent so many saints - rather the whole of christianity: this indeed is in reality the most holy council of the orthodox fathers - from pronouncing authoritatively this expression and sanctioning it against the contraction of Eutyches'?[94] So that he seems to use the term 'father' in two senses in the previous quotation: it refers to the fathers actually in council and to a father as the source of testimony. While the Scripture is at the basis of the faith, it is for councils to sanction the right understanding of the same faith relying on the faithful transmission of the fathers in the sense of the approved bishops who left written evidence of their belief. 'If the Fathers give testimony to the right faith, the Councils define it with authority'.[95]

With regard to Scripture, Fathers and Councils 'it is (Christ) who has spoken through them';[96] they in turn are the way to Christ and through him to God. The formulation of the gospel message in Creeds was for Maximus as for the whole Church of his time an essential synthesis of the faith, to be professed explicitly by those who claimed to follow Christ and be members of the Church. He devotes much attention to it in his Mystagogia.[97] For him it was the ultimate criterion of orthodoxy and just as it was a

synthesis of belief, so it could be unfolded to show its implications. In fact every statement that purported to be an expression of Christian faith must be in some way related to these basic Symbols, a qualification that Maximus cannot find, for instance, in his examination of the origenistic theory of the preexistence of souls.[98] The possibility of synthesization and development of the data of revelation is evidence that the human appropriation of the word of God is not something mechanical, but something living, an assimilation of the truth given in faith in a genuinely human way, capable of conceptualization, definition, division and judgement. Because of this, besides the external criterion of truth that the Confessor finds in the faith of the Church taught with authority in councils that define the testimony of the fathers and scripture, he looks for an inner criterion, by which man can know that his grasp of the revealed faith is coherent and integral and he finds it in logic.[99] For him every father, whether poring over the scriptures and expressing his meditations in writing or sitting with his fellow-bishops in council had to exercise his mind and exercise it rightly. Between the 'practical philosophy' of the exercise of virtue and an unthematic encounter with God there was for Maximus the stage of 'natural contemplation' with its unremitting application of reason to revelation in the light of faith, a faith that was patient of contemplative modification, but which was always laborious as a search for a definition of what the Church actually believed. Interpretation is the proper trade of the fathers as theologians.[100]

Although there is no need to elaborate the place of

the liturgy as an element in the theological methodology of Maximus it would be an inexcusable omission not to mention it. When we think of him as a theologian contemplating evidence for God in scripture and in nature we must recall that his actual experience of life was also to a large extent informed by his participation in the liturgy. He did not use the liturgy in the spirit of contemporary theologians as a locus theologicus nor is his Mystagogia[101] a technical commentary on the liturgy of his time. It is above all a work of asceticism and mysticism in which he opens up for us vistas of breathtaking grandeur as he interprets the Church and the Liturgical rites so that those who take part in the liturgical action may be disposed to encounter in and through the mystery of the eucharist, the mystery of Christ.[102] Because of this rapport with the mystery through action we find in the liturgy powerful evidence for the spiritual character of all the theological undertaking of Maximus. The liturgy was the situation in which the mystery was assimilated in a way that transcends a mere conceptualization in an intellectual way. It was the acting out of faith in terms of sacrament and through sacrament there was a living relationship with Christ who is the mystery in a fuller sense. The liturgy came within the purview of 'natural contemplation' but as a symbol, in the maximian sense of a mode of the presence of the mystery rather than as a quarry for theological language and thought.[103] Mystagogy was for Maximus a kind of initiation into the mysteries, an interpretation not unlike the catechetical

interpretations of other Fathers, Cyril of Jerusalem for instance, who prepared their neophytes, not merely to understand the mysteries, but to be existentially disposed to enter into them by fitting states of mind and feeling.[104] It was an exercise in proper orientation.

Having reviewed Maximus' use of scripture and tradition in the sense of the councils and fathers and having recalled the concrete milieu of his christian experience in the liturgy we must now address ourselves to the question of how he searched for God by an appreciation of what it was to be a knowing subject confronted not merely with revelation in the strict sense, but with nature as a declaration of the Logos.

(iii) Logos

Perhaps the theological epistemology of Maximus could be described as logical realism. For Him the ultimate real in the order of knowledge is the Logos and consciousness is the real come to self-awareness, so that consciousness finds in itself the real in terms of knowledge, it is the real in the order of knowledge, become aware of reality and so of the laws of reality, so that gnoseological laws are the laws of being at the level of knowledge and awareness. Since this real is, for Maximus, the Logos, being logical is having a consciousness that obeys the reality of the Logos participated, that submits to the laws of logic in the sense of being, as a capacity of knowing, conformed subjectively to the reality of the Logos and so able to lay hold of the Logos through the logoi of created things, of

being able to appropriate the truth that is derived from the Logos and leads to the Logos. The process of knowing theologically approximates to the knowledge the Logos has of reality in himself and as Himself, being a share in his knowledge as faith and in the power to know with the laws of knowing woven into it so that a right use of that power will ensure the unfolding of what is implicit in the statements of scripture and also in the manifestation of the Logos that Maximus finds in nature.

As we have noted already Maximus does not think of philosophy as a possibility for the Christian apart from the 'practical philosophy' of the purification wrought in man by his tackling inordinate passions which distort human vision, giving him a caricature of the real, by restricting his knowledge to sense and the merely created. The purification then is not conceived as a merely moral rectification but as the physical rectification of the power to know, rendering it truly logical. This, for him, is the pre-requisite of 'natural contemplation' or 'contemplation in spirit'.[105] The object of that contemplation is Scripture and nature, so that we have a 'natural contemplation' of Scripture and a 'natural contemplation' of nature of 'the beings of nature'.[106] Maximus deals with this possibility and this distinction in many places, especially in the Ambigua. Commenting on the Transfiguration, for instance, he writes that 'the most blessed splendour of the shining face, which was too much for the power to see, is a symbol of his divinity which is above intellect, sensation, substance and knowledge. .... the white garments are the symbol of the words

of sacred Scripture, in so far as they became for them (the apostles) limpid and clear and evident ... and of the creation itself in so far as it was liberated from the perverse opinion of those who allow themselves to be deceived by its appearances and are bound by sensation alone ... In the words of Scripture he is veiled as Logos, in creation as creator, maker and artificer. Therefore I affirm that whoever wishes to make for God in an unblameworthy way has absolute need of both, whether of the scriptural knowledge in spirit or of natural contemplation of being according to spirit'.[107] The interest of Maximus in the knowledge of nature was caught up in the dynamic of his whole life with its powerful bias to God and union with Him, so that we never find him revelling in a merely humanistic way in knowledge for its own sake. This does not mean that he was in any way negligent of the power to know, accepting its strength and limitations with wisdom. While he normally used the argument from nature together with that from scripture and the fathers and councils, there were two areas where he occasionally used it on its own: natural theology and anthropology. We can hear anticipatory notes from the Canticle of the Sun in this quotation: 'all the creatures that make up the totality of the cosmos praise and glorify God with inarticulate expressions, and their praise becomes ours, "by means of having received the power to praise", says Gregory, the great eponym of theology'.[108] The recognition of God from creatures depends on the Christian apatheia, but that undertaken and the consequent power of vision achieved, they 'learned that there is a provident being of things,

whom they recognized as God and the creator of all things.[109] Maximus contrasts the views of the Christian thinker on creation with those of origenism, which he attributes to pagan Greek thought. For him the dependence of the world on God was total, the contrast between the creature and God absolute, so that the providence of God was universal and absolute too: 'Providence is the will of God, by which all beings receive fitting guidance'.[110] He finds the origenistic teaching on the 'unity of logical beings' had its origin in 'the thought of the Greeks'.[111] It would be entirely mistaken to suggest that Maximus hellenized the gospel. He accepts the opinions of the philosophers when they coincide with his own, but he contradicts them, modifies them, reinterprets them according to the exigencies of his independent thought, which is thoroughly Christian in inspiration and evolution. There is no need to substantiate that claim here beyond referring to passages like these in the Opuscula Theologica et Polemica, where he contrasts Christian usage with that of the pagan philosophers in the interpretation of terms like nature, individual and hypostasis.[112]

The other area where he sees the validity of the natural argument as particularly relevant is that of anthropology. His thought about man and his nature is expressed at times without citations from the Scripture or the Fathers, as for instance in his Letter to Bishop John, where the argument is from Reason only, as he proves that the soul is incorporeal.[113] In another letter he undertakes to show how the soul continues to hold its intellectual

capacity after death.[114] His thought in this style is very self-critical and he affirms more than once that it is a matter of 'research',[115] or 'conjecture';[116] the quality of the certainty is in contrast to the dogmatic assurance of argument from scripture and tradition which can give a 'tranquil knowledge of God and his creatures'.[117] The argument from nature can give genuine knowledge, but it must be accompanied by a sense of its frailty which becomes its strength, a quality that Maximus finds lacking in the pagans who 'believed that all that could not be affirmed by their own reasonings did not in fact exist either'.[118]

Although Maximus was the greatest thinker of his age and has left ample evidence of the depth and breadth of his mind, although he provided a system of thought that was a thoroughly Christian counterpart to ancient philosophy, particularly because of its comprehensive-ness, he nowhere confronts ancient philosophy as such, nor does he give us an explicit account of how he saw the relation between philosophy and his own synthesis. As Sherwood has shown with authority, he was capable of giving an orthodox bias to a system as profound and comprehensive as that of Origen, but he does it modestly, quietly, almost, one would think, without adverting to his momentous adjustments.[119]

We have seen that Maximus considers the Logos not merely as the ultimate reality but also as in some way shared by man subjectively, so that his thought is logical when it is consistent with the Logos, not merely as an appropriation of objective reality, but as the proper

functioning of the knowing subject. What is illogical cannot coexist with what is logical for Maximus, no more than light can cause darkness, incredulity find a place in faith or the devil connive with Christ.[120] The metaphysical impossibility of the coincidence of the incompatible becomes in the order of knowledge the principle of contradiction in the thought of Maximus, the irreplaceable foundation of sane thought and for him that sanity is required in every sphere of enquiry and reflection, human and divine: 'It is not possible to consider contradictory realities at the same time and under the same aspect'.[121]

There are numerous examples in the theology of the Confessor where he points out the presence or absence of this principle: in his rejection of the origenistic thesis about the fall of the angels and men from the primitive <u>henad</u> of rational beings,[122] demonstrating the absurdity of knowing God as He knows himself,[123] in his refutation of the monothelite errors, where he reduces their errors to the heretical opinions of their predecessors already condemned and then shows the illogical character of the previous opinions.[124] On the other hand, he frequently examines the logical coherence of the Christian teaching as for instance with an argument that foreshadows the contemporary proof from the connection of dogmas, he confutes the origenistic opinion on the pre-existence of souls by showing that not alone is it metaphysically absurd, but irreconcilable with the 'most mysterious of the divine mysteries, the mystery of Christ'.[125] Likewise he can use effectively arguments based on the soteriological principle which held such sway with the

Fathers as he does, for example, when he quotes Gregory of Nazianzus: 'what was not assumed, was that not healed; that in turn which is united to God is also saved'[126] and concludes that something of human nature would have evaded salvation if there were not two wills and activities in Christ.[127] We have further compelling evidence of his esteem for vigorous logic in his finding that principles of 'theology' are valid in 'economy'.[128] Besides 'every proposition pertaining to the right profession of faith can show its bond with the fundamental truths expressed in the Creed'.[129] But logical coherence is not something static, it is seen too in growth, not in the sense of addition to the deposit of faith, but in a deepening and widening of the understanding of faith. Because it was the meaning immanent in the words that the theologian sought, it was reasonable to expect development in doctrine as a mode of profounder understanding, of a more explicit grasp of the meaning of the words of revelation.

Maximus did not shirk this task in his christological debates and he found a precedent for it in both the practice of councils and the method of his great theological predecessors: 'if indeed it is possible to accuse the council of Chalcedon of a different definition of the faith because of the addition of expressions to the definition of the Council of Nicaea, the same accusation must logically follow for the same reason against Cyril and the one hundred and fifty. If on the other hand it is not possible to bring this accusation against the latter, I cannot understand how it can be brought against the former'.[130] The irreproachable Gregory of Nanzianzus is brought in to justify his procedure: he would be open to the same

accusation from his adversaries of having distorted doctrine 'because he developed that which at the council of Nicaea was said in an incomplete way about the Holy Spirit' because (as he said) "such a question had not been asked then"[131] and he recognized the Spirit with the Father and the Son and wrote to Cledonius to think and teach that'.[132] The way of development was not for Maximus, no more than for any of the Fathers, a mere philological exercise. For them the indwelling of the Spirit in the Church was a guarantee that the Church was in possession of her total doctrine just as a person knows his own mind.[133] The development of doctrine is the development in awareness of the total content of the words of revelation. The mystery has been expressed in history, but it is not possible to lay hold of the mystery by merely scrutinizing the history; it must be contemplated in the light of the Church's faith in the mystery itself. The growing awareness is not the exclusive privilege of theologians; it is the whole Church that makes progress in the realization of the implications of the deposit of faith, because it is the whole Church that is informed by the Holy Spirit. Within that mutuality the Fathers were for Maximus the brilliant logicians.

The theologian is soon confronted with the problem of combining negation and affirmation in his discourse on God and all things in relation to Him. He has to steer a steady course between an arrogance that would presume to speak accurately and satisfactorily about God in himself and the opposite temptation to give up the attempt and say nothing at all because of the magnitude of the task and the impenetrability of the divine. Since Moses had caught

sight of the back of God and had been blinded by the light of his presence, men had oscillated between apophaticism and cataphaticism. We find it in Philo, the Cappadocians and Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite for instance,[134] before we come up against it in Maximus. It is well to mention this here as it concerned Maximus as a theologian and we find that he balances the possibilities very nicely by his confidence in speaking about the 'energy' of God while accepting the inaccessibility of the divine essence.[135] Nor does he become vertiginous in reconciling affirmation and negation because he holds on to his principle of contradiction and allows a succession in the phases of knowing, extrapolating with assurance, qualifying with respect for mystery, constantly mindful that God transcends both negation and affirmation.[136] Because our language is the expression of our conceptual appropriation of created reality, the scriptures too have to accept the limitations of creaturely expression in the face of the divine ineffability. This holds even for the Word made flesh: 'In fact being truly made substantial with our substance, the supersubstantial Logos joined with the affirmation of nature and that which is natural their negation through supereminence and became man, joining the τρόπος of supernatural being with the λόγος of the being of nature'.[137] 'Substantial' here implies coming within the ambit of created being and so of creaturely intelligence.

Before bringing this section to a close it will be helpful to mention the Fathers that Maximus quotes in his christological works to give an idea of extent of his knowledge of the Fathers. There is no need to elaborate

his use of the Fathers here in the sense of how he handled the testimony of individuals. It can be said in general that it was reverent but free. The present list is by way of making concrete the many references already given to 'the Fathers': Cyril of Alexandria, Gregory of Nanzianzus, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite ('Bishop of Athens'!), John of Constantinople, Chrysostom, Athanasius of Alexandria, Leo the Great, Anastasius of Antioch, Clement of Alexandria, Theophilus of Alexandria, Ambrose of Milan, Cyril of Jerusalem, Severianus of Gabala, Eulogius of Alexandria, Irenaeus of Lyons, Alexander of Alexandria, Eustachius of Antioch, Diadocus of Photice, Nemesius of Emesa, Justin the philosopher. He quotes these in his treatment of the two wills and energies of Christ. His spirituality shows acquaintance, with Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nanzianzus, Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite and Evagrius, John Climacus and John Moschus. Leontius of Byzantium, Leontius of Jerusalem and John of Scythopolis influenced him especially in forging an accurate language to make the proper distinctions in his personalism.

Enough has been said to justify Maximus' title to being a theologian and to show how he conceived the metier of doing theology. Because of our special interest in the spiritual aspect of his theological work it may be useful to add that his theology as a whole was spiritual because of its orientation to mysticism, placed as we have seen between 'practical and philosophy' and 'theology'. It was spiritual too in the sense that his method rested on faith in the 'mystery', a word that always means for him the

saving event of Christ, and that basic stance gave a spiritual character to all his thought: it was a persevering exploration of the implications of his relationship to Christ in faith and probably, as we have suggested, in a faith that was enhanced by contemplative experience. This is evident in his use of scripture for instance, where he is habitually concerned with the 'spiritual sense'. It must be remembered too that for him theology, while it was splendidly speculative, was never merely academic. It was always done with a sense of the urgency of the love of God and so even his most abstract reflections have some orientation to finality. The pressure of finality becomes more evident in his strictly spiritual works, where not alone is the method spiritual but the content too in the sense that it is concerned with the praxis of metanoia and contemplation. Works like the Liber Asceticus,[138] Capitum de Caritate Quattuor Centuriae,[139] Capitum Theologicorum et Oeconomicorum Duae Centuriae,[140] apart from some masterful Epistolae,[141] give ample evidence of this Christian commitment. We shall examine more closely below the claim of the Expositio Orationis Dominicae[142] to be called a work of Christian spirituality.

The Works of St. Maximus the Confessor

Having seen something of the method of St. Maximus as a theologian, it will be instructive to survey briefly his extant writings which give evidence of the depth and breadth of his thought as well as of a highly developed faith and spiritual awareness. Although the categories, into which his writings are usually divided, are somewhat artificial and not at all water-tight, they will suffice

as a basis for the kind of discussion envisaged here. It is customary to classify them as exegetical writings, commentaries on the Fathers, liturgical works, dogmatic-polemical treatises and ascetic-mystical writings. His letters, apart from giving occasional flashes of insight into his personality, might be said to cover in their interest all the other classes just mentioned. Some are purely occasional pieces.

(i) Exegetical Writings

The most important of these writings is Quaestiones ad Thalassium in locos Scripturae difficiles,[143] being sixty five questions and answers on difficult passages in Scripture addressed to his friend Thalassius, a Libyan priest-monk whose acquaintance he would have made after his arrival in Africa. Sherwood dates it between 630 and 633/634.[144] In the literary genre of patristic exegesis of Scripture, Maximus develops many suspects of a spiritual anthropology in keeping with the tradition of monasticism to which Thalassius would have belonged, while taking care to correct its origenistic deviations in matters cosmological and anthropological. It is obviously meant to be used as monastic spiritual reading. Writing in the genre Quaestiones et Responsiones, about which our knowledge is far from complete, Maximus undertakes to meet his friend's request for a commentary κατά τήν ἀναγωγικήν θεωρίαν .[145] He realises that Thalassius has attained to the summit of spiritual knowledge and so he accommodates his observations to the needs of one who has transcended the letter for the

spirit and concentrates on anagogical interpretation of the texts: 'We shall pass over then the history, already corporally fulfilled in the time of Moses, and shall consider that history's spiritual power with the mind's eye, a power ever becoming and, in the process, flourishing all the more'.[146] Maximus allows that there may be several valid higher interpretations of a text because of the convergence of partial realizations in a central mystery of which there will be diverse representations. Sherwood would seem to have demonstrated that for Maximus this mystery is 'the mystery of Christ and of our unity in Him'.[147] As Maximus read Scripture, the Lord of glory was present to him in a faith enhanced by θεολογία and so his commentaries constantly refer to this illuminating presence and do not pretend to be exegesis in the Antiochene tradition, much less in a contemporary sense. Maximus is in the Alexandrine tradition of exegesis that derives from Origen, which brings together the interpretation of the Old Testament in its fulfilment in Christ, with the Hellenic categories of the material and the νοητόν . For Maximus with St. Paul, 'the end of the law is Christ'.[148] The aim and object of his interpretation is an ἀναγωγή that will issue in the manifestation of the Spirit proportionate to each one's faith.[149]

The Quaestiones et Dubia[150] and the Ad Theopemptum scholasticum[151] are works of exegesis in the same class as the Quaestiones ad Thalassium. They are both early works, seemingly more or less contemporaneous with the ad Thalassium. The former is a series of seventy nine

questions and answers. The questions cover a wider range than those in the ad Thalassium, but often the answers are no more than a sentence or two. Ad Theopemptum is described as 'Qui quaesierat de judice iniquitatis; deque illo, "Si quis percusserit te in dexteram maxillam"; itemque illo, "Nòli me tangere: nondum enim ascendi ad Patrem" ', three questions that give Maximus an opportunity of giving a gnostic interpretation of scripture and touching on points of what we would call Christian spirituality. With his Expositio in Psalmum LIX (Deus, repulisti nos)[152] and Orationis Dominicae brevis expositio[153] we come to the two commentaries on scriptural prayer composed by Maximus, one from the Old Testament, the other from the New. Again the weight of opinion places them among the earlier works of Maximus, Sherwood dating the former at 626 and the commentary on the Our Father: 628-630,[154] in Psalm LIX, the psalmist celebrates the deeds of David, recorded in 2 Kings, 8 and 1 Paralipomenon, 18; the exegesis of Maximus is little concerned with the letter, but strives after the allegorical sense centred on Christ's victory and the vocation of the nations, with penetrating observations on aspects of spiritual anthropology. Here too we find Maximus, in the patristic tradition, using numbers as tools for insight and principles of formal organisation. Proper names are also here considered to be keys to deciphering the mysteries hidden in the words of Scripture. In spite of its relative brevity the Orationis Dominicae brevis expositio is a work of considerable importance in the Maximian corpus.[155] In itself it is a commentary on

the Lord's Prayer full of theological insight, but perhaps it will be seen to have an even greater importance because of its powerfully articulated synthetic character. It is a commonplace of scholarship to remark on the lack of a thorough synthesis of Maximus' thought. He himself never provided it, either because he did not think that it was necessary to his immediate purposes or because he did not have the opportunity of welding all the essential elements of his theology into a whole, or even because it eluded him due to its vast and complex character. But there can be no doubt about his having had the principles of such a synthesis; we have evidence for that in this commentary.

From the point of view of exegesis it is in line with the other exegetical works in that its main interest is in an attempt to convey his own insights into the divine mystery and the economy, those λόγοι that appear in θεωρία φυσική, here brought to bear on the dominical prayer itself. Nor must we exclude the possibility that this θεωρία was modified by θεολογία in such a way that his intuitions became too rich and too profound for straightforward comment, but rather often give the impression that he is struggling to express simultaneously many facets of a mystery. It is intended to be an affective initiation into the mysteries that it presents so that 'we may appropriate these blessings of which only God the Father, by the natural intermediary of his Son, is, in the Holy Spirit, the veritable dispenser', in the words of Maximus himself.[156] This claim is strengthened by the knowledge that the 'Our Father' finds a place in the liturgy and that 'mystagogy' was designed to facilitate

fruitful participation in the liturgical life of the early church as we see in the catheceses of Cyril of Jerusalem and Theodore of Mopsuestia.[157] The Orationis Dominicae brevis expositio is related to the other works in this class and to grasp its full implications it would be necessary to refer constantly to them, as to both content and method. It can be said here that it is equally related to his great patristic commentaries and to the Mystagogia. Although Maximus had not undertaken his specialized Christological explorations when he composed this work, it provides sufficient foundation for assimilating whatever was to come, and in fact adumbrates it in an unambiguous way.

(ii) Liturgy

With the Mystagogia[158] we come to one of the most significant and influential of the writings of Maximus. It is generally considered to have been composed during the earlier phase of his literary output; Sherwood places it between 628 and 630;[159] Dalmais thinks that it probably comes between 632 and 634.[160] It has obvious affinities with all the works of that period and especially with Ambigua II. It reflects the monastic anthropology which by that time had come to maturity in its essentials and which forms the groundwork of his teaching as it is to be found more or less clearly articulated in the Quaestiones ad Thalassium, the Ambigua I and II, the Capita Caritatis, the Capita Theologica et Oeconomica as well as in the Liber Asceticus. It has much in common too with the Orationis Dominicae brevis expositio, not only with regard to its

anthropological content, but also because of its firm structure. The introductory seven chapters see the church edifice as an image of God, the universe, man and scripture. It is an image of the great mysteries accomplished within the church itself and of the anthropological and cosmic syntheses achieved through the mystery. 'The mystery' is Christ through whose hypostatic union the original intention of the 'oneing' of the Creator and the creature is brought about, primarily through the deification of man which, for Maximus, is a participation in the mode of existence proper to the Word in his relation with his Father and by which the ultimate unity of all things is made possible while conserving their distinguishing particularities. Chapters 8 to 23 are concerned with the spiritual interpretation of the rites in their temporal sequence. It is noteworthy that Maximus does not undertake to comment on the more sacred parts of the eucharistic synaxis, but leaves them wrapped in the silence which fosters γνῶσις as if it were the realm of the priest beyond the iconostasis. He has addressed himself to the uncovering of 'the mystery' which is the focal point of the whole liturgical celebration by leading into it or by a μυσταγωγία .[161]

It has been pointed out that the kernel of Maximus' teaching with regard to the liturgy is that beyond, but through the rites, everyone of the faithful is introduced into ultimate realities, the mystery, the coming of the kingdom in power which the Church introduced into the interior of time and of which it anticipates the full realisation in the measure in which the faithful allow

themselves to be taken hold of by the τρόπος ὑπάρξεως of the Christ to which the mysteries celebrated ought to conform them.[162] The final chapter 24 rounds off the work with further observations, the anthropological one being most probably the work of Maximus himself, the liturgical comments being more probably the contribution of anonymous scholiasts.

The Mystagogia is a work of liturgical θεωρία. As such, it fits perfectly into the totality of Maximus' vision and describes a process that is an essential component in his spiritual anthropology. For him the mystery can be revealed in the λόγοι that contemplation releases from the natural universe; it is equally accessible in the words of Scripture; the presupposition of the liturgical treatise under consideration here is that it is to be found too in the rites of the eucharistic synaxis.[163] The Mystagogia purports to introduce us into a knowledge of γνῶσις of the mystery by a θεωρία directed to the liturgical symbols. Θεωρία then is the process by which the initiation is effected in mystagogy. Corresponding to the threefold possibilities of λόγοι scriptural words and liturgical rites there will be three kinds of mystagogy: cosmic, scriptural and liturgical, achieved by natural, scriptural and liturgical θεωρία.[164] This higher knowledge of the mystery is to be attained by an intellectual penetration of the mystery under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit and it would fall short of Maximus' understanding of the knowledge involved to restrict it to a merely speculative exercise. The γνῶσις implies experience of the mystery, something that

modifies not only the noetic faculties, but through them the whole man under the shock of a personal encounter with the living mystery of Christ, so that γνῶσις is complemented by πρᾶξις and the total commitment of the man is unfolded in the activation of ζωτική δύναμις as a response to God as Good and in conjunction with the perfection of his νοῦς in living knowledge of God as the Truth.[165]

An analysis of the text soon reveals a complex tissue of references to Maximus' great predecessors. While it is beyond the scope of this brief survey to attempt to disentangle the root system of Maximus' dependence on others, it is essential to point out that he explicitly declares that he is emulating to Pseudo-Dionysius[166] and there are references to his work in the course of the Mystagogia,[167] but it is equally imperative to keep in mind that the work of Maximus is in striking contrast to that of Dionysius, not only in its method and object, but especially in the perspective of spiritual anthropology against which he sets his theory of liturgical anagogy.[168] References to Evagrius also abound and probably through him to Origen, although it would be difficult to prove that Maximus had not read Origen himself when he came to write his Mystagogia.[169] Bornert has brought attention to the fact that in the Mystagogia Maximus gave to monastic asceticism a liturgical broadening, and proposed the exterior cult of the liturgy as a valid basis for mystical ascent, thus synthesising the hesychasm of Evagrius and the sacramentalism of Dionysius; at the same time he offset the danger of spiritualism in the former and formalism in the latter, by having integrated again gnostic understanding in liturgical action, and above all, in this way, he rooted

christian mysticism in the mystery of Christ.[170] The dependence of Maximus is quite obvious, but no less obvious is his originality in having turned the teaching of his predecessors to greater advantage because of his Christian holism. The employment of the 'old man'[171] as the source of his information and indeed formation in the liturgy, may be nothing more than a literary device, but it may also be a tribute to a liturgical initiate to whom Maximus owed a genuine debt. Dalmais has suggested, tentatively, that this may be a reference to Sophronius.[172] It is interesting to speculate that the reference to love of the neighbour, found at the end of Mystagogia may be an echo of the central theme of the Liber Asceticus and in turn may be derived from Sophronius and through him from abbot Palladius.[173]

(iii) Commentaries on the Fathers

Since the condemnation of 553 forbade even the name of Origen to be mentioned, we find that Maximus had to tackle the problems of Origenism by discussing controversial passages taken from the works of the great Fathers, especially from St. Gregory of Naziansus, and given an ambiguous interpretation by those in monastic circles who wished to hold on to the teaching of Origen, Didymus and Evagrius.[174] The main purpose of his De variis difficilibus locis SS. Patrum Dionysii et Gregorii[175] was to reverse the pernicious conclusions drawn from the Origen's theory of the Henad, which can be seen as a grandiose attempt to interpret Scripture in concepts of a Plotinian hellenism.[176] In this system the eternal goodness of God was deemed to account for the eternal creation of the

'rationals',[177] so that the pre-existence of souls was integral to this teaching.[178] A combination of spiritual satiety[179] and free choice[180] was invoked to account for the fall and a second creation,[181] in which bodies[182] were provided for the progressive recovery of a purely spiritual state through knowledge of God gained in 'an experience of the contrary' and by habitual prayer and apatheia.[183] This process would be completed in the apokatastasis[184] or reconstitution of the Henad, when the 'rationals' having shed their material bodies,[185] would, become like Christ, the one unfallen logikos not open to evil.[186]

The bulk of the Ambigua consists of commentaries on opinions of Gregory, but Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite figures in the work too. In fact, there are two sets of ambigua: Ambigua II[187] or the 'Earlier Ambigua', dating from 628-30 and Ambigua I,[188] written in 634 or shortly afterwards. Maximus himself placed the later Ambigua before those written in 628-30 and numbered them accordingly, Ambigua 1-5 of Ambigua I thus preceding Ambigua 6-71 of the 'Earlier Ambigua', a convention that has been observed ever since. The characteristic themes of this work give us some idea of its scope: of the Trinity, Christological problems, the Logos-Christus relationship, anthropology, the Economy, prophecy, negative and affirmative theology, arguments against Origenism, arguments against other errors, straightforward exegesis and philological exercises. Sherwood, who has written the fullest commentary on Ambigua II so far,[189] points out that 'the Ambigua are an illustration of that diabasis from the temporal and the present to the everlasting, of

the entirely central place that Christ and the Incarnation play in the attaining of that goal: participation in (rather than vision of) the Blessed Trinity'.[190]

Of the quotations chosen for comment in Ambigua I by 'the holy man, Thomas', four are taken from the Orations of Gregory[191] and one from the Epistola ad Gaium[192] of Dionysius. Maximus is invited to elaborate his understanding of statements like 'Therefore unity, having from all eternity arrived by motion at duality, found its rest in trinity';[193] 'For he whom you now treat with contempt was once above you. He who is now man was once uncompounded. What he was he continued to be; what he was not he took to himself'[194] from Gregory or this from Dionysius: 'How, you say, is Jesus, who is superior to all, reduced to the same order of essence as the rest of men? Nor in this place is he considered as the cause of men, but as being, in fact, essentially a complete man'.[195] Ambiguum V,[196] to which this citation is prologue, is the only complete chapter devoted to Dionysius. Here Maximus comments on the 4th Letter of Dionysius in which is found the celebrated expression καινήν τινα τήν θεανδρικήν ἐνέργειαν ',[197] that was modified tendentiously in the debates of the time. The presence of Dionysius is palpable in other ambigua and in the Quaestiones ad Thalassium, Capitum de Caritate Quattuor Centuriae, the Mystagogia as well as in the Quaestiones et Dubia, Opuscula Theologica et Polemica, the 'Gnostic Chapters' and Epistola XIII.

Lack of unanimity on the significance of the Dionysian corpus makes it difficult to assess the influence of Dionysius on Maximus or of the way in which Maximus

modified this doctrine to make it more congruous with tradition.[198] Riou has suggested that Maximus counter-balanced an excessively personalist Origenism with the cosmic ontology of Dionysius, so that we find in Maximus a teaching in which person or nature do not obscure each other, but remain in an irreducible tension.[199] Whether we think of the Dionysian cascade as primarily ontological or primarily gnoseological, it is obvious that the teaching of Maximus has a much sounder Christological base.[200] 'And although Riou's division is rather too neat, it points to one of the most important features of Maximus' work, its character as a '"metaphysics of grace" - a serious essay on the structure of reality that yet succeeds in having at its heart the free loving activity of God in Christ, the self-yielding of God on the cross'.[201]

Finally it can be said that the Scholia in opera S. Dionysii[202] which have been ascribed to Maximus are almost certainly not his work.[203]

(iv) Dogmatic-Polemical

The works of Maximus in this category fall into two principal groups, both concerned with questions of Christology. The first set is directed to clarifying the dyophysite position and combating Severian Monophysitism; these works cover the time between the beginning of Maximus' writing career, probably about 625, and his Epistola XVIII written in the name of the prefect, George in 641.[204] The second set has to do with the heresies that came to a head during the lifetime of Maximus himself: Monenergism and Monothelitism.[205] We find the discussion of these problems becoming progressively more prominent in

his works from 634, onwards and they engaged his attention right up to the end of his life.[206]

By the time that Maximus had become aware of the religious situation in his environment, Monophysitism had consolidated itself in three areas: among the Copts and Abyssinians, Syrian Jacobites and Armenians.[207] The tendency to discount the humanity of Christ had been felt before the events that led to the Council of Chalcedon (451), especially in the teaching of Apollinarius.[208] But it was Eutyches, 'the aged and muddle-headed archimandrite',[209] who was challenged by Leo in his Tome and who was condemned for his monophysitic views at Chalcedon.[210] He was induced to concede that Christ was 'of two natures', but he insisted that 'after the union, I confess one nature'.[211] With Timothy Aelurus we find the beginning of a rigorous insistence on the terminology of Cyril as the canon in these matters,[212] so that Monophysitism, pretending to conserve a pure Alexandrian doctrine, became a movement and found powerful adherents among monks and prelates, including Peter the Fuller, Philoxenus of Mabboug and Severus.[213] These theologians, especially Severus, gave proof of a speculative ability far beyond that of the well-meaning but blundering Eutyches, multum imprudens et nimis imperitus.[214] The situation was aggravated by political interest and initiative at both the ecclesiastical and secular levels. It was the moderate and subtle teaching of Severus that attracted the attention of Maximus.[215] The debate between Severus and Julian of Halicarnassus illustrates how difficult it was to steer an orthodox course between the variations of heteredoxy at the time,

because interpreted benignly, the doctrine of Severus would seem to be unimpeachable.[216] Even though his language, properly sieved, may be shown to be wholesome,[217] yet his inability to make any concessions to the conciliatory John the Grammarian[218] may indicate some deficiency in ecclesial sense and, in fact, a terminology not sufficiently refined to provide an alternative to that of Leo and the Chalcedonian canons, which in retrospect, is accepted as faithful to the Tradition in both the East and the West. Maximus, who had an exact concept of Nestorianism,[219] saw in the teaching of Severus a monophysitic threat to orthodoxy and he reacted accordingly.[220]

Among the works of Maximus that show his concern with precision in language and exact definition in debate with the Monophysites we find: De duabus Christi naturis;[221] De qualitate, proprietate et differentia ad Theodorum Presbyterum in Mazario;[222] Capita de substantia seu essentia et natura deque hypostasi et persona;[223] De communi et proprio, hoc est, de essentia et hypostasi ad Cosmam religiosissimum diaconum Alexandrinum.[224] We find an explicit defence of the Definition of Chalcedon in Opusculum XXII.[225] Epistolae XII[226] and XIII[227] provide evidence of his theological polemic directed against Severus. It is abundantly clear from the writings of Maximus that these debates were not conducted in the atmosphere of an ivory tower. The affair of George, Eparch of Africa, and the way in which it prompted 'a long exposition of the right faith in view of the Severian doctrine'[228] shows that the doctrinal divergences were considered by Maximus to be something of far greater import than doctrinaire logomachy.[229] They were matters of truth and life.

With the promulgation of the Pact of Union[220] by Cyrus, Patriarch of Alexandria, in 633, new Christological problems demanded the attention of the upholders of orthodoxy. Sophronius immediately objected to the conciliatory Monenergism of the Pact.[231] The astute Sergius of Constantinople realized that the Pact would open fresh rifts in the Christian empire and at the end of 633 he brought out his Psephos in which he forbade the mention of either one or two operations in Christ.[232] By shifting the basis of a possible theological consensus to the realm of the will, he merely introduced a new heresy, Monothelitism, but so subtly that Honorius the Pope and Maximus, the greatest theologian of the day, did not find his formula alarming. The latter was willing to accept the Psephos in a dyothelite sense;[233] the former having failed to distinguish between diversity and contrariety in the wills of Christ, laid himself open to subsequent condemnation,[234] even although Maximus had interpreted his views in an orthodox way.[235] The doughty Sophronius published his Synodicon[236] in 634, in which he argued that Monenergism is at odds with the Tradition of the Church.[237] In 638, Sergius reaffirmed his position in his Ecthesis,[238] but he replaced a philosophical argument with an appeal to the authority of the hapless Honorius.[239] Meanwhile Maximus was refining his understanding of the problems involved in these debates. As early as 633 he was engaged in countering monenergistic arguments in Opusculum V[240] and in Epistola XIX,[241] of approximately the same date, we find him championing the dyothelite position, while at the same time praising Sergius effusively for having countered the heteredoxy of the Pact of Union in his Psephos.[242] Epistola XV,[243]

which is still as early as 634, is primarily concerned with the refutation of Monophysitism, but it contains antimonenergistic material too. With his Opusculum IV[244] in 634 we find the first approaches to a solution of the problem of monothelitism; this is developed in Opusculum XX.[245] Both of these works were composed about 640, after Maximus had heard of the Ecthesis.[246]

With the appearance of Opusculum VI[247] in 641, he provided a solution to Monothelitism which is also a landmark in the history of theology, since, for the first time, the place of the human will of Christ in the work of salvation is stated unequivocally.[248] The most extensive treatment of the problem posed by the interplay of the divine and human wills in the Agony in the Garden is to be found in Opusculum XV, ad sanctissimum Dorensem episcopum Stephanum.[249] This is also dealt with in Opuscula III,[250] VII[251] and XVI.[252] Maximus at one stroke, exposes the ambiguity of the interpretation of Sergius and puts forward a totally convincing piece of exegesis. His antimonotheliteolemic is exemplified in Opuscula XX,[253] XXIV[254] and XXV.[255] This reached its zenith with his celebrated Disputatio cum Pyrrho[256] which took place at Carthage in 645. Here we see Maximus not merely as a brilliant controversialist, but also as a theologian of formidable ability. In Opusculum XII[257] he has left us a valuable record of the principal events of the monothelite controversy. Opuscula XIV,[258] XVI[259] and XVIII[260] provide evidence of the meticulous care that Maximus devoted to honing theological concepts, the tools of orthodox thought and doctrine. Opuscula XV,[261] XXIII,[262] XXVI[263] and XXVII[264]

show him as the patristic anthologist, culling texts from the great Fathers, both as a means of insight into the tradition and as a way of defending a doctrinal development that was organically continuous with that tradition.

After the Dispute with Pyrrhus, Maximus went to Rome and collaborated with the theologians whose work under Pope Theodore bore fruit in the Lateran Synod of 649, which condemned the Typos of Constans.[265] This zeal for truth was interpreted as an act of defiance so that Maximus, together with Theodore's successor, Martin I, incurred the imperial displeasure which led to their arrest, trial and martyrdom. In the Disputatio Bizyae[266] with bishop Theodosius in 656 we have testimony that Maximus was still the vigorous and lucid champion of orthodoxy. Although we have extended passages on other dogmatic questions like that of the Blessed Trinity,[267] we do not have any complete work devoted to non-Christological questions. The De Anima,[268] long attributed to Maximus, is not considered to be authentic.

(v) Ascetic - Spiritual

As we have seen in the biographical chapter on Maximus, the question of his early formation is hypothetical as there are two distinct possibilities, the one stemming from the evidence of the Syriac Life, the other from the longer established Vita. If we are to accept the former, then Maximus was entrusted to the care of Abbot Pantaleon in the monastery of St. Chariton, known as the Palaia Lavra near Jerusalem when he was ten years of age and it was there that he received his monastic education; on the evidence of the Vita he received his formation in

the monastery of Chrysopolis, having distinguished himself in public service. We must admit that we do not know with any exactitude the programme of formation in either of these establishments as we lack the typica that would enable us to appreciate the style of life peculiar to these monasteries in which Maximus came to realize himself as a monk. The same holds for the monastery at Cyzicus, which as we have seen, may have been the place where he enjoyed theological exchanges with John of Cyzicus and his brethren. But although we do not possess definite evidence of the immediate monastic influences to which Maximus was subjected, we are not entirely devoid of information on the monastic life of his time and environment as we possess the more or less contemporary Pratum Spirituale[269] of John Moschus and the equally contemporaneous manual of spiritual formation by John Climacus entitled Scala Paradisi.[270] The light which these notable works may throw on the nature of the monastic life of the time in so far as it has bearing on Maximus would be very faint indeed and perhaps even illusory if it were not for his relationship with Sophronius,[271] the life-long companion of John Moschus, and one of the greatest exemplifiers of the monastic tradition associated with John Climacus.[272] The Syriac Life would have us believe that Sophronius, a monk of the monastery of St. Theodosius near St. Chariton's, admired Maximus in his youth and suggests that Sophronius may even have been influenced by Maximus.[273] The probability of Sophronius having been Maximus' abbot much later when they lived in the monastery of Eucratades in Africa is well established[274]

and John Moschus, known as 'Eucratos' probably lent his name as well as his presence to this community. There can be no question of affirming that the identical typicon was in use in St. Chariton's and in the Eucratades, but it is entirely probable that Maximus would have sought a kind of monastic life in exile that corresponded to what he knew as a young monk, so that he breathed the air so to speak of Moschus and Sophronius, and so would have seen monastic life as they did.

The alternative possibility of giving a local habitation and a name to the monastic milieu in which Maximus may have received his initial formation is the monastery of Phillipicus, the brother-in-law of Emperor Maurice, founded in 594, in the asiatic suburb if Constantinople, Chrysopolis, on Mount St. Elijah and dedicated to the Mother of God.[275] As we do not possess the typicon of this monastery we have no exact information about the life in the monastery nor the system for the initiation of novices. The monastic movement had spread like wildfire through all the East after the example of Antony and Pachomius. Although there is no evidence of monastic life in Constantinople before 382, once the first monastery of Dalmatius was founded there it made such startling progress that by 536 there were 73 monasteries for men, including foundations set aside for national or provincial communities within the city.[276] These disappeared about 536, probably due to the pressure of Byzantine nationalism and the monastery of Chrysopolis may well have been a replacement for a dissolved community.

Again we know nothing definite about the regime in the monastery of Chrysopolis nor in that at Cyzicus, in one or both of which Maximus may have been a monk. But we do know that the Byzantine monasticism of his time recognised the genius of St. Basil and the relevance of his monastic Rules.[277] True the basilian renaissance of St. Theodore had not yet taken place, but the cenobitical ideal that obtained in the monasteries of Constantinople and its environs was stamped with the character of Basil long before the Studite monasticism of the ninth century emerged as unequivocally basilian.[278] So that apart from explicit references to Basil, the possibility and even probability of his influence having gone to shaping the monastic outlook of Maximus is considerable, if Maximus became a novice in Chrysopolis. The moderation of Basil is the obvious quality that spirituality inherited from him. His ideal of cenobitism to the exclusion of anchoritism had not yet impressed itself on Byzantine practice. Gregory of Nazianzus, explored the interior of the monastic ideal that had been outlined by Basil and we have no doubt that with him we can identify a definite influence on Maximus. We have seen already that Maximus had a first-hand knowledge of the works of Gregory of Nazianzus. We inevitably find gregorian themes woven into the spiritual treatises of Maximus: the dangers that attend spiritual progress, the need of purifications and the master theme of divinisation. Maximus encountered the spiritual teaching of Nanzianzus in the systematisations of Evagrius as well, but we find in Maximus's handling of theosis a greater emphasis on the will. The

consummation of spiritual growth takes place in the silent envelopment of the Spirit in which the divinized man knows God intimately through the Word made flesh.[279] Basil's brother, Gregory of Nyssa, completed this erudite monastic spirituality by providing a system of thought that would make more explicit the implications of monastic life and endowed it with a highly developed mystical teaching. He too was known to Maximus.

So we find the same monastic preoccupations in the writing of Gregory of Nyssa: the struggle with the passions, the elements of the virtuous life; i.e. faith, prayer, joy, angelic conduct, impassibility, charity and the imitation of Christ. The contrast between knowing God in himself and through his attributes of goodness, justice, providence and peace as well as the theme of darkness are central to his spirituality. The dependence of Dionysius on Nyssa is patent, even if modified and, apart from direct knowledge of his works, Maximus would have undergone the influence of Nyssa through his reading of Dionysius.[280] Epektasis[281] and apokatastasis[282] find their level in an original way in the teaching of Maximus. We can say, therefore, that in him we find the confluence of two great monastic traditions, the one taking its rise in Egypt and eventually acquiring a theological dimension from the works of Origen, which reached the monastic milieux of Maximus' time primarily through the teaching of Evagrius, but which also finds testimony in the works of Moschus and Climacus, the other reaching him by way of the Pseudo-Dionysius and carrying with it the Cappadocian assimilation and development of Origen as a theory that rendered intelli-

gible to a high degree the monastic ideal, as well as providing it with an organisation that was more sophisticated in its intellectual justification than the empirical system of Pachomius.[283] The influences on Maximus can be seen as typical of the monastic world of his time; while there were different forms of monastic life and different formulae for the regulation of spiritual endeavour, it would be a mistake to imagine that monastic forms with a bias towards the desert were insensitive to the refinements of the Cappadocians, or that monasteries with a cenobitical and liturgical emphasis were unaware of the great tradition of the Desert Fathers. This is a way of saying that if Maximus entered the Palaia Lavra in Palestine, it did not mean that he was cut off from the rich patrimony of the more cenobitical forms of monastic life, especially the Cappadocian heritage; nor can we equally exclude from the formation programme of a monastery near Constantinople the knowledge of the ideals and methods of a more primitive way of religious life. In any event, the extant writings of the Confessor show a thoroughgoing knowledge of the twofold monastic discipline, so that whether we think of him as having being initiated in the Palaia Lavra and then going either to Chrysopolis or Cyzicus or to both, or as having begun at Chrysopolis and then spent some time in Cyzicus, we need not be surprised at the evidence of a comprehensive awareness of the tradition in his works. His sojourn in Africa would have sharpened his insights and facilitated a further appropriation of his reflection on the relations of means to ends within the sphere of monastic practice.

In the Pratum Spirituale of John Moschus we have in a simple straightforward style a constellation of short biographies, instructive discourses and anecdotes with a moral purpose that portrays for us the types of monastic life in his own time and communicates to us a sense of the transfiguration of the world that was achieved around the monks, much as the Fioretti creates the world of Francis of Assisi.[284] The pertinence of this important work to our interest in Maximus is rooted in the fact that Moschus was widely travelled, having gone to Egypt, the Thebaid, Sinai, the lavras of Palestine, the monasteries of Syria, Cilicia and then Alexandria and the Nile delta as well as Cyprus and Samos on his way to Rome, besides the fact of his having done so precisely about the time that Maximus was undergoing his monastic formation. The dates of Moschus are not definitively established but they are between 540 and 634 to put them at their maximum, between 550 and 619 at their minimum. The possibilities of monastic life varied from that of a well organized community living the cenobitic life to that of a hermit more or less withdrawn from both secular and ecclesiastical society. Although the legislation of Justinian had attempted to offset the more colourful eccentricities of the hermits by prescribing that the eremitical life should be lived in relation to an organized community, there were still hardy solitaries to be found in Moschus' day. In Palestine, which interests us because of its possible bearing on Maximus, he found the official compromise in the form of a lavras, which comprised a monastery where the monks received their initial

training together with hermit cells for the τέλειοι .[285] At the same time in Egypt this combination of communal and individual styles of life found a looser structure in semi-eremitical institutions where the disciples lived in scattered cells under the direction of an acknowledged master and came together for liturgy once a week. The Palaia Lavra was founded by St. Chariton in the mid fourth century,[286] and although we know nothing precise about its history in the late sixth and early seventh century, we can reasonably take it for granted that its life corresponded to that of other lavras where Moschus found the tighter style of communal-eremitical life. The common purpose of all the forms of monasticism encountered by Moschus in the Middle East of his day was the winning of ἡσυχία by means of rigorous ἄσκησις . The idea of ἡσυχία includes the mastery of the passions, freedom from worldly care, contemplation of divine things, union with Christ, conversation with God and the angels,[287] while the preparatory ἄσκησις demanded detachment, fasting, vigils, continence, sleeping on the ground and the habitual grind of manual work.[288] A cursory glance at the Pratum Spirituale makes it obvious that we are in the tradition of monasticism described in the oldest monastic texts: the Vita Antonii of Athanasius,[289] the Vita Prima of Pachomius[290] and the Apophthegmata Patrum.[291] It describes a way of life that was capable of retaining its vigour in a primitive way, entirely evangelical in its inspiration and popular in its formulation, innocent of philosophical speculation and unaware of the problems and debates of

sophisticated culture. But it was a way of life that was capable of the most refined analysis and, in fact, became progressively the subject of a highly developed monastic anthropology as we see in the work of Maximus. This process had already begun in the Conferences of Cassian[292] and would attain provisional definition in the elaboration of Evagrius Ponticus, as well as in the Cappadocian synthesis and it would issue in the cosmic theology of The Pseudo-Dionysius.

With the Scala Paradisi[293] of John Climacus we come to a work of major importance in attempting to assess the quality of monastic life at the time of Maximus. Here we have what may be described as a comprehensive directory for the formation of the monk. Climacus is not insensitive to the possibilities of Christian maturation outside the cloister, but his teaching is aimed primarily, and almost exclusively, at those who aspire to break with the world and attain to union with God. Here we find the same ideal and the same means of approaching it as in the Pratum Spirituale, but spelt out more systematically and more extensively. The virtues of faith, hope and charity are the indispensable foundation of the monastic life and it is in function of these participations in the Christian life that the aspirant can embark on the first steps of detaching himself from the world in so far as it is inimical to the imitation of Christ: ἀποταγή ἀπροσπάθεια and ξενιτεία [294] and undertake the life-long task of transforming natural love into the love of God. Like all the great monastic teachers of the early Church, Climacus discerns behind the crippling disorder of human passions the malign influence of the demons and

so his analysis of the passions, schematized on a tripartite division of human being familiar to his contemporaries: the θυμικόν the ἐπιθυμητικόν and the λογικόν , is meant to facilitate πένθος [295] in a warfare joined in man's heart between virtue and vice, the outcome of which is meant to be the defeat of the devil and the victory of Christ. The practical aim of the author ensures that he does not spare effort to provide his readers with an instrument of self-knowledge, so that his analyses of the disorders in man are thorough, accurate and searing.[296] While he is not unaware of the relative character of ascesis, he devotes ample space to expounding its elements, so that the novice may not presumptuously aspire to the contemplation that leads to union with God, before having realistically accepted the laws of purification that ensure the indispensable ἀπάθεια ; it is tears that prepare for the sentiment of the heart, it is fear that is prelude to illumination.[297] John visualises the exercise of the asceticism in a monastic milieu, either solitary or communal. For him preferably it would be a partially solitary life, a few disciples under the direction of a spiritual father whom they would consult periodically.[298] The function of the spiritual father is basic ~~axial~~ in his system. It ensures that the penitence, the remembrance of Christ, the whole quality of the kind of life envisaged and desired would be safeguarded by obedience.[299] This emphasis on a moral and spiritual discipline rather than on an external practice which, of course, is not neglected, is characteristic of this marvellously balanced spiritual strategy which is meant

to transform the ascetic into the hesychast by means of a contemplative endowment centred on discernment[300] that progresses from knowledge of self to illuminative knowledge and is the fruit of virtue that manifests a growing assimilation to Christ. The interior heaven of the anticipated resurrection enjoyed by the monk, who is introduced to union with God, is most obvious in his capacity for continual prayer.[301] While terms like ἡσυχία, προσευχή, ἁγνεία , ἀγάπη and υἱοθεσία bring out aspects of this blessed condition, we probably see the most distinctive aspect of the monk's experience in ἡσυχία : 'an incessant act of worship and a continual presence before God'[302] says Climacus and he then advises his disciples: 'Unite the memory of Jesus with your breathing; then will you understand the usefulness of ἡσυχία .[303] This would become in the subsequent development of Byzantine spirituality an exhortation to technique as well as to qualitative maturity, but in Climacus it seems to emphasise the habitual condition of the developed hesychast: he lives in that way: his life becomes the prayer of μονολογία.

In this system we have a compendium of asceticism that was meant to issue in an ἀπάθεια that would be the reverse of a union with God expressed primarily in habitual contemplative prayer. It has a twofold significance for us in this context, the one general the other more specific: it sums up the monastic teaching that sprang up in the desert when monachism replaced martyrdom on a large scale as a limit expression of the gospels and, more specifically, it describes in systematic detail the

kind of life to which the works of Maximus constantly refer, especially the Liber Asceticus, the Centuria Caritatis and the opuscula that are embedded in larger works, like the ascetical introduction to the Quaestiones ad Thalassium, but which he nowhere describes in the systematic way we find in Climacus. In his lifetime Climacus was known as John the Scholastic because of his extensive erudition.[304] Although he believed that the best teaching transcended that to be found in bookishness, he betrays either explicitly or implicitly a comprehensive knowledge of all the monastic literature produced before his time, so that in him, besides testimony to personal experience, we find the distillation of a long tradition, stretching from the monastic collections and histories like the Apophthegmata Patrum and Historia Monachorum[305] through the letters and conferences of Nilus, Barsanuphius Dorotheus and their peers to his own time.[306] Like Moschus he too was a well-travelled man in the spirit of ξενιτεία as well as in his desire to comprehend and experience the monastic life. Besides he became abbot of the monastery of Mt. Sinai to which Moschus too was attached for a time as a monk. The history of this monastery which Justinian built to protect the solitaries of the desert from both the external assault of nomads and the inner compulsion of eccentricity ensured that it enshrined the heritage of the wilderness, especially the ideal of constant absorption in God by prayer as well as the memory of well-tried ascetical practices. The Scala Paradisi is the ascetical counterpart of the profounder intellectual discourses of Maximus. It throws into

relief the principal preoccupations of the monasticism of his time as well as giving us a probable outline of the praxis of the monastery in which he may have received his early training: the Palaia Lavra, the regimen of which although not necessarily identical with that of the monastery of St. Catherine at Sinai, would have combined the same elements of spiritual formation in analogous patterns. For Maximus the imitation of Christ, by participation in his death and resurrection, should lead to the restoration of the image of God in likeness by way of an ἄσχησις more or less interiorised, producing an ἀπάθεια that released the monk into habitual prayer. This prayer, the expression of θέωσις because of a developed ἀγάπη was the preoccupation and the ideal of the man who would sound its depths experimentally and reflectively to leave us a record of aspects of his discoveries in works of striking depth and comprehensiveness. Through a Climacus we catch a compelling glimpse of a Maximus participating in the daily round of a monastery of his time. Admittedly it is an oblique perspective in which we see him, but it would be unreasonably fastidious to deny to the Scala Paradisi considerable importance in an attempt to observe him in the living context where he produced his teaching. It is a further reminder that his doctrine is the expression of a highly developed way of life, the radiation of a Christian existence. Evagrius played a major role in the formulation of monastic spirituality. His writings were known to Maximus. They played a basic part in the forging of his theories of monastic anthropology and

provided him with language that had by then become normal in the monastic world. The influence of Evagrius on Climacus is apparent at once, both with regard to terminology and the provision of anthropological and ascetical models.[307] This is symptomatic of the universality of his influence even after the condemnations of 553.

At this point it is pertinent to recall an instance of the cross-fertilisation of the desert tradition with that of the more complex and intellectually refined tradition exemplified in Gregory of Nyssa. Jaeger has established the dependence of the Great Letter of the Pseudo-Macarius on the De Instituto Christiano of Gregory of Nyssa,[308] so that we are not dealing at any time subsequent to this process with two contrasting and mutually exclusive traditions, the one primitive and evangelical, the other reflex and philosophical. We have clear evidence of the influence of Diadochus of Photike on both Antiochus of St. Sabas[309] and on John Climacus;[310] Diadochus, in turn, was undoubtedly influenced by the Pseudo-Macarius.[311] Sophronius and Moschus frequented the monasteries of both Antiochus and Climacus and would have been aware of the Pandectes of Antiochus written by 615 as well as the Scala of John, or at least its content, so that the knowledge of Diadochus and the presence of macarian influence that we find in Maximus can be traced to Sophronius with cogent probability.[312] If we interpret the evidence for the influence of Diadochus, and so of the macarian tradition, as symptomatic of a spirituality obtaining more or less widely in the Middle-East as a whole, and if we can rely on the Syriac Life, then

perhaps we can attribute the macarian influence on Maximus, not only to his relationship with Sophronius, but to the shadowier figure of Pantaleon, abbot of St. Chariton's, and conclude tentatively that, from his earliest formation, Maximus was being equipped to counterbalance the excessive spiritualism and intellectualism of Evagrius with themes derived from the macarian tradition, for instance that of affectivity, the synergy of the will, the heart, baptismal grace and charity.[313] Maximus' correspondent, Thalassius, gives evidence of a strong evagrian bias in his Centuries[314] and it is in Maximus' Quaestiones ad Thalassium, an indisputably earlier work, while granting that it was probably composed after his having joined Sophronius in Africa, that we find these themes. Here too Nyssa has again come into his own, so that if the literary work of Pseudo-Macarius depends in some way on the spiritual teaching of Macarius the Egyptian, and it obviously does,[315] then with Maximus we find that the equilibrium of the desert Father, upset by the excessively intellectualist interpretations of his disciple Evagrius, recovers its original poise by the restoration of essential elements, on the affective and volitional side for instance, to offset the teaching on impassibility and pure prayer which had become distorted in the evagrian synthesis. This allows the spontaneous and homespun style of the desert fathers to enjoy once more the benefit of an adequate intellectual interpretation.

The Syriac Life ascribes the Origenism of Maximus to the influence of Pantaleon.[316] St. Chariton's monastery had been involved in the Origenist crisis of the second

half of the sixth century[317] and Maximus had first-hand information about this doctrinal dispute which he would have been well-placed to obtain at the Palaia Lavra. But this does not mean that he, or Pantaleon for that matter, could have been justly dubbed 'Origenist' in the pejorative sense, although it is precisely what we find the author of the Syriac Life doing. Garrigues has pointed out that the Neo-Chalcedonian victory of 553 struck both Origenists and Nestorians because they refused to believe that the Word had suffered in the flesh.[318] On the other hand, John the Almoner, Sophronius, Maximus and Anastasius the Sinaite instinctively recoiled from the christological interpolation in the Trisagion, seeing in it evidence of the influence of Severus of Antioch and his formula of the 'composite nature' of Christ. Sophronius and Maximus, and possibly Pantaleon, had assimilated [redacted] the myths of the De Principiis, but also the dogmatic implications of the Neo-Chalcedonianism of the sixth century, especially the identification of the hypostasis of union as that of the Word, 'one of the Trinity'. But because they opposed the severian monophysitism, the author of the Syriac Life, representative of the semitic cast of thought that found Severus congenial, goes back to the condemnations of Justinian to find a term with discreditable connotations to discomfit his opponents. No one tackled the Origenism of Evagrius with the energy and competence of Maximus who salvaged the deeper insights of Origen himself, by incorporating them in his own orthodox synthesis.

The works of Maximus usually assigned to this category are Epistolae I,[319] II,[320] III,[321] IV,[322] Liber

Asceticus,[323] Capita de Caritate[324] and Capita theologica et oeconomica.[325] The most significant works in this class are the Liber Asceticus and the Capita de Caritate which are considered to be a studied revision of the Praktikos and Gnostikos of Evagrius of Pontus.[326] The Liber Asceticus is a dialogue between a novice and an old monk, although the form eventually develops into two long monologues by the monk. The splendid ascetical teaching is grounded in the plan of salvation proposed by Christ, so that here we have a theological synthesis rather than a series of more less disconnected admonitions. The 'purpose of the Lord'[327] is the restoration of the unity among men that has been disrupted by disobedience and enslavement to passion. Charity is the principle of that unity, not merely on the basis of the one human nature but with God in a unity 'without confusion'.[328] Although the interest and usefulness of this work depend to a large extent on the magisterial handling of evagrian asceticism and through it of the heritage of prudence taken from the psychology of the Stoics together with the daring speculations of the Alexandrians, its principal value is that, while Maximus could disengage the lines of an orthodox spirituality from the excessively intellectualist teaching of Evagrius, he was able at the same time to restore to asceticism its foundation in the Passion and Death of Christ seen as the supreme expression of a love that ensures the rectification of self-love and adherenéce to the original bias of man towards God in whom he finds his meaning and his stability.[329] This was possible for Maximus because of his appreciation of

the Chalcedonian definitions, clarified by Neo-Chacedonian developments and eventually taken to their ultimate conclusions by himself in the Monothelite debate. The Christology of Evagrius had no room for the Passion of Christ because of its exclusive intellectualism and its distinction between Christ and the Word. The way to participation in the Henad for Maximus was charity, not the gnostic speculation of Evagrius and the possibilities of both Henad and charity were to be found in the Incarnate Logos who suffered and died for us. The σκοπός τοῦ Κυρίου is that we should assimilate what is realized in Him and so it is the fundamental theme of the contemplation of Maximus in this splendid treatise.[330]

The Capita de Caritate were intended at the time of their being sent to Elpidius to be a complement to the Liber Asceticus and in that context they can be seen as a redressing of the teaching of Evagrius in his Five Gnostic Centuries, the Gnostikos.[331] They take the form of gnomic literature, a series of apophthegms divided into four books of a hundred, on ascetic practice and prayer calculated to lead the monk to deification. The form owes its invention to Evagrius; the century represents the One, God, and the number four refers to the Gospels.[332] The apophtegmatic style has its roots in the Desert Fathers and a living tradition of monastic wisdom passed from generation to generation of monks in this way. In Evagrius we see the confluence of this traditional monastic asceticism with its concern for deification through renunciation or worldly satisfaction, war on the passions, the cultivation of virtue and the

development of forms of contemplation with Alexandrian speculation, especially the Logos mysticism of Origen which undoubtedly becomes in Evagrius, whatever may be said of Origen himself, a more Hellenic than Christian intellectualism.[333] In the Capita de Caritate Maximus salvages the orthodox in this tradition by replacing the gnostic ideal of spiritual perfection with the Gospel revelation on charity and its fundamental role in the Christian life.[334] Apart from deft adjustments to the evagrian text, that owe inspiration to the Cappadocians or to the Pseudo-Dionysius, it is this constitution of a charity that is founded on the Incarnate Word as the organising principle of the whole body of ascetic and spiritual teaching in the Capita de Caritate that makes it so much an original work of Maximus and not merely plagiarism.[335] All through the Centuries there is an abiding awareness of 'the love of God which is in Christ Jesus'. There is a marked development in awareness of the presence of Christ to the believer and more intimately in the believer. Conflating Ephesians 3.17 and Col.2.3, our author writes: 'If, according to the words of the divine Apostle, Christ dwells in our hearts by faith and in Him "are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge", then in our hearts are to be found all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. And they are revealed to the heart according to the measure of the purification of each man by the commandments'.[336] This is central to his spirituality and we note that it implies a presence of Christ in man; that this is in some way bound up with faith; that faith requires a purification by the observance of the

commandments, and presumably most of all by the commandments of love, in order that it may be the means of revealing that presence to us; that this will initiate us into a fullness of wisdom and knowledge. Just before this Maximus has admitted that we are excluded from these divine gifts because, through laziness, we lack active love for Christ.[337] The gifts are said to be gifts of the Holy Spirit. A little further on he speaks of mind 'which the Lord calls "heart" ' and says that it is unaware of Christ 'who lives in it by the grace of holy baptism' because of impurity.[338] 'Cleanse your mind' he tells us 'and then you will be able to know the indwelling of Christ'.[339] The revelation the Trinity, the Incarnation, the meaning of the universe and of the Christian life are attributed to 'the grace of Christ which lives in you and is the pledge of the Holy Spirit'.[340] Here we have the elements of a sublime anthropology which finds its centre and meaning in the intimate presence of Christ in men because of the action of the Holy Spirit. It is an obvious way of linking the christology and anthropology of Maximus and this is even more obvious when he sees it as the way of restoring the lost unity of mankind because they now possess a common life in Christ: 'He who says "I am the life" is properly life'.[341] This puts Christ as Life at the very heart of the spiritual life which is the reappropriation of the life man lost by sin; it is a <u>motio sui</u> that is truly his own but is even more truly the life of Christ. It is a restoration of the image by the death of Christ who 'led back to life him who had been made dead'.[342] The Pauline associations are strong although not quoted

directly: 'I live, now not I, Christ lives in me'.[343] A further realization of the implications of unity is to be found in paragraphs 29 and 30 of the Second Century where Maximus seems to be pointing to the Trinity which 'is divided indivisibly and combined but dividedly'[344] as an exemplar for the unity which Christ has achieved in mankind where there is now 'neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female', but all in all is Christ[345] (Gal 3.28). Maximus then, with due deference to analogy, sees the work of Christ issuing in that union for which He prayed the night before he suffered. The new man, 'being above the tyranny of passions and seeing one human nature, he looks equally on all men and is equally disposed towards them all'.[346] Christ has enabled man to wed gnome to nature and so to become in Christ one, the new Adam.[347] Sherwood dates both of these writings early, 'by 626' in fact.[348]

The Capita theologica et oeconomica are placed by Sherwood between 630 and 634.[349] With Von Balthasar he notes their dependence on the Quaestiones ad Thalassium and the Ambigua II. There is heavy dependence on Evagrius and through him on Origen for the material of these sentences, but Maximus has taken care to preface them with a group of ten capita that ensure that the reader will be able to draw benefit from the insights of the older masters into Theology and Incarnation without being trapped into the heterodoxy of evagrian Origenism.[350] Von Balthasar has classified the contents of the Gnostic Centuries: the transcendence of God and temporality as

the essence of the creature; the Good and its perversion; symbolical classifications of the way of perfection; the mystical sabbath as world transcendence; the symbolism of the redemptive Economy; mystical ascent and economic stages of transformation; deification; new metamorphosis: mystical resurrection and ascension; allegories from the Old Testament; metamorphoses of the Logos, Parousia and eschatological sabbath.[351] These indications give some idea of the scope of this outstanding work of spirituality. In his Epistola XII Maximus wrote: 'I do not write these things because I wish ill to the heretics or rejoice in their misfortune, but because I rejoice and take pleasure in their conversion. What is more beautiful for the faithful than to see the scattered sons of God united?'[352] During his trial he was forced to condemn Origen explicitly, possibly the Origen he knew through the condemnations of Justinian's Council in 553, or even more probably the Origen seen through the speculative Evagrius' Centuries. But his customary policy is to reverence the thought of his great predecessors and to attempt to incorporate their teaching into larger syntheses so that nothing of value may be lost. This admirable self-effacement is a dimension of the reverence which Maximus had for the Fathers, so that even when he was faced with deviations, he sought to reconcile tensions in higher syntheses rather than display his intellectual acumen in unilateral polemics. His approach was different when it was a matter of confronting the living representatives of what he recognized to be heresy.[353] But here too his intentions were eirenical. Of the remaining writings belonging to

this class, the one that deserves most notice is the remarkable Epistola II to John the Chamberlain. Epistola I is a long exhortation to George the Eparch on his embarking for Constantinople. Since his career was in jeopardy the letter is meant to stiffen his courage. It was almost inevitable that Maximus should have had recourse to Stoic vocabulary in that kind of context, but basically the letter appeals to theoria on the basis of Scripture. Epistola III is a letter of gratitude to John the Chamberlain, but Maximus does not fail to introduce considerations that recommend the practice of the virtues. Epistola IV is on salutary grief and its benefits, a typically monastic exhortation.

Of Epistola II Sherwood says: 'on love, perhaps the earliest little treatise that comes from Maximus',[354] and scholars, from Combefis on, have not failed to notice that here vere maximum agit Maximus.[355] Maximus uses the term γνώμη in this letter and although in other cases it may be hazardous to date a letter or opus of a Father from verbal usage, it must be admitted that here Sherwood is right, as γνώμη was so central to Maximus' later thinking on the dyothelite question and would not have been then used by him in the way it is found in this opusculum.[356] Referring to ἀγάπη , Maximus says that 'it is, to sum up in a definition, a universal inward disposition with respect to the First Good, together with an all-embracing care for the whole race in keeping with nature'.[357] Behind this arid formula is the conviction that the human λόγος φύσεως is orientated to God. This means that man is God's εἰκών , an existential capacity for relationship with God which implies that he is what

he becomes and that he becomes what he does.[358] This requires that man in his freedom should innovate his nature expressed in reason and become like to God through this personalisation. This, in turn, would mean that he was united to God and had laid the foundation of union with his fellow men. The realized unity of human nature would reflect the goodness of God and manifest his simplicity and consistency.[359] The Fall is seen as man's failure to rise to his vocation because of passionate self-love expressed in the pursuit of the pleasure of sense. The waywardness of γνώμη fragmented nature because man, by his abuse of freedom, refused to identify himself with nature and, deceived by the Devil, turned away from his natural bias towards God.[360] The upshot of this was a multitude of individualists, saddled with ignorance, egoism and tyranny, at loggerheads with each other in place of a community based on human nature.[361] It required the kenotic, Incarnation of the divine Word to heal man's 'sickness unto death' and to restore to nature its power of union with God and men through ἀγάπη .[362]

The purpose of the Incarnation was to stabilize nature and to restore its unity, no longer shattered by the wilfulness of γνώμη . At the same time the way of ἀγάπη was established: divine, deifying and leading to God.[363] To bring this about the Word Incarnate took hold of the consequences of sin and accepting for love of his Father injuries, suffering and death, he freely submitted nature to the will of the Father and through the paradoxical use of the meontic he restored nature to its original

unity.[364] Because γνώμη and φύσις were again at one, the reconstitution of the body, of which men were to be members and in which they would recover the sense of being related to each other, had been achieved in principle.[365] Maximus concludes that Christ removed the obstacles to the way of charity in order to persuade us to cleave to God and to one another; consequently the saints suffered and resisted sin even unto death in order to be united to God and to each other in the unity of nature.[366] In his justly famous letter, Maximus describes deification by comparing it to a communication of idioms, in which man and God exchange that which they possess most intimately.[367] Man participates in the divine glory and goodness, but God, for his part, conducts himself like a man to a man, whom he treats as a friend. A 'union without confusion', to use the Chalcedonian expression, is wrought where the Creator and the creature are united in one charity which ignores every difference. Christian existence finds its exemplar in the hypostatic union and the mysterious synergy of the two natures in the one person.[368] Even though we may find here Pauline doctrine elaborated in Platonic and Stoic concepts,[369] there is no question of a reductionism that would signify the overwhelming of the author's contemplative intuition by secular modes of thought. On the contrary, we are presented with an anthropology that has been immeasurably enriched by a profound understanding of the mystery of Christ.

# Chapter III

## LANGUAGE, MEANING AND STRUCTURE IN THE EXPOSITIO ORATIONIS DOMINICAE

Having examined the theological method of St. Maximus in a general way, it will be seen from a closer scrutiny of one of his works, the Expositio Orationis Dominicae,[1] that his claim to be a writer of outstanding spiritual attainment is well founded. This conclusion emerges, not merely from an assessment of the content of his writings, but it becomes apparent too from an analysis of his style. Here we can approach the author, more or less unaware of himself, so to speak, and observe how he expresses himself rather than what he says. This sketch of the saint in profile should confirm the impression gained from a face to face encounter, in which the coherence of his life and writings is so radiantly obvious.[2] Even the celebrated critic seems to have overlooked such manifest evidence. Commenting on the Quaestiones ad Thalassium, Photius has this to say about the writing of St. Maximus:

> As regards his style, he is tortuous in his sentences; he delights in inversions; he is in his element with amplification and he does not take care to express himself accurately. The result is that his writing is shot through with a lack of clarity and difficulty in understanding. Subjecting his discourse to a crudely tumid style with regard to construction and cadence, he does not try to soothe the ear. His figurative use of language does not glow with grace and charm, but is undertaken simply and artlessly. He even comes close to blunting those who are keen on him, for the solutions that he contrives are far from the text and known history, and even farther from the difficulty itself.[3]

Photius goes on to recommend his 'contemplative ways of thought' and acknowledges his genuine piety. While admitting the pertinence of this criticism of the

Quaestiones, it should be noted too that another work of Maximus, more or less contemporaneous with this one selected among others for assessment by Photius, displays characteristics which show him to have been not merely a saintly master of 'anagogical and contemplative ways of thought', but a writer of power and distinction. A cursory examination of his Commentary on the Pater Noster from the point of view of language and structure may serve to counterbalance the impression given by the Patriarch of Constantinople.

(i) Language

Like all his great predecessors, Maximus can use the accepted language with the liberty of a master, so that we have to weigh each word with discretion if we are to approach the meaning he intends it to bear in its context. Further, like him we have to constantly keep in mind that language and the thought that it expresses are not absolute entities, but rather a means of grasping reality. With these provisos in mind we can now look at the terminology of the Pater Noster.[4] While the list is not meant to be exhaustive, it should enable us to draw some conclusions, not merely about the nature of the language used by Maximus, but also about the kind of theology he practised. This selection from a computerized analysis of the text merely notes the occurrence of the terms, without giving details of inflexion and conjugation. The numbers in brackets refer to frequency:

ἀγάπη (8), ἀγαπάω (16), ἀγαθά (17), αἴσθησις (6), αἰτία (6), ἀλήθεια (4), ἀλογία (1), ἄνθρωπος (26), ἀπαθής (5), ἀποκατάστασις (1), ἀρετή (13), ἀρχή (4), αὐτουργός (6), βασιλεία (20), βουλή (5), γένεσις (12), γνώμη (24), γνῶσις (4), διαίρεσις (2), διάθεσις (14), δόξα (4), δύναμις (24), εἰκών (2), εἶναι (13) ἐκούσιος (5), ἐνέργεια (6), ἐπιθυμία (11), εὐχή (5), ζωή (25), ἡδονή (8), θάνατος (12), θεῖα (7), θέλημα (7), θέλησις (2), θεολογία (4), Θεός (49), θεότης (4), θεωρία (3), θέωσις (5), θυμός (7), κένωσις (3), κίνησις (2), κόσμος (6), λόγος (67), μυστήριον (3), νόμος (20), νοῦς (11), ὀδύνη (2), οἰκονομία (1), ὁμοούσιος (1), ὄνομα (9), ὄντα (7), πάθη (15), Πατήρ (39), πειρασμός (40), Πνεῦμα (30), πόθος (9), πρᾶξις (2), προαίρεσις (4), πρόνοια (1), προσευχή (26), σάρξ (12), σοφία (4), στάσις (1), σῶμα (9), Σωτήρ (3), σχέσις (7), Τριάς (13), τρόπος (12), ὕλη (12), ὑπάρχειν (13), ὕπαρξις (2), ὑπόστασις (4), φαινόμενα (1), φόβος (8), φθορά (5), φύσις (79), φυσικός (8), χάρις (26), ψυχή (17), Ὤν (34).

It will be readily conceded that this list makes a considerable proportion of a text of 13, 274 words, including the article, conjunctions and particles. A glance at Lampe[5] and more pertinently at works like that of Thunberg[6] will show that this terminology drawn from common usage, philosophy and Scripture was, by the time of Maximus on the way to technical precision, if it had not already attained it. Although each word would merit special attention and distinctions, we can affirm confidently that here we are in the presence of a scientific vocabulary. It is a language that, while patient of a cluster of cognate meanings and sufficiently plastic to assume connotations from its context, has become consistent in usage, fixed, defined. This process will have ensured besides that it will have, for the most part, forsaken its concrete origins and entered the realm of the abstract, the universal and the necessary. This invites us to ask ourselves whether or not we are in the presence of a scientific vocabulary.

For the Greeks ἐπιστήμη deduces universal and necessary conclusions from universal and necessary principles and all the materials it uses are marked with the same universality and necessity. The aim of science, which is said to be περί τό ὄν , is truth. The way to this kind of appropriation of truth is through a rigorous method of proof(ἀπόδειξις ) which has for instruments syllogism and induction. The former deduces the universal from axioms and first principles which it takes for granted upon authority(ὡς παραξυνιέντων ) .[7] The other proves the universal from knowledge derived from particulars through clear evidence of sense.[8]

Since the major premisses or universals are ultimately derived from induction, the scientific process is rooted in experience, but transcends it. Every science has its proper principles; beyond these are the common principles,[9] the ultimates in every kind of reasoning process, the ground of rationality: the basic principles of logic: the law of contradiction etc., mathematical and metaphysical axioms. Is it possible to have a theology that will meet the requirements of this kind of knowledge? To invoke the example of Aquinas is not to do violence to historical sense, but merely to affirm the possibility of attaining the ideal of ἐπιστήμη , simply because it has been realized in his method. He says summarily: sacra doctrina est scientia.[10] So in his treatment of theology we find the use of explanatory understanding of the formulae of the Creed and behind them of the content of divine revelation. The first principles of this science are the articles of faith and the rational process, by the use of induction and deduction, ensures the evolution of theological insight. It is a discursive, ratiocinative, collative process that satisfies the exigencies of reason and gives rise to a knowledge through proper causes that can claim the title of ἐπιστήμη . It is an exercise in explanatory understanding and 'explanation is in terms of the ultimates reached in analysis'.[11] St. Thomas abstracts from particular and accidental determinations so that his theology can justifiably profess to be a mediation of the truth of revelation in rational categories.[12] This was the theological road that Aquinas travelled. It can be said straight off that it was not the way of Maximus.

When we examine the Pater Noster of Maximus in the light of the achievement of Aquinas we have to admit that, although ultimates have been reached in analysis, as the language shows, the form is not discursive. There is no evidence of an habitual proceeding from principles to scientific conclusions. There is a tendency to draw paranetic conclusions, which alerts us to thinking that here we have a different intention and so find ourselves in a different realm of discourse. His performance in the Dispute with Pyrrhus,[13] for instance, assures us that it was well within the competence of Maximus to reach the ultimates demanded by ἐπιστήμη , but in the Pater Noster we have to admit that even though we are presented with a scientific vocabulary, we do not find it used scientifically. We are not being presented with a scientific treatise.

A closer look at some of the passages in the Pater Noster will reveal unmistakeable evidence of another kind of discourse. In his essay on the 'spiritual senses' in the teaching of Origen, Rahner lays it down as a canon that 'if an author clearly speaks of five spiritual faculties, we are justified in taking into account texts which refer to a single faculty.[14] We find that Maximus meets that requirement. In the Ambigua he says:

> The sight, that is the eye, is the image of the mind; the hearing, that is the ear, is the image of reason and smell, that is the nose, is the image of the aggressive appetite; taste is the image of the pleasure appetite and touch is the image of life.[15]

Maximus understands man to be fitted with five spiritual powers corresponding to the five bodily senses so that he may effect unity in creation as a whole. We may now

proceed to examine some texts that speak of 'a single faculty' and then corroborate our claims by adducing further statements that seem to indicate a higher apprehension of divine things than would be required for the abstract elaboration of revelation.

> (877C): He (the Word) imparts a share of divine life by making himself eatable in a way that he himself understands; so do they who have received from him such intellectual sense that, by the taste of this food, they know in accurate knowledge truly that 'the Lord is good'.

The crucial terms are αἴσθησις, νοερά, γεῦσις, εἰδέναι κατ'ἐπίγνωσιν .[16] The object of the knowledge referred to by Maximus is not merely a web of thoughts about God; it is some kind of affective knowledge; it even looks as if it is knowledge through love: a realization that 'the Lord is good'. It has the character of sense perception: it is an αἴσθησις , but at a higher level, that of νοῦς ; it is νοερά ; it takes place in that area where man can encounter God himself in himself,[17] it has something of the experimental character of sense knowledge, its concreteness, its immediacy, its imperturbable sense of the real, (an Aristotelian touch). The Word makes himself ἐδώδιμον and he can be tasted. This will obviously give rise to a more perfect embodiment of the Word in men. Those who eat are imbued with a divine quality that makes for divinisation: ποιότης πρός θέωσιν . This passage illustrates the creative tension between the use of a technical vocabulary and a more descriptive terminology, when common or universal language has to give way to something more concrete if the experience of Christian verities, known at one level through tradition and its purified language, is to be communicated as something personal and known intimately

by the writer. The implication is that the author enjoys this apprehension.

(897A): Here again we have the notion of nourishment with its connotation of tasting and eating: 'we are nourished by virtue and wisdom'; the Word 'is embodied in a variety of ways in each of the saved'. Πρᾶξις, θεωρία and θεολογία obviously account for ποικίλως. The bread of life and full knowledge is for the vanquishing of sin and death. If Adam had agreed to live and know in this way, had been willing to accept the Word-bread, he would not have died. Man must aspire to experimental knowledge if he is to be wise and live. The Word gives himself in proportion to 'works', to the deserts of νοῦς man's basic capacity for the Word which can be deepened.

> (901A): He who seeks the incorruptible bread of wisdom through prayer .... knows that the one pleasure consists in the attainment of divine things, the giver of which is naturally God, the guardian of which is the choice of free will of the one who receives. The only pain is failing to attain these blessings .

We are given here something of the 'passionate' dimension of the experience of divine things. Aristotle speaks of the 'feelings' or emotions or affections of our moral nature, on which follow pleasure and pain as their distinctive feature.[18] In Maximus we can transpose this to αἴσθησις νοερά and assume that it follows the internal senses of ἐπιθυμία and θυμός . We are in the realm of spiritual experience. The assumption that ἐπιθυμία and θυμός are being exercised at a higher level than their material principles would warrant is corroborated by Maximus's teaching on the transformation of passion, instanced in the Pater Noster (896AB), where

νοῦς is 'stretched like a cord' by θυμός and is set on fire with ἐπιθυμία . We find similar implications further on (905C), where the Word is said to move 'our appetite insatiably to Himself', the bread of life, wisdom, knowledge and justice. Ἀχορέστως reveals the play of will, man's capacity for the transcendent in an appetitive way and the quality of the drive suggests a strong experimental dimension in the account.

> (905D): And from there again he leads upon the supreme ascent of divine realities to the Father of lights, and makes us sharers of the divine nature by participation in the Spirit through grace; through this we are given the status of sons of God, all of us having within us the entire author himself of this grace: the Son of the Father by nature, without over limitation and in a pure way. From Him, by Him, and in Him we have and shall have being, movement and life.

The embodiment of the Word is achieved in a threefold way, as we have seen, and culminates in the life of 'pure prayer', which is synonymous with θεολογία , and which is implied here as vision or sight by reference to 'the Father of lights', and is the anticipation of perfect θέωσις in the next life. The passage takes on an experimental character from the context of concern with conversion and especially the teaching on prayer. There is besides an urgency woven into the style that communicates a sense of pressing reality with regard to τά θεῖα of Maximus, which radiates through a seemingly conventional terminology.

Other texts corroborate these principal ones: Maximus is about to describe what God grants χάριτι , the grace to recognise grace; in (876A) we are reminded that it is profitable to know and experience γνῶναι καί πρᾶξαι and thus to write duly about the power of the Lord's prayer; in (877C) he exhorts his readers to 'acquire λόγος by

πρᾶξις in order to be united to God γνωστικῶς which will be attained by withdrawal from created things; this suggests a union beyond every finite thing and concept; the emphasis on ἀπόλαυσις (881B) takes us through the will beyond the conceptual order to the order of the real in its own existence. The συγγενὴς ἀντίληψις (888C) hints at a connaturality begotten of παθῶν τά θεῖα.

If we are to trust a master, this play of spiritual sense might have led us to expect to find Maximus among those who 'by means of figures, comparisons and similitudes allow something of what they feel to overflow and utter secrets and mysteries from the abundance of their spirits rather than explain these things in arguments'.[19] This genre would be marked by description rather than by explanation, 'feeling' rather than conceptual understanding. In this kind of writing, where there is an effort to communicate directly with some kind of concrete immediacy what is experienced, we find recourse to images, not merely deployed as phantasms in an intellectual process, nor even the 'exploitation of image to develop an idea already formed',[20] but as symbols where their sensuousness is employed to convey a whole scale of experimental resonances, spiritual, intellectual, volitional and emotional.[21] It is an effort to elaborate the phenomenological features of a lived theology by the conversion of perceptions into apperceptions with a view to describing an interiorly differentiated consciousness. Since, 'description is in terms of the given, while explanation is in terms of the ultimates reached in

analysis,[22] the evidence of the spiritual senses at work in the theology of Maximus would have led us to expect a language marked by its concreteness and sharp particularity put to the service of scientific and interpretative description, but in the Pater Noster we hardly find the language of spiritual sense used in this way. The experience is affirmed rather than conveyed by symbols. If Photius was lamenting the poverty of Maximus's imagery from this point of view, then his criticism was well placed, but perhaps he was merely deploring an imagination that was incapable of producing anything more exciting than 'like a sheepskin' or 'fiery horses', (888D).

While there is evidence of rational power and activity in the Pater Noster, at least in the form of enthymeme and example, it would be more true to say that his method is declarative and compositional after the manner of art:[23] The careful arrangement of ideas and images is reminiscent of mosaic; the collative process is not inspired by an analytic purpose, but rather by the desire to penetrate language, image and concept in order to apprehend the reality veiled there; in a complementary manner that reality once apprehended would lead us to a new appreciation of concept, image and language. In a remarkable passage in the Mystagogia he says: 'if the invisible things are contemplated through the visible things, in a much greater measure the visible things are understood through the invisible things by those who give themselves to contemplation'.[24] Applied to the words of Scripture and so presumably to the Pater Noster, we are told that 'when the Logos of God becomes clear and luminous in us, and his face

shines like the sun then also his garments appear to shine, that is the words of holy Scripture, of the Gospels, appear evident and manifest, having nothing hidden. But Moses and Elijah also come with him, that is the most spiritual λόγοι of the law and the Prophets'.[25] For Maximus the mystery of Christ is the unique object of the spiritual sense of Scripture; it is not so much a case of understanding something of Christ through the Scriptures as of understanding the Scriptures through Him, and beyond them the whole created realm. He tells us explicitly in the Pater Noster that his method is to be the examination and interpretation of each word by means of θεωρία a search for the λόγοι which will make the prayer intelligible.[26] His expositions on the Word and the Holy Trinity assure us that θεωρία will be φυσική and θεολογική. Besides the indications of the role of spiritual sense, which we have noted, suggest that it would be informed also by θεολογία in the experimental sense, something that would have to be mediated by another kind of activity, that of λόγος . The language of spiritual sense is a sign that the Word of God had become 'clear and luminous' in Maximus, so that the rest of the language, which has acquired scientific status or nearly so, is to be read in the spirit of gazing at the shining garments of Thabor. In fact, the author asks the Lord to open his νοῦς so that he may grasp the mysteries and that he may have matching λόγος for clear knowledge of the νοούμενα . (876A). Here we have a distinction between the order of apprehension and the order of mediation, the activity of 'mind' and the activity of 'reason'. This is explicit if

we translate νοούμενα as 'ideas'; it is implicit if we render it as 'intelligibles'. The whole process requires a gratuitous enhancement of νοῦς : τοῖς ἐρρωμένοις τόν νοῦν . The result is an unveiling of reality, 'Anagogical and contemplative ways of thought' seem to have found a medium of expression that is valid even if defective in the use of imagery.

(ii) Structure

'Byzantine civilization was essentially mathematical in its emphasis on the inevitability of due proportion, rhythm and order. This sense of the inevitable reflected the underlying serenity of the self-concentrated Byzantine culture, based on recognition of the dominance of Idea and of the rule of cool and temperate mind.'[27] This emphasis on the mathematical was bound up with the concept of man as mediating between κόσμος νοητός and κόσμος αἰσθητός , so that in his artistic activity the harmonies of the world of mind would find an echo in the world of sense. The sense components of art became articulate by becoming part of rhythm which was understood as a participation in the harmonies of pure numbers. Geometry and arithmetic were embodied in architecture and music. An examination of the Pater Noster will show that it is informed by this mathematical spirit. The arithmetical character of the work appears, for instance, in the six-fold treatment of the 'mysteries',[28] while its geometric structure is evident in single elements like a grammatical sentence and more obviously in its over-all organization. This structural quality gives Maximus the claim to be an artist and the Pater Noster the title of work of art.

Photius does not seem to have adverted to this facet of the Confessor's literary achievement and so to have overlooked his having succeeded in informing diversity with a marvellous unity and given his use of language the splendour of form.

It will be instructive then to examine the work as a whole from the point of view of structure and to supplement this with an analysis of a paragraph and a single sentence in the same way. The work falls easily into a prologue and six sections, the last of which can be treated as a conclusion, but which recapitulates much of the material of the five preceding parts, so that we have a six-fold treatment of the main themes. The petitions of the Pater Noster provide a sure basis for a systematic approach and in section 1 we have a provisional list of the seven 'mysteries' that Maximus discerns in the dominical prayer (876BC); there is no elaboration here, but after the manner of an overture it sets the themes in relation to the petitions for the first time and we are invited to explore the implications of what has been merely put before us nominally. Then the author unfolds some of the meaning of the terms from a theological point of view (876C-881A). This is highlighted by the stylistic device of introducing his commentary on the mysteries with the Word as subject: 'The Word made flesh teaches theology'; 'He has made men of equal dignity with the angels' and so on. This emphasis gives a theological bias to the whole work, so that structure is used significantly. This becomes even more plausible when we recall that the structure of his experience, which we presume to be the inspiration of his

writing, points to an initial encounter with the Word in a supra-rational way, so that the logical sequence of his creativity is here embodied in the manner in which the work is constructed. The role of the Word Incarnate is set in the context of the life of the Trinity and θέωσις is already seen as developing because of κένωσις in function of our relationships to the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. The initiative and the dominance of the Word made flesh is basic to Maximus's exposition and he leaves us in no doubt about his vision and intentions by this literary emphasis, which throws into relief the Christocentrism of his thought. Section 3 recapitulates the seven 'mysteries' and while it does not add to our understanding of the terms, it does round off the first presentation of the themes and sets them in the context of 'prayer' and 'vow' (881AB).

In Section 4 we have the Main Commentary (884A-905B). The fundamental intuition of Maximus, in keeping with Byzantine theology in general, is God's self-communication to man in Christ, so that we find a consideration of God, the Blessed Trinity and man, and the union of God and man in deification. This was made possible by the incarnation and Redemption which culminated in κένωσις and issued in the sending of the Spirit and the formation of the Church. These themes are woven into this commentary more or less explicitly. For Maximus man is an open and dynamic being essentially in relation to God, created in his image and given the task of acquiring his likeness in a free personal way. The Chacedonian 'union without confusion' of the natures in Christ is the key to his insight into

the possibility of a perfect union between the divine and the human, because in Christ it was realized hypostatically and offered to all men as their destinty in Him. He unites the human and divine natures and by a deified humanity removes man from the law of sin and by his incarnate divinity raises him to the deification of grace. The confluence of the theological and ascetical streams in perfect synthesis is made possible by the firmness of the author's spiritual anthropology. That is reflected in the place given to it in this work, where these themes occupy the principal exposition like the centre-piece of a great triptych, flanked by christological and ascetical contemplations. Structure is again seen to be significant.

Section 5 is a further recapitulation (905BD); this time however the 'mysteries' are taken in reverse order, prefaced by: 'If we really desire to be delivered from the Evil One and not enter into temptation', which shows that the approach has shifted from the theological to the ascetical point of view. The treatment begins with man's tragic situation and progresses to the glorious destiny held out to him by the Word Incarnate. The ascetical momentum of section 5 carries over into section 6 (905D-908D), a splendid parenetic passage that summarises the whole teaching of the Pater Noster, although its sequence does not correspond exactly to the previous order of the themes. These few remarks should assure us that in this treatise of St. Maximus, structure is not something adventitious, but intrinsic to the significance of the work as a whole.

Now for a look at a paragraph, where we shall find a comparable structural firmness! In his prologue (873A-C), he declares that 'I have mingled fear with yearning for him and have formed from the two, fear and yearning, one love consisting of reverence and benevolence, so that fear stripped of affection may not become hatred, nor affection unaccompanied by prudent fear become contempt, but love should appear as the inner law of affection and appropriate everything that pertains to nature: by benevolence it masters hatred and by reverence it dispels contempt'. He then gives illustrative examples from Scripture and continues: 'As I have said, on my part mingling fear with yearning, I have laid down this law of love towards my Lord up to this day: restrained from writing through reverence lest contempt occur, I am moved to write by benevolence so that hatred may not be considered the final excuse for not writing'. An analysis of this text will reveal how carefully constructed it is. Here we have to limit ourselves to saying that, while the upshot of the mingling of πόθος and φόβος is ἀγάπη , the components of the amalgam have been transformed in the process. Φόβος has taken on the connotation of reverence and awe, while πόθος is now in some way more deliberately other-centred. From an entological point of view it would seem that it is ἀγάπη that has transformed φόβος and πόθος . Μίσος and καταφρόνησις are seen to be defective in combining πόθος and φόβος an imbalance that must be corrected by the play of ἀγάπη , the νόμος ἐνδιάθετος στοργῆς . Στοργή , which has been translated as 'affection' is, for the Fathers, the

essence of φιλανθρωπία . Here its natural energy is transformed by ἀγάπη , and εὔνοια and αἰδώς now reappear in dispelling μίσος and καταφρόνησις , that is by restoring the proper balance between φόβος and πόθος . Ἀγάπη is said to 'appropriate everything that pertains to nature'. This is essential to the whole of Maximus's spiritual anthropology with its concern for unification; here it refers to the capacity of love to transmute fear and yearning into something finer, so that the outcome of their association is more than the effect of their mutual influence. Once touched by ἀγάπη the alchemy is at work. Finally we note that Maximus does not qualify the νόμος ἀγάπης as ἐνδιάθετος as he did with στοργή . This is because nothing can be more inward than ἀγάπη itself. Grammatically νόμος ἀγάπης is in contrast to νόμος στοργῆς as subjective genitive to objective genitive. Στοργή is the object of ἀγάπη which modifies it; Ἀγάπη is the source of εὔνοια and αἰδώς which are modes of expressing ἀγάπη in writing to his correspondent. The law that demands εὔνοια and αἰδώς is ἀγάπη or stems from ἀγάπη .[29] This whole passage falls into well-wrought periods that are classical in their equilibrium. The secret of the mathematical symmetry is that the author has found a centre of gravity for his thought, the notion of ἀγάπη , and so he can arrange the other concepts with the precision of an artist in mosaic. More than that, the experience of ἀγάπη shines through the symmetry in a life-giving way, ensuring that the visible beauty that delights sense and mind is an image of that invisible beauty that flows into man from on high.

Finally, we can scrutinize one sentence to verify our claim that language is used with precision and freedom in a geometrically patterned way in this work:

> If we really desire to be delivered from the Evil One and not enter into temptation, let us (trust God and) forgive our debtors their debts; thus shall we not alone receive forgiveness for the sins we have committed, but we shall overcome the law of sin and we shall trample on the Evil One.

Firstly, we should note that in the terminology of Maximus the expression 'law of sin' is synonymous with 'temptation'. Then we can see that in this finely formed inclusion he makes the whole ascetic life turn on forgiveness. The structure of the sentence shows the pivotal function of this truth, as becomes evident if we set it out in a discrete way:

| a | b | c |
|---|---|---|
| If we really desire to be delivered from the Evil One | and not enter into temptation | let us (trust God and) forgive our debtors their debts; |
| **a1** | **b1** | **c1** |
| and we shall trample on the Evil One | but we shall overcome the law of sin | thus shall we not alone receive forgiveness for the sins we have committed |

The structure is seen to be integral to the meaning, not merely of this sentence, but of the ascetical dimension of the treatise as a whole.

The Pater Noster then is obviously a work that exhibits a marked structure; at the same time we cannot escape the impression of a freedom of use that is truly remarkable. This assures us that in this writing there is more than structure; beneath the carefully organized manner of expression we are sensible of depths of life, dare we say hypostatic depths, that reveal themselves in the singularly original way in which the author communicates his unique

grasp of the 'mysteries' by means of a traditional terminology, organized into patterns that, at first sight, seem to have the rigidity of something abstract and impersonal. Freedom is not opposed by determination, but by necessity. The Byzantine writer does not have to be bound by necessity because he accepts the structures of his culture, no more than a violinist who accepts the 'givenness' of his instrument. The self-determination behind the thought of Maximus is apparent in his striking individuality; it can be presumed to have been formative in the creations of his cultural ancestors and in its very use to still bear in itself the imprint of that free origin, something rediscovered and recreated in the act of writing by an author of his power and profundity. We might say that he releases the potential freedom of the determinations woven into the cultural traditions of which he finds himself the inheritor.[30] In the usage of a man of this calibre we cannot afford to neglect the situational aspect by an excessive insistence on the formational aspect, the element that tends to constitute itself as a system. The situational aspect makes room for the subject, thinking and free, a being which is defined, in the spirit of the Fathers, in terms of mutual relationships, the ontological foundation of communication. Persons are basically the possessors of the medium of communication, most radically of the nature, with its structural elements. But persons are irreducible to nature and are the source of the plastic and creative use of nature, together with all its components and derivatives. The person finds expression in the nature; the nature is innovated by the person. The suggestion here is

that this principle extends to the literary composition which we are examining.

It may be hazardous to suggest that it is easy to discern a necessary connection between the moral and even mystical maturity of a writer and his aesthetic refinement. But given the facts known about Maximus, his views on human growth, the singular combination of freedom and discipline in the Pater Noster, surely we can claim that such a fusion of spirit and law, of inspiration and literary convention is likely to bear some trace of the remarkable originality of the writer, not merely in his spiritual attainment but also in his power to express it. In this work we have a brilliant combination of the freedom and originality of an experiencing person with the accepted conventions of a cultural milieu. This is evidence of a remarkable talent for selecting and combining in a unique way the terms of an established system of thought and means of communication. Here we have undoubted indications of the presence of a dimension of human being that is unpredictable and self-determined, the power and the glory of person. The subject matter certainly contributes to our impression of a freedom and self-possession indicative of one who has realized his personal pitch, but the originality in the use of language and structure indicate in perhaps an even more cogent way the presence of a fully developed man. Persons are constituted by relationship and are revealed in the proper activity of personhood, communication. Here we find an instance of communication that accepts the limits of language and structure imposed by an accepted and

appropriated culture, but which moulds it into something entirely distinctive. The reader of this work cannot be persuaded that the writer is the prisoner of his cultural structures; he is detached from them and uses them to convey a significantly unique vision and experience. The style and literary structure give the impression of that creative tension which emanates from a work that displays the personal acquisition of a common heritage. It would be fatuous to suggest that he can express himself without using the accepted means of communication, so that it cannot be claimed that the writer is fully autonomous. This is an exemplification of the situation of man: he shares in nature; he communicates with his fellows through nature; he accepts the structures which constitute and distinguish nature, but he does so in a way that cannot be reduced to those structures; he does so creatively, with originality, personally. The work of art is a project of one who is a compound of λόγος and τρόπος , and it embodies projections of these two indispensable dimensions of human being.[31] The Pater Noster exemplifies the interplay of these two aspects of man. The examples of structure that we have given will serve to reassure us about the presence of the intelligibility of nature; it is impossible to illustrate the contribution of the person apart from drawing attention to the splendid unity of the work as a whole and by reminding ourselves with Plotinus that:

> we have to recognize that beauty is that which irradiates symmetry rather than symmetry itself, and it is that which truly calls for our love. Why else is there more of the glory of beauty upon the living and only some faint traces of it upon the dead, even though the face still retains its fulness and symmetry? Why are the most living portraits the most beautiful?[32]

We might add that in the case of the Pater Noster, since the work can be classified as mystagogia,[33] it would be a considerable advantage in the reader to have a spiritual awareness that matches the author's.

We can conclude then that because this work is so strongly marked by its author's individuality, while it accepts the theological and literary conventions of his time, there must be a source of such striking originality. We suggest that it is the uncharted depths of hypostasis, where man is not alone, which are sounded in θεολογία and echo in the experience of 'pure prayer'. The generative use of language, especially from a structural point of view, enables the author to convey his experience. This is something extra, a grace proper to a Father of the Church.

# CHAPTER IV

## Expositio Orationis Dominicae

This is the main part of the thesis, in which we examine Maximus' Commentary on the 'Our Father'. The Prologue will provide us with an opportunity of seeing how the theme of agape has a bearing on this treatise even although it is not dealt with in the central parts of the work. The Introductions introduce the theme of the Divine Counsel and how the plan of that Counsel is reflected in the plan of the 'Our Father'. Here we can examine Maximus' view of the Incarnate Logos as the Mediator between God and man, of how the five divisions, which man was meant to overcome, are healed by Him and the way is opened to all men to assume their role of mediation in the Church. We shall then address ourselves to commenting on Maximus' treatment of the'Seven Mysteries'. I have, on the basis of his example, reduced the sevenfold divisions of Parts I and III to the fivefold division of Part II, so that we can have a synoptic view of how he sees these themes throughout the Pater Noster. In Chapter VI, (i), we shall recapitulate the principal concepts that emerge in Part II as a preface to a more organized statement on Maximus' teaching on the virtues, 'the three laws', prayer and contemplation.

Expositio Orationis Dominicae

The Prologue (872D-873C)

If Dalmais is correct in placing the composition of the Pater Noster in that period when Maximus is thought to have deepened his understanding of the significance of the couplet λόγος - τρόπος,[1] then we would expect to find ἀγάπη thrown into relief in the structure and elaboration of that work. But an analysis of the text reveals that while the noun ἀγάπη , occurs ten times, including its inflected forms, these instances are restricted to the Prologue, where it appears seven times,[2] to the Conclusion where it appears twice[3], and to the final observations of Part III where it occurs once.[4] It does not appear at all in the main body of the work. The verb ἀγαπάω , turns up twice in the Conclusion;[5] it is used only twice in the main part of the Commentary (Part II)[6] and there not in a way that is germane to the structural interests of Maximus. So striking is the absence of ἀγάπη from the structure of his thesis in the Pater Noster that one might be tempted to suggest that the main part of the treatise was written at an earlier, more 'gnostic',[7] phase in the Confessor's development and that he provided a balancing introduction later on, when asked by his anonymous correspondent for his ideas on the 'Our Father'. Or the anomaly might be explained by saying that, while he realized the prime importance of ἀγάπη in Christian spirituality and pays due respect to it in his introduction and epilogue, it had not yet entered dynamically into his still mainly evagrian way of understanding,

evidence of which would then be found in the 'logical' exegesis of the 'Our Father'.[8] A third and equally probable hypothesis would be that the Pater Noster (A.D. 628-30) is evidence that Maximus was substantially in possession of his understanding of the spiritual life from early in his writing career and that his use of the concept ἀγάπη in this treatise is evidence for that. If his further analyses demonstrate a more refined and developed understanding of the couplet λόγος - τρόπος it would be mistaken to give his discoveries the revolutionary character attributed to them by Riou[9] and Garrigues[10] and adopted by Dalmais.[11] They would point to a logical evolution rather than to dramatic discontinuity. It will serve our purpose then to put this introductory paragraph under the microscope.

Maximus opens his treatise with a personal address to his correspondent, whose identity is not known. He may have been a hegoumen,[12] under whose authority Maximus had lived. His correspondent's letter has enabled Maximus to realise his presence. Maximus then assures him that he is always present 'in spirit', a reference to their common life in the Spirit and the mutual sensitivity that comes with a developed life of prayer. Apart from being a gracious compliment, this first sentence conveys to us something of the paradisal possibilities of friendship between men, purified from passion and already accomplished in the ways of the Spirit. It is a glimpse of Maximus relating to his fellow monks, unconsciously revealing not merely a romantic ideal, but hard won attainment. This initial evidence of spiritual maturity

is complemented and elaborated by Maximus' description of his own attitude in answering the letter: because his friend is what he is, he too will act in a way that is consistent with ἀγάπη , a theme which he develops briefly, but masterfully. He rounds off what he has to say by adding:

> And I, as I have said, mixing fear with affection, have laid down this law of charity in regard to my Master, up to this day: restrained from writing through reverence lest contempt should occur, I am moved to write by goodwill so that an honourable refusal to write may not be considered to be hatred.[13]

We shall now examine the thesis that Maximus inserts between his first affirmation about his attitude and this conclusion. Apart from its intrinsic value and the bearing it has on the treatise as a whole and indeed on the entire spiritual anthropology of Maximus, it gives insight into the dimensions of his language and the coherence of his vigorous thought. He says that in approaching the task of writing to his friend, he has mingled fear ( φόβος) with affection ( πόθος ) and formed from them one ἀγάπη consisting of αἰδώς καί εὔνοια.

He is speaking with psychological awareness and intention by claiming to have 'mingled' and 'formed'. The 'fear' he has mingled with 'affection' is designated by the word φόβος which in patristic usage can have the nuance of fear of God in contrast to fear of punishment.[14] As Maximus, in fact, will contrast the higher fear with fear of punishment, we may be justified in taking it that he has chosen the word carefully. Similarly, although πόθος can have implications of strong natural desire and even sexual longing, again we find it used for spiritual desire and affection by the

Fathers.[15] We then find Maximus saying that he has 'mingled' these two and from them 'formed' one ἀγάπη. For the Fathers generally ἀγάπη is love in relation to God or what Maximus calls a few lines farther on 'divine love', especially God's or Christ's love for man and reciprocally man's love for God and man's participation in the love proper to God which he manifests in a disinterested love for his fellows.[16]

We are then confronted with two new terms αἰδώς and εὔνοια and told that ἀγάπη consists of them. Αἰδώς can be fittingly translated as 'reverence' but we should not overlook the implication of 'awe' in this context; Εὔνοια can also mean 'affection' or 'love', but perhaps 'goodwill' or 'benevolence' is nearer to what is intended here. The mingling of φόβος and πόθος which Maximus says lead to the forming of ἀγάπη has obviously modified both φόβος and πόθος. The result of the mingling is ἀγάπη and the components in the amalgam have undergone a conversion in the process. Φόβος has acquired reverence and πόθος now transcends its intrinsic self-concern ἀγάπη has become the inner law of love (ἐνδιάθετος νόμος στοργῆς . Στοργή is almost entirely free of sexual implications even in profane usage, while in patristic Greek it approximates closely to ἀγάπη, since it can mean God's love for man and vice versa, as well as being the essence of φιλανθρωπία. Its inner law, ἀγάπη , is then said to 'appropriate everything that pertains to nature'.[17] Maximus has said that φόβος without πόθος becomes hatred and

πόθος without φόβος , qualified as σόφρων , degenerates into contempt. He rounds off this well-wrought sentence by assuring us that ἀγάπη , as the inner law of love, masters hatred by goodwill (εὔνοια) and dispels contempt with reverence ( αἰδώς ) , so that when he says that ἀγάπη consists of reverence and goodwill, he is presuming that the latter have been effected by ἀγάπη having appropriated and transformed φόβος and πόθος , reverence and goodwill thus becoming properties or constituents of ἀγάπη in man.

Maximus then proceeds to throw further light on the interplay of fear and love by reconciling two scriptural texts that appear at first to be mutually exclusive: 'The fear (φόβος) of the Lord is chaste and lasts from age to age' (Ps. 19, 9) and 'Charity (ἀγάπη) casts out fear' (φόβος) (1 John 4, 18). This he does by distinguishing between two kinds of fear. This possibility is hinted at in the quotation from 'David' where the fear is said to be 'chaste'; for Maximus this can be reconciled with ἀγάπη while the other fear is cast out. He characterises the latter as fear (δέος) of punishment. The use of δέος is probably to emphasise the contrast, although in the Greek of the Fathers it can be used for that fear that is the ground of the fear of God.[18] It has been distinguished from φόβος as being more lasting and it is possible that Maximus chooses it deliberately in this context, where he is distinguishing a fear that lasts from a fear that passes, associating δέος

with punishment and affirming that lasting fear of punishment cannot be associated with ἀγάπη. In using φόβος to designate the fear that is compatible with ἀγάπη he obviously wishes it to retain in this context the epithet ἁγνός attributed to it in the quotation from Psalm 19. Fear of punishment is something servile, the property of a slave and cannot last in a relationship with a God who can now be addressed as 'Father', nor with the substance of man's relationship to Him which is ἀγάπη. On the other hand the fear which is said to be 'chaste' is for Maximus a constituent of 'divine charity', τῆς θείας ἀγάπης συστατικόν .[19] a fear that has taken on overtones of awe and it lasts as long as charity 'from age to age'. It 'naturally characterises the law of true love (στοργή). Στοργή has affinities with ἀγάπη and is put beyond the bounds of misinterpretation by ἀληθοῦς . We have seen already that the inner law of στοργή is agape so that φόβος ἁγνός 'naturally' characterises ἀγάπη in man: it is basic and so 'lasts from age to age'. 'By reverence it preserves for ever for the saints entirely without corruption the norm and code of charity towards God and towards one another'. 'Before looking more closely at the principal elements of this claim for φόβος ἁγνός it can be noted that its activity produces effects that are at once 'incorruptible' and 'for ever'. The relationship between the two goes without saying, but it indicates that Maximus has not let go for a moment of his total view of his subject as these qualifications refer back to 'from age to age'.[20] Φόβος ἁγνός is the implicit subject of the sentence represented by 'it' and it is said to exercise its

influence 'by reverence'. Maximus is not necessarily making a distinction between φόβος and αἰδώς so that we can retain our claim that φόβος has been transformed by ἀγάπη . The connection 'by' in 'By Reverence.. ..' throws into relief the aspect of fear that is predominant in man's relationship in ἀγάπη with God and his fellows, that of reverence and more profoundly, of religious awe. We have seen that ἀγάπη is the νόμος ἐνδιάθετος στοργῆς. Here a new distinction is made in the interests of emphasising the comprehensiveness of ἀγάπη and the necessity of αἰδώς as a component in it. Not alone can this fear be reconciled with ἀγάπη , but ἀγάπη without it would not retain its essence nor be exercised personally without corruption. The couple θεσμός - τρόπος (norm and mode) inevitably calls to mind the frequently recurring couple logos-tropos[21] in the maximian system: the essential element of a being as distinct from its hypostatic mode. Θεσμός with the Fathers generally means law or natural law or revealed law. It is the norm for both doctrine and morals; it can also mean the Λόγος as a rule for human activity.[22]

The associations Λόγος, λόγος, λογικός are habitually found in Maximus' writing and a fundamental note of λόγος is its normative character.[23] It is likely that he chooses θεσμός in conjunction with τρόπος as a synonym for λόγος in this context because of the obvious association of θεσμός with νόμος. He has said that ἀγάπη is the νόμος ἐνδιάθετος στοργῆς. He conceives of ἀγάπη as a principle of participated divine life that appropriates and transforms 'everything that pertains to nature'. Ἀγάπη is the gift par excellence of God that created nature cannot produce, but which has within itself the power to transpose whatever it finds in nature unspoilt by the personal malice of man, prompted by the Evil One.[24] Ἀγάπη then takes hold of στοργή and so transmutes it that it at once informs it in the philosophical sense and becomes its inner principle or law, the life principle or soul of στοργή and so it expresses itself in terms of

στοργή or love and in this sense is its norm. It can be said at once that this interpretation of νόμος is virtually a description of λόγος as Maximus understands it, so that the substitution of θεσμός for λόγος is not fortuitous but calculated. It means the same thing but because ἀγάπη has been spoken of as normative in terms of νόμος , Maximus refers to it as θεσμός when he wants to speak of it in association with τρόπος which indicates the use to which man puts ἀγάπη ; it is its hypostatic mode, its personal expression in individual lives.[25] For Maximus it is τρόπος ὑπάρξεως that is the key to both personal salvation and personal perdition.[26] The λόγος or νόμος of ἀγάπη refers to something stable, its principle of intelligibility or raison d'etre, but it does not exclude the dynamic character of ἀγάπη ; it is something living and active so that νόμος is not to στοργή something extrinsic, a canon, but something intrinsic, a modal principle of activity. It is with ἀγάπη thought of in that way, that φόβος ἁγνός is associated and, we are told, φυσικῶς. The introduction of τρόπος is then not to cover the fact of activity, but rather that of personal activity, an activity that stems from the responsibility of a person endowed with a nature that is transformed by ἀγάπη . So that φόβος made ἁγνός because of αἰδώς cannot be disassociated from ἀγάπη in the concrete life of the Christian.

It is 'towards God and one another' πρός Θεόν καί ἀλλήλους [27] that reverence preserved ἀγάπη without corruption. In commenting on the contrast between the

two fears of which Maximus speaks we suggested that he opposed the fear of punishment to a fear that responded to God as 'Father'. Filial fear will show itself as a punctilious care to act in such a way that man does not offend his Father because of the love that binds them to each other. But here Maximus is probably throwing into relief another aspect of this fear; it is an affirmation that no matter how deep the love of man for God, even when it is consummated in deification, it must always be qualified by the truth that man remains a creature in the presence of his Creator. In the very intimacy of love he is confronted by God as mysterium tremendum;[28] there is an abyss between Creator and creature that cannot be bridged and man's acknowledgement of this unalterable fact is religious awe or fear. God, for Maximus, as for Denis the pseudo-Areopagite, is the Transcendent One.[29] As a mystical theologian Maximus must stress the necessity of fear even in the intimacy of love. It does justice to the truth. This love and this reverence enhance each other; the fear by acknowledging the permanence of man's creaturehood tempers the love so that it does not degenerate into presumption; the love prevents man from succumbing to the terror that the contrast between himself and God evokes. While Maximus is content to imply this in relation to God he does refer to it in relation to man, or more precisely, with reference to his correspondent. Ἀγάπη for Maximus, as for the whole Christian tradition, must be expressed not only towards God, but also towards man.[30] It is the same ἀγάπη , being a share in something

proper to God, which is extended to man. It is love in expression, so that we cannot claim to love God, whom we do not see, unless we love men with whom we can have immediate contact. This love too must be tempered by a reverence that is in some way analogous to the fear of God that we have just considered. It will be an attitude to man as related to the majesty and holiness of God, a reverence for the mystery of his being and personhood which will modify ἀγάπη in his regard in a way that is parallel to its modification of ἀγάπη when directed to God. For Maximus there can be no question of a love that is not balanced by respect, not alone with regard to God but with regard to his fellow men made in His image. Maximus simply says that he is 'restrained' by reverence.

