Resistance and Rebellion against King Charles VII of France (1422-1461): A Study of Noble Networks and French Politics in the Fifteenth Century.

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Abstract:

Although the Valois monarchy suffered a series of blows during the 1420s, the reign of King Charles VII of France (1422-1461) has often been characterised as a time of 'state'-growth and of increasingly inexorable progression towards the end of the Hundred Years' War. This thesis takes an alternative approach to the politics of the reign. It argues that even as Charles VII's power increased, he still faced persistent and potent opposition within France. This opposition came in a variety of forms – including pro-Lancastrian resistance, large-scale 'internal' rebellions, and regionalised revolts in Charles' lands – but it was consistently underpinned by broad networks under French noble leadership. Through case studies, this thesis explores the workings and activity of such networks, their noble and non-noble constituencies, the causes and ideologies behind their actions, and the consequences of their defiance of the Valois crown. The study's findings challenge traditional views of Valois triumph and the rise of the 'state' under Charles VII and his successors, alongside offering a fresh perspective on oppositional movements and rebellions, agency, power structures, and dialogue in fifteenth-century politics.

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PhD, History, Durham University, 2023

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List of abbreviations

Archival sources

ADCM SJA – Archives départementales de la Charente-Maritime, La Rochelle: Archives communales de Saint-Jean-d'Angély

ADG – Archives départementales de la Gironde, Bordeaux

ADH – Archives départementales de l'Hérault, Montpellier

ADHG – Archives départementales de la Haute-Garonne, Toulouse

ADI – Archives départementales de l'Isère, Grenoble

ADPA – Archives départementales des Pyrénées-Atlantiques, Pau

ADPD – Archives départementales du Puy-de-Dôme, Clermont-Ferrand

ADTG – Archives départementales de Tarn-et-Garonne, Montauban

AMSF – Archives municipales, Saint-Flour

AN – Archives Nationales, Paris

BM Bordeaux – Bibliothèque municipale, Bordeaux

BM Lille – Bibliothèque municipale, Lille

BNF – Bibliothèque Nationale de France

BNF Fr. – Bibliothèque Nationale de France: 'Français'

NA – National Archives, London

Journal titles

ABSHF – Annuaire-Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire de France

AHG – Archives Historiques de la Gironde

AHP – Archives Historiques de Poitou

AHS – Archives Historiques de la Saintonge et de l'Aunis

BEC – Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes

BIHR – Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research

BSEB – Bulletin de la Société d'émulation du Bourbonnais

EHR – English Historical Review

Printed primary sources

Basin, *Histoire* – Thomas Basin, *Histoire des règnes de Charles VII et de Louis XI*, ed. J. Quicherat (Paris, 1855-9).

Chartier, *Chronique* – Jean Chartier, *Chronique de Charles VII, roi de France,* ed. A. Vallet de Viriville (Paris, 1858).

Chastelain, *Livre IV* – Georges Chastelain, *Chronique. Les Fragments du Livre IV*, ed. J.-C. Delclos (Geneva, 1991).

Chastelain, *Œuvres* – Georges Chastelain, *Œuvres*, ed. J. C. Kervyn de Lettenhove (Brussels, 1863-6).

De Cagny, *Chronique* – Perceval de Cagny, *Chroniques de Perceval de Cagny*, ed. H. Moranvillé (Paris, 1902).

Escouchy, *Chronique* – Mathieu d'Escouchy, *Chronique de Mathieu d'Escouchy*, ed. G. du Fresne Beaucourt (Paris, 1863-4).

Gruel, *Chronique* – Guillaume Gruel, *Chronique d'Arthur de Richemont, connétable de France, duc de Bretagne (1393-1458),* ed. A. Le Vavasseur (Paris, 1890).

Journal Paris – Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris, 1405-1449, ed. A. Tuetey (Paris, 1881).

Leseur, *Histoire de Gaston IV* – Guillaume Leseur, *Histoire de Gaston IV par Guillaume Leseur*, ed. H. Courteault (Paris, 1893).

Letters and papers – Letters and papers illustrative of the wars of the English in France during the reign of Henry the Sixth, King of England, ed. J. Stevenson (London, 1861-4).

Le Bouvier, *Chronique* – Gilles Le Bouvier, *Les chroniques du roi Charles VII par Gilles le Bouvier dit le Héraut Berry*, ed. H. Courteault & L. Celier (Paris, 1979).

'Memoire des plaintes' – 'Memoire des plaintes et demandes faictes au conseil du Roy estant à Montferrant', in *Chronique de Mathieu d'Escouchy*, ed. G. du Fresne Beaucourt, v. 3 (Paris, 1864), pp. 4-29.

Monstrelet, *Chronique* – Enguerrand de Monstrelet, *La chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet*, ed. L. Douët-d'Arcq (Paris, 1857-62).

Ordonnances des rois – Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race, ed. L.-G. de Vilevault, L. Bréquigny, *et al.* (Paris, 1723-1849).

Acknowledgements:

I would not have been able to complete this thesis without the help of many people in Durham and beyond. Firstly, I am extremely grateful to my supervisors, Graeme Small, Christian Liddy, and Neil Murphy, for their exceptional advice and backing. I would also like to thank staff at all of the archives which I have visited for their assistance, Erika Graham-Goering for her valuable suggestions on my research, Pierre Courroux for his support for a recent visit to Pau, and the AHRC Northern Bridge Doctoral Training Partnership (2019-2023) for their generosity. During my time in Oxford before the PhD, I benefitted enormously too from the guidance of John Watts, Grant Tapsell, and Christina Kuhn.

Finally, I will always be grateful to my late grandparents Meg and John, and to everyone in my network of lovely family and friends, for their support. I would particularly like to thank Mark and Austin for discussing my research with me and Richard for travelling with me to Grenoble. Most of all, my parents Sue and Jonathan, my grandma Margaret and grandad Alan, and my sister, Katie, have given me unswerving support and encouragement, and it is to them that the thesis is dedicated.

Chapter 1: Towards a new understanding of noble opposition and politics in the reign of Charles VII

i) Introduction

This thesis has two main objectives. First and foremost, it will offer a revisionist account of opposition to Charles VII from French nobles, be they in Valois or Lancastrian allegiance, around the end of the Hundred Years' War. Charles VII's reign (1422-1461) is well known to have begun amidst a series of catastrophes for his dynasty, but for the period from the mid-late 1430s onwards, past research has mostly emphasised narratives of victory over 'the English', 'state'-growth and centralisation, and increasing national unity in France. By contrast, this thesis will draw attention to the persistent vitality and variety of noble resistance against the Valois crown. Through case studies, it will re-examine questions around how and why different forms of noble opposition to Charles VII originated and endured, how far and from whom resistance attracted support, and under what circumstances and to what extent Charles VII was eventually able to overcome opposition. This analysis will in turn cast fresh light on the events of a reign that had a profound impact on France, England, and the Low Countries, as well as enabling the thesis to make a novel contribution to debates around the nature and significance of rebellion in late-medieval Europe, in a point to which we will return in our conclusion.

Concurrently, though, the other main aim of the thesis is to make the case that a revisionist approach is needed for understanding politics more generally in France in the later Middle Ages. Whereas we shall see that scholarship has often regarded 'state'-formation and the choices of the leaders of 'states' as the fundamental driving forces behind events in mid-fifteenth-century France, the present study of opposition to Charles VII will foreground the enduring influence of a wider range of actors. Above all, it will highlight the importance of noble networks with multifaceted interests and ideological concerns. Networks of this kind will be conceptualised broadly as groups of individuals who had ties to a powerful noble or family, but who also had numerous lateral connections to one another. The structures will not be anatomised with reference to social network analysis given the incompleteness of the available source material, but the thesis will aim to shed light on the underexplored issue of how they functioned in a late medieval French context. By the end of the study, this issue will be shown to be of paramount importance, as it will be suggested that the behaviour of noble networks was fundamental in influencing, facilitating, and, at times, constraining resistance to the Valois crown and, indeed, the choices of all political actors right up to princes and sovereigns.

The three main chapters of the thesis (2-4) will look at case studies of different types of noble opposition against Charles VII and the networks involved. Before then, however, the present chapter will discuss past historiography on politics in Charles VII's reign in more detail in Section ii), ahead of setting out more about the structure, key terms, and sources used in the thesis in Section iii). Finally, Section iv) will offer an overview of the course of noble opposition under Charles VII in order to contextualise and support the in-depth analysis of the later chapters.

ii) Historiography

We are immensely fortunate to be able to draw on a rich historiography for studying politics in France in and around the mid-fifteenth century. However, as already implied, it remains the case that there are shortcomings in current understandings of opposition to Charles VII from both Lancastrian and Valois vassals, as well as more broadly in coverage of the political activity and influence of the nobility in France in this period. This section will seek to explore how and why this is the case, through a critique of three broad strands of past scholarship. We will begin by looking at research on Charles VII's kingship and overarching political developments across his reign. Then, we will move on to assessing further research on the nobility, noble opposition, and contemporary individual nobles. Finally, we will discuss the smaller quantity of research that has dealt specifically with noble networks around this time.

Scholarship on Charles VII's kingship and concomitant political developments has often been dismissive of the significance of noble opposition and noble networks after the 1420s-30s. This dismissiveness arguably stems from the manner in which this historiography has been dominated by narratives of triumph, unification, and the rise of the 'state' under the Valois. As an archetypal example here, let us consider the arguments about Charles VII's reign offered in the monarch's biography by the late Philippe Contamine, who was one of the most distinguished and influential historians to have studied the period. One of Contamine's central contentions in his 2017 study is that Charles VII governed France effectively and conscientiously during the later decades of his rule, meaning that he became a king of 'victory… unity, and peace'.[1] This appraisal of Charles' kingship rejects the eighteenth-century view that the ruler was a passive 'witness of the wonders of his reign', although it also frames the era in a way which is unsympathetic to, and inclined to downplay the scope and impact of, ongoing opposition to the Valois.[2] Contamine writes, ultimately, as 'the

[1] P. Contamine, *Charles VII: une vie, une politique* (Paris, 2017), esp. pp. 412, 416, 478 (quoted).
[2] See C.-J.-F. Hénault, *Nouvel abrégé chronologique de l'Histoire de France* 3.e. (Paris, 1749), p. 254 for the description of Charles VII as 'le témoin des merveilles de son règne' (my translation follows that of M. Vale, *Charles VII* (London, 1974), p. 20).

king's friend', and a similar comment can be made about other biographers of Charles VII.[3] These include Gaston du Fresne de Beaucourt, who penned an encomiastic, though magisterially detailed, biography of Charles VII over six volumes in 1881-91, and Malcolm Vale, who argued in 1974 that the monarch was a masterful political operator throughout his adult life, even if he was forced to battle against the English and a self-serving aristocracy.[4]

For Contamine, however, it was also crucial that Charles VII was a 'foundational king', whose reign seemingly corresponded to a key period of 'growing pains in the development of the State' ('une crise de croissance de l'État') and to 'an important stage in the construction of the "empire du Roi"' ('une étape importante dans la construction de l'"empire du Roi"').[5] This evaluation is based on many developments under Charles VII, and Contamine explicitly cites: a strengthened concept of sovereignty and rule of succession, a more effective use of 'the space of the realm and its human resources', major fiscal and military reforms (which saw more tacit consent to taxation, more stable finances, and the emergence of a permanent army), greater royal authority over the Church, largely peaceful relations between the king and the majority of his *bonnes villes*, re-established sovereign justice, the end of systematic use of the estates general, a stronger sense of identity amongst royal subjects, a lessening of political tensions, reduced intellectual criticism of the king, and, finally, diminished aristocratic freedoms.[6] This lengthy list is striking in several regards, but, in the first instance, it is again worth noting that Contamine's arguments align closely with the preoccupations and narratives found in many other works. For example, the contention that there was an emergent, conceptual 'empire du Roi' in late medieval France was initially championed by Jacques Krynen in his 1993 study of the rise of absolutist thought.[7] Meanwhile, Charles VII's reign has also been viewed as especially pivotal in the development of Valois sovereignty and French national unity by historians such as Colette Beaune (1985/1991), Claude Gauvard (1991, 2009), Léonard Dauphant (2012), and Jonathan Sumption (2023).[8] In the realm of financial and military structures, similarly, scholars such

[3] Cf. K.B. McFarlane, *The Nobility of Later Medieval England* (Oxford, 1973), p. 2.
[4] G. du Fresne de Beaucourt, *Histoire de Charles VII* (Paris, 1881-91), praises Charles VII's character e.g. in his conclusion to v. 6 (1891), pp. 451-2, in sentiments influenced by monarchist views (for which see Vale, *Charles VII*, pp. 8-10). Beaucourt's positive take on Charles VII's kingship may have influenced Contamine, although the latter's account of the period from c.1435-c.1440 is more pessimistic (cf. e.g. Beaucourt, *Histoire de Charles VII*, v. 3, p. 417; Contamine, *Charles VII*, pp. 247-8). M. Vale, *Charles VII*, differs from both scholars in portraying Charles as a skilful manoeuvrer even from the 1420s (see e.g. pp. 3-4, 38-41, 102).
[5] Contamine, *Charles VII*, pp. 474-5, 478.
[6] *Ibid*., p. 475.
[7] J. Krynen, *L'empire du roi. Idées et croyances politiques en France, xiiie-xve siècles (*Paris, 1993).
[8] C. Beaune, *The birth of an ideology: myths and symbols of nation in late-medieval France* (Berkeley, 1991), esp. pp. 146-50; C. Gauvard, *'De Grace especial'. Crime, état et société en France à la fin du Moyen Âge* (Paris, 1991), esp. pp. 915, 952; C. Gauvard, 'Pardonner et oublier après la Guerre de cent ans. Le rôle des lettres d'abolition de la chancellerie royale française', in R. Marcowitz & W. Paravicini (eds.), *Vergeben und*

as John Bell Henneman (1999) have suggested that changes to taxation from the late 1430s marked the permanent foundation of 'state' finance in France, just as Contamine's own *Guerre, État et société à la fin du Moyen Âge* (1972) earlier traced the genesis of the army of the Ancien Régime back to royal military reforms in 1445.[9] With regard to the enforcement of justice under Charles VII, Malcolm Vale has even gone so far as to describe the king's condemnation of Jean II duke of Alençon for treason in 1458 as a 'landmark in the process by which the relationship between king and prince of the blood was transformed from the bilateral feudal contract to unilateral subjection'.[10]

For thinking about both Contamine's schema of centralisation and this wider historiographical tradition which it embodies, two points are especially worth making. One of these is that we are again dealing with a framework that is inclined to overlook, downplay, or show antipathy towards resistance to Charles VII and his successors. Opposition is for the most part treated, or implied to be, increasingly exceptional, ineffectual, and reactionary. It is perhaps even conceptualised as foredoomed, since there is a clear teleological aspect to many of the above narratives, whose tacit endpoint is the flourishing of early modern absolutism or the modern nation-state. Contamine's 2017 biography, indeed, asserts that 'absolute monarchy' was in the process of being established during Charles VII's reign, despite a handful of princes offering a 'counter-model' to it.[11] Secondly, though, what is also striking about the aforementioned narratives is how little emphasis is placed on the nobility at all, except as a monarchical 'resource', or as victims or anomalous holdouts against change.[12] This lack of emphasis is especially remarkable when one considers that historiography on

Vergessen? Vergangenheitsdiskurse nach Besatzung, Bürgerkrieg und Revolution (Munich, 2009), esp. pp. 54-5; L. Dauphant, *Le royaume des quatre rivières. L'espace politique français (c.1380-1515)* (Seyssel, 2012), esp. p. 284; J. Sumption, *Triumph and Illusion: The Hundred Years War V* (London, 2023), esp. pp. 800, 806-9. For related ideas in older historiography, see e.g. A. Vallet de Viriville, *Histoire de Charles VII, roi de France, et de son époque, 1403-1461* (Paris, 1863-5), esp. v. 3 (1865), p. 462.

[9] J. B. Henneman, 'France in the Middle Ages', in R. Bonney (ed.), *The rise of the fiscal state in Europe, c. 1200-c.1815* (Oxford, 1999), p. 117; P. Contamine, *Guerre, état et société à la fin du Moyen Âge: études sur les armées des rois de France 1337-1494* (Paris, 1972), p. 275ff.

[10] Vale, *Charles VII*, p. 154; cf. B.-A. Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, 'Une idée politique de Louis XI: la sujétion éclipse la vassalité', *Revue historique*, v. 226 (1961) pp. 383-98; A.-B. Spitzbarth, 'De la vassalité à la sujétion: l'application du traité d'Arras (21 septembre 1435) par la couronne', *Revue du Nord*, v. 349 (2003), pp. 43-72. For the significance of Alençon's trial, see also: S. Cuttler, 'A report to Sir John Fastolf on the trial of Jean, Duke of Alençon', *EHR*, v. 96/381 (1981), p. 808; P. Contamine, 'Le premier procès de Jean II, duc d'Alençon (1456-1458): quels enjeux, quels enseignements politiques?', in P. Hoppenbrouwers, A. Janse & R. Stein (eds.), *Power and Persuasion: Essays on the Art of State Building in Honour of W.P. Blockmans* (Turnhout, 2010), p. 121; J. Blanchard (ed.), *Procès Politiques au temps de Charles VII et de Louis XI: Alençon* (Geneva, 2018), p. xxi.

[11] Contamine, *Charles VII*, p. 477; cf. *idem*, 'Jean II, duc d'Alençon', pp. 105-6.

[12] Cf. P. Contamine, *La noblesse au royaume de France de Philippe le Bel à Louis XII: essai de synthèse* (Paris, 1998), pp. 316ff., 327ff., where Contamine goes further in acknowledging the nobility's ongoing importance and power, but still regards them as being increasingly drawn into the orbit and structures of the rising 'state'.

fifteenth-century England and Scotland has in contrast underlined that the aristocracy remained the king's key partners in government and in governance over the localities.[13]

Against this backdrop, it can be contended that the aforementioned tradition of scholarship on France has undervalued the political importance of most nobles' activity and agency, at least beyond the great princes and outside of official and institutional contexts. Instead, many historians have arguably been anachronistic in the extent of their fixation on the conceptual and institutional underpinnings of Valois power. In turn, this has led to a prevalence of excessively centralised perspectives on late medieval France. Such trends owe much to the fact that the medieval French 'state' has never been displaced as a central focus of political historiography in the same way as happened in Britain after K.B. McFarlane (d. 1966), although Jean-Philippe Genet is also justified in remarking that historians' perceptions have been influenced by the nature of the extant sources (2015).[14] Unlike in England, it is simply difficult to use national archives in France 'to track in any detail the relations of the centre with the regional administration and localities'.[15] Yet, this last point notwithstanding, it should be recognised that overly centralised perspectives remain limiting for our understanding of noble behaviour and power structures – and thence, one should add, for our comprehension of the full workings of the French polity under Charles VII and his dynasty.

Of course, other research has focused more specifically on the nobility and related opposition to Charles VII. A tradition of studies of individual magnates, noble families, and specific regions of France stretches back to the nineteenth century and beyond, and, as we shall soon see, there has also been some research which has been more focused on the aristocracy's collective political significance, on noble support for the Lancastrian 'dual monarchy', and on rebellions by nobles in Valois allegiance in the mid-fifteenth century. This historiography can to an extent be seen as a counter-tradition to the scholarship discussed previously. However, at the same time, it has arguably been inflected by many similar preoccupations and perspectives. In consequence, problems remain

[13] See e.g. C. Carpenter, *The Wars of the Roses: Politics and the Constitution in England, c.1437-1509* (Cambridge, 1997). p. 34ff.; A. Barrell, *Medieval Scotland* (Cambridge, 2000), p. 198ff. Additionally, cf. C. Armstrong, 'The golden age of Burgundy: dukes that outdid kings', in A. Dickens (ed.), *The courts of Europe: politics, patronage and royalty, 1400-1800* (London, 1977), p. 60; J. R. Major, *From Renaissance Monarchy to Absolute Monarchy: French Kings, Nobles and Estates* (Baltimore, 1994), pp. 57-8.

[14] J.-P. Genet, 'The government of later medieval France and England: a plea for comparative history', in *idem*, C. Fletcher, & J. Watts (eds.), *Government and political life in England and France, c.1300-c.1500* (Cambridge, 2015), p. 9. See also: G. Prosser, ''Decayed feudalism' and 'royal clienteles': Royal office and magnate service in the fifteenth century', in C. Allmand (ed.), *War, Government and Power in Late Medieval France* (Liverpool, 2000), pp. 175-6, and for McFarlane's impact on historiography on England: C. Carpenter, 'Political and Constitutional History: Before and After McFarlane', in R. Britnell & A. Pollard (eds.), *The McFarlane legacy studies in late medieval politics and society* (Stroud, 1995), pp. 175-206.

[15] Genet, 'The government of later medieval France and England', p. 9.

in the coverage of noble opposition and political structures – at least outside of a minority of studies concerned with magnate networks which we shall consider later as a third historiographical strand.

To begin with, we can note that some research on noble opposition and the nobility has overtly been shaped by traditional views of 'state'-growth and centralisation under the Valois. As an illustration of this point, let us consider three articles discussing the largest revolt of the Valois aristocracy during Charles VII's reign, the so-called Praguerie of 1440, written by Robert Favreau (1971), Bernard Chevalier (1995), and Élodie Lecuppre-Desjardin and Valérie Toureille (2020).[16] The first and second of these articles respectively analyse events in Poitou in 1440 and urban attitudes to the princely-led rebellion, although tellingly, the revolt's true significance is in both cases seen as lying in its defeat. For Favreau, the Praguerie's failure paved the way for military and financial reforms and thence the birth of 'modern France', whilst for Chevalier, the overwhelming rejection of the rebels by towns was a seminal moment in collaboration between *bonnes villes* and 'the state'.[17] The alignment here with the sorts of teleological arguments discussed earlier is self-evident, although interestingly, the more recent article by Lecuppre-Desjardin and Toureille also contends that the Praguerie was itself a contemporary reaction against growing monarchical power; indeed, these authors' core argument is that the Praguerie emerged in response to centralising military reforms and innovations in 'the construction of the royal State'.[18] As such, we are still locked into a framework in which the rise of 'the state' is seen as the driver and heart of political change under Charles VII and subsequent monarchs, and in which noble activity is viewed as in some sense subordinate or responsive to this. Within this framework, assumptions about noble revolt can also continue to be propagated in which the phenomenon is treated in a pejorative and dismissive manner. As an example, it is striking that, even though the Praguerie lasted for the best part of half a year, Lecuppre-Desjardin and Toureille suggest that it was led by rebel noblemen who lacked any true 'vertical solidarities' with other groups or 'credible alternative projects' to those of the growing 'state'.[19] More broadly, views of this type in historiography have also resulted in a shortage of attention to ideological concerns that ran counter to support for the Valois, as well as leaving the inherent significance of magnate revolt as open to question. This latter point may in turn be relevant for explaining why there is yet to be a

[16] R. Favreau, 'La Praguerie en Poitou', *BEC,* v. 129 (1971), pp. 277-301; B. Chevalier, 'Un tournant du règne de Charles VII: Le ralliement des bonnes villes à la monarchie pendant la Praguerie', in *idem*, *Les bonnes villes, l'État et la société dans la France de la fin du XVe siècle* (Orléans, 1995), pp. 155-67; E. Lecuppre-Desjardin & V. Toureille, 'Servir ou trahir. La réaction des grands féodaux face aux innovations étatiques, au temps de la Praguerie', *Publications du Centre Européen d'Études Bourguignonnes*, v. 60 (2020), pp. 7-20.
[17] Favreau, 'La Praguerie en Poitou', p. 301; Chevalier, 'Un tournant du règne de Charles VII', pp. 162-3; see also *idem, Les bonnes villes de France du XIVe au XVIe siècle* (Paris, 1982), p. 101.
[18] Lecuppre-Desjardin & Toureille, 'Servir ou trahir', pp. 10, 19 (quoted).
[19] *Ibid*., p. 20. For similar arguments about the Praguerie and rebellion in fifteenth century France, see also the other works referenced in Chapter 3 nn. 9-13 below.

general monograph on the Praguerie or later aristocratic uprisings in fifteenth-century France, for all that the Guerre du Bien Public of 1465 and other revolts under Louis XI have attracted greater attention and have new research on them forthcoming.[20]

In other instances, research on the French nobility and localities in the fifteenth century has explored what Jean-Philippe Genet terms 'the amount and vitality of state-building activities emulating but also opposing the French kings'.[21] This challenge to centralised perspectives is linked by Genet specifically to Anglophone studies of Lancastrian-ruled areas of France and the principalities of Burgundy and Brittany, as epitomised by Malcolm Vale's *English Gascony 1399-1453* (1970), Richard Vaughan's *Philip the Good: the apogee of Burgundy* (1970), the late Christopher Allmand's *Lancastrian Normandy 1415-1450* (1983), and Michael Jones' *The creation of Brittany: a late medieval state* (1987).[22] Yet, Genet's characterisation might equally be used to describe further scholarship on the same and other territories. For example, as early as 1866, Henri Ribadieu asserted that Gascony was a 'separate state' ('un État séparé') prior to Charles VII's conquest in the early 1450s.[23] Subsequently, monographs by historians such as Jean Kerhervé (1987) and Bertrand Schnerb (1999) have also analysed Brittany and Burgundy as fully-fledged 'states' in the later Middle Ages, albeit in a perspective that has provoked some dissent.[24] Meanwhile, principalities elsewhere in France have attracted less in-depth attention, but there is still a longstanding tradition of scholarship showing that different princely dynasts at a minimum controlled their own administrations and pursued distinct political agendas in the fifteenth century.[25] One should for

[20] Research on 1465 from O. Mattéoni is forthcoming, as is an article by N. Murphy on 'Towns and princely rebellion in fifteenth-century France: The War of the Public Weal, 1465'. For published work on 1465 and aristocratic opposition to Louis XI, see: W. Paravicini, 'Peurs, pratiques, intelligences: formes de l'opposition aristocratique à Louis XI d'après les interrogatoires du connétable de Saint-Pol', in B. Chevalier & P. Contamine (eds.), *La France de la fin du XVe siècle: renouveau et apogée* (Paris, 1985), pp. 183-96; J. Krynen, 'La Rébellion du Bien Public (1465)' in M.-T. Fögen (ed.), *Ordnung und Aufruhr im Mittelalter. Historische und juristische Studien zur Rebellion* (Frankfurt, 1995), pp. 81-97; O. Bouzy, *La révolte des nobles du Berry contre Louis XI: guerre et économie en 1465* (Paris, 2006); J. Collins, *The French Monarchical Commonwealth, 1356-1560* (Cambridge, 2022), pp. 147-88. For regionalised revolts, see also the works cited in Chapter 4 n. 1 below.

[21] Genet, 'The government of later medieval France and England', p. 5.

[22] M. Vale, *English Gascony, 1399-1453: a study of war, government and politics during the later stages of the Hundred Years' War* (London, 1970); R. Vaughan, *Philip the Good: the apogee of Burgundy* (London, 1970); C. Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy, 1415-1450: the history of a medieval occupation* (Oxford, 1983); M. Jones, *The creation of Brittany: a late medieval state* (London, 1987).

[23] H. Ribadieu, *Histoire de la conquête de la Guyenne par les Français, de ses antécédents et de ses suites* (Bordeaux, 1866), p. vii.

[24] J. Kerhervé, *L'État breton aux 14e et 15e siècles: les ducs, l'argent et les hommes* (Paris, 1987); B. Schnerb, *L'État bourguignon, 1363-1477* (Paris, 1999). For alternative perspectives, see the works cited in n. 32 below, as well as G. Small, *George Chastelain and the shaping of Valois Burgundy: political and historical culture at court in the fifteenth century* (Woodbridge, 1997), esp. p. 229.

[25] In addition to the works mentioned in the text, see e.g. A. Lecoy de la Marche, *Le roi René: sa vie, son administration, ses travaux artistiques et littéraires d'après les documents inédits des archives de France et*

instance mention Henri Courteault's superlative biography of Gaston IV count of Foix (1895), Charles Samaran's study of the counts of Armagnac (1907), and André Leguai's research on the dukes of Bourbon and their contemporaneous 'state' (1962, 1969).[26]

Historiography of this kind has overall made excellent use of princely and English archives, valuably strengthened our understanding of the high-ranking nobility, and offered a reminder that power in France was 'polycentric', to employ the term used by Marie-Thérèse Caron in her synthesis of *Noblesse et Pouvoir Royal en France XIIIe-XVIe siècle* (1994).[27] However, even still, this scholarship has failed fully to break from problematic paradigms. For a start, views of opposition to the Valois crown after c.1435 have often continued to be governed by pessimistic and fatalistic attitudes, since many principalities and territories have been portrayed as on mirror trajectories to the growing French 'state', and as destined by the middle of Charles VII's reign to fall before his or his successors' power.[28] If we concentrate on research on Lancastrian-ruled parts of France, we can note that Christopher Allmand portrays the 'English occupation' of Normandy as 'collapsing from within' even prior to the Valois conquest of 1449-50, and that Malcolm Vale contends that 'English Gascony' was 'as good as lost' by the early 1440s amidst a growing shortage of resources.[29] Vale's argument in particular glosses over – and thence fails to explain – the existence of substantial support for the English from the regional nobility into the 1450s. Nonetheless, defeatist characterisations of the last years of Lancastrian rule have still received little challenge in subsequent historiography.[30]

Scholarship on the Burgundian principality has for its part made far less effort to align with narratives of centralisation under the Valois crown, as a result of separate teleological concerns relating to the later independence of the Low Countries. For both this historiography and that on

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d'Italie (Paris, 1875); P. Champion, *Vie de Charles d'Orléans (1394-1465)* (Paris, 1911). For more general work on principalities, see also: E. Perroy, 'Feudalism or principalities in fifteenth-century France', *BIHR,* v. 20 (1943-5), pp. 181-5; A. Leguai, 'Royauté et principautés en France aux XIVe et XVe siècles: l'évolution de leurs rapports au cours de la Guerre de Cent Ans', *Le Moyen Âge*, v. 101 (1995), pp. 121-135.

[26] H. Courteault, *Gaston IV, comte de Foix, vicomte souverain de Béarn, prince de Navarre, 1423-1472: étude historique sur le midi de la France et le nord de l'Espagne au XVe siècle* (Toulouse, 1895); C. Samaran, *La Maison d'Armagnac au XVe siècle, et les dernières luttes de la féodalité dans Le Midi de la France* (Paris, 1907); A. Leguai, *Les ducs de Bourbon pendant la crise monarchique du XVe siècle: contribution à l'étude des apanages* (Paris, 1962); *idem*, *De la seigneurie à l'état: le Bourbonnais pendant la guerre de Cent Ans* (Moulins, 1969).

[27] M.-T. Caron, *Noblesse et pouvoir royal en France, XIIIe-XVIe siècle* (Paris, 1994), p. 11.

[28] As well as the works cited below, see e.g. Samaran, *La Maison d'Armagnac*, esp. pp. 321, 327; Leguai, *Les ducs de Bourbon*, esp. pp. 185-6.

[29] Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, p. 40; Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 217-9; see also *idem*, 'The Last Years of English Gascony, 1451-1453', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, v. 19 (1969), pp. 131-2, 138.

[30] R. Harris, *Valois Guyenne: a study of politics, government and society in late medieval France* (Woodbridge, 1994), pp. 153-6, 182-6 and Sumption, *Triumph and Illusion*, pp. 740-1 both suggest that Henry VI attracted more substantial noble support in Gascony in 1452-3, but they still embrace Vale's conceptual framework by treating Lancastrian rule in France as increasingly doomed: Harris, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-7; Sumption, *op. cit*., esp. pp. 476, 594-5, 607-8. For defeatist views in more Anglocentric historiography, see e.g. G. Harriss, *Shaping the Nation: England, 1360-1461* (Oxford, 2005), pp. 577, 584.

other principalities and Lancastrian France, though, it is worth underlining the extent to which scholars have thought in 'statist' terms. Alongside the frequent use of the term 'state', many historians have emulated research on the Valois monarchy by placing their primary emphasis on institutions and administration, in lieu of taking a more holistic view of relations between noble elites and princely or Lancastrian leaders. This point is exemplified by Richard Vaughan's seminal work on Philip the Good and the Burgundian 'state', in which three out of four thematic chapters discuss the Burgundian court, finances, and administrative machinery, whilst the other addresses dealings with the Church – although not nobility.[31]

More recently, historians such as Élodie Lecuppre-Desjardin (2016/2022), Graeme Small (2019), and Erika Graham-Goering (2020) have challenged the limitations and anachronism in this sort of viewpoint on principalities, whilst we shall also see below that there has since been further research on noble supporters of princes such as the dukes of Burgundy.[32] Even still, however, the impact of 'statist' views has been significant for research on principalities, and there have also been profound consequences for wider thought on the French nobility and polity. France has come to be seen by a number of historians as a collection of 'states' or aspirant 'states' competing with the Valois 'state', and this has arguably meant that scholars have widened their gaze beyond the Valois monarchy only at the price of placing inordinate weight on the independence and agency of other supposed 'state-builders'. As a case in point, let us return to Marie-Thérèse Caron's overview work on *Noblesse et Pouvoir*. This account remains the best narrative synthesis of relations between the aristocracy and crown in late medieval France, but it is conspicuous that Caron is heavily focused on princely 'states' and their leaders, who allegedly almost 'monopolised political action'.[33] Caron does undercut this emphasis by warning of the dangers of overlooking the lesser nobility, whom she also discusses in her earlier research on Burgundy; yet, she suggests that outside of the royal domain and times of crisis, 'the nobility of lesser importance… only had contact with the king and with the organs of his government via the mediation of the princes'.[34] Pushed to its logical and problematical conclusion, this is a conceptualisation of France that still focuses agency and attention on a handful of figures who are thought to have controlled 'state'-like structures and thence been able to represent their subjects. Other nobles and forms of power meanwhile remain marginalised, in an issue that is also

[31] Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, p. 127ff.
[32] E. Lecuppre-Desjardin, *The illusion of the Burgundian state* (Manchester, 2022), esp. pp. 332-41; G. Small, 'French politics during the Hundred Years War', in A. Curry (ed.), *The Hundred Years War revisited* (London, 2019), esp. pp. 41-2; E. Graham-Goering, *Princely power in late medieval France: Jeanne de Penthièvre and the war for Brittany* (Cambridge, 2020), esp. pp. 4-8. For a broader critique of 'state'-centric frameworks in scholarship, see also: J. Watts, *The Making of Polities: Europe, 1300-1500* (Cambridge, 2009), esp. pp. 29-33.
[33] Caron, *Noblesse et pouvoir*, e.g. pp. 192, 264, 283-6, 287 (quoted).
[34] *Ibid*., pp. 11-2; *idem*, *La noblesse dans le duché de Bourgogne, 1315-1477* (Lille, 1987).

reflected across further scholarship. Many magnates who did not control principalities are for instance still comparatively neglected, and to take just one case study, Charles count of Maine (d. 1472) remains a remarkably obscure figure despite being the younger brother of René duke of Anjou and a powerful favourite of Charles VII for the best part of three decades. In a similar vein, it can be observed that many noblewomen have continued to be overlooked as significant political actors or have been studied almost as a separate subject from their male contemporaries.[35]

It is worth asking, though, to what extent matters have been changed by a third current in scholarship, which has focused more closely on aristocratic networks and affinities. If we begin here by looking at Graeme Small's recent overview article on 'French politics during the Hundred Years War' (2019), it is striking that he hints that the political history of late medieval France might have potential to be rewritten through a foregrounding of the aspirations and actions of noble networks.[36] It is indeed more than possible to envisage how a focus on networks could provide an opportunity to re-evaluate past assumptions about opposition to the crown, and to elucidate the agency of overlooked figures such as princely vassals, magnates outside of principalities, and noblewomen. However, for all that it is well known that work on aristocratic affinities has long been abundant in historiography on late medieval England, we need to evaluate what research has been undertaken in detail for networks in France in and around the reign of Charles VII.[37]

An interest in prosopographical research on this period of French history can arguably be traced back to the work of historians such as Gustave Dupont-Ferrier (from 1942) and Bernard Guénee (1963) on 'state' officeholders, but, overall, the study of noble networks has not been in any way systematic.[38] On the positive side, we can note that Peter Lewis' innovative article on 'Decayed and non-Feudalism in Later Medieval France' (1964) expanded previously Anglocentric debates around

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[35] For further discussion, see Graham-Goering, *Princely power*, pp. 14-5. For work to date on noblewomen in fifteenth-century France, see e.g. M. Sommé, *Isabelle de Portugal: duchesse de Bourgogne: une femme au pouvoir au XVe siècle* (Villeneuve-d'Ascq, 1998); E. Bousmar, J. Dumont, A. Marchandisse, & B. Schnerb (eds.), *Femmes de pouvoir, femmes politiques durant les derniers siècles du Moyen Age et au cours de la première Renaissance* (Brussels, 2012); Z. Rohr, *Yolande of Aragon (1381-1442). Family and power: the reverse of the tapestry* (New York, 2016).

[36] Small, 'French politics', esp. pp. 39-50.

[37] For research on England, see e.g. C. Carpenter, 'The Beauchamp affinity: a study of bastard feudalism at work', *EHR*, v. 95 (1980), pp. 514-532; *idem*, 'The Duke of Clarence and the Midlands: a study in the interplay of local and national politics', *Midland History,* v. 11 (1986), pp. 23-48; *idem*, *Locality and polity: a study of Warwickshire landed society, 1401-1499* (Cambridge, 1992); S. Walker, *The Lancastrian affinity, 1361-1399* (Oxford, 1990); M. Hicks, *Bastard feudalism* (London, 1995); A. Gundy, *Richard II and the rebel earl* (Cambridge, 2017); G. McKelvie, *Bastard feudalism, English society and the law: the statutes of livery, 1390 to 1520* (Woodbridge, 2020).

[38] G. Dupont-Ferrier, *Gallia regia, ou, état des officiers des bailliages et sénéchaussées de 1328 à 1515* (Paris, 1942-66); B. Guenée, *Tribunaux et gens de justice dans le bailliage de Senlis à la fin du Moyen Age (vers 1380-vers 1550)* (Paris, 1963).

the workings of noble affinities to encompass the French polity.[39] Using an analysis of written alliances made by the counts of Foix with other nobles in the fifteenth century, Lewis postulated that analogies existed in France for English 'bastard feudalism', which he regarded as a system of bonds of service anchored by money or patronage rather than land. Further research has since vindicated Lewis' theory about the existence of such bonds, and we now have an enhanced understanding of how the uppermost nobility in France used a plurality of means to attract and maintain support amongst their inferiors. Our knowledge of these means has for instance been strengthened by prosopographical studies of the adherents of the dukes of Bourbon and Orléans in the later Middle Ages by Olivier Mattéoni (1998) and Elizabeth Gonzalez (2004).[40] Likewise, the operation of political and military networks in Burgundian allegiance in the fifteenth century has been illuminated by Bertrand's Schnerb's rich works on the Bournonville and Saveuse families and their place in a wider milieu (1997, 2018). The interplay between princely power and noble clienteles in fourteenth-century Brittany has been compellingly analysed too from a revisionist perspective by Erika Graham-Goering in her study of the duchess Jeanne de Penthièvre.[41]

Nevertheless, historiography of this kind remains scarce, and many fundamental questions about the workings of noble networks are still far from being adequately discussed, never mind answered. To give some examples: should some types of bonds be seen as more important than others in holding together noble networks, and in what ways and to what extent did this picture vary between regions, across strata, and over time?[42] Exactly how did these bonds connect to the ways in which military manpower was raised and sustained by magnates across France, especially considering that English-style contracts of retainer rarely survive?[43] Should noble networks even be conceptualised as 'noble', or would it be better to think in terms of wider followings that could also draw in clergy, townspeople, and maybe even peasants on a routine basis? We shall return to these questions – and how they might be more fully addressed in future – in the conclusion of the thesis, but for the moment, one can do little more than speculate about any of them.

Equally, it can be argued that there are some limitations in how scholarship has analysed the linkages between networks, on the one hand, and the wider canvas of noble opposition and political

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[39] P. Lewis, 'Decayed and non-Feudalism in Later Medieval France', *BIHR*, v. 37 (1964), pp. 157-84. For the significance of Lewis' ideas, see also: Genet, 'The government of later medieval France and England', p. 4; Small, 'French Politics', pp. 34-5.

[40] O. Mattéoni, *Servir le prince: les officiers des ducs de Bourbon à la fin du Moyen Âge (1356-1523)* (Paris, 1998); E. Gonzalez, *Un prince en son hôtel: Les serviteurs des ducs d'Orléans au XVe siècle* (Paris, 2004).

[41] B. Schnerb, *Enguerrand de Bournonville et les siens. Un lignage noble du Boulonnais aux XIVe et XVe siècles* (Paris, 1997); *idem*, *La noblesse au service du prince: Les Saveuse: un hostel noble de Picardie au temps de l'État bourguignon (v. 1380-v. 1490)* (Turnhout, 2018); Graham-Goering, *Princely power*, esp. pp. 130-155.

[42] Cf. Prosser, 'Decayed feudalism', pp. 178-9.

[43] Cf. Perroy, 'Feudalism or principalities', p. 181; Lewis, 'Decayed and non-feudalism', pp. 157-8.

developments in France, on the other. For the most part, historians have prioritised using princely archives to examine the relationships of 'lesser' nobles with princes or the 'princely state', which has often continued to be championed as a concept in spite of the apparent tension between a focus on an institutional 'state' and personal networks.[44] In any case, the result has been that this scholarship has paid less attention to how networks under princes and other nobles interacted with royal power (be it Valois or Lancastrian), as well as vice versa. Even if we turn to another article by Peter Lewis contending that 'royal clienteles' were important in the 'construction of the French monarchy' (1996), it is arguable that this piece if anything highlights the paucity of work on relations between the Valois crown and magnate networks, as well as on officeholding under the Valois themselves in most localities.[45] Outside of periods of sustained conflict between the Valois and dukes of Burgundy, the majority of scholarship has also had still less to say about how affinities or networks could connect to rebellion against the crown or to other, 'factional' movements.

There are a small number of exceptions, however, as historians such as Céline Berry (2011) and Loïc Cazaux (2018, 2022) have at least postulated that resistance against the Valois was dependent on effective mobilisation of noble affinities.[46] Furthermore, Gareth Prosser has placed exceptional emphasis on relations between noble networks and the crown in the mid-fifteenth century, most of all during his 1996 doctoral thesis on political society in Normandy in c.1450-c.1465. In this thesis, Prosser explores how one key lord and officeholder, Pierre de Brézé, acted as a key broker between his affinity and the Valois monarchy during a period of alleged harmony under Charles VII, only for a breakdown to occur after Louis XI became king and humiliated the nobleman. According to Prosser, this precipitated the rebellion of many of Brézé's supporters and thence the loss of royal control over Normandy in 1465.[47] One can quibble that this narrative overlooks more disruptive events under Charles VII such as the fall of the duke of Alençon (1456), but what is crucial is that Prosser is

[44] For continued support for the concept of the 'princely state', see e.g. Schnerb, *Les Saveuse*, p. 334; Mattéoni, *Servir le prince*, p. 459.
[45] P. Lewis, 'Reflections on the role of royal clienteles in the construction of the French monarchy (mid-XIVth/end-XVth centuries)', in N. Bulst, R. Descimon & A. Guerreau (eds.), *L'État ou le roi: les fondations de la modernité monarchique en France (XIVe-XVIIe siècles)* (Paris, 1996), pp. 51-67.
[46] L. Cazaux, 'Une étude comparée sur la guerre civile au XVe siècle: les révoltes princières de la Praguerie, du Bien public et de la guerre folle', in O. Carpi (ed.), *Guerres et paix civiles de l'Antiquité à nos jours: les sociétés face à elles-mêmes* (Villeneuve d'Ascq, 2018), pp. 77-8; *idem*, *Les capitaines dans le royaume de France: guerre, pouvoir et justice au bas Moyen Âge* (Paris, 2022), e.g. pp. 569-70; C. Berry, 'Les Luxembourg-Ligny, un grand lignage noble de la fin du Moyen-Âge' (PhD diss., Paris Est, 2011), e.g. pp. 370, 660-1 (I am very grateful to Céline Berry for kindly sharing her thesis). For hints at networks' importance under Charles VII, see also A. Bossuat, *Perrinet Gressart et François de Surienne, agents de l'Angleterre* (Paris, 1936), esp. pp. 283ff., 380-1.
[47] G. Prosser, 'After the Reduction: re-structuring Norman political society and the Bien Public, 1450-65' (PhD diss., UCL, 1996). See too *idem*, 'Affinity as a social world: marriage brokerage, maintenance and lateral networks. A magnate affinity in 15th century Normandy: the followers of Pierre de Brézé, comte de Maulevrier (1450-65)', in D. Bates & V. Gazeau (eds.), *Liens personnels, réseaux, solidarités en France et dans les îles Britannique (XIe-XXe siècle)* (Paris, 2006), pp. 29-58.

able to argue convincingly that the maintenance of royal authority in the localities remained contingent on cooperation from noble networks. This was because, as he puts it, 'the machinery of government was not really machinery: it was persons, with their own kinship and personal connections, career strategies and collective interests'.[48] If one adds ideological considerations into this mix, then it is hard to disagree with Prosser's logic here, and this makes it all the more striking that his thesis remains so unusual within scholarship. We can draw comparisons with a handful of other works looking at the impact of networks in France in earlier years, such as Émilie Lebailly's 2006 discussion of the activity of the 'noble circle' of the Valois constable Raoul I count of Eu (d. 1344), and Timur Pollack-Lagushenko's 2003 doctoral thesis on the 'Armagnac faction' in the early fifteenth century.[49] Yet, such studies do not necessarily speak to the ongoing significance of networks even in the face of 'state'-growth. Similarly, although historians such as Arlette Jouanna (1989) and Stuart Carroll (1998) have emphasised the importance of noble followings within ideologically motivated revolts much later in the sixteenth century, these arguments again do not reveal whether noble networks remained consistently powerful under the Valois – as opposed to being neutered and then re-emerging as a force amidst unprecedented confessional divides and a weakening of royal authority during the French Wars of Religion.[50] In the end, there is simply no escaping from the fact that further research is needed on the interplay between noble networks, opposition to the Valois, and politics in France in the period between the early-fifteenth and mid-sixteenth centuries, beginning with Charles VII's reign.

iii) The structure, terminology, and sources used in this study

As a way forward, this thesis will examine a different type of noble opposition under Charles VII in each of the three main chapters, with reference to a case study centred around a group of networks or to two case studies centred around a noble network each. This threefold typology of noble resistance will allow the thesis to analyse a range of forms of opposition to the Valois crown in the age of the later Hundred Years' War, and ultimately to make comparisons between them and the implicated networks in a way that has not previously been attempted. The precise structure of the chapters will vary, but the constituency, causes, and impacts of resistance will all be considered in

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[48] *Idem*., 'After the Reduction', p. 245; *idem*, 'Decayed feudalism', p. 186.

[49] É. Lebailly, 'Le connétable d'Eu et son cercle nobiliaire. Le réseau d'un grand seigneur au XIVe siècle', *CRM,* v. 13 (2006), pp. 41-52; T. Pollack-Lagushenko, 'The Armagnac faction: new patterns of political violence in late medieval France' (PhD diss., Johns Hopkins University, 2004). For earlier work on the fourteenth century, see also: R. Cazelles, *La société politique et la crise de la royauté sous Philippe de Valois* (Paris, 1958); *idem*, *Société politique, noblesse et couronne sous Jean II et Charles V* (Paris, 1982); J. B. Henneman, *Olivier de Clisson and Political Society in France under Charles V and Charles VI* (Philadelphia, 1996).

[50] A. Jouanna, *Le devoir de révolte. La noblesse française et la gestation de l'État moderne* (Paris, 1989), esp. pp. 65-79; S. Carroll, *Noble power during the French wars of religion: the Guise affinity and the Catholic cause in Normandy* (Cambridge, 1998); cf. also Contamine, *La Noblesse*, p. 317.

every case. Chapter Two will focus on backing for the Lancastrian dynasty against Charles VII. It will do so through the lens of examining two examples of prominent Lancastrian supporters – Jean de Luxembourg count of Guise in the north-east, and Gaston de Foix captal de Buch and his son Jean de Foix viscount of Castillon in the south-west – and their followings over time. The succeeding chapter will then turn to large-scale 'internal' resistance aimed at effectuating changes in government and governance, whilst looking at the case study of the greatest magnate revolt in Charles VII's reign, the so-called Praguerie of 1440. Lastly, Chapter 4 will analyse 'internal' opposition of a more regionalised nature, which was narrower in geography and scope, through examining case studies of rebellions led by nobles in Saintonge and Comminges in the mid-1440s. These case studies have all been chosen with consideration to the availability of underexplored source material, but also as examples which were especially impactful on, or which can otherwise tell us something new about, the politics of Charles VII's reign. They have likewise been selected to offer breadth of geographical coverage across France and to draw attention to figures and networks beyond the great princes who have traditionally monopolised historiographical attention, all of which will allow the thesis to be broader and more ambitious in its arguments.

At this point, it may be worth clarifying several key terms used repeatedly across the introduction and thesis. Firstly, when this study talks about 'opposition' or 'resistance' to Charles VII, it is referring to behaviour that occurred in defiance of Charles' public authority – even if the participants themselves may have perceived their conduct more positively as support for something or someone else. 'Rebellion' will be used in a comparable fashion, although this term and its synonyms will be applied exclusively to movements which were accompanied by force or the threat of force, and which occurred in defiance of an authority that had been recognised by those involved.[51] Meanwhile, the term 'France' will be employed to refer to all lands on the continent held by Valois and Lancastrian kings, not just those described as 'France' by contemporaries (which could only amount to a limited portion of the kingdom).[52] By extension, the term 'French' will be applied to people or entities from across all of these lands, whilst the competing sides who fought on the continent in the names of Charles VII and Henry VI will be labelled respectively as 'Valois' and 'Lancastrian' rather than 'French' and 'English'. Much as the former labels are something of a modern imposition, the latter will be avoided because they risk airbrushing out, or implicitly passing

[51] Cf. C. Liddy & J. Haemers, 'Popular Politics in the late medieval city: York and Bruges', *EHR*, v. 128/533 (2013), p. 785.
[52] Cf. P. Lewis, *Later Medieval France* (London, 1968), pp. 1-2; and for definitions of France which could exclude regions such as the Bordelais and Comminges: G. Pépin, 'The French Offensives of 1404-1407 against Anglo-Gascon Aquitaine', in A. Curry & A. Bell (eds.), *Soldiers, Weapons and Armies in the Fifteenth Century* (Woodbridge, 2011), p. 34; *Archives Municipales de Bordeaux. Registres de la Jurade: délibérations 1414 à 1416 et de 1420 à 1422* (Bordeaux, 1883), p. 375; AN J 334 no. 50.

a value judgement on, those Frenchmen and women who contended that Henry VI was the rightful claimant to the French throne.[53]

Additionally, and as alluded to earlier in the introduction, a 'network' will be conceptualised in the thesis as a collection of individuals who had ties to a powerful noble or family and to one another.[54] The ties to the central figure or figures could take a variety of forms, but they typically involved some sort of mutual obligation. In this light, networks will be viewed as partially comparable to – and inclusive of – what other historians have termed noble affinities or clienteles. However, the idea of 'networks' is preferred here because there is less historiographical baggage about what types of bonds and people were involved, meaning that the concept is potentially broader and more inclusive. Likewise, the word 'network' captures the fact we are dealing with groups of people who were interconnected to each other.[55] It is worth noting from the outset that networks will be conceptualised in fluid terms in this thesis, with any given network able to encompass multiple elements and sub-networks operating beneath it. As we shall also see, networks could equally have entanglements and overlaps with other similar entities and could coalesce to form the basis of more temporary coalitions or confederacies.[56]

With regard to the sources utilised, we have drawn on five broad types of evidence where relevant to our case studies, be it in published form or through material found across a dozen archives. These sources include, firstly, narrative accounts such as chronicles, and, secondly, rare but valuable familial records such as charters in cases where these are extant (including in summarised form). Next, we have used urban records such as letters exchanged with the crown, deliberations, and accounts too in cases where there is a clear link to one of our case studies. Fourthly, we have employed a range of legal sources, including a handful of extant court cases and depositions, and a larger number of pardon letters (which mostly survive from the second half of Charles VII's reign onwards in the Archives Nationales, JJ 176-198). Finally, we have used additional documents relating to political and financial interactions between relevant nobles and the Valois and Lancastrian monarchies, including material such as quittances in the 'Pièces Originales' series in the Bibliothèque Nationale, and the 'Gascon Rolls' in the English National Archives (which have been calendared and digitised by the Gascon Rolls Project). In future and with more time, there may be further archival

[53] Cf. T. Adams, 'Feuding, factionalism and national identity: Reconsidering Charles VII's Armagnacs', *Digital Philology*, v. 1 (2012), pp. 5-31; A. Lobanov, 'Anglo-Burgundian military cooperation, 1420-1435' (PhD diss., University of Southampton, 2015), pp. 4-5.
[54] Cf. E. Hartrich, 'Charters and inter-urban networks: England, 1439-1449', *EHR*, v. 132/155 (2017), pp. 224-6.
[55] Cf. McKelvie, *Bastard feudalism*, p. 150.
[56] Cf. D. Hardy, *Associative political culture in the Holy Roman Empire: Upper Germany, 1346-1521* (Oxford, 2018), pp. 93-122.

finds that can be uncovered – not least in Burgundian repositories, for which this study has had to rely on inventories – although every effort has been made to prioritise the most promising material in the time available.

It is true that we are still left with a source-base that contains many records and accounts that are overly sympathetic towards the Valois crown, or which were written at some distance from the networks and individuals being studied. Amongst the chroniclers, for example, it is rare to find writers such as Perceval de Cagny (d. 1438) and Enguerrand de Monstrelet (d. 1453) who were close to key nobles involved in opposition to Charles VII, whilst the author who was perhaps best connected to the royal court, Georges Chastelain, has unfortunately left an account with considerable lacunae.[57] At the same time, our source-base as a whole is unavoidably fragmentary, making it easy to feel a world away from, say, Christine Carpenter's Warwickshire, or even Gareth Prosser's Normandy, where a vastly greater quantity and range of sources survive at a regional level. However, hopefully, through piecing together scattered evidence and reading sources carefully, the case studies developed during the thesis will show that there is still much that we can discover about noble opposition and networks across France.

iv) The course of noble opposition against Charles VII: an overview

We shall soon move on to looking at our case studies, but beforehand, it is worth offering a more general overview of the chronology and geography of noble opposition across Charles VII's reign, which can act as a contextual framework for the subsequent analysis. This final section of the chapter will therefore examine all strands of noble opposition against Charles VII in outline, primarily with reference to material found in narrative sources, pardon letters, and past historiography read 'against the grain'. Whilst doing so, Charles' reign will be broken down into three chronological stages: from the monarch's accession to the *de facto* acknowledgement of his kingship by the duke of Burgundy in 1435; from the Treaty of Arras to Valois victories over Lancastrian forces in Gascony in 1453; and from this (re)conquest to Charles' death in 1461. Crucially, though, the aim of this section will be to begin building a new, revisionist narrative of events, rather than simply echoing traditional talking points. In particular, we will highlight vital continuities as well as changes in resistance to Charles VII across the three sub-periods. Additionally, the importance of a plurality of actors in opposition will be emphasised, even whilst in-depth analysis of noble networks will be saved until the subsequent chapters.

[57] For Monstrelet's background and ties to Jean de Luxembourg, see Chapter 2 Section i) & n. 3 below. For de Cagny's background and ties to Jean II duke of Alençon, see Chapter 3 Section iv) & n. 135 below. For Chastelain's links to the royal court, see Small, *George Chastelain*, pp. 13, 42-4.

c.1422-c.1435

When Charles VII acceded to the throne in October 1422, aged nineteen, he inherited arguably the most difficult position of any Valois monarch and was not recognised as king across large portions of France (for a general map of which, see Map 1 below).[58] His father, Charles VI, had suffered from serious mental illness since 1392, and amidst strife over the control and conduct of his government, the French kingdom had been in a state of intermittent civil war since c.1410. Up to 1419, this conflict had generally been waged between rival factions. The first of these groups was led by John the Fearless duke of Burgundy (despite his orchestration of the murder of Charles VI's brother Louis duke of Orléans in Paris in 1407), and the second successively rallied around Orléans' young heir Charles (until his capture by the English in 1415), Bernard VII count of Armagnac (the constable in 1415-18 until his lynching in Paris), and the future Charles VII (who was Dauphin from 1417 following the deaths of his two older brothers and who claimed to be regent from 1418). In the same period, though, King Henry V of England had also invaded northern France, and after winning a crushing victory at Agincourt in 1415, he proceeded to conquer virtually all of Normandy. This put pressure on the Dauphin Charles and John the Fearless to attempt to set aside their differences, except that when they met on a bridge at Montereau in September 1419, the Burgundian duke was hacked to death by the Dauphin's subordinates whilst he stood by and watched. Leadership of the duke's cause then passed to his son Philip the Good, and, in conjunction with Charles VI's wife Isabelle of Bavaria, he struck a deal for Henry V to be named as heir to the French throne at the expense of the Dauphin under the terms of the Treaty of Troyes in 1420. This agreement was recognised in Paris and across swathes of northern and eastern France, where Henry V became regent. The Lancastrian monarch also won promises of recognition from princes in the south such as Jean I count of Foix, in addition to enjoying staunch support in an increasingly resurgent Lancastrian Gascony, where English kings had long been recognised as dukes. For all this, however, the Dauphin's position was far from hopeless, since he was still able to rally remnants of the Armagnac faction, supporters in central France, Scottish forces, and some Norman nobles who had chosen exile from their lands over submission to Henry V. Moreover, he was dealt a great stroke of fortune in summer 1422, when the thirty-five-year-old Henry V died of illness at Vincennes. Henry left behind a one-year-old heir in England, Henry VI, and a younger brother, John duke of Bedford, to succeed as regent in the Lancastrian-held areas of France. It was in this political context that Charles VI also died.

[58] For the events that follow in this paragraph, more detailed narratives can be found in: Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 1; R. Famiglietti, *Royal Intrigue: Crisis at the Court of Charles VI, 1392–1420* (New York, 1986); B. Schnerb, *Les Armagnacs et les Bourguignons: la maudite guerre* (Paris, 2001); J. Wylie & W. Waugh, *The reign of Henry the Fifth* (Cambridge, 1914-29); Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*.

Map 1: France in the age of Charles VII.



France during the reign of Charles VII

The original version of this map comes from Malcolm Vale's *Charles VII* (London, 1974), p. 13.

Thereafter, Charles VII and his government remained locked in an acute struggle with Bedford and his regime for wider backing and control of territory in France, and in the years between 1422 and 1429, it was the enemies of the Valois crown who overall enjoyed greater success. In the north, Lancastrian forces for instance won a major victory at the Battle of Verneuil (1424) and then conquered Maine (1424-8), whilst Bedford's government patently managed to secure a significant degree of local acceptance and support. To give just one indication of the solidity of Lancastrian rule in Normandy, it is surely telling that many Norman lords and nobles offered military service to the dynasty during the Orléans campaign in 1429, as attested by a muster conducted in Paris by Guy le Bouteiller seigneur de la Bouteillerie.[59] Six years earlier, Bedford had further bolstered the Lancastrian position by forging a double alliance with the dukes of Burgundy and Brittany and by marrying Philip the Good's sister Anne. Jean V duke of Brittany was later forced to stay in Lancastrian allegiance by force of arms, even after Charles VII's mother-in-law Yolande of Anjou had induced Jean's younger brother Arthur count of Richemont to join the Valois side in 1425 in return for the constableship.[60] Amicable relations with Burgundy and his adherents meanwhile bore fruit in a joint victory at the Battle of Cravant (1423), before the Lancastrian cause was placed further in the ascendancy in eastern France by successful operations against Valois holdouts in the county of Guise (1424-5) and the Argonne region (1428). These campaigns were orchestrated by pro-Burgundian noblemen who profited from them, including Jean de Luxembourg (who became count of Guise) and Antoine de Vergy (who became governor of Champagne); yet, the campaigns also put underappreciated pressure on other neighbouring magnates and their networks. In 1425, Robert de Sarrebrück damoiseau de Commercy was thus impelled to swear to recognise the Treaty of Troyes in Paris, and even more strikingly, René of Anjou – the brother-in-law of Charles VII and heir to the duchies of Bar and Lorraine – offered homage to the Lancastrians by proxy in spring 1429.[61]

By this time, Lancastrian armies had achieved some (since neglected) successes in south-western France as well, for instance as the formerly exiled Archambaud VI count of Périgord was installed as

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[59] N. Langlois, *Une famille normande à travers mille ans. Histoire généalogique de la maison de Mary de Longueville* (Coutances, 1910), pp. 112-4; Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, pp. 216-7; J.-M. Roger, 'Guy Le Bouteiller', in *La guerre et la paix, frontières et violences au Moyen Âge* (Paris, 1978), pp. 302-3. Further details on the campaigns in the north or regional support for the Lancastrians can also be found in: Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 2, p. 15ff; R. Planchenault, 'La conquête du Maine par les Anglais', *Revue historique et archéologique du Maine*, v. 81 (1925), pp. 3-31, v. 89 (1933), pp. 125-52, v. 93 (1937), pp. 24-34, 160-172, v. 94 (1938), pp. 47-60; D. Fiasson, '"Tenir frontière contre les Anglois". La frontière des ennemis dans le royaume de France (v.1400-v.1450)', (PhD diss., Lille, 2019), p. 523 (I am very grateful to David Fiasson for kindly sharing his thesis).

[60] For more on these events, see: E. Cosneau, *Le connétable de Richemont* (Paris, 1886), pp. 74, 82-92, 134-48.

[61] S. Luce, *Jeanne d'Arc à Domremy* (Paris, 1887), pp. 164-6; Lecoy de la Marche, *Le roi René*, v. 1, pp. 70-3. For more on the fighting in eastern France and its importance, see also: Lobanov, 'Anglo-Burgundian military cooperation', esp. pp. 79-89., 110-9, 139-42.

the ruler of much of this county with support from English and Gascon troops.[62] Conversely, the Armagnac and Albret families ignored previous promises to uphold the Treaty of Troyes, and Jean I count of Foix and his younger brother Mathieu count of Comminges were also induced to recognise Valois suzerainty from 1425 in return for hefty territorial concessions and the governorship of Languedoc. Yet, in the immediate term, even the 1425 agreement only had a defensive value for Charles VII, and it additionally sparked an increase in military cooperation between the now disillusioned Jean IV count of Armagnac and Lancastrian adherents. The latter included the captain André de Ribes, who controlled multiple places in the seneschalcy of Toulouse and its environs prior to his death in 1428.[63] In sum, the chronicler Enguerrand de Monstrelet may have exaggerated when he claimed that the Valois king was 'almost abandoned' ('comme habandonné') by the majority of princes and major lords in c.1429, but his statement was not altogether without foundation.[64]

Over the course of 1429-30, though, Lancastrian hopes of defeating Charles VII were dealt a series of blows. Valois forces inspired by Joan of Arc famously lifted the siege of Orléans and triumphed at the Battle of Patay in May-June 1429, after which an ensuing march to Reims saw Charles VII crowned as king and allegiance secured from further towns such as Beauvais, Compiègne, Senlis, and Laon. These gains were then consolidated by the defeat of a Lancastrian army led by Jean de Luxembourg outside of Compiègne in late 1430, albeit at the price of Joan of Arc's capture and subsequent execution.[65] By this stage, the key fortress of Auberoche in Périgord had fallen to Valois vassals too after a siege in 1429-30, whilst an attempt to seize the Dauphiné under Louis II de Châlon, the pro-Burgundian prince of Orange, was crushed in calamitous fashion at the Battle of Anthon in the summer of 1430. These setbacks inevitably took their toll on Lancastrian military capabilities, and it should also be emphasised that many close supporters of the dynasty were weakened and that broader attempts to win support for Henry VI amongst the French nobility were undermined. For example, Archambaud VI count of Périgord's position never recovered, and, in eastern France, nobles such as René of Anjou and the damoiseau de Commercy immediately rallied to Charles VII

[62] G. Clément-Simon, 'Un capitaine de routiers sous Charles VII, Jean de La Roche', *Revue des questions historiques*, v. 58 (1895), pp. 51-3; L. Dessalles, *Périgueux et les deux derniers comtes de Périgord, ou histoire des querelles de cette ville avec Archambaud V et Archambaud VI* (Paris, 1847), 'preuves', pp. 137-42.
[63] For Ribes and Armagnac: AN JJ 176 no. 190, JJ 177 no. 127 (printed in Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 3, 'preuves', pp. 125-39); J. Quicherat, *Rodrigue de Villandrando, l'un des combattants pour l'independence française au quinzième siècle* (Paris, 1879), pp. 31-3; Samaran, *La Maison d'Armagnac*, pp. 62-3. For the context of allegiances in southern France: L. Flourac, *Jean I^er^, comte de Foix, vicomte souverain de Béarn, lieutenant du roi en Languedoc* (Paris, 1884), p. 102ff; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 1, p. 47 & n.; *ibid*., v. 2, pp. 80, 115, 341 & n.
[64] Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 4, p. 310.
[65] For more on these campaigns, see e.g. *ibid*., v. 4, p. 319ff.; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 2, p. 32ff. Joan's capture will be discussed below in Chapter 2, and for her trial and execution, see e.g. Beaucourt, *op. cit*., pp. 246-51.

during his coronation campaign.[66] They were later followed in switching allegiances by the prince of Orange (1432) and Guillaume seigneur de Châteauvillain (1433), the second of whom was an important lord in Champagne. He had been captured by Valois forces in the north-east in 1430, and he was afterwards joined in changing sides by other regional allies.[67] Of course, Henry VI was still crowned in Paris in 1431 and continued to enjoy substantial backing in many quarters, with one snapshot provided by the fact that a successful effort to recapture Saint-Denis in autumn 1435 was aided by hundreds of Picard troops under the Lancastrian marshal Jean de Villiers seigneur de L'Isle-Adam.[68] However, fatefully, even before this siege was concluded, the most powerful ducal supporter of the Lancastrian cause had in turn been swayed by frustrations at the course of the war and by generous offers from Charles VII, prompting a rapprochement between the Valois crown and Burgundy at the Treaty of Arras.

We shall shortly look at the consequences and aftermath of this agreement, but beforehand, let us examine the opposition that Charles VII faced in his early reign from his own, acknowledged vassals. At first glance, one might not have expected that Charles VII's government would have faced significant 'internal' resistance in the period up to c.1435, given that the gravity of the Lancastrian threat meant that the Valois monarch was forced to be highly conciliatory in his dealings with most subjects. Estates were thus convened annually, and extensive concessions were offered to wavering magnates, to the point where the duchy of Auvergne was relinquished from the royal domain in 1425 in order to strengthen the loyalty of Charles de Bourbon count of Clermont and his mother Marie de Berry duchess of Bourbon.[69] Yet, royal weakness also created problems of its own. Above all, Charles VII's government was made extremely vulnerable to criticism by its ineffectiveness in redressing disorder, financial difficulties, and (at least initially) the Lancastrian threat.[70]

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[66] For Archambaud VI and the fall of Auberoche: Clément-Simon, 'Jean de La Roche', pp. 52-6. For Anjou and Commercy: Lecoy de la Marche, *Le roi René*, v. 1, pp. 72-5; Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 4, p. 339; V. Toureille, *Robert de Sarrebrück, ou l'honneur d'un écorcheur (v.1400-v.1462)* (Rennes, 2014), p. 80.

[67] For Orange and the earlier battle of Anthon: F. Barbey, *Louis de Chalon, prince d'Orange, seigneur d'Orbe, Échallens, Grandson, 1390-1463* (Lausanne, 1926), pp. 142ff., 170-4. For Châteauvillain: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 52-4; A. Bossuat, 'Les prisonniers de guerre au XVe siècle: la rançon de Guillaume, seigneur de Châteauvillain', *Annales de Bourgogne* v. 23 (1951), pp. 7-17.