Maximus concludes: 'As I have said, on my part mixing fear with affection, I have laid down this law of love towards my lord up to this day; restrained from writing through reverence lest contempt occur, I am moved to write by goodwill so that hatred may not be considered the final excuse for not writing'.[31] Before examining this, we may ask ourselves if Maximus has neglected to perfect the symmetry of his thesis by not having dealt with πόθος - εὔνοια in the same way as he dealt with φόβος - αἰδώς . Πόθος - εὔνοια is already treated implicitly in the argument concerning φόβος - ἀγάπη . There is a conflict between some kinds of fear and ἀγάπη , not that the fear of punishment is something bad; it is in fact a phase in spiritual purification and growth. The point that Maximus wants to make is

that love casts out this kind of fear-eventually, that it is irreconcilable with the perfection of ἀγάπη . He would not deny that πόθος could be irreconcilable with ἀγάπη if it is passionate in the pejorative sense, but that would be something totally incompatible with ἀγάπη whereas δέος τιμωρίας is not. Then he implies that there is not the same kind of opposition to the perfection of ἀγάπη to be found in πόθος , which in itself is a kind of love, so that when informed by ἀγάπη , it is transfigured and one might say appropriated by ἀγάπη . Therefore there is never a phase in the development of the spiritual life when ἀγάπη would have to cast out πόθος since the higher love virtually contains the humbler sort already. Pothos has a potentiality for transformation into ἀγάπη which cannot be said of δέος τιμωρίας , so that there is no need to perform a comparable operation to square πόθος with ἀγάπη in terms of εὔνοια . The sentence quoted at the beginning of this paragraph rounds off what Maximus wants to say. It is the practical conclusion to his brief but complex treatment of an aspect of asceticism. The fact that it is practical helps us to understand the sense in which he uses νόμος τῆς ἀγάπης . He says that the law of love he has set himself is restraint through reverence and allowing himself to be moved by good will. Inevitably we recall the use of νόμος which we have just examined. If its use here were identical, then αἰδώς and εὔνοια would represent the inner principle of ἀγάπη rather than be its constituents. It is worth noting that Maximus carefully avoids qualifying the

νόμος here by the adjective ἐνδιάθετος. He is rather using language empirically and describing again his intentions as he did when he spoke of 'mingling' and 'forming' above. He has returned to the plane of experience and practical intention.[32]

It should be now possible to penetrate in some way the psychology of Maximus. Dalmais is probably correct in supposing that the addressee is a monk, because of the absence of any allusion, in the course of the whole opuscle, to responsibilities civil or ecclesiastical.[33] Maximus considers him to be present in a godlike manner by his ἀρετή and possibly by his candour or capacity for plain speaking. It is because of his virtue that he is θεομίμητος . The συγκατάβασις , which his correspondent has shown, has divine associations, used as it is with reference to the Incarnation and the operation of the Holy Spirit in man.[34] For Maximus, the Logos is incarnate in the Christian through the presence of the virtues.[35] Here ἀρετή can refer to the diapason of man's virtuous life, moral, theological and mystical; but it is above all in ἀγάπη that ἀρετή finds expression. Maximus says that he has been the object of his friend's ἀγάπη and so the introduction to the brief statement on the interplay of love and fear, which we have just examined, is introduced by διό .[36] Maximus accepts the burden of Christian friendship and love. Just as his friend's charity has been marked by selfless concern for his fellow, so will Maximus allow charity to sublimate his own gifts and enable him to

show the face of Christ to his friend. This is possible because of the indwelling of the Logos through the virtues which are energized by the Holy Spirit's action in pouring charity into the human heart.[37]

In this opening passage of the Pater Noster we have evidence of the play of θεωρία φυσική , and even of θεολογία , in the thought processes of St. Maximus. Because there is depth to his vision of ἀγάπη , the tesseral exactness of his composition should not blind us to the freedom with which he uses concepts like πόθος , φόβος and στοργή , allowing them to be refined by both the immediate context, the larger ambience of patristic usage and, above all, by his personal experience. Spirituality emerges as doctrine lived. To get inside his thought, then, we have to search for its foci and keep in mind that he uses the accepted language with the liberty of a master, so that we have to weigh each word with discretion if we are to approach the meaning that he intends it to bear in its context. Further we have to remember that language and the thought that it expresses are not absolute entities to be appropriated for themselves, but rather a means of grasping reality, a reality that, for Maximus, was primarily accessible to faith and γνῶσις .[38]

The analysis of this introductory passage of the Pater Noster must make it obvious that ἀγάπη is a central and controlling idea in the theology of Maximus, and that, even when he is not explicit, it is operative all through the treatise.[39] This claim is reinforced by

the occurrence of the noun, ἀγάπη ,[40] twice and of the verb ἀγαπάω ,[41] twice in the Conclusion, which lends to ἀγάπη the character of an inclusion. It provides a framework, within which the rest of what is said is to be placed and understood. In his elaboration of the Pater Noster themes, πραότης [42] seems to occur when we would have expected ἀγάπη . We may suggest here that it can be understood as a subjective disposition in man to accept the inpouring of 'divine charity' and so that when it is mentioned, it is meant to evoke its correlative ἀγάπη . Again when ἀγάπη seems to be required, we are provided with γνώμη [43] or προαίρεσις .[44] This should not surprise us because, in this system these faculties or activities are the organs or means through which ἀγάπη is exercised, so that when they are mentioned, provided their functioning is in keeping with λόγος φύσεως we are meant to presume the presence of transforming ἀγάπη . This would seem to be further borne out by the couplet λόγος - θεσμός , which we have examined. As we shall see, the idea of divine and natural law[45] in Maximus has a strongly personal character, and so again implies the intervention of ἀγάπη .

Introduction, a. The Divine Counsel (873CD).

From an analysis of the Introduction to the Pater Noster (873CD) some of the basic themes of the theology of St. Maximus emerge. While he looks back to the dawn of creation he makes it abundantly clear that his reflections on man will be set between the moments of κένωσις and θέωσις. It is what God the Father 'wills and grants by grace' that will concern him primarily. Χάρις here alerts us to the will and gift of God in so far as it concerns man in particular. It is that πλέον τί of which Athanasius speaks, the grace of the image or the grace of the Trinity.[46] Elsewhere, Maximus speaks of the will of the Son in this matter. The Father creates by his Logos and Spirit.[47] We know that he considers the λόγοι of a differentiated creation, that express the purpose of the Creator, to be held together by the Logos, and more, that they are bound up with the economy of salvation and the Incarnation of the Logos, so that creation-redemption is ultimately derived from the Trinity.[48] But here he is concentrating on the mystery of human freedom, hypostasisation and sonship. That is the 'work' of the will of God on which he intends to meditate. That the will of God is what is intended is confirmed by the cognate passage of the Quaestiones ad Thalassium.[49] There we find that it is a ῥοπή of the θέλημα of the Son that complements the establishment of creatures with the hypostatic union and the divinisation of man. The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit will as one, since they are personally

identified with the wholeness of the divine nature, while the divine will bears the impress of the hypostatic characteristics of each of the Persons. So Maximus can, without ambiguity, speak of the βουλή of the Father or the βουλή of the Son. Elsewhere,[50] that βουλή is identified with 'the mystery of the Economy', which Maximus reminds us, is secret until it is revealed by the Son, who thus becomes 'the Angel of the great Counsel of God'. We find the Counsel of the Blessed Trinity embodied in the incarnate person and history of the Logos made flesh.[51] The θέλημα of the Trinity has been expressed with wisdom in a βουλή that is embodied in Jesus Christ. The Λόγος became man so that man might become god.[52] Divinisation enables the man who knows the λόγος of the mystery to become, in turn, an 'angel of the great Counsel of God' rising by virtuous living and contemplation, rooted in personalisation , 'to Him who came down to him'.[53] Κένωσις and θέωσις immediately evoke the whole span of Christology and anthropology in the teaching of Maximus. When salvation is appropriated by men, the great Counsel of God is revealed anew. The work of the divine Counsel is embodied in the 'work' of man.[54]

Between βουλή and κένωσις and θέωσις Maximus places πρόνοια and κρίσις .[55] Providence and Judgment are exercised by God and ensure that the eternal purposes of His Counsel are effected in a strong yet gentle manner. In the Pater Noster text, Maximus confines the field of divine activity to 'our present and future life', in which He determines for each the 'mode of activity that becomes it'. The emphasis on activity

recalls the fundamental τρόπος ὑπάρξεως reminding us of the interpenetration of being, becoming and doing in the teaching of Maximus, where man is what he becomes and becomes what he does. Εὖ εἶναι will give way to ἀεί εἶναι .[56] In a cognate text the 'ages' or 'generations' of Scripture are interpreted to mean salvation history up to and including the Incarnation and then the age of man's appropriating the salvation held forth to him by God in Christ, until it is finally consummated in θέωσις .[57] Therefore Maximus wants us to remember that, from beginning to end, it is God who takes the initiative, wisely upholding and moulding, by the λόγοι of His Providence and Judgement, the destiny of everyman in Christ.

It should be said in a preliminary way that Maximus chooses in this passage to contemplate the divine mysteries rather than to have recourse to his own ingenuity, which would merely subjugate him to λογισμοί , a term that usually conveys the futility of intellectual endeavour divorced from prayer and even the downright perversity of that kind of thinking. To avoid ambiguity Maximus transposes the λογισμοί of the scriptural quotations to the unequivocal λόγοι. He does not want to impose his λογισμοί on revelation by substituting the mythology of Origenism for true interpretation. He modestly prefaces what he has to say with τυχόν . This is the area of θεολογούμενα but they are to be weighed against Scripture and Tradition in the balance of a comprehensive theology. He interprets the βουλή of the Lord to mean the κένωσις of the Son for man's deification. That κένωσις is a synonym for the redemptive incarnation of the Logos is clear from parallel passages in the

Quaestiones ad Thalassium[58] and the Capitum Theologicorum et Oeconomicorum Duae Centuriae.[59] In the former we are told that He 'had in their regard the ineffable supremely good Counsel: that He should mingle Himself with the nature of men without change through the veritable hypostatic union, to unite to Himself the human nature without alteration, so that He became man in a way that He Himself knows'; the latter has: 'The great Counsel of the God and Father is the secret and unknown mystery of the Economy, which having fulfilled, the Only-Begotten Son through His Incarnation revealed, becoming the angel of the great eternal Counsel of the God and Father'. In the same passage of the Quaestiones ad Thalassium, he makes a clear distinction between the decision of the divine will to create, which was 'before all the ages' and the actual origin of created things. The decision is in the transcendent order, something outside time and the order of creation. There is no question of an Origenistic fragmentation of the Henad. The διάστημα between λόγοι and Λόγος will have to find another interpretation. In the same way, the bridging of that διάστημα will require a more comprehensive solution than the intellectualist theory of Evagrius. In the Pater Noster, God is said to 'wisely' regulate our life by the λόγοι of his Providence and Judgment. The cognate passage from the Quaestiones ad Thalassium also invokes the wisdom of God, associating it with the providential and judicious distinction of the ages, that preceding the Incarnation and that subsequent to it. It is σοφία [60] that endows the βουλή of God with a 'logical' character, so to speak, so that Maximus does not think of the divine Will as arbitrary or tyrranical, but rather

full of order and intelligence. The theologian who contemplates the evolution of the divine βουλή , expressed in the mystery of God's Providence and Judgment, will himself participate in that wisdom. The λόγοι will expel the λογισμοί.

In De quinque modis contemplationis naturalis brevis expositio[61] we have a fundamental text that throws light on what Maximus means by πρόνοια and χρίσις . It implies a trenchant critique of the Origenist and Evagrian notions of Providence and Judgement. The purpose of Maximus is to release by θεωρία φυσική the λόγοι of οὐσία , κίνησις, διαφορά, χρᾶσις, and θέσις .[62] For the Evagrians, Judgment meant the chastisement which God designed for fallen spirits: to incorporate them in bodies proportionate to the degree of their guilt and fall; corresponding to this, Providence expressed the goodness of God, who planned that the fallen spirits would be brought back to the Henad by progressive purification. Maximus says that the contemplation of οὐσία reveals the existence of God; Κίνησις gives insight into His Providence and Judgement is discerned in διαφορά .[63]

Maximus contrasts the mistaken notions of Providence and Judgement with orthodox concepts:

> I mean by Providence, not the convertive and, as it were, economic restoration of the objects of Providence from what need not be to what needs be, but that which binds the whole together and preserves the principles ( λόγοι) by which, in the beginning, the whole came to be, and by Judgment, not that which is educative and, as it were, punitive of sinners, but the saving and defining differentiation of beings according to which each of the created things, bound to the principles ( λόγοι) according to which they were created, has in its natural identity inviolable, unalterable validity, since the Creator from the beginning decided and made each one to exist with regard to being, substance, mode and quality.[64]

The Evagrian notions of πρόνοια and χρίσις confuse the ontological and moral orders,[65] and it is the purpose of this passage to ensure that this distinction is made unequivocally. Here the author wants to define the ontological and cosmological sense of the terms before he will introduce moral considerations. It is the contemplation of movement that reveals πρόνοια so that the description of πρόνοια [66] binding the whole together must be understood in a dynamic way. The movement has its source in divine power which has for aim the unification of all things that came to be, in the beginning, in dependence on the divine λόγοι. To be a creature is to be in movement, but not in a random way. Rather it displays to the scrutiny of θεωρία φυσική the presence of a majestic sweep of divine influence gathering all creatures into a pre-determined unity. Maximus insists that the progress of creatures to this end leaves intact the principles according to which they were created, but it does not imply that spirits were integral to the Henad before the fall. In fact the λόγοι are themselves the principles of the divinely projected unity, so that the realization of the divine intentions requires that they should be preserved. Since unity is the aim of the divine will, the λόγοι imply movement towards end. The notion of φύσις and λόγος φύσεως can be rooted in the divine intention and activity in this way.

Maximus' definition of χρίσις [67] is designed to make obvious that the process of unification, effected by πρόνοια, in no way trespasses on the unassailable

individuality of each created thing when caught into the comprehensive thrust of πρόνοια . He sketches in four aspects of created being: εἶναι, τί εἶναι , πῶς and ὁποῖον to emphasize that it is the created being in its entirety that is left intact.[68] Νομιμότης[69] suggests that each being retains its legitimate individuality, so that it implies a created self-possession that will mature into self-realization under the influence of God's Providence and Judgment. The bringing of creation to perfection does not mean that the splendour of individuals has to be sacrificed. Κρίσις prepares, by 'difference', created beings for the harmonious movement of πρόνοια ensuring that individual purposes ( λόγοι ) are distributed wisely in relation to the natural power of each being, proportioned in keeping with the subject of each substance.[70] Harmony will be the effect of the unifying relationship that respects every facet of created being.

Having established the inviolability of created beings, Maximus then goes on to safeguard the moral dimensions of πρόνοια and χρίσις ; he affirms that he does not deny a moral πρόνοια and χρίσις in so far as God deals with men endowed with volition. The same Providence and Judgement are brought to bear differently on the exercise of human freedom.[71] Once the ontological status of creatures is established, Maximus can throw open the possibility of union with God through freedom. He proceeds to describe χρᾶσις and θέσις two moral categories.[72] Since they are not mentioned in this context of the Pater Noster, it is important to remember that they are linked by Maximus with πρόνοια and χρίσις being an unfolding of the

moral implications of χρίσις in particular. This in turn will be seen to be emphasis on τρόπος ὑπάρξεως [73] and so on the personal dimension of human being, so that we find God moulding his world to His purposes through the personal exercise of human freedom. Κρᾶσις or synthesis symbolises the way in which γνώμη informs the virtues and how, in turn, it is transformed by them. Θέσις refers to man in action and so to man's being in act. It is θέσις that ensures that man's life is in keeping with a γνώμη that accepts the godward thrust of the λόγος φύσεως If we understand prudence to be the actual ordering of human life in keeping with the divine idea of what that life should be (λόγος) , then this ordinance might be translated accurately as 'prudence'. Since it is through ἀγάπή that man's freedom is transformed, rendered pliable to the action of the Holy Spirit and open to the invitation to a synergy that issues in θέωσις, Providence and Judgement extended in Synthesis and Ordinance will be seen to culminate in ἀγάπη .

> The purpose of Divine Providence is to unify by right faith and spiritual charity those whom vice has sundered in various ways. Indeed for this the Saviour suffered - to gather together in one the children of God that were dispersed. He then who does not sustain the irksome, bear with annoyances, endure the laborious, walks outside divine charity and the purpose of Providence.(74)

Here the shadow of sin is acknowledged as a factor to be overcome by Providence, compounding, so to speak, the problem set the πρόνοια of God by his χρίσις The original divine intention ( σκοπός ) was, for Maximus, perichoretic deification. The Fall bedevilled this aim and is remedied in the salvation that is then necessarily included in the divine σκοπός . In this way Maximus

has safeguarded the unity that fascinated Origen and his less discriminating followers, but without allowing differentiating hypostasis to be swallowed up in a heteredox unity. This is besides an optimistic view, not alone of finiteness, but of its material substructure, especially the somatic dimension of man with all that it entails in his concrete life and experience.

In Ambigua 32, Maximus combines wisdom with substance (God as always the same), knowledge with providence (God as the ground of the whole creation) and virtue with judgment (God as Saviour).[75] Thunberg notes that the point of view changes from the cosmological to the soteriological in the third element of the triad, which leads him to conclude justly that: 'this shows, however, not a Maximus haunted by Origenist temptations, but a Maximus for whom the idea of a general purpose of creation, and of Christ as the centre of understanding, is of primary importance'.[76] The mystery of the Incarnation is, for Maximus, the key to the possibilities of union, and it goes beyond the merely moral sphere. In the Quaestiones ad Thalassium, πρόνοια and χρίσις are said to be 'the eyes of the Logos'[77] overseeing the universe, the 'wings'[78] on which the Logos comes flying to created beings. Nor does the Incarnation fall outside the scope of πρόνοια and χρίσις since the hypostatic union is referred to πρόνοια [79] with its emphasis on movement as a structural element in created being, and assuring us that the Immoveable One 'moves about' his creatures; it is the passion of Christ that is referred to χρίσις ,[80] where we find His freedom exercised sublimely in κένωσις .

In Ambigua 10, Maximus is concerned to emphasize that πρόνοια 'preserves the λόγοι by which, in the beginning the whole came to be', and that χρίσις has to do with individual beings, 'bound to the logoi according to which they were created'.[81] In the Pater Noster, it is the λόγοι of the πρόνοια and χρίσις of God that wisely direct men, allotting to present and future life 'the mode of activity that becomes it'. The λόγοι are not to be identified with the essence of God, as Evagrius would suggest, nor are they to be restricted to identification with things in their created existence.[82] They are undoubtedly identified with created being, but they have a transcendent reference, being divine principles of being. The expression λόγος τοῦ εἶναι relates created beings to God's will as to what they should be;[83] λόγος τοῦ εὖ εἶναι relates them to Him as good and as such regulates human freedom.[84] In the dyad λόγος - τρόπος the τρόπος is identified with personal individuality and thus it appropriates the dynamism of λόγος φύσεως and enables the individual to go beyond himself while preserving his logical identity. The use of λόγος in relation to εὖ εἶναι reminds us that, for Maximus, personal realization is not cut adrift from its source in the Logos. While the dimension of τρόπος in human existence ensures that person is irreducible to nature, the ground of λόγος in relation to that very τρόπος suggests that man's uniqueness is itself derived from the Logos, that it is related to the Logos. Man enjoys λόγος ὑπάρξεως as a foundation for the exercise of personal existence, so that his individuality can never

become a principle of arbitrariness and revolt, if he is to retain his proper identity. It is his destiny to be a son in the Son. The emphasis given by Maximus to ἕκαστων and ἕκαστα [85] is meant to draw our attention, not merely to generic or formal distinction in created beings, but to their personal individuality. It is not merely mankind that is differentiated, as Maximus would have it, but each man in his uniqueness.

Maximus' concern with the pair χένωσις - θέωσις is in the mainstream of theological tradition. St. Athanasius summed up the reflections of his predecessors on the divine image in man and the gift of divine sonship by saying simply: 'The Logos became man in order that we should become gods'.[86] Dalmais, in his splendid article, 'Divinisation', in the Dictionnaire de Spiritualité, shows how Athanasius understood that deification was essentially linked to sonship and that it was bound up with Baptism and the role of the Holy Spirit; he sees the Cappadocians as maintaining this teaching, with Gregory of Nyssa adding the idea of the Eucharist as unification of the deified flesh of Christ with ours; he observes that it became increasingly obvious that deification and union with the Logos are inseparable, the latter being the cause of the former; he points out that Cyril of Alexandria considered that deification was wrought in principle in Christ and was communicated to the individual Christian by the action of the Holy Spirit.[87] With the writings of Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, θέωσις finally became a technical term. Dionysius saw deification as the purpose of creation.[88] It is the work of grace. He keeps in line

with the tradition by declaring that Baptism and the Eucharist are the means of effecting deification,[89] but he adds his distinctive touch by saying that it is through the hierarchies that man rises to divine virtue.[90] That Maximus is in continuity with this tradition and especially with Dionysius, is obvious from a sentence like this:

> He made us to be partakers of the divine nature, sharers in his eternity and we appear like Him according to the deification that comes from grace, on account of which there exists and abides the system of created things and the creation and bringing into being of things that did not exist.[91]

In this passage Maximus considers θέωσις to be the end of creation, so that we expect to find the rest of his understanding finalized by this teleology. Because of the emphasis on the personal that marks his teaching as a whole, it is obvious that here he wants to underscore 'partakers' and 'sharers'. Deification requires the irreducibility of the person; it is the personal share in the divine nature by which man participates in divine life that enables him to move from image to likeness; it is this that effects the transition from εὖ εἶναι to ἀεί εἶναι , making us 'sharers' of his eternity.[92] For Maximus deification is the work of grace, that over-and-above conferred on man by his Creator, which makes him to be the image of God and gives him the power to grow into His likeness. This demands the exercise of his freedom, informed by ἀγάπη . This in turn depends on the action of the Holy Spirit pouring ἀγάπη into his heart and man's response in synergy.[93] Like Cyril of Alexandria, Maximus considers this to have been wrought in principle in Christ.[94] Deification does not mean that man can enjoy the

kind of being proper to God, but he can become godlike by 'the possessive imitation'[95] of divine qualities: immutable in soul, immortal in body,[96] endowed with divine simplicity[97] and above all, possessing the divine gift of ἀγάπη [98] which ensures that his use of freedom is in keeping with the basic impulse of his λόγος φύσεως . For Maximus, man was created for union with God so that it is natural to him to go beyond his nature. This brings us back to the mystery of ὑπόστασις and the existential character of τρόπος . It is in the actuality of participating and sharing that man becomes like to God. That is χάρις . It is how we become gods.[99] Maximus gives this teaching a personal turn by his emphasis on the tantum-quantum character of what takes place in deification through ἀντίδοσις and ἐμπεριχώρησις :

> They say that God and man are models for each other, that God humanizes Himself for man through philanthropy to the extent that man, enabled by charity, divinizes himself for God; that man is rapt up by God in mind to the unknowable in so far as man has manifested through virtues the God who is by nature invisible.[100]

When we speak of deification as the effect of grace, we do not attribute to Maximus a theory of grace that is, in any way, divorced from the concrete character of the Incarnation. Deification is possible because it has been realized par excellence in the Word made flesh and because He communicates it to men by the action of the Spirit and through the Church.

It is in the Incarnation that Maximus finds the fullest possible realization of the union of God and man, with the humanization of the divine and the divinization of the human necessarily involving each other. At the

basis of his thinking is the definition of Chalcedon: ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν Χριστόν, Υἱόν, Κύριον, Μονογενή, ἐν δύο φύσεσιν ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωρίστως γνωριζόμενων.[101] There can be no question, for Maximus, of blurring the edges of the natures. He balances the ἐκ δύο φύσεσιν[102] stressed by the Neo-Chalcedonians with their ἐν δύο φύσεσιν[103] in order to remind us that the union does not violate the distinction of the natures. He adds that the natures are identical with the person to exclude the possibility of a tertium quid. Christ is God and He is man. Ὃς οὐκ ἄλλο τι παρά τό ἐξ ὧν, ἐν οἷς τε καί ἅπερ ἐστι γνωριζόμενος[104] excludes the τρίτον ἀποτέλεσμα[105] and touches the ontological foundation of his teaching on dyothelitism by the refined co-ordination of the concepts of nature and hypostasis. The Logos extends His personal existence to a concrete humanity, in such a way that there are not merely two λόγοι φύσεως in Christ, but a new mode of existing of the Person of the Logos as well.[106] This conjunction ensures that, while the unity of the person of the Logos is maintained, the enhypostasization of the humanity safeguards its integrity and guarantees its personal human activity. By adroitly striking a balance between potential Nestorianism and potential Monophysitism, Maximus lays the foundation of a Christology that preserves the wholeness of the natures and the oneness of the person, and once this is established, can give full play to both natures, so that divinity does not have to be hampered by humanity, nor can humanity be thought to be deprived of what human personhood would give it. The teaching on

ὑπόστασις σύνθετος allows us to predicate of Christ, without a whiff of heterodoxy, two sets of particularized characteristics provided that we insist, with Maximus, on one Subject.[107]

This must be complemented by the affirmation of the polarity and reciprocity of the two natures within the hypostatic unity. Christ is 'a man above men'.[108] He is no longer ψιλός ἄνθρωπος [109] nor γυμνός Θεός .[110] This is brought out most clearly in the use of the concept περιχώρησις ,[111] particularly with regard to Christ's activity. But this kind of activity is made possible by the συμφυΐα of the natures, which enables the theologian to apply divine attributes to Christ as man and human attributes to Christ as God. The activity of Christ is characterized by τῇ πρός ἀλλήλας συμφυΐᾳ καί περιχωρήσει ,[112] where συμφυΐα evokes the mutual adhesion of the natures in the mystery of the person and περιχώρησις refers to the interplay of their mutual activity as a co-penetration, again a fruit and consequence of the fundamental union of natures in the hypostasis. In fact, for Maximus, the unity requires the difference and the difference requires the unity, in the mystery of Christ: μέχρι γάρ τότε σαφῶς ἕνωσις πραγμάτων ἐστίν , ἕως ἄν ἡ τούτων σώζεται φυσική διαφορά .[113] Once Incarnation is effected, deification follows of necessity. He will appropriate a text of Cyril's much used by the Monothelites and interpret it in keeping with the stringent distinctions of Chalcedon: μία τε καί συγγενής δι' ἀμφοῖν ἐνέργεια .[114] He insists that it is not a mixed energy that is in question,

but a περιχώρησις of human and divine energies, so that the man acts divinely because of the Logos and the Logos, become man, acts humanly.[115] Cyril had taught a συμφυΐα and ἕνωσις of energies, not the hybrid fabrication of the heretics. The key to Cyril is σύστασις,[116] the most intimate union of the energies, because of the unity of the person, not their confusion. The ἀσύγχύτως of Chalcedon constantly finds play in the Christology and Soteriology of Maximus. When Maximus speaks of the λόγοι κατά φύσιν, he is emphasising the distinction of the natures.[117] They are inviolable in the union brought about in the hypostasis. We see the consequences of συμφυΐα in the περιχώρησις of the τρόποι ὑπάρξεως. The natures are not merely seen as dynamic because they are φύσις; it is above all the hypostasized mutual dynamism of the natures that gives rise to the tantum-quantum[118] in Christ, between God and man, which is at once an exemplar for the deification of man and historically what makes it possible. Sherwood can justifiably observe that 'again and again deification is represented as the result of the Incarnation. It is then often expressed with an antistrophic arrangement: to the condescension of God in His Man-becoming responds the imitation of man in God-becoming, by the grace and power of the God-man'.[119]

The original aim of the Great Counsel of God is realized in the Incarnation. 'In fact, before the ages a union of limit and without-limit, of measure and without-measure, of extremity and without-extremity, of Creator and creation, of stability and movement, was conceived'.[120]

Man's failure in his vocation as mediator opened the way to the coming of Christ who would heal the divisions and achieve the unity willed in the βουλή of God. In fact, this unity 'has taken place in Christ shown forth in the final ages'.[121] Christ is mediator because as man He freely consents to the filial attitudes that constitutes the hypostatic character of the Logos.[122] The Logos is Son; it is his relationship to his Father that constitutes him as Son and is expressed in his τρόπος ὑπάρξεως . His mode of existence is filial and it is by this very mode that his humanity exists in the Incarnation, so that as man he is made son from the first moment of his human existence in the womb of His Mother.[123] Maximus is insisting that he was not born of the will of the flesh nor of the will of man, but of God. His entry into our condition, that of γένεσις is marked by γέννησις .[124] This implies the presence of the Person of the Logos from the beginning of his human history. His γέννησις befits the λόγος φύσεως and λόγος τῆς γενέσεως of man, destined to be son of God. Man's γέννησις had lapsed to the animal level, the product of instinct and philautic γνώμη . In the Incarnation, it is the τρόπος τῆς γεννήσεως that is new; the λόγος φύσεως retains its identity.[125] Christ is fully human; but the mode of existence that characterizes this human being is in keeping with human dignity and the destiny that God holds out to man. Even as man, He is ad Patrem and so He can heal the ancient divisions in creation and between creation and God. It is already achieved in His Person because of the

hypostatic union of the two natures, so that the cosmic vocation of man is fulfilled in Christ. In Him the right relationship between person and nature is expressed in fitting activity. The precariousness of nature is stabilized by innovation and made 'incorruptible'. It is an enhypostasized human nature that is at the source of the human willing and acting of the Incarnate Logos. It is γέννησις carried over into κίνησις as εὖ εἶναι and issuing finally in ἀεί εἶναι . Nor does Maximus leave these concepts suspended in abstraction. He joins them to the mysteries of Christ's Birth, Baptism, Passion, Death, Resurrection and Ascension.[126] The union of Creator and creature realized ontologically in the Hypostatic Union is taken into existence and life so that the five divisions are healed in history and metahistory. The willing and activity of Christ as man express the being of the Hypostatic Union. Because of the free consent of his human will to the hypostatic character of the Word he can unite male and female, Paradise and the inhabited world, heaven and earth, intelligible and sensible things and finally created and uncreated nature.[127] This is rooted in His τρόπος ὑπάρξεως . The union of Creator and creature, which is the σκοπός of the divine βουλή , has its ground in the ontology of the Hypostatic Union which is the basis of the union of wills in Christ and between Christ and his Father. Ἀγάπη is what informs the human will of Christ and ensures that it is at one with His divine Will and so with the Will of His Father. Ἀγάπη translates the enhypostasisation of the humanity into a life that is totally at one with the Will of the

Father.[128] It is in this way that the 'Henad' is constituted, that the διάστημα between the λόγοι and the Λόγος is bridged, that the five divisions are overcome, that the restlessness of created nature comes to rest in God. This is not restricted to the Person and life of Christ but is extended to all those who are filially adopted in Him.

By His birth the Incarnate Logos inaugurated a new mode of birth by which man can participate in the His filial mode of existence.[129] θέωσις is the consummation of this process. It begins with Baptism,[130] in which he is born of the Holy Spirit and launched into a new life of ἀγάπη .[131] This presumes ὑποτύπωσις ,[132] the intervention of the Holy Spirit[133] and συνεργεία ,[134] It requires the renunciation of φιλαυτία ,[135] the acceptance of ἀγάπη and the conversion of the passions into virtue. It is the combination of συνεργεία and ἀγάπη [136] that will bring about the personalisation of man's being and life, enabling him to go out of his old self to live for God in a way analogous to the ecstatic human life of the Incarnate Logos. It is analogous because Christ's being as man is ecstatic; being enhypostasized substantially, it belongs not to itself but to the eternal Logos. On the other hand the analogy is valid since the life which everyman can live in Christ is because of the <u>agape</u> derived from Christ and poured into human hearts by the Holy Spirit.[137] It is this that enables man to live as a son of God and so to enter into his inheritance as a person by sharing in the Son's τρόπος ὑπάρξεως . The new baptismal birth

culminates in θέωσις .[138] The states of Christ from γέννησις to ἀνάστασις are to be reproduced in the Christian. Just as the Incarnation evolved as redemption through willing and activity, so the new-born Christian must walk the same road. The Church is the milieu where the life of agape is lived until it issues in the perfection of θέωσις .[139]

The maximian triad οὐσία , δύναμις and ἐνέργεια [140] assure us that Maximus held for stability in the created order, even if it were relative and dependent. Creatures exercised the act of existence, they were capable of existing in themselves, they were agents. This triad also makes evident the dynamic character of creatures in this system: they are empowered and realize themselves in activity. As Von Balthasar reminds us, οὐσία is the supreme aristotelian category comprising the quid est and the quod est of things.[141] Maximus, in dependence on Leontius of Byzantium, thinks of οὐσία in a twofold way: as the supreme logical category embracing genus, species and individuals; it is also an ontological category, the καθ'ὅλον and so is equal to the total being of the universe.[142] Von Balthasar rightly points out that οὐσία and φύσις are virtually equivalent, particularly when it is a case of οὐσία καθ' ἕκαστον.[143] While the dimension of καθ' ἕκαστον and καθ' ἑαυτόν are not identical, it is well to note that in the concrete existent they coincide so that the relationship of the individual to the divine χρίσις , which were mentioned above, is valid even when it entails hypostatic individuality, allowing for the different exercise of

προνοια and χρισις in regard to free beings, as Maximus himself noted.[144] No ουσια can exist, in fact, without the prerogative of καθ' ἑαυτόν . Φυσις too has a general reference and particular essence is attached to a genus so that we have εἶδος ἄτομον .[145] The distinctive thing about ουσια , φυσις and εἶδος is that they denote the essential dimension of being. They require another dimension to account for their existential actuality: καθ' ἑαυτόν .[146]

Ουσία, δύναμις and ἐνέργεια are three irreplaceable aspects of created being. They add up to the notion of φυσις . Φυσις is essentially dynamic, but it is also imperishably consistent in its basic principle.[147] Undoubtedly, φυσις is in the realm of the objective and since it has a transcendent reference because of its λογος ,[148] it is ultimately grounded in the objective energy of the Logos. It is the point of intersection of two activities, that of the Logos and that of the λογος φυσεως . The possessors of φυσις must respect its parameters. To disregard φυσις is to plunge into unreality. It is the vector of individual activity. It also bears the character of the concrete universal of Gregory of Nyssa: its concreteness, in fact, is due to its being innovated by the possessors of nature so that Maximus can say that 'the saints, through many sufferings, free the nature that is them from the condemnation of death on account of sin'.[149]

So basic to φυσις is the idea of κίνησις that Maximus can define the inmost secret of each thing's essential consistency through its activity: 'the definition

of each nature is the principle of its essential activity'.[150] All creatures are, can act and do act, that is, they are made up of οὐσία , δύναμις and ἐνέργεια . Their energy is the unfolding of their essential existence through the power to act. Maximus draws attention to the reciprocal compenetration of the three aspects of creatures: the essence of a thing is constituted 'in truth and uniquely by its power of actuation, which one can call its natural activity. It is by that that it is essentially charcterized, because it is a specifying movement'.[151] Movement reveals the λόγος φύσεως of what moves; the movement cannot emancipate itself from the same λόγος φύσεως if it is to be authentic movement. Conversely it is essential to the φύσις to move, so that Maximus can identify συστατική δύναμις with φυσική ἐνέργεια . Von Balthasar says finely that 'nature is nothing else but organized movement'[152] and he reminds us of how fundamental that principle would be to Maximus in his defence of orthodox Christology.

That Maximus thinks of the triad οὐσία , δύναμις , ἐνέργεια from the point of view of finality is clear from his other triad γένεσις , κίνησις and στάσις * In this way Maximus can preserve the divine transcendence, deny the pre-existence of souls and find an ontological basis for the pre-eminence of the free movement of men in a Christian universe. His dynamic concept of the creature is set in the ultimate framework of ἀρχή, μεσότης and τέλος . The whole of creation is referred to God in

* Vide Appendix IV for an excursus on this triad.

this way:

> God is the Beginning, Middle and the End of beings in so far as He is active and not passive, like all the other things named by us. For He is beginning as Creator, He is middle as Provider and He is end as the Circumference, for from Him and through Him and to Him are all things.[153]

The bond between the triads becomes evident in Ambigua 15:

> So, God is the beginning and the end of every genesis and movement of things that exist, since from Him they have genesis and movement and they make for Him as respose.[154]

The asceticism of Maximus is an elaboration of the concept εὖ εἶναι . This notion expresses the virtuous free movement of man, by which he evolves from being in the image of God to being in His likeness. From this point of view the terminus a quo is εἶναι and the terminus ad quem is ἀεί εἶναι . The triad εἶναι , εὖ εἶναι and ἀεί εἶναι are the ascetical counterpart of the ontological οὐσία , δύμανις , ἐνέργεια and the teleological triad γένεσις, κίνησις and στάσις .[155] Between the termini εἶναι and ἀεί εἶναι Maximus visualizes the whole of man's temporal career. We can see this constellation of basic maximian ideas beautifully depicted in the following passage from the Capitum de Caritate Quattuor Centuriae:

> In bringing into being natures endowed with reason and understanding, God, out of His supreme goodness, communicated to them four of the divine attributes by which He supports, guards, and preserves beings, namely: being and ever-being, goodness and wisdom. Of these, the first two He grants to the essence; the other two, goodness and wisdom, He grants for fitness of will and judgment, in order that the creatures may become by sharing, what He is by essence. Therefore he is said to be made to God's image and likeness; to the image of His being by being, of His ever-being by ever-being (though it has a beginning, yet it is without end); to the likeness of His goodness by goodness,

> of His wisdom by wisdom. The one is by nature, the other by grace. Every rational creature is made to the image of God, but only the good and the wise are to His likeness.[156]

Through the notion of εὖ εἶναι Maximus can insert his ideas about human intelligence, will and the play of grace in human life. Thus he can insist on the mystery of innovation at the heart of the stability of φύσις . It is here that τρόπος intersects with λόγος and that a firmly structured universe finds its fulfilment in the self-abandonment of ἀγάπη .[157] Φύσις is transformed into the mystery of the intersubjectivity of God and man. Behind the apparently arid language of the theologian we catch a glimpse of the Great Counsel of God the Father in all its height and breath and depth:

> Contemplation reveals that the complete λόγος of the whole genesis of rational beings comprises the principle of being, that of well-being and that of ever-being. The first, that of being, is given to beings by essence, the second, that of well-being, is given by free choice in that they are self-moved; the third, that of ever-being, is given to them by grace. It is seen that the first has to do with power, the second with activity and the third with repose.[158]

Introduction b. The plan of the Divine Counsel reflected in the plan of the 'Our Father' (873D-876C)

This section invites reflection on two aspects of the teaching of St. Maximus: his understanding of the 'Our Father' as containing the σκοπός of the Divine Counsel, articulated in seven principal mysteries and how a man might enter into those mysteries by identifying himself with the dominical prayer through πράξαι ,[159] which can extend from the work of virtuous living to an experimental

knowledge of the inflow of divine grace. Here we shall isolate the theme of mediation and postpone a consideration of Maximus' teaching on prayer to the chapter on aspects of his anthropology. We are told that the 'Our Father' 'teaches us to lay claim to the benefits of which the God and Father alone, through the natural mediation of his Son in the Holy Spirit, is truly the giver'. The benefits are the 'mysteries', so that the use of the prayer is meant to be a way of appropriating the mysteries, which he understands to be subsumed under the seven which he lists here: 'theology, sonship in grace, equality in honour with the angels, a share in eternal life, the restoration of nature to dispassionate inclination to itself, the destruction of the law of sin and the abolition of the tyranny of the Evil One, who mastered us by deceit'. Since we shall see something of the import of the mysteries in the next section, it will be useful here to examine the basic character of his teaching on 'the Lord Jesus', who is '"the mediator between God and men"'. This is an inclusive doctrine and a more developed consideration of it by reference to other passages in the maximian corpus should provide us with useful associations, if not a solid framework, for our analysis of the main themes of the Pater Noster.[160]

## The Mediator, aim of the Divine Counsel

Commenting on a conflation of pauline texts - Maximus says in Ambigua 7:

> For the mystery hidden from ages and generations is now manifested however, through the true and perfect inhomination of the Son of God, who hypostatically united our nature to Himself inseparably and unconfusedly. He also united us to Himself as if we were first fruits through that intellectually and rationally animated holy flesh of His, which is from us and ours, and He deigned that we should be one and the same with Himself through His humanity. As we were predestined to be in Him before the ages as members of His body, in spirit He fitted and joined us to Himself like soul to body and led us into the measure of the spiritual age of the fullness that is according to Him. He showed too that we were made for that and that the excellent purpose of God in our regard before all the ages is not to be understood according to any innovation with regard to its proper principle (logos), but that it comes to fulfilment, indeed, through another newer mode (tropos) which is brought into play.[161]

In this passage it is obvious that Maximus holds that the creation of man was with a view to incorporation in Christ. That is the mystery hidden from ages and generations. The λόγος of the divine purpose is constant, but the manner of its fulfilment is different. Here again we find that the divine σκοπός becomes clearer when referred to the contrasting operations of the Providence and Judgment of God. We have seen already that the Incarnation is referred by Maximus to the Providence and the Passion of Christ is linked to Judgment. In the following excerpt from the Quaestiones ad Thalassium, it is clear that the Judgment of God initiates a new mode of human freedom. Deification is still available to man through the Incarnation of the eternal Logos, but now it comes to him through a suffering Messiah. Commenting on the prophetic olive-trees he says:

> The mystery of the Incarnation of God according to Providence is on the right, because it operates the deification, which is above nature, by grace and which was fore-ordained before the ages for those who are saved. No principle at all of nature that

belongs to beings could attain to that. On the left clearly is the mystery, in keeping with Judgment, of the life-giving Passion of the God who willed to suffer in the flesh. This operates the total abolition of all the characteristics and movements, which had entered into nature in a way contrary to nature because of the transgression. On the other hand, it brings about the restitution, which lacks nothing of all the characteristics and movements, which existed beforehand in keeping with nature and according to which no counterfeit λόγος of beings will be found.[162]

In this revealing passage we find that Maximus understands the Incarnation to be without presupposition. It does not take place in any way in dependence on the prevarication of Adam, but is willed absolutely by God. The relationship of Incarnation to deification is also unequivocal: the Incarnation effects deification. The function of the sufferings of the God-man is to restore to man the deification willed for him in the Incarnation. It is a work of ἀποκατάστασις and reconstitutes in humanity the characteristics and vitality proper to deification. The Judgment of God ensures that the original σκοπός of His Providence is achieved. This gives us a glimpse of the true dimensions of the redemptive Incarnation in the thought of Maximus. It is that in terms of which the whole of the created universe can be understood:

> The mystery of the embodiment of the Logos has the meaning of all the riddles and types of Scripture and the knowledge of the phenomenal and intelligible creatures. He then who understands the mystery of the Cross and burial has understood the principles of what was said before; he who has been initiated into the ineffable meaning of the Resurrection has known the purpose for which God constituted all things beforehand.[163]

The ultimate purpose of God in creating has been revealed in the risen Lord. It is there that man not merely grasps the significance of the natural and written laws, but

where he discovers embodied in flesh the law of grace, that guarantees the presence of the Love of God in the Person of His Son. It is that Love that will deify every willing man. The eternal βουλή radiates through the providential and judicious activity of God and lets man see into 'the innermost depth of the Fatherly goodness'.[164] In the light of this distinction the κένωσις - θέωσις dyad of the Pater Noster can be understood as the foundation of the theology of Maximus. Κένωσις will assume its connotations of suffering and death because of the Fall. Divinisation has become salvation.

Assuming that the thought of Maximus was consistent and coherent on the subject of the σκοπός of the divine βουλή, we can arrange seemingly incompatible texts by referring those, which seem to isolate salvation as the cause of the Incarnation, to the Judgment of God and interpret them within the wider context of Providence and the absolute character of 'His wonderful advent to us'.[165] Thus we find statements like: 'the Incarnation took place for the salvation of the nature',[166] or 'God becomes man in order to save man who is being lost',[167] or even more unambiguously, 'the only cause of His birth in the flesh was our salvation'.[168] In the following passage, the Redemption appears as an alternative way of ensuring that men would attain to union with God rather than that the Incarnation was the unqualified end of creation:

> It was proper that, when God had made us like to Himself by having through participation the exact

> signs of His goodness, (He who had as purpose before all the ages that we should be in Him and to lead us to this most happy end, giving us the way through the good use of natural powers, but with man voluntarily rejecting this way by the bad use of the powers), another (way) more marvellous and more in keeping with God should be substituted, to the extent that that which is above nature is superior to that which is according to nature, in order that man might not become a stranger far from God. And this, as all believe, is the mystery of the mystical sojourn of God with men.[169]

We can reconcile this with the deeper intuition of Maximus by saying that he refrains from speculating on hypotheses for which there is no foundation in Scripture and Tradition, on whether the Incarnation would have taken place without the presupposition of the Fall and confines himself to describing how, in fact, God now saves man. We have a dramatic description of man's inability to divinize himself. The implications of his failure are not spelt out, so that we are not told in what way the good use of his powers would have implied the presence of the Logos. It will be sufficient here to draw attention to the passage in the Pater Noster where we are told that 'the transgression of the divine commandment did not allow the first man to become a sharer of this'.[170] 'This' refers to the 'bread' which the Logos is. Divinisation depended on the Logos from the beginning.

In the Quaestiones ad Thalassium we have a passage that clearly and unambiguously declares the Incarnation, which achieves the union without confusion of the uncreated and the created, to be the aim of the creation and the core of great Counsel of God:

> The text of Scripture calls Christ 'the mystery of Christ' and the great Apostle attests it clearly when he says: "The mystery that has been hidden

from generations, has now been manifested" (Col 1, 26), saying namely that the mystery of Christ is identical with Christ. Evidently, this is the ineffable and incomprehensible Hypostatic Union of divinity and humanity, leading the humanity to identity with the divinity in every way, by reason of the hypostasis and making the one composite hypostasis from the two, in such a way however as to bring about no diminution at all of their essential differences, from the point of view of nature, so that their hypostasis, as I have said, becomes one and the natural difference remains unharmed, in accordance with which, even after the union, their natural number is preserved undiminished, even when united. For where, by the union, no modification at all of change or alteration ensued for the things united, the λόγος of each of the united entities remained uncorrupted. Those things, whose λόγος of essence remained uncorrupted, even after the union, their natures had remained in every way intact, so that neither renounced what was its own at all through the union. For it became the Creator of all things, become by nature in keeping with the economy what He was not, to conserve unaltered both Himself as He was by nature and what He had become, in keeping with the economy. For change, in regard to which movement takes place in beings that are moved, is naturally not observed in God, in whom no movement at all is discerned. This is the great hidden mystery. This is the blessed end, on account of which all things were constituted. This is the divine purpose, conceived before the origin of beings. Defining this, we say that it is the preconceived end, on account of which all things are, but which itself is not on account of anything.[171]

In this closely woven passage we can see that, for Maximus, there is nothing created, in function of which the Incarnation can be said to have taken place; on the contrary it is the mystery, 'ineffable and incomprehensible', of the Hypostatic Union which accounts for everything else in the created order. Maximus emphasizes that we cannot account for the union, merely in terms of λόγος. The λόγος of nature is, for him, inviolable:

> Indeed, no creature at all, existing according to its logos among the things that are, was ever what it is not now, nor is it, nor will it be, nor, indeed, is it now, nor will it be in the future, what it was not before. For those things, whose λόγος possessed in the presence of God perfection together with existence, their production and realization

> according to their own λόγοι are, in order to be, entirely unreceptive of every addition to and subtraction from the very thing which they happen to be.[172]

Therefore the unprecedented event of the man-becoming of God must have taken place in another order, that of τρόπος. It is in this order, too, that human participation in that mystery will take place:

> For every innovation, to speak in general, naturally takes place with regard to the mode (τρόπος) of the innovated thing, but not in regard to the λόγος of the nature. Therefore, on the one hand, the λόγος of the innovated thing destroys the nature, which does not preserve unaltered the λόγος according to which it is; on the other hand, the innovated mode of the entirely preserved λόγος of the nature manifests the power of the prodigy, in showing clearly the nature active and passive beyond its own limit.[173]

We shall return to this theme, having seen it functioning in the principal parts of the Pater Noster.

In the following excerpts from the Quaestiones ad Thalassium, we find the Incarnate Logos assumes a position in regard to 'the ages' comparable to what we have seen attributed to God in an absolute way:

> Since Our Lord Jesus Christ is the beginning, middle and end of the ages, those that have been, are and will be, suitably there has come to us by faith the end of the ages, which will be in act by vision according to grace, because of the deification of the worthy.[174]

Again the beginning can be identified with the law of nature, the middle with the written law and the end with the law of grace. The divinisation of man is subordinate to and dependent on the mystery of Jesus Christ, in whom the mystery of divinisation has been realized as in its foundation. His filial mode of existence, to which man is destined to be configured through divinisation, is reflected in the περιχώρησις of the divine and human energies in His composite hypostasis. The deification of Adam, the

paradigm for the deification of all those descended from him, was meant to be a union of the created with the Uncreated through agape, which man would have achieved,

> the whole man having penetrated ( περιχωρήσας ) the whole God wholly and having become everything that God is, without the identity of substance and having taken into himself the whole God Himself and having obtained God Himself as the highest reward of his ascent to Him.[175]

But this perichoretic divinisation is entirely beyond the native power of man: 'nothing created can by nature effect divinisation, because nothing can grasp God by itself'.[176] The combination of this radical inability with the way, in fact, it has been made possible, seems to have led Maximus to conclude that 'the whole man is deified by the inhomination of God, being made god by grace'.[177] Since this is so, divinisation simply presupposes Incarnation; in the present economy this is translated as κένωσις with a view to θέωσις Therefore when Maximus speaks of the Hypostatic Union, he always means it to imply the divinisation of the humanity of Christ and through Him the divinisation of those who accept salvation. Because of the necessarily opaque character of the divine mystery to human reflection, Maximus must be content to have recourse to the argument from fittingness:

> It was necessary, indeed, that He who was the creator of the substance of beings by nature should become the author, by grace, of the deification of the beings brought into being, so that He who is the giver of being should be seen to be the bestower of eternal well-being (ἀεί εὖ εἶναι ).[178]

Our dependence on the Word Incarnate for divinisation is expressed antistrophically in this passage which sums up the thought of the Confessor on the subject:

> For as He descended because of us and without change became man like us, apart from sin, having undone the laws of nature in a way that transcended nature, so we too in consequence shall ascend because of Him and become gods in keeping with Him, by the mystery of grace, changed in no way at all as regards our nature.[179]

The parallelism of descent-ascent and the insistence on the lack of change in the natures, the Logos retaining his divine nature and man his human nature, is obvious. So too is the fact that He became man that we may become gods. This has been done in a way that transcends nature: τρόπος complements λόγος and enables it to go outside itself in personal ecstasy. The 'undoing' with regard to the laws of nature refers to the violence done to nature by man through sin, not to any solution of his λόγος φύσεως, which, for Maximus, as we have seen, is inviolable. In fact the phrase comes from Gregory Nazianzen and is the basis of the discussion in Ambigua 31: 'The laws of nature are dissolved; the world above must be fulfilled. Christ orders it; let us not resist'.[180] Having dealt with the dissolution of the laws of nature as it is after the Fall, Maximus then proceeds to a more fundamental modification of the same laws. Human nature is taken into the personal existence of the Logos and thus becomes capable of a new way of life, entirely beyond the possibilities of nature left to itself and its own laws.

> Thus God dissolves the laws of nature, using nature above nature in the things that belong to nature.[181]

He will complement this in Ambigua 36, by saying of the sacred humanity:

> Thus from one point of view, it remains in the λόγος of being according to which it was created,

> having properly its being undiminished in any way; from the other point of view, having taken on the divine subsistence by the λόγος of 'how-being', it neither knows nor tolerates absolutely any impulse of movement towards anything else.[182]

Elsewhere he makes explicit the bearing that this mystery has on divinisation:

> Having assumed for us the λόγος of the genesis and the τρόπος of the birth, God has renewed the nature or, to speak more truly, He has innovated it and led it back to the ancient beauty of incorruptibility by the holy flesh endowed with a rational soul, which He took from us, and He has granted it munificently divinisation.[183]

The Logos has assumed human nature in such a way that He respects λόγος φύσεως . He has already made His own the way in which that nature was being used by man, the tropos of a slave not by becoming guilty of sin, but by taking on the consequences of sin and in that way, living as a Son, the tropos of His birth. He has restored to man his likeness to God so that men can again use nature as sons. It is His innovation of nature that makes innovation possible for all men. This is to regain likeness to God, to be divinized. Maximus dwells on the paradoxical manner in which this innovation has been wrought in the human existence of the eternal Logos. He has reversed the domination of evil over human passibility in such a way that it is through passion and death, consequences of sin, that He frees 'the whole nature of men'. By maintaining His filial mode of existence in the extremest abandonment by his Father, he has reconciled mankind with God:

> By His power, He has freed the whole nature of man from the evil that was mixed into it through its passibility by His holy flesh taken from us, as if by some first fruits. He did it by subordinating the domination of evil over nature to the natural passibility, a domination which lorded it over it, I mean over the passibility of nature.[184]

The 'natural passibility' was made to express the tropos of the Logos, 'obedient unto death'. Κένωσις issues in θέωσις .[185] The mediatorial role of the Incarnate Logos is most obvious in the fact of the Incarnation itself. It is this which, for Maximus, makes the other unifications possible:

> For a union of limited and unlimited, of measured and immense, of bounded and unbounded, of Creator and creature, of rest and movement, was preconceived before the ages. This took place in Christ appearing in the latter times, giving by means of itself fulfilment to the prescience of God. (PG 90. 621B)

## The Five Divisions and Synthetic Mediation

A rapid survey of Ambigua[41] will reveal the context in which Maximus understood the mediatorship of Christ. Here he presents it in contrast to the failure of man to meet this vocation. The question of the ultimate σκοπός of the divine Counsel is not foreclosed by this essay and the claim that the mediatorship of man is to be understood in the context of Christ can be upheld if we read it against the background of the distinction between Providence and Judgment which we outlined above a/nd remember that chronology is secondary to divine intention in the thought of Maximus.

He appeals to the saints, who are followers and ministers of the Logos, and thus rooted in Tradition he reminds us that they

> say that the substance of created things is divided by five divisions, of which the first is that which divides the created nature - that which acquires existence through generation - from the uncreated nature... the second is that by which the entire nature below God, which receives existence by creation, is divided into intelligibles and sensibles. The third is that by which the sensible nature is

> divided into heaven and earth. The fourth is that by which the earth is divided into paradise and the inhabited world and the fifth is that by which man, benevolently introduced among beings by creation, like some comprehensive workshop in respect of all things and naturally mediating through himself in regard to all things and for all the extremes, is divided into male and female.[186]

The thing to note in this cosmic vision is the mediatorial role assigned to man. The way in which he was to fulfil his vocation as the kingpin of creation emerges with sufficient clarity in what Maximus goes on to say. His constitution as microcosm fitted him to bring unity to the whole span of creation, since he concentrated in himself, a combination of elements that were found in the macrocosm: 'body, sense, soul and spirit'.[187] It was through him that the τρόπος of God's plan to unite Himself with his creatures was to be accomplished.

> Because of this, man was introduced last to beings, like a natural link to the extremes of the whole because of his mediating parts; uniting in himself those things which are naturally very distant from each other so that, because of the union which leads all things to God as cause, beginning from the division in himself first of all and progressing in sequence and order through the parts to God, he would find the end of his ascent on high, which takes place through all things, in the union.[188]

The Creator desires that creatures, separated from each other by their natures, should attain unity, converging towards each other in the single nature of man and thus 'God Himself would in this way become all in all'.[189] This 'is the great mystery of the divine Counsel'.[190] It now becomes clear that the unity, which man is called to mediate, while it presupposes his affinity with the 'extremes' of the universe, depends for its accomplishment on how God intended him to live. The dimension of

τρόπος is thrown into relief. The ultimate principle of the unity will be in the hypostatic order.

The sexual distinction of male and female was not necessarily dependent on God's original intention for the generation of the human race, so that the basic division to be healed by man is the division that he finds in himself. He was to have shaken off divisive sexuality by impassibility, that 'most dispassionate condition'[191] so that man would not be male and female; it was his holy way of life that was to have ensured the unity between the inhabited earth and paradise so that there would be one earth, 'pulled together' and not allowing a withdrawal of its parts;[192] the unity of earth with heaven would come about when man acquired an angelic kind of life 'through virtue';[193] it was 'likeness in knowledge to the angels' that was to have compassed the union of sensibles and intelligibles, because now the two orders would not be divided by ignorance in contrast to knowledge, since man would enjoy 'gnostic understanding of the λόγοι ' and find himself prepared for 'a plentiful effusion of true wisdom';[194] finally man would bring about the union of creation with God 'through charity'; 'pouring himself wholly into the whole God and becoming whatever God is, apart from identity of essence, he receives the whole God Himself in place of himself'.[195]

In the Pater Noster 'male and female' are identified with anger and concupiscence[196] so that Maximus is here visualising the realization of the first union through the exercise of the vita practica in so far as it is brought to bear on man's passibility and would allow the

basic λόγος of humanity to assert itself.[197] It is the practice of the virtues that would ensure the maintenance of true consistency with the divine intention for man at this level. The paradise of the second mediation obviously has an earthly character and here again it is πρᾶξις that would effect the unity, now not merely restricted to the establishment of harmony in man's passionate life, but extended to the relationships with other men.[198] This would be a foretaste of post-resurrection life in the present economy, but which was intended in an unqualified way by God's Providence. The third and fourth mediations were to have been realized through the exercise of θεωρία φυσική . In the third unification, men would know the sensible creation as the angels know it, that is through its λόγοι , and thus as it is in relation to the Logos.[199] In this way man would not be 'inhibited from ascent into the heavens'[200] because he would be no longer subservient to the world, but would in some sort have entered the realm of the angels because, as Maximus insists in the Pater Noster, he would obey as the angels obey the divine will and in the consequent peace, be in a position to know as they know.[201] The range of that knowledge would be extended in the fourth mediation to the order of the intelligibles in themselves.[201] The most characteristic aspect of this was to have been an insight into the mystery of creaturehood and the divine principle by which all things subsist, called as they are from non-being to to being by God's creative word. This attainment of the ultimate cause of the created order would precipitate 'a

plentiful effusion of true wisdom',[203] in the context of which is mentioned the final possibility of an immediate knowledge of God, ἀδιάγνωστον καί ἀμερμήνευτον .[204] The final phase of unification is left to agape[205] and would coincide with the attainment of θεολογία . Knowledge here would be in function of charity. The emphasis on ἀγάπη shows that Maximus understands the denoument of man's ascent to God to take place primarily in the hypostatic order.[206] The emphasis on mode of life lets us know that this principle of human existence has found play throughout man's search for God, but its irreplaceable function in effecting the union of God with his creatures reveals its true grandeur here, ensuring that creatures attain that 'firm and stable rest' in Him.[207]

> Since, therefore, when he had been created, man had not moved naturally around the Unmoved as his proper principle, I mean God, he had been moved willingly, foolishly, against nature around the things beneath him, over which he was set to rule by God, misusing the natural power which was given him to unite what was divided, in keeping with his origin, rather to divide what was united and by this he risked almost returning to non-being again. On that account, natures are being renewed and that which is altogether unmoved by nature moves, so to speak, in an unmoved way, paradoxically, beyond nature, around that which is naturally moved and God becomes man, so that He may save man, who is lost, through Himself uniting the rifts of universal nature in its totality and the expressed universal λόγοι of the particulars, by which the union of the divided has come about. He demonstrated that the great Counsel of God the Father was fulfilled, recapitulating in Himself all things, those in heaven and those on earth, in the very One in Whom they were created.[208]

Here man is portrayed as having failed in his vocation to mediation and by his foolishness to have risked being engulfed in the meontic. God remedies this by moving into the created order of change in order to save man and to perform the task of uniting the divisions as the

Mediator, and so to restore to man his original place in the fabric of the universe. Since there can be no question of the introduction of movement into the nature of the Unmoved, it must take place in a different dimension of being, 'beyond nature'. God cannot cease to be God, nor can the creature be elevated to the level of essential divinity. But what is impossible in the order of λόγος φύσεως has been achieved in the order of τρόπος ὑπάρξεως . The Word becomes; it is as person that He subsists in a human nature and that a human nature exists in Him. His 'movement' in no way signifies that He is subject, as God, to the created order, nor does it, in the light of what we have seen above, have to be made dependent on the Fall in any way to account for its having taken place.

Maximus then goes on to affirm the perfection of Christ's humanity and the uniqueness of his begetting which is the first indication of the intervention of God in a fallen world to restore man to his original status and vocation:

> Of course then, having begun the union in general of all things with Himself from the division in us, He becomes perfect man from us, because of us, for us, having all that is proper to us in full, except sin, not needing in any way marital succession for this.[209]

For Maximus the tragic plight of man, caught into a chain of birth and death, of pleasure and pain, is symbolised dramatically in the manner of human generation. The virgin birth of Christ is evidence for him that the new order is being established, in which men can again be born as sons of God and not merely the products of the

will of the flesh and the self-centred will of man. Γέννησις is again in keeping with γένεσις .[210] The ἀκολουθία γαμική that had been reduced to that of the animal kingdom, because man had turned his capacity for God to matter, is superseded 'in the renewal of the laws of the first and really divine creation, so that what man, being weak, had lost through negligence, God who is powerful should rectify through philanthropy'.[211]

Maximus puts forward his view in a tentative way:

> Likewise He showed, I think, and in the same manner that there was perhaps another mode for increasing the number of men, foreknown by God, if the first man had kept the commandment and had not lowered himself to brutishness in the way in which he uses his powers, producing for himself the distinction of male and female and the division of nature. As I have said, man did not need this for generation at all, without which, perhaps, it is possible to exist; these things are not a necessity for continued survival. 'For in Christ Jesus' says the divine apostle, 'there is neither male nor female'.[212]

Here, it seems that Maximus is saying that the distinction of the sexes is the result of the Fall. His teaching corresponds to Gregory of Nyssa's doctrine of the 'garment of skin'[213] added to man, because of his prevarication, as an alternate way of ensuring that the divinely ordained mankind would in fact be realized. But there are, too, texts that imply that sexuality and the passions are natural. [214] While these must be assessed in an attempt to establish the thought of Maximus in this area, Maximus is concentrating here on the Person of the Word Incarnate and on the renewal that He brings to mankind by the new mode of His birth without seed or corruption which restores incorruptibility.[215] Maximus does not use the term, but we have evidence here of his sympathy with a

'physical theory' of Redemption. He then proceeds to the other mediations which the Word Incarnate performed on behalf of mankind. The way in which Maximus handles this subject shows clearly that his theology is poles apart from a Neo-Platonic philosophy. The solution of the divisions that inflict man and the world is to be found in the concrete history of the God-man, not in an abstract return, counterbalancing an abstract emanation. The healing of the cosmic rifts continues to be in keeping with the unification of male and female brought about by the paradoxical birth of the Son of God in the flesh:

> Then having sanctified our inhabited earth by His mode of life in a way that befits mankind, He enters paradise without impediment after death, as he candidly declared to the thief when he said: 'To-day you will be with me in Paradise'. From there, since our inhabited earth from then on was not distant from paradise, He again appeared in it, conversing with the disciples after His resurrection from the dead, showing that earth is one and not separated from itself, by preserving the principle according to which it is free from the difference of division. Then through His ascension into heaven, He clearly united heaven and earth and having gone into heaven with this earthly body, which is the same as ours in nature and substance, He showed that the whole sensible nature is at one with its more universal principle, annulling that particularity which caused in itself the division due to difference. Then, in addition to this, going through in succession all the orders of divine and spiritual beings of heaven with His soul and body, that is our perfect nature, He united the sensibles and the intelligibles and showed that the convergence to unity of the whole creation, in keeping with its most fundamental and universal principle, was altogether undivided and stable. And finally, added to all these, according to the human way of understanding, He arrives at God Himself, having appeared on our behalf, as it is written, before the face of the God and Father, as man, He who never in any way was capable of being separated from the Father as Word, having fulfilled as man in deed and truth, by an obedience never transgressed, whatever He Himself, as God, had foreordained should take place. He also carried out the whole will of the God and Father for our sakes, we who had rendered void, by abuse, the power naturally given to us in the beginning for this. First of all, He united us to ourselves in Himself, through the removal of the

> difference of male and female and instead of men and women, in whom the manner of the division is especially discerned, He revealed men alone, exactly and in truth, formed entirely like Him and bearing altogether pure and unadulterated His image.[216]

For Maximus, the relationship between the sexes is now marked by sin. The quest for sensual pleasure replaced the search for God and so ἀπορά issued in φθορά . Man is tied to the existential dialectic of ἡδονή - ὀδύνη .[217] Through his γέννησις , which is not in keeping with his genesis, man is bound to death on account of Adam's sin. While his nature is basically integral, his mode of existence is that of a slave bound by the shackles of lust and death. Man, in the distinctness of male and female, is the subject of passionate action which reveals a disordered use of ἐπιθυμία and θυμός .[218] The sinful use of the passible powers of the soul and the disordered manner of generation, now peculiar to man, are so intertwined, that Maximus can see in aggression and passionate desire the signs of a nature subject to corruption and generation. It is only in Christ that man is freed from this misery and his way of life restored to the primordial divine intention. Christ was born as man, but undid the sinful law of procreation. Thus He was in a position to take death on Himself in a voluntary way and change the death from sin into a sacrificial judgment on sin itself.[219] He liberated the common principle of human nature from the division into male and female, that is expressed in disordered passion. As we have seen, Maximus considers that Christ has removed 'the difference of male and female and instead of men and women, in whom the manner of the division is especially

discerned, He revealed men (ἀνθρώπους ) alone'.[220] Christ effects this, not by pruning away anything that is proper to human nature, but by ensuring that it will be hypostatically subordinate to its normative principle, the λόγος φύσεως . Thus in the Pater Noster we find that the passible faculties are subsumed into man's higher powers and become energy in his quest for God.[221] The paradoxical birth of Christ is the foundation on which this human possibility is now founded. The mode of His birth from his Mother is at the same time evidence of his being son of God in the flesh and the basis of the possibility of his taking on man's τρόπος of slave in order to change it into filial obedience.[222]

Maximus knows from Scripture, which he has just quoted to that effect, that the good thief is to be with Christ in Paradise after his death and also that Christ returned to the inhabited earth to converse with His disciples. This is evidence that, for him, the paradise in question is the earthly paradise so that the entry of Christ and the thief there shows that the 'earth' is one. The thief, then, represents all those who make that transition. In a cognate text, Maximus says that Christ removed the difference between Paradise and the Oikumene by constituting the unity of the 'earth'.[224] Man is now meant to participate in that process of unification, made possible by Christ. Man's way of life must conform to the mode of life that befits mankind, which Maximus sees as explanatory of Christ's having performed this mediation.[225] This conduct is to be marked by the practice of virtue which will undo the effects of the

wilfulness of rebellious γνῶμαι , especially the divisions between men. The way to Paradise has been opened by Christ, because of his conduct and his death. It is for men now to live harmoniously in a comparable way and thus anticipate beatitude in a paradise of moral virtue. This would be a radiation of the unity of the whole 'earth', the created world, in the Logos. Thunberg has pointed out that in Maximus' interpretation of Luke 23.43, 'Christ's death and resurrection safeguard the literal and historical relevance, while his promise to the penitent on the cross seems to imply immediate spiritual consequences related to this age'.[226] It is the presence of the Logos in the virtues appropriated by men that opens the way to Paradise, unites men to each other and leads to union with God. This will require the spiritual transformation of pain, those 'labours' which are the consequence of sin and which become, in man's ascesis, a participation in the sufferings and death that opened the way to Paradise.[227] In this way is preserved 'the principle according to which it is free from the difference of division',[228] says Maximus, referring to the new unity of inhabited earth and paradise.

The Ascension of Christ into Heaven demonstrates for Maximus that 'the whole sensible nature is at one with its more universal λόγος '.[229] In the Quaestiones ad Thalassium, this elimination of the particularity, which caused the division of heaven and earth, shows that there is only one nature of sensible things.[230] The ascension of Christ is here not merely the historical object of the act of Christian faith, but it also has to do with the

incarnation of the Logos in the world, so that the realization of the union of heaven and earth by Christ implies a restoration of man's original power to mediate between heaven and earth. The literal interpretation of the mystery of Christ's Ascension is accompanied in the thought of Maximus by a more allegorical understanding of its significance for men, because of the unity of the logoi in the Logos.[231] The historical and metahistorical achievement of Christ provides a concrete foundation for another kind of exposition which has bearing on how man can now so conduct his life as to participate in the mystery of the Ascension.[232] His virtuous endeavour enables him to break his affective ties with the world and to ascend in an angelic fashion to a higher kind of knowledge of the whole sensible order of creation in the Logos.[233] The simplification of affectivity will free the contemplative νοῦς to discern the unity that binds the differentiated order of the sensibles. Maximus combines his twofold understanding of the Ascension when he says:

> The Lord does not ascend to the Father for those who examine the λόγος of God in a fleshly manner; He does ascend to the Father, however, for those who search for it spiritually through lofty contemplations;[234]

and

> As long as one manfully engages in divine struggles through practical philosophy, he holds on to the Logos who came into the world through the precepts. When, however, he has performed contests against the passions by πρᾶξις , obviously victor over passions and demons, he turns his attention to gnostic philosophy through contemplation, he allows the Logos to leave the world again and to go to the Father.[235]

The Logos, who was condensed or made 'thick' in His three-fold incarnation,[236] and in man's virtues,[237] becomes 'thin' in the contemplative who ascends to the undifferentiated Logos who accounts for the determining principles of the sensible creation.[238] He is admitted to an appreciation of the "diastolic-systolic" expanding and contracting action of the Logos in the universe, realizing that its manifold λόγοι radiate from the Logos and seek their unity in Him.[239]

Ambigua 41 makes it clear that this knowledge is made possible by the Incarnation of Christ, culminating in His Ascension.[240]

Then Maximus, in his mind's eye, follows the trajectory of the ascending Christ through the order of intelligibles.[241] He emphasizes that it is in the fulness of His humanity that He ascends and thus shows that man is at home in the world of the intelligibles. It is this actual presence of Christ, the Word made flesh, in the angelic world that demonstrates the unity intended by God for all His creation. Maximus thinks of the diverse orders of being as converging to that unity in virtue of a common λόγος .[242] He has already discovered a human λόγος as principle of unity for male and female, a human λόγος from a social point of view which reveals the unity of mankind, a higher λόγος in virtue of which the whole sensible domain can be understood as one and now he is confronted with a final λόγος , which binds together the total span of creation in all its dimensions, its 'most fundamental and universal principle'.[243] Here again, the literal sense of Scripture, provides a basis for understanding the dynamism of a spiritual anthropology.

Man's vocation to mediate the union of the sensibles and the intelligibles is seen to be no mere philosophical project, because the Incarnate Logos, the first-born of many brethren, has gone before and actually entered the loftiest created realms, ensuring hypostatically the entrance there of 'our humanity in its perfection'.[244] Having established that, Maximus can deploy the resources of other systems to explain how man may now appropriate what Christ has done for him. It must be remembered that the orders of the sensible and intelligibles are, for Maximus, ontological entities, part of the original divine plan, not merely a basic spiritual order plus the adventitious order of sensibles, due to some pristine spiritual boredom in the Henad.[245] Then it should be remarked that the ascension of Christ corresponds to an inclination in creation itself towards its unity in the Logos.[246] His ascension facilitates the realization that there is, in fact, a common λόγος which holds the creation as a whole together.[247] Man shares in an angelic insight into the mystery of God's leading being out of the abyss of non-being, which is at the same time a contemplative discovery of the inexpressible contrast between Creator and creature which can be, Maximus assures us, the threshold to an immediate knowledge of God that is heralded by a 'plentiful effusion of wisdom'.[248] The associations of wisdom, for Maximus, indicate that man is going beyond the resources of his nous and entering an area that is more properly hypostatic, the world of ἀγάπη .[249] Because man can grasp the whole created order, the intelligible and the sensible, open to the

former through intelligence, open to the latter through sense informed by intelligence, he can hold it together as seen in relation to the Logos Creator and so is disposed for the grace of mystical knowledge or θεολογία .[250] Maximus sees this human possibility as a share in what was achieved by the Incarnate Logos, who

> recapitulated into Himself, in a way that befits God, all things in the way put forward above. He showed that the whole creation is one, just like another man, consummated by the reciprocal nexus among themselves of its single parts and converging to itself by the wholeness of subsistence in keeping with the one and single undefined and indistinguishable notion of the production from non-being. In keeping with this, the whole creation can receive the one and the same and altogether undifferentiated λόγος , in that it had 'it was not' before it had 'being'.[251]

Again in the fifth mediation Maximus sees the original divine intention of the union of God with His creatures fulfilled in the final phase of the Ascension of Christ who, 'according to the human way of understanding', 'arrives at God Himself'.[352] We are reminded that there can be no question of the Logos having ever forsaken his substantial unity with His Father. His becoming is personal to Himself; it is hypostatically that He becomes the 'man' who reaches the Father as the term of his ascent and this He does 'on our behalf'. He is also said to have attained to this human fulfilment through an obedience that ensured the accomplishment of the divine will in regard to man, a will which is here identified with the Logos himself as co-possessing that Counsel with the Father and the Holy Spirit.[254] The filial τρόπος , discarded by man become slave, has been reaffirmed by the Logos precisely as 'obedient'. Obedience is a way of describing human life as God intends it to be lived and

is the pledge of the 'reward of the ascent undertaken to God' by man in Christ.[255] It is the final development of the ascent of Christ to His Father that most clearly reveals the principle from which it began and in virtue of which it is achieved. It is the principle defined so comprehensively at Chalcedon of the hypostatic union of the two natures. This union is wrought beyond the limits of nature, but involving the natures in perichoretic communion. It bridges the chasm between uncreated and created nature. The principle of the union is unequivocally 'above nature'.[256] It is realized in Christ in a unique way. The union of men with God is in function of that ineffable hypostasisation which has taken place in Christ and it is revealed primarily in the mystery of ἀγάπη poured into human hearts by the Holy Spirit, ensuring that men become 'sons in the Son' and so capable of a union with God analogous to that achieved by the Logos made flesh, when He 'appeared on our behalf, as it is written, before the face of the God and Father as man'.[257] The union here does not take place in terms of λόγος, because there is not any common λόγος in terms of which God and His creatures can be grasped.[258] So it must take place in the order of τρόπος. This is another way of saying that it must take place δι' ἀγάπης.[259] In this way the foreordained union of man with God is accomplished in Christ and thus man attains to God 'as the end of the movement of moved beings, and the firm and stable repose of the things which are borne to Him, the End of every end and rule and law, of reason and intelligence and nature and the infinite boundless and unlimited limit'.[260]

## Mediation Effected in the Church by the Spirit

For Maximus, the divine Counsel intends the κένωσις with a view to the divinisation of man.[261] As we have seen, the κένωσις is the divine adaptation of the original intention that the union of God and man should take place through the mystery of the Incarnation.

> Because of the failure of man to live according to the λόγος of his nature and to accept the invitation to become a son of God, the Logos took our nature in his Mother's womb and, in addition to that, the filial τρόπος which God intended for Adam in the beginning.
>
> Adam, having voluntarily abandoned the birth from the Spirit for divinisation, was condemned to be born corporally for corruption.... Undoing in him for us the chains of corporal birth, He has given us by the voluntary birth according to the Spirit, the power to become sons of God in place of being sons of the flesh and blood, to us who believe in His name.[262]

Maximus associates the taking on of the adamic τρόπος with the baptism of Christ by John:

> He was baptized, entering voluntarily into birth to spiritual filiation to suppress the birth in keeping with the body.[263]

The paradox for Maximus is that it was precisely through this voluntary assumption of the τρόπος of Adam that the Logos incarnate wrought our restoration to sonship lost in Adam. By contrast, it is the baptism given by Christ that effects that restoration. The baptism is bound up with faith: the power to become sons of God is given 'to us who believe in His name'. It is in this way that the divinely intended γένεσις and γέννησις of man are recovered and bestowed on man anew, thus reconstituting him in the condition which, in the beginning, God willed

for him:

> In the beginning man came to being ( γεγενῆσθαι ) in the image of God; added to that he was born ( γεννηθῆναι ) to the Spirit in accordance with free choice and received, besides, the coming to likeness by keeping the divine commandment, so that the same man is the image ( πλάσμα ) of God by nature and the son of God and god because of the Spirit through grace. For it was not otherwise possible that created man should be able to be son of God and god by divinisation by grace, if he were not first of all born of the Spirit according to free choice by the power which is in him, which moves of itself and is not subject to mastery.[264]

The sonship of God conferred on man could not be realized without synergy. This is why Maximus emphasizes the freedom of man, his divinely endowed αὐτεξουσία ,[265] which is how God ensures that He is present in the world in the way He intended from the beginning in the tri-Hypostatic Counsel.

The κένωσις is, therefore, coterminous with the creation of the universe in the divine intensions and because of the divine foresight. It is this self-emptying in redemptive Incarnation that ensures that God's purpose for man is realized. The mystery of the ὑπόστασις σύνθετος ,[266] with its actualization in synergic perichoresis, expressed in the history and metahistory of Christ, ensures that the cosmic mediations originally entrusted to man are achieved. It is obvious that the five divisions to be overcome are due to the failure of man to realize his hypostatic vocation, to move from εἶναι to εὖ εἶναι, from image to likeness, in a word, because of his failure to accept his vocation to divine sonship.[267] Maximus understands the composition of the whole created universe and its relationship to God to require hypostasisation. This it acquires in the

mystery of the Incarnation by the hypostatic union of the divinity and the humanity in the Person of the Logos, ἀσυγχύτως, ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀχωρίστως , which is articulated in the mysteries of the birth, baptism, life, death, resurrection and ascension of Christ. In the light of these reflections it becomes obvious that the Church is prior to creation in the divine βουλή , that the creation is conceived as being within the Church rather than being the field in which the Church is built, so to speak. Maximus thinks of the order of nature as being preceded by the intention to divinise in the divine Counsel, so that the Economy is not to be thought of as within the context of a pre-established natural order, even if that order chronologically precedes the Incarnation. If the Church is the mystery of the synergy of the Holy Spirit and man's freedom for sonship, the hypostatic encounter of God and man, the mode of the passage of the Mystery into the world and of the world's passage into the Mystery, then the Church is the new creation, in which the world rises afresh to the freedom of filial existence. 'The Church is a spiritual man and man is a mystical Church'.[268]

This shows the philosophical understanding of the relationship of the created universe to God in a new light. In the Mystagogia Maximus reminds us that God, who has created all things and led them into being by His infinite power, contains, conducts and circumscribes them; He binds them together, both to each other and to Himself, both sensibles and intelligibles, by His Providence. In maintaining them about Himself 'as cause', principle and

end, He binds them to one another by the very power of their relation to Himself as principle. It is this communal share in existence through the power of God, that forms the basis of the unity of creation and ultimately that makes them to be like Him.[269] In this context, Maximus emphasizes the causality of God and the caused character of creatures; God in relation to the work of His hands is understood:

> as the whole appears above the parts, or again, as the cause is manifested above this whole, in keeping with which the whole itself and the parts of the whole naturally have the appearance and the being in so far as possessing entirely the cause which shines above them, and as the sun eclipses the stars in nature and power, so the cause hides the existence of the beings in so far as they are caused.[270]

Behind this affirmation there is a strong perception of the inability of the creature to account for itself and so of its demand for the presence of the Cause. This call for a reason is stronger in the light of the ensemble of creatures, since it is existence itself, and existence which is not self-accounting, that binds them together. The principle of their 'wholeness', being in the order of existence, must be beyond the realm of the created, in another order of being:

> for just as the parts proceed from the whole, it is likewise from the cause that caused beings have their proper being and can be known, that they have their dependent particular existence, when, placed in relationship with the cause, they are entirely qualified, as was said, by the act of the power of their relation to it.[271]

Garrigues has pointed out that Maximus has here transformed the aristotelian metaphysic of the causality of movement into a creationist doctrine of the causality of being.[272] Maximus is here describing the benefit of natural

contemplation. Once the spirit is purified and the work of collecting the evidence for God's causality has been done, then the point of view from which the creatures are contemplated is God himself, the 'whole' in terms of which the parts are intelligible, the cause in the light of which their being, beginning and end is grasped:

> because being all in all, God who is in an infinite measure above everything, will be contemplated only by those who are pure in spirit, when the intellect, gathering analogically in its contemplation the λόγοι of beings, will repose in God Himself as cause, principle and end of the production and of the creation of the whole universe and as the inseparable foundation of its structure.[273]

The existence of created things is obscured in this contemplation by comparison with the brilliant obviousness of the reality of God, the Cause. Man has moved from the knowledge of God in creatures to a knowledge of creatures in God. It is 'the power of their relation to it',[274] the Cause, that qualifies created beings. This power has its source in God, not in the creature. It is the divine energy, here conceived in terms of causality, which is the 'power' of the relation of creatures to their Cause; participation is to be accounted for by the causality of creative Being. It is the contemplative amazement at the gratuitousness of the act of created being that discerns the declaration by that being of its springing from the Cause and its being caught into the teleological sweep of all created things to their End. They cannot but be seen to be contained, conducted and circumscribed.[275]

However, while there can be no question of abrogating the principles of causality and the grasp of the created order as effect, Maximus thinks of that order as

provisional, and possibly, in the light of the Econony, as the order of the world during the interval between the Fall of man and the Incarnation.[276] It was the divine intention that the whole of creation should be united to God, not merely as the effect of His omnipotent efficiency and as that which is drawn by His limitless finality in a process of πρόοδος and ἐπιστροφή , but that it should be united to Him hypostatically as well. This is brilliantly obvious in the fact that the Incarnation is the primary object of the divine βουλή . It has been realized in its irreplaceable principle in the Logos incarnate; it is made effective in the world through the communication to man of His hypostatic presence through the action of the Holy Spirit in the Church, a presence that ensures that God is in the world in synergy with man and that man becomes, in the iconic Church, the icon of God.

> The Holy Church is therefore an icon of God, in so far as it accomplishes the same union as God among the believers. No matter how different they may be by their properties, and their differences of places and modes of life, beings find themselves unified in it by the faith. God accomplishes this union naturally Himself with regard to the essences of beings without confusing them, in making to be silent and in rendering the same what there is of difference among them, as was shown, by their relation and union with Him, cause, principle and end.[277]

The Church is icon of God in that it is the mode of His hypostatic presence in the world and the point of intersection between the divine and human energies. Man is introduced into that mystery through faith, received in conjunction with baptism, so that he is in a new relationship with God and his fellow-men. The constitutive causality of God is complemented by His hypostatic

presence with its implications of synergy and perichoresis in the joyful dance of a cosmic liturgy. That divine presence is realized through the mystery of the Logos Incarnate, extended to men by the action of the Holy Spirit, in such a way that they become sons in the Son, in Him who has become 'the first-born among many brethren'.[279]

Although Maximus does not have an elaborate teaching on the Eucharist, he is unambiguous about its relevance to the life of the Church:

> However, Christ being come, high priest of the good things to come, He sacrifices Himself an ineffable sacrifice and in addition to His flesh gives His blood to those who have the senses of their soul exercised by perfection, for distinguishing good and evil.[280]

At the end of the Mystagogia he speaks of the reception of the Sacrament by which the recipients are made like to it.[281]

We have seen already that it is faith that constitutes the new relationship with God, so that His causal presence in the world is complemented by his iconic presence in the Church through the sons in His Son, generated by the Holy Spirit in baptism and sustained in sonship by the mutuality of their action with the same Holy Spirit. Maximus visualises man's present life as progress from one incorruptibility to another:

> Baptized in Christ by the Spirit, we have received the first incorruptibility of the flesh; we await the final incorruptibility according to Christ in the Spirit. This takes place by keeping immaculate the first incorruptibility by a voluntary gift of good works and by the death that is entered deliberately, incorruptibility by which none of those who have acquired it lose the benefits they have acquired.[282]

This means that man lives in hope, while he accepts the death, that has been transformed by Christ, by voluntary mortification.[283] Maximus understands the actualisation of the hypostatic renewal of man to take place through his identification with the mystery of Christ, so that the process of divinisation cannot dispense with a share in Christ's sufferings. Since κένωσις is ordered to θέωσις, θέωσις requires a deliberate entry into κένωσις:

> Already consummated in Christ, the world above must be consummated in those who come afterwards, behind Christ, when they too will be planted in the Resurrection, those who have already become by their sufferings in the likeness of his death.[284]

It is above all through ἀγάπη that κένωσις will issue in θέωσις for mankind, renewed in the mystery Christ by the Holy Spirit. It is thus that man freely wills what God wills primordially in the mystery of His Trinitarian Counsel, namely, that man should be united to God and through him God should be united to the whole of His creation.

> For the Spirit does not engender a γνώμη that is not willing, but models it endowed with willingness with a view to divinisation.[285]

> Charity is the fulfilment of faith and hope. It embraces entirely the entire supremely Desirable One and makes to rest in Him the movement towards Him of faith and hope. For faith in His existence and hope in His coming, it substitutes by itself the enjoyment of His presence.[286]

It has been said aptly of Maximus' view of the process of the making of a Christian that 'we must not forget that the habitus of grace which man receives from the humanity of Christ is nothing else than the created imprint which the hypostatic mode of the Son of God, who has enhypostasized it, has sealed on it'.[287]

> Christ is the Head of the Church by reason of His humanity. Having then the Spirit by nature, as God, He has given to the Church the energies of the Spirit. For me the Logos has become man and for me He has wrought the whole of salvation. In taking that which is of my nature, He has given to me in exchange that which belongs to Him by nature. It is why he became man. He has accomplished the manifestation of what is proper to Him in that He accepts it for me. He reckons as His own, in being a Lover of men, the grace which is for me and He ascribes to me His natural power of the virtues. Because of this, even now He is said to accept what is His eternally and supernaturally by nature.[288]

He is, as man, always receiving the Spirit which, as God, He gives.[289] This He does for us. We are enabled to participate in the filial τρόπος that is proper to His humanity because of the energies of the Spirit that He has received as man and Whom He communicates to us.

The process of hypostasisation is central to Maximus' understanding of the recreation of man in the Economy. It depends on 'a created disposition to act with a view to the birth of virtue, by the grace of Him who is good by nature'.[290] Maximus considers that this disposition is something primarily proper to Christ, which belongs to Him in virtue of the Hypostatic Union:

> By charity, the Author Himself of nature - something fearful to see and hear about - has put on our nature and, without change, united it to Himself by way of the hypostasis to arrest its conduct and bring it back to Him, pulled together in itself and no longer having in itself a difference of free-will with regard to Him. He has brought to light the most glorious way of charity which is truly divine and divinising, since it leads to God and which is even said to be God. This way which, in the beginning, the thistles of passionate self-love had hidden, by His sufferings for us He has first of all impressed on Himself and given it by grace to all who are free from obstacles.[300]

'Αγάπη is the actualisation of the Hypostatic Union in the life of Christ here seen in His Kenotic obedience.

It is his τρόπος ὑπάρξεως [301] and requires for its actualisation those 'energies of the Spirit' which He has released first of all in His own humanity and which, as Maximus assures us, 'He has given to the Church'.[302] In giving us 'what belongs to Him by nature',[303] the Holy Spirit, He gives us the One which pours out this divinising ἀγάπη in our hearts. In this way He imprints on us the τρόπος that is proper to His own humanity. Since this is a 'created disposition' it is the effect of the causality of God, but it is a causality that is exercised in a way proper to man alone, giving him that πλέον τι which entitles him to be called a son of God and to inherit the Kingdom of Heaven. When God, through His energy, has caused this operative disposition to take root in man, he is then prepared to engage in the human-divine synergy proper to a son of God and to allow God to be present and active in the world in a new way, bringing into being that union of God and man and through man of the universe, willed by God in His eternal βουλή. This intentional presence of God, of the Known in the knower and of the Beloved in the lover is peculiar to man graced with a participation in the mode of existence proper to the Logos Incarnate. Man cannot become the Son of God in the flesh, but because of the imprint of the τρόπος of the Son, he can live His life in a personal way:

> The most holy and venerable invocation of the great and blessed God the Father (in the liturgical use of the Our Father) is a symbol of the really existing and hypostatic filial adoption, granted by the gift of the grace of the Holy Spirit: by means of this every human particularity is overcome and covered up by the coming of grace and all the saints will be called and will be sons of God, who from now on will

> illumine themselves with the divine beauty of goodness splendidly and gloriously by means of virtue.[304]

It is this above all that will ensure that man follows Christ 'upon the ascent of divine realities to the Father of lights'.[305]

Garrigues insists that 'in centring the divinisation on the habitus of charity, Maximus has not impoverished the realism of divinisation: intentional being is not less real than entitative being; it constitutes simply the mode of participation proper to the liberty of a person, the only one which would be hypostatic'.[306] By the entry of the eternal Logos into the 'organized movement' of our nature the twofold dislocation, which characterized man's existence since the Fall, was rectified in principle. The dislocation of the relationship between man and the Logos was set right when the Logos became man; this in turn ensured that there would be no longer a destructive tension between man's will and his nature because the human will of Christ was in perfect harmony with the principle of human nature, which embodied His eternal will as God. There could not be inconsistency between a divine will and a human will enhypostasised in the same Person. Obedience, even unto death, would express the ἀγάπη that expresses His filial τρόπος as man. It is the communication of this divine gift to man that ensures that he becomes a son in the Son and enters into the work of mediation performed by the Logos Incarnate, that he can undo in turn the twofold dislocation in himself and accept his vocation to work with God the final union envisaged in the eternal Counsel. Man can

again enhypostasize the whole universe in the filial τρόπος , by means of the cosmic syntheses through his union of love with God. While the thesis of Garrgues about the imprint of the τρόπος of the Son on the sons is impressive, it also highlights the apophatic character of this dimension of human being. Granting that it is a useful way of speaking about divinisation, since the Fathers normally discuss this from the point of view of its actualisation in a life lived, yet it does not link man's basic capacity for being a possessor of divine nature in participation, his hypostasis to the Logos. The uniqueness of hypostasis constitutes a special difficulty with regard to the question of participation. How can one participate in a principle of uniqueness? Yet the fact that Maximus understands us to have been conceived as 'sons in the Son' in the original divine plan would seem to point to a fundamental relationship to the Son as Son. This would mean that since it was God's intention from the beginning that we should be 'sons in the Son', it is not improbable that He gave us the basis for sonship, not merely as nature, the capacity for organized movement in synergy with the Logos, but also that He willed that our role of being possessors of that nature should be an extension of His filial character too. This is a way of saying that the capacity to be released into the freedom of sonship by the action of the Holy Spirit would seem to presume an ontological ground and that this is a mysterious share in the personal uniqueness of the eternal Son that is more basic than an intentional participation. We shall

run into this problem again in our examination of the main parts of the Pater Noster.

In the first five chapters of the Mystagogia Maximus takes up again the question of the divisions and he expounds his understanding of how they are to be solved in synthesis. Chapter One deals with the synthesis of Uncreated and created, chapter two with the sensibles and the intelligibles, chapter three with heaven and earth. Chapters four and five do not deal with the divisions of inhabited earth and paradise and of male and female, but show the work of synthesis in terms of psychological anthropology, with chapter four comparing the Church to a man analysed as body, soul and spirit, while chapter five is concerned with the 'reduction of the ten to unity', that is with the synthesis of the powers of the soul. In his splendid study, Le Monde et l'Eglise, Riou has demonstrated how the primary concern of Maximus in these chapters is the Church as the τρόπος of the free union of His creatures with God 'from the boundaries of creation to the depth of the human heart'.[307] He sees it as 'the great matrix which restores creation, in all its levels, to the play of love of the cosmic liturgy'.[308] Man can enjoy his predestined role when he is divinized in the unconfused union of the soul with God:

> On the blessed and most holy couch of God is accomplished this redoubtable mystery of the unity beyond intellect and reason, mystery by which God with the Church, the soul, and the soul with God, become one only flesh and one spirit... For 'they will be two in one flesh and this mystery is great; I speak of Christ and the Church', says the divine Apostle; he adds: 'He who adheres to the Lord is only one Spirit'.[309]

Maximus then goes on to say that this divinising union enables man to grasp the unity of the creatures in the Logos. In synergy, man can be brought back to God by the λόγοι , which, in his fallenness, lured him down the roads of division:

> The soul therefore having arrived at this simplicity and being thus recollected in itself and in God, there is not, as far as one can divine, the reason for dividing it in many parts, that which is crowned as a head by the first, only, unique Logos and God; in Him, who is the artisan and creator of beings, in a unique and incomprehensible simplicity under one form, all the λόγοι of beings have being and hypostasis. Fixing its regard on Him, who is not outside it, entirely in it entire, it will understand, even it, having been espoused by God the Logos, by a simple elan the λόγοι and the cause of beings, through which, perhaps, it has gone away by the roads of division; it which through them is carried in a saving and harmonious manner towards Him, who contains and creates every λόγος and cause.[310]

Because man has regained his personal existence and function, not only does the rest of creation bring him to God, but in doing so, it regains too the fulness of its purpose in the divine Counsel. Not alone is man himself synthesized in his soul and body because of the recovery of hypostatic being, but the world too is now unified in unconfused perichoresis. By becoming in the Church the iconic presence of God in the world, man is able to bring the universe to its true destiny. As Riou points out, while there is nothing original in comparing man to the world, it is new to root the comparison in the mystery of hypostasis and thus centre it in the unifying and synthesising vocation of the new man, enhypostasised in the Logos:

> As the soul is in the body, the intelligible is in the sensible, and the sensible is combined with the intelligible as the body with the soul. From the two there is only one world, just as from soul and

> body there is only one man. Neither of those which have arisen together in the union, either denies or repels the other because of the law of Him who has bound them together. According to this law, there was sown in them a λόγος of unifying power, which does not permit that the identity in the union according to hypostasis should be ignored because of the natural differences, nor that the property circumscribing each of them in itself should appear more powerful, causing distance and fragmentation, than the loving affinity, mystically inserted into them by the union.[311]

Here we find that Maximus elaborates his view, put forward in Ambigua 41, that 'the whole creation is one, just like another man',[312] except that here the hypostatic principle, which accounts for the unity, is mentioned explicitly. In fact. in the Mystagogia, the anthropological model is uppermost in his mind, in his understanding of the whole of the divine plan.

In Ambigua 33 we have a magnificent passage outlining the three-fold incarnation of the Logos in creation, in scripture and in the hypostatic Union:

> The Logos is said by the inspired teacher to be condensed, in this sense, I think, either that the Logos, being simple and without a body, nourishing spiritually in an orderly manner all the divine powers in heaven, deigned even by His incarnate presence from us, for us, like us apart from sin, to be condensed and to suitably reveal doctrine to us by words and examples about things secret and surpassing the power of every word... or that hiding Himself mysteriously for us in the inner λόγοι of things that are, He is signified analogously through each of the visible things as if through some written characters, totally present in each one in His plenitude and complete in each of them, totally and not diminished, He who is undifferentiated and eternally identical in the different things, the One who is simple and without composition in the composite things and the One without principle in the things dependent on a principle and He who is invisible in the visible things and He who is intangible in the tangible things, or for us who are slow to understand He was embodied for our sakes and endured being expressed in letters, syllables and sounds, so that from all these He might gather to Himself, after a little while, us who follow Him,

> made one in spirit and that He might lead us to the simple unconditioned idea about Him, so drawing us together to union with Him to the extent that He himself, by reason of his condescension, differentiated Himself for us.[313]

We have to content ourselves with remarking that the three-fold embodiment of the Logos, a teaching derived from Origen,[314] is still markedly gnostic in its conception here. The Logos transcends the embodiments: He is simple and without a body; capable of being totally present in each of the expressions; undifferentiated and eternally identical; simple and without composition; without principle; invisible; intangible. These are predicates of the divine Logos and He is presented primarily as one to be known in the variety of his expressions. Maximus might even be interpreted as describing the phenomenal manifestation of a Platonic Idea. But we know that concrete reality is, for him, hypostatic. He substitutes for the philosophical concept of essence: 'a reality in itself necessitating nothing else in order to exist',[315] where the quid est and the quod est are identical, that of the Fathers: 'a natural entity proper to numerous and different hypostases'.[316] Nor must this substitution be thought of as a preference of Aristotle to Plato. 'The hypostasis is, according to the philosophers, an essence with characteristics; for the Fathers, it is each man in particular as distinct from other men'.[317] As Meyendorff says, the hypostasis is here presented as 'the concrete sourse of existence'.[318] It is the irreducible centre that determines the 'mode of existence' or 'movement' of nature.[319] A new reality has been introduced as primary and basic and totally

irreducible to nature. Maximus is here content to draw our attention to its non-essential character by limiting himself to a denotative definition: 'each man in particular'. We have seen already how this mysterious dimension of human being is released and restored by the play of agape, so that we are not surprised to find Maximus in the Mystagogia presenting the teaching on the three-fold Incarnation of the Word in a personalistic way, rooted in the grace of the Holy Spirit:

> If anyone, therefore, desires to live and have a logos beloved of God and agreeable to God, let him esteem the better and more honourable dimensions of these three men, I mean the world and Holy Scripture and him who is one of us. And, in so far as he can, let him have care of the soul, which is immortal and divine and vivified by virtue, and let him despise the flesh, which is subject to corruption and death and capable of corrupting the neglected dignity of the soul. 'The corruptible body' in fact, it says 'weighs down the soul and the unquiet mind oppresses the earthly tabernacle' (Wis.9.15). And again: 'The flesh has desires against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh' (Gal. 5.17). And then: 'He who has sown in his own flesh, from the flesh he will reap corruption' (Gal. 6.8). On the contrary, let him struggle towards the incorporeal and spiritual powers with his intellect by thought, setting aside present and visible matters. 'The things that are visible', it says, 'are temporal; those which are invisible are eternal (2 Cor. 4.18), in which, through the fullness of the habit of peace, God reposes. And let him rise to the Holy Spirit, he who, by a wise meditation on sacred Scripture, has surpassed the letter. In Him is the fullness of benefits and 'the hidden treasures of knowledge and wisdom' (Col. 3.2). If anyone will be shown to be interiorly worthy of these things, he will find God himself impressed on the tablets of the heart through the grace in his spirit, seeing as in a mirror 'the glory of God in the unveiled face' (2 Cor. 3.18), by the removal of the veil of the letter.[320]

Because of the strength of his hypostatic vision Maximus can take hold of the Origenist triad, μονή , κίνησις , γένεσις , now rectified as γέναις, κίνησις and στάσις [321] and show how man's destiny is stabilized by enhypostasisation in the Mystery of Christ. He tells us

that the principle of the origin of rational beings comprises the λόγος of being, well-being and ever-being; the first is given to beings by essence, the second by free choice in that they are capable of self-movement, the third is given by grace. He then introduces another triad to incorporate another philosophical tradition: the first has to do with the power, the second with the act and the third with repose.[322] In Ambigua 42 we find him integrating these categories into the mystery of the Incarnation in which the three-fold birth of man is seen to attain its predestined purpose and man finds his beginning in his end:

> By his Incarnation our Lord and God has honoured our three-fold birth, that is to say in general the modes of our genesis to being, to well-being and to ever-being: the first birth is from bodies (which is one from two at the same time by the simultaneous co-existence of the parts, body and soul, a co-existence that is divided in two because of the distinct mode of each of the genesises) according to which we receive being, the second birth from baptism according to which we receive abundantly well-being, the third birth from the resurrection according to which we are transformed by grace with a view to ever-being.[323]

From this examination of mediation that is complemented by teaching on the Holy Spirit and the Church, we can presume that a maximian spirituality will bear predictable well marked traits. If for Maximus the filial τρόπος of the Incarnate Logos is imprinted on man by the energy of the Holy Spirit in the mystery of the Church, then his spirituality is bound to be christological, pneumatological and ecclesial. Although we have chosen to concentrate on its christological dimension in this thesis, the foregoing outline should show that this would be largely unintelligible without the other two

dimensions since it is obvious that the christological considerations of Maximus spill over into pneumatological and ecclesial concepts. A spirituality of faith, hope and charity must be seen in the perspectives of the mystery of Christ, the Holy Spirit and the Church. We can now proceed to some enquiry into the christological and anthropological ideas of the main parts of the Pater Noster.

## The Seven Mysteries

Here we shall accept the divisions of the Main Commentary, which is Part II in our structural analysis of the Pater Noster.* This means that we shall treat the Invocation and the first two petitions of the 'Our Father', together with the first and second mysteries of Maximus' commentary as given in Parts I and III, under Part II(a): Theology and Sonship by grace. Under Part II(b) we shall treat Maximus' commentary on the third petition of the 'Our Father', and incorporate the parallel handling of these themes in Part I,3 and Part III,3: Equality of honour with the angels. The fourth petition will be commented on under Part II(c) together with the cognate passages from Part I,4 and Part III,4: Participation in divine life. Under Part II(d) we shall see the exegesis of the fifth petition and include the commentary given in Part I,5 and Part III,5: Restoration of nature to itself. The sixth and seventh petitions of the 'Our Father' will be handled together under Part

* Vide APPENDIX III (v) and (viii) for the relationship of the petitions to the maximian 'mysteries' and the relationship of the parts of the Commentary to each other.

II(e), paralleled by Part I,6,7 and Part III,6,7: Purification from the 'law of sin' and abolition of the tyranny of the Evil One.

(i) Theology and Sonship by grace

In this section we find Maximus dealing with Theology and the adoption of man into filial relationship with God through grace. For him, as for his great predecessors, the circumincession of the three equal but distinct Persons constitutes the mysterious life of the Holy Trinity. Although this life is revealed to men, it remains wrapped in obscurity; even the Incarnate Logos, through whom the revelation comes is Himself incomprehensible except to the Father and the Holy Spirit.[324] The mystery of the divine life is extended to man in the grace of adoption. This too is the effect of the Incarnation, the ground of our becoming the brethren of whom He is the firstborn. He is the author and the model of this filial life, which is made possible by the gift of προαίρεσις through which we can distinguish in man the process of γέννησις from that of γένεσις. Birth as son of God implies the glorious freedom which is the birthright of a son.

The first and most obvious comment to be made is that the Logos is the subject of all the sentences in Part I,[325] so that grammatically we are left in no doubt but that the Logos is meant to dominate not only this section but the whole treatise which holds true even when some anthropological aspects of Maximus' thought are given a more complete elaboration. Without more ado it

can then be said that Λόγος is the synthetic principle of this section and this will provide an immediate bond with Part II[326] where we shall see that λόγος is the source of the unity of the thought there. Here the Λόγος is presented as the source of the seven mysteries conferred on man so that man's being and destiny are totally bound up with the Λόγος and without Him man is for Maximus unintelligible. Christology is the key to maximian anthropology and the inextricable quality of the treatment of these themes is meant to be a reflection of their ontological coherence. This finds its explanation in the mystery of the Incarnation where humanity and divinity are united in Christ with the qualifications spelt out so firmly by Chalcedon, principles in fact that operate at the very foundation of Maximus' system, explanatory not only of the mystery of the Incarnation but as we have seen, of the whole relationship of creation to God.

Part I,1.2.[327]

We are not surprised then to find that the Logos teaches theology ( θεολογία) ! Maximus is here concerned with the mystery of the Blessed Trinity in so far as it is communicated to man through Christ. The mystery is first presented to us as θεολογία , so that the mystery of the Trinity itself is thought of here in an anthropological context, in so far as it is communicated to man, so that we do not find an abstract treatment of the mystery but sufficient elaboration to enable us to identify Christ the Logos Incarnate as One of the

Three in One, who puts on humanity by hypostatic union. It is the very being and life of the Incarnate Word that is presented to us as revelatory of the mystery of the Trinity because he remains ἔννους and ζῶν in His incarnation, with the Father and the Spirit approving and co-operating respectively, even if it is the person of the Word himself who effects the Incarnation in the sense that it is He, and not the other two persons, who becomes man. The inseparability of the Persons in the mystery of the immanent Trinity ensures that they are manifested in the mystery of the Incarnation ( σάρκωσις) of the Logos, that the economic Trinity is brought to our attention because it enters our life through Christ. The distinctness of the persons is emphasized by the use of their hypostatic names while their perichoresis is equally stressed in the epithets applied to the Logos: ἔννους and ζῶν where νοῦς is a way of designating the Father and ζωή the Spirit in so far as they comprehend or even penetrate ( χωρούμενος ) the Logos by being said to be in him and in some way His being alive. We should note too that they are said to be in Him entirely ( οὐσιωδῶς ) substantially and that He is comprehended by them κατ' οὐσίαν . This refers to the substance and nature of God so that the coinherence and mutual indwelling of the three persons, while it is in the personal realm, is required by their equally possessing the same godhead. This must have bearing on what is to follow where Maximus is so concerned with the question of unity so that he is adumbrating in the very being of God the principle of unity; the divine οὐσία which will finds its created

counterpart in the φύσις shared by men, and which has to be restored to its proper place and function in the life of men. The revelation of the Father and the Spirit in the Logos incarnate is significant for man because he becomes 'son' and shares in divine life; man participating in the Logos will be analogously ἔννους and ζῶν . Finally, φιλανθρωπία is thrown into relief here. It is given as the ultimate reason for the Hypostatic Union on which depends the whole possibility of the manifestation of the Trinity implied in δεικνύς , a manifestation that is meant to enable man to realize the implications of the mystery into which he has been drawn by the love of God expressed in the personal love of the Logos, who enters into the human condition to communicate the life of God to man.

In Part I,2, Theology and Sonship by grace are treated concurrently so that thematically they are correlatives, the self communication of God being realized in filial adoption which the Logos effects. This section falls easily into two complementary parts: the theme of υἱοθεσία which is referred to as χάρις , κάλλος, θεότητος and the theme of προαίρεσις explicated in the notions of cherishing, adorning and laying claim to. It is the Logos who confers the grace of sonship as we have noted. He is personally responsible for man's being endowed with this gift. The gratuitousness is underlined by ἐν χάριτι . The 'birth from above' which results in υἱοθεσία is related to the Logos and it is said to transcend nature. Since the Fathers saw human sonship of God in the personal order

Maximus is reminding us here that man has a twofold relationship to the Logos: that of ὑπόστασις to ὑπόστασις and that of the objective coincidence of the energy of the Logos and of man in nature or φύσις. By breaking his relationship to the Logos in the personal order in the Fall, he incapacitated himself for co-operating with Him in the order of φύσις. The restoration of man to his pristine condition is said here to be ὑπέρ φύσιν: it is beyond his own capacity to achieve; it is too in the hypostatic order so that he becomes one on whom God can look as a person in dependence on the person of His Son: 'He gives sonship' 'from above', that is from His own in which man participates by the enjoyment of that πλέον τι which he aborted so tragically in the Fall. By being restored to personhood he is restored to sonship. His rebirth is the birth of a son, a γέννησις. Part of the newness, which Maximus does not elaborate here but which is implicit in his emphasis on σάρκωσις, is that the sonship is now conferred on man from within the realm of human nature, into which the Logos has entered διά φιλανθρωπίαν so that human nature can never again be deprived of the personal presence of the Logos, now realized as a union καθ' ὑπόστατον: that is part of the implication of ἐν χάριτι.

It is of paramount importance to note here the function of the Spirit. It is through the Spirit that υἱοθεσία is given by that birth from above in which man emerges as a person. The concept of person here should be understood in a dynamic way: it is a process

of hypostatic becoming which is expressed in free activity, so that the Spirit is introduced as the immediate source of the ἐνέργεια that brings about man's sonship through the synergy that requires the exercise of man's freedom. Although Maximus does not mention it here, we know from elsewhere that the upshot of that synergy is <u>agape</u>, poured into man's heart by the Spirit, ensuring that his exercise of free-choice is loving. This is brought out in the complementary theme of this section: προαίρεσις which is said to be proper to those born in God, a birth given by the Logos through the Spirit and throwing man into a filial relationship with the Father. The dynamic character of this sonship and the function of προαίρεσις in its evolution is underlined by attributing to the latter the φυλακή and τήρησις of the grace which it cherishes with a genuine disposition, by a basically right orientation, one might say by a willingness to correspond to the grace, a kind of promptitude in man's freedom to accept the gift of God which must precede every other vital manifestation of the exercise of freedom: the adorning of the beauty by the practice of the commandments, which provides us with a context in which to see how Maximus relates the commandments to the gift of sonship and virtuous exercise of freedom: the energizing of the commandments by freedom and the reciprocal information of the free-choices by the commandments issues in a splendour proper to divine filiation; finally it is προαίρεσις that lays claim to divinity, the grace of sonship of God by an emptying of the passions that are subsequent to the Fall and which mar man's being and impede his becoming

a person in the true sense, because of the submergence of his freedom in self-love, orchestrated in ἐπιθυμία and θυμός and their multifarious expressions. Προαίρεσις then is here presented as the key to human being from a subjective point of view and on it depends entirely, from a created point of view, the reception and growth of the grace of sonship implanted in man by the Logos through the Holy Spirit.

It should be noted too that Maximus here introduces a favourite theme of his: the τοσοῦτον - ὅσον by which he expresses his insight into the reciprocity of the exchanges implied in the mystery of the Incarnation and analogously in the divinization of man.[328] Here the parallelism pivots on the idea of κένωσις derived from the Epistle to the Philippians.[329] There is a proportion between the emptying by which the Logos emptied himself of his glory in becoming man and the way in which man's freedom appropriates divinity by his expropriation of the passions which is markedly inverse, an appeal to man to set going in himself the process by which he is divinized through the Logos having foregone the glory proper to Him as God-made-man, by foregoing his passionate attachments. This is an exemplification of a theme common in Maximus: God becomes man to the extent that man becomes god, something modified in this particular instance by the historical conditions of the κένωσις of the Logos's δόξα and the passionate character of the terminus a quo proper to man, but it is the same principle that is at work here: something realized par excellence in the Logos incarnate, to be

participated in by those endowed with υἱοθεσία .

We should note particularly here the notion of προαίρεσις with its associations and its complementing the action of the Holy Spirit. This emphasis throws light on the idea of birth and adoptive sonship as something dynamic and evolutionary in the thought of Maximus.

Part II(a)

In Part II(a)* 330 'Theology' is elaborated as a statement about the Three Persons of the Trinity where 'relationships' are stressed as a significant clue to the mystery. The Son is identified with the 'Name' of the prayer and the Holy Spirit with the Kingdom. The trinitarian context of the whole treatise is emphasized in this way and leads us to consider that Maximus wants all his subsequent reflections to be related to and understood ultimately in terms of what we know of the Trinity in its immanence and its economy. We are here in the realm of the apophatic and have to tread warily, trying not merely to know something of God through His revelation, but to establish rigorously how we know, the precise kind of knowledge that is available to us and the function of differential concepts, based on the language of Scripture. We shall see that it is kenosis that opens up the inner life of God for Maximus.

The hallowing of the Name and the coming of the Kingdom are given a firm anthropological interpretation in terms of λόγος and πραότης . We find λόγος

* Vide APPENDIX III(vi) for a schematic presentation of this most complex section of the whole Pater Noster.

associated here with ἐπιθυμία and θυμός . The platonic psychological triad takes on a complex of meanings that enables Maximus not merely to distinguish between faculties of the soul and their disordered use as passions, but λόγος is transposed from being the innate ἡγεμονικόν to being the divine Logos, so that the establishment of authentic human being will have a transcendent reference. The ascetical implications of λόγος are clarified in its relation to ἐπιθυμία and θυμός so that human integration is thrown into relation with the divine order and recognized as a hallowing of the Logos. It is not only an immanent perfection of man that is at stake, but its implications reveal the fundamental role of Logos in creation and salvation and the relevance of the λόγοι in the constitution of man and his development. This is paralleled by the introduction of πραότης with its evangelical connotations. Gregory of Nyssa had taught that the request for the coming of the Kingdom was asking for the coming of the Holy Spirit,[331] an interpretation which Maximus accepts here. Since the Spirit has promised to rest on the meek and humble,[332] therefore πραότης assumes in man's life a function that will be complementary to that of λόγος . Dalmais rightly points out that in the oeuvre of Maximus πραότης and ἀγάπη are easily identified.[333] But in the Pater Noster it is used especially to emphasize man's dependence on the Holy Spirit to become his true self, so that it connotes a wise passivity in his relationship with the Holy Spirit: 'he is meek too, because he realizes that the use of his

powers in keeping with nature has been donated to him'.[334] It is assigned the function of ensuring that the man, who possesses it, will enable the Kingdom to come, that is the Holy Spirit to act freely in his life. It is tied to notions of human freedom, synergy, stability and ultimately man's becoming a person. At this stage we can discern the play of a polarity in the evolution of man and acknowledge that Maximus relates it to the economic intervention of the Son and of the Spirit in the life of man.