[68] For more on support for the Saint-Denis campaign, see: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 184-7; Lobanov, 'Anglo-Burgundian military cooperation', pp. 251-2.

[69] For dialogue with estates and its importance: Major, *Renaissance Monarchy*, p. 8; Watts, *Making of Polities*, pp. 320-1. For alienations from the royal domain: Leguai, *Les ducs de Bourbon*, pp. 103-5; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 2, pp. 562-4.

[70] For contemporary criticism of the government, see e.g. L'Avis à Yolande d'Aragon: un miroir au prince du temps de Charles VII', ed. J.-P. Boudet & E. Sené, *Cahiers de recherches médiévales et humanistes* v. 24 (2012), https://journals.openedition.org/crmh/12899?lang=en (accessed 31/12/2023); A. Bossuat, 'Un manifeste des comtes de Richemont, de Clermont et de Pardiac contre Georges de la Trémoïlle (1428)', *Bulletin philologique et historique* (1944), pp. 87-97; '1428. Cahier de doléances des députés de Languedoc', ed. G. du Fresne de Beaucourt, in *Notices et documents publiés pour la Société de l'histoire de France à l'occasion du cinquantième*

Simultaneously, even sympathetic authors believed the king to be in the grip of favourites as he loitered in central France.[71] Under such circumstances, plotting against Charles' pre-eminent councillors was almost incessant, and there were no fewer than four successful coups or enforced changes in government in the period up to Arras, beginning with the removal of Jean Louvet seigneur de Mirandol and his adherents in 1425, and ending with the capture of Georges seigneur de la Trémoille in 1433.[72] Changes in government and intrigues of this kind were typically supported by the constable Arthur de Richemont and did not directly threaten the king's person, but it is vital to emphasise that attacks on Charles' favourites were still attacks on his public authority. Far from showing the king to be a masterful manipulator as has occasionally been suggested, these actions should therefore be regarded as a dangerous form of opposition which both reflected a lack of monarchical control and further undermined Charles' standing.[73] The king was publicly humiliated, for example, when he was obliged to accept Louvet's exile from court in 1425 by acknowledging that he had only ever indulged this favourite through 'inadvertence'.[74] Worse still, in 1427, Charles was forced to overlook the successive killings of his favourites Pierre seigneur de Giac and Le Camus de Beaulieu, with the former seized and executed by Richemont and La Trémoille in spite of well-publicised royal anger, and the latter then assassinated during a promenade near Poitiers. On this second occasion, Richemont's biographer Guillaume Gruel records that, quite extraordinarily, the king himself was reduced to spectating as Beaulieu's mule was led back to the castle.[75]

Events of this type may additionally have encouraged challenges to, and violations of, royal authority in the localities of France. In this context, it is striking that the Valois marshal Amaury seigneur de Sévérac was suspected to have been murdered near Rodez not long after the killing of Pierre de Giac, perhaps on the orders of Bernard count of Pardiac or his older brother the count of Armagnac,

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anniversaire de sa fondation (Paris, 1884), pp. 243-252; *Chronique de la Pucelle*, ed. A. Vallet de Viriville (Paris, 1859), p. 250.

[71] For concerns about the influence of favourites, see e.g. 'La Geste des Nobles Françoys', in *Chronique de la Pucelle*, ed. Vallet de Viriville, p. 199; Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 1, p. 54; Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 121. See also: Contamine, *Charles VII*, pp. 408-9; *idem*., 'Charles VII, roi de France, et ses favoris: l'exemple de Pierre, sire de Giac († 1427), in J. Hirschbiegel & W. Paravicini (eds.), *Der Fall des Günstlings* (Ostfildern, 2004), pp. 143-4.

[72] See *ibid*., p. 144; Cosneau, *Le connétable de Richemont*, pp. 99-104, 129-41, 199-201. For further plotting, see also: G. Peyronnet, 'Les complots de Louis d'Amboise contre Charles VII (1428-1431): un aspect des rivalités entre lignages féodaux en France au temps de Jeanne d'Arc', *BEC*, v. 142 (1984), pp. 115-135.

[73] Cf. Vale, *Charles VII*, pp. 38-42.

[74] BNF Fr. 6965 f. 3v; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 2, pp. 67-8 (the letters revoking past gifts to Louvet are also printed in Cosneau, *Le connétable de Richemont*, pp. 507-9, but with 'inadvertance' erroneously replaced with 'maladvertance').

[75] Gruel, *Chronique*, pp. 53-4. For Giac's earlier execution and Charles VII's reaction, see also: Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 2, pp. 132-6; Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 1, p. 54.

and again without any royal response.[76] Similarly, plotting against favourites at times became interlinked with regional feuding in defiance of the king's wishes. Attempts by Richemont to remove La Trémoille from Charles VII's side in 1427-33 were thus accompanied by destabilising warfare between the two noblemen's supporters in Poitou. This conflict was further inflamed by La Trémoille's influence over monarchical justice and patronage, as seen for instance in his benefiting from the grant of Lusignan in October 1428.[77]

The still more serious danger for Charles VII, though, was that this sort of fighting with royal favourites might escalate into a far larger rebellion in which noble networks were mobilised across multiple regions in the name of the public good. A situation along these lines came perilously close to unfolding in the summer of 1428, when the key town and castle of Bourges were seized by allies of Richemont. Amongst their number were the count of Clermont, the count of Pardiac, and at least two royal marshals. The rebel counts had previously issued manifestoes attacking the government of La Trémoille and his allies, and the leaguers appear to have won support from many inhabitants and officials at Bourges, in addition to attracting sympathy from other towns and magnates such as Yolande of Anjou.[78] A devastating internal war could hence easily have occurred if Richemont had not failed to reach Bourges in force ahead of La Trémoille and Charles VII. Viewed in this light, even the ruler's later nickname of the 'roi de Bourges' appears ironically to overstate his control over his kingdom.

c.1435-c.1453

Nonetheless, we must now ask how far noble opposition changed, and how far Charles VII's authority increased, in the aftermath of the tacit acknowledgement of his kingship by the most powerful of the French princes. If we return firstly to Lancastrian resistance, there is no denying that the Treaty of Arras was a fresh, catastrophic blow to the chances of Henry VI being recognised as king throughout France. Even whilst the duke of Burgundy offered little direct support to Charles VII, Valois resources were freed up from the frontiers of his domains, and his vast influence meant that many of his supporters followed him in abandoning the Lancastrians. Indeed, some Burgundian

[76] See C. Felgères, *Histoire de la baronnie de Chaudesaigues depuis ses origines (XIe siècle) jusqu'à 1789* (Paris, 1905), pp. 94-5; cf. H. Dupont & J.-F. Bertrand, 'Un condottiere rouergat: Amaury de Sévérac (1365?-1427)', *Revue du Rouergue*, v. 4 (1950), p. 306.
[77] See Peyronnet, 'Les complots de Louis d'Amboise', esp. p. 126; P. Guérin, 'introduction' to *AHP*, v. 29 (1898), p. iff.; Gruel, *Chronique*, pp. 65-7, 76-7.
[78] Further information on the 1428 revolt and its support-base can be found in: Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 2, pp. 162-8; Cosneau, *Le connétable de Richemont*, pp. 156-61, 534-7; G. Thaumas de la Thaumassière, *Histoire de Berry*, v. 1 (Bourges, 1863), pp. 309-12; 'Un manifeste contre Georges de la Trémoïlle (1428)', pp. 87-97.

nobles, including the marshal Jean de Villiers, played a key role in helping Valois armies to retake Paris in early 1436.[79]

In many ways, this created a platform for further, if gradual, success for Charles' cause in the ensuing period. Between the siege of Paris and the mid-1440s, Valois forces retook the remainder of the Île-de-France (1437-41), as well as ensuring that virtually all of Picardy was in the hands of vassals of Charles VII from 1441. They additionally made sporadic gains in both Normandy and the south-west, in the latter case especially in the Landes region in 1442. A sequence of truces was afterwards agreed in 1444-49, but the Valois monarchy remained in the ascendancy. The county of Maine was surrendered by Henry VI's government in return for an extension to the peace in 1448, and even more importantly, Charles VII obtained the homage of François I duke of Brittany two years earlier. This homage paved the way towards an unprecedented level of military support being offered to the king from the duchy of Brittany.[80] Considering that Charles had also begun to receive newfound support from formerly pro-Lancastrian families and their networks in Picardy and the eastern marches of France from 1441, and from the previously disengaged Gaston IV count of Foix and his adherents in the south from 1442, the Valois ruler was thus gradually able to call on a greater breadth and quantity of manpower as his influence snowballed. This shift must have had a substantial impact on subsequent Valois campaigns, although it has arguably been undervalued in scholarship by comparison to Charles' more celebrated reforms, which saw taxation begin to be collected with reduced consent from c.1436 and permanent *compagnies d'ordonnance* established from 1445.[81]

By the mid-late 1440s, Charles was also being helped by the fact that his Lancastrian opponents were facing mounting political and financial difficulties. In Autumn 1445-Spring 1448, Normandy was left without even a resident commander in place, since the regent Bedford had died during the congress

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[79] For the capture of Paris and military consequences of Arras, see: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 216-222; Lobanov, 'Anglo-Burgundian military cooperation', pp. 282-4. Further details on all the campaigns discussed in the present and next paragraphs can likewise be found in Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, pp. 3ff., 173, & v. 5, pp. 3ff., 261ff., although for events in Picardy in 1441, see too the commentary in Chapter 2 Section iii) below.

[80] For Brittany's homage and subsequent support for the Valois cause, see: Cosneau, *Le connétable de Richemont*, pp. 380-1, 395ff. For the surrender of Maine and earlier truce of Tours: Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, pp. 269-78; *ibid*., v. 4, p. 284ff.

[81] For Charles VII's reforms and past assessments of their impact, see the works mentioned in n. 9 above. For support from networks in Picardy and the east, see the discussion of the Luxembourgs and their adherents in Chapter 2 Section iii) below, as well as Berry, 'Les Luxembourg-Ligny', pp. 417-28; for a comparable case study of the Vaudémont family and their adherents, see too: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 6, p. 9; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, p. 179; Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 1, p. 211; Lobanov, 'Anglo-Burgundian military cooperation', pp. 217-8. For support from Gaston IV and his networks: Leseur, *Histoire de Gaston IV,* v. 1, p. 1ff.; Courteault, *Gaston IV*, pp. 72-5, 141ff.; Gaston's influence also enabled him to facilitate the 'defection' of certain Gascon nobles from the Lancastrians to the Valois, as evidenced by: *ibid*., p. 146; J. Jaurgain & R. Ritter, *La Maison de Gramont, 1040-1967* (Lourdes, 1968), p. 73.

of Arras without an obvious successor, before Henry VI proved too incapable of ruling as an adult to appear again on the continent or to contain divisions amongst his subordinates. Nor was he able to secure extensive taxation or to authorise the concessions necessary for a permanent peace agreement.[82] Under these circumstances, it proved disastrous for the Lancastrian dynasty that war resumed unexpectedly in 1449. Swollen Valois armies suddenly and completely overran first Normandy and then Gascony in the two years up to 1451, and although Lancastrian rule over much of the Bordelais and its environs was restored in the next year, this reversal proved short-lived. Charles VII's supporters won a decisive victory over an Anglo-Gascon army commanded by John Talbot earl of Shrewsbury at the Battle of Castillon on 17th July 1453, and by the ensuing winter, the port of Calais was the only, meagre remnant of Henry VI's France.

With all of the above being said, however, it is vital to emphasise that there was nothing pre-ordained about the Lancastrian expulsion. Elements of chance and countervailing dynamics remained present throughout the period from 1435-1453, and for many years after Arras, there even continued to be realistic openings for the Lancastrian dynasty to secure new noble allies and adherents to help to compensate for past losses. Prior to the successful Valois campaign in Gascony in 1442, for example, it is worth observing that the powerful Albret family had pledged conditionally to surrender Tartas and agree a twenty-year truce with Henry VI, and that Jean IV count of Armagnac was in negotiations regarding a marriage alliance between one of his daughters and the Lancastrian monarch.[83] Concerns about such a wedding – as well as a lack of belief that fighting could imminently be brought to a satisfactory conclusion – may then have incentivised Charles VII and his government to agree to the truce of 1444 and to an interlinked marriage between Charles' niece Margaret of Anjou and Henry VI. Yet, if the Valois aim here was to forestall dialogue between the Lancastrian dynasty and French magnates, then the truce of Tours did not succeed in the immediate term. Substantive discussions still took place in 1445 between Henry VI's government and the Angevin family over the restoration of Charles of Anjou to the county of Maine in return for an alliance and twenty-year truce, whilst Anjou's rival Jean II duke of Alençon also appears to have

[82] For the situation in Normandy in the 1440s, see: M. K. Jones, 'Somerset, York and the Wars of the Roses', *EHR*, v. 104 (1989), esp. pp. 290-4; Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy*, esp. pp. 45-9, 184-6; cf. also Langlois, *Une famille normande*, pp. 115-7. For Henry VI's incapability and other Lancastrian difficulties: J. Watts, *Henry VI and the politics of kingship* (Cambridge, 1996), p. 122ff.; Harriss, *Shaping the Nation*, pp. 614-5; Carpenter, *The Wars of the Roses*, pp. 104-5; Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 9, 206-10, 217.

[83] See Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, pp. 233-4; S. Dicks, 'Henry VI and the daughters of Armagnac: a problem in medieval diplomacy', *Medieval and Renaissance Studies*, v. 4 (1967), pp. 5-12. For support from other princes for the Armagnac marriage plan, see too: *A journal by one of the suite of Thomas Beckington, afterwards Bishop of Bath and Wells*, ed. N. Nicolas (London, 1828), p. 40.

shown interest in a similar deal involving his duchy.[84] Even in 1446, when Charles VII obtained the homage of François I duke of Brittany, this development occurred primarily because the duke had been spooked by aggressive Lancastrian moves to cultivate his younger brother Gilles seigneur de Chantocé as a pensioned supporter.[85] This once again demonstrates that the Lancastrian dynasty was by no means regarded as a spent force by contemporaries.

Concurrently, we should not forget that Henry VI retained strong backing from many other noble supporters within France. In the northern and eastern reaches of the kingdom, the most powerful French magnate to remain in Lancastrian allegiance after Arras was Jean de Luxembourg count of Guise (d. 1441), whose brother Louis de Luxembourg archbishop of Rouen and bishop of Ely (d. 1443) had likewise served as Lancastrian chancellor since 1426. Equally, though, a mass of less high-ranking nobles persisted in backing Henry VI too. To take just a couple of cases from frontier areas, we can note that Jean bastard of Thien *bailli* of Meaux only ceased to fight for the Lancastrians when he was captured and executed after the seizure of Meaux in 1439, as well as that Robert de Hellenvillier seigneur d'Avrilly was still to be found amongst Lancastrian forces after the fall of nearby Évreux in autumn 1441.[86] This latter lord had been raised in Lancastrian obedience by his mother Jeanne de Gaillomiel following the death of his father Pierre de Hellenvillier *bailli* of Évreux at Agincourt, and he merely changed sides after being captured, ransomed, and pardoned with the support of the new count of Évreux, Pierre de Brézé, in 1442-3.

Plenty of other French nobles continued to be part of networks in Lancastrian service in Normandy for even longer and in some cases continued to hold local offices. Numbers are difficult to estimate on the basis of current research, but there were clearly many who did not change sides until during the collapse of 1449-50. This was for instance the case with Richard aux Épaules seigneur de Sainte-Marie-du-Mont (in Manche) and the esquire Thomassin Duquesne. The first of these noblemen was the son-in-law of the garter knight François de Surienne and surrendered Longny-au-Perche in return for the retention of this captaincy in summer 1449, whilst the second was de Surienne's escalade-

[84] For the Angevins: Lecoy de la Marche, *Le roi René*, v. 2, pp. 258-9; B. Cron, 'The duke of Suffolk, the Angevin marriage, and the ceding of Maine, 1445', *Journal of Medieval History*, v. 20 (1994), p. 96; Watts, *Henry VI*, pp. 222-4. For Alençon: *Procès Politiques: Alençon*, p. 117; AN KK 893, f. 21v (1667 summary of a document from April 1445 referring to an understanding between Alençon and Henry VI regarding the restoration of his lands).
[85] For more on the Lancastrians and Brittany, see: M. Keen & M. Daniel, 'English diplomacy and the sack of Fougeres in 1449', *History* v. 59 (1974), pp. 383-6.
[86] For Thien: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, p. 388; Roger, 'Guy Le Bouteiller', p. 300. For Hellenvillier, and what follows on his life: AN JJ 184 no. 606 (a title is not specified in this pardon, but it is very probable that he was already lord of Avrilly, on the basis of: *Inventaire sommaire des Archives départementales antérieures à 1790: Seine-Inférieure, Archives ecclésiastiques Série G (nos 1 à 1566)*, ed. C. de Beaurepaire (Paris, 1868), p. 279; L. Raoul, *Le fief d'Avrilly et ses seigneurs* (Rouen, 1891), p. 210; for his later career in the service of Pierre de Brézé, see also: Prosser, 'After the Reduction', p. 263; *idem*, 'Affinity as a social world', p. 53).

master and submitted after a brief period of resistance alongside other nobles and townspeople inside the castle of Verneuil at around the same time.[87] Even during such campaigns, moreover, it is not necessarily the case that everyone chose submission over other alternatives. In this regard, it is interesting to consider what one should make of the behaviour of Jean Carbonnel seigneur de Vauville (also in Manche), who retreated with English troops to Valognes and Cherbourg in c.1450, before departing across the Channel alongside his wife and children. He was pardoned in December 1450 and returned to France, but does his conduct perhaps hint that some Norman nobles remained integrated in, and supportive of, Lancastrian armies right up to the very end?[88]

In Henry VI's domains in south-western France, there should certainly be no doubt that staunch aristocratic support for the Lancastrian dynasty endured well into the 1450s. Charles VII and other Valois authors were explicit in stating that support for 'the English' in the south-west continued to run deep after hundreds of years of Plantagenet and Lancastrian rule, and, against this backdrop, we can note that some local magnates even held critically important posts at the time of the Valois conquests.[89] As a little-known but significant exemplar, it is revealing that when the key town of Bayonne was subjected to a fiercely contested siege in 1451, its garrison was not commanded by an Englishman; rather, it was led by Jean de Beaumont, who was a scion of a powerful landowning family across southern Gascony and Navarre, in addition to being the chancellor of this allied Iberian kingdom.[90] Further north, most Lancastrian vassals yielded more easily in 1451 in the absence of English reinforcements, but Gaston de Foix captal de Buch and his son Jean departed into exile in Aragon rather than changing allegiances, and they and many other nobles then played a key role in the restoration of Lancastrian rule in 1452-3. We shall look in detail at the contribution of the Foix cadets and their network to this restoration and revolt in Chapter 2, although it can be added here that when forces led by John Talbot arrived near Bordeaux in autumn 1452, backing was also offered by other key lords such as Pierre de Montferrand Soudic de la Trau (the son-in-law of John duke of Bedford) and Gaillard IV de Durfort seigneur de Duras (the grandson of a former seneschal of

[87] For aux Épaules and Duquesne: AN JJ 185 no. 56; AN JJ 186 no. 12; Bossuat, *Perrinet Gressart et François de Surienne,* pp. 256, 286-7, 340-2; *Letters and papers*, v. 1, p. 281; Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 3, 'preuves', p. 374. For resistance at Verneuil, see also: AN JJ 180 no. 4, JJ 198 no. 4. Further examples of individuals who served under the Lancastrians in the 1440s can be found in Prosser, 'After the Reduction', 'Appendix 3', p. 306ff.
[88] For Carbonnel's flight and restoration: AN JJ 186 no. 61; Prosser, 'After the Reduction', pp. 152-3 (Carbonnel's pardon alleges that he was coerced to flee by English forces, but acting under duress was a stock excuse used in documents of this kind; for similarly questionable claims, see e.g. Chapter 2 n. 115 below).
[89] For Valois commentary, see e.g. *Letters and papers,* v. 1, p. 343; *Cronicques de Normendie*, p. 176; Leseur, *Histoire de Gaston IV*, v. 2, p. 3.
[90] For Beaumont and Bayonne: Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 2, pp. 318-9; Courteault, *Gaston IV*, p. 156. For his career, his involvement in earlier fighting in Gascony, and his family's landowning: C. Barquero Goñi, 'Juan de Beaumont', *Diccionario Biográfico Español*, https://dbe.rah.es/biografias/32136/juan-de-beaumont (accessed 31/12/2023); Leseur, *Histoire de Gaston IV*, v. 2, 'preuves', pp. 320-2; NA C 61/135/6, 40 (calendared in https://www.gasconrolls.org/edition/index.html, accessed 31/12/23).

Gascony and the son-in-law of William de la Pole duke of Suffolk).[91] Beyond the Bordelais and its borderlands, it is similarly of interest that in regions where Lancastrian power had been weakened earlier such as Périgord and Landes, notable lords were again believed by Valois officials to be in league with Talbot's forces. Amongst these implicated individuals were Jean d'Abzac seigneur de Bellegarde, whose father had been forced to surrender Domme in Périgord and executed for his Lancastrian allegiances by Charles VII in 1438-9, François seigneur de Gramont, who had previously changed sides in 1442, and Louis d'Aspremont viscount of Orthe, who was forced into exile in c.1453-61 for having tried to raise forces on Talbot's behalf near Dax.[92] In the end, Lancastrian power in the south-west was broken by fortunes on the battlefield, and not by any inevitable exhaustion or dwindling enthusiasm for Henry VI as king.

During the period from c.1435-c.1453, Charles VII also faced profound, ongoing problems within Valois France. For a start, tensions over the direction of government remained acute – or perhaps even intensified – until at least the early 1440s. Although no clear successor to Georges de la Trémoille was apparent at time of the rapprochement with Burgundy, it was not long before the influence of Charles of Anjou and his allies grew to the point of generating consternation. The chronicler Perceval de Cagny for instance alleged in c.1438 that this courtier appeared to be dominating the king, to the exasperation of rivals such as Jean II duke of Alençon and Charles duke of Bourbon (whom we have already met as count of Clermont).[93] De Cagny likewise hints that the same two dukes were critical of the extent of progress being made against the Lancastrians and internal disorder in this period, and we should perhaps regard attempted military reforms and reports of strife between the king and military captains in late 1439 as another sign that these issues were creating controversy.[94] Either way, Bourbon and Alençon certainly played a leading role in no fewer than three different oppositional leagues across 1437-1442. The most serious of these leagues rebelled during the so-called Praguerie of 1440, which saw an armed uprising take place across swathes of Valois France in the name of the teenage Dauphin Louis. This revolt will be discussed in depth in Chapter 3, but for now, suffice it to say that fighting was waged for nearly half a year

[91] For Montferrand and Durfort in 1452-3: Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 2, p. 29; Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 3, p. 8; NA C 61/139/69, 61/140/6 (calendared in https://www.gasconrolls.org/edition/index.html, accessed 31/12/23); Vale, 'The last years of English Gascony', p. 129; Harris, *Valois Guyenne*, p. 185. For the nobles' family ties: *The Bedford inventories: the worldly goods of John, Duke of Bedford, Regent of France, 1389-1435*, ed. J. Stratford (London, 1993), pp. 416-7; *Letters and papers*, v. 2, pp. 508-9; F. de La Chesnaye-Desbois, *Dictionnaire de la Noblesse* 2.e. (Paris, 1772), v. 5, pp. 712-3.
[92] Harris, *Valois Guyenne*, pp. 154-6, 181-3; AN JJ 198 no. 544.
[93] Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, pp. 41-2; De Cagny, *Chronique*, p. 253.
[94] *Ibid*., pp. 228-9. For the events of 1439, as well as the Praguerie of 1440, see Chapter 3 below.

between forces loyal to Charles' regime and a broad confederacy of networks calling for reforms in government, only for the leading rebels to be forced to submit in Bourbonnais in return for pardons.

Either side of this uprising, other coalitions also sought changes in government without resorting to open violence. Firstly, Bourbon and Alençon formed an obscure coalition with René duke of Anjou at Angers in early 1437, with additional support seemingly promised by Jean V duke of Brittany, Alençon's new father-in-law Jean IV count of Armagnac, and Bourbon's *routier* brother-in-law, Rodrigo de Villandrando. The nobles' exact plans are difficult to gauge and proved abortive given that Charles VII rushed north from a peregrination in Languedoc to drive Villandrando into exile; but, suggestively, a later pardon for one of Armagnac's subordinates, Jean Mancip seigneur de Bournazel, alleges that Bournazel had plotted to remove councillors from around the king at this time.[95] Five years later, a new noble and urban coalition met in eastern France in the town of Nevers. Bourbon and Alençon were on this occasion accompanied by a selection of former Praguerie rebels, as well as Philip the Good of Burgundy, Charles count of Nevers, Charles duke of Orléans (who had previously been imprisoned in England from 1415-40), Marie duchess of Orléans, and Agnes duchess of Bourbon. The coalition called for a negotiated peace with Henry VI and issued more damaging attacks on royal governance. These included criticisms of justice, order, and taxation, which had increasingly been collected without explicit recourse to the estates-general or estates of Languedoïl.[96] It is therefore clear that Charles VII's regime remained vulnerable to attacks and censure, as well as that the Treaty of Arras could not even guarantee that the duke of Burgundy would not again ally with other actors in opposition to the Valois crown.

As the 1440s wore on, Charles VII's position did gradually grow more secure. Even prior to the victories over the Lancastrians from 1449, his government was able to ride out the Praguerie and Nevers gathering, and order then improved after the Truce of Tours and ensuing military reforms. However, political tensions within the Valois polity still only partially abated across this decade. For example, in 1443-48 alone, there were at least four occasions when a prominent councillor or councillors suddenly lost their place at the royal court. The influential admiral Prégent de Coëtivy thus fell from favour in late 1443, before Charles of Anjou count of Maine and his brother René were

[95] For Bournazel: AN JJ 176 no. 217 (printed in M. Boudet, 'Charles VII à Saint-Flour et le prélude de la Praguerie (1437)', *Annales du Midi*, v. 6/23 (1894), pp. 323-6). For the wider plotting: De Cagny, *Chronique*, pp. 233-5; *Proceedings and ordinances of the Privy Council of England*, ed. H. Nicolas (London, 1834-1837), v. 5, p. 52; Quicherat, *Rodrigue de Villandrando*, pp. 139-43; Boudet, 'Charles VII à Saint-Flour', pp. 301-22.

[96] For more on the Nevers gathering and criticisms there, see: Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, p. 211ff.; A. Tuetey, *Les écorcheurs sous Charles VII* (Montbéliard, 1874), v. 1, p. 130; Olivier de La Marche, *Mémoires*, ed. H. Beaune & J. d'Arbaumont (Paris, 1883-8), v. 1, p. 250; and the documents printed in Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 3, 'preuves', pp. 41-92. For taxation and the estates, see also: J. R. Major, *Representative Institutions in Renaissance France, 1421-1559* (Madison, 1960), pp. 34-41.

temporarily banished from the king's presence from autumn 1445. The Dauphin Louis was then obliged to depart for the Dauphiné at the turn of 1446-7 and refused to return, and, finally, Pierre de Brézé count of Évreux briefly lost his pre-eminent position in early 1448.[97] These upheavals in government were clearly much less dramatic and violent than those seen in earlier years, although they may still have been unhelpful for dispelling doubts about Charles' own level of political control. Even the sympathetic portrait of the monarch in this era offered by the chronicler Georges Chastelain suggests that his kingship appeared somewhat unorthodox, given that no courtier 'had the faintest idea where they stood'.[98]

What is more, changes in personnel were in many cases interlinked with fresh anxieties about opposition to the crown. The Angevins for instance fell at the very time when they were negotiating with the English over Maine, as well as at a moment when Pierre de Brézé apparently claimed that they and their allies were plotting a new 'Praguerie'.[99] Comparably, the Dauphin Louis left court shortly after Antoine de Chabannes count of Dammartin had deposed that he had once more conspired to seize control of the government and his father's person, in a development that further poisoned relations between Louis and the king's regime.[100]

In the years between Arras and the victories of 1449-53, it can finally be added that Charles VII faced other opposition to his authority at a more local level. Concerns about disorder continued or increased in many areas in the immediate aftermath of 1435, and some captains and bands of roving soldiers were not only emboldened to pillage, but even to launch more egregious attacks against royal officials. Perhaps most strikingly, Giraut de Goulart *bailli* of Berry was killed in a skirmish in early 1437 whilst fighting on royal orders against 'Le Petit Rodrigue' and other *routiers* who were raiding his province under the command of Rodrigo de Villandrando. At around the same, the town of Compiègne in Picardy was seized by its former captain Guillaume de Flavy, who went on to imprison the royal marshal Pierre de Rieux in a dungeon and leave him to die in his custody. In both of these cases, Charles VII's reaction was limited, perhaps to the point of further undermining his authority. 'Le Petit Rodrigue' seemingly escaped punishment until he was murdered by Giraut de Goulart's brother in an act of private vengeance, whilst Guillaume de Flavy retained his position and

[97] For the respective departures of the Angevins and Dauphin and surrounding circumstances, see the works cited below in nn. 99-100. For Coëtivy's fall, see Gruel, *Chronique*, p. 182 & the discussion in Chapter 4 Section iii) below. For Brézé in 1448: Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 1, pp. 135-7; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 4, pp. 214-6.
[98] Chastelain, *Œuvres*, v. 2, p. 184 ('l'estat autour de luy devint à estre si dangereux que nul, tant fust grant, pouvoit cognoistre à peine là ou il en estoit'). The translation follows that of Vale, *Charles VII*, p. 113.
[99] For Brézé's accusations: Gruel, *Chronique*, p. 187. For the timing and background: Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 4, pp. 101-3; Lecoy de la Marche, *Le roi René*, v. 2, pp. 258-9.
[100] See Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 1, p. 120; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 4, pp. 191-201; and the documents printed in full in *Le Jouvencel par Jean de Bueil*, ed. L. Lecestre (Paris, 1889), v. 2, p. 323ff.

was able to purchase a pardon in 1441 in exchange for a loan of 20,000 écus and artillery to use against the Lancastrians.[101]

Admittedly, it may be contended that the king was in other instances becoming more forceful in trying to impose his (or his council's) will in the localities by this time. Just before Guillaume de Flavy was pardoned, it is notable Alexandre bastard of Bourbon was drowned at Bar-sur-Aube as a punishment for alleged disorder.[102] Yet, even if royal interventionism did gradually increase, this does not mean that monarchical actions were always helpful in quelling opposition or promoting stability. We shall look further at this issue during Chapter 4, where we will examine localised revolts of noble networks in the 1440s in Comminges (involving adherents of the titular countess Marguerite) and in Saintonge (led by Jacques seigneur de Pons, who was ultimately banished in 1449). We can also observe here that the Valois monarchy faced fresh rebellions in this period in Angoumois in 1442 and in the lands of Jean IV count of Armagnac in 1444-46. On the former occasion, deputies of the Orléans family led by Guy de la Roche seigneur de Verteuil resisted a royal siege at Angoulême, after Guy and other regional nobles had been ordered to submit to the king for purported involvement in pillaging. On the latter occasion, strife occurred following the arrest of Jean IV count of Armagnac for defiance of royal orders relating to the future of Comminges.[103] Jean IV had attempted to negotiate with troops led the Dauphin before he was captured in early 1444, ensuring that violent resistance to royalist forces is initially attested only in a few areas of his county of Rodez that were in league with Jean de Lescun bastard of Armagnac.[104] However, during the ensuing occupation of Jean IV's territories, fresh rebellions broke out in western Armagnac, at Lectoure in Lomagne, and at Chaudesaigues in Haute-Auvergne, whilst the count's eldest son Jean also remained at large until he and his father were pardoned in 1445/6.[105] This again demonstrates that the Valois king faced persisting challenges to his authority in this period.

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[101] For Goulart and 'Le Petit Rodrigue': AN JJ 186 no. 58, JJ 198 no. 7 (printed in Quicherat, *Rodrigue de Villandrando,* pp. 293-4); P. Lauer, 'Un nouveau document sur Rodrigue de Villandrando: le meurtre de Giraud Goulart bailli de Berry (1437)', *BEC,* v. 80 (1919), pp. 145-51. For Flavy and Rieux: P. Champion, *Guillaume de Flavy, capitaine de Compiègne* (Paris, 1906), pp. 73-6; cf. Cazaux, *Les capitaines*, pp. 639-40.
[102] See e.g. Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, p. 458.
[103] For the revolt in Angoumois: AN JJ 178 no. 95 (printed in *AHP*, v. 29 (1898), pp. 364-79); Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, pp. 245-7. For Jean IV and Comminges in 1443, see Chapter 4 section iii) below.
[104] For resistance in the county of Rodez: Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 266; AN JJ 177 no. 236; C. Devic & J. Vaissette, *Histoire générale de Languedoc* (Toulouse, 1889), v. 11, pp. 7-8; M. Thibault, *La Jeunesse de Louis XI* (Paris, 1907), pp. 326-8. For the backdrop of Armagnac's arrest: Samaran, *La maison d'Armagnac*, pp. 91-2.
[105] For Lectoure: *Inventaire sommaire des Archives départementales antérieures à 1790: Haute-Garonne. Archives civiles, Série B, nos. 1 à 92 N*, ed. C. Roques (Toulouse, 1903), p. 2; Samaran, *La maison d'Armagnac*, p. 98 & n. For western Armagnac: *Comptes consulaires de la ville de Riscle, 1441-1507*, ed. P. Parfouru & J. de Carsalade du Pont (Paris, 1886), v. 1, p. 27; A. Breuils, 'La campagne de Charles VII en Gascogne. Une conspiration du Dauphin en 1446, d'après des documents inédits', *Revue des questions historiques,* v. 57

c.1453-c.1461

It finally remains to ask how far noble resistance was transformed by, or declined after, the spectacular Valois triumphs in Normandy and Gascony in 1449-53. It is undoubtedly the case that these victories broke Lancastrian power in France, alongside enhancing Charles VII's reputation in a way that overall left 'internal' resistance weaker and more isolated. However, this is not to say that authors such as Thomas Basin were correct that the king thence 'held the entire realm in peace and tranquillity under his authority'.[106] Quite apart from anything else, the spectre of Lancastrian opposition still haunted the French polity. A number of former vassals of Henry VI and discontented Valois princes continued to hope that English forces might again return, and in 1454, Pierre de Montferrand Soudic de la Trau was executed for treason after failing to leave France, and allegedly continuing to conspire, following the second fall of Bordeaux.[107] Two years later, the inveterately disobedient Jean II duke of Alençon was also arrested for having engaged in treasonous negotiations with the 'ancient enemy'. Subsequent interrogations of the duke's adherents suggest that he had promised to help the English government to reinvade northern France and even contemplated changing allegiances, largely as a result of ongoing anger at the influence of opponents such as Charles of Anjou count of Maine. Such claims of course need to be treated with extreme caution – as do other allegations such as that Alençon planned to poison the king's laundry – but there is corroboratory evidence that Alençon was genuinely negotiating with Henry VI's government prior to his arrest in Paris. An English safe conduct was notably issued on 22nd May 1456 to one Jean Ferman, who is identifiable as Alençon's *valet de chambre*.[108] At the same time, it is just conceivable that Alençon might have had supporters in Normandy or Brittany who would have been willing to support a new English attack. One can merely speculate about this subject, but it could be significant that when Charles VII wrote to the constable Arthur de Richemont (now also duke of Brittany) to inform him of Alençon's arrest, he warned that there were men prepared to support an English

(1895), esp. p. 130. For Chaudesaigues: Felgères, *Histoire de la baronnie de Chaudesaigues*, p. 109ff. For Armagnac's son and their pardon: Devic & Vaissette, *Histoire générale de Languedoc*, p. 8; *Comptes consulaires de la ville de Riscle*, p. 17; Samaran, *op. cit*., pp. 95-8, 374-5; AN JJ 177 no. 127 (printed in Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 3, 'preuves', pp. 125-39).

[106] Basin, *Histoire*, v. 1, pp. 324-5 ('totum regnum pacifice et tranquille sua sub ditione tenebat').

[107] For Montferrand's activity, see: Harris, *Valois Guyenne*, p. 155.

[108] For Ferman's safe conduct and background: NA C 76/138/13 (calendared in 'Calendar of the French Rolls: Henry VI', ed. A. C. Ewald, in *The forty-eighth annual report of the deputy keeper of the public records* (London, 1887), p. 413); *Procès Politiques: Alençon*, pp. 35-6, 131-2. For the allegations about Alençon's activities: *ibid*., esp. pp. 37, 46, 70-1, 116, 122-3.

descent within Saint-Mâlo, which was a coastal town where Gilles seigneur de Chantocé had formerly been governor.[109]

More broadly, there were also contemporary suspicions that Alençon had been abetted or encouraged in his treason by his brother-in-law Jean V count of Armagnac, his longstanding ally Philip the Good of Burgundy, and his godson the Dauphin Louis. Indeed, in 1458, Charles VII seemingly felt it necessary to deny publicly that Louis had been complicit in Alençon's conduct – in what must have been a considerable embarrassment to the French king – whilst in summer 1461, both the Dauphin and the duke of Burgundy would again go on to be accused of inviting the English to reinvade.[110] In many ways, however, incidents of this sort tell us less about the risks of a Lancastrian revival, which was unlikely at a time of civil war in England, than they do about the scope of ongoing divisions and latent opposition within the French polity. Charles VII never faced a wide-ranging rebellion akin to the Praguerie during the last years of his reign, but his relations with all of the princes mentioned above, and with some of their supporters, had become seriously strained by the mid-1450s. Jean V count of Armagnac, for example, apparently quarrelled with the king over an incestuous marriage to his sister Isabelle and the succession of the archbishopric of Auch. Meanwhile, the Dauphin Louis irritated his father by marrying Charlotte of Savoy without his permission in 1451, before Charles and his councillors eventually lost patience with his repeated refusals to return to court from his Dauphiné.[111] Under these circumstances, royal forces invaded and occupied the lands of Jean V count of Armagnac from 1455 and of the Dauphin from 1456, although the princes themselves both evaded capture, aided by the fact that a number of their adherents prioritised loyalty to them over obedience to the crown. Jean V's partisans for instance held up royal forces with armed resistance at Lectoure and in the Pyrenean valley of Aure whilst he fled into Spain. In Aure, opposition appears to have been directed by the regional seneschal Jean de Labarthe and his son, and at Lectoure, it was led by Jean V's younger brother Charles, the consuls of the town, and the experienced captain Thomassin Duquesne, who had earlier moved from François de Surienne's service to that of the Armagnac family.[112] Comparably, the Dauphin was helped by loyal members of his network to flee to

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[109] 'Pièces soustraites au trésor des chartes des ducs de Bretagne', ed. L. Delisle, *BEC,* v. 54 (1893), pp. 414-5. For Chantocé's earlier governorship, see: Keen & Daniel, 'English diplomacy', pp. 384-5. For further allegations that Alençon had contacts in Norman towns, see: *Procès Politiques: Alençon*, pp. 46, 70, 115, 128.

[110] For the official exoneration of Louis: Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 3, pp. 105-7; *Procès Politiques: Alençon*, pp. 145-6. For suspicions (apparently also thrown out by the king) regarding Alençon's contacts with Armagnac and Burgundy: *ibid*., pp. 43, 124-5; Chastelain, *Œuvres*, v. 3, p. 423 & n.; Contamine, 'Le premier procès', pp. 104-5. For alleged plotting in 1461: Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 6, pp. 337-8.

[111] See e.g. Vale, *Charles VII*, pp. 164-7; and for Armagnac: Samaran, *La maison d'Armagnac*, p. 115ff.

[112] *Ibid*., pp. 122-5. Jean V was ultimately condemned for treason in absentia in 1460 after returning to France and then fleeing again, whilst the situation within the re-occupied Armagnac lands appears to have remained tense and perhaps rebellious until Jean V's restoration following Charles VII's death: *ibid*., pp. 125-30, 143;

the court of Louis II de Châlon prince of Orange and then on to the Burgundian Low Countries in summer-autumn 1456. Even thereafter, bastions of resistance endured into 1457 in some vales and towns of the Dauphiné, not least as forces under Guillaume de Meuillon refused to surrender Grenoble until ordered to do so by the Dauphin.[113] This offers yet another illustration of how noble opposition and rebellion remained persistent even in the face of greater royal assertiveness.

In the final years of Charles VII's life, the Dauphin's retreat to the lands of Philip the Good added a further dimension to divisions and opposition in France. Dissensions between the king and the duke of Burgundy had again existed for many years after Arras, but whereas it had previously been possible for intermediaries such as the duchess Isabella of Burgundy to negotiate political compromises, the Dauphin's arrival and reception in the Low Countries in defiance of royal authority created an insoluble problem. Tensions continued to escalate amidst reports of plotting against the king when Burgundian envoys were at court in early 1457, as well as amidst a series of aggressive judicial and diplomatic manoeuvres on the part of the Valois crown. In July 1460, the royal council even took the penultimate step towards full-scale conflict by passing a resolution advising that preparations be made for a just war to be declared against Burgundy. However, for all that both sides believed conflict to be imminent in summer 1461, Charles VII fell ill and died before the Treaty of Arras was officially broken.[114] One can only hypothesise as to how different Charles' legacy might have been had the king embarked upon another war against his most powerful subject, or how Philip the Good and other frontier nobles such as Louis de Luxembourg count of Saint Pol might have reacted.[115] As it was, Charles' passing meant that it fell to the Dauphin to return to France and assume control over the French kingdom as Louis XI. Within just four years, his conduct and inability to move on from earlier divisions would trigger a noble-led rebellion that was larger in scale even than the Praguerie, and had he not fought his opponents to a draw at the battle of Montlhéry, his reign might well have come to a premature end.

We will return to events in Louis XI's reign later on in the thesis, but for the moment, let us end this section by emphasising that noble opposition to Charles VII already appears far more abundant and persistent than has traditionally been assumed. We have seen that Charles VII continued to face

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Comptes de Riscle, pp. 66-8 & nn. Thomassin Duquesne resurfaces in Burgundian service in c.1460: Bossuat, *Perrinet Gressart et François de Surienne*, p. 369.

[113] See R. Ambühl, *Le séjour du futur Louis XI dans les pays de Philippe le Bon (1456-1461)* (Genappe, 2002), pp. 17-8, 25-6; *Dispatches with related documents of Milanese ambassadors in France and Burgundy, 1450-1483*, ed. P. Kendall & V. Ilardi, v. 1 (Athens, Ohio, 1970), pp. 237-42; Chastelain, *Œuvres,* v. 3, pp. 227, 464.

[114] For more on mounting tensions and moves towards war with Burgundy, see: Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 6, pp. 121, 262ff.; Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, pp. 347-53; U. Plancher, *Histoire générale et particuliere de Bourgogne* v. 4 (Dijon, 1781), 'preuves', pp. ccxxxv-ccxxxvi.

[115] For speculation about the increased potential for other rebellions, cf. also *Dispatches with related documents of Milanese ambassadors*, v. 2, pp. 429-30.

serious challenges to his authority even as circumstances changed, royal power grew, and the Lancastrian position collapsed; and across his entire reign, it may be said that virtually no region of France was left untouched by resistance of some form or another. All of this suggests that there is a profound need for more in-depth research into opposition, and for further reassessment of politics in France, in this period. The following three chapters will attempt to meet this need by using case studies to look more closely at different types of resistance to Charles VII and at the networks at their heart – beginning with opposition from Lancastrian-supporting magnates and their adherents.

Chapter 2: Lancastrian supporters and their networks in conflict with Charles VII

i) Introduction: pro-Lancastrian opposition and the case studies of Jean de Luxembourg and the Foix cadets

For the majority of Charles VII's reign, a sizeable portion of the French nobility clearly did not subscribe to the Valois mantra that the English were 'longstanding enemies of the realm'.[1] Instead, many nobles fought for the Lancastrian dynasty 'without appearance of repentance', as Jean Juvenal des Ursins bishop of Beauvais lamented in 1435, and as we have already seen evidenced by multiple examples discussed in outline in Chapter One.[2] Yet, if pro-Lancastrian noble opposition to Charles VII should thus be regarded as vigorous and obdurate – in some regions even into the 1450s – then this only begs further questions. Exactly how, why, and from whom did such resistance obtain backing? And at what cost was it able to be overcome by the Valois?

The present chapter will seek to offer fresh answers here, through discussion of two case studies of French magnates and their networks who supported Henry VI's cause over multiple decades in different parts of France. The magnates in question are Jean de Luxembourg (c.1390-1441), who was count of Guise in the north-east from c.1425, and Gaston de Foix captal de Buch (c.1383-c.1459) and his son Jean de Foix (c.1422?-1485), who were pre-eminent Lancastrian vassals in Gascony. These nobles were cadet members of leading families (see below for family trees 1 and 2), but they are of especial interest as case studies here because they were the most powerful lords to remain in Lancastrian allegiance even after the Treaty of Arras. They are likewise amongst the Lancastrian supporters in this period whose careers and networks are best documented, since Jean de Luxembourg's life is for instance detailed in the chronicle of Enguerrand de Monstrelet (who probably had ties to his household or affinity), whilst Gaston and Jean de Foix feature prominently in the Gascon Rolls and have also left behind a handful of extant charters.[3] At the same time, the

[1] For this refrain, see e.g. Cosneau, *Le connétable de Richemont*, p. 495 ('anciens ennemis de ce royaume'); *Ordonnances des rois*, v. 14, p. 135; *Letters and papers*, v. 1, pp. 332-3.
[2] Lewis, *Later Medieval France* pp. 39-40 & n. ('sans appercevance de repentence').
[3] Monstrelet's exact connection to Jean de Luxembourg is uncertain, but his work is unusually sympathetic to, and replete with detailed knowledge about, this magnate: see e.g. *Chronique*, v. 5, p. 454-6. The chronicler's claim to have attended an interview between Joan of Arc and Burgundy at Compiègne in 1430 could also hint that he was there on Jean's behalf, and it may be significant too that from 1436 he held offices in Cambrai, where Jean possessed property and influence: *Chronique*, v. 4, pp. 388-9; A. Lesort, 'Notes biographiques sur le chroniqueur Enguerrand de Monstrelet', *Bulletin historique et philologique* (1908), pp. 153-5; A. Marchandisse & B. Schnerb, 'Le testament de Jean III de Luxembourg et de Jeanne de Béthune (17 avril 1430)', in *idem*, P. Delsalle, & G. Docquier (eds.), *Pour la singuliere affection qu'avons a luy: études bourguignonnes offertes à Jean-Marie Cauchies* (Turnhout, 2017), pp. 293-4.

magnates and their supporters have remained understudied in modern scholarship.[4] In large part, this is arguably a result of the inordinate focus on principalities and prevalence of defeatist narratives about Lancastrian France identified earlier. Equally, though, nationalistic views in historiography have also contributed to Jean de Luxembourg and the Foix cadets being dismissed as exceptional 'anglophiles', whilst other Lancastrian supporters have been treated as mere English pawns, or even as atypical 'collaborators' in northern France.[5] All of this adds to the need for a new, revisionist assessment of pro-Lancastrian noble opposition.

In the main body of this chapter, Section ii) will begin by examining how Jean de Luxembourg and Gaston and Jean de Foix built up, and obtained backing from, broad networks over many years in opposition to the Valois monarchy. Section iii) will then explore how these networks remained resilient and influential even as Lancastrian resistance to Charles VII came to a close, with their impact still felt in different ways during the final campaigns of the Hundred Years' War and beyond. Lastly, Section iv) will discuss the motives involved in pro-Lancastrian opposition, and specifically the role played by ideology in the actions of Jean de Luxembourg, the Foix cadets, and their networks.

Beforehand, however, it is worth offering an outline of the careers of the magnates at the centre of our case studies. If we begin with Jean de Luxembourg, we can note that this cadet nephew of Waleran II count of Saint Pol (d. 1415) started out simply as seigneur de Beaurevoir in Picardy. Yet, he soon established himself as an important subordinate of the dukes of Burgundy and of the Lancastrian monarchy after the Treaty of Troyes, and he was entrusted with offices such as the captaincy of Picardy and governorship of Artois across the 1420s.[6] He would go on to become most (in)famous to posterity for ransoming Joan of Arc to Henry VI's government after she was captured by his adherents at the siege of Compiègne in 1430, but he also led further campaigns in opposition

[4] The best account of Jean de Luxembourg's career is found in C. Berry's unpublished 2011 thesis on 'Les Luxembourg-Ligny' in the later Middle Ages, which draws on chronicles and Burgundian records. A small minority of Jean's supporters are also discussed in detail by B. Schnerb in his 1997 *Enguerrand de Bournonville et les siens.* A very brief discussion of the Foix cadets' support-base with reference to three published charters can be found in F. Bériac & F. Legrand, 'D'une fidélité à l'autre: la noblesse bordelaise de la domination anglaise à celle du roi de France', in M. Agostino, F. Bériac, & A.-M. Dom (eds.), *Les ralliements. Ralliés, traîtres et opportunistes du Moyen Age à l'époque Moderne et Contemporaine* (Bordeaux, 1997), pp. 33-4.

[5] For use of the term 'anglophile' for these nobles and others, see e.g. Sumption, *Triumph and Illusion*, pp. 471-2, 740; Contamine, *Charles VII*, pp. 192, 218, 293. For de-emphasis on the agency of Lancastrian supporters, see e.g. A. Pollard, *John Talbot and the war in France, 1427-1453* (London, 1983), p. 136; A. Sadourny, 'Occupants et occupés (1417-1449)', in *La Normandie au XVe siècle: Art et histoire* (Saint-Lô, 1999) pp. 11-15; For use of the term 'collaborators', see e.g. C. Gauvard, 'Résistants et collaborateurs pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans: le témoignage des lettres de rémission', in *La "France anglaise" au Moyen Age. Colloque des historiens médiévistes français et britanniques*, v. 1 (Paris, 1988), pp. 123-38; Roger, 'Guy Le Bouteiller', p. 271.

[6] For more on Jean's early career: Berry, 'Les Luxembourg-Ligny', p. 248ff.; A. Duchesne, *Histoire Généalogique de la Maison de Béthune* (Paris, 1639), pp. 341-2; R. de Smedt, (ed.), *Les chevaliers de la Toison d'Or au XVe siècle* (Frankfurt, 2000), p. 30. For his offices: Berry, *op. cit*., pp. 283-4; cf. Schnerb, *Les Saveuse*, pp. 130-1.

to Charles VII, during which he acquired a reputation for pitilessness.[7] Still more significantly for our purposes, he also managed to expand his own landed powerbase in spectacular fashion amidst Valois weakness and Lancastrian ascendancy. For example, he wrested control of many Picard possessions from nobles who supported Charles VII as Dauphin and Valois ruler, including Coucy from the captive duke of Orléans (in 1419), Le Nouvion from the count of Penthièvre (in c.1423), and the entire county of Guise from René of Anjou (in 1423-5, with financial aid from Philip the Good and military backing from hundreds of English troops).[8] Likewise, Jean obtained control of many further possessions in the north-east through a Burgundian-brokered marriage to Jeanne de Béthune (the titular viscountess of Meaux and widow of Robert de Bar count of Marle and Soissons) in 1418, through Lancastrian-inspired grants of territories such as Beaulieu and Nesle in the 1420s, and through a dubious inheritance claim on the county of Ligny-en-Barrois and other lordships from 1430.[9] Map 2 below depicts the most important places that were garrisoned by him in eastern Picardy, which were densely located and cut across strategic river and road networks. This agglomeration of castles made Jean 'greatly feared' by his Valois opponents according to Enguerrand de Monstrelet, and another illustration of his growing strength is provided by the fact that the townspeople of pro-Valois Tournai offered him the impressive sum of 6,000 écus in 1429, in return for peace and the right to trade through his territories.[10]

Jean's landed base would prove important in later years as well, through providing him with a platform for remaining in Lancastrian allegiance and for resisting attacks from forces in Charles VII's allegiance even as Valois power grew. In 1433, Jean likely supported the marriage of his niece Jacquetta of Luxembourg and John duke of Bedford in defiance of both Valois and Burgundian wishes, and, even more importantly, he then refused to subscribe to the Treaty of Arras after 1435.

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[7] For the ransom of Joan of Arc, see n. 156 below. For Jean's pitilessness: Monstrelet, *Chronique,* v. 5, pp. 78-9, 455; Matton, *Histoire de la ville et des environs de Guise*, v. 1 (Laon, 1898), p. 205; 'Le livre des trahisons de France', *Chroniques relatives à l'histoire de la Belgique sous la domination des ducs de Bourgogne: textes français*, ed. J. C. Kervyn de Lettenhove (Brussels, 1873), p. 175.

[8] For Coucy: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 3, pp. 310-3. For Le Nouvion: BNF Fr. 23018 ('Chronique des Cordeliers'), fs. 443v-444; BM Lille Godefroy 25 ('Inventaire des archives de La Fère', c.1686, v. 1), fs. 40-40v; Matton, *Histoire de Guise*, v. 1, p. 220. For the campaigns of 1423-5 and ownership of Guise: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 4, pp. 163-6, 178-88, 199-207; *ibid*., v. 5, pp. 50-1; Matton, *op. cit.*, v. 1, p. 199ff.; Lobanov, 'Anglo-Burgundian military cooperation', pp. 110-9; Berry, 'Les Luxembourg-Ligny', pp. 291-9.

[9] For the Luxembourg-Béthune marriage and grants: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 3, pp. 297-8; *ibid*., v. 5, p. 386; AN JJ 172 no. 91; Matton, *Histoire de Guise*, v. 1, pp. 219-20. For the 1430 inheritance: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 4, pp. 401-2, 429; BM Lille Godefroy 25, fs. 64v-66; Berry, 'Les Luxembourg-Ligny', pp. 67-8.

[10] Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, p. 386 ('Jehan de Luxembourg estoit fort doubté, pour tant qu'il avoit de moult puissans places'); *Extraits analytiques des anciens registres des consaux de la ville de Tournai 1385-1430*, ed. H. Vandenbroeck (Tournai, 1861-3), v. 2, pp. 321-5.

Instead, Jean remained a vassal of Henry VI and a rebel in the eyes of the Valois king.[11] Even still, there were complexities to his position, as for all that he maintained close contacts with the Lancastrian regime and passed them intelligence regarding the siege of Meaux in 1439, he did not participate in offensive campaigns.[12] Moreover, he remained a founding member of the Burgundian Order of the Golden Fleece and never decisively broke from Philip the Good, even amidst serious tensions between the pair that will be discussed further below. Jean simply defended his own territories – with considerable success – until his death from natural causes in January 1441, having never acknowledged Charles VII as king.

Meanwhile, in the south-west, Gaston de Foix and his son Jean supported the Lancastrian cause for still longer. Gaston was the second son of Archambaud de Grailly count of Foix (d. 1412), who had effectively controlled territories in both Valois and Lancastrian jurisdictions, but who divided his lands so that his eldest heirs would be in different allegiances. Gaston thence became the most powerful landowner in Lancastrian Gascony by the accession of King Henry V, with his territories including the *captalat* de Buch and *vicomtés* of Benauges and Castillon.[13] These lordships came complete with lucrative toll rights and opportunities to raid shipping, as seen in a later allegation that Gaston had boarded a Breton ship 'in person' near the *captalat* de Buch to steal wine destined for the Church.[14] Gaston's position was further strengthened by a prestigious marriage to Marguerite d'Albret in 1410, and, like Jean de Luxembourg, he then expanded his powerbase whilst offering military support to the ascendant Lancastrian dynasty. For instance, Gaston aided Henry V in the Île-de-France by leading the capture of Pontoise in 1419, for which he received the Norman county of Longueville in recompense.[15] Subsequently, he returned to Gascony and campaigned in this region's northern and eastern borderlands, where he both seized and was granted control of important castles and lordships. These included Montguyon (1422?), Sainte-Bazeille (1424-5), and Chalais (c.1438) – with Map 3 below depicting these forts and other Gascon possessions held by the family

[11] For the Luxembourg-Bedford marriage: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, p. 55. For Jean's rejection of Arras: J. Dickinson, *The Congress of Arras, 1435: a study in medieval diplomacy* (Oxford, 1955), pp. 61-2; Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 270-1, 311-2, 455-6; AN X 1a 8605, fs. 99v-100.
[12] For complexities to Jean's stance, see e.g. Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 342-3, 396, 454-5, as well as the discussion in Section iv) below. For Meaux: *Proceedings and ordinances*, v. 5, pp. 384, 388; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, p. 19.
[13] For the division of Archambaud's inheritance, Gaston's early career in Gascony, and the marriage of 1410, see: Flourac, *Jean Ier*, pp. 43, 227-8; P. Courroux, *Charles d'Albret. Le connétable d'Azincourt* (Bordeaux, 2019), pp. 196-7, 234-5; Pépin, 'The French Offensives of 1404-1407', pp. 37-8; NA C 61/114/14. Benauges was later elevated into a county in 1426: NA C 61/121/44.
[14] For toll rights: NA C 61/130/10, C 61/131/85. For the alleged raid: *AHG*, v. 7 (1865), p. 350.
[15] For the capture of Pontoise: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 3, p. 333; *The St Albans Chronicle: The Chronica Maiora of Thomas Walsingham, Vol. 2: 1394–1422*, ed. J. Taylor, W. Childs, & L. Watkiss (Oxford, 2011), pp. 740-2. For Longueville: *Rymer's Foedera,* ed. T. Rymer (London, 1739-1745), v. 9, p. 765; *English suits before the Parlement of Paris 1420-1436* ed. C. Allmand & C. Armstrong (London, 1982), p. 6 & n.

before 1450.[16] Gaston additionally supported Lancastrian offensives against the Bazadais region (1423-4) and Tartas (1440-1), and he was rewarded with the captaincy of the former's main town from c.1424-1442.[17] He was a made a knight of the Garter in 1438/9 and a member of the Lancastrian council in Gascony too from 1445, although his record of officeholding was otherwise far more limited than that of Jean de Luxembourg.[18]

Nonetheless, Gaston's landed power again guaranteed him substantial influence, and this only increased as the Valois threat to Gascony grew. The captal de Buch played a leading role in fighting off the Valois invasion of 1442 alongside his young son and heir Jean viscount of Castillon; and thereafter, both father and son doubled down on their loyalty to the Lancastrian dynasty.[19] They fostered a close relationship with Henry VI's chief minister in England, William de la Pole, and in return they received many new rewards. Amongst these were fresh grants of Gascon lordships and co-lordships such as at Castelnau-de-Médoc, the English earldom of Kendal and election to the Order of the Garter for Jean, and a marriage alliance between Jean and William de la Pole's niece Margaret Kerdeston.[20] It was only in the early 1450s that the Foix cadets' position collapsed amidst the successive Valois conquests of Gascony, in circumstances that we shall examine at length in Section iii).

Prior to these conquests, though, it should be evident that Gaston and his son enjoyed significant success in resisting the authority and wishes of the Valois crown over many years in the south-west. In so doing, they built up and exploited extensive landed possessions, as was also the case with Jean

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[16] For Montguyon: *Registres de la Jurade: 1414 à 1422*, p. 602; Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 2, p. 250; AN JJ 198 no. 442. For Sainte-Bazeille, which probably returned to Valois allegiance from 1442: *AHG*, v. 16 (1878), p. 102-4; NA C 61/121/44; R.-L. Alis, *Histoire de la ville et de la baronnie de Ste Bazeille* (Agen, 1892), pp. 110-4. For Chalais: NA C 61/128/28; *AHG*, v. 16 (1878), p. 292.

[17] For the campaigns in Bazadais: *AHG*, v. 1 (1859), p. 10; P.-J. O'Reilly, *Essai sur l'Histoire de la ville et de l'arrondissement de Bazas* (Bazas, 1840), p. 111. For the captaincy of Bazas and this town's fall to Valois forces in c.1442 (as well as temporarily in the late 1430s): *Variétés Bordelaises* n.e., v. 3, pp. 220-1; NA C 61/130/9; ADG 1 Mi 93-1-22, f. 49v; BNF Dupuy 634, fs. 25-26v. For the siege of Tartas: BNF Fr. 6965, fs. 131-140; J. Jaurgain, 'Deux comtes de Comminges béarnais du XVe siecle: Jean de Lescun, bâtard d'Armagnac, et Odet d'Aydie, seigneur de Lescun', *Bulletin de la Société archéologique du Gers*, v. 15 (1914), p. 120.

[18] For the Garter: *Register of the Order of the Garter*, ed. J. Anstis (London, 1724), p. 121. For the Lancastrian council: 'Gascon Rolls Project', https://www.gasconrolls.org/edition/calendars/C61_134/document.html (accessed 31/12/23).

[19] For the Foix cadets and the 1442 campaign: *A journal by one of the suite of Thomas Beckington,* pp. 31, 58-9.

[20] For the grants in Gascony: NA C 61/132/50, C 61/134/25, C 61/135/14; cf. Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 134-5; C. Higounet, *La seigneurie et le vignoble de Château La Tour: histoire d'un grand cru du Médoc (XIVe-XXe siècle)* (Bordeaux, 1974), pp. 181-2. For the earldom of Kendal (as part of an agreement with William de la Pole in c.1445) and subsequent Foix-Kerdeston marriage: G. Cokayne, *Complete peerage of England, Scotland, Ireland* (London, 1892), v. 4, p. 340; Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 133-4; C. Hansen, 'Suffolk's niece: the identity of Margaret, the wife of Jean de Foix, earl of Kendal', *Genealogists' Magazine*, v. 22/10 (1988), pp. 373-7; ADG 1 Mi 93-1-22, f. 76. For the Garter for Jean (again with support from William de la Pole in 1446): *Register of the Order of the Garter*, pp. 127-8. See also, for cancellations of local lawsuits: NA C 61/134/23, C 61/136/16.

de Luxembourg. All of the nobles made use of direct Lancastrian patronage and backing too, just as Jean de Luxembourg additionally profited from, and relied upon, maintaining relations with the Duke of Burgundy. However, none of this suffices in and of itself to explain how the magnates' prolonged resistance to Charles VII was tenable. Both the count of Guise and the Foix cadets must have needed substantial further backing at a regional level and from amongst their compatriots, and so let us now turn to analysing how, and from whom, this support was obtained.

Family tree 1 – selective family tree for Jean de Luxembourg:



Family tree 2 – selective family tree for Gaston and Jean de Foix:



Map 2: Jean de Luxembourg's key possessions in eastern Picardy and its environs, c.1440.

This map shows (a selection of) Jean de Luxembourg's key regional possessions around eastern Picardy in c.1440, which are circled in red. The towns of Chauny and Soissons, which Jean also controlled until the mid-1430s, are circled in blue.[21] The map itself is adapted from David Potter's *War and Government in the French Provinces: Picardy 1470-1560* (Cambridge, 1993).

[21] For Chauny, see the sources in n. 81 below, and for Soissons, see n. 80 below & Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 270-1. All of the places circled in red are explicitly mentioned as being under Jean de Luxembourg's control in 1439 in Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 386, 396, with the exception of Le Nouvion, for which see n. 8 above & n. 88 below.

Map 3: Gaston and Jean de Foix's key possessions in northern Gascony and its environs, c.1450.



This map shows (a selection of) Gaston and Jean de Foix's key possessions in and around Gascony in c.1450, which are circled in red. Bazas and Sainte-Bazeille, which Gaston de Foix also controlled until the early-1440s, are circled in blue.[22] The map itself is adapted from Jonathan Sumption's *Cursed Kings* (London, 2016).

[22] For Bazas and Sainte-Bazeille, see nn. 6 & 17 above. Of the places circled in red, Benauges, Cadillac, Castillon-sur-Dordogne, and La-Teste-de-Buch had long been key possessions of the family, and see also, for Blaignac and Vayres: Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 2, p. 283; for Castelnau-de-Médoc and Lamarque: nn. 25 & 117 below; for Langon, Gensac, and Castillon-de-Médoc: n. 121 below; for Chalais and Montguyon: n. 16 above & n. 65 below; and for Le Fleix: *AHG*, v. 7 (1865), p. 351ff.; Flourac, *Jean Ier*, pp. 43, 227-8.

ii) Noble networks and support for the Lancastrian cause

In exploring how Jean de Luxembourg and the Foix cadets built up and maintained support, this section will contend that they were assisted by broad-based networks. We will begin by analysing how different nobles formed part of these structures, with a particular focus on four groups: officeholding deputies, family members, vassals, and allied supporters. For each group, we will consider how nobles were linked to the central magnates, how they supplied them with political and military aid, and where possible how they were interconnected to other members within the same network. We will then move on to considering how individuals from other backgrounds such as clergymen and townspeople were again drawn into the magnates' networks or offered them assistance. Throughout, we must of course remain cognisant of fluctuations over time and limitations in our source material, whilst for the purposes of this chapter, Gaston and Jean de Foix will also be treated as co-leaders of the same network given the track-record of cooperation between them and interrelationships between their power.[23] However, it will hopefully be possible to demonstrate that they and Jean de Luxembourg obtained extremely wide-ranging backing, even as their networks also remained cohesive and durable. This will then allow Section iii) to go on to highlight the ongoing influence of the networks as support for the Lancastrian dynasty came to an end.

The Foix cadets and Jean de Luxembourg were aided by an array of nobles, and, for a start, it can be contended that an enduring cornerstone of political and military support came from 'lesser' noblemen who were attached to their households or who held offices under them. We have extensive evidence for the existence of such bonds under Jean de Luxembourg, and there are also indications that they were important under Gaston and Jean de Foix. For the Foix cadets, we can only rely on a handful of charters which were made for, or in the presence of, the noblemen, but it is worth remarking that officeholders feature prominently amongst the witnesses to these. A grant made by Gaston de Foix in 1439 thus mentions his *maître d'hôtel* Menaut de Garlenx and captain of La-Teste-de-Buch Arnaut de Sus, the former of whom had also witnessed an alliance alongside Gaston ten years earlier.[24] Meanwhile, other individuals who appear as witnesses in comparable familial documents include Arnaut d'Aylquand (1426), who was then captain of La-Teste-de-Buch, Ramon-Guillem de Lavau (1426, 1436), who reappears as Gaston's captain of Cadillac in the 1440s, Gaston seigneur de l'Isle (1435, 1450), who is attested as captain of Castelnau-de-Médoc prior to the

[23] Jean de Foix was viscount of Castillon as heir to his father, and first appears with the title in 1436: ADPA E 438 (August 1436 alliance between Jean de Foix and Gaston IV count of Foix); cf. NA C 61/130/14. For more examples of cooperation: NA C 61/135/3, C 61/138/101.
[24] NA C 61/135/3; ADPA E 434 (August 1429 renewal of Montferrand-Foix alliance).

second Valois conquest, and Janicot de Lahet (1450), who was Jean de Foix's captain of Lamarque in at least 1450 and 1453.[25] It can be presumed that such men participated in Foix armies too, just as Jean de Luxembourg was given support and advice by 'men of the household' when he was on campaigns according to Monstrelet and Chastelain.[26]

In Jean de Luxembourg's case, many officeholders may likewise be found amongst the fifteen knights and twenty-four esquires who appear under his command in extant (and thus sadly exceptional) musters from a Lancastrian-financed campaign to Beaumont-en-Argonne in 1428.[27] Certainly, over a quarter of the nobles named in these musters are attested as fighting for Jean de Luxembourg on other occasions too, and one, Guillaume bastard of Wandonne, is explicitly described as a member of Jean's household in a passage of the *Chronique des Cordeliers* recounting how he and Antoine de Bournonville captured Joan of Arc whilst fighting for Jean in 1430.[28] Six or more individuals from the 1428 musters are also attested as captains or governors of towns in Jean's possession.[29] As exemplars here, let us look at the careers of the Picard knights Daviot de Poix seigneur de la Verrière and Jacques de Lievin seigneur de Lesquin. The first of these nobles oversaw Guise's surrender in 1424-5 and then acted as its governor from 1425 to c.1444.[30] Meanwhile, the second, who was seemingly knighted during the Portuguese crusade against Ceuta in 1415, served as the governor of Luxembourg-held Oisy from at least 1424 to 1431 and as governor of Luxembourg-held Bohain from at least 1431 to 1450. In addition, he deputised for Jean during the sieges of Guise

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[25] For Aylquand: ADPA E 434 (December 1426 sale by Jean de la Motte to Gaston de Foix). For Lavau: *ibid*.; BM Bordeaux MS 2805 F 4 (January 1436 marriage contract of Jean seigneur de La Lande and Bonne d'Anglade witnessed by Gaston de Foix, Lavau, and others); NA C 61/136/16; ADG 1 Mi 93-1-22, fs. 61, 84v. For Isle: *Variétés Bordelaises* n.e., v. 3, p. 231; *AHG*, v. 45 (1910), p. 522; AN JJ 182, no. 14; Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 3, p. 11. For Janicot (or Jean) de Lahet, who also captained Lamarque before it was fully in Foix control: Higounet, *La Tour,* pp. 162, 181-2; ADG 2 E 1234 (March 1442 act relating to nearby Cussac); NA C 61/135/19; ADG H 735, fs. 11-12v.

[26] See e.g. Chastelain, *Œuvres*, v. 2, p. 111; Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, p. 77.

[27] BNF Fr. 4484, fs. 77v-105v.

[28] For Guillaume bastard of Wandonne: BNF Fr. 23018 ('Chronique des Cordeliers'), f. 498; Schnerb, *Enguerrand de Bournonville*, pp. 211-2. Of the other captains, the careers of Daviot de Poix and Jacques de Lievin (appearing as Jacques Lievim) will be discussed below, whilst Raoul d'Ailly, Waleran de Bournonville, Ferry and Colard de Mailly, Jacotin de Cambert, Aubelet de Folleville, Bertrand de Manicamp, and Enguerrand de Griboval are all attested as fighting for Jean de Luxembourg on at least one further occasion in 1420-1431: Schnerb*, op. cit.,* pp. 196, 210-1; Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 3, p. 369; *ibid*., v. 4, pp. 173, 184, 290-1, 403, 431-2; AN JJ 172 no. 649.

[29] In addition to Daviot de Poix and Jacques de Lievin, Waleran de Bournonville, Ferry de Mailly and/or Colard de Mailly, Enguerrand de Griboval, and Jean de Moulins are all attested as captains of towns on Jean's behalf: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 4, p. 291; *ibid*., v. 5, pp. 19-21; BNF Fr. 4484, f. 160; Matton, *Histoire de Guise*, v. 1, p. 204; *Registre de délibérations du conseil de ville de Reims* (1422-1436), ed. S. Guilbert (Reims, 1993), p. 100. Robert de Saveuses also captained towns for Jean's older brother Pierre: Schnerb, *Les Saveuse*, pp. 133-4.

[30] For Daviot de Poix and the siege of Guise: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 4, p. 205. For appearances as governor of Guise in 1425, 1430, 1440, and 1442: *ibid*., v. 4, p. 230; *ibid*., v. 5, p. 416; *Inventaire sommaire des Archives départementales antérieures à 1790: Nord. Archives civiles, Série B*, v. 4, ed. M. le Chanoine Dehaisnes (Lille, 1881), p. 117; AN JJ 176, no. 244; Matton, *Histoire de Guise*, v. 1, pp. 247-8.

and Compiègne, witnessed his will in 1430, and accompanied him to Arras in 1435 alongside Daviot de Poix.[31] The sustained service of these two knights is indicative of how magnates like Jean de Luxembourg and the Foix cadets must have relied on delegation to – and assistance from – officeholding nobles in managing their resources, lands, and other administrative needs. One is also struck, though, by the long durations of the governorships held here. A possible inference would be that regionalised continuity in officeholding was advantageous in allowing figures like governors to build up sub-networks of their own, which in turn could help to entrench their masters' influence. Sub-networks of this sort might for instance have helped with quickly raising manpower and repelling raids in opposition to the Valois; and, in this context, it is interesting that chroniclers imply that the Guise garrison and Daviot de Poix supported Jean de Luxembourg in resisting incursions on multiple occasions.[32]

Backing from officeholders was also important in resistance to Charles VII because these deputies often showed loyalty to their patrons even when under intense pressure. This point can be inferred from the successful manner in which Jean de Luxembourg and the Foix cadets held the majority of their lands together for many years even as Valois power grew, although it is perhaps easiest to demonstrate with reference to evidence for officeholding under Jean de Luxembourg in the aftermath of the Treaty of Arras. In this period, Jean faced an increased threat from direct Valois attacks, but also from his supporters joining Burgundy in allegiance to Charles VII. The risks associated with the latter danger should not be underestimated, since a number of Jean's captains had long-standing ties to the ducal family of Burgundy, for instance as Daviot de Poix served as the Burgundian captain of Tournehem in the 1420s.[33] Furthermore, Philip the Good appears to have deliberately increased the pressure on loyalties to Jean de Luxembourg through installing the count of Étampes as governor of Picardy and marrying him to Jean's niece Jacqueline d'Ailly in 1434-5, and through later persuading Jean's nephew and heir Louis de Luxembourg count of Saint Pol to

[31] Jacques de Lievin appears as governor of Oisy in 1424 and 1430: *Letters and papers*, v. 2/1, p. 29; BNF Duchesne 82, f. 248v; as governor of Bohain and Oisy in 1431: BM Lille Godefroy 25, f. 25; and as governor of Bohain in 1439 and 1450: BM Lille Godefroy 26 ('Inventaire des archives de La Fère', c.1686, v. 2), f. 217; BNF Duchesne 80, f. 142. For his other service to Jean: *Letters and papers*, v. 2/1, p. 29; Lobanov, 'Military Cooperation', p. 405; BNF Duchesne 82, f. 248v; Jean Le Fèvre, *Chronique*, ed. F. Morand, v. 2 (Paris, 1881), p. 312; and see also: *Inventaire Sommaire: Nord*, v. 4, p. 98; AN JJ 173 no. 647. For Ceuta: Antoine de La Sale, *Le Reconfort de Madame de Fresne*, ed. I. Hill (Exeter, 1979), p. 27.

[32] Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 386, 416; 'Le Livre des trahisons de France', pp. 208-9.

[33] Daviot de Poix was a Burgundian écuyer and échanson when made captain of Tournehem in 1418, and he still held the captaincy in 1430: *Inventaire Sommaire: nord*, v. 4, p. 117; M. Depreter, *De Gavre à Nancy (1453-1477): L'artillerie Bourguignonne sur la voie de la "modernité"* (Turnhout, 2011), p. 16. Depreter also identifies him as the man who would become Philip the Good's *maître d'artillerie* in 1453.

subscribe to the Treaty of Arras.[34] Yet, crucially, Jean's network still proved highly resilient. Many longstanding deputies such as Daviot de Poix, Jacques de Lievin, and Lionel de Wandonne governor of Nesle and Beaulieu remained staunchly devoted to Jean's cause in opposition to Charles VII, whilst others perhaps continued to offer support more tacitly.[35] As cases in point, let us take Waleran de Moreuil and Guy de Roye. These two nobles appear in the count of Étampes' service in 1438 in spite of past records of officeholding under Jean de Luxembourg, and yet in the same year, they are also mentioned in a separate transaction as representatives of Jean's wife Jeanne de Béthune.[36] In turn, Jean de Luxembourg and his wife Jeanne probably prioritised offering protection and patronage to their officeholders in order to maintain these relationships. When Jean's governor of Ham Jacotin de Béthune was accused of attacking a troupe of Burgundian archers who were collecting taxes nearby in c.1439, Jean even preferred to risk Philip the Good's fury rather than surrender his subordinate.[37] This was no trivial decision, as Philip the Good had already been angered by Jean de Luxembourg's refusal to subscribe to the Treaty of Arras, and he subsequently went on to confiscate some of Jean's isolated lordships within his domains.[38] Regardless, Jean publicly defended Jacotin's conduct, perhaps in part to send a message to his other captains. He also argued in a *mémoire* to his friend Hue de Lannoy that Jacotin and his men's control of Ham and two neighbouring forts might allow them to resist any attempted arrest, or that they might leave these forts vulnerable to raiders if they attempted to flee. These contentions were given short shrift by Philip the Good when they were relayed to him, but, again, they hint at how Luxembourg (as well as Foix) power was fundamentally collaborative and dependent on support from deputies.[39]

Officeholders' importance within the magnates' support-bases would have been further strengthened by the fact that many of them had lateral bonds and agreements with one another. A detailed reconstruction here is again difficult for officeholders under the Foix cadets, but amongst

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[34] For Étampes' installation and marriage: Schnerb, *Les Saveuse,* p. 131. For Saint Pol and Burgundy: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, p. 311; C. Cagé, 'Louis de Luxembourg, Comte de Saint Pol, Connétable de France (1418-1475)', *Positions des Thèses Présentées par les Élèves de la Promotion 1876* (Paris, 1876), p. 31.
[35] For Wandonne's support after Arras: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, p. 456; for his earlier career, see also: *ibid*., v. 4, pp. 152, 182; BNF Duchesne 82, f. 248v.
[36] Monstrelet, *Chronique,* v. 5, p. 351; BM Lille Godefroy 28 ('Inventaire des archives de La Fère', c.1686, v. 4), f. 131. Guy de Roye continued to fight for and hold office under Jean de Luxembourg up to least 1436, although Waleran de Moreuil seems to have subscribed to the Treaty of Arras by 1437: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 270, 315. For the nobles' earlier careers, see also: *ibid*., v. 4, p. 403; *ibid*., v. 5, pp. 21, 76; Chastelain, *Livre IV,* p. 283; B. Schnerb, 'Guy, seigneur de Roye. Ung moult notable et vaillant chevalier', in A. Marchandisse & G. Docquier (eds.), *Autour de la Toison d'or. Ordres de chevalerie et confréries nobles aux XIVe-XVIe siècles* (Neuchâtel, 2019), pp. 49-52.
[37] Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 384-5, 391-9; BNF Fr. 1278, fs. 291-292v (printed in B. Lannoy, *Hugues de Lannoy, le bon seigneur de Santes* (Brussels, 1957), pp. 255-7); Berry, 'Les Luxembourg-Ligny', p. 334.
[38] Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 376-80, 393.
[39] BNF Fr. 1278, fs. 291-293.

Jean de Luxembourg's subordinates, we can for instance note that one finds brothers such as Ferry and Colard de Mailly and Lionel de Wandonne and Guillaume bastard of Wandonne.[40] Similarly, other regular captains such as Enguerrand de Griboval and Bertrand de Manicamp appear to have been close associates who fought together regularly in the company of Waleran de Bournonville, whilst Bertrand Schnerb has argued that Waleran's kinsman Antoine de Bournonville and Guillaume bastard of Wandonne may have been brothers-in-arms on the basis of the *Chronique des Cordeliers*.[41] Bonds of these types mattered because they would have meant that close subordinates of Jean de Luxembourg and the Foix cadets were also bound to others within the same, coherent network, meaning that they had all the more incentive to remain part of the wider whole in opposition to the Valois. Feelings of regional solidarity could, moreover, have acted as a further lateral tie here. It is typical for nobles from the 1428 *montres*, for instance, to be identifiable as coming from families with lands in areas of north-eastern France such as Picardy, Artois, Boulonnais, and Champagne; and, analogously, one often finds lords with lands in Gascony amongst the witnesses to Foix charters.[42] Of course, this does not mean that the magnates' networks could not draw in more itinerant individuals, and to give just one counterexample, we can note that a certain esquire from Nivernais, Miles de Bourbon, was pardoned by Charles VII for having served under Jean de Luxembourg against the Valois before returning south in c.1441.[43] Yet, what can still be said is that there was a strong coherence at the heart of the magnates' followings.

This coherence is once more in evidence if we turn to looking at a second, overlapping group of nobles who offered pivotal support to Jean de Luxembourg and the Foix cadets: their family members and kin. Gaston and Jean de Foix, characteristically, were aided by an array of cadet and illegitimate relatives. These included their Savoyard kinsman Pierre de Grailly, who served them in war, on naval voyages, and as an official representative, and Ramon-Arnaud de Béarn seigneur de Saint-Aubin-de-Médoc, who witnessed documents for or alongside Gaston de Foix in 1429, 1435, 1436, and 1439.[44] Amongst the family's recurrent charter witnesses, one likewise encounters Jean V

[40] For the Maillys: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 4, pp. 184, 403; *ibid*., v. 5, pp. 19-21; BNF Fr. 4484, fs. 83-83v, 93-94; A. Ledru, *Histoire de la maison de Mailly* (Paris, 1893), v. 1, pp. 276-289. For the Wandonnes, see nn. 28 & 35 above; Schnerb, *Enguerrand de Bournonville*, pp. 211-2.
[41] For Manicamp and Griboval: BNF Fr. 4484, fs. 97v-98v; BNF Fr. 23018 ('Chronique des Cordeliers'), fs. 498v, 506; Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 4, pp. 431-2. For Wandonne and Bournonville: Schnerb, *Enguerrand de Bournonville,* pp. 211-2.
[42] Cf. Berry, 'Les Luxembourg-Ligny', pp. 505-6, arguing that chronicle evidence suggests that Artois and the Somme valley were of particular importance for recruitment for Jean de Luxembourg.
[43] AN JJ 179 no. 48.
[44] For Pierre de Grailly: *AHG*, v. 56 (1925), p. 34 & n.; ADG H 735, fs. 11-12v; 'Gascon Rolls Project', https://www.gasconrolls.org/edition/calendars/C61_138/document.html (accessed 31/12/2023); *Variétés Bordelaises* n.e., v. 2, p. 184. For Ramon-Arnaud de Béarn: ADPA E 434 (August 1429 renewal of Montferrand-Foix alliance); *Variétés Bordelaises* n.e., v. 3, p. 231; BM Bordeaux MS 2805 F 4 (January 1436 marriage

seigneur de La Lande et la Brède, an eminent lord in Lancastrian Gascony who had married Gaston de Foix's daughter Jeanne in 1427.[45] Jean de la Lande and Jeanne's daughter Catherine would go on to wed Gaston seigneur de l'Isle, whom we have already met; and another notable witness to documents for Gaston de Foix, Jean seigneur d'Anglade, appears to have become united to the La Lande family as well through two marriages before 1453.[46] Against a backdrop of renewed war with the Valois, the lords of La Lande, Anglade, and Isle all appear together with Gaston de Foix in his town of Cadillac in August 1450 as witnesses to a marriage contract for his illegitimate daughter Jeanne de Béarn, which strengthens the sense that they should be regarded as a coherent familial sub-group within Gaston's wider network.[47]

Jean de Luxembourg, meanwhile, appears to have relied heavily on cadet relatives of his wife, Jeanne de Béthune, even whilst he had no surviving children in his own right, and few junior kinsmen apart from two 'bastards of Saint Pol'.[48] At least four nobles whom we have previously encountered in Luxembourg service – Jacotin de Béthune, Daviot de Poix, Guy de Roye, and Waleran de Moreuil – were linked to Jeanne de Béthune's family by blood or marriage. So too were at least two other nobles named in the 1428 *montres*, Raoul d'Ailly vidame d'Amiens and Jacques de Hans (for whom see family tree 3 below).[49] This suggests that extended families offered another vital constituency in attracting support for the magnates, as well as that marriages could have been used to reinforce existing ties. Even if kinship by no means guaranteed backing or shared allegiances, the prevalence of familial ties thus indicates that they provided another important vertical bond – as well as a lateral one – which strengthened the magnates' networks in opposition to the Valois.

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contract of Jean seigneur de La Lande and Bonne d'Anglade); NA C 61/135/3; Bériac-Lainé & Legrand, 'D'une fidélité à l'autre', pp. 33-4.

[45] For the Foix-La Lande marriage: BM Bordeaux MS 2805 F 3 (January 1427 contract between Jean de La Lande and Jeanne de Foix); M. Meaudre de Lapouyade, *La Maison de Bordeaux et les premiers Captaux de Buch* (Bordeaux, 1939), pp. 143-4. For documents witnessed by Jean V de La Lande: NA C 61/135/3; ADG G 2775 (April 1448 sale by Gaston de Foix captal de Buch); *AHG*, v. 45 (1910), p. 522.

[46] For the La Lande-Isle marriage: Meaudre de Lapouyade, *Maison de Bordeaux*, pp. 143-4; *Variétés Bordelaises* n.e., v. 3, p. 30; *ibid*., v. 1, p. 298. For the La Lande-Anglade marriages, Jean V seigneur de La Lande most likely remarried Jean d'Anglade's sister Bonne in 1436, before Jean d'Anglade himself married another member of the La Lande family named Jeanne: BM Bordeaux MS 2805 F 4 (January 1436 marriage contract of Jean seigneur de La Lande and Bonne d'Anglade); La Chesnaye-Desbois, *Dictionnaire de la Noblesse* 2.e., v. 1, pp. 279-80. For documents witnessed by Anglade: *AHG*, v. 45 (1910), p. 522; *Variétés Bordelaises* n.e., v. 2, p. 184.

[47] *AHG*, v. 45 (1910), p. 522.

[48] For Jean 'bastard of Saint Pol' seigneur de Haubourdin, see n. 59 below. For Louis 'bastard of Saint Pol' and his service to Jean de Luxembourg: AN JJ 180 no. 14.

[49] Family tree 3 follows Duchesne, *Maison de Béthune*, pp. 308, 321. 381-5. For Raoul d'Ailly, Jacques de Hans, and their backgrounds, see also: BNF Fr. 4484, fs. 95-96v; Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 4, p. 184; F.-I. Darsy, *Picquigny et ses seigneurs, vidames d'Amiens* (Abbeville, 1860), pp. 54-6; Anselme, *Histoire Généalogique de la maison royale*, 3.e., v. 2 (Paris, 1726), pp. 322-3; G. de Pouilly, *Notice historique sur Cornay et son ancien château* (Mézières, 1865), p. 23 & n. For Daviot de Poix's more obscure connection to the Béthune family: Anselme, *op. cit.,* v. 7 (Paris, 1733), p. 822; BM Lille Godefroy 25, f. 36.

Family tree 3 – selective family tree for Jeanne de Béthune and her wider kinship group:



At the same time, female family members also offered vital assistance to Jean de Luxembourg and Gaston and Jean de Foix. Such support is rarely mentioned in our sources, but we can observe that Jean de Foix's spouse Margaret Kerdeston travelled with him from France into exile in Iberia after the first Valois conquest and that she is attested in 1460 as deputising for Jean as lord of Maella in Aragon (which his father had purchased).[50] This hints that Margaret and her mother-in-law Marguerite d'Albret may similarly have played an important role in helping to manage supporters and lands in Gascony in partnership with, or on behalf of, the Foix cadets. Jeanne de Béthune may also have performed a still greater role alongside Jean de Luxembourg in north-eastern France. It is at least suggestive that Jean relied so heavily on members of his wife's family, in a connection that was reinforced after 1435, when Jeanne's daughter from her first marriage, Jeanne de Bar, married Louis de Luxembourg count of Saint Pol. Likewise, it is worth noting that Jean de Luxembourg and Jeanne de Béthune took the unusual step of writing a joint will in 1430, in what may be regarded as a statement of their unity as a political partnership.[51]

Further relatives of Foix cadets and Jean de Luxembourg often appear to have been much more distant from the heart of their networks. However, such kinsfolk could still offer valuable services as allies or informal contacts, including across jurisdictions. Gaston de Foix, for example, was formally allied to his older brother Jean count of Foix from 1414 and to his nephew Gaston IV count of Foix from 1436, in the latter case with Jean de Foix viscount of Castillon agreeing a separate alliance too.[52]

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[50] 'Expedientes Casa Ducal de Híjar: ES/AHPZ P/1-17-26', https://dara.aragon.es/opac/app/item/?dt=1461&vm=nv&df=1440&ob=re:1&q=foix&p=0&st=.2.6.100.522995.105.202491&i=203774 (accessed 31/12/2023). For the purchase of Maella, see below n. 101.
[51] Marchandisse & Schnerb, 'Le testament de Jean III de Luxembourg et de Jeanne de Béthune', esp. p. 292; Duchesne 82, fs. 241-249 (also printed with amendments in Marchandisse & Schnerb, *op. cit*., pp. 305-9).
[52] ADPA E 438 (August 1436 alliance between Gaston de Foix captal de Buch and Gaston IV count of Foix, August 1436 alliance between Jean de Foix viscount of Castillon and Gaston IV count of Foix); Flourac, *Jean Ier*, pp. 224-6. For the backdrop of the Foix-Armagnac feud, see too: Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 170-2.

These alliances did not prevent the counts of Foix from freely serving the Valois, and they were instead directed primarily against the Armagnac family. Nevertheless, they may have been helpful in allowing Gaston to persuade his brother briefly to subscribe to the Treaty of Troyes after 1422, and in the obtention of other political favours. Even as late as 1451, when Gaston decided to arrange a surrender agreement with Charles VII rather than risk an annihilating defeat, it is telling that he approached his nephew to act as a broker.[53] Similarly, a familial connection to the Valois-supporting Jacques seigneur de Pons proved valuable to the Foix cadets. Jacques de Pons was the leading lord in Saintonge, but he married Gaston's daughter Isabelle in c.1428 following the agreement of a truce, and in 1443, he then was accused by Charles VII of leaking intelligence regarding a pro-Valois plot to take Blaye.[54] It is highly probable that he had in fact tipped off his kinsmen, given that Jean de Foix prevented Blaye from falling into Valois hands by seizing it for himself.[55] Jacques would subsequently be banished from France in circumstances that will be discussed further in Chapter 4 of the thesis, although he still managed to sell artillery to Gaston de Foix in 1449/50.[56]

Jean de Luxembourg for his part maintained regular contacts with his older brothers Pierre de Luxembourg count of Saint-Pol (d. 1433) and Louis de Luxembourg chancellor of Lancastrian France (d. 1443).[57] He received support from his nephew and heir Louis de Luxembourg count of Saint Pol as well, including against raiders in Valois allegiance even in 1440.[58] What is more, in the years after the Treaty of Arras, other family members in Burgundian allegiance also helped to mediate between Jean de Luxembourg and Philip the Good. Amidst high tensions in c.1439 following Jacotin de Béthune's attack on Burgundian archers, Jean initially asked his ally Hue de Lannoy seigneur de Saintes and the more obscure Jean de Griboval to represent him at the Burgundian court. However, when they in turn secured support from a handful of other courtiers, these included Jean de Melun seigneur d'Antoing (Jean de Luxembourg's former brother-in-law), Jean V seigneur de Créquy (a relative of Jeanne de Béthune who also represented Jean de Luxembourg in chapters of the Golden Fleece), and Jean bastard of Saint-Pol seigneur de Haubourdin (Jean de Luxembourg's cousin, who had previously

[53] For Foix brokerage in the agreement of 1451: Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 1, pp. 337-8. For negotiations surrounding Foix allegiance after Troyes: Flourac, *Jean Ier*, pp. 83-6; NA C 61/119/10, 35.
[54] For the truce and Foix-Pons marriage: NA C 61/122/3; 'Chartrier de Pons II', ed. G. Musset, *AHS*, v. 21 (1892), pp. 242-4, 246-8, 265-6; Vale, *English Gascony*, p. 197. For the accusation of leaked intelligence: BNF Fr. 28812 'Pons', no. 13; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, p. 245.
[55] NA C 61/134/23; *Proceedings and ordinances,* v. 5, pp. 291-2; A. Dalloz, *Jurisprudence générale du royaume*, v. 11 (Paris, 1835), pp. 91-2.
[56] *Variétés Bordelaises* n.e., v. 1, p. 190.
[57] See e.g. *Ville d'Amiens: Inventaire sommaire des archives communales antérieures a 1790*, ed. G. Durand (Amiens, 1901), v. 4, pp. 106, 132; Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 209-10.
[58] *Ibid*., pp. 79, 424.

fought with him and Jean de Melun at Guise).[59] Together, this group managed to persuade Isabella duchess of Burgundy to establish a diplomatic backchannel for further negotiations, which helped to avert a decisive break with Burgundy. For all that Philip the Good confiscated Jean's lordships within his domains, crucially, the duke did not attempt to carve up his lands in alliance with Charles VII, as Charles the Bold and Louis XI would later do to the count of Saint Pol in 1475. Nor did the duke cut ties with Jean or expel him from the Order of the Golden Fleece, meaning that he remained potentially under Burgundian protection.[60] The behaviour of Jean's kinsmen thus encapsulates how political support from family members could be vital even in the tenability of opposition against Charles VII.

A third group of nobles who offered Jean de Luxembourg and the Foix cadets substantial backing in resisting the Valois was their noble vassals. A plethora of 'lesser' landowners can be presumed to have given homage to the magnates and concurrently sworn to aid them against 'all men in the world' except for their overlord – as the esquire Jean de Labatut pledged to Gaston de Foix in 1423.[61] In certain cases, though, noble vassals of the Foix cadets and Jean de Luxembourg also appear more prominently within their networks or overlap with the kinds of other subordinates already discussed. Gaston seigneur de l'Isle, for example, was the heir of Tristan seigneur de l'Isle, who did homage to Gaston de Foix for possessions at Castelnau in the early 1420s alongside acting as a charter witness for him.[62] In addition, the Foix cadets secured homage from two other established supporters, Bernat de Lamensans and Pierre de Grailly, through respectively granting them the lordships of Auros in Bazadais (1439) and Saint-Genès in Médoc (1446).[63] At some point before 1441, Jean de Luxembourg comparably granted the key fortress of Chavignon (between Soissons and Laon) to his supporter Guy de Béthune, who was yet another relative of Jeanne de Béthune and the brother of Jacotin.[64] In such cases, purposefully entrusting lands to favoured nobles might again have proved

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[59] For the 1439 negotiations: BNF Fr. 1278, f. 293 (printed in Lannoy, *Hugues de Lannoy,* pp. 258-60). For the nobles' ties to Jean de Luxembourg, see family trees 1 & 3, and: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 4, p. 184; Lobanov, 'Anglo-Burgundian cooperation', p. 366; *Die Protokollbücher des Ordens vom Goldenen Vlies,* ed. S. Dünnebeil (Stuttgart, 2002), v. 1, pp. 30, 36, 42, 82; Duchesne, *Maison de Béthune*, preuves, p. 246.

[60] For the outcome of negotiations: BNF Fr. 1278, f. 293; Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 396-9. For ambiguities in Philip the Good's relationship with Jean de Luxembourg, cf. also: M. Sommé, 'Les délégations de pouvoir a la duchesse de Bourgogne Isabelle de Portugal au milieu du XVe siecle', *Actes des congrès de la Société des historiens médiévistes de l'enseignement supérieur public*, v. 23 (1992), p. 295; Berry, 'Les Luxembourg-Ligny', pp. 600-1. For Saint Pol's downfall in 1475: D. Potter, *War and Government in the French Provinces: Picardy, 1470-1560* (Cambridge, 1993), p. 36.

[61] ADG 2 E 1234 (April 1423 homage of Jean de Labatut to Gaston de Foix, 'contra totz homes deu monde').

[62] ADG 1 E 17, 'Inventaire des titres (1703)', fs. 11v-12. For Tristan de l'Isle as a witness: ADG 1 E 17 (February 1423 reconnaissance of Jean de la Fite for Gaston de Foix); ADPA E 434 (December 1426 sale of Jean de la Motte to Gaston de Foix captal de Buch).

[63] For Auros: NA C 61/135/3. For Saint-Genès: *AHG*, v. 56 (1925), p. 34 & n.

[64] BM Lille Godefroy 27 ('Inventaire des archives de La Fère', c.1686, v. 3), fs. 170v-72, 177v-179.

helpful for strengthening the magnates' control over frontier regions and for raising manpower rapidly. When Jean de Luxembourg called on adherents such as Guy de Béthune to defeat a Valois raiding party in 1440, or when Gaston de Foix raised troops to defend Chalais in c.1450, the ability to gather forces locally and quickly would naturally have been of the essence.[65] However, more broadly, the above examples might also be interpreted as offering a glimpse into how land – like officeholding – could act as an anchor for relationships between magnates and other individuals in their networks, in opposition to the Valois and beyond.

Amongst the nobility, Jean de Luxembourg and the Foix cadets may finally have received further backing from other allies and paid supporters. It is possible, for example, that the magnates employed formal alliances akin to those used by the counts of Foix and analysed by Peter Lewis.[66] Such documents seldom survive, but it is worth noting that when Bertran seigneur de Montferrand renewed an alliance in 1428-9 between his family and the house of Foix-Béarn, he swore to uphold this agreement to both Jean I count of Foix and Gaston de Foix captal de Buch.[67] In addition, further Gascon lords such as Guicharnaud viscount of Hureaux, Jean Dax seigneur de Brutailhes, and François seigneur de Gramont and his kinsman Gracian mention prior obligations to Gaston in other extant alliances.[68] There could be a number of reasons for this, but it is at least conceivable that some of these nobles might have previously made written alliances with Gaston in which they offered him military service. Analogously, Jean de Luxembourg appears to have searched for allies in the areas around his lands as well, including within the Holy Roman Empire. As count of Ligny-en-Barrois, it is for instance striking that he was temporarily granted the town of Hattonchâtel in 1438 in return for helping Guillaume Fillâtre bishop of Verdun to resist attacks from his enemies.[69] This indicates that this imperial bishop and landowner had made a formal arrangement with Jean, and this type of agreement could have been especially valuable at a time when Jean's opposition to Charles VII had left him more vulnerable to attacks within France.

The case of the bishop of Verdun, though, also indicates that it was not only secular nobles who could work with the magnates in opposition to the Valois and be drawn into their networks. Clergymen too could be active in their support, and in this context, it is worth noting that the Jean

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[65] For 1440: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 416-7. For Chalais: 'Registres des comptes du consulat de Périgueux: archives municipales E dep. 5021 Série CC, transcrits de l'occitan par Jean Roux: CC 84', http://www.guyenne.fr/Site_Perigord_Occitan/Paleographie/AM%20Px%20Comptes/AM%20Px%20CC%2084%20tr.htm (accessed 31/12/23); AN JJ 185 no. 184.
[66] See Lewis, 'Decayed and non-Feudalism', pp. 157-84.
[67] ADPA E 434 (August 1429 renewal of Montferrand-Foix alliance).
[68] ADPA E 322 (October 1438 alliance between Jean Dax and Gaston IV count of Foix), E 435 (January 1432 alliance between Jean Dax and Jean I count of Foix), E 438 (October 1438 alliance between Guicharnaud vicomte de Hureaux and Gaston IV count of Foix); Jaurgain & Ritter, *Maison de Gramont*, p. 72.
[69] BM Lille Godefroy 25, fs. 10v-11.

de Griboval who aided Jean de Luxembourg in 1439 may be identifiable as a canon of Cambrai, in addition to being a relation of the Enguerrand de Griboval who had earlier fought for the count of Guise and died in his service.[70] There is likewise still more evidence that townspeople provided political assistance and military manpower to both Jean de Luxembourg and the Foix cadets. For a start, large towns in the vicinity of the noblemen's powerbases at times offered them backing during campaigns. Some of the latest medieval registers from Bordeaux thus show that the ruling *jurade* of this town loaned Gaston de Foix three cannons for a siege of Montguyon in 1422.[71] Relations between the two parties are later known to have deteriorated into a feud that required settlement in 1447, but even then there were probably nuances to the relationship, since Gaston was still a landowner and perhaps honorary burgess in Bordeaux as lord of the house of Puy Paulin.[72] Meanwhile, in the more widely urbanised north-east, the municipal council of Amiens aided Jean de Luxembourg with a troop of crossbowmen when he campaigned in the region in 1433, as well as offering him financial support at this time in conjunction with Abbeville.[73] Comparably, the town council of Laon dispatched contingents to Jean on multiple occasions up to 1429, including by sending him sixteen crossbowmen, sixteen shield-bearing soldiers, a surgeon, craftsmen, and wagons of victuals to support a siege at nearby Dercy in 1423.[74] Assistance was even provided by the council of Laon for assaults by Jean on Beaumont-en-Argonne, Mouzon, and Raucourt in 1428 despite these places lying over seventy miles away from their town.[75] Lancastrian success and the destruction of Valois forts may still have been viewed enthusiastically by many townspeople in this period, but the council of Laon's zeal here was perhaps extreme due to hopes of securing tax remission from Jean's brother Louis de Luxembourg chancellor of Lancastrian France, to whom they had also tried sending a bribe of fine cheeses.[76] The elite of Laon subsequently gave up and changed allegiances in 1429. They were followed seven years later by the townspeople of Paris, where Jean

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[70] For the canon: C. Douxchamps-Lefèvre, 'Jean de Griboval, doyen du chapitre de Thérouanne, ou le train de vie d'un haut dignitaire ecclésiastique à l'époque bourguignonne' in J.-M. Cauchies (ed.), *Images et représentations princières et nobiliaires dans les Pays-Bas bourguignons et quelques régions voisines (XIVe-XVIe s.)* (Neuchâtel, 1997), p. 231. For Enguerrand and Luxembourg links to Cambrai, see nn. 3 & 41 above.
[71] *Registres de la Jurade: 1414 à 1422*, p. 602.
[72] For feuding: NA C 61/135/42; *AHG*, v. 16 (1878), pp. 359-63; *Variétés Bordelaises* n.e., v. 2, pp. 179-84. For Puy Paulin: NA C 61/91/50, C 61/132/88; ADG 2 E 1234 (April 1423 homage of Jean de Labatut to Gaston de Foix captal de Buch/seigneur de Puy Paulin); ADG G 2775 (April 1448 sale by Gaston de Foix captal de Buch made at Puy Paulin); L. Drouyn, 'Plan de Bordeaux vers 1450', https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b53030004x/f1.item.zoom (accessed 31/12/2023).
[73] *Ville d'Amiens: Inventaire sommaire*, v. 2, p. 51; *ibid*., v. 4, p. 134; *Ville d'Abbeville: Inventaire sommaire des archives municipales antérieures à 1790*, ed. M. Alcius Ledieu (Abbeville, 1902), p. 67.
[74] Matton, *Histoire de Guise*, v. 1, pp. 204-5, 208-9; *Ville de Laon: Inventaire sommaire des archives communales antérieures à 1790*, ed. A. Matton & V. Dessein (Laon, 1885), 'série CC', pp. 2-3.
[75] The council of Laon at a minimum contributed a subsidy and sent envoys to Reims to ask for further support for Jean de Luxembourg: *Laon: Inventaire sommaire*, p. 3; *Registre de Reims*, pp. 101, 105.
[76] Matton, *Histoire de Guise*, v. 1, pp. 218-9; *Laon: Inventaire sommaire*, pp. 2-3.

de Luxembourg had owned property and from where he was also able to borrow artillery for the 1428 expedition.[77]

More consistent support came from townspeople whom the Foix cadets and Jean de Luxembourg counted as their direct subjects. The accounts of the Foix town of Cadillac notably reveal that this urban centre dispatched small contingents of troops to Gaston de Foix on a regular basis, as well as offering him presents such as a Christmas yule log even amidst moments of tension. Characteristically, a contingent with siege engines appears to have been sent from Cadillac to a siege of Tonneins in 1437/8, whilst in 1440/1 eight men participated in a campaign on Gaston's orders and six were sent to a siege of Casteljaloux (again in Lancastrian Gascony's eastern borderlands).[78] Additionally, small numbers of troops were dispatched on several occasions to reinforce the town of Bazas in 1441-2 where Gaston was captain.[79] There is every reason to suppose that this type of support would have been replicated elsewhere, and Monstrelet indeed notes that Jean de Luxembourg's backers in Soissons played a decisive role in his recovery of this town in 1430 after it was briefly taken by Valois forces.[80] Monstrelet's description of this incident could moreover hint that in towns where the magnates held strong sway, they sought to form especially close ties with influential individuals. In this context, it is noteworthy that when the mayor of the Picard town of Chauny-sur-Oise, Jean de Longueval, was involved in a Parlement case in the mid-1440s, he was accused of having previously been Jean de Luxembourg's great 'ally and friend', of having loaned him a bombard from the town, and of having remained in close contact with him and his men with the intention of betraying the town to them after Arras.[81] Of course, these allegations could be an untrue political smear, but what is significant is that it was regarded as plausible that Jean de Luxembourg could have had close contacts in another town which he controlled into the 1430s.

All in all, it is patent that participation and agency in pro-Lancastrian opposition thus extended far beyond the English, beyond great princes such as Burgundy, and even beyond magnates such as Jean de Luxembourg and the Foix cadets. Both before and after the Treaty of Arras, Jean de Luxembourg and Gaston and Jean de Foix were able to resist Charles VII over a period of years in large part because they acted in conjunction with broader networks of subordinates and allies. Within these

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[77] For Jean's property: AN JJ 172 no. 41 (printed in *Paris pendant la domination anglaise*, ed. A. Longnon (Paris, 1878), pp. 32-3). For artillery in 1428: BNF Fr. 4484, f. 168; A. Lapierre, 'La guerre de Cent Ans dans l'Argonne et le Rethelois', *Revue d'Ardenne et d'Argonne*, v. 7 (1899), p. 62.
[78] For the military support: ADG 1 Mi 93-1-22, fs. 19, 37, 38v. For gift-giving: *ibid*., fs. 91, 97. For tensions: *ibid*., f. 64v.
[79] *Ibid*., fs. 31, 37v-39, 49-49v.
[80] Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 4, p. 396.
[81] AN X 2a 24, fs. 11-11v. For earlier relations between Jean de Luxembourg and the townspeople of Chauny, see also: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 19-21.

networks, a range of interconnected nobles offered pivotal support, with ties of officeholding, kinship, land, and to a lesser extent alliance all important as a basis for relationships. Simultaneously, the nobles within the networks had a variety of interconnections with each other, meaning that they formed part of strong and cohesive structures, within which churchmen and townspeople could also be included. Just as John Armstrong has suggested that 'Burgundian power was something of a syndicate in which people took stakes so as to share in the fortunes of the house', so too did a range of actors 'take stakes' in the power of Jean de Luxembourg and the Foix cadets in opposition to the Valois – or otherwise collaborate with them.[82] However, this still does not fully explain why the networks proved so persistent in supporting the Lancastrian monarchy, and nor does it help us to understand the circumstances in which resistance was eventually overcome by the Valois. We will look next at the latter issue, before returning to the former.

iii) Noble networks and the end of Lancastrian resistance

Charles VII's eventual victory over the networks of Jean de Luxembourg and the Foix cadets can to some extent be explained in terms of his increasing political and military influence. When coupled with growing weaknesses in the Lancastrian position, Valois strength ultimately allowed Charles VII's armies to overwhelm the magnates' territories or otherwise to force settlements to be reached. Jean de Luxembourg died in January 1441 before a large-scale attack on his lands could be launched, but his heir Louis de Luxembourg count of Saint Pol was immediately in difficulties. The key town of Coucy defected back to the duke of Orléans, whilst the townspeople of Nesle and Beaulieu revolted and expelled their Luxembourg garrisons.[83] Charles VII and his government then quickly pounced. An army was dispatched against the count of Saint Pol in early 1441 on the grounds that some of his men had attacked a royal baggage train, but also in order to make him swear homage for his lands in France. The Luxembourg fortress of Ribemont was seized and Marle besieged, before Saint Pol and his mother-in-law Jeanne de Béthune opted to negotiate terms with Charles VII at Laon.[84] A little over ten years later, Gaston de Foix too had limited alternatives to brokering a peace treaty and making terms in summer 1451.[85] Charles VII's forces were at this time pouring into Gascony without

[82] Armstrong, 'The golden age of Burgundy', p. 60.
[83] Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 455-6.
[84] For the campaign and initial settlement of 1441: *ibid.*, pp. 462-9; and see also: Matton, *Histoire de Guise*, v. 1, esp. pp. 241-2; Berry, 'Les Luxembourg-Ligny', pp. 416-7.
[85] For negotiations for a general surrender: Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 1, pp. 337-9. For the specific treaty reached between Gaston and Charles VII: E. d'Auriac, *La reddition de Bordeaux sous Charles VII* (Paris, 1864), pp. 20-4; cf. also Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 2, pp. 292-8.

reinforcements forthcoming from England, and a number of Foix possessions had already been seized or besieged, including Montguyon, Chalais, and Castillon-sur-Dordogne.[86]

With all of this being acknowledged, though, it remains important to emphasise that the initial settlements that the Foix cadets and Luxembourgs reached with Charles VII were by no means one-sided. The families still worked to win compromises or secure terms which suited their wishes, even whilst the nature and outcomes of their agreements differed significantly. It is hence worth analysing both agreements with the Valois, and, more importantly, their political consequences and aftermath. In what follows, we will argue that the events that ensued from the respective agreements of 1441 and 1451 reveal that magnate-led networks continued to exert significant influence as Lancastrian resistance came to an end, albeit in divergent ways in the different case studies.

In the case of the Luxembourgs, the count of Saint Pol initially agreed to recognise Charles VII's authority as king, alongside conceding that the fate of Jean de Luxembourg's former territories would be placed in the hands of the Parisian Parlement.[87] A further accommodation was reached in 1444 whereby Saint Pol was allowed to keep the majority of the lands, with the key exceptions of the county of Guise and lordship of Le Nouvion, which he was forced to cede to René of Anjou's brother, Charles count of Maine. At the king's instigation, however, even these territories were yielded as part of a marriage alliance between the count of Maine and Saint Pol's sister Isabelle.[88] This marriage provided Saint Pol, whose own wedding to Jeanne de Bar in 1435 had not been attended by a single Valois prince, with immediate access to the inner circle of Charles VII's court; and the count of Maine quickly helped to broker another marriage alliance between Saint Pol's sister Catherine and the Valois constable Arthur de Richemont in 1445.[89] Just as crucially, Charles VII allowed the Luxembourgs to keep their network of supporters and allies intact. In Autumn 1441, the Valois monarch issued a blanket pardon to Jean de Luxembourg's former supporters at Jeanne de Béthune's instigation, and this enabled the Luxembourgs to continue to rely on and reward their traditional partisans.[90] Committed backers of Jean de Luxembourg such as Daviot de Poix, Jacques de

[86] Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 2, pp. 243, 250, 267, 282-3; Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 1, p. 336; Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, pp. 360-5.
[87] Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 466-7; Matton, *Histoire de Guise*, v. 1, pp. 240-1.
[88] AN X 1a 8605, fs. 99v-101v (these letters detailing the 1444 agreement are also printed in G. Duboscq, 'Le mariage de Charles d'Anjou comte du Maine et le comté de Guise (1431-73)', *BEC* 96 (1935), pp. 356-61). Another clause for the county of Ligny to be given to Maine was never enforced: Duboscq, *op. cit.,* p. 348; Matton, *Histoire de Guise*, v. 1, p. 245. Charles VII had already permitted Jeanne de Béthune to inherit her late husband's movable goods in September 1441, but the county of Guise and lordship of Le Nouvion were excluded: Duchesne, *Maison de Béthune*, 'preuves', pp. 233-5.
[89] For 1435: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, p. 131. For 1445: BM Lille Godefroy 26, fs. 105-106.
[90] BNF Duchesne 120, fs. 56-56v (printed in Duchesne, *Maison de Béthune*, 'preuves', pp. 235-6).

Lievin, and Lionel de Wandonne thus continue to appear as officeholders under Saint Pol, albeit joined in his affinity by some new men like Colard de Moy (whose father was apparently killed fighting against Jean de Luxembourg's forces in 1433).[91] Another of Jean's key subordinates, Guy de Béthune, would similarly go on to serve as Saint Pol's standard-bearer at Ghent in 1452, and he also kept hold of his acquisition of Chavignon after a brief setback in 1441.[92] This is probably a sign that in most of the Luxembourg lands, there was no large-scale change in land ownership of the kind that was seen in regions such as Normandy after 1449.[93] Yet others of Jean de Luxembourg's supporters benefited from continued patronage from his widow Jeanne de Béthune, who for instance brokered a marriage alliance in 1449 between Guy de Roye and Jeanne de Mailly, whose father Ferry was again an adherent of Jean de Luxembourg whom we have met previously.[94]

All of this suggests that Charles VII was prepared to leave the Luxembourgs' powerbase untouched in many parts of the north-east once the count of Saint Pol had reached a settlement with him. The Valois monarch and his advisers may in part have calculated that it was more desirable to try to win Saint Pol over than to drive him into the arms of the duke of Burgundy, and, in this context, it is notable that the count took a pro-Valois stance on a number of subsequent occasions. He remarkably refused to join the Burgundian Order of the Golden Fleece in 1445 and offered a public assertion of Valois sovereignty during the Feast of the Pheasant in 1454.[95] However, Charles VII and his government may also have figured that whereas it would have been difficult to break up Luxembourg networks in the north-east, they could be used to their advantage against the Lancastrians. Charles VII was able to expect support from Saint Pol and his network whilst on campaign, and he explicitly delayed granting the 1441 letters of pardon until many of Jean de Luxembourg's former supporters had joined Saint Pol at the siege of Pontoise.[96] Saint Pol would go on to lead similar contingents to Normandy in 1443 and 1449-50 and to Gascony in 1453, and according to chroniclers such as Monstrelet and Mathieu d'Escouchy, erstwhile followers of Jean de

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[91] For Jean de Luxembourg's officeholders, see nn. 30-31 & 35 above, and for Wandonne's later service as governor of Vendeuil for Saint Pol in 1451/2: *Inventaire sommaire des Archives départementales antérieures à 1790: Aisne,* ed. A. Matton (Laon, 1878), v. 2, 'Série E', p. 94. For Moy: R. Rodière & E. Vallée, *La maison de Moy* (Le Mans, 1928), pp. 39-41; Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 1, p. 189; Potter, *War and Government*, p. 34.
[92] La Marche, *Mémoires,* v. 2, p. 262; BM Lille Godefroy 27, fs. 171-171v, Godefroy 25, fs. 164-164v.
[93] For Normandy, see e.g. Prosser, 'After the Reduction', pp. 30-33, 58-59.
[94] Duchesne, *Maison de Béthune*, 'preuves', p. 279. Ferry de Mailly was also prominent in the service of Saint Pol and his wife Jeanne de Bar: BM Lille Godefroy 25, fs. 34v-36v, Godefroy 26, fs. 105-106, Godefroy 27, fs. 160-160v; Berry, 'Les Luxembourg-Ligny', p. 72; Anselme, *Histoire Généalogique* 3.e., v. 8, p. 654.
[95] See *Die Protokollbücher des Ordens*, v. 1, pp. 93-4; Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 2, p. 165; D. Soumillion, *Le procès de Louis de Luxembourg, comte de Saint Pol, connétable de France (1418-1475)* (Enghien, 2008), p. 52; Berry, 'Les Luxembourg-Ligny', p. 428. Cf. also M. Boone, 'Diplomatie et Violence d'Etat. La sentence rendue par les ambassadeurs et conseillers du roi de France, Charles VII, concernant le conflit entre Philippe le Bon, duc de Bourgogne, et Gand en 1452', *Bulletin de la Commission royale d'Histoire* (1990), v. 156, pp. 15-16.
[96] BNF Duchesne 120, fs. 56-56v.

Luxembourg such as Daviot de Poix and Ferry de Mailly again featured repeatedly in these armies.[97] To give one more individual example, Georges de Croix can be identified as Jean de Luxembourg's co-captain of Montaigu in 1430 and held Marle against Valois forces for Saint Pol in early 1441, but he then seems to have joined all four campaigns from 1441-1453. He would be knighted at Dieppe in 1443 alongside Saint Pol, Jacotin de Béthune, and Antoine de Bournonville, before going on to play a leading role in the capture of Gournay in 1449, and then dying in the 'conquest of Guyenne'.[98] Evidently, Charles VII thus managed to co-opt Luxembourg networks for his own purposes, rather than trying to overturn them.

By contrast, the Valois monarch was not successful in reaching a stable settlement with the Foix cadets. Charles VII may well have hoped that Gaston and Jean de Foix would transfer their allegiances to him, and he even pledged that he would grant Jean de Foix an annuity of 2,000 *livres tournois* as compensation for the English lands which he would have lost in doing so.[99] However, whilst many of the family's subordinates such as Jean V de La Lande and Jean d'Anglade did agree to swear fealty to the Valois king in return for royal pensions and the retention of their lordships, the Foix cadets themselves stubbornly refused.[100] They instead decided to enter into exile and purchased the lordship of Maella in Aragon (having presumably decided to stay away from England following the murder of their in-law William de la Pole in 1450).[101] Before departing Gascony, they agreed with Charles VII that Jean de Foix's infant son would remain in the tutelage of the count of Foix and have the right to much of the family's inheritance, but this compromise may have been insufficient to avoid tensions in their lands.[102] Charles VII refused the captal de Buch's request for all of his captains to retain their offices, and the Foix cadets were also forced to raise money by selling

[97] See e.g. Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 6, p. 8; Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 1, p. 188; for a detailed narrative of Luxembourg involvement in campaigns under Charles VII, see also: Berry, 'Les Luxembourg-Ligny', pp. 417-28.
[98] For fighting against the Lancastrians: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 6, pp. 8, 80; Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 1, pp. 189, 194; AN JJ 198 no. 244. For earlier fighting against the Valois: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 4, pp. 380, 399; *ibid*., v. 5, pp. 464-5.
[99] D'Auriac, *La reddition de Bordeaux,* p. 23; Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 2, p. 297.
[100] AN JJ 198 no. 292 (February 1462 abolition for Jean d'Anglade, a copy of which is printed in *AHG*, v. 6 (1864), pp. 107-111); AN JJ 199 no. 170 (July 1463 abolition for Jean VI de la Lande son of Jean V and Jeanne de Foix, an earlier version of which is printed in *Variétés Bordelaises* n.e., v. 2, pp. 413-6); Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 5, p. 262 & n.
[101] For the purchase of Maella: NA C 61/138/101; 'Expedientes Casa Ducal de Híjar: ES/AHPZ P/1-17-27', https://dara.aragon.es/opac/app/item/doma?dt=1485&vm=nv&df=1400&ob=re:1&q=foix&p=0&i=203775 (accessed 31/12/2023); C. Corbero, 'Coerción y Consenso: un levantamiento antiseñorial aragonés, Maella, 1436-1444', *Scripta: estudios en homenaje a Elida García García* (Oviedo, 1998), v. 1, p. 315. For the context of events in England: Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 133-4; B. Wolffe, *Henry VI*, n.e. (London, 2001), pp. 228-9. Gaston had also earlier had correspondence with the Aragonese royal family as rulers of Navarre: *Archivo General de Navarra. Catalogo de la seccion de comptos*, ed. J. Castro, (Pamplona, 1952-74), v. 42, p. 67; *ibid*., v. 45, p. 81.
[102] D'Auriac, *La reddition de Bordeaux*, pp. 21-2; Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 2, pp. 294-5.

many of their territories to the counts of Foix and Dunois.[103] At Castelnau, there is some evidence that the rule of these new lords may have been disliked, since in 1452 the townspeople had to be forced by royal decree to obey an order to undertake watch duties in the castle.[104] More importantly still, Gaston and Jean's decision to remain in Lancastrian allegiance in itself kept the door open for them to try to regain their lands through English support and through rallying their former partisans, as was to happen in 1452-3.

The centrality of the Foix cadets and their network to the Gascon revolt and campaigns of 1452-3 has not hitherto been appreciated.[105] This historiographical oversight may in part be because the elderly Gaston de Foix appears to have resigned his powers to his son whilst never leaving exile in Aragon.[106] It may equally stem from the fact that pro-Valois chroniclers pay far less attention to the family than to figures such as Pierre de Montferrand soudic de la Trau, who had sworn oaths to Charles VII and who could hence be criticised for acting in a supposedly 'judas'-like manner.[107] In reality, though, the Foix cadets and their network were integral to every stage of the Gascon revolt and campaigns of 1452-3. The ensuing paragraphs will attempt to substantiate this contention in detail, in order again to highlight how durable the power of networks could be and just how damaging it was for Charles VII that he was not able to win over the loyalties of Gaston and Jean de Foix.

Before the start of the Gascon rebellion and restoration of Lancastrian rule, a confirmation of rights in the Gascon rolls shows that Gaston and Jean lobbied the English to reinvade in July 1452. Their request may well have been influential in persuading the English to target Gascony rather than Normandy, and it appears that it was conveyed to England by supporters of the family.[108] It is noteworthy that on the same day that Henry VI's government acknowledged the family's support for a reconquest, two Gascon esquires were given grants of their own.[109] These esquires, Louis de

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[103] The Foix cadets asked to be able to nominate all officers under Jean de Foix's infant son as per the clause printed in Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 2, p. 295, but Charles VII insisted in the final treaty that captains would have to be chosen by the count of Foix: d'Auriac, *La reddition de Bordeaux*, pp. 16-8, 22. For the sale of lands: Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 2, pp. 298-9 & n.; Courteault, *Gaston IV,* pp. 154-5, 219, 249-50.
[104] ADG 1 E 17, 'Inventaire des titres' (1703), fs. 31-31v.
[105] There has at best been acknowledgement that the Foix cadets provided support to the revolt/reconquest, e.g. by L. Drouyn, *La Guienne militaire: histoire et description des villes fortifiées, forteresses et châteaux* (Paris, 1865), v. 2, pp. 91-3; Sumption, *Triumph and Illusion*, pp. 737-40. Otherwise, agency has been attributed largely to the English and a handful of less powerful conspirators, as seen in e.g. Vale, 'The last years of English Gascony', pp. 119-38; Pollard, *John Talbot*, pp. 135-8; Harris, *Valois Guyenne*, p. 6; Harriss, *Shaping the Nation*, p. 584.
[106] ADG 1 Mi 93-1-22, f. 113.
[107] See e.g. Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 2, p. 331; Leseur, *Histoire de Gaston IV*, pp. 3-4. For the problematic nature of contemporary accounts of the genesis of the revolt, cf. Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 142-3.
[108] NA C 61/138/101; and for the evolution of English plans: Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 141-2.
[109] NA C 61/138/101, 103, 109.

Bruthails and Jean de Castandet, are explicitly described as 'servants' of Gaston de Foix, meaning that they were probably members of Gaston's household who had travelled to England specifically to represent the family's interests.[110] They could perhaps have liaised with other exiles in England too if necessary; and at least one member of the Gascon pressure group in England identified by Malcolm Vale, Louis Despoy, again had longstanding links to Gaston de Foix.[111] Afterwards, Jean de Castandet could have reported back to the Foix cadets in Aragon, although Louis de Bruthails certainly accompanied the initial English descent on Gascony in October, since he personally helped to capture the Valois seneschal Olivier de Coëtivy.[112]

Alongside the arrival of forces from England, Gaston and Jean de Foix's old network of noble adherents within Gascony crucially rallied in support of the family too. Evidence is lacking for the activity of their noble supporters in the initial stages of the revolt, but it is highly striking that when Jean de Foix was present in Gascony in June 1453, he was represented in dealings with the Abbaye Sainte-Croix de Bordeaux by two established supporters of his house in the Médoc: Pierre de Grailly seigneur de Saint-Genès and Janicot de Lahet captain of Lamarque.[113] The fact that these men represented Jean de Foix in Bordeaux offers a tantalising hint that the magnate may have succeeded not only in attracting military support from former adherents, but also in renormalising his family's political authority for a brief period. It may even be the case that noblemen like Pierre de Grailly, whom the English had previously considered to be a traitor, were motivated to join the revolt primarily by the prospective restoration of the Foix cadets.[114]

The likelihood that this was the case is strengthened by the fact that other former supporters of the Foix cadets were again prominent in the revolt, including Jean V seigneur de la Lande, Gaston seigneur de l'Isle, and Jean seigneur d'Anglade. The earliest activity of these noblemen is somewhat nebulous, but there are clues that their loyalties to the Foix cadets were again revived and significant.[115] Multiple chroniclers claim that Jean d'Anglade led a failed relief force to the rebel

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[110] Louis de Bruthails also appears as a charter witness for Jean de Foix in 1450 and Jean de Castandet subsequently remained in his service: see Higounet, *La Tour*, pp. 181-2; n. 130 below. In later life, Bruthails entered the service and literary circle of Anthony Woodville, Earl Rivers: A. Peyrègne, 'Les émigrés gascons en Angleterre (1453-1485), *Annales du Midi*, v. 66 (1954), p. 121; foreword of William Caxton to Abu al-Wafa' al-Mubashshir Ibn Fatik, *The dictes and sayings of the philosophers* (1477; facsimile printed in London, 1877).
[111] Louis Despoy exchanged lands with Gaston de Foix in 1440 and 1447, and then witnessed a sale by him in 1448: NA C 61/130/13; *Variétés Bordelaises* n.e., v. 2, pp. 183-4; ADG G 2275. For the pressure group in England: Vale, *English Gascony*, p. 144.
[112] *Variétés Bordelaises* n.e., v. 1, p. 135; P. Marchegay, 'La rançon d'Olivier de Coëtivy, seigneur de Taillebourg et sénéchal de Guyenne, 1451-1477', *BEC*, v. 38 (1877), pp. 32-3.
[113] ADG H 735, fs. 11-12v.
[114] NA C 61/138/105.
[115] Pardons issued by Louis XI, AN JJ 198 no. 292 & JJ 199 no. 170, for Jean d'Anglade and Jean de la Lande's son suggest that these noblemen were left with no choice but to support the English, as noted in Harris, *Valois*

fortress of Chalais in summer 1453, whilst Gaston de l'Isle is known to have served as captain of Castelnau-de-Médoc in this period.[116] This is highly suggestive given that both of these places had previously been longstanding Foix bases.[117] Furthermore, although Gaston de l'Isle cut his losses by striking a deal with the count of Foix just after the Battle of Castillon, Jean d'Anglade and Jean de la Lande both saw their lands forfeited after being captured at Castillon alongside Jean de Foix. Anglade was thereafter kept imprisoned for the remainder of Charles VII's reign, whilst La Lande was ransomed and forced into exile along with his son.[118] It is more than likely that Charles VII's harsh attitude here was a response to problems that these men had caused him as leading figures in a Foix network.

There are also further hints that the Foix cadets' old support-base rallied decisively behind the family. Above all, there is a strong correlation between key territorial centres of revolt and lands formerly under Gaston and Jean's control.[119] We have already seen that the long-time Foix bases of Chalais and Castelnau both joined the revolt, and this is especially noteworthy in the case of the former given its vast distance from Bordeaux and the fact that around eighty Gascons are attested as having been executed there after attempting to resist a Valois siege in summer 1453.[120] Other towns with close ties to the Foix cadets were also amongst the places which went over to the Lancastrians, with the most notable being Langon and Castillon-sur-Dordogne.[121] Castillon lay at the centre of the *vicomté* previously controlled by Jean de Foix, and its garrison appealed for aid in summer 1453 after

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Guyenne, 154-5. However, these letters employ standard tropes to mitigate behaviour, and so should not be accepted at face value: cf. Chapter 1 n. 88 above; N. Zemon Davis, *Fiction in the archives: pardon tales and their tellers in sixteenth-century France* (Stanford, 1987).

[116] For Anglade: Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 388; Martial d'Auvergne, *Les vigilles de la mort du feu roy Charles septiesme* (Paris, 1493), p. 189; Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 2, p. 335 (as the 'sire de Langlade'); cf. also *ibid*., v. 2, p. 330; Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, pp. 385-6. For Isle: AN JJ 182 no. 14 (April 1454 abolition); Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 3, p. 11.

[117] For previous ties to Chalais, see nn. 16 & 65 above. For previous ties to Castelnau-de-Médoc, where Gaston de Foix originally inherited a half share of the lordship, see: *Variétés Bordelaises* n.e., v. 1, pp. 305-6; Flourac, *Jean Ier*, p. 228; Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, p. 355; NA C 61/135/14; Higounet, *La Tour*, pp. 181-2.

[118] See the pardons cited in nn. 115 & 116 above, as well as: AN JJ 191 no. 5; Harris, *Valois Guyenne*, pp. 184-5; Ribadieu, *Histoire de la conquête de la Guyenne*, p. 390; R. Boutruche, *Bordeaux de 1453 à 1715* (Bordeaux, 1966), p. 14.

[119] Of the family's three greatest possessions (the *captalat* de Buch, county of Benauges, and *vicomté* of Castillon), only the participation of places in the *captalat* is uncertain. The involvement of this region might have been overlooked by chroniclers or inhibited by the presence of a Valois army to the west of Bordeaux: Leseur, *Histoire de Gaston IV,* v. 2, pp. 10-1.

[120] Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 2, p. 31; Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 388; Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 2, p. 334.

[121] For Langon and the revolt: Leseur, *Histoire de Gaston IV*, v. 2, pp. 5-6. This town had previously been held illicitly by Gaston de Foix in c.1423-36, before the new owner changed sides in 1442, prompting Jean de Foix to be granted his co-share of the lordship; the town was then probably back in Foix control by 1444: NA C 61/125/35, C 61/127/54, C 61/132/50; ADG 1 Mi 93-1-22, f. 64v. Other implicated towns with links to the Foix cadets are Gensac, for which see: Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 2, p. 32; *Variétés Bordelaises* n.e., v. 2, pp. 183-4; *AHG*, v. 16 (1878), pp. 363-4; NA C 61/138/26; and Castillon-de-Médoc, for which see: Leseur, *Histoire de Gaston IV*, v. 2, pp. 5-6; NA C 61/135/14; *AHG*, v. 6 (1864), pp. 74-5.

being besieged by Valois forces. This in turn fatefully prompted John Talbot to lead his Anglo-Gascon army there from Bordeaux – apparently against his better judgement and perhaps under pressure from Jean de Foix to avoid a repeat of the fall of Chalais.[122]

Our best evidence for the revival and importance of a Foix network, however, relates to the family's former territories in and around the county of Benauges. Gaston and Jean de Foix's former town of Cadillac apparently joined the Anglo-Gascon cause within just three days of Talbot's arrival, and the town's *comptes* leave no room for doubt that lingering loyalties to the Foix cadets remained extremely important. The town's *jurats* travelled to Bordeaux to swear oaths of fealty to Jean de Foix once he had arrived there, and they later sent messengers to try to discover his fate, as their lord, when he was captured following the Battle of Castillon.[123] Interestingly, both Cadillac and the castle of Benauges are also amongst the few places known to have actively held out even after this battle, with the town at the former taken by storm in September 1453.[124] Cadillac was at this time commanded by a French nobleman named Gaillardet. His background is regrettably obscure, although the chroniclers Guillaume Leseur and Arnaud Esquerrier suggest that he was afterwards executed as a former inhabitant of Béarn, who had failed to honour an agreement to surrender the town to the count of Foix according to the former author.[125] In any case, it is certain that Cadillac's *jurats* and elites remained involved in pro-Lancastrian resistance prior to this point. The town's *comptes* reveal that these men had stocked up on military supplies and raised money for their captain, as well as that they continued to supply wine to English members of the garrison even whilst their town was under attack.[126]

Conversely, Mathieu d'Escouchy downplays Gascon support for resistance at Benauges after Cadillac's fall by suggesting that it was English troops here who refused to surrender, sparking violence between them, Gascons, and other defenders of the castle.[127] However, this account may well give a misleading impression of the importance of Gascon loyalties here. A letter from Charles VII to the town of Saint-Flour in October notes that inhabitants of Gascony ('ceulx du pais') were just

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[122] Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 2, pp. 33-5; Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 389.
[123] ADG 1 Mi 93-1-22, fs. 113, 115. For the initial decision to back Talbot: Leseur, *Histoire de Gaston IV*, pp. 5-6.
[124] Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 395; Leseur, *Histoire de Gaston IV*, p. 25; Escouchy, *Chronique*, pp. 64-5, 77-8. For other ongoing opposition at nearby Rions and at Blanquefort under the seigneur de Duras, see: *ibid*., pp. 67, 77; Ribadieu, *Histoire de la conquête de la Guyenne*, pp. 329-30.
[125] Leseur, *Histoire de Gaston IV*, v. 2, pp. 20, 25-6; Arnaud Esquerrier, *Chroniques romanes des comtes de Foix*, ed. F. Pasquier & H. Courteault (Foix, 1895), p. 74; see also: Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 3, p. 14. Gaillardet is tentatively identified by Courteault (Leseur, *op. cit*., p. 20 & n.) with a Béarnais *routier*, although this attribution is insecure and other figures with the name 'Galhardet' appear earlier in the *comptes* of Cadillac and Gascon rolls: ADG 1 Mi 93-1-22, fs. 2v, 22, 52; NA C 61/138/105.
[126] ADG 1 Mi 93-1-22 fs. 112, 115, 116v. Wine was also given to defenders from Podensac, a neighbouring town whose lord was François de Montferrand, 'by order of the jurats': *ibid*., f. 115v.; *AHG*, v. 16 (1878), p. 16.
[127] Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 2, pp. 77-8.

as active as Englishmen in opposition after Castillon, and a letter of abolition from the king to Benauges hints that this could be applicable to this castle and lordship, as 'rebellion' here is said (albeit formulaically) to have been supported by 'churchmen, nobles, and other residents and inhabitants' ('gens d'eglise, nobles, et autres manans et habitans').[128] What is more, Benauges' captain was again a French nobleman, who is named as 'Jehanot de Castendet' in a surrender agreement dated 25th September 1453.[129] This captain is described as a follower of 'le captau' – a title traditionally used for Gaston de Foix – and he may even be identifiable as the Jean de Castandet whom we encountered earlier and who subsequently remained in Jean de Foix's service.[130]

In light of all this, it can be argued that the Foix cadets' refusal to submit to Charles VII allowed them to rally their network and to deliver a significant – if temporary – setback to the Valois monarchy in 1452-3. It was only in the aftermath of the revolt's failure that Charles VII was in a more secure position, although he still felt the need to augment the 1451 settlement with harsher measures. He for instance appears to have left permanent garrisons in former Foix bases, as the inhabitants of Cadillac were forced to pay for Valois troops to be maintained within their town.[131] Meanwhile, Jean de Foix was kept imprisoned for over six years after the Battle of Castillon, before he was released to raise money towards a ruinous ransom of around 46,000 écus.[132] By this time, his father had died in exile.[133] Jean himself soon became entangled in the Wars of the Roses in England and helped to hold the Tower of London against Yorkist forces, before he was reduced to raising money through wool shipping.[134] He would only be thrown a political lifeline when Louis XI became king of France and agreed to settle his ransom. He was restored by Louis to his many of his lands in Gascony in the early

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[128] AMSF ch. 4 art. 2 no. 4 (letter of 28th October [1453]); AN JJ 182 no. 13 (September 1453 abolition).
[129] AN JJ 182 no. 1 (printed with minor inaccuracies in *Ordonnances des rois*, v. 14, pp. 262-4).
[130] *Ibid*. A Jean de Castandet also appears as an adherent of Jean de Foix in 1455 and 1460, and as captain of Benauges in 1473 after Jean de Foix's restoration under Louis XI: Marchegay, 'La rançon d'Olivier de Coëtivy', p. 38 & n.; NA C 61/143/53; *Inventaire sommaire des Archives départementales antérieures a 1790: Gironde. Série H, Tome Premier (Art. 1 à 1335)*, ed. J.-A. Brutails (Bordeaux, 1914), p. 89.
[131] *Inventaire sommaire des Archives départementales antérieures à 1790: Gironde. Série E Supplément*, v. 1, ed. G. Ducannés-Duval & J.-A. Brutails (Bordeaux, 1898), pp. 78-9; Harris, *Valois Guyenne*, p. 127. For repressive policies elsewhere in Gascony, see also: P. Prétou, 'The subjection of the Landes and southern Aquitaine by the king of France (1441-1463)', in G. Pépin (ed.), *Anglo-Gascon Aquitaine: Problems and Perspectives* (Woodbridge, 2017), pp. 171-81.
[132] Marchegay, 'La rançon d'Olivier de Coëtivy', esp. pp. 8-9, 23-6, 32-4, 38ff.
[133] Gaston raised money for Jean in 1455 by selling Savoyard lordships inherited from his father by proxy, but he died between September 1457 and October 1459: 'Expedientes Casa Ducal de Híjar: ES/AHPZ P/1-17-24', https://dara.aragon.es/opac/app/results/?dt=1461&df=1456&ob=re:1&sr=1&q=foix&st=.2.6.100.522995.105.202491 (accessed 31/12/2023); 'Chartrier de Pons II', p. 265; 'Gascon Rolls Project', https://www.gasconrolls.org/edition/calendars/C61_138/document.html (accessed 31/12/2023).
[134] For Jean's time in England, see: Peyrègne, 'Les émigrés gascons', p. 123; 'A Short English Chronicle: London under Henry VI (1422-71)', in J. Gairdner (ed.), *Three Fifteenth-Century Chronicles with Historical Memoranda by John Stowe* (London, 1880), pp. 73-5; 'Calendar of the French Rolls: Henry VI', pp. 440, 443, 446; *Lettres de Louis XI,* v. 2, pp. 37-9.