The twofold activity of the Son and the Spirit produces a conformation to Christ, to elaborate which the Pauline quintet is used.[335] The Incarnation is stressed in the abolition of the categories of male and female and the other divisions which St. Paul listed. For Maximus, male and female represent ἐπιθυμία and θυμός ,[336] so that he provides further elaboration of the influence of Christ on the healing of man's passionate malaise. The tragedy of man's situation before he is redeemed by Christ is that he turns his capacity for God to creatures and in doing so inverts right order in himself. This abandonment to passionate desire turns him into a rapacious aggressor if and when his concupiscence is foiled. Man cannot be himself unless these powers, by which he was meant to interact with his environment, are subjected to λόγος , so that Maximus insists on the need for the reign of λόγος in the life of the spiritual man. 'Jew and Greek' takes up the theological theme again and elaborates it. This is paralleled by 'circumcision and uncircumcision', signifying for Maximus an attitude to creation consistent with the

contrasting theologies of Jew and Greek. 'Barbarian and Scythian' symbolise the rifts introduced into nature by the abuse of free-will while 'slave and free' testify to the tyranny that is consequent on such abuse. Under the comments on 'male and female' above, the theme of Elijah and his sheepskin is introduced and prefaces significant references to the couplet, image and likeness, which is used by Maximus to describe the unfolding of nature in person and the innovation of nature by person in relation to the creative and redemptive action of God. This process is described frequently as the development of εἶναι into ἀεί εἶναι through εὖ εἶναι . In this context we have too a refreshing reference to the Mother of God in the idea of the soul as virgin-mother on the model of the Theotokos bringing to birth in personal life the Logos in each individual man.[337] The Christian has a λόγος deiform by γνῶσις and γνώμη that chooses ἀρετή .[338] This twofold activity perfects man in his twofold potentiality: for truth and for goodness.[339] Λόγος is used here as the principle of man's contemplative capacity while γνώμη is entrusted with his practical perfection. This leaves the way open for another use of νοῦς to which we shall return below. Γνώμη being the faculty of freedom and so that through which ἀγάπη is poured into nature, is being used here to remind us of the counterpointing of λόγος by τρόπος in the thought of Maximus. That prepares the way for introducing further references to humility and meekness and that we have seen is what opens man to the personalising action of the Holy Spirit, perfecting

in him the life of Christ, who thus becomes 'all in all'.[340] This means that 'he is always moved towards God with respect to νοῦς ',[341] while he enjoys ἀπάθεια in his sense life. His one delight is 'intercourse of the soul with the Logos'[342] which is the ground of θέωσις . Maximus may seem here to dismiss the bodily dimension of human being in an evagrian way, but he wants to emphasize what man must 'seek first'. We know from other parts of his works, including the Pater Noster, how integral and humane his doctrine is in regard to the body.[393] He concludes this section by exhorting his readers to purification with a view to hallowing the Name by λόγος and receiving the Kingdom through πραότης.

Having seen the principal themes of Part II(a) in outline it will now serve our purpose to look at some aspects of it more carefully.

We are told that the Lord initiates men 'into the mode of existence' of God, that He is Father, Son and Holy Spirit.[344] This initiation is the basis of 'theology', so that knowledge of the Incarnate Logos is an introduction to the inner life of God. Insistence on the 'mode of existence' is a reminder that in God the one essence is identified hypostatically with the trinity of persons. Because of its inaccessible transcendence man requires the mystagogia provided by the Incarnate Logos. The God who is in some way apparent to His creatures through the radiations of His creative energy is revealed as a Father with a 'Name' and a King with a 'Kingdom' in the language of the 'Our Father'. The God

of revellation is characterized by the irreducibility of the persons to the substance in the godhead; in Him is found a mysterious identity of unity and trinity. That the Incarnate Logos is not indulging in a merely speculative exercise in teaching the 'Our Father' is obvious because of the implications of the mystagogia: men are to invoke, venerate and adore the One Trinity.[345] They are being invited to enter the life of the Trinity; this is 'to honour the Trinity as creative cause of our being'.[346] Maximus may be merely saying that 'from the beginning' man should pray so, but the text allows us to understand that he wants us to begin from the Principle in the Trinity, the sourceless Source, the Father, when we say 'Our Father'.[347] It is to the Father that man is being led through the Son in the Spirit. Therefore even though the Persons, in their indivisible distinctness as One God, created and redeemed man, man is called to discover them in their personal distinctness through his use of the 'Our Father' and ultimately by his ascent to the Father with the Risen Son. Maximus here confines himself to speaking of the Trinity in the way formulated after the Council of Nicaea. He insists that the Son who is the 'Name' of the prayer and the Holy Spirit, the 'Kingdom', are co-eternal with the Father, that there is no question of Origenian subordinationism. He invokes the category of 'relationship' to account for the mysterious simultaneity of the processions and circumincession within God.[348] The implication is that the personal order cannot be deduced from the essential order in God,

that the movement of divine life is not subject to the limitations of the created order, that man has to bow before the apophatic irreducibility of the Persons to the divine Essence in the Holy Trinity. In fact, it will be seen that this very irreducibility is what makes the Incarnation of the Logos intelligible. Maximus is keen to root the mystery of the Economy in the mystery of the Holy Trinity, prepared to see the temporal missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit as in some way an extension of their eternal procession in the life of God.

Maximus returns to the subject of the Trinity when he introduces the excerpt from Galatians 3.28: 'neither Greek nor Jew'.[349] This provides him with an opportunity of elaborating the deficiencies of the hellenic and semitic views of God as he understands them. He examines the contrasting positions of Greek and Jew in the light of the knowledge of the God of Christian revelation: One and Three. He criticizes the Greeks' failure to appreciate the Unity of God and their being seduced by polytheism. He will complement this with an unfavourable comment on their consequent view of creation, their tendency to divinize its powers. He does not honour the views of the Greek philosophers with criticism, so that we cannot say how he might have found their highest conceptions wanting, except perhaps to guess that they would then have been pilloried with the Jews for an arid monotheism which was either abstract or mono-personal. For Maximus the austere monotheism of the Jews fails to make room for Word and Spirit and so the life of God is impoverished

unspeakably. Their attitude to nature is consonant with this severity and so he welcomes the rite of circumcision as evidence of an outlook that would fit more comfortably the followers of Marcion or Manos. In a series of negations he denies to the Trinity the kind of inter-personal dependence that created causality would suggest, so that it is not a case of one thing in another, one thing after another, of universal and particular, one thing through another, one thing from another. Because 'God is identically monad and triad'[350] there can be no question of attributing to Him the kind of determinations that would imply something less than perfect immutability. But the same is said and understood to be truly Unity and Trinity, the former by reason of the principle of essence, the latter by reason of the mode of existence. The same is entirely Unity without being divided by the hypostases; the same is entirely Trinity without being confused by the Unity, so that polytheism is not introduced by fragmentation, nor atheism by confusion.[351] We have to remember that these trinitarian observations, so purely Cappadocian in their inspiration, are placed by Maximus between the poles of <u>kenosis</u> and <u>theosis</u> which control the entire field of his theological reflections in this treatise, so that together with confirming the eternal identity of Jesus Christ, he wants us to grasp the relationship of Economy to Theology and realize that it is the irreducibility of the Persons to Nature in God that makes the redemptive Incarnation possible.

It would be difficult to rebut Dalmais' charge that Maximus' critique of Jewish monotheism, by faulting them for not having attributed Logos and Spirit to God at least by appropriation, gives the impression of archaism.[352] Not alone, he thinks, does it not show awareness of the riches of the Fourth Century Fathers and Cyril, but much less does it show any development in the direction of an Augustine. However, what Maximus says here may be seen to have some significance within the structural limits of his treatise as a whole, something to which Dalmais does not advert. Having rejected the inadequacies of both Judaic and Hellenic religion, he then says that they are not to be found in Christ at all, 'but only the conception of true religion, a firm law of mystical theology'.[353] This will eventually be seen to be the mystery of Three Persons in One Nature, but before going on to that Maximus says, summing up his criticism of the Jews 'and Greeks' notion of God:

> That would mean deprived of Logos and Spirit or qualified by Logos and Spirit, but then God is not worshipped as Intellect, Logos and Spirit. It teaches us, who have been introduced to a recognition of the truth by the vocation of grace through faith, to know the one nature and the power of the godhead, that is to say One God, contemplated in Father, Son and Holy Spirit. That means the unique uncaused substantially subsistent Intellect who is the Generator of the only Logos, who subsists substantially without cause, who is the source of the only eternal Life that subsists in a substantial manner as the Holy Spirit, a Trinity in Unity and a Unity in Trinity.[354]

Here Maximus distinguishes the Persons of the Trinity as Νοῦς , Λόγος and Πνεῦμα and again as Νοῦς, Λόγος and Ζωή . It would be ill-judged to attribute this usage to levity in the author; on the

contrary, we know already from our examination of his structural style of thought and expression how carefully he chooses every word. We shall restrict our observations to two comments on this passage. Firstly, the use of Νοῦς to express the hypostatic distinction of the Father and of Ζωή to perform a comparable function for the Holy Spirit enables us to establish securely that when Maximus said that the Incarnate Logos continued to be ἔννους and ζῶν ,[355] he was affirming the continued perichoresis of the Father and the Spirit in the Son, even when the Incarnation had taken place. They were present by virtue of their personal characteristics and the circumincession that their common identity with the one divine nature warrants. It is this that underlies the fact that the Father is present as εὐδοκῶν and the Spirit as συνεργοῦν 'in the whole Son entirely even made flesh'.[356] It is impossible to identify the Subject of Christology without recognizing His eternal relationships in the Holy Trinity. It is these relationships that validate the Economy as a revelation of the inner life of God and make it a declaration of φιλανθρωπία .[357]

The other observation that may throw some light on Maximus's understanding of man in his relation to God has to do with the way in which the life of the Holy Trinity is described: The Father, described as Νοῦς , is the generator of the Logos and source of the Life. The Life has already been designated as Πνεῦμα in this paragraph, so perhaps we can speak of Νοῦς, Λόγος and Πνεῦμα- Ζωή .[358] If this is the

application to the Trinity of an understanding of the dynamics of the human person and life then perhaps it will tell us something of how Maximus understands that. In this whole section, dealing with the hallowing of the Name and the coming of the Kingdom, the ideas of λόγος and πραότης are fundamental. The Name is hallowed, that is the Logos is hallowed, when λόγος finds its true level in the life of man; this is further elaborated by attributing to λόγος the ordering of man's passionate life: his ἐπιθυμία and his θυμός .[359] This results in ἀπάθεια , that state of harmonious feeling which disposes man to engage with God in prayer and virtue. Πραότης is linked with the Kingdom or the Spirit and His coming in the life of man in such a way that his freedom is moored to the freedom of God.[360] The evangelical πραότης can be identified with ἀγάπη ;[361] it is what characterizes the son who enjoys freedom because the whole power of his soul(life) is moored to the freedom of God. His freedom is identified with the divine freedom and so he is free indeed, willing what God wills, loving as God loves, living in Truth. It is the life of a son of God. This coming of the Kingdom is then aligned with the restoration of man to his personhood; it squares with what Maximus has to say of λόγος and τρόπος : through the ἀγάπη which the Spirit pours into man's willing soul (πραότης) the λόγος of his nature is innovated and transposed to the level of filial τρόπος . His capacity for being a son, his status as εἰκών of God is actualized in ὁμοίωσις .[362] This

actualisation is not out of relation with the λόγος φύσεως of man, made functional in his faculty of λόγος by which he hallows the Name; it is rather the making personal of that λόγος φύσεως expressed in λόγος by the action of the Spirit through πραότης . Τρόπος ὑπάρξεως must have an ontological root, as we suggested and to which we shall return, but it refers too to the mode of life of the subject and that is meant to be filial, so that the λόγος that is energized by the Spirit through πραότης releases the relationship of man to the Logos not merely in terms of nature, but in terms of hypostasis. The λόγος τοῦ πῶς εἶναι [363] of man is activated through the ἐνέργεια of the Spirit, by the coming of the Kingdom. Man is truly alive with the personal life of God, the Spirit.

Obviously, if man's personhood is a participation in the Son's, then λόγος should be used to indicate the personal element in him. If we become λόγοι , then it would be in order to think of us as in some way being ξννους and ζῶν , but our perichoresis would be only analogous to that of the Logos. We become sons by becoming persons, by τρόπος innovating λόγος , so that we are λόγοι , when λόγος is personalized by the action of the Spirit who makes us like the Logos. There must be a root to this which the action of the Spirit releases in man as his participation in the Logos as hypostasis; he has in him an ontological root that we can designate as λόγος ὑπάρξεως and it is this which is the personal ground of the exercise of his freedom, which is synonymous with τρόπος ὑπάρξεως .

If we settle for λόγος ὑπάρξεως as our personal participation in the Logos, then we might say that man becomes ἔννους and ζῶν analogously to the perichoresis of the Father and the Spirit in the Logos. Their circumincession is not in any way a relinquishing of their personal characteristics, but because they are identical with the same divine nature, they are obviously intimately bound to each other personally, giving and receiving a nature with which they are identical and doing so in perfect freedom, something warranted by the irreducibility of the Persons to the Nature in God.[364] When Maximus speaks of ἔννους in this context, he is referring to that personal co-inherence and for the purpose of insisting that the Three are bound up in creation and redemption, albeit according to their personal traits, which enables the Son to assume human nature without involving the other Persons as He is involved. We might say that They act in concert to produce it and that He does so as the Term of this trinitarian action, that the humanity exists in Him because He subsists in the humanity. Our analogous perichoresis would not have to be anything more than an assurance that the Three make us to be sons and λόγοι ὑπάρξεως and that because our status as persons is constituted as a participation of the Son's personal character, then the Father and the Spirit must indwell us too since participation in his Personal character entails the perichoresis of Father and the Spirit, that they would indwell us as Persons because the perichoresis that obtains in the Trinity is

analogously established in man. If we love the Son, - due to the action of the Holy Spirit making us to live as He does through ἀγάπη - then the Father will come to us and make his abode with us;[365] we become temples of the Holy Spirit,[366] not merely the objects of his hypostasizing activity. That action of the Holy Spirit releases our λόγος ὑπάρξεως and we can enter into the life that circulates perichoretically in the Holy Trinity, becoming ἔννους and ζῶν . The basis of perichoresis cannot be divine nature held in common in our case. But the hypostasization that makes us sons in the Son, λόγοι in the Logos together with the ἀγάπη , that expresses this and informs our lives, ensures that we are caught into the perichoretic life of the Trinity, not merely in terms of nature, but as participators of divine nature, as persons in relationship to Persons, sons who are identified with the Son, who can call God Abba and whose life is the fruit of the personal indwelling of the Holy Spirit.

Once the analogous perichoresis has ensured that the Father and the Spirit are within us, then the perspective can be changed, just as it can in the case of Christ. It is as God-man that He is ἔννους and ζῶν ; it is as divinized men that we are ἔννους and ζῶν analogously. He is ἔννους and ζῶν as man because as Logos He lives in perichoretic concert with His Father and the Spirit. But from the point of view of the eternal processions in the Holy Trinity, the Father is Νοῦς [367] generating the Λόγος -Son and Source of the Πνεῦμα - Ζωή . Analogously too, νοῦς in us can assume

a generative and fontal role. It can become the source of λόγος and γνώμη ζωή , that from which they flow, that through which the divinizing action of God enters the being and life of man. We might even dare to say that as logically procession precedes perichoresis in the Trinity, in the case of man it is perichoresis that establishes procession. The mystery of divine life in us can never be natural and personal in the way it is in the Holy Trinity so that νοῦς, λόγος and γνώμη can never be hypostatic traits in the strict sense, but if we think of them as a threefold activity by which we participate in the life of God who is not merely Nature but Persons, then because it is through νοῦς that we are basically open to the divine invasion of our beings, νοῦς assumes in the dynamics of the life of grace a role that is analogous to the role of the Father-Nous in the Trinity;[368] λόγος will liken us to the Logos-Son and γνώμη - ζωή to the Spirit who is understood to be not merely alive in the Trinity but life hypostasized, binding the Father and the Son. What we cannot afford to suggest is that νοῦς is person. We have suggested that it is where person emerges in nature, where nature is innovated in person so that it would be where ἀγάπη encounters λόγος or where λόγος is enlivened as person. This would give it affinity with the 'ground of the soul' or the 'apex of soul' or the 'substance of the soul'[369] of later formulations as well as the καρδία of Scripture.[370] It would also perhaps square with Augustine's memoria.[371] If we keep in mind that this is a way of describing activities and experience rather than an attempt to

provide a faculty-physiognomy of the soul, then if the constitution of the λόγος ὑπάρξεως in act by the action of the Spirit can be said to be wrought basically in νοῦς , then it leaves the λόγος as man's basic personal relationship to the Logos and assigns to the Spirit the energizing of the λόγος ὑπάρξεως which releases the λόγος φύσεως into the order of person, there is no reason why νοῦς cannot be said to be where this 'takes place' and so to be where λόγος and γνώμη reassume their functions in a proper way, that from which they flow.

We have translated νοῦς as 'mind' and as 'intellect', but we cannot forget that this philosophical term acquires new meanings and new associations in the theological context of the usage of the Fathers. We find it eleven times in the Pater Noster, and while it must not be restricted to one sense here, it does seem open to the interpretation which we have suggested in some places in this work. Apart from the texts which we have mentioned it occurs in 876A: 'ask the Lord, the teacher of this prayer, to open my mind to the apprehension of the mysteries it contains'; 885D: 'Since such promises were for those who love the Lord, who then, if he gives his mind only to the word of Scripture and if he is moved by reason and longs to be a servant of reason ....'; 888D: 'The spirit is still perfectly master of nature, persuading the intellect to forego ethical philosophy when it ought to unite itself with the super-essential Logos through simple and indivisible contemplation, even if this contributes naturally to the easy

cutting off and transcending of things fleeting in the realm of time'; 893D: 'And in this way he is always moved towards God with respect to intellect'; 896C: 'let the whole intellect strain towards God as if it were stretched through a forceful exertion by way of the irascible power and on fire with longing though the supreme yearning of the concupiscible power'; 896D: 'For by imitating the angels in heaven in this way, we shall be found to give worship to God in everything and show ourselves to have on earth the same kind of citizenship as the angels, having, just like them, our intellect in its integrity moved to nothing that is inferior to God'; 897C: 'He gives Himself more to those who have done great works, but less to those who have done less of them, to each one, however, according as the worth of his intellect is capable of receiving'; 901C: 'he forgives those who have offended him, not allowing the intellect to be impressed by any memory of the foregoing injuries'.

There is not room to comment on these texts in extenso, but νοῦς is obviously the primary openness of man's being to the mysteries revealed in the 'Our Father'. It is the part of man which above all must be kept free from God, so that its capacity must not be marred by irregular concern with what is not God. It is that by which man receives God and the measure of his receiving-power is the measure of his νοῦς . It is that through which he is primarily moved towards God. It is νοῦς that ultimately draws on the energies of the soul in its stretching out to and yearning for God; it

is where he becomes ecstatic and cleaves to 'the super-essential Logos through simple and indivisible contemplation'. Finally, it is what likens man to the angels, emphasizing the aspect of his being that is ordered to the contemplative glorification of God.

All of this takes νοῦς beyond the philosophical connotations of 'mind' and 'intellect', even understood as man's passive power for conceiving reality intentionally. It describes a depth in man that only God can discover and explore. This gives nous a certain primacy in the constitution of man and enables us to see how Maximus, while he does not organize his thought in this area, thinks of it as the source of man's λόγος and γνώμη in their divinized activity. While acknowledging that Maximus is more concerned with realities than with systems, and recognizing that he draws his language from different sources and uses different anthropological models with the freedom of a spiritual realist, we can see the outline of an anthropology here that is meant to help us to understand the life of man as image of God.

We shall now examine more carefully the place of λόγος and πραότης . After the introduction in which the Trinity is taken primarily in its communal sense, with emphasis on the godhead and unity, once the tri-hypostatic character of God is established, Maximus then proceeds to underline the distinctness of the Son and the Holy Spirit because of the bearing of that distinctness on the being and life of man. We are taught to hallow the Name on earth. Here the Son is singled out for a peculiar glorification and it is not

by a mere declaration that this will be effected, but by something more deeply existential, by mortifying the desire for material things and purifying the passions of concupiscence and aggressiveness, the basic emotions in the anthropology of Maximus.[372] Here, as we noted, ἐπιθυμία and θυμός are at once faculties and the passions they express and more specifically their activity as indicative of the fallen state of man. They indicate that man has perverted the original intention of God in his regard and has plunged into a heedless cult of creation, allowing himself to be submerged by creatures precisely in that part of himself destined to unite him with God. It is the function of λόγος to restore order in ἐπιθυμία and θυμός , to draw them back to their rightful function in nature, because informed by the λόγος φύσεως [373] which is meant to integrate all the faculties and activities proper to itself. That principle of the nature, exercises its hegemony over the lower faculties through the mediation of the faculty of λόγος . The Fall brought imbalance to man and it is the function of λόγος to restore the lost equilibrium. The λόγος that emanates from the λόγος φύσεως is ultimately derived from the Λόγος in whom the λόγοι of all the rationals are to be found.[374] That is why Maximus says that we 'hallow the Name on earth',[375] 'show ourselves children by our actions'.[376] We glorify the Λόγος when our lives are resplendent with the impress of their source, when our conduct shows that we are children because of our affinity with the Son, 'by what we think (νοοῦμεν ) or do (πράττομεν) '.[377]

Besides the Son is here declared to be 'the author of adoption'. This throws us back to the earlier passage where the Persons of the Trinity were characterised as taking part in the Incarnation and Economy in different ways, the Son being described as being the 'author' of that mystery.[379] It is definitely the logical element in our constitution that is being emphasized here, so that it is better to leave the further implications of adoption for the intervention of the Holy Spirit. We cannot separate λόγος from τρόπος, since λόγος must become personal λόγος ; the stability of τρόπος will confirm the innate stability of λόγος . The inextricability of λόγος and τρόπος is brought out in the next sentence where we are said to 'hallow the Name of the Father by grace by mortifying desire ( ἐπιθυμία ) '.[380] The reference to 'grace' keeps us aware of the unfettered benevolence of the Trinity in our regard and that this is personally to be found in the Father as gracious source, and whose sons it makes us to be in the Son by the action of the Holy Spirit. While Maximus is dealing explicitly with the logical character of our relation to the Son, he does not allow us to overlook the intervention of the other two Persons in our adoption, each bringing it about in a way that is in keeping with His personal attributes analogous to the Father delighting in ( εὐδοχῶν ) , the Spirit co-operating with συνεργοῦν the Son effecting (αὐτουργοῦντι) the incarnation.[381] This we also do by hushing aggresiveness which is not stimulated by ἐπιθυμία , that is said to be 'already mortified by

the holiness that is in keeping with reason (λόγος)'.[382] Λόγος is the principle of the sanctity which enables us to sanctify the Name of God. It is the holiness of our being that honours the 'Name' since he is the source of that holiness. We testify to Him by being like him.

Then Maximus goes on to indicate the way in which the Holy Spirit intervenes in the lives of men. He says that 'in those mortified' by the influence of λόγος in their lives, 'the Power of the Kingdom comes'.[383] The sequence here is not temporal, but logical: the power of the Kingdom cannot come where nature is not restored to its integral harmony by the pacification of desire in ἀπάθεια . The turmoil of a life dominated by passion is inconsistent with the reception of the Holy Spirit and his gifts. We become temples for God through the Spirit by the λόγος and τρόπος of meekness πραότης .[384] There is another dimension to man's being that is not derived from λόγος nor can it be reduced to it. It is something sovereign and independent, a mode of being. Here Maximus admits that meekness has its λόγος , the essential principle of being and intelligibility that gives it place and identity in the fabric of created reality. But he points out too that it has another side to it, something that is not restricted to the field of the logical. He takes two images from Scripture to evolve his understanding of this twofold aspect of meekness: the 'earth'[385] and 'rest'.[386] For him the 'earth' means 'the middle position of the universe'[387] and so it symbolizes stability and immutability that comes

through meekness, a stable habit and power. This is exemplified by the stability of the impassible man who retains his freedom of nature when caught between good and ill-repute. He is impervious to inclination, not swaying from side to side, but holding to the mean of virtue in meekness. There is a significant emphasis in the next clause: 'and moored the whole power of the soul to the divine and imperturbable liberty'.[388] This is consistent with what we have seen of λόγος above and how it opens the way to the coming of the Kingdom. Stability must be established through freedom and if that freedom is to be genuine, then it has to take its source in divine freedom. Freedom indicates the τρόπος side of being; it reveals the personal, it is an epiphany of the possibilities of existence that cannot be confined to the essential. If nature is to achieve its destiny and find an existential stability consonant with its λόγος , then it must be innovated in a personal way. Freedom is the basic expression of that hypostatic appropriation. It is the way that nature is meant to exist.

The synergic character of that freedom is underlined by the other image take from Scripture, that of 'rest'. This is not meant to be a static image. Maximus has already spoken of the immobility (ἀκινησία)[389] that marks sense desire (ἐπιθυμία ) when λόγος informs it. But movement is at the very basis of his cosmology, linking as it does the primal γένεσις with the final στάσις .[390] Here he gives us insight into the kind of movement that he visualises in the

hypostatic evolution of man: it is the play of personal freedom, which is made possible by the interaction of the human and divine freedoms in synergy and which excludes the impulsiveness of φιλαυτία [391] taking its rise in personal will, just as the waywardness of passion is stabilized by λόγος . The primacy of the personal in Maximus is in no way a declaration in favour of the irrational; it is an act of faith in the primacy of the intervention of the divine freedom in our lives, here attributed in some special way to the action of the Holy Spirit. The idea of man must come to life in the freedom of the person interlocking with the freedom of the Holy Spirit. 'Rest' is the power (κράτος) of the Kingdom, that is the Spirit, producing in the worthy a mastery ( δεσποτεία) that is freed from all servitude (δουλεία) .[392] 'Ανάπαυσις , in the ascetical usage of the Fathers, indicates spiritual perfection, the result of the practice of virtue and is marked by refreshing repose in prayer.[393] Here we have 'Rest' as the paradoxical possibility of human action because of the interaction of divine and human freedom. Paradoxically again, it gives rise to δεσποτεία , a word that denotes ownership, and here obviously self-possession. A man can only give himself to God when he has himself to give. Mastery is acquired by submission to the mastery of the Spirit and this gives rise to freedom from all servitude, not alone from passion, but from the caprice of self-will as well as the influence of the demons.

Humility is now introduced in association with meekness and we are asked 'who would be so devoid of love and entirely without longing for the divine benefits as not to desire limitless humility and meekness'?[394] The reason for this is that man might become the imprint of the Kingdom (χαραχτήρ) . This powerful image is common in Maximus although he uses ὑποτύπωσις[395] to convey his meaning more often. The Spirit is the matrix in which man is formed and again we must not think of this in a static way; it is the energetic encounter of two personal freedoms so that the person is the knot in which are joined two energies: that of the Spirit and that of man. Man is what he becomes and he becomes what he does because of the <u>way</u> the Spirit acts in him. Maximus then goes on to say that the man in whom the Kingdom had come 'would bear in himself by grace the exact form in spirit of Christ, who is truly the great king in essence'.[396] We do not have to delay on the attribution of kingship to Christ. It will suffice to refer to his treatment of διά Υἱοῦ[397] to provide a foundation for the title, even within the Trinity. What interests us in this context is that the form of Christ is produced in man by grace. The participation in λόγος would not be merely a Neoplatonic declension of form. Indeed, it is precisely to Christ as Person that man is conformed. His participation in the Logos is hypostatic, energized by the Spirit in and through his receptivity to the divine inpouring of ἀγάπη : Πραότης disposes him for the Kingdom. It binds him to the Logos not merely as

nature, but as person, so that his whole being is filialized precisely by the coming of the Kingdom of Christ in him. This is the force of 'by grace'.

Part III, 1,2.

In this final retrospective summary of what Maximus has to say about the 'mysteries' of 'theology' and 'adoptive sonship', having reminded us that:

> He constitutes us co-worshippers with the angels in fulfilment of the Father's will, manifesting in a well imitated way, by the conduct of our lives, celestial satisfaction,

he then goes on to say:

> and from there again he is a leader upon the ascent of divine realities to the Father of lights (Cf. James 1,17) and makes us sharers of the divine nature (Cf. 2 Pet. 1,4) by participation in the Spirit through grace; through this we are given the status of sons of God, all of us having within us the entire author himself of this grace: the Son of the Father by nature, without any limitation and in a pure way. From Him, by Him and in Him, we have and shall have being, movement and life (Cf. Acts 17,28).[398]

The first thing to note is that it is 'Christ' who is the subject of this sentence again. He is the author of our salvation and divinization given to us in the seven 'mysteries' made the object of prayer in the 'Our Father'. The reference to the 'Father of lights' recalls James 1,17 where ' πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθή καί πᾶν δώρημα τέλειον ἄνωθεν ἐστιν καταβαῖνον ἀπό τοῦ Πατρός τῶν φώτων '. We recall that in this section of his commentary Maximus has reversed the order of the 'mysteries' so that we can presume that the previous θεῖα are the ἀγαθά or μυστήρια

already mentioned, beginning with petitions to be delivered from the Evil One and not to be led into temptation. The supreme ascent will then be initiation into the inner life of the Trinity by which we encounter the Father as Father because we are sons in the Son, being made sharers in the divine nature by participation in the grace of the Spirit. Anthropology here again takes on an unequivocal trinitarian character. We attain to the Sourceless Source in God, from Whom proceeds every uncreated and created gift. It is by participation in the grace of the Spirit that we become κοινωνοί of the divine nature, that is personal participants in that nature through synergy with the Spirit, with whose freedom we interlock in becoming persons through His anointing of our being with His ἀγάπη . It is as persons that we are participating sons and it is the Son who brings this about in us through the action of the Spirit. Christ is the αὐτουργός ; we have seen in Part I,1, that he is described as αὐτουργοῦντι σάρκωσιν and here he is credited with the sharing of sonship with us because of that redemptive incarnation. In fact we are said to be identified with Him to the extent of always bearing Him about (περιχωρίζοντες ) without limitation and defilement δίχα περιγραφῆς καί ἀχράντως . This is further strengthened by attributing to Christ our being, movement and life, something claimed for the God of his preaching by St. Paul in the Athenian agora. Maximus again elaborates the mode of our relation to Christ: 'from whom, by whom and in whom' we have these

fundamental prerogatives thus sealing in a definitive way his affirmation of the indissolubility of christology and anthropology. 'The bearing him about' would seem to be a gloss on Paul's: 'I live, now not I, Christ lives in me', (Gal. 2,20) a matter of belief for all Christians, of experience for mystics. The epithets that qualify this claim are meant to disarm 'somatic' or 'psychic' objections. The mode of the presence is not bound in any way nor defined by the limitations of the created order, even if it implies the presence of Christ in his humanity to his faithful. Ἀχρᾶντωϛ is applied by the Fathers to the mode of Christ's generation as Son and his birth as son, so that here we are being reminded that his presence in us in no way resembles the presence of flesh to flesh, much less the presence of sinful flesh to sinful flesh. The τρόποϛ of Christ's presence is apophatic. In the light of what we have seen already of triads used in the Main Commentary: νοῦϛ, λόγοϛ , ζωή we may suggest here that τό εἶναι, κινεῖσθαι and ζῆν refer to εἶναι, εὖ εἶναι and ἀεί εἶναι ,[399] We are in the image of God, growing in his likeness entirely in dependence on Christ: ἐξ οὗ καί δι' οὗ καί ἐν ᾧ . The εἶναι of the formula in question here can be thought to correspond to the εἶναι of the more familiar triad of εἶναι, εὖ εἶναι and ἀεί εἶναι . Κίνησιϛ from the triad γένεσιϛ, κίνησιϛ and στάσιϛ which is the ontological terminology that becomes ethical in εἶναι, εὖ εἶναι and ἀεί εἶναι turns up as κινεῖσθαι and is obviously meant to be understood as εὖ εἶναι .

The third member of the triad ζῆν cannot be derived from either of these other sets but we have already encountered ζωή both in the language applied to the Persons of the Trinity and, by implication, in man where we have found νοῦς , λόγος and γνώμη . Γνώμη or personal will is most obviously related to the Holy Spirit, through freedom and ultimately ἀγάπη which would give us an anthropological triad νοῦς , λόγος ζωή ( γνώμη ) . The Pauline triad, transposed here, would then be a way of saying what Maximus has been saying in so many different ways: that Christ is the source of man's being, his growth in well-being and its definitive state of ever-well-being or the fullness of life which the Holy Spirit pours into man as ἀγάπη and which stabilizes him in God. The most significant aspect of all this in regard to the passage of the Pater Noster under consideration is that the being, movement and life which characterize the beneficiaries of the Word made flesh are derived immediately from Him. The text is emphatically Christocentric, but it avoids the charge of Christomonism because of the adroit references to the Father and the Holy Spirit.

## The Ultimate Source of Christology and Anthropology

We have seen already that in the theology of St. Maximus the world does not have an immanent end, but that in the eternal βουλή of God it was destined to be united to Him through the mediation of man, become a son in His Son. Maximus sees this realized in the κένωσις of the Logos, so that everything that he has

to say in this commentary on the 'Our Father' is set in the framework of κένωσις - θέωσις . It was only the κένωσις of the Logos that enabled God to enter the tragic condition of man and to revive him to his vocation to divine sonship. In this way the freedom of man was left intact; no external pressure was brought to bear on him; salvation would not be effected by the violent imposition of a divine nature on a human nature. For this reason Maximus would find the traditional image of the union of soul and body defective as an analogy for the mystery of the redemptive Incarnation.[400] The Incarnation for him was grace, something that entirely transcended natural necessity. It was a mystery in another dimension of being. In the Incarnation and Redemption the divine nature acts through the movement of personal κένωσις . It is in this sense that the Logos, while not forsaking His divinity nor the mysterious perichoresis with the Father and the Spirit which is the eternal life of God, can be said to be the αὐτουργός [401] of the Incarnation. It is in Him alone that it is wrought hypostatically. It is His hypostasis that enhypostasizes the human being and life of Jesus, thus opening to men the new birth as sons of God in the Spirit through His obedience unto death, death on a cross. The dynamism of the filialized being and life and death of Jesus is ἀγάπη . As Maximus sees it, the law of nature and the written law are surpassed and perfected by the law of grace:[402] 'For there is no greater love than this that a man should lay down his

life for his friends'.[403] Because in Him we find a hypostatic subject of human being and life, we find too a hypostatic transposition of the laws of nature; Ἀγάπη is the impress of the hypostasis of the Logos on a human freedom enabling His human will to move freely from within, preserving the ἀσυγχύτως , ἀτρέπτως of Chalcedon not merely in the natures, but in His willing and activity as Maximus would have occasion to remind the Monothelites and Monenergists in his tireless defence of orthodoxy.[404]

Maximus' doctrine of the ὑπόστασις σύνθετος[405] enables him to see that the Logos, enhypostasizes a human nature by assuming it into His personal mode of existence so that the Hypostasis of the Son becomes the source and mode of the human existence of Jesus. It is the Son who innovates this individual human nature by transposing it into His filial mode so that the mode of the Economy in the flesh is the hypostatic mode of the eternal Logos. The individual traits of this human nature express the hypostatic uniqueness of the Logos:

> By the things through which He is distinguished from the extremes (natures) He showed the identity of the parts in the Hypostasis. Therefore Christ had the common and the proper of the parts of both of which He was composed. The common by reason of the identity of nature between the extremes and His parts, an identity according to which He keeps and saves the difference of the parts among themselves, after the union. The proper by reason of the hypostatic union of the parts, in so far as He is distinct from the natures, keeping unconfusedly His distinction in their regard.[406]

As Garrigues says so aptly: 'For Maximus, the hypostatic union rests on two isomorphic but asymmetrical distinc-

tions: the individuation of the human nature in the existence of Jesus and the irreducibility of the hypostasis of the Son in the divine existence'.[407] We do not have a tertium quid in the mystery of the Hypostatic Union, but we know that it is the identical Person who makes the divinity His in the mystery of the Trinity and who makes the humanity His in the mystery of the Incarnation. It is because of this that He manifests the Father and leads men reconciled in the Spirit to the Father. It is the philanthropic κένωσις which enables us to penetrate to the eternal Counsel of the Trinity. Because Christ, One of the Three, has become the 'Angel of the great Counsel' we can surmise why Incarnation has to be rooted in the mystery of the Trinity. The created reality of Jesus of Nazareth, because it subsists in the eternal Logos, expresses the eternal Counsel of the Trinity in man's regard. 'As the Father has loved me, so have I loved you';[408] 'having loved his own who were in the world, He loved them to the limit'.[409] The fact of Jesus is a revelation of the divine philanthropy:

> For the Word remained in possession of his Intelligence and of his Life and was comprehended by no one at all in substance except by the Father alone and the Spirit and effected the hypostatic union with the flesh because of His philanthropy.[410]

Just as each of the Persons in the Trinity possesses the nature, substance, power and energy of God in a distinctive way,[411] so each of the Persons possesses the divine will and βουλή in regard to man in a characteristic manner. In the same way the Three Persons

were involved in the mystery of the Incarnation according to their hypostatic identities; referring to the Father and the Spirit, Maximus says: 'for the former delighted in and the latter co-operated with the Son, who Himself effected the Incarnation ( αὐτουργοῦντι)'.[412] While the Son alone assumes flesh, the Father and the Spirit do not renounce their eternal properties in their relationships with the Son; where He is They are; where He acts They act. The Son in the flesh can embody the eternal Counsel of God the Father because the eternal Son makes his own entirely what He receives from His Father: His nature, His energy, His will, His counsel:

> 'The great Counsel of God the Father is the secret and unknown mystery of the divine Economy. By accomplishing it through the Incarnation, the Only-begotten Son has revealed it and has become the Angel of the eternal Counsel of God the Father'.[413]

Maximus does not merely include his trinitarian meditations here to satisfy a need for formal completeness, to present a comprehensive picture of Christian doctrine. The very fact of the κένωσις would be unintelligible, as he knows, without the mystery of the irreducibility of the Persons to the Nature in God. In the Pater Noster he insists that in the dominical prayer the Lord 'initiates them into the mode of existence of the creative Cause of beings',[414] that is into the mystery of that irreducibility, which He goes on to account for in terms of relationship: 'For relationship possesses the power of simultaneously demonstrating the terms of which it is and is said to be a relation,

without allowing them to be thought of as one subsequent to the other'.[415] Because theology has to rely on human language a human logical category has to be invoked to try to account for what transcends the order of nature, even in God. The co-subsistence and the co-inherence of the divine Persons can be intimated, if not explained, by insisting that the one nature is identical with Three Persons whose distinctness cannot be abstracted from their relationship to one another and whose character of being Persons cannot be deduced from nor reduced to the mystery of the unique divine substance:

> The knowledge which man has of the movement according to which the Monad is a Triad is incapable of grasping the simultaneous manifestation in God of His principle of being and of the mode of His hypostatic existence.[416]

The incomprehensibility of the trinitarian mystery is partly bound up with the inability of man to conceive of threeness without opposition of individuals in nature and to conceive a unity that does not remove distinctness. In God, 'the absolute irreducibility of three persons among themselves is not in conflict with the absolute uniqueness of the divine nature'.[417] Maximus uses the language of the Cappadocians to account for this transcendence of the mystery and its supreme "apophasy" (ἀπόφασις)

> God is Monad and Triad, comprising, without confusion, the unconfused union and the undivided and division-less distinction: Monad according to the principle of essence, that is to say of being, and not by synthesis, assembly or any confusion whatever; Triad according to the hypostatic mode of existence and not by division, by diversity or any kind of partition. For the unity is not divided by the persons nor is it in them or contemplated in them by relationship; nor do the persons come together in unity by composition nor fill it by contraction but it

> itself is in itself the same thing, but in different ways. For the Holy Trinity of the hypostases is unconfused Monad ἐν essence according to its simple λόγος and the Holy Monad is Trinity ἐν the hypostases and their mode (τρόπος) of existence.[418]

It is this mystery of the contrast between the λόγος and τρόπος in God which allows us to grasp in faith why One of the Three can assume human nature and also to have some idea of why the ἀγάπη that is manifested in the redemptive Incarnation is an expression of the mysterious possession of one nature by three persons and how they communicate to each other the fullness of divinity in perfect freedom. As Maximus says God is 'more than good',[419] which is glossed by Garrigues as meaning that the life of the Holy Trinity transposes hypostatically the properties of the divine Essence and enables God to come in Person as philanthropist and messenger of the eternal βουλή of the Trinity.[420] In this way, because of the hypostatic emphasis in interpretation, Maximus can find the Trinitarian Economy through the κένωσις, without that dread of implying subordinationism which overshadowed theological reflection since the Arian controversy. He can hold in creative tension the complementary doctrines of the consubstantiality of the Three Persons and, like the anti Nicene-Fathers, the 'condescension' of the Three in their Economy centred on the κένωσις of the eternal Logos.[421] Christology and anthropology are seen to have their ultimate source in the life of the Holy Trinity and the Mystery of God's plan to draw men into union with Himself in θέωσις to be accomplished

in the κένωσις of the Logos:

> The voluntary κένωσις of God gave rise to the Mystery through goodness towards men. But His voluntary condescension ( συγκατάβασις) through the flesh was not a falling away from divinity. For being immutable, He remained what He was and He became what He was not. He preserved what He had become, while remaining what He was in the beginning for He is a Lover of men.[422]

(ii) Equality of honour with the angels

Part I,3.[423]

In this section, we find Maximus making use of another tradition and seeking to understand salvation as the establishment of some kind of parity between man and the angels. At the same time he integrates the insights of Dionysius the Areopagite to give us a vision of human destiny as a vocation to cosmic liturgy. Again it is the Incarnate Logos who achieves this by having made peace through the blood of His Cross between those in heaven and those on earth, by having undone the evil spirits, denizens of some vague world between heaven and earth, by having formed into one a heavenly choir of men and angels and by Ascension having entered definitively into the angelic world and thus made way for the entry of those He saved in the integrity of their human being, body and soul. The use of λόγος , to make this aspect of the Economy intelligible, is to the fore here and Maximus employs it with considerable subtlety, binding together both Origenian and Dionysian ideas, as Dalmais says wittily, in 'a union without confusion'.[424] The notion θέλημα occurs here too. It could be argued that it does not enter into Maximus' articulation

of his understanding of this petition of the 'Our Father' and that the term is restricted to its application to the Will of the Father. But in the light of his teaching as a whole it is reasonable to understand him to refer as well to the θέλημα of men and angels and above all of the saving Christ. We have explicit references to the distinction between θέλημα φυσικόν and θέλημα γνωμικόν in his later works and he acknowledges that he got it from 'a venerable monk', who may have been the redoubtable Sophronius, who was alerted to the dangers of the new thinking as early as 633, and we know that Maximus was exercised about these problems from the start and so more or less contemporaneously with his writing of the Pater Noster. His concern with γνώμη later in the work as pertinent to man's integration, the link between γνώμη and ἀρετή and the function of ἀρετή in this section shows his concern with will, even granting the nuance of personal modification implicit in γνώμη . In Part III,3 we find too that the language of Maximus can be interpreted to give the sense suggested here to θέλημα , without doing violence to grammar or syntax. The least that can be said for this suggestion is that it squares with the developed thought of Maximus on will. The probability is that he was aware of this implication of θέλημα in this context of the Pater Noster and it is as such it is put forward here.

The overriding concern here is that of unity and the principle of that unity is said to be θέλημα and λόγος . Again the Logos is credited with having

achieved this unity in himself and of communicating it to man. We note too that the mysteries of the Incarnate Logos are brought to the fore so that there is no question of a merely philosophical principle as the ground of this unity nor can we predict an a priori unity in his treatment of this petition but rather it is based on the data of revelation and is moulded by them. Already in I,1, we have had reference to His σάρκωσις and to kenotic incarnation in I,2; here we are reminded of His having perfected the Economy by fulfilling His human existence by the paschal mystery; the Cross is mentioned, the Resurrection is implied and the Ascension is affirmed explicitly so that we are being confronted with the historical Christ. It is He who made men of equal dignity with the angels: He showed that the multitude of earthly and heavenly powers are one and that He united heaven and earth, intelligibles and sensibles.

The implication is that it is first of all in the Logos incarnate that human nature celebrates with the angels the glory of God. The possibility of that concelebration relies on the unity obtaining between the powers of the heavenly and, earthly orders, evidence for which is here adduced as κατά τό ἕν καί τό αὐτό θέλημα .[425] The 'thy will be done' of the 'Our Father' is realised in this way. The θέλημα of God finds a response in the created θέλημα of men and angels. Maximus distinguishes θέλημα φυσικόν and θέλημα γνωμικόν [426] and we might think of him as emphasising the former here because of his reference to ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις . Christ does not have γνώμη

in the developed theology of Maximus,[427] but even here he finds a common term to cover Christ, the angels and men. The emphasis is on φύσις and λόγος and θέλημα is undoubtedly capable of bearing this connotation, as we have just noted, so that the whole section can be thought of as basically concerned with unity because of the unity of φύσις and what is proper to the λόγος of φύσις rather than to θέλημα γνωμικόν with its ancillary ideas of γνώμη and προαίρεσις [428] as if Maximus were assuring us that if φύσις through λόγος is realized through θέλημα proper to it, then the unity that is proper to φύσις will be preserved in the order of θέλημα . In the concrete we cannot divorce θέλημα from the personal qualification which it receives in the concrete decisions of the λογικοί , but to use θέλημα in conjunction with φύσις is a way of stressing the possibility of the realization of φύσις in its voluntary dimension, consistent with the basic integrity of φύσις and its λόγος . Since the θέλημα of God is operative here, we may well wonder if Maximus wishes us to return to the οὐσία of God which we have seen to be ground of the unity of Blessed Trinity and if he is not suggesting that, by the observance of the unity of nature, man realises in his own order a dimension of being that has its exemplar in the transcendent being of God. We know that for Maximus the οὐσία of God is shrouded in absolute mystery, but we know too that there is only one θέλημα in God proper to his nature, the evidence of the one being as the source of activity so

that he is putting this before men here as demanding a unity of θέλημα among men to thus share with the angels the unity that is presumed to be operative among them. This aligns θέλημα with φύσις and the unity of φύσις but does not exclude the personal imprint that willing gets from its hypostatic appropriation by 'the multitude of earthly and heavenly powers'.[429] Nor does it encourage us to pry into the mystery of the personal determination of the exercise of will implied in εὐδοκῶν, συνεργοῦν and ἀντουργῶν .[430] But the affinity of οὐσία and φύσις and their structural relationship in this passage entitle us to draw attention to the possibility of an emphasis on a principle of unity analogous to that hidden in the splendour of the godhead; a triadological anthropology cannot neglect the question of unity.[431] Just as in the language of the Trinity we find proof of Maximus' holding that, while περιχώρησις was hypostatic, unity is grounded in one οὐσία , so here he would seem to be suggesting the one θέλημα willed by God for men will demand a principle of unity in created φύσις, φύσις κτιστή . The subsequent union of the personal προαιρέσεις will accept this physical basis for volitional unity brought about by the infusion of charity in the case of men.[432]

The Incarnate Word is also said to have united heaven and earth, the sensibles and intelligibles. These are two of the five great unifications attributed to the incarnate Logos by Maximus.[433] He is said explicitly to have united heaven and earth δι'ἑαυτόν [434]

having ascended with an assumed body; the reference to the 'body' is calculated here as this dimension of created being is stressed in the third mediation while the soul and its activities, here virtue and knowledge, are given emphasis in the fourth mediation. The fact that human nature re-echoes the glory of God with the powers on high in one and the same will demonstrates that angels and men are one 'with regard to the distribution of divine gifts'.[435] This participation in a divine liturgy presumes being, and well-being, νοῦς and θέλημα , nature and personal existence. But Maximus is here emphasising unity, as we have seen, and he develops this in his treatment of the way in which the Logos incarnate united the separate heaven and earth, intelligibles and sensibles, a process that converges on the idea of λόγος . The mention of the First Cause in this doxological context is an indication that what both the sensibles and intelligibles have in common is their createdness and it is the λόγος of this that they discern as binding them in common to the creative love of God in his Logos. 'The divine principle which holds the entire creation together is that it would have non-being as the ground of its being'.[436] This is a principle of unity since it is a participation in being through creaturehood, common to men and angels and opens up the gratuitousness of their existence, offsetting heterodox opinions of a pantheistic or emanationist stamp and revelling in the gift of dependent being, rooted as it is in a common Logos and stable with the absolute character of the First Cause.

If we work backwards we may get some insight into what Maximus is driving at here. He exhorts us to acquire λόγος by practice in order to be united not only to the angels in virtue, but to God in γνῶσις, by withdrawal from things. It is to this parenetic conclusion that this whole section moves, so that λόγος emerges as the basic principle of understanding the whole passage since it is central to Maximus' thought here and thus adds a new dimension to the synthetic use of λόγος which governs the whole of Part I, elaborating its unifying function in a clearly defined instance. The exhortation follows the affirmation that the Logos shows, by the things he did mystically, how λόγος is the union of things separated and how its contrary ἀλογία is the source of division for things united. 'Mystically'[437] is used to remind us of the hidden character of all the mysterious events of Christ's life and work because of his unique being: God and man united hypostatically. The previous references to the Cross, the Resurrection by implication and to the Ascension point to his referring to them in particular here; these particular manifestations of the mysteries of His hypostatic union and salvific history. This to Maximus demonstrates the power of the λόγος to unite, since it is seen so evidently to do so in its eponymous Source. Although we are not told openly how He did it here, the reference to δι' ἑαυτόν[438] points to the hypostatic union as having made possible the entering of heaven by 'body', a natural denizen of earth and that ἀρετή and ἐπίγνωσις articulate the way in which 'soul' contrives to unite intelligibles and

sensibles. It is by λόγος that the Incarnate Logos effects these unifications, so that our acquisition of λόγος is a becoming like Him by participation: hypostatically and naturally, our becoming persons in the act of appropriating the φύσις which, as created, we hold in common with the angels, an appropriation that presumes ἀρετή and matures into knowledge of the First Cause.

'Αλογία is presumed to be holding sway as the source of division: it is an absence of λόγος and man is exhorted to acquire λόγος by πρᾶξις. Πρᾶξις is a technical term in Maximus for the active effort to acquire moral virtue and to live by it, by which ἐπιθυμία and θυμός, as inordinate passions, are eliminated, the powers of the sensible soul are reduced to order and their energies assumed into the higher order of λόγος. The realization of the first two mediations, that between male and female, between the inhabited and paradise is brought about by πρᾶξις; here λόγος is given a higher task, that of uniting heaven and earth, sensibles and intelligibles, so that πρᾶξις is given a more extensive role that has to do with uniting men with angels in virtue. Πρᾶξις can therefore be described as the affirmation of λόγος, the application of λόγος to man's activity, the process of the realization of the order of λόγος in the whole being of man. Λόγος which is realized perfectly in the Second Person and communicated flawlessly to his humanity must be introduced into every dimension of man's existence, a task that is ascribed to πρᾶξις

We know from other schematizations of man's powers and activities that λόγος , as distinct from νοῦς has to do with the practical order,[439] that the virtues are the impress of λόγος on the active powers of man and that this is the first project assigned to the ascetic by the tradition formulated so clearly in Evagrius,[440] but modified in Maximus. The further claim here is that this unites men not merely to each other, but to the angels and that it is precisely by virtue that this is achieved. Above it was said to be brought about κατά τό ἕν καί αὐτό θέλημα so that there is obviously a link between the affirmation of λόγος through πρᾶξις and the exercise of θέλημα. Πρᾶξις and ἀρετή are by implication not merely the expression of λόγος but involve θέλημα too. We are entitled to think also that the realization of λόγος in man would ensure the presence of θέλημα which is a component of his incorruptible nature, but freed from what impedes its proper functioning. This introduces the cognate notion of λόγος φύσεως and recalls the way in which λόγος as faculty, through πρᾶξις allows the λόγος φύσεως to assert itself in man's life.[441] Maximus is very concerned with the idea of φύσις here, and, as we have seen, it is precisely as φύσις that men and angels are united by the Logos and the imprint of λόγος on the life of man. Φύσις and unity are correlatives in his system. There is no attempt to say that angelic and human nature are identical, but that they have a fundamental natural factor in common and θέλημα is probably tied up

with that in this context. Nature is the locus of the intersection of the activity of the Logos and of men; it is the objective order in which synergy takes place where the personal activity of the Logos and created persons concurs in keeping with the uncreated λόγοι , especially in this context with the λόγος shared by men and angels of spiritual endowment and of being drawn from nothing by the creative power of God. θέλημα is invited to adopt this truth as its own, to be consistent with the λόγος of nature, and to ensure its doxological expression. The created nature is one and in that sense it has one θέλημα . The Logos is related to the angels then in precisely the same way as He is related to men: a similar synergy that is free and consistent obtains between them and the Logos on an objective basis: the basis of commonness being 'the having of non-being as the ground of their being'. Here Maximus is suggesting that λόγος through πρᾶξις will enable man to appreciate this fact and so release his θέλημα for the praise of God. From another point of view it is the very condition of λόγος realized as ἀρετή that is the will of God and the fact that this is realized presumes that man's θέλημα is in concord with that of the angels and ultimately with that of God.

There is the further question of ἐπίγνωσις which is said to depend on λόγος through πρᾶξις .[442] This knowledge is a form of contemplation but falls short of θεολογία .[443] It is the apprehension of the Logos behind the common λόγος of the sensibles and intelligibles which in turn manifests the First Cause or

is identified with the First Cause. The exercise of knowledge is not strictly within the realm of πρᾶξις nor is it designated as ἀρετή . Therefore we must conclude that our union with God γνωστικῶς by withdrawal from things is not effected directly by πρᾶξις nor by λόγος exerting itself as πρᾶξις , but that πρᾶξις precedes this knowledge and accompanies it in the sense that the elevated knowledge in question would be impossible without the detachment from passionate involvement and carnal modes of apprehension which are its necessary preliminary. We know that in another context λόγος mediates between αἴσθησις and νοῦς and this can be said to be operative here.[444] Since Maximus does not introduce the notion of νοῦς here we can take it for granted that λόγος usurps its function in this context and is a way of describing man's capacity for insight into the ultimate intelligibility of the whole cosmos by grasping its foundation in the Logos. If man appropriates λόγος in the wider sense than that of meaning the faculty that impresses order and humanity on man's activity, as the full realization of humanity, then we can take it for granted that it includes ἐπίγνωσις , something in keeping with his λόγος φύσεως and restored to him by the Logos incarnate.

Working backwards then we find that λόγος is a principle of being, order and intelligibility with its ontological ground in the Logos and by means of which the whole created order is sustained and given coherence and order. This is actuated by the exercise of λόγος

by men, something that emerges as a participation in the Logos incarnate and with him unites men to angels in worship. The whole scale of referents resonates in this word: faculty, principle of φύσις , Logos in person and as such it points to a unity that finds its ultimate source in the οὐσία of God.

Part II(b)[445]

There seems to be little emphasis on human will in this section, if any at all. It must be there by implication. The emphasis is rather on λόγος which ensures the continuity between II(a) and II(b). This is the notion by which Maximus can extend his reflections and so we see him using λόγος as the focus of the section II(a), that around which he organizes the rest of his insights. Undoubtedly πραότης and its attendant notions form a cluster of complementary ideas, but equally clearly it is λόγος rather than γνώμη , that enables him to co-ordinate his ideas on worship with theology and anthropology in II(a). It is λόγος that makes union with the angels feasible since when it is allowed its proper function it leads to Logos. Λόγος then must be the principle of worship and the principle of unity. It has not yet been defined more accurately. It implies λόγος φύσεως as is obvious from the relationship to Logos, which entails some reference to the root of man's being, the principle of his humanity and perhaps it even connotes the principle of his personality. It also means λόγος as the faculty of rationality, or the affirmation of the higher aspect of man's nature, his reason. More precisely it can denote his reason in so far as it

is extended to the ordering of the practical dimension of his life. Here, because it is used in relation to the Logos, in whom are to be found the λόγοι of creatures, its use is disemantic: referring to the higher aspect of his nature and at the same time to the faculty by which in practice his life can be related to the λόγος and so become consistent with the λόγος φύσεως . The implication of λόγος ὑπάρξεως can be thought to be secondary here, but it will come into its own later in the commentary with the introduction of γνώμη , which implies the impress of the ὑπόστασις on the act of willing.[446] The introduction of ἐπιθυμία and θυμός as the disordered passions which are symptomatic of the failure of man to become himself in ecstasy towards God, ensures that λόγος is still being thought of in an ascetical way. Λόγος must impress itself on man's passionate life if he is to worship as the angels and be properly united to them and to the Logos. Man's becoming himself implies his becoming angelic: his life is not dominated by animal passion; his proper assertion of his λόγος is itself worship; he becomes what God intends him to be, what God wills, so that the will emphasized here is the Will of God and it is His Will that man should be λογικός. that is realizing the intention of God in his regard by the harmony of his life considered immanently and transcendentally: by the inner ordering of his being and by the proper ordering of his being to that of his fellow λογικοί and the Logos. This is attained when the Logos is allowed to exercise His role in regard to the

λογικοί . The angels in heaven are already in a right relationship to the Logos; when man becomes rightly ordered to the Logos he is a fellow of the angels; he is logical.

We have seen how Maximus uses the notion of λόγος to spell out, with the Cappadocians,[447] some of the implications of the triune life in God. The ascetical use to which he puts the term to denote the process of liberating man from passionate obsession and which he identifies with the hallowing of the Name is largely derived from Evagrius.[448] In this section he refers back to that emancipation from concupiscence and aggressiveness, but now his inspiration in the use of the notion of λόγος is primarily dependent on the Alexandrian tradition, with its emphasis on the function of the angels in the divine scheme of things and man's vocation to enter into the angelic state.[449] With this he combines a vision of man as primarily a being destined for the worship of God, which puts him in line with Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite.[450] In the Mystagogia, we find an extended liturgical commentary, which assures us that there is nothing fortuitous about the cultic bias of this passage. In the system of Maximus the metaphysical transposition of Origenian mythology makes the Logos to be the origin and end of the λόγοι which proceed and return in a diastolic-systolic action that is unambiguously free from pantheistic or emanationist associations. Angels and men share the title of λογικοί , that is λόγοι which enjoy subsistence and they have a common destiny, θέωσις , and a

common responsibility, the good use of their freedom in order to achieve it.[451] While we have seen that in Part I,3, the theme of will is probably introduced in terms of human as well as angelic and divine θέλημα , human will does not appear here. It is, of course, understood, since the human being is inconceivable for Maximus without the dimension of freedom and it is what regulates the process of the evolution of εἶναι into εὖ εἶναι , of man's growth from being in the image of God to being in His likeness. The emphasis here is rather on the progressive coincidence of beings with their λόγος , the emergence of the idea into the realm of personal existence, the attainment of which must be finally grace since the idea is divine and man's entry into the state of ἀεί εἶναι must make him surpass the limits of his created nature.[452]

Since for Maximus, both angels and men are λογικοί , it is obvious that the union of angels and men is in the process of being realized when λόγος μονώτατος [453] leads men to the Logos. When we recall that for Maximus the creative λόγοι are synonymous with the divine θελήματα ,[454] and that the dominical prayer assures us that the angels are doing the will of God in heaven, then we can see why the acquisition of logical status is the fulfilling of the Will of God and the basis of the union of the λογικοί . Being logical is an existential acknowledgement of the supreme dominion of God. Not alone does asceticism ensure that man's being is simplified by singular reason and rendered consistent with his

λόγος φύσεως which anchors him to his ground in the Logos, but this spiritual activity is integral to man's liturgical tribute to the majesty of God. He 'offers mystically to God the cult of worship with a reasonable power alone';[455] 'he becomes in all things a worshipper like the angels';[456] 'nothing is offered to God in heaven apart from the rational worship, which he expects from us when He teaches us to say in our prayer: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven"'.[457] Maximus has blended the angelology of Origen and the liturgy of Dionysius through his deft use of λόγος .

In his elaboration of the theme of 'reason in its singularity' naturally leading reasonable beings to the first Logos, we find Maximus making an interesting distinction:

> Let our reason, therefore, be moved to search for God and let the concupiscible power strive to desire Him and the irascible power to hold on to Him. Rather, to speak more properly, let the whole intellect strain towards God, as if it were stretched through a forceful exertion by way of the irascible power and on fire with longing through the supreme yearning of the concupiscible power.[458]

We shall return to the development with regard to ἐπιθυμία and θυμός . Firstly, we shall examine the function of different models in this statement of Maximus. Maximus amplifies his exhortation to let λόγος be moved to search for God by saying: 'Rather, to speak more properly, let the whole nous strain towards God'.[459] The choice of λόγος in this context is dictated by the whole concept of the Pater Noster, which is bound together from the point of view of conceptual articulation by this idea. We have

already noted that it can be referred to Cappadocian, Evagrian and Alexandrian usage. Basically it forms part of a platonic triad, but it has undergone a transformation in its use by the Fathers, primarily because of its Johannine associations and the osmosis of scriptural and philosophic ideas in patristic theology. As part of the original platonic triad it was associated with ἐπιθυμία and θυμός and it represented the higher or spiritual part of man, τό λογιστικόν .[460] We have already found Maximus using it in this way, not least in its role of mastering the irregular movements of the lower appetitive powers. But in that kind of context it can too assume the role of contemplation and extend its activity from πρᾶξις to θεωρία . In fact, used thus it is synonymous with νοῦς in the usage of Maximus.[461] It can be the power by which man searches for God and relates to Him noetically. Used in opposition to ἐπιθυμία and θυμός it denotes spiritual activity in so far as it reflects directly the divine Logos. Dalmais has pointed out that it can be used thus in preference to νοῦς because it comprises a reference that transcends every particular determination.[462] It has a scale of meanings ranging from the humble exercise of human reason to the person of the Son in the mystery of the Holy Trinity. In the Pater Noster as a whole, and not least in this section, we can see this observation verified, because it is λόγος that provides the intellectual bond between the different orders of reality considered by Maximus and in terms of which he undertakes to account for the unity of angels

and men. It is λόγος that is used to bind man to the λογικοί and to the Logos.

Νοῦς [463] descended from the Aristotelian triad of αἴσθησις, λόγος and νοῦς,[414] where the emphasis is on man's powers to know with αἴσθησις having for its object the sensible realm, while λόγος and νοῦς pointed to a distinction in man's intellectual equipment between his practical and speculative abilities. ἐπιθυμία and θυμός are the appetitive counterpart of αἴσθησις and when Maximus uses λόγος and νοῦς in the same context we find him inclined to relate λόγος to the more practical of man's concerns, to his concern with the acquisition and practice of virtue, while νοῦς is given a more contemplative function,[465] but as we have seen already, this should not be restricted to the merely natural identification of man with the objects of his intellectual knowing. It has acquired mystical and personal associations as a way of knowing in patristic usage. It is never an ambiguous term but in contrast to ψυχή, a way of referring to ἐπιθυμία and θυμός,[466] it is always thought of as a divine power in which man participates. Frequently it is qualified as πνευματικός,[467] to indicate that it is 'where' man is open to God and the inflow of His Spirit. While πρᾶξις,[468] as the exercise of λόγος, is concerned with the making logical of man's παθητικαί δυνάμεις, τό παθητικόν μέρος, ἐπιθυμία and θυμός, his ψυχή in the restricted sense,[469] γνῶσις is thought to be the proper occupation of his νοῦς,[470] or more correctly, of man in his capacity as

νοῦς . While λόγος then is concerned with the establishment of ἀπάθεια in man's lower powers, νοῦς will 'strain towards God'[471] by γνῶσις or θεωρία πνευματική or θεωρία γνωστική .[472] It is primarily in this way that Maximus understands man to be like the angels and to exercise a liturgical function. Since νοῦς is the place of the divine illumination, the γνῶσις in its higher forms will become the θεολογία of another triad: πρᾶξις, θεωρία, θεολογία .[473] Maximus obviously has the twofold division of ψυχή - νοῦς in mind here since he describes the embodiment of the Logos in the λογικοί as a nourishment by virtue, the fruit of πρᾶξις corresponding to the rendering of ψυχή logical, and wisdom[474] which in the Mystagogia is the power at the basis of γνῶσις and is seated in νοῦς .

We can say then that when the Platonic triad is being used, λόγος stands for the whole intellectual spiritual dimension of man with the advantage of implying the relationship of λόγος φύσεως , and λόγος the faculty, to the eternal Logos. When the Aristotelian triad is employed then λόγος tends to become discursive and prudential, while νοῦς is entrusted with the more contemplative aspects of man's life and experience. Because of the Platonic usage λόγος and νοῦς can be employed interchangeably; when they are used in conjunction with each other, λόγος becomes the organ of ἀρετή and ἀπάθεια , while retaining its transcendental associations, and νοῦς is then available for describing man's more immediate openness to God. This

accounts for μᾶλλον in 896C. We can sum up by saying that λόγος is used here to underline the unity of the realm of the λογικοί , which is accomplished in their common doing of the Will of God, which is the worship which is His due. Since the λογικοί are derived from the λόγος and ordered to the Logos, the choice of λόγος is meant to throw into relief the principle of their unity, because of the common source and end of their being and the common inner principle of their structure and movement. When this has been established, Maximus can use νοῦς , with its connotation of γνῶσις , to bring out the concrete way in which he visualizes the union to take place. Angels and men are united by the virtue that λόγος establishes and even more radically because of their union with God through γνῶσις . This ties in with what Maximus has already said in Part I,3:

> Let us learn then to strive for the Logos through virtuous activity in order to be united not only to the angels in virtue, but to God in gnosis by detachment from things.[475]

In this section there is little or no concern with the first two mediations performed by Christ and to be appropriated by man, that of male and female, inhabited earth and paradise, but considerable attention is given to the union of earth and heaven, and the union of the sensibles and the intelligibles, between men and angels. We recall that these mediations were associated by Maximus with the Ascension of Christ[476] and that accounts for his concern here with the integration of the energy of ἐπιθυμία and θυμός into the Godward thrust of

man's λόγος and the exercise of his νοῦς . Since the passions have a psycho-somatic character, to underline their vital potential in the search for and union with God is to set a seal on the abiding validity of man's somatic dimension and to extend to all men the possibility of that final ascent to God with Christ in body and soul. It is also a maximian gloss on the evangelical: 'Seek the kingdom of God and these things will be added to you'.[477] There can be no question of the unification of man with the angels and with the Logos until he has been simplified in himself. Rather we might say that simplification is the reverse of the desired unification. Λόγος has reduced the impulses of the passions to order; ἀπάθεια reigns in his passable powers. But now their potential is redirected and they become sources of energy for λόγος in its search for God by intensifying its drive towards Him and enhancing the tenacity of λόγος in its hold on Him. The integration of ἐπιθυμία and θυμός is then made more specific and the former is compared to fire lending ardour to νοῦς in its yearning for God while the latter is likened to a bowstring, the tension of which facilitates the flight of νοῦς to God.[478] Maximus is advocating not merely longing for and loving adherence to God, but passionate longing and love.

In fact, love is not mentioned in this section of the Pater Noster, but we can assume that the inclusive ἀγάπη , which we have seen in the Prologue, is here too 'the inner law of love ( στοργῆς ) and appropriates everything related to it by nature'.[479] It can be said

then that ἀπάθεια does not imply the destruction of the sensible order; it does require a θεωρία φυσική that enables man to overcome his tendency to be captivated by material things because thus he can take hold of the ψιλά νοήματα of things and eliminate distorting passion;[480] he must discover the world for what it really is by reaching its λόγοι and then passion is not alone a hindrance to his self-realization but becomes in the words of Von Balthasar 'a salutary and necessary weight of terrestrial existence'.[481] To approach God without passion is to linger in an area of ambiguity:

> To have cut back one's passions and simplified one's thoughts is not, for all that, to have turned them entirely towards the divine. One is no longer attached to the human, but neither is he to the divine. This happens in the case of men in the active life, who have not yet merited knowledge; they put off the passions either by fear of punishment or hope of the kingdom.[482]

Elsewhere he points to the porcine condition of those whose knowledge does not free them from immersion in materialism:

> The knowledge of divine things without passion does not lead the spirit to a complete scorn of the earthly. Its action resembles the simple representation of a sensible object. So, many men can be found who wallow all the same in bodily passions like pigs in the mud.[483]

In the Capitum de Caritate Quattuor Centuriae we find complementary teaching to that of the Pater Noster, but the function of ἀγάπη is made explicit:

> For him whose mind (νοῦς) is continually with God, even his concupiscence is increased above measure into a divinely burning love (ἔρωτα) and the entire irascible element is changed into divine charity (ἀγάπην) .[484]

In this perspective man's evaluation of creaturely

being undergoes a remarkable adjustment:

> Knowledge is good in itself, health is the same.
> But for many their opposite is more useful.[485]

In the Ambigua we find a synthesis of the virtues that squares with more than one statement of the Pater Noster. In the latter we find that 'the great Elijah

> advanced towards God, absolutely untrammelled in any way in his relations to things, simple in desire and uncomplicated in free-will, he made for his dwelling with Him, who is simple by nature, by means of interconnected cardinal virtues, yoked together in gnosis like fiery horses.[486]

In the Ambigua we find the cardinal virtues further generalized as wisdom and meekness and that the virtuous man ultimately brings all his good qualities together in ἀγάπη :

> Again from the general virtues he learns to make two more general still by composition, I mean wisdom and meekness. Wisdom, indeed, is the end of things perceptible and meekness is the end of things practical, for from prudence and justice he makes wisdom, as being the conserving cause of gnosis in keeping with prudence and of exact knowledge in keeping with justice and because of this, it is, as I said, the end of things perceptible; from courage and temperance he makes meekness, which is nothing else than the perfect immobility of aggressiveness and concupiscence with regard to what is contrary to nature, which some people call apatheia and so it is the end of things practical. These again he unites in the most general of all the virtues, I mean in charity. This removes what is apart from it; it collects what pertains to it; it unifies what takes its rise in, moves in and ends up in itself and which is especially the cause of divinisation in every way.[487]

Finally Maximus sees the activity of λόγος and νοῦς as ensuring that the Logos will be embodied in us,[488] thus summing up this petition 'Thy will be done' and at the same time introducing the following petition: 'Give us this day our daily bread'. In the embodiment of the Logos in virtuous men he sees the logical conse-

quence of Christ's claim that 'I am the bread which has come down from heaven and gives life to the world'.[489] 'Living thus we shall receive the Word as daily bread'.[490] Οὕτω refers to the function of λόγος in affirming its detachment from concupiscence and aggressiveness and then in ensuring that the passions are integrated into the life of man in his search for and union with God and more specifically in his contemplation through νοῦς . In this passage we have a striking convergence of the christological and anthropological themes of the thought of Maximus. It is Christ's embodiment in man that ensures that man will become his true self as God intends. We shall receive him 'as our substantial and living bread for the nourishment of our souls and the preservation of the good condition of the benefits bestowed on us'.[491]

The presence of the Logos ensures the preservation of the good condition (εὐεξία) of the goods (τῶν ἀγαθῶν) bestowed on us. Τά ἀγαθά in the language of Maximus comprise the sum total of what God has bestowed on man in creation-salvation and culminate in His self-gift, which here is renewed and confirmed by the Bread which is Himself as the Word. The possibility of the deterioration of the good condition of the goods indicates that man is still <u>in via</u>, that εὖ εἶναι has not yet given way to ἀεί εἶναι , so that man needs some kind of principle of stability on his pilgrimage through life and Maximus does not find that within man, but rather in the Logos, who is ontologically his source and who offers Himself in free-gift to

him as his Bread and indefectible life-principle:

> He becomes everything to us in proportion to how we are nourished by virtue and wisdom and He is embodied in a variety of ways, as He himself knows, in each of the saved while they are still in this age.

The indwelling of Christ in the virtuous and wise in proportion (ἀναλόγως) to the strength of these qualities gives this idea a new synthetic power: virtue and wisdom are no longer merely human qualities, but ways of the embodiment of the Logos.[491]

The Word becomes everything (πάντα) to us; he is the meaning of our existence, the centre and circumference of our universe. He is the risen Lord, who fills all things and accounts for all things.[492] Virtue is what effects in man the irreplaceable function of the Word. This is complemented by wisdom so that here Maximus is again concerned with the contemplative and practical activities of man and finds in them, thus marked by λόγος and releasing νοῦς to its proper activity, evidence of the embodiment of the Logos. In Scripture He is the one bread that makes the one body; that is to the forefront of the thought of Maximus here, even though the interpretative terminology may seem to be more akin to Stoic philosophical language. The bread, suggested by the words of the 'Our Father', draws our attention to a concrete presence of the Logos who is said to be embodied ( σωματούμενον ) in man.[493] This goes beyond anything that the Stoics might claim for their λόγος , which remains a principle of order and intelligibility. Here we see Maximus trying to transcend the limitations of philosophical models and to

communicate, with the help of a more concrete and semitic language, the indefinable dimensions of a religious and Christian understanding of the universe and its ultimate structure: the varied expression of the λόγος in nature, law and Incarnation is being extended in those who freely become virtuous and wise and above all possess ἀγάπη so that they can say: 'I live, now not I, it is Christ who lives in me'.[494] The way for the following exegesis is opened up by reference to Logos as 'daily bread', so that λόγος is explicitly used as the link term between II(b) and II(c). If man does the Will of God, then he receives the Logos in a more intimate way. The hypothetical character of this reception is not merely a question of contraries, but of proportion. Man may receive the Logos, but it will be in proportion to ἀρετή and σοφία. The capacity of man for God, his νοῦς, is modified directly by σοφία and indirectly by ἀρετή. 'Capacity' has then a voluntary aspect as well as a practical side. It is realized finally through ἀγάπη. It is 'by living thus'[495] that man is disposed to receive the Logos. Here it is virtue and wisdom that open man to welcome the Logos. They are in this context to be associated with λόγος and νοῦς respectively. In II(a) we found ἀρετή associated with γνώμη and γνῶσις was associated with λόγος. This does not surprise us as we have seen something of how Maximus articulates λόγος and νοῦς, but it does assure us that γνώμη is never far from his meditations on anthropology which gives some support to the interpretation of θέλημα

in I,3 above, as referring not merely to the unique Will of God, but to man's will as well.

Part III, 3.

> He constitutes us co-worshippers with the angels in fulfilment of the Father's will, manifesting in a well imitated way, by the conduct of our lives, celestial satisfaction.[496]

This obviously understands the Father's will to be the union of men with angels in common worship. The Logos has achieved this. Πληρώσει might equally be translated as 'by the fulfilment of the Father's will' which would imply that it was the way in which Christ met His Father's will by his obedience and love, in other words by the way in which He exercised His own will, that He made us co-worshippers. That would leave the way open to interpreting the 'one will' of I,3 as covering the will of man as well as the Will of God. This would be enhanced by understanding the will of Christ to embrace His human will as well as His divine Will. Maximus had not necessarily made that distinction as clearly as he would under the pressure of the Monothelite debate,[497] but we cannot exclude its presence here in a less well defined way. Christ is presented here as the cause of our being made one with the angels in worship. It is Christ who achieves this union in His own person by the Hypostatic Union and by His willing Ascension. Our doing the Will of the Father is the way in which we appropriate what Christ has accomplished and this constitutes us as co-worshippers with the angels. Εὐαρέστησις can

mean the state of being satisfied or that of satisfying. Either would fit the context. If we opt for 'being satisfied' then doing the Will of the Father is the source of man's happiness, in imitation of the happiness that characterizes the angels in heaven. The adverb εὐμιμήτως may well tilt the balance in favour of rendering εὐαρέστησις as 'a state of being well-pleasing' to God. This would give our earthly existence an angelic character and heaven would have broken into this world.

All this conspires to show the sacredness of human life, as Maximus understands it, when it is lived as God wills. The seemingly pedestrian fulfilment of one's duties becomes in itself a celestial liturgy and a humdrum existence takes on the splendour of angelic homage, provided that λόγος and νοῦς have enabled man to integrate the totality of his powers and activities into the godward orientation willed by the Father, which is imprinted in his λόγος φύσεως and which must be transformed into personal being by the exercise of human freedom.

(iii) Participation in divine life
Part I,4[498]

Again the obvious concept in this section is that of λόγος which is the subject of the sentence and is the basic idea running through every consideration as well as linking this statement with the other six 'mysteries'. The Logos is here identified with the bread of the petition and the language of the prayer is interpreted as another facet of the communication of the

innumerable divine mysteries, recapitulated in seven, discerned by Maximus in the Pater Noster. In giving us his Logos, God has given us everything and whatever the commentator has to say is bound to be another aspect of that basic endowment, throwing into relief, from another point of view, the immeasurable love God has shown us in Christ. The idea of participation is brought out in ποιεῖται μετάδοσιν [499] and μεταχιρνῶν [500]: the Logos described as 'bread' imparts divine life and imbues those who eat Him with a divine quality. This terminology is deliberately calculated to bring home, in the strongest possible terms, the presence of the Logos in those to whom He communicates Himself and who participate in Him so that the relationship of men to the Logos is not merely an extrinsic dependence but an immanent realization. The indwelling of the Logos in men in some way constitutes them as men, by imparting to them divine life because of the divine quality in which they participate by eating of this Logical bread. The participation through eating ensures that the Logos is within, communicating λόγος as the foundation of divine life shared. We remember that it is the Logos incarnate who is the subject of this sentence together with the rest of the statements of this section. It is the Incarnation that ensures that the Logos is within the created realm, in a new way identified hypostatically with human nature, so that any Neoplatonic associations that the term λόγος carries with it in this context and which help to elucidate the Christian mystery in terms of participation, must be counterbalanced by the fact of the Incarnation and

its wholly unforeseen character as a mode of presence in and to man from a philosophical point of view. The ontology here is the ontology of the Mystery of 'Christ in you the hope of glory', where ontology, as Riou reminds us, is not metaphysics so much as a synonym for the mystery itself.[501] We are dealing with a mode of presence that eludes philosophical categories by which the Logos incarnate can be so intimately present to man as to be the life of his life, the ground of his Christian being, something conveyed by images of vine and branches, head and members of a body, ultimately due to a hypostatic relationship with its associations of synergy, enhypostasisation. If Logos is embodied in man, then man too becomes ζῶν .[502]

It is divine life that the incarnate Logos imparts to man and we have noted already the reference to the fact that the Logos is alive with the personal perichoretic presence of the Holy Spirit, even in his Incarnation, so that in communicating life to us He is bound to do so by a communication to us of 'Life' in the Trinity itself, that our life in dependence on His immanence within us as bread-Logos implies the presence of the Personal source of Life in the Trinity with Whom we co-operate synergetically in a loving περιχώρησις , which ensures that we are imbued with a divine quality that is a participation in the Logos and is activated in knowledge and love, thus finding ourselves caught into the divine interplay of the Persons of the Trinity as well as participating in divine nature. The divine quality is said to have been given πρός θέωσιν ,[503] an expression to

connote the perfect actuation of the divine life in man because of his being caught into the life of the Blessed Trinity, having fellowship with the Father and the Son and the Spirit, something communicated to him from the Father, through the Son in the Spirit, constituting him son of the Father, in the Son, by the action of the Spirit, and connoting the full flowering of his power to know and love within the perichoretic movement of the divine Persons. In this life, this is primarily the exercise of ἀγάπη , the dominant factor in Maximian anthropology so that ζωή and ἀγάπη will be almost synonymous, perhaps ζωή connoting the active exercise of ἀγάπη by which the θέωσις , with a view to which the divine quality is bestowed, is realized. This understanding of ἀγάπη - ζωή will facilitate the link with the ζῶν of I,1, which is proper to Logos and the reference to the life that is presented anthitetically to death in Part I,5[504] and 7[505] below.

The notion of ποιότης would seem at first sight to evoke essential, natural associations as if the entity communicated had in some way a role in relation to φύσις or οὐσία as it would in an Aristotelian schema, so that the Logos would then be credited with imparting to man an entitative habit by which his basic nature would be modified in such a way as to become the principle of activity, not merely proper to man, but proper to God: it would be a divine quality, given for θέωσις , a term that connotes energy not merely a static predisposition, but rather the expression of

nature in living activity. But it is doubtful if this two-tier notion of regenerated man is dominating, if at all relevant, to this way of thinking. It presumes that man has some perfection as man in the intention of God which is not necessarily bound up with his relationship to God in a living interchange, as if God had one plan for him at the created level and another at the supernatural level, so that he would need to be re-created in the sense of being entitatively enhanced in order to become capable of participated divine life, a notion of habitual grace common to the scholastics and generally held by western theologians since.[507] This may be, in some way, implied in the thought of Maximus, but it is hardly the primary way in which he thinks of divinization. The grammatical root of ποιότης would rather seem to point to πῶς and we know that this is used in a personal way by Maximus so that the θεία ποιότης would seem to designate a personal endowment rather than a natural one in this context and so be a personal category, indicating that what the Logos is doing for us, by feeding us on Himself, is giving us the possibility of becoming persons who appropriate and innovate nature in such a way that man's primordial relationship to the Logos is not merely as his partner in objective activity but in a relationship that is intersubjective and hypostatic. Φύσις itself is a term that partakes of the associations of both οὐσία and ὑπόστασις[508] and here it is obviously implied as related to θέωσις an active and dominantly hypostatic category.

On the other hand we have tended to associate the λόγος and λόγος φύσεως with the Logos and it might be well to stress that here, and to put it forward as the logical and natural foundation of life realized through synergy by the intersection of man in his personal freedom with the Holy Spirit, but on the basis of his φύσις and its · λόγος which are participations of the Logos, whom he 'eats' as bread. We could then underline the emphasis on life and the hypostatic character of ποιότης but not neglect the corresponding and complementary role of λόγος and Logos. The synergic action of the Spirit and man must be thought of as taking place between the Logos and man, something that activates that relationship rather than being isolated from the Logos, so that there would be no question of θέωσις without a personal factor in man which is activated as θέωσις . We may ask ourselves how it differs from the λόγος φύσεως . This is the basic ontological infrastructure of man, which he holds in dependence on the Logos and which refers man to Him. If something is added to man by the Logos, partaken of as bread, what can it be? Is it the restoration of λόγος φύσεως to its proper functioning, something occluded by φιλαυτία and released by ἀγάπη ? While this is true, does it still define with sufficient precision what this divine quality is or does Maximus think in this way? The λόγος φύσεως , as we know from other contexts, enters into the fullness of human being as an irreplaceable factor,[509] but is there a further development implied here? It would be quite

coherent to speak about man and his deification on the basis of the λόγος φύσεως and the τρόπος ὑπάρξεως and to confine oneself to these terms on the principle of entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem, which would imply that the 'imparting' and 'imbuing' was in fact the restoration of man to his pristine condition by the release of λόγος φύσεως to its proper functioning. This would leave the ποιότης on the logical side of the line so to speak, but guarantee the possibility of θέωσις with the proviso that man was freely engaged with the Holy Spirit in the innovation of His λόγος . This would not have to exclude the immanence of the Logos as the ground of the λόγος φύσεως nor would it render superfluous the presence of the Holy Spirit as the agent of the deification that guaranteed the bearing of λόγος ὑπάρξεως on man's evolution. We have already suggested in the commentary on Part II(a) above that this factor might be called λόγος ὑπάρξεως , connoting πῶς , while explicitly referring the ontological root of person to the Logos. This is a way of saying that the whole of man's being is dependent on and derived from the Logos both in its physical and existential or personal aspects, that it requires the agency of the Holy Spirit to activate the λόγος ὑπάρξεως and through it the λόγος φύσεως by means of a τρόπος ὑπάρξεως , which would ensure that the totality of man's being was related to the Logos, but that his actual taking possession of that being in a personal way was equally dependent on the synergy of man and the Spirit, so that while person

as well as physis is rooted in the Logos, the activation of personal existence requires the intervention of the Spirit who dynamizes created person and makes man to be ζῶν in a way that is analogous to the ζῶν proper to the Word, but on the assumption that man embodies the λόγος φύσεως and λόγος ὑπάρξεως imparted to him by the Logos. Otherwise there would be nothing to dynamize, no one to live with shared life. This leaves us with the question of whether the ποιότης is to be thought of primarily in terms of person or nature. It can be safely said that this is wrapped in some obscurity, both because of the intrinsic opacity of the problem and because we have no specific statement from Maximus on the subject. We can hazard the guess that it is in some way bound up with both aspects of human being: with its nature and its λόγος , which it either restores to its proper functioning or enhances in a new way, the former alternative being more probable in the patristic context of Maximus' system, but not excluding the personal dimension and its innovatory function, so that like φύσις itself it can be thought of as partaking of οὐσία and ὑπόστασις and so, in some way, as being expressive of them both. If θέωσις is understood to be the culmination of the process of the evolution of man under the influence of the Holy Spirit, then we can think of this quality as θέωσις in the making: it is πρός θέωσιν[510] either basically logical with a 'tropical' bias or primarily 'tropical' on a logical basis. The affinity of πῶς and ποιότης makes us incline to the latter option. In a trinitarian context we can

definitely say that enhypostasisation takes a place in relation to the Logos and that the synergy which effects this is due to the Holy Spirit and His inpouring of ἀγάπη being received by man in personal freedom. Λόγος ὑπάρξεως can be aligned with εἰκών while τρόπος ὑπάρξεως refers rather to ὁμοίωσις. This would claim that man is fully constituted as human person in relation to the Logos, but that the actuation of his personal being requires the intervention of the Spirit with its connotations of hypostatic synergy and περιχώρησις, so that the person in act is the living person, a dynamic and existential concept.

This is revealed in a scrutiny of the simple language used by the Christian man who knows that he can say: 'I am', referring to his person; 'I have', with reference to his nature and 'I do' as expressive of his living activity by which he is what he becomes and he becomes what he does. In this scheme man will be εἰκών as 'I am' and 'I have'; Ὁμοίωσις as 'I do'. The possibility of being what I do is already present in what I become. It is to that possibility that εἰκών primarily refers while ὁμοίωσις undoubtedly refers to actualisation, something indicated in our present text by θέωσις. This is an analysis of the Christian possession, in the act of Christian living, of creature-hood. An advantage of this way of thinking is that the 'I' is common to the three statements but with different connotations because of different ways of looking at the concrete man and by isolating different relationships for clarification while not suggesting that there are

fragments bound into a whole at this level. 'I am' and 'I have' refer primarily to man's relation to the Logos and his character as εἰκών ; 'I do', not discarding 'I am' and 'I have', refers above all to the relationship to the Holy Spirit who energizes man in his personal evolution. This does leave us with some obscurity with regard to the distinction between λόγος and τρόπος when used in conjunction with ὕπαρξις : it suggests that there is a 'principle of existence' and a 'mode of existence'. Heretofore we have given the τρόπος the function of being the distinctively personal factor, something not in the essential line. We cannot think of ὕπαρξις in itself as being the constitutive element in person as it is common to the whole existing man both λόγος and τρόπος, φύσις and ὑπόστασις .[511]

What is at stake here is the reality rather than the language. We have distinguished λόγος from τρόποςand aligned λόγος with φύσις and τρόπος with ὕπαρξις . This has been adequate for a description of the realities in question and it is founded on maximian usage. The question is whether in this kind of context we need a further refinement and whether the use of λόγος with ὕπαρξις is justified because it brings out a nuance, enabling us to refer the whole man, in his basic structure of nature and person, to the Logos while retaining τρόπος in this context for the personal evolution of man through energy interlocking with the intervening Spirit; this would seem to be required by the 'imparting' and 'imbuing' of the Pater text.[512] Ὑπαρξις is associated with the idea of person in both schemes .

φύσις is what men hold in common, that in which they participate, but the other terms refer to the possessors of the nature in the actuality of existence, the one pointing to the principle of that possession, the other to its existential evolution. The divine quality would then definitely seem to refer to the hypostatic aspect of man rather than his physical one, although necessarily implying it. There is not a renewal of the λόγος φύσεως or a modification of that, but rather its innovation considered in two phases: ποιότης πρός θέωσιν and θέωσις : εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις , λόγος ὕπάρξεως and τρόπος ὑπάρξεως .

The other idea in this section has to do with the knowledge ( ἐπίγνωσις )of God. The object of the knowledge is that 'the Lord is good'.[513] This in turn is the way in which those who eat know how the Logos makes himself to be 'eatable'. In a previous section we interpreted this ἐπίγνωσις as knowledge of the λόγοι and eventually the only Logos from whom and to whom the λόγοι are derived and return. Ἐπίγνωσις here seems to be of a more developed kind. It is undoubtedly a spiritual knowledge, something that involves man's νοῦς , but it partakes too of the properties of αἴσθησις . This has the immediacy of sense knowledge, its experimental character, except at this stage the knowledge has to do with the highest object of man's perception: the Lord. It is the Logos who gives this knowledge: He is the source of this intellectual perception and this is bound up with the tasting of the food which is the Logos himself the 'bread of life and

strength'. 'Taste' corroborates the notion of αἴσθησις and strengthens our impression that knowledge here is mystical in character and transcends the logical categories, whose obliqueness it forsakes for direct apprehension of the Lord.[514] Everything is ultimately derived from the Logos and here Maximus is primarily concerned with the experience so that we can take it that the fact the Logos as bread is apprehended in this way is what conveys to man in a superlative way the conviction that 'the Lord is good'. 'The Lord is good' is a scriptural phrase and so we do not have to think that the Lord is necessarily distinct from the Logos who imparts this knowledge. If the Lord refers to the Father or the Holy Trinity, then the object of the knowledge is extended in a personal way but not substantially, since to know the Logos is to know God and it is in and through the Logos that the Father and the Spirit are known. Whether the humanity assumed by the Logos is here in question as object of the knowledge is not clarified. To taste the food is to have intellectual perception that the food, which is the Logos, is good. This kind of immediacy in knowledge presumes that it is taking place with another kind of relationship than that demanded in noetic appropriation of the λόγοι and even of the Logos perceived as one. Here there is a distinctly new kind of apprehension and we know that it takes place within the relationship of ἀγάπη or synergy about which we have spoken above, that θεολογίαις the knowledge proper to θέωσις, which is the unfolding of the life made possible by that θεία ποιότης granted by the Logos to those who eat him.

We have to remember too that Maximus describes the bread as 'of life and power'. Δύναμις is a divine attribute[515] made manifest in Christ[516] and through him in the Christian life of grace,[517] the power of God expressed in his operation[518] and in this context issuing in the divine quality that makes θέωσις possible, something in which man participates because he is fed on the Bread which is the Logos. Christ himself is the δύναμις of God,[519] to participate in Him is to participate in that power; the Holy Spirit is the δύναμις of Christ[520] and as we have seen it is through this power and synergic share in it that θέωσις is brought about.

In this section then, the Logos is the dominant notion, weaving the other ideas together and providing the basis of integrating these considerations into the Part I as a whole and beyond that into the whole treatise and finally in the thought of Maximus in all its length and breadth.

Part II(c) (897A-900D)

Before we look at the content of this section it will be advisable to take note of terminological factors that have bearing on what Maximus wants to say. Firstly, the 'Our Father' describes the bread for which man is to pray as ἐπιούσιος . If this is derived from the verb εἰμί , 'I am', then it can mean 'substantial', 'suited to one's nature', or 'supernatural', 'super-substantial'. This is the primary sense attached to the terms by Maximus since his exegesis is dominantly spiritual here. But he does not neglect the other

possibility either, presuming that the adjective may be derived from εἶμι , 'I go', and then it could mean either 'pertaining to the future, to the world to come', or in a more down to earth sense, 'daily' or 'for the day'. In fact when Maximus wants to introduce the latter meaning of the word, he gives ἐφήμερος [521] as its equivalent. The qualification σήμερον will have to be modified according to the way ἐπιούσιος is intended. If it means 'supersubstantial' then, as Maximus points out, σήμερον must mean 'this age',[522] the present state of the world in its post-Resurrection and ante-Parousia condition, while it must mean 'to-day' if ἐπιούσιος is interpreted to mean 'daily', 'for the day'.[523]

Here we find Maximus concerned, first of all, that we should ask for 'the bread of life and knowledge';[524] then he raises the problem of how to reconcile this petition of asking for bread with the command of the Lord not to be solicitous, but to seek the kingdom of God and His justice above all. Here there has obviously been a shift in the meaning of 'bread'. He then provides ascetical principles for the use of temporal goods and finally exhorts his readers, in a splendid parainetic passage, to regulate their lives on the basis of the distinctions he has made between what is eternal and what is passing.

Maximus shows his hermeneutical preference in dealing with this petition by identifying the 'bread' with the Logos. In the previous section we have seen that the

Logos becomes everything to those nourished on virtue and wisdom, that He is the 'substantial and living bread for the nourishment of our souls'.[525] Here, He becomes 'the bread of life and full knowledge' and at the beginning of the next section 'the incorruptible bread of wisdom'.[526] In the corresponding Part I,4, He is described as 'the bread of life and strength'[527] and later again as 'the bread of knowledge',[528] while in Part III,4 we find that He is 'the bread of life, wisdom, knowledge and justice'.[529] These are obviously glosses on the Johannine 'I am the bread of life'[530] and Maximus bolsters up his interpretation by citing Matthew 6, 25,32-33, in which men are exhorted to seek first the kingdom and justice of God. It is noteworthy that Maximus does not interpret the 'bread' in a eucharistic way, at least not overtly. In fact, here Maximus is more akin to Origen than to any of his other great predecessors, with his emphasis on the spiritual character of the Logos-bread and the relation of the recipients' capacity to subjective worthiness.[531] It is the relationship of the Logos to men, whose λόγοι are dependent on Him and who need to be nourished by Him, that ensures the continuity between here and the hereafter. To use the words of the dominical prayer is to ask for fuller participation in the Logos so that man, the existent λόγος φύσεως , may 'to-day' become more identified with the Source of his being, progressing from εἶναι through εὖ εἶναι to ἀεί εἶναι . Maximus will refer to this below as a formation 'by firmness in goodness'.[532] The scriptural sequence of the prayer is underpinned by the variations in the use of λόγος so that we

find the themes of 'Name' and 'will' of God given further development here where the one praying asks for a fuller personal identification with the Logos for Whom he wants to find a new embodiment in himself.

The bread which the prayer would have us ask from the Father is described as the 'bread of life and full knowledge' and immediately life is contrasted with 'death'.[533] Man was made for life, for incorruptibility and immortality. This life was to have been a participation in the life proper to God, but man rejected the divine offer by sin to death. It is crucial to note that the immortality of mankind was 'in the beginning'[534] to have depended on the Logos. But the mystery of man's freedom is respected too by the indication of an interval between his creation and the eating of the bread that would have assured his immortality. As Dalmais points out,[535] the whole question of the relationship between life and knowledge in the destiny of Adam presented Maximus with a thorny problem, which he does not attempt to solve in the Pater Noster. The fruit of the tree of knowledge could not have been denied to Adam indefinitely in the perspective of an Alexandrian view of sin, which was so tied up with the notion of ignorance. Origen and Gregory of Nyssa even seem to suggest that an experimental knowledge of good and evil was a stage on the way to the realization of the plenitude of life.[536] Maximus prudently sensed danger in that kind of hypothesis and suggested to his friend Thalassius that there may have been two trees, that of life and knowledge, which would be ways of describing a twofold power of discernment in

man, one corresponding to the tree of life would be wisdom in man's νοῦς , enabling him to distinguish the intelligibles from the sensibles, the temporal from the eternal, the other at the level of sense would enable him to distinguish between bodily pleasure and pain.[537] In the Ambigua we have an interpretation that corresponds to that in the Pater Noster. Referring to Adam he says:

> If he had trusted in God rather than in his mate he would have been nourished on the tree of life; he would not have lost the gift of immortality but would have kept it for ever by participating in life, because all life is conserved by right and fitting nourishment. Now, the nourishment of this happy life is the bread that comes down from heaven and gives life to the world as the Word of truth has revealed about Himself in the Gospels. The first man, not having been willing to nourish himself on it, was rightly deprived of divine life and fell into another from which death took its rise. He decked himself out in irrational wear, obscured the ineffable beauty of the divine life and handed the whole of nature over as food for death.[538]

Man disqualified himself from sharing in the bread that would have enabled him to avoid sin and death. The 'over and above' held out to him as a possibility on condition that he feeds on the Logos who is 'the bread of life' may evoke platonic associations here because of its Alexandrian provenance, but it is hard to avoid the conclusion that we are again being confronted with the distinction between principle of nature and principle of hypostasis. It is the first man's failure to accept his invitation to hypostatic status, to become a son in the Son, that deprives him of the consequences of that condition: incorruptibility and immortality which are necessarily divine gifts, in no way within man's own competence to create.[539] Without the Logos, who is the

bread of life, he dies. It is the Logos, who by His condescension entered man's condition and put on his humanity, who restores that lost immortality. The mystery of His feeding man on bread is the mystery of man's dependence on Him to become a person, not alone to share in the nature that is proper to Him with His Father and the Holy Spirit, but to participate in His sonship. He the Logos in nature, gives man λόγος in nature and invites him to the λόγος of personhood, so that caught up in His filiation, the Father might take His delight in him too and that he might, through the agency of the Spirit, be enabled to say Abba. This is another way of saying that man, made in the image of God, was destined to become, in dependence on the Logos, also in His likeness. As we shall see, this would be in some way extended to man's body, become the messenger of a soul that was the herald of God. The body too would be drawn into the realm of personhood. Because the 'bread' has come down from heaven man can ask for it with confidence 'to-day', 'in this present age'.

Maximus then proceeds to remind us that the principle formulated in another tradition as quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientur recipitur is operative here. We are reminded that the Logos is both willing and able to provide Himself as bread and this is attributed to His being φιλάνθρωπος ,[540] which ensures that this gesture of benevolence has the same root as the whole divine Economy, which has its ultimate source in the tender love of God for men. There is no limitation in the bread itself. It is men who condition its

reception. This is measured by the quality of the 'works'[541] performed by the recipients. This puts before us an anthropology in which man is at once endowed with and burdened by freedom and responsibility, while being, from another point of view, unconditionally dependent on the Logos for whatever is in him. The 'works' evoke the idea of the virtues so that coupled with νοῦς[542] here we are back to the familiar pair: virtue and wisdom. The capacity of man for 'the bread of life and knowledge' will be in proportion to his being when he receives it. The relevance of worthiness to νοῦς is underlined. Here we can recall that, while νοῦς does not necessarily have to relinquish its intellectual connotations, it is primarily understood as a capacity for God,[543] and more specifically in this context, for the Logos.

Ἀξία[544] implies due or merit, but since this implies a modification of the ability to receive, we can translate it as 'capacity'. Ἀξία would then be something more than a moral claim on the fuller participation in the Logos that it undoubtedly implies; it would seem to touch man at the basis of his ontic structure as capacity for God. Another way of putting this would be to suggest that νοῦς and γνώμη connote personhood and that knowledge and virtue at their apex are fused into a single experience of the self-giving of God in Christ.

The quotation from Matthew 6[545] provides the way of transition from bread understood as the Logos to bread in its mundane sense. Maximus shows that there is no opposition, apparent or real, between bread understood as the Logos and this passage from Matthew. Most obviously

the 'kingdom and justice' of Matthew can be identified with the Logos and there the difficulty would end. But it is possible that Maximus intends a more nuanced squaring of the two scriptural passages, the dominical petition in the 'Our Father' and the injunction of the Matthew text. If Maximus is identifying the 'kingdom and justice' of the commandment given in Matthew with the foregoing petitions, 'Thy Kingdom come, Thy will be done', then we have further evidence of his concern to highlight the play of human will when he deals with the theme of the intervention of the Holy Spirit and more pertinently, when he interprets the doing of the will of the Father as union with the angels in cosmic liturgy. He is saying here that if there is union between the divine and human wills with regard to the coming of the kingdom and the doing of the will of God, then the τά πάντα of Matthew will be added to man and it is as such that he must ask for them, as bread for the day. Maximus then accepts, if in a secondary way, the realistic tradition with regard to this petition of the 'Our Father' to be found in the teaching of Gregory of Nyssa, John Chrysostom and Cyril of Alexandria.[546] The dominical emphasis on the priority of the transcendental order makes the first interpretation of 'bread' necessary, as Maximus sees it, but he does not fail to turn his attention to the humbler semantic possibility, that 'bread' also refers to the τροφή αἰσθητή , necessary to the preservation of man in so far as he makes part of the κόσμος αἰσθητός , the order of ὕλη . He introduces it by saying 'if';[547] his

treatment is hypothetical, which ensures that he does not neglect a possible meaning of the language of the prayer, but it leaves the symbolic interpretation beyond argument for him.

What Maximus wants to ensure in our use of the temporal goods is that we do not forget our mortal condition. This will be expressed in confining our petition for bodily bread to the needs of each day, thus eliminating solicitude from our attitude to earthly goods, which will be in turn a free anticipation of death and a liberation of man's natural inclination to the good. The bread which sustains our fleeting life on earth, 'lasting for a day' is corruptible, pertaining to the order of the sensible which has not yet been integrated into the order of the spirit after the model of the ascended Logos incarnate. Since the ἄρτος ἐφήμερος is necessary in our present condition which is 'passing like a shadow',[548] that is subject to mortality, then it must be sought in the light of that sobering truth. To identify a state of material change with the permanence of beatitude is to be totally confused; it is to forget man's mortal condition and to indulge in a λήθη [549] that deprives men of ἀλήθεια . The basic illusion would be to miscalculate the meaning of time, 'envisaging with cupidity many periods of years'.[550] Πλεονεξία is here a blanket term for the helplessness of man, fascinated as he is with the material, because of his subjection to the passions. The radical character of man's perversion is seen as the 'turning the use of the natural inclination towards matter'.[551] Man's λόγος φύσεως necessarily

relates him to the Logos, but in his fall he substituted φιλαυτία for ἀγάπη . Instead of fulfilling his mediatorial vocation, he tried to divinize matter and assume the role of God, only to find himself the slave of his passions, bound to corruption and generation, caught into the fallen dialectic of pleasure and pain and bound to his ego as the false pivot of the universe instead of being related to God and the willing recipient of τά πάντα of His Providence.[552] Asceticism for the Fathers is largely a matter of remembering death, precisely because that places us squarely in the truth. Dalmais has pointed out that Maximus here recalls a pre-occupation of Platonic-Stoic[553] philosophy and we note that Maximus introduces the adverb φιλοσόφως .[554] But the philosophy of Christ is based on the Paschal Mystery in which death undergoes a total transformation, so that the willing anticipation of death, which Maximus recommends here, is a progressive identification with what Christ achieved and a preparation to enter into it fully at the moment of literal death. Death is the absolute detachment; it is inevitable, in the way of φύσις [555] as man possesses and experiences it and it will cut him off at a stroke from the life that is tied to corruptibility. To enter into it by willing degrees is to substitute the nails of Christ for the material nails that pin man to corruptible things and to release himself for the reception of the 'abundance of divine benefits'.[556] Contemplation is inaccessible without the virtue that ensures detachment from obsession with the material.[557]

The series of exhortations which Maximus appends to these reflections are the practical counterpart of Christian insight and they are remarkable not merely for their uncompromising character, but also for their refreshing equilibrium. They may be summed up as a directive to eat to live to God which will typify cleaving tenaciously to 'the only life of the spirit' and using 'the present life in order to lay hold of it'.[558] This will depend on valuing God 'as we have been taught'[559] and consequently having the ability to evaluate everything else in relation to Him. λόγος demands that man should live consistently with his participation in it; to reverse proper order is to be liable to the charge of 'living for the sake of eating'.[560] That is to live below the human level, in a way that befits φύσις ἄλογος .[561] To live in keeping with φύσις λογική is to be disposed for 'the life of the spirit'.[562] As we have seen λόγος and νοῦς may be used interchangeably, depending on which model Maximus has in mind at the time. Πνεῦμα is thrown into relationship with λόγος here, where λόγος designates the spiritual dimension of man's being.[563] If there is to be a nuance in the use of νοῦς it has possibly to do with what is uppermost in the mind of the writer in any particular context. If νοῦς or λόγος can designate the openness of man to God, then πνεῦμα will describe the same situation, but with more emphasis on the divine activity. This does not disallow the use of πνεῦμα as virtually synonymous with νοῦς or λόγος when the occasion demands. In this

context to be 'logical' is to 'cleave tenaciously to the one and only life in the spirit'. This means that we must 'use the present (life) in order to lay hold of it'.[564] The perfection of the life in spirit is for the hereafter, but it is being appropriated by every logical gesture which man can produce in this life, so that the regulation of the humbler side of human existence is a matter of considerable importance for Christian spirituality:

> For that reason we love to make use of it to this extent that we do not avoid sustaining it by bread alone and preserving incorruptible, in so far as it is allowed, its natural health, not that we may live, but that we may live to God.[565]

Here the upward thrust of the argument of Maximus breaks through to its object: the life to which we are called is not merely that of the urbane philosopher, regulated by reason, but a life centred in God. In fact the bond between the λόγος φύσεως and the Logos so far transcends a theory of world-soul that Christian reasonableness is a factor in an interpersonal relationship between man and the Logos. This humanizing truth ensures that there is no trace of an unbalanced asceticism here, but rather an exhortation to take reasonable care of one's bodily health.[566] This seems to be the first time that such teaching is made so explicit in the ascetical teaching of the Church. It is something new. But we are left in no doubt about the quality of the attention which the body deserves: we are not to avoid sustaining it by bread alone, but always confining our reasonable concern 'to one day'. There is to be no enthusiasm, just the minimum of attention required for basic health and given in a way that will not distract man from 'living for God'. Maximus goes on to say:

> We make the body, rendered reasonable by the virtues, the messenger of the soul and we make the latter, formed by firmness in goodness, the herald of God.[567]

Σῶμα will extend beyond man's physical body to his life characterized by somatic dominance so that the virtues will have to do with the regulation of psychosomatic functions, that is the passions, with their neuro-endocrine dimension, as well as keeping the body as such in ascetical trim. Maximus requires vigils and fasts as well as singing the psalter and praying.[568] It is clear that here ψυχή represents the higher principle in man,[569] that by which he relates directly to God and which is set in order by the higher virtues of faith, hope and charity, so that here we have the traditional hierarchy of body, soul and God, where body must be subject to soul and soul must be subject to God.[570] In another scheme, this is how image grows into likeness or again how εἶναι evolves into ἀεί εἶναι through εὖ εἶναι . The reference to 'messenger' and to 'herald' remind us of the role of the Incarnate Logos as 'the Angel of the Great Counsel' and man's vocation to participate in that angelic role,[571] so that here again the presence of λόγος in the life of man is a guarantee of his being enfolded by the Counsel of God and a striking manifestation of the presence of God in his people.

Part III,4,[572]

In this final resume, Maximus simply says: 'He who is the bread of life, wisdom, knowledge and justice, moves our appetite insatiably to Himself'. The singling out of appetite is suggested by the notion of the Logos as bread.

It emphasizes the volitional and conative side of man's constitution and this is how Maximus primarily inserts man into the great sweep of γένεσις, κίνησις and στάσις, a process that is perfected when γνώμη is informed with divinizing ἀγάπη.[573] The adverb 'insatiably' is dictated by the character of the Logos, not to be defined in merely creaturely terms; He is the eternal Logos, the beginning and end of man's being, the principle of his teleological bias and movement. The question of the affinity of the notion of ἀχορέστως with ἐπέκτασις, associated with the teaching of Gregory of Nyssa, might be raised here.[574] Garrigues has pointed out that even in his earlier works we find Maximus balancing the play of free-will with the silent aspiration of nature towards God. 'This natural dynamism, when it is freed and transposed by grace into personal liberty, gives to nature the stability and the energy necessary to attach itself to its ultimate Good'.[575] So in Maximus the insatiability will be finally satisfied in hypostatic στάσις.

Here, Maximus describes the Logos as bread in the language of Scripture: he is 'the bread of life, wisdom, knowledge and justice'. These qualities are said to be in Christ or they are identified with Him, so that they primarily refer to the Logos himself. But He shares these qualities with us in making us to participate in his property of being Logos. That is why we are taught to ask for this bread in the 'Our Father'. Ζωή is basic enough to precede definition, but in the Fathers in general and in Maximus in particular it has the nuance, if nuance be required, and eternal life in contrast to physical life

and the life of sin.[576] Σοφία is a supreme category in the thought of Maximus and it is communicated to men by God. 'God knows Himself from His own blessed essence, and the things He has made from His Wisdom, through which and in which He made all things';[577] 'The mind, joined with God and abiding with Him through prayer and charity, becomes wise, good, powerful, benevolent, merciful, long-suffering; in a word, it contains in itself practically all the divine attributes'.[578] In Capitum de Caritate Quattuor Centuriae,[579] Maximus argues that if Christ dwells in our hearts by faith and if all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hid in Him, 'then all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hid in our hearts'[580] too. We have already seen something of the place of γνῶσις in the theology of Maximus. Here it is attributed primarily to the Son who knows the Father and Who reveals Him to those whom He chooses.[581] It enables man to know the Holy Trinity, Providence, things invisible and things visible. In its higher reaches it is identified with θεολογία , the supreme knowledge open to man. Finally the Logos is said to be the bread of justice or righteousness. Maximus has already associated justice with the kingdom of God and we suggested that he may have referred it to the third petition of the 'Our Father',[582] so that here it would refer to the identity of the will of the Logos with the will of His Father. Elsewhere we saw him link justice to exact knowledge,[583] but we have no way of knowing if he intends that here. The dubious Loci Communes quote Scripture, but deal mainly with justice as

an ethical virtue.[584] In the usage of the Fathers we find that δικαιοσύνη can refer to justice or righteousness in general[585] or to the justice or righteousness of God,[586] especially to Christ as the justice or righteousness of God.[587] Christ's righteousness justifies sinners and the justice of man is obtained from Christ.[588] We can reasonably take it for granted that Maximus has this in mind here and that justice, associated with the Logos, is salvific justice, that is the merciful fidelity of God. Again we are confronted with the interplay of Christology and anthropology, where our becoming what God wills in His merciful fidelity is at once dependent on the initiative of Christ and on man's fitting response.

(iv) Restoration of nature to itself

Part I,5[589]

In this section we are presented with the vision of the Logos restoring nature to itself and so creating one new man. It is concerned with the personal way in which the Logos effected this and the implications that this has for the rest of men. Again the evidence for what the Logos achieved is found in scripture and interpreted by means of fundamental anthropological concepts in the Maximian system: Φύσις and γνώμη . It is His Incarnation ( γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος )[590] first of all that brings about the condition of the relationship of γνώμη to nature that ensures the integrity of human being and is the source of the unity of all men in human nature. We should notice here the use of γνώμη to designate the

human will of Christ, something that Maximus will abandon later in his theological development.[591] This does not mean that there is anything heteredox about its usage here. It merely affirms the presence of human will in Christ and the right use which He made of it. Here we may recall that θέλημα was used in Part 3, where Maximus was concerned with a will that was common to all the λογικοί as created. Here he is more concerned with the personal determination of will and the bearing that has on the oneness of mankind. Γνώμη connotes this. The dispassionate tolerance of Christ's Passion provides evidence of this ἀπάθεια and even more of a strong decision to die on behalf of His executioners, evidence of supreme love: in this way 'the voluntary character of the passion ratified by the philanthropic disposition of the one who suffered is shown'.[592] In this context Maximus is concerned with the unforgiving spirit that blights every relationship marred by hatred; he finds this exemplified in the opposition of those under the law to those outside the law, who are reconciled in principle by His having broken down the wall of partition. The language here is somewhat obscure: Maximus may have written ἀφανίσας not σαφηνίσας[593]; the sense seems to be, at any rate, that the Old Law was surpassed by the New, which was realized by Christ on the cross: the laws of love and forgiveness would be common to all His followers and so unite 'those far away and those who were near',[544] used paradigmatically here for all forms of opposition in human relationships.

The 'one new man', created by the incarnate Logos making peace and reconciling 'us' through himself to the Father and with one another, is not confined to a reconciliation of Jews and Gentiles. Because the 'one man' extends to us, He extends in intention to all men, and demands the healing of every kind of division that springs from hatred and the cure for which is the kind of forgiveness exemplified in the crucified Christ, something that can be realized only because of the presence of a new kind of love, the ἀγάπη shown by Christ, and communicated to us by the Holy Spirit.

The implication here is that nature was, in some way, estranged from itself and is in need of reconciliation with itself. Nature here is considered to be the basis of γνώμη , that on which γνώμη is founded, from which it springs. It is the ground of γνώμη . This nature was implacably at war with itself because of the sin that Christ nailed in record to the cross. The source of the division is clearly defined when we are told that the new unity achieved by Christ is because of 'no longer having the γνώμη at loggerheads with the principle of nature, ( λόγος φύσεως )'.[595] The idea of ground is alluded to again when we are reminded that men bound into the unity of the new man would be 'immutable in free-will as well as in physis'.[596] The adhesion of γνώμη to φύσις would ensure the stability of γνώμη and the unity of men with one another and with the Father through Christ and in the Holy Spirit.