1460s, as were other prominent supporters and kinsmen such as Jean seigneur d'Anglade and Jean VI seigneur de la Lande.[135]

In comparing what happened to the networks of Jean de Luxembourg and the Foix cadets, several points deserve emphasis. Firstly, it is patent that the networks built up by the magnates by no means ceased to be important because of Charles VII's initial victories. The magnates and their powerbases instead retained the ability to help or to hinder the Valois monarch's cause significantly, and so their futures remained a vital issue for Charles VII's regime to reckon with. The Valois strategy in response was to offer compromises which recognised the fact that the nobles' networks had become a key facet of the political geographies of the regions in which they were operating. The political benefits of this approach are demonstrated by the advantages that Charles VII then derived from his dealings with the Luxembourgs, and from how Louis XI would subsequently find that Jean de Foix and his adherents offered him valuable support in his early reign, probably even amidst the Guerre du Bien Public of 1465.[136] Nor did the advantages of, and need for, cooperation with the networks disappear after this point. Louis count of Saint Pol was appointed constable of France even though he and many of his supporters backed the revolt of 1465, before his granddaughter Marie de Luxembourg was granted control of many of his possessions in c.1487, despite Louis himself being executed for plotting with the English in 1475.[137] Similarly, for all that Jean de Foix backed Louis XI's rebellious brother Charles duke of Guyenne in c.1469-72, this did not prevent him and his network from soon being restored to royal favour. Jean was able to prove his loyalty by supporting the Valois crown against Jean V count of Armagnac in 1473, before his son Gaston went on to become lieutenant-

[135] For Jean de Foix's agreement with Louis XI and restoration: AN JJ 198 nos. 355, 363 & 442 (printed in *Ordonnances des rois*, v. 15, pp. 482-9); Marchegay, 'La rançon d'Olivier de Coëtivy', pp. 8-9, 38-48. For his struggle to reclaim some territories, including from the ascendant Albret family, see too: Harris, *Valois Guyenne,* p. 105; *AHG*, v. 13 (1871), pp. 82-5; Jaurgain, 'Deux comtes de Comminges', *Bulletin Gers*, v. 17 (1917), pp. 204-5; Courteault, *Gaston IV*, pp. 249-50. For Jean d'Anglade and Jean VI de la Lande: AN JJ 198 no. 292, JJ 199 no. 170; Harris, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-5.

[136] Jean de Foix himself was Louis XI's lieutenant-general in Roussillon in 1463-7, as per: J. Calmette, *Louis XI, Jean II et la Révolution catalane* (Toulouse, 1902), pp. 168-9, 205; H. Stein, *Charles de France, frère de Louis XI* (Paris, 1919), p. 318 & n.; still, the Bordelais in general appears to have been exceptionally loyal to Louis XI in 1465: Harris, *Valois Guyenne*, p. 165; 'Lettres, mémoires, instructions et autres documents relatifs à la guerre du bien public en l'année 1465', ed. J. Quicherat, *Documents historiques inédits tirés des collections manuscrites*, v. 2 (Paris, 1843), p. 211; Murphy, 'The War of the Public Weal, 1465' (forthcoming).

[137] For Marie de Luxembourg: D. Potter, 'The Luxembourg inheritance: the house of Bourbon and its lands in northern France during the sixteenth century', *French History*, v. 6 (1992), esp. p. 28. For more on Louis de Luxembourg's career in Louis XI's reign and dealings with Edward IV, see also: Potter, *War and Government*, pp. 30-6; Soumillion, *Le procès de Louis de Luxembourg*, p. 108ff.

general in Gascony, and Gaston's daughter Anne – somewhat unexpectedly – became queen of Hungary in the early sixteenth century.[138]

Even if we just focus on the divergent fates of the networks of the Foix cadets and Luxembourgs in c.1441-c.1462, however, one is secondly struck by how much agency rested with individuals in these networks, and most of all with their leaders. It was primarily the divergent choices of the Foix cadets and successors of Jean de Luxembourg, rather than royal policy under Charles VII, which facilitated divergent outcomes in this period.

iv) The role of ideology in pro-Lancastrian opposition

Given the agency shown by nobles like the Foix cadets and Luxembourgs, as well as their adherents, it is all the more necessary to return to the issue of why they chose to resist Charles VII for so long before defeat or death. The magnates' networks were capable of opposing the Valois monarchy over many years, but there were nonetheless escalating risks involved, as the Foix cadets and their supporters found to their cost in 1451-3. Considering these increasing dangers, why did the Foix cadets and Jean de Luxembourg not make terms sooner, as the count of Saint Pol and Jeanne de Béthune did in 1441?

One possible answer to this question, which has at times been employed in past historiography, is simply to emphasise the magnates' self-interest.[139] The Lancastrian cause was ascendant in the 1420s, and by the time that Charles VII's capabilities were growing increasingly menacing, Jean de Luxembourg and the Foix cadets had accepted lucrative rewards from the Lancastrian monarchy, not least including grants of the counties of Longueville, Guise, and Kendal.[140] They would have been unable to retain these lands if they had changed sides, and so had a clear incentive to continue opposing Charles VII. Their supporters in turn had incentives to follow them, given the patronage which they offered.

This brief sketch emphasising personal interests undoubtedly has a significant element of truth behind it. Yet, it does overlook the fact that Charles VII was willing to be generous to Lancastrian nobles like the Foix cadets and would have offered compensation for any lands lost. In addition, it is worth noting that other historiography on the later Middle Ages has tended to argue that the

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[138] For Jean de Foix's career post-1469: Stein, *Charles de France*, pp. 318 & n., 328; Samaran, *La Maison d'Armagnac*, p. 187 & n. For his descendants: La Chesnaye-Desbois, *Dictionnaire de la Noblesse* 2.e., v. 6, p. 457; Hansen, 'Suffolk's niece', p. 376.

[139] See e.g. F. Roucole, 'De royale et impériale maison: les liens de parenté de Jean de Luxembourg, comte de Ligny', in C. Raynaud (ed.), *Familles royales: vie publique, vie privée aux XIVe et XVe siècles* (Aix-en-Provence, 2010), pp. 122-4. Cf. Dickinson, *Congress of Arras,* p. 65.

[140] For Longueville and Kendal, see nn. 15 & 20 above. Jean de Luxembourg was formally granted Guise several years before its conquest: Matton, *Histoire de Guise*, v. 1, p. 199.

choices of noblemen were usually multifactorial, and that ideological concerns also had a profound influence on behaviour.[141] Consequently, this section will seek to assess whether 'pro-English' sentiment, pro-Lancastrian ideology, or other ideals of loyalty worked alongside self-interest in fuelling the opposition of Jean de Luxembourg, the Foix cadets, and their networks.

For all the problems of viewing the Hundred Years' War in nationalistic terms, certain contemporaries did feel that resistance against Charles VII was encouraged by 'pro-English' feeling. Jean Juvenal des Ursins famously wrote in 1445 that there were some in France who were almost more 'English' in their hearts than 'the English natives of England' ('vrais et parfais Anglois, plus a peine que les Anglois natifs d'Angleterre'), whilst Valois-supporting chroniclers regularly mention the traditional ties of Gascony to England as a factor in the Gascon revolt of 1452-3.[142] More specifically for our case studies, the Saint-Denis chronicler also alleged in the early fifteenth century that Gaston de Foix himself saw his loyalties in an uncompromisingly nationalistic manner. In recounting an earlier incident in Gaston's life when the nobleman and his older brother Jean were held as hostages at the Valois court in the 1400s, the chronicler claims that Gaston threatened to kill Jean if he 'made himself French' ('si se redderet Gallicum'), because Gaston 'always preferred the lion over the fleurs-de-lis' ('leopardum semper liliis aureis preferendo').[143]

However, whilst such comments reveal much about the views of their authors, it is deeply problematic to accept them as evidence that noblemen like Gaston de Foix were genuinely 'anglophiles'. Firstly, it is worth remembering that the Lancastrian monarchs were endorsed by their supporters as the 'King of England and France', with this formulation even used in an oath sworn by a labourer from Mornac to a pro-Lancastrian priest during the Gascon revolt.[144] As a result, any conceptualisation of the French and English kingdoms as diametrically opposed should be regarded as the preserve of Valois propagandists and supporters. Secondly, it is demonstrable as well that the loyalties of magnates like the Foix cadets and Jean de Luxembourg were far more complex than any binary division between 'English' and 'French' allegiances would allow for. Jean de Luxembourg, for example, continued to regard Henry VI as his sovereign after 1435, but he still insisted on his right to

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[141] See e.g. Carpenter, *The Wars of the Roses*, (Cambridge, 1997), p. 118; Watts, *Henry VI*, pp. 4-7; E. Powell, 'After "After McFarlane": The poverty of patronage and the case for constitutional history', in D. Clayton, R. G. Davies, & P. McNiven (eds.), *Trade, devotion, and governance: papers in later medieval history* (Stroud, 1994), pp. 10-1.

[142] Lewis, *Later Medieval France*, p. 69 (quoted). For the Gascon revolt, see: *Les Cronicques de Normendie: 1223-1453*, ed. A. Hellot (Rouen, 1881), p. 176; Leseur, *Histoire de Gaston IV*, p. 3; Basin, *Histoire*, v. 1, p. 260; and more obliquely, *Chronique du Mont Saint-Michel (1343-1468)*, ed. S. Luce, v. 1 (Paris, 1879), p. 60.

[143] *Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys, contenant le règne de Charles VI, de 1380 à 1422*, ed. M. Bellaguet & M. de Barante (Paris, 1840), v. 2, p. 778. For the incident and its context, see also: Flourac, *Jean Ier*, pp. 25-6.

[144] For the labourer's oath: ADG H 735, fs. 3-3v. For other acceptance of the titles, see e.g. Dessalles, *Périgueux et les deux derniers comtes de Périgord*, 'preuves', p. 139.

protect his subjects from harm by any party, at the same time as ceasing to join wider campaigns in support of the Lancastrians 'as if he were neutral' ('comme neutre').[145] Moreover, he continued to profess loyalty to Burgundy as his lord too and remained a founding member of the Order of the Golden Fleece (for which see Image 1 below). Although he refused to ever serve Philip the Good against the English, he was even pressurised by him into sending miners to support the siege of Calais in 1436.[146]

Admittedly, Jean de Luxembourg's position at this time was exceptional because he and Burgundy in effect acknowledged different sovereigns, but, for the Foix cadets as well, allegiance to the English had to co-exist with other loyalties. These included obligations to their wider family, since Gaston de Foix consistently supported the counts of Foix in accordance with his parents' wishes.[147] Even after the Lancastrian crown had banned assistance to the comital family in 1433, Gaston still travelled to Béarn with his son in 1436 and 1439 to aid his nephew after his accession, as well as offering military backing to his relatives against the Armagnacs as late as Autumn 1441.[148] Gaston had also supported his family in previous Foix-Armagnac conflicts, and in 1415 Jean d'Armagnac threatened that Gaston and others of his ilk would be treated 'not as if they were English, but as if they were merely servants or helpers of the count of Foix' ('non pas tant coma Angles, mas tant solament coma servidors et baledors deudeyt comte de Foys').[149] This was a polemical threat, but it may genuinely be the case that Gaston saw himself in part as a Foix dynast. He participated in Foix funerary honours in Béarn in 1414 and 1428 and was represented at honours for his late brother Jean I in Foix in 1437, whilst some of his subjects at Cadillac likewise offered money to honour this late count.[150] Furthermore, Gaston and his son used an almost identical coat of arms to their relatives in Valois allegiance, as can ironically be seen by studying the coat of arms in Gaston's extant stall plate in St

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[145] Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 342-3 (quoted), 386-7; AN X 1a 8605, f. 100. Jean also supported Philip the Good against Humphrey duke of Gloucester in the mid-1420s: Berry, 'Les Luxembourg-Ligny', p. 305.
[146] For Jean's refusal to fight the English and professions of loyalty to Burgundy, see e.g. Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 311-2, 394. For Calais: Berry, 'Les Luxembourg-Ligny', p. 333.
[147] For the importance of the parents' wishes: ADPA E 438 (August 1436 alliance between Gaston de Foix captal de Buch and Gaston IV count of Foix, August 1436 alliance between Jean de Foix viscount of Castillon and Gaston IV count of Foix). See also: Flourac, *Jean Ier*, pp. 224-6; Courteault, *Gaston IV*, pp. 44-5.
[148] For the 1433 ban: *Proceedings and ordinances*, v. 4, p. 157. For support in 1436 and 1439: *Compilation d'aucuns privilèges et reglemens du pays de Bearn* (Orthez, 1676), p. 5; ADPA E 438 (esp. the alliances cited in the above n., as well as a March 1439 alliance between François de Montferrand seigneur d'Uza and Gaston IV count of Foix witnessed by the captal de Buch and his son at Lescar). For support in 1441: Courteault, *Gaston IV,* p. 69; Michel du Bernis, 'Cronique dels comtes de Foix et senhors de Bearn', in *Choix de chroniques et mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France*, ed. J. Buchon (Paris, 1861), pp. 596-7 (with erroneous dating). For correspondence between Gaston and his family, see also: Flourac, *op. cit.,* pp. 290-1.
[149] *Registres de la Jurade: 1414 à 1422*, p. 147.
[150] For the funerary honours: ADPA E 426, fs. 2v-6v, 21v-22, 26-26v, 28 (the part of the register covering 1414 is printed and translated by V. Lespy in *Revue d'Aquitaine*, v. 4 (1860), pp. 357-72, 413-29). For Cadillac: ADG 1 Mi 93-1-22, f. 8.

George's Chapel at Windsor (for which see Image 2 below). Considering all of this, it seems untenable to regard the Foix cadets' choices, or those of Jean de Luxembourg, as driven by any kind of dogmatically 'anglophile' sentiment.

A more promising alternative might be to regard the nobles as possessing an ideological commitment to the Lancastrian dynasty, which was sincere but able to sit alongside other loyalties. This commitment may in part have been founded on political and personal preferences for Lancastrian rule. Henry V and the regent Bedford certainly made a concerted effort to portray their dynasty as the most fitting successors of Charles VI through images and words, and the Dauphin's conduct was notably attacked in letters, poems, and the Treaty of Troyes itself.[151] These invectives may have had a particular resonance for nobles like Jean de Luxembourg and Gaston de Foix, who had respectively lost a patron and brother during the chaos of John the Fearless' murder at Montereau.[152] The Lancastrian monarchy and its forebears might well also have been particularly associated with the protection of traditional privileges and customs. This would have been especially true in their long-held region of Gascony, where Gaston de Foix was amongst those who participated in meetings of the estates of the Bordelais and Guyenne, before they seemingly ceased to assemble in 1453-61.[153]

In the inculcation of loyalty to the Lancastrians, though, it may be that traditions of service and the swearing of oaths were of still greater importance, since these practices meant that dynastic allegiances became intertwined with ideals about noble honour. The fact that Jean de Luxembourg had sworn oaths to the English, for example, was seen by Olivier de la Marche as the key reason why he refused to subscribe to the Treaty of Arras.[154] It would be easy to dismiss this as romanticisation given how many Burgundian noblemen did repudiate earlier oaths to the Lancastrians, but Jean de Luxembourg was by no means alone in having qualms. Jean de Villiers and Jean bastard of Saint Pol strikingly submitted requests to the Order of the Golden Fleece for advice about their honour in

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[151] For attacks on the Dauphin: B. Guenée, 'Les campagnes de lettres qui ont suivi le meurtre de Jean sans Peur, duc de Bourgogne', *ABSHF*, v. 106 (1993), esp. p. 58; *Les grands traités de la guerre de Cent Ans*, ed. E. Cosneau (Paris, 1889), p. 113; B. Rowe, 'King Henry VI's claim to France in picture and poem', *The Library*, v. 13 (1932/3), p. 84. For wider efforts to emphasise legitimacy, see too: *ibid*., p. 81; G. Thompson, 'Le régime anglo-bourguignonne à Paris: facteurs idéologiques', in *La 'France Anglaise'*, pp. 58-60.

[152] Archambaud de Foix seigneur de Navailles was killed alongside John the Fearless whilst trying to defend him: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 2, pp. 344-5; Courteault, *Gaston IV*, pp. 31-2.

[153] For Gaston de Foix and the regional estates: *Registres de la Jurade: 1414 à 1422*, pp. 236, 238; NA C 61/131/102; Major, *Representative Institutions*, pp. 44-5; cf. Harris, *Valois Guyenne*, p. 75. For other hints at ideas of freedoms in Gascony under rule from England, see: Lewis, *Later Medieval France*, p. 61; Basin, *Histoire*, v. 1, pp. 260-1. For parallels in northern France, see also: N. Murphy, 'War, Government and Commerce: the towns of Lancastrian France under Henry V's rule, 1417-22', in G. Dodd (ed.), *Henry V: New interpretations* (Woodbridge, 2013), p. 272.

[154] La Marche, *Mémoires,* v. 1, p. 242.

1436, in which they appear to have been concerned less about repudiating the Treaty of Troyes than about the fact that they had sworn additional oaths to the English through homage or officeholding.[155] This arguably hints that commitments of allegiance were seen as existing on a sliding scale. If so, Jean de Luxembourg may have felt that his honour would have been exceptionally compromised by changing allegiances, given that he had held extensive lands under the Lancastrian monarchy. Worse still, he had sold Joan of Arc to Henry VI as his subject in 1430. This decision could have been regarded as a fresh recognition of Henry VI's sovereignty, as well as perhaps involving an emotional investment; Jean vacillated beforehand and was allegedly advised not to ransom *La Pucelle* by his aunt Jeanne de Luxembourg, before he came to visit his former prisoner in Rouen according to a later witness.[156]

A still stronger ideological commitment that could be made to Henry VI was joining the Order of the Garter, and it is therefore of the utmost significance that Gaston and Jean de Foix accepted elections to this order in c.1439 and 1446 respectively. Their elections brought them enormous prestige as the first Gascons to be elected since their kinsman Jean de Grailly captal de Buch at the Order's foundation, but this status crucially meant that they were even more honour-bound to try to defend Lancastrian interests. The English privy council notably portrayed Gaston's position as a 'brother of the Garter' as a tie on his loyalty in 1443 when trying to persuade him and his son to hand over Blaye.[157] Likewise, multiple Valois chroniclers regarded Gaston's membership of the Order as sufficient explanation for his decision to depart into exile in 1451 rather swearing fealty to Charles VII after surrendering.[158] There is once more good reason to take these views seriously. Georges Chastelain analogously portrayed membership of the Order of the Garter as a more binding commitment than regular oaths, and for all that we do have other examples of members of chivalric orders betraying their patrons, there was an off-putting reputational cost involved in doing so.[159]

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[155] *Die Protokollbücher des Ordens,* v. 1, pp. 65-9. For noble concerns about swearing to Arras, see also: Antoine de La Taverne, *Journal de la paix d'Arras (1435),* ed. A. Bossuat (Paris, 1936), p. 82.

[156] For the ransom and its terms: R. Ambühl, 'Joan of Arc as prisonnière de guerre', *EHR* 132/558 (2017), pp. 1060, 1067; *Procès de condamnation et de réhabilitation de Jeanne d'Arc, dite La Pucelle*, ed. J. Quicherat (Paris, 1841-9), v. 1, pp. 10-3. For the reported feelings of Jeanne de Luxembourg, vacillation, and alleged visit in Rouen: *ibid*., v. 1, p. 231; *ibid*., v. 3, pp. 121-2; Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 4, pp. 389. Cf. also C. Taylor, *Joan of Arc: La Pucelle* (Manchester, 2007), p. 254 & n.; P. Courroux, *L'Écriture de l'histoire dans les chroniques françaises (XIIe-XVe siècle)* (Paris, 2016), p. 423.

[157] *Proceedings and ordinances*, v. 5, pp. 291-2; H. Collins, *The Order of the Garter, 1348-1461: Chivalry and Politics in Late Medieval England* (Oxford, 2000), pp. 61, 141-2.

[158] Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 373; Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 2, pp. 292, 309; Jean de Wavrin, *Recueil des croniques et anchiennes istories de la Grant Bretaigne*, ed. W. Hardy & E. Hardy, v. 5 (London, 1891), p. 184; Jacques du Clercq, 'Mémoires', *Collection complète des mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France* v. 11, ed. M. Petitot (Paris, 1820), p. 24.

[159] Chastelain, *Œuvres*, v. 2, pp. 10-12. See e.g. F. de Reiffenberg, *Histoire de l'ordre de la toison d'or* (Brussels, 1830), pp. 123-4, for the dishonour attached to betrayal by knights of the Order of the Golden Fleece after 1477.

Even when Jean de Foix abandoned the English and order of the Garter to become a vassal of Louis XI in 1462, he stage-managed this by asserting that he would only change sides 'without reproach' ('sans reprouche'), after receiving authorisation from (the then-exiled) 'King Henry of England'.[160]

Many noble and non-noble adherents of magnates like Jean de Luxembourg and the Foix cadets would likewise have sworn oaths to the Lancastrian monarchy, as typified by Jean V seigneur de la Lande, who offered homage in person to the earl of Huntingdon as Henry VI's lieutenant in Bordeaux in 1440.[161] Contemporaneously, the bonds between the Luxembourg and Foix families and their supporters often had an ideological element themselves. This was especially true if they were underpinned by solemn undertakings and oaths, or were strengthened by long-standing traditions of familial service. To give just a few examples of this, Jean de Luxembourg's followers Antoine and Waleran de Bournonville were from a family which had long been prominent in the service of his uncle, Waleran de Luxembourg, whilst Guy de Roye's father had served Jeanne de Béthune even before her marriage to Jean.[162] For such men, again, the reputational cost of abandoning their patrons could well have been highly impactful.

In sum, it is obvious that opposition to Charles VII from pro-Lancastrian networks cannot be explained solely in terms of self-interest, but nor are nationalistic frameworks helpful as an alternative lens for understanding behaviour. Instead, it has been contended here that ideas around good kingship, and above all dynastic and familial service, helped to fuel and sustain conflict with the Valois crown. These ideals had to co-exist with nobles' other interests and commitments, such as to their families and vassals, but they were of fundamental importance because they were interlinked with ideals around honour which possessed real power.

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[160] AN JJ 198, no. 355. For contacts between Jean de Foix and exiled Lancastrians in France, see also: *Lettres de Louis XI, roi de France*, ed. J. Vaesen (Paris, 1883-1908). v. 2, p. 46 & n.
[161] BM Bordeaux MS 2802 J no. 4.
[162] For the Royes: Duchesne, *Maison de Béthune*, pp. 337, 340. For the Bournonvilles: Schnerb, *Enguerrand de Bournonville*, pp. 74-6; and see also: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 2, pp. 166, 200.

Image 1 – Jean de Luxembourg's likeness in an armorial of the Order of the Golden Fleece:

This image of Jean de Luxembourg and his familial arms appears in an armorial of the Order of the Golden Fleece from c.1473. The composition of Jean's figure reflects the fact that he had been blinded in one eye and suffered a second facial injury whilst fighting against the Valois (Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 3, pp. 383; *ibid.*, v. 4, p. 64). The image is from:

'Medieval Illuminated Manuscripts', https://manuscripts.kb.nl/show/images/76+E+10/page/2 (accessed 31/12/2023, with the original in The Hague, KB Ms. 76 E 10, f. 45).

Image 2 – Gaston de Foix's arms on his stall plate at Windsor:

Gaston de Foix's arms appear on the stall plate created to mark his election to the Order of the Garter in c.1439 and found in St George's Chapel at Windsor. The pallets of Foix and cattle of Béarn are identical to those employed by the counts of Foix, as per Le Bouvier's *Armorial* (BNF Fr. 4985, f. 23v). Further information, and the original image, can be found in: *The stall plates of the knights of the Order of the Garter, 1348-1485*, ed. W. Hope (London, 1901), plate 56.

v) Conclusion

Overall, this chapter has offered a revisionist view of pro-Lancastrian opposition, which has sought to diverge from traditional narratives that have emphasised the inevitability of Valois victory or have focused on the English and princely 'states'. Section ii) demonstrated that magnates such as Jean de Luxembourg and the Foix cadets were able to sustain resistance to Charles VII for many years in large part because of backing networks of supporters and allies, which were wide-ranging but also cohesive. Nobles played a key role within these networks, but they additionally incorporated clergymen and townspeople. The structures also retained an enduring influence even as Lancastrian opposition came to an end, and nowhere is this better evidenced than in events after the respective peace agreements of 1441 and 1451, as was discussed in Section iii). When Charles VII passed away in 1461, the power of networks controlled by families like the Luxembourgs and Foix cadets remained alive or latent, and it was not ignored by the Valois monarchy.

In seeking to understand the conduct of Jean de Luxembourg, the Foix cadets, and their networks, we also saw in Section iv) that resistance appears to have been driven by a mixture of ideological considerations and other interests. In conjunction with the analysis in the previous sections, this makes it easier to understand why pro-Lancastrian opposition endured for such a long time, and why there was no simplistic or inexorable trajectory towards submission to the Valois. Next, we will turn to considering how 'internal' rebellions in Valois France again proved powerful and persistent, since they too were underpinned by noble networks with complex interests and ideological concerns.

Chapter 3: Large-scale resistance in Charles VII's France

i) Introduction: large-scale rebellion and the case study of the Praguerie

Some Valois-supporting Frenchmen liked to imagine that their kings were constantly backed by 'the good and loyal people of France', in contrast to treachery and turmoil in England.[1] However, as we have already seen in Chapter One, such claims did not prevent a wide array of French nobles from engaging in revolt, even whilst acknowledging that they remained Valois vassals and subjects. We will now seek to build on that earlier discussion, and on our analysis of support for the Lancastrian dynasty, by examining 'internal' resistance against Charles VII across the next two chapters. We will look here at the constituencies, causes, and impacts of large-scale opposition led by magnates in Valois France. This opposition was supra-regional or transregional in nature, and although more episodic than other forms of resistance, it aimed to bring about changes in central government and governance.

We will examine opposition of this type through the prism of a central case study involving multiple networks: the Praguerie of 1440. This revolt has a misleading name derived from contemporary criticism comparing the rebels to the Bohemian Hussites, but, for our purposes, it is of exceptional value as case study.[2] For one thing, it is by far the best evidenced uprising of Valois vassals in Charles VII's reign. Despite a lack of documentation from the rebels themselves, we are fortunate to have a handful of extant letters of abolition, a variety of chronicle accounts, summaries of grants made by the duke of Bourbon, and multiple updates sent by Charles VII to his supporters (including letters and a more detailed *mémoire*).[3] The Praguerie was also the broadest revolt of its kind which Charles faced. As a result, it provides an unusual opportunity to analyse the activity and aspirations of a wide range of individuals and networks acting together in a coherent movement.

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[1] P. Lewis, *Essays in later medieval French history* (London, 1985), p. 169 ('En Angleterre ilz ont souvent mis a mort leurs roys… ce que ne fist jamais le bon et loyal peuple de France': Jean de Rély, 1484); see also: C. Valente, *The theory and practice of revolt in Medieval England* (Aldershot, 2003), p. 1.

[2] For the link to criticism of the rebels: Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 1, p. 258.

[3] The most important sources are the account in Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, pp. 213-28; the July 1440 pardon of the duke of Bourbon (AN P 1372/2 no. 2099, printed in P. Dupieux, 'La paix de Cusset (17 juillet 1440)', *BSEB* (1945), pp. 449-51); summaries of grants in BNF Fr. 22299 pp. 8-11; the royal letters detailed in n. 113 below; and the royal 'Memoire des plaintes' (from around early June 1440, with a copy printed in Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 3, 'preuves', pp. 4-29; a second copy of the *mémoire* addressed to the duke of Savoy, with the same narrative but a different final list of articles, also survives in the archives of the royalist Dauphiné, ADI B 3273, probably reflecting how the *mémoire* was disseminated for propagandistic purposes at a time when initial negotiations between Charles VII and the leading rebels were faltering or had broken down).

The rebellion itself began in February 1440, when it emerged almost simultaneously in the Loire valley and Poitou.[4] Charles VII's kinsman Charles duke of Bourbon held an initial meeting of rebel nobles and captains in the former region at Blois, before the monarch's own son, the sixteen-year-old Dauphin Louis, assumed leadership of the movement in the latter region after joining with his godfather Jean II duke of Alençon at Niort. The leading rebels appear to have desired the Dauphin to assume control of government and rallied in his name, in the hope that political changes and reforms could thence be enacted. However, Charles VII soon forced the duke of Bourbon to retreat from the castle of Loches (to the south-east of Tours), after which the king spent almost half a year leading further counteroffensives. He travelled first to Poitou, where he narrowly prevented the rebels from taking the town of Saint-Maixent, before he recaptured Niort and other surrounding places through force. The Dauphin and duke of Alençon, though, managed to escape with support from adherents of the duke of Bourbon, and they then rendezvoused with him in his lands in central France. Charles VII followed, and a 'guerre de Bourbonnais' occurred, which also spilled over into, or engulfed, many of the surrounding regions.[5] Conflict between royalist forces and rebels notably took place or continued in Berry, Nivernais, Forez, Beaujolais, Basse and Haute Auvergne, and the borderlands of Gévaudan, as well as in Bourbonnais itself.[6] Warfare between rebel garrisons and forces loyal to the king rumbled on in Touraine and in the Île-de-France too, and at least a few towns or forts in Angoumois, Saintonge, and Périgord additionally remained under rebel control.[7] All of the individual places which can be linked to the rebel side are shown on Map 4 below, and it was not until the summer of 1440 that Bourbon, Alençon, and the Dauphin were forced to submit in Bourbonnais in return for pardons. Considering all of this, the Praguerie arguably ought to be viewed as one of the most extensive rebellions ever to occur in late medieval France or Europe, albeit behind the Guerre du Bien Public of 1465 in its scope.

Nevertheless, modern scholarship has shown limited interest in the Praguerie or has treated it dismissively. The sequence of key events in the revolt was established in the late-nineteenth century

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[4] For the events discussed in this paragraph, see the accounts of Le Bouvier and the 'Memoire des plaintes' cited above unless otherwise specified, as well as: Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, pp. 115-35; and for the Praguerie's beginning and end: the letter from Charles VII to Reims, 24th February 1440, printed in *ibid*., pp. 529-31; Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 412-6; Dupieux, 'La Paix de Cusset', pp. 385ff.

[5] For the phrase 'guerre de Bourbonnais', or 'guerre… oudit pays de Bourbonnais': AN JJ 178 nos. 178 (printed in *AHP* v. 32 (1903), pp. 6-9) & 203.

[6] For fighting in Beaujolais: *Registres consulaires de la ville de Villefranche (Rhône)*, ed. A. Besançon (Villefranche, 1905), v. 1, pp. 168-70; AN P 1372/2 no. 2099. For Auvergne/Gévaudan, Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 222 is misleading in appearing to downplay conflict beyond Riom, in contrast to: AMSF ch. 4 art. 2 no. 5 (August [1440] royal letter to Saint-Flour calling for support against the rebel Berault seigneur d'Apchier), ch. 4 art. 6 no. 20 (May 1440 royal letter to Saint-Flour describing unnamed places near Saint-Flour in rebel hands), *Inventaire Manuscrit:* ch. 4 art. 6 no. 21 (lost June 1440 royal letter to Saint-Flour, apparently referring to rebel activity nearby).

[7] As well as the sources cited in n. 3 above, see *Journal Paris*, pp. 351-3; *AHP*, v. 29 (1898), pp. lxiv, lxviii.

by the work of Gaston du Fresne de Beaucourt, but since then there has been little holistic work on the rebellion, and Philippe Contamine's 478-page biography of Charles VII devotes fewer than three pages to it.[8] Furthermore, as we saw in Chapter One, when historians have analysed the Praguerie, they have tended to do so within frameworks which emphasise the rise of the 'state' or success of Charles VII's rule. Within these frameworks, the Praguerie has generally been blamed on a handful of self-interested princes or 'malcontents', whose goals have been regarded as obstructing military reforms from 1439 or otherwise pursuing private ambitions.[9] The princely rebels are also characteristically thought to have won enthusiastic support only from mercenary *routiers* and a small number of other partisans, since it has been assumed that most of the nobility were indifferent or backed the king, whilst townspeople and the wider populace have been seen as still more hostile to the rebellion.[10] The rallying of towns to Charles VII, in particular, is thought to have been pivotal in dooming the Praguerie to failure. In the eyes of the majority of scholars, this failure in turn meant that the movement's main consequence was that the authority of the Valois monarchy was strengthened.[11]

Arguments of this sort – about rebel failure, struggles to attract support, and the importance of noble self-interest – all find parallels in the treatment of other opposition to Charles VII, including the leagues of 1428 and 1442.[12] So too can one find matching themes in traditional interpretations

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[8] Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, pp. 115-35; Contamine, *Charles VII*, pp. 251-3; cf. Lecuppre-Desjardin & Toureille, 'Servir ou trahir', p. 8.

[9] For the term 'malcontent' or emphasis on private interests, see e.g. Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, pp. 115-9; E. Perroy, 'Feudalism or principalities', pp. 184-5; Leguai, *Les ducs de Bourbon*, pp. 165-6; Vale, *Charles VII*, pp. 76-7; Favreau, 'La Praguerie en Poitou', p. 283; Caron, *Noblesse et pouvoir*, p. 213; L. Scordia, 'La Praguerie racontée par Louis XI au dauphin Charles dans le Rosier des guerres: une leçon politique', *ABSHF* (2015), p. 118. For emphasis on opposition to military reforms or other suggestions that rebel ideology was underdeveloped or insincere, see too: Lecuppre-Desjardin & Toureille, 'Servir ou trahir', pp. 8-10, 19-20; Lewis, *Essays*, p. 178; Cazaux, 'Une étude comparée sur la guerre civile'. pp. 78, 81; S. Gunn & A. Jamme, 'Kings, nobles and military networks', in *Government and political life in England and France*, p. 51; cf. Watts, *Making of Polities*, pp. 321, 444.

[10] For emphasis on *routier* support or a lack of broader backing, see e.g. Leguai, *Les ducs de Bourbon*, pp. 160, 170-2; Favreau, 'La Praguerie en Praguerie', pp. 288-9; Vale, *Charles VII*, p. 79; Caron, *Noblesse et pouvoir*, pp. 214, 287; Contamine, *Charles VII*, pp. 252-3; Lecuppre-Desjardin & Toureille, 'Servir ou trahir', pp. 18-20; Sumption, *Triumph and Illusion*, pp. 569-70. For dissenting suggestions that the Praguerie may have had broader appeal, cf. Murphy, 'The War of the Public Weal, 1465' (forthcoming); and to a lesser extent Cazaux, 'Une étude comparée sur la guerre civile', p. 77.

[11] See esp. Favreau, 'La Praguerie en Poitou', p. 301; Chevalier, 'Un tournant du règne de Charles VII', pp. 162-3; Contamine, *Charles VII*, pp. 253-4; Lecuppre-Desjardin & Toureille, 'Servir ou trahir', pp. 17-20. For a more complex view of the Praguerie's results in relation to dialogue about use of force and order, cf. L. Cazaux, 'Les lendemains de la Praguerie. Révolte et comportement politique à la fin de la guerre de Cent Ans', in F. Pernot (ed.), *Lendemains de guerre* (Brussels, 2010), pp. 368, 372-3; and cf. also *idem*, 'Une étude comparée sur la guerre civile', p. 76.

[12] For the 1428 league, for which historians have emphasised self-interest although not hostility to centralisation, see e.g. Vale, *Charles VII*, pp. 53-4; Lecuppre-Desjardin & Toureille, 'Servir ou trahir', p. 14; although for blame on La Trémoille's self-interest in 1428, cf. Cosneau, *Le connétable de Richemont*, pp. 153-

of the Guerre du Bien Public under Charles' son and the Guerre Folle under his grandson.[13] Yet, the aforementioned arguments will all be challenged or nuanced over the course of this chapter. Whilst setting the Praguerie in a comparative context, we shall seek to offer a revisionist analysis of who rebelled in 1440 and how they formed part of a wider coalition of networks, what triggered the Praguerie and was used to justify it, and what the revolt's impacts were. Sections ii) and iii) will begin by exploring the constituency of the revolt amongst the nobility and other groups in society. We will show that powerful and coherent networks under noble leadership were again integral to resistance to Charles VII, although the analysis will also demonstrate that there was real diversity to the rebel coalition and that many noble insurgents had complex interconnections to local and royal networks. Section iv) will then discuss causes and ideological considerations behind the Praguerie. We will initially address traditional historiographical explanations for the revolt, before proposing an alternative framework centred around concerns about ineffective kingship which find parallels in other uprisings. Finally, Section v) will analyse the impacts and long-term effects of the Praguerie. These were multifaceted, although it will be argued here that Charles VII was ultimately forced to make compromises with many of the rebels and their demands, in a reflection of the potency of aristocratic revolt.

61, Leguai, *Les ducs de Bourbon*, pp. 124-5. For the 1442 Nevers gathering, see e.g. *ibid*., pp. 172-7; Caron, *Noblesse et pouvoir*, pp. 234-5; Sumption, *Triumph and Illusion*, pp. 590-1.

[13] For comparable treatment of later revolts, see e.g. P. Champion, *Louis XI*, v. 2 (Paris, 1927), p. 61; B. Chevalier, 'The recovery of France, 1450-1520', in C. Allmand (ed.), *The New Cambridge Medieval History, Volume VII c.1450-c.1500* (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 408, 410; E. Le Roy Ladurie, *The Royal French State, 1460-1610* (Oxford, 1994), pp. 63-6, 72, 76-8; Lecuppre-Desjardin & Toureille, 'Servir ou trahir', pp. 19-20. See also Cazaux, Une étude comparée sur la guerre civile', pp. 78-81, and for revisionist perspectives on 1465, cf. Krynen, 'La Rébellion du Bien Public (1465)', pp. 81-97; Collins, *The French Monarchical Commonwealth*, p. 147ff.; Murphy, 'The War of the Public Weal, 1465' (forthcoming).

Map 4: Places which offered support to the Praguerie.

This map shows the places attested as offering support to the noble rebels at some point during the Praguerie, which are marked in red. The towns of Saint-Maixent and Saint-Flour, which were contested by the rebels, are also marked in a darker red.[14] The underlying map of France is from https://www.mapchart.net/.

[14] For Saint-Flour, see nn. 6 above & 81 below, and for Saint-Maixent: Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, pp. 215-6; Favreau, 'La Praguerie en Poitou', pp. 289-92. For the places marked in red, see the sources in nn. 3 & 7 above, as well as: *AHP*, v. 29 (1898), pp. i-lxviii; A. Thomas, *Les états provinciaux de la France centrale sous Charles VII* (Paris, 1879), v. 1, pp. 122-3 & n.; *Registres de Villefranche*, v. 1, pp. 168-70.

ii) Noble networks and aristocratic participation in large-scale rebellion

Just under ninety named nobles can be identified as participants in the Praguerie. All of these individuals are either described as supporting the revolt in our extant sources or can be presumed to have been implicated in the movement on the basis of strong circumstantial evidence. This sample of probable rebels is still relatively small and top-heavy, and it can never fully do justice to gradations in commitment and shifts in allegiance during the revolt's course. Nevertheless, it does provide an invaluable basis for reconsidering where, how, and to what extent the Praguerie attracted support amongst the nobility, and by extension how large-scale opposition functioned. This section will therefore begin by offering an overview discussion of the figures from different noble strata who can be identified as participants in the 1440 rebellion, with a full list to be found in the Appendix. We will then move on to analysing how these individuals formed part a coalition of networks. The networks involved in the Praguerie will be shown to have been held together by a plurality of pre-existing ties, which were not unlike those seen in the previous chapter, although it will also be suggested that they had entanglements across them. In part three of the section, it will then be argued that together the networks were also diverse, and that they had further, and at times surprising, interconnections with local and royal networks.

Part 1: The implicated nobles

Let us start by considering who was implicated in the Praguerie, and specifically, the most high-ranking insurgents. The Dauphin Louis is well known to have been the figurehead of the rebellion, but royal letters identify its main ringleaders as four other noblemen from great princely families. These were the dukes of Bourbon and Alençon, whom we have already mentioned, Louis de Bourbon count of Vendôme, and – initially – Jean bastard of Orléans count of Dunois.[15] These magnates were backed by the duke of Bourbon's younger brother Louis count of Montpensier until at least late spring 1440, and several other great princes appear to have been sympathetic to, or complicit in, the uprising. René duke of Anjou at a minimum remained a close ally of Bourbon even though absent in the kingdom of Naples, and Jean V duke of Brittany was named by the Dauphin amongst the lords who had counselled him and whom he wanted the king to pardon.[16] It can thus be said that the Praguerie had substantial appeal within the uppermost echelons of the Valois nobility, for all that other princes such as Charles of Anjou count of Maine, Arthur count of Richemont, and

[15] The magnates are all named in royal letters from February (e.g. the letter from Charles VII to Reims, 24th February 1440, in Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, pp. 529-31), but Dunois quickly submitted to the king and is not named in later letters (e.g. the letter to Narbonne, 24th April 1440, in *Ville de Narbonne: Inventaire des archives communales antérieures à 1790. Annexes de la Série AA*, ed. G. Mouynès (Narbonne, 1871), pp. 392-3). For further details on his and the others' involvement, see Table 1 in the Appendix below, nos. 1-3, 5, & 8.
[16] See Table 1 below, nos. 4, 6, & 57; 'Memoire des plaintes', p. 22; AN P 1372/2 no. 2099, P 1379/2 no. 3136.

Bernard count of Pardiac did conversely rally to the king's side, or offered him more passive support as in the case of the duke of Burgundy.[17]

The uprising similarly gained traction amongst other leading landowners and important royal officeholders. Antoine de Chabannes count of Dammartin and Charles VII's pensioned former favourite Georges seigneur de la Trémoille both offered strong political and military support to the rebellion throughout, and an array of courtiers and major officeholders in 1440 were implicated as well. These included a royal marshal (Gilbert de la Fayette), two royal seneschals (Jean de la Roche of Poitou and Jacques de Chabannes of Toulouse), a royal *bailli* (Baudoin de Tucé of Touraine), and the royal *grand queux*, or ceremonial head of king's kitchen, Antoine seigneur de Prie.[18] One of the king's most trusted councillors, Pierre d'Amboise seigneur de Chaumont, was additionally prominent in the Praguerie from its inception, as indeed was Chaumont's wife Anne de Bueil. Both Anne and Pierre used their positions at court to help win over the Dauphin according to the royal *mémoire*, before Anne remained at rebel-held Loches, where her husband had been captain, throughout the Praguerie according to the herald Gilles le Bouvier's chronicle.[19] One might still contend that this couple and their confederates did not represent a majority amongst the senior landholding and officeholding Valois nobility, but at the very least, they formed a substantial minority whose political influence should not be understated.

More than seventy other nobles can also be connected to the rebel coalition, and of these, around twenty potentially fit the profile of itinerant *routier* captains. In addition to Antoine de Chabannes, seven individuals in the sample are identifiable as royal captains who defied orders to travel to the frontiers before the Praguerie, and another five as siblings of these men.[20] These include well-known *routiers* such as Alexandre bastard of Bourbon and 'le grand Blanchefort', who were involved in the

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[17] For princely support for the king, see e.g. Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, pp. 215, 218, 221-2; Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 411-2.

[18] See Table 1 below, nos. 7, 9-12, 15, 58. For the nobles' royal offices or patronage, see also, for Gilbert de la Fayette: 'Memoire des plaintes', pp. 5-7; A. Vallet de Viriville, *Charles VII, roi de France et ses Conseillers, 1403-1461* (Paris, 1859), p. 35; for Jean de la Roche: *Gallia Regia*, v. 4, p. 477; Favreau, 'La Praguerie en Poitou', p. 299; for Jacques de Chabannes: *Preuves pour servir à l'histoire de la maison de Chabannes*, ed. H. de Chabannes (Dijon, 1892), v. 1, pp. 168-72; for Baudoin seigneur de Tucé: Chevalier, 'Un tournant du règne de Charles VII', p. 165; *Gallia Regia*, v. 6, pp. 13-4; for Antoine de Prie: Vallet de Viriville, *op. cit*, p. 40; and for Georges de la Trémoille: *Les la Trémoille pendant cinq siècles*, ed. L. de la Trémoïlle, v. 1 (Nantes, 1890), pp. 221-3

[19] See Table 1 below, nos. 13-14; Memoire des plaintes', p. 7; Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, pp. 217-8.

[20] Amongst the captains sent to the frontiers, 'Memoire des plaintes', p. 9 names: Antoine de Chabannes, 'Brusac' (most likely Pierre de Brusac, named with his brother in Bourbon's pardon), 'Blanchefort' (most likely Jean de Blanchefort, who appears to have supported the rebels near Loches with a brother), Jean d'Apchier (named in Bourbon's pardon letter along with two probable brothers), the 'bastard of Beaumanoir', Louis de Valpergue, and the 'bastard of Bourbon' (probably Alexandre bastard of Bourbon, if not his brother Guy who appears in Bourbon's pardon); see Table 1 below, nos. 12, 20-21, 25, 29, 33-35, 38-40, & 59.

revolt from its early stages according to narrative sources, as well as many others who are attested as offering military support in regions such as Touraine, Poitou, and Bourbonnais. Alongside this group, further probable rebels are also described as 'écorcheurs' (literally 'flayers') in Burgundian sources relating to pillaging in the 1430s. These include Louis de Bueil, who is named as supporting the revolt in the later *Chronique Martiniane*, and Pierre Regnault de Vignolles, who was rewarded by Bourbon after the Praguerie conjointly with his 'frère d'armes' Philippe de la Tour.[21] Meanwhile, two more rebels whom the royal mémoire mentions as fighting at Loches (Alain Ferlin and Archambaud de la Roque) are attested as 'captains of men at arms' in grants made by the Bourbon, and two further individuals in the duke's service in 1440 (Étienne de Lespinasse and Blain Loup seigneur de Beauvoir) appear on a provisional list of royal ordonnance-company captains in 1443/4.[22] This prominence of careerist military captains amongst the Praguerie rebels, and their appearances across different sources, suggests that the traditional historiographical emphasis on *routier* participation is to a certain extent justified. However, the picture should still be nuanced. One might equally point to many examples of *routiers* across France who supported the crown in 1440, including famous individuals such as Poton de Saintrailles, Flocquet, and Jean de Salazar.[23] Likewise, it should be noted that those captains who joined the Praguerie still form less than a quarter of our total sample of identifiable participants.

More than fifty further individuals can be linked to the rebel confederacy too, many of whom are identifiable as either lords or cadet members of notable regional families. Pardon letters affirm, for example, that Jean de la Roche's rebel garrison at Niort in Poitou included his brother Guy de la Roche seigneur de Verteuil, as well as representatives of other Poitevin houses like the Harpedenne, Perceval, and Saint Gelais lineages.[24] Comparably, the duke of Bourbon could count many lords amongst his supporters, and those named in a royal pardon letter for the duke and his adherents include regionally influential landowners such as Draguinet seigneur de Lastic (in Auvergne) and Pierre seigneur d'Urfé (in Forez).[25] Amongst other examples, the royal mémoire also suggests that

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[21] See Table 1 below, nos. 29, 80-81; *Cronique Martiniane*, ed. P. Champion (Paris, 1907). p. 43; BNF Fr. 22299 p. 9. For descriptions of the nobles as écorcheurs: Quicherat, *Rodrigue de Villandrando*, p. 145; La Marche, *Mémoires,* v. 1, pp. 243-4; and see also: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 201, 316.
[22] See Table 1 below, nos. 22-23, 41, 79; 'Memoire des plaintes', p. 11; BNF Fr. 22299 pp. 9-10; AN P 1372/2 no. 2099. For the list of provisional captains: Contamine, *Guerre, état et société*, p. 596.
[23] Le Bouvier, *Chronique,* pp. 219, 222; 'Memoire des plaintes', p. 9.
[24] See Table 1 below, nos. 45-49; AN JJ 177 no. 196 (April 1446 abolition for Olivier de Harpedenne, printed in *AHP*, v. 29 (1898), pp. 280-6); AN JJ 178 no. 95 (June 1446 abolition for Guy de la Roche and others printed in *AHP*, v. 29, pp. 364-79). For the Poitevin nobles' familial backgrounds: H. Filleau, *Dictionnaire historique, biographique et généalogique des familles de l'ancien Poitou* (Poitiers, 1854), v. 2, pp. 329-31; *AHP*, v. 29 (1898), p. 280-2 & n.; *ibid*., v. 35 (1906), p. 452 & n.
[25] See Table 1 below, nos. 43 & 44; AN P 1372/2 no. 2099. For the nobles' lands: La Chesnaye-Desbois, *Dictionnaire Noblesse* 2.e., v. 8, p. 507; J. M. de La Mure, *Histoire des ducs de Bourbon et des comtes de Forez*, v. 2 (Paris, 1868), p. 185.

four further lords or prominent cadets contributed to promoting division. These were: Jean seigneur de Montejean from Anjou, Guillaume Blosset seigneur de Saint Pierre, who was living in exile from his titular lordship in Normandy, Jean Sanglier seigneur de Bois Rogue, who was a member of another prominent Poitevin family, and 'Boucicaut', who must have been a nephew of the famous marshal from Touraine under Charles VI.[26] Lower down the hierarchy of rebels, there are many other esquires and a few chatelains whose backgrounds are more obscure, although we typically know of them from documents relating to the duke of Bourbon or Jean de la Roche, meaning that they would mainly have been active in Bourbon's territories or in Poitou. Beyond this, there will be many more individuals whose names have simply been lost to time. However, from what we do know, it should already be clear that the Praguerie was a movement that had appeal far beyond a few 'malcontents' and allied captains.

Part 2: The rebels as a coalition of networks

Thinking collectively about the nobles and groups identified above, it is possible to detect a number of patterns within the sample. In the first place, we can note that it is common to find pre-existing connections between insurgents from different backgrounds. This is because, fundamentally, the rebel coalition was comprised of established noble networks. As we will now explore, these networks were internally held together, or reinforced, by bonds of officeholding, vassalage, service, and kinship, as well as by further lateral ties within (and to an extent across) the different structures.

If we begin by looking at bonds of officeholding, we can note that around a third of our sample of individuals are attested as holding an office under a more senior rebel, even if we exclude appointments which appear to have been made during or after the Praguerie. Our evidence here is strongest for the network of Charles duke of Bourbon. Amongst the more prominent rebels, Gilbert de la Fayette, Jacques de Chabannes, and Antoine de Chabannes were all attached to this duke's household or council.[27] Analogously, ties of officeholding under Bourbon recur across the strata involved in the revolt, and other captains whom we have met such as Alain Ferlin and Archambaud de la Roque, as well as lords such as Pierre seigneur d'Urfé, are attested as ducal *écuyers d'écurie* or

[26] See Table 1 below, nos. 16-19; 'Memoire des plaintes', pp. 18-9. For Jean Sanglier and Boucicaut's respective backgrounds, see also: A. Duchesne, *Histoire de la maison de Chastillon-sur-Marne* (Paris, 1621), pp. 512-3; Anselme, *Histoire Généalogique* 3 e., v. 6, pp. 754-5.

[27] For La Fayette and Jacques de Chabannes (who was also seneschal of Bourbonnais): 'Memoire des plaintes', p. 5; *Preuves Chabannes*, v. 1, p. 161; BNF Fr. 22299 p. 8. For Antoine de Chabannes: L. Cazaux, 'Antoine de Chabannes, capitaine d'Écorcheurs et officier royal: fidélités politiques et pratiques militaires au XVe siècle', in G. Pépin, F. Lainé, & F. Boutoulle (eds.), *Routiers et mercenaires pendant la guerre de Cent Ans: hommage à Jonathan Sumption* (Pessac, 2015), p. 166.

chambellans.[28] Four probable participants in the rebellion were meanwhile connected to the Dauphin's household. The most important of these, Jean Sanglier seigneur de Bois Rogue, seemingly served Louis as a *maître d'hôtel* from the mid-1430s and was paid in 1437 for caring for his array of falcons, whilst the next most senior, Jean seigneur de Gamaches, is attested Louis' *chambellan* and councillor across 1439-40.[29] Draguinet seigneur de Lastic was in turn a *chambellan* of the count of Montpensier by at least 1441, Guillaume Blosset seigneur de Saint-Pierre was almost certainly a *chambellan* of the duke of Alençon, and Baudoin seigneur de Tucé was a councillor of René duke of Anjou, whom we have seen may again have been sympathetic to the Praguerie.[30]

A number of rebels are also attested as military or administrative officeholders and chatelains under more senior insurgents. To give one illustration of this, Cagnon de la Chassaigne seigneur de la Molière served as Bourbon's *bailli* of Beaujolais well before and after he was pardoned alongside him in 1440.[31] Or, to take another case in point, we can consider the esquire Simon de Barro and two other captains of Jean de la Roche seneschal of Poitou in towns near Verteuil in Angoumois. These men were forced to swear oaths of loyalty to Charles VII in September 1440, implying that they too had joined their patron in supporting the Praguerie.[32]

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[28] For the captains: BNF Fr. 22299 pp. 9-10. For Urfé: A. Barban, 'Recueil d'hommages, aveux et dénombrements de fiefs relevant du Comté de Forez du XIIIe au XVIe siècle', *Recueil de mémoires et documents sur le Forez*, v. 8 (1885), p. 469; H. Dupont, 'Les Raybe d'Urfé', *Bulletin de la Diana*, v. 36 (1960), p. 271. As further examples, the nobles named in Table 1 nos. 53, 74, & 76 will be discussed later. The nobles at nos. 42, 78, & 83-4 are also attested as members of Bourbon's household in 1440 or beforehand (as per *Dictionnaire statistique et historique du département du Cantal*, ed. J.-B. de Ribier du Chatelet, v. 5 (Aurillac, 1857), p. 199; BNF Fr. 22299 pp. 8-10), and those at nos. 30, 36, & 89 amongst others suggestively appear to have accompanied him to Arras (La Taverne, *Journal de la paix d'Arras*, pp. 96-7).

[29] See Table 1 below, nos. 18, 60, 62-3. For Jean Sanglier and Gamaches' ties to Louis, see also: BNF Fr. 29110 'Sanglier' nos. 8-9; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, p. 40; *Lettres de Louis XI*, v. 1, p. 171; *Catalogue des Actes du Dauphin Louis,* ed. E. Pilot de Thorey (Grenoble, 1899), v. 1, p. 2; ADI B 4658, f. 192.

[30] Lastic was probably attached to Montpensier's household by the late 1430s, although he is first attested as his chambellan in 1441: BNF Fr. 28140 'Lastic' no. 3; Boudet, 'Charles VII à Saint-Flour', pp. 318-9. Saint-Pierre was Alençon's *premier chambellan* according to his epitapth, but he was in ducal service by at least the early 1420s: H. Tournouër, 'Excursion archéologique dans le Houlme', *Bulletin de l'Orne*, v. 22 (1903), p. 385; P. Odolant-Desnos, *Mémoires historiques sur la ville d'Alençon et sur ses seigneurs* (Alençon, 1787), v. 2, pp. 18, 37. Tucé was a councillor of Anjou by 1434 and later served as his treasurer and ambassador to England in 1445: La Chesnaye-Desbois, *Dictionnaire Noblesse* 2.e., v. 4, p. 187; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 4, p. 145. Jean de Montejean may have been attached to Anjou's household too, since he gave guarantees on his behalf in 1437: Lecoy de la Marche, *Le Roi René*, v. 1, p. 133.

[31] For La Molière, see Table 1 below, no. 37; AN P 1372/2 no. 2099; and for his office: L. Aubret, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de Dombes* (Trévoux, 1868), v. 2, pp. 579, 587; F. de La Roche La Carelle, *Histoire du Beaujolais et des sires de Beaujeu*, v. 2 (Lyon, 1853), p. 274. Guillaume Regnault de Cordebeuf and Amé de Vert, on whom see Table 1 nos. 42 & 73, were also the ducal baillis of the Montagnes d'Auvergne and Forez respectively in 1440, and Louis de la Vernade, on whom see Table 1 no. 75, was a *juge* in Forez: BNF Fr. 22299 p. 10; M. Boudet, *Les baillis royaux et ducaux de la Haute-Auvergne* (Paris, 1906), p. 209; Aubret, *op. cit*., pp. 579, 630; Mattéoni, *Servir le prince*, p. 149 & n.

[32] See Table 1 below, nos. 70-72; *AHP*, v. 29 (1898), p. lxviii. As further examples, the individuals named at nos. 50-51, & 55 will be discussed later, and 'Ferrieres', no. 28, was Bourbon's captain of Varennes-sur-Allier.

This abundance of pre-existing ties of officeholding amongst the rebels indicates that these bonds were of great significance in providing a basis for cooperation within networks and in raising manpower in resistance to the crown. Admittedly, it can be countered that some of our sources exclusively inform us about individuals who were connected to certain rebels, and above all the duke of Bourbon. By contrast, figures with more ambiguous or shifting allegiances, such as the follower of the La Rivière family who tried to hand over Saint-Maixent to the rebels (alternatively described as the captain Jacquet or a valet acting in league with a chambermaid), could be underrepresented in our sample.[33] With that being acknowledged, though, it is worth emphasising that even sources which offer a more arbitrary selection of rebels still reinforce the sense that networks and officeholding were important. If we look at extant royal letters which dismissed chatelains in the Dauphiné for joining the Praguerie, for example, we can note that of one of the two nobles who lost his post, Jean du Chastel, was a *chambellan* of Bourbon by at least the mid-1430s, whilst the other, Jean seigneur de Montenay, was attached to Alençon's affinity and would go on to serve as his lieutenant in the Normandy campaign of 1449.[34] It could thus be that our analysis has if anything underestimated the prevalence of these sorts of ties amongst the rebels, given that our extant evidence for households and officeholding is so fragmentary.

At the same time, many individuals in our sample must have held lands under more senior insurgents. At a minimum, there is a firm correlation between the areas where the revolt took place, the areas where the leading rebels owned territories, and the areas where other rebel lords' titular lands were located, as can be glimpsed by comparing Map 4 above and Map 5 below.

[33] For Jacquet, see Table 1 below, no. 32; Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 1, pp. 254-6; Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 216.
[34] For Jean du Chastel: ADI B 3224, fs. 347-348; La Taverne, *Journal de la paix d'Arras*, pp. 96 & n. For Montenay: ADI B 3224, fs. 350-353; *Oeuvres de Robert Blondel: historien normand du xve siècle*, ed. A. Héron (Rouen, 1893), v. 2, p. 378. See also Table 1 below, nos. 53 & 54.

Map 5: Titular possessions of lords who were involved or implicated in the Praguerie.



This map shows the titular possessions of lords who were involved or implicated in the Praguerie, in so far as this can be reconstructed. For 'lesser' lords, these are marked with a yellow/red circle. The titular lands/main towns of the dukes of Bourbon, Alençon, Brittany, and Anjou, and counts of Vendôme, Dunois, and Montpensier are marked with a red/yellow star. In practice, Alençon and other places in Normandy remained under Lancastrian control, and the dukes of Anjou and Brittany did not participate in fighting in the revolt. The underlying map of France is from https://www.mapchart.net/.

There could of course be a plurality of factors behind the geographical points of overlap across Maps 4 and 5. The very south of France, for example, may be absent from both maps because the nobility there were distracted, or inclined to take a more conservative stance towards the Praguerie, as a result of a flare-up in the Foix-Armagnac feud that will be discussed further in Chapter 4. Equally, patterns of landownership may have influenced the geography and constituency of the Praguerie because 'lesser' lords were more able to support opposition in areas where others were doing so, or where a leading rebel was the major territorial power and could thence use their powerbase to facilitate resistance.

However, the correlation between landowning and areas of revolt may also owe much to direct ties between the rebels. If we start by considering the thirteen identifiable 'lesser' lords who held their titular lands in Bourbonnais, Auvergne, Forez, and Limousin (eastwards from Charlus and south of Moulins on Map 5), it is likely that all of these men were Bourbon's vassals. Several of the lords are attested as performing homage to the duke, and one of them, Gastonnet Gaste seigneur de Lupé, even offered Bourbon an *aveu* (or recognition of Bourbon's rights as lord) on 14th March 1440 for his lordship of Lupé at the edge of Forez.[35] Gastonnet Gaste was already a *chambellan* and vassal of Bourbon by the mid-1430s, but his *aveu* may have amounted to a further pledge of support, with clearly defined landed ties thus cementing the bond between him and Bourbon.[36] Multiple layers and types of connection could in this way have proved mutually reinforcing, which suggests that even the most powerful landowner in the Praguerie was reliant less on a monolithic principality than on a network of supporters. To corroborate this argument, we can add that further nobles also possessed familial ties to lands held under Bourbon, for instance as Anne de Bueil dame de Chaumont had an inherited claim to the lordship of Aubijoux in Auvergne.[37] Meanwhile, in southern Poitou and northern Angoumois, landed connections may again have been even more significant than Maps 4 and 5 alone would suggest. Jean duke of Alençon, Georges de la Trémoille, and Guy de la Roche respectively owned or co-owned the key rebel strongholds of Niort, Melle, and Verteuil before the Praguerie, but other identifiable rebels such as Jean de la Roche seneschal of Poitou, Pierre de Saint Gelais, Olivier and Jacques Perceval, and Simon de Barro all had ties to lands in the immediate vicinity of these three bases.[38]

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[35] AN P 1398/2 cote 670; for Gaste's involvement in the Praguerie, see too Table 1 below, no. 74. Further rebels (or their successors) in Table 1 below, at nos. 36, 44, & 73, are also attested as offering homage to Bourbon in the early 1440s: La Mure, *Histoire des ducs de Bourbon*, v. 2, pp. 185, 190.
[36] *Titres de la maison ducale de Bourbon*, ed. A. Lecoy de la Marche (Plon, 1874), v. 2, pp. 250, 263.
[37] Anselme, *Histoire Généalogique* 3.e., v. 7, pp. 850; *Le Jouvencel*, v. 2, 'preuves', p. 361.
[38] For the ownership of Niort, Melle, and Verteuil: *AHP*, v. 26 (1896), pp. 405-12; *ibid*., v. 29 (1898), pp. xiii, 149 & n., 368-9 & n.; Favreau, 'La Praguerie en Poitou', p. 282; Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 3, 'preuves', p. 42. For

These kinds of connections may, moreover, have been supplemented by past records of fighting under more senior insurgents, or on occasion by more specific contracts. Several pardon letters for Praguerie rebels allude to service in the Hundred Years' War in the company of other rebels, as was the case with Olivier de Harpedenne under Jean de la Roche and one Regnault le Pele under Jacques de Chabannes.[39] Jacques himself is attested as a key lieutenant of the duke of Bourbon in 1434 (when he led resistance against Burgundian forces at Belleville-en-Beaujolais according to Monstrelet), and it may be speculated that many *routiers* and local lords would have previously fought for Bourbon too in similar contexts. In fact, the location of Bourbon's lands on the frontier with Burgundy would have provided a strong reason for *routiers* to figure prominently in his network even before the Praguerie.[40] Jacques' brother Antoine, Blain Loup seigneur de Beauvoir, and nine other individuals who are identifiable as military captains or their kinsmen may thus have been attached to the duke's service well before they appeared in his July 1440 pardon letter.[41] Further captains could have earlier offered Bourbon and other rebels more specific pledges of loyalty too, just as Jean de Blanchefort and Louis de Valpergue did in giving engagements of support to Jean V duke of Brittany in early 1440.[42]

Bonds of kinship would likewise have reinforced both the networks and broader coalition in the Praguerie. In this context, it is worth noting that the duke of Bourbon alone had familial ties to around a tenth of our sample of identifiable rebels, including the counts of Montpensier and Vendôme, two bastards of Bourbon, and four members of the Apchier family.[43] By the same token, the siblings Anne and Louis de Bueil were not only amongst this kin group through shared descent from the Dauphins d'Auvergne, but they also had separate familial connections to five other nobles who were implicated in the revolt. These were: Anne's husband Pierre d'Amboise, Pierre and Anne's brother-in-law Antoine seigneur de Prie, Pierre's kinsman Antoine Guenand seigneur de Saint-Cyran-du-Jambot, Louis' adoptive father-in-law Baudoin seigneur de Tucé, and Jean seigneur de Montejean, who was the brother of Louis and Anne's sister-in-law Jeanne.[44] Of course, familial

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landholdings or familial ties to lands nearby: *AHP*, v. 29 (1898), p. lxviii; *ibid*., v. 35 (1906), p. 452; Filleau, *Dictionnaire Poitou*, v. 2, pp. 327-9*; ibid*., 2.e., v. 1, p. 312.

[39] For Olivier de Harpedenne: AN JJ 177 no. 196. For Regnault le Pele: AN JJ 178 no. 210 (June 1447 abolition printed in *Preuves Chabannes*, v. 1, pp. 190-3). See also Table 1 below, nos. 49 & 51.

[40] Cf. Leguai, *Les Ducs de Bourbon*, p. 160. For the 1434 siege: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, p. 99.

[41] AN P 1372/2 no. 2099 (Guy bastard of Bourbon, Pierre and Guy de Brusac, Louis de Valpergue, Jean, François and Galias d'Apchier, Archambaud de la Roque, & Alain Ferlin).

[42] BNF Fr. 26848 'Blanchefort', no. 118; Cosneau, *Le connétable de Richemont*, p. 303 & n. For their involvement in the Praguerie, see also Table 1 below, nos. 20 & 38.

[43] For Montpensier, Vendôme, and the 'bastards of Bourbon': Anselme *Histoire Généalogique* 3.e, v. 1, pp. 304, 322. For the Apchier and Bueil families and their ties to the Bourbon lineage: *ibid*., v. 3, pp. 816-7; *ibid*., v. 7, pp. 849-50; *ibid*., v. 8, p. 522; *ibid*., v. 1, pp. 301-3; BNF Fr. 22299 p. 9.

[44] For Chaumont and Prie: Anselme, *Histoire Généalogique* 3.e, v. 7, pp. 123-4. For Antoine Guenand: Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 217 & n. For Tucé and Montejean: *Le Jouvencel*, v. 1, pp. lii-liii, lxvi & n.

bonds like these by no means guaranteed shared allegiances, but they may well have acted as both a vertical and lateral connection which added cohesion within networks, and which also acted as an interconnection across them.

A similar point can be made about ties of equal alliance and collaboration, and sociability and friendship, which were again common amongst the nobles involved in the revolt. Amongst the military captains, for instance, the 'frères d'armes' Pierre Regnault de Vignolles and Philippe de la Tour patently had a formal agreement to share the risks and profits of war whilst in Bourbon's service.[45] Many other rebel *routiers*, though, would also have had previous experience of working together in a more *ad hoc* manner – as Alain Ferlin and the 'bastard of Beaumanoir' did in 1438, when they both joined a raiding band in Limousin under the leadership of Louis de Bueil.[46] Amongst the lords in the Praguerie, pre-existing ties of association and alliance were also typical. Jean seigneur de Montenay and Guillaume Blosset seigneur de Saint Pierre offer a clear-cut example here. They are identifiable as friends or associates on top of being exiled Normans and members of the network of the duke of Alençon, since when Jean de Montenay married Antoinette d'Argenton in April 1439, Guillaume Blosset was listed as the first witness to this alliance.[47] Some of the more senior rebels such as Alençon and Bourbon, and Georges de la Trémoille and Jean de la Roche, were closely associated before the start of the Praguerie too, whilst other nobles would have been strongly positioned to act as intermediary figures and go-betweens across different rebel networks and sub-groups.[48] Jean Sanglier seigneur de Boisrogue and Jean seigneur de Gamaches encapsulate this last point. We have seen that these nobles were both attached to the Dauphin's household, but the first is also identifiable as the cousin of Jean de la Roche's wife Jeanne Sanglier and as a vassal of René of Anjou. Still more notably, the second nobleman had amicable ties with the duke of Bourbon even though his titular lordship lay in Vexin, since Bourbon described him as his 'especial friend' when he pledged to reinforce Gamaches' castle of Rosemont in southern Nivernais during the Praguerie.[49]

A final point of cohesion within and across multiple networks involved in the revolt was arguably provided by links to the princely house of Orléans, whose two heads – Charles duke of Orléans and

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[45] BNF Fr. 22299 p. 9. For more on how this type of bond worked, see Schnerb, *Enguerrand de Bournonville*, pp. 211-2; *idem*, *Bulgnéville (1431). L'État bourguignon prend pied en Lorraine* (Paris, 1993), pp. 99-100.
[46] Thomas, *Les états provinciaux*, v. 2, p. 103. For the 'bastard of Beaumanoir', see also Table 1 below, no. 59.
[47] BNF Fr. 28498 'Montenay' nos. 73-75.
[48] For Bourbon and Alençon: De Cagny, *Chronique*, pp. 228, 233; cf. also *Titres de la maison ducale de Bourbon*, v. 2, p. 178. For Jean de la Roche and La Trémoille: *AHP,* v. 29 (1898), p. xiii; 1428 manifesto printed in Bossuat, 'Un manifeste', p. 95.
[49] For Gamaches: BNF Fr. 22299 p. 8 ('son especial amy'). For Jean Sanglier: Contamine, *Guerre, état et société*, p. 473 & n.; Duchesne, *Chastillon-sur-Marne*, pp. 512-3. See also Table 1 below, nos. 18 & 60.

Jean count of Angoulême – were then imprisoned in England. The count of Dunois was famously their bastard brother and a vassal of the duke of Orléans, but so too was Georges de la Trémoille amongst the nobles who had performed homage to Orléans, in his case in person in c.1410.[50] Not dissimilarly, the houses of Harpedenne, Boucicaut, Amboise-Chaumont, and Alençon had in the past been close to Orléans or his father. Jean II d'Alençon solidified this connection by marrying Orléans' daughter Jeanne in 1423, and still more strikingly, Pierre d'Amboise seigneur de Chaumont appears to have been the son of Orléans' *premier chambellan* who died at Agincourt.[51] Alongside offering to contribute to the duke's ransom in 1439, Pierre and his wife Anne are then attested as a part of the social milieu of the Orléans family later in Charles VII's reign, as is one of the marshal Boucicaut's nephews.[52] To the south-west, Jean de la Roche seneschal of Poitou was for his part a deputy of Orléans' brother Jean count of Angoulême as captain of his titular town, and many of the seneschal's supporters would again have seen themselves as subordinates of the family. Jean de la Roche's brother Guy went on to serve as their seneschal of Angoulême through at least 1443-53, and he and four other nobles who joined the Praguerie would also be described as 'serviteurs' of the duke of Orléans in a pardon describing opposition to the crown in Angoumois in 1442.[53] These sorts of connections to Orléans and his house may well have further bound the Praguerie rebels together and given them a sense of common cause in 1440, as will be discussed further subsequently when we come to analysing the reasons why the revolt broke out.

For now, though, this analysis has demonstrated that the Praguerie was reliant on a coalition of pre-existing networks, which had links across the networks as well as many within them. In the centrality of networks to a wider coalition, clear parallels can be seen in other large-scale revolts in Valois France in the later Middle Ages, even as further research is awaited. Olivier Bouzy has for instance

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[50] For Dunois: P. Bord, 'Jean Bâtard d'Orléans (1402-1468): étude d'un bâtard princier dans le royaume de France au XV siècle' (PhD diss., Université de Lille, 2019), pp. 217-22; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, p. 118 & n. For La Trémoille: *Les collections de Bastard d'Estang à la Bibliothèque Nationale: catalogue analytique,* ed. L. Delisle (Nogent-le-Rotrou, 1885), p. 65.

[51] For Alençon and his family, see e.g. Champion, *La vie de Charles d'Orléans*, pp. 70-4, 177-8. For Chaumont's father: *Collections Bastard d'Estang*, p. 72; Anselme, *Histoire Généalogique* 3.e, v. 7, p. 123. For the Harpedenne family: BNF Fr. 27970 'Harpedenne', no. 22; M. Nordberg, *Les ducs et la royauté: études sur la rivalité des ducs d'Orléans et de Bourgogne, 1392-1407* (Stockholm, 1964), pp. 50-1. For the Boucicaut family: C. Taylor, *A virtuous knight: defending Marshal Boucicaut (Jean II Le Meingre, 1366–1421)* (York, 2019), p. 25; Champion, *op. cit.,* p. 237.

[52] For Pierre and Anne: Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, p. 147; Champion, *La vie de Charles d'Orléans,* pp. 518, 526. For Boucicaut: G. Raynaud, *Rondeaux et autres poésies du XVe siècle* (Paris, 1889), pp. x-xi.

[53] For Jean de la Roche: *AHP*, v. 29 (1898), pp. 278, 284. For Guy de la Roche's office, see: the July 1443 alliance between Prégent de Coëtivy and Guy de la Roche printed in *Prigent de Coëtivy: amiral et bibliophile*, ed. L. de la Trémoïlle (Paris, 1906), p. 47; *AHP*, v. 29 (1898), pp. 364-5 & nn. (also describing later offices held by Pierre de Saint-Gelais); 'Lettre sur la bataille de Castillon en Périgord (19 juillet 1453)', *BEC*, v. 8 (1846), p. 247. For Guy and the other rebels in 1442: AN JJ 178 no. 95 (printed in *AHP*, v. 29, pp. 364-79); and see also Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, pp. 246-7.

shown that the duke of Berry was supported in the Guerre du Bien Public by a number of lords who held prominent positions within his household, and Peter Lewis has noted that Jean II duke of Bourbon called on vassals for support during the same revolt.[54] Yet, it is worth adding that a reliance on such networks does not mean that the Praguerie or other comparable revolts were dependent on groups of nobles that were restrictive, isolated, or cliquish in nature. Before concluding this section, it is essential to make three broad arguments to underline this.

Part 3: Diversity and connections to local and royal networks amongst the rebel coalition

We will shortly look at connections between the rebels in our sample and local and royal networks, but in the first instance, it is worth emphasising that the coalition involved in the Praguerie remained diverse in many other regards. Alongside the implicated nobles' disparities in status which we have discussed, it is clear from Map 5 that the coalition was profoundly transregional in its participants' origins. Some nobles from still further afield were included as well, amongst whom were several individuals with backgrounds in Italy (such as the *routiers* Louis de Valpergue and 'Barette') and Scotland (such as the Dauphin's supporter Guillaume de Meny-Peny and perhaps Alain Ferlin).[55] More significantly, the coalition of rebel networks in 1440 also incorporated people with varied attitudes towards past rebellions. Some of the leading nobles such as Bourbon had been involved in opposition against the crown in 1428 and 1437, but others had supported the king on one or both of these occasions, including with the count of Vendôme and seigneur de Chaumont backing Charles VII on his expedition to Languedoc in 1437.[56] So too was the confederacy of networks in the Praguerie transgenerational, with ages ranging from sixteen in the case of the Dauphin to at least the mid-sixties in the case of Vendôme.[57] In all these regards, the rebellion was again comparable to other large-scale uprisings in Valois France, such as the revolt of 1428, the Guerre du Bien Public, and the Guerre Folle, when equally or even more heterogenous coalitions of nobles again rose up against the crown.[58]

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[54] Bouzy, *La révolte des nobles du Berry*, pp. 25-7; Lewis, *Later Medieval France*, p. 51.
[55] For the Valpergue family and 'Barette': Contamine, *Guerre, état et société*, p. 254 & n.; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 2, p. 342 & n.; Champion, *Guillaume de Flavy,* p. 38 & n. For Guillaume de Meny-Peny and Alain Ferlin: *Nouvelle biographie générale*, ed. F. Hoefer, v. 34 (Paris, 1865), pp. 1015-6; Contamine, *op. cit*., pp. 268-9 & n. See also Table 1 below, nos. 22, 27, 38, & 63.
[56] See Chapter 1 for discussion of leagues in 1428 and 1437, and *Proceedings and ordinances*, v. 5, p. 52 for the suggestion that Dunois may also have supported the latter. For Chaumont and Vendôme: Beaucourt, *Charles VII,* v. 3, p. 44 & n.; Quicherat, *Rodrigue de Villandrando*, p. 287; Devic & Vaissette, *Histoire générale de Languedoc*, v. 9, p. 1128; Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 196.
[57] Cf. Scordia, 'La Praguerie racontée par Louis XI', p. 118.
[58] See e.g. the March 1465 proclamation of Jean II duke of Bourbon printed in 'Lettres relatifs à la guerre du Bien Public', pp. 196-7, for a sense of the breadth of princes in this revolt, and n. 61 below for the 1480s.

The rebel networks in the Praguerie were not exclusively male either, since we have seen that Anne de Bueil was identified by contemporaries as an important figure in the rebellion. Her activity is of particular interest because it is often assumed that leadership in, and enthusiasm for, aristocratic-led revolt was the preserve of men in this period. This is despite the fact that Anne de Bueil's participation in the uprising of 1440 once more finds parallels in other opposition to the Valois. Alongside other examples mentioned previously in Chapters One and Two, we can for instance note that Thomas Beckington bishop of Bath and Wells observed during Charles VII's attack on Gascony in 1442 that the 'women of the country' had played a major role in capturing and delivering up lost Valois soldiers.[59] Likewise, Jeanne Crespin dame du Bec-Crespin was instrumental in the defection of Rouen during the 1465 Guerre du Bien Public against Louis XI, following the death of her husband Pierre de Brézé.[60] More than two decades later, Magdalene de Valois princess-dowager of Navarre and her daughter Catherine de Foix were finally named as leading supporters of the league behind the Guerre Folle in manifestoes by their confederates, and one of these manifestoes in December 1486 was even co-authored by the Breton countess of Laval, Françoise de Dinan.[61] Given that recent research has paid increased attention to women's agency in late medieval 'popular' revolts, this subject deserves to be pursued further in future in the context of noble-led opposition.[62]

The cohesiveness of the rebel networks within the Praguerie secondly should not be taken as a sign that these networks were somehow set apart from aristocratic society in general. If it was to be expected for senior rebels to turn to trusted subordinates, vassals, allies, and family members for support, then so too would these individuals have been able to rally noble backers of their own. Local networks or sub-networks of this kind are not easy to study in detail, but we can occasionally obtain glimpses of them in action. If we start by considering the rebel garrisons which were active in the Île-de-France and which supported raiding into and around Paris, it is possible to identify at least three regional deputies of the duke of Bourbon and Jacques de Chabannes who joined the Praguerie after being in post since 1438 or earlier. These were Roger de Pierrefrite, an esquire who was lieutenant at Bois-de-Vincennes, Gérard de Semur, an esquire who was lieutenant at Corbeil, and

[59] *A journal by one of the suite of Thomas Beckington,* p. 59.
[60] Prosser, 'After the Reduction', pp. 216-20.
[61] BNF Dupuy 634, fs. 136-141v ('February 1487 declaration of Charles count of Angoulême') & 142-145v ('December 1486 declaration of Jean de Châlon prince of Orange, Françoise de Dinan countess of Laval, and Jean de Rieux'); additional confederates named in these letters (also printed in abbreviated form in *Mémoires pour servir de preuves à l'histoire ecclésiastique et civile de Bretagne*, ed. H. Morice, v. 3 (Paris, 1746), pp. 527-8) are: the dukes of Orléans, Bourbon, Brittany, and Lorraine, the king of Navarre, the cardinal of Foix, the counts of Nevers, Dunois, and Comminges, and the seigneurs d'Albret, Lautrec, and Pons.
[62] See e.g. J. Firnhaber-Baker, 'The Social Constituency of the Jacquerie Revolt of 1358', *Speculum*, v. 95/3 (2020), pp. 707-12; A. Raw, 'Gender and Protest in Late Medieval England, c.1400-c.1532', *EHR*, v. 136/582 (2021), pp. 1148-1163.

Regnault le Pele, who was a more obscure nobleman who seems to have supported Semur in or around his garrison.[63] Since these men had been in post for many months prior to the Praguerie, they must be presumed to have built up relationships with the troops under their command which then proved useful in persuading their garrisons to support the rebellion. Supplementary manpower could also have been supplied by further regional adherents of Bourbon (who was additionally count of Clermont), for instance as Louis de Soyecourt seigneur de Mouy-en-Beauvaisis dispatched soldiers to Corbeil according to a 1441 pardon.[64]

Many 'lesser' lords may have been able to rally their vassals and supporters too, and in fact even *routiers* who were not in control of substantial lands could still have utilised strong local connections. As an example, let us take the captain Jean d'Apchier, who was probably only a minor landowner in his own right.[65] Jean defied royal orders to travel to the frontiers and fought against royal forces near Loches in early 1440, before being pardoned with Bourbon alongside two (probable) brothers.[66] Yet, what is interesting is that a royal letter datable to 3rd August 1440 asserts that Jean's father Berault seigneur d'Apchier was also a rebel. Berault d'Apchier was said to have 'allies, accomplices, and adherents' ('aliez complices et adherans') who remained active near to the town of Saint-Flour, presumably in his territorial base around Apcher in the hills of Gévaudan and southern Auvergne.[67] In the light of these details, it can be posited that Jean's decision to rebel may have been interdependent with that of his wider family, and that he may even have supported the rallying of local nobility in his father's lands in the revolt's later stages. The likelihood that this was the case is strengthened by the fact that a joint pardon letter survives from 1443 for Jean and his kin, which describes him and his brothers as using their father's castles as a base for attacking the king's subjects. The letter is set notionally in the context of wars against the English rather than the

[63] For the nobles' positions before the Praguerie: *Gallia Regia*, v. 4, pp. 383, 405-7; *Journal Paris*, p. 326 & n. For their activity in 1440, see Table 1 below, nos. 50-51, 55, as well as no. 31.
[64] AN U 446, f. 76. Several chroniclers (*Journal Paris*, pp. 351-2; Jean Maupoint, *Journal parisien,* ed. G. Fagniez (Paris, 1878), p. 26) suggest that Louis de Soyecourt and Jean Foucault took overall command of Bois-de-Vincennes and Corbeil during the Praguerie, but this evidence is problematic (see Table 1 no. 31 below), and the sources cited in Table at nos. 50-1 & 55 suggest that the existing leaders at a minimum continued to play important roles.
[65] Anselme, *Histoire Généalogique* 3.e., v. 3, p. 818 suggests that Jean acquired five lordships including Arzenc in Gévaudan, but his possessions were probably far more limited in 1440 and prior to his father's death; no title is attributed to him in the documents cited in the following n., or in fragmentary references to grants and payments to him up to 1453 (BNF Fr. 26562 'Apchier' nos. 59-62; BNF Fr. 22299 p. 9).
[66] See Table 1 below, nos. 24, & 39-40; AN P 1372/2 cote 2099; 'Memoire des plaintes', pp. 9-11.
[67] AMSF ch. 4 art. 2 no. 5; for the dating of this letter, see Table 1 below, no. 52. Anselme, *Histoire Généalogique* 3.e., v. 3, p. 817 suggests that Berault d'Apchier held over seven lordships, including at Apcher (in Gévaudan) and Vabres (near Saint Flour).

Praguerie, but at the very least, it should be a reminder that many different forms and levels of power could be interlinked, in rebellion and beyond.[68]

Thirdly and still more importantly, the networks in the Praguerie were also in many ways interconnected with royal networks and power structures. A final key trend amongst the insurgents which is hence worth considering is their prior connections to Charles VII. Above all, it would be remiss to have emphasised officeholding within our sample of nobles without also observing that more than a quarter of the group can be identified as holding a permanent royal office prior to the Praguerie.[69] Of this sub-group, nearly three quarters were attached to the royal household, often at the same time as holding an office under another noble. To give a few arbitrary examples, Berault seigneur d'Apchier, Cagnon de la Chassaigne seigneur de la Molière, Pierre seigneur d'Urfé, Louis de Soyecourt seigneur de Mouy, Guillaume Blosset seigneur de Saint Pierre, Jean Sanglier seigneur de Bois Rogue, and Jean seigneur de Gamaches all appear to have been linked to the royal household as *chambellans*, whilst Antoine de Chabannes and Louis de Valpergue served as *royal écuyers d'écurie*.[70] Further rebels likewise received money from the king in pensions or military wages, or held temporary positions as royal commissioners in 1440. Gastonnet Gaste seigneur de Lupé and his associates Louis de la Vernade and Robert Parent (Bourbon's *maître d'hotel*) exemplify this, since they all served as royal tax officials at the time of the Praguerie.[71] As a result, the total proportion of our sample of nobles who were in receipt of direct patronage from the king in 1440 is strikingly high: even on the basis of a conservative estimate using our limited sources, the figure is well over a third.

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[68] AN JJ 176 no. 177 (the same pardon is also included in AN JJ 179 no. 112, which is printed in Tuetey, *Les écorcheurs*, v. 2, pp. 443-6).

[69] On top of examples given subsequently, the individuals named below in Table 1, nos. 15, 53-54, & 58, have already been identified as officeholders. Further individuals who appear to have held captaincies or council/household positions before the Praguerie include those named at nos. 16, 31, 56, 73, 88-89, whilst Jean de Harpedenne (no. 61) was also married to Charles VII's illegitimate sister Marguerite: Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 2, p. 566; Vallet de Viriville, *Conseillers*, pp. 10, 14-5; La Mure, *Histoire des ducs de Bourbon*, v. 2, p. 140; BNF Fr. 22299, pp. 10-11; R. Ambühl, *Prisoners of war in the Hundred Years War: ransom culture in the Late Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 2013), p. 194 & n.; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 2, p. 566.

[70] The evidence for royal officeholding is fragmentary, but Antoine de Chabannes and Louis de Valpergue are attested as *écuyers d'écurie* in 1439/40: *Preuves Chabannes*, v. 2, p. 13; BNF Fr. 22299 p. 9. Apchier, La Molière, Urfé, Saint-Pierre, and Jean Sanglier are attested as royal *chambellans* in documents preserved from the mid-1420s or 1430s: BNF Fr. 26562 'Apchier', nos. 2, 4; BNF Fr. 27179 'de la Chassagne', nos. 4-5; A. Barban, 'Recueil d'hommages', p. 469; BNF Fr. 26857 'Blosset', no. 51; BNF Fr. 31590, f. 4; BNF Fr. 29110 'Sanglier', no. 9. Gamaches appears as a royal chambellan before and immediately after the Praguerie, and Mouy is mentioned as a chambellan early in the following year and so can be presumed to have held the office beforehand: BNF Fr. 27757 'Gamaches' no. 31; ADI B 4658, f. 192; AN U 446 f. 76. For later in the 1440s, the individuals named in Table 1 below nos. 24, 29, 34, 39, 45, & 49, are also attested as holding household offices: AN JJ 177 no. 196, JJ 178 no. 67, JJ 179 no. 112; Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 1, p. 50; BNF Fr. 27026 'Brusac', no. 10.

[71] For the royal offices: AN P 1372/2 no. 2099. For Robert's Parent's ducal office: AN P 1358/2 no. 564. See also Table 1 below, nos. 74-77. As further examples, rebel captains ordered to the frontiers probably received pensions, as did La Trémoille: 'Memoire des plaintes', p. 9; *Les la Trémoille pendant cinq siècles*, v. 1, pp. 221-3.

Moreover, close links to the king run right through to the very top of the rebel confederacy. We have already encountered a number of senior royal officeholders and councillors who rebelled, such as Pierre d'Amboise, Jacques de Chabannes, Jean de la Roche, and Gilbert de la Fayette. However, it is also worth looking again at the Dauphin and four princely ringleaders named in royal letters. All of these magnates were present at the king's court or council even in early winter 1439/40, and they likewise held major royal offices at the time of the Praguerie. Alençon and the Dauphin were royal lieutenants, and Bourbon, Vendôme, and Dunois served in senior posts in the royal household, with Bourbon indeed continuing to style himself as 'chamberier de France', or head of the king's chamber, in a ducal order of payment from May 1440.[72]

This profound overlap between royal officeholders and the rebel constituency has a number of implications. Perhaps most significantly, it is evident that the Praguerie was by no means a rebellion of networks consisting of chagrined outsiders or entrenched opponents of Charles VII's regime prior to 1440. We have already noted that the leading rebels had a range of attitudes towards earlier leagues in 1428 and 1437, but, with the partial exception of Georges de la Trémoille, it can be added that almost none of them had been frozen out of royal favour or banished from court. It would in fact be more accurate to say that the Praguerie was an oppositional movement which was inculcated in, and which cut right through the heart of, the Valois establishment. If anything, the proximity of the leading rebels to the court was even greater than that seen in other rebellions in fifteen-century France, for all that some parallels can be drawn with, say, the prominence of officeholders such as the constables of Albret and Richemont in opposition in the early 1410s and 1420s.[73]

The close links of rebels to the crown in the Praguerie simultaneously suggest that many of them had much to lose, materially and reputationally, by rebelling. Of course, any insurgent took a risk by abandoning the expectation of allegiance being owed to one's king, and some of the rebels in fact broke the habit of a lifetime by doing so. Certain of them, such as the count of Vendôme and Gilbert de la Fayette, had previously offered decades of service to the Valois, whilst others were later renowned for their military support for Charles VII's cause outside of the Praguerie – such as with Pierre seigneur d'Urfé and Louis de Soyecourt seigneur de Mouy respectively remembered by

[72] For the May 1440 order: AN P 1379 no. 3136. For Bourbon as hereditary *grand chambrier*, Vendôme as *grand maître d'hôtel*, and Dunois as *grand chambellan*, see too: Vallet de Viriville, *Conseillers*, pp. 37-9; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3., p. 422; *ibid*., v. 6, pp. 353; *Titres de la maison ducale de Bourbon*, v. 2, p. 269. For the Dauphin and Alençon's lieutenancies: Thibault, *La Jeunesse de Louis XI*, pp. 191-3, 216; Odolant-Desnos, *Mémoires historiques*, v. 2, p. 64 & n.; *Mémoires de Bretagne*, v. 2, pp. 1323-4; Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 3, p. 80. For the nobles at court: 'Memoire des plaintes', p. 7; Vallet de Viriville, *Conseillers,* p. 19.

[73] For Richemont, see Chapter 1 Section iv) above. For more on Albret: Courroux, *Charles d'Albret*, p. 239ff.

chroniclers for their prowess in fighting at Bulgnéville (1431) and Dieppe (1443).[74] Crucially, though, the reputational dangers for nobles in rebellion were exacerbated by close ties of officeholding under the crown. Household and military offices were regarded as a bond of trust involving oaths that could not lightly be violated, and in this context, it is revealing that when Jean du Chastel was stripped of the captaincy of Revel during the Praguerie, he was described in royal letters as being 'unworthy' of holding it as a result of his conduct, but 'especially considering the oath which he had given for it' (indigne de plus avoir… ledit office actendu mesmement le serment par luy fait a cause d'icelluy').[75]

All of this implies that, although connections to other nobles may have had a profound influence on participation the Praguerie, joining a revolt was always an individual – and difficult – choice. In this sense, it differed from supporting one's lord in the name of one's king as we saw in the case of pro-Lancastrian opposition, and there was still less guarantee that networks would rally behind their leaders. Further proof of this point can be found by looking for inverse cases of individuals who had ties to both Charles VII and a leading rebel and yet chose to support the crown in 1440. As an example, Guillaume Perceval went from being pardoned alongside Jean de la Roche in 1431 to serving as a royal *écuyer d'écurie* by 1446, having in the interim abandoned his noble patron and family by joining the king's forces at Melle in 1440.[76] Comparably, the duke of Bourbon sacked a number of captains whom he felt had not offered sufficient support against royal forces and he was famously rebuffed too by certain noblemen in the duchy of Auvergne. The second group included the royal *grand panetier* (or ceremonial supplier of baked goods) Jacques de Châtillon seigneur de Dampierre, and perhaps the royal councillor and *chambellan* Bertrand de la Tour d'Auvergne, who played a mediating role near the end of the conflict.[77] Examples of this kind suggest that the coexistence of bonds to the king and leading rebels imposed some limits on magnates' ability to

[74] For Urfé: Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 431. For Mouy: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 6, p. 80.
[75] ADI B 3224, f. 347v. Royal attacks on oath-breaking by *routiers* such as Antoine de Chabannes after Angers can also be found in ADI B 3273 (including in the final articles which differ from the other copy of the 'memoire des plaintes'). For the wider importance of oaths and expectations of loyalty from officeholders in late medieval France, see too: T. Dutour, 'Le serment dans l'organisation de la vie publique (espace francophone, XIIIe-XVe siècle)', in W. Fałkowski & Y. Sassier (eds.), *Confiance, bonne foi, fidélité. La notion de "fides"* (Paris, 2018), pp. 293-312; O. Mattéoni, 'Service du prince, fonction châtelaine et élites nobiliaires dans la principauté bourbonnaise à la fin du Moyen Âge', in *idem* & G. Castelnuovo (eds.), '*De part et d'autre des Alpes'. Les châtelains des princes à la fin du Moyen Âge* (Paris, 2006), esp. pp. 251-2.
[76] For the 1431 pardon: *AHP*, v. 29 (1898), p. 12. For Guillaume Perceval's subsequent career: AN JJ 177, no. 170 (printed in *ibid.,* pp. 253-6). For lower-ranking individuals linked to the service of Jean de la Roche who allegedly supported the king in 1440, see also: *AHP*, v. 29, pp. 297, 323-6; *AHP* v. 32 (1903), pp. 86-90.
[77] For Dampierre: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, p. 411; Vallet de Viriville, *Conseillers*, p. 40. For Bertrand de la Tour: Thomas, *Les états provinciaux*, v. 1, pp. 122-3; Vallet de Viriville, *op. cit.*, p. 19; H. Burin de Roziers, *La baronnie de La Tour-d'Auvergne* (Clermont-Ferrand, 1892), p. 329. For the dismissal of captains by Bourbon: BNF Fr. 22299, pp. 9-10.

attract support from their networks in their entirety. This should not be taken to indicate a lack of widespread support or sympathy for the Praguerie though, not least because similar cases could be cited from Bourbon's lands in the Guerre du Bien Public in 1465.[78] Instead, the key point here is that noble interrelationships alone are not enough to explain why so many figures rebelled in Valois France in 1440 or in other years, given that there was always an alternative of supporting the crown.

In sum, we have seen that noble-led networks were at the core of the Praguerie's constituency, but that the picture was far more complicated than this statement in itself would suggest. On the one hand, the noble rebels were a cohesive coalition of pre-established networks. These were held together by a range of durable ties including bonds centred around land and officeholding, as we also saw in looking at Lancastrian opposition and as we shall see again in looking at more localised revolts. Likewise, the rebel coalition was solidified by many lateral interconnections within – and to an extent across – different networks, as also appears to have been the case in other large-scale rebellions. On the other hand, however, the noble rebels remained diverse and must have represented a substantial segment of the entire Valois nobility, especially since they would have been supported by innumerable further adherents. Many of the nobles also had very close ties to the Valois monarchy, and so there was nothing unsurprising or inevitable about the fact that they revolted *en masse*. We will need to think further about the Praguerie's causes and justifications in light of this in Section iv), but beforehand, we must turn to another question about the revolt's constituency: namely, whether the noble rebels appealed successfully to other groups in society.

iii) Noble networks and wider support for large-scale rebellion

In spite of the traditional emphasis on 'popular' backing for Charles VII during the Praguerie, it is well worth re-examining the issue of how far the rebel nobles attracted support from other groups in society. This is especially the case given that we have already seen that the town of Bourges went over to Charles de Bourbon and his allies in 1428, given that we have emphasised the broad roots of support for pro-Lancastrian opposition, and given that Neil Murphy has recently proposed that the Guerre du Bien Public attracted significant urban support.[79] In this section, we will therefore offer a fresh analysis of backing for the secular nobles in the Praguerie from peasants, clergymen, and townspeople. We will contend that the revolt did gain traction amongst the last of these groups in particular, adding further weight to the argument that support for resistance to the Valois could be

[78] As examples of men dismissed by Jean II duke of Bourbon in 1465 (though later restored to favour), Louis de Brie will be discussed below in Section v), n. 203, and Merlin de Cordebeuf lost the captaincy of Gannat after rallying to Louis XI: P. Contamine, 'Merlin de Cordebeuf et son traité sur les chevaliers errants', *Bulletin de la Société nationale des Antiquaires de France 1992* (1994), p. 258; Mattéoni, *Servir le prince,* p. 395.
[79] Murphy, 'The War of the Public Weal, 1465' (forthcoming).

very diverse. At the same time, though, it will be proposed that non-noble rebels in 1440 were often very like their blue-blooded counterparts, in that they tended to have pre-existing ties to more senior insurgents – and to have been part of the same networks even before the revolt.

If we start by considering assistance to the noble rebels from the peasantry and clergy, it is regrettably difficult to build up any kind of detailed picture. Bourbon's promise of backing to Jean seigneur de Gamaches did commit the people of the small parish of Fleury-sur-Loire to perform watch duties at Rosemont, and the king's letter of abolition for Bourbon and his followers also offered a blanket pardon to all of the duke's 'people and servants, vassals, men and subjects' ('tous ses gens et serviteurs, vassaulx, hommes et subgetz') without specifying that they had to be noble.[80] Yet, for all that these cases imply that peasants and lesser clergy could have supported the revolt as vassals and adherents of the rebel lords, little evidence survives beyond these tantalising hints.

Amongst the higher clergy one fares little better, although it is at least possible to show that one senior ecclesiastic was implicated in the rebellion: Jacques Loup, who was bishop of Saint-Flour in Haute-Auvergne. A remarkable royal letter from 27th May 1440 shows that the consuls of Saint-Flour were authorised to wall up one of the town's gates near to Jacques Loup's house. The letter claims that Jacques had been using this gate to communicate with leading rebels and was feared to be plotting to betray Saint-Flour, and it also describes him as a 'serviteur' of the duke of Bourbon.[81] This is perhaps not too surprising given that he was from a family in Bourbonnais, as well as being the uncle of the Blain Loup seigneur de Beauvoir who is named in Bourbon's pardon letter. Against this backdrop, Jacques might be viewed as a clergyman who was unusually well integrated within the sort of networks described earlier. However, perhaps he was not as unusual as all that. He would have been far from the only churchman with close ties to the rebels prior to 1440, and his case also appears less exceptional if we look for parallels in other French rebellions. Bishops of the neighbouring see of Puy-en-Velay, for example, are attested as participating in the oppositional leagues of 1428 and 1465 alongside noble kinsmen, before a third bishop of the town, Antoine de Chabannes, was arrested in 1523 for supporting Charles III duke of Bourbon in treason.[82] Likewise, we shall see in the next chapter that there was substantial clerical involvement in Jacques seigneur de Pons' network and in regionalised resistance in Saintonge in the mid-1440s.

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[80] BNF Fr. 22299 p. 8; AN P 1372/2 no. 2099.

[81] AMSF ch. 4 art. 6 no. 20 (May 1440 royal letter to Saint Flour); M. Boudet, 'Saint-Flour et la Haute-Auvergne pendant les révoltes des Armagnacs et des Bourbons (XVe s.)', *Revue de la Haute-Auvergne*, v. 8 (1906), pp. 351-3. For the Loup family and Blain Loup, see also: J. Viple, 'Le Château de Beauvoir et ses possesseurs', *BSEB* v. 26 (1923), p. 428; Table 1 below, no. 41.

[82] For 1428: Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 2, p. 164 & n. For 1465: Devic & Vaissette, *Histoire générale de Languedoc*, v. 11, pp. 57-8. For 1523: Caron, *Noblesse et Pouvoir*, p. 263.

Nonetheless, for the Praguerie, we must turn instead to townspeople to try to build up a more extensive view of support for the noble insurgents from outside of their own class. Using narrative sources and a small number of extant archival records, around three dozen towns can be identified which offered assistance to the rebels, which hosted garrisons, or which are attested as either being besieged by royal forces or yielding to the king by composition. These places are depicted on Map 4 above, along with the parish of Fleury-sur-Loire and castles of Rosemont and Beauté-sur-Marne. The number of towns here is smaller than would be found in other revolts such as the Guerre du Bien Public, but it is still a substantial one, particularly considering the limitations of our extant evidence and the manner in which the revolt occurred at a time when large parts of France were still being contested with the Lancastrians.[83] Moreover, the implicated towns include major regional centres such as Moulins, Riom, and – initially – Blois, and they are also located across a range of regions, albeit with an especial concentration in the area around southern Bourbonnais where fighting is best attested through the account of Gilles le Bouvier.[84]

Admittedly, in certain cases, some or all of the inhabitants in towns shown on Map 4 may have only been reluctant participants in the Praguerie. In areas such as Berry and the Île-de-France, the rebel towns are portrayed by le Bouvier as isolated bases that were dominated by men-at-arms, and the inhabitants of Corbeil are even alleged by the so-called Bourgeois of Paris to have fought against their own garrison at the first opportunity.[85] In other cases, urban support for the Praguerie may have existed but been somewhat shallow, with pragmatism ultimately governing decisions just as Neil Murphy has observed in some towns during the Guerre du Bien Public.[86] The townspeople of Aigueperse in Basse-Auvergne notably surrendered to Charles VII almost immediately upon his arrival and then had their privileges confirmed by the king, whilst those of Decize in Nivernais made the reverse decision by joining the Praguerie only when an army of rebels arrived on their doorstep.[87] Even at Riom in Basse-Auvergne, the inhabitants appear to have hedged their bets by overtly supporting the duke of Bourbon whilst maintaining tacit contacts with royalist regional centres such as Montferrand.[88]

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[83] Cf. Murphy, 'The War of the Public Weal, 1465' (forthcoming).
[84] Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, esp. pp. 219-27. For Moulins and Blois, see also n. 89 below.
[85] Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 222; *Journal Paris*, p. 352.
[86] Murphy, 'The War of the Public Weal, 1465' (forthcoming).
[87] For Aigueperse: Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 220; 'Memoire des plaintes', p. 15; AN JJ 198 no. 360. For Decize: Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 221; H. Flamare, *Histoire du Nivernais pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans* (Nevers, 1925), v. 2, pp. 231-2; *Inventaire sommaire des Archives communales antérieures à 1790. Ville de Nevers*, ed. F. Boutillier (Nevers, 1876), p. 19.
[88] Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 222; ADPD 'Fonds de Montferrand' CC 181, fs. 14, 19.

However, such examples notwithstanding, it is indisputable that in many instances townspeople were highly forthcoming in their support. At least five further towns – Blois, Niort, Saint-Pourçain-sur-Sioule, Gannat, and Moulins – are attested as hosting leading rebels at different stages in the revolt, and of these towns, two or more were then stripped of their municipal privileges by Charles VII. In a telling sign of assumed complicity on the part of the townspeople, Niort in Poitou was thus deprived of its financial rights, and Saint-Pourçain-sur-Sioule in Bourbonnais forfeited the ability to coin money, as well as being forced to accept a changed 'gouvernement' according to Gilles le Bouvier.[89] A sixth town, Angoulême, welcomed Jean de la Roche as its captain immediately after the revolt too and ahead of his submission to the king. It may thence have been no accident that Charles VII besieged this town after fresh opposition in 1442, before its mayor and burgesses were included in a new pardon for Guy de la Roche and his adherents.[90] Two years earlier, there are additionally cases of townspeople offering financial support to the leading insurgents in the Praguerie, as with Villefranche in Beaujolais, and of their probably being complicit in armed resistance.[91] It is worth observing that a third of our sample of places in Bourbon's lands had to be taken by assault or averted this fate only after an attack had been ordered, suggesting that, at a minimum, townspeople were not the royalist fifth column that has often been alleged.[92]

Instead, it is more plausible to view the townspeople involved in the Praguerie in a similar light to many of the 'lesser' nobility, since we again find a strong correlation between participation in the rebellion and pre-existing ties to other rebels. If we take the two towns stripped of their privileges, for example, we can note that Niort had been in the hands of the duke of Alençon since 1423, and that Saint-Pourçain-sur-Sioule lay within Bourbon's lands and had close links to the Loup family. Specifically, Blain Loup seigneur de Beauvoir owned lordships and castles such as Montfand in the

[89] For Saint-Pourçain-sur-Sioule: AN JJ 177 no. 40 (printed in *Ordonnances des rois*, v. 13, pp. 421-2); ADPD 'Fonds de Montferrand' BB 1, f. 3v; Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 228. For Niort: Favreau, 'La Praguerie en Poitou', pp. 297-300; Murphy, 'The War of the Public Weal, 1465' (forthcoming); cf. *AHP*, v. 35 (1906), pp. 297-305. See also, for Blois: 'Memoire des plaintes', p. 11; Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, pp. 213, 218; for Gannat: Thomas, *Les états provinciaux*, v. 1, pp. 122-3 & n.; and for Moulins: Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 221; Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, p. 410.

[90] For Jean de la Roche's retreat to Angoulême in early Autumn 1440: Favreau, 'La Praguerie en Poitou', p. 294; AN JJ 177, no. 196; *AHP*, v. 29 (1898), pp. lxiv-lxviii. For the pardoning of the mayor, burgesses, and other inhabitants: AN JJ 178 no. 95.

[91] *Registres de Villefranche*, v. 1, pp. 123-5.

[92] Chambon-sur-Voueize, Évaux-les-Bains ('Crevon'), and Charroux were taken by assault according to Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, pp. 219, 221. The same was true for Bourbon-l'Archambaut ('Achambon') and Buxière-la-Grue ('Guo') according to 'Memoire des plaintes', p. 15. Saint-Haon only narrowly avoided being captured by storm, as per Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 226. Cf. Leguai, *Les ducs de Bourbon*, pp. 170-1; Chevalier, 'Un tournant du règne de Charles VII', pp. 160-3.

immediate vicinity of the town, and his uncle Jacques had financial interests there.[93] In such towns, it may well also be the case that influential individuals were attached to the service of noble rebels or had long been incorporated within their networks. In this regard, it is of interest that a burgess from Ébreuil witnessed Jacques de Chabannes' marriage contract in 1432 (as did the local abbot), and that one year earlier, burgesses from Clermont, Riom, and Aigueperse witnessed the marriage of Guillaume Regnault de Cordebeuf. This latter nobleman was a knight and Bourbon's *bailli* in Haute-Auvergne in 1440, and he may also be identifiable as a Praguerie rebel.[94] Considering that Ébreuil, Riom, and Aigueperse would all go on to be embroiled in the revolt of 1440 as well, these examples strengthen the case for regarding noble networks as *noble-led* networks in which townspeople could be included inside and outside of opposition.

Thinking in terms of individual ties, we can also consider examples of specific townspeople who are attested as being implicated in the Praguerie. A burgess of Blois called Étienne Lefuselier, for instance, gave a pledge and guarantee to the treasurer of Bourbonnais prior to 12th March 1440, perhaps hinting that he was an established point of contact for the rebels in this town.[95] Meanwhile, two pardon letters survive for Poitevin participants in the Praguerie who may again have been from urban backgrounds. Most notably, a man named Jean Marsillac, who served in Jean de la Roche's company in 1440 and against the English, is described as residing at Aulnay (not far to the south of Niort) in his 1445 letter.[96] Of especial interest, though, is another man who appears in the duke of Bourbon's pardon as the one individual whom Charles VII refused to forgive entirely.[97] This was Jean de la Borderie, who had previously served as Bourbon's *receveur* of Haute-Auvergne in the 1430s. Jean seemingly lent Bourbon large sums of money whilst in his service, leading some local historians to speculate that he may have been a 'Jacques Cœur' or financier of the rebels.[98] Crucially, however, Jean's background, like that of Jacques Cœur, was quintessentially urban, since he is later described in a royal order from 1452 as having 'made his residence and dwelt' at Cusset in southern

[93] For Saint-Pourçain-sur-Sioule and the Loup family: AMSF ch. 4 art. 6 no. 20 (May 1440 royal letter to Saint Flour); Boudet, 'Saint-Flour et la Haute-Auvergne', p. 351; Dupieux, 'La Paix de Cusset', p. 441 & n. For Niort, see n. 38 above.
[94] For Jacques de Chabannes: *Preuves Chabannes*, v. 1, p. 160. For Guillaume Regnault: BNF Fr. 27337 'Cordebeuf' no. 14; see also n. 31 above and Table 1 below, no. 42. For Ébreuil's involvement in the Praguerie: Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 220; 'Memoire des plaintes', p. 15.
[95] AN P 1358/2 no. 564.
[96] AN JJ 177 no. 182 (August 1445 abolition for Jean Marsillac, printed in *AHP* v. 29 (1898), pp. 208-10); AN JJ 178 no. 178 (May 1445 abolition for Pierre Quissarme, printed in *AHP* v. 32 (1903), pp. 6-9). There are also cases of townspeople being pardoned for serving in other internal conflicts in Poitou in Charles VII's reign (e.g. Jean Guilloton merchant of Mareuil-sur-Lay, as per AN JJ 177 no. 180, printed in *AHP* v. 29 (1898), pp. 263-6).
[97] AN P 1372/2 no. 2099.
[98] Dupieux, 'La Paix de Cusset', p. 444; Leguai, *Les ducs de Bourbon*, p. 169.

Bourbonnais.[99] His case consequently reveals that even as powerful a nobleman as Bourbon could cultivate townspeople amongst his adherents and that these ties could continue during rebellion.

What is also interesting with Jean de la Borderie, however, is that Cusset as a whole appears to have rejected rebel advances in 1440.[100] This is a reminder that some towns may have supported the king but had individuals or factions which retained close ties to the rebels, suggesting that our sample of towns could again understate the extent of urban support. In this context, it is worth highlighting that divided loyalties were prevalent in Saint-Flour in 1440 and in other rebellions, and that similar dynamics have been observed in many royalist towns during the Guerre du Bien Public of 1465.[101] There are even hints that this picture may be applicable to major urban centres like La Rochelle and Lyon during the Praguerie. The first of these towns was ordered by Charles VII to suspend mayoral elections in early 1440, whilst the second seems to have belatedly rallied behind the king, but it is still named as the projected location where the rebels intended to hold a meeting of the estates.[102] Detailed records for Lyon do not survive for 1440, but in light of the rebels' plan, it may be speculated that they had reasons to expect sympathy from within the town – as well as from its noble governor, Theaude de Valpergue, who was a kinsman of Louis de Valpergue and a *chambellan* of Bourbon.[103]

Still, though, none of this is to say that townspeople, any more than other groups, participated in the Praguerie solely because of prior connections to more senior rebels. The fact that the royal *mémoire* suggests that rebel manifestoes were sent to towns in the Dauphiné, Champagne, and Languedoc, and that royal letters consistently contain instructions relating to rebel messages and messengers, is probably indicative of how the insurgents also made more general appeals to towns.[104] Their missives are now lost, barring any new finds, and they seem to have had limited impact in the aforementioned regions. Yet, the fact that the rebels tried to appeal for broad support in this way is still highly significant, because one would presume that similar documents, manifestoes, and

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[99] BNF Fr. 26902 'de la Borderie' no. 3 ('faisoit sa residence et demourans'). Jean's son Henri later served Jean II duke of Bourbon and was accused of betraying Cusset to the rebels in the Guerre du Bien Public; he then continued to reside within the town, although he is described as an esquire in 1467, suggesting that the family had risen in status by this time: P. Duchon, 'Cusset à travers les siècles', *BSEB*, v. 24 (1921), p. 229; *Titres de la maison ducale de Bourbon*, v. 2, p. 354.

[100] Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 221.

[101] For Saint-Flour: AMSF ch. 2 art. 2 no. 62 (February 1413 declaration relating to dissensions in Saint-Flour), ch. 4 art. 6 no. 20 (May 1440 royal letter to Saint-Flour); Boudet, 'Saint-Flour et la Haute-Auvergne', pp. 351-3, & *ibid. cont.*, esp. pp. 64-5, 80, 317-8. For other towns in 1465: Murphy, 'The War of the Public Weal, 1465' (forthcoming).

[102] For La Rochelle: A. Barbot, 'Histoire de la Rochelle', *AHS*, v. 14 (1886), p. 305. For Lyon: 'Memoire des plaintes', p. 14; A. Bossuat, *Le bailliage royal de Montferrand (1425-1556)* (Paris, 1957), p. 49 & n.

[103] For Theaude de Valpergue: *Gallia Regia*, v. 3, p. 583. For the gap in records: *Registres consulaires de la ville de Lyon*, ed. G. Guigue, v. 2 (Lyon, 1926), p. 477.

[104] 'Memoire des plaintes', pp. 7, 14. The royal letters will be discussed further below in Section iv) & n. 113.

grievances would have been circulated in towns which did support and sympathise with the rebellion.

Considering all of this, townspeople and other individuals from non-noble backgrounds should be seen as agents in the Praguerie and as an important part of rebel networks, although the picture is again nuanced. There was certainly no firm division in loyalties between the nobility and groups such as townspeople in 1440, and cross-class alliances were widespread, just as has been identified in revisionist scholarship on the Guerre du Bien Public. Strong emphasis has also been placed here on pre-existing ties between different groups, although at the same time, it is necessary to acknowledge that these bonds must have been supplemented by other influences and ideas. A key question for the next section to consider will be what these influences might have been.

iv) The causes and ideology of large-scale rebellion

For the purposes of this study and for understanding the wider phenomenon of opposition to the Valois, it is fundamental to assess what triggered the Praguerie and how it was justified. The fact that such a wide array of Charles VII's subjects were prepared to rebel over a period of months in 1440, despite the many practical risks and ideological disincentives against doing so, only deepens the need for answers. However, finding these is not a straightforward matter. Recent research on late medieval 'popular' revolt reminds us that there would typically have been a multiplicity of motives and ideas in circulation during a rebellion, whilst we also saw in the previous chapter that pro-Lancastrian nobles appear to have been influenced by a mixture of ideological and personal concerns.[105] Yet, pinning down such concerns in the Praguerie is difficult given the combination of its breadth and the loss of almost all documents written by the rebels themselves, which engenders a reliance on allusions to the leading rebels' agenda in unsympathetic sources.

As a way forward, part one of this section will offer a revisionist analysis of the evidence for, and plausibility of, the two explanations of the leading rebels' goals in 1440 which have been central to modern scholarship. We will begin by assessing the theory that the Praguerie was instigated primarily to block centralising military reforms passed in the ordonnance of Orléans in 1439. Afterwards, we will discuss how far it is likely that the rebels' main objectives were to bolster their personal positions and profits by removing royal favourites and by seizing full control of the machinery of government. In both cases, it will be contended that these views do not provide a satisfactory framework for understanding the Praguerie in their own right.

[105] See e.g. J. Firnhaber-Baker, *The Jacquerie of 1358: A French Peasants' Revolt* (Oxford, 2021), pp. 21, 96.

Resultantly, the second part of this section will propose an alternative framework for understanding the uprising's emergence. It will be argued here that the leading rebels attempted to offer a meaningful programme of changes in 1440 in response to perceived weak kingship. Concerns about Charles VII's leadership, we will suggest, were integral to the rebels' plans to elevate the Dauphin, as well as underpinning both their calls for broader reforms and many of their more self-interested concerns. Viewing the Praguerie in this way will in turn create new possibilities for situating the revolt within the wider context of noble-led leagues in Charles VII's reign and beyond.

Part 1: Traditional explanations for the Praguerie

Hostility to centralising military reforms provides one clear hypothesis for why the Praguerie emerged in early 1440. On 2nd November 1439, Charles VII passed the ordonnance of Orléans during a meeting of the Estates-General, and this ordonnance not only set out plans to regulate the conduct of military captains, but it also banned any magnate from employing such captains without royal licence under pain of lèse-majesté. It moreover contained articles which prohibited noblemen from stocking castles with men-at-arms and oppressing the surrounding countryside, as well as targeting nobles' ability to obstruct royal taxation and to raise *tailles* themselves.[106] These provisions were regarded in nineteenth-century scholarship as provoking a reactionary noble fightback against a benevolent monarchy, and subsequently, historians have continued to assert that the ordonnance was a trigger point because it aided the crown, or rise of the 'state', at the expense of the interests of the leading rebels and captains.[107]

There are, though, serious problems with this contention even in its more moderate forms. To begin with, it is worth questioning how far Charles VII actually possessed the means to enforce the ordonnance of Orléans. Ongoing war with the Lancastrians and their supporters continued to put strain on royal resources in c.1439, and even looking at the ordonnance itself, it can be noted that multiple clauses appear to be idealistic in nature or of little practical import. These include a declaration that Charles VII did not intend to grant remissions for any infringements, which was disregarded or circumvented on countless occasions thereafter, not least through the granting of letters of abolition to dozens of nobles involved in pillaging.[108] Furthermore, it should be added that

[106] The ordonnance is printed in *Ordonnances des rois*, v. 13, pp. 306-13 & V. Bessey, *Construire l'armée française: textes fondateurs des institutions militaires* (Turnhout, 2006), pp. 88-101.
[107] For traditional views on the ordonnance and Praguerie, see e.g. Vallet de Viriville, *Histoire de Charles VII*, v. 2, pp. 401-7; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, pp. 409, 412-3. For more recent scholarship, see the works cited in n. 9 above, esp. Lecuppre-Desjardin & Toureille, 'Servir ou trahir', pp. 8-10, 19. For a more sceptical perspective on the ordonnance's scope, cf. J. Garillot, *Étude de la coutume constitutionnelle au XVe siècle: les États généraux de 1439* (Nancy, 1947), p. 22ff.
[108] *Ordonnances des rois*, v. 13, p. 310; cf. Gauvard, 'Pardonner et oublier après la Guerre de cent ans', pp. 28-30, 49.

one of the few truly contemporary comments on the ordonnance is a sceptical one. Jean Juvénal des Ursins bishop of Beauvais complained in a treatise in early 1440 that the king had not given any instructions to the count of Eu for implementing the law near to Beauvais, and, strikingly, this allegation follows straight on from comments by Ursins about how Charles VII's previous promises to reduce disorder had only amounted to 'meaningless words' ('paroles sans effect').[109] If the ordonnance of 2nd November was viewed in a similar light by Ursins and others, then it might have been perceived less as a groundbreaking threat to the nobility, and more as a statement of intent designed to assuage public opinion during the estates-general. It would perhaps be excessive to say that the law was therefore a paper tiger, since we shall see later on and in Chapter Four that there were occasions when its principles were used to justify other measures that facilitated opposition. Yet, it is entirely plausible that nobles such as the duke of Bourbon and count of Vendôme felt no grounds for concern when they assented to it during the estates.[110]

In addition, it is not obvious why many of the rebels would have objected to the ordonnance of Orléans more than other magnates and captains who rallied to the crown during the Praguerie. Bourbon and Vendôme's public assent to the law may instead indicate that there was a consensus amongst the senior nobility that measures were needed to bring a halt to disorder, whilst it can also be noted that another senior figure in the Praguerie coalition, the marshal de La Fayette, was consistently supportive of military reform.[111] Still more significantly, negotiations preserved in the royal *mémoire* of 1440 and later demands made at the Nevers gathering in 1442 fail to demonstrate that the need for reform was contested or disputed in principle by noble opposition in the early 1440s. Instead, as Loïc Cazaux has rightly acknowledged, attacks on provisions for order by oppositional nobles appear to have been concentrated on the conduct of those around the king and on 'military practices', rather than on 'military regulations'.[112] One can even take this argument a stage further, by observing that neither is there any mention whatsoever of rebel hostility to the ordonnance of Orléans in the extant letters sent by Charles VII to towns and officials in February-

[109] Jean Juvénal des Ursins, 'Loquar in tribulacione', in P. Lewis (ed.), *Écrits politiques de Jean Juvénal des Ursins*, (Paris, 1978), v. 1, pp. 324-6.
[110] For the nobles' public assent: *Ordonnances des rois*, v. 13, p. 306; Cazaux, 'Les lendemains de la Praguerie', p. 369 & n.
[111] See *ibid*; and for La Fayette and reform, also: Thomas, *Les états provinciaux*, v. 1, pp. 146-7; A. de Bouillé, *Un conseiller de Charles VII, le Maréchal de La Fayette* (Lyon, 1955), pp. 111-2; Contamine, *Guerre, état et société*, p. 493 & n.
[112] Cazaux, 'Les lendemains de la Praguerie', pp. 368-9. The argument is applicable to the 'Mémoire des plaintes', pp. 20-7 and documents from 1442 printed in Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 3, 'preuves', pp. 41-92. Cf. Cazaux, 'Une étude comparée sur la guerre civile', p. 78.

May 1440.[113] If this ordonnance had really been a key dividing line between Charles and rebels in 1440, the king would surely have had every reason to have emphasised that his opponents were obstructing a law that was to the advantage of the populace.

Admittedly, two letters from 24th February and the royal *mémoire* are explicit in accusing the Praguerie rebels of violating another ordonnance issued at Angers around December 1439.[114] This lost, second ordonnance added more substance to a particular part of the ordonnance of Orléans, through commanding named captains who had been active in northern France to remain in frontier garrisons on the grounds of preventing pillaging.[115] We have seen that at least seven rebel *routiers* were amongst those who refused to obey this command, most of whom had close ties to Bourbon. As a result, this later ordonnance of Angers can more convincingly be seen as an important context for the Praguerie.

However, one should not equate the interests of the rebel captains and Bourbon with those of all of the insurgents, and even for them, it is worth asking whether the crown's right to regulate the activity and freebooting of captains was truly the main issue at stake. When the chronicler Gilles Le Bouvier discussed the Angers ordonnance in the 1450s, he notably portrayed it as a reaction to, and maybe even a punishment for, perceived failings in the *routiers*' conduct during an earlier siege of Avranches.[116] This may hint that a quarrel between Charles VII and certain captains took place in late 1439 which also touched on issues around reputation, honour, and leadership, and it could even be that some were ordered to the frontiers in order to try to prevent them from plotting with allies at court amidst growing acrimony. The ordonnance of Angers might also have been regarded by Bourbon and his subordinates as targeting his network in a partisan fashion. Although we can only hypothesise about this matter, it is not inconceivable that Bourbon and his supporters could have been concerned about *routiers* in his service being forced to stay at the frontiers, whilst his lands

[113] At least six letters survive which discuss the king's views on the Praguerie in detail, none of which mentions the ordonnance: a letter from Charles VII to Reims, 24th February 1440, printed in Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, pp. 529-31; a near-identical letter from Charles VII to Narbonne, 24th February 1440, in *Narbonne Inventaire Annexes*, pp. 391-2; a second letter from Charles VII to Narbonne, 24th April 1440, in *Narbonne Inventaire Annexes*, pp. 392-3; a letter from Charles VII to Saint-Flour, 21st April 1440, AMSF ch. 2 art. 2 no. 72; a near-identical letter from Charles VII to the Dauphiné, 23rd April 1440, ADI B 3180; and a second letter from Charles VII to the Dauphin, 2nd May 1440', in C. Duclos, *Histoire de Louis XI* (La Haye, 1746), v. 3, pp. 15-9.
[114] Letter from Charles VII to Reims, 24th February 1440, in Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, pp. 529-30; letter from Charles VII to Narbonne, 24th February 1440, in *Narbonne Inventaire Annexes*, pp. 391-2; 'Memoire des plaintes', pp. 8-9. *Ibid*., p. 8, & Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, pp. 212-4 also refer to the rebels of breaking 'ordonnances' made by the king, but only that of Angers is discussed explicitly in either case.
[115] 'Memoire des plaintes', pp. 8-9.
[116] Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, pp. 212-3.

and vassals were left vulnerable to rival companies in southern France which were less affected by the law.

Pursuing this train of thought, one might instead argue that the leading rebels' main aims were to seize full control of government in order to remove opponents and to seek political, military, and financial advantage.[117] We saw earlier that very few of the Praguerie insurgents were frozen out of royal favour or the court, but a range of later chroniclers do still suggest that divisions at the top of polity impacted the uprising. Around fifteen years after the revolt, the herald Gilles le Bouvier for instance claimed that the rebels hoped to remove rivals within the great council, before Philippe de Commynes and Jean Chartier too agreed that the Praguerie was essentially a 'court dispute' ('débat de court') or quarrel amongst the lords around the king.[118] More specifically, the Delphinal writer Mathieu Thomassin alleged that the Dauphin had quarrelled with his father's closest advisers, whilst the future pope Aeneas Piccolomini stated that it was antagonism between Charles VII's favourite Charles of Anjou and the dukes of Bourbon and Alençon that was instrumental to the movement.[119] The former of these authors may admittedly have been influenced by the later fall-out between the Dauphin and Charles VII's regime in the 1450s, whilst the latter sets his comments within a garbled account of the Praguerie. Yet, this does not mean that their claims should be dismissed. For one thing, political rivalries in 1440 could have heightened concerns about the recent ordonnance of Angers, as well as about further measures such as a hypothetical cancellation of royal grants from the domain set out in December 1438.[120] Equally, several of the leading rebels would have had specific grievances which could have fuelled resentment towards the king's close favourites and a desire for greater influence. The Dauphin, for example, expressed unhappiness during the Praguerie about his lack of landed power, protesting during the negotiations preserved within the royal *mémoire* that it was wrong that he had not been granted control of 'his Dauphiné'.[121] Jean II duke of Alençon was for his part struggling financially under the weight of a heavy ransom, whilst Georges de la Trémoille hoped to recover his former influence in government according to Gilles le Bouvier,

[117] For emphasis on private interests of this sort in historiography, see the works cited in n. 9 above.
[118] Le Bouvier, *Chronique,* p. 213; Philippe de Commynes, *Mémoires*, ed. J. Blanchard, v. 1, p. 486; Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 1, p. 253.
[119] Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, *Europe (c.1400-1458)*, tr. R. Brown & ed. N. Bisaha (Washington, 2013), p. 202; *Registre Delphinal par Mathieu Thomassin*, ed. K. Daly (Paris, 2018), p. 205. For further commentary on Charles of Anjou's influence and hostility to him, see also: Favreau, 'La Praguerie en Poitou', p. 288 & n.; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, p. 145; *ibid*., v. 6, p. 55; as well as the discussion of De Cagny, *Chronique*, p. 253 in part 2 of this section.
[120] For the theoretical cancellation of grants of the domain: *Ordonnances des rois*, v. 13, pp. 293-5; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, pp. 417-20; G. Small, *Late Medieval France* (New York, 2009), p. 160.
[121] 'Memoire des plaintes', p. 23.

and Jean count of Dunois was unhappy about the lack of progress in securing the release of his half-brother Charles duke of Orléans according to the royal *mémoire*.[122]

In addition, seizing full control of government may have been attractive to leading rebels as a result of anxieties about their positions in more regional power-struggles and feuds. It is well known that such disputes were a destabilising influence in the build up to the Wars of the Roses in England in the 1450s, and there are grounds for thinking that a similar dynamic could have filtered into French politics some years earlier.[123] For instance, it is suggestive that several regional rivals appear on opposite sides during both the 1428 and 1440 rebellions, even if this meant inverting roles between the two clashes. As cases in point, one might think of Georges de La Trémoille and the count of Richemont, whom we have seen were locked in a power struggle in Poitou, and Jean de la Roche and the count of Pardiac, who were longstanding enemies who had clashed in Limousin in the mid-1420s.[124] In a similar vein, it may be no coincidence that further rivals of La Trémoille and the duke of Bourbon again opposed them by taking the king's part during the Praguerie. Amongst their number were Martin Gouge bishop of Clermont in Auvergne, who had previously been arrested by both La Trémoille and Bourbon, and Louis d'Amboise viscount of Thouars in Poitou, whose properties had been granted to La Trémoille after he orchestrated his condemnation for treason in 1431.[125] All of this indicates that personal enmities and grievances must at least have factored into loyalties during opposition under the princes.

There remains a danger here of overlooking the agency of 'lesser' rebels by focusing only on more powerful individuals in the Praguerie. However, this problem can be surmounted. Firstly, we can note that some 'lesser' insurgents would have had strong vested interests of their own. This point is typified by Jean seigneur de Montenay and Jean seigneur de Montejean, both of whom were suffering from severe financial difficulties by at least the 1450s, which forced them to engage in

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[122] For Alençon: De Cagny, *Chronique*, pp. 22-3; Chastelain, *Œuvres*, v. 2, pp. 163-4. For Dunois: 'Memoire des plaintes', pp. 7-8. For La Trémoille: Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, pp. 213-4. See also: Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, p. 116; Scordia, 'La Praguerie racontée par Louis XI', p. 102; Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 1, p. 253.

[123] See e.g. R. Storey, *The end of the house of Lancaster* (London, 1966), p. 27; Harriss, *Shaping the Nation*, pp. 626-8; cf. Carpenter, *The Wars of the Roses*, p. 24.

[124] For Georges de La Trémoille and Richemont's history, see Chapter 1 Section iv) above & Guérin, 'introduction' to *AHP*, v. 29, p. iff. For Jean de la Roche and Pardiac prior to the Praguerie: 1428 manifesto in Bossuat, 'Un manifeste', p. 95; Clément-Simon, 'Jean de La Roche', p. 46.

[125] For Martin Gouge: Le Bouvier, *Chronique,* pp. 223-4; Contamine, *Charles VII*, pp. 134-5; Leguai, *Les ducs de Bourbon*, pp. 99, 123. For Louis d'Amboise: BNF Fr. 6965, fs. 113-114 (March 1440 payment from Charles VII to Louis d'Amboise for services against rebels in Poitou); Peyronnet, 'Les complots de Louis d'Amboise contre Charles VII', pp. 116-7, 122-6. A more obscure quarrel between the Armagnac and Bourbon families may also have influenced the former's support for the crown in 1440: *Titres de la maison ducale de Bourbon*, v. 2, p. 277; Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 222.

large-scale alienations of their inheritances in this period.[126] More broadly, it can also be contended that rebels within pre-existing networks would have been highly amenable to arguments that their patrons and their allies had been unfairly treated. This is difficult to prove in the context of the Praguerie, although we have seen that the Dauphin made no attempt to conceal his stake in the uprising. Similarly, the abundance of ties to the duke of Orléans amongst the rebels could be a sign that the count of Dunois was far from alone in being angered by a lack of progress in securing Orléans' release.

If we search for parallels in extant documents from other opposition, we can also observe that personal grievances figure centrally in one manifesto issued by Charles de Bourbon and his allies in early 1428. This declaration begins with series of twelve articles attacking the government of Georges de la Trémoille. Interestingly, though, whilst the 'public good' ('chose publique') is mentioned multiple times, every single one of the articles relates in some way to wrongs and slanders against the three leading leaguers.[127] This emphasis on personal grievances may stem from the messaging being tailored to this manifesto's audience. The document appears in a collection of material from the town of Saint-Amand-Tallende in Bourbon's duchy of Auvergne, and so this could be an indicator that it was designed to appeal to pre-existing vassals or supporters of the family – in contrast to a broader declaration which survives from earlier in the winter of 1427-8.[128] In any case, both manifestoes are evidence that self-interested and 'public' concerns were not always regarded as antithetical in revolt. Until the Guerre du Bien Public at the very least, individualistic grievances may rather have been openly utilised by rebels and accepted by many as a significant part of noble-led opposition.[129]

However, having said this, it is important to make a clear distinction. The argument that the Praguerie was influenced by a range of self-interested considerations, and that the importance of these considerations may have been accepted and amplified by bonds within networks, emphatically does not mean that these are sufficient to explain the Praguerie in and of themselves. Instead,

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[126] For Montenay: Prosser, 'After the Reduction', pp. 68-70. For Montejean: Anselme, *Histoire Généalogique* 3 e., v. 7, p. 176.

[127] 1428 manifesto in Bossuat, 'Un manifeste', pp. 94-5.

[128] For the provenance of both manifestoes, see Bossuat, 'Un manifest', pp. 87, 91-3; and for the earlier document: Cosneau, *Le connétable de Richemont*, 'preuves', pp. 534-7. Cf. Lecuppre-Desjardin & Toureille, 'Servir ou trahir', p. 14.

[129] In 1465, the rebels' extreme emphasis on the 'common good' in the face of tyrannical rule may have led to individual concerns being less discussed, as in the March 1465 proclamation of Jean II duke of Bourbon in 'Lettres relatifs à la guerre du Bien Public', pp. 196-7, whilst Louis XI responded by alleging that his opponents were acting through pure greed: Lewis, *Later Medieval France*, pp. 227-8. For the earlier Nevers gathering of 1442, cf. the March 1442 instructions of the assembled princes, printed in Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 3, 'preuves', pp. 78-86.

viewing any revolt simply through the lens of personal ambition remains incredibly problematic. For a start, one is forced to dismiss other concerns professed by rebels as window-dressing or a 'cloak' (to use the term employed by Malcolm Vale for the Praguerie), meaning that a multitude of people must be regarded as either completely cynical or gullible in supporting rebellion.[130] To compound this issue, opponents of the crown are then treated entirely differently from royal supporters, who have continued to be seen as attracted to the king's cause through royalist ideology.[131]

On top of this, political divisions, feuds, and jostling for preferment would have concerned people in any polity or time period across the Middle Ages and beyond, without grievances usually being pursued through avenues which conflicted so dramatically with pragmatic and ideological loyalties to the crown.[132] What is incomprehensible within frameworks emphasising self-interest is therefore why matters escalated in such an extreme manner specifically in 1440, at a time when links between the Praguerie rebels and Valois monarchy were extensive, or at other moments of rebellion in the fifteenth century. Given that opposition to the ordonnance of Orléans and centralisation also cannot provide a satisfying explanation for the events of the Praguerie, it is necessary to take a different approach to understanding its emergence.

Part 2: Ineffective kingship

As an alternative to traditional approaches to the Praguerie, we will propose here that the revolt emerged primarily from a wide-ranging loss of confidence in the ability of Charles VII to rule in an effective manner. In constructing this argument, we will firstly show that concerns about Charles' capabilities were increasing in salience, or at least widespread, in the run up to 1440. Afterwards, we will move on to looking at how doubts about Charles VII informed the rebels' decision to rally in the name of the Dauphin, their calls for reforms, and many of their more specific grievances. We will end by considering the implications for analysing the Praguerie within the wider sweep of noble-led rebellion.

Whatever Charles VII's ultimate achievements, it is incontrovertible that a range of contemporaries expressed doubts about whether he was any more able to rule than his father or to make basic political decisions. Within Valois France, such concerns may well have been encouraged by the sequence of revolts and successful putsches against ministers earlier in Charles' reign. We saw in Chapter One that the king was humiliated on several occasions in the 1420s and forced to admit that

[130] Vale, *Charles VII*, p. 76. Cf. Carpenter, *The Wars of the Roses*, p. 26.
[131] For emphasis on royalist ideology or sentiment in the face of revolt, see e.g. Chevalier, 'Un tournant du règne de Charles VII', pp. 162-3; Caron, *Noblesse et pouvoir*, p. 287; Contamine, *Charles VII*, pp. 252-3.
[132] Cf. Watts, *Making of Polities*, p. 6 for the argument that personal concerns were ubiquitous and have been overvalued in past scholarship, in contrast to broader 'structures and processes'.

he had acted with 'inadvertence' in 1425. These events must surely have had some impact on wider opinion, and chronicles and advisory treatises from, or describing, this period make claims such as that the king was 'governed', that his favourites 'ruled' France, and that he had been 'deceived in past times'.[133] Nor is it clear that Charles VII had managed to shake off this reputation by 1440. As late as 1438, the chronicler Perceval de Cagny claimed that Bourbon and Alençon were unhappy with Charles of Anjou's pre-eminence, since this lord 'governed the king and his household' ('gouvernoit le roy et son hostel').[134] This claim is of particular interest not only given the date, but also because De Cagny was the father-in-law of Guillaume Blosset seigneur de Saint Pierre and a member of Alençon's household, meaning that even whilst he died before the Praguerie, he was attached to one of the networks involved in the rebellion.[135]

De Cagny's language likewise finds echoes in claims made by other contemporaries. Writing further away from the Valois court but in starker terms, for example, the Burgundian Hue de Lannoy stated in a memorandum in 1437 that Charles VII 'did not govern for himself, but was governed' ('ne gouverne point de soy-meismes, mais est gouverné').[136] Similarly, the English duke of Gloucester alleged in a protestation to his king in spring 1440 that it was 'comune reporte and fame' that Charles had 'neither… wisdom nor discretion to governe himself, but must be led, for defaut of naturell reason'.[137] Still more extreme anxieties about Charles VII's capabilities can also be detected in trial records across his adult life. Claims were allegedly made that Charles could 'be made to say anything' and 'lacked the royal mark', and it was even asserted that a consul of the town of Millau had said in around 1440 that the king was 'the son of a barber' and 'a madman who would destroy the realm of France' ('[le] fils d'un barbier… [et] un fol qui perdroit le royaume de France').[138]

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[133] For allegations about control of the king, see the works cited above in Chapter 1 n. 71, esp. Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 1, p. 54 & Contamine, 'Charles VII, roi de France, et ses favoris', p. 144, for claims that Pierre de Giac 'gouvernoit le roi' or 'regna'. For the claim that the king 'a esté deceu ou temps passé': 'L'Avis à Yolande d'Aragon', https://journals.openedition.org/crmh/12899?lang=en (accessed 31/12/2023); as a parallel, see also the argument in the Treaty of Arras that Charles VII had 'petite cognoissance' as a teenager at Montereau: *Grands traités*, p. 125.