Nature here is what men hold in common and what the

Logos took hold of hypostatically in his Incarnation. Maximus obviously thinks of nature as a unity and a principle of unity. Nor does he suggest that it has its source of division in itself, but rather in the γνώμαι that tears it asunder and makes it to be at war with itself, where will, while being a constituent element of nature itself, must be thought of as having a personal determination. The idea of nature as a unity must surely have associations of the concrete universal of Gregory of Nyssa[597] and, beyond that, in the notion of the one nature of God possessed personally by the Three.[598] In Part I,3, Maximus was concerned with the unity of created nature but here it is undoubtedly the unity of human nature that engages his attention and we have already marked the difference in terminology by which he speaks about the faculty of will in both contexts: in the former as θέλημα , as if to choose the most generic term to indicate the ability to will in man which he holds in common with all the λογικοί ; it is this coupled with a common createdness that initiates him into the company of the angels in their common response to God as First Cause; in the latter as γνώμη where he is concerned with a principle of division, which cannot be θέλημα as such, which is, as we have just pointed out, an element of φύσις itself, and so it must be will with a difference, will determined in a personal way by the individual possessors of the common nature.[599] This does not suggest that γνώμη is not active in the union with the angels, but it is not so basic a principle of voluntary unity as

θέλημα is. Γνώμη must identify itself with θέλημα, as rooted in the λόγος φύσεως, which is the principle of consistency of the order of nature.

In this discussion we have to keep in mind the theological conception of man and his relation to God which modifies everything that Maximus says, and which is marked by the contrast and complementarity of two irreducible orders of being: Φύσις and ὑπόστασις.[600] Both are relationships to the Logos, created participations in what is proper to Him. Φύσις is the result of the free and consistent synergy between the Logos and man on an objective basis. It is what man has from the Logos. From another point of view, it is <u>what</u> he is in contrast to <u>who</u> he is. Ὑπόστασις on the other hand is the basis of the synergy between man and the Logos on a subjective basis: who man is. The former is objective, the latter is subjective, the former is immanent, the latter is transcendent,[601] the former is οὐσία or φύσις, the latter is ὑπόστασις, the former is λόγος φύσεως, the latter is τρόπος ὑπάρξεως: the former I have, the latter I am, both of which issue in what I do. What I have from the Logos is nature; life is what I freely do with the λόγος on the basis of what I freely have from the Logos. In the theology of the Fathers this ideal state of affairs either never obtained in fact or was short lived because of the cataclysm of the Fall,[602] so that φύσις is in reality the result of a refracted interaction between the Logos and man on an objective basis. Man negates Him and He negates man's negation

to redeem him. In this phase ὑπόστασις in man implies the mystery of the refracted interaction between man and the Logos on a subjective basis whereby man negates Him as his λόγος ὑπάρξεως and He negates his negation as a presupposition to man's redemption in order to redeem man. While historically this state obtained before the Redemption, it is now present in man to the extent that he is not yet fully redeemed.

If we think of γνώμη as the immediate source of man's wrong use of his freedom and his setting in train the baneful effects of his perversity, then we realize that γνώμη is man's ability for freedom, marked by his ὑπόστασις ,[603] that the divisions in nature created as one are due to personal waywardness on the part of men. The implications from the text are that γνώμη was not preserved passionless in its relation to nature, that it was in a state of revolt, that it was shaken from its basis in nature, that hatred is of prime importance in considering the rifts in nature, implacably at war with itself, that γνώμη opposed the λόγος φύσεως and that men were changeable in γνώμη . The principle of stability is therefore λόγος φύσεως and it is obviously meant to have a bearing on the state and condition of γνώμη . In the context of what we have outlined above the λόγος φύσεως will be the principle immanent to man which constitutes him as a man, a member of the human race, possessed of a nature that is human, enjoying access to the locus of interaction between the Logos and men on an objective basis. The idea of λόγος as fundamental to φύσις , while it is

undoubtedly immanent to man, has a relationship to the Logos who is the transcendent source of the λόγοι [604] the basis and ground of natural consistency, the incorruptible reason of nature's constancy, the secret of its objectivity. To recall the terminology above, the λόγος φύσεως is the immanent principle of what man has or even of what he is in contrast to who he is. Γνώμη on the other hand is presented here as subject to inconsistency, to liability to change and to becoming the source of fragmentation and disorder. The γνώμη is subject to passions and the possibility of revolt and of being prized away from its basis in φύσις , of opposing the λόγος φύσεως . The λόγος φύσεως in this context is definitely thought of as normative and foundational. This is obviously because of its being rooted in the Logos, and in some sense indefectibly so. Γνώμη , on the other hand, bespeaks a possibility of failure and while it too must signal acceptance of the primacy of the Logos, we know from man's history that it has, or he through it, has attempted to throw off this 'given', this ontological necessity.[605] Here Maximus is suggesting that γνώμη and more radically its hypostatic source, will be in a proper relationship to the Logos if they accept the exigencies of λόγος φύσεως . This is the norm for a proper relationship to the Logos in the hypostatic order. Man cannot indulge in the luxury of wanting a personal relationship to the Logos while neglecting the correspondingly necessary relationship of φύσις and its λόγος . To attempt this is to be divided in himself and to cause division in society,

because of the dominance of passion and its divisive effects. This shows that man in his person had chosen to condemn the dictates of nature as a whole, which is Godward in its essence. Maximus does not here treat of the complementary possibility for man in his person and freedom, that of innovating nature, in an explicit and positive way, but he does so by simply affirming what the Logos Incarnate has done and the implications for mankind which are evident in his saving action.

Maximus puts the fact of the hypostatic union at the basis of the unification of man visualized in this section: γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος .[606] There could be no rift in nature as the result of the abuse of freedom in His case since He personally is the Logos from whom the λόγος φύσεως of his humanity is derived and who imparts a personal impress to His use of will; in the language of this phase of Maximus' theology His γνώμη was indefectible as well as His λόγος , since it is rooted in the same Logos as Hypostasis, so that inconsistency in the use of His human will would imply some kind of inconsistency in the divine Logos himself, something unthinkable, so that the principle that is deployed in the whole of this Christology is here applicable too: 'To speak in general, all that is natural in Christ has also, joined to its λόγος , the mode (τρόπος) which is above nature'.[607] Besides in his divine and unique hypostasis there is no place for fluctuation and hesitation.[608] So 'he preserved γνώμη passionless in its relation to the nature'.[609] Likewise it was not in a state of

revolt from φύσις nor shaken from its base in φύσις . Christ's personal human will was in perfect harmony with the totality of his nature as a man and, beyond that, with its ground which was Himself in person. Maximus appreciated the historical unfolding of that perfection, especially in its expression in the Passion, where the Hypostatic Union takes on its historical dimensions and retains its transcendent consistency even to the acceptance of death to give life to man.[610] The measure of the unifying love displayed by the Incarnate Logos was in His choice of death instead of life on behalf of His persecutors paradoxically producing unity through the result of Adam's sin. The annulling of hatred is then invoked as further evidence for and a key to the restoration of nature.[611] The 'one new man' who is created is capable of embracing everyman with his γνώμη , through the logical use of his γνώμη. There is a depth of meaning behind the expression ἕνα καινόν ἄνθρωπον into which the two were created. Here Maximus is not discussing the unity of nature merely. He is treating rather the total unity of each man because of the harmony of his λόγος φύσεως and his γνώμη and by implication his ὑπόστασις ; since φύσις is thought of as one because of its λόγος , then the concert of γνώμαι will ensure the union of all men in one nature, that there will be a hypostatic unity because the ὑποστάσεις accept the unity of φύσις demanded by its one λόγος , rooted in the Logos. Ἄνθρωπος here then will have basically a

natural connotation but ordered to a hypostatic one. This brings us back to the considerations of patristic anthropology which we have outlined above and the twofold relationship of man to the Logos. Because the ὑποστάσεις are derived from and dependent on the Logos when they accept the unity of λόγος φύσεως , then they are united to the Logos as ὑποστάσεις . We do not have to deal with the innovatory character of the hypostatic influence on φύσις here, apart from pointing out that it is undoubtedly an aspect of Maximus' teaching and would certainly enter into his later reflections on this mystery, the mystery of the καινός ἄνθρωπος , who is one. Ultimately, it is the uniqueness of the ὑπόστασις of the Logos, that accounts for the unity of the ὑποστάσεις that constitutes one new man.

Although this problem of the relationship of γνώμη to φύσις comes later than the treatment of the healing of the divisions through the Incarnate Logos and derivately through the mediation of man,[612] we can take it from the evidence of this section that he considers the unity of man in himself as basic to the reconstruction of the fragmented universe and the restoration of man's proper relationship to God. This he sees achieved in and exemplified by the Incarnate Logos himself in whom two natures, human and divine, are united in one Person. It is that astounding and unprecedented union that makes the other unities possible. This is achieved in man analogously. Man becomes a true person when γνώμη and φύσις are

co-ordinated in the way that Maximus outlines here. This signals the restoration of man to his proper relationship to the Logos both as φύσις and as ὑπόστασις and we might suggest that the ὑπόστασις has a certain priority in this new condition which entitles man to participate in the unifications wrought by the Incarnate Word. In His case we find one ὑπόστασις and two natures so united that He can restore to unity male and female, inhabited earth and paradise, heaven and earth, intelligibles and sensibles, God and creatures and this He articulates historically by His virginal birth. His entry into paradise with the good thief, His ascension, His recapitulation of all created powers and finally by sitting in His humanity at the right hand of the Father.[613] The possibility of these unities obviously hangs on the union of divinity and humanity in the one Hypostasis. In an analogous way we can claim that the becoming mediator by man, in dependence on Christ, will necessitate his achieving personality in the way suggested in this section with all the overtones of εὖ εἶναι and ὁμοίωσις that it necessarily possesses in a maximian context as well as the necessity of the intervention of the Holy Spirit in terms of synergy, ensuring that man is truly related in a hypostatic manner to the Logos and through him to the Father whom he addresses as Abba. This can be referred to as the mystery of enhypostasisation whether we extend it to mean that the created hypostases emerge fully when they realize their ontological dependence on the Logos and accept it in consciousness and will or whether we think of the term

as pointing out no more than that they are ὑπόστασις , existing on their own, in contrast to their φύσις or accidents, that they become truly instanced natures in the fully human sense even if they do not yet enjoy mystical awareness of this. This would still require the ontological support of the Logos in person, so that we are left with the vision of all men being one in Him, Who is one. Once this integration has been attained, then man is ready for the fullness of mediatorial role in the universe, capable as he is of ἀρετή, θεωρία and θεολογία in the mystery of θέωσις . It is because he enters the mystery of person that this becomes possible just as it is because of the ὑπόστασις of the Logos that divinity and humanity can be united uniquely in Jesus Christ.

The fundamental role of λόγος is again evident in this section. It appears in the Person of the Logos and His saving intervention in the world. It appears too as the foundation of φύσις and the source of its transcendental relationship to its ground in the Logos. The stress on γνώμη must evoke the presence and activity of the Holy Spirit, as well as the whole realm of ὑπόστασις , τρόπος ὑπάρξεως and so the polarity and dialectic of λόγος - τρόπος , φύσις - ὑπόστασις which is maintained with such finesse throughout this work. This is constantly revealing man as caught into the mysterious circulation of divine life in the Holy Trinity.

Part II(d)[614]

In this section Maximus proceeds to assure us that he who seeks the 'bread of wisdom' forgives easily because his detachment from the visible order renders him immune to rancorous vulnerability. His one pleasure is the attainment of divine benefits, his only pain failing to do so. Then he points to the paradox of the words of the dominical prayer which exhort man to set himself up as a model for God in forgiveness. God wills this to purify him from passion and to remind him that his disposition must correspond to the grace of divine forgiveness. Since human nature in dissension with itself cannot receive the divine condescension, free-will must harmonize with the principle of nature. The one who asks for 'the bread of knowledge', that is for the Logos in person, is disposed to this when he prays; so is he who seeks the empirical bread only for the day. Both kinds of men need a pure disposition towards those who cause them sorrow in order to lay hold of the divine benefits that have already been detailed and also in order to be freed from temptation and evil.

The root of forgiveness as Maximus understands it is the freedom experienced by the man whose good is inviolable and cannot be touched by any enmity. What that good is we have already been told: it is bound up with τά ἀγαθά conferred on man by God and the petition of which takes shape in the Pater Noster. It implies the mystery of the hallowing of the Name, the coming of the Kingdom, the angelic worship and the

Logos-bread and the process of divinization by which man shares in God's nature and lives His life. Some of the implications of that grace have been spelt out in terms of λόγος as we have seen; and the final touch was that those fed with the Logos and in search of the Kingdom of God and his Justice are disposed to forgive. Behind this claim is the assumption that man is liable to hurt and injury and that the instinctive and passionate response to this is vengeance. Maximus is reminding us that the man whose good transcends the conditions of temporal existence is not vulnerable in this way, that he cannot be deprived of the Logos and all that that implies by any hostile man and so he cannot be injured in the essence of his being. Therefore there is nothing on account of which he should retaliate. He lives on another plane and is invulnerable.

In this section we find a reciprocity of causalities and influences: seeking the Kingdom and Justice of God, of which he cannot be deprived by human malevolence, he is disposed to forgive; conversely, because he is disposed to forgive he is well placed to receive not only the Bread of life but the bread for the day which sustains his transient life. To close his heart to man is to close his heart to God and so to be incapable of receiving the gifts of God, eternal and temporal.

Maximus elaborates the basic tenet in this section by reminding us that, while man is subject to pleasure and pain in his fallenness, he reaches a stage,

through the embodiment of Logos with all its implications, in which his one pleasure is the attainment of divine things and his one pain the forfeiting of these. Pleasure and pain are the product of the Fall as Maximus affirms in more than one context; they are the terms of a tragic dialectic bound up with generation and corruption in which man vainly tries to discover that for which he was created and destined. The relative cannot replace the absolute, that is God, in man's life. Pleasure and pain can only be rectified when, as Maximus avers, man returns to his true good and attains 'divine things'. In some sense, pleasure and pain are tied to the order of φαινόμενα and the αἰσθητά , but Maximus transposes them here and the implication is that the appropriate response to αἰσθητά will be possible when God becomes man's joy.[615] Then there will be no contrary to joy or pleasure, because the alternative to the possession of God can in no way be entertained together with Him. The pleasures associated with sense will be integrated into man's possession of God, adding, as Maximus reminds us in the Pater Noster, their own energy to man's longing for God and firm holding on to Him.[616]

The distinction which Maximus made between the 'bread of wisdom' and the bread that sustains man's temporal life, in his exposition of the mystery of participation in divine life, is carried over into this elaboration of how he understands the restoration of nature to itself. He organises what he has to say primarily around the notion of bread as being the Logos and then he turns to the benefits of using the empirical

bread in relation to the work of unifying human nature. Here he combines an interest in the role of the Logos in the life of man with some consideration of how man should use his freedom, thus maintaining the co-ordination of theological and anthropological concepts in his exegesis. The quality of man's response to the self-offering of the Logos-bread is the link for Maximus between the fourth and fifth petitions of the 'Our Father' and their corresponding mysteries. If man appreciates the Logos then he is so far removed from the relative trivialities of this life that forgiveness comes spontaneously to him. Here we have insight into an ascetical emancipation that has its focus in the Logos. It is not anthropocentric but related to the Logos primarily, another facet of seeking firstly the Kingdom of God and His Justice. Because it is relational it is basically personal so that although we have a precise reference to the faculty of προαίρεσις,[617] it is inserted into a personal context: 'this man holds his free-choice inclined to nothing of the sum total of visible things'.[618] In the Fall, man was seduced by the 'visible', so that here it is paradigmatic for the created in so far as it becomes a temptation for man and prevents his proper response to the Logos. Concern with the bodily is presented as the source of man's liability to pain. Maximus contrasts pleasure and pain and observes their dialectic in the context of Fall and Redemption. For him, if man enjoys the Logos then the question of pain preventing his forgiving the hurt done him does not arise. If 'he seeks the incorruptible bread of wisdom', he cannot be

diminished in his basic being, which is actuated in what he does, that is the holding of his προαίρεσις inclined to the same sapiential bread.[619] The qualification of this maintenance of freedom by ἀπαθῶς[620] evokes the whole patristic tradition of asceticism. Ἀπάθεια is stabilized by freedom in the will; it is from this that the inner serenity, impervious to the disturbance of passion, comes. Behind this association of freedom and spiritual serenity, Maximus perceives the presence of ἀγάπη, which informs man's capacity for freedom, his will,[621] which deracinates his passions from their rootedness in φιλαυτία obtaining since the Fall[622] and which becomes the ground and unifying principle of the virtues in his state of regeneration.[623] The implication is that 'the bread of wisdom' is incomparably worthy of the striving of man's freedom; the co-ordination of the use of the other bread will be touched on in a parallel way. Here, the freedom that comes from unqualified dedication to the Logos is seen to be the basic principle of an ascetical anthropology. The whole power of the soul is bent on the Logos; the greatest commandment is implemented; ἀγάπη confers on its subject a sovereign freedom in choice, because in giving man to the Logos it gives him to himself in αὐτεξουσία.[624] 'Absolutely no one can lay a hand on the good which he strives for longingly'.[625] That is why man cannot be damaged essentially and so does not experience the need to forgive as in some way beyond his power.

In his elaboration of why forgiveness comes easily

to the man who seeks the Logos-bread he says:

> he knows that the one pleasure consists in the attainment of divine things, the giver of which is naturally God, the guardian of which is the choice of free-will of the one who receives. He also knows that the only pain is the failure to attain to these; the devil instigates this, but everyman, who grows weary of divine things because of slackness in his free-will and does not preserve the honourable with love by a disposition of free-will, is its author.[626]

In this classic sentence, thrown in as a kind of parenthesis, we find a vivid contrast between the possibilities that confront man in his freedom and between the role of God and the role of the Devil in his destiny. Man can either opt for the restoration of the original state intended by God, which was to have depended on his eating of 'the bread of wisdom' or he can continue in the condition set in train by the primordial transgression. Union with God is presented as the 'one pleasure', reminiscent of the Augustinian victrix delectatio. It is 'one' in the sense of being fundamental and incomparable. Nothing can compare with it and without it no other pleasure can have its proper quality. 'Pleasure' rather than 'joy' is chosen here to contrast the experience of the possession of 'divine things' with the enjoyment of the sensibles. It is the 'one' pleasure in contrast to the pleasure which seduced man and caused him to plunge vertiginously into a despairing search for his good where it is not to be found. Since the one pleasure can only consist in the attainment of τά θεῖα , only God can give it. He is the giver κατά φύσιν .[627] Although God is the ultimate source

of the good things, the responsible freedom of man is not irrelevant to his laying hold of what will serve to satisfy him. It is his προαίρεσις κατὰ θέλησιν [628] that preserves the pleasure by holding to good things granted by God. The combination of προαίρεσις and θέλησις is to remind us that freedom is not fully human until the generic orientation to the good has become a decided choice. Θέλησις must take on the personal connotations of γνώμη and issue in προαίρεσις after a process of alternating reflections and choices that constitute the human act. The thrust of λόγος φύσεως and 'the natural desire of the mind for God'[629] have to be personalized before man can attain to the divine things that will guarantee the 'one pleasure'. Again the contrasting pain is characterized as 'only'. Maximus does not think for a moment that it is literally the only pain; the dialectic of pleasure and pain embraces cruder distress in his system, but here 'only' is to be construed again as incomparable and unique, because it has to do with man's ultimate finality. It is a kind of ontological agony, of which the superficial losses and frustrations of temporal life are merely symptomatic. In the grammatical symmetry we discern a conceptual assymetry: God is the giver of the θεῖα , but the Devil cannot be the giver of anything. He is master of privation merely, an instigator. The contrast of the causality that is proper to God and that which is peculiar to the Devil is complemented by the contrast in human response. With regard to God, man can only receive. Since there is nothing to

receive from the Devil, man can be merely prompted to refuse being and life, to frustrate and annul the benevolence of God. So 'everyman' is the 'author' of the pain that besets him for having failed to acquire 'the divine things'. He is in some sense the first cause of evil. This tragic failure is attributed to ἀτονία in his γνώμη .[630] He lacks vital tension in his personal will. The implicit torpor is akin to the Origenian κόρος , but without the Origenian ambiguities. Even in a negative context γνώμη emerges as central to the anthropology of Maximus. Through it man has the capacity either to accept the destiny held out to him by God or to refuse it by ultimately choosing himself.

Maximus now sets himself a problem. The 'as' in the fifth petition seems to exhort us to propose ourselves as a model to God in the matter of forgiveness. As Dalmais says, 'Maximus, doctor of the Incarnation and deification, loves to consider this dialogue between man and God, where the Creator deigns to permit his creature, His image and mirror, to remind Him of this likeness and to confirm himself in the hope of divine benefits'.[631] Maximus soon dispels any impression that man anticipates God in forgiveness. The true state of affairs is introduced by δηλονότι :

> This means that just as God forgives dispassionately those whom He forgives, so likewise he remains impassible in whatever befalls him.[632]

One might say that while understood from a temporal point of view, the forgiveness of God extended to man is conditioned by the disposition to forgive found already

in man, yet the impassibility of man is at once a participation in and an imitation of God's impassibility. The order of true dependence is not disturbed by the temporal sequence, so that the petition for forgiveness, on the basis of having already forgiven, does not reverse the roles of God and man in this particular relationship; it merely insists that man must imitate God in impassibility, from which flows forgiveness, in order that man may in turn experience the forgiveness of God. To deny forgiveness to his fellow-man would be to render himself impervious to the mercy of God. Even though God may require the temporal precedence of man's forgiving his fellow, there can be no question of causal precedence. This phrase can be used authentically provided that the one praying does not confuse the temporal and causal orders.

Maximus then draws attention to an obstacle to forgiveness: 'not allowing the νοῦς to be impressed by any memory of foregoing injuries'.[633] The ἀπάθεια which is the ground of forgiveness demands that memory should not be engaged in preserving in the present what was distressful in the past, but should rather concern itself with constituting in the present the θεῖα , from which arises the unique pleasure that satisfies man. Memory was central to the ascetical preoccupations of the whole monastic tradition[634] and its inclusion here in such a deft way demonstrates Maximus' understanding of the interaction of the cognitive and conative aspects of man's spiritual psychology. Since γνώμη presumes a more specialized

faculty and activity than θέλησις , its functioning depends on the presentation of particular goods. Memory is here given the task of that presentation. The control of memory with regard to what may stimulate the will to a desire for and choice of revenge is seen as the way in which to liberate the will for forgiveness. A touch like this reveals how a practised master of the ascetical life can evoke a whole tradition in a phrase. We should note especially the reference to νοῦς here. As we have seen, νοῦς in the thought of Maximus is often the faculty of the divine, so that the concept of memory has to be extended from sensitive or even intellectual power or activity in the philosophical sense, to which we have alluded above, being a mode of the exercise of νοῦς , understood as man's specific capacity for God. This puts Maximus squarely in the tradition of μνήμη Θεοῦ [635] and makes him a forerunner of St. John of the Cross in his teaching on the anagogical method.[636] It may also show the affinity of his teaching with the trinitarian thinking of St. Augustine, whose memoria we have had occasion to recall already. It certainly gives us a glimpse of how the cloistered life of Maximus opened onto the limitless mystery of the presence of God. The perversity and tragic character of the Fall can be seen mirrored in this passage of Maximus. Man bends his νοῦς to the created order, allowing himself to be submerged in the finite precisely through his capacity for God and so to become depersonalized. Thus he rejects his vocation to relate to God in divine nature and, divinized by

ἀγάπη , to men in human nature. The purpose of not allowing his νοῦς to be impressed by painful memories was to prevent the severing of nature by free-will. This is the main concern of Maximus in this section: the restoration of nature to itself.

The hypostatic character of the rupturing of nature is brought out clearly here: man severs nature by γνώμη when, swayed by passion, he sets himself up in opposition to his brother-men. On the contrary, 'when free-will is united to the principle of nature, the reconciliation of God with nature naturally takes place'.[637] It is nature as a whole, hypostasized by men, that God wills to be in harmony with Himself. There is a delicate balance between nature and person throughout all the teaching of Maximus, but here the emphasis seems to be on the λόγος φύσεως as a principle of unity. This is reminiscent of the concrete universal of St. Gregory of Nyssa.[638] Maximus presumes that God wills mankind to be reconciled to Him. This cannot come about until the nature that is made concrete in its several existents is accepted in its specific integrity by everyman. This in turn will ensure the harmony of men among themselves, incorporating, as they must, the λόγος φύσεως and accepting its exigencies in the very act of transposing it to the personal level. Passion leads men to something less than a full innovation of nature; men identify themselves with an aspect of nature at the expense of its entirety. There is a twofold failure here: men fail to personalize nature in its integrity; nature

becomes less than itself in their distorted activity, where ignorance, self-love and tyranny make it a caricature of its true self.[639] Since it is one in principle, the men who would personalize it in its integrity would have to be at one among themselves. The passionate opposition of men to each other prevents nature from rising to the personal level to which it is destined and so nature as a whole, because it is not completely possessed in its completeness by men, cannot be at one with God. In passing, we can note how this combination of irreducibility and co-ordination in the relationship of person to nature emancipates man from the Greek problem of primary substance.[640] Once it is realized that the mystery of person is not an individuating condition within the realm of nature itself, then the possibility of the realization of the λόγος φύσεως in the order of spiritual existents is open. In his remarks on the restoration of nature to itself, Maximus shows that for him, there is a profounder reason for the fragmentation of human nature than passion. 'When free-will is united to the principle of nature, the reconciliation of God with nature naturally takes place'.[641] It is γνώμη , which participates in both co-ordinates in the structure of man, that is at the root of φιλαυτία and that is crucial in the work of unification and reconciliation. It is through will that man can impress the uniqueness of his person on nature, raising it to the personal level while accepting its logical integrity. Once the Logos becomes man

nature is healed in principle. This becomes obvious in the historical dimensions of His human existence, not least for Maximus, in His forgiveness of His tormentors,[642] which has such bearing on his understanding of this petition of the 'Our Father'. Maximus insists that the disposition of those forgiven, unsullied by passion, corresponds to 'the relationship of grace'[643] that is to the status of sonship of God, with which anything at variance with the faith that finds expression through love is incompatible. We find the ecclesial aspect of this truth in the Mystagogia:

> The Holy Church is the very type and icon of God, because just as He effects, according to His infinite power and wisdom, the union without confusion with regard to the different essences of beings, attaching them most intimately to Himself as creator, likewise she binds in one form only the believers to each other by the unique grace and vocation of faith.[644]

Maximus then goes on to say in the Pater Noster:

> He has clearly made it evident that, while the free-will is united to the principle of nature, the free-choice of those who have put this right will not be in revolt against God, because nothing that is illogical can naturally be discerned in the principle of nature, which is both natural and divine law whenever it possesses the movement of free-will that operates in keeping with itself.[645]

Here we find that the λόγος φύσεως must in some way be the ground and norm for γνώμη if γνώμη is to be in harmony with God in its free-choices ( προαίρεσις ) . We should note here the relationship of γνώμη to προαίρεσις ; it is obviously the source of προαίρεσις , something potential of which προαίρεαις is the actuation, so that we can safely conclude that here it means the power of

freedom, while προαίρεσις will be the actual exercise of deliberate choice. The contrast between the λόγος φύσεως and the γνώμη makes it evident that γνώμη is not, from some point of view, in the order of nature, that it stands over against it and must be co-ordinated with it. It is in fact personal will or the personal mode of will. We know that Maximus refined the use of γνώμη , but the analysis of the text reveals this here; it does not make explicit the personal character of γνώμη , but it certainly conceives γνώμη as in some way in contrast to φύσις , and we know from the basic distinction of λόγος - τρόπος , φύσις - ὑπόστασις that what is not in the order of λόγος - φύσις must be found in the order of τρόπος - ὑπόστασις . The λόγος φύσεως is given a definite normative function here; the personal exercise of freedom will be rectified when it is regulated by λόγος φύσεως . There is no hint of the innovatory character of the exercise of γνώμη , at least not explicitly, so far in this statement. The deeper concern is to show that what is in keeping with λόγος is in keeping with God, 'because nothing illogical can naturally be discerned in the λόγος of nature'.[646] Λόγος is here a relational concept; nature is not conceived as something closed after the model of the philosophical μορφή and its λόγος is the principle of its openness and relatedness; ontologically the nature is in reference to the Logos, in whom are the principles of all natures.[647] Therefore it must be in harmony with God and it ensures

that what is in harmony with itself is necessarily in a similar relationship to God. We may note in passing that this is tied up with the notion in Maximus of the incorruptibility of the λόγος φύσεως and the preservation of the image, while the likeness which is in the order of τρόπος can be corrupted; it is necessary to mention too that this does not exclude the damage done to nature by original sin, animal generation, vice, suffering and death.

Personal existence will be right for Maximus, when it expresses in freedom the consistency of nature with God which is dictated by the λόγος φύσεως . This is a way of saying that γνώμη adds its own dimension to human existence but that it must not indulge in what is παρά λόγον . It is interesting that λόγος φύσεως in this context does not become law, natural or divine, until the will has intervened.[648] The 'natural or divine' is obvious if we accept what has just preceded this phrase: the relation of λόγος to Logos. The interesting development is that which has to do with law. The λόγος φύσεως as it stands is not considered to be law; it requires a movement of free-will that is however in keeping with itself. This is a dynamic concept of law and if we are to retain the τρόπος emphasis when we speak about γνώμη it is also a personal one. Law comes to be when the λόγος φύσεως is transformed into free-will, consents to the movement of free-will which is energized in it or more properly in keeping with it. 'In it' would have

interesting implications: we have seen already references to the will being rooted in some way in φύσις and here we see what is natural becoming personal. Even if Maximus does not intend that, there can be no doubt about what he is claiming for law in general. It is not at all law in an abstract and impersonal way; it is not a mere canon to which man must adjust himself; it is rather the living willed orientation of man to the object of the inclination of λόγος φύσεως . It is not like the law of nature in this respect, which is the pre-volitional inclination of irrational creatures to act in accordance with their nature; this is a more splendid concept: it includes the freedom of man; that the 'divine law', becomes 'natural' through the personalisation of λόγος φύσεως through γνώμη , means that God is there at the heart, not merely of man's fundamental natural inclination to his good, but also through law, in the sense of a fully human canon when it is adopted voluntarily by man and becomes personal to him.[649] Its necessity embraces the flexibility of human freedom which is informed by λόγος φύσεως and in turn transforms λόγος φύσεως by personalization. In this twofold participation in the Logos through λόγος and γνώμη man enters the process of becoming in the likeness of God: he is caught into the movement (κίνησις ) that is characteristic of the surge of creation from γένεσις to στάσις , the transition from τό εἶναι to τό ἀεί εἶναι through τό εὖ εἶναι , the progress from image to likeness. We can note here the relevance of λόγος φύσεως and

γνώμη to this development and the way in which Maximus understands law, human and divine, or divine become human, not as something imposed on man from without, but an inner drive that at once shapes his freedom and is lifted by it into the personal order. The Logos then is not exemplar for man merely in the order of φύσις but also in the order of ὑπόστασις and the exemplarity is not something extrinsic, but rather a real dependence and relationship.[650] Natural will ( θέλησις ) becomes natural law through the reciprocity of λόγος φύσεως and γνώμη ; since it is divine law as well, man is made to become exactly what God wills.

Whereas he has stated above the necessity of the harmony of man with God if the λόγος φύσεως and γνώμη coincide, he reiterates that principle now in a positive way:

> 'And if nothing illogical exists in the principle of nature, naturally the free-will moved in keeping with the principle of nature will have an activity ( ἐνέργεια) that is in all things in harmony with God'.[651]

Again the bond between the λόγος of nature and Logos guarantees harmony with God in the will if it is aligned with λόγος φύσεως ; that is self-evident to Maximus once the terms are understood. ἐνέργεια is the evidence of harmony with God; the whole process of θέωσις takes place as ἐνέργεια and Maximus normally speaks about the spiritual life from the point of view of activity rather than that of the powers of the soul. He is primarily interested in free activity, the product of the interaction of the activity of God and the activity of man, that of God

being sovereignly free while that of man is so in a dependent way. He concludes:

> This is the efficacious disposition, created by the grace of Him who is good by nature, for the production of virtue.652

Virtue is the logical activity of man. Here it is said to have its source in the goodness of God, so that we are back to that φιλανθρωπία which is the basis of the whole Economy. It is virtuous activity that will ensure that man attains the σκοπός Θεοῦ 653 which controls and articulates every facet of the Economy, enabling him to hallow the Name and welcome the coming of the Kingdom. The addition of ἔμπρακτος to διάθεσις is to emphasize the order of activity. Man is to attain the realization of his being by becoming what he does. While διάθεσις would more easily refer to γνώμη , it is also possible to understand it to refer to ἐνέργεια , so that we are confronted with man in the process of evolving into sonship of God. He is actually being moulded by the energy of divine and human law.

Maximus then turns his attention to the relationship between forgiveness and an attitude to bread understood as the humbler sustenance of man's temporal life. He admits that the demands of nature have to be satisfied, but he insists that this must be done in a way consistent with the transience of mundane things. This is a further elaboration of the ascetical directives which he gave in the previous section on 'bread for the day'. Here it is thrown into relationship with the disposition to forgive. The habitual

realization of mortality produces a detachment that enables man to forgive his trespassers willingly. In a sense, the very act of preserving his temporal life with empirical bread is a meditation on death which puts the injuries suffered at the hands of others in proper perspective. The willing uncertainty with which one accepts the precarious succession of days and what is required for self-preservation is in itself to anticipate 'nature with his free-will' and so too is to die to the world. It is ἀπάθεια the fruit of the rectification of ἐπιθυμία - θυμός , that makes this possible. Maximus also hints at a sacrificial aspect to this mortification which raises this forebearance above a Stoic indifference and may even invest it with the highest kind of love and give it a vicarious character in the hidden life of the Church.[654]

Part III,5

In this part, the order of the petitions has been reversed in the interests of the ascetical perspectives with which Maximus wants to conclude his treatise, so that the reference to the subject of this mystery is to be found in a sentence that refers to final petitions of the 'Our Father' which have already been dealt with summarily:

> And we shall trample on the one who begat this, the evil serpent from whom we ask to be delivered with Christ, who conquered the world as our leader, arming us with the laws of His commandments and binding nature to itself through charity, by lawfully laying aside the passions.[655]

Here again, Maximus attributes the initiative in the restoration of nature to itself to Christ, so that we

are again reminded of the subordination of anthropology to Christology in his theology. The binding of nature to itself is associated with the commandments of Christ and especially with ἀγάπη . It is remarkable that ἀγάπη has not been mentioned in either of the other two treatments of this subject, but as we have seen in commenting on the Prologue above, it was the intention of Maximus that it should be understood to have relevance to every aspect of this work. That is made explicit here. We must also take note that it comes in a passage, the parallels of which introduce the idea of of γνώμη , so that Maximus is obviously associating ἀγάπη with γνώμη in a special way. Ἀγάπη enters human life through γνώμη . The process of restoring nature to its integrity involves γνώμη as the organ of ὑπόστασις . The restoration of nature must be seen as realized in the evolution of man as image into man as likeness of God. This throws a shaft of light on the way in which Maximus understands the co-ordination of nature and person and how he would interpret the concrete universal of Gregory of Nyssa. The following passage draws together some of the principal ideas of his spiritual anthropology:

> He who has caused his νοῦς to flash like lightning with divine contemplations and accustomed his λόγος to praise the Creator with divine canticles unceasingly and has purified his αἴσθησις with pure representations, this man has added to the natural good in keeping with the image the voluntary good ( γνωμικόν ἀγαθόν ) in keeping with the likeness.[656]

The process of the restoration of nature is spelt out here and we can conclude that what is done through ἀγάπη in the Pater Noster is done through γνώμη here, so that

Maximus thinks of them as involving each other in the work of man's salvation.

(v) Purification from the 'law of sin' and abolition of the tyranny of the Evil One.

Part I, 6,7[657]

Maximus now addresses himself to the question of the removal of the obstacles to the divine beneficence in man's regard. As in the preceding mysteries of Part I, the Logos is given the initiative. It is He who primarily establishes nature free from 'the law of sin' and who destroys the tyranny of the Evil One. This will require the willing co-operation of man, but consistent with his practice in dealing with the previous petitions of the 'Our Father' and their associated mysteries he will deal with that more extensively in Parts II and III. Here he concentrates on the Christological dimension of the questions. The fact that the Logos is the subject of the principal statements is in itself bond enough with what has gone before. We are meditating on further aspects of the mystery of κένωσις - θέωσις .

Temptation

At a glance we can see that Maximus understands that there is a connection between pleasurable procreation and 'the law of sin' which is the equivalent of the 'temptation' in the 'Our Father'. The manner of the conception and birth of the Incarnate Logos has a direct bearing on the abolition of 'the law of sin'. The usual 'corruption' that marks human birth was not realized in the case of Mary. In fact, Maximus claims that her virginity was in some way enhanced.[658] Maximus then transfers his

attention to the death of Christ, saying that He frees nature from the 'law of sin' in those who willingly imitate his voluntary death. Men cannot be born free from this law as Christ was, but by being baptized into his death and living consistently with that they can be reborn and progressively rid themselves of this impediment to their identification with the Logos. The mortification which was inculcated in the previous sections is now seen in relation to purification from the 'law of sin'.

In order to grasp more fully what Maximus is saying here we must look more closely at his teaching on sin and especially at the ἀρχαία παράβασις, of which every other sin is in some way a dark reflection. Maximus finds the abuse of free-choice at the core of Adam's sin. Man was created with the gift of self-determination in the image of God and it was God's intention that he should grow into His likeness through the proper exercise of freedom: 'every reasonable creature is the image of God; but only those who are good and wise are in His likeness'.[659] Since he was φύσει θελητικός,[660] the exercise of his freedom was to have been in keeping with his godward nature; it was to have been ἡ κατά φύσιν αὐτεξουσιότης.[661] Maximus understands that exercise of freedom to have been intended as the human way of attaining to God:

> For thus man must have been in the beginning: in no way distracted by what was beneath him or around him or near him, and desiring perfection in nothing except irresistible movement, with all the strength of love, towards the One who was above him, that is God.[662]

This was to have been the manner in which man willingly entered the cosmic movement of all creation to God. Man's failure was the outcome of the corruption of his

προαίρεσις ;[663] the repercussions from this are the disorders to be found in his nature: animal generation, corruptibility, passibility, death. While for Maximus sin is the transgression of a divine commandment, this juridical notion has an ontological dimension. Evil ἐν τῷ μή εἶναι τό εἶναι ἔχει was how Gregory of Nyssa put it.[664] Maximus echoes this and concludes that man's substituting creatures for God is to grasp at minus-being in the place of being. 'Evil is the failure of the operation of the powers that are in nature to attain its end',[665] he says, having shown that it cannot be identified with any of the known categories of being. The enormity of the primeeval sin is revealed for Maximus in the fact that it is precisely man's capacity for God that he recklessly turns to creatures:

> . This power then, I mean the natural power of the νοῦς which turns to God, the first man, as soon as he was created gave to sense: by the very first movement through sense to the sensibles he acquired the pleasure that is activated contrary to nature.[666]

Creatures are the 'something besides the end' which man pursues in his by 'the unlogical movement of his natural powers',[667] which is Maximus' alternative definition of evil. The notion of 'pleasure' is central to this conception of the Fall. As we have seen, Maximus has a place for θεία ἡδονή .[668] But here pleasure is a component of the disorder of sinfulness; it is bound up with that abuse of free-choice and perversion of the νοῦς which are fundamental to this understanding of the ἀρχαία παράβασις .[669] It is an epiphenomenon of man's substitution of the created for the Creator and itself becomes the object of his desire. In the Pater

Noster we find that it plays an essential part in the defective manner of human generation that followed man's transgression.[670] The Logos becomes man without being caught into this fallen process and thus He can institute a new order of things. We find an elaboration of the process of the Fall in the Quaestiones ad Thalassium:

> Since the creation contains the spiritual λόγοι of visible things, which nourish the mind, and also the natural power which delights the senses but distracts the mind (one might say that it was for this reason) it was called the tree of knowledge of good and evil; for when considered spiritually it contains knowledge of good, but when taken in a bodily way, it induces a forgetfulness of divine things; and perhaps it was because of this that God forbade man to eat of it, deferring his enjoyment of it for the meantime until, as was most just, he had come to recognize his own cause by participation in the life of grace and by the immortality given in grace by means of this participation had persevered to the state of freedom from passion and distraction, so that then he might come to know them, this time, not as man, but as God, possessing by grace, the same knowledge of what is as God himself possesses, coupled with wisdom, by virtue of the deification of his mind and the transfiguration of his sense perception.[671]

Man could have had a proper appreciation of the created order and used it appropriately if he had first participated in the grace of θέωσις . This he would have attained by partaking of the tree of life which is identified with the ἀψευδής λόγος .[672] Because man failed to maintain his relationship with the Logos in the personal order, he was unfitted to co-operate with Him in the order of nature.

We can measure something of the depth of the Fall by considering God's original intention for man. He was created in a state of dynamic potentiality as image in order to move freely to likeness of God. His bodily condition was to have enjoyed a perfect balance of

qualities immune to corruption. Being free from sin, there would have been no death.[673] He would not have experienced the conflicts of passion since he was to have been in a state of serene integration. He was to have enjoyed the vision of God and to have chosen Him supremely, solely with all the energy of his free-will.[674] This would have freed him to choose everything else in relationship to that sovereign choice. The manner of the multiplication of the human race would have been in harmony with the totality of man's constitution.[675] Because of his microcosmic structure, he was called to combine and unify the various aspects of creation: mind, soul and matter.[676] Since man's senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch are paralleled and controlled by intellect, reason, irascible and concupiscible powers and the faculty of life, and in that order, through their right use he was to have, by means of the appropriate virtues, achieved his own fulfilment and discerned God in the universe, thus discovering God and allowing the universe to recover its proper relationship to God through himself.[677] We have already seen something of the cosmic role assigned to man, that of being σύνδεσμός τις φυσικός.[678] This he forfeited in the Fall and re-acquired in Christ.

In the following passage we see the devastation wrought in nature by man's personal failure to use his will as God willed:

> When at the beginning the seductive Devil, by a stratagem which his egoism maliciously inspired, tempted man by the seduction of pleasure, he separated our will from God and from others. In destroying the rectitude of our will he has, in this way, divided nature and torn it into a

> multitude of opinions and imaginations; he has in the course of time established as law the search for and discovery of all kinds of evil, assisted in this by our own powers; and in order that evil may dwell in all men, he bolsters it up in them by stressing this irreconcilable opposition of the will, which had allowed him to persuade man insidiously to turn aside once from the thrust of nature, to divert his desire from that which was permitted to him in order to incline towards that which was forbidden him and to establish in him the three greatest and most fundamental evils and, to put it in a nutshell, authors of viciousness. I refer to ignorance, passionate self-love and tyranny, which depend on each other and strengthen each other. For from ignorance of God is born passionate self-love and from this tyranny over the neighbour, something beyond doubt. They grow strong by the disordered use of our own powers: the irascible and the concupiscible appetites and reason.[679]

This passage is self-explanatory. It will suffice to point out that Maximus does not think of disorder in human being apart from the malign influence of the Devil so that 'temptation' and the Evil One imply each other. There is too a polarity of ὑπόστασις , through γνώμη , and φύσις evident in this analysis of human waywardness, so that the twofold structure of man is involved in Maximus's view of sin and Fall. Maximus finds that man's body, or perhaps man considered as somatic becomes νέφος καί προκάλυμμα to his spiritual self.[680] His carnal passions impede his ἡγεμονικόν and the deceit of sense overcomes it with the appearances of the sensibles and prevents its passage to the intelligibles.[681] Through his body too he becomes liable to animal generation, pleasure, passibility, corruption and death. The mode of post-lapsarian generation plays a prominent part in the thinking of Maximus in the passage of the Pater Noster which we are considering. It might be thought to typify man's fallen condition which was remedied by the

Logos, so that it will require further examination.

In the following excerpts from the Ambigua, Maximus contrasts the modes of generation that characterize man before and after 'the ancient transgression':

> The first man is condemned to have a generation that belongs to bodies, indeliberate, material and perishable, since God rightly judged him who wilfully preferred inferior things to superior, that is to exchange generation subject to passion, servile and constrained like the beasts of the earth, brutish and lacking in mind, for a generation that is free, impassible, chosen and holy and to have dishonourable materialization with brute beasts instead of divine and ineffable honour with God.[682]

Man's aspiration to be like a god have reduced him in some way to the condition of the beasts, where with them, he wallows in συμπαρενύλησις .[683] Elsewhere we find the pleasure associated with this inferior mode of propagation stressed and the consequent paradoxical pain and death thrown into relief:

> For as Adam, the first parent, because he transgressed the divine commandment, introduced into nature besides the first, another principle of generation consisting of pleasure indeed, but through pain ending in death and invented in accordance with the advice of the serpent, a pleasure that was not the successor of foregoing pain, but rather passing into pain, he had all those begotten in flesh from him like him through the wicked principle of pleasure, rightly made subject to him with death through pain for end.[684]

We should note here too some kind of solidarity between Adam and those begotten of him in flesh. This in turn is dependent in some way on 'the wicked principle of pleasure', which is synonymous with the fallen mode of propagation, so that the changed condition of man is transmitted to his successors precisely because of the way in which he begets his children, not as sons of God, but as the offspring of the will of the flesh and the

will of man. Maximus says as much:

> Since the first purpose of God was not that we should be born through marriage from corruption, for it was the transgression of the commandment that introduced marriage through Adam's prevarication, that is his violation of the God-given law, hence all those begotten of Adam are conceived in sin, liable to the condemnation of the forefather.[685]

The 'sin' here does not mean that the act of begetting is a sin, but it means that it takes place in the state of 'sin' that is consequent on the ἀρχαία παράβασις , a state in which the passions have replaced the λόγος φύσεως as the ground of decision and so make part of 'the law of sin' by an analogy with the law of nature which we have met above. An analysis of Quaestiones ad Thalassium 21,313AB shows this as an aspect of the total situation visualized by Maximus as consequent on the Fall.[686]

For him, transgression, sin and passibility are bound together in a causal sequence.[687] 'Sin' seems to be a generic condition of mankind which results from the original transgression. It is central to this passage and its implications. 'It may include guilt or not according to context'.[688] The παθητόν is consequent on 'sin' and is associated with the fallen mode of generation in particular. Maximus will elsewhere distinguish between the πάθη ἀτιμίας and the πάθη ἐπιτιμίας .[689] Man cannot, of himself, extricate himself from the παθητόν , with which he is born. Nature is said to be bound to the first transgression through the παθητόν . 'The original transgression is active in the παθητόν and so when nature exerts itself through γνώμη to

maintain itself by γέννησις it cannot avoid binding itself to 'the law of sin'. The irony is that what man desires and wills to maintain nature becomes the beginning of his dissolution. Pleasure is accompanied by pain; life is doomed to death because the 'law of sin' has taken the place of 'the law of nature'. 'God' we are told, 'the dispenser of our salvation, wisely and at the same time mercifully and in keeping with His goodness suitably joined to the irrational movement of our spiritual power the punishment due to it'. We find that παθητόν , which covers the most elementary stirrings of passion, extended to that final movement by which man is deprived of his temporal life:

> The God who created human nature did not produce with it sensible pleasure and pain, but made a spiritual power with it by which man would be able to enjoy Him in an ineffable way. However, this power (I mean desire for God in keeping with the nature of νοῦς ) as soon as it came to be, the first man gave to sense and with the very first movement by means of sense towards sensibles he activated pleasure contrary to nature. To this, God who is concerned about salvation, providentially attached pain as a penalty. In this way the law of death was wisely rooted in the nature of the body, putting limits to the unnatural desire for sensibles which characterized the madness of νοῦς .[690]

Maximus finds this exemplified in the process of generation, which is proper to man in his condition since the ancient transgression, in a particularly significant way. In the Pater Noster it is precisely by not allowing pleasure to precede His incarnation that the Logos frees nature from 'the law of sin'. In other words, because the He could be σπορά τῆς οἰκείας σαρκός ,[691] he could become man without being

caught into the tragic dialectic of generation and corruption, of pleasure and pain, in which man found himself since the sin of Adam.

The following passage from the Opuscula Theologica et Polemica enlarges on the Pater Noster text. Commenting on a passage from Gregory of Nazianzus he says:

> He hints at the same thing in the following saying: 'He was conceived without sin from the Holy Spirit and from the holy, immaculate, ever-virgin Mother of God, Mary, and He was born of her according to the flesh without defilement'. He adduces indeed the Holy Scripture as remembering to praise and to blame the flesh, not, far from it, that he would suggest understanding the flesh of the Lord as different from ours in nature and substance, he who understood that this was assumed from our substance, that is from the most holy womb of the ever-virgin Mother of God, but different with regard to proneness to sin, because in no way did He have in His members a law which is derived from the transgression, contrary to the law of the spirit. 'Flesh' he says, 'which was corrupted by sin was not assumed by the Saviour, which would be at variance with the law of his nous'. For He, whose generation the law of sin through seed did not precede, in no way is it in His members, but the law of divine justice, shining forth to determine us and abolishing perfectly that which befell nature through the transgression.[692]

Here Maximus affirms the consubstantiality of the Logos with us in human nature, but he makes crucial distinctions with regard to how the Logos possesses that nature in contrast to fallen men. The latter has in his members 'a law which is derived from the transgression'. The transgression is the ἀρχαία παράβασις . The 'sin' which results from that is present in mankind, 'derived from' that transgression and the basis of the 'law of sin', which is a parody of 'the law of nature', which we saw to be fundamental to man's being and destiny. Besides, 'the law of sin' is not to be found

in the Logos because his generation was not dependent on procreation by seed. There is an intimate bond between 'the law of sin', which is identified with 'proneness to sin' (τῇ ἁμαρτησίᾳ ) and generation διά σπορᾶς . Because the Logos is not subject to this kind of generation, He is not subject to 'the law of sin'. His norm is 'the law of the spirit', 'the law of his νοῦς ', 'the law of divine justice'. As man, these will be aligned with His λόγος φύσεως , which becomes in Him a component of 'the law of nature'. For this man has substituted the 'law of sin', where passion becomes a substitute for reality in the life of man. The rebirth of men as sons of God does not coincide with their physical birth. It is initiated in baptism and has to be progressively appropriated by a death to 'the law of sin'. A new order has begun with the conception and birth of the Saviour.

This was possible because the Christ was 'a man above men' and could bring the indefectibility of the person of the Logos to bear on the exercise of human freedom:

> He was not a mere man indeed, but God as well become man in order to renew through and in Himself the nature of men grown old of itself and to make it a sharer of divine nature, that is having cast aside corruption and alteration by which it was made like to the beasts and had sense with the upper hand over λόγος .[693]

For Maximus the whole human life of Jesus was salvific. He overcame the Evil One and every kind of temptation in the desert and in his Passion, demonstrating the control of ἐπιθυμία and θυμός .[694] He accepted in our place spiritual birth in baptism, putting off fleshly birth and conferring divine sonship on man.[695] He was

anointed by the Holy Spirit and showed in His life an example of every virtue and perfection so that men might become His imitators. Maximus sums this up by saying: 'Taking flesh by the Holy Spirit and the Holy Virgin, He showed us a godlike way of life'.[696] In the Pater Noster having spoken of His birth, he immediately transfers his attention to the death of Christ and its bearing on man's salvation.[697] It is His self-chosen death that is seen as particularly significant. The function of the will in His agony and death would find a new clarification in the Monothelite debate,[698] but as early as Epistola II we find Maximus emphasizing the willingness of Christ in His undoing of the condition of man brought on by his perverse use of free-choice:

> The Lord and God of all and Saviour Jesus Christ, who willingly accepted death for us and by His blood redeemed us from the power of darkness.[699]

The negative dimension of that freedom is emphasized in Quaestiones ad Thalassium as well as the creative use of the 'pathetic' link between pleasure and suffering:

> Just as the pleasurable life of Adam became the source of corruption, thus the death of the Lord for Adam, being free of the pleasure from Adam, becomes the source of eternal life.[700]

Because the Logos is free from the baneful effects of Adam's misuse of pleasure He is in a position to use suffering and death to undo the condition into which man has got himself and which becomes more insoluble with every act of wilful γνώμη .[701] The following passage from the Quaestiones ad Thalassium, where Maximus comments on the scriptural declaration that Christ is made sin for us, makes a useful distinction with bearing

on the Pater Noster text:

> Two sins took place in the first parent because of the transgression of the commandment: the one blameworthy, the other blameless, caused by the blameworthy one. Indeed the one consists in the willing setting aside of the good by free-choice, the other in nature setting aside immortality unwillingly because of that free-choice. Therefore our Lord and God, rectifying this independent corruption and alteration of nature, assuming entire nature, possessed Himself the passibility ( παθητόν ) in the assumed nature, which is put in order by the incorruptibility of free-choice. And He became sin for us through the passibility in nature, not knowing indeed deliberate sin because of the firmness of his free-choice; He rectified the passibility of nature through the incorruptibility of free-choice, that is making the end of the passibility of nature, I mean death, the beginning of the remodelling of nature to incorruptibility.[702]

Beneath the dialectic of this passage we can discern the distinction between person and nature and consequently that between λόγος and τρόπος . There is too the paradox of the Logos isolating the blameworthy 'sin' from the blameless one and using the latter to nullify the former. It is by the 'incorruptibility of free-choice' that he can use the παθητόν , the effect of the blameworthy sin to undo that sin and consequently its effect. Maximus puts this very clearly in a passage further on in the Quaestiones ad Thalassium:

> Taking on this condemnation of my voluntary sin, I mean the passibility, corruptibility and death of nature, the Lord became sin because of me by corruptibility, passibility and death, having willingly put on my condemnation in nature, being without condemnation with regard to his free-choice, so that He might condemn my voluntary and natural sin and condemnation.[703]

Because the willing putting on of the penal παθητόν is given the filial character of the Logos, suffering and death became redemptive and a way to union with God, not merely for the Logos as man, but because of man's

solidarity with Him, for all men in principle. It is then up to men to make their own what He has won for them by willingly imitating His self-chosen death. In the Mystagogia we find woven together the themes of redemptive sacrifice, vicarious suffering and the solidarity of Christ with all men. Referring to His first παρουσία, Maximus says:

> By that Christ liberated and redeemed the human race, enslaved by corruption, subject to death by its own fault and because of sin, ruled tyrannically by the Devil. He paid all its debt as if He had been responsible, He who was innocent and faultless; then He led us back into the original grace of the Kingdom by giving Himself as a ransom and exchange for us and offering in place of our destructive passion his vivifying passion, salutary remedy and Saviour of the whole world.[704]

The link between solidarity and the use of free-choice is brought out brilliantly in the following passage, which puts the mystery of redemption in a concise formula that would be elaborated and nuanced in Maximus' later controversial writings:

> And thus as through one man, turning in free-choice willingly from the good, the change of nature from incorruptibility to corruptibility took place in all men, so through one man, Jesus Christ, not turning in free-choice from the good, took place the restoration in all men of nature from corruptibility to incorruptibility.[705]

## The Evil One

Maximus continues to deal with the providential overcoming of whatever impedes the progress of man to θέωσις. He continues to be concerned with the problems of sin, corruption and death, and their undoing through the beneficence of Christ, but here the whole tragic dilemma of man is given a new dimension by the introduction of the Evil One. There is a subtle play on the ideas of death

and life which makes for continuity with what Maximus has said in the previous section where he presented us with the vision of the Word Incarnate annulling the 'law of sin' by his paradoxical generation and birth and the culmination of his sanctifying life in his passion and death. Here we are reminded that it was for the purposes of salvation that 'God becomes man and voluntarily accepts the death of the flesh'.[706] He voluntarily accepts on Himself punishment for sin, so that by his unjust sufferings our just punishment may be nullified. He took on the wholeness of our human condition, becoming what is described here as σάρξ but without sin, so that the incorruption of His προαίρεσις might rectify our παθητόν . Maximus emphasises the redemptive and vicarious character of His death : 'giving himself as a redemption and exchange on our behalf',[707] He the innocent one who has been born in a manner that clearly demonstrated His sinlessness had taken on through love not merely our common humanity but also the consequences of our corrupted freedom. It should be noted here that Maximus says that Christ destroys the life of the Evil One, presumably in men, 'by a natural death' and further on in this passage that He accepts death θέλων . This aspect of salvation is wrapped in obscurity. Florovsky thinks that 'He was exempt from the necessity of death, because His humanity was pure and innocent. Therefore Christ's death was and could not but be voluntary, not by the necessity of fallen nature, but by free choice and acceptance'.[708] This would seem to be demanded by the quality of His person and the mode of His conception and birth, which Maximus has noted above, but it would not do

violence to the thought of Maximus to invoke a distinction which he makes elsewhere about the way in which passibility is in Christ[709] and which is taken up by John of Damascus. The latter says that the natural passions were in Christ 'according to nature' but also in a way that is 'over and above nature'.[710] Christ according to this view permitted the flesh to suffer what was proper to it, but in a way that is 'over and above nature', because subject to His will, whereas in fallen mankind the passions are undergone by necessity. So that although Christ was not subject to death in this latter sense it is not inconsistent with the teaching of Maximus elsewhere to say that Christ's death was according to nature,[711] or as he says in the Pater Noster, that He died 'by a natural death', but that since He accepted it 'willingly', it was 'over and above nature'. In this way one would not have to agree with Florovsky and interpret Maximus holding that Christ, at His Incarnation, did not assume a 'suffering humanity'.[712] The mystery would rather seem to be that in His humanity He was from the beginning both sinless and suffering, so that He might undo sin and the consequences of sin through His sinless suffering. In this Maximus sees the Judgment of God complementing His Providence, as we have already pointed out.

The specific characteristic of this 'mystery' is Christ's victory over the Evil One, something in which we can participate by the νέκρωσις described in the previous section, but which is elaborated here by implication to include the outcome of a mortified life in a resurrection made possible by Christ 'the first-born

from the dead'. By his willing death and by his blood 'he redeemed us from the power of darkness'.[713] Here we find the manner of that redemption outlined by means of favourite patristic images where the 'flesh' is symbolised as 'a weapon' and 'a poison' and, by implication, the leaven of the whole mass of human nature. We are reminded that 'the flesh' was vanquished in Adam, a formula that throws into relief yet again the λόγος - τρόπος character of Maximus' theological reflection and his abiding awareness of the dialectic of person and nature. The vanquished flesh is to conquer in the new Adam, the Word Incarnate and our author is at pains to show that it is precisely through the 'flesh' that the Word achieves His victory: 'he overcomes him in order to show that what was previously captured for death conquers the conqueror and destroys his life by a natural death'.[714] The role of the Evil One as the corrupter of Adam and the malignant source of man's misfortune is brought out here. We have noted the distinction between the untrammeled freedom of divine causality and the instigatory nature of the devil's interference. The beating of the Evil One at his own game of deceit is emphasized in the passage from Quaestiones ad Thalassium, where Maximus comments on the Lord as worm and no man:

> As well as this putting it (σάρξ ) on as a bait for the deception of the devil by the fish-hook of the divinity so that the insatiable spiritual serpent with its mouth open for the flesh because of its easily-overcome nature, should be caught by the hook of divinity and vomit up, because of the holy flesh of the Word assumed from us, the whole human nature he had previously swallowed, so that just as previously he swallowed man enticed by hope of divinity, so enticed by the expectation of humanity deceived by expectation of divinity, he, deceived by expectation

> of humanity, would afterwards vomit and show the excellence of divine powerconquering the strength of the conqueror through the weakness of worsted nature and God, using the proffer of the flesh would be shown victorious, rather than the Devil promising man the nature of divinity. The worm struck and withered the gourd: I mean that He abolished the law as a shadow and thereby did away with jewish self-conceit.715

The tragic condition of fallen man is reversed by the Incarnate Word; the deceiver is deceived and mankind no longer languishes under the thrall of the Evil One, subject to death because of sin. Σάρξ is central to the intricate pattern of opposites. Vulnerable in its weakness it is the means of (u)doing the strength of the Evil One because of its assumption by the Logos, who being sinless was able to negate the wages of sin, death. We find here another expression of the truths which Maximus is keen to make in the Pater Noster: It is the Logos who destroys the Evil One; it is by the very flesh, which the Devil overpowered through sin to death, that he is in turn overcome; the release from the diabolical realm of death is expressed as a vomiting on the part of the Evil One, the deceived serpent. We find the equivalent of the 'bait' of the Ad Thalassium[716] in the 'poison' which acts as an emetic in the Pater Noster; the notion of 'weapon' in the Pater Noster finds its counterpart in the 'fish-hook' of the Ad Thalassium. The 'deceit' is again the 'hope of divinity', to be like gods, which is disappointed to the extent of tasting death, the essential flavour of meontic being.

It is now that Maximus takes the argument forward in a positive way: 'the flesh of the Word becomes life to the human race by impelling the whole nature like dough to resurrection of life'. In the Ambigua he tells us that:

'if (Adam) had put his confidence in God rather than in his companion he would have been nourished on the tree of life; he would not have lost the gift of immortality but would have preserved it for ever by participating in life, since all life is conserved by the nourishment that is proper and appropriate. For the nourishment of this blessed life is the bread that comes down from heaven and gives life to the world as the Word of truth has revealed about himself in the Gospels. The first man, not having wanted to nourish himself on it, was rightly deprived of the divine life and fell into another from which was born death. He decked himself out in irrational clothing, obscured the ineffable beauty of the divine life and delivered up the whole of nature as food to death. Through this, death lives throughout all this space of time, making us to be food, nor do we ever live, constantly devoured as we are by it through corruption'.[717]

The gloomy picture of our condition as 'food for death' is accounted for here by Adam's failure to feed on the Logos who is described not merely as the 'bread', but also as 'the tree of life'. Maximus states very clearly what death means in its deeper significance when he writes:

> Separation from God is properly death and sin the sting of death. In consenting to it, Adam at the same time became exiled from the Tree of Life, from Paradise and from God; of necessity, bodily death followed after.[718]

Then he adds: 'He who says I am life is properly life. He, in His death, led back to life him who had been made dead'.[719] It is Adam who separates himself from God, the same Adam who failed to nourish himself on the Logos. 'Adam' refers primarily to the person who breaks his essentisl bond with the Logos and who as a consequence is deprived of the proper interaction of his nature with the energy of the Logos which becomes tragically obvious in 'the bodily death' which followed of necessity. Death is voluntary separation from the living God and the sin of the forefather was instrumental in delivering

up 'the whole of nature as food for death'. The outcome of this for the human race is that 'death lives throughout all this space of time'; man cannot find within himself the resource to deliver himself from this fate, but what is impossible to man is possible to God. The Logos himself, who is the source of life, enters the human condition, taking on the fullness of humanity, but without sin. There can be no deflection of energy between his Person and the nature He assumed. Since the Word Incarnate was never separated from God in sin, He can change the meaning of death and lead men back to participate in the resurrection which crowned His passion and death. In the following passage, having referred to his Incarnation and Passion, Maximus writes:

> 'and having willingly gone down to the heart of the earth where the Evil One kept us in thrall, swallowing us through death and having drawn us back up through the resurrection and leading up to heaven this whole conquered nature, He is indeed our 'rest', 'healing' and 'grace'. He is 'rest' because he abrogated the law of besetting servitude in flesh by reason of timebound life; 'healing' in that he heals thoroughly the fracture of death and corruption by resurrection; finally 'grace' as dispenser of adoptive sonship in spirit through faith and of the grace of deification in keeping with one's worthiness'.[720]

There is no need to elaborate this magnificently comprehensive passage, which so deftly enumerates the final significant phases of salvation and how they are to be appropriated by man, except to note how the Word by his σάρξ becomes 'life to the race of men by impelling the whole nature like dough to resurrection of life'.[721] The resurrection of Christ who never ceased to be God, makes the resurrection of the race of men a real possibility. The impulsion of the Incarnate Word

requires the response of faith so that man may become 'son', and worthiness that he may be given deification and be restored to the Tree of Life, Paradise and God from which he was exiled by the ancient transgression and his personal sins. In the perspectives of this final 'mystery' of the Pater Noster Maximus sees this salvific achievement as 'destruction of the Evil One who dominated us by deceit'.

In the thought of Maximus we find an acceptance of the so-called 'physical' theory of redemption. Christ assumes humanity in its physical integrity, body, soul and spirit (νοῦς ) and the very fact of assumption is the source of the vivifying renewal of mankind. Referring to Christ, Gregory of Nanzianzus says: 'that which was not assumed was not healed; that alone is saved which is united to God'.[722] As we have seen, Maximus' view of human nature has affinity with the 'concrete universal' of Gregory of Nyssa, so that Doucet can conclude that 'nature is completely rectified in Jesus Christ, in its "comprehensive" totality, and by Jesus Christ, in its "extensive" totality, that is to say in all the individual men'.[723] Similarly, for Maximus as for Gregory of Nyssa, in the person of the Incarnate Logos is to be found the ἀπαρχή of the whole human race.[724] He is the 'leaven' of the mass, so that His passion, resurrection and ascension can be reproduced in those who are willing. It is the ἀπαρχή of His flesh that makes possible the divinisation of all mankind and which is the principle of the restoration of the unity of human nature, fractured by the wilful γνώμη of Adam and his

seed.[725] But we know that Maximus complements this teaching with the function of the exemplarity of Christ in regard to men[726] and also with the role of His human will in salvation.[727] The latter aspect would be developed and refined in the course of his dogmatic controversies, but we have evidence that he was not unaware of its relevance in his earlier thinking. So we are not surprised to find him emphasising the role of προαίρεσις in relation to the resurrection of Christ. Contrasting the corruption consequent on the sin of Adam with its denoument in mortality he says:

> 'thus in Christ the good of free-choice proper to Him removes the common shame from the whole nature, transformed as it is into the incorruptibility of nature by the resurrection in keeping with the immutability of free-will'.[728]

We should also take note of this cosmic implication of the exercise of the human freedom of the Word, which has a bearing on 'the whole nature'. Προαίρεσις emerges again as central to both the Christology and anthropology of our author. The destiny of men will depend on their ability to appropriate, what the Word Incarnate has acquired through His free-will by the manner in which they exercise theirs. In some way the ἀτρεψία of free-choice, its incorruptibility, is the personal source of the incorruptibility of nature to which man aspires and which he finds in Christ the first-born from the dead. In the following quotation from the Ambigua we find Maximus recalling the basis of the whole of man's regeneration and relating its phases to their realization in the Incarnate Logos.

Having insisted on the manner in which the Logos took on human nature, he then says a propos of the teaching of Gregory of Nanzianzus:

> In this way indeed, as I think, the master says that our Lord and God has honoured our threefold birth, that is the general modes of our generation to being, to well-being, to ever-being: that from bodies, which is one from both together by the mutual co-existence of the parts among themselves at once, I mean of soul and body, but divided in two because of the different manner of generation of each singly, by which we acquire existence; that from baptism, by which we receive well-being amply; that from resurrection, by which we lay claim to ever-being by grace.[729]

## Part II (e)[730]

Maximus had concluded Part II (d) by saying that the pure disposition is necessary because of all that has been said about forgiveness, but also because of what he is about to say. The most obvious connection between Part II (e) and the previous Part II (d)[15] is that it provides an account of what will happen to the unforgiving man in contrast to what is in store for the forgiving, so that he now describes the consequences of the other possibility facing man's free-will: what will befall him if he does not forgive. In this way we see the central role of forgiveness in the anthropology and especially the ascetical teaching of the saint. Both doctrinally and structurally it is pivotal and it, in turn, depends on man's personal will and how he uses it so that the pairs λόγος - τρόπος , φύσις - ὑπόστασις emerge very strongly here.

If he refuses to forgive, the unrepentant man is handed over to Temptation and Evil. The latter are given a twofold interpretation, temptation being 'law

of sin'and consent, evil being understood as the Evil One and the activity that follows consent. The Devil is given his traditional place in the scheme of Maximus and man's life is seen to be bound up with diabolical intrigue and interference. 'Consent' and 'action' are moments in the monastic analysis of the process of sin.[731] The basic concern of Maximus here is that man, because of his hard-heartedness, is overcome by these destructive forces, that he is handed over to them, which in turn puts his destiny in the hands of God who respects his freedom even when he abuses it. The God who has been portrayed as Creator, Father, King, is now cast in the role of Just Judge.

Maximus does not hesitate to define 'temptation' as 'the law of sin'.[732] He is not content with a phenomenological description, but tries to understand it basically on an analogy with the 'law of nature' which we have met already. He hastens to assure us that the first man was created without it, that it is in no way constitutive of human nature, that in fact it was introduced by the agency of the Evil One. He qualifies the causality of this malign influence on human destiny by saying that he

> kneaded this into the nature of men and persuaded man by deceit to make the desire of his soul pass from what is permitted to what is forbidden and to turn to the transgression of the divine commandment.[733]

The scriptural inspiration of this statement is obvious. Maximus is contrasting the causality of the Devil with that of God. The Devil can only be an instigator, a deceiver, an anarchist, in contrast to God whose creativity is positive, beneficent and effective.

Whereas God's commandment was designed to ensure that man would concern himself with the capacity of creaturehood, the Devil leads him to attempt to exploit its incapacity and so he is trapped in weakness and degeneration in place of that splendid evolution held out to him by God as progress from εἶναι to ἀεί εἶναι through εὖ εἶναι . In place of the λόγος φύσεως , man with his γνώμη adopts disordered passion as the quicksand ground of his activity and so he institutes a law that is the antithesis of 'the law of nature', that is 'the law of sin'.[734] Unwittingly man has substituted μή εἶναι for εἶναι in his reckless pursuit of what seems to be good. Φιλαυτία undoes the free appropriation of the authentic 'desire of his soul'.[735] Here we are presented with the tragic image of man who fails through the perverse use of his freedom to be borne on the great wave of created κίνησις to its true goal, God Himself. As a result he exchanges corruptibility for incorruptibility. Φθορά (negative) is the consequence and concomitant of the "meontic"/decision of the human will, something that infects every dimension of man's being because of his rejection of the grace which is the foundation of its opposite, ἀφθαρσία .

Maximus then provides an alternative interpretation of πειρασμός and πονηρός: voluntary consent to the passions and the mode which consummates in act the passionate disposition.[736] This is a development of the interpretation of πειρασμός considered to be 'the law of sin' which is the dynamism engendered in the will by allowing itself to be mastered by disordered passion.

Elsewhere, in keeping with the ascetical tradition, both primitive and erudite, Maximus describes the process of moral and spiritual disintegration in clear and virtually technical language.[737] For this tradition, 'consent' and 'action' are the final and critical phases of sinful activity.[738] 'Consent' is verbally identical with what we find in the Pater Noster; 'action' is the kernel of the more cumbersome 'mode which consummates in act the passionate disposition', so that in the Pater Noster, Maximus concentrates on the stages of sinful activity that are characterized by guilt. It is from these above all that we pray to be delivered. By the introduction of the distinction between πειρασμός and πονηρός in this sense Maximus shows that he wished to refer to a whole tradition of ascetical psychology and to place it in the context of the wider synthetic concerns of his anthropology and Christology.[739] It should be noted too that he associates the whole process of sinful capitulation with demonic influence so that, in the associations of Maximus, the 'evil' of his second interpretation, while it is primarily concerned with the external expression of sinful consent, is not wholly dissociated from diabolical interference.[740] For Maximus, man is caught up in the warfare of superior powers, a stake in angelic conflict, a protagonist in a drama that eludes the scrutiny of mortal eyes.[741]

Maximus then returns to what he considers to be the most significant factor in conversion: forgiveness. Unless the one who uses the 'Our Father' forgives he will fail to obtain forgiveness from God, who now

portrayed as 'Just Judge', will abandon him to the consequences of his hardheartedness. Maximus is careful to avoid attributing to God the initiative in punishment. The verbs which he applies to God's initiative leave the freedom of man intact and show that what he suffers is, in the last analysis, attributable to his own misguided use of his freedom. The Just Judge 'allows', 'abandons', 'does not prevent' and 'does not ransom'.[742] The counterpart of human autonomy is liability to punishment for its abuse. Maximus is here assigning that punishment to the permissive will of God rather than to His positive will. The 'law of sin' and the 'Evil One' now have their way with the unforgiving man, staining him and mastering him respectively. Preference for dishonourable passion to nature is given as the cause for this captivity. This puts the genesis of the 'law of sin' in a nutshell. Again we are reminded of the contrasting sources of these gnomic canons: σπορεύς and δημιουργός . God is the creative source of nature, or reality, while the Devil can only be a deceiver, attempting to induce man to substitute the unreal for the real, groundless passion for the λόγος φύσεως , as the co-ordinate of his free-will. The role of preference is crucial in this passage. It reminds us of the precarious character of human existence in the vision of Maximus, where man is liable to plunge into the vortex of passion and to become subject to the warped power of the Evil One. This does not mean that he thinks of the plight of man as desperate, but it does mean that he realizes that man is totally dependent on the omnipotent mercy of God. In the Capitum de Caritate

Quattuor Centuriae, Maximus enumerates five reasons why God permits man to be warred upon by the demons, the principal of which he says is 'that when we become detached we forget not our own weakness nor the power of Him who has helped us'.[743]

Having examined the way in which the Just Judge will deal with man in his relationship to 'temptation' and 'evil' in the first sense given to them above, he then turns his attention to the alternative interpretation of these terms from the dominical prayer and the way in which the Judge will deal with them. Again the will of God is permissive and again the will of man retains its creaturely autonomy: 'He does not prevent him from giving in voluntarily to the passions of the flesh'.[744] Again it is the passions that seduce man. This is an empirical description of temptation; from another point of view, it is the abuse of personal freedom that constitutes the passions as the basis of the law of human activity, as 'the law of sin'.[745] Neither will God, he continues, interrupt the externalization of the sinful consent. The phrase κατ' αὐτά [746] reminds us of the way in which the passions are a norm in caricature of the λόγος φύσεως . They are not merely an external canon, but rather an informing factor in the will. The contrast between the basis of authentic human activity and its passionate counterfeit is brought out brilliantly in the clause: 'because thinking less of nature than of groundless passions he disregarded its principle in his eagerness for them'.[747] The passions are founded on the fabrications of man's phantasy. It is

thus that man enters the realm of minus-being and tends to fall back into non-being.[748] This reminds us of the privative character of evil in the theology of Maximus and gives us a glimpse of the dark kingdom of the Evil One.[749] 'Thinking less of' implies a failure in recognition as well as a defect in appreciation; 'disregarding' entails deficiency in knowledge as well as wilful rebuff. The twofold implication is made explicit in Maximus' treatment of the human act with its alternations of cognition and appetite.[750] There is an element of open-eyed responsibility for failure to accept the proper role of the λόγος φύσεως in human becoming and also a suggestion that the failure in vision is due to an enigmatic bias in man's will towards the insubstantial. The σπουδή with which man is said to pursue his phantom good conveys the impetuosity of passion, but also its counterfeiting of an enthusiasm that should spring from the highest levels of his being, to which Maximus has already referred twice in his Pater Noster.[751]

In the series of rebukes which Maximus now hands out to the unforgiving man we can discern further his notion of genuine moral activity and his understanding of the moral imperative. Ἔδει [752] governs 'have known', 'have preserved', 'have rejected', 'Preserved', 'have made sure' and the final ἀποστῆσαι , which outline a complete reform of the use of human liberty in the context of the forgiveness required by the 'Our Father'. We may ask ourselves what the source of the dictate implied in ἔδει is. Ἔδει imposes an obligation on man to act consistently with his basic

natural structure. Maximus says that he should have known in accordance with the movement of nature's λόγος what the law of nature is. Here Maximus is claiming that man has the capacity to recognize the movement of λόγος φύσεως as it exercises its influence on the will in the process of the formation of the νόμος φύσεως .[753] What we have seen already of the relationship between divine law and natural law will serve to remind us that the ultimate source of the movement in question here is the eternal Logos, so that so far from being arbitrary is human activity, that its rightness is not merely derived from consistency with a principle of nature, conceived after the closed fashion of the Greek philosophers, but rather from a λόγος φύσεως that is open and ultimately rooted in the Logos Himself. Because he is endowed with λόγος , the man of sensitive moral discrimination should be able to discern the source of the dynamism in his will and to adjust it accordingly. In contrast to the 'law of nature' we find here 'the law of the passions'[754] which is identical with 'the law of sin'. As Maximus intimates here, the foundation of 'the law of the passions' is illusory. It has its basis, not in reality, but in a perverse 'voluntary choice'. In place of nature, before man's gaze there opens up a moral 'black hole', which is the ironical effect of his attempt to play at being God.

The next phrases have to do with the preservation and rejection that should have taken place if man were to have been consistent with a right knowledge of 'the movements of the soul'[755] so that ἕξεις is now brought to

bear on the volitional and conative aspects of man's self-expression. It is 'natural operations' that should have preserved the sway of 'the law of nature' in his life; man's activities should have been the product of a γνώμη that has adopted the λόγος φύσεως and in turn been informed by it, while at the same time raising the λόγος φύσεως to the level of the person. This would have required the expulsion of the 'law of the passions' from γνώμη just as light dispels darkness. He mentions 'hatred and dissension' as typifying passionate disorder because of his concern with the final petitions of the 'Our Father' and his conviction that man's moral and spiritual life pivots on forgiveness, the contrary of these vices. Having dealt with γνώμη implicitly and negatively, he now turns his attention to it positively and rounds off his series of strictures by saying how man should have managed his personal freedom:

> Besides, he should have made sure that the free-will co-operated with nature, entirely unconcerned about anything at all which the principle of nature does not bestow.[756]

Maximus concludes that the one who prays must put aside hatred and dissension if he is to be heard when he prays. He has already drawn attention to the essential bond between εὐχή and προσευχή [757] and here analogously he insists that unless man is properly orientated to his neighbour he cannot pray effectively, because his prayer will be mere lip-service. The ἀποστῆσαι is governed by the ἔδει which has lent its urgency to the previous infinitives, so that this final requirement is pressed on our attention with the same insistence and is meant to form a whole with them,

bearing the same weight of moral responsibility as they did. This is a matter of first rate importance to Maximus and reminds us again that his ascetical teaching in the Pater Noster is centred on forgiveness. The neighbour is said to be a relative κατά φύσιν ,[758] a phrase that evokes the concept of concrete universal, Maximus' concern with unity and the tension between φύσις and ὑπόστασις in his work. This tension can become either creative in innovation or destructive in φιλαυτία , the former ensuring that men become true persons in possession of nature and so open to those in the same relationship to the same nature, the latter issuing in the stultification of person and the frustration of nature as well as its fragmentation through divisive γνῶμαι . Maximus sees the consequence of forgiveness as the gift of God's forgiveness to the one who prays sincerely and protection from future sin, which will include freedom from falling into temptation and the power of the Evil One.

Part III, 6,7[759]

We have seen already that this part of the Pater Noster is arranged from an ascetical point of view so that Maximus deals with the final petitions of the 'Our Father' and their corresponding mysteries in the first place and gives the desire to be liberated from temptation and the Evil One as motivation for undertaking what is demanded from man's effort in the other petitions. In Chapter III above, we have drawn attention to the crucial character of forgiveness and how its function

in the spiritual life is emphasized by the structure of language in this part of the Pater Noster. This is strengthened by the quotation from Scripture: 'If you will not forgive men their sins, neither will your heavenly Father forgive you yours'.[760] Forgiveness is the guarantee that we shall be forgiven; besides, it ensures that we shall overcome the law of sin and not be abandoned to the power of the Evil One. The main interest of this passage is the way it highlights faith and forgiveness as central to the 'Our Father' and so to the Christian life, which Maximus sees mirrored in the prayer. The exposition adds little to what we have seen already. The 'law of sin' is contrasted with actual sins and grammatically it is so placed that it is seen as a deeper problem than sins committed; it remains with man as the perverse dynamism of his gnome and so makes him liable to an ever deeper involvement in φιλαυτία . Maximus says that man is not allowed to enter the 'experience' of temptation. This will at least mean that he is assured of the 'way out'[761] of which St. Paul speaks, but we may too find in it a specifically monastic pre-occupation, to attain to perfect ἀπάθεια . Finally, Maximus evokes the Christological emphasis of the whole of Part I and the fundamental role of Logos in Part II by reminding his readers that it is Christ who wins the victory over the world, who gives men the commandments that ensure liberating virtue and who unites nature by ἀγάπη .

Conclusion[762]

Here Maximus returns to the complementary ideas of

θέωσις and κένωσις around which he organizes the whole treatise. He wants the purpose of the prayer to be a realization of how κένωσις has made θέωσις a real alternative to what man's perversity had engineered. The immediate consequence of this appreciative knowledge is love of God who offers man θέωσις . This love must be expressed by a life consistent with the prayer which will show God to be our Father and that we have rejected the Evil One. On the basis of the principle that each shares his properties with his associates, those who love God receive life while the devotees of the Evil One receive death. The latter is the effect of submission to voluntary temptation. Maximus distinguishes between temptations that are voluntary and involuntary, pleasurable and painful, deliberate and unbidden. The former beget sin, the latter avenge it. The place of the Evil One in the work of man's undoing is placed in relation to this twofold temptation: he bends himself to the first by seducing the soul with bodily pleasure in order to avert its desire from God; he seeks to corrupt nature, undermined by suffering, by contriving man's slander of God. The remedy for the voluntary temptation is to pray in order to keep desire informed by ἀγάπη ; the way to cope with the involuntary is to endure it and to demonstrate that we prefer the Creator of nature to nature. Prayer is then shown to be relevant to the latter kind of temptation as well. Calling on the name of Jesus should ensure that we are freed from present pleasures as well as future pains. This will come about through participation in the reality of the good things

to come, 'given us to be seen in Christ himself, our Lord, who alone with the Father and the Holy Spirit is glorified by all creation, Amen'.

We should now be in a better position to appreciate the theological resonances of that early statement of the 'mysteries' contained in the Pater Noster:[763]

> The text of the prayer will be found to contain the petition of all these things. For it speaks of the Father, of the Name of the Father and of the Kingdom. Besides, it presents the one who prays as being a son of this Father by grace. It asks that those in heaven and those on earth should become of one will. It commands us to ask for substantial bread. It prescribes reconciliation for men and binds nature to itself by forgiving and being forgiven, not being hacked asunder by the differences of free-will. It teaches us to ask not to enter into temptation which is the law of sin, and it recommends the avoidance of evil. For it was fitting that the author and giver of the benefits should also be a teacher to those who believe in Him and imitate his conduct in the flesh, providing the words of this prayer as precepts of life. Through these He revealed the hidden treasures of wisdom and knowledge that really exist in Him, clearly impelling the desire of those who pray to enjoy them.

# CHAPTER V

# THE CHRISTOLOGICAL DIMENSION

The purpose of this chapter is to complement the references to Christ and the Christian Mystery in the previous chapters so that we can fill out our understanding of how Maximus would have explained his Christology if asked about it. This will require attention to aspects of Christology and Soteriology that claimed his attention in a special way because of the needs of the Church in his time. The point of view will be that of the Confessor when he had entered into full possession of his thought about Christ and His saving intervention in the lives of men.

## (i) The Hypostatic Union

It is a commonplace of Maximian studies that the Christology of Maximus is a development of the dogmatic formulation of Chalcedon and his formulae illustrates in a concise way his power of enclosing a whole doctrinal tradition in the space of a few words. Chalcedon had spoken of μία ὑπόστασις and ἐν δυσίν φύσεσιν,(1) where the principle of contradiction is respected in the contrast of hypostasis and nature, so that Christ can be both one and two at the same time, but from a different point of view, thus transcending the limitations of Eutychian monophysitism and the two-person teaching of Nestorianism. The language of Chalcedon spells out the implications of Cyril's μία φύσις τοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη(2) by the juxtaposition of ὑπόστασις and φύσις and the use of ἐν with the

natures, echoing Cyril's τέλειος ἐν θεότητι..... καί ἐν ἀνθρωπότητι ,(3) but rounding it off with ἐν δυαίν φύσεσιν ,(4) which in turn is caught in the ἐν οἷς of the Maximian formula that we shall examine below. Although Cyril had conceded the appropriateness of the ἐκ δύο φύσεων (5) as a way of ensuring that the duality in Christ was not overlooked in concern for His unity, this phrase does not occur in the terminology of Chalcedon. Eutyches was prepared to admit that the unity of Christ proceeded in some way from δύο , but his intentions are clarified by Dioscorus Alexandrinus' ἐκ δύο οὐ δύο .(6) The close association of ἐκ and οὐ in this way of thinking accounts for its omission by those who drafted the Chalcedonian formula.(7) Neither ἐκ nor ἐν appear in the language of the Antiochians contributing to the Union Symbol, but the duality is affirmed by saying that 'Christ is the two natures'. The Neo-Chalcedonians, keen to redress the balance by Cyrillian emphasis, used ἐκ and ἐν in relation to the natures of Christ as in no way mutually exclusive, so that we find them co-ordinated in Neo-Chalcedonian writing.(8) Maximus was the first to add the Antiochian <u>esti</u> to the Neo-Chalcedonian pair. He sums up his insight into the relationship between the person and the natures in Christ in a formula that comprises the distinctness of the subject from the natures with the identity of the subject with the natures and in such a way that the duality of the natures remains intact: the natures ἐξ ὧν καί ἐν οἷς καί ἅπερ ἐστίν .(9)

In the formula of Maximus, the ἐκ and the ἐν indicate

some kind of distinction between the unique subject and the natures, a distinction that is elsewhere formulated as that between the whole and the parts.(10) The ἐκ does not imply any pre-existence of the humanity of Christ, but emphasises the logical anteriority of the natures to their union. The ἐν emphasizes the permanence of the two natures in the union. It is associated with the Leonine view: salva igitur proprietate utriusque naturae et in unam coeunte personam..In integra ergo veri hominis perfectaque natura verus natus est Deus, totus in suis, totus in nostris". The ἐστίν insists on the fact that there is not a third quid in Christ, that, whatever hypostasis may be, it is not reducible to the essential order and at the same time it can be identified with that order, without doing violence to the principle of contradiction.(12) Maximus will insist that Christ is not anything else but His natures.(13) The 'who' is identified with the two 'what's without being reduced to them. In a sense He has them. In the Incarnation we have a unique subject, distinct in some way from the natures. The Greek philosophical tradition concentrated on the world of quiddities and there is no attempt to define the meaning of hypostasis at Chalcedon, but it is affirmed and points the way to a resolution of the problems caused by trying to grasp the significance of the Incarnation in a merely quidditative way. The solutions of Eutyches and Nestorius were seen by their orthodox contemporaries and by Maximus to have failed to take sufficient account of the way in which ὑπόστασις at once transcends and is identified with the order of φύσις , how πῶς εἶναι can preserve the

unity of the being of Christ without damaging the integrity of the ἁπλῶς εἶναι of divinity and humanity. In the development of doctrine that followed Chalcedon, new insights would be gained in the order of hypostasis, particularly in the work of the Leontii, whose ontological formulae would serve to underpin the particularising characteristics of Cappadocian teaching already incorporated into Christology.(14) Chalcedon had done enough by drawing attention to another order of being. Maximus could avail of the theological developments, by which the appreciation of the meaning and relevance of hypostasis had been enhanced, to give a comprehensiveness to his formulae which had not been attained by the theologians at Chalcedon.

The most systematic exposition of the views of Maximus on the Monophysite heresy is to be found in Epistola XV.(15) After a laborious analysis of the possible types of union and the bearing of this on the mystery of Christ, Maximus says: 'Christ therefore has what is common and what is proper to each of the members of which He is composed'.(16) This is his answer to Cosmas the Deacon, to whom the letter is addressed and who has asked him: 'What is the common and the universal and what is the particular and the proper, so that henceforth the whole question of the union may become clear to us'.(17) The 'union', to which he refers, is that of the natures in Christ. Maximus tells him that 'according to the Fathers, therefore, the common and the universal is the essence and the nature, for they say that the two are identical. The proper and the particular is the hypostasis and the person, both being identical'.(18) In his analysis of the types of union,

he rejects the possibility of a direct union of natures and throws considerable light on the mystery of the union in hypostasis of the divine and human natures of Christ.

For Maximus the order of nature and the order of hypostasis are irreducible to one another and this principle holds good in every realm of being:

> For an angel is distinguished from another angel, a man from another man, an ox from another ox, a dog from another dog, according to hypostasis and not according to nature and essence...even in the First Cause, without origin and creator of everything, we see that nature and hypostasis are not identical, for we recognize one only essence and nature of the divinity existing in three hypostases, distinct from each other by their properties...unbegottenness, begottenness and procession, which do not divide the unique nature and the power of the ineffable divinity into three essences or unequal natures, or even into equal ones, but which characterize the persons in whom is the unique divinity and who are themselves this divinity.(19)

Consubstantiality is only possible between beings that have nature in common; distinctness proceeds from what is proper to them, or as Maximus says here from what 'characterizes' them, so that hypostasis is from one point of view 'the distinctive characteristics of each being'.(20) The union of hypostatically distinct beings must be in the order of nature:

> The things which are united according to one and only essence and nature, that is that are of one and the same essence and nature, they are on the one hand entirely consubstantial and on the other hypostatically distinct.(21)

They are consubstantial because of their essential community, which they enjoy immoveably because of their natural identity; personal distinctness accounts for hypostatic difference:

> each one possesses with the complex of properties that are his the principle of hypostasis that belongs to him most properly.(22)

Maximus then comes to the kind of union, for the understanding of which he has embarked on this analysis: things which are united according to one and the same hypostasis or person are of the same hypostasis but of different essences. He elaborates this by saying that they are ὁμοϋπόστατα (23) by reason of the personal and indivisible unit which is realized by their union; it is the reason by which the distinctive properties, which mark each one off from its own essential community, become characteristic of the unique hypostasis wrought from them by the fact that they come together in being. Hypostasis is that by which their unity, which admits no division, is recognized. The beings which find unity in this way are necessarily distinct in essence: 'each one respects irreducibly the principle of the substance of the other'.(24)

To Maximus the λόγος of nature is inviolable, something indestructible that retains the consistency granted it at creation, so that there can be no possibility of a fusion of natures.(25) There can be no question of consubstantiality between natures as such, but only between individuals of the same species, that possess the same essence. The only possibility of union for natures is in the same hypostasis and, from what we have seen, Maximus understands this to happen through the distinctive properties of each nature which mark it off in the individual from all the others of the same species. The hypostasis of two natures, the common

hypostasis or what Maximus calls in the case of Christ the ὑπόσταασις σύνθετος , would be marked by the sum of the distinctive properties peculiar to each nature involved in the union. Accepting the current theory of the union of soul and body, Maximus sees it as exemplifying the hypostatic union of two distinct natures. The sum of the properties peculiar to the body and soul of 'Paul' is what gives its identity to his hypostasis. They are his.

Maximus applies the result of his enquiry to the problems of Christology:

> The Word of God himself teaches us clearly that He is perfect in essence and nature, by which He is identical and consubstantial with the Father and the Spirit, wholly preserving without confusion the personal difference in keeping with his person, his hypostasis, according to which He is different from the Father and the Spirit. He has taken flesh of the Holy Spirit and the holy Mother of God, Mary ever-virgin and has become man perfectly. That means that He became a perfect man by the assumption of a flesh, having an intelligible and reasonable soul, flesh which receives in Him both its nature and its hypostasis, that is to say being (εἶναι) and subsistence ( ὑφεστᾶναι ) . From its conception it is together with the Word, because the Word himself took the place of the seed (or rather, He is the seed) of His own voluntary Incarnation. Thus He became composite as regards hypostasis. He who, in his nature, is simple and not composed.(26)

The union that took place in the Incarnation must belong to the second of the two categories which Maximus has outlined above, so that he can conclude that Christ was not divided by the natural difference of His members, nor confused by the hypostatic unity. By reason of the community of essence of each of the members of which He is composed, He is united to the Father and to his Mother by nature, showing that He safeguards the difference of the members of which He is composed.(27) By

reason of the hypostatic particularity of his proper members which distinguish Him from the individual terms, that is his Father and his Mother, the unity of his own hypostasis appeared completely without differentiation, enjoying the unity of his own members among themselves in the highest personal identity. From this we can see that, for Maximus, Christ maintains community of nature with his Father and his Mother; at the same time the particularities of his two natures unite to form one only hypostasis. Maximus is explicit about this:

> The hypostatic particularity of each of the members, of which Christ is composed in his unity, has resulted in a common characteristic (ἀπετέλεσεν γνώρισμα κοινόν ) , a characteristic which marks the hypostasis and which they constitute together: for we say that the unique hypostasis has become common to the flesh and to the divinity by an ineffable union.(28)

Here we see clearly that the distinctiveness of the characteristics of the natures is identified with the unique hypostasis of the Logos. 'The hypostatic particularity' of each nature marks the hypostasis of the Logos. The hypostatic fusion of these characteristics results in γνώρισμα κοινόν . This gives us an astonishing insight into the mystery of the Incarnation; the flesh is truly the flesh of the Only-begotten Son of God; all its individual traits are determined by His eternal personality and they reveal it. This extends to every dimension of His being and life as man. It marks His style.

Maximus then proceeds to draw out the implications of this union in order to offset unorthodox claims and to throw into relief the orthodox dimensions of the

mystery. This he does firstly from the point of view of the flesh that the Logos assumed and then from the point of view of the assuming Logos:

> The flesh has not preserved the difference with regard to the Logos by the properties which distinguish it from other men; nor again was it distinguished from us by the properties that make it different from the Logos. But it preserved the hypostatic union or identity with the Logos by the properties which distinguish it from us, just as it has kept the essential difference from the Logos by that by which it is united to us naturally. Just as the Logos also has preserved the hypostatic union or identity with the flesh by the properties which distinguish Him as Son and Logos from what is common in the divinity and being united by essence to the Father and the Spirit by the properties according to which, as God, He preserves the difference of nature in relation to the flesh, He combined both the difference and the identity between Himself and the extremes.(29)

Maximus concludes that He has both the common and the proper of each of the members of which He is composed. When we recall the way in which Maximus has defined this for Cosmas, his notion of ὑπόστασις σύνθετος forces itself on our attention. We shall examine that below. Here he is emphasising that what distinguishes the Logos as Son is what unites Him with what distinguishes Him as man, while the union leaves intact what He has in common with the Father and the Spirit on the one hand and on the other with all men.

The Cappadocians had established that the three hypostases in the Holy Trinity were one οὐσία in an absolute manner, not merely as human persons share in one human nature, but in that each of the Three Persons in the Trinity was identified with the totality of the divine substance in its numerical identity. For Basil, for instance, the persons were distinguished among

themselves by identifying particularities (γνωριστικαί ἰδιότητες ) , the Father being unbegotten, the Son being begotten and the Holy Spirit proceeding. These are the only distinctive traits of the Three Persons; all the other attributes of God are common to the Three in the same way that οὐσία is, so that the Three Persons have only one will and one operation.(30) In fact, very often the unity of the nature is deduced from the unity of the operation of the Three Persons. Maximus clarifies his understanding of the terminology in keeping with the usage of the tradition: 'the essence and the nature, it is the same thing';(31) 'the hypostasis and the person, it is the same thing'.(32) In fact he sees the application of the notions of nature and hypostasis to everything that exists: 'the state of existence is contemplated in substance and in hypostasis'.(33) But Maximus is primarily interested in the trinitarian mystery of three hypostases in one nature and the Christological mystery of one person in two natures. The terminology which the Cappadocians had elaborated with such finesse in order to speak coherently about the mystery of the Holy Trinity without endangering its apophatic character was gradually transferred to the area of Christology and applied with equal refinement there. While terms like ὕπαρξις, γέννησις, τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως were practically synonymous with ὑπόστασις in the evolution of this terminology, οὐσία and φύσις found a counterpart in λόγος φύσεως .(34) The pair λόγος - τρόπος would become a way of extending the φύσις - ὑπόστασις distinction and giving it a wider applica-

tion in drawing out the implications of the Hypostatic Union.(35) Before we turn our attention to that it will be instructive to consider an extended passage from the Opuscula Theologica et Polemica(36) where we find Maximus making fine use of Cappadocian terminology not merely to show trinitarian heterodoxy because of a failure to do justice to the required balance between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις , but in a parallel manner demonstrating how a neglect of the same principles in Christology led to comparable distortions of Christian truth. The principal value of this is that it lets Maximus speak for himself! On the two natures of Christ:

1. Arius confesses the three hypostases, but denies the Unity and he does not say that the Holy Trinity is consubstantial. Sabellius confesses the Unity, but denies the Trinity, because he says that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are the same. The Church of God both confesses the Unity and proclaims the Trinity. Macedonius honours the same things as Arius because he supposes that the Holy Spirit is a creature; the Church proclaims the Spirit consubstantial with the Father and the Son and affirms that He is God. Similarly, Nestorius says that there is a natural difference with respect to One of the Holy Trinity, but he does not confess the union, because he does not say that this union comes about according to hypostasis. Eutyches confesses the union, but denies the difference in substance and introduces a confusion of the natures. The Church venerates the union according to hypostasis because of the inseparability and the difference according to substance because of the absence of confusion.

2. How does the strict union comprise both identity and heterogeneity, the identity of substances and the heterogeneity of persons and vice versa? Just as in the Holy Trinity there is identity of substance and heterogeneity of persons, since we confess one only substance and three hypostases, so in man there is identity of person and heterogeneity of substances, since man being one, the soul is of one substance and the body of another; likewise in our Lord Jesus Christ there is identity of person and heterogeneity of substances, since the person is one, that is the hypostasis, but the divinity is of one substance and the humanity of another substance. Just as it is impossible to confess the unity of the Holy Trinity without affirming the difference, so it is entirely necessary with regard to the One of the Holy Trinity to proclaim both the union and the difference.

3. Just as in the Holy Trinity the difference and the unity are not signified by the same expressions, but in saying three hypostases the difference is signified and in confessing one only substance the unity is signified, so with regard to the One of the Holy Trinity, in recognizing the two natures, the difference is signified and in proclaiming the one composite hypostasis the union is confessed.

4. For just as we anathematize Arius not for proclaiming the difference with regard to hypostasis in the Holy Trinity, but for not declaring the unity of the nature, so we anathematize Nestorius not for recognizing the difference of nature in Christ, but for not declaring that there is a union according to hypostasis.

5. Just as we anathematize Sabellius not for proclaiming the unity of nature in the Holy Trinity, but for not saying that there is a difference according to hypostasis, so we anathematize Eutyches not for saying that there is a union according to hypostasis in Christ, but for not recognizing the difference of nature.

6. As regards the difference according to hypostasis with regard to the Holy Trinity and difference of nature with regard to the One of the Holy Trinity, it must be said that it is not in the realm of perception but is known by the eyes of the spirit. How as regards the Holy Trinity do you affirm the three hypostases because of the difference in hypostasis, while with regard to the One of the Holy Trinity you do not affirm two natures in one only hypostasis because of difference of nature?

7. Just as because of the consubstantiality of the Holy Trinity you say that there is one substance only and because of the difference of hypostasis you say that there are three hypostases, likewise because of difference of substance of the Logos and the flesh say that there are two substances, and because of the absence of its own hypostasis say that there is one hypostasis only.

8. Just as in the case of the Holy Trinity it is not by the confusion of the three hypostases that we say that there is one substance, nor by the suppression of the one substance that there are three hypostases, so with regard to the One of the Trinity it is not by the confusion of the two natures that we say that there is one hypostasis nor by division of the unique hypostasis that there are two natures.

9. He who does not say that in Christ there is union according to hypostasis because of the difference of natures is Nestorian; he who does not say that there is a difference of nature in the union according to hypostasis is Eutychian. He who proclaims as regards the One of the Holy Trinity both the union according to hypostasis and the difference of nature, holds the royal and blemeless faith.

10. He therefore who says that there is difference and union with regard to Christ does not suppress the difference nor confuse the union. For the divine Cyril anathematizes those who suppress the union according to hypostasis because of the difference and the Ecumenical Council anathematizes those who suppress the difference of nature because of the union according to hypostasis in the One of the Holy Trinity.

It would take us far beyond the scope of this essay to analyse fully this remarkable passage from the works of St. Maximus. Sherwood thinks that it represents the position defended by Maximus before the Severian bishops in Crete.(37) It has been introduced here primarily to demonstrate how Maximus can combine a survey of Trinitarian errors with a similar conspectus of Christological heresies by showing what happens when a proper balance is not maintained between the notion of ὑπόστασις and the notion of οὐσία in both areas. It also proves that by the time of Maximus the transfer of the Trinitarian terminology to the question of Christology had been completed. He was not unaware of the opposition to this way of doing theology put up by Monophysites and Monothelites, but he relies on the resources of analogy to guarantee the authentic coherence of his position and ultimately this is validated by the fact that the Son who became flesh is 'the object of theology'(38) with the Father, so that there cannot be a break between Economy and Theology.

In the Disputatio cum Pyrrho, Maximus insists on the analogical character of the notions applied to God and to creatures. The term φύσις is used ὁμονύμως in its application to God, to men and to angels.(39) The wise theologian uses his terms

conscious of their analogical flexibility.(40) But, as Doucet points out with regard to the notion of nature, there is 'a unity of signification sufficient to legitimise the use in Christology of the patristic principles of argumentation based on this notion and its trinitarian use'.(41) He illustrates this by quoting Maximus: 'the difference of wills entails as well a difference of natures'.(42) Maximus is reversing the direction of an argument used in relation to the Holy Trinity: identity of will entails identity of nature. Here he argues the contrary: if there are two natures in Christ, then there must be two wills in Him as well. What matters to Maximus is the indissoluble bond between nature and will in both Theology and Economy and the necessity of equality of number between them: where there is one nature there is one will; where there are two natures, there must be two wills. The principle survives the analogical transpositions. It is this that the Monophysites and Monothelites dispute. Maximus indulges in reductiones ad absurdum to show that their positions are untenable.

The other principle which Maximus keeps in mind in his use of trinitarian terminology in the elaboration of Christological questions is that Theology and Economy are in continuity because of the identity of the eternal Logos made flesh. In the courses of his exchanges with Pyrrhus, the latter objects to the principle that what is proper to the substance is proper to the operation on the grounds that it holds in Theology but not in Economy. Maximus counters that if this is so then after the

Incarnation the Son cannot be the object of Theology as the Father is and so cannot be invoked in the baptismal formula with the result that the faith and preaching would be in vain.(43) He then asks Pyrrhus to whom passages of Scripture,(44) which he cites, can be applied if not to the Incarnate Logos. The implication is that the Incarnate Logos can be the subject of predication that is equally valid in Theology and Economy.

In Adversus Eunomium Libri Duo(45) we find the author illustrating his understanding of τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως , with an anthropological example that shows different τρόποι of one λόγος τῆς οὐσίας . This refers to the birth of Christ from Mary. The concern in this context is trinitarian, but the possibilities for Christology were not lost on Maximus as we shall see in Opusculum IV, where he gives as proof of the consubstantiality of Christ with us, in spite of the uniqueness of His begetting, the example of the the consubstantiality of the godhood in the Father and Son, even though they have different τρόποι ὑπάρξεως .

The Antiochians insisted on the reality of the human nature of Christ and the integrity of his human traits. For them He is ὁμοούσιος ἡμῖν . Eustathius insists that the soul of Christ as well as his flesh is ὁμοούσιος with that of men.(46) This is not to claim that the humanity of Christ is numerically one with that of other men, but it does affirm a specific unity with them. For Cyril, the Logos is consubstantial with the Father and with us. Cyril draws attention to the two meanings of ὁμοούσιος .(47) In the case of the

commonness of nature that Christ enjoys with His Father it is a matter of ταυτότης ; with men it is characterized by ὁμοιότης .(48) But even if the Fathers who contrived the transfer of trinitarian terminology to that of Christology used the κοινόν of Aristotle, it must not be thought that they interpreted it as abstract. For them the nature is made to be concrete in the persons who possess it, even if, in the case of men, it is not possessed in its numerical totality by each one of them as obtains in the case of the Persons of the Holy Trinity, identified with the totality of the divine nature.(49) The most economic way of discovering the play of fundamental concepts will be to examine Opusculum IV

> According to nature, the human in the Saviour is not other than the human in us, but is identical with it in essence, without any difference, because it was taken from our own nature, by the ineffable assumption from the virginal and immaculate blood of the all-pure Mother of God. United to this blood, like seed, the Logos became flesh without ceasing to be God in essence. Perfect man, He was like us, with the exception of sin alone. By sin, we often revolt and oppose God by the will, which in us inclines from one side to the other; but He, being by nature free from all sin because He was not a mere man, but God made man, had nothing in Him that was opposed to God. He preserved our nature completely pure and immaculate. It is thus that He says: 'The Prince of this world comes and in Me he finds nothing' (Jn 14,30), nothing of all that by which we show contrariety of will, thus depraving our nature. Because of this contrariety which is in us, Christ himself was said to be insubordinate until He freed us from it by the power of His Incarnation. Because of all that He became on our account and because of all He willingly did for us, He has confirmed the truth of His Incarnation, without ever falsifying our nature or anything that belongs to it in a natural and irreproachable manner, even though He divinized this nature itself with all its properties, like an incandescent piece of iron, rendering it entirely capable of accomplishing divine works in concentrating it by the union, having become one with it, without confusion, according to the same unique hypostasis.(50)

Behind this whole passage is the Chalcedonian expression ὁμοούσιος ἡμῖν κατά τήν ἀνθρωπότητα .(51) Although Maximus is sensitive to the impenetrable character of the mystery of the Incarnation, 'the ineffable assumption', to which he refers above, he wants to grasp more adequately how the physical identity of Christ with us was possible without detriment to His divine or human nature. He immediately draws attention to the unique manner of Christ's conception where the Logos in person assumes the function of the seed that plays an essential part in the origin of everyman. In this way Maximus can emphasize the uniqueness of the conception of the Logos as man. In the thought of Maximus hypostatic mode, τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως and τρόπος τῆς γεννήσεως are virtually synonymous so that the mode of Christ's conception is a declaration of His personal identity.(52) This is bound up with the trinitarian notion of τρόπος and its implications of origin and relationship and in this Christological context it is meant to evoke these associations.(53) Hypostatic assumption does no violence to natural integrity.

Maximus then turns his attention to the sinlessness of Christ. Lethel has pointed out that here we are in the presence of the first affirmation of the human will of Christ in the works of Maximus and indeed that this is a totally new departure in the patristic understanding of the play of the human will in His humanity and in salvation.(54) Sin is presented as a perverse attitude of the will, opposed not merely to nature, but to the God of nature.(55) The absence of sin in Christ does

not imply any diminishing of human nature in Him; on the contrary the assumed nature enjoys a wholeness in Him that is unique, since there can be no question of that ἐναντίωσις of the will that perverts nature and stunts its possibility of actualization in unfettered freedom. The absence of sin enhances the fact of His being ὁμοούσιος ἡμῖν. The divinisation of the assumed nature in the Hypostatic Union enables nature to attain to its divinely willed destiny by enabling it to go out of itself in freedom to share in divine life. It should be noted that when Maximus uses the traditional image of incandescent iron to suggest the transformation of nature wrought in divinization, he is careful to qualify it by reminding us that this takes place κατά τήν αὐτήν καί μίαν ὑπόστασιν.(56) Even in the intimacy of περιχώρησις the ἀσυγχύτως of Chalcedon is emphasized.

The text of Opusculum IV continues:

> Consequently His humanity differs from ours, not by the λόγος of nature, but by the new τρόπος of His coming to be, being by nature identical with it, but in keeping with the absence of seed not being identical with it, because this human nature was not that of a mere man, but belonged to Him, who for us was made man. Likewise His will was on the one hand truly natural like ours, on the other, it was characterized divinely in a way superior to ours. It is clear, in fact, that the presence or absence of seed does not distinguish the nature, but that they are distinguished with regard to the same nature; the same holds for unbegottenness and begottenness.(57)

Sherwood has drawn attention to the development of the use of τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως and λόγος τῆς οὐσίας by the Cappadocians, which provided new insight into the problem of unity in diversity as exemplified in

trinitarian theology.(55) Unity is to be found in the essential realm, the order of what, τό τί ἐστιν, while diversity has to do with the dimension of how, τό ὅπως ἐστιν , the realm of the hypostatic.(59) We find this trinitarian usage in the works of Maximus. For instance in the Mystagogia he says that God is monad κατά τόν τῆς οὐσίας ἤτοι τοῦ εἶναι λόγον , while He is triad κατά τόν τοῦ πῶς ὑπάρχειν καί ὑφεστᾶναι τρόπον .(60) Maximus was probably the first theologian to transfer the trinitarian terminology to Christology.(61) We find it for instance in Ambigua 36. Contrasting the creation of the first man with the recreation of man in Christ he says of the assumed nature:

> Thus on the one hand it remains in the λόγος of being according to which it was created and is, having properly its being undiminished in any way; on the other hand, having taken subsistence divinely by the λόγος of how-being, it neither knows nor allows absolutely any inclination of movement towards any other thing.(62)

The principle is at work here although the terminology has not yet attained its definitive form. Commenting on this text, Riou reminds us that ὑφεστᾶναι is the equivalent of ὑπόστασις and that τρόπος is used for this principle from Ambigua 41 onwards in the works of Maximus.(63) The λόγος - τρόπος distinction enables Maximus to transcend the impasse of a theology too heavily dependent on hellenistic thought-models, with their undue emphasis on the essential dimension of being, something exemplified in the aberrations of Nestorianism and Monophysitism, the former denying the possibility of a real union of natures, the latter blurring the edges of the natural components. More profoundly it enables him

to write lucidly about the relationship of God and man in Christ and through that insight to illuminate the relationship of the whole creation to God. As long as the principle that 'there is evidently union of things in so far as their natural distinction is preserved'(64) is held in the elaboration of Christology and anthropology, the human in Christ and in all men can be allowed its full scope without prejudice to the divine sovereignty or the minimisation of the function of θέωσις . The terms λόγος and τρόπος allow Maximus to extend the implications of the distinction between φύσις and ὑπόστασις as we see in Opusculum IV. The λόγος which is associated with nature is here contrasted with the τρόπος that is associated with person, but the latter term can be made to describe the manner of His coming to be in a way that the term ὑπόστασις does not allow. The humanity of Christ is identical with ours with regard to its λόγος , but it enjoys a difference in its τρόπος . The fact that the hypostatic περιχώρησις of the Logos and His humanity gives this humanity a unique status does not undermine the fact of his ὁμοούσιος ἡμῖν . Maximus insists on the natural identity between Christ and other men; a difference there may be, but it is not in the natural order, but in some other realm of being. This is made manifest by 'the new τρόπος of His coming to be'. σπορά and ἀσπορία are clues to a contrast in hypostases, the former being associated with 'a mere man', the latter with Him who became man. But the contrast in the manner of coming to be does not have to imply a difference in nature. The close link between the manner

of coming to be and distinctiveness of the hypostasis has obvious associations with the Cappadocian use of τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως and its development from meaning mode of origin to relational mode of being in the Holy Trinity.(65) The example of the will is introduced to illustrate the point which Maximus is making. Because the possessor of the will is more than a mere man and because He uses it in a way above nature, does not in any way change its natural status nor undermine its λόγος .

The λόγος - τρόπος distinction then, which St. Maximus uses so effectively, has a polymorphous quality which ensures that it can be applied in different areas of theology and it is the principle of a striking synthetic character in his thought. Apart from its use in the theology of the Trinity, Maximus transposed it to Christology, where he points out that the human in us is not other than that in the Saviour but that it enjoys a unique mode of existence.(66) The new mode has its ground in the Hypostasis of the Logos and it is demonstrated in His paradoxical conception without seed and the miraculous birth that tightens the bonds of virginity in His Mother.(67) It becomes evidenttoo in the blameless life of Christ, particularly in the way in which He uses His human will.(68) Maximus can extend this polarity to anthropology and interpret human destiny as the progressive innovation of the λόγος of nature by the τρόπος of existence,(69) something realized in Christ and made effective in men by the action of the Holy Spirit.

The Cappadocian provenance of the terminology, applied in Opusculum IV to Christological questions,

becomes clear in the following comparison with the hypostatic properties in the Trinity, unbegottenness and begottenness:

> If the Logos, in so far as He is man, differs from us in nature because of His seedless conception, He would, in so far as He is God, have necessarily a difference from His Father in essence because of His begottenness, for unbegottenness and begottenness are not identical. We too, in the same way, would differ in nature from the old Adam and Eve, who came into existence without seed, since the former was the handiwork of God and the latter was a slip from that handiwork. In reality, the Son is the very same thing as the Father, by the divinity, since He is God and consubstantial. Likewise, we too, by the humanity, are of the same stock as Adam and Eve and God himself incarnate for us; we are consubstantial with them. Therefore, just as the terms 'unbegotten' and 'begotten' are not the essence of God - who would dare to say so? - so conception without seed and conception with seed are in no way the nature of humanity.(70)

The τρόπος of the coming to be of Adam and Eve is added to the example of the mysterious hypostatic properties of the Father and the Son to show that the order of τρόπος does not violate the order of λόγος. These examples are invoked to strengthen the claim of Maximus that the Christ is ὁμοούσιος ἡμῖν in spite of the uniqueness of His begetting as man. Maximus then proceeds to clarify a misinterpretation of a passage of Gregory of Nazianzus' Oratio I de Filio.(71) Lethel has remarked how crucial this excerpt from Gregory was to the Monothelite debate.(72) Gregory gives the impression that the human in Christ was different from that in other men. Since the will is drawn into the argument to illustrate the integrity of the nature, it is no surprise that it is the power of willing, nearer to the nature, that is put forward here rather than acts of will.