[134] De Cagny, *Chronique*, p. 253.

[135] For De Cagny's background: De Cagny, *Chronique*, p. iii; Tournouër, 'Excursion archéologique dans le Houlme', p. 358; *Château de Carrouges, chartrier et papiers de la famille Le Veneur, 1394-1925*, ed. L. Bergès (Alençon, 1995), p. 89.

[136] February 1437 Memorandum, in J. C. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 'Programme d'un gouvernement constitutionnel en Belgique au XVe siècle', *Bulletin de l'Académie Royale de Belgique*, 2.s. v. 14 (Brussels, 1862), p. 229.

[137] June 1440 vidimus of a protestation of the duke of Gloucester, in *Rymer's Foedera*, v. 10, p. 764.

[138] Lewis, *Later Medieval France*, pp. 61, 69-70, 235; and for Millau, see too J. Artières, *Annales de Millau depuis ses origines jusqu'à nos jours* (Millau, 1894), v. 1, pp. 95-6. For comparable allegations about Henry VI, cf. Watts, *Henry VI*, pp. 103-4.

Of course, these kinds of reports may have been politically motivated fictions. The above case is especially suspect given that the accused consul, Raymond de Montcalm, was himself the son of a barber-surgeon, given that the consul's son Jean was also attacked through an accusation of likening the king to dog faeces ('estron de chien'), and given that the allegations were made against the backdrop of a dispute between the viscount of Lomagne and opponents at Millau.[139] In the previous chapter, we additionally saw that Charles VII and his government were, to all appearances, quite effective in their handling of the count of Saint Pol's change of allegiances from 1441.

However, in c.1440, concerns about Charles VII's kingship might still have had particular resonance. Charles' heir Louis was at this time just reaching adulthood, and aside from the reconquest of Paris, the Treaty of Arras had as yet produced disappointing results. As Philippe Contamine hints, moreover, criticism appears to have been mounting due to perceived royal inactivity against this backdrop.[140] Perceval de Cagny, for instance, wrote that Bourbon, Alençon and many others were perturbed at how long the king had spent residing in southern France in 1436 whilst seeming to have 'little regard for the great mischiefs and wars of his realm' ('povoit sembler… que il avoit petit regart aux grans meschiefs et guerres de son royaume'); and in 1438, the chronicler complained again that the king and his nobles 'did not undertake to make war' even though those at the frontiers continued 'always pillaging the poor people' ('le roy ne s'est entremis de faire guerre… et n'y eut fait guerre que des frontieres les uns aux autres, en pillant tousjours le povre peuple').[141] In the same year, it was likewise observed publicly in the municipal council of Toulouse that the city's inhabitants had been 'abandoned by the king' ('sunt habandonati per regem'). This opinion was offered by Bernard du Rosier, a Languedocian ecclesiastic who would later write a loyalist treatise during the Praguerie. However, what is even more remarkable and exceptional is that the comment was committed to writing in Toulouse's official registers.[142] Meanwhile, in Paris, the so-called Bourgeois lamented in his journal in 1436 that 'there was no more news of the king than if he were in Rome or Jerusalem' ('n'estoit nouvelle du roy nullement, ne que se il fust à Romme ou en Jherusalem'); and in

[139] For Montcalm's background: L. Dulieu, *La médecine à Montpellier,* v. 1 (Avignon, 1975), p. 313. For the accusation against his son and the context of the dispute (which does not appear to have been connected to the Praguerie): Artières, *Annales de Millau*, pp. 95-6.

[140] Contamine, *Charles VII*, pp. 249-52 dismisses the Praguerie rebels as having a mere 'semblant de programme', but he rightly notes the existence of arguments that the king was 'inerte et invisible' on the basis of views from Jean Juvénal des Ursins and Jean du Bois, both also discussed below in this section.

[141] De Cagny, *Chronique*, pp. 228-9, 253.

[142] For the 1438 criticism: X. Nadrigny, 'L'opinion sur le roi. La guerre dans les registres de délibérations toulousains de la première moitié du XVe siècle', in F. Foronda, C. Barralis, & B. Sère (eds.), *Violences souveraines. Travaux d'une école historique* (Paris, 2010), pp. 149-50; *idem, Information et opinion publique à Toulouse à la fin du Moyen Age* (Paris, 2013), pp. 325-8. For Du Rosier's background and 1440 treatise: P. Arabeyre, 'Un prélat languedocien au milieu du xve siècle: Bernard du Rosier, archevêque de Toulouse (1400-1475)', *Journal des savants*, v. 3/4 (1990), pp. 291-326; BNF Latin 6020, fs. 67-75v.

1439 he added that 'the king always remained in Berry, and did not pay heed to the Île-de-France, nor to the war, nor to his people, any more than if he were prisoner of the Saracens' ('se tenoit le roy tousjours en Berry, ne il ne tenoit compte de l'Isle de France, ne de la guerre, ne de son peuple, ne que s'il fust prinsonnier aux Sarazins').[143]

Yet more critical commentary on Charles' inertia was offered by Jean Juvénal des Ursins bishop of Beauvais in early 1440. In the famous advisory treatise already cited, he urged the king to cease 'sleeping'. In addition, he complained that Charles had been avoiding the frontiers and meeting his subjects, even to the point of hiding in a separate room or privy ('ung petit retrait') when guests entered his chamber during the 1439 estates of Orléans.[144] Finally, in another treatise addressed to the monarch in 1445, the little-known landowner Jean du Bois lamented that Charles had 'been obscured and hidden from the people' ('vous avés esté obscur et mucé de vostre peuple') and that he 'was seen only in a small portion of the realm' ('on ne vous veoit que en une petite porcion de vostre royaulme'). The ruler, du Bois observed, did not even appear to 'make haste to recover his kingdom' but truly 'made very little effort', to the despair of his people ('il me semble que ne vous hastés pas de recouvrer vostre royaume; vraiment vous faictes bien petite diligence: dont tout vostre people est esbahy').[145]

Taken together, these contemporary views offer a relatively homogenous set of concerns about royal inactivity. When one considers that they were expressed by authors from disparate backgrounds and geographical areas, and across different – and at times unexpected – media, it can be inferred that unhappiness about Charles VII's performance as king in c.1440 may well have been very deep-rooted. So too can it be deduced that there would have been critical ideas and discourses in circulation which could have inspired and been drawn on by the rebels. What is also noticeable, though, is that some of the above criticisms imply that the king's perceived weakness threatened the wider security and internal order of France. By the same logic, the Praguerie rebels could have both convinced themselves and contended that a political intervention was necessary in order to protect the realm, and it can be postulated that this argument was fundamental to the revolt.

Our evidence for the thinking of any of the Praguerie insurgents is naturally limited. Yet, it is of the utmost importance that one of the few aspects of the rebels' plans which is mentioned frequently in our extant sources is that there was an intention to establish the Dauphin Louis as the effective

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[143] *Journal Paris*, pp. 327, 344. For this author's likely identity and clerical background, see: L. Giraudet, *Public opinion and political contest in late medieval Paris: the Parisian bourgeois and his community, 1400-50* (Turnhout, 2022), pp. 26-30.
[144] Ursins, 'Loquar in tribulacione', pp. 322-3, 328-9 (with p. 295 & n. for the dating of the treatise).
[145] 'Conseils et prédictions adressés à Charles VII en 1445 par un certain Jean du Bois', ed. N. Valois, *ABSHF,* v. 46 (1909), pp. 228-9.

leader of France in place of his father. If we begin with the chronicle evidence, we can note that multiple authors assert that the Dauphin was to assume control of the government of the kingdom. As one example, the bishop Thomas Basin claimed around thirty years later that Louis was persuaded to try to take the 'helm of the kingdom' ('gubernacula regni') because Charles VII and those around him were said to be unconcerned with its 'security, safety, or defence' ('salute et incolumitate seu defensione').[146] These assertions could imply that the rebels planned for the Dauphin to become the king's new chief minister, although an alternative reading would be that it was intended for the Dauphin to be named as regent, just as Charles VII had styled himself under his father. Basin's subsequent comment that the king would have been 'deprived of all power' ('omni potestate privasset') leaves open the latter possibility, as does the language used by Enguerrand de Monstrelet, writing less than a decade after the Praguerie, and the author of the sixteenth-century *Chronique Martiniane*. These chroniclers both state that the rebels planned for Charles VII to be treated 'as if in tutelage' ('comme en tutelle'/'quasi en tutelle'), in the manner of a legally incapable or minor individual.[147]

Remarkably, Charles himself offered a similar appraisal of the rebels' plans during the revolt. He wrote in a letter to Narbonne in April that the leading princes planned to 'raise up the Dauphin… and make him rule in spite of us' ('le voulant eslever, mectre sus et faire régenter a l'encontre de nous'), and he also alleged in three other letters in April-May 1440 that the princes wanted to 'raise up the Dauphin into government and rule' ('le voulant eslever en gouvernement et régence').[148] In the case of the second set of letters, two of which were written to the Dauphiné and one to Saint-Flour, the choice of wording is again evocative, as the word 'régence' literally refers to rule as a regent. The implication is hence that the rebels planned to treat the king as though he was unfit to govern at a minimum, and considering the potentially dangerous implications for his kingship, there is little reason to think that Charles would have exaggerated about this point. It is more plausible that he only acknowledged the matter because the leading rebels' plans were already widely known and understood. Even if the insurgents themselves did not explicitly criticise the king as opposed to his

[146] Basin, *Histoire,* v. 1, p. 136.
[147] *Ibid*.; Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, p. 411; *Cronique Martiniane*, p. 40; cf. Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, p. 121.
[148] Letter from Charles VII to Narbonne, 24th April 1440, in *Narbonne Inventaire Annexes*, p. 392; letter from Charles VII to Saint-Flour, 21st April 1440, AMSF ch. 2 art. 2 no. 72; letter from Charles VII to the Dauphiné, 23rd April 1440, ADI B 3180; letter from Charles VII to the Dauphiné, 2nd May 1440, in Duclos, *Histoire de Louis XI*, v. 3, p. 16.

advisers, their very act of revolting in support of an alternative Valois figurehead may have been enough to send a clear message.[149]

In addition, the rebels' public calls for other reforms were arguably again premised on – and tapped into – the idea that the king was not ruling effectively and that the greater good was thus endangered. Let us look firstly at calls for improvements in justice and order. To judge from mockery in the royal mémoire, one central argument made by the leading rebels in manifestoes to Languedoc and the Dauphiné was that once estates were assembled at Lyon, 'all would be done to bring order to the realm' ('tout se faisoit pour mettre ordre en ce Royaume').[150] On one level, calls of this sort for a restoration of order might just be seen as a staple and standard trope of rebellion, since they also figure in oppositional proclamations in France from across the fifteenth century.[151] On another level, though, the issue of disorder might have had a particular significance in 1440 in light of concerns about Charles VII combined with the wider situation in France. Problems with pillaging were assumed by chroniclers and Burgundian sources to have continued or worsened after the false dawn of the Treaty of Arras, and the ordonnance of Orléans could be interpreted as a sign of popular pressure on Charles VII and leading princes to be seen to be dealing with the issue.[152] Yet, contemporaries might reasonably have asked how progress could be made if the ruler appeared unwilling to travel widely and enforce the law. If the king was viewed as inert, or 'sleeping whilst the people were tyrannised' to use the language of Jean Juvénal des Ursins, then this was a serious impediment to progress.[153] Worse still, if the king was seen as too passive, then it would also have been easy to suggest that he was struggling to differentiate between just subjects and malefactors, making the influence of his government actively deleterious to order. In light of this point, it is striking that the royal *mémoire* includes a demand from the leading rebels made late in the Praguerie that the king choose only 'suitable captains' ('capitaines convenables'), with the added implication that Charles VII was unable to tell that those around him were contributing to 'wretched pillaging' ('dolente pillerie').[154] Significatively, this contention also has echoes in another claim made

[149] Cf. J. Rosenthal, 'The King's "Wicked Advisers" and Medieval Baronial Rebellions', *Political Science Quarterly*, v. 82/4 (1967), p. 597, as well as the manifestoes from 1428 and 1465 cited previously, for the tradition of not attacking the king directly in opposition.
[150] 'Memoire des plaintes', p. 14.
[151] See e.g. E. Hutchinson, '"Pour le bien du roy et de son royaume": Burgundian propaganda under John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy, 1405-1419' (PhD diss., York, 2006), pp. 62, 88-9; 1428 manifesto in Bossuat, 'Un manifeste', p. 96; Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 3, 'preuves', pp. 70-2; 'Lettres relatifs à la guerre du Bien Public', p. 197; BNF Dupuy 634, f. 137 (February 1487 declaration of Charles count of Angoulême, calling for 'prompte provision' to problems including 'injustices et violences').
[152] For concerns about 'écorcheur' raiding after 1435 see e.g. La Marche, *Mémoires,* v. 1, pp. 243-7; Tuetey, *Les écorcheurs*, pp. 6-7. For the wider context of concerns and dialogue about order in this period, see also: Cazaux, 'Les lendemains de la Praguerie', pp. 368-72.
[153] Ursins, 'Loquar in tribulacione', p. 328 ('Vous estes endormy entre les tirannies que seuffre vostre peuple').
[154] 'Memoires des plaintes', p. 20.

by Ursins that when oppressors travelled to Charles' court 'they received horses, harnesses, and money in place of being punished' ('en lieu de les pugnir on leur donrra chevaulx, harnoiz et argent'), as well as in an argument made at Nevers in 1442 that Charles VII was encircled by 'écorcheurs'.[155]

Of course, if the Praguerie rebels did make an analogous argument, then one might contend that this was hypocritical given that many *routiers* were amongst their number, even whilst others supported the crown. Indeed, some contemporaries may well have agreed with this view. However, this does not mean that concerns about disorder amongst the rebels were therefore meaningless or insincere. The ultimate responsibility for upholding justice and order in the realm lay with the king, but if he was perceived to be failing in his task then his leading subjects could justifiably have been seen – or have seen themselves – as duty-bound to intervene. This would have been especially true for members of the king's family and senior officeholders, who, as well as having duties to their own adherents, were viewed as having a responsibility to the realm in proportion to their status.[156]

As a second area of reform, the royal *mémoire* also suggests that the leading rebels used their missives to the Dauphiné and Languedoc to call for the reduction or suppression of aides ('faire abattre les aides').[157] Again, it was by no means atypical for oppositional leagues to take an interest in financial matters, and it was for instance claimed by the leaguers of 1428 that delays under La Trémoille's government in resolving problems with the coinage had been 'prejudicial to the entire public good' ('préjudiciable au fait de la chose publique').[158] It was also not unusual for nobles to seek to protect their own subjects from taxation which they perceived to be excessive or unfair. The dukes of Alençon and Anjou both objected to high taxes in their lands in 1450s, and we can additionally note that the violent quarrel at Ham-sur-Somme which was discussed in the previous chapter occurred amidst tensions between Jean de Luxembourg and Philip the Good over regional rights to taxation in c.1439.[159]

Once more, though, the Praguerie rebels' demands can only fully be comprehended as a response to anxieties about kingship in 1440. To begin with, it is important to note that Charles VII had effectively reintroduced *aides* in the later 1430s on the grounds that they were needed for the war

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[155] Ursins, 'Loquar in tribulacione', p. 366; Tuetey, *Les écorcheurs,* v. 1, p. 130 (the original letter from 1442 referenced by Tuetey is sadly lost).
[156] For theories about the king's role in maintaining justice and peace, see e.g. J. Krynen, *Idéal du prince et pouvoir royal en France à la fin du Moyen Âge (1380-1440): étude de la littérature politique du temps* (Paris, 1981), pp. 165-70, 184ff. For theories about the particular responsibilities of princes and councillors, see e.g. *ibid*., pp. 141-4, 148, 161-2; Collins, *The French Monarchical Commonwealth*, p. 110; Caron, *Noblesse et pouvoir*, p. 235.
[157] 'Memoire des plaintes', pp. 7, 14.
[158] 1428 manifesto in Bossuat, 'Un manifeste', pp. 96-7.
[159] For Anjou: Lewis, *Later Medieval France*, pp. 14, 229. For Alençon: Cosneau, *Le connétable de Richemont*, p. 432 & n.; *Procès Politiques: Alençon*, p. 116.

against the Lancastrians.[160] Consequently, to argue that *aides* could be lowered or abolished was surely to imply that they were not being spent on this purpose, and that money was instead being misappropriated amidst a lack of effective and honest oversight. John the Fearless had previously used letters to towns in the 1410s to connect criticisms of excessive taxation and allegations of corruption regarding its usage, and the league in the Guerre Folle followed suit in a different context, through linking overtaxation ('excessives' *tailles*) to payments to soldiers for private use ('volonté').[161] Anxieties about unchecked malfeasance by royal councillors or officials likewise appear to have been current in 1440 even outside the Praguerie. Amidst wider concerns about governance, Jean Juvénal des Ursins, for one, argued that taxes were being diverted straight to 'private purses', rather than being spent properly on the 'public good' ('si levoit on l'argent… estoit exposé en boursses particulières et non mie au prouffit de vostre seignorie ne de la chose publique').[162]

At the same time, there may have been further anxieties about regional disparities in the collection of *aides* (since regions such as Limousin, La Marche, and Périgord were initially allowed to offer equivalent sums in lieu of paying this disliked sales tax), and about whether the king had been following due process in the collection of taxation. The nobles gathered at Nevers in 1442 complained on that occasion that taxes such as *tailles* had been taken without adequate consent from general estates.[163] This implies that Charles VII's efforts to collect taxation more arbitrarily from the later 1430s may have raised further doubts about the counsel that he was listening to. One might even speculate that the Praguerie rebels' plan to call their own estates in 1440 may have been intended as some sort of corrective in this regard.

In terms of general demands for change, it may lastly be the case that the Praguerie rebels called for a new approach to dealing with the English in response to concerns about royal leadership. Past historians have been divided on whether the leading insurgents desired a renewal of the war or new peace negotiations as at the Nevers gathering in 1442, although the truth could be somewhere between the two.[164] Given that the subject of a peace settlement had caused controversy in 1439,

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[160] For the link between aides and the war: Devic & Vaissette, *Histoire générale de Languedoc*, v. 10, p. 2127; Thomas, *Les états provinciaux*, v. 1, p. 197. For the background of aides' reintroduction: Henneman, 'France in the Middle Ages', pp. 117-8.

[161] Hutchinson, 'Burgundian propaganda under John the Fearless', pp. 92-5; BNF Dupuy 634, f. 137 (February 1487 declaration of Charles count of Angoulême).

[162] Ursins, 'Loquar in tribulacione', p. 321.

[163] For Nevers, see the March 1442 instructions of the assembled princes, in Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 3, 'preuves', pp. 74-5. For changes in the collection of taxation and disparities in the collection of *aides*: Major, *Representatives Institutions*, pp. 39-40; Thomas, *Les états provinciaux* v. 1, pp. 131-3.

[164] For an emphasis on desire for negotiations in historiography, see e.g. Cosneau, *Le connétable de Richemont*, p. 303; Leguai, *Les ducs de Bourbon*, pp. 163-4. For the inverse: Vale, *Charles VII*, p. 77; Contamine, *Charles VII*, p. 252; Lecuppre-Desjardin & Toureille, 'Servir ou trahir', p. 15.

and perhaps split opinion even amongst the leading rebels, it would have been expedient for them to have avoided offering too concrete a solution to the issue of dealing with the Lancastrian monarchy in 1440.[165] The leaders of the Praguerie could simply have made vaguer promises which echoed John the Fearless' claim in 1405 that 'sufficient remedy' ('remede souffisant') was needed to setbacks against the English, as Thomas Basin seems to hint in claiming that the Dauphin was persuaded that 'suitable remedies' ('remedia opportuna') could see the realm's enemies thrown out.[166] Even hazy rhetoric of this kind could have tapped into frustrations about Charles VII's lack of personal effort to put pressure on his opponents, although this must unfortunately remain a matter of speculation in the absence of further evidence.

Nonetheless, overall, these arguments suggest that concerns about Charles VII would have created a context in which rebellion could have been seen as an imperative or duty.[167] It might reasonably be objected, though, that this still does not explain why the specific group of rebels whom we have been studying revolted, whilst many others felt the Praguerie to be unjustified. In response to this point, it can be noted that the people with personal grievances would probably have been more suggestible to the idea that the greater good was being endangered by failings in government. Equally, one would expect that pre-existing followers of the leading rebels would have given more credence to arguments coming from them as a result of long-established bonds of trust. Yet, one can also go further still. At a more fundamental level, it can be contended that anxieties about weak kingship were interlinked with many of the rebels' more personal grievances as well, meaning that these would have become blurred with broader concerns about kingship and calls for reform.

As one major example, the quarrel between leading rebels and Charles of Anjou appears in a very different light if we postulate that the insurgents agreed with Perceval de Cagny that Anjou was dominating the king. De Cagny's description would suggest a political rivalry which had already moved outside of normal and accepted boundaries in the eyes of Anjou's opponents, with Charles VII's favourite presumably perceived to be unfairly exploiting his master's failings for his own advantage.[168] Such behaviour could plausibly have been regarded as a threat to both the leading princes and the wider realm simultaneously. Anjou and his allies could have been blamed for giving 'evil counsel' to the king, but their perceived control of Charles VII could also have been inherently

[165] A marginal addition to Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 208 suggests that Vendôme spoke in favour of peace in 1439, and Dunois and La Fayette for continuing the war. The 'Memoire des plaintes', p. 5 also alleges that Bourbon and his councillors were opposed to proposed terms for negotiations earlier in 1439, although Bourbon did then join Alençon and others in supporting diplomacy in 1441-2: Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, p. 200; Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 3, 'preuves', pp. 57-8.
[166] Hutchinson, 'Burgundian propaganda under John the Fearless', p. 89; Basin, *Histoire*, v. 1, p. 136.
[167] Cf. Jouanna, *Le devoir de révolte*, p. 8.
[168] De Cagny, *Chronique*, p. 253.

characterised as a subversion of natural order and practices of good government. At the Nevers gathering in 1442, the confederate princes interestingly complained that the affairs of the realm should not be committed only to a handful of individuals as in the past ('à ung, deux ou troys seulement'), but ought to be dealt with collectively by the 'princes and lords of Charles' blood' ('princes et seigneurs de son sanc').[169] This statement hints at conciliarist ideas which were also echoed in the discourses employed by the rebel Yorkists in England in the 1450s, although the analogy perhaps should not be taken too far, given that many of the leading rebels in France had very recently been sitting on the king's council.[170] What is indisputably pertinent to thinking about the Praguerie, however, is the emphasis on due hierarchy. By right of birth, only one man could have consulted the princes and taken an appropriate lead in decision-making on behalf of Charles VII – and this was the Dauphin Louis.

Anxieties about local feuds, the resumption of domain lands, and the terms of the ordonnance of Angers would also have been exacerbated if the king was not trusted as an independent arbiter or leader. The same can be said for the ransom of the duke of Orléans, which merits revisiting now. We have seen that this duke's fate would have personally concerned Dunois and many other rebels, but it can be added here that his situation would have been a matter of general concern too. Orléans was a key supporter of the Valois cause and second-in-line to the throne as a Valois claimant, and against this backdrop, it is highly plausible that the rebels made public calls for his release to be secured. Charles VII's missives to towns and officials during the Praguerie could at least be interpreted as rebutting such an argument. The king felt it necessary to suggest in letters from February 1440 that he had hoped to provide for Orléans' return at new estates only for his plans to be disrupted by the Praguerie itself, whilst his later letters even implied that the rebels had wilfully obstructed Orléans' release.[171] What is particularly intriguing, though, is that in late 1439 the duke's release had appeared to be closer than ever before, with most of the senior Valois nobility having offered financial guarantees on his behalf to the English.[172] For supporters of Orléans and many others to rebel in early 1440, therefore, once more suggests a catastrophic loss of trust and confidence in Charles VII, who had not offered financial guarantees himself and who was presumably

[169] March 1442 instructions of the assembled princes in Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 3, 'preuves', p. 77.
[170] For conciliarist ideas in England, see e.g. Watts, *Henry VI*, p. 351. For discourses about evil councillors there, see also: Rosenthal, 'The King's "Wicked Advisers"', pp. 598-9.
[171] Letter from Charles VII to Reims, 24th February 1440, in Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, pp. 529-30; letter from Charles VII to Narbonne, 24th February 1440, in *Narbonne Inventaire Annexes*, p. 391; letter from Charles VII to Saint-Flour, 21st April 1440, AMSF ch. 2 art. 2 no. 72; letter from Charles VII to the Dauphiné, 23rd April 1440, ADI B 3180; letter from Charles VII to the Dauphiné, 2nd May 1440, in Duclos, *Histoire de Louis XI,* v. 3, p. 17.
[172] See Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, p. 147 & n.; Champion, *La vie de Charles d'Orléans*, pp. 300-1 & n..

thought to have been influenced to obstruct Orléans' return.[173] An apparently personal grievance hence again appears to have been underpinned by doubts about governance and to have intersected with perceived communal interests, meaning that rebellion could again have been considered as an unfortunate imperative.

Considering all the above, the insurgents of 1440 must have had complex, pluralistic motivations in opposing Charles VII. Ultimately, though, it was concerns about ineffective kingship which lay at the heart of the Praguerie, its impetus, and its ideology. Understanding the revolt within this framework can help us to make more sense of the behaviour of the nobles involved, but it can also tell us much about the wider sweep of opposition to the Valois and how the Praguerie fits into this picture. For a start, rather than viewing the rebellion of 1440 as a sudden fightback against centralisation under Charles VII, we can regard it as merely one extreme moment within a broader sequence of opposition between the early-1410s and mid-1440s. This period saw frequent revolts and conspiracies in which the quality of rulership was criticised and those around the king targeted, and even in 1446, it would still be alleged that the Dauphin had plotted for his father to be captured and become king 'under' his guidance.[174] Opposition of this kind and its frequency must in part have been a reaction to Charles VI and Charles VII's individual capabilities, behaviour, and perceived competence. Yet, we can also speculate that each rebellion would have set a precedent that encouraged future opposition, and we can ask too whether there were structural issues which brought the quality of kingship under especial scrutiny.[175] Endemic disorder, financial difficulties, and the state of the war with the Lancastrian dynasty all spring immediately to mind, and we will see in the next section that it is probably no accident that Charles VII's position was strengthened as some of these issues began to ameliorate from the mid-1440s.

Even then, however, the underlying risk of nobles and their supporters revolting as a response to malfunctioning governance was not confined to France, and neither did it disappear after the Praguerie. The Guerre du Bien Public and Guerre Folle might again be seen as revolts caused by tensions over governance and leadership, albeit in the first case as a response to rule of a more tyrannical bent, and in the second case as a by-product of disputes over decisions made during a challenging minority. If we look later into the sixteenth century, Arlette Jouanna has argued too that rebellion remained an aristocratic 'devoir' in response to failing rulership. As time moved by, nobles

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[173] For Charles VII's lack of a personal contribution, see the works cited in n. 172 above, and cf. also the royal letter of 16th July 1440 printed in Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, pp. 531-2.
[174] *Le Jouvencel,* v. 2, 'preuves', p. 326.
[175] For similar ideas in an English context, cf. J. Watts, 'Usurpation in England: A Paradox of State-Growth', in F. Foronda, J.-P. Genet, & J. M. Nieto Soria (eds.), *Coups d'État à la fin du Moyen Âge?: aux fondements du pouvoir politique en Europe occidentale* (Madrid, 2005), pp. 116-21.

became more preoccupied with royal patronage and religious divides, but an underlying focus on effective kingship and the 'common good' remained.[176]

v) The impacts of large-scale rebellion

Returning to the situation in 1440, though, it is lastly worth asking what significance the Praguerie had for the remainder of Charles VII's reign and for future transregional rebellions. If it is the case that opposition set a precedent for more opposition, why was the Praguerie not followed by an uprising of comparable violence and scope for another twenty-five years? Should this be seen as a result of the rebels' defeat and bolstering of royal authority? Or, building on Loïc Cazaux's article on ideas about force in the aftermath of the revolt, should we posit that a more complex dialogue continued between the crown and the defeated rebels?[177]

In response to these questions, we will argue here that the results of the Praguerie, like any large-scale revolt, were multifaceted. On the one hand, Charles VII's victory did allow him to adopt some punitive measures which attacked the interests and ideology of the insurgents. However, these may if anything have encouraged further opposition, and so it was arguably of greater value to the king that he and his regime ultimately reached accommodations with many of the individuals and networks involved in the Praguerie. Equally, the royal government made some constructive changes in response to the rebels' criticisms. These changes are indicative of the power of aristocratic-led revolt even in defeat, although they may ironically have lessened the potential for further large-scale rebellion until after Charles VII's death.

To begin with, it is patent that Charles VII did adopt some punitive measures during and after the suppression of the Praguerie. Even whilst the uprising ended in an amnesty thanks to mediation efforts from princes such as Charles d'Artois count of Eu, it remained the case that some rebels lost their lives, not least as Jacquet and a number of followers of Jean de la Roche were beheaded or drowned on royal orders at Niort and Saint-Maixent.[178] Many of the rebels' lands must also have been damaged during the fighting, and alongside destruction committed by the insurgents' own troops, the king himself admitted to the town of Aigueperse that his forces had caused significant harm.[179] The leading rebels and their powerbases would consequently have been weakened, and to add insult to injury, the majority of insurgents lost posts which they had held as royal councillors,

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[176] Jouanna, *Le devoir de révolte,* pp. 8-10, 108-10.
[177] Cazaux, 'Les lendemains de la Praguerie', esp. pp. 365-6; cf. Cazaux, *Les capitaines*, pp. 403-4.
[178] For princely mediation: 'Memoire des plaintes', pp. 14-6; Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 223; Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 1, p. 258; Basin, *Histoire*, v. 1, p. 137. For the executions in Poitou: 'Mémoire des plaintes', p. 13; Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 216; Chartier, *Chronique,* pp. 256-7; Gruel, *Chronique*, p. 159.
[179] For the admission to Aigueperse: AN JJ 198 no. 360.

lieutenants, seneschals, *baillis*, and captains. The main beneficiaries, in turn, were close supporters of the king and Charles of Anjou.[180]

The Praguerie rebels also suffered the ignominy of being portrayed as a threat to the common good amidst an ideological fightback from the king and his new-look council. Charles VII and supportive propagandists during the revolt, for example, emphasised his right to obedience as sovereign, the Dauphin's 'young age' and the unnaturalness of a son being turned against his father, and how the king had planned to make reforms at new estates before being thwarted by the Praguerie.[181] Charles' opponents, conversely, were accused in royal missives of having unpatriotically undermined his ability to resist the English, of having plotted with them, and of having behaved like his enemies in pillaging and making war against his loyal subjects.[182] A clear inversion of, and counternarrative against, the rebels' worldview was hence created, and Charles VII and those around him then worked to give further substance to it.

By late 1440, it was being advertised to towns that the king intended to visit Champagne to address pillaging.[183] Here, the *routier* Alexandre bastard of Bourbon met with his end early in the following year, as he was thrown into a sack and drowned in the river at Bar-sur-Aube on royal orders. This execution for crimes of disorder was viewed as an act of revenge for Alexandre's role in the Praguerie by multiple chroniclers and perhaps by the townspeople of royalist Montferrand, who expressed fears that they would fall victim to retribution from the duke of Bourbon.[184] However, the choice to target Bourbon's brother could equally be viewed as a continuation of royal efforts to present Charles VII as the defender of order in the realm, and the Bourbon family and their allies as the ones who threatened it. Indeed, there again appears to have been a performative quality to the

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[180] As examples, Pierre de Brézé seneschal of Anjou replaced Jean de la Roche as seneschal of Poitou and the royal councillor Galaubie seigneur de Panassac replaced Jacques de Chabannes as seneschal of Toulouse: Favreau, 'La Praguerie en Poitou', p. 299 & n.; *Preuves Chabannes*, v. 1, pp. 171-2.

[181] For Louis' duty to his father: BNF Latin 6020, fs. 68-70v; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, p. 130. For the other themes: letter from Charles VII to Saint-Flour, 21st April 1440, AMSF ch. 2 art. 2 no. 72; letter from Charles VII to the Dauphiné, 23rd April 1440, ADI B 3180; letter from Charles VII to the Dauphiné, 2nd May 1440, in Duclos, *Histoire de Louis XI*, v. 3, pp. 16-7. The letters refer specifically to Louis' 'jeune age' and name peace in the realm and the ransom of Orléans as issues which the king would have addressed; royal letters from February also refer to plans for 'le fait et union de l'Eglise' (letter from Charles VII to Reims, 24th February 1440, in Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, p. 529; letter from Charles VII to Narbonne, 24th February 1440, in *Narbonne Inventaire Annexes,* p. 391).

[182] For alleged negotiations with the earl of Huntingdon: 'Memoire des plaintes', p. 13. For pillaging ('comme feroient noz ennemys') and undermining the war effort ('nous empeschant a resister a l'encontre des angloys noz anciens ennemys'): letter from Charles VII to Saint-Flour, 21st April 1440, AMSF ch. 2 art. 2 no. 72; letter from Charles VII to the Dauphiné, 23rd April 1440, ADI B 3180; letter from Charles VII to the Dauphiné, 2nd May 1440', in Duclos, *Histoire de Louis XI*, v. 3, pp. 16-7.

[183] The king informed Saint-Flour of his plans from Chartres on 22nd December 1440, as per AMSF 'Inventaire Manuscrit': ch. 5 art. 2 no. 2 (the original is badly damaged).

[184] ADPD 'Fonds de Montferrand' CC 181, f. 41v; Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, p. 458; *Cronique Martiniane*, p. 46; Piccolomini, *Europe (c.1400-1458)*, p. 203.

way in which the king meted out justice in early 1442. On this occasion, the king travelled to Saintonge and Angoumois on another mission against pillaging, where he threatened nine noblemen with banishment as public enemies ('ennemis de la chose publique') because of alleged involvement in disorder. Of these nine individuals, tellingly, at least six were former Praguerie rebels or close adherents of the deceased Jean de la Roche, including his brother Guy, who was subsequently besieged in Angoulême.[185] We will return to the remaining three targets – Jacques seigneur de Pons, Maurice de Plusqualec, and Pierre Béchet – in the next chapter, although it is worth noting here that Jacques was Georges de la Trémoille's nephew and former ward, whilst the other two nobles had ties to Jacques' service.

In the face of these royal efforts, even Praguerie rebels who were not directly targeted may have suffered lasting damage to their reputations. Georges Chastelain implies, for example, that perceptions of both Bourbon and Vendôme continued to be affected, to the point where the latter was seen as suffering from a hint of 'folly' ('folie') in his final years.[186] Likewise, Jean seigneur de Montejean would find that his proposed entry into René of Anjou's chivalric Order of the Croissant was blocked by his peers in consultation with the king in 1450, on the grounds that his military support to the Dauphin and Alençon ten years earlier may have amounted to a 'case of dishonour' ('cas de reproche').[187]

Collectively, these developments must have placed severe strain on future relations between former rebels and the crown. The duke of Alençon's relationship with the king, for instance, appears to have been permanently damaged. In c.1441, Jean II notably moved to ally himself with the dukes of Burgundy and Brittany and leaked intelligence to the Lancastrians about plans to seize his own birthplace of Argentan, before Charles VII retaliated by confiscating his town of Niort when he travelled to the gathering at Nevers in the following year.[188] Here, he was supported not only by Bourbon, but also by other former Praguerie rebels such as Georges de la Trémoille and the counts of Vendôme and Dunois.[189] Afterwards, although Jean II joined the Valois reconquest of Normandy,

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[185] Tuetey, *Les écorcheurs,* v. 1, pp. 127-9 & n. (the other five nobles with ties to the La Roche family were: Brisset de Saint-Cire, on whom see *AHP*, v. 29 (1898), pp. 12, 367, 373-5 & n., Pierre de Saint-Gelais, Jean Raymond, & Olivier and Jacques Perceval, on whom see Table 1 below, nos. 46-48 & 64). For the royal expedition, see also: Cazaux, *Les capitaines*, pp. 419-22; AN JJ 178 no. 95 (printed in *AHP*, v. 29, pp. 364-79); Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, pp. 244-7.

[186] Chastelain, *Œuvres*, v. 2, pp. 164, 175 (quoted).

[187] BNF Clairambault 1241 pp. 907-8; M. Vale, *War and Chivalry* (London, 1981), p. 62.

[188] For the confiscation of Niort: Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 3, 'preuves', p. 42; Favreau, 'La Praguerie en Poitou', p. 300. For Argentan: S. Dicks, 'The question of peace: Anglo-French diplomacy, A.D. 1439-1449' (PhD diss., University of Oklahoma, 1966), p. 90; *Letters and papers*, v. 1, pp. 190-1; Anselme, *Histoire Généalogique* 3 e., v. 1, p. 273. For other intrigues: Beaucourt, *Histoire*, v. 3, pp. 200-1.

[189] 'Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 3, 'preuves', pp. 41, 80-5.

he appears to have spent most of his time in retreat in his lands collecting horses and hounds, even before his dramatic arrest for fresh plotting in 1456.[190] By the same token, for all that Charles VII moved to placate the Dauphin Louis by granting him the Dauphiné within weeks of his submission, the distrust engendered by the Praguerie provides a key context for understanding the disputes between the pair which continued through the remainder of the reign.[191]

In truth, however, the damage could have been far worse were it not for Charles VII's placidity. Whereas a king in the mould of an Edward II or Richard II of England might have struggled ever to move beyond the divisions of the Praguerie, Charles did ultimately show a willingness to forget past injuries. He may have been encouraged here by conciliatory nobles, have been incentivised by the sheer expediency of the ongoing Lancastrian threat, or have simply recognised the advantages of compromise, as his grandson did in the aftermath of the Guerre Folle.[192] Whatever his reasons, though, Charles VII did not strip the rebels of all their offices – above all household posts – and he also allowed many of them to regain their influence after an initial period of disgrace. The marshal de La Fayette and counts of Dunois and Vendôme thus kept their offices and reappear as royal councillors by the mid-1440s, with the last of these men not only trusted to head a royal embassy to England in 1445, but even granted a visit from Charles VII when on his deathbed the following year.[193] As another example, Antoine seigneur de Prie again retained his office of *grand queux* for the remainder of the reign, and he is portrayed by Mathieu d'Escouchy as offering Charles VII sage counsel at a meeting in 1456 where the king was allegedly dissuaded from attacking Burgundy.[194] A decade earlier, an *entente* had also been reached between the king and his *grand chambrier* Charles de Bourbon, who was granted a new pension and a royal marriage for his son.[195] So too were other key members of the duke's network welcomed back into the fold. The Chabannes brothers for instance received extensive royal patronage and promotions to major household offices in the 1450s, whilst Louis de Soyecourt seigneur de Mouy was also made captain of Beauvais by early 1442

[190] For Alençon's arrest in 1456, see Chapter 1 Section iv) above. For his support for the reconquest and retreat to his lands: *Cronicques de Normendie*, pp. 117, 143; *Chartier*, v. 2, pp. 174-5; Odolant-Desnos, *Mémoires historiques*, v. 2, p. 83.
[191] For the August 1440 grant: *Ordonnances des rois*, v. 13, pp. 318-9.
[192] For Charles VIII, cf. Chevalier, 'The recovery of France', p. 413.
[193] For the nobles' offices and return to favour: Vallet de Viriville, *Conseillers*, pp. 21-4, 35-9; Bouillé, *Le Maréchal de La Fayette* (Lyon, 1955), p. 121ff. For Vendôme's embassy and death: Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 4, p. 145; Chastelain, *Œuvres*, v. 2, p. 175. For other examples of nobles who seem to have kept household offices, see also n. 70 above.
[194] Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 2, p. 343; BNF Fr. 28870 'Prie' no. 47; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 6, p. 188; Vallet de Viriville, *Conseillers*, p. 40.
[195] See Leguai, *Les ducs de Bourbon*, p. 177.

and a councillor by 1453.[196] Even at a local level in central France, Draguinet de Lastic and – remarkably – Jean de la Borderie appear as royal commissioners for the collection of *aides* in Auvergne as early as 1441, whilst Saint-Pourçain-sur-Sioule had its right to coin money restored in 1445.[197]

These attempts at reconciliation are likely to have been welcomed and emulated by many others in society. During widely-attended jousts organised by René of Anjou in 1445 and 1446, for example, almost a dozen former rebels are recorded as participants, suggesting that there was a genuine process of reintegration within the Valois-supporting elite in the years after the revolt.[198] Against this backdrop, it is notable that there is no consistent correlation between noble loyalties in the Praguerie and in the Guerre du Bien Public twenty-five years later. There were certainly networks, towns, and individuals that again rebelled, including the counts of Dunois, Montpensier, and Dammartin.[199] These magnates were joined by other followers of the Bourbon family such as Blain Loup seigneur de Beauvoir and Louis de la Vernade, whilst Pierre d'Amboise seigneur de Chaumont also backed the uprising and had his family castle burned down as punishment.[200] Yet, conversely, other Praguerie rebels such as Antoine seigneur de Prie and Louis de Soyecourt seigneur de Mouy offered staunch military backing to the crown in 1465.[201] Jean II duke of Alençon and Jean seigneur de Montenay also followed suit and remained within the royal camp that year, and Anne de Bueil diverged from her husband by submitting to Louis XI early in the revolt.[202] The esquire Louis de Brie, who was appointed by Charles duke of Bourbon as captain of Billy after serving him in the Praguerie, was even stripped of this captaincy by Jean II duke of Bourbon in light of his conduct in the Guerre

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[196] For the Chabannes brothers see e.g. *Preuves Chabannes*, v. 1, pp. 198-9; *ibid*., v. 2, pp. 33-4, 43-7; Vallet de Viriville, *Conseillers*, pp. 38, 40. For Mouy: *Gallia Regia*, v. 5, p. 415; BNF Fr. 29207 'Soyecourt' no. 13; cf. also Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 293.

[197] BNF Fr. 28140 'Lastic' no. 3; BNF Fr. 26902 'de la Borderie' no. 2; AN JJ 177 no. 40 (March 1445 restoration of Saint-Pourçain-sur-Sioule's right to coin money, printed in *Ordonnances des rois*, v. 13, pp. 421-2).

[198] See C. de Mérindol, *Les Fêtes de chevalerie à la cour du roi René: emblématique, art et histoire* (Paris, 1993), pp. 62-3, 121 (for Louis de Bueil, Blain Loup seigneur de Beauvoir, Jean duke of Alençon, Jean seigneur de Montenay, Jean d'Apchier, 'Boucicaut', Jean count of Dunois, Jean seigneur de Montejean, Antoine seigneur de Prie, Antoine de Chabannes count of Dammartin, Pierre d'Amboise seigneur de Chaumont).

[199] For Dunois: Bord, 'Jean Bâtard d'Orléans (1402-1468), p. 313ff. For Montpensier: 'Lettres relatifs à la guerre du Bien Public', p. 213. For Dammartin: Stein, *Charles de France,* p. 78; *Preuves Chabannes*, v. 2, p. 114. For examples of urban continuity: Murphy, 'The War of the Public Weal, 1465' (forthcoming).

[200] For Beauvoir: *Lettres de Louis XI*, v. 2, p. 286. For Louis de la Vernade: 'Lettres relatifs à la guerre du Bien Public', p. 283; A.-M. Chazaud, 'Une campagne de Louis XI, la ligue du Bien Public en Bourbonnais (mars-juillet 1465), *BSEA*, v. 12 (1873), p. 71. For Chaumont: *Lettres de Louis XI*, v. 2, p. 311 & n.; *Le Jouvencel*, v. 1, p. cclix.

[201] For Prie: 'Catalogue du fonds Bourré à la Bibliothèque Nationale', ed. J. Vaesen, *BEC* v. 44 (1883) pp. 305, 310; Anselme, *Histoire Généalogique* 3 e., v. 8, p. 840. For Mouy: *Lettres de Louis XI*, v. 3, pp. 4-5 & n.

[202] For Alençon: F. Bouvier de Noës, 'Procédures politiques du règne de Louis XI. Le procès de René d'Alençon, comte de Perche, 1481-1483' (PhD diss., Lille, 2003), p. 64-6. For Montenay: BNF Fr. 28498 'Montenay' no. 93. For Anne de Bueil: 'Lettres relatifs à la guerre du Bien Public', p. 270. Jean d'Apchier was additionally made bailli of Velay in January 1466, in what might have been a reward for earlier service: *Gallia Regia*, v. 6, p. 210; J. Arnaud, *Histoire du Velay jusqu'à la fin du règne de Louis XV*, v. 1 (Puy, 1816), p. 261.

du Bien Public.[203] This implies that, whilst there were personal as well as structural continuities between the two rebellions, there was no clear or inevitable path from one to the other.

Instead, the Praguerie was arguably followed by a period in which the threat of a sequel appeared to have lessened from at least the late 1440s. This situation may have owed something to the accommodations discussed above, and it is worth reiterating that it still did not prevent some serious tensions, opposition, and concerns about Charles VII from continuing. However, fundamentally, it can be asserted that the king's position improved, and that this was in large part because his regime managed to respond to criticisms raised in the Praguerie. In the immediate aftermath of the revolt, for example, the Valois king immediately signalled a willingness to listen by ceding ground in two areas: through granting the Dauphiné to Louis and through raising funds which secured the release of the duke of Orléans.[204] Afterwards, the ruler gave a show of energy in the war against the Lancastrians by leading campaigns to Pontoise (1441) and Gascony (1442), having only directed a single campaign to Montereau (1437) in the entirety of the previous decade.[205]

These campaigns were followed by the Truce of Tours in 1444, which was supported by princes including the duke of Orléans, and which saw decades of continuous fighting come to a halt. Although easy to overlook as a result of later events, this peace must have had a substantive impact on the maintenance of order and security in frontier areas. In Saintonge, for example, witnesses on different sides of a later court case in c.1460 were unanimous that travel in this region became far safer from this point onwards.[206] Indirectly, the truce also provided the Valois government with the breathing space for military reforms, and the creation of the ordonnance companies and disarming of other troops in 1445 were widely thought by chroniclers to have further reduced disorder.[207] From 1449-1453, Charles VII then enjoyed his famous triumphs against the Lancastrians, which established him as the 'roi victorieux' as well as just the 'roi bien servi'.[208] Together, these successes surely minimized the potential for another mass revolt against ineffectual kingship in his reign, as well as sealing the Praguerie's negative later reputation. It would be absurd to suggest that all of

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[203] See Mattéoni, *Servir le prince,* pp. 346, 353 & n.; and for 1440: BNF Fr. 22299 p. 9 & Table 1 below no. 82.
[204] For the ransom of Orléans, see the royal letter of 16th July 1440 printed in Beaucourt, *Charles VII,* v. 3, pp. 531-2; Champion, *La vie de Charles d'Orléans*, p. 308ff.
[205] For the 1441 and 1442 campaigns: Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 6, pp. 6ff., 50ff.; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, pp. 22-4. For 1437: *ibid*., p. 11; De Cagny, *Chronique*, p. 240.
[206] For Saintonge: R. Favreau, *La commanderie du Breuil-du-Pas et la guerre de Cent Ans dans la Saintonge méridionale* (Jonzac, 1986), pp. 58-9. For backing for the truce: Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, pp. 268, 275-6.
[207] For a summary of views on the 1445 reforms, see Lewis, *Later Medieval France*, pp. 102-3. Cf. also Cazaux, 'Les lendemains de la Praguerie', p. 373.
[208] For the titles, see: P. Contamine, 'Le sang, l'hôtel, le conseil, le peuple: l'entourage de Charles VII selon les récits et les comptes de ses obsèques en 1461', in J.-L. Kupper & A. Marchandisse (eds.), *À l'ombre du Pouvoir: Les entourages princiers au Moyen Âge* (Liège, 2003) https://books.openedition.org/pulg/5670 (accessed 31/12/2023).

these later events emerged directly from the uprising, but it in a strange sense, it may be that the revolt did end up helping the king. Its power was such that it must at a minimum have underscored the importance and urgency of responding to subjects' concerns about governance. It was presumably, to use the language of Thomas Basin, a 'wake up' call for Charles VII and the royal government.[209]

vi) Conclusion

Across this chapter, we have put forward a revisionist view of the Praguerie and large-scale opposition against the Valois. In Sections ii) and iii), we contended the Praguerie won support from a vast coalition, which incorporated nobles as well as other groups such as townspeople. Most people within the coalition were linked to one another within pre-existing networks under noble leadership, which were held together by an array of ties, including officeholding and landed bonds. However, it is still extremely striking that these networks turned against the crown nearly two decades into Charles VII's reign, and this is especially true when one considers that they were heavily interpenetrated at every level with royal networks. This suggests that the Praguerie – and other large-scale revolts – cannot just be seen as the handiwork of 'malcontents' and their subaltern supporters. Rather, the revolt of 1440 was a profound rejection of Charles VII's government and leadership by a substantial, cross-class section of the populace of Valois France.

In Section iv), we also proposed that the key area of contention was not the royal ordonnance of Orléans or purely personal grievances. Instead, the Praguerie was above all a reaction to Charles VII's perceived weak kingship, which was already under attack in critical discourses. The rebels of 1440 may have had varying personal concerns and appeals to different groups may even have been tailored in varying ways, but ultimately there was a real ideological coherence behind the rebellion. In light of this, the Praguerie needs to be viewed in conjunction with other oppositional movements under Charles VI and Charles VII in particular, whilst it is now time to set aside the paradigm of centralisation or a nascent 'royal State' driving change by threatening the nobility.

If the Praguerie rebels' concerns about good governance were largely traditional, then so too in many ways was the royal reaction. Some punitive measures were adopted, as was discussed at the start of section vi). However, Charles VII not only pardoned the majority of the Praguerie insurgents, but he also allowed many of them to regain influence by at least the mid-1440s. In addition, the revolt had a powerful impact in provoking the royal government into more energetic attempts to address concerns about disorder and the ongoing war with England. It was in fact only under Louis XI

[209] Basin, *Histoire*, v. 1, p. 138 (Charles VII 'excitatus est').

that there was any serious suggestion that reforms under Charles VII might have laid the foundations for monarchical 'tyranny'.[210]. Whatever else one might say about Charles VII, he was a ruler who could be prepared to be conciliatory, and whose eventual success rested on compromise with his subjects. We will next turn to considering whether similar themes are apparent in looking at opposition of a more regionalised nature in Valois France, and particularly resistance led by noble networks in Saintonge and Comminges in the mid-1440s.

[210] Lewis, *Later Medieval France*, p. 103.

Chapter 4: Regionalised resistance in Charles VII's France

i) Introduction: regionalised rebellion and the case studies of revolts in Saintonge and Comminges in the mid-1440s

Alongside opposition from Lancastrian supporters and large-scale coalitions, a third type of challenge to Charles VII's power was offered by more regionalised resistance from Valois nobles and other subjects. 'Internal' opposition of this kind typically centred around attempts to effectuate change at a local or regional level in defiance of royal wishes. It was thus more circumscribed in both its geography and ambition than the opposition discussed in the previous chapter, but it could still hold wider political significance.

Scholars such as André Leguai, Jean-François Lassalmonie, and Adrien Carbonnet have suggested that localised revolts and recalcitrant behaviour amongst the elite classes were in fact a pervasive and important feature of the reign of Louis XI (1461-1483).[1] For Lassalmonie, this phenomenon signified that 'the recovery of royal authority remained incomplete' in this period ('le redressement de l'autorité royale restait inachevé').[2] Considering that we saw in Chapter One that Charles VII also faced an array of rebellions and attacks against royal officials in the localities of France, one might think that his reign would be ripe for a similar analysis of how such opposition could conflict with royal power.

However, whilst specific incidents under Charles VII have attracted occasional research, past scholarship has been more concerned with the suppression and pardoning of regionalised resistance than with resistance itself. Loïc Cazaux and Claude Gauvard have for instance emphasised how the responses of Charles VII and his Parlement to disobedience were part of trends whereby the crown established itself as the arbiter of legitimate violence and 'master of political memory'.[3] Likewise, Simon Cuttler and others have underscored how monarchical authority was bolstered by Charles VII prosecuting treason, and Valérie Toureille has contended that the king forced frontier recalcitrants

[1] A. Leguai, 'Troubles et révoltes sous le règne de Louis XI: les résistances des particularismes', *Revue Historique*, v. 249 (1973), pp. 285-324; J.-F. Lassalmonie, 'Louis XI et les Limousins récalcitrants (1471). Un épisode des rapports entre pouvoir central et élites locales dans la France de la fin du Moyen Âge' in P. Gilli & J. Paviot (eds.), *Hommes, cultures et sociétés à la fin du Moyen Âge* (Paris, 2012), pp. 375-390; A. Carbonnet, *Louis XI et les villes en révolte (1461-1483)* (Paris, 2023).
[2] Lassalmonie, 'Louis XI et les Limousins', pp. 389-90.
[3] Gauvard, 'Pardonner et oublier après la Guerre de cent ans', esp. p. 55 ('Maître de l'oubli, [le roi] est alors devenu celui de la mémoire politique de ceux qui ont choisi de demeurer en son parti'); Cazaux, *Les capitaines*, esp. pp. 689-92; *idem*, 'Le parlement et la guerre au XVe siècle: l'affaire Plusqualec', in O. Descamps, F. Hildesheimer, & M. Morgat-Bonnet (eds.), *Le parlement en sa cour: études en l'honneur du Professeur Jean Hilaire* (Paris, 2012), pp. 133-48.

such as Robert de Sarrebrück to conform to his will through the 'steamroller' of 'state power'.[4] Arguments of this sort have been conducive for supporting narratives of centralisation, but they have been rather less propitious for discussion of how resistance could impose limits on royal power, or of its dynamics and causes. With a few partial exceptions, it has usually just been assumed that blame for any conflict with the crown must have lain with individual noblemen and *routiers*, whose conduct has been suggested to have been self-interested, reactionary, and even 'anarchic'.[5]

This chapter will offer a different take on regionalised resistance under Charles VII, through the prism of two case studies of oppositional movements which each involved a noble network. These two case studies are both discussed in contemporary letters of abolition, the first of which was granted in April 1446 to Jacques seigneur de Pons in Saintonge (c.1413-c.1472) and over one hundred of his supporters.[6] Meanwhile, the second was granted in September 1448 to thirteen named individuals and the inhabitants of twelve communities in the county of Comminges, who were seemingly all former subjects of the countess Marguerite (c.1366-1443).[7] We shall see later on that the oppositional movements in both these abolitions were linked to wider power struggles and to royal attacks on leading noble families. Most importantly, though, the two case studies are worth considering at length in this chapter because they will allow us to analyse opposition in two different parts of France – and the implicated networks and the causes and impacts of their conduct– through letters that are rich in detail and yet have attracted little or no critical analysis.[8]

Before going any further, let us look more closely at the contents and background of the two abolitions. Jacques de Pons' pardon covers or mentions a variety of alleged crimes, but its primary focus is on illicit activity in, and support for Jacques from, the region of Saintonge and its environs in

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[4] S. Cuttler, *The law of treason and treason trials in later medieval France* (Cambridge, 1981), esp. pp. 212, 241-2; Toureille, *Robert de Sarrebrück,* pp. 227-8 (le 'rouleau compresseur de la puissance d'État'); and see also the works cited above in Chapter 1 n. 10.

[5] See e.g. Cuttler, *The law of treason*, pp. 197 (quoted), 198-200; Toureille, *Robert de Sarrebrück,* pp. 227-8; Cazaux, *Les capitaines*, pp. 395, 419-20; cf. C. Higounet, *Le Comté de Comminges de ses origines á son annexion á la couronne* (Toulouse, 1949), pp. 602-5.

[6] AN JJ 177 no. 238 (a vidimus of Jacques' pardon can be found in AN K 68 no. 26 and a printed copy in 'Chartrier de Pons II', *AHS*, v. 21 (1892), pp. 250-7, followed by documents relating to the publication of the letter on pp. 257-60). Hereafter, unless otherwise specified, discussion of the narrative of Jacques' pardon in this chapter is based on AN JJ 177 no. 238, fs. 157v-158 ('Chartrier de Pons II', pp. 250-5), discussion of the list of names in the pardon is based on AN JJ 177 no. 238, fs. 158-158v ('Chartrier de Pons II', pp. 255-6), and discussion of the conditions of the pardon is based on AN JJ 177 no. 238, fs. 158v-159 ('Chartrier de Pons II', pp. 256-7).

[7] AN JJ 179 no. 251. Hereafter, unless otherwise specified, discussion of the narrative of the *Commingeois*' pardon in this chapter is based on *ibid*., fs. 145-145v, discussion of the list of names in the pardon is based on *ibid*., f. 145v, and discussion of the conditions of the pardon is based on *ibid*., fs. 145v-146.

[8] Cuttler, *The law of treason*, pp. 199-201 arguably offers the best published summary of the contents of Jacques de Pons' pardon and surrounding events, but this account accepts accusations against Jacques at face value and so is very hostile to him. The events surrounding the Comminges pardon are discussed more sympathetically in Higounet, *Le Comté de Comminges,* pp. 602-8, but the 1448 abolition does not feature.

1443-5. This nobleman was the son of Regnaud de Pons, a lieutenant of Charles V's constable Bertrand du Guesclin, and Marguerite de la Trémoille, who was the sister of the royal favourite and Praguerie rebel Georges de la Trémoille. Jacques was brought up by his uncle Georges in the 1420s, and his paternal inheritance meant that he became the pre-eminent noble landowner in Saintonge.[9] However, he was deprived of control of his lands across 1442 and 1443 after being accused of *lèse-majesté* by Charles VII, most seriously in relation to alleged treason with the English.[10] This putative conspiracy with the Lancastrians was explicitly not covered by the 1446 pardon (or an earlier lost pardon from 1444 which Jacques failed to enregister), but the 1446 abolition does incorporate and discuss the behaviour of Jacques and his adherents as they refused to accept his reduced situation. Most notably, they instigated an armed uprising in winter 1443-4. This revolt saw many of Jacques' key towns and forts in Saintonge seized back from the 'hand of the king' ('notre main'), as detailed on Map 6 below.[11] Jacques apparently executed opponents too in retaliation for a number of his own adherents being beheaded, hanged, or put to torture, but his rebellion was soon suppressed by the crown. Jacques submitted around spring 1444, at the same time as the town of Royan was suffering from a bloody siege from royalist forces. Nonetheless, Jacques' abolition suggests that he still retained a substantial regional support-base, with many of his adherents even helping him to stage a daring escape from the Conciergerie of Paris in early 1445 after he was imprisoned there ahead of a projected trial. Jacques then fled to other lands in Périgord and obtained his 1446 pardon, although, regardless, he would be banished from France in 1449 after being found guilty of treason with the English in absentia by the Parlement of Paris. Aside from a brief appearance at the Burgundian Feast of the Pheasant in 1454, he subsequently disappears from view until after Charles VII's death.[12]

The second letter of abolition from September 1448 was given to 'churchmen, nobles and inhabitants' ('gens d'eglise, nobles, et habitans') in the county of Comminges who had engaged in repeated disobedience against the crown in c.1444-1447. A single leader in resistance is in this case

[9] For Regnaud's career: J. Chavanon, 'Renaud VI de Pons', *AHS*, v. 31 (1902), esp. pp. 27-33. For Regnaud's marriage to Marguerite and their son's tutelage and inheritance: *ibid*., pp. 76-9; 'Chartrier de Pons II', p. 242; NA C 61/122/3.

[10] See Section iii) & nn. 79 & 83 below for the charges of 1442-3. Subsequent developments discussed in this paragraph from 1443-6 are detailed in Jacques de Pons' 1446 pardon unless specified.

[11] The places which Jacques seized are not stated to have been his own in the pardon, but four (Pérignac, Préguillac, Villars-en-Pons, Gémozac) were dependencies of his former lordship of Pons: Chavanon, 'Renaud VI de Pons', p. 63. The others are attested as having been in his control in further sources, e.g. NA C 61/122/3 (October 1426 truce with Jacques incorporating Nieul-le-Virouil, Plassac, Marennes, Arvert, and Royan); BNF Fr. 26634 'Auxigny', no. 3 (July 1445 quittance referring to Plassac and Nieul-le-Vireuil as having recently been in Jacques' hands). For Royan (and Mornac, which also appears to have been seized in 1443/4 to judge from AN JJ 178 no. 162, and which is again mentioned in NA C 61/122/3), see too n. 80 below.

[12] For Jacques' banishment and appearance at the Burgundian feast: AN X 2a 26, fs. 41v-43v (June 1449 condemnation); Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 2, pp. 140, 166; Cuttler, *The law of treason*, p. 201.

not identified in the letter, but it is evident that opposition was closely connected to events in the life of Marguerite countess of Comminges (d. 1443). Marguerite de Comminges was the last surviving heir from the traditional ruling house of Comminges, but following two turbulent marriages to Armagnac princes and a decade of independent power, she had been abducted and imprisoned by Bernard VII count of Armagnac in 1412.[13] Her captor was lynched in Paris six years later, and Jean I count of Foix then ransomed Marguerite and compelled her to marry his younger brother Mathieu de Foix (also the brother of Gaston de Foix captal de Buch) in 1419. From almost immediately afterwards, Mathieu callously incarcerated Marguerite in order to exercise more complete control over her county. Marguerite was detained by her husband at Saint-Marcet in Comminges up to c.1438, and she was then kept incommunicado in territories such as Béarn and Foix up to 1443 as a major rebellion erupted within Comminges.[14] This rebellion was supported by Jean IV count of Armagnac, and the deteriorating situation eventually prompted Charles VII to intervene. He forced Mathieu to agree to a treaty in March 1443 which secured Marguerite's freedom and divided the county of Comminges between the couple, with the *châtellenies* of Samatan, Aurignac, and Isle-en-Dodon comprising Marguerite's portion. Yet, this treaty also determined that Mathieu would become sole count of Comminges after his elderly wife's death, before being succeeded by the king after his own decease. Marguerite duly passed away just months after she managed to retire to Poitiers in 1443, and her death precipitated fresh strife.[15] Many of her adherents and subjects in the contested *châtellenies* not only continued to resist Mathieu de Foix, but they also flagrantly and persistently defied royal agents who ordered that they submit to Mathieu's authority. The 1448 pardon states that tensions with crown officials in the town of Samatan in one instance spilled over to the point where a royal sergeant's rod was dramatically thrown to the ground 'in a sign of rebellion and disobedience' ('en signe de rebellion et desobeissance'). Further acts of 'rebellion' in other communities are also alluded to, and all of the named places which were pardoned can be seen on Map 7 below. It was only in 1447 that a new royal commission headed by Jean d'Étampes bishop of Carcassonne obtained the submission of the recalcitrants and forced them to comply with

[13] For details on Marguerite's life and the wider chronology of events in the county of Comminges in her lifetime, see C. Higounet, *Le Comté de Comminges*, p. 547ff.

[14] Marguerite's imprisonment began in c.1420, as per: AN J 334 no. 50 (May 1447 report and legal judgement of royal commissioners, suggesting that Mathieu claimed to have imprisoned Marguerite 'pour ce qu'elle ne vouloit obéir a lui'); ADTG A 43 no. 7 (undated *mémoire* relating to Mathieu de Foix's defence of his conduct in Comminges); Higounet, *Le Comté de Comminges*, p. 584 & n.; 'Charles VII et le Languedoc, d'après un registre de la viguerie de Toulouse (1436-1448)', ed. C. Douais, *Annales du Midi*, v. 8 (1896), p. 153. Her whereabouts were unknown to her partisans by 1439, seemingly because she was moved between castles in Béarn, Saint-Julien in Comminges, and Foix after late 1438: *ibid*.; AN J 334 no. 50; Courteault, *Gaston IV*, pp. 77-8. For further discussion of events in Comminges from c.1438, see Section iii) below.

[15] For Marguerite's retirement and death: Higounet, *Le Comté de Comminges*, p. 602 & n. For the 1443 treaty: *ibid*., pp. 599-601; Devic & Vaissette, *Histoire générale de Languedoc*, v. 10, pp. 2192-6.

the royal treaty. Even whilst an abolition was granted the following year, a fine of 3,000 *livres tournois* was imposed.[16]

In both cases, the abolitions can usefully be studied in conjunction with related legal documents, the occasional local record, and material in later works of local or regional history by scholars such as Charles Higounet.[17] Naturally, we are still very dependent on sources which offer a royal or official perspective on rebellion, and which must therefore be treated with considerable caution. Even whilst bearing this in mind, though, Section ii) will explore how regionalised opposition was again underpinned by diverse but durable noble-led networks. Section iii) will then analyse the causes of the behaviour of these networks, and its impacts in both of our case studies. We will argue that regionalised opposition involved considered political dissent against, and attempts to secure dialogue with, the Valois crown, since networks protested forcefully against royal interventions which they regarded as illegitimate.

[16] For the fine: AN JJ 179 no. 251. For the 1447 commission: *ibid*.; AN J 344 no. 50 (other members of the commission appointed by the king included Étienne Cambrai, subsequently bishop of Ayde, Tanguy du Châtel, the former assassin of Jean Sans Peur, and the financier Jacques Cœur).
[17] See esp. Higounet, *Le Comté de Comminges*, p. 581ff.

Map 6: Places seized by Jacques de Pons in winter 1443-4.



This map depicts the places (circled in red) that were seized by Jacques de Pons during his revolt of winter 1443-4, according to his 1446 pardon (AN JJ 177 no. 238, f. 157v; 'Chartrier de Pons II', pp. 251-2). The town of Mornac is additionally circled in red with dashes, since a separate pardon for Jean Thévenart refers to royal sieges against rebels here and at Royan, probably during the same revolt (AN JJ 178 no. 162, f. 95v). The map itself is adapted from R. Favreau, *La commanderie du Breuil-du-Pas et la guerre de Cent Ans dans la Saintonge méridionale* (Jonzac, 1986), p. 49.

Map 7: Places in the county of Comminges pardoned in September 1448.