> The great theologian Gregory says nothing, not even apparently, that would lead to the belief that the human in the Saviour is other than the human in us. Some have thought so nevertheless because of what he says: 'We would say that these words express the language of a man, not of him whom we consider in the Saviour, for His will is not contrary to God since it is totally divinized, but of a man of our sort, in that the human will does not always follow the divine will, but that most often it resists it and struggles against it'. What in Him is human is truly His, not being of an essence or nature other than ours, but as existing in the same unique hypostasis, by Him and in Him, and not separately in itself nor produced on its own as in our case. The human in Him had for its seed the Logos himself who innovated the super-added mode of birth. Thus what is human has contrived to subsist divinely in Him and at the same time to exist in a natural fashion, so that what is ours should be confirmed and that what is above us should be held in faith.(73)

The most obvious thing about this passage is again the unequivocal assertion of the normality of the human nature of Christ; it is identical with that of other men in everything that pertains to nature; it is ὁμοούσιος

But Maximus at once points out the contrast between how the humanity of Christ exists and how that of other men exists. The latter exists separately in itself; it is produced on its own; by implication it exists in itself and by itself. These expressions refer to the way in which human persons exist: they subsist. Again Maximus refers to significant τρόπος γεννήσεως of the Logos as man where He was his own seed. The mode of His conception points to the unique mode of existence of His humanity. It exists in a natural fashion. The use of εἶναι should be noted. Here Maximus is saying that the state of the human nature's being outside causes and outside nothing is comparable to that of everyman. It is its subsistence, its mode of existence, that is different. It lacks a proper subsistence. This humanity does not

stand by itself, nor in itself; it is not for itself nor because of itself. The Logos extends His subsistence to His humanity so that He subsists in it and it exists in Him. 'What is human has contrived to subsist divinely in Him'.

Heinzer has drawn attention to the fact that Maximus brings Neo-Chalcedonian terms into play in order to confirm what he has already said in a Cappadocian manner.(74) John the Grammarian seems to have been the first to complement the idiomatic definition of hypostasis by pointing to subsistence as the basic factor in its constitution.(75) Καθ' ἑαυτόν εἶναι is what, for him, ultimately distinguishes the person as person. The definition of ὑπόστασις as ἰδιώματα made its use in Christology scabrous, as it was open to the exaggerations of both Nestorianism and Monophysitism, but emphasis on subsistence secured the notion hypostasis for Christology and made way for a fruitful use of the ὑπόστασις - οὐσία pair. In his acknowledgement of the usefulness of ὑπόστασις and οὐσία (76) in Christology, Leontius of Byzantium uses both definitions of hypostasis. We find the Cappadocian terminology: ἡ μέν ὑπόστασις ἀφορίζει τοῖς χαρακτηριστικοῖς ἰδιώμασι (77) complemented by the notion of subsistence: ἡ μέν γάρ φύσις τόν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον ἐπιδέχεται · ἡ δέ ὑπόστασις καί τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτόν εἶναι . (78) This made it possible to use the notion of hypostasis not only for different beings of the same nature, but it could henceforth safely be made to denote a being made up of different natures. With the ontological ground now the predominant factor

in hypostasis the assumed nature in the hypostatic union can be ascribed ἀφοριστικά ἰδιώματα (79) without danger of Nestorianism. There is no fear of a second hypostasis because the Logos is the principle of individuation as well. It is this ontological notion of person that Maximus is denying to the humanity of Christ in the passage from the Opusculum IV that we are examining. It is οὐ καθ' ἑαυτό χωρίς , but rather participates in the καθ' ἑαυτόν of the eternal Logos, being ὀι ' ἐκεῖνον καί ἐν ἐκείνῳ.(80) The fact that it lacks a proper subsistence does not deprive it of what is proper to human nature. It is grounded in the subsistence of the Logos and thus lacks nothing in the order of hypostasis which it would enjoy through a proper subsistence. The claim that its 'actual being is the divine personal existence of the Logos himself'(81) does not exclude the possibility of holding that the existence proper to the humanity of the Logos is created provided that we do not deny to it the personal existence of the eternal Son of God. We shall return to this point below.

Maximus concludes his argument by saying:

> In every case we must hold, on the one hand, both the nature assumed by the God-Logos himself, who became incarnate and was made man perfectly for us, and its natural properties without which there is absolutely no nature, but only a hollow appearance, and on the other hand, safeguard the union where the assumed nature is conserved in its natural diversity, while the union is recognized in the hypostatic identity. Thus it must be shown that in its totality, the λόγος of the Economy is at once without confusion and without division.(82)

Maximus can confidently dismiss any Docetic interpretation of the humanity of Christ, not merely in its extreme form, but in the more relevant hetereodoxies of his day where

the emphasis on mono in Christ tended to play down the integrity of His humanity. Maximus is telling us here that Christ's humanity is integral, even if it came into being and subsists in an unprecedented way. This is something of incalculable consequence for mankind and its redemption. He has been able to show this by the contrast of λόγος and τρόπος in the constitution of the Incarnate Logos and His coming to be. He has been able to strengthen his demonstration by the superimposition of Neo-Chalcedonian terminology on that distinction, thus deepening the concept of hypostasis and allowing him to underline the coincidence of natural diversity and hypostatic identity as the status of the human nature assumed by the Logos.

(ii) The Body-Soul Analogy

Although the Council of Chalcedon canonized the use of the terms φύσις and ὑπόστασις as a way of speaking about the mystery of the union of humanity and divinity in the person of Christ,(83) the efforts of Monophysites to reject the terminology and of Nestorians to interpret it in a way that would support their position gave rise to long and tortuous arguments about the precise mode of composition in the mystery of the Incarnation. In these debates the analogy of body and soul resulting in one hypostasis found prominence, especially in the writings of Leontius of Byzantium.(84) But it was St. Maximus the Confessor who so refined the use of the comparison that it could not be turned to advantage by heterodox thinkers. He found in the example

of body and soul an illustration of the unity of humanity and divinity in Christ. Here he considered that there were two natures united ontologically and without confusion to make one person.(85) The Monophysites had lighted on the weakness of Leontius' use of the analogy by insisting that if he were right in claiming that two complete substances were hypostatically united in the human person, then there must be either one nature in Christ or three.(86) It was inevitable that this model of unity in diversity should lead to monophysite exaggeration since the intimate unity of soul and body implies 'one human nature' which can refer to ὑπόσταασις , but must also denote φύσις to ensure an ontological union and not merely a relational one.(87) If a Cyril can select the hypostatic dimension for emphasis, a Severus can just as inevitably isolate the natural unity for his own purposes.(88)

When Sophronius attacked the christological interpolation of the Trisagion, he showed that it contained the refined monophysitism of Severus which attributed to Christ a 'composite nature' in the sense that human attributes were assumed directly into the divine nature.(89) St. Maximus was no less concerned because of the insidious nature of this caricature of the mystery of the Incarnation and it was his desire to expose its heterodoxy that urged him to the splendid teaching on composite hypostasis that we find in his writings and which served him so well in his analyses of the Monothelite and Monenergistic errors and his defence of orthodox tradition.(90) Severus had been explicit: 'the properties of the humanity become those of the divinity of the Logos'.(91) It is this which gives

rise to a 'composite nature'. Severus thought of the Word Incarnate assuming human qualities as a new state of being of his divinity,(92) 'of the unique divine incarnate nature of the Logos'.(93) While Severus, in contrast to the cruder Monophysitism of Eutyches, held to the permanence in some sense of the human element in Christ after the union, yet his teaching constituted a double menace to the mystery of Christ: by a docetic-like reduction of Christ's humanity, he undermined the reality of His created being; by obscuring the transcendence of His divine aseity he assailed the majesty of His uncreated being.(94) Garrigues has noted that it was the refusal of the monophysites to accept the transposition of trinitarian distinctions to christology, because of a mistaken fidelity to Cyril's terms, which led them to depreciate what enabled him to speak of 'Christ, One of the Trinity', that is the firm delimiting of the notion of hypostasis, which would evolve into 'composite hypostasis' in a christological context.(95)

St. Maximus vindicated the usefulness of the psychosomatic analogy by taking into account, in his explication of it, the idea of φύσις σύνθετος , whereby the two incomplete natures of body and soul form one complete synthetic human nature which is realized at the personal level as ὑπόστασις σύνθετος . It was the achievement of Maximus to have distinguished between φύσις σύνθετος and ὑπόστασις σύνθετος in human being(96) and to have seen that the analogy with the Incarnation, in which divine and human nature are united hypostatically, is valid when the point of the comparison is the ὑπόστασις σύνθετος , but

that the way to heterodoxy was open if the same use were made of φύσις αὔνθετος . In this way he was able to nullify the severian formula: μία φύσις Χριστοῦ αὔνθετος .(97)

The inappropriateness of 'compound nature' in the use of the analogy becomes apparent to Maximus because of three properties that characterize it and that can in no way be associated with the hypostatic union: the composite nature does not have it within its power to unite its parts; this takes place by necessity, ἐξ ἀνάγκης (98) or ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἱρμῷ τινι φυσικῷ ;(99) then the parts of a composite nature are simultaneous with each other and with the whole, ἑαυτῇ καί ἀλλήλοις ὁμόχρονα (100), coming to be at the same time, without either pre-existing the other. Finally, every composite nature is created εἰς συμπλήρωσιν τῆς τοῦ παντός διακοσμήσεως ,(101) a determined species that has its allotted place in differentiated harmony of the universe. Maximus gives the example of the union of soul and body to illustrate this.(102) For him, soul and body have to be defined in terms of each other,(103) 'so that the necessity that obtains between them is because of their being essentially incomplete and components of a complete nature, that is parts of a substantial whole.(104)

Maximus admits the usefulness of the comparison of soul and body as a way to grasping something of the mystery of the Incarnation:

> In man there is identity of hypostasis and diversity of substance, because while man is one, the substance of his soul is one thing and that of his body is another. In the same way, in the case of the Lord

> Christ, there is identity of person and diversity of substances, because the person is one, that is the hypostasis, while the divinity is of one substance and the humanity is of another.(105)

But he is careful to restrict the comparison to unity of hypostasis and diversity of substances, thus assuring us that it is possible to find in the created order an example of one hypostasis in diverse natures, confining the comparison to the result of the union and studiously avoiding the implication that the manner of the union between the divinity and humanity of Christ coincides with that between soul and body. In fact, Maximus sets the manner of the union of soul and body in contrast with that between humanity and divinity in Christ which, for him, is μονώτατος :(106) the former is, as we have seen, necessary, simultaneous and constitutive of a species, whereas in the case of Christ the union is brought about freely, the divinity pre-exists the humanity, and Christ is neither individual nor species, but unique:

> He who was before all the ages or, better, the creator of the ages, became incarnate freely after a decree of his will; he emptied himself voluntarily for the regeneration of the universe and not to complete it.(107)

Maximus avoids firmly anything that would suggest thearchy or cosmic theurgy.(108) The Incarnation is for him the revelation of the foolishness of the love of God, of his 'weakness' and of the play of God in the world:

> The 'folly' and the 'weakness' of God, of which the holy apostle Paul speaks (1 Cor.1,25) and the 'play' of God,of which Gregory, the great and marvellous master, speaks, is the mystery of the divine Incarnation which surpasses superessentially the whole order and harmony of the whole of nature, power and activity.(109)

God's loving liberty would be doubly compromised by a union comparable to that of composite nature:(110) in its transcendence and in its generosity, since that kind of composition would entail passivity and God would not really become man in loving κένωσις Maximus insists that:

> It is by his foolish and infinite love for men that he has become truly and by nature that very thing which he loved, without losing anything of his own nature by the fact of this ineffable kenosis and without diminishing anything or changing anything of the human composite by the fact of the indescribable assumption, but, on the contrary, he assures the maintenance of the latter's constitution.(111)

The Logos is not drawn within the order of the creation by any kind of necessity nor is he thought to be the inevitable natural culmination of the cosmos. Creation and redemptive Incarnation are the work of divine love, even if, says Maximus, referring to the body-soul composite, 'such a natural composite is seen to be created to contribute magnificently to the fulfilment of the outline plenitude of the universe'.(112) Maximus insists that nothing of the kind can be discovered in the case of Christ, since it would suggest that there was something involuntary about his assumption of the flesh. It was by a deliberate act of will that the Logos accomplished his kenosis and became man, not to be drawn into the natural evolution of the universe, but to redeem and to restore it.

> It is by the mode of the Economy and not according to the law of nature that the Word of God came to men in the flesh.(113)

And again

> He, unique in his assumption of a flesh endowed with a soul, has become man by an ineffable will, remaining what He was and innovating the natures according to a mode above nature, in order to save man.(114)

Maximus, in his concern with the paradigm of the soul and body, dear to the upholders of christological monism in its origenistic platonic form, refuses to be trapped in an essentialist metaphysics, where the complementarity of the natures in the Incarnation would mean an active preponderance of the superior, but without freedom and liable to being itself dominated, a possibility totally inconsistent with the divine aseity and sovereign divine freedom.

> The soul dominates the body without willing it deliberately and it is dominated by it; without choice it gives it life by the very fact of being in it; and by nature it is liable to sufferings and pains because its innate power is susceptible to them.(115)

Maximus perceives the limitations of the analogy which, while it is useful for understanding the unity of the hypostasis, breaks down in its coordination of humanity and divinity, which are neither complementary nor come into being simultaneously. A twofold flaw is here thrown into relief in the body-soul example: lack of liberty in the way the dominant member relates to the subject member and the subjection of the superior to the inferior in that kind of relationship. Neither the divine transcendence nor the total gratuitousness of the redemptive Incarnation can be respected in the misapplication of the analogy. Besides, the operation of reciprocity in 'synthetic nature' would demand simultaneity in the production of the components of this nature. Literal insistence on a strict parallelism would obviously empty the Incarnation of divine content and reduce Christ to the status of a mere creature, since the Word would be no longer eternal. This is true because,

> Every composite nature holds its own parts simultaneously from the moment of its beginning to be, that is its genesis from non-being to being, with a view to the fulfilment of the orderly arrangement of the universe, produced as it is by the power that upholds the universe and conserves it in being.(116)

Neither is there room for the absurdity of the flesh being coeternal with the Logos and the Logos being contemporaneous with the flesh.(117) The unity of the composing parts of 'synthetic nature' is dictated by a finality that transcends them, that of the species, so that the individual man, even though he is a person, is also a component in a greater whole.

> Every synthetic nature has a simultaneous and involuntary genesis; it is created having a particular place assigned to it in its own world.

It is ordered to a fulfilment,(119) to the fulfilment of a whole as species,(120) something that cannot pertain to Christ, who is neither individual ( ἄτομον ) , because that would make him part of a genus, nor genus ( γένος ) because that would always imply a number of individuals.(121) Von Balthasar has pointed out that in Maximus we find a constant parallelism between the physical composition of the soul and body and the metaphysical composition between the individual and the species, because of the identity between the becoming of the unique hypostasis of man from his physical constituents and the becoming of the individual pertaining to the species.(122) Some development of this observation should enhance our appreciation of the strength of the critique that Maximus provided of the severian confusion.

To try to understand the coordination of humanity and

divinity in Christ on the model of the soul and body as understood in a platonic way would lead to the conclusion that Christ was part and parcel of the created universe, since things of a composite nature from a physical point of view are subordinate to the metaphysical composition of species and individual in the porphyrian scheme.(123) But the coordination of humanity and divinity in Christ does not give rise to a species as happens in the case of soul and body. As Cyril has insisted, according to Maximus, Christ cannot be defined.(124) The mode of union in Christ transcends the necessities of an essential philosophy and underlines the uniqueness of the Incarnation in which the components, in a synthesis of concrete and concrete, because of the enhypostasisation of the humanity in the one subsistence of the Word cannot be reproduced after the manner of individuals embodying a species, since they are already concrete and fixed. The coordination of humanity and divinity does not give rise to a species; they do not combine to form a nature as the relation of soul and body combine in human nature. The unity of soul and body in hypostasis can provide a model for the unity in Christ, but it fails to provide a way of understanding the coordination of concrete divinity and concrete humanity in Christ, since the notion of species does not intervene between the discrete consideration of divinity and humanity and their realized union in the hypostasis of the Word, as happens in the case of body and soul which coalesce as humanity realized in hypostasis. If the analytic process is reversed, beginning with the 'result', physically the hypostasis can be

traced back to body and soul in their coalescence; simultaneously, an analysis of the hypostasis from a metaphysical point of view shows that the individual has emerged from the species. This parallelism is instructive because it tells us that while we are comparing the union of divinity and humanity in Christ to the union of soul and body from a purely physical point of view, inadvertently we are implying a precise metaphysical structure in Christ, the relationship of the individual to the species. This means that the example of body and soul undoubtedly 'limps' and that its limitations must be offset by the relevant distinctions. The failure to realize that physical composition did not imply metaphysical composition in the case of the Incarnate Word had deleterious effects in the case of the monophysites who concluded that, because two beings had become one, the unity was natural as well as hypostatic.(125) Christ transcends the necessity of being εἰς συμπλήρωσιν τῆς τοῦ παντός διακοσμήσεως .(126)

In his refutation of Severus, Maximus can ask if his μία φύσις Χριστοῦ σύνθετος is generic (γενική ) or singular ( μοναδική ) .(127) For Leontius of Byzantium the fact that human nature makes part of an εἶδος (128) ensures that its unity is not merely hypostatic, the mark of which is καθ' ἑαυτόν εἶναι ,(129) incommunicability, so that there must be some difference between the nature of Christ and human nature.(130) Although Maximus did concede that the soul keeps, even in its union with the body, its own substance, that κατά τόν οὐσιώδη λόγον it differs

from the body,(131) the non-hypostatic character of the unity of the human composite thus deriving from genus, a logical category, rather than from nature, he advanced from this position and insisted on the natural unity of human being.(132) Grumel has pointed out that the strength of the argument of Maximus in contrast to that of Leontius against Severus, is rooted in the conviction that the logical unity of human nature, of the human species, is founded on the genuine natural unity of each man in particular, that 'one human nature' expresses an insight into being and translates physical reality into a metaphysical category.(133) Maximus thought of genus as being an ontological fact, not merely a nominalistic logical category. For him man is undoubtedly a 'composite hypostasis',(134) but just as surely he is part of the interlocking pattern of beings that comprise the universe, enjoying from this point of view 'no advantage over the other species, which make part of the whole of nature',(135) but subject to passivity, being a 'composite nature'(136) which ensures that man's unity cannot be merely personal.(137) For Maximus, the species truly represents an essence common to many particular beings, whereas for Leontius of Byzantium it only designates a common name, founded on similarity. Therefore Maximus can plant Severus on the horns of a genuine dilemma: his μία φύσις must be either generic or singular; if the former, there can be many Christs; if the latter, then he cannot be consubstantial with either his Father or with men.(138)

So the validity of the body-soul analogy in Christology resides for Maximus in the fact that human beings are not merely characterized by composite nature, but that they are composite hypostases as well. In fact, the natural composition is what gives rise to the composite hypostasis, that is its ground, so to speak.(139) For Maximus, there is composite hypostasis wherever diverse substances, whether complete or incomplete, are united in one hypostasis(140) so that he can say simply that the human composite is composite hypostasis.(141) But, while in man there is composition that is at once natural and hypostatic, we have seen why natural composition cannot apply to Christ; in him the union is, however, hypostatic, whereby the divine and human nature are not united immediately to make a composite nature, but only in the hypostasis, each retaining its natural identity and integrity.(142) For Maximus, it is the pre-existing Word who extends his proper subsistence to a humanity that never enjoyed being or subsistence apart from him.(143) It is the Word who is born of the Virgin Mary and He acts as his own fecundating sperm;(144) he underwent no change;(145) only one person subsists before the assumption of the flesh and after the Incarnation;(146) there is not a double person because he was before the flesh and remains with the flesh one and the same.(147) In fact, although he does describe both natures as ἐνυπόστατος,(148) elsewhere he insists that a contrast between the creaturely and uncreated attributes of Christ implies a contrast between human nature and divine hypostasis identified in some way with divine nature:

> For it is not by hypostasis that Christ is mortal and immortal; nor again powerless and all-powerful, visible and invisible, created and uncreated; but he is one by nature, the other by hypostasis.(149)

As Grumel has remarked, nothing could emphasize more emphatically that the hypostasis is divine and pre-existent.(150) By contrast,

> The flesh of Christ was never an hypostasis, because never, not even for what the speed of a more thought would accommodate, did it subsist apart by itself, separated from beings of the same species by means of the properties distinguishing it, or indeed, in regard to the Word who is united to it hypostatically, having its proper separated from its common (i.e. having its own personality); but it is in-existent ( ἐνυπόστατος ) as having received him, and, by him the genesis of its being τοῦ εἶναι τήν γένεσιν .(151)

Because of this character of ἐνυπόστατος which marks the humanity of Christ, Maximus can say that the two natures are only one hypostasis because they lack ἰδιοὐπόστατος .(152) In the concrete reality of Christ, divinity and humanity are united hypostatically. Because of the presence of two natures in Christ, his hypostasis can be described as ὑπόστασις σύνθετος .(153)

> It is by the mode ( τρόπος ) of the Economy and not according to the law of nature that the Word of God has come to men in the flesh. Thus therefore Christ is not a composite nature, contrary to the theory of those who void the Gospel, because he exists according to a hypostatic mode totally independent of the law of composite nature. But he is a composite hypostasis which does not comprise synthetic nature which would be attributed to him according to essence. This is truly paradoxical: to contemplate a composite hypostasis without the composite nature being attributed to him according to essence.(154)

Since for Maximus the Three Persons of the Holy Trinity are at once the same being of the Godhead and distinguished from each other by the τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως that constitutes their relationship to each other,(155) the hypostasis of the Logos is at once the divine εἶναι and the καθ' ἑαυτόν εἶναι according to which it subsists in Him. Each person is God according to the mode of existence proper to Him, the Father as unbegotten, the Son as begotten and the Holy Spirit as proceeding. The Three are not only identified with the one οὐσία in God, but they act in concert with regard to what lies outside the immanent life of the Trinity.(156) Therefore the whole Trinity is active in the Incarnation giving the human nature existence so that the Logos acts with the Father and the Holy Spirit in making His humanity to be, but it is assumed into the τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως which is proper to Him only so that it is only the Logos who becomes incarnate. He now subsists not merely in divine nature, but in human nature too. This is why Maximus can speak of the ὑπόστασις σύνθετος of the Logos.

Maximus insists that 'it is by the τρόπος of the Economy and not according to the law of nature that the Word of God is come to men in the flesh'.(157) We have already examined the limitations of the body-soul analogy with regard to this aspect of the mystery of the Incarnation. We have seen too that:

> the Logos also has preserved the hypostatic union or identity with the flesh by the properties which distinguish Him as Son and Logos from what is common in the divinity.(158)

Von Schonborn has pointed out that 'the divine Persons are not chained to their nature by the bonds of necessity, that They are free by an unspeakable liberty, that They possess their nature freely in being totally mutual gift'.(159) This free identity of the persons with the nature in God is the mystery of the ἀγάπη which God is.(160) It is this free mode of existence that the Logos brings to the mystery of the Incarnation and it is by this mode that His humanity exists. The humanity becomes His according to the same mode by which He possesses the divinity. He subsists in humanity now as well as in divinity, while His humanity exists only in Him. Now the Logos is not merely identified with divinity; He is also identified with humanity. We have seen that Maximus says that 'Christ is not anything else except (the natures) from which, in which and which He is',(161) while noting the distinctions that have to be made, especially that care must be taken to speak of the nature <u>in concreto</u> when referring to Christ's relationship to His humanity.(162) The freedom of the Logos in the Economy uniting human nature to Himself is brought out in the term προσληψις.(163) Because it is His subsistence that the Logos extends freely to a human nature, the mode of the assumption is said to be enhypostasisation. His humanity has the ground of its existence in the hypostasis of the eternal Logos. Because this is so, He can freely assume an integral humanity and it can exist in Him without the slightest implication of any fusion of the divine and human natures as such or any need to reduce the concrete fullness of the nature in a φύσις σύνθετος, ( ἡ θαυμαστή τῶν Σεβήρου λόγων ἀκρόπολις )(164) no matter how modified. It is the

natures that Christ is, in enhypostasising their existence in His unique mode of existence.(165)

Although Maximus himself did not explicitly use the distinction between essence and existence to articulate his understanding of the mystery of the Hypostatic Union, recent scholars profess to see this distinction at work beneath what he does say.(166) The notions of essence and existence undoubtedly occur in the works of Maximus, but he had not attained to the later scholastic explicitness about the significance of this distinction and it is not so easy to determine in what direction his thought is flowing, especially with regard to the alignment of essence and existence with nature and person respectively. For him hypostasis is defined most accurately as καθ' ἑαυτόν εἶναι . A person exists for himself, in himself, by himself, something that must precede, at least logically, the relational possibilities that characterize personality understood ontologically. He speaks of the mystery of the Holy Trinity as ἐνούσιος ὕπαρξις τριαυποστάτου μονάδος (167) the essential existence of the tri-hypostatic monad, where there is identity between three hypostases or modes of existence and one existing being. We know that Maximus relied on the notion of σχέσις to account for the distinctiveness of the Three in the Trinity,(168) in keeping with the Cappadocian tradition, but he is here also calling on the kind of existence that characterizes the Persons. In Christology, he holds for one ὑπόσταοις and two οὐσίαι . This would not exclude the formulation of the mystery of the Incarnation as one ὑφεστᾶναι and

two εἶναι's . We can find a basis for this claim in the text of the Mystagogia where he speaks of τοῦ εἶναι λόγος, τοῦ πῶς εἶναι ὑπάρχειν καί ὑφεστᾶναι τρόπος (169) with regard to the Holy Trinity and in Opusculum IV, τῷ εἶναι φυσικῶς and τό ὑφεστῆναι θεϊκῶς (170) with regard to the humanity of Christ. It is not so clear that when we use the term 'existence', we can identify it exclusively with either εἶναι or ὑποστῆναι in the thought of Maximus. The οὐσία exists as 'what', the hypostasis as 'how'. The problem of interpreting the intentions of Maximus is accentuated by the attempt to diagnose whether his thought would have developed in a Thomist or in a Palamite way. Von Balthasar opts for the former, Lossky for the latter when he joins issue with Von Balthasar in his In the Image and Likeness of God.(171) Riou makes a palpable hit when he reminds us that if existence can be identified, presumably in an exclusive way, with hypostasis, then we are into tritheism.(172) However, it must be said that the examples, which he adduces to prove that in Maximus existence is synonymous with essence, are not entirely convincing. The irreducibility of ὑπόστασις to οὐσία provides Maximus with the essential tool for interpreting the mystery of the Holy Trinity and the mystery of the Hypostatic Union, without his having to identify existence exclusively with either member of the distinction.(173) While the metaphysical principle, ens et unum convertuntur may be at the basis of the insistence on the unum esse that we find in Aquinas' Summa Theologica(174) with regard to Christ, he does make provision for an esse secundarium.(175) We can distinguish

between esse personale(176) and esse secundarium, so that Guillou can write: 'Christ possesses without altering them the divine existence and a human existence (esse secundarium) which do not penetrate each other in a theandric way, except in the hypostasis of the Son of God made man'.(177) Lethel takes Von Schonborn to task for speaking of 'the created existence of the human nature of Jesus', claiming that he relies too much on one text of Maximus in Opusculum XVI, in which he affirms two existences, considering existence in the line of nature.(178) The point would seem to be that it is precisely that which Maximus does, while insisting on one existence from the point of view of the Person of the Logos. The enhypostasisation proper to the Incarnation then comprises a unity of being between Creator and creature in the sense that we find there one subsisting thing. The fact that the union takes place according to the subsistence that is proper to the Logos leaves the way open for a created existence in Christ in respect of His human nature, which can express what is proper to Him in the uniqueness of his Person. The eternal subsistence respects the existential status of the human nature. As Garrigues has said: 'By the Economy of the Incarnation, all that is personally specific to the Son became and was contained in the existence, heart and soul of the man Jesus'.(179)

In his recent study Gottes Sohn als Mensch, Heinzer has thrown considerable light on the notion of ὑπόστασις σύνθετος by comparing the teaching of the Leontii on the subject of hypostasis.(180) He shows how Leontius of Byzantium, having established the ontological status

of hypostasis can transfer the idiomatic distinctness of hypostasis to a Christological level and distinguishing the natural from the hypostatic predicates, can speak of the ἴδια of both natures as κοινά κατά μίας ὑποστάσεως καί προσώπου .(181) Heinzer reminds us that for Leontius of Byzantium the synthesis of the ἰαιώματα refers to the material, not to the formal aspect of hypostasis,(182) where we are to understand formal as referring to that by which hypostasis is fundamentally constituted. Hence the formal principle of hypostasis is clearly untouched in its unity. The commonness of the properties of Christ will refer to their hypostatic dimension and it is there we have 'composition'. It is Leontius of Jerusalem who has given us the notion of ὑπόστασις σύνθετος . He is careful to exclude a composite of hypostases and any suggestion of composition at the basis of hypostasis itself.(183) It is the ἰδιώματα demonstrating the presence of hypostasis that exhibit composition. The upshot of the Hypostatic Union is ἴδίωμα συνθετώτερον : 'A more composite property of the hypostasis of the Logos came into being from the assemblage in it of many simple properties after the enfleshment'.(184) The profile of two natures now existing in the subsistence of the Logos has gained its clarity.

Heinzer has shown too that the ὑπόστασις ἰδιική (185) of the one corresponds to the καθ' ἑαυτόν εἶναι (186) of the other, so that they both realize the fundamental principle of personality. Leontius of Byzantium approaches the root of personality through an ἄθροισμα of

properties,(187) where the idiomata refer to two natures; Leontius of Jerusalem speaks of ὑπόστασις κοινή (188) where the hypostasis subsists in two natures and thus embraces the ἰδιώματα of both natures. The human ἰδιώματα have been assumed by the hypostasis of the Logos and become proper to it in the Incarnation. This idiomatic characterisation of the hypostasis of the Logos is not what formally constitutes it and it is essential to keep this in mind when speaking of ὑπόστασις σύνθετος . The formal principle is the τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως of the Logos, but the fact of enhypostasisation which preserves the distinction of the natures in the Incarnation effects ὑπόστασις σύνθετος in the material sense, giving to the human nature its personally distinctive traits and ensuring that the particularities of this man reveal the presence of the eternal Logos. Leontius of Jerusalem insists that the κοινή ὑπόστασις is that of the Logos.(189) By becoming the subsistence of the two natures in assuming humanity it has become ποικιλοτέρα (190) and is now characterized not merely by τό γεννητό , but by the ἰδιώματα of divinity and humanity as well.(191) This is the basis of the common-proper language which we have seen Maximus use in Epistola XV.

Maximus clearly considered that the humanity of Christ was created in and for the hypostasis of the Logos. That is the implication of πρόληψις . He speaks with Leontius of Byzantium of a human nature with concrete characteristics(192) and with Leontius of Jerusalem of φύσις ἰδική τις ,(193) so that the being, which the human nature receives from and in the Logos, is not merely

a specific human nature, but an individual human nature, enjoying concrete existence.(194) But for Maximus this individuation of the humanity took place in the act of assumption. For he and his predecessors did not possess the concept of materia signata quantitate of the Scholastics, which accounted for the individual character of the human nature of Christ, and left to His hypostasis the work of enhypostasisation. We have seen in Opusculum IV that His humanity differs from ours 'by the new τρόπος of His coming to be'.(195) From the context it is obvious that this refers to the distinction brought to the humanity of Christ by His hypostasis so that the subsistence of the Logos is the principle of the individuation of His humanity as well as of its union with Him.(196) But even if enhypostasisation renders the human nature of Christ individual, it does not mean that He assumes an individual. Garrigues says finely that the more you descend into what is particular in the humanity of Jesus, the more nearly you touch the hypostatic character of the Son himself and he concludes: 'In exorcising definitively the Docetic temptation and a monist Christology, Maximus is able to recapture all the psychological richness and bodily richnesss of Jesus (Antiochian intuition) as an epiphany of the most personal properties of the Son of God (Alexandrian principle). He lays in advance the foundations of the theology of the ikon of St. Theodore the Studite, which constitute by a kind of conversio ad phantasmata the return to what is most concrete in Christ after ages of abstract analysis of His theandric structure'.(197)

We have seen already that Maximus holds that the humanity of Christ exists οὐ καθ' ἑαυτό χωρίς ἤ ὅι' ἑαυτό , but rather ὡς ὅι' ἐκεῖνον καί ἐν ἐκείνῳ . (198)

To return to Epistola XV, we find a formulation that attempts to outline and delimit this relationship of the Logos to His humanity:

> The flesh of the God-Logos is not therefore a hypostasis. For indeed never, not for the length that a swift thought of the mind itself would take, was it distinguished through itself by properties dividing it off from things of its own kind or in the personally conjoined Logos having what is proper separated off from what is common, but enhypostasised, that is in Him and through Him receiving the genesis of being and becoming by the union His flesh and united with Him according to hypostasis by the principle of particularity that divided it from the rest of men. To speak more clearly it was made what is proper to the Logos through hypostasis, so that what is common by substance truly became His flesh by the union.(199)

Maximus is denying to the nature the ability to distinguish itself from 'things of its own kind' by anything that would proceed from itself as such. It attains to the free standing condition of personhood by being enhypostasised in the Logos. This is what distinguishes it from the humanity of every other man and which can be recognized by the individuality of its properties. It becomes by the union His flesh, 'united with Him according to hypostasis by the principle of the particularity that divided it from the rest of men'. This gives us the basis of the distinction between formal and material personhood, between ontological ground and idiomatic characterisation.

In the Ambigua Maximus emphasises that the mystery of ὑπόστασις σύνθετος extends to every aspect of His humanity and that it is within the dynamics of that hypostatic mystery that we must envisage the communicatio

idiomatum proper to Christ:

> The Logos of God, who as God is entirely complete substance and as Son is entirely perfect hypostasis, having emptied Himself, became the seed of His own flesh; then having become the subject of synthesis by an ineffable conception, He became the hypostasis of the flesh which He assumed. By this new mystery, becoming truly without change a complete man, He himself as the hypostasis of the two natures, uncreated and created, impassible and passible, accepted unfailingly all the natural principles of which He is the hypostasis.(200)

Συντεθείς , etymologically akin to the σύνθετος that qualifies ὑπόστασις in this context, is linked here with the φυσικοί λόγοι . The human properties cannot be enhypostasised apart from their ontic source, the individuated nature of Christ. They are properties of the nature and become properties of the Person of the Logos though enhypostasisation. This will be thrown into relief in the polemical works of Maximus where he has to insist on the twofold character, not merely of the natural in Christ, but also of the volitional and operational. They are natural properties, but they take on the particularity that radiates from the hypostasis of the Logos in Whom they are grounded.(201) It is this principle that would be of such value to Maximus in his conflict with Monothelitism and Monenergism. He can preserve the distinctness of the natures in Christ and their proper willing and activity by uniting them in 'the highest form of personal identity'.

## (iv) Operation and Will in Christ

### Operation

The Christological principles, which we have seen in the theology of Maximus, emerge very clearly in his defence

of orthodoxy during the Monenergistic and Monothelite debates. Here the distinction between λόγος φύσεως and τρόπος ὑπάρξεως and the function of ὑπόστασις σύνθετος are used with consistency and finesse. The Chalcedonian axiom that the natures are conserved in Christ without alteration is analysed to show that His hypostasis can characterize His human being in all its dimensions without doing it any violence, that He exercises human will and produces human operations without suppressing or altering anything proper to them from a natural point of view. For Maximus, because Christ subsists in two natures, He must have the wills and operations proper to those natures and He must have them in their integrity.(202)

We have seen already how Maximus understands the structure of created being in terms of γένεσις, κίνησις στάσις .(203) In that ontological context nature or 'organized movement'(204) is defined by operation. Every nature is endowed with its proper movement which is the way it unfolds in keeping with its λόγος . Maximus insists that:

> Absolutely no created being, in virtue of its λόγος or essential element, is without movement, not even sensible inanimate beings. That is the opinion of those who give themselves up to the contemplation of beings.(205)

He then specifies movement as 'a natural power' or 'a passion' or 'an active operation' and concludes that 'no created being ceases to be in movement as long as it has not reached the first and unique cause'.(206) Needless to say, this movement takes on the associations of εἶναι, εὖ εἶναι, ἀεί εἶναι in the case of men,

being characterized by the exercise of will. In fact, operation understood as power is constitutive of the nature and a property, as well as being from another point of view that which manifests the nature. Without it nature would not be itself: 'Since it is natural, the operation is constitutive of the nature; it is its proper mark'.(207) Because nature is the ontological ground of operation, like natures will produce like operations.(208) When hypostasised, natures retain their 'logical' consistency and so do their operations, so that the union of divine and human nature in the hypostasis of the Logos does not interfere with the natural integrity of either the natures or their operations. As we have seen in Epistola XV, it is through the particularities which they gain from their common hypostasis that they are united, not through any invasion of what is proper to the natures as such.(209)

While it is essential to give the λόγος φύσεως its rightful role in an interpretation of the two natures and operations in Christ, this would be unintelligible without a comparable grasp of its complementary principle, τρόπος ὑπάρξεως . They require each other as the two necessary dimensions of all existents. It is the existent alone that is in reality and that acts in reality. Since in God there is one nature, we find in Him only one operation, but since in God there are three Persons, even though they have a common operation we find that They operate according to their distinctive modes of existence.(210) Likewise with regard to the ὑπόστασις σύνθετος of the Logos, about Whom it is said that He is from, in and is the natures,(211) we find that while

His operations are consistent with the natures, they bear the identical cachet of the eternal Logos. He acts according to the operation proper to His natures, but He does so as the eternal Logos Incarnate, so that the mode of action is that of the hypostasis of the Son. It is the person who acts; it is the hypostasis who has the operations of nature or as the Scholastics put it: operatio est personae a natura.(212) The contrast and identity of nature and person in Christ means that He can co-ordinate two aspects of operation, ἁπλῶς and πῶς and He can do it at the divine and human levels. While there are two natures and two operations in Christ there is only one mode of existence. Maximus quotes the celebrated formulation of Leo to emphasize the two operations:

ἐνεργεῖ γάρ ἑκατέρα μορφή μετά τῆς θατέρου χοινωνίας ,(213) to which he adds in the Disputatio cum Pyrrho the observation of Gregory of Nyssa on Christ's action at the end of His forty days of fasting:

ἐδόχει γάρ τῇ φύσει ὅτε ἐθέλησε τά ἴδια ἐνεργῆσαι .(214) For good measure he throws in three expressions from the Fathers without quoting his sources: the operations are said to be 'different' or 'double' or 'one and other'.(215) But while he delimits the natures and operations in Christ, he is equally precise about what they have in common because of the unity of hypostasis in Him. He denies that there is a unique operation in Christ, but at the same time he affirms that there is in Him a unique mode of operation. He acted μοναδιχῶς ἤγουν ἑνοειδῶς .(216) This emphasizes that it is the hypostasis that has the operations which take their rise

in the natures. The τρόπος ὑπάρξεως extends its unity to the operations, which enable us to realize that in Christ we have ὑπόστασις σύνθετος , which can retain its ontological unity while allowing a composite of particularizing characteristics.

With regard to the co-ordination of the two operations in Christ, we have to realize that the Logos does not act on His human nature, but rather in it.(217) He does not exert any divine pressure, so to speak, on his human nature through an external causality. He is his natures and He acts as such. Sophronius describes this co-operation as συνεργεία : 'each operation proceeds indivisibly from its essence and respective nature, in keeping with the natural and essential quality of each nature and each nature conveys with it the co-operation συνεργεία at once undivided and unconfused of the other essence'.[218] Pyrrhus invoked the authority of Dionysius in his exchanges with Maximus and quoted with a quantitative interpretation his καινήν τινα καί τήν θεανδρικήν ἐνέργειαν to bolster his views,[219] but Maximus reminded him that the καινή was a qualitative determination:(220) it is the τρόπος that changes in the operation of Christ while the λόγος remains intact. The τρόπος which is new is one, while there are two λόγοι , that corresponding to θεός and that corresponding to ἀνήρ . Just as in Christ the two natures appeared in a new mode, so each of the operations which retains its specific distinctness, puts on a new mode in its manifestation. In Ambigua 5, Maximus goes to the root of the problem by linking 'newness' with 'mode' and that mode is hypostatic:

> For the essential principle of the things united is in no way damaged by the union whether you look at the nature or the quality. But he does not affirm, as some would have it, a mean, by the negation of the extremes. For there is no mediation in Christ which would be affirmed by the negation of the extremes. It is 'new' because it is characteristic of a new Mystery of which the principle is the ineffable mode of the union.(221)

He reminds us that in the mystery of the Incarnation divinity and humanity were united hypostatically, so that neither loses its natural operation through the union but remains distinct from that with which it is united. The newness of mode which the natures give to each other is rooted in the ineffable mode of the union. Where the mode is concerned, Christ operates what is human divinely and what is divine in a human way. Maximus calls this exchange a περιχώρησις .(222) Christ became man, submitted to conception and birth, but in a manner above the normal, becoming his own seed; He makes the πάθη works of liberty, not having been subjected to their necessity. On the contrary His divine operations put on a human mode since they are realized through the flesh.(223) Maximus does not have as clearly as John of Scythopolis the distinctions with regard to the operations of Christ: those performed as God, those performed as man and those that were mixed, like His miracles,(224) but in his teaching on the operations of Christ we see that they can retain their natural identity and at the same time enter into an exchange in His hypostasis, which entitles them to the epithet 'new' and the theological status of being theandric. As Von Schonborn says: 'In Christ, a fully human activity has become the activity of the very person of the Son of God'.(225) In the following passage

Maximus reminds us of the constancy of the λόγος φύσεως and the natural aspect of operations, while they will acquire their uniqueness from the mystery of person. The nature of the agent is revealed in the nature of the operation, the identity of the agent is manifested in the mode of operation and Maximus identifies this in turn with the exercise of free-will, which we shall presently examine briefly as it is to be found in his teaching:

> Each one of us acts, not in that he is someone, but in that he is something, that is to say man. But in so far as he is someone, Peter or Paul, he gives form to the mode of operation by remission or intension, marking it in this or that manner, in keeping with his free-will. Thus one recognizes in the mode the difference of persons according to activity and in the λόγος the unchanging character of the natural operation.(226)

Will

In his debate with the Monothelites, Maximus uses arguments with regard to the will that are parallel to the arguments which he used to prove that in Christ there must be two operations. He insists that Christ subsists in two natures and that since will is a natural property, there must be two wills in Christ.(227) Where there is one nature, as in the case of God, there is one will; where there is one will there is one nature. Likewise, where there are two natures, there are two wills and vice versa. The possibility of a third quid disappears once it is clear that 'Christ is nothing else except His natures'.(228) Maximus refuses to make the hypostasis the source of the will but he insists that the hypostasis has bearing on the will. In the Disputatio cum Pyrrho he makes a distinction between τό ἁπλῶς θέλειν which

pertains to nature and τό πῶς θέλειν which stems from the hypostasis.[229] Scholars associate θέλημα φυσικόν with ἁπλῶς θέλειν and θέλημα γνωμικόν with πῶς θέλειν.[(230)] In the course of anti-Monothelite polemic, with reference to the claim that there is only one will in Christ, he says:

> If it is gnomic, it will be characteristic of the hypostasis alone. For the gnomic element is delimiting of the person and it will be shown clearly, (with you for author) that Christ will have different will at variance with the Father and the Spirit.(231)

This means that the λόγος of the will is in nature and that it derives its τρόπος from the person. Maximus transposes the nature-hypostasis distinction at the ontological level to the level of the will and maintains, with admirable consistency, the principles of Chalcedon in an area that until his time had not been properly defined.

In his magisterial study of the Disputatio cum Pyrrho,[(232)] Doucet shows how it took even Maximus time to realize that will is rooted in nature and is something permanent beneath its passing acts. While the earlier works of Maximus speak of 'movement' and 'self-determination", he obviously considers only the subject and the acts, but he does not focus on the will as faculty until forced to do so by his defence of orthodoxy during the Monothelite crisis. Doucet shows how appetency in the earlier works of Maximus is a fundamental movement of ἔρως to God, which springs up in a subject master of himself.[(233)] It was fully natural but not then rooted in θέλησις . Perfected by ἀγάπη it underlies successive acts of will

like a continual tension. The fundamental option passes through the multitude of particular volitions, carrying them in its elan. To fail to accept the direction of that movement was to miss the divine σκοπός and end up in φιλαυτία , deceived by a failure to distinguish between real and apparent good. Doucet reminds us that the Monothelites forced Maximus to make distinctions: 'the internal act of will and its components, the object of willing, a natural as distinct from a personal level, in order to do justice to the fixity of nature and individual variations, the identification of self-determination with the natural will rather than with the act of choice, in order to do justice to the perfection of Christ'.(234)

The basic rational power of appetency for Maximus is θέλησις or θέλημα , although the latter can designate the object of appetency as well as the faculty. As faculty he speaks of θέλημα λογικόν .(235) The spiritual being possesses a spiritual elan, the will, so that 'our thought is based on willing ( θέλοντες λογιζόμεθα ) , as the decisions of our will are based on thought ( λογιζόμενοι θέλοντες βουλόμεθα) '.(236) θέλημα γνωμικόν , which issues in προαίρεσις , is the will in so far as it is modified by the possessor of the nature and the will, the θέλημα φυσικόν .(237) In the course of his polemics, Maximus saw that he would have to preserve the fullness of human will in Christ, but eliminate from it what was defective. The latter dimension of willing he eventually identified with γνώμη

and, together with its consequent προαίρεσις he denied it to Christ.(238) The equivalence of θέλησις and αὐτεξουσία enabled him to show that Christ was endowed with the power of self-determination as a man while He was free of what impairs that endowment in fallen men.(239) He possessed a human will that actualized itself in a self-determining way without the limitations of hesitation and fallibility that beset the exercise of this faculty in the case of those bound to 'consecutive choice'. It is a spontaneous unfolding of man's capacity for the Good, which bypasses the failures that stem from imperfect knowledge and partial self-possession. In the Disputatio cum Pyrrho, thelesis has become 'an element of nature distinct from reason, underlying proairesis and other acts of will and enveloping them as a unique power envelopes its actualisations'.(241) In his analysis of the will, Maximus distinguishes objects that at once depend and don't depend on us from objects that depend on us. It is with regard to the latter that we are free and exercise ἐξουσία . In his expression θέλοντες βουλόμεθα ,(242) he is drawing attention to two aspects of the act of will, the former member referring to basic movement of man's rational power of appetency considered from the point of view of nature, the latter referring to its hypostatic determination, both of which are immanent to the whole process of ὄρεξις λογικὴ θέλησις καὶ βούλησις .(243) Because of the logical element in the human act, this orientation of the will must be impregnated with λόγος which takes the form of enquiry, examination and deliberation

( ζήτησις, σκέψις, βούλησις ) , so that the ὄρεξις λογική becomes ὄρεξις ζητική that issues in a judgement that what man seeks is, in fact, in keeping with his λόγος φύσεως . It is at this stage that man can become fuddled in his judgment about what is truly good and so mistaken in his choices. The pressure of his passions on his judgment will on the other hand put it at the service, not of his genuine good, God and the objective divine order, but of his φιλαυτία . The bearing of βούλησις or βούλη on judgment and προαίρεσις is the key to the βουλόμεθα with which Maximus qualifies θέλοντες . In choice, or προαίρεσις the will is finally determined by the die cast in judgment.(244)

The morality of the act is now determined but it finds expression in ὁρμή , χρῆσις .

Maximus was not consistent in his placing of γνώμη in this process. In the Epistola ad Marinum(245) it precedes choice, in the Disputatio(246) it depends on choice. It is sufficiently characteristic to qualify the fallible dimension of human willing and so it is excluded from the willing of Christ, whether it means primarily 'a qualified will, bound by attachment to good or apparent good'(247) from which choice proceeds or whether it comes between judgment and choice as an element of disposition there. In Maximus it keeps a cognitive connotation, but is basically an aspect of spiritual appetency.(248) With regard to the Pater Noster it is safely translated as 'free-will', where it most probably refers to acts of will. Maximus did not

apply his analysis of the human will to Christ. Because of the integrity of His humanity He possessed θέλησις and because that humanity was enhypostasized in Him we must conclude that it was determined hypostatically. 'Everything that is natural in Christ, has as well the τρόπος that is above nature'.(249 But Maximus is reticent about the mode of that determination. He excludes θέλημα γνωμικόν . Since ignorance can be in Christ, according to Maximus, only by relational appropriation, there is no room for the fallibility and ambiguity which we noted in the evolution of the normal volitional process.(250) He does not attribute to him βούλησις explicitly. It is bound up with gnomic will and since this is 'particularly a matter of the person and the hypostasis',(251) it cannot find place in Christ. Von Balthasar says that this is so 'because in His unique and divine hypostasis, there was no place for indecision and hesitation'.(252) In fact we know that, for Maximus, will in Christ precedes what is instinctive in other men. We have to be content to know that θέλησις is actuated in Christ, without wanting Maximus to give this process a name. Because He possessed 'by His being itself, that is by his subsisting divinely, naturally a propensity towards the good and an aversion for what is evil',(253) the unfolding of his human will in freedom at once transcended γνώμη and contained its positive character in an eminent way.

Pere Lethel has brought further refinement to the study of the place of the will in the psychology of Christ and particularly in His work of salvation.(254)

In his Opusculum VI on the words 'Father, if it be possible that this cup should pass from me', Maximus, commenting on a gloss of Gregory of Nazianzen, used skilfully by the Monothelites, says by way of counter argument:

> If on the contrary, you have taken the phrase: 'not that which I will, but may your will triumph', as coming, not from a man of our kind, but from the man we consider in the Saviour, then you, by that very fact, have confessed the supreme consent of His human will to the divine will, which is at once that of His Father and His own, and thus you have established that in Him, who has two natures there are two wills and two operations which exist in conformity with each nature. These two wills and operations belong to Him who does not have contrariety in either of the two, even although he preserves entirely the difference of the natures from which, in which and which He himself is by nature.(255)

Lethel points out that Maximus, for the first time in the history of theology, makes it apparent that Christ willed to accomplish his Passion with his human will.(256) Until then the Fathers considered that to have a different will from that of God was to have a will contrary to His. Therefore they thought of Christ agreeing with his Father by his divine will in the Garden of Gethsemani. Lethel concludes his impeccable analysis of this passage by saying: 'In thus manifesting the perfect accord of the human will of Christ with the divine will, Maximus destroyed the foundation of Byzantine Monothelitism: since this will agrees with the divine will, there is no longer any reason to say that it is by appropriation alone that it is in Christ. There is no longer any reason to deny it'.(257) Maximus uses the axiom of Gregory of Nazianzen: τό γάρ ἀπρόσληπτον ἀθεράπευτον ὅ δέ ἥνωται τῷ Θεῷ τοῦτο καί σώζεται .(258)

In Opusculum VI this teaching finds a new clarity because we see that the human will which is a component of human nature is united to God not merely in the act of assumption by the Logos, but in its exercise by Him, in Whom it subsists, for the salvation of the world willed by His Father.(259) We see that humanity is preserved in Him in its integrity at the very apex of its liberty, precisely there where person innovates nature. In Epistola II Maximus speaks of the rectification of willing in the κένωσις of Christ.(260) This is brought about by the play of ἀγάπη which in turn will unify men by enabling them to be of one will through the τρόποι χρήσεως that ensure that they appropriate personally the one λόγος φύσεως of their common nature. In the Pater Noster, Maximus links the need of preserving unity at a human level as a condition of being united to God: man forgives:

> so that he may not be accused of severing nature by γνώμη , separating himself, though being a man, from any other man. For thus when γνώμη is united to the λόγος φύσεως , the reconciliation of God with nature naturally takes place.(261)

By hindsight we can understand that Maximus would eventually see this brought about by the transforming influence of ἀγάπη poured into man's life through a will that bears the mark of a person totally in harmony with the action of the Holy Spirit, thus reproducing in himself the filial character of the Logos Incarnate. We have seen already that Christ was the 'Angel' of the Counsel of God and that in Him was realized and revealed the purpose of creation, the union of the created and

the uncreated, of the human and the divine, in a mode that respects the inviolability of the natures, but which confers on the human nature a divine mode of being. We have seen too that the divine mystery of ἀγάπη implies the free possession of the divine nature by the Persons of the Trinity and their free communication of that nature to each other. The same freedom, identified with the same ἀγάπη characterizes the 'mode of the 'Economy', by which One of the Three assumes a human nature, subsists in it and expresses ἀγάπη 'to the limit': 'not that which I will'. It is through ἀγάπη and synergy that man is enabled to enter the mystery of θέωσις by which he makes his own the fruit of the κένωσις of Christ.(262) We have intimated how Maximus would understand the exercise of that ἀγάπη through the personal use of human will, a process by which man's person would take full possession of his nature, and through which his nature would attain its end. Men would be sons in the Son. Receiving a share in the ἀγάπη which His hypostasis guaranteed to His human nature, they would become participators in the Logos as Hypostasis, through ἀγάπη . which confers on the human a divine mode of being and thus releases man into the full enjoyment of his hypostasis. He is now a son of God, because he is now a free person. In the theology of Maximus the full understanding of man depends on an adequate grasp of the meaning of Christ.

# CHAPTER VI

## THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL DIMENSION

The purpose of this chapter is to underline some of the aspects of the anthropology of St. Maximus in the light of a revision of the main ideas on this subject, which emerges from an analysis of the Pater Noster. Since the point of view from which the work as a whole has been approached is that of spirituality, I intend to concentrate on the elements of his anthropology that have to do with the daily living of the Christian life, the exercise of virtue and the practice of prayer. As regards the former, I shall recapitulate the main part of the Pater Noster, Part II, in the division of the work as I present it. This will be followed by a brief account of the purification from the passions and the concern for virtue, which characterize Christian spirituality. This section of the final chapter will come to an end with some consideration of Maximus' teaching on 'the three laws', by which it will be seen that the life of virtue culminates in and is perfected by ἀγάπη. Ἀγάπη will also be seen as the way in which man is perfectly identified with Christ. In the section dealing with prayer, I intend to select the formal teaching on this subject in so far as it can be gleaned from the Expositio Orationis Dominicae. This will be followed by a rapid examination of Maximus' teaching on the contemplative life. Finally, an analysis of the expression αἴσθησις νοερά , which occurs in the Pater Noster, will reveal the place of

ἀγάπη in Maximus' understanding of the mystical life, so that the quality which identifies man with Christ will be seen as the means of his union with God in prayer. Maximus has suggested that praying the 'Our Father' is the way to assimilate 'the mysteries', which God bestows on man in Christ. Θεολογία will be the way in which the life of the man, who has attained the plenitude of ἀγάπη , will be expressed. In this kind of prayer, the articulation of the mysteries in the 'Our Father' will be summed up in a profound experience of the mystery of the Holy Trinity, by which man will anticipate the fullness of θέωσις and receive a pledge of what God holds in store for him when he enters into the perfection of life.

(i) Virtue

The Formal Concepts in the Expositio Orationis Dominicae, Part II[1]

The most elementary concepts of this part of the Pater Noster can be set out in this way:

(1) Theology: Son: λόγος

Spirit: πραότης

Therefore purification!

(2) Thy Will be done: worship: λόγος

leads to Λόγος

(3) The Bread of Life gives Himself in proportion to works and worth of νοῦς .

Eat to live to God.

(4) Because his good is inviolable the logical man forgives. So he is disposed for the Bread

of Life and the bread for the day.

(5) If he does not forgive he will be handed over to Temptation and the Evil One.

The Just Judge.

He is heard because he forgives.[2]

In this analysis we have the most elementary links between the parts of the Main Commentary. Obviously the language of the '<u>Our Father</u>' is the basis of this system of co-ordination, the remarks being an exegesis of those words and linked together because of the sequence of the '<u>Our Father</u>' itself. But already another kind of organic unity is beginning to emerge: that which springs from the inner congruence of the ideas used by Maximus in his interpretation of the dominical words.

(1) Λόγος and πραότης are associated with the Logos and the Spirit respectively and they intimate some kind of polarity in Maximus' thinking about the process of divine filial adoption, two foci around which all his reflections on Christian anthropology tend to rotate. They indicate properties of man in his formation as son of God and because he is fallen they demand purification.[3]

(2) It is the will of God that he should be worshipped by man as the angels worship Him and λόγος is the key to the understanding of this requirement. When it becomes dynamic in man's life it leads him to the Logos and this ensures that he is united to angels and a worshipper of God. Πραότης is not mentioned explicitly but it is implied in the dynamism which enables λόγος to ensure that man attains to equality with the angels.[4]

(3) The Logos is the Bread of Life and his new function of nourishing is congruent with that union with Logos asked for in the previous petition. The embodiment of Logos in man will be proportionate to his works and the worth of his νοῦς ; this refers to the twofold capacity of man for the good and the true, his need of ἀρετή and σοφία if his primordial relationship to the Logos is to be realized. The management of his bodily life is to be regulated by the principle that he must eat his earthly bread to live to God, by which the hierarchy of reality is translated into his being through asceticism.[5]

(4) Man's ability to forgive is derived from his relationship to the Logos of the previous interpretation which he chooses as his good: 'the incorruptible bread of wisdom'. Conversely, his forgiving is a disposition for Bread in both the senses given it by Maximus.[6]

(5) The alternative befalls him if he refuses to forgive: he is handed over to Temptation and Evil so that (4) and (5) set in contrast the possibilities held out to man's freedom of choice and the consequences of that use of freedom. The role of the Just Judge in applying the consequences of bad choice is then outlined. The section ends on an optimistic note: if he forgives, his prayer is heard and he comes into possession of the good things he asks for in the '<u>Our Father</u>' through forgiveness of former sins and protection from future ones.[7]

If there is already any single notion that seems to run through the seven 'mysteries', treated under five

headings by the combination of the invocation and first two petitions and the similar handling of the last two, it would seem to be λόγος . This emerges strongly in the first 'mystery', associated with the Son and also with the required purification. It is the dominating factor in the second 'mystery' where we are told that λόγος leads to Logos. The Logos becomes the 'bread' of the third 'mystery' and that in turn is the 'good' of the 4th section which renders possible forgiveness. On the contrary, if it is not effective in producing forgiveness, then 'temptation and evil' hold sway. In section (1) we find an exposition of theology and filiation: theology is concerned with the Holy Triad and its position at the beginning of the whole commentary makes it obvious that Maximus wants us to consider it as having the fundamental place in reality and in his treatise and it would be surprising if what he has to say about this supreme mystery was not meant to have a bearing on his understanding of man and his divine filiation, so that we are not reading into his arrangement and statements more than he intends if we discover that he tries to grasp the meaning of human existence and the unfolding of divine life in man through what he understands of the Blessed Trinity as a consequence of revelation. The distinctness of the persons is emphasized and the whole elaboration of the mystery of filiation is articulated around the bipolarity of λόγος and πραότης which are the human qualities that correspond to the Son-Name and Spirit-Kingdom and in terms of which the 'hallowing' and 'coming' prayed for

are interpreted as being realized.

The 'theology' theme is taken up again in the exegesis of 'conformation to Christ' under the heading of 'neither Jew nor Greek' complemented by the interpretation of 'circumcision-uncircumcision'. 'Male-female' is an elaboration of the ἐπιθυμία, θυμός dyad that has already been associated with λόγος in relation to the hallowing of the Name. The doublet image-likeness with its dynamic implication is obviously related to the polarity of λόγος - πραότης the latter member implying freedom and the synergy of the activity of the Holy Spirit and man's. This is further developed by the pairs: λόγος - γνῶσις, γνώμη - ἀρετή where the fundamental capacities in man already related to God through 'Name' and 'Kingdom' by λόγος and πραότης are said to be perfected by γνῶσις and ἀρετή so that we discern an alignment of γνῶσις with 'Name' and ἀρετή with 'Kingdom'. As we have noted already the dominant notion in this interpretation is λόγος . It should be noted too that it is not to be thought of out of relation to Kingdom, πραότης - γνώμη , which are related to it through the polarity that we have already discerned and find rooted in the inviolable distinctness of the hypostases of the Three in One. This section concludes with an exhortation to purification, that is the removal of whatever would impede the coming of the Kingdom and the hallowing of the Name, whatever is opposed to the full realization of λόγος and γνώμη .

Section (2) on the equality of man with angels is linked to the first section formally because of the sequence of petitions but conceptually through the idea of λόγος , with all that it entails, especially the counterpointing of γνώμη which is not mentioned explicitly in this section at all, but its counterpart ἀρετή is, even if it comes in the anticipatory reference to the Bread. It is λόγος that leads to Logos and ensures that man becomes a worshipper in spirit and in truth. This would seem to be, with the hallowing of the Name and the Equality of man with the angels, a variation on the theme of λόγος . We do not have to analyse it more precisely at this point, but we must keep in mind its various meanings. The dyad ἐπιθυμία - θυμός from the transposed platonic triad of λόγος - ἐπιθυμία - θυμός turns up here again, which is inevitable because of the association with λόγος , but now in association with νοῦς , a member of another triad: νοῦς λόγος - αἴσθησις . Ἐπιθυμία and θυμός are now integrated positively into man's orientation to God. The theme of bread is introduced here because the equality is considered to be the disposition for receiving the Bread but in proportion to ἀρετή and σοφία . We can equate this dyad with γνῶσις - ἀρετή in (1) and find room for γνώμη through this usage and so for ὑπόστασις , and in the context of the reception of the Logos as Bread, so that now the third section emerges as another variation on the relationship of man to the Logos who

is embodied in him according to his personal capacity.

This self-communication of the Logos, as bread, to man in (3) is said to take place in proportion to man's works (ἔργα ) , that is the works of virtue ( ἀρετή) which emphasizes again the function of man's freedom and responsibility and by implication his personal generosity and so his person, as well as the ἀξία of his νοῦς , that is his basic capacity for God which we are entitled to link up with γνῶσις and σοφία through logical parallelism with ἀρετή . The complementary theme of eating to live to God ties up with the λόγος - ἐπιθυμία - θυμός , purification of (1), νοῦς - ἐπιθυμία - θυμός and ἀρετή - σοφία of (2). The conundrum about the apparent conflict between the precept of not being concerned about material welfare and the injunction to ask for bread in the prayer produces the solution that the intention of the formula of the prayer is to join man's γνώμη to God's θέλημα . This is another reference to personal freedom and so by implication to person. The θέλημα is identical with that which wants angelic worship from men in (2) and probably refers to Justice in the evangelical precept to seek first the Kingdom and Justice of God. (3) disposes for (4) and (5). The root of the ability to forgive is described in (4) as the transcendence of the good to which the virtuous man is attached with the reverse implication of detachment from the created order in ἀπάθεια . He cannot be damaged in his relationship to this good and so there is nothing to forgive where there is no injury.

λόγος must be admitted to be at the heart of this good, bound up as it is with the language of interpreting the mysteries so far, so that the connection between (4) and (1), (2), and (3) is not merely due to the literary sequence of the petitions, but is also because of the organic function of λόγος in the hermeneutical task of Maximus. We must keep in mind too the abiding presence of γνώμη , with its associations, as the counterbalancing factor always present in his thought with its deepest foundation in the λόγος and τρόπος , about which his whole system is articulated.

The expression which Maximus uses to indicate this mystery is the 'restoration of nature to itself' and he addresses himself to the explanation of that 'mystery' in terms of λόγος φύσεως , γνώμη and προαίρεσις . Γνώμη and προαίρεσις , the faculties which take on personal qualification are the principles of unity or disunity of nature, depending on how they relate to λόγος φύσεως , so that the latter is at the centre of Maximus's understanding of the unity of nature willed by God. This lays stress on λόγος once again and makes of it a principle of ontological unity as well as of hermeneutical insight. If the presence of λόγος in nature is respected, accepted and personalized then all men are united in nature. This unites them in the Logos as we have seen in (2) where they are not merely united among themselves but with the angels, thus making up the great universe of the λογικοί . It also ensures that the Logos is embodied in them as the Bread of life and that they use the transient things of

creation in a fitting way. In a reciprocal employment of 'disposition', he now shows that forgiveness is a pre-requisite for the reception of the Bread in its twofold meaning. We can note, with re-assurance, the association in an explicit way of γνώμη and λόγος φύσεως in this context which confirms our claim that they are co-relatives in Maximus' system and that they are always thought of in mutual association even when this is not stated categorically. We can leave aside for the moment the problem of the co-ordination of λόγος and γνώμη in the system of Maximus, but we can be absolutely certain that both are essential constituents of his thought. We have already noted the links between λόγος - πραότης and λόγος - (γνῶσις ) - γνώμη (ἀρετή) in (1), ἀρετή - σοφία and ἔργα -ἀξία κατά νοῦν of (2) with this concern with γνώμη - λόγος φύσεως in (4). The ideas of νόμος φυσικός and θεῖος are added here too, further developing the dynamic presence of Logos in men through the λόγοι and the λόγος φύσεως in association with γνώμη . They give to νόμος an ontological relevance, emancipating it from legalistic concepts and preparing the way for the positive commandments of the revealed law and its bearing on ἀρετή which is seen in this context as a mode of existence, and not merely an optional adjunct to human being. This associates ἀρετή with τρόπος ὑπάρξεως and is on the way to showing that human existence is sonship of God in the Son, since it is the presence of λόγος personalized that makes for ἀρετή .

The 'as' in the petition raises the question of whether or not the prayer is suggesting that man can become an example to God. The solution of this apparent problem gives Maximus the opportunity of returning to the theme of purification from passions and its necessity for θέωσις , the process by which the Name is hallowed and the Kingdom comes, which again is linked to the main themes through λόγος and its correlative γνώμη .

We are told here too that the disposition of the forgiven must correspond to χάρις a term that evokes the initiative of God in all his activity towards man, creative and redemptive. It refers more particularly to the gratuitousness of the divine ἀγάπη and of the gifts of the πλεῖον τι , by which man becomes a participator in the divine nature, in the grace of the Trinity which in turn emphasizes the reality of the presence of God to man and in him by θέωσις . The themes of forgiveness and purification evoke the two basic concepts of Maximus' whole treatise: κένωσις - θέωσις , something realized in the Incarnate Logos and appropriated by man. Man cannot receive this gift unless he is forgiving, open to God because not closed to men.

The theme of 'conformation to Christ' is echoed here too since the treatment of the elimination of the 'categories' of 'barbarian-Scythian' and 'slave-free' has to do with removing obstacles to unity of nature: another link with (1). At the end of section (3) we were told that the man who was disposed to eat to live to God could then move on to (4) and (5), but not as if

(5) were a development of (4), but rather that in them he was faced with a decision and its alternative consequences, the decision to forgive or not: if he chose the former then he would be disposed for the Bread of life and the bread for the day the fulness of being willed for him by God, θέωσις if he chose not to forgive then he would have to make do with the frustration of his being, implied in the forfeiture of the divine ἀγαθά . We must keep in mind that the two final petitions are 'mysteries' too and so among the good things held out to man by God. But they are goods that obviously entail the presence of evil in human existence and in the world of man's experience. His coping with temptation and evil is presented here as tied up with his willingness to forgive and in this way (5) is linked to (4) and through (4) to (1), (2), (3). The 'good' here is the good of escape through divine intervention but in dependence on man's use of his freedom: man will be heard because he forgives and so freed from former and future sins and their consequences: the privation of the ἀγαθά of God.

The main treatment of (5) is taken up with the dire effects of not forgiving: If he does not forgive he will be handed over to Temptation and Evil. The role of the Just Judge in the evolution of man's fate is also stated.

The conceptual continuity of this section with section (4) and through it with the whole treatment of the mysteries becomes more obvious when he deals with the 'law of nature' and its contrary, the 'law of

passions'. Man's liability to enslavement to the Evil One takes place through his susceptibility to the 'law of sin' or the 'law of the passions', so that we are not excluding the influence of the devil by concentrating on the meaning of 'temptation' which is dialectically related to the foregoing interpretations through νόμος, φύσις and λόγος with its inevitable correlative γνώμη already so obviously implicit in the 'if', on which the fate of man is said to hang.

As we have seen the 'law of nature' is bound up with the λόγος of nature since it comes to be when γνώμη adopts the λόγος φύσεως so that λόγος is again basic to Maximus' understanding of the final petitions and their corresponding 'mysteries'. 'He should have known the law of nature and preserved it'. That would have ensured that he was in a proper relation to λόγος that he was freely appropriating it and so expropriating the 'law of passions' or the 'law of sin' which substitutes an unstable and transient foundation for the reality of λόγος so that there is a retrospective glance at all the implications of λόγος here and so at the whole commentary because of the organic systematization of all the ideas of Maximus by means of λόγος . He goes on to say that the man faced with the decisive choice 'should have preserved nature by λόγος ' and 'ensured that γνώμη co-operated with φύσις ' by appropriating its λόγος . Here we are undoubtedly back to our dyad, λόγος - γνώμη which is ultimately λόγος - τρόπος .

Although the section ends by reminding us that he is heard because he forgives, we recall too that he forgives because his good is beyond the tampering of created hands: it is λόγος opening out to the fullness of the life of the Blessed Trinity.

We shall now examine more closely Maximus' view of πρᾶξις.

## Praxis[8]

We have seen that in the Pater Noster, Maximus articulates many of his insights into the Christian life around the notion of λόγος . As we can see from the ascetical elements of his work as a whole, the notion of λόγος is fundamental to his understanding of the plight of man in his post-lapsarian state and of the way in which he is to arrive at the condition willed by God for him. Maximus, in common with the whole tradition, traces the present condition of man back to the Fall and considers that it can be undone by the Logos Incarnate if man accepts the salvation which He brought. In the Prologue to the Quaestiones ad Thalassium he says that the first man,

> having become a transgressor and having become ignorant of God and mixing the whole of his noetic power persistently with the whole of sensation, introduced knowledge which is composite and harmful, in as much as it is productive of passion for the sensibles, and became like to the mindless beasts and resembled them in wishing and seeking and doing in every way the same things that they do. And also he himself turned to the irrational in as much as he exchanged what is against nature for the λόγος that is in keeping with nature.9

In this unflattering picture of man and the origin of his disorders, ignorance of God, which follows on the

mysterious perversity of the first man's abuse of his freedom, gives rise to a situation in which man turns his νοῦς which is basically his spiritual capacity for God as truth, to the material creation and thus perverts not merely his knowledge, but the whole diapason of his existence. He has substituted the ἀλογία for the realm of λόγος . The renewal of man will therefore require the progressive restoration of λόγος in his life. Ignorance of God is at the root of the unreality into which fallen man plunges; he prefers phantasy and its consequent disordered emotion:

> The mind of the lover of God does not war against the realities, nor against their conceptions, but against the passions joined to these conceptions.[10]

> Passion is a movement of the soul contrary to nature, either in irrational love or in ill-judged hatred of something or because of something material.[11]

This combination of make-believe and irrational movements of the soul gives rise to a caricature of man's true self: 'From the reasonable or unreasonable use of things, we become virtuous or vicious'.[12] The tragedy of passion, as Maximus sees it, is that it perverts the movement which he considers to be fundamental to man's created being and prevents him from identifying with the elan of his nature to God. He is misled by the appearances of things and responds to them in ill-considered movement: 'without some kind of subject moving the powers of the soul to itself by means of some sensation, passion never comes about'.[13]

In his ascetical writings, Maximus uses the triad ἐπιθυμία - θυμός - λόγος to discuss the nature

and requirements of πρᾶξις . These terms relate basically to three powers of the soul, man's capacity for pleasure, his resource of emotional energy with which to undertake what is difficult and his power of reason. In the divine scheme of things, the concupiscible and irascible powers were meant to be subject to reason, while reason is by nature ordered to God. When ignorance entered λόγος , then the lower powers asserted themselves irrationally and the πάθη came to be, since man's reason had resigned from its role as ἡγεμονικόν . Maximus refers to the disorder in λόγος as passion too:

> All the rest of the passions take hold of either the irascible part of the soul or the concupiscible only or also the reasonable part (λογιστικόν) like forgetfulness and ignorance.[14]

Corresponding to the three powers, we find three basic passions: ignorance, tyranny and intemperance which take hold of λόγος - θυμός and ἐπιθυμία respectively.[15] The fundamental vice for Maximus is φιλαυτία [16] which can be associated in an especial way with ἐπιθυμία as love for the body, but which can express itself as inordinate love of self at a much deeper level and be identified with pride. The prolific character of φιλαυτία is suggested in the following:

> Guard yourself from the mother of all vices, self-love, which is irrational love of the body, for from this, obviously the first three cardinal, impassioned, mad thoughts arise, namely gluttony, avarice and vainglory. They originate in necessary demands of the body, from which the whole catalogue of evils is born.[17]

The core of man's passionate vulnerability is, then, self-love. For Maximus there can be no compromise between self-love and spiritual growth, so that he bluntly pres-

cribes the opposite as the remedy which will purify man:

> Do not be self-interested and you will not hate your brothers; do not be a self-lover and you will be a lover of God.[18]

Maximus also knows that this cannot come about unless the passions that impede λόγος have been corrected by their opposite; so ignorance and forgetfulness must yield to knowledge and remembrance of God. This aspect of purification will be emphasized much more when Maximus comes to deal with θεωρία , but at no stage is spiritual progress in any way due to blind voluntarism:

> The true love of God in keeping with knowledge and the complete rejection of the soul's love for the body and this world is the liberation from all these evils and the quick way to salvation, according to which we get rid of the desire for pleasure and the fear of pain. We are liberated from the evil of self-love and we are raised to the knowledge of the Creator.[19]

> The process of impressing λόγος on man's passionate life is not divorced from a knowledge in his faculty of λόγος , which puts him in relation with the Logos who is the source of the λόγοι immanent to man and the world, knowledge of which corrects his tendency to substitute λογισμοί of his own devising for the objective truth of the divine order and so is at the root of his effort to bring his passions into line with reality. We know from the Pater Noster how Maximus thinks of the passions as being finally integrated into man's desire for God, a condition in which they find their ultimate meaning.[20]

Maximus thinks of the purification of the passions as being concerned with two areas, as we would expect, that of the concupiscible appetite and that of the

irascible appetite, the ἐπιθυμία and θυμός of the Pater Noster. He knows that it is easier for man to control his attachment to external things than to regulate his inner faculties, so that the elements of ascesis have to do with externals: food, sexual gratification, reputation, money.[21] Predictably Maximus thinks that detachment from the objects of sense would be well nigh impossible unless desire found a better object. 'Now knowledge of God and divine things is incomparably better than them'.[22] Man will have to pursue inordinate passion back to its source in his disordered complacency in himself. The quality which counteracts man's pride is described here, with evangelical overtones, as 'the loving yoke of true piety' by which 'God has freed us from the bitter slavery of the tyrannizing demons, namely humility, by which every diabolical power is mastered'.[23] In fact, Maximus has a virtuous remedy for every passion and vice. Involuntary pain and suffering, used creatively, eliminate disordered pleasure: it is 'the harsh mistress of the passions and the modest and reputable mother of the virtues'.[24] Maximus has dealt with this aspect of Christian spirituality in the Pater Noster as a form of 'temptation'. He sees it in an even more positive light elsewhere: 'for godly suffering is clearly a divine seed, producing as a ripe fruit the gladness of eternal benefits'.[25]

In the Pater Noster, Maximus had said that we hallow the Name by mortifying epithumia and he adds: 'When we arrive at that we hush the unbecoming

barkings of the irascible appetite, which no longer has the concupiscible appetite stimulating it and persuading it to fight for the pleasures that are dear to it'.[26] That describes exactly the relationship of the two sets of passions. Maximus admits that the pacification of the aggressive passions is more difficult than the ordering of concupiscence.[27] Because their province is the difficult, then they present more difficulty to λόγος . Humility extends its influence to θυμός since in deflating man's bloated sense of his excellence, together with his pleasure in his image of himself, it undermines as well the source of his sense of injured merit and resentfulness.[28] It is left to meekness to curb anger thus deprived of its stimulation:

> Meekness keeps anger undisturbed; humility frees the mind from conceit and arrogance.[29]

Maximus knows that the irascible passions spring from the concupiscible, that the undisciplined drive to pleasure becomes the cause of enmity between men. This means that the sobriety required by meekness and humility will have considerable bearing on the forgiveness, which we have seen to play such a pivotal part in Maximus' account of the spiritual life in the Pater Noster. Forgiveness cannot begin as long as anger and its attendant passions smoulder in the soul. In fact, they impede the unfolding of ἀγάπη . In answer to why the Lord told us to 'love your enemies', he says:

> That He might free you from hate, grief, anger, grudges, and that He might grant you the greatest of all possessions, perfect charity, which cannot be had except by the man who loves all men equally in imitation of God, who loves all men equally and wills them 'to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth'.[30]

The ascetical life is to a large extent, for Maximus, the effort to free thought, that is the activity of λόγος , from the passionate accretions that spring from man's selfishness, so that he may be able to assess reality for what it is and allow charity to flow freely in his life:

> An impassioned representation is a thought compounded of passion and representation. Let us separate the passion from the representation: the thought alone will remain. If we but will, we make this separation by means of spiritual charity and self-mastery.[31]

Finally, we find Maximus returning to the subject of prayer, which in conjunction with πρᾶξις , is largely the petition for the virtues which at once purify the soul from the passions and dispose it for the contemplative life. With prayer he associates vigilance, which is principally concerned with habitual awareness that our conflict is with 'principalities and powers'. Maximus tells his correspondent Peter:

> If we are alert and vigilant, we know how to keep ourselves from the guiles of the demons, and if we pray we can acquire the divine grace for our help, which fights with us and makes us victors against any opposing power and delivers us from all deceit and ignorance.[32]

In the Prologue to the Pater Noster we have seen Maximus concerned with the relationship of charity and fear. He thinks of man's spiritual journey to God as beginning in fear and gradually opening out into the full freedom of love, when fear itself will take on a new mode:

> The fear of God is twofold. The one is born out of the threats of punishment on account of which self-control and patience and hope in God and impassibility, from which charity comes, emerge

> in us in that order. The other is joined to charity itself and constantly creates reverence in the soul so that it may not come to contempt of God because of the boldness of charity.[33]

We shall see this again in his treatment of 'The Three Laws'.

Maximus does not think of the passions as operating independently of the higher part of man's being, nor as uninfluenced by malign forces from outside. He says: 'Again there are three things which move us towards evil; the passions, the demons and the evil use of choice',[34] which he contrasts with a threefold source of good movements: natural tendencies, the Holy Powers and good choice.[35] We have seen that he does not neglect the presence and influence of the Evil One in the Pater Noster, although we should remember too that the devils cannot enter the bastion of man's freedom and influence him from within as God can. This is rooted in the contrast, which we noted, between the causality exercised by God and that exercised by the Evil One, the former being the Creator, the latter having to settle for being an instigator:

> Those that forever seek our soul do so through bad thoughts that they may throw it into some sin of thought or deed. When therefore they find the mind unreceptive, they will be ashamed and confounded; but when they find it given over to spiritual contemplation, then will they be turned back and utterly put to shame in short order.[36]

Nor are their onslaughts restricted to attempting to manipulate man's imagination and his thoughts:

> The demons make their attacks either with things or with the impassioned thoughts connected with them. They attack with things those that are occupied in affairs; with thoughts those that live withdrawn from affairs.[37]

But the vulnerable aspect of man, for Maximus, is his proneness to passionate self-indulgence and it is through that the demons try to subjugate him:

> From the passions embedded in the soul the demons seize opportunities of stirring up in us impassioned thoughts. Then warring on the mind through them, they force it to consent to sin. When the mind is overcome, they lead on to a sin of thought; and when this is completed, they finally carry it prisoner to the deed.[38]

Elsewhere in the Capitum de Caritate Quattuor Centuriae, Maximus discusses the various alleged strategies of the demons in their corruptive approach to men, either through the body, or by directly stirring up passion or through the mind, but in every case the principal concern is to rouse passion, so that the primary aim of his asceticism is to regulate the passions, which here are said to be impervious to demonic influence; 'when charity and self-mastery are present'.

In contrast to the malicious influence of the demons, Maximus shares with the tradition the conviction that the angels play a part in the life and destiny of men:

> 'Sometimes God Himself enters the pure mind and teaches it; sometimes the holy Powers suggest good things; sometimes the nature of the things we contemplate'.[39]

As in the case of the demons, the holy Powers cannot enter the mind and heart of man as God can. They too have to rely on suggestion, except that in their case it is benevolent and beneficent. Just as the demons take advantage of the passions to gain entry to man's life, so the angels avail of the good tendencies which they find in man's powers to encourage him in virtue.

Likewise, good choice helps man towards the good to which the angels exhort him, while evil choice supports the attacks of the demons.[40]

We have seen that, in the Pater Noster, Maximus organizes much of what he has to say about anthropology around the foci of λόγος and γνώμη, where λόγος is primarily taken to be the principle of nature which γνώμη must make its own if men are to be at one among themselves and with God. In our examination of some of the salient aspects of Maximus' Christology, we have seen the prominence which he gave to will and that he was forced to refine and make precise his teaching on the will in order to defend orthodoxy. In his earlier writings γνώμη and προαίρεσις are virtually synonymous, where they stand for free-will or free-choice.[41] In the Quaestiones ad Thalassium we find γνώμη set in contrast to παθητόν, in which the demons lodge in order to attack man in his freedom.[42] They cannot reach his γνώμη directly, nor exercise their tyranny on it in an immediate way. By accepting the servitude which the demons impose on it through the παθητόν, the γνώμη binds the whole human nature to evil.[43] In fact, in yielding to the movements of παθητόν, the γνώμη allows itself to be captivated by what is against nature.[44] Because of the sentence on Adam, the free will of man inclines to pleasure and not even the fear of death can free him from this yoke.[45] Christ removed that sentence. The γνώμη which accepts the requirements of the λόγος φύσεως allows itself to be moulded by the Holy

Spirit and moves man towards deification:

> The Spirit does not engender a free-will that is unwilling, but He transforms one that wills it with a view to deification.[46]

Maximus does not dissociate charity from faith and hope.[47] The spiritual life is founded on them and develops in virtue of their development in the life of man, and even more specifically, each of these virtues, while having its proper function, grows in relation to the others.[48] In the Pater Noster, Maximus associates the Name with λόγος and the Kingdom with πραότης. A random selection of texts from his ascetical writing would show that this polarity is constantly at work in his thought. We have noted already that λόγος is fundamental to his conception of virtue and that it implies a presence of the Logos in the life of man. But Maximus associates ἀγάπη with λόγος in the production of the ἀπάθεια, that is thought of as the culmination of praxis.[49] With ἐγκράτεια it enables man to integrate the vitality of his sense powers into his life as a whole. In that context it is associated with θυμός in an especial way, something inherited from Evagrius. But we have seen too that προαίρεσις is a significant factor in the asceticism of Maximus.[50] If it is a potent source of evil, then it is a potent source of good. We know that in works more or less contemporary with the Pater Noster Maximus associated ἀγάπη with will in a special way, so that the proper exercise of free-choice is informed by charity.[51] Already in the Capitum de Caritate Quattuor Centuriae, Maximus gives ἀγάπη a more fundamental

role than that of remedy for aggressiveness. It is one of the two fundamental options which confront man: 'do not be a self-lover and you will be a lover of God'.[52] Dalmais, as we noted, thinks that πραότης is practically synonymous with ἀγάπη .[53] Because of its association with the Holy Spirit in the Pater Noster, we can safely think that it refers to ἀγάπη as gift of God and that it so implies the receptivity of man to what is poured into his heart. In this way by the play of ἀγάπη in his life through the exercise of free-choice, we can discern the presence of the personal dimension of human activity.

The way in which Maximus uses terminology in the Pater Noster is no exception to the way he uses it throughout his works, especially in the earlier spiritual writings. He tends to give the terms the meaning they have in the source which he is using at the time, without being over concerned about the meaning he has given them in other contexts, when drawn from other sources. Λόγος is a notoriously flexible term in his vocabulary. In the Pater Noster it is used to designate the principle of the rectification of ἐπιθυμία and θυμός , so that it will be related to ἀρετή , which can be understood as the imprint of λόγος on man's concupiscible and irascible powers.[54] Further on we find λόγος aligned with γνῶσις , so that it has become the faculty of man's knowledge of God.[55] In this context it is γνώμη that is associated with ἀρετή .[56] It can be said in passing that this is a distinctively Christian development as

the Greek philosophers did not speak of the relationship of will to virtue; for them that was the province of λόγος . When Maximus uses the triad ἐπιθυμία - θυμός - λόγος he assigns a twofold function to λόγος : it is the faculty of knowledge of God or designates man in his actual knowing of God; on the other hand, it refers to his task of rendering his sense powers reasonable by informing them with the virtues. When he uses the triad αἴσθησις - λόγος - νοῦς , he allots to νοῦς the role of knowing God, while λόγος is primarily discursive reason, which performs a variety of mediations. When λόγος is paired with γνώμη , then γνῶσις is the province of λόγος , while γνώμη is assigned the task of the virtues.[57] Προαίρεσις at this stage is used alternatively with γνώμη , both terms referring to voluntary activity rather than to the faculty. The play of γνώμη - προαίρεσις implies the personal qualification which the human act acquires in the concrete,[58] so that nature-person, λόγος - τρόπος are ultimately the dimensions of human being that are in relation to the 'Name' and the 'Kingdom' through λόγος and πραότης . We have suggested in Chapter IV that the outcome of this is that man becomes a son in the Son through the action of the Spirit. This means that the virtues ensure that the Logos was present in the life of the virtuous, not merely because He is the source of the λόγοι , but in some way in His uniqueness, that is communicating to them a participation in the sonship that became the ground of His

humanity in the Hypostatic Union, which would in turn constitute them in the freedom of their persons. The virtues reveal this participation because of being marked by the ἀγάπη which the Holy Spirit causes to flow from the Head to the members in the Body of Christ.

## The Three Laws[59]

The synthesis of St. Maximus had its foundation in his understanding of the Logos. He thought of the Logos as present to His creatures in a threefold way: in the principles of creation, in the Scriptures and in the mystery of the Incarnation. Corresponding to that threefold presence, he discerned three laws, which are calculated to bring man to his fulfilment in deification. In a passage in the Ambigua, he describes the threefold presence as a triple incarnation of the Logos,[60] by which the preliminary incarnations in nature and Scripture prepare for and are perfected in the personal incarnation, in which the Logos assumes human nature in such a way that His personal existence is extended to a human nature. The Incarnation is the ultimate realization of the possibility of the union of God with man and the most intimate presence of God to man which has become the ground and exemplar of union for mankind. The 'law of nature' corresponds to the natural presence of the Logos, the 'written law' corresponds to His presence in Scripture and the 'law of grace' has its foundation in His presence as Jesus Christ. Although the laws were promulgated in a temporal sequence, the law of nature at creation, the written law with the Old Testament and the law of grace

with the Gospel, they are bound to each other because they have the same source, the Logos, and the same purpose, the deification of man. Maximus associates the law of nature with 'the Logos of God, Jesus Christ' as the Creator and the written and spiritual laws with Him as provider and lawgiver.[61] The Logos nourishes men on the laws.[62]

We have already seen how Maximus understands the notion 'law of nature' in the Pater Noster. There it was understood as a spontaneous inclination in man rather than an objective canon. Again in the Quaestiones ad Thalassium we find law described in relation to 'ways of living':

> The making of a journey of three days then should be understood as the different ways of living on the journey according to God, that is a mode of life that is in accordance with each universal law. For by universal law I mean the natural law, the written law and the law of grace. For each of these has its proper mode of life and fitting course, as well as having a different ordering of activities taking its rise in keeping with free-will.[63]

The image of the journey and the days is taken from Jonah 3,3. It suggests movement, a basic action in the spirituality of Maximus. The image allows him to introduce the distinctions that arise from the activity of different principles in the evolution of man's destiny. The journey demands different ways of living, corresponding to the sequence of the days. But Maximus thinks of the laws of nature and of Scripture as coinhering, while they are transcended and perfected in the law of grace.[64] A key to the understanding of the text is the function of γνώμη throughout the

development of man's spiritual life. This will be found to be ultimately linked to the idea of person, so that the growth visualized here is not a spontaneous unfolding of nature. It demands the presence of another dimension of human existence, the mystery of ὑπόστασις and the qualification of τρόπος . The ordering of human activities will differ according to their dependence on the different laws 'in keeping with free-will'. Ideally, human existence is free existence, human activities are free activities, because while being shaped by laws, they take their rise in free-will, which is the way in which man as person takes possession of man as nature. But Maximus draws attention to the formative character of the laws. They are intermediary between the principles that are grounded in the Logos and the personal realm of activity, which requires their information, so that will may not be arbitrary in order to be free. But Maximus avoids the pitfall of an objective positivism, by affirming the actualisation of nature in personal freedom, under the influence of ἀγάπη transforming πόθος , the expression of γνώμη . There we find the existential epiphany of the τρόπος ὑπάρξεως which is the root of personality.

As Maximus develops his view of the three laws in this passage, we find that law moves from being 'outside' man to being 'inside' him. At first it is said to create a disposition in man; each law is formulated in language taken from Scripture; eventually it becomes the principle of activity within man developing from the natural principle through ἀγάπη informing the

natural principle to being ἀγάπη in the full development of its hypostatic freedom. The 'inside' is to be understood primarily in terms of γνώμη , the faculty by which the law is appropriated to become the principle of man's spontaneous activity. Since it is rooted in the presence of the Logos, the full development of the law will mean the fullness of His presence in the free activity of man, until he can say: 'I live, now not I, Christ lives in me'.

We shall now look at the three laws more closely:

> For each of them naturally creates a different disposition in those under it; for instance, the natural law, whenever it does not have sense gaining the upper hand over reason, persuades in a non-didactic manner to embrace all as related and of the same race, having the same nature. It is the teacher of succour to the needy and that all should will for all whatever, according to his wishes, each one considers should come his way from others. Teaching this, the Lord says: 'Whatever you would wish men to do to you, do you to them likewise'. In those to whom nature is ruled by reason, their disposition is naturally one; manifestly both the ethical style and the way of life of those, whose disposition is one, is naturally one; the bond of relationship to one another of those whose ethical style and way of life is one is obviously one and the same in free-will, leading all to the one principle of nature by the one free-will, in which the completely mastering division of nature, because of self-love, is not now to be found.[65]

Maximus says that 'the law of nature is the natural principle subduing sense to remove the irrational, from which arises the division of things naturally united'. The law of nature is founded on the λόγος φύσεως ; so it requires that man should remove from his life what is not in keeping with that nature. This is necessary if men are to be united because of willing

what is basic to the unity of nature possessed by each and every man. It is this that will heal divisions. Maximus refers to 'the same race', 'having the same nature', 'the one principle of nature'. That oneness is fragmented when sense is not subordinate to reason, the faculty that mediates the requirements of the λόγος φύσεως to man's activity, so that he may become what he is. The Fall was due to failure of γνώμη to maintain this integrity because of pernicious self-love. Every failure to respect the non-didactic ordinances of the principle of nature is a re-enactment of that pristine fall. Maximus understands the whole of the practical endeavour of man to be the mediation of the λόγος φύσεως into the existential dimensions of his being so that the law of nature has to do with 'ethical behaviour', the creation of virtue in his life. Because men will the conformity of their lives with a common principle, they are bound to be at one among themselves. To fail to will that conformity is to introduce division into nature. Maximus finds a scriptural maxim to sum up the demands made by the law of nature: 'whatever you wish men to do to you, do you to them likewise'.[66] As Maximus understands it, this law enables man to lay the foundation of his moral and spiritual being. It is a sine qua non of further growth and progress. It has to be superseded; it cannot be dispensed with. It is the first and most elementary way in which the Logos comes to be present in men.

> The written law, restraining by fear of penalties the disorderly impulses of the more foolish and teaching them, accustoms them to have regard only to the distribution of what is equal, by which the power of

> justice, strengthened by time, transfers itself to nature, making fear quietly by degrees to be a disposition controlled by free-will, directed to moral good, a fixed inclination, the habit, purified by forgetfulness of former things, giving rise to mutual love together with itself, by which the fulness of the law comes about when all are bound to one another by charity. For the fullness of the law naturally is the interrelated joining by charity of all those who share in nature, carrying along with it the principle of nature, crowned by a love in accordance with charity, making the law of nature resplendent by the addition of charity. For the law of nature is the natural principle ensuring that sense is subject to ethical behaviour; written law however, or rather the fulfilment of written law, is the natural principle assuming the spiritual principle that helps to achieve the reciprocal cohesion of those bound by race. For it says: 'You shall love your neighbour as yourself', but not: 'you shall treat your neighbour as yourself'. For the one means the union of the related with reference to being only, the other signifies providence with a view to well-being.[67]

He thinks of the written law as 'the natural principle, after the removal of the irrationality in the realm of sense, that takes on as well the spiritual love that takes hold of the reciprocal bond that pertains to the race'. He makes this more precise by saying that it is the 'fulfilment of written law' that facilitates 'the reciprocal cohesion of those bound by race'. This means that there is a development in terms of the written law, that the principle which it involves is a source of growth and that its presence becomes unequivocally evident when it has reached a certain 'fulness'. Maximus describes something of the process by which the written law effects the gradual conversion of fear into love by way of justice: it restrains by fear of punishment, teaches, accustoms men to regard the distribution of what is equal so that justice gradually becomes assimilated by nature and grows into love.[68]

Fear of penalties gives way to concern for the good in itself, so that the new principle can ensure that those who possess it can transform by a succession of acts their habitual attitude from being one of fear to being one of love. Maximus says that the maxim which will then express the basic orientation of man in his freedom is: 'you shall love your neighbour as yourself',[69] not 'you shall treat your neighbour as yourself'. He invokes the distinction between εἶναι and εὖ εἶναι to bring home what he means. The law of nature by removing the passions that prohibit the union of men has reference to the λόγος φύσεως . By acting freely in keeping with that principle, men are necessarily united, since it is the natural principle in each man. By affirming the principle of unity, they create unity. But with the written law and its principle of ἀγάπη , gradually men confront each other precisely as free subjects and relate as such, 'for the fulness of the law naturally is the interrelated joining by charity of all those who share in nature, carrying along with it the principle of nature, crowned by love in accordance with charity'. While still a human being, man now confronts his neighbour as another 'self'. He does not neglect the demands of the λόγος φύσεως but because of the transcendence of person a new relationship is possible, that of person to person. This is characterized by a care for the neighbour's spiritual welfare, a 'providence with a view to well-being'. At this stage of his development, Maximus visualizes man looking to the prescriptions of the written law in order to shape himself according to

the will of the Logos. He understands that this demands an inner principle in man, in virtue of which he will gradually progress from acting through fear to acting through charity. But the Gospel demands further development from those endowed with divine charity. The example of the Incarnate Logos reveals possibilities beyond even the unselfishness of a charity that enables man to love others as he loves himself:

> But the law of grace teaches those being formed to imitate in an immediate way God, who loved us to such an extent above Himself, who were enemies at that because of sin, as to come among us in a nature without change and, being above every nature, to assume nature in a way above nature and become man and to will to be called a man among men; nor did He refuse to make our condemnation His own and to divinize us by grace to the extent that He himself by the economy became man by nature, so that we would learn not merely to cleave to each other naturally and love each other as ourselves spiritually, but be divinely concerned for one another beyond ourselves and display that love towards one another which is a desire in keeping with virtue to die of one's own will on behalf of another. 'For there is no greater love than this' says Scripture, 'than that one should lay down his life for his friends'.[70]

The maxim now is: 'there is no greater love than this' says Scripture, 'than that one should lay down his life for his friends'.[71] This shows that ἀγάπη has a resource which invites men to go beyond mutual respect and even mutual love, which has the 'self' as canon. In this mode of life the hypostatic and ecstatic dimensions of man's being become apparent with a new brilliance.[72] He becomes concerned for his neighbour in a way that has no self-reference, by going out of himself in total self-disregard even to the extent of being willing to forego his life for the good of his fellow-man. The principle of this emigration from self for the sake of the other

is more than 'the principle of nature'; it is more even than the natural principle that takes on as well the spiritual principle. The law of grace invites us to imitate the selfless love of the Incarnate Logos, who, in virtue of the uniqueness of His hypostasis, went beyond His divine nature, so to speak, and took on ours, even to the extent of making 'our condemnation His own', in order to divinize us by grace. The themes of κένωσις and θέωσις emerge here. Humanity was divinized in the kenotic assumption of our nature by the Person of the Logos. The ἀγάπη which He showed in His humanity is due ultimately to who He is. We have seen some of the implications of His Hypostatic Union, His composite Hypostasis and the way in which He willed and acted, as Maximus came to formulate them in the Christological debates. The basis of those claims is firmly stated here: He assumed nature 'in a way above nature'; so is the principle of that ecstatic self-immolation on our behalf: ἀγάπη . The presence of ἀγάπη in man enables him to come to the point of total self-forgetfulness. In the Ad Thalassium text, this kind of love is related to Christ's love for us who were His enemies 'because of sin'. It is precisely in the love of enemies that Maximus considers that ἀγάπη is demonstrated most clearly and that man participates in the φιλανθρωπία of God-made-man, who laid down his life for men.[73] For Maximus this is possible because of the personal dimension of man's being, which enables him to go out of himself in perfect love. Because of the gift of agape the

perfect coincidence of ὑπόστασις and ἔκστασις is revealed 'in a desire in keeping with virtue to die of one's own will on behalf of another'. Maximus reminds us that 'the law of grace is a principle beyond nature'. He goes on to say that it shows the Logos, 'the Archetype above essence and nature incomprehensibly as in an image in the nature of men'. Maximus thinks of the written law as preparing man for fulfilment through hope, which will issue in charity and in the same context he shows how he understands the Archetype to be present:

> 'The word of Scripture makes us by hope apt to receive the Archetype of all truths, to become the living image of Christ, or rather, by the grace of Christ, Christ himself' (Ambig. PG 91, 1253D).

This is something beyond understanding and conceptual expression. The ἀγάπη , which has its source in the Logos, which is poured into the heart of man by His Spirit, so transforms not merely 'the principle of nature', but also the 'mode of existence', that man's person emerges in all its splendour, revealing him to be a son in the Son. It is this that will enable him to pass over to the Lord, to enter 'the permanence of ever-well-being'. Maximus sums up his teaching on the three laws thus:

> To put it summarily, therefore, the law of nature is the natural principle subduing sense to remove the irrational element from which arises the division of things naturally united. The written law, on the other hand, is the natural principle, after the removal of irrationality with regard to sense, that takes on as well the spiritual love that takes hold of the reciprocal bond that pertains to the race. Then the law of grace is a principle beyond nature, remodelling nature without change with a view to divinization, showing the Archetype above essence and nature incomprehensibly as in an image in the nature of men and providing the permanence of ever-well-being.74

While Maximus realizes that we cannot put limits to the way in which the Holy Spirit is free to act, he knows in faith that the Church is where the action of the Spirit is guaranteed. The Church is the extension of Christ and so it is the mystery of the presence of the Spirit in the world. It is a mystery hidden before all ages and generations,

> but now appearing through the true and perfect "inhomination" of the Son of God, who united to Himself hypostatically our nature without division and without confusion.[75]

Because of this, we are the members and the body and the fullness of Christ who is God and Who fills all things entirely 'in accordance with our having been predestined before the ages in Him to be members of His body'.[76] The Church is the icon of God 'because she brings about the union of God and the faithful'.[77] This is founded on the grace of faith: 'The Catholic Church is the right and saving confession of the faith, as the Lord himself said'.[78] We can see Maximus relating the presence of the Spirit to the threefold presence of the Logos and the triple mode of life in keeping with the three laws in this passage:

> The Holy Spirit is simply in all, in as much as He holds all together and cares for all and in as much as He moves the natural tendencies. But in a specific way He is also in all those who are under the Law, in that He points out the commandments that define transgression and throws light on the fore-ordained promise of Christ. But He is also in all who follow Christ, to whom He was announced as the author of adoption. As the creator of wisdom He does not exist in any one of the above mentioned in a simple way except in those who endowed with understanding, [redacted] have made themselves through a godly way of life worthy of His divine indwelling.[79]

We might think of the action of the Holy Spirit as taking place between the laws as ideal and the laws as fulfilled, which is another way of saying that we become identified with the Logos through the synergy of the Spirit's action and man's response. This takes place in the measure of man's incorporation in the Church through faith and his participation in the gift of the Spirit's operation:

> The revelation of the Spirit is given according to the measure of the faith, which is in each one, by participation in this gift. Each of the believers, that is, according to the measure of the faith and the disposition of soul, of which he is subject, receives commensurate energy of the Spirit which grants to him the habit of activity appropriate to this or that command-ment.[80]

It is against the background of this teaching that we must look at the way in which Maximus relates λόγος to the 'Name' and πραότης to the 'Kingdom' in the Pater Noster. We have suggested already that πραότης connotes a receptivity to the Spirit and his forming activity. Maximus opens out this receptivity in his teaching on the seven spirits, which he takes from Isaiah, 11, 2. He relates them to progress in the spiritual life, or, as he suggests, in one place, to the expression of faith in appropriate activity:[81]

> The Holy Spirit produces purification in those who are worthy of the purity of the virtues through fear and piety and knowledge; to those who are worthy of light He grants en-lightenment with regard to the principles by which beings exist through fortitude and counsel and understanding; He bestows on those worthy of deification perfection through radiant and simple and complete wisdom.[82]

Maximus does not forget to remind his readers that the

action of the Holy Spirit does not diminish nor destroy the native ability of man or what Maximus calls 'the receptive habit and power which is in every man'.[83] He associates this receptivity of man with all his powers,[84] but most significantly with γνώμη , of which he says:

> The Spirit does not engender a free-will that is unwilling, but He transforms it when it is willing with a view to deification.[85]

In the Greek he contrasts θέλουσαν and βουλομένην , thus bringing out the free decision with which the action of the Holy Spirit must be complemented if it is to form man in a personal way and make of him a son of God. The teaching of Maximus on the Holy Spirit and on the Church is not divorced from his teaching on the Sacraments, especially on Baptism and the Eucharist.[86] Of Baptism he says:

> We, who have put on the first incorruptibility with ritual baptism in Christ through the Spirit, let us await the last (which will be) with Him in the Spirit, having preserved the first unspotted through progress in good works and death voluntarily accepted.[87]

Maximus insists on the need of co-operation with the action of the Spirit in Baptism. He says that we sin if we do not respond to the grace of Baptism with a will that is free from attachment to what is at variance with the grace. On the contrary,

> If we prepared the will to receive the energy of these things, I mean water and the Spirit, spiritually, the mystical water would have cleansed conscience through the practice of virtue, and the enlivening Spirit would have produced in us the immoveable perfection of what is good through the knowledge that comes with experience.[88]

We shall now address ourselves to some consideration of the place that knowledge holds in Maximus' view of man and his fulfilment.

(ii) Prayer

Formal elements of prayer from the Expositio Dominicae

We know from the Prologue[89] and Introduction[90] to the Pater Noster that it was the friend who asked him to write this treatise who also suggested that it should take the form of a commentary on the 'Our Father', so that the first motivation to provide a statement on prayer came from outside. Maximus did not approach his subject in the spirit of a dilettante, but rather in the spirit of the service of his brothers and of the Church. When he finds himself committed to writing on prayer, he turns in prayer to the Lord in order to find the ability to write.[91] He wants to grasp the mysteries and the gift of a suitable language to express them.[92] Before he suggests a definition of prayer, we find Maximus in the act of prayer: acknowledging his dependence on God. An analysis of what Maximus asks for shows his awareness of the necessity of contemplation in order to apprehend the mysteries together with a parallel understanding and cognate language to express it adequately. "Apophasy" (ἀπόφασις) should be complemented and mediated by "cataphasy" (κατάφασις).

The intrinsic motivation for commenting on the 'Our Father', as Maximus sees it, is the connection between the prayer and the divine Economy. He understands that the prayer is a means of identifying with the divine intentions for man and so of appropriating the mysteries that God bestows as benefits on man. The prayer is related to the divine purpose of deification and the way in which God intends man to attain to that purpose. It

is this which makes it worth while for Maximus to, first of all, know and experience the power of the 'Our Father' and so be in a position to write about it.[93] Πρᾶξαι can also mean 'to do' or 'to put into practice' so that at the threshold of his commentary he reminds us of the inseparability of theory and practice in the Christian life and of the need of both in order to speak of prayer authoritatively. Maximus will not relinquish this point of view, but keeps insisting on the need for consistency throughout his treatise. Von Balthasar reminds us that in the mind of Maximus the perfect man can unite αἴσθησις to νοῦς through λόγος and introduce the content of αἴσθησις into the superior unity of νοῦς which is orientated to God.[94] The same process is at work when he reads Scripture and, by extension, when he prays the 'Our Father'. Dalmais speaks of this work of Maximus as a mystagogy, a treatise that is not merely an explanation of the mysteries, but which is also an affective initiation into the mysteries.[95] His intention in writing is to invite us to share in his appreciation of the mysteries so that we too may be initiated into them. Indeed, the prayer 'which teaches us to lay claim to the benefits of which the God and Father alone, through the natural mediation of his Son in the Holy Spirit, is truly the giver', contains the whole 'scope' of God mystically concealed in its language.[96] Maximus qualifies this by saying that the 'scope' is clearly proclaimed to those who are robust in mind. The implication is that the mysteries, which are facets of the divine purpose, have become in the kenosis of the Son of God obvious realities, but not

necessarily amenable to conceptual appropriation and expression. In this way, the 'hiddenness' and the clarity can be reconciled. The robust in spirit can attain to the realities through the inspired language of the prayer. The beginning of that process is, according to Maximus, petition.[97] The power of the prayer is open to those who lay themselves open through αἴτησις. Petition is the bridge between the acknowledged need of man and the blessings with which God wills to endow him. It should be noted in passing too that prayer is said to teach.[98] It is a form of instruction and enlightenment.

Maximus then elaborates the role of Christ in the bestowal of the divine benefits.[99] He is the mediator of the gifts of God and the author and teacher of the mysteries. He reminds us that He manifests the Father through His flesh and brings men reconciled in Him through the Spirit to the Father. Theology and Economy, which will find fuller treatment in the course of the treatise, are here deftly introduced to remind us of the larger perspectives in which prayer is to be understood and practised. The end towards which prayer is ordered, the obtaining of deification, has already been achieved <u>par excellence</u> in the Incarnation. The Logos has identified himself with men and entered into solidarity with them in order to restore to them the destiny for which they were originally created. It is this that makes Him the author of the new mysteries. The author is also the teacher of the mysteries. Beyond comprehension they may be, but no one can teach them with more authority than their author. In the 'Our Father', He has focussed on

seven of them, throwing light on their meaning and encouraging men to ask for a participation in what He has given to them 'in keeping with his exceptional generosity'.

While the first section of Part I is concerned primarily with the content of the 'Our Father', the Reprise[100] is more concerned with the formal aspects of prayer and helps us to appreciate the nuances of petition. Here we find that although the 'Our Father' is primarily an expression of desire and need, a petition or request, because of the One to whom it is addressed, it opens out into a declaration of the mystery of the Trinity and becomes a disclosure of the new identity of men as sons of God because of the One who teaches it. To enter the world of prayer is to enter into a new realization of Whom we are addressing, a threefold Thou, and a new appreciation of the 'I' who prays as one who participates in divine nature and, having become son, can address God as 'Father'. The prayer is a way of discovery, in which is revealed in a sevenfold manner what the Father has done for men through his Son in the Holy Spirit. For Maximus, the first petitions of the 'Our Father' are primarily declaratory and expository, the other petitions are seen as mainly supplicatory and parainetic. All through the Expositio Orationis Dominicae we find a combination of exposition and exhortation, factors that emerge from the nature of prayer. It would be accurate to say that they are dimensions of αἴτησις as it is presented in the 'Our Father'. To recite the prayer is to put oneself under the obligations which Maximus rightly finds in the petitions. It is to enter a school of perfection. It should be noted

that it is the 'Our Father' that is the subject of the verbs in this section. This in turn is ultimately derived from Christ, who has taught it, so that we can infer that He is the subject of what is being taught and inculcated. Maximus here envisages man at prayer realising what is implied in the words which he recites. If the prayer speaks, then praying means listening; if it presents something, praying implies acceptance of a truth; if it commands, prescribes and recommends, then the man of prayer must be disposed to obey, comply and be pliant; if it teaches, he must be docile; if it asks, it is being true to its fundamental character of interpreting man's desires to God. Here Maximus gives us a resume of what the 'Our Father' implies, but with an emphasis on the existential logic required by prayer. If we identify with the petitions, we find that we are being addressed, taught, commanded, exhorted. The Commentary, which Maximus has decided to provide, is meant to facilitate this in others, to encourage a fitting response to God's self-disclosure and self-offering through Christ in the Holy Spirit. Maximus rounds off this resume with a splendid sentence which confirms this interpretation of his understanding of prayer and opens up new vistas of its mystery:

> For it was fitting that the author and giver of the benefits should also be a teacher to those who believe in Him and imitate his conduct in the flesh, providing the words of this prayer are precepts of life. Through these he revealed the hidden treasures of wisdom and knowledge that really exist in Him, clearly impelling the desire of those who pray to enjoy them.[101]

A sentence from the Capitum de Caritate Quattuor Centuriae

complements this by emphasizing the ability of man to make these treasures his own and reminding us of the indispensable foundation of the Christian life and of Christian prayer:

> If according to the words of the divine Apostle, Christ dwells in our hearts by faith and in Him are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, then in our hearts are to be found all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. And they are to be revealed to the heart according to the measure of the purification of each man by the commandments.[102]

It is by faith that man appropriates the treasures that are hidden in Christ. Prayer is therefore an invitation to Christ himself to dwell in the heart of man. To select one schematization of Maximus, wisdom and prudence are parallel in man, the one corresponding to his theoretical capacity and ordered to the truth, the other concerned with his practical ability and ordered to the good, the true and the good being ultimately God himself from different points of view.[103] In this schema wisdom through the habit of contemplation becomes knowledge and prudence through practice becomes virtue, the former being perfected in unforgetting knowledge, the latter in faith. We might have expected faith to be aligned with νοῦς , the capacity of contemplation rather than with λόγος, the practical dimension of man's intellect, but we have seen that Maximus has associated belief with the imitation of the conduct of Christ in the Pater Noster[104] while in the Mystagogia faith is associated with the purification that is produced in man by the observance of the commandments. He does understand it too as 'a true knowledge, which reposes on undemonstrable principles, because it is the substance of the things which are beyond theoretical and

practical reason'.[105] In fact, it joins knowledge beyond knowledge as γνῶσις πιστοτάτη where the theoretical and practical aspects of man's noetic ability are transcended and become one.[106] This unification requires the intervention of ἀγάπη, which ensures that nature is personalised. This in turn will guarantee that man at prayer is not at variance with his neighbour: 'Αγάπη, perfecting faith and hope, ensures that we can be united to God and to one another 'in one nature, one γνώμη and one will'.[107] This will come about when 'charity persuades γνώμη not to oppose the law of nature any more' and when 'the law of nature is freely ( γνωμικῶς ) renewed through the law of grace'.[108]

Maximus has not overlooked the place of the will in prayer. He says that Christ's revelation of the treasures of wisdom and knowledge impel the desire of those who pray to enjoy them. Ephesis is used seven times in the Pater Noster and once in conjunction with γνώμη[109]. The introduction in a context of prayer recalls the ontological context of the thought of Maximus:

γένεσις, κίνησις, στάσις[110] and the role of will in the articulation of the 'movement' of that triad in the case of men, adopted as sons of God. Not alone will ἀγάπη 'persuade man's personally determined will not to oppose the law of nature any more';[111] it will ensure that man chooses the hidden treasures of wisdom and knowledge in prayer. Desire is the experience of φύσις as a thrust to God. Prayer is meant to awaken, stimulate, direct and inform that by providing objects for γνώμη and Maximus reminds us in the Pater Noster what those objects are.

It is to the enjoyment of these that prayer impels its devotees. Again it is Epistola II that enables us to fit this nuance into a wider maximian context:

> Faith, in fact, which firmly establishes the truth is the foundation of that which comes after it, I mean to say of hope and charity. Hope is the strength of the extremes, that is of faith and charity, showing to them both in itself what is credible and what is loveable and teaching by its function how to hasten to it. Charity is the completion of these, embracing as it does fully the supremely desirable One in his totality and gives their movement towards Him its goal, substituting through itself the enjoyment of His presence for faith in His existence and hope of His presence.[112]

This magnificent passage on the theological virtues throws a strong shaft of light into Maximus' understanding of the mystery of prayer. As he enters on his main commentary Maximus recalls that it is the Logos Incarnate who has given us the formula of the prayer and that it is He who enables us to grasp its meaning.[113] It is He then Who must be our guide and Who will open our eyes to the significance of what we say when we pray 'Our Father'.

In the Coda to Part I,[114] Maximus introduces a discussion on the relationship between prayer and vow, which is a reminder, if need be, of his concern that prayer should not be thought of as divorced from the will to live as God wills, that is according to His commandments. Although he takes it from his predecessors,[115] it comes into his treatise quite fittingly at this point just before he begins to show in earnest that the 'Our Father' will demand a profound reform of conduct from those who pray it sincerely. He contrasts prayer and vow in terms of petition and promise respectively and then he substantiates his definitions with quotations from Scripture, to return to two further attempts to define them

in which he relates them more closely, firstly by presenting prayer as a petition for the transformation demanded by what has been vowed and secondly as the reward of the virtue implied in the vow. In the Quaestiones ad Thalassium he provides parallel formulations which pivot around the notion of 'good things':

> Prayer is the request of what God naturally gives for salvation, and very fittingly indeed. For if vow is the pledge of good things offered to God in promise, prayer will clearly be likewise the urgent petition of the good things provided by God for salvation, bringing the reward of the disposition of those who have already made vows.[116]

The idea of vow is constant and univocal while prayer is both petition and reward. The vow is basically a promise to God to live according to His commandments, which involves struggle. This promise, if effective, will be the source of the transformation which God wills for man with a view to his salvation. Maximus sees this as the gift of God given to man because of the prayer of petition: the prayer brings the reward of the promise: man becomes what he wills through the merciful condescension of God. In the Pater Noster, this is not so clear. There the prayer itself seems to be the reward, implying that the transformation wrought in man by his will to keep the commandments disposes him for the gift of prayer. There is nothing incompatible between these two views. Rather, they complement each other.

Turning now to Part III,[117] we find Maximus again referring to the δύναμις of the words of the 'Our Father'. This means basically the 'meaning' of the words our Saviour taught us, but it has connotations of force and power. The prayer, for Maximus, is a way of access

to the mysteries which it represents. The language of the prayer has the power to transform human lives on condition that it is said with the proper dispositions. Maximus immediately confronts us with the indispensable condition, from the human point of view, for the efficacy of the prayer: εἴπερ βουλώμεθα . We must desire and will what the 'Our Father' declares to be desirable, in this case to be delivered from the Evil One. But this will is obviously meant to be extended to the other 'mysteries', here presented from an ascetical point of view, in reverse order. Because we desire, we ask to be delivered, so that desire spontaneously takes the form of petition in prayer. Again in this section we find that prayer is intimately bound up with volition: 'He who is the bread of life... moves our appetite insatiably to Himself'.[118] In that phrase is revealed the source of the dynamism of Christian prayer. It is the Logos himself who moves us; He whom we know to be the Alpha of our existence is here presented as its Omega. The κίνησις that is characteristic of our ontological condition is specified as ὄρεξις , the thrust of man towards his good. In the language of Maximus" ὄρεξις λογική must become ὄρεξις βουλευτική . The fundamental <u>elan</u> of nature towards the good, the anonymity of which veils God, here the Logos, must be innovated through personal will, so that the thrust of nature becomes the thrust of every man in his uniqueness to union with Christ. It is ἀγάπη that stabilizes the will in the course of this transposition, so that here we see not merely the basic function of ἀγάπη but also the irreplaceable role of prayer in the being and in the life

of man. It is prayer that will bring about the union with the Logos for which man was created and thus it plays an indispensable part in the unfolding of his destiny. It is not fanciful to see in this section a reference to the development of prayer as Maximus conceives it. The petition which gives expression to the will in prayer is here applied to the seven mysteries, beginning with the need to be delivered from the Evil One. It covers the whole span of the possibilities held out to man by God, up to and including union with God himself, because of the indwelling in him of 'the Son of the Father by nature'. Within the development of προσευχή we find αἴτησις taking on the form of θεωρία and θεολογία, where asking progresses from concern with the most elementary need of man to survive as a son of God up to an ecstatic affirmation of God in His Trinitarian life: 'Hallowed be Thy Name, Thy Kingdom come'.[119]

In the Conclusion,[120] Maximus recalls the purpose of the prayer which we have seen him identify with the purpose of the divine Counsel and he encourages his readers to make that purpose their own by a contemplative concern with deification so that they may realize contrast between their condition as sinners and what God has in store for those who love Him. He adds the dimensions of θεωρία and γνῶσις to petition.[121] The purpose of this contemplative appreciation of God's mercy is that man may respond fittingly to the love of God by loving Him in return: Ἀγαπήσωμεν, so that we see that love is clearly a dimension of prayer as Maximus understands it. But again we are reminded of

the integration of the theoretical and practical aspects of man's power to know in ἀγάπη by the exhortation to prove that the prayer is being fulfilled in πρᾶξις . Πρᾶξις becomes the expression of ἀγάπη , an activity illuminated and made spiritually significant by θεωρία and reaching its climax in θεολογία [122] . In this state of prayer it is the whole man who enters into union with God: 'with a man whose spirit is wholly turned towards God, even concupiscence gives strength to burning love for God, even the irascible power goes as a whole towards divine charity'. [123] In the thought of Maximus, the tension between αἴσθησις and γνῶσις , between πρᾶξις and θεωρία is transcended and overcome in ἀγάπη , a charity that integrates not merely the two aspects of man's higher being, but through his passions extends down to the humblest dimensions of his bodily self.[124] Prayer here too will necessarily imply the rejection of whatever militates against man's union with God so that Maximus reminds us that this will be possible if 'we call on the name of the Lord Jesus'. Again it is ἔφεσις [125] that needs the discipline and transforming influence of prayer to ensure that man is not swept away by the seductions of the Evil One, but maintains his longing for divine charity. Prayer will deal creatively with the temptation to pleasure by discovering the object of man's deepest desire; endurance will prevent suffering from being wasted by becoming an occasion of an ever-renewed preference for God.

The Contemplative Life

Maximus complements his teaching on the active life with a traditional account of the contemplative life. It has to be said straight away that he has a place for prayer in the active life, where man is primarily concerned with the acquisition of virtue. For the πραχτιχός, prayer will be primarily a matter of asking for the virtues, whereas the φυσιχός seeks knowledge of things visible and invisible, while the θεολόγος is wrapped in a profound silence which characterizes his having gone beyond thought and knowledge in a union with God that transcends the limits of his discursive reason, even when it rests in hard won intuition.[126] He speaks of the contemplative life as θεωρία[127] or θεωρητιχή[128] and says that if a man lives it properly he will be brought through his νοῦς to γνῶσις . In fact, γνῶσις is used without qualification to designate the same contemplative life.[129] Those who devote themselves to θεωρίαι or θεωρίαι πνευματιχαί[130] are said to be θεωρητιχοί[131] or γνωστιχοί[132]. When we look more closely at Maximus' concept of the contemplative life, we find that the distinction indicated above between φυσιχός and θεολόγος is based on the kinds of contemplation that distinguish them: θεωρία φυσιχή and θεολογία . These in turn are distinguished on the basis of the objects of contemplation: Θεωρία has for object knowledge of things visible and things invisible in their relationship to God, while θεολογία is concerned with God in Himself.[133] Θεολογία , in Maximus' usage, is synonymous with the θεολογιχή μυσταγωγία[134] and

Maximus normally thought of development in the spiritual life in terms of πρᾶξις, θεωρία , θεολογία . While πρᾶξις is primarily concerned with the asceticism that rids man of inordinate self-love, its inadequacy in the face of man's vocation to perfection demands a complementary rectification of his mind through contemplative knowledge. As Maximus says:

> The practical method is not sufficient for the perfect liberation of the mind from passions, so that it may be enabled to pray without distraction, unless various spiritual contemplations arise in it, for the one frees the mind from incontinence and hatred only, the other gets rid of forgetfulness and ignorance. Thus it will become able to pray as it ought. [136]

We have an intimation here that Maximus understands man's being and destiny primarily in a contemplative perspective. He will have reached his goal when his knowledge of God is freed from the possibility of forgetfulness in γνῶσις ἄληστος [137] . Progress from πρᾶξις to θεωρία is thought of as an extension of the presence of Logos in man's life, which will endow him with a vision comparable to that of the angels. Comparing the two states, he says:

> The first one, persevering in sufferings without being shaken because of virtue, has the first presence of the Logos active in itself and the other, transforming the mind through θεωρία to the condition of the angels, has the power of the second presence (of the Logos), which effects impassibility in it and makes it unassailable. [138]

Maximus is careful to remind his disciples that this kind of knowledge does not mean forsaking the efforts of ascesis proper to the stage of πρᾶξις . Since the contemplative knowledge, which he visualises here, is something qualitatively different from philosophical reflection, he insists

that it requires a sustained purification from passions, so that the mind may be free to catch sight of the λόγοι that reveal the purpose of the Logos in the world:

> Having been made worthy of a partial knowledge by God, do not neglect charity and continence, for they purify the passible part of the soul and always prepare for you the way that leads to knowledge. It is impassibility and humility, without which no one will see the Lord, that are the way to knowledge.[139]

In fact, spiritual knowledge will be in proportion to this purification of man's passibility.[140] Corresponding to the spiritual love and self-discipline which bring order to the παθητόν , the λογιστικόνwill require 'readings, spiritual contemplations and prayer'.[141] The treasures of wisdom and knowledge 'are made manifest to the heart in proportion to each one's purification by the commandments'.[142] There is a rigorous logic behind Maximus' conception of spiritual purification. Every advance towards the summit of perfection necessarily demands an accompanying detachment: the passions, impassioned thoughts, knowledge of things visible and things invisible have to be left behind in turn as man progresses to knowledge of the Trinity.[143] Pure prayer requires a night of sense and a night of spirit. To arrive at it a man must undergo a cleansing of heart and mind: he needs ἀπάθεια and ἀγάπη :

> the man who loves God is bent on pure prayer and every passion, that hinders him on his way to it, he casts out of himself.[144]

Since ἀγάπη is that by which he finally enters into 'knowledge of the Holy Trinity',[145] it is ἀγάπη too that puts the final touches to his purification, de-

spoiling him at a much deeper level than that of his passibility.

We have indicated that Maximus divides the kinds of contemplation on the basis of the objects of contemplation into θεωρία φυσική and θεολογία . He provides a more complex division when the objects are defined in a fivefold way: God, visible things, invisible things, Providence and Judgment.[146] The search for the λόγοι is a search for an understanding of the whole created realm, both visible and invisible, in its ultimate constitution and in its final purpose. For Maximus the λόγοι of creatures are also the βουλαί and θελήματα[147] of God in their regard so that this vision of creatures is theological rather than scientific in a profane way. The contemplative insight into their structure reveals them in their relationship to God, which will necessarily include an intimation of how they are enveloped in His Providence and benefit by the attention that He gives them in the uniqueness of their individuality through His Judgment:

> The pure mind is to be found either with mere ideas of human things, or in the natural contemplation of the visible creation, or in that of the invisible, or in the light of the Trinity.[148]
>
> Settled in the contemplation of the invisible, it seeks both the natural reasons of things, the cause of their production and whatever is related to these; and also what providence and judgment there is about them.[149]

With θεωρία Maximus links the notion of μυσταγωγία : initiation into the mystery is brought about through θεωρία , so that the aim of mystagogy is to introduce the initiate into γνῶσις of the mystery. As

Bornert comments, 'it communicates a spiritual understanding and a certain experience' of the mystery.[150] Apart from the liturgy, Maximus teaches that there are two other ways of entering the mystery: through the contemplation of nature and through the enlightened reading of Scripture. With regard to the former, natural contemplation discovers the λόγοι of creatures, then symbolic contemplation becomes aware of the mutual immanence of the sensible and intelligible worlds and finally, transcending the world, νοῦς enters theological mystagogy.[151] Mystical experience is something that man cannot learn; in a sense it is discontinuous with what has gone before; it is given. The corresponding process through Scripture is called μυσταγωγία γραφική[152], which initiates the reader into the spiritual sense of Scripture. Because of the relationship of contemplation to mystagogy, the kinds of θεωρία will correspond to the kinds μυσταγωγία, so that we have natural contemplation, scriptural contemplation and liturgical contemplation.[153]

For Maximus man, who is a compound of sense and intelligence, is confronted by nature compounded of appearances and λόγοι and Scripture which is made up of 'letter' and 'spirit'. The pure mind is to be found either with mere conceptions of human realities or in natural contemplation of things visible or invisible and, adds Maximus, 'in the light of the Holy Trinity'.[154] In a celebrated passage in the Quaestiones ad Thalassium, he shows that a fully human response to both the natural order and to Scripture leads to God:

> He who penetrates with contemplation the symbols of the Law or who contemplates with knowledge the apparent nature of beings, makes a distinction with regard to Scripture, with regard to creation and with regard to himself. In Scripture he can distinguish between the letter and the spirit, in creation between λόγος and appearance, in himself between mind and sense. And taking from Scripture spirit, from creatures λόγος and from himself mind, and having united them to one another indissolubly, he finds God, knowing, as he ought and can, God who is in mind, logos and spirit.[155]

It will suffice to say here that the threefold discovery of man, creation and nature issues in knowledge of God. We shall see below that the knowledge of God is of two kinds so that the disposing knowledge described here may culminate in a recollection in which God can be enjoyed as the final discovery of the questing spirit of man or in a knowledge that goes beyond any effort on his part and which he must simply accept when it is given to him by God.[156] Maximus does not think of the perfection of contemplation as within the scope of man's powers without the intervention of the Holy Spirit:

> The Spirit demands, in order to give them knowledge of the mysteries, the collaboration of their natural faculties, which search and examine this knowledge.[157]

> The exact knowledge of the words of the Spirit is only revealed to those who are worthy of the Spirit.[158]

Maximus thinks of knowledge as assimilation of the subject to the object[159] so that entry into θεολογία, which is knowledge of God, will require a simplicity of νοῦς that is in some way comparable to the Simplicity of God. Referring to the mind in this state of prayer, he says:

> When it comes to be in God, it is entirely without form and without pattern. For in contemplating Him who is simple, it becomes simple and wholly transfused with light.[160]

In the Liber Asceticus, Maximus says simply that prayer separates nous from all thoughts and puts it naked in the presence of God himself.[161] It is this condition that earns for prayer the epithet 'pure': καθαρά προσευχή[162]. Maximus describes the gradual purification of νοῦς until it reaches this sublime simplicity in its contemplation of God himself:

> Through the observance of the commandments the mind sheds the passions; through the spiritual contemplation of things visible the impassioned thoughts about things; through knowledge of the invisible things, the contemplation of the visible and this latter through knowledge of the Trinity.[163]

Maximus considers this phase in the life of prayer to be a state,[164] a concept which is bound up with the simplicity with which, as we have seen, he characterizes θεολογία. In its perfection it is without distraction, without interruption and unforgetting:

> The man who loves God genuinely prays altogether without distraction and he who prays altogether without distraction loves God genuinely.[165]
>
> The supreme state of prayer, they say, is the mind's being outside the flesh and the world, praying altogether without matter and without form. He, therefore, who keeps this state intact, he truly prays without ceasing.[166]
>
> He said that the mind is moved through wisdom to go to contemplation, through contemplation to knowledge and through knowledge to unforgetting knowledge and finally through unforgetting knowledge to the truth.[167]

The stability of this kind of prayer is linked to ἀγάπη. Maximus encourages his disciples not to neglect charity and continence, because they correct the excesses of irascibility and concupiscence respectively. But we know from his developed theology the remarkable role which he assigns to ἀγάπη in the process of the personal

innovation of human nature, so that it is not fanciful to see ἀγάπη as having a fundamental part to play in the evolution of prayer.[168] It is the way in which man is united to God and so that by which he is stabilized. Therefore ἀγάπη will exercise an influence beyond the pacification of θυμός ; it will unite man to God and so quell the restlessness of his mind, becoming itself the mean of his knowledge, so that he can dispense with θεωρίαι . This may require us to make a distinction even within the realm of θεολογία , accepting the term as signifying contemplation with God as its object. Maximus, in keeping with the tradition, holds that man cannot trespass on the inner being of God. The mind is inflamed with desire to know God in Himself, but finds no encouragement in what is κατ' αὐτόν , that is in what is proper to Him; it has to be content with what concerns Him in His eternity, infinity, immensity, that is with His attributes, with what is περί αὐτόν :

> When you embark on theology, do not seek the λόγοι that are proper to Him (for the human mind cannot attain to that nor can that of any being inferior to God). But scrutinize in so far as it is possible those that concern Him, like eternity, immensity and infinity, goodness, wisdom and power that is creative and providential and critical of beings.[169]

Although the object is God, the method might still be that of θεωρία φυσική , except that here the λόγοι of creatures would have to be transcended by extrapolation. This would be more than the metaphysical contemplation of the philosopher. Maximus does teach that he, who scrutinizes wisely with his νοῦς the principle of every creature, finds God. But the contemplation of nature can become 'a contemplation of nature, practised in the Spirit',[170]

which issues in contemplation of the Trinity, because of the intervention of the Spirit. Human reason 'scrutinizes in the Spirit the things of the Spirit and this reveals the hidden mysteries'.[171] Maximus makes another distinction when he says:

> There are two supreme states of pure prayer: the one, for those of the active life; the other, for those of the contemplative. The one comes to the soul from fear of God and a good hope; the other, from burning divine love and maximum purification.[172]

The signs of the first, he says, are that a man recollects himself and prays as though God Himself were at his side. He adds that He is really present. This prayer is characterised by freedom from distraction and is unperturbed by passion. By contrast, the second type of prayer is produced by the divine and limitless light taking hold of the νοῦς , when it becomes unaware of the world and even of itself and is conscious only of 'Him who through charity produces this illumination in it'. We have here two forms of pure prayer, the one is obviously acquired, the other infused. In the former it is the man at prayer who recollects himself and succeeds in resting in the presence of God; in the latter it is God who takes the initiative in an experienced way and it should be noted that ἀγάπη is the mean of knowledge. This accounts for the reassurance which Maximus feels he has to give to the man who recollects himself and has taken care to 'cast away from the mind the mere thoughts of human affairs and contemplations devoted to created things'[173] in order not to lose what is incomparably greater by indulging his fancy with what is less. This activity does not in itself give him a self-authenticating experience of the presence

of God even although he has attained to a state of pure prayer. There is no need to qualify the second kind of pure prayer in this way. It is an empirical knowledge of God, made possible by ἀγάπη . Nor would we have to think that in the latter kind of prayer it would not be possible to go beyond 'the things that concern Him', provided we were not tempted to hold that man could grasp God 'as Hé is' through the idea of any of His attributes. The point about this knowledge is that it is not mediated through ideas. With regard to the mystery of the Transfiguration, Maximus says:

> The light therefore of the face of the Lord, which surpassed human blessedness in the case of the Apostles, is a matter of apophatic mystical theology in that the blessed and holy Godhead is in substance ineffable and above knowledge and transcending every infinity infinitely, not leaving any vestige, even the slightest, of understanding to those beneath it nor does it allow to any being the understanding of how or to what extent the same Unity is Trinity, since the uncreated cannot be naturally grasped by the creature, nor the boundless be comprehended by the bounded.[174]

Unforgetting knowledge leads νοῦς , which has already surpassed the sensible and intelligible of its activity, to where it undergoes 'mystical theology'.[175] Here man, like Moses, enters 'the darkness, the formless and immaterial place of knowledge', where he performs 'the most highly rites'.[176] The peace and stability which man experiences in his νοῦς are due to its ecstasy through love, by which he is united to God in a way beyond the resources of a νοῦς , that depends on the ministrations of λόγος :

> It is the Sabbath of Sabbaths, the spiritual calmness of the rational soul, which has removed the mind even from all those more divine λόγοι which are in beings and has bound it entirely to God alone by loving ecstasy and made it totally immovable through the mystical theology of God.[177]

Although we do not find an elaboration of mystical theology in the Pater Noster, we do find, as we have already seen, evidence that this commentary was written out of an experience of God, which gave its author an indispensable authority in spiritual matters. It will serve our purpose here to examine one phrase from the Pater Noster, αἴσθησις νοερά [178], in the light of other statements from the works of Maximus. This will show that he was referring to mystical experience, which in turn will have bearing on our assessment of the quality of this short but very important treatise.

Aisthesis Noera

For Maximus αἴσθησις means basically the organ of sense perception and its function, sensation. It is part of a triad inherited from Aristotle and the Stoics: αἴσθησις, λόγος , νοῦς [179]. In the Platonic scheme κόσμος αἰσθητός is contrasted with κόσμος νοητός . It would be a mistake to think that Maximus understands the sensible and intelligible worlds to co-ordinate in a Platonic way. This is obvious from the following passage from the Mystagogia which shows us how he understands the functioning of αἴσθησις in symbolic contemplation:

> Indeed the whole intelligible world appears to be imprinted mystically on the whole sensible world in symbolic forms for those who are able to see and the whole sensible exists in the whole intelligible, simplified by concepts of the mind in gnosis. The latter is indeed in the former by concepts and the former is in the latter by imprints. And their work is one as if there were 'a wheel within a wheel', says Ezechiel, the admirable contemplative of great matters, speaking, I think, of the two worlds. And again, 'ever since the creation of the world, His invisible things are seen to be intelligible by things created', says the divine Apostle. And, as it is written, if the things that do not appear are seen through those that do appear, all the more the things that appear will be understood through the things that

> appear not by those who rise to spiritual contemplation. For the symbolic contemplation of the intelligible things by means of the visible things is spiritual knowledge and understanding of visible things through invisible things. It is necessary indeed that things which manifest each other should have a totally true and clear reciprocal signification and between themselves an unbroken relation. (PG 91, 669CD).

In this splendid passage we find that θεωρία συμβολική corresponds to θεωρία πνευματική in a way that parallels the correspondence of things visible and invisible. The spiritual world in its entirety is expressed mysteriously in symbolic forms through the sensible world for those who have the required power of vision and the sensible world is summed up within the spiritual world through the activity of mind. To the reciprocal interpenetration of the two worlds corresponds a circumincession of concepts and imprints. There is no question of discarding the phenomena in the interests of the noumena nor of renouncing αἴσθησις when νόησις is attained. Maximus insists that 'the world is one' and that it perdures. Αἴσθησις is cognition directly concerned with what is perceptible by sense: τά φαινόμενα . In this passage we see that it is integral to human knowing for Maximus.

It is paradoxical that Maximus uses the notion of αἴσθησις elsewhere to convey a knowledge that is not restricted to sense, a kind of knowledge that far surpasses that which he describes in the passage just cited from the Mystagogia where he contrasts the worlds of sense and intelligence in the act of reconciling them. In the following excerpt from the Quaestiones ad Thalassium we find that αἴσθησις is used analogically to speak of a knowledge that is open only to man's νοῦς :

> Scripture knows a twofold knowledge of divine things: the one is relational, as consisting of conceptual knowledge and thoughts and not having a perception in act of the things known through experience, by which we manage in this present life. The other in truth consists precisely of experience alone in act, without conceptual knowledge and thoughts, providing the whole perception ( αἴσθησιν ) by participation according to grace, through which we receive, in keeping with future rest, the supernatural deification that is unceasingly activated. And they say that the relational, consisting as it does in conceptual knowledge and thoughts, moves the desire to knowledge by active participation while that which is by activity, providing perception of its object by participation through experience, removes the knowledge that consists in conceptual knowledge and thoughts. The wise men say that the conceptual knowledge about God is unable to co-exist with experience of God or thoughts about Him with perception of God. I mean by λόγος about God the analogy from beings proper to the gnostic contemplation concerning Him, by perception, the experience because of participation of benefits above nature, by thought the simple unitary knowledge concerning Him from beings. Perhaps, this is recognized with regard to everything else since the experience of this suppresses the λόγος about it and the perception of this makes the thought about it superfluous. I mean by experience that knowledge in act which follows on all λόγος , by perception that participation of the known object which follows, appears after all thought.[180]

Here Maximus is discussing two ways of knowing God and their relationship to each other: the one is intellectual, the other is mystical, the former prepares for the latter, the latter dispenses with the former. Discursive knowledge must give way to experimental knowledge; so must a simplified knowledge through ascent to a concept of God that has affinity with a Neoplatonic 'One'. Mystical knowledge takes place in a different order: by participation in benefits above nature, ultimately though ἀγάπη and the encounter of the human person with the divine Persons in a union that defies conceptual expression. The term αἴσθησις , which we have seen applied to the world of sense has been raised to describe a knowledge

that transcends not merely sense, but discursive intellect.

It is αἴσθησις at this level that Maximus calls αἴσθησις νοερά in the Pater Noster, where it is associated with mystical knowledge of the Logos, who is the bread of life. Νοερά is obviously derived from νοῦς and in conjunction with αἴσθησις it speaks of a knowledge that transcends symbolic contemplation where αἴσθησις and νοῦς complement each other in apprehending the world simultaneously from two points of view. In patristic thought there is a more basic distinction than that between κόσμος νοητός and κόσμος αἰσθητός It is that between the created and the uncreated and in the usage of Maximus we find that νοῦς becomes the faculty of the Uncreated, so that αἴσθησις νοερά ., instead of being a contradiction in terms, denotes an apprehension of the divine realm analogical to the relationship between sense and the sensibles. Maximus tells us that the erudite hold that:

> the soul has three universal movements combined into one by grace: that which is in the order of the νοῦς , that which is in the order of λόγος and that which is in the order of αἴσθησις . The first is simple and beyond understanding, through which (the soul), moved without discursive knowledge about God, knows Him par excellence, not in any way from any of the things that exist.181

Χάρις , which connotes ἀγάπη , is at the root of the synthesis of the three powers described here. Maximus is using the language of a spiritual psychology to declare that the mystical experience, which we have seen him describe in terms of κατ' ἐνέργειαν and μέθεξις is the culmination of man's possibility of relating to God immediately and so mediates to him knowledge par excellence, 'simple and beyond understanding'. It is

this knowledge that makes possible the unifying co-ordination of the 'three fundamental movements' of the soul. It is through χάρις that νοῦς receives this supreme knowledge, which in turn informs the findings of λόγος, as it harvests the meanings sown in the sensible world and revealed by αἴσθησις. This ensures that everything that proceeds from God returns to Him through the mystical operation of the perfect man. In this state, man is unaware of everything, 'but only perceives the One Who produces this illumination in it (νοῦς) through charity'.[182] Ἐπαισθάνεσθαι is used analogously of creatures and of God. Ἀγάπη is the mean, which assures us that the unity of the powers is, in the last analysis, brought about through the unity of the person who exercises them and in such a way that the concomitant knowledge of God is itself personal. The contrast, with which Maximus confronts us, is between a knowledge that is relational or knowledge about its object and a knowledge that overcomes the limitations of relational knowledge and enters the sphere of realization through experience, knowledge of the object.[183] The realization is made possible by the gratuitous activity of God. It takes place within the experience of the interlocking of two freedoms, that of God and that of man, made possible by the divine gift of ἀγάπη. This is to know God 'under the impact of distinctively divine ἐνέργεια, that is to know him through a living empirical relation determined by θέωσις'.[184] Maximus in no way denies the validity of the appropriation afforded by conceptual knowledge and the mediation of ideas, but he undoubtedly indicates that

this kind of knowledge, by which the fabric of reality is enmeshed in a network of concepts, must be transcended if man is to satisfy his desire to know God. As we noted, he extends his caveat to the most comprehensive concept available to the human kind. Man longs for the reality of God in himself. This is open to him only through a knowing that is more akin to sense knowledge because of its concreteness and immediacy. The σχέσις that characterizes the inadequate knowledge described by Maximus refers to the abstract nature of conceptual knowledge and consequently its remoteness from what it knows, even when that knowledge is valid. This knowledge is mediate; the means are λόγοι or νοήματα . The other knowledge takes place within μέθεξις κατά χάριν through which man receives θέωσις . The object of this kind of knowledge is said to be 'divine things' and more precisely lower down in the passage 'God' himself.[185] Although there is a means of knowledge here, it is not in the noetic order, but in the order of grace and charity. The αἴσθησις takes place through πεῖρα made possible by μέθεξις . Experience and participation are the context of the act of perception above perception of which Maximus speaks in The Gnostic Centuries. Referring to the cave of Elijah on Horeb he says:

> The cave is the hiddenness of wisdom in regard to the mind. He who finds himself there will perceive knowledge mystically in a way above perception. God is said to be there.[186]

Χάρις is the key to ὑπέρ νοῦν γιγνώσεται[187] of the tradition, where νοῦς is raised above itself in a personal manner to become a faculty of empirical knowledge of God. In the passage where he discusses the movements

of the soul, which we have been examining, we find Maximus presenting the faculties as suspended from God through grace which demands that in their functioning they should return to Him, their source. This accepts the traditional view of the body as subject to the soul and of the soul as subject to God. λόγος is the key to the relationship between νοῦς and αἴσθησις in its literal sense. Νοῦς, the faculty of the divine, is open to the intelligibility of the world, garnered by λόγος from αἴσθησις. Αἴσθησις is ennobled by λόγος and νοῦς is served by λόγος, so that through νοῦς, transformed by χάρις to being the power of knowing God intimately, the whole universe can be returned to Him in prayer and praise. Maximus knows from tradition that:

> the νοῦς indeed is understood to be concerned with God alone and His attributes and that it goes straight to the ineffable glory of His blessedness, without discursive reasoning; that the λόγος becomes the interpreter of things grasped by νοῦς and sings their praises and rightly reasons out the unifying ways that lead to them; that αἴσθησις ennobled by reason, forms images of the different powers and energies in the universe and reveals to the soul, in so far as it is possible, the λόγοι of beings.[188]

This is the notion of νοῦς, that is the etymological basis of the νοερά, which we find associated with αἴσθησις in the Pater Noster. We have seen that Maximus prayed that God would open his νοῦς to apprehend the mysteries and give him matching λόγος to clarify the νούμενα or objects of νοῦς, so that he might be able to write fittingly about the 'Our Father'. These passages from other writings show us the author of the Expositio Orationis Dominicae describing the life of prayer, so that we can conclude that he wrote from the fullness of contemplative knowledge, θεολογία while

it is obvious that he was granted matching λόγος for the elucidation of what he knew in an ineffable way. The Expositio Orationis Dominicae is itself testimony to the fact that Maximus enjoyed that union of the three powers which he describes in his writings, so that we can be sure that his Commentary on the 'Our Father' is the fruit of theology in the strict sense and so that it is an expression of theology lived, a splendid work of Christian spirituality.

# EPILOGUE

In the Mystagogia, Maximus tells us how he understands the place of the 'Our Father' in the Liturgy and in the life of the Church and it will serve our purpose to examine briefly the way in which he explains it in that context. The deification of human nature began with the mystery of the Incarnation and the deification of the individual Christian begins with his incorporation into the Body of Christ through birth from the Holy Spirit and water in the sacrament of Baptism.[1] Maximus knows that man must live consistently with the mystery of his Baptism if he is to reach the fullness of deification. This concerns the whole man. The soul is to receive immutability, the body immortality and the whole man the deification of grace because 'he is divinized by the grace of the inhominated God'.[2] Participation in the Liturgy presupposes Baptism and requires the practice of asceticism and the exercise of prayer which we have seen to be essential to Maximus' conception of how man progresses from being in the image of God to being in His likeness. In the teaching of Maximus we can distinguish θέωσις as process from θέωσις as consummation. In the course of this thesis we have concentrated on the former meaning of the term, emphasizing the virtuous and contemplative dimensions of the Christian life. But we have intimated too the place of the Church in the spiritual life of man and the role of the sacraments in its genesis and growth, through which the Holy Spirit gives increment to the fontal grace

given to man in Baptism. This is perfected by participation in the Eucharist. Maximus has not given us a systematic account of θέωσις in its perfection, for the simple reason that it eludes the power of eye and ear and human heart to comprehend it. In fact, the Scholiast is less reticent than the master, but Maximus does provide some clues to his understanding of δεῖ εὖ εἶναι in the Mystagogia and it will be helpful to review them briefly as a way of bringing this work to an end.

In a series of chapters in the Mystagogia,[3] Maximus hands on the teaching of 'the blessed old man', possibly Sophronius, on the significance of the rites of the Eucharistic Assembly. The first entry of the bishop symbolizes the first coming of the Son of God in the flesh;[4] the entry of the people with him represents the passage of the infidels from ignorance and error to recognition of God as well as the passage of the faithful from evil and ignorance to virtue and knowledge;[5] the readings from the sacred books show the divine and blessed wills and designs of God;[6] the canticles signify the joy in the revelation of the divine benefits, which moves souls to the perfect and blessed love of God and excites even more to hatred of sin;[7] the divine favours bestowed through the angels are indicated by the proclamations of peace;[8] the reading of the Gospel proposes to the zealous sufferings for the Logos, who comes down from heaven to purify their minds and lead them to the contemplation of the intelligible world. When they have closed their senses to every word and every activity and are found to be outside the flesh

and the world, He teaches them ineffable things, when they are united among themselves and with Him by the kiss of peace and they have offered to Him in return for his blessings the unique confession of the act of thanks-giving, which the divine symbol of the faith chants. Then having placed them among the angels with the Trisagion, and having accorded them the same knowledge as they have of sanctifying theology, He leads them to God the Father, become sons in the Spirit, by the prayer through which they have been rendered worthy to call God 'Father'. And thereupon being raised in knowledge above all the principles of existing things, He leads them in a way beyond intelligence to the unintelligible Monad, by means of the hymn: 'One alone is holy' and what follows, united by grace and made like to Him by participation in an identity as indivisible as possible.[9] It would be superfluous to point out the similarities between this teaching and that which we have seen in the Pater Noster and associated texts.

Maximus then returns to the reading of the Gospel and its symbolism. He says that it signifies 'in general, the end of this world'. The end will come when the Gospel will have been preached in the whole inhabited world as a testimony to the Gentiles, when by His second Parousia our great God and Saviour, Jesus Christ will come naturally from heaven in great glory. He will appear as Judge. He will put his adversaries to judgment and by means of the holy angels He will separate the believers from the infidels, the unjust

from the just, the impious from the saints and, in a word, from those who conform themselves to the Holy Spirit, those who follow after the flesh. And in the infinite and interminable ages, He will render to each one the just recompense of the life that he has lived.[10] In the course of the liturgical celebration the faithful have now entered symbolically the ἔσχατον. Θέωσις has now developed from being process to being consummation, in symbol, but what Maximus tells us of the liturgical experience is meant to say something about what lies beyond death.

The ritual closing of the church doors signifies going out from material things and entry into the intelligible for those who are worthy of it, that is, says Maximus, 'into the nuptial chamber of Christ'.[11] The entry of the holy mysteries is the beginning of the new teaching which will be given in heaven concerning the Economy of God in our regard and the full revelation of the mystery of our salvation.[12] The spiritual kiss represents the common opinions and identity of views, which will mark all at the time of that final revelation when the beings endowed with λόγος will be at one with all, because of being in union with 'the first and unique Logos, origin of every λόγος'.[13] The confession of the divine symbol of faith by everyone signifies the mystical act of thanksgiving, which will last for all eternity, for the admirable Providence of God towards our natures and our persons.[14] The threefold proclamation of 'holy' by all the people represents the union and equality of honour in the future with the incorporeal

and spiritual Powers. 'It is by them that human nature will be instructed to chant and sanctify, in harmony with the Powers above, the unique Divinity in Three Persons in a threefold hallowing'. In this way men will participate in the angels''motionless ever-motion about God'.[15]

Maximus then comments on the symbolism of the recitation of the 'Our Father', emphasizing the significance of the introductory phrase and what it tells us by implication of the destiny of men whose existence is worked out between the poles of χένωσις and θέωσις:

> The most holy and venerable invocation of the great and blessed Father is the symbol of the real and intimate adoption, granted by gift and grace of the Holy Spirit, by means of which every human peculiarity, being overcome and covered up through the intervention of grace, all the saints will be called and will be in fact sons of God. They, by their virtues, will be adorned from now on splendidly and gloriously by the beauty of Goodness.[16]

Maximus then proceeds to the chanting of the 'One alone is holy', which for him represents the union beyond all reason and intellect, which is given to those who have been initiated 'mystically and wisely'; they will be united with the mysterious unity of the divine simplicity in the endless eternity of the intelligible world; they will have part with the Powers on high in blessed purity.[17]

Finally Maximus arrives at the moment of communion, in which the Eucharist is received, and in which he sees the consummation of the liturgy and a symbol of the consummation of the destiny of man:

> After that, as the end of everything, the distribution of the mystery takes place. It transforms

into itself and makes like by grace and by participation in the Good as cause those who partake worthily. They will lack nothing of that Good in so far as that is attainable and is possible to men. Thus they can be and can be called gods by the gift of grace, because God entire fills them entirely and does not leave any of them empty of His presence.[18]

## CHAPTER I - FOOTNOTES

1 Relatio Motionis, PG 90.128C. For the date of the first trial, long considered to have taken place in 655, vide GARRIGUES, J.M. Maxime le Confesseur, La Charite, Avenir Divin de l'Homme (Theologie Historique 38) Paris, Beauchesne, 1976. p.68.

2 DEVREESE, R. 'La fin inedite d'une lettre de S. Maxime'. Revue de Sciences religieuses (17) 1937, pp. 25-35. Until the publication of his article it was generally thought that Maximus did not arrive in Africa until 640.

3 Relatio Motionis, loc. cit. Again, if we accept the time of the first trial as 654, we can push the 618 established by Grumel back to 617. Vide GRUMEL, V. 'Notes d'histoire et de chronologie sur la vie de Saint Maxime le Confesseur'. Echos d'Orient (26) 1927, pp. 24-32. Grumel, in correcting Montmasson's 630, was followed by Devreese, Von Balthasar, Sherwood and those who depended on them.

4 Vita ac Certamen, PG 90. 67A-109B. Vide HALKIN, F. Auctarium Bibliothecae Hagiographicae Graecae, Bruxelles, 1969, n. 1234; DEVREESE, R. 'La Vie de S. Maxime le Confesseur et ses recensions'. Analecta Bollandiana (46) 1928, pp. 5-49.

5 Relatio Motionis, PG 90. 109C-129D.

6 Ad Anastasium monachum, PG 90. 132A-133A.

7 Epistola Anastasii, PG 90. 133B-136C; ibid 171C-178A.

8 Disputatio Bizyae, PG 90. 136D-172B.

9 Hypomnesticum, PG 90. 193C-202C. The Greek version of the PG Latin is in Analecta Bolliandiana (53) 1935, pp. 66-80.

10 LACKNER, W. 'Zu Quellen und Datierung der Maximosvita'. Analecta Bollandiana (85) 1967, pp. 285-316. Vide GARRIGUES, J.M. 'La Personne Composee du Christ d'apres saint Maxime le Confesseur'. Revue Thomiste (74) 1974, pp. 181-204.

11 SHERWOOD, P. An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor (Studia Anselmiana 30) Rome, 1952. For a more detailed life of Maximus vide the same author's 'Notes on the Life and doctrine of Maximus the Confessor'. American Benedictine Review (1) 1950, pp. 347-356.

12 BROCK, S. 'An Early Syriac Life of Maximus the Confessor'. Analecta Bollandiana (91) 1973, pp, 299-346.

13 FORSHALL, J. Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum orientalium qui in Museo Britannico asservantur, London, 1838. No. 51, pp.83-84. WRIGHT, W. Catalogue of the Syriac Manuscripts in the British Museum, London, 1870-2,p.1206. BM Add. 7192,ff. $72^{b}$-$78^{b}$. Brock considers that Wright's dating of the manuscript as seventh or eighth century is more plausible than Rosen-Forhsall's tenth century. Vide Brock, op. cit. p.300.

14 BROCK, S. op. cit. pp. 300, 341-2.

15 J.-M. GARRIGUES has already made a useful contribution to this reconstruction of the life of Maximus in his 'Personne Composee du Christ d'apres saint Maxime le Confesseur'. Revue Thomiste (74) 1974, pp. 181-204, in which he supplements the biographical sketch of Maximus to be found in his Maxime le Confesseur, la Charite, Avenir Divin de l'Homme, pp. 35-75. Garrigues in his unpublished thesis, 'Naitre de Dieu dans la charite' (Le Saulchoir, 1970), had already corrected the date-list of SHERWOOD in the light of the studies of Grumel and Peeters, seemingly overlooked by Sherwood. Vide RIOU,A. Le Monde et l'Eglise selon Maxime le Confesseur (Theologie Historique 22) Paris, Beauchesne, 1973. p. 201. The cautious optimism of Brock has become a scarcely tempered confidence in Garrigues with regard to the authenticity of the Syriac Life.

16 Vita ac Certamen, PG 90. 69B-73B.

17 BROCK, S. op. cit. pp. 314-5.

18 SHERWOOD, P. An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, pp. 1-22. The biographical material from this work is republished in SHERWOOD, P. St. Maximus the Confessor, The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on Charity, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1955. pp. 6-28. Details about Maximus' education are given on p.6. For further information vide KOUKELES, P. Vie et Civilization Byzantines (1.1) Athens, 1948, pp. 105-137; DVORNIK, F. 'Photius et la reorganization de l'Academie patriarcale'. Analecta Bollandiana (68) 1950, pp. 108-119.

19 KOUKELES. P. op. cit. pp. 123-137.

20 P. SHERWOOD suggests this in his treatment of Maximus' life. Vide St. Maximus the Confessor, The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on Charity. p. 6.

21 For a brief but judicious account of Maximus' sources, vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Maxime le Confesseur'. Dictionnaire de Spiritualite, Ascetique et Mystique, Doctrines et Histoire (10) Paris, 1980. 840-1.

22 cf. SHERWOOD, P. An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, pp. 27-30, where he discusses Epistolae 28, 30, 29, 8 and 31. Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1064B where in his introduction to Ambigua II, Maximus refers to his sojourn with Bishop John. GARRIGUES, in

'Persone Composee du Christ d'apres saint Maxime le Confesseur', p.183, gives ground for thinking that Maximus was never at Cyzicus, that the John of Cyzicus was at Jerusalem. DALMAIS, op. cit. 837, follows this. The argument is inconclusive and leaves the way open to other suggestions to be found in the present essay.

23 BROCK, S. op. cit. p.315. We are told that Maximus' father died nine years after his birth and that his mother died a year later when Maximus would have been ten. Martyrios is then said to have taken him to the Palaia Lavra. The interval between the death of his mother and his arrival at the Palaia Lavra is not specified. He may have been reared for a further time by Martyrios, but in a story where the father dies of dropsy, the mother by a fall from a pomegranate bush, the sister by falling in the fire and the brother by a bite from a 'vicious camel', it would be inappropriate to be too fussy about details. The author shifts the responsibility for these details to one Eulogios and of course the tissue of improbabilities does not undermine the credibility of the rest of the life nor the residuum of the early years with Maximus being eventually found in the Palaia Lavra under Pantoleon.

24 Ambig. PG 91. 1064B. For Maximus' rectification of Origenism, vide SHERWOOD, P. The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor and his Refutation of Origenism (Studia Anselmiana 36) Rome, 1955.

25 Ep. 31, PG 91,625C. All the letters to John (Ep. 28-31, 8) have symptoms of nostalgia and express the desire to be restored to the bishop's community.

26 Cf. MOSCHUS JEAN, Le Pre spirituel 187 (Sources Chretiennes 12) Paris, 1946. pp. 249-250. Vide GARRIGUES, J.M. 'La Persone Composee du Christ d' apres S. Maxime le Confesseur', pp. 182-3.

27 Ep. 28-31, PG 91. 620C-625D.

28 Vide LECLERCQ, H. 'Cenobitisme'. Dictionnaire d' Archeologie Chretienne et de Liturgie (2,2) Paris, 1924, 3165ff. for a list of monasteries in Jerusalem.

29 Ep.31, PG 91. 625B.

30 SCHWARTZ, E. Kyrillos von Skythopolis, Leben des Sabas, (Texte und Untersuchungen 49) Leipzig, J.C. Heinrichs Verlag, 1939, pp. 85-200.

31 BROCK, S. op. cit. p.315, No. 7. I.-H. DALMAIS, in his article 'Maxime le Confesseur', Dictionnaire de Spiritualite (10) 836-7, thinks that the Syriac Life inspires little confidence, but that some points should hold our attention. Maximus' sojourn at the Palaia Lavra must be one of these.

32 BROCK, S. op. cit. p.315, No. 6.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid., No. 7.

35 Ibid., p. 321.

36 Ep. 2, PG 91. 392D-408B; Ep. 3, PG 91. 408C-412C;
Ep. 4, PG 91. 414A-420C; Ep. 10, PG 91. 450A-454A;
Ep.12, PG 91. 460A-510B; Ep. 27, PG 91. 618B-620C;
Ep.43, PG 91. 638B-642C; Ep. 44, PG 91. 642D-648C;
Ep.45, PG 91. 648D-650C.

37 Ep.13, PG 91. 509B-533A; Ep. 14, PG 91. 533B-544C;
Opusc. 12, PG 91. 141A-146A.

38 Ep. 1, PG 91. 363A-392B; Ep. 18, PG 91. 584D-589B.

39 Disputatio Bizyae, PG 90. 168A.

40 Ibid., 161A.

41 GARRIGUES, J.M. Maxime le Confesseur, la Charite, Avenir Divin de l'Homme, p. 36. Cf. JANIN, R. 'L'Eglise byzantine sur les rives du Bosphore (cote asiatique)'. Revue d'Etudes Byzantines, 1954, pp. 92-94.

42 Pyrr. PG 91. 288B.

43 Ep. 53, PG 91. 637C.

44 DEVREESE, R. 'la fin inedite d'une lettre de S. Maxime', pp. 23-35.

45 GRUMEL, V. 'Notes d'histoire et de chronologie sur la vie de Saint Maxime le Confesseur', p. 26.

46 SHERWOOD, P. St. Maximus the Confessor, The Ascetic Life, the Four Centuries on Charity, p. 7.

47 DEVREESE, R. op. cit. pp. 31 ff.

48 SHERWOOD, P. op. cit. p. 10. A. RIOU in his Le Monde et l'Eglise selon Maxime le Confesseur and J.M. GARRIGUES, in his Maxime le Confesseur, la Charite, Avenir Divine de l'Homme, highlight the importance of this event in the life of Maximus, seeing in it the beginning of a revolution in his thought, so that henceforth it was impossible for him to reduce the role of personal liberty to a simple acquiescence in the ontological finality of the creature towards God, even when this finalisation manifests itself, as rational desire, through the most spiritual faculties of human nature. In future, for Maximus, man would have to clear for his nature a path not traced out in advance; this play of creative imagination of the personal order constitutes a constant innovation of the order of nature (GARRIGUES, op. cit. p. 100ff; vide RIOU, op. cit. p. 80ff). They find literary evidence for this

development especially in Ambigua 42. M. DOUCET, in his 'Vues recentes sur les "Metamorphoses" de la pensee de saint Maxime le Confesseur'. Science et Esprit, (31,3) 1979, pp. 269-302, provides trenchant but accurate criticism of this view by showing the exaggerated claims for Ambigua 42, the inadequate appreciation of the earlier Ambigua 7, as well as faults of interpretation, and he suggests alternative explanations that tilt the precarious balance away from 'freedom' to the stability of 'nature'. Although DOUCET's criticism is somewhat morose, his observations are well authenticated and serve to mute the possible sensationalism of the studies of RIOU and GARRIGUES, which as DOUCET must allow, 'permit the reader to come into contact with diverse aspects of the rich maximian synthesis' (op. cit. p. 269).

49 Opusc. 3, PG 91. 49C.

50 Ep. 21, PG 91. 604B-606B; opusc. 20, PG 91. 245C. Vide SHERWOOD, P. St. Maximus the Confessor, The Ascetic Life, the Four Centuries on Charity, p. 218, n. 64.

51 Ep. 20, PG 91. 598B-604B. Vide SHERWOOD, P. An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, p. 34, where the author discusses the problem of the identity of the addressee of this letter.

52 Opusc. 20, PG 91. 245C. Vide SHERWOOD, P. St. Maximus the Confessor, The Ascetic Life, the Four Centuries on Charity, p. 218, n. 64.

53 BROCK, S. op. cit. pp. 316-7; p. 322, No. 7.

54 Ibid., p. 316, No. 11; p. 321, No. 4.

55 Ep. 12, PG 91. 461A.

56 Opusc. 12, PG 91. 142A.

57 Ep. 13, PG 91. 533A.

58 BROCK, S. op. cit. p. 316, Nos. 11,12; p. 342.

59 GARRIGUES, J.M. Maxime le Confesseur, la Charite, Avenir de l'Homme, pp. 45-6.

60 Ibid., pp. 44-5. Cf. VON SCHONBORN, C. Sophrone de Jerusalem, vie monastique et confession dogmatique (Theologie Historique 20) Paris, Beauchesne, 1972. pp. 62; ibid n. 31.

61 GARRIGUES, J.M. op. cit. pp. 44-45.

62 SHERWOOD, P. St. Maximus the Confessor, The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on Charity, p. 10. Cf. GARRIGUES, J.M. op. cit. p. 41.

63 Opusc. 12, PG 91. 143CD.

64 BALTHASAR, H.U. VON. Komische Liturgie. Maximus der Bekenner: Höhe und Krisis des griechischen Weltbildes, Fribourg-im-Bresgau, Herder, 1941, p.42. VON BALTHASAR has modified his views in the light of the study of Sherwood and revised his opinions in Komische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus des Bekenners, Einsiedeln, Johannes-Verlag, 1961. pp. 12-13.

65 SHERWOOD, P. The Earlier Ambigua of St. Maximus the Confessor, passim. VON BALTHASAR has provided a new introduction to his Die Gnostischen Centurien, originally published by Herder at Fribourg-'m-Bresgau in 1941, in the second edition which appears in his Komische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus des Bekenners, Einsiedeln, Johannes-Verlag, 1961, pp. 482-643.

66 Ep. 25, PG 9. 613AD. Vide SHERWOOD, P. An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, p. 40.

67 BROCK, S. op. cit. p. 317, No. 18; pp. 324-5.

68 Ibid., p. 325.

69 Ibid., p. 317, No. 18.

70 For a summary account of the Byzantine Church in the seventh century vide KNOWLES, D. & OBOLENSKY, D. The Middle Ages (The Christian Centuries 2) London, Darton, Longman & Todd, 1969. pp. 81-86. For fuller treatment vide HEFELE, C.-J. & LECLERCQ, H. Histoire des Conciles (3) Paris, Letouzy et Ane, 1909. pp. 317-471; BREHIER, L. & AIGRAIN, R. Gregoire le Grand, Les Etats Barbares et la Conquete Arabe (590-757) (FLICHE, A. & MARTIN, V. Histoire de l'Eglise 5) Paris, Bloud & Gay, 1947, pp. 79-180. The wider context of the Church's predicaments will be found on OSTROGORSKY, G. History of the Byzantine State, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1956, pp. 79-110. A more recent comprehensive treatment can be found in MURPHY, F.X. & SHERWOOD, P. Constantinople II et Constantinople III, Paris, Editions de l'Orante, 1974.

71 The authorship of the 'Acathistus' is attributed to him, but not unanimously. There is evidence of his theological acumen as well as of his diplomatic skill in his Letter to Honorious, MANSI 11,529A-537B. This is our evidence for the formulation of Psephos. For a summary, vide Ep. 19, PG 91. 592B-593C.

72 Pyrr. PG 91. 332B-333B.

73 GARRIGUES, J.M. 'La Personne Composee du Christ d' apres S. Maxime le Confesseur', pp. 184-9.

74 MANSI 11, 565D. Dionysius had been misquoted in the Pact, as he spoke of a 'new' theandric operation of Christ. Vide Ep. 4, PG 3. 1072C. For the Greek text of the Pact of Union, vide MANSI 11,564C-568C. Cf. HEFELE, C.J. & LECLERCQ, H. op. cit. pp. 338-342.

75 MANSI 11, 533A-536D.

76 Ibid., 533C.

77 Pyrr. PG 91. 332C.

78 MANSI 11, 540C-E. For Maximus' defence of the orthodoxy of Honorius, vide Pyrr. PG 91. 328B-329C.

79 Epistola Synodica ad Sergium, PG 87. 3149BC.

80 MANSI 11, 461B-509A; PG 87. 3148A-3200C. Vide SCHONBORN, C. VON. Sophrone de Jerusalem. pp. 99-101.

81 Ep. 19, PG 91. 589C-597B.

82 Ibid., 593A.

83 SHERWOOD, P. An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, p. 39.

84 Opusc. 9, PG 91. 129C-132C.

85 LETHEL, F.M. Theologie de l'Agonie du Christ (Theologie Historique 52) Paris, Beauchesne, 1979. pp. 62-64.

86 Ambig. PG 91. 1031A-1060D.

87 Ep. 19, PG 91. 596B.

88 Opusc. 4, PG 91. 56D-61D; opusc. 20, ibid., 228B-245D; opusc 9, ibid 112C-132D; opusc. 6, ibid., 65A-69A; opusc. 8, ibid., 80C-81B; opusc. 16, ibid., 196C-197A; Pyrr. ibid., 288A-353B.

89 Ambig. PG 91. 1032A-1060D. Vide especially CANART, P. 'La deuxieme lettre a Thomas de Maxime le Confesseur'. Byzantion (34) 1964, pp. 415-445.

90 CANART, P. op. cit. p. 445.

91 BROCK, S. op. cit. p. 315, No. 8.

92 Ibid., p. 317, No. 15.

93 In the Syriac Life: 'Maximos reminded Sophronios, who was in the same error, of the letter in which "Arkadios the archbishop of Cyprus showed you contempt"'. BROCK points out that although we do not have the letter of Arcadius to Sophronius, we do have Sophronius' letter in Syriac translation, which may have provoked the asperity to which Maximus refers here. It is to be found in BM Or. 8606, ff. $127^{a}$-$140^{b}$. Vide BROCK, S. op. cit. p. 322; ibid., n. 5.

94 HEFELE, C.J. & LECLERCQ, H. op. cit. pp. 333-6.

95 Opusc. 21, PG 91. 245B.

96 BROCK, S. op. cit. p. 316, No. 9.

97 GARRIGUES, J.M. 'La Personne Composee du Christ d'apres S. Maxime le Confesseur', p. 184.

98 Ep. 13, PG 91. 532D; Ambig. PG 91. 1045D-1060D.

99 BROCK, S. op. cit. pp. 323-4, argues that the 'Edict' is the Psephos. GARRIGUES, J.M. op. cit. p. 187; ibid., n. 34, seems to have more reason on his side in holding that it was the Ecthesis, the overtly imperial document, although before he died, Heraclius disclaimed its authorship and put the blame squarely on Sergius.

100 MANSI 10, 992A-997A.

101 Opusc. 20, PG 91. 228B-245D.

102 SHERWOOD, P. An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, p. 12.

103 Vide SCHONBORN, C. VON. op. cit. p. 97, n 136, for discussion on the date of the death of Sophronius.

104 BREHIER, L. & AIGRAIN, R. Gregoire le Grand, Les Etats Barbares et la Conquete Arabe (590-757) (FLICHE, A. & MARTIN, V. Histoire de l'Eglise 5), p. 400, n. 6.

105 Relatio Motionis, PG 90. 125AB.

106 BROCK, S. op. cit. pp. 317-8, Nos. 17-20.

107 The last straw as far as Martina was concerned was the refusal of George to set free a community of Monophysite nuns. For a discussion of the relevant Epistolae 18 and 12, vide SHERWOOD, P. An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, pp. 45-9.

108 MANSI, 10, 677A-678C.

109 Opusc. 6, PG 91. 65A-69A; opusc. 7, ibid., 80C-81B; opusc. 16, ibid., 196C-197A; Pyrr. ibid., 288A-353B.

110 Opusc. 20, PG 91. 237C-244B.

111 Ep. 12, PG 91. 460A-509B. SHERWOOD, P. op. cit. pp. 44-8.

112 Vide Ep. 18, PG 91. 584D-589B, i.e. Maximus' letter in the name of George to the recalcitrant Monophysite nuns.

113 CANART, P. op. cit. p. 441.

114 Vide GARRIGUES, J.M. 'La Personne Composee du Christ d'apres S. Maxime le Confesseur', pp. 188-9 and passim.

115 Opusc. 12, PG 91. 144A-D. This is the Latin version: Defloratio ex Epistola S. Maximi ad Petrum Illustrem. The Greek is lost.

116 MANSI 10, 702D-708A.

117 Pyrr. PG 91. 332B.

118 Ibid., 288A-353B.

119 Relatio Motionis, PG 90. 112C-113C. His revolt, which was a bid for the imperial title, took place in 646.

120 MANSI 10, 610 A-C.

121 Ep. 10, PG 91. 133A-137C. Vide BROCK, S. op. cit. p. 318, No. 20.

122 SHERWOOD, P. An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, p. 16; ibid., p. 219, n. 80.

123 MANSI 10, 678A. For a fuller discussion of the maximian texts dealing with the Roman See, vide SHERWOOD, P. St. Maximus the Confessor, The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on Charity, pp. 73-7; RIOU, A., op. cit. pp. 206-212; CROCE, V. Tradizione e Ricerca, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1974. pp. 115-131.

124 Ep. 12, PG 91. 144A.

125 Ibid., 144C.

126 Ep. 10, PG 91. 137CD.

127 Ep. 11, PG 91. 137D-140A.

128 Pyrr. PG 91. 352D-353A. If Anastasius, Maximus' secretary, is the one who recorded the Dispute with Pyrrhus, then it seems that, because 'Pyrrhus , as he promised, went to Rome with us and condemned the teaching of the impious Ecthesis' (Pyrr. PG 91. 353A), the ex-patriarch must have accompanied Maximus and his party to Rome.

129 BROCK, S. op. cit. p. 318, No. 20.

130 Ep. 16, PG 91. 197C; Ep. 15, ibid., 181CD.

131 Vide GARRIGUES, J.M. Maxime le Confesseur. La Charite, Avenir Divin de l'Homme, p. 62-3.

132 Opusc. 15, PG 91. 153C-184C. For the question of Maximus' composition of florilegia, vide SHERWOOD, P. An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, pp. 18-20. Vide ibid., pp. 53-6 for notes on the works of this period.

133 The text of the Typos is given in MANSI 10, 1029C-1032D. The Patriarch Paul was probably the eminence grise behind the Typos. His deposition by Theodore was bound to have intensified his theological scruples!

134 At his trial, Maximus denied that he anathematized the emperor, but admitted that he anathematized the Typos (PG 90. 128B). GARRIGUES, J.M. op. cit. p. 63, thinks that this proves that Maximus was a conciliar father as Maximus says that he pronounced his anathematization in the basilicas of the Lateran and St. Mary Major. Slender evidence! Maximus' name appears on one of the documents of the Synod, but this was not necessarily more than an anti-Monothelite statement drawn up by a body of lobbyists. Vide HEFELE, C.J. & LECLERCQ, H. op. cit. pp. 439-440. For the texts of the Canons 11 and 12, vide MANSI 10, 1153D-1156A.

135 BROCK, S. op. cit. p. 318. 'They' refers to the monks said to have travelled with Maximus from Africa. The official record says that one hundred and five bishops attended the Lateran Synod. Vide MANSI 10, 863C-864C.

136 We have an eye-witness account of the final days of Martin in the Commemoratio (PL 129. 591A-604A). There is also an account of his sufferings 'because of his right confession of and uncorrupted faith in Christ our God and because of his anathematization of the heretics' in a later Greek Life. Vide PEETERS, P. 'Une Vie grecque du pape S. Martin I'. Analecta Bollandiana (51) 1953, pp. 225-263. His final letters show him dying of hunger and cold, the intrepid opponent of heresy, but full of Christian forbearance. Vide Ep. 14-17, PL 87. 197D-204D.

137 BROCK, S. op. cit. p. 319, No. 25.

138 For the use of the Syriac Life in the Syriac Chronicles, vide BROCK, S. op. cit. pp. 337-340. The manuscript of the Syriac Life is defective and breaks off before the final days of Maximus, but details of his activity at Constantinople then can be gleaned from the Syriac Chronicles.

139 We have ample and authentic documentation for the last years of Maximus' life. The relevant texts: Relatio Motionis, Epistola Anastasii, Disputatio Bizyae, Ad Anastasium, Monachum, Epistola ad Theodosium Presbyterum Gangrensem, Hypomnesticum

139 (continued)

as well as evidence given at the Sixth Ecumenical Council, MANSI 11, 73A-76A, 357AB, are introduced and translated by GARRIGUES, J.M. in 'Le Martyre de saint Maxime le Confesseur' Revue Thomiste (76,3) 1976, pp. 410-452.

140 Relatio Motionis, PG 90. 112A.

141 Ibid., 128B.

142 Disputatio Bizyae, PG 90. 161D.

143 Relatio Motionis, PG 90. 124D.

144 Ibid., 121A.

145 Ibid., 121B.

146 Ibid., 121C.

147 Ibid., 117D.

148 Ibid., 125A.

149 Ibid., 128B.

150 Maximus had been accused of this theological teaching, but had defended himself and rejected it, as we have seen already. Vide Opusc. 8, PG 91. 112C-132D.

151 Epistola Anastasii, PG 90. 133B-136C.

152 Disputatio Bizyae, PG 90. 148A.

153 Ibid., 148A.

154 Ibid., 153B-D.

155 Ibid., 160C.

156 Ibid., 161D-163A.

157 Ibid., 164B.

158 Ibid., 165B.

159 Ibid., 168B.

160 Ad Anastasium Monachum, PG 90. 132A-133A.

161 Ibid., 132A.

162 Ibid., 132C.

163 The attitude of Vitalian may seem to be timorous and excessively cautious. It would be well to remember the complexity of the situation with which he was faced and to see in his diplomatic dissimulations the intention of leaving well enough alone, in the hope that time would heal divisions. Later in his reign he had to take a stronger line with the Byzantines. Vide BREHIER, L. & AIGRAIN, R., op. cit. pp. 403-4. The fact that Vitalian and his predecessor, Eugene I, are reckoned as saints emphasizes the paradoxes that confronted the harassed Maximus.

164 Ad Anastasium Monachum, PG 90. 132C.

# CHAPTER II - FOOTNOTES

1. Gal. 6,5.

2. BALTHASAR, H.U. VON. Word and Redemption (Essays in Theology 2) New York, Herder & Herder, 1965. p. 49.

3. MEYENDORFF, J. Byzantine Theology, London & Oxford, Mowbrays, 1975. pp. 8-9. While the author describes the Eastern theological method in its most typical form, he tends to ride somewhat roughshod over necessary distinctions about theological method in the West. He fails to take into account achievements like the scriptural commentaries of St. Thomas Aquinas and even more pertintently the monastic theology of a St. Bernard or the mystical theology of St. John of the Cross. DRAGAS, G.D. The Meaning of Theology, Darlington, 1980, provides a very helpful summary of the idea of theology as it was understood by the Fathers from the beginning up to the Cappadocians. Penetrating explorations of these themes can be found in TORRANCE, T.F. Theological Science, London, Oxford University Press, 1969 and in LONERGAN, B. Method in Theology, London, Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972.

4. LOSSKY, V. The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, London, James Clarke & Co., 1975, p. 21.

5. DIONYSIUS, the Pseudo-Areopagite. De Divinis Nominibus, PG 3, 648B.

6. Rom. 12,2.

7. SUDBRACH, J. 'Spirituality'. Encyclopedia of Theology, ed. by K. Rahner, London, Burns & Oates, 1975, pp. 1623-1626. For a more extensive treatment vide idem. 'Spirituality'. Sacramentum Mundi 6, ed. K. Rahner et al. London, Burns & Oates, pp. 147-157.

8. SUDBRACH, J. 'Spirituality'. Encyclopedia of Theology, p. 1264.

9. 1 Cor. 2,6-7.

10. Gal. 5,6. Vide Jn. 3,21; 1 Jn. 1,6.

11. 2 Cor. 3,17.

12. 1 Cor. 2, 13-15; 9,11; 14,1.

13. BALTHASAR, H.U. VON. op. cit. p.10.

14 LOSSKY, V. The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, London, James Clarke & Co. Ltd., 1957 (a translation of Essai sur la Theologie Mystique de l'Eglise d'Orient, Paris, 1944) pp. 7-22. FLOROVSKY, G. Bible, Church, Tradition: An Eastern Orthodox View, Belmont, Massachussetts, Nordland Publishing Company, 1972. pp. 9-16; 17-36; 93-103. DRAGAS, G.D. The Meaning of Theology, Darlington, 1980. pp. 83-4.

15 Vide THUNBERG, L. Microcosm and Mediator, Lund, C.W.K. Gleerup Lund, 1965. pp. 351-7.

16 Ibid., pp. 377-391.

17 Ep. 7, PG 91, 433D; Pyrr. PG 91, 301D.

18 Ambig. PG 91, 1128C-1129D.

19 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 604B; 617A; Ambig. PG 91, 1128C

20 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 280AB.

21 CROCE, V. Tradizione e Ricerca, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1974. PELIKAN, J. '"Council or Father or Scripture": The Concept of Authority in the Theology of Maximus Confessor'. The Heritage of the Early Church (Orientalia Christiana Analecta 195) Rome, Pont. Institutum Studiorum Orientalium, 1973. pp. 277-288, provides a useful synthesis of the principal themes dealt with at greater length by Croce.

22 HEIDEGGER, M. What is Philosophy? (Translation with an Introduction by Kluback, W. & Wilde, J.T.) London, Vision Press Ltd., 1962. pp. 75-85.

23 Ep. 6, PG 91, 425A.

24 Disputatio Bizyae, PG 90, 152C.

25 Ambig. PG 91, 1089A.

26 Pyrr. PG 91, 344A.

27 Opusc. 15, PG 91, 180BC.

28 THUNBERG, L. op. cit. pp. 377-391.

29 Carit. 1, 11, PG 90, 964A.

30 THUNBERG, L. op. cit. pp. 384-391.

31 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 620C-634A. Vide CROCE, V. op. cit. pp. 29-30.

32 Ambig. PG 91, 1089A.

33 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 465B.

34 Ascet. 40, PG 90, 948D.

35 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 465C.

36 Ep. 2, PG 91, 405C.

37 Cap. Theol. 2, 60, PG 90, 1149C-1152A.

38 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 372BD.

39 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 372C.

40 This emerges from a survey of the work of Maximus as a whole. It may be seen in detail in the conjunction of texts like: Cap. Theol. 1, 9, PG 90, 1085D; Myst. PG 91, 665C-667C; Qu. Thal. PG 90, 681D; ibid., 620C-625C; ibid., 436AB: Ambig. PG 91, 1308D-1312B.

41 Cap. Theol. 2, 60, PG 90, 1149C-1152A. Cf. Cap. Theol. 1, 66, PG 90, 1108AB.

42 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 245B.

43 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 608B.

44 Vide CROCE, V. op. cit. pp. 32-35.

45 Vide DALMAIS, I.H. 'La theorie de"logoi"des creatures chez S. Maxime le Confesseur'. Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques (36) 1952, pp. 244-249.

46 CROCE, V. op. cit. pp. 39-40.

47 2 Tim. 3, 16.

48 Vide DANIELOU, J. Origen, London, Sheed & Ward, 1955 (a translation of Origene, Paris, by Mitchell, W.) pp. 139-173.

49 ORIGENE, Commentaire sur S. Jean II (Sources Chretiennes 157) Paris, Les Editions du Cerf, 1970. (Introduction, translation and notes by Blanc, C.) 10, 43, 100, p. 566. Vide ibid., pp. 567-577 and the introductory discussion: 'Le fruit de la resurrection: la foi', pp. 101-5.

50 Myst. PG 91, 669C.

51 Cap. Theol. 2, 60, PG 90, 1149C-1152A.

52 BALTHASAR, H.U. VON, Liturgie Cosmique, Paris, Aubier, 1947 (a translation of Komische Liturgie, Fribourg-im-Bresgau, 1941 by Lhaumet, L. & Prentout, H.A.) pp. 19-28.

53 Vide LONERGAN, B.J. Verbum, Word and Idea in Aquinas, London, Darton, Longman & Todd, 1968, pp. 31, 80-2, 173-4.

54 Cap. Theol. 1, 66, PG 90, 1108AB.

55 Cap. Theol. 2, 14, PG 90, 1132A.

56 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 372B-D; ibid., 465B-468C.

57 Vide CROCE, V. op. cit. p. 55.

58 Ep. 10, PG 91, 452C.

59 Ep. 13, PG 91, 520B.

60 Qu. Dub. 71, PG 90, 844C.

61 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 249A; ibid., 465B.

62 Ep. 13, PG 91, 520B.

63 Ambig. PG 91, 1089A.

64 Pyrr. PG 91, 320D.

65 Opusc. 15, PG 91, 177A.

66 Opusc. 7, PG 91, 73B.

67 Ambig. PG 91, 1190B.

68 Pyrr. PG 91, 320C.

69 Opusc. 15, PG 91, 165C.

70 Ad Anastasium Monachum, PG 90, 132A. Cf. Qu. Thal. PG 90, 665D-668A.

71 Opusc. 22, PG 91, 257C.

72 A list of the Fathers cited by Maximus is given below.

73 Ep. 13, PG 91, 532C.

74 Opusc. 15, PG 91, 177A.

75 Ep. 15, PG 91, 549A.

76 Disputatio Bizyae, PG 90, 149A.

77 Opusc. 19, PG 91, 224B-225A.

78 Opusc. 25, PG 91, 273C.

79 Vide CROCE, V. op. cit. p. 93.

80 Ad Anastasium Monachum, PG 90, 132A; Opusc. 11, PG 91, 137C-140A; Qu. Thal. PG 90, 665B-668A.

81 Ep. 13, PG 91, 532C.

82 Ep. 15, PG 91, 549A.

83 Ambig. PG 91, 1336B.

84 Vide CROCE, V. op. cit. p. 77, n. 56.

85 Vide NEWMAN, J.H. On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine (edited with an introduction by Coulson, J.) London, Chapman, 1961.

86 Ad Anastasium Monachum, PG 90, 132A.

87 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 665B.

88 Vide CROCE, V. op. cit. p. 80.

89 Ad Anastasium Monachum, PG 90, 132A; Ep. 15, PG 91, 549A.

90 Opusc. 22, PG 91, 257C. Cf. Opusc. 15, PG 91, 180BC.

91 Ambig. PG 91, 1336B; Ep. 13, PG 91, 532D; Opusc. 13, PG 91, 145AB.

92 Opusc. 22, PG 91, 257C.

93 Opusc. 15, PG 91, 180BC.

94 Opusc. 22, PG 91, 257C.

95 CROCE, V. op. cit. p. 104.

96 Relatio Motionis, PG 90, 124A. The citation of Eph. 4,11 makes it obvious that the 'he' of Maximus' statement refers to 'Christ'.

97 Myst. PG 91, 692C; ibid., 696AB; ibid., 708CD.

98 Ambig. PG 91, 1336B.

99 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 708D-709A.

100 Ep. 19, PG 91, 596BC; Disputatio Bizyae, PG 90, 149AD; Qu. Thal. PG 90, 604B-618A.

101 PG 91, 557B-717D.

102 Vide BORNERT, R. Les commentaires byzantines de la divine liturgie du VII$^{e}$ au XV$^{e}$ siecle (Archives de l'Orient chretien, 9) Paris, Institut Francais d'Etudes Byzantines, 1966, pp. 83-124.

103 Ibid., pp. 90-97.

104 Vide DALMAIS, I.H. 'Un traite de theologie contemplative: le commentaire du Pater Noster de S. Maxime le Confesseur'. Revue d'Ascetique et de Mystique(29) 1953, p. 125.

105 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 604B; ibid., 617A.

106 Ambig. PG 91, 1128CD.

107 Ambig. PG 91, 1128A-C.

108 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 484D-485A.

109 Ambig. PG 91, 1176BC.

110 Ambig. PG 91, 1189B.

111 Ambig. PG 91, 1069A.

112 Opusc. 26, PG 91, 276AB.

113 Ep. 6, PG 91, 424C-433A.

114 Ep. 7, PG 91, 433A-440C.

115 Ep. 6, PG 91, 432C.

116 Ambig. PG 91, 1393B.

117 Ep. 6, PG 91, 432D.

118 Ambig. PG 91, 1304B.

119 Vide SHERWOOD, P. The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor and his Refutation of Origenism (Studia Anselmiana 36) Rome, Herder, 1955.

120 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 708D.

121 Ibid.

122 Ambig. PG 91, 1069B.

123 Ambig. PG 91, 1232D.

124 Opusc. 21, PG 91, 152AB.

125 Ambig. PG 91, 1332C.

126 Ep. 101, PG 37, 181C.

127 Opusc. 9, PG 91, 128C-129A.

128 Pyrr. PG 91, 348CD.

129 CROCE, V. op. cit. p. 165.

130 Opusc. 22, PG 91, 257D.

131 Ep. 102, PG 37, 193C.

132 Opusc. 22, PG 91, 259A.

133 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 604BD; ibid., 608B.

134 Vide PUECH, H.C. 'La tenebre mystique chez le Pseudo-Denys l'Areopagite et dans la tradition patristique'. Etudes Carmelitaines (23,2) 1938, pp. 33-53.

135 Cap. Theol. 2, 76, PG 90, 1160C.

136 Ambig. PG 91, 1288AC.

137 Ambig. PG 91, 1053B.

138 PG 90, 912A-956D.

139 PG 90, 960A-1073A.

140 PG 90, 1084A-1173A.

141 Ep. 1, PG 91, 364A-392B; Ep. 2, PG 91, 392D-408B; Ep. 3, PG 91, 408C-412C; Ep. 4, PG 91, 413A-420c.

142 PG 90, 872D-909A.

143 PG 90, 244D-773B.

144 SHERWOOD, P. An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, pp. 34-35.

145 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 249B.

146 Ibid., 304B. (trans. Sherwood).

147 Vide SHERWOOD, P. 'Exposition and Use of Scripture in St. Maximus as manifest in the Quaestiones ad Thalassium'. Orinetalia Christiana Periodica (24) 1958, p. 204.

148 Rom. 10, 4. Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 305D-308C.

149 Vide SHERWOOD, P. op. cit. pp. 202-207.

150 PG 90, 785C-856B.

151 PG 90, 1393A-1400D.

152 PG 90, 856D-872B.

153 PG 90, 872D-909A.

154 SHERWOOD, P. An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, pp. 26 and 31 respectively.

155 Maximus' commentary on the 'Our Father' shows very little sign of dependence on the commentaries on the dominical prayer by his great predecessors, like Origen and Gregory of Nyssa. Vide WALTHER, G. 'Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der griechischen Vaterunser Exegese'. Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Altchristlichen Literatur (40,3) Leipsig, 1914, pp. 83-89.

156 PG 90, 876B.

157 Vide DALMAIS, I.H. 'Un traite de theologie contemplative: le commentaire du Pater Noster de saint Maxime le Confesseur'. Revue d'Ascetique et de Mystique (29) 1953, p. 125.

158 PG 91, 657C-717D.

159 SHERWOOD, P. An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, p. 32.

160 DALMAIS, I.H. 'Mystere liturgique et divinisation dans la Mystagogie de Saint Maxime le Confesseur'. Epektasis (Melanges Danielou) Paris, Beauchesne, 1972, p. 55.

161 Vide BORNERT, R. Les Commentaires Byzantines de la Divine Liturgie du VII^e au XV^e siecle, p. 92.

162 Vide DALMAIS, I.H. 'Mystere liturgique et divinisation dans la Mystagogie de Saint Maxime le Confesseur', pp. 57-58. For an ecclesial development of the same theme vide the same author's 'L' Eglise icone du "Mystere": la "Mystagogie" de S. Maxime le Confesseur, une ecclesiologie liturgique'. L'Eglise dans la Liturgie ed. Triacca, A.M. & Pistoia, A., C.L.V. - Edizioni Liturgiche, 1980, pp. 107-117.

163 Vide BORNERT, R. op. cit. pp. 90-97.

164 Ibid.

165 Myst. PG 91, 672D-673B. For a useful schematization of this chapter 5 of the Mystagogia vide RIOU, A. Le Monde et l'Eglise selon Maxime le Confesseur, n. 29, pp. 152-153.

166 Myst. PG 91, 661AB.

167 E.g. Myst. PG 91, 660D-661A; ibid., 701C; ibid., 716C. Vide BORNERT, R. op. cit. pp. 97-104.

168 Vide WILLIAMS, R. The Wound of Knowledge, London, Darton Longman & Todd, 1979, pp. 116-121. Cf. DALMAIS, I.H. 'Mystere liturgique et divinisation dans la Mystagogie de Saint Maxime le Confesseur', esp. pp. 61-62.

169 Vide BORNERT, R. op. cit. pp. 97-104.

170 Vide ibid., pp. 85-86.

171 Myst. PG 91, 657C; ibid., 661BC.

172 DALMAIS, I.H. 'Mystere liturgique et divinisation dans la Mystagogie de Saint Maxime le Confesseur', p. 55.

173 Ibid., pp. 55-56. Cf. SCHONBORN, C.VON. Saint Sophrone de Jerusalem, vie monastique et confession dogmatique, n. 140, p. 223. It is John Moschus who provides the link with Palladius. Vide Pratum Spirituale, PG 87, 2925D.

174 SHERWOOD, P. The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor and his Refutation of Origenism, p. 77. For Justinian's Liber adversus Origenem and the fifteen anathemas directed against the propositions of Origen at the Synod of Constantinople in 543, vide HEFELE, J. & LECLERCQ, H. Histoire des Conciles, 2,2, Paris, Letouzy, 1908, pp. 1182-1196. MURPHY, F.-X. & SHERWOOD, P. op. cit. pp. 73-74, remind us that this condemnation had more bearing on the Evagrian systematisation of Origen's teaching than on the master's views. Although Origen's name appears in the list of those condemned at Constantinople II, (Denzinger-Schönmetzer, 433), MURPHY and SHERWOOD argue that this condemnation cannot be interpreted as meaning that Origen is a heretic in the formal sense (op. cit. pp. 108-109). They hold that the Council was primarily concerned with contemporary origenist monks who claimed Origen as the authority for their heterodox teaching.

175 PG 91, 1032A-1417C.

176 Cf. RIOU, A. Le Monde et l'Eglise selon Maxime le Confesseur. pp. 34-35. Vide DANIELOU, J. Origen (translation by Mitchell, W. of Origene, Paris, La Table ronde, 1949,) London, Sheed & Ward 1955, pp. 209-219. For an excellent recent essay on Origen, vide LOUTH, A. The Origins of Christian Mystical Tradition, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981, pp. 52-74.

177 ORIGEN. De Principiis, 3. 5,3; ibid., 2. 9,6. ed. Koetschau, P., G.C.S. (22) Leipzig, J.C. Heinrichs' sche Buchhandlung, 1913.

178 De Princ. 2. 9,5. Vide JUSTINIAN. Ep. ad Menam, MANSI, 9, 513B; DANIELOU, J. op. cit. p. 212.

179 De Princ. 1. 3,8. Vide SHERWOOD, P. op. cit. pp. 181-204.

180 De Princ. 2. 9,6. All Book 3 of De Principiis is devoted to Free-will.

181 De Princ. 2. 3.

182 Ibid., 1. 8,1.

183 In Numeros Homilia, 27, 9. ed. Baehrens, W.A., G.C.S. (30), 1921. Exposita in Proverbia 24. 31, PG 17, 232A; ibid., 19. 17, PG 17, 209A.

184 De Princ. 2. 10,8; ibid., 2. 1,3; Vide DANIELOU, J. op. cit. pp. 217-219.

185 De Princ. 1. 7,3; ibid., 2. 3,3.

186 De Princ. 1. 8,3; Comm. in Jo. 1. 32. ed. Blanc, C. vol. 1, p. 177; vide ibid., pp. 28-29.

187 PG 91, 1081A-1417C.

188 PG 91, 1032A-1060D. For further commentary on the difficulties handled in Ambigua 1, 3 and 5, vide CANART, P. 'La Deuxieme Lettre a Thomas de S. Maxime le Confesseur'. Byzantion (34) 1964, pp. 415-445 : a critical text, introduction and translation.

189 SHERWOOD, P. The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor and his refutation of Origenism, Rome, 1955.

190 Op. cit. p. 10.

191 For Amb. 1: Orat. 3 De Filio, 2; Orat. 3 De pace; for Amb. 2: Orat. 3 De Filio, 18; for Amb. 4: Orat. 4 De Filio, 6.

192 Ep. 4, PG 3, 1072BC.

193 GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS, Orat. 3, De Filio, 2. (translation: Christology of the Later Fathers, The Library of the Christian Classics, London, SCM Press, 1954, p. 161.)

194 Ibid., p. 173.

195 DIONYSIUS the Pseudo-Areopagite, Ep. 4, PG 3, 1072A-C.

196 PG 91, 1045C-1060D.

197 PG 3, 1072C.

198 Vide SHERWOOD, P. 'Denys l'Areopagite'. Dictionnaire de Spiritualite, Ascetique et Mystique (3) 295-300.

199 RIOU, A. Le Monde et l'Eglise selon Maxime Le Confesseur, p. 39.

200 Vide MEYENDORFF, J. Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, New York, St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1975, pp. 109-110. WILLIAMS, R. The Wound of Knowledge, pp. 120-121, gives a neat summary of this view.

201 WILLIAMS, R. The Wound of Knowledge, p. 121.

202 PG 4, 14A-526C; ibid., 527A-576A.

203 Vide BALTHASAR, H.U.VON, 'Das Problem der Dionysius-Scholien', Komische Liturgie, pp. 644-672. SHERWOOD, P. 'Denys l'Areopagite' Dictionnaire de Spiritualite, Ascetique et Mystique (3) 295, is not convinced by the modest claims for maximian authorship, put forward by VON BALTHASAR.

204 Vide SHERWOOD, P. An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, pp. 24-48. For the theological perspectives within which these writings were conceived vide MEYENDORFF, J. Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, pp. 29-46. A good summary of the historical background to Monophysitism can be found in MURPHY, F.-X. & SHERWOOD, P. Constantinople II et Constantinople III, Paris, Editions de l'Orante, 1974, pp. 13-70.

205 Vide MURPHY, F.-X. & SHERWOOD, P. op. cit. pp. 133-240.

206 Vide LETHEL, F.M. Theologie de l'Agonie du Christ (Theologie Historique 52) Paris, Editions Beauchesne, 1979, pp. 65-99. Cf. SHERWOOD, P. An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, pp. 37-56.

207 Vide MURPHY, F.-X. & SHERWOOD, P. op. cit. pp. 34-54. WIGRAM, W.A. The Separation of the Monophysites, London, The Faith Press, 1923, pp. 191-207; BARDY, G. & BREHIER, L. De la mort de Theodore a l'election de Gregoire le Grand, (FLICHE, A. & MARTIN, V. Histoire de l'Eglise 4) Paris, Bloud & Gay, 1945, pp. 483-532.

208 Vide KELLY, J.N.D. Early Christian Doctrines, London, Adam & Charles Black, 1968, pp. 289-295. MEYENDORFF, J. op. cit. pp. 15-17, 19-21, 39 and passim.

209 KELLY, J.N.D. op. cit. p. 331.

210 Vide GRILLMEIER, A. Christ in Christian Tradition, London & Oxford, Mowbrays, 1975. pp. 526-539. FOUYAS, Archbishop M. The Person of Jesus Christ, Addis Ababa, Central Printing Press, 1976, pp. 117-126.

211 Vide SCHWARZ, E. Der Prozess des Eutyches, München, Sitzungsberichte der Bayrischen Akademie der Wissenchaften, philosophisch-philologisch-historische Klasse, 1929, H.5, 25.

212 Vide MURPHY, F.-X. & SHERWOOD, P. op. cit. pp. 24-26.

213 Vide SELLERS, R.V. The Council of Chalcedon, London, S.P.C.K. 1961, pp. 254-301.

214 Ep. 2. MANSI 5, 1336B.

215 Vide LEBON, J. 'La Christologie du monophysisme syrien'. Das Konzil von Chalkedon, ed. by Grillmeier, A. & Bacht, H., Wurzburg, Echter-Verlag, 1962, pp. 425-580, for a thorough examination of the theology of Severus and the Syrian monophysites on the mystery of Christ. For a summary of the position of Severus vide MURPHY, F.-X. & SHERWOOD, P. op. cit. pp. 49-50. The most penetrating study of Maximus' handling of the problems posed by the Christology of Severus is to be found in GARRIGUES, J.M. 'La Personne

composee du Christ d'apres saint Maxime', Revue Thomiste (74) 1974, pp. 181-204. WIGRAM, W.A. op. cit. pp. 190-207 is still worth consideration.

216 Vide SELLERS, R.V. op. cit. p. 309, n 6. The standard work is DRAGUET, R. Julien d'Halicarnasse et sa controverse avec Severe d'Antioche sur l'incorruptibilite du corps du Christ, Louvain, Smeesters, 1924. For a brief summary of the conflict between Aphthartdocetists and Phtartolaters vide MURPHY, F.-X. & SHERWOOD, P. op. cit. 50-51; 61-62.

217 Vide LEBON, J. op. cit. passim.

218 Vide SELLERS, R.V. op. cit. pp. 294-301.

219 Vide PG 91, 172D-173B for an exact appreciation of the Scylla of Nestorianism. PG 91, 97BC will provide at a glance a comparable assessment of the Charybdis of Monophysitism.

220 Vide GARRIGUES, J.M. op. cit.

221 PG 91, 145A-149B.

222 PG 91, 245D-257A.

223 PG 91, 260D-268A.

224 PG 91, 544C-576D.

225 PG 91, 257A-260D.

226 PG 91, 460A-509B. Vide especially ibid., 488C-500A.

227 PG 91, 509B-533A.

228 SHERWOOD, P. op. cit. p. 46.

229 Vide ibid., pp. 45-48.

230 MANSI 11, 564C-568C. Vide MURPHY, F.-X. & SHERWOOD, P. Constantinople II et Constantinople III, p. 305 for a translation of the crucial passages of the Pact. It is here that we find for the first time the dionysian theandric activity cited, but modified significantly by the substitution of 'one' for 'new':

καί ἀνθρώπινα μιᾷ θεανδρικῇ ἐνεργείᾳ (565D)

231 Vide MURPHY, F.-X. & SHERWOOD, P. op. cit. pp. 151-153.

232 MANSI 11, 529A-537B. Vide MURPHY, F.-X. & SHERWOOD, P. op. cit. pp. 306-308 for a translation and comparison with the Ecthesis.

233 Vide Ep. 19 ad Pyrrhum, PG 91, 589C-597B. LETHEL, F.M. op. cit. p. 26, points out that the teaching of Sergius which he dubs 'monothelisme byzantine' in

contrast to the monophysite monothelitism of a Severus and the crude variety that characterized the slogan-theology of the crowd, was not so much a matter of doctrinal compromise as of verbal equivocation.

234 Vide MANSI 11, 553C-556D; DENZINGER-SCHONMETZER, 550-551.

235 Vide Tomus Dogmaticus ad Marinum Presbyterum PG 91, 228B-245D, esp. 237C-244B where Maximus says that Honorius was denying two morally contradictory wills. Besides, he says that Anastasius had made enquiries at Rome and found that to have been the sense intended by Honorius' letter to Sergius. Honorius' secretary, John, said that there had been no mention of one will in the original nor of a human physical will in the Saviour (ibid., 244C-245A). Cf. SHERWOOD, P. An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, pp. 41-42.

236 MANSI 11, 461B-509A.

237 Vide SCHONBORN, C.VON, Sophrone de Jerusalem, vie monastque et confession dogmatique, pp. 100-101; 199-228.

238 MANSI 10, 991A-997A.

239 Vide LETHEL, F.M. op. cit. pp. 48-49.

240 PG 91, 64A-65A.

241 PG 91, 589C-597B.

242 Maximus would withdraw that praise later on. Vide PG 91, 129C-132C.

243 PG 91, 544C-576B.

244 PG 91, 56D-61D.

245 PG 91, 228B-245D.

246 Vide SHERWOOD, P. op. cit. p. 43.

247 PG 91, 65A-69A.

248 Vide LETHEL, F.M. op. cit. pp. 65-74.

249 PG 91, 153C-184C.

250 PG 91, 45B-56D.

251 PG 91, 69B-89B.

252 PG 91, 184C-212A.

253 PG 91, 228B-245D.

254 PG 91, 268A-269D.

255 PG 91, 269D-273D.

256 PG 91, 288A-353B. The outstanding work on the 'Dispute' is DOUCET, M. La Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus, Montreal, 1972, (an unpublished thesis).

257 PG 91, 141A-145A.

258 PG 91, 149B-153B.

259 PG 91, 184C-212A.

260 PG 91, 213A-216A.

261 PG 91, 153C-184C.

262 PG 91, 260D-268A.

263 PG 91, 276A-280B.

264 PG 91, 280B-285B.

265 MANSI 10, 1029C-1032D. There are no theological developments in the Typos. It merely exemplifies the bulldozing tactics of a Byzantine emperor.

266 PG 90, 136C-172B.

267 E.g. Cap. Theol., 2, 1. PG 90, 1124D-1126C; Ex opere LXIII Dubiorum, ad divinissimum Achridae regem, PG 90, 1461B-D; Ex Anastasii Epistola ad Joannem Diaconum, PG 91, 133D-136B.

268 PG 91, 353C-361B. Vide SHERWOOD, P. The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on Charity, pp. 214-215. He omits it from his Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor.

269 Bibliotheca Veterum Patrum (2) ed. Ducaeus, F., 1624, pp. 1057-1169; Ecclesiae Graecae Monumenta (2) Cotelerius, J.B., Paris, 1681, pp. 341-456; supplemental chapters from Ms. Par. Reg. 2464, printed in Migne, PG 87, 2851-3112. French translation: Rouet De Journal, M.-J. Le Pre Spirituel, Paris, Les Editions du Cerf, 1946. Vide MIONI, E. 'Jean Moschus'. Dictionnaire de Spiritualite, Ascetique et Mystique (8) 632-640.

270 PG 88, 585-1248. English translation: St. John Climacus, The Ladder of Divine Ascent, Moore, L. & Heppell, M., London, Faber & Faber, 1959. Vide COUILLEAU, G. 'S. Jean Climaque'. Dictionnaire de Spiritualite, Ascetique et Mystique (8) 369-389.

271 Vide SCHONBORN, C. VON. Sophrone de Jerusalem, vie monastique et confession dogmatique, pp. 72-78 and passim. For the relationship between Sophronius and Moschua, vide Rouet de Journal, M.-J. op. cit. pp. 7-12.

272 Vide SCHONBORN, C.VON. op. cit. pp. 74-78.

273 Vide BROCK, S. 'An Early Life of Maximus the Confessor', p. 315.

274 PG 91, 142A-461A.

275 Vide JANIN, R. 'L'Eglise byzantine sur les rives du Bosphore (cote asiatique), pp. 92-94.

276 Vide COUSIN, P. Precis d'Histoire Monastique, Paris, Bloud et Gay, 1959, p. 88.

277 PG 31, 889-1428. The outstanding quality of the Rules of Basil is their scriptural foundation and spirit.

278 Vide BOUYER, L. The Spirituality of the Middle Ages, A History of Christian Spirituality (2), London, Burns & Oates, 1968 (a translation of LECLERCQ, J., VANDENBROUCHE, F., BOUYER, L. La Spiritualite du Moyen Age, Paris, Aubier, 1961) p. 557. Vide ibid., pp. 547-590, for a stimulating essay on 'Byzantine Spirituality'. A competent treatment of 'Erudite monasticism' is to be found in Id. The Spirituality of the New Testament and the Fathers, A History of Christian Spirituality (1), London, Burns & Oates, 1963 (a translation of La Spiritualite du Nouveau Testament et des Peres, Paris, Aubier, 1960) pp. 331-394.

279 Vide ROUSSE, J. 'Saint Gregoire de Nazianze'. Dictionnaire de Spiritualite. Ascetique et Mystique (6) 962-963. Cf. WINSLOW, D.F. The Dynamics of Salvation, Cambridge, Massachussetts, The Philadelphia Patristic Foundation Ltd., 1979, pp. 147-199.

280 Vide CAVENET, M. 'Saint Gregoire de Nysse'. Dictionnaire de Spiritualite Ascetique et Mystique (6) 1007.

281 Vide DESEILLE, P. 'Epectace'. Dictionnaire de Spiritualite, Ascetique et Mystique (4,1) 785-788. Cf. BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. Komische Liturgie, pp. 352-353.

282 Vide SHERWOOD, P. The Earlier Ambigua of St. Maximus the Confessor, pp. 205-222; DALEY, B.E. 'Apokatastasis and "Honourable Silence" in the Eschatology of Maximus the Confessor'. Maximus Confessor, ed. Heinzer, F. & Schonborn, C. Fribourg, Editions Universitaires, 1982.

283 Vide BOUYER, L. The Spirituality of the New Testament and the Fathers, pp. 395-436.

284 Vide MIONI, E. op. cit. 640.

285 Vide MIONI, E. op. cit. 638. Cf. LECLERCQ, H. 'Laures Palestiniennes'. Dictionnaire d'Archaeologie Chretienne et de Liturgie (8,2) Paris, Letouzey, 1929, 1961-1988.

286 Vide BROCK, S. op. cit. p. 321, n. 4.

287 Vide ADNES, P. 'Hesychasme'. Dictionnaire de Spiritualite, Ascetique et Mystique (7) 381-399.

288 Vide VILLER, M. & OLPHE-GALLIARD, M. 'Ascetisme' Dictionnaire de Spiritualite, Ascetique et Mystique (1) 964-977.

289 It is generally considered to have been written by St. Athanasius since EICHORN, A., in his Athanasii de Vita Ascetica Testimonia Collecta, Halle, 1886, rebutted H. Weingarten's attack.
The text is to be found in PG 26, 835-978. The most recent English version is Athanasius, The Life of Antony and the Letter to Marcellinus, translation, Gregg, R.C. (The Classics of Western Spirituality) London, S.P.C.K. 1980.

290 S. Pachomii Vitae graecae, (Subsidia hagiographica 19) ed. Halkin, E., Brussels, 1932; LEFORT, T.H. Les Vies coptes de S. Pachome et de ses premiers successeurs, (Bibliotheque du Museon 16) Louvain, 1943.

291 PG 65, 71-440 gives the 'Alphabetical Collection', which is supplemented by GUY, J.-C. Recherches sur la Tradition Grecque des Apophthegmata Patrum (Subsidia hagiographica 36) Brussels, 1962. The 'Anonymous Sayings' are to be found partially published by Nau, F. Revue de l'Orient Chretien, (12-14) 1907-9, (17-18) 1912-13. A Latin version of the 'Systematic Collection' is available in PL 73, 851-1052. English translations: 'Alphabetical Collection', The Sayings of the Desert Fathers, London, ed. Ward, B., Mowbray, 1975; 'Anonymous Sayings', id. The Wisdom of the Desert Fathers, Oxford, SLG Press, 1975.

292 PL 49, 477-1328 The Conferences are also to be found in Johannis Cassiani Opera, ed. Petschenig, M. (Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 13) Vienna, 1886. French translation: JEAN CASSIEN. Conferences (1,2,3), ed. Pichery, E. (Sources Chretiennes, 67) Paris, Les Editions du Cerf, 1971. For a first class study of Cassian vide CHADWICK, O. John Cassian, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1968.

293 PG 88, 632A-1164A.

294 Scala Paradisi, Gradus 1-3, PG 88, 632A-677B.

295 Ibid., Gradus 7, 801C-823B.

296 Ibid., Gradus 8-23, 823B-980C.

297 Ibid., Gradus 7, 801C-823B.

298 Ibid., Gradus 1-3, 632A-677B.

299 Ibid., Gradus 1-3, 632A-677B and especially Gradus 4, 677C-764B.

300 Ibid., Gradus 26, 1013A-1096C.

301 Ibid., Gradus 27-29, 1096C-1153D. The whole work culminates in a splendidly sane recommendation of the three theological virtues, faith, hope and charity: Gradus 30.

302 Ibid., 1112C.

303 Ibid.

304 Vide COUILLEAU, G. 'Saint Jean Climaque'. Dictionnaire de Spiritualite, Ascetique et Mystique (8) 369-389, for a splendid monograph on John Climacus.

305 PL 21, 387-462.

306 Vide BOUYER, L. The spirituality of the New Testament and the Fathers for a comprehensive description of 'developments and counter-currents', pp. 422-454.

307 Vide COUILLEAU, G. op. cit. 382. COUILLEAU quotes VOLKER, W. Scala Paradisi. Eine Studie zu Johannes Climacus und zugleich eine Vorstudie zu Symeon dem neuen Theologen, Wiesbaden, 1968, as holding that the principal formative influence on Climacus was the school of Gaza, represented by Dorotheus, Barsanuphius and Isaiah of Scete.

308 JAEGER, W. Two Rediscovered Works of Ancient Christian Literature: Gregory of Nyssa and Macarius, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1954. Vide QUASTEN, J. Patrology (3) Utrecht/Antwerp, Spectrum Publishers, 1960, pp. 162-166; ibid., pp. 273-275.

309 Vide KIRCHMEYER, J. in Orientalia Christiana Periodica, 1962, pp. 418-421 (quoted by GARRIGUES, J.M. Maxime le Confesseur, la charite avenir divine de l'homme, p. 45, n.10).

310 Vide COUILLEAU, G. op. cit. 382.

311 Vide PLACES, E. DES. 'Diadoque de Photice'. Dictionnaire de Spiritualite, Ascetique et Mystique (3) 817-834; DESPREZ, V. 'Pseudo-Macaire (Symeon)'. Ibid. (10) 39-40.

312 Vide GARRIGUES, J.M. Saint Maxime le Confesseur, la charite avenir divin de l'homme, p. 45, n. 10.

313 Vide Qu. Thal. 6, PG 90, 280C-281B; 63, ibid., 665A-688B; 64, 693A-728D for the themes of baptism and ascesis, the ecclesial mystery of collaboration with the Holy Spirit and charity as divinisation, respectively.

314 PG 91, 1427A-1469C. DISDIER, M.-TH. 'Le temoignage spirituel de Thalassius le Lybien'. Etudes byzantines (2) 1944, pp. 79-118, argues that Maximus was undoubtedly influenced by Thalassius. For an elegant translation of the 'Centuries' of Thalassius vide The Philokalia (2) ed. Palmer, G.E.H., Sherrard, P., Ware, K., London & Boston, Faber & Faber, 1981, pp. 307-332.

315 Vide BOUYER, L. The Spirituality of the New Testament and the Fathers. pp. 369-380.

316 BROCK, S. op. cit. p. 315.

317 Ibid., p. 321-322, n. 7.

318 Vide GARRIGUES, J.M. 'La Personne Composee du Christ d'apres S. Maxime le Confesseur', p. 188.

319 PG 91, 364A-392B.

320 PG 91, 392D-408A.

321 PG 91, 408C-412C.

322 PG 91, 413A-420C.

323 PG 90, 912A-956D.

324 PG 90, 960A-1073A. English translation: SHERWOOD, P. St. Maximus the Confessor. The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on Charity, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1955.

325 PG 90, 1084A-1173A.

326 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'L'Oeuvre spirituelle de Saint Maxime le Confesseur'. Supplement de la Vie Spirituelle (21) 1952, p. 225. Vide Id. 'Saint Maxime le Confesseur et la crise de l'origenisme monastique'. Theologie de la Vie Monastique, Paris, Editions Montaigne, 1961, pp. 411-421. The fundamental study of the relationship between the teaching of St. Maximus and that of Evagrius Ponticus is VILLER, M. 'Aux sources de la spiritualite de saint Maxime, Les oeuvres d'Evagre le Pontique'. Revue d' Ascetique et de Mystique (11) 1930, pp. 156-184;

239-268. The contrasts between the teaching of the two authors, not noted by VILLER, have been emphasized by other scholars, especially by DALMAIS in the articles cited above and in 'La doctrine ascetique de S. Maxime le Confesseur d'apres le Liber Asceticus'. Irenikon (26) 1953, pp. 34-36. Vide SHERWOOD, P. op. cit. pp. 91-97.

327 PG 90, 912A.

328 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'La doctrine ascetique de S. Maxime le Confesseur d'apres le Liber Asceticus', pp. 17-39. Vide also SHERWOOD, P. St. Maximus the Confessor. The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on Charity, pp. 28-99.

329 Ascet. PG 90, 920A-924D.

330 Ibid., 924D.

331 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'L'Oeuvre spirituelle de Saint Maxime le Confesseur', p. 225.

332 Vide HAUSHERR, I. 'Centuries'. Dictionnaire de Spiritualite, Ascetique et Mystique (2,1) 416-418.

333 Vide GUILLAUMONT, A. & C. 'Evagre le Pontique'. Dictionnaire de Spiritualite, Ascetique et Mystique (4,2) 1737-1741.

334 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Saint Maxime le Confesseur et la crise de l'origenisme monastique', pp. 413-414.

335 Vide SHERWOOD, P. St. Maximus the Confessor, The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on Charity, p. 261, n.187; p. 262, n.188., and passim.

336 Carit. 4, 70, PG 90, 1065A.

337 Ibid., 69, PG 90, 1064D-1065A.

338 Ibid., 73, PG 90, 1065BC.

339 Ibid., 76, PG 90, 1068A.

340 Ibid., 77, PG 90, 1068AB.

341 Ibid., 3. 93, PG 90, 1045B.

342 Ibid.

343 Gal. 2, 20.

344 Carit. 2. 29, PG 90, 992D-993B.

345 Gal. 3, 28.

346 Carit. 2. 30, PG 90, 993B.

347 Carit. 4. 90, PG 90, 1069C. Cf. Or. Dom. PG 90, 893B; ibid. 900D-901D; 904D; Ascet. PG 90, 921A-C; Ep. 2, PG 91, 396C. Vide SHERWOOD, P. op. cit. pp. 55-63; DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Le vocabulaire des activites intellectuelles, volontaires et spirituelles dans l'anthropologie de S. Maxime le Confesseur'. Melanges offerts au P. M.-D. Chenu, Paris, Vrin, 1967, pp. 193-197; MEYENDORFF, J. 'Free Will in Saint Maximus the Confessor'. The Ecumenical World of Orthodox Civilization, ed. Blane, A., The Hague/Paris, Mouton, 1974, pp. 71-75.

348 SHERWOOD, P. An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, p. 26. DALMAIS, I.-H. 'L'Oeuvre spirituelle de Saint Maxime le Confesseur', pp. 220-225; 'La doctrine ascetique de S. Maxime le Confesseur d'apres le Liber Asceticus' pp. 31-32; 'Maxime le Confesseur'. Dictionnaire de Spiritualite Ascetique et Mystique (10) 838-839 contests this view, although he has shifted the probable date of composition from the end of Maximus' life to 'the time of the exile'. If we agreed with Sherwood, then we find in Maximus a theologian and writer of remarkable consistency, whose teaching had from an early phase the homogeneity of a man who has achieved remarkable integrity. This does not seem improbable for any known reason. Besides, Maximus was no beardless youth in 626. If he were writing in a more tortuous style in another genre at the same period, it would mean nothing more wonderful than that he was capable of relinquishing a style that is marked by the gropings of an intellectual explorer to set down what he knew already with clarity and precision. Arguments from style alone are a fragile way of establishing chronology in the case of Maximus, as DALMAIS concedes and points out with regard to the opinions of Disdier and Lot-Borodine (L'oeuvre spirituelle de Saint Maxime le Confesseur' p. 221).

349 SHERWOOD, P. An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, p. 35.

350 Ibid.

351 BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. 'Die Gnostischen Centurien'. Komische Liturgie, pp. 488-503. We have already noted that VON BALTHASAR has modified his views on the Origenist temptation of Maximus, even if only slightly.

352 Ep. 12, PG 91, 465C.

353 Vide Pyrr. PG 91, 288A-353B; Disputatio Bizyae, PG 90, 136D-172B.

354 SHERWOOD, P. An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, p. 25.

355 PG 91, 393, n(d).

356 SHERWOOD, P. op. cit. p. 25. Vide Id. St. Maximus the Confessor, The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on Charity, pp. 55-63.

357 Ep. 2. PG 91, 401D.

358 Ibid., 396CD.

359 Ibid., 400CD.

360 Ibid., 396D-397A.

361 Ibid.

362 Ibid., 397BC.

363 Ibid., 404BC.

364 Ibid.

365 Ibid., 400B.

366 Ibid., 404CD.

367 Ibid., 401B.

368 Vide GARRIGUES, J.M. 'L'energie divine et la grace chez Maxime le Confesseur'. Istina, 1974,3, pp. 272-296.

369 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Saint Maxime le Confesseur, Docteur de la Charite'. La Vie Spirituelle (333) 1948, p. 294. The author provides an excellent translation of Epistola II, pp. 296-303.

## CHAPTER III - FOOTNOTES

1 PG 90, 872D-909A. From now on this work will be referred to as the Pater Noster.

2 We have attempted to show this in Chapter I. For a fuller exposition of this theme vide GARRIGUES, J.M. Maxime le Confesseur, La Charite, Avenir Divin de l' Homme, pp. 35-82. DOUCET, M. 'Vues Recentes sur les "Metamorphoses" de la Pensee de Saint Maxime le Confesseur'. Science et Esprit (31, 3) 1979, provides well-aimed criticism of GARRIGUES' views.

3 Bibliothecae Codices 192, PG 103, 645BC.

4 PG 90, 872D-909A.

5 A Patristic Greek Lexicon, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961 (ed. Lampe, G.W.H.)

6 THUNBERG, L. Microcosm and Mediator, passim.

7 ARISTOTLE. Analytica Posteriora, 1, 1, $71^{a7-8}$ (ed. Bekker).

8 Ibid., 1, 2, $71^{b9}$-$72^{b4}$; 1, 18, $81^{a38}$-$81^{b9}$.

9 Ibid., 1, 32, $88^{a18}$-$88^{b29}$.

10 Summa Theologiae, 1a,1, 2.

11 LONERGAN, J.F.B. Insight, London, Darton Longman & Todd, 1973, p. 292.

12 It would be mistaken to assume that this style of theology necessarily leads to sterile rationalism. Aquinas reminds us that faith 'transforms the water of human intelligence into the wine of divine understanding' (In Boeth. De Trin. q2, a2, ad 5), a process that assumes that theology is guided not alone by the axiom: fides quaerens intellectum, but also that it accepts the demands of crede ut intelligas. Nor must we underplay the function of affectivity in this kind of theology, both as a tension towards understanding that energizes the exploration of what God has said and as the presupposition of passive knowledge of divine things, noted in the famous contrast of Dionysius: οὐ μόνον μαθὼν ἀλλὰ καὶ παθὼν τὰ θεῖα. (De Div. Nom. 2, PG 3, 648B). Vide COLLINGS, R. Passivity in the Spiritual Life, Oxford, 1978, pp. 9-50 (an unpublished thesis).

13 PG 91, 288B-353B.

14 RAHNER, K. 'The Spiritual Senses according to Origen'. Theological Investigations (16) London, Darton, Longman & Todd, 1979 (a translation of Schriften zur Theologie 12,1, Einsiedeln, by Morland, D.) pp. 81-103.

15 PG 91, 1248A. The formulation of the teaching on the spiritual senses here does provide some problems, since the inner senses mentioned are not all noetic, nor even 'spiritual', strictly speaking, but they square neatly with the five bodily senses and give a comprehensive view of inwardness in terminology taken from the anthropological teaching of Maximus. Experience can come through appetency and because of the fundamental place of will in mysticism, we should not be surprised that Maximus can find volitional modalities in terms of taste and touch. In this context he does speak of ἁπτική , γευστική and ἀσφραντική as properties of spiritual concupiscible and aggressive appetency. Besides, taste and touch, while being less specific from a cognitional point of view than the other senses, do give a strong impression of intimate experience and are used by the mystics to convey this. DANIELOU, J. Origen, pp. 307-309, does not think that any more than 'a set of metaphors denoting spiritual experience' is at stake in the teaching of Origen.

16 We should recall that Origen hit on his doctrine of spiritual sense through reflection on Heb. 5, 14 and Prov. 2, 5 and gave it a characteristic interpretation: 'the solid food' is the nourishment of the 'perfect'; they are capable of a higher kind of knowledge, because of their 'sense for the divine'. Vide RAHNER, K. op. cit. p. 83.

17 DALMAIS, I.H. 'Le vocabulaire des activites intellectuelles, volontaires et spirituelles dans l'anthropologie de S. Maxime le Confesseur'. Melanges au P. M.-D Chenu, Paris, Vrin, 1967, p. 193.

18 ARISTOTLE. Ethica Nicomachea, 2, 4, $1105^{b19-23}$ (ed. Bekker).

19 JOHN OF THE CROSS, [redacted] 'Cantico Espiritual'. Vida y Obras de San Juan de la Cruz, Madrid, Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1950, Prologo, p. 736.

20 LUBAC, H. DE, The Sources of Revelation, New York, Herder & Herder (a translation of L'Ecriture dans la Tradition, Paris, 1967, by O. Neill, L.) p. 12.

21 KNIGHTS, L.C. 'Theology and Poetry'. Theology and the University, (ed. Coulson, J.) London, Darton Longman & Todd, 1964, pp. 207-218; LEWIS, C.S. The Allegory of Love, London, Oxford University Press, 1936, pp. 44-48; HOUGH, G. A Preface to the Faerie Queene, London, Duckworth, 1962, pp. 100-111 provide interesting analogies for the working of symbolism in mystical writing.

22 LONERGAN, J.F.B. op. cit. p. 292.

23 A study of the Pater Noster in the light of the teaching of the Greeks on Rhetoric and Poetry would yield interesting clues to the genre of Maximus' work. It should be noted, however, that the patristic principle of human individuation gives us more confidence in ways of knowing that are not strictly scientific than the philosopher's notion of the basis of individuality. Personal knowledge, for being individual, is not a less valid way than ἐπιστήμη to a noetic appropriation of being. LONERGAN, J.F.B. op. cit. pp. 173-244 handles 'common sense' and modes of description in a way that throws a lot of light on this. The same can be said of his treatment of aesthetic and interpersonal ways of knowing. Vide ibid. RULAND, V. 'Understanding the Rhetoric of the Theologians'. Semeia (13) 1978, pp. 203-225 has incisive observations to make on this matter; however, the implications of his distinction between an 'activist' and a 'contemplative' silence should be taken with a grain of salt. For the background to Maximus' cultural formation vide MARROU, H.I. A History of Education in Antiquity, London, Sheed & Ward, 1956 (a translation of Histoire de l'Education dans l'Antiquite, Paris, 1948, by Lamb, G.); BOLGAR, R.R. The Classical Heritage and its Beneficiaries, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1954, pp. 1-90.

24 Myst. PG 91, 669D.

25 Cap. Theol. 2, 14, PG 90, 1132A.

26 Or. Dom. PG 90, 884AB.

27 MATHEW, A.G. Byzantine Aesthetics, London, John Murray, 1963, p. 3.

28 Ibid., p. 26: 'In a close study of any Byzantine work of art, it is perhaps worth looking for the proportion of three to two or six to one'.

29 πόθος + φόβος = εὔνοια + αἰδώς = ἀγάπη ;

φόβος - πόθος = μίσος ; πόθος - φόβος = καταφρόνησις ;

νόμος ἐνδιάθετος στοργῆς = ἀγάπη ; ν. μίσος, καταφρόνησις·

∴ νόμος ἀγάπης = { αἰδώς ν. καταφρόνησις,
εὔνοια ν. μίσος.

30 Cf. MC NICHOLL, A. Structuralism, Rome, Pontificia Universita di S. Tommaso, 1975, pp. 183-196.

31 This pair is fundamental to understanding the doctrine of Maximus. Vide RIOU, A. Le Monde et l'Eglise selon Maxime le Confesseur, pp. 73-79 and passim; GARRIGUES, J.M. Maxime le Confesseur, La Charite, Avenir Divin de l'Homme, pp. 100-112 and passim; LETHEL, F.-M. Theologie de l'Agonie du Christ (Theologie Historique 52) Paris, Editions Beauchesnes, 1979, pp. 75-85; HEINZER, F. Gottes Sohn als Mensch, Freiburg, Universitatsverlag Freiburg Schweiz, 1980, pp. 29-148.

32 The Enneads, 6, 7, 22, translated by MacKenna, S., London, Faber & Faber, 1952.

33 Vide DALMAIS, I.H. 'Un Traite de Theologie Contemplative, Le Commentaire du Pater de S. Maxime le Confesseur'. Revue d'Ascetique et de Mystique (29) 1953, p. 125.

# CHAPTER IV - FOOTNOTES

1 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Maxime le Confesseur'. Dictionnaire de Spiritualite Ascetique et Mystique, Doctrines et Histoire (10) 839-840.

2 PG 90, 873A.8; ibid. A.12; ibid. B.2; ibid. B.6; ibid. B.8; ibid. B.12; ibid. C.2.

3 PG 90, 908C.10; ibid. D.3.

4 PG 90, 905C.11.

5 PG 90, 908A5; ibid. B.1.

6 PG 90, 885C.4; ibid. D.1.

7 The term is used in a Origenian-Evagrian sense.

8 Vide BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. Komische Liturgie: Das Westbild Maximus des Bekenners, pp. 12-13, where he modifies his earlier view of the 'Origenist' phase of Maximus' development. SHERWOOD, P. The Earlier Ambigua of St. Maximus the Confessor, seems to have completely undermined the original thesis of VON BALTHASAR.

9 Vide RIOU, A. Le monde et l'Eglise selon Maxime le Confesseur, pp. 73-121.

10 Vide GARRIGUES, J.M. Maxime le Confesseur, la charite avenir d vin de l'homme, pp. 100 ff.

11 Loc. cit.

12 He is addressed as δεσπότης , a title for one in either civil or ecclesiastical authority. But there are no references in the text to such obligations so that we can presume that Maximus is addressing his correspondent primarily as a spiritual master. It would be pleasant to think that both kinds of authority were combined in Sophronius. The reference to συγκατάβασις would then take on new vitality, as it was a central idea in the theology of Sophronius. (Vide SCHONBORN, C. VON. Sophrone de Jerusalem, vie monastique et confession dogmatique, pp. 123, 127, 142, 164).

13 PG 90, 873C. The structure of this section has been examined in Chapter III.

14 Cf. CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. Paedagogus. PG 8, 321A; ibid. 1,9. PG 8, 353B.

15 Cf. CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. Stromateis. 7,7. PG 9, 456B; ibid. 8,1. PG 9, 561A.

16 Cf. BASIL. Sermones Ascetici, 2,2. PG 31, 885B; Regulae Fusius Tractatae, 3,2. PG 31, 917C; Ep. 70, PG 32, 433C; Ep. 203, PG 32, 741A. GREGORY OF NYSSA. De Hominis Opificio, 5. PG 44, 137C; Homiliae in Cant. 5. PG 44, 857D; ibid. 13. PG 44, 1044B. DIONYSIUS the pseudo-Areopagite. De Divinis Nominibus, 4,14. PG 3, 712C. For a splendid treatment of disinterested love in the teaching of Maximus vide HAUSHERR, I. Philautie,De la tendresse pour soi a la charite, selon saint Maxime le Confesseur. (Orientalia Christiana Analecta 137) Rome, Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1952.

17 PG 90, 873A.

18 Cf. JUSTIN MARTYR. Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo. PG 6, 492D. Vide LIDDELL & SCOTT, A Greek - English Lexicon under δέος where it is distinguished from φόβος.