This map depicts the places in the county of Comminges (circled in red) which were explicitly pardoned in September 1448 (AN JJ 179 no. 251, f. 145v). The map itself is adapted from C. Higounet, *Le Comté de Comminges* (Toulouse, 1949), p. 512.

ii) Noble networks and participation in regionalised rebellion

The letters of abolition for the Comminges recalcitrants and for Jacques de Pons and his supporters both provide extensive lists of included individuals and communities.[18] Of course, these lists cannot be treated as a complete cross-section of the people involved in opposition. Only men are included by name, and even those who are present may simply be those who had happened to come to the attention of royal agents, and who had not since died or reached a separate accommodation with the crown. It is often impossible to be sure about precisely what each individual was accused of either, or in many cases to identify them from a name alone, given the paucity of local records. Nevertheless, when used carefully, the lists in the abolitions do provide an exceptional basis for a reconstruction of who was involved in resistance and what connected them to each other. The present section will aim to offer such a reconstruction, and we will suggest that far from isolated individuals or troublemakers being to blame for opposition in Saintonge or Comminges, resistance was in each case underpinned by a resilient noble network. These networks were geographically narrower than those studied in the earlier chapters, and we shall also see that clear leadership was lacking in the Comminges example. However, in other ways, the networks were similar to those examined previously. In Part One of the section, we will argue that many of the nobles named in the abolitions were attached to each network through pre-existing bonds such as service and vassalage, and that non-nobles were also incorporated within the same entities. In Part Two, we will assert that the networks' lateral ties likewise gave them a strong unity, cohesion, and influence even in defiance of royal authority, and in the face of limited leadership in Comminges. This will then allow the following section to analyse the wider roots and significance of the networks' opposition to Charles VII.

Part 1: Implicated networks of nobles and non-nobles

Let us begin by looking at the small number of nobles who are identifiable in the abolitions, starting with those named in Jacques de Pons' pardon. A large proportion of these individuals were less powerful noblemen who were attached to the service of Jacques and his forebears. Characteristically, one encounters members of local families such as the Gombaut, Ragoule, Brun, Estuer, and Rengeart lineages, whose representatives also appear in earlier *montres* for Jacques de Pons' father or as witnesses to extant documents for Regnaud.[19] In addition, one can identify pardoned noblemen who supported Jacques himself both in the 1440s and under Louis XI. As

[18] See nn. 6-7 above.
[19] For members of the Gombaut, Ragoule, and Brun families in 1386/7 *montres*: BNF Clairambault 188, nos. 95, 98, 100, 102. For members of the Estuer and Rengeart (or 'Rengeard') families as witnesses to wills made by Regnaud de Pons in 1419 & 1427: 'Chartrier de Pons II', pp. 242, 244.

probable examples here, one might cite Jean de Sainte-Hermine, who was an esquire who took charge of Royan on Jacques' behalf in 1461, Geoffroy Gombaut and Guillaume Mage, who were local nobles who aided Jean de Sainte-Hermine in supporting Jacques' cause in 1461, and Guillaume de Savigné, who was an esquire who received a gift from Jacques in 1463.[20] Such men may also have been officeholders under Jacques or members of his household. Although evidence here is limited, enquiries conducted by royal commissioners suggest that the pardoned esquires Jean de Sainte-Hermine and Robin Gombaut were both Jacques' 'serviteurs' and deputies employed by him in Saintonge. This service resulted in the former man being arrested by the regional seneschal Guy d'Aussigny in late 1444, when Jean was found to be carrying a bundle of letters from his imprisoned master to kin and supporters. The messages seemingly included innocuous instructions relating to the care of Jacques' horses, but the seneschal suspected that Jean's true mission was to help with plotting to free Jacques from Paris.[21] This suspicion may have been only too justified, since further records relating to Jacques' jailbreak in early 1445 attest that other pardoned 'serviteurs' and members of his household ('gentilshommes de l'ostel dudit de Pons') did travel to the Conciergerie to assist him.[22]

Concurrently, bonds of service would have been strengthened by ties of kinship for at least one individual included within Jacques' pardon. A man named 'Jean d'Estuers' is identifiable as a relation of Jacques' illegitimate sister Jeanne de Pons dame de Saint-Maigrin and her late husband Jean d'Estuer.[23] Jacques' rebel supporter could plausibly have been the couple's son Jean d'Estuer seigneur de la Barde, who later served in the household of the Dauphin Louis, carried Louis' banner at the Battle of Towton in England in 1461, and became seneschal of Limousin during Louis' reign.[24] It is more probable, though, that the rebel was La Barde's cousin, since this same cousin is

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[20] For Guillaume de Savigné: J. de Courcelles, *Histoire Généalogique et Héraldique des Pairs de France*, v. 4 (Paris, 1824), 'de Pons', p. 41. For the other nobles in 1461, see the report of Guillaume d'Estuer seigneur de Saint-Meigrin to Louis XI, in 'Chartrier de Pons II', pp. 269-73 (where Guillaume Mage is referred to as Guillaume Mège seigneur de Montsanson).

[21] For Jacques' letters and connection to Robin Gombaut (or 'Combaut'): BNF Fr. 20494, fs. 91-91v (November 1444 interrogation of Jacques de Pons). For Jean de Sainte-Hermine's position and arrest for carrying the letters, after which he escaped: BNF Fr. 20494, fs. 92-92v (November 1444 interrogation of Guillaume François).

[22] For the involvement of unidentified household nobles: AN JJ 177 no. 189 (December 1445 pardon for Pierre des Hayes). For the involvement of (possibly synonymous) 'serviteurs' such as Gonsale de Caseneuve: AN JJ 177 no. 238; 'Chartrier de Pons II', pp. 253-5, 259; AN X 2a 24, fs. 71v, 79v.

[23] For the Pons-Estuer marriage in c.1416: Courcelles, *Histoire Généalogique,* v. 4, 'de Pons', pp. 40-1. Jeanne was widowed by November 1444, as per: BNF Fr. 20494, fs. 91-91v.

[24] For La Barde and his career in France: Courcelles, *Histoire Généalogique,* v. 4, 'de Pons', pp. 39-40; G. Small, 'Opening and closing the Cent Nouvelles nouvelles. Paratext, context and reception, 1469-c.1550', in *idem* (ed.), *The Cent Nouvelles nouvelles (Burgundy-Luxembourg-France, 1458-c.1550)* (Turnhout, 2023), pp. 156-7; *Catalogue des Actes du Dauphin Louis*, v. 1, p. 454; *Lettres de Louis XI*, v. 1, p. 129 & n. For La Barde and Towton: Basin, *Histoire*, v. 2, p. 232; Ambühl, *Le séjour du futur Louis XI*, p. 160 & n.

mentioned in testimony from 1442 as having been amongst Jacques de Pons' men in the earlier capture of a royal agent named Yvon de Melle.[25] In either case, the rebel could have followed his kinswoman Jeanne's lead in backing Jacques' cause. One can again only speculate here, but Jacques certainly admitted to writing a letter to his sister from prison in 1444, which Jean de Sainte-Hermine was entrusted to deliver.[26]

Another group of noblemen who appear well represented in Jacques' pardon are his vassals in Saintonge (prior to the loss of his lands in 1442-3), who in some cases overlap with the individuals discussed already. Robin and Geoffroy Gombaut, for instance, at least came from a family which held lands in the *châtellenie* of Pons, as did their pardoned associates Lambert and Jean de la Rabaine. By 1449, Lambert de la Rabaine possessed a stake in Usson and was styled as lord of Gémozac in Pons, which was one of the places that played a major role in Jacques' revolt in 1443-4.[27] Jean de Sainte-Hermine was likewise a co-lord of Usson, even though his main possessions were situated further east towards Angoulême.[28] As a final example here, we can note as well that Guillaume de Léon – a pardoned esquire who first appears with Jacques in a 1439 summons to Parlement – resided at Avy in the *châtellenie* of Pons, according to a court case from c.1460.[29]

By contrast, it is very difficult to find nobles who were obviously based far beyond Jacques de Pons' lands. Some individuals of Iberian or Breton origin were undoubtedly pardoned too, but these men may well have been resident in or at least near to Jacques' territories, as was the case with Bertrand de La Court. This Breton is described in another local court case from c.1480 as having supported the capture of Jean V duke of Brittany by the Penthièvre family in 1420, after which he absented himself from Brittany and married a minor noblewoman from Cognac (to the north-east of Pons).[30] One individual in Jacques' abolition who seems to have remained more itinerant even in the 1430s-40s was Pierre de Saint-Gelais. This nobleman came from a substantial landowning family in southern Poitou, but his presence in the pardon is particularly intriguing because he can be identified as a knight whom we have met previously in Chapter Three as supporter of the Praguerie. Indeed, across

[25] For the 1442 testimony and its context: 'Procès des frères Plusqualec', ed. L. Delayant, *AHP*, v. 2 (1873), p. 230; Cazaux, 'Le parlement et la guerre', pp. 133ff.
[26] BNF Fr. 20494, f. 91-91v.
[27] For the Rabaine family: C. Dangibeaud, 'La maison de Rabaine en Saintonge', *AHS*, v. 19 (1891), 'preuves', pp. 107-10, 174-5; *AHP*, v. 29 (1898), p. 335 & n. For the Gombaut family and lands near Gémozac: L. de Beaumont, *Le Chevalier de Méré* (Niort, 1869), pp. 19-20.
[28] Filleau, *Dictionnaire Poitou*, v. 2, pp. 655-6; *AHP*, v. 29 (1898), p. 335 & n.
[29] For the c.1460 court case: Favreau, *La commanderie du Breuil-du-Pas*, p. 99. For the 1439 summons, in which Jean de Sainte-Hermine also appears: AN X 2a 22, fs. 62-62v.
[30] For La Court: C. Dangibeaud, 'Un fief en Saintonge: La maison de La Madeleine à Cognac', *AHS*, v. 28 (1899), 'preuves', pp. 69-70, 90, 130-1. As examples of men with Iberian backgrounds, a Lopes Ortilz and a Rodrigo de Sozillie are also included within the list of those pardoned alongside Jacques de Pons.

1431-46, Pierre de Saint-Gelais appears to have been pardoned no less than five times, including after backing Jean de la Roche at Niort in 1440 and Guy de la Roche at Angoulême in 1442.[31] This suggests not only that Pierre had links to both the Pons and La Roche families, but also that he was a figure whose repeated involvement in disobedience and rebellions in western France perhaps engendered a greater willingness to defy royal authority. It should equally be emphasised, though, that he remains an atypical individual within Jacques de Pons' pardon. Overall, most of Jacques' noble supporters seem to have been less prominent and more local actors who were connected to him by multifarious but durable ties.

In the Comminges abolition, at least eight nobles and lesser lords are again named individually. It might initially seem more questionable to suggest that these men were part of a network centred around a single figure, given that no leader in resistance is specified. However, it can be contended that the pardoned noblemen were part of a network of former partisans of Marguerite countess of Comminges. This magnate's life differed from that of Jacques de Pons and other lords whom we have studied, given her position as a female heiress and her long period of political inactivity during her incarcerations. She was also obviously deceased by the time of opposition to the crown after 1443. None of this means, though, that she did not have a committed and cohesive following.

Two esquires who were pardoned in 1448 – Arnaud-Bernard seigneur de Benque and Aimeric de Comminges seigneur de Péguilhan (the 'sire de Puech Guillen') – are for instance identifiable as relatives of the countess who had tried to support Marguerite even during her imprisonment.[32] These men claimed to royal commissioners in 1447 that they and their allies had faced persecution from her husband as a result, and indeed, by Mathieu's own admission he had launched legal proceedings against Aimeric de Comminges. Analogously, the count acknowledged that he had imprisoned Arnaud-Bernard de Benque, before this esquire most likely escaped in the late-1430s following around seventeen years of confinement.[33] Arnaud-Bernard afterwards appears in May 1439 amongst a delegation of Marguerite's 'kin, friends and subjects' ('parans, amis et subgiez'), who beseeched Charles VII at Le Puy to help to secure her freedom from her captivity.[34] The extant

[31] Pierre de Saint-Gelais was pardoned with one or both of the La Roche brothers in 1431, 1440, 1442, & 1446, as per: *AHP*, v. 29 (1898), p. 13; AN JJ 178 no. 95 (printed in *ibid*., pp. 364-79). For his involvement in the Praguerie and background, see also Table 1 no. 46 below & Filleau, *Dictionnaire Poitou*, v. 2, pp. 327-9.
[32] The seigneur de Péguilhan/'Puech Guillen' in the 1448 pardon was most likely the esquire Aimeric V de Comminges, whose father Aimeric IV, a knight and former seneschal of Comminges, was dead by 1447 to judge from AN J 334 no. 50 (cf. La Chesnaye-Desbois, *Dictionnaire de la Noblesse* 2.e., v. 5, pp. 71-2; C. Derblay, 'Les Comminges-Péguilhan', *Revue de Gascogne*, n.s. v. 25 (1930), p. 150). Arnaud-Bernard de Benque is described as an esquire amongst Marguerite's relatives ('parens') in AN J 334 no. 50; and for his and Péguilhan's familial backgrounds, see also Higounet, *Le Comté de Comminges*, pp. 267-70, 276-9.
[33] For the claims and counterclaims made by Mathieu and his opponents: AN J 334 no. 50.
[34] 'Charles VII et le Languedoc d'après un registre de la Viguerie de Toulouse', p. 152ff.

royal response to this embassy suggests that Arnaud-Bernard and his associates pleaded with Charles VII due to concerns for the 'good and honour of their rightful lady' ('au bien et honneur de… leur dame naturele'). The same document also interestingly implies that such concerns were in some sense universal and ungendered in their root, since in nature they were 'exactly as good and loyal subjects ought to and were bound to have' ('ainsi que bons et leaulx subgiez doivent et sont tenuz avoir').[35] Against the backdrop of these professions of loyalty, it is worth adding that Arnaud-Bernard de Benque and Aimeric de Comminges's service to the countess had a long background in tradition as well as just kinship. Both men came from ancient families in Comminges, which had supported Marguerite and her ancestors for generations prior to Mathieu's arrival. The latter point is likewise applicable to further noblemen named within the pardon, including the esquire Arnaud de Martres seigneur de Lafitte, plus Raymond d'Orbessan and the latter's probable kinsman the seigneur de la Bastide (who is most likely identifiable as Monet or Bernard d'Orbessan).[36]

Many of the pardoned noblemen would likewise have been bound to Marguerite as her former vassals. Some individuals such as Arnaud-Bernard de Benque could conceivably have done homage to her during Charles VI's reign, although it is of great importance too that Marguerite was briefly acknowledged as the sole lord of the *châtellenies* of Samatan, Aurignac and Isle-en-Dodon in 1443. The 1448 pardon and an earlier report of royal commissioners in 1447 both suggest that opposition to the crown subsequently occurred within these *châtellenies* and arose over the question of whether they should be handed to Mathieu de Foix after his wife's death.[37] One would thus naturally expect the implicated noblemen to have been landowners in this region with a stake in its future and an historic connection to Marguerite. Indeed, in three instances, we can use summaries of later homages to confirm that this was the case. In 1456/7, after Charles VII had become count of Comminges, Arnaud-Bernard de Benque, Aimeric de Comminges, and Arnaud de Martes all performed homage to him for lands in the *châtellenie* of Aurignac. Arnaud-Bernard owned most of his possessions within this jurisdiction and Aimeric de Comminges also controlled further lands in the *châtellenie* of Samatan, with a more precise depiction of the three esquires' possessions to be found on Map 8 below.[38]

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[35] *Ibid*., p. 153.

[36] For the backgrounds of the Benque, Comminges-Péguilhan, Martres, and Orbessan families: Higounet, *Le Comté de Comminges*, pp. 267-70, 276-84, 291-3. For the potential identity of the seigneur de la Bastide: AN JJ 180 no. 92 (fs. 40v-41v); ADHG 1 A 2 v. 4, f. 29v.

[37] For the 1447 report: AN J 334 no. 50. For the division of Comminges in 1443: Devic & Vaissette, *Histoire générale de Languedoc*, v. 10, pp. 2192-4.

[38] The original homages of 1456/7 are lost along with many other administrative records relating to Comminges (Higounet, *Le Comté de Comminges*, pp. xxxviii-xxxix), but summaries survive in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century inventories (ADHG 1 A 2 v. 4, fs. 28v-30, 289v-291; ADH 1 B 23886, fs. 28-29, 248-9; ADH 1

Map 8: Places in the county of Comminges where three rebel esquires held lands and/or which were pardoned in September 1448.



This map depicts the lands in Comminges held by Arnaud-Bernard seigneur de Benque (marked with a purple diamond), Aimeric de Comminges seigneur de Péguilhan (marked with a blue pentagon) and Arnaud de Martres seigneur de Lafitte (marked with a yellow triangle), as far as can be reconstructed from later summaries of homages from 1456/7 (see n. 38 for details). The twelve places pardoned in 1448 are marked with a red circle, and the contested *châtellenies* of Samatan, Aurignac and Isle-en-Dodon are marked with a black and white star. The map itself is adapted from C. Higounet, *Le Comté de Comminges* (Toulouse, 1949), p. 512.

B 23887, pp. 397-8, 403; ADH 1 B 23888, pp. 2318-9, 2324). These summaries do not distinguish between lordships, co-lordships, and fiefs, although slightly a more detailed description of Arnaud de Martres' homage also survives from 1610 (ADHG II 173, p. 9; Higounet, *op. cit*., p. 614 & n.).

In light of all the above analysis, the noble recalcitrants in Comminges can be regarded similarly to Jacques de Pons' adherents as a network with a range of ties to a single magnate, except that we are here dealing with a central noblewoman who was dead by the time of opposition to the crown. It will hence be necessary further to assess how Marguerite's supporters remained united in her absence in Part 2 of this section, as well as thinking subsequently about why they and Jacques de Pons' network behaved as they did. Beforehand, though, it is next worth broadening our analysis of who was involved in regionalised opposition. The discussion thus far has focused exclusively on nobles, but groups and individuals from other classes likewise feature in both abolitions. Crucially, it can again be shown that it was typical for these people to have a prior connection to Marguerite countess of Comminges or Jacques de Pons respectively, suggesting that they should be regarded as part of the same, magnate-centric networks.

Inhabitants of communities ruled by consuls are particularly well represented in the 1448 Comminges letter, with the residents of twelve such towns and communes incorporated *en masse*. All of these places (shown on Map 7 above) are described as part of the *châtellenies* which had been under the control of Marguerite in 1443, and in each case, it is likely that support for opposition was driven especially by elites who had previously pledged their allegiance to the countess and her cause. The report of royal commissioners in 1447 suggests that legal objections to the implementation of the 1443 treaty were led by consuls from at least seven of the places which were subsequently pardoned (Samatan, Aurignac, Saint-Martory, Martres, Mondavezan, Beauchalot, and Bosseins). Some of these consuls had the support of other named residents, and consuls from another four of the pardoned communities (Sauveterre, Latoue, Puymaurin and Lestelle) were summoned by the commissioners to appear as well.[39] Similarly, the narrative of the 1448 abolition confirms that the premier consul of the town of Samatan directed its eventual submission to royal authority, and it may even be that this man is one of the unidentifiable individuals included within the letter.

Jacques de Pons' abolition meanwhile includes two small parishes or communities *en masse* amongst the list of those pardoned. These are Gémozac and Saint-Romain-de-Benet, the first of which was a dependency of the lordship of Pons that was seized during the 1443-4 revolt. Moreover, this is probably only a small glimpse of the wider support which Jacques de Pons enjoyed. In the same period, the port of Royan was betrayed to Jacques through treason, and the non-noble captain of his titular town of Pons was arrested and brutally tortured on suspicion of conspiring with him. This captain, Arnault Gaillart, denied any complicity with Jacques when he launched proceedings in

[39] AN J 334 no. 50.

Parlement against his superior and captor, the admiral Prégent de Coëtivy, although an earlier pardon suggests that he was patronised by a member of Jacques' household before he entered into Prégent's service.[40] One additionally suspects that urban elites in Jacques' other former possessions would have offered backing to him, and there are even signs that some such men may appear amongst the individuals named in the 1446 abolition. For example, a certain Foucaud du Brueil and Jenot Amat may have been kinsmen of the Guillaume du Brueil and Guillaume Amat who later took charge of the town of Mornac on Jacques' behalf in 1461, and whom a royal commissioner then described as 'residents and inhabitants of the said town' ('manans et habitans de laditte ville').[41]

Further support may also have been offered by individuals from less prominent urban backgrounds. Whilst details are often elusive, a later pardon for a carpenter named Jean Nau interestingly relates that this tradesman was included on a second, lost list of names which Jacques de Pons sent to the seneschal of Saintonge to be incorporated within his 1446 abolition. Jean Nau was said to have served Jacques on other expeditions as well, including against the English.[42] This again shows how bonds of service could extend down the social ladder and yet remain important in opposition to the crown. As a second exemplar, a townsman named Pierre des Hayes was also included in Jacques' pardon and received an unusual second abolition of his own. This individual pardon and royal enquiries into Jacques de Pons' escape from Paris suggest that Pierre des Hayes was resident in the capital with his wife and children, but that he was likely employed by members of Jacques' household for a reconnaissance mission inside the Conciergerie. He then participated in Jacques' jailbreak of February 1445, which saw a ladder set up outside a window through which Jacques and his page escaped.[43] Pierre des Hayes appears in this light to have been a somewhat atypical figure within Jacques' pardon, although his presence should again alert us to the possibility that many of the unknown men listed there may have had urban roots.

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[40] For the case brought by Arnault Gaillart (who was imprisoned along with Robin Gombaut, perhaps identifiable as the man pardoned alongside Jacques de Pons): AN X 2a 24, fs. 73-78v (May-June 1445). For the earlier pardon of June 1443: AN JJ 184 no. 599. For Royan: AN X 2a 24, f. 76v.

[41] For 1461: 'Chartrier de Pons II', p. 272. Guillaume du Brueil (or 'Broil') is also attested as a resident of Mornac in c.1460, although he was probably from a noble family as well, given that he is described as a 'noble homme' in c.1460 and that other nobles with the surname 'du Breuil' appear in Regnaud de Pons' service: Favreau, *La commanderie du Breuil-du-Pas*, p. 83; 'Chartrier de Pons II', p. 235; Chavanon, 'Renaud VI de Pons', pp. 65-6.

[42] For Jean Nau's April 1450 pardon: AN JJ 180 no. 83. Jacques de Pons' right to give further names to the seneschal of Saintonge to be included within his 1446 abolition is also mentioned in AN JJ 177 no. 238.

[43] For Pierre des Hayes' December 1445 pardon, recounting his participation in the jailbreak and local residency with his family: AN JJ 177 no. 189. For interrogations of him, his wife, and his children after Jacques' escape: BNF Fr. 20494, f. 82v (inventory of material relating to Jacques de Pons' procès). For further inquiries into Jacques' escape and the earlier reconnaissance mission: BNF Fr. 20494, fs. 88v-89 (March 1445 interrogation of Clément de Reilhac, gaoler of the Conciergerie).

The narrative of Jacques' abolition also claims that he was aided in his revolt by numerous 'gens d'armes et de trait', whilst Pierre des Hayes' pardon suggests that two specialist ladder-climbers were summoned from Jacques' lands to offer their assistance to the Paris jailbreak.[44] No further information survives about such forces or siege warfare specialists, but they could easily have been troops with prior connections to Jacques or his noble supporters. Similarly, 'English' troops who are attested as participants in the 1443-4 revolt could perhaps have been Gascons with ties to Jacques' relatives in Lancastrian allegiance, Gaston and Jean de Foix. Jacques' pardon asserts only that he was supported by pro-Lancastrian mercenaries ('Angloys qu'il y tenait comme ses souldoyers'), but a royalist *mémoire* from outside Royan suggests that such men ('Anglois') were also supported by wider supply lines stretching across the Gironde estuary and into Gascony.[45]

References to comparable troops are absent from the Comminges abolition, and in both of our case studies it is again impossible to gauge participation from the wider peasantry. However, there is evidence in each case of clerical involvement in opposition. For Comminges, we are mostly reliant on the formulaic inclusion of 'gens d'église' in the contested *châtellenies* in the 1448 pardon, but it is plausible that even the most senior ecclesiastic in Marguerite's former lands was complicit in resistance. Gérard Garsias de Charne bishop of Lombez (near Samatan) was strikingly summoned to appear before royal commissioners in 1447, for all that his *procureur* then professed that he was prepared to support the implementation of the 1443 treaty, in contrast to noblemen such as Arnaud-Bernard de Benque and Aimeric de Comminges.[46]

The text of Jacques' de Pons' pardon goes further, as it recounts that when he seized Plassac and Nieul-le-Virouil during the 1443-4 revolt, he was accompanied by the abbots of La Couronne and Bassac. These abbots near Angoulême – the first of whom was Pierre de Bouchard and the second perhaps Pierre de Bernard – might at first seem to be unlikely figures to be involved in rebellion. However, it is worth observing that the abbey of La Couronne controlled a priory in Arvert, which was a former lordship of Jacques de Pons that was again involved in the rebellion.[47] As such, Pierre de Bouchard was perhaps not so different a figure from some of the lesser noblemen whom we

[44] For the 'meilleurs eschalleux': AN JJ 177 no. 189.
[45] For the contemporary *mémoire* (with incorrect dating): 'Documents inédits sur la Saintonge et l'Aunis du XIIe au XVIIe siècle', ed. P. Marchegay, *AHS*, v. 5 (1878), pp. 29-30. The word 'Anglois' could be used in Valois France to refer to supporters of the Lancastrian cause, including Jean de Foix after Castillon: *AHG*, v. 10 (1868), p. 506.
[46] AN J 334 no. 50.
[47] For the priory in Arvert: 'Chartes Saintongeaises de l'Abbaye de La Couronne, 1116-1473', ed. P. de Fleury, *AHS*, v. 7 (1880), p. 69; *Chronique latine de l'Abbaye de la Couronne (diocèse d'Angoulême)*, ed. J.-F. Eusèbe Castaigne, (Paris, 1864), 'preuves', p. 108. J.-P.-G. Blanchet, 'Histoire de l'Abbaye royale de N.D. de La Couronne en Angoumois', *Bulletin de la Société archéologique et historique de la Charente,* v. 11 (1887), p. 91. For the identities of the abbots: *ibid*., pp. 215ff., 223.

encountered earlier, since he would have had both a pre-existing political relationship with Jacques de Pons and a direct concern about the future of Jacques' territories. The same may also have been true for further priests and priors who are included individually in Jacques' pardon. These men include a parish priest at Plassac and the priors of Les Mathes and Gémozac, who would have been based in Jacques' former territories. Two more named priors from Merpins and Saint-Genis also lived at least close by to Jacques' lands, as depicted on Map 9 below, and so they might have been regional allies as well as neighbours. Given that Jacques' alleged plotting with Arnault Gaillart of Pons also centred around messages transmitted by a churchman, and that individuals such as Jean de Courbon prior of Pérignac later supported Jacques' restoration in 1461, it is certainly not unreasonable to think that many clergy could have been amongst Jacques' most committed adherents.[48]

[48] For Arnault Gaillart and the clerical messenger: AN X 2a 24, fs. 73, 74v, 76v. For the prior of Pérignac in 1461: 'Chartrier de Pons II', p. 269.

Map 9: Places where four rebel priors were based and/or which were seized by Jacques de Pons in winter 1443-4.



This map depicts the priories (marked with a white diamond) whose leaders were pardoned alongside Jacques de Pons in 1446 (AN JJ 177 no. 238, f. 157v; AHS v. 21, pp. 251-2). The places that were seized by Jacques de Pons during the winter 1443-4 revolt are also circled in red for context, in line with Map 6, above. The map itself is adapted from R. Favreau, *La commanderie du Breuil-du-Pas et la guerre de Cent Ans dans la Saintonge méridionale* (Jonzac, 1986), p. 49.

All in all, we have therefore seen that participation in regionalised opposition could cut across many different classes, but that attachment to the networks of Jacques de Pons and Marguerite de Comminges remained key. We now need to return, though, to the unresolved issue of how Marguerite's supporters could have operated as a unified and cohesive network even in the absence of the sort of personal direction that was supplied by Jacques de Pons and other magnates.

Part 2: The unity of the rebel networks

One potential solution to the problem of how Marguerite's network remained united is to postulate that its members turned to other nobles or entities to provide substitute leadership whilst she was incommunicado in prison and then deceased. We shall see in the next section that notable attempts were made in c.1439-c.1443 and 1443-4 to establish Jean IV count of Armagnac as the governor or lord of contested parts of Comminges in conjunction with the regional three estates. However, Jean IV's ensuing imprisonment by the crown in 1444 would not have allowed him to lead the later resistance described in our letter of abolition, and nor is there evidence that the estates played a meaningful role from 1443 onwards either. If we look instead at the nobles named within the pardon, it may be more relevant that the esquire Arnaud-Bernard de Benque was trusted by other supporters of the countess to represent their interests before Charles VII in 1439, and that nobles and consuls from two-thirds of the pardoned towns formally empowered him to speak on their behalf before royal commissioners in 1447.[49] Bonds of trust of this sort could have helped Arnaud-Bernard to play a coordinating role in opposition to crown too, but even still, they must have been an inadequate replacement for true lordship and leadership.

An additional suggestion for how Marguerite's former supporters were able to remain so cohesive is therefore required, and it can be argued that the answer lies in lateral bonds and interconnections. Just as we observed that oppositional networks were strengthened by ties between different subordinate members in Chapters Two and Three, so too can it be contended that the networks involved in localised opposition in Comminges and Saintonge were in each case deeply interlinked. As we shall now explore, a range of horizontal ties would have provided a structural basis for trust and unity to be maintained even in the absence of a fixed leader in the former region.

Lateral alliances and friendships are difficult to trace amidst a shortage of local sources in Comminges, but we can note that the abbots of La Couronne and Bassac, and pardoned members of

[49] 'Charles VII et le Languedoc d'après un registre de la Viguerie de Toulouse', p. 152; AN J 334 no. 50 (Arnaud-Bernard de Benque was empowered to represent Aimeric de Comminges and at least one other lord, as well as consuls from Samatan, Aurignac, Saint-Martory, Martres, Mondavezan, Beauchalot, Bosseins, and Puymaurin).

the Gombaut and Rabaine families, appear together in subsequent documents in Saintonge.[50] Likewise, some pardoned individuals in both of our case studies were linked together by ties of kinship. Later genealogies suggest, for instance, that Aimeric de Comminges was the grandson of a noblewoman from the Orbessan family, meaning that he would have been a blood relative of the members of this lineage included within the 1448 abolition, in addition to being a kinsman of Arnaud-Bernard de Benque.[51] A more obscure Jean and Guillaume-Regnault de Sainte-Hilaire appear together too in the same abolition, just as Hélie Giraut prior of Gémozac was pardoned in conjunction with two other representatives of his family in 1446, alongside multiple members of the Gombaut and Rabaine lineages.

More concretely, ties centred around land would have provided another basis for cohesion and unity. In Comminges, above all, it cannot be coincidental that Aimeric de Comminges and Arnaud-Bernard de Benque were both extensive landowners in the geographical space between clusters of pardoned communities to the north and south. The distribution of their lands can again be seen on Map 8, and one should infer from this pattern that bonds of day-to-day collaboration and regional association had the potential to act as powerful, unifying forces. These forces must have operated both within and across class boundaries, which in any case left some potential for fluidity.[52]

Members of the networks of Marguerite countess of Comminges and Jacques de Pons would sometimes also have cooperated as co-lords or landowners within the same lordship. Jean de Sainte-Hermine and Lambert de Rabaine's stakes at Usson in Saintonge offer one instance of this, but so too can cases be found within Comminges. As an example, Arnaud de Martres and Aimeric de Comminges both owned shares or lands at Martres on the river Garonne. Martres, importantly, was one of the places included in the 1448 pardon, suggesting that shared landed interests here may have fostered cooperation between both noblemen and other local elites as well. In the same context, it is worth noting that two other pardoned communities in Comminges, Puymaurin and Mondavezan, were also places where Arnaud-Bernard de Benque and Arnaud de Martres respectively owned lands or fiefs.[53] At Gémozac in Saintonge, it is even the case that the local lord or his heir, the local prior and his family, and the inhabitants of the parish were all pardoned together alongside their overlord, Jacques de Pons.[54]

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[50] For the abbots: Blanchet, 'Histoire de l'Abbaye royale de N.D. de La Couronne', pp. 222-3. For the Rabaines and Geoffroy Gombaut: Dangibeaud, 'La maison de Rabaine', 'preuves', pp. 174-5.
[51] Higounet, *Le Comté de Comminges*, p. 279; Courcelles, *Histoire Généalogique*, v. 1, 'de la Roche-Fontenilles', pp. 4-5; cf. n. 32 above for our identification of Aimeric de Comminges.
[52] For cases of blurred class boundaries, cf. n. 41 above & Chapter 3 n. 99.
[53] For the overlaps in landowning in Comminges see Map 8 & the sources cited above in n. 38.
[54] For Lambert de la Rabaine as seigneur de Gémozac, see n. 27 above.

Connections of this sort would, furthermore, have been reinforced by ties of shared attachment to a common cause, which were perhaps especially important in Comminges. Alongside the persecution from Mathieu de Foix suffered by Arnaud-Bernard de Benque and Aimeric de Comminges, these nobles and many others had been involved in violent clashes with Mathieu de Foix after rebellion against his rule broke out in c.1438. Royal commissioners were informed in 1447 that Mathieu and his troops had raided many of the nobles' lordships and neighbouring communities, and the places named include at least eight of those which were subsequently pardoned for opposition to the crown: Samatan, Aurignac, Lestelle, Beauchalot, Saint-Martory, Martres, Puymaurin and Mondavezan. The count's men were even alleged to have abducted and murdered two men from Samatan and committed an horrific rape against a girl from Puymaurin.[55] Besides the immediate impact on those affected, atrocities of this kind – or even stories of them – would presumably have engendered and strengthened feelings of solidarity amongst Marguerite's supporters, which in turn would have made them into an even more unified group.[56]

As we also observed when looking at the Praguerie, however, none of this is to say that pre-existing connections to or within a network invariably led to shared participation in opposition to the crown. The narrative of the 1448 pardon letter is itself explicit that resistance in Comminges did not encompass all parts of the contested *châtellenies* of Samatan, Aurignac and Isle-en-Dodon. Some nobles from local families instead supported Mathieu de Foix and Charles VII, and as an example here, we can note that a number of individuals offered unprompted support for the implementation of the 1443 treaty before royal commissioners in early 1447. They included Odet Ysalguier, who was lord of Pompiac near Samatan, and Arnaud-Bernard de Martres, who is attested as Mathieu de Foix's contemporaneous captain of Castillon in southern Comminges even though he was also a cadet relative of Arnaud de Martres.[57] Communities ruled by consuls could be just as divided in their loyalties, and many rebel-held towns and communes may well have had factions with differing views from the governing elite. The king's *procureur* alleged in 1447 that consuls opposing the earlier treaty had acted without convoking 'the inhabitants of the places or at least the majority of them as was customary' ('les habitans des lieux ou au moins la plus grant partie ainsi que on a accoustumé de faire'), and although this criticism was by no means impartial, it is the case that ten inhabitants

[55] AN J 334 no. 50.
[56] Cf. C. Gauvard, 'Rumeur et gens de guerre dans le royaume de France au milieu du XVe siècle', *Hypothèses*, v. 4 (2001), pp. 281-92.
[57] For Odet Ysalguier's conduct and title: AN J 334 no. 50; ADHG 1 A 2 v. 4, f. 29. For Arnaud-Bernard de Martres' position as captain of Castillon in 1447 and background: AN J 334 no. 50; Higounet, *Le Comté de Comminges*, p. 281.

from Samatan diverged from their consuls in 1447, when they professed to the royal commissioners that they were ready for the 1443 treaty to be implemented without debate.[58]

Jacques de Pons, equally, was not supported by his former titular town as a whole in 1443-4, even if its captain was arrested during his revolt.[59] The townspeople of Pons were also far from alone in abandoning his cause. A later pardon for one Jean Thévenart suggests that this individual served under the esquire Pierre Béchet in Jacques' company prior to his rebellion, only for both men then to change sides and for Jean to support the royalist sieges of towns such as Royan.[60]

Overall, though, limits to the power of networks still should not be allowed to obscure their cohesion or their centrality in regionalised opposition to the crown. Rather, we have seen that networks once more proved durable and acted as the foundation of resistance. They also incorporated a diverse range of individuals, even whilst these individuals typically had current or past ties to a central figure and important lateral interconnections. We must now turn to examining why the networks acted as they did and with what consequences.

iii) Political dissent and dialogue in regionalised rebellion

As a framework for understanding regionalised opposition to the monarchy, its significance, and its attraction to such a broad range of people in Saintonge and Comminges, this section will propose that it should be seen as involving attempted dialogue with the crown and dissent against unpopular royal decisions and agents. In the first part of the section, we will argue that regional networks aimed to undermine or reverse royal interventions which were viewed as partisan and illegitimate, and as grossly unacceptable in the way in which they affected pre-existing power struggles and structures. Disobedience in each of our case studies endured for a period of years, and so from the perspective of the networks involved, it can also be viewed as a series of efforts to engage the Valois monarchy in political negotiation. Charles VII and his supporters, for their part, perceived resistance more uncompromisingly, as we will explore during the second part of the section. Ultimately, we shall see that the king responded to attempts at negotiation by imposing settlements on his own terms in Saintonge and Comminges. However, these did not break the power of networks, whilst the persistence of opposition in both regions will also be argued to have offered Charles VII a meaningful and important warning.

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[58] AN J 334 no. 50.
[59] For support for the crown from the town of Pons before and during the revolt of 1443-4: AN JJ 177 no. 238; AN X 2a 24, fs. 76-76v.
[60] AN JJ 178 no. 162 (March 1447 pardon for Jean Thévenart).

Part 1: Drivers of resistance

Let us begin by examining what lay behind opposition to the king and his agents in Comminges. Rebellion here was undoubtedly provoked by the manner in which Charles VII agreed in 1443 that the *châtellenies* of Samatan, Aurignac and Isle-en-Dodon should pass to Mathieu de Foix after Marguerite's death, and by how the king and his agents then attempted to enforce this treaty. Charles VII had a strong personal stake in this enforcement because the 1443 agreement also guaranteed that the county of Comminges would revert to the royal domain after Mathieu's death, but this would have been of little comfort to former supporters of the countess Marguerite. This group suggested to royal commissioners in 1447 that they had had little choice but to resist the king's plans 'out of necessity' ('par nécessité') after Marguerite's death, and there are compelling grounds for sympathising with this claim given their history with her husband.[61]

We have already seen that clashes between Marguerite's adherents and Mathieu de Foix led the former to suggest that they were victims of political persecution, although in order to comprehend this relationship more fully, it is now worth fleshing out the narrative of divisions in Comminges prior to 1443. In essence, Mathieu de Foix appears to have controlled all of Comminges between 1419 and the late-1430s, in spite of the imprisonment of Marguerite and Arnaud-Bernard de Benque. However, his position was weakened after 1436 by the death of his formidable older brother Jean I count of Foix (who had signed alliances with a range of *Commingeois* nobles), before matters escalated into a crisis during the chaos of a *routier* invasion of Comminges at the end of 1438.[62] An insurgency within Comminges engineered for places in the north and centre of the county to be delivered first to the *routier* captain Poton de Saintrailles and then to Jean IV count of Armagnac, and pro-Foix chroniclers note that the rebels included the townspeople of Samatan and Mathieu's own seneschal Pierre-Raimond de Comminges seigneur de Roquefort.[63] Testimony to the royal

[61] AN J 334 no. 50.

[62] For Mathieu's control of Comminges up to the death of his brother: Higounet, *Le Comté de Comminges*, pp. 584-91. For Jean I's alliances with nobles such as Pierre-Raimond de Comminges (perhaps identifiable as the seneschal discussed below and mentioned in Leseur, *Chronique*, v. 2, 'preuves', p. 289): ADPA E 429 (May 1420 alliances with Bernard bastard of Comminges and Bertran seigneur de Noé); ADPA E 432 (May 1422 alliances with Pierre-Raimond de Comminges and Ramonac seigneur de Fauga). Aimeric V de Comminges perhaps also acquiesced to Foix rule as a young man, since it may have been in this period that he made a marriage alliance with the family of two seneschals of Foix: La Chesnaye-Desbois, *Dictionnaire de la Noblesse* 2.e., v. 5, p. 72; Courteault, *Gaston IV*, p. 69 & n.

[63] For accounts in pro-Foix chroniclers: Du Bernis, 'Chronique dels comtes de Foix et senhors de Bearn', p. 596; Esquerrier, *Chroniques romanes*, p. 70. For the wider context of the *routier* invasion and rebellion in Comminges: Higounet, *Le Comté de Comminges*, pp. 591-3; AN J 334 no. 50. Letters of the Dauphin in October 1439 (Devic & Vaissette, *Histoire générale de Languedoc*, v. 10, pp. 2134-6) also assert that places in Comminges were transferred from the control of Poton de Saintrailles to the count of Armagnac prior to this date, probably including Samatan to judge from references to Charles d'Armagnac travelling to this town (AN J

commissioners in 1447 also reveals that the *Commingeois* who defied Mathieu included many of the same individuals and communities who would later be involved in opposition to the crown, and it appears that they used the three estates of Comminges to call for Marguerite's release in conjunction with the count of Armagnac.[64] They appealed to Charles VII too in 1439, as we have seen, although the king did not at first intervene decisively. This left Mathieu free to counterattack, having apparently responded to his opponents that it was his business how he treated 'sa femme'.[65] In addition to launching raids, places such as Isle-en-Dodon and Roquefort were taken by siege during a major campaign in late summer-autumn 1441, which was headed by the young Gaston IV count of Foix and also included Gaston captal de Buch.[66] The seneschal of Comminges and others were captured, and it was only in March 1443 that Charles VII finally imposed a settlement through the treaty agreed with Mathieu.[67] This treaty admittedly placed Marguerite's supporters in Comminges under the safeguard of the crown and imposed a general amnesty that was to be underpinned by oaths from the count of Comminges. Yet, it should still be clear that Marguerite's adherents not only had every reason to loathe the idea of Mathieu becoming their lord as a result of his past conduct, but also had strong grounds for thinking that they would face further political discrimination and reprisals at his hands. Mathieu had not respected his marriage contract of 1419, and even under a best-case scenario, he would have legitimately been able to impose captains, judges, and officers of his choice on the *châtellenies*. From his perspective, furthermore, he would be dealing with subjects who had rebelled against him in league with the count of Armagnac, who was an inveterate enemy of his house with designs of his own on Comminges.

In consequence, one can understand why the provisions of the 1443 treaty for after Marguerite's death would have seemed intolerable to her supporters, and why they also argued in 1447 that the agreement's implementation would be contrary to the future stability and prosperity of their region.[68] Equally, though, the group appear to have consistently reasoned that the treaty itself was invalid. The agreement had indeed been arranged exclusively between the crown and Mathieu de

334 no. 50). Royal letters of January 1443 (ADH, A 2 fs. 355v-358v) suggest that Saintrailles may have gone on to take control of further places in Comminges which were again delivered to Jean IV.

[64] AN J 334 no. 50.

[65] *Ibid*.

[66] Du Bernis, 'Chronique dels comtes de Foix et senhors de Bearn', pp. 596-7 (with erroneous dating); Esquerrier, *Chroniques romanes*, p. 70 (again with erroneous dating); Courteault, *Gaston IV,* p. 69.

[67] The seneschal Pierre-Raimond de Comminges, who does not appear in the pardon, is referred to as being imprisoned in AN J 334 no. 50 & ADTG A 43. For the treaty of 1443: Devic & Vaissette, *Histoire générale de Languedoc*, v. 10, pp. 2192-6. For ineffectual earlier royal efforts to negotiate with Mathieu, see also: Higounet, *Le Comté de Comminges*, pp. 593-8; Courteault, *Gaston IV*, pp. 69-70.

[68] AN J 334 no. 50 (it was argued specifically that many inhabitants of Comminges would be driven into exile 'pour doute de la rigueur' of Mathieu).

Foix, even though the latter was not accepted by his opponents as the 'true' count of Comminges.[69] In contrast, no prior consent had been given by the estates of Comminges, the count of Armagnac, or, most importantly, the countess Marguerite.[70] This would have raised credible doubts about whether Mathieu de Foix had misdirected the king and acted outside of his authority, and ideas of this kind would have been particularly potent when combined with existing enmities. This mixture arguably provided a foundation not just for the acts of opposition to the king's wishes described in our letter of abolition, but also for others beforehand.

In the immediate aftermath of Marguerite's death in late 1443, a pro-Armagnac rebellion unfolded in northern and central Comminges. This uprising tellingly appears to have been justified on the grounds that Marguerite herself had chosen the count of Armagnac as her heir, and Mathieu de Foix's lawyer in 1447 went so far as to claim that a forged document ('ung faulx instrument') was produced to suggest that this donation had been formalised.[71] Oaths of loyalty were sworn to Armagnac by the rebels' own subsequent admission, and this took place in the presence of the estates of Comminges according to a later abolition for Jean IV.[72] The seneschal of Toulouse was even refused entry to Samatan whilst Jean IV resided there according to the same pardon, and the insurgents' efforts only failed in early 1444 when Charles VII sent his son Louis south with an army. Jean IV was arrested in his town of Isle-en-Jourdain, and the 'churchmen, nobles, merchants, and inhabitants' ('gens d'eglize, nobles, marchans et autres manans') of the *châtellenies* of Samatan, Isle-en-Dodon, Aurignac, and Saint-Marcet in Comminges were fined 2,000 *écus d'or* alongside being pardoned for their 'disobedience' ('desobeissance').[73]

The opposition recounted in our separate letter of abolition therefore amounted to a second wave of dissent against royal attempts to enforce the handover of the contested *châtellenies* to Mathieu de Foix, as well as forming part of a longer conflict with this nobleman. This fresh dissent lasted until after the arrival of a new royal commission led by the bishop of Carcassonne in early 1447, and even at this stage Arnaud-Bernard de Benque and his fellow recalcitrants still attempted to plead their

[69] *Ibid*. (Mathieu was described as not being 'vray comte').
[70] For Charles VII's reliance on Mathieu's consent in 1443: Higounet, *Le Comté de Comminges*, pp. 599-603; AN J 334 no. 50.
[71] *Ibid*.; Higounet, *Le Comté de Comminges*, p. 603.
[72] AN J 334 no. 50; AN JJ 177 no. 127 (August 1445 abolition printed in Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 3, 'preuves', pp. 125-39, esp. pp. 130-2 for Comminges). Noble support for Armagnac in Comminges is also alluded to in a summary of an October 1443 summons before the Parlement of Toulouse: ADHG 1 A 2 v. 3, f. 4v; Higounet, *Le Comté de Comminges*, p. 603 & n.
[73] For the February 1444 fine and pardon for the *Commingeois*: ADH A 2, fs. 385v-386. For their place in the Dauphin's wider campaign after Armagnac's arrest: Higounet, *Le Comté de Comminges*, pp. 603-4.

case legally before the commission.[74] The arguments which they employed there, to judge from the commissioners' extant report, can shed further light on their opposition to the 1443 treaty. The recalcitrants remained vocally unhappy that the treaty had been made without their consent, although they also attacked the agreement from a different angle than in the immediate aftermath of Marguerite's death. Their contention was now that the treaty had illegitimately prejudiced Charles VII's own rights. Mathieu de Foix had in their eyes forfeited any claim to his wife's lands, and so the county of Comminges – and in particular the contested *châtellenies* – ought to have passed directly into the royal domain. Such arguments have an air of desperation, and Arnaud-Bernard de Benque and his associates struggled to find a lawyer who was willing to support their case even before it was rejected by the royal commissioners. Yet, the incident does again suggest that attacks on the legitimacy of the 1443 treaty may have continued to resonate emotionally with Marguerite's former supporters, in a way that would also have underpinned their physical acts of disobedience.

It is hence clear that the network which we have been studying in Comminges was determined to try to persuade or force the Valois monarchy to renegotiate a settlement which was felt to be unreasonable and illicit, and we now need to consider how far contemporaneous resistance in support of Jacques de Pons should be seen through a similar lens. As a starting point, it is certainly the case that the most serious opposition offered by Jacques de Pons and his adherents came in response to royal decisions to seize Jacques' lands in Saintonge in 1442-3 and then to prosecute him for treason. We have seen that an armed revolt in winter 1443-4 attempted to retake Jacques' familial territories, and it is also telling that there was a second uprising in Jacques' former possessions of Nieul-le-Virouil and Plassac in the summer of 1445. This is not mentioned in Jacques' pardon, but a quittance and urban sources from Saint-Jean-d'Angély reveal that a localised rebellion was again terminated by sieges from royalist forces backed by the seneschal of Saintonge.[75] Likewise, Jacques' escape from prison with support from his household earlier in the same year can be regarded as another act of defiance and dissent against the king's prosecution of him. This all still begs the question, though, as to why Jacques' supporters were prepared to resort to such dangerous extremes in his name. The group of course had long-standing ties of loyalty to him and vested

[74] The 1448 abolition refers to further 'desobeissance' for a short time after the arrival of the royal commissioners headed by the bishop of Carcassonne. For the rest of what follows in this paragraph: AN J 334 no. 50.

[75] BNF Fr. 26634 'Auxigny', no. 3 (July 1445 quittance referring to sieges of Plassac and Nieul-le-Vireuil/'Vireul', cf. Favreau, *La commanderie du Breuil-du-Pas*, p. 56); ADCM SJA CC 9 (August 1445 *compte* referring to a siege of Plassac); ADCM SJA FF 43 (November 1445 judgement of a royal commissioner referring to sieges of Plassac and Nieul-le-Vireul/'Virol' around August, or the 'saison de moisson', printed with incorrect dating in L.-C. Sandau, *Saint-Jean d'Angély d'après les archives de l'échevinage* (Saint-Jean d'Angély, 1886), pp. 137-41).

interests in his future, but these alone seem insufficient to explain the risks that they were prepared to take.

To offer a more satisfying explanation of their conduct, we need to look further at the context and nature of Charles VII's initial interventions against the seigneur de Pons. For this reason, it is worth giving a more detailed account here of relations between the crown and this nobleman up to c.1443. In Jacques de Pons' early life and Charles VII's early reign in the 1420s-30s, there is surprisingly little indication of any tension. Jacques was very exposed to Lancastrian pressure on the frontier in Saintonge, but even though he married the daughter of Gaston de Foix captal de Buch in c.1428 at the instigation of his uncle and tutor Georges seigneur de la Trémoille, he nonetheless remained constantly in Valois allegiance.[76] He helped to defeat a Lancastrian takeover of his town of Mornac in 1434, before he played a leading role in defending Saintonge against an expedition led by the earl of Huntingdon in 1439-40.[77] This second feat perhaps inhibited any major involvement in the Praguerie, although Jacques and his supporters did become implicated in other, endemic conflict with royal towns such as Saint-Jean-d'Angély, Saintes, and Rochefort.[78] Such raiding may have been a factor in Jacques becoming ensnared by Charles VII's efforts to signal a clampdown on disorder in early 1442. As was alluded to in Chapter Three, Jacques was one of nine noblemen in western France who were dramatically denounced by Charles VII as 'enemies of the public weal… destroyers and depopulators of the country, and criminals guilty of lèse-majesté' ('ennemis de la chose publique… destruisseurs et depopulateurs de pais et crimineulx de lese magesté').[79] Jacques submitted and took oaths that were implicitly in line with the principles set out in the 1439 ordonnance of Orléans, but, regardless,

[76] For Lancastrian pressure, see: Favreau, *op. cit*., pp. 60-61; 'Registres de l'Échevinage de Saint-Jean d'Angély III', ed. D. d'Aussy, *AHS*, v. 32 (1902), p. 419 & n. For Jacques' marriage with Isabelle de Foix, who had died by June 1443 (as per AN JJ 184 no. 599), see Chapter 2 n. 54 above.

[77] For the siege of Mornac: E. Bonazzi, 'Saint-Jean-d'Angély de 1372 à 1453. Son histoire, ses institutions' (PhD diss., École Nationale des Chartes, 1958), p. 69; Barbot, 'Histoire de la Rochelle', pp. 299-302; *AHG*, v. 1 (1859), p. 160. For Huntingdon's expedition and its impact: AN JJ 177 no. 238; AN JJ 178 no. 21 (August 1446 pardon referring to the campaign); Favreau, *La commanderie du Breuil-du-Pas*, p. 55; 'Documents relatifs à Prégent de Coëtivy, seigneur de Taillebourg et amiral de France', ed. P. Marchegay, *AHS*, v. 6 (1879), pp. 28-30; Cosneau. *Le connétable de Richemont*, p. 301 & n.

[78] For Saint-Jean-d'Angély and its environs: ADCM SJA CC 9 (1440 and 1441 *comptes* referring to protective measures taken against the 'gens du seigneur de Pons'); ADCM SJA FF 36, esp. fs. 46-48v (January 1440 confession of a member of Jacques' garrison at Royan involved in disorder); 'Procès des frères Plusqualec', p. 244. For Saintes: Favreau, *La commanderie du Breuil-du-Pas*, p. 114; although cf. 'Procès des frères Plusqualec', p. 230. For Rochefort and its environs: AN X 2a 24, fs. 83-83v (July 1445 case between Maurice de Plusqualec and Prégent de Coëtivy). The January 1442 declaration printed in Tuetey, *Les écorcheurs*, v. 1, pp. 127-9 also implies that Jacques had already received a pardon and made promises to the king prior to this date, but his 1446 abolition makes no mention of support for the Praguerie.

[79] Tuetey, *Les écorcheurs,* v. 1, pp. 127-9 & n.

Charles VII removed places such as Royan, Mornac, and Broue from his control.[80] This move was justifiable in so far as Royan and Mornac had been granted to Jacques' father by the crown in 1399 on condition that they be returned on demand, but the decision was still extremely punitive, not least because Royan was a port of major strategic and financial value.[81] Jacques contained his anger sufficiently for participating in campaigns against Lancastrian Gascony in 1442, but he was alleged to have sent an indiscreet letter to the king later in the 1440s.[82] In addition, in summer 1443, he was accused of more serious treason. His titular lordship and other possessions were seized by the crown at this time due to charges that he had agreed to betray his town of Pons to the English in return for lands under their jurisdiction, as well as that he had informed them about Valois plans to seize the fortress of Blaye in 1442/3.[83] He would later be prosecuted and found guilty specifically on these charges.

The justice of the crown's accusations against Jacques de Pons from 1442 onwards has been wholeheartedly accepted in past scholarship. However, there are grounds for making an alternative case: that Jacques' supporters would have had compelling reasons for questioning the extent of his guilt, which would have made the king's interventions seem highly unfair and provocative.

If we return firstly to the accusations of disorder in 1442, it is worth noting that Jacques' pardon suggests that the defence of his frontier lands required him to employ many 'gens de guerre', whom 'he could not maintain in order because he was not paid regularly' ('pour ce qu'il n'estait point souldoyé…[il] ne pouvoit entretenir ses dictes gens'). This hints that at least some of Jacques' difficulties stemmed from the fact that he lacked resources to pay his soldiery. Indeed, there is corroboratory evidence that certain robberies and raids in Saintonge were launched by profiteering troops without his consent, to the point where Maurice de Plusqualec alleged in 1442 that Jacques had intervened to free prisoners taken by his subordinates.[84] Given that the crown and other nobles encountered analogous problems, many of Jacques' supporters could have concluded that Charles

[80] For the submission and oaths: AN J 389 no. 10 (March 1442 promises of Jacques de Pons at Saintes, a copy of which can be found in AN P 2298, pp. 1203-7); Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, pp. 244-5. For the removal of Royan and other possessions: *ibid*.; 'Documents relatifs à Prégent de Coëtivy', pp. 36-7; 'Documents tirées des archives du duc de La Trémoille', ed. P. Marchegay, *AHS*, v. 1 (1874), p. 72 & n.

[81] For the 1399 grant: *ibid*., pp. 70-5. For Royan's value, see also: G. Musset, *La coutume de Royan au Moyen Âge* (La Rochelle, 1905), p. 96ff.

[82] For the 1442 campaign: AN JJ 177 no. 238; Cuttler, *The law of treason*, p. 200. For the indiscreet letter: 'Quatre lettres inédites de Jacques, sire de Pons, vicomte de Turenne et de Ribérac (1446-1447)', ed. A. de Bremond d'Ars, *AHS*, v. 31 (1902), pp. 209-10.

[83] For the charges of conspiracy: BNF Fr. 28812 'Pons', no. 13 (June 1443 royal letter); AN X 2a 26, f. 42 (June 1449 condemnation); AN JJ 198 no. 513 (November 1461 revocation of the 1449 judgement). For the removal of Jacques' possessions: AN JJ 177 no. 238; AN X 2a 24, fs. 73, 76-76v; BNF Fr. 26634 'Auxigny', no. 3.

[84] 'Procès des frères Plusqualec', pp. 231, 240. For other seemingly unsanctioned raiding: ADCM SJA FF 36, esp. fs. 46-48v.

VII's actions were hypocritical at best, as well as offering no meaningful financial basis for improving order in Saintonge.[85] Comparably, the more serious accusations from 1443 were far from irrefutable. It is very probable that Jacques divulged plans to seize Blaye so that this fortress could be captured by Jean de Foix as we saw in Chapter Two, but cross-frontier contacts of this kind do not prove that Jacques intended to defect. Rather, his past actions could have been seen as evidence of just the opposite by his network. There are hints in the 1445 pardon of Pierre des Hayes that some of Jacques' supporters were convinced that he was still committed to the Valois cause, as well as more practically that it was in the wider interest for him to continue to lead the defence of Saintonge. According to the 1445 pardon, Pierre des Hayes was told by an esquire in Jacques' service, Pierre Cailleteau, that Jacques needed to be freed from Paris because 'he wanted to employ himself against the English' ('il voulsist soy employer contre les anglois') and because 'if the truces were broken, he would do such a great service that all good Frenchmen would be joyful because of it' ('se les treues estoient rompues… [il] feroit ung si grant service que tous bons françois en seroient joyeux').[86]

Another alleged argument of Pierre Cailleteau, though, is more interesting still; namely, that Charles VII and the Dauphin bore Jacques no ill will, but that he needed to escape from the malice of opponents. Apparently, Jacques 'had great enemies in the court of king who sought his death' ('il avoit de grants ennemys en la court du roy qui lui pourchassorent sa mort'), and who planned to 'have him killed in order to have his lands' ('on le feroit morir pour avoir sa terre').[87] This language about the influence of 'enemies' finds striking echoes in a deposition taken from Jacques in prison in November 1444 and in fears expressed by him in extant letters from 1446-7.[88] Moreover, parallels can also be found in the revocation of Jacques' 1449 conviction by Louis XI in November 1461. This document asserts that the charges of treason against the nobleman were contrived by covetous rivals, whom a further royal letter from 1465 names as Prégent and Olivier de Coëtivy.[89] This all hints that Charles VII's interventions might not just have been perceived as unreasonable by Jacques' network, but as a still more incendiary and illegitimate series of attacks which were engineered by partisan pressure on the king.

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[85] Disorder in this period amidst widespread difficulties in payment of wages is again described in pardons such as AN JJ 178 no. 3 (April 1445 pardon for Guinot de Chastenet), JJ 189 no. 103 (September 1457 pardon for Salidon Aubet). For serious accusations against royal officers in Saintonge, see also e.g. Favreau, *La commanderie du Breuil-du-Pas*, p. 114.
[86] AN JJ 177 no. 189 (December 1445 pardon for Pierre des Hayes).
[87] *Ibid*.
[88] For the letters: 'Quatre lettres inédites de Jacques, sire de Pons', pp. 209, 213. For the November 1444 interrogation: BNF Fr. 20494, f. 91v.
[89] For the November 1461 revocation: AN JJ 198 no. 513. For a copy of the same and the December 1465 letter: AN J 865 no. 27.

If we pursue this line of argument, we can note that after places such as Royan, Mornac, and Pons were taken from Jacques de Pons' control, Charles VII immediately placed them under the guard of the admiral Prégent de Coëtivy.[90] This Breton nobleman was a favourite of the king, and concurrently, he was a major regional rival of Jacques de Pons in Saintonge and Aunis. He had received the guard of Rochefort-sur-Charente, La Rochelle, and the bridge of Saintes in the 1430s, before obtaining further regional grants at the start of the following decade.[91] Amongst these were Chay and Talmont in c.1440, despite both places being claimed by Jacques de Pons.[92] Deteriorating relations between the two nobles may then have encouraged raiding and Jacques' suspected involvement in thwarting the attack on Blaye, which the admiral had supported.[93] Certainly, a state of local war ('guerre') had been reached by 1443 according to Prégent de Coëtivy's lawyer in the case brought against him by Arnault Gaillart.[94] What is even more striking, however, is that this lawyer went on to claim that the revolt of winter 1443-4 saw Jacques 'recommence the war' ('recommanca la guerre') against the admiral.[95] This suggests that on one level the actions of Jacques and his network were in a fact a continuation of a personal feud. On another level, though, it is also clear that their revolt was a violent assault on, and rebuke of, Charles VII's decision to place many of Jacques' lands under the admiral's control in 1442-3. Prégent de Coëtivy was presumably seen as an 'evil counsellor' who had abused his influence over Charles VII to misdirect the king's justice in an illegitimate manner, and his case for innocence would not have been helped by the fact that he had been at the king's side incessantly in 1440-3.[96] Nor would it have been helped by Charles VII's reputation for pliability, which we have seen was central to arguments aired during the Praguerie.

It is even conceivable that the king himself may have come to feel that he had been misled. The chronicler Guillaume Gruel and archival records both attest that Prégent de Coëtivy was banished from court in disgrace around the end of 1443, probably at the very moment when large swathes of

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[90] For Royan and Mornac: 'Documents relatifs à Prégent de Coëtivy', pp. 36-7. For Pons: AN X 2a 24, f. 76v.
[91] For the grants from the 1430s: Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 2, p. 281; BNF Fr. 27281 'Coëtivy', nos. 7, 9-10, 16; 'Documents relatifs à Prégent de Coëtivy', p. 26. For grants in the early 1440s: *ibid*., pp. 28-32; BNF Fr. 27281 'Coëtivy', nos. 10, 21; D. d'Aussy, 'Faye en Saintonge, 1215-1368', *AHS*, v. 13 (1885), p. 20.
[92] Chay and Talmont were controlled by the earl of Huntingdon's forces when they were granted to the admiral ('Documents relatifs à Prégent de Coëtivy', pp. 28-30; Favreau, *La commanderie du Breuil-du-Pas*, p. 55), but Chay previously appears in a local truce made by Jacques de Pons in 1426 (NA C 61/122/3). Talmont had also been granted to Jacques' father, and in 1425 its captain was Thibaut de la Goublaye, who is attested as Jacques' 'serviteur': Chavanon, 'Renaud VI de Pons', pp. 182-4; 'Procès des frères Plusqualec', p. 251; AN JJ 184 no. 599.
[93] For Prégent's support for the attack on Blaye: BNF Fr. 27281 'Coëtivy' no. 32 (November 1447 payment referring to Prégent visiting the king whilst he was in Saintonge in 1442/3 'pour le fait et deliverance de la place de Blaye').
[94] AN X 2a 24, f. 76v.
[95] *Ibid.*
[96] For the admiral's presence at court and influence: Vallet de Viriville, *Conseillers*, pp. 19-21; Chastelain, *Livre IV*, p. 311-2.

Saintonge joined Jacques de Pons in revolt.[97] This did not stop Charles VII from later allowing for information supplied by the Coëtivy family to be used in Jacques' *procès*, or from granting Royan and Mornac to Prégent's brother Olivier in 1458, after the admiral himself was killed by a cannon shot in 1450.[98] Yet, the family never quite recovered their former level of influence, and other gifts of Jacques' former lands instead went to courtiers such as André de Villequier and Pierre de Brézé.[99]

Jacques de Pons and his adherents could have felt too that they were up against more powerful 'enemies' than any of these men. The Coëtivy brothers were in fact longstanding adherents of the Valois constable Arthur de Richemont, and the admiral and Pierre de Brézé were also close to Richemont's pre-eminent ally Charles of Anjou. These men had all worked together in the face of the Praguerie, as well as during the earlier coup against Georges de la Trémoille in 1433.[100] By contrast, Jacques de Pons was inescapably connected to the family and household of Richemont and Anjou's rival. This raises the possibility that political divides at the top of the French polity may have influenced both the reality and perceptions of Jacques' treatment. Just as Georges de la Trémoille had himself used his influence to press his advantage at a regional level against opponents such as Richemont and Louis d'Amboise in 1427-33, so can it be noted that a number of former Praguerie rebels and their allies lost out in western France in the immediate aftermath of this uprising.[101] For instance, amidst the punitive measures imposed by Charles VII in the early 1440s, La Trémoille and Jean II duke of Alençon lost control of the Poitevin towns of Melle and Niort respectively. The first of these places was then granted to Charles of Anjou, whilst the second was placed in the control of Pierre de Brézé.[102] La Trémoille was also forced to evacuate garrisons which had been troubling Richemont at Mareuil and Sainte-Hermine in 1442, and further south in Saintonge and Angoumois, all of the nobles who were denounced alongside Jacques de Pons were again closely tied to La Trémoille and his allies.[103] Guy de la Roche had been closely associated with this magnate since 1413, and the other denounced nobles were in the service of the La Roche family as we have seen,

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[97] Gruel, *Chronique*, p. 182; Vallet de Viriville, *Conseillers,* p. 21ff.
[98] For the procès: BNF Fr. 20494, f. 81 (inventory of material relating to Jacques de Pons' procès). For the admiral's death: Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 351; Gruel, *Chronique*, p. 214. For the grant to his brother: Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 6, p. 433; 'Chartrier de Pons II', pp. 270-2.
[99] For gifts to Villequier: AN JJ 185, nos. 95, 253; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 5, pp. 61-2. For gifts to Brézé: 'Chartrier de Pons II', 275, 286-7, 291ff.
[100] For the 1433 alliance against La Trémoille: Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 1, pp. 170-1; Gruel, *Chronique*, p. 81; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 2, pp. 296-8. For the Praguerie government: Vallet de Viriville, *Conseillers*, p. 19; Favreau, 'La Praguerie en Poitou', pp. 291-2. For Richemont and the Coëtivy brothers: Gruel, *Chronique*, pp. 80, 107-8, 167; Cosneau, *Le connétable de Richemont*, p. 295.
[101] For La Trémoille's earlier actions, see Chapter 1 n. 77 & Chapter 3 n. 125 above.
[102] For Niort: *AHP*, v. 29 (1898), p. 179 & n.; Escouchy, *Chronique*, v. 3, 'preuves', p. 42; Favreau, 'La Praguerie en Poitou', p. 300. For Melle: *ibid*.; AN JJ 176 no. 178 (printed in *AHP*, v. 29, pp. 146-52).
[103] For Mareuil and Sainte-Hermine: Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 244.

or attached to Jacques de Pons' network, or both.[104] The most notable inclusion here was Maurice de Plusqualec. This nobleman was an adherent and former captain of Jacques de Pons at Plassac, but he also controlled the important fortress of Taillebourg to the north of Saintes. After a violent siege, Taillebourg was awarded by the crown in September 1442 to its rival claimant, who was the admiral Prégent de Coëtivy.[105] Patently, there is thus a pattern of Charles VII making interventions in western France in this period which favoured Richemont, Anjou and their protégés, at the same time as being highly detrimental to their rivals.

The recurrence of such interventions would have left Jacques de Pons and his network with all the more grounds for thinking that he had fallen victim to a partisan assault and for wanting to force the king to reverse his previous decisions. When viewed in this light, open defiance against the king's orders can be seen almost as a measure of last resort in Saintonge just as in Comminges. In both cases, a network was vehemently opposed to royal actions which cut across an existing regional power struggle, and which were seen as illicit and monstrously unacceptable.

In turn, this has wider implications for our understanding of regionalised resistance and politics under Charles VII. Whereas past narratives have portrayed the king as a consistently positive force for the enforcement of justice and order, the above analysis has suggested not only that the monarchy could be highly selective about whom it chose to penalise, but also that it could be the crown's own decisions which precipitated challenges to its authority at a regional level.[106] Future research may likewise suggest that other regionalised revolts under Charles VII were reactions against royal interventions that were objectionable to local networks and elites, and there is good reason to think, for instance, that this picture would apply to rebellions in the lands of Jean IV count of Armagnac in the years after his capture in 1444.[107]

In examining opposition from networks in Saintonge and Comminges, we have also seen that resistance was able to persist over many years. This doggedness was underpinned by expediency, as well as probably by a sense that the key target was not the king himself, but rather malign actors who had misdirected him and threatened the wider good. Nevertheless, a fundamental aim of resistance was to force the crown to rethink its decisions. We now need to consider whether such

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[104] For Guy de la Roche and La Trémoille: *AHP,* v. 29 (1898), pp. xiii. See Chapter 3 n. 185 above for the supporters of the La Roche family in the denunciation, as well as Section ii) of the present chapter for discussion of Pierre Béchet and Pierre de Saint-Gelais.