19 PG 90, 873B.

20 It is the intention of the spirituality of Maximus to root man in the immutable and the incorruptible, τό ἀεί εἶναι It is a dimension of θέωσις . The 'corruptible' is bound up with matter and man's liability to be drawn into the vortex of the material through passion. So the epithet ἀδιαφθόρως is heavy with associations and qualifies ἀγάπη , which is man's way of being emancipated from the tendency to nothingness, that is bound into creaturehood for the Fathers. Through ἀγάπη man enters the realm of the divine, above the transient and caducous condition of creation cut off from God. Through the action of God in Christ, he is anchored to permanence, destined to last 'from age to age'.

21 This distinction, which is derived from the Trinitarian theology of the Cappadocians, is found throughout the works of Maximus and is one of his fundamental insights and theological tools. It has had many commentators. The most recent scholar to elaborate this distinction is HEINZER, F. Gottes Sohn als Mensch, as we pointed out in Chapter III - Footnotes, n. 31.

22 Cf. CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. Stromateis, 1,26. PG 8, 916A; ibid. 7,3 PG 9, 421A. DIONYSIUS the pseudo-Areopagite. De Caelesti Hierarchia 4,3. PG 3, 181A; De Divinis Nominibus, 2.9. PG 3, 648A.

23 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'La theorie des "Logoi" des creatures chez S. Maxime lr Confesseur'. Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques (36) 1952, pp. 244-249; 'La manifestation du Logos dans l'homme et dans l'Eglise'. Maximus Confessor ed. by Heinzer, F. & Schönborn, C., Fribourg, Editions Universitaires, 1982, pp. 13-25.

24 Cf. Expositio Orationis Dominicae, PG 90, 904B-905B.

25 Vide HEINZER, F. op. cit. pp. 162-198.

26 Vide GARRIGUES, J.M. Maxime le Confesseur, la charite avenir divine de l'homme, pp. 176-186.

27 PG 90, 873B.

28 For a stimulating study of the numinous in general, vide OTTO, R. The Idea of the Holy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1923. For an analysis of mysterium tremendum, vide pp. 12-31. The author's Lutheran culture and Kantian philosophical presuppositions should not be allowed to drop out of sight.

29 Vide LOSSKY, V. The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, pp. 7-43; The Vision of God, London, The Faith Press, 1963, pp. 99-110; In the Image and Likeness of God, London & Oxford, Mowbrays, 1975, pp. 13-43.

30 For a useful summary of Maximus' teaching on agape, vide SHERWOOD, P. The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on Charity, pp. 91-97. GARRIGUES, J.M. Maxime le Confesseur, la charite avenir divine de l'homme is the most thorough study of this aspect of Maximus' teaching.

31 PG 90, 873C.

32 Other passages in the maximian corpus corroborate this interpretation of the Prologue passage of the Pater Noster. In Qu. Thal. 10 (PG 90, 287A-292C) Maximus sets himself the task of reconciling the two fears in a commentary on Matt. 10, 28 and Pss. 19, 9 & 88, 8. He admits that it is necessary to enquire how ἀγάπη casts out φόβος if it remains from age to age and how God remains φοβερός to endless ages. He recalls the distinction between a fear that is 'chaste' and fear that is not. The non-chaste fear has its source in sin and expects punishment. That will disappear with penitence. This fear makes man look on God as Judge (cf. Or. Dom. PG 90, 904D). The 'chaste' fear remains always without the memory of sin; it is rooted in an appreciation of the natural dignity of God's eminence. 'He therefore who does not fear God as a judge, but reveres him because of the eminence of his infinite power, justly nothing will be lacking to him, being perfect in charity, loving God with the reverence and veneration that befit Him. This man has acquired the fear that lasts from age to age and absolutely nothing remains to him to acquire'. In Carit. 1, 81 we find: 'There is a twofold fear of God: the one takes its rise in us from threats of punishment; because of it are engendered in us in due order self-control, patience, hope in God and liberty of spirit and from these comes charity; the other is joined with charity itself and constantly produces respect (εὐλάβεια) in the soul, lest because of the bold freedom of charity, it come to contempt for God' (Sherwood's translation, slightly modified). Cf. Carit. 1, 82. The points of contact with the Pater Noster passage under consideration are obvious. Εὐλάβεια is interchangeable with εἶδος In fact, Evagrius, always a quarry for terminology with Maximus, uses if of fear that is distinct from servile fear and is expressed in prayer towards God (PG 79, 1176B). It has overtones of caution, restraint and discretion, all qualities associated with εἶδος In the Centuries

charity casts out the lower kind of fear, but not before it has been instrumental in engendering virtues that release the play of charity in man's life. This has affinities with the role of compunction in Liber Asceticus (PG 90, 932C). In reply to the Brother's concern with his lack of compunction the Old Man accounts for its absence 'because there is no fear of God before our eyes, because we have become the resting place of all evils, and, for that reason, we scorn as a mere thought the dreadful punishment of God' (Sherwood). The Old Man is obviously linking fear with punishment and so speaking of the non-chaste fear. But this is the source of compunction which sets in train the radical conversion of man and which is so finely described in the latter part of Liber Asceticus. Dalmais has pointed out that Maximus' interpretation of the scriptural texts on love and fear is the first instance of that exegesis in the East. Both St. Augustine and St. Gregory the Great wrote on this subject and this raises the question of the possibility of Augustinian influence on Maximus and the slight chance of Maximus having met Gregory when he went to Constantinople. (Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Un Traite de Theologie Contemplative, Le Commentaire du Pater de S. Maxime le Confesseur'. p. 127).

33 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Un traite de theologie contemplative, le commentaire du Pater Noster de S. Maxime le Confesseur'. p. 126.

34 As we mentioned above, n. 12, συγκατάβασις is a basic idea with Sophronius. We find it playing an important part in Maximus' own thought about the Incarnation. Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1041D. But the use goes back to Athanasius. Vide ATHANASIUS. Orationes Tres Adversus Arianos, 2, 62. PG 26, 280A; ibid. 4, 31. PG 26, 516C. Vide etiam DIDYMUS THE BLIND. Contra Eunomium Libri, 5, (int. opp. Bas.) PG 29, 716A; GREGORY OF NYSSA. Contra Eunomium, 6. PG 45, 716C; LEONTIUS OF BYZANTIUM. Adversus Argumenta Severi. PG 86, 1940A.

35 Vide Ascet. PG 90, 940B; Qu. Thal. PG 90, 657D; Ambig. PG 91, 1081D; ibid. 1032B.

36 PG 90, 873A.5.

37 For an excellent treatment of this theme, vide GARRIGUES, J.M. Maxime le Confesseur. La charite avenir divin de l'homme, pp. 112-152. Cf. RIOU, A. Le monde et l'Eglise selon Maxime le Confesseur. pp. 123-135.

38 Vide Ep. 2, PG 91, 393C. For a magisterial presentation of the teaching of Maximus on the perfection of man through Christ, vide BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. Liturgie Cosmique, pp. 209-278. PP. 215-221 and 253-265 are particularly relevant.

39 For a synthesis of Maximus' teaching on ἀγάπη vide Ep. 2, PG 91, 392D-408B.

40 PG 90, 908C.10; ibid. D.3.

41 PG 90, 908A.5; ibid. B.1.

42 PG 90, 885B.9; ibid. 888B.11; ibid. 893B.15; ibid. 896A.6. Some of the uses are associated with the idea of humility, derived from the Gospels, but the structure of the Pater Noster gives πραότης striking prominence, so that we are justified in thinking that Maximus sees it as a fundamental and comprehensive attitude to God as well as to man. Perhaps 'disponibility', an awkward but pertinent term, suggests what he means. Πρᾶος occurs seven times in the Pater Noster: PG 90, 885B.11; ibid. 888A.8; ibid. 888B.3; ibid. 888B.8; ibid. 893C.2; ibid. 893C.3; ibid. 893C.5.

43 Γνώμη occurs twenty four times in the Pater Noster, including its inflected forms. This indicates the habitual character of Maximus thinking; he is constantly concerned with man's freedom, and so with what frees him to be truly free: ἀγάπη As we have seen, Maximus would restrict the use of γνώμη later on, when it was associated with fallibility and so had to be excluded from the terminology attributable to Christ. Vide SHERWOOD, P. The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on Charity, pp. 55-63. The finest treatment of the whole question of will in the teaching of Maximus is DOUCET, M. La Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus, Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes (an unpublished thesis) Montreal, 1972. A splendid essay on the emergence of the notion of the will can be found in MADDEN, J.D. 'The Authenticity of Early Definitions of Will (thelēsis)'. Maximus Confessor. Fribourg, 1982.

44 Προαίρεσις occurs four times, and προαιρετικός once, in the Pater Noster.

45 Vide Expositio Orationis Dominicae PG 90, 901D.

46 ATHANASIUS. De Incarnatione Verbi, 3,21; ibid., 7,26; ibid., 11,14.

47 Vide Qu. Thal.. PG 90, 364A; Carit. 4, 3, PG 90, 1048C.

48 Vide THUNBERG, L. Microcosm and Mediator, The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor, pp. 76-84.

49 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 317BC.

50 Vide Cap. Theol. 2, 23, PG 90, 1136A.

51 For parallel treatment of this theme vide SCHONBORN, C.VON. Sophrone de Jerusalem: vie monastique et confession dogmatique, pp. 119-156.

52 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Divinisation'. Dictionnaire de Spiritualite, Ascetique et Mystique (3) 1370-1389.

53 Vide Cap. Theol. 2, 23, PG 90, 1136A.

54 Ibid.

55 Or. Dom. PG 90, 873CD.

56 Ambig. PG 91, 1116B; ibid., 1392A.

57 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 317BC.

58 Ibid.

59 Cap. Theol. 2, 23, PG 90, 1136A.

60 The σοφός of the Pater Noster (873D) is reproduced as σοφία in Qu. Thal. (317B). For an indication of how Maximus understands the function of wisdom in the life of the individual and the life of the Church, vide Myst. PG 91, 672D-681D.

61 Ambig. PG 91, 1133A-1137C.

62 Ibid., 1133A.

63 Ibid., 1133B.

64 Ibid., 1133D-1136A.

65 Vide SHERWOOD, P. The Earlier Ambigua of St Maximus the Confessor, pp. 36-37 and 144ff.

66 Ambig. PG 91, 1133C.

67 Ibid., 1133CD.

68 Ibid., 1136A.

69 Ibid.

70 Cf. THUNBERG, L. op.cit. p. 74.

71 Ambig. PG 91, 1136A.

72 Ibid., 1136AB.

73 The most recent treatment of this theme is to be found in HEINZER, F. Gottes Sohn als Mensch; vide especially pp. 132-145 and 171-198.

74 Carit. 4, 17, PG 90, 1052B. This union, brought about by Providence, is dealt with in the Pater Noster as the harmony of γνώμη and λόγος φύσεως . Vide Or. Dom. PG 90, 900B-904B.

75 Ambig. PG 91, 1281D-1284A.

76 THUNBERG, L. op. cit. p. 75.

77 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 501C.

78 Ibid., 517D.

79 Ibid., 681D.

80 Ibid.

81 Ambig. PG 91, 1133D-1136A.

82 Vide BALTHASAR, H.U. VON. Liturgie Cosmique, pp. 71-80; DALMAIS, I.-H. 'La theorie des "Logoi" des creatures chez Maxime le Confesseur'. Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques (36) 1952, pp. 244-249.

83 Ambig. PG 91, 1084B.

84 Ibid.

85 Ambig. PG 91, 1133D-1136A. Vide STANILOAE, D. Hagiou Maximou: Philosophika kai theologika erotemata(1) pp.13-89.

86 ATHANASIUS. De Incarnatione Verbi, 54, PG 25, 192B.

87 DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Divinisation'. Dictionnaire de Spiritualite, Ascetique et Mystique (3) 1380-1385.

88 DIONYSIUS the Pseudo-Areopagite. De Eccl. Hier. 1,3, PG 3, 376A.

89 Ibid., 2.2,1; ibid., 6.3,5, PG 3, 393A and 536C.

90 Ibid., 1.2, PG 3, 373A.

91 Ep. 24, PG 91, 609C.

92 Vide THUNBERG, L. op. cit. pp. 127-129; GARRIGUES, J.M. Maxime le Confesseur, la charite avenir divin de l'homme, pp. 113-199.

93 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1345D; ibid., 1348A-D. For an account of this aspect of Maximus' teaching, vide RIOU, A. Le monde et l'Eglise selon Maxime le Confesseur, pp. 125-135.

94 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 612AB; Ambig. PG 91, 1316D; Ambig. PG 91, 1317B Ambig. PG 91, 1344D.

95 Vide SHERWOOD, P. St. Maximus the Confessor, The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on Charity, p. 72.

96 Ambig. PG 91, 1088C.

97 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 333A.

98 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 725C; Ep. 2, PG 91, 405A.

99 Vide GARRIGUES, M.-J. Maxime le Confesseur, la charite avenir divin de l'homme, pp. 176-199.

100 Ambig. PG 91, 1113BC.

101 DENZIGER-SCHONMETZER. Enchiridion Symbolorum Definitionum et Declarationum, n. 302.

102 Ep. 13, PG 91, 524D-525A.

103 Ibid.

104 Opusc. 9, PG 91, 121A.

105 Ibid.

106 Vide GARRIGUES, J.-M. op. cit. pp. 107-112.

107 Vide HEINZER, F. op. cit. p. 76, where he points out that the ἰδιώματα refer to the material aspect of hypostatic individuality, while subsistence refers to its formal aspect. The formal aspect ensures one subsistence, the material aspect allows two sets of ἰδιώματα.

108 Ambig. PG 91, 1056A.

109 Ibid.

110 Ibid.

111 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 608C-609A; Ambig. Pg 91, 1053B. For a discussion of this vide THUNBERG, L. op. cit. pp. 21-37.

112 Opusc. 7, PG 91, 88A.

113 Opusc. 8, PG 91, 97A.

114 CYRIL of Alexandria. In Joann. 4, PG 73, 577CD.

115 Opusc. 8, PG 91, 101AB.

116 Opusc. 7, PG 91, 85C.

117 Ambig. PG 91, 1056A.

118 Ambig. PG 91, 1084CD; ibid., 1113BC; ibid. 1288A.

119 SHERWOOD, P. op. cit. p. 72.

120 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 621BC.

121 Ibid., 621C.

122 Cf. DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Maxime le Confesseur'. Dictionnaire de Spiritualite, Ascetique et Mystique (10) 845.

123 Ambig. PG 91, 1273D-1275D.

124 Ambig. PG 91, 1316D; ibid., 1344D.

125 Vide a useful schematization of maximian texts on this subject: Ambig. PG 1317D-1320A; Qu. Thal. PG 90, 312B-316D; ibid., 405B-409A; Ep. 2, PG 91, 396C-401C in RIOU, A. Le monde et l'Eglise selon Maxime le Confesseur, p. 84.

126 For the Incarnation, Death, Resurrection and Ascension vide, e.g. Ambig. PG 91, 1334BC; for Baptism, Ambig. PG 91, 1348AB. See DOUCET, M. 'Vues Recentes sur les "Metamorphoses" de la Pensee de Saint Maxime le Confesseur' pp. 271-273 for discussion on the precise significance of the Baptism of Christ in our regard.

127 Ambig. PG 91, 1304D-1308D.

128 Vide GARRIGUES, J.-M. Maxime le Confesseur, la charite avenir divin de l'homme, pp. 153-175.

129 Vide HEINZER, F. op. cit. pp. 171-181.

130 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 636B-D.

131 Vide HEINZER, F. op. cit. pp. 181-198 for a perceptive account of this theme in Maximus.

132 Ep. 44, PG 91, 644B; Opusc. 20, PG 91, 241A-C; for the cognate προτυπώσας vide Ep. 2, PG 91, 404C.

133 Vide RIOU, A. op. cit. pp. 123-200.

134 Vide GARRIGUES, J.-M. 'L'energie divine et la grace chez Maxime le Confesseur'. Istina, 1974, pp. 277-296. For περιχώρησις in this context vide e.g. Ambig. PG 91, 1308B.

135 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 260B; Carit. 3.56,57. Cf. HAUSHERR, S. Philautie, De la tendresse pour soi a la charite, selon saint Maxime le Confesseur, pp. 93-109.

136 Vide GARRIGUES, J.-M. op. cit. pp. 180-199.

137 Ibid. Cf. RIOU, A. op. cit. pp. 125-135.

138 Ep. 24. PG 91, 609C; Ambig. PG 91, 1097C; Ascet. PG 90, 953B.

139 Vide SHERWOOD, P. St. Maximus the Confessor, The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries of Charity, pp. 73-77; RIOU, A. op. cit. pp. 135-170.

140 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1217A; Cap. Theol. 2, PG 90, 1084A.

141 BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. Liturgie Cosmique, p. 159.

142 Ibid.

143 Ibid., p. 160. In Opusc. 14, PG 91, 149B, Maximus says: 'The essence and the nature are the same thing'.

144 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1136A.

145 'Not only that which is subject to generation and corruption is moved according to generation and corruption, for the οὐσία of things taken in its simple sense was in movement, and is always, according to the mode of expansion and contraction ( διαστολή καί συστολή ) . For it moves itself from the most general through the less restricted genera towards the species, by which, and in which, it is found divided, progressing to the most specific species in which its expansion comes to a halt and which bounds its being below. On the contrary, it is gathered together from the most specific species through the restricted genera in mounting up to the most general genus where its contraction comes to an end, bounding its being above. Thus circumscribed in a twofold way above and below, the οὐσία shows that it possesses a beginning and an end and that it is incapable of infinity' (Ambig. 1177BC). This passage shows that Maximus finds creaturely movement, which is the basis of created φύσις not merely between the genus and the ὑποκείμενον but even within the world of the informing ideas.

146 For the Leontian source of this idea in the teaching of Maximus vide HEINZER, F. op. cit. pp. 70-76.

147 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1057B; ibid., 1078A; Ep. 12, PG 91, 492A.

148 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'La theorie de "Logoi" des creatures chez. S. Maxime le Confesseur. Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques (36) 1952, pp. 244-249.

149 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 637A.

150 Ambig. PG 91, 1057B.

151 Ibid., 1078A.

152 BALTHASAR, H.U.VON, op. cit. p. 98.

153 Cap. Theol. 1, 10, PG 90, 1085D-1088A.

154 Ambig. 1217CD.

155 Vide RIOU, A. Le monde et l'Eglise selon Maxime le Confesseur, p. 51.

156 Carit. 3, 25, PG 90, 1024BC.

157 For the co-ordination of this irreducible pair in the teaching of Maximus, vide RIOU, A. op. cit. pp. 73-121; GARRIGUES, J.-M. Maxime le Confesseur, la charite avenir divin de l'homme, pp. 100-112; LETHEL, F.-M. op. cit. pp. 75-85; HEINZER, F. op. cit. pp. 29-148.

158 Ambig. 1392A.

159 Or. Dom. PG 90, 876A.

160 The reference will be especially to the Ambigua and to the Mystagogia. If we accept that Maximus excludes the use of γνώμη as proper to Christ from A.D. 643 onwards, then we know that the Pater Noster was composed before that date since there gnome is attributed to Christ (877D). We know that the Ambigua and the Mystagogia were composed before that date too and DAMAIS accepts that the Pater Noster is more or less contemporaneous with them, that we cannot be thought to be reading back into the Pater Noster theological implications which are not necessarily there. We have already intimated some uneasiness with the dramatization of the development of Maximus' thought by RIOU and GARRIGUES, but that does not undermine a policy of reference to the works in which they find such abrupt development. We have already referred to DOUCET'S critique of their views. If we accept the dating of SHERWOOD, which is still basically unchallenged, then the Pater Noster, having been written in 628-630 was more or less contemporaneous with the Mystagogia, which is assigned to the same dates and the Ambigua, the composition of which SHERWOOD puts between 628 and 634. Just as DOUCET can find the basic teaching, thought by RIOU and GARRIGUES to be so startlingly new in Ambigua 42, in the earlier Ambigua 7, so we can with reasonable confidence find the same doctrine, at least in outline, in the Pater Noster. Vide DOUCET, M. 'Vue recentes sur les "Metamorphoses" de la pensee de Saint Maxime le Confesseur', pp. 270-274.

161 Ambig. PG 91, 1097BC.

162 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 684A.

163 Cap. Theol. PG 90, 1108AB.

164 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 621B.

165 Ep. 11, PG 91, 456C.

166 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 692B.

167 Ambig. PG 91, 1308D.

168 Ambig. PG 91, 1040B.

169 Ambig. PG 91, 1097C.

170 Or. Dom. PG 90, 897B.

171 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 620C-621A.

172 Ambig. PG 91, 1345BC.

173 Ambig. PG 91, 1341D.

174 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 320BC.

175 Ambig. PG 91, 1308B.

176 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 321A.

177 Ambig. PG 91, 1088C.

178 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 624D.

179 Ambig. PG 91, 1280BC. Cf. Ambig. PG 91, 1385BC. Vide RIOU, A. op. cit. pp. 119-121.

180 GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS, Or. 38.2. PG 36, 313B.

181 Ambig. PG 91, 1280C.

182 Ambig. PG 91, 1289BD.

183 Ambig. PG 91, 1320A.

184 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 316CD. RIOU, op. cit. p. 86, suggests that 'the natural passibility' here means the natural elan towards God. This seems to be far-fetched and unnecessary for a sound translation. Vide the cognate text Qu. Thal. PG 90, 408CD.

185 For this whole question of the skopos of the Divine Counsel, vide the able presentation of RADOSAVLJEVIC, A. 'Le probleme du "presuppose" ou du "non-presuppose" de l'Incarnation de Dieu le Verbe'. Maximus Confessor, Fribourg, 1982, pp. 193-206.

186 Ambig. PG 91, 1304D-1305A. For a parallel treatment of these themes vide Qu. Thal. 48, PG 90, 436AB.

187 Ambig. PG 91, 1312A.

188 Ambig. PG 91, 1305B-1305C.

189 Ambig. PG 91, 1092C.

190 Ambig. PG 91, 1305B.

191 Ambig. PG 91, 1305C.

192 Ambig. PG 91, 1305D.

193 Ambig. PG 91, 1305D-1308A.

194 Ambig. PG 91, 1308AB.

195 Ambig. PG 91, 1308BC.

196 Or. Dom. PG 90, 888C.

197 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 436A.

198 For the association of virtuous life with Paradise vide Ascet. PG 90, 912AB. Cf. Ambig. PG 91, 1372D. Maximus interpretation of Lk. 23.43 brings out both the need for virtue and its social consequences. Vide the commentary of THUNBERG, L. Microcosm and Mediator, pp. 408-413.

199 For the knowledge of the angels in which men participate by θεωρία φύσική , vide Carit. 3, 21,22, PG 90, 1021D-1024A.

200 Ambig. PG 91, 1308A.

201 Or. Dom. PG 90, 896A-897A.

202 Ambig. PG 91, 1308AB.

203 Ambig. PG 91, 1308B.

204 Ibid.

205 Ibid.

206 Vide HEINZER, F. op. cit. pp. 181-198.

207 Ambig. PG 91, 1308B.

208 Ambig. PG 91, 1308CD.

209 Ambig. PG 91, 1308D-1309A.

210 Ambig. PG 91, 1317D-1320A. Cf. Qu. Thal. PG 90, 312B-316D.

211 Ambig. PG 91, 1276B.

212 Ambig. PG 91, 1309AB.

213 GREGORY OF NYSSA. On the Soul and Resurrection, PG 46, 148C-149A. Cf. idem. On the Creation of Man, PG 44, 184CD.

214 Vide BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. Kosmische Liturgie (2 ed.) pp. 191-203; SHERWOOD, P. 'Maximus and Origenism ΑΡΧΗ ΚΑΙ ΤΕΛΟΣ'. Berichte zum XI Internationalen Byzantinisten-Kongress, Munchen 1958, Munich, 1958, pp. 10-16.

215 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1317BC; ibid., 1320BD; ibid., 1341C.

216 Ambig. PG 91, 1309B-1312A.

217 Vide SCHONBORN, C. 'Plaisir et douleur dans l'analyse de S. Maxime, d'apres les Quaestiones ad Thalassium'. Maximus Confessor, Fribourg, 1982. pp. 273-284.

218 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 632A-C; Ambig. PG 91, 1313CD; ibid., 1341C.

219 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 632A-C.

220 Ambig. PG 91, 1312A.

221 Or. Dom. PG 90, 896C.

222 Vide RIOU, A. op. cit. pp. 83-85.

223 Ambig. PG 91, 1309B.

224 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 436AB.

225 Vide THUNBERG, op. cit. pp. 405-416.

226 THUNBERG, L. op. cit. p. 408.

227 Vide Carit. 2,34; ibid., 2,58; Qu. Thal. PG 90, 636D-637A.

228 Ambig. PG 91, 1309B.

229 Ambig. PG 91, 1309C.

230 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 436B.

231 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1285C-1288A. For an excellent introductory essay on this theme vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'La theorie des "Logoi" des creatures chez S. Maxime le Confesseur'. Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques (36) 1952, pp. 244-249.

232 Vide Ep. 2, PG 91, 396AB; Cap. Theol. PG 90, 1145B.

233 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1077C; ibid., 1081BC; vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 377C where the logoi of sensible things are the flesh of the Logos, those of the intelligibles His blood.

234 Cap. Theol. 2,47, PG 90, 1145B.

235 Ibid., 2,94, PG 90, 1170BC.

236 Ambig. PG 91, 1285C-1288A.

237 Vide Carit. 4,73, PG 90, 1065BC; Qu. Thal. PG 90, 400BC; Ambig. PG91, 1032B. ibid., PG 91, 1145B.

238 Cap. Theol. 2,37, PG 90, 1141C.

239 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1177BC; vide THUNBERG, L. op. cit. pp. 63-64 Cf. BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. op. cit. p. 278.

240 Ambig. PG 91, 1309BC.

241 Ambig. PG 91, 1309C.

242 Ibid.

243 Ibid.

244 Ibid.

245 Vide Carit. 1,78, PG 90, 977BC. Cf. THUNBERG, L. op. cit. pp. 180-183; RIOU, A. op. cit., pp. 33-71 gives an outline of the Origenian position and how Maximus integrates it with that of DIONYSIUS the PSEUDO-AREOPAGITE to produce a balanced cosmology.

246 Ambig. PG 91, 1309C.

247 Ibid. Cf. Qu. Thal. PG 90, 436B.

248 Ambig. PG 91, 1308B.

249 Vide Mystagogia, PG 91, 672D-681B. For the place of ἀγάπη in the synthesis that ensures that wisdom finds expression in 'unforgetting knowledge' vide Carit. 1,61, PG 90, 973A; ibid., 1,25, PG 90, 965B. These texts must be read in conjunction with the text from the Mystagogia to grasp how Maximus understands how man transcends wisdom and prudence when he is united to God who is true and good by ἀγάπη , which is his way of participating in the filial τρόπος of the incarnate logos, as we shall see below, Vide BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. Liturgie Cosmique, pp. 253-260.

250 Ambig. PG 91, 1305AB; Qu. Thal. PG 90, 372CD; ibid., 596D. For man interpreted as nous engaged in the active life, the contemplative life the theological life, vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 329D-332C.

251 Ambig. PG 91, 1312AB.

252 Ambig. PG 91, 1309CD.

253 Ibid.

254 Ambig. PG 91, 1309D.

255 Ambig. PG 91, 1308C. For the place of obedience in the theology of Sophronius, vide SCHONBORN, C.VON. Sophrone de Jerusalem, vie monastique et confession dogmatique, pp. 137-140.

256 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 436B.

257 Ambig. PG 91, 1309C.

258 Ambig. PG 91, 1305A.

259 Ambig. PG 91, 1308B.

260 Ambig. PG 91, 1308C.

261 Or. Dom. PG 90, 873C.

262 Ambig. PG 91, 1348CD.

263 Ambig. PG 91, 1348B.

264 Ambig. PG 91, 1345D.

265 For a magisterial exposition of this theme in the teaching of St. Maximus, vide DOUCET, M. La Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus (unpublished thesis) Montreal, 1972, pp. 169-190.

266 Vide GARRIGUES, J.-M. 'La Personne composee du Christ d'apres saint Maxime', pp. 196-204; SCHONBORN, C.VON. L'Icone du Christ, Fribourg, Suisse, Editions Universitaires, 1976, pp. 113-120.

267 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 620C-621A where it is obvious that the ultimate union of created and Uncreated is to be sought in the hypostatic order.

268 Myst. PG 91, 684A.

269 Vide Myst. PG 91, 664D-665C.

270 Myst. PG 91, 665AB.

271 Myst. PG 91, 665B.

272 Vide GARRIGUES, J.-M. 'L'energie divine et la grace chez Maxime le Confesseur'. Istina(3) 1974, p. 283.

273 Myst. PG 91, 665B.

274 Ibid.

275 Vide Myst. PG 91, 664D.

276 Vide RIOU, A. op. cit. pp. 137-139.

277 Myst. PG 91, 668BC.

278 Vide GARRIGUES, J.-M. Maxime le Confesseur, la charite avenir divin de l'homme, pp. 113-138 for a fine exposition of the teaching of Maximus on this theme.

279 Rom. 8.29.

280 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 381B.

281 Myst. PG 91, 704A.

282 Cap. Theol. 1,87, PG 90, 1120B.

283 Or. Dom. PG 90, 900AB.

284 Ambig. PG 91, 1281AB.

285 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 280C.

286 Ep. 2, PG 91, 396C.

287 GARRIGUES, J.-M. 'L'energie divine et la grace chez Maxime le Confesseur', p. 293.

288 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 672BC.

289 Cf. ATHANASIUS. Contra Arianos, 1, 46. PG 26.108BC.

290 Or. Dom. PG 90, 901D. The translation has been varied slightly here to bring out the created character of the disposition. It is still faithful to the Greek of Maximus.

300 Ep. 2, PG 91, 404C.

301 The emphasis here is on the personal character of the human life of the Incarnate Logos.

302 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 672B.

303 Ibid., 672C.

304 Myst. Pg 91, 696CD.

305 Or. Dom. PG 90, 905D.

306 GARRIGUES, J.-M. 'L'energie divine et la grace chez Maxime le Confesseur', p. 294.

307 RIOU, A. op. cit. pp. 123-159.

308 Ibid., p. 155.

309 Myst. PG 91, 680D-681A.

310 Ibid. 681B.

311 Myst. PG 91, 685AB.

312 Ambig. PG 91, 1312A.

313 Ambig. PG 91, 1285C-1288A.

314 ORIGEN, Comm. in Joann. PG 14, 472D-476A. Cf. DALMAIS, I.-H. 'La theorie des "Logoi" des creatures chez S. Maxime le Confesseur', p.249. DALMAIS says that this theme is 'one of the fundamental axes of the thought of Maximus' (ibid., n. 38). Vide RIOU, A. op. cit. pp. 62-63; 110-111; 157-158.

315 Opusc. PG 91, 276A.

316 Ibid.

317 Ibid. 276B: 'like Peter and Paul' says Maximus by way of illustration.

318 MEYENDORFF, J. Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, p. 145.

319 Ibid. p. 146.

320 Myst. PG 91, 685D-688B.

321 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1216A-1221B.

322 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1392A.

323 Ambig. PG 91, 1325B.

324 Or. Dom. PG 90, 876C.

325 Ibid. 876C-884A. The term 'Father' has three meanings in patristic literature: trinitarian, cosmological and soteriological or adoptive. The word is given its three meanings by Maximus, in that he refers to the Father in His intra-Trinitarian status, to the Trinity as the 'Father' who creates and to the intra-Trinitarian Father who becomes 'Our Father' because of our identification with the Incarnate Logos. Cyril of Alexandria excluded the cosmological meaning; Gregory of Nyssa used it. It is the Invocation of the 'Our Father' that provides the foundation for Maximus' claims with regard to man's huiothesia in his Pater Noster. Maximus does not comment on the phrase 'who art in the heavens'. He is in line with Fathers like Cyril of Alexandria, Cyril of Jerusalem and John Chrysostom in his teaching on adoptive sonship. (Vide WALTHER, G. 'Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Griechischen Vaterunser-Exegese', TEXTE UND UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DER ALTCHRISTLICHEN LITERATUR (ed. Harnach, A.Von & Lchmidt, C) Leipsig, J.C. Hinrichsche Buchhandlung, 1914, pp. 83-84). In general it can be said that, apart from common patristic assumptions, the Expositio Orationis Dominicae bears little or no resemblance to previous commentaries on the 'Our Father', those of Origen, Cyprian and Gregory of Nyssa. There are bound to be occasional doctrinal tangents but there is no question of literary dependence.

326 Ibid. 884A-905B.

327 Ibid. 876C-877A. The following references are directly from this section, so that it would be superfluous to cite them individually.

328 Vide. nn. 100 and 118 supra.

329 Phil. 2,7.

330 Or. Dom. PG 90, 884A-896A.

331 Vide GREGORY OF NYSSA, Or. III in Or. Dom. PG 44, 1157C.

332 Vide Or. Dom. 885BC for Maximus' use of Scripture texts to make his point.

333 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Un traite de theologie contemplative: le commentaire du Pater Noster de saint Maxime le Confesseur', p. 139.

334 Or. Dom. PG 90, 893C.

335 Vide Gal. 3,28.

336 Vide Or. Dom. PG 90, 888C.

337 Vide SQUIRE, A.E. 'The idea of the soul as virgin and mother in Maximus the Confessor'. Studia Patristica(8) Berlin, 1966, pp. 456-461.

338 Vide Or. Dom. PG 90, 889D-892A.

339 Vide Myst. PG 91, 672D-676A.

340 Cf. Col. 3,11.

341 Or. Dom. PG 90, 893C.

342 Ibid. 893D.

343 Vide Or. Dom. PG 90, 900CD.

344 Or. Dom. PG 90, 884AB.

345 Ibid.

346 Ibid.

347 Arche in 884B most obviously refers to the first words of the 'Our Father' but the trinitarian associations are to the fore in all this section, so that it is not forcing the interpretation to think that Maximus refers to the Source in the Trinity.

348 Vide Or. Dom. PG 90, 884C.

349 Vide Or. Dom. PG 90, 892A-893A.

350 Cap. Theol. 2,1, PG 90, 1125A.

351 Or. Dom. PG 90, 892D-893A.

352 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. op. cit. p. 133.

353 Or. Dom. PG 90, 892B.

354 Ibid. 892C. Vide ORIGEN. Comm. in Joann., 1,38(42).

355 Ibid. 876D.

356 Ibid.

357 Ibid.

358 The introduction of γνώμη as the third significant element in the anthropological triad will be justified by the association of γνώμη and λόγος in 889D-892A. The association of freedom and the action of the Spirit in the oeuvre of Maximus justify this.

359 Vide Or. Dom. PG 90, 885AB.

360 Vide ibid., 885B-888B.

361 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. op. cit. p. 139.

362 Vide Or. Dom. PG 90, 889B.

363 Vide e.g. Ambig. PG 91, 1289C. Maximus does not develop the distinction between the principle of personhood a nd the actualisation of personhood in his writings, but the basis for such a distinction is obviously there and emerges from the juxtaposition of ideas in the Pater Noster, as we shall see, rather than being found there explicitly. We can refer to it as λόγος ὑπάρξεως in contrast to τρόπος ὑπάρξεως provided the λόγος includes the notion of pos. RIOU seems to take this into account where he speaks of 'le germe de l'hypostase créée' (op. cit. p. 75).

364 Vide GARRIGUES, J.M. Maxime le Confesseur, la charite avenir de l'homme, pp. 156-158.

365 Cf. John 14,23.

366 Cf. I Cor 6,15; ibid., 3,16-17.

367 Cf. CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. Stromateis, 4,25, PG 8, 1272B; ORIGEN. Commentarii in Joannem, 1,38, PG 14, 100A; GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS. Or. 23, PG 35, 1161C.

368 Vide the stimulating observations on the use of nous in the theology of Athanasius by KANNENGIESSER, C. Athanase d'Alexandrie Sur l'Incarnation du Verbe (Sources Chretiennes 199) Paris, Les Editions du Cerf, 1973, pp. 69-81.

369 Vide JUAN DE LA CRUZ. Cantico Espiritual, 13,12; Llama de Amor Viva, 2, 21 in Vida y Obras de San Juan de la Cruz (Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos) Madrid, 1960, pp. 771; 1017.

370 Vide LEON-DUFOUR, X. Dictionary of Biblical Theology. London, Geoffrey Chapman, 1969, pp. 200-202 for a summary of biblical scholarship on this subject.

371 Vide AUGUSTINE. De Trinitate, 4,30; ibid., 15,12. It has to be admitted that Augustine has a more highly developed awareness of the movements of the inner life, from the point of view of psychology, than St. Maximus. Vide LONERGAN, B. Verbum. London, Darton, Longman & Todd, 1968, pp. X-XV and passim.

372 Vide Or. Dom. PG 90, 885A-888B.

373 Vide ibid., 901C; ibid., 901D.

374 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'La theorie des "Logoi" des creatures chez S. Maxime le Confesseur'. Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques (36) 1952, pp. 244-249.

375 Or. Dom. PG 90, 885A.

376 Ibid.

377 Ibid.

378 Ibid.

379 Ibid., 876C. Cf. ibid., 905D.

380 Ibid., 885A.

381 Ibid., 876CD.

382 Ibid., 885A.

383 Ibid., 885B.

384 Ibid.

385 Ibid., 885C. Cf. Matt. 5,5.

386 Ibid., 885B. Cf. Isa. 66,2. DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Un traite de theologie contemplative, le commentaire du Pater Noster de S. Maxime le Confesseur', pp. 137-138 points out that while Maximus follows Evagrius here, he substitutes for the intellectualism of Evagrius the primacy of charity.

387 Or. Dom. PG 90, 885C.

388 Ibid., 888AB.

389 Ibid., 885A.

390 Vide Appendix IV.

391 Vide HAUSHERR, I. Philautie, de la tendresse pour soi a la charite, selon saint Maxime le Confesseur, pp. 43-56.

392 Or. Dom. PG 90, 888B.

393 Vide CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. Paedagogus, 1,6, PG 8, 292B; EVAGRIUS PONTICUS. Capita Practica ad Anatolium A 45, PG 40, 1232D; DOROTHEUS ABBAS. Doctrinae Diversae, 1,7, PG 88, 1625A; ibid., 1625B; MACARIUS of Egypt, Homiliae Spirituales, 15, 14f., PG 34, 585B; ibid., 2,15, 685A.

394 Or. Dom. 888B.

395 Vide GARRIGUES, J.M. Maxime le Confesseur, la charite, avenir divin de l'homme, pp. 148-199.

396 Or. Dom. PG 90, 888BC.

397 Vide Qu. Dub. PG 90, 813C. Cf. Ep. ad Marinum PG 91, 136AB.

398 Or. Dom. PG 90, 905CD.

399 We have seen this already but it may be helpful to recall that the ontological triad at the basis of this way of thinking can be found in Ambig. PG 91, 1217A; Cap. Theol. 1,2, PG 90, 1084A; its teleological form can be found in Ambig. PG 91, 1217D; ibid. 1184D-1185A; from an ascetical point of view: εἶναι, εὖ εἶναι , ἀεί εὖ εἶναιvide Ambig. PG 91, 1084B; the triads can be seen synoptically in Ambig. PG 91, 1392A. All that we have seen already of γένεσις, κίνησις and στάσις together with their cognate triads can be seen here as brought to fruition in and through Christ. We have seen too the relationship of the three human births to the mysteries of Christ. Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1325BC. In Cap. Theol. 1,51 & 56, PG 90, 1101C & 1104C we find the same ideas as an interpretation of the days of God's creative and redemptive activity: 'The sixth day suggests the principle of the being of things; the seventh day signifies the mode of the well-being of things; the eight indicates the ineffable mystery of the ever-well-being of things' (n.56). Time is obviously the dimension in which the freedom of man can model his movement, while the final phase of both sentences has to do with definitive fulfilment. It is the ὅρος and so can be mystically designated as the 'Sabbath' (Ambig.

PG 91, 1392C), that state of being into which man is introduced by the totally gratuitous initiative of God, His χάρις which historical man achieves through the Resurrection in which he participates by his own resurrection and thus breaks through to ἀεί εὖ εἶναι .

400 Vide GARRIGUES, J.M. 'La Personne composee du Christ d'apres saint Maxime le Confesseur', pp. 189-196.

401 Or. Dom. PG 90, 876C; 905D.

402 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 724C-728A.

403 Jn. 15,13.

404 Vide DOUCET, M. La Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus, especially pp. 339-352; 402-421.

405 Vide GARRIGUES, J.M. op. cit. pp. 196-204; SCHONBORN, C.VON L'Icone du Christ, Fondements Theologiques, Fribourg, Suisse, Editions Universitaires, 1976, pp. 113-120.

406 Ep. 15, PG 91, 557CD,

407 GARRIGUES, J.M. Maxime le Confesseur, la charite avenir divin de l'homme. p. 171.

408 Jn. 15,9.

409 Jn. 13,1.

410 Or. Dom. PG 90, 876C.

411 Cap. Theol. 2,1, PG 90, 1124D - 1125C.

412 Or. Dom. PG 90, 876C.

413 Cap. Theol. 2,23, PG 90, 1136A.

414 Or. Dom. PG 90, 884B.

415 Ibid., 884C.

416 CANART, R. 'La deuxieme Lettre a Thomas de saint Maxime the Confesseur'. Byzantion (34) 1964, p. 433.

417 SCHONBORN, C.VON. Sophrone de Jerusalem, vie monastique et confession dogmatique, p. 127.

418 Myst. PG 91, 700D-701A.

419 Ep. 44, PG 91, 644A.

420 GARRIGUES, J.M. Maxime le Confesseur, la charite avenir divin de l'homme, pp. 156-158.

421 Vide GARRIGUES, J.M. op. cit. p. 158. Cf. SCHONBORN, C.VON. op. cit. p. 130-131. The

parallels between Maximus and Sophronius are striking. It will have to suffice here to recommend the splendid study of VON SCHONBORN to see this claim borne out.

422 Ep. 19, PG 91, 592D.

423 Or. Dom. PG 90, 877A-C.

424 DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Le Commentaire du Pater de S. Maxime le Confesseur', p. 143. Thelema most obviously refers to the Will of the Father expressed in the words of the 'Our Father'. Neither WALTHER nor DALMAIS in their commentaries, associate it directly with the will of man. The translation allows this interpretation and it enables us to prepare the ground for the 'restoration of nature to itself' below in PG 90, 877D-880A.

425 Or. Dom. PG 90, 877B.

426 Vide GRUMEL, V. 'Maxime de Chrysopolis our Maxime le Confesseur'. Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique (10.1) col. 456; SHERWOOD, P. St. Maximus the Confessor, The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on Charity, pp. 55-63; THUNBERG, L. Microcosm and Mediator, The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor, pp. 220-231; DOUCET, M. La Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus, pp. 119-133. Undoubtedly, Maximus did not bring his thought on the will into focus until he became engrossed in the Monothelite debate. He acknowledges his indebtedness to a venerable monk for the distinction we have given here. Vide PG 91, 185D; ibid. 192B, but θέλημα was part of the traditional vocabulary as we see in GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS. Orat. 36, quoted by Maximus in his Opusc. 4, PG 91, 61AB, which could be as early as A.D. 634, more or less contemporaneous with the composition of the Pater Noster. Vide LETHEL, F.-M. Theologie de l'Agonie du Christ, pp. 65-99, for a masterly statement on this theme.

427 Vide SHERWOOD, P. St. Maximus the Confessor, The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on Charity, pp. 55-63.

428 Vide Or. Dom. PG 90, 877D-880A for γνώμη and PG 90, 901A, 901D, for προαίρεσις and their function in the restoration of nature to itself.

429 Or. Dom. PG 90, 877B. The 'festal gathering' of the powers excludes the 'hostile powers' rendered ineffectual by Christ.

430 Or. Dom. PG 90, 876C.

431 For some amplification on the Imago Trinitatis in the teaching of Maximus vide THUNBERG, L. op. cit. 137-140.

432 In the Pater Noster Maximus deals with this under the heading of the 'restoration of nature to itself' infra.

433 Vide supra in the commentary on Introduction b.

434 Or. Dom. PG 90, 877B.

435 Ibid., 877B. Θέλημα is a divine gift to man, equipping him to receive further divine gifts.

436 This is THUNBERG's formulation of the thought of Maximus in Ambig. PG 91, 1312B. Vide op. cit. p. 427.

437 Or. Dom. PG 90, 877B.

438 Ibid.

439 Vide e.g. Myst. PG 91, 672B-673B.

440 Vide VILLER, M. 'Aux sources de la spiritualite de saint Maxime, Les oeuvres d'Evagre le Pontique'. Revue d'Ascetique et de Mystique II, 1930, pp. 156-184, 239-268. For necessary modifications of this fundamental essay vide inter alios SHERWOOD, P. op. cit. pp. 235ff; 249ff.

441 Vide Or. Dom. PG 90, 901D to see the implications this has for divine and natural law.

442 Vide VILLER, M. op. cit. especially pp. 162-164.

443 Both Evagrius and Maximus identify θεολογία with the summit of prayer. Vide VILLER, M. op. cit. pp. 165, n. 39; 247-256.

444 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Le vocabulaire des activities intellectuelles, volontaires et spirituelles dans l'anthropologie de S. Maxime le Confesseur'. Melanges offerts au P.M.-D. Chenu, Paris, Vrin, 1967, pp. 189-202. Vide especially pp. 190-193. Cf. THUNBERG, L. op. cit. pp. 179-220.

445 Or. Dom. PG 90, 896A-897A.

446 Vide MEYENDORFF, J. 'Free Will (gnome) in Saint Maximus the Confessor'. The Ecumenical World of Orthodox Civilization, Russia and Orthodoxy (3), ed. Blane, A., The Hague-Paris, Mouton, 1974, pp. 71-75.

447 Vide BERTHOLD, G. 'The Cappadocian Roots of Maximus the Confessor'. Maximus Confessor, ed. Heinzer, F. & Schonborn, C., pp. 51-59.

448 Vide VILLER, M., op. cit.

449 Vide DANIELOU, J. Origen, pp. 32-34, 214-216, 220ff., 247ff., 270ff.

450 Vide BORNERT, R. Les Commentaires Byzantines de la Divine Liturgie du VII$^{e}$ au XV$^{e}$ siecle, pp. 83-124.

451 Cf. DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Le Commentaire du Pater de S. Maxime le Confesseur', p. 141.

452 Cf. DALMAIS, I.-H. ibid.

453 Or. Dom. PG 90, 896B.

454 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1085AB. This is to be found in DIONYSIUS the Pseudo-Areopagite. De Divinis Nominibus, PG 3, 824C.

455 Or. Dom. PG 90, 896A.

456 Ibid., 896B.

457 Ibid.

458 Ibid., 896C.

459 Ibid.

460 Vide VILLER, M. op. cit. pp. 160-162. Cf. DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Le vocabulaire des activites intellectuelles, volontaires et spirituelles dans l'anthropologie de S.Maxime le Confesseur', pp. 190-193.

461 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. op. cit. pp. 190-193.

462 Vide Ibid., p. 190.

463 Nous is the highest part of the soul; Vide Carit. 1,3, PG 90, 961B; ibid., 1,8, PG 90, 961D; ibid., 1,9, PG 90, 964A; ibid., 2, 1-6, PG 90, 984B-985B; ibid., 2,18-21, PG 90, 989B-992A; ibid., 2, 52-55, PG 90, 1001B-d; ibid., 3,45-47, PG 90, 1029B-1032A; ibid., 3, 75-77, PG 90, 1040C-1041A. It is the locus of θεολογία ; Vide Carit. 2, 61, PG 90, 1004 CD. Vide VILLER, M. op. cit. pp. 247-256 for a discussion of this aspect of the teaching of Maximus in relation to that of Evagrius.

464 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. op. cit. p. 190.

465 Vide e.g. Myst. PG 91, 672D-673B.

466 Vide Carit. 1,33-34, PG 90, 968A; ibid., 3,98-99, PG 90, 1048A, for contrasts between νοῦς and ψυχή .

467 Cf. DALMAIS, I.-H. op. cit. p. 192.

468 Vide Carit.1,44; PG 90, 968D-969A; ibid., 2,28, PG 90, 992D; ibid., 2,31, PG 90, 993B-D; ibid., 2,90, PG 90, 1013BC. Cf. Carit. 2,26, PG 90, 992BC for the cognate πραχτική in contrast to the θεωρητική and Carit. 2,25, PG 90, 992B for πραχτική μέθοδος . Virtues and commandments are the preoccupation of those who live 'practically'; vide Carit, 3,44, PG 90, 1029B and ibid., 1,77, PG 90, 977B and ibid., 4,47, PG 90, 1057C for references to virtues and commandments respectively.

469 Vide VILLER, M. op. cit. p. 161. For an analysis of the παθητικόν , vide Ambig. PG 91, 1196C-1197D.

470 Vide Carit. 1,92, PG 90, 981B; ibid., 2,25, PG 90, 992B; ibid., 2,28, PG 90,992D; ibid., 34, PG 90, 996BC; ibid., 3,1, PG 90, 1017B; ibid., 3,65, PG 90, 1036C; ibid., 3,75, PG 90, 1049CD; ibid., 4,61, PG 90, 1061BC. The object of the highest gnosis is the Holy Trinity; vide Carit. 1,86, PG 90, 980C; ibid., 1,94, PG 90, 981BC; ibid., 2,21, PG 90, 989D-992A. This is the equivalent of theologia or pure prayer. The object of gnosis can also be Providence; vide Carit. 1,12, PG 90, 964B; ibid., 2,99, PG 90, 1017A; ibid., 3,33, PG 90, 1028B; ibid., 3,66, PG 90, 1036D-1037A; ibid., 4,62, PG 90, 1061C-1064A; ibid., 4,77, PG 90, 1068AB. It can also be invisible things; vide ibid., 1,90, PG 90, 981A; ibid., 1,94, PG 90, 981BC, and finally of creatures in general; vide ibid., 2,21, PG 90, 989D-992A. These senses pertain to θεωρία . In Carit. 2,26, PG 90, 992BC, Maximus says: 'The mind that follows well the active life advances in prudence; the contemplative life, in knowledge. To the one it belongs to bring the contender to a discernment of virtue and vice; to the other, to lead the participant to the essences of the incorporeal and corporeal creation. Then finally it is fit for the grace of theology when it has passed beyond, on the wings of charity, all the things just mentioned; and, being in God, it will examine, through the Spirit, the essential concerning Him, as much as the human mind may'(S). Here we have a synthesis of the two kinds of lives and also an outline of the development within gnosis. Maximus seems to associate the final stage of prayer, θεολογία , with the fifth mediation, so that the knowledge attainable in this life, consonant with the angelic state, being described at this stage of the Pater Noster, would seem to still fall short of the final possibility held out to man, that of 'being in God'.

471 Or. Dom. PG 90, 896C.

472 Cf. DALMAIS, I.-H. op. cit. p. 192.

473 For gnosis and theologia vide n.470 supra. Vide VILLER, M. op. cit. pp. 162-164; 247-256. On the threefold division, derived from Evagrius, vide Carit. 2,26 quoted under n.470 supra.

474 Or. Dom. PG 90, 897A.

475 Ibid., 877C.

476 Vide Introduction b. supra.

477 Lk. 12,31.

478 Or. Dom. PG 90, 896C.

479 Ibid., 873A.

480 Vide Carit. 3,41-44, PG 90, 1029AB.

481 BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. Liturgie Cosmique, p. 264.

482 Carit. 3,68, PG 90, 1037B.

483 Carit. 3,68, PG 90, 1037B.

484 Carit. 3,66, PG 90, 1036D-1037A.

485 Ibid., 2,77, PG 90, 1009A.

486 Or. Dom. PG 90, 889A.

487 Ambig. PG 91, 1249AB. This is a masterful synthesis. However, Maximus does stretch the meaning of the cardinal virtues beyond their traditional range, giving to prudence and justice especially a function outside the scope of moral virtue. The carefree use of terminology does not, however, invalidate what he is saying.

488 Or. Dom. PG 90, 896D-897A.

489 Jn. 6,33-35.

490 Or. Dom. PG 90, 896D.

491 Maximus does not speak of the Eucharist directly here. This is less surprising than his reticence in the Mystagogia, but it is probably due to a similar decision to confine himself to a 'spiritual' interpretation, a mystagogical commentary to initiate his readers into the 'mysteries' through the words. The sphere of liturgical action is outside his formal object.

492 Cap. Theol. PG 90, 1108AB.

493 Or. Dom. PG 90, 897A.

494 Gal. 2,20.

495 Or. Dom. PG 90, 896D.

496 Ibid., 905CD.

497 Vide LETHEL, F.-M. Theologie de l'Agonie du Christ, especially pp. 59-99.

498 Or. Dom. PG 90, 877C.

499 Ibid.

500 Ibid.

501 Vide RIOU, A. op. cit. pp. 93-95.

502 Cf. Or. Dom. PG 90, 876C.

503 Or. Dom. PG 90, 877C.

504 Or. Dom. PG 90, 877D.

505 Ibid., 880C.

506 Ibid., 877C.

507 Vide The Theology of Man and Grace:Commentary (ed. Fortman, E.J.) Milwaukee, The Bruce Publishing Company, 1966, pp. 81-148, for a rapid review of the theology of grace in the Eastern and Latin Fathers. Subsequent essays in the same volume describe the way grace has been understood in East and West since. In this context I have found the outstanding essay of ZIZIOULAS, J.D. 'Human Capacity and Human Incapacity: A Theological Exploration of Personhood'. Scottish Journal of Theology (28) 1975, pp. 401-448, very helpful. In the following discussion I again have recourse to the distinction between λόγος ὑπάρξεως and λόγος φύσεως on the one hand and between λόγος ὑπάρξεως and τρόπος ὑπάρξεως on the other. Vide n. 363 supra. The expression λόγος ὑπάρξεως is to be found in LEONTIUS OF BYZANTIUM, Adv. Nest. et Eutychian, PG 86, 1285A; ibid., 1304B, but the meaning of ὕπαρξις there is not absolutely clear. Cf. SHERWOOD, P. The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor and His Refutation of Origenism. Here I am using it as synonymous with the τῷ τοῦ πῶς εἶναι λόγῳ of Ambig. PG 91, 1289C but asking it to connote a reference of the principle of personhood to the Logos, something that the juxtaposition of ideas in the Pater seems to warrant, but which is not spelt out by Maximus himself.

508 For a stimulating essay on the earlier use of this and associated terms vide TORRANCE, T.F. 'Athanasius: A Study in the Foundations of Classical Theology'. Theology in Reconciliation, London, Geoffrey Chapman, 1975, pp. 215-266. Vide especially pp. 243-249.

509 Vide RIOU, A. Le Monde et l'Eglise, pp. 73ff; GARRIGUES, J.-M. Maxime le Confesseur, la charite, avenir divin de l'homme, pp. 100ff; LETHEL, F.-M. Theologie de l'Agonie du Christ, pp. 77ff.

510 Or. Dom. PG 90, 877C.

511 Here we touch on a very difficult matter. VON BALTHASAR considers that the scholastic distinction between essence and existence is latent in all the Christological thinking of Maximus. Vide Liturgie Cosmique pp. 158, 166-167. LOSSKY takes exception to identifying the distinction between nature and person with essence and existence. Vide In the Image and Likeness of God, pp. 120-123. RIOU and GARRIGUES side with LOSSKY. LETHEL favours VON BALTHASAR. Vide RIOU, A. op. cit. pp. 78-79, n. 1; p. 91, n. 12; GARRIGUES, J.-M. 'La Personne composee du Christ d'apres saint Maxime', p. 191, n. 51; LETHEL, F.-M. op. cit. p. 84, n. 43.

512 Or. Dom. PG 90, 877C.

513 Ibid., a quotation from Ps 34,8.

514 Vide Chapter III supra on the language of the Pater Noster. For passages that show how Maximus thinks of this kind of apprehension vide: Myst. PG 91, 669CD; Qu. Thal. PG 90, 621D-624A; Ambig. PG 91, 1112D-1113A; Ibid., 1116D.

515 Vide CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. Paedogogus 2,8, PG 8, 488A; DIONYSIUS the Pseudo-Areopagite. De Divinis Nominibus 8,2, PG 3, 889C.

516 Vide EUSEBIUS OF CAESAREA. De Ecclesiastica Theologia 3,17, PG 24, 1042A.

517 Vide IGNATIUS OF ANTIOCH. Epistula ad Romanos 3,2, PG 5, 688B.

518 Vide CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. Stromateis 2,11, PG 8, 984C; ibid., 5,10, PG 9, 97A; ibid., 7,11, PG 9, 489A.

519 Vide GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS. Orationes Theologicae 30,20, PG 36, 129B; GREGORY OF NYSSA. Contra Eunomium 2, PG 45, 497B.

520 Vide CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Adversus Nestorium 4,1, PG 76, 176A. He is described as the dynamis of the Father by JOHN OF DAMASCUS, De Fide Orthodoxa 1,12, PG 94, 849A.

521 Or. Dom. PG 90, 900A.

522 Ibid., 897A.

523 Ibid., 900A.

524 Ibid., 897B.

525 Ibid., 896D.

526 Ibid., 901A.

527 Ibid., 877C.

528 Ibid., 904A.

529 Ibid., 905C.

530 Jo. 6,35.

531 Vide WALTHER, G. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Griechischen Vaterunser-Exegese, p. 90-91. Vide DANIELOU, J. Origen, pp. 61-68 for a balanced account of Origen's teaching on the Eucharist.

532 Or. Dom. PG 90, 900C.

533 Ibid., 897B.

534 Ibid.,

535 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Le Commentaire du Pater de S. Maxime le Confesseur', pp. 144-145.

536 Vide ibid.

537 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 412A-413B.

538 Ambig. PG 91, 1156D-1157A. The references to Gregory of Nyssa are obvious. In order to place the Fall in the teaching of Gregory vide DANIELOU, J. From Glory to Glory, Texts from Gregory of Nyssa's Mystical Writings, London, John Murray, 1962 (translation by Musurillo, H). The Introduction by DANIELOU is excellent. Vide pp. 3-78.

539 For accounts of Maximus' teaching on the Fall, vide DISDIER, M.-Th. 'Les Fondements dogmatiques de la spiritualite de saint Maxime le Confesseur'. Echos d'Orient(29) 1930, pp. 296-313, especially pp. 307-311; BOOJARMA, J. 'Original Sin According to St. Maximus the Confessor'. St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly (20) 1976, pp. 19-30.

540 Or. Dom. PG 90, 897B.

541 Ibid., 897C.

542 Ibid.

543 Vide commentary on Part II(a) supra.

544 Or. Dom. PG 90, 897C.

545 Ibid.

546 Vide WALTHER, G. op. cit. p. 90.

547 Or. Dom. PG 90, 900A.

548 Ibid.

549 The form in the text is λαθῶμεν .

550 Or. Dom. PG 90, 900A.

551 Ibid., 900B.

552 Vide HAUSSERR, I. Philautie, de la tendresse pour soi a la charite selon saint Maxime le Confesseur, pp. 57-83.

553 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. op. cit. p. 146.

554 Or. Dom. PG 90, 900A.

555 The text says 'by anticipating nature'. This is obviously 'nature' in so far as it is abused by the wilful γνῶμαι of men, not φύσις in its incorruptible principle.

556 Or. Dom. PG 90, 900B.

557 Cf. Carit. 4,77, PG 90, 1068AB.

558 Or. Dom. PG 90, 900C.

559 Ibid., 900B.

560 Ibid., 900C.

561 Ibid.

562 Ibid.

563 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Le vocabulaire des activites intellectuelles volontaires et spirituelles dans l'anthropologie de S. Maxime le Confesseur', pp. 192-193, for the relation of πνεῦμα to νοῦς .

564 Or. Dom. PG 90, 900C.

565 Ibid.

566 Cf. Carit. 4,44, PG 90, 1057B.

567 Or. Dom. PG 90, 900C.

568 Vide Carit. 1,42, PG 90, 968D. Cf. ibid., 1,45, PG 90, 969A; ibid., 2,19, PG 90, 989BC; ibid., 3,13, PG 90, 1020CD.

569 Cf. Ascet. PG 90, 952C; Carit. 1,1, PG 90, 961A; ibid., 1,7, PG 90, 961CD. Vide SHERWOOD, P. St. Maximus the Confessor, The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on Charity, pp. 84-87.

570 Cf. Carit. 1,7, PG 90, 961D. This formulation is derived from Origen through Evagrius. Vide DANIELOU, J. Origen, pp. 293-309 and VILLER, M. 'Aux sources de la spiritualite de saint Maxime, le Les oeuvres d'Evagre le Pontique'. Revue d'Ascetique et de Mystique II, 1930, pp. 156-184, 239-268.

571 Vide Introduction a, supra.

572 Or. Dom. PG 90, 905C.

573 Vide GARRIGUES, J.-M. Maxime le Confesseur, la charite avenir divin de l'homme, pp. 83-199, especially pp. 138-152; HEINZER, F. op. cit. pp. 181-198.

574 Vide DANIELOU, J. From Glory to Glory, Texts from Gregory of Nyssa, pp. 56-71 for an account of this aspect of Gregory's teaching. For some discussion on Maximus' use of this idea vide SHERWOOD, P. The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor and His Refutation of Origenism, pp. 192-198 where it is discussed within the context of Maximus' solution to the Origenian χόρος .

575 GARRIGUES, J.-M. op. cit. pp. 84-85.

576 Vide Ascet. PG 90, 920D; Carit. 1,58, PG 90, 972C; ibid., 3,2, PG 90, 1017BC, where it is found in association with the Evagrian practice, theory and theology; ibid., 4,77, PG 90, 1068AB.

577 Carit. 3,21, PG 90, 1021D.

578 Carit. 2,52, PG 90, 1001B. Cf. ibid., 3,24, 1024AB; ibid., 3,25, PG 90, 1024BC; ibid., 3,27, PG 90, 1025A.

579 PG 90, 1065A. Maximus quotes Eph. 3,17.

580 Ibid. The quotation is from Col. 2,3. VON BALTHASAR places wisdom in the teaching of St. Maximus in his Liturgie Cosmique, pp. 253-265.

581 Cf. Mt. 11,27; Lk. 10,22.

582 Or. Dom. PG 90, 897CD.

583 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1249AB.

584 Vide PG 91, 749B-753D.

585 Vide BASIL OF CAESAREA. Homiliae Variae, 12,8, PG 31, 401B; GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS. Carminum Libri Duo, 1,2,34,59, PG, 37, 950A.

586 Vide BASIL OF CAESAREA. Homiliae in Psalmos, 7, PG 29, 241A; GREGORY OF NYSSA. Oratio Cathecetica, 21, PG 45, 57Cff.

587 Vide BASIL OF CAESAREA. Homiliae Variae, 12,9, PG 31, 404C; GREGORY OF NYSSA. Contra Eunomium,6, PG 45, 724D.

588 Vide CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. Fragmenta, PG 9, 765C. CYRIL OF JERUSALEM. Catechesis 13,33, PG 33, 813A. ORIGEN. Comm. in Matt. 12,11, PG 13, 1004A; idem., Comm. in Joannem, 6,6, PG 14,212B.

589 Or. Dom. PG 90, 877D-880A.

590 Ibid., 877D.

591 Vide SHERWOOD, P. St. Maximus the Confessor, The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on Charity, pp. 55-63. The outstanding treatment of the place of will in the thought of Maximus is DOUCET, M. La Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus. LETHEL, F.-M. Theologie de l'Agonie du Christ, La liberte humaine du Fils de Dieu et son importance soteriologique mises en lumiere par Saint Maxime Confesseur, further refines the issue of the human will of Christ in the theology of Maximus, especially in the maximian texts dealing with the Agony in the Garden.

592 Or. Dom. PG 90, 877D-880A.

593 Vide PG 90, 879CD, n.(d).

594 Or. Dom. PG 90, 880A. Cf. Eph. 2,17.

595 Ibid., 880A.

596 Ibid.

597 Vide SHERWOOD, P. op. cit. p. 230-231, n. 287 for observations on this and references to PRESTIGE, VON BALTHASAR, DANIELOU and LOOSEN on the same subject. The essay by LADNER, G.B. 'The Philosophical Anthropology of Saint Gregory of Nyssa'. Dumbarton Oaks Papers (12) 1958, pp. 59-64 helps to put this idea of Gregory in the context of his theological vision as a whole.

598 Vide Or. Dom. PG 90, 876C and my comment on Part I,1, supra, where it was suggested that the unity of God was understood as exemplary for the unity of human nature.

599 Vide MEYENDORFF, J. 'Free Will (γνώμη) in Saint Maximus the Confessor'. The Ecumenical World of Orthodox Civilization, pp. 71-75.

600 This distinction has universal application in the thought of Maximus. Vide Opusc. 25, PG 91, 272B. The distinction between λόγος and τρόπος , to which references have already been given more than once and which we shall discuss below, is at the basis of the following remarks.

601 Cf. ZIZIOULAS, J.D. op. cit. on the notion of ἔκστασις in this regard.

602 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 628A and Ambig. PG 91, 1321B where Maximus uses a phrase that suggests that the Fall was produced by the first act of man. The influence of Origen was bound to have coloured the Alexandrian tradition and to have made the idea of a temporal paradise before the Fall more difficult to accommodate. Vide LADNER, G.B. op. cit. for an interesting discussion on how Gregory of Nyssa tried to make a coherent pattern of the data. Vide DANIELOU, J. Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture (A History of Early Christian Doctrine before the Council of Nicaea, vol. 2. Translation of Message evangelique et culture hellenistique aux IIe et IIIe siecles by Baker, J.A.) London, Darton, Longman & Todd, 1973, pp. 387-398 for the beginning of another tradition with Theophilus of Antioch.

603 Vide MEYENDORFF, J. op. cit. Cf. BOOJARMA, J. op. cit.

604 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'La Theorie des "Logoi" des creatures chez S. Maxime le Confesseur'.

605 Γνώμη has the marks of ὑπόστασις and τρόπος . Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1217AB; ibid., 1280A; ibid., 1289BD for the λόγος - τρόπος distinction; vide Opusc. 20, PG 91, 236B-D for the application of this distinction to will. Although γνώμη is not used in the latter quotation, its proven association with ὑπόστασις enables us to apply τρόπος to it here and to conclude that the will is stabilized personally when the hypostasis is stable, something given in the case of the Incarnate Logos, something to be acquired in θέωσις by mankind.

606 Or. Dom. PG 90, 877D.

607 This is the way Maximus would formulate the principle already at work in the Pater Noster when he came to his Disputatio cum Pyrrho, PG 91, 297D-300A.

608 Cf. BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. Liturgie Cosmique, pp. 196-203.

609 Or. Dom. PG 90, 877D.

610 Vide LETHEL, F.-M. Theologie de l'Agonie du Christ, especially pp. 86-121.

611 The subject of the choice is 'it', that is γνώμη ; since there is no question of a faculty acting on its own, this usage shows that Maximus is thinking of will in a personal way, that is the Logos as Hypostasis who is willing.

612 Maximus introduced this theme under the heading of the 'equality of honour with the angels' supra, even although he did not develop it fully. Vide 'The Five Divisions and Synthetic Mediation' supra pp.188 - 222 and the comments on Part I,3.

613 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1308C-1312A.

614 Or. Dom. PG 90, 900D-904B.

615 For an excellent essay on this theme vide SCHONBORN, C. 'Plaisir et douleur dans l'analyse de S. Maxime, d'apres Quaestiones ad Thalassium'. Maximus Confessor, pp. 273-284.

616 Vide Or. Dom. PG 90, 896C.

617 Ibid., 901A.

618 Ibid.

619 Ibid.

620 Ibid. For cognate texts vide Carit. 1,2, PG 90, 961AB; ibid., 1,36, PG 90, 968AB; ibid., 1,85, PG 90, 980C; ibid., 2,22, PG 90, 992A; ibid., 4,42, PG 90, 1057A; ibid., 4,91, PG 90, 1069CD. In Ascet. PG 90, 953D-956A, Maximus speaks of perfect ἀπάθεια and links it with forgiveness, which is central to the theme of this section of the Pater Noster.

621 Vide infra Or. Dom. PG 90, 905C, together with our comments in the text.

622 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 260BC; Carit. 3,56-57, PG 90, 1033BC.

623 Vide Ep. 2, PG 91, 397B-400B.

624 Cf. Or. Dom. PG 90, 901A. Vide DOUCET, M. op. cit. pp. 169-195 for a comprehensive statement on the use of this notion by Maximus.

625 Ibid.

626 Ibid.

627 Ibid.

628 Ibid. Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Le vocabulaire des activites intellectuelles, volontaires et spirituelles dans l'anthropologie de S. Maxime le Confesseur', pp. 193-197; DOUCET, M. op. cit. pp. 114-168 presents a clear picture of the terms that Maximus uses for will.

629 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 628A. Cf. Ambig. PG 91, 1361A.

630 Or. Dom. PG 90, 901A.

631 DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Le Commentaire du Pater de S. Maxime le Confesseur', p. 148.

632 Or. Dom. PG 90, 901B.

633 Ibid., 901BC. For memory and temptation vide Carit. I,84. PG 90, 980BC.

634 Vide BORD, A. 'Memoire'. Dictionnaire de Spiritualite, Ascetique et Mystique, Doctrines et Histoire(IO) col. 991-1008; SIEBEN, H.J. ibid., col. 1407-1414.

635 Cf. SIEBEN, H.J. op. cit.

636 Vide DUAN DE LA CRUZ, SAN. Vida y Obras, pp. 1166-1167, for the Dictamenes de espiritu attributed to the saint by Eliseo de los Martires.

637 Or. Dom. PG 90, 901C.

638 Vide BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. Presence et Pensee, Paris, Beauchesne, 1942, pp. 22ff. Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 637A, for a clear use of this idea.

639 Vide e.g. Ep. 2, PG 91, 397A. To put this in context, vide HAUSERR, I. Philautie, de la tendresse pour soi a la charite selon Saint Maxime le Confesseur, pp. 57-93. For a thorough description of the teaching of Maximus on the Passions and Vices vide THUNBERG, L. Microcosm and Mediator, pp. 244-301.

640 Cf. LANGMEAD CASSERLY, J.V. The Christian in Philosophy, London, Faber & Faber, 1949, pp. 30-35.

641 Or. Dom. PG 90, 901C.

642 Vide Ascet. PG 90, 917A-D; ibid., 924CD; ibid., 953AB.

643 Or. Dom. PG 90, 901C.

644 PG 91, 705AB.

645 Or. Dom. PG 90, 901D.

646 Ibid.

647 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'La theorie des "Logoi" des creatures chez S. Maxime le Confesseur'. For a consideration of the teaching of Maximus on this from a more philosophical point of view, vide SHELDON-WILLIAMS, I.P. 'St. Maximus the Confessor'. The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, pp. 492-505. His analysis would require a firmer complementary synthesis.

648 DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Le Commentaire du Pater de S. Maxime le Confesseur', p. 149, identifies the fundamental law of the creature with the logos physeos. The thought of Maximus is more nuanced here.

649 Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS. 'Super Epistolam ad Galatas Lectura'. Super Epistolas S. Pauli Lectura, ed. Cai, P.R. Turin-Rome, 1953, Lectio V. n. 318.

650 There is no thorough study of the theme of participation in the thought of Maximus. For possible lines of investigation vide BALAS, D.L. ΜΕΤΟΥΣΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΘΕΟΥ , Man's Participation in God's Perfections According to Saint Gregory of Nyssa (Studia Anselmiana 55) Rome, Libreria Herder, 1966, whose study might be applied to the work of Maximus, but would require extension especially with regard to the personal aspect of the Saint's thought.

651 Or. Dom. PG 90, 901D.

652 Ibid.

653 For the use to which Maximus puts this idea in the Pater Noster, vide Or. Dom. PG 90, 873D; ibid., 876A; ibid., 876C. Cf. Ascet. PG 90, 912A-913A; ibid., 920A-C; ibid., 921BC.

654 Cf. Phil. 2,17; Col 1,24. For a useful commentary on the latter text vide AHERN, B.M. 'The Fellowship of His Sufferings (Phil 3,10)'. The Catholic Biblical Quarterly (22) 1960, pp. 26-28. Cf. Jn 17, 17-19.

655 Or. Dom. PG 90, 905C.

656 Cap. Theol. 1,13, PG 90, 1088BC.

657 Or. Dom. PG 90, 880A-881A.

658 Cf. Ambig. PG 91, 1273D-1276D. Physical intactness was understood to be a sign of dedication to God. Mary's dedication would have been deepened by the mystery of the birth of her Son. Cf. SQUIRE, A.K. 'The idea of the soul as virgin and mother in Maximus the Confessor'. Studia Patristica (8) Berlin, 1966, pp. 456-461.

659 Carit. 3,25, PG 90, 1024C.

660 The doctrine is constant, the formulation is from Pyrr. PG 91, 304D.

661 Ibid., 324D.

662 Ambig. PG 91, 1353C.

663 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 405C.

664 GREGORY OF NYSSA. De Anima et Resurrectione, PG 46, 93B.

665 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 253AB. Ibid., 257A-260C. From these passages we see that for Maximus evil is the failure of the powers to attain their end; evil is the unlogical movement, by an erroneous judgement, of the natural powers to something besides the end; evil is ignorance of the good Cause of beings, an alienation of the νοῦς from God, which fills it with knowledge of the sensibles and makes man the subject of passion in his very act of attempting to deify creation. Therefore evil is not οὐσία ; it is in the order of operation; basically it is expressed as φιλαυτία κατά σῶμα .

666 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 628AB.

667 Ibid., 253B.

668 Ibid., 628B.

669 Ibid., 424B. Cf. ibid., 405C.

670 This is implied in the passage from the Pater Noster which we are now examining: Or. Dom. PG 90, 880AB.

671 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 257C-260A.

672 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1156D-1157A.

673 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1317AB.

674 Ibid., 1353D.

675 Ibid., 1309A.

676 Vide Myst. PG 91, 685A-C.

677 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1248A-1249B.

678 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1304D-1308C.

679 Ep. 2, PG 91, 396D-397A.

680 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1112B.

681 Ibid.

682 Ambig. PG 91, 1348A.

683 Ibid.

684 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 632B.

685 Qu. Dub. PG 90, 788AB. BOOJARMA, J. 'Original Sin According to St. Maximus the Confessor', p.29, remarks: 'His system indeed would have allowed for a more positive evaluation of sexuality. Instead of seeing the division of humanity into male and female overcome in the very act of marriage, he sees it overcome by an ascetic rejection of marriage. Instead of seeing marriage as an eternal bond, as does St.Paul, reflective of the permanent and intimate unity of Christ with his Church, he sees it as serving only the function of procreation (Ambig. PG 91, 1305C).

686 SHERWOOD, P. in his article 'Maximus and Origenism, ΑΡΧΗ ΚΑΙ ΤΕΛΟΣ' has shown that in Epistola XII, Maximus speaks of the patheton as essential to human being, and so that it pertained to human nature before the ἀρχαία παράβασις . This would admit sensibility to man's paradisiac state. On the other hand, commentators, as SHERWOOD reminds us, have drawn attention to maximian texts that say that the παθητόν was introduced by the ancient transgression. VON BALTHASAR (Liturgie Cosmique, p. 136) suggests that was a covert return to Origenism. SHERWOOD qualifies this by suggesting that Maximus was more dependent on the 'two-creation' theory of Gregory of Nyssa (ibid. pp. 2-4). Elsewhere, Maximus tries to circumvent the problem by the λόγος - τρόπος distinction (vide e.g. Ambig. 42, PG 91, 1341D). If we think of the use of τρόπος as being more than a logical device to overcome a thorny dilemma, we may have to conclude that what Maximus finds 'around' the λόγος φύσεως is ultimately rooted in hypostasis, the perversity of which, in Adam and his posterity, fastens on the παθητόν — through γνώμη — in so far as it is παρά φύσιν when wrapped in a παθητόν that is κατά φύσιν (vide PG 90, 313AB). BOOJARMA, J. 'Original Sin According to St. Maximus the Confessor' (p. 25), says 'The natural will as a result of the first sin was contaminated; the focal point of this contamination was the gnomic will ( θέλημα γνωμικόν ) , which is always seen as hypostatic and not an essential characteristic'. This frailty in γνώμη would square with the way in which Maximus finds it associated with παράβασις, ἁμαρτία, and παθητόν (PG 90, 313AB); it would also leave the primacy in responsibility with hypostasis and show the vulnerability of man to the demons and his need of divine ἀγάπη to stabilize him in the good. MEYENDORFF, J. Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, pp. 88, 117, 142 says that there is no question of the transmission of guilt in the idea of 'original sin' proper to the Greek patristic tradition. DOUCET, M. op. cit. pp. 200-205, makes

a strong case for saying that it is to be found in Gregory of Nazianzus and in St. Maximus: 'Maximus, in the same way, makes of the transgression of Adam a transgression committed by us, in our will, which has need of being cured of it' (ibid., p.20). Cf. CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. In Epistolam ad Romanos, PG 74, 789AB. The contrast in these opinions makes it obvious that further work needs to be done on this aspect of the teaching of Maximus. For a sketch of the teaching of the Greek Fathers on Original Sin, vide KELLY, J.N.D. Early Christian Doctrines, pp. 346-357. Cf. PELIKAN, J. The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600) (The Christian Tradition 1) Chicago-London, The University of Chicago Press, 1971, pp. 278-292. For an essay in aid of overcoming the creationist-traducianist dilemma, vide DRAGAS, G.D. 'A Note concerning Athanasius' Soteriology'. Athanasiana (1), London, 1980, pp. 143-155.

687 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 313AB. The following observations are based on this passage.

688 SHERWOOD, P. op. cit. p.12.

689 Vide Opusc. PG 91, 237B.

690 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 628AB.

691 Ambig. PG 91, 1037A.

692 PG 91, 240D-241B.

693 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 505C. ὑπέρ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπος comes in Ambig. PG 91, 1056A.

694 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 313C-316C; Ascet. PG 90, 920A-921B.

695 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1348BC.

696 Ascet. PG 90, 912B.

697 Vide Or. Dom. PG 90, 880B.

698 Vide LETHEL, F.-M. op. cit. pp. 86-99.

699 Ep. 2, PG 91, 584C.

700 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 632D. Note the interesting contrast between πατήρ and μήτηρ .

701 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 313AB.

702 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 405CD.

703 Ibid., 408CD.

704 Myst. PG 91, 688BD.

705 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 405D-408A.

706 Or. Dom. PG 90, 880D-881A.

707 Myst. PG 91, 688C.

708 FLOROVSKY, G. Creation and Redemption (Collected Works 3) Massachusetts, Nordland Publishing Company, 1976, p. 98.

709 Vide DOUCET, M. op. cit. pp. 241-246.

710 JOHN OF DAMASCUS. De Fide Orthodoxa, 3,20, PG 94, 1081A-1084A where among other examples he says: 'and by willing He died'. Cf. ibid., 3,26, PG 94, 1093BC.

711 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 405CD.

712 FLOROVSKY, G. op. cit. p. 98. For an opinion in contrast to that of FLOROVSKY from a contemporary Orthodox theologian vide WARE, K. The Orthodox Way, London-Oxford, Mowbrays, 1979, pp. 99-100; MEYENDORFF, J. op. cit. pp. 166-167.

713 Ep. 17, PG 91, 584C.

714 Or. Dom. PG 90, 880C.

715 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 713A. Cf. PG 91, 1181D-1184A, which may not be authentic but is compiled from maximian sources.

716 Cf. GREGORY OF NYSSA, Oratio Catechetica, 24, PG 45, 65A.

717 Ambig. PG 91, 1156C-1157A.

718 Carit. 2,93, PG 90, 1016BC(S).

719 Ibid.

720 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 700AB.

721 Or. Dom. PG 90, 880C.

722 Ep. 101, PG 37, 181C. This theory does not have to preclude the mode of that transformation of mankind nor exclude the historical and metahistorical dimensions of salvation. In PG 91, 220B, Maximus makes an interesting and necessary distinction between οἰκείωσις οὐσιώδης and οἰκείωσις σχετική. This comes in a letter to Marinus clarifying opinions of Theodore the Deacon, who made Athanasius and Gregory of Nanzianzus attribute will by appropriation to Christ in the same way as insubmission, dereliction, transgression and ignorance. He admits that Christ can appropriate in the first way mentioned above sleep, hunger, thirst, weariness, crying, agony, submission, the cross, death and resurrection and ascension. From these he distinguishes what is 'not properly ours either as a natural

component, although it is said to be ours because of the ancient transgression, I mean ignorance, dereliction, transgression, insubordination. For what λόγος φύσεως of ours is there in these things, or constitutive of substance?' These obviously imply a culpable disorder, totally incompatible with the person of the Logos so that here again Maximus allows that Christ can appropriate what he calls elsewhere blameless 'sin', the penalty of the blameworthy sin that resulted from the ἀρχαία παράβασις, but not anything that would imply a will at variance with the will of His Father. Or we might say that He can assume with His humanity the παθητόν that is now proper to mankind in the concrete since the first transgression, but which does not imply blameworthiness. It is that 'proneness to sin' which follows on the pleasurable procreation peculiar to postlapsarian man that can find no place in Him, so that there is no basis in Him for 'the law of sin'. In his Tomus Dogmaticus to Marinus, PG 91, 237A-C, he writes: 'For there is a twofold kind of passion: the one is penal, the other is shameful,* the one indeed characterizing our nature, the other spoiling it; the former indeed He took on as man for us willingly, substantially, building up nature at the same time and undoing the condemnation against us; the latter again, recognized in us as well by our unruly way of life, He appropriated philanthropically and economically; just as fire does with wax or the sun with vapours on earth, having totally destroyed it in us, in order that he might share what is proper to Him and render us dispassionate as a result and incorruptible in keeping with the promise'. (* I am following Combefis' acceptable interpretation of this phrase. It would favour the idea of Christ's having innocently taken on a penalized humanity at His Incarnation. This would lessen the cogency of Florovsky's argument, op. cit. p. 281, n. 9, where the ἕκτισις is obviously meant in the sense of penalty for personal sin. The κένωσις can be partly accounted for because Christ endures a penalty that was due to, not His sin, but ours. An alternative would be 'the one is honourable, the other dishonourable'). The οἰκείωσις σχετική does not imply any physical appropriation but rather taking responsibility for the moral failure of others. In this way Christ admits to Himself by love what only really exists in others. It is not in Him. So he can take on our sins, but without being tainted by sin Himself. As Maximus says in the Tomus Dogmaticus quoted above, morally defective qualities like ἐναντίωσις and ἀντίταξις can only be ascribed to the Incarnate Logos 'by appropriation; because of mercy as to the head of the whole body are they attributed, as diseases of a patient to a doctor, while He who became man for us, God freed us from them' (loc. cit.) LOSSKY in his The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, pp. 148-149, professes to find in Maximus a foundation for his distinction between a natural and a relative assumption in Christ, the former referring to incorruptibility, the latter corruptibility and passibility. But as DOUCET, op. cit. pp. 317-320, points out, Maximus does not use

'assumption' with regard to the relative and economic taking on; Christ does not assume the object of οἰκείωσις σχετική ; that is burnt up like wax and mist (PG 91, 237C). Whatever we may think of LOSSKY's theory of the coincidence of two manners of assumption, we cannot allow him to cite Maximus in support of his views. Vide BALTHASAR, H.U.VON, Theodramatik, Band III, Die Handlung, Einsiedeln, 1980, pp. 232ff.

723 Vide DOUCET, M. op. cit. pp. 207-208.

724 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1280C-1281B; Ep. 12, PG 91, 468C.

725 Ep. 12, PG 91, 468C.

726 Ascet. PG 90, 916B; Carit. 2,13, PG 90, 988AB.

727 Vide DOUCET, M. op. cit. LETHEL, F.-M. op. cit.

728 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 408B.

729 Ambig. PG 91, 1326B.

730 Or. Dom. PG 90, 904B-905B.

731 Vide Carit. 1,84, PG 90, 980B; ibid., 2,31, PG 90, 993C.

732 Or. Dom. PG 90, 904C.

733 Ibid.

734 Cf. Qu. Thal. PG 90, 312B-313B.

735 Or. Dom. PG 90, 904C.

736 Ibid., 904CD.

737 Vide Qu. Dub. 31, PG 90, 812B; ibid., 33, PG 90, 813A; Carit. 1,84, PG 90, 980B; ibid., 2,31, PG 90, 993C.

738 Vide e.g. Carit. 1,84, PG 90, 980B.

739 Vide BARDY, G. 'Discernment des Esprits'. Dictionnaire de Spiritualite, Ascetique et Mystique (3) col. 1247-1254.

740 Vide Carit. 2,31, PG 90, 993C.

741 Cf. Eph. 6,10ff; 1 Pet. 5,8f; Rev. 12,17-13, 10; 17.

742 Or. Dom. PG 90, 905AB. I have made the sense of obligation more explicitly in the commentary than in the translation of the text as a whole.

743 Carit. 2,67, PG 90, 1005BC.

744 Or. Dom. PG 90, 904D-905A.

745 Vide e.g. Qu. Thal. PG 90, 313AB.

746 Or. Dom. PG 90, 905A.

747 Ibid.

748 Vide MEYENDORFF, J. Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, p. 135.

749 Vide. Qu. Thal. PG 90, 253AB; ibid., 257A-260C.

750 Vide GAUTHIER, R.-A. 'Saint Maxime le Confesseur et la psychologie de l'acte humain'. Rescherches de Theologie Ancienne et Medievale (21) 1954, pp. 51-100.

751 Cf. Or. Dom. PG 90, 884D1 ibid., PG 90, 901B.

752 Or. Dom. PG 90, 905A.

753 Vide Or. Dom. PG 90, 901D and the commentary under Part II(d).

754 Or. Dom. PG 90, 905A.

755 Vide n. 739 supra. Vide NILUS ANCYRANUS(?). De Malignis Cogitationibus, PG 79, 1200D-1234A. Cf. EVAGRIUS PONTICUS. Capita Practica ad Anatolium, PG 40, 1220C-1252C.

756 Or. Dom. PG 90, 905A.

757 Ibid., 881B-884A.

758 Ibid., 905A.

759 Ibid., 905BC.

760 Matt. 6, 15.

761 1 Cor. 10, 13.

762 Or. Dom. PG 90, 905B-908D.

763 Ibid., 881AB.

1. DENZINGER-SCHONMETZER. n. 302. Cf. KELLY, J.N.D. op. cit. pp. 338-343.

2. CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Adversus Nestorium, 2, prooem. PG. 76, 60D. Cf. Ep. ad Successum, 2,3.

3. Vide ACO 1,1,4, p. 18, 25.

4. DENZINGER-SCHONMETZER. n. 302.

5. Vide ACO 2, 1,1, p. 143, 10f.

6. Vide ACO 2, 1,1, p. 120, 14.

7. Vide ACO 2, 1,2, pp. 123f. Cf. KELLY, J.N.D. op. cit. p. 340.

8. Vide SELLERS, R.V. The Council of Chalcedon, London, S.P.C.K., 1953, pp. 332ff.

9. Opusc. 9, PG 91, 121AB.

10. HEINZER, F. op. cit. pp. 85-94 admits that this thought-model may seem to be excessively academic, but he insists that it helps an understanding of the way in which hypostasis and nature combine in the thinking of the Leontii, especially in that of Leontius of Jerusalem. The latter's emphasis on the fact that the human ἰδιώματα are not a 'part' making up the 'whole' of Christ's hypostasis serves to show that the union of the natures is not a matter of addition, but the actuation of both of them in the one hypostatic existence. Neither οὐσίαι nor features of οὐσίαι can be 'part' of an hypostasis (Adv. Nest. PG 86, 1421AB). An insistence on his divinity and manhood being parts of Christ's hypostasis would lead to the anomalies of Severus. Differentiation of φύσις and ὑπόστασις is necessary (ibid., 1432BC); they are two different orders of being and combine in a way that transcends the restricted order of essences. With this in view we can admit that the Logos as hypostasis is the whole of Christ's person, which in a strictly formal way is identical with the Person of the Logos, (ibid., 1536). Logos as οὐσία is one of the two οὐσίαι united in His personal subsistence and as such is part of Christ, God made man (ibid). These refinements in thinking about the relationship of the ὑπόστασις and the οὐσία adumbrate the more polished formulae of Maximus. The use of ἔστιν or ἦν or ὑπάρχειν will bring out vividly what is implied by Leontius of Jerusalem. Vide Opusculum 9, (PG 91, 117CD) where Maximus says that his adversaries hold that the whole is something else than the parts, from which and in which it consists. He does not fail to remark that their discourse is declarative, not demonstrative and then he proceeds to demonstrate the untenability of their position: 'Firstly, let them demonstrate that the whole has an existence other than that of its own parts, and then only let them in the

same manner attribute to the whole as whole an operation other than the essential operations which exist in its parts! If, in fact, they do not accord to the whole an existence other by nature, evidently they should not either attribute to it an operation other by nature than those of the parts. Christ, who by nature is each of the two (the Same is by nature God and man) possesses by nature that which is proper to each nature: divine will and operation as well as human will and operation, and not one only by the exclusion of two natural operations, nor another besides the two which exist by nature, which would make three operations and three wills'.

11. DENZINGER-SCHONMETZER. n. 293.

12. LETHEL, F.-M., op. cit. pp. 82-85 discusses how precisely Maximus understands the identity of the Logos with his natures, expressed in the esti of Ambig. PG 91, 1052D. He claims that for Maximus there is not a real distinction between Christ and his divinity so that the esti expresses real identity. He cites Ep. 15 to back up that claim where Maximus says that the unique divine nature is not alone 'in Three Persons' but that 'it' is the Three Persons' (PG 91, 549D-552A). MEYENDORFF, J. Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, pp. 212-213, prefers the Palamite tradition and speaks of 'the real distinction in trinitarian theology between essence and hypostasis'. When in the text we say: 'In the Incarnation we have a unique subject distinct in some way from the natures', the intention is to affirm a rational or even an apophatic distinction between the Person of the Logos and his divine nature, thus preserving the irreducibility of the person to nature, but not necessarily affirming any real distinction in God apart from that which holds between the Persons as such. Lethel points out that there must be a real distinction between the hypostasis of the Logos and his human nature, but he invokes St. Thomas Aquinas to make a distinction which St. Maximus did not make and which clarifies the contribution of the latter to the already existing terminology of ek and en. Aquinas says: 'Utraque ergo natura praedicatur de Verbo Dei, sed una in concreto tantum, scilicet humana, ut cum dicimus Filius Dei est homo; divina vero natura in abstracto et in concreto dici potest: ut quod Verbum Dei est divina essentia vel natura, et quod est Deus'. (De Rationibus fidei, 6,n.990 ed. Marietti). We cannot say that the Son of God is human nature, but we can say that he is man. It is in the latter sense that He is identical with human nature, in the concrete. Vide DOUCET, M. op. cit. p. 119, on what he calls the 'gaucherie' of the formula of Maximus' formula. He makes the point made by Aquinas, quoted above.

13. Vide Opusc. 9, PG 91, 121A. Cf. ibid.,117CD, 121B; Opusc. 19, PG 91, 224A.

14. The outstanding study of this development in relation-

ship to the work of Maximus is HEINZER, F. Gottes Sohn als Mensch, Freiburg, 1980. Vide especially pp. 70-116.

15. PG 91, 544C-576D.

16. Ibid., 557C.

17. Ibid., 544D.

18. Ibid., 545A. As regards his theological method, he prefaces what he has to say with: 'I will not say anything off my own bat, but what I have learned from the Fathers without changing anything of their teaching'. Citations from Basil and Gregory of Nanzianzen are prominent in this context.

19. Ibid., 549C-552A.

20. The phrase is that of SCHONBORN, C.VON. L'Icone du Christ, p. 110.

21. Ep. 15, PG 91, 552B.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., 552C.

24. Ibid., 553A.

25. Ibid., 568A. Cf. Opusc. 8, PG 91, 108CD.

26. Ibid., 553C-556A.

27. For an illuminating comparison of the relation forming function of hypostatic subsistence in the teaching of Leontius of Byzantium, Leontius of Jerusalem and Maximus, vide HEINZER, F. op. cit. pp. 94-108.

28. Ep. 15, PG 91, 556C.

29. Ibid., 557AC.

30. Vide PRESTIGE, G.L. God in Patristic Thought, London, S.P.C.K., 1936, pp. 242-264.

31. Opusc. 14, PG 91, 149B.

32. Ibid., 152A.

33. Opusc., 25, PG 91, 272B.

34. Vide BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. Liturgie Cosmique, pp. 159-174; HEINZER, F. op. cit. pp. 33, 54-58.

35. Vide RIOU, A. op. cit. pp. 73-121; GARRIGUES, M.-J. Maxime le Confesseur, La charite avenir divin de l'homme, pp. 100ff. as well as the corrective provided by DOUCET, M. 'Vues Recentes sur les "Metamorphoses" de la Pensee de Saint Maxime le Confesseur', pp. 276-282.

36. Opusc. 13, PG 91, 145A-149A.

37. Vide SHERWOOD, P. An Annotated Date-list of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, p. 27.

38. Pyrr. PG 91, 348D.

39. Ibid., 324D-325A.

40. Ibid., 289A.

41. DOUCET, M. op. cit. p. 273.

42. Pyrr. PG 91, 289A.

43. Ibid., 348C-349A.

44. Jn. 5,17; ibid., 19; ibid., Jn. 10,38; ibid., 25; Jn. 5,21.

45. BASIL OF CAESAREA (?) Adversus Eunomium Libri Duo, PG 29, 680D-681AB.

46. THEODORET. Eranistes, 1, PG 83, 88D.

47. CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Contra Nestorium, 3, PG 76, 141CD.

48. Ibid., 141D.

49. Cf. DOUCET, M. op. cit. pp. 272-273.

50. PG 91, 57D-60C.

51. DENZINGER-SCHONMETZER, n. 301.

52. Cf. RIOU, A. op. cit. p. 84.

53. Vide Qu. Dub. 46, PG 90, 821C; Ambig. PG 91, 1037A; ibid. PG 91, 1052D; Ep. 15, PG 91, 553D for the idea of the Logos as δίκην σποράς. . Referring to the use of τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως by Amphilochius in a trinitarian context SHERWOOD, P. The Earlier Ambigua, p. 160 says: 'There can be no doubt - attention has shifted from the moment of origin in which the phrase is applicable only to the originated persons to the, (logically) subsequent relation, which, of course, is applicable to the originating person'. The Fathers were unwilling to use hyparxis or tropos tes hyparxeos to denote the Persons in the Trinity, because of the associations of 'origin' that they retained and so could not be used unambiguously of the Three Persons in the Trinity. Σχέσις was preferred. But with Amphilochius (PG 39, 112C), contrasting God, τό κοινόν τῆς οὐσίας , with the persons, Father, Son and Spirit, we find τρόπον ὑπάρξεως, ἤτουν σχέσεως ὀνόματα where τρόπος ὑπάρξεως is the equivalent of σχέσις as a term to designate the Persons in the Trinity. HEINZER, F. op. cit. pp. 46-

47 points out the close relationship between the original and relational senses of the expression τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως . For instance in the human analogy, the origin of a person from a father or mother is the basis of relationship to that person; while the personal realization of this relationship activates and in a sense ratifies this origin. When applied to the Holy Trinity, this language must be understood to forego its temporal character of implying sequence, of the structure of potency and act, and be understood to imply coincidence where the processions are to be understood as relational realities. In the passage from Opus IV which we are examining the language has returned to the human level bearing the connotations it has acquired in its trinitarian usage.

54. LETHEL, F.-M. op. cit. p. 67.

55. Cf. Or. Dom. PG 90, 901D.

56. This comparison seems to have been used for this purpose for the first time by ORIGEN. De Principiis, 2, 6,6. GCS 22, 145. It is also to be found in Cyril of Alexandria and Theodoret. Vide Ambig. 1076A; ibid., 1088D; ibid., 1140C. The qualification which we have noted in the text occurs for the first time in Ambig. 1060AB.

57. PG 91, 60C.

58. Vide SHERWOOD, P. The Earlier Ambigua of St. Maximus the Confessor, pp. 155-164.

59. Vide BASIL OF CAESAREA. Adversus Eunomium Libri Tres, I, 15, PG 29, 545B.

60. Myst. PG 91, 701A.

61. Vide RIOU, A. op. cit. pp. 80-82; HEINZER, F. op. cit. pp. 54-58.

62. Ambig. PG 91, 1289CD.

63. Cf. RIOU, A. op. cit. p. 78.

64. Opusc. 8, PG 91, 97A.

65. Cf. HEINZER, F. op. cit. p. 126.

66. Vide. Ep. 12, PG 91, 489C-492A; Ambig. PG 91, 1276D-1280A; ibid., 1343C-1349B.

67. Vide Or. Dom. PG 90, 880B. Cf. Ambig. PG 91, 1276AB.

68. Vide Opusc. 20, PG 91, 236CD.

69. Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1316B-1317C.

70. PG 91, 60D-61A.

71. Vide GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS, Orationes Theologicae, PG 36, 117C-120A.

72. Vide LETHEL, F.-M. op. cit. pp. 71ff.

73. PG 91, 61BC.

74. Vide HEINZER, F. op. cit. pp. 130-131.

75. Vide MOELLER, C. 'Trois fragments grecs de l'Apologie de Jean le Grammarien pour le Concile de Chalcedoine'. Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique (46) 1951, pp. 683-688.

76. LEONTIUS OF BYZANTIUM. Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos 1, PG 86, 1273A.

77. Ibid., 1277D.

78. Ibid., 1280A.

79. Vide idem, Adversus Argumenta Severi, PG 86, 1917CD.

80. PG 91, 61B.

81. HEINZER, F. op. cit. p. 141. He refers to the view of DE LA TAILLE, M. 'Actuation créée par Acte Incrée'. Rescherches de Science Religieuse(18) 1928, pp. 253-268 which BALTHASAR, H.U.VON, Liturgie Cosmique, p.185, finds so akin to those of Maximus in the text we are analysing. We examine that obscure problem below. Here it might be said that the filial character of the humanity of Christ would be safeguarded, even if his existence as man is created, provided that the καθ'ἑαυτόν of that existence is that of the Logos.

82. PG 91, 61C.

83. DENZINGER-SCHONMETZER, nn. 300-302.

84. Vide PG 86, 1281C; ibid., 1940B; ibid., 1289D-1291B.

85. Vide PG 91, 488CD; ibid., 516C-517D.

86. Vide PG 86, 1289B-1291C for Leontius' way of countering this.

87. Vide MEYENDORFF, J. Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, pp. 81-82 for an account of how Justinian discerned the flaw in an uncritical use of the body-soul analogy. Justinian, aware that the Monophysites did not share the Origenist view of human composition, 'states that the image may be used to describe the hypostatic unity of Christ, but not its composite character, for the two natures of Christ are neither complementary, as the soul and body are, nor simultaneously created, since his uncreated divinity pre-existed the Incarnation'.

88. For a brief but comprehensive statement on Cyril's famous μία φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη vide GRILLMEIER, A. Christ in Christian Tradition (1), Revised Edition, London, Mowbrays, 1975, pp. 480-483. The most authoritative essay on Severus is still that of LEBON, J. 'La christologie du monophysisme syrien'. Das Konzil von Chalkedon (1) ed. Grillmeier A. & Bacht, H., Wurzburg, Echter-Verlag, 1954, pp. 425-580.

89. Vide MEYENDORFF, J. op. cit. pp. 34-35, for the interpolation in the Trisagion. Cf. GARRIGUES, J.-M. 'La Person composee du Christ d'apres Saint Maxime le Confesseur', pp. 188-190. The Trisagion is addressed to God, a name that evokes the nature rather than the hypostases; the claim of the Monophysites to address it to the Incarnate Son did not justify the ambiguity caused by the failure to distinguish what characterizes the Son as hypostasis, nor the omission of a reference to His flesh, so that death is attributed to the divinity. Sophronius did not oppose the hypostatic theopaschism of the Logos in his human nature, but rather the direct attribution to the divine nature of human properties.

90. For anti-Severian teaching of Maximus, vide Ep. 13, PG 91, 509B-533A; Ep. 14, PG 91, 533B-544B; Ep. 15, PG 91, 544C-576B; Ep. 17, PG 91, 580C-584D; Opusc. 5, PG 91, 64A-65B; Opusc. 8, OG 91, 89C-112B; Opusc. 21, PG 91, 245D-257A.

91. Vide LEBON, J. Le Monophysisme Severien, Louvain, 1909, p. 429.

92. Vide MEYENDORFF, J. op. cit. p. 43.

93. Vide LEBON, J. Le Monophysisme Severien, pp. 433-435. In this view the human characteristics of Christ would become the immediate properties of the unique divine incarnate nature of the Logos. They would not characterize a concrete human nature individuated by enhypostasisation in the Logos.

94. Vide GARRIGUES, J.-M. op. cit. p. 191.

95. Ibid.

96. Vide Ep. 12, PG 91, 488B.

97. Vide LEBON, J. 'La Christologie du monophysisme syrien', pp. 478ff. Maximus calls the φύσις of Severus ἡ θαυμαστή τῶν Σεβήρου λόγων ἀκρόπολις (PG 91, 517C).

98. Ep. 12, PG 91, 488D.

99. Ibid., 489B.

100. Ibid., 488CD.

101. Ibid., 488D.

102. Ibid.

103. Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1101C.

104. Cf. GRUMEL, V. 'L'union hypostatique et la comparaison de l'ame et du corps chez Leonce de Byzance et saint Maxime le Confesseur'. Echos d'Orient(25) 1926, pp. 401-402.

105. Opusc. 13, PG 91, 145C-148A.

106. Ep. 13, PG 91, 532B.

107. Ibid., 517B.

108. Cf. GARRIGUES, J.-M. op. cit. p. 194.

109. Ambig. PG 91, 1409C.

110. Cf. GARRIGUES, J.-M. op. cit. p. 194.

111. Ambig. PG 91, 1048C.

112. Ep. 13, PG 91, 517A.

113. Ibid., 517B.

114. Ibid., 532BC.

115. Ep. 12, PG 91, 488D.

116. Ibid., 488CD.

117. Ibid., 489B.

118. Opusc. 8, PG 91, 64D.

119. Ep. 13, PG 91, 517A.

120. Ibid., 529D.

121. Ibid., 529A; Vide etiam ibid., 520A; 529D.

122. Vide BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. Liturgie Cosmique, p. 182.

123. For background to this vide LLOYD, A.C. 'The Later Neoplatonists'. The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. Armstrong, A.H., Cambridge, University Press, 1967, esp. pp. 283-296. For more specific information on this aspect of Porphyry's teaching vide GREDT, J. Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae(1) Freiburg, Herder & Co., 1926, pp. 123-130.

124. Vide Ep. 12, PG 91, 488C. A note in Migne says that this is not to be found in Cyril.

125. There is too a failure to distinguish the unity that characterizes the individual from that which distinguishes the hypostasis. 'Individual' does not have to connote anything more than numerical qualification of species; it is basically a quantitative distinction, ἄτομον - εἶδος . The notion of person introduces an altogether new dimension, that transcends essences and their quantitative determinations. This refinement was to come later, but it is adumbrated in the distinction that Maximus suggests between ὑποκείμενον and ὑπόστασις , even although it is not elaborated in his work. Vide BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. op. cit. pp, 162-172; FLOROVSKY, G. Creation and Redemption, pp. 19-20.

126. Ep. 12, PG 91, 488D.

127. Ep. 13, PG 91, 517C.

128. Vide LEONTIUS OF BYZANTIUM. Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos 1, PG 86, 1292A. GRUMEL, V. op. cit. p. 397, points out that the word 'nature' has two meanings for Leontius of Byzantium: the one physical, designating the essence or the elements that constitute the substance; the other logical, designating the universal, the species, that is to say the likeness of the constitutive elements of many beings, the common type realized in each of them. But as we note below, Leontius did not reach the ontological universal in his meditations on 'human nature'. For him, the distinctive mark of the human εἶδος was that it was composed of two natures, the body and the soul. Vide PG 86, 1289D-1291B.

129. Vide Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos 1, PG 86, 1277D. Elsewhere we find that the characteristic of hypostasis is καθ'ἑαυτῷ ὑφεστός (Adversus Argumenta Severi, PG 86, 1933A).

130. Cf. BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. op. cit. p. 179.

131. Ep. 12, PG 91, 488B.

132. Vide BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. op. cit. p. 179.

133. Vide GRUMEL, V. op. cit. p. 403.

134. Ep. 12, PG 91, 489C-491C.

135. Ep. 13, PG 91, 517AB.

136. Ep. 12, PG 91, 488B.

137. BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. op. cit. p. 180 recalls that it is not accident that the stoic ἡ καθ'ὅλου φύσις appears; fecund source from which are born and reborn without cessation the millions of particular beings which lose themselves in it. It is, in fact, he reminds us, birth and natural death that make of man εἶδος and φύσις .

138. Vide Ep. 13, PG 91, 516D-520D. To plead that Severus is soteriologically sound while, perhaps, philosophically weak, seems to be an evasion since it is then possible that his reflections on soteriology are weak too!

139. Vide Ep. 13, PG 91, 525D-528A; Cf. Ep. 12, PG 91, 489D.

140. Cf. GRUMEL, V. op. cit. p. 403.

141. Vide Opusc. 14, PG 91, 152AB.

142. Vide Ep. 13, PG 91, 525D-529A.

143. Vide Ibid., 517B; Cf. Ep.12, PG 91, 489B; ibid., 492A.

144. Vide Ep. 14, PG 91, 537A.

145. Vide Opusc. 1, PG 91, 36D.

146. Vide Ep. 13, PG 91, 521B.

147. Vide Ep. 12, PG 91, 468D.

148. Vide Ep. 15, PG 91, 557CD.

149. Opusc. 24, PG 91, 268B.

150. Vide GRUMEL, V. op. cit. p. 406.

151. Ep. 15, PG 91, 560BC.

152. Vide Opusc. 13, PG 91, 148C.

153. Vide Ep. 15, PG 91, 556D; cf. Ep. 12, PG 91, 489C-491C.

154. Ep. 13, PG 91, 517C.

155. Vide Ep. 15, PG 91, 553C-566A.

156. Vide Or. Dom. PG 90, 876CD.

157. Ep. 13, PG 91, 517C.

158. Ep. 15, PG 91, 557B.

159. SCHONBORN, C.VON. L'Icone du Christ, p. 117.

160. Cf. 1 Jn. 4,8.16.

161. Opusc. 9, PG 91, 121D.

162. Vide n. 12 supra.

163. Vide Ep.13, PG 91, 529AB.

164. Ep. 13, PG 91, 517C.

165. Vide Opusc. 9, PG 91, 117D; ibid., 121AB; Opusc. 19, PG 91, 224A; Ep. 14, PG 91, 536A; Ep. 15, PG 91, 573A; Ambig. PG 91, 1044D; ibid., 1045A; ibid., 1060B.

166. Vide BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. Liturgie Cosmique, pp. 21-22, 69, 166-167, and LETHEL, F.-M. op. cit. pp. 77-85, especially nn. 39, 43, 44.

167. Ambig. PG 91, 1036B.

168. Vide Or. Dom. PG 90, 884C.

169. Myst. PG 91, 701A.

170. Opusc. 4, PG 91, 61C.

171. LOSSKY, V. In the Image and Likeness of God, pp. 120-123.

172. RIOU, A. op. cit. p. 91, n. 12.

173. For an excellent summary of the problems and the developing solutions with regard to the Hypostatic Union, vide KASPER, W. Jesus the Christ, London-New York, Burns & Oates, Paulist Press, 1976 (a translation of Jesus der Christus, Mainz, 1974 by Green, V.) pp. 230-268, especially pp. 240-252.

174. THOMAS AQUINAS. Summa Theologica, 3.17,2.

175. Idem, De Unitate Verbi, a.4.

176. Idem, Summa Theologica, 3.2,10; ibid., 8,5,ad3; ibid., 10,1,ad2; ibid., 21,1,ad3, where he quotes JOHN OF DAMASCUS, De Fide Orthodoxa, 3,24, PG 94, 1089D.

177. GUILLOU, M.-J. Le Mystere du Pere, Paris, Fayard, 1973, p. 118.

178. LETHEL, F.-M. op. cit. p. 82, n. 39.

179. GARRIGUES, J.-M. Maxime le Confesseur. La charite avenir divin de l' homme, p. 171.

180. HEINZER, F. Gottes Sohn als Mensch, Die Struktur des Menscheins Christi bei Maximus Confessor, pp. 70-116. His distinction formal-material with regard to Composite Hypostasis is very useful.

181. LEONTIUS OF BYZANTIUM. Adversus Argumenta Severi, PG 86, 1945B-D.

182. HEINZER, F. op. cit. p. 81.

183. LEONTIUS OF JERUSALEM. Adversus Nestorianos, PG 86, 1485A-1488B.

184. Ibid., 1485D.

185. LEONTIUS OF JERUSALEM. Adversus Nestorianos, PG 86, 1568AB.

186. LEONITUS OF JERUSALEM. Adversus Nestorianos et Eutychianos, PG 86, 1280A.

187. Idem. Adversus Argumenta Severi, PG 86, 1945BC.

188. LEONTIUS OF JERUSALEM. Adversus Nestorianos, PG 86, 1568AB.

189. Ibid., 1568BC.

190. Ibid.

191. For a more extended treatment of these themes, vide HEINZER, F. op. cit. pp. 94-108.

192. LEONTIUS OF BYZANTIUM. Adversus Argumenta Severi, PG 86, 1921A.

193. LEONTIUS OF JERUSALEM. Adversus Nestorianos, 1,20, PG 86, 1485D. Vide Ep. 15, PG 91, 560BC where we find Maximus co-ordinating the two ideas.

194. In the Adversus Argumenta Severi (PG 86, 1916D-1917A) Leontius of Byzantium asks himself whether the nature assumed was τήν ἐν τῷ εἴδει θεωρουμένην or τήν ἐν τῷ ἀτόμῳ and he concludes that the λόγος of nature is the same in either case, ἁπλῶς or ἔν τινι ; it is not modified by the hypostatic actuation. Many individual beings participating in one specific nature do not divide it; one being's participation in several natures does not mix them (1917B). In fact Maximus will point out that the unity and diversity are in direct proportion, the greater the unity the greater the diversity (Opusc. 7, PG 91, 97A). The humanity assumed by the Logos is one and the same nature in which all men share as the nature in an individual. HEINZER; op. cit. p. 74, tackles OTTO, S. for suggesting that Leontius means an individual nature, pointing out that he confuses ἄτομον with φύσις ἐν ἀτόμῳ . Leontius reminds us that φύσις ἐν ἀτόμῳ does not imply a second hypostasis in Christ (1917B). The humanity has not existed before; it exists [redacted] only as an assumed nature in the hypostasis of the Logos, thereby acquiring its individuality. The humanity of Christ becomes singular in the assuming person which makes it such by allowing it to have singular characteristics. DOUCET, (op. cit. p. 211) acutely remarks that the twofold function of subsistence with regard to the human nature of Christ can be aligned with the two notions of hypostasis used by Maximus, that of Basil, 'a nature with particular characteristics' and that of Leontius of Byzantium, 'a subsistent by itself'. With regard to the status of the nature assumed, he points out that ordinarily, the Fathers speak of

the assumption of a complete nature without making precise whether it is universal or particular (op. cit. p. 212) and he rightly says that the thought of Maximus oscillates between the notion of nature as an ensemble of logoi and the whole nature embracing individuals (op. cit. p. 209).

195. PG 91, 60C.

196. Vide HEINZER, F. op. cit. pp. 133-139 for a painstaking elaboration of this.

197. GARRIGUES, J.M. 'La Personne composee du Christ d'apres saint Maxime le Confesseur', pp. 202-203.

198. Opusc. 4, PG 91, 61B.

199. Ep. 15, PG 91, 560BC.

200. Ambig. PG 91, 1037A.

201. Emphasis on the 'gnoseological' character of the particularities of the humanity of Christ should not distract us from their ontological foundation in His hypostasis.

202. Vide Pyrr. PG 91, 290A-C.

203. Vide Appendix IV.

204. The expression is VON BALTHASAR's.

205. Ambig. PG 91, 1072AB.

206. Ibid., 1072C.

207. Pyrr. PG 91, 348A.

208. Vide ibid., 348C.

209. Ep. 15. PG 91, 557A-C.

210. Vide PRESTIGE, G.L. op. cit. pp. 242-264.

211. Vide Opusc. 9, PG 91, 121AB.

212. This seems to be the guiding principle in the work of DOUCET, M. La Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus. Vide p. 67.

213. Pyrr. PG 91, 352B. Cf. DENZINGER-SCHONMETZER, n. 294 : Agit enim utraque forma cum alterius communione quod proprium est.

214. Pyrr. PG 91, 352B.

215. Pyrr. PG 91, 352B.

216. Ambig. PG 91, 1052C.

217. Cf. SCHONBORN, C.VON. L'Icone du Christ, pp. 122-123.

218. Vide Epistola Synodica, PG 87, 3169D. Vide SCHONBORN, C.VON. Sophrone de Jerusalem, Vie Monastique et Confession Dogmatique, pp. 215-216, for commentary on this passage.

219. Pyrr. PG 91, 345C.

220. Pyrr. PG 91, 345C-348B.

221. Ambig. PG 91, 1056D-1057A.

222. Vide Ep. 19, PG 91, 593AB; Opusc. 20, PG 91, 232AB; Pyrr. PG 91, 345D.

223. Cf. Ambig. PG 91, 1060A-C.

224. Vide DOUCET, M. op. cit. p. 468. Vide SOPHRONIS, Epistola Synodica, PG 87,3,3177BC, who has the same distinction.

225. SCHONBORN, C.VON. L'Icone du Christ, p. 123.

226. Opusc. 10, PG 91, 137A.

227. Vide Pyrr. PG 91, 290A-C.

228. Pyrr. PG 91, 289B.

229. Pyrr. PG 91, 292B-D.

230. DOUCET, M. op. cit. p. 129 quotes BECK, H.G. with approval.

231. Opusc. 3, PG 91, 53C.

232. DOUCET, M. La Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus, Introduction, texte, critique, traductions et notes (an unpublished thesis) Montreal, 1972, vide p. 149. This is, perhaps, the finest piece of Maximian study to have appeared in recent times. It is a model of exact scholarship. What it may lack in sparkle, it makes up in reliability. It becomes a subject of disagreement only where the thought of Maximus and its interpretation by scholars becomes intrinsically obscure, as, for instance where to place the emphasis with regard to the relationship of nature and person.