[105] For control of Taillebourg: Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 245; Beaucourt, *Charles VII*, v. 3, p. 419; Cazaux, 'Le parlement et la guerre', pp. 134-8. For Maurice de Plusqualec's captaincy of Plassac and links to Jacques de Pons: 'Procès des frères Plusqualec', p. 229; AN X 2a 22, fs. 62-62v.

[106] For past narratives, see e.g. the works cited in nn. 3-4 above.

[107] For these rebellions, see the discussion in Chapter 1 Section iv) above.

efforts prompted Charles VII and his agents to listen. Put another way, did localised resistance still only amount to a failed attempt at dialogue with a monarch who was ultimately prepared to 'steamroller' his opponents?

Part 2: Results of resistance

Clearly, those pardoned in Comminges and Saintonge obtained few practical concessions, beyond the act of receiving abolition in itself. In the former region, the recalcitrants did secure the opportunity to make their case before royal commissioners in 1447, but a hostile judgement was a foregone conclusion. All that the commissioners were prepared to concede was that Marguerite's former supporters should remain under royal safeguard and that Mathieu should swear oaths not to take vengeance as set out by the 1443 treaty.[108] These measures could only have offered protection against the most egregious persecution. Considering that the affected network was fined twice by the crown, and that the allied count of Armagnac suffered still more severe treatment, it is difficult to think that such meagre concessions would have offered much consolation. Meanwhile, Jacques de Pons' supporters obtained still less from the king, outside of the fact that Prégent de Coëtivy was banished from court in disgrace and that Jacques was able to depart alive into exile in 1449. In practical terms, Charles VII was thus able to ride out localised opposition. He then profited from adding territories such as the lordship of Pons and the county of Comminges to the royal domain, in the latter case after Mathieu de Foix's death in late 1453.[109]

At an ideological level, the Valois king and his deputies also launched a determined – and at least partially successful – effort to crush the arguments made by oppositional networks in both regions. Striking attempts were made to impose royal narratives about what had happened onto collective memory, and as an initial example of this, let us look again at Jacques de Pons' 1446 pardon. The narrative of this document strips away the political context of the 1443-4 revolt and makes no mention of Prégent de Coëtivy. This is highly significant when one considers that the pardon was read out in regional centres such as Saint-Jean-d'Angély, Saintes, and Cognac.[110] As a result of its public nature combined with its contents, the document can be viewed as an attempt to instruct local society that Jacques and his supporters had engaged in a rebellion which saw royal subjects suffer needlessly from 'many evils and oppressions' ('pluseurs maulx et oppressions'). The men listed

[108] AN J 334 no. 50.
[109] For the absorption of Comminges: Higounet, *Le Comté de Comminges*, pp. 609-12. For the absorption of Pons: AN JJ 185 no. 278 (printed in *Ordonnances des rois*, v. 14, pp. 197-9).
[110] For the pardon's dissemination: 'Chartrier de Pons II', pp. 257-60.

within the pardon can also be regarded as having been 'named and shamed', with the taint of humiliation perhaps augmented by the consistent omission of any titles for the secular noblemen.

As another example of attempts to control how Jacques de Pons' opposition was remembered, we can turn to a judgement issued by an anonymous royal commissioner in Saintonge in November 1445.[111] This judgement directly concerned the town of Saint-Jean-d'Angély, whose inhabitants were fined twenty-five *livres tournois* for refusing to send victuals and troops to support royalist sieges against rebels in Plassac and Nieul-le-Virouil earlier in the year. The inhabitants' decision must surely have reflected discomfort about the king's dealings with Jacques de Pons, as the town had in contrast offered enthusiastic support against Lancastrian forces at Mornac in 1434.[112] Yet, the royal commissioner felt it necessary to insist in his judgement that the townspeople had acted only by 'negligence and indifference' ('négligence et nonchalance') in 1445, and not by any 'favour that they had for the seigneur de Pons' (non point… par faveur ils eussent au dit seigneur de Pons'). Further still, whilst the inhabitants had apparently told the commissioner that they had been unable to send troops because of the harvest, the need to make repair works, and the distance of the sieges, he instead judged that their crime was mitigated because of 'the great and irreparable damages which they had incurred as a result of the seigneur de Pons, who had raided, pillaged and robbed them in many ways, taken and ransomed their livestock, and done many other harms' ('les grans dommages irréparables qu'il leur a convenu supporter pour le fait du dit seigneur de Pons, qui les a courus, pillés et robés en plusieurs manières, prins et rançonné leur bétail et fait plusieurs autres dommages'). A concerted attempt was hence made to characterise Jacques de Pons as a dangerous villain, and this has indeed shaped the prevailing view of the nobleman in modern historiography as 'un des plus dangereux brigands de l'époque'.[113] The effect on contemporary society in Saintonge is trickier to gauge, although it is likely that Jacques' pardon in particular left some mark on public consciousness. The pardon did not prevent certain of his followers from remaining important local figures, but the children of the pardoned Bertrand de la Court appear to have been undermined in court as late as c.1480, when a rival witness slyly noted that their opponents, Jacques de la Magdalenne and his family, were never 'accused or suspected of treason' ('accusez ne suspectionnées de traïson').[114]

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[111] For the November 1445 judgement discussed across this paragraph: ADCM SJA FF 43 (printed with incorrect dating in Sandau, *Saint-Jean d'Angély*, pp. 137-41).
[112] For 1434: Bonazzi, 'Saint-Jean-d'Angély de 1372 à 1453', p. 69.
[113] See esp. Favreau, *La commanderie du Breuil-du-Pas*, p. 62 (quoted); Cuttler, *The law of treason*, p. 201; Vallet de Viriville, *Histoire de Charles VII*, v. 2, p. 406.
[114] Dangibeaud, 'La maison de La Madeleine à Cognac', 'preuves', p. 69.

In Comminges, the 1448 pardon also seems to suggest that royal commissioners insisted that the sergeant's rod which was thrown to the ground at Samatan was returned to the Parlement of Toulouse in full reverence and then placed in a spot where 'desraisonnables' words had been spoken by some of the recalcitrants. This would have offered an unmissable symbol of royal authority, and it shows how even physical space, as well as public memory, was not immune from attempts to impose particular narratives in the aftermath of opposition. An analogy might likewise be drawn with a stone monument that was to be established in Jacques de Pons' titular town in Saintonge according to his 1449 condemnation, in order to ensure that his treasons were committed to 'perpetual memory' ('ad perpetuam… memoriam').[115] In both cases, the king and his supporters clearly wished to project a sense that resistance had insulted royal majesty but been utterly futile in the face of it.

However, this does not mean that we should accept that localised opposition in Saintonge and Comminges was simply a tale of royal triumph in the face of adversity. It is worth emphasising, firstly, that Charles VII's eventual successes did not mean that the power of regional networks was broken. Instead, many of Jacques de Pons' supporters clearly had loyalties that were reactivated when Louis XI quashed his conviction and restored him to his lands in 1461. This restoration was led by Jacques' nephew Guillaume d'Estuer seigneur de Saint-Maigrin, who was the son of Jeanne de Pons and brother of Jean seigneur de la Barde, but assistance was also proffered by one Arnault Gaillart, who is later attested as captain of Pons in 1464, as well as by pardoned nobles whom we have discussed.[116] Thereafter, Jacques, his son Guy, and their network would engage in a prolonged struggle against the networks built up by the Coëtivy and Villequier families, which was not unlike strife that occurred between Jean de Foix and rivals in Gascony. Louis XI and his successors were unfaithful in which party they supported in Saintonge, but ultimately the Pons family did manage to secure a substantial portion of the lands which they had lost under Charles VII, ensuring that much of their old power was re-established.[117] When Guy de Pons made his will in 1504, he did so in his titular town, and the document was even witnessed by a man named Colas Rengeart, whose

[115] AN X 2a 26, f. 42.
[116] For Guillaume d'Estuer and his background: 'Chartrier de Pons II', p. 266ff.; Courcelles, *Histoire Généalogique,* v. 4, 'de Pons', pp. 39-40. For Arnault Gaillart: 'Chartrier de Pons II', p. 267ff., 289. For nobles in 1461, see n. 20 above.
[117] For Pons-Villequier conflict, in which the Pons family eventually triumphed: D. d'Aussy, 'La tour de Broue, 1115-1789', *AHS*, v. 19 (1891), pp. 345-6; 'Quatre lettres inédites de Jacques, sire de Pons', pp. 214-5. For Pons-Coëtivy conflict, in which the Coëtivy family ultimately regained control of Royan and Mornac: G. Binot, *Histoire de Royan et de la presqu'île d'Arvert* (Paris, 1994), pp. 78-81; Musset, *Coutume de Royan,* p. 96ff.; 'Chartrier de Pons II', pp. 309-11.

kinsman Guillaume had helped Jacques de Pons to escape from Paris almost sixty years earlier.[118] Likewise, Guy de Pons was able to take part in further opposition to the Valois in the fifteenth century. He notably supported the early stages of the Guerre Folle in 1486-7, in which he was joined by the related Aydie family, whose head Odet was then count of Comminges. Odet d'Aydie would go on to fight in Brittany too, before being pardoned along with his supporters in 1491.[119]

Secondly, it can be argued that regionalised opposition in Saintonge and Comminges in itself offered a warning about the limits of royal power, which was not entirely lost on Charles VII and his councillors. The rebellions which we have analysed here, as well as further revolts such as those in the lands of the count of Armagnac after 1444, would have provided a reminder to the king that he should expect to face pushback from local networks and elites when he interfered in their affairs in a manner that was perceived as illegitimate. These very risks of precipitating resistance may have ensured that extremely provocative royal actions were the exception rather than the norm across Charles VII's reign. Jacques de Pons was in fact the most senior magnate to banished by this king apart from Jean V count of Armagnac, and there were clearly many other regions where Charles VII was happy to take a more conciliatory and *laissez-faire* approach towards regional networks. We saw this with the count of Saint Pol's network in Chapter Two and ultimately with regard to the networks of ex-Praguerie rebels like the duke of Bourbon in Chapter Three. As a further example that is pertinent here, it is worth adding that Guy de la Roche was permitted to rebuild his powerbase in Angoulême even after his denunciation in 1442 and the ensuing revolt. He managed to remain as seneschal of Angoulême on behalf of the Orléans family, adapted to developments in western France by making an alliance with Prégent de Coëtivy in summer 1443, and obtained permission from Charles VII in 1446 to reconstruct his castle of Vertueil following its destruction in his earlier rebellion.[120] In this light, royal actions in Saintonge and Comminges appear much more uncompromising than elsewhere.

In fact, it can be postulated that the main reason why regionalised opposition here was relatively straightforward to suppress was precisely because it remained regionalised, and because the king or his advisers recognised the importance of not provoking similar outbreaks of resistance throughout

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[118] For Colas Rengeart: 'Chartrier de Pons II', p. 368. For his kinsman Guillaume: AN X 2a 24, fs. 71v, 79v; AN JJ 177 no. 238.

[119] For the early stages of the Guerre Folle and links between the Pons and Aydie families, see the manifestoes cited above in Chapter 3 n. 61, as well as: *Lettres de Charles VIII*, ed. P. Pélicier, v. 1 (Paris, 1898), pp. 160-1; Chartrier de Pons II', pp. 326-30; Jaurgain, 'Deux comtes de Comminges', *Bulletin Gers*, v. 19 (1918), pp. 45, 52-4. For the count of Comminges in Brittany and his December 1491 pardon: *ibid*., pp. 54ff., 149ff.; *Ordonnances des rois*, v. 20, pp. 203-5.

[120] For Guy de la Roche as seneschal of Angoulême, see Chapter 3 n. 53 above. For the July 1443 alliance: *Prigent de Coëtivy: amiral et bibliophile*, p. 47. For the November 1446 concession: AN JJ 178 no. 67; *AHP*, v. 29 (1898), pp. 368-9 & n.

France. This was a danger which, by contrast, Louis XI failed to understand, and he came profoundly to regret his meddling across the kingdom at the start of his reign.[121] During the 1465 Guerre du Bien Public, local grievances not unlike those which we have been examining in this chapter arguably coalesced and aligned with a broader rebel agenda, and it is worth considering just a couple of examples. Louis XI's brutal treatment of Pierre de Brézé is well known to have facilitated the defection of Rouen at the behest of his affinity in 1465, although many pro-Burgundian and pro-Luxembourg nobles also supported the rebel side after losing out from the king's forced purchase of the Somme towns in late 1463.[122] Amongst these nobles were Antoine de Crèvecœur, who had lost the office of *bailli* of Amiens and who was then captured at the Battle of Montlhéry, Philippe de Saveuse, who had been stripped of the captaincy of Amiens, and Waleran de Soissons seigneur de Moreuil, whose titular lordship was located between Amiens and Roye.[123] We have met this last man as an adherent of Jean de Luxembourg and Jeanne de Béthune, but after control of his lands was bought by Louis XI, Chastelain claims that he warned the king that he would remain loyal to Burgundy because he 'only ever supported one party' ('ne tins oncques que un parti').[124] Opposition even at a regional level was thus not a matter for the Valois to trifle with.

iv) Conclusion

Overall, this chapter has put forward a novel, and more sympathetic, interpretation of regionalised resistance. It is worth reiterating that there are inescapable limitations in our source-base for this topic, but we saw in Section ii) that there is still ample evidence that opposition in Saintonge and Comminges was dependent on the activity of complex, magnate-centric networks. These networks were bound together by a range of ties which could function across class boundaries, and which could operate both vertically and horizontally. It was even possible in Comminges for an oppositional network to remain cohesive in the absence of clear or consistent leadership, in a further testament to the power and durability of these kinds of political structures.

In Section iii), we argued that substantial opposition in our two case studies occurred largely because of previous interventions into local affairs by the crown. The key issue here was not noble misbehaviour, centralisation, or monarchical ideas about the maintenance of order, but instead that

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[121] For Louis' regret about sweeping changes in officeholding: Commynes, *Mémoires*, v. 1, p. 486; *Ordonnances des rois*, v. 19, p. 58; Scordia, 'La Praguerie racontée par Louis XI', p. 115.
[122] For the Brézé affinity and Rouen: Prosser, After the Reduction', pp. 216-25. For the purchase of the Somme towns: Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, pp. 355-7.
[123] See Schnerb, *Les Saveuse*, pp. 224ff., inc. for the destitutions of 1463, which Louis XI tried unsuccessfully to reverse in early 1465. For Crèvecœur's support for the rebellion and capture, see too: 'Lettres relatifs à la guerre du Bien Public', pp. 352-3. For Moreuil's involvement as Burgundian master of artillery: La Marche, *Mémoires*, v. 3, p. 13; Jean de Haynin, *Mémoires*, ed. R. Chalon, v. 1 (Mons, 1942), p. 10.
[124] Chastelain, *Œuvres*, v. 4, p. 400.

specific royal decisions were seen by local networks as intolerable and illicit. In so far as the networks' criticisms can be reconstructed, they appear to have been highly pragmatic and traditional in nature. It was seen as necessary to oppose royal actions which were thought to be driven by malign actors, which threatened the interests of the communities affected, and which thence contravened expected standards of good government. Once again, revolt was probably hence conceptualised as an unfortunate duty.

Lastly, Section iii) also suggested that Charles VII was able to address regionalised resistance more easily than other forms of opposition, but that its existence and persistence still testifies to the limits of monarchical power. Even royal severity against rebels in Saintonge and Comminges ended in pardons, as well as being facilitated by the king's readiness to compromise with subjects elsewhere.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

Across Chapters One to Four, this thesis has attempted to offer a revisionist perspective on noble opposition against Charles VII and politics in mid-fifteenth century France. As an overall conclusion, let us now pick up and develop four key themes which cut across the analysis. These themes are, specifically: the ongoing vitality of aristocratic opposition, the breadth of agency and participation in political life, the nature of noble-led networks and mechanisms of raising support, and the importance of political dialogue and compromises between elites and the crown. All of these topics are arguably fundamental for understanding developments in Charles VII's reign and at the end of the Hundred Years' War, but they also have a wider relevance for thinking about late medieval France and other kingdoms.

To start with, the continuing dynamism of aristocratic opposition undoubtedly deserves further comment. We saw across Chapters One and Two that Charles VII was only able to neutralise the Lancastrian threat with great difficulty, not least because the networks of magnates like Jean de Luxembourg and the Foix cadets helped them to defy the Valois crown and support the Lancastrian dynasty for many decades. The magnates' networks also remained influential even as the Valois monarchy sought to broker accommodations, and their potential to create problems was for instance seen in the leading role played by Jean de Foix and his adherents in the Gascon revolt of 1452-3. Likewise, as per Chapters One, Three and Four, Charles VII faced continuing difficulties from 'internal' opposition in France, which extended far beyond well-studied figures like the great princes and *écorcheurs*. The Praguerie of 1440 was a powerful rebuke against his kingship from a vast coalition of networks, and even as pressure on the monarch lessened thereafter, regionalised opposition involving networks of magnates such as Jacques de Pons and Marguerite countess of Comminges continued. Across different forms of opposition, moreover, resistance not only had diverse consistencies, but also had strong ideological appeal. Ideals about honour, about acceptable kingship and governance, and about the wider good were all influential in opposition. None of these points can be fully accounted for in narratives emphasising increasing unity, centralisation, or the rise of supposed 'absolutism' under Charles VII, which suggests that these narratives require reassessment and that, at a minimum, continuities in resistance ought to be highlighted.

Crucially, though, continuities in resistance were by no means only a feature of Charles VII's reign. Quite apart from the fact that support for the kings of England in France had roots stretching back decades and even centuries in Gascony, Chapter Three proposed that there were structural continuities in large-scale 'internal' revolts across Charles VI's and Charles VII's reigns. Furthermore, broad revolts were a recurrent feature of later fifteenth-century French history as well. The Guerre

du Bien Public in 1465 and Guerre Folle in the 1480s are the most spectacular examples, but in truth the Valois monarchy was embroiled in conflict with the noble-led opposition in most years between the 1460s and early 1490s. Resistance to Louis XI could, if anything, have been more serious if he had not been incredibly fortunate. Opposition under princely leadership faltered during the 1470s because Charles the Bold duke of Burgundy erratically abandoned his allies and then died in battle at Nancy in 1477, whilst in southern France, Louis was able to profit from the deaths of his own brother Charles duke of Guyenne (1472), Charles' ally Gaston IV count of Foix (1472), and the rebellious Jean V count of Armagnac (1473). All of these magnates lacked competent or adult heirs, and the last Angevin prince then expired in turn in 1481.[1] Yet, even amidst repeated setbacks of this kind, regionalised or localised rebellions persisted in posing problems for the crown. So too was the spectre of an English return to France revived as Edward IV's position became more secure, before new oppositional alliances emerged during Charles VIII's minority.[2]

These events indicate that, for all that noble-led resistance has been de-emphasised in 'state'-centric narratives, it remained a fundamental element of politics in fifteenth-century France. This opposition merits greater recognition, whilst the adoption of a wider perspective on noble resistance to the Valois might also allow future research to go further in identifying recurrent political patterns and shifts over time. We can already posit that there were continuities across the fifteenth century in the importance of noble-led networks in aristocratic opposition, in the use of manifestoes that tapped into particular discourses and ideologies to attract wider support for rebellion, and in the factors which exacerbated the likelihood and severity of resistance. To give some examples of these factors, we have seen that doubts about the competence or behaviour of the king and his subordinates, interrelated divisions amongst the extended royal family and officeholders, and wider pressures relating to war, order, and taxation were important in multiple 'internal' rebellions under Charles VII. Similar themes again appear prominently in declarations from both 1465 and 1486-7, and one also finds echoes of them in manifestoes from the sixteenth century.[3] Later events such as the rebellion of the constable of Bourbon in the 1520s and the Wars of Religion from the 1560s might now look different in the light of long-lasting patterns of opposition. If nothing else, comments by sixteenth-century contemporaries imply that late medieval revolts left a lasting legacy in historical memory. A

[1] For more on developments across c.1465-83, see: Prosser, 'After the Reduction', p. 242-4; Paravicini, 'Peurs, pratiques, intelligences', pp. 183-96; Commynes, *Mémoires*, v. 1, pp. 344-5, 366-7; Stein, *Charles de France,* p. 135ff.; Courteault, *Gaston IV*, p. 323ff.; Samaran, *La Maison d'Armagnac*, p. 142ff.

[2] For the renewed threat of an English return, see e.g. *Documents sur la maison de Durfort*, ed. N. de Peña (Bordeaux, 1977), v. 1, pp. 948-9; C. Ross, *Edward IV* (New Haven, 1997), esp. p. 223ff. For events in the 1480s: D. Le Fur, *Charles VIII* (Paris, 2006), p. 115ff. For regionalised and localised rebellions, see too the works cited in chapter 4 n. 1 above.

[3] For 1465 and 1487, see the documents cited above in Chapter 3 nn. 58 & 61. For the later sixteenth century: Jouanna, *Le devoir de révolte*, p. 119ff.

1576 remonstration in support of the rebellious François duke of Alençon for example, contended that insurgents like Charles de Valois in 1465 and Louis duke of Orléans in the 1480s were 'heroiques & excellentes personnes' who had stood up to the 'tyrannie' of men around the king, whilst conversely, a royal letter in November 1561 expressed fears that a plot to seize one of Charles IX's brothers 'was only aimed at inciting a praguerie, just as was seen once before in this realm' ('le fond de cela ne tendoit qu'à exciter une praguerie, comme il s'en est vu autrefois en ce royaume').[4]

Research into late medieval aristocratic revolt – and its constituencies, discourses, and underlying causes – has potential to be expanded on a pan-European scale as well. Some noble-led risings in England and Wales have been better studied than French counterparts such as the Praguerie, but a traditional de-emphasis on aristocratic resistance in the later Middle Ages is not exceptional to France. As John Watts observes, there is a wider history of oppositional groups and movements being 'neglected and depreciated' where these were thought to have worked counter to the positive development of 'states'.[5] At the same time, although there has been a recent resurgence of scholarly interest in late medieval revolt, this has been focused on 'popular' uprisings. Research in this tradition still has much to say that is valuable for thinking about noble-led uprisings too, including through a growing focus on political communication and through insights into dealing with hostile sources and discourses on revolt.[6] Historians such as Justine Firnhaber-Baker and Andrew Prescott have also emphasised the importance of cross-class coalitions in rebellions such as the Jacquerie (1358) and English Rising (1381), just as we have seen that noble-led movements had significant potential to gain wide-ranging support and traction.[7] However, there remains a risk that these 'popular' elements in noble-led movements are overlooked in scholarship focused on more traditionally conceived 'popular' revolts, or that such revolts come to be treated as paradigmatic for all rebellion. This also creates a danger of more distinctive features of noble-led uprisings being undervalued, including the centrality of aristocratic networks within them and their potential for

[4] For the 1576 pamphlet: *Brieve Remonstrance à la Noblesse de France sur le faict de la Declaration de Mons. le Duc d'Alençon* (1576), pp. 34-6. For the 1561 letter: *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, ed. H. de la Ferrière, v. 1 (Paris, 1880), p. 250 & n.; N. Valois, 'Projet d'enlèvement d'un enfant de France (le futur Henri III) en 1561', *BEC*, v. 75 (1914), p. 22 & n.

[5] Watts, *Making of Polities*, p. 30; see also *ibid*., pp. 3-9 for the potential for comparative research on aristocratic revolts across jurisdictions. For monographs on England and Wales, see e.g. R. Davies, *The Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr* (Oxford, 1995); Valente, *The theory and practice of revolt in medieval England*.

[6] For valuable commentary on sources and political communication in scholarship with an almost exclusive focus on 'popular' revolt, see e.g. J. Firnhaber-Baker, 'Introduction: medieval revolt in context' in *idem* & D. Schoenaers (eds.), *The Routledge History Handbook of Medieval Revolt* (Abingdon, 2017), pp. 1-15; J. Watts, 'Conclusion' to *ibid*., pp. 370-80.

[7] Firnhaber-Baker, 'The social constituency of the Jacquerie', p. 700; A. Prescott, '"Great and horrible rumour": shaping the English revolt of 1381', in Firnhaber-Baker & Schoenaers (eds.), *The Routledge History Handbook of Medieval Revolt,* p. 78.

greater consistency in leadership. In this context, further studies of rebellions led by elites continue to be vital.

As a second theme, this work has emphasised the broad nature of participation in French politics more generally, in an attempt to refute assumptions that agency rested primarily with the leaders of 'states'. We have argued instead that a range of noblemen, noblewomen, clergy, and townspeople were active in magnate-led networks. These networks were in no way supine or in thrall to more 'state'-like actors and structures. Rather, they were consistently at the core of opposition to the Valois. This probably reflects networks' broader importance in late medieval society, how they offered a basis for trust and collaborative action in resistance, and how even less powerful individuals could find that their influence was amplified by being part of a wider whole.[8]

This emphasis on the significance of a plurality of political actors again finds parallels in other historiography on the period. Many scholars have for instance attacked the idea that there was a 'crisis' in the position of the nobility, or have sought to broaden conceptions of agency by emphasising the importance of the 'public sphere', 'public opinion', and 'popular politics' in the fifteenth century.[9] Nonetheless, for late medieval France at least, it is important to note that historians have still tended to view princely courts and *bonnes villes* as the normal loci of political exchange, or have focused on the formation of 'public opinion' within the latter.[10] By contrast, we have suggested in this study that networks under the nobility could be of pivotal importance in the development, adoption, and promulgation of ideas and discourses which ran counter to Valois aims. If we take a revolt such as the Praguerie or the uprisings in Saintonge and Comminges, it is clear that even where large *bonnes villes* showed loyalty to the crown, they were not representative of society in its entirety. Instead, entities linked to noble networks – such as households and armies,

[8] Cf. Hartrich, 'Charters and inter-urban networks', pp. 225-7.
[9] For discussion of the 'crisis of the nobility' thesis and historiography, see e.g. F. Buylaert, 'The Late Medieval "Crisis of the Nobility" Reconsidered: The Case of Flanders', *Journal of Social History* v. 45 (2012), pp. 1117-34. For the 'public sphere', 'public opinion', and 'popular politics', see e.g. the works cited in n. 10 below, as well as J. Watts, 'The pressure of the public on later medieval politics', in L. Clark & C. Carpenter (eds.), *The Fifteenth Century IV: political culture in late medieval Britain* (Woodbridge, 2004) pp. 159-80; Haemers & Liddy, 'Popular politics', pp. 771-805; J. Dumolyn, J. Haemers, H. R. Oliva Herrer, & V. Challet (eds.), *The voices of the people in late medieval Europe: communication and popular politics* (Turnhout, 2014); H. R. Oliva Herrer, V. Challet, J. Dumolyn, & M. A. Carmona Ruiz (eds.*), La comunidad medieval como esfera pública* (Seville, 2014).
[10] See e.g. P. Boucheron & N. Offenstadt (eds.), *L'espace public au Moyen Âge: débats autour de Jürgen Habermas* (Paris, 2011), esp. pp. 17-9; Nadrigny, *Information et opinion publique à Toulouse*; Giraudet, *Public opinion and political contest in late medieval Paris* (Turnhout, 2022).

oppositional assemblies and manifestoes, and smaller towns under noble control – may have had far more importance in the development of opinion than is usually recognised.[11]

Further research in this area could also be strengthened by more attention to the wider interrelationships between different groups in the Later Middle Ages. As examples from a French context, topics such as the involvement of noblewomen in aristocratic movements and interconnections between towns and nobles again remain understudied. The import of noble-urban relationships has arguably been obscured by a tendency to see towns as drifting into the arms of the monarchy, whereas this thesis and other revisionist scholarship have suggested that towns formed part of a more vibrant, complex, and interconnected political world.[12] Likewise, building on the work of Erika Graham-Goering, we have suggested here that individuals like Jeanne de Béthune and Anne de Bueil show that women could exert significant influence on opposition through their involvement in networks.[13] Of course, this is in no way to downplay the patriarchal nature of politics and society in the later Middle Ages. The long imprisonment of Marguerite countess of Comminges by her husband offers one stark reminder of this, and we can also add that even as Gaston de Foix obtained support from the town of Cadillac against Charles VII, an executioner was paid by the *jurats* there in c.1442 for killing women adjudged to be witches.[14] Notwithstanding such brutality, though, it remains the case that female agency and leadership in opposition to the Valois was far from unusual, as would be seen again in the activity of figures like Jeanne Crespin and Françoise de Dinan countess of Laval in later revolts.

A focus on magnate-led networks in a French context can thirdly afford us greater insight into the nature of these structures and noble recruitment. Across the many regions and strata considered in Chapters Two, Three, and Four, we saw that a range of bonds were important in holding networks together. These bonds included ties of land and lordship, but also connections centred around the household and officeholding, supplementary familial ties, and alliances which may at times have been formalised through contracts of service. Different bonds very often reinforced one another, and they were all tightly interlinked to the raising of both political and military support.

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[11] For oppositional manifestoes, cf. Hutchinson, 'Burgundian Propaganda under John the Fearless'; Guenée, 'Les campagnes de lettres', pp. 45-65. *Guerre des manifestes: Charles le Téméraire et ses ennemis (1465-1475)*, ed. V. Bessey & W. Paravicini (Paris, 2017).

[12] For revisionist work on towns, see e.g. T. Dutour, 'Les nobles et la ville à la fin du Moyen Âge dans l'espace francophone vus par les historiens médiévistes', *CRM* v. 13 (2006), pp. 151-64; *idem* (ed.), *Les nobles et la ville dans l'espace francophone: XIIe-XVIe siècles* (Paris, 2010); 'Murphy, 'The War of the Public Weal, 1465' (forthcoming); C. Liddy, 'The making of towns, the making of polities: towns and lords in late medieval Europe' (forthcoming).

[13] See Graham-Goering, *Princely power*, esp. pp. 130-155.

[14] For the alleged witches and the payment of their executioner: ADG 1 Mi 93-1-22, fs. 49v-50.

The picture that emerges here of networks being multi-faceted in nature corroborates many of the arguments that have been advanced by scholars such as Peter Lewis, Émilie Lebailly, and Gareth Prosser.[15] It likewise finds strong echoes in scholarship on fifteenth-century England, where 'bastard feudalism' has been re-defined by Michael Hicks as a pluralistic 'set of relationships with their social inferiors that provided the English aristocracy with the manpower they required'.[16] Nevertheless, two specific points about our findings are worth emphasising. One is that more traditional forms of service, including landed and familial ties, still appear to have been of substantial importance in many different settings. The other point is that, conversely, we have found far less evidence than in England for service being regulated purely through cash payments or contracts, as opposed to via officeholding.[17] Of course, these conclusions may stem partly from the nature of our extant sources, given the scarcity of local records and absence of financial accounts. However, there are also other potential explanations. It could be the case, for example, that the relative strength of lordship in France allowed for more traditional bonds to survive there to a greater extent. Similarly, contracts of retainer or alliance may have been less necessary in the late medieval French polity. Society here was more militarised and war more regular, and so service could have been easier to regulate through other bonds that were reinforced through oaths, such as household service and officeholding. Perhaps even the distinction made recently by Gordon McKelvie between affinities and purely military retinues in an English setting would be of more limited value in a French one.[18] Hopefully, further research will test and develop such hypotheses in the context of networks under noble leadership in France, as well as with reference to networks under ecclesiastics, prominent townspeople, and indeed the Valois and Lancastrian monarchies. One day, it may then be possible for more in-depth conclusions and trans-jurisdictional comparisons to be offered.[19]

In the meantime, this thesis has additionally proposed that French magnate-led networks could be broad in composition and draw in non-noble actors, at the same time as remaining cohesive, durable, and powerful. Admittedly, the influence of networks had some limits, since membership of a particular network could affect people's decisions but not determine them, and since individuals in

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[15] P. Lewis, 'Decayed and non-feudalism', esp. pp. 173-7; É. Lebailly, 'Le connétable d'Eu et son cercle nobiliaire', pp. 41-52; Prosser, 'Decayed feudalism', pp. 178-9.

[16] Hicks, *Bastard Feudalism*, pp. 1, 43ff.; cf. McKelvie, *Bastard feudalism*, pp. 13-14, 207-8, where a narrower definition of 'bastard feudalism' is employed, but still set within a context of a wide array of bonds.

[17] Cf. Prosser, 'Decayed feudalism', pp. 178-9, where it is also argued that pensions may have been a comparatively unimportant part of constructing affinities in France, although again with recognition of limitations in the availability of sources such as accounts. For emphasis on officeholding under princes, cf. too Mattéoni & Castelnuovo (eds.), *Les châtelains des princes à la fin du Moyen Âge*, as well as the works cited in Chapter 1 n. 40 above.

[18] McKelvie, *Bastard feudalism*, pp. 207-8.

[19] For the need for comparative work, see also: J. Burgers & M. Damen, 'Feudal obligation or paid service? The recruitment of princely armies in the late medieval Low Countries', *EHR*, v. 133 (2018), p. 779.

networks could be pressurised by a mixture of competing loyalties, interests, and ideologies. Yet, equally, the enduring strength of networks still deserves to be underlined. This is especially the case given that we have seen that networks remained potent even in contexts where they had limited institutional support (such as outside of 'principalities'), or where direct leadership was lacking and lateral ties had a greater impact (such as under the imprisoned Marguerite countess of Comminges). This is indicative of how the late medieval French kingdom was in many ways a world of networks and of how it deserves to be studied in these terms.

The enduring power of magnate-led networks can finally help to explain why dialogue and compromise between the crown and elites continued to be fundamental for both parties, forming a fourth theme for us to consider. We have contended across this thesis that Charles VII was reliant on accommodations with noble-led networks in order to succeed in the face of pro-Lancastrian and 'internal' opposition. We have also argued that rebellions themselves could seek to secure negotiation, and that even if the king did not compromise on every occasion, the frequency with which he did so reflects the limits of his inherent power.

In reaching accords in this way, it is not certain to what extent Charles VII was fortunate or skilfully cognisant of his dependency on others. A cautious answer, though, might lie somewhere between the two. Perhaps Charles VII's kingship was always somewhat unorthodox, but his willingness to delegate, to compromise, to show restraint, and to learn from his mistakes ultimately worked to his advantage. In any case, it would be unwise to focus too much on the ability of this one ruler alone. The need for dialogue and compromises by no means ended with Charles VII's death, and Louis XI, for example, was also forced to cede significant ground to rebels in 1465 following the Guerre du Bien Public.[20]

Once again, contentions of this kind fundamentally challenge the sort of narratives outlined in Chapter One which emphasise the rise of absolutist monarchy or a domineering 'state' in France. Interestingly, however, the stress on dialogue and compromise in this thesis does find analogies in arguments made by contemporary historians writing about the 'state' in earlier and later periods of French history, such as Justine Firnhaber-Baker and James Collins.[21] An emphasis of cooperation and collaboration is also of a piece with some other research on late-medieval 'state'-building, such as Bernard Guenée's influential work on *les États* (1971), Michel Hébert's study of representative assemblies and political exchange (2014), and a recent EU-funded project led by Frederik Buylaert on

[20] For 1465 and its aftermath, see e.g. Krynen, 'La Rébellion du Bien Public (1465)', p. 89ff.
[21] J. Firnhaber-Baker, *Violence and the State in Languedoc, 1250-1400* (Cambridge, 2014), esp. pp. 183-4; J. Collins, *The State in Early Modern France* (Cambridge, 1995), esp. pp. 1-2.

the interrelationships between 'lordship and the rise of states in western Europe, 1300-1600'.[22] This all raises the question of whether the findings of this thesis might in fact support a revised narrative of 'state'-building centred around power-sharing.

An argument along these lines would have certain advantages over more traditional views of 'state'-growth, not least through the greater acknowledgement of the plurality of agency and power. However, some significant problems would remain. For a start, John Watts is right to note that even subtler 'state'-centric narratives tend to over-emphasise the importance of formal or institutional structures, whereas the present study has proposed that accommodations with networks were often founded on more broad-based and even tacit political arrangements.[23] Furthermore, if we were to replace one teleological narrative of the rise of the 'state' with another, there would also be a serious risk of continuing to undervalue elements of conflict, and the fragility and reversibility of compromises. Throughout this work, we have suggested that agreements between the crown and networks were not inevitably stable or successful for the former. This point is typified by the events of 1452-3 in Gascony and by the protracted nature of royal attempts to quell opposition in Saintonge and Comminges across the preceding decade. Equally, accommodations reached by Charles VII with the Luxembourg family and many Praguerie rebels broke down after the monarch's death, or beforehand in the case of the duke of Alençon and the Dauphin Louis. In fact, the Praguerie itself can be viewed as stemming from a catastrophic collapse in an array of compromises. Nobles like Charles duke of Bourbon had previously received extensive royal patronage, had been present in institutional fora like the royal council and estates-general, and had probably received promises from the king about his intentions in reducing disorder and securing the ransom of the duke of Orléans. Yet, none of this stopped them and their networks from rebelling in the name of the wider good.

In light of this and the other conclusions above, it is arguably better to move beyond a focus on 'states', and to view politics in this period more in terms of a mixture of dynamism, consolidation, and continuity. There is no denying that the influence of monarchs was strengthened in France and other kingdoms across the fifteenth century. Yet, vitally, there were also countervailing forces at

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[22] B. Guenée, *L'Occident aux XIVe et XVe siècles: les Etats* (Paris, 1971); M. Hébert, *Parlementer: assemblées représentatives et échange politique en Europe occidentale à la fin du Moyen Age* (Paris, 2014); and for 'lordship and the rise of states': https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/677502 (accessed 31/12/2023). For discussion of the significance of Guenée's ideas, see also: Watts, *Making of Polities*, p. 26; P. Boucheron & N. Offenstadt, 'Introduction générale: une histoire de l'échange politique au Moyen Âge', in *idem* (eds.), *L'espace public au Moyen Âge*, p. 16.

[23] Watts, *Making of Polities*, pp. 32-3; see also pp. 34-5, and p. 287ff. for an alternative account of political developments across fifteenth century Europe. For concern about informal and non-institutional forms of power being overlooked by a focus on 'the state', see too R. Davies, 'The medieval state: the tyranny of a concept', *Journal of Historical Sociology,* v. 16 (2003), esp. pp. 291-4.

work in politics. As a result, throughout Charles VII's reign and in ages to come, negotiating with noble-led networks remained at the very heart of what it meant to rule.

Appendix: Table 1 for Chapter 3

Table 1: Nobles who can be identified as participants in the Praguerie or as complicit in the rebellion.

	Individual	Source(s) for involvement in the Praguerie; extent of involvement; identification (all dates 1440 unless specified)
Individuals named as participants in the 'Memoire des plaintes'		
1.	Louis de Valois, Dauphin of France	e.g. 'Memoire des plaintes', pp. 7, 22, royal letters of February-May 1440,[1] Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, pp. 213, 227. The figurehead of the revolt, although portrayed by the king as a pawn of the princes. He was active in Poitou and then in Bourbon's lands, before submitting in July alongside Bourbon.
2.	Charles duke of Bourbon	e.g. 'Memoire des plaintes', pp. 9, 12, 14, 22, royal letters of February-May 1440, Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 213, 216-7, 221ff., Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 1, p. 258, AN P 1372/2 no. 2099. Amongst the lords whom the Dauphin Louis asked to be pardoned for supporting him and who is named as one of the leaders of the revolt in royal letters; after retreating from Loches, he played a pivotal role in the rebellion in his lands before receiving a pardon in July.
3.	Jean duke of Alençon	e.g. 'Memoire des plaintes', pp. 8, 22, royal letters of February-May 1440, Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, pp. 216-7, 224, 227. Amongst the lords whom the Dauphin asked to be pardoned for supporting him and who is named as one of the leaders of the revolt in royal letters; he joined the Dauphin at Niort, before playing a leading role in the rebellion in Poitou and Bourbonnais and then submitting in June/early July.
4.	Jean duke of Brittany	'Memoire des plaintes', p. 22. Not active militarily, but amongst the lords whom the Dauphin asked to be pardoned for supporting him. He had also made alliances with Bourbon and other rebels in January, and he seems to have subsequently feared royal retribution (see Cosneau, *Le connétable de Richemont,* pp. 303, 309, 580-1; cf. also *Lettres de Louis XI*, v. 1, pp. 182-3).
5.	Louis de Bourbon count of Vendôme	e.g. 'Memoire des plaintes', pp. 8, 22, royal letters of February-May 1440, Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, p. 410. Amongst the lords whom the Dauphin asked to be pardoned for supporting him and who is named as one of the leaders of the revolt in royal letters. He was apparently prominent in rebel meetings at Blois and later Moulins.
6.	Louis de Bourbon count of Montpensier	'Memoire des plaintes', p. 22, AN P 1372/2 no. 2099. Amongst the lords whom the Dauphin asked to be pardoned for supporting him. He was pardoned along with Bourbon at the end of the Praguerie, although he had probably made terms with the king before this, since he appears as a mediating figure in the revolt's later stages (see Thomas, *Les états provinciaux*, v. 1, pp. 122-3).
7.	Georges seigneur de la Trémoille	e.g. 'Memoire des plaintes', pp. 18, 22, Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 221, Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 410, 412-3. Amongst the lords whom the Dauphin Louis asked to be pardoned for supporting him and whom Charles VII demanded be handed over in negotiations around May; he apparently played a key role in rebel assemblies, brought 100 men-at-arms to Bourbonnais, and was still with the Dauphin and Bourbon in July.

[1] For the letters, see Chapter 3 n. 113.

8.	Jean bastard of Orléans, count of Dunois	e.g. 'Memoire des plaintes', pp. 7-8, royal letters of February 1440, Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, pp. 213, 218. Participated in the rebel assembly at Blois and named as one of the leaders of the revolt by the king on 24th February, but submitted soon afterwards.
9.	Gilbert de La Fayette, marshal of France	'Memoire des plaintes', p. 7, BNF Fr. 22299 p. 8. Named in the royal mémoire as amongst the initial conspirators. A grant from Bourbon of a lordship in Forez was also formalised by the duke ('exped.') on 18th April.
10.	Jean de la Roche, seneschal of Poitou and seigneur de Barbezieux	e.g. 'Memoire des plaintes', pp. 12-13, 19, Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, pp. 215-6, AN JJ 177 no. 196 (*AHP*, v. 29, pp. 280-6), AN JJ 178 no. 95 (*AHP*, v. 29, pp. 364-79), A*HP*, v. 29, pp. lxiv-lxviii. One of the lords whom Charles VII demanded be handed over around May. He played a leading role in the revolt in Poitou and later retreated to Angoulême; he swore oaths of loyalty to the king there in October, after first extorting money from Saint-Jean-d'Angély (see Favreau, 'La Praguerie en Poitou', p. 294).
11.	Jacques de Chabannes, seneschal of Toulouse and seigneur de Charlus	e.g. 'Memoire des plaintes', p. 18, Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 220, *Preuves Chabannes*, v. 1, pp. 171-2, AN P 1372/2 no. 2099, BNF Fr. 22299 pp. 8-10. One of the lords whom Charles VII demanded be handed over around May. He was stripped of the seneschalcy of Toulouse and ambushed the king's artillery near Aigueperse. He received support from Bourbon for his castle of Montaigu-le-Blin, was pardoned with him, and was rewarded by him for his services on 2nd August.
12.	Antoine de Chabannes count of Dammartin	e.g. 'Memoire des plaintes', p. 12, Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, pp. 216-7, AN P 1372/2 no. 2099, BNF Fr. 22299, p. 9. Involved in fighting near Loches and escorted the Dauphin to Bourbonnais from Niort. He was pardoned along with Bourbon and subsequently rewarded by him on 22nd July for his services.
13.	Pierre d'Amboise seigneur de Chaumont	e.g. 'Memoire des plaintes', pp. 7, 11, 18, 28, Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, pp. 213, 217, Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 410, 412-3, Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 1, p. 254. One of the lords whom Charles VII demanded be handed over around May. He apparently helped to win over the Dauphin, brought Loches into rebel control, and played a prominent part in rebel assemblies, before remaining with the Dauphin and Bourbon into July.
14.	Anne de Bueil dame de Chaumont	'Memoire des plaintes', p. 7, Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 218. Apparently helped to win over the Dauphin and then remained at rebel held Loches (where her husband had been captain) throughout the revolt.
15.	Antoine seigneur de Prie	'Mémoire des plaintes', p. 18, Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 410, 412-3. One of the lords whom Charles VII demanded be handed over around May. He was apparently prominent in rebel assemblies and stayed with the Dauphin and Bourbon into July.
16.	Jean seigneur de Montejean	'Memoire des plaintes', p. 18, BNF Clairambault 1241, pp. 907-8. One of the nobles whom Charles VII demanded be handed over around May as responsible for creating division, and who was later blocked from entering the chivalric Order of the Croissant due to his support for the Dauphin and Alençon.
17.	Guillaume Blosset seigneur de Saint Pierre	'Memoire des plaintes', p. 19. One of the nobles whom Charles VII demanded be handed over around May as responsible for creating division. He is named only as 'sire de Saint Pierre', but he can be confidently identified as Guillaume 'le Borgne de' Blosset (on the basis of:

		AHP, v. 29, p. 336; BNF Fr. 28498 Montenay nos. 73-75; BNF Fr. 3159, f. 4; Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 1, p. 136).[2]
18.	Jean Sanglier	'Memoire des plaintes', p. 19, Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 213. One of the nobles whom Charles VII demanded be handed over around May, after he helped to win over the Dauphin. He can be identified as Louis' *maître d'hôtel* (Beaucourt, Charles VII, v. 3, p. 40; BNF Fr. 29110 no. 8) and as the seigneur de Bois Rogue (Contamine, *Guerre, état et société*, p. 473 & n.; Duchesne, *Chastillon-sur-Marne*, pp. 512-3).
19.	'Boucicaut'/'Le petit Boucicaut'	'Memoire des plaintes', p. 19 (as 'Bouciquaut'), Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 213 & n. (as 'le petit Boucicaut'). One of the nobles whom Charles VII demanded be handed over around May, after he helped to win over the Dauphin. Assuming the references are to the same figure, the most plausible identification is with either Jean or Louis Le Meingre, both of whom were nephews of the marshal under Charles VI (Anselme, *Histoire Généalogique* 3.e, v. 6, p. 755).
20.	'Le grand Blanchefort'/Jean de Blanchefort	'Memoire des plaintes', p. 11. 'Le grand Blanchefort' was involved in fighting near Loches. The most plausible identification is with Jean de Blanchefort, who made an alliance with the duke of Brittany in early 1440 (Cosneau, *Le connétable de Richemont,* p. 303, BNF Fr. 26848 no. 118).
21.	'Le petit Blanchefort'/Pierre de Blanchefort	'Memoire des plaintes', p. 11, Gruel, *Chronique*, p. 158. 'Le petit Blanchefort' was involved in fighting near Loches, captured and almost executed. The most plausible identification is arguably with Pierre de Blanchefort, who witnessed his brother Jean's alliance with Brittany in early 1440 (BNF fr. 26848 no. 118).[3]
22.	Alain Ferlin	'Memoire des plaintes', p. 11, AN P 1372/2 no. 2099, BNF Fr. 22299 p. 9. Involved in fighting near Loches. He was later pardoned with Bourbon and rewarded by him on 31st July.
23.	Archambault (de) la Roque (Pipon)/Jean dit Archambaud de la Roque seigneur de Senezergues	e.g. 'Memoire des plaintes', p. 11, Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 217. Involved in fighting near Loches after becoming co-captain. He is named in narrative sources as Archembault/Archambault la Roque, but he is very likely identifiable as the 'Archambault de la Roque Pipon' who was pardoned with Bourbon (AN P 1372/2 no. 2099), and also as the 'Jean dit Archambaud de la Roque seigneur de Senezergues', who was rewarded for his services by Bourbon on 15th August and appointed as *bailli* des Montagnes d'Auvergne (BNF fr. 22299, p. 10; Boudet, *Les baillis,* p. 249).
24.	Jean d'Apchier	'Memoire des plaintes', p. 11, AN P 1372/2 no. 2099, BNF Fr. 22299, p. 9. Involved in fighting near Loches. He was later rewarded for his services by Bourbon on 1st July and then pardoned along with him.[4]
Further individuals named as participants in chronicle sources		
25.	Alexandre bastard of Bourbon	Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 5, pp. 410, 458, *Cronique Martiniane*, p. 46, Piccolomini, *Europe*, p. 203. Executed in early 1441, with the real reason alleged to have been that he had helped to divide the Dauphin from his father as well as offering military support to the rebels.

[2] Cf. also De Cagny, *Chronique*, p. 199; Tournouër, 'Excursion archéologique dans le Houlme', pp. 358-9.
[3] The more customary identification is with Guy de Blanchefort, who was later seneschal of Lyon, but this is problematic given the claim in Monstrelet, *Chronique*, v. 6, p. 54 that 'le petit Blanchefort' died in 1442.
[4] See also Chapter 3 Section ii) part 3 for the possibility that he and his brothers may have fought in their father's lands in southern Auvergne and Gévaudan.

26.	Antoine Guenand, seigneur de Saint-Cyran-du-Jambot	Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 217 (as 'Anthoine Gunaut') & n. Co-captain of Loches during the revolt.
27.	Bartelemy [?] Baretta	Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 224. Captain of Vichy until its surrender to Charles VII. He is named only as 'Barette', but the most plausible identification is with the Barthelemy Baretta who appears as a royal captain in 1431 and the 1440s, if not with the Jean Baretta who appears in royal service in Lorraine in 1439 (see Champion, *Guillaume de Flavy*, p. 38; Contamine, *Guerre, état et société*, p. 265).
28.	Guillaume de [?] Ferrières	Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, pp. 219, 225. The captain of Varennes for Bourbon, who captured Raoul de Gaucourt and other hostages whilst active in Nivernais. He is named only as 'Ferrieres', but the most plausible identification is with the Guillaume de Ferrières, who served Bourbon as a chatelain in the 1440s and later appears as seigneur de Ferrières in Nivernais (Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 175 & n.; *Titres de la maison de Bourbon,* v. 2, p. 288; J. D. Léon de Bastard d'Estang, *Vie de Jean de Ferrières, vidame de Chartres, seigneur de Maligny* (Auxerre, 1861), pp. 161-3).
29.	Louis de Bueil seigneur de Marmande	*Cronique Martiniane*, p. 43. Apparently served the Dauphin faithfully during the revolt along with Antoine de Chabannes. He later appears in the Dauphin's household along with Jean seigneur de Montejean (Tuetey, *Les écorcheurs*, v. 1, p. 158; see also Anselme, *Histoire Généalogique* 3.e, v. 7, p. 849).
30.	Louis de Soyecourt seigneur de Mouy	Maupoint, *Journal parisien*, p. 26, AN U 446, f. 76, AN P 1372/2 no. 2099. Garrisoned Bois-de-Vincennes for Bourbon according to Maupoint, although Roger de Pierrefrite (no. 55) is attested elsewhere as lieutenant there. A later pardon claims only that Mouy supplied troops to Corbeil; he was also included in Bourbon's pardon.
31.	Jean Foucault	Maupoint, *Journal parisien*, p. 26, *Journal Paris*, pp. 351-2. Garrisoned Corbeil and led a raid into Paris according to Maupoint and was captain of Corbeil and complicit in the raid according to the Bourgeois, although this testimony is problematic.[5]
32.	'Jacquet'	Chartier, *Chronique*, v. 1, pp. 254-6. According to Chartier, the captain of the castle of Saint-Maixent for Perrette de La Rivière dame de la Roche-Guyon, who covertly gave the castle to the Praguerie rebels. He then fled to Niort, where he was ultimately executed. Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 216 gives an alternative story of a valet betraying the family in league with a chambermaid.
Further individuals named as participants in royal pardons		
33.	Guy bastard of Bourbon	AN P 1372/2 no. 2099, BNF Fr. 22299 p. 10. Pardoned with Bourbon and subsequently given a captaincy in Rouannais by him on 16th August.
34.	Pierre de Brusac	AN P 1372/2 no. 2099, BNF Fr. 22299 p. 9 (as Pierre de Bruzat). Pardoned with Bourbon, whom he seems to have served as a captain of men-at-arms; he was subsequently rewarded by the duke on 20th July.
35.	Guyot de Brusac	AN P 1372/2 no. 2099. Pardoned with Bourbon, alongside his brother Pierre (he is styled as Guinot de Brusac, but cf. *AHP*, v. 29, p. 221 & n.).

[5] The difficulty here is that a later court case suggests that Foucault was appointed as the royal captain of Bois-de-Vincennes immediately after the revolt (X2a 22 f. 105, printed in Cosneau, *Le connétable de Richemont*, p. 577). Additionally, Gérard de Semur (no. 50) is attested elsewhere as lieutenant at Corbeil in 1440.

36.	Guy Durgel [?] seigneur de Saint Priest	AN P 1372/2 no. 2099. Pardoned with Bourbon. He is named only as the 'sire de Saint Priet', but the most plausible identification is with the lord of St-Priest-en-Jarez (see Guillaume Revel, *L'Armorial de Guillaume Revel*, ed. P.-Y. Laffont (Lyon, 2011), no. 821). This lord was Guy Durgel in 1433, who was closely attached to Bourbon's service, although his brother Jean had succeeded him by 1444 when he gave homage to Bourbon (see Quicherat, *Rodrigue de Villandrando*, p. 251; La Mure, *Histoire*, v. 2, p. 190).
37.	Cagnon de la Chassaigne seigneur de la Molière	AN P 1372/2 no. 2099 (as Cagnon de la Molière). Pardoned with Bourbon, whom he served at the time as bailli of Beaujolais.
38.	Louis de Valpergue	AN P 1372/2 no. 2099, BNF Fr. 22299 p. 9. Pardoned with Bourbon and subsequently appointed by him as captain of Saint-Just on 26th July as a reward for his services. He had previously made an alliance with Brittany in January (as per Cosneau, *Le connétable de Richemont*, p. 303).
39.	François d'Apchier	AN P 1372/2 no. 2099. Pardoned with Bourbon alongside Jean and Galias d'Apchier, likely both his brothers.
40.	Galias d'Apchier	AN P 1372/2 no. 2099. Pardoned with Bourbon alongside Jean and François d'Apchier, likely both his brothers. He is plausibly identifiable an illegitimate son of Berault d'Apchier named 'Gonnet' in AN JJ 176 no. 177).
41.	Blain Loup seigneur de Beauvoir	AN P 1372/2 no. 2099. Pardoned with Bourbon.
42.	Guillaume Regnaut [?] 'seigneur de Cordebeuf'	AN P 1372/2 no. 2099. Pardoned with Bourbon, where he is named only as the 'sire de Cordebeuf'. This title seems to have been used by the Chareil family (P. Bétencourt, *Noms féodaux* 2.e. (Paris, 1867), v. 2, p. 8), but their obscurity means that there are strong grounds for accepting the more customary identification with Guillaume Regnault de Cordebeuf, who was ducal *bailli* des Montagnes d'Auvergne up to August 1440.[6]
43.	Draguinet seigneur de Lastic	AN P 1372/2 no. 2099. Pardoned with Bourbon.
44.	Pierre seigneur d'Urfé	AN P 1372/2 no. 2099. Pardoned with Bourbon (as the 'sire d'Ulfé'; elsewhere, his first name is sometimes given as Paillart).
45.	Guy de la Roche seigneur de Verteuil	AN JJ 178 no. 95 (*AHP*, v. 29, pp. 364-79), *AHP,* v. 29, pp. lxiv-lxviii. Garrisoned Niort with Jean de la Roche; subsequently pardoned and forced to take a new oath of loyalty to the king.
46.	Pierre de Saint Gelais	AN JJ 178 no. 95 (*AHP*, v. 29, pp. 364-79), *AHP,* v. 29, pp. lxiv-lxviii. Garrisoned Niort with Jean and Guy de la Roche; subsequently pardoned and forced to take a new oath of loyalty to the king.
47.	Olivier Perceval	AN JJ 178 no. 95 (*AHP*, v. 29, pp. 364-79), *AHP,* v. 29, pp. lxiv-lxviii. Garrisoned Niort with Jean and Guy de la Roche; subsequently pardoned and forced to take a new oath of loyalty to the king.
48.	Jacques Perceval	AN JJ 178 no. 95 (*AHP*, v. 29, pp. 364-79). Garrisoned Niort with Jean and Guy de la Roche, and his brother Olivier Perceval, before being pardoned.

[6] See Boudet, *Les baillis*, p. 209; Contamine, 'Merlin de Cordebeuf', p. 256; BNF Fr. 22299 p. 10. If this identification is correct, Guillaume Regnault might have changed sides before the end of the revolt and thence been dismissed by Bourbon. Another possibility could be that the figure mentioned in Bourbon's pardon letter was Guillaume Regnault's father Durant de Cordebeuf, who was still alive in 1431 (BNF Fr. 27337 Cordebeuf no. 14).

49.	Olivier de Harpedenne	AN JJ 177 no. 196 (*AHP*, v. 29, pp. 280-6). Supported Jean de la Roche in Niort and Angoulême according to a subsequent pardon.
50.	Gérard de Semur	AN JJ 178 no. 203, AN X2a 24 f. 247, BNF fr. 22299 p. 10. The lieutenant of Jacques de Chabannes at Corbeil (see also Gallia Regia, v. 4, p. 383; Journal Paris, p. 326 & n.), who supported Chabannes during the Praguerie at Corbeil and possibly also in Bourbonnais. He was subsequently given another captaincy by Bourbon on 18th August.
51.	Regnault le Pele	AN JJ 178 no. 210, AN X2a 24, fs. 232v, 246v-250. A notable figure in the garrison at Corbeil, who was subsequently pardoned for attacking merchants from there but was nonetheless subjected to later legal proceedings (in which he claimed to be from a noble background).
Further individuals named as participants in miscellaneous sources		
52.	Berault seigneur d'Apchier	AMSF ch. 4 art. 2 no. 5. Described as a rebel in a royal letter (datable to 3rd August 1440) asking Saint Flour for support against him and his adherents.[7]
53.	Jean du Chastel	ADI B 3224, fs. 347-348. Dismissed as royal captain of Revel on 1st April for supporting Bourbon and other rebels. A potential, but uncertain, identification is with Jean seigneur du Chastel de Nangis (G. Estournet, 'Origines des seigneurs de Nemours', *Annales de la Société historique et archéologique du Gâtinais*, v. 30 (1912), pp. 121-2).
54.	Jean seigneur de Montenay	ADI B 3224, fs. 350-353. Dismissed as royal captain of Falavier on 10th March (confirmed 26th July) for accompanying and supporting Alençon and other rebels.
55.	Roger de Pierrefrite	AN X2a 22, fs. 103v-105v (Cosneau, *Le connétable de Richemont*, pp. 574-7). Lieutenant of Jacques de Chabannes at Bois-de-Vincennes, subsequently subjected to legal proceedings for the violating the 1440 abolition; his real name was Roger du Bort (as per *Gallia Regia*, v. 4, p. 405).
56.	Louis des Quars	*AHP*, v. 29, p. lviii & n. Garrisoned Airvault for the rebels with support from the company of the bastard of Beaumanoir.
Further individuals whose involvement or complicity in the revolt can be inferred from various sources		
57.	René duke of Anjou	AN P 1379/2 no. 3136. Not involved in the Praguerie militarily due to being absent in the kingdom of Naples, but perhaps still complicit, not least as he was paid 394 *écus d'or* by Bourbon as a dowry installment on 2nd May.[8]
58.	Baudoin de Champagne seigneur de Tucé	Chevalier, 'Un tournant', p. 165; *Gallia Regia*, v. 6, pp. 13-4. Sacked as bailli of Touraine and captain of Tours in February 1440 (with the decision confirmed in April and not reversed), indicating that Charles VII thought him to be complicit in the rebellion.
59.	Geoffroy [?] bastard of Beaumanoir	*AHP*, v. 29, p. lviii & n. His company was involved in raiding around Airvault alongside Louis des Quars. He is named only as the 'bastard of Beaumanoir', but the most plausible identification is with Geoffroy bastard of Beaumanoir, who was a captain at the siege of Montereau in

[7] The royal letter is only dated 3rd August and signed 'Charles'. However, the signature patently matches that of Charles VII, and because the letter is specified to have been written from the town of Charlieu in Forez, it can only have been sent in 1440. Charles VII was in Forez at this time, and there is corroboratory evidence that he was staying at Charlieu through at least 28th July-3rd August (Duclos, *Histoire de Louis XI*, v. 3, p. 22; *Lettres de Louis XI*, v. 1, pp. 4-5).

[8] For René's absence in Naples: M. Kekewich, *The Good King: René of Anjou and fifteenth century Europe* (Basingstoke, 2008), p. 63.

		1437 (*Mémoires de Bretagne*, ed. Morice, p. 1268; Le Bouvier, *Chronique*, p. 184).
60.	Jean seigneur de Gamaches	*Lettres de Louis XI*, v. 1, p. 181, BNF Fr. 22299 p. 8. With the Dauphin on 29th January, and later described as an 'especial amy' of Bourbon in a summarised letter from 29th June, in which the duke ordered the inhabitants of Fleury to keep watch over Gamaches' castle of Rosemont.
61.	Jean de Harpedenne seigneur de Belleville	*Lettres de Louis XI*, v. 1, p. 181, *AHP*, v. 29, pp. lvii, 121. Probably at least complicit in plotting for the Praguerie (and perhaps more, as with his estranged brother Olivier de Harpedenne).[9] He hosted the Dauphin just before the revolt at Montaigu and was apparently in his confidence, witnessing a document for him at Fontenay-le-Comte on 29th January alongside Gamaches. He subsequently retained a close financial relationship with the Dauphin (*Les la Trémoille,* v. 1, pp. 224-5).
62.	Jean Trousseau	*Lettres de Louis XI*, v. 1, p. 170. Remained with the Dauphin during the revolt as his *écuyer tranchant.*
63.	Guillaume de Meny-Peny	Quicherat, *Rodrigue de Villandrando*, pp. 328-9. Arrested by Gracian de Gramont seigneur de Haux during the Praguerie, after meeting with Jean de Salazar and other followers of Villandrando. He claimed to be returning from a pilgrimage in Iberia but was almost certainly seeking support as an envoy of the Dauphin, to whose service he was attached as an *écuyer d'écurie* (see also: Courteault, *Gaston IV*, pp. 66-67).
64.	Jean Raymond	*AHP*, v. 29, pp. lxiv-lxviii. Swore an oath of loyalty before royal commissioners at Angoulême in October along with Jean and Guy de la Roche (cf. also *ibid.*, pp. 328-31).
65.	Mathieu Embasmat	*AHP*, v. 29, pp. lxiv-lxviii. Swore an oath of loyalty before royal commissioners at Angoulême in October along with Jean and Guy de la Roche.
66.	André de Seyvre	*AHP*, v. 29, pp. lxiv-lxviii. Swore an oath of loyalty before royal commissioners at Angoulême in October along with Jean and Guy de la Roche.
67.	Pierre Deschamps	*AHP*, v. 29, pp. lxiv-lxviii. Swore an oath of loyalty before royal commissioners at Angoulême in October along with Jean and Guy de la Roche.
68.	Perrinet Quessaut	*AHP*, v. 29, pp. lxiv-lxviii. Swore an oath of loyalty before royal commissioners at Angoulême in October along with Jean and Guy de la Roche.
69.	Antoine Foulquet	*AHP*, v. 29, pp. lxiv-lxviii. Swore an oath of loyalty before royal commissioners at Angoulême in October along with Jean and Guy de la Roche.
70.	Pierre Saunier	*AHP*, v. 29, pp. lxiv-lxviii. Swore an oath of loyalty before royal commissioners in October as captain of Tusson for Jean de la Roche; unlike the other figures named in this document he is not styled as an esquire, so it is not certain that he was a nobleman.
71.	Simon de Barro	*AHP*, v. 29, pp. lxiv-lxviii. Swore an oath of loyalty before royal commissioners in October as captain of Courcôme for Jean de la Roche.
72.	Alain Merlet, dit Tambourlant	*AHP*, v. 29, pp. lxiv-lxviii. Swore oath of loyalty before royal commissioners in October as captain of Rouffec for Jean de la Roche.

[9] For more on the family, see *AHP*, v. 29, pp. 45-7 & n.

73.	Amé de Vert seigneur de Chenereilles	AN P 1398/2 no. 670. Received an *aveu* of Gastonet Gaste on Bourbon's behalf on 14th March in his capacity as ducal *bailli* of Forez, before remaining in post.
74.	Gastonet Gaste seigneur de Lupé	AN P 1372/2 no. 2099, P 1398/2 no. 670. Gave Bourbon an *aveu* for his lordship of Lupé on 14th March. Bourbon's pardon implies that he was stripped of royal office as an *élu* in Vivarais before being reappointed.
75.	Louis de la Vernade	AN P 1372/2 no. 2099 (as Louis Vernade), P 1398/2 no. 670. Witnessed Gaste's *aveu* to Bourbon on 14th March. Bourbon's pardon implies that he was stripped of royal office as an *élu* in Vivarais before being reappointed.
76.	Robert Parent	AN P 1372/2 no. 2099, P 1358/2 no. 564. Signed a document as Bourbon's *maître d'hôtel* on 12th March 1440. Bourbon's pardon implies that he was stripped of royal office as a 'général conseiller sur le fait de la justice des aides' before being reappointed.
77.	Guillaume Constant	AN P 1372/2 no. 2099. Bourbon's pardon implies that he was stripped of royal office as a 'notaire et secretaire' before being reappointed. It is not entirely certain that he was a nobleman, but a plausible identification is with the Guillaume Constant who was treasurer of Bourbonnais in the 1430s (*Titres de la maison de Bourbon*, v. 2, pp. 252, 267-8) and who appears later as seigneur d'Avrilly (La Mure, *Histoire*, v. 2, p. 374).
78.	Louis Marechal seigneur d'Apinac	AN P 1379/2, BNF Fr. 22299 p. 8. Witnessed an order of payment for Bourbon on 2nd May. He had also been granted letters by Bourbon on 2nd November 1439, which were formalised ('exped.') on 17th June.
79.	Étienne de Lespinasse	BNF Fr. 22299 p. 9 (as Étienne de Lespinace). Granted the captaincy of Auzon by Bourbon on 21st July as a reward for services.
80.	Pierre Regnault de Vignolles	BNF Fr. 22299 p. 9. Granted a share of the lordship of Milly in Clermont-en-Beauvaisis by Bourbon on 25th July as a reward for services.
81.	Philippe de la Tour	BNF Fr. 22299 p. 9. Granted a share of the lordship of Milly in Clermont-en-Beauvaisis by Bourbon on 25th July as a reward for services.
82.	Louis de Brie	BNF Fr. 22299 p. 9. Granted the captaincy of Billy by Bourbon on 24th July as a reward for services.
83.	Louis de Segrie	BNF Fr. 22299 p. 9. Granted a captaincy by Bourbon in July.
84.	Jean seigneur de la Forest	BNF Fr. 22299 p. 10. Granted the captaincy of Saint Germain de Laval by Bourbon on 1st August.
85.	Perrinet de Lonzay	BNF Fr. 22299 p. 10. Granted the captaincy of Montmarault by Bourbon on 1st June.
86.	Aymes Saunier	BNF Fr. 22299 p. 10. Granted the captaincy of Vichy by Bourbon on 4th August as a reward for services (although an 'Aymes Saulnier' had previously lost the captaincy of Billy on 24th July: BNF Fr. 22299 p. 9).
87.	'L'Auvegernat'	BNF Fr. 22299 p. 10. Granted a captaincy by Bourbon on 16th August.
88.	Bertrand de Bouthéon	BNF Fr. 22299 pp. 10-11. Granted a captaincy by Bourbon on 22nd August.
89.	Louis des Barres	BNF Fr. 22299 p. 11. Granted a captaincy by Bourbon on 16th October.

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