233. Vide op. cit. p. 155.

234. Vide op. cit. p. 156.

235. Opusc. 1, PG 91, 21D.

236. Pyrr. PG 91, 293BC.

237. Vide DALMAIS, H.-I. 'Le vocabulaire des activites intellectuelles, volontaires et spirituelles dans l'anthropologie de S. Maxime le Confesseur', pp. 193-197.

238. Vide SHERWOOD, P. St. Maximus the Confessor, The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on Charity, pp. 55-63.

239. Vide DOUCET, M. op. cit. pp. 169-190.

240. Ibid., p. 189.

241. For an authoritative essay on the human act, both with regard to the sources of the teaching of Maximus and to his influence as well as a commentary on the elements of the process as he understands it, vide GAUTHIER, R.-A. 'S. Maxime le Confesseur et la psychologie de l'acte humain'. Rescherches de Theologie Ancienne et Medievale (21) 1954, pp. 51-100.

242. Pyrr. PG 91, 293B-C.

243. Vide GAUTHIER, R.-A. op. cit. pp. 71-82 for an account of the stages in the human act. Cf. DOUCET, M. op. cit. pp. 355-382. These references apply the following citations from the works of Maximus.

244. Vide Opusc. 1, PG 91, 29A.

245. Ibid., 17C.

246. Vide Pyrr. PG 91, 308A-309A. For a full discussion on γνώμη vide DOUCET, M. op. cit. pp. 374-378.

247. Pyrr. PG 91, 308C.

248. Cf. DOUCET, M. op. cit. p. 376.

249. Pyrr. PG 91, 297D-300A.

250. Vide Opusc. 19, PG 91, 220B-221C.

251. Opusc. 16, PG 91, 192BC.

252. BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. Liturgie Cosmique, p. 198. Vide e.g. Pyrr. PG 91, 297D.

253. Pyrr. PG 91, 309A.

254. Vide LETHEL, F.-M. Theologie de L'Agonie du Christ, la liberte humaine du Fils de Dieu et son importance soteriologique mises en lumiere par Saint Maxime Confesseur (Theologie Historique 52) Paris, Editions Beauchesne, 1979. This is an elegant piece of work, characterized by an admirable Gallic clarity. The only qualifications that it calls for are again in those areas that do not yield easily to analysis and where the periti disagree.

255. Opusc. 6, PG 91, 65A-68D.

256. LETHEL, F.-M. op. cit. p. 92.

257. Ibid., p. 93.

258. GREGORY OF NAZIANZEN. Ep. 101, PG 37, 181C.

259. LETHEL, F.-M. op. cit. p. 99, reminds us that Maximus is careful to say that Christ obeys His Father so that the harmony between the two wills in Christ is lived in His relationship to His Father and not in relationship between himself as man and Himself as God. cf. THOMAS AQUINAS. Summa Theologica, 3,20,a 2.

260. Vide PG 91, 396C-399B.

261. Or. Dom. PG 90, 901C.

262. Vide GARRIGUES, J.M. Maxime le Confesseur, la charite avenir divin de l'homme, pp. 130-138, for suggestions as to how Maximus understands this in Christ and its communication to men. His view of the 'created imprint' of the Hypostasis on the humanity of Christ needs further elaboration. Cf. Idem, 'L'energie divine et la grace chez Maxime le Confesseur'. Istina, 1974, pp. 272-296.

# CHAPTER VI - FOOTNOTES

1 Or. Dom. PG 90, 884A-905B.

2 In the following revision of Part II, I shall refer to the five sections of Maximus' exposition by the numbers used in this scheme, e.g. (1).

3 Or. Dom. PG 90, 884A-896A.

4 Ibid., 896A-897A.

5 Ibid., 897A-900D.

6 Ibid., 900D-904B.

7 Ibid., 904B-905B.

8 Vide THUNBERG, L. op. cit. pp. 244-349 for a thorough treatment of this aspect of Maximus' teaching. Vide too the excellent series of articles on various aspects of Maximus' teaching by DALMAIS, I.-H., in which he deals with his anthropology, especially: 'La doctrine spirituelle de saint Maxime le Confesseur d'apres le Liber Asceticus'. Irenikon (26) 1953, pp. 17-39; 'Un traite contemplative: le commentaire du Pater Noster de saint Maxime le Confesseur'. Revue d' Ascetique et de Mystique (29) pp. 123-159; 'L'anthropologie spirituelle de saint Maxime le Confesseur'. Recherches et Debats (36) 1961, pp. 202-211; RANTOSAVLIEVITS, A. To Mysterion tes soterias kata ton hagion Maximon ton Homologeton, Athens, 1975, presents the ascetical teaching of Maximus in a lucid and orderly fashion. Vide especially pp. 125-158.

9 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 253C.

10 Carit. 3, 40, PG 90, 1028D-1029A.

11 Ibid., 2, 16, PG 90, 988D-989A.

12 Ibid., 1, 92, PG 90, 981B.

13 Qu. Thal. 472D.

14 Carit. 1, 67, PG 90, 973D.

15 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 461A.

16 The best study of this aspect of Maximus' teaching is that of HAUSERR, I. Philautie, De la tendresse pour soi a la charite, selon saint Maxime le Confesseur. For the genesis of φιλαυτία and its spawning of the other passions, vide pp. 57-83.

17 Carit. 2, 59, PG 90, 1004B.

18 Ibid., 4, 37, PG 90, 1056C.

19 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 260D.

20 Vide Or. Dom. PG 90, 896C.

21 Vide Carit. 3, 64, PG 90, 1036C.

22 Ibid.

23 Cap. Theol. 1, 15, PG 90, 1088D-1089A.

24 Ep. 4, PG 91, 413B.

25 Ibid., 413D.

26 Or. Dom. PG 90, 885A.

27 Vide Carit. 1, 66, PG 90, 973C.

28 Vide Cap. Theol. 1, 15, PG 90, 1088D. Cf. Carit. 1, 48, PG 90, 969BC; ibid., 3, 14, PG 90, 1020D.

29 Carit. 1, 80, PG 90, 977C.

30 Ibid., 1, 61, PG 90, 973A(S).

31 Ibid., 3, 43, PG 90, 1029B(S).

32 Ep. 14, PG 91, 537D-540A.

33 Carit. 1, 81, PG 90, 977CD.

34 Ibid., 2, 33, PG 90, 996AB.

35 Vide ibid., 32, PG 90, 993D-996A.

36 Carit. 2, 20, PG 90, 989C(S).

37 Ibid., 2, 71, PG 90, 1008A(S).

38 Ibid., 2, 85, PG 90, 1012BC.

39 Ibid., 3, 94, PG 90, 1045B.

40 Vide ibid., 3, 93, PG 90, 1045B.

41 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Le vocabulaire des activites intellectuelles, volontaires et spirituelles dans l'anthropologie de S. Maxime le Confesseur' pp. 193-197. I am indebted to this splendid article for much of what follows in this paragraph.

42 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 313A.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., 313B.

45 Ibid., 316A.

46 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 281B.

47 Vide Carit. 1, 3, PG 90, 961B; Cf. Qu. Thal. PG 90, 448B.

48 Vide Ep. 2, PG 91, 396B-D.

49 Vide Carit. 3, 43, PG 90, 1029B. Cf. Qu. Thal. PG 90, 260D.

50 Vide Carit. 2, 33, PG 90, 996AB.

51 Vide Ep. 2, PG 91, 400AB; ibid., 404B-D.

52 Carit. 4, 37, PG 90, 1056C.

53 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Un traite de theologie contemplative, Le Commentaire du Pater de S. Maxime le Confesseur', p. 139.

54 Or. Dom. PG 90, 885AB; ibid., 888C-892A.

55 Ibid., 892A.

56 Ibid.

57 For an elaboration of these observations, vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Le vocabulaire des activites intellectuelles, volontaires et spirituelles dans l'anthropologie de S. Maxime le Confesseur', pp. 190-197.

58 Vide MEYENDORFF, J. 'Free Will ( γνώμη ) in Saint Maximus the Confessor'. The Ecumenical World of Orthodox Civilization (3) pp. 71-75.

59 For a more elaborate treatment of this theme, vide BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. Liturgie Cosmique, pp. 221-242. In my handling of this subject, I have concentrated on an analysis of one text in order not to miss the wood for the trees.

60 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1285C-1288A. Vide supra p. 218-219.

61 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 308B.

62 Ibid., 393AB.

63 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 724C.

64 Vide BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. op. cit. p. 222. Maximus says: 'In Christ natural law, written law and the law of grace are summed up' (Qu. Thal. PG 90, 308BC).

65 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 724C-725A.

66 Tob. 4, 16; Mt 7, 12; Lk. 6, 13.

67 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 725AB.

68 We have seen how this is used in the Prologue of the Pater Noster.

69 Mt. 5, 43.

70 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 725CD.

71 Jn 15, 13.

72 Vide ZIZIOULAS, J. 'Human Capacity and Human Incapacity: A Theological Exploration of Personhood', pp. 407-408.

73 Vide Ascet. PG 90, 917B.

74 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 725D-728A.

75 Ambig. PG 91, 1097AB. Vide supra pp. 204 ff. for some reflections on 'Mediation effected in the Church by the Spirit'. There may be a little overlapping with what is there in the following paragraphs, but they have been added for the sake of rounding off this sketch of Maximus' view of how man attains his end.

76 Ibid.

77 Myst. PG 91, 668B.

78 Vita ac Certamen, PG 90, 93D.

79 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 297D-300A.

80 Ibid., 365AB.

81 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 521AB.

82 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 673C. Cf. Ibid., 521B-524A for a fuller statement.

83 Ibid., 605B. Cf. ibid., 608A-C.

84 Ibid.

85 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 280D.

86 Vide SHERWOOD, P. St. Maximus the Confessor, The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on Charity, pp. 78-81; THUNBERG, L. 'Symbol and Mystery in St. Maximus the Confessor. With particular reference to the doctrine of eucharistic presence'. Maximus Confessor, HEINZER, F. & SCHONBORN, C. (eds.) pp. 285-308.

87 Cap. Theol. 1, 81, PG 90, 1120B(S).

88 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 281B.

89 Or. Dom. PG 90, 872D-873C.

90 Ibid.. 873C-876C.

91 Ibid., 876A.

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid., 873D-876A.

94 Vide BALTHASAR H.U.VON. Liturgie Cosmique, pp. 253-265.

95 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Un traite de theologie contemplative, le commentaire du Pater de S. Maxime le Confesseur', p. 125.

96 Or. Dom. PG 90, 876A.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid.

99 Ibid., 876B.

100 Ibid., 881AB.

101 Ibid., 881B.

102 PG 90, 1065A.

103 Vide Myst. PG 91, 672D-673B.

104 Vide Expositio Orationis Dominicae, PG 90, 881B.

105 Cap. Theol. PG 90, 1085CD.

106 Vide Myst. PG 90, 680B.

107 Ep. 2, PG 91, 396C.

108 Ibid.

109 Vide Or. Dom. PG 90, 889A.

110 Vide Appendix IV.

111 Ep. 2, PG 91, 396C.

112 Ibid., 396BC.

113 Or. Dom. PG 90, 884A.

114 Or. Dom. PG 90, 881B-884A.

115 Vide ORIGEN. De Oratione, PG 11, 415.

116 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 469A.

117 Or. Dom. PG 90, 905BD.

118 Ibid., 905C.

119 Vide VILLER, M. 'Aux sources de la spiritualite de S. Maxime, les oeuvres d'Evagre le Pontique', pp. 251-252, n. 161 for a note on προσευχή as distinct from δέησις in Origen and Evagrius. The analogical character of αἴτησις in the Pater Noster is based on the petitionary character of the 'Our Father'.

120 Or. Dom. PG 90, 905D-908D.

121 This is obvious from the conjunction of βλέπω and ἀγαπάω.

122 Vide infra.

123 Carit. PG 90, 1000C.

124 Vide BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. Liturgie Cosmique, pp. 261-265.

125 Or. Dom. PG 90, 908D.

126 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 329B-336C. Cf. Carit. 1, 97, PG 90, 981D; ibid., 3, 97, PG 90, 1045D. For the dependence of Maximus on Evagrius for this triad and the corresponding πραχτική, φυσική καί θεολογία , vide VILLER, M. op. cit. pp. 164-166. It can be said summarily that ἀγάπη plays a more fundamental part in the theology of Maximus than in that of Evagrius, so that the dependence, which Viller discerns and illustrates so ably, needs to be more qualified than he allows. Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'L'heritage evagrien dans la synthese de saint Maxime le Confesseur'. Studia Patristica (8) Berlin, 1966, pp. 356-363.

127 Ambig. PG 91, 1285A. I am indebted to VILLER, M. op. cit. pp. 162-166, for his citations, which I use in the rest of this paragraph.

128 Carit. 2,26, PG 90, 992B.

129 Ibid., 2, 28, PG 90, 992D.

130 Ibid., 3, 44, PG 90, 1029B.

131 Ibid., 2, 6, PG 90, 985AB.

132 Ibid., 2, 55, 1001CD.

133 Ibid., 2, 26, PG 90, 992B.

134 Ambig. PG 91, 1285A.

135 Ibid., 1285B.

136 Carit. 2, 5, PG 90, 985A.

137 Myst. PG 91, 673B.

138 Cap. Theol. 1, 98, PG 90, 1124B.

139 Carit. 4, 57, PG 90, 1061A.

140 Vide Carit. 4, 70, PG 90, 1065A.

141 Carit. 4, 44, PG 90, 1057B.

142 Carit. 4, 70, PG 90, 1065A.

143 Ibid., 1, 94, PG 90, 981BC.

144 Ibid., 2, 7, PG 90, 985BC.

145 Ibid., 1, 94, PG 90, 981BC.

146 Ibid., 1, 78, PG 90, 977BC.

147 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 293D-296A.

148 Carit. 1, 97, PG 90, 981D.(S).

149 Ibid., (S).

150 BORNERT, R. 'Les commentaires byzantines de la divine liturgie du VII$^{e}$ au XV$^{e}$ siecle', Paris, 1966, p. 93. I have relied on his synthesis of Maximian texts, ibid., pp. 90-97 in writing the next two paragraphs. For Maximian references to μυσταγωγία , vide Ambig. PG 91, 1233C; ibid., 1409B; ibid., 1320D; ibid., 1236A.

151 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1285A.

152 Ibid., 1160A.

153 Vide BORNERT, R. op. cit. p.93.

154 Carit. 1, 97, PG 90, 981D.

155 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 372C.

156 Below I suggest that this may be a distinction between acquired and infused contemplation, terms from a later and different tradition. Maximus says that the former comes from fear and hope, while the latter comes from love. While charity can be the mean of empirical knowledge of God, fear and hope would seem to require another kind of 'presence' which would be genuine, as Maximus assures his reader in Carit. 2, 6, but which would not seem to be its own guarantee as is the case in mystical knowledge in the strict sense, that mediated by ἀγάπη .

157 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 608B.

158 Ibid., 737A.

159 Vide Carit. 3, 97, PG 90, 1045D.

160 Ibid.(S).

161 Ascet. PG 90, 925D-928A.

162 Carit. 3, 44, PG 90, 1029B.

163 Ibid., 1, 94, PG 90, 981BC.

164 Ibid., 4, 86, PG 90, 1069B.

165 Ibid., 2, 1, PG 90, 984B.

166 Ibid., 2, 61, PG 90, 1004CD.

167 Myst. PG 91, 676C.

168 Vide GARRIGUES, J.M. Maxime le Confesseur, la charite avenir divin de l'homme, pp. 176-199.

169 Carit. 2, 27, PG 90, 992CD.

170 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 329A; ibid., 332A.

171 Ibid., 245B.

172 Carit. 2, 6, PG 90, 985AB.

173 Ibid., 3, 49, PG 90, 1032B.

174 Ambig. PG 91, 1168AB.

175 Vide PUECH, H.-C. 'La tenebre mystique chez le Pseudo-Denys l'Areopagite et dans la tradition patristique'. Etudes Carmelitaines, 23 annee, vol. 1, 1938, pp. 33-53.

176 Cap. Theol. 1, 84, PG 90, 1117C.

177 Ibid., 1, 39, PG 90, 1097C.

178 Or. Dom. PG 90, 877C.

179 Vide DALMAIS, I.-H. 'Le vocabulaire des activites intellectuelles, volontaires et spirituelles dans l'anthropologie de S. Maxime le Confesseur', p. 190.

180 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 621C-624A.

181 Ambig. PG 91, 1112D-1113A.

182 Carit. 2, 6, PG 91, 985AB.

183 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90, 621C-624A.

184 TORRANCE, T.F. Theology in Reconciliation, London, Geoffrey Chapman 1975, p. 248.

185 Qu. Thal. PG 90, 624A.

186 Cap. Theol. 2, 74, PG 90, 1160A.

187 DIONYSIUS, the Pseudo-Areopagite. Ep. 1, PG 3, 1065A.

188 Ambig. PG 91, 1116D. Vide BALTHASAR, H.U.VON. Liturgie Cosmique, 253-265.

## EPILOGUE - FOOTNOTES

1 Vide Ambig. PG 91, 1345D.

2 Vide ibid., 1088C

3 Vide Myst. PG 91, 688C-697B.

4 Vide ibid., 688CD.

5 Vide ibid., 688D-689B.

6 Vide ibid., 689BC.

7 Vide ibid., 689C.

8 Vide ibid., 689D-692A.

9 Vide ibid., 692A-C.

10 Vide ibid., 692D-693B.

11 Vide ibid., 693BC.

12 Vide ibid., 693CD.

13 Vide ibid., 693D-696A.

14 Vide ibid., 696AB.

15 Vide ibid., 696BC.

16 Vide ibid., 696CD.

17 Vide ibid., 696D-697A.

18 Vide ibid., 697A.

# APPENDIX I

Chronological Table of the Life of St. Maximus the Confessor, taking into account the possible variations suggested by the Syriac Life and Chronicles.

| | Vita, Opera, etc. | Syriac Life & Chronicles |
|---|---|---|
| 579 | Birth | |
| | Early life at Constantinople; entered monastery of Chrysopolis. | Early life in Palestine; entered Palaia Lavra. |
| 617 | Anastasius becomes his disciple. | |
| | Went to Cyzicus? | Moved to Jerusalem, then to Cyzicus. |
| 626 | Went into exile from Chrysopolis/Cyzicus; Vists Crete. | |
| 628 | No longer near John the Chamberlain. | |
| 630 | Arrives in Africa. | |
| 632 | Already in Africa. | |
| 633 | Possibly in Alexandria with Sophronius. Pact of Union of Cyrus and later the Psephos of Sergius. | Between 633 and 641, returns to Syria-Palestine. |
| 638 | Ecthesis of Heraclius and Sergius. | In Syria after the Ecthesis of 638. |
| 641 | Returns to Africa. | |
| 645 | Dispute with Pyrrhus. | |
| 646 | Goes to Rome. | |
| 647 | Typos of Constans. | |
| 649 | Lateran Synod. | |
| 652 | went to Constantinople to propagate the decrees of the Lateran Synod. | |
| 653 | Taken to Constantinople with Pope Martin I. | |
| 654 | First Trial; exiled to Bizya. | |

656 Attempts to suborn Maximus;
transferred to Rhegium;
further pressures.
Back to Constantinople.

662 Final Trial; exiled to Lazica. Death on the 10th of August.

# APPENDIX II

## Expositio Orationis Dominicae - A Literal Translation*

872D I received my Master himself, protected by God, who comes to me through his most praiseworthy letters. Indeed, he is always present in spirit and cannot absent
873A himself completely; and yet he does not avoid coming to the help of his servants in imitation of God by the abundance of his virtue and through the occasion that God provided by nature.

Therefore, marvelling at the greatness of his condescension, I have mingled fear with affection in his regard and have formed from the two, fear and affection, one charity consisting of reverence and goodwill, so that fear stripped of affection may not become hatred, nor affection unaccompanied by prudent fear become contempt. So, charity should appear as the inner law of love and appropriate everything related to it by nature: by goodwill it masters hatred and by reverence it dispels
873B contempt. The blessed David, recognizing in addition that it, I mean fear, is a constituent of divine charity, says: 'The fear of the Lord is chaste and lasts from age to age' (Ps. 19,9), that is he knew that this is different from the fear that consists in the dread of punishment because of crimes. Indeed, the one is expelled, disappearing entirely by the presence of charity, as the great evangelist John shows somewhere when he says: 'Charity casts out fear' (I John 4, 18); the other characterizes naturally the law of true love. By reverence it preserves for ever for the saints entirely without corruption the norm and mode of charity towards God and towards one another.

873C And I, as I have said, mixing fear with affection, have laid down this law of charity in regard to my Master up to this day: restrained from writing through reverence lest contempt should occur, I am moved to write by goodwill so that an honourable refusal to write may not be considered to be hatred. Bidden to do this, I write not whatever thoughts occur to me because 'the thoughts of men are worthless' (Wisd. 9, 14) according to Scripture, but whatever God wills and grants by grace for effecting what is profitable. 'For the counsel of the Lord', says David, 'lasts for ever; the thoughts of his heart from generation to generation' (Ps. 33, 11).

---

* The Greek text from which the translation is made is that of Migne, Patrologia Graeca XC, 872D-908D. The English version of the scriptural citations is mine, apart from the formula of the Pater Noster which is that of the Roman liturgical usage. This accounts for translating as 'daily' in 897A.

Perhaps he means by the counsel of God the Father the ineffable self-emptying of the only-begotten Son (Cf. Phil. 2, 7) for the deification of our nature by
873D which he sets a limit to all the ages. By the 'thoughts of his heart' he means the principles of his Providence and Judgement, by which He wisely regulates our present and future life as different generations, appropriately allotting to each the mode of activity that becomes it.

If then the work of the divine counsel is the deification of our nature and if the purpose of the divine thoughts is the leading of our life to the goal of what is sought, then it is profitable to know and to experi-
876A ence and so to write duly about the power of the Lord's prayer. But since my Master, in writing to me his own servant, moved by God, remembered particularly this prayer which I make of necessity the subject matter of my words, I ask the Lord, the teacher of this prayer, to open my mind to the apprehension of the mysteries it contains and to give me commensurate discourse for the clear expression of the ideas. For it contains the whole scope in sum mystically concealed in its language or, to put it more properly, clearly proclaimed to those who are robust in mind. Indeed, the language of the prayer contains the petition of all the things of which the Word of God, having emptied himself, became the author through his flesh. It teaches us to lay
876B claim to the benefits of which the God and Father alone, through the natural mediation of his Son in the Holy Spirit, is truly the giver. For, according to the divine Apostle, the Lord Jesus is 'the mediater between God and men' (I Tim. 2, 5), making the Father, who is unknown, manifest to men through the flesh. He brings the men who were reconciled in him through the Spirit to the Father (Cf. Eph. 2, 18). Being made man without changing for them and on their account, he becomes the author and teacher of so many new mysteries that reason cannot in any measure comprehend their multitude and their magnitude.

There are seven in number more general than the rest, which he obviously gave to men in keeping with his singular generosity. The scope of the prayer, as I said, contains their power in a mystical way:
876C theology, sonship in grace, equality of honour with the angels, a share in eternal life, the restoration of nature to dispassionate inclination to itself, the destruction of the law of sin and the abolition of the tyranny of the Evil One who mastered us by deceit.

Let us examine the truth of what has been said. In fact, the Word of God made flesh teaches theology in that in himself he reveals the Father and the Holy Spirit. For the whole Father and the whole Holy Spirit were substantially and perfectly in the whole Son, even made flesh, even although they themselves were not made flesh. The former delighted in and the latter co-operated with the Son who himself effected the incarna-
876D tion. For the Word remained in possession of his

intelligence and his life and was comprehended by no one at all in substance except by the Father alone and the Spirit and effected the hypostatic union with the flesh because of his love for man.

877A He gives adoptive sonship, conferring through the Spirit in grace from above the birth which transcends nature. The protection and preservation of this in God is the free choice of those born. This loves with a sincere disposition the given grace and by the practice of the commandments carefully adorns the beauty given through the grace and by an emptying of the passions it lays claim to divinity to such an extent as the Word of God himself, having emptied himself voluntarily of his own pure glory by economy, became and was truly a man.

He has made men of equal dignity with the angels, not only because, 'having pacified through the blood of His Cross...things in heaven and things
877B on earth' (Col. 1, 20), and having made ineffectual the hostile powers that fill the middle place between heaven and earth, He showed that as regards the distribution of divine gifts the festal gathering of earthly and heavenly powers was one because human nature joins in singing with great joy the glory of God in one and the same will with the powers on high; but also because after the fulfilment of the economy on our behalf and having ascended with the body He had assumed, He united heaven and earth through Himself and joined the sensibles to the intelligibles and showed the created nature to be one in the extremes of its parts, bound to itself by virtue and the full knowledge of the First Cause. He shows, I think, by what he did mystically, how, on the one hand the Logos is the union of what is separated and
877C on the other how the absence of the Logos is the separation of what is united. Let us learn, then to strive for the Logos through virtuous activity in order to be united not only to the angels in virtue, but to God in gnosis by detachment from things. ?

He imparts a share of the divine life by making Himself eatable in a way that He himself understands; so do they who have received from him such intellectual sense, that, by the taste of this food, they know in accurate knowledge truly that 'the Lord is good'. (Ps. 34, 8). It is He who imbues those who eat with a divine quality so that they may be deified, in as much as He clearly is and is called the bread of life and strength. (Cf. Jn. 6, 48; Ps. 78, 25).

877D He restores nature to itself, not only because He was made man and preserved free-will passionless and without revolt in its relation to nature, nor was it shaken at all from its proper basis in nature against those who crucified Him, but rather, on the contrary, it chose death instead of life on their behalf, by which the voluntary character of

880A the passion, ratified by the philanthropic disposition of the one who suffered, is shown; but rather in that he annulled the hatred by nailing to the cross the record of the sin by which nature was implacably at war with itself (Cf. Col. 2, 14). Having called those who were far away and those who were near, that is obviously those who were under the law and those who were outside the law and having broken the wall of partition, that is having clarified the law of the commandments with his decrees, he created the two into one new man, making peace (Cf. Eph. 2, 14-18) and reconciling us through Himself to the Father and to one another, no longer having the will at loggerheads with the principle of nature; rather, we would be immutable in free-will as well as in nature.

He constitutes nature free from the law of sin
880B by not allowing pleasure to precede His incarnation for our sakes. For his conception has taken place paradoxically without semen and his birth was supernaturally without corruption. This means that when God was born, he tightened the bonds of the virginity of his Mother by a birth that transcended nature. He frees all nature from the power of the law which dominated it in those who are willing and who imitate His self-chosen death by the mortification of their earthly members with regard to sense. (Cf. Col. 3, 5). For the mystery of salvation is for the willing, not for the coerced.

He works the destruction of the tyranny of the Evil One who dominated us by deceit: casting the
880C flesh that was vanquished in Adam at him as a weapon, He overcame him. In order to show that what was previously captured for death conquers the conqueror and destroys his life by a natural death, it became on the one hand a poison to him in order that he may vomit up all those whom he had swallowed when he held sway in having the power of death (Cf. Heb. 2, 14); on the other hand, it became life to the human race by impelling the whole nature to rise like dough to resurrection of life. (Cf. Rom. 11, 15-16; I Cor. 5, 6-7). It was for this especially that the Logos who is God becomes man - a truly
881A strange fact and piece of news - and voluntarily accepts the death of the flesh.

As I have said, the text of the prayer will be found to contain the petition of all these things. For it speaks of the Father, of the Name of the Father and of the Kingdom. Besides, it presents the one who prays as being a son of this Father by grace. It asks that those in heaven and those on earth should become of one will. It commands me to ask for substantial bread. It prescribes reconciliation for men and binds nature to itself by forgiving and being forgiven, not being hacked asunder by the

differences of free-will. It teaches us to ask not to enter into temptation which is the law of sin, and it recommends the avoidance of evil. For it was
881B fitting that the author and giver of the benefits should also be a teacher to those who believe in Him and imitate his conduct in the flesh, providing the words of this prayer as precepts of life. Through these he revealed the hidden treasures of wisdom and knowledge that really exist in Him (Cf. Col. 2, 3), clearly impelling the desire of those who pray to enjoy them.

Because of this, I think, Scripture has called this teaching 'prayer', containing as it does the petition of gifts given through grace by God to men. For thus our divinely inspired Fathers described prayer by defining it as a petition for those things which God naturally gives to men in a way that
881C befits Him, just as a vow is, in turn, an undertaking, that is a promise of what men, who worship sincerely, offer to God. They adduce, besides, the Scripture which bears this out in many places in its own words, for instance: 'Make vows and render them to the Lord our God' (Ps. 76, 11.LXX), and 'As much as I have vowed, I will render to you my Saviour, my Lord' (Jonah 2, 10.LXX). These things are said of vows; and again with regard to prayer, for instance: 'And Anna prayed to the Lord saying: "Lord God, God of hosts, if listening you will hear your servant and give me fruit of the womb"' (Cf. I Sam. 1, 11), and 'Hezekiah the king of Judah and Isaiah, son of Amos the prophet, prayed to the Lord' (Cf. 2 Chr. 32, 20), and also what was said by the Lord to his disciples: 'When you pray, say: "Our Father who art in heaven"'
881D (Matt. 6, 9; Luke 11, 2). So a vow is the voluntary decision of the one who made the vow to observe the commandments; prayer, on the other hand, is a petition by the one who has observed them for renewal with reference to the good things observed, or, rather, a vow is the struggle of virtue, an offering which God accepts with greatest goodwill and
884A prayer is the reward of virtue which God very gladly gives in return.

Accordingly, since it has been shown that prayer is a request for the benefits given by the incarnate Logos, let us make Him our leader who is the teacher of the formula of the prayer and go forward boldly, exposing carefully by contemplation the meaning of each word, in so far as it is possible; indeed, the Logos himself is wont to equip us to our advantage and gives us the ability to take in the meaning of the One who says: 'Our Father, who art in heaven, hallowed by Thy name; Thy kingdom come' (Matt. 6, 9-10). Straight away the Lord teaches those who pray in these words to begin duly from 'theology', and being by essence the
884B Cause of beings, He initiates them into the mode of

existence of the creative Cause of beings. For the words of the prayer contain a manifestation of the Father, of the Name of the Father and of the Kingdom of the Father, so that we might be taught from the very beginning to venerate, invoke and adore the unique Trinity. For the Name of the God and Father subsists essentially and is the only-begotten Son; the Kingdom of the God and Father subsists essentially and is the Holy Spirit. For what Matthew here calls 'Kingdom', another one of the evangelists has elsewhere called 'Holy Spirit', saying: 'Let your Holy Spirit come and purify us' (Cf. Luke 11, 2). For the Father does not have the Name as something acquired nor, indeed, do we understand the Kingdom as a dignity that was considered to have been added to Him, for He did not
884C commence to be in order to commence also to be a Father or a King, but being always, He is always both Father and King, having neither in any way at all commenced to be, nor to be Father nor King. And if He is always, then He is also both Father and King and therefore the Son and the Holy Spirit have always co-subsisted essentially with the Father, being from Him and naturally in Him, above cause and reason, but they are not subsequent to Him, as if coming to be afterwards through a cause. For relationship possesses the power of simultaneously demonstrating the terms of which it is and is said to be a relation, without allowing them to be thought of as one subsequent to the other.

When we begin this prayer, then, we are led to honour the consubstantial and superessential Trinity as the creative cause of our coming into being. And
884D besides, we are taught to proclaim the grace of our filial adoption, deemed worthy to call the Creator by nature Father by grace. Thus, reverencing the invocation of the Begetter by grace, we should strive to exhibit in our lives the characteristics of the parent, hallowing his name on earth and taking after
885A Him as a Father; we should show ourselves to be children by our actions and magnify by what we think or do the author of this adoption as sons, the Son of the Father by nature.

But we hallow the Name of the Father by grace, who is in heaven, by clearly mortifying the desire for material things and by purifying ourselves of corrupting passions, since holiness is the immobility and mortification of sense desire. When we arrive at that, we hush the unbecoming barkings of the irascible appetite which no longer has the concupiscible appetite stimulating it and persuading it to fight for the pleasures that are dear to it, since it is already mortified by the holiness that is in keeping with reason. Indeed, the irascible appetite,
885B being by nature the vindicator of the concupiscible appetite, naturally ceases to rage whenever it sees the latter mortified.

Suitably then, by the rejection of aggression and desire in keeping with the prayer, the power of the Kingdom of the God and Father comes for those who, after the repudiation of these things, have become worthy to say: 'Thy Kingdom come', (Matt. 6, 10), referring to the Holy Spirit; already they have been made temples for God by means of the Spirit through the principle and mode of meekness. (Cf. Eph. 2, 21-22). For, He says, 'On whom shall I rest but on the meek and on the humble and on him who fears my words?' (Cf. Isa. 66, 2). Consequently, it is clear from this that the Kingdom of the God
885C and Father belongs to the humble and to the meek. Indeed, he says: 'Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth' (Matt. 5, 5). God did not promise as a heritage to those who love Him this earth which, by nature, holds the middle position of the universe, since he speaks the truth in saying: 'For when they shall arise from the dead they shall take neither husband nor wife, but they shall be like the angels in heaven' (Matt. 22, 30), and 'Come you blessed of my Father, you shall inherit the Kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world' (Matt. 25, 34), and elsewhere again to another who served with goodwill, 'Enter into the joy of your Lord' (Matt. 25, 21). And after Him the divine Apostle says: 'For the trumpet will sound and the dead in Christ will rise first incorruptible. Then we the living who are left shall be borne away with them in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air and thus we shall be with the Lord for ever' (Cf. I Cor. 15, 52; I Thess. 4, 16-17).

885D Since such promises were for those who love the Lord, who then, if he gives his mind only to the word of Scripture and if he is moved by reason and longs to be a servant of reason, would say that the heaven and the kingdom prepared from the foundation of the world and the joy of the Lord mystically hidden away and the continual and entirely uninterrupted dwelling and abiding of the worthy with the Lord are in some way identical with the earth? But now I think that 'earth' means that habit and power of immutability that is stable and cannot be
888A deflected from the good, which belongs to the meek man. This means that he exists always with the Lord and has unfailing joy, having received the kingdom prepared from the beginning and having been deemed worthy of a place and position in heaven. He has taken possession, then, of the principle of virtue just like the 'earth', the middle position of the universe. In keeping with this, the meek man, finding himself between good and ill repute (Cf. 2 Cor. 6, 8), remains impassible, being neither puffed up by the good reports (elated or vainglorious), nor made gloomy by the ill reports. For reason by nature remains free from them; having repulsed the inclination, it is insensible of them when they annoy it with their onslaughts,

having prevented itself from all agitation in their regard and moored the whole power of the soul to the
888B divine and imperturbable liberty. The Lord, desiring to share this with his disciples, says: 'Take my yoke upon you and learn from me, for I am meek and humble of heart and you will find rest for your souls' (Matt. 11, 29). He calls the power of the divine kingdom 'rest' in so far as it produces in those who are worthy a mastery that is freed from all servitude.

If the indestructible power of the inviolable kingdom is given to the humble and the meek, who would be so devoid of love and entirely without longing for the divine benefits as not to desire limitless humility and meekness in order that he might become, in so far as it is possible to man, the imprint of the divine kingdom? He would bear in himself by grace the exact form in spirit of
888C Christ who is truly by nature the great king in essence. In this, the divine Apostle says, 'there is no male and female' (Gal. 3, 28), that is, neither aggressiveness nor concupiscence. The former does away tyranically with the reasoning power and causes the operation of the intellect to be outside the law of nature; the latter causes what is inferior to be more desirable than the one and only desirable and impassible cause and nature; thus it puts more value on the flesh than on the spirit and makes the enjoyment of the sensibles more agreeable than the glory and splendour of the intelligibles. By the soothing character of sense pleasure it hinders the intellect from the divine
888D and connatural grasp of the intelligibles. But, indeed, reason in its singularity, through the advantage of virtue, is stripped of tenderness and affection, which is entirely impassible but which is still natural, for the body. The spirit is still perfectly master of nature, persuading the intellect to forego ethical philosophy when it ought to unite itself to the superessential Logos through simple and indivisible contemplation, even if this contributes naturally to the easy cutting off and transcending of things fleeting in the realm of time. When this transcendence is achieved it is not reasonable that he, who has been shown to be detached from sensibles, should be weighed down with moral living as if it were a sheepskin.

The great Elijah reveals this, having demon-
889A strated this mystery figuratively by what he did. (Cf. 2 Kgs. 2, 11-14). On the one hand, when he was caught up, he gave to Elisha his sheepskin, by which I mean the mortification of the flesh, through which moral decorum is firmly made an ally of the Spirit against every adverse power and a blow against the unstable and fluctuating nature, of which the Jordan was a figure; thus the disciple would not be impeded from crossing to the holy land and would not be overwhelmed by the

turbid and slippery condition of the passionate inclination to material things. On the other hand, he himself, being unrestricted, advanced towards God, absolutely untrammeled in any way in his relation to things, simple in desire and uncomplicated in free-will, he made for his dwelling with Him who is simple by nature by means of interconnected cardinal virtues, yoked together in gnosis like fiery horses. For he knew that a
889B disciple of Christ ought to steer clear of unbalanced dispositions; their difference proves their estrangement: since the passion of concupiscence produces a diffusion of blood about the heart, while the irascible appetite, when it is aroused, clearly causes the blood to boil. For instance, when a man has arrived at living, being moved and being in Christ (Cf. Acts 17, 28), he has rid himself of the discordant origin of inequalities, because, as I said, he does not have in himself the contrary dispositions of these passions, like male and female, that the reason may not be enslaved by them, subject to alteration with their unstable mutations; reverence for the divine image has been naturally infused in this, persuading the soul to be transformed through its free-will into the divine likeness and to become subject to the great Kingdom which co-subsists
889C substantially with the God and Father of all things in that it becomes the all-resplendent dwelling place of the Holy Spirit. Thus, if it is permissible to say so, it receives the whole authority of the knowledge of the divine nature, in so far as it is possible. In keeping with this the origin of what is worse is prevented, but the origin of what is better is made real, so that the soul preserves unimpaired in itself, in a manner like unto God by the grace of its vocation, the reality of the benefits conferred on it; in keeping with this Christ always desires to be born mystically becoming incarnate in those who are saved. He makes the soul which gives birth a virgin-mother which, to put it briefly, does not have, because of its condition, the characteristics of male and female peculiar to a nature that is subject to corruption and generation.

889D No one should be astonished to hear corruption put before generation. For he who scrutinizes dispassionately, with right reason, the nature of what comes to be and passes away, will find generation clearly beginning from corruption and ending in corruption. Christ does not have, as I said, the passions that signify this; by that I mean the life and way-of-life of Christ and according to Christ, if, indeed, he speaks truly who says: 'In Christ, in fact, there is not male and female' (Gal. 3, 28), meaning, obviously, the signs and the passions of a nature subject to corr-
892A uption and generation; in fact, there is only that reason made deiform by divine gnosis and a unique movement of free-will that chooses virtue only.

'Neither Greek nor Jew' (Gal. 3, 28; Col. 3, 11); by this is meant the different, or at any rate, to speak more truly, opposite conceptions of the notion of God. One foolishly introduces a polyarchy and divides the one principle into opposite energies and powers and fashions a polytheistic cult in a state of dissension with itself, because of the multitude of beings worshipped and ridiculous because of the diversity in the manner
892B of worshipping. The other introduces one principle, but narrow and imperfect and nearly unreal, benefit as it were, of reason and of life and falling into evil comparable with the first conception, but in the opposite way, that of atheism, it limits the one principle to one person and this subsisting without Logos and Spirit, or as merely qualified by Logos and Spirit; it does not see what kind of God this would be if he were without a share in these, nor how he would be God by sharing in them as accidents by a participation akin to that of the rational beings subject to creation. Neither of these are to be found in Christ at all, as I said, but only the conception of true religion, a firm law of mystical theology. This rejects both the expansion of the divinity in the former conception and does not accept the contraction of the latter, so that there is not
892C faction through the natural plurality, for that is the Greek position, nor the subject of one hypostasis, for that is what the Jews hold. That would mean deprived of Logos and Spirit or qualified by Logos and Spirit, but then God is not worshipped as Intellect, Logos and Spirit. It teaches us, who have been introduced to a recognition of the truth by the vocation of grace through faith, to know the one nature and power of the godhead, that is to say One God, contemplated in Father, Son and Holy Spirit. That means the unique uncaused substantially subsistent Intellect who is the Generator of the only Logos who subsists substantially without cause, who is the source of the only eternal Life that subsists in a substantial manner, as the Holy Spirit, a Trinity in Unity and a Unity in Trinity. It is not a case of one thing in
892D another, because the Trinity is not in the Unity as an accident in a substance nor, inversely, is the Unity in the Trinity, because it is without quality. Nor is it as one thing and another, because the Unity does not differ from the Trinity by diversity of nature, being, as it is, one simple nature. Nor is it as one thing after the other, because the Trinity is not distinguished from the Unity by a diminution of power, nor the Unity, in turn, from the Trinity. Nor is the Unity distinct from the Trinity as something common and universal from the particulars it subsumes, considered only in thought, since it is a substance that exists properly by itself and a power that really owns its strength. Nor as one through another, because there is no

mediation by relationship, like that of effect to cause, in that which is altogether identical and without relationship. Nor is one thing from the other, because the Trinity is not produced from the Unity, being uncreated and self-manifested. But the same is said and understood to be truly Unity
893A and Trinity, the former by reason of the principle of essence, the latter by reason of the mode of existence. The same is entirely Unity without being divided by the hypostases; the same is entirely Trinity without being confused by the Unity, so that polytheism is not introduced by fragmentation, nor atheism by confusion.

By avoiding this, the teaching of Christ is resplendent; by 'the teaching of Christ' I mean the new proclamation of the truth that 'In him there is not male and female' (Cf. Gal. 3, 28), that is to say, the signs and passions of nature subject to corruption and generation. 'There is no Greek and Jew' (Col. 3, 11), that is to say, contrary conceptions of godhead. 'There is no circumcision and uncircumcision'(Cf. Col. 3, 11), that is to say, the cults appropriate to each of these, the one through the symbols of the law blaming the visible creation and accusing the Creator as if he were the author of evils; the other, through the passions, deifying it and
893B setting up the creature in opposition to the Creator. Both end up equal to each other in evil: insulting God. 'There is no barbarian and Scythian' (Cf. Col. 3, 11), that is, seditious dissension of the one nature against itself through free-will. By this, the law of mutual slaughter, which brings destruction to men, was unnaturally introduced. 'There is no slave and free' (Cf. Col. 3, 11), that is, of course, the division of the same nature because of free-will, depriving him of honour who has equal honour by nature, something which has as a supporting law the disposition of those who exercise dominance, which tyrannizes the dignity of the image. 'But Christ is all and in all' (Col. 3, 11), who by means of what transcends nature and law, works at the formation of the eternal kingdom in the Spirit, which humility and meekness, as has been
893C shown, naturally characterize. Their concurrence reveals the man who is being created perfect according to Christ (Cf. Col. 1, 28). For every humble man is also entirely meek and every meek man is also entirely humble. He is humble, indeed, because he knows that he has his being on loan; he is meek too, because he realizes that the use of his powers in keeping with nature has been donated to him. He gives the service of these to reason in order to produce virtue and he moderates perfectly their sense activity. And in this way he is always moved towards God with respect to intellect, on the one hand; on the other, with respect to sense, he is entirely unmoved when he experienced at the same time all the ills that afflict the

body, nor does the imprint of sorrow engrave his soul in place of the disposition that causes joy in it. In fact, he does not think sensible pain to be a privation of pleasure; indeed, he knows one
893D delight, the intercourse of the soul with the Logos. The privation of this would be endless punishment, which naturally encompasses all the ages and because of this, having set aside the body and all that belongs to the body, he is born vehemently towards the divine intercourse, considering that, even if he should master everything on earth, one thing alone would be loss: the foregoing of the
896A anticipated deification by grace. Therefore, let us purify ourselves from every stain of flesh and spirit (Cf. 2 Cor. 7, 1) that we may hallow the divine Name, quenching the concupiscence which improperly plays the wanton with the passions and let us restrain with reason the irascible appetite, which is thrown into a disorderly fury by pleasures, so that we may receive the Kingdom of the God and Father, which comes through meekness. And let us join the following phrase of the prayer to the preceding and say: 'Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven' (Matt. 6, 10).

He who offers mystically to God the cult of worship with a reasonable power alone, which has been detached from concupiscence and aggressiveness, this man fulfills the divine will on earth
896B as the orders of angels do in heaven. He becomes in all things a worshipper like the angels and their companion, as the great Apostle says somewhere: 'Our citizenship is in heaven' (Phil. 3, 20). They have neither concupiscence which relaxes the tension of the intellect through pleasure, nor raging forgiveness, which barks irreverently at its fellow, but reason in its singularity that naturally leads reasonable beings to the first Logos. It is in that alone that God rejoices and that He demands from us, his servants and he shows this by saying to the great David: 'What is there for me in heaven and, apart from you, what did I desire on earth?' (Ps. 73, 25. LXX). Nothing is offered to God in heaven apart from the rational worship, which he expects from us when He teaches us to say in our prayer: 'Thy will be
896C done on earth as it is in heaven' (Matt. 6, 10).

by the holy angels

Let our reason, therefore, be moved to search for God and let the concupiscible power strive to desire Him and the irascible power to hold onto Him. Rather, to speak more properly, let the whole intellect strain towards God, as if it were stretched through a forceful exertion by way of the irascible power and on fire with longing through the supreme yearning of the concupiscible power. For by imitating the angels in heaven in this way, we shall be found to give worship to God

in everything and show ourselves to have on earth the same kind of citizenship as the angels, having, just like them, our intellect in its integrity
896D moved to nothing that is inferior to God. For, by living thus, we shall receive, in keeping with our prayers, the Logos, who said: 'I am the bread which has come down from heaven and which gives life to the world' (Cf. John 6, 33-35), as our substantial and living bread for the nourishment of our souls and the preservation of the good
897A condition of the benefits bestowed on us. He becomes everything to us in proportion to how we are nourished by virtue and wisdom and He is embodied in a variety of ways in each of the saved, as he himself understands, while they are still in this age. This fits the meaning of the expression of the prayer which says: 'Give us this day our daily bread' (Matt. 6, 11).

For I think that this age is meant by 'today', as if one were to say, because of understanding this part of the prayer more clearly, 'Our bread',
897B which you prepared in the beginning for the immortality of nature, 'give to us today', who have part in the mortality that pertains to this present life, in order that the nourishment of the bread of life and full knowledge may vanquish the death that results from sin. The transgression of the divine commandment did not allow the first man to become a sharer of this. So then, if he had been filled with this divine nourishment, he would not have been trapped by the death due to sin. Moreover, he who prays to receive this daily bread does not receive it, at any rate, entirely as the bread is in itself, but according as the recipient himself has a capacity for it. For the Bread of Life, being a lover of men, gives Himself to all who ask, but not in the same way at all. He gives
897C Himself more to those who have done great works, but less to those who have done less of them, to each one, however, according as the worth of his intellect is capable of receiving. The Saviour led me to this understanding of the present statement, by explicitly ordering his disciples to take no account at all of sensible food, in saying: 'Be not solicitous about your life and what you eat or what you drink, nor about your body, what you wear. For the peoples of world seek all these things. But seek first the kingdom of God and his justice and all these things will be added to you' (Matt. 6, 25, 32-33). How then does he teach us to pray for what he formerly commanded us not to seek? For, it is clear that he did not command us to ask
897D in prayer for what he had not enjoined to ask for by his commandment. Because only what is to be sought in keeping with the commandment is to be asked for in prayer. Perhaps, therefore, whatever we were not allowed to seek after by commandment, he did not lay down as lawful to ask for in prayer.

And if the Saviour has commanded us to seek only the kingdom and justice of God, it is likely that he urged those who are desirous of divine gifts to ask
900A for this through prayer, so that having determined the gift of what is to be naturally asked for in prayer, he may join to the will of Him who grants the gift the free-will of those who ask, made identical with it through a relational union.

If we are ordered in the prayer to ask for the daily bread, by which our present life is naturally sustained, let us not leap over the limits of the prayer, envisaging with cupidity many periods of years and forget that we are mortals and that we possess a life that is passing like a shadow. But let us, without solicitude, ask in prayer for bread for a day and show that, in keeping (with the philosophy of Christ, we make life a practice for death, by anticipating nature with free-will and, before
900B death sets in, cut off the soul from solicitude about bodily things, so that it may not be nailed to corruptible things, turning the use of the natural inclination towards matter and learning avarice which deprives us of the abundance of divine benefits.

Let us then fly as far as we can from love for matter and wipe away, like dust from our intellectual eyes, the relationship with it. Let us be content with those things alone which sustain our present life and not with those which give pleasure. Even above them let us value God, as we have been taught, that we may be able to preserve the soul unenslaved, mastered, through the body, by absolutely nothing visible. We must be seen to
900C eat for the sake of living, but we must not lay ourselves open to the accusation of living for the sake of eating; the former is obviously proper to rational, the latter to irrational nature. Let us be careful guardians of the prayer, shown by our very actions to cleave tenaciously to the one and only life in the spirit and to use the present (life) in order to lay hold of it. For that reason we love to make use of it to this extent that we do not avoid sustaining it by bread alone and preserving incorruptible, in so far as it is allowed, its natural health, not that we may live, but that we may live to God. We make the body, rendered reasonable by the virtues, the messenger of the soul and we make the latter, formed by firmness in goodness, the herald of God. And we naturally confine this bread to one day, not
900D daring to extend the petition for it to a second day through the mediation of Him who gave the prayer. For should we thus really dispose ourselves in harmony with the meaning of the prayer, we should be able to move forward in a purified way to the following words, saying: 'And forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors' (Matt. 6, 12).

He who seeks through prayer the incorruptible
901A bread of wisdom, from which according to the first attempt at an exposition of the previous statement, the transgression at the beginning cut us off, in this age, of which we said that 'today' is a symbol, he knows that the one pleasure consists in the attainment of divine things, the giver of which is naturally God, the guardian of which is the choice of free-will of the one who receives. He also knows that the only pain is the failure to attain to these; the devil instigates this, but everyman, who grows weary of divine things because of slackness in his free-will and does not preserve the honourable with love by a disposition of free-will, is its author. This man maintains his free-choice inclined to nothing of the sum total of visible things and, because of that, he is not subject to the painful things that happen to him in a bodily way. Truly, this man dispassionately forgives those who offend him because absolutely no one can lay a hand on the good which
901B he strives for longingly and which is believed to be naturally unattainable. He even sets himself up as an example of virtue, if one may say so, by inviting the Inimitable One to come and imitate him, saying: 'Forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors'. He beseeches God to become that which he was to his neighbour, for just as he forgave the debts of those who offended him, so he desires that he also may be forgiven by God. This means that just as God forgives dispassionately those whom He forgives, so likewise he remains impassible in whatever befalls him; he forgives those who have offended him, not allowing the intellect to be impressed by any memory of
901C foregoing injuries, so that he may not be accused of severing nature by free-will by separating himself, though a man, from some other man. For thus, when free-will is united to the principle of nature, the reconciliation of God with nature takes place naturally. Because, otherwise, it would be impossible that nature, in dissension with itself through will, should receive the inexpressible divine condescensionand, perhaps, because of this, God wills us first of all to make reconciliations with one another, not in order to learn from us to be reconciled to sinners and to waive the penalty of many monstrous crimes, but in order to purify us from passions and to show that the disposition
901D of those forgiven corresponds with the relationship of grace. He has clearly made it evident that, while the free-will is united to the principle of nature, the free-choice of those who have put this right will not be in revolt against God, because nothing that is illogical can naturally be discerned in the principle of nature, which is both natural and divine law whenever it possesses the movement of free-will that operates in keeping with itself. And if nothing illogical exists in the principle of

nature will naturally have an activity that is in harmony with God in all things. This is an efficacious disposition, created by the grace of Him who is good by nature, for the production of virtue.

904A The one who asks for the bread of knowledge is disposed in this way, therefore, when he prays; after him is the one who seeks bread for the day only, through the constraint of nature; he has the same disposition. He forgives the debtors their debts because he knows that he is mortal by nature, and, for the rest, awaits each day in uncertainty that which is produced by nature, anticipating nature with his free-will, he becomes on his own initiative dead to the world according to the verse that says: 'For your sake we are put to death all the day long; we are reputed as sheep for slaughter' (Ps. 44, 22; Rom. 8, 36). For his reason he is sacrificed for all (Cf. Phil. 2, 17) in order to carry with him no mark of the depravity of the present age, when he emigrates to the life that grows not old, and that he may receive from the
904B Judge and Saviour of the universe a recompense that is equal to the use of things he made while here. A pure disposition towards those who have caused them suffering is necessary to both of these for their own profit, all things considered and not least because of the meaning of the expressions that remain, which go like this: 'And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil' (Matt. 6, 13).

In these words, indeed, Scripture makes clear that he who does not perfectly pardon transgressors and present to God a heart purified from rancour, resplendent with the light of reconciliation with his neighbour, will fail to obtain the grace of the benefits requested in prayer. And he will be handed over to temptation and to the Evil One by a
904C just judgement, so that he may learn to be purified from his sins, being rid of his grievances against others. Now, temptation means the 'law of sin', free from which the first man came into existence and 'evil' means the devil, who kneaded this into the nature of men and persuaded man by deceit to make the desire of his soul pass from what is permitted to what is forbidden and to turn to the transgression of the divine commandment. The effect of this was the putting aside of the incorruptibility that had been given through grace.

Or again, 'temptation' means the voluntary consent of the soul to the passion of the flesh; 'evil' means the mode which consummates in act the
904D passionate disposition. The just Judge will exempt from none of these things the man who does not forgive the debtors their debts, even if he should simply plead for this by the prayer. But rather,

he allows such a man to be stained by the law of sin and abandons the one whose will is hard and crude to be mastered by the Evil One, because he has preferred the passions of dishonour (Cf. Rom. 1, 26), of which the devil is the sower, to nature, whose creator is God. Nay more, he does not prevent him from giving
905A in voluntarily to the passions of the flesh, nor does he ransom him from the way the disposition is consummated in an activity in keeping with them. That is because thinking less of nature than of groundless passions he disregarded its principle in his eagerness for them. If he had been moved in harmony with it, he should have known which was the law of nature and which that of the passions, whose tyranny arises through a voluntary choice, but not by nature; then he would have preserved the former by means of the natural operations and he would have rejected the latter far from his free-will and preserved by means of rationality the nature, which of itself is pure and stainless, without hatred or dissension. Besides, he would have made sure that the free-will co-operated with nature, entirely unconcerned about anything at all which the principle of nature does not bestow. Because of this, he puts aside all hatred and every dissension in regard to him who is by nature his relative, so that he may be heard when he says this prayer, and receive from God
905B a double instead of a single grace: the forgiveness of sins already committed and from the future ones protection and redemption; also that he may not be allowed to enter into temptation nor suffered to being enslaved by the Evil One, because of one thing only: the prompt remittance of his neighbour's debts.

Therefore - to go back a little that I may recount briefly the meaning of the words - if we really desire to be delivered from the Evil One and not to enter into temptation, let us have faith in God and forgive our debtors their debts, for He
905C says: 'If you will not forgive men their sins, neither will your heavenly Father forgive you yours' (Matt. 6, 15). Thus shall we not alone receive forgiveness for the sins we have committed, but we shall overcome the law of sin, not being left to enter into the experience of it. And we shall trample on the one who begat this, the evil serpent (Cf. Gen. 3, 7ff.) from whom we ask to be delivered with Christ, who conquered the world as our leader (Cf. John 16,33), arming us with the laws of His commandments and binding nature to itself through cha-
× rity, by lawfully laying aside the passions. He who is the bread of life, wisdom, knowledge and justice, moves our appetite insatiably to Himself. He constitutes us co-worshippers with the angels in fulfilment of the Father's will, manifesting in
905D a well imitated way, by the conduct of our lives, celestial satisfaction. And from there again he is a leader upon the ascent of divine realities to the

Father of lights (Cf. James 1, 17), and makes us sharers of the divine nature (Cf. 2 Pet. 1, 4) by participation in the Spirit through grace; through this we are given the status of sons of God, all of us having within us the entire author himself of this grace: the Son of the Father by nature, without any limitation and in a pure way. From Him, by Him and in Him, we have and shall have being, movement and life (Cf. Acts 17, 28).

Let the purpose of the prayer, then, be for us
908A to look towards this mystery of deification, that we may know in place of what the self-emptying of the Only-begotten through the flesh has made us the kind we are and whence and where he raised up, by virtue of His beneficent hand, those who had reached the lowest place of the universe, into which the weight of sin had thrust us down. Let us love all the more Him who has so wisely prepared this salvation for us. By what we do, let us show the prayer being fulfilled and let us reveal and proclaim the God who is truly Father by grace. But, let us clearly prove ourselves not to have for the father of our lives the Evil One, who always tries to rule tyrannically over nature through the dishonour of the passions and let us not unawares exchange death for life. For it happens naturally that each one should share with his associates his
908B properties: the one provides eternal life for those who love Him; the other gives death to those who approach him, prompted by voluntary temptations.

For there are, according to Scripture, two kinds of temptation: the one is pleasurable, the other is painful; the one is deliberately chosen, the other is unchosen. The former is the begetter of sin, into which we were commanded to pray that we might not enter, according to the teaching of the Lord, who says: 'And lead us not into temptation' (Matt. 6, 13), and 'Watch and pray that you may not enter into temptation' (Matt. 26, 41). The latter takes vengeance for sin, chastising the sin-loving disposition by the involuntary onset of distress. If one endures this, especially one who
908C is not pinned down by the nails of vice, he will hear the great James proclaiming explicitly: 'Consider it altogether a joy, my brothers, when you fall into various temptations, because the testing of your faith produces steadfast endurance, steadfast endurance produces approved character; let approved character bring forth a perfect work' (Cf. Jas. 1, 2-4; Rom. 5, 4). The Evil One maliciously exploits both temptations, the voluntary and the involuntary, the former by sowing and stimulating the soul with the pleasures of the body, scheming to turn the desire away from divine charity; the latter he provokes with sophistry, wishing to corrupt nature through pain, in order that he might constrain the soul, downcast through the languor that comes from sufferings, to move the thoughts to find fault with the Creator.

908D But let us, who are well aware of the designs of the Evil One, on the one hand, avert by prayer the voluntary temptation, so that we may not set aside our longing for the divine charity; on the other hand, let us nobly endure the involuntary one, when it comes, with the permission of God, so that we may show that we have preferred the Creator of nature to nature. May it befall all of us, who call on the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, to be delivered from the present pleasures of the Evil One and to be freed from the future pains by really participating in the substance of the good things to come (Cf. 2 Cor. 5, 7; Heb. 11, 1), given to us to be seen in Christ himself, our Lord, who alone with the Father and the Holy Spirit is glorified by all creation. Amen.

## APPENDIX III (i)

### The Expositio Orationis Dominicae of St. Maximus the Confessor - a schematic presentation:

| | |
|---|---|
| Prologue | 872D-873C * |
| Introduction | 873C-876C |
| Part I | 876C-884A |
| Part II | 884A-905B |
| Part III | 905B-905D |
| Conclusion | 905D-908D |

---

* The references are to the Greek text as it is to be found in Migne, PG XC 872D-873C.

The following pages aim at showing progressively the principal ideas and synthetic principles to be found in the Pater Noster. They are rounded off with a synoptic view of Parts I, II and III, together with some observations on comparing the three Parts.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Prologue | 872D - 873C | Personal address;<br>Discourse on love and fear. |
| Introduction | 873C - 876C | The Divine Counsel (873CD).<br>The plan of the Divine Counsel reflected in the plan of the "Our Father" (873D-876C). |
| Part I<br>(Christological viewpoint) | 876C - 884A | The Seven Mysteries (876C-881A).<br>Reprise (881AB).<br>Coda (881B-884A): Prayer and Vow. |
| Part II<br>(Christological - anthropological viewpoint) | 884A- 905B | The Seven Mysteries (884A-905B). |
| Part III<br>(Ascetical viewpoint) | 905B-D | The Seven Mysteries (905B-D). |
| Conclusion | 905D - 908D | Exhortation (905D-908D). |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Part I | 876C - 884A | The Seven Mysteries from a Christological point of view : | Theology (876CD).<br>Sonship by grace (877A).<br>Equality of honour with the angels (877A-C).<br>Participation in divine life (877CD).<br>Restoration of nature to itself (877D-880A).<br>Purification from the 'law of sin' (880AB).<br>Abolition of Tyranny of the Evil One (880B-881A). |
| | | Reprise : | Father, Name of Father, Kingdom<br>son of Father in grace;<br>those in heaven and on earth of one will;<br>daily bread;<br>reconciliation;<br>asks not to enter temptation;<br>recommends avoidance of evil (881A).<br><br>Fitting that author-giver should also be teacher (881AB). |
| | | Coda : | Interlude on Prayer and Vow (881B-884A). |

Part I : The principal ideas and the synthetic principles in 'The Seven Mysteries'.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| The | 1. teaches theology : (876CD) | He reveals the Father | He effected because of love of man |
| | | and the Holy Spirit. | the union with the flesh hypostatically. |
| Logos | | | |
| | 2. gives sonship : (877A) | conferring in grace through the Spirit the | the guard and preservation of which |
| Incarnate | | birth from above, | is the free-choice of those who are born in God. |
| | 3. has made men of equal dignity with the angels (877A-C) | He showed that as regards the distribution of divine gifts the multitude of earthly and heavenly powers are one. | He shows that the λόγος is the union of those things which are separated. |
| | 4. imparts divine life : (877CD) | who imbues those who eat with a divine quality so that they may be deified (θέωσις) | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 5. restores nature to itself : (877D-880A) | he preserved γνώμη passionless in its relation to φύσις ; He annulled hatred. | He created the two into one new man. |
| 6. establishes nature free from the law of sin : (880AB) | by the mortification of earthly members with regard to sense. | |
| 7. works the destruction of the tyranny of the Evil One : (880B-881A) | throwing at him as a weapon the flesh that was vanquished in Adam, becoming a poison to him and life to the human race, | by impelling the whole nature to rise like a dough to resurrection of life. |

(v)

Part II 884A - 905B *

The Seven Mysteries combining Christological and anthropological-ascetical points of view :

| | |
|---|---|
| (a) Our Father (who art in heaven) Hallowed be thy Name, Thy Kingdom come (884A-896A). | - Theology and Filiation. |
| (b) Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven (896A-897A). | - Equality with angels. |
| (c) Give us this day our daily bread (897A-900D). | - A share in eternal life. |
| (d) And forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us (900D-904B). | - Restoration of nature to itself. |
| (e) And lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil (904B-905B). | - Destruction of 'law of sin' and abolition of tyranny of Evil One. |

* Here the 'seven mysteries' are dealt with in five sections, (a) corresponding to 1 and 2 of Parts I and III, (e) corresponding to 6 and 7 of Parts I and III.

Part II : The principal ideas and synthetic principles subsumed under five headings

(a) : Theology (884AC). We proclaim the grace of filial adoption (884D).
Hallow the Name - by mortification of ἐπιθυμία and θυμός by λόγος (885AB).
Thy Kingdom come through meekness; the 'earth' and 'rest' (885B-888B).
Configuration to Christ: neither male nor female (888C-892A);
Elijah, Elisha; image - likeness; virgin-mother soul (888D-889C
: neither Greek nor Jew (892A-893A);
: no circumcision and uncircumcision (893AB);
: no barbarian and Scythian (893B);
: no slave and free (893B);
Christ is all in all; He effects the Kingdom in Spirit, so purification required to hallow the Name and receive the Kingdom (896A).

(b) : Cult of worship; λόγος leads to Logos. It is in that alone that God rejoices and demands.
Let νοῦς seek God with ἐπιθυμία and θυμός : like angels (896CD).
Living thus, we shall receive the Word as daily bread in proportion to virtue and wisdom.
He is embodied in the saved (896C-897A).

(c) : Give us 'to-day' the bread of life and knowledge to vanquish the death of sin (897AB).
The Bread of life himself in proportion to the works and worth of νοῦς (897BC).
'Seek first the kingdom of heaven'. How then does he teach to pray for what he formerly commanded us not to seek? If the Saviour commanded us to seek the kingdom and justice of God', it is likely that he urged those desirous of divine gifts to ask for this in prayer, so that having determined the grace of what is to be asked naturally in prayer, He may join the free-will of those who ask, made identical by a relational union, to the will of Him who grants the grace (897C-900A).
Let us ask bread 'for a day'; eat to live to God! (900A-C).
If thus disposed, we can move forward to the remaining phrases in a purified way (900D).

(d) : He who seeks the bread of the Word forgives, because no one can lay a hand on his good; the one pleasure is the attainment of divine things, the only pain is the missing of these (901AB).
Example to the Inimitable One? God wills it to purify us from passion and to show that the disposition of the forgiven must accord with grace (901BC).
Free-will, λόγος φύσεως and free-choice; natural and divine law (901D).
In this way, the one who asks for the bread of knowledge is disposed when he prays; also he who seeks the bread for a day (904A).
A pure disposition towards those who have caused us sorrow is necessary to both for their own profit (904B).

(e) : If he is not thus disposed, he will fail to obtain the goods prayed for and be handed over to 'temptation' and 'evil': (i) 'law of sin' and devil; or (ii) consent to passions and the way the disposition is consummated in activity (904BC).
The Just Judge and temptation and evil (1) and (2) (904D-905A).
He should have known the law of nature v. the law of passions; preserved the one, rejected the other; ensured that free-will co-operated with nature.
Thus he is heard when he prays and receives from God forgiveness for former sins and protection from future ones, not allowed to enter temptation nor to be enslaved by the Evil One because of forgiveness (905AB).

Part III 905B - 905D *

The Seven Mysteries from an ascetical point of view :

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 7. | Delivery from the Evil One | - trample on the Evil One. |
| 6. | Not to enter temptation | - overcome the 'law of sin'. |
| 5. | Forgive our debtors their debts | - binding nature to itself. |
| 4. | The bread of life, wisdom and knowledge | - moves our appetite to Himself. |
| 3. | Co-worshippers with the angels | - fulfilment of Father's will. |
| 2. | Status of sons of God | - made sharers of divine nature by sharing in the Spirit according to grace; |
| | | - bearing about the Son. |
| 1. | Ascent to the Father | - (clothed with Son by grace of Spirit). |

* The numeration has been reversed here to prepare for the synoptic view.

Synoptic view of the Three Parts

| Part I | II | III |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Theology: | Theology - Begin from theology! Father, Son, Spirit; / Name Kingdom; 'always' - because of the relationships. | Ascent to the Father, (in Son by Spirit). |
| 2. Sonship by grace: | (a) Filiation - we proclaim the grace of filial adoption. Hallow the Name by λογος ! Thy Kingdom come through 'meekness'! 'earth' and 'rest'. Configuration to Christ. Image to likeness. Christ all in all; effects Kingdom. Purification! | Status of sons - sharers of divine nature by sharing in Spirit according to grace; bearing about the Son. |
| 3. Equality of honour with the angels: | (b) Equality with angels - Cult of worship; λόγος leads to Logos. Like angels let νοῦς seek God. Living thus, we receive Word as bread in proportion to wisdom - virtue. | Co-worshippers with the angels - in fulfilment of the Father's will. |
| 4. Participation in divine life: | (c) A share in eternal life - Give us 'today' the bread of life and knowledge to vanquish death from sin. He gives himself more to those who have done great works, less to those who have done less of them; to each according to worth of nous. 'Eat to live to God'. | The bread of life, wisdom and knowledge - moves our appetite to Himself. |

099

| | Part I | II | III |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5. | Restoration of nature to itself: | (d) Restoration of nature to itself - He forgives because no one can lay a hand on his good; the one pleasure; the one pain! γνώμη, λόγος φύσεως, προαίρεσις, νόμος. | Binding nature to itself; |
| 6. | Purification from the 'law of sin': | (e) Destruction of 'law of sin' - If he is unforgiving, he will be handed over to 'temptation': 'law of sin' or 'consent to passions'. He should have known the law of nature v. the law of passions; preserved the one, rejected the other; ensured that free-will co-operated with nature. | Overcome the 'law of sin'. |
| 7. | Abolition of tyranny of the Evil One. | Abolition of tyranny of the Evil One - (If not forgiving handed over to) 'devil' or 'the way the disposition is consummated in activity'. The Just Judge.<br>Thus he is heard when he prays and receives from God forgiveness for former sins and protection from future ones, not allowed to enter temptation nor to be enslaved by the Evil One because of forgiveness. | Trample on the Evil One. * |

* In the interests of conspectus the textual order of PartIII has been reversed here.

## Some observations on comparing the Three Parts

(Note that the Arabic numerals used here refer to the 'seven mysteries' of the 'synoptic view' (viii). The Roman numerals refer to the three parts of the Commentary of Maximus, described above (i) as 'Part I', 'Part II' and 'Part III', and shown horizontally in the 'synoptic view'. The bracketed lower-case letters refer to the five sections of Part II which subsume the 'seven mysteries' of the other two parts).

1. In II Theology and Filiation are dealt with as a unit and the treatment of the two is intermingled. There are passages that deal with Theology explicitly at the beginning and under the explanation of 'neither Greek nor Jew'. In III Theology is not detached from filiation but nevertheless it is clearly implied. In the schema I have made this more explicit, while allowing the 'economic' form of the text.

2. In II and III sonship by grace is treated in a Trinitarian context: Hallowing the Name, ensuring the coming of the Kingdom in II; participation in the Spirit, bearing about the Son in III. The II treatment is dynamic; III brings out the 'sharers of divine nature', underlining the ontological basis of the dynamism, but 'nature' itself is a dynamic concept, so that the distinction must not be overdrawn. II articulates the whole around the foci of λόγος and meekness, λόγος - τρόπος by implication, where 'meekness' is openness to the personalising action of the Holy Spirit. There is also a firm balance in holding the Christological and anthropological elements in right co-ordination. The λόγος - τρόπος dyad is also at work in 'image' to 'likeness' in II. In III there is a very neat formulation of the whole work of economy. We are said to be sharers of the divine nature by being sharers of the Spirit according to grace: The action of the Spirit is seen to be primary here, initiating the process of participating in divine nature and doing this according to grace, by pouring ἀγάπη into man and personalising him and so enabling him to appropriate the dynamism not only of his human nature, but of divine nature, knowing and loving God as He knows and loves himself. It is a 'sharer' that he is made to be, that is a free appropriator which makes him to be a son and so 'bearing about' the Son and having God for Father. This requires 'purification' according to II, purification of what is opposed to λόγος in ἐπιθυμία and θυμός, and what is opposed to πραότης, the willingness to interlock human freedom with God's or to receive ἀγάπη by which we are divinized: rendered capable of being sharers of divine nature. Περιχωμίζοντες (III,2) is akin to the embodiment of the Word in II(b).

3. The Will of God is that we should join the angels in worshipping Him. His Will is done when this is achieved (III): unity of the intelligibles and the sensibles, which makes for 'equality with angels' (II) in honour (I). λόγος is seen as the key to this unification by leading man back to his Alpha, the Λόγος which ensures a proper harmony in man; his νοῦς is then in search of God, his Omega.
(II): In II, we are told that living thus, we receive the Word as Bread in proportion to the wisdom and virtue we possess, that He is embodied in the saved. This describes the effect of λόγος leading to Λόγος but it is linked to the presence of Bread in man. It also looks back to the characteristic of sons in III,2: 'bearing about the Son'.

4. The Theme of Bread is very definitely linked to participation in divine life in I and a 'share in eternal life' in II. This bread which is described as 'of life and knowledge' is given to us to vanquish death - the antithesis of life. The bread is then equated with 'He' who gives himself proportionately to the works and worth of νοῦς. The secondary problem of bread 'for the day' is solved by the axiom to: 'eat to live to God'. The notion of embodiment from the previous section should not be overlooked. Part III speaks of 'bread of life' and adds 'wisdom and knowledge' which aligns it with II, but it does not refer directly to participation in life. We are told that the Word moves our appetite to Himself. The conative side of spiritual life is emphasized. We might ask ourselves if knowledge-wisdom and appetite are a way of referring to wisdom-virtue or even more basically to person-nature where appetite, the organ of ἀγάπη , balances wisdom, one of the comprehensive notions of Maximus, which is on the noetic side but would seem to bridge the gap between theoria and πρᾶξις if not actually between φύσις and ὑπόστασις in ἐνέργεια . We would then have σοφία binding the active and contemplative aspects of man and ἀγάπη , through appetite, ensuring that the unified nature was lifted to the personal level. It is the whole man that the Word moves to Himself through appetite. We may refer again to the embodiment forestalled in II,(b), as it evokes the περιχομίζοντες of III,2. Identification with the Word is fundamental to this view. Men are sons in the Son and this is elaborated in terms of this Bread of life here which assimilates them to itself - paradoxically. We might notice that it is sharers in 'life' that they become. In III,2 it was in nature; this is dynamic. The movement of appetite is 'life', appetite being 'nature' or nature's ὄρεξις .

5. Forgiveness is made to be the principle of unification for those who share the one nature. (The one Bread makes us one body). The term used in I and II is 'restoration' of nature to itself; in III 'binding' nature to itself. The implication is that nature has been torn asunder and that it is constitutionally one. The principle of fragmentation is γνώμη , by which persons fail to accept the exigencies of λόγος φύσεως and indulge wayward προαίρεσις . This centrifugal activity has to be replaced by centripetal choices which reconstitute riven nature. This binds 'nature' to itself, restores its fundamental unity. Beneath this there appears to be the Nyssene idea of concrete universal; persons are participants in human nature and nature is restored when they become participants in divine nature. Man becomes himself by going beyond himself - in ecstasy. II spells out the implications of this 'restoration' and 'binding' in terms of γνώμη, λόγος φύσεως, προαίρεσις and νόμος φύσεως.

6. Again the nullifying of the 'law of sin' is spelt out in II with its distinctions re 'temptation' and its use of νόμος φύσεως and νόμος παθῶν as well as γνώμη and φύσις.

7. In III it is merely a matter of 'trampling' on the Evil One. I introduces the notion of 'tyranny' implied in the Evil One who is constantly trying to extend his negative empire. In II 'evil' is elaborated as 'devil' and 'actual consummation of the disposition'.

   The Just Judge is introduced and his handling of those who fail to forgive.

# APPENDIX IV

## Γένεσις, Κίνησις, Στάσις.

In this attempt to elaborate the θεωρία φυσική of Maximus on becoming, movement and repose, we shall restrict our reflections to the visible creation. Since it is the Origenistic background that dictates, to a large extent, Maximus' selection of disputed questions, he is primarily concerned with embodied beings. It should be noted, too, that although these considerations are overtly cosmological, Maximus is searching all the time for the ultimate ontological structure of the creature, its basic λόγος, so that concepts like 'time' and 'space' are, for him, declarations of creaturely insufficiency and so of the need of God. The λόγοι of creation are derived from and directed to the eternal Λόγος.

With this triad γένεσις, κίνησις, στάσις Maximus proposes an account of the visible world as an alternative to the condemned views of the Origenists, the basis of whose synthesis was expressed in the triad: στάσις. κίνησις, γένεσις .(1) For Origen, the phenomenal world was to be understood as in some way the expression of a falling away from an original state of spiritual perfection, in which God was the world of spirit, so to speak, and in whom dwelt the sum total of other spiritual beings. Some of these had fallen away from their divine state, evidence of which was their separate existence apart from the primordial στάσις . A mysterious restlessness had taken hold of them due it must be, for want of anything extrinsic, to χόρος (2), to some kind of satiety or surfeit, a κίνησις implying a boredom. The boredom implied freedom, so that the fall was a decision to live apart from, even independent of the Henad, the principle of which was God. The γένεσις or coming to be of the visible world was then the manifestation of a divisive restlessness. The material dimension of man was an expression of his bid for independence from the Henad and from God. So that, for Origen, movement and the beginning of the visible world are symptoms of imperfection and limitation, an epiphany of an unsatisfactory state of affairs, that can only be remedied for man by a return to the immobile perfection of his original condition. This does not mean that Origen held that the material world was a mere accident of the Fall; it was the remedy provided by the goodness of God to enable man to find his way back to his secure tenure of

---

(1) Vide SHERWOOD, P. The Earlier Ambigua of St. Maximus the Confessor, pp. 92-102. For a comprehensive view of this theme vide BALTHASAR, H.U.VON, Liturgie Cosmique, pp. 89-103.

(2) Vide SHERWOOD, P. op. cit. pp. 181-204.

life and God. The freedom of spiritual beings is at the centre of his vision. Creationism seemed to imply an unnecessary concern with petty detail; traducianism endangered the spiritual transcendence of the soul, so that a theory of pre-existence with emphasis on freedom seemed to avoid the limitations of the other two theories and, besides, it safe-guarded the justice of God by attributing the inequalities of a hierarchy of angels, men and demons to the quality of the primal disobedience shown by each one.(3)

It is obvious that, if Maximus proposes a rearrangement of the terms of the triad, he does so in the perspectives of the ontology and anthropology envisaged by Origen. In fact, the origenist monks of Maximus's time had drawn bizarre conclusions from their master's principles, so that Maximus' construction of an orthodox theory was not merely an exercise in idle speculation. It shows also that he was not content to formulate a psychology and a spirituality out of the context of a complete philosophy of life. He never elaborated an ontology, but he gives us brilliant sketches of his insights and in this triad we have a fundamental tenet of his doctrine. When he speaks of movement or change, κίνησις , he is thinking of it primarily in an ontological way. It describes the state of the creature in contrast to the state of the Creator. Κίνησις is a characteristic of being; it marks being that is limited. If being is in movement, then, qua being it cannot be thought to be a fullness of being. It is of such a kind that it becomes what it was not. The whole fabric of the visible world is marked by this movement. Movement reveals its status as being.

There is an existential character about being encountered in this way. It is a realization of the existence of concrete things, of their inability to account for the fact that they exist. The existence is grasped and affirmed in judgement; judgement is suffused with wonder, the πάθος of the philosopher (4). The existing thing reveals itself as something that participates in being. It is not so much a case of kinds of things, to which existence is applied, so to speak, a predominantly essential approach to the mystery of things, as that the essence of things is a way of sharing in existence, so that existence, even if it can only be grasped conceptually in an oblique way, not being an essence, is seen to be that which projects essences into the realm of actuality or, more exactly, that in which things, that are, actually participate. It is why there is more mystery in the hazel nut in the hand of a mystic than in all idealist metaphysics put together. It is the intuitive grasp of the gratuitousness of the existence of the least thing, together with the realization that no definable created thing can exhaust the possibilities of existence as such, that projects the mind beyond the thing and demands a

---

(3) Vide ORIGEN. De Principiis, 1. 1,3; 2. Cf. CHADWICK, H. 'Philo and the Beginnings of Christian Thought'. The Cambridge History of Later Greek & Early Medieval Philosophy (ed. Armstrong, A.H.) Cambridge University Press, 1967, pp. 190-192.

(4) PLATO. Theaetetus, 155d.

limitless Existence to account for the partial existences, the sum total of which makes up the visible world.

Movement is a symptom of the restricted character of everything that falls within our experience; it is an existential admission that the order, in which movement takes place, cannot be the ultimate order of things, simply because the fact of the movement reveals the inability of the moving thing to be absolutely. Since essence here is thought of as limited capacity for existence, the being to which participant being points must be without essence in this sense. In the realm of movement we catch the implication of the Unmoved; we apprehend transcendent being in the 'cosmological relation'.

If the being of man's experience is of such a kind, it had to come to be. Κίνησις demands γένεσις It is a self-disclosure of the dependent nature of the created realm, because coming to be in this way cannot be anything else than creation, a production from nothing. There can be no question of emanation or any kind of distribution of the Being that is apprehended as demanded by being-in-motion. It is simply, and as such must be in itself substantially incommunicable fullness of being. Because it if is above movement, it cannot become from an essential point of view. If other being appears, then it must have been created: Γένεσις accounts for κίνησις.

> 'The principle of all natural movement is the genesis of the beings set into motion; and the principle of the genesis of the beings set into motion is God as Creator ( γενεσιουργός ). (5)

There can be no question of the created being existing in the way the uncreated Being exists: the total, simultaneous, perfect possession of life.(6) And because there is no potentiality, there is no emerging into being, so that the mode of being must be totally self-possessed always, where the 'always' does not imply any kind of temporal succession. 'Who does not know that in every being .... the first thing to be known is the Where, to which is always attached the knowledge of the When?'(7) In fact time is the mode of the duration of dependent being; it is the measure of being that is κίνησις being, that is incapable of total simultaneous and perfect self-possession, simply because it is not absolutely. It is a blend of being and not-being. In contrast to necessary being which is the unbounded exercise of existence, contingent being must begin as timebound. Genesis is the beginning of contingent being in time. Even if it

---

(5) Ambig. PG 91, 1217C.

(6) Ambig. PG 91, 1217C.

(7) Qu. Thal. PG 90, 757D.

always existed, it would have always existed as contingent and so would have been measured by time with regard to its duration. Time is one dimension of contingent being, a reference to its duration which, on the one hand, reveals the presence of being, and, on the other hand, is a declaration that this being is not absolute, is not the unqualified subsisting being which is entirely accountable for itself, unlimited in every way, including the mode of its duration. Just as contingent being must have a duration in keeping with its ontic structure, so it must be somewhere. Its falling short of being absolute is revealed as being located. 'Where' is again an ambivalent category: it is an explicit declaration of the presence of something in existence, but, at the same time, its being bounded is an admission of the limits of what is there, another symptom of its contingency, its finitude, its dependence. Place and time are the sine qua non of the being that we recognize as not being absolute.

'The immobile state is the aim of the natural movement of created beings; this state comes from the Infinitude ( ἀπειρία ) when one goes beyond all that is finite: in it, for absence of space, all movements of the beings set naturally into motion cease.(8). For Maximus, the movement that is at the heart of created being will be stilled. He finds the στάσις which was the first moment in the triad of Origen to be, in fact, the destiny of the creature, its final end. Where Origen leaves off his contemplation of the process of creaturehood with γένεσις , and supplements it with the idea of the return, Maximus sees the outcome of κίνησις in στάσις . By saying that: 'the immobile state is the aim of the natural movement of created beings', he is affirming that the destiny of the creature is beyond the creaturely state. There cannot be an ontological transformation of the creature in the sense that it is no longer a creature. Maximus suggests that the creature is introduced into a state that is, in some way, beyond all that is finite. While remaining a creature it is granted a way of being a mode of existence, of moving, of living, that is beyond it. This stabilizes the constant possibility of slipping back into non-being or, in the case of creatures endowed with intellect and will, of aspiring to an autonomy that is ontologically impossible. - Man, through hypostatic innovation, can go beyond the limitations of a world bounded by time and space.

'God is the principle (ἀρχή) and the end (τέλος) of all genesis and of all movement of beings: from Him they come, towards Him they move and in Him they shall find immobility'.(9) Maximus does not here provide a concept to link 'principle' to 'end'. It is implied in the very terms themselves because they indicate God from two points of view.

---

(8) Ambig. PG 91, 1217C.

(9) Ambig. PG 91, 1217D. For the triad vide Ambig. PG 91, 1184D-1185A; ibid. 1217D.

God cannot avoid being the τέλος of the activity of which He is the ἀρχή . Otherwise He would be subject to some other end and so to some other being. He simply is the End and so must be the end to whatever He creates. To endow beings with being and to call them to share in existence and, in the case of man to call him beyond his state and habitat to enter ἀπειρία ,(10) is a giving by God. The creature is the object of His benevolence, the beneficiary of His goodness. Thrown into existence, the creature is called to God. God cannot avoid that act of calling, but it is a call to share in something for which beings compoinded of being and nothingness have, of themselves, no capacity and to which they have no right, because of the nothingness from which they came. Στάσις is achieved by man when he attains to God as τέλος. That he remains a creature and at the same time that he truly enters into ἀπειρία is suggested by Maximus in the notion ἀεικινησία .(11) The creaturehood requires κίνησις ; the τέλος present to him in ἀπειρία changes time into a state of ἀεί. The attainment of ἀπειρία is the fulfilment of the creature. Eternity is the mode of the duration of God. No creature, because of its creaturely constitution, can enter into a mode of duration that is described as 'eternity' in the strict sense. That is proper to God, so that Maximus, in his Contemplatio in Moysen et Elian, is describing the endless duration granted to creatures, when he says that 'eternity is time deprived of movement, time is eternity measured by movement'.(12) Eternity cannot be measured by a temporal canon; even if 'time' is deprived of movement, the new condition of duration cannot be 'eternity' as it is in God. The immobility proper to God is in a different order from the immobility won by the creature in στάσις . Divine immobility is the prerogative of the One who possesses in total simultaneity the perfection of Being. The στάσις if the creature is the definitive stabilization of being that is mutable in essence through hypostatic relationship to the Eternal God. Maximus sees this realized in the mystery of the Incarnation. Referring to Moses, he says:

Ἰησοῦν γάρ ἔχει τόν παντός ὄντα καί χρόνου καί αἰῶνος διάδοχον.

'The Creator and the creature are not the same thing'.(13) 'God is one, without beginning, incomprehensible, having in His totality the entire power to be, excluding altogether the notion of time and mode, in that He is inaccessible to all and is unknowable through any being in a natural way'.(14) 'Mode' is here a comprehensive term that excludes from God any kind of limit with

---

(10) Ambig. PG 91, 1220C. (11) Ambig. PG 91, 1245B.

(12) Ambig. PG 91, 1164C. (13) Ambig. PG 91, 1221A.

(14) Cap. Theol., 1,1. PG 90, 1084A.

regard to His being and existence. It is exemplified in 'time'. But it extends to every conceivable way of thinking about God that would imply that He was defined in any way. When Maximus ascribes to God 'the entire power to be', he is referring to His existence. The kind of existence of which man is aware within the horizon of his normal experience characterizes a compound of being and non-being. 'Every creature is a composite of substance and accident and always in need of Divine Providence, as it is not free from mutability'.(15)

Τρόποι is a form of κίνησις

While Maximus is here dealing with the essential aspects of created being rather than their existence, the essential τρόποι is a symptom of the kind of 'power to be' possessed and exercised by creatures. The whole fabric of creation is of such a kind. It is testimony to the reality of existence and yet it demands the perfection of existence in order to account for itself. The recognition in the 'hazel-nut' (16) of the need of an existence beyond its own, to account for it, is not divorced from an intuition here and now into its ontological structure, that it is a complex of being and non-being. The cogency of the insight depends to a large extent on the ontological principle that contingent being demands necessary being which is revealed in the contemplation of κίνησις. Neither the principle on its own, nor any logical orchestration based on the principle, could point conclusively to the fact of God. What seems to be an unauthorized leap from a realm of discourse, becomes acceptable when we keep in mind that the principle is used as an interpretation of this concrete thing here and now. The apprehension of the existent and the recognition of its exemplifying the principle coincide. The fact is self-evident at one level; the principle is self-evident at another. Their coincidence is the ground for secure extrapolation. It is obvious that what is obvious is not able to account for itself. The 'hazel-nut' demands a self-accounting Being to account for its being there.

'On reflecting on the divine, universal infinity - that inaccessible, much desired abyss - the mind marvels; then it is astounded at how He has brought beings into existence from nothing'.(17) 'Some say that created things eternally existed with God, which is impossible. For how can things that are limited in every way eternally coexist with the absolutely infinite? Or how

---

(15) Carit. 4,9. PG 90, 1084A (Sherwood).

(16) Cf. JULIAN OF NORWICH. Showings, 5. (The Classics of Western Spirituality) New York, Paulist Press, 1978, translated by Colledge E. & Walsh, J. pp. 183-184.

(17) Carit. 4,1. PG 90, 1048B (Sherwood).

are they properly creatures if they are coeternal with the Creator? But such is the theory of the Greeks who make God out as Creator not at all of the substance of things, but only of their qualities. We, who know the all-powerful God, say that He is Creator not of the qualities but of the qualified substances. And if this is so, created things do not eternally coexist with God'.(18) In contrast to God 'the substance of things, however, has 'not-being' as contrary'.(19) We can agree with Meyendorff when he says that: 'the absolute transcendence of the divine being, and the full reality of creation in time are solidly established'. (20) But it must be observed that it is not so obvious what 'in time' means. It certainly means that time is the measure of the duration of creatures; but it is not entirely obvious that creatures could not always have been, in dependence. Then Meyendorff finds that his conclusion is evidence that 'Origenism is outstripped'. Much of the Origens' effort was to establish the divine transcendence, especially as seen from the point of view of God's justice and goodness. Nor did he hold that souls were not created or were eternal. Where Maximus scores is in insisting implicitly on the substantial unity of man, and so on his being created as a unit.(21) Nor can there be any necessary denigration of matter in this view of creation. He also avoids the hazard of tampering with the transcendent being of God by ideas of the Henad. The Henad-thesis did not eliminate the creation of spiritual beings but it obscured their relation to God. From the point of view of creation, there was no reason why God might not have created spirits who would eventually become incarnate. At least this was not incompatible with a Greek view of the hylomorphic constitution of man. It would not satisfy the Semitic sense of the wholeness of man. But Meyendorff is right to emphasise that the transcendence of God is enhanced in Maximus's view, where there can not be the slightest temptation to associate creatures with God in any way that would invade the divine otherness.

This triad is in contrast to the Plotinian and Procline triad: μονή - πρόδος - ἐπιστροφή (22) and it is corroborated by the other Maximian triad: οὐσία - δύναμις - ἐνέργεια.

---

(18) Ibid. 4,6. PG 90, 1049A (Sherwood).

(19) Ibid. 3,28. PG 90, 1025BC (Sherwood).

(20) MEYENDORFF, J. Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, p. 133.

(21) SHERWOOD, P. St. Maximus the Confessor, The Ascetic Life, the Four Centuries on Charity, p. 51.

(22) Vide SHELDON WILLIAMS, I.P. 'St. Maximus the Confessor'. The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, p. 492.

In the Maximian view, movement is not so much a descent and return as the transition from being to its fulfilment. For Maximus, we can say that movement is the process of the being's becoming what it is. We have suggested that movement, in some sense, will always be basic to creaturely being, even when it is caught into Infinitude and thus stabilized. In man it is a way of saying that he will always live, but in such a way that there will be no possibility of his not living as befits his being; his movement will be true movement, his life true life. This will be so because he will have been lifted out of himself and stabilized in relation to God through his hypostasis. His μονή will be the outcome of κίνησις. The dynamic and creative character of the πρόοδος is better suggested in the γένεσις. The ἐπιστροφή is κίνησις. Sheldon William says simply that in Maximus "Motion is no longer descent and return".(23) This is particularly true if we wish to exclude the idea of movement as 'the nostalgia for an original perfection to be found again' (24) and see Maximus substituting for it a notion of movement that is 'a tension towards God as end and stable repose of the whole creation'.(25) If, with that proviso, we still think of creatures coming from God and returning to Him, as we can, then, the point of return is hypostatic freedom by which nature is innovated. It is in this way that the whole of creation, for Maximus, is eventually anchored in God.

---

(23) Ibid., p. 23.

(24) Vide RIOU, A. Le monde et l'Eglise selon Maxime le Confesseur, p. 51.

(25) Ibid.

The abbreviations used in this bibliography are taken from the list given in Aloys GRILLMEIER, Christ in Christian Tradition, vol. i, From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451), 2nd (revised) edn., translated by J. Bowden (Mowbrays, London & Oxford, 1975), pp. xiii-xvi.

## (I) TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS

(1) (a) COMBEFIS, F. & OEHLER, F., Patrologia Graeca (Migne), vols. 90 and 91 (Paris, 1860).

(b) CANART, R., 'La deuxième lettre à Thomas de saint Maxime le Confesseur', Byz xxxiv (1964), 415-445.

CERESA-GASTALDO, Aldo, Capitoli sulla carità, editi criticamente con introduzione, versione e note (Verba Seniorum, New Series 3, Rome, 1963).

DEVREESSE, R., 'La fin inédite d'une lettre de saint Maxime', RSR xvii (1937) 23-35.

DOUCET, M., 'La dispute de saint Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus', introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes (Unpublished thesis, Montreal, 1972).

(2) (a) Acta

GARRIGUES, Juan-Miguel, 'Le martyre de saint Maxime le Confesseur', RevThom lxxvi (1976) 410-452.

RAHNER, Hugo, L'Eglise et l'Etat dans le christianisme primitif (Editions du Cerf, Paris, 1964). Translation, with some lacunae, of the Relatio motionis (PG 90.109C-129D) and the Dispute at Byzia (PG 90.136-172).

(b) Ascet.

CERESA-GASTALDO, Aldo, Massimo il Confessore: Umanità e divinità di Cristo, traduzione, introduzione e note (Città Nuova Editrice, Rome, 1979), pp. 23-62.

DESEILLE, P., L'Evangile au désert (Editions du Cerf, Paris, 1965), pp. 161-194.

SHERWOOD, Polycarp, S.Maximus the Confessor: The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on Charity (Ancient Christian Writers 21, The Newman Press, Westminster, Maryland, 1955).

(c) Carit.

BALTHASAR, Hans Urs von, Kosmische Liturgie. Das Weltbild Maximus des Bekenners, zweite völlig veränderte Auflage (Johannes-Verlag, Einsiedeln, 1961), pp. 403-481.

CERESA-GASTALDO, A., Capitoli sulla carita (see (1) (a) above).

PALMER, G.E.H., SHERRARD, Philip & WARE, Kallistos, The Philokalia: the Complete Text, vol. ii (Faber & Faber, London & Boston, 1981), pp. 52-113.

PEGON, J., Centuries sur la charité, introduction et traduction (Sources Chretiennes 9, Editions du Cerf, Paris, 1945).

SHERWOOD, P. (see (2) (b) above).

(d) Or. dom.

CERESA-GASTALDO, A., Massimo il Confessore: Umanita e divinita di Cristo (see (2) (b) above), pp. 63-94.

PALMER, G.E.H. et all (see (2) (c) above), pp. 285-305.

RIOU, A., Le monde et l'Eglise selon Maxime le Confesseur (Théologie historique 22, Editions Beauchesne, Paris, 1973), pp. 214-239.

(e) Pyrr.

CERESA-GASTALDO, A., Massimo il Confessore: Umanità e divinità di Cristo (see (2) (b) above), pp. 99-156.

DOUCET, M. (see (1) (b) above).

(f) Ep. 2

DALMAIS, Irenee-Henri, 'Saint Maxime le Confesseur, docteur de la charité, La Vie spirituelle, lxxxii (1948), 269-303.

(g) Myst.

BALTHASAR, H. Urs Von, Kosmische Liturgie, 2nd edn. (see (2) (c) above), pp. 363-407.

CANTARELLA, R., Massimo il Confessore: La Mistagogia ed altri scritti (Edizione "Testi Cristiani", Florence, 1931).

LOT-BORODINE, Myrrha, in Irenikon, xiii (1936) to xv (1938).

(h) Cap.theol.

BALTHASAR, Hans Urs von, Kosmische Liturgie, 2nd edn. (see (2) (c) above), pp. 482-643.

PALMER, G.E.H., et al (see (2) (c) above), pp. 114-163.

RIOU, Alain, (see (2) (d) above), pp. 240-261 (Cap.theol. 1 only).

## (II) SECONDARY LITERATURE

ARMSTRONG, A.H. (ed.), The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (C.U.P., Cambridge, 1967).

BALTHASAR, Hans Urs von, Kosmische Liturgie. Hohe und Krise des griechischen Weltbilds bei Maximus Confessor (Herder, Freiburg i. Br., 1941).

Liturgie cosmique. Maxime le Confesseur, traduit de l'allemand par L.Haumet & H.-A. Prentout (Aubier, Paris, 1947).

Kosmische Liturgie, Das Weltbild Maximus des Bekenners, zweite vollig veranderte Auflage (Johannes-Verlag, Einsiedeln, 1961).

BORNERT, R. Les commentaires byzantines de la divine liturgie du VII^e au XV^e siecle (Archives de l'Orient chretien 9 Paris, Institut Francais d'Etudes Byzantines, 1966), 83-124.

'Explication de la liturgie et interpretation de l'Ecriture chez Maxime le Confesseur', StudPat x (Berlin, 1970), 323-327.

BROCK, Sebastian, 'An Early Syriac Life of Maximus the Confessor', AnalBoll xci (1973), 299-346.

CANDAL, M., 'La gracia increada del Liber Ambiguorum de san Maximo', OCP xxvii (1961), 131-149.

CAPPUYNS, M., 'Jean Scot Erigène et les Scholiae de Maxime le Confesseur', RTAM xxxi (1964), 122-124.

CASPAR, E., 'Die Lateransynode von 649', ZKG li (1932), 75-137.

CERESA-GASTALDO, Aldo, 'Maximos Confessor', LThK vii, 208-210.

CROCE, V., Tradizione e ricerca. Il metodo teologico di san Massimo Confessore (Studia Patristica Mediolanensia 2, Milan, 1974).

DALMAIS, Irenee-Henri, 'Saint Maxime le Confesseur, docteur de la charité', La Vie spirituelle, lxxxii (1948), 269-303.

'La théorie des "logoi" des creatures chez saint Maxime le Confesseur', RSPT xxxvi (1952), 244-249.

'L'oeuvre spirituelle de saint Maxime le Confesseur', Supplement de La Vie spirituelle xxi (1952), 216-226.

'La doctrine ascétique de saint Maxime le Confesseur d'après le Liber Asceticus', Irenikon xxvi (1953), 17-39.

'Un traité de théologie contemplative: le commentaire du Pater Noster de saint Maxime le Confesseur', RAM xxix (1953), 123-159.

'Divinisation ii: Patristique grecque', DictSpirit iii (Paris, 1957), 1376-1389.

'L'anthropologie spirituelle de saint Maxime le Confesseur', Recherches et debats xxxvi (1961), 202-211.

'Saint Maxime le Confesseur et la crise de l'origénisme monastique', in Théologie de la vie monastique(Editions Montaigne,Paris, 1961), pp. 411-421.

'La fonction unificatrice du Verbe Incarné dans les oeuvres spirituelles de saint Maxime le Confesseur', Sciences ecclesiastiques, xiv (1962), 445-459.

'Place de la Mystagogie de saint Maxime le Confesseur dans la théologie liturgique byzantine', StudPat v (Berlin, 1962), 277-283.

'L'héritage évagrien dans la synthèse de saint Maxime le Confesseur', StudPat viii (Berlin, 1966), 277-283.

'Le vocabulaire des activités intellectuelles, volontaires et spirituelles dans l'anthropologie de saint Maxime le Confesseur', in Mélanges offerts au P. M.-D.Chenu (Vrin, Paris, 1967), pp. 189-202.

'Mystère liturgique et divinisation dans la Mystagogie de saint Maxime le Confesseur', in FONTAINE, J. & KANNENIGESSER, C. (ed.s), Epektasis. Mélanges patristiques offers au Cardinal Jean Daniélou (Beauchesne, Paris, 1972), pp. 55-62.

'Théologie de l'Eglise et mystère liturgique dans la Mystagogie de saint Maxime le Confesseur', StudPat viii (Berlin, 1975), 145-153.

'Maxime le Confesseur', DictSpirit x (Paris, 1980), 836-842.

'L'Eglise icône du "Mystère": la "Mystagogie" de S. Maxime le Confesseur, une ecclesiolgie

liturgique', in TRIACCA, A.M. & PISTOIA.A(eds.), L'Eglise dans la liturgie. Conferences Saint-Serge, XXVIe semaine d'etudes liturgiques, Paris, 26-29 Juin 1979 (C.L.V., Edizioni Liturgiche, Rome, 1980), 107-117.

DEVREESSE, R., 'La vie de saint Maxime le Confesseur et ses recensions', AnalBoll xlvi (1928), 5-49.

'La fin inédite d'une lettre de saint Maxime', RSR xvii (1937), 23-35.

'La lettre d'Anastase l'Aprocrisaire sur la mort de saint Maxime le Confesseur et de ses compagnons d'exil', AnalBoll lxxiii (1955), 5-16.

DISDIER, M.-Th., 'Les fondements dogmatiques de la spiritualite de saint Maxime le Confesseur', EO xxix (1930), 296-313.

DOUCET, M., 'La dispute de S.Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus', introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes (Unpublished thesis, Montreal, 1972).

DRAESEKE, J., 'Zu Maximus Confessor', Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie, xlvi (1903), 563-580 and xlvii (1904), 121-130.

'Maximus Confessor und Johannes Scotus Erigena', Theologische Studien und Kritiken lxxxiv (1911), 20-60 and 204-229.

DRAGAS, George D., The Meaning of Theology. An Essay in Greek Patristics (Privately published, Darlington, 1980).

FLOROVSKY, Georges, Collected Works, vol.i, Bible, Church, Tradition: An Eastern Orthodox View (Nordland Publishing Company, Belmont, Massachusetts, 1972).

GARRIGUES, Juan-Miguel, 'L'énergie divine et la grace chez Maxime le Confesseur', Istina xix (1974), 272-296.

'La Personne composée du Christ d'après saint Maxime le Confesseur', RevThom lxxiv (1974), 181-204.

'Le sens de la primauté romaine selon Maxime le Confesseur', Istina xxi (1976), 6-24.

'Le martyre de de S.Maxime le Confesseur', RevThom lxxvi (1976), 410-452.

Maxime le Confesseur. La charité avenir divin de l'homme (Théologie Historique 38, Editions Beauchesnem Paris, 1976).

GARRIGUES, Juan-Miguel & RIOU, Alain, 'Théophanie selon Jean Scot Erigène et divinisation selon saint Maxime le Confesseur', Annuaire de l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, V^e section (Sciences religieuses), lxxvii (1969/70), 312-314.

GAUTHIER, R.A., 'Saint Maxime le Confesseur et la psychologie de l'acte humain', RTAM xxi (1954), 51-100.

GEANAKOPLOS, D.J., 'Some aspects of the influence of the Byzantine Maximos the Confessor on the theology of East and West', Church History xxxviii (1969), 150-163.

GRILLMEIER, Aloys, Christ in Christian Tradition, vol. i, From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451), 2nd (revised) edn., translated by J. Bowden (Mowbrays, London & Oxford, 1975).

GRUMEL, V., 'L'union hypostatique et la comparaison de l'âme et du corps chez Léonce de Byzance et saint Maxime le Confesseur', EO xxv (1926), 393-406.

'Notes d'histoire et de chronologie sur la vie de saint Maxime le Confesseur', EO xxvi (1927), 24-32.

'Recherches sur l'histoire du Monothélisme', EO xxvii (1928), 6-16; xviii (1929), 19-34, and 272-282; xxix (1930), 16-28.

'Le surnaturel dans l'humanité du Christ Viateur d'après Léonce de Byzance', Mélanges Mandonnet ii (Paris, 1930), 15-22.

'Maxime de Chrysopolis', DTC x (Paris, 1928), 448-459.

HAUSHERR, Irénée, 'Les grands courants de la spiritualité orientale', OCP i (1935), 114-138.

Philautie. De la tendresse pour soi a la charité, selon saint Maxime le Confesseur (Orientalia Christiana Analecta 137, Rome, 1952).

Korreferat zu P. Sherwood, Maximus and Origenism, in Berichte zum XI. Internationalen Byzantinisten-Kongress (Munich, 1968).

'Ignorance infinie our science infinie', OCP xxv (1959), 44-52.

'Christliche Berufung und Berufung zum Mönchtum nach den Kirchenvätern', in THILS, G., & TRUHLAR, K.V. (eds.), Laien und christliche Vollkommenheit (Herder, Freiburg, Basle & Vienna, 1966), pp. 30-114.

HEINZER, Felix, Gottes Sohn als Mensch. Die Struktur des Menschseins Christi bei Maximus Confessor' (Paradosis 26, Universitatsverlag, Freiburg, Schweiz, 1980).

HEINZER, Felix & SCHÖNBORN, Christoph (eds.), Maximus Confessor. Actes du Symposium sur Maxime le Confesseur, Fribourg, 2-5 septembre 1980 (Paradosis 27, Editions Universitaires, Fribourg, Suisse, 1982).

IVANKA, Endre von, 'Der philosophische Ertag Auseinandersetzung Maximus des Bekenners mit dem Origenismus', Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinischen Gesellschaft, vii (1958), 23-49.

Maximos der Bekenner: All-Eins in Christus (Johannes-Verlag, Einsiedeln, 1961).

Plato Christianus (Johannes-Verlag, Einsiedeln, 1964).

JANIN, R., 'L'Eglise byzantine sur les rives du Bosphore (côte asiatique)', RevEtByz (1954), 92-94.

KANNENGIESSER, Charles, Athanase d'Alexandrie: Sur l'Incarnation du Verbe, introduction, texte critique, traduction, notes et index (Sources Chrétiennes 199, Editions du Cerf, Paris, 1973).

KASPER, Walter, Jesus the Christ, translated by V. Green (Burns & Oates, London, 1976).

KIRCHMEYER, J., 'Un commentaire de Maxime le Confesseur sur le Cantique?', StudPat viii (Berlin, 1966), 406-413.

LACKNER, W., 'Zu Quellen und Datierung der Maximosvita', AnalBoll lxxxv (1967), 285-316.

LEBON, J., 'La christologie du monophysisme syrien', in GRILLMEIER, Aloys & BACHT, Heinrich (eds.), Das Konzil von Chalkedon, Bond; (Echter-Verlag, Wurburg, 1951), pp. 425-580.

LETHEL, Francois-Marie, Théologie de l'agonie du Christ. La liberté humaine du Fils de Dieu et son importance sotériologique mises en lumière par saint Maxime le Confesseur (Théologie Historique 52, Editions Beauchesne, Paris, 1979).

LOOSEN, J., Logos und Pneuma in begnadeten Menschen bei Maximus Confessor (Münsterische Beitrage zur Theologie 24, Munster, 1941).

LOSSKY, Vladimir, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, translated by members of the Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius (James Clarke & Co.Ltd., Cambridge, 1957).

The Vision of God, translated by A. Moorhouse (The Faith Press, London, 1963).

In the Image and Likeness of God, edited by John H. Erickson & Thomas E. Bird (Mowbrayu, London & Oxford, 1975).

LOUTH, Andrew, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition. From Plato to Denys (The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981).

MEYENDORFF, Jean, Le Christ dans la théologie byzantine (Editions du Cerf, Paris, 1969).

MICHAUD, E., 'Saint Maxime le Confesseur et l'apoctastase', Revue internationale de théologie, x (1902), 257-272.

MIQUEL, P., 'Peira. Contribution a l'etude du vocabulaire de l'expérience religieuse dans l'oeuvre de Maxime le Confesseur', StudPat vii (Berlin, 1966), 355-361.

MOELLER, Charles, 'Textes "monophysites" de Leonce de Jérusalem', EphThLov xxvii (1951), 467-482.

'Le chalcédonisme et le néo-chalcédonisme en Orient de 451 a la fin du VI$^{e}$ siècle', in GRILLMEIER & BACHT, Band I; (see under LEBON above), pp. 637-720.

MONMASSON, E., 'La chronologie de la vie de saint Maxime le Confesseur', EO xiii (1910), 149-154.

'La doctrine de l'apatheia d'après saint Maxime', EO xiv (1911), 36-41.

MURPHY, Francis Xavier & SHERWOOD, Polycarp, Constantinople II et Constantinople III (Histoire des conciles oecumeniques 3, Editions de l' Orante, Paris, 1973).

NEGRI, L., 'Elementi cristologici ed antropologici nel pensiero di S.Massimo il Confessore', La Scuola Cattolica, ci (1973), 331-361.

OTTO, S., Person und Subsistenz. Die philosophische Anthropologie des Leontios von Byzanz. Ein Beitrag zur spatantiken Geistesgeschichte ( W. Fink, Munich, 1968).

PELIKAN, Jaroslav, The Christian Tradition. A History of the Development of Doctrine, vol. i, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600) (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1971); vol. ii, The Spirit of Eastern Christendom (600-1700) (Chicago & London, 1974).

'"Council or Father or Scripture": The Concept of Authority in the Theology of Maximus Confessor', in NEIMAN, David & SCHATKIN, Margaret (eds.), The Heritage of the Early Church. Essays in Honour of the Very Reverend Georges Vasilievich Florovsky (Orientalia Christiana Analecta 195, Rome, 1973), pp. 277-288.

PHARANTOU, M.L. Christologia, I, To Enhypostaton (Privately published, Athens, 1972).

PRESTIGE, G.L., Fathers and Heretics (S.P.C.K., London, 1968).

God in Patristic Thought (S.P.C.K., London, 1969).

PUECH, H.-C., 'La ténèbre mystique chez le pseudo-Denys', Etudes Carmelitaines xxiii/2 (1938), 33-53.

RAHNER, Hugo, 'Die Gottesgeburt. Die Lehre der Kirchenvater von der Geburt Christi aus dem Herzen der Kirche und der Glaubigen', in Symbole der Kirche. Die Ekklesiologie der Vater (Otto Muller, Salzburg, 1964), pp. 13-87.

RAHNER, Karl, 'Le debut d'une doctrine des cinq sens spirituels chez Origene', RAM xiii (1932), 113-145.

RANTOSAVLIEVITS, A., To mysterion tes soterias kata ton hagion Maximon ton Homologeton (Privately published, Athens, 1975).

RICHARD, M., 'Léonce de Jérusalem et Léonce de Byzance', MSR i (1944), 35-88.

'L' introduction du mot "hypostase" dans la theologie de l'Incarnation', MSR ii (1945), 5-32 and 243-270.

'Le néo-chalcédonisme', MSR iii (1946), 156-161.

RIOU, Alain, Le monde et l'Eglise selon Maxime le Confesseur (Theologie historique 22, Editions Beauchesne, Paris, 1973).

SCHÖNBORN, Christoph von, Sophrone de Jerusalem. Vie monastique et confession dogmatique. (Theologie Historique 20, Editions Beauchesne, Paris, 1972).

L'Icône du Christ. Fondements théologiques élaborés entre le I^er et le II^e Concile de Nicee (325-787) (Paradosis 24, Editions Universitaires Fribourg, Suisse, 1976).

'La "lettre 38 de Saint Basile" et le problème christologique de l'iconoclasme', RSPT lx (1976), 446-450.

SHERWOOD, Polycarp, 'Notes on Maximus the Confessor', American Benedictine Review, i (1950), 347-356.

An annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor (Studia Anselmiana 30, Rome, 1952).

The Earlier Ambigua of St. Maximus the Confessor (Studia Anselmiana 36, Rome, 1955).

'Maximus and Origenism. Archo kai Telos', in Berichte zum XI. Internationalen Byzantinisten-Kongress (in Kommission bei Beck, Munich, 1958).

'Exposition and Use of Scripture in St. Maximus as manifest in the Quaestiones ad Thalassium', OCP xxiv (1958), 202-207.

'Survey on Recent Work on Maximus the Confessor', Trad xx (1964), 428-437.

'Saint Maxime et Denys l'Aréopagite', Dict Spirit iii (Paris, 1957), 295-299.

SQUIRE, A.K., 'The Idea of the Soul as Virgin and Mother in Maximus the Confessor', StudPat viii (Berlin, 1966), 451-461.

STANILOAE, D., Hagiou Maximou Homologetou: Philosophika kai theologika erotemata, tom. 1, introduction and commentary, translation by Ignatius Sakalos (Apostolike Diakonia tes Ekklesias tes Hellados, Athens, 1978).

STEPHANOU, E., 'La coexistence initiale du corps et de l'âme d'après St Gregoire de Nysse et St Maxime l'Homologete', EO xxxi (1932), 304-315.

STRAUBINGER, H., Die Christologie des hl. Maximus Confessor (P. Hanstein, Bonn, 1906).

STUDER, B., 'Das Heil aufgrund der gottmenschlichen Freiheit nach Maximus dem bekenner' HDG III/2a (Herder, Freiburg, Basle & Vienna, 1978), pp. 212-223.

THUNBERG, Lars, Microcosm and Mediator. The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor (Acta Seminarii Neotestamentici Upsaliensis 25, C.W.K.Gleerup, Lund, 1965).

UNGER, D.J., 'Christ Jesus, Centre and Final Scope of All Creation According to St. Maximus the Confessor', Franciscan Studies ix (1949), 50-62.

VILLER, M., 'Aux sources de la spiritualité de saint Maxime. Les oeuvres d'Evagre le Pontique', RAM xi (1930), 156-184 and 230-268.

VOELKER, W., 'Der Einfluss des Ps. Dionysius Areopagita auf Maximus Confessor', in KLOSTERMANN, E. (ed.), Studien zum Neuen Testament und zur Patristik (TU 77, Berlin, 1961), pp. 331-350.

'Zur Ontologie des Maximus Confessor', in Und fragten nach Jesus. Festschrift E. Barnikol ( Evang. Ver. - Anst., Berlin, 1964), 57-79.

'Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens (Franz Steiner, Wiesbaden, 1965).

WALTHER, G., Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der griechischen Vaterunserexegese (TU, 40/3, Leipzig, 1914).

WARE, Kallistos, The Orthodox Way, (Mowbrays, London & Oxford, 1979).

WILLIAMS, Rowan, The Wound of Knowledge. Christian Spirituality from the New Testament to St. John of the Cross (Darton, Longman & Todd, London, 1979